Skip to main content

Full text of "The Discourses Of Epictetus"

See other formats 


w>  Ojl 

K<OU_160539>m 

* 


OUP467-1  1-1-^8-5,000. 

OSMANIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 

Call  No.       '*$£'!  Accession  No.   7  4  </n 

" 


Author 
Title 
This  book  should  be  returned  on  or  before  the  date  last  marked  below. 


BOHN'S  CLASSICAL  LIBRARY. 


THE  DISCOUKSES  OF  EPICTETUS. 


THE 


DISCOUKSES  OF  EPICTETUS; 


ENCHEIEIDION  AND  FKAGMENTS. 


TRANSLATED, 

WITH  NOTES,  A  LIFE  OF  EPICTETUS,  AND  A  VIEW   OF  HIS 
PHILOSOPHY, 

BY   GEOBGE   LONG. 


"The  important  question,  What  is  the  rule  of  Life  ?  is  lost  out  of 
the  uorld."— Br  BUTLEE. 

"Consider  thyself  to  be  dead,  and  to  have  completed  thy  life  up  to 
the  present  time;  and  live  according  to  Nature  the  remainder  which 
is  allowed  thee."— M.  ASTOXIXUS,  vii.  56. 


LONDON:   GEOEGE  BELL  AND  SONS,  YOEK  STREET, 

COVENT  GAEDEN. 

1800. 

AU  ritfitu  reserved. 


LONDON  : 
PRINIKD   BY   WILLIAM    CLOWKJs    AND    MJN^    LIMITED, 

STAMSXKID    &>fKLLr    AXO    C'lIAUlNi.    CKUNS, 


TO 

ESTHER    LAWRENCE, 

A  DILIGENT  READER  OF  EPICTETUS, 

TO  WHOM  THE  TRANSLATOR  OWES  MANY 

USEFUL  REMARKS. 


CONTENTS. 


BOOK   I. 

CHAP.  PAGR 

I.  OF  THE  THINGS  WHICH  ABE  IN  OUR  POWER,  AND  NOT 

IN  OUR  POWER     .......       3 

II.  How  A  MAN  ON  EVERT  OCCASION  CAN  MAINTAIN  HIS 

PROPER  CHARACTER      .  ....       8 

III.  How  A  MAN  SHOULD  PROCEED  FROM  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF 

GOD  BEING  THE   FATHER  OF   ALL  MEN  TO  THE  REST        12 

IV.  OF  PROGRESS  OR  IMPROVEMENT          .         .         .         .18 
V.  AGAINST  THE  ACADEMICS 17 

VI.  OF  PROVIDENCE 19 

VII.  OF  THE  USE  OF  SOPHISTICAL  ARGUMENTS  AND  HYPO- 
THETICAL, AND  THE  LIKE        .  .  .  .  .23 
VIII.  THAT    THE   FACULTIES  ARE    NOT    SAFE    TO  THE  UN- 

INSTUUCTED  ........       28 

IX.  How  FROM  THE  FACT  THAT  \VB  ARE  AKIN  TO  GOD  A 

MAN   MAY   PROCEED  TO   THE   CONSEQUENCES         .  .       30 

X.  AGAINST  THOSE  WHO  EAGERLY  SEEK  PREFERMENT  AT 

KOME  .........     35 

XI.  OF  NATURAL  AFFECTION  .         .         .         .         .37 

XII.  OF  CONTENTMENT    .......     41 

XIII.  How  EVERYTHING  MAY  BE  DONE  ACCEPTABLY  TO  THE 

GODS  .........     45 

XIV.  THAT  THE  DEITY  OVERSEES  ALL  THINGS  .         .         .     -1(1 
XV.  WHAT  PHILOSOPHY  PROMISES 49 

XVI.  OF  PROVIDENCE       .......     50 

XVII.  THAT  THE  LOGICAL  ART  is  NECESSARY      .         ,         .52 
XVIII.  THAT  WE  OUGHT  NOT  TO  BE  ANGRY  WITH  THE  ERRORS 

(FAULTS)  OF  OTHERS     .         .         .         .         .         .55 

XIX.  HOW  WE  SHOULD  BEHAVE  TO  TYRANTS       .         .         .GO 

XX.  ABOUT  REASON  AND  HOW  IT  CONTEMPLATES  ITSELF     .     63 

XXI.  AGAINST  THOSE  WHO  WISH  TO  BE  ADMIRED        .         .     66 

XXII.  OF  PRAECOGNITIONS 66 

XXIII.  AGAINST  EPICURUS  .  .         •         :         •         .     69 


VJ11  CONTENTS. 

CHAP.  PAGB 

XXIV.  HOW  WE  SHOULD  STRUGGLE  WITH  CIRCUMSTANCES          .      70 

XXV.   ON  THE  SAME 73 

XXVI.  WHAT  is  THE  LAW  OP  LIFE 77 

XXVII.   IN    HOW    MANY  WAYS  APPEARANCES    EXIST,  AND  WHAT 

AlDS  WE  SHOULD  PROVIDE  AGAINST  THEM  .  .      80 

XXVIII.  THAT  WE  OUGHT  NOT  TO  BE  ANGRY  WITH  MEN;  AND 
WHAT  ARE  THE  SMALL  AND  THE   GREAT  ^THINGS 

AMONG  MEN 83 

XXIX.  ON  CONSIANCY  (OR  FIRMNESS)          .         .         .         .87 
XXX.  WHAT   WE   OUGHT    TO   HAVE    READY   IN   DIFFICULT 

CIRCUMSTANCES 96 


BOOK    II. 

I.  THAT  CONFIDENCE  (COURAGE)  is    NOT   INCONSISTENT 

WITH  CAUTION 97 

II.  OF  TRANQUILLITY  (FREEDOM  FROM  PERTURBATION)    .  103 

III.  To  THOSE  WHO  RECOMMEND  PERSONS  TO  PHILOSOPHERS   106 

IV.  AGAINST  A  PERSON  WHO  HAD  ONCE  BEEN  DETECTED 

IN  ADULTERY 107 

V.  How  MAGNANIMITY  is  CONSISTENT  WITH  CARE  .        .108 
VI.  OF  INDIFFERENCE 112 

VII.   HOW  WE  OUGHT  TO  USE  DlVINATION  .  .  .    11G 

VIII.  WHAT  is  THE  NATURE  (fj  ovvia)  OF  THE  GOOD          .  118 
IX.  THAT   WHEN   WE   CANNOT  FULFIL   THAT  WHICH  THE 
CHARACTER  OF  A  MAN  PROMISES,  WE  ASSUME  THE 
CHARACTER  OF  A  PHILOSOPHER      ....  123 

X.   HOW  WE  MAY   DISCOVER    THE    DUTIES    OF    LlFE    FROM 

NAMES 127 

XI.  WHAT  THE  BEGINNING  OF  PHILOSOPHY  is  .        .        .  130 
XII.  OF  DISPUTATION  OR  DISCUSSION        .        .        .        .133 

XIII.  OF  ANXIETY  (SOLICITUDE) 136 

XIV.  To  NASO HO 

XV.  TO    OR  AGAINST    THOSE  WHO  OBSTINATELY    PERSIST    IN 

WHAT  THEY  HAVE  DETERMINED         ....    144 

XVI.  THAT    WE   DO  NOT   STRIVE   TO   USE   OUR    OPINIONS 

ABOUT  GOOD  AND  EVIL 147 

XVII.  HOW  WE  MUST  ADAPT  PRECONCEPTIONS  TO  PARTICULAR 

^  CASES 153 

XVIII.  HOW  WE  SHOULD  STRUGGLE  AGAINST  APPEABANCES     .  158 
XIX.  AGAINST     THOSE      WHO      EMBRACE      PHILOSOPHICAL 

OPINIONS  ONLY  IN  WORDS 162 

XX.  AGAINST  THE  EPICUREANS  AND  ACADEMICS        .        ,  167 


CONTENTS.  ]X 

CHA>\  P40R 

XXI.  OF  INCONSISTENCY 173 

XXII.  OF  FRIENDSHIP 176 

XXIII.  ON  THE  POWER  OF  SPEAKING 182 

XXIV.  To  (ou   AGAINST)  A  PERSON  WHO  WAS  ONE  OP  THOSE 

WHO  WERE  NOT  VALUED  (ESTEEMED)  PAr   HIM     .  .    188 

XXV.  THAT  LOGIC  is  NECESSARY 192 

XXVI.  WHAT  is  THE  PROPERTY  OF  ERROR  •  192 


BOOK    III. 

I.  OF  FINERY  IN  DRESS       ......  195^ 

II.  IN  WHAT  A  MAN  OUGHT  TO  BE  EXERCISED  WHO  HAS 
MADE  PROFICIENCY;  AND  THAT  WE  NEGLECT  THE 
CHIEF  THINGS 201 

III.  WHAT  is  THE  MATTER  ON  WHICH  A  GOOD  MAN  SHOULD 

BE  EMPLOYFD,   AND  IN  WHAT  WE    OUGHT  CHIEFLY  TO 
EMPLOY   OrilSELVES 201 

IV.  AGAINST  A  PEIISON  WHO  SHOWED  HIS  PARTIZANSHIP  IN 

AN  TNbEEMLY  WAY  IN  A  TlIEATRE  .  .  .    207 

V.  AGAINST   THOSE    WHO   ON    ACCOUNT  OF   SICKNESS  GO 

AWAY  HOME 20D 

VI.  MISCELLANEOUS 211 

VII.  To  THE  ADMINISTRATOR  OF  THE  FREE  CITIES  WHO 

WAS  AN  EPICUREAN       .         .         ,         .         .         .213 

Till.   HOW  WE  MUST    EXERCISE  OURSELVES  AGAINST   APPEAR- 

ANCES  (<paVTa(riai) 218 

IX.   TO    A    CERTAIN    KlIETORICIAN  WHO   WAS    GOING    UP    TO 

EOME  ON  A  SUIT 21 D 

X.  IN  WHAT  MANNER  WE  OUGHT  TO  BEAR  SICKNESS         .  222 

XI.  CERTAIN  MISCELLANEOUS  MATTERS    ....  225 

XII.  ABOUT  EXERCISE 225 

XIII.  WHAT  SOLITUDE  is,   AND  WHAT  KIND  OF  PERSON  A 

SOLITARY  MAN  is 228 

XIV.  CERTAIN  MISCELLANEOUS  MATTERS    ....  233 
XV.  THAT  WE  OUGHT  TO  PROCEED  WITH  CIRCUMSPECTION 

TO  EVERYTHING 23± 

XVI.  THAT   WE    OUGHT   WITH    CAUTION   TO    ENTER   INTO 

FAMILIAR  INTERCOURSE  WITH  MEN         .        .        .  23$ 

XVII.  OF  PROVIDENCE -1238 

XVIII.  THAT  WE  OUGHT   NOT    TO   BE   DISTURBED   BY   ANY 

NEWS 23^ 

XIX.  WHAT  is  THE  CONDITION  OF  A  COMMON  KIND  OF  MAN 

AND  OF  A  PHILOSOPHER         *         .        ,        .        .240 


CONTENTS. 

CHAP.  PAG1 

XX.  THAT  WE  CAN  DERIVE  ADVANTAGE  FROM  ALL  EXTERNAL 

THINGS 241 

XXI.  AGAINST  THOSE  WHO  READILY  COME  TO  THE  PROFES- 
SION OP  WOPHISTS          .                 ....  244 
XXII.  ABOUT  CYNISM .248 

XXIII.  TO  THOSE  WHO  READ    AND    DISCUSS    FOR    THE'.  SAKE  OP 

OSTENTATION 2G4 

XXIV.  THAT  WE  OUGHT  NOT  TO   BE  MOVED  BY  A  DESIRE  OP 

THOSE  THINGS  WHICH  ARE  NOT  IN  OUR  POWER         .  270 
XXV.  TO    THOSE    WHO    FALL    OFF    (DESIST)    FKOM   THEIR 

PURPOSE      .  287 

XXVI.   TO  THOSE  WHO  FEAR  WANT 289 


BOOK   IV. 

I.  ABOUT  FREEDOM 203 

II.  OP  FAMILIAR  INTIMACY 322; 

III.  WHAT    THINGS   WE   SHOULD    EXCHANGE   FOR   OTHER 

THINGS 324 

IV.  T()  THO.SE  WHO   ARE   DESIROUS   OF  PASSING  LlFE  IN 

TRANQUILLITY 325 

V.  AGAINST  THE  QUARRELSOME  AND  FEROCIOUS      .         .  333 
VI.  AGAINST  THOSE  WHO  LAMENT  ovEit  BEING  PITIED        .  339 

VII.    ON   FlIEEDOM  FROM   FEAR 315 

VIII.  AGAINST  THOSE  WHO  HAISTILY  RUSH  INTO  THE  PHILO- 
SOPHIC DRESS 351 

IX.  To  A  PERSON  WHO   HAD  BEEN  CHANGED  TO  A  CHAR- 
ACTER OF  HHAMELESSNESS 357 

X.  WHAT    THINGS   WE    OUGHT   TO    DESPISE   AND   WHAT 

THINGS  WE  OUGHT  TO  VALUE        ....  3GO 
XI.  ABOLT  PURITY  (CLEANLINESS)  ....  306 

XII.  ON  ATTENTION  372 

XIII.  AGAINST  on  10  THOSE  WHO  READILY  TELL  THEIII  OWN 

AFFAIRS 375 

THE  ENCHEIRIDION  OR  MANUAL          .        .        ,  379 

>  FRAGMENTS       ...,.„,,.  405 
INDEX  .  .441 


EPICTETUS. 


VERY  little  is  known  of  the  life  of  Epictetus.  It  is  said 
that  ho  was  a  native  of  Hierapolis  in  Plirygia,  a  town 
between  the  Maeandcr  and  a  branch  of  the  Maeander 
named  the  Lycus.  Ilierapolis  is  mentioned  in  the  epistle 
of  Paul  to  the  people  of  Colossae  (Coloss.  iv.  13);  from 
which  it  has  been  concluded  that  there  was  a  Christian 
church  in  Hierapolis  in  the  time  of  the  apostle.  The  date 
of  the  birth  of  Epictetus  is  unknown.  The  only  recorded 
fact  of  his  early  life  is  that  he  was  a  slave  in  Heine,  and 
his  master  was  Kpaphroditus,  a  profligate  freedman  of  the 
emperor  Nero.  There  is  a  story  that  the  master  broke  his 
slave's  leg  by  torturing  him ;  but  it  is  better  to  trust  to 
the  evidence  of  Simplicius,  the  commentator  on  the  Enchei- 
ridion  or  Manual,  who  says  that  Epictetus  was  weak  in 
body  and  lame  from  an  early  age.  It  is  not  said  how  ho 
became  a  slave ;  but  it  has  been  asserted  in  modern  times 
that  the  parents  sold  the  child.  I  have  not,  however, 
found  any  authority  for  this  statement. 

It  may  bo  supposed  that  the  young  slave  showed  intel- 
ligence, for  his  master  sent  or  permitted  him  to  attend  the 
lectures  of  C.  Musonius  llufus,  an  eminent  Stoic  philoso- 
phor.  It  may  seem  strange  that  such  a  master  should  have 
wished  to  have  his  slave  made  into  a  philosopher^  but 
Gamier,  the  author  of  a  Me  moire  sur  les  ouvrages 
d'Epictete,  explains  this  matter  very  well  in  a  communica- 
tion to  Schweighaouscr,  Gamier  says:  "Epictetus,  bore 


Xll  EPICTETUS. 

at  Hierapolis  of  Phrygia  of  poor  parents,  was  indebted 
apparently  fur  the  advantages  of  a  good  education  to  the 
whim,  which  was  common  at  the  end  of  the  Republic  and 
tinder  the  fir*t  emperors,  among  the  great  of  Rome  to 
reckon  among  their  numerous  slaves  Grammarians,  Poets, 
Rhetoricians,  and  Philosophers,  in  the  same  way  as  rich 
financiers  in  these  later  ages  have  been  led  to  foim  at  a 
great  cost  rich  and  numerous  libraries.  This  supposition 
is  the  only  one  which  can  explain  to  us,  how  a  wretched 
child,  born  as  poor  as  Irus,  had  received  a  good  education, 
and  how  a  rigid  Stoic  was  the  slave  of  Epapbroditus,  one 
of  the  officers  of  the  Imperial  guard.  For  we  cannot  sus- 
pect that  it  was  through  predilection  for  the  Stoic  doctrine 
and  for  his  own  use,  that  the  confidant  and  the  minister  of 
the  debaucheries  of  Nero  would  have  desired  to  possess 
such  a  slave." 

Some  writers  assume  that  Epictetus  was  manumitted  by 
his  master ;  but  I  can  find  no  evidence  for  this  statement. 
Epaphroditns  accompanied  Xero  when  he  fled  from  Rome 
before  his  enemies,  and  ho  aided  the  miserable  tyrant  in 
killing  himself.  Domitiari  (Sueton.  Domit.  14)  afterwards 
put  Epaphroditus  to  death  for  this  service  to  Nero.  We 
may  conclude  that  Epictetus  in  some  way  obtained  his 
freedom,  and  that  he  began  to  teach  at  Rome ;  but  after 
the  expulsion  of  the  philosophers  from  Rome  by  Domitian 
A.D.  89,  he  retired  to  Nicopolis  in  Bpirus,  a  city  built  by 
Augustus  to  commemorate  the  victory  at  Actium.  Epic-^ 
tetus  opened  a  school  or  lecture  room  at  Nicopolis,  where 
he  taught  till  he  was  an  old  man.  The  time  of  his  death 
is  unknown.  Epictetus  was  never  married,  as  we  learn 
from  Lucian  (Demonax,  c.  55,  Tom.  ii.  ed.  Hemsterh. 
p.  SQ^S).1  When  Epictetus  was  finding  fault  \vith  Demonax 
and  advising  him  to  take  a  wife  and  beget  children,  for 
this  also,  as  Epictetus  said,  was  a  philosopher's  duty,  to 
1  Luciaii's  c  Life  of  the  Philosopher  Demonax.' 


E.ICTETUS.  Xlll 

leave  in  place  of  himself  another  in  the  Universe,  Demonax 
refuted  the  doctrine  by  answering,  Give  me  then,  Epic- 
tetus, one  of  your  own  daughters.  Simplicius  says  (Com- 
ment, c.  46,  p.  432,  ed.  Schweigh.)  that  Epictetus  lived 
alone  a  long  time.  At  last  he  took  a  woman  into  his  house 
as  a  nurse*' for  a  child,  which  one  of  Epictetus'  friends  was 
going  to  expose  on  account  of  his  poverty,  but  Epictetus 
took  the  child  and  brought  it  up. 

Epictetus  wrote  nothing ;  and  all  that  we  have  under 
his  name  was  written  by  an  affectionate  pupil,  Arrian, 
afterwards  the  historian  of  Alexander  the  Great,  who,  as 
he  tells  us,  took  down  in  writing  the  philosopher's  dis- 
courses (the  Epistle  of  Arrian  to  Lucius  Gellius,  p.  1).  These 
discourses  formed  eight  books,  but  only  four  are  extant 
under  the  title  of  'ETTIKT^TOV  Starpt^at.  Simplicius  in  his 
commentary  on  the  5Eyx€t/3t'^tw  or  Manual,  states  that  this 
work  also  was  put  together  by  Arrian,  who  selected  from 
the  discourses  of  Epictetus  what  he  considered  to  be  most 
useful,  and  most  necessary,  and  most  adapted  to  move 
men's  minds.  Simplicius  also  says  that  the  contents  of 
the  Encheiridion  are  found  nearly  altogether  and  in  the 
same  words  in  various  parts  of  the  Discourses.  Arrian 
also  wrote  a  work  on  the  life  and  death  of  Epictetus. 
The  events  of  the  philosopher's  studious  life  were  probably 
not  many  nor  remarkable ;  but  we  should  have  been  glad 
if  this  work  had  been  preserved,  which  told,  as  Simplicius 
says,  what  kind  of  man  Epictetus  was. 

Photius  (Biblioth.  58 )  mentions  among  A  man's  works 
Conversations  with  Epictetus,  "O/juXtai  'J&TnKTrjrov  in  twelve 
books.  Upton  thinks  that  this  work  is  only  another  name 
for  the  Discourses,  and  that  Photius  has  made  the  mistake 
of  taking  the  Conversations  to  be  a  different  work  %-om 
the  Discourses.  Yet  Photius  has  enumerated  eight  books 
of  the  Discourses  and  twelve  books  of  the  Conversations. 
Schweighaeuser  observes  that  Photius  had  not  seen  these 


XIV  EPICTETUS. 

works  of  Arrian  on  Epictetus,  for  so  he  concludes  from  the 
brief  notice  of  these  works  by  Photius.  The  fact  is  that 
Photius  does  not  say  that  he  had  read  these  books,  as  he 
generally  does  when  he  is  speaking  of  the  books,  which 
he  enumerates  in  his  Bibliotheca.  The  conclusion  is  that 
we  are  not  certain  that  there  was  a  work  of  Arrian, 
entitled  the  Conversations  of  Epictetus. 

The  Discourses  of  Epictetus  with  the  Encheiridion  and 
Fragments  were  translated  into  English  by  the  learned 
lady  Mrs.  Elizabeth  Carter ;  who  is  said  to  have  lived  to 
the  age  of  eighty-nine.  The  fourth  edition  (1807)  contains 
the  translator's  last  additions  and  alterations.  There  is  an 
Introduction  to  this  translation  which  contains  a  summary 
view  of  the  Stoic  philosophy  for  the  purpose  of  explaining 
Epictetus ;  and  also  there  are  notes  to  the  translation.  The 
editor  of  this  fourth  edition  says  that  "the  Introduction 
and  notes  of  the  Christian  translator  of  Epictetus  are,  in 
the  estimation  of  most  readers,  not  the  least  valuable  parts 
of  the  work  "  :  and  lie  adds  "  this  was  also  the  opinion  of 
tho  late  Archbishop  Seeker,  who  though  he  thought  very 
highly  of  the  philosophy  of  Epictetus,  considered  the 
Introduction  and  notes  as  admirably  calculated  to  prevent 
any  mistake  concerning  it,  as  well  as  to  amend  and  instruct 
the  world."  The  Introduction  is  certainly  useful,  though 
it  is  not  free  from  errors.  I  do  not  think  that  the  notes 
are  valuable.  I  have  used  some  of  them  without  any 
remarks ;  and  I  have  used  others  and  made  some  remarks 
on  them  where  I  thought  that  Mrs.  Carter  was  mistaken 
in  her  opinion  of  the  original  text,  or  on  other  matters. 

The  translation  of  Mrs.  Carter  is  good ;  and  perhaps  no 
Englishman  at  that  time  would  have  made  a  bettor  trans- 
lation. I  intended  at  first  to  revise  Mrs.  Carter's  transla- 
tion? and  to  correct  any  errors  that  I  might  discover.  I 
had  revised  about  half  of  it,  when  I  found  that  I  was  not 
satisfied  with  my  work ;  and  I  was  advised  by  a  learned 


EPICTETUS.  XV 

friend  to  translate  the  whole  myself.  This  was  rather  a 
great  undertaking  for  an  old  man,  who  is  now  past  seventy- 
six.  I  have  however  done  the  work  with  great  care,  and 
as  well  as  I  could.  I  have  always  compared  my  transla- 
tion with  the  Latin  version  and  with  Mrs.  Carter's ;  and  I 
think  that /this  is  the  best  way  of  avoiding  errois  such  as 
any  translator  may  make.  A  man  who  has  not  attempted 
to  translate  a  Greek  or  Latin  author  does  not  know  the 
difficulty  of  the  undertaking.  That  which  may  appear 
plain  when  he  reads,  often  becomes  very  difficult  when  he 
tries  to  express  it  in  another  language.  It  is  true  that 
Epictetus  is  generally  intelligible ;  but  the  style  or  manner 
of  the  author,  or  we  may  say  of  Arrian,  who  attempted  to 
produce  what  he  heard,  is  sometimes  made  obscure  by  the 
continual  use  of  questions  and  answers  to  them,  and  for 
other  reasons. 

Upton  remarks  in  a  note  on  iii.  23  (p.  184  Trans.),  that 
*'  there  are  many  passages  in  these  dissertations  which  are 
ambiguous  or  rather  confused  on  account  of  the  small 
questions,  and  because  the  matter  is  not  expanded  by 
oratorical  copiousness,  not  to  mention  other  causes."  The 
discourses  of  Epictetus,  it  is  supposed,  were  spoken  ex- 
tempore, and  so  one  thing  after  another  would  come  into 
the  thoughts  of  the  speaker  (Wolf).  Schweighaeuser  also 
observes  in  a  note  (ii.  336  of  his  edition)  that  the  con- 
nexion of  the  discourse  is  sometimes  obscure  through  the 
omission  of  some  words  which  are  necessary  to  indicate  the 
connexion  of  the  thoughts.  The  reader  then  will  find  that 
he  cannot  always  understand  Epictetus,  if  he  does  not 
read  him  very  carefully,  and  some  passages  more  than 
once.  He  must  also  think  and  reflect,  or  he  will  miss  the 
meaning.  I  do  not  say  that  the  book  is  worth  all  this 
trouble.  Every  man  must  judge  for  himself.  But  I  should 
not  have  translated  the  book,  if  I  had  not  thought  it  worth 


xvi  EPICTETUS, 

study ;  and  I  think  that  all  books  of  this  kind  require 
careful  reading,  if  they  are  worth  reading  at  all. 

The  text  of  Epictetus  is  sometimes  corrupted,  and  this 
corruption  causes  a  few  difficulties.  However,  these  diffi- 
culties are  not  numerous  enough  to  cause  or  to  admit  much 
variety  or  diversity  in  the  translations  of  the  text.  This 
remark  will  explain  why  many  parts  of  my  translation  are 
the  same  or  nearly  the  same  as  Mrs.  Carter's.  When  this 
happened,  I  did  not  think  it  necessary  to  alter  my  trans- 
lation in  order  that  it  might  not  be  the  same  as  hers.  I 
made  my  translation  first,  and  then  compared  it  with  Mrs. 
Carter's  and  the  Latin  version.  I  hope  that  I  have  not 
made  many  blunders.  I  do  not  suppose  that  I  have  made 
none. 

The  last  and  best  edition  of  the  Discourses,  the  Enchei- 
ridion,  and  the  fragments  is  by  J.  Schweighaeuser  in  6  vols. 
8vo.  This  edition  contains  the  commentary  of  Siinplicius 
on  the  Encheiridion,  and  two  volumes  of  useful  notes  on 
the  Discourses.  These  notes  are  selected  from  those  of 
Wolf,  Upton,  and  a  few  from  other  commentators ;  but  a 
large  part  are  by  Schweighaeuser  himself,  who  was  an 
excellent  scholar  and  a  very  sensible  man.  I  have  read 
all  these  notes,  and  I  have  used  them.  Many  of  the  notes 
to  the  translation  are  my  own. 


xvii    ) 


THE  -PHILOSOPHY  OF  EPICTETUS. 


I  HAVE  made  a  large  Index  to  this  book ;  and  any  person, 
who  has  the  necessary  industry,  may  find  in  it  almost 
every  passage  in  the  Discourses  in  which  the  opinions  of 
the  philosopher  are  stated;  and  thus  he  may  acquire  a 
general  notion  of  the  philosophical  system  of  Epictetus, 
But  few  readers  will  have  the  time  and  the  inclination  for 
this  labour,  and  therefore  I  shall  attempt  to  do  the  work 
for  them. 

I  have  found  two  expositions  of  the  system  of  Epictetus. 
One  is  by  Dr.  Heinrich  Bitter  in  his  Geschichte  der  Philo- 
eophie  alter  Zeit,  Vierter  Theil,  1839.  The  other  is  by 
Professor  Christian  A.  Brandis.1  Both  of  these  exposi- 
tions are  useful ;  and  I  have  used  them,  I  do  not  think 
that  either  of  them  is  complete,  nor  will  mine  be*  I  shall 
not  make  my  exposition  exactly  in  the  same  form  as  either 
of  them  ;  nor  shall  I  begin  it  in  the  same  way. 

Bitter  has  prefixed  a  short  sketch  of  0.  Musonius  Bufus, 
a,  Boman  Stoic,  to  his  exposition  of  the  system  of  Epic- 
tetus. Bufus  taught  at  Borne  under  the  emperor  Nero, 
who  drove  him  from  Borne ;  but  Bufus  returned  after  the 
tyrant's  death,  and  lived  to  the  times  of  Vespasian  and  his 
son  Titus.  He  acquired  great  reputation  as  a  teacher,  but 
there  is  no  evidence  that  he  wrote  anything,  and  all  tfcat 
we  know  of  his  doctrines  is  from  a  work  of  Pollio  in 

1  Article  EPIOTETUS  in  the  *  Dictionary  of  Greek  and  Roman 
Biography,'  etc.  edited  by  Doctor  William  Smith. 

& 


XVlll  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EPICTETU8. 

Greek,  which  was  written  after  the  model  of  Xenophon's 
Memorabilia  of  Socrates.  Of  this  work  there  are  many 
fragments.2 

Rufus  taught  a  practical  philosophy,  one  that  was  useful 
for  the  purposes  of  life,  and  for  the  life  of  a  philosopher 
who  was  not  hindered  by  following  the  common  occupa- 
tions of  mankind  from  philosophizing  and  aiding  others  to 
philosophize.3  He  urged  young  men  especially  to  the 
study  of  philosophy,  and  even  women,  because  without 
philosophy  no  person  can  be  virtuous  and  do  his  duty.  He 
asks,  what  hinders  the  scholar  from  working  with  his 
teacher  and  at  the  same  time  learning  from  him  something 
about  moderation  (crw^pocnJn;)  and  justice  and  endurance  ? 
His  belief  in  the  power  of  philosophy  over  men's  minds 
was  strong,  and  he  was  convinced  that  it  was  a  perfect 
cure  for  the  corruption  of  mankind.  He  showed  the  firm- 
ness of  this  conviction  on  an  occasion  which  is  recorded 
by  Tacitus  (Hist.  iii.  81).  He  endeavoured  to  mediate 
between  the  partizans  of  Vitellius  who  were  in  Rome,  and 
the  army  of  Vespasian,  which  was  before  the  gates :  but 
he  failed  in  his  attempt.  His  behaviour  was  like  that  of 
a  modern  Christian,  who  should  attempt  to  enforce  the 
Christian  doctrines  of  peace  on  men  who  are  arrayed 
against  one  another  with  arms  in  their  hands.  Such  a 
Christian  would  be  called  a  fanatic  now ;  and  Tacitus, 
who  was  himself  a  philosopher,  gives  to  the  behaviour  of 
Rufus  the  mild  term  of  "in  tempest  ivam"  or  "unseasonable." 
The  judgment  of  Tacitus  was  right:  the  behaviour  of 

2  See  the  *  Fragments  from  Stobaeus,'  cited  by  Eitter  in  his  notes 
(Vierter  Theil,  p.  204).    The  notice  of  IIwAW,  as  he  is  named,  in 
Suidas,  i§  not  satisfactory.     It  speaks  of  the  'ATro/A^juovetVara  of 
M^sonius  by  Polio  or  Pollio;  and  yet  it  states  that  Pollio  taught  at 
Home  in  the  time  of  Pompeius  Magnus.  See  Clinton,  Fasti,  iii.  p.  550. 

3  "  It  would  be  a  strange  thing  indeed  if  the  cultivation  of  the  earth 
hindered  a  man  from  philosophizing  or  aiding  others  to  philosophize.* 
Stobaeus, 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF   EPICTETU8.  XIX 

Rufus  was  unseasonable,  as  the  result  proved;  but  the 
attempt  of  Eujfus  was  the  act  of  a  good  man. 

Eufus  did  not  value  Dialectic  or  Logic  so  highly  as  the 
old  Stoics ;  but  he  did  not  undervalue  it,  and  he  taught 
that  a  man  should  learn  how  to  deal  with  sophistical  argu- 
ments, as  we  learn  from  Epictetus  (I.  c.  7  at  the  end). 

In  his  teaching  about  the  Gods  he  follows  the  general 
Stoic  practice  of  maintaining  the  popular  religion.  He 
taught  that  nothing  was  unknown  to  the  Gods :  as  Socrates 
(Xenophon,  Mem.  i.  c.  1)  taught  that  the  Gods  knew  every- 
thing, what  was  said,  what  was  done,  and  what  men 
thought.  .  He  considered  the  souls  of  men  to  be  akin  to 
the  Gods ;  but  as  they  were  mingled  with  the  body,  the 
soul  musfc  partake  of  the  impurities  of  the  body.  The 
intelligent  principle  (Bidvoia)  is  free  from  all  necessity 
(compulsion)  and  self  sufficient  (avrcfovortos).  We  can  only 
conjecture  that  Eufus  did  not  busy  himself  about  either 
Dialectic  or  Physic ;  for  he  said  that  philosophizing  waa 
nothing  else  than  an  inquiry  about  what  is  becoming  and 
conformable  to  duty ;  an  inquiry  which  is  conducted  b^r 
reason,  and  the  result  is  exhibited  in  practice. 

The  old  Stoics  considered  virtue  to  be  the  property  only 
of  the  wise  man ;  and  they  even  doubted  whether  such  a 
man  could  be  found.  But  Eufus  said  that  it  was  not 
impossible  for  such  a  man  to  exist,  for  we  cannot  conceive 
such  virtues  as  a  wise  man  possesses  otherwise  than  from 
the  examples  of  human  nature  itself  and  by  meeting  with 
men  such  as  those  who  are  named  divine  and  godlike. 
The  Stoical  doctrine  that  man  should  live  according  to 
nature  is  not  pressed  so  hard  by  Eufus  as  by  some  Stoics, 
and  he  looks  on  a  life  which  is  conformable  to  nature  as 
not  very  difficult ;  but  he  admits  that  those  who  attempt 
philosophy  have  been  trained  from  youth  in  great  corrup- 
tion and  filled  with  wickedness,  and  so  when  they  seek 
after  virtue  they  require  more  discipline  or  practice.  Ac- 

b  2 


tX  THE  PHILOSOPHY  0?  EPIOTETUS. 

cordingly  hs  views  philosophy  as  a  spiritual  medicine,  and 
gives  more  weight  to  the  practice  or  exercise  of  virtue 
than  the  older  Stoics  did.  The  knowledge  and  the  teach- 
ing of  what  is  good,  he  says,  should  come  first ;  but  Bufus 
did  not  believe  that  the  knowledge  of  the  Good^was  strong 
enough  without  practice  (discipline)  to  lead  to  moral  con- 
duct, and  consequently  he  believed  that  practice  has  greater 
efficacy  than  teaching.4  He  makes  two  kinds  of  exercise, 
first,  the  exercise  of  the  soul  in  thinking,  in  reflecting  and 
in  stamping  on  the  mind  sound  rules  of  life ;  and  second, 
in  the  enduring  of  bodily  labours  or  pains,  in  which  act 
of  endurance  the  soul  and  the  body  act  together. 

"  The  sum  of  his  several  rules  of  life,"  says  Hitter,  may 
l>e  thus  briefly  expressed :  in  his  opinion  a  life  according 
to  Nature  results  in  a  social,  philanthropic  and  contented 
state  of  mind,  joined  to  the  most  simple  satisfaction  of  our 
accessary  wants.  We  see  his  social  and  philanthropic  dis- 
position in  this  that  he  opposes  all  selfishness  (selbstsucht), 

*  I  have  followed  the  exposition  of  Bitter  here.  Perhaps  a  literal 
translation  of  the  Greek  is  still  better ;  "  Reason  which  teaches  how 
we  should  act  co-operates  with  practice,  and  reason  (or  teaching) 
comes  in  order  before  custom  (habit)  or  practice :  for  it  is  not  possible 
to  become  habituated  to  any  thing  good  if  a  person  is  not  habituated 
by  reason  (by  teaching) ;  in  power  indeed  the  habit  (practice)  has  the 
advantage  over  teaching,  for  habit  (practice)  is  more  efficacious  in 
leading  a  man  to  act  (properly)  than  reason  is."  I  have  given  the 
meaning  of  the  Greek  as  accurately  as  I  can.  In  our  modern  education 
•we  begin  with  teaching  general  rules,  or  principles  or  beliefs ;  and  there 
we  stop.  The  result  is  what  might  be  expected.  Practice  or  the  habit 
*>f  doing  what  we  ought  to  do  is  neglected.  The  teachers  are  teachers 
of  words  and  no  more.  They  are  the  men  whom  Epictetus  (iii.  21, 
note  6)  describes :  "  You  have  committed  to  memory  the  words  only,  and 
you  say,  Sacred  are  the  words  by  themselves."  See  p.  245,  note  3. 

«5t  is  one  of  the  greatest  merits  of  Kufus  that  he  laid  down  the 
principle  which  is  expounded  above ;  and  it  is  the  greatest  demerit  of 
our  system  of  teaching  that  the  principle  is  generally  neglected :  and 
most  particularly  by  those  teachers  who  proclaim  ostentatiously  that 
they  give  a  religious  education. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EPIOTETUS.  XXI 

that  he  views  marriage  not  only  as  the  sole  right  and 
natural  satisfaction  of  the  sexual  feelings,  but  also  as  the 
foundation  of  family,  of  a  state,  and  of  the  continuation 
of  the  human  race ;  and  accordingly  he  declares  himself 
against  the  exposure  of  children  as  an  unnatural  practice ; 
and  he  ofte'n  recommends  beneficence.1* 

Epictetus  was  a  pupil  of  this  noble  Eoman  teacher,  whose 
name  occurs  several  times  in  the  Discourses.  Bitter  con- 
jectures that  Epictetus  also  heard  Euphrates,  whom  he 
highly  commends.  It  has  been  justly  said  that,  though 
Epictetus  is  named  a  Stoic,  and  that  his  principles  are 
Stoical,  he  is  not  purely  a  Stoic.  He  learned  from  other 
teachers  as  well  as  the  Stoic.  He  quotes  the  teaching  and 
example  of  Socrates  continually,  and  the  example  of  Dio- 
genes the  Cynic,  both  of  whom  he  mentions  more 
frequently  than  Zeno  the  founder  of  the  Stoic  philosophy. 
He  also  valued  Plato,  who  accepted  from  Socrates  many 
of  his  principles,  and  developed  and  expanded  them.  So 
Epictetus  learned  that  the  beginning  of  philosophy  is 
man's  knowledge  of  himself  (yvo$t  orcaviw),  and  the  ac- 
knowledgment of  his  own  ignorance  and  weakness.  He 
teaches  (i.  c.  17 ;  ii.  c.  14;  ii.  c.  10)  that  the  examination 
of  names,  the  understanding  of  the  notion,  of  the  concep- 
tion of  a  thing,  is  the  beginning  of  education :  he  con- 
sistently teaches  that  we  ought  to  pity  those  who  do 
wrong,  for  they  err  in  ignorance  (i.  c.  18 ;  ii.  c.  22,  p.  181); 
and,  as  Plato  says,  every  mind  is  deprived  of  truth 
unwillingly.  Epictetus  strongly  opposes  the  doctrines  of 
Epicurus,  of  the  newer  Academics,  and  of  Pyrrho,  the 
great  leader  of  the  Sceptical  school  (i.  c.  5,  c.  23 ;  ii.  o.  20). 
He  has  no  taste  for  the  subtle  discussions  of  these  men. 
He  says  (p,  81),  "Let  the  followers  of  Pyrrho  and  t!id 
Academics  come  and  make  their  objections.  For  I,  as  to 
my  part,  have  no  leisure  for  these  disputes,  nor  am  I  able 
to  undertake  the  defence  of  common  consent  (opinion)/' 


XX11  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  EPIOTETUS, 

41  How  indeed  perception  is  effected,  whether  through  the 
whole  body  or  any  part,  perhaps  I  cannot  explain;  for 
both  opinions  perplex  me.  But  that  you  and  I  are  not 
the  same,  I  know  with  perfect  certainty.  How  do  you 
know  it  ?  When  I  intend  to  swallow  anything,  I  never 
carry  it  to  your  mouth,  but  to  my  own.  And*  you  your- 
selves (the  Pyrrhonists),  who  take  away  th&  evidence  of 
the  senses,  do  you  act  otherwise  ?  Who  among  you,  when 
he  intended  to  enter  a  bath,  ever  went  into  a  mill?"  He 
also  says  (ii.  c.  20)  that  "  the  propositions  which  are  true 
and  evident  are  of  necessity  used  even  by  those  who  con- 
tradict them ;  and  a  man  might  perhaps  consider  it  to  be 
the  greatest  proof  of  a  thing  being  evident  that  it  is 
found  to  be  necessary  even  for  him  who  denies  it  to  make 
use  of  it  at  the  same  time.  For  instance,  if  a  man  should 
deny  that  anything  is  universally  true,  it  is  plain  that  he 
must  make  the  contradictory  negation,  that  nothing  is 
universally  true." 

Epictetus  did  not  undervalue  Dialectic  or  Logic,  and  the 
solution  of  what  are  called  Sophistical  and  Hypothetical 
arguments  (i.  c.  7) ;  but  he  considered  the  handling  of  all 
such  arguments  as  a  thing  relating  to  the  duties  of  life, 
and  as  a  means  towards  Ethic,  or  the  practice  of  morals. 
Eufiis  said,  "  for  a  man  to  use  the  appearances  presented 
to  him  rashly  and  foolishly  and  carelessly,  and  not  to 
understand  argument  nor  demonstration  nor  sophism,  nor, 
in  a  word,  to  see  in  questioning  and  answering  what  is 
consistent  with  that  which  we  have  granted  or  is  not  con- 
sistent :  is  there  no  error  in  this  "  ?  Accordingly  Dialectic 
is  not  the  object  of  our  life,  but  it  is  a  means  for  dis- 
tinguishing between  true  and  false  appearances,  and  for 
ascertaining  the  validity  of  evidence,  and  it  gives  us 
security  in  our  judgments.  It  is  the  application  of  these 
things  to  the  purposes  of  life  which  is  the  first  and  neces- 
sary part  of  philosophy.  So  he  says  in  the  Encheiridion 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EPIOTETUS.  XX111 

(LI.):  "The  first  and  most  necessary  place  in  philosophy 
is  the  use  of  theorems  (precepts),  fqr  instance,  That  we 
must  not  lie:  the  second  is  that  of  demonstration,  for 
instance,  How  is  it  proved  that  we  ought  not  to  lie :  the 
third  is  that  which  is  confirmatory  of  these  two  and  ex- 
planatory,* for  example,  How  is  this  a  demonstration"? 
The  philosophy  of  Epictetus  is  in  fact  only  the  way  of 
living  as  a  man  ought  to  live,  according  to  his  nature. 

Epictetus  accordingly  views  that  part  of  the  Stoic  teach- 
ing, named  Physic  or  the  Nature  of  things,  also  as  sub- 
ordinate to  his  philoHophy,  which  is  purely  Ethical. ,  We 
ought  to  live  according  to  Nature,  and  therefore  we  must 
inquire  what  the  Law  of  Nature  is.  The  contemplation 
of  the  order  of  things  is  the  duty  of  man,  and  tQ  observe 
this  wonderful  system  of  which  man  is  a  part ;  but  the  pur- 
pose of  the  contemplation  and  the  observation  is  that  we 
may  live  a  life  such  as  we  ought  to  live.  He  says  (Frag. 
CLXXV.,  "  What  do  I  care  whether  all  things  are  com- 
posed of  atoms  or  of  similar  parts,  or  of  fire  and  earth  ?  for  is 
it  not  enough  to  know  the  nature  of  the  good  and  the  evil, 
and  the  measures  of  the  desires  and  aversions,  and  also  the 
movements  towards  things  and  from  them ;  and  using  these 
as  rules  to  administer  the  affairs  of  life,  but  not  to  trouble 
ourselves  about  the  things  above  us  ?  For  these  things  ave 
perhaps  incomprehensible  to  the  human  mind :  and  if  any 
man  should  even  suppose  them  to  be  in  the  highest  degree 
comprehensible,  what  then  is  the  profit  of  them,  if  they  are 
comprehended?  And  must  we  not  say  that  those  men 
have  needless  trouble  who  assign  these  things  as  necessary 
to  a  philosopher's  discourse?"  Epictetus  then  did  not 
vajue  the  inquiries  of  the  Physical  philosophers,  or  he  had 
no  taste  for  them.  His  Philosophy  was  Ethical,  and  hig 
inquiry  was,  What  is  the  rule  of  life  ? 
.  "  With  respect  to  gods,"  says  Epictetus  (i.  o.  12),  "  there 
are  some  who  say  that  a  divine  being  does  not  exist :  others 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  EPICTETUS. 

say  that  it  exists,  but  is  inactive  and  careless,  and  takes  no 
forethought  about  anything ;  a  third  class  say  such  a  being 
exists  and  exercises  forethought,  but  only  about  great 
things  and  heavenly  things,  and  about  nothing  on  the 
earth;  a  fourth  class  say  that  a  divine  being  exercises 
forethought  both  about  things  on  the  earth  and-  heavenly 
things,  but  in  a  general  way  only,  and  not  about  things 
severally.  There  is  a  fifth  class  to  whom  Ulysses  and 
Socrates  belong,  who  say,  '  I  move  not  without  thy  know- 
ledge,'" (Iliad,  x.  278).  After  a  few  remarks  Epietetus 
concludes :  "  The  wise  and  good  man  then  after  considerr 
ing  all  these  things,  submits  his  own  mind  to  him  wiu 
administers  the  whole,  as  good  citizens  do  to  the  law  ot 
the  state." 

The  foundation  of  the  Ethic  of  Epictetus  is  the  doctrine 
which  the  Stoic  Cleanthes  proclaimed  in  his  hymn  to  Zeus 
(God),  "  From  thee  our  race  comes."  Epictetus  speaks  of 
Gods,  whom  we  must  venerate  and  make  offerings  to  ; 
and  of  God,  from  whom  we  all  are  sprung  in  an  especial 
manner.  "  God  is  the  father  both  of  men  and  of  Gods.'* 
This  great  descent  ought  to  teach  us  to  have  no  ignoble  or 
mean  thoughts  about  oiirselves.  He  says,  "Since  these* 
two  things  are  mingled  in  the  generation  of  man,  body 
in  common  with  the  animals,  and  reason  and  intel- 
ligence in  common  with  the  Gods,  many  incline  to  this 
kinship,  which  is  miserable  and  mortal ;  and  some  few  to 
that  which  is  divine  and  happy  w  (i.  c.  3).  In  a  chapter  of 
Providence  (i.  c.  6)  he  attempts  to  prove  the  existence  of 
God  and  his  government  of  the  world  by  everything  which 
is  or  happens ;  but  in  order  to  understand  these  proofs,  a» 
man,  he  says,  must  have  the  faculty  of  seeing  what  belong® 
ano^, happens  to  "all  persons  and  things,  and  a  grateful 
disposition  "  (also,  i.  c.  16).  He  argues  from  the  very  struc- 
ture of  things  which  have  attained  their  completion,  that 
we  are  accustomed  to  show  that  a  work  is  certainly  the  act 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EPICTETUS,  XXV 

of  some  artificer,  and  tbat  it  has  not  been  constructed 
without  a  purpose.  "  Does  then  each  of  these  things  de- 
monstrate the  workman,  and  do  not  visible  things  and  the 
faculty  of  seeing  and  light  demonstrate  him  "  ?  He  then* 
considers  the  constitution  of  man's  understanding  and  its- 
operations  ;  and  he  asks,  if  this  is  not  sufficient  to  convince 
us,  let  people  "  explain  to  us  what  it  is  that  makes  each 
several  thing,  or  how  it  is  possible  that  things  so  wonderful 
and  like  the  contrivances  of  art  should  exist  by  chance» 
and  from  their  own  proper  motion  "  ? 

It  is  enough  for  animals  to  do  what  their  nature  leads 
them  to  do  without  understanding  why  they  do  it.  But  it 
is  not  enough  for  us  to  whom  God  has  given  also  the  intel- 
lectual faculty ;  for  unless  we  act  conformably  to  the  nature 
and  constitution  of  each  thing,  we  shall  never  attain  our 
true  end.  God  has  introduced  man  into  the  world  to  be  a, 
spectator  of  God  and  his  works ;  and  not  only  a  spectator 
of  them,  but  an  interpreter.  For  this  reason,  he  says,  "  it 
is  shameful  for  man  to  begin  and  to  end  where  irrational 
animals  do ;  but  rather  he  ought  to  begin  where  they  begin, 
and  to  end  where  nature  ends  in  us ;  and  nature  ends  in, 
contemplation  and  understanding,  and  in  a  way  of  life  con- 
formable to  nature"  (p.  21).  He  examines  in  another 
chapter  (i.  c.  9),  How  from  the  fact  that  we  are  akin  to 
God,  a  man  may  proceed  to  the  consequences.  Here  he» 
shows  that  a  man  who  has  observed  with  intelligence  the 
administration  of  the  world,  and  has  learned  that  the 
greatest  community  is  that  which  is  composed  of  men  and 
God,  and  that  from  God  came  all  beings  which  are  pro- 
duced on  the  earth,  and  particularly  rational  beings  who* 
are  by  reason  conjoined  with  him, — "  why  should  not  such 
a  man  call  himself  a  citizen  of  the  world,  why  not  a .son. 
of  God,  and  why  should  he  be  afraid  of  anything  which 
happens  among  men  ? — when  you  have  God  for  your  maker, 
and  father,  and  guardian,  shall  not  this  release  us  from 
sorrows  and  fears?" 


XXV.I  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EPICTETUS. 

In  this  chapter  also  is  a  supposed  address  of  Epictetus 
to  those  people  who  on  account  of  the  bonds  of  the  body 
and  the  troubles  of  this  life  intend  to  throw  them  off,  "  and 
to  depart  to  their  kinsmen."  Epictetus  says,  "Friends, 
wait  for  God :  when  He  shall  give  the  signal  and  release 
you  from  this  service,  then  go  to  Him ;  but  for  the  present 
endure  to  dwell  in  this  place  where  He  has  put  you — wait 
then,  do  not  depart  without  a  reason.*'  He  gives  the  ex- 
ample of  Socrates,  who  said  that  if  God  has  put  us  in  any 
place,  we  ought  not  to  desert  it.  I  think  that  Epictetus 
did  not  recommend  suicide  in  any  case,  though  he  admitted 
that  there  were  cases  in  which  he  would  not  condemn  it ; 
but  a  man  ought  to  have  good  reasons  for  leaving  his 
post. 

The  teaching  of  Epictetus,  briefly  expressed,  is,  that  man 
ought  to  be  thankful  to  God  for  all  things,  and  always 
content  with  that  which  happens,  for  what  God  chooses  is 
better  than  what  man  can  choose  (iv.  c.  7).  This  is  what 
Bishop  Butler  says,  "  Our  resignation  to  the  will  of  God 
may  be  said  to  be  perfect  when  our  will  is  lost  and  resolved 
up  into  his ;  when  we  rest  in  his  will  as  our  end,  as  being 
itself  most  just  and  right  and  good."  (Sermon  on  the  Love 
of  God.) 

I  have  not  discovered  any  passage  in  which  Epictetus 
gives  any  opinion  of  the  mode  of  God's  existence.  He  dis- 
tinguishes God  the  maker  and  governor  of  the  universe 
from  the  universe  itself.  His  belief  in  the  existence  of 
this  great  power  is  as  strong  as  any  Christian's  could  be; 
and  very  much  stronger  than  the  belief  of  many  who  call 
themselves  Christians,  and  who  solemnly  and  publicly 
declare  "  I  believe  in  God  the  Father  Almighty,  Maker  of 
heajen  and  earth."  Epictetus  teaches  us  what  our  duty  is 
towards  God ;  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  he  practised 
what  he  taught,  as  a  sincere  and  honest  man  should  do,  or 
at  least  try  to  do  with  all  his  might.  We  must  suppose 
that  a  man  of  his  temper  of  mind,  and  his  great  abilities 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EPIOTETUS.  XXVU 

did  what  he  recommends  (Fragments,  cxviii.,  cxix.) :  "  Let 
your  talk  of  God  be  renewed  every  day  rather  than  you? 
food " ;  and  "  Think  of  God  more  frequently  than  you 
breathe."  I  see  no  other  conclusion  that  such  a  man  could 
come  to  than  this,  that  God  exists  without  doubfy  and  that 
He  is  incomprehensible  to  such  feeble  creatures  as  man 
who  lives  in  so  feeble  a  body.  See  p.  21,  note  5. 

We  must  now  see  what  means  God  has  given  to  His 
children  for  doing  their  duty.  Epictetus  begins  by  show- 
ing what  things  God  has  put  in  our  power,  and  what 
things  he  has  not  (i.  c.  1 ;  Encheir.  1).  "  That  which  is 
best  of  all  and  supreme  over  all  is  the  only  thing  which 
the  gods  have  placed  in  our  power,  the  right  use  of  appear- 
ances ;  but  all  other  things  they  have  not  placed  in  our 
power  " ;  and  the  reason  of  this  limitation  of  man's  power 
is,  "  that  as  we  exist  on  the  earth  and  are  bound  to  such 
a  body  and  to  such  companions,  how  was  it  possible  for  us 
not  to  be  hindered  as  to  these  things  by  externals?"  He 
says  again  (Encheirid.  1) :  "  Of  things  some  are  in  our 
power,  and  others  are  not.  In  our  power  are  opinion, 
movement  towards  a  thing,  desire,  aversion  (turning  from 
a  thing) ;  and  in  a  word,  whatever  are  our  own  acts :  not 
in  our  power  are  the  body,  property,  reputation,  offices 
(magisterial  power),  and  in  a  word,  whatever  are  not  our 
own  acts.  And  the  things  in  our  power  are  by  nature  free, 
not  subject  to  restraint  nor  hindrance :  but  the  things  not 
in  our  power  are  weak,  slavish,  subject  to  restraint,  in  the 
power  of  others."  This  is  his  notion  of  man's  freedom. 
On  this  notion  all  his  system  rests.  He  says  (i*  o.  17) : 
44  if  God  had  made  that  part  of  himself,  which  he  took 
from  himself  and  gave  to  us,  of  such  a  nature  as  to  be 
hindered  or  compelled  either  by  himself  or  by  another,,  he 
would  not  then  be  God  nor  would  he  be  taking  care  of  *u«' 
as  he  ought."  ,  *' 

He  says  (i.  c.  1 ;  iii.  o.  3;  and  else  where)  'that  the  right 


XXV111  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EPICTETUS. 

use  of  appearances  is  the  only  thing  that  the  gods  have 
placed  in  our  power ;  and  "  that  it  is  the  business  of  the 
wise  and  good  man  to  use  appearances  conformably  to 
nature."  For  this  purpose  a  man  has  what  Epictetus  names 
a  ruling  faculty  (TO  ^yc/Aon/coV),  of  which  he  gives  a  defini- 
tion or  description  (iv.  c.  7).  It  is  that  faculty  "  Which  uses 
all  other  faculties  and  tries  them,  and  selects  and  rejects;'1 
a  faculty  by  which  we  reflect  and  judge  and  determine, 
a  faculty  which  no  other  animal  has,  a  faculty  which, 
as  Bishop  Butler  says,  "  plainly  bears  upon  it  marks  of 
authority  over  all  the  rest,  and  claims  the  absolute  direc- 
tion of  them  all,  to  allow  or  forbid  their  gratification  *' 
(Preface  to  the  Sermons). 

These  appearances  are  named  ^avrao-Lat  by  Epictetus ; 
and  the  word  is  translated  "  Visa  animi  "  by  Gellws  (Frag, 
clxxx.).  This  Phantasy  (^avracrta)  is  not  only  the  thing 
which  is  perceived  by  the  eyes,  but  the  impression  which 
is  made  on  the  eyes,  and  generally  it  means  any  impression 
received  by  the  senses;  and  also  it  is  the  power  of  the 
mind  to  represent  things  as  if  they  were  present,  though 
they  are  only  present  in  the  mind  and  are  really  absent. 
This  power  of  Phantasy  exists  also  in  animals  in  various 
degrees  according  to  their  several  capacities :  animals  make 
use  of  appearances,  but  man  only  understands  the  use  of 
appearances  (i.  c.  6).5  If  a  man  cannot  or  does  not  make 
a  right  use  of  appearances,  he  approaches  the  nature  of  an 
irrational  animal;  and  he  is  not  what  God  made  him 
capable  of  being. 

The  nature  of  the  Good  is  in  the  use  of  appearances, 

*  I  suppose  that  this  will  be  generally  allowed  to  be  true.  Whatever 
an  animal  can  do,  we  shall  hardly  admit  that  he  understands  the  use 
of  appearances,  and  uses  them  as  a  man  can.  However  the  powers 
of  some  animals,  such  as  ants  for  example,  are  very  wonderful ;  and 
it  may  be  contended  that  they  are  not  irrational  in  many  of  their  acts, 
but  quite  rational. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EPICTETUS.  XXIX 

and  the  nature  of  evil  likewise ;  and  things  independent 
of  the  will  do  not  admit  either  the  nature  of  evil  or  of 
good  (ii.  c.  1).  The  good  and  the  bad  are  in  man's  will, 
and  in  nothing  external.  The  rational  power  therefore 
leads  us  to  acknowledge  as  good  only  that  which  is  con- 
formable to  reason,  and  to  recognize  as  bad  that  which  is 
not  conformable  to  reason.  The  matter  on  which  the  good 
man  labours  is  his  rational  faculty  (TO  IStov  fiytpoviKov)  : 
that  is  the  business  of  the  philosopher  (iii.  c.  3).  A  man 
who  wishes  to  be  what  he  is  by  nature,  by  his  constitution, 
adapted  for  becoming,  must  "struggle  against  appear- 
ances" (ii.  c.  18).  This  is  not  an  easy  thing,  but  it  is  the 
only  way  of  obtaining  true  freedom,  tranquillity  of  mind, 
and  the  dominion  over  the  movements  of  the  soul,  in  a 
word  happiness,  which  is  the  true  end  and  purpose  of  man's 
existence  on  earth.  Every  man  carries  in  him  his  own 
enemy,  whom  he  must  carefully  watch  (Ench.  xlviii.). 
There  is  danger  that  appearances,  which  powerfully  resist 
reason,  will  carry  you  away :  if  you  are  conquered  twice 
or  even  once,  there  is  danger  that  a  habit  of  yielding  to 
them  will  be  formed.  "Generally,  then,  if  you  would 
make  anything  a  habit,  do  it :  if  you  would  not  make  it  a 
habit,  do  not  do  it ;  but  accustom  yourself  to  do  something 
else  in  place  of  it"  (ii.  c.  18).  As  to  pleasure  Epictetus 
says  (Ench.  xxxiv.) :  "  If  you  have  received  the  impression 
(<t>avTa<Tiav)  of  any  pleasure,  guard  yourself  against  being 
carried  away  by  it ;  but  let  the  thing  wait  for  you,  and 
allow  yourself  a  certain  delay  on  your  own  part.  Then 
think  of  both  times,  of  the  time  when  you  will  enjoy  the 
pleasure,  and  of  the  time  after  the  enjoyment  of  the  plea- 
sure when  you  will  repent  and  reproach  yourself.  And 
set  against  these  things  how  you  will  rejoice,  if  you  Lfrave 
abstained  from  the  pleasure,  and  how  you  will  commend 
yourself.  But  if  it  seem  to  you  seasonable  to  undertake 
(do)  the  thing,  take  care  that  the  charm  of  it,  and  the 


XXX  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EPICTETUS. 

pleasure,  and  the  attraction  of  it  shall  not  conquer  you . 
and  set  on  the  other  side  the  consideration  how  much 
better  it  is  to  be  conscious  that  you  have  gained  this 
victory. " 

Hence  the  rule  that  a  man  must  be  careful  and  cautious 
in  everything  which  is  in  the  power  of  the  will ;  but  on 
the  contrary,  with  respect  to  externals  which  are  not  in  a 
man's  power,  he  must  be  bold.  "Confidence  (courage) 
then  ought  to  be  employed  against  death,  and  caution 
against  the  fear  of  death :  but  now  we  do  the  contrary, 
and  employ  against  death  the  attempt  to  escape ;  and  to 
our  opinion  about  it  we  employ  carelessness,  rashness  and 
indifference "  (ii.  c.  1).  For  the  purification  of  the  soul 
and  enabling  it  to  employ  its  powers  a  man  must  root  out 
of  himself  two  things,  arrogance  (pride,  otrjo-ts)  and  dis- 
trust. "  Arrogance  is  the  opinion  that  you  want  nothing 
(are  deficient  in  nothing) ;  but  distrust  is  the  opinion  that 
you  cannot  be  happy  when  so  many  circumstances  sur- 
round you."  6 

The  notion  of  Good  and  Bad  should  be  firmly  fixed  in 
man's  mind.  There  is  in  the  opinion  of  Epictetus  no 
difference  among  men  on  this  matter.  He  says  (ii.  c.  11) 
on  the  beginning  of  Philosophy :  As  to  good  and  evil,  and 
what  we  ought  to  do  and  what  we  ought  not  to  do,  and 
the  like,  "  whoever  came  into  the  world  without  having 
an  idea  (e/x^vros  «Woia)  of  them  ?"  These  general  notions  he 
names  TrpoX^ets,  preconceptions,  or  praecognitions  (ii.  c.  2) ; 
and  we  need  discipline  "  in  order  to  learn  how  to  adapt 
the  preconception  of  the  rational  and  the  irrational  to  the 
several  things  conformably  to  nature."  Why  then  do  men 
differ  in  their  opinions  about  particular  things?  The 
differences  arise  in  the  adaptation  of  the  praecognitions  to 
the  particular  cases.  He  says  (iv.  c,  1):  "This  is  the 

•  Eitter,  p.  227,  has  a  wrong  reading  in  hia  quotation  of  this 
passage,  and  he  has  misunderstood  it. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EPIOTE^US.  XXXI 

cause  to  men  of  all  their  evils,  the  not  being  able  to  adapt 
the  general  preconceptions  to  the  several  things/'  It  is  so 
in  everything.  General  principles  are  often  very  simple 
and  intelligible ;  but  when  we  come  to  the  application  of  the 
principles,  there  arises  difficulty  and  difference  of  opinions. 
"  Education  is  the  learning  how  to  adapt  the  natural  prae- 
cognitions  to  the  particular  things  conformably  to  nature ; 
and  then  to  distinguish  that  of  things  some  are  in  our 
power,  but  others  are  not."  The  Great  Law  of  Life 
(i.  c.  26)  is  that  we  must  act  conformably  to  nature.  "  In 
theory  there  is  nothing  which  draws  us  away  from  follow- 
ing what  is  taught ;  but  in  the  matters  of  life,  many  are 
the  things  which  distract  us."  A  man  then  must  not 
begin  with  the  matters  of  real  life,  for  it  is  not  easy  to 
begin  with  the  more  difficult  things.  "  This  then  is  the 
beginning  of  philosophy,  a  man's  perception  of  the  state  of 
his  ruling  faculty ;  for  when  a  man  knows  that  it  is  weak, 
then  he  will  not  employ  it  on  things  of  the  greatest  diffi- 
culty"; and  again  (ii.  11),  "the  beginning  of  philosophy 
is  a  man's  consciousness  about  his  own  weakness  and 
inability  about  necessary  things  "  :  and  further,  "  this  is 
the  beginning  of  philosophy,  a  perception  of  the  disagree- 
ment of  men  with  one  another,  and  an  inquiry  into  tho 
cause  of  the  disagreement,  and  a  condemnation  and  distrust 
of  that  which  only  '  seems,'  and  a  certain  investigation  of 
that  which  *  seems,'  whether  it  *  seems'  rightly,  and  a  dis- 
covery of  some  rule,  as  we  have  discovered  a  balance  in  the 
determination  of  weights,  and  a  carpenter's  rule  (or  square) 
in  the  case  of  straight  and  crooked  things.  This  is  the 
beginning  of  philosophy." 

Epictetus  urges  the  fact  of  a  man  assenting  to  or  not 
assenting  to  a  thing  as  a  proof  that  man  possesses  scne- 
thing  which  is  naturally  free.  He  says  (p.  253) :  "  Who  is 
able  to  compel  you  to  assent  to  that  which  appears  false? 
No  man.  And  who  can  compel  you  not  to  assent  to  thai 


xxxu         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EPICTETUS. 

which  appears  true  ?  No  man.  By  this  then  you  see  that 
there  is  something  in  you  naturally  free.  But  to  desire  01 
to  be  averse  from,  or  to  move  towards  an  object  or  to  move 
from  it,  or  to  prepare  yourself,  or  to  propose  to  do  any- 
thing, which  of  you  can  do  this,  unless  he  has  received  an 
impression  of  the  appearance  of  that  which  is  profitable 
or  a  duty  ?  No  man.  You  have  then  in  these  things  also 
something  which  is  not  hindered  and  is  free.  Wretched 
men,  work  out  this,  take  care  of  this,  seek  for  good  here." 
{Compare  iv.  c.  1  p.  303,  and  note  20.) 

Here  the  philosopher  teaches  that  a  man's  opinion  or  his 
belief  cannot  be  compelled  by  another,  though  we  may 
conclude  from  what  we  see  and  hear  and  is  done  in  the 
world,  that  a  large  part  of  mankind  do  not  know  this  fact. 
A  man  cannot  even  think  or  believe  as  he  chooses  himself: 
if  a  thing  is  capable  of  demonstration,  and  if  he  under- 
stands demonstration,  he  must  believe  what  is  demon- 
strated. If  the  thing  is  a  matter  of  probable  evidence,  he 
will  follow  that  which  seems  the  more  probable,  if  he  has 
any  capacity  for  thinking.  I  say  '  any  capacity'  for  think- 
ing, because  the  intellectual  power  in  the  minds  of  a  great 
number  of  persons  is  very  weak ;  and  in  all  of  us  often 
very  weak  compared  with  the  power  of  the  necessities  of 
our  nature,  of  our  desires,  of  our  passions,  in  fact  of  all 
that  is  in  this  wonderful  creature  man,  which  is  not  pure 
reason  or  pure  understanding  or  whatever  name  we  give 
to  the  powers  named  intellectual. 

The  second  part  of  this  last  quotation  from  Epictelus 
relates  to  the  Will,  by  which  I  mean,  and  I  suppose  that 
he  means,  the  wish  and  the  intention  and  the  attempt  to 
do  something  particular,  or  to  abstain  from  doing  some 
particular  thing.  Much  has  been  written  about  man's 
Will.  Some  persons  think  that  he  has  none;  that  he 
moves  as  he  is  moved,  and  cannot  help  himself.  Epictetus 
ias  no  essay  or  dissertation  on  this  matter ;  and  it  would 


THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  EPIOTETUS. 

have  been  contrary  to  his  method  of  teaching  to  make  a 
formal  discussion  of  the  Will,  after  the  manner  of  modern 
philosophers.  He  does  not  touch  on  the  question  of  man's 
will  as  dependent  on  the  will  of  God,  or  as  acting  in  oppo- 
sition to  it.  God  has  made  man  as  free  as  he  could  be  in 
such  a  body,  in  which  he  must  live  on  the  earth.  This 
body  is  not  man's  own,  but  it  is  clay  finely  tempered ;  and 
God  has  also  given  to  man  a  small  portion  of  himself,  in  a 
word,  the  faculty  of  using  the  appearances  of  things,  of 
which  faculty  Epictetus  says,  "if  you  will  take  care  of 
this  faculty  and  consider  it  your  only  possession,  you  will 
never  be  hindered,  never  meet  with  impediments,  you  will 
not  lament,  you  will  not  blame,  you  will  not  llatter  any 
person "(i.  c.  1).  He  says  (iv.  c.  12)  that  God  "has  placed 
me  with  myself,  and  has  put  my  will  in  obedience  to  myself 
alone,  and  has  given  me  rules  for  the  right  use  of  it." 

The  word  of  Epictetus  which  I  have  always  translated 
by  Will  is  7r/ooa/p€crts,  which  is  literally  a  '  preference,'  a 
choice  of  one  thing  before  another,  or  before  any  other 
thing;  a  description  which  is  sufficiently  intelligible.7 

7  H.  Stephanus  in  his  Greek  Lexicon  (s.  v.  AfyeV)  has  a  long  discus- 
eion  on  the  word  irpoatpecris :  which  is  not  satisfactory.  He  objects  to- 
the  translation  by  the  old  scholars  of  irpoaipecris  by  '  JSlectio,'  *  choice, 
because  irpoalptffis.  he  says,  is  not  'Electio,'  but  it  is  that  which 
follows  from  the  choice  itself.  "  For,"  he  adds,  "  Electio  is  the  act  of 
*  choosing,  of  selection,'  and  Electio  can  only  be  in  the  mind,  when  we 
have  chosen  this  or  that."  This  distinction  is  trifling.  When  he  says- 
that  "  irpoalpccris  applies  to  him  who  out  of  several  things  selects  one 
after  deliberation  and  prefers  it  to  others,"  he  says  right,  and  this  is. 
sufficient.  He  then  discusses  whether  irpoalpcffts  should  be  -rendered, 
when  Aristotle  uses  it  strictly,  by  *  Propositum '  or  '  Consilium,'  and 
he  decides  in  favour  of '  Propositum.'  At  the  beginning  of  Aristotle's- 
Ethic  he  translates  Trao-a  npoaipeffis  by  *  Propositum  omne,'  or  *  Con- 
siliura  omne : '  but  he  prefers  *  Propositum.'  He  objects  to  the  Latf* 
translation  of  rrpoatpwis  by  *  Voluntas '  in  cases  where  Aristotle  uses 
the  word  strictly,  for  Aristotle  makes  a  distinction  between  irpoaipco-t? 
and  &ot\iiffis.  A  distinction  between  irpoaipeffis  and  &ov\r)<ns  is 
certain,  and  it  is  plain.  But  Stephanus  does  not  seem  to  know  thai 


SXX1V  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF   EPICTETUS. 

Though  Epictetus  contends  that  man  has  power  over  his 
will,  he  well  knew  how  weak  this  power  sometimes  is. 
An  appearance,  he  says  (p.  86),  is  presented,  and  straight- 
way I  act  according  to  it ;  and,  what  is  the  name  of  those 
who  follow  every  appearance  ?  They  are  called  madmen. — 
Such  are  a  large  part  of  mankind ;  and  it  is  true,  that 
many  persons  have  no  Will  at  all.  They  are  deceived  by 
appearances,  perplexed,  tossed  about  like  a  ship  which  has 
lost  the  helm :  they  have  no  steady,  fixed,  arid  rational 
purpose.  Their  perseverance  or  obstinacy  is  often  nothing 
more  than  a  perseverance  in  an  irrational  purpose.  It  is 
often  so  strong  and  so  steady  that  the  man  himself  and 
others  too  may  view  it  as  a  strong  will ;  and  it  is  a  strong 
will,  if  you  choose,  but  it  is  a  will  in  a  wrong  direction. 
"  The  nature  of  the  Good  is  a  certain  Will :  the  nature  of 
the  Bad  is  a  certain  kind  of  Will"  (i.  c.  29). 

Those  who  have  been  fortunate  in  their  parents  and  in 
their  education,  who  have  acquired  good  habits,  and  are 
not  greatly  disturbed  by  the  affects  and  the  passions,  may 


the  *  Latin  word  '  voluntas,'  especially  in  the  law  writers,  does 
represent  a  deliberate  purpose  or  will,  as  when  a  man  intends,  designs, 
and  uses  the  necessary  means,  for  example,  to  kill  another,  in  which 
case  the  Romans  rightly  viewed  the  will  as  equivalent  to  the  deed. 
Cicero  (Tuscul.  iv.  6)  says,  "  Quamobrem  simul  objecta  species 
cujuspiam  est,  quod  bonum  videatur,  ad  id  adipiscendum  impellit 
ipsa  natura.  Id  quum  constanter  prudenterque  fit,  ejusmodi  appeti- 
tionem  Stoici  $ov\t\ffiv  appellant,  nos  appellamus  Voluntatem.  Earn 
illi  putant  in  solo  esse  sapiente,  quam  sic  definiunt:  Voluntas  est  quao 
quid  cum  ratione  desiderat.  Quae  autem  ratione  adversa  incitata  est 
vehementius,  ea  libido  est,  vel  cupiditas  effrenata,  quae  in  omnibus 
etultis  invenitur." 

In  p.  183  Schweighaeuser  has  a  note  on  the  irpoatperiK^  5t5i/ajuis 
afcft  irpoatp€<ris,  which  are  generally,  he  says,  translated  by  Voluntas  ; 
but,  he  adds,  it  has  a  wider  meaning  than  is  generally  given  to  the 
Latin  word,  and  it  comprehends  the  intellect  with  the  will,  and  all 
the  active  powers  of  the  mind  which  we  sometimes  designate  by  tho 
general  name  of  Reason. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  EPICTETUS.  XXXV 

pass  through  life  calmly  and  with  little  danger,  even  when 
the  powers  of  the  will  are  very  weak,  and  hardly  ever 
exercised.  Life  with  them  is  fortunately  a  series  of  habits, 
generally  good,  or  at  least  not  bad.  This  is  the  condi- 
tion of  many  men  and  women.  They  are  good  or  seem  to 
be  good,  because  they  are  not  tried  above  their  power;  but 
if  a  temptation  should  suddenly  surprise  them  when  they 
are  not  prepared  for  it,  they  are  conquered  and  they  fall. 
Even  a  man,  who  has  trained  himself  to  the  exercise  of 
his  rational  faculties  and  has  for  a  long  time  passed  a 
blameless  life,  may  in  a  moment  when  his  vigilance  is 
relaxed,  when  he  is  off  his  gu&<d,  be  defeated  by  the 
enemy  whom  he  always  carries  about  with  him. 

The  difference  between  a  man,  who  has  within  him  the 
principles  of  reason  and  him  who  has  not,  appears  from  a 
story  told  by  Gellius  (xix.  1) : — We  were  sailing,  he  says, 
from  Cassiopa  to  Brundisium  when  a  violent  storm  came 
on.  In  the  ship  there  was  a  Stoic  philosopher,  a  man  of 
good  repute.  He  who  told  the  story  says  that  he  kept  his 
eyes  on  the  philosopher  to  see  how  he  behaved  under  the 
circumstances.  The  philosopher  did  not  weep  and  bewail 
like  the  rest,  but  his  complexion  and  apparent  perturbation 
did  not  much  differ  from  those  of  the  other  passengers. 
"When  the  danger  was  over,  a  wealthy  Greek  from  Asia, 
went  up  to  the  Stoic,  and  in  an  insulting  manner  said, 
How  is  this,  philosopher  ?  when  we  were  in  danger,  you 
were  afraid  and  grew  pale ;  but  I  was  neither  afraid  nor 
was  I  pale.  The  philosopher  after  a  little  hesitation  said, 
If  I  seemed  to  be  a  little  afraid  in  so  violent  a  tempest, 
you  are  not  worthy  to  hear  the  reason  of  it.  However  he 
told  the  man  a  story  about  Aristippus8,  who  on  a  like  occa- 
sion was  questioned  by  a  man  like  this  Greek ;  and  so  th% 
philosopher  got  rid  of  the  impertinent  fellow.  When  they 

•  Or  a  follower  of  Aristippus.    The  text  is  not  certain. 

c  2 


XXXVI  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EPICTETUS. 

arrived  at  Brundisium,  the  narrator  asked  the  philosopher 
for  an  explanation  of  his  fear,  which  the  philosopher 
readily  gave,  He  took  out  of  his  bag  a  work  of  Epictetus, 
the  fifth  book  of  his  discourses  in  which  was  the  following 
passage  (Frag,  clxxx.):  The  affects  of  the  mind  (visa- 
animi),  which  philosophers  name  ^cu/racnat,  by  which  a 
man's  mind  is  struck  by  the  first  appearance  of  a  thing 
which  approaches,  are  not  things  which  belong  to  thfe  will 
nor  in  our  power,  but  by  a  peculiar  force  they  intrude 
themselves  on  men.  But  the  assents,  which  they  name 
crvyKaTaOto-eis  (the  assents  of  the  judgment),  by  which  the 
same  affects  (visa  animi)  are  known  and  determined  are 
from  the  will  and  are  in  the  power  of  men  to  make.  For  this. 
reason  when  some  frightful  sound  in  the  heavens  or  from 
a  fall,  or  some  sudden  news  of  danger  comes,  or  any  thing- 
of  the  same  kind  happens,  it  is  unavoidable  that  even  the 
mind  of  the  wise  man  must  be  moved  somewhat  and  con- 
founded, and  that  he  must  grow  pale,  not  through  an 
opinion  which  he  has  first  conceived  of  any  danger  (or 
evil),  but  by  certain  rapid  and  inconsiderate  emotions 
which  anticipate  (prevent)  the  exercise  of  the  mind  and  the 
reason.  In  a  short  time  however  the  wise  man  does  not 
allow  these  emotions  (visa  animi)  to  remain,  but  he  rejects 
them,  and  he  sees  nothing  terrible  in  them.  But  this  is 
the  difference  between  the  fool  and  the  wise  man:  the 
fool,  as  the  things  at  the  first  impulse  appeared  to  be 
dangereus,  such  he  thinks  them  to  be ;  but  the  wise  man, 
when  he  has  been  moved  for  a  short  time,  recovers  the 
former  state  and  vigour  of  his  mind,  which  he  always  had 
with  reference  to  such  appearances,  that  they  are  not 
objects  of  fear,  but  only  terrify  by  a  false  show.9 

^This  explanation  may  be  applied  to  all  the  events,  to  all 
the  thoughts  and  to  all  the  emotions  which  disturb  the  mind 

•  This  is  the  general  sense  of  the  passage.    The  translation  is  not 
easy. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  EPICTETUS.          XXXV11 

and  the  reason,  whatever  be  their  cause  or  nature.  If  a  man's 
mind  has  been  long  under  proper  discipline,  after  reflec- 
tion he  is  able  to  recover  from  this  disorder  and  to  resume 
his  former  state.  If  he  has  not  been  under  proper  dis- 
cipline when  his  powers  of  reason  are  thus  assailed,  he 
may  do  any  thing  however  foolish  or  bad.  A  sound  ex- 
ercise of  the  faculty  of  the  Will  therefore  requires  dis- 
cipline, in  order  that  it  may  be  corrected  and  maintained. 
A  man  must  exercise  his  will  and  improve  it  by  labour  so 
as  to  make  it  conformable  to  nature  and  free.  This  exer- 
cise of  the  will  and  the  improvement  of  it  are  a  labour 
that  never  ends.  A  man  should  begin  it  as  soon  as  he 
can.  If  the  question  is  asked  how  a  man  must  begin,  who 
has  never  been  trained  by  a  parent  or  teacher  to  observe 
carefully  his  own  conduct,  to  reflect,  to  determine,  and 
then  to  act,  I  cannot  tell.  Perhaps  a  mere  accident,  some 
trifle  which  many  persons  would  not  notice,  may  be  the 
beginning  of  a  total  change  in  a  man's  life,  as  in  the  case 
of  Polemon,  who  was  a  dissolute  youth,  and  as  he  was  by 
chance  passing  the  lecture  room  of  Xenocrates,  he  and  his 
drunken  companions  burst  into  the  room.  Polemon  was 
so  affected  by  the  words  of  the  excellent  teacher,  that  he 
came  out  a  different  man,  and  at  last  succeeded  Xenocrates 
in  the  school  of  the  Academy  (iii.  c.  1).  Folly  and  bad 
habits  then  may  by  reflection  be  altered  into  wisdom  and 
a  good  course  of  life.  If  such  a  thing  hap  pens,  and  un- 
doubtedly it  has  happened,  it  may  be  said  that  the  origin 
of  the  change  is  not  in  a  man's  will,  l>ut  in  something 
external.  Granted:  a  thing  external  has  presented  an 
appearance  to  a  man,  but  the  effect  of  the  appearance 
would  not  be  the  same  in  all  men,  as  we  presume  that  it 
was  not  the  same,  as  the  story  is  told,  in  Polemon  andiiis 
companions.  One  man  in  this  case  had  a  temper  or  dis- 
position and  a  capacity  to  use  his  mental  power  and  to 
profit  by  the  words  of  Xenocrates.  It  may  bo  said  that 


XXXV111        THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  EPICTETUS. 

this  temper  or  disposition  and  capacity  are  not  in  tlte 
power  of  a  man's  Will;  and  this  is  true.  But  that 
matter  is  nothing  to  us.  Men  have  various  capacities,  and, 
as  Epictetus  would  say,  they  are  the  gift  of  God,  who  dis- 
tributes them  as  he  pleases.  One  man  has  the  power  of 
using  an  appearance  in  a  way  which  is  good  for  himself, 
and  another  has  not.  We  can  say  no  more.  In  whatever 
way  then  a  mm  has  been  led  to  exercise  his  will  towards 
a  good  end,  he  must  practise  the  exercise  of  his  will  for 
such  an  end ;  ho  must  make  a  habit  of  it,  which  habit  will 
acquire  strength ;  and  he  may  then  have  a  reasonable  hope 
that  he  will  not  often  fail  in  his  good  purpose.  This  I 
believe  to  be  the  meaning  of  Epictetus,  as  we  may  collect 
from  the  numerous  passages  in  which  he  speaks  of  the  will. 
I  hope  that  no  reader  will  think  that  I  propose  what  I 
have  said  as  a  sufficient  explanation  of  a  difficult  matter, 
I  have  only  said  what  I  think  to  be  sufficient  to  explain 
Epictetus ;  and  I  have  said  what  seems  to  me  to  be  true. 

Epicurus  taught  that  we  should  not  marry  nor  beget 
children  nor  engage  in  public  affairs,  because  these  things 
disturb  our  tranquillity.  Epictetus  and  the  Stoics  taught 
that  a  man  should  marry,  should  beget  children,  and  dis- 
charge all  the  duties  of  a  citizen.  In  one  of  his  best  dis- 
courses (iii.  o.  22 ;  About  Cynism),  in  which  he  describes 
what  kind  of  person  a  Cynic  (his  ideal  philosopher)  should 
be,  he  says  that  he  is  a  messenger  from  God  (Zeus)  to  men 
about  good  and  bad  things,  to  show  them  that  they  have 
wandered  and  are  seeking  the  substance  of  good  and  evil 
where  it  is  not ;  but  where  it  is,  they  never  think.  The 
Cynic  is  supposed  to  say,  How  is  it  possible  that  a  man 
like  himself,  who  is  houseless  and  has  nothing  can  live 
happily  ?  The  answer  is,  See,  God  has  sent  you  a  man  to 
show  you  that  it  is  possible.  The  man  has  no  city,  nor 
house,  he  has  nothing ;  he  has  no  wife,  nor  children ;  and 
yet  he  wants  nothing.  In  reply  to  a  question  whether  a 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EPICTETUS.  XXXIX 

Cynic  should  marry  and  procreate  children,,  Epictetus 
answers :  "  If  you  grant  me  a  community  of  wise  ment 
perhaps  no  man  will  readily  apply  himself  to  the  Cynic 
practice."  However,  he  says,  if  he  does,  nothing  will 
prevent  him  from  marrying  and  begetting  children,  for  his 
wife  will  be  another  like  himself.  "But,"  he  adds,  "  in  the 
present  state  of  things  which  is  like  that  of  an  army 
placed  in  battle  order,  is  it  not  fit  that  the  Cynic  should 
without  any  distraction  be  employed  only  on  the  ministra- 
tion of  God,  able  to  go  about  among  men,  not  tied  down 
to  the  common  duties  of  mankind,  nor  entangled  in  the 
ordinary  relations  of  life,  which  if  he  neglects,  he  will  not 
maintain  the  character  of  an  honourable  and  good  man? 
and  if  he  observes  them,  he  will  lose  the  character  of  the 
messenger,  and  spy  and  herald  of  God."  The  conclusion 
is  that  it  is  better  for  a  minister  of  God  not  to  marry.10 

Epictetus  distinguishes  the  soul  from  the  body  in  the 
chapter  (iv.  c.  11)  about  purity  (cleanliness);  but  he 
wisely  does  not  attempt  to  define  the  soul.  He  says, 
"  We  suppose  that  there  is  something  superior  in  man  and 
that  we  first  receive  it  from  the  Gods :  for  since  the  Gods 
by  their  nature  are  pure  and  free  from  corruption,  so  far 
as  men  approach  them  by  reason,  so  far  do  they  cling  to 
purity  and  to  a  love  (habit)  of  purity."  It  is  however 
impossible  for  man's  nature  to  be  altogether  pure;  but 
reason  endeavours  to  make  human  nature  love  purity. 
"  The  first  then  and  highest  purity  is  that  which  is  in  the 
soul ;  and  we  say  the  same  of  impurity.  But  you  could 
not  discover  the  impurity  of  the  soul  as  you  could  discover 

'•  Dr.  Farrar  says  in  his  'Seekers  after  God'  (Epictetus  p.  213), 
**That  Epictetus  approves  of  celibacy  as  a  '  counsel  of  perfection/  a- Jd 
indeed  his  views  have  a  close  and  remarkable  resemblance  to  those  of 
St.  Paul."  I  do  not  understand  the  first  part  of  this  sentence ;  and 
the  reader  of  Epictetus  will  see  that  the  second  part  is  not  true.  There 
10  a  note  on  the  matter  (pp.  258, 316). 


xl  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  EPICTETUS. 

that  of  the  body :  but  as  to  the  soul,  what  else  could  you 
find  in  it  than  that  which  makes  it  filthy  in  respect  to  the 
acts  which  are  her  own  ?  Now  the  acts  of  the  soul  are 
movement  towards  an  object  or  movement  from  it,  desire, 
aversion,  preparation,  design  (purpose),  assent.  What  then 
is  it  which  in  these  acts  makes  the  soul  filthy  and  impure  ? 
Nothing  else  than  her  own  bad  judgments  (Kpt/xara).  Con- 
sequently the  impurity  of  the  soul  is  the  soul's  bad 
opinions ;  and  the  purification  of  the  soul  is  the  planting 
in  it  of  proper  opinions;  and  the  soul  is  pure  which  has 
proper  opinions,  for  the  soul  alone  in  her  own  acts  is  free 
from  perturbation  and  pollution." 

Epictetus  says  (iv.  c.  7)  that  man  is  not  "flesh  nor 
bones  nor  sinews  (vevpa),  but  he  is  that  which  makes  use 
of  these  parts  of  the  body  and  governs  them  and  follows 
(understands)  the  appearances  of  things."  This  opinion 
seems  to  be  the  same  or  nearly  the  same  as  Bp.  Butler's 
(iv.  c.  7,  note  10).  If  then  Epictetus  had  any  distinct 
notion  of  the  soul,  and  he  is  a  man  whose  notions  are 
generally  distinct,  I  think  that  his  opinion  of  man's  body 
and  of  man's  soul  are,  that  a  man's  body  is  not  the  man, 
but  the  body  is  that  "  finely  tempered  clay"  in  which  the 
man  dwells,  and  without  the  body  he  could  not  live  this 
earthly  life :  and  his  notion  of  the  soul  is  that  which  is 
stated  above  (iv.  c.  11  and  c.  7).  As  to  the  mode  and  nature 
of  this  connexion  between  the  body  and  the  soul,  I  can 
only  suppose  that  he  would  have  disclaimed  all  knowledge 
of  it,  as  he  does  of  the  nature  of  perception  (p.  82) ;  and 
I  do  not  suppose  that  any  philosopher  or  theologian  would 
venture  to  say  what  this  connexion  of  soul  and  body  is. 
In  the  life  then  which  man  lives  on  the  earth  I  think  that 
tfte  opinions  of  Epictetus  are  the  same  or  nearly  the  same 
as  those  of  Swedenborg ;  but  after  the  event,  which  comes 
to  all  men,  and  which  we  name  Death,  the  opinions  are 
very  different. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EPICTETUS.  xli 

And  what  is  Death?  (p.  230  in  the  chapter  on  Solitude). 
It  is  a  going  "  to  the  place  from  which  you  came,  to  your 
friends  and  kinsmen,  to  the  elements :  what  there  was  in 
you  of  fire  goes  to  fire,  of  earth  to  earth ;  of  air  (spirit) 
to  air;  of  water  to  water:  no  Hades,  nor  Acheron,  nor 
Cocytus,  nor  Pyriphlegethon,  but  all  is  full  of  Gods  and 
Daemons."  He  says  (p.  282) :  "  death  is  a  greater  change, 
not  from  the  state  which  now  is  to  that  which  is  not,  but 
to  that  which  is  not  now.  Shall  I  then  no  longer  exist  ? 
You  will  not  exist,  but  you  will  be  something  else,  of  which 
the  world  now  has  need :  for  you  also  came  into  existence 
not  when  you  chose,  but  when  the  world  had  need  of  you." 
Death  is  the  resolution  of  the  matter  of  the  body  into  the 
things  out  of  which  it  is  composed  (p.  347).  This  is  dis- 
tinct and  intelligible.  Of  the  soul,  which,  as  we  have 
seen,  he  considers  to  be  in  some  way  different  from  the 
body  during  life,  he  does  not  speak  so  distinctly.  I  think 
that  he  means,  if  he  means  any  thing,  something  like  what 
I  have  said  in  p.  347,  note  4. 

The  philosopher,  who  appears  to  have  no  belief  in  a 
future  existence,  as  it  is  generally  understood,  teaches  that 
we  ought  to  live  such  a  life  in  all  our  thoughts  and  in  all 
our  acts  as  a  Christian  would  teach.  He  says  (p.  285), 
"  Then  in  the  place  of  all  other  delights  substitute  this, 
that  of  being  conscious  that  you  are  obeying  God,  that  not 
in  word,  but  in  deed  you  are  performing  the  acts  of  a  wise 
and  good  man."  He  looks  for  no  reward  for  doing  what 
;he  ought  to  do.  The  virtuous  man  has  his  reward  in  his 
own  acts.  If  he  lives  conformably  to  nature,  he  will  do 
what  is  best  in  this  short  life,  and  will  obtain  all  the  hap- 
piness which  he  can  obtain  in  no  ether  way. 

He  says  (p.  310) :  "  Who  are  you  and  for  what  purpose 
did  you  come  into  the  world  ?  Did  not  God  introduce  yoti 
here,  did  he  not  show  you  the  light,  did  he  not  give  you 
fellow  workers,  and  perception  and  reason?  and  as  whom 


xlii  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EHCTETUS. 

did  he  introduce  yon  here?  did  he  not  introduce  you  as 
subject  to  death,  and  as  one  to  live  on  the  earth  with  a 
little  flesh,  and  to  observe  his  administration  and  to  join 
with  him  in  the  spectacle  and  the  festival  for  a  short  time  ? 
Will  you  not  then,  as  long  as  you  have  been  permitted, 
after  seeing  the  spectacle  and  the  solemnity,  when  he  leads 
you  out,  go  with  adoration  of  him  and  thanks  for  what  you 
have  heard  and  seen  "  ? 

Perhaps  we  may  say  that  the  conclusion  of  Epictetus 
about  the  soul  after  the  separation  from  the  body  is  equiva- 
lent to  a  declaration  that  he  knew  nothing  about  it;  as  he 
disclaims  sometimes  the  knowledge  of  other  things.  We 
cannot  assume  that  in  the  books  which  are  lost  he  ex- 
pressed any  opinions  which  are  inconsistent  with  those 
contained  in  the  books  which  exist.  He  must  have  known 
the  opinion  of  Socrates  about  the  immortality  of  the  soul, 
or  the  opinion  attributed  to  Socrates ;  but  he  has  not  said 
that  he  assents  to  it,  nor  does  he  express  dissent  from  it. 
Bp.  Butler  in  his  Analogy  of  Beligion  Natural  and  Ee- 
vealed  (Part  I.  Of  Natural  Religion,  Chap.  I.  of  a  Future 
Life)  has  examined  the  question  of  a  Future  Life  with  his 
usual  modesty,  good  sense  and  sagacity.  The  inquiry  is  very 
difficult.  He  says  at  the  end  of  the  chapter :  "  The  credi- 
bility of  a  future  life,  which  has  been  here  insisted  on,  how 
little  soever  it  may  satisfy  our  curiosity,  seems  to  answer 
all  the  purposes  of  religion,  in  like  manner  as  a  demon- 
strative proof  would.  Indeed,  a  proof,  even  a  demon- 
strative one,  of  a  future  life,  would  not  be  a  proof  of 
religion.  For,  that  we  are  to  live  hereafter,  is  just  as 
reconcileable  with  the  scheme  of  atheism,  and  as  well  to 
be  accounted  for  by  it,  as  that  we  are  now  alive  is ;  and 
therefore  nothing  can  be  more  absurd  than  to  argue  from 
that  scheme  that  there  can  be  no  future  state.  But  as 
religion  implies  a  future  state,  any  presumption  against 
eueh  a  state  is  a  presumption  against  religion." 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  EPICTETUS. 

I  conclude  that  Epictetus,  who  was  a  religious  man,  and 
who  believed  in  the  existence  of  God  and  his  administra- 
tion of  all  things,  did  not  deny  a  future  life;  nor  does  he 
say  that  he  believes  it.    I  conclude  that  he  did  not  under- 
stand  it ;  that  it  was  beyond  his  conception,  as  the  nature  of 
God  also  was.    His  great  merit  as  a  teacher  is  that  he 
"  attempted  to  show  that  there  is  in  man's  nature  and  in 
the  constitution  of  things  sufficient  reason  for  living  a 
virtuous  life."11     He  knew  well  what  man's  nature  is,  and 
he  endeavoured  to  teach  us  how  we  can  secure  happiness 
in  this  life  as  far  as  we  are  capable  of  attaining  it. 

More  might  be  said;  but  this  is  enough.  I  will  only 
add  that  the  Stoics  have  been  charged  with  arrogance ;  and 
the  charge  is  just.  Epictetus  himself  has  been  blamed 
for  it  even  by  modern  theologians,  who  are  not  always  free 
from  this  fault  themselves.  If  there  is  any  arrogance  or 
apparent  arrogance  in  Epictetus,  he  did  not  teach  it,  for 
he  has  especially  warned  us  against  this  fault,  as  the 
reader  will  see  in  several  passages. 

II  I  am  not  sure  that  I  rightly  understood  the  Apostle  Paul,  when 
I  wrote  the  note  22  in  p.  283.    Tho  words  "Let  us  eat  and  drink,  for 
to-morrow  we  die,"  are  said  to  be  a  quotation  from  a  Greek  writer. 
The  words  then  may  be  taken  not  as  Paul's,  but  as  the  conclusion  of 
foolish  persons.    A  friend  who,  as  I  understand  his  remarks,  is  of  this 
opinion,  also  adds  that  as  Paul  was  a  learned  man,  and  knew  some- 
thing about  the  Greek  philosophers,  he  would  certainly  give  them 
credit  for  better  and  more  rational  opinions.    This  may  be  the  true 
meaning  of  the  words.    Paul  is  not  always  easy  to  understand,  even 
by  those  who  make  a  special  study  of  his  Epistle*. 


AEEIAN'S 
DISCOUKSES   OF  EPICTETUS. 

ARRIAN  to  Lucius  GELLIUS,  with  wishes  for  his  happiness. 

I  NEITHER  wrote  these  Discourses x  of  Epictetus  in  the  waj 
in  which  a  man  might  write  such  things ;  nor  did  I  make 
them  public  myself,  inasmuch  as  I  declare  that  I  did  not 
even  write  them.  But  whatever  I  heard  him  say,  the 
same  I  attempted  to  write  down  in  his  own  words  as 
nearly  as  possible,  for  the  purpose  of  preserving  them  as 
memorials  to  myself  afterwards  of  the  thoughts  and  the 
freedom  of  speech  of  Epictetus.  Accordingly,  the  Dis- 
courses are  naturally  such  as  a  man  would  address  with- 
out preparation  to  another,  not  such  as  a  man  would  writt 

1  A.  Gellius  (i.  2  and  xvii.  19)  speaks  of  the  Discourses  of  Epictetus 
being  arranged  by  Arrian;  and  Gullius  (xix.  1)  speaks  of  a  fifth  book 
of  these  Discourses,  but  only  four  are  extant  and  some  fragments.  The 
whole  number  of  books  was  eight,  as  PJiotius  (Cod.  58)  says.  There 
is  also  extant  an  Encheiridion  or  Manual,  consisting  of  short  pieces 
selected  from  the  Discourses  of  Epictetus ;  and  there  is  the  valuable 
•commentary  on  the  Encheiridion  written  by  Simplicius  in  the  sixth 
century  A.D.  and  in  the  reign  of  Justinian. 

Arrian  explains  in  a  manner  what  he  means  by  saying  that  he  did 
not  write  these  Discourses  of  Epictutus ;  but  he  does  not  explain  his 
meaning  when  he  says  that  he  did  not  make  them  public.  He  tells 
us  that  he  did  attempt  to  write  down  in  the  words  of  Epictetus  what 
the  philosopher  said ;  but  how  it  happened  that  they  were  first  pu|> 
iished,  without  his  knowledge  or  consent,  Arrian  does  not  say.  It 
appears,  however,  that  he  did  see  the  Discourses  when  they  were 
published ;  and  as  Schweighaeuser  remarks,  he  would  naturally  correct 
any  errors  that  he  detected,  and  so  there  would  be  an  edition  revised 
by  himself.  Schweighaeuser  has  a  note  (i.  ch,  2G,  13)  on  the  difficulties 
which  we  now  find  in  the  Discourses. 


2  EPIOTETUS. 

with  the  view  of  others  reading  them.  Now,  being  each, 
I  do  not  know  how  they  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  public, 
without  either  my  consent  or  my  knowledge.  But  it 
concerns  me  little  if  I  shall  be  considered  incompetent 
to  write ;  and  it  concerns  Epictetns  not  at  all  if  any  man 
shall  despise  his  words ;  for  at  the  time  when  hs  uttered 
them,  it  was  plain  that  he  had  no  other  purpose  than  to 
move  the  minds  of  his  hearers  to  the  best  things.  If,  indeed, 
these  Discourses  should  produce  this  effect,  they  will  have, 
I  think,  the  result  which  the  words  of  philosophers  ought 
to  have.  But  if  they  shall  not,  let  those  who  read  them 
know  that,  when  Epictetus  delivered  them,  the  hearer 
could  not  avoid  being  affected  in  the  way  that  Epictetus 
wished  him  to  be.  But  if  the  Discourses  themselves, 
as  they  are  written,  do  not  effect  this  result,  it  may  be 
that  the  fault  is  mine,  or,  it  may  be,  that  the  thing  ia 
unavoidable. 
Farewell! 


BOOK  I. 


CHAPTER  L 

OF  THB  THINGS  WHICH   ARE  IN  OUR  POWER,   AND  NOT   IN    OUR 

POWER. 

OF  all  the  faculties  (except  that  which  I  shall  soon  men- 
tion), you  will  find  not  one  which  is  capable  of  contem- 
plating itself,  and,  consequently,  not  capable  either  of 
approving  or  disapproving.1  How  far  does  the  grammatic 
art  possess  the  contemplating  power  ?  As  far  as  forming 
a  judgment  about  what  is  written  and  spoken.  And  how 
far  music?  As  far  as  judging  about  melody.  Does 
either  of  them  then  contemplate  itself?  By  no  means. 
But  when  you  must  write  something  to  your  friend, 
grammar  will  tell  you  what  words  you  should  write  ;  but 
whether  you  should  write  or  not,  grammar  will  not  tell 
you.  And  so  it  is  with  music  as  to  musical  sounds  ;  but 
whether  you  should  sing  at  the  present  time  and  play  on 
the  lute,  or  do  neither,  music  will  not  tell  you.  What 
faculty  then  will  tell  you?  That  which  contemplates 
both  itself  and  all  other  things.  And  what  is  this  faculty  ? 
The  rational  faculty  ;  2  for  this  is  the  only  faculty  that  we 


1  "  This  moral  approving  and  disapproving  faculty  "  is  Bp. 
translation  of  the  5ofc(ua<rrtic^  and  &iro5o/ci/<ta<rTi/c^  of  Epiotetus  (i.  1,  1) 
in  his  dissertation,  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.    See  his  note. 

2  The  rational  faculty  is  the  AoyiKfy  tyvxh  of  Epictetus  and  Anto- 
ninus, of  which  Antoninus  says  (xi.  1)  :  "  These  are  the  properties  of 
the  rational  soul  :  it  sees  itself,  analyses  itself,  and  makes  itself  such 
as  it  chooses  ;  the  fruit  which  it  bears,  itself  enjoys," 

B  2 


4  EPICTETUS. 

have  received  which  examines  itself,  what  it  is,  and  what 
power  it  has,  and  what  is  the  value  of  this  gift,  and  exa- 
mines all  other  faculties:  for  what  else  is  there  which 
tells  us  that  golden  things  are  beautiful,  for  they  do  not 
say  so  themselves?  Evidently  it  is  the  faculty  which  is 
capable  of  judging  of  appearances.3  What  else  judges  of 
music,  grammar,  and  the  other  faculties,  proves  their  uses, 
and  points  out  the  occasions  for  using  them?  Nothing 
else. 

As  then  it  was  fit  to  be  so,  that  which  is  best  of 
all  and  supreme  over  all  is  the  only  thing  which  the 
gods  have  placed  in  our  power,  the  right  use  of  appear- 
ances ;  but  all  other  things  they  have  not  placed  in  our 
power.  Was  it  because  they  did  not  chouse  ?  I  indeed 
think  that,  if  they  had  been  able,  they  would  have  put 
<these  other  things  also  in  our  power,  but  they  certainly 
could  not.4  For  as  we  exist  on  the  earth,  and  are  bound 
to  such  a  body  and  to  such  companions,  how  was  it  pos- 
sible for  us  not  to  be  hindered  as  to  these  things  by 
externals  ? 

•  But  what  says  Zeus?  Epictetus,  if  it  were  possible, 
I  would  have  made  both  your  little  body  and  your  little 
property  free  and  not  exposed  to  hindrance.  But  now  be 
not  ignorant  of  this :  this  body  is  not  yours,  but  it  is  clay 
finely  tempered.  And  since  I  was  not  able  to  do  for  you 

8  This  is  what  he  has  just  named  the  rational  faculty.  The  Stoics 
gave  the  name  of  appearances  (Qavrao-iai)  to  all  impressions  received 
by  the  senses,  and  to  all  emotions  caused  by  external  things.  Chry- 
eippus  said :  Qavracrla  tffrl  irdQos  cV  TTJ  tyvxy  yu'6/jLevov,  eVSet/cy^eyoi/ 
cavr6  re  Kal  rk  ireitoniK&$  (Plutarch,  iv.  c.  12,  Do  Placit.  Philosoph.). 

4  Compare  Antoninus,  ii.  3.  Epictetus  does  not  intend  to  limit  the 
power  of  the  gods,  but  he  means  that  the  constitution  of  things  being 
what  it  is,  they  cannot  do  contradictories.  They  have  so  constituted 
things  that  man  ia  hindered  by  externals.  How  then  could  they 
give  to  man  a  power  of  not  being  hindered  by  externals?  Seneca 
(De  Providentia,  c.  6)  says :  "  But  it  may  be  said,  many  things 
happen  which  cause  sadness,  fear,  and  are"  hard  to  bear.  Because 
(ttbd  says)  I  conM  not  save  you  from  them,  I  have  armed  your  minds 
against  all."  This  is  the  answer  to  those  who  imagine  that  they  have 
disproved  the  common  assertion  of  the  omnipotence  of  God,  when 
they  ask  whether  He  can  combine  inherent  contradictions,  whether  He 
can  cause  two  and  two  to  make  five.  This  is  indeed  a  very  absurd 
way  of  talking. 


EPICTETUS.  5 

what  I  have  mentioned,  I  have  given  you  a  small  portion 
of  us,5  this  faculty  of  pursuing  an  object  and  avoiding  it, 
and  the  faculty  of  desire  and  aversion,  and,  in  a  word,  the 
faculty  of  using  the  appearances  of  things ;  and  if  you  will 
take  care  of  this  faculty  and  consider  it  your  only  posses- 
sion, you  will  never  be  hindered,  never  meet  with  impedi- 
ments ;  you  will  not  lament,  you  will  not  blame,  you  will 
not  flatter  any  person. 

Well,  do  these  seem  to  you  small  matters?  I  hope 
not.  Be  content  with  them  then  and  pray  to  the 
gods.  But  now  when  it  is  in  our  power  to  look  after 
one  thing,  and  to  attach  ourselves  to  it,  we  prefer  to  look 
after  many  things,  and  to  be  bound  to  many  things,  to 
the  body  and  to  property,  and  to  brother  and  to  friend, 
and  to  child  and  to  slave.  Since  then  we  are  bound  to 
many  things,  we  are  depressed  by  them  and  dragged  down. 
For  this  reason,  when  the  weather  is  not  fit  for  sailing,  we 
sit  down  and  torment  ourselves,  and  continually  look  out 
to  see  what  wind  is  blowing.  It  is  north.  What  is  that 
to  us  ?  When  will  the  west  wind  blow?  When  it  shall 
choose,  my  good  man,  or  when  it  shall  please  Aeolus ;  for 
God  has  not  made  you  the  manager  of  the  winds,  but 
Aeolus.6  What  then  ?  We  must  make  the  best  use  that 
we  can  of  the  things  which  are  in  our  power,  and  use  the 
rest  according  to  their  nature.  What  is  their  nature 
then  ?  As  God  may  please. 

Must  I  then  alone  have  my  head  cut  off?  What,  would 
you  have  all  men  lose  their  heads  that  you  may  be  con- 

5  Schweighaeuser  observes  that  these  faculties  of  pursuit  and  avoid- 
ance, and  of  desire  and  aversion,  and  even  the  faculty  of  using 
appearances,  belong  to  animals  as  well  as  to  man  ;  but  animals  in 
using  appearances  are  moved  by  passion  only,  and  do  not  understand 
what  they  are  doing,  while  in  man  these  passions  are  under  his 
control.  Salmasius  proposed  to  change  ^/xerepoi/  into  vptTepov,  to 
remove  the  difficulty  about  these  animal  passions  being  called  "a 
small  portion  of  us  (the  gods)."  Schweighaenser,  however,  though  he 
sees  the  difficulty,  does  not  accept  the  emendation.  Perhaps  Arrian 
has  here  imperfectly  represented  what  his  muster  said,  and  perhap*»h6 
did  not. 

•  He  alludes  to  the  Odyssey,  X.  21 : 

enwv  iroii)ff€  Kpoviw. 


6  EPICTETUS. 

soled  ?  Will  you  not  stretch  out  your  neck  as  Lateranus7 
did  at  Rome  when  Nero  ordered  him  to  be  beheaded? 
For  when  he  had  stretched  out  his  neck,  and  received  a 
feeble  blow,  which  made  him  draw  it  in  for  a  moment,  he 
stretched  it  out  again.  And  a  little  before,  when  he  was 
visited  by  Epaphroditus,8  Nero's  froedman,  who  asked  him 
about  the  cause  of  offence  which  he  had  given,  he  said,  u  If 
I  choose  to  tell  anything,  I  will  tell  your  master." 

"What  then  should  a  man  have  in  readiness  in  such  cir- 
cumstances? What  else  than  this?  What  is  mine,  and 
what  is  not  mine ;  and  what  is  permitted  to  me,  and  what 
is  not  permitted  to  me.  I  must  die.  Must  I  then  die 
lamenting  ?  I  must  be  put  in  chains.  Must  I  then  also 
lament?  I  must  go  into  exile.  Does  any  man  then 
hinder  me  from  going  with  smiles  and  cheerfulness  and 
contentment  ?  Tell  me  the  secret  which  you  possess.  I 
will  not,  for  this  is  in  my  power.  But  I  will  put  you  in 
chains.9  Man,  what  are  you  talking  about  ?  Me  in 
chains  ?  You  may  fetter  rny  leg,  but  my  will 10  not  even 
Zeus  himself  can  overpower.  I  will  throw  you  into  prison. 
My  poor  body,  you  mean.  I  will  cut  your  head  off.  When 
then  have  I  told  you  that  my  head  alone  cannot  be  cut 
•off?  These  are  the  things  which  philosophers  should  medi- 
tate on,  which  they  should  write  daily,  in  which  they 
.should  exorcise  themselves. 

Thrasea n  used  to  say,  I  would  rather  be  killed  to-day 

7  Plautius  Lateranus,  consul-elect,  was  charged  with  being  engaged 
in  Piso's  conspiracy  against  Nero.    He  was  hurried  to  execution 
without  being  allowed  to  see  his  children;  and  though  the  tribune 
who  executed  him  was  privy  to  the  plot,  Lateranus  said  nothing. 
(Tacit.  Ann.  xv.  49,  GO.) 

8  Epaphroditus  was  a  freedman  of  Nero,  and  once  the  master  of 
Epictetus.    He  was  Nero's  secretary.    One  good  act  is  recorded  of 
him :  he  helped  Nero  to  kill  himself,  and  for  this  act  he  was  killed  by 
Dornitian  (Suetonius,  Dornitian,  c.  14). 

9  This  is  an  imitation  of  a  passage  in  the  Bacchae  of  Euripides 
(v.  492,  &c.),  which  is  also  imitated  by  Horace  (Epp.  i.  16). 

J<!  %  irpoaipeffis.  It  is  sometimes  rendered  by  the  Lathi  propo~ 
situm  or  by  voluntas,  the  will. 

11  Thrasea  Paetus,  a  Stoic  philosopher,  who  was  ordered  in  Kero's 
time  to  put  himself  to  death  (Tacit.  Ann.  xvi.  21-35).  He  was 
the  husband  of  Arria,who£e  mother  Arria,  the  wife  of  Caecina  Paetus, 


EPICTETUS.  7 

than  banished  to-morrow.  What  then  did  Eufus 12  say  to 
him?  If  you  choose  death  as  the  heavier  misfortune, 
how  great  is  the  folly  of  your  choice?  But  if,  as  the 
lighter,  who  has  given  you  the  choice?  Will  you  not 
study  to  be  content  with  that  which  has  been  given  to 
you? 

What  then  did  Agrippinus 13  say  ?  Ho  said,  "  I  am  not 
a  hindrance  to  myself."  When  it  was  reported  to  him 
that  his  trial  was  going  on  in  the  Senate,  he  said,  "  1  hope 
it  may  turn  out  well ;  but  it  is  the  fifth  hour  of  the  day  " 
— this  was  the  time  when  he  was  used  to  exercise  himself 
and  then  take  the  cold  bath — "let  us  go  and  take  our 
exercise."  After  he  had  taken  his  exercise,  one  comes 
and  tells  him,  You  have  been  condemned.  To  banish- 
ment, he  replies,  or  to  death  ?  To  banishment.  What 
about  my  pi-operty  ?  It  is  not  taken  from  you.  Let  us 
go  to  Aricia  then, 14  he  said,  and  dine. 

This  it  is  to  have  studied  what  a  man  ought  to  study ; 
to  have  made  desire,  aversion,  free  from  hindrance,  and 
free  from  all  that  a  man  would  avoid.  I  must  die.  If 
now,  I  am  ready  to  die.  If,  after  a  short  time,  I  now  dine 
because  it  is  the  dinner-hour ;  after  this  I  will  then  die. 
How  ?  Like  a  man  who  gives  up 15  what  belongs  to 
another. 

in  the  time  of  the  Emperor  Claudius,  heroically  showed  her  husband 
the  way  to  die  (Plinins,  Letters,  iii.  16.)  Martial  has  immortalised 
the  elder  Arria  in  a  famous  epigram  (i.  14)  : — 

"  When  Arria  to  her  Paetus  gave  the  sword, 
Which  her  own  band  from  her  chaste  bosom  drew, 
*  This  wound,'  she  said,  *  believe  me,  gives  no  pain, 
But  that  will  pain  me  which  thy  hand  will  do.'  *' 

12  C.  Musonius  Rufus,  a  Tuscan  by  birth,  of  equestrian  rank,  a 
philosopher  and  Stoic  (Tacit.  Hist.  iii.  81). 

13  Paconius  Agrippmus  was  condemned  in  Nero's  time.  The  ehargo 
against  him  was  that  he  inherited  his  father's  hatred  of  the  head  of 
the  Eoman  state  (Tacit.  Ann.  xvi.  28).    The  father  of  Agrippmus 
had  been  put  to  death  under  Tiberius  (Suetonius,  Tib.  c.  61). 

14  Aricia,  about  twenty  Roman  miles  from  Eome,  on  the  Via  Appia 
(Horace,  Sat.  i.  5,  1) : —  '* 

"Kgressum  raagna  me  excepit  Aricia  Roma." 

15  Epictetus,  Encheiridion,  c.  11:  "Never  say  on  the  occasion  of 
any  thing, '  I  have  lost  it/  but  say,  *  I  have  returned  it.' " 


EPICTETCSL 


CHAPTER  II. 

HOW  A  MAK  ON  EVERY  OCCASION    CAN    MAINTAW   HIS    PROPER 
CHARACTER. 

To  the  rational  animal  only  is  the  irrational  intolerable; 
but  that  which  is  rational  is  tolerable.  Blows  are  not 
naturally  intolerable.  How  is  that  ?  See  how  the  Lace- 
daemonians l  endure  whipping  when  they  have  learned  that 
whipping  is  consistent  with  reason.  To  hang  yourself  is 
i\ot  intolerable.  When  then  you  have  the  opinion  that  it 
is  rational,  you  go  and  hang  yourself.  In  short,  if  we 
observe,  we  shall  find  that  the  animal  man  is  pained  by 
nothing  so  much  as  by  that  which  is  irrational ;  and,  on 
the  contrary,  attracted  to  nothing  so  much  as  to  that 
which  is  rational. 

But  the  rational  and  the  irrational  appear  such  in  a 
different  way  to  different  persons,  just  as  the  good  and  the 
bad,  the  profitable  and  the  unprofitable.  For  this  reason, 
particularly,  we  need  discipline,  in  order  to  learn  how  to 
adapt  the  preconception  2  of  the  rational  and  the  irrational 
to  the  several  things  conformably  to  nature.  But  in  order 
to  determine  the  rational  and  the  irrational,  we  use  not 
only  the  estimates  of  external  things,  but  we  consider  also 

1  The  Spartan  boys  used  to  be  whipped  at  the  altar  of  Artemis 
Orthia  till  blood  flowed  abundantly,  and  sometimes  till  death ;  but 
they  never  uttered  even  a  groan  (Cicero,  Tuscul.  ii.  14 ;  v.  27). 

2  The  preconception  (vp6\ytyis)  is  thus  defined  by  the  Stoics :  fort 
ty  %  irp6\yfyis  &vota  QUO-IK))  ruv  KaO'  %\ov  (Dingenes  Laert.  vii.).    "  We 
name  Anticipation  all  knowledge,  by  which  I  can  a  priori  know  and 
determine  that  which  belongs  to  empirical  knowledge,  and  without 
doubt  this  is  the  sense  in  which  Epicurus  used  his  expression  -n-pA 
\-ntyis"  (Kant,   Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  p.  152,  7th  ed.).     He 
adds :    "  But  since  there  is  something  in  appearances  which  ne.ver 
can  be  known  a  priori,  and  which  consequently  constitutes  the  d*#er- 
ence  between  empirical  knowledge  and  knowledge  a  priori,  that  is, 
sensation  (as  the  material  of  observation),  it  follows  that  this  sen- 
sation is  specially  that  which  cannot  be  anticipated  (it  cannot  be  a 
7rp*AipJ/is).    On  the  other  hand,  we  could  name  the  pure  determina- 
tions in  space  and  time,  both  in  respect  to  form  and  magnitude,  an- 
ticipations of  the  appearances,  because  these  determinations  represent 

priori  whatever  may  be  presented  to  us  d  posteriori  in  experience.." 


EPICTETUS.  9 

what  is  appropriate  to  each  person.  For  to  one  man  it  w 
consistent  with  reason  to  hold  a  chamber  pot  for  another, 
and  to  look  to  this  only,  that  if  he  does  riot  hold  it,  he  will 
receive  stripes,  and  he  will  not  receive  his  food  :  but  if  he 
shall  hold  the  pot,  he  will  not  suffer  anything  hard  or  dis- 
agreeable. But  to  another  man  not  only  does  the  holding 
of  a  chamber  pot  appear  intolerable  for  himself,  but  in- 
tolerable also  for  him  to  allow  another  to  do  this  office  for 
him.  If  then  you  ask  me  whether  you  should  hold  the- 
chamber  pot  or  not,  I  shall  Fay  to  you  that  the  receiving* 
of  food  is  worth  more  than  the  not  receiving  of  it,  and  the 
being  scourged  is  a  greater  indignity  than  not  being 
scourged ;  80  that  if  you  measure  your  interests  by  thcso 
things,  go  and  hold  the  chamber  pot.  "  But  this,"  you 
say,  "  would  not  be  worthy  of  me."  Well  then,  it  is  you- 
who  must  introduce  this  consideration  into  the  inquiry, 
not  1 ;  for  it  is  you  who  know  yourself,  how  much  you  are 
worth  to  yourself,  and  at  what  price  you  sell  yourself;  for 
men  sell  themselves  at  various  prices. 

For  this  reason,  when  Florus  was  deliberating  whether 
he  should  go  down  to  Nero's  3  spectacles,  and  also  perform 
in  them  himself,  Agrippinus  said  to  him,  Go  down : 
and  when  Florus  asked  Agrippinus,  Why  do  not  you  go- 
down?  Agrippinus  replied,  Because  I  do  not  even  deli- 
berate about  the  matter.  For  he  who  has  once  brought 
himself  to  deliberate  about  such  matters,  and  to  calculate 
the  value  of  external  things,  corncs  very  near  to  those 
who  have  forgotten  their  own  character.  For  why  do  you 
ask  me  the  question,  whether  death  is  preferable  or  life  ? 
I  say  life.  Pain  or  pleasure  ?  I  say  pleasure.  But  if  I 
do  not  take  a  part  in  the  tragic  acting,  I  shall  have  my 
head  struck  off.  Go  then  and  take  a  part,  but  I  will  not. 
Why?  Because  you  consider  yourself  to  bo  only  one 
thread  of  those  which  are  in  the  tunic.  Well  then  it  was 
fitting  for  you  to  take  care  how  you  should  bo  like  the  rest 
of  men,  just  as  the  thread  has  no  design  to  be  anything 

8  Nero  was  passionately  fond  of  scenic  representations,  and  used  to- 
induce  the  descendants  of  noble  families,  whose  poverty  made  them, 
consent,  to  appear  on  the  stage  (Tacitus,  Annals,  xiv.  14 ;  Suetonhu^ 
Nero,  o.  21). 


10  EPICTETUS. 

superior  to  the  other  threads.  But  I  wish  to  be  purple,4 
that  small  part  which  is  bright,  and  makes  all  the  rest 
appear  graceful  and  beautiful.  Why  then  do  you  tell  me 
to  make  myself  like  the  many  ?  and  if  I  do,  how  shall  1 
still  be  purple  ? 

Priscus  Helvidius 5  also  saw  this,  and  acted  conformably. 
For  when  Vespasian  sent  and  commanded  him  not  to  go 
into  the  senate,  he  replied,  "  It  is  in  yonr  power  not  to 
allow  me  to  be  a  member  of  the  senate,  but  so  long  as  I 
am,  I  must  go  in."  Well,  go  in  then,  says  the  em- 
peror, but  say  nothing.  Do  not  ask  my  opinion,  and 
I  will  be  silent.  But  I  must  ask  your  opinion.  And 
I  must  say  what  I  think  right.  But  if  you  do,  I 
shall  put  you  to  death.  When  then  did  I  tell  you 
that  I  am  immortal?  You  will  do  your  part,  and  I 
will  do  mine :  it  is  your  part  to  kill ;  it  is  mine  to  die, 
but  not  in  fear :  yours  to  banish  me ;  mine  to  depart 
without  sorrow. 

AVhat  good  then  did  Priscus  do,  who  was  only  a  single 
person  ?  And  what  good  does  the  purple  do  for  the  toga  ? 
Why,  what  else  than  this,  that  it  is  conspicuous  in  the 
toga  as  purple,  and  is  displayed  also  as  a  fine  example  to 
all  other  things?  But  in  such  circumstances  another 
would  have  replied  to  Caesar  who  forbade  him  to  enter  the 
senate,  I  thank  you  for  sparing  me.  But  such  a  man 
Vespasian  would  not  even  have  forbidden  to  enter  the 
senate,  for  he  knew  that  he  would  either  sit  there  like  an 
earthen  vessel,  or,  if  he  spoke,  he  would  say  what  Caesar 
wished,  and  add  even  more. 

4  The  "  purple  "  is  the  broad  purple  border  on  the  toga  named  tho 
toga  praetexta,  worn  by  certain  Roman  magistral  s  and  some  others, 
and  by  senators,  it  is  said,  on  certain  days  (Cic.  Phil.  ii.  43). 

*  Helvidius  Priscus,  a  Eoman  senator  and  a  philosopher,  is  com- 
mended by  Tacitus  (Hist.  iv.  4,  5)  as  an  honest  man :  "  He  followed 
the  philosophers  who  considered  those  things  only  to  be  good  which 
are  virtuous,  those  only  to  be  bad  which  are  foul ;  and  he  reckoned 
power,  rank,  and  all  other  things  which  are  external  to  the  mind  aa 
neither  good  nor  bad."  Vespasian,  probably  in  a  fit  of  passion,  being 
provoked  by  Helvidius,  ordered  him  to  be  put  to  death,  and  then 
revoked  the  order  when  it  was  too  late  (Suetoniu^  Vespasianus, 
o.  15). 


EPICTETUS.  11 

In  this  way  an  athlete  also  acted  who  was  in  danger  of 
dying  unless  his  private  parts  were  amputated.  His 
brother  came  to  the  athlete,  who  was  a  philosopher,  and 
said,  Come,  brother,  what  are  you  going  to  do  ?  Shall  we 
amputate  this  member  and  return  to  the  gymnasium  ? 
But  the  athlete  persisted  in  his  resolution  and  died. 
When  some  one  asked  Epictetus,  How  he  did  this,  as  an 
athlete  or  a  philosopher  ?  As  a  man,  Epictetus  replied, 
and  a  man  who  had  been  proclaimed  among  the  athletes  at 
the  Olympic  games  and  had  contended  in  them,  a  man  who 
had  been  familiar  with  such  a  place,  and  not  merely 
anointed  in  Baton's  school.6  Another  would  have  allowed 
even  his  head  to  bo  cut  off,  if  he  could  have  lived  without 
it.  Such  is  that  regard  to  character  which  is  so  strong  in 
those  who  have  been  accustomed  to  introduce  it  of  them- 
selves and  conjoined  with  other  things  into  their  de- 
liberations. 

Come  then,  Epictetus,  shave 7  yourself.  If  I  am  a  philo- 
sopher, I  answer,  I  will  not  shave  myself.  But  I  will  take 
off  your  head  ?  If  that  will  do  you  any  good,  take  it  off. 

Some  person  asked,  how  then  shall  every  man  among 
us  perceive  what  is  suitable  to  his  character?  How,  he 
replied,  does  the  bull  alone,  when  the  lion  has  attacked, 
discover  his  own  powers  and  put  himself  forward  in 
defence  of  the  whole  herd?  Jt  is  plain  that  with  the 
powers  the  perception  of  having  them  is  immediately  con- 
joined: and,  therefore,  whoever  of  us  has  such  powers 
will  not  be  ignorant  of  them.  Now  a  bull  is  not  made  sud- 
denly, nor  a  biave  man;  but  we  must  discipline  ourselves 
in  the  winter  for  the  summer  campaign,  and  not  lashly 
ran  upon  that  which  does  not  concern  us. 

Only  consider  at  what  price  you  sell  your  own  will :  if 
for  no  other  reason,  at  least  for  this,  that  you  sell  it  not  for 
a  small  sum.  But  that  which  is  great  and  superior  per- 

6  Baton  was  elected  for  two  years  gymnasiarch  or  superintendent  of 
a  gymnasium  in  or  about  the  time  of  M.  Aurelius  Antoninus.    So> 
Schweighaeuser's  note. 

7  This  is  supposed,  as  Casaubon  says,  to  refer  to  Domitian's  order 
to  the  philosophers  to  go  into  exile ;  and  some  of  them,  in  order  to 
conceal  their  profession  of  philosophy,  shaved  their  beards.    Epictetui 
would  not  take  off  his  beard. 


12  EFICTETUS. 

haps  belongs  to  Socrates  and  such  as  are  like  him.  Why 
then,  if  we  are  naturally  such,  are  not  a  very  great  number 
of  us  like  him?  Is  it  true  then  that  all  horses  become 
swift,  that  all  dogs  are  skilled  in  tracking  footprints? 
What  then,  since  I  am  naturally  dull,  shall  I,  for  this 
reason,  take  no  pains  ?  I  hope  not.  Epictetus  is  not 
superior  to  Socrates;  but  if  he  is  not  inferior,8  this  is 
enough  for  mo ;  for  I  shall  never  be  a  Milo,9  and  yet  I  do 
not  neglect  my  body ;  nor  shall  I  be  a  Croesus,  and  yet  I 
do  not  neglect  my  property ;  nor,  in  a  word,  do  we  neglect 
looking  after  anything  because  we  despair  of  reaching  the 
highest  degree. 


CHAPTER  III. 

HOW  A  MAN    SHOULD    PROCEED    FROM    THE    PRINCIPLE    OF    GOD 
BEING   THE   FATHER  OF  ALL  MEN   TO   THK  REST. 

IF  a  man  should  be  able  to  assent  to  this  doctrine  as  he 
ought,  that  we  are  all  sprung  from  God l  in  an  especial 
manner,  and  that  God  is  the  father  both  of  men  and  of 
gods,  I  suppose  that  he  would  never  have  any  ignoble 
or  mean  thoughts  about  himself.  But  if  Caesar  (the 
emperor)  should  adopt  you,  no  one  could  endure  your 
arrogance ;  and  if  you  know  that  you  are  the  son  of  Zeus, 
will  you  not  be  elated  ?  Yet  we  do  not  so ;  but  since 

*  The  text  is :  el  5e  ^  off  %6/pwz/.  The  sense  seems  to  be :  Epic- 
tetus is  not  superior  to  Socrates,  but  if  he  is  not  worse,  that  is  enough 
for  me.  On  the  different  readings  of  the  passage  and  on  the  sense, 
see  the  notes  in  Schweig.'s  edition.  The  difficulty,  if  there  is  any, 
is  in  the  negative  p-fj. 

9  Milo  of  Croton,  a  groat  athlete.  The  conclusion  is  the  same  as 
in  Horace,  Epp.  i.  1,  28,  &c. :  "Est  quodam  prodire  tenus,  sinon  datur 
ultra." 

^  l  Epictetus  speaks  of  God  (6  Oe6s)  and  the  gods.  Also  conformably 
to  the  practice  of  the  people,  ho  speaks  of  God  under  the  name  of 
Zeus.  The  gods  of  the  people  were  many,  but  his  God  was  perhaps 
one.  "Father  of  men  and  gods,"  says  Homer  of  Zeus;  and  Virgil 
says  of  Jupiter,  "  Father  of  gods  and  king  of  men."  Salmaaius  pro- 
posed avb  rov  Oeov.  See  Schweig.'s  note. 


EPICTETUS.  13 

these  two  things  are  mingled  in  the  generation  of  man, 
body  in  common  with  the  animals,  and  reason  and  intelli- 
gence in  common  with  the  gods,  many  incline  to  this  kin- 
ship, which  is  miserable  and  mortal ;  arid  some  few  to  that 
which  is  divine  and  happy.  Since  then  it  is  of  necessity 
that  every  man  uses  everything  according  to  the  opinion 
which  he  has  about  it,  those,  the  few,  who  think  that  they 
are  formed  for  fidelity  and  modesty  and  a  sure  use  of 
appearances  have  no  mean  or  ignoble  thoughts  about 
themselves  ;  but  with  the  many  it  is  quite  the  contrary. 
For  they  say,  What  am  I?  A  poor,  miserable  man,  with 
my  wretched  bit  of  flesh.  Wretched,  indeed ;  but  you  pos- 
sess something  better  than  your  bit  of  flesh.  Why  then 
do  you  neglect  that  which  is  better,  and  why  do  you 
attach  yourself  to  this  ? 

Through  this  kinship  with  the  flesh,  some  of  us  in- 
clining to  it  become  like  wolves,  faithless  and  treacherous 
and  mischievous:  some  become  like  lions,  savage  and 
bestial  and  untamed ;  but  the  greater  part  of  us  become 
foxes,  and  other  worse  animals.  For  what  else  is  a 
slanderer  and  a  malignant  man  than  a  fox,  or  some  other 
more  wretched  and  meaner  animal  ?  See  2  then  and  take 
care  that  you  do  not  become  some  one  of  these  miserable 
things. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

OF  PROGRESS  OR  IMPROVEMENT. 

HE  who  is  making  progress,  having  learned  from  philoso* 
phers  that  desire  means  the  desire  of  good  things,  and 
aversion  means  aversion  from  bad  things  ;  having  learned 


*  6paT€  Kal  irpo(T^x€T€  ^  ri  rofowv  &iroj8^T6  twit  fa-uxwctrw.  Upto> 
compares  Matthew  xvi.  6:  dpare  Kal  irpo<r4xfr€  fab  -rifr  £#/M?S,  &c. 
Upton  remarks  that  many  expressions  in  Epictetus  are  not  unlike  the 
*tyle  of  the  Gospels,  which  were  written  in  the  same  period  in  which 
Epictetus  was  teaching.  Schweighaeuscr  also  refers  to  Wetetein'a 
New  Testament. 


14  EPICTETUS. 

too  that  happiness 1  and  tranquillity  are  not  attainable  by 
man  otherwise  than  by  not  failing  to  obtain  what  he  desires, 
and  not  falling  into  that  which  he  would  avoid ;  such  a 
man  takes  from  himself  desire  altogether  and  defers  it,2 
but  he  employs  his  aversion  only  on  tilings  which  are  de- 
pendent on  his  will.  For  if  he  attempts  to  avoid  anything 
independent  of  his  will,  he  knows  that  sometimes  he  will 
fall  in  with  something  which  he  wishes  to  avoid,  and  he 
will  be  unhappy.  Now  if  virtue  promises  good  fortune 
and  tranquillity  and  happiness,  certainly  also  the  progress 
towards  virtue  is  progress  towards  each  of  these  things. 
For  it  is  always  true  that  to  whatever  point  the  perfecting 
of  anything  leads  us,  progress  is  an  approach  towards  this 
point. 

How  then  do  we  admit  that  virtue  is  such  as  I  have 
said,  and  yet  seek  progress  in  other  things  and  make  a  dis- 
play of  it  ?  What  is  the  product  of  virtue  ?  Tranquillity. 
Who  then  makes  improvement?  Is  it  he  who  has  read 
many  books  of  Chrysippus  ? 3  But  does  virtue  consist  in 
having  understood  Chrysippus  ?  If  this  is  so,  progress  is 
clearly  nothing  else  than  knowing  a  great  deal  of  Chry- 
sippus. But  now  we  admit  that  virtue  produces  one 
thing,  and  we  declare  that  approaching  near  to  it  is 
another  thing,  namely,  progress  or  improvement.  Such  a 
person,  says  one,  is  already  able  to  read  Chrysippus  by 
himself.  Indeed,  sir,  you  are  making  great  progress. 
What  kind  of  progress?  But  why  do  you  mock  the  man? 
Why  do  you  draw  him  away  from  the  perception  of  his 
own  misfortunes  ?  Will  you  not  show  him  the  effect  of 
virtue  that  he  may  learn  where  to  look  for  improvement? 

1  -rb  ctfpow  or  yj  cvpota  is  translated  "  happiness."    The  notion  IB 
that  of  "  flowing  easily,"  as  Seneca  (Epp.  120)  explains  it :  "  beata 
vita,  secundo  defluens  cursu." 

2  forepWfleiTcu.     The  Latin  translation  is:    "in  futurum  tempua 
rejicit."    Wolf  says :  '•  Significat  id,  quod  in  Enchtridio  dictum  est : 
nhilosophiae  tironem  non  nimium  tribuere  sibi,  sed  quasi  addubi- 
tantem  expectare  dum  confirmettir  judicium." 

8  Diogenes  Laertius  (Chrysippus,  lib.  vii.)  states  that  Chrysippua 
wrote  seven  hundred  and  five  books,  or  treatises,  or  whatever  the 
word  ffvyypdfJLfAara  means.  He  wus  born  at  Soli,  in  Cilicia,  or  at 
Tarsus,  in  B.C.  280,  as  it  is  reckoned,  and  on  going  to  Athens  he 
became  a  pupil  of  the  Stoic  Cleanthes. 


EPICTETUS.  15 

Seek  it  there,  wretch,  where  your  work  lies.  And  where 
is  your  work  ?  In  desire  and  in  aversion,  that  you  may 
not  be  disappointed  in  your  desire,  and  rhat  you  may  not 
fall  into  that  which  you  would  avoid ;  in  your  pursuit  and 
avoiding,  that  you  commit  no  error;  in  assent  and  sus- 
pension of  assent,  that  you  be  not  deceived.  The  first 
things,  and  the  most  necessary,  are  those  which  I  have 
named.4  But  if  with  trembling  and  lamentation  you 
seek  not  to  fall  into  that  which  you  avoid,  tell  me  how 
you  are  improving. 

Do  you  then  show  me  your  improvement  in  these 
things?  If  I  were  talking  to  an  athlete,  I  should  say, 
Show  me  your  shoulders;  and  then  he  might  say, 
Here  are  my  Halteres.  You  and  your  Halteres  5  look  to 
that.  I  should  reply,  I  wish  to  see  the  effect  of  the 
Halteres.  So,  when  you  say :  Take  the  treatise  on  the 
active  powers  (op/xij),  and  see  how  I  have  studied  it.  I 
reply,  Slave,  I  am  not  inquiring  about  this,  but  how  you 
exercise  pursuit  and  avoidance,  desire  and  aversion,  how 
you  design  and  purpose  and  prepare  yourself,  whether 
conformably  to  nature  or  not.  If  conformably,  give  me 
evidence  of  it,  and  I  will  say  that  you  are  making  pro- 
gress :  but  if  not  conformably,  be  gone,  and  not  only 
expound  your  books,  but  write  such  books  yourself;  and 

4  Compare  iii.  c.  2.    The  word  is  ToVoi. 

8  Halteres  are  gymnastic  instruments  (Galen,  i.  Do  Sanitate 
tuenda ;  Martial,  xiv.  49 ;  Juvenal,  vi.  420,  and  the  Scholiast.  Upton). 
Halteres  is  a  Greek  word,  literally  "leapcrs."  They  are  said  to  have 
been  masses  of  lead,  used  for  exercise  and  in  making  jumps.  Tho 
effect  of  such  weights  in  taking  a  jump  is  well  known  to  boys  who 
have  used  them.  A  couple  of  bricks  will  serve  the  purpose.  Martial 
says  (xiv.  49) : — 

"Quid  pereunt  stulto  fortes  haltero  lacerti? 
Exercet  melius  vinea  fossa  viros." 

Juvenal  (vi.  421)  writes  of  a  woman  who  uses  dumb-bells  till  slio 
sweats,  and  is  then  rubbed  dry  by  a  man, 

*'  Quum  lassata  gravi  ceciderunt  brachia  massa." 

(Macleane's  Juvenal.)  * 

As  to  the  expression,  "O»|>ei  o^,  «al  otf  <£\TJ)pes,  see  Upton's  note.  It  is 
also  a  Latin  form :  "  Epicurus  hoc  viderit,"  Cicero,  Acad.  ii.  c.  7 ; 
•'  haec  fortuna  viderit,"  Ad  Attic,  vi.  4.  It  occurs  in  M.  Antoninus, 
viii.  41,  v.  25 ;  and  in  Acta  Apostol.  xviii.  15. 


16  EPICTETUS. 

what  will  you  gain  by  it?  Bo  you  not  know  that  the 
whole  book  costs  only  five  denarii  ?  Does  then  the  ex- 
pounder seem  to  be  worth  more  than  five  denarii  ?  Never 
then  look  for  the  matter  itself  in  one  place,  and  progress 
towards  it  in  another. 

Where  then  is  progress?  If  any  of  you,  withdrawing 
himself  from  externals,  turns  to  his  own  will  (Trpoatpccrts) 
to  exercise  it  and  to  improve  it  by  labour,  so  as  to  make  it 
conformable  to  nature,  elevated,  free,  unrestrained,  un- 
impeded, faithful,  modest  ;  and  if  he  has  learned  that  he 
who  desires  or  avoids  the  things  which  are  not  in  his 
power  can  neither  be  faithful  nor  free,  but  of  necessity  he 
must  change  with  them  and  be  tossed  abortt  with  them  as 
in  a  tempest,6  and  of  necessity  must  subject  himself  to 
others  who  have  the  power  to  procure  or  prevent  what 
he  desires  or  would  avoid  ;  finally,  when  ho  rises  in  the 
morning,  if  he  observes  and  keeps  these  rules,  bathes  as  a 
man  of  fidelit}r,  eats  as  a  modest  man  ;  in  like  manner,  if 
in  every  matter  that  occurs  he  works  out  his  chief  prin- 
ciples (TO,  irporjyovfjitva)  as  the  runner  does  with  reference  to 
running,  and  the  trainer  of  the  voice  with  reference  to  the 
voice  —  this  is  the  man  who  truly  makes  progress,  and  this 
is  the  man  who  has  not  travelled  in  vain.  But  ii  he  has 
strained  his  efforts  to  the  practice  of  reading  books,  and 
labours  only  at  this,  and  has  travelled  for  this,  I  tell  him 
to  return  home  immediately,  and  not  to  neglect  his  affairs 
there  ;  for  this  for  which  he  has  travelled  is  nothing.  But 
the  other  thing  is  something,  to  study  how  a  man  can 
rid  his  life  of  lamentation  and  groaning,  and  saying,  Woe 
to  me,  and  wretched  that  I  am,  and  to  rid  it  also  of  mis- 
fortune and  disappointment,  and  to  learn  what  death  is, 
and  exile,  and  prison,  and  poison,  that  he  may  be  able  to 
say  when  he  is  in  fetters,  Dear  Crito,7  if  it  is  the  will  of  the 
gods  that  it  be  so,  let  it  bo  so  ;  and  not  to  say,  Wretched 
am  I,  an  old  man;  have  I  kept  my  grey  hairs  for  this? 
Who  is  it  that  speaks  thus  ?  Do  you  think  that  I  shall 
some  man  of  no  repute  and  of  low  condition?  Does 


Compare  James,   Ep.  i.  6:  6  yap 
"rjs  avejUt^bjueVy  /cat  £i7n£o/teV<Si>. 
7  This  is  stud  in  the  Criton  of  Plato,  1;  but  not  in  exactly  the 
«ame  way. 


EPIC7ETUS.  17 

not  Priam  say  tins  ?  Does  not  Oedipus  Fay  this  ?  Nay, 
all  kings  say  it ! 8  For  what  else  is  tragedy  than  the  per- 
turbations (7rd6rf)  of  men  who  value  externals  exhibited  in 
this  kind  of  poetry  ?  But  if  a  man  must  learn  by  fiction 
that  no  external  things  which  are  independent  of  the  will 
concern  us,  for  my  part  I  should  like  this  fiction,  by  the 
aid  of  which  I  should  live  happily  and  undisturbed.  But 
you  must  consider  for  yourselves  what  you  wish. 

What  then  does  Ohrysippus  teach  us  ?  The  reply  is, 
to  know  that  these  things  are  not  false,  from  which  happi- 
ness comes  and  tianquillity  arises.  Take  my  books,  and 
you  will  learn  how  true  and  conformable  to  nature  are  the 
things  which  make  me  free  from  perturbations.  0  great 
good  fortune !  0  the  great  benefactor  who  points  out  the 
way  !  To  Triptolemus  all  men  have  erected 9  temples  and 
altars,  because  he  gave  us  food  by  cultivation ;  but  to  him 
who  discovered  truth  and  brought  it  to  light  and  commu- 
nicated it  to  all,  not  the  truth  which  shows  us  how  to  live, 
but  how  to  live  well,  who  of  you  for  this  reason  has  built 
an  altar,  or  a  temple,  or  has  dedicated  a  statue,  or  who  wor- 
ships God  for  this  ?  Because  the  gods  have  given  the 
vine,  or  wheat,  we  sacrifice  to  them :  but  because  they  have 
produced  in  the  human  mind  that  fruit  by  which  they  de- 
signed to  show  us  the  truth  which  relates  to  happiness, 
shall  we  not  thank  God  for  this  ? 


CHAPTEE  V. 

AGAINST  THE   ACADEMICS.1 

IF  a  man,  said  Epictetus,  opposes  evident  truths,  it  is 
not  easy  to  find  arguments  by  which  we  shall  make  him 
change  his  opinion.  But  this  does  not  arise  either  from  the 

9  So  kings  and  such  personages  speak  in  the  Greek  tragedies!? 
Compare  what  M.  Antoninus  (xi.  6)  says  of  Tragedy. 

9  tofffrdiccuriy.    See  the  note  of  Schweig.  on  the  use  of  this  form  of 
the  verb. 

1  See  Lecture  V.,  The  New  Academy,  Levin's    Lectures  Intro- 
ductory to  the  Phoilsophical  Writings  of  Cieeio,  Cambridge,  1871. 

C 


18  EPICTETUS. 

man's  strength  or  the  teacher's  weakness ;  for  when  the 
man,  though  he  has  "been  confuted,2  is  hardened  like  a 
ston^,  how  shall  we  then  be  able  to  deal  with  him  by 
argument  ? 

Now  there  are  two  kinds  of  hardening,  one  of  the  un- 
derstanding, the  other  of  the  sense  of  shame,  when  a  man 
is  resolved  not  to  assent  to  what  is  manifest  nor  to  desist 
from  contradictions.  Most  of  us  are  afraid  of  mortification 
of  the  body,  and  would  contrive  all  means  to  avoid  such  a 
thing,  but  we  care  not  about  the  soul's  mortification.  And 
indeed  with  regard  to  the  soul,  if  a  man  be  in  such  a  state 
as  not  to  apprehend  anything,  or  understand  at  all,  we 
think  that  he  is  in  a  bad  condition :  but  if  the  sense  of 
shame  and  modesty  are  deadened,  this  we  call  even  power 
(or  strength). 

Do  you  comprehend  that  you  are  awake?  I  do  not,  the 
man  replies,  for  I  do  not  even  comprehend  when  in  my 
sleep  I  imagine  that  I  am  awake.  Does  this  appearanco 
then  not  differ  from  the  other  ?  Not  at  all,  he  replies. 
Shall  I  still  argue  with  this  man?3  And  what  fire  or 
what  iron  shall  I  apply  to  him  to  make  him  feel  that  he  is 
deadened  ?  He  does  perceive,  but  he  pretends  that  ho 
does  not.  He  is  even  worse  than  a  dead  man.  He  does 
not  see  the  contradiction :  he  is  in  a  bad  condition. 
Another  does  see  it,  but  he  is  not  moved,  and  makes  no 
improvement  :  he  is  even  in  a  worse  condition.  His 
modesty  is  extirpated,  and  his  sense  of  shame ;  and  the 
rational  faculty  has  not  been  cut  off  from  him,  but  it  is 
brutalised.  Shall  I  name  this  strength  of  mind?  Cer- 
tainly not,  unless  we  also  name  it  such  in  catamites, 
through  which  they  do  and  say  in  public  whatever  comes 
into  their  head. 

•  cbraxOek.    See  the  note  in  Schweig.'s  edition. 

•  Compare  Cicero,  Ac&dem.  Prior,  ii.  6. 


EPIOTETUS.  19 

CHAPTER  VI. 

OF   PROVIDENCE. 

FROM  every  tiling  which  is  or  happens  in  the  world,  it 
is  easy  to  praise  Providence,  if  a  man  possesses  these  two 
qualities,  the  faculty  of  seeing  what  belongs  and  happens 
to  all  persons  and  things,  and  a  grateful  disposition.  If  ho 
does  not  possess  these  two  qualities,  one  man  will  not  see 
the  use  of  things  which  are  and  which  happen ;  another 
will  not  be  thankful  for  them,  even  if  he  does  know  them. 
If  God  had  made  colours,  but  had  not  made  the  faculty  of 
seeing  them,  what  would  have  been  their  use  ?  None  at 
all.  On  the  other  hand,  if  He  had  made  the  faculty  of 
vision,  but  had  not  made  objects  such  as  to  fall  under  the 
faculty,  what  in  that  case  also  would  have  been  the  use 
of  it?  None  at  all.  Well,  suppose  that  He  had  made 
both,  but  had  not  made  light?  In  that  case,  also,  they 
would  have  been  of  no  use.  Who  is  it  then  who  has 
fitted  this  to  that  and  that  to  this  ?  And  who  is  it  that 
has  fitted  the  knife  to  the  case  and  the  case  to  the  knife? 
Is  it  no  one  ? l  And,  indeed,  from  the  very  structure  of 
things  which  have  attained  their  completion,  we  are  accus- 
tomed to  show  that  the  work  is  certainly  the  act  of  some 
artificer,  and  that  it  has  not  been  constructed  without  a 
purpose.  Does  then  each  of  these  things  demonstrate  the 
workman,  and  do  not  visible  things  and  the  faculty  of 
seeing  and  light  demonstrate  Him  ?  And  the  existence  of 
male  and  female,  and  the  desire  of  each  for  conjunction, 
and  the  power  of  using  the  parts  which  are  constructed, 
do  not  even  these  declare  the  workman?  If  they  do  not, 
let  us  consider 2  the  constitution  of  our  understanding 

1  Goethe  has  a  short  poem,  entitled  Gleich.  und  Gleich  (Like  and 
Like) : 

"  Kin  Blumenglockchen 
Vom  Boderi  hcrvor 

War  friih  getprosset  m 

In  lieblichern  Flor ; 
Da  kam  ein  Bienchen 
Und  naschte  feln : — 
Die  mlissen  wohl  beyde 
Fur  einander  seyn." 

»  See  Schweig.'s  note.    I  have  given  the  sense  of  the  psssagw,  I 
think. 

c  2 


20  EPICTETCJS. 

according  to  which,  when  we  meet  with  sensible  objects, 
wo  do  not  simply  receive  impressions  from  them,  but  we 
also  select3  homething  from  them,  and  subtract  something, 
and  add,  and  compound  by  means  of  them  these  things  or 
those,  and,  in  fact,  pass  from  some  to  other  things  which, 
in  a  manner,  resemble  them :  is  not  even  this  sufficient 
to  move  some  men,  and  to  induce  them  not  to  forget  the 
workman?  If  not  so,  let  them  explain  to  us  what  it  is 
that  makes  each  several  thing,  or  how  it  is  possible  that 
things  so  wonderful  and  like  the  contrivances  of  art 
should  exist  by  chance  and  from  their  own  proper  motion? 
"What,  then,  are  these  things  done  in  us  only  ?  Many, 
indeed,  in  us  only,  of  which  the  rational  animal  had 
peculiarly  need ;  but  you  will  find  many  common  to  us 
with  irrational  animals.  Do  they  then  understand  what 
is  done  ?  By  no  means.  For  use  is  one  thing,  and  under- 
standing is  another :  God  had  need  of  irrational  animals 
to  make  use  of  appearances,  but  of  us  to  understand  the 
use  of  appearances.4  It  is  therefore  enough  for  them  to 
eat  and  to  drink,  and  to  sleep  and  to  copulate,  and  to  do  all 
the  other  things  which  they  severally  do.  But  for  us,  to 
whom  He  has  given  also  the  intellectual  faculty,  these 
things  are  not  sufficient ;  for  unless  we  act  in  a  proper 
and  orderly  manner,  and  conformably  to  the  nature  and 
constitution  of  each  thing,  we  shall  never  attain  our  true 
end.  For  where  the  constitutions  of  living  beings  are 
different,  there  also  the  acts  and  the  ends  are  different. 
In  those  animals  then  whose  constitution  is  adapted  only 
to  use,  use  alone  is  enough :  but  in  an  animal  (man),  which 
has  also  the  power  of  understanding  the  use,  unless  there 
be  the  due  exercise  of  the  understanding,  he  will  never 
attain  his  proper  end.  Well  then  God  constitutes  every 
animal,  one  to  be  eaten,  another  to  serve  for  agriculture, 
another  to  supply  cheese,  and  another  for  some  like  use ; 
for  which  purposes  what  need  is  there  to  understand 
appearances  and  to  be  able  to  distinguish  them  ?  But  God 
jias  introduced  man  to  be  a  spectator  of  God 5  and  of  His 

*  Cicero,  De  Off.  i.  o.  4,  on  the  difference  between  man  and  beast. 
4  See  Schweig.'f  note,  torn.  ii.  p.  84. 

*  The  original  is  aurou,  which  I  refer  to  God ;  but  it  may  be  am- 
fclguoiu.    Schweighaeuser  refers  it  to  man,  and  explains  it  to  mean 


EPIOTETUS.  21 

works ;  and  not  only  a  spectator  of  them,  but  an  interpreter. 
For  this  reason  it  is  shameful  for  man  to  begin  and  to  end 
where  irrational  animals  do ;  but  rather  he  ought  to  begin 
where  they  begin,  and  to  end  where  nature  ends  in  us ; 
•and  nature  ends  in  contemplation  and  understanding,  and 
in  a  way  of  life  conformable  to  nature.  Take  care  then 
not  to  die  without  having  been  spectators  of  these  things. 
But  you  take  a  journey  to  Olympia  to  sue  the  work  of 
Phidias,6  and  all  of  you  think  it  a  misfortune  to  die  with- 
out having  seen  such  things.  But  when  there  is  no  need 
to  take  a  journey,  and  where  a  man  is,  there  he  has  the 
works  (of  God)  before  him,  will  you  not  desire  to  see  and 
(understand  them  ?  Will  you  not  perceive  either 7  what 
you  are,  or  what  you  were  born  for,  or  what  this  is  for 
which  you  have  received  the  faculty  of  sight  ?  But  you 
may  say,  there  are  some  things  disagreeable  and  trouble- 
some in  life.  And  are  there  none  at  Olympia?  Are  you 
not  scorched?  Are  you  not  piessed  by  a  crowd?  Are 
you  not  without  comfortable  means  of  bathing  ?  Are  you 
not  wet  when  it  lains  ?  Have  you  not  abundance  of  noise, 
clamour,  and  other  disagreeable  things  ?  But  I  suppose 
that  setting  all  these  things  olf  against  the  magnificence  of 
the  spectacle,  you  bear  and  endure.  Well  then  and  have 

that  man  should  bo  a  spectator  of  himself,  according  to  the  maxim, 
Tv&Ot  <reauTo'j>.  It  is  true  that  man  can  in  a  inaiiiicr  contemplate 
himself  and  his  faculties  as  well  as  external  objecfs;  and  as  every 
jnan  can  be  an  object  to  every  other  man,  so  a  man  may  be  an  object 
to  himself  when  he  examines  his  faculties  and  reflects  on  his  own 
acts.  Schweighaeuscr  asks  how  can  a  man  be  a  spectator  of  God, 
except  so  far  as  he  is  a  spectator  of  God's  works?  It  is  not  enough^ 
•he  says,  to  reply  that  God  and  the  universe,  whom  and  which  man 
contemplates,  are  the  same  tiling  to  the  Stoics ;  for  Epiotetus  always 
distinguishes  God  the  maker  and  governor  of  the  universe  from  the 
universe  itself.  But  here  lies  the  difficulty.  The  universe  is  an 
all-comprehensive  term :  it  is  all  that  we  can  in  any  way  perceive  and 
conceive  as  existing ;  arid  it  may  therefore  comprehend  God,  not  as 
something  distinct  from  the  universe,  but  as  being  the  universe  him- 
self. This  form  of  expression  is  an  acknowledgment  of  the  weakness  of 
the  human  faculties,  and  contains  the  implicit  assertion  of  Locke  thai 
the  notion  of  God  is  beyond  man's  understanding  (Essay,  etc.  ii.  c.  17). 

6  This  work  was  the  colossal  chryselephantine  statue  of  Zeua 
(Jupiter)  by  Phidias,  which  was  at  Olympia.  This  wonderful  work 
is  described  by  Pausanias  (Eliuca,  A,  11). 

1  Compare  Persius,  Sat.  iii,  06 — 

"Di^ci'e,  io,  mis-eri  et  causns  cognoscite  rerurn, 
Quid  su.uus  aui  qu.<Ja<mi  \  ictui  i  g'gniiuur. 


22  EPICTETUS. 

yon  not  received  faculties  by  which  you  will  be  able  to 
bear  all  that  happens  ?  Have  you  not  received  greatness 
of  soul?  Have  you  not  received  manliness?  Have  you 
not  received  endurance  ?  And  why  do  I  trouble  myself 
about  anything  1hat  can  happen  if  I  possess  greatness  of 
eoul  ?  AVhat  shall  distract  my  mind  or  disturb  me,  or 
appear  painful?  Shall  I  not  use  the  power  for  the  pur- 
poses for  which  I  received  it,  and  shall  I  grieve  and  lament 
over  what  happens  ? 

Yes,  but  my  nose  rims.8  For  what  purpose  then,  slave, 
have  you  hands  ?  Is  it  not  that  you  may  wipe  your  nose  ?  — 
Is  it  then  consistent  with  reason  that,  there  should  be  run- 
ning of  noses  in  the  world  ?  —  Nay,  how  much  better  it  is 
to  wipe  your  nose  than  to  find  fault.  What  do  you  think 
that  Hercules  would  have  been  if  there  had  not  been  such 
a  lion,  and  hydra,  and  stag,  and  boar,  and  certain  unjust 
and  bestial  men,  whom  Hercules  used  to  drive  away  and 
clear  out  ?  And  what  would  he  have  been  doing  if  there 
had  been  nothing  of  1he  kind?  Is  it  not  plain  that  he 
would  have  wrapped  himself  up  and  have  slept?  In  the 
first  place  then  he  would  not  have  been  a  Hercules,  when 
he  was  dreaming  away  all  his  life  in  such  luxury  and  ease  ; 
and  even  if  he  had  been  one,  what  would  have  been  the 
use  of  him  ?  and  what  the  use  of  his  arms,  and  of  the 
strength  of  the  other  parts  of  his  body,  and  his  endurance 
and  noble  spirit,  if  such  circumstances  and  occasions  had 
not  roused  and  exercised  him?  Well  then  must  a  man 
provide  for  himself  such  means  of  exercise,  and  seek  to  in- 
troduce a  lion  from  some  place  into  his  country,  and  a  boar, 
and  a  hydra?  This  would  be  folly  and  madness:  but  as 
they  did  exist,  and  were  found,  they  were  useful  for  show- 
ing what  Hercules  was  and  for  exercising  him.  Come 
then  do  you  also  having  observed  these  things  look  to  the 
faculties  which  you  have,  and  when  you  have  looked  at 
them,  say  :  Bring  now,  O  Zeus,  any  difficulty  that  thou 
t)leasest,  for  I  have  means  given  to  me  by  thee  and  powers  * 

•  Compare  Antoninus,  viii.  50,  and  Epictetus,  ii.  16,  13. 
f  a<j>opfji&s.     This  word  in  this  passage  has  a  different  meaning 
from  that  which  it  has  when  it  is  opposed  to  dp/ufa     See  Gataker, 


Antoninus,  ix.  1  (Upton).  Epictetus  says  that  the  powers  which  mi  an 
has  were  given  by  God  :  Antoninus  says,  from  nature.  They  mean 
the  same  thing.  See  Schweighaeuser's  note. 


EPICTETUS.  23 

for  honouring  myself  through  the  things  which  happen. 
You  do  not  so :  but  you  sit  still,  trembling  for  fear  that 
gome  things  will  happen,  and  weeping,  and  lamenting,  and 
groaning  for  what  does  happen  :  and  then  you  blame  the 
gods.  For  what  is  the  consequence  of  such  meanness  of 
spirit  but  impiety  ? 10  And  yet  God  has  not  only  given  us 
these  faculties ;  by  which  we  shall  be  able  to  bear  every- 
thing that  happens  without  being  depressed  or  broken  by 
it ;  but,  like  a  good  king  and  a  true  father,  He  has  given  us- 
these  faculties  free  from  hindrance,  subject  to  no  compul- 
sion, unimpeded,  and  has  put  them  entirely  in  our  own 
power,  without  even  having  reserved  to  Himself  any  power 
of  hindering  or  impeding.  You,  who  have  received  these 
powers  free  and  as  your  own,  use  them  not :  you  do  not 
even  see  what  you  have  received,  and  from  whom ;  some  of 
you  being  blinded  to  the  giver,  and  not  even  acknowledg- 
ing your  benefactor,  and  others,  through  meanness  of 
spirit,  betaking  yourselves  to  fault-finding  and  making 
charges  against  God.  Yet  I  will  show  to  you  that  you 
have  powers  and  means  for  greatness  of  soul  and  man- 
liness :  but  what  powers  you  have  for  finding  fault  and 
making  accusations,  do  you  show  me. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

OF  THE  USE  OF   SOPHISTICAL   ARGUMENTS   AND   HYPOTHETICAL 
AND   THE   LIKE.1 

THE  handling  of  sophistical  and  hj^pothetical  arguments, 
and  of  those  which  derive  their  conclusions  from  question- 
ing, and  in  a  word  the  handling  of  all  such  arguments, 

10  Compare  Antoninus,  ix.  1. 

1  The  title  is  ire  pi  TT?S  XP*tas  TW  ^raTmrTSyrcatf  KO,}  viroBeriKaw 
Kal  f&v  bpoiwv.  Schweighaeuscr  lias  a  big  note  on  ^raitlTtrovrfs 
\6yoi,  which  he  has  collected  from  various  critics.  Mrs.  Carter  translated 
the  title  *  Of  the  Use  of  Convertible  and  Hypothetical  Propositions 
and  the  like/  But  "  convertible  "  might  be  understood  in  the  common 
logical  sense,  which  is  not  the  meaning  of  Epictetus.  Schweighaeuser 
explains  jueTa7rhrro»>T€s  \6joi  to  bo  sophistical  arguments  in  which  the 
meaning  of  propositions  or  of  terms,  which  ought  to  remain  the  same, 
IB  dexterously  changed  and  perverted  to  another  meaning. 


24  EPICTETUS. 

relates  to  the  duties  of  life,  though  the  many  do  not  know 
this  truth.  Fur  in  every  matter  we  inquire  how  the  wise 
and  good  man  shall  discover  the  proper  path  and  the 
proper  method  of  dealing  with  the  matter.  Let  then 
people  either  say  that  the  grave  man  will  not  descend  into 
the  contest  of  question  and  answer,  or,  that  if  he  does 
descend  into  the  contest,  he  will  take  no  care  about  not 
conducting  himself  rashly  or  carelessly  in  questioning  and 
answering.  But  if  1hey  do  not  allow  either  the  one  or  the 
other  of  these  things,  they  must  admit  that  some  inquiry 
ought  to  be  made  into  those  topics  (TOTTWI/)  on  which  par- 
ticularly questioning  and  answering  are  employed.  .For 
•what  is  the  end  proposed  in  reasoning  ?  To  establish  true 
propositions,  to  remove  the  false,  to  withhold  assent  from 
those  which  are  not  plain.  Is  it  enough  then  to  have 
learned  only  this  ?  It  is  enough,  a  man  may  reply.  Is 
it  then  also  enough  for  a  man,  who  would  not  make  a 
mistake  in  the  use  of  coined  money,  to  have  heard  this 
precept,  that  he  should  receive  the  genuine  drachmae  and 
reject  the  spurious?  It  is  not  enough.  What  then  ought 
to  be  added  to  this  precept  ?  What  else  than  the  faculty 
which  proves  and  distinguishes  the  genuine  and  the  spurious 
drachmae  ?  Consequently  also  in  reasoning  what  has  been 
haid  is  not  enough ;  but  it  is  necessary  that  a  man  should 
acquire  the  faculty  of  examining  and  distinguishing  thfc 
true  and  the  false,  and  that  which  is  not  plain?  It  is 
necessary.  Besides  this,  what  is  proposed  in  reasoning? 
That  you  should  accept  what  follows  from  that  which  you 
have  properly  granted.  Well,  is  it  then  enough  in  this 
case  also  to  know  this?  It  is  not  enough;  but  a  man 
must  learn  how  one  thing  is  a  consequence  of  other  things, 
and  when  one  thing  follows  from  one  thing,  and  when  it 
follows  from  seveial  collectively.  Consider  then  if  it  be 
not  necessary  that  this  power  should  also  be  acquired  by 
him,  who  purposes  to  conduct  himself  skilfully  in  reason- 
ing, the  power  of  demonstrating  himself  the  several 
ttings  which  ho  has  proposed,2  and  the  power  of  under- 
standing the  demonstrations  of  others,  and  of  not  being 
deceived  by  sophists,  as  if  they  were  demonstrating. 
Therefore  there  has  arisen  among  us  the  practice  and 

*  See  Schwcig.'B  note  on  &iro8cf£ciir 


EI'ICTETUS.  25 

exercise  of  conclusive  arguments  3  and  figures,  and  it  has 
been  shown  to  be  necessary. 

But  in  fact  in  some  cases  we  have  properly  granted  the 
premises4  or  assumptions,  and  there  results  from  them 
something ;  and  though  it  is  not  true,  yet  none  the  less  it 
does  result.  What  then  ought  I  to  do  ?  Ought  I  to  admit 
the  falsehood  ?  And  how  is  that  possible  ?  Well,  should  I 
say  that  I  did  not  properly  grant  that  which  we  agreed 
upon?  But  you  are  not  allowed  to  do  even  this.  Shall  I 
then  &ay  that  the  consequence  does  not  arise  through  what 
has  been  conceded  ?  But  neither  is  this  allowed.  What  then 
must  be  done  in  this  case?  Consider  if  it  is  not  this  :  as 
to  have  borrowed  is  not  enough  to  make  a  man  still  a 
debtor,  but  to  this  must  be  added  the  fact  that  he  continues 
to  owe  the  money  and  that  the  debt  is  not  paid,  so  it  is  not 
enough  to  compel  you  to  admit  the  inference5  that  you  have 
granted  the  premises  (TO.  A^ju-ju-ara),  but  you  must  abide 
by  what  you  have  granted.  Indeed,  if  the  premises  con- 
tinue to  the  end  such  as  they  were  when  they  were  granted, 
it  is  absolutely  necessary  for  us  to  abide  by  what  we  have 
gi  anted,  and  we  must  accept  their  consequences:  but  if 
the  premises  do  not  remain 6  such  as  they  were  when  they 

3  These  are  syllogisms  and  figures,  modes  (rp^Trot)  by  which  the 
syllogism  1ms  its  proper  conclusion. 

4  Compare  Aristotle,   Topic,  viii.  1,  22  (ed.  J.  Pac.  758).     After- 
wards   Epictetus    uses    ra    ufjio\oy7)iJ.4va   as   equivalent   to   A^/x^uara 
(premises  or  a&sumptions). 

5  "  The  inference,"  rb  eV/cpfp^uej/oj/.    "  'EiriQopci.  est  '  illatio '  quao 
assumptionem  sequitur"  (Upton). 

6  This,  then,  is  a  case  of  ^rairiirro^Tey  \6joi  (chap.  vii.  1),  where 
there  has  been  a  sophistical  or  dishonest  change  in  the  premises  or  in 
some  term,  by  virtue  of  which  change  there  appears  to  be  a  just  con- 
clusion, which,  however,  is  false;  and  it  is  not  a  conclusion  derived 
from  the  premises  to  which  we  assented.     A  ridiculous  example  is 
given   by  Seneca,  Ep.  48;    "Mus  syllabu  est:    mus  autem  caseum 
rodit :  syllaba  ergo  caseurn  rodit."     Seneca  laughs  at  this  absurdity, 
and  says  perhaps  the  following  syllogism  (cottectio)  may  be  a  better 
example  of  acuteness:  "Mus  syllaba  ebt :  syllaba  autcm  caseurn  non 
rodit:  mus  ergo  caseurn  non  rodit."    One  is  as  good  as  the  other,    \Ve 
know  that  neither  conclusion  is  true,  and  we  bee  where  the  error  U. 
Me'nage  bays  that  though  the  Stoics  particularly  cultivated  logic, 
some  of  them  despised  it,  and  he  mentions  Seneca,  Epictetas,  and 
Marcus  Antoninus.     Upton,  however,  observes  that  Epictetus  and 
Marcus  Antoninus  did  not  despise   logic  (lie    says  nothing  about 
Beneca),  but  employed  it  tor  their  own  purposes. 

It  baa  been  observed  that  if  a  man  is  asked  whether,  if  every  A  i« 


26  EPICTETTJS. 

were  granted,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  for  us  also  so  with- 
draw from  what  wo  granted,  and  from  accepting  what  does 
not  follow  from  the  words  in  which  our  concessions  were 
made.  For  the  inference  is  now  not  our  inference,  nor  does 
it  result  with  our  assent,  since  we  have  wit! i drawn  from  the 
premises  which  we  granted.  We  ought  then  both  to  ex- 
amine such  kinds  of  premises,  and  Buch  change  and  varia- 
tion of  them  (from  one  meaning  to  another),  by  which  in 
the  course  of  questioning  or  answering,  or  in  making  the 
syllogistic  conclusion,  or  in  any  other  such  way,  the  pre- 
mises undergo  variations,  and  give  occasion  to  the  foolish 
to  be  confounded,  if  they  do  not  see  what  conclusions 
(consequences)  are.  For  what  reason  ought  we  to  ex- 
amine ?  In  order  that  we  may  not  in  this  matter  be 
employed  in  an  improper  manner  nor  in  a  confused  way. 

And  the  same  in  hypotheses  and  hypothetical  arguments ; 
for  it  is  necessary  sometimes  to  demand  the  granting  of 
some  hypothesis  as  a  kind  of  passage  to  the  argument 
which  follows.  Must  we  then  allow  every  hypothesis  that 
is  proposed,  or  not  allow  everyone?  And  if  not  every 
one,  which  should  we  allow  ?  And  if  a  man  has  allowed 
an  hypothesis,  must  he  in  every  case  abide  by  allowing 
ijt  ?  or  must  he  sometimes  withdraw  from  it,  but  admit  tho 
consequences  and  not  admit  contradictions?  Yes;  but 
suppose  that  a  man  says,  If  you  admit  the  hypothesis  of 
a  possibility,  I  will  draw  you  to  an  impossibility.  With 
.such  a  person  shall  a  man  of  sense  refuse  to  enter  into  a 
contest,  and  avoid  discussion  and  conversation  with  him  ? 
But  what  other  man  than  the  man  of  sense  can  use  argu- 
mentation and  is  skilful  in  questioning  and  answering,  and 

B,  every  B  is  also  A,  he  might  answer  that  it  is.  But  if  you  put  tho 
conversion  in  this  material  form:  "Every  goose  is  an  animal,"  ho 
immediately  perceives  that  he  canoot  say,  "Every  animal  is  a  goose." 
What  does  this  show  ?  It  shows  that  the  man's  comprehension  of  the 
proposition,  every  A  is  B,  was  not  true,  and  that  ho  took  it  to  mean 
something  different  from  what  the  person  intended  who  put  the 
question.  He  understood  that  A  and  B  were  coextensive.  Whether 
•we  call  this  reasoning  or  something  else,  makes  no  matter.  A  man 
whose  understanding  is  sound  cannot  in  tho  nature  of  things  reason 
wrong ;  but  his  understanding  of  the  matter  on  which  he  reasons  may 
bo  wrong  somewhere,  and  he  may  not  be  able  to  discover  where.  A 
man  who  has  been  trained  in  the  logical  art  may  show  him  that  his 
conclusion  is  just  according  to  his  understanding  of  the- tennis  and  the 
propositions  employed,  but  yet  it  is  not  true. 


EPICTETUS.  27 

incapable  of  being  cheated  and  deceived  by  false  reasoning  ? 
And  shall  he  enter  into  the  contest,  and  yet  not  take  care 
whether  he  shall  engage  in  argument  not  rashly  and  not 
carelessly  ?  And  if  he  does  not  take  care,  how  can  he  bo 
such  a  man  as  we  conceive  him  to  be  ?  But  without  some 
such  exercise  and  preparation,  can  ho  maintain  a  con- 
tinuous and  consistent  argument  ?  Let  them  show  this ; 
and  all  these  speculations  (flewp^/xaTa)  become  superfluous, 
and  are  absurd  and  inconsistent  with  our  notion  of  a  good 
and  serious  man. 

Why  are  we  still  indolent  and  negligent  and  sluggish, 
and  why  do  we  seek  pretences  for  not  labouring  and  not 
being  watchful  in  cultivating  our  reason?  If  then  I  shall 
make  a  mistake  in  these  matters  may  I  not  have  killed  my 
father  ?  Slave,  whore  was  there  a  father  in  this  matter 
that  you  could  kill  him?  What  then  have  you  done? 
The  only  fault  that  was  possible  hero  is  the  fault  which 
you  have  committed.  This  is  the  very  remark  which  I 
made  to  Kufus 7  when  he  blamed  mo  for  not  having  dis- 
covered the  one  thing  omitted  in  a  certain  syllogism :  I 
suppose,  I  said,  that  I  have  burnt  the  Capitol.  Slave,  he 
replied,  was  the  thing  omitted  here  the  Capitol?  Or  aro 
these  the  only  crimes,  to  burn  the  Capitol  and  to  kill  your 
father  ?  But  for  a  man  to  use  the  appearances  presented 
to  him  rashly  and  foolishly  and  carelessly,  and  not  to 
understand  argument,  nor  demonstration,  nor  sophism^ 
nor,  in  a  word,  to  see  in  questioning  and  answering  what 
is  consistent  with  that  which  we  have  granted  or  is  not 
consistent ;  is  there  no  error  in  this  ? 

7  Kufus  is  Musonius  Rufus  (i.  1).  To  kill  a  father  and  to  burn 
the  Koman  Capitol  are  mentioned  as  instances  of  the  greatest  crimes. 
Coinp.  Horace,  Epode,  iii.;  Cicero,  De  Amicit.  c.  11 ;  Fkitarch,  Tib, 
Gracchus,  c.  20. 


28  EriCTETUS. 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

THAT   THE   FACULTIES1  ARE    NOT   SAFE    TO   THE    UNINSTRUOTED. 

IN  as  many  ways  as  we  can  change  things2  which  are 
equivalent  to  one  another,  in  just  so  many  ways  we 
can  change  the  forms  of  arguments  (eTrt^etprJ/xaTa)  and 
enthymemes  3  (e^u^/xara)  in  argumentation.  This  is  an 
instance:  if  you  have  borrowed  and  not  repaid,  you  owe 
me  the  money  :  you  have  not  borrowed  and  you  have  not 
repaid ;  then  you  do  not  owe  me  the  money.  To  do  this 
skilfully  is  suitable  to  no  man  more  than  to  the  philo- 
sopher ;  for  if  the  enthymemo  is  an  imperfect  syllogism, 
it  is  plain  that  he  who  has  been  exercised  in  the  perfect 
syllogism  must  be  equally  expert  in  the  imperfect  also. 

Why  then  do  we  not  exercise  ourselves  and  one  another 
in  this  manner  ?  Because,  I  reply,  at  present,  though  we  are 
not  exercised  in  these  things  and  not  distracted  from  the 
study  of  morality,  by  me  at  least,  still  we  make  no  progress 
in  virtue.  What  then  must  we  expect  if  we  should  add 
this  occupation  ?  and  particularly  as  this  would  not  only 
be  an  occupation  which  would  withdraw  us  from  more 
necessary  things,  but  would  also  be  a  cause  of  self-conceit 
and  arrogance,  and  110  small  cause.  For  great  is  the 
power  of  arguing  and  the  faculty  of  persuasion,  and  par- 
ticularly if  it  should  be  much  exercised,  and  also  receive 
additional  ornament  from  language :  and  so  universally, 
every  faculty  acquired  by  the  unins  true  ted  and  weak 
brings  with  it  the  danger  of  these  persons  being  elated 

1  The  faculties,  as  Wolf  says,  are  the  faculties  of  speaking  and 
arguing,  which,  as  he  also  bays,  make  men  arrogant  and  cureless  who 
tiave  no  solid  knowledge,  according  to  Bion's  maxim,  TI  yap  ofyffts 
fyKotr^  rfjs  TrpoKOTnjs  tarns,  u  arrogance  (belt-conceit)  is  a  hindrance  to 
improvement."  See  viii.  8. 

a  Things  mean  *•  propositions  "  and  "  terms."  See  Aristot  Analyt. 
Prior.  1.  39,  Se?  8e  KO.\  fteraXayUjSayeiy,  &C.  'ETTiXfiprif^ara  are  argU- 
m*<ats  of  any  kind  with  which  we  attack  (eVix^peiV)  an  adversary. 

8  The  Enthymcme  is  deiined  by  Aristotle :  eVfl^uTj/xa  /lev  ovv  fort 
crv\\oyiffij.bs  e£  cifcJrwi'  3)  ffijfjLfitav  (Aiiui.  1'rior.  ii.  c.  27).  He  has  ex- 
plained, in  the  first  part  of  this  chapter,  what  he  means  by  eiVds  and 
4TinA€ioif.  See  also  De  Morgan's  Formal  Logic,  p.  237;  and  P.  CJ. 
Organon,  p.  G,  note. 


EPICTETUS.  2S 

and  inflated  by  it.  For  by  wliat  means  could  one  persuade 
a  young  man  who  excels  in  these  matters,  that  he  ought 
not  to  become  an  appendage  4  to  them,  but  to  make  them 
an  appendage  to  himself?  Docs  he  not  trample  on  all  such 
reasons,  and  strut  before  us  elated  and  inflated,  not  en- 
during that  any  man  should  reprore  him  and  remind 
him  of  what  he  has  neglected  and  to  what  he  has  turned 
aside  ? 

What  then  was  not  Plato  a  philosopher?5  I  reply, 
and  was  not  Hippocrates  a  physician?  but  you  see  how 
Hippocrates  speaks.  Does  Hippocrates  then  speak  thus  in 
respect  of  being  a  physician  ?  "Why  do  you  mingle  things 
which  have  been  accidentally  united  in  the  same  men? 
And  if  Plato  was  handsome  and  strong,  ought  I  also  to  set 
to  work  and  endeavour  to  become  handsome  or  strong,  as  if 
this  was  necessary  for  philosophy,  because  a  certain  philo- 
sopher was  at  the  same  time  handsome  and  a  philosopher  ? 
Will  you  not  choose  to  see  and  to  distinguish  in  respect 
to  what  men  become  philosophers,  and  what  things  belong 
to  them  in  other  respects  ?  And  if  I  were  a  philosopher, 
ought  you  also  to  be  made  lame  ?  6  What  then  ?  Do  1  take 
away  these  faculties  which  you  possess  ?  By  no  means  ; 
for  neither  do  I  take  away  the  faculty  of  seeing.  But  if 
you  ask  me  what  is  the  good  of  man,  I  cannot  mention  to 
you  anything  else  than  that  it  is  a  certain  disposition  of 
the  will  with  respect  to  appearances.7 

4  A  man,  as  Wolf  explains  it,  should  not  make  oratory,  or  the  art 
of  speaking,  his  chief  excellence.    He  should  use  it  to  set  off  some- 
thing which  is  superior. 

5  Plato  was  eloquent,  and  the  adversary  asks,  if  thaf  is  a  reason  for 
not  allowing  him  to  be  a  philosopher.    To  which  the  rejoinder  is  that 
Hippocrates  was  a  physician,  and  eloquent  too,  but  not  as  a  physician. 

6  Epictetus  was  lame. 

7  In  i.  20, 15,  Epictetus  defines  the  being  (oixria)  or  nature  of  good 
to  be  a  proper  use  of  appearances ;  and  he  also  says,  i.  29,  1,  that  the 
nature  of  the  good  is  a  kind  of  will  (Trpoalpeo-ts  Trotd),  and  the  nature 
of  evil  is  a  kind  of  will.    But  Schweighaeuser  cannot  understand  how 
the  "  good  of  man  "  can  be  "  a  certain  will  with  regard  to  appearances  £ 
and  he  suggests  that  Arrian  may  have  written,  "  a  certain  wUl  whiob 
makes  use  of  appearances." 


30  EPICTETUS. 


CHAPTEE  IX. 

HOW  FROM   THE  FACT  THAT  WE  ARE  AKIN  TO  GOD  A  MAS 
MAY   PROCEED  TO   THE  CONSEQUENCES. 

IF  tho  things  are  true  which  are  said  by  the  philosophers 
about  the  kinship  between  God  and  man,  what  else  re- 
mains for  men  to  do  than  what  Socrates  did  ?  Never  in 
reply  to  the  question,  to  what  country  you  belong,  say 
that  you  are  an  Athenian  or  a  Corinthian,  but  that  ycni 
are  a  citizen  of  the  world  (/cocr/uos).1  For  why  do  you 
say  that  you  are  an  Athenian,  and  why  do  you  not 
say  that  you  belong  to  the  small  nook  only  into  which 
your  poor  body  was  cast  at  birth  ?  Is  it  not  plain  that 
you  call  yourself  an  Athenian  or  Corinthian  from  the 
place  which  has  a  greater  authority  and  comprises  not 
only  that  small  nook  itself  and  all  your  family,  but 
even  the  whole  country  from  which  the  stock  of  your 
progenitors  is  derived  down  to  you  ?  He  then  who 
has  observed  with  intelligence  the  administration  of  the 
world,  and  has  learned  that  the  greatest  and  supreme  and 
the  most  comprehensive  community  is  that  which  is  com- 
posed of  men  and  God,  and  that  from  God  have  descended 
the  seeds  not  only  to  my  father  and  grandfather,  but  to 
all  beings  which  are  generated  on  the  earth  and  are  pro- 
duced, and  particularly  to  rational  beings — for  these  only 
are  by  their  nature  formed  to  have  communion  with  God, 
being  by  means  of  reason  conjoined  with  him2 — why 

1  Cicero,  Tuscul.  v.  37,  has  the  same :  "  Socrates  cum  rogaretur; 
cujatem  se  esse  diceret,  Mundanmn,  inquit.    Totius  einin  mundi  se 
incolam  et  civem  arbitrabatur."    (Upton.) 

2  It  is  the  possession  of  reason,  ho  says,  by  which  man  has  com- 
munion with  God ;  it  is  not  by  any  external  means,  or  religious  cere- 
monial.   A  modern  expositor  of  Epictetus  says,  "  Through  reahon  our 
souls  are  as  closely  connected  and  mixed  up  with  the  deity  as  though 
they  were  part  of  him"  (Epictet.  i.  14,  6;  ii.  8, 11,  17,  33).    In  the 
iJgpiatle  named  from  Peter  (ii.  1, 4)  it  is  written :  "  Whereby  are  given 
to  us  exceeding  great  and  precious  promises  that  by  these  (see  v.  3) 
ye  might  be  partakers  of  the  divine  nature  (yevyaBt  Betas  Koivvvol 
4>tJ(reo>s),  having  escaped  the  corruption  that  is  in  the  world  through 
lust""  Mrs.  Carter,  Introduction,  §  31,  has  some  remarks  on  this  Stoio 
doctrine,  which  are  not  a  true  explanation  of  the  principles  of  Epic- 
tetufl  and  Antoninus. 


EPICTETUS.  31 

should  not  such  a  man  call  himself  a  citizen  of  the  world, 
why  not  a  son  of  God,3  and  why  should  he  be  afraid  of 
anything  which  happens  among  men  ?  Is  kinship  with 
Caesar  (the  emperor)  or  with  any  other  of  the  powerful 
in  Eomo  sufficient  to  enable  us  to  live  in  safety,  and  abovo 
contempt  and  without  any  fear  at  all  ?  and  to  have  God 
for  your  maker  (ironqrjjv),  and  father  and  guardian,  shall 
not  this  release  us  from  sorrows  and  fears  ? 

But  a  man  may  say,  Whence  shall  I  get  bread  to  eat 
when  I  have  nothing? 

And  how  do  slaves,  and  runaways,  on  what  do  they  rely 
when  they  leave  their  masters?  Do  they  rely  on  their 
lands  or  slaves,  or  their  vessels  of  silver?  They  rely  on 
nothing  but  themselves;  and  food  does  not  fail  them.4 
And  shall  it  be  necessary  for  one  among  us  who  is  a 
philosopher  to  travel  into  foreign  parts,  and  trust  to  and 
rely  on  others,  and  not  to  take  care  of  himself,  and  shall 
he  be  inferior  to  irrational  animals  and  more  cowardly, 
each  of  which  being  self-sufficient,  neither  fails  to  get 
its  proper  food,  nor  to  find  a  suitable  way  of  living,  and 
one  conformable  to  nature  ? 

3  So  Jesus  said,  "  Our  Father  which  art  in  heaven.'1    Cleanthes,  in 
his  hymn  to  Zeus,  writes,  IK  o-ov  y&p  yeVos  ^oyieV.    Compare  Acts  of 
the  Apostles,  xvii.  28,  where  Paul  quotes  these  words.    It  is  not  true 
then  that  the  "  conception  of  a  parental  deity,"  as  it  has  been  asserted, 
was  unknown  before  the  teaching  of  Jesus,  and,  after  the  time  of 
Jesus,  unknown  to  those  Greeks  who  were  unacquainted  with  Hia 
teaching. 

4  In  our  present  society  there  are  thousands  who  rise  in  the  morning 
and  know  not  how  they  shall  find  something  to  eat.    Some  find  their 
food  by  fraud  and  theft,  some  receive  it  as  a  gift  from  others,  and  some 
look  out  for  any  work  that  they  can  find  and  get  their  pittance  by 
honest  labour.    You  may  see  such  men  everywhere,  if  you  will  keep 
your  eyes  open.    Such  men,  who  live  by  daily  labour,  live  an  heroio 
life,  wnich  puts  to  shame  the  well-fed  philosopher  and  the  wealthy 
Christian. 

Epictetus  has  made  a  great  misstatement  about  irrational  animals. 
Millions  die  annually  for  want  of  sufficient  food ;  and  many  human 
beings  perish  in  the  same  way.  We  can  hardly  suppose  that  he  did 
not  know  these  facts. 

Compare  the  passage  in  Matthew  (vi.  25-34).  It  is  said,  v.  26 : 
•c  Behold  the  fowls  of  the  air :  for  they  sow  not,  neither  do  they  reap, 
nor  gather  into  barns ;  yet  your  heavenly  Father  feedeth  them.  Are 
ye  not  much  better  than  they  ?"  The  expositors  of  this  passage  may 
be  consulted. 


82  EPICTETUS. 

I  indeed  think  that  the  old  man5  ought  to  be  sitting 
here,  not  to  contrive  how  you  may  have  no  mean  thoughts 
nor  mean  and  ignoble  talk  about  yourselves,  but  to  take 
care  that  there  be  not  among  us  any  young  men  of  such  a 
mind,  that  when  they  have  recognised  their  kinship  to 
God,  and  that  we  are  fettered  by  those  bonds,  the  body, 
I  mean,  and  its  possessions,  and  whatever  else  on  account 
of  them  is  necessary  to  us  for  the  economy  and  commerce 
of  life,  they  should  intend  to  throw  otf  these  things  as  if 
they  were  burdens  painful  and  intolerable,  and  to  depart 
to  their  kinsmen.  But  this  is  the  labour  that  your 
teacher  and  instructor  ought  to  be  employed  upon,  if  he 
really  were  what  he  should  be.  You  should  come  to  him 
and  say,  "  Epictetus,  we  can  no  longer  endure  being 
bound  to  this  poor  body,  and  feeding  it  and  giving  it 
drink,  and  rest,  and  cleaning  it,  and  for  the  sake  of  the 
body  complying  with  the  wishes  of  these  and  of  those.6 
Are  not  these  things  indifferent  and  nothing  to  us;  and 
is  not  death  no  evil  ?  And  are  we  not  in  a  manner 
kinsmen  of  God,  and  did  we  not  come  from  him  ?  Allow 
us  to  depart  to  the  place  from  which  we  came ;  allow  ufc 
to  be  released  at  last  from  these  bonds  by  which  we  are 
bound  and  weighed  down.  Here  there  are  robbers  and 
thieves  and  courts  of  justice,  and  those  who  are  named 
tyrants,  and  think  that  they  have  some  power  over  us  by 
means  of  the  body  and  its  possessions.  Permit  us  to  show 
them  that  they  have  no  power  over  any  man."  And  I  on 
my  part  would  say,  " Friends,  wait  for  God:  when  He 
shall  give  the  signal 7  and  release  you  from  this  service, 
then  go  to  Him ;  but  for  the  present  endure  to  dwell  in 
this  place  where  He  has  put  you :  short  indeed  is  this 
time  of  your  dwelling  here,  and  easy  to  bear  for  those 
who  are  so  disposed :  for  what  tyrant  or  what  thief,  or 

5  The  old  man  is  Epictetus. 

6  He  means,  as  Wolf  says,  "  on  account  of  the  necessities  of  the 
£ody  seeking  the  favour  of  the  more  powerful  by  disagreeable  com- 
pliances." 

7  Upton  refers  to  Cicero,  Tuscul.  i.  30 ,  Cato  Major,  c.  20 ;  Somnium 
Scipionis,  c.  3  (De  Repuhlica,  iv.  15);  the  purport  of  which  passage* 
is  that  we  must  not  depart  from  life  without  the  command  of  God. 
See  Marcus  Antoninus,  ii.  17;  iii.  5;  y.  33.  But  how  shall  a  man  know 
the  signal  for  departure,  of  which  Epictetus  speaks  ? 


33 

what  courts  of  justice,  are  formidable  to  those  who  have 
thus  considered  as  things  of  no  value  the  body  and  the 
possessions  of  the  body  ?  Wait  then,  do  not  depart 
without  a  reason." 

Something  like  this  ought  to  be  said  by  the  teacher  to 
ingenuous  youths.  But  now  what  happens  ?  The  teacher 
is  a  lifeless  body,  and  you  are  lifeless  bodies.  When  you 
have  been  well  filled  to-day,  you  sit  down  and  lament 
about  the  morrow,  how  you  shall  get  something  to  eat. 
Wretch,  if  you  have  it,  you  will  have  it ;  if  you  have  it 
not,  you  will  depart  from  life.  The  door  is  open.8  Why 
do  you  grieve?  where  does  there  remain  any  room  for 
tears  ?  and  where  is  there  occasion  for  flattery  ?  why  shall 
one  man  envy  another  ?  why  should  a  man  admire  the 
rich  or  the  powerful,  even  if  they  bo  both  very  strong  and 
of  violent  temper?  for  what  will  they  do  to  us?  We  shall 
not  care  for  that  which  they  can  do;  and  what  we  do 
care  for,  that  they  cannot  do.  How  did  Socrates  behave 
with  respect  to  these  matters?  Why,  in  what  other  way 
than  a  man  ought  to  do  who  was  convinced  that  he  was 
a  kinsman  of  the  gods?  "If  you  say  to  mo  now,"  said 
Socrates  to  his  judges,9  "  we  will  acquit  you  on  the  con- 
dition that  you  no  longer  discourse  in  the  way  in  which 
you  have  hitherto  discoursed,  nor  trouble  either  our  young 
or  our  old  men,  I  shall  answer,  you  make  yourselves 
ridiculous  by  thinking  that,  if  one  of  our  commanders  lias 
appointed  me  to  a  certain  post,  it  is  my  duty  to  keep  and 
maintain  it,  and  to  resolve  to  die  a  thousand  times  rather 
than  desert  it;  but  if  God  has  put  us  in  any  place  and 
way  of  life,  we  ought  to  desert  it."  Socrates  speaks  like  a 

•  Upton  has  referred  to  the  passages  of  Epictetus  in  which  this 
expression  is  used,  i.  24,  20 ;  i.  25,  18  ;  ii.  1,  19,  and  others ;  to  Soncca, 
De  Proyid.  c.  6,  Ep.  91 ;  to  Cicero,  De  Fin.  iii.  18,  where  there  is  this 
conclusion:  "e  quo  apparet  et  sapientis  esse  aliquando  officium  ex- 
cedere  e  vita,  quum  beatus  sit;  et  stulti  manere  in  vita  qumn  &ifc 
miser." 

Compare  Matthew  vi.  31:  "Therefore  take  no  thought,  saying. 
What  shall  we  eat?  or,  What  shall  we  drink?  or,  Wherewithal  shalf 
we  be  clothed?  (For  after  all  these  things  do  the  Gentiles  seek:) Tor 
your  heavenly  Father  knoweth  that  ye  have  need  of  all  these  things," 
&o. 

9  This  passage  is  founded  on  and  is  in  substance  the  same  as  that 
in  Plato's  Apology,  c.  17. 

D 


34  EPICTETTJS. 

mar.  \\lio  is  really  a  kinsman  of  the  gods.  But  we  think 
about  ourselves,  as  if  \vo  wore  only  stomachs,  and  intes- 
tines, and  .shameful  parts ;  wo  fear,  we  desire ;  we  flatter 
those  who  aie  able  to  help  us  in  these  matters,  and  we 
fear  them  also. 

A  man  asked  mo  to  write  to  Itome  about  kirn,  a  man 
who,  as  most  peoplo  thought,  had  been  unfortunate,  for 
formerly  he  was  a  man  of  rank  and  rich,  but  had  been 
stripped  of  all,  and  was  living  here.  I  wrote  on  his 
behalf  in  a  submissive  manner;  but  when  ho  had  read  tho 
letter,  he  gave  it  back  to  me  and  said,  UI  wished  for  your 
help,  not  your  pity :  no  evil  has  happened  to  me." 

Thus  also  Musi mius  Unfits,  iu  older  to  try  me,  used  to 
say:  This  and  this  will  befall  you  from  your  master; 
find  when  I  replied  that  these  were  things  which  happen 
in  the  ordinary  course  of  human  affairs.  Why  then, 
Haiti  he,  should  I  ask  him  for  anything  when  I  can 
obtain  it  from  you  ?  For,  in  fact,  what  a  man  has  from 
himself,  it  is  superfluous  and  foolish  to  receive  from 
another?10  Shall  I  then,  who  am  able  1o  receive  from 
myself  greatness  of  soul  and  a  goner  on  s  spirit,  receive 
from  you  land  and  money  or  a  magisterial  oilice?  I  hope 
not :  T  will  not  be  so  ignorant  about  my  own  possessions. 
Hut  when  a  man  is  cowardly  and  mean,  what  else  must 
be  dono  for  him  than,  to  write  letters  as  you  would  about 
a  corpse.11  Please  to  grant  us  the  body  of  a  certain  person 
and  a  sextarius  of  poor  blood.  For  such  a  person  is,  in 
fact,  a  carcase  and  a  sextarius  (a  certain  quantity)  of 
blood,  and  nothing  more.  l>nt  if  ho  were  anything  more, 
he  would  know  that  one  man  is  not  miserable  through  the 
means  of  another. 

10  Schweiglweuscr  has  ft  lon£ noto  on  this  passage,  to  "receive  from 
another."    I  think  that  there  is  no  difficulty  about  the  meaning;  and 
the  careful  reader  will  find  none.    Epictetns  was  once  a  slave. 

11  Tho  meaning  is  obscure.     Schweighaeuser  thinks  that  the  allu- 
eion  is  to  a  defeated  enemy  asking  permission  from  the  ccnqueror  to 
'tmry  the  dead.    Epictetus  considers  a  man  as  a  mere  carcase  who 
places  his  happiness  in  externals  and  in  the  favour  of  others. 


EPICTETUS.  85 

CHAPTER  X. 

AGAINST  THOSE  WHO  EAGERLY  SEKK  rilEFElUIEHT  AT  ROME. 

IK  we  applied  ourselves  as  busily  to  our  own  work  as  tho 
old  men  at  Home  do  to  those  matters  about  which  they  aro 
employed,  perhaps  we  also  mi»ht  accomplish  something. 
I  am  acquainted  with  a  man  older  than  myself,  who  is  now 
superintendent  of  corn1  at  Homo,  and  I  remember  tho  tinio 
when  he  came  here  on  his  way  back  from  exile,  and  what 
he  said  as  he  related  tho  events  of  his  former  life,  and 
how  he  declared  that  with  respect  to  the  future  after  his 
return  he  would  look  after  nothing  else  than  passing  the 
rest  of  his  life  in  quiet  and  tranquillity.  For  how  little  of 
life,  he  said,  remains  for  me.  1  replied,  you  will  not  do  it, 
but  as  soon  as  you  smell  Koine,  you  will  forget  all  that  you 
have  said;  and  if  admission  is  allowed  even  into  the  im- 
perial palace,  he2  will  gladty  thrust  himself  in  and  thank 
God.  If  you  find  me,  Epictetus,  ho  answered,  setting  oven 
one  foot  within  the  palace,  think  what  jou  please.  Well, 
what  then  did  he  do  ?  Before  he  entered  the  city,  ho  was-- 
met  by  letters  from  Caesar,  and  as  soon  as  he  received  them, 
he  forgot  all,  and  ever  after  has  added  one  piece  of  busi- 
ness to  another.  I  wish  that  I  were  now  by  his  side  to 
remind  him  of  what  he  said  when  he  was  passing  this  way, 
and  1o  tell  him  how  much  better  a  poor  I  am  than  he  is. 

AVell  then  do  I  say  that  man  is   an  animal  made  for 
doing  nothing  ? 3     Certainly  not.      But  why  are  wo  not 

1  A  "  Prroforf  ns  Annona?,"  or  superintendent  of  the  supply  of  corn 
at  Rome  is  first  mentioned  by  Livy  (iv.  12)  as  appointed  daring  a 
scarcity.     At  a  later  timo  this  office  was  conferred  on  Cn.  Pompeius 
for  five  years.    Maecenas  (Dion.  52,  c.  2-t)  advised  Augustus  to  mnko 
a  Praefectns  Annonae  or  permanent  officer  over  the  com  market  and  all 
other  markets  ( tirl  roT>  a-irov  rf/s  re  ayopas  rrjs  \otiriis).     He  would 
thus  have  the  office  formerly  exercised  by  the  aediles. 

2  I  cannot  explain  why  the  third  person  is  used  here  instead  of  th* 
second.    Sen  Schweig.'s  note. 

3  The  Stoics  tmght  that  man  is  adapted  by  his  nature  for  action. 
He  ought  not  therefore  to  withdraw  from  human  affairs,  and  indulge 
in  a  lazy  life,  not  even  a  life  of  contemplation  and  religious  observances 
only.    Upton  refers  to  Antoninus,  v.  1,  viii.  19,  and  Cicero,  De  Fin. 
v.  20. 

D2 


36  EPICTETUS. 

active  ? 4  (We  are  active.)  For  example,  as  to  myself, 
as  soon  as  day  comes,  in  a  few  words  I  remind  myself 
of  what  I  must  read  over  to  my  pupils;5  then  forth- 
with I  say  to  myself,  But  what  is  it  to  me  how  a 
certain  person  shall  read?  the  first  thing  for  me  is  to 
sleep.  And  indeed  what  resemblance  is  there  between 
what  other  persons  do  and  what  we  do  ?  If  you  observe 
what  they  do,  you  will  understand.  And  what  else  do 
they  do  all  day  long  than  make  up  accounts,  enquire 
among  themselves,  give  and  fake  advice  about  some 
small  quantity  of  grain,  a  bit  of  land,  and  such  kind  of 
profits?  Is  it  then  the  same  thing  to  receive  a  petition 
and  to  read  in  it :  I  in  treat  you  to  permit  me  to  ex- 
port6 a  small  quantity  of  coin  ;  and  one  to  this  effect :  "  I 
intreat  you  to  learn  from  Chrysippus  what  is  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  world,  and  what  place  in  it  the  rational 
animal  holds  ;  consider  also  who  you  are,  and  what  is  the 
nature  of  your  good  and  bad.  Are  these  things  like  the 
other,  do  they  require  equal  care,  and  is  it  equally  base  to 
neglect  these  and  those  ?  Well  then  are  we  the  only  per- 
sons who  are  lazy  and  love  sleep  ?  No  ;  but  much  rather 
you  young  men  are.  For  we  old  men  when  we  see  young 
men  amusing  themselves  are  eager  to  play  with  them ; 
and  if  I  saw  you  active  and  zealous,  much  more  should 
I  be  eager  myself  to  join  you  in  your  serious  pursuits." 

4  Schweighaeuser  proposes  a  small  alteration  in  the  Greek  text,  but 
I  do  not  think  it  necessary.  When  Epictctus  says,  "  Why  are  we  not 
active?"  He  means,  Why  do  some  say  that  we  are  not  active  ?  And 
he  intends  to  say  that  We  are  active,  but  not  in  the  way  in  which 
some  people  are  active.  I  have  therefore  added  in  (  )  what  is  neces- 
sary to  make  the  text  intelligible. 

6  This  passage  is  rather  obscure.  The  word  fawayvuvai  signifies, 
it  is  said,  to  read  over  for  the  purpose  of  explaining  as  a  teacher  may 
do.  The  pupil  also  would  read  something  to  the  teacher  for  the  pur- 
pose of  showing  if  he  understood  it.  So  Epictetus  also  says,  **  But  what 
is  it  to  me,"  &c. 

•  A  plain  allusion  to  restraints  put  on  the  exportation  of  grain. 


EPICTETUS.  87 

CHAPTEE  XI. 

OF  NATURAL   AFFECTION. 

WHEN  ho  was  visited  by  one  of  the  magistrates,  Epictetus 
inquired  of  him  about  several  particulars,  and  asked  if  lie 
had  children  and  a  wife.  The  man  replied  that  he  Lad  ; 
and  Epictetus  inquired  further,  how  he  felt  under  the 
circumstances.  Miserable,  the  man  said.  Then  Epictetus 
asked,  In  what  respect,  for  men  do  not  marry  and  beget 
children  in  order  to  be  wretched,  but  rather  to  be  happy. 
But  I,  the  man  replied,  am  so  wretched  about  my  children 
that  lately,  when  my  little  daughter  was  sick  and  was  sup- 
posed to  be  in  danger,  I  could  not  endure  to  stay  with 
her,  but  I  left  home  till  a  person  sent  me  news  that  she 
had  recovered.  Well  then,  said  Epictetus,  do  you  think  that 
you  acted  right  ?  I  acted  naturally,  the  man  replied.  But 
convince  me  of  this  that  you  acted  naturally,  and  I  will 
convince  you  that  everything  which  takes  place  according 
to  nature  takes  place  rightly.  This  is  the  case,  said  the 
man,  with  all  or  at  least  most  fathers.  I  do  not  deny  that : 
but  the  matter  about  which  we  are  inquiring  is  whether 
such  behaviour  is  right;  for  in  respect  to  this  matter  we 
must  say  that  tumours  also  come  for  the  good  of  the  body, 
because  they  do  come ;  and  generally  we  must  say  that  to 
do  wrong  is  natural,  because  nearly  all  or  at  least  most  of 
us  do  wrong.  Do  you  show  me  then  how  your  behaviour 
is  natural.  I  cannot,  he  said  ;  but  do  you  rather  show  me 
how  it  is  not  according  to  nature,  and  is  not  rightly 
done. 

Well,  said  Epictetus,  if  we  were  inquiring  about  white  and 
black,  what  criterion  should  we  employ  for  distinguishing 
between  them  ?  The  sight,  he  said.  And  if  about  hot  and 
cold,  and  hai  d  and  soft,  what  criterion  ?  The  touch.  Well 
then,  since  we  are  inquiring  about  things  which  are  accord- 
ing to  nature,  and  those  which  are  done  rightly  or  riftt 
rightly,  what  kind  of  criterion  do  you  think  that  we  should 
employ?  I  do  not  know,  ho  taid.  And  yet  not  to  know 
the  criterion  of  colours  and  smells,  and  also  of  tastes,  is 


38  EPICTETUS. 

perhaps  no  great  harm ;  but  if  a  man  do  not  know  in* 
criterion  of  good  and  bud,  and  of  things  according  to  nature 
and  contrary  to  nature,  does  this  seem  to  you  a  small  harm  ? 
The  greatest  harm  (I  think).  Come  tell  me,  do  all  things 
which  seem  to  some  persons  to  bo  good  and  becoming, 
rightly  appear  such ;  and  at  present  as  to  Jews  and  Syrians 
and  Egyptians  and  Komans,  is  it  poj-sible  that  the  opinions 
of  all  ot  them  in  respect  to  food  are  light?  How  is  it 
possible?  he  said.  Well,  I  suppose,  it  is  absolutely  neccs- 
saiy  that,  if  the  opinions  of  the  Egyptians  are  right,  the 
opinions  of  the  rest  must  be  wrong:  if  the  opinions  of  tho 
Jexvs  are  right,  those  of  the  icsfc  cannot  be  right.  Cer- 
tainly. But  where  there  is  ignorance,  there  also  there  is 
want  of  learning  and  training  in  things  which  are  neces- 
sary. He  assented  to  this.  You  then,  said  Epictetus, 
since  you  know  this,  for  the  future  will  employ  yourself 
seiiously  about  nothing  else,  and  will  apply  your  mind  to 
nothing  else  than  to  learn  the  criterion  of  things  which  are 
according  to  nature,  and  by  using  it  also  to  determine  each 
several  thing.  But  in  the  present  matter  1  have  so  much 
as  this  to  aid  you  towards  what  you  wish.  Does  affection 
to  those  of  your  family  appear  to  you  to  be  according  to 
nature  and  to  bo  good?  Certainly.  Well,  is  such  affection 
natural  and  good,  and  is  a  thing  consistent  with  reason  not 
good  ?  By  no  means.  Is  then  that  winch  is  consistent  with 
reason  in  contradiction  with  affection?  1  think  not.  You 
are  right,  for  if  it  is  otherwise,  it  is  necessary  that  one  of 
the  contradictions  being  according  tonutme,  the  other  must 
bo  contrary  to  nature.  Is  it  not  so  ?  It  is,  he  said.  Whatever 
then  we  shall  discover  to  be  at  the  same  time  affectionate 
and  also  consistent  with  reason,  this  we  coniidently  declare 
to  be  ri<;ht  and  good.  Agieed.  Well  then  to  leave  your 
sick  child  arid  to  go  away  is  not  reasonable,  and  I  suppose 
that  you  \vill  not  say  that  it  is;  but  it  remains  for  us  to 
inquire  if  it  is  consistent  with  affection.  Yes,  let  us  con- 
sider. Did  you  then,  since  you  had  an  affectionate  disposi- 
tion to  your  child,  do  right  when  you  ran  off  and  left  her; 
and  has  tho  mother  no  affection  for  the  child?  Certainly, 
she  has.  Ought  then  the  mother  also  to  have  left  her,  or 
ought  she  not  ?  She  ought  not.  And  the  nurse,  does  she 


EPICTETUS.  39 

love  her?  Slie  does.  Ought  then  she  also  fco  have  loft  her? 
By  no  means.  And  the  pacdagogtie,1  does  he  not  love  her? 
He  does  lovo  her.  Ought  then  he  also  to  have  deserted 
her?  and  so  should  iho  child  have  been  left  alone  and 
without  help  on  account  of  the  great  affection  of  you  the 
parents  and  of  those  about  her,  or  should  she  have  died  in 
the  hands  of  those  who  neither  loved  her  nor  cared  for  her? 
Certainly  not.  Now  this  is  unfair  and  unreasonable,  not 
to  allow  those  who  have  equal  affection  with  yourself  to  do 
what  you  think  to  be  proper  for  yourself  to  do  because  yon 
have  affection.  It  is  absurd.  Come  then,  if  you  were 
sick,  would  you  wish  your  relations  to  be  so  affectionate, 
and  all  the  rest,  children  and  wife,  as  to  leave  you  alone 
and  deserted?  By  no  means.  And  would  you  wish  to  be 
BO  loved  by  your  own  that  through  their  excessive  affection 
you  would  always  be  left  alone  in  sickness?  or  for  this 
reason  would  you  rather  pray,  if  it  wero  possible,  to  be 
loved  by  your  enemies  and  deserted  by  them  ?  But  if  this 
is  so,  it  results  that  your  behaviour  was  not  at  all  an  affec- 
tionate act. 

Well  then,  was  it  nothing  which  moved  you  and  induced 
you  to  desert  your  child  ?  and  how  is  that  possible  ?  Bu* 
it  might  be  something  of  the  kind  which  moved  a  man  at 
Koine  to  wrap  up  his  head  while  a  horse  was  running 
which  he  favouied  ;  and  when  contrary  to  expectation  the 
horse  won,  he  required  sponges  to  recover  from  his  faint- 
ing fit.  What  then  is  the  thing  which  moved?  The 
exact  discussion  of  this  docs  not  belong  to  the  present 
occasion  perhaps;  but  it  is  enough  to  be  convinced  of 
this,  if  what  the  philosophers  say  is  true,  that  we  must 
not  look  for  it  anywhere  without,  but  in  all  cases  it  is  one 
and  the  same  thing  which  is  the  cause  of  our  doing  or  not 
iloing  something,  of  saying  or  not  saying  something,  of 
being  elated  or  depressed,  of  avoiding  any  thing  or  pur 
suing :  the  very  thing  which  is  now  the  cause  to  me  and 
to  you,  to  you  of  coining  to  me  and  sitting  and  hearing, 
and  to  me  of  saying  what  I  do  say.  And  what  is  thjp  ? 
Is  it  any  other  than  our  will  to  do  sc  ?  No  other.  But 

1  «*  When  we  aro  children  onr  parents  put  us  in  the  bonds  of  » 
frnc.ingugi.ie  to  see  on  all  occasions  that  we  take  no  harm."— Epictetus. 
Krag.  U7. 


40  EPICTETUS. 

if  we  had  willed  otherwise,  what  else  should  we  have 
been  doing  than  that  which  we  willed  to  do  ?  This  then 
was  the  cause  of  Achilles'  lamentation,  not  the  death  of 
Patroclus ;  for  another  man  does  not  behave  thus  on  the 
death  of  his  companion ;  but  it  was  because  he  chose  to 
do  so.  And  to  you  this  was  the  very  cause  of  your  then 
running  away,  that  you  chose  to  do  so ;  and  on  the  other 
side,  if  you  should  (hereafter)  fctay  with  her,  the  reason 
will  bo  the  same.  And  now  }*ou  are  going  to  Koine 
because  you  choose  ;  and  if  you  should  change  your  mind,a 
you  will  not  go  thither.  And  in  a  word,  neither  death 
nor  exile  nor  pain  nor  anything  of  the  kind  is  the  cause 
of  our  doing  anything  or  not  doing ;  but  our  own  opinions 
and  our  wills  (8oy/xara). 

Do  I  convince  you  of  this  or  not?  You  do  convince 
mo.  Such  then  as  the  causes  are  in  each  case,  such  also 
are  the  effects.  When  then  wo  are  doing  anything  not 
rightly,  from  this  day  we  shall  impute  it  to  nothing  else 
than  to  the  will  (Soy/xa  or  opinion)  from  which  we  have 
done  it :  and  it  is  that  which  wo  shall  endeavour  to  take 
away  and  to  extirpate  more  than  the  tumours  and  abscesses 
out  of  the  body.  And  in  like  manner  we  shall  give  the 
game  account  of  the  cause  of  the  things  which  we  do  right ; 
and  we  shall  no  longer  allege  as  causes  of  any  evil  to  us, 
either  slave  or  neighbour,  or  wife  or  children,  being  per- 
suaded, that  if  we  do  not  think  things  to  be  what  we  do 
think  them  to  be,  wo  do  not  the  acts  which  follow  from 
such  opinions ;  and  as  to  thinking  or  not  thinking,  that  is 
in  our  power  and  not  in  externals.  It  is  so,  he  said. 
From  this  day  then  we  shall  inquire  into  and  examine 
nothing  else,  what  its  quality  is,  or  its  state,  neither  land 

3  K&V  j*eTa5<f£?/,  "  if  you  should  change  your  mind,"  as  we  say.  So 
we  may  translate,  in  the  previous  part  of  this  chapter,  e$o&v  yfjuv, 
trot,  and  tho  like,  "  we  had  a  mind  to  such  and  such  a  thing."  Below 
it  is  said  that  the  causes  of  our  actions  are  "  our  opinions  and  our 
wills,'*  where  the  Greek  for  "wills"  is  So'yjuara.  If  we  translate 
28o£«/  f)i£v,  "  seemed  right,"  as  some  persons  would  translate  it,  that 
is  not  the  meaning,  unless  we  understand  "  seemed  right "  in  a  sense 
in  which  it  is  often  used,  that  is,  a  man's  resolve  to  do  so  and  so.  See 
Schweig.'s  note  on  uir6\ri^is  and  8<tyjuo.  As  Antoninus  says  (viii.  1) : 
"  How  then  shall  a  man  do  this  (what  his  nature  requires)  ?  If  he 
has  principles  (Sity/tara)  from  which  come  his  affects  ^p/xai)  and  hia 

* 


EPIOTETUS.  41 

nor  slaves  nor  horses  nor  dogs,  nothing  else  than  opinions.3 
I  hope  so.  You  see  then  that  you  must  become  a  Scholar 
ticus,4  an  animal  whom  all  ridicule,  if  you  really  intend 
to  make  an  examination  of  your  own  opinions :  and  that 
this  is  not  the  work  of  one  hour  or  day,  you  know 
yourself. 


CHAFTEK  XII. 

OF   CONTENTMENT. 

WITH  respect  to  gods,  there  are  some  who  say  that  a 
divine  being  does  not  exist :  others  say  that  it  exists,  but 
is  inactive  and  careless,  and  takes  no  forethought  about 
any  thing  ;  a  third  class  say  that  such  a  being  exists  and 
exercises  forethought,  but  only  about  great  things  and 
heavenly  things,  and  about  nothing  on  the  earth ;  a  fourth 
class  say  that  a  divine  being  exercises  forethought  both 
about  things  on  the  earth  arid  heavenly  things,  but  in  a 
general  way  only,  and  not  about  things  severally.  There 
is  a  fifth  class  to  whom  Ulysses  and  Socrates  belong,  who 
say:  "I  move  not  without  thy  knowledge"1  (Iliad,  x. 
278). 

3  He  uses  the  word  SJyjuara,  which  contains  the  same  element  01 
root  as  5oK-e?,  e8o|e. 

4  A  Scholasticus  is  one  who  frequents  the  schools ;  a  studious  and 
literary  person,  who  does  not  engage  in  the  business  of  active  life. 

1  The  Hue  is  from  the  prayer  of  Ulysses  to  Athena :  "  Hear  me 
child  of  Zeus,  thou  who  standest  by  me  always  in  all  dangers,  nor  do 
I  even  move  without  thy  knowledge."  Socrates  said  that  the  gods 
know  everything,  what  is  said  and  done  and  thought  (Xenophon, 
Mem.  i.  1,  19).  Compare  Cicero,  Do  Nat.  Deorum,  i.  1,  2;  and  Dr. 
Price's  Dissertation  on  Providence,  sect.  i.  Epictetus  enumerates  tho 
various  opinions  about  the  gods  in  antient  times.  The  re  ider  may 
consult  the  notes  in  ^chweigbaeuser's  edition.  The  opinions  about 
God  among  modern  nations,  who  are  called  civilized,  and  arc  so  nior*^ 
or  less,  do  not  seem  to  be  so  varied  as  in  antient  times  ;  but  the  con- 
trasts in  mod«  rn  opinions  are  striking.  These  modern  opinions  vary 
between  denial  of  a  God,  though  the  number  of  tho«o  who  deny  ia 
perhaps  not  large,  and  the  superstitious  notions  about  God  and  his 
administration  of  the  world,  which  are  taught  by  teachers,  learned 
and  ignorant,  and  exercise  a  great  power  over  the  minds  of  those  who 
are  unable  or  do  not  dare  to  exercise  the  faculty  of  reason. 


42  EriCTETUH. 

Before  all  other  tilings  then  it  is  necessary  to  inquire 
about  each  of  these  opinions,  whether  it  is  affirmed  truly 
or  not  truly.  For  if  there  arc  no  gods,  how  is  it  our 
proper  end  to  follow  them  ?  2  And  if  they  exist,  but  take 
no  care  of  anything,  in  this  case  also  how  will  it,  be  right 
to  follow  them?  But  if  indeed  they  do  exist  and  look 
after  things,  still  if  there  is  nothing  communicated  from 
them  to  men,  nor  in  fact  to  myself,  how  even  so  is  it  right 
(to  follow  them)  ?  The  wise  and  good  man  then  after  con- 
sidering all  these  things,  submits  his  own  mind  to  him 
who  administers  the  whole,  as  good  citizens  do  to  the  law 
of  the  state.  Ho  who  is  receiving  instruction  ought  to 
come  to  bo  instructed  with  this  intention,  How  shall  I 
follow  the  gods  in  all  things,  how  shall  I  be  contented 
with  the  divine  administration,  and  how  can  I  become 
free?  For  he  is  free  to  whom  every  thing  happens 
according  to  his  will,  and  whom  no  man  can  hinder. 
What  then  is  freedom  madness?  Certainly  not:  for  mad- 
ness ;  n  I  freedom  do  not  consist.  But,  you  say,  I  would 
have  every  thing  result  just  as  I  like,  and  in  whatever 
way  I  like.  You  are  mad,  you  aro  beside  yourself.  Do 
you  not  know  that  freedom  is  a  noble  and  valuable  thing? 
But  for  me  inconsiderately  to  wish  for  things  to  happen 
as  i  inconsiderately  like,  this  appears  to  bo  not  .only  not 
noble,  but  even  most  base.  For  how  do  we  proceed  in 
the  matter  of  writing  ?  Do  I  wish  to  write  the  name  of 
Dion  as  I  choose  ?  JSro,  but  I  am  taught  to  choose  to  write 
it  as  it  ought  to  be  written.  And  how  with  respect  to 
music  ?  In  the  same  manner.  And  what  universally  in 
every  art  or  science?  Just  the  tame.  If  it  were  not  so, 
it  would  be  of  no  value  to  know  anything,  if  knowledge 
were  adapted  to  every  man's  whim.  Is  it  then  in  this 
alone,  in  this  which  is  the  greatest  and  the  chief  thing, 
I  mean  freedom,  that  I  am  permitted  to  will  inconside- 
rately? By  no  means;  but  to  bo  instructed  is  this,  to 
learn  to  wish  that  every  thing  may  happen  as  it  does.3 

2  "  To  follow  God,"  is  a  Stoical  expretmon.    Antoninus,  x.  11. 

8  This  means  that  we  ought  to  learn  to  he  satisfied  with  everything: 
that  happens,  in  fact  with  the  will  of  God.  This  is  a  part  of  educa- 
tion, tic'cording  lo  Kpictetus.  But  it  does  not  appear  in  our  systems  of 
education  so  plainly  as  it  does  here.  Antoninus  (iv.  23) :  "  Everything 
harmonizes  with  mo,  which  is  harmonious  to  thee,  O  universe.  Nothing 
for  me  is  too  early  nor  too  late,  which  is  in  due  time  for  thee/' 


EPIOTETUS.  43 

how  do  things  happen?  As  the  disposer  has  dis- 
posed them  ?  And  he  has  appointed  summer  and  winter, 
and  abundance  arid  scarcity,  and  virtue  and  vice,  and  all 
fmch  opposite®  for  the  haimony  of  the  whole;4  and  to 
oach  of  us  he  has  given  a  body,  and  paits  of  the  body, 
and  po.ssei-sions,  and  companions* 

Remembering  then  this  disposition  of  things,  we  ought 
to  go  to  be  instructed,  not  that  we  may  change  the  consti- 
tution5 of  things, — for  we  have  not  the  power  to  do  it, 
nor  is  it  better  that  we  should  have  the  power, — but  in 
order  that,  as  the  things  around  us  are  what  they  are  and 
by  nature  exist,  we  may  maintain  our  minds  in  harmony 
with  the  things  which  happen.  For  can  we  escape  from 
men  ?  and  how  is  it  possible  ?  And  if  we  associate  with 
them,  can  we  change  them?  Who  gives  us  the  power? 
What  then  lemains,  or  what  method  is  discovered  of  hold- 
ing commerce  with  them?  Is  there  such  a  method  by 
which  they  shall  do  what  seems  fit  to  them,  and  we  not 
the  less  shall  be  in  a  mood  which  is  conformable  to  nature  ? 
But  you  are  unwilling  to  endure  and  are  discontented : 
and  if  you  are  alone,  you  call  it  solitude  ;  and  if  you  are 
with  men,  you  call  them  knaves  and  robbers;  and  you 
find  fault  with  your  own  parents  and  children,  and  brothers 
and  neighbours.  But  you  ought  when  you  are  alone  to 
call  this  condition  by  the  name  of  tranquillity  and  freedom, 

4  Upton  lias  collected  the  passages  in  which  this  doctrine  was  men- 
tioned. One  pasaige  is  in  Gellius  (vi.  1),  from  the  fourth  book  of 
Chrysippus  on  Providence,  who  siys  :  "  nothing  is  more  foolish  than 
the  opinions  of  those  who  think  that  good  could  have  existed  without 
evil."  Schwdghneuser  wishes  that  Epictetus  had  discussed  more  fully 
the  quebtion  on  the  nature  and  origin  of  Evil.  lie  refers  to  the  com- 
mentary of  Simplicius  on  the  EnchoirMion  of  Epictetus,  c.  13  (8),  and 
:U  (27),  for  his  treatment  of  this  subject.  Epictetus  (Encheiridion, 
c.  27)  says  that  "  as  a  mark  is  not  set  up  for  the  purpose  of  missing  it, 
to  neither  does  the  nature  of  evil  exist  in  the  universe."  Simpliciua 
observes  (p.  278,  ed.  Schweig.) :  "  The  Good  is  that  which  is  accord- 
ing to  each  thing's  nature,  wherein  each  thing  has  its  perfection :  but 
the  Bad  is  the  disposition  contrary  to  its  nature  of  the  thing  which 
contains  the  bud,  by  which  disposition  it  is  deprived  of  that  which  & 
according  to  nature,  namely,  the  good.  For  if  the  Bad  as  well  as  the 
*iood  were  a  deposition  and  perfection  of  the  form  (efSous)  in  which  it 
is,  the  bad  itself  would  also  be  good  and  would  not  theu  be  called 
Uad." 

4  The  word  is  faoecffets.    It  is  explained  by  what  follows. 


44  EPICTETUS. 

and  to  think  yourself  liko  to  the  gods ;  and  when  you  arc 
with  many,  you  ought  not  to  call  it  crowd,  nor  trouble, 
nor  uneasiness,  but  festival  and  assembly,  and  so  accept 
all  contentedly. 

What  then  is  the  punishment  of  those  who  do  not 
accept  ?  It  is  io  bo  what  they  are.  Is  any  person  dis- 
satisfied with  being  alone?  let  him  be  alone.  Is  a  man 
dissatisfied  with  his  parents?  let  him  be  a  bad  son,  and 
lament.  Is  he  dissatisfied  with  his  children?  let  him 
l>e  a  bad  father.  Cast  him  into  prison,  \\liat  prison? 
Where  he  is  already,  for  he  is  there  against  his  will;  and 
where  a  man  is  ngainst  his  will,  there  he  is  in  prison.  So 
Socrates  was  not  in  prison,  for  he  was  there  willingly — 
Must  my  leg  then  be  lamed?  Wictch,  do  you  then  on 
account  of  one  poor  leg  find  fault  with  the  world  ?  Will 
you  not  willingly  surrender  it  for  the  whole  ?  Will  you 
not  withdraw  from  it  ?  Will  you  not  gladly  part  with  it 
to  him  who  gave  it  ?  And  will  you  be  vexed  and  discon- 
tented with  the  things  established  by  Zeus,  which  he  with 
the  Moirne  (fates)  who  were  present  and  spinning  the 
thread  of  your  generation,  defined  and  put  in  order? 
Know  you  not  how  e-mail  a  part  you  are  compared  with  the 
whole.6  I  mean  with  respect  to  the  body,  for  as  to  intelli- 
gence you  are  not  inferior  to  the  gods  nor  less ;  for  the 
magnitude  of  intelligence  is  not  measured  by  length  nor 
yet  by  height,  but  by  thoughts.7 

Will  you  not  then  choose  to  place  your  good  in  that  in 
which  you  are  equal  1o  the  gods? — Wretch  that  I  am  to 
have  such  a  father  and  mother. — What  then,  was  it  per- 
mitted to  you  to  come  forth  and  to  select  and  to  say :  Let 
Mich  a  man  at  this  moment  unite  with  such  a  woman  that 
I  may  be  produced?  It  was  not  permitted,  but  it  was  a 

•  "  Et  quota  pars  homo  sit  terrai  totius  unus."  Lucret.  vi.  652,  and 
Antoninus,  ii.  4. 

7  The  original  is  Stfyjuatn,  which  the  Latin  translators  render 
"decretis,"  and  Mrs.  Gaiter  "principles."  I  don't  understand  cither. 
1  have  rendered  the  word  hy  *'  thoughts,"  which  is  vague,  but  I  can 
do  no  better.  It  was  the  Stoic  doctrine  that  the  human  intelligence 
is  a  particle-  of  the  divine.  Mrs.  Carter  nnmes  this  "one  of  the  Stoio 
extravagancies,  arising  from  tho  no! ion  that  human  souls  were  literally 
parts  of  the  Deity."  But  this  is  hardly  a  correct  representation  of  the 
Stoic  doctrine. 


EPICTETUS.  45 

necessity  for  your  parents  to  exist  first,  and  then  for  you 
to  be  begotten.  Of  what  kind  of  parents  ?  Of  such  as. 
they  were.  Well  then,  since  they  are  such  as  they  are,  is 
there  no  remedy  given  to  you  ?  Now  if  you  did  not  know 
for  what  purpose  you  possess  the  faculty  of  vision,  you 
would  be  unfortunate  and  wretched  if  you  closed  your 
eyes  when  colours  were  brought  before  them ;  but  in  that 
you  possess  greatness  of  soul  and  nobility  of  spirit  for 
every  event  that  may  happen,  and  you  know  not  that  you 
possess  them,  are  you  not  more  unfortunate  and  wretched  ? 
Things  are  brought  close  to  you  which  are  proportionate 
to  the  power  which  you  possess,  but  you  turn  away  this 
power  most  particularly  at  the  very  time  when  you  ought 
to  maintain  it  open  and  discerning.  Do  you  not  rather 
thank  the  gods  that  they  have  allowed  you  to  bo  above 
these  things  which  they  have  not  placed  in  your  power, 
and  have  made  you  accountable  only  for  those  which  aro 
in  your  power  ?  As  to  your  parents,  the  gods  have  left 
you  free  from  responsibility ;  and  so  with  respect  to  your 
brothers,  and  your  body,  and  possessions,  and  death  and 
life.  For  what  then  have  they  made  you  responsible? 
For  that  which  alone  is  in  your  power,  the  proper  use  of 
appearances.  Why  then  do  you  draw  on  yourself  the 
things  for  which  you  are  not  responsible  ?  It  is,  indeed, 
a  giving  of  trouble  to  yourself. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

HOW  EVERYTHING  MAY  BE  DONE  ACCEPTABLY  TO  THE  GODS. 

WHEN  some  one  asked,  how  may  a  man  eat  acceptably  to 
the  gods,  he  answered  :  If  he  can  eat  justly  and  contentedly, 
and  with  equanimity,  and  temperately  and  orderly,  will  it 
not  be  also  acceptably  to  the  gods?  But  when  you  havo' 
asked  for  warm  water  and  the  s!«;ve  has  not  heard,  or  if  he 
did  hear  has  brought  only  tepid  water,  or  he  is  not  even 
found  to  be  in  the  house,  then  not  to  be  vexed  or  to  burst 


4(5  EPICTETUS. 

with  passion,  is  not  this  acceptable  to  the  gods? — 
then  shall  a  man  endure  such  persons  as  this  slaver 
Slave  yourself,  will  yon  not  bear  with  your  own  brother, 
who  has  Zens  for  his  progenitor,  and  is  like  a  son  from 
the  same  seeds  and  of  the  same  descent  from  above  ?  lJut 
if  you  have  been  put  in  any  such  higher  place,  will  yon 
immediately  make  yourself  a  tyrant?  Will  you  not 
remember  who  you  are,  and  whom  3^011  rule?  that  they  are 
kinsmen,  that  they  are  brethren  by  nature,  that  they  are 
the  offspring  of  Zeus  ? l — But  I  have  purchased  them,  and 
they  have  not  purchased  me.  Do  you  sou  in  what  direction 
you  are  looking,  that  it  is  towards  tho  earth,  towards  the 
pit,  that  it  is  towards  these  wretched  laws  of  dead  men  ?a 
but  towards  the  laws  of  the  gods  you  are  not  looking. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

THAT  THE  DEITY   OVERSEAS   ALL   THINGS. 

WHEX  a  person  avked  him  how  a  man  could  be  convinced 
that  all  his  actions  are  under  the  inspection  of  God,  he 
answered,  Do  you  not  think  that  all  things  are  united  in 
one?1  I  do,  the  person  replied.  Well,  do  you  not  think 

1  Mrs.  Carter  compares  Job  xxxi.  1.5  :  "  T3id  not  ho  that  made  mo 
in  the  womb  make  him  (my  man-servant)  ?    And  did  not  one  fashion 
us  in  the  womb  V" 

2  I  suppose  he  means  human  laws,  which  have  made  one  man  a 
slave  to  another;   and  when  he  says  "dead  men,"  ho  may  iii'im 
mortal  men,  as  contrasted  with  tho  gods  or  God,  who  has  made  all 
men  brothers. 

1  Things  appear  to  be  separate,  but  there  is  a  bond  by  which  they 
are  united.  "  All  this  that  you  see,  wherein  things  divine  and  huma» 
are  contained,  is  One :  we  are  members  of  one  large  body  "  (Seiiec*, 
Ep.  95).  "  Tho  universe  is  either  a  confusion,  a  mutual  involution  of 
things  and  a  dispersion;  or  it  is  unity  and  order  and  providence" 
(Antoninus,  vi.  10) :  also  vii.  9,  "  all  things  are  implicated  with  one 
another,  and  tho  bond  is  holy  ;  and  there  is  hardly  any  thing  uncon- 
nected with  any  other  thing."  See  also  Cicero,  De  Nat.  Deorum,  ii, 
7 ;  and  De  Oratore,  iii.  5. 


EriCTETUS.  47 

that  earthly  tilings  have  a  natural  agreement  and  union1 
with  heavenly  things  ?  I  do.  And  how  else  so  regularly 
as  if  by  God's  command,  when  lie  bids  the  plants  to  flower, 
do  they  flower  ?  when  Ho  bids  them  to  send  forth  shoots, 
do  they  shoot?  when  Tie  bids  them  to  produce  fruit,  how 
else  do  they  produce  fruit  ?  when  He  bids  the  fruit  to  ripen, 
does  it  ripen?  when  again  He  bids  them  to  cast  down  the 
fruits,  how  else  do  they  cast  them  down?  and  when  to 
shed  the  leaves,  do  they  shed  the  leaves  ?  and  when  He 
bids  them  to  fold  themselves  up  and  to  remain  quiet  and 
rest,  how  else  do  they  remain  quiet  and  rest?  And  how 
else  at  the  growth  and  th«  wane  of  the  moon,  and  at  the 
approach  and  recession  of  the  sun,  are  so  great  an  altera- 
tion and  change  to  the  contrary  seen  in  earthly  things?3 
But  are  plants  and  our  bndie*  so  bound  up  and  united  with 
the  whole,  and  are  not  our  souls  much  more  ?  and  our  souls 
so  bound  up  and  in  contact  with  God  as  parts  of  Him  and 
portions  of  Him ;  and  does  not  God  perceive  every  motion 
of  these  parts  as  being  his  own  motion  connate  with  himself? 
Now  are  you  able  to  think  of  the  divine  administration, 
and  about  all  things  divine,  and  at  the  same  time  also 
about  human  affairs,  and  to  be  moved  by  ten  thousand 
things  at  the  same  time  in  your  senses  and  in  your  under- 
standing, and  to  assent  to  some,  and  to  dissent  from  others, 
and  again  as  to  some  things  to  suspend  your  judgment  ; 
and  do  you  retain  in  your  soul  so  many  impressions  from 
so  many  and  various  things,  and  being  moved  by  them,  do 
you  fall  upon  notions  similar  to  thoso  first  impressed,  and 
do  you  retain  numerous  arts  and  tho  memories  of  ten 
thousand  things  ;  and  is  riot  God  able  to  oversee  all  things, 
and  to  be  present  with  all,  and  to  receive  from  all  a  certain 
communication  ?  And  is  the  sun  able  to  illuminate  so 
large  a  part  of  tho  All,  and  to  fleave  so  little  not  illumi- 
nated, that  part  only  which  is  occupied  by  the  earth's 
shadow ;  and  Ho  who  made  the  sun  itself  and  makes  it  go 
round,  being  a  small  part  of  himself  compared  with  the 
whole,  cannot  He  perceive  all  things  ? 

But  I  cannot,  the  man  may  reply,  comprehend  all  these 

8  The  word  is  crviJLira6civ.    Cicero  (De  Divin.  ii.  69)  translates  crt//« 
»e(fl  uav  by  "  oontinuatio  conjunctioque  naturae." 
*  Compare  Swedcnborg,  Angelic  Wisdom,  349-356. 


48  EPICTETTJS. 

things  at  once.  But  who  tells  you  that  you  have  equal 
power  with  Zeus?  .Nevertheless  he  has  placed  by  every 
man  a  guardian,  every  man's  Daemon,4  to  whom  he  has 
committed  the  care  of  the  man,  a  guardian  who  never 
sleeps,  is  never  deceived.  For  to  what  Letter  and  more 
careful  guardian  could  Ho  have  intrusted  each  of  us?5 
When  then  you  havo  shut  the  doors  and  made  darkness 
within,  remember  never  to  say  that  you  are  alone,  for  you 
are  not ;  but  God  is  within,  and  your  Daemon  is  within, 
and  what  need  have  they  of  light  to  see  what  you  are 
doing  ?  To  this  God  you  ought  to  swear  an  oath  just  as 
the  soldiers  do  to  Caesar.  But  they  who  are  hired  for  pay 
swear  to  regard  the  safety  of  Caesar  "before  all  things ;  and 
you  who  have  received  so  many  and  such  great  favours, 
will  you  not  swear,  or  when  you  have  sworn,  will  you  not 
abide  by  your  oath  ?  And  what  shall  you  swear  ?  Never 
to  be  disobedient,  never  to  make  any  charges,  never  to 
find  fault  with  any  thing  that  ho  has  given,  and  never 
unwillingly  to  do  or  to  suffer  any  thing  that  is  necessary. 
Is  this  oath  like  the  soldier's  oath?  The  soldiers  swear 
not  to  prefer  any  man  to  Caesar  :  in  this  oath  men  swear  to 
honour  themselves  before  all.6 

4  Antoninus,  v.  27 :  "  Live  with  the  gods.  And  he  docs  live  with 
the  gods  who  constantly  shows  to  them  that  his  own  soul  is  satisfied 
with  that  which  is  assigned  to  him,  and  that  it  does  all  that  the 
Daemon  wishes,  which  Zeus  hath  given  to  every  man  for  his  guardian 
and  guide,  a  portion  of  himself.  And  this  is  every  man's  under- 
standing and  reason."  Antoninus  (iii.  5)  names  this  Daemon  "the 
god  who  is  in  thee."  St.  Paul  (1  Cor.  i.  3,  10)  says,  "  Know  ye  not 
that  ye  are  the  temple  of  God,  and  that  the  spirit  of  God  dwelleth  in 
you  ?"  Even  the  poets  use  this  form  of  expression — 


"Est  Deus  in  nobis,  agitante  caloscimus  illo  fipso]: 

Impetus  hie  sacrae  semina  mentis  habet.  — Ovid,  *  Fasti.' 


TiC. 


5  See  Schweig.'s  note 
*  See  Schweig/s  note. 


EPICTETUS.  49 

CHAPTEB  XV. 

WHAT  PHILOSOPHY   PROMISES. 

WHEN  a  man  was  consulting  him  how  he  should  persuade 
his  brother  to  cease  being  angry  with  him,  Epictetus 
replied,  Philosophy  does  not  propose  to  secure  for  a  man 
any  external  thing.  If  it  did  (or,  if  it  were  not,  as  I  say), 
philosophy  would  be  allowing  something  which  is  not 
within  its  province.  Eor  as  the  carpenter's  material  is 
wood,  and  that  of  the  statuary  is  copper,  so  the  matter  of 
the  art  of  living  is  each  man's  life. — What  then  is  my 
brother's  ? — That  again  belongs  to  his  own  art ;  but  with 
respect  to  yours,  it  is  one  of  the  external  things,  like  a 
piece  of  land,  like  health,  like  reputation.  But  Philosophy 
promises  none  of  these.  In  every  circumstance  I  will  main- 
tain, she  says,  the  governing  part l  conformable  to  nature* 
Whose  governing  part  ?  His  in  whom  I  am,  she  says. 

How  then  shall  my  brother  cease  to  be  angry  with 
me?  Bring  him  to  me  and  I  will  tell  him.  But  I  hava 
nothing  to  say  to  you  about  his  anger. 

When  the  man,  who  was  consulting  him,  said,  I  seek 
to  know  this,  How,  even  if  my  brother  is  not  reconciled 
to  me,  shall  I  maintain  myself  in  a  state  conformable  to« 
nature  ?  Nothing  great,  said  Epictetus,  is  produced  sud- 
denly, since  not  even  the  grape  or  the  fig  is.  If  you  say 
to  me  now  that  you  want  a  fig,  I  will  answer  to  you  that 
it  requires  time  :  let  it  flower  2  first,  then  put  forth  fruit,, 
and  then  ripen.  Is  then  the  fruit  of  a  fig-tree  not  perfected 
suddenly  and  in  one  hour,  and  would  you  possess  the  fruit 
of  a  man's  mind  in  so  short  a  time  and  so  easily?  Do  not 
expect  it,  even  if  I  tell  you. 

1  This  is  rfc  T]yf(jioviK6v,  a  word  often  used  by  Antoninus,  ii.  2 ;  vi.  8. 

2  "  The  philosopher  had  forgot  that  fig-trees  do  not  blossom  "  (Mrs. 
Carter).    The  flowers  of  a  fig  are  inside  the  fleshy  receptacle  which 
becomes  the  fruit. 

Schweig.  prints  ^  5*  &i>,  iy&  voi  \4yw,  irpo<r$6Ka, :  and  in  his  Latin 
version  he  prints :  "  Id  vero,  ego  tibi  dico,  ne  expectes."  I  neither 
undei  stand  his  pointing,  nor  his  version.  Wolf  translates  it,  "  Etst 
ego  tibi  dixero  (virtutem  brevi  parari  posse),  noli  credere"  :  which  IB 
tijjht  Wolf  makes  &v  go  with  A4y». 

I 


50  EPICTETUS. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

OF  PROVIDENCE. 

Do  not  wonder  if  for  other  animals  than  man  all  things 
are  provided  for  the  body,  not  only  food  and  drink,  but  beds 
also,  and  they  have  no  need  of  shoes  nor  bed  materials, 
nor  clothing ;  but  we  require  all  these  additional  things. 
For  animals  not  being  made  for  themselves,  but  for  service, 
it  was  not  fit  for  them  to  be  made  so  as  to  need  other 
things.  For  consider  what  it  would  be  for  us  io  take  care 
not  only  of  ourselves,  but  also  about  cattle  and  asses,  how 
they  should  be  clothed,  and  how  shod,  and  how  they 
should  eat  and  drink.  Now  as  soldiers  are  ready  for  their 
commander,  shod,  clothed,  and  armed :  but  it  would  be 
.a  hard  thing  for  the  chili  arch  (tribune)  to  go  round  and 
shoe  or  clothe  his  thousand  men :  so  also  nature  has  formed 
the  animals  which  are  made  for  service,  all  ready,  pre- 
pared, and  requiring  no  further  care.  So  one  little  boy 
with  only  a  stick  drives  the  cattle. 

But  now  we,  instead  of  being  thankful  that  we  need 
not  take  the  same  care  of  animals  as  of  ourselves,  complain 
of  God  on  our  own  account;  and  yet,  in  the  name  of  Zeus 
and  the  gods,  any  one  thing  of  those  which  exist  would 
be  enough  to  make  a  man  perceive  the  providence  of  God, 
at  least  a  man  who  is  modest  and  grateful.  And  speak 
not  to  me  now  of  the  great  things,  but  only  of  this,  that 
milk  is  produced  from  grass,  and  cheese  from  milk,  and 
wool  from  skins.  Who  made  these  things  or  devised 
them  ?  No  one,  you  say.  0  amazing  shamelessness  and 
stupidity! 

Well,  let  us  omit  the  works  of  nature,  and  contemplate 
lier  smaller  (subordinate,  Trdpcpya)  acts.  Is  there  anything 
less  useful  than  the  hair  on  the  chin  ?  What  then,  has 
not  nature  used  this  hair  also  in  the  most  suitable  manner 
possible?  Has  she  not  by  it  distinguished  the  male  and 
the  female?  does  not  the  nature  of  every  man  forthwith 
proclaim  from  a  distance,  I  am  a  man :  as  such  approach 
me,  as  such  speak  to  me ;  look  for  nothing  else ;  see  the 
signs  ?  Again,  in  the  case  of  women,  as  she  has  mingled 


EPICTETUS.  51 

something  softer  in  the  voice,  so  she  has  also  deprived  them 
of  hair  (on  the  chin).  You  say,  not  so :  the  human  animal 
ought  to  have  been  k)ft  without  marks  of  distinction,  and 
each  of  us  should  have  been  obliged  to  proclaim,  I  am  a 
man.  But  how  is  not  the  sign  beautiful  and  becoming 
and  venerable?  how  much  more  ^beautiful  than  the  cock's 
comb,  how  much  more  becoming  than  the  lion's  mane? 
For  this  reason  we  ought  to  preserve  the  signs  which  God 
has  given,  we  ought  not  to  throw  them  away,  nor  to  con- 
found, as  much  as  we  can,  the  distinctions  of  the  sexes. 

Are  these  the  only  works  of  providence  in  us?  And 
what  words  are  sufficient  to  praise  them  and  set  them  forth 
according  to  their  worth  ?  For  if  we  had  understanding, 
ought  we  to  do  any  thing  else  both  jointly  and  severally 
than  to  sing  hymns  and  bless  the  deity,  and  to  tell  of 
his  benefits?1  Ought  we  not  when  we  are  digging  and 
ploughing  and  eating  to  sing  this  hymn  to  God?  "Great 
is  God,  who  has  given  us  such  implements  with  which  we 
shall  cultivate  the  earth:  great  is  God  who  has  given  us 
hands,  the  power  of  swallowing,  a  stomach,  imperceptible 
growth,  and  the  power  of  breathing  while  we  sleep."  This 
is  what  we  ought  to  sing  on  every  occasion,  and  to  sing  the 
greatest  and  most  divine  hymn  for  giving  us  the  faculty 
of  comprehending  these  things  and  using  a  proper  way.'2 
Well  then,  since  most  of  you  have  become  blind,  ought  there 
not  to  be  some  man  to  fill  this  office,  and  on  behalf  of  all  to 
sing3  the  hymn  to  God?  For  what  else  can  I  do,  a  lame 
old  man,  than  sing  hymns  to  God  ?  If  then  I  was  a  night- 
ingale, I  would  do  the  part  of  a  nightingale .  if  I  were 
a  swan,  I  would  do  like  a  swan.  But  now  I  am  a  rational 
creature,  and  I  ought  to  praise  God:  this  is  my  work;  I 
do  it,  nor  will  I  desert  this  post,  so  long  as  I  am  allowed 
to  keep  it ;  and  I  exhort  you  to  join  in  this  same  song. 

1  Antoninus,  v.  33. 

f  See  Upton's  note  on  &8£. 

,  is  Sotweighaeuser's  probable  emendation. 


52 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

THAT  THE  LOGICAL  ART  IS  NECESSARY. 

SINCE  reason  is  the  faculty  which  analyses  1  and  peifecfcs 
the  rest,  and  it  ought  itself  not  to  be  imanalysed,  by  what 
should  it  be  analysed  ?  for  it  is  plain  that  this  should  be 
done  either  by  itself  or  by  another  thing.  Either  then 
this  other  thing  also  is  reason,  or  something  else  superior 
to  reason;  which'  is  impossible.  But  if  it  is  reason,  again 
who  shall  analyse  that  reason  ?  For  if  that  reason  does 
this  for  itself,  our  reason  also  can  do  it.  But  if  we  shall 
require  something  else,  the  thing  will  go  on  to  infinity  and 
have  no  end.2  .Reason  therefore  is  analysed  by  itself. 
Yes  :  but  it  is  more  urgent  to  cure  (our  opinions  3)  and  the 
like.  Will  you  then  hear  about  those  things  ?  Hear.  But 
if  you  should  say,  "  I  know  not  whether  you  are  arguing 
truly  or  falsely,"  and  if  I  should  express  myself  in  any  way 
ambiguously,  and  you  should  say  to  me,  "  Distinguish," 
I  will  bear  with  you  no  longer,  and  I  shall  say  to  you,  "  It 
is  more  urgent."  4  This  is  the  reason,  I  suppose,  why  they 
(the  Stoic  teachers)  place  the  logical  art  first,  as  in  the 
measuring  of  corn  we  place  first  the  examination  of  the 
measure.  But  if  we  do  not  determine  first  what  is  a 

1  A(fyos   fffrlv   6  SiapOpwv.     AtapOpovv  means  "to  divide  a  thing; 
into  its  parts  or  members."    The  word  "analyse"  seems  to  be  the 
nearest  equivalent.    Bee  Schweig.'s  note  on  fab  rtvos  fiiapOpuOfj  / 

2  This  is  obscure.    The  conclusion,  "  Reason  therefore  is  analysed 


properties 

reason,  our  reason,  requires  another  reason  to  analyse  it,  that  other 
reason  will  require  another  reason  to  analyse  that  other  reason ;  and 
so  on  to  infinity.  If  reason  then,  our  reason,  can  be  analysed,  it  must 
be  analysed  by  itself.  The  notes  on  the  first  part  of  this  chapter  in 
the  edition  of  Schweighaeuser  may  be  read  by  those  who  are  inclined. 

3  ik  Our  opinions."    There  is  some  defect  in  the  text,  as  Wolf  re- 
* Jaarks.    **  The  opponent,"  he  says,  "  disparages  Logic  (Dialectic)  as  a 

thing  which  is  not  necessary  to  make  men  jrood,  and  he  prefers  moral 
teaching  to  Logic  :  but  Epictetus  informs  him,  that  a  man  who  is  not 
a  Dialectician  will  not  have  a  sufficient  perception  of  moral  teaching." 

4  He  repeats  the  words  of  the  supposed  opponent;  and  ho  means 
that  his  adversary's  difficulty  shows  the  necessity  of  Dialectic. 


EPICTETUS.  53 

motlius,  and  what  is  a  balance,  liow  shall  we  be  able  to 
measure  or  weigh  anything  ? 

In  this  case  then  if  we  have  not  fully  learned  and 
accurately  examined  the  criterion  of  all  other  things,  by 
which  the  other  things  are  learned,  shall  we  be  able  to 
examine  accurately  and  to  learn  fully  any  thing  else  ?  How 
is  this  possible  ?  Yes ;  but  the  niodius  is  only  wood,  and 
a  thing  which  produces  no  fruit. — But  it  is  a  thing  which 
can  measure  corn. — Logic  also  produces  no  fruit. — As  to 
this  indeed  we  shall  see  :  but  then  even  if  a  man  should 
grant  this,  it  is  enough  that  logic  has  the  power  of  distin- 
guishing and  examining  other  things,  and,  as  we  may 
say,  of  measuring  and  weighing  them.  Who  says  this  ? 
Is  it  only  Chrysippus,  and  Zeno,  and  Clean thes?  And 
does  not  Antisthenes  say  so?5  And  who  is  it  that  has 
written  that  the  examination  of  names  is  the  beginning  of 
education  ?  And  does  not  Socrates  say  so  ?  And  of  whom 
does  Xenophon  write,  that  he  began  with  the  examination 
of  names,  what  each  name  signified?6  Is  this  then  the 
great  and  wondrous  thing  to  understand  or  intcrpretChry- 
sippus?  Who  says  this? — What  then  is  the  wondrous 
thing  ? — To  understand  the  will  of  nature.  Well  then  do 
you  apprehend  it  yourself  by  your  own  power  ?  arid  what 
more  have  you  need  of?  For  if  it  is  true  that  all  men 
err  involuntarily,  and  you  have  learned  the  truth,  of  neces- 
sity you  must  act  right. — But  in  truth  I  do  not  apprehend 
the  will  of  nature.  Who  then  tells  us  what  it  is  ? — They 
say  that  it  is  Chrysippus. — I  proceed,  arid  I  inquire  what 
this  interpreter  of  nature  says.  I  begin  not  to  understand 
what  he  says  :  I  seek  an  interpreter  of  Chrysippus. — Well, 
consider  how  this  is  said,  just  as  if  it  were  said  in  the 

5  Antisthenos,  who  professed  the  Cynic  philosophy,  rejected  Logic 
and  Physic  (Scjiwcig.  note  p.  201). 

6  Xenophon,  Mem.  iv.  5,  12,  and  iv.  6,  7.     Epictetus  knew  what 
education  ought  to  be.    We  learn  language,  and  we  ought  to  learn 
what  it  means.    When  children  learn  words,  they  should  learn  what 
the  thing  is  which  is  signified  by  the  word.    In  the  case  of  childrei^ 
this  can  only  bo  done  imperfectly  as  to  some  words,  but  it  may  be 
done  even  then  in  some  degree ;  and  it  must  be  done,  or  the  word 
signifies  nothing,  or,  what  is  equally  bad,  the  word  is  misunderstood. 
All  of  us  pass  our  lives  in  ignorance  of  many  words  which  we  use ; 
eome  of  us  in  greater  ignorance  than  others,  but  all  of  us  in  ignorance 
to  some  degree. 


54  EPICTETUS. 

Roman  tongue.7 — What  then  is  this  superciliousness  of 
the  interpreter?8  There  is  no  superciliousness  which  can 
justly  be  charged  even  to  Chrysippus,  if  he  only  interprets 
the  will  of  nature,  but  does  not  follow  it  himself;  and 
much  more  is  this  so  with  his  interpreter.  For  we  have 
no  need  of  Chrysippus  for  his  own  sake,  but  in  order  that 
wo  may  understand  nature.  Nor  do  we  need  a  diviner 
(sacrificer)  on  his  own  account,  but  because  we  think  that 
through  him  we  shall  know  the  future  and  understand  the 
signs  given  by  the  gods ;  nor  do  we  need  the  viscera  of 
animals  for  their  own  sake,  but  because  through  them 
signs  are  given ;  nor  do  we  look  with  wonder  on  the  crow 
or  raven,  but  on  God,  who  through  them,  gives  signs  ?9 

I  go  then  to  the  interpreter  of  these  things  and  the 
sacrifice!-,  and  I  say,  Inspect  the  viscera  for  me,  and  tell  me 
what  signs  they  give.  Tlie  man  takes  the  viscera,  opens 
them,  and  interprets :  Man,  he  says,  you  have  a  will  free 
by  nature  from  hindrance  and  compulsion  ;  this  is  written 
here  in  the  viscera.  I  will  show  you  this  first  in  the  matter 
of  assent.  Can  any  man  hinder  you  from  assenting  to  the 
truth  ?  No  man  can.  Can  any  man  compel  you  to  receive 
what  is  false  ?  No  man  can.  You  see  that  in  this  matter 
you  have  the  faculty  of  the  will  free  from  hindrance,  free 
from  compulsion,  unimpeded.  Well  then,  in  the  matter  of 
desire  and  pursuit  of  an  object,  is  it  otherwise  ?  And  what 
can  overcome  pursuit  except  another  pursuit  ?  And  what 
can  overcome  desire  and  aversion  (e/ocAccrti/)  except  another 
desire  and  aversion  ?  But,  you  object :  "  If  you  place  before 
me  the  fear  of  death,  you  do  compel  me."  No,  it  is  not  what 
is  placed  before  you  that  compels,  but  your  opinion  that  it 
is  better  to  do  so  and  so  than  to  die.  In  this  matter  then 
it  is  your  opinion  that  compelled  you  :  that  is,  will  com- 
pelled will.10  For  if  God  had  made  that  part  of  himself, 

7  The  supposed  interpreter  says  this.  When  Epictetus  says  "the 
>Roman  tongue,"  perhaps  he  means  that  the  supposed  opponent  is  a 
Roman  and  does  not  know  Greek  well. 

•  Encheiridion,  c.  49.  "When  a  man  gives  himself  great  airs 
because  he  can  understand  and  expound  Chrysippus,  say  to  yourself. 
If  Chrysippus  had  not  written  obscurely,  this  man  would  have  had 
nothing  to  be  proud  of."  See  the  rest. 

9  Compare  Xenophon,  Mem.  i.  1,  3. 

10  This  is  true.    If  you  place  before  a  man  the  fear  of  death,  you 
threaten  him  with  the  fear  of  death.    The  man  may  yield  to  the 


EPIOTETUS.  55 

which  he  took  from  himself  and  gave  to  us,  of  such  a 
nature  as  to  be  hindered  or  compelled  either  by  himself  or 
by  another,  he  would  not  then  be  God  nor  would  he  bo 
taking  care  of  us  as  he  ought.  This,  says  the  diviner,  I 
find  in  the  victims  :  these  are  the  things  which  are  signi- 
fied to  you.  If  you  choose,  you  are  free;  if  you  choose,. 
you  will  blame  no  one  :  you  will  charge  no  one.  All  will 
be  at  the  same  time  according  to  your  mind  and  the  mind 
of  God.  For  the  sake  of  this  divination  I  go  to  this- 
diviner  and  to  the  philosopher,  not  admiring  him  for  this 
interpretation,  but  admiring  the  things  which  he  in- 
terprets. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

THAT  WE  OUGHT  NOT  TO  BE  ANGRY  WITH  THE  ERRORS 
(FAULTS)  OF  OTHERS. 

IF  what  philosophers  say  is  true,  that  all  men  have  one  prin- 
ciple, as  in  the  case  of  assent  the  persuasion1  that  a  thing 
is  so,  and  in  the  case  of  dissent  the  persuasion  that  u 
thing  is  not  so,  and  in  the  case  of  a  suspense  of  judgment 
the  persuasion  that  a  thing  is  uncertain,  so  also  in  the 

throat  and  do  what  it  is  the  object  of  the  threat  to  make  him  do  j  or 
lie  may  make  resistance  to  him  who  attempts  to  enforce  the  threat ; 
or  he  may  refuse  to  yield,  and  so  take  the  consequence  of  his  refusal. 
If  a  man  yields  to  the  threat,  he  does  so  for  the  reason  which  Epic- 
tetus  gives,  and  freedom  of  choice,  and  consequently  freedom  of  will 
really  exists  in  this  case.  The  Roman  law  did  not  allow  contracts  or 
agreements  made  under  the  influence  of  threats  to  be  valid ;  and  the 
reason  for  declaring  them  invalid  was  not  the  want  of  free  will  in  him 
who  yielded  to  the  threat,  but  the  fact  that  threats  are  directly  con- 
trary to  the  purpose  of  all  law,  which  purpose  is  to  secure  the  inde- 
pendent action  of  every  person  in  all  things  allowed  by  law.  This 
matter  is  discussed  by  JSavigny,  Das  heut.  Komische  Beclit,  iii.  §  114. 
See  the  title  *  Quod  metus  caiba,'  in  the  Digest,  4, 2.  Compare  also 
Epictetus,  iv.  1,  68,  etc.  * 

1  rb  iraOfw  fin,  etc. :  Schweighaeuser  has  a  note  on  the  distinction 
between  T&  opeyfo-Oai  and  rb  6p/j.av.  Compare  Epictetus,  iii.  2,  1  ; 
iii.  3,  2;  iii.  22,  43;  and  i.  4,  11.  Schweig.  says  that  6p4y€(r6ai  refers  to 
the  iyaOov  and  <ru/i<pepoH,  and  dp^av  to  the  Kafltj/coi/,  and  he  concludcg 
that  there  is  a  defect  in  the  text,  which  he  endeavours  to  supply. 


56  EPICTETUS. 

case  of  a  movement  towards  any  thing  the  persuasion  that 
a  thing  is  for  a  man's  advantage,  and  it  is  impossible  to 
think  that  one  thing  is  advantageous  and  to  desire  another, 
and  to  judge  one  thing  to  be  proper  and  to  move  towards 
another,  why  then  are  we  angry  with  the  many?2 

2  Mrs.  Carter  says:  "The  most  ignorant  persons  often  practise 
what  they  know  to  be  evil:  and  they,  who  voluntarily  suffer,  as  many 
do,  their  inclinations  to  blind  their  judgment,  are  not  justified  by  fol- 
lowing it.  (Perhaps  she  means  "  them,"  "  their  inclinations.")  The 
doctrine  of  Epictetus  therefore,  here  and  elsewhere,  on  this  head,  con- 
tradicts the  voice  of  reason  and  conscience :  nor  is  it  less  pernicious 
than  ill-grounded.  It  destroys  all  guilt  and  merit,  all  punishment 
and  reward,  all  blame  of  ourselves  or  others,  all  sense  of  misbehaviour 
towards  our  fellow-creatures,  or  our  Creator.  No  wonder  that  such 
philosophers  did  not  teach  repentance  towards  God." 

Mrs.  Carter  has  not  understood  Epictetus;  and  her  censure  is  mis- 
placed. It  is  true  that  "  the  most  ignorant  persons  often  practise  what 
they  know  to  be  evil,"  as  she  truly  says.  But  she  might  have  said 
more.  It  is  also  true  that  persons,  who  are  not  ignorant,  often  do  what 
they  know  to  bo  evil,  and  even  what  they  would  condemn  in  another, 
at  least  before  they  had  fallen  into  the  same  evil  themselves;  for 
when  they  have  done  what  they  know  to  bo  wrong,  they  have  a  fellow- 
feeling  with  others  who  are  as  bad  as  themselves.  Nor  does  he  say, 
as  Mrs.  Carter  seems  to  imply  that  he  docs,  for  her  words  are  ambi- 
guous, that  they  who  voluntarily  suffer  their  inclinations  to  blin<f 
their  judgment  are  justified  by  following  them.  He  says  that  men 
will  do  as  they  do,  so  long  as  they  think  as  they  think.  He  only 
traces  to  their  origin  the  bad  acts  which  bad  men  do ;  and  he  says 
that  we  should  pity  them  and  try  to  mend  them.  Now  the  best  man 
in  the  world,  if  he  sees  the  origin  and  direct  cause  of  bad  acts  in  men, 
may  pity  them  for  their  wickedness,  and  he  will  do  right.  He  will 
pity,  and  still  he  will  punish  severely,  if  the  interests  of  society 
require  the  guilty  to  be  punished:  but  ho  will  not  punish  in  anger. 
Epictetus  says  nothing  about  legal  penalties ;  and  I  assume  that  ho 
would  not  say  that  the  penalties  are  always  unjust,  if  I  understand  his 
principles,  llis  discourse  is  to  this  eifect,  as  the  title  tells  us,  that  we 
ought  not  to  bo  angry  with  the  errors  of  others :  the  matter  of  the 
discourse  is  the  feelmg|and  disposition  which  we  ought  to  have  towards 
those  who  do  wrong,  "because  they  are  mistaken  about  good  and 

He  does  not  discuss  the  question  of  the  origin  of  these  men's  mistake 
further  than  this  :  men  think  that  a  thing  or  act  is  advantageous ;  and 
it  is  impossible  for  them  to  think  that  one  thing  is  advantageous  and 
to  desire  another  thing.  Their  error  is  in  their  opinion.  Then  ho 
tells  us  to  show  them  their  error,  and  they  will  desist  from  their 
errors.  He  is  not  here  examining  the  way  of  showing  them  their 
error ;  by  which  I  suppose  that  he  means  convincing  them  of  their 
erron  He  seems  to  admit  that  it  may  not  be  possible  to  convince 


EPICTETUS.  57 

They  are  thieves  and  robbers,  you  may  say.  What  do 
you  mean  by  thieves  and  robbers  ?  They  are  mistaken 
about  good  and  evil.  Ought  we  then  to  be  angry  with 
them,  or  to  pity  them  ?  But  show  them  their  error,  and 
you  will  see  how  they  desist  from  their  errors.  If  they 
do  not  see  their  errors,  they  have  nothing  superior  to 
their  present  opinion. 

Ought  not  then  this  robber  and  this  adulterer  to  be 
destroyed  ?  By  no  means  say  so,  but  speak  rather  in  this 
way  :  This  man  who  has  been  mistaken  and  deceived  about 
the  most  important  things,  and  blinded,  not  in  the  faculty 
of  vision  which  distinguishes  white  and  black,  but  in  the 
faculty  which  distinguishes  good  and  bad,  should  we  not 
destroy  him?  Jf  you  speak  thus,  you  will  see  how  in- 
human this  is  which  you  say,  and  that  it  is  just  as  if  you 
would  say,  Ought  wo  lot  to  destroy  this  blind  ojid  deaf 
man?  But  if  the  greatest  harm  is  the  privation  of  the 
greatest  things,  and  the  greatest  thing  in  every  man  is  the 
will  or  choice  btfch  as  it  ought  to  be,  and  a  man  is  de- 
prived of  this  will,  why  are  you  also  angry  with  him  ? 
Man,  you  ought  not  to  be  affected  contrary  to  nature  by 
the  bad  things  of  another.3  Pity  him  rather :  drop  this 
readiness  to  be  offended  and  to  hate,  and  these  words  which 
the  many  utter :  "  these  accursed  and  odious  follows." 
How  have  you  been  made  so  wise  at  once  ?  and  how  are 
you  so  peevish  ?  Why  then  are  we  angry?  Is  it  because 
we  value  so  much  the  things  of  which  these  men  rob  us  ? 
Do  not  admire  your  clothes,  and  then  you  will  not  be 
angry  with  the  thief.  Do  not  admire  the  beauty  of  your 
wife,  and  you  will  not  be  angry  with  the  adulterer.  Learn 
that  a  thief  and  an  adulterer  have  no  place  in  the  things 
which  are  yours,  but  in  those  which  belong  to  others  and 
which  are  not  in  your  power.  If  you  dismiss  these  things 
and  consider  them  as  nothing,  with  whom  are  you  still 
angry?  But  so  long  as  you  value  these  things,  be  angry 
with  yourself  rather  than  with  the  thief  and  the  adulterer. 

them  of  their  errors  ;  for  he  says,  "  if  they  do  not  see  their  errors,  they 
have  nothing  superior  to  their  present  opinion." 

This  is  the  plain  and  certain  meaning  of  Epictetus  which  Mrs.  Carter 
In  her  zeal  has  not  seen. 

1  Here  the  text,  9, 10, 11  is  defective.    See  Schweighaeuser's  note. 


58  EPICTETUS. 

Consider  the  matter  thus  :  you  hava  fine  clothes ;  youi 
neighbour  has  not :  you  have  a  window ;  you  wish  to 
air  the  clothes.  The  thief  does  not  know  wherein  man's 
good  consists,  but  he  thinks  that  it  consists  in  having 
tine  clothes,  the  very  thing  which  you  also  think.  Must 
he  not  then  come  and  take  them  away?  When  }ou  show 
a  cake  to  greedy  persons,  and  swallow  it  all  yourself,  do 
you  expect  them  not  to  snatch  it  from  you?  Do  rot  pro- 
voke them :  do  not  have  a  window :  do  not  air  your 
clothes.  I  also  lately  had  an  iron  lamp  placed  by  the 
side  of  my  household  gods  :  hearing  a  noi^e  at  the  door,  I 
ran  down,  and  found  that  the  lamp  had  been  carried  off. 
I  reflected  that  he  who  had  taken  the  lamp  had  done 
nothing  stiange.  What  then?  To-morrow,  I  said,  you 
will  find  an  earthen  lamp  :  for  a  man  only  loses  that  which 
lie  has.  1  have  lost  my  garment.  The  reason  is  that  you 
had  a  garment.  I  have  pain  in  my  head.  Have  you  any 
pain  in  your  horns  ?  Why  then  are  you  troubled  ?  for  we 
only  lose  those  things,  we  have  only  pains  about  those 
things  which  we  possess.4 

But  the  tyrant  will  chain — what?  the  leg.  He  will 
take  away — what?  the  neck.  What  then  will  he  not 
chain  and  not  take  away?  the  will.  This  is  why  the 
antients  taught  the  maxim,  Know  thyself.5  Therefore 
we  ought  to  exorcise  ourselves  in  small6  things,  and 
beginning  with  them  to  proceed  to  the  greater.  I  have 
pain  in  the  head.  Do  not  say,  alas !  I  have  pain  in  the 
ear.  Do  not  say,  alas !  And  I  do  not  say,  that  you  are 
not  allowed  to  groan,  but  do  not  groan  inwardly ;  and 
if  your  slave  is  slow  in  bringing  a  bandage,  do  not  cry 
out  and  torment  yourself,  and  say,  "  Every  body  hates 
me "  :  for  who  would  not  hate  such  a  man  ?  For  the 

4  The  conclusion  explains  what  precedes.  A  man  can  have  no 
pain  in  his  horns,  because  he  has  none.  A  man  cannot  be  vexed 
about  the  loss  of  a  thing  if  he  does  not  possess  it.  Upton  says  that 
Epictetus  alludes  to  the  foolish  quibble :  "  If  you  have  not  lost  a  thing, 
you  have  it :  but  you  have  not  lost  horns ;  therefore  you  have  horns  " 
(Seneca,  Ep.  45).  Epictetus  says,  "  You  do  not  lose  a  thing  when  you 
have  it  not."  See  Sehweig.'s  note. 

6  Compare  what  is  said  in  Xenophon,  Mem.  iv.  2,  24,  on  the  ex- 
pression Know  thyself. 

•  This  ought  to  be  the  method  in  teaching  children." 


EPICTETUS.  f)9 

future,  relying  on  these  opinions,  walk  about  upright,  free ; 
not  trusting  to  the  size  of  your  body,  as  an  athlete,  for  a 
man  ought  not  to  be  invincible  in  the  way  that  an  ass  is.7 
Who  then  is  the  invincible  ?  It  is  he  whom  none  of 
the  things  distuib  which  are  independent  of  the  will. 
Then  examining  one  circumstance  after  another  I  observe, 
as  in  the  case  of  an  athlete  ;  he  has  come  off  victorious  in 
the  first  content :  well  then,  as  to  the  second  ?  and 
what  if  there  should  be  great  heat?  and  what,  if  it 
should  be  at  Otyrnpia?  And  the  same  I  say  in  this  case  : 
if  you  should  throw  money  in  his  way,  he  will  despise  it. 
Well,  suppose  you  put  a  young  girl  in  his  way,  what 
then  ?  and  what,  if  it  is  in  the  dark  ? 8  what  if  it  should 
be  a  little  reputation,  or  abuse  ;  and  what,  if  it  should  be 
praise;  and  what  if  it  should  be  death?  He  is  able  to 
overcome  all.  What  then  if  it  be  in  heat,  and  what  if  it 
is  in  the  rain,9  and  what  if  he  be  in  a  melancholy  (mad) 
mood,  and  what  if  he  be  asleep  ?  He  will  still  conquer. 
This  is  my  invincible  athlete. 

7  That  is  obstinate,  as  this  animal  is  generally ;  and  sometimes  very 
obstinate.    The  meaning  then  is,  as  Schwci^haeuser  says:  "a  man 
should  be  invincible,  not  with  a  kind  of  stupid  obstinacy  or  la/iness 
and  slowness  in  moving  himself  like  an  ass,  but  he  should  be  invin- 
cible through  reason,  reflection,  meditation,  study,  and  diligence." 

8  "  From  the  rustics  came  the  old  proverb,  for  when  they  commend 
a  man's  fidelity  and  goodness  they  say  he  is  a  man  with  whom  you 
may  play  the  game  with  the  fingers  in  the  dark."    Cicero,  De  Officiis, 
iii/li).     See  Forcellini,  Micare. 

9  The  MSS.  have  OojueVos  or  oi6p€vos.    Sch weigh aeuser  has  accepted 
Upton's  emendation  of  ofVw/ueVos,  but  I  do  not.    The  "  sleep "  refers 
to   dreams.     Aristotle,  Ethic,  i.  13,  says :    "  better  are  the  visions 
(dreams)  of  the  good  (tirieiKav)  than  those  of  the  common  sort;"  and 
Zeno  taught  that  "  a  man  might  from  his  dreams  judge  of  the  progress 
that  he  was  making,  if  he  observed  that  in  his  sleep  he  was  not  pleased 
with  anything  bad,  nor  desired  or  did  anything  unreasonable  or  un- 
just."   Plutarch,  Trepi  7rpo/cor?}$,  ed.  Wyttenbaoh,  vol.  i.  o.  12. 


60  EPICTETUS, 

CHAPTEB  XIX. 

HOW   WE   SHOULD  BEHAVE   TO   TYRANTS. 

IF  a  man  possesses  any  superiority,  or  thinks  that  he  does, 
when  he  does  not,  such  a  man,  if  he  is  iminstructed,  will 
of  necessity  be  puffed  up  through  it.  For  instance,  the 
tyrant  says,  "  I  am  master  of  all  ?  "  And  what  can  you 
do  for  me  ?  Can  you  give  me  desire  which  shall  have  no 
hindrance?  How  can  you?  Have  you  the  infallible 
power  of  avoiding  what  you  would  avoid  ?  Have  you  the 
power  of  moving  towards  an  object  without  error  ?  And 
how  do  you  possess  this  power  ?  Come,  when  you  are  in 
a  ship,  do  you  trust  to  yourself  or  to  the  helmsman  ?  And 
when,  you  are  in  a  chariot,  to  whom  do  you  trust  but  to 
the  driver?  And  how  is  it  in  all  other  arts?  Just  the 
same.  In  what  then  lies  your  power?  All  men  pay 
respect  l  to  me.  Well,  I  also  pay  respect  to  my  platter, 
and  I  wash  it  and  wipe  it  ;  and  for  the  sake  of  my  oil 
flask,  I  drive  a  peg  into  the  wall.  Well  then,  are  these 
things  superior  to  me  ?  No,  but  they  supply  some  of  my 
wants,  and  for  this  reason  I  take  care  of  them.  Well,  do 
I  not  attend  to  my  ass  ?  Do  I  not  wash  his  feet  ?  Do  I 
not  clean  him  ?  Do  you  not  know  that  every  man  has 
regard  to  himself,  and  to  you  just  the  same  as  he  has 
regard  to  his  ass  ?  For  who  has  regard  to  you  as  a  man? 
Show  me.  Who  wishes  to  become  like  you?  Who 
imitates  you,  as  he  imitates  Socrates?  —  But  I  can  cut  off 
your  head.  —  You  say  right.  I  had  forgotten  that  I  must 
have  regard  to  you,  as  I  would  to  a  fever  2  and  the  bile, 
and  raise  an  altar  to  you,  as  there  is  at  Kome  an  altar 
to  fever. 

What  is  it  then  that  disturbs  and  terrifies  the  multi- 
tude ?  is  it  the  tyrant  and  his  guards  ?  [By  no  means.] 
I  hope  that  it  is  not  so.  It  is  not  possible  that  what 
is  by  nature  free  can  be  disturbed  by  anything  else,  or 


.    Epictetus  continues  to  use  the  same  word. 
2  Febris,  fever,  was  a  goddess  at  Kome.    Upton  refers  to  an  inscrip- 
tion  in  Grutcr  97,  which  begins  "  Febri  Divae."    Compare  Lactantius, 
De  falsa  religioue,  o.  20. 


EPICTETUS.  61 

hindered  by  any  other  thing  than  by  itself.  But  it  is  a 
man's  own  opinions  which  disturb  him  :  for  when  the 
tyrant  says  to  a  man,  "  I  will  chain  your  leg,"  he  who 
values  his  leg  says,  "  Do  not  ;  have  pity  :  "  but  ho  who 
values  his  own  will  says,  "  If  it  appears  more  advantageous 
to  you,  chain  it."  Do  you  not  care?  I  do  not  care.  I 
will  show  you  that  I  am  master.  You  cannot  do  that. 
Zeus  has  set  me  free  :  do  you  think  that  lie  intended  to 
allow  his  own  son3  lo  be  enslaved  ?  But  you  are  master 
of  my  carcase  :  take  it.  —  So  when  you  approach  me,  you 
have  no  regard  to  me  ?  No,  but  I  have  regard  to  myself; 
and  if  you  wish  rne  to  say  that  I  have  regard  to  you  also, 
I  tell  you  that  I  have  the  same  regard  to  you  that  I  have 
to  my  pipkin. 

This  is  not  a  perverse  self-regard,4  for  the  animal  is 
constituted  so  as  to  do  all  things  for  itself.  For  even  the 
sun  does  all  things  for  itself;  nay,  even  Zeus  himself. 
But  when  he  chooses  to  be  the  Giver  of  rain  and  the  Giver 
of  fruits,  and  the  Father  of  Gods  and  men,  you  see  that 
he  cannot  obtain  these  functions  and  these  names,  if  he  is 
not  useful  to  man;  and,  universally,  he  has  made  the 
nature  of  the  rational  animal  such  that  it  cannot  obtain 
any  one  of  its  own  proper  interests,  if  it  does  not  con- 
tribute something  to  the  common  interest.5  In  this 
manner  and  j-ense  it  is  not  unsociable  for  a  man  to  do 
every  thing  for  the  sake  of  himself.  For  what  do  you 
expect?  that  a  man  should  neglect  himself  and  his  own 
interest  ?  And  how  in  that  case  can  there  be  one  and  the 
same  principle  in  all  animals,  the  principle  of  attachment 
(regard)  to  themselves  ? 

What  then?   when  absurd  notions  about  things  inde- 

f  Comp.  i.  c.  3. 

4  The  word  is  q>i\avrov,  self-love,  but  here  it  means  self-regard,  which 
implies  i\o  censure.    See  Aristotle,  Ethic.  Nicom.  ix.  c.  8  :  us  ev  al 
<£>tAat/Toi>s  airoKa\ov(n.     His  conclusion  is:  ourey  /x€i>  o5»>  Se?  tyiX 
' 


€?pai,  KaOdirep  efp/Tcu*  ws  8'  oi  TroAXot,  ov  XP^«  See  the  note  of  Schweig- 
haeuser.    Epictetus,  as  usual,  is  right  in  his  opinion  of  man's  nature. 

5  This  has  been  misunderstood  by  Wolf.  Schweighaeuser,  who 
always  writes  like  a  man  of  sense,  says  :  "  Epictetus  means  by  *  our 
proper  interests,'  the  interests  proper  to  man,  as  a  man,  as  a  rational 
being;  and  this  interest  or  good  consists  in  the  proper  use  of  pur 
powers,  and  so  far  from  being  repugnant  to  common  interest  or  utility, 
it  contains  within  itself  the  notion  of  general  utility  and  cannot  b* 
separated  from  it.1' 


62  EPIGTETUS. 

pendent  of  our  will,  as  if  they  were  good  and  (or)  bad,  lie  at 
the  bottom  of  our  opinions,  we  must  of  necessity  pay  re- 
gard to  tyrants ;  for  I  wish  that  men  would  pay  regard  to 
tyrants  only,  and  not  also  to  the  bedchamber  men.6  How 
is  it  that  the  man  becomes  all  at  once  wise,  when  Caesar 
has  made  him  superintendent  of  the  close  stool  ?  How  is 
it  that  we  say  immediately,  "  Felicion  spoke  sensibly  to 
me."  I  wish  he  were  ejected  from  the  bedchamber,  that 
he  might  again  appear  to  you  to  be  a  fool. 

Epaphroditus 7  had  a  shoemaker  whom  he  sold  because 
he  was  good  for  nothing.  This  fellow  by  some  good  luck 
was  bought  by  one  of  Caesar's  men,  and  became  Caesar's 
shoemaker.  You  should  have  seen  what  respect  Epaphro- 
ditus paid  to  him :  "  How  does  the  good  Felicion  do,  I 
pray?"  Then  if  any  of  us  asked,  u  What  is  master 
(Epaphroditus)  doing  ? "  the  answer  was,  "  He  is  con- 
sulting about  something  with  Felicion."  Had  he  not  sold 
the  man  as  good  for  nothing  ?  Who  then  made  him  wiso 
all  at  once  ?  This  is  an  instance  of  valuing  something  else 
than  the  things  which  depend  on  the  will. 

Has  a  man  been  exalted  to  the  tribuneship?  All  who 
meet  him  offer  their  congratulations  :  one  kisses  his  eyes, 
another  the  neck,  and  the  slaves  kiss  his  hands.8  He 
goes  to  his  houso,  he  finds  torches  lighted.  Ho  ascends 
the  Capitol:  he  offers  a  sacrifice  on  the  occasion.  Now 
who  ever  sacrificed  for  having  had  good  desires  ?  for  having 
acted  conformably  to  nature  ?  For  in  fact  we  thank  the 
gods  for  those  things  in  which  we  place  our  good.9 

6  Suoh  a  man  was  named  in  Greek  KoirwviTys ;  in  Latin  "  cubicu- 
larius,"  a  lord  of  the  bedchamber,  as  we  might  say.     Seneca,  Do  Con- 
etantia  Sapientis,  c.  14,  speaks  "  of  the  pride  of  the  nomenclator  (the 
announcer  of  the  name),  of  the  arrogance  of  the  bedchamber  man." 
Even  the  clerk  of  the  close-stool  was  an  important  person.     Slaves 
used  to  carry  this  useful  domestic  vessel  on  a  journey.    Horat.  Sat.  i. 
t>,  109  (Upton). 

7  Once  the  master  of  Epictetus  (i.  1,  20). 

•  Hand-kissing  was  ,in  those  times  of  tyranny  the  duty  of  a  slave, 
not  of  a  free  man.  This  servile  practice  still  exists  among  men  called 
free. 

9  Schweighaeuser  says  that  he  has  introduced  into  the  text  Lord 
Sbaftesbury's  emendation,  faov.  The  emendation  oirov  is  good,  but 
Schweighaeuser  has  not  put  it  in  his  text :  he  has  of  rb  byaQbv  nOt* 
fjLtOa.  Matthew  vi.  21,  "  for  where  your  treasure  is,  there  will  your 
heart  be  also."  So  these  people  show  by  thanking  God,  what  it  is  for 
which  they  are  thankful. 


EPICTETUS.  63 

A  person  was  talking  to  me  to-day  about  the  priesthood 
of  Augustus.10  I  say  to  him :  "  Man,  let  the  thing  alone : 
you  will  spend  much  for  no  purpose."  But  he  replies, 
"  Those  who  draw  up  agreements  will  write  my  name." 
Do  you  then  stand  by  those  who  read  them,  and  say  to 
such  persons,  "  It  is  I  whose  name  is  written  there  "  ?  And 
if  you  can  now  be  present  on  all  such  occasions,  what  will 
you  do  when  you  are  dead  ?  My  name  will  remain. — 
Write  it  on  a  stone,  and  it  will  remain.  But  come,  what 
remembrance  of  you  will  there  bo  beyond  Nicopolis  ? — But 
I  shall  wear  a  crown  of  gold. — If  you  desire  a  crown  at 
all,  take  a  crown  of  roses  and  put  it  on,  for  it  will  be 
more  elegant  in  appearance. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

ABOUT    REASON,    HOW  IT   CONTEMPLATES   ITSELF.1 

EVERY  art  and  faculty  contemplates  certain  things  especi- 
ally.2 When  then  it  is  itself  of  the  same  land  with  the 
objects  which  it  contemplates,  it  must  of  necessity  con- 
template itself  also :  but  when  it  is  of  an  unlike  kind,  it 
cannot  contemplate  itself.  For  instance,  the  shoemaker's 
art  is  employed  on  skins,  but  itself  is  entirely  distinct 
from  the  material  of  skins :  for  this  reason  it  does  not 
contemplate  itself.  Again,  the  grammarian's  art  is  em- 

10  Cnsaubon,  in  a  learned  note  on  Suetonius,  Augustus,  c.  18,  informs 
us  that  divine  honours  were  paid  to  Augustus  at  Nicopolis,  which  town 
he  founded  after  the  victory  at  Actium.  The  priesthood  of  Augustus 
at  Nieopolis  was  a  high  office,  and  the  priest  gave  his  name  to  the  year; 
that  is,  when  it  was  intended  in  any  writing  to  fix  the  year,  either  in 
any  writing  which  related  to  public  matters,  or  in  instruments  used  in 
private  affairs,  the  name  of  the  priest  of  Augustus  was  used,  and  this 
was  also  the  practice  in  most  Greek  cities.  In  order  to  establish  the 
sense  of  this  passage,  Casaubon  changed  the  text  from  ras  (pwvds  into 
r&  (rv/AQuva,  which  emendation  Schweighaeuser  has  admitted  into  his 
text. 

1  A  comparison  of  lib.  i.  chap.  1,  will  help  to  explain  this  chapter. 
Compare  also  lib.  i.  chap.  17. 

*  Wolf  suggests  that  we  should  read  7^07770  vftcVas  instead  of 


64  EPICTETUS. 

ployed  about  articulate  speech;3  is  then  the  art  also 
articulate  speech?  By  no  means.  For  this  reason  it 
is  not  able  to  contemplate  itself.  "Now  reason,  for  what 
purpose  has  it  been  given  by  nature?  For  the  right  use 
of  appearances.  What  is  it  then  itself?  A  System  (com- 
bination) of  certain  appearances.  So  by  its  nature  it  has 
the  faculty  of  contemplating  itself  also.  Again,  sound 
sense,  for  the  contemplation  of  what  things  does  it  belong 
to  us?  Good  and  evil,  and  things  which  are  neither. 
What  is  it  then  itself?  Good.  And  want  of  sense,  what 
is  it?  Evil.  Do  you  see  then  that  good  sense  necessarily 
contemplates  both  itself  and  the  opposite  ?  For  this  reason 
it  is  the  chief  and  the  first  work  of  a  philosopher  to  ex- 
amine appearances,  and  to  distinguish  them,  and  to  admit 
none  without  examination.  You  see  even  in  the  matter 
of  coin,  in  which  our  interest  appears  to  be  somewhat  con- 
cerned, how  we  have  invented  an  art,  and  how  many 
means  the  assay er  uses  to  try  the  value  of  coin,  the  sight, 
the  touch,  the  smell,  and  lastly  the  hearing.  He  throws 
the  coin  (denarius)  down,  and  observes  the  sound,  and  he 
is  not  content  with  its  sounding  once,  but  through  his 
great  attention  he  becomes  a  musician.  In  like  manner, 
where  we  think  that  to  be  mistaken  and  not  to  be  mis- 
taken make  a  great  difference,  there  we  apply  great  atten- 
tion to  discovering  the  things  which  can  deceive.  But 
in  the  matter  of  our  miserable  ruling  faculty,  yawning  and 
sleeping,  we  carelessly  admit  every  appearance,  for  the 
harm  is  not  noticed. 

When  then  you  would  know  how  careless  you  are 
with  respect  to  good  and  evil,  and  how  active  with  re- 
spect to  things  which  are  indifferent4  (neither  good  nor 
evil),  observe  how  you  feel  with  respect  to  being  deprived 
of  the  sight  of  the  eyes,  and  how  with  respect  to  being 
deceived,  and  you  will  discover  that  you  are  far  from 
feeling  as  you  ought  to  do  in  relation  to  good  and  evil. 
But  this  is  a  matter  which  requires  much  preparation, 
and  much  labour  and  study.  Well  then  do  you  expect 

3  See  Schweighaeusers  note. 

4  "We  reckon  death  among  the  things  which  are  indifferent  (in- 
differentia),  which  the  Greeks  name  a$id<j>opa.    But  I  name  'indif- 
ferent '  the  things  which  are  neither  good  nor  bad,  as  disease,  pain, 
poverty,  exile,  death/'— Seneca,  Ep.  82. 


EPICTETUS.  6i> 

to  acquire  the  greatest  of  arts  witli  small  labour?  And 
yet  the  chief  doctrine  of  philosophers  is  very  brief.  If 
you  would  know,  read  Zeno's5  writings  and  you  will  see 
For  how  few  words  it  requires  to  say  that  man's  end  (or 
object)  is  to  follow6  the  gods,  and  that  the  nature  of 
good  is  a  proper  use  of  appearances.  But  if  you  say 
What  is  God,  what  is  appearance,  and  what  is  particular 
and  what  is  universal 7  nature  ?  then  indeed  many  words 
are  necessary.  If  then  Epicurus  should  come  and  say, 
that  the  good  must  be  in  the  body ;  in  this  case  also  many 
words  become  necessary,  and  wo  must  be  taught  what  is 
the  leading  principle  in.  us,  and  the  fundamental  and  the 
substantial ;  and  as  it  is  not  probable  that  the  good  of 
a  snail  is  in  the  shell,  is  it  probable  that  the  good  of  a 
man  is  in  the  body  ?  But  you  yourself,  Epicurus,  possess 
something  better  than  this.  What  is  that  in  you  which 
deliberates,  what  is  that  which  examines  every  thing,  what 
is  that  which  forms  a  judgment  about  the  body  itself,  that 
it  is  the  principal  part?  and  why  do  you  light  your  lamp 
and  labour  for  us,  and  write  so  many8  books?  is  it  that 
wo  may  not  be  ignorant  of  the  truth,  who  we  are,  and 
what  we  are  with  respect  to  you?  Thus  the  discussion 
requires  many  words. 

5  Zeno,  a  native  of  Citium,  in  the  island  of  Cyprus,  is  said  to  havo 
come  when  ho  was  young  to  Athens,  where  he  spent  the  rest  of  a 
long  life  in  the  study  and  teaching  of  Philosophy.    He   was  the 
founder  of  the  Stoic  sect,  and  a  man  respected  for  his  ability  and  high 
character.    Pie  wrote  many  philosophical  works.    Zeno  was  succeeded 
in  his  school  by  Cleantht-s. 

6  Follow.     See  i.  12,5. 

7  "  I  now  have  what  the  universal  nature  wills  me  to  have,  and 
I  do  what  my  nature  now  wills  me  to  do."     M.  Antoninus,  v.  25, 
and  xi.  5. 

Epictetus  never  attempts  to  say  what  God  is.  He  was  too  wise 
to  attempt  to  do  what  man  cannot  do.  But  man  does  attempt  to 
do  it,  and  only  shows  the  folly  of  his  attempts,  and,  1  think,  his  pre- 
fciimption  also. 

8  Epicurus  is  said  to  have  written  more  than  any  other  person,  a? 
many  as  three  hundred  volumes  (/cuAij/Spot,  rolls).    Chrysippus  was 
his  rival  in  this  respect.    For  it'  Kpicurua  wrote  anything,  Chrysippus 
vied  with  him  in  writing  as  much;  and  for  this  reason  he  often  re- 
peated himself,  because  he  did  not  read  over  what  he  had  written,  and 
he  left  his  writings  uncorrected  in  consequence  of  his  hurry. 
(jenes  Laertius,  x.— Upton.    See  i.  4. 

If 


66  EPICTETUS. 

CHAPTEE  XXI. 

AGAINST   THOSE   WHO  WISH   TO   EE   ADMIRED. 

WHEN  a  man  holds  his  proper  station  in  life,  ho  does  not 
gape  after  things  beyond  it.  Man,  what  do  you  wish  to 
happen  to  you  ?  I  am  satisfied  if  I  desire  and  avoid  con- 
formably to  nature,  if  I  employ  movements  towards  and 
from  an  object  as  I  am  by  nature  formed  to  do,  and  pur- 
pose and  design  and  assent.  Why  then  do  you  strut 
before  us  as  if  you  had  swallowed  a  spit  ?  My  wish  has 
always  been  that  those  who  meet  me  should  admire  me, 
and  those  who  follow  me  should  exclaim  0  the  gieat 
philosopher.  Who  are  they  by  whom  you  wish  to  be 
admired?  Are  they  not  those  of  whom  you  are  used  to 
say,  that  they  are  mad?  Well  then  do  you  wish  to  be 
admired  by  madmen  ? 


CHAPTEE    XXII. 

ON  PRAECOGXITIONS.1 

?RAECOGNITIONS  are  common  to  all  men.  and  praecognition 
is  not  contradictory  to  praecognition.  For  who  of  us  does 
not  assume  that  Good  is  useful  and  eligible,  and  in  all  cir- 
cumstances that  we  ought  to  follow  and  pursue  it  ?  Arid 

1  Praecognitions  (irpo\ri^€is)  is  translated  Praecognita  by  John 
Smith,  Select  Discourses,  p.  4.  Cicero  bays  (Topica,  7) :  "  Notionem 
appello  quod  Graeci  turn  twoiav,  turn  vp6\7i\f/iv  dicunt.  Ea  est  insita 
et  ante  percepta  cujusque  formae  cognitio,  enodationis  indigens."  In 
the  De  Natura  Deorum  (i.  16)  ho  says  :  "  Quae  est  enim  gens  aut  quod 
genus  horninum,  quod  non  habeat  sine  doctrina  antieipationem  quan- 
dam  deorum,  quam  appellat  7rpoArji|/ti/  Epicurus?  id  est,  anteceptam 
animo  rei  quandam  informationem,  sine  qua  nee  intelligi  quidquam 
nee  quaeri  nee  disputari  potest."  Epicurus,  as  Cicero  says  in.  the 
following  chapter  (17),  was  the  first  who  used  irp6\7ityts  in  this  sense, 
which  Cicero  applies  to  what  he  calls  the  ingrafted  or  rather  innate 
cognitions  of  the  existence  of  gods,  and  these  cognitions  he  supposes 
to  be  universal ;  but  whether  this  is  so  or  not,  I  do  not  know.  See 
i  &  2 ;  Tuscul.  i,  24 ;  De  Fin.  iii.  6,  and  Trp6\-n$is  in  iv,  8.  6. 


EPICTETUS.  67 

who  of  us  does  not  assume  that  Justice  is  beautiful  and 
becoming?  When  then  does  the  contradiction  arise? 
It  arises  in  the  adaptation  of  the  praecognitions  to  the 
particular  cases.  When  one  man  says,  He  has  done  well : 
he  is  a  brave  man,  and  another  says,  "  Not  so ;  but  he 
has  acted  foolishly ; "  then  the  disputes  arise  among  men. 
This  is  the  dispute  among  the  Jews  and  the  Syrians  and 
the  Egyptians  and  the  Koinans ;  not  whether  holiness2 
should  be  preferred  to  all  things  and  in  all  cases  should 
be  pursued,  but  whether  it  is  holy  to  eat  pig's  flesh  or 
not  holy.  You  will  find  this  dispute  also  between  Aga- 
memnon and  Achilles;3  for  call  them  forth.  What  do 
you  say,  Agamemnon?  ought  not  that  to  bo  done  which 
is  proper  and  right  ?  Certainly.  Well,  what  do  you  say, 
Achilles?  do  you  not  admit  that  what  is  good  ought  to 
be  done?  I  do  most  certainly.  Adapt  your  praecogni- 
tions then  to  the  present  matter.  Here  the  dispute 
begins.  Agamemnon  says,  I  ought  not  to  give  up 
Chryseis  to  her  father.  Achilles  says,  You  ought.  It 
is  certain  that  one  of  the  two  makes  a  wrong  adaptation 
of  the  praecogiiition  of  "  ought "  or  "  duty."  Further, 
Agamemnon  says,  Then  if  I  ought  to  restore  Chryseis, 
it  is  fit  that  I  take  his  prize  from  some  of  you.  Achilles 
replies,  "Would  you  then  take  her  whom  I  love?" 
Yes,  her  whom  you  love.  Must  I  then  be  the  only  man 
who  goes  without  a  prize  ?  and  must  I  be  the  only  man 
who  has  no  prize?  Thus  the  dispute  begins.4 

What  then  is  education?  Education  is  the  learning 
how  to  adapt  the  natural  piaecognitions  to  the  particular 
things  conformably  to  nature;  and  then  to  distinguish 
that  of  things  some  are  in  our  power,  but  others  are  not : 
in  our  power  are  will  and  all  acts  which  depend  on  the 
will ;  things  not  in  our  power  are  the  body,  the  parts  of 

2  The  word  is  #<noj/,  which  is  very  difficult  to  translate.     We  may 
take  an  instance  from  ourselves.     There  is  a  general  agreement  about 
integrity,  and  about  the  worship  of  the  supreme  being,  but  a  wondrous 
difference  about  certain  acts  or  doings  in  trading,  whether  they  are 
consistent  with  integrity  or  not ;  and  a  still  more  wondrous  difference 
in  forms  of  worship,  whether  they  are  conformable  to  religion  or  not. 

3  Horace,  Epp,  i.  2. 

4  Iliad,  i.    The  quarrel  of  Achilles  and  Agamemnon  about  giving 
up  Chryseis  to  her  father. 

F2 


68  EPICTEYUS. 

the  body,  possession s^parents,  brothers,  children,  country 
and  generally,  all  with  whom  we  live  in  society.  In  what 
then  should  we  place  the  good  ?  To  what  kind  of  things 
(ovaia)  shall  we  adapt  it  ?  To  the  things  which  are  in 
our  power?  Is  not  health  then  a  good  thing,  and 
soundness  of  limb,  and  life  ?  and  are  not  children  and 
parents  and  country  ?  Who  will  tolerate  you  if  you  deny 
this  ? 

Let  us  then  transfer  the  notion  of  good  to  these  things. 
Is  it  possible  then,  when  a  man  sustains  damage  and 
does  not  obtain  good  things,  that  he  can  be  happy?  It  is 
not  possible.  And  can  he  maintain  towards  society  a 
proper  behaviour?  He  can  not.  For  I  am  naturally 
formed  to  look  after  my  own  interest.  If  it  is  my  in- 
terest to  have  an  estate  in  land,  it  is  my  interest  also  to 
take  it  from  my  neighbour.  If  it  is  my  interest  to  have  a 
garment,  it  is  my  interest  also  to  steal  it  from  the  bath.5 
This  is  the  origin  of  wars,  civil  commotions,  tyrannies, 
conspiracies.  And  how  shall  I  be  still  able  to  maintain 
my  duty  towards  Zeus  ?  for  if  I  sustain  damage  and  am 
unlucky,  he  takes  no  care  of  me ;  and  what  is  he  to  me 
if  he  cannot  help  me ;  and  further,  what  is  he  to  me  if  he 
allows  me  to  be  in  the  condition  in  which  I  am?  I  now 
begin  to  hate  him.  Why  then  do  we  build  temples,  why 
set  up  statues  to  Zeus,  as  well  as  to  evil  daemons,  such 
as  to  Fever ; 6  and  how  is  Zeus  the  Saviour,  and  how  the 
giver  of  rain,  and  the  giver  of  fruits?  And  in  truth  if  we 
place  the  nature  of  Good  in  any  such  things,  all  this 
follows. 

What  should  we  do  then?  This  is  the  inquiry  of  the 
true  philosopher  who  is  in  labour.7  Now  I  do  not  see 

8  The  bath  was  a  place  of  common  resort,  where  a  thief  had  the 
opportunity  of  carrying  off  a  bather's  clothes.  From  men's  desires  to 
have  what  they  have  not,  and  do  not  choose  to  labour  for,  spring  the 
disorders  of  society,  as  it  is  said  in  the  epistle  of  James,  o.  iv.,  v.  1,  to 
which  Mrs.  Carter  refers. 

6  See  i.  19.  6,  note  2. 

7  Upton  refers  to  a  passage  in  the  Theaetetus  (p.  150,  Stcph.), 
where  Socrates  professes  that  it  is  his  art  to  discover  whether  a  young 
man's  mind  is  giving  birth  to  an  idol  (an  unreality)  and  a  falsity,  or  to 
something  productive  and  true  ;  and  he  says  (p.  151)  that  those  who 
associate  with  him  are  like  women  in  child-birth,  for  they  are  in  labour 
and  full  of  trouble  nights  and  days  much  more  than  women,  and  hii 


EPICTETUS.  69 

what  the  Good  is  nor  the  Bad.  Am  I  not  mad?  Yes. 
But  suppose  that  I  place  the  good  somewhere  among  the 
things  which  depend  on  the  will :  all  will  laugh  at  me. 
There  will  come  some  greyhead  wearing  many  gold  rings 
on  his  fingers,  and  he  will  shake  his  head  and  say,  Hear, 
my  child.  Jt  is  right  that  you  should  philosophize ;  but 
you  ought  to  have  some  brains  also :  all  this  that  you 
are  doing  is  silly.  You  learn  the  syllogism  from  philo- 
sophers ;  but  you  know  how  to  act  better  than  philosophers 
do. — Man,  why  then  do  you  blame  me,  if  I  know?  What 
shall  I  say  to  this  slave  ?  If  I  am  silent,  he  will  burst. 
I  must  speak  in  this  way :  Excuse  me,  as  you  would 
excuse  lovers:  I  am  not  my  own  master :  I  am  mad. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

AGAINST  EPICURUS. 

EVEN  Epicurus  perceives  that  we  are  by  nature  social,  but 
having  once  placed  our  good  in  the  husk l  he  is  no  longer 
able  to  say  anything  else.  For  on  the  other  hand  he 
strongly  maintains  this,  that  we  ought  not  to  admire  nor  to 
accept  any  thing  which  is  detached  from  the  nature  of  good  ; 
and  he  is  right  in  maintaining  this.  How  then  are  wo 
[suspicious],2  if  we  have  no  natural  affection  to  our  chil- 
dren? Why  do  you  advise  the  wise  man  not  to  bring  up 
children?  Why  are  you  afraid  that  he  may  thus  fall  int.i* 

art  has  the  power  of  stirring  up  and  putting  to  rest  this  labour  of 
child-birth. 

The  couclusion  in  the  chapter  is  not  clear.  The  student  is  supposed 
to  be  addressed  by  some  rich  old  man,  who  really  does  not  know  what 
to  say ;  and  the  best  way  of  getting  rid  of  him  and  his  idle  talk  is  by 
dismissing  him  with  a  joke.  See  Schweighaeuser's  note. 

1  That  is  in  tho  body ;  see  i.  20, 17.    Compare  ii.  20,  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  chapter. 

2  The  word  virovoririKoi  is  not  intelligible.   Schweighaeuser  suggests 
that  it  ought  to  be  vpovorirtKol,  "  how  have  we  any  care  for  others  ?" 
Epicurus  taught  that  we  should  not  marry  nor  beget  children  not 
engage  in  public  affairs,  because  these  things  disturb  our  tranquillity. 


70  EPICTETUS. 

trouble  ?  For  does  he  fall  into  trouble  on  account  of  the 
mouse  which  is  nurtured  in  the  house  ?  What  does  he  care 
if  a  little  mouse  in  the  house  makes  lamentation  to  him? 
But  Epicurus  knows  that  it'  once  a  child  is  born,  it  is  no 
longer  in  our  power  not  to  love  it  nor  care  about  it.  For 
this  reason,  Epicurus  sajs,  that  a  man  who  has  any  sense 
also  does  not  engage  in  political  matters  ;  for  he  knows 
what  a  man  must  do  who  is  engaged  in  such  things ;  for 
indeed,  if  you  intend  to  behave  among  men  as  you  would 
among  a  swarm  of  flies,  what  hinders  you?  But  Epicurus, 
who  knows  this,  ventures  to  say  that  we  should  not  bring  up 
children.  But  a  sheep  does  not  desert  its  own  offspring, 
nor  yet  a  wolf;  and  shall  a  man  desert  his  child?  What 
do  you  mean  ?  that  we  should  be  as  silly  as  sheep  ?  but  not 
even  do  they  desert  their  offspring :  or  as  savage  as  wolves, 
but  not  even  do  wolves  desert  their  young.  Well,  who 
would  follow  your  advice,  if  he  saw  his  child  weeping 
after  falling  on  the  ground  ?  For  my  part  I  think  that 
even  if  your  mother  and  your  father  had  been  told  by  an 
oracle,  that  you  would  say  what  you  have  said,  they  would 
not  have  cast  you  away. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

HOW  WE  SHOULD  STRUGGLE   WITH   CIRCUMSTANCES. 

IT  is  circumstances  (difficulties)  which  show  what  men 
are.1  Therefore  when  a  difficulty  falls  upon  you,  re- 
member that  God,  like  a  trainer  of  wrestlers,  has  matched 
you  with  a  rough  young  man.  For  what  purpose?  yon 
may  say.  Why  that  yon  may  become  an  Olympic  con- 
queror ;  but  it  is  not  accomplished  without  sweat.  In 
my  opinion  no  man  has  had  a  more  profitable  difficulty 
than  you  have  had,  if  you  choose  to  make  use  of  it  as  an 
athlete  would  deal  with  a  young  antagonist.  We  are  now 

1  So  Ovid  says,  Trist.  iv.  3, 79  :— 

"Quae  latet  inque  bonis  cessat  non  cognita  rebofi, 
Apparet  virtus  arguiturque  malis." 


EPICTETUS.  71 

sending  a  scout  to  Eome ; 2  but  no  man  sends  a  cowardly 
scout,  who,  if  he  only  hears  a  noise  and  sees  a  shadow  any 
whore,  comes  running  back  in  terror  and  reports  that  the 
enemy  is  close  at  hand.  So  now  if  you  should  come  and 
tell  us,  Fearful  is  the  state  of  affairs  at  Koine,  terrible  is 
death,  terrible  is  exile ;  terrible  is  calumny ;  terrible  is 
poverty;  fly,  my  friends;  the  enemy  is  near — we  shall 
answer,  Be  gone,  prophesy  for  yourself;  we  have  com- 
mitted only  one  fault,  that  we  sent  such  a  scout. 

Diogenes,3  who  was  sent  as  a  scout  before  you,  made  a 
different  report  to  us.  He  says  that  death  is  no  evil,  for 
neither  is  it  base:  he  says  that  fame  (reputation)  is  the 
noise  of  madmen.  And  what  has  this  spy  said  about  pain, 
about  pleasure,  and  about  poverty  ?  He  says  that  to  be  naked 
is  better  than  any  purple  robe,  and  to  sleep  on  the  bare 
ground  is  the  softest  bed ;  and  he  gives  as  a  proof  of  each 
thing  that  ho  affirms  his  own  courage,  his  tranquillity,  his 
freedom,  and  the  healthy  appearance  and  compactness  of 
his  body.  There  is  no  enemy  near,  he  says ;  all  is  peace. 
How  so,  Diogenes  ?  See,  he  replies,  if  I  am  struck,  if  I 
have  been  wounded,  if  I  have  fled  from  any  man.  This  is 
what  a  scout  ought  to  be.  But  you  come  to  us  and  tell  us 
one  thing  after  another.  Will  you  not  go  back,  and  you 
will  see  clearer  when  you  have  laid  aside  fear  ? 

What  then  shall  I  do  ?  What  do  you  do  when  you  leavo 
a  ship  ?  Do  you  take  away  the  helm  or  the  oars  ?  What 
then  do  you  take  away?  You  take  what  is  your  own,  your 
bottle  and  your  wallet;  and  now  if  you  think  of  what  is 
your  own,  you  will  never  claim  what  belongs  to  others. 
The  emperor  (Domitian)  feays,  Lay  aside  your  lati- 

2  In  the  time  of  Domitian  philosophers  were  banished  from  Homo 
and  Italy  by  a  £enatusconsultum  (Sueton.  Domitian,  c.  10 ;  Dion,  67, 
c.  13),  and  at  that  time  Epictetus,  as  Gellius  says  (xv.  11),  went  from 
Home  to  Nicopolis  in  Epirus,  where  he  opened  a  school.    We  may 
suppose  that  Epictetus  is  here  speaking  of  some  person  who  had  gone 
from  Nicopolis  to  Home  to  inquire  about  the  state  of  affairs  there  under 
the  cruel  tyrant  Domitian.    (Schwcighaeuser.) 

3  Diogenes  was  brought  to  king  Philip  after  the  battle  of  Chaerone"  t 
as  a  spy  (iii.  22,  24).   Plutarch  in  the  treatise,  Quomodo  assentator  ab 
amico  dignoscatur,  c.  30,  states  that  when  Philip  asked  Diogenes  if  he 
was  a  spy,  he  replied,  Certainly  I  am  a  spy,  Philip,  of  your  want  of 
judgment  and  of  your  folly,  which  lead  you  without  any  necessity  to 
put  to  the  hazard  your  kingdom  and  your  life  in  one  single  hour. 


72  EPICTETUS, 

clave.4  See,  I  put  on  the  angusticlave.  Lay  aside  this 
also.  See,  I  have  only  my  toga.  Lay  aside  your  toga. 
See,  I  am  now  naked.  But  you  still  raise  my  envy.  Take 
then  all  my  poor  body;  when,  at  a  man's  command,  I 
can  throw  away  my  poor  body,  do  I  still  fear  him? 

But  a  certain  person  will  not  leave  to  me  the  succession 
to  his  estate.  What  then?  had  I  forgotten  that  not  one  of 
these  things  was  mine.  How  then  do  we  call  them  mine  ? 
Just  as  we  call  the  bed  in  the  inn.  If  then  the  innkeeper 
at  his  death  leaves  you  the  beds  ;  all  well ;  but  if  ho  leaves 
them  to  another,  he  will  have  them,  and  you  will  seek 
another  bed.  If  then  you  shall  not  find  one,  you  will 
sleep  on  the  ground:  only  sleep  with  a  good  will  and 
snore,  and  remember  that  tragedies  have  their  place  among 
the  rich  and  kings  and  tyrants,  but  no  poor  man  fills  a 
part  in  a  tragedy,  except  as  one  of  the  Chorus.  Kings 
indeed  commence  with  prosperity  :  u  ornament  the  palace 
with  garlands " :  then  about  the  third  or  fourth  act  they 
call  out,  "Oh  Cithaeron,5  why  didst  thou  receive  me"? 
Slave,  where  are  the  crowns,  where  the  diadem  ?  The 
guards  help  thee  not  at  all.  When  then  you  approach  any 
of  these  persons,  remember  this  that  you  are  approaching 
a  tragedian,  not  the  actor,  but  Oedipus  himself.  But  you 
say,  such  a  man  is  happy  ;  for  he  walks  about  with  many, 
and  I  also  place  myself  with  the  many  and  walk  about 
with  many.  In  sum  remember  this :  the  door  is  open  ;G 
be  not  more  timid  than  little  children,  but  as  they  say,  when 
the  thing  does  not  please  them,  "  I  will  play  no  longer," 
so  do  you,  when  things  seem  to  you  of  such  a  kind,  say  I 
will  no  longer  play,  and  be  gone  :  but  if  you  stay,  do  not 
complain. 

4  The  garment  with  the  broad  border,  the  laticlave,  wns  the  dress 
of  a  senator  ;  the  garment  with  the  narrow  border,  the  angusticlave, 
was  the  dress  of  a  man  of  the  equestiian  order. 

a  The  exclamation  of  Oedipus  in  the  Oedipus  Tyrannus  of  Sopho- 
cles, v.  1390. 

6  This  means  "you  can  die  when  you  please."  Comp.  i.  c.  9.  The 
power  of  dying  when  you  please  is  named  by  Plinius  (N.  II,  ii.  c.  7) 
the  best  thing  that  God  has  given  to  man  amidst  all  the  sufferings  of 
life.  Horace,  Epp.  ii.  2.  213,— 

"Vivere  si  recte  nescis,  decode  peritis: 
Lusisti  satis,  edlsti  satis  atque  bibisti ; 
Tempus  abirc  tibi." 


EriCTETUS.  73 

CHAPTER  XXV. 

ON   THE  SAME. 

IF  these  things  are  true,  and  if  we  are  not  silly,  and  are 
not  acting  hypocritically  when  we  say  that  the  good  ol 
man  is  in  the  will,  and  the  evil  too,  and  that  every  thing 
else  docs  not  concern  us,  why  are  we  still  disturbed,  why 
are  we  still  afraid  ?  The  things  about  which  we  have  been 
busied  are  in  no  man's  power :  and  the  things  which  are  in 
the  power  of  others,  we  care  not  for.  What  kind  of  trouble 
have  we  still  ? 

But  give  me  directions.  Why  should  I  give  you  direc- 
tions? has  not  Zeus  given  you  directions?  Has  he  not 
given  to  you  what  is  your  own  free  from  hindrance  and 
free  from  impediment,  and  what  is  not  your  own  sub- 
ject to  hindrance  and  impediment  ?  What  directions  then, 
what  kind  of  orders  did  you  bring  when  you  came 
from  him  ?  Keep  by  every  means  what  is  your  own ;  do 
not  desire  what  belongs  to  others.  Fidelity  (integrity) 
is  your  own,  virtuous  shame  is  your  own ;  who  then  can 
take  these  things  from  you?  who  else  than  yourself  will 
hinder  you  from  using  them  ?  But  how  do  you  act?  when 
you  seek  what  is  not  your  own,  you  lose  that  which  is  your 
own.  Having  such  promptings  and  commands  from  Zeus, 
what  kind  do  you  still  ask  from  me  ?  Am  I  more  powerful 
than  he,  am  J  more  worthy  of  confidence  ?  But  if  you 
observe  these,  do  you  want  any  others  besides  ?  Well,  but 
he  has  not  given  these  orders,  you  will  say.  Produce  your 
praecognitions  (Tr-poX^a?),  produce  the  proofs  of  philoso- 
phers, produce  what  you  have  often  heard,  and  produce 
what  you  have  said  yourself,  produce  what  you  have  read, 
produce  what  you  have  meditated  on ;  and  you  will  then 
see  that  all  these  things  are  from  God.1  How  long  then  is 

1  The  conclusion  "and  you  will  then  see,"  is  not  in  the  text,  but 
it  is  what  Epictetus  means.  The  argument  is  complete.  If  we  admit 
Ihe  existence  of  God,  and  that  he  is  our  father,  as  Epictetus  teaches, 
we  have  from  him  the  intellectual  powers  which  we  possess;  and 
those  men  in  whom  these  powers  have  been  roused  to  activity,  and  are 
exercised,  require  no  other  instructor.  It  is  true  that  in  a  large  part 
of  mankind  those  powers  are  inactive  and  are  not  exercised,  or  if  they 


74  EPICTETUS. 

it  fit  to  observe  these  precepts  from  God,  and  not  to  break 
tip  the  play  ?  2  As  long  <IB  the  play  is  continued  with  pro- 
priety. In  the  Saturnalia  3  a  king  is  chosen  by  lot,  for  it 
has  been  the  custom  to  play  at  this  game.  The  king  com- 
mands :  Do  you  drink,  Do  you  mix  the  wine,  Do  you  sing, 
Do  you  go,  Do  you  come.  I  obey  that  the  game  may  not 
be  broken  up  through  me. — But  if  he  says,  think  that  you 
are  in  evil  plight:  I  answer,  I  do  not  think  so;  and  who 
will  compel  me  to  think  so  ?  Further,  we  agreed  to  play 
Agamemnon  and  Achilles.  lie  who  is  appointed  to  play 
Agamemnon  says  to  me,  Go  to  Achilles  and  tear  from,  him 
Briseis.  I  go.  He  says,  Come,  and  I  come. 

For  as  we  behave  in  the  matter  of  hypothetical  argu- 
ments, so  ought  wo  to  do  in  life.  Suppose  it  to  be 
night.  I  suppose  that  it  is  night.  Well  then ;  is  it  day  ? 
No,  for  I  admitted  the  hypothesis  that  it  was  night.  Sup- 
pose that  you  think  that  it  is  night  ?  Suppose  that  I  do. 
But  also  think  that  it  is  night.  That  is  not  consistent  with 
the  hypothesis.  So  in  this  case  also  :  Suppose  that  you 
are  unfortunate.  Well,  suppose  so.  Are  you  then  un- 
happy? Yes.  Well  then  are  you  troubled  with  an 

are  exercised,  it  is  in  a  very  imperfect  way.  But  those  who  contem- 
plate the  improvement  of  the  human  race,  hope  that  all  men,  or  if  not 
all  men,  a  great  number  will  be  roused  to  the  exercise  of  the  powers 
which  they  have,  and  that  human  life  will  be  made  more  conformable 
to  Nature,  that  is,  that  man  will  use  the  powers  which  he  has,  and 
will  not  need  advice  and  direction  from  other  men,  who  professing 
that  they  are  wise  and  that  they  can  teach,  prove  by  their  teaching 
and  often  by  their  example  that  they  are  not  wise,  and  are  incapable 
of  teaching. 

This  is  equally  true  for  those  who  may  deny  or  doubt  about  the 
existence  of  God.  They  cannot  deny  that  man  has  the  intellectual 
powers  which  he  does  possess ;  and  they  are  certainly  not  the  persons 
who  will  proclaim  their  own  want  of  these  powers.  If  man  has  them 
and  can  exercise  them,  the  fact  is  sufficient ;  and  we  need  not  dispute 
about  the  source  of  these  powers  which  are  in  man  Naturally,  that  is, 
according  to  the  constitution  of  his  Nature. 

2  See  the  end  of  the  preceding  chapter.    Upton  compares  Horace's: 
"Incidere  ludum"   (Epp.  i.   14,  36).     Compare  also  Epictetus,  ii. 
16,  37. 

3  A  festival  at  Rome  in  December,  a  season  of  jollity  and  license 
(Livy,  xxii.  1 ).    Compare  the  passage  in  Tacitus,  Ann.  xiii.  ]5,  in 
which  Nero  is  chosen  by  lot  to  be  king :  and  Seneca,  Do  Constant. 
Sapient,  c.  12,  "  Illi  (pneri)  inter  ipsos  magistratus  gerunt,  et  praetex* 
tarn  fascesque  uc  tribunal  imitantur." 


EPICTETUS.  75 

unfavourable  daemon  (fortune)?  Yes.  But  think  also 
that  yon  are  in  misery.  This  is  not  consistent  with  the 
hypothesis ;  and  another  (Zeus)  forbids  me  to  think  so. 

How  long  then  must  we  obey  such  orders  ?  As  long  as  it 
is  profitable ;  and  this  means  as  long  as  I  maintain  that 
which  is  becoming  and  consistent.  Further,  some  men  are 
sour  and  of  bad  temper,  and  they  say,  "I  cannot  sup  with 
this  man  to  be  obliged  to  hear  him  telling  daily  how  he 
fought  in  Mysia  ":  "  I  told  you,  brother,  how  I  ascended  the 
hill :  then  I  began  to  be  besieged  again."  But  another  says, 
"  I  prefer  to  get  my  supper  and  to  hear  him  talk  as  much  as 
ho  likes."  And  do  you  compare  these  estimates  (judg- 
ments) :  only  do  nothing  in  a  depressed  mood,  nor  as  one 
afflicted,  nor  as  thinking  that  you  are  in  misery,  for  no  man 
compels  you  to  that. — Has  it  smoked  in  the  chamber  ?  If 
the  smoke  is  moderate,  I  will  stay ;  if  it  is  excessive,  I  go 
out :  for  you  must  always  remember  this  and  hold  it  fast, 
that  the  door  is  open. — Well,  but  you  say  to  me,  Do  not 
live  in  Nicopolis.  I  will  not  live  there. — Nor  in  Athens. — 
I  will  not  live  in  Athens. — Nor  in  Eome. — I  will  not  live 
in  Eome. — Live  in  Gyarus.4 — I  will  live  in  Gyarus,  but 
it  seems  like  a  great  smoke  to  live  in  Gyarus ;  and 
I  depart  to  the  place  where  no  man  will  hinder  me  from 
living,  for  that  dwelling  place  is  open  to  all;  and  as  to  the 
last  garment,5  that  is  the  poor  body,  no  one  has  any  power 
over  me  beyond  this.  This  was  the  reason  why  Demetrius6 
said  to  Nero,  "You  threaten  mo  with  death,  but  nature 
threatens  you."  If  I  set  my  admiration  on  the  poor  body, 
I  have  given  myself  up  to  be  a  slave :  if  on  my  little  pos- 
sessions, I  also  make  myself  a  slave :  for  I  immediately 
make  it  plain  with  what  1  may  be  caught ;  as  if  the  snake 

4  Gyarus  or  Gyara  a  wretched  island  in  tlie  Aegean  sea,  to  which 
criminals  were  sent  under  the  empire  at  Rome.  Juvenal,  Sat.  i.  73. 

6  See  Schweighaeuser's  note. 

6  Demetrius  was  a  Cynic  philosopher,  of  whom  Seneca  (De  Benef. 
vii.  1)  says :  "  He  was  in  my  opinion  a  great  man,  even  if  he  is  com- 
pared with  the  greatest."  One  of  his  sayings  was  ;  "  You  gain  more 
by  possessing  a  few  precepts  of  philciophy,  if  you  have  them  ready 
and  use  them,  than  by  learning  many,  if  you  have  them  not  at  hand." 
Seneca  often  mentions  Demetrius.  The  saying  in  the  text  is  also 
attributed  to  Anaxagoras  (Life  by  Diogenes  Laertius)  and  to  Socrates 
by  Xeuophon  (Apologia,  27;. 


76  EriCTETUS. 

draws  in  his  head,  I  tell  you  to  strike  that  part  of  him 
which  he  guards ;  nnd  do  you  be  assured  that  whatever 
part  you  choose  to  guard,  that  part  your  master  will  attack. 
Remembering  this  whom  will  you  still  flatter  or  fear? 

But  I  should  like  to  sit  where  the  Senators  sit.7 — Do 
you  see  that  you  are  putting  yourself  in  straits,  you  are 
squeezing  yourself. — How  then  s,iall  I  see  well  in  any 
other  way  in  the  amphitheatre  ?  Man,  do  not  be  a  spec- 
tator at  all ;  and  you  will  not  be  squeezed.  Why  do  you 
give  yourself  trouble?  Or  wait  a  little,  and  when  the 
spectacle  is  over,  seat  yourself  in  the  place  reserved  for  the 
Senators  and  sun  yourself.  For  remember  this  general 
truth,  that  it  is  we  who  squeeze  ourselves,  who  put  our- 
selves in  straits  ;  that  is  our  opinions  squeeze  us  and  put 
us  in  straits.  For  what  is  it  to  be  reviled  ?  Stand  by  a 
stone  and  revile  it;  and  what  will  you  gain?  If  then  a 
man  listens  like  a  stone,  what  profit  is  there  to  the  reviler  ? 
But  if  the  reviler  has  as  a  stepping-stono  (or  ladder) 
the  weakness  of  him  who  is  reviled,  then  he  accomplishes 
something. — Strip  him. — What  do  you  mean  by  him?8 — 
Lay  hold  of  his  garment,  strip  it  off.  I  have  insulted  you. 
Much  good  may  it  do  you. 

This  was  the  practice  of  Socrates  :  this  was  the  reason 
why  ho  always  had  one  face.  But  wo  choose  to  practise 
and  study  any  thing  rather  than  the  means  by  which  we 
shall  be  unimpeded  and  free.  You  say,  Philosophers  talk 
paradoxes.9  But  are  there  no  paradoxes  in  the  other  arts  ? 
and  what  is  more  paradoxical  than  to  puncture  a  man's  eye 
in  order  that  he  may  see  ?  If  any  one  said  this  to  a  man  igno- 
rant of  the  surgical  art,  would  ho  not  ridicule  the  speaker  ? 
Where  is  the  wonder  then  if  in  philosophy  also  many  things 
which  are  true  appear  paradoxical  to  the  inexperienced  ? 

T  At  Rome,  and  probably  in  other  towns,  there  were  seats  reserved 
for  the  different  classes  of  men  at  the  public  spectacles. 

8  See  Schweighaeuser's  note. 

9  Paradoxes  (7rapa5o£a\  "  things  contrary   to  opinion,"  are    con- 
trasted   with    paralogies  (7rapoAo7a),   "  things   contrary  to  reason " 
(iv.  1.  173).    Cicero  says  (Prooemium.  to  his  Paradoxes),  that  para- 
doxes are  "  something  which  cause  surprise  and  contradict  common 
opinion; "and  in  another  place  ho  says  that  the  Romans  gave  tho 
name  of  "  admirabilia "  to  the  {Stoic  paradoxes. — The  puncture  o/ 
the  eye  is  the  operation  for  cataract 


£PICTETUS.  77 

CHAPTEK  XXVI. 

WHAT  IS  THE   LAW  OF   LIFE. 

a  person  was  reading  hypothetical  arguments, 
Epictetus  said,  This  also  is  an  hypothetical  law  that  we 
must  accept  what  follows  from  the  hypothesis.  But  much 
before  this  law  is  the  law  of  life,  that  we  must  act  con- 
formably to  nature.  For  if  in  every  matter  and  circum- 
stance we  wish  to  observe  what  is  natural,  it  is  plain  that 
in  every  thing  we  ought  to  make  it  our  aim  that  neither 
that  which  is  consequent  shall  escape  us,  and  that  we  do 
not  admit  the  contradictory.  First  then  philosophers 
exercise  us  in  theory l  (contemplation  of  things),  which  is 
easier ;  and  then  next  they  lead  us  to  the  more  difficult 
things ;  for  in  theory,  there  is  nothing  which  draws  us 
away  from  following  what  is  taught ;  but  in  the  matters 
of  life,  many  are  the  things  which  distract  us.  He  is 
ridiculous  then  who  says  that  he  wishes  to  begin  with  the 
matters  of  real  life,  for  it  is  not  easy  to  begin  with  the 
more  difficult  things  ;  and  we  ought  to  employ  this  fact  as 
an  argument  to  those  parents  who  are  vexed  at  their 
children  learning  philosophy  :  Am  I  doing  wrong  then 

1  eVl  rri$  Occaplas.  "  Intelligere  quid  verum  rectumque  sit,  prins 
est  et  facilius.  Id  vcro  exsequi  et  obaervare,  postering  et  dillicilius." 
—Wolf. 

This  is  a  profound  and  useful  remark  of  Epictetus.  General  prin- 
ciples are  most  easily  understood  and  accepted.  The  difficulty  is  in 
the  application  of  them.  What  is  more  easy,  for  example,  than  to 
understand  general  principles  of  law  which  are  true  and  good  ?  But 
iu  practice  cases  are  presented  to  us  which  as  Bacon  says,  are  "  im- 
mersed in  matter ;"  and  it  is  this  matter  which  makes  the  difficulty 
of  applying  the  principles,  and  requires  the  ability  and  study  of 
an  experienced  num.  It  is  easy,  and  it  is  right,  to  teach  the  young 
the  general  principles  of  the  rules  of  life ;  but  the  difficulty  of  ap- 
plying them  is  that  in  which  the  young  and  the  old  too  often  foil. 
So  if  you  ask  whether  virtue  can  be  taught,  the  answer  is  that  the 
rules  for  a  virtuous  life  can  be  delivered ;  but  the  application  of  the 
rules  is  the  difficulty,  as  teachers  of  religion  and  morality  know  well, 
if  they  are  fit  to  teach.  If  they  do  not  know  this  truth,  they  are 
neither  fit  to  teach  the  rules,  nor  to  lead  the  way  to  the  practice  of 
them  by  the  only  method  which  is  possible ;  and  this  method  is  by 
their  own  example,  assisted  by  the  example  of  those  who  direct  the 
education  of  youth,  and  of  those  with  whom  young  persons  live. 


78  EPICTETUS. 

my  father,  and  do  I  not  know  what  is  suitable  to  rri'»  and 
"becoming?  If  indeed  this  can  neither  be  learned  nor 
taught,  why  do  you  blame  me  ?  but  if  it  can  be  taught, 
teach  me ;  and  if  you  can  not,  allow  me  to  learn  from  those 
who  say  that  they  know  how  to  teach.  For  what  do  you 
think?  do  you  suppose  that  I  voluntarily  fall  into  evil 
and  miss  the  good  ?  I  hope  that  it  may  not  be  so.  What 
is  then  the  cause  of  my  doing  wrong  ?  Ignorance.  Do 
you  not  choose  then  that  I  should  get  rid  of  my  ignoiance  ? 
Who  was  ever  taught  by  anger  the  art  of  a  pilot  or  music  ? 
Do  you  think  then  that  by  means  of  your  anger  I  shall 
learn  the  art  of  life?  He  only  is  allowed  to  speak  in  this 
way  who  has  shown  such  an  intention.2  But  if  a  mar. 
only  intending  to  make  a  display  at  a  banquet  and  to  show 
that  he  is  acquainted  with  hypothetical  arguments  reads 
them  and  attends  the  philosophers,  what  other  object  has 
he  than  that  some  man  of  senatorial!  rank  who  sits  by 
him  may  admire?  For  there  (at  Borne)  are  the  really 
great  materials  (opportunities),  and  the  riches  here  (at 
Nicopolis)  appear  to  be  trifles  theie.  This  is  the  reason 
why  it  is  difficult  for  a  man  to  be  n  aster  of  the  appearances, 
where  the  things  which  disturb  the  judgment  are  great.3 
I  know  a  certain  person  who  complained,  as  he  embraced 
the  knees  of  Epaphroditus,  that  he  had  only  one  hundred 
and  fifty  times  ten  thousand  denarii 4  remaining.  What 
then  did  Epaphroditus  do  ?  Did  he  laugh  at  him,  as  we 
slaves  of  Epaphroditus  did  ?  No,  but  he  cried  out  with 
amazement,  4t  Poor  man,  how  then  did  you  keep  silence, 
how  did  you  endure  it  ?  " 

When  Epictetus  had  reproved 5  (called)  the  person  who 

2  "  Such  an  intention  "  appears  to  mean  "  the  intention  of  learn- 
ing1."    "  The  son  alone  can    say  this    to  his  father,  when  the  son 
studies  philosophy  for  the  purpose  of  living  a  good  life,  and  not  for 
the  purpose  of  display." — Wolf. 

3  I   have  followed  Sohwcighaeuser's  explanation  of  this  difficult 
pnssnge,  and  I  have  accepted  his  emendation  e'/co-eiWra,  in  place  of 
the  MSS.  reading  */ce?  ovra. 

4  This  was  a  large  sum.    He  is  speaking  of  drachmae,  or  of  the 
Eoman  equivalents  denarii.    In  Roman  language  the  amount  would 
be  briefly  expressed  by  »*  sexagies  centena  millia  H.S.,"  or  simply  by 
"  sexagies." 

5  See  Schweighaeuser's  not  3 }  and  all  his  notes  on  this  chapter, 
which  is  rather  difficult. 


EPICTETUS,  79 

was  reading  the  hypothetical  arguments,  and  the  teacher 
who  had  suggested  the  reading  was  laughing  at  the  reader, 
Epictetus  said  to  the  teacher,  "  You  are  laughing  at  your- 
self:  you  did  not  prepare  the  young  man  nor  did  you 
ascertain  whether  he  was  able  to  understand  these  matters ; 
but  perhaps,  you  are  only  employing  him  as  a  reader." 
Well  then  said  Epictetus,  if  a  man  has  not  ability 
enough  to  understand  a  complex  (syllogism),  do  we  trust 
him  in  giving  praise,  do  we  trust  him  in  giving  blame, 
do  we  allow  that  he  is  able  to  form  a  judgment  about  good 
or  bad  ?  and  if  such  a  man  blames  any  one,  does  the  man 
care  for  the  blame  ?  and  if  he  praises  any  one,  is  the  man 
elated,  when  in  such  small  matters  as  an  hypothetical 
syllogism  he  who  praises  cannot  see  what  is  consequent 
on  the  hypothesis  ? 

This  then  is  the  beginning  of  philosophy,6  a  man's  per- 
ception of  the  state  of  his  ruling  faculty ;  for  when  a  man 
knows  that  it  is  weak,  then  he  will  not  employ  it  on  things 
of  the  greatest  difficulty.  But  at  present,  if  men  cannot 
swallow  even  a  morsel,  they  buy  whole  volumes  and 
attempt  to  devour  them  ;  and  this  is  the  reason  why  they 
vomit  them  up  or  suffer  indigestion :  and  then  come 
gripings,  defluxes,  and  fevers.7  Such  men  ought  to  con- 
sider what  their  ability  is.  In  theory  it  is  easy  to  convince 
an  ignorant  person ;  but  in  the  affairs  of  real  life  no  one 
offers  himself  to  be  convinced,  and  we  hate  the  man  who 
has  convinced  us.  But  Socrates  advised  us  not  to  live  a 
life  which  is  not  subjected  to  examination.8 

6  See  ii.  o  11. 

7  Seneca,  Do  Tranqnillitato  animi,  c.  9,  says :  "  What  is  the  use  of 
countless  books  and  libraries,  when  the  owner  scarcely  reads  in  his 
whole  life  the  tables  of  contents  ?  The  number  only  confuses  a  learner, 
does  not  instruct  him.    It  is  much  better  to  give  yourself  up  to  a  few 
authors  than  to  wander  through  many.'* 

•  Soe  Plato's  Apology,  o.  28 ;  and  Antoninus,  iii.  5. 


80  EPICTETU8. 


CETAPTEE  XXVII. 

IN   HOW   MANY  WAYS  APPEARANCES   EXIST,   AND   WHAT  AIDS 
WE   SHOULD   PROVIDE   AGAINST   THEM. 

APPEARANCES  are  to  us  in  four  ways  :  for  either  things 
appear  as  they  are ;  or  they  are  not,  and  do  not  even 
appear  to  be  ;  or  they  are,  and  do  not  appear  to  be ;  or 
they  are  not,  and  yet  appear  to  be.  Further,  in  all  these 
cases  to  form  a  right  judgment  (to  hit  the  mark)  is  the 
office  of  an  educated  man.  But  whatever  it  is  that  annoys 
(troubles)  us,  to  that  we  ought  to  apply  a  remedy.  If  the 
sophisms  of  Pyrrho1  and  of  the  Academics  are  what  amio}Ts 
(troubles),  we  must  apply  the  remedy  to  them.  If  it  is 
the  persuasion  of  appearances,  by  which  some  things 
appear  to  be  good,  when  they  are  not  good,  let  us  seek  a 
remedy  for  this.  If  it  is  habit  which  annoys  us,  we  must 
try  to  seek  aid  against  habit.  What  aid  then  can  we  find 
against  habit?  The  contrary  habit.  You  hear  the  igno- 
rant say:  u  That  unfortunate  person  is  dead  :  his  father  and 
mother  are  overpowered  with  sorrow  ;  '2  he  was  cut  off  by 
an  untimely  death  and  in  a  foreign  land."  Hear  the  con- 
trary way  of  speaking :  Tear  yourself  from  these  expres- 
sions :  oppose  to  one  habit  the  contrary  habit ;  to  sophistry 
oppose  reason,  and  the  exercise  and  discipline  of  reason ; 
against  persuasive  (deceitful)  appearances  we  ought  to  have 
manifest  praecognitions  (7r/ooAry^eis),  cleared  of  all  impurities 
and  ready  to  hand. 

"When  death  appears  an  evil,  we  ought  to  have  this  rule 
in  readiness,  that  it  is  fit  to  avoid  evil  things,  and  that 

1  Pyrrho  was  a  native  of  Elis,  in  the  Peloponnesus.    He  is  said  to 
have  accompanied  Alexander  the  (Jreat  in  his  Asiatic   expedition 
•(Diogenes  Laertius,  ix.  61).     The  time  of  his  birth  is  not  stated,  but 
it  is  said  that  he  lived  to  tho  age  of  ninety. 

See  Levin's  Six  Lectures,  1871.    Lecture  IT.,  On  the  Tyrrhenian 
Ethic  ;  Lecture  III.,  On  the  grounds  of  Scepticism. 

2  aTrwAero  docs  not  mean  that  the  father  is  dead,  and  that  <he 
mother  is  dead.    They  survive  and    lament.    Compare  Euripide8; 
Alcestis,  v.  H25 : 


EPICTETUS.  81 

death  is  a  necessary  thing.  For  what  shall  I  do,  and 
where  shall  I  escape  it  ?  Suppose  that  I  am  not  Sarpedori,3 
the  son  of  Zeus,  nor  able  to  speak  in  this  noble  way  :  I 
will  go  and  I  am  resolved  either  to  behave  bravely 
myself  or  to  give  to  another  the  opportunity  of  doing  so  ; 
if  I  cannot  succeed  in  doing  any  thing  myself,  I  will  not 
grudge  another  the  doing  of  something  noble.  —  Suppose 
that  it  is  above  our  power  to  act  thus  ;  is  it  not  in  our 
power  to  reason  thus  ?  Tell  me  where  I  can  escape  death  : 
discover  for  me  the  country,  show  me  the  men  to  whom  I 
must  go,  whom  death  docs  not  visit.  Discover  to  me  a 
charm  against  death.  If  I  have  not  one,  what  do  you  wish 
me  to  do  ?  I  cannot  escape  from  death.  Shall  I  not  escape 
from  the  fear  of  death,  but  shall  I  die  lamenting  and 
trembling?  For  the  origin  of  perturbation  is  this,  to 
wish  for  something,  and  that  this  should  not  happen. 
Therefore  if  I  am  able  to  change  externals  according  to 
my  wish,  I  change  them  ;  but  if  I  can  not,  I  am  ready  to 
tear  out  the  eyes  of  him  who  hinders  me.  For  the  nature 
of  man  is  not  to  endure  to  be  deprived  of  the  good,  and 
not  to  endure  the  falling  into  the  evil.  Then  at  last,  when 
I  am  neither  able  to  change  circumstances  nor  to  tear  out 
the  eyes  of  him  who  hinders  me,  I  sit  down  and  groan,  and 
abuse  whom  I  can,  Zeus  and  the  rest  of  the  gods.  For  if 
they  do  not  care  for  me,  what  are  they  to  me?  —  Yes,  but 
you  will  be  an  impious  man.  —  In  what  respect  then  will 
it  be  worse  for  me  than  it  is  now  ?  —  To  sum  up,  remember 
this  that  unless  piety  and  your  interest  be  in  the  same 
thing,  piety  cannot  be  maintained  in  any  man.  Do  not 
these  things  seem  necessary  (true)  ? 

Let  the  followers  of  Pyrrho  and  the  Academics  come 
and  make  their  objections.  For  I,  as  to  my  part,  have  no 
leisure  for  these  disputes,  nor  am  I  able  to  undertake  the 
defence  of  common  consent  (opinion).4  If  I  had  a  suit  even 
about  a  bit  of  land,  I  would  call  in  another  to  defend  my 

8  Homer,  Iliad,  xii.  v.  328:    Kb/iey,  fa  rep  t$x°s  fyQopw  ije  rts 


4  "  This  means,  the  received  opinion  about  the  knowledge  and  cer- 
tainty of  things,  which  knowledge  and  certainty  the  Sceptic  philo- 
sophers attack  by  taking  away  general  assent  or  consent"  (Wolf). 
Lord  Shaftesbury  accepts  this  explanation.  See  also  Sehweig.'s  note. 

a 


82  EPICTETUS. 

interests.  With  what  evidence  then  am  I  satisfied  ?  With 
that  which  belongs  to  the  matter  in  hand.5  How  indeed 
perception  is  effected,  whether  through  the  whole  body  or 
any  part,  perhaps  I  cannot  explain  :  for  both  opinions  per- 
plex me.  But  that  you  and  I  are  not  the  same,  I  know 
•with  perfect  certainty.  How  do  you  know  it  ?  When  I 
intend  to  swallow  any  thing,  I  never  carry  it  to  your  mouth, 
but  to  my  own.  When  I  intend  to  take  bread,  I  never  lay 
hold  of  a  broom,  but  I  always  go  to  tho  bread  as  to  a 
mark.6  And  you  yourselves  (the  Pyrrhonists),  who  take 
away  the  evidence  of  the  senses,  do  you  act  otherwise  ? 
Who  among  you,  when  he  intended  to  enter  a  bath,  ever 
went  into  a  mill  ? 

What  then  ?  Ought  we  not  with  all  our  power  to  hold  to 
this  also,  the  maintaining  of  general  opinion,7  and  fortify- 
ing ourselves  against  the  arguments  which  are  directed 
against  it?  Who  denies  that  we  ought  to  do  this?  Well, 
he  should  do  it  who  is  able,  who  has  leisure  for  it  ;  but  as 
to  him  who  trembles  and  is  perturbed  and  is  inwardly 
broken  in  heart  (spirit),  he  must  employ  his  time  better 
on  something  else. 

8  "  The  chief  question  which  was  debated  between  the  Pyrrhonists 
and  the  Academics  on  one  side,  and  the  Stoics  on  tho  other,  was  this, 
whether  there  is  a  criterion  of  truth;  and  in  the  first  place,  the  ques- 
tion is  about  the  evidence  of  the  senses,  or  tho  certainty  of  truth  in 
those  things  which  are  perceived  by  the  senses."  —  Schweighaeuser. 

The  strength  of  the  Stoic  system  was  that  "  it  furnishes  a  ground- 
work of  common  sense,  and  the  universal  belief  of  mankind,  on  which 
to  found  sufficient  certitude  for  the  requirements  of  life  :  on  the  other 
hand,  the  real  question  of  knowledge,  in  the  philosophical  sense  of  tho 
word,  was  abandoned/'  Levin's  Six  Lectures,  p.  70. 

6  &s  irpbs  ffKOTrov,  Schweighaeuser's    emendation  in  place   of  &i 


7  For  the  word  ffwfifaw,  which  occurs  in  s.  20,  Schweighaeuser 
iBuggests  aA^0€m»>  here,  and  translates  it  by  "veritas."  See  his  notei 
on  this  chapter,  s.  15  and  s.  20. 


EPICTETUS.  83 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

THAT   WE  OUGHT  NOT    TO    BE  ANGRY   WITH    MEN ;     AND   WHAT 
ARE  THE  SMALL   AND   THE   GREAT   THINGS   AMONG   MEN.1 

WHAT  is  the  cause  of  assenting  to  anything?  The  fact 
that  it  appears  to  be  true.  It  is  not  possible  then  to 
assent  to  that  which  appears  not  to  be  true.  Why? 
Because  this  is  the  nature  of  the  understanding,  to  incline 
to  the  true,  to  be  dissatisfied  with  the  false,  and  in  matters 
uncertain  to  withhold  assent.  What  is  the  proof  of  this? 
Imagine  (persuade  yourself),  if  you  can,  that  it  is  now 
night.  Ifc  is  not  possible.  Take  away  your  persuasion  that 
it  is  day.  It  is  not  possible.  Persuade  yourself  or  take 
away  your  persuasion  that  the  stars  are  even  in  number.2 
It  is  impossible.  When  then  any  man  assents  to  that 
which  is  false,  be  assured  that  he  did  not  intend  to  assent 
to  it  as  false,  for  every  soul  is  unwillingly  deprived  of  the 
truth,  as  Plato  says ;  but  the  falsity  seemed  to  him  to  be 
true.  Well,  in  acts  what  have  wo  of  the  like  kind  as  we 
have  here  truth  or  falsehood?  We  have  the  fit  and  the 
not  fit  (duty  and  not  duty),  the  profitable  and  the  unprofit- 
able, that  which  is  suitable  to  a  person  and  that  which  is 
not,  and  whatever  is  like  these.  Can  then  a  man  think 
that  a  thing  is  useful  to  him  and  not  choose  it?  He  can- 
not. How  says  Medea?3 — 

"  'Tis  true  I  know  what  evil  I  shall  do, 
But  passion  overpowers  the  better  counsel." 

She  thought  that  to  indulge  her  passion  and  take  ven- 
geance on  her  husband  was  more  profitable  than  to  spare 
her  children.  It  was  so  ;  but  she  was  deceived.  Show  her 
plainly  that  sho  is  deceived,  and  she  will  not  do  it ;  but  so 
long  as  you  do  not  show  it,  what  can  she  follow  except 

1  See  c.  18  of  this  book, 

2  We  cannot  conceive  that  the  number  of  stars  is  either  even  or 
odd.    The  construction  of  the  word  a-woTr&ff^w  is  uncertain,  for,  says 
Schweighaeuser,  the  word  is  found  only  here. 

3  The  Medea  of  Euripides,  1079,  "  where,  instead  of  tyav  ^\\w  of 
Epictetus,  the  reading  is  TO\/^(TO,>  "  (Upton).    «'  ro^fou  (Kirchoff), 
with  the  best  MSS.,  for  8pai>  jue'AAw,  which,  however  is  the  reading 
cited  by  several  antient  authors.'*    Paley's  Euripides,  note. 

G2 


84  EPICTETUS. 

that  which  appears  to  hsrself  (Lor  opinion)  ?  Nothing 
else.  Why  then  aro  you  angry  with  the  unhappy 
woman  that  she  has  been  bewildered  about  the  most  im- 
portant things,  and  is  beoDine  a  viper  instead  of  »  human 
creature?  And  why  not,  if  it  is  possible,  rather  pity,  as 
we  pity  the  blind  and  the  lame,  so  those  who  are  blinded 
and  maimed  in  the  faculties  which  are  supreme? 

Whoever  then  clearly  remembers  this,  that  to  man  the 
measure  of  every  act  is  the  appearance  (the  opinion), — • 
whether  the  thing  appears  good  or  bad  :  if  good,  he  is  free 
from  blame ;  if  bad,  himself  suffers  the  penalty,  for  it  is 
impossible  that  he  who  is  deceived  can  be  one  person,  and 
he  who  suffers  another  person — whoever  remembers  this 
will  not  be  angry  with  any  man,  will  not  be  vexed  at  any 
man,  will  not  revile  or  blame  any  man,  nor  hate  nor 
quarrel  with  any  man. 

So  then  all  these  great  and  dreadful  deeds  have  this 
origin,  in  the  appearance  (opinion)  ?  Yes,  this  origin  and 
no  other.  The  Iliad  is  nothing  else  than  appearance  and 
the  use  of  appearances.  It  appeared  4  to  Alexander  to  carry 
off  the  wife  of  Menelaus  :  it  appeared  to  Helene  to  follow 
him.  If  then  it  had  appeared  to  Menelaus  to  feel  that  it 
was  a  gain  to  be  deprived  of  such  a  wife,  what  would  have 
happened  ?  Not  only  would  the  Iliad  have  been  lost, 
but  the  Odyssey  also.  On  so  small  a  matter  then  did 
such  great  things  depend  ?  But  what  do  you  mean  by  such 
great  things  ?  Wars  and  civil  commotions,  and  the  de- 
struction of  many  men  and  cities.  And  what  great  matter 
is  this?  Is  it  nothing? — But  what  great  matter  is  the 
deatli  of  many  oxen,  and  many  sheep,  and  many  nests  of 
swallows  or  storks  being  burnt  or  destroyed  ?  Are  these 
things  then  like  those?  Very  like.  Bodies  of  men  are 
destroyed,  and  the  bodies  of  oxen  and  sheep ;  the  dwell- 
ings of  men  are  burnt,  and  the  nests  of  storks.  What  is 
there  in  this  great  or  dreadful  ?  Or  show  me  what  is  the 
difference  between  a  m^n's  house  and  a  stork's  nest,  as  far 

4  This  is  the  lileral  version.  It  does  not  mean  "  that  it  appeared 
right,"  as  Mrs.  Carter  translates  it.  Alexander  never  thought  whether 
it  was  right  or  wrong.  All  that  appeared  to  him  was  the  possessing 
of  Helene,  and  he  used  the  means  for  getting  possession  of  her,  as  a 
dog  who  spies  and  pursues  some  wild  animal. 


EPICTETUS.  85 

as  each  is  a  dwelling ;  except  that  man  builds  his  little 
houses  of  beams  and  tiles  and  bricks,  and  the  stork  builds 
them  of  sticks  and  mud.  Are  a  stork  and  a  man  then 
like  things  ?  What  say  you  ? — In  body  they  are  very  much 
alike. 

Does  a  man  then  differ  in  no  respect  from  a  stork: 
Don't  suppose  that  I  say  so;  but  there  is  no  difference  in 
these  matters  (which  I  have  mentioned).  In  what  then 
is  the  difference  ?  Seek  and  you  will  find  that  there  is  a 
difference  in  another  matter.  See  whether  it  is  not  in  a 
man  the  understanding  of  what  he  does,  see  if  it  is  not  in 
social  community,  in  fidelity,  in  modesty,  in  «{eadfastnessv 
in  intelligence.  Where  then  is  the  great  good  and  evil  in 
men?  It  is  where  the  difference  is.  If  the  difference  is 
preserved  and  remains  fenced  round,  and  neither  modesty 
is  destroyed,  nor  fidelity,  nor  intelligence,  then  the  man 
also  is  preserved  ;  but  if  any  of  these  things  is  destroyed 
and  stormed  like  a  city,  then  the  man  too  perishes ; 
and  in  this  consist  the  great  things.  Alexander,  you 
say,  sustained  great  damage  then  when  the  Hellenes 
invaded  arid  when  they  ravaged  Troj7,  and  when  his 
brothers  perished.  By  no  means  ;  for  no  man  is  damaged 
by  an  action  which  is  not  his  own  ;  but  what  happened 
at  that  time  was  only  the  destruction  of  storks'  nests : 
now  tho  ruin  of  Alexander  was  when  he  lost  the  cha- 
racter of  modesty,  fidelity,  regard  to  hospitality,  and  to 
decency.  When  was  Achilles  ruined  ?  \Vaa  it  when 
Patroclus  died  ?  Not  so.  But  it  happened  when  he  began 
to  be  angry,  when  he  wept  for  a  girl,  when  he  forgot  that 
he  was  at  Troy  not  to  get  mistresses,  but  to  fight.  These 
things  are  tho  ruin  of  men,  this  is  being  besieged,  this  is 
the  destruction  of  cities,  when  right  opinions  are  destroyed, 
when  they  are  corrupted. 

When  then  women  are  carried  off,  when  children  are 
made  captives,  and  when  the  men  are  killed,  are  these  not 
evils?  How  is  it  then  that  you  add  to  the  facts  these 
opinions?  Explain  this  to  me  also. — I  shall  not  do  that; 
but  how  is  it  that  you  say  that  these  are  not  evils? — Let 
us  come  to  the  rules :  produce  the  praecognitions  (TT/XJ- 
AT^CIS)  :  for  it  is  because  this  5s  neglected  that  we  can  not 
sufficiently  wonder  at  what  men  do.  When  we  intend  to 


86  EPICTETUa 

j'udge  of  weights,  we  do  not  judge  by  guess :  where  we 
intent!  to  judge  of  straight  and  crooked,  we  do  not  judge 
by  guess.  In  all  cases  where  it  is  our  interest  to  know 
what  is  true  in  any  matter,  never  will  any  man  among  us 
do  anything  by  guess.  But  in  things  which  depend  on 
the  first  and  on  the  only  cause  of  doing  right  or  wrong,  of 
happiness  or  unhappiness,  of  being  unfortunate  or  "for- 
tunate, there  only  we  are  inconsiderate  and  rash.  There 
is  then  nothing  like  scales  (balance),  nothing  like  a  rule : 
but  some  appearance  is  presented,  and  straightway  I  act 
according  to  it.  Must  I  then  suppose  that  I  am  superior  to 
Achilles  or  Agamemnon,  so  that  they  by  following  appear- 
ances do  and  suffer  so  many  evils :  and  shall  not  the 
appearance  be  sufficient  for  me  ?5 — And  what  tragedy  has 
any  other  beginning  ?  The  Atreus  of  Euripides,  what  is 
it  ?  An  appearance.6  Tho  Oedipus  of  Sophocles,  what  is 
it?  An  appearance.  The  Phoenix?  An  appearance. 
The  Hippolytus  ?  An  appearance.  What  kind  of  a  man 
then  do  you  suppose  him  to  be  who  pays  no  regard  to  this 
matter  ?  And  what  is  the  name  of  those  who  follow  every 
appearance  ?  They  are  called  madmen.  Do  we  then  act 
at  all  differently? 

5  Schweighaeuser  proposes  to  erase  ^  from  the  text,  but  it  is,  I 
suppose,  in  all  the  MSS. :  and  it  is  easy  to  explain  the  passage  with- 
out erasing  the  ^. 

6  The  expression  rb  <^a,iv6^vov  often  occurs  in  this  chapter,  and  it  is 
sometimes  translated  by  the  Latin  asententia"  or  "  opinio" :  and  so  it 
may  be,  and  I  have  translated  it  by  "  opinion."    But  Epictetus  says 
(s.  30)  dAA&  rl  e<f>av7j,  Kal  elOvs  iroiS)  rb  <pa.v ev  :  which  means  that  there 
was  an  appearance,  which  was  followed  by  the  act.    The  word  gene- 
rally used  by  Epictetus  is  Qavraffia,  which  occurs  very  often.    In  the 
Encheiridion  (i,  5)  there  is  some  difference  between  <$>wra.ff(a  and  Tb 
^atv6fjL€vo^  for  they  are  contrasted:  rb  <paiv6^vov  is  the  phenomenon, 
the  bare  appearance :  Qavraffla  in  this  passage  may  be  the  mental  state 
consequent  on  the  <^aiv6^vov :  or  as  Diogenes  Laertiug  says, 


EPICTETUS.  87 

CHAPTEE  XXIX. 

ON  CONSTANCY    (OR   FIRMNESS). 

THE  being1  (nature)  of  the  Good  is  a  certain  Will;  1he 
being  of  the  Bad  is  a  certain  kind  of  Will.  What  then 
are  externals?  Materials  for  the  Will,  about  which  the 
will  being  conversant  shall  obtain  its  own  good  or  evil. 
How  shall  it  obtain  the  good.  If  it  does  not  admire2 
(overvalue)  the  materials ;  for  the  opinions  about  the 
materials,  if  the  opinions  are  right,  make  the  will  good : 
but  perverse  and  distorted  opinions  make  the  will  bad. 
God  has  fixed  this  law,  and  says,  "If  you  would  have  any 
thing  good,  receive  it  from  yourself."  You  say,  No,  but 
I  will  have  it  from  another. — Do  not  so  :  but  receive  it 
from  yourself.  Therefore  when  the  tyrant  threatens  and 
calls  me,  I  say,  Whom  do  you  threaten  ?  If  he  says, 
I  will  put  you  in  chains,  I  say,  You  threaten  my 
hands  and  my  feet.  If  he  says,  I  will  cut  off  your 
head,  I  reply,  You  threaten  my  head.  If  he  says,  I 
will  throw  you  into  prison,  I  say,  You  threaten  the 
whole  of  this  poor  body.  If  he  threatens  me  with 
banishment,  I  say  the  same.  Does  he  then  not  threaten 
you  at  all  ?  If  I  feel  that  all  these  things  do  not  concern 
me,  he  does  not  threaten  me  at  all ;  but  if  I  fear  any  of 
them,  it  is  I  whom  he  threatens.  Whom  then  do  I  fear  ? 
the  master  of  what  ?  The  master  of  things  which  are  in 
my  own  power  ?  There  is  no  such  master.  Do  I  fear  the 

1  The  word  is  ova-la.    The  corresponding  Latin  word  which  Cicero 
introduced  is  "essentia"  (Seneca,  Epist.  58).     The  English  word 
"essence"  has  obtained  a  somewhat  different  sense.     The  proper 
translation  of  ova-la  is  "  being"  or  "  nature." 

2  This  is  the  maxim  of  Horace,  Epp.  i.  6 ;  and  Macleane's  note, —    • 

"Nil  admirari  prope  res  est  una,  Nrnnici, 
plaque  quae  possit  facere  et  servare  beatum." 

on  which  Upton  remarks  that  this  maxim  is  explained  very  philo- 
sophically and  learnedly  by  Lord  Shaftesbury  (the  author  of  tho 
Characteristics),  vol.  iii.  p.  202.  Compare  M.  Antoninus,  xii.  1, 
Seneca,  De  Vita  Beata,  c.  3,  writes,  u  Aliarum  rerum  quae  yitam 
instruunt  diligens,  sine  admiratione  cujusquam."  Antoninus  (i.  15) 
expresses  the  "  sine  admiratione  "  by  rb  a 


88  EPICITETUS. 

master  of  things  which  are  not  in  my  power?  And  what 
are  these  things  to  me  ? 

Do  you  philosophers  then  teach  us  to  despise  k?ngs? 
I  hope  not.  "Who  among  us  teaches  to  claim  against  them 
the  power  over  things  which  they  possess?  Take  tny 
poor  body,  take  my  property,  take  my  reputation,  take 
those  who  are  about  me.  If  I  advise  any  peisons  to  claiit). 
these  things,  they  may  truly  accuse  me. — Yes,  but  I  intend 
to  command  your  opinions  also. — And  who  has  given  you 
this  power  ?  How  can  you  conquer  the  opinion  of  another 
man  ?  By  applying  terror  to  it,  he  replies,  I  will  conquer 
it.  Do  you  not  know  that  opinion  conquers  itself,3  and  is 
not  conquered  by  another  ?  But  nothing  else  can  conquer 
Will  except  the  Will  itself.  For  this  reason  too  the  law 
of  God  is  most  powerful  and  most  just,  which  is  this :  Let 
the  stronger  always  be  superior  to  the  weaker.  Ten  are 
stronger  than  one.  For  what?  For  putting  in  chains, 
for  killing,  for  dragging  whither  they  choose,  for  taking 
away  what  a  man  has.  The  ten  therefore  conquer  the  one 
in  this  in  which  they  are  stronger.  In  what  then  are  the 
ten  weaker  ?  If  the  one  possesses  right  opinions  and  the 
others  do  not.  Well  then,  can  the  ten  conquer  in  this 
matter  ?  How  is  it  possible  ?  If  we  were  placed  in  the 
scales,  must  not  the  heavier  draw  down  the  scale  in  which 
it  is. 

How  strange  then  that  Socrates  should  have  been  so 
treated  by  the  Athenians.  Slave,  why  do  you  say  Socrates  ? 
Speak  of  the  thing  as  it  is  :  how  strange  that  the  poor 
body  of  Socrates  should  have  been  carried  off  and  dragged 
to  prison  by  stronger  men,  and  that  any  one  should  have 
given  hemlock  to  the  poor  body  of  Socrates,  and  that  it 
should  breathe  out  the  life.  Do  these  things  seem  strange, 
do  they  seem  unjust,  do  you  on*  account  of  these  things 
blame  God  ?  Had  Socrates  then  no  equivalent  for  these 
things?  Where  then  for  him  was  the  nature  of  good? 
Whom  shall  we  listen  to,  you  or  him  ?  And  what  docs 
Socrates  say  ?  Anytus  and  Melitus4  can  kill  me,  but  they 

*  This  is  explained  by  what  follows.  Opinion  does  not  really  con- 
quer itself;  but  one  opinion  can  conquer  another,  and  nothing  else  can. 

4  The  two  chief  prosecutors  of  Socratea  (Plato.  Apology,  o.  18; 
Epictetua,  ii  2, 15). 


EPICTETUS.  81) 

cannot  hurt  me :  and  further,  he  sayp,  "  If  it  so  pleases 
God,  so  let  it  be." 

But  show  me  that  ha  who  has  the  inferior  principles 
overpowers  him  who  is  superior  in  principles.  You  will 
never  show  this,  nor  come  near  showing  it;  for  this  is  the 
law  of  nature  and  of  God  that  the  superior  shall  always 
overpower  the  inferior.  In  what?  In  that  in  which  it  is 
superior.  One  body  is  stronger  than  another  :  many  are 
stronger  than  one :  the  thief  is  stronger  than  he  who  is1 
not  a  thief.  This  is  the  reason  why  I  also  lost  my  lamp,5 
because  in  wakeful  ness  the  thief  was  superior  to  me.  But 
the  man  bought  the  lamp  at  this  price :  for  a  lamp  ho 
became  a  thief,  a  faithless  fellow,  and  like  a  wild  beast. 
This  seemed  to  him  a  good  bargain.  Be  it  so.  But  a 
man  has  seized  me  by  the  cloak,  and  is  drawing  me  to  the 
public  place :  then  others  bawl  out,  Philosopher,  what 
has  been  the  use  of  your  opinions  ?  see  you  are  dragged 
to  prison,  you  are  going  to  be  beheaded.  And  what 
system  of  philosophy  (acraywyryi/)  could  I  have  made  so 
that,  if  a  stronger  man  should  have  laid  hold  of  my  cloak, 
I  should  not  be  dragged  off;  that  if  ten  men  should  have 
laid  hold  of  me  and  cast  me  into  prison,  I  should  not  be 
cast  in?  Have  I  learned  nothing  else  then?  I  have 
learned  to  see  that  every  thing  which  happens,  if  it  bo 
independent  of  my  will,  is  nothing  to  mo.  I  may  ask,  if 
you  have  not  gained  by  this.6  Why  then  do  you  seek 
advantage  in  any  thing  else  than  in  that  in  which  you 
have  learned  that  advantage  is  ? 

Then  sitting  in  prison  I  say :  The  man  who  cries  out 
in  this  way  7  neither  hears  what  words  mean,  nor  under- 
stands what  is  said,  nor  does  he  care  at  all  to  know  what 
philosophers  say  or  what  they  do.  Let  him  alone. 

But  now  he  says  to  the  prisoner,  Come  out  from  your 
prison. — If  you  have  no  further  need  of  me  in  prison,  I 
come  out :  if  you  should  have  need  of  me  again,  I  will 
enter  the  prison. — How  long  will  you  act  thus?— So  long 
as  reason  requires  me  to  be  with  the  body:  but  when 
reason  does  not  require  this,  take  away  the  body,  and  fare 

*  See  i.  18, 15,  p.  5S. 

*  ft>4>€Ar?<rcu.    See  Schweighaouser's  note. 

*  One  of  those  who  cry  out  "  Philosopher/'  Ac. 


90  EPICTETUS. 

you  well.8  Only  we  must  not  do  it  inconsiderately,  not 
weakly,  nor  for  any  slight  reason ;  for,  on  the  other  hand, 
God  does  not  wish  it  to  be  done,  and  he  has  need  of  such 
a  world  and  such  inhabitants  in  it.9  But  if  he  sound-s 
the  signal  for  retreat,  as  he  did  to  Socrates,  we  must  obey 
him  who  gives  the  signal,  as  if  he  were  a  general.10 

Well  then,  ought  we  to  say  such  things  to  the  many  ? 
Why  should  we  ?  Is  it  not  enough  for  a  man  to  be  per- 
suaded himself?  When  children  come  clapping  their 
hands  and  crying  out,  "To-day  is  the  good  Saturnalia,"11 
do  we  say,  "  The  Saturnalia  are  not  good "  ?  By  no 
means,  but  we  clap  our  hands  also.  Do  you  also  then, 
when  you  are  not  able  to  make  a  man  change  his  mind, 
bo  assured  that  he  is  a  child,  and  clap  your  hands  with 
him  ;  and  if  you  do  not  choose  12  to  do  this,  keep  silent. 

A  man  must  keep  this  in  mind  ;  and  when  he  is  called 
to  any  such  difficulty,  he  should  know  that  the  time  is 
come  for  showing  if  he  has  been  instructed.  For  he  who 
is  come  into  a  difficulty  is  like  a  young  man  from  a  school 
who  has  practised  the  resolution  of  syllogisms ;  and  if  any 
person  proposes  to  him  an  easy  syllogism,  he  says,  rather 
propose  to  me  a  syllogism  which  is  skilfully  complicated 
that  I  may  exercise  myself  on  it.  Even  athletes  are  dis- 
satisfied with  slight  young  men,  and  say,  "  He  cannot  lift 
me." — "  This  is  a  youth  of  noble  disposition."  13  [You  do 
not  so] ;  but  when  the  time  of  trial  is  come,  one  of  you 
must  weep  and  say,  "  I  wish  that  I  had  learned  more."  A 
little  more  of  what?  If  you  did  not  learn  these  things  it: 
order  to  show  them  in  practice,  why  did  you  learn  them  ~ 

8  See  i.  9.  20. 

9  See  i.  6. 13. 

10  Socrates  was  condemned  by  the  Athenians  to  die,  and  he  wa 
content  to  die,  and  thought  that  it  was  a  good  thing ;  and  this  was 
the  reason  why  lie  made  such  a  defence  as  he  did,  which  brought  on 
him  condemnation  ;  and  he  preferred  condemnation  to  escaping  it  by 
entreating  the  dicasts  (judges),  and  lamenting,  and  saying  and  doing 
things  unworthy  of  himself,  as  others  did. — Pluto,  Apology,  cc.  29-33. 

ompare  Epict.  i.  9, 16. 

11  See  i.  25,  8. 

13  Bead  6c\r}s  instead  of  Ofay.    See  Schweighaeuser's  note. 

13  See  Schweighaeuser's  note.  This  appears  to  be  the  remark  of 
Epictetus.  If  it  is  so,  what  fellows  is  not  clear.  Schweighaeuser 
explains  it, "  But  most  of  you  act  otherwise." 


EPICTETUS.  91 

I  think  that  th»3ie  is  some  one  among  you  who  are  sitting 
here,  who  is  suffering  like  a  woman  in  labour,  and  Bay- 
ing, "  Oh,  that  buch  a  difficulty  does  not  present  itself  to 
ine  as  that  which  has  come  to  this  man ;  oh,  that  I  should 
be  wasting  my  life  in  a  corner,  when  I  might  be  crowned 
at  Olympia.  When  will  any  one  announce  to  me  such  a 
contest?"  Such  ought  to  be  the  disposition  of  all  of  you. 
Even  among  the  gladiators  of  Caesar  (the  Emperor)  there 
are  some  who  complain  giievously  that  they  are  not 
brought  forward  and  matched,  and  they  offer  up  prayers 
to  God  and  address  themselves  to  their  superintendents 
intreating  that  they  may  fight,14  And  will  no  one  among 
you  show  himself  such?  I  would  willingly  take  a  voyage 
[to  Eome]  for  this  purpose  and  see  what  my  athlete  is 
doing,  how  he  is  studying  his  subject.15 — I  do  not 
choose  such  a  subject,  he  says.  Why,  is  it  in  your 
power  to  take  what  subject  you  choose  ?  There  has  been 
given  to  you  such  a  body  as  you  have,  such  parents,  such 
brethren,  such  a  country,  such  a  place  in  your  country : 
— then  you  come  to  me  and  say,  Change  my  subject. 
Have  you  not  abilities  which  enable  you  to  manage  the 
subject  which  has  been  given  to  you  ?  [You  ought  to  say]  : 
It  is  your  business  to  propose;  it  is  mine  to  exercise 
myself  well.  However,  you  do  not  say  so,  but  you  say, 
Do  not  propose  to  me  such  a  tropic,16  but  such  [as  I  would 

14  The  Roman  emperors  kept  gladiators  for  their  own  amusement 
and  that  of  the  people  (Lipsius,  Saturnalia,  ii.  16).    Seneca  says  (  De 
Provid.  c.  4),  "I  have  heard  a  mirmillo  (a  kind  of  gladiator)  in  the 
time  of  0.  Caesar  (Caligula)  complaining  of  the  rarity  of  gladiatorial 
exhibitions  :  "  What  a  glorious  period  of  life  is  wasting."    "  Virtue/' 
says  Seneca,  "  is  eager  after  dangers ;  and  it  consider  only  what  it 
seeks,  not  what  it  may  suffer.'* — Upton. 

15  The  word  is  Hypothesis  (uVdflejm),  which  in  this  passage  means 
"matter  to  work  on/'  "material/1  "subject,"  as  in  ii.  5, 11,  where  it 
means  the  "  business  of  the  pilot.'*    In  i.  7  hypothesis  has  the  sense 
of  a  proposition  supposed  for  the  present  to  be  true,  and  used  as  the 
foundation  of  an  argument. 

16  Tropic  (rp<nriit6v),  a  logical  term  used  by  Stoics,  which  Schweig- 
haeuser  translates  "  propositio  connexa  in  syllogismo  hypothetico." 

The  meaning  of  the  whole  is  this.  You  do  not  like*  the  work  which 
is  set  before  you  :  as  we  say,  you  are  not  content  "  to  do  your  duty  in 
that  state  of  life  unto  which  it  shall  please  God  to  call  you."  Now 
this  is  as  foolish,  says  Wolf,  as  for  a  man  in  any  discussion  to  require 
that  his  adversary  should  raise  no  objection  except  such  as  may  serve 
the  man's  own  case. 


92  EPICTETUS. 

choose] :  do  not  urge  against  me  such  an  objection,  but 
such  [as  I  would  choose]."  There  \vill  be  a  time  perhaps 
when  tragic  actors  will  suppose  that  they  are  [only]  masks 
and  buskins  and  the  long  cloak.17  I  say,  these  things, 
man,  are  your  material  and  subject.  Utter  something 
that  we  may  know  whether  you  are  a  tragic  actor  or  a 
buffoon ;  for  both  of  you  have  all  the  rest  in  common.  If 
any  one  then  should  take  away  the  tragic  actor's  buskins 
and  his  mask,  and  introduce  him  on  the  stage  as  a 
phantom,  is  the  tragic  actor  lost,  or  does  he  still  remain  ? 
If  he  has  voice,  he  still  remains. 

An  example  of  another  kind.  "  Assume  the  governor- 
ship of  a  province."  I  assume  it,  and  when  I  have  assumed 
it,  I  show  how  an  instructed  man  behaves,  "  Lay  aside  the 
laticlave  (the  mark  of  senatorial  rank),  and  clothing  your- 
self in  rags,  come  forward  in  this  character."  What  then 
have  I  not  the  power  of  displaying  a  good  voice  (that  is, 
of  doing  something  that  I  ought  to  do)?  How  then  do 
you  now  appear  (on  the  stage  of  life)?  As  a  witness  sum- 
moned by  God.  "  Come  forward,18  you,  and  bear  testimony 
for  me,  for  you  are  worthy  to  be  brought  forward  as  a 
witness  by  me :  is  any  thing  external  to  the  will  good  or 
bad  ?  do  I  hurt  any  man  ?  have  I  made  every  man's 
interest  dependent  on  any  man  except  himself?  What 
testimony  do  you  give  for  God?" — I  am  in  a  wretched 
condition,  Master 19  (Lord),  and  I  am  unfortunate ;  no  man 

17  There  will  be  a  time  when  Tragic  actors  shall  not  know  what 
their  business  is,  but  will  think  that  it  is  all  show.     So,  says  Wolf, 
philosophers  will  be  only  beard  and  cloak,  and  will  not  show  by 
their  life  and  morals  what  they  really  are ;  or  they  will  be  like  false 
monks,  who  only  wear  the  cowl,  and  do  not  show  a  life  of  piety  and 
sanctity. 

18  God  is  introduced  as  speaking. — Schweighaeuser. 

19  The  word  is  Kfyioy,  the  name  by  which  a  slave  in  Epictetus 
addresses  his  master  (tlominus),  a    physician   is    addressed  by  his 
patient,  and  in  other  cases  also  it  is  used.    It  is  also  used  by  the 
Evangelists.    They  speak  of  the   angel  of  the  Lord  (Matt.  i.  24) ; 
and  Jesus  is  addressed  by  the  same  term  (Matt.  viii.  2),  Lord  or 
master. 

Mrs.  Carter  has  the  following  note  :  "  It  hath  been  observed  that 
this  manner  of  expression  is  not  to  be  met  with  in  the  Heathen  authors 
before  Christianity,  and  therefore  it  is  one  instance  of  Scripture  lan- 
guage coming  early  into  common  use." 

But  the  word  (xvptos)  is  used  by  early  Greek  writers  to  indicate  one 
who  has  power  or  authority,  and  in  a  sense  like  the  Roman  "domiaus," 


EPICTETUS.  93 

cares  for  me,  no  man  gives  me  anything ;  all  blame  me,  all 
speak  ill  of  me. — Is  this  the  evidence  that  you  are  going 
to  give,  and  disgrace  his  summons,  who  has  conferred  so 
much  honour  on  you,  and  thought  you  worthy  of  being 
called  to  bear  such  testimony? 

But  suppose  that  he  who  has  the  power  has  declared, 
"  I  judge  you  to  be  impious  and  profime."  What  has  hap- 
pened to  you?  I  have  been  judged  to  be  impious  and 
profane?  Nothing  else?  Nothing  else.  But  if.  the  same 
person  had,  passed  judgment  on  an  hypothetical  syllogism 
(owTy/x/AeVov),  and  had  made  a  declaration,  "the  conclusion 
that,  if  it  is  day,  it  is  light,  I  declare  to  be  false,"  what 
has  happened  to  tho  hypothetical  syllogism?  who  is 
judged  in  this  case  ?  who  has  been  condemned  ?  the  hypo- 
thetical syllogism,  or  the  man  who  has  been  deceived  by 
it?  Does  he  then  who  has  the  power  of  making  any  de- 
claration about  you  know  what  is  pious  or  impious  ?  Has 
he  studied  it,  and  has  he  learned  it?  Where?  From  whom? 
Then  is  it  the  fact  that  a  musician  pays  no  regard  to  him 
who  declares  that  the  lowest20  chord  in  the  lyre  is  the 
highest ;  nor  yet  a  geometrician,  if  he  declares  that  the 
lines  from  the  centre  of  a  circle  to  the  circumference  are 

as  by  Sophocles  for  instance.  The  use  of  the  word  then  by  Epictctns  was 
not  new,  and  it  may  have  been  used  by  the  Stoic  writers  long  before 
his  time.  The  language  of  the  Stoics  was  formed  at  least  two  cen- 
turies before  the  Christian  aera,  and  the  New  Testament  writers  would 
use  tho  Greek  which  was  current  in  their  age.  The  notion  of  "  Scrip- 
ture language  coining  early  into  common  use  "  is  entirely  unfounded, 
and  is  even  absurd.  Mrs.  Carter's  remark  implies  that  Epictetus  used 
the  Scripture  language,  whereas  he  used  the  particular  language  of 
the  Stoics,  and  the  general  language  of  his  age,  and  the  New  Testa- 
ment writers  would  do  the  same.  There  are  resemblances  between 
the  language  of  Epictetus  and  the  New  Testament  writers,  such  as 
the  expression  ^  yevoiro  of  Paul,  which  Epictetus  often  uses ;  but  this 
is  a  slight  matter.  The  words  of  Peter  (Ep.  ii.  1,  4),  "  that  by  these 
ye  might  be  partakers  of  the  divine  nature,"  are  a  Stoic  expression, 
and  the  writer  of  this  Epistle,  I  think,  took  them  from  the  language  uf 
the  Stoics. 

20  The  words  in  the  text  are  :  ircpl  T^S  I/^TTJS  (j/cdrrjs)  €?rot  virdryi', 
il  When  OTrciTTj  is  translated  *  the  lowest  chord  or  note,'  it  must  bo 
remembered  that  the  names  employed  in  the  Greek  musical  termin- 
ology are  precisely  the  opposite  to  ours.  Compare  vedrrf  *  the  highest 
note/  though  the  word  in  itself  means  lowest.*' — Key's  Philological 
Eesayg,  p.  42,  note  1. 


94  EPICTETUS. 

not  equal ;  and  shall  he  who  is  really  instructed  pay  any 
regard  to  the  uninstructed  man  when  he  pronounces 
judgment  on  what  is  pious  and  what  is  impious,  on  what 
is  just  and  unjust?  Oh,  the  signal  wrong  done  by  the 
instructed.  Did  they  learn  this  hero?  21 

Will  you  not  leave  the  small  arguments  (Xoyapta) 22  about 
these  matters  to  others,  to  lazy  fellows,  that  they  may  sit 
in  a  corner  and  receive  their  sorry  pay,  or  grumble  that  no 
one  givest  them  any  thing ;  and  will  you  not  come  forward 
and  make  use  of  what  you  have  learned  ?  For  it  is  not 
these  small  arguments  that  are  wanted  now :  the  writings 
of  the  Stoics  are  full  of  them.  What  then  is  the  thing 
which  is  wanted  ?  A  man  who  shall  apply  them,  one  who 
by  his  acts  shall  bear  testimony  to  his  words.23  Assume, 
I  intreat  you,  this  character,  that  we  may  no  longer  use  in 
the  schools  the  examples  of  the  antients,  but  may  have 
some  example  of  our  own. 

To  whom  then  does  the  contemplation  of  these  matters 
(philosophical  inquiries)  belong  ?  To  him  who  has  leisure, 
for  man  is  an  animal  that  loves  contemplation.  But  it  is 
shameful  to  contemplate  these  things  as  runaway  slaves 
do :  we  should  sit,  as  in  a  theatre,  free  from  distraction, 
and  listen  at  one  time  to  the  tragic  actor,  at  another  time 
to  the  lute-player;  and  not  do  as  slaves  do.  As  soon  as 
the  slave  has  taken  his  station  he  praises  the  actor24  and  at 
the  same  time  looks  round  :  then  if  any  one  calls  out  his 
master's  name,  the  slave  is  immediately  frightened  and 
disturbed.  It  is  shameful  for  philosophers  thus  to  con- 
template the  works  of  nature.  For  what  is  a  master  ?  Man 
is  not  the  master  of  man;  but  death  is,  and  life  and  plea- 

<21  I  think  that  Schweighaeuser's  interpretation  is  right,  that  "the 
instructed"  are  those  who  think  that  they  are  instructed  but  are  not, 
as  they  show  by  their  opinion  that  they  accept  in  moral  matters  the 
judgment  of  an  ignorant  man,  whose  judgment  in  music  or  geometry 
they  would  not  accept. 

22  He  names  these  "  smnll  arguments  "  \oydpia,  which  Cicero  (Tusc. 
Disput.  ii.  12)  names  u  ratiunculae." 

23  «  What  is  the  profit,  my  brethren,  if  any  one  should  say  that  he 

hath  faith  and  have  not  works  ? Thus  also  faith,  if  it* hath  not 

works,  is  dead  in  itself.    But  a  man  may  say,  Thou  hast  faith,  and  I 
have  works :  shew  me  thy  fuith  without  thy  works,  and  I  will 
thee  my  faith  by  my  works."— Epistle  of  James,  ii.  14-18. 

24  See  Schweighaeuser's  note  on  M<rrTt* 


EPICTETUS.  95 

sure  and  pain  ;  for  if  he  comes  without  these  things,  bring 
Caesar  to  me  and  you  will  see  how  firm  I  am.25  But  when 
ne  shall  come  with  these  things,  thundering  and  lightning,26 
and  when  I  am  afraid  of  them,  what  do  I  do  then  except  to 
recognize  my  master  like  the  runaway  slave  ?  But  so  long 
as  I  have  any  respite  from  these  terrors,  as  a  runaway  slave 
stands  in  the  theatre,  so  do  I  :  I  bathe,  I  drink,  I  sing  ; 
but  all  this  I  do  with  terror  and  uneasiness.  But  if  I  shall 
release  myself  from  my  masters,  that  is  from  those  things 
by  means  of  which  masters  are  formidable,  what  further 
trouble  have  I,  what  master  have  I  still  ? 

AVhat  then,  ought  we  to  publish  these  things  to  all 
men  ?  No,  but  wo  ought  to  accommodate  ourselves  to  the 
ignorant  27  (rots  tStorrats)  and  to  say  :  "  This  man  recom- 
mends to  me  that  which  he  thinks  good  for  himself:  I 
excuse  him."  For  Socrates  also  excused  the  jailor,  who 
had  the  charge  of  him  in  prison  and  was  weeping  when 
Socrates  was  going  to  drink  the  poison,  and  said,  How 
generously  he  laments  over  us.28  Does  he  then  say  to  the 
jailor  that  for  this  reason  we  have  sent  away  the  women  ? 
No,  but  he  says  it  to  his  friends  who  were  able  to  hear 
(understand)  it;  and  he  treats  the  jailor  as  a  child. 


15  The  word  is  euo-rafla).  The  corresponding  noun  is  evoraflem,  which 
is  the  title  of  this  chapter. 

28  Upton  supposes  that  Epictetus  is  alluding  to  the  verse  of  Aristo- 
phanes (Acharn.  531),  where  it  is  said  of  Pericles  : 

"He  flashed,  he  thundered,  and  confounded  Hellas." 

27  Ho  calls  the  uninstructed  and  ignorant   by  the  Greek  word 
"Idiotae,"  ll  idiots,"  which  we  now  use  in  a  peculiar  sense.    An  Idiota 
was  a  private  individual  as  opposed  to  one  who  filled  some  public 
office  ;  and  thence  it  had  generally  the  sense  of  one  who  was  ignorant 
of  any  particular  art,  as,  for  instance,  one  who  had  not  studied 
philosophy. 

28  Compare   the  Phaedon  of   Plato  (p.   116).      The   children  of 
Socrates  were  brought  in  to  see  him  before  he  took  the  poison  by 
which  he  died  ;  and  also  the  wives  of  the  friends  of  Socrates  who 
attended  him  to  his  death.   Socrates  had  ordered  his  wife  Xanthippe  to 
be  led  home  before  he  had  his  last  conversation  with  his  friends,  and 
ghe  was  taken  away  lamenting  and  bewailing. 


96  EPICTETUS. 


CIIAPTEK  XXX. 

WHAT  WE  OUGHT  TO  HAVE  HEADY  IN  DIFFICULT 
CIRCUMSTANCES.1 

WHEN  you  are  going  in  to  any  great  personage,  remember 
that  another  also  from  above  sees  what  is  going  on,  and 
that  you  ought  to  please  him  rather  than  the  other.  Ho 
then  who  sees  from  above  asks  you :  In  the  schools  what 
used  you  to  say  about  exile  and  bonds  and  death  and 
disgrace  ?  I  used  to  say  that  they  are  things  indifferent 
(neither  good  nor  bad).  "What  then  do  you  say  of  them 
now?  Are  they  changed  at  all?  No.  Are  you  changed 
then?  No.  Tell  me  then  what  things  are  indifferent? 
The  things  which  are  independent  of  the  will.  Tell  me, 
also,  what  follows  from  this.  The  tilings  which  are  inde- 
pendent of  the  will  are  nothing  to  me.  Tell  me  also  about 
the  Good,  what  was  your  opinion?  A  will  such  as  we 
ought  to  have  and  also  such  a  use  of  appearances.  And 
the  end  (purpose),  what  is  it  ?  To  follow  thee.  Do  you 
say  this  now  also  ?  I  say  the  same  now  also. 

Then  go  in  to  the  great  personage  boldly  and  remember 
these  things ;  and  you  will  see  what  a  youth  is  who  has 
studied  these  things  when  he  is  among  men  who  have  not 
studied  them.  I  indeed  imagine  that  you  will  have  such 
thoughts  as  these :  Why  do  we  make  so  great  and  so  many 
preparations  for  nothing?  Is  this  the  thing  which  men 
name  power?  Is  this  the  antechamber?  this  the  men 
of  the  bedchamber  ?  this  the  armed  guards  ?  Is  it  for 
this  that  I  listened  to  so  many  discourses?  All  this  is 
nothing :  but  I  have  been  preparing  myself  as  for  some- 
thing great. 

1  The  reader  may  understand  why  Epictetus  gave  such  a  lesson  a« 
this,  if  he  will  remember  the  tyranny  under  which  men  at  that  lima 
lived. 


BOOK  IL 


CHAPTEK  I. 

THAT  CONFIDENCE  (COURAGE)  IS    NOT  INCONSISTENT  WITH 
CAUTION. 

THE  opinion  of  the  philosophers  perhaps  seems  to  some  to 
be  a  paradox  ;  but  still  let  us  examine  as  well  as  we  can, 
if  it  is  true  that  it  is  possible  to  do  ever/  thing  both  with 
caution  and  with  confidence.  For  caution  seems  to  be  in 
a  manner  contrary  to  confidence,  and  contraries  are  in  no 
way  consistent.  That  which  seems  to  many  to  be  a  para- 
dox in  the  matter  under  consideration  in  my  opinion  is  of 
this  kind  :  if  we  asserted  that  we  ought  to  employ  caution 
and  confidence  in  the  same  things,  men  might  justly 
accuse  us  of  bringing  together  things  which  cannot  be 
united.  But  now  where  is  the  difficulty  in  what  is  said  ? 
for  if  these  things  are  true,  which  have  been  often  said 
and  often  proved,  that  the  nature  of  good  is  in  the  use  of 
appearances,  and  the  nature  of  evil  likewise,  and  that 
things  independent  of  our  will  do  not  admit  either  the 
nature  of  evil  nor  of  good,  what  paradox  do  the  philo- 
sophers assert  if  they  say  that  where  things  are  not 
dependent  on  the  will,  there  you  should  employ  confidence, 
but  where  they  are  dependent  on  the  will,  there  you 
should  employ  caution?  For  if  the  bad  consists  in  a  bad 
exercise  of  the  will,  caution  ought  only  to  be  used  where 
things  are  dependent  on  the  will.  But  if  things  inde- 
pendent of  the  will  and  not  in  our  power  are  nothing  to 
us,  with  respect  to  these  we  must  employ  confidence ;  and 

H 


98  BPICTETUS. 

thus  we  shall  both  be  cautious  and  confident,  and  indeed 
confident  because  of  our  caution.  For  by  employing 
caution  towards  things  which  are  really  bad,  it  will  result 
that  we  shall  have  confidence  with  respect  to  things  which 
are  not  so. 

We  are  then  in  the  condition  of  deer;1  when  they  flee 
from  the  huntsmen's  feathers  in  fright,  whither  do  they 
turn  and  in  what  do  they  seek  refuge  as  safe  ?  They  turn 
to  the  nets,  and  thus  they  perish  by  confounding  things 
which  are  objects  of  fear  with  things  that  they  ought  not 
to  fear.  Thus  we  also  act :  in  what  cases  do  we  fear  ?  In 
things  which  are  independent  of  the  will.  In  what  cases 
on  the  contrary  do  we  behave  with  confidence,  as  if  there 
were  no  danger  ?  In  things  dependent  on  the  will.  To 
be  deceived  then,  or  to  act  rashly,  or  shamelessly  or  with 
base  desire  to  seek  something,  does  not  concern  us  at  all, 
if  we  only  hit  the  mark  in  things  which  are  independent 
of  our  will.  But  where  there  is  death,  or  exile  or  pain  or 
infamy,  there  we  attempt  to  ran  away,  there  we  are  struck 
with  terror.  Therefore  as  we  may  expect  it  to  happen 
with  those  who  err  in  the  greatest  matters,  we  convert 
natural  confidence  (that  is,  according  to  nature)  into 
audacity,  desperation,  rashness,  shamelessiiess ;  and  we 
convert  natural  caution  and  modesty  into  cowardice  and 
meanness,  which  are  full  of  fear  and  confusion.  For  if  a 
man  should  transfer  caution  to  those  things  in  which  the 
will  may  be  exercised  and  the  acts  of  the  will,  he  will 
immediately  by  willing  to  bo  cautious  have  also  the  power 
of  avoiding  what  he  chooses  :  but  if  he  transfer  it  to  the 
things  which  are  not  in  his  power  and  will,  and  attempt 
to  avoid  the  things  which  are  in  the  power  of  others,  he 
will  of  necessity  fear,  he  will  be  unstable,  he  will  be  dis- 
turbed. For  death  or  pain  is  not  formidable,  but  the  fear 
of  pain  or  death.  For  this  reason  we  commend  the  poet 2 
who  said 

Not  death  is  evil,  but  a  shameful  death. 

1  It  was  the  fashion  of  hunters  to  frighten  deer  by  displaying  feathers 
of  various  colours  on  ropes  or  strings  and  thus  frightening 
the  nets.    Virgil,  Georg.  iii.  372 — 

Puniceaeve  agitant  pavidos  formidine  pennafc 

*  Euripides,  fragments. 


EPICTETUS.  99 

Confidence  (courage)  then  ought  to  be  employed  against 
death,  and  caution  against  the  fear  of  death.  But  now  wo 
do  the  contrary,  and  employ  against  death  the  attempt  to 
escape ;  and  to  our  opinion  about  it  wo  employ  careless- 
ness, rashness  and  indifference.  These  things  Socrates3 
properly  used  to  call  tragic  masks ;  for  as  to  children 
masks  appear  terrible  and  fearful  from  inexperience,  we 
also  are  affected  in  like  manner  by  events  (the  things 
which  happen  in  life)  for  no  other  reason  than  children 
are  by  masks.  For  what  is  a  child  ?  Ignorance.  What 
is  a  child?  Want  of  knowledge.  For  when  a  child  knows 
these  things,  he  is  in  no  way  inferior  to  us.  What  is 
death?  A  tragic  ma^k.  Turn  it  and  examine  it.  See,  it 
does  not  bite.  The  poor  body  must  be  separated 4  from 
the  spirit  either  now  or  later  as  it  was  separated  from 
it  before.  Why  then  are  you  troubled,  if  it  be  sepa- 
rated now  ?  for  if  it  is  not  separated  now,  it  will  be 
separated  afterwards.  Why  ?  That  the  period  of  the 
universe  may  be  completed,5  for  it  has  need  of  the  pre- 
j-ent,  and  of  the  future,  and  of  the  past.  What  is  pain  ? 
A  mask.  Turn  it  and  examine  it.  The  poor  flesh  i& 
moved  roughly,  then  on  the  contrary  smoothly.  If  this 
does  not  satisfy  (please)  you,  the  door  is  open:6  if  it. 

8  In  the  Phaedon,  c.  24,  or  p.  78. 

4  It  was  the  opinion  of  some  philosophers  that  the  soul  was  a  portion* 
of  the  divinity  sent  down  into  human  hodies. 

5  This  was  a  doctrine  of  Ilcraolitus  and  of  Zeno.    Zeno  (Diog.  Laert. 
vii.  137)  speaks  of  God  as  "in  certain  periods  or  revolutions  of  time 
<-xhausting  into  himself  the  universal  stibstnnce  (ova  to)  and  again 
generating  it  out  of  himself."  Antoninus  (xi.  1 )  speaks  of  the  periodical 
renovation  of  all  things.     For  man,  whoso  existence  is  so  short,  the 
doctrine  of  all  existing  things  polishing  in  the  course  of  time  and  then 
being  renewed,  is  of  no  practical  value.   The  present  is  enough  for  most 
men.    But  for  the  few  who  are  able  to  embrace  in  thought  the  past, 
the  present  and  the  future,  the  contemplation  of  the  perishable  nature 
of  all  existing  things  may  have  a  certain  value  by  elevating  their  minds- 
above  the  paltry  things  which  others  prize  above  their  worth. 

6  Sec.  i.  9,  note  7.    Sehwcighaeusor  says  that  he  does  not  quite  see 
what  is  the  moaning  of  *  ought  to  be  open ' ;  and  ho  suggests  that 
Epictetus  intended  to  say  *  we  ought  to  consider  that  the  door  is  open 
for  all  occasions';  but  the  occasions,  he  says,  ought  to  bo  when  things 
are  such  that  a  man  can  in  no  way  bear  them  or  cannot  honourably 
endure  them,  and  such  occasions  the  wise  man  considers  to  be  the  voice 
of  God  giving  to  him  the  eigno'  to  retire. 

H  2 


100  EPICTETUS. 

does,  bear  (with  things).    For  the  door  ought  to  be  open 
for  all  occasions  ;  and  so  we  have  no  trouble. 

What  then  is  the  fruit  of  these  opinions?  It  is  that 
which  ought  to  be  the  most  noble  and  the  most  becoming 
to  those  who  are  really  educated,  relea8e  from  perturba- 
tion, release  from  fear,  freed nrn.  For  in  these  matters  we 
must  not  believe  the  ni#ry,  who  say  tha  t  free  persons  only 
ought  to  be  educated -out  we  should  rather  btelieve  the  philo- 
sopher?  W11O  say  that  the  educated  only  arei  free.  How  is 
this  ?  In  this  manner.  Is  freedom  any  thingr  else  than  the 
power  of  living  as  we  choose  ?  Nothing  else. ^  Tell  me  then , 
J-e  men,  do  you  wish  to  live  in  error  ?  We  douiot.  No  one 
then  who  lives  in  error  is  free.  Do  you  wish  to\  live  in  fear  ? 
Do  you  wish  to  live  in  sorrow  ?  Do  you  wish  tf o  live  in  per- 
turbation? By  no  means.  No  one  then  who  tjs  in  a  state 
of  fear  or  sorrow  or  perturbation  is  free ;  but  rvhoever  is 
delivered  from  sorrows  and  fears  and  perturbations,  ho  is 
at  the  same  time  also  delivered  from  servitude.  Hpw  then 
can  we  continue  to  believe  you,  most  dear  legislators,  when 
you  say,  We  only  allow  free  persons  to  be  educated  ?  For 
philosophers  say  we  allow  none  to  be  free  except  the 
educated ;  that  is,  God  does  not  allow  it.  When  then  a 
man  has  turned7  round  before  the  praetor  his  own  slave, 
has  he  done  nothing?  He  has  done  something.  What? 
He  has  turned  round  his  own  slave  before  the  praetor. 
Has  he  done  nothing  more  ?  Yes :  he  is  also  bound  to 
pay  for  him  the  tax  called  the  twentieth.  Well  then,  ie 
not  the  man  who  has  gone  through  this  ceremony  become 
free  ?  No  more  than  he  is  become  free  from  perturbations. 
Have  you  who  are  able  to  turn  round  (free)  others  no 

7  This  is  an  allusion  to  one  of  the  Roman  modes  of  manumitting  a 
slave  before  the  praetor.    Compare,  Persius,  Sat.  V.  75— 

— Hen  sterlles  veri,  quibus  una  Quiritem 
Vertigo  lacit; 
and  again 

Verterit  hunc  dominus,  momento  turbinis  exit 
Marcus  Duma. 

The  sum  paid  on  manumission  was  a  tax  of  five  per  cent.,  established 
In  B.C.  356  (Livy,  vii.  16),  and  paid  by  the  slave.  Epictetus  here  speaks 
of  the  tax  being  paid  by  the  master;  but  in  iii.  26,  he  speaks  of  it  as 
paid  by  the  enfranchised  slave.  See  Bureau  de  la  Malle, 
Politi<iiie  des  Remains,  i.  290,  ii  16D. 


EPIOTETUS.  101 

master  ?  is  not  money  your  master,  or  a  prl  or  a  boy,  or 
some  tyrant,  or  some  friend  of  the  tyrant?  why  do  you 
tremble  then  when  you  are  going  off  to  any  trial  (danger) 
of  this  kind?  It  is  for  this  reason  that  I  often  say,  study 
,-md  hold  in  readiness  these  principles  by  which  you  may 
determine  what  those  things  are  with  reference  to  which 
you  ought  to  have  confidence  (courage),  and  those  things 
with  reference  to  which  you  ought  to  be  cautious : 
courageous  in  that  which  does  not  depend  on  your  will ; 
cautious  in  that  which  does  depend  on  it. 

Well  have  I  not  read  to  you,8  and  do  you  not  know 
what  I  was  doing  ?  In  what  ?  In  my  little  dissertations. 
— Show  me  how  you  are  with  respect  to  desire  and  aver- 
sion (JLfK\urLv) ;  and  show  me  if  you  do  not  fail  in  getting 
what  you  wish,  and  if  you  do  not  fall  into  the  thingvs 
which  you  would  avoid :  but  as  to  these  long  and  labored 
sentences  9  you  will  take  them  and  blot  them  out. 

What  then  did  not  Socrates  write?  And  who  wrote  so 
much?10 — But  how?  As  he  could  not  always  have  at 
hand  one  to  argue  against  his  principles  or  to  be  argued 
against  in  turn,  he  used  to  argue  with  and  examine  himself, 
and  he  was  always  treating  at  least  some  one  subject  in 
a  practical  way.  These  are  the  things  which  a  philosopher 
writes.  But  little  dissertations  and  that  method,  which  I 
speak  of,  he  leaves  to  others,  to  the  stupid,  or  to  those 
happy  men  who  being  free  from  perturbations11  have 

8  These  are  the  words  of  some  pupil  who  is  boasting  of  what  he  has 
written. 

9  The  word  is  irepi6$ia.    I  am  not  sure  about  the  exact  meaning  of 
irfpi65ta :  see  the  notes  of  Wolf  and  Schweig. 

10  No  other  author  speaks  of  Socrates  having  written  any  thing.  It 
is  therefore  very  difficult  to  explain  this  passage  in  which  Arrim,  who 
took  down  the  words  of  Epictetus,  represents  him  as  saying  that  So- 
crates wrote  so  much.    Socrates  talked  much,  and  Epictetus  may  have 
spoken  of  talking  as  if  it  were  writing ;  for  he  must  have  known  that 
Socrates  was  not  a  writer.    See  Schweig/s  note. 

11  The  word  is  virb  arapa£ias.      Mrs.  Carter  thinks  that  the  true 
reading  is  fab  a7rpa£fas,  *  through  idleness*  or  *  having  not  1 1  ing  to  do'; 
and  she  remarks  that*  freedom  from  perturbations '  is  the  very  thing 
that  Epictetus  had  been  recommending  through  the  whole  chapter  and 
is  the  subject  of  the  next  chapter,  and  therefore  cannot  be  well  supposed 
to  be  the  true  reading  in  a  place  where  it  is  mentioned  with  contempt. 
It  is  probable  that  Mrs.  Carter  is  right.    Upton  thinks  that  Epictetus 
is  alluding  to  the  Sophists,  and  that  we  should  understand  him  as 
speaking  ironically :  and  this  may  also  be  right.    Schweighaeuser 


102  EPICTETUS. 

leisure,   or  to  ^uch  as  are    too  foolish  to  reckon  con- 
sequences. 

And  will  you  \now,  when  the  opportunity  invites,  go 
and  display  those  things  which  you  possess,  and  recite 
them,  and  make  ian  idle  show,12  and  say,  See  how  I  make 
dialogues  ?  Do  not  so,  my  man ;  but  rather  say ;  See 
how  I  am  not  disappointed  of  that  which  I  desire  :  See 
how  I  do  not  fall  into  that  which  I  would  avoid.  Set 
death  before  me,  and  you  will  see.  Set  before  me  pain, 
prison,  disgrace  and  condemnation.  This  is  the  proper 
display  of  a  young  man  who  is  come  out  of  the  schools. 
But  leave  the  rest  to  others,  and  let  no  one  ever  hear  you 
say  a  word  about  these  things  ;  and  if  any  man  commends 
you  for  them,  do  not  allow  it;  but  think  that  you  are 
nobody  and  know  nothing.  Only  show  that  you  know 
this,  how  never  to  be  disappointed  in  your  desire  and  how 
never  to  fall  into  that  which  you  would  avoid.  Let  others 
labour  at  forensic  causes,  problems  and  syllogisms  :  do 
you  labour  at  thinking  about  death,13  chains,  the  rack, 
exile;14  and  do  all  this  with  confidence  and  reliance  on 
him  who  has  called  you  to  these  sufferings,  who  has 
judged  you  worthy  of  the  place  in  which  being  stationed 
you  will  show  what  things  the  rational  governing  power 
can  do  when  it  takes  its  stand  against  the  forces  which 
are  not  within  the  power  of  our  will.  And  thus  this  para- 
dox will  no  longer  appear  either  impossible  or  a  paradox, 

attempts  to  explain  the  passage  by  taking  '  free  from  perturbations '  in 
the  ordinary  simple  sense ;  but  I  doubt  if  he  has  succeeded. 

12  tpir€pTrep€iJo"!i.        Epictetus     (iii.     2.   14)     uses     the    adjective 
TTfpircpos  to  signify  a  vain  man.     Antoninus   (v.  5)  uses  the  verb 
Trcpir4pi:V€(r6at :  and  Paul  (Corinthians  i.  c.  1 3,  4),  where  our  version  is, 
*  charity  (love)  vaunteth  not  itself.'    Cicero  (ad  Attic,  i.  14,  4)  uses 
fj>cTrepv€pev<rciii<.r)v,  to  express  a  rhetorical  display. 

13  *  The  whole  life  of  philosophers/  says  Cicero  (Tuso.  i.  30),  following 
Plato, '  is  a  reflection  upon  death.' 

14  **  Some  English  readers,  too  happy  to  comprehend  how  chains, 
torture,  exile  and  sudden  executions,  can  be  ranked  among  the  common 
accidents  of  life,  may  be  surprised  to  find   Epictetua  so  frequently 
endeavouring  to  prepare  his  hearers  for  them.    But  it  must  be  recol- 
lected that  he  addressed  himself  to  persons  who  lived  under  the  Roman 
emperors,  from  whose  tyranny  the  very  best  of  men  were  perpetually 
liable  to  such  kind  of  dangers."— Mrs.  Carter.  All  men  even  now  are 
exposed  to  accidents  and  urisfortunes^against  which  there  is  no  security, 
and  even  the  most  fortunate  of  men  must  die  at  last.    The  lessons  of 
Epictetus  may  be  as  useful  now  as  they  were  in  his  time.    See  i.  30. 


EPIOTETUS.  103 

that  a  man  ought  to  be  at  the  same  time  cautious  and 
courageous :  courageous  towards  the  things  which  do  not 
depend  on  the  will,  and  cautious  in  things  which  are  within 
the  power  of  the  will. 


CHAPTEK  II. 

OF   TRANQUILLITY   (FREEDOM   FROM  PERTURBATION). 

CONSIDER,  you  who  are  going  into  court,  what  you  wish  to 
maintain  and  what  you  wish  to  succeed  in.  For  if  you 
wish  to  maintain  a  will  conformable  to  nature,  you  have 
every  security,  every  facility,  you  have  no  troubles.  For 
if  you  wish  to  maintain  what  is  in  your  own  power  and 
is  naturally  free,  and  if  you  are  content  with  these,  what 
else  do  you  care  for?  For  who  is  the  master  of  such 
things?  Who  can  take  ijiem  away?  If  you  choose  to  be 
modest  and  faithful,  who  shall  not  allow  you  to  be  so? 
If  you  choose  not  to  be  restrained  or  compelled,  who  shall 
compel  you  to  desire  what  you  think  that  you  ought  not 
to  desire  ?  who  shall  compel  you  to  avoid  what  you  do  not 
think  fit  to  avoid?  But  what  do  you  say?  The  judge 
will  determine  against  you  something  that  appears  formid- 
able ;  but  that  you  should  also  suffer  in  trying  to  avoid  it, 
how  can  he  do  that  ?  When  then  the  pursuit  of  objects  and 
the  avoiding  of  them  are  in  your  power,  what  else  do  you 
care  for  ?  Let  this  be  your  preface,1  this  your  narrative, 
this  your  confirmation,  this  your  victory,  this  your  pero- 
ration, this  your  applause  (or  the  approbation  which  you 
will  receive). 

Therefore  Socrates  said  to  one  who  was  reminding  him 
to  prepare  for  his  trial,2  Do  you  not  think  then  that  I 
have  been  preparing  for  it  all  my  life  ?  By  what  kind  of 
preparation  ?  I  have  maintained  that  which  was  in  my 
own  power.  How  then?  I  have  never  done  anything 
unjust  either  in  my  private  or  in  my  public  life. 

1  Epictetus  refers  to  the  rhetorical  divisions  of  a  speech. 

2  Xenophon  (Mem.  iv.  c.  8,  4)  has  reported  this  saying  of  Socrates 
on  the  authority  of  Hermogenes.    Compare  the  Apology  of  Xenophoa 
near  the  beginning. 


104  EPIOTETUS. 

But  if  you  wish  to  maintain  externals  also,  your  poo* 
body,  your  little  property  and  your  little  estimation,  I 
advise  you  to  make  from  this  moment  all  possible  prepa- 
ration, and  then  consider  both  the  nature  of  your  judgo 
and  your  adversary.  If  it  is  necessary  to  embrace  his- 
knees,  embrace  his  knees ;  if  to  weep,  weep ;  if  to  groan, 
groan.  For  when  you  have  subjected  to  externals  what  is 
your  own,  then  be  a  slave  and  do  not  resist,  and  do  not 
sometimes  choose  to  be  a  slave,  and  sometimes  not  choose,, 
but  with  all  your  mind  be  one  or  the  other,  either  free  or 
a  slave,  either  instructed  or  uninstructod,  either  a  well 
bred  cock  or  a  mean  one,  either  endure  to  be  beaten  until 
you  die  or  yield  at  once;  and  let  it  not  happen  to  you 
to  receive  many  stripes  and  then  to  yield.  But  if  these 
things  are  base,  determine  immediately.  Where  is  the 
nature  of  evil  and  good?  It  is  where  truth  is:  where 
truth  is  and  where  nature  is,  there  is  caution:  where 
truth  is,  there  is  courage  where  nature  is.3 

For  what  do  you  think  ?  do  you  think  that,  if  Socrates 
had  wished  to  preserve  externals,  he  would  havo  come 
forward  and  said :  Anytus  and  Melitus  can  certainly  kill 
me,  but  to  harm  me  they  are  not  able  ?  Was  he  so  foolish 
as  not  to  see  that  this  way  leads  not  to  the  preservation 
of  life  and  fortune,  but  to  another  end  ?  \\  hat  is  the 
reason  then  that  he  takes  no  account  of  his  adversaries, 
and  even  irritates  them?4  Just  in  the  same  way  my 
friend  Heraclitus,  who  had  a  little  suit  in  Khodes  about  a 
bit  of  land,  and  had  proved  to  the  judges  (8i/<aaTats)  that 
his  case  was  just,  said  when  he  had  come  to  the  peroration 
of  his  speech,  I  will  neither  intreat  you  nor  do  I  care 
what  judgment  you  will  give,  and  it  is  you  rather  than  I 
who  are  on  your  trial.  And  thus  he  ended  the  business.5 
"What  need  was  there  of  this  ?  Only  do  not  intreat ;  but 
do  not  also  say, '  I  do  not  intreat ;'  unless  there  is  a  fit 
occasion  to  irritate  purposely  the  judges,  as  was  the  case 
with  Socrates.  And  you,  if  you  are  preparing  such  a 
peroration,  why  do  you  wait,  why  do  you  obey  the  order 

1  Schweighaeuser  says  that  he  can  extract  no  sense  out  of  thia 

passage.    I  leave  it  as  it  is. 

4  There  is  some  difficulty  here  in  the  original.    See  Schweig.'s  note 
*  The  words  may  mean  either  what  I  have  written  in  the  text,  or 

4  and  so  he  lost  his  suit.' 


EP;CTETUS,  105 

<o  submit  to  trial?  For  if  you  wish  to  he  crucified,  wait 
und  the  cross  will  come :  but  if  you  choose  to  submit  and 
to  plead  your  cause  as  well  as  you  can,  you  must  do  what 
is  consistent  with  this  object,  provided  you  maintain  what 
is  your  own  (your  proper  character). 

For  this  reason  also  it  is  ridiculous  to  say,  Suggest 
something  to  me6  (tell  me  what  to  do).  What  should  I 
suggest  to  you?  Well,  form  my  mind  so  as  to  accom- 
modate itself  to  any  event.  Why  that  is  just  the  same  as 
if  a  man  who  is  ignorant  of  letters  should  say,  Tell  mo 
what  to  write  when  any  name  is  proposed  to  me.  For  if 
I  should  tell  him  to  write  Dion,  and  then  another  should 
come  and  propose  to  him  not  the  name  of  Dion  but  that  of 
Theon,  what  will  be  done  ?  what  will  he  write  ?  But  if 
you  have  practised  writing,  you  are  also  prepared  to 
write  (or  to  do)  any  thing  that  is  required.  If7  you  are 
not,  what  can  I  now  suggest?  For  if  circumstances  re- 
quire something  else,  what  will  you  say,  or  what  will  you 
do?  Eemember  then  this  general  precept  and  you  will 
need  no  suggestion.  But  if  you  gape  after  externals,  you 
must  of  necessity  ramble  up  and  down  in  obedience  to 
the  will  of  your  master.  And  who  is  the  master?  He 
who  has  the  pow<  r  over  the  things  which  you  seek  to 
gain  or  try  to  avoid.8 

6  "  The  meaning  is,  You  nrast  not  ask  for  advice  when  you  are  come 
into  a  difficulty,  but  every  man  ought  to  have  such  principles  as  to  be 
ready  on  all  occasions  to  act  as  he  ought ;  just  as  he  who  knows  how  to 
write  can  write  any  name  which  is  proposed  to  him." — Wolf. 

7  "  The  reader  must  know  that  these  dissertations  were  spoken 
<'xtcmpore,  and  that  one  thing  after  another  would  come   into  the 
thoughts  of  the  speaker.   So  the  reader  will  not  be  surprised  that  when 
the  discourse  is  on  the  maintenance  of  firmness  or  freedom  from  pertur- 
bations, Epictetus  should  now  speak  of  philosophical  preparation, 
which  is    most   efficient  for  the   maintenance  of  firmness.*' — Wolf. 
See  also   Schweig.'s  note  on   section    21,  "Suggest   something  to 
me : "  and  ii.  24. 

•  In  th«  Eneheiridion  or  Manual  (c.  14)  it  is  written,  *  Every  man's 
master  is  he  who  has  the  power  to  give  to  a  man  or  take  away  that 
Which  he  would  have  or  not  have :  whoever  then  wishes  to  be  free, 
let  him  neither  seek  any  thing  or  avoid  any  thing  which  is  in  tl>e 
power  of  others :  if  he  does  not  act  thus,  he  will  be  a  slave/ 


10(5  EPICTETUS. 

CHAPTER  III. 

TO  THOSE  WHO  KECOMMEND  PERSONS  TO  PHILOSOPHERS. 

DIOSENES  said  well  to  one  who  asked  from  him  letters  of 
recommendation,  "  That  you  are  a  man,  he  said,  he  will 
know  as  soon  as  he  sees  you ;  and  he  will  know  whether 
you  are  good  or  bad,  if  he  is  by  experience  skilful  to 
distinguish  the  good  and  the  bad ;  but  if  he  is  without 
experience,  he  will  never  know,  if  I  write  to  him  ten 
thousand  times." l  For  it  is  just  the  same  as  if  a  drachma 
(a  piece  of  silver  money)  asked  to  be  recommended  to  a 
person  to  be  tested.  If  he  is  skilful  in  testing  silver,  he 
will  know  what  you  are,  for  you  (the  drachma)  will 
recommend  yourself.  We  ought  then  in  life  also  to  have 
some  skill  as  in  the  case  of  silver  coin  that  a  man  may  be 
able  to  say  like  the  judge  of  silver,  Bring  me  any  drachma 
and  I  will  test  it.  But  in  the  case  of  syllogisms,  I  would 
eay,  Bring  any  man  that  you  please,  and  I  will  distinguish 
for  you  the  man  who  knows  how  to  resolve  syllogisms  and 
the  man  who  does  not.  Why  ?  Because  I  know  how  to 
resolve  syllogisms.  I  have  the  power,  which  a  man  must 
have  who  is  able  to  discover  those  who  have  the  power  of 
resolving  syllogisms.  But  in  life  how  do  I  act  ?  At  one 
time  I  call  a  thing  good,  and  at  another  time  bad.  What 
is  the  reason  ?  The  contrary  to  that  which  is  in  the  case 
of  syllogisms,  ignorance  and  inexperience. 

1  Mrs.  Carter  says  '  This  is  one  of  the  many  extravagant  refinements 
of  the  philosophers;  and  might  lead  persons  into  very  dangerous 
mistakes,  if  it  was  laid  down  as  a  maxim  j\\  ordinary  life.'  I  think 
that  Mrs.  Carter  has  not  seen  the  meaning  of  Epictetus.  The  philo- 
sopher will  discover  the  man's  character  by  trying  him,  as  the  assayer 
tries  the  silver  by  a  test. 

Cicero  (De  legibus,  i.  9)  says  that  the  face  expresses  the  hidden 
character.  Euripides  (Medea,  518)  says  better,  that  no  mark  is  im- 
pressed on  the  body  by  which  we  can  distinguish  the  good  man  from 
the  bad.  Shakspere  says 

There  'a  no  art 
.  To  find  the  mind*j  obstruction  in  the  face. 

Macbeth,  act  i.  so.  4. 


EPICTETUS.  107 


CHAPTER  IV. 

AGAINST   A  PERSON  WHO   HAD   ONCE  BEEN  DETECTED  IX 
ADULTERY. 

As  Epictetus  was  saying  that  man  is  formed  for  fidelity, 
and  that  ho  who  subverts  fidelity  subverts  the  peculiar 
characteristic  of  men,  there  entered  one  of  those  who  are 
considered  to  be  men  of  letters,  who  had  once  been 
detected  in  adultery  in  the  city.  Then  Epictetus  con- 
tinued, But  if  we  lay  aside  this  fidelity  for  which  we  are 
formed  and  make  designs  against  our  neighbour's  wife, 
what  are  we  doing  ?  What  else  but  destroying  and  over- 
throwing? Whom,  the  man  of  fidelity,  the  man  of 
modesty,  the  man  of  sanctity.  Is  this  all  ?  And  are  we 
not  overthrowing  neighbourhood,  and  friendship,  and  the 
community  ;  and  in  what  place  are  we  putting  ourselves  ? 
How  shall  I  consider  you,  man?  As  a  neighbour,  as  a 
friend?  What  kind  of  one?  As  a  citizen?  Wherein  shall 
I  trust  you  ?  So  if  you  were  an  utensil  so  worthless  that  a 
man  could  not  use  you,  you  would  be  pitched  out  on  the 
dung  heaps,  and  no  man  would  pick  you  up.  But  if 
being  a  man  you  are  unable  to  fill  any  place  which  befits 
a  man,  what  shall  we  do  with  you?  For  suppose  that 
you  cannot  hold  the  place  of  a  friend,  can  you  hold  the 
place  of  a  slave  ?  And  who  will  trust  you  ?  Are  you  not 
then  content  that  you  also  should  be  pitched  somewhere 
on  a  dung  heap,  as  a  useless  utensil,  and  a  bit  of  dung? 
Then  will  you  say,  no  man  cares  for  me,  a  man  of  letters  ? 
They  do  not,  because  you  are  bad  and  useless.  It  is  just 
as  if  the  wasps  complained  because  no  man  cares  for 
them,  but  all  fly  from  them,  and  if  a  man  can,  he  strikes 
them  and  knocks  them  down.  You  have  such  a  sting 
that  you  throw  into  trouble  and  pain  any  man  that  you 
wound  with  it.  What  would  you  have  us  do  with  you  ? 
You  have  no  place  where  you  can  be  put. 
What  then,  are  not  women  common  by  nature?1  So  I 

1  It  is  not  clear  what  is  meant  by  women  being  common  by  nature  In 
any  rational  sense.  Zeno  and  his  school  said  (Diogenes  Laertius,  vii. ; 
Zeno,  p.  195.  London,  1664) :  '  it  is  their  opinion  also  that  the  women 


108  EPICTETUS. 

say  also;  for  a  little  pig  is  common  to  all  the  invited 
guests,  but  when  the  portions  have  been  distributed,  go,  if 
you  think  it  right,  and  snatch  up  the  portion  of  him  who 
reclines  next  to  you,  or  slily  steal  it,  or  place  your  hand 
down  by  it  and  lay  hold  of  it,  and  if  you  can  not  tear 
away  a  bit  of  the  meat,  grease  your  fingers  and  lick  them. 
A  fine  companion  over  cups,  and  Socratic  guest  indeed! 
Well,  is  not  the  theatre  common  to  the  citizens  ?  When 
then  they  have  taken  their  seats,  come,  if  you  think 
proper,  and  eject  one  of  them.  In  this  way  women  also 
are  common  by  nature.  When  then  the  legislator,  like  the 
master  of  a  feast,  has  distributed  them,  will  you  not  also 
look  for  your  own  portion  and  not  filch  and  handle  what 
belongs  to  another.  But  I  am  a  man  of  letters  and 
understand  Archedemus.2 — Understand  Archedemus  then, 
and  be  an  adulterer,  and  faithless,  and  instead  of  a  man, 
be  a  wolf  or  an  ape :  for  what  is  the  difference  ?3 


CHAPTER  V. 

HOW  MAGNANIMITY  IS  CONSISTENT  WITH  CARE. 

THINGS  themselves  (materials)  are  indifferent;1  but  the 
use  of  them  is  not  indifferent.  How  then  shall  a  man 
preserve  firmness  and  tranquillity,  and  at  the  same  time 

should  be  common  among  the  wise,  so  that  any  man  should  use  any 
woman,  as  Zeno  says  in  his  Polity,  and  Chrysippus  in  the  book  on  Polity, 
and  Diogenes  the  Cynic  and  Plato ;  and  we  shall  love  all  the  children 
equally  like  fathers,  and  tlie  jealousy  about  adultery  will  be  removed/ 
These  wise  men  knew  little  about  human  nature,  if  they  taught  such 
doctrines. 

2  Archedemus  was  a  Stoic  philosopher  of  Tarsus.  We  know  little 
about  him. 

8  A  man  may  be  a  philosopher  cr  pretend  to  be ;  and  at  the  same 
time  he  may  be  a  bea^t. 

1  The  materials  (0A«t)  on  which  man  works  are  neither  good  nor 
bad,  and  so  they  are,  as  Epictetus  names  them,  indifferent.  But  the 
use  of  things,  or  of  material,  is  not  indifferent.  They  may  be  used  well 
or  ill,  conformably  to  nature  or  not. 


EPICTETUS,  109 

be  careful  and  neither  rash  nor  negligent  ?  If  he  imitates 
those  who  play  at  dice.  The  counters  are  indifferent ;  the 
dice  are  indifferent.  How  do  I  know  what  the  cast  will 
be  ?  But  to  use  carefully  and  dexterously  the  cast  of  the 
dice,  this  is  my  business.2  Thus  then  in  life  also  the  chief 
business  is  this  :  distinguish  and  separate  things,  and  say, 
Externals  are  not  in  my  power:  will  is  in  my  power. 
'Where  shall  I  seek  the  good  and  the  bad  ?  Within,  in  the 
things  which  are  my  own.  But  in  what  does  not  belong- 
to  you  call  nothing  either  good  or  bad,  or  profit  or  damage 
or  any  thing  of  the  kind. 

What  then  ?  Should  we  use  such  things  carelessly  ? 
In  no  way:  for  this  on  the  other  hand  is  bad  for  the 
faculty  of  the  will,  and  consequently  against  nature  ;  but 
we  should  act  carefully  because  the  use  is  not  indifferent, 
and  we  should  also  act  with  firmness  arid  freedom  from 
perturbations  because  the  material  is  indifferent.  For 
where  the  material  is  not  indifferent,  there  no  man  can 
hinder  me  nor  compel  me.  Where  I  can  be  hindered  and 
compelled,  the  obtaining  of  those  things  is  not  in  my  power, 
nor  is  it  good  or  bad ;  but  the  use  is  either  bad  or  good, 
and  the  use  is  in  my  power.  But  it  is  difficult  to  mingle 
and  to  bring  together  these  two  things,  the  carefulness  of 
him  who  is  affected  by  the  matter  (or  things  about  him) 
and  the  firmness  of  him  who  has  no  regard  for  it ;  but  it 
is  not  impossible  :  and  if  it  is,  happiness  is  impossible. 
But  we  should  act  as  we  do  in  the  case  of  a  voyage.  "What 
can  I  do  ?  I  can  choose  the  master  of  the  ship,  the  sailors, 
the  day,  the  opportunity.  Then  comes  a  storm.  What 
more  have  I  to  care  for  ?  for  my  part  is  done.  The  busi- 
ness belongs  to  another,  the  master. — But  the  ship  is  sink- 
ing— what  then  have  I  to  do?  I  do  the  only  thing  that 
I  can,  not  to  be  drowaed  full  of  fear,  nor  screaming  nor 
blaming  God,  but  knowing  that  what  has  been  produced 
must  also  perish  :  for  I  am  not  an  immortal  being,  but  a 
man,  a  part  of  the  whole,  as  an  hour  is  a  part  of  the  day  ; 

f  Terence  says  (Adelphi,  iv.  7)— 

Si  illud,  quod  <  st  maxtme  opus,  jactu  non  cadit, 
Illud  quod  cecidit  foite,id  urte  ut  currigas. 

Dexterously*  is  'arte/  TCX^KWS  in  Epictetus.— Upton. 


110  EPICTETTJS. 

I  must  "be  present  like  the  hour,  and  past  lite  the  hour. 
"What  difference  then  does  it  make  to  me,  how  I  pass 
away,  whether  by  being  suffocated  or  by  a  fever,  for  I 
must  pass  through  some  such  means  ? 

This  is  just  what  you  will  see  those  doing  who  play  at 
ball  skilfully.  No  one  cares  about  the  ball3  as  being 
good  or  bad,  but  about  throwing  and  catching  it.  In  this 
therefore  is  the  skill,  in  this  the  art,  tho  quickness,  the 
judgment,  so  that  even  if  I  spread  out  my  lap  I  may  not 
be  able  to  catch  it,  and  another,  if  I  throw,  may  catch  the 
ball.  But  if  with  perturbation  and  fear  we  receive  or 
throw  the  ball,  what  kind  of  play  is  it  then,  and  wherein 
shall  a  man  be  steady,  and  how  shall  a  man  see  the  order 
in  the  game  ?  But  one  will  say,  Throw ;  or  Do  not  throw ; 
and  another  will  say,  You  have  thrown  once.  This  is 
quarrelling,  not  play. 

Socrates  then  knew  how  to  play  at  ball.  How  ?  By 
using  pleasantry  in  the  court  where  he  was  tried.  Tell 
me,  he  says,  Anytus,  how  do  you  say  that  I  do  not  believe 
in  God.  The  Daemons  (Sou'/xom),  who  are  they,  think 
you?  Are  they  not  sons  of  Gods,  or  compounded  of  gods 
and  men?  When  Anytus  admitted  this,  Socrates  said, 
Who  then,  think  you,  can  believe  that  there  are  mules 
(half  asses),  but  not  asses ;  and  this  he  said  as  if  he  were 
playing  at  ball.4  And  what  was  the  ball  in  that  case? 
Life,  chains,  banishment,  a  draught  of  poison,  separation 
from  wife  and  leaving  children  orphans.  These  were  tho 
things  with  which  he  was  playing ;  but  still  he  did  play 
and  threw  the  ball  skilfully.  So  we  should  do  :  we  must 
employ  all  the  care  of  the  players,  but  show  the  same 
indifference  about  the  ball.  For  we  ought  by  all  means 

3  The  word  is  apTratrr^,  which  was  also  used  by  the  Romans.    One- 
threw  the  ball  and  the  other  caught  it.  Chrysippus  used  this  simile  of 
u  ball  in  speaking  of  giving  and  receiving  (Seneca,  Do  Beneficiisr 
ii.  17).     Martial  has  the  word  (Epig.  iv.  19)  *  Sive  harpasta  manu 
pulverulenta  rapis ' ;  and  elsewhere. 

4  In  Plato's  Apology  c.  15,  Socrates  addresses  Meletus  ;  and  he  says, 
t  would  be  equally  absurd  if  a  man  should  believe  that  there  are  foals 

of  horses  and  asses,  and  should  not  believe  that  there  are  horses  and 
asses.  But  Socrates  says  nothing  of  mules,  for  the  word  mules  in  sonn 
texts  of  the  Apolog*  is  manifestly  wronjr 


EPICTETUS.  Ill 

to  apply  our  art  to  Rome  external  material,  not  as  valuing 
the  material,  but,  whatever  it  may  be,  showing  our  art  in 
it.  Thus  too  the  weaver  does  not  make  wool,  but  exercises 
his  art  upon  such  as  he  receives.  Another  gives  you  food 
and  property  and  is  able  to  take  them  away  and  your  poor 
body  also.  When  then  you  have  received  the  material, 
work  on  it.  If  then  you  come  out  (of  the  trial)  without 
having  suffered  any  thing,  all  who  meet  you  will  congratu- 
late you  on  your  escape  ;  but  he  who  knows  how  to  look 
at  such  things,  if  he  shall  see  that  you  have  behaved 
properly  in  the  matter,  will  commend  you  and  be  pleased 
with  you ;  and  if  he  shall  find  that  you  owe  your  escape 
to  any  want  of  proper  behaviour,  he  will  do  the  contrary. 
For  where  rejoicing  is  reasonable,  there  also  is  congratu- 
lation reasonable. 

How  then  is  it  said  that  some  external  things  are 
according  to  nature  and  others  contrary  to  nature  ?  It  is 
said  as  it  might  be  said  if  we  were  separated  from  union 
(or  society)  .  for  to  the  foot  I  shall  say  that  it  is  accord- 
ing to  nature  for  it  to  be  clean ;  but  if  you  take  it  as  a 
foot  and  as  a  thing  not  detached  (independent),  it  will 
befit  it  both  to  step  into  the  mud  and  tread  on  thorns,  and 
sometimes  to  be  cut  off  for  the  good  of  the  whole  body ; 
otherwise  it  is  no  longer  a  foot.  We  should  think  in  some 
such  way  about  ourselves  alsc.  What  are  you  ?  A  man. 
If  you  consider  yourself  as  detached  from  other  men,  it  is 
according  to  nature  to  live  to  old  age,  to  be  rich,  to  be 
healthy.  But  if  you  consider  yourself  as  a  man  and  a 
part  of  a  certain  whole,  it  is  for  the  sake  of  that  whole 
that  at  one  time  you  should  be  sick,  at  another  time  take 
a  voyage  and  run  into  danger,  and  at  another  time  be  in 
want,  and  in  some  cases  die  prematurely.  Why  then  are 
you  troubled?  Do  you  not  know,  that  as  a  foot  is  no 
longer  a  foot  if  it  is  detached  from  the  body,  so  you  are 
no  longer  a  man  if  you  are  separated  from  other  men. 
For  what  is  a  man  ?6  A  part  of  a  state,  of  that  first  which 
consists  of  Gods  and  of  men ;  then  of  that  which  is  called 

5  &ir6\vToi.    Compare  Antoninus,  x.  24,  via.  34. 

6  Compare  Antoninus,  ii.  16,  iii.  11,  vi.  44,  xii.  36 ;  and  Seneca,  de 
Otio  Sap.  o.  31 ;  and  Cicero,  De  Fin.  iii.  19. 


112  EPICTETUS. 

next  to  it,  which  is  a  small  image  of  the  universal  state. 
What  then  must  I  be  brought  to  trial ;  must  another  have 
a  fever,  another  sail  on  the  sea,  another  die,  and  another 
be  condemned  ?  Yes,  for  it  is  impossible  in  such  a  body, 
in  such  a  universe  of  things,  among  so  many  living  to- 
gether, that  such  things  should  not  happen,  some  to  one 
and  others  to  others.  It  is  your  duty  then  since  you  are 
come  here,  to  say  what  you  ought,  to  arrange  these  things 
as  it  is  fit.7  Then  some  one  says,  "  I  shall  charge  you 
with  doing  me  wrong."  Much  good  may  it  do  you :  I 
have  done  my  part ;  but  whether  you  also  have  done  yours, 
you  must  look  to  that ;  for  there  is  some  danger  of  this 
too,  that  it  may  escape  your  notice. 


CHAPTEE  VL 

OF  INDIFFERENCE.1 

THE  hypothetical  proposition2  is  indifferent :  the  judgment 
about  it  is  not  indifferent,  but  it  is  either  knowledge  or 
opinion  or  error.  Thus  life  is  indifferent :  the  use  is  not 
indifferent.  When  any  man  then  tells  you  that  these 
things  also  are  indifferent,  do  not  become  negligent ;  and 
when  a  man  invites  you  to  be  careful  (about  such  things), 
do  not  become  abject  and  struck  with  admiration  of  ma- 
terial things.  And  it  is  good  for  you  to  know  your  own 
preparation  and  power,  that  in  those  matters  where  you 
have  not  been  prepared,  you  may  keep  quiet,  and  not  be 

7  He  tells  some  imaginary  person,  who  hears  him,  that  since  lie  is 
come  into  the  world,  he  must  do  his  duty  in  it. 

1  This  discussion  is  with  a  young  philosopher  who,  intending  to 
return  from  Nicopolis  to  Rome,  feared  the  tyranny  of  Domitian,  who  was 
particularly  severe  towards  philosophers.  See  also  the  note  on  i.  24.  3. 
Schweig.  Compare  Plin.  Epp.  i.  12,  and  the  expression  of  Corelliui 
Kufus  about  the  detestable  villain,  the  emperor  Domitian. 

The  title  *  of  Indifference*  means  *  of  the  indifference  of  things;1 
of  the  things  which  are  neither  good  nor  bad, 

*  r>  0wty/Ajuc'fw,  p,  93. 


EPICTETUS.  113 

vexed,  if  others  have  the  advantage  over  you.  For  you 
too  in  syllogisms  will  claim  to  have  the  advantage  over 
them ;  and  if  others  should  be  vexed  at  this,  you  will 
console  them  by  sa>  ing,  *  I  have  learned  them,  and  you 
have  not.'  Thus  also  where  there  is  need  of  any  practice, 
seek  not  that  which  is  acquired  from  the  need  (of  such 
practice),  but  yield  in  that  matter  to  those  who  have  had 
practice,  and  be  yourself  content  with  firmness  of  mind. 

Go  and  salute  a  certain  person.  How  ?  Not  meanly. — 
But  I  have  been  shut  out,  for  I  have  not  learned  to  make 
my  way  through  the  window ;  and  when  I  have  found  the 
door  shut,  I  must  either  come  back  or  enter  through  the 
window. — But  still  speak  to  him. — In  what  way  ?  Not 
meanly.  But  suppose  that  you  have  not  got  what  you 
wanted.  Was  this  your  business,  and  not  his  ?  "Why  then 
do  you  claim  that  which  belongs  to  another?  Always 
remember  what  is  your  own,  and  what  belongs  to  another ; 
and  you  will  not  be  disturbed.  Chrysippus  therefore  said 
well,  So  long  as  future  things  are  uncertain,  I  always 
cling  to  those  which  are  more  adapted  to  the  conservation, 
of  that  which  is  according  to  nature ;  for  God  himself  has 
given  me  the  faculty  of  such  choice.  But  if  I  knew  that 
it  was  fated  (in  the  order  of  things)  for  me  to  be  sick,  I 
would  even  move  towards  it ;  for  the  foot  also,  if  it  had 
intelligence,  would  move  to  go  into  the  mud.3  For  why- 
are  ears  of  corn  produced  ?  Is  it  not  that  they  may 
become  dry  ?  And  do  they  not  become  dry  that  they  may 
be  reaped?4  for  they  are  not  separated  from  communion, 
with  other  things.  If  then  they  had  perception,  ought 
they  to  wish  never  to  be  reaped  ?  But  this  is  a  curse  upon 
ears  of  corn,  to  be  never  reaped.  So  we  must  know  that 
in  the  case  of  men  too  it  is  a  curse  not  to  die,  just  the 
game  as  not  to  be  ripened  and  not  to  be  reaped.  But  since. 
we  must  be  reaped,  and  we  also  know  that  we  are  reaped, 

»  Sec.  ii.  5,  24. 

4  Epiotetus  alludes  to  the  verses  from  the  Hypsipyle  of  Euripides. 
Compare  Antoninus  (vii.  40) :  *  Life  must  be  reaped  like  the  ripe  ears 
of  corn :  one  man  is  born ;  another  dies.'  Cicero  (Tuscul.  Disp.  iii.  25) 
has  translated  six  verses  from  Euripides,  and  among  them  are 
these  two : 

turn  vita  omnibus 
Metenda  ut  fruges :  Bic  Jubet  neoessitos. 

I 


114  EPICTETtJS. 

we  are  vexed  at  it :  for  we  neither  know  what  we  are  nor 
have  we  studied  what  belongs  to  man,  as  those  who  have 
studied  horses  know  what  belongs  to  horses.  But  Chry- 
saritas5  when  he  was  going  to  strike  the  enemy  checked 
himself  when  he  heard  the  trumpet  sounding  a  retreat:  so 
it  seemed  better  to  him  to  obey  the  general's  command 
than  to  follow  his  own  inclination.  But  not  one  of  us 
chooses,  even  when  necessity  summons,  readily  to  obey  it, 
but  weeping  and  groaning  we  snifer  what  \ve  do  suffer, 
and  we  call  them  '  circumstances.'  What  kind  of  circum- 
stances, man  ?  If  you  give  the  name  of  circumstances  to 
the  things  which  are  around  you,  all  things  are  circum- 
stances ;  but  if  you  call  hardships  by  this  name,  what 
hardship  is  there  in  the  dying  of  that  which  has  been  pro- 
duced ?  But  that  which  destroys  is  either  a  sword,  or  a 
wheel,  or  the  sea,  or  a  tile,  or  a  tyrant.  Why  do  you  care 
about  the  way  of  going  down  to  Hades  ?  All  ways  are 
equal.6  But  if  you  will  listen  to  the  truth,  the  way  which 
the  tyrant  sends  you  is  shorter.  A  tyrant  never  killed  a 
man  in  six  months  :  but  a  fever  is  often  a  year  about  it. 
All  these  things  are  only  sound  and  the  noise  of  empty 
names. 

I  am  in  danger  of  my  life  from  Caesar.7  Awl  am  not  I 
in  danger  who  dwell  in  Nicopolis,  where  there  are  so 
many  earthquakes :  and  when  you  are  crossing  tho 
Hadriatic,  what  hazard  do  you  run  ?  Is  it  not  the  hazard 
of  your  life  ?  But  I  am  in  danger  also  as  to  opinion.  Do 
you  mean  your  own  ?  how  ?  For  who  can  compel  you  to 
have  any  opinion,  which  you  do  not  choose  ?  But  is  it  as 
to  another  man's  opinion  ?  and  what  kind  of  danger  is 

5  The  story  is  in  Xenophon's  Cyropaedia  (IV.  near  the  beginning) 
where  Cyrus  says  that  ho  called  Chrysantas  by  name.    Epictetus,  as 
Upton  remarks,  quotes  from  memory. 

6  So  Anaxagoras  said  that  the  road  to  the  other  world  (ad  inferos)  is 
tlie  same  from  all  places.    (Cicero,  Tusc.  Disp.  i.  43).     What  follows  is 
one  of  the  examples  of  extravagant  assertion  in  Epictetus.    A  tyrant 
may  kill  by  a  slow  death  as  a  fever  does.    I  suppose  that  Epictetus 
would  have  some  answer  to  that.    Except  to  a  Stoic  the  ways  to  death 
are  not  indifferent :  some  ways  of  dying  are  painful,  and  even  he  who 
can  endure  with  fortitude,  would  prefer  an  easy  death. 

7  The  text  has   lirl  KcuVapos;  but  tirl  perhaps  ought  to  be  M 


EPICTETU8.  115 

yours,  if  others  have  false  opinions?  But  I  am  in  danger 
of  being  banished.  What  is  it  to  be  banished?  To  bo 
somewhere  else  than  at  Home  ?  Yes  :  what  then  if  I 
should  be  sent  to  Gyara  ? 8  If  that  suits  you,  you  will  go 
there ;  but  if  it  does  not,  you  can  go  to  another  place 
instead  of  Gyara,  whither  he  also  will  go,  who  sends  you 
to  Gyara,  whether  he  choose  or  not.  Why  then  do  you 
go  up  to  Borne  as  if  it  were  something  great  ?  It  is  not 
worth  all  this  preparation,  that  an  ingenuous  youth 
should  say,  It  was  not  worth  while  to  have  heard  so 
much  and  to  have  written  so  much  and  to  have  sat  so  long 
by  the  side  of  an  old  man  who  is  not  worth  much.  Only 
remember  that  division  by  which  your  own  and  not  your 
own  are  distinguished :  never  claim  any  thing  which 
belongs  to  others.  A  tribunal  and  a  prison  are  each  a 
place,  one  high  and  the  other  low ;  but  the  will  can  be 
maintained  equal,  if  you  choose  to  maintain  it  equal  in 
each.  And  we  shall  then  be  imitators  of  Socrates,  when 
we  are  able  to  write  paeans  in  prison.9  But  in  our  present 
disposition,  consider  if  we  could  endure  in  prison  another 
person  saying  to  us,  Would  you  like  me  to  read  Paeans  to 
you? — Why  do  you  trouble  me?  do  you  not  know  tho 
evils  which  hold  me  ?  Can  I  in  such  circumstances  (listen 
to  paeans)  ? — What  circumstances  ? — I  am  going  to  die. — 
And  will  other  men  be  immortal  ? 

•  See  i.  25,  note  4. 

9  Diogenes  Laertius  reports  in  his  life  of  Socrates  that  he  wrote  in 
prison  a  Paean,  and  he  gives  the  first  Hue  which  conta  us  an  address  to 
Apollo  and  Artemis. 


12 


116  EPICTETUS. 

CHAPTER  VII. 

HOW   WE   OUGHT   TO  USE   DIVINATION. 

THROUGH  an  unreasonable  regard  to  divination  many  of 
us  omit  many  duties.1  For  what  more  can  the  diviner 
see  than  death  or  danger  or  disease,  or  generally  things  of 
that  kind  ?  If  then  I  must  expose  myself  to  clanger  for  & 
friend,  and  if  it  is  my  duty  even  to  die  for  him,  what  need 
have  I  then  for  divination?  Have  I  not  within  me  a 
diviner  who  has  told  me  the  nature  of  good  and  of  evilr 
and  has  explained  to  mo  the  signs  (or  marks)  of  both? 
"What  need  have  I  then  to  consult  the  viscera  of  victims  01 
the  flight  of  birds,  and  why  do  I  submit  when  he  says,  It 
is  for  your  interest?  For  does  he  know  what  is  for  my 
interest,  does  he  know  what  is  good;  and  as  he  has- 
learned  the  signs  of  the  viscera,  has  he  also  learned  the- 
signs  of  good  and  evil?  For  if  he  knows  the  signs  of 
these,  he  knows  the  signs  both  of  the  beautiful  and  of  the 
ugly,  and  of  the  just  and  of  the  unjust.  Do  you  tell  me,, 
man,  what  is  the  thing  which  is  signified  for  me :  is  it  life 
or  death,  poverty  or  wealth?  But  whether  these  things 
are  for  my  interest  or  whether  they  are  not,  I  do  not 
intend  to  ask  you.  Why  don't  you  give  your  opinion  on 
matters  of  grammar,  and  why  do  you  give  it  hero  about 
things  on  which  we  are  all  in  error  and  disputing  with 
one  another?2  The  woman  therefore,  who  intended  to 

1  Divination  was  a  great  part  of  antient  religion,  and,  as  EpictetTa» 
says,  it  led  men  *  to  omit  many  duties.'  In  a  certain  sense  there  was 
some  meaning  in  it.  If  it  is  true  that  those  who  believe  in  God  can 
see  certain  ^igns  in  the  administration  of  the  world  by  which  they  can 
judge  what  their  behaviour  ought  to  be,  they  can  learn  what  their 
duties  are.  If  these  signs  are  misunderstood,  or  if  they  are  not  seen 
right,  men  may  be  governed  by  an  abject  superstition.  So  the  external 
forms  of  any  religion  may  become  the  means  of  corruption  and  of  human 
debasement,  and  the  true  indications  of  God's  will  may  be  neglected. 
Upton  compares  Lucan  (ix.  572),  who  sometimes  said  a  few  good 
things. 

*  A  man  who  gives  his  opinion  on  grammar  gives  an  opinion  on  a 
thin^  of  which  many  know  something.  A  man  who  gives  his  opinion 
on  divination  or  on  future  events,  gives  an  opinion  on  things  of  which 
we  all  know  nothing.  When  then  a  man  affects  to  instruct  on  things 
unknown,  we  may  ask  him  to  give  his  opinion  on  things  which  are 
known,  and  so  we  may  learn  what  kind  of  man  he  is. 


EPICTSTUS.  117 

eend  by  a  vessel  a  month's  provisions  to  Gratilla3  in  her 
banishment,  made  a  good  answer  to  him  who  said  that 
Domitian  would  seize  what  she  sent,  I  would  rather,  she 
replied,  that  Domitian  should  seize  all  than  that  1  should 
not  send  it. 

What  then  leads  us  to  frequent  use  of  divination? 
Cowardice,  the  dread  of  what  will  happen.  This  is  the 
reason  why  we  flatter  the  diviners.  Pray,  master,  shall  I 
succeed  to  the  property  of  my  father  ?  Let  us  see :  let  us 
sacrifice  on  the  occasion. — Yes,  master,  as  fortune  chooses. 
— When  he  has  said,  You  shall  succeed  to  the  inheritance, 
we  thank  him  as  if  we  received  the  inheritance  from  him. 
The  consequence  is  that  they  play  upon  us.4 

What  then  should  we  do?  We  ought  to  come  (to  divina- 
tion) without  desire  or  aversion,  as  the  wayfarer  asks  of 
the  man  whom  he  meets  which  of  two  roads  leads  (to  his 
journey's  end),  without  any  desire  for  that  which  leads  to 
the  right  rather  than  to  the  left,  for  he  has  no  wish  to  go  by 
any  road  except  the  road  which  leads  (to  his  end).  In  the 
same  way  ought  we  to  come  to  God  also  as  a  guide;  as  we 
use  our  eyes,  not  asking  them  to  show  us  rather  such 
things  as  we  wish,  but  receiving  the  appearances  of 
things  such  as  the  eyes  present  them  to  us.  But  now  we 
trembling  take  the  augur  (bird  interpreter)5  by  the  hand, 
and  while  we  invoke  God  we  intreat  the  augur,  and  say 
Master  have  mercy  on  me  ;6  suffer  me  to  come  safe  out  of 
this  difficulty.  Wretch,  would  you  have  then  any  thing 
other  than  what  is  best?  Is  there  then  any  thing  better 
than  what  pleases  God?  Why  do  you,  as  far  as  is  in  your 
power,  corrupt  your  judge  and  lead  astray  your  adviser  ? 

1  Gratilla  was  a  lady  of  rank,  who  was  banished  from  Rome  and 
Italy  by  Domitian.  Pliny,  Epp.  iii.  11.  See  the  note  in  Schweig.'s 
•ed.on  ^iri^via. 

4  As  knavish  priests  have  often  played  on  the  fears  and  hopes  of  the 
auperstitious. 

a  Schweighaeuser  reads  rbv  bpviOdpiov.    See  his  note. 

6  *  K6pi€  <?A6i?(r0p,  Domine  miserere.  Notissima  formula  in  Christiana 
eoolesia  jam  uso^ue  a  priinis  temporibus  usurpata.'  Upton. 


118  EPICTETUS. 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

WHAT  IS  THE  NATUEE  (fj  ov(TLa)  OF  THE  GOOD  i  * 

GOD  is  beneficial.  But  the  Good  also  is  beneficial.2  It  is 
consistent  then  that  where  the  nature  of  God  is,  there  also 
the  nature  of  the  good  should  be.  What  then  is  the 
nature  of  God  ? 3  Elesh  ?  Certainly  not.  An  estate  in 
land  ?  By  no  means.  Fame  ?  No.  Is  it  intelligence, 
knowledge,  right  reason  ?  Yes.  Herein  then  simply  seek 
the  nature  of  the  good ;  for  I  suppose  that  you  do  not  seek 
it  in  a  plant.  No.  Do  you  seek  it  in  an  irrational 
animal?  No.  If  then  you  seek  it  in  a  rational  animal, 
why  do  you  still  seek  it  any  where  except  in  the  supe- 
riority of  rational  over  irrational  animals?4  Now  plants 
have  not  even  the  power  of  using  appearances,  and  for  this 
reason  you  do  not  apply  the  term  good  to  them.  The 
good  then  requires  the  use  of  appearances.  Does  it  re- 
quire this  use  only  ?  For  if  you  say  that  it  requires  this 
use  only,  say  that  the  good,  and  that  happiness  and  unhap- 
piness  are  in  irrational  animals  also.  But  you  do  not  say 
this,  and  you  do  right;  for  if  they  possess  even  in  the 
highest  degree  the  use  of  appearances,  yet  they  have  not 
the  faculty  of  understanding  the  use  of  appearances ;  and 
there  is  good  reason  for  this,  for  they  exist  for  the  purpose 
of  serving  others,  and  they  exercise  no  superiority.  For 
the  ass,  I  suppose,  does  not  exist  for  any  superiority  over 
others.  No ;  but  because  we  had  need  of  a  back  which  is 
able  to  bear  something ;  and  in  truth  we  had  need  also  of 
his  being  able  to  walk,  and  for  this  reason  he  received 
also  the  faculty  of  making  use  of  appearances,  for  other 

1  Schweighaeuser  observes  that  the  title  of  this  chapter  would  more 
correctly  he  6  ©e&s  Iv  fyup,  God  in  man.    There  is  no  better  chapter  in 
the  hook. 

2  Socrates  (Xenophpn,  Mem.  iv.  6,  8)  concludes  *  that  the  useful  ia 
good  to  him  to  whom  it  is  useful.' 

8  I  do  not  remember  that  Epictetus  has  attempted  any  other  descrip- 
tion of  the  nature  of  God.  He  has  done  more  wisely  than  some  who 
have  attempted  to  answer  a  question  which  cannot  he  answered.  Put 
gee  ii.  14, 11-13. 

4  Compare  Cicero,  de  Offic.  i.  27. 


EPICTETUS.  119 

wise  he  would  not  have  been  able  to  walk.  And  here  then 
the  matter  stopped.  For  if  he  had  also  received  the  faculty 
of  comprehending  the  use  of  appearances,  it  is  plain  that 
consistently  with  reason  he  would  not  then  have  been. 
subjected  to  us,  nor  would  ho  have  done  us  these  serviceSj 
but  he  would  have  been  equal  to  us  and  like  to  us. 

Will  you  not  then  seek  the  nature  of  good  in  the 
rational  animal  ?  for  if  it  is  not  there,  you  will  not  choose 
to  say  that  it  exists  in  any  other  thing  (plant  or  animal). 
What  then  ?  are  not  plants  and  animals  also  the  works  of 
God?  They  are;  but  they  are  not  superior  things,  nor 
yet  parts  of  the  Gods.  But  you  are  a  superior  thing;  you 
are  a  portion  separated  from  the  deity  ;  you  have  in  your- 
self a  certain  portion  of  him.  Why  then  are  you  ignorant 
of  your  own  noble  descent?5  Why  do  you  not  know 
whence  you  came?  will  you  not  remember  when  you  are- 
eating,  who  you  are  who  eat  and  whom  you  feed?  When 
you  aro  in  conjunction  with  a  woman,  will  you  not  re- 
member who  you  are  who  do  this  thing  ?  When  you  ara 
in  social  intercourse,  when  you  are  exercising  yourself, 
when  you  are  engaged  in  discussion,  know  you  not  that, 
you  are  nourishing  a  god,  that  you  are  exercising  a  god  ? 
Wretch,  you  aro  carrying  about  a  god  with  you,  and  you 
know  it  not.6  Do  you  think  that  I  mean  some  God  of 

5  Noble  descent.    See  i.  o.  9. 

The  doctrine  that  God  is  in  man  is  an  old  doctrine.  Euripides  saici 
(Apud  Theon.  Soph.  Progym.)  :  — 

'O   vovs   yap   fyulj/   IffTiv  Iv   fKdffTcp   Sets. 


The  doctrine  became  a  common  place  of  the  poets  (Ovid,  Fast.  vi.)y 

*  Est  deus  in  nob  is,  agitante  cale^cimus  illo  ;  '  and  Horace,  Sat.  ii.  6,  79, 

*  Atque  affigit  humo  divinae  particulam  aurae.'    See  i.  14,  note  4. 

6  Mrs.  Carter  has  a  note  here.  4  See  1  Cor.  vi.  19,  2  Cor.  vi.  16, 
2  Tim.  i.  14,  1  John  iii.  ^jv,  12,  13.  But  though  the  simple  expression 
of  carrying  God  about  wUh  us  may  seem  to  have  some  nearly  parallel 
to  it  in  the  New  Testament,  yet  those  represent  the  Almighty  in  a  more 
venerable  manner,  as  taking  the  hearts  of  good  men  for  a  temple  to 
dwell  in.  But  the  other  expressions  here  of  feeding  and  exercising 
God,  and  the  whole  of  the  paragraph,  and  indeed  of  the  Stoic  system, 
show  the  real  sense  of  even  its  more  decent  phrases  to  be  vastly 
differen«  from  that  of  Scripture.' 

The  passage  in  1  Cor.  vi.  19  is,  'What?  know  ye  not  that  your 
body  is  the  temple  of  the  Holy  Ghost  which  is  in  you,  which  ye  have 
of  God  and  ye  are  not  your  own  '  ?  This  follows  v.  18,  which  is  an 
exhortation  to  '  flee  fornication.'  The  passage  iii  2  Cor.  vi.  16  is  'And 


120  EPICTETUS. 


or  of  gold,  and  external?    You  carry  him  within 
yourself,  and  you  perceive  not  that  you  are  polluting  him 

what  agreement  hath  the  temple  of  God  with  idols  ?  for  ye  are  the 
temple  of  the  living  God;  as  God  hath  said,  I  will  dwell  in  them, 
and  walk  in  them/  etc.  Mrs.  Carter  has  not  correctly  stated  the  sense 
of  these  two  passages. 

It  is  certain  that  Epictetus  knew  nothing  of  the  writers  of  the 
Epistles  in  the  New  Testament  ;  but  whence  did  these  writers  learn 
such  forms  of  expression  as  we  rind  in  the  passages  cited  by  Mrs. 
Carter  ?  1  believe  that  they  drew  them  from  the  Stoic  philosophers  who 
wrote  before  Epictetus  and  that  they  applied  them  to  the  new  religion 
which  they  were  teaching.  The  teaching  of  Paul  and  of  Epictetus 
does  not  differ  :  the  spirit  of  God  is  in  man. 

Swedonborg  says,  '  In  these  two  faculties  (rationality  and  liberty) 
the  Lord  resides  witli  every  man,  whether  ho  be  good  or  evil,  they  being 
the  Lord's  mansions  in  the  human  race.  But  the  mansion  of  the  Lord 
is  nearer  with  a  man,  in  proportion  as  the  man  opens  the  superior 
degrees  by  these  faculties  ;  for  by  the  opening  thereof  he  comes  into 
superior  degrees  of  love  and  wisdom,  and  consequently  nearer  to  the 
Lord.  Hence  it  may  appear  that  as  these  degrees  are  opened,  so  a  man 
is  in  the  Lord  and  the  Lord  in  him/  Swedenborg,  Angelic  Wisdom, 
240.  Again,  *  the  faculty  of  thinking  rationally,  viewed  in  itself,  is  not 
man's,  but  God's  in  man.' 

I  am  not  quite  sure  in  what  sense  the  administration  of  the  Eucharist 
ought  to  be  understood  in  the  church  of  England  service.  Some  English 
divines  formerly  understood,  and  perhaps  some  now  understand,  the 
ceremony  as  a  commemoration  of  the  blood  of  Christ  shed  for  us  and  of 
his  body  which  was  broken  ;  as  we  see  in  T.  Burnet's  Posthumous  work 
(de  Fide  et  Officiis  Chribtianorum,  p.  SO).  It  was  a  commemoration  of 
the  last  supper  of  Jesus  and  the  Apostles.  But  this  does  not  appear  to 
be  the  sense  in  which  the  ceremony  is  now  understood  by  some  priests 
and  by  some  members  of  the  church  of  England,  whose  notions  approach 
near  to  the  doctrine  of  the  Catholic  mass.  Nor  does  it  appear  to  be  the 
sense  of  the  prayer  made  before  delivering  the  bread  and  wine  to  the 
Communicants,  for  the  prayer  is  *  Grant  us,  gracious  Lord,  so  to  eat  the 
flesh  of  thy  dear  son  Jesus  Christ  and  to  drink  his  blood  that  our  sinful 
bodies  may  be  made  clean  by  his  body  and  our  souls  washed  through 
his  most  precious  blood  and  that  we  may  evermore  dwell  in  him  and  he 
in  us.'  This  is  a  different  thing  from  Epictetus'  notion  of  God  heing  in 
man,  and  albo  different,  as  I  understand  it,  from  the  notion  contained  in 
the  two  passages  of  Paul  ;  for  it  is  there  said  generally  that  the  Holy 
Ghost  is  in  man  or  God  in  man,  not  that  God  is  in  man  by  virtue  of  a 
particular  ceremony.  It  should  not  be  omittx-d  that  there  is  after  the 
end  of  the  Communion  service  an  admonition  that  the  sacramental  bread 
and  wine  remain  what  they  were,  *  and  that  the  natural  body  and  blood 
of  our  Saviour  Christ  are  in  heaven  and  not  hero  ;  it  being  against  the 
truth  of  Christ's  natural  body  to  be  at  one  time  in  more  places  than  one/ 
It  was  affirmed  ^by  the  Reformers  and  the  best  writers  of  the  English 
church  that  the  presence  of  Christ  in  the  Eucharist  is  a  spiritual 


EPIOTETUS.  121 

by  impure  thoughts  and  dirty  deeds.    And  if  an  image  of 
God  were  present,  you  would  not  dare  to  do  any  of  the 
things  which  you  are  doing:  but  when  God  himself  is 
present  withia  and  sees  all  and  hears  all,  you  are  not 
ashamed  of  thinking  such  things  and  doing  such  things, 
ignorant  as  you  are  of  your  own  nature  and  subject  to  the 
anger  of  God.     Then  why  do  we  fear  when  we  are  send- 
ing a  young  man  from  the  school  into  active  life,  lest  he 
should   do    anything   improperly,   eat    improperly,   have 
improper  intercourse  with  women;   and  lest  the  rags  in 
which  he  is  wrapped  should  debase  him,  lest  fine  garments 
should  make  him  proud?    This  youth  (if  he  acts  thus) 
does  not  know  his  own  God  :  he  knows  not  with  whom  ho 
sets  out  (into  the  world).     But  can  we  endure  when  he 
says  '  I  wish  I  had  you  (God)  with  me/    Have  you  not 
God  with  you  ?  and  do  you  seek  for  any  other,  when  you 
have  him  ?  or  will  God  tell  you  any  thing  else  than  this  ? 
If  you  were  a  statue  of  Phidias,  either  Athena  or  Zeus,  you 
would  think  both  of  yourself  and  of  the  artist,  and  if  you 
had  any  understanding  (power  of  perception)  you  would 
try  to  do  nothing  unworthy  of  him  who  made  you  or  of 
yourself,  and  try  not  to  appear  in  an  unbecoming  dress 
(attitude)  to  those  who  look  on  you.    But  now  because 
Zeus  has  made  you,  for  this  reason  do  you  care  not  how  you 
shall  appear?    And  yet  is  the  artist  (in  the  one  case)  like 
the  artist  in  the  other  ?  or  the  work  in  the  one  case  like 
the  other?    And  what  work  of  an  artist,  for  instance,  has 
in  itself  the  faculties,  which  the  artist  shows  in  making 
it  ?    Is  it  not  marble  or  bronze,  or  gold  or  ivory  ?  and  the 
Athena  of  Phidias  when  she  has  once  extended  the  hand 
ari$  received  in  it  the  figure  of  Victory7  stands  in  that 

presence,  and  in  this  opinion  they  followed  Calvin  and  the  Swiss  divines : 
and  yet  in  the  Prayer  book  we  have  the  language  that  I  have  quoted ; 
and  even  Calvin,  who  only  maintained  a  spiritual  presence,  said,  *  that 
the  verity  is  nevertheless  joined  to  the  signs,  and  that  in  the  sacrament 
we  have  "true  Communion  in  Christ's  body  and  blood'"  (Con- 
temporary Keview,  p.  464,  August  1874).  What  would  Epictetus  have 
thought  of  the  subtleties  of  our  days  ? 

1  The  Athena  of  Phidias  was  in  the  Parthenon  on  the  Athenian 
Acropolis,  a  colossnl  chryselephantine  statue,  that  is,  a  frame  work  of 
wood,  covered  with  ivory  and  gold  (Pausanias,  i.  24).  The  figure  of 


122  EPICTETUS. 

attitude  for  ever.  But  the  works  of  God  have  power  of 
motion,  they  breathe,  they  have  the  faculty  of  using  the 
appearances  of  things,  and  the  power  of  examining  them. 
Being  the  work  of  such  an  artist  do  you  dishonour  him  ? 
And  what  shall  I  say,  not  only  that  he  made  you,  but  also 
entrusted  you  to  yourself  and  made  you  a  deposit  to  your- 
self ?  Will  you  not  think  of  this  too,  but  do  you  also  dis- 
honour your  guardianship?  But  if  God  had  entrusted 
an  orphan  to  you,  would  you  thus  neglect  him?  He  has 
delivered  yourself  to  your  own  care,  and  says,  I  had  no 
one  fitter  to  intrust  him  to  than  yourself:  keep  him  for 
me  such  as  he  is  by  nature,  modest,  faithful,  erect,  unterri- 
fied,  free  from  passion  and  perturbation.  And  then  you 
do  not  keep  him  such. 

But  some  will  say,  whence  has  this  fellow  got  the 
arrogance  which  he  displays  and  these  supercilious 
looks? — I  have  not  yet  so  much  gravity  as  befits  a 
philosopher ;  for  I  do  not  yet  feel  confidence  in  what  I 
have  learned  and  in  what  I  have  assented  to :  I  still 
fear  my  own  weakness.  Let  me  get  confidence  and 
then  you  shall  see  a  countenance  such  as  I  ought  to  have 
and  an  attitude  such  as  I  ought  to  have :  then  I  will 
show  to  you  the  statue,  when  it  is  perfected,  when  it 
is  polished.  What  do  you  expect  ?  a  supercilious  coun- 
tenance? Does  the  Zeus  at  Olympia8  lift  up  his  brow? 
No,  his  look  is  fixed  as  becomes  him  who  is  ready  to 
say 

Irrevocable  is  my  word  and  shall  not  fail. — Iliad,  i.  526. 

Such  will  I  show  myself  to  you,  faithful,  modest,  noble, 
free  from  perturbation — What,  and  immortal  too,  exempt 
from  old  age,  and  from  sickness  ?  No,  but  dying  as  becomes 
a  god,  sickening  as  becomes  a  god.  This  power  I  possess  ; 
this  I  can  do.  But  the  rest  I  do  not  possess,  nor  can  I  do. 
I  will  show  the  nerves  (strength)  of  a  philosopher.  What 

Victory  stood  on  the  hand  of  the  goddess,  as  we  frequently  see  in  coins. 
See.  i.  6,  23,  and  the  note  in  Schweig.*s  edition.  Cicero,  de  Natura 
Deornm,  iii.  34. 

8  The  great  statue  at  Olympia  was  the  work  of  Phidias  (Pausanias, 
v.  11).  It  was  a  seated  colossal  chryselephantine  statue,  and  held  a 
Victory  in  the  right  hand. 


EPIOTETUS.  123 

nerves*  are  these?     A   desire  never    disappointed,    an 
aversion10  which  never  falls  on  that  which   it  would 


avoid,  a  proper  pursuit  (bpjuLrjv),  a  diligent  purpose,  an 
assent  which  is  not  rash.    These  you  shall  see. 


CHAPTEE  IX. 

THAT  WHEN"  WE  CANNOT  FULFIL  THAT  WHfCH  THE  CHARACTER 
OF  A  MAN  PROMISES,  WE  ASSUME  THE  CHARACTER  OF  A 
PHILOSOPHER. 

It  is  no  common  (easy)  thing  to  do  this  only,  to  fulfil  the 
promise  of  a  man's  nature.  For  what  is  a  man?  The 
answer  is,  a  rational  and  mortal  being.  Then  by  the 
rational  faculty  from  whom  are  we  separated?1  From 
wild  beasts.  And  from  what  others  ?  From  sheep  and 
like  animals.  Take  care  then  to  do  nothing  like  a  wild 
beast;  but  if  you  do,  you  have  lost  the  character  of 
a  man ;  you  have  not  fulfilled  your  promise.  See  that 
you  do  nothing  like  a  sheep  ;  but  if  you  do,  in  this  case 
also  the  man  is  lost.  What  then  do  we  do  as  sheep? 
When  we  act  gluttonously,  when  we  act  lewdly,  when  w© 
act  rashly,  filthily,  inconsiderately,  to  what  have  wo 
declined  ?  To  sheep.  What  have  we  lost  ?  The  rational 
faculty.  When  we  act  contentiously  and  harmfully  and 
passionately,  and  violently,  to  what  have  we  declined? 
To  wild  beasts.  Consequently  some  of  us  are  great  wild 
beasts,  and  others  little  beasts,  of  a  bad  disposition  and 

9  An  allusion  to  the  combatants  in  the  public  exercises,  who  used  to 
show  their  shoulders,  muscles  and  sinews  us  a  proof  of  their  strength. 
See  i.  4,  ii.  18,  iii.  22  (Mrs.  Carter). 

10  HKK\UTIV.    See  Book  iii.  c.  2. 

1  *  The  abuse  of  the  faculties,  which  are  proper  to  man,  called  ration- 
ality and  liberty,  is  the  origin  of  evil.  By  rationality  is  meant  the 
faculty  of  understanding  truths  and  thence  falses,  and  goods  and  then 
evils ;  and  by  liberty  is  meant  the  faculty  of  thinking,  willing  and 
acting  freely— and  these  faculties  distinguish  man  from  beasts.* 
Swedenborg,  Angelic  Wisdom,  264  and  also  210.  See  Epictetus,  ii.  c.  8, 


124:  EPICTETUS. 

etnall,  wlience  we  may  say,  Let  me  be  eaten  by  a  lion.1 
But  in  all  these  ways  the  promise  of  a  man  acting  as  a 
man  is  destroyed.  For  when  is  a  conjunctive  (complex) 
proposition  maintained?3  When  it  fulfils  what  its  nature 
promises ;  so  that  the  preservation  of  a  complex  proposi- 
tion is  when  it  is  a  conjunction  of  truths.  When  is  a 
disjunctive  maintained  ?  When  it  fulfils  what  it  promises. 
When  are  flutes,  a  lyre,  a  horse,  a  dog,  preserved?  (when 
they  severally  keep  their  promise).  What  is  the  wonder 
then  if  man  also  in  like  manner  is  preserved,  and  in  like 
manner  is  lost  ?  Each  man  is  improved  and  preserved  by 
corresponding  acts,  the  carpenter  by  acts  of  carpentry, 
the  grammarian  by  acts  of  grammar.  But  if  a  man 
accustoms  himself  to  write  ungrammatically,  of  necessity 
his  art  will  be  corrupted  and  destroyed.  Thus  modest 
actions  preserve  the  modest  man,  and  immodest  actions 
destroy  him :  and  actions  of  fidelity  preserve  the  faithful 
man,  and  the  contrary  actions  destroy  him.  And  on  the 
other  hand  contrary  actions  strengthen  contrary  charac- 
ters :  shamelessness  strengthens  the  shameless  man, 
faithlessness  the  faithless  man,  abusive  words  the  abusive 
man,  anger  the  man  of  an  angry  temper,  and  unequal 
receiving  and  giving  make  the  avaricious  man  more 
avaricious. 

For  this  reason  philosophers  admonish  us  not  to  be 
satisfied  with  learning  only,  but  also  to  add  study,  and 
then  practice.4  For  we  have  long  been  accustomed  to  do 

2  This  seems  to  be  a  proverb.    If  I  am  eaten,  let  me  be  eaten  by  the 
nobler  animal. 

3  A   conjunctive  or  complex  (ffv^T^irK^y^vov)  axiom  or  lemma. 
Gellius  (xvi.  8)  gives  an  example :  *  P.  Scipio,  the  son  of  Paulus,  was 
both  twice  consul  and  triumphed,  and  exercised  the  censorship  and  was 
the  colleague  of  L.  Mummius  in  his  censorship/    GelUus  adds,  'hi 
every  conjunctive  if  there  is  one  falsehood,  though  the  other  parts  are 
true,  the  whole  is  said  to  be  false/    For  the  whole  is  proposed  as  true  : 
therefore  if  one  part  is  false,  the  whole  is  not  true.    The  disjunctive 
(Sie&vyfjLfvov)  is  of  this  kind:    *  pleasure  is  either  bad  or  good,  or 
neither  good  nor  bad/ 

4  We  often  say  a  man  learns  a  particular  thing :  and  there  are  men 
who  profess  to  teach  certain  things,  such  as  a  language,  or  an  art ;  and 
they  mean  by  teaching  that  the  taught  shall  loam ;  and  Iteming  means 
that  they  shall  be  able  to  do  what  they  learn.    He  who  teaches  an  art 
professes  that  the  scholar  shall  be  able  to  practise  the  art,  the  art  of 


EPICTETUS.  125 

contrary  tilings,  and  we  put  in  practice  opinions  which 
are  contrary  to  true  opinions.  If  then  we  shall  not  also 
put  in  practice  right  opinions,  we  shall  be  nothing  more 
than  the  expositors  of  the  opinions  of  others.  For  now 
who  among  us  is  not  able  to  discourse  according  to  the 
rules  of  art  about  good  and  evil  things  (in  this  fashion)? 
That  of  things  some  are  good,  and  some  are  bad,  and  some 
are  indifferent :  the  good  then  are  virtues,  and  the  things 
which  participate  in  virtues;  and  the  bad  are  the  con- 
trary ;  and  the  indifferent  are  wealth,  health,  reputation. — 
Then,  if  in  the  midst  of  our  talk  there  should  happen  some 
greater  noise  than  usual,  or  some  of  those  who  are  present 
should  laugh  at  us,  we  are  disturbed.  Philosopher,  where 
are  the  things  which  you  were  talking  about?  Whence 
did  you  produce  and  utter  them.  From  the  lips,  and 
thence  only.  Why  then  do  you  corrupt  the  aids  provided 
by  others  ?  Why  do  you  treat  the  weightiest  matters  as  if 
you  were  playing  a  game  of  dice?  For  it  is  one  thing 
to  lay  up  bread  and  wine  as  in  a  storehouse,  and  another 
thing  to  eat.  That  which  has  been  eaten,  is  digested, 
distributed,  and  is  become  sinews,  flesh,  bones,  blood, 
healthy  colour,  healthy  breath.  Whatever  is  stored  up, 
when  you  choose  you  can  readily  take  and  show  it ;  but 
you  have  no  other  advantage  from  it  except  so  far  as  to 
appear  to  possess  it.  For  what  is  the  difference  between 
explaining  these  doctrines  and  those  of  men  who  have 
different  opinions?  Sit  down  now  and  explain  according 
to  the  rules  of  art  the  opinions  of  Epicurus,  and  perhaps 
you  will  explain  his  opinions  in  a  more  useful  manner 
than  Epicurus  himself.5  Why  then  do  you  call  yourself  a 

making  shoes  for  example,  or  other  useful  things.  There  are  men  who 
profess  to  teach  religion,  and  morality,  and  virtue  generally.  These 
men  may  tell  us  what  they  conceive  to  be  religion,  and  morality,  and 
virtue ;  and  those  who  are  said  to  be  taught  may  know  what  their 
teachers  have  told  them.  But  the  learning  of  religion,  and  of  morality 
and  of  virtue,  mean  that  the  learner  will  do  the  acts  of  religion  and  of 
morality  and  of  virtue ;  which  is  a  very  different  thing  from  knowing 
what  the  acts  of  religion,  of  morality,  and  of  virtue  are.  The  teacher's 
tenoning  is  in  fact  only  made  efficient  by  his  example,  by  his  doing  that 
which  he  teaches. 

5  4  He  is  not  a  Stoic  philosopher,  who  can  only  explain  in  a  subtle 
and  proper  manner  the  Stoic  principles:  for  the  same  person  can. 
explain  the  principles  of  Epicurus,  of  course  for  the  purpose  of  refuting 


126  EPICTETUS. 

Stoic?  Why  do  yotz  deceive  the  many?  Why  do  yon  set 
the  part  of  a  Jew,6  when  you  are  a  Greek?  Do  you  not 
see  now  (why)  each  is  called  a  Jew,  or  a  Syrian  or  an 
Egyptian  ?  and  when  we  see  a  man  inclining  to  two  sides, 
we  are  accustomed  to  say,  This  man  is  not  a  Jew,  but  he 
acts  as  one.  But  when  he  has  assumed  the  affects  of  one 
who  has  been  imbued  with  Jewish  doctrine  and  has 
adopted  that  sect,  then  he  is  in  fact  and  he  is  named  a 
Jew.7  Thus  we  too  being  falsely  imbued  (baptized),  are 
in  name  Jews,  but  in  fact  we  are  something  else.  Our 
affects  (feelings)  are  inconsistent  with  our  words ;  we  are 
far  from  practising  what  we  say,  and  that  of  which  we  are 
proud,  as  if  we  knew  it.  Thus  being  unable  to  fulfil  even 
what  the  character  of  a  man  promises,  we  even  add  to  it 
the  profession  of  a  philosopher,  which  is  as  heavy  a  burden, 
as  if  a  man  who  is  unable  to  bear  ten  pounds  should 
attempt  to  raise  the  stone  which  Ajax8  lifted. 

them,  and  perhaps  he  can  explain  them  hettcr  than  Epicurus  himself. 
Consequently  he  might  be  at  the  same  time  a  Stoic  and  an  Epicurean ; 
which  is  absurd.' — Schweig.  He  means  that  the  mere  knowledge 
of  Stoic  opinions  does  not  make  a  man  a  Stoic,  or  any  other 
philosopher.  A  man  must  according  to  Stoic  principles  practise  them 
in  order  to  be  a  Stoic  philosopher.  So  if  we  say  that  a  man  is  a 
religious  man,  he  must  do  the  acts  which  his  religion  teaches ;  for  it  is 
by  his  acts  only  that  we  can  know  him  to  be  a  religious  man.  What 
he  says  and  professes  may  be  false ;  and  no  man  knows  except  himself 
whether  his  words  and  professions  are  true.  The  uniformity,  regularity, 
and  consistency  of  his  acts  are  evidence  which  cannot  be  mistaken. 

6  It  has  been  suggested  that  Epictetus  confounded  under  the  name 
of  Jews  those  who  were  Jews  and  those  who  were  Christians.    We 
know  that  some  Jews  became  Christians.    But  see  Scbweig.'s  note  1 
and  note  7. 

7  It  is  possible,  as  I  have  said,  that  by  Jews  Epictetus  means 
Christians,  for  Christians  and  Jews  are  evidently  confounded  by  gome 
writers,  as  the  first  Christians  were  of  the  Jewish  nation.    In  book  iv. 
c^  7,  Epictetus  gives  the  name  of  Galilaeans  to  the  Jews.    The  term 
Galilaeans  points  to  the  country  of  the  great  teacher.    Paul  says 
(Romans,  ii.  28),  *  For  he  is  not  a  Jew,  which  is  one  outwardly — but  he 
is  a  Jew  which  is  one  inwardly/  etc.    His  remarks  (ii.  17-29)  on  the 
man  *  who  is  called  a  Jew,  and  rests  in  the  law  and  makes  his  boast 
of  God '  may  be  compared  with  what  Epictetus  says  of  a  man  who  is 
called  a  philosopher,  and  does  not  practise  that  which  he  professes. 

8  Seeii.24,  26;  Iliad,  vii.  264,  etc.;  Juvenal,  xv.  65, 

Nee  hunc  lapldem,  quales  et  Turnns  et  Ajax 
Vel  quo  Tydides  percussit  pondere  coxam 
Aeneae.— Upton. 


EPICTETUS.  127 

CHAPTER  X. 

HOW  WE  MAY  DISCOVER   THE  DUTIES  OF  LIFE  FROM  NAMES. 

CONSIDER  who  you  are.  In  the  first  place,  you  are  a  man ; l 
and  this  is  one  who  has  nothing  superior  to  the  faculty  of 
the  will,  but  all  other  things  subjected  to  it;  and  the 
faculty  itself  he  possesses  unenslaved  and  free  from  sub- 
jection. Consider  then  from  what  things  you  have  been 
separated  by  reakson.  You  have  been  separated  from  wild 
beasts  :  you  have  been  separated  from  domestic  animals 
(Trpo/ScxTwv).  Further,  you  are  a  citizen  of  the  world,2  and 
a  part  of  it,  not  one  of  the  subservient  (serving),  but  one 
of  the  principal  (ruling)  parts,  for  you  are  capable  of  com- 
prehending the  divine  administration  and  of  considering 
the  connexion  of  things.  What  then  does  the  character 
of  a  citizen  promise  (profess)  ?  To  hold  nothing  as  pro- 
fitable to  himself;  to  deliberate  about  nothing  as  if  he 
were  detached  from  the  community,  but  to  act  as  the 
hand  or  foot  would  do,  if  they  had  reason  and  understood 
the  constitution  of  nature,  for  they  would  never  put  them- 
selves in  motion  nor  desire  any  thing  otherwise  than  with 
reference  to  the  whole.  Therefore  the  philosophers  say 
well,  that  if  the  good  man  had  foreknowledge  of  what 
would  happen,  he  would  co-operate  towards  his  own  sick- 
ness and  death  and  mutilation,  since  he  knows  3  that  these 
tnings  are  assigned  to  him  according  to  the  universal 

1  Cicero  (do  Fin.  iv.  10) ;  Seneca,  Ep.  95. 

*  See  i.  9.  M.  Antoninus,  vi.  44 :  *  But  my  nature  is  rational  and 
social ;  and  my  city  and  country,  so  far  as  I  am  Antoninus,  is  Rome,  but 
so  far  as  I  am  a  man,  it  is  the  world.' 

I  have  hero  translated  irpo&druv  by  *  domestic  animals ;'  I  suppose 
that  tho  bovine  species,  and  sheep  and  goats  are  meant. 

3  This  may  appear  extravagant ;  but  it  is  possible  to  explain  it,  and 
even  to  assent  to  it.  If  a  man  believes  that  all  is  wisely  arranged  in 
the  course  of  human  events,  he  would  not  even  try  to  resist  that  which 
he  knows  it  is  appointed  for  him  to  suffer :  he  would  submit  and  lie 
would  endure.  If  Epictetus  means  that  the  man  would  actively  pro- 
mote the  end  or  purpose  which  he  foreknew,  in  order  that  his  acts  may 
be  consistent  with  what  he  foreknows  and  with  his  duty,  perhaps  the 
philosopher's  saying  is  too  hard  to  deal  with ;  and  as  it  rests  on  an 
impossible  assumption  of  foreknowledge,  we  may  be  here  wiser  than 
the  philosophers,  if  we  say  no  more  about  it.  Compare  Seneca,  da 
Frovid.  c.  5. 


128  EPICTETUS. 

arrangement,  and  tliat  the  whole  is  superior  to  the  part, 
and  the  state  to  the  citizen.4  But  now  because  we  do  not 
know  the  future,  it  is  our  duty  to  stick  to  the  things 
which  are  in  their  nature  more  suitable  for  our  choice,  for 
we  were  made  among  other  things  for  this. 

After  this  remember  that  you  are  a  son.  What  does 
this  character  promise  ?  To  consider  that  every  thing 
which  is  the  son's  belongs  to  the  father,  to  obey  him  in 
all  things,  never  to  blame  him  to  another,  nor  to  say  or 
do  any  thing  which  does  him  injury,  to  yield  to  him  in  all 
things  and  give  way,  co-operating  with  him  as  far  as  you 
can.  After  this  know  that  you  are  a  brother  also,  and 
that  to  this  character  it  is  due  to  make  concessions ;  to  be 
easily  persuaded,  to  speak  good  of  your  brother,  never  to 
claim  in  opposition  to  him  any  of  the  things  which  are 
independent  of  the  will,  but  readily  to  give  them  up,  that 
you  may  have  the  larger  share  in  what  is  dependent  ou 
the  will.  For  see  what  a  thing  it  is,  in  place  of  a  lettuce, 
if  it  should  so  happen,  or  a  seat,  to  gain  for  yourself 
goodness  of  disposition.  How  great  is  the  advantage.5 

Next  to  this,  if  you  are  a  senator  of  any  state,  remember 
that  you  are  a  senator  :  if  a  youth,  that  you  are  a  youth : 
if  an  old  man,  that  you  are  an  old  man ;  for  each  of  such 
names,  if  it  conies  to  be  examined,  marks  out  the  proper 
duties.  But  if  you  go  and  blame  your  brother,  I  say  to 
you,  You  have  forgotten  who  you  are  and  what  is  your 
name.  In  the  next  place,  if  you  were  a  smith  and  made 
a  wrong  use  of  the  hammer,  you  would  have  forgotten  the 
smith  ;  and  if  you  have  forgotten  the  brother  and  instead 
of  a  brother  have  become  an  enemy,  would  you  appear  not 
to  have  changed  one  thing  for  another  in  that  case  ?  And 
if  instead  of  a  man,  who  is  a  tame  animal  and  social,  you 
are  become  a  mischievous  wild  beast,  treacherous,  and 
biting,  have  you  lost  nothing  ?  But,  (I  suppose)  you  must 
lose  a  bit  of  money  that  you  may  suffer  damage  ?  And 
does  the  loss  of  nothing  else  do  a  man  damage  ?  If  you 

4  Antoninus,  vi.  42 :  *  We  are  all  working  together  to  one  end,  some 
with  knowledge  and  design,  and  others  without  knowing  what 
they  do.' 

*  A  lettuce  is  an  example  of  the  most  trifling  thing.  A  seat 
probably  means  a  seat  of  superiority,  a  magistrate's  seat,  a  Roman 
gella  curulia. 


EPICTETTJS.  129 

had  lost  the  art  of  grammar  or  music,  would  you  think 
the  loss  of  it  a  damage  ?  and  if  you  shall  lose  modesty, 
moderation  (jfaracrroX^v)  and  gentleness,  do  you  think  the 
loss  nothing  ?  And  yet  the  things  first  mentioned  are  lost 
by  some  cause  external  and  independent  of  the  will,  and 
the  second  by  our  own  fault ;  and  as  to  the  first  neither  to 
have  them  nor  to  lose  them  is  shameful ;  but  as  to  the 
second,  not  to  have  them  arid  to  lose  them  is  shameful  and 
anatter  of  reproach  and  a  misfortune.  What  does  the 
pathic  lose  ?  He  loses  the  (character  of)  man.  What 
does  ho  lose  who  makes  the  pathic  what  he  is  ?  Many 
other  things ;  and  he  also  loses  the  man  no  less  than  the 
other.  What  does  he  lose  who  commits  adultery  ?  He 
loses  the  (character  of  the)  modest,  the  temperate,  the 
decent,  the  citizen,  the  neighbour.  What  does  he  lose  who 
is  angry?  Something  else.  What  does  the  coward  lose? 
Something  else.  No  man  is  bad  without  suffering  some 
loss  and  damage.  If  then  you  look  for  the  damage  in 
the  loss  of  money  only,  all  these  men  receive  no  harm 
or  damage ;  it  may  be,  they  have  even  profit  and  gain, 
when  they  acquire  a  bit  of  money  by  any  of  these  deeds. 
But  consider  that  if  you  refer  every  thing  to  a  small  coin, 
not  even  he  who  loses  his  nose  is  in  your  opinion  damaged. 
Yes,  you  say,  for  he  is  mutilated  in  his  body.  Well ;  but 
does  he  who  has  lost  his  smell  only  lose  nothing  ?  Is  there 
then  no  energy  of  the  soul  which  is  an  advantage  to  him 
who  possesses  it,  and  a  damage  to  him  who  has  lost  it  ? — 
Tell  me  what  sort  (of  energy)  you  mean. — Have  we  not  a 
natural  modesty? — We  have. — Does  he  who  loses  this 
sustain  no  damage?  is  he  deprived  of  nothing,  does  he  part 
with  nothing  of  the  things  which  belong  to  him  ?  Have 
we  not  naturally  fidelity  ?  natural  affection,  a  natural  dis- 
position to  help  others,  a  natural  disposition  to  forbearance  ? 
The  man  then  who  allows  himself  to  be  damaged  in  these 
matters,  can  he  be  free  from  harm  and  uninjured6  What 
then?  shall  I  not  hurt  him,  who  has  hurt  ine?7  In  the 

•  OUTOS  #  &j8\aj8fc.    See  Schweig.'s  note. 

*  Socrates.   We  must  by  no  means  then  do  an  act  of  injustice.   Crito. 
Certainly  not.    Socrates.  Nor  yet  when  you  are  wronged  must  you  do 
•wrong  in  return,  as  most  people  think,  since  you  must  in  no  way  do  an 
Unjust  act.    Plato,  Crito,  o.  10. 

K 


130  EPICTETUS. 

first  place  consider  what  hurt  (/?Aa/:fy)  is,  and  remember 
what  you  have  heard  from  the  philosophers.  For  if  the 
good  consists  in  the  will  (purpose,  intention,  TrpocupcW), 
and  the  evil  also  in  the  will,8  see  if  what  you  say  is 
not  this :  What  tben,  since  that  man  has  hurt  himself 
by  doing  an  unjust  act  to  me,  shall  I  not  hurt  myself 
by  doing  some  unjust  act  to  him?  Why  do  we  not 
imagine  to  ourselves  (mentally  think  of)  something  of 
this  kind  ?  But  where  there  is  any  detriment  to  the  body 
or  to  our  possession,  there  is  harm  there ;  and  where  the 
same  thing  happens  to  the  faculty  of  the  will,  there  is 
(you  suppose)  no  harm ;  for  he  who  has  been  deceived  or 
he  who  has  done  an  unjust  act  neither  suffers  in  the  head 
nor  in  the  eye  nor  in  the  hip,  nor  does  he  lose  his  estate ; 
and  we  wish  for  nothing  else  than  (security  to)  these 
things.  But  whether  we  shall  have  the  will  modest  and 
faithful  or  shameless  and  faithless,  we  care  not  the  least, 
except  only  in  the  school  so  far  as  a  few  words  are  con- 
cerned. Therefore  our  proficiency  is  limited  to  these  few 
words ;  but  beyond  them  it  does  not  exist  even  in  the 
slightest  degree.9 


CHAPTER  XI. 

WHAT  THE  BEGINNING  OF  PHILOSOPHY   IS. 

THE  beginning  of  philosophy  to  him  at  least  who  enters 
on  it  in  the  right  way  and  by  the  door,  is  a  consciousness 
of  his  own  weakness  and  inability  about  necessary  things. 
For  we  come  into  the  world  with  no  natural  notion  of  a 
right  angled  triangle,  or  of  a  diesis  (a  quarter  tone),  or  of 
a  half  tone ;  but  we  learn  each  of  these  things  by  a  cer- 
tain transmission  according  to  art;  and  for  this  reason 

8  See  the  beginning  of  ii.  16. 

•  The  same  remark  will  apply  to  most  dissertations  spoken  or  written 
on  moral  subjects  :  they  are  exercises  of  skill  for  him  who  delivers  or 
writes  them,  or  matter  for  criticism  and  perhaps  a  way  of  spending  an 
idle  hour  for  him  who  listens ;  and  that  is  all.  Epictetus  blames  our 
indolence  and  indifference  as  to  acts,  and  the  trifling  of  the  schools  of 
philosophy  in  disputation. 


EP1CTETUS.  131 

fcliose  who  do  not  know  them,  do  not  think  that  they  know 
them.  But  as  to  good  and  evil,  and  beautiful  and  ugly, 
and  becoming  and  unbecoming,  and  happiness  and  mis- 
fortune, and  proper  and  improper,  and  what  we  ought  to 
do  and  what  we  ought  not  to  do,  who  ever  came  into  the 
world  without  having  an  innate  idea  of  them  ?  Where- 
fore we  all  use  these  names,  and  wo  endeavour  to  fit  the 
preconceptions1  to  the  several  cases  (things)  thus  :  he  has 
done  well,  he  has  not  done  well ;  he  has  done  as  he  ought, 
not  as  he  ought;  he  has  been  unfortunate,  he  has  been 
fortunate;  he  is  unjust,  he  is  just:  who  does  not  uso 
these  names  ?  who  among  us  defers  the  use  of  them  till  he 
has  learned  them,  as  he  defers  the  use  of  the  words  about 
lines  (geometrical  figures)  or  sounds  ?  And  the  cause  of 
this  is  that  we  come  into  the  world  already  taught  as  it 
were  by  nature  some  things  on  this  matter  (TOTTW),  and 
proceeding  from  these  we  have  added  to  them  self-conceit 
(ofycra').2  For  why,  a  man  says,  do  I  not  know  the  beau- 
tiful and  the  ugly?  Have  I  not  the  notion  of  it?  You 
have.  Do  I  not  adapt  it  to  particulars  ?  You  do.  Do  I 
not  then  adapt  it  properly  ?  In  that  lies  the  whole  ques- 
tion; and  conceit  is  added  here.  For  beginning  from 
these  things  which  are  admitted  men  proceed  to  that 
which  is  matter  of  dispute  by  means  of  unsuitable  adapta- 
tion ;  for  if  they  possessed  this  power  of  adaptation  in 
addition  to  those  things,  what  would  hinder  them  from 
being  perfect?  But  now  since  you  think  that  you  pro- 
perly adapt  the  preconceptions  to  the  particulars,  tell  me 
whence  you  derive  this  (assume  that  you  do  so).  Because 
I  think  so.  But  it  does  not  seem  so  to  another,  and  he 
thinks  that  he  also  makes  a  proper  adaptation ;  or  does  he 
not  think  so  ?  He  does  think  so.  Is  it  possible  then  that 
both  of  you  can  properly  apply  the  preconceptions  to 
things  about  which  you  have  contrary  opinions?  It  is 
not  possible.  Can  you  then  show  us  anything  better 
towards  adapting  the  preconceptions  beyond  your  thinking 
that  you  do?  Does  the  madman  do  any  other  things  than 
the  things  which  seem  to  him.  right?  Is  then  this 
criterion  sufficient  for  him  also  ?  It  is  not  sufficient. 

1  See  i.  o.  2. 

f  See  Cicero's  use  of  •  opinatio '  (Tusc.  iv.  11). 

K  2 


132  EPICTETUS 

Come  then  to  something  which  is  superior  to  seeming 
(jov  SoKctv).  What  is  this  ? 

Observe,  this  is  the  beginning  of  jphilosoplry,  a  percep- 
tion of  the  disagreement  of  men  with  one  another,  and 
an  inquiry  into  the  cause  of  the  disagreement,  and  a 
condemnation  and  distrust  of  that  which  only  '  seems,' 
and  a  certain  investigation  of  that  which  *  seems '  whether 
it '  seems '  rightly,  and  a  discovery  of  some  rule  (/cavoVos), 
as  we  have  discovered  a  balance  in  the  determination  of 
weights,  and  a  carpenter's  rule  (or  square)  in  the  case  of 
straight  and  crooked  things. — This  is  the  beginning  of 
philosophy.  Must  we  say  that  all  things  are  right  which 
seem  so  to  all  ?3  And  how  is  it  possible  that  contradictions 
can  be  right  ? — Not  all  then,  but  all  which  seem  to  us  to  be 
right. — How  more  to  you  than  those  which  seem  right  to  the 
Syrians  ?  why  more  than  what  seem  right  to  the  Egyptians  ? 
why  more  than  what  seems  right  to  me  or  to  any  other  man  ? 
Not  at  all  more.  What  then  '  seems '  to  every  man  is  not 
sufficient  for  determining  what '  is ; '  for  neither  in  the  case 
of  weights  or  measures  are  we  satisfied  with  the  bare  ap- 
pearance, but  in  each  case  we  have  discovered  a  certain 
rule.  In  this  matter  then  is  there  no  rule  superior  to 
what  'seems'?  And  how  is  it  possible  that  the  most 
necessary  things  among  men  should  have  no  sign  (mark), 
and  be  incapable  of  being  discovered?  There  is  then 
some  rule.  And  why  then  do  we  not  seek  the  rule  and 
discover  it,  and  afterwards  use  it  without  varying  from  it, 
not  even  stretching  out  the  finger  without  it  ?  4  For  this, 
I  think,  is  that  which  when  it  is  discovered  cures  of  their 
madness  those  who  use  mere  '  seeming '  as  a  measure,  and 
misuse  it;  so  that  for  the  future  proceeding  from  certain 
things  (principles)  known  and  made  clear  we  may  use  in 
the  case  of  particular  things  the  preconceptions  which  are 
distinctly  fixed. 

What  is  the  matter  presented  to  us  about  which  we  are 
inquiring?  Pleasure  (for  example).  Subject  it  to  the 
rule,  throw  it  into  the  balance.  Ought  the  good  to  be 

•    s  See  Schweig.'B  note, 

4  Doing  nothing  without  the  rule.  This  is  a  Greek  proverb,  used 
also  by  Persius,  Sat.  v.  119;  compare  Cicero,  de  Fin.  iii.  17;  and 
Antoninus,  ii  Id 


EPICTETUS.  133 

Bueh  a  thing  that  it  is  fit  that  we  have  confidence  in  it  ? 
Yes.  And  in  which  we  ought  to  confide  ?  It  ought  to 
be.  Is  it  fit  to  trust  to  any  thing  which  is  insecure? 
No.  Is  then  pleasure  any  thing  secure?  No.  Take  it 
then  &nd  throw  it  out  of  the  scale,  and  drive  it  far  away 
from  the  place  of  good  things.  But  if  you  are  not  sharp- 
sighted,  and  one  balance  is  not  enough  for  you,  bring 
another.  Is  it  fit  to  be  elated  over  what  is  good  ?  Yes. 
Is  it  proper  then  to  be  elated  over  present  pleasure?  See 
that  you  do  not  say  that  it  is  proper ;  but  if  you  do,  I 
shall  then  not  think  you  worthy  even  of  the  balance.5 
Thus  things  are  tested  and  weighed  when  the  rules  are 
ready.  And  to  philosophize  is  this,  to  examine  and  con- 
firm the  rules ;  and  then  to  use  them  when  they  are 
known  is  the  act  of  a  wise  and  good  man.6 


CHAPTER  XII. 

OF  DISPUTATION   OR  DISCUSSION. 

WHAT  things  a  man  must  learn  in  order  to  be  able  to 
apply  the  art  of  disputation,  has  been  accurately  shown  by 
our  philosophers  (the  Stoics)  ;  but  with  respect  to  the 
proper  use  of  the  things,  we  are  entirely  without  practice. 
Only  give  to  any  of  us,  whom  you  please,  an  illiterate  man 
to  discuss  with,  and  he  can  not  discover  how  to  deal  with 
the  man.  But  when  he  has  moved  the  man  a  little,  if  he 
answers  beside  the  purpose,  he  does  not  know  how  to  treat 
him,  but  he  then  either  abuses  or  ridicules  him,  and  says, 
He  is  an  illiterate  man ;  it  is  not  possible  to  do  any  thing 


*  That  is,  so  far  shall  I  consider  you  from  heing  able  \ 
of  things  without  a  balance  that  I  shall  understand  that  not  even  with 
the  aid  of  a  balance  can  you  do  it,  that  you  cannot  even  use  a  balance, 
and  consequently  that  you  are  not  worth  a  single  word  from  me. 
Schweig. 

6  This  is  a  just  conclusion.  We  must  fix  the  canons  or  rules  by 
which  things  are  tried ;  and  then  the  rules  may  be  applied  by  the  wise 
and  good  to  all  cases. 


134  .  EPICTETUS. 

•with  him.  Now  a  guide,  when  he  has  found  a  man  out  of 
the  road  leads  him  into  the  right  way  :  he  does  not  ridi- 
cule or  abuse  him  and  then  leave  him.  Do  you  also  show 
the  illiterate  man  the  truth,  and  you  will  see  that  he  fel- 
lows. But  so  long  as  you  do  not  show  him  the  truth,  do 
not  ridicule  him,  but  rather  feel  your  own  incapacity. 

How  then  did  Socrates  act?  He  used  to  compel  his 
adversary  in  disputation  to  bear  testimony  to  him,  and 
he  wanted  no  other  witness.1  Therefore  he  could  say,  *  I 
care  not  for  other  witnesses,  but  I  am  always  satisfied 
with  the  evidence  (testimony)  of  my  adversary,  and  I  do 
not  ask  the  opinion  of  others,  but  only  the  opinion  of  him 
who  is  disputing  with  me/  For  he  used  to  make  the 
conclusions  drawn  from  natural  notions2  so  plain  that 
every  man  saw  the  contradiction  (if  it  existed)  and  with- 
drew from  it  (thus) :  Does  the  envious3  man  rejoice  ?  By 
no  means,  but  he  is  rather  pained.4  Well,  Do  you  think 
that  envy  is  pain  over  evils  ?  and  what  envy  is  there  of 
evils  ?  Therefore  he  made  his  adversary  say  that  envy  is 
pain  over  good  things.  Well  then,  would  any  man  envy 
those  who  are  nothing  to  him?  By  no  means.  Thus 
having  completed  the  notion  and  distinctly  fixed  it  he 

1  This  is  what  is  sa^l  Ir^he  Gorgias  of  Plato,  p.  472,  474. 
*  The  word  is  cwoiai,  which  Cicero  explains  to  be  the  fame  as 
irpoxtyeis.    Acad.  Pr.  ii.  10. 

3  Socrates'  notion  of  envy  is  stated  by  Xenophon  (Mem.  iii.  9,  8),  to 
be  this :    '  it  is   the  pain   or  vexation  which   men  have  at  the  pro- 
sperity of  their  friends,  and  that  such  are  the  only  envious  persons.' 
Bishop  Butler  gives  a  better  definition ;  at  least  a  more  complete  de- 
scription of  the  thing.    *  Emulation  is  merely  the  desire  and  hope  of 
equality  with  or  superiority  over  others,  with  whom  we  may  compare 
ourselves.    There  does  not  appear  to  be  any  other  grief  in  the  natural 
passion,  but  only  that  want  which  is  implied  in  desire.    However  this 
may  be  so  strong  as  to  be  the  occasion  of  great  grief.    To  desire  the 
attainment  of  this  equality  or  superiority,  by  the  particular  means  of 
others  being  brought  down  to  our  level,  or  below  it,  is,  I  think,  the 
distinct  notion  of  envy.    From  whence  it  is  easy  to  see,  that  the  real 
end  which  the  natural  passion,  emulation,  and  which  tho  unlawful 
one,  envy,  aims  at  is  the  same ;  namely,  that  equality  or  superiority : 
and  consequently  that  to  do  mischief  is  not  the  end  of  envy,  but  merely 
the  means  it  makes  use  of  to  attain  its  end.' — Sermons  upon  Human 
Nature,  I. 

4  I  have  omitted  the  words  cbrb  rov  ^avrlov  4/cf  *>T)<re  T&J/ 
tee  no  sense  in  them ;  and  the  text  is  plain,  without  them. 


EPICTETUS.  185 

wjuld  go  away  without  saying  to  his  adversary,  Define  to 
me  envy ;  and  if  the  adversary  had  denned  envy,  he  did 
not  say,  You  have  defined  it  badly,  for  the  terms  of  the 
definition  do  not  correspond  to  the  thing  defined — These 
are  technical  terms,  and  for  this  reason  disagreeable  and 
hardly  intelligible  to  illiterate  men,  which  terms  we 
(philosophers)  cannot  lay  aside.  But  that  the  illiterate 
man  himself,  who  follows  the  appearances  presented  to 
him,  should  be  able  to  concede  any  thing  or  reject  it,  we 
can  never  by  the  use  of  these  terms  move  him  to  do.5 
Accordingly  being  conscious  of  our  own  inability,  we  do 
not  attempt  the  thing;  at  least  such  of  us  as  have  any 
caution  do  not.  But  the  greater  part  and  the  rash,  when 
they  enter  into  such  disputations,  confuse  themselves  and 
confuse  others ;  and  finally  abusing  their  adversaries  and 
abused  by  them,  they  walk  away. 

Now  this  was  the  first  and  chief  peculiarity  of  Socrates, 
never  to  be  irritated  in  argument,  never  to  utter  any  thing 
abusive,  any  thing  insulting,  but  to  bear  with  abusive 
persons  and  to  put  an  end  to  the  quarrel.  If  you  would 
know  what  great  power  he  had  in  this  way,  read  the 
Symposium  of  Xenophon,6  and  you  will  see  how  many 
quarrels  he  put  an  end  to.  Hence  with  good  reason  in  the 
poets  also  this  power  is  most  highly  praised, 

Quickly  with  skill  he  settles  great  disputes. 

Hesiod,  Theogony,  v.  87. 

Well  then ;  the  matter  is  not  now  very  safe,  and  particu- 
larly at  Eome ;  for  he  who  attempts  to  do  it,  must  not  do 
it  in  a  corner,  you  may  be  sure,  but  must  go  to  a  man  of 
consular  rank,  if  it  so  happen,  or  to  a  rich  man,  and  ask 
him,  Can  you  tell  me,  Sir,  to  whose  care  you  have  en- 
trusted your  horses?  I  can  tell  you.  Have  you  entrusted 
them  to  any  person  indifferently  and  to  one  who  has  no 
experience  of  horses? — By  no  means. — Well  then  ;  can 
you  tell  me  to  whom  you  entrust  your  gold  or  silver 
things  or  your  vestments  ?  I  don't  entrust  even  ^iese  to 

5  I  am  not  sure  that  I  have  understood  rightly  tj-  &v  5£  avrSs  at  the 
beginning  of  this  sentence. 

6  The  Symposium  or  Banquet  of  Xenophon  is  extant.    Compare 
Epiotetus,  iii.  16, 5,  and  iv.  o.  5,  the  beginning. 


136  EPICTETUS. 

any  one  indifferently.  Well ;  your  own  body,  have  you 
already  considered  about  entrusting  the  care  of  it  to  any 
person? — Certainly. — To  a  man  of  experience,  I  suppose, 
and  one  acquainted  with  the  aliptic,7  or  with  the  healing 
art  ? — Without  doubt. — Are  these  the  best  things  that  you 
have,  or  do  you  also  possess  something  else  which  is  better 
than  all  these  ? — What  kind  of  a  thing  do  you  mean  ? — 
That  I  mean  which  makes  use  of  these  things,  and  tests 
each  of  them,  and  deliberates. — Is  it  the  soul  that  you 
mean  ? — You  think  right,  for  it  is  the  soul  that  I  mean. — 
In  truth  I  do  think  that  the  soul  is  a  much  better  thing 
than  all  the  others  which  I  possess. — Can  you  then  show 
us  in  what  way  you  have  taken  care  of  the  soul  ?  for  it  is 
not  likely  that  you,  who  are  so  wise  a  man  and  have  a 
reputation  in  the  city,  inconsiderately  and  carelessly  allow 
the  most  valuable  thing  that  you  possess  to  be  neglected 
and  to  perish. — Certainly  not. — But  have  you  taken  care 
of  the  soul  yourself;  and  have  you  learned  from  another 
to  do  this,  or  have  you  discovered  the  means  yourself? — 
Here  comes  the  danger  that  in  the  first  place  he  may  say, 
What  is  this  to  you,  my  good  man,  who  are  you?  Next,  if 
you  persist  in  troubling  him,  there  is  danger  that  he  may 
raise  his  hands  and  give  you  blows.  I  was  once  myself 
also  an  admirer  of  this  mode  of  instruction  until  I  fell  into 
these  dangers.8 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

ON   ANXIETY   (SOLICITUDE). 

WHEN  I  see  a  man  anxious,  I  say,  What  does  this  man 
want  ?  If  he  did  not  want  some  thing  which  is  not  in  his 
power,  how  could  he  be  anxious  ?  For  this  reason  a  lute 

7  The  aliptic  art  is  the  art  of  anointing  and  rubbing,  one  of  the  best 
means  of  maintaining  a  body  in  health.  The  iatric  or  healing  art  is  the 
art  of  restoring  to  health  a  diseased  body.  The  aliptio  art  is  also 
equivalent  to  the  gymnastic  art,  or  the  art  of  preparing  for  gymnastic 
exercises,  which  are  also  a  means  of  preserving  the  body's  health,  when 
the  exercises  are  good  and  moderate. 

•  Epictetus  in  speaking  of  himself  and  of  his  experience  at  K)me. 


EPIOTETUS.  137 

player  when  he  is  singing  by  himself  has  no  anxiety,  but 
when  he  enters  the  theatre,  he  is  anxious  even  if  he  has  a 
good  voice  and  plays  well  on  the  lute;  for  he  not  only 
wishes  to  sing  well,  but  also  to  obtain  applause :  but  this 
is  not  in  his  power.  Accordingly,  where  he  has  skill, 
there  he  has  confidence.  Bring  any  single  person  who 
knows  nothing  of  music,  and  the  musician  does  not  care 
for  him.  But  in  the  matter  where  a  man  knows  nothing 
and  has  not  been  practised,  there  he  is  anxious.  What 
matter  is  this  ?  He  knows  not  what  a  crowd  is  or  what 
the  praise  of  a  crowd  is.  However  he  has  learned  to 
strike  the  lowest  chord  and  the  highest  j1  but  what  the 
praise  of  the  many  is,  and  what  power  it  has  in  life  he 
neither  knows  nor  ?j.as  he  thought  about  it.  Hence  he 
must  of  necessity  tromblo  and  grow  pale.  I  cannot  then 
say  that  a  man  is  not  a  lute  player  when  I  see  him 
afraid,  but  I  can  say  something  else,  and  not  one  thing, 
but  many.  And  first  of  all  I  call  him  a  stranger  and  say, 
This  man  does  not  know  in  what  part  of  the  world  he  is, 
but  though  he  has  been  here  so  long,  he  is  ignorant  of 
the  laws  of  the  State  and  the  customs,  and  what  is  per- 
mitted and  what  is  not ;  and  he  has  never  employed  any 
lawyer  to  tell  him  and  to  explain  the  laws.  But  a  man 
does  not  write  a  will,  if  he  does  not  know  how  it  ought  to 
be  written,  or  he  employs  a  person  who  does  know ;  nor 
does  he  rashly  seal  a  bond  or  write  a  security.  But  he 
uses  his  desire  without  a  Jawyer's  advice,  and  aversion, 
and  pursuit  (movement),  and  attempt  and  purpose.  How 
do  you  mean  without  a  lawyer  ?  He  does  not  know  that 
he  wills  what  is  not  allowed,  and  does  not  will  that  which 
is  of  necessity ;  and  he  does  not  know  either  what  is  his 
own  or  what  is  another  man's ;  but  if  he  did  know,  he 
would  never  be  impeded,  he  would  never  be  hindered,  he 
would  not  be  anxious.  How  so  ? — Is  any  man  then  afraid 
about  things  which  are  not  evils  ?— No. —Is  he  afraid 
about  things  which  are  evils,  but  still  so  far  within  his 
power  that  they  may  not  happen  ? — Certainly  he  is  not. — 
If  then  the  things  which  are  independent  of  the  will  are 
neither  good  nor  bad,  and  all  things  which  do  depend  on 

1  See  i.  29,  note  20. 


138  EPICTETUS. 

the  will  are  within  our  power,  and  no  man  can  either  take 
them  from  us  or  give  them  to  us,  if  we  do  not  choose, 
where  is  room  left  for  anxiety  ?  But  we  are  anxious  about 
our  poor  body,  our  little  property,  about  the  will  of  Caesar; 
but  not  anxious  about  things  internal.  Are  we  anxious 
about  not  forming  a  false  opinion  ? — No,  for  this  is  in  my 
power. — About  not  exerting  our  movements  contrary  to 
nature? — No,  not  even  about  this. — When  then  you 
see  a  man  pale,  as  the  physician  says,  judging  from  the 
complexion,  this  man's  spleen  is  disordered,  that  man's 
liver ;  so  also  say,  this  man's  desire  and  aversion  are  dis- 
ordered, he  is  not  in  the  right  way,  he  is  in  a  fever.  For 
nothing  else  changes  the  colour,  or  causes  trembling  or 
chattering  of  the  teeth,  or  causes  a  man  to 

Sink  in  his  knees  and  shift  from  foot  to  foot.— Iliad,  xiii.  281. 

For  this  reason  when  Zeno  was  going  to  meet  Antigonus,  - 
he  was  not  anxious,  for  Antigonus  had  no  power  over  any 
of  the  things  which  Zeno  admired ;  and  Zeno  did  not  caro 
for  those  things  over  which  Antigonus  had  power.  But 
Antigonus  was  anxious  when  he  was  going  to  meet  Zeno, 
for  he  wished  to  please  Zeno;  but  this  was  a  thing 
external  (out  of  his  power).  But  Zeno  did  not  want  to 
please  Antigonus ;  for  no  man  who  is  skilled  in  any  art 
wishes  to  please  one  who  has  no  such  skill. 

Should  I  try  to  please  you?  Why?  I  suppose,  you 
know  the  measure  by  which  one  man  is  estimated  by 
another.  Have  you  taken  pains  to  learn  what  is  a  good 
man  and  what  is  a  bad  man,  and  how  a  man  becomes  one 
or  the  other?  Why  then  are  you  not  good  yourself? 
— How,  ho  replies,  am  I  not  good  ? — Because  no  good  man 
laments  or  groans  or  weeps,  no  good  man  is  pale  and 
trembles,  or  says,  How  will  he  receive  me,  how  will  he 
listen  to  me? — Slave,  just  as  it  pleases  him.  Why  do  you 
care  about  what  belongs  to  others  ?  Is  it  now  his  fault  if 
he  receives  badly  what  proceeds  from  you  ? — Certainly. — 

2  In  Diogenes  Laertius  (Zeno,  vii.)  there  is  a  letter  from  Antigonus 
to  Zeno  and  Zeno's  answer.  Simplicity  (note  on  the  Encheiridion,  c.  51) 
supposes  this  Antigonus  to  be  the  King  of  Syria;  but  Upton  remarks 
that  it  is  Antigonus  Gonatas,  king  of  Macedonia. 


EPICTETUS.  13!) 

And  is  it  possible  that  a  fault  should  be  one  man's,  and 
the  evil  in  another? — No. — Why  then  are  you  anxious 
about  that  which  belongs  to  others? — Your  question  is 
reasonable ;  but  I  am  anxious  how  I  shall  speak  to  him. 
Cannot  you  then  speak  to  him  as  you  choose  ? — But  I  fear 
that  I  may  be  disconcerted  ? — If  you  are  going  to  write  the 
name  of  Dion,  are  you  afraid  that  you  would  be  discon- 
certed ? — By  no  means. — Why  ?  is  it  not  because  you  have 
practised  writing  the  name? — Certainly. — Well,  if  you 
were  going  to  read  the  name,  would  you  not  feel  the 
Kime?  and  why?  Because  every  art  has  a  certain 
strength  and  confidence  in  the  things  which  belong  to  it. 
— Have  you  then  not  practised  speaking  ?  and  what  else  did 
you  learn  in  the  school  ?  Syllogisms  and  sophistical  pro- 
positions?3 For  what  purpose?  was  it  not  for  the  purpose 
of  discoursing  skilfully  ?  and  is  not  discoursing  skilfully 
the  same  as  discoursing  seasonably  and  cautiously  and 
with  intelligence,  and  also  without  making  mistakes  and 
without  hindrance,  and  besides  all  this  with  confidence? — 
Yes. — When  then  you  are  mounted  on  a  horse  and  go  into 
a  plain,  are  you  anxious  at  being  matched  against  a  man 
who  is  on  foot,  and  anxious  in  a  matter  in  which  you  are 
practised,  and  he  is  not? — Yes,  but  that  person  (to  whom 
1  am  going  to  speak)  has  power  to  kill  me.4  Speak  the 
truth  then,  unhappy  man,  and  do  not  brag,  nor  claim  to 
be  a  philosopher,  nor  refuse  to  acknowledge  your  masters, 
but  so  long  as  you  present  this  handle  in  your  body, 
follow  every  man  who  is  stronger  than  yourself.  So< 
crates  used  to  practise  speaking,  he  who  talked  as  he  did  to 
the  tyrants,5  to  the  dicasts  (judges),  he  who  talked  in 
his  prison.  Diogenes  had  practised  speaking,  he  who 
spoke  as  he  did  to  Alexander,  to  the  pirates,  to  the  person 

3  Seo  i.  c.  7. 

4  The  original  is  '  but  that  person  (tKetvos)  has  power  to  kill  me/ 
*  That  person*  must  be  the  person  already  mentioned,  and  Mrs.  Carter 
has  done  right  in  adding  this  explanation. 

5  The  Thirty  tyrants  of  Athens,  as  they  were  named  (Xenophon, 
Hellenica,  ii.).    The  talk  of  Socrates  with  Critias  and  Chancles  two  of 
the  Thirty  is  reported  in  Xenophon'a  Memorabilia  (i.  2,  33).    The 
defence  of  Socrates  before  those  who  tried  him  and  his  conversation  in 
prison  are  reported  in  Plato's  Apology,  and  in  the  Phaedon  and  Crito. 
Diogenes  was  captured  by  some  pirates  and  sold  (iv. 


140  EPICTETtTS. 

who  bought  him.  These  men  were  confident  in  th« 
things  which  they  practised.6  But  do  you  walk  off  to 
your  own  affairs  and  never  leave  them:  go  and  sit  in  a 
corner,  and  weave  syllogisms,  and  propose  them  to 
another.  There  is  not  in  you  the  man  who  can  rule  a 
state. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

TO  NASO. 

WHEN  a  certain  Eoman  entered  with  his  son  and  listened 
to  one  reading,  Epictetus  said,  This  is  the  method  of  in- 
struction ;  and  he  stopped.  When  the  Roman  asked  him 
to  go  on,  Epictetus  said,  Every  art  when  it  is  taught 
causes  labour  to  him  who  is  unacquainted  with  it  and 
is  unskilled  in  it,  and  indeed  the  things  which  proceed 
from  the  arts  immediately  show  their  ube  in  the  purpose 
for  which  they  were  made  ;  and  most  of  them  contain  some- 
thing attractive  and  pleasing.  For  indeed  to  be  present 
and  to  observe  how  a  shoemaker  learns  is  not  a  pleasant 
thing ;  but  the  shoe  is  useful  and  also  not  disagreeable  to 
look  at.  And  the  discipline  of  a  smith  when  he  is  learning 
is  very  disagreeable  to  one  who  chances  to  be  present  and 
is  a  stranger  to  the  art :  but  the  work  shows  the  use  of 
the  art.  But  you  will  see  this  much  more  in  music  ;  for 
if  you  are  present  while  a  person  is  learning,  the  disci- 
pline will  appear  most  disagreeable ;  and  yet  the  results 
of  music  are  pleasing  and  delightful  to  those  who  know 
nothing  of  music.  And  here  we  conceive  the  work  of  a 
philosopher  to  be  something  of  this  kind:  he  must  adapt 
his  wish  (povXrjviv)  to  what  is  going  on,1  so  that  neither 
any  of  the  things  which  are  taking  place  shall  take  place 
contrary  to  our  wish,  nor  any  of  the  things  which  do  not 
take  place  shall  not  take  place  when  we  wish  that  they 

6  There  is  some  corruption  here. 

1  Encheiridion,  c.  8 :  'Do  not  seek  (wish)  that  things  which  take 
place  shall  take  place  as  you  desire,  but  desire  that  things  which  take 
place  shall  take  place  as  they  do,  and  you  will  live  a  tranquil  life.' 


EPICTETUS.  141 

tiould.  From  this  the  result  is  to  those"  who  have  so 
rranged  the  work  of  philosophy,  not  to  fail  in  the  desire, 
or  to  fall  in  with  that  which  they  would  avoid  ;  without 
neasiness,  without  fear,  without  perturbation  to  pass 
irough  life  themselves,  together  with  their  associates 
laintaining  the  relations  both  natural  and  acquired,2  as 
tie  relation  of  son,  of  father,  of  brother,  of  citizen,  of  man, 
f  wife,  of  neighbour,  of  fellow  traveller,  of  ruler,  of  ruled, 
'he  work  of  a  philosopher  we  conceive  to  be  something 
ke  this.  It  remains  next  to  inquire  how  this  must  bo 
ccomplished. 

We  see  then  that  the  carpenter  (TCKTCOV)  when  he  has 
earned  certain  things  becomes  a  carpenter ;  the  pilot  by 
earning  certain  things  becomes  a  pilot.  May  it  not  then  in 
hilosophy  also  not  be  sufficient  to  wish  to  be  wise  and  good, 
ad  that  there  is  also  a  necessity  to  learn  certain  things? 
\Te  inquire  then  what  these  things  are.  The  philosophers 
ly  that  we  ought  first  to  learn  that  there  is  a  God  and 
lat  he  provides  for  all  things ;  also  that  it  is  not  possible 
)  conceal  from  him  our  acts,  or  even  our  intentions  and 
tioughts.3  The  next  thing  is  to  learn  what  is  the  nature 

2  Compare  iii.  2.  4,  iv.  8.  20.  Antoninus  (viii.  27)  writes :  l  There  are 
iree  relations  [between  thee  and  other  things] :  the  one  to  the  body 
hich  surrounds  thee ;  the  second  to  the  divine  cause  from  which  all 
lings  come  to  all ;  and  the  third  to  those  who  live  with  thee. '  This 
precise,  true  and  practical.  Those  who  object  to  'the  divine  cause,* 
ay  write  in  place  of  it  *  the  nature  and  constitution  of  things ; '  for 
lere  is  a  constitution  of  things,  which  the  philosopher  attempts  to 
scover ;  and  for  most  practical  purposes,  it  is  immaterial  whether  we 
y  that  it  is  of  divine  origin  or  has  some  other  origin,  or  no  origin  can 
)  discovered.  The  fact  remains  that  a  constitution  of  things  exists ; 
,  if  that  expression  be  not  accepted,  we  may  say  that  we  conceive  that 
exists  and  we  cannot  help  thinking  so. 

»  See  i.  14. 13,  ii.  8.  14.  Socrates  (Xen.  Mem.  i.  1.  19)  said  the 
,me.  That  man  should  make  himself  like  the  Gods  is  said  also  by 
ntoninus,  x.  8. — See  Plato,  De  Legg.  i.  4.  (Upton.) 
When  God  is  said  to  provide  for  all  things,  this  is  what  the  Greeks 
lied  irpSvota,  providence.  (Epictetus,  i.  16,  iii.  17.)  In  the  second  of 
iese  passages  there  is  a  short  answer  to  some  objections  made  to 
rovidence. 

Epictetus  could  only  know  or  believe  what  God  is  by  the  observation 
phaenomena;  and  he  could  only  know  what  he  supposed  to  be  God's 
•evidence  by  observing  his  administration  of  the  world  and  all  that 
tppens  in  it  Among  other  works  of  God  is  man,  who  possesses 


142  EPICTETUS. 

of  the  Gods ;  for  such  as  they  are  discovered  to  be,  he,  who 
would  please  and  obey  them,  must  try  with  all  his  power 
to  be  like  them.  If  the  divine  is  faithful,  man  also  must 
be  faithful ;  if  it  is  free,  man  also  must  be  free ;  if  bene- 
ficent, man  also  must  be  beneficent ;  if  magnanimous,  man 
also  must  be  magnanimous ;  as  being  then  an  imitator  of 
God  he  must  do  and  say  every  thing  consistently  with  this 
fact. 

With  what  then  must  we  begin  ?  If  you  will  enter  on 
the  discussion,  I  will  tell  you  that  you  must  first  under- 
stand names4  (words). — So  then  you  say  that  1  do  not 
now  understand  names. — You  do  not  understand  them. — 
How  then  do  I  use  them? — Just  as  the  illiterate  use 
written  language,  as  cattle  use  appearances:  for  use  is 
one  thing,  understanding  is  another.  But  if  you  think 
that  you  understand  them,  produce  whatever  word  you 
please,  and  let  us  try  whether  we  understand  it. — But  it 
is  a  disagreeable  thing  for  a  man  to  be  confuted  who  is 
now  old,  and,  it  may  be,  has  now  served  his  three  cam- 
paigns.— I  too  know  this :  for  now  you  are  conie  to  me  as 
if  you  were  in  want  of  nothing :  and  what  could  you  even 
imagine  to  be  wanting  to  you  ?  You  are  rich,  you  have 
children  and  a  wife  perhaps,  and  many  slaves:  Caesar 

certain  intellectual  powers  which  enable  him  to  form  a  judgment  of 
God's  works,  and  a  judgment  of  man  himself.  Man  has  or  is  supposed 
to  have  certain  moral  sentiments,  or  a  capacity  of  acquiring  them  in 
some  way.  On  the  supposition  that  all  man's  powers  are  the  gift  of 
God,  man's  power  of  judging  what  happens  in  the  world  under  God's 
providence  is  the  gift  of  God  ;  and  if  he  should  not  be  satisfied  with 
God's  administration,  we  have  the  conclusion  that  man,  whose  powers 
are  from  God,  condemns  that  administration  which  is  also  from  God. 
Thus  God  and  man,  who  is  God's  work,  are  in  opposition  to  one 
another. 

If  a  man  rejects  the  belief  in  a  deity  and  in  a  providence,  because 
of  the  contradictions  and  difficulties  involved  in  this  belief  or  supposed 
to  be  involved  in  it,  and  if  he  finds  the  contradictions  and  difficulties 
euch  as  he  cannot  reconcile  with  his  moral  sentiments  and  judgments, 
he  will  be  consistent  in  rejecting  the  notion  of  a  deity  and  of  provi- 
dence. But  he  must  also  consistently  admit  that  his  moral  sentiments 
and  judgments  are  his  own,  and  that  he  cannot  say  how  he  acquired 
them,  or  how  he  has  any  of  the  corporeal  or  intellectual  powers  which 
he  is  daily  using.  By  the  hypothesis  they  are  not  from  God.  All 
then  that  a  man  can  say  is  that  he  has  such  powers. 

<  See  ii.  10,  i.  17. 12,  ii.  11.  4,  etc.    M.  Antoninus,  x.  8.J 


EPICTETUS.  ,  143 

knows  yon,  in  Heine  you  have  many  friends,  you  render 
their  dues  to  all,  you  know  how  to  requite  him  who  does 
you  a  favour,  and  to  repay  in  the  same  kind  him.  who 
does  ycu  a  wrong.  What  do  you  lack  ?  If  then  I  shall  shew 
you  that  you  lack  the  things  most  necessary  and  the  chief 
things  for  happiness,  and  that  hitherto  you  have  looked 
after  every  thing  rather  than  what  you  ought,  and,  to  crown 
all,5  that  you  neither  know  what  God  is  nor  what  man  is, 
nor  what  is  good  nor  what  is  bad ;  and  as  to  what  I  have  said 
about  your  ignorance  of  other  matters,  that  may  perhaps  be 
endured,  but  if  I  say  that  you  know  nothing  about  yourself, 
how  is  it  possible  that  you  should  endure  mo  and  bear  the 
proof  and  stay  here  ?  It  is  not  possible ;  but  you  imme- 
diately go  off  in  bad  humour.  And  yet  what  harm  have 
I  done  you  ?  unless  the  mirror  also  injures  the  ugly  man 
because  it  shows  him  to  himself  such  as  he  is ;  unless  the 
physician  also  is  supposed  to  insult  the  sick  man,  when  he 
says  to  him,  Man,  do  you  think  that  you  ail  nothing? 
But  you  have  a  fever:  go  without  food  to-day;  drink 
water.  And  no  one  says,  what  an  insult!  But  if  you 
say  to  a  man,  Your  desires  are  inflamed,  your  aversions 
are  low,  your  intentions  are  inconsistent,  your  pursuits 
(movements)  are  not  conformable  to  nature,  your  opinions 
are  rash  and  false,  the  man  immediately  goes  away  and 
says,  He  has  insulted  me. 

Our  way  of  dealing  is  like  that  of  a  crowded  assembly.6 
Beasts  are  brought  to  be  sold  and  oxen ;  and  the  greater 
part  of  the  men  come  to  buy  and  sell,  and  there  are  some 
few  who  come  to  look  at  the  market  and  to  inquire  how 
it  is  carried  on,  and  why,  and  who  fixes  the  meeting 
and  for  what  purpose.  So  it  is  here  also  in  this  assem- 
bly (of  life)  :  some  like  cattle  trouble  themselves  about 
nothing  except  their  fodder.  For  to  all  of  you  who  are 
busy  about  possessions  and  lands  and  slaves  and  magis- 
terial offices,  these  are  nothing  except  fodder.  But  there 
are  a  few  who  attend  the  assembly,  men  who  love  to 
look  on  and  consider  what  is  the  world,  who  governs  it. 

5  The  original  is  '  to  add  the  colophon/  which  is  a  proverbial  exprea- 
•ion  and  signifies  to  give  the  last  touch  to  a  thing. 
G  See  the  fragments  of  Menander  quoted  by  Upton. 


144  EPICTETTTS. 

Has  it  no  governor  ? T  And  how  is  it  possible  that  a  city 
or  a  family  cannot  continue  to  exist,  not  even  the  shortest 
time  without  an  administrator  and  guardian,  and  that  so 
great  and  beautiful  a  system  should  be  administered  with 
such  order  and  yet  without  a  purpose  and  by  chance  ? 8 
There  is  then  an  administrator.  What  kind  of  adminis- 
trator and  how  does  he  govern  ?  And  who  are  we,  who 
were  produced  by  him,  and  for  what  purpose  ?  Have  we 
some  connexion  with  him  and  some  relation  towards  him, 
or  none  ?  This  is  the  way  in  which  these  few  are  affected, 
and  then  they  apply  themselves  only  to  this  one  thfng,  to 
examine  the  meeting  and  then  to  go  away.  What  then  ? 
They  are  ridiculed  by  the  many,  as  the  spectators  at  the 
fair  are  by  the  traders ;  and  if  the  beasts  had  any  under- 
standing, they  would  ridicule  those  who  admired  anything 
else  than  fodder. 


CHAPTEE  XV. 

TO  OB  AGAINST  THOSE  WHO  OBSTINATELY   PERSIST  IN  WHAT 
THEY  HAVE  DETERMINED. 

WHEN  some  persons  have  heard  these  words,  that  a  man 
ought  to  be  constant  (firm),  and  that  ^the  will  is  naturally 
free  and  not  subject  to  compulsion,  but  that  all  other 
things  are  subject  to  hindrance,  to  slavery,  and  are  in  the 
power  of  others,  they  suppose  that  they  ought  without 
deviation  to  abide  by  every  thing  which  they  have  deter- 
mined. But  in  the  first  place  that  which  has  been  deter- 
mined ought  to  be  sound  (true).  I  require  tone  (sinews) 
in  the  body,  but  such  as  exists  in  a  healthy  body,  in  an 
athletic  body ;  but  if  it  is  plain  to  me  that  you  have  the 

»  Sunt  In  Fortunae  qui  casibus  omnia  ponunt* 
Et  mundum  credunt  nullo  rectore  moved. 

Juvenal,  xiii.  86. 

•  From  the  fact  that  man  has  some  intelligence  Voltaire  conclude* 
that  we  must  admit  that  there  is  a  greater  intelligence.  (Letter  to 
Mde.  Necker.  Vol.  67,  ed.  Kehl.  p.  278.) 


EPIOTETUS.  145 

tone  of  a  phrensied  man  and  you  boast  of  it,  I  shall  say  to 
you,  man,  seek  the  physician :  this  is  not  tone,  but  atony 
(deficiency  in  right  tone).  In  a  different  way  something 
of  the  same  kind  is  felt  by  those  who  listen  to  these  dis- 
courses in  a  wrong  manner ;  which  was  the  case  with  one 
of  my  companions  who  for  no  reason  resolved  to  starve 
himself  to  death.1  I  heard  of  it  when  it  was  the  third 
day  of  his  abstinence  from  food  and  I  went  to  inquire  what 
had  happened.  I  have  resolved,  he  said. — But  still  tell  me 
what  it  was  which  induced  you  to  resolve ;  for  if  you  have 
resolved  rightly,  we  shall  sit  with  you  and  assist  you  to 
depart ;  but  if  you  have  made  an  unreasonable  resolution, 
change  your  mind. — We  ought  to  keep  to  our  determinations. 
— What  are  you  doing,  man  ?  We  ought  to  keep  not  to  all 
our  determinations,  but  to  those  which  are  right ;  for  if 
you  are  now  persuaded  that  it  is  night,  do  not  change  your 
mind,  if  you  think  fit,  but  persist  and  say,  we  ought  to 
abide  by  our  determinations.  Will  you  not  make  the 
beginning  and  lay  the  foundation  in  an  inquiry  whether 
the  determination  is  sound  or  not  sound,  and  so  then  build 
on  it  firmness  and  security  ?  But  if  you  lay  a  rotten  and 
ruinous  foundation,  will  not  your  miserable  little  building 
fall  down  the  sooner,  the  more  and  the  stronger  are  the 
materials  which  you  shall  lay  on  it  ?  Without  any  reason 
would  you  withdraw  from  us  out  of  life  a  man  who  is  a 
friend,  and  a  companion,  a  citizen  of  the  same  city,  both 
the  great  and  the  small  city  ?  2  Then  while  you  are  com- 
mitting  murder  and  destroying  a  man  who  has  done  no 
wrong,  do  you  say  that  you  ought  to  abide  by  your  deter- 
minations ?  And  if  it  ever  in  any  way  came  into  your 
head  to  kill  me,  ought  you  to  abide  by  your  determinations  ? 
Now  this  man  was  with  difficulty  persuaded  to  change 
his  mind.  But  it  is  impossible  to  convince  some  persons 
at  present ;  so  that  I  seem  now  to  know,  what  I  did  not 
know  before,  the  meaning  of  the  common  saying,  That 

:  The  word  is  diroKaprfp<??i/,  which  Cicero  (Tusc.  i.  34)  renders  '  per 
inediam  vita  discedere.'  The  words  '  I  have  resolved  *  are  in  Epio- 
tetug,  KCKptKa.  Pliny  (Epp.  i.  12)  says  that  Oorellius  Rufus,  when  he 
determined  to  end  his  great  sufferings  by  starvation  made  tho  same 
answer,  K^KptKa,  to  the  physician  who  offered  him  food. 

8  The  great  city  is  the  world. 

L 


146  EFICTETUS. 

you  can  neither  persuade  nor  break  a  fool.3  Ma}r  it 
never  be  my  lot  to  have  a  wise  fool  for  my  friend :  nothing 
is  more  untractable.  c  I  am  determined,'  the  man  says. 
Madmen  are  also;  but  the  more  firmly  they  form  a  judg- 
ment on  things  which  do  not  exist,  the  more  ellebore4 
they  require.  Will  you  not  act  like  a  sick  man  and  call  in 
the  physician  ? — I  am  sick,  master,  help  me ;  consider 
what  I  must  do :  it  is  my  duty  to  obey  you.  So  it  is  here 
also :  I  know  not  what  I  ought  to  do,  but  I  am  come  to 
learn. — Not  so ;  but  speak  to  me  about  other  things :  upon 
this  I  have  determined. — What  other  things?  for  what  is 
greater  and  more  useful  than  for  you  to  be  persuaded  that 
it  is  not  sufficient  to  have  made  your  determination  and 
not  to  change  it.  This  is  the  tone  (energy)  of  madness, 
not  of  health. — I  will  die,  if  you  compel  me  to  this. — Why, 
man  ?  What  has  happened  ? — I  have  determined — I  have 
had  a  lucky  escape  that  you  have  not  determined  to  kill 
me — I  take  no  money.5  Why  ? — I  have  determined — Be 
assured  that  with  the  very  tone  (energy)  which  you  now 
use  in  refusing  to  take,  there  is  nothing  to  hinder  you  at 
some  time  from  inclining  without  reason  to  take  money  and 
then  saying,  I  have  determined.  As  in  a  distempered 
body,  subject  to  defluxions,  the  humour  inclines  sometimes 
to  these  parts,  and  then  to  those,  so  too  a  sickly  soul  knows 
not  which  way  to  incline :  but  if  to  this  inclination  and 
movement  there  is  added  a  tone  (obstinate  resolution), 
then  the  evil  becomes  past  help  and  cure. 

8  The  meaning  is  that  you  cannot  lead  a  fool  from  his  purpose  either 
by  words  or  force.  *  A  wise  fool '  must  mean  a  fool  who  thinks  himself 
wise ;  and  such  we  sometimes  see.  *  Though  thou  shouldst  bray  a  fool 
in  the  mortar  among  wheat  with  a  pestle,  yet  will  not  his  foolishness 
depart  from  him/  Proverbs,  xxvii.  22. 

4  Ellebore  was  a  medicine  used  in  madness.    Horace  gays,  Sat.  ii. 
3.82— 

Danda  est  ellebori  multo  pars  maxima  avaris. 

5  'Epictetus  seems  in  this  discussion  to  te  referring  to  some  pro- 
fessor, who  had  declared  that  he  would  not  take  money  from  his 
hearers,  and  then,  indirectly  at  least,  had  blamed  our  philosopher  #» 
receiving  some  fee  from  his  hearers/    Schweig. 


EPICTETUS.  147 


CHAPTEE  XVI. 

THAT  WE  DO  NOT  STRIVE  TO  USE  OUR  OPINIONS  ABOUT  GOOD  AND 

EVIL. 

WHERE  is  the  good?  In  the  will.1  Where  is  the  evil? 
In  the  will.  Where  is  neither  of  them  ?  In  those  things 
which  are  independent  of  the  will.  Well  then?  Does 
any  one  among  us  think  of  these  lessons  out  of  the  schools  ? 
Does  any  one  meditate  (strive)  by  himself  to  give  an 
answer  to  things2  as  in  the  case  of  questions?  Is  it 
day  ? — Yes. — Is  it  night  ? — No. — Well,  is  the  number  of 
stars  even  ?  3 — I  cannot  say. — When  money  is  shown 
(offered)  to  you,  have  you  studied  to  make  the  proper 
answer,  that  money  is  not  a  good  thing  ?  Have  you  prac- 
tised yourself  in  these  answers,  or  only  against  sophisms  ? 
Why  do  you  wonder  then  if  in  the  cases  which  you  have 
studied,  in  those  you  have  improved ;  but  in  those  which  you 
have  not  studied,  in  those  you  remain  the  same  ?  When  the 
rhetorician  knows  that  he  has  written  well,  that  he  has 
committed  to  memory  what  he  has  written,  and  brings  an 
agreeable  voice,  why  is  he  still  anxious  ?  Because  he  is 
not  satisfied  with  having  studied.  What  then  does  he 
want?  To  be  praised  by  the  audience?  For  the  purpose 
then  of  being  able  to  practise  declamation  he  has  been 
disciplined  ;  but  with  respect  to  praise  and  blame  he  has 
not  been  disciplined.  For  when  did  he  hear  from  any  one 
what  praise  is,  what  blame  is,  what  the  nature  of  each  is, 
what  kind  of  praise  should  be  sought,  or  what  kind  of 
blame  should  be  shunned  ?  And  when  did  he  practise  this 
discipline  which  follows  these  words  (things)  ? 4  Why 
then  do  you  still  wonder,  if  in  the  matters  which  a  man 
has  learned,  there  he  surpasses  others,  and  in  those  in 

1  See  ii.  10.  25. 

2  'To  answer  to  things'  means  to  act  in  a  way  suitable  to  circum- 
stances, to  be  a  match  for  them.    So  Horace  says  (Sat.  ii.  7.  85)-— 

Responsare  cupidinibus,  contemnere  honores 
Fortis. 

8  Perhaps  this  was  a  common  puzzle.    The  man  answers  right ;  he 
cannot  say. 

4    That  is  which  follows  praise  or  blame.   He  seems  to  mean  making 
the  proper  use  of  praise  or  of  blame. 

L  2 


148 

which  he  has  not  been  disciplined,  there  he  is  the  same 
with  the  many.  So  the  lute  ~  player  knows  how  to  play, 
sings  well,  and  has  a  fine  dress,  and  yet  he  trembles  when 
he  enters  on  the  stage  ;  for  these  matters  he  understands, 
but  he  does  not  know  what  a  crowd  is,  nor  the  shouts  of  a 
crowd,  nor  what  ridicule  is.  Neither  does  he  know  what 
anxiety  is,  whether  it  is  our  work  or  the  work  of  another, 
whether  it  is  possible  to  stop  it  or  not.  For  this  reason  if 
he  has  been  praised,  he  leaves  the  theatre  puffed  up,  but  if 
he  has  been  ridiculed,  the  swollen  bladder  has  been  punc- 
tured and  subsides. 

This  is  the  case  also  with  ourselves.  What  do  we 
admire?  Externals.  About  what  things  are  we  busy? 
Externals.  And  have  we  any  doubt  then  why  we  fear  or 
why  we  are  anxious  ?  What  then  happens  when  we  think 
the  things,  which  are  coming  on  us,  to  be  evils?  It  is  not 
in  our  power  not  to  be  afraid,  it  is  not  in  our  power  not  to 
be  anxious.  Then  we  say,  Lord  God,  how  shall  I  not  be 
anxious  ?  Fool,  have  you  not  hands,  did  not  God  make 
them  for  you  ?  Sit  down  now  and  pray  that  your  nose  may 
not  run.5  Wipe  yourself  rather  and  do  not  blame  him.  Well 
then,  has  he  given  to  you  nothing  in  the  present  case  ? 
Has  he  not  given  to  you  endurance  ?  has  he  not  given  to 
you  magnanimity?  has  he  not  given  to  you  manliness? 
When  you  have  such  hands,  do  you  still  look  for  one  who 
Bhall  wipe  your  nose  ?  But  we  neither  study  these  things 
nor  care  for  them.  Give  me  a  man  who  cares  how  he 
shall  do  any  thing,  not  for  the  obtaining  of  a  thing,  but 
who  cares  about  his  own  energy.  What  man,  when  he  is 
walking  about,  cares  for  his  own  energy  ?  who,  when  he 
is  deliberating,  cares  about  his  own  deliberation,  and  not 
about  obtaining  that  about  which  he  deliberates?  And 
if  he  succeeds,  he  is  elated  and  says,  How  well  we  have 
deliberated ;  did  I  not  tell  you,  brother,  that  it  is  impos- 
sible, when  we  have  thought  about  any  thing,  that  it 
should  not  turn  out  thus  ?  But  if  the  thing  should  turn 
out  otherwise,  the  wretched  man  is  humbled ;  he  knows 
not  even  what  to  say  about  what  has  taken  place.  Who 

5  By  the  words  *  Sit  down '  Epictetus  indicates  the  man's  baseness  and 
indolence,  who  wishes  God  to  do  for  him  that  which  he  can  do  himself 
bud  ought  to  do.  Schweig. 


EPICTETT7S.  149 

is  for  the    sake   of  this  matttr   lias   consulted  a 
Tho  among  us  as  to  his  actions  has  not  slept  in  in- 
?6    Who  ?   Give  (name)  to  me  one  that  I  may  see 
whom  I  have  long  been  looking  for,  who  is  truly 
.ad  ingenuous,  whether  young  or  old  ;  name  him.7 

then  are  we  still  surprised,  if  we  are  well  prac- 
j.sed  in  thinking  about  matters  (any  given  subject),  but 
in  our  acts  are  low,  without  decency,  worthless,  cowardly, 
impatient  of  labour,  altogether  bad  ?  For  we  do  not  care 
about  these  things  nor  do  we  study  them.  But  if  we  had 
feared  not  death  or  banishment,  but  fear  itself,8  we  should 
have  studied  not  to  fall  into  those  things  which  appear  to 
us  evils.  Now  in  the  school  we  are  irritable  and  wordy ; 
and  if  any  little  question  arises  about  any  of  these  things, 
we  are  able  to  examine  them  fully.  But  drag  us  to  prac- 
tice, and  you  will  find  us  miserably  shipwrecked.  Let 
some  disturbing  appearance  come  on  us,  and  you  will 
know  what  we  have  been  studying  and  in  what  we  have 
been  exercising  ourselves.  Consequently  through  want  of 
discipline  we  are  always  adding  something  to  the  appear- 
ance and  representing  things  to  be  greater  than  what  they 

6  So  Schweighaeuser  explains  this  difficult  passage.  Perhaps  he  i* 
i  ight.  This  part  of  the  chapter  is  obscure. 

1  *  It  is  observable,  that  this  most  practical  of  all  the  philosophers 
owns  his  endeavours  met  with  little  or  no  success  among  his  scholars. 
The  Apostles  speak  a  very  different  language  in  their  epistles  to  the 
first  converts  of  Christianity :  and  the  Acts  of  the  Apostles,  and  all  the 
monuments  of  the  primitive  ages  bear  testimony  to  the  reformation  of 
manners  produced  by  the  Gospel.  This  difference  of  success  might 
indeed  justly  be  expected  from  the  difference  of  the  two  systems/  Mrs. 
Carter. — I  have  not  quoted  this  note  of  Mrs.  Carter,  because  I  think 
that  it  is  true.  We  do  not  know  what  was  the  effect  of  the  teaching  of 
Epictetus,  unless  this  passage  informs  us,  if  Mrs.  Carter  has  drawn  a 
right  inference  from  it.  The  language  of  Paul  to  the  Corinthians  is  not 
very  different  frdm  that  of  Epictetus,  and  he  speaks  very  unfavourably 
of  some  of  his  Corinthian  converts.  We  may  allow  that  *'  a  reformation 
of  manners  was  produced  by  the  Gospel "  hi  many  of  the  converts  to 
Christianity,  but  there  is  no  evidence  that  this  reformation  was  pro- 
duced in  all ;  and  there  is  evidence  that  it  was  not.  The  corruptions  in 
the  early  Christian  church  and  in  subsequent  ages  are  a  proof  that  the 
reforms  made  by  the  Gospel  were  neither  universal  nor  permanent;  and 
this  is  the  result  which  our  knowledge  of  human  nature  would  lead  ua 
to  f-xpect. 

•  bee  ii.  1.  13. 


150  EPICTETUS. 

are.     For  instance  as  to  myself,  when  I  ani  on  t 
and  look  down  on  the  deep  sea,  or  look  round 
see  no  land,  I  am  out  of  my  mind  and  imagine  i 
drink  np  all  this  water  if  I  am  wrecked,  and  i 
occur  to  me  that  three  pints  are  enough.      \\A 
disturbs  me?     The   sea?     No,    but   my  opinion.     A^ 
when  an  earthquake  shall  happen,  I  imagine  that  the  Ci 
is  going  to  fall  on  me ;  but  is  not  one  little  stone  enoug 
to  knock  my  brains  out  ? 

What  then  are  the  things  which  are  heavy  on  us  and 
.disturb  us?  What  else  than  opinions?  What  else  th^n 
opinions  lies  heavy  upon  him  who  goes  away  and  leaves 
his  companions  and  friends  and  places  and  habits  of  life? 
Now  little  children,  for  instance,  when  they  cry  on  the 
nurse  leaving  them  for  a  short  time,  forget  their  sorrow  if 
they  receive  a  small  cuke.  Do  you  choose  then  that  we 
should  compare  you  to  little  children? — No,  by  Zeus,  for 
I  do  not  wish  to  be  pacified  by  a  small  cake,  but  by  right 
opinions.— -And  what  are  these  ?  Such  as  a  man  ought  to 
study  all  day,  and  not  to  be  affected  by  any  thing  that  is 
not  his  own,  neither  by  companion  nor  place  nor  gym- 
nasia, and  not  even  by  his  own  body,  but  to  remember  the 
law  and  to  have  it  before  his  eyes.  And  what  is  the 
divine  law?  To  keep  a  man's  own,  not  to  claim  that 
which  belongs  to  others,  but  to  use  what  is  given,  and 
when  it  is  not  given,  not  to  desire  it ;  and  when  a  thing 
is  taken  away,  to  give  it  up  readily  and  immediately,  and 
to  be  thankful  for  the  time  that  a  man  has  had  the  use  of 
it,  if  you  would  not  cry  for  your  nurse  and  mamma.  For 
what  matter  does  it  make  by  what  thing  a  man  is  sub- 
dued, and  on  what  he  depends  ?  In  what  respect  are  you 
better  than  he  who  cries  for  a  girl,  if  you  grieve  for  a 
little  gymnasium,  and  little  porticoes  and  young  men  and 
isuch  places  of  amusement  ?  Another  comes  and  laments 
that  he  shall  no  longer  drink  the  water  of  Dirce.  Is  the 
Marcian  water  worse  than  that  of  Dirce  ?  But  I  was  used 
to  the  water  of  Dirce.9  And  you  in  turn  will  be  used  to 
the  other.  Then  if  you  become  attached  to  this  also,  cry 

•  Dirce  a  pure  stream  in  Boeotia,  which  flows  into  the  Ismenug, 
The  Marcian  water  is  the  Marcian  aqueduct  at  Rome,  which  was  con- 
structed B.O.  144,  and  was  the  best  water  that  Rome  had.  Some  or  tne 


EMCTETUS.  151 

for  this  too,  and  try  to  make  a  verse  like  the  verse  of 
Euripides, 

The  hot  baths  of  Nero  and  the  Marcian  water. 

See  how  tragedy  is  made  when  common  things  happen 
to  silly  men. 

"When  then  shall  I  see  Athens  again  and  the  Acropolis? 
Wretch,  are  yon  not  content  with  what  you  see  daily? 
have  you  any  thing  better  or  greater  to  see  than  the  sun, 
the  moon,  the  stars,  the  whole  earth,  the  sea?  But  it* 
indeed  you  comprehend  him  who  administers  the  "Whole, 
and  carry  him  about  in  yourself,  do  you  still  desire  small 
stones,  and  a  beautiful  rock  ?10  When  then  you  are  going 
to  leave  the  sun  itself  and  the  moon,  what  will  you  do  ? 
will  you  sit  and  weep  like  children?  Well,  what  have 
you  been  doing  in  the  school?  what  did  you  hear,  what 
did  you  learn  ?  why  did  you  write  yourself  a  philosopher, 
when  you  might  have  written  the  truth ;  as,  "  I  made 
certain  introductions,11  and  I  read  Cbrysippus,  but  I  did 
not  even  approach  the  door  of  a  philosopher."  For  how 
should  1 12  possess  any  thing  of  the  kind  which  Socrates 
possessed,  who  died  as  he  did,  who  lived  as  he  did,  or  any 
thing  such  as  Diogenes  possessed?  Do  you  think  that 
any  one  of  such  men  wept  or  grieved,  because  he  was  not 
going  to  see  a  certain  man,  or  a  certain  woman,  nor  to  be 
in  Athens  or  in  Corinth,  but,  if  it  should  so  happen,  in 
8usa  or  in  Ecbatana  ?  For  if  a  man  can  quit  the  banquet 
when  he  chooses,  and  no  longer  amuse  himself,  does  he 
still  stay  and  complain,  and  does  ho  not  stay,  as  at  any 
amusement,  only  so  long  as  he  is  pleased  ?  Such  a  man,  I 
suppose,  would  endure  perpetual  exile  or  to  be  condemned 
to  death.  Will  you  not  be  weaned  now,  like  children,  and 

arches  of  this  aqueduct  exist.  The  *  bright  stream  of  Dirce '  is  spoken 
of  in  the  Hercules  Furens  of  Euripides  (v.  573).  The  verse  in  the  text 
which  wo  may  suppose  that  Epictetus  made,  has  a  spondee  in  the  fourth 
place,  which  is  contrary  to  the  rule. 

10  The  *  small  stones '  are  supposed  to  be  the  marbles  which  decorated 
Athens,  and  the  rock  to  bo  the  Acropolis. 

11  In  the  original  it  is  Elo-aywyaL    It  was  a  name  used  for  short 
commentaries  on  the  principles  of  any  art;   such  as  we  now  call 
Introductions,  Compendiums,  Elements,    Gellius,  xvi.  8. 

12  See  Schweiac.'s  note. 


152  EPICTETUS. 

take  more  solid  food,  and  not  cry  after  mammae  and 
nurses,  which  are  the  lamentations  of  old  women  ? — But  if 
I  go  away,  I  shall  cause  them  sorrow. — You  cause  them 
sorrow  ?  By  no  means ;  but  that  will  cause  them  sorrow 
which  also  causes  you  sorrow,  opinion.  What  have  you 
to  do  then  ?  Take  away  your  own  opinion,  and  if  these 
women  are  wise,  they  will  take  away  their  own :  if  they 
do  not,  they  will  lament  through  their  own  fault. 

My  man,  as  the  proverb  says,  make  a  desperate  effort  on 
behalf  of  tranquillity  of  mind,  freedom  and  magnanimity. 
Lift  up  your  head  at  last  as  released  from  slavery.  Dare 
to  look  up  to  God  and  say,  Deal  with  me  for  the  future  as 
thou  wilt ;  I  am  of  the  same  •  mind  as  thou  art ;  I  am 
thine  :13  I  refuse  nothing  that  pleases  thee  :  lead  me  where 
thou  wilt:  clothe  me  in  any  dress  thou  choosest:  is  it 
thy  will  that  I  should  hold  the  office  of  a  magistrate,  that 
I  should  be  in  the  condition  of  a  private  man,  stay  here 
or  be  an  exile,  be  poor,  be  rich  ?  I  will  make  thy  defence 
to  men  in  behalf  of  all  these  conditions : u  I  will  shew 
the  nature  of  each  thing  what  it  is. — You  will  not  do  so ; 
but  sit  in  an  ox's  belly15  and  wait  for  your  mamma  till  she 
shall  feed  you.  Who  would  Hercules  have  been,  if  he 
had  sat  at  home  ?  He  would  have  been  Eurystheus  and 
not  Hercules.  Well,  and  in  his  travels  through  the  world 
how  many  intimates  and  how  many  friends  had  he  ?  Bui 
nothing  more  dear  to  him  than  God.  For  this  reason  it 
was  believed  that  he  was  the  son  of  God,  and  he  was.  In 
obedience  to  God  then  he  went  about  purging  away  in- 
justice and  lawlessness.  But  you  are  not  Hercules  and 
you  are  not  able  to  purge  away  the  wickedness  of  others ; 
nor  yet  are  you  Theseus,  able  to  purge  away  the  evil 

18  The  MSS.  have  foos  dpi :  but  the  emendation  of  Salmasius,  o-Js 
€/V",  is  certain. 

14  it  There  are  innumerable  passages  in  St.  Paul,  which,  in  reality, 
bear  that  noble  testimony  which  Epictetus  here  requires  in  his  imaginary 
character.  Such  are  those  in  which  he  glories  in  tribulation ;  speaks 
with  an  heroic  contempt  of  life,  when  set  in  competition  with  the 
performance  of  his  duty ;  rejoices  in  bonds  and  imprisonments,  and  the 
view  of  his  approaching  martyrdom ;  and  represents  afflictions  as  a 
proof  of  God's  love.  See  Acts  xx.  23,  24 ;  Bom.  v.  3,  viii.  88-39 ;  2  Tinx 
iv.  6."— Mrs.  Carter. 

19  The  meaning  is  uncertain.    See  Schweighaeuser's  note. 


EPIOTETUS.  153 

things  of  Attica  Clear  away  your  own.  From  yourself, 
from  your  thoughts  cast  away  instead  of  Procrustes  and 
Sciron,16  sadness,  fear,  desire,  envy,  malevolence,  avarice, 
effeminacy,  intemperance.  But  it  is  not  possible  to  eject 
these  things  otherwise  than  by  looking  to  God  only,  by 
fixing  your  affections  on  him  only,  by  being  consecrated 
to  his  commands.  But  if  you  choose  any  thing  else,  you 
will  with  sighs  and  groans  be  compelled  to  follow17  what 
is  stronger  than  yourself,  always  seeking  tranquillity  and 
never  able  to  find  it;  for  you  seek  tranquillity  there 
where  it  is  not,  and  you  neglect  to  seek  it  where  it  is. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

HOW  WE  MUST  ADAPT  PRECONCEPTIONS  TO  PARTICULAR 

CASES. 

WHAT  is  the  first  business  of  him  who  philosophizes  ?  To 
throw  away  self-conceit  (ofycrts).1  For  it  is  impossible  for 
a  man  to  begin  to  learn  that  which  he  thinks  that  he 
knows.  As  to  things  then  which  ought  to  be  done  and 
ought  not  to  be  done,  and  good  and  bad,  and  beautiful 
and  ugly,  all  of  us  talking  of  them  at  random  go  to  the 
philosophers ;  and  on  these  matters  we  praise,  we  censure, 
we  accuse,  we  blame,  we  judge  and  determine  about  prin- 
ciples honourable  and  dishonourable.  But  why  do  we  go 
to  the  philosophers  ?  Because  we  wish  to  learn  what  we  do 
not  think  that  we  know.  And  what  is  this  ?  Theorems.2 
For  we  wish  to  learn  what  philosophers  say  as  being 
something  elegant  and  acute ;  and  some  wish  to  learn  that 

lf  Procrustes  and  Sciron,  two  robbers  who  infested  Attica  and  were 
destroyed  by  Theseus,  as  Plutarch  tells  in  his  life  of  Theseus. 

IT  Antoninus  x.  28,  "  only  to  the  rational  animal  is  it  given  to  follow 
voluntarily  what  happens;  but  simply  to  follow  is  a  necessity  imposed 
on  all."  Compare  Seneca,  Quaest.  Nat.  ii.  59. 

1  See  ii.  11. 1,  and  iii.  14.  8. 

8  Theorems  are  defined  by  Cicero,  de  Fato,  c.  6,  *Percepta  appello 
quae  dicuntur  Graece  0ewpVaTa»* 


154  EPICTETUS. 

they  may  get  profit  from  what  they  learn.  It  is  ridiculous 
then  to  think  that  a  person  wishes  to  learn  one  thing,  and 
will  learn  another;  or  further,  that  a  man  will  make  pro- 
ficiency in  that  which  he  does  not  learn.  But  the  many 
are  deceived  by  this  which  deceived  also  the  rhetorician 
Theopompus,3  when  he  blames  even  Plato  for  wishing 
everything  to  be  denned.  For  what  does  he  say?  Did 
none  of  us  before  you  use  the  words  Good  or  Just,  or  do 
we  utter  the  sounds  in  an  unmeaning  and  empty  way 
without  understanding  what  they  severally  signify  ?  Now 
who  tells  you,  Theopompus,  that  we  had  not  natural 
notions  of  each  of  these  things  and  preconceptions  (Trpo- 
\yj\l/€i<i)  ?  But  it  is  not  possible  to  adapt  preconceptions 
to  their  correspondent  objects  if  we  have  riot  distinguished 
(analyzed)  them,  and  inquired  what  object  must  be  sub- 
jected to  each  preconception.  You  may  make  the  same 
charge  against  physicians  also.  For  who  among  us  did 
not  use  the  words  healthy  and  unhealthy  before  Hippo- 
crates lived,  or  did  we  utter  these  words  as  empty  sounds  ? 
For  we  have  also  a  certain  preconception  of  health,4  but 
we  are  not  able  to  adapt  it.  For  this  reason  one  says, 
abstain  from  food ;  another  says,  give  food ;  another 
says,  bleed  ;  and  another  says,  use  cupping.  What  is  the 
reason?  is  it  any  other  than  that  a  man  cannot  properly 
adapt  the  preconception  of  health  to  particulars? 

So  it  is  in  this  matter  also,  in  the  things  which  concern 
life.  Who  among  us  does  not  speak  of  good  and  bad,  of 
useful  and  not  useful ;  for  who  among  us  has  not  a  pre- 
conception of  each  of  these  things  ?  Is  it  then  a  distinct 
and  perfect  preconception  ?  Show  this.  How  shall  I  show 
this  ?  Adapt  the  preconception  properly  to  the  particular 
things.  Plato,  for  instance,  subjects  definitions  to  the 
preconception  of  the  useful,  but  you  to  the  preconception 
of  the  useless.  Is  it  possible  then  that  both  of  you  are 

3  This  rhetorician  or  orator,  as  Epictetus  names  him,  appears  to  be 
the  same  person  as  Theopompus  of  Chios,  the  historian. 

4  'That  Epictetus  does  not  quite  correctly  compare  the  notion  of 
what  is  wholesome  to  the  human  body  with  the  preconceived  notion 
(anticipata  notione)  of  moral  good  and  bad,  will  be  apparent  to  those 
who  have  carefully  inquired  into  the  various  origin  and  principles  of 
our  notions.'    Sch weigh.    Also  see  his  note  on  av 


EPIOTETUS.  155 

right?  How  is  it  possible?  Does  not  one  man  adapt 
the  preconception  of  good  to  the  matter  of  wealth,  and 
another  not  to  wealth,  but  to  the  matter  of  pleasure  and  to 
that  of  health  ?  For,  generally,  if  all  of  us  who  use  those 
words  know  sufficiently  each  of  them,  and  need  no  dili- 
gence in  resolving  (making  distinct)  the  notions  of  the 
preconceptions,  why  do  we  differ,  why  do  we  quarrel,  why 
do  we  blame  one  another  ? 

And  why  do  I  now  allege  this  contention  with  one  an- 
other and  speak  of  it?  If  you  yourself  properly  adapt  your 
preconceptions,  why  are  you  unhappy,  why  are  you  hin- 
dered ?  Let  us  omit  at  present  the  second  topic  about  the 
pursuits  (op/xas)  and  the  study  of  the  duties  which  relate  to 
them.  Let  us  omit  also  the  third  topic,  which  relates  to  the 
assents  ((juy/cara^ecrets) :  I  give  up  to  you  these  two  topics. 
Let  us  insist  upon  the  first,  which  presents  an  almost 
obvious  demonstration  that  wo  do  not  properly  adapt  tho 
preconceptions.5  Do  you  now  desire  that  which  is  possible 
and  that  which  is  possible  to  you?  Why  then  are  you 
hindered  ?  why  are  you  unhappy  ?  Do  you  not  now  try 
to  avoid  the  unavoidable?  "Why  then  do  you  fall  in  with 
any  thing  which  you  would  avoid  ?  Why  are  you  unfor- 
tunate ?  Why,  when  you  desire  a  thing,  does  it  not  happen, 
and,  when  you  do  not  desire  it,  does  it  happen?  For  this 
is  the  greatest  proof  of  unhappiness  and  misery :  I  wish 
for  something,  and  it  does  not  happen.  And  what  is  more 
wretched  than  I  ?6 

It  was  because  she  could  not  endure  this  that  Medea 
came  to  murder  her  children :  an  act  of  a  noble  spirit  in 
this  view  at  least,  for  she  had  a  just  opinion  what  it  is 
for  a  thing  not  to  succeed  which  a  person  wishes.  Then 
she  says,  '  Thus  I  shall  bo  avenged  on  him  (my  husband) 
who  has  wronged  and  insulted  me  ;  and  what  shall  I  gain 
if  he  is  punished  thus  ?  how  then  shall  it  be  done  ?  I 
shall  kill  my  children,  but  I  shall  punish  myself  also  : 
and  what  do  I  care?'7  This  is  the  aberration  of  soul 
which  possesses  great  energy.  For  she  did  not  know 

*  The  topic  of  the  desires  and  aversions.    Sec,  iii.  c.  2. 
9  Compare  i.  c.  27, 10. 

7  Thibis  the  meaning  of  what  Medea  says  in  the  Medea  of  Kuripidea 
Epictetua  does  not  give  the  words  of  the  poet. 


156  EPICTETUS. 

wherein  lies  the  doing  of  that  which  wo  wish ;  that  you 
cannot  get  this  from  without,  nor  yet  by  the  alteration 
and  new  adaptation  of  things.  Do  not  desire  the  man 
(Jason,  Medea's  husband),  and  nothing  which  you  desire 
will  fail  to  happen :  do  not  obstinately  desire  that  he 
shall  live  with  you :  do  not  desire  to  remain  in  Gcrinth ; 
and  in  a  word  desire  nothing  than  that  which  God  wills. — 
And  who  shall  hinder  you  ?  who  shall  compel  you  ?  No 
man  shall  compel  you  any  more  than  he  shall  compel  Zeus. 

When  you  have  such  a  guide8  and  your  wishes  and 
desires  are  the  same  as  his,  why  do  you  still  fear  dis- 
appointment? Givo  up  your  desire  to  wealth  and  your 
aversion  to  poverty,  and  you  will  be  disappointed  in  the 
one,  you  will  fall  into  the  other.  Well  give  them  up 
to  health,  and  you  will  be  unfortunate  :  give  them  up  to 
magistracies,  honours,  country,  friends,  children,  in  a  word 
to  any  of  the  things  which  are  not  in  man's  power  (and 
you  will  be  unfortunate).  But  give  them  up  to  Zeus 
and  to  the  rest  of  the  gods ;  surrender  them  to  the  gods, 
let  the  gods  govern,  let  your  desire  and  aversion  be  ranged 
on  the  side  of  the  gods,  and  wherein  will  you  be  any 
longer  unhappy?9  But  if,  lazy  wretch,  you  envy,  and 
complain,  and  are  jealous,  and  fear,  and  never  cease  for 
a  single  day  complaining  both  of  yourself  and  of  the  gods, 
why  do  you  still  speak  of  being  educated?  What  kind 
of  an  education,  man  ?  Do  you  mean  that  you  have  been 
employed  about  sophistical  syllogisms  ((nAAoyiayxovs  /x,era- 
TriTTTovTas)  ? 10  Will  you  not,  if  it  is  possible,  unlearn  all 
these  things  and  begin  from  the  beginning,  and  see  at 
the  same  time  that  hitherto  you  have  not  even  touched  the 
matter ;  and  then  commencing  from  this  foundation,  will 
you  not  build  up  all  that  comes  after,  so  that  nothing  may 
happen  which  you  do  not  choose,  and  nothing  shall  fail 
to  happen  which  you  do  choose  ? 

Give  me  one  young  man  who  has  come  to  the  school 
with  this  intention,  who  is  become  a  champion  for  this 
matter  and  says,  *  I  give  up  every  thing  else,  and  it  is 

1  Compare  iv.  7.  20. 

9  '  If  you  would  subject  all  things  to  yourself,  subject  yourself  to 
reason/    Seneca.  Ep.  37. 
>•  See  i.  7. 1. 


EPICTETUB.  157 

enough  for  me  if  it  shall  ever  be  in  my  power  to  pass  my 
life  free  from  hindrance  and  free  from  trouble,  and  to  stretch 
out  (present)  my  neck  to  all  things  like  a  free  man,  and 
to  look  up  to  heaven  as  a  friend  of  God  and  fear  nothing 
that  can  happen.5  Let  any  of  you  point  out  such  a  man 
that  I  may  say,  *  Come,  young  man,  into  the  possession 
of  that  which  is  your  own,  for  it  is  your  destiny  to  adorn 
philosophy  :  yours  are  these  possessions,  yours  these  books, 
yours  these  discourses.'  Then  when  he  shall  have  la- 
boured sufficiently  and  exercised  himself  in  this  part  of 
the  matter  (TOTTOV),  let  him  come  to  me  again  and  gay, 
*  I  desire  to  be  free  from  passion  and  free  from  pertur- 
bation ;  and  I  wish  as  a  pious  man  and  a  philosopher  and 
a  diligent  person  to  know  what  is  my  duty  to  the  gods, 
what  to  my  parents,  what  to  my  brothers,  what  to  my 
country,  what  to  strangers.'  (I  say)  l  Come  also  to  the 
second  matter  (TOTTO^  :  this  also  is  yours.' — '  But  I  have 
now  sufficiently  studied  the  second  part  (TOTTOV)  also,  and 
I  would  gladly  be  secure  and  unshaken,  and  not  only  when 
I  am  awake,  but  also  when  I  am  asleep,  and  when  I  am 
filled  with  wine,  and  when  I  am  melancholy.'  Man,  you 
are  a  god,  you  have  great  designs. 

No :  but  I  wisli  to  understand  what  Chrysippus  says  in 
his  treatise  of  the  Pseudomenos11  (the  Liar). —  Will  you 
not  hang  yourself,  wretch,  with  such  your  intention  ?  And 
what  good  will  it  do  you  ?  You  will  read  the  whole  with 
sorrow,  and  you  will  speak  to  others  trembling.  Thus 
you  also  do.  "  Do  you  wish  me,12  brother,  to  read  to 
you,  and  you  to  me"? — You  write  excellently,  my  man; 
and  you  also  excellently  in  the  style  of  Xenophon,  and  you 

11  The  Pseudomenos  was  a  treatise  by  Chrysippus  (Diog.  Laert.  vii. 
Chrysippus).    "  The  Pseudomenos  was  a  famous  problem  among  the 
Stoics,  and  it  is  this.    When  a  person  says,  I  lie;  doth  he  lie,  or  doth 
he  not?    If  he  lies,  he  speaks  truth :  if  he  speaks  truth,  he  lies.    The 
.philosophers  composed  many  books  on  this  difficulty.    Chrysippus 
wrote  six.     Philetas    wasted    himself  in   studying    to  answer  it/' 
Mrs.  Carter. 

12  Epictetus  is  ridiculing  the  men  who  compliment  one  another  on 
their  writings.    Upton  compares  Horace,  Epp.  ii.  2.  87. 

ut  alter 

Alter'ms  sermone  meros  audlret  honores— 
Discedo  Alcaeus  puncto  illius?  ille  meo  quls? 
Quia  nisi  Cailimachus  ? 


158  EP10TETUS. 

in  the  style  of  Plato,  and  you  in  the  style  of  Antisthenes, 
Then  having  told  your  dreams  to  one  another  you  return 
to  the  same  things :  your  desires  are  the  same,  your 
aversions  the  same,  your  pursuits  are  the  same,  and  your 
designs  and  purposes,  you  wish  for  the  same  things  and 
work  for  the  same.  In  the  next  place  you  do  not  even 
seek  for  one  to  give  you  advice,  but  you  are  vexed  if  you 
hear  such  things  (as  I  say).  Then  you  say,  "  An  ill-na- 
tured old  fellow :  when  1  was  going  away,  he  did  not 
weep  nor  did  he  say,  Into  what  danger  you  are  going :  if 
you  come  off  safe,  my  child,  I  will  burn  lights.13  This  is 
what  a  good  natured  man  would  do."  It  will  be  a  great 
thing  for  you  if  you  do  return  safe,  and  it  will  be  worth 
while  to  burn  lights  for  such  a  person  :  for  you  ought  to 
be  immortal  and  exempt  from  disease. 

Casting  away  then,  as  I  say;  this  conceit  of  thinking 
that  we  know  something  useful,  we  must  come  to  philo- 
sophy as  we  apply  to  geometry,  and  to  music:  but  if  we 
do  not,  we  shall  not  even  approach  to  proficiency  though 
we  read  all  the  collections14  and  commentaries  of  Chry- 
sippus  and  those  of  Antipater  and  Archedemus,16 


CHAPTEK  XVIII. 

HOW  WE  SHOULD  STRUGGLE  AGAINST  APPEARANCES. 

EVERY  habit  and  faculty1  is  maintained  and  increased  by 
the  corresponding  actions  :  the  habit  of  walking  by  walk- 
ing, the  habit  of  running  by  running.  If  you  would  be  a 
good  reader,  read ;  if  a  writer,  write.  But  when  you  shall 
not  have  read  for  thirty  days  in  succession,  but  have  done 
something  else,  you  will  know  the  consequence.  In  the 
same  way,  if  you  shall  have  lain  down  ten  days,  get  up 

18  Compare  i.  19.  4, 

14  Schweighaeuser  has  no  doubt  that  we  ought  instead  of  ffwaywyfa, 
1  collections,'  to  read  eiffaywyds,  '  introductions.' 

15  As  to  Archedemus,  see  ii.  4, 11 ;  and  Antipater,  ii.  19,  2, 
'  See  iv.  c.  12, 


KPICTETUS.  159 

and  attempt  to  make  a  long  walk,  and  you  will  see  how 
your  legs  are  weakened.  Gencially  then  if  you  would 
make  any  thing  a  habit,  do  it;  if  you  would  not  make  it 
a  habit,  do  not  do  it,  but  accustom  yourself  to  do  something 
else  in  place  of  it. 

So  it  is  with  respect  to  the  affections  of  the  soul :  when 
you  have  been  angry,  you  must  know  that  not  only  has 
this  evil  befallen  you,  but  that  you  have  also  increased  the 
habit,  and  in  a  manner  thrown  fuel  upon  fire.  When  you 
have  been  overcome  in  sexual  intercourse  with  a  person, 
do  not  reckon  this  single  defeat  only,  but  reckon  that  you 
have  also  nurtured,  increased  your  incontinence.  For  it 
is  impossible  for  habits  and  faculties,  some  of  them  not  to 
be  produced,  when  they  did  not  exist  before,  and  others 
not  be  increased  and  strengthened  by  corresponding  acts. 

In  this  manner  certainly,  as  philosophers  say,  also  dis- 
eases of  the  mind  grow  up.2  For  when  you  have  once 
desired  money,  if  reason  be  applied  to  lead  to  a  per- 
ception of  the  evil,  the  desire  is  stopped,  and  the  ruling 
faculty  of  our  mind  is  restored  to  the  original  authority. 
But  if  you  apply  no  means  of  cure,  it  no  longer  returns  to 
the  same  state,  but  being  again  excited  by  the  correspond- 
ing appearance,  it  is  inflamed  to  desire  quicker  than  be- 
fore :  and  when  this  takes  place  continually,  it  is  hence- 
forth hardened  (made  callous),  and  the  disease  of  the  mind 
confirms  the  love  of  money.  For  he  who  has  had  a  fever, 
and  has  been  relieved  from  it,  is  not  in  the  same  state 
that  he  was  before,  unless  he  has  been  completely  cured. 
Something  of  the  kind  happens  also  in  diseases  of  the  soul. 
Certain  traces  and  blisters  are  left  in  it,  and  unless  a  man 
shall  completely  efface  them,  when  he  is  again  lashed  on 
the  same  places,  the  lash  will  produce  not  blisters  (weals) 
but  sores.  If  then  you  wish  not  to  be  of  an  angry  temper, 
do  not  feed  the  habit :  throw  nothing  on  it  which  will 
increase  it :  at  first  keep  quiet,  and  count  the  days  on 
which  you  have  not  been  angry.  I  used  to  be  in  passion 
every  day ;  now  every  second  day ;  then  every  third,  then 
every  fourth.  But  if  you  have  intermitted  thirty  days, 
make  a  sacrifice  to  God.  For  the  habit  at  first  begins  to 

'Aegrotationes     quae     appellantur     a    Stoicia 
Cicero,  T>isc.  iv.  10, 


160 

be  weakened,  and  then  is  completely  destroyed.  "  I  have 
not  been  vexed  to-day,  nor  the  day  after,  nor  yet  on  any 
succeeding  day  during  two  or  three  months  ;  but  I  took 
care  when  some  exciting  things  happened."  Be  assured 
that  you  are  in  a  good  way.3  To-day  when  I  saw  a 
handsome  person,  I  did  not  say  to  myself,  I  wish  I  could 
lie  with  her,  and  Happy  is  her  husband  ;  for  he  who  says 
this  says,  Happy  is  her  adulterer  also.  Nor  do  I  picture 
the  rest  to  my  mind  ;  the  woman  present,  and  stripping 
herself  and  lying  down  by  my  side.  I  stroke  my  head 
and  say,  Well  done,  Epictetus,  you  have  solved  a  fine  little 
sophism,  much  finer  than  that  which  is  called  the  master 
sophism.  And  if  even  the  woman  is  willing,  and  gives 
signs,  and  sends  messages,  and  if  she  also  fondle  me  and 
come  close  to  me,  and  I  should  abstain  and  be  victorious, 
that  would  be  a  sophism  beyond  that  which  is  named  the 
Liar,  and  the  Quiescent.4  Over  such  a  victory  as  this  a 
man  may  justly  be  proud  ;  not  for  proposing  the  master 
sophism. 

How  then  shall  this  be  done  ?  Be  willing  at  length  to 
be  approved  by  yourself,  be  willing  to  appear  beautiful 
to  God,  desire  to  be  in  purity  with  your  own  pure  self 
and  with  God.  Then  when  any  such  appearance  visits 
you,  Plato  says,6  Have  recourse  to  expiations,  go  a  sup* 
pliant  to  the  temples  of  the  averting  deities.  It  is  even 
sufficient  if  you  resort  to  the  society  of  noble  and  just 
men,  and  compare  yourself  with  them,  whether  you  find 
one  who  is  living  or  dead.  Go  to  Socrates  and  see  him 
lying  down  with  Alcibiades,  and  mocking  his  beauty: 


tyus  ffol  Iffrt.    Compare  the  Gospel  of  St.  John  iv.  52, 
irap9  avruv  rV  &pa-v  tv  y  Ko^tirepov  %<TX€- 
4  Placet  enim  Ohrysippo  cum  gradatim  interrogetur,  verbi  causa, 
tria  pauca  sint  anne  multa,  aliquanto  prius  quam  ad  multa  perveniat 
quiescere  ;  id  est  quod  ab  iis  dicitur  yffvxdfav.     Cicero,  Aead.  ii.  Pr. 
29.   Compare  Persius,  Sat.  vi.  80  : 

Depinge  ubi  Bistam, 
Inventus.  Chrysippe,  tui  finltor  acervL 

*  The  passage  is  in  Plato,  Laws,  ix.  p.  854,  Zrav  <rot  vpoffviTrrrj  n  TW* 
roiotTw  tioyndruv,  etc.  The  conclusion  is,  l  if  you  cannot  be  cured  of 
your  (mental)  disease,  seek  death  which  is  better  and  depart  from 
life.'  This  bears  some  resemblance  to  the  precept  in  Matthew  vi.  29 
4  And  if  thy  right  eye  offend  thee,  pluck  it  out  and  cast  it  from 
thee/  (to. 


EPICTETUS.  161 

consider  what  a  victory  he  at  last  found  that  he  had 
gained  over  himself ;  what  an  Olympian  victory ;  in  what 
number  he  stood  from  Hercules ; 6  so  that,  by  the  Gods, 
one  may  justly  salute  him,  Hail,  wondrous  man,  you  who 
have  conquered  not  these  sorry  boxers7  and  pancratiasts, 
nor  yet  those  who  are  like  them,  the  gladiators.  By 
placing  these  objects  on  the  other  side  you  will  conquer  the 
appearance :  you  will  not  be  drawn  away  by  it.  But  in 
the  first  place  be  not  hurried  away  by  the  rapidity  of  the 
appearance,  but  say,  Appearances,  wait  for  me  a  little :  let 
me  see  who  you  are,  and  what  you  are  about : 8  let  me  put 
you  to  the  test.  And  then  do  not  allow  the  appearance  to 
lead  you  on  and  draw  lively  pictures  of  the  things  which 
will  follow ;  for  if  you  do,  it  will  carry  you  off  wherever 
it  pleases.  But  rather  bring  in  to  oppose  it  some  other 
beautiful  and  noble  appearance  and  cast  out  this  base 
appearance.  And  if  you  are  accustomed  to  be  exercised 
in  this  way,  you  will  see  what  shoulders,  what  sinews, 
what  strength  you  have.  But  now  it  is  only  trifling 
words,  and  nothing  more. 

This  is  the  true  athlete,  the  man  who  exercises  himself 
against  such  appearances.  Stay,  wretch,  do  not  be  carried 
away.  Great  is  the  combat,  divine  is  the  work ;  it  is  for 
kingship,  for  freedom,  for  happiness,  for  freedom  from 
perturbation.  Eemember  God :  call  on  him  as  a  helper 
and  protector,  as  men  at  sea  call  on  the  Dioscuri9  in  a 
Btorm.  For  what  is  a  greater  storm  than  that  which, 
comes  from  appearances  which  are  violent  and  drive  away 
the  reason  ?10  For  the  storm  itself,  what  else  is  it  but  an 
appearance  ?  For  take  away  the  fear  of  death,  and  suppose 

•  Hercules  is  said  to  have  established  gymnastic  contests  and  to  have 
been  the  first  victor.    Those  who  gained  the  victory  both  in  wrestling 
and  in  the  pancratium  were  reckoned  in  the  list  of  victors  as  coming  in 
the  second  or  third  place  after  him,  and  so  on. 

1  I  have  followed  Wolff's    conjecture  irt/KTas  instead  of  the  old 
reading  rralKras. 

•  Compare  iii.  12. 15. 

9  Castor  and  Pollux.    Horace,  Cai  m.  i.  12  :— 

Quorum  slmul  alba  nautis 
Stella  refulslt,  etc. 

"  Gellius,  xix.  c.  1, '  visa  quae  vi  quadam  sua  se&e  inferunt  nose* 
tanda  hominibus.' 


162  EPICTETUS. 

as  many  thunders  and  lightnings  as  you  please,  and  you 
will  know  what  calm11  and  serenity  there  is  in  the  ruling 
faculty.  But  if  you  have  once  been  defeated  and  say  that 
you  will  conquer  hereafter,  and  then  say  the  same  again, 
be  assured  that  you  will  at  last  be  in  so  wretched  a 
condition  and  so  weak  that  you  will  not  even  know 
afterwards  that  you  are  doing  wrong,  but  you  will  even 
begin  to  make  apologies  (defences)  for  your  wrong  doing, 
and  then  you  will  confirm  the  saying  of  Hesiod12  to  be 
true, 

With  constant  ills  the  dilatory  strives. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

AGAINST   THOSE   WHO   EMBRACE   PHILOSOPHICAL  OPINIONS  ONLY 
IN  WORDS.1 

THE  argument  called  the  ruling  argument  (6  Kvpievw 
Xoyos)2  appears  to  have  been  proposed  from  such  prin- 
ciples as  these :  there  is  in  fact  a  common  contradiction 
between  one  another  in  these  three  propositions,  each  two 
being  in  contradiction  to  the  third.  The  propositions  are, 
that  every  thing  past  must  of  necessity  be  true ;  that  an 
impossibility  does  not  follow  a  possibility ;  and  that  a  thing 
is  possible  which  neither  is  nor  will  be  true.  Diodorus3 
observing  this  contradiction  employed  the  probative  force 
of  the  first  two  for  the  demonstration  of  this  proposition, 
That  nothing  is  possible  which  is  not  true  and  never  will 

11  *  Consider  that  every  thing  is  opinion,  and  opinion  is  in  thy  power. 
Take  away  then,  when  thou  choosest,  thy  opinion,  and  like  a  mariner, 
who  has  doubled  the  promontory,  thou  wilt  find  calm,  every  thing 
stable,  and  a  waveless  pay.'    Antoninus,  xii.  22. 

12  Hesiod,  Works  and  Days,  v.  411. 

1  Compare  Gellius  xvii.  c.  19. 

2  See  the  long  note  communicated  to  Upton  by  James  Harris ;  and 
Schweighaeuser's  note. 

3  Diodorus,  surnamed  Cronus,  lived  at  Alexandria  in  the  time  of 
Ptolemaeus  Soter.    He  was  of  tht  school  named  the  Megaric,  and  dis- 
tinguished in  dialectic. 


EPIOTETUS.  163 

be.  Now  another  will  hold  these  two  :  That  something  is 
possible,  which  is  neither  true  nor  ever  will  be  :  and  That 
an  impossibility  does  not  follow  a  possibility.  But  he 
will  not  allow  that  every  thing  which  is  past  is  necessarily 
true,  as  the  followers  of  Cleanthes  seem  to  think,  and 
Antipater  copiously  defended  them.  But  others  maintain 
the  other  two  propositions,  That  a  thing  is  possible  which 
is  neither  true  nor  will  be  true :  and  That  everything 
which  is  past  is  necessarily  true ;  but  then  they  will 
maintain  that  an  impossibility  can  follow  a  possibility. 
But  it  is  impossible  to  maintain  these  three  propositions, 
because  of  their  common  contradiction.4 

If  then  any  man  should  ask  me,  which  of  these  propo- 
sitions do  you  maintain?  I  will  answer  him,  that  I  do 
not  know ;  but  I  have  received  this  story,  that  Diodorus 
maintained  one  opinion,  the  followers  of  Panthoides,  I 
think,  and  Cleanthes  maintained  another  opinion,  and 
those  of  Chrysippus  a  third.  What  then  is  your  opinion  ? 
I  was  not  made  for  this  purpose,  to  examine  the  appear- 
ances that  occur  to  me,  and  to  compare  what  others  say 
and  to  form  an  opinion  of  my  own  on  the  thing.  Therefore 
I  differ  not  at  all  from  the  grammarian.  Who  was  Hector's 
father  ?  Priam.  Who  were  his  brothers  ?  Alexander  and 
Deiphobus.  Who  was  their  mother?  Hecuba.  —  I  have 
heard  this  story.  From  whom  ?  From  Homer.  And  Hel- 
lanicus  also,  I  think,  writes  about  the  same  things,  and 
perhaps  others  like  him.  And  what  further  have  I  about 
the  ruling  argument  ?  Nothing.  But,  if  I  am  a  vain 
man,  especially  at  a  banquet  i  surprise  the  guests  by 
enumerating  those  who  have  written  on  these  matters. 
Both  Chrysippus  has  written  wonderfully  in  his  first  book 
about  Possibilities,  and  Cleanthes  has  written  specially  on 
the  subject,  and  Archedemus.  Antipater  also  has  written, 
not  only  in  his  work  about  Possibilities,  but  also  separately 
in  his  work  on  the  ruling  argument.  Have  you  not  read 
the  work  ?  I  have  not  read  it.  Eead.  And  what  profit 
will  'a  man  have  from  it  ?  he  will  be  more  trifling  and 
impertinent  than  he  is  now ;  for  what  else  have  you 
gained  by  reading  it  ?  What  opinion  have  you  formed  ou 

4  If  you  assume  any  two  of  these  three,  they  must  be  in  contradiction 
to  the  third  and  destroy  it 

M  2 


16 1  EPICTETUS. 

this  subject?  none;  but  you  will  tell  us  of  Helen  and 
Priam,  and  the  island  of  Calypso  which  never  was  and 
never  will  be.  And  in  this  matter  indeed  it  is  of  no  great 
importance  if  you  retain  the  story,  but  have  formed  no 
opinion  of  your  own.  But  in  matters  of  morality  (Ethic) 
this  happens  to  us  much  more  than  in  these  things  of 
which  we  are  speaking. 

Speak  to  me  about  good  and  evil.     Listen  : 

The  wind  from  Ilium  to  Ciconian  shores 
Brought  me.5— Odyssey,  ix.  39. 

Of  things  some  are  good,  some  are  bad,  and  others  are 
indifferent.  The  good  then  are  the  virtues  and  the  things 
which  partake  of  the  virtues :  the  bad  are  the  vices,  and 
the  things  which  partake  of  them ;  and  the  indifferent  are 
the  things  which  lie  between  the  virtues  and  the  vices, 
wealth,  health,  life,  death,  pleasure,  pain.  Whence  do  you 
know  this  ?  Hellanicus  says  it  in  his  Egyptian  history ; 
for  what  difference  does  it  make  to  say  this,  or  to  say  that 
Diogenes  has  it  in  his  Ethic,  or  Chrysippus  or  Cleanthes  ? 
Have  you  then  examined  any  of  these  things  and  formed 
an  opinion  of  your  own  ?  Show  how  you  are  used  to 
behave  in  a  storm  on  shipboard  ?  Do  you  remember  this 
division  (distinction  of  things),  wben  the  sail  rattles  and 
a  man,  who  knows  nothing  of  times  and  seasons,  stands  by 
you  when  you  are  screaming  and  says,  Tell  me,  I  ask  you 
by  the  Gods,  what  you  were  saying  just  now,  Is  it  a  vice 
to  suffer  shipwreck :  does  it  participate  in  vice  ?  Will  you 
not  take  up  a  stick  and  lay  it  on  his  head  ?  What  have 
we  to  do  with  you,  man  ?  we  are  perishing  and  you  come 

5  '  Speak  to  me,'  etc.  may  be  supposed  to  be  said  to  Epictetus,  who 
has  been  ridiculing  logical  subtleties  and  the  grammarians'  learning. 
When  he  is  told  to  speak  of  good  and  evil,  he  takes  a  verse  of  the 
Odyssey,  the  first  which  occurs  to  him,  and  says,  Listen.  There  is 
nothing  to  listen  to,  but  it  is  as  good  for  the  hearer  as  any  thing  else. 
Then  he  utters  some  philosophical  principles,  and  being  asked  where 
he  learned  them,  he  says,  from  Hellanicus,  who  was  an  historian,  not 
a  philosopher.  He  is  bantering  the  hearer :  it  makes  no  matter  from 
what  author  I  learned  them ;  it  is  all  the  same.  The  real  question  is, 
have  you  examined  what  Good  and  Evil  are,  and  have  you  formed  an 
opinion  yourself? 


EPIOTETUS.  165 

to  mock  us?  But  if  Caesar  send  for  you  to  answer  a 
.charge,  do  you  remember  the  distinction  ?  If  when  you 
are  going  in  pale  and  trembling,  a  person  should  come  up 
to  you  and  say,  Why  do  you  tremble,  man  ?  what  is  the 
matter  about  which  you  are  engaged  ?  Does  Caesar  who 
sits  within  give  virtue  and  vice  to  those  who  go  in  to 
him  ?  You  reply,  Why  do  you  also  mock  me  and  add 
to  my  present  sorrows? — Still  tell  me,  philosopher,  tell 
me  why  you  tremble?  Is  it  not  death  of  which  you  rim 
the  risk,  or  a  prison,  or  pain  of  the  body,  or  banishment, 
or  disgrace  ?  What  else  is  there  ?  Is  there  any  vice  or 
anything  which  partakes  of  vice?  What  then  did  you 
use  to  say  of  these  things  ? — *  What  have  you  to  do  with 
me,  man  ?  my  own  evils  are  enough  for  me.'  And  you 
say  right.  Your  own  evils  are  enough  for  you,  your 
baseness,  your  cowardice,  your  boasting  which  you  showed 
when  you  sat  in  the  school.  Why  did  you  decoiate  yourself 
with  what  belonged  to  others  ?  Why  did  you  call  yourself 
a  Stoic  ? 

Observe  yourselves  thus  in  your  actions,  and  you  will 
find  to  what  sect  you  belong.  You  will  find  that  most  of 
you  are  Epicureans,  a  few  Peripatetics,6  and  those  feeble. 
For  wherein  will  you  show  that  you  really  consider  virtue 
«qual  to  everything  else  or  even  superior  ?  But  show  me 
a  Stoic,  if  you  can.  Where  or  how?  But  you  can  show 
me  an  endless  number  who  utter  small  arguments  of  the 
Stoics.  For  do  the  same  persons  repeat  the  Epicurean 
opinions  any  worse  ?  And  the  Peripatetic,  do  they  not 
handle  them  also  with  equal  accuracy?  who  then  is  a 
Stoic  ?  As  we  call  a  statue  Phidiac,  which  is  fashioned 
according  to  the  art  of  Phidias ;  so  show  me  a  man  who 
is  fashioned  according  to  the  doctrines  which  he  utters. 
Show  me  a  man  who  is  sick  and  happy,  in  danger  and 
happy,  dying  and  happy,  in  exile  and  happy,  in  disgrace 
and  happy.  Show  him :  I  desire,  by  the  gods,  to  see  a 
•Stoic.  You  cannot  show  me  one  fashioned  so  ;  but  show 
me  at  least  one  who  is  forming,  who  has  shown  a  ten- 
dency to  be  a  Stoic.  Do  me  this  favour :  do  not  grudge 

6  The  Peripatetics  allowed  many  things  to  be  good  which  contributed 
to  a  happy  life;  but  still  they  contended  that  the  smallest  mental 
excellence  was  superior  to  all  other  things,  Cicero,  De  Fin.  v.  5.  31* 


166  EPICTETUS. 

an  old  man  seeing  a  sight  which  I  have  not  seen  yet,  Do 
yon  think  that  you  must  show  me  the  Zeus  of  Phidias  or 
the  Athena,  a  work  of  ivory  and  gold  ?7  Let  any  of  you 
show  me  a  human  soul  ready  to  think  as  God  does,  and 
not  to  blame8  either  God  or  man,  ready  not  to  be  disap- 
pointed about  anything,  not  to  consider  himself  damaged 
by  anything,  not  to  be  angry,  not  to  be  envious,  not  to 
be  jealous ;  and  why  should  I  not  say  it  direct  ?  desirous 
from  a  man  to  become  a  god,  and  in  this  poor  mortal  bod}7" 
thinking  of  his  fellowship  with  Zeus.9  Show  me  the  man. 
But  you  cannot.  Why  then  do  you  delude  yourselves  and 
cheat  others?  and  why  do  you  put  on  a  guise  which 
does  not  belong  to  you,  and  walk  about  being  thieves  and 
pilferers  of  these  names  and  things  which  do  not  belong 
to  you  ? 

And  now  I  am  your  teacher,  and  you  are  instructed  in 
my  school.  And  I  have  this  purpose,  to  make  you  free 
from  restraint,  compulsion,  hindrance,  to  make  you  free, 
prosperous,  happy,  looking  to  God  in  everything  small 
and  great.  And  you  are  here  to  learn  and  practise  these 
things.  Why  then  do  you  not  finish  the  work,  if  you  also 
have  such  a  purpose  as  you  ought  to  have,  and  if  I  in  addi- 
tion to  the  purpose  also  have  such  qualification  as  I  ought 
to  have  ?  What  is  that  which  is  wanting  ?  When  I  see 
an  artificer  and  material  lying  by  him,  I  expect  the  work. 
Here  then  is  the  artificer,  hero  the  material;  what  is  it 
that  we  want?  Is  not  the  thing  one  that  can  be  taught? 
It  is.  Is  it  not  then  in  our  power  ?  The  only  thing  of  all 

7  See  ii.  c.  8.  20. 

8  *to  blame  God*  means  to  blame  the  constitution   and  order  of 
things,  for  to  do  this  appeared  to  Epictctus  to  be  absurd  and  wicked ; 
as  absurd  as  for  the  potter's  vessel  to  blame  the  potter,  if  that  can  be 
imagined,  for  making  it  liable  to  wear  out  and  to  break. 

9  *  Our  fellowship  is  with  the  Father  and  with  his  son  Jesus  Christ,' 
1  John  i.  3.   The  attentive  reader  will  observe  several  passages  besides 
those  which  have  been  noticed,  in  which  there  is  a  striking  conformity 
between  Epictetus  and  the  Scriptures  ;  and  will  perceive  from  them, 
either  that  the  Stoics  had  learnt  a  good  deal  of  the  Christian  language 
or  that  treating  a  subject  practically  and  in  earnest  leads  men  to  such 
strong  expressions  as  we  often  rind  in  Scripture  and  sometimes  in  the 
philosophers,  especially  Epictetus/    Mrs.  Carter. 

The  word  4  fellowship '  in  the  passage  of  John  and  of  Epictetus  ii 
See  i.  29.  note  19. 


EPICTETUS.  1R7 

that  is  in  our  power.  Neither  wealth  is  in  our  power,  nor 
health,  nor  reputation,  nor  in  a  word  any  thing  else  except 
the  right  use  of  appearances.  This  (right  use)  is  by  nature 
free  from  restraint,  this  alone  is  free  from  impediment. 
Why  then  do  you  not  finish  the  work  ?  Tell  me  the  reason. 
For  it  is  either  through  my  fault  that  you  do  not  finish  it, 
or  through  your  own  fault,  or  through  the  nature  of  the 
thing.  The  thing  itself  is  possible,  and  the  only  thing 
in  our  power.  It  remains  then  that  the  fault  is  either  in 
me  or  in  you,  or,  what  is  nearer  the  truth,  in  both.  Well 
then,  are  you  willing  that  we  begin  at  last  to  bring  such 
a  purpose  into  this  school,  and  to  take  no  notice  of  the 
pa.st  ?  Let  us  only  make  a  beginning.  Trust  to  me,  and 
you  will  see. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

AGAINST   THE  EPICUREANS   AND  ACADEMICS. 

THE  propositions  which  are  true  and  evident  are  of  neces- 
sity used  even  by  those  who  contradict  them  :  and  a  man 
might  perhaps  consider  it  to  be  the  greatest  proof  of  a 
thing  being  evident  that  it  is  found  to  be  necessary  even 
for  him  who  denies  it  to  make  use  of  it  at  the  same  time. 
For  instance,  if  a  man  shotild  deny  that  there  is  anything 
universally  true,  it  is  plain  that  he  must  make  the  contra- 
dictory negation,  that  nothing  is  universally  true.  What, 
wretch,  do  you  not  admit  even  this?  For  what  else  is 
this  than  to  affirm  that  whatever  is  universally  affirmed 
is  false  ?  Again  if  a  man  should  come  forward  and  say : 
Know  that  there  is  nothing  that  can  be  known,1  but  all 
things  are  incapable  of  sure  evidence ;  or  if  another  say, 
Believe  me  and  you  will  bo  the  better  for  it,  that  a  man 

1  'Itaque  Arcesilas  negabat  esse  quidquam  quod  soiri  posset,  ne 
illud  quidein  ipsura,  quud  Socrates  sibi  reliquisset.  Sic  omniu,  latere 
censebat  in  occulto,  neque  esse  quidquam  quod  cerni  aut  intelligi 
possit.  Quibus  de  causis  nihil  oportere  neque  profited  iicque  adfirmare 
quemquam  neque  adsensione  adprobare.'  Cicero,  Academ.  Post.  1. 12, 
Diog.  Laert.  ix.  90  of  the  Pyrrhonists. 


168  EPICTETUS. 

ought  not  to  believe  any  thing ;  or  again,  if  another  should 
Bay,  Learn  from  me,  man,  that  it  is  not  possible  to  learn 
any  thing ;  I  tell  you  this  and  will  teach  you,  if  you  choose. 
Now  in  what  respect  do  these  differ  from  those  ?  Whom 
shall  I  name?  Those  who  call  themselves  Academics? 
*  Men,  agree  [with  us]  that  no  man  agrees  [with  another]  : 
believe  us  that  no  man  believes  anybody.' 

Thus  Epicurus2  also,  when  he  designs  to  destroy  the 
natural  fellowship  of  mankind,  at  the  same  time  makes  use 
of  that  which  he  destroys.  For  what  does  he  say  ?  *  Be 
not  deceived,  men,  nor  be  led  astray,  nor  be  mistaken : 
there  is  no  natural  fellowship  among  rational  animals ; 
believe  me.  But  those  who  say  otherwise,  deceive  you 
and  seduce  you  by  false  reasons.1 — What  is  this  to  you? 
Permit  us  to  be  deceived.  Will  you  fare  worse,  if  all  the 
rest  of  us  are  persuaded  that  there  is  a  natural  fellowship 
among  us,  and  that  it  ought  by  all  means  to  be  preserved? 
Nay,  it  will  be  much  better  and  safer  for  you.  Man,  why  do 
you  trouble  yourself  about  us  ?  Why  do  you  keep  awake 
for  us  ?  Why  do  you  light  your  lamp  ?  Why  do  you  rise 
early  ?  Why  do  you  write  so  many  books,  that  no  one  of 
us  may  be  deceived  about  the  gods  and  believe  that  they 
take  care  of  men ;  or  that  no  one  may  suppose  the  nature 
of  good  to  be  other  than  pleasure  ?  For  it'  this  is  so,  lie 
down  and  sleep,  and  lead  the  life  of  a  worm,  of  which  you 
judged  yourself  worthy  :  eat  and  drink,  and  enjoy  women, 
and  ease  yourself,  and  snore.3  And  what  is  it  to  you,  how 
the  rest  shall  think  about  these  things,  whether  right  or 
wrong  ?  For  what  have  we  to  do  with  you  ?  You  take 
care  of  sheep  because  they  supply  us  with  wool  and  milk, 
and  last  of  all  with  their  flesh.  Would  it  not  be  a  desirable 

*  Cicero,  de  Fin.  ii.  30.  81,  speaking  of  the  letter,  which  Epicurus 
wrote  to  Hermarchus  when  he  was  dying,  says  *  that  the  actions  of 
Epicurus  were  inconsistent  with  his  sayings/  and  4  his  writings  were 
confuted  by  his  probity  and  morality/ 

3  Paul  says,  Cor.  i.  15. 32  :  '  If  after  the  manner  of  men  I  have  fought 
with  beasta'at  Ephesus,  what  advantageth  it  me,  if  the  dead  rise  not  ? 
let  us  eat  and  drink,  for  to-morrow  we  die/  The  words  '  let  us  eat 
and  drink,  etc.'  are  said  to  be  a  quotation  from  the  Thais  of  Menander. 
The  meaning  seems  to  be,  that  if  I  do  not  believe  in  the  resurrection  of 
the  dead,  why  should  I  not  enjoy  the  sensual  pleasures  of  life  only? 
This  is  not  the  doctrine  of  Epictetus,  as  we  see  in  the  text 


EPICTETUS,  169 

thing  if  men  could  be  lulled  and  enchanted  by  the  Stoics, 
and  sleep  and  present  themselves  to  you  and  to  those  like 
you  to  be  shorn  and  milked  ?  For  this  you  ought  to  say  to 
your  brother  Epicureans :  but  ought  you  not  to  conceal  it 
from  others,  and  particularly  before  every  thing  to  persuade 
them,  that  we  are  by  nature  adapted  for  fellowship,  that 
temperance  is  a  good  thing ;  in  order  that  all  things  may 
be  secured  for  you?4  Or  ought  we  to  maintain  this  fellow- 
ship with  some  and  not  with  others  ?  With  whom  then 
ought  we  to  maintain  it  ?  With  such  as  on  their  part  also 
maintain  it,  or  with  such  as  violate  this  fellowship  ?  And 
who  violate  it  more  than  you  who  establish  such  doctrines  ? 
What  then  was  it  that  waked  Epicurus  from  his  sleepi- 
ness, and  compelled  him  to  write  what  he  did  write? 
What  else  was  it  than  that  which  is  the  strongest  thing 
in  men,  nature,  which  draws  a  man  to  her  own  will  though 
he  be  unwilling  and  complaining?  For  since,  she  says, 
you  think  that  there  is  no  community  among  mankind, 
write  this  opinion  and  leave  it  for  others,  and  break  your 
sleep  to  do  this,  and  by  your  own  practice  condemn  your  own 
opinions.  Shall  we  then  say  that  Orestes  was  agitated  by 
the  Erinyes  (Furies)  and  roused  from  his  deep  sleep,  and 
did  not  more  savage  Erinyes  and  Pains  rouse  Epicurus 
from  his  sleep  and  not  allow  him  to  rest,  but  compelled 
him  to  make  known  his  own  evils,  as  madness  and  wine 
did  the  Galli  (the  priests  of  Cybele)?  So  strong  and  in- 
vincible is  man's  nature,  For  how  can  a  vine  be  moved 
not  in  the  manner  of  a  vine,  but  in  the  manner  of  an 
olive  tree  ?  or  on  the  other  hand  how  can  an  olive  tree  be 
moved  not  in  the  manner  of  an  olive  tree,  but  in  the 
manner  of  a  vine  ?  It  is  impossible :  it  cannot  be  con- 
ceived. Neither  then  is  it  possible  for  a  man  completely 
to  lose  the  movements  (affects)  of  a  man  ;  and  even  those 
who  are  deprived  of  their  genital  members  are  not  able  to 
deprive  themselves  of  man's  desires.5  Thus  Epicurus  also 
mutilated  all  the  offices  of  a  man,  and  of  a  father  of  a 
family,  and  of  a  citizen  and  of  a  friend,  but  he  did  not 

4  It  would  give  security  to  tho  Epicureans,  that  they  would  enjoy 
all  that  they  value,  if  other  men  should  be  persuaded  that  we  aw 
all  made  for  fellowship,  and  that  temperance  is  a  good  thing. 

3  See  Upton's  note. 


170  EPICTETUS. 

mutilate  human  desires,  for  he  could  not  ;  not  more  than 
the  lazy  Academics  can  cast  away  or  blind  their  own 
senses,  though  they  have  tried  with  all  their  might  to  do 
it.  What  a  shame  is  this  ?  when  a  man  has  received  from 
nature  measures  and  rules  for  the  knowing  of  truth,  and 
does  not  strive  to  add  to  these  measures  and  rules  and  to 
improve  6  them,  but  just  the  contrary,  endeavours  to  take 
away  and  destroy  whatever  enables  us  to  discern  the 
truth  ? 

What  say  you  philosopher  ?  piety  and  sanctity,  what  do 
you  think  that  they  are  ?  If  you  like,  I  will  demonstrate 
that  they  are  good  things.  Well,  demonstrate  it,  that  our 
citizens  may  be  turned  and  honour  the  deity  and  may  no 
longer  be  negligent  about  things  of  the  highest  value. 
Have  you  then  the  demonstrations?  —  I  have,  and  I  am 
thankful.  —  Since  then  you  are  well  pleased  with  them,  hear 
the  contrary  :  That  there  are  no  Gods,  and,  if  there  are,  they 
take  no  care  of  men,  nor  is  there  any  fellowship  between 
us  and  them;  and  that  this  piety  and  sanctity  which  is 
talked  of  among  most  men  is  the  lying  of  boasters  and 
sophists,  or  certainly  of  legislators  for  the  purpose  of 
terrifying  and  checking  wrong  doers.7  —  Well  done,  philo- 
sopher, you  have  done  something  for  our  citizens,  you  have 
brought  back  all  the  young  men  to  contempt  of  things 
divine.  —  What  then,  does  not  this  satisfy  you?  Learn 
now,  that  justice  is  nothing,  that  modesty  is  folly,  that  a 
father  is  nothing,  a  son  nothing.  —  Well  done,  philosopher, 
persist,  persuade  the  young  men,  that  we  may  have  more 
with  the  same  opinions  as  you  and  who  say  the  same  as 
you.  From  such  principles  as  these  have  grown  our  well 
constituted  states  ;  by  these  was  Sparta  founded  :  Lycurgus 
fixed  these  opinions  in  the  Spartans  by  his  laws  and  edu- 
cation, that  neither  is  the  servile  condition  more  base  than 
honourable,  nor  the  condition  of  free  men  more  honourable 


6  I  have  followed  Sch  weigh  aeuser  who  suggests 
in  place  of  tho  MSS.  irpocrepydcrao'&ai. 

7  Polybius  (vi.  56),  when  he  is  speaking  of  the  Boman  state,  com- 
mends the  men  of  old  time,  who  established  in  the  minds  of  tht>  multi- 
tude the  opinions  about  the  gods  and  Hades,  wherein,  he  says,  thej 
acted  more  wisely  than  those  in  his  time  who  would  destroy  suet 
opinions. 


EPICTETUS.  171 

than  base,  and  that  those  who  died  at  Thermopylae 8  died 
from  these  opinions ;  and  through  what  other  opinions  did 
the  Athenians  leave  their  city  ? 9  Then  those  who  talk 
thus,  marry  and  beget  children,  and  employ  themselves 
in  public  affairs  and  make  themselves  priests  and  inter- 
preters. Of  whom  ?  of  gods  who  do  not  exist :  and  they 
consult  the  Pythian  priestess  that  they  may  hear  lies,  and 
they  report  the  oracles  to  others.  Monstrous  impudence 
and  imposture. 

Man  what  are  you  doing  ? 10  are  you  refuting  yourself 
every  day  ;  and  will  you  not  give  up  these  frigid  attempts  ? 
When  you  eat,  where  do  you  carry  your  hand  to?  to  your 
mouth  or  to  your  eye  ?  when  you  wash  yourself,  what  do 
you  go  into  ?  do  you  ever  call  a  pot  a  dish,  or  a  ladle  a 
spit  ?  If  I  were  a  slave  of  any  of  these  men,  even  if  I 
must  be  flayed  by  him  daily,  1  would  rack  him.  If  he 
said,  'Boy,  throw  some  olive  oil  into  the  bath,'  I  would 
take  pickle  sauce  and  pour  it  down  on  his  head.  What  is 
this  ?  he  would  say — An  appearance  was  presented  to  me,  1 
swear  by  your  genius,  which  could  not  be  distinguished 
from  oil  and  was  exactly  like  it — Here  give  me  the  barley- 
drink  (tisane),  he  says — I  would  fill  and  carry  him  a  dish 
of  sharp  sauce — Did  I  not  ask  for  the  barley  drink  ?  Yes, 
iiifister:  this  is  the  barley  drink?  Take  it  and  smell; 
take  it  and  taste.  How  do  you  know  then  if  our  senses 
deceive  us? — If  I  had  three  or  four  fellow-slaves  of  the 
same  opinion,  I  should  force  him  to  hang  himself  through 
passion  or  to  change  his  mind.  But  now  they  mock  us  by 
using  all  the  things  which  nature  gives,  and  in  words 
destroying  them. 

Grateful  indeed  are  men  and  modest,  who,  if  they  do 

0  Epictetus  alliules  to  the  Spartans  who  fought  at  Thermopylao 
B.C.  480  against  Xerxes  and  his  army.  Herodotus  (vii.  228)  has 
recorded  the  inscription  placed  over  the  Spartans : — 

Sti  anger,  go  tell  the  Spartans,  Here  we  lie 
Obedient  to  those  who  bade  us  die. 

The  inscription  is  translated  by  Cicero,  Tusc.  Disp.  i.  42. 

9  When  Xerxes  was  advancing  on  Athens,  the  Athenians  left  the 
city  and  embarked  on  their  vessels  before  the  battle  of  Salami's,  B.C. 
480.    See  Cicero,  Do  Ofliciis,  iii.  11. 

10  He  is  now  attacking  the  Academics,  who  asserted  that  wo  can 
know  nothing. 


172  EPICTETUS. 

nothing  else,  are  daily  eating  bread  and  yet  are  shameless 
enough  to  say,  we  do  not  know  if  there  is  a  Demeter  or  her 
•daughter  Persephone  or  a  Pluto ; n  not  to  mention  that 
they  are  enjoying  the  night  and  the  day,  the  seasons  of 
the  year,  and  the  stars,  and  the  sea  and  the  land  and  the 
co-operation  of  mankind,  and  yet  they  are  not  moved  in 
any  degree  hy  these  things  to  turn  their  attention  to  them ; 
but  they  only  seek  to  belch  out  their  little  problem  (matter 
for  discussion),  and  when  they  have  exercised  their  stomach 
to  go  off  to  the  bath.  But  what  they  shall  say,  and  about 
what  things  or  to  what  persons,  and  what  their  hearers 
shall  learn  from  this  talk,  they  care  not  even  in  the  least 
degree,  nor  do  they  care  if  any  generous  youth  after  hear- 
ing such  talk  should  suffer  any  harm  from  it,  nor  after  he 
has  suffered  harm  should  lose  all  the  seeds  of  his  generous 
nature ;  nor  if  we 12  should  give  an  adulterer  help  towards 
being  shameless  in  his  acts;  nor  if  a  public  peculator 
ehould  lay  hold  of  some  cunning  excuse  from  these 
doctrines ;  nor  if  another  who  neglects  his  parents  should 
be  confirmed  in  his  audacity  by  this  teaching. — What 
then  in  your  opinion  is  good  or  bad?  This  or  that?— 
Why  then  should  a  man  say  any  more  in  reply  to  such 
persons  as  these,  or  give  them  any  reason  or  listen  to 
any  reason  from  them,  or  try  to  convince  them?  By 
Zeus  one  might  much  sooner  expect  to  make  catamites 
change  their  mind  than  those  who  are  become  so  deaf  and 
blind  to  their  own  evils.13 

11  Epictetus  is  speaking  according  to  the  popular  notions.    To  deny 
Demeter  and  to  eat  the  bread  which  she  gives  is  the  same  thing  in  the 
common  notions  of  the  Greeks,  as  it  would  be  for  Epictetus  to  deny  the 
existence  of  God  and  to  eat  the  bread  which  he  gives. 

12  The  MSS.  have  ira^xta^v.    riapcS<rxw<n  would  be  in  conformity 
with  the  rest  of  the  passage.    But  this  change  of  persons  is  common 
iu  Epictetus. 

13  'This  resembles  what  our  Saviour  said  to  the  Jewish  rulers: 
Verily  I  say  unto  you,  that  the  publicans  and  the  harlots  go  into  the 
kingdom  of  God  before  you/    Matthew,  xxi.  31.    Mrs.  Carter. 

To  an  Academic  who  said  he  comprehended  nothing,  the  Stoic  Ariston 
replied,  *  Do  you  not  see  even  the  person  who  is  sitting  near  you  ?'  When 
the  Academic  denied  it,  Ariston  said,  *  Who  made  you  blind?  who  stola 
your  power  of  sight? '  (Diog.  Laert.  vii.  163.  Upton.) 


EP1CTETUS.  173 

CHAPTER    XXI. 

OF  INCONSISTENCY.1 

SOME  things  men  readily  confess,  and  other  things  they  du 
not.  No  one  then  will  confess  that  he  is  a  fool  or  without 
understanding ;  but  quite  the  contrary  you  will  hear  all 
men  saying,  I  wish  that  I  had  fortune  equal  to  my  under- 
standing. But  men  readily  confess  that  they  are  timid, 
and  they  say:  I  am  rather  timid,  I  confess;  hut  as  to 
other  respects  you  will  not  find  me  to  be  foolish.  A  man 
will  not  readily  confess  that  he  is  intemperate ;  and  that 
he  is  unjust,  he  will  not  confess  at  all.  He  will  by  na 
means  confess  that  he  is  envious  or  a  busy  body.  Most 
men  will  confess  that  they  are  compassionate.  What 
then  is  the  reason  ? — The  chief  thing  (the  ruling  thing) 
is  inconsistency  and  confusion  in  the  things  which  relate 
to  good  and  evil.  But  different  men  have  different  reasons ; 
and  generally  what  they  imagine  to  be  base,  they  do  not 
confess  at  all.  But  they  suppose  timidity  to  be  a  charac- 
teristic of  a  good  disposition,  and  compassion  also;  but 
silliness  to  be  the  absolute  characteristic  of  a  slave.  And 
they  do  not  at  all  admit  (confess)  the  things  which  ale- 
offences  against  society.  But  in  the  case  of  most  errors 
for  this  reason  chiefly  they  are  induced  to  confess  them, 
because  they  imagine  that  there  is  something  involuntary 
in  them  as  in  timidity  and  compassion;  and  if  a  man 
confess  that  he  is  in  any  respect  intemperate,  he  alleges 
love  (or  passion)  as  an  excuse  for  what  is  involuntary. 
But  men  do  not  imagine  injustice  to  be  at  all  involuntary. 
There  is  also  in  jealousy,  as  they  suppose,  something  in- 
voluntary; and  for  this  reason  they  confess  to  jealousy 
also. 

Living  then  among  such  men,  who  are  so  confused,  so 
ignorant  of  what  they  say,  and  of  the  evils  which  they 
have  or  have  not,  and  why  they  have  them,  or  how  they 
shall  be  relieved  of  them,  I  think  it  is  worth  the  trouble 

1  Schweig.  has  some  remarks  on  the  title  of  this  chapter.  He  says- 
4  that  this  discourse  does  not  keep  to  the  same  subject,  hut  proceed* 
from  that  with  which  it  began  to  other  things.' 


174  EPICTETUS. 

for  a  man  to  watch  constantly  (and  to  ask)  whether  I  alss 
am  one  of  them,  what  imagination  I  have  about  myself, 
how  I  conduct  myself,  whether  I  conduct  myself  as  a 
prudent  man,  whether  I  conduct  myself  as  a  temperate 
man,  whether  I  ever  say  this,  that  I  have  been  taught  to 
be  prepared  for  every  thing  that  may  happen.  Have  I 
the  consciousness,  which  a  man  who  knows  nothing  ought 
to  have,  that  I  know  nothing?  Do  I  go  to  my  teacher  as 
men  go  to  oracles,  prepared  to  obey?  or  do  I  like  a  snivel- 
ling boy  go  to  my  school  to  learn  history  and  understand 
the  books  which  I  did  not  understand  before,  and,  if  it 
should  happen  so,  to  explain  them  also  to  others  ? — Man, 
you  have  had  a  fight  in  the  house  with  a  poor  slave,  you 
have  turned  the  family  upside  down,  you  have  frightened 
the  neighbours,  and  you  come  to  me  2  as  if  you  were  a  wise 
man,  and  you  take  your  seat  and  judge  how  I  have  ex- 
plained some  word,  and  1  ow  I  have  babbled  whatever 
came  into  my  head.  You  come  full  of  envy,  and  humbled, 
because  you  bring  nothing  from  home;3  and  you  sit 
during  the  discussion  thinking  of  nothing  else  than  how 
your  father  is  disposed  towards  you  and  your  brother. 
*  What  are  they  saying  about  me  there  ?  now  they  think 
that  I  am  improving,  and  are  saying,  ITe  will  return  with 
all  knowledge.  I  wish  I  could  learn  every  thing  before  I 
return :  but  much  labour  is  necessary,  and  no  one  sends 
me  any  thing,  and  the  baths  at  Nicopolis  are  dirty ;  every 
thing  is  bad  at  home,  and  bad  here/ 

Then  they  say,  no  one  gains  any  profit  from  the  school. 
— Why,  who  comes  to  the  school?  who  comes  for  the 
purpose  of  being  improved?  who  cornes  to  present  his 
opinions  to  be  purified  ?  who  comes  to  learn  what  he  is  in 
want  of?  Why  do  you  wonder  then  if  you  carry  back 
from  the  school  the  very  things  which  you  bring  into  it? 
For  you  come  not  to  lay  aside  (your  principles)  or  to  correct 

*  KaTtxo-ToX&s  Troi^o-as.  I  have  omitted  these  words  because  I  don't 
understand  them;  nor  do  the  commentators.  The  word  KaraffroX-fi 
occurs  in  ii.  10.  15,  where  it  is  intelligible. 

8  Literally,  *  because  to  you  or  for  you  nothing  is  brought  from 
home.'  Perhaps  the  meaning  is  explained  by  what  follows.  The  mail 
has  no  comfort  at  home;  he  brings  nothing  by  the  thought  of  which  he 
i*  comforted* 


EPICTETUS.  175 

them  or  to  receive  other  principles  in  place  of  them.  By 
no  means,  nor  any  thing  like  it.  Yon  rather  look  to  this, 
whether  you  possess  already  that  for  which  you  come. 
You  wish  to  prattle  about  theorems  ?  "What  then  ?  Do  you 
not  become  greater  triflers  ?  Do  not  your  little  theorems 
give  you  some  opportunity  of  display  ?  You  solve  sophis- 
tical syllogisms.4  Do  you  not  examino  the  assumptions 
of  the  syllogism  named  the  Liar?5  Do  you  not  examine 
hypothetical  syllogisms  ?  Why  then  are  you  still  vexed  if 
you  receive  the  things  for  which  you  come  to  the  school  ? 
Yes;  but  if  my  child  die  or  my  brother,  or  if  I  must 
die  or  be  racked,  what  good  will  these  things  do  me 6  ? — 
Well,  did  you  come  for  this  ?  for  this  do  you  sit  by  my 
side  ?  did  you  ever  for  this  light  your  lamp  or  keep 
awake?  or,  when  you  went  out  to  the  walking  place, 
did  you  ever  propose  any  appearance  that  had  been  pre- 
sented to  you  instead  of  a  syllogism,  and  did  you  and  your 
friends  discuss  it  together?  Where  and  when?  Then  you 
say,  Theorems  are  useless.  To  whom  ?  To  such  as  make 
a  bad  use  of  them.  For  eye-salves  are  not  useless  to  those 
who  use  them  as  they  ought  and  when  they  ought. 
Fomentations  are  not  useless.  Dum-bells 7  are  not  useless ; 
but  they  are  useless  to  some,  useful  to  others.  If  you  ask 
me  now  if  syllogisms  are  useful,  I  will  tell  you  that  they 
are  useful,  and  if  you  choose,  I  will  prove  it.8 — How  then, 
will  they  in  any  way  be  useful  to  me  ?  Man,  did  you  ask 
if  they  are  useful  to  you,  or  did  you  ask  generally  ?  Let 
him  who  is  suffering  from  dysentery,  ask  me  if  vinegar  is 
useful ;  I  will  say  that  it  is  useful. — Will  it  then  be  useful 
to  me? — I  will  say,  no.  Seek  first  for  the  discharge  to 
be  stopped  and  the  ulcers  to  be  closed.  And  do  you,  0 
men,  first  cure  the  ulcers  and  stop  the  discharge ;  be  tran- 
quil in  your  mind,  bring  it  free  from  distraction  into  the 
school,  and  you  will  know  what  power  reason  has. 

«6eet7. 

5  See  ii.  17.  34. 

6  rt  /ue  ravra,  w^e^ffft ;  Schweig.  in  his  note  says  that  lie  has  written 
the  text  thus ;  but  he  has  not.  He  has  written  ri  /UCT&  ravra  &?</>eA?f<r6( ; 
The  fu  appears  to  be  necessary,  and  he  ha»  rendered  the  passage 
accordingly ;  and  rightly,  I  think. 

7  See  i.  4,  note  5  on  Halteres. 

8  See  ii.  25. 


176  EPiCIETUS. 

CHAPTEE  XXIL 

ON   FRIENDSHIP.1 

WHAT  a  man  applies  himself  to  earnestly,  that  he  natu- 
rally loves.  Do  men  then  apply  themselves  earnestly  to 
the  things  which  are  bad  ?  By  no  means.  Well,  do  they 
apply  themselves  to  things  which  in  no  way  concern 
themselves?  not  to  these  either.  It  remains  then  that 
they  employ  themselves  earnestly  only  about  things  which 
are  good ;  and  if  they  are  earnestly  employed  about  things, 
they  love  such  things  also.  Whoever  then  understands 
what  is  good,  can  also  know  how  to  love:  but  he  who 
cannot  distinguish  good  from  bad,  and  things  which  are 
neither  good  nor  bad  from  both,  how  can  he  possess  the 
power  of  loving?  To  love  then  is  only  in  the  power  of 
the  wise. 

How  is  this  ?  a  man  may  say ;  I  am  foolish,  and  yet  I 
love  my  child. — I  am  surprised  indeed  that  you  have 
begun  by  making  the  admission  that  you  are  foolish.  For 
what  are  you  deficient  in?  Can  you  not  make  use  of 
your  senses  ?  do  you  not  distinguish  appearances  ?  do  you 
not  use  food  which  is  suitable  for  your  body,  and  clothing 
and  habitation?  Why  then  do  you  admit  that  you  are 
foolish?  It  is  in  truth  because  you  are  often  disturbed  by 
appearances  and  perplexed,  and  their  power  of  persuasion 
often  conquers  you ;  and  sometimes  you  think  these  things 
to  be  good,  and  then  the  same  things  to  be  bad,  and  lastly 
neither  good  nor  bad ;  and  in  short  you  grieve,  fear,  envy, 
are  disturbed,  you  are  changed.  This  is  the  reason  why 
you  confess  that  you  are  foolish.  And  are  you  not  change- 
able in  love?  But  wealth,  and  pleasure  and  in  a  word 

1  '  In  this  dissertation  is  expounded  the  Stoic  principle  that  friend- 
ship is  only  possible  between  the  good.'  Schweig.  He  also  says  that 
there  was  another  discourse  by  Epictetus  on  this  subject,  in  which  he 
expressed  some  of  the  opinions  of  Musonius  Eufus  (i.  1.  note  12). 
Schweig.  draws  this  conclusion  from  certain  words  of  Stobaeus ;  and  he 
supposes  that  this  dissertation  of  Epictetus  was  in  one  of  the  last  fout 
books  of  Epictetus'  discourses  by  Arrian,  which  have  been  lost, 

Cicero  (de  Amicit.  c.  5)  says  '  nisi  in  bonis  amicitiam  esse  non  poese, 
and  o.  18. 


EPICT32TUS.  177 

things  themselves,  do  you  sometimes  think  them  to  bo 
good,  and  sometimes  bad  ?  and  do  you  not  think  the  same 
men  at  one  time  to  be  good,  at  another  time  bad?  and 
have  you  not  at  one  time  a  friendly  feeling  towards  them, 
and  at  another  time  the  feeling  of  an  enemy  ?  and  do  you 
not  at  one  time  praise  them,  and  at  another  time  blame 
them?  Yes;  I  have  these  feelings  also.  Well  then,  do 
you  think  that  he  who  has  been  deceived  about  a  man  is 
his  friend?  Certainly  not.  And  he  who  lias  selected  a 
man  as  his  friend  and  is  of  a  changeable  disposition,  has 
he  good  will  towards  him?  He  has  not.  And  lie  who 
now  abuses  a  man,  and  afterwards  admires  him  ?  This 
man  also  has  no  good  will  to  the  other.  Well  then,  did 
you  never  see  little  dogs  caressing  and  playing  with  one 
another,  so  that  you  might  say,  there  is  nothing  more 
friendly?  but  that  you  may  know  what  friendship  is, 
throw  a  bit  of  flesh,  among  them,  and  you  will  learn. 
Throw  between  yourself  and  your  son  a  little  estate,  and 
you  will  know  how  soon  he  will  wish  to  bury  you  and 
how  soon  you  wish  your  son  to  die.  Then  you  will  change 
your  tone  and  say,  what  a  son  I  have  brought  up !  He 
has  long  been  wishing  to  bury  me.  Throw  a  smart  girl 
between  you ;  and  do  you  the  old  man  love  her,  and  the 
young  one  will  love  her  too.  If  a  little  fame  intervene 
or  dangers,  it  will  be  just  the  same.  You  will  utter  the 
words  of  the  father  of  Admetus  ! 

Life  gives  you  pleasure :  and  why  not  your  father  ?  s 

Do  you  think  that  Admetus  did  not  love  his  own  child 
when  he  was  little  ?  that  he  was  not  in  agony  when  the 
child  had  a  fever  ?  that  he  did  not  often  say,  I  wish  I  had 
the  fever  instead  of  the  child  ?  then  when  the  test  (the 
thing)  came  and  was  near,  see  what  words  they  utter. 
Were  not  Eteocles  and  Polynices  from  the  same  mother 
and  from  the  same  father?  Were  they  not  brought  up 
together,  had  they  not  lived  together,  drunk  together, 
slept  together,  and  often  kissed  one  another  ?  So  that,  if 

«  The  first  verse  is  from  the  Alcestis  of  Euripides,  v.  691.  The  second 
in  Epiotetus  is  not  in  Euripides.  Schweighaeuser  thinks  that  it  haa 
been  intruded  into  the  text  from  a  trivial  scholium. 


178  KHCIETDS. 

any  man,  I  think,  had  seen  them,  he  would  have  ridiculed 
the  philosophers  for  the  paradoxes  which  they  utter  about 
friendship.  But  when  a  quarrel  rose  between  them  about 
the  royal  power,  as  between  dogs  about  a  bit  of  meat,  BOO 
what  they  say 

Polynices.    Where  will  you  take  your  station 

before  the  towers  ? 

Jfteocles.       Why  do  you  ask  me  this? 
Pol.  I  will  place  myself  opposite  and  try  to 

kill  you. 
Et.  I  also  wish  to  do  the  same.3 

Such  are  the  wishes  that  they  utter. 

For  universally,  be  not  deceived,  every  animal  is 
attached  to  nothing  so  much  as  to  its  own  interest.4 
Whatever  then  appears  to  it  an  impediment  to  this  interest, 
whether  this  be  a  brother,  or  a  father,  or  a  child,  or 
beloved,  or  lover,  it  hates,  spurns,  curses  :  for  its  nature  is 
to  love  nothing  so  much  as  its  own  interest  ;  this  is  father, 
and  brother  and  kinsman,  and  country,  and  God.  When 
then  the  gods  appear  to  us  to  be  an  impediment  to  this, 
we  abuse  them  and  throw  down  their  statues  and  burn 
their  temples,  as  Alexander  ordered  the  temples  of  Aes- 
culapius to  be  burned  when  his  dear  friend  died.5 

For  this  reason  if  a  man  put  in  the  same  place  his 
interest,  sanctity,  goodness,  and  country,  and  parents,  and 
friends,  all  these  are  secured  :  but  if  he  puts  in  one  place 
his  interest,  in  another  bis  friends,  and  his  country  and 
his  kinsmen  and  justice  itself,  all  these  give  way  being 
borne  down  by  the  weight  of  interest.  For  where  the  I 
and  the  Mine  are  placed,  to  that  place  of  necessity  the 
animal  inclines  :  if  in  the  flesh,  there  is  the  luling  power  : 
if  in  the  will,  it  is  there  :  and  if  it  is  in  externals,  it  is 

8  Prom  the  Phoenissae  of  Euripides,  v.  723,  etc. 
4  Compare  Euripides,  Hecuba,  v.  846,  etc,  :  — 


Seivdv  ye  Qvt\rols  &s  ftiravra, 

icai  rets  avdyKOLs  &s  v6p.oi  §id,pi<ra,v, 

<j>l\ovs  rtOevres  rotfs  ye 

re  rot/s  vplv  evpsveis 


*  Alexander  did  this  when  Hephaestion  died.    Arrian.  Expedition 
of  Alexander,  vii.  14. 


BPICTETUS;  179 

there.*  If  then  I  am  there  where  my  will  is,  then  only 
shall  I  be  a  friend  such  as  I  ought  to  be,  and  son,  and 
father;  for  this  will  be  my  interest,  to  maintain  the 
character  of  fidelity,  of  modesty,  of  patience,  of  abstinence, 
of  active  co-operation,  of  observing  my  relations  (towards 
all).  But  if  I  put  myself  in  one  place,  and  honesty  in 
another,  then  the  doctrine  of  Epicurus  becomes  strong, 
which  asserts  either  that  there  is  no  honesty  or  it  is  that 
which  opinion  holds  to  be  honest  (virtuous).' 

It  was  through  this  ignorance  that  the  Athenians  and 
the  Lacedaemonians  quarrelled,  and  the  Thebans  with 
both ;  and  the  great  king  quarrelled  with  Hellas,  and  the 
Macedonians  with  both ;  and  the  Komans  with  the  Getae.8 
And  still  earlier  the  Trojan  war  happened  for  these 
reasons.  Alexander  was  the  guest  of  Menelaus;  and  if 
any  man  had  seen  their  friendly  disposition,  he  would  not 
have  believed  any  one  who  said  that  they  were  not  friends. 
But  there  was  cast  between  them  (as  between  dogs)  a  bit 
of  meat,  a  handsome  woman,  arid  about  her  war  arose. 
And  now  when  you  see  brothers  to  be  friends  appearing  to 
have  one  mind,  do  not  conclude  from  this  any  thing  about 
their  friendship,  not  even  if  they  swear  it  and  say  that  it  is 
impossible  for  them  to  be  separated  from  one  another.  For 

6  Matthew  vi.  21, '  for  where  your  treasure  is,  there  will  your  heart 
be  also.' 

1  *  By  «*  self  "  is  here  meant  the  proper  Good,  or,  as  Solomon  expresses 
it,  Eccl.  xii.  13,  u  the  whole  of  man."  The  Stoic  proves  excellently  the 
inconvenience  of  placing  this  in  any  thing  but  a  right  choice  (a  right 
disposition  and  behaviour):  but  how  it  is  the  interest  of  each 
individual  in  every  case  to  make  that  choice  in  preference  to  present 
pleasure  and  in  defiance  of  present  sufferings,  appears  only  from 
the  doctrine  of  a  future  recompense.'  Mrs.  Carter.  Compare  Cicero, 
De  Fin.  ii.  15,  where  he  is  speaking  of  Epicurus,  and  translates 
the  words  &iro<palif€iv  fy  /i^Sev  elvcu  rb  xaXbv  v)  Spa  -rb  ev5o£oi/,  <;  ut  enini 
consuetude  loquitur,  id  solum  dicitur  Honestum  quod  est  populari 
faina  gloriosum  (ei/Sc^op)."  See  Schweig.'s  note. 

8  The  quarrels  of  the  Athenians  with  the  Lacedaemonians  appear 
chiefly  in  the  history  of  the  Peloponnesian  war.  (Thucydides,  i.  1). 
The  quarrel  of  the  great  king,  the  king  of  Persia,  is  the  subject  of 
the  history  of  Herodotus  (i.  1).  The  great  quarrel  of  the  Macedo- 
nians with  the  Persians  is  tiie  subject  of  Arrian's  expedition  of 
Alexander.  The  Romans  were  at  war  with  the  Getae  or  Daci  in 
the  time  of  Trajan,  and  we  may  assume  that  Epictetus  was  still 
living  then. 


180  EPICTETUS. 

the  ruling  principle  of  a  bad  man  cannot  be  trusted,  it  is 
insecure,  has  no  certain  rule  by  which  it  is  directed,  and 
is  overpowered  at  different  times  by  different  appearances.9 
But  examine,  not  what  other  men  examine,  if  they  are 
born  of  the  same  parents  and  brought  up  together,  and 
under  the  same  paedagogue;  but  examine  this  only, 
wherein  they  place  their  interest,  whether  in  externals  or 
in  the  will.  If  in  externals,  do  not  name  them  friends,  no 
more  than  name  them  trustworthy  or  constant,  or  brave 
or  free :  do  not  name  them  even  men,  if  you  have  any 
judgment.  For  that  is  not  a  principle  of  human  nature 
which  makes  them  bite  one  another,  and  abuse  one  another, 
and  occupy  deserted  places  or  public  places,  as  if  they 
were  mountains,10  and  in  the  courts  of  justice  display  the 
acts  of  robbers ;  nor  yet  that  which  makes  them  intem- 
perate and  adulterers  and  corrupters,  nor  that  which 
makes  them  do  whatever  else  men  do  against  one  another 
through  this  one  opinion  only,  that  of  placing  themselves 
and  their  interests  in  the  things  which  are  not  within  the 
power  of  their  will.  But  if  you  hear  that  in  truth  these 
men  think  the  good  to  be  only  there,  where  will  is,  and 
where  there  is  a  right  use  of  appearances,  no  longer 
trouble  yourself  whether  they  are  father  or  son,  or 
brothers,  or  have  associated  a  long  time  and  are  com- 
panions, but  when  you  have  ascertained  this  only,  confi- 
dently declare  that  they  are  friends,  as  you  declare  that 
they  are  faithful,  that  they  are  just.  For  where  else  is 
friendship  than  where  there  is  fidelity,  and  modesty, 
where  there  is  a  communion11  of  honest  things  and  of 
nothing  else? 

But  you  may  say,  such  a  one  treated  me  with  regard  so 
lung ;  and  did  he  not  love  me  ?  How  do  you  know,  slave, 
if  he  did  not  regard  you  in  the  same  way  as  he  wipes  his 

•  Aristotle,  Etli.  via*,  c.  8.    Mrs.  Carter. 

u  Schweig.  thinks  that  this  is  the  plain  meaning:  'as  wild  beasts 
in  the  mountains  He  in  wait  for  men,  so  men  lie  in  wait  for  men,  not 
only  in  deserted  places,  but  even  in  the  forum.' 

11  '6-irov  $6<rts  rov  Ka\ov.  Lord  Shaftesbury  suggested  8601$  ical  Aijifaf 
TOV  rca\ov:  which  Upton  approved,  and  he  refers  to  ii.  9.  12,  al 
&Kard\\r.\ot  xtyt-is  Kal  $6cr€ts.  Schweighaeuser  suggests  SiaSfots 
which  I  have  followed  in  the  version.  Schweig.  refers  to  i.  12.  6 
i.  14,  9.  The  MSS.  give  no  help. 


EPIOTETUS.  181 

shoes  with  a  sponge,  or  as  he  takes  care  of  his  beast  ?  How 
do  you  know,  when  you  have  ceased  to  be  useful  as  a 
vessel,  he  will  not  throw  you  away  like  a  broken  platter  ? 
But  this  woman  is  my  wife,  and  we  have  lived  together  so 
long.  And  how  long  did  Eriphyle  live  with  Amphiaraus, 
and  was  the  mother  of  children  and  of  many?  But  a 
necklace 12  came  between  them :  and  what  is  a  necklace  ? 
It  is  the  opinion  about  such  things.  That  was  the  bestial 
principle,  that  was  the  thing  which  broke  asunder  the 
friendship  between  husband  and  wife,  that  which  did  not 
allow  the  woman  to  be  a  wife  nor  the  mother  to  be  a 
mother.  And  let  every  man  among  you  who  has  seriously 
resolved  either  to  be  a  friend  himself  or  to  have  another  for 
his  friend,  cut  out  these  opinions,  hate  them,  drive  them  from 
his  soul.  And  thus  first  of  all  he  will  not  reproach  himself, 
he  will  not  be  at  variance  with  himself,  he  will  not  change 
his  mind,  he  will  not  torture  himself.  In  the  next  place,  to 
another  also,  who  is  like  himself,  he  will  be  altogether  and 
completely  a  friend.13  But  he  will  bear  with  the  man 
who  is  unlike  himself,  he  will  be  kind  to  him,  gentle,  ready 
to  pardon  on  account  of  his  ignorance,  on  account  of  his 
being  mistaken  in  things  of  the  greatest  importance ;  but 
he  will  be  harsh  to  no  man,  being  well  convinced  of 
Plato's  doctrine  that  every  mind  is  deprived  of  truth 
unwillingly.  If  you  cannot  do  this,  yet  you  can  do  in  all 
other  respects  as  friends  do,  drink  together,  and  lodge 
together,  and  sail  together,  and  you  may  be  born  of  the 
same  parents ;  for  snakes  also  are :  but  neither  will  they 
be  friends  nor  you,  so  long  as  you  retain  these  bestial  and 
cursed  opinions. 

14  The  old  story  about  Ejriphyle  who  betray tnl  her  tmsband  for  a 
necklace. 
18  See  Sohwcig.'i  note 


182 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

OX  THE   POWER   OF   SPEAKING. 

EVERY  man  will  read  a  book  with  more  pleasure  or  even 
with  more  ease,  if  it  is  written  in  fairer  characters.  There- 
fore every  man  will  also  listen  more  readily  to  what  is 
spoken,  if  it  is  signified  by  appropriate  and  becoming 
words.  We  must  not  say  then  that  there  is  no  faculty 
of  expression  :  for  this  affirmation  is  the  characteristic  of 
an  impious  and  also  of  a  timid  man.  Of  an  impious  man, 
because  he  undervalues  the  gifts  which  come  from  God, 
just  as  if  he  would  take  away  the  commodity  of  the  power 
of  vision,  or  of  hearing,  or  of  seeing.  Has  then  God 
given  you  eyes  to  no  purpose  ?  and  to  no  purpose  has  he 
infused  into  them  a  spirit1  so  strong  and  of  such  skilful 
contrivance  as  to  reach  a  long  way  and  to  fashion  the 
forms  of  things  which  are  seen?  What  messenger  is  so 
swift  and  vigilant?  And  to  no  purpose  has  he  made  the 
interjacent  atmosphere  so  efficacious  and  elastic  that  the 
vision  penetrates  through  the  atmosphere  which  is  in  a 
manner  moved  ?  2  And  to  no  purpose  has  he  made  light, 
without  the  presence  of  which  there  would  be  no  use  in 
any  other  thing  ? 

Man,  be  neither  ungrateful  for  these  gifts  nor  yet  forget 
the  things  which  are  superior  to  them.  But  indeed  for  the 
power  of  seeing  and  hearing,  and  indeed  for  life  itself,  and 
for  the  things  which  contribute  to  support  it,  for  the  fruits 
which  are  dry,  and  for  wine  and  oil  give  thanks  to  God  : 
but  remember  that  he  has  given  you  something  else  better 
than  all  these,  I  mean  the  power  of  using  them,  proving 
them  and  estimating  the  value  of  each.  For  what  is  that 

1  The  word  for  '  spirit  '  is  irycCjua,  a  vital  spirit,  an  animal  spirit, 
a  nervous  fluid,  as  Schweighaeuser  explains  it,  or  as  Plutarch  says 
(De  Placit.  Philosoph.  iv.  15),  'the  spirit  which  has  the  power  of 
vision,  which  permeates  from  the  chief  faculty  of  the  mind  to  the  pupil 
of  the  eye  ;  '  and  in  another  passage  of  the  same  treatise  (iv.  8),  *  the 
instruments  of  perception  are  said  to  be  intelligent  spirits  (irrotf/uxTa 
vocpd)  which  have  a  motion  from  the  chief  faculty  of  the  mind  to  the 
organs.' 

9  See  Schweig.'s  note. 


EPICTETUS.  18S 

wiiiuii  gives  information  about  each  of  these  powers,  what 
each  of  them  is  worth?3  Is  it  each  faculty  itself?  Did 
you  ever  hear  the  faculty  of  vision  saying  any  thing  about 
itself?  or  the  faculty  of  hearing?  or  wheat,  or  barley,  or  a 
horse  or  a  dog?  No ;  but  they  are  appointed  as  ministers 
and  slaves  to  serve  the  faculty  which  has  the  power  of 
making  use  of  the  appearances  of  things.  And  if  you 
inquire  what  is  the  value  of  each  thing,  of  whom  do  you 
inquire?  who  answers  you?  How  then  can  any  other 
faculty  be  more  powerful  than  this,  which  uses  the  rest  as 
ministers  and  itself  proves  each  and  pronounces  about 
them  ?  for  which  of  them  knows  what  itself  is,  and  what 
is  its  own  value  ?  which  of  them  knows  when  it  ought 
to  employ  itself  and  when  not  ?  what  faculty  is  it  which 
opens  and  closes  the  eyes,  and  turns  them  away  from 
objects  to  which  it  ought  not  to  apply  them  and  does 
apply  them  to  other  objects  ?  Is  it  the  faculty  of  vision  ? 
No ;  but  it  is  the  faculty  of  the  will.  What  is  that  faculty 
which  closes  and  opens  the  ears  ?  what  is  that  by  which 
they  are  curious  and  inquisitive,  or  on  the  contrary  un- 
moved by  what  is  said?  is  it  the  faculty  of  hearing? 
Jt  is  no  other  than  the  faculty  of  the  will.4  Will  this 
faculty  then,  seeing  that  it  is  amidst  all  the  other  faculties 
which  are  blind  and  dumb  and  unable  to  see  any  thing 
olse  except  the  very  acts  for  which  they  are  appointed  in 
order  to  minister  to  this  (faculty)  and  serve  it,  but  this 
faculty  alone  .^ees  sharp  and  sees  what  is  the  value  of  each 
of  the  rest ;  will  this  faculty  declare  to  us  that  any  thing 
else  is  the  best,  or  that  itself  is  ?  And  what  else  does  the 
eye  do  when  it  is  opened  than  see  ?  But  whether  we  ought 
to  look  on  the  wife  of  a  certain  person,  and  in  what 
manner,  who  tells  us?  The  faculty  of  the  will.  And 
whether  we  ought  to  believe  what  is  said  or  not  to  believe 
it,  and  if  we  do  believe,  whether  we  ought  to  be  moved  by 
it  or  not,  who  tells  us  ?  Is  it  not  the  faculty  of  the  will  ? 

8  See  i.  1. 

4  Schweighaetisor  has  this  note :  '  That  which  Epiotetus  names  the 
vpoaiperiK^  Swa^is  and  afterwards  frequently  irpoalpfffts,  is  generally 
translated  by  *  voluntas '  (will) ;  but  it  lias  a  wider  meaning  than  is 
generally  given  to  the  Latin  word,  and  it  comprehends  the  intellect 
with  the  will,  and  all  the  active  power  of  the  inind  which  we  sometimes 
designate  by  the  general  name  Reason.' 


184  EPICTETU8, 

But  tins  faculty  of  speaking  and  of  ornamenting  words, 
if  there  is  indeed  any  sr.ch  peculiar  faculty,  what  else  doee 
it  do,  when  there  happens  to  be  discourse  about  a  thing, 
than  to  ornament  the  words  and  arrange  them  as  hair- 
dressers do  the  hair  ?  But  whether  it  is  better  to  speak 
or  to  be  silent,  and  better  to  speak  in  this  way  or  that 
way,  and  whether  this  is  becoming  or  not  becoming,  and 
the  season  for  each  and  the  use,  what  else  tells  us  than 
the  faculty  of  the  will  ?  Would  you  have  it  then  to  come 
forward  and  condemn  itself? 

What  then?  it  (the  will)  says,5  if  the  fact  is  so,  can 
that  which  ministers  be  superior  to  that  to  which  it 
ministers,  can  the  horse  be  superior  to  the  rider,  or  the 
dog  to  the  huntsman,  or  the  instrument  to  the  musician, 
or  the  servants  to  the  king  ?  What  is  that  which  makes 
use  of  the  rest  ?  The  will.  What  takes  care  of  all  ?  The 
will.  What  destroys  the  whole  man,  at  one  time  by 
hunger,  at  another  time  by  hanging,  and  at  another  time 
by  a  precipice  ?  The  will.  Then  is  any  thing  stronger 
in  men  than  this  ?  and  how  is  it  possible  that  the  things 
which  are  subject  to  restraint  are  stronger  than  that  which 
is  not  ?  What  things  are  naturally  formed  to  hinder  the 
faculty  of  vision?  Both  will  and  things  which  do  not 
depend  on  the  faculty  of  the  will.6  It  is  the  same  with 
the  faculty  of  hearing,  with  the  faculty  of  speaking  in 
like  manner.  But  what  has  a  natural  power  of  hinder- 
ing the  will  ?  N  othing  which  is  independent  of  the  will ; 
but  only  the  will  itself,  when  it  is  perverted.  Therefor© 
this  (the  will)  is  alone  vice  or  alone  virtue. 

Then  being  so  great  a  faculty  and  set  over  all  the  rest, 
let  it  (the  will)  come  forward  and  tell  us  that  the  most 
excellent  of  all  things  is  the  flesh.  Not  even  if  the  flesh 
itself  declared  that  it  is  the  most  excellent,  would  any- 
person  bear  that  it  should  say  this.  But  what  is  it,  Epi- 
curus, which  pronounces  this,  which  wrote  about  the  End 

1  On  the  Greek  text  Upton  remarks  that,  '  there  are  many  passages 
in  these  dissertations  which  are  ambiguous  or  rather  confused  on 
account  of  the  small  questions,  and  because  the  matter  is  not 
expanded  by  oratorical  copiousness,  not  to  mention  other  causes.' 

6  The  general  reading  is  Kal  Trpoaiperd.  Salmasius  proposes  Kn\ 
birpoatpfra,  which  Schweig.  says  in  a  note  that  he  accepts,  and  so 
he  translates  it  in  the  Latin ;  but  in  his  text  he  has  Kal  irpo 


EPIOTETUS.  185 

(purpose)  of  our  Being,7  which  wrote  on  the  Nature  of 
Things,  which  wrote  about  the  Canon  (rule  of  truth), 
which  led  you  to  wear  a  beard,  which  wrote  when  it  was 
dying  that  it  was  spending  the  last  and  a  happy  day?8 
Was  this  the  flesh  or  the  will  ?  Then  do  you  admit  that 
you  possess  any  thing  superior  to  this  (the  will)  ?  and  are 
you  not  mad?  are  you  in  fact  so  blind  and  deaf? 

What  then  ?  does  any  man  despise  the  other  faculties  ? 
I  hope  not.  Does  any  man  say  that  there  is  no  use  or 
excellence  in  the  speaking  faculty  ?  9  I  hope  not.  That 
would  be  foolish,  impious,  ungrateful  towards  God.  But 
a  man  renders  to  each  thing  its  due  value.  For  there  is 
some  use  even  in  an  ass,  but  not  so  much  as  in  an  ox  : 
there  is  also  use  in  a  dog,  but  not  so  much  as  in  a  slave : 
there  is  also  some  use  in  a  slave,  but  not  so  much  as  in 
citizens :  there  is  also  some  use  in  citizens,  but  not  so- 
much  as  in  magistrates.  Not  indeed  because  some  things 
are  superior,  must  we  undervalue  the  use  which  other 
things  have.  There  is  a  certain  value  in  the  power  of 
speaking,  but  it  is  not  so  great  as  the  power  of  the  will. 
When  then  I  speak  thus,  let  no  man  think  that  I  ask  you 
to  neglect  the  power  of  speaking,  for  neither  do  I  ask  you 
to  neglect  the  eyes,  nor  the  ears  nor  the  hands  nor  the  feet, 
nor  clothing  nor  shoes.  But  if  you  ask  me  what  then  is- 
the  most  excellent  of  all  things,  what  must  I  say?  1 
cannot  say  the  power  of  speaking,  but  the  power  of  the- 
will,  when  it  is  right  (opOrj).  For  it  is  this  which  uses- 
the  other  (the  power  of  speaking),  and  all  the  other 
faculties  both  small  and  great.  For  when  this  faculty  of 
the  will  is  set  right,  a  man  who  is  not  good  becomes  good : 

7  This  appears  to  be  the  book  which  Cicero  (Tuscul.  iii.  18) 
entitles  on  the  'supreme  good*  (de  summo  bono),  which,  as  Cicero 
eays,  contains  all  the  doctrine  of  Epicurus.  The  book  on  the  Canon* 
or  Kule  is  mentioned  by  Velleius  in  Cicero  de  Nat.  Deorum  i.  c.  16,. 
as  'that  celestial  volume  of  Epicurus  on  the  Rule  and  Judgment.' 
See  also  De  Fin.  i.  19. 

•  This  is  said  in  a  letter  written  by  Epicirus,  when  he  was- 
dying  in  great  pain  (Diog.  Laert.  x.  22);  Cicero  (De  Fin.  ii.  c.  30) 
quotes  this  letter. 

9  The  MSS.  have  irpoaipertK^s   Swdpcws.     L<ird  Shaftesbury  sug- 
gested <j>paffriKris  and  Salmasius  also.     Schweig,  has  put 
in  the  text,  and  he  has  done  right. 


186  EPICTETUS 

but  when  it  fails,  a  man  becomes  bad.  It  is  through  this 
that  we  are  unfortunate,  that  we  are  fortunate,  that  we 
blame  one  another,  are  pleased  with  one  another.  In  a 
word,  it  is  this  which  if  we  neglect  it  makes  unhappiness, 
and  if  we  carefully  look  after  it,  makes  happiness. 

But  to  take  away  the  faculty  of  speaking  and  to  say 
that  there  is  no  such  faculty  in  reality,  is  the  act  not  only 
of  an  ungrateful  man  towards  those  who  gave  it,  but  also 
of  a  cowardly  man :  for  such  a  person  seems  to  me  to  fear, 
if  there  is  any  faculty  of  this  kind,  that  we  shall  not  be 
able  to  despise  it.  Such  also  are  those  who  say  that  there 
is  no  difference  between  beauty  and  ugliness.  Then  it 
would  happen  that  a  man  would  be  affected  in  the  same 
way  if  he  saw  Thersites  and  if  he  saw  Achilles;  in  the 
same  way,  if  he  saw  Helen  and  any  other  woman.  But 
these  are  foolish  and  clownish  notions,  and  the  notions  of 
men  who  know  not  the  nature  of  each  thing,  but  are  afraid, 
if  a  man  shall  see  the  difference,  that  he  shall  immediately 
be  seized  and  carried  off  vanquished.  But  this  is  the 
great  matter;  to  leave  to  each  thing  the  power  (faculty) 
which  it  has,  and  leaving  to  it  this  power  to  see  what  is 
the  worth  of  the  power,  and  to  learn  what  is  the  most 
excellent  of  all  things,  and  to  pursue  this  always,  to  be 
diligent  about  this,  considering  all  other  things  of  second- 
ary value  compared  with  this,  but  yet,  as  far  as  we  can, 
not  neglecting  all  those  other  things.  For  we  must  take 
care  of  the  eyes  also,  not  as  if  they  were  the  most  excel- 
lent thing,  but  we  must  take  care  of  them  on  account  of 
the  most  excellent  thing,  because  it  will  not  be  in  its  true 
natural  condition,  if  it  does  not  rightly  use  the  other 
faculties,  and  prefer  some  things  to  others. 

What  then  is  usually  done  ?  Men  generally  act  as  a 
traveller  would  do  on  his  way  to  his  own  country,  when 
he  enters  a  good  inn,  and  being  pleased  with  it  should 
remain  there.  Man,  you  have  forgotten  your  purpose : 
you  were  not  travelling  to  this  inn,  but  you  were  passing 
through  it. — But  this  is  a  pleasant  inn. — And  how  many 
other  inns  are  pleasant?  and  how  many  meadows  are 
pleasant  ?  yet  only  for  passing  through.  But  your  purpose 
is  this,  to  return  to  your  country,  to  relieve  your  kinsmen 
of  anxiety,  to  discharge  the  duties  of  a  citizen,  to  marry,  to 


EPIOTETUS.  187 

beget  children,  to  fill  the  usual  magistracies.10  For  you 
are  not  come  to  select,  more  pleasant  places,  but  to  live 
in  these  where  you  were  born  and  of  which  you  were  made 
a  citizen.  Something  of  the  kind  takes  place  in  the  matter 
which  we  are  considering.  Since  by  the  aid  of  speech  and 
such  communication  as  you  receive  here  you  must  advance 
to  perfection,  and  purge  your  will  and  correct  the  faculty 
which  makes  use  of  the  appearances  of  things;  and  since 
it  is  necessary  also  for  the  teaching  (delivery)  of  theorems 
to  be  effected  by  a  certain  mode  of  expression  and  with  a 
certain  variety  and  sharpness,  some  persons  captivated  by 
these  very  things  abide  in  them,  one  captivated  by  the  ex- 
pression, another  by  syllogisms,  another  again  by  sophisms, 
and  still  another  by  some  other  inn  (7rav8o/cei'oi/)  of  the  kind ; 
and  there  they  stay  and  waste  away  as  if  they  were 
among  Sirens. 

Man,  your  purpose  (business)  was  to  make  yourself 
capable  of  using  comformably  to  nature  the  appearances 
presented  to  you,  in  your  desires  not  to  be  frustrated, 
in  your  aversion  from  things  not  to  fall  into  that  which 
you  would  avoid,  never  to  have  no  luck  (as  one  may  say), 
nor  ever  to  have  bad  luck,  to  be  free,  not  hindered,  not 
compelled,  conforming  yourself  to  the  administration  of 
Zeus,  obeying  it,  well  satisfied  with  this,  blaming  no  one, 
charging  no  one  with  fault,  able  from  your  whole  soul  to 
utter  these  verses 

Lead  me,  O  Zeus,  and  thou  too  Destiny.11 

Then  having  this  purpose  before  yon,  if  some  little  form  of 
expression  pleases  you,  if  some  theorems  please  you,  do 

10  The  Stoics  taught  that  a  man  should  lead  an  active  life.    Horace 
(Ep.  i.  1.  16)  represents  himself  as  sometimes  following  the  Stoio 
principles : 

'Nunc  agilis  fio  et  mersor  civilibus  undis.' 

but  this  was  only  talk.  The  Stoic  should  discharge  all  the  dutiea 
of  a  citizen,  says  Epictetus ;  he  should  even  marry  and  beget  children. 
But  the  marrying  may  be  done  without  any  sense  of  duty ;  and  the 
continuance  of  the  human  race  is  secured  by  the  natural  love  of  the 
male  and  of  the  female  for  conjunction.  Still  it  is  good  advice, 
which  the  Koman  censor  Metellus  gave  to  his  fellow  citizens,  that, 
as  they  could  not  live  without  women,  they  should  make  the  best 
of  this  business  of  marriage.  (Gellius,  i.  6.) 

11  The  rest  of  the  verses  are  quoted  iu  the  Encheiridion,  B.  52. 


188  EPICTETUS, 

yon  abide  among  them  and  choose  to  dwell  there, 
forgetting  the  things  at  home,  and  do  you  say,  These 
things  are  fine  ?  Who  says  that  they  are  not  fine  ?  but 
only  as  being  a  way  home,  as  inns  are.  For  what  hinders 
you  from  being  an  unfortunate  man,  even  if  you  speak  like 
Demosthenes  ?  and  what  prevents  you,  if  you  can  resolve 
syllogisms  like  Chrysippus,12  from  being  wretched,  from 
sorrowing,  from  envying,  in  a  word,  from  being  disturbed, 
from  being  unhappy  ?  Nothing.  You  see  then  that  these 
were  inns,  worth  nothing;  and  that  the  purpose  before 
you  was  something  else.  When  I  speak  thus  to  some 
persons,  they  think  that  I  am  rejecting  care  about  speaking 
or  care  about  theorems.  But  I  am  not  rejecting  this  care, 
but  I  am  rejecting  the  abiding  about  these  things  inces- 
santly 13  and  putting  our  hopes  in  them.  If  a  man  by  this 
teaching  does  harm  to  those  who  listen  to  him,  reckon  me 
too  among  those  who  do  this  harm  :  for  I  am  not  able, 
when  I  see  one  thing  which  is  most  excellent  and  supreme, 
to  say  that  another  is  so,  in  order  to  please  you. 


CHAPTEE  XXIV. 

TO  (OR  AGAINST)  A  PERSON  WHO  WAS  ONE  OF  THOSE  WHO  WEEK 
NOT  VALUED  (ESTEFMED)  BY  HIM. 

A  CERTAIN  person  said  to  him  (Epictetus) :  Frequently  I 
desired  to  hear  you  and  came  to  you,  and  you  never  gave 
me  any  answer:  and  now,  if  it  is  possible,  I  intreat  YOU 
to  say  something  to  me.  Do  you  think,  said  Epictetus, 
that  as  there  is  an  art  in  any  thing  else,  so  there  is  also 
an  art  in  speaking,  and  that  he  who  has  the  art,  will  speak 
skilfully,  and  he  who  has  not,  will  speak  unskilfully  ? — 
I  do  think  so. — He  then,  who  by  speaking  receives  benefit 

14  Chrysippus  wrote  a  book  on  the  resolution  of  Syllogisms,  Diogenea 
Laertius  (vii.)  says  of  Chrysippus  that  he  was  so  famous  among  Dialec- 
ticians that  most  persons  thought,  if  there  was  Dialectic  among  tha 
Gods,  it  would  not  be  any  other  than  that  of  Chrysippus. 

19  See  Sohweig.'s  note  on  &fcaTa\7j/cTiKwj. 


EPICTETUS.  189 

himself,  and  is  able  to  benefit  others,  will  speak  skilfully  : 
but  he  who  is  rather  damaged  by  speaking  and  does  damage 
to  others,  will  he  be  unskilled  in  this  art  of  speaking  ? 
And  you  may  find  that  some  are  damaged  and  others  bene- 
fited by  speaking.  And  are  all  who  hear  benefited  by 
what  they  hear?  Or  will  you  find  that  among  them  also 
some  are  benefited  and  some  damaged  ? — There  are  both 
among  these  also,  he  said. — In  this  case  also  then  those 
who  hear  skilfully  are  benefited,  and  those  who  hear 
unskilfully  are  damaged?  lie  admitted  this.  Is  there 
then  a  skill  in  hearing  also,  as  there  is  in  speaking? — 
It  seems  so. — If  you  choose,  consider  the  matter  in  this 
way  also.  The  practice  of  music,  to  whom  does  it  belong? 
To  a  musician.  And  the  proper  making  of  a  statue,  to 
whom  do  you  think  that  it  belongs  ?  To  a  statuary.  And 
the  looking  at  a  statue  skilfully,  does  this  appear  to  you 
to  require  the  aid  of  no  art  ? — This  also  requires  the  aid 
of  art. — Then  if  speaking  properly  is  the  business  of  the 
skilful  man,  do  you  see  that  to  hear  also  with  benefit  is 
the  business  of  the  skilful  man  ?  Now  as  to  speaking  and 
hearing  perfectly,  and  usefully,1  let  us  for  the  present,  if  you 
please,  say  no  more,  for  both  of  us  are  a  long  way  from 
every  thing  of  the  kind.  But  I  think  that  every  man  will 
allow  this,  that  he  who  is  going  to  hear  philosophers 
requires  some  amount  of  practice  in  hearing.  Is  it  not  so  ? 
Tell  me  then  about  what  I  should  talk  to  you :  about 
what  matter  are  you  able  to  listen  ? — About  good  and  evil. 
— Good  and  evil  in  what  ?  In  a  horse  ?  No.  Well,  in  an 
ox  ?  No.  What  then  ?  In  a  man  ?  Yes.  Do  we  know  then 
what  a  man  is,  what  the  notion  is  which  we  have  of  him, 
or  have  we  our  ears  in  any  degree  practised  about  this 
matter  ?  But  do  you  understand  what  nature  is  ?  or  can 
you  even  in  any  degree  understand  me  when  I  say,  I  shall 
vise  demonstration  to  you?  How?  Do  you  understand 
this  very  thing,  what  demonstration  is,  or  how  any  thing 
i^  demonstrated,  or  by  what  means ;  or  what  things  are 

1  l  That  is,  let  us  not  now  consider  whether  I  am  perfect  in  the  art 
of  speaking,  and  you  have  a  mind  well  prepared  to  derive  real  advantage 
from  philosophical  talk.  Let  us  consider  this  only,  whether  your  ears 
are  sufficiently  prepared  for  listening,  whether  you  can  understand  a 
philosophical  discussion.'  Schweig. 


190  EPICTETUS. 

like  demonstration,  but  are  not  demonstration  ?  Do  you 
know  what  is  true  or  what  is  false  ?  What  is  consequent 
on  a  thing,  what  is  repugnant  to  a  thing,  or  not  con- 
sistent, or  inconsistent?2  But  must  I  excite  you  to  philo- 
sophy, and  how  ?  Shall  I  show  to  you  the  repugnance  in 
the  opinions  of  most  men,  through  which  they  differ  about 
things  good  and  evil,  and  about  things  which  are  profit- 
able and  unprofitable,  when  you  know  not  this  very  thing, 
what  repugnance  (contradiction)  is  ?  Show  me  then  what 
I  shall  accomplish  by  discoursing  with  you:  excite  my 
inclination  to  do  this.  As  the  grass  which  is  suitable, 
when  it  is  presented  to  a  sheep,  moves  its  inclination  to 
eat,  but  if  you  present  to  it  a  stone  or  bread,  it  will  not 
be  moved  to  eat ;  so  there  are  in  us  certain  natural  incli- 
nations also  to  speak,  when  the  hearer  shall  appear  to  be 
somebody,  when  he  himself  shall  excite  us :  but  when  he 
shall  sit  by  us  like  a  stone  or  like  grass,  how  can  he  excite 
a  man's  desire  (to  speak)  ?  Does  the  vine  say  to  the  hus- 
bandman, Take  care  of  me  ?  No,  but  the  vine  by  showing 
in  itself  that  it  will  be  profitable  to  the  husbandman,  if 
he  does  take  care  of  it,  invites  him  to  exercise  care.  When 
children  are  attractive  and  lively,  whom  do  they  not  invite 
to  play  with  them,  and  crawl  with  them,  and  lisp  with 
them?  But  who  is  eager  to  play  with  an  ass  or  to  bray 
with  it  ?  for  though  it  is  small,  it  is  still  a  little  ass. 

Why  then  do  you  say  nothing  to  rne  ?  I  can  only  say 
this  to  you,  that  he  who  knows  not  who  he  is,  and  for 
what  purpose  he  exists,  and  what  is  this  world,  and  with 
whom  he  is  associated,  and  what  things  are  the  good  and 
the  bad,  and  the  beautiful  and  the  ugly,  and  who  neither 
understands  discourse  nor  demonstration,  nor  what  is  true 
nor  what  is  false,  and  who  is  not  able  to  distinguish  them, 
will  neither  desire  according  to  nature  nor  turn  away  nor 
move  towards,  nor  intend  (to  act),  nor  assent,  nor  dissent 
nor  suspend  his  judgment:  to  say  all  in  a  few  words,  he 
will  go  about  dumb  and  blind,  thinking  that  he  is  some- 
body, but  being  nobody.  Is  this  so  now  for  the  first  time  ? 
Is  it  not  the  fact  that  ever  since  the  human  race  existed, 
all  errors  and  misfortunes  have  arisen  through  this  igno- 

*  See  Schweig/s  note. 


EPICTETUS.  191 

ranee?  Why  did  Agamemnon  and  Achilles  quarrel  with 
one  another?  Was  it  not  through  not  knowing  what 
things  are  profitable  and  not  profitable?  Does  not  the 
one  say  it  is  profitable  to  restore  Chryseis  to  her  father, 
and  does  not  the  other  say  that  it  is  not  profitable  ?  does 
not  the  one  say  that  he  ought  to  take  the  prize  of  another, 
and  does  not  the  other  say  that  he  ought  not  ?  Did  they 
not  for  these  reasons  forget,  both  who  they  were  and  for 
what  purpose  they  had  come  there?  Oh,  man,  for  what 
purpose  did  you  come?  to  gain  mistresses  or  to  fight?  To 
fight.  With  whom  ?  the  Trojans  or  the  Hellenes  ?  With  the 
Trojans.  Do  you  then  leave  Hector  alone  and  draw  your 
sword  against  your  own  king  ?  And  do  you,  most  excel- 
lent Sir,  neglect  the  duties  of  the  king,  you  who  are  the 
people's  guardian  and  have  such  cares ;  and  are  you  quar- 
relling about  a  little  girl  with  the  most  warlike  of  your 
allies,  whom  you  ought  by  every  means  to  take  care  of  and 
protect?  and  do  you  become  wiorse  than  (inferior  to)  a 
well  behaved  priest  who  treats  you  these  fine  gladiators 
with  all  respect?  Do  you  see  what  kind  of  things  igno- 
rance of  what  is  profitable  does? 

But  I  also  am  rich.  Are  you  then  richer  than  Aga- 
memnon ?  But  I  am  also  handsome.  Are  you  then  more 
handsome  than  Achilles  ?  But  I  have  also  beautiful  hair, 
But  had  not  Achilles  more  beautiful  hair  and  gold  co- 
loured? and  he  did  not  comb  it  elegantly  nor  dress  it. 
But  I  am  also  strong.  Can  you  then  lift  so  great  a  stone 
as  Hector  or  Ajax  ?  But  I  am  also  of  noble  birth.  Are 
you  the  son  of  a  goddess  mother  ?  are  you  the  son  of  a 
father  sprung  from  Zeus  ?  What  good  then  do  these  things 
do  to  him,  when  he  sits  and  weeps  for  a  girl  ?  But  I  am  an 
orator.  And  was  he  not  ?  Do  you  not  see  how  he  handled 
tbe  most  skilful  of  the  Hellenes  in  oratory,  Odysseus  and 
Phoenix  ?  how  he  stopped  their  mouths  ?  3 

This  is  all  that  I  have  to  say  to  you ;  and  I  say  even 
this  not  willingly.  Why  ?  Because  you  have  not  roused 
me.  For  what  must  I  look  to  in  order  to  be  roused,  as 
men  who  are  expert  in  riding  are  roused  by  generous 

3  In  the  ninth  book  of  the  Iliad,  where  Achilles  answers  the 
messengers  sent  to  him  by  Agamemnon.  The  reply  of  Achilles  ia 
a  wonderful  example  of  eloquence. 


192  EPICTETUS. 

horses?  Must  I  look  to  your  body?  You  treat  it  dis- 
gracefully. To  your  dress  ?  That  is  luxurious.  To  your 
behaviour,  to  your  look?  That  is  the  same  as  nothing. 
When  you  would  listen  to  a  philosopher,  do  not  say  to  him, 
You  tell  me  nothing,;  but  only  show  yourself  worthy  of 
hearing  or  fit  for  hearing ;  and  you  will  see  how  you  will 
move  the  speaker. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

THAT  LOGIC  IS  NECESSARY.1 

WHEN  one  of  those  who  were  present  said,  Persuade  me 
that  logic  is  necessary,  he  replied,  Do  you  wish  me  to 
prove  this  to  you  ?  The  answer  was — Yes. — Then  I  must 
use  a  demonstrative  form  of  speech. — This  was  granted. — 
How  then  will  you  know  if  I  am  cheating  you  by  my  argu- 
ment ?  The  man  was  silent.  Do  you  see,  said  Epictetus, 
that  you  yourself  are  admitting  that  logic  is  necessary,  if 
without  it  you  cannot  know  so  much  as  this,  whether 
logic  is  necessary  or  not  necessary  ? 


CHAPTEE  XXVI. 

WHAT  IS  THE  PROPERTY  OF  ERROll. 

EVERY  error  comprehends  contradiction  :  for  since  he  who 
errs  does  not  wish  to  err,  but  to  be  right,  it  is  plain  that 
he  does  not  do  what  he  wishes.  For  what  does  the  thief 
wish  to  do  ?  That  which  is  for  his  own  interest.1  If  then 
the  theft  is  not  for  his  interest,  he  does  not  do  that  which 
he  wishes.  But  every  rational  soul  is  by  nature  offended 
at  contradiction,  and  so  long  as  it  does  not  understand  this 
contradiction,  it  is  not  hindered  from  doing  contradictory 

1  See  i.  17. 

1  Compare  Xenophon,  Mem.  iii.  9, 4. 


EPIOTETUS.  193 

tilings:  but  when  it  does  understand  the  contradiction, 
it  must  of  necessity  avoid  the  contradiction  and  avoid 
it  as  much  as  a  man  must  dissent  from  the  false  when  he 
sees  that  a  thing  is  false  ;  hut  so  long  as  this  falsehood 
does  not  appear  to  him,  he  assents  to  it  as  to  truth. 

He  then  is  strong  in  argument  and  has  the  faculty  of 
exhorting  and  confuting,  who  is  able  to  show  to  each  man 
the  contradiction  through  which  he  errs  and  clearly  to  prove 
how  he  does  not  do  that  which  he  wishes  and  does  that 
which  he  does  not  wish.  For  if  any  one  shall  show  this,  a 
man  will  himself  withdraw  from  that  which  he  does ;  hut 
80  long  as  you  do  not  show  this,  do  not  be  surprised  if  a 
man  persists  in  his  practice  ;  for  having  the  appearance  of 
doing  right,  he  does  what  he  does.  For  this  reason 
Socrates  also  trusting  to  this  power  used  to  say,  I  am 
used  to  call  no  other  witness  of  what  I  say,  but  I  am  always 
satisfied  with  him  with  whom  I  am  discussing,  and  I  ask 
him  to  give  his  opinion  and  call  him  as  a  witness,  and 
though  he  is  only  one,  ho  is  sufficient  in  the  place  of  all. 
For  Socrates  knew  by  what  the  rational  soul  is  moved,  just 
like  a  pair  of  scales,  and  then  it  must  incline,  whether  it 
chooses  or  not.2  Show  the  rational  governing  faculty  a 
contradiction,  and  it  will  withdraw  from  it ;  but  if  you  do 
not  show  it,  rather  blame  yourself  than  him  who  is  not 
persuaded.3 

2  There  is  some  deficiency  in  the  text.  Cicero  (Acad.  Prior,  i.  12), 
*ut  enim  necesse  est  lancem  in  libra  ponderibus  impositis  deprimi; 
eic  animum  perspicuis  cedere/  appears  to  supply  the  deficiency. 

*  M.  Antoninus,  v.  28 ;  x.  i. 


BOOK  TIL 

CHAPTER  I. 

OF  FINERY  IN  DRESS, 

A  CERTAIN  young  man  a  rhetorician  came  to  see  Epictetus, 
with  his  hair  dressed  more  carefully  than  was  usual  and 
nis  attire  in  an  ornamental  style ;  whereupon  Epictetus 
said,  Tell  me  if  you  do  not  think  that  some  dogs  are 
beautiful  and  some  horses,  and  so  of  all  other  animals. 
I  do  think  so,  the  youth  replied.  Are  not  then  some  men 
also  beautiful  and  others  ugly  ?  Certainly.  Do  we  then  for 
the  same  reason  call  each  of  them  in  the  same  kind  beau- 
tiful, or  each  beautiful  for  something  peculiar  ?  And  you 
will  judge  of  this  matter  thus.  Since  we  see  a  dog  natu- 
rally formed  for  one  thing,  and  a  horse  for  another,  and 
for  another  still,  as  an  example,  a  nightingale,  we  may 
generally  and  not  improperly  declare  each  of  them  to  be- 
beautiful  then  when  it  is  most  excellent  according  to  its 
nature ;  but  since  the  nature  of  each  is  different,  each  of 
them  seems  to  me  to  be  beautiful  in  a  different  way.  Is  it 
not  so  ?  He  admitted  that  it  was.  That  then  which  makes 
a  dog  beautiful,  makes  a  horse  ugly;  and  that  which 
makes  a  horse  beautiful,  makes  a  dog  ugly,  if  it  is  true- 
that  their  natures  are  different.  It  seems  to  bo  so.  For 
I  think  that  what  makes  a  Pancratiast  beautiful,  makes  a* 
wrestler  to  be  not  good,  and  a  runner  to  be  most  ridicu- 
lous; and  he  who  ivS  beautiful  for  the  Pentathlon,  is  very 
ugly  for  wrestling.1  It  is  so  said  he.  What  then  makes 

1  A  Pancratiast  is  a  man  who  is  trained  for  the  Pancratium,  that 
is,  both  for  boxing  and  wrestling.  The  Pentathlon  comprised  five 
exercises,  which  are  expressed  by  one  Greek  line, 

Leaping,  running,  the  quoit,  throwing  the  Javelin,  wrestling. 

Compare  Aristotle,  Ehet.  i.  5. 

o  2 


196  EPICTETUS. 

a  man  beautiful?  Is  it  that  which  in  its  kind  makes 
both  a  dog  and  a  horse  beautiful  ?  It  is,  ho  said.  What 
then  makes  a  dog  beautiful?  The  possession  of  the 
excellence  of  a  clog.  And  what  makes  a  horse  beautiful  ? 
The  possession  of  the  excellence  of  a  horse.  What 
then  makes  a  man  beautiful  ?  Is  it  not  the  possession  of 
the  excellence  of  a  man?  And  do  you  then,  if  you 
wish  to  be  beautiful,  young  man,  labour  at  this,  the 
acquisition  of  human  excellence.  But  what  is  this? 
Observe  whom  you  yourself  praise,  when  you  praise 
many  persons  without  partiality :  do  you  praise  the 
just  or  the  unjust?  The  just.  Whether  do  you  praise 
the  moderate  or  the  immoderate  ?  The  moderate.  And 
the  temperate  or  the  intemperate?  The  temperate.  If 
then  you  make  yourself  such  a  person,  you  will  know  that 
you  will  make  yourself  beautiful :  but  so  long  as  you 
neglect  these  things,  you  must  be  ugly  (cucrxpoi/),  even 
though  you  contrive  all  you  can  to  appear  beautiful. 

Further  I  do  not  know  what  to  say  to  you  :  for  if  I  say 
to  you  what  I  think,  I  shall  offend  you,  and  you  will 
perhaps  leave  the  school  and  not  return  to  it :  and  if  I  do 
not  say  what  I  think,  see  how  I  shall  be  acting,  if  you 
<some  to  me  to  be  improved,  and  I  shall  not  improve  you  at 
all,  and  if  yon  come  to  me  as  to  a  philosopher,  and  I  shall 
.gay  nothing  to  you  as  a  philosopher.  And  how  cruel  it 
is  to  you  to  leave  you  uncorrected.  If  at  any  time 
afterwards  you  shall  acquire  sense,  you  will  with  good 
reason  blame  me  and  say,  What  did  Epictetus  observe  in 
me  that  when  he  saw  me  in  such  a  plight  coming  to  him 
in  such  a  scandalous  condition,  he  neglected  me  and  never 
said  a  word  ?  did  he  so  much  despair  of  me  ?  was  I  not 
young  ?  was  I  not  able  to  listen  to  reason  ?  and  how  many 
other  young  men  at  this  age  commit  many  like  errors  ?  I 
'hear  that  a  certain  Polemon  from  being  a  most  dissolute 
youth  underwent  such  a  great  change.  Well,  suppose  that 
itio  did  not  think  that  I  should  be  a  Polemon;2  yet  he 

*  Gomp.  Horace,  Sat.  ii.  3,  v.  253. 

Quacro,  fuciasne  quod  olim 
Mutatus  Polemon  ?  etc. 

The  story  of  Polemon  is  told  by  Diogenes  Laertms.  He  was  a  dis- 
solute youth.  As  ho  was  passing  one  day  the  place  where  Xenocratet 


EPICTETUS.  197 

might  have  set  my  hair  right,  he  might  have  stripped  off 
my  decorations,  he  might  have  stopped  me  from  plucking 
the  hair  out  of  my  body ;  but  when  he  saw  me  dressed 
like — what  shall  I  say  ? — he  kept  silent.  I  do  not  say  like 
what ;  but  you  will  say  when  you  come  to  your  senses,  and 
shall  know  what  it  is,  and  what  persons  use  such  a  dress. 

If  you  bring  this  charge  against  me  hereafter,  what 
defence  shall  I  make?  Why,  shall  I  say  that  the  man  will 
not  be  persuaded  by  me  ?  Was  Laius  persuaded  by  Apollo  ? 
Did  he  not  go  away  and  get  drunk  and  show  no  care  for 
the  oracle  ?  3  WTell  then  for  this  reason  did  Apollo  refuse 
to  tell  him  the  truth?  I  indeed  do  not  know,  whether 
you  will  be  persuaded  by  me  or  not;  but  Apollo  knew 
most  certainly  that  Laius  would  not  be  persuaded  and  yet 
he  spoke.  But  why  did  he  speak?  I  say  in  reply,  But  why 
is  he  Apollo,  and  why  does  he  deliver  oracles,  and  why  has 
he  fixed  himself  in  this  place  as  a  prophet  and  source  of 
truth  and  for  the  inhabitants  of  the  world  to  resort  to 
him  ?  and  why  are  the  words  Know  yourself  written  in 
front  of  the  temple,  though  no  person  takes  any  notice  of 
them? 

Did  Socrates  persuade  all  his  hearers  to  take  care  of 
themselves?  Not  the  thousandth  part.  But  however, 
after  he  had  been  placed  in  this  position  by  the  deity,  as 
he  himself  says,  he  never  left  it.  But  what  does  he  say 
even  to  his  judges  ?  *'  If  you  acquit  me  on  these  con- 
ditions that  I  no  longer  do  that  which  I  do  now,  I  will  not 
consent  and  I  will  not  desist;  but  I  will  go  up  both  to 
young  and  to  old,  and,  to  speak  plainly,  to  every  man  whom 
I  meet,  and  I  will  ask  the  questions  which  I  ask  now ;  and 
most  particularly  will  I  do  this  to  you  my  fellow  citizens, 
because  you  are  more  nearly  related  to  me."  4 — Are  you  so 

was  lecturing,  he  and  his  drunken  companions  burst  into  the  school, 
but  Polemon  was  so  affected  by  the  words  of  the  excellent  teacher 
that  he  came  out  quite  a  different  man,  and  ultimately  aucceeded 
Xenocrates  in  the  school  of  the  Academy.  See  Epict.  iv.  11.  30. 

8  Laius  consulted  the  oracle  at  Delphi  how  he  should  have  children. 
The  oracle  told  him  not  to  beget  children,  and  even  to  expose  them  if 
he  did.  Laius  was  so  foolish  as  to  disobey  the  god  in  both  respects, 
for  he  begot  children  and  brought  them  up.  He  did  indeed  order  hid 
child  Oedipus  to  be  exposed,  but  the  boy  was  saved  and  became  the 
murderer  of  Laius. 

4  Plato,  Apology,  i,  9,  etc.  and  c.  17, 


198  EPICTETUS. 

curious,  Socrates,  and  such  a  busy-body  ?  and  how  < 
concern  you  liow  we  act  ?  and  what  is  it  that  yc  ?*  saJ  ? 
Being  of  the  same  community  and  of  the  same  kin,\Jou 
neglect  yourself,  and  show  yourself  a  bad  citizen  to*^6 
state,  and  a  bad  kinsman  to  your  kinsmen,  and  a  ba  ^ 
neighbour  to  your  neighbours.     Who  then  are  you? — '*. 
Here  it  is  a  great  thing  to  say,  "  I  am  be  whose  duty  it  is 
to  take  care  of  men ;  for  it  is  not  every  little  heifer  which 
dares  to  resist  a  lion  ;  but  if  the  bull  comes  tip  and  resists 
him,  say  to  the  bull,  if  you  choose,  *  and  who  are  you,  and 
what  business  have  you  here  ? ' "   Man,  in  every  kind  there 
is  produced  something  which  excels ;  in  oxen,  in  dogs,  in 
bees,  in  horses.     Do  not  then  say  to  that  which  excels, 
Who  then  are  you?    If  you  do,  it  will  find  a  voice  in 
some  way  and  say,  I  am  such  a  thing  as  the  purple  in  a 
garment : 5   do  not  expect  me  to  be  like   the  others,  or 
blame  my  nature  that  it  has  made  me  different  from  the 
rest  of  men. 

What  then  ?  am  I  such  a  man  ?  Certainly  not.  And 
are  you  such  a  man  as  can  listen  to  the  truth  ?  I  wish 
you  were.  But  however  since  in  a  manner  I  have  been 
condemned  to  wear  a  white  beard  and  a  cloak,  and  you 
come  to  me  as  to  a  philosopher,  I  will  not  treat  you  in  a 
cruel  way  nor  yet  as  if  I  despaired  of  you,  but  I  will  say, 
Young  man,  whom  do  you  wish  to  make  beautiful?  In 
the  first  place,  know  who  you  are  and  then  adorn  yourself 
appropriately.  You  are  a  human  being;  and  this  is  a 
mortal  animal  which  has  the  power  of  using  appearances 
rationally.  But  what  is  meant  by  '  rationally '  ?  Con- 
formably to  nature  6  and  completely.  What  then  do  you 
possess  which  is  peculiar?  Is  it  the  animal  part?  No. 
Is  it  the  condition  of  mortality  ?  No.  Is  it  the  power  of 
using  appearances  ? T  No.  You  possess  the  rational  faculty 
as  a  peculiar  thing :  adorn  and  beautify  this ;  but  leave 

5  i  2.  note  4. 

'  Cicero,  de  Fin.  ii.  11 :  Horace,  Epp.  i.  10, 12.  This  was  the  great 
principle  of  Zeno,  to  live  according  to  nature.  Bishop  Butler  in  the 
Preface  to  his  Sermons  says  of  this  philosophical  principle,  that  virtue 
consisted  in  following  nature,  that  it  is  "  a  manner  of  speaking  not 
loose  and  undeterminate,  but  clear  and  distinct,  strictly  just  and  true." 

7  The  bare  use  of  objects  (appearances)  belongs  to  all  animals; 
a  rational  use  of  them  is  peculiar  to  man.  Mrs.  Carter,  Introd.  §  7. 


EPICTETUS.  199 

your  hair  to  him  who  made  it  as  he  chose.  Come,  what 
other  appellations  have  you?  Are  you  man  or  woman? 
Man.  Adorn  yourself  then  as  man,  not  as  woman. 
Woman  is  naturally  smooth  and  delicate ;  and  if  she  has 
much  hair  (on  her  body),  she  is  a  monster  and  is  exhibited 
•at  Home  among  monsters.  And  in  a  man  it  is  monstrous 
inot  to  have  hair ;  and  if  he  has  no  hair,  he  is  a  monster ; 
'but  if  he  cuts  off  his  hairs  and  plucks  them  out,  what 
shall  we  do  with  him  ?  where  shall  we  exhibit  him  ?  and 
under  what  name  shall  we  show  him  ?  I  will  exhibit  to 
you  a  man  who  chooses  to  be  a  woman  rather  than  a  man. 
What  a  terrible  sight!  There  is  no  man  who  will  n^ 
wonder  at  such  a  nolice.  Indeed  I  think  that  the  men 
who  pluck  out  their  hairs  do  what  they  do  without 
knowing  what  they  do.  Man  what  fault  have  you  to  find 
with  your  nature?  That  it  made  you  a  man  ?  What  then  * 
was  it  fit  that  nature  should  make  all  human  creatures 
women  ?  and  what  advantage  in  that  case  would  you  have 
had  in  being  adorned?  for  whom  would  you.  have  adorned 
yourself,  if  all  human  creatures  were  women  ?  But  you 
are  not  pleased  with  the  matter :  set  to  work  then  upon 
the  whole  business.8  Take  away — what  is  its  name  ? — 
that  which  is  the  cause  of  the  hairs  :  make  yourself  a 
woman  in  all  respects,  that  we  may  not  be  mistaken  :  do 
not  make  one  half  man,  and  the  other  half  woman.  Whom 
do  you  wish  to  please  ?  The  women  ?  Please  them  as  a 
man.  Well;  but  they  like  smooth  men.  Will  you  not 
hang  yourself?  and  if  women  took  delight  in  catamites, 
would  you  become  one?  Is  this  your  business?  were 
you  born  for  this  purpose,  that  dissolute  women  should 
delight  in  you  ?  Shall  we  make  such  a  one  as  you  a  citizen 
of  Corinth  and  perchance  a  praefect  of  the  city,  or  chief 
of  the  youth,  or  general  or  superintendent  of  the  games  ? 
Well,  and  when  you  have  taken  a  wife,  do  you  intend  to 
have  your  hairs  plucked  out?  To  please  whom  and  for 
what  purpose?  And  when  you  have  begotten  children, 
will  you  introduce  them  also  into  the  state  with  the  habit 
of  plucking  their  hairs?  A  beautiful  citizen,  and  senator 

•  $\ov  5*'  $\(av  aM  irolyffov.  Wolf  proposed  an  emendation  which 
Schweighaeuser  does  not  put  in  his  text,  but  he  has  expressed  it  in  tho 
Latin  version.  The  Greek  is  intelligible,  if  wo  look  to  what  follows. 


200  EPICTETUS. 

and  rhetorician,    We  ought  to  pray  that  such  young  men 
be  born  among  us  and  brought  up. 

Do  not  so,  I  intreat  you  by  the  Go'ds,  young  man :  but 
when  you  have  once  heard  these  words,  go  away  and  say 
to  yourself,  'Epictetus  has  not  said  this  to  me;  for  how 
could  he  ?  but  some  propitious  God  through  him :  for  it 
would  never  have  come  into  his  thoughts  to  say  this,  since 
he  is  not  accustomed  to  talk  tlms  with  any  person.  Come 
then  let  us  obey  God,  that  we  may  not  be  subject  to  his 
anger/  You  say,  No.  But  (I  say),  if  a  crow  by  his 
croaking  signifies  any  thing  to  you,  it  is  not  the  crow 
which  signifies,  but  God  through  the  crow;  and  if  he 
signifies  any  thing  through  a  human  voice,  will  he  not 
cause  the  man  to  say  this  to  you,  that  you  may  know  the 
power  of  the  divinity,  that  he  signifies  to  some  in  this 
way,  and  to  others  in  that  way,  and  concerning  the 
greatest  things  and  the  chief  he  signifies  through  the 
noblest  messenger  ?  "What  else  is  it  which  the  poet  says : 

For  we  ourselves  have  warned  him,  and  have  sent 
Hermes  the  careful  watcher,  Argus'  slayer, 
The  husband  not  to  kill  nor  wed  the  wife.9 

Was  Hermes  going  to  descend  from  heaven  to  say  this  to 
him  ( Aegisthus)  ?  And  now  the  Gods  say  this  to  you  and 
send  the  messenger,  the  slayer  of  Argus,  to  warn  you  not 
to  pervert  that  which  is  well  arranged,  nor  to  busy  your- 
self about  it,  but  to  allow  a  man  to  be  a  man,  and  a  woman 
to  be  a  woman,  a  beautiful  man  to  he  as  a  beautiful  man, 
and  an  ugly  man  as  an  ugly  man,  for  you  are  not  flesh 
and  hair,  but  you  are  will  (7r/>ocu/o«m)  ;  and  if  your  will  is 
beautiful,  then  you  will  be  beautiful.  But  up  to  the 
present  time  I  dare  not  tell  you  that  you  are  ugly, 
for  I  think  that  you  are  readier  to  hear  anything  than 
this.  But  see  what  Socrates  says  to  the  most  beautiful 
and  blooming  of  men  Alcibiades :  Try  then  to  be  beau- 
tiful. What  does  he  say  to  him?  Dress  your  hair  and 
pluck  the  hairs  from  your  legs?  Nothing  of  that  kind. 
But  adorn  your  will,  take  away  bad  opinions.  How  with 

*  From  the  Odyssey,  i.  37,  where  Zeus  is  speaking  of  Aegisthus. 


EPICTETUS.  201 

the  body?  Leave  it  as  it  is  by  nature.  Another  has 
looked  after  these  things :  intrust  them  to  him.  "What 
then,  must  a  man  be  uncleaned  ?  Certainly  not ;  but 
what  you  are  and  are  made  by  nature,  cleanse  this.  A 
man  should  be  cleanly  as  a  man,  a  woman  as  a  woman,  a 
child  as  a  child.  You  say  no :  but  let  us  also  pluck  out 
the  lion's  mane,  that  he  may  not  be  uncleaned,  and  the 
cock's  comb  for  he  also  ought  to  be  cleaned.  Granted,  but 
as  a  cock,  and  the  lion  as  a  lion,  and  the  hunting  dog  as  a 
hunting  dog. 


CHAPTER  IL 

IN  WHAT  A  MAN  OUGHT  TO   BE   EXERCISED   WHO  HAS  MADE 
PROFICIENCY  ;  l   AND  THAT  WE  NEGLECT  THE  CHIEF  THINGS. 

THERE  are  three  things  (topics,  TO'TTOI)  in  which  a  mans 
ought  to  exercise  himself  who  would  be  wise  and  good.2 
The  first  concerns  the  desires  and  the  aversions,  that  a 
man  may  not  fail  to  get  what  he  desires,  and  that  he  may 
not  fall  into  that  which  he  does  not  desire.3  The  second 
concerns  the  movements  (towards  an  object)  and  th& 
movements  from  an  object,  and  generally  in  doing  what  a 
man  ought  to  do,  that  he  may  act  according  to  order,  to 
reason,  and  not  carelessly.  The  third  thing  concerns 
freedom  from  deception  and  rashness  in  judgment,  and 
generally  it  concerns  the  assents  (cruyKarafoWs).  Of  these 


1  In  place  of  irpoKSfyavra  Schweig.  suggests  that  we  should  read 
itpoKtyovra.  :  and  this  is  probable. 

2  KaAbs  KO.\  *yaQ6s  is  the  usual  Greek  expression  to  signify  a  perfect 
man.     The  Stoics,  according  to  Stobaeus,  absurdly  called  *  virtue/ 
KoX6v  (beautiful),  because  it  naturally  *  calls  '  («aX€t)  to  itself  those 
•who  desire  it.   The  Stoics  also  said  that  every  thing  good  was  beautiful 
(KoA(fc),  and  that  the  good  and  the  beautiful  were  equivalent.    Tho 
Roman  expression  is  Vir  bonus  et  sapiens.  (Hor.  Epp.,  i.  7,  22  and  16> 
20).    Perhaps  the  phrase  «aX&s  K*\  aya66s  arose  from  the  notion  ol 
beauty  and  goodness  being  the  combination  of  a  perfect  human  being. 

3  Antoninus,  xi.  37,  '  as  to  sensual  desire  he  should  altogether  keep 
away  from  it  ;  and  as  to  avoidance  [aversion]  he  should  not  show  i* 
with  respect  to  any  of  the  things  which  are  not  in  our  power.' 


202  EPICTETUS. 

topics  tlie  chief  and  the  most  urgent  is  that  which  relates 
to  the  affects  (ra  TrdOrj,  perturbations)  ;  for  an  affect  is 
produced  in  no  other  way  than  by  a  failing  to  obtain  that 
which  a  man  desires  or  falling  into  that  which  a  man 
would  wish  to  avoid.  This  is  that  which  brings  in  per- 
turbations, disorders,  bad  fortune,  misfortunes,  sorrows, 
lamentations,  and  envy ;  that  which  makes  men  envious 
and  jealous ;  and  by  these  causes  we  are  unable  even  to 
listen  to  the  precepts  of  reason.  The  second  topic  con- 
cerns the  duties  of  a  man ;  for  I  ought  not  to  be  free 
from  affects  (a-rraOrf)  like  a  statue,  but  I  ought  to  maintain 
the  relations  (ax^'crcis)  natural  and  acquired,  as  a  pious 
man,  as  a  son,  as  a  father,  as  a  citizen. 

The  third  topic  is  that  which  immediately  concerns 
those  who  are  making  proficiency,  that  which  concerns  the 
security  of  the  other  two,  so  that  not  even  in  sleep  any 
appearance  unexamined  may  surprise  us,  nor  in  intoxica- 
tion, nor  in  melancholy.  This,  it  may  be  said,  is  above 
our  power.  But  the  present  philosophers  neglecting  the 
first  topic  and  the  second  (the  affects  and  duties),  employ 
themselves  on  the  third,  using  sophistical  arguments 
(jtAcraTriTrrovTas),  making  conclusions  from  questioning,  em- 
ploying hypotheses,  lying.  For  a  man  must,  as  it  is  said, 
when  employed  on  these  matters,  take  care  that  he  is  not 
deceived.  Who  must?  The  wise  and  good  man.  This 
then  is  all  that  is  wanting  to  you.  Have  you  successfully 
worked  out  the  rest  ?  Are  you  free  from  deception  in  the 
matter  of  money  ?  If  you  see  a  beautiful  girl,  do  you  resist 
the  appearance?  If  your  neighbour  obtains  an  estate  by 
will,  are  you  not  vexed?  Now  is  there  nothing  else 
wanting  to  you  except  unchangeable  firmness  of  mind 
(dju-eraTrrwcrta)  ?  Wretch,  you  hear  these  very  things  with 
fear  and  anxiety  that  some  person  may  despise  you,  and 
with  inquiries  about  what  any  person  may  say  about  you. 
And  if  a  man  come  and  tell  you  that  in  a  certain  conversa- 
tion in  which  the  question  was,  Who  is  the  best  philoso- 
pher, a  man  who  was  present  said  that  a  certain  person 
was  the  chief  philosopher,  your  little  soul  which  was  only 
a  finger's  length  stretches  out  to  two  cubits.  But  if 
another  who  is  present  says,  You  are  mistaken ;  it  is  not 
worth  while  to  listen  to  a  certain  person,  for  what  does  he 


EPICTETUS.  203 

know?  lie  has  only  the  first  principles,  and  no  more?  then 
you  are  confounded,  you  grow  pale,  you  cry  out  immediately, 
I  will  show  him  who  I  ana,  that  I  am  a  great  philosopher. — 
It  is  seen  by  these  very  things :  why  do  you  wish  to  show 
it  hy  others?  Do  you  not  know  that  Diogenes  pointed 
out  one  of  the  sophists  in  this  way  by  stretching  out  his 
middle  finger?4  And  then  when  the  man  wa«  wild  with 
rage,  This,  he  said,  is  the  certain  person :  I  have  pointed 
him  out  to  you.  For  a  man  is  not  shown  by  the  finger,  as 
a  stone  or  a  piece  of  wood ;  but  when  any  person  shows 
the  man's  principles,  then  he  shows  him  as  a  man. 

Let  us  look  at  your  principles  also.  For  is  it  not  plain 
that  you  value  not  at  all  your  own  will  (Trpoaipecris),  but 
you  look  externally  to  things  which  are  independent  of 
your  will  ?  For  instance,  what  will  a  certain  person  say  ? 
and  what  will  people  think  of  you?  will  you  be  considered 
a  man  of  learning ;  have  you  read  Chrysippus  or  Antipater? 
for  if  you  have  read  Archedemus  5  also,  you  have  every  thing 
[that  you  can  desire].  Why  are  you  still  uneasy  lest  you 
should  not  show  us  who  you  are  ?  Would  you  let  me  tell 
you  what  manner  of  man  you  have  shown  us  that  you  are  ? 
You  have  exhibited  yourself  to  us  as  a  mean  fellow, 
querulous,  passionate,  cowardly,  finding  fault  with  every 
thing,  blaming  every  body,  never  quiet,  vain :  this  is  what 
you  have  exhibited  to  us.  Go  away  now  and  read  Arehe- 
demus;  then  if  a  mouse  should  leap  down  and  make  a 
noise,  you  are  a  dead  man.  For  such  a  death  awaits  you 
as  it  did  6 — what  was  the  man's  name  ? — Ciinis ;  and  he  too 
was  proud,  because  he  understood  Archedemus. 

Wretch,  will  you  not  dismiss  these  things  that  do  not 
concern  you  at  all?  These  things  are  suitable  to  those 
who  are  able  to  learn  them  without  perturbation,  to  those 
who  can  say  :  "  I  am  not  subject  to  anger,  to  grief,  to 
envy :  I  am  not  hindered,  I  am  not  restrained.  What 

4  To  point  out  a  man  with  the  middle  finger  waa  a  way  of  showing 
the  greatest  contempt  for  him. 

5  As  to  Archedemus,  see  ii.  4, 11.    'Aire'xeis  cfrravra :  this  expression 
is  compared  by  Upton  with  Matthew  vi.  2,  farlxovtri  (jLurdbv. 

6  Wolf  suggests  oToy.    Criaia  was  a  Stoic  philosopher  mentioned  by- 
Diogenes  Laeitius.    Wo  may  suppose  that  he  was  no  real  philosopher, 
and  that  he  died  of  fright. 


204  EPICTETUS 

remains  for  me  ?  I  have  leisure,  I  am  tranquil :  let  us 
see  how  wo  must  deal  with  sophistical  arguments ; 7  let  us 
see  how  when  a  man  has  accepted  an  hypothesis  he  shall 
not  be  led  away  to  any  thing  absurd."  To  them  such 
things  belong.  To  those  who  arc  happy  it  is  appropriate 
to  light  a  fire,  to  dine ;  if  they  choose,  both  to  sing  and 
to  dance.  But  when  the  vessel  is  sinking,  you  come  to 
me  and  hoist  the  sails.8 


CHAPTER  III. 

WHAT  IS  THE  MATTER  OX  WHICH  A  GOOD  MAN  SHOULD  BE 
EMPLOYED,  AND  IN  WHAT  WE  OUGHT  CHIEFLY  TO  PRACTISE 
OURSELVES. 

THE  material  for  the  wise  and  good  man  is  his  own  ruling 
faculty :  and  the  body  is  the  material  for  the  physician 
and  the  aliptes  (the  man  who  oils  persons) ;  the  land  is 
the  matter  for  the  husbandman.  The  business  of  the  wise 
and  good  man  is  to  use  appearances  conformably  to  nature: 
and  as  it  is  the  nature  of  every  soul  to  assent  to  the  truth, 
to  dissent  from  the  false,  and  to  remain  in  suspense  as  to 
that  which  is  uncertain ;  so  it  is  its  nature  to  be  moved 
towards  the  desire  of  the  good,  and  to  aversion  from  the 
evil ;  and  with  respect  to  that  which  is  neither  good  nor 
bad  it  feels  indifferent.  For  as  the  money-changer  (banker) 
is  not  allowed  to  reject  Caesar's  coin,  nor  the  seller  of  herbs, 
but  if  you  show  the  coin,  whether  he  chooses  or  not,  he 
must  give  up  what  is  sold  for  the  coin ;  so  it  is  also  in  the 
matter  of  the  soul.  When  the  good  appears,  it  immediately 

7  See  this  chapter  above. 

8  rovs  <ri(f>dpovs.    On  this  reading  the  student  may  consult  the  note 
in  Schweighaeuser's  edition.    The  word  (nQdpovs,  if  it  is  the  right 
reading,  is  not  clear ;  nor  the  meaning  of  this  conclusion. 

The  philosopher  is  represented  as  being  full  of  anxiety  about  things 
which  do  not  concern  him,  and  which  are  proper  subjects  for  those 
only  who  are  free  from  disturbing  passions  and  are  quite  happy,  which  is 
not  the  philosopher's  condition.  He  is  compared  to  a  sinking  ship,  and 
at  this  very  time  he  is  supposed  to  be  employed  in  the  useless  labour 
of  hoisting  the  sails. 


EPICTETUS.  205 

attracts  to  itself;  the  evil  repels  from  itself.  But  the  soul 
will  never  reject  the  manifest  appearance  of  the  good,  any 
more  than  persons  will  reject  Caesar's  coin.  On  this 
principle  depends  every  movement  both  of  man  and  God.1 

For  this  reason  the  good  is  preferred  to  every  intimate 
relationship  (obligation).  There  is  no  intimate  relation- 
ship between  me  and  my  father,  but  there  is  between  me 
and  the  good.  Are  you  so  hard-hearted?  Yes,  for  such  is 
my  nature  ;  and  this  is  the  coin  which  God  has  given  me. 
For  this  reason  if  the  good  is  something  different  from  the 
beautiful  and  the  just,  both  father  is  gone  (neglected),  and 
brother  and  country,  and  everything.  But  shall  I  overlook 
my  own  good,  in  order  that  you  may  have  it,  and  shall  I 
give  it  up  to  you  ?  Why  ?  I  am  your  father.  But  you  are 
not  my  good.  I  am  your  brother.  But  you  are  not  my 
good.  But  if  we  place  the  good  in  a  right  determination 
of  the  will,  the  very  observance  of  the  relations  of  life  is 
good,  and  accordingly  he  who  gives  up  any  external  things, 
obtains  that  which  is  good.  Your  father  takes  away  your 
property.  But  he  does  not  injure  you.  Your  brother  will 
have  the  greater  part  of  the  estate  in  land.  Let  him  have 
as  much  as  he  chooses.  Will  he  then  have  a  greater  share 
of  modesty,  of  fidelity,  of  brotherly  affection  ?  For  who  will 
eject  you  from  this  possession  ?  Not  even  Zeus,  for  neither 
has  he  chosen  to  do  so ;  but  he  has  made  this  in  my  own 
power,  and  he  has  given  it  to  me  just  as  he  possessed  it 
himself,  free  from  hindrance,  compulsion,  and  impediment. 
When  then  the  coin  which  another  uses  is  a  different  coin, 
if  a  man  presents  this  coin,  he  receives  that  which  is 
sold  for  it.  Suppose  that  there  comes  into  the  province  a 
thievish  proconsul,  what  coin  does  ho  use?  Silver  coin. 
Show  it  to  him,  and  carry  off  what  you  please.  Suppose 
one  comes  who  is  an  adulterer :  what  coin  does  he  use  ? 
Little  girls.  Take,  a  man  says,  the  coin,  and  sell  me  the 
small  thing.  Give,  says  the  seller,  and  buy  [what  you  want]. 
Another  is  eager  to  possess  boys.  Give  him  the  coin,  and 
receive  what  you  wish.  Another  is  fond  of  hunting :  give 
him  a  fine  nag  or  a  dog.  Though  he  groans  and  laments, 
ke  will  sell  for  it  that  which  you  want.  For  another 

1  Comp.  i.  19, 11, 


206  EPICTETUS. 

compels  him  from  within,  he  who  has  fixed  (determine tl) 
this  coin.2 

Against  (or  with  respect  to)  this  kind  of  thing  chiefly  a 
man  should  exercise  himself.  As  soon  as  you  go  out  in  the 
morning,  examine  every  man  whom  you  see,  every  man 
whom  you  hear ;  answer  as  to  a  question,  What  have  you 
seen  ?  A  handsome  man  or  woman  ?  Apply  the  rule.  Is 
this  independent  of  the  will,  or  dependent?  Independent. 
Take  it  away.  What  have  you  seen  ?  A  man  lamenting 
over  the  death  of  a  child.  Apply  the  rule.  Death  is  a 
thing  independent  of  the  will.  Take  it  away.  Has  the 
proconsul  met  you  ?  Apply  the  rule.  What  kind  of  thing  is 
a  proconsul's  office?  Independent  of  the  will,  or  dependent 
on  it?  Independent.  Take  this  away  also:  it  does  not 
stand  examination :  cast  it  away  :  it  is  nothing  to  you. 

If  we  practised  this  and  exercised  ourselves  in  it  daily 
from  morning  to  night,  something  indeed  would  bo  done. 
But  now  we  are  forthwith  caught  half  asleep  by  every 
appearance,  and  it  is  only,  if  ever,  that  in  the  school  we  aro 
roused  a  little.  Then  when  we  go  out,  if  we  see  a  man 
lamenting,  we  say,  He  is  undone.  If  we  see  a  consul, 
we  say,  He  is  happy.  If  we  see  an  exiled  man,  we  say,  He 
is  miserable.  If  we  see  a  poor  man,  we  say,  He  is  wretched ; 
he  has  nothing  to  eat. 

We  ought  -  then  to  eradicate  these  bad  opinions,  and  to 
this  end  we  should  direct  all  our  efforts.  For  what  is 
weeping  and  lamenting  ?  Opinion.  What  is  bad  fortune  ? 
Opinion.  What  is  civil  sedition,  what  is  divided  opinion, 
what  is  blame,  what  is  accusation,  what  is  impiety,  what  is 

2  Mrs.  Carter  compares  the  Epistle  to  the  Romans,  vii.  21-23. 
Schweighaeuser  says,  the  man  either  sees  that  the  thing  which  he  is 
doing  is  bad  or  unjust,  or  for  any  other  reason  he  does  not  do  the 
thing  willingly  ;  but  he  is  compelled,  and  allows  himself  to  be  carried 
away  by  the  passion  which  rules  him.  The  '  another '  who  compels 
is  God,  Schweig.  says,  who  has  made  the  nature  of  man  such,  that 
he  must  postpone  every  thing  else  to  that  thing  in  whicli  he  places 
his  Good  :  and  he  adds,  that  it  is  man's  fault  if  he  places  his  good  in 
that  thing,  in  which  God  has  not  placed  it. 

Some  persons  will  not  consider  this  to  be  satisfactory.  The  man  ia 
'compelled  and  allows  himself  to  be  carried  away,'  etc.  The  notion  of 
*  compulsion'  is  inconsistent  with  the  exercise  of  the  will.  The  man  ia 
unlucky.  He  is  like  him  *  who  sees,*  as  the  Latin  poet  says, 4  the 
better  things  and  approves  of  them,  but  follows  the  worse.' 


EPICTETUS.  207 

trifling  ?  All  these  things  are  opinions,  and  nothing  more, 
and  opinions  about  things  independent  of  the  will,  as  if  they 
were  good  and  bad.  Let  a  man  transfer  these  opinions  to 
things  dependent  on  the  will,  and  I  engage  for  him  that  he 
will  be  firm  and  constant,  whatever  may  be  the  state  of 
things  around  him.  Such  as  is  a  dish  of  water,  such  is  the 
soul.  Such  as  is  the  ray  of  light  which  falls  on  the  water, 
such  are  the  appearances,  When  the  water  is  moved,  the 
ray  also  seems  to  be  moved,  yet  ifc  is  not  moved.  And  when 
then  a  man  is  seized  with  giddiness,  it  is  not  the  arts  and 
the  virtues  which  are  confounded,  but  the  spirit  (the 
nervous  power)  on  which  they  are  impressed ;  but  if  the 
spirit  be  restored  to  its  settled  state,  those  things  also  are 
restored.3 


CHAPTEE    IV. 

AGAINST  A   PERSON   WHO   SHOWED  HIS   PARTIZANSHIP  IN   AN 
UNSEEMLY   WAY   IN  A  THEATRE. 

THE  governor  of  Epirus  having  shown  his  favour  to  an 
actor  in  an  unseemly  way  and  being  publicly  blamed  on 
this  account,  and  afterwards  having  reported  to  Epictetus 
that  he  was  blamed  and  that  he  was  vexed  at  those  who 
blamed  him,  Epictetus  said,  What  harm  have  they  been 
doing?  These  men  also  were  acting  as  partizans,  as  you 
were  doing.  The  governor  replied,  Does  then  any  person 
show  his  partizanship  in  this  way  ?  When  they  see  yout 
said  Epictetus,  who  are  their  governor,  a  friend  of  Caesar 
and  his  deputy,  showing  partizanship  in  this  way,  was  it 
not  to  be  expected  that  they  also  should  show  their  par- 
tizanship in  the  same  way  ?  for  if  it  is  not  right  to  show 
partizanship  in  this  way,  do  not  do  so  yourself;  and  if  it  is 
right,  why  are  you  angry  if  they  followed  your  example  ? 
For  whom  have  the  many  to  imitate  except  you,  who  a:re 
their  superiors?  to  whose  example  should  they  look  when 

,     *  See  Schweig.'e  note  on  this  obscure  passage. 


208  EPICTETUS. 

they  go  to  the  theatre  except  yours?  See  how  the  deputy 
of  Caesar  looks  on  :  he  has  cried  out,  and  I  too  then  will 
cry  out.  Ho  springs  up  from  his  seat,  and  I  will  spring 
up.  His  slaves  sit  in  various  parts  of  the  theatre  and  call 
out.  I  have  no  slaves,  but  I  will  myself  cry  out  as  much  as 
I  can  and  as  loud  as  all  of  them  together.  You  ought  then 
X)  know  when  you  enter  the  theatre  that  you  enter  as  a 
rule  and  example  to  the  rest  how  they  ought  to  look  at 
the  acting.  Why  then  did  they  blame  you?  Because 
every  man  hates  that  which  is  a  hindrance  to  him.  They 
wished  one  person  to  be  crowned;  you  wished  another. 
They  were  a  hindrance  to  you,  and  you  were  a  hindrance 
to  them.  You  were  found  to  be  the  stronger ;  and  they 
did  what  they  could ;  they  blamed  that  which  hindered 
them.  What  then  would  you  have  ?  That  }TOU  should  do 
what  you  please,  and  they  should  not  even  say  what  they 
please  ?  And  what  is  the  wonder  ?  Do  not  the  husband- 
men abuse  Zeus  when  they  are  hindered  by  him?  do  not 
the  sailors  abuse  him  ?  do  they  ever  cease  abusing  Caesar  ? 
What  then?  does  not  Zeus  know?  is  not  what  is  said 
reported  to  Caesar?  What  then  does  he  do?  he  knows 
that,  if  he  punished  all  who  abuse  him,  he  would  have 
nobody  to  rule  over.  What  then  ?  when  you  enter  the 
theatre,  you  ought  to  say  not,  Let  Sophron  (some  actor)  be 
crowned,  but  you  ought  to  say  this,  Come  let  me  maintain 
my  will  in  this  matter  so  that  it  shall  be  conformable  to 
nature  :  no  man  is  dearer  to  me  than  myself.  It  would  be 
ridiculous  then  for  me  to  be  hurt  (injured)  in  order  that 
another  who  is  an  actor  may  be  crowned.  Whom  then  do 
I  wish  to  gain  the  prize  ?  Why  the  actor  who  does  gain 
the  prize ;  and  so  he  will  always  gain  the  prize  whom  I 
wish  to  gain  it. — But  I  wish  Sophron  to  be  crowned. — • 
Celebrate  as  many  games  as  you  choose  in  your  own  house, 
Nemean,  Pythian,  Isthmian,  Olympian,  and  proclaim  him 
victor.  But  in  public  do  not  claim  more  than  your  due, 
nor  attempt  to  appropriate  to  yourself  what  belongs  to  all. 
If  you  do  not  consent  to  this,  bear  being  abused :  for  when 
you  do  the  same  as  the  many,  you  put  yourself  on  the 
same  level  with  them. 


EPIOTETCS.  209 


CHAPTER  V, 

AGAINST  THOSE  WHO  ON  ACCOUNT  OF  SICKNESS  GO  AWAY 
HOME. 

I  AM  sick  here,  said  one  of  the  pupils,  and  I  wish  to  return 
home. — At  home,  I  suppose,  you  were  free  from  sickness. 
Do  you  not  consider  whether  you  are  doing  any  thing  here 
which  may  be  useful  to  the  exercise  of  your  will,  that  it 
may  be  corrected  ?  For  if  you  are  doing  nothing  towards 
this  end,  it  was  to  no  purpose  that  you  came.  Go  away. 
Look  after  your  affairs  at  home.  For  if  your  ruling  power 
cannot  be  maintained  in  a  state  conformable  to  nature,  it 
is  possible  that  your  land  can,  that  you  will  be  able  to 
increase  your  money,  you  will  take  care  of  your  father  in 
his  old  age,  frequent  the  public  place,  hold  magisterial 
office :  being  bad  you  will  do  badly  any  thing  else  that  you 
have  to  do.  But  if  you  understand  yourself,  and  know- 
that  you  are  casting  away  certain  bad  opinions  and  adopting 
others  in  their  place,  and  if  you  have  changed  your  state  of 
life  from  things  which  are  not  within  your  will  to  things 
which  are  within  your  will,  and  if  you  ever  say,  Alas !  you 
are  not  saying  what  you  say  on  account  of  your  father,  or 
your  brother,  but  on  account  of  yourself,  do  you  still  allege- 
your  sickness  ?  Do  you  not  know  that  both  disease  and 
death  must  surprise  us  while  we  are  doing  something? 
the  husbandman  while  he  is  tilling  the  ground,  the  sailor 
while  he  is  on  his  voyage  ?  what  would  you  be  doing  when* 
death  surprises  you,  for  you  must  be  surprised  when  you 
are  doing  something?  If  you  can  be  doing  anything  better 
than  this  when  you  are  surprised,  do  it.  For  I  wish  to  be- 
surprised  by  disease  or  death  when  I  am  looking  after 
nothing  else  than  my  own  will,  that  I  may  be  free  from 
perturbation,  that  I  may  be  free  from  hindrance,  free  from 
compulsion,  and  in  a  state  of  liberty.  I  wish  to  be  found 
practising  these  things  that  I  may  be  able  to  say  to  God, 
Have  I  in  any  respect  transgressed  thy  commands  ?  have  I 
in  any  respect  wrongly  used  the  powers  which  thou  gavest 
me  ?  have  I  misused  my  perceptions  or  my  preconceptions 

P 


210  EPIOTETUS. 

(irpoXfycorL)  ? l  have  I  ever  blamed  ihee  ?  have  I  ever  found 
fault  with  thy  administration?  I  have  been  sick,  because 
it  was  thy  will,  and  so  have  others,  but  I  was  content  to 
be  sick.  I  have  been  poor  because  it  was  thy  will,  but  I 
was  content  also.  I  have  not  filled  a  magisterial  office, 
because  it  was  not  thy  pleasure  that  I  should:  I  have 
never  desired  it.  Hast  thou  ever  seen  me  for  this  reason 
discontented  ?  have  I  not  always  approached  thee  with  a 
cheerful  countenance,  ready  to  do  thy  commands  and  to 
obey  thy  signals  ?  Is  it  now  thy  will  that  I  should  depart 
from  the  assemblage  of  men  ?  I  depart.  I  give  thee  all 
thanks  that  thou  hast  allowed  me  to  join  in  this  thy 
assemblage  of  men  and  to  see  thy  works,  and  to  comprehend 
this  thy  administration.  May  death  surprise  me  while  I 
-am  thinking  of  these  things,  while  I  am  thus  writing  and 
reading. 

But  my  mother  will  not  hold  my  head  when  I  am  sick. 
'Go  to  your  mother  then ;  for  you  are  a  fit  person  to  have 
your  head  held  when  you  are  sick. — But  at  home  I  used  to 
lie  down  on  a  delicious  bed. — Go  away  to  your  bed  :  indeed 
you  are  fit  to  lie  on  such  a  bed  even  when  you  are  in 
health :  do  not  then  lose  what  you  can  do  there  (at  home). 

But  what  does  Socrates  say  ?  2  As  one  man,  ho  says,  is 
pleased  with  improving  his  land,  another  with  improving 
-his  horse,  so  I  am  daily  pleased  in  observing  that  I  am 
growing  better.  Better  in  what?  in  using  nice  little 
words  ?  Man,  do  not  say  that.  In  little  matters  of  specu- 
lation (QewprjjjLdTCL)  ?  what  are  you  saying  ? — And  indeed  I 
do  not  see  what  else  there  is  on  which  philosophers  employ 
their  time. — Does  it  seem  nothing  to  you  to  have  never 
found  fault  with  any  person,  neither  with  God  nor  man  ?  to 
have  blamed  nobody  ?  to  carry  the  same  face  always  in  going 
out  and  coming  in  ?  This  is  what  Socrates  knew,  and  yet 

1  On  '  preconceptions,'  see  i.  2. 

2  Xenophon  (Memorab.  i.  6,  14) ;  but  Epicteius  does  not  quote  the 
Tnrrds,  he  only  gives  the  meaning.    Antoninus  (viii.  43)  says, 4  Differ- 
ent things  delight  different  people.    But  its  is  my  delight  to  keep  the 
ruling  faculty  sound  without  turning  away  either  from  any  man  or 
from  any  of  the  things  which  happen  to  men,  but  looking  at  and 
receiving  all  with  welcome  eyes,  and  using  every  thing  according  to 
its  value.' 


EPICTETUS.  211 

he  never  said  that  he  knew  any  thing  or  taught  any  thing.3 
But  if  any  man  asked  for  nice  little  words  or  little  speeu* 
lations,  ho  would  carry  him  to  Protagoras  or  to  Hippias ; 
and  if  any  man  came  to  ask  for  potherbs,  he  would  carry 
him  to  the  gardener.  Who  then  among  you  'has  this 
purpose  (motive  to  action)  ?  for  if  indeed  you  had  it,  you 
would  both  be  content  in  sickness,  and  in  hunger,  and  in 
death.  If  any  among  you  has  been  in  love  with  a  charming 
girl,  he  knows  that  I  say  vhat  is  true.4 


CHAPTER  VL 

MISCELLANEOUS. 

WHEN  some  person  asked  him  how  it  happened  that  since 
reason  has  been  more  cultivated  by  the  men  of  the  present 
«ge,  the  progress  made  in  former  times  was  greater.  In 
what  respect,  he  answered,  has  it  been  more  cultivated 
now,  and  in  what  respect  was  the  progress  greater  then  ? 
For  in  that  in  which  it  has  now  been  more  cultivated,  in 
that  also  the  progress  will  now  be  found.  At  present  it 
has  been  cultivated  for  the  purpose  of  resolving  syllogisms, 
arid  progress  is  made.  But  in  former  times  it  was  culti- 
vated for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  the  governing  faculty 
in  a  condition  conformable  to  nature,  and  progress  was 
made.  Do  not  then  mix  things  which  are  different,  and 
do  not  expect,  when  you  are  labouring  at  one  thing  to 
make  progress  in  another.  But  see  if  any  man  among  us 
when  he  is  intent  upon  this,  the  keeping  himself  in  a  state 

*  Socrates  never  professed  to  teach  virtue,  but  by  showing  himself 
to  be  a  virtuous  man  he  expected  to  make  his  companions  virtuous  by 
imitating  his  example.    (Xenophon,  Memorab.  i.  2,  3.) 

*  Upton  explains  this  passage  thus :  '  He  who  loves  knows  what  it 
is  to  endure  all  things  for  love.    If  any  man  then  being  captivated 
with  love  for  a  girl  would  for  her  sake  endure  dangers  and  even  death, 
what  would  he  not  endure  if  he  possessed  the  love  of  God,  ths  Uni- 
versal, the  chief  of  beautiful  things?' 

P  2 


212  EPICTETUS. 

conformable  to  nature  and  living  so  always,  does  not  make 
progress.    For  you  will  not  find  such  a  man. 

The  good  man  is  invincible,  for  ho  does  not  enter  the 
contest  where  he  is  not  stronger.  If  you  (his  adversary) 
want  to  have  his  land  and  all  that  is  on  it,  take  the  land ; 
take  his  slaves,  take  his  magisterial  office,  take  his  poor 
body.  But  you  will  not  make  his  desire  fail  in  that  which 
it  seeks,  nor  his  aversion  fall  into  that  which  he  would 
avoid.  The  only  contest  into  which  he  enters  is  that  about 
things  which  are  within  the  power  of  his  will ;  how  then 
will  he  not  be  invincible? 

Some  person  having  asked  him  what  is  Common  sense, 
Epictetus  replied,  As  that  may  be  called  a  certain  Common 
hearing  which  only  distinguishes  vocal  sounds,  and  that 
which  distinguishes  musical  sounds  is  not  Common,  but 
artificial ;  so  there  are  certain  things  which  men,  who  are 
not  altogether  perverted,  see  by  the  common  notions  which 
all  possess.  Such  a  constitution  of  the  mind  is  named 
Common  sense.1 

It  is  not  easy  to  exhort  weak  young  men ;  for  neither 
is  it  easy  to  hold  (soft)  cheese  with  a  hook.2  But  those 
who  have  a  good  natural  disposition,  even  if  you  try  to 
turn  them  aside,  cling  still  more  to  reason.  Wherefore 
Kufus  3  generally  attempted  to  discourage  (his  pupils),  and 
he  used  this  method  as  a  test  of  those  who  had  a  good 
natural  disposition  and  those  who  had  not.  For  it  was  his 
habit  to  say,  as  a  stone,  if  you  cast  it  upwards,  will  be 
brought  down  to  the  earth  by  its  own  nature,  so  the  man 
whose  mind  is  naturally  good,  the  more  you  repel  him, 
the  more  he  turns  towards  that  to  which  he  is  naturally 
inclined, 

1  The  Greek  is  wivos  wOs,  the  Comniunis  sensus  of  the  Komans,  and 
our  Common  sense.    Horace  (Sat.  i.  3,  65)  speaks  of  a  man  who  *  com- 
muni  sensu  plane  caret,'  one  who  has  not  the  sense  or  understanding 
which  is  the  common  property  of  men. 

2  This  was  a  proverb  used  by  Bion,  as  Diogenes  Laertius  says.  The 
eheese  was  new  and  soft,  as  the  antients  used  it. 

3  Kufus  is  mentioned  i.  1,  note  12. 


EPICTETUS.  213 


CHAPTEE  VII. 

TO  THE  ADMINISTRATOR  OF  THE  FREE  CITIES  WHO  WAS  AN 
EPICUREAN. 

WHEN  the  administrator  l  came  to  visit  him,  and  the  man 
was  an  Epicurean,  Epictetus  said,  It  is  proper  for  us  who 
are  not  philosophers  to  inquire  of  you  who  are  philoso- 
phers,2 as  those  who  come  to  a  strange  city  inquire  of  the 
citizens  and  those  who  are  acquainted  with  it,  what  is 
the  best  thing  in  the  world,  in  order  that  we  also  after 
inquiry  may  go  in  quest  of  that  which  is  best  and  look 
at  it,  as  strangers  do  with  the  things  in  cities.  For 
that  there  are  three  things  which  relate  to  man,  soul, 
body,  and  things  external,  scarcely  any  man  denies.  It 
remains  for  you  philosophers  to  answer  what  is  the 
best.  What  shall  we  say  to  men  ?  Is  the  flesh  the  best  ? 
and  was  it  for  this  that  Maximus3  sailed  as  far  as  Cas- 
siope  in  winter  (or  bad  weather)  with  his  son,  and  ac- 
companied him  that  he  might  be  gratified  in  the  flesh? 
When  the  man  said  that  it  was  not,  and  added,  Far  be 
that  from  him.  —  Is  it  not  fit  then,  Epictetus  said,  to 
be  actively  employed  about  the  best  ?  It  is  certainly  of 
all  things  the  most  fit.  What  then  do  we  possess  which 
is  better  than  the  flesh  ?  The  soul,  he  replied.  And  the 
good  things  of  the  best,  are  they  better,  or  the  good  things 
of  the  worse  ?  The  good  things  of  the  best.  And  are  the 
good  things  of  the  best  within  the  power  of  the  will 
or  not  within  the  power  of  the  will  ?  They  are  within 
the  power  of  the  will.  Is  then  the  pleasure  of  the  soul 
a  thing  within  the  power  of  the  will  ?  It  is,  he  replied. 


1  The  Greek  is  tiiopeurfo.    The  Latin  word  is  Corrector,  which 
occurs  in  inscriptions,  and  elsewhere. 

2  The  Epicureans  are  ironically  named  Philosophers,  for  most  of 
them  were  arrogant  men.    See  what  is  said  of  them  in  Cicero's  Do 
Natura  Deorum,  i.  8.    Schweig. 

3  Maximus  was  appointed  by  Trajan  to  conduct  a  campaign  against 
the  PartMans,  in  which  he  lost  his  life.    Dion  Cassius,  ii.  1108,  1126, 
Heimarus. 

Cassiope  or  Cassope  is  a  city  in  Epirus,  near  the  sea,  and  between 
Pandosia  and  Nicopolis,  where  Epictetus  lived. 


214  EPIOTETUS. 

And  on  what  snail  this  pleasure  depend  ?  On  itself?  But 
that  can  not  bo  conceived :  for  there  must  first  exist  a 
certain  substance  or  nature  (ovo-ia)  of  good,  by  obtaining 
which  we  shall  have  pleasure  in  the  soul.  He  assented  to 
this  also.  On  what  then  shall  we  depend  for  this  pleasure 
of  the  soul  ?  for  if  it  shall  depend  on  things  of  the  soul,4 
the  substance  (nature)  of  the  good  is  discovered ;  for  goocl 
can  not  be  one  thing,  and  that  at  which  we  are  rationally 
delighted  another  thing ;  nor  if  that  which  precedes  is  not 
good,  can  that  which  comes  after  be  good,  for  in  order  that 
the  thing  which  comes  after  may  be  good,  that  which 
precedes  must  be  good.  But  you  would  not  affirm  this, 
if  you  are  in  your  right  mind,  for  you  would  then  say 
what  is  inconsistent  both  with  Epicurus  and  the  rest  of 
your  doctrines.  It  remains  then  that  the  pleasure  of  the 
soul  is  in  the  pleasure  from  things  of  the  body :  and  again 
that  those  bodily  things  must  be  the  things  which  precedo 
and  the  substance  (nature)  of  the  good. 

For  this  reason  Maximus  acted  foolishly  if  he  made  the 
voyage  for  any  other  reason  than  for  the  sake  of  the  flesh, 
that  is,  for  the  sake  of  the  best.  And  also  a  man  acts 
foolishly  if  he  abstains  from  that  which  belongs  to  others,, 
when  he  is  a  judge  (Siicacmfc)  and  able  to  take  it.  But,, 
if  you  please,  let  us  consider  this  on]y,  how  this  thing  may 
be  done  secretly,  and  safely,  and  so  that  no  man  will  know 
it.  For  not  even  does  Epicurus  himself  declare  stealing  to 
bo  bad,5  but  he  admits  that  detection  is;  and  because  it 
is  impossible  to  have  security  against  detection,  for  this 
reason  he  says,  Do  not  steal.  But  I  say  to  you  that  if 
stealing  is  done  cleverly  and  cautiously,  we  shall  not  bo 
detected :  further  also  we  have  powerful  friends  in  Rome 
both  men  and  women,  and  the  Hellenes  (Greeks)  are  weak,, 
and  no  man  will  venture  to  go  up  to  Borne  for  the  purpose 
(of  complaining).  Why  do  you  refrain  from  your  own 
good?  This  is  senseless,  foolish.  But  even  if  you  tell  me 
that  you  do  refrain,  I  will  not  believe  you.  For  as  it  is. 

4  VVXIKOIS  is  Lord  Shaftesbury's  emendation  in  place  of  byaQots,  and 
it  is  accepted  by  Schweighaeuser. 

a  Diogenes  Laertius  (x.  151),  quoted  by  Upton.  *  Injustice/  says 
Epicurus,  *  is  not  an  evil  in  itself,  but  the  evil  is  in  the  fear  which  there 
is  on  account  of  suspicion.' 


EPICTETUS.  215 

impossible  to  assent  to  that  which  appears  false,  and  to 
turn  away  from  that  which  is  true,  so  it  is  impossible 
to  abstain  from  that  which  appears  good.  But  wealth  is 
a  good  thing,  and  certainly  most  efficient  in  producing 
pleasure.  Why  will  you  not  acquire  wealth  ?  And  why 
should  we  not  corrupt  our  neighbor's  wife,  if  wo  can  do 
it  without  detection  ?  and  if  the  husband  foolishly  prates 
about  the  matter,  why  not  pitch  him  out  of  the  house  ?  If 
you  would  be  a  philosopher  such  as  you  ought  to  be,  if  a 
perfect  philosopher,  if  consistent  with  your  own  doctrines, 
[you  must  act  thus].  If  you  would  not,  you  will  not 
differ  at  all  from  us  who  are  called  Stoics  ;  for  wo  also  say 
one  thing,  but  we  do  another  :  we  talk  of  the  things  which 
are  beautiful  (good),  but  we  do  what  is  base.  But  you 
will  bo  perverse  in  the  contrary  way,  teaching  what  ia 
bad,  practising  what  is  good.6 

In  the  name  of  God,7  are  you  thinking  of  a  city  of  Epi- 
cureans ?  [One  man  says],  '  1  do  not  marry.'  —  4  Nor  I,  for 
a  man  ought  not  to  manry  ;  nor  ought  we  to  beget  children, 
nor  engage  in  public  matters/  What  then  will  happen  ? 
whence  will  the  citizens  come?  who  will  bring  them  up? 
who  will  be  governor  of  the  youth,  who  preside  over  gym- 
nastic exercises  ?  and  in  what  also  will  the  teacher  instruct 
them  ?  will  he  teach  them  what  the  Lacedaemonians  were 
taught,  or  what  the  Athenians  were  taught?  Come  take  a 
young  man,  bring  him  up  according  to  your  doctrines.  The 
doctrines  are  bad,  subversive  of  a  state,  pernicious  to 
families,  and  not  becoming  to  women.  Dismiss  them,  man. 
You  live  in  a  chief  city  :  it  is  your  duty  to  be  a  magistrate, 
to  judge  justly,  to  abstain  from  that  which  belongs  to  others  ; 
no  woman  ought  to  seem  beautiful  to  you  except  your  own 


8  The  MSS.,  with  one  exception,  have 
alffxpa,  hut  it  was  properly  corrected  by  Wolf,  as  Upton  remarks,  who 
shows  from  Cicero,  de  Fin.,  ii.  25  and  31,  that  the  MSS.  are  wrong.  In 
the  second  passage  Cicero  gays,  *nihil  in  hae  praeclara  epistola  saip- 
tum  ab  Epicuro  oongruens  et  conveniens  decretis  ejus  repcriotis.  Ita 
redarguitur  ipse  a  sese,  vincunturque  ecripta  ejus  probitato  ipsius  ac 
moribus.'  See  Epictetus,  ii.  18. 

7  Upton  compares  the  passage  (v.  333)  in  the  Cyclops  of  Euripides, 
who  speaks  like  an  Epicurean.  Not  to  marry  and  not  to  enga  ?e  iu 
public  affairs  were  Epicurean  doctrines.  See  Epictetus,  i.  23,  3  ewid  6 


216  EPICTETUS. 

wife,  and  no  youth,  no  vessel  of  silver,  no  vessel  of  gold 
(except  your  own).  Seek  for  doctrines  which  are  consistent 
with  what  I  say,  and  by  making  thorn  your  guide  you  will 
with  pleasure  abstain  from  things  which  have  such  per- 
suasive power  to  lead  ns  and  overpower  us.  But  if  to  the 
persuasive  power  of  these  things,  we  also  devise  such  a 
philosophy  as  this  which  helps  to  push  us  on  towards  them 
and  strengthens  us  to  this  end,  what  will  be  the  conse- 
quence ?  In  a  piece  of  toreutic8  art  which  is  the  best  part? 
the  silver  or  the  workmanship?  The  substance  of  the  hand 
is  the  flesh ;  but  the  work  of  the  hand  is  the  principal 
part  (that  which  precedes  and  leads  the  rest).  The  duties 
then  are  also  three  : 9  those  which  are  directed  towards  the 
existence  of  a  thing  ;  those  which  are  directed  towards  its 
existence  in  a  particular  kind ;  and  third,  the  chief  or 
leading  things  themselves.  So  also  in  man  we  ought  not 
to  value  the  material,  the  poor  flesh,  but  the  principal 
(leading  things,  TO.  Trporjyov^va).  What  are  these?  Engaging 
in  public  business,  marrying,  begetting  children,  venerat- 
ing God,  taking  care  of  parents,  and  generally,  having 
desires,  aversions  (c/cKAu/eiv),  pursuits  of  things  and  avoid- 
ances,  in  the  way  in  which  we  ought  to  do  these  things, 
and  according  to  our  nature.  And  how  are  we  constituted 
by  nature  ?  Free,  noble,  modest :  for  what  other  animal 
blushes  ?  what  other  is  capable  of  receiving  the  appearance 
(the  impression)  of  shame  ?  and  we  are  so  constituted  by 
nature  as  to  subject  pleasure  to  these  things,  as  a  minister, 
a  servant,  in  order  that  it  may  call  forth  our  activity,  in 
order  that  it  may  keep  us  constant  in  acts  which  are 
conformable  to  nature.10 

But  I  am  rich  and  I  want  nothing. — Why  then  do  you 
pretend  to  be  a  philosopher  ?  Your  golden  and  your  silver 
vessels  are  enough  for  you.  What  need  have  you  of  prin- 
ciples (opinions)?  But  I  am  also  a  judge  (/c/omfc)  of  the 
Greeks. — Do  you  know  how  to  judge  ?  Who  tauglat  you  tc 

8  The  toreutic  art  is  the  art  of  working  in  metal,  stone,  or  wood,  and 
of  making  figures  on  them  in  relief  or  by  cutting  into  the  material. 
8  See  Schweig/s  note. 
»  See  Schweig.'s  aota. 


EPICTETUS,  217 

know  ?  Caesar  wrote  to  me  a  codicil. ll  Let  him  write  and 
give  you  a  commission  to  judge  of  music ;  and  what  will 
be  the  use  of  it  to  you?  Still  how  did  you  become  a 
judge  ?  whose  hand  did  you  kiss  ?  the  hand  of  Symphorus 
or  Numenius  ?  Before  whose  bed-chamber  have  you  slept  ? 12 
To  whom  have  you  sent  gifts  ?  Then  do  you  not  see  that 
to  be  a  judge  is  just  of  the  same  value  as  Numenius  is  ? 
But  I  can  throw  into  prison  any  man  whom  I  please. — 
So  you  can  do  with  a  stone. — But  I  can  beat  with  sticks 
whom  I  please. — So  you  may  an  ass.  This  is  not  a 
governing  of  men.  Govern  us  as  rational  animals  :  show 
us  what  is  profitable  to  us,  and  we  will  follow  it :  show  us 
what  is  unprofitable,  and  we  will  turn  away  from  it. 
Make  us  imitators  of  yourself,  as  Socrates  made  men  imita- 
tors of  himself.  For  he  was  like  a  governor  of  men,  who 
made  them  subject  to  him  thoir  desires,  their  aversion,  their 
movements  towards  an  object  and  their  turning  away  from 
it. — Do  this :  do  not  do  this  :  if  you  do  not  obey,  I  will 
throw  you  into  prison. — This  is  not  governing  men  like 
rational  animals.  But  I  (say)  :  As  Zeus  has  ordained,  so 
act :  if  you  do  not  act  so,  you  will  feel  the  penalty,  you  will 
lie  punished. — What  will  be  the  punishment?  Nothing 
else  than  not  having  done  your  duty :  you  will  lose  the 
character  of  fidelity,  modesty,  propriety.  Do  not  look  for 
greater  penalties  than  these. 

11  A '  codicillus '  is  a  small k  codex*  and  the  original  sense  of  *  codex* 
is  a  strong  stem  or  stump.    Lastly  it  was  used  for  a  book,  and  even  for 
a  will.    *  Codtcilli '  were  small  writing-tablets,  covered  with  wax,  on 
which  men  wrote  with  a  stylus  or  pointed  metal.    Lastly,  codicillus  is 
a  book  or  writing  generally ;  and  a  writing  or  letter  by  which  the 
emperor  conferred  any  office.    Our  word  codicil  has  only  one  sense, 
which  is  a  small  writing  added  or  subjoined  to  a  will  or  testament ;  but 
this  sense  is  also  derived  from  the  Roman  use  of  the  word.    (Dig.  29, 
tit.  7,  de  jure  codicillorum.) 

12  Upton  supposes  this  to  mean,  whose  bedchamber  man  are  you  ? 
and  he  compares  i.  19.    But  Schweig.  says  that  this  is  not  the  meaning 
here,  and  that  the  meaning  is  this  :   He  who  before  daybreak  is  wait- 
ing at  the  door  of  a  rich  man,  whose  favour  he  seeks,  is  said  in  a 
derisive  way  to  be  passing  the  night  before  a  man's  chamber. 


218  KPIGTETUS. 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

HOW   WE   MUST   EXERCISE  OURSELVES  AGAINST   APPEABANCES 


As  we  exercise  ourselves  against  sophistical  questions,  so 
we  ought  to  exercise  ourselves  daily  against  appearances  ; 
for  these  appearances  also  propose  questions  to  us.  A 
certain  person's  bon  is  dead.  Answer  ;  the  thing  is  not 
within  the  power  of  the  will:  it  is  not  an  evil.  A  father 
has  disinherited  a  certain  son.  What  do  you  think  of  it  ? 
It  is  a  thing  beyond  the  power  of  the  will,  not  an  evil. 
Caesar  has  condemned  a  person.  It  is  a  thing  beyond  the 
power  of  the  will,  not  an  evil.  The  man  is  afflicted  at  this. 
Affliction  is  a  thing  which  depends  on  the  will  :  it  is  an 
evil.  He  has  borne  the  condemnation  bravely.  That  is  a 
thing  within  the  power  of  the  will  :  it  is  a  good.  If  we 
train  ourselves  in  this  manner,  we  shall  make  progress  ; 
for  we  shall  never  assent  to  any  thing  of  which  there  is  not 
an  appearance  capable  of  being  comprehended.  Your  son 
is  dead.  What  has  happened  ?  Your  son  is  dead.  Nothing 
more  ?  Nothing.  Your  bhip  is  lost.  What  has  happened  ? 
Your  ship  is  lost.  A  man  has  been  led  to  prison.  What  has 
happened  ?  He  has  been  led  to  prison.  But  that  herein  he 
has  fared  badly,  every  man  adds  from  his  own  opinion.  But 
Zeus,  you  say,  does  not  do  right  in  these  matters.  Why  ? 
because  he  has  made  you  capable  of  endurance  ?  because  he 
has  made  you  magnanimous  ?  because  he  has  taken  from  that 
which  befalls  you  the  power  of  being  evils  ?  because  it  is  in 
your  power  to  be  happy  while  you  are  suffering  what  you 
suffer  ;  because  ho  has  opened  the  door  to  you,1  when  things 
do  not  please  you  ?2  Man,  go  out  and  do  not  complain. 

Hear  how  the  Romans  feel  towards  philosophers,  if  you 
would  like  to  know.  Italicus,  who  was  the  most  in  repute 
of  the  philosophers,  once  when  I  was  present  being  vexed 
with  his  own  friends  and  as  if  he  was  suffering  something 
intolerable  said,  "  I  cannot  bear  it,  you  are  killing  me  :  you 
will  make  me  such  as  that  man  is  ;  "  pointing  to  me.3 

1  See  i.  9.  20. 

2  See  ii.  6.  22,  &v  croi  iroif).     Upton. 

3  Schweighaeuser  says  that  he  does  not  clearly  see  what  Epicletua 
means  :  nor  do  I. 


EPICTETUS.  219 


CHAPTEE  IX. 

YO  A  CERTAIN  RHETORICIAN  WHO  WAS  GOING  UP  TO  ROME  ON 
A  SUIT. 

WHEN  a  certain  person  came  to  him,  who  was  going  up  to 
Home  on  account  of  a  suit  which  had  regard  to  his  rank, 
Epictetus  enquired  the  reason  of  his  going  to  Rome,  and 
the  man  then  a^ked  what  he  thought  about  the  matter. 
Epictetus  replied,  If  you  ask  me  what  you  will  do  in 
Borne,  whether  you  will  succeed  or  fail,  I  have  no  rule 
(Otuprjfjia)  about  this.  But  if  you  ask  me  how  you  will 
fare,  I  can  tell  you :  if  you  have  right  opinions  (Soy/xara), 
you  will  fare  well ;  if  they  are  false,  you  will  fare  ill. 
For  to  every  man  the  cause  of  his  acting  is  opinion.  For 
what  is  the  reason  why  you  desired  to  be  elected  governor 
of  the  Cnossians?  Your  opinion.  What  is  the  reason 
that  you  are  now  going  up  to  Rome  ?  Your  opinion.  And 
going  in  winter,  and  with  danger  and  expense. — I  must 
go. — What  tells  you  this?  Your  opinion.  Then  if  opi- 
nions are  the  causes  of  all  actions,  and  a  man  has  bad 
opinions,  such  as  the  cause  may  be,  such  also  is  the  effect. 
Have  we  then  all  sound  opinions,  both  you  and  your 
adversary?  And  how  do  you  differ?  But  have  you 
sounder  opinions  than  your  adversary?  Why?  You 
think  so.  And  so  does  he  think  that  his  opinions  are- 
better ;  and  so  do  madmen.  This  is  a  bad  criterion. 
But  show  to  me  that  you  have  made  some  inquiry 
into  your  opinions  and  have  taken  some  pains  about 
them.  And  as  now  you  are  sailing  to  Rome  in  order 
to  become  governor  of  the  Cnossians,  and  you  are  not 
content  to  stay  at  home  with  the  honours  which  you  had, 
but  you  desire  something  greater  and  more  conspicuous, 
so  when  did  you  ever  make  a  voyage  for  che  purpose 
of  examining  your  own  opinions,  and  casting  them  out,  if 
you  have  any  that  are  bad  ?  Whom  have  you  approached 
for  this  purpose  ?  What  time  have  you  fixed  for  it  ?  What 
age?  Go  over  the  times  of  your  life  by  yourself,  if  you 
are  ashamed  of  me  (knowing  the  factj  when  you  were  a 
boy,  did  you  examine  your  own  opinions  ?  and  did  you  not 


220  EPICTETDS. 

then,  as  you  do  all  things  now,  do  as  you  did  do?  and 
when  you  were  become  a  youth  and  attended  the  rheto- 
ricians, and  yourself  practised  rhetoric,  what  did  you  imagine 
that  you  were  deficient  in  ?  And  when  you  were  a  young 
man  and  engaged  in  public  matters,  and  pleaded  causes 
yourself,  and  were  gaining  reputation,  who  then  seemed 
your  equal  ?  And  when  would  you  have  submitted  to  any 
man  examining  and  showing  that  your  opinions  are  bad  ? 
"What  then  do  you  wish  me  to  say  to  you  ? — Help  me  in 
this  matter. — I  have  no  theorem  (rule)  for  this.  Nor  have 
you,  if  you  came  to  me  for  this  purpose,  come  to  me  as  a 
philosopher,  but  as  to  a  seller  of  vegetables  or  a  shoemaker. 
For  what  purpose  then  have  philosopher  theorems  ?  For 
this  purpose,  that  whatever  may  happen,  our  ruling  faculty 
may  be  and  continue  to  be  conformable  to  nature.  Does 
this  seem  to  you  a  small  thing  ? — No ;  but  the  greatest. 
— What  then  ?  does  it  need  only  a  short  time  ?  and  is  it 
possible  to  seize  it  as  you  pass  by?  If  you  can,  seize  it. 

Then  you  will  say,  I  met  with  Epictetus  as  I  should 
meet  with  a  stone  or  a  statue :  for  you  saw  me,  and  nothing 
more.  But  he  meets  with  a  man  as  a  man,  who  learns  his 
opinions,  and  in  his  turn  shows  his  own.  Learn  my 
opinions :  show  me  yours ;  and  then  say  that  you  have 
visited  me.  Let  us  examine  one  another :  if  I  have  any 
bad  opinion,  take  it  away  :  if  you  have  any,  show  ifc.  This 
is  the  meaning  of  meeting  with  a  philosopher. — Not  so, 
(you  say)  :  but  this  is  only  a  passing  visit,  and  while  we 
are  hiring  the  vessel,  we  can  also  see  Epictetus.  Let  us 
see  what  he  says.  Then  you  go  away  and  say :  Epictetus 
was  nothing ;  he  used  solecisms  and  spoke  in  a  barbarous 
way.  For  of  what  else  do  you  come  as  judges? — Well, 
but  a  man  may  say  to  me,  if  I  attend  to  such  matters l  (as 
you  do),  I  shall  have  no  land,  as  you  have  none ;  I  shall 
have  no  silver  cups  as  you  have  none,  nor  fine  beasts  as 
yon  have  none. — In  answer  to  this  it  is  perhaps  sufficient 
to  say :  I  have  no  need  of  such  things :  but  if  you  possess 
many  things,  you  have  need  of  others :  whether  you 
choose  or  not,  you  are  poorer  than  I  am.  What  then  have 
I  need  of?  Of  that  which  you  have  not :  of  firmness,  of  a 

1  See  Schweig.'s  noto. 


EPICTETUS.  221 

mind  which  is  conformable  to  nature,  of  being  free  from 
perturbation.  Whether  I  have  a  patron  2  or  not,  what  is 
that  to  me  ?  but  it  is  something  to  you.  I  am  richer  than 
you :  I  am  not  anxious  what  Caesar  will  think  of  me  :  for 
this  reason,  I  flatter  no  man.  This  is  what  I  possess 
instead  of  vessels  of  silver  and  gold.  You  have  utensils 
of  gold ;  but  your  discourse,  your  opinions,  your  assents, 
your  movements  (pursuits),  your  desires  are  of  earthen 
ware.  But  when  I  have  these  things  conformable  to 
nature,  why  should  I  not  employ  my  studies  also  upon 
reason?  for  I  have  leisure:  my  mind  is  not  distracted. 
What  shall  I  do,  since  I  have  no  distraction?  What  more 
suitable  to  a  man  have  I  than  this?  When  you  have 
nothing  to  do,  you  are  disturbed,  you  go  to  the  theatre  or 
you  wander  about  without  a  purpose.  Why  should  not 
the  philosopher  labour  to  improve  his  reason?  You 
employ  yourself  about  crystal  vessels :  I  employ  myself 
about  the  syllogism  named  the  lying :  3  you  about 
myrrhine  4  vessels  ;  I  employ  myself  about  the  syllogism 
named  the  denying  (TOU  aTro^xxcrKovros).  To  you  every 
thing  appears  small  that  you  possess :  to  me  all  that  I 
have  appears  great.  Your  desire  is  insatiable:  mine  i» 
satisfied.  To  (children)  who  put  their  hand  into  a  narrow- 
necked  earthen  vessel  and  bring  out  figs  and  nuts,  this 
happens ;  if  they  fill  the  hand,  they  cannot  take  it  out., 
and  then  they  cry.  Drop  a  few  of  them  and  you  will 
draw  things  out.  And  do  you  part  with  your  desires: 
do  not  desire  many  things  and  you  will  have  what  you 
want. 

2  The  Koman  word  '  patronus,'  which  at  that  time  had  the  sense  of 
a  protector. 

8  On  the  syllogism  named  *  lying '  (if>€v8efyi€Kos)  see  Epict.  ii.  17. 34. 

4  4  Murrhina  vasa'  were  reckoned  very  precious  by  the  Romans,  and 
they  gave  great  prices  for  them.  It  is  not  certain  of  what  material 
they  were  made.  Pliny  (xxivii.  o.  2)  has  something  about  them. 


222 


CHAPTER  X. 

IN  WHAT  MANNER  WE  OUGHT  TO  BEAR  SICKNESS. 

WHEN  the  need  oF  each  opinion  comes,  we  ought  to  have  it 
in  readiness  :  l  on  the  occasion  of  breakfast,  such  opinions 
as  relate  to  breakfast  ;  in  the  bath,  those  that  concern  the, 
bath  ;  in  bed,  those  that  concern  bed. 

Let  sleep  not  corae  upon  thy  languid  eyes 
Before  each  daily  action  thou  hast  scann'd  ; 
What's  done  amiss,  what  done,  what  left  undone  ; 
From  first  to  last  examine  all,  and  then 
Blame  what  is  wrong,  in  what  is  right  rejoice.2 

And  we  ought  to  retain  these  verses  in  such  way  that 
we  may  use  them,  not  that  we  may  utter  them  aloud,  as 
when  we  exclaim  'Paean  Apollo.'3  Again  in  fever  wo 
should  have  ready  such  opinions  as  concern  a  fever  ;  and 
we  ought  not,  as  soon  as  the  fever  begins,  to  lose  and  forget 
all.  (A  man  who  has  a  fever)  may  say  :  If  I  philosophize 
any  longer,  may  I  bo  hanged  :  wherever  I  go,  I  must  tako 
care  of  the  poor  body,  that  a  fever  may  not  come.4  But 
what  is  philosophizing  ?  Is  it  not  a  preparation  against 
events  which  may  happen  ?  Do  you  not  understand  that 
you  are  saying  something  of  this  kind  ?  44  If  I  shall  still 
prepare  myself  to  bear  with  patience  what  happens,  may  I 
be  hanged."  But  this  is  just  as  if  a  man  after  receiving 

1  M.  Antoninus,  iii.  13.    '  As  physicians  have  always  their  instru- 
ments and  knives  ready  for  cases  which  suddenly  require  their  skill, 
so  do  thou  have  principles  (Scfy/iara)  ready  for  the  understanding  of 
things  divine  and  human,  and  for  doing  every  thing,  even  the  smallest, 
with  a  recollection  of  the  bond  which  unites  the  divine  and  human  to 
one  another.  For  neither  wilt  thou  do  anything  well  which  pertains  to 
man  without  at  the  same  time  having  a  reference  to  things  divine  ; 
nor  the  contrary.' 

2  These  verses  are  from  the  Golden  verses  attributed  to  Pythagorag. 
See  iv.  6.  32. 

3  The  beginning  of  a  form  of  prayer,  as  in  Macrobius,  Sat.  i.  17  : 
*  namque  Vestales  Virgines  ita  indigitant  :   Apollo  Maedice,  Apollo 
Paean.1 

4  Tkis  passage  ia  obscure.    See  Schweig.'a  note  here,  and  also  hii 
note  on  g.  6. 


EPICTETUS.  223 

blows  should  give  up  the  Pancratium.  In  the  Pancratium 
it  is  in  our  power  to  desist  and  not  to  receive  blows.  But 
in  the  other  matter  if  we  give  up  philosophy,  what  shall 
we  gain  ?  What  then  should  a  man  say  on  the  occasion  of 
each  painful  thing?  It  was  for'  this  that  I  exercised 
myself,  for  this  I  disciplined  myself.  God  says  to  you, 
Give  me  a  proof  that  you  have  duly  practised  athletics,5 
that  you  have  eaten  what  you  ought,  that  you  have  been 
exercised^  that  you  have  obeyed  the  aliptes  (the  oiler  and 
rubber).  Then  do  you  show  yourself  weak  when  the  time 
for  action  comes  ?  Now  is  the  time  for  the  fever.  Let  it 
be  borne  well.  Now  is  the  time  for  thirst,  bear  it  well; 
now  is  the  time  for  hunger,  bear  it  well.  Is  it  not  in  your 
power  ?  who  shall  hinder  you  ?  The  physician  will  hinder 
you  from  drinking;  but  he  cannot  prevent  you  from 
bearing  thirst  well :  and  he  will  hinder  you  from  eating ; 
but  he  cannot  prevent  you  from  bearing  hunger  well. 

But  I  cannot  attend  to  my  philosophical  studies.6  And 
for  what  purpose  do  you  follow  them?  Slave,  is  it  not 
that  you  may  be  happy,  that  you  may  be  constant,  is  it 
not  that  you  may  be  in  a  state  conformable  to  nature  and 
live  so  ?  What  hinders  you  when  you  have  a  fever  from 
having  your  ruling  faculty  conformable  to  nature  ?  Here 
is  the 'proof  of  the  thing,  here  is  the  test  of  the  philosopher. 
For  this  also  is  a  part  of  life,  like  walking,  like  sailing, 
like  journeying  by  land,  so  also  is  fever.  Do  you  read 
when- you  are  walking?  No.  Nor  do  you  when  you liave 
a  fever.  But  if  you  walk  about  well,  you  have  all  that 
belongs  to  a  man  who  walks.  If  you  bear  a  fever  well, 
you  have  all  that  belongs  to  a  man  in  a  fever.  What  is 
it  to  bear  a  fever  well  ?  Not  to  blame  God  or  man  ;  not  to 
be  afflicted  at  that  which  happens,  to  expect  death  well 
and  nobly,  to  do  what  must  be  done :  when  the  physician 
comes  in,  not  to  be  frightened  at  what  he  says ;  nor  if  he 
says,  4  you  are  doing  well/ 7  to  be  overjoyed.  For  what 
good  has  he  told  you?  and  when  you  were  in  health, 
what  good  was  that  to  you  ?  And  even  if  he  says,  *  you 

8  ct  vofjiifjuas  tf6\vi<Tas.    *  St.  Paul  hath  made  use  of  this  very  expres- 
sion &v  jjA)  von'ifMs  a0A^(H7,  2  Tim,  ii.  3.'    Mrs.  Carter. 
8  The  Greek  is  ou  <pi\o\oyw.    See  Schweighaeuser's  note. 
f  See  ii.  18, 14. 


224  EPICTETUS. 

are  in  a  bad  way,'  do  not  despond.  For  what  is  it  to  be 
ill  ?  is  it  that  you  are  near  the  severance  of  the  soul  and 
the  body?  what  harm  is  there  in  this?  If  you  are  not 
near  now,  will  you  not  afterwards  be  near  ?  Is  the  world 
going  to  be  turned  upside  down  when  you  are  dead? 
Why  then  do  you  flatter  the  physician  ?  8  Why  do  you  say 
if  you  please,  master,  I  shall  be  well  ?  9  Why  do  you  give 
him  an  opportunity  of  raising  his  eyebrows  (being  proud ; 
or  showing  his  importance)?10  Do  you  not  value  a 
physician,  as  you  do  a  shoemaker  when  he  is  measuring 
your  foot,  or  a  carpenter  when  he  is  building  your  house, 
and  so  treat  the  physician  as  to  the  body  which  is  not 
yours,  but  by  nature  dead?  He  who  has  a  fever  has  an 
opportunity  of  doing  this  :  if  he  does  these  things,  he  has 
what  belongs  to  him.  For  it  is  nofc  the  business  of  a 
philosopher  to  look  after  these  externals,  neither  his  wine 
nor  his  oil  nor  his  poor  body,  but  his  own  ruling  power. 
But  as  to  externals  how  must  he  act  ?  so  far  as  not  to  be 
careless  about  them.  Where  then  is  there  reason  for  fear  ? 
where  is  there  then  still  reason  for  anger,  and  of  fear  about 
what  belongs  to  others,  about  things  which  are  of  no  value  ? 
For  we  ought  to  have  these  two  principles  in  readiness, 
that  except  the  will  nothing  is  good  nor  bad;  and  that 
we  ought  not  to  lead  events,  but  to  follow  them.11 — My 
brother 12  ought  not  to  have  behaved  thus  to  me. — No  ;  but 
he  will  see  to  that :  and,  however  he  may  behave,  I  will 
conduct  myself  towards  him  as  I  ought.  For  this  is  my 
own  business :  that  belongs  to  another ;  no  man  can  pre- 
vent this,  the  other  thing  can  be  hindered. 


8  Et  quid  opus  Cratero  magnos  promittere  monies  ?    Persius,  iii.  65. 
Craterus  was  a  physician. 

9  Upton  compares  Matthew,  viii.  2.    '  Lord,  if  thou  wilt,  thou  canst 
make  me  clean.' 

10  Compare  M.  Antoninus,  iv.  48.    ras  otypvs. .  .ffvcnrAffavres. 

11  To  this  Stoic  precept  Horace  (Epict.  i.  1.  19)  opposes  that  ol 
Aristippus. 

Et  mibl  res,  non  me  rebus,  subjungcre  conor. 

Both  wisely  said,  if  they  are  rightly  taken.    Schweig.,  who  refers  to 
i.  12. 17. 

12  Lord  Shaftesbury  proposed  to  read  rbv  iwptv  for  rbv 
But  see  Schweig/s  note. 


EPICTETUS.  225 

CHAPTEK    XT. 

CERTAIN   MISCELLANKOUS   MATTERS. 

THERE  are  certain  penalties  fixed  as  by  law  for  those  who 
disobey  the  divine  administration.1  Whoever  thinks  any 
other  thing  to  be  good  except  those  things  which  depend 
on  the  will,  let  him  envy,  let  him  desire,  let  him  flatter, 
let  him  be  perturbed :  whoever  considers  any  thing  else  to 
be  evil,  let  him  grieve,  let  him  lament,  let  him  weep,  let 
him  be  unhappy.  And  yet,  though  so  severely  punished, 
we  cannot  desist. 

Remember  what  the  poet 2  says  about  the  stranger  : 

Stranger,  I  must  not,  o'en  if  a  worse  man  come. 

This  then  may  be  applied  even  to  a  father  :  I  must  not, 
even  if  a  worse  man  than  you  should  come,  treat  a  father 
unworthily  ;  for  all  are  from  paternal  Zeus.  And  (let  the 
same  be  said)  of  a  brother,  for  all  are  from  the  Zeus  who 
presides  over  kindred.  And  so  in  the  other  relations  of 
life  we  shall  find  Zeus  to  be  an  inspector. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

ABOUT   EXERCISE. 

WE  ought  not  to  make  our  exercises  consist  in  means 
contrary  to  nature  and  adapted  to  cause  admiration,  for  if 
we  do  so,  we  who  call  ourselves  philosophers,  shall  not 
differ  at  all  from  jugglers.  For  it  is  difficult  even  to 

1  '  As  to  the  divine  law,  see  iii.  24.  32,  and  Xenophon's  Memorabilia, 
iv.  4.  21,' etc.    Upton. 

3  The  poet  is  Homer.    The  complete  passage  is  in  the  Odyssey,  xiv. 
Y.  55,  etc. 

Stranger,  I  must  not,  e'en  if  a  worse  man  come, 
III  treat  a  stranger,  for  all  come  from  Zeus, 
Strangers  and  poor. 

Q 


226  EPICTETUS. 

walk  on  a  rope ;  and  not  only  difficult,  but  it  is  also  dan- 
gerous. Ought  we  for  this  reason  to  practise  walking  on 
a  rope,  or  setting  up  a  palm  tree,1  or  embracing  statues? 
By  no  means.  Every  thing  which  is  difficult  and  dan- 
gerous is  not  suitable  for  practice ;  but  that  is  suitable 
which  conduces  to  the  working  out  of  that  which  is  pro- 
posed to  us.  And  what  is  that  which  is  proposed  to 
us  as  a  thing  to  be  worked  out?  To  live  with  desire 
and  aversion  (avoidance  of  certain  things)  free  from  re- 
straint. And  what  is  this?  Neither  to  be  disappointed  in 
that  which  you  desire,  nor  to  fall  into  any  thing  which 
you  would  avoid.  Towards  this  object  then  exorcise 
(practice)  ought  to  tend.  For  since  it  is  not  possible  to 
have  your  desire  not  disappointed  and  your  aversion  free 
from  falling  into  that  which  you  would  avoid,  without 
great  and  constant  practice,  you  must  know  that  if  you 
allow  your  desire  and  aversion  to  turn  to  things  which 
are  not  within  the  power  of  the  will,  you  will  neither 
have  your  desire  capable  of  attaining  your  object,  nor 
your  aversion  free  from  the  power  of  avoiding  that  which 
you  would  avoid.  And  since  strong  habit  leads  (prevails), 
and  we  are  accustomed  to  employ  desire  and  aversion  only 
to  things  which  are  not  within  the  power  of  our  will,  we 
ought  to  oppose  to  this  habit  a  contrary  habit,  and  where 
there  is  great  slipperiness  in  the  appearances,  there  to 
oppose  the  habit  of  exercise. 

I  am  rather  inclined  to  pleasure :  I  will  incline  to  the 
contrary  side2  above  measure  for  the  sake  of  exercise.  I 

1  "  To  set  up  a  palm  tree."    He  docs  not  mean  a  real  palm  tree,  but 
something  high  and  upright.     The  climbers  of  palm  trees  are  men- 
tioned by  Lucian,  de  Dea  Syria  (c.  29).    Sch weigh,  has  given  the 
true  interpretation  when  he  says  that  on  certain  feast  days  in  the 
country  a  high  piece  of  wood  is  fixed  in  the  earth  and  climbed  by  the 
most  active  youths  by  using  only  their  hands  and  feet.    In  England 
we  know  what  this  is. 

It  is  said  that  Diogenes  used  to  embrace  statues  when  they  were 
covered  with  snow  for  the  purpose  of  exercising  himself.  I  suppose 
bronze  statues,  not  marble  which  might  be  easily  broken.  The  man 
would  not  remain  long  in  the  embrace  of  a  metal  statue  ill  winter. 
]5ut  perhaps  the  story  is  not  true.  I  have  heard  of  a  general,  not  an 
English  general,  setting  a  soldier  on  a  cold  cannon ;  but  it  was  as  a 
punishment. 

2  waToix'fiffw.    See  the  note  of  Schweighaeusex. 


EPICTETUS.  227 

am  averse  to  pain :  I  will  rub  and  exercise  against  this 
the  appearances  which  are  presented  to  me  for  the  purpose 
of  withdrawing  my  aversion  from  every  such  thing.  For 
who  is  a  practitioner  in  exercise  ?  He  who  practises  not 
using  his  desire,  and  applies  his  aversion  only  to  things 
which  are  within  the  power  of  his  will,  and  practises 
most  in  the  things  which  are  difficult  to  conquer.  For 
this  reason  one  man  must  practise  himself  more  against 
one  thing  and  another  against  another  thing.  What  then 
is  it  to  the  purpose  to  set  up  a  palm  tree,  or  .to  carry  about 
a  tent  of  skins,  or  a  mortar  and  pestle?3  Practise,  man, 
if  you  are  irritable,  to  endure  if  you  are  abused,  not 
to  be  vexed  if  you  are  treated  with  dishonour.  Then  you 
will  make  so  much  progress  that,  even  if  a  man  strikes  you 
you  will  say  to  yourself,  Imagine  that  you  have  embraced 
a  statue :  then  also  exercise  yourself  to  use  wine  properly 
so  as  not  to  drink  much,  for  in  this  also  there  are  men 
who  foolishly  practise  themselves;  but  first  of  all  you 
should  abstain  from  it,  and  abstain  from  a  young  girl  and 
dainty  cakes.  Then  at  last,  if  occasion  presents  itself,  for 
the  purpose  of  trying  yourself  at  a  proper  time  you  will 
descend  into  the  arena  to  know  if  appearances  overpower 
you  as  they  did  formerly.  But  at  first  fly  far  from  that 
which  is  stronger  than  yourself:  the  contest  is  unequal 
between  a  charming  young  girl  and  a  beginner  in  philo- 
sophy. The  earthen  pitcher,  as  the  saying  is,  and  the 
rock  do  not  agree.4 

After  the  desire  and  the  aversion  comes  the  second  topic 
(matter)  of  the  movements  towards  action  and  the  with- 
drawals from  it ;  that  you  may  be  obedient  to  reason,  that 
you  do  nothing  out  of  season  or  place,  or  contrary  to  any 
propriety  of  the  kind.6  The  third  topic  concerns  the 
assents,  which  is  related  to  the  things  which  are  per- 
suasive and  attractive.  For  as  Socrates  said,  we  ought  not 

*  This  was  done  for  the  sake  of  exercise  says  Upton ;  but  I  don't 
understand  Ihe  passage. 

4  There  is  a  like  fable  in  Aesop  of  the  earthen  pitcher  and  the 
brazen.    Upton. 

5  The  text  has  cLcrv^erplav.    It  would  be  easier  to  understand  the 
passage,  if  we  read  orvjUjucT/ucb',  as  in  iv.  1,  84  we  have  irapcb  T& 

See  Schweig.'s  note. 

Q  2 


228  EPICTETUS. 

to  live  a  life  without  examination,6  so  we  ought  not  to 
accept  an  appearance  without  examination,  but  wft  should 
say,  Wait,  let  me  see  what  you  are  and  whence  you  come  ; 
like  the  watch  at  night  (who  says)  Show  me  the  pass 
(the  Eoman  tessera).7  Have  you  the  signal  from  nature 
which  the  appearance  that  may  be  accepted  ought  to 
have?  And  finally  whatever  means  are  applied  to  the 
body  by  those  who  exercise  it,  if  they  tend  in  any  way 
towards  desire  and  aversion,  they  also  may  be  fit  means 
of  exercise ;  but  if  they  are  for  display,  they  are  the  indi- 
cations of  one  who  has  turned  himself  towards  something 
external  and  who  is  hunting  for  something  else  and  who 
looks  for  spectators  who  will  say,  Oh  the  great  man.  For 
this  reason  Apollonius  said  well,  When  you  intend  to 
exercise  yourself  for  your  own  advantage,  and  yon  are 
thirsty  from  heat,  take  in  a  mouthful  of  cold  water,  and 
spit  it  out  and  tell  nobody.8 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

WiIAT  SOLITUDE  IS,   AND  WHAT    KIND    OF    PERSON    A   SOLITARY 

MAN   18. 

SOLITUDE  is  a  certain  condition  of  a  helpless  man.  For 
because  a  man  is  alone,  he  is  not  for  that  reason  also  soli- 
tary ;  just  as  though  a  man  is  among  numbers,  he  is  not 
therefore  not  solitary.  When  then  we  have  lost  either  a 
brother,  or  a  son  or  a  friend  on  whom  wo  were  accustomed 
to  repose,  we  say  that  we  are  left  solitary,  though  we  are 
often  in  Borne,  though  such  a  crowd  meet  us,  though  so. 
many  live  in  the  same  place,  and  sometimes  we  have  a 
great  number  of  slaves.  For  the  man  who  is  solitary,  as 

«  See  i.  26, 18,  and  iii.  2,  5. 

7  Polybius  vi.  36. 

8  Schweighaeuser  refers  to  Arrian's  Expedition  of  Alexander  (vi. 
26)  for  such  an  instance  of  Alexander's  abstinence.    There  was  an 
Apollonius  of  Tyana,  whose  life  was  written  by  Philostratus :  but  it 
may  be  that  this  is  not  the  man  who  is  mentioned  here. 


EPICTETUS,  229 

ft  is  conceived,  is  considered  to  be  a  helpless  person  and 
exposed  to  those  who  wish  to  harm  him.  For  this  reason 
when  we  travel,  then  especially  do  we  say  that  we  are 
lonely  when  we  fall  among  robbers,  for  it  is  not  the  sight 
of  a  human  creature  which  removes  us  from  solitude,  but 
the  sight  of  one  who  is  faithful  and  modest  and  helpful 
to  us.  For  if  being  alone  is  enough  to  make  solitude,  you 
may  say  that  even  Zeus  is  solitary  in  the  conflagration l 
and  bowails  himself  saying,  Unhappy  that  I  am  who  have 
neither  Hera,  nor  Athena,  nor  Apollo,  nor  brother,  nor  son, 
nor  descendant  nor  kinsman.  This  is  what  some  say  that 
he  does  when  he  is  alone  at  the  conflagration.2  For  they 
do  not  understand  how  a  man  parses  his  life  when  he  is 
alone,  because  they  set  out  from  a  certain  natural  prin- 
ciple, from  the  natural  desire  of  community  and  mutual 
love  and  from  the  pleasure  of  conversation  among  men. 
But  none  the  less  a  man  ought  to  be  prepared  in  a  manner 
for  this  also  (being  alone),  to  be  able  to  be  siifHcienfc  for 
himself  and  to  be  his  own  companion.  For  as  Zeus  dwells 
with  himself,  and  is  tranquil  by  himself,  and  thinks  of  his 
own  administration  and  of  its  nature,  and  is  employed  in 
thoughts  suitable  to  himself;  so  ought  we  also  to  be  able 
to  talk  with  ourselves,  not  to  feel  tho  want  of  others  also, 
not  to  be  unprovided  with  the  means  of  passing  our  time; 
to  observe  the  divine  administration,  and  the  relation  of 

1  This  was  the  doctrine  of  Heraclitus  *  that  all  things  were  com- 
posed from  (had  their  origin  in)  fire,  and  were  resolved  into  it,*  an 
opinion  afterwards  adopted  by  tho  Stoics.    It  is  not  so  extravagant,  as 
it  may  appear  to  some  persons,  to   suppose  that  the  earth  had  a 
beginning,  is  in  a   state  of  continual   change,  and  will  finally  be 
destroyed  in  some  way,  and  have  a  new  beginning.     See  Seneca, 
Ep.  9  '  cum  resoluto  mimdo,  diis  in  unum  confusis,  paulisper  cessante 
natnra,  adquiescit  sibi  Jupiter,  cogitationibus  suis  traditus.' 

2  The  Latin  translation  is :  *  hoc  etiam  nonnulli  facturum  eum  in 
conflagrationo  mundi  ....  aiunt.'    But  the  word  is  Troie? ;  and  this 
may  mean  that  the  conflagration  has  happened,  and  will  happen 
again.    The  Greek  philosophers  in  their  speculations  were  not  troubled 
with  the  consideration  of  time.  Even  Herodotus  (ii.  11),  in  his  specula- 
tions on  the  gulf,  which  he  supposes  that  the  Nile  valley  was  once, 
speaks  of  the  possibility  of  it  being  filled  up  in  20,000  years,  or  less. 
Modem  speculators  have  only  recently  become  bold  enough  to  throw 
aside   the  notion  of  the  earth  and  the  other  bodies  in  space  being 
limted  by  time,  as  the  ignorant  have  conceived  it. 


230  EPICTETUS. 

ourselves  to  every  tiling  else ;  to  consider  how  we  for- 
merly were  affected  towards  things  that  happen  and  how 
at  present ;  what  are  still  the  things  which  give  us  pain ; 
how  these  also  can  be  cured  and  how  removed ;  if  any 
things  require  improvement,  to  improve  them  according 
to  reason. 

Eor  you  see  that  Caesar  appears  to  furnish  us  with  great 
peace,  that  there  are  no  longer  enemies  nor  battles  nor 
great  associations  of  robbers  nor  of , 'pirates,  but  we  can 
travel  at  every  hour  and  sail  from  east  to  west.  But  can 
Caesar  give  us  security  from  fever  also,  can  he  from  ship- 
wreck, from  fire,  from  earthquake  or  from  lightning  ?  well, 
I  will  say,  can  he  give  us  security  against  love  ?  He  cannot. 
From  sorrow  ?  He  cannot.  From  envy  ?  He  cannot.  In  a 
word  then  he  cannot  protect  us  from  any  of  these  things. 
But  the  doctrine  of  philosophers  promises  to  give  us 
security  (peace)  even  against  these  things.  And  what 
does  it  say  ?  Men,  if  you  will  attend  to  me,  wherever  you 
are,  whatever  you  are  doing,  you  will  not  feel  sorrow,  nor 
anger,  nor  compulsion,  nor  hindrance,  but  you  will  pass 
your  time  without  perturbations  and  free  from  every  thing. 
When  a  man  has  this  peace,  not  proclaimed  by  Caesar,  (for 
how  should  he  be  able  to  proclaim  it?),  but  by  God  through 
reason,  is  he  not  content  when  he  is  alone  ?  when  he  sees 
and  reflects,  Now  no  evil  can  happen  to  me  ;  for  me  there 
is  no  robber,  no  earthquake,  every  thing  is  full  of  peace, 
full  of  tranquillity :  every  way,  every  city,  every  meeting, 
neighbour,  companion  is  harmless.  One  person  whose 
business  it  is,  supplies  me  with  food ; 3  another  with 
raiment;  another  with  perceptions,  and  preconceptions 
(717)0X771/^15).  And  if  he  does  not  supply  what  is  necessary, 
no  (God)  gives  the  signal  for  retreat,  opens  the  door,  and 
says  to  you,  Go.  Go  whither  ?  To  nothing  terrible,  but  to 
the  place  from  which  you  came,  to  your  friends  and  kins- 
men, to  the  elements  :4  what  there  was  in  you  of  fire  goes 

8  See  in.  1,  43. 

4  'What  a  melancholy  description  of  death  and  how  gloomy  the 
ideas  in  this  consolatory  chapter!  All  beings  reduced  to  mere 
elements  in  successive  conflagrations  I  A  noble  contrast  to  the  Stoic 
notions  on  this  subject  may  be  produced  from  several  passages  in  the 
Scripture—"  Then  shall  the  dust  return  to  the  earth,  as  it  was ;  and 


EPICTETUS.  231 

to  fire;  of  earth,  to  earth;  of  air  (spirit),  to  air;  of  water 
to  water  :  no  Hades,  nor  Acheron,  nor  Cocytus,  nor 
Pyriphlegethon,  but  all  is  full  of  Gods  and  Daemons. 
When  a  man  has  such  things  to  think  on,  and  sees  the  sun, 
the  moon  and  stars,  and  enjoys  earth  and  sea,  he  is  not 
solitary  nor  even  helpless.  Well  then,  if  some  man  should 

the  spiiit  shall  return  to  God  who  gave  it,"  Ecoles.  xii.  7.*  Mrs. 
Carter  ;  who  also  refers  to  1  Thcss.  iv.  14  ;  John  vi.  39,  40  ;  xi.  25,  26  ; 
3  Cor.vi.  14;  xv.  53  ;  2  Cor.  v.  14  etc. 

Mrs,  Carter  quotes  Ecclesiastes,  but  the  author  sajs  nearly  what 
Epicharmus  said,  quoted  by  Plutarch,  irapa^vB.  irpbs  'Airo\\{6vtoi'9  vol.  i. 
p.  435  ed.  Wytt. 

crvveKpiQri  Kal  SieKpiOr]  Kal  airfiXBtv  80ev  fade  TraAiy, 

yci  juei/  £s  y&Vj  Trvevfia  5'  &/&>  '   TI  rwi/Se  xa\€ir6v  ;  ou5e  eV. 


Euripides  in  a  fragment  of  the  Chrysippus,  fr.  836,  ed.  Nauck,  says 


IK  yatas  QVVT*  €ts  yaiav, 
5J  OTT*  alOfplov  0\a(rr6vTa  yovr^s 
els  ovpdvtov  itd\iv  ^A0€  if6\ov. 

I  have  translated  the  words  of  Epictctus  ocrov  Trrei^aT/ot;,  els 
Trvev^driov  by  l  of  air  (spirit),  to  air  '  :  but  the  Trvev/jidnov  of  Epictetus 
may  mean  the  same  as  the  Tn/efyta  of  Epicharmus,  and  the  same  as 
the  *  spirit  '  of  Ecclesiastes. 

An  English  commentator  says  that  "  the  doctrine  of  a  future  retri- 
bution forms  the  great  basis  and  the  leading  truth  of  this  book 
(Ecclesiastes),"  and  that  "  the  royal  Preacher  (Ecclesiastes)  brings  for- 
ward the  prospect  of  a  future  life  and  retribution.''  I  cannot  discover 
any  evidence  of  this  assertion  in  the  book.  The  conclusion  is  the  best 
part  of  this  ill-connected,  obscure  and  confused  book,  as  it  appears  in 
our  translation.  The  conclusion  is  (xii.  13,  14):  l  Fear  God  and  keep 
his  commandments  :  for  this  is  the  whole  duty  of  man,  for  God  shall 
bring  every  work  into  judgment  with  every  secret  thing,  whether  it  be 
good  or  whether  it  be  evil/  This  is  all  that  I  can  discover  in  the  book 
which  can  support  the  commentator's  statement  ;  and  even  this  may 
not  mean  what  he  affirms. 

Schweighaeuser  observes  that  here  was  the  opportunity  for  Epictetus 
to  say  something  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  if  ho  had  any  thing 
to  say.  But  he  says  nothing  unless  ho  moans  to  say  that  the  soul,  the 
spirit,  "  returns  to  God  who  gave  it  "  as  the  Preacher  says.  There  is 
a  passage  (iii.  24,  94)  which  appears  to  mean  that  the  soul  of  man 
after  death  will  be  changed  into  something  else,  which  the  universe 
will  require  for  some  use  or  purpose.  It  is  strange,  observes  Schweig., 
that  Epictetus,  who  studied  the  philosophy  of  Socrates,  and  speaks  so 
eloquently  of  man's  capacity  and  his  duty  to  God,  should  tay  no 
more  :  but  the  explanation  may  be  that  he  had  no  doctrine  of  man's 
immortality,  in  the  sense  in  which  that  word  is  now  used. 


232  EPIOTETUS. 

come  upon  me  when  I  am  alone  and  murder  me?  Fool,  not 
murder  You,  but  your  poor  body. 

What  kind  of  solitude  then  remains  ?  what  want  ?  why 
do  we  make  ourselves  worse  than  children  ?  and  what  do 
children  do  when  they  are  left  alone  ?  They  take  up  shells 
and  ashes,  and  they  build  something,  then  pull  it  down, 
and  build  something  else,  and  so  they  never  want  the  means 
of  passing  the  time.  Shall  I  then,  if  you  sail  away,  sit 
down  and  weep,  because  I  have  been  left  alone  and  solitary  ? 
Shall  I  then  have  no  shells,  no  ashes?  But  children  do 
what  they  do  through  want  of  thought  (or  deficiency  in 
knowledge),  and  we  through  knowledge  are  unhappy. 

Every  great  power  (faculty)  is  dangerous  to  beginners.5 
You  must  then  bear  such  things  as  you  are  able,  but  con- 
formably to  nature  :  but  not  .  .  .  .  Practise  sometimes  a 
way  of  living  like  a  person  out  of  health  that  you  may  at 
some  time  live  like  a  man  in  health.  Abstain  from  food, 
drink  water,  abstain  sometimes  altogether  from  desire,  in 
order  that  you  may  some  time  desire  consistently  with 
reason  ;  and  if  consistently  with  reason,  when  you  have 
anything  good  in  you,  you  will  desire  well.  —  Not  so  ;  but 
we  wish  to  live  like  wise  men  immediately  and  to  be 
useful  to  men  —  Useful  how?  what  are  you  doing?  have 
you  been  useful  to  yourself?  But,  I  suppose,  you  wish  to 
exhort  them  ?  You  exhort  them  !  G  You  wish  to  be  useful 
to  them.  Show  to  them  in  your  own  example  what  kind  of 
men  philosophy  makes,  and  don't  trifle.  When  you  are 
eating,  do  good  to  those  who  eat  with  you  ;  when  you  are 
drinking,  to  those  who  are  drinking  with  you  ;  by  yielding 
to  all,  giving  way,  bearing  with  them,  thus  do  them  good, 
and  do  not  spit  on  them  your  phlegm  (bad  humours). 


5  The  text  has  apxaMcW,  but  it  probably  ought  to  be 
Compare  i,  1,  8,  iracra  tivvafus  eirurtyah.'fis. 

The  text  from  Qcpetv  olv  5e?  to  r$  <f>0iffuc$  is  unintelligible.  Lord 
Shaftesbury  says  that  the  passage  is  not  corrupt,  and  ho  gives  an  ex- 
planation ;  but  Schweig.  says  that  the  learned  Englishman's  exposition 
does  not  make  the  text  plainer  to  him  ;  nor  does  it  to  me.  Schweig. 
observes  that  the  pass-age  which  begins  iracra  peyfarj  and  what  followf 
geem  to  belong  to  the  next  chapter  xiv. 

*  See  Sohweig.'s  note,  and  the  Latin  version 


EPICTETUS.  233 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

CERTAIN  MISCELLANEOUS  MATTERS. 

As  bad  l  tragic  actors  cannot  sing  alone,  but  in  company 
with  many:  so  some  persons  cannot  walk  about  alone. 
Man,  if  you  are  anything,  both  walk  alone  and  talk  to 
yourself,  and  do  not  hide  yourself  in  the  chorus.  Examine 
a  little  at  last,  look  around,  stir  yourself  up,  that  you  may 
know  who  you  are. 

When  a  man  drinks  water,  or  does  anything  for  the 
sake  of  practice  (discipline),  whenever  there  is  an 
opportunity  he  tolls  it  to  all  :  *  I  drink  water.'  Is  it  for 
this  that  you  drink  water,  for  the  purpose  of  drinking 
water  ?  Man,  if  it  is  good  for  you  to  drink,  drink  ;  but  if 
not,  you  are  acting  ridiculously.  But  if  it  is  good  for  you 
and  you  do  drink,  say  nothing  about  it  to  those  who  are 
displeased  with  water-drinkers.  What  then,  do  you  wish 
to  please  these  very  men  ? 

Of  things  that  are  done  some  are  done  with  a  final 
purpose  (TT/aoiTyov/xcWs),  some  according  to  occasion,  others 
with  a  certain  reference  to  circumstances,  others  for  the 
purpose  of  complying  with  others,  and  some  according  to 
a  fixed  scheme  of  life.  2 

You  must  root  out  of  men  these  two  things,  arrogance 
(pride)  and  distrust.  Arrogance  then  is  the  opinion  that 
you  want  nothing  (are  deficient  in  nothing)  :  but  distrust 
is  the  opinion  that  you  cannot  be  happy  when  so  many 
circumstances  surround  you.  Arrogance  is  removed  by 
confutation  ;  and  Socrates  was  the  first  who  practised  this. 
And  (to  know)  that  the  thing  is  not  impossible  inquire 
and  seek.  This  search  will  do  you  no  harm  ;  and  in  a 
manner  this  is  philosophizing,  to  seek  how  it  is  pos- 
sible to  employ  desire  and  aversion  (e/c*AiW)  without 
impediment. 

I  am  superior  to  you,  for  my  father  is  a  man  of  consular 
rank.  Another  says,  I  have  been  a  tribune,  but  you  have 


1  All  the  MSS.  have  *  good'  (/caAoQ,  which  the  iritics  have  properly 
corrected.    As  to  vK&irti  see  Schweig.'s  note. 

2  This  section  is  not  easy  to  translate. 


234  EPICTETUS. 

not.  If  we  were  horses,  would  you  say,  My  father  was 
swifter?  I  have  much  barley  and  fodder,  or  elegant  neck 
ornaments.  If  then  while  you  were  saying  this,  I  said, 
Be  it  so :  let  us  run  then.  Well,  is  there  nothing  in  a  man 
such  as  running  in  a  horse,  by  which  it  will  be  known 
which  is  superior  and  inferior?  Is  there  not  modesty 
(atSws),  fidelity,  justice  ?  Show  yourself  superior  in  these, 
that  you  may  be  superior  as  a  man.  If  you  tell  me  that 
you  can  kick  violently,  I  also  will  say  to  you,  that  you 
are  proud  of  that  which  is  the  act  of  an  ass. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

THAT  WE  OUGHT   TO  PROCEED  WITH   CIRCUMSPECTION  TO 
EVERY   THING.1 

IN  every  act  consider  what  precedes  and  what  follows,  and 
then  proceed  to  the  act.  If  you  do  not  consider,  you  will 
at  first  begin  with  spirit,  since  you  have  not  thought  at  all 
of  the  things  which  follow;  but  afterwards  when  some 
consequences  have  shown  themselves,  you  will  basely 
desist  (from  that  which  you  have  begun). — I  wish  to 
conquer  at  the  Olympic  games. — [And  I  too,  by  the  gods : 
for  it  is  a  fine  thing].  But  consider  here  what  precedes 
and  what  follows ;  and  then,  if  it  is  for  your  good,  under- 
take the  thing.  You  must  act  according  to  rules,  follow 
strict  diet,  abstain  from  delicacies,  exercise  yourself  by 
compulsion  at  fixed  times,  in  heat,  in  cold ;  drink  no  cold 

1  Compare  Encheiridion  29. 

"  This  chapter  has  a  great  conformity  to  Luke  xiv.  28  etc.  But  it 
is  to  be  observed  that  Epictetus,  both  here  and  elsewhere,  supposes 
gome  persons  incapable  of  being  philosophers  ;  that  is,  virtuous  and 
pious  men:  but  Christianity  requires  and  enables  all  to  be  such." 
Mrs.  Carter. 

The  passage  in  Luke  contains  a  practical  lesson,  and  so  far  is  the 
game  as  the  teaching  of  Epictetus :  but  the  conclusion  in  v.  33  does 
not  appear  to  be  helped  by  what  immediately  precedes  v.  28-32.  The 
remark  that  Christianity  '  enables  all  to  be  such '  is  not  true,  unless 
Mrs.  Carter  gives  to  the  word  *  enables '  a  meaning  which  I  do  not  sea. 


EPICTETUS.  235 

water,  nor  wine,  when  there  is  opportunity  of  drinking  it. 2 
In  a  word  you  must  surrender  yourself  to  the  trainer,  as 
you  do  to  a  physician.  Next  in  the  contest,  you  must  be 
covered  with  sand,3  sometimes  dislocate  a  hand,  sprain  an 
ankle,  swallow  a  quantity  of  dust,  be  scourged  with  the 
whip ;  and  after  undergoing  all  this,  you  must  sometimes 
be  conquered.  After  reckoning  all  these  things,  if  you 
have  still  an  inclination,  go  to  the  athletic  practice.  If 
you  do  not  reckon  them,  observe  you  will  behave  like 
children  who  at  one  time  play  as  wrestlers,  then  as 
gladiators,  then  blow  a  trumpet,  then  act  a  tragedy,  when 
they  have  seen  and  admired  such  things.  So  you  also  do  : 
you  are  at  one  time  a  wrestler  (athlete),  then  a  gladiator, 
then  a  philosopher,  then  a  rhetorician;  but  with  your 
whole  soul  you  are  nothing :  like  the  ape  you  imitate  all 
that  you  see ;  and  always  one  thing  after  another  pleases 
you,  but  that  which  becomes  familiar  displeases  you.  For 
you  have  never  undertaken  any  thing  after  consideration, 
nor  after  having  explored  the  whole  matter  and  put  it  to  a 
strict  examination ;  but  you  have  undertaken  it  at  hazard 
and  with  a  cold  desire.  Thus  some  persons  having  seen  a 
philosopher  and  having  heard  one  speak  like  Euphrates4 — 
and  yet  who  can  speak  like  him? — wish  to  be  philosophers 
themselves. 

Man,  consider  first  what  the  matter  is  (which  you  pro- 
pose to  do),  then  your  own  nature  also,  what  it  is  able  to 
bear.  If  you  are  a  wrestler,  look  at  your  shoulders,  your 
thighs,  your  loins :  for  different  men  are  naturally  formed 
for  different  things.  Do  you  think  that,  if  you  do  (what 

2  The  commentators  refer  us  to  Paul,  1  Cor.  o.  9,  25.  Compare 
Horace,  Ars  Poetica,  30 : 

Versate  din  quid  ferre  recusent, 
Quid  valeant  humeri. 

8  Wolf  thought  that  the  word  irapopvo-o-cffGai  might  mean  the  loss  of 
an  eye ;  but  other  commentators  give  the  word  a  different  meaning. 
See  Schweigh.'s  note. 

4  In  place  of  Euphrates  the  Encheiridion  29  had  in  the  text 
'  Socrates/  which  name  the  recent  editors  of  the  Encheiridion  altered 
to  *  Euphrates/  and  correctly.  The  younger  Pliny  (i.  Ep.  10)  speaks 
in  high  terms  of  the  merits  and  attractive  eloquence  of  this  Syrian 
philosopher  Euphrates,  who  is  mentioned  by  M.  Antoninus  (x.  31)  and 
by  others. 


236  JEPICTETUS. 

you  are  doing  da*ly),  you  can  be  a  philosopher  ?  Do  you 
think  that  you  can  eat  as  you  do  now,  drink  as  you  do 
now,  and  in  the  same  way  be  angry  and  out  of  humour? 
You  must  watch,  labour,  conquer  certain  desires,  you  must 
depart  from  your  kinsmen,  be  despised  by  your  slave, 
laughed  at  by  those  who  meet  you,  in  every  thing  you 
must  be  in  an  inferior  condition,  as  to  magisterial  office,  in 
honours,  in  courts  of  justice.  When  you  have  considered 
all  these  things  completely,  then,  if  you  think  proper, 
approach  to  philosophy,  if  you  would  gain  in  exchange 
for  these  things  freedom  from  perturbations,  liberty,  tran- 
quillity. If  you  have  not  considered  these  things,  do  not 
approach  philosophy :  do  not  act  like  children,  at  one  time 
a  philosopher,  then  a  tax  collector,  then  a  rhetorician,  then 
a  procurator  (officer)  of  Caesar.  These  things  are  not 
consistent.  You  must  be  one  man  either  good  or  bad : 
you  must  either  labour  at  your  own  ruling  faculty  or  at 
external  things  :  you  must  either  labour  at  things  within 
or  at  external  things :  that  is,  you  must  either  occupy  the 
place  of  a  philosopher  or  that  of  one  of  the  vulgar. 

A  person  said  to  Eufus 5  when  Galba  was  murdered,  Is 
the  world  now  governed  by  Providence?  But  Kufus 
replied,  Did  I  ever  incidentally  form  an  argument  from 
Galba  that  the  world  is  governed  by  Providence  ? 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

THAT  WE  OUGHT  WITH   CAUTION   TO   ENTER   INTO   FAMILIAR 
INTERCOURSE   WITH   MEN. 

IF  a  man  has  frequent  intercourse  with  others  either  for 
talk,  or  drinking  together,  or  generally  for  social  purposes, 
lie  must  either  become  like  them,  or  change  them  to  his 

5  Eufus  was  a  philosopher.  See  i.  1,  i.  9.  Gulba  is  the  ^  emperor 
Galba,  who  was  murdered.  The  meaning  of  the  passage  is  rather 
obscure,  and  it  is  evident  that  it  does  not  belong  to  this  chapter.  Lord 
Shaftesbury  remarks  that  this  passage  perhaps  belongs  to  chapter  11 
or  14,  or  perhaps  to  the  end  of  chapter  17. 


EPICTETUS.  237 

own  fashion.  For  if  a  man  places  a  piece  of  quenched 
charcoal  close  to  a  piece  that  is  burning,  either  the 
quenched  charcoal  will  quench  the  other,  or  the  burning 
charcoal  will  light  that  which  is  quenched.  Since  then 
the  danger  is  so  great,  we  must  cautiously  enter  into 
such  intimacies  with  those  of  the  common  sort,  and 
remember  that  it  is  impossible  that  a  man  can  keep  com- 
pany with  one  who  is  covered  with  soot  without  being 
partaker  of  the  soot  himself.  For  what  will  you  do 
if  a  man  speaks  about  gladiators,  about  horses,  about 
athletes,  or  what  is  worse  about  men  ?  Such  a  person  is 
bad,  such  a  person  is  good  :  this  was  well  done,  this  was 
done  badly.  Further,  if  he  scoif,  or  ridicule,  or  show  an 
ill-natured  disposition  ?  Is  any  man  among  us  prepared 
like  a  lute-player  when  he  takes  a  lute,  so  that  as  soon  as 
he  has  touched  the  strings,  he  discovers  which  aro  dis- 
cordant, and  tunes  the  instrument  ?  such  a  power  as 
Socrates  had  who  in  all  his  social  intercourse  could  lead 
his  companions  to  his  own  purpose?  How  should  you 
have  this  power?  It  is  therefore  a  necessary  consequence 
that  you  are  carried  about  by  the  common  kind  of  people. 

Why  then  are  they  more  powerful  than  you  ?  Because 
they  utter  these  useless  words  from  their  real  opinions : 
but  you  utter  your  elegant  words  only  from  your  lips ;  for 
this  reason  they  are  without  strength  and  dead,  and  it  is 
nauseous l  to  listen  to  your  exhortations  and  your  miser- 
able virtue,  which  is  talked  of  every  where  (up  and  down). 
In  this  way  the  vulgar  have  the  advantage  over  you :  for 
every  opinion  (Soy/xa)  is  strong  and  invincible.  Until  then 
the  good  (KOJJUI/O.L)  sentiments  (wroA^eis)  are  fixed  in  you, 
and  you  shall  have  acquired  a  certain  power  for  your 
security,  I  advise  you  to  be  careful  in  your  association 
with  common  persons  :  if  you  are  not,  every  day  like  wax 
in  the  sun  there  will  be  melted  away  whatever  you 
inscribe  on  your  minds  in  the  school.  Withdraw  then 
yourselves  far  from  the  sun  so  long  as  you  have  these 
waxen  sentiments.  For  this  reason  also  philosophers 
advise  men  to  leave  their  native  country,  because  antient 
habits  distract  them  and  do  not  allow  a  beginning  to  be 

1  The  word  is  criiexSwH.    See  Antoninus  v.  9. 


238  EPICTETUS. 

made  of  a  different  habit ;  nor  can  we  tolerate  those  who 
meet  us  and  say :  See  such  a  one  is  now  a  philosopher, 
who  was  once  so  and  so.  Thus  also  physicians  send  those 
who  have  lingering  diseases  to  a  different  country  and  a 
different  air ;  and  they  do  right.  Do  you  also  introduce 
other  habits  than  those  which  you  have  :  fix  your  opinions 
and  exercise  yourselves  in  them.  But  you  do  not  so  :  you 
go  hence  to  a  spectacle,  to  a  show  of  gladiators,  to  a  place 
of  exercise  (fwrov),  to  a  circus;  then  you  come  back 
hither,  and  again  from  this  place  you  go  to  those  placss, 
and  still  the  same  persons.  And  there  is  no  pleasing  (goo  ) 
habit,  nor  attention,  nor  care  about  self  and  observation  f 
this  kind,  How  shall  I  use  the  appearances  presenter  x> 
me  ?  according  to  nature,  or  contrary  to  nature  ?  how  <  I 
answer  to  them  ?  as  I  ought,  or  as  I  ought  not  ?  Do  I  y 
to  those  things  which  are  independent  of  the  will,  1  it 
they  do  not  concern  me  ?  For  if  you  are  not  yet  in  1  .s 
state,  fly  from  your  former  habits,  fly  from  the  comiL.  n 
sort,  if  you  intend  ever  to  begin  to  be  something. 


CHAPTEE  XVIL 

ON  PROVIDENCE. 

WHEN  you  make  any  charge  against  Providence,  consider, 
and  you  will  learn  that  the  thing  has  happened  according 
to  reason. — Yes,  but  the  unjust  man  has  the  advantage. — 
In  what? — In  money. — Yes,  for  he  is  superior  to  you  in 
this,  that  he  flatters,  is  free  from  shame,  and  is  watchful. 
What  is  the  wonder  ?  But  see  if  he  has  the  advantage 
over  you  in  being  faithful,  in  being  modest :  for  you 
will  not  find  it  to  be  so ;  but  wherein  you  are  superior, 
there  you  will  find  that  you  have  the  advantage.  And  I 
once  said  to  a  man  who  was  vexed  because  Philostorgug 
was  fortunate :  Would  you  choose  to  lie  with  Sura  ? l — 

1  Upton  suggests  that  Sura  may  be  Palfurius  (Juvenal,  iv.  53),  01 
Palfurius  Sura  (Suetonius,  Domitian,  o.  13). 


EPICTETUS.  239 

May  it  never  happen,  he  replied,  that  this  day  should 
coine  ?  Why  then  are  you  vexed,  if  he  receives  something 
in  return  for  that  which  he  sells  ;  or  how  can  you  consider 
him  happy  who  acquires  those  things  by  such  means  as  you 
abominate ;  or  what  wrong  does  Providence,  if  he  gives 
the  better  things  to  the  better  men?  Is  it  not  better  to  bo 
modest  than  to  be  rich  ? — He  admitted  this — Why  are  you 
vexed  then,  man,  when  you  possess  the  better  thing? 
Remember  then  always  and  have  in  readiness  the  truth, 
that  this  is  a  law  of  nature,  that  the  superior  has  an  ad- 
vantage over  the  inferior  in  that  in  which  he  is  superior ; 
and  you  will  never  be  vexed. 

But  my  wife  treats  mo  badly. — Well,  if  any  man  asks 
you  what  this  is,  say,  my  wife  treats  me  badly — Is  there 
then  nothing  more?  Nothing. — My  father  gives  me 
nothing — [What  is  this?  my  father  gives  me  nothing — Is 
there  nothing  else  then  ? — Nothing]  2  :  but  to  say  that  this 
is  an  evil  is  something  which  must  be  added  to  it  exter- 
nally, and  falsely  added.  For  this  reason  wo  must  not  get 
rid  of  poverty,  but  of  the  opinion  about  poverty,  and  then 
we  shall  be  happy. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

THAT  WE  OUGHT  NOT  TO  BE  DISTURBED  BY  ANY  NEWS. 

WHEN  any  thing  shall  be  reported  to  you  which  is  of  a 
nature  to  disturb,  have  this  principle  in  readiness,  that 
the  news  is  about  nothing  which  is  within  the  power  of 
your  will.  Can  any  man  report  to  you  that  you  have 
formed  a  bad  opinion,  or  had  a  bad  desire?  By  no  means. 
But  perhaps  he  will  report  that  some  person  is  dead. 
What  then  is  that  to  you?  He  may  report  that  some 
person  speaks  ill  of  you.  What  then  is  that  to  you?  Or 
that  your  father  is  planning  something  or  other.  Against 
whom?  Against  your  will  (irpocup€<ns)?  How  can  he? 
Bu*  is  it  against  your  poor  body,  against  your  little  pro- 

2  See  Scliweig.'s  note. 


240  EPICTETTTS. 

perty?  You  are  quite  safe:  it  is  not  against  you.  But 
the  judge  declares  that  you  have  committed  an  act  of 
impiety.  And  did  not  the  judges  (oiKctcmu)  make  the  same 
declaration  against  Socrates?  Does  it  concern  you  that 
the  judge  has  made  this  declaration  ?  No.  Why  then  do 
you  trouble  yourself  any  longer  about  it  ?  Your  father 
has  a  certain  duty,  and  if  he  shall  not  fulfil  it,  he  loses 
the  character  of  a  father,  of  a  man  of  natural  affection,  of 
gentleness.  Do  not  wish  him  to  lose  any  thing  else  on 
this  account.  For  never  does  a  man  do  wrong  in  one 
thing,  and  suffer  in  another.  On  the  other  side  it  is  your 
duty  to  make  your  defence  firmly,  modestly,  without 
anger :  but  if  you  do  not,  you  also  lose  the  character  of 
a  son,  of  a  man  of  modest  behavior,  of  generous  character. 
Well  then,  is  the  judge  free  from  danger?  No;  but  he 
also  is  in  equal  danger.  Why  then  are  you  still  afraid  of 
his  decision  ?  What  have  you  to  do  with  that  which  is 
another  man's  evil?  It  is  your  own  evil  to  make  a  bad 
defence :  be  on  your  guard  against  this  only.  But  to  be 
condemned  or  not  to  be  condemned,  as  that  is  the  act  of 
another  person,  so  it  is  the  evil  of  another  person.  A  cer- 
tain person  threatens  you.  Me?  No.  He  blames  you. 
Let  him  see  how  he  manages  his  own  affairs.  He  is  going 
to  condemn  you  unjustly.  He  is  a  wretched  man. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

WHAT  IS  THE  CONDITION  OF  A  COMMON  KIND  OF  MAN"  AND  OF 
A  PHILOSOPHER. 


THE  first  difference  between  a  common  person 
and  a  philosopher  is  this  :  the  common  person  says,  Woe 
to  me  for  my  little  child,  for  my  brother,  for  my  father.1 
The  philosopher,  if  he  shall  ever  be  compelled  to  say,  Woe 
to  me,  stops  and  says,  '  but  for  myself.'  For  nothing 
which  is  independent  of  the  will  can  hinder  cr  damage 

1  Compare  iii.  5.  4. 


EPICTETUS.  241 

the  will,  and  the  will  can  only  hinder  or  damage  itself. 
If  then  we  ourselves  incline  in  this  direction,  so  as,  when 
we  are  unlucky,  to  blame  ourselves  and  to  remember 
that  nothing  else  is  the  cause  of  perturbation  or  loss  of 
tranquillity  except  our  own  opinion,  I  swear  to  you  by 
all  the  gods  that  we  have  made  progress.  But  in  the 
present  state  of  affairs  we  have  gone  another  way  from 
the  beginning.  For  example,  while  we  were  still  children, 
the  nurse,  if  we  ever  stumbled  through  want  of  care,  did 
not  chide  us,  but  would  beat  the  stone.  But  what  did  the 
stone  do  ?  Ought  the  stone  to  have  moved  on  account  of 
your  child's  folly  ?  Again,  if  we  find  nothing  to  eat  on 
coming  out  of  the  bath,  the  paedagogue  never  checks  our 
appetite,  but  he  flogs  the  cook.  Man,  did  we  make  you 
the  paedagogue  of  the  cook  and  not  of  the  child  ?2  Correct 
the  child,  improve  him.  In  this  way  even  when  we  are 
grown  up  we  are  like  children.  For  he  who  is  unmusical 
is  a  child  in  music ;  he  who  is  without  letters  is  a  child  in 
learning :  he  who  is  untaught,  is  a  child  in  life. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

THAT  WE  CAN  DERIVE  ADVANTAGE  FROM  ALL  EXTERNAL  THINGS. 

IN  the  case  of  appearances  which  are  objects  of  the  vision,1 
nearly  all  have  allowed  the  good  and  the  evil  to  be  in 
ourselves,  and  not  in  externals.  No  one  gives  the  name 
of  good  to  the  fact  that  it  is  day,  nor  bad  to  the  fact 
that  it  is  night,  nor  the  name  of  the  greatest  evil  to  the 
opinion  that  three  are  four.  But  what  do  men  say  ?  They 

2  I  have  not  followed  Schweighaeuser's  text  here.    See  his  note. 

1  The  original  is  flewprj-n/cwv  tyavraviiav,  which  is  translated  in  the 
Latin  version '  visa  theoretica,'  but  this  does  not  help  us.  Perhaps 
the  author  means  any  appearances  which  are  presented  to  us  either 
by  the  eyes  or  by  the  understanding ;  but  I  am  not  sure  what  he 
means.  It  is  said  in  the  Index  Graecitatis  (Schweig/s  ed.) :  « <j>wTa<rtai 
0€&>p7)TiKaf,  notiones  theoreticae,  iii.  20. 1,  quibus  opponuntur  Practicae 
ad  vitam  regendam  spectantes.' 

R 


242  EPICTETUS. 

say  that  knowledge  is  good,  and  that  error  is  bad;  so  thai 
even  in  respect  to  falsehood  itself  there  is  a  good  result, 
the  knowledge  that  it  is  falsehood.  So  it  ought  to  be  in 
life  also.  Is  health  a  good  thing,  and  is  sickness  a  bad 
thing?  No,  man.  But  what  is  it?  To  be  healthy,  and 
healthy  in  a  right  way,  is  good  :  to  be  healthy  in  a  bad 
way  is  bad  ;  so  that  it  is  possible  to  gain  advantage  even 
from  sickness,  I  declare.  For  is  it  not  possible  to  gain 
advantage  even  from  death,  and  is  it  not  possible  to  gain 
advantage  from  mutilation  ?  Do  you  think  that  Menoeceus 
gained  little  by  death?2  Could  a  man  who  says  so,  gain  so 
much  as  Menoeceus  gained?  Come,  man,  did  he  not  main- 
tain the  character  of  being  a  lover  of  his  country,  a  man  of 
great  mind,  faithful,  generous?  And  if  he  had  continued 
to  live,  would  he  not  have  lost  all  these  things  ?  would  he 
not  have  gained  the  opposite  ?  would  he  not  have  gained 
the  name  of  coward,  ignoble,  a  hater  of  his  country,  a  man 
who  feared  death?3  Well,  do  you  think  that  he  gained 
little  by  dying  ?  I  suppose  not.  But  did  the  father  of 
Admetus4  gain  much  by  prolonging  his  life  so  ignobly 
and  miserably?  Did  he  not  die  afterwards?  Cease,  I 
adjure  you  by  the  gods,  to  admire  material  things.  Cease 
to  make  yourselves  slaves,  first  of  things,  then  on  account 
of  things  slaves  of  those  who  are  able  to  give  them  or  take 
them  away. 

Can  advantage  then  bo  derived  from  these  things? 
From  all;  and  from  him  who  abuses  you.  Wherein 
does  the  man  who  exercises  before  the  combat  profit  the 
athlete?  Very  greatly.  This  man  becomes  my  exerciser 
before  the  combat :  he  exercises  me  in  endurance,  in  keep- 
ing my  temper,  in  mildness.  You  say  no :  but  he,  who  lays 
hold  of  my  neck  and  disciplines  my  loins  and  shoulders, 

2  Menoeceus,  the  son  of  Creon,  g:ave  up  his  life  by  which  lie  would 
save  his  country,  as  it  was  declared  by  an  oracle.  (Cicero,  Tuscul.  i, 
c.  48.)  Juvenal  (Sat.  xiv.  238)  says 

Quarum  Amor  in  te 

Quaiitus  erat  patviae  Declorum  in  pectorc ;  quantum 
Dilexit  Tbebus,  si  Graecia  vera,  Menoeceus. 

Euripides,  Phocnissao,  v.  913, 
8  See  Schweig.'s  note. 
4  The  father  of  Admetus  was  Phe  es  (Euripides,  Alcesti*). 


EPICTETUS.  243 

does  me  good;  and  the  exercise  master  (the  aliptes,  or 
oiler)  does  right  when  he  says;  Raise  him  up  with  both 
hands,  and  the  heavier  he  (ocetvos)  is,  so  much  the  more  IH 
my  advantage.5  But  if  a  man  exercises  me  in  keeping  my 
temper,  does  ho  not  do  mo  good? — This  is  not  knowing 
how  to  gain  an  advantage  from  men.  Is  my  neighbour 
oad  ?  Bad  to  himself,  but  good  to  me :  he  exercises  my 
2jood  disposition,  my  moderation.  Is  my  father  bad  ?  Bad 
to  himself,  but  to  me  good.  This  is  the  rod  of  Hermes : 
touch  with  it  what  you  please,  as  the  saying  is,  and  it 
will  be  of  gold.  I  say  not  so :  but  bring  what  you  please, 
and  I  will  make  it  good.6  Bring  disease,  bring  death, 
biing  poverty,  bring  abuse,  bring  trial  on  capital  charges : 
all  these  things  through  the  rod  of  Hermes  shall  be  made 
profitable.  What  will  you  do  with  death?  Why,  what 
else  than  that  it  shall  do  you  honour,  or  that  it  shall  show 
you  by  act  through  it,7  what  a  man  is  who  follows  the 
will  of  nature?  What  will  you  do  with  disease?  I  will 
show  its  nature,  I  will  be  conspicuous  in  it,  I  will  be  firm, 
I  will  be  happy,  I  will  not  natter  the  physician,  I  will  not 
wish  to  die.  What  else  do  you  seek?  Whatever  you 
shall  give  me,  I  will  make  it  happy,  fortunate,  honoured, 
a  thing  which  a  man  shall  seek. 

You  say  No  :  but  take  care  that  you  do  not  fall  sick  :  it 
is  a  bad  thing.  This  is  the  same  as  if  you  should  say,  Take 
care  that  you  never  receive  the  impression  (appearance)  that 
three  are  four :  that  is  bad.  Man,  how  is  it  bad?  If  I  think 
about  it  as  I  ought,  how  shall  it  then  do  me  any  damage  ? 
and  shall  it  not  even  do  me  good  ?  If  then  I  think  about 
poverty  as  I  ought  to  do,  about  disease,  about  not  having 
office,8  is  not  that  enough  for  me  ?  will  it  not  be  an  advan- 

5  The  meaning  is  not  clear,  if  we  follow  the  original  text.    Schwcig. 
cannot  see  the  sense  '  with  both  hands  *  in  the  Greek,  nor  can  I.    He 
also  says  that  in  the  words  5poi/  vntp  a^ore'pas  unless  some  masculine 
noun  is  understood  which  is  not  expressed,  e/ceu/os  must  be  referred  to 
the  aliptes ;  and  he  translates  fiapvrepos  by  *  soverior.' 

6  Mrs.  Carter  quotes  the  epistle  to  the  Romans  (viii.  28) :  '  and  we 
tfnow  that  all  things  work  together  for  good  to  them  that  love  God ' ; 
but  she  quotes  only  the  first  part  of  the  verse  and  omits  the  conclusion, 
4  to  them  who  are  the  called  according  to  his  purpose.* 

7  See  Schweig.'s  note. 

*  kvapxfas ;  see  iv.  4,  2  and  23. 

B  2 


244  EFICTETUS. 

tage?  How  then  ought  I  any  longer  to  look  to  seek 
and  good  in  externals  ?  What  happens  ?  these  doctrines 
are  maintained  here,  but  no  man  carries  them  away 
home ;  but  immediately  every  one  is  at  war  with  his  slave, 
with  his  neighbours,  with  those  who  have  sneered  at  him, 
with  those  who  have  ridiculed  him.  Good  luck  to  Lesbius,9 
who  daily  proves  that  1  know  nothing. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

AGAINST  THOSE   WHO   KEAD1LY   COME  TO  THE  PROFESSION   OP 
SOPHISTS. 


THEY  who  have  taken  up  bare  theorems 
immediately  wish  to  vomit  them  forth,  as  persons  whose 
stomach  is  diseased  do  with  food.  First  digest  the  thing, 
then  do  not  vomit  it  up  thus  :  if  you  do  not  digest  it, 
the  thing  becomes  truly  an  emetic,  a  crude  food  and 
•unfit  to  eat.  But  after  digestion  show  us  some  change 
in  your  ruling  faculty,  as  athletes  show  in  their  shoulders 
by  what  they  have  been  exercised  and  what  they  have 
eaten  ;  as  those  who  have  taken  up  certain  arts  show  by 
what  they  have  learned.  The  carpenter  does  not  come 
and  say,  Hear  me  talk  about  the  carpenter's  art;  but 
having  undertaken  to  build  a  house,  he  makes  it,  and 
proves  tbat  he  knows  the  art.  You  also  ought  to  do 
something  of  the  kind;  eat  like  a  man,  drink  like  a 
man,  dress,  marry,  beget  children,  do  the  office  of  a  citizen, 
endure  abuse,  bear  with  an  unreasonable  brother,  bear 
with  your  father,  bear  with  your  son,  neighbour,  com- 
panion.1 Show  us  these  things  that  we  may  see  that 

9  Some  abusive  fellow,  known  tc  some  of  the  hearers  of  Epictetus. 
We  ought  perhaps  to  understand  the  words  as  if  it  were  said,  '  each  of 
you  ought  to  say  to  himself,  Good  luck  to  Lesbius  etc/  Schweig.'s 
note. 

1  The  practical  teaching  of  the  Stoics  is  contained  in  iii.  c.  7,  and  it 
is  good  and  wise.  A  modern  writer  says  of  modern  practice  :  '  If  we 
Open  our  eyes  and  if  we  will  honestly  acknowledge  to  ourselves  whal 
we  discover,  we  shall  be  compelled  to  confess  that  all  the  life  and 


EPICTETUS.  245 

you  have  in  truth  learned  something  from  the  philosophers. 
You  say,  No ;  but  come  and  hear  me  read  (philosophical) 
commentaries.  Go  away,  and  seek  somebody  to  vomit 
them  on.  (He  replies)  And  indeed  I  will  expound  to  you 
the  writings  of  Chrysippus  as  no  other  man  can :  I  will 
explain  his  text  most  clearly :  I  will  add  also,  if  I  can, 
the  vehemence  of  Antipater  and  Archedemus.3 

Is  it  then  for  this  that  young  men  shall  leave  their 
country  and  their  parents,  that  they  may  come  to  this 
place,  and  hear  you  explain  words  ?  Ought  they  not  to 
return  with  a  capacity  to  endure,  to  be  active  in  asso- 
ciation with  others,  free  from  passions,  free  from  pertur- 
bation, with  such  a  provision  for  the  journey  of  life  with 
which  they  shall  be  able  to  bear  well  the  things  that 
happen  and  derive  honour  from  them?3  And  how  can 
you  give  them  any  of  these  things  which  you  do  not 
possess?  Have  you  done  from  the  beginning  any  thing 
else  than  employ  yourself  about  the  resolution  of  Syllo- 

efforts  of  the  civilized  people  of  our  times  is  founded  on  a  view  of  the 
world,  which  is  directly  opposed  to  the  view  of  the  world  which  Jesus 
had*  (Strauss,  Der  alto  und  dor  neue  Glaube,  p.  74). 

2  Cicero  (Acadern.  Prior,  ii.  47)  names  Antipater  and  Archide- 
mus  (Archedornus)  the  chief  of  dialecticians,  and  also  '  opiniosissinii 
homines.' 

8  This  passage  is  one  of  those  which  show  the  great  good  sense  of 
Epictetus  in  the  matter  of  education ;  and  some  other  remarks  to  the 
same  effect  follow  in  this  chapter.  A  man  might  justly  say  that  we 
have  no  clear  notion  of  the  purpose  of  education.  A  modern  writer, 
who  seems  to  belong  to  the  school  of  Epictetus  says :  "  it  cannot  be 
denied  that  in  all  schools  of  all  kinds  it  ought  to  be  the  first  and  the 
chief  object  to  make  children  healthy,  good,  honest,  and,  if  possible, 
sensible  men  and  women;  and  if  this  is  not  done  in  a  reasonable 
degree,  I  maintain  that  the  education  of  these  schools  is  good  for 
nothing — I  do  not  propose  to  make  children  good  and  honest  and  wise 
by  precepts  and  dogmas  and  preaching,  as  you  will  see.  They  must 
be  made  good  and  wise  by  a  cultivation  of  the  understanding,  by  the 
practice  of  the  discipline  necessary  for  that  purpose,  and  by  the 
example  of  him  who  governs,  directs  and  instructs."  Further,  "  my 
men  and  women  teachers  have  something  which  the  others  have  not : 
they  have  a  purpose,  an  end  in  their  system  of  education ;  and  what  is 
education  ?  What  is  human  life  without  some  purpose  or  end  which 
may  be  attained  by  industry,  order  and  the  exercise  of  moderate 
abilities?  Great  abilities  are  rare,  and  they  are  often  accompanied  by 
qualities  which  make  the  abilities  useless  to  him  who  has  them,  and 
even  injurious  to  society." 


246  .EPICTETUS. 

gisms,  of  sophistical  arguments  (ot  ju-eTaTrtTrrovrcs),  and  in 
those  which,  woik  by  questions?  But  such  a  man  has  a 
school ;  why  should  not  I  aLo  have  a  school  ?  These 
things  are  not  done,  man,  in  a  careless  way,  nor  just  as 
it  may  happen ;  but  there  must  be  a  (fit)  age  and  life 
and  God  as  a  guide.  You  say,  No.  But  no  man  sails 
from  a  port  without  having  sacrificed  to  the  Gods  and 
invoked  their  help  ;  nor  do  men  sow  without  having  called 
on  Demeter ;  and  shall  a  man  who  has  undertaken  so  great 
a  work  undertake  it  safely  without  the  Gods?  and  shall 
they  who  undertake  this  work  come  to  it  with  success? 
What  else  are  you  doing,  man,  than  divulging  the  mys- 
teries? You  say,  there  is  a  temple  at  Eleusis,  and  one 
here  also.  There  is  an  Hierophant  at  Eleusis,4  and  I  also 
will  make  an  Hierophant:  there  is  a  herald,  and  I  will 
•establish  a  herald :  there  is  a  torchbearer  at  Eleusis,  and 
I  also  will  establish  a  torchbearer;  there  are  torches  at 
Eleusis,  and  I  will  have  torches  here.  The  words  are 
the  same :  how  do  the  things  done  hero  differ  from  those 
•done  thei^e? — Most  impious  man,  is  there  no  difference? 
these  things  are  done  both  in  due  place  and  in  due  time  ; 
and  when  accompanied  with  sacrifice  and  prayers,  when  a 
man  is  first  purified,  and  when  he  is  disposed  in  his  mind 
to  the  thought  that  he  is  going  to  approach  sacred  rites 
and  antient  rites.  In  this  way  the  mysteries  are  useful, 
in  this  way  we  come  to  the  notion  that  all  these  things 
were  established  by  the  antients  for  the  instruction  and 
correction  of  life.5  But  you  publish  and  divulge  them 
out  of  time,  out  of  place,  without  sacrifices,  without  purity ; 
you  have  not  the  garments  which  the  hierophant  ought  t«? 
have,  nor  the  hair,  nor  the  headdress,  nor  the  voice,  nor 
the  age;  nor  have  you  purified  yourself  as  he  has:  bnl 
you  have  committed  to  memory  the  words  only,  and  yuti 
say,  Sacred  are  the  words  by  themselves.6 

4  There  was  a  great  temple  of  Demeter  (Ceres)  at  Eleusis  in  Attica, 
and  solemn  mysteries,  and  an  Hierophant  or  conductor  of  the  ceremonies, 

5  See  the  note  of  T.  Burnet,  De  Fide  et  Officiis  Christianorum,  Ed. 
Sec.  p.  89. 

9  The  reader,  who  has  an  inclination  to  compare  religious  formg 
antient  and  modern,  may  find  something  in  modern  practice  to  which 
the  words  of  Epictetus  are  applicable. 


EPICTETUS.  247 

You  ought  to  approach  these  matters  in  another  way: 
the  thing  is  great,  it  is  mystical,  not  a  common  thing, 
nor  is  it  given  to  every  man.  But  not  even  wisdom7 
perhaps  is  enough  to  enable  a  man  to  take  care  of  youths : 
a  man  must  have  also  a  certain  readiness  and  fitness  for 
this  purpose,  and  a  certain  quality  of  body,  and  above  all 
things  he  must  have  God  to  advise  him  to  occupy  this 
office,  as  God  advised  Socrates  to  occupy  the  place  of  one 
who  confutes  error,  Diogenes  the  office  cf  royalty  and 
reproof,  and  the  office  of  teaching  precepts.  But  you  open 
a  doctor's  shop,  though  you  have  nothing  except  physic  : 
but  where  and  how  they  should  be  applied,  you  know  not 
nor  have  you  taken  any  tumble  about  it.  See,  that  man 
says,  I  too  have  salves  for  the  eyes.  Have  you  also  the 

7  This  is  a  view  of  the  fitness  of  a  teacher  which,  as  far  as  I  know, 
is  quite  new;  and  it  is  also  true.  Perhaps  there  was  some  vague 
notion  of  this  kind  in  modern  Europe  at  the  time  when  teachers  of 
youths  were  only  priests,  and  when  it  was  supposed  that  their  fitness 
for  the  office  of  teacher  was  secured  by  their  fitness  for  the  office  of 
priest.  In  the  present  *  Ordering  of  Deacons '  in  the  Church  of  Eng- 
land, the  person,  who  is  proposed  as  a  fit  person  to  be  a  deacon,  is 
asked  the  following  question  by  the  bishop :  '  Do  you  trust  that  you  are 
inwardly  moved  by  the  Holy  Ghost  to  take  upon  you  this  office  and 
ministration  to  serve  God  for  the  promotion  of  his  glory  and  the  edifying 
of  his  people?'  'In  the  ordering  of  Priests'  this  question  is  omitted, 
and  another  question  only  is  put,  which  is  used  also  in  the  ordering 
of  Deacons ;  *  Do  you  think  in  your  heart  that  you  be  truly  called, 
Recording  to  the  will  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ*  etc.  The  teacher 
ought  to  have  God  to  advise  him  to  occupy  the  office  of  teacher,  as 
Epictetus  says.  He  does  not  say  how  God  will  advise :  perhaps  he 
supposed  that  this  advice  might  be  given  in  the  way  in  which  Socrates 
said  that  he  received  it. 

'  Wisdom  perhaps  is  not  enough '  to  enable  a  man  to  take  care  of 
youths.  Whatever  *  wisdom'  may  mean,  it  is  true  that  a  teacher 
should  have  a  fitness  and  liking  for  the  business.  If  he  has  not,  he 
will  find  it  disagreeable,  and  he  will  not  do  it  well.  He  may  and 
ought  to  gain  a  reasonable  living  by  his  labour:  if  he  seeks  only 
money  and  wealth,  he  is  on  the  wrong  track,  and  he  is  only  like  a 
common  dealer  in  buying  and  selling,  a  butcher  or  a  shoemaker,  or  a 
tailor,  all  useful  members  of  society  and  all  of  them  necessary  in  their 
several  kinds.  But  the  teacher  has  a  priestly  office,  the  making,  as 
far  as  it  is  possible,  children  into  good  men  and  women.  Should  he 
be  « ordered '  like  a  Deacon  or  a  Priest,  for  his  office  is  even  more  useful 
than  that  of  Priest  or  Deacon?  Some  will  say  that  this  is  ridiculous. 
Perhaps  the  wise  will  not  think  so* 


248  EPiCTETUS. 

power  of  using  them  ?  Do  you  know  both  when  and  how 
they  will  do  good,  and  to  whom  they  will  do  good  ?  Why 
then  do  you  act  at  hazard  in  things  of  the  greatest  impor- 
tance ?  why  are  you  careless  ?  why  do  you  undertake  a 
thing  that  is  in  no  way  fit  for  you  ?  Leave  it  to  those  who 
are  able  to  do  it,  and  to  do  it  well.  Do  not  yourself  bring 
disgrace  on  philosophy  through  your  own  acts,  and  be  not 
one  of  those  who  load  it  with  a  bad  reputation.  But  ii 
theorems  please  you,  sit  still,  and  turn  them  over  by  your- 
self; but  never  say  that  you  are  a  philosopher,  nor  allow 
another  to  say  it ;  but  say :  He  is  mistaken,  for  neither  are 
my  desires  different  from  what  they  were  before,  nor  is  my 
activity  directed  to  other  objects,  nor  do  I  assent  to  other 
things,  nor  in  the  use  of  appearances  have  I  altered  at  all 
from  my  former  condition.  This  you  must  think  and  say 
about  yourself,  if  you  would  think  as  you  ought :  if  not 
act  at  hazard,  and  do  what  you  are  doing ;  for  it  becomes 
you. 


CHAPTEE  XXII. 

ABOUT   CYNISM. 

WHEN  one  of  his  pupils  inquired  of  Epictetus,  and  hd  was 
a  person  who  appeared  to  be  inclined  to  Cynism,  what 
kind  of  person  a  Cynic  ought  to  be  and  what  was  the 
notion  (TrpdX^ts)  of  the  thing,  we  will  inquire,  said  Epic- 
tetus, at  leisure :  but  I  have  so  much  to  say  to  you  that 
he  who  without  God  attempts  so  great  a  matter,  is  hateful 
to  God,  and  has  no  other  purpose  than  to  act  indecently 
in  public.  For  in  any  well-managed  house  no  man  comes 
forward,  and  says  to  himself,  I  ought  to  be  manager  of 
the  house.  If  he  does  so,  the  master  turns  round,  and 
seeing  him  insolently  giving  orders,  drags  him  forth  and 
flogs  him.  So  it  is  also  in  this  great  city  (the  world) ; 
for  here  also  there  is  a  master  of  the  house  who  orders 
every  thing.  (He  says)  You  are  the  sun ;  you  can  by- 
going  round  make  the  year  and  seasons,  and  make  the 


EPICTETTTS.  249 

fraits  grow  and  nourish  them,  and  stir  the  winds  and 
make  them  remit,  and  warm  the  bodies  of  men  properly : 
go,  travel  round,  and  so  administer  things  from  the  greatest 
to  the  least.  You  are  a  calf ;  when  a  lion  shall  appear, 
do  your  proper  business  (i.e.  run  away):  if  you  do  not, 
you  will  suffer.  You  are  a  bull :  advance  and  fight,  for 
this  is  your  business,  and  becomes  you,  and  you  can  do  it. 
You  can  lead  the  army  against  Ilium;  be  Agamemnon. 
You  can  fight  in  single  combat  against  Hector:  be 
Achilles.  But  if  Thersites1  came  forward  and  claimed 
the  command,  he  would  either  not  have  obtained  it ;  or 
if  he  did  obtain  it,  he  would  have  disgraced  himself 
before  many  witnesses. 

Do  you  also  think  about  the  matter  carefully :  it  is  not 
what  it  seems  to  you.  (You  say)  I  wear  a  cloak  now 
and  I  shall  wear  it  then :  I  sleep  hard  now,  and  I  shall 
sleep  hard  then :  I  will  take  in  addition  a  little  bag  now 
and  a  staff,  and  I  will  go  about  and  begin  to  beg  and  to 
abuse  those  whom  I  meet ;  and  if  I  see  any  man  plucking 
the  hair  out  of  his  body,  I  will  rebuke  him,  or  if  he  has 
dressed  his  hair,  or  if  ho  walks  about  in  purple — If  you 
imagine  the  thing  to  be  such  as  this,  keep  far  away  from 
it :  do  not  approach  it :  it  is  not  at  all  for  you.  But  if 
you*  imagine  it  to  be  what  it  is,  and  do  not  think  your- 
self to  be  unfit  for  it,  consider  what  a  great  thing  yon 
undertake. 

In  the  first  place  in  the  things  which  relate  to  yourself, 
you  must  not  bo  in  any  respect  like  what  you  do  now : 
you  must  not  blame  God  or  man :  you  must  take  away 
desire  altogether,  you  must  transfer  avoidance  (l/c/cXto-ts) 
only  to  the  things  which  are  within  the  power  of  the  will : 
you  must  not  feel  anger  nor  resentment  nor  envy  nor  pity ; 
a  girl  must  not  appear  handsome  to  you,  nor  must  you 
love  a  little  reputation,  nor  be  pleased  with  a  boy  or  a 
cake.  For  you  ought  to  know  that  the  rest  of  men  throw 
walls  around  them  and  hoiises  and  darkness  when  they 
do  any  such  things,  and  they  have  many  means  of  con- 
cealment. A  man  shuts  the  door,  he  sets  somebody  before 

1  See  the  description  of  Thersites  in  the  Iliad,  ii.  212. 


250  EPICTETUS. 

the  chamber :  if  a  person  comes,  say  that  he  is  out,  he  ia 
not  at  leisure.  But  the  Cynic  instead  of  all  these  things 
must  use  modesty  as  his  protection :  if  he  does  not,  he 
will  be  indecent  in  his  nakedness  and  under  the  open  sky. 
This  is  his  house,  his  door:  this  is  the  slave  before  his 
bedchamber :  this  is  his  darkness.  For  he  ought  not  to 
wish  to  hide  any  thing  that  he  does  :  and  if  he  does,  he 
is  gone,  he  has  lost  the  character  of  a  Cynic,  of  a  man 
who  lives  under  the  open  sky,  of  a  free  man :  he  hug 
begun  to  fear  some  external  thing,  ho  has  begun  to  have 
need  of  concealment,  nor  can  he  get  concealment  when 
he  chooses.  For  where  shall  he  hide  himself  and  how  ? 
And  if  by  chance  this  public  instructor  shall  be  detected, 
this  paedagogue,  what  kind  of  things  will  he  be  compelled 
to  suffer?  when  then  a  man  fears  these  things,  is  it  pos- 
sible for  him  to  be  bold  with  his  whole  soul  to  superintend 
men  ?  It  cannot  be :  it  is  impossible. 

In  the  first  place  then  you  must  make  your  ruling 
faculty  pure,  and  this  mode  of  life  also.  Now  (you  should 
say),  to  mo  the  matter  to  work  on  is  my  understanding, 
as  wood  is  to  the  carpenter,  as  hides  to  the  shoemaker; 
and  my  business  is  the  right  use  of  appearances.  But  the 
body  is  nothing  to  me  :  the  parts  of  it  are  nothing  to  me. 
Death  ?  Let  it  come  when  it  chooses,  either  death  of  the 
whole  or  of  a  part.  Fly,  you  say.  And  whither;  can 
any  man  eject  me  out  of  the  world?  He  cannot.  But 
wherever  I  go,  there  is  the  sun,  there  is  the  moon,  there 
are  the  stars,  dreams,  omens,  and  the  conversation  (6/uAi'a) 
with  Gods. 

Then,  if  he  is  thus  prepared,  the  true  Cynic  cannot  be 
satisfied  with  this ;  but  he  must  know  that  he  is  sent  a 
messenger  from  Zeus  to  men  about  good  and  bad  things,2  to 
show  them  that  they  have  wandered  and  are  seeking  the 
substance  of  good  and  evil  where  it  is  not,  but  where  it 
is,  they  never  think ;  and  that  he  is  a  spy,  as  Diogenes3 
was  carried  off  to  Philip  after  the  battle  of  Chaeroneia  as 
a  spy.  For  in  fact  a  Cynic  is  a  spy  of  the  things  which 

2  The  office  which  in  our  times  corresponds  to  this  description  of  the 
Cynic,  is  the  office  of  a  teacher  of  religion. 
"3  See  i.  24,  note  °. 


EPIOTETUS.  251 

are  good  for  men  and  which  are  evil,  and  it  is  his  duty  to 
examine  carefully  and  to  come  and  report  truly,  and  not 
to  be  struck  with  terror  so  as  to  point  out  as  enemies 
those  who  are  not  enemies,  nor  in  any  other  way  to  "be 
perturbed  by  appearances  nor  confounded. 

It  is  his  duty  then  to  be  able  with  a  loud  voice,  if  the 
occasion  should  arise,  and  appearing  on  the  tragic  stage 
to  say  like  Socrates  :  Men,  whither  are  you  hurrying,  what 
are  you  doing,  wretches  ?  like  blind  people  you  are  wan- 
dering up  and  down  :  you  are  going  by  another  road,  and 
have  left  the  true  road :  you  seek  for  prosperity  and  hap- 
piness where  they  are  not,  and  if  another  shows  you  where 
they  are,  you  do  not  believe  him.  Why  do  you  seek  it 
without  ?  4  In  the  body  ?  It  is  not  there.  If  you  doubt, 
look  at  Myro,  look  at  Ophellius.5  In  possessions?  It 
is  not  there.  But  if  you  do  not  believe  me,  look  at 
Croesus :  look  at  those  who  are  now  rich,  with  what 
lamentations  their  life  is  filled.  In  power?  It  is  not 
there.  If  it  is,  those  must  be  happy  who  have  been  twice 
and  thrice  consuls  ;  but  they  are  not.  Whom  shall  we 
believe  in  these  matters?  You  who  from  without  see  their 
affairs  and  are  dazzled  by  an  appearance,  or  the  men 
themselves  ?  What  do  they  say  ?  Hear  them  when  they 
groan,  when  they  grieve,  when  on  account  of  these  very 
consulships. and  glory  and  splendour  they  think  that  they 
are  more  wretched  and  in  greater  danger.  Is  it  in  royal 
power  ?  It  is  not :  if  it  were,  Nero  would  have  been 
happy,  and  Sardanapalus.  But  neither  was  Agamemnon 

*  Quod  pctis  hie  e'st, 

Est  Ulubris,  animus  si  te  non  deficit  aequus. 

Horace,  Ep.  i.  11,  30. 

Willst  du  imraer  weiter  schweifeu  ? 
Sieh,  das  Gute  liegt  so  nali. 
Lerne  nur  das  Gliick  ergreifen, 
Denn  das  Gliick  i&t  iminer  da. 

Goethe,  Gedichte. 

5  These  men  are  supposed  to  have  been  strong  gladiators.  Croesus 
is  the  rich  king  of  Lydia,  who  was  taken  prisoner  by  Cyrus  the 
Persian. 


252  EPICTETUS. 

happy,  though  lie  was  a  bettor  man  than  Sarddnapalus  and 
Nero;  but  while  others  are  snoring,  what  is  he  doing? 

Much  from  his  head  he  tore  his  rooted  hair : 

Iliad,  x.  15. 
and  what  does  he  say  himself  ? 

*  I  am  perplexed/  he  says,  'and 

Disturb'd  I  am/  and  4  my  heart  out  of  my  bosom 

Is  leaping.' 

Iliad  x,  91. 

Wretch,  which  of  your  affairs  goes  badly?  Your  posses- 
sions? No.  Your  body?  No.  But  you  are  rich  in  gold 
and  copper.  What  then  is  the  matter  with  you  ?  That 
part  of  you,  whatever  it  is,  has  been  neglected  by  yon 
and  is  corrupted,  the  part  with  which  we  desire,  with 
which  wo  avoid,  with  which  we  move  towards  and 
move  from  things.  How  neglected?  He  knows  not 
the  nature  of  good  for  which  he  is  made  by  nature  and 
the  nature  of  evil;  and  what  is  his  own,  and  what  be- 
longs to  another;  and  when  any  thing  that  belongs  to 
others  goes  badly,  he  says,  Wo  to  me,  for  the  Hellenes 
are  in  danger.  Wretched  is  his  ruling  facility,  and  alone 
neglected  and  uncared  for.  The  Hellenes  are  going  to 
die  destroyed  by  the  Trojans.  And  if  the  Trojans  do 
not  kill  them,  will  they  not  die?  Yes;  but  not  all  at 
once.  What  difference  then  does  it  make  ?  For  if  death 
is  an  evil,  whether  men  die  altogether,  or  if  they  die 
singly,  it  is  equally  an  evil.  Is  any  thing  else  then  going 
to  happen  than  the  separation  of  the  soul  and  the  body  ?  6 
Nothing.  And  if  the  Hellenes  perish,  is  the  door  closed, 
and  is  it  nofc  in  your  power  to  die  ?  It  is.  Why  then  do 
you  lament  (and  say)  Oh,  you  who  are  a  king  and  have 
the  sceptre  of  Zeus  ?  An  unhappy  king  does  not  exist 
more  than  an  unhappy  god.  What  then  art  thou?  In 
truth  a  shepherd:  for  you  weep  as  shepherds  do,  when 
a  wolf  has  carried  off  one  of  their  sheep :  and  these  who 

6  Man  then  is  supposed  to  consist  of  a  sou'I  and  of  a  body.  It  may 
be  useful  to  remember  this  when  we  are  exminrig  other  passages  in 
Kpictetus. 


EFIOTETUS.  253 

are  governed  by  you  are  sheep.  And  why  did  you  come 
hither?  Was  your  desire  in  any  danger?  was  your  aver- 
sion (cK/cXto-ts)  ?  was  your  movement  (pursuits)  ?  was  your 
avoidance  of  things  ?  He  replies,  No ;  but  the  wife  of  my 
brother  was  carried  off.  Was  it  not  then  a  great  gain 
to  be  deprived  of  an  adulterous  wife  ? — Shall  we  be  de- 
spised then  by  the  Trojans  ? — What  kind  of  people  are 
the  Trojans,  wise  or  foolish?  If  they  are  wise,  why  do 
you  fight  with  them  ?  If  they  are  fools,  why  do  you  care 
about  them  ? 

In  what  then  is  the  good,  since  it  is  not  in  these  things  ? 
Tell  us,  you  who  are  lord,  messenger  and  spy.  Where 
you  do  not  think  that  it  is,  nor  choose  to  seek  it :  for  if 
you  chose  to  seek  it,  you  would  have  found  it  to  be  in 
yourselves  ;  nor  would  you  be  wandering  out  of  the  way, 
nor  seeking  what  belongs  to  others  as  if  it  were  your  own. 
Turn  your  thoughts  into  yourselves  :  observe  the  precon- 
ceptions which  you  have.  What  kind  of  a  thing  do  you 
imagine  the  good  to  be  ?  That  which  flows  easily,  that 
which  is  happy,  that  which  is  not  impeded.  Come,  and 
do  you  not  naturally  imagine  it  to  be  great,  do  you  not 
imagine  it  to  be  valuable  ?  do  you  not  imagine  it  to  be 
free  from  harm?  In  what  material  then  ought  you  to 
seek  for  that  which  flows  easily,  for  that  which  is  not  im- 
peded ?  in  that  which  serves  or  in  that  which  is  free  ?  In 
that  which  is  free.  Do  you  possess  the  body  then  free  or 
is  it  in  servile  condition  ?  We  do  not  know.  Do  you  not 
know  that  it  is  the  slave  of  fever,  of  gout,  ophthalmia, 
dysentery,  of  a  tyrant,  of  fire,  of  iron,  of  every  thing 
which  is  stronger?  Yes,  it  is  a  slave.  How  then  is  it 
possible  that  any  thing  which  belongs  to  the  body  can  be 
free  from  hindrance?  and  how  is  a  thing  great  or  valuable 
which  is  naturally  dead,  or  earth,  or  mud  ?  Well  then,  do 
you  possess  nothing  which  is  free?  Perhaps  nothing. 
And  who  is  able  to  compel  you  to  assent  to  that  which 
appears  false  ?  No  man.  And  who  can  compel  you  not 
to  assent  to  that  which  appears  true  ?  No  man.  By  this 
then  you  see  that  there  is  something  in  you  naturally  free. 
But  to  desire  or  to  be  averse  from,  or  to  move  towards  an 
object  or  to  move  from  it,  or  to  prepare  yourself,  or  to 
propose  to  do  any  thing,  which  of  you  can  do  this,  unless 


254  EPICTETUS. 

he  has  received  an  impression  of  the  appearance  of  ,'thal 
which  is  profitable  or  a  duty  ?  No  man.  You  have  then 
in  these  things  also  something  which  is  not  hindered  and 
is  free.  Wretched  men,  work  out  this,  take  care  of  this, 
seek  for  good  here. 

And  how  is  it  possible  that  a  man  who  has  nothing, 
who  is  naked,  houseless,  without  a  hearth,  squalid,  without 
a  slave,  without  a  city,  can  pass  a  life  that  flows  easily  ? 
See,  God  has  sent  you  a  man  to  show  you  that  it  is  pos  • 
sible.7  Look  at  me,  who  am  without  a  city,  without  a 
house,  without  possessions,  without  a  slave;  I  sleep  on 
the  ground ;  I  have  no  wife,  no  children,  no  praetorium, 
but  only  the  earth  and  heavens,  and  one  poor  cloak.  And 
what  do  I  want  ?  Am  I  not  without  sorrow  ?  am  I  not 
without  fear  ?  Am  I  not  free  ?  \\  hen  did  any  of  you  see 
me  failing  in  the  object  of  my  desire  ?  or  ever  falling  into 
that  which  I  would  avoid  ?  did  I  ever  blame  God  or  man  ? 8 

7  "  It  is  observable  that  Epictetns  seems  to  think  it  a  necessary 
qualification  in  a  teacher  sent  from  God  for  the  instruction  of  man- 
kind to  be  destitute  of    all  external    advantages    and  a  suffering 
character.    Thus  doth    this  excellent  man,  who  had  carried  human 
reason  to  so  great  a  height,  bear  testimony  to  the  propriety  of  that 
method  which  the  divine  wisdom  hath  thought  fit  to  follow  in  the 
scheme  of  the  Gospel ;  whose  great  author  had  not  where  to  lay  his 
head ;  and  which  some  in  later  ages  have  inconsiderately  urged  as  an 
argument  against  the  Christian  religion.      The    infinite    disparity 
between  the  proposal  of  the  example  of  Diogenes  in  Epictetus  and  of 
our  Redeemer  in  the  New  Testament  is  too  obvious  to  need  any  en- 
largement."   Mrs.  Carter. 

8  Some  of  the  antients,  who  called  themselves  philosophers,  did 
blame  God  and  his  administration  of  the  world ;  and  there  are  men 
who  do  the  same  now.    If  a  man  is  dissatisfied  with  the  condition  of 
the  world,  he  has  the  power  of  going  out  of  it,  as  Epictetus  often  says  ; 
and  if  he  knows,  as  he  must  know,  that  he  cannot  alter  the  nature  of 
man  and  the  conditions  of  human  life,  he  may  think  it  wise  to  with- 
draw from  a  state  of  things  with  which  ho  is  not  satisfied.    If  he 
believes  that  there  is  no  God,  he  is  at  liberty  to  do  what  he  thinks 
best  for  himself ;  and  if  he  does  believe  that  there  is  a  God,  he  may 
still  think  that  his  power  of  quitting  the  world  is  a  power  which  he 
may  exercise  when  ho  chooses.,    Muny  persons  commit  suicide,  not 
because  they  are  dissatisfied  with  the  state  of  the  world,  but  for  other 
reasons.   I  have  not  yet  heard  of  a  modern  philosopher  who  found  fault 
with  the  condition  of  human  things,  and  voluntarily  retired  from  life, 
Our  philosophers  live  as  long  as  they  can,  and  some  of  them  take  care 
of  themselves  arid  of  all  that  they  possess ;  they  even  provide  well  for  tha 


EPICTETUS.  255 

did  I  ever  accuse  any  man  ?  did  any  of  you  ever  see  mo 
with  sorrowful  countenance  ?  And  how  do  I  meet  with 
those  whom  you  are  afraid  of  and  admire?  Do  not  I 
treat  them  like  slaves  ?  Who,  when  he  sees  me,  does  not 
think  that  he  sees  his  king  and  master  ? 

This  is  the  language  of  the  Cynics,  this  their  character, 
this  is  their  purpose.  You  say  No  :  but  their  charac- 
teristic is  the  little  wallet,  and  stalf,  and  great  jaws :  the 
devouring  of  all  that  you  give  them,  or  storing  it  up,  or 
the  abusing  unreasonably  all  whom  they  meet,  or  dis- 
playing their  shoulder  as  a  fine  thing. — Do  you  see  how 
you  are  going  to  undertake  so  great  a  business?  First 
take  a  mirror  :  look  at  your  shoulders  ;  observe  your  loins, 
your  thighs.  You  are  going,  my  man,  to  be  enrolled  as  a 
combatant  in  the  Olympic  games,  no  frigid  and  miserable 
contest.  In  the  Olympic  games  a  man  is  not  permitted  to 
be  conquered  only  and  to  take  his  departure ;  but  first  he 
must  be  disgraced  in  the  sight  of  all  the  world,  not  in 
the  sight  of  Athenians  only,  or  of  Lacedaemonians  or  of 
Nicopolitans;  next  he  must  be  whipped  also  if  he  has 
entered 9  into  the  contests  rashly :  and  before  being  whipped, 
he  must  suffer  thirst  and  heat,  and  swallow  much  dust. 

comfort  of  those  whom  they  leave  behind  them.  The  conclusion  seems 
to  be  that  they  prefer  living  in  this  world  to  leaving  it,  that  their  com- 
plaints are  idle  talk ;  and  that  being  men  of  weak  minds,  and  great 
vanity  they  assume  the  philosopher's  name,  and  while  they  try  to 
make  others  as  dissatisfied  as  they  profess  themselves  to  be,  they  are 
really  enjoying  themselves  after  their  fashion  as  much  as  they  can. 
These  men,  though  they  may  have  the  means  of  living  with  as  much 
comfort  as  the  conditions  of  human  life  permit,  are  dissatisfied,  and 
they  would,  if  they  could,  make  as  dissatisfied  ns  themselves  those  who 
have  less  means  or  making  life  tollable.  These  grumblers  are  not 
the  men  who  give  their  money  or  their  labour  or  their  lives  for  in- 
creasing the  happiness  of  mankind  and  diminishing  the  unavoidable 
sufferings  of  human  life ;  but  they  find  it  easier  to  blame  God,  when 
they  believe  in  him ;  or  to  find  fault  with  things  as  they  are,  which  is 
more  absurd,  when  they  do  not  believe  in  God,  and  when  they  ought 
to  make  the  best  that  they  can  of  the  conditions  under  which  we 
live. 

9  The  text  is  €t/c?)  e£e\0(Wa.  Meibomius  suggested  €iVeA0<Wa 
in  place  of  <?£eA0<Wa :  Schweig.  appears  to  prefer  €lcre\d6vra,  and  I 
have  translated  this  word  in  the  version.  I  think  that  there  is  no 
doubt  about  the  emendation. 


256  EPICTETUS. 

Eeflect  more  carefully,  know  thyself,10  consult  tiiO  divi- 
nity, without  God  attempt  nothing  ;  for  if  he  shall  advise 
you  (to  do  this  or  anything),  be  assured  that  he  intonds 
you  to  become  great  or  to  receive  many  blows.  For  this 
very  amusing  quality  is  conjoined  to  a  Cynic  :  he  must  be 
flogged  like  an  ass,  and  when  he  is  flogged,  he  must  krve 
those  who  flog  him,  as  if  he  were  the  father  of  all,  and 
the  brother  of  all.11  —  You  say  No  ;  but  if  a  man  flogs  you, 
stand  in  the  public  place  and  call  out,  '  Caesar,  what  do  I 
suffer  in  this  state  of  peace  under  thy  protection  ?  '  Let  us 
bring  the  offender  before  the  proconsul.  —  But  what  is 
Caesar  to  a  Cynic,  or  what  is  a  proconsul  or  what  is  any 
other  except  him  who  sent  the  Cynic  down  hither,  and 
whom  he  serves,  namely  Zeus  ?  Does  he  call  upon  any 
other  than  Zeus?  Is  he  not  convinced  that  whatever 
he  suffers,  it  is  Zeus  who  is  exercising  him?  Hercules 
when  he  was  exercised  by  Eurystheus  did  not  think  that 
he  was  wretched,  but  without  hesitation  he  attempted  to 
execute  all  that  he  had  in  hand.  And  is  he  who  is  trained 
to  the  contest  and  exercised  by  Zeus  going  to  call  out  and 
to  be  vexed,  he  who  is  worthy  to  bear  the  sceptre  of 
Diogenes?  Hear  what  Diogenes  says  to  the  passers  by 
when  he  is  in  a  fever,  Miserable  wretches,  will  you  not 
stay  ?  but  are  you  going  so  long  a  journey  to  Olympia  to  see 
the  destruction  or  the  fight  of  athletes  ;  and  will  you  not 
choose  to  see  the  combat  between  a  fever  and  a  man  ?  12 
Would  such  a  man  accuse  God  who  sent  him  down  as  if 
God  were  treating  him  unworthily,  a  man  who  gloried  in 


10  *  E  caelo  descendit  yv&dt  crtavTSv'  Juvenal  xi.  27.    The  expression 
4  Know  thyself  '  is  attributed  to  several  persons,  and  to  Socrates  among 
them.    Self-knowledge  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  kinds  of  knowledge  ; 
and  no  man  has  it  completely.    Men  either  estimate  their  powers  too 
highly,  and  this  is  named  vanity,  self  conceit  or  arrogance  ;  or  they 
think  too  meanly  of  their  powers  and  do  not  accomplish  what  they 
might  accomplish,  if  they  had  reasonable  self  confidence. 

11  "Compare  this  with  the  Christian  precepts  of  forbearance  and 
love  to  enemies,  Matthew  v.  39-44.    The  reader  will  observe  that 
Christ  specifies  higher  injuries  and  provocations  than  Epictetus  doth  ; 
and  requires  of  all  his  followers,  what  Epictetus  describes  only  as  the 
duty  of  one  or  two  extraordinary  persons,  as  such."    Mrs.  Carter. 

j2  Upton  quotes  Hieronymus  lib.  ii  ad  versus  Jovianum,  where  the 
thing  is  told  in  a  different  way. 


EPICTETUS.  257 

his  circumstances,  and  claimed  to  be  an  example  to  those 
who  were  passing  by  ?  For  what  shall  he  accuse  him  of  ? 
because  he  maintains  a  decency  of  behaviour,  because  he 
displays  his  virtue  more  conspicuously  ? 13  Well,  and 
what  does  he  say  of  poverty,  about  death,  about  pain  ? 
How  did  he  compare  his  own  happiness  with  that  of  the 
great  king  (the  king  of  Persia)?  or  rather  ho  thought 
that  there  was  no  comparison  between  them.  For  where 
there  are  perturbations,  and  griefs,  and  fears,  and  desires 
not  satisfied,  and  aversions  of  things  which  you  cannot 
avoid,  and  envies  and  jealousies,  how  is  there  a  road  to 
happiness  there  ?  But  where  there  are  corrupt  principles, 
there  these  things  must  of  necessity  be. 

When  the  young  man  asked,  if  when  a  Cynic  has  fallen 
sick,  and  a  friend  asks  him  to  come  to  his  house  and  to  be 
takei:  care  of  in  his  sickness,  shall  the  Cynic  accept  the 
invitation,  he  replied,  And  where  shall  you  find,  I  ask,  a 
Cynic's  friend  ?  u  For  the  man  who  invites  ought  to  bo 
such  another  as  the  Cynic  that  he  may  be  worthy  of  being 
reckoned  the  Cynic's  friend.  He  ought  to  be  a  partner  in 
the  Cynic's  sceptre  and  his  royalty,  and  a  worthy  minister, 
if  he  intends  to  be  considered  worthy  of  a  Cynic's  friend- 
ship, as  Diogenes  was  a  friend  of  Antisthenes,  as  Crates 
was  a  friend  of  Diogenes.  Do  you  think  that  if  a  man 
comes  to  a  Cynic  and  salutes  him,  that  he  is  the  Cynic's 
friend,  and  that  the  Cynic  will  think  him  worthy  of 
receiving  a  Cynic  into  his  house  ?  So  that  if  you  please,15 
reflect  on  this  also :  rather  look  round  for  some  convenient 
dunghill  on  which  you  shall  bear  your  fever  and  which 
will  shelter  you  from  the  north  wind  that  you  may  not  be 
chilled.  But  you  seem  to  me  to  wish  to  go  into  some- 
man's  house  and  to  be  well  fed  there  for  a  time.  Why 
then  do  you  think  of  attempting  so  great  a  thing  (as  the 
life  of  a  Cynic)  ? 

18  I  have  not  translated,  because  I  do  not  understand,  the  words 
&n  Kcrriiyopf?.  See  Schweig.'s  note. 

14  This  must  be  the  meaning.  Meibomius  suggested  that  the  true 
reading  is  KWIKOV,  and  not  K\>vut6v :  and  Schweig.  seems  to  be  of  the 
same  mind.  I  have  repeated  the  word  Cynic  several  times  to  remove 
ail  ambiguity  in  this  section. 

**  See  Schweig.'s  note  on 


258  EPICTETUS. 

But,  said  the  young  man,  shall  marriage  and  the  pro- 
creation of  children  as  a  chief  duty  be  undertaken  by  the 
Cynic?16  If  you  grant  me  a  community  of  wise  men, 
Epictetus  replies,  perhaps  no  man  will  readily  apply 
himself  to  the  Cynic  practice.  For  on  whose  account 
should  he  undertake  this  manner  of  life  ?  Howe\er  if  we 
suppose  that  he  does,  nothing  will  prevent  him  from 
marrying  and  begetting  children;  for  his  wife  will  be 
another  like  himself,  and  his  father  in  law  another  like 
himself,  and  bis  children  will  be  brought  up  like  him- 
self. But  in  the  present  state  of  things  which  is  like 
that  of  an  army  placed  in  battle  order,  is  it  not  fit  that 
the  Cynic  should  without  any  distraction  be  employed  only 
on  the  ministration  of  God,17  able  to  go  about  among  men, 

16  The  Stoics  recommended  marriage,  the  procreation  of  children, 
the  discharge  of  magisterial  offices,   and   the  duties  of   social  life 
generally. 

17  "It  is   remarkable  that  Epictetus  here  uses  the   same  word 
(airepta-irdffTws)  with  St.  Paul,  1  Cor.  vii.  35,  and  urges  the  same  con- 
sideration, of  applying  wholly  to  the  service  of  God,  to  dissuade  from 
marriage.    HLs  observation  too  that  the  state  of   things  was    then 
(cbs  iv  Trapardfci)  like  that  of  an  army  prepared  for  battle,  nearly  re- 
feembles  the  Apostle's  (eVea-T&>(ra  dva-y/o?)  present  necessity.     St.  Paul 
says  2  Tim.  ii.  4   (oufcls  crTpaT€v6fjL*vos  ^UTrAe'/ceTcu  etc.)  no  man  that 
warreth  entangleth  himself  with  the  affairs  of  life.     So  Epictetus  says 
here  that  a  Cynic  must  not  be  (evLireTrteyfjiivov)  in  relations  etc.     From 
these  and  many  other  passages  of  Epictetas  one  would  bo  inclined  to 
think  that  he  was  not  unacquainted  with  St.  Paul's  Epistles  or  that 
he  had  heard  something  of  the  Christian  doctrine.7'    Mrs.  Carter. 

I  do  not  find  any  evidence  of  Epictetus  biing  acquainted  with  the 
Epistles  of  Paul.  It  is  possible  that  he  had  heard  something  of  the 
Christian  doctrine,  but  1  have  not  observed  any  evidence  of  the  fact. 
Epictetus  and  Paul  have  not  the  same  opinion  about  marriage,  for 
Paul  says  that '  if  they  cannot  contain,  let  them  marry :  for  it  is  better 
to  marry  than  to  burn.'  Accordingly  his  doctrine  is  4to  avoid  fornica- 
tion let  every  man  have  his  own  wife,  and  let  every  woman  have  her 
own  husband.'  He  does  not  directly  say  what  a  man  should  do  when 
he  is  not  able  to  maintain  a  wife;  but  the  inference  is  plain  what  he 
will  do  (1  Cor.  vii,  2).  Paul's  view  of  marriage  differs  from  that  of 
Epictetus,  who  recommends  marriage.  Paul  does  not :  he  writes,  4 1 
gay  therefore  to  the  unmarried  and  widows,  It  is  good  for  them  if  they 
abide  even  as  I.'  He  does  not  acknowledge  marriage  and  the  beget- 
ting of  children  as  a  duty  ;  which  Epictetus  did. 

In  tho  present  condition  of  the  world  Epictetus  says  that  the 
'minister  of  Cod'  should  not  marry,  because  the  cares  of  a  family 
would  distract  him  and  make  him  unable  to  discharge  his  duties. 


EPICTETUS.  259 

not  tied  down  to  the  common  duties  of  mankind,  nor 
entangled  in  the  ordinary  relations  of  life,  which  if  he 
neglects,  he  will  not  maintain  the  character  of  an  honour- 
able and  good  man?  and  if  he  observes  them  he  will  lose 
the  character  of  the  messengar,  and  spy  and  herald  of  God. 
For  consider  that  it  is  his  duty  to  do  something  towards 
his  father  in  law,  something  to  the  other  kinsfolks  of  his 
wife,  something  to  his  wife  also  (if  he  has  one).  He  is 
also  excluded  by  being  a  Cynic  from  looking  after  the 
sickness  of  his  own  family,  and  from  providing  for  their 
support.  And  to  say  nothing  of  the  rest,  he  must  have  a 
vessel  for  heating  water  for  the  child  that  he  may  wash 
it  in  the  bath ;  wool  for  his  wife  when  she  is  delivered  of 
a  child,  oil,  a  bed,  a  cup  :  so  the  furniture  of  the  house  is 
increased.  I  say  nothing  of  his  other  occupations,  and  of 
his  distraction.  "Where  then  now  is  that  king,  he  who 
devotes  himself  to  the  public  interests, 

The  people's  guardian  and  so  full  of  cares. 

Homer,  Iliad  ii.  25 

whose  duty  it  is  to  look  after  others,  the  married  and 
those  who  have  children ;  to  see  who  uses  his  wife  well, 
who  uses  her  badly;  who  quarrels;  what  family  is  well 
administered,  what  is  not;  going  about  as  a  physician 
does  and  feels  pulses?  He  says  to  one,  you  have  a  fever, 
to  another  you  have  a  head-ache,  or  the  gout:  he  says  to 
one,  abstain  from  food ; 18  to  another  he  says,  eat ;  or  do 
not  use  the  bath ;  to  another,  you  require  the  knife,  or  th© 
cautery.  Plow  can  he  have  time  for  this  who  is  tied  to 
the  duties  of  common  life  ?  is  it  not  his  duty  to  supply 
clothing  to  his  children,  and  to  send  them  to  the  school- 
master with  writing  tablets,  and  styles  (for  writing).19 
Besides  must  he  not  supply  them  with  beds?  for  they 

There  is  sound  sense  in  this.  A  *  minister  cf  God '  should  not  be  dis- 
tracted by  the  cares  of  a  family,  especially  if  he  is  poor. 

18  The  word  is  avdrttvov.    Compare  ii.  17,  9. 

19  In  the  text  it  is  ypa.Qe'ia,  rt\\dpia.     It  is  probable  that  thero 
should  be  only  one  word.    See  Schweig.'s  note.    Horace  (Sat.  i.  6. 
73)  speaks  of  boys  going  to  school 

Laevo  sutpensi  loculos  tabulamque  lacerto. 

s2 


260  EPICTETUS. 

cannot  "be  genuine  Cynics  as  soon  as  they  are  born.  If  lie 
does  not  do  this,  it  would  be  better  to  expose  the  children 
as  soon  as  they  are  born  than  to  kill  them  in  this  way* 
Consider  what  we  are  bringing  the  Cynic  down  to,  how 
we  are  taking  his  royalty  from  him. — Yes,  but  Crates 
took  a  wife. — You  are  speaking  of  a  circumstance  which 
arose  from  love  and  of  a  woman  who  was  another  Crates.20 
But  we  are  inquiring  about  ordinary  marriages  and  those 
which  are  free  from  distractions,21  and  making  this  inquiry 
we  do  not  find  the  affair  of  marriage  in  this  state  of  the 
world  a  thing  which  is  especially  suited  to  the  Cynic. 

How  then  shall  a  man  maintain  the  existence  of  society  ? 
In  the  name  of  God,  are  those  men  greater  benefactors  to» 
society  who  introduce  into  the  world  to  occupy  their  own 
places  two  or  three  grunting  children,22  or  those  who  super- 
intend as  far  as  they  can  all  mankind,  and  see  what  they  do, 
how  they  live,  what  they  attend  to,  what  they  neglect  con- 
trary to  their  duty  ?  Did  they  who  left  little  children  to  the 
Thebans  do  them  more  good  than  Epaminondas  who  died 
childless?  And  did  Priamus  who  begat  fifty  worthless 
sons  or  Danaus  or  Aeolus  contribute  more  to  the  com- 
munity than  Homer  ?  then  shall  the  duty  of  a  general  or 
the  business  of  a  writer  exclude  a  man  from  marriage  or 
the  begetting  of  children,  and  such  a  man  shall  not  be 
judged  to  have  accepted  the  condition  of  childlessness  for 
nothing ;  and  shall  not  the  royalty  of  a  Cynic  be  considered 
an  equivalent  for  the  want  of  children  ?  Do  we  not  per- 
ceive his  grandeur  and  do  wo  not  justly  contemplate  the 
character  of  Diogenes  ;  and  do  we  instead  of  this  turn  our 
eyes  to  the  present  Cynics  who  are  dogs  that  wait  at  tables* 
and  in  no  respect  imitate  the  Cynics  of  old  except  perchance- 
in  breaking  wind,  but  in  nothing  else  ?  For  such  matters- 
would  not  have  moved  us  at  all  nor  should  we  have- 
wondered  if  a  Cynic  should  not  marry  or  beget  children. 

20  Tho  wife  of  Crates  was  Hipparchia,  who  persisted  against  all 
advice  in  marrying  Crates  and  Jived  wit\  \im  exactly  as  he  lived, 
Diogenes  Laertius,  vi.  96.    Upton. 

21  There  is  some  difficulty  about  fatpurirAavotv  here.    Upton  pro- 
posed to  write  faepurTdTuv,  which  he  explains  '  that  which  has  nothing 
peculiar  in  it/ 

**  Sohweig.  translates  KaKopvyx*  '  male  grunnientce ' :  perhaps  it 
means '  ugly-faced/ 


EPICTETUS.  261 

Man,  the  Cynic  is  the  father  of  all  men ;  the  men  are  his 
sons,  the  women  are  his  daughters :  he  so  carefully  visits 
all,  so  well  does  he  care  for  all.  Do  you  think  that  it  is 
from  idle  impertinence  that  ho  rebukes  those  whom  he 
meets  ?  He  does  it  as  a  father,  as  a  brother,  and  as  the 
minister  of  the  lather  of  all,  the  minister  of  Zeus. 

If  you  please,  ask  me  also  if  a  Cynic  shall  engage  in  the 
administration  of  the  state.  Fool,  do  you  seek  a  greater 
form  of  administration  than  that  in  which  he  is  engaged  ? 
Do  you  ask  if  he  shall  appear  among  the  Athenians  and 
say  something  about  the  revenues  and  the  supplies,  he 
who  must  talk  with  all  men,  alike  with  Athenians,  alike 
with  Corinthians,  alike  with  Romans,  not  about  supplies, 
nor  yet  about  revenues,  nor  about  peace  or  war,  but  about 
happiness  and  unhappiness,  about  good  fortune  and  bad 
fortune,  about  slavery  and  freedom?  When  a  man  has 
undertaken  the  administration  of  such  a  state,  do  you  ask 
me  if  he  shall  engage  in  the  administration  of  a  state  ?  ask 
me  also  if  he  shall  govern  (hold  a  magisterial  office) :  again 
I  will  say  to  you,  Fool,  what  greater  government  shall  he 
•exercise  than  that  which  he  exercises  now  ? 

It  is  necessary  also  for  such  a  man  (the  Cynic)  to  have  a 
certain  habit  of  body :  for  if  he  appears  to  be  consumptive, 
thin  and  pale,  his  testimony  has  not  then  the  same  weight. 
For  he  must  not  only  by  showing  the  qualities  of  the  soul 
prove  to  the  vulgar  that  it  is  in  his  power  independent  of  the 
things  which  they  admire  to  be  a  good  man,  but  he  must 
also  show  by  his  body  that  his  simple  and  frugal  way  of 
living  in  the  open  air  does  not  injure  even  the  body.  See, 
he  says,  I  am  a  proof  of  this,  and  my  own  body  also  is. 
So  Diogenes  used  to  do,  for  he  used  to  go  about  fresh 
looking,  and  ho  attracted  the  notice  of  the  many  by  his 
personal  appearance.  But  if  a  Cynic  is  an  object  of  com- 
passion, he  seems  to  be  a  beggar :  all  persons  turn  away 
from  him,  all  are  offended  with  him ;  for  neither  ought  he 
to  appear  dirty  so  that  he  shall  not  also  in  this  respect 
drive  away  men ;  but  his  very  roughness  ought  to  be  clean 
and  attractive. 

There  ought  also  to  belong  to  the  Cynic  much  natural 
grace  and  sharpness  ;  and  if  this  is  not  BO,  he  is  a  stupid 
fellow,  and  nothing  else;  and  ho  must  have  these  qualities 


262  EPICTETUS. 

that  he  may  be  able  readily  and  fitly  to  be  a  match  for  all 
circumstances  that  may  happen.  So  Diogenes  replied  to 
one  who  said,  Are  you  the  Diogenes  who  does  not  believe 
that  there  are  gods?23  And,  how,  replied  Diogenes,  can 
this  be  when  I  think  that  you  are  odious  to  the  gods? 
On  another  occasion  in  reply  to  Alexander,  who  stood 
by  him  when  he  was  sleeping,  and  quoted  Homer's  lino 
(Iliad,  ii.  24) 

A  man  a  councillor  should  not  sleep  all  night, 
he  answered,  when  he  was  half  asleep, 

The  people's  guardian  and  so  full  of  cares. 

But  before  all  the  Cynic's  ruling  faculty  must  be  purer 
than  the  sun ;  and  if  it  is  not,  he  must  necessarily  be  a 
cunning  knave  and  a  fellow  of  no  principle,  since  while  he 
himself  is  entangled  in  some  vice  he  will  reprove  others.24 
For  see  how  the  matter  stands :  to  these  kings  and  tyrants 
their  guards  and  arms  give  the  power  of  reproving  some 
persons,  and  of  being  able  even  to  punish  those  who  do 
wrong  though  they  are  themselves  bad ;  but  to  a  Cynic 
instead  of  arms  and  guards  it  is  conscience  (TO  owciSo?) 
which  gives  this  power.  When  he  knows  that  he  has 
watched  and  laboured  for  mankind,  and  has  slept  pure, 
and  sleep  has  left  him  still  purer,  and  that  he  thought 
whatever  he  has  thought  as  a  friend  of  the  gods,  as  a 
minister,  as  a  participator  of  the  power  of  Zeus,  and  that 
on  all  occasions  he  is  ready  to  say 

Lead  me,  0  Zeus,  and  thou,  O  Destiny  ;** 

and  also,  If  so  it  pleases  the  gods,  so  let  it  be ;  why  should 
he  not  have  confidence  to  speak  freely  to  his  own  brothers, 
to  his  children,  in  a  word  to  his  kinsmen  ?  For  this  reason 
he  is  neither  over  curious  nor  a  busybody  when  he  is  in 

28  Diogenes  Laertius,  yi.  42. 

s*  The  Cynic  is  in  Epictetus  the  minister  of  religion,  He  must  ba 
pure,  for  otherwise  how  can  he  reprove  vice  ?  This  is  a  useful  lessoa 
to  those  whose  business  it  is  to  correct  the  vices  of  mankind. 

••  See  ii.  23, 42,  note  ». 


EPIOTETUS.  263 

this  state  of  mind ;  for  lie  is  not  a  meddler  with  the  affairs 
of  others  when  he  is  superintending  human  affaiis,  but  ho 
is  looking  after  his  own  affairs.  If  that  is  not  so,  you  may 
also  say  that  the  general  is  a  busybody,  when  he  inspects 
his  soldiers,  and  examines  them  and  watches  them  and 
punishes  the  disorderly.  But  if  while  you  have  a  cake 
under  your  arm,  you  rebuke  others,  I  will  say  to  you, 
Will  you  not  rather  go  away  into  a  corner  and  eat  that 
which  you  have  stolen ;  what  have  you  to  do  with  the 
affairs  of  others  ?  For  who  are  you  ?  are  you  the  bull  of 
the  herd,  or  the  queen  of  the  bees  ?  Show  me  the  tokens 
of  your  supremacy,  such  as  they  have  from  nature.  But  if 
you  are  a  drone  claiming  the  sovereignty  over  the  bees,  do 
you  not  suppose  that  your  fellow  citizens  will  put  you 
down  as  the  bees  do  the  drones? 

The  Cynic  also  ought  to  have  such  power  of  endurance 
ns  to  seem  insensible  to  the  common  sort  and  a  stone :  no 
man  reviles  him,  no  man  strikes  him,  no  man  insults  him, 
but  he  gives  his  body  that  any  man  who  chooses  may  do 
with  it  what  ho  likes.  For  he  bears  in  mind  that  the 
inferior  mu&t  bo  overpowered  by  the  superior  in  that  in 
which  it  is  inferior ;  and  the  body  is  inferior  to  the  many, 
the  weaker  to  the  stronger.  He  never  then  descends  into 
such  a  contest  in  which  he  can  be  overpowered;  but  he 
immediately  withdraws  from  things  which  belong  to 
others,  he  claims  not  the  things  which  are  servile.  But 
where  there  is  will  and  the  use  of  appearances,  there  you 
will  see  how  many  eyes  he  has  so  that  you  may  say,  Argus 
was  blind  compared  with  him.  Is  his  assent  ever  hasty > 
his  movement  (towards  an  object)  rash,  does  his  desire 
ever  fail  in  its  object,  does  that  which  he  would  avoid 
befal  him,  is  his  purpose  unaccomplished,  does  he  ever  find 
fault,  is  he  ever  humiliated,  is  he  ever  envious  ?  To  these 
he  directs  all  his  attention  and  energy ;  but  as  to  every 
thing  else  he  snores  supine.  All  is  peace;  there  is  no 
robber  who  takes  away  his  will,26  no  tyrant.  But  what 
say  you  as  to  his  body  ?  I  say  there  is.  And  his  possessions  ? 
I  say  there  is.  And  as  to  magistracies  and  honours? — 
What  does  he  care  for  them  ? — When  then  any  person  would 

M  This  is  quoted  by  M.  Antoninus,  xi.  36* 


264  EPICTETUS. 

frigliten  him  through  them,  he  says  to  him,  Begone,  look 
for  children  :  masks  are  formidable  to  them ;  but  I  know 
that  they  are  made  of  shell,  and  they  have  nothing  inside. 
About  such  a  matter  as  this  you  are  deliberating. 
Therefore,  if  you  please,  I  urge  you  in  God's  name,  defer 
the  matter,  and  first  consider  your  preparation  for  it.  For 
see  what  Hector  says  to  Andromache,  Eetire  rather,  he 
eays;  into  the  house  and  weave : 

War  is  the  work  of  men 
Of  all  indeed,  but  specially  'tis  mine. 

11.  vi.  490. 

So  he  was  conscious  of  his  own  qualification,  and  knew 
her  weakness. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 


TO   THOSE   WHO   READ  AND  DISCUSS   FOR   THE   SAKE  OF 


OSTENTATION. 


FIRST  say  to  yourself  Who  you  wish  to  be:  then  do 
accordingly  what  you  are  doing ;  for  in  nearly  all  other 
things  we  see  this  to  be  so.  Those  who  follow  athletic 
exercises  first  determine  what  they  wish  to  be,  then  they 
do  accordingly  what  follows.  If  a  man  is  a  runner  in 
the  long  course,  there  is  a  certain  kind  of  diet,  of 
walking,  rubbing,  and  exercise :  if  a  man  is  a  runner 
in  the  stadium,  all  these  things  are  different ;  if  he  is  a 
Pentathlete,  they  are  still  more  different.  So  you  will 
find  it  also  in  the  arts.  If  you  are  a  carpenter,  you  will 
have  such  and  such  things :  if  a  worker  in  metal,  such 
things.  For  every  thing  that  we  do,  if  we  refer  it  to  no 
end,  we  shall  do  it  to  no  purpose ;  and  if  we  refer  it  to 

1  Epictetus  in  an  amusing  manner  touches  on  the  practice  of 
Sophists,  Rhetoricians,  and  others,  who  made  addresses  only  to  get 
praise.  This  practice  of  reciting  prose  or  verse  compositions  was 
common  in  the  time  of  Epictetus,  as  we  may  learn  from  the  letters  of 
the  younger  Pliny,  JuTenal,  Martial,  and  the  author  of  the  i^atise  de 
Causis  corruptae  eloqitDntiae.  Upton. 


EPICTETUS.  265 

tlie  wrong  end,  we  shall  miss  the  mark.  Further,  there 
is  a  general  end  or  purpose,  and  a  particular  purpose. 
First  of  all,  we  must  act  as  a  man.  What  is  compre- 
hended in  this?  We  must  not  be  like  a  sheep,  though 
gentle;  nor  mischievous,  like  a  wild  beast.  But  the 
particular  end  has  reference  to  each  person's  mode  of  life 
and  his  will.  The  lute-player  acts  as  a  lute-player,  the 
carpenter  as  a  carpenter,  the  philosopher  as  a  philosopher, 
the  rhetorician  as  a  rhetorician.  When  then  you  say, 
Come  and  hear  me  read  to  you  :  take  care  first  of  all  that 
you  are  not  doing  this  without  a  purpose ;  then  if  you 
have  discovered  that  you  are  doing  this  with  reference  to 
a  purpose,  consider  if  it  is  the  right  purpose.  Do  you 
wish  to  do  good  or  to  be  praised?  Immediately  you  hear 
him  saying,  To  me  what  is  the  value  of  piaise  from  the 
many?  and  he  says  well,  for  it  is  of  no  value  to  a 
musician,  so  far  as  he  is  a  musician,  nor  to  a  geome- 
trician. Do  you  then  wish  to  be  useful?  in  what?  tell  us 
that  we  may  run  to  your  audience  room.  Now  can  a  man 
do  anything  useful  to  others,  who  has  not  received  some- 
thing useful  himself?  No,  for  neither  can  a  man  do  any 
thing  useful  in  the  carpenter's  art,  unless  he  is  a  carpenter ; 
nor  in  the  shoemaker's  art,  unless  he  is  a  shoemaker. 

Do  you  wish  to  know  then  if  you  have  received  any 
advantage?  Produce  your  opinions,  philosopher.  What 
is  the  thing  which  desire  promises  ?  Not  to  fail  in  the 
object.  What  docs  aversion  promise?  Not  to  fall  into 
that  which  you  would  avoid.  Wrell;  do  we  fulfill  their 
promise  ?  Tell  me  the  truth ;  but  if  you  lie,  I  will  tell 
you.  Lately  when  your  hearers  came  together  rather 
coldly,  and  did  not  give  you  applause,  you  went  away 
humbled.  Lately  again  when  you  had  been  praised,  you 
went  about  and  said  to  all,  What  did  you  think  of  me  ? 
Wonderful,  master,  I  swear  by  all  that  is  dear  to  me.  But 
how  did  I  treat  of  that  particular  matter  ?  Which?  The 
passage  in  which  I  described  Pan  and  the  nymphs?2  Ex- 
cellently. Then  do  you  tell  me  that  in  desire  and  in 
aversion  you  are  acting  according  to  nature?  Be  gone; 
try  to  persuade  somebody  else.  Did  you  not  praise  a  cer- 

*  Such  were  the  subjects  which  the  literary  men  of  the  day  de- 
lighted in . 


266  EPICTETUS. 

tain  person  contrary  to  your  opinion?  and  did  you  no  I 
flatter  a  certain  person  who  was  the  son  of  a  senator? 
Would  you  wish  your  own  children  to  be  such  persons? — I 
hope  not — Why  then  did  you  praise  and  flatter  him  ?  Ho 
is  an  ingenuous  youth  and  listens  well  to  discourses  — 
IIuw  is  this?  —  He  admires  me.  You  have  stated  your 
proof.  Then  what  do  you  think  ?  do  not  these  very  peoplo 
secretly  despise  you  ?  When  then  a  man  who  is  conscious 
that  he  has  neither  done  any  good  nor  ever  thinks  of  it, 
finds  a  philosopher  who  says,  You  have  a  great  natural 
talent,  and  you  have  a  candid  and  good  disposition,  what 
else  do  you  think  that  he  says  except  this,  This  man  has 
some  need  of  me  ?  Or  tell  me  what  act  that  indicates  a 
great  mind  has  he  shown  ?  Observe ;  he  has  been  in  your 
company  a  long  time ;  he  has  listened  to  your  discourses, 
he  has  heard  you  reading;  has  he  become  more  modest? 
has  he  been  turned  to  reflect  on  himself?  has  he  per- 
ceived in  what  a  bad  state  he  is  ?  has  he  cast  away  self- 
conceit?  does  he  look  for  a  person  to  teach  him?  He  does. 
A  man  who  will  teach  him  to  live  ?  No,  fool,  but  how  to 
talk ;  for  it  is  for  this  that  he  admires  you  also.  Listen 
and  hear  what  he  says :  This  man  writes  with  perfect 
art,  much  better  than  Dion.3  This  is  altogether  another 
thing.  Does  he  say,  This  man  is  modest,  faithful,  free 
from  perturbations  ?  and  even  if  he  did  say  it,  I  should 
say  to  him,  Since  this  man  is  faithful,  tell  me  what  this 
faithful  man  is.  And  if  he  could  not  tell  me,  I  should 
add  this,  First  understand  what  you  say,  and  then  speak. 
You  then,  who  are  in  a  wretched  plight  and  gaping 
after  applause  and  counting  your  auditors,  do  you  intend 
to  be  useful  to  others  ? — To-day  many  more  attended  my 
discourse.  Yes,  many;  we  suppose  five  hundred.  That 
is  nothing;  suppose  that  there  were  a  thousand  —  Dion 
never  had  so  many  hearers  —  How  could  he? — And  they 
understand  what  is  said  beautifully.  What  is  fine,  master, 
can  move  even  a  stone  —  See,  these  are  the  words  of  a 

*  Dion  of  Prusa  in  Bithynia  was  named  Chrysostomus  (golden- 
mouthed)  because  of  his  eloquence.  He  was  a  rhetorician  and  sophist, 
as  the  term  was  then  understood,  and  was  living  at  the  same  time  as 
Epictetus.  Eighty  of  his  oratioES  written  in  Greek  are  still  extant, 
and  some  fragments  of  fifteen, 


EPICTETUS.  267 

philosopher.  This  is  the  disposition  of  a  man  who  will 
do  good  to  others ;  here  is  a  man  who  has  listened  to  dis- 
courses, who  has  read  what  is  written  about  Socrates  as 
Socratic,  not  as  the  compositions  of  Lysias  and  Isocrates. 
*  I  have  often  wondered  by  what  arguments/  4  Not  so, 
but  4  by  what  argument ' :  this  is  more  exact  than  that  — 
\Vhat,  have  you  read  the  words  at  all  in  a  different  way 
from  that  in  which  you  read  little  odes  ?  For  if  you  read 
them  as  you  ought,  you  would  not  have  been  attending  to 
such  matters,  but  you  would  rather  have  been  looking  to 
these  words :  "  Anytus  and  Melitus  are  able  to  kill  me, 
but  they  cannot  harm  me :"  "  and  I  am  always  of  such  a 
disposition  as  to  pay  regard  to  nothing  of  my  own  except 
to  the  reason  which  on  inquiry  seems  to  me  the  best." 5 
Hence  who  ever  heard  Socrates  say,  "  I  know  something 
and  I  teach;"  but  he  used  to  send  different  people  to 
different  teachers.  Therefore  they  used  to  come  to  him 
and  ask  to  be  introduced  to  philosophers  by  him ;  and  he 
would  take  them  and  recommend  them.  —  Not  so;  but  as 
he  accompanied  them  he  would  say,  Hear  me  to-day  dis- 
coursing in  the  house  of  Quadratus.6  Why  should  I  hear 
you?  Do  you  wish  to  show  me  that  you  put  words 
together  cleverly?  You  put  them  together,  man;  and 
what  good  will  it  do  you  ?  —  But  only  praise  me. —  What 
do  you  mean  by  praising  ?  —  Say  to  me,  admirable,  won- 
derful. —  Well,  I  say  so.  But  if  that  is  praise  whatever 
it  is  which  philosophers  mean  by  the  name  (/car^yopta)  7  of 

4  These  words  are  the  beginning  of  Xenophon's  Memorabilia,  i.  1. 
The  small  critics  disputed  whether  the  text  should  be  rtfft  \6yois,  or 
rtvi  \6yif. 

5  From  th®  Crito  of  Plato,  c.  6. 

•  The  rich,  says  Upton,  used  to  lend  their  houses  for  recitations,  as 
we  learn  from  Pliny,  Ep.  viii.  12  and  Juvenal,  vii.  40. 

Si  dulcedine  famae 
Succcnsus  recites,  maculosas  commodat  aedes. 

Quadratus  is  a  Roman  name.  There  appears  to  be  a  confusion 
between  Socrates  and  Quadratus.  The  man  says,  No.  Socrates 
would  not  do  so :  but  he  would  do,  as  a  man  might  do  now.  He  would 
eay  on  the  road ;  I  hope  you  will  come  to  hear  me.  I  don't  find  any- 
thing in  the  notes  on  this  passage ;  but  it  requires  explanation. 
f  Karriyopia  is  one  of  Aristotle's  common  terms. 


268  EPICTETUS. 

good,  what  have  I  to  praise  in  yon  ?  If  it  is  good  to  speak 
well,  teach  me,  and  I  will  praise  you. —  What  then? 
ought  a  man  to  listen  to  such  things  without  pleasure  ? — 
I  hope  not.  For  my  part  I  do  not  listen  even  to  a  lute- 
player  without  pleasure.  Must  I  then  for  this  reason 
stand  and  play  the  lute?  He*r  what  Socrates  says,  Nor 
would  it  be  seemly  for  a  man  of  my  age,  like  a  young 
man  composing  addresses,  to  appear  before  you.8  Like  a 
young  man,  he  says.  For  in  truth  this  small  art  is  an 
elegant  thing,  to  select  words,  and  to  put  them  together, 
and  to  come  forward  and  gracefully  to  read  them  or  to 
speak,  and  while  he  is  reading  to  say,  There  are  not 
many  who  can  do  these  things,  I  swear  by  all  that  you 
value. 

Does  a  philosopher  invite  people  to  hear  him  ?  As  the 
Bun  himself  draws  men  to  him,  or  as  food  does,  does  not 
the  philosopher  also  draw  to  him  those  who  will  receive 
benefit  ?  What  physician  invites  a  man  to  be  treated  by 
him?  Indeed  I  now  hear  that  even  the  physicians  in 
Rome  do  invite  patients,  but  when  I  lived  there,  the 
physicians  were  invited.  I  invite  you  to  come  and  hear 
that  things  are  in  a  bad  way  for  you,  and  that  you  are 
taking  care  of  every  thing  except  that  of  which  you  ought 
to  take  care,  and  that  you  are  ignorant  of  the  good  and 
the  bad  and  are  unfortunate  and  unhappy.  A  fine  kind 
of  invitation :  and  yet  if  the  words  of  the  philosopher  do 
not  produce  this  effect  on  you,  he  is  dead,  and  so  is  the 
speaker.  Eufus  was  used  to  say :  If  you  have  leisure  to 
praise  me,  I  am  speaking  to  no  purpose.9  Accordingly 
ne  used  to  speak  in  such  a  way  that  every  one  of  us  who 
were  sitting  there  supposed  that  some  one  had  accused 
him  before  Eufus :  he  so  touched  on  what  was  doing,  he 
so  placed  before  the  eyes  every  man's  faults. 

The  philosopher's  school,  ye  men,  is  a  surgery:  you 
ought  not  to  go  out  of  it  with  pleasure,  but  with  pain. 
For  you  are  not  in  sound  health  when  you  enter :  one  has 
dislocated  his  shoulder,  another  has  an  abscess,  a  third  a 
fistula,  and  a  fourth  a  head  ache.  Then  do  I  sit  and  utler  to 

•  From  Plato's  Apology  of  Socrates, 

*  Aulus  Gellius  v.  1.    Seneca,  Ep.  52.    Upton. 


EPICTETUS. 

you  little  thoughts  and  exclamations  that  you  may  praise 
me  and  go  away,  one  with  his  shoulder  in  the  same  con- 
dition  in  which  he  entered,  another  with  his  head  still 
aching,  and  a  third  with  his  fistula  or  his  abscess  just  as 
they  were  ?  Is  it  for  this  then  that  young  men  shall  quit 
home,  and  leave  their  parents  and  their  friends  and  kins- 
men and  property,  that  they  may  say  to  you,  Wonderful ! 
when  you  are  uttering  your  exclamations.  Did  Socrates 
do  this,  or  Zeno,  or  Cleanthes  ? 

What  then?  is  there  not  the  hortatory  style?  Who 
denies  it?  as  there  is  the  style  of  refutation,  and  the 
didactie  style.  Who  then  ever  reckoned  a  fourth  style 
with  these,  the  style  of  display?  What  is  the  hortatory 
style?  To  be  able  to  show  both  to  one  person  and  to 
many  the  struggle  in  which  they  are  engaged,  and  that 
they  think  more  about  any  thing  than  about  what  they 
really  wish.  For  they  wish  the  things  which  lead  to  hap- 
piness, but  they  look  for  them  in  the  wrong  place.  In 
order  that  this  may  be  done,  a  thousand  seats  must  be 
placed  and  men  must  be  invited  to  listen,  and  you  must 
ascend  the  pulpit  in  a  fine  robe  or  cloak  and  describe  the 
death  of  Achilles.  Cease,  I  intreat  you  by  the  gods,  t$> 
spoil  good  words  and  good  acts  as  much  as  you  can. 
Nothing  can  have  more  power  in  exhortation  than  when 
the  speaker  shows  to  the  hearers  that  he  has  need  of 
them.  But  tell  me  who  when  he  hears  you  reading  or 
discoursing  is  anxious  about  himself  or  turns  to  reflect  on 
himself?  or  when  he  has  gone  out  says,  The  philosopher 
hit  me  well :  I  must  no  longer  do  these  things.  But  does 
he  not,  even  if  you  have  a  great  reputation,  say  to  some 
person  ?  He  spoke  finely  about  Xerxes  ;10  and  another  says> 
No,  but  about  the  battle  of  Thermopylae.  Is  this  listening 
to  a  philosopher? 

10  Cicero,  de  Officiis  i.  18  :  *  Quao  magno  animo  et  fortiter  excel- 
lenterque  gesta  simt,  ea  nescio  quoinoclo  pleniore  ore  laudamus.  Hino 
Bhetorum  campus  de  Marathone,  Salamine,  Plataeis,  Thennopylis, 
Louctria.' 


270  EPICTETUS. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

THAT  WE   OUGHT.    NOT   TO   BK   MOVED   BY   A   DESIRE  OF  THOSE 
THINGS   WHICH  ARE  NOT   Iff   OUR   POWER. 

LET  not  that  which  in  another  is  contrary  to  nature  be 
an  evil  to  you :  for  you  are  not  formed  by  nature  to  be 
depressed  with  others  nor  to  be  unhappy  with  others,  but 
to  be  happy  with  them.  If  a  man  is  unhappy,  remember 
that  his  unhappiness  is  his  own  fault :  for  God  has  made 
all  men  to  be  happy,  to  be  free  from  perturbations.  For 
this  purpose  he  has  given  means  to  them,  some  things  to 
each  person  as  his  own,  and  other  things  not  as  his  own  : 
some  things  subject  to  hindrance  and  compulsion  and 
deprivation ;  and  these  things  are  not  a  man's  own :  but 
the  things  which  are  not  subject  to  hindrances,  are  his 
own ;  and  the  nature  of  good  and  evil,  as  it  was  fit  to  be 
done  by  him  who  takes  care  of  us  and  protects  us  like  a 
father,  he  has  made  our  own. — But  you  say,  I  have  parted 
from  a  certain  person,  and  he  is  grieved. — Why  did  he 
consider  as  his  own  that  which  belongs  to  another  ?  why, 
when  he  looked  on  you  and  was  lejoiccd,  did  he  not  also 
reckon  that  you  are  mortal,  that  it  is  natural  for  you 
to  part  from  him  for  a  foreign  country?  Therefore  he 
suffers  the  consequences  of  his  own  folly.  But  why  do 
you l  or  for  what  purpose  bewail  yourself?  Is  it  that  you 
also  have  not  thought  of  these  things?  but,  like  poor 
women  who  are  good  for  nothing,  you  have  enjoyed  all 
things  in  which  you  took  pleasure,  as  if  you  would  always 
enjoy  them,  both  places  and  men  and  conversation ;  and 
now  you  sit  and  weep  because  you  do  not  see  the  same 
persons  and  do  not  live  in  the  same  places. — Indeed  you 
deserve  this,  to  be  more  wretched  thai)  crows  and  ravens 
who  have  the  power  of  flying  where  they  please  and 
changing  their  nests  for  others,  and  crossing  the  seas 
without  lamenting  or  regretting  their  former  condition. — 
Yes,  but  this  happens  to  them  because  they  are  irrational 
creatures. — Was  reason  then  given  to  us  by  the  gods  for 

1  See  Schweig.'s  note. 


EPICTETUS.  271 

the  purpose  of  unhappiness  and  misery,  that  we  may  pass 
our  lives  in  wretchedness  and  lamentation?  Must  all 
persons  bo  immortal  and  must  no  man  go  abroad,  and 
must  we  ourselves  not  go  abroad,  but  remain  rooted  like 
plants ;  and  if  any  of  our  familiar  friends  goes  abroad, 
must  we  sit  and  weep;  and  on  the  contrary,  when  he  re- 
turns, must  wo  dance  and  clap  our  hands  like  children? 

Shall  we  not  now  wean  ourselves  and  remember  what 
we  have  heard  from  the  philosophers  ?  if  we  did  not  listen 
to  them  as  if  they  were  jugglers :  they  tell  us  that  this 
world  is  one  city,2  and  the  substance  out  of  which  it  has 
been  formed  is  one,  and  that  there  must  be  a  certain  period, 
and  that  some  things  must  give  way  to  others,  that  some 
must  be  dissolved,  and  others  come  in  their  place ;  some  to 
remain  in  the  same  place,  and  others  to  be  moved;  and 
that  all  things  are  full  of  friendship,  first  of  the  gods,3  and 
then  of  men  who  by  nature  are  made  to  be  of  one  family ; 
and  some  must  bo  with  one  another,  and  others  must  be 
separated,  rejoicing  in  those  who  are  with  them,  and  not 
grieving  for  those  who  are  removed  from  them ;  and  man 
in  addition  to  being  by  nature  of  a  noble  temper  and 
having  a  contempt  of  all  things  which  are  not  in  the 
power  of  his  will,  also  possesses  this  property  not  to  be 
rooted  nor  to  be  naturally  fixed  to  the  earth,  but  to  go 
at  different  times  to  different  places,  sometimes  from  the 
urgency  of  certain  occasions,  and  at  others  merely  for  the 
sake  of  seeing.  So  it  was  with  Ulysses,  who  saw 

Of  many  men  the  states,  and  learned  their  ways.4 

And  still  earlier  it  was  the  fortune  of  Hercules  to  visit 

all  the  inhabited  world 

Seeing  men's  lawless  deeds  and  their  good  rules  of  law  :5 

casting  out  and  clearing  away  their  lawlessness  and  intro- 
ducing in  their  place  good  rules  of  law.  And  yet  how 
many  friends  do  you  think  that  he  had  in  Thebes,  how 
taariy  in  Argos,  how  mauy  in  Athens  ?  and  how  many  do 

2  See  ii.  5,  26.  *  Homer,  Odyssey  i.  3. 

»  See  iii.  13. 15.  *  Odyssey,  xvii.  487. 


272  EPICTETUS. 

you  think  that  lie  gained  by  going  about  ?  And  he  married 
also,  when  it  seemed  to  him  a  proper  occasion,  and  begot 
children,  and  left  them  without  lamenting  or  regretting 
or  leaving  them  as  orphans ;  for  he  knew  that  no  man  is 
an  orphan ;  but  it  is  the  father  who  takes  care  of  all  men 
always  and  continuously.  For  it  was  not  as  mere  report 
that  he  had  heard  that  Zeus  is  the  father  of  men,  for  he 
thought  that  Zeus  was  his  own  father,  and  he  called  him 
so,  and  to  him  he  looked  when  he  was  doing  what  he  did. 
Therefore  he  was  enabled  to  live  happily  in  all  places. 
And  it  is  never  possible  for  happiness  and  desire  of  what 
is  not  present  to  come  together.  For  that  which  is  happy 
must  have  all6  that  it  desires,  must  resemble  a  person 
who  is  filled  with  food,  and  must  have  neither  thirst  nor 
hunger. — But  Ulysses  felt  a  desire  for  his  wife  and  wept 
as  he  sat  on  a  rock. — Do  you  attend  to  Homer  and  his 
stories  in  every  thing  ?  Or  if  Ulysses  really  wept,  what 
was  he  else  than  an  unhappy  man  ?  and  what  good  man 
is  unhappy  ?  In  truth  the  whole  is  badly  administered, 
if  Zeus  does  not  take  care  of  his  own  citizens  that  they 
may  be  happy  like  himself.  But  these  things  are  not 
lawful  nor  right  to  think  of:  and  if  Ulysses  did  weep 
and  lament,  he  was  not  a  good  man.  For  who  is  good  if 
he  knows  not  who  he  is  ?  and  who  knows  what  he  is,  if  he 
forgets  that  things  which  have  been  made  are  perishable, 
and  that  it  is  not  possible  for  one  human  being  to  be  with 
another  always  ?  To  desire  then  things  which  are  impos- 
sible is  to  have  a  slavish  character,  and  is  foolish :  it  is 
tbe  part  of  a  stranger,  of  a  man  who  fights  against  God 
in  the  only  way  that  he  can,  by  his  opinions. 

But  my  mother  laments  when  she  does  not  see  me. — 
Why  has  she  not  learned  these  principles  ?  and  I  do  not 
say  this,  that  we  should  not  take  care  that  she  may  not 
lament,  but  I  say  that  we  ought  not  to  desire  in  every 
way  what  is  not  our  own.  And  the  sorrow  of  another  is 
another's  sorrow :  but  my  sorrow  is  my  own.  I  then  will 
stop  my  own  sorrow  by  every  means,  for  it  is  in  my  power : 
and  the  sorrow  of  another  I  will  endeavour  to  stop  as  far 
as  I  can ;  but  I  will  not  attempt  to  do  it  by  every  means,- 

.    Seo  ill  2, 13.    Panl  to  tbe  Philippians,  iv.  18, 


EPICTETUS.  273 

for  if  I  do,  I  shall  bo  fighting  against  God,  I  shall  Le 
opposing  Zens  and  shall  be  placing  myself  against  him  in 
the  administration  of  the  universe ;  and  the  reward  (the 
punishment)  of  this  fighting  against  God  and  of  this  dis- 
obedience not  only  will  the  children  of  my  children  pay, 
but  I  also  shall  myself,  both  by  day  and  by  night,  startled 
by  dreams,  perturbed,  trembling  at  every  piece  of  news, 
and  having  my  tranquillity  depending  on  the  letters  of 
others. — Some  person  has  arrived  from  Home.  I  only  hope 
that  there  is  no  harm.  But  what  harm  can  happen  to 
you,  where  you  are  not? — From  Hellas  (Greece)  some  one 
is  come :  I  hope  that  there  is  no  harm. — In  this  way  every 
place  may  be  the  cause  of  misfortune  to  you.  Is  it  not 
•enough  for  you  to  be  unfortunate  there  where  you  are,  and 
must  you  be  so  even  beyond  sea,  and  by  the  report  of  letters  ? 
Is  this  the  way  in  which  your  affairs  are  in  a  state  of 
security  ? — Well  then  suppose  that  my  friends  have  died 
in  the  places  which  are  far  from  me. — What  else  have 
they  suffered  than  that  which  is  the  condition  of  mortals  ? 
Or  how  are  you  desirous  at  the  same  time  to  live  to  old 
age,  and  at  the  same  time  not  to  see  the  death  of  any 
person  whom  you  love  ?  Know  you  not  that  in  the  course 
of  a  long  time  many  and  various  kinds  of  things  must 
happen;  that  a  fever  shall  overpower  one,  a  robber  an- 
other, and  a  third  a  tyrant?  Such  is  the  condition  of 
things  around  us,  such  are  those  who  live  with  us  in  the 
world  :  cold  and  heat,  and  unsuitable  ways  of  living,  and 
journeys  by  land,  and  voyages  by  sea,  and  winds,  and 
various  circumstances  which  surround  us,  destroy  one  man, 
and  banish  another,  and  throw  one  upon  an  embassy  and 
another  into  an  army.  Sit  down  then  in  a  flutter  at  all 
these  things,  lamenting,  unhappy,  unfortunate,  dependent 
on  another,  and  dependent  not  on  one  or  two,  but  on  ten 
thousands  upon  ten  thousands. 

Did  you  hear  this  when  you  were  with  the  philosophers  ? 
did  you  learn  this?  do  you  not  know  that  human  life  is 
a  warfare?  that  one  man  must  keep  watch,  another  must 
go  out  as  a  spy,  and  a  third  must  fight?  and  it  is  not  pos- 
sible that  all  should  be  in  one  place,  nor  is  it  better  that 
it  should  be  so.  But  you  neglecting  to  do  the  commands 
of  the  general  complain  when  any  thing  more  hard  than 

T 


274  EPIOTETUS. 

usual  is  imposed  on  you,  and  you  dp  not  observe  ^hat 
you  make  the  army  become  as  far  as  it  is  in  your  power  ; 
that  if  all  imitate  you,  no  man  will  dig  a  trench,  no  man 
will  put  a  rampart  round,  nor  keep  watch,  nor  exposo 
himself  to  danger,  but  will  appear  to  be  useless  for  the 
purposes  of  an  army.  Again,  in  a  vessel  if  you  go  as  a 
sailor,  keep  to  one  place  and  stick  to  it.  And  if  you  are 
ordered  to  climb  the  mast,  refuse ;  if  to  run  to  the  head 
of  the  ship,  refuse ;  and  what  master  of  a  ship  will  endure 
you?  and  will  he  not  pitch  you  overboard  as  a  useless 
thing,  an  impediment  only  and  bad  example  to  the  other 
sailors?  And  so  it  is  here  also:  every  man's  life  is  a 
kind  of  warfare,  and  it  is  long  and  diversified.  You  must 
observe  the  duty  of  a  soldier  and  do  every  thing  at  the 
nod  of  the  general ;  if  it  is  possible,  divining  what  his 
wishes  are:  for  there  is  no  resemblance  between  that 
general  and  this,  neither  in  strength  nor  in  superiority 
of  character.  You  are  placed  in  a  great  office  of  command 
and  not  in  any  mean  place ;  but  you  are  always  a  senator. 
Do  you  not  know  that  such  a  man  must  give  little  time 
to  the  affairs  of  his  household,  but  bo  often  away  from 
home,  either  as  a  governor  or  one  who  is  governed,  or 
discharging  some  office,  or  serving  in  war  or  acting  as  a 
judge?  Then  do  you  tell  me  that  you  wish,  as  a  plant, 
fco  bo  fixed  to  the  same  places  and  to  be  rooted? — Yes> 
for  it  is  pleasant. — Who  says  that  it  is  not  ?  but  a  soup  is 
pleasant,  and  a  handsome  woman  is  pleasant.  What  else 
do  those  say  who  make  pleasure  their  end  ?  Do  you  not 
see  of  what  men  you  have  uttered  the  language  ?  that  it 
is  the  language  of  Epicureans  and  catamites  ?  Next  while 
you  are  doing  what  they  do  and  holding  their  opinions, 
do  you  speak  to  us  the  words  of  Zeno  and  of  Socrates  r 
Will  you  not  throw  away  as  far  as  you  can  the  things 
belonging  to  others  with  which  yon  decorate  yourself, 
though  they  do  not  fit  you  at  all  ?  For  what  else  do  they 
desire  than  to  sleep  without  hindrance  and  free  from  com- 
pulsion, and  when  they  have  risen  to  yawn  at  their  leisure, 
and  to  wash  the  face,  then  write  and  read  what  they  choose, 
sand  then  talk  about  some  trifling  matter  being  praised  by 
their  friends  whatever  they  may  say,  then  to  go  forth  for 
a  walk,  and  having  walked  about  a  little  to  bathe,  and  then 


EPICTETUS.  275 

eat  and  sleep,  such  sleep  as  is  the  fashion  of  such  men  ? 
why  need  we  say  how?  for  one  can  easily  conjecture. 
Come,  do  you  also  tell  your  own  way  of  passing  the  time 
which  you  desire,  you  who  are  an  admirer  of  truth  and 
of  Socrates  and  Diogenes.  What  do  you  wish  to  do  in 
Athens?  the  same  (that  others  do),  or  something  else? 
Why  then  do  you  call  yourself  a  Stoic?  Well,  but  they 
who  falsely  call  themselves  Eoman  citizens,7  are  severely 
punished ;  and  should  those,  who  falsely  claim  so  great 
and  reverend  a  thing  and  name,  get  off  unpunished?  or 
is  this  not  possible,  but  the  law  divine  and  strong  and 
inevitable  is  this,  which  exacts  the  severest  punishments 
from  those  who  commit  the  greatest  crimes  ?  For  what 
does  this  law  say?  Let  him  who  pretends  to  things  which 
do  not  belong  to  him  be  a  boaster,  a  vain-glorious  man  :8 
let  him  who  disobeys  the  divine  administration  be  base, 
and  a  slave;  let  him  suffer  grief,  let  him  be  envious, 
let  him  pity;9  and  in  a  word  let  him  be  unhappy  and 
lament. 

Well  then ;  do  you  wish  me  to  pay  court  to  a  certain 
person  ?  to  go  to  his  doors?10 — If  reason  requires  this  to  be 
done  for  the  sake  of  country,  for  the  sake  of  kinsmen,  for 
the  sake  of  mankind,  why  should  you  not  go  ?  You  are 
not  ashamed  to  go  to  the  doors  of  a  shoemaker,  when  you 
are  in  want  of  shoes,  nor  to  the  door  of  a  gardener,  when 
you  want  lettuces  ;  and  are  you  ashamed  to  go  to  the  doors , 
of  the  rich  when  you  want  any  thing  ? — Yes,  for  I  have  no 
awe  of  a  shoemaker — Don't  feel  any  awe  of  the  rich — Nor 

7  Suetonius  (Claudius,  25)  says:  'Peregrinae  conditionis  homines' 
votuit    usurpare    Homana    noinina,    duntaxat    gentilia.    Civitatem 
Romanam  usurpantes  in  cumpo  Esquilino  securi  percussit.'    Upton. 

8  This  is  a  denunciation  of  the  hypocrite. 

0  '  Pity '  perhaps  means  that  he  will  suffer  the  perturbation  of  pity>. 
when  ho  ought  not  to  feel  it,  I  am  not  sure  about  the  exact  meaning. 

10  *  What  follows  hath  no  connection  with  what  immediately  pre~ 
ceded;  but  belongs  to  the  general  subject  of  the  chapter.'  Mrs 
Carter. 

*  The  person  with  whom  Epictctns  chiefly  held  this  discourse,  seems 
to  have  been  instructed  by  his  friends  to  pay  his  respects  to  some 
great  nmn  at  Nicopolis  (perhaps  the  procurator,  iii.  4.  1)  and  to  visit 
bis  house.'  Schweig. 

T  2 


276  EP10TETUS. 

will  I  flatter  the  gardener — And  do  not  flatter  the  rich — 
How  then  shall  I  get  what  I  want? — Do  I  say  to  you,  go  ae 
if  you  were  certain  to  get  what  you  want-  ?  And  do  not  1 
only  tell  you,  that  you  may  do  what  is  becoming  to  your- 
self? Why  then  should  I  still  go?  That  you  may  have 
gone,  that  you  may  have  discharged  the  duty  of  a  citizen, 
of  a  "brother,  of  a  friend.  And  further  remember  that  you 
have  gone  to  the  shoemaker,  to  the  seller  of  vegetables,  who 
have  no  power  in  any  thing  great  or  noble,  though  he  may 
sell  dear.  You  go  to  buy  lettuces:  they  cost  an  obolns 
(penny),  but  not  a  talent.  So  it  is  here  also.  The  matter 
is  worth  going  for  to  the  rich  man's  door — Well,  I  will  go 
— It  is  worth  talking  about — Let  it  be  so ;  I  will  talk  with 
him — But  you  must  also  kiss  his  hand  and  flatter  him  with 
praise — Away  with  that,  it  is  a  talent's  worth :  it  is  not 
profitable  to  me,  nor  to  the  stale  nor  to  my  friends,  to  have 
done  that  which  spoils  a  good  citizen  and  a  friend. — But 
you  will  seem  not  to  have  been  eager  about  the  matter,  if 
you  do  not  succeed.  Have  you  again  forgotten  why  you 
went  ?  Know  you  not  that  a  good  man  does  nothing  for 
the  sake  of  appearance,  but  for  the  sake  of  doing  right? — 
What  advantage  is  it  then  to  him  to  have  done  right? — And 
what  advantage  i^  it  to  a  man  who  writes  the  name  of 
Dion  to  write  it  as  he  ought  ? — The  advantage  is  to  have 
written  it. — Is  there' no  reward  then11? — Do  you  seek  a 
reward  for  a  good  man  greater  than  doing  what  is  good 
and  just  ?  At  Olympia  you  wish  for  nothing  more,  but  it 
seems  to  you  enough  to  be  crowned  at  the  games.  Does  it 
seem  to  you  so  small  and  worthless  a  thing  to  be  good  and 

11  The  reward  of  virtue  is  in  the  acts  of  virtue.  The  Stoics  taught 
that  virtue  is  its  own  reward.  When  I  was  a  boy  I  have  written  this 
in  copies,  but  I  did  not  know  what  it  meant.  I  know  now  that  few 
people  believe  it ;  and  like  the  man  here,  they  inquire  what  reward 
they  shall  have  for  doing  as  they  ought  to  do.  A  man  of  common 
sense  would  give  no  other  answer  than  what  Epictetus  gives.  But 
that  will  not  satisfy  all.  The  heathens  must  give  the  answer:  'For 
what  more  dost  thou  want  when  thou  hast  done  a  man  a  service?  Art 
thou  not  content  that  thou  hast  done  something  conformable  to  thy 
nature,  and  dost  thou  seek  to  be  paid  for  it  ?  just  as  if  the  eye  de- 
manded a  recompense  for  seeing  or  the  feet  for  walking.'  M.  Anto* 
ninus,  ix.  42.  Compare  Seneca,  de  Vita  Beata,  c.  9. 


EPICTETU&  277 

happy?  For  these  purposes  being  introduced  by  the  gods 
into  this  city  (the  world),  and  it  being  now  your  duty  to 
undertake  the  work  of  a  man,  do  you  still  want  nurses  also 
and  a  mamma,  and  do  fool^n  women  by  their  weeping  move 
you  and  make  you  effeminate?  Will  you  thus  never  cease 
to  be  a  foolish  child?  know  you  not  that  he  who  does  the 
acts  of  a  child,  the  older  he  is,  the  more  ridiculous 
he  is? 

In  Athens  did  you  see  no  one  by  going  to  his  house? — 
I  visited  any  man  that  I  pleased — Here  also  be  ready  to 
see,  and  you  will  see  whom  you  please :  only  let  it  be 
without  meanness,  neither  with  desire  nor  with  aversion, 
and  your  affairs  will  be  well  managed.  But  this  result 
does  not  depend  on  going  nor  on  standing  at  the  doors, 
but  it  depends  on  what  is  within,  on  your  opinions. 
When  you  have  learned  not  to  value  things  which  are 
external  and  not  dependent  on  the  will,  and  to  consider 
that  not  one  of  them  is  your  own,  but  that  these  things 
only  are  your  own,  to  exercise  the  judgment  well,  to  form 
opinions,  to  move  towards  an  object,  to  desire,  to  turn 
fiom  a  thing,  where  is  there  any  longer  room  for  flattery, 
where  for  meanness  ?  why  do  you  still  long  for  the  quiet 
there  (at  Athens),  and  for  the  places  to  which  you  are 
accustomed  ?  Wait  a  little  and  you  will  again  find  theso 
places  familiar :  then,  if  you  are  of  so  ignoble  a  nature, 
again  if  you  leave  these  also,  weep  and  lament. 

How  then  shall  I  become  of  an  affectionate  temper  ?  By 
being  of  a  noble  disposition,  and  happy.  For  it  is  not 
reasonable  to  be  mean-spirited  nor  to  lament  yourself,  nor 
to  depend  on  another,  nor  over  to  blame  God  or  man.  I 
entreat  you,  become  an  affectionate  person  in  this  way,  by 
observing  these  rules.  But  if  through  this  affection,  as 
you  name  it,  you  are  going  to  be  a  slave  and  wretched, 
there  is  no  profit  in  being  affectionate.  And  what  prevents 
you  from  loving  another  as  a  person  subject  to  mortality, 
as  one  who  may  go  away  from  you.  Did  not  Socrates  love 
his  own  children  ?  He  did ;  but  it  was  as  a  free  man,  as 
one  who  remembered  that  he  must  first  be  a  friend  to  tho 
gods.  For  this  reason  he  violated  nothing  which  was  be- 
coming to  a  good  man,  neither  in  making  his  defence  nor 


278  EPICTETUS. 

by  fixing  a  penalty  on  himself,12  nor  even  in  the  former  part 
of  bis  lite  when  he  was  a  senator  or  when  he  was  a  soldier. 
But  we  are  fully  supplied  with  every  pretext  for  bei^ig 
of  ignoble  temper,  some  for  the  sake  of  a  child,  some  foJf  a 
mother,  and  others  for  brethren's  sake.  But  it  is  notj1  fit 
for  us  to  be  unhappy  on  account  of  any  person,  but  toj  be 
happy  on  account  of  all,  but  chiefly  on  account  of  God  who 
has  made  us  for  this  end.  Well,  did  Diogenes13  Jove 
nobody,  who  was  so  kind  and  so  much  a  lover  of  all  that 
for  mankind  in  general  he  willingly  undertook  so  much 
labour  and  bodily  sufferings  ?  He  did  love  mankind,  but 
how?  As  became  a  minister  of  God,  at  the  same  time 
caring  for  men,  and  being  also  subject  to  God.  For  this 
reason  all  the  earth  was  his  country,  and  no  particular 
place ;  and  when  he  was  taken  prisoner  he  did  not  regret 
Athens  nor  his  associates  and  friends  there,  but  even  he 
became  familiar  with  the  pirates  and  tried  to  improve 
them ;  and  being  sold  afterwards  he  lived  in  Corinth  as 
before  at  Athens ;  and  he  would  have  behaved  the  same, 
if  he  had  gone  to  the  country  of  the  Perrhaebi.14  Thus  is 
freedom  acquired.  For  this  reason  he  used  to  say,  Ever 
since  Antisthenes  made  me  free,  I  have  not  been  a  slave. 
How  did  Antisthenes  make  him  free  ?  Hear  what  he  says  : 
Antisthenes  taught  me  what  is  my  own,  and  what  is  not 
my  own ;  possessions  are  not  my  own,  nor  kinsmen, 
domestics,  friends,  nor  reputation,  nor  places  familiar,  nor 
mode  of  life ;  all  these  belong  to  others.  What  then  is 
your  own?  The  use  of  appearances.  This  he  showed  to 
me,  that  I  possess  it  free  from  hindrance,  and  from  com- 

12  It  was  the  custom  at  Athens  when  the  court  (the  dicasts)  had  de- 
termined to  convict  an  accused  person,  in  some  cases  at  least,  to  ask 
him  what  penalty  he  proposed  to  be  inflicted  on  himself;  hut  Socrates 
refused  to  do  this  or  to  allow  his  friends  to  do  it,  for  he  said  that  to 
name  the  penalty  was  the  same  as  admitting  his  guilt  (Xenophon, 
Apologia,  23).  Socrates  said  that  if  he  did  name  a  proper  penalty  for 
himself,  it  would  be  that  ha  should  daily  be  allowed  to  dine  in  the 
Prytaneium  (Plato,  Apology,  o.  26 ;  Cicero,  Be  Oratore,  i.  54). 

u  The  character  of  Diogenes  is  described  very  differently  by  Epic- 
tetus  from  that  which  we  read  in  common  books. 

u  A  people  in  Thessaly  between  the  river  Peneius  and  Mount 
Olympus.  It  is  the  same  as  if  Epictetua  had  said  to  any  remote  country. 


EPICTETUS.  279 

pulsion,  no  person  can  put  an  obstacle  in  my  way,  no 
person  can  force  me  to  use  appearances  otherwise  than  I 
wish.  Who  then  has  any  power  over  me?  Philip  or 
Alexander,  or  Perdiccas  or  the  great  king  ?  How  have  they 
this  power  ?  For  if  a  man  is  going  to  be  overpowered  by 
a  man,  he  must  long  before  be  overpowered  by  things.  If 
then  pleasure  is  not  able  to  subdue  a  man,  nor  pain,  nor 
fame,  nor  wealth,  but  he  is  able,  when  he  chooses,  to  spit 
out  all  his  poor  body  in  a  man's  face  and  depart  from  life, 
whose  slave  can  he  still  be  ?  But  if  he  dwelt  with  pleasure 
in  Athens,  and  was  overpowered  by  this  manner  of  life, 
his  affairs  would  have  been  at  every  man's  command ;  the 
stronger  would  have  had  the  power  of  grieving  him.  How 
do  you  think  that  Diogenes  would  have  flattered  the 
pirates  that  they  might  sell  him  to  some  Athenian,  that 
some  time  he  might  see  that  beautiful  Piraeus,  and  the 
Long  Walls  and  the  Acropolis  ?  Tn  what  condition  would 
you  see  them  ?  As  a  captive,  a  slave  and  mean :  and  what 
would  be  the  use  of  it  for  you  ? — Not  so  :  but  I  should  see 
them  as  a  free  man — Show  me,  how  you  would  be  free. 
Observe,  some  person  has  caught  you,  who  leads  you 
away  from  your  accustomed  place  of  abode  and  says,  You 
are  my  slave,  for  it  is  in  my  power  to  hinder  you  from 
living  as  you  please,  it  is  in  my  power  to  treat  you  gently, 
and  to  humble  you :  when  I  choose,  on  the  contrary  you 
are  cheerful  and  go  elated  to  Athens.  What  do  you  say  to 
him  who  treats  you  as  a  slave  ?  What  means  have  you  of 
finding  one  who  will  rescue  you  from  slavery  ? 15  Or  cannot 
you  even  look  him  in  the  face,  but  without  saying  more  do 
you  intreat  to  be  set  free  ?  Man,  you  ought  to  go  gladly  to 
prison,  hastening,  going  before  those  who  lead  you  there. 
Then,  I  ask  you,  are  you  unwilling  to  live  in  Eome  and 
desire  to  live  in  Hellas  (Greece)  ?  And  when  you  must 
die,  will  you  then  also  fill  us  with  your  lamentations, 
because  you  will  not  see  Athens  nor  walk  about  in  the 
Lyceion  ?  Have  you  gone  abroad  for  this  ?  was  it  for  this 
reason  you  have  sought  to  find  some  person  from  whom 
you  might  receive  benefit?  What  benefit?  That  you  may 

15  On  the  word  Kctpiriffr^v  see  the  notes  in  Schweig.'s  edition.    The 
word  is  supposed  to  be  formed  from  Kapiris,  /tape's,  festuca. 


280  EPICTETUS. 

solve  syllogisms  more  readily,  or  handle  hypothetical 
arguments?  and  for  this  reason  did  you  leave  brother, 
country,  friends,  your  family,  that  you  might  return  when 
you  had  learned  these  things  ?  So  you  did  not  go  abroad 
to  obtain  constancy  of  mind,  nor  freedom  from  perturbation,, 
nor  in  order  that  being  secure  from  harm  you  may  never 
complain  of  any  person,  accuse  no  person,  and  no  man  may 
wrong  you,  and  thus  you  may  maintain  your  relative? 
position  without  impediment  ?  This  is  a  fine  traffic  that 
you  have  gone  abroad  for  in  syllogisms  and  sophistical 
arguments16  and  hypothetical:  if  you  like,  take  your 
place  in  the  agora  (market  or  public  place)  and  proclaim) 
them  for  sale  like  dealers  in  physic.17  Will  you  not  deny 
even  all  that  you  have  learned  that  you  may  not  bring  a 
bad  name  on  your  theorems  as  useless?  What  harm  has 
philosophy  done  you?  Wherein  has  Chrysippus  injured 
you  that  you  should  prove  by  your  acts  that  his  labours 
are  useless  ?  Were  the  evils  that  you  had  there  (at  home) 
not  enough,  those  which  were  the  cause  of  your  pain  and 
lamentation,  even  if  you  had  not  gone  abroad  ?  Have  you 
added  more  to  the  list?  And  if  you  again  have  other 
acquaintances  and  friends,  you  will  have  more  causes  for 
lamentation ;  and  the  same  also  if  you  take  an  affection 
for  another  country.  Why  then  do  you  live  to  surround 
yourself  with  other  sorrows  upon  sorrows  through  which 
you  are  unhappy?  Then,  1  ask  you,  do  you  call  this 
affection  ?  What  affection,  man  !  If  it  is  a  good  thing,  it 
is  the  cause  of  no  evil :  if  it  is  bad,  I  have  nothing  to  do» 
with  it.  I  am  formed  by  nature  for  my  own  good :  I  am 
not  formed  for  my  own  evil. 

What  then  is  the  discipline  for  this  purpose  ?  First  of 
all  the  highest  and  the  principal,  and  that  which  stands  as 
it  were  at  the  entrance,  is  this ;  when  you  are  delighted 
with  anything,  be  delighted  as  with  a  thing  which  is  not 

10  MeTaTrfTTToz/Tas.    See  i.  7. 

17  This  is  an  old  praofcice,  to  go  about  and  sell  physic  to  people* 
Cicero  (Pro  Cluentio,  c.  14)  speaks  of  sucli  a  quack  (pharmacopola)r 
who  would  do  a  poisoning  job  for  a  proper  sura  of  money.  I  have  seeih 
a  travelling  doctor  in  Franco  who  went  about  in  a  cart,  and  rang  a 
bell,  at  the  sound  of  which  people  came  round  him.  Some  who  wero 
deaf  had  stuff  poured  into  their  ears,  paid  their  money,  and  made  way 
for  others  who  had  other  complaints. 


EPICTETUS.  281 

one  of  those  which  cannot  be  taken  away,  but  as  with 
something  of  such  a  kind,  as  an  earthen  pot  is,  or  a  glass 
cup,  that  when  it  has  been  broken,  you  may  remember 
what  it  was,  and  may  not  be  troubled.  So  in  this  matter 
also :  if  you  kiss  your  own  child,  or  your  brother  or  friend, 
never  give  full  license  to  the  appearance  (^avracrtav),  and 
allow  not  your  pleasure  to  go  as  far  as  it  chooses ;  but 
check  it,  and  curb  it  as  those  who  stand  behind  men  in 
their  triumphs  and  remind  them  that  they  are  mortal.18 
Do  you  also  remind  yourself  in  like  manner,  that  he  whom 
you  love  is  mortal,  and  that  what  you  love  is  nothing  of 
your  own :  it  has  been  given  to  you  for  the  present,  not 
that  it  should  not  be  taken  from  you,  nor  has  it  been  given 
to  you  for  all  time,  but  as  a  fig  is  given  to  you  or  a  bunch 
of  grapes  at  the  appointed  season  of  the  year.  But  if  you 
wish  for  these  things  in  winter,  you  are  a  fool.  So  if  you 
wish  for  your  son  or  friend  when  it  is  not  allowed  to 
you,  you  must  know  that  you  are  wishing  for  a  fig  in, 
winter.19  For  such  as  winter  is  to  a  fig,  such  is  every 
event  which  happens  from  the  universe  to  the  things 
which  are  taken  away  according  to  its  nature.  And 
further,  at  the  times  when  you  aro  delighted  with  a  thing, 
place  before  yourself  the  contrary  appearances.  What 
harm  is  it  while  you  are  kissing  your  child  to  say  wilh  a 
lisping  voice,  To-morrow  you  will  die;  and  to  a  friend 
also,  To-morrow  you  will  go  away  or  I  shall,  and  never 
shall  we  see  one  another  again? — But  these  are  words  of 
bad  omen — And  some  incantations  also  aro  of  bad  omen ; 
but  because  they  are  useful,  I  don't  caro  for  this ;  only  let 
them  be  useful.  But  do  you  call  things  to  be  of  bad  omen 
except  those  which  are  significant  of  some  evil  ?  Cowardice- 
is  a  word  of  bad  omen,  and  meanness  of  spirit,  and  sorrow, 
and  grief  and  shamelessness.  These  words  are  of  bad 
omen  :  and  yet  we  ought  not  to  hesitate  to  utter  them  in 
order  to  protect  ourselves  against  the  things.  Do  you  tell 
me  that  a  name  which  is  significant  of  any  natural  thing 
is  of  evil  omen  ?  say  that  even  for  the  ears  of  corn  to  bo 

13  It  was  the  custom  in  Roman  triumphs  for  a  slave  to  stand  behincl 
the  triumphant  general  in  his  chariot  and  to  remind  him  that  he  wa» 
fetill  mortal.  Juvenal,  x.  41. 

19  Compare  Antoninus  xi.  33  and  34. 


282  EPICTETVS. 

reaped  is  of  bad  omen,  for  it  signifies  the  destruction  of 
the  ears,  but  not  of  the  world.  Say  that  the  falling  of 
the  leaves  also  is  of  bad  omen,  and  for  the  dried  fig  to 
take  the  place  of  the  green  fig,  and  for  raisins  to  be  made 
from  the  grapes.  For  all  these  things  are  changes  from  a 
former  state  into  other  states ;  not  a  destruction,  but  a 
certain  fixed  economy  and  administration.  Such  is  going 
away  from  home  and  a  small  change :  such  is  death,  a 
greater  change,  not  from  the  state  which  now  is  to  that 
which  is  not,  but  to  that  which  is  not  now.20 — Shall  I  then 
no  longer  exist? — You  will  not  exist,  but  you  will  be 
something  else,  of  which  the  world  now  has  need : 21  for 
you  also  came  into  existence  not  when  you  chose,  but 
when  the  world  had  need  of  you.  22 

20  Marcus  Antoninus,  xi.  35.    Compare  Epict.,  iii.  13, 14,  and  iv. 
7.75. 

21  Upton  altered  the  text  ou/ceVi  ovv  foopai  ;   OVK  £07?  •  dAA'  #AAo  TJ, 
ov  vvv  6  /c&Tjitos  xpefa*'  %X€ti  i^Q  OVK.STI  ovv  ecro/Acti ;  *E(rr} '  dAA.'  &\\o  n9  ov 
vvv  6  K6a-fji.os  xptioiv  OVK  %x€t*    He  says  that  he  made  the  alteration 
without  MS.  authority,  but  that   the  sense   requires  the  change. 
Schweighaeuser  does  not  accept  the  alteration,  nor  do  I.    Schweig. 
remarks  that  there  may  be  some  difficulty  in  the  words  ov  vvv  6  Ktfojuof 
Xptiav  €%€i.    H©  first  supposes  that  the  word  '  now '  (wv)  means  after 
a  man's  death;  but  next  he  suggests  that  #AAo  n  o5  means  *  some- 
thing different  from  that  of  which  the  world  has  now  need/    A  reader 
might  not  discover  that  there  is  any  difficulty.  He  might  also  suggest 
that  vvv  ought  to  be  omitted,  tor  if  it  were  omitted,  the  sense  would  be 
still  plainer.    See  iii.  13.  15,  and  iv.  7.  15. 

22  I  am  not  sure  if  Epictetus  ever  uses  icAo-pos  in  the  sense  of  *  Uni- 
verse/ the  *  universum '  of  philosophers.   I  think  he  sometimes  uses  it  in 
the  common  sense  of  the  world,  the  earth  and  all  that  is  on  it.  Epictetus 
appears  to  teach  that  when  a  man  dies,  his  existence  is  terminated. 
The  body  is  resolved  into  the  elements  of  which  it  is  formed,  and  these 
elements  are  employed  for  other  purposes.     Consistently  with  this 
doctrine  he  may  have  supposed  that  the  powers,  which  we  call  rational 
and  intellectual,  exist  in  man  by  virtue  only  of  the  organisation  of  his 
brain  which  is  superior  to  that  of  all  other  animals ;  and  that  what 
we  name  the  soul  has  no  existence  independent  of  the  body.    It  waa 
an  old  Greek  hypothesis  that  at  death  the  body  returned  to  earth  from 
which  it  came,  and  the  soul  (irvev^a)  returned  to  the  regions  above, 
from  which  it  came.    I  cannot  discover  any  passage  in  Epictetus  in 
which  the  doctrine  is  taught  that  the  soul  has  an  existence  indepen- 
dent of  the  body.    The  opinions  of  Marcus  Antoninus  on  this  matter  are 
contained  in  his  book,  iv.  14,  21,  and  perhaps  elsewhere :  but  they  are 
rather  obscure.    A  recent  writer  has  attempted  to  settle  the  question 
of  the  existence  of  departed  souls  by  affirming  that  we  can  find 


EPICTETUS.  283 

Wherefore  the  wise  and  good  man,  remembering  who  he 
is  and  whence  he  carne,  and  by  whom  he  was  produced,  is 

no  place  for  them  either  in  heaven  or  in  hell ;  for  the  modem  scientific 
notion,  as  I  suppose  that  it  must  be  named,  does  not  admit  the  con- 
ception of  a  place  heaven  or  a  place  hell  (Strauss,  Der  Alte  und  der 
Neue  Glanbe,  p.  129). 

We  may  name  Paul  a  contemporary  of  Epictetus,  for  though  Epictetus 
may  have  been  the  younger,  he  was  living  at  Rome  during  Nero's  reign 
(A.D.  51-68) ;  and  it  is  affirmed,  whether  correctly  or  not,  I  do  not 
undertake  to  say,  that  Paul  wrote  from  Ephesus  his  first  epistle  to  the 
Corinthians  (Cor.  i.  16,  8)  in  the  beginning  of  A.D.  56.  Epictetus,  it  is 
said,  lived  in  Rome  till  the  time  of  the  expulsion  of  the  philosophers 
by  Domitian,  when  he  retired  to  Nicopolis  an  old  man,  and  taught 
there.  Paul's  first  epistle  to  the  Corinthians  (c.  15)  contains  his 
doctrine  of  the  resurrection,  which  is  accepted,  I  believe,  by  all,  or 
nearly  all,  if  there  are  any  exceptions,  who  profess  the  Christian  faith : 
but  it  is  not  understood  by  all  in  the  same  way. 

Paul  teaches  that  Christ  died  for  our  sins,  that  he  was  buried  and 
rose  again  on  the  third  day ;  and  that  after  his  resurrection  he  was 
eeen  by  many  persons.  Then  he  asks,  if  Christ  rose  f rom  the  dead,  how 
can  some  say  that  there  is  no  resurrection  of  the  dead  ?  l  But  if  there 
be  no  resurrection  of  the  dead,  then  is  Christ  not  risen '  (v.  13) ;  and 
(v.  19),  *  if  in  this  life  only  we  have  hope  in  Christ,  we  are  of  all  men 
most  miserable/  But  he  affirms  again  (v.  20)  that  *  Christ  is  risen  and 
become  the  first  fruits  of  them  that  slept.'  In  v.  32,  he  asks  what 
advantages  he  has  from  his  struggles  in  Ephesus,  *  if  the  dead  rise 
not :  let  us  eat  and  drink,  for  to-morrow  we  die.'  He  seems  not  to 
admit  the  value  of  life,  if  there  is  no  resurrection  of  the  dead ;  and  he 
seems  to  say  that  we  shall  seek  or  ought  to  seek  only  the  pleasures  of 
sense,  because  life  is  short,  if  we  do  not  believe  in  a  resurrection  of 
the  dead.  It  may  be  added  that  there  is  not  any  direct  assertion  in 
this  chapter  that  Christ  ascended  to  heaven  in  a  bodily  form,  or  that 
lie  ascended  to  heaven  in  any  way.  He  then  says  (y.  35),  *  But  some 
man  will  say,  How  are  the  dead  raised  up  ?  and  with  what  body  do 
they  come  ?'  He  answers  this  question  (v.  36),  *  Thou  fool,  that  which 
thou  sowest  is  not  quickened  except  it  die ':  and  he  adds  that t  God 
giveth  it  (the  seed)  a  body  as  it  hath  pleased  him,  and  to  every  seed 
his  own  body/  We  all  know  that  the  body,  which  is  produced  from 
the  seed,  is  not  the  body  *  that  shall  be  /  and  we  also  know  that  the 
seed  which  is  sown  does  not  die,  and  that  if  the  seed  died,  no  body 
would  be  produced  from  such  seed.  His  conclusion  is  that  the  dead 
•is  sown  a  natural  body;  it  is  raised  a  spiritual  body*  (crwjua  Trveu- 
acm/crfj'),  I  believe  that  the  commentators  do  not  agree  about  this 
*  spiritual  body ' :  but  it  seems  plain  that  Paul  did  not  teach  that  the 
body  which  will  rise  will  be  the  same  as  the  body  which  is  buried.  He 
«ays  (v.  50)  that '  iiesh  and  blood  cannot  inherit  the  kingdom  of  God/ 
Yet  in  the  Apostles'  Creed  we  pronounce  our  belief  in  the  4  resurrec- 
tion of  the  body ' :  but  in  the  Nicene  Creed  it  is  said  we  look  *  for 
the  resurrection  of  the  dead/  which  is  a  different  thing  or  may  have  a 


284  EHCTETUS, 

attentive  only  to  this,  how  he  may  fill  his  place  with  due 
regularity,  and  obediently  to  God.  Dost  thou  still  wish 
me  to  exist  (live)?  I  will  continue  to  exist  ae  free,  as 
noble  in  nature,  as  thou  hast  wished  me  to  exist :  for 
thou  hast  made  me  free  from  hindrance  in  that  which  is 
my  own.  But  hast  thou  no  further  need  of  me?  I  thank 
thee ;  and  so  far  I  have  remained  fur  thy  sake,  and  for  the 
sake  of  no  other  person,  and  now  in  obedience  to  thee  I 
depart.  How  dost  thou  depart?  Again,  I  say,  as  thou 
hast  pleased,  as  free,  as  thy  servant,  as  one  who  has  known 
thy  commands  and  thy  prohibitions.  And  so  long  as  I 
shall  stay  in  thy  service,  whom  dost  thou  will  me  to  be? 
A  prince  or  a  private  man,  a  senator  or  a  common  person, 
a  soldier  or  a  general,  a  teacher  or  a  master  of  a  family  ? 
whatever  place  and  position  thou  mayest  assign  to  me,  as- 
Socrates  says,  I  will  die  ten  thousand  times  rather  than 
desert  them.  And  where  dost  thou  will  me  to  be?  in 
Borne  or  Athens,  or  Thebes  or  Gyara.  Only  remember  me 
there  where  I  am.  If  thou  sendest  me  to  a  place  where 
there  are  no  means  for  men  living  according  to  nature,  I 
shall  not  depart  (from  life)  in  disobedience  to  thee,  but  as 
if  thou  wast  giving  mo  the  signal  to  retreat :  I  do  not 
leave  thee,  let  this  be  far  from  my  intention,  but  I  per- 
ceive that  thou  hast  no  need  of  me.  If  means  of  living 
according  to  nature  be  allowed  to  me,  I  will  seek  no  other 
place  than  that  in  which  I  am,  or  other  men  than,  those 
among  whom  I  am. 

Let  these  thoughts  be  ready  to  hand  by  night  and  by 
day :  these  you  should  write,  these  you  should  read :  about 
these  you  should  talk  to  yourself,  and  to  others.  Ask  a 
man,  Can  you  help  me  at  all  for  this  purpose  ?  and  further, 
go  to  another  and  to  another.  Then  if  any  thing  that  is 

different  meaning  from  '  the  resurrection  of  the  body.1  In  the  minis- 
tration of  baptism  to  such  as  are  of  riper  years,  the  person  to  bo- 
baptized  is  asked i  Dost  thou  believe  in  God  the  Father  Almighty,'  etc.  iu 
the  terms  of  the  Church  Creeds,  but  in  place  of  the  resurrection  of  the 
body  or  ot  the  dead,  ho  is  asked  if  he  believes  *  in  the  resurrection  of 
the  flesh.' 

The  various  opinions  of  divines  of  the  English  church  on  the 
resurrection  of  the  body  are  stated  by  A.  Clissold  in  the  4  Practical 
Nature  ot  the  Theological  Writings  of  E.  Swedenborg  iu  a  letter  to 
Whately,  Archbishop  of  Dublin,  1859,  2nd  ed.' 


EPICTETUS.  285 

said  be  contrary  to  your  wish,  this  reflection  first  will  im- 
mediately relieve  you,  that  it  is  not  unexpected.  For  it  is 
a  great  thing  in  all  cases  to  say,  I  knew  that  I  begot  a 
son  who  is  mortal.23  For  so  you  also  will  say,  I  knew  that 
I  am  mortal,  I  knew  that  I  may  leave  rny  home,  I  knew 
that  I  may  be  ejected  from  it,  I  knew  that  I  may  be  led  to 
prison.  Then  if  you  turn  round  and  look  to  yourself,  and 
seek  the  place  from  which  comes  that  which  has  happened, 
you  will  forthwith  recollect  that  it  comes  from  the  placo 
of  things  which  are  out  of  the  power  of  the  will,  and  of 
things  which  are  not  my  own.  What  then  is  it  to  me? 
Then,  you  will  ask,  and  this  is  the  chief  thing  :  And  who 
is  it  that  sent  it  ?  The  leader,  or  the  general,  the  state, 
the  law  of  the  state.  Give  it  me  then,  for  I  must  always 
obey  the  law  in  every  thing.  Then,  when  the  appearance 
{of  things)  pains  you,  for  it  is  not  in  your  power  to 
prevent  this,  contend  against  it  by  the  aid  of  reason, 
conquer  it :  do  not  allow  it  to  gain  strength  nor  to  lead 
you  to  the  consequences  by  raising  images  such  as  it 
pleases  and  as  it  pleases.  If  you  bo  in  Gyara,  do  not 
imagine  the  mode  of  living  at  Eome,  and  how  many  plea- 
sures there  were  for  him  who  lived  there  and  how  many 
there  would  be  for  him  who  returned  to  Eome :  but  fix 
your  mind  on  this  matter,  how  a  man  who  lives  in  Gyara 
ought  to  live  in  Gyara  like  a  man  of  courage.  And  if  you 
be  in  Eome,  do  not  imagine  what  the  life  in  Athens  is,  but 
think  only  of  the  life  in  Home. 

Then  in  the  place  of  all  other  delights  substitute  this, 
that  of  being  conscious  that  you  are  obeying  God,  that  not 
in  word,  but  in  deed  you  are  performing  the  acts  of  a  wise 
and  good  man.  For  what  a  thing  it  is  for  a  man  to  bo 
able  to  say  to  himself,  Now  whatever  the  rest  may  say  in 
solemn  manner  in  the  schools  and  may  be  judged  to  be 
saying  in  a  way  contrary  to  common  opinion  (or  in  a 
strange  way),  this  I  am  doing ;  and  they  are  sitting  and 
are  discoursing  of  my  virtues  and  inquiring  about  me  and 
praising  me  ;  and  of  this  Zeus  has  willed  that  I  shall  receive 
from  myself  a  demonstration,  and  shall  myself  know  if  he 
ims  a  soldier  such  as  he  ought  to  have,  a  citizen  such  as 

f »  Seneca  de  ConeoL  ad  Pol.  o.  SO ;  Cicero,  Tuscul.  Disp.  iii.  13. 


286  EPICTETUS. 

he  ought  to  have,  and  if  he  has  chosen  to  produce  me 
the  rest  of  mankind  as  a  witness  of  the  things  which  i 
independent  of  the  will :  See  that  you  fear  without  reasc 
that  you  foolishly  desire  what  you  do  desire  :  seek  not  t 
good  in  things  external ;  seek  it  in  yourselves :  if  you  do  n 
you  will  not  find  it.    For  this  purpose  he  leads  me  at  c 
time  hither,  at  another  time  sends  me  thither,  shows : 
to  men  as  poor,  without  authority,  and  sick ;  sends  me 
Gyara,  leads  me  into  prison,  not  because  he  hates  me,  . 
from  him  be  such  a  meaning,  for  who  hates  the  best  of 
servants  ?  nor  yet  because  he  cares  not  for  me,  for  he  d 
not  neglect  any  even  of  the  smallest  things;24   but 
does  this  for  the  purpose  of  exercising  me  and  making       . 
of  me  as  a  witness  to  others.     Being  appointed  to  sue]    a 
service,  do  I  still  care  about  the  place  in  which  I  am,  or 
with  whom  I  am,  or  what  men  say  about  me?  and  do  1 
not  entirely  direct  my  thoughts  to  God  and  to  his  instruc- 
tions and  commands? 

Having  these  things  (or  thoughts)  always  in  hand,  and 
exercising  them  by  yourself,  and  keeping  them  in  readiness, 
you  will  never  be  in  want  of  one  to  comfort  you  and 
strengthen  you.  For  it  is  not  shameful  to  be  without 
something  to  eat,  but  not  to  have  reason  sufficient  for 
keeping  away  fear  and  sorrow.  But  if  once  you  have 
gained  exemption  from  sorrow  and  fear,  will  there  any 
longer  be  a  tyrant  for  you,  or  a  tyrant's  guard,  or  atten- 
dants on  Caesar  ?25  Or  shall  any  appointment  to  offices  at 
court  cause  you  pain,  or  shall  those  who  sacrifice  in  the 
Capitol  on  the  occasion  of  being  named  to  certain  functions, 
cause  pain  to  you  who  have  received  so  great  authority 
from  Zeus?26  Only  do  not  make  a  proud  display  of  it, 
nor  boast  of  it;  but  shew  it  by  your  acts  ;  and  if  no  man 
perceives  it,  be  satisfied  that  you  are  yourself  in  a  healthy 
btate  and  happy. 

24  Compare  i.  12.  2,  ii.  14.  11,  iii.  26.  28.    'Compare  this  with  the 
description  of  the  universal  car*)  of  Providence,  Matthew,  x.  29, 30,  and 
the  occasion  on  which  it  was  produced/    Mrs.  Carter. 

25  See  i.  19.  19. 

26  On  the  strange  words  optiivariuv  and  oTrrt/a'ois,  which  occur  in  tliia 
sentence,  see  tha  notes  in  Schweighaeuser's  edition. 


EPICTETUS.  287 

CHAPTER  XXV. 

TO  THOSE   WHO   FALL   OFF   (DESIST)   FROM  THEIR   PURPOSE, 

CONSIDER  as  to  the  things  which  you  proposed  to  yourself  at 
first,  which  you  have  secured,  and  which  you  have  not ;  and 
how  you  are  pleased  when  you  recall  to  memory  the  one, 
and  are  pained  about  the  other;  and  if  it  is  possible,  recover 
the  things  wherein  you  failed.  For  we  must  not  shrink 
when  we  are  engaged  in  the  greatest  combat,  but  we  must 
even  take  blows.1  For  the  combat  before  us  is  not  in  wrest- 
ling and  the  Fancration,  in  which  both  tho  successful  and 
the  unsuccessful  may  have  the  greatest  merit,  or  may  have 
little,  and  in  truth  may  be  very  fortunate  or  very  unfor- 
tunate ;  but  the  combat  is  for  good  fortune  and  happiness 
themselves.  Well  then,  oven  if  we  have  renounced  the 
contest  in  this  matter  (for  good  fortune  and  happiness),  110 
man  hinders  us  from  renewing  the  combat  again,  and  we 
are  not  compelled  to  wait  for  another  four  years  that  the 
games  at  Olympia  may  come  again  2 ;  but  as  soon  as  you 
have  recovered  and  restored  yourself,  and  employ  the 
same  zeal,  you  may  renew  the  combat  again;  and  if  again 
you  renounce  it,  you  may  again  renew  it ;  and  if  you  once 
gain  the  victory,  you  are  like  him  who  has  never  renounced 
the  combat.  Only  do  not  through  a  habit  of  doing  the 
same  thing  (renouncing  the  combat)  begin  to  do  it  with 
pleasure,  and  then  like  a  bad  athlete  go  about  after  being 
conquered  in  all  the  circuit  of  the  games  like  quails  whu 
have  run  away.3 

The  sight  of  a  beautiful  young  girl  overpowers  me.   Well, 

1  Compare  iii.  15,  4. 

9  These  games  were  celebrated  once  in  four  years. 

3  *  All  the  circuit  of  the  games '  means  the  circuit  of  the  Pythian, 
Isthmian,  Nemean,  and  Olympic  games.  A  man  who  had  contended 
in  these  four  games  victoriously  was  named  Periodonices,  or  Perio- 
deutes.  Upton.  ^  . 

The  Greeks  used  to  put  quails  in  a  cockpit,  as  those  who  are  old 
enough  may  remember  that  we  used  to  put  game  cocks  to  fight  with 
one  another.  Schweighaeuser  describes  a  way  of  trying  the  courage 
of  these  quails  from  Pollux  (ix.  109);  but  I  suppose  that  the  birds 
fought  also  with  one  another. 


288 

have  I  not  been  overpowered  before  ?  An  inclination  arises 
in  me  to  find  fault  with  a  person  ;  for  have  I  not  found  fault 
with  him  before  ?  You  speak  to  us  as  if  you  had  come  oft* 
(from  these  things)  free  from  harm,  just  as  if  a  man  should 
eay  to  his  physician  who  forbids  him  to  bathe,  Have  I  not 
bathed  before?  If  then  the  physician  can  say  to  him,  Well, 
and  what  then  happened  to  you  after  the  bath  ?  Had  you 
not  a  fever,  had  you  not  a  headache  ?  And  when  you  found 
fault  with  a  person  lately,  did  you  not  do  the  act  of  a 
malignant  person,  of  a  trifling  babbler  ;  did  you  not  cherish 
this  habit  in  you  by  adding  to  it  the  corresponding  acts? 
And  when  you  were  overpowered  by  the  young  girl,  did 
you  come  off  unharmed  ?  Why  then  do  you  talk  of  what  you 
did  before?  You  ought,  I  think,  remembering  what  you 
did,  as  slaves  remember  the  blows  which  they  have  received, 
to  abstain  from  the  same  faults.  But  the  one  case  is  not 
like  the  other  ;  for  in  the  case  of  slaves  the  pain  causes  the 
remembrance  :  but  in  the  case  of  your  faults,  what  is  the 
pain,  what  is  the  punishment  ;  for  when  have  you  been 
accustomed  to  fly  from  evil  acts?  4  Sufferings  then  of  the 
trying  character  are  useful  to  us,  whether  we  choose 
or  not. 


4  Upton  supposed  that  the  words  'AAA*  ovx  ti^oiov  ....  to 
^ep7f)<rcu,  in  the  translation,  *  But  the  one  case  is  not,  ,  .  .  to  '  fly 
from  evil  acts,'  are  said  by  the  adversary  of  Epictetus,  and  Mrs.  Carter 
lias  followed  Upton  in  the  translation.  But  then  there  is  no  sense  in 
the  last  sentence  Of  v6voi.  &pa  etc.,  in  the  translation,  *  Sufferings 
then  '  etc.  The  reader  may  consult  Schweigbaeuser's  note.  I  suppose 
that  Epictetus  is  speaking  the  words  '  But  the  one  case  *  etc.  to  the 
end  of  the  chapter.  The  adversary,  who  is  not  punished  like  a  slave, 
and  has  no  pains  to  remind  him  of  his  faults,  is  supposed  so  far  not 
to  have  felt  the  consequences  of  his  bad  acts  ;  but  Epictetus  concludes 
that  sufferings  of  a  painful  character  would  be  useful  to  him,  as  they 
are  to  all  persons  who  do  what  they  ought  not  to  do.  There  is  perhaps 
some  difficulty  in  the  word  ireiparripiM.  But  I  think  that  Schweig. 
has  correctly  explained  the  passage. 


EP1CTETUS.  289 

CHAPTER  XXVL 

TO  THOSE  WHO  FEAE  WANT.1 

ARE  you  not  ashamed  at  being  more  cowardly  and  more 
mean  than  fugitive  slaves  ?  How  do  they  when  they  run 
away  leave  their  masters  ?  on  what  estates  do  they  depend, 
and  what  domestics  do  they  rely  on  ?  Do  they  not  after 
stealing  a  little  which  is  enough  for  the  first  days,  then 
afterwards  move  on  through  land  or  through  sea,  contriving 
one  method  after  another  for  maintaining  their  lives  ?  And 
what  fugitive  slave  ever  died  of  hunger?2  But  you  are 
afraid  lest  necessary  things  should  fail  you,  and  are  sleep- 
less by  night.  Wretch,  are  you  so  blind,  and  don't  you  seo 
the  road  to  which  the  want  of  necessaries  leads? — Well, 
where  does  it  lead  ? — To  the  same  place  to  which  a  fever 
leads,  or  a  stone  that  falls  on  you,  to  death.  Have  you  not 
often  said  this  yourself  to  your  companions  ?  have  you  not 
read  much  of  this  kind,  and  written  much?  and  how  often 
have  you  boasted  that  you  were  easy  as  to  death  ? 

Yes :  but  my  wife  and  children  also  suffer  hunger.3 — Well 
then,  does  their  hunger  lead  to  any  other  place?  Is  there 
not  the  same  descent  to  some  place  for  them  also  ?  Is  not 

1  *  Compare  this  chapter  with  the  beautiful  and  affecting  discourses 
of  our  Saviour  on  the  same  subject,  Matthew  vi.  25-34 ;  Luke  xii. 
22-30.'  Mrs.  Carter.    The  first  verse  of  Matthew  begins,  4  Take  no 
thought  for  your  life,  what  ye  shall  eat  or  what  ye  shall  drink '  etc. 
No  Christian  literally  follows  the  advice  of  this  and  the  following 
verses,  and  he  would  be  condemned  by  the  judgment  of  all  men  if 
he  did. 

2  It  is  very  absurd  to  suppose  that  no  fugitive  slave  ever  died  of 
hunger.    How  could  Epictetus  know  that  ? 

3  He  supposes  that  the  man  who  is  dying  of  hunger  has  also  wife 
and  children,  who  will  suffer  the  same  dreadful  end.    The  consolation, 
if  it  is  any,  is  that  the  rich  and  luxurious  and  kings  will  also  die. 
The  fact  is  true.    Death  is  the  lot  of  all.    But  a  painful  death  by 
hunger  cannot  be  alleviated  by  a  man  knowing  that  all  must  die  in 
some  way.    It  seems  as  if  the  philosopher  expected  that  even  women 
and  children  should  be  philosophers,  and  that  the  husband  in  his 
philosophy  should  calmly  contemplate  the  death  of  wife  and  children 
by  starvation.    This  is  an  example  of  the  absurdity  to  which  even  a 
wise  man  carried  his  philosophy  ;  and  it  is  unworthy  of  the  tea0her'9 
general  good  sense. 

or 


290  EPICTETUS. 

there  the  same  state  below  for  them  ?  Do  you  not  chooso 
then  to  look  to  that  place  full  of  boldness  against  every 
want  and  deficiency,  to  that  place  to  which  both  the  richest 
and  those  who  have  held  the  highest  offices,  and  kings  them- 
selves and  tyrants  must  descend?  or  to  which  you  will 
descend  hungry,  if  it  should  so  happen,  but  they  burst  by 
indigestion  and  drunkenness.  What  beggar  did  you  hardly 
ever  see  who  was  not  an  old  man,  and  even  of  extreme  old 
age  ?  But  chilled  with  cold  day  and  night,  and  lying  on 
the  ground,  and  eating  only  what  is  absolutely  necessary 
they  approach  near  to  the  impossibility  of  dying.4  Cannot 
you  write?  Cannot  you  teach  (take  care  of)  children? 
Cannot  you  be  a  watchman  at  another  person's  door  ? — But 
it  is  shameful  to  come  to  such  a  necessity. — Learn  then 
first  what  are  the  things  which  are  shameful,  and  then  tell 
us  that  you  are  a  philosopher  :  but  at  present  do  not,  even 
if  any  other  man  call  you  so,  allow  it. 

Is  that  shameful  to  you  which  is  not  your  own  act,  that 
of  which  you  are  not  the  cause,  that  which  has  come  to  you 
by  accident,  as  a  headache,  as  a  fever?  If  your  parents 
were  poor,  and  left  their  property  to  others,  and  if  while 
they  live,  they  do  not  help  you  at  all,  is  this  shameful  to 
you  ?  Is  this  what  you  learned  with  the  philosophers  ?  Did 
you  never  hear  that  the  thing  which  is  shameful  ought  to 
be  blamed,  and  that  which  is  blameable  is  worthy  of  blame  ? 
Whom  do  you  blame  for  an  act  which  is  not  his  own,  whicfc 
he  did  not  do  himself?  Did  you  then  ma  key  our  father  such 
as  he  is,  or  is  it  in  your  power  to  improve  him  ?  Is  this 
power  given  to  you  ?  Well  then,  ought  you  to  wish  the 
things  which  are  not  given  to  you,  or  to  be  ashamed  if  you 
do  not  obtain  them  ?  And  have  you  also  been  accustomed 
while  you  were  studying  philosophy  to  look  to  others  and 
to  hope  for  nothing  from  yourself  ?  Lament  then  and  groan 
and  eat  with  fear  that  you  may  not  have  food  to-morrow. 

4  We  see  many  old  beggars  who  endure  what  others  could  not 
endure ;  but  they  all  die  at  lust,  and  would  have  died  earlier  if  their 
beggar  life  had  begun  sooner.  The  living  in  the  open  air  and  wander- 
ing about  help  them  to  last  longer ;  but  the  exposure  to  cold  and  wet 
and  to  the  want  of  food  hastens  their  end.  The  life  of  a  poor  old 
beggar  is  neither  bo  long  nor  so  comfortable  as  that  of  a  man,  who  hag 
a  good  home  and  sufficient  food,  and  livis  with  moderation. 


EPICTETUS.  '  291 

Tremble  about  your  poor  slaves  lest  they  steal,  lest  they 
run  away,  lest  they  die.  So  live,  and  continue  to  live,  you 
who  in  name  only  have  approached  philosophy,  and  have 
disgraced  its  theorems  as  far  as  you  can  by  showing  them 
to  be  useless  and  unprofitable  to  those  who  take  them  up ; 
you  who  have  never  sought  constancy,  freedom  from  pertur- 
bation, and  from  passions :  you  who  have  not  sought  any 
person  for  the  sake  of  this  object,  but  many  for  the  sake  of 
syllogisms ;  you  who  have  never  thoroughly  examined  any 
of  these  appearances  by  yourself,  Am  I  able  to  bear,  or  am 
I  not  able  to  bear  ?  What  remains  for  me  to  do  ?  But  as  if 
all  your  affairs  were  well  and  secure,  you  have  been  resting 
on  the  third  topic,5  that  of  things  being  unchanged,  in  order 
that  you  may  possess  unchanged — what  ?  cowardice,  mean 
spirit,  the  admiration  of  the  rich,  desire  without  attaining 
any  end,  and  avoidance  (cKKXtcru>)  which  fails  in  the 
attempt?  About  security  in  these  things  you  have  been 
anxious. 

Ought  you  not  to  have  gained  something  in  addition  from 
reason,  and  then  to  have  protected  this  with  security  ?  And 
whom  did  you  ever  see  building  a  battlement  all  round  arid 
not  encircling  it  with  a  wall  ? 6  And  what  door-keeper  is 
placed  with  no  door  to  watch  ?  But  you  practise  in  order 
to  be  able  to  prove — what  ?  You  practise  that  you  may 
not  be  tossed  as  on  the  sea  through  sophisms,7  arid  tossed 
about  from  what  ?  Shew  me  first  what  you  hold,  what  you 
measure,  or  what  you  weigh ;  and  shew  me  the  scales  or 
the  medimnus  (the  measure)  ;  or  how  long  will  you  go  on 
measuring  the  dust8?  Ought  you  not  to  demonstrate 
those  things  which  make  men  happy,  which  make  things 
go  on  for  them  in  the  way  as  they  wish,  and  why  we  ought 
to  blame  no  man,  accuse  no  man,  and  acquiesce  in  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  universe?  Shew  me  these.  'See,  I 

*  See  iii.  c.  2. 

6  *  Plato  using  the  same  simile  Reaches  that  last  of  all  disciplines 
dialectic  ought  to  be  learned.'  Schweighaeuser. 

1  &iroffa\eve(rOau.  Paul,  Ep.  to  the  Thessalonians  (ii.  2.  2)  has  els 
rb  ju$j  TOX^WS  ffuXevOyvai  vjuas  airb  rov  vo6s.  Upton. 

8  This  is  good  advice.  When  you  propose  to  measure,  to  estimnte 
things,  you  should  first  tell  us  what  the  things  are  before  you  attempt 
to  fix  their  value  ;  and  what  is  the  measure  or  scales  that  you  use. 

u  2 


292  EPICTETUS. 

shew  them :  I  will  resolve  syllogisms  for  you.' — This  is  tne 
measure,  slave ;  but  it  is  not  the  thing  measured.  There* 
fore  you  are  now  paying  the  penalty  for  what  you  neglected, 
philosophy :  you  tremble,  you  lie  awake,  you  advise  with 
all  persons ;  and  if  your  deliberations  are  not  likely  to 
please  all,  you  think  that  you  have  deliberated  ill.  Then 
you  fear  hunger,  as  you  suppose :  but  it  is  not  hunger 
that  you  fear,  but  you  are  afraid  that  you  will  not  have  a 
cook,  that  you  will  not  have  another  to  purchase  provisions 
for  the  table,  a  third  to  take  off  your  shoes,  a  fourth  to  dress 
you,  others  to  rub  you,  and  to  follow  you,  in  order  that  in 
the  bath,  when  you  have  taken  off  your  clothes  and 
stretched  yourself  out  like  those  who  are  crucified  you  may 
be  rubbed  on  this  side  and  on  that,  and  then  the  aliptes 
(rubber)  may  say  (to  the  slave),  Change  his  position, 
present  the  side,  take  hold  of  his  head,  shew  the  shoulder  ; 
and  then  when  you  have  left  the  bath  and  gone  home,  you 
may  call  out,  Does  no  one  bring  something  to  eat?  And 
then,  Take  away  the  tables,  sponge  them  :  you  are  afraid  of 
this,  that  you  may  not  be  able  to  lead  the  life  of  a  sick 
man.  But  learn  the  life  of  those  who  are  in  health,  how 
slaves  live,  how  labourers,  how  those  live  who  are  genuine 
philosophers;  how  Socrates  lived,  who  had  a  wife  and  chil- 
dren ;  how  Diogenes  lived,  and  how  Cleanthes 9  who  atten- 
ded to  the  school  and  drew  water.  If  you  choose  to  have 
these  things,  you  will  have  them  every  where,  and  you 
will  live  in  full  confidence.  Confiding  in  what  ?  In  that 
alone  in  which  a  man  can  connde,  in  that  which  is  secure,  in 
that  which  is  not  subject  to  hindrance,  in  that  which  cannot 
be  taken  away,  that  is,  in  your  own  will.  And  why  have  you 
made  yourself  so  useless  and  good  for  nothing  that  no  man 
will  choose  to  receive  you  into  his  house,  no  man  to  take  caro 
of  you  ? :  but  if  a  utensil  entire  and  useful  were  cast  abroad, 
every  man  who  found  it,  would  take  it  up  and  think  it  a  gain ; 
but  no  man  will  take  you  up,  and  every  man  will  consider 
you  a  loss.  So  cannot  you  discharge  the  office  even  of  a  dog, 

•  Cleanthes,  the  successor  of  Zeno  in  his  school,  was  a  great 
example  of  the  pursuit  of  knowledge  under  difficulties:  during  the 
night  he  used  to  draw  water  from  the  wells  for  the  use  of  the  gardens  : 
during  the  day  he  employed  himself  in  his  studies.  He  was  the 
author  of  a  noble  hymn  to  Zeus,  which  is  extant. 


EPIOTBTtTS.  293 

jr  of  a  cook  ?    Why  then  do  you  choose  to  live  any  longer, 
when  you  are  what  you  are  7 

Does  any  good  man  fear  that  he  shall  fail  to  have  food  ? 
To  the  blind  it  does  not  fail,  to  the  lame  it  does  not :  shall 
it  fail  to  a  good  man  ?  And  to  a  good  soldier  there  does 
not  fail  to  be  one  who  gives  him  pay,  nor  to  a  labourer, 
nor  to  a  shoemaker :  and  to  the  good  man  shall  there  be 
wanting  such  a  person  ? 10  Does  God  thus  neglect  the 
things  that  he  has  established,  his  ministers,  his  witnesses, 
whom  alone  he  employs  as  examples  to  the  uninstructed, 
both  that  he  exists,  and  administers  well  the  whole,  and 
does  not  neglect  human  affairs,  and  that  to  a  good  man 
there  is  no  evil  either  when  he  is  living  or  when  he  is 
dead?  What  then  when  he  does  not  supply  him  with 
food  ?  What  else  does  he  do  than  n  like  a  good  general 
he  has  given  me  the  signal  to  retreat  ?  I  obey,  I  follow, 
assenting  to  the  words  of  the  commander,12  praising  his 
acts  :  for  I  came  when  it  pleased  him,  and  I  will  also  go 
away  when  it  pleases  him ;  and  while  I  lived,  it  was  my 
duty  to  praise  God  both  by  myself,  and  to  each  person 
severally  and  to  many.13  He  does  not  supply  me  with 
many  things,  nor  with  abundance,  he  does  not  will  me  to 
live  luxuriously ;  for  neither  did  he  supply  Hercules  who 
was  his  own  son ;  but  another  (Eurystheus)  was  king  of 
Argos  and  Mycenae,  and  Hercules  obeyed  orders,  and 
laboured,  and  was  exercised.  And  Eurystheus  was  what 
he  was,  neither  king  of  Argos  nor  of  Mycenae,  for  he  was 
not  even  king  of  himself;  but  Hercules  was  ruler  and 
leader  of  the  whole  earth  and  sea,  who  purged  away  law- 
lessness, and  introduced  justice  and  holiness ; u  and  he 
did  these  things  both  naked  and  alone.  And  when  Ulysses 

10  It  seems  strange  that  Epictetus  should  make  such  assertiona 
when  we  know  that  they  are  not  true.   Shortly  after  he  himself  speaks 
even  of  the  good  man  not  being  supplied  with  food  by  God. 

11  See  i.  29.29. 

19  The  word  is  ^vev^^uv.  Compare  ^TTCU^^/UTJO-OV,  Homer.  Iliac 
L22. 

13  See  i.  16. 15. 

14  Compare  Hebrews  xi.  and  xii.,  in  which  the  Apostle  and  Philo- 
sopher reason  in  nearly  the  same  manner  and  even  use  the  same 
terms;  but  how  superior  is  the  example  urged  by  the  Apostle  £• 
Hercules  and  Ulysses  1'    Mrs.  Carter. 


294  EPICTETUS. 

was  cast  out  shipwrecked,  did  want  humiliate  him,  did  it 
break  his  spirit  ?  but  how  did  he  go  off  to  the  virgins  to 
ask  for  necessaries,  to  beg  which  is  considered  most 
shameful?15 

As  a  lion  bred  in  the  mountains  trusting  in  his  strength. — 

Od.  vi.  130. 

Belying  on  what  ?  Not  on  reputation  nor  on  wealth  nor 
on  the  power  of  a  magistrate,  but  on  his  own  strength, 
that  is,  on  his  opinions  about  the  things  which  are  in  our 
power  and  those  which  are  not.  For  these  are  the  only 
things  which  make  men  free,  which  make  them  escape 
from  hindrance,  which  raise  the  head  (neck)  of  those  who 
are  depressed,  which  make  them  look  with  steady  eyes  on 
the  rich  and  on  tyrants.  And  this  was  (is)  the  gift  given  to 
t}ie  philosopher.  But  you  will  not  come  forth  bold,  bub 
trembling  about  your  trifling  garments  and  silver  vessels. 
Unhappy  man,  have  you  thus  wasted  your  time  till 
now? 

What  then,  if  I  shall  be  sick  ?  You  will  be  sick  in  such 
a  way  as  you  ought  to  be. — Who  will  take  care  of  me  ? — 
God ;  your  friends — I  shall  lie  down  on  a  hard  bed — But 
you  will  lie  down  like  a  man — I  shall  not  have  a  con- 
venient chamber — You  will  be  sick  in  an  inconvenient 
chamber — Who  will  provide  for  me  the  necessary  food  ?— — 
Those  who  provide  for  others  also.  You  will  be  sick  like 
Manes.16 — And  what  also  will  be  the  end  of  the  sickness  ? 
Any  other  than  death  ? — Do  you  then  consider  that  this 
the  chief  of  all  evils  to  man  and  the  chief  mark  of  mean 
spirit  and  of  cowardice  is  not  death,  but  rather  the  fear  of 
death?  Against  this  fear  then  I  advise  you  to  exercise 
yourself :  to  this  let  all  your  reasoning  tend,  your  exer- 
cises, and  reading ;  and  you  will  know  that  thus  only  are 
men  made  free. 

15  The  story  of  Ulyssos  asking  Nausicaa  and  her  maids  for  help 
when  he  was  cast  naked  on  the  land  is  in  the  Odyssey  vi.  127. 

"  Manes  is  a  slave's  name.  Diogenes  had  a  slave  named  Manes, 
his  only  slave,  who  ran  away,  and  though  Diogenes  was  informed 
where  the  slave  was,  he  did  not  think  i\  worth  while  to  have  him 
brought  back.  He  said,  it  would  be  a  fchame  if  Manes  could  live 
Without  Diogenes,  and  Diogenes  could  not  live  without  Mauet, 


BOOK  IT. 

CHAPTEE  I. 

ABOUT   FREEDOM. 

HE  is  free  who  lives  as  he  wishes  to  live ; l  who  is  neither 
subject  to  compulsion  nor  to  hindrance,  nor  to  force; 
whose  movements  to  action  (6p/xat)  are  not  impeded, 
whose  desires  attain  their  purpose,  and  who  does  not  fall 
into  that  which  he  would  avoid  (c/cicAuras  aTreptTmoToi). 
Who  then  chooses  to  live  in  error  ?  No  man.  Who  chooses 
to  live  deceived,  liable  to  mistake,2  unjust,  unrestrained, 
discontented,  mean?  No  man.  Not  one  then  of  the  bad 
lives  as  he  wishes ;  nor  is  he  then  free.  And  who  choose.s 
to  live  in  sorrow,  fear,  envy,  pity,  desiring  and  failing  in 
his  desires,  attempting  to  avoid  something  and  falling 
into  it  ?  Not  one.  Do  we  then  find  any  of  the  bad  free 
from  sorrow,  free  from  fear,  who  does  not  fall  into  that 
which  he  would  avoid,  and  does  not  obtain  that  which 
he  wishes  ?  Not  one ;  nor  then  do  we  find  any  bad  man 
free.3 

If  then  a  man  who  has  been  twice  consul  should  hear 
this,  if  you  add,  But  you  are  a  wise  man ;  this  is  nothing 
to  you:  he  will  pardon  you.  But  if  you  tell  him  the 
truth,  and  say,  You  differ  not  at  all  from  those  who  have 
been  thrice  sold  as  to  being  yourself  not  a  slave,  what  else 
ought  you  to  expect  than  blows  ?  For  he  says,  What,  I  a 

1  Cicero,  Paradox,  v.  'Quid  est  enim  Hbertas ?  Potestas  vivondi  ut 
veliy.  Quis  igitur  vivit  ut  vult,  nisi  qui  recta  sequitur,'  etc. 

2  TrpoirliTTtav.    Comp.  ii.  1.  10 :  ^airarrjO^yai  olv  ^  irpoveffctv. 

3  'Whoever  committeth  sin,  is  the  servant  of  sin,'  John  viii.  31. 
Mrs,  Carter. 


slave,  I  whose  father  was  free,  whose  mother  was  free 
I  whom  no  man  can  purchase:  I  am  also  of  senatorial 
rank,  and  a  friend  of  Caesar,  and  I  have  been  a  consul, 
and  I  own  many  slaves.  —  In  the  first  place,  most  excel- 
lent senatorial  man,  perhaps  your  father  also  was  a  slave 
in  the  same  kind  of  servitude,  and  your  mother,  and  your 
grandfather  and  all  your  ancestors  in  an  ascending  series. 
But  even  if  they  were  as  free  as  it  is  possible,  what  is  this 
to  you  ?  What  if  they  were  of  a  noble  nature,  and  you  of 
a  mean  nature ;  if  they  were  fearless,  and  you  a  coward ; 
if  they  had  the  power  of  self-restraint,  and  you  are  not 
able  to  exercise  it. 

And  what,  you  may  say,  lias  this  to  do  with  being  a 
slave  ?  Does  it  seem  to  you  to  be  nothing  to  do  a  thing  un- 
willingly, with  compulsion,  with  groans,  has  this  nothing 
to  do  with  being  a  slave  ?  It  is  something,  you  say :  but 
who  is  able  to  compel  me,  except  the  lord  of  all,  Caesar  ? 
Then  even  you  yourself  have  admitted  that  you  have  one 
master.  But  that  he  is  the  common  master  of  all,  as  you 
say,  let  not  this  console  you  at  all :  but  know  that  you 
are  a  slave  in  a  great  family.  So  also  the  people  of 
Nicopolis  are  used  to  exclaim,  By  the  fortune  of  Caesar,4 
we  are  free. 

However,  if  you  please,  let  us  not  speak  of  Caesar  at 
present.  But  tell  me  this :  did  you  never  love  any  person, 
a  young  girl,  or  slave,  or  free  ?  What  then  is  this  with 
respect  to  being  a  slave  or  free?  Were  you  never  com- 
manded by  the  person  beloved  to  do  something  which  you 
did  not  wish  to  do  ?  have  you  never  flattered  your  little 
slave  ?  have  you  never  kissed  her  feet  ?  And  yet  if  any 
man  compelled  you  to  kiss  Caesar's  feet,  you  would  think 
it  an  insult  and  excessive  tyranny.  What  else  then  is 
slavery?  Did  you  never  go  oat  by  night  to  some  place 
whither  you  did  not  wish  to  go,  did  you  not  expend  vsrhat 
you  did  not  wish  to  expend,  did  you  not  utter  words  with 
sighs  and  groans,  did  you  not  submit  to  abuse  and  to  bo 

4  A  usual  form  of  oath.  See  ii.  20.  29.  Upton  compares  the  Reman 
expression  *  Per  Genium,'  as  in  Horace  Epp.  i.  7.  94 — 


Quod  te  per  Genium,  doxtramque,  Deosque  Fenatei 
Otoecro  et  obteator. 


BP10TETUS.  297 

excluded  ?5  But  if  you  are  ashamed  to  confess  your  own 
acts,  see  what  Thrasonides6  says  and  does,  who  having 
seen  so  much  military  service  as  perhaps  not  even  you 
have,  first  of  all  went  out  by  night,  when  Geta  (a  slave) 
does  not  venture  out,  but  if  he  were  compelled  by  his 
master,  would  have  cried  out  much  and  would  have  gone 
out  lamenting  his  bitter  slavery.  Next,  what  does  Thra- 
sonides say  ?  A  worthless  girl  has  enslaved  me,  me  whom 
no  enemy  ever  did.  Unhappy  man,  who  are  the  slave  even 
of  a  girl,  and  a  worthless  girl.  Why  then  do  you  still  call 
yourself  free  ?  and  why  do  you  talk  of  your  service  in  the 
army  ?  Then  he  calls  for  a  sword  and  is  angry  with  him 
who  out  of  kindness  refuses  it ;  and  he  sends  presents  to 
her  who  hates  him,  and  intreats  and  weeps,  and  on  the 
other  hand  having  had  a  little  success  he  is  elated.  But 
even  then  how?  was  he  free  enough  neither  to  desire 
nor  to  fear? 

Now  consider  in  the  case  of  animals,  how  we  employ1 
the  notion  of  liberty.  Men  keep  tame  lions  shut  up,  and 
feed  them,  and  some  take  them  about;  and  who  will  say 
that  this  lion  is  free?7  Is  it  not  the  fact  that  the  more 
he  lives  at  his  ease,  so  much  the  more  he  is  in  a  slavish 
condition  ?  and  who  if  he  had  perception  and  reason  would 
wish  to  be  one  of  these  lions?  Well,  these  birds  when 
they  are  caught  and  are  kept  shut  up,  how  much  do  they 
suffer  in  their  attempts  to  escape?8  and  some  of  them  die 
of  hunger  rather  than  submit  to  such  a  kind  of  life.  And 
as  many  of  them  as  live,  hardly  live  and  with  suffering  pine 
away ;  and  if  they  ever  find  any  opening,  they  make  their 

5  A  lover's  exclusion  by  his  mistress  was  a  common  topic,  and  * 
serious  cause  of  complaint  (Lucretius,  iv.  1 172) : 

At  laorimans  exclusus  amator  limlna  saepe 
Floribus  et  eertis  operit. 

See  also  Horace,  Odes,  i.  25. 

6  Thrasonides  was  a  character  in  one  of  Menander's  plays,  intitled 
t/liffotfjicvos  or  the  Hated. 

1  It  must  have  been  rather  difficult  to  manage  a  tame  lion ;  but  we 
read  of  such  things  among  the  Komans.  Seneca,  Epp.  41. 

8  The  keeping  of  birds  in  cages,  parrots  and  others,  was  also  common 
among  the  Romans.  Ovid  (Amor.  ii.  6)  has  written  a  beautiful  elegy 
oil  the  death  of  a  favourite  parrot. 


298  EPICTETUS. 

escape.  So  much  do  they  desire  their  natural  liberty, 
to  be  independent  and  free  from  hindrance.  And  what 
harm  is  there  to  you  in  this?  What  do  you  say?  I  am 
formed  by  nature  to  fly  where  I  choose,  to  live  in  the 
open  air,  to  sing  when  I  choose:  you  deprive  me  of  all 
this,  and  say,  what  harm  is  it  to  you?  For  this  reason 
we  shall  say  that  those  animals  only  are  free,  which 
cannot  endure  capture,  but  as  soon  as  they  are  caught, 
escape  from  captivity  by  death.  So  Diogenes  also  some- 
where says  that  there  is  only  one  way  to  freedom,  and 
that  is  to  die  content :  and  he  writes  to  the  Persian  king, 
You  cannot  enslave  the  Athenian  state  any  more  than  you 
can  enslave  fishes.  How  is  that?  cannot  1  catch  them? 
If  you  catch  them,  says  Diogenes,  they  will  immediately 
leave  you,  as  fishes  do ;  for  if  you  catch  a  fish,  it  dies ;  and 
if  these  men  that  are  caught  shall  die,  of  what  use  to  you 
is  the  preparation  for  war?  These  are  the  words  of  a 
free  man  who  had  carefully  examined  the  thing,  and,  as 
was  natural,  had  discovered  it.  But  if  you  look  for  it  in 
a  different  place  fiom  where  it  is,  what  wonder  if  you 
never  find  it? 

The  slave  wishes  to  be  set  free  immediately.  "Why? 
Do  you  think  that  he  wiJies  to  pay  money  to  the  collec- 
tors of  twentieths?9  No;  but  because  he  imagines  that 
hitherto  through  not  having  obtained  this,  he  is  hindered 
and  unfortunate.  If  1  shall  bo  set  free,  immediately  it  is 
all  happiness,  1  care  for  no  man,  I  speak  to  all  as  an  equal 
and  like  to  them,  I  go  where  1  choose,  I  come  from  any 
place  I  choose,  and  go  where  I  choose.  Then  he  is  set 
free;  and  forthwith  ha\ing  no  place  where  he  can  eat,  he 
looks  for  some  man  to  flatter,  some  one  with  whom  he 
shall  sup :  then  he  either  works  with  his  body  and  en- 
dures the  most  dreadful  things ; 10  and  if  he  can  obtain  u 
manger,  he  falls  into  a  slavery  much  worse  than  his  former 

9  See  ii.  1.  26.     The  etKocrrdwai  were  the  Publican!,  men  who 
farmed  this  and  other  taxes.    A  tax  of  a  twentieth  of  the  vulue  of  a 
slave  when  manumitted  was  established  at  an  early  time  (Livy  vii.  16). 
It  appears  from  this  passage  that  the  manumitted  slave  paid  the  tax 
out  of  his  savings  (peculium).    See  ii.  1.  note  7. 

10  The  reader  may  guess  the  meaning, 


BPICTETUS.  299 

slavery ;  or  even  if  lie  is  become  rich,  beirg  a  man  with- 
out any  knowledge  of  what  is  good,  he  loves  some  little 
girl,  and  in  his  unhappiness  laments  and  desires  to  be  a 
slave  again.  He  says,  what  evil  did  I  suffer  in  my  state 
of  slavery?  Another  clothed  me,  another  supplied  me 
with  shoes,  another  fed  me,  another  looked  after  me  in 
sickness;  and  I  did  only  a  few  services  for  him.  But 
now  a  wretched  man,  what  things  I  suffer,  being  a  slave 
to  many  instead  of  to  one.  But  however,  he  says,  if  I 
shall  acquire  rings,11  then  I  shall  live  most  prosperously 
and  happily.  First,  in  order  to  acquire  these  rings,  he 
submits  to  that  which  he  is  worthy  of;  then  when  he  has 
acquired  them,  it  is  again  all  the  same.  Then  he  says, 
If  I  shall  bo  engaged  in  military  service,  I  am  free  from 
all  evils.  He  obtains  military  service.  He  suffers  as  much 
as  a  flogged  slave,  and  nevertheless  he  asks  for  a  second 
service  and  a  third.  After  this,  when  he  has  put  the  finish  - 
ing  stroke  (the  colophon)  12  to  his  career,  and  is  become  a 
senator,  then  he  becomes  a  slave  by  entering  into  the 
assembly,  then  he  serves  the  finer  and  most  splendid 
slavery — not  to  be  a  fool,  but  to  learn  what  Socrates 
taught,  what  is  the  nature  of  each  thing  that  exists,  and  that 
a  man  should  not  rashly  adapt  preconceptions  (?rpoA.^€is) 
to  the  several  things  which  are.13  For  this  is  the  cau.se 
to  men  of  all  their  evils,  the  not  being  able  to  adapt  the 
general  preconceptions  to  the  several  things.  But  we 
have  different  opinions  (about  the  cause  of  our  evils). 
One  man  thinks  that  he  is  sick :  not  so  however,  but  the 
fact  is  that  he  does  not  adapt  his  preconceptions  right. 
Another  thinks  that  he  is  poor;  another  that  ho  has  a 
severe  father  or  mother ;  and  another  again  that  Caesar  is 
not  favourable  to  him.  But  all  this  is  one  and  only  one 
thing,  the  not  knowing  how  to  adapt  the  preconceptions. 
For  who  has  not  a  preconception  of  that  which  is  bad, 

11  A  gold  ring  was  worn  by  the  Equites ;  and  accordingly  to  desire  the 
gold  ring  is  the  same  as  to  desire  to  be  raised  to  the  Equestrian  cjass. 

18  The  colophon.  See  ii.  14.  note  5.  After  the  words  *  most  splendid 
slavery '  it  is  probable  that  some  words  have  accidentally  been  omitted 
in  the  MSS. 

18  Compare  i  2. 6, 


300  EPICTETUS. 

that  it  is  hurtful,  that  it  ought  to  be  avoided,  that  it  ought 
in  every  way  to  be  guarded  against?  One  preconception 
is  not  repugnant  to  another,14  only  where  it  comes  to  the 
matter  of  adaptation.  What  then  is  this  evil,  which  is 
both  hurtful,  and  a  thing  to  be  avoided?  He  answers 
not  to  be  Caesar's  friend. — He  is  gone  far  from  the  mark, 
he  has  missed  the  adaptation,  he  is  embarrassed,  he 
seeks  the  things  which  are  not  at  all  pertinent  to  the 
matter;  for  when  he  has  succeeded  in  being  Caesar's 
friend,  never  the  less  he  has  failed  in  finding  what  he 
sought.  For  what  is  that  which  every  man  seeks  ?  To 
live  secure,  to  bo  happy,  to  do  every  thing  as  he  wishes, 
not  to  be  hindered,  nor  compelled.  When  then  he  is 
become  the  friend  of  Caesar,  is  he  free  from  hindrance  ? 
free  from  compulsion,  is  he  tranquil,  is  he  happy?  Of 
whom  shall  we  inquire?  What  more  trustworthy  witness 
have  we  than  this  very  man  who  is  become  Caesar's 
friend  ?  Come  forward  and  tell  us  when  did  you  sleep 
more  quietly,  now  or  before  you  became  Caesar's  friend  ? 
Immediately  you  hear  the  answer,  Stop,  I  intreat  you,  and 
do  not  mock  me :  you  know  not  what  miseries  I  suffer, 
and  sleep  does  not  come  to  me  ;  but  one  comes  and  says, 
Caesar  is  already  awake,  he  is  now  going  forth :  then 
come  troubles  and  cares — Well,  when  did  you  sup  with 
more  pleasure,  now  or  before  ?  Hear  what  he  says  about 
this  also.  He  says  that  if  he  is  not  invited,  he  is  pained : 
and  if  he  is  invited,  he  sups  like  a  slave  with  his  master, 
all  the  while  being  anxious  that  he  does  not  say  or  do  any 
thing  foolish.  And  what  do  you  suppose  that  he  is  afraid 
of ;  lest  he  should  be  lashed  like  a  slave  ?  How  can  he 
expect  any  thing  so  good  ?  No,  but  as  befits  so  great  a 
man,  Caesar's  friend,  he  is  afraid  that  he  may  lose  his 
head.  And  when  did  you  bathe  more  free  from  trouble, 
and  take  your  gymnastic  exercise  more  quietly  ?  In  fine, 
which  kind  of  life  did  you  prefer  ?  your  present  or  your 
former  life  ?  I  can  swear  that  no  man  is  so  stupid  or  so 
ignorant  of  truth  as  not  to  bewail  his  own  misfortunes  tho 
nearer  he  is  in  friendship  to  Caesar. 

14  Compare  i.  22, 


EPICTET0S.  801 

Since  then  neither  those  who  are  called  kings  live  as 
they  choose,  nor  the  friends  of  kings,  who  finally  are 
those  who  are  free?  Seek,  and  you  will  find;  for  you 
have  aids  from  nature  for  the  discovery  of  truth.  But  if 
you  are  not  able  yourself  by  going  along  these  ways  only 
to  discover  that  which  follows,  listen  to  those  who  have 
made  the  inquiry.  What  do  they  say?  Does  freedom 
seem  to  you  a  good  thing?  The  greatest  good.  Is  it 
possible  then  that  he  who  obtains  the  greatest  good  can  be 
unhappy  or  fare  badly?  No.  Whomsoever  then  you 
shall  see  unhappy,  unfortunate,  lamenting,  confidently 
declare  that  they  are  not  free.  I  do  declare  it.  We  have 
now  then  got  away  from  buying  and  selling  and  from  such 
arrangements  about  matters  of  property  :  for  if  you  have 
rightly  assented  to  these  matters,  if  the  great  king  (the 
Persian  king)  is  unhappy,  he  cannot  be  free,  nor  can  a 
little  king,  nor  a  man  of  consular  rank,  nor  one  who  has 
been  twice  consul. — Be  it  so. 

Further  then  answer  me  this  question  also,  does  freedom 
seem  to  you  to  be  something  great  and  noble  and  valu- 
able ? — How  should  it  not  seem  so  ?  Is  it  possible  then 
when  a  man  obtains  anything  so  great  and  valuable  and 
noble  to  be  mean? — It  is  not  possible — When  then  you  see 
any  man  subject  to  another  or  flattering  him  contrary  to 
his  own  opinion,  confidently  affirm  that  this  man  also  is 
not  free ;  and  not  only  if  he  do  this  for  a  bit  of  supper, 
but  also  if  he  does  it  for  a  government  (province)  or  a 
consulship :  and  call  these  men  little  slaves  who  for  the 
sake  of  little  matters  do  these  things,  and  those  who  do  so 
for  the  sake  of  great  things  call  great  slaves,  as  they 
deserve  to  be. — This  is  admitted  also — Do  you  think  that 
freedom  is  a  thing  independent  and  self  governing? — 
Certainly — Whomsoever  then  it  is  in  the  power  of  another 
to  hinder  and  compel,  declare  that  he  is  not  free.  And  do 
not  look,  I  intreat  you,  after  his  grandfathers  and  great 
grandfathers,  or  inquire  about  his  being  bought  or  sold; 
but  if  you  hear  him  saying  from  his  heart  and  with 
feeling,  *  Master,'  even  if  the  twelve  fasces  precede  him  (as 
consul),  call  him  a  slave.  And  if  you  hear  him  say, 
'  Wretch  that  I  am,  how  much  I  suffer/  call  him  a  slave. 
If  finally  you  see  him  lamenting,  complaining,  unhappy, 


302  EPICTETUS. 

call  him  a  slave  though  he  wears  a  praetexta.15  If  then  he 
is  doing  nothing  of  this  kind,  do  not  yet  say  that  he  is 
free,  but  learn  his  opinions,  whether  they  are  subject  to 
compulsion,  or  may  produce  hindrance,  or  to  bad  fortune ; 
and  if  you  find  him  such,  call  him  a  slave  who  has  a  holi- 
day in  the  Saturnalia : 16  say  that  his  master  is  from 
home :  he  will  return  soon,  and  you  will  know  what  he 
suffers.  Who  will  return  ?  Whoever  has  in  himself  the 
power  over  anything  which  is  desired  by  the  man,  either 
to  give  it  to  him  or  to  take  it  away  ?  Thus  then  have  we 
many  masters  ?  We  have  :  for  we  have  circumstances  as 
masters  prior  to  our  present  masters ;  and  these  circum- 
stances are  many.  Therefore  it  must  of  necessity  be  that 
those  who  have  the  power  over  any  of  these  circumstances 
must  be  our  masters.  For  no  man  fears  Caesar  himself, 
but  he  fears  death,  banishment,  deprivation  of  his  pro- 
perty, prison,  and  disgrace.  Nor  does  any  man  love 
Caesar,  unless  Caesar  is  a  person  of  great  merit,  but  he 
loves  wealth,  the  office  of  tribune,  praetor  or  consul.  When 
we  love,  and  hate  and  fear  these  things,  it  must  be  that 
those  who  have  the  power  over  them  must  be  our  masters. 
Therefore  we  adore  them  even  as  gods ;  for  we  think  that 
what  possesses  the  power  of  conferring  the  greatest 
advantage  on  us  is  divine.  Then  we  wrongly  assume 
(vTrorao-o-o/xev)  that  a  certain  person  has  the  power  of  con- 
ferring the  greatest  advantages ;  therefore  he  is  something 
divine.  For  if  we  wrongly  assume  17  that  a  certain  person 
has  the  power  of  conferring  the  greatest  advantages,  it  is 
a  necessary  consequence  that  the  conclusion  from  these 
premises  must  be  false. 

What  then  is  that  which  makes  a  man  free  from 
hindrance  and  makes  him  his  own  master  ?  For  wealth 
does  not  do  it,  nor  consulship,  nor  provincial  government, 

l*  Sic  practextatos  referunt  Artaxata  mores.— Juv.  ii.  170. 

See  Epict.  i.  2,  note  4. 

16  Saturnalia.    See  i,  25,  note  3. 

At  this  season  the  slaves  had  liberty  to  enjoy  themselves  and  to  talk 
freely  with  their  masters.  Hence  Horace  says  Sat.  ii.  74-— 

Age,  llbertate  Decembri, 
Quando  ita  mtyores  volucnint,  utere. 

1T  "Insigne  hoc  exemplum  est  rov  CIKTJ  rcfcy  vpo^tyeis  tya.piJi6fav  rotii 
ipevs  ovfftais.    De  quo,  vicie  i.  22,  9,  ii.  11,  3,  ii.  17, 7."    Upton. 


EPICTETUS.  303 

nor  royal  power ;  but  something  else  must  be  discovered. 
What  then  is  that  which  when  we  write  makes  us  free  from 
hindrance  and  unimpeded  ?  The  knowledge  of  the  art  of 
writing.  What  then  is  it  m  playing  the  lute?  The 
science  of  playing  the  lute.  Therefore  in  life  also  it  is  the 
science  of  life.  You  have  then  heard  in  a  general  way  : 
but  examine  the  thing  also  in  the  several  parts.  Is  it 
possible  that  he  who  desires  any  of  the  things  which 
depend  on  others  can  be  free  from  hindrance  ?  No — Is  it 
possible  for  him  to  be  unimpeded  ?  No — Therefore  he 
cannot  be  free.  Consider  then :  whether  we  have  nothing 
which  is  in  our  own  power  only,  or  whether  we  have  all 
things,  or  whether  some  things  are  in  our  own  power,  and 
others  in  the  power  of  others. — What  do  you  mean? — 
When  you  wish  the  body  to  be  entire  (sound),  is  it  in 
your  power  or  not  ? — It  is  not  in  my  power — When  you 
wish  it  to  be  healthy  ? — Neither  is  this  in  my  power. — 
When  you  wish  it  to  be  handsome  ? — Nor  is  this — Life  or 
death  ? — Neither  is  this  in  my  power.18 — Your  body  then 
is  another's,  subject  to  every  man  who  is  stronger  than 
yourself — It  is — But  your  estate,  is  it  in  your  power  to 
have  it  when  you  please,  and  as  long  as  you  please,  and 
such  as  you  please? — No — And  your  slaves? — No — And 
your  clothes? — No — And  your  house? — No — And  your 
horses  ? — Not  one  of  these  things — And  if  you  wish  by  all 
means  your  children  to  live,  or  your  wife,  or  your  brother, 
or  your  friends,  is  it  in  your  power  ? — This  aLo  is  riot  in 
my  power. 

Whether  then  have  you  nothing  which  is  in  your  own 
power,  which  depends  on  yourself  only  and  cannot  be 
taken  from  you,  or  have  you  any  thing  of  the  kind? — I 
know  not — Look  at  the  thing  then  thus,  and  examine  it. 
Is  any  man  able  to  make  you  assent  to  that  which  is 
fa]ge  is — No  man — In  the  matter  of  assent  then  you  are  free 

18  Schweighaeuser  observes  that  death  is  in  our  power,  as  the  Stoics 
taught ;  and  Epictetus  oiten  tells  us  that  the  door  is  open.  He  suggests 
that  the  true  reading  may  be  Kal  OVK  biroOave'iv.  I  think  that  the  text 
is  right.  Epictetus  asks  is  '  Life  or  death '  in  our  power.  He  means 
no  more  than  if  he  had  said  Life  only. 

10  He  means  that  which  seems  to  you  to  be  false.    See  iii.  22,  42. 

"  In  the  matter  cf  assent  then  "  :  this  is  the  third  r6iros  or  *  locus*  or 
division  in  philosophy  (iii.  2, 1-5),  As  to  the  Will,  compare  i.  17,  rote 


304  EPIOTETtJS. 

from  hindrance  and  obstruction. — Granted — Well; 
can  a  man  force  you  to  desire  to  move  towards  that  to 
which  you  do  not  choose  ? — He  can,  for  when  he  threatens 
me  with  death  or  "bonds,  he  compels  me  to  desire  to  move 
towards  it.  If  then,  you  despise  death  and  bonds,  do  you 
still  pay  any  regard  to  him? — No — Is  then  the  despising 
of  death  an  act  of  your  own  or  is  it  not  yours? — It  is  my 
act — It  is  your  own  act  then  also  to  desire  to  move  towards 
a  thing :  or  is  it  not  so  ? — It  is  my  own  act — But  to  desire 
to  move  away  from  a  thing,  whose  act  is  that  ?  This  also 
is  your  act — What  then  if  I  have  attempted  to  walk,  sup- 

10.  Epictetus  affirms  that  a  man  cannot  be  compelled  to  assent,  that  is 
to  admit,  to  allow,  or,  to  use  another  word,  to  believe  in  that  which  swing 
to  him  to  be  false,  or,  to  use  the  same  word  again,  to  believe  in  that  in 
which  he  does  not  believe.  When  the  Christian  uses  the  two  creeds, 
which  begin  with  the  words,  *  I  believe  etc./  he  knows  or  he  ought  to 
know,  that  he  cannot  compel  an  unbeliever  to  accept  the  same  belief. 
He  may  by  pains  and  penalties  of  various  kinds  compel  some  persons 
to  profess  or  to  express  the  same  belief:  but  as  no  pains  or  penalties 
could  compel  some  Christians  to  deny  their  belief,  so  I  suppose  that 
perhaps  there  are  men  who  could  not  be  compelled  to  express  this 
belief  when  they  have  it  not.  The  case  of  the  believer  and  the  un- 
believer however  are  not  the  same.  The  believer  may  be  strengthened 
in  his  belief  by  the  belief  that  he  will  in  some  way  be  punished  by  God, 
if  he  denies  that  which  he  believes.  The  unbeliever  will  not  have  the 
same  motive  or  reason  for  not  expressing  his  assent  to  that  which  he 
does  not  believe.  He  believes  that  it  is  and  will  be  all  the  same  to 
him  with  respect  to  God,  whether  he  gives  his  assent  to  that  which  he 
does  not  believe  or  refuses  his  assent.  There  remains  nothing  then  to 
trouble  him  if  he  expresses  his  assent  to  that  which  he  does  not  believe, 
except  the  opinion  of  those  who  know  that  he  does  not  believe,  or  his 
own  reflections  on  expressing  his  assent  to  that  which  he  does  not 
believe ;  or  in  other  words  his  publication  of  a  lie,  which  may  probably 
do  no  harm  to  any  man  or  in  any  way.  I  believe  that  some  men  are 
strong  enough,  under  some  circumstances  at  least,  to  refuse  their  assent 
to  any  thing  which  they  do  not  believe;  but  I  do  not  affiim  that  they 
would  do  this  under  all  circumstances. 

To  return  to  the  matter  under  consideration,  a  man  cannot  be  com- 
pelled by  any  power  to  accept  voluntarily  a  thin#  as  true,  when  he 
believes  that  it  is  not  true ;  and  this  act  of  his  is  quite  independent  of 
the  matter  whether  his  unbelief  is  well  founded  or  not.  Me  does  not 
believe  because  he  cannot  believe.  Yet  it  is  said  (Mark  xvi.  lt>)  in 
the  received  text,  as  it  now  stands, 4  He  that  believeth  and  is  baptized 
shall  be  haved ;  but  he  that  believetli  not,  shall  be  damned '  (condemned). 
The  cause,  as  it  is  called,  of  this  unbelief  is  explained  by  some  theolo- 
gians ;  but  all  men  do  not  admit  the  explanation  to  be  sufficient ;  and 
ft  does  not  concern  the  present  subject. 


EP1CTETUS.  305 

pose  another  should  hinder  me — What  part  of  you  does  he 
hinder  ?  does  lie  hinder  the  faculty  of  assent  ? — No :  but 
my  poor  body — Yes,  as  he  would  do  with  a  stone — 
Granted  ;  but  I  no  longer  walk — And  who  told  you  that 
walking  is  your  own  act  free  from  hindrance?  for  I  said 
that  this  only  was  free  from  hindrance,  to  desire  to  move  : 
but  where  there  is  need  of  body  and  its  co-operation,  you 
have  heard  long  ago  that  nothing  is  your  own. — Granted 
this  also — And  who  can  compel  you  to  desire  what  you 
do  not  wish  ? — No  man — And  to  propose  or  intend,  or  in 
short  to  make  use  of  the  appearances  which  j  resent  them- 
selves, can  any  man  compel  you  ? — He  cannot  do  this :  but 
he  will  hinder  me  when  I  desire  from  obtaining  what  I 
desire. — If  you  desire  any  thing  which  is  your  own,  and 
one  of  the  things  which  cannot  be  hindered,  how  will  he 
hinder  you? — He  cannot  in  any  way — Who  then  tells 
you  that  he  who  desires  the  things  that  belong  to  another 
is  free  from  hindrance  ? 

Must  I  then  not  desire  health?  By  no  means,  nor 
any  thing  else  that  belongs  to  another:  for  what  is  not 
in  your  power  to  acquire  or  to  keep  when  you  please,  this 
belongs  to  another.  Keep  then  far  from  it  not  only  your 
hands,  but  more  than  that,  even  your  desires.  If  you  do 
not,  you  have  surrendered  yourself  as  a  slave ;  you  have 
subjected  your  neck,  if  you  admire  20  any  thing  not  your 
own,  to  every  thing  that  is  dependent  on  the  power  of 
others  and  perishable,  to  which  you  have  conceived  a 
liking. — Is  not  my  hand  my  own  ? — It  is  a  part  of  your 
own  body ; 21  but  it  is  by  nature  eai  th,  subject  to  hindrance, 
compulsion,  and  the  slave  of  every  thing  which  is  stronger. 
And  why  do  I  say  yonr  hand  ?  You  ought  to  possess  your 
whole  body  as  a  poor  ass  loaded,  as  long  as  it  is  possible, 
as  long  as  you  are  allowed.  But  if  there  be  a  press,22  and 

20  The  word  r  admire*  is  QavfjLdffys  in  the  original.  The  word  is  often 
used  by  Epictetus,  and  Horace  uses  '  admirari '  in  this  Stoical  sense. 
See  i.  29.  2,  note. 

21  See  Schweig.'s  note  on  nfyos. 

29  The  word  is  ayyapcia,  a  word  of  Persian  origin  (Herodotus,  viii. 
98).  It  means  here  the  seizure  of  animals  for  military  purposes  when 
it  is  necessary.  Upton  refers  to  Matthew  5,  v  41,  Mark  15,  c.  21  for 
similar  uses  of  the  verb  kyyaptfa 

X 


306  ETICTETDS. 

a  soldier  should  lay  hold  of  it,  let  it  go,  do  not  resist,  nor 
murmur  ;  if  you  do,  you  will  receive  blows,  and  never  the 
less  you  will  also  lo.se  the  ass.  But  when  you  ought  to 
feel  thus  with  respect  to  the  body,  consider  what  remains 
to  be  done  about  all  the  rest,  which  is  provided  for  the 
sake  of  the  body.  When  the  body  is  an  ass,  all  the  other 
things  are  bits  belonging  to  the  ass,  pack-saddles,  shoes,23 
barley,  fodder.  Let  these  also  go  :  get  rid  of  them  quicker 
and  more  readily  than  of  the  ass. 

When  you  have  made  this  preparation,  and  have  prac- 
tised this  discipline,  to  distinguish  that  which  belongs  to 
another  from  that  which  is  your  own,  the  things  which 
are  subject  to  hindrance  from  those  which  are  not,  to  con- 
sider the  things  free  from  hindrance  to  concern  yourself, 
and  those  which  are  not  free  not  to  concern  yourself,  to 
keep  your  desire  steadily  fixed  to  the  things  which  do 
concern  yourself,  and  turned  from  the  things  which  do 
not  concern  you  i  self ;  do  you  still  fear  any  man  ?  No  one. 
For  about  what  will  you  be  afraid  ?  about  the  things  which 
are  your  own,  in  which  consists  the  nature  of  good  and 
evil  ?  and  who  has  power  over  these  things  ?  who  can  take 
them  away  ?  who  can  impede  them  ?  No  man  can,  no  more 
than  he  can  impede  God.  But  will  you  be  afraid  about 
your  body  and  your  possessions,  about  things  which  are 
not  yours,  about  things  which  in  no  way  concern  you  ? 
and  what  else  have  you  been  studying  from  the  beginning 
than  to  distinguish  between  your  own  and  not  your  own, 
the  things  which  are  in  your  power  and  not  in  your  power, 
tlio  things  subject  to  hindrance  and  not  subject  ?  and  why 
liave  you  come  to  the  philosophers  ?  was  it  that  you  may 
never  the  less  be  unfortunate  and  unhappy  ?  You  will  then 
in  this  way,  as  I  have  supposed  you  to  have  done,  be  with- 
out fear  and  disturbance.  And  what  is  grief  to  you  ?  for 
icar  comes  from  what  you  expect,  but  grief  from  that  which 
is  present.24  But  what  further  will  you  desire?  For  of 
the  things  which  are  within  the  power  of  the  will,  as  being 
good  and  present,  you  have  a  proper  and  regulated  desira : 

?8  Here  he  speaks  of  asses  being  shod.  The  Latin  translation  of  the 
word  (uTroSTj/xaria)  in  Eptctetus  is  *ferrea»  calces.  I  suppose  they 
could  use  nothing  but  iron. 

24  See  Schweig.'s  note. 


EPIOTETUS.  807 

but  of  the  things  which  are  not  in  the  power  of  the  will 
you  do  not  desire  any  one,  and  so  you  do  not  allow  any 
place  to  that  which  is  irrational,  and  impatient,  and  above 
measure  hasty.25 

When  then  you  are  thus  affected  towards  things,  what 
man  can  any  longer  be  formidable  to  you?  For  what  has 
a  man  which  is  formidable  to  another,  either  when  you  see 
him  or  speak  to  him  or  finally  are  conversant  with  him  ? 
Not  more  than  one  horse  has  with  respect  to  another,  or 
one  dog  to  another,  or  one  bee  to  another  bee.  Things 
indeed  are  formidable  to  every  man ;  and  when  any  man 
is  able  to  confer  these  things  on  another  or  to  take  them 
away,  then  he  too  becomes  formidable.  How  then  is  an 
acropolis  (a  stronghold  or  fortress,  the  seat  of  tyranny) 
demolished  ?  Not  by  the  sword,  not  by  fire,  but  by  opinion. 
For  if  we  abolish  the  acropolis  which  is  in  the  city,  can  we 
abolish  also  that  of  fever,  and  that  of  beautiful  women  ? 
Can  we  in  a  word  abolish  the  acropolis  which  is  in  us  and 
cast  out  the  tyrants  within  us,26  whom  we  have  daily  over 
us,  sometimes  the  same  tyrants,  at  other  times  different 
tyrants  ?  But  with  this  we  must  begin,  and  with  this  we 
must  demolish  the  acropolis  and  eject  the  tyrants,  by  giving 
up  the  body,  the  parts  of  it,  the  faculties  of  it,  the  posses- 
sions, the  reputation,  magisterial  offices,  honours,  children, 
brothers,  friends,  by  considering  all  these  things  as  belong- 
ing to  others..  And  if  tyrants  have  been  ejected  from  us, 
why  do  I  still  shut  in  the  acropolis  by  a  wall  of  circum- 
vallation,27  at  least  on  my  account ;  for  if  it  still  stands,  what 
does  it  do  to  me  ?  why  do  I  still  eject  (the  tyrant's)  guards  ? 
For  where  do  I  perceive  them  ?  against  others  they  have 
their  fasces,  and  their  spears  and  their  swords.  But  I 
have  never  been  hindered  in  my  will,  nor  compelled  when 
I  did  not  will.  And  how  is  this  possible  ?  I  have  placed 

<25  See  Schweig.'s  note. 

26  Schweig.  suggests  Kara&e ^\^KOL^V  instead  of  &iro&€&\'f)Kai*wt  though 
all  his  MSS.  have  the  word  in  the  text.   I  do  not  think  that  his  proposed 
alteration  is  an  improvement. 

27  The  word  is  &jroT€ixffa,  which  means  what  I  have  translated.  The 
purpose  of  circumvallation  was  to  take  and  sometimes  also  to  destroy 
a  fortress.    Schweig.  translates  Iho  word  hy  *destruam,'  and  that  is 
perhaps  not  contrary  to  the  meaning  of  the  text ;  but  it  is  not  the  exact 
meaning  of  the  word. 


308  EPICIETUS. 


my  movements  lowards  action  (oppyv)  in  obedience  to 
God.28  Is  it  his  will  that  I  shall  have  fever  ?  It  is  my 
will  also.  Is  it  his  will  that  1  should  move  towards  any 
thing?  It  is  my  will  also.  Is  it  his  will  that  I  should 
obtain  any  thing?  It  is  my  wish  also.29  Does  he  not 
will?  I  do  not  wish.  Is  it  his  will  that  I  die,  is  it  his 
will  that  I  bo  put  to  the  rack  ?  It  is  my  will  then  to  die  : 
it  is  my  will  then  to  be  put  to  the  rack.  Who  then  is 
still  able  to  hinder  me  contrary  to  my  own  judgment,  or  to 
compel  me?  No  more  than  he  can  hinder  or  compel  Zeus. 
Thus  the  more  cautious  of  travellers  also  act.  A  traveller 
has  heard  that  the  road  is  infested  by  robbers  ;  he  does  not 
venture  to  enter  on  it  alone,  but  he  waits  for  the  companion- 
ship on  the  road  either  of  an  ambassador,  or  of  a  quaestor, 
or  of  a  proconsul,  and  when  he  has  attached  himself  to  such 
persons  he  goes  along  the  road  safely.  So  in  the  world30 
the  wise  man  acts.  There  are  many  companies  of  robbers, 
tyrants,  storms,  difficulties,  losses  of  that  which  is  dearest. 
"Where  is  there  any  place  of  refuge  ?  how  shall  he  pass 
along  without  being  attacked  by  rubbers  ?  what  company 
shall  he  wait  for  that  he  may  pass  along  in  safety  ?  to  whom 
shall  he  attach  himself?  To  what  person  generally?  to 
the  rich  man,  to  the  man  of  consular  rank?  and  what  is 
the  use  of  that  to  me?  Such  a  man  is  stripped  himself, 
groans  and  laments.  But  what  if  the  fellow  companion 
himself  turns  against  me  and  becomes  my  robber,  what 
shall  I  do  ?  I  will  be  a  friend  of  Caesar  :  when  I  am  Caesar's 
companion  no  man  will  wrong  me.  In  the  first  place,  that 
I  may  become  illustrious,  what  things  must  I  endure  and 

28  In  this  passage  and  in  what  follows  we  find  the  emphatic  affirma- 
tion of  the  duty  of  conformity  and  of  the  subjection  of  man's  will  to  the 
"will  of  God.     The  words  are  conclusive  evidence  of  the  doctrine  of 
Epictetus  that  a  man  ought  to  subject  himself  in  all  things  to  the  will 
of  God  or  to  that  which  he  believes  to  be  the  will  of  God.   No  Christian 
martyr  ever  proclaimed  a  more  solemn  obedience  to  God's  will.    The 
Christian  martyr  indeed  has  given  perfect  proof  of  his  sincerity  by 
enduring  torments  and  death:  the  heathen  philosopher  was  not  put  to 
the  same  test,  and  we  cannot  therefore  say  that  he  would  have  been 
able  to  bear  it. 

29  In  this  passage  the  distinction  must  be  observed  between  0e'Aw  and 
6oiSAo/wu,  which  the  Latin  translators  have  not  observed,  nor  Mrs. 
Carter.    See  Schweig.'s  note  on  s.  90. 

*  iv  T$  K<J<r/iy  :  he  means  'on  earth.' 


EFICTETUS.  309 

suffer?  how  often  and  by  how  many  mu«t  1  be  rotted? 
Then,  if  I  become  Caesar's  friend,  he  also  is  mortal.  And 
if  Caesar  from  any  circumstance  becomes  my  enemy,  where 
is  it  best  for  me  to  retire  ?  Into  a  desert  ?  Well,  does  fever 
not  come  there?  What  shall  be  done  then?  Is  it  not 
possible  to  find  a  safe  fellow  traveller,  a  faithful  one,  strong, 
secure  against  all  surprises  ?  Thus  he  considers  and  per- 
ceives that  if  he  attaches  himself  to  God,  he  will  make  his 
journey  in  safety. 

How  do  you  understand  '  attaching  yourself  to  God  ? 
In  this  sense,  that  whatever  God  wills,  a  man  also  shall 
will;  and  what  God  does  not  will,  a  man  also  shall  not 
will.  How  then  shall  this  be  done  ?  In  what  other  way 
than  by  examining  the  movements  (6/o/xas,  the  acts)  of 
God31  and  his  administration?  What  has  he  given  to  me 
as  my  own  and  in  my  own  power  ?  what  has  he  reserved 
to  himself?  He  has  given  to  me  the  things  which  are  in 
the  power  of  the  will  (ra  irpoatpertKa) :  he  has  put  them 
in  my  power  free  from  impediment  and  hindrance.  How 
was  he  able  to  make  the  earthy  body  free  from  hindrance  ? 
[He  could  not],  and  accordingly  he  has  subjected  to  the 
revolution  of  the  whole  (TTJ  TU>V  oXcov  TrepioSw)32  possessions, 
household  things,  house,  children,  wife.  Why  then  do  I 
fight  against  God  ?  why  do  I  will  what  does  not  depend  on 
the  will  ?  why  do  I  will  to  have  absolutely  what  is  not 
granted  to  me  ?  But  how  ought  I  to  will  to  have  things  ? 
In  the  way  in  which  they  are  given  and  as  long  as  they  are 
given.  But  he  who  has  given  takes  away.33  Why  then 
do  I  resist?  I  do  not  say  that  I  shall  be  a  fool  if  I  use 
force  to  one  who  is  stronger,  but  I  shall  first  be  unjust. 
For  whence  had  I  things  when  I  came  into  the  world  ? — 

Schweig.  expresses  his  surprise  that  Epictetus  has  applied  this  word 
to  God.    He  says  that  Wolf  has  translated  it  •  Dei  appetitionem,' 
pton  *  impetum.'    He  says  that  he  has  translated  it '  consilium.' 
It  is  not  unusual  for  men  to  speak  of  God  in  the  same  words  in  which 
they  speak  of  man. 

8«  Bee  ii.  1.  18.  Sohweig.  expected  that  Epictetus  would  have  said 
1  body  and  possessions  etc.*  I  assume  that  Epictetus  did  say  *  body  and 
possessions  etc./  and  that  his  pupil  or  some  copyist  of  MSS.  has  omitted 
the  word  *  body.' 

™  *  The  Lord  gave  and  the  Lord  hath  taken  a\rcy.  Job  i.  21.'  Mr* 
Carter. 


310  EPICTETUS. 

My  father  gave  them  to  me — And  who  gave  them  to  him? 
and  who  made  the  sun  ?  and  who  made  the  fruits  of  the 
earth  ?  and  who  the  seasons  ?  and  who  made  the  connection 
of  men  with  one  another  and  their  fellowship  ? 

Then  after  receiving  everything  from  another  and  even 
yourself,  are  you  angry  and  do  you  blame  the  giver  if  he 
takes  any  thing  from  you?  Who  are  you,  and  for  what 
purpose  did  you  come  into  the  world  ?  Did  not  he  (God) 
introduce  you  here,  did  he  not  show  you  the  light,  did  he 
not  give  you  fellow  workers,  and  perceptions  and  reason  ? 
and  as  whom  did  he  introduce  you  here?  did  he  not  intro- 
duce you  as  subject  to  death,  and  as  one  to  live  on  the 
earth  with  a  little  flesh,  and  to  observe  his  administration, 
and  to  join  with  him  in  the  spectacle  and  the  festival  for 
a  short  time?  Will  you  not  then,  as  long  as  you  have 
been  permitted,  after  seeing  the  spectacle  and  the  solemnity, 
when  he  leads  you  out,  go  with  adoration  of  him  and  thanks 
for  what  you  have  heard  and  seen  ? — No ;  but  I  would  still 
enjoy  the  feast. — The  initiated  too  would  wish  to  be  longer 
in  the  initiation  :34  and  perhaps  also  those  at  Olympia  to 
see  other  athletes ;  but  the  solemnity  is  ended :  go  away 
like  a  grateful  and  modest  man ;  make  room  for  others : 
others  also  must  be  born,  as  you  were,  and  being  born  they 
must  have  a  place,  and  houses  and  necessary  things.  And 
if  the  first  do  not  retire,  what  remains  ?  Why  are  you  in- 
satiable ?  Why  are  you  not  content  ?  why  do  you  contract 
the  world  ? — Yes,  but  I  would  have  my  little  children  with 
me  and  my  wife — What,  are  they  yours  ?  do  they  not  belong 
to  the  giver,  and  to  him  who  made  you  ?  then  will  you  not 
give  up  what  belongs  to  others  ?  will  you  not  give  way  to 
him  who  is  superior? — Why  then  did  he  introduce  me  into 
the  world  on  these  conditions  ? — And  if  the  conditions  do 
not  suit  you,  depart.35  He  has  no  need  of  a  spectator  who 

14  The  initiated  (pforat)  are  those  who  were  introduced  with  solemn 
ceremonies  into  some  great  religious  body.  These  ceremonies  are  de- 
scribed by  Dion  Prus.  Orat.  xii.,  quoted  by  Upton. 

35  "  And  is  this  all  the  comfort,  every  serious  reader  will  be  apt  to 
say,  which  one  of  the  best  philosophers,  in  one  of  his  noblest  discourses, 
can  give  to  the  good  man  under  severe  distress?  'Either  tell  yourself 
that  present  suffering  void  of  future  hope,  is  no  evil,  or  give  up  your 
existence  and  mingle  with  the  elements  of  the  Universe ' !  Unspeakably 
more  rational  and  more  worthy  of  infinite  goodness  is  our  blessed 


EIIOTETUS.  311 

is  not  satisfied.  He  wants  those  who  join  in  the  festival, 
those  who  take  part  in  the  chorus,  that  they  may  rather 
applaud,  admire,  and  celebrate  with  hymns  the  solemnity. 
But  those  who  can  bear  no  trouble,  and  the  cowardly  he 
will  not  unwillingly  s»ee  absent  from  the  great  assembly 
(Trav^yupt?) ;  for  they  did  not  when  they  were  present  be- 
have as  they  ought  to  do  at  a  festival  nor  fill  up  their  place 
properly,  but  they  lamented,  found  fault  with  the  deity, 
fortune,  their  companions ;  not  seeing  both  what  they  had, 
and  their  own  powers,  which  they  received  for  contrary 
purposes,  the  powers  of  magnanimity,  of  a  generous  mind, 
manly  spirit,  and  what  we  are  now  inquii  ing  about,  free- 
dom.— For  what  purpose  then  have  I  received  these  things  ? 
— To  use  them — How  long  ? — So  long  as  he  who  has  lent 
them  chooses. — What  if  they  are  necessary  to  me  ? — Do  not 
attach  yourself  to  them  and  they  will  not  be  necessary :  do 
not  say  to  yourself  that  they  are  necessary,  and  then  they 
are  not  necessary. 

This  study  you  ought  to  practise  from  morning  to  even- 
ing, beginning  with  the  smallest  things  and  those  most 
liable  to  damage,  with  an  earthen  pot,  with  a  cup.  Then 
proceed  in  this  way  to  a  tunic,  to  a  little  dog,  to  a  horse, 
to  a  small  estate  in  land  :  then  to  yourself,  to  your  body, 
to  the  parts  of  your  body,  to  your  children,  to  your  wife,  to 
your  brothers.  Look  all  round  and  throw  these  things 
from  you  (which  are  not  yours).  Purge  your  opinions,  so 
that  nothing  cleave  to  you  of  the  things  which  are  Dot 
your  own,  that  nothing  grow  to  you,  that  nothing  give 
you  pain  when  it  is  torn  from  you  ;36  and  say,  while  you 

Master's  exhortation  to  the  persecuted  Christian:  'Kejoice  and  be 
exceedingly  glad,  for  great  is  your  reward  iu  heaven.' "  Mrs.  Carter. 

I  do  not  think  that  Mrs.  Carter  has  represented  correctly  the  teaching 
of  Epictetus.  He  is  addressing  men  who  were  not  Christians,  but  were, 
as  he  assumes,  believers  in  God  or  in  the  Gods,  and  his  argument  is 
that  a  man  ought  to  be  contented  with  things  as  they  are,  because  they 
are  from  God.  If  he  cannot  be  contented  with  things  as  they  are,  and 
make  the  best  of  them,  the  philosopher  can  say  no  more  to  the  man.  He 
tells  him  to  depart.  What  else  could  he  say  to  a  grumbler,  who  is  also 
a  believer  in  God?  If  he  is  not  a  believer,  Epictetus  might  say  the 
same  to  him  also.  The  case  is  past  help  or  advice. 

The  Christian  doctrine,  of  which  probably  Epictetus  knew  nothing,  is 
very  different.  It  promises  future  happiness  on  certain  conditions  to 
Christians,  but  to  Christians  only,  if  I  understand  it  right. 

M  See  the  note  of  Schweig.  on  this  passage. 


812  EPIOTBTUS. 

are  daily  exercising  yourself  as  you  do  there  (in  the  school), 
not  that  you  are  philosophizing,  for  this  is  an  arrogant 
(offensive)  expression,  but  that  you  are  presenting  an 
asserter  of  freedom  :37  for  this  is  really  freedom.  To  this 
freedom  Diogenes  was  called  by  Antisthenes,  and  he  said 
that  he  could  no  longer  be  enslaved  by  any  man.  For 
this  reason  when  he  was  taken  prisoner,38  how  did  he 
behave  to  the  pirates  ?  Did  he  call  any  of  them  master  ? 
and  I  do  not  speak  of  the  name,  for  I  am  not  afraid  of  the 
word,  but  of  the  state  of  mind,  by  which  the  word  is  pro- 
duced. How  did  he  reprove  them  for  feeding  badly  their 
captives  ?  How  was  he  sold  ?  Did  he  seek  a  master  ?  no ; 
but  a  slave.  And  when  he  was  sold  how  did  he  behave  to 
his  master?39  Immediately  be  disputed  with  him  and 
said  to  his  master  that  he  ought  not  to  be  dressed  as  he 
was,  nor  shaved  in  such  a  manner ;  and  about  the  children 
he  told  them  how  he  ought  to  bring  them  up.  And  what 
was  strange  in  this  ?  for  if  his  master  had  bought  an 
exercise  master,  would  he  have  employed  him  in  the  exer- 
cises of  the  palaestra  as  a  servant  or  as  a  master  ?  and  sc 
if  he  had  bought  a  physician  or  an  architect.  And  so  in 
every  matter,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  he  who  has 
skill  must  be  the  superior  of  him  who  has  not.  Whoever 
then  generally  possesses  the  science  of  life,  what  else  must 
he  be  than  master  ?  For  who  is  master  in  a  ship  ?  The 
man  who  governs  the  helm?  Why?  Because  he  who 
will  not  obey  him  suffers  for  it.  But  a  master  can  give 
me  stripes.  Can  he  do  it  then  without  suffering  for  it  ?  So 
I  also  used  to  think.  But  because  he  cannot  do  it  without 
suffering  for  it,  for  this  reason  it  is  not  in  his  power  :  and 
no  man  can  do  what  is  unjust  without  suffering  for  it. 
And  what  is  the  penalty  for  him  who  puts  his  own  slave/ 
in  chains?40  what  do  you  think  that  is?  The  fact  fff. 
putting  the  slave  in  chains : — and  you  also  will  admit  this, 

87  The  word  is  Kapwlffrrjv  difta*.  See  iii.  24. 76  and  the  note  15 :  also 
Upton's  note  on  this  passage.  Schweig.  says  that  he  does  not  quito 
understand  why  Epictetus  here  says  8t8<fo/cu  fcaprfcrrrjj',  *  dare  vindicem  * 
or  '  adsertorem,'  instead  of  saying  *  vindicate  sese  in  libertatem.' 

«  See  iii  24.  66,  ii.  13.  24. 

19  See  the  same  story  in  Aulus  Gtellius  (ii.  c.  18),  who  says  that 
Xeniades,  a  Corinthian,  bought  Diogenes,  manumitted  him  and  made 
Jum  the  master  of  his  children. 

«•  fififi  Rohwefer.'B  note  15. 


EPICTETU8.  813 

if  you  choose  to  maintain  the  truth,  that  man  is  not  a  wild 
beast,  but  a  tame  animal.  For  when  is  a  vine  doing  badly  ? 
When  it  is  in  a  condition  contrary  to  its  nature.  When 
is  a  cock?  Just  the  same.  Therefore  a  man  also  is  so. 
What  then  is  a  man's  nature  ?  To  bite,  to  kick,  and  to 
throw  into  prison  and  to  behead  ?  No ;  but  to  do  good, 
to  co-operate  with  others,  to  wish  them  well.  At  that 
time  then  he  is  in  a  bad  condition,  whether  you  chose  to 
admit  it  or  not,  when  he  is  acting  foolishly. 

Socrates  then  did  not  fare  badly?— No;  but  his  judges 
and  his  accusers  did. — Nor  did  Helvidius41  at  Eome  fare 
badly  ? — No ;  but  his  murderer  did.  How  do  you  mean? — 
The  same  as  you  do  when  you  say  that  a  cock  has  not 
fared  badly  when  he  has  gained  the  victory  and  been 
severely  wounded ;  but  that  the  cock  has  fared  badly  when 
he  has  been  defeated  and  is  unhurt :  nor  do  you  call  a  dog 
fortunate,  who  neither  pursues  game  nor  labours,  but 
when  you  see  him  sweating,42  when  you  see  him  in  pain 
and  panting  violently  after  running.  What  paradox  (un- 
usual thing)  do  we  utter  if  we  say  that  the  evil  in  every 
thing  is  that  which  is  contrary  to  the  nature  of  the  thing  ? 
Is  this  a  paradox  ?  for  do  you  not  say  this  in  the  case  of 
all  other  things  ?  Why  then  in  the  case  of  man  only  do 
you  think  differently  ?  But  because  we  say  that  the  nature 
of  man  is  tame  (gentle)  and  social  and  faithful,  you  will 
not  say  that  this  is  a  paradox?43  It  is  not— -What  then 
is  it  a  paradox  to  say  that  a  man  is  not  hurt  when  he  is 
whipped,  or  put  in  chains,  or  beheaded  ?  does  he  not,  if  he 
suffers  nobly,  come  off  even  with  increased  advantage  and 
profit  ?  But  is  he  not  hurt,  who  suffers  in  a  most  pitiful 
and  disgraceful  way,  who  in  place  of  a  man  becomes  a 
wolf,  or  viper  or  wasp  ? 

Well  then  let  us  recapitulate  the  things  which  have 
been  agreed  on.  The  man  who  is  not  under  restraint  is 
free,  to  whom  things  are  exactly  in  that  state  in  which  ho 
wishes  them  to  be ;  but  he  who  can  be  restrained  or  com- 
pelled or  hindered,  or  thrown  into  any  circumstances 

41  See  i.  2,  note  5. 

42  I  do  not  know  if  dogs  sweat;  at  least  in  a  state  of  health  I  havt 
never  seen  it.    But  this  is  a  question  for  the  learned  in  dog  science, 

48  See  Schweig.'s  note. 


314  EPICTETUS. 

against  his  will,  is  a  slave.  But  who  is  free  from  restraint? 
Ho  who  desires  nothing  that  belongs  to  (is  in  the  power 
of)  others.  And  what  are  the  things  which  belong  to 
others  ?  Those  which,  are  not  in  our  power  either  to  have 
or  not  to  have,  or  to  have  of  a  certain  kind  or  in  a  certain 
manner.44  Therefore  the  body  belongs  to  another,  the 
parts  of  the  body  belong  to  another,  possession  (property) 
belongs  to  another.  If  then  you  are  attached  to  any  of 
these  things  as  your  own,  you  will  pay  the  penalty  which 
it  is  proper  for  him  to  pay  who  desires  what  belongs  to 
another.  This  road  leads  to  freedom,  this  is  the  only  way 
of  escaping  from  slavery,  to  be  able  to  say  at  last  with  all 
your  soul 

Lead  me,  O  Zeus,  and  thou  O  destiny, 
*     The  way  that  I  am  bid  by  you  to  go.44 

But  what  do  you  say,  philosopher?  The  tyrant  summons 
you  to  say  something  which  does  not  become  you.  Do  you 
say  it  or  do  you  not  ?  Answer  me — Let  me  consider — Will 
you  consider  now  ?  But  when  you  were  in  the  school,  what 
was  it  which  you  used  to  consider  ?  Did  you  not  study 
what  are  the  things  that  are  good  and  what  are  bad,  and 
what  things  are  neither  one  nor  the  other  ? — I  did. — What 
then  was  our  opinion? — That  just  and  honourable  acts 
were  good ;  and  that  unjust  and  disgraceful  (foul)  acts 
were  bad. — Is  life  a  good  thing? — No. — Is  death  a  bad 
thing? — No. — Is  prison? — No. — But  what  did  we  think 
about  mean  and  faithless  words  and  betrayal  of  a  friend 
and  flattery  of  a  tyrant? — That  they  are  bad. — Well  then, 
you  are  not  considering,  nor  have  you  considered  nor  de- 
liberated. For  what  is  the  matter  for  consideration,  is  it 
whether  it  is  becoming  for  me,  when  I  have  it  in  my 
power,  to  secure  for  myself  the  greatest  of  good  things, 
and  not  to  secure  for  myself  (that  is,  not  to  avoid)  the 
greatest  evils  ?  A  fine  inquiry  indeed,  and  necessary,  and 
one  that  demands  much  deliberation.  Man,  why  do  you 
mock  us?  Such  an  inquiry  is  never  made.  If  you  really 

44  As  Upton  remarks,  Epictetus  is  referring  to  the  four  categories  of 
the  Stoics. 

45  Epictetus,  Encheiridion  c.  52.    M.  Antoninus,  Gatak.  2d.  ed.  1697, 
Annot.  p.  96. 


EPIOTETUS.  315 

imagined  that  base  things  were  bad  and  honourable  things 
were  good,  and  that  all  other  things  were  neither  good  nor 
bad,  you  would  not  even  have  approached  this  enquiry, 
nor  have  come  near  it ;  but  immediately  you  would  have 
been  able  to  distinguish  them  by  the  understanding  as  you 
would  do  (in  other  cases)  by  the  vision.  For  when  do 
you  inquire  if  black  things  are  white,  if  heavy  things  are 
light,  and  do  not  comprehend  the  manifest  evidence  of  the 
senses  ?  How  then  do  you  now  say  that  you  are  consider- 
ing whether  things  which  are  neither  good  nor  bad  ought 
to  be  avoided  more  than  things  which  are  bad  ?  But  you 
do  not  possess  these  opinions ;  and  neither  do  these  things 
seem  to  you  to  be  neither  good  nor  bad,  but  you  think 
that  they  are  the  greatest  evils;  nor  do  you  think  those 
other  things  (mean  and  faithless  words,  etc.)  to  be  evils,  but 
matters  which  do  not  concern  us  at  all.  For  thus  from  the 
beginning  you  have  accustomed  yourself.  Where  am  I? 
In  the  schools  :  and  are  any  listening  to  me  ?  I  am  discours- 
ing among  philosophers.  But  I  have  gone  out  of  the 
school.  Away  with  this  talk  of  scholars  and  fools.  Thus 
a  friend  is  overpowered  by  the  testimony  of  a  philosopher : 46 
thus  a  philosopher  becomes  a  parasite ;  thus  he  lets  him- 
self for  hire  for  money :  thus  in  the  senate  a  man  does  not 
say  what  he  thinks ;  in  private  (in  the  school)  he  proclaims 
his  opinions.47  You  are  a  cold  and  miserable  little  opinion, 
suspended  from  idle  words  as  from  a  hair.  But  keep  your- 
self strong  and  fit  for  the  uses  of  life  and  initiated  by  being 
exercised  in  action.  How  do  you  hear  (the  report)  ? — I  do 
not  say,  that  your  child  is  dead — for  how  could  you  bear 
that? — but  that  your  oil  is  spilled,  your  wine  drunk  up. 
Do  you  act  in  such  a  way  that  one  standing  by  you  while 
you  are  making  a  great  noise,  may  say  this  only,  Philo- 

**  Stoicus  occidit  Baream,  delator  amicum, 
Discipulumque  senex. 

Juvenal,  iii.  116. 

Epictetus  is  supposed  to  allude  to  the  crime  of  Egnatius  Celer  who 
accused  Barea  Soranus  at  Borne  in  the  reign  of  Nero  (Tacit.  Ann. 
xvi.  32). 

47  Mrs.  Carter  says  that  *  there  is  much  obscurity  and  some  variety  of 
reading  in  seYeral  lines  of  the  original.'  But  see  Schweig.'s  notes. 
Epictetus  is  showing'  that  talk  about  philosophy  is  useless :  philosophy 
should  be  practical. 


316  EPICTETUS. 

gopher,  you  say  something  different  in  the  school.  Why 
do  you  deceive  us?  Why,  when  you  are  only  a  worm,  do 
you  say  that  you  are  a  man  ?  I  should  like  to  be  present 
when  some  of  the  philosophers  is  lying  with  a  woman,  that 
I  might  see  how  he  is  exerting  himself,  and  what  words  he 
is  uttering,  and  whether  he  remembers  his  title  of  philo- 
sopher, and  the  words  which  he  hears  or  says  or  reads. 

And  what  is  this  to  liberty?  Nothing  else  than  this, 
whether  you  who  are  rich  choose  or  not. — And  who  is 
your  evidence  for  this  ? — who  else  than  yourselves  ?  who 
have  a  powerful  master  (Caesar),  and  who  live  in  obedi- 
ence to  his  nod  and  motion,  and  who  faint  if  he  only  looks 
at  you  with  a  scowling  countenance ;  you  who  court  old 
women48  and  old  men,  and  say,  I  cannot  do  this :  it  is  not 
in  my  power.  Why  is  it  not  in  your  power  ?  Did  you 
not  lately  contend  with  me  and  say  that  you  are  free? 
But  Aprulla49  has  hindered  me?  Tell  the  truth  then, 
slave,  and  do  not  run  away  from  your  masters,  nor  deny, 
nor  venture  to  produce  any  one  to  assert  your  freedom 
(/capTrtcrr^v),  when  you  have  so  many  evidences  of  your 
slavery.  And  indeed  when  a  man  is  compelled  by  love  to 
do  something  contrary  to  his  opinion  (judgment),  and  at 
the  same  time  sees  the  better,  but  has  not  the  strength  to 
follow  it,  one  might  consider  him  still  more  worthy  of 
excuse  as  being  held  by  a  certain  violent  and  in  a  manner 
a  divine  power.50  But  who  could  endure  you  who  are  in 

48  Horace  Sat.  ii.  5. 

49  Aprulla  is  a  Koman  woman's  name.    It  means  some  old  woman 
who  is  courted  for  her  money. 

50  Compare  Plato  (Symposium,  p.  206) :  •  All  men  conceive  both  as  to 
the  body  and  as  to  the  soul,  and  when  they  have  arrived  at  a  certain  age, 
our  nature  desires  to  procreate.    But  it  cannot  procreate  in  that  which 
is  ugly,  but  in  that  which  is  beautiful.   For  the  conjunction  of  man  and 
woman  is  generation;  but  this  act  is  divine,  and  this  in  the  animal 
which  is  mortal  is  divine,  conceiving  and  begetting.'    See  what  is  said 
in  ii.  23,  note  10  on  marrying.    In  a  certain  sense  the  procreation  of 
children  is  a  duty,  and  consequently  the  providing  for  them  is  also  a 
duty.    It  is  the  fulfilling  of  the  will  and  purpose  or  the  Deity  to  people 
the  earth ;  and  therefore  the  act  of  procreation  is  divine.    So  a  man's 
duty  is  to  labour  in  some  way,  and  if  necessary,  to  earn  his  living  and 
sustain  the  life  which  he  has  received;  and  this  is  also  a  divine  act. 
Paul's  opinion  of  marriage  is  contained  in  Cor.  i.  7.    Some  of  his  teach- 
ing on  this  matter  has  been  justly  condemned.    He  has  no  conception  of 
the  true  nature  of  marriage ;  at  leabt  he  does  not  show  that  he  has  in 


EPICTETUS.  317 

love  with  old  women  and  old  men,  and  wipe  the  old 
women's  noses,  and  wash  them  and  give  them  presents, 
and  also  wait  on  them  like  a  slave  when  they  are  sick, 
and  at  the  same  time  wish  them  dead,  and  question  the 
physicians  whether  they  are  sick  unto  death  ?  And  again, 
when  in  order  to  obtain  these  great  and  much  admired 
magistracies  and  honours,  you  kiss  the  hands  of  these 
slaves  of  others,  and  so  you  are  not  the  slave  even  of  free 
men.  Then  you  walk  about  before  me  in  stately  fashion 
a  praetor  or  a  consul.  Do  I  not  know  how  you  became  a 
praetor,  by  what  means  you  got  your  consulship,  who 
gave  it  to  you?  I  would  not  even  choose  to  live,  if  I 
must  live  by  help  of  Felicion51  and  endure  his  arroganoa 
and  servile  insolence :  for  I  know  what  a  slave  is,  who  is 
fortunate,  as  he  thinks,  and  puffed  up  by  pride. 

You  then,  a  man  may  say,  are  you  free  ?  I  wish,  by  the 
Gods,  and  pi-ay  to  be  free ;  but  I  am  not  yet  able  to  face 
my  masters,  1  still  value  my  poor  body,  I  value  greatly 
the  preservation  of  it  entire,  though  I  do  not  possess  it 
entire.52  But  I  can  point  out  to  you  a  free  man,  that  you 
may  no  longer  seek  an  example.  Diogenes  was  free. 
How  was  he  free  ? — not  because  ho  was  born  of  free 
parents,53  but  because  he  was  himself  free,  because  he 
had  oast  off  all  the  handles  of  slavery,  and  it  was  not 
possible  for  any  man  to  approach  him,  nor  had  any  man 
the  means  of  laying  hold  of  him  to  enslave  him.  He  had 
everything  easily  loosed,  everything  only  hanging  to  him. 
If  you  laid  hold  of  his  property,  ho  would  have  rather 
let  it  go  and  be  yours,  than  ho  would  have  followed  you 
for  it :  if  you  had  laid  hold  of  his  leg,  he  would  have  let 
go  his  leg ;  if  of  all  his  body,  all  his  poor  body ;  his 
intimates,  friends,  country,  just  the  same.  For  he  knew 

this  chapter.  His  teaching  is  impracticable,  contrary  to  that  of  .Epietetus, 
and  to  the  nature  and  constitution  of  man ;  and  it  is  rejected  by  the 
good  sense  of  Christians  who  affect  to  receive  his  teaching ;  except,  I 
suppose,  by  the  superstitious  body  of  Christians,  who  recommend  and 
commend  the  so-called  religious,  and  unmarried  life. 

51  Felicion.    See  i.  19,  p.  62. 

82  Epietetus  alludes  to  his  lameness :  compare  i.  8. 14,  i.  16.  20,  and 
other  passages.  Upton. 

8*  Schweig.  doubts  if  the  words  ov  y&p  T$J/,  which  I  have  omitted,  aw 
genuine,  and  gives  his  reasons  for  the  doubt 


818  EPICTETUS. 

from  whence  he  had  them,  and  from  whom,  and  on  what 
conditions.  His  true  parents  indeed,  the  Gods,  and  his 
real  country  he  would  never  have  deserted,  nor  would  he 
have  yielded  to  any  man  in  obedience  to  them  and  to  their 
orders,  nor  would  any  man  have  died  for  his  country  more 
readily.  For  he  was  not  used  to  inquire  when  he  should 
be  considered  to  have  done  anything  on  behalf  of  the  whole 
of  things  (the  universe,  or  all  the  world),  but  he  remem- 
bered that  every  thing  which  is  done  comes  from  thence 
and  is  done  on  behalf  of  that  country  and  is  commanded 
by  him  who  administers  it.64  Therefore  see  what  Dio- 
genes himself  says  and  writes: — "For  this  reason,  he 
says,  Diogenes,  it  is  in  your  power  to  speak  both  with 
the  King  of  the  Persians  and  with  Archidamus  the  king 
of  the  Lacedaemonians,  as  you  please."  Was  it  because 
he  was  born  of  free  parents  ?  I  suppose  all  the  Athenians 
and  all  the  Lacedaemonians  because  they  were  born 
of  slaves,  could  not  talk  with  them  (these  kings)  as 
they  wished,  but  feared  and  paid  court  to  them.  Why 
then  does  he  say  that  it  is  in  his  power  ?  Because  I  do 
not  consider  the  poor  body  to  be  my  own,  because  I  want 
nothing,  because  law B5  is  every  thing  to  me,  and  nothing 
else  is.  These  were  the  things  which  permitted  him  to  be 
free. 

And  that  you  may  not  think  that  I  frhow  you  the  ex- 
ample of  a  man  who  is  a  solitary  person,56  who  has  neither 
wife  nor  children,  nor  country,  nor  friends  nor  kinsmen,  by 
whom  he  could  be  bent  and  drawn  in  various  directions, 
take  Socrates  and  observe  that  he  had  a  wife  and  children, 
but  he  did  not  consider  them  as  his  own  ;  that  he  had  a 
country,  so  long  as  it  was  fit  to  have  one,  and  in  such  a 
manner  as  was  fit ;  friends  and  kinsmen  also,  but  he  held 
all  in  subjection  to  law  and  to  the  obedience  due  to  it. 
For  this  reason  he  was  the  first  to  go  out  as  a  soldier,  when 
it  was  necessary,  and  in  war  he  exposed  himself  to  danger 

54  Schweig.  has  a  note  on  this  difficult  passage,  which  is  rather 
obscure. 

53  The  sense  of  law*  (6  */<fyu>s)  can  be  collected  from  what  follows. 
Comppre  the  discourse  of  Sucrates  on  obedience  to  the  law.  (Criton, 
e.  11,  &c.) 

M  See  Schweig.'s  note  on  fa 


EPICTETUS.  319 

most  unsparingly ; 67  and  when  he  was  sent  by  the  tyrants 
to  seize  Leon,  he  did  not  even  deliberate  about  the  matter, 
because  he  thought  that  it  was  a  base  action,  and  he  knew 
that  he  must  die  (for  his  refusal),  if  it  so  happened.53 
And  what  difference  did  that  make  to  him  ?  for  he  in- 
tended to  preserve  something  else,  not  his  poor  flesh,  but 
his  fidelity,  his  honourable  character.  These  are  things 
which  could  not  be  assailed  nor  brought  into  subjection. 
Then  when  he  was  obliged  to  speak  in  defence  of  his  life, 
did  he  behave  like  a  man  who  had  children,  who  had  a 
wife  ?  No,  but  he  behaved  like  a  man  who  has  neither. 
And  what  did  he  do  when  he  was  (ordered)  to  drink  the 
poison,59  and  when  he  had  the  power  of  escaping  from 
prison,  and  when  Crito  said  to  him,  Escape  for  the  sake  ol 
your  children,  what  did  Socrates  say?60  did  he  consider 
the  power  of  escape  as  an  unexpected  gain?  By  no 
means :  he  considered  what  was  fit  and  proper ;  but  the 
rest  he  did  not  even  look  at  or  take  into  the  reckoning. 
For  he  did  not  choose,  he  said,  to  save  his  poor  body,  but 
to  save  that  which  is  increased  and  saved  by  doing  what 
is  just,  and  is  impaired  and  destroyed  by  doing  what  is 
unjust.  Socrates  will  not  save  his  life  by  a  base  act ;  he 
who  would  not  put  the  Athenians  to  the  vote  when  they 
clamoured  that  he  should  do  so,61  he  who  refused  to  obey 

57  Socrates  fought  at  Potidaea,  Amphipolis  and  Delium.    He  is  said 
to  have  gained  the  prize  for  courage  at  Delinm.     He  was  a  brave 
soldier  as  well  as  a  philosopher,  a  union  of  qualities  not  common. 
(Plato's  Apology.) 

58  Socrates  with  others  was  ordered  by  the  Thirty  tyrants,  who  at 
that  time  governed  Athens,  to  arrest  Leon  in  the  island  of  Salamis  and 
to  bring  him  to  be  put  to  death.    But  Socrates  refused  to  obey  the 
order.    Few  men  would  have  done  what  he  did  uuder  the  circum- 
stances.   (Platp's  Apology  ;  M.  Antoninus,  vii.  66.) 

48  Cicero,  Tuscul.  Disp.  i.  29. 

00  The  Dialogue  of  Plato,  named  Criton,  contains  the  arguments 
which  were  used  by  his  friends  to  persuade  Socrates  to  escape  from 
prison,  and  the  reply  of  Socratos. 

61  This  alludes  to  the  behaviour  of  Socrates  when  he  refused  to  put 
to  the  vote  the  matter  of  the  Athenian  generals  and  tht-ir  behaviour  after 
the  naval  battle  of  Arginusae.  The  violence  of  the  weather  prevented 
the  commanders  from  collecting  and  honorably  burying  those  who  fel1 
m  the  battle ;  and  the  Athenians  after  their  hasty  iashion,  wished  all 
the  commanders  to  be  put  to  death.  But  Socrates,  who  was  in  office 
at  this  time,  resisted  the  unjust  clamour  of  the  people.  Xeiwphon 
Hellenica,  i,  c.  7,  15 ;  Plato,  Apologia ;  Xenophon,  Memorab.  i.  1,  1& 


320  EPICTETUS. 

the  tyiants,  lie  who  discoursed  in  such  a  manner  about 
virtue  and  right  behaviour.  It  is  not  possible  to  save 
such  a  man's  life  by  base  acts,  but  he  is  aaved  by  dying, 
not  by  running  away.  For  the  good  actor  also  preserves 
his  character  by  stopping  when  he  ought  to  stop,  better 
than  when  he  goes  on  acting  beyond  the  proper  time. 
What  then  shall  the  children  of  Socrates  do?  "If,"  said 
Socrates,  "  I  had  gone  off  to  Thessaly,  would  you  have 
taken  care  of  them ;  and  if  I  depart  to  the  world  below, 
will  there  be  no  man  to  take  care  of  them  ?"  See  how  he 
gives  to  death  a  gentle  name  and  mocks  it.  But  if  you 
and  I  had  been  in  his  place,  we  should  have  immediately 
answered  as  philosophers  that  those  who  act  unjustly  must 
be  repaid  in  the  same  way,  and  we  should  have  added,  u  I 
shall  be  useful  to  many,  if  my  life  is  saved,  and  if  1  die, 
I  bhall  be  useful  to  no  man."  For,  if  it  had  been  neces- 
sary, we  should  have  made  our  escape  by  slipping  through 
a  small  hole.  And  how  in  that  case  should  we  have  been 
useful  to  any  man  ?  for  where  would  they  have  been  then 
staying?62  or  if  we  were  useful  to  men  while  we  were 
alive,  should  we  not  have  been  much  more  useful  to 
them  by  dying  when  we  ought  to  die,  and  as  we  ought  ? 
And  now  Socrates  being  dead,  no  less  useful  to  men,  and 
even  more  useful,  is  the  remembrance  of  that  which  he  did 
or  said  when  he  was  alive.63 

62  The  original  is  irov  yhp  &i/  en  fysvov  IKILVOL  ;  this  seems  to  mean, 
if  we  had  escaped  and  left  the  country,  where  would  those  have  been  to 
whom  we  might  have  been  useful  ?    They  would  have  been  left  behind, 
and  we  could  have  done  nothing  for  them. 

63  This  is  the  conclusion  about  Socrates,  whom  Epictetus  highly 
valued :  the  remembrance  of  what  Socrates  did  and  said  is  even  more 
useful  than  his  life.     "  The  life  of  the  dead,"  says  Cicero  of  Servius 
Sulpicius,  the  great  Roman  jurist  and  Cicero's  friend,  "  rests  in  the 
remembrance  of  the  living."    Epictetus  has  told  us  of  some  of  the  acts 
of  Socrates,  which  prove  him  to  have  been  a  brave  and  honest  man 
Ho  does  not  tell  us  here  what  Socrates  said,  which  means  what  he 
taught ;  but  he  knew  what  it  was.    Modern  writers  have  expounded 
the  matter  at  length,  and  in  a  form  which  Epictetus  would  not  or 
could  not  have  used. — Socrates  left  to  others  the  questions  which  relate 
to  the  material  world,  and  he  first  taught,  as  we  are  told,  the  things 
which  concern  man's  daily  life  and  his  intercourse  with  other  men :  in 
other  words  he  taught  Ethio  (the  principles  of  morality).    Fields  and 
trees,  he  said,  will  teach  me  nothing,  but  man  in  his  social  state  will ; 
and  man  then  is  the  proper  subject  of  the  philosophy  of  Socrates.   The 
beginning  of  this  knowledge  was.  as  he  said,  to  know  himself  according 


EPICTETU8.  321 

Think  of  these  things,  these  opinions,  these  words  :  look 
to  these  examples,  if  you  would  be  free,  if  you  desire  the 
thing  according  to  its  worth.  And  what  is  the  wonder 
if  you  buy  so  great  a  thing  at  the  price  of  things  so  many 
and  so  great  ?  For  the  sake  of  this  which  is  called  liberty, 
some  hang  themselves,  others  throw  themselves  down  pre- 
cipices, and  sometimes  even  whole  cities  have  perished: 
and  will  you  not  for  the  sake  of  the  true  and  unassailable 
and  secure  liberty  give  back  to  God  when  he  demands 
them  the  things  which  he  has  given  ?  Will  you  not,  as 
Plato  says,  study  not  to  die  only,  but  also  to  endure  tor- 
ture, and  exile,  and  scourging  and  in  a  word  to  give  up 
all  which  is  not  your  own  ?  If  you  will  not,  you  will  be 

to  the  precept  of  the  Delphic  oracle,  Know  thyself  (yv&Oi  (reaurJv) : 
and  the  object  of  his  philosophy  was  to  comprehend  the  nature  of  man 
as  a  moral  being  in  all  relations ;  and  among  these  the  relation  of  man 
to  God  as  the  father  of  all,  creator  and  ruler  of  all,  as  Plato  expresses 
it.  Socrates  taught  that  what  wo  call  death  ia  not  the  end  of  man ; 
death  is  only  the  road  to  another  life.  The  death  of  Socrates  was  con- 
formable to  his  life  and  teaching.  "  Socrates  died  not  only  with  the 
noblest  courage  and  tranquillity,  but  he  also  refused,  as  we  are  told,  to 
escape  from  death,  which  the  laws  of  the  state  permitted,  by  going  into 
exile  or  paying  a  fine,  because  as  he  said,  if  he  had  himself  consented 
to  a  fine  or  allowed  others  to  propose  it,  (Xenophon,  Apol.  §  22),  such 
an  act  would  have  been  an  admission  of  his  guilt.  Both  (Socrates 
and  Jesus)  offered  themselves  with  the  firmest  resolution  for  a  holy 
cause,  which  was  so  far  from  being  lost  through  their  death  that  it 
only  served  rather  to  make  it  the  general  cause  of  mankind.'*  (Das 
Christliche  des  Platonismus  oder  Socrates  uud  Christus,  by  F.  C.  Baur.) 

This  essay  by  Baur  is  very  ingenious.  Perhaps  there  are  some 
readers  who  will  disagree  with  him  on  many  points  in  the  comparison 
of  Socrates  and  Christus.  However  the  essay  is  well  worth  the  trouble 
of  reading. 

The  opinion  of  Rousseau  in  his  comparison  of  Jesus  and  Socrates  is 
in  some  respects  more  just  than  that  of  Baur,  though  the  learning  of 
the  Frenchman  is  very  small  when  compared  with  that  of  the  German. 
"  What  prejudices,  what  blindness  must  a  man  have/'  says  Rousseau, 
•"  when  he  dares  to  compare  the  son  of  Sophroniscus  with  the  son  of 
Mary!— The  death  of  Socrates  philosophising  tranquilly  with  his 
friends  is  the  most  gentle  that  a  man  could  desire ;  that  of  Jesus  ex- 
piring in  torments,  insulted,  jeered,  cursed  by  a  whole  people,  is  the 
most  horrible  that  a  man  could  dread.  Socrates  taking  the  poisoned 
cup  blesses  him  who  presents  it  and  weeps;  Jesus  in  his  horrible 
punishment  prays  for  his  savage  executioners.  Yes,  if  the  life  and  the 
<leuth  of  Socrates  are  those  of  a  sage,  the  life  and  the  death  of  Jesus  are 
those  of  a  God."  (Rousseau,  Emile,  vol.  iii.  p.  166.  Amsterdam,  1765.) 

Y 


822  BPICTETUS. 

a  slave  among  slaves,  even  if  you  be  ten  thousand  times 
a  consul;  and  if  you  make  your  way  up  to  the  Palace 
(Caesar's  residence),  you  will  no  less  be  a  slave  ;  and  you 
will  feel,  that  perhaps  philosophers  utter  words  which  are 
contrary  to  common  opinion  (paradoxes),  as  Clean thes  also 
said,  but  not  words  contrary  to  reason.  For  you  will  know 
by  experience  that  the  words  are  true,  and  that  there  is  no 
profit  from  the  things  which  are  valued  and  eagerly  sought 
to  those  who  have  obtained  them  ;  and  to  those  who  have 
not  yet  obtained  them  there  is  an  imagination  (</>avracria), 
that  when  these  things  are  come,  all  that  is  good  will 
come  with  them;  then,  when  they  are  come,  the  feverish 
feeling  is  the  same,  the  tossing  to  and  fro  is  the  same, 
the  satiety,  the  desire  of  things  which  are  not  present ; 
for  freedom  is  acquired  not  by  the  full  possession  of  the 
things  which  are  desired,  but  by  removing  the  desire. 
And  that  you  may  know  that  this  is  true,  as  you  have 
laboured  for  those  things,  so  transfer  your  labour  to  these; 
be  vigilant  for  the  purpose  of  acquiring  an  opinion  which. 
will  make  you  free;  pay  court  to  a  philosopher  instead  of 
to  a  rich  old  man  :  be  seen  about  a  philosopher's  doors : 
you  will  not  disgrace  yourself  by  being  seen ;  you  will 
not  go  away  empty  nor  without  profit,  if  you  go  to  the 
philosopher  as  you  ought,  and  if  not  (if  you  do  not  suc- 
ceed), try  at  least :  the  trial  (attempt)  is  not  disgraceful. 


CHAPTEE  II. 

ON   FAMILIAR  INTIMACY. 

To  this  matter  before  all  you  must  attend,  that  you  be 
never  so  closely  connected  with  any  of  your  former  in- 
timates or  friends  as  to  come  down  to  the  same  acts  as  he 
does.1  If  you  do  not  observe  this  rule,  you  will  ruin  your- 
self. But  if  the  thought  arises  in  your  mind,  "  I  .shall 
seem  disobliging  to  him  and  he  will  not  have  the  samo 
feeling  towards  me,"  remember  that  nothing  is  done  with- 

1  He  means  that  you  must  not  do  as  he  does,  because  he  does  this 
or  that  act.  The  advice  is  in  substance,  Do  not  do  as  your  friend  doea 
ainmlv  because  he  is  your  friend. 


EPICTETUS.  323 

out  cost,  nor  is  it  possible  for  a  man  if  lie  does  not  do  the 
same  things  to  be  the  same  man  that  he  was.  Choose 
then  which  of  the  two  you  will  have,  to  be  equally  loved 
by  those  by  whom  you  were  formerly  loved,  being  the 
bame  with  your  former  self;  or  being  superior,  not  to 
obtain  from  your  friends  the  same  that  you  did  before. 
For  if  this  is  better,  immediately  turn  away  to  it,  and  let 
not  other  considerations  draw  you  in  a  different  direction. 
For  no  man  is  able  to  make  progress  (improvement),  when 
he  is  wavering  between  opposite  things ;  but  if  you  have 
preferred  this  (one  thing)  to  all  things,  if  you  choose  to 
attend  to  this  only,  to  work  out  this  only,  give  up  every 
thing  else.  But  if  you  will  not  do  this,  your  wavering 
will  produce  both  these  results :  you  will  neither  improve 
as  you  ought,  nor  will  you  obtain  what  you  formerly 
obtained.  For  before  by  plainly  desiring  the  things 
which  were  worth  nothing,  you  pleased  your  associates. 
But  you  cannot  excel  in  both  kinds,  and  it  is  necessary 
that  so  far  as  you  share  in  the  one,  you  must  fall  short  in 
the  other.  You  cannot,  when  you  do  not  drink  with  those 
with  whom  you  used  to  drink,  be  agreeable  to  them  as  you 
were  before.  Choose  then  whether  you  will  be  a  hard 
drinker  and  pleasant  to  your  former  associates  or  a  sober 
man  and  disagreeable  to  them.  You  cannot,  when  you  do 
not  sing  with  those  with  whom  you  used  to  sing,  be 
equally  loved  by  them.  Choose  then  in  this  matter  also 
which  of  the  two  you  will  have.  For  if  it  is  better  to  be 
modest  and  orderly  than  for  a  man  to  say,  He  is  a  jolly 
fellow,  give  up  the  rest,  renounce  it,  turn  away  from  it, 
have  nothing  to  do  with  such  men.  But  if  this  behaviour 
shall  not  please  you,  turn  altogether  to  the  opposite :  be- 
come a  catamite,  an  adulterer,  and  act  accordingly,  and 
you  will  get  what  you  wi^h.  And  jump  up  in  the  theatre 
and  bawl  out  in  praise  of  the  dancer.  But  characters  so 
different  cannot  be  mingled :  you  cannot  act  both  Thersites 
and  Agamemnon.  If  you  intend  to  be  Thersites,2  you 
must  be  humpbacked  and  bald :  if  Agamemnon,  you  must 
be  tall  and  handsome,  and  love  those  who  are  placed  in 
obedience  to  you. 

*  See  Iliad,  ii.  216 ;  and  for  the  description  of  Agamemnon.  Iliad 
til  167. 

Y  2 


324  EPICTETtS. 

CHAPTER  III. 

WHAT  THINGS   WE  SHOULD  EXCHANGE  FOR  OTHER  THINGS. 

KEEP  this  thought  in  readiness,  when  you  lose  any  thing 
external,  what  you  acquire  in  place  of  it;  and  if  it  be 
worth  more,  never  say,  I  have  had  a  loss;  neither1  if  you 
have  got  a  horse  in  place  of  an  ass,  or  an  ox  in  place  of  a 
sheep,  nor  a  good  action  in  place  of  a  bit  of  money,  nor  in 
place  of  idle  talk  such  tranquillity  as  befits  a  man,  nor  in 
place  of  lewd  talk  if  you  have  acquired  modesty.  If  you 
remember  this,  you  will  always  maintain  your  character 
such  as  it  ought  to  be.  But  if  you  do  riot,  consider  that 
the  times  of  opportunity  are  perishing,  and  that  whatever 
pains  you  take  about  yourself,  you  are  going  to  waste 
them  all  and  overturn  them.  And  it  needs  only  a  few 
things  for  the  loss  and  overturning  of  all,  namely  a  small 
deviation  from  reason.  For  the  steerer  of  a  ship  to  upset  it, 
he  has  no  need  of  the  same  means  as  he  has  need  of  for 
saving  it:  but  if  he  turns  it  a  little  to  the  wind,  it  is 
lost ;  and  if  he  does  not  do  this  purposely,  but  has  been 
neglecting  his  duty  a  little,  the  ship  is  lost.  Something 
of  the  kind  happens  in  this  case  also :  if  you  only  fall 
a  nodding  a  little,  all  that  you  have  up  to  this  time 
collected  is  gone.  Attend  therefore  to  the  appearances  of 
things,  and  watch  over  them  ;  for  that  which  you  have  to 
preserve  is  no  small  matter,  but  it  is  modesty  and  fidelity 
and  constancy,  freedom  from  the  affects,  a  state  of  rnind 
undisturbed,  freedom  from  fear,  tranquillity,  in  a  word 
liberty.  For  what  will  you  sell  these  things  ?  See  what 
is  the  value  of  the  things  which  you  will  obtain  in  ex- 
change for  these. — But  shall  I  not  obtain  any  such  thing 
for  it  ? — See,  and  if  you  do  in  return  get  that,  see  what 
you  receive  in  place  of  it.2  I  possess  decency,  he  possesses 
a  tribuneship :  he  possesses  a  praetorship,  1  possess 
modesty.  But  I  do  not  make  acclamations  where  it  is 
not  becoming :  I  will  not  stand  up  where  I  ought  not ; 3 

1  See  Schweig.'s  note. 

2  The  text  is  obscure,  and  perhaps   there  is  something  wrong. 
Bohweighaeuser  has  a  long  noto  on  the  passage. 

*  He  alludes  to  the  factious  in  the  theatres,  iii,  4, 4 ;  iy,  2-9.    Upton. 


EPIOTETUS.  325 

for  I  am  free,  and  a  friend  of  God,  and  so  I  obey  him 
willingly.  But  I  must  not  claim  (seek)  any  thing  else, 
neither  body  nor  possession,  nor  magistracy,  nor  good  re- 
port, nor  in  fact  any  thing.  For  he  (God)  does  not  allow 
me  to  claim  (seek)  them :  for  if  he  had  chosen,  he  would 
have  made  them  good  for  me  ;  but  he  has  not  done  so,  and 
for  this  reason  1  cannot  transgress  his  commands.4  Preserve 
that  which  is  your  own  good  in  every  thing ;  and  as  to  every 
other  thing,  as  it  is  permitted,  and  so  far  as  to  behave  con- 
sistently with  reason  in  respect  to  them,  content  with  this 
only.  If  you  do  not,  you  will  be  unfortunate,  you  will 
fail  in  all  things,  you  will  be  hindered,  you  will  be  im- 
peded. These  are  the  laws  which  have  been  sent  from 
thence  (from  God) ;  these  are  the  orders.  Of  these  laws 
a  man  ought  to  be  an  expositor,  to  these  he  ought  to 
submit,  not  to  those  of  Masurius  and  Cassius.5 


CHAPTER  IV. 

TO  THOSE  WHO  ARE  DESIROUS  OF   PASSING    LIFE   IN 
TRANQUILLITY. 

EEM EMBER  that  not  only  the  desire  of  power  and  of  riches 
makes  us  mean  and  subject  to  others,  but  even  the  desire 
of  tranquillity,  and  of  leisure,  and  of  travelling  abroad, 
and  of  learning.  For  to  speak  plainly,  whatever  the 
external  thing  may  be,  the  value  which  we  set  upon  it 
places  us  in  subjection  to  others,  \\hat  then  is  the  dif- 
ference between  desiring  to  be  a  senator  or  not  desiring 
to  be  one ;  what  is  the  difference  between  desiring  power 
or  being  content  with  a  private  station ;  what  is  the  dif- 
ference between  saying,  I  am  unhappy,  I  have  nothing  to 
do,  but  I  am  bound  to  my  books  as  a  corpse  ;  or  saying,  I 
am  unhappy,  I  have  no  leisure  for  reading?  For  as  saluta- 
tions l  and  power  are  things  external  and  independent  of 

4  See  i.  25.  note  1 ;  iv.  7.  17. 

5  Mat>urius  Sabinus  was  a  great  Roman  jurisconsult  in  the  times  of 
Augustus  and   'liberius.    He  is  sometimes    named    Masurius  only 
(Peraius,  v.  90).     C.  Cassius  Longinus  was  also  a  jurist,  and,  it  is  said, 
a  descendant  of  the  Cassius,  who  was  one  of  the  nmi  derers  of  the  dic- 
tator C.  Caesar.    He  lived  from  the  time  of  Tiberius  to  that  of  Y€S- 
pasiaii. 

f.    See  this  chapter  further  on. 


326  EPICTETUS. 

the  will ,  so  is  a  book.  For  what  purpose  do  you  choose 
to  read?  Tell  me.  For  if  you  only  direct  your  purpose 
to  "being  amused  or  learning  something,  you  are  a  silly 
fellow  and  incapable  of  enduring  labour.2  But  if  you 
refer  reading  to  the  proper  end,  what  else  is  this  than  a 
tranquil  and  happy  life  (e&rota)  ?  But  if  reading  does  not 
secure  for  you  a  happy  and  tranquil  life,  what  is  the  use 
of  it  ?  But  it  does  secure  this,  the  man  replies,  and  for 
this  reason  I  am  vexed  that  I  am  deprived  of  it. — And 
what  is  this  tranquil  and  happy  life,  which  any  man  can 
impede,  I  do  not  say  Caesar  or  Caesar's  friend,  but  a  crow, 
a  piper,  a  fever,  and  thirty  thousand  other  things  ?  But 
a  tranquil  and  happy  life  contains  nothing  so  sure  as  con- 
tinuity and  freedom  from  obstacle.  Now  I  am  called  to 
do  something:  1  will  go  then  with  the  purpose  of 
observing  tho  measures  (rules)  which  I  must  keep,3  of 
acting  with  modesty,  steadiness,  without  desire  and 
aversion  to  things  external;4  and  then  that  I  may  attend 
to  men,  what  they  say,  how  they  are  moved ; 5  and  this 
not  with  any  bad  disposition,  or  that  I  may  have  some- 
thing to  blame  or  to  ridicule ;  but  I  turn  to  myself,  and 
ask  if  I  also  commit  the  same  faults.  How  then  shall  I 

2  See  Bishop  Butler's  remarks  iu  the  Preface  to  his  Sermons  vol.  ii. 
He  speaks  of  the  '  idle  way  of  reading  and  considering  things :  by  this 
means,  time  even  in  solitude  is  happily  got  rid  of  without  the  pain  of 
attention :  neither  is  any  part  of  it  more  put  to  the  account  of  idleness, 
one  can  scarce  forbear  saying,  is  spent  with  less  thought  than  great 
part  of  that  which  is  spent  in  reading.1 

*  Sed  verae  numerosque  modosque  ediscere  vitae.    Hor.  Epp.  ii.  2. 
144.    M.  Antoninus,  iii.  1. 

4  *  The  readers  perhaps  may  grow  tired  with  being  so  often  told 
what  they  will  find  it  very  difficult  to  believe,  That  because  externals 
are  not  in  our  power,  they  are  nothing  to  us.  But  in  excuse  for  this 
frequent  repetition,  it  must  be  considered  that  the  Stoics  had  reduced 
themselves  to  a  necessity  of  dwelling  on  this  consequence,  extravagant 
as  it  is,  by  rejecting  stronger  aids.  One  cannot  indeed  avoid  highly 
admiring  the  very  few,  who  attempted  to  amend  and  exalt  themselves 
on  this  foundation.  No  one  perhaps  ever  carried  the  attempt  so  far  in 
practice,  and  no  one  ever  spoke  so  well  in  support  of  the  argument  as 
Epictetus.  Yet,  notwithstanding  his  great  abilities  and  the  force  of 
his  example,  one  finds  him  strongly  complaining  of  the  want  of  success ; 
and  one  sees  from  this  circumstance  as  well  as  from  others  in  the  Stoic 
writings,  That  virtue  can  not  be  maintained  in  the  world  without  tho 
hope  of  a  future  reward.'  Mrs.  Carter. 

*  Compare  Horace,  Sat.  i.  4. 133 :  Neque  enim  cum  lectulus  etc* 


EPICTETU8.  327 

cease  to  commit  them?  Formerly  I  also  acted  wrong*, 
but  now  I  do  not :  thanks  to  God. 

Come,  when  you  have  done  these  things  and  have  at- 
tended to  them,  have  you  done  a  worse  act  than  when  you 
have  read  a  thousand  verses  or  written  as  many  ?  For  when 
you  eat,  are  you  grieved  because  you  are  not  reading  ?  are 
you  not  satisfied  with  eating  according  to  what  you  have 
learned  by  reading,  and  so  with  bathing  and  with  exer- 
cise? Why  then  do  you  not  act  consistently  in  all  things, 
both  when  you  approach  Caesar,  and  when  you  approach 
any  person  ?  If  you  maintain  yourself  free  from  pertur- 
bation, free  from  alarm,  and  steady  ;  if  you  look  rather  at 
the  things  which  are  done  and  happen  than  are  looked  at 
yourself;  if  you  do  not  envy  those  who  are  preferred  before 
you ;  if  surrounding  circumstances  (vXat)  do  not  strike  you 
with  fear  or  admiration,  what  do  you  want?  Books?  How 
or  for  what  purpose?  for  is  not  this  (the  reading  of 
books)  a  preparation  for  life?  and  is  not  life  itself 
(living)  made  up  of  certain  other  things  than  this  ?  This 
is  just  as  if  an  athlete  should  weep  when  he  enters  the 
stadium,  because  he  is  not  being  exercised  outside  of  it. 
It  was  for  this  purpose  that  you  used  to  practise  exercise  ; 
for  this  purpose  were  used  the  halteres  (weights),6  the  dust, 
the  young  men  as  antagonists ;  and  do  you  seek  for  those 
things  now  when  it  is  the  time  of  action  ?  This  is  just  as 
if  in  the  topic  (matter)  of  assent  when  appearances  pre- 
sent themselves,  some  of  which  can  be  comprehended,  and 
some  cannot  be  comprehended,  we  should  not  choose  to 
distinguish  them  but  should  choose  to  read  what  has  been 
written  about  comprehension  (/cara^i/as). 

What  then  is  the  reason  of  this  ?  The  reason  is  that 
we  have  never  read  for  this  purpose,  we  have  never  written 
for  this  purpose,  so  that  we  may  in  our  actions  use  in  away 
conformable  to  nature  the  appearances  presented  to  us ; 
but  we  terminate  in  this,  in  learning  what  is  said,  and  in 
being  able  to  expound  it  to  another,  in  resolving  a  syllo- 
gism,7 and  in  handling  the  hypothetical  syllogism.  For 

•  See  i.  4.  note  5,  iii.  15. 4 ;  and  i.  24. 1,  i.  29. 34.  The  athletes  were 
oiled,  but  they  used  to  rub  themselves  with  dust  io  be  enabled  to  lay 
hold  of  one  another. 

7  M.  Antoninus,  i.  17,  thanks  the  Gods  that  ho  did  not  waste  hi* 
time  in  the  resolution  of  syllogisms. 


328  EPICTETUS. 

this  reason  where  our  study  (purpose)  is,  there  alone  is 
the  impediment.  Would  you  have  by  all  means  the 
things  which  are  not  in  your  power?  Be  prevented 
then,  be  hindered,  fail  in  your  purpose.  But  if  we  read 
what  is  written  about  action  (efforts,  op//,??),8  not  that  we 
may  see  what  is  said  about  action,  but  that  we  may  act 
well :  if  we  read  what  is  said  about  desire  and  aversion 
{avoiding  things),  in  order  that  we  may  neither  fail  in 
our  desires,  nor  fall  into  tliat  which  we  try  to  avoid ;  if 
we  read  what  is  said  about  duty  (officium),  in  order  thai 
remembering  the  relations  (of  things  to  one  another)  we 
may  do  nothing  irrationally  nor  contrary  to  these  rela- 
tions ;  we  should  not  be  vexed  in  being  hindered  as  to  our 
readings,  but  we  should  bo  satisfied  with  doing  the  acts? 
which  are  conformable  (to  the  relations),  and  we  should 
be  reckoning  not  what  so  far  we  have  been  accustomed  to 
reckon :  To-day  I  have  read  so  many  verses,  I  have  written 
so  many ;  but  (we  should  say),  To-day  I  have  employed 
my  action  as  it  is  taught  by  the  philosophers  ;  I  have  not 
employed  my  desire  ;  I  have  used  avoidance  (croAt'cm)  only 
with  respect  to  things  which  are  within  the  power  of  my 
will ;  I  have  not  been  afraid  of  such  a  person,  I  have  not 
been  prevailed  upon  by  the  entreaties  of  another ;  I  have 
exercised  my  patience,9  my  abstinence,  my  co-operation 
with  others  ;  and  so  we  should  thank  God  for  what  we 
ought  to  thank  him. 

But  now  we  do  not  know  that  we  also  in  another  way 
are  like  the  many.  Another  man  is  afraid  that  he  shall 
not  have  power :  you  are  afraid  that  you  will.  Do  not  do* 
so,  my  man  ;  but  as  you  ridicule  him  who  is  afraid  that  he- 
shall  not  have  power,  so  ridicule  yourself  also.  For  it 
makes  no  difference  whether  you  are  thirsty  like  a  mar* 
who  has  a  fever,  or  have  a  dread  of  water  like  a  man  who* 
is  mad.  Or  how  will  you  still  be  able  to  say  as  Socrates 
did,  If  so  it  pleases  God,  so  let  it  be  ?  Do  you  think  that 
Socrates  if  he  had  been  eager  to  pass  his  leisure  in  the 
Lyceum  or  in  the  Academy  and  to  discourse  daily  with 
the  young  men,  would  have  readily  served  in  military 

•  See  iii.  c.  2. 

9  8ee  Aulus  Gellius  xvii.  19,  where  he  quotes  Epictetus  OD  what 
Gellius  expresses  by  *  intolcrantia  *  and  *  ineontinentia.'  Compare  M. 
Antoninus  (v,  33)  on  the  precept  'Av*xov  and  ' 


EPICTETUS.  329 

expeditions  so  often  as  he  did ;  and  would  he  not  have 
lamented  and  groaned,  Wretch  ihat  I  am ;  I  must  now 
"be  miserable  here,  when  I  might  bo  sunning  myself  in  the 
Lyceum  ?  Why,  was  this  your  business,  to  sun  yourself? 
And  is  it  not  your  business  to  be  happy,  to  be  free  from 
hindrance,  free  from  impediment  ?  And  could  he  still  have 
been  Socrates,  if  he  had  lamented  in  this  way  :  how  would 
he  still  have  been  able  to  write  Paeans  in  his  prison  ?10 

In  short  remember  this,  that  what  you  shall  piize  which 
is  beyond  your  will,  so  far  you  have  destroy ed  your  will. 
But  these  things  are  out  of  the  power  of  the  will,  not 
only  power  (authority),  but  also  a  private  condition :  not 
only  occupation  (business),  but  also  leisure. — Now  then 
must  I  live  in  this  tumult? — Why  do  you  say  tumult? — I 
mean  among  many  men. — Well  what  is  the  hardship? 
Suppose  that  you  are  at  Olympia :  imagine  it  to  be  a 
panegyris  (public  assembly),  where  one  is  calling  out  one 
thing,  another  is  doing  another  thing,  and  a  third  is  push- 
ing another  person :  in  the  baths  there  is  a  crowd :  and 
who  of  us  is  not  pleased  with  this  assembly,  and  leaves  it 
unwillingly?  Be  not  difficult  to  please  nor  fastidious 
about  what  happens. — Vinegar  is  disagreeable,  for  it  is 
sharp ;  honey  is  disagreeable,  for  it  disturbs  my  habit  of 
body.  I  do  not  like  vegetables.  So  also  I  do  not  like  leisure  j, 
it  is  a  desert :  I  do  not  like  a  crowd  ;  it  is  confusion. — 
But  if  circumstances  make  it  necessary  for  you  to  live 
alone  or  with  a  few,  call  it  quiet,  and  use  the  thing  as  you 
ought :  talk  with  yourself,  exercise  the  appeal ances  (pre- 
sented to  you),  work  up  your  preconceptions.11  If  you; 
fall  into  a  crowd,  call  it  a  celebration  of  games,  a  panegyris, 
a  festival :  try  to  enjoy  the  festival  with  other  men.  For 
what  is  a  morepL-asant  sight  to  him  who  loves  mankind 
than  a  number  of  men  ?  We  see  with  pleasure  herds  of 
horses  or  oxen  :  we  are  delighted  when  we  see  many  ships: 
who  is  pained  when  he  sees  many  men? — But  they  deafen 
me  with  their  cries. — Then  your  hearing  is  impeded. 
What  then  is  this  to  you  ?  Is  then  the  power  of  making 
use  of  appearances  hindered  ?  And  who  prevents  you 

lf  Plato  in  the  Phaedon  (c.  4)  says  that  Socrates  in  his  prison  wrote 
»  hymn  to  Apollo. 
11  i  22. 


330  EPICTETUS. 

from  using  according  to  nature  inclination  to  a  thing  and 
aversion  from  it ;  and  movement  towards  a  thing  and  move- 
ment from  it?  What  tumult  (confusion)  is  able  to  do 
this? 

Do  you  only  bear  in  mind  the  general  rules :  what  is 
mine,  what  is  not  mine ;  what  is  given  (permitted)  to  me ; 
what  does  God  will  that  I  should  do  now  ?  what  does  he 
not  will  ?  A  little  before  he  willed  you  to  be  at  leisure, 
to  talk  with  yourself,  to  write  about  these  things,  to  read, 
to  hear,  to  prepare  yourself.  You  had  .sufficient  time  for 
this*  Now  he  says  to  you  :  Come  now  to  the  contest, 
show  us  what  you  have  learned,  how  you  have  practised 
the  athletic  art.  How  long  will  you  be  exercised  alone  ? 
Now  is  the  opportunity  for  you  to  learn  whether  you  are 
an  athlete  worthy  of  victory,  or  one  of  those  who  go  about 
the  world  and  are  defeated.  Why  then  are  you  vexed  ? 
No  contest  is  without  confusion.  There  must  be  many 
who  exercise  themselves  for  the  contest,  many  who  call 
out  to  those  who  exercise  themselves,  many  masters,  many 
spectators. — But  my  wish  is  to  live  quietly. — Lament  then 
and  groan  as  you  deserve  to  do.  For  what  other  is  a 
greater  punishment  than  this  to  the  untaught  man  and  to 
him  who  disobeys  the  divine  commands,  to  be  grieved,  to 
lament,  to  envy,  in  a  word  to  be  disappointed  and  to  be 
unhappy?  Would  you  not  release  yourself  from  these 
things  ? — And  how  shall  I  release  myself? — Have  you  not 
often  heard,  that  you  ought  to  remove  entirely  desire, 
apply  aversion  (turning  away)  to  those  things  only  which 
are  within  your  power,  that  you  ought  to  give  up  every 
thing,  body,  property,  fame,  books,  tumult,  power,  private 
station?  for  whatever  way  you  turn,  you  are  a  slave,  you 
are  subjected,  you  are  hindered,  you  are  compelled,  you 
are  entirely  in  the  power  of  others.  But  keep  the  words 
of  Cleanthes  in  readiness. 

Lead  me,  O  Zeus,  and  thou  necessity.1* 

Is  it  your  will  that  I  should  go  to  Rome  ?  I  will  go  to 
Kome.  To  Gyara  ?  I  will  go  to  Gyara.  To  Athens  ?  I 

12  Compare  Encheiridion,  52.  Cleanthes  was  a  Stoic  philosopher, 
who  also  wrote  some  poetry.  See  p.  292,  note. 


EPICTETUS.  331 

will  go  to  Athens.  To  prison  ?  I  will  go  to  prison.  If 
you  should  once  say,  When  shall  a  man  go  to  Athens? 
you  are  undone.  It  is  a  necessary  consequence  that  this 
desire,  if  it  is  not  accomplished,  must  make  you  unhappy ; 
and  if  it  is  accomplished,  it  must  make  you  vain,  since 
you  are  elated  at  things  at  which  you  ought  not  to  be 
elated;  and  on  the  other  hand,  if  you  are  impeded,  it 
must  make  you  wretched  because  you  fall  into  that  which 
you  would  not  fall  into.  Give  up  then  all  these  things. — 
Athens  is  a  good  place. — But  happiness  is  much  better ; 
and  to  be  free  from  passions,  free  from  disturbance,  for 
your  affairs  not  to  depend  on  any  man.  There  is  tumult 
at  Rome  and  visits  of  salutation.13  But  happiness  is  an 
equivalent  for  all  troublesome  things.  If  then  the  time 
comes  for  these  things,  why  do  you  not  take  away  the  wish 
to  avoid  them  ?  what  necessity  is  there  to  carry  a  burden 
like  an  ass,  and  to  be  beaten  with  a  stick  ?  But  if  you  do 
not  so,  consider  that  you  must  always  be  a  slave  to  him 
who  has  it  in  his  power  to  effect  your  release,  and  also  to 
impede  you,  and  you  must  serve  him  as  an  evil  genius.14 

There  is  only  one  way  to  happiness,  and  let  this  rule  be 
ready  both  in  the  morning  and  during  the  day  and  by 
night :  the  rule  is  not  to  look  towards  things  which  are 
out  of  the  power  of  our  will,  to  think  that  nothing  is  our 
own,  to  give  up  all  things  to  the  Divinity,  to  Fortune ;  to 
make  them  the  superintendents  of  these  things,  whom 
Zeus  also  has  made  so;  for  a  man  to  observe  that  only 
which  is  his  own,  that  which  cannot  be  hindered;  and 
when  we  read,  to  refer  our  reading  to  this  only,  and  our 
writing  and  our  listening.  For  this  reason  I  cannot  call 
the  man  industrious,  if  1  hear  this  only,  that  he  reads  and 
writes ;  and  even  if  a  man  adds  that  he  reads  all  night,  I 
cannot  say  so,  if  he  knows  not  to  what  he  should  refer  his 
reading.  For  neither  do  you  say  that  a  man  is  industrious 
if  he  keeps  awake  for  a  girl ; 15  nor  do  I.  But  if  he  does 
it  (reads  and  writes)  for  reputation,  I  say  that  he  is  a 

13  He  alludes  to  the  practice  of  dependents  paying  formal  visits  in 
the  morning  at  the  houses  of  the  great  and  powerful  at  Rome.    Upton 
refers  to  Virgil,  Georgics,  ii.  461, 

14  Compare  i,  19.  6. 

l*  Compare  Horace  Sat.  i.  5.  83. 


332  EPICTET^S. 

lover  of  reputation.  And  if  he  does  it  for  rn  ,  I  say 
that  he  is  a  lover  of  money,  not  a  lover  of  l&bo  and  if 
he  does  it  through  love  of  learning,  1  say  that  he  a  lover 
of  learning,  But  if  he  refers  his  labour  to  his  owa  ruling 
power  (^ycjU,oviKoV),  that  ho  may  keep  it  in  a  state  con- 
formable to  nature  and  pass  his  life  in  that  state,  then  only 
do  I  say  that  he  is  industrious.  For  never  commend  a 
man  on  account  of  these  things  which  are  common  to  all, 
but  on  account  of  his  opinions  (principles) ;  for  these  are 
the  thing's  which  belong  to  each  man,  which  make  his 
actions  bad  or  good.  Remembering  these  rules,  rejoice  in 
that  which  is  present,  and  be  content  with  the  things 
which  come  in  season.16  If  you  see  any  thing  which  you 
have  learned  and  inquired  about  occurring  to  you  in  your 
course  of  life  (or  opportunely  applied  by  you  to  the  acts  of 
life),  be  delighted  at  it.  If  you  have  laid  aside  or  have 
lessened  bad  disposition  and  a  habit  of  reviling;  if  you 
have  done  so  with  rash  temper,  obscene  words,  hastiness, 
sluggishness  ;  if  you  are  not  moved  by  what  you  formerly 
were,  and  not  in  the  same  way  as  you  once  were,  you  can 
celebrate  a  festival  daily,  to-day  because  you  have  behaved 
well  in  one  act,  and  to-morrow  because  you  have  behaved 
well  in  another.  How  much  greater  is  this  a  reason  for 
making  sacrifices  than  a  consulship  or  the  government  of 
a  province  ?  These  things  come  to  you  from  yourself  and 
from  the  gods.  Remember  this,  who  gives  these  things 
and  to  whom,  and  for  what  purpose.  If  you  cherish  your- 
self in  these  thoughts,  do  you  still  think  that  it  makes  any 
difference  where  you  shall  be  happy,  where  you  shall 
please  God?  Are  not  the  gods  equally  distant  from  all 
places  ? 17  Do  they  not  see  from  all  places  alike  that  which 
is  going  on  ? 

w  See  Antoninus,  vi.  2 ;  and  ix.  6  '  Thy  present  opinion  founded  on 
understanding,  and  thy  present  conduct  directed  to  social  good,  and 
thy  present  disposition  of  contentment  with  everything  which  happens 
— that  is  enough.' 

17  Compare  Upton's  note  on  airlxown,  and  Schweig.'s  version,  and 
the  Index  Ghaecitatis.  These  commentators  do  not  appear  to  be  quite 
certain  about  the  meaning  of  the  text 


Et'ICTETUS.  333 

CHAPTER  V. 

AGAINST   THE   QUARRELSOME   AND  FEROCIOUS. 

THE  wise  and  good  man  neither  himself  fights  with  any 
person,  nor  does  he  allow  another,  so  far  as  he  can  pre- 
vent it.  And  an  example  of  this  as  well  as  of  all  other 
things  is  proposed  to  us  in  the  life  of  Socrates,  who  not 
only  himself  on  all  occasions  avoided  fights  (quarrels),  but 
would  not  allow  oven  others  to  quarrel.  See  in  Xenophon's 
Symposium 1  how  many  quarrels  he  settled,  how  further 
he  endured  Thrasymachus  and  Polus  and  Callicles ;  how 
he  tolerated  his  wife,  and  how  he  tolerated  his  son  2  who 
attempted  to  confute  him  and  to  cavil  with  him.  For  he 
remembered  well  that  no  man  has  in  his  power  another 
man's  ruling  principle.  He  wished  therefore  for  nothing 
else  than  that  which  was  his  own.  And  what  is  this? 
Not  that  this  or  that  man  may  act  according  to  nature ; 
for  that  is  a  thing  which  belongs  to  another;  but  that 
while  others  are  doing  their  own  acts,  as  they  choose,  he 
may  never  the  less  be  in  a  condition  conformable  to 
nature  and  live  in  it,  only  doing  what  is  his  own  to  the 
end  that  others  also  may  be  in  a  state  conformable  to 
nature.  For  this  is  the  object  always  set  before  him  by 
the  wise  and  good  man.  Is  it  to  be  commander  (a 
praetor)  3  of  an  army  ?  No  :  but  if  it  is  permitted  him, 
his  object  is  in  this  matter  to  maintain  his  own  ruling 
principle.  Is  it  to  marry  ?  No ;  but  if  marriage  is  allowed 
to  him,  in  this  matter  his  object  is  to  maintain  himself  in 
a  condition  conformable  to  nature.  But  if  he  would  have 
his  son  not  to  do  wrong  or  his  wife,  he  would  have  what 
belongs  to  another  not  to  belong  to  another:  and  to  be 
instructed  is  this,  to  learn  what  things  are  a  man's  own 
and  what  belongs  to  another. 

How  then  is  there  left  any  place  for  fighting  (quarrel- 
ling) to  a  man  who  has  this  opinion  (which  he  ought  to 
have)?  Is  he  surprised  at  any  thing  which  happens, 

*  See  ii.  12.  15. 

*  See  Xenophon,  Memorabilia,  ii.  2, 

*  The  word  a-rpartiy^ffai  may  be  translated  either  way. 


334  EPICTETUS. 

and  does  it  appear  new  to  him  ?  4  Does  he  not  expect 
that  which  comes  from  the  bad  to  be  worse  and  more 
grievous  than  what  actually  foefals  him  ?  And  does  he  not 
reckon  as  pure  gain  whaterer  they  (the  bad)  may  do 
which  falls  short  of  extreme  wickedness  ?  Such  a  person 
has  reviled  you.  Great  thanks  to  him  for  not  having 
struck  you.  But  he  has  struck  mo  also.  Great  thanks 
that  he  did  not  wound  you.  But  he  wounded  me  also. 
Great  thanks  that  he  did  not  kill  you.  For  when  did  he 
learn  or  in  what  school  that  man  is  a  tame 5  animal,  that 
men  love  one  another,  that  an  act  of  injustice  is  a  great 
harm  to  him  who  does  it.  Since  then  ho  has  not  learned 
this  and  is  not  convinced  of  it,  why  shall  ho  not  follow 
that  which  seems  to  be  for  his  own  interest?  Your 
neighbour  has  thrown  stones.  Have  you  then  done  any 
thing  wrong?  But  the  things  in  the  house  have  been 
broken.  Are  you  then  a  utensil ?  No;  but  a  free  power 
of  will.6  What  then  is  given  to  you  (to  do)  in  answer  to 
this  ?  If  you  are  like  a  wolf,  you  must  bite  in  return,  and 
throw  more  stones.  But  if  you  consider  what  is  proper 
for  a  man,  examine  your  storehouse,  see  with  what  facul- 
ties you  came  into  the  world.  Have  you  the  disposition 
of  a  wild  beast,  have  you  the  disposition  of  revenge  for  an 
injury?  "When  is  a  horse  wretched ?  When  he  is  deprived 
of  his  natural  faculties,  not  when  he  cannot  crow  like  a 
cock,  but  when  he  cannot  run.  When  is  a  dog  wretched  ? 
Not  when  he  cannot  fly,  but  when  he  cannot  track  his 
game.  Is  then  a  man  also  unhappy  in  this  way,  not 
because  he  cannot  strangle  lions  or  embrace  statues,7  for 
he  did  not  come  into  the  world  in  the  possession  of  certain 
powers  from  nature  for  this  purpose,  but  because  he  has 
lost  his  probity  and  his  fidelity?  People  ought  to  meet 
and  lament  such  a  man  for  the  misfortunes  into  which  he 

4  See  iv.  1.  77,  and  the  use  of  0au/*c££e/j/. 

5  See  ii.  10.  14,  iv.  1. 120.    So  Plato  says  (Legg.  vi.),  that  a  man  who 
has  had  right  education  is  wont  to  bo  the  most  divine  and  the  tamest 
of  animals.    Upton. 

On  the  doing  wrong  to  another,  see  Plato's  Critc,  and  Epictetus  iv. 
1. 167. 

*  See  iii.  1.  40. 
1  Like  Hercules  and  Diogenes     See  iii  12.  2. 


EPICTETUS.  335 

has  fallen  ;  not  indeed  to  lament  because  a  man  has  "been 
"born  or  has  died,8  but  because  it  has  happened  to  him  in 
his  life  time  to  have  lost  the  things  which  are  his  own, 
not  that  which  he  received  from  his  father,  not  his  land 
and  house,  and  his  inn,9  and  his  slaves  ;  for  not  one  of 
these  things  is  a  man's  own,  but  all  belong  to  others,  are 
servile,  and  subject  to  account  (vtrevOvva),  at  different 
times  given  to  different  persons  by  those  who  have  them 
in  their  power  :  but  I  mean  the  things  which  belong  to 
him  as  a  man,  the  marks  (stamps)  in  his  mind  with  which 
he  came  into  the  world,  such  as  we  seek  also  on  coins,  and 
if  we  find  them,  we  approve  of  the  coins,  and  if  we  do  not 
find  the  marks,  we  reject  them.  What  is  the  stamp  on 
this  Sestertius  ?  10  The  stamp  of  Trajan.  Present  it.  It 
is  the  stamp  of  Nero.  Throw  it  away  :  it  cannot  be 
accepted,  it  is  counterfeit.11  So  also  in  this  case  :  What  is 

8  The  allusion  is  to  a  passage  (a  fragment)  in  the  Cresphontes  of 
Euripides  translated  by  Cicero  into  Latin  Iambics  (Tusc.  Disp.  i.  48)  — 

cSet  yap  ^juay  ffv\\oyoy 


as,  €V(pr)fJiOvt>Tas 

Herodotus  (v.  4)  says  of  the  Trausi,  a  Thracian  tribe  :  *  when  a  child 
is  born,  the  relatives  sit  round  it  and  lament  over  all  the  evils  which  it 
must  suffer  on  coming  into  the  world  and  enumerate  all  the  calamities 
of  mankind  :  but  when  one  dies,  they  hide  him  in  the  earth  with 
rejoicing  and  pleasure,  reckoning  all  the  evils  from  which  he  is  now 
released  and  in  possession  of  all  happiness/ 

9  The  word  is  7rap5o/ce7o*>,  which  Schweig.  says  that  he  does  not 
understand.    He  supposes  the  word  to  be  corrupt  ;  unless  we  take  it 
to  mean  the  inn  in  which  a  man  lives  who  has  no  home.    I  do  not 
understand  the  word  here. 

10  See  the  note  of  Schweig.  on  the  word  rerp<i<r<rapov  in  the  text. 

11  This  does  not  mean,  it  is  said,  that  Nero  issued  counterfeit  coins, 
for  there  are  extant  many  coins  of  Nero  which  both  in  form  and  in  the 
purity  of  the  metal  are  complete.    A  learned  numismatist,  Francis 
Wise,  fellow  of  Trinity  College  Oxford,  in  a  letter  to  Upton,  says  that 
he  can  discover  no  reason  for  Nero's  coins  being  rejected  in  commercial 
dealings  after  his  death  except  the  fact  of  the  tyrant  having  been 
declared  by  the    Senate   to   be  an  enemy  to  the  Commonwealth. 
(Suetonius,  Nero,  c.  49.)    When  Domitian  was  murdered,  the  Senate 
ordered  his  busts  to  be  taken  down,  as  the  French  now  do  after  a 
revolution,  and  all  memorials  of  him  to  be  destroyed  (Suetonius, 
Domitian,  c.  23).    Dion  also  reports  (LX.)  that  when  Caligula  wag 


336  EPICTETUS. 

the  stamp  of  Ms  opinions?  It  is  gentleness,  a  sociable  dis- 
position, a  tolerant  temper,  a  disposition  to  mutual  aft'eo 
tion.  Produce  these  qualities.  I  accept  them :  I  consider 
this  man  a  citizen,  I  accept  him  as  a  neighbour,  a  com- 
panion in  my  voyages.  Only  see  that  he  has  not  Nero's 
« tamp.  Is  he  passionate,  is  he  full  of  resentment,  is  he 
fault-finding  ?  If  the  whim  seizes  him,  does  he  break  the 
heads  of  those  who  come  in  his  way?  (If  so),  why  then 
did  you  say  that  he  is  a  man  ?  Js  every  thing  judged 
(determined)  by  the  bare  form  ?  If  that  is  so,  say  that  the 
form  in  wax  12  is  an  apple  and  has  the  smell  and  the  taste 
•of  an  apple.  But  the  external  figure  is  not  enough : 
neither  then  is  the  nose  enough  and  the  eyes  to  make  the 
man,  but  he  must  have  the  opinions  of  a  man.  Here  is 
a  man  who  does  not  listen  to  reason,  who  does  not  know 
when  he  is  refuted:  he  is  an  ass:  in  another  man  the 
sense  of  shame  is  become  dead  :  he  is  good  for  nothing,  he 
is  any  thing  rather  than  a  man.  This  man  seeks  whom 
he  may  meet  and  kick  or  bite,  so  that  he  is  not  even  a 
sheep  or  an  ass,  but  a  kind  of  wild  beast. 

What  then?  would  you  have  me  to  be  despised? — By 
whom?  by  those  who  know  you?  and  how  shall  those 
who  know  you  despise  a  man  who  is  gentle  and  modest? 
Perhaps  you  mean  by  those  who  do  riot  know  you  ?  What 
is  that  to  you  ?  For  no  other  artisan  cares  for  the  opinion 
of  those  who  know  not  his  art. —  Hu1  they  will  be  more 
hostile  to  me13  for  this  reason. — Why  do  you  say  'me'? 
Can  any  man  injure  your  will,  or  prevent  you  from  using 
in  a  natural  way  the  appearances  which  are  presented  to 

murdered,  it  was  ordered  that  all  the  brass  coin  which  bore  his  image 
should  be  melted,  and,  I  suppose,  coined  again.  There  is  more  on  thia 
subject  in  Wise's  letter. 

I  do  not  believe  that  genuine  coins  would  be  refused  in  commercial 
dealings  for  the  reasons  which  Wise  gives,  at  least  not  refused  in  parts 
distant  from  Rome.  Perhaps  Epictetus  means  that  some  people  would 
not  touch  the  coins  of  the  detestable  Nero. 

12  He  says  rb  icfipivov,  which  Mrs.  Carter  translates  *  a  piece  of  wax.' 
Perhaps  it  means  '  a  piece  of  wax  in  the  form  of  an  apple.' 

18  The  word  is  tiri<pvr)(rovTatt  the  form  of  which  is  not  Greek 
JSchweig.  has  no  remark  on  it,  aiid  he  translates  the  word  by 
4  adoritmtur.'  The  form  ought  to  be  firupvcrovrat.  See  Stephen^ 
Lexicon  on  the  word  ^vt^vo^ai.  Probably  the  word  is  corrupted. 


EPICTETUS.  337 

you?  In  no  way  can  he.  Why  then  are  you  still  dis- 
turbed and  why  do  you  choose  to  show  yourself  afraid  ?14 
And  why  do  you  not  come  forth  and  proclaim  that  you 
are  at  peace  with  all  men  whatever  they  may  do,  and 
laugh  at  those  chiefly  who  think  that  they  can  harm  you? 
These  slaves,  you  can  say,  know  not  either  who  I  am,  nor 
where  lies  my  good  or  my  evil,  because  they  have  no 
access  to  the  things  which  are  mine. 

In  this  way  also  those  who  occupy  a  strong  city  mock  the 
besiegers,  (and  say):  What  trouble  these  men  are  now  taking 
for  nothing :  our  wall  is  secure,  we  have  food  for  a  very 
long  time,  and  all  other  resources.  These  are  the  things 
which  make  a  city  strong  and  impregnable :  but  nothing 
else  than  his  opinions  makes  a  man's  soul  impregnable. 
For  what  wall  is  so  strong,  or  what  body  is  so  hard,  or 
what  possession  is  so  safe,  or  what  honour  (rank,  character) 
so  free  from  assault  (as  a  man's  opinions)?  All  (other) 
things  every  where  are  perishable,  easily  taken  by  assault, 
and  if  any  man  in  any  way  is  attached  to  them,  he  must 
be  disturbed,  expect  what  is  bad,  he  must  fear,  lament, 
find  his  desires  disappointed,  and  fall  into  things  which, 
he  would  avoid.  Then  do  we  not  choose  to  make  secure 
the  only  means  of  safety  which  are  offered  to  us,  and  do 
we  not  choose  to  withdraw  ourselves  from  that  which  is* 
perishable  and  servile  and  to  labour  at  the  things  which 
are  imperishable  and  by  nature  free ;  and  do  we  not  re- 
member that  no  man  either  hurts  another  or  does  good  to- 
another,  but  that  a  man's  opinion  about  each  thing,  is  that 
which  hurts  him,  is  that  which  overturns  him ;  this  is 
fighting,  this  is  civil  discord,  this  is  war?  That  which 
made  Eteocles  and  Polynices15  enemies  was  nothing  eLse- 
than  this  opinion  which  they  had  about  royal  power,  their 
^pinion  about  exile,  that  the  one  is  the  extreme  of  evils,, 
the  other  the  greatest  good.  Now  this  is  the  nature  of 

14  Mrs.  Carter  renders  4>oftcp6v  by  *  formidable,'  and  in  the  Latin 
translation  it  is  rendered  « formidabilem,'  but  that  cannot  be  the 
meaning  of  the  word  here. 

15  Eteooles  and  Polynices  were  the  sons  of  the  unfortunate  Oedipus,, 
who  quarrelled  about  the  kingship  of  Thebes  and  killed  one  another 
This  quarrel  is  the  subject  of  the  Seven  against  Thebes  of  Ae&chylui 
and  the  Phoenissae  of  Euripides.     See  ii.  22.  note  3. 


338  EPICTETUa 

every  man  to  seek  the  good,  to  avoid  the  bad ; 16  to  con* 
sider  him  who  deprives  us  of  the  one  and  involves  us  in 
the  other  an  enemy  and  treacherous,  even  if  he  be  a 
brother,  or  a  son  or  a  father.  For  nothing  is  more  akin 
to  us  than  the  good :  therefore  if  these  things  (externals) 
are  good  and  evil,  neither  is  a  father  a  friend  to  sons,  nor 
a  brother  to  a  brother,  but  all  the  world  is  every  where 
full  of  enemies,  treacherous  men,  and  sycophants.  But  if 
the  will  (TTpoatpecris,  the  purpose,  the  intention)  being- what 
it  ought  to  be,  is  the  only  good ;  and  if  the  will  being 
such  as  it  ought  not  to  be,  is  the  only  evil,  where  is  there 
any  strife,  where  is  there  reviling  ?  about  what  ?  about  the 
things  which  do  not  concern  us  ?  and  strife  with  whom  ? 
with  the  ignorant,  the  unhappy,  with  those  who  are  de- 
ceived about  the  chief  things  ? 

Remembering  this  Socrates  managed  his  own  house  and 
endured  a  very  ill  tempered  wife  and  a  foolish  (un- 
grateful?) son.17  For  in  what  did  she  show  her  bad 
temper?  In  pouring  water  on  his  head  as  much  as  she 
liked,  and  in  trampling  on  the  cake  (f-ent  to  Socrates). 
And  what  is  this  to  me,  if  I  think  that  these  things  are 
nothing  to  me?  But  this  is  my  business;  and  neither 
tyrant  shall  check  my  will  nor  a  master;  nor  shall  the 
many  check  me  who  am  only  one,  nor  shall  the  stronger 
check  me  who  am  the  weaker ;  for  this  power  of  being 
free  from  check  (hindrance)  is  given  by  God  to  every 
man.  For  these  opinions  make  love  in  a  house  (family), 

19  'Every  man  in  everything  he  does  naturally  aHs  upon  the  fore- 
thought and  apprehension  of  avoiding  evil  or  obtaining  good.'  Bp. 
Butler,  Analogy,  Chap.  2.  The  bishop's  *  naturally  *  is  the  Qfois  of 
Kpictetus. 

17  Socrates'  wife  Xanthippe  is  charged  by  her  eldest  son  Lnmprocles 
with  being  so  ill-tempered  as  to  be  past  all  endurance  (Xenophon, 
Memorab.  ii.  2,  7).  Xenophon  in  this  chapter  has  reported  the  con- 
versation of  Socrates  with  his  son  on  this  matter. 

Diogenes  Laertius  (ii.)  tells  the  story  of  Xanthippe  pouring  water 
on  the  head  of  Socrates,  and  dirty  water,  as  Seneca  says  (De  Constantia, 
c.  18).  Aelian  (xi.  12)  reports  that  Alcibiades  sent  Socrates  a  large 
and  good  cake,  which  Xanthippe  trampled  under  her  feet.  Socrates 
only  laughed  and  said,  Well  then,  you  will  not  have  your  share  of  it. 
The  philosopher  showed  that  his  philosophy  was  practical  by  enduring 
the  torment  of  a  very  ill-tempered  wife,  one  of  the  greatest  calamities 
that  can  happen  to  a  man,  and  the  trouble  of  an  undutiful  sou. 


EPICTETUS.  339 

concord  in  a  state,  among  nations  peace,  and  gratitude  to 
God ;  they  make  a  man  in  all  things  cheerful  (confident) 
in  externals  as  about  things  which  belong  to  others,  as 
about  things  which  are  of  no  value.18  We  indeed  are 
able  to  write  and  to  read  these  things,  and  to  praise  them 
when  they  are  read,  but  we  do  not  even  come  near  to 
being  convinced  of  them.  Therefore  what  is  said  of  the 
Lacedaemonians,  "  Lions  at  home,  but  in  Ephesus  foxes," 
will  fit  in  our  case  also,  "  Lions  in  the  school,  but  out  of  it 
foxes."19 


CHAPTER  VI. 

XGAINST  THOSE  WHO  LAMENT  OVER  BEING  PITIED. 

1  AM  grieved,  a  man  says,  at  being  pitied.  Whether  then 
is  the  fact  of  your  being  pitied  a  thing  which  concerns 
you  or  those  who  pity  you?  Well,  is  it  in  your  power  to 
fetop  this  pity? — It  is  in  my  power,  if  I  show  them  that 
1  do  not  require  pity. — And  whether  then  are  you  in  the 
condition  of  not  deserving  (requiring)  pity,  or  are  you  not 
in  that  condition  ? — J  think  that  I  am  not :  but  these 
persons  do  not  pity  me,  for  the  things  for  which,  if  they 
ought  to  pity  me,  it  would  be  proper,  I  mean,  for  my 
faults;  but  they  pity  me  for  my  poverty,  for  not  pos- 
sessing honourable  offices,  for  diseases  and  deaths  and 
other  such  things — Whether  then  are  you  prepared  to  con- 
vince the  many,  that  not  one  of  these  things  is  an  evil,  but 
that  it  is  possible  for  a  man  who  is  poor  and  has  no  office 
(dvapxovTi)  and  enjoys  no  honour  to  be  happy ;  or  to  shew 
yourself  to  them  as  rich  and  in  power  ?  For  the  second  of 
these  things  belong  to  a  man  who  is  boastful,  silly  and 
good  for  nothing.  And  consider  by  what  means  the  pre- 

1§  This  is  one  of  the  wisest  and  noblest  expressions  cf  Epictetua. 
"  See  Aristophanes,  the  Peace,  v.  1188 : 

iroAAcb  yoip  5$)  ^  J}S//c??(ra?, 

&VTf  S  ofrcOl  jlte?  \GOVT€S, 

Upton. 

z  2 


310  EPICTETUS, 

tence  must  be  supported.  It  will  be  necessary  for  you  t€ 
hire  slaves  anl  to  possess  a  few  silver  vessels,  and  to  ex- 
hibit them  in  public,  if  it  is  possible,  though  they  are 
often  the  same,  and  to  attempt  to  conceal  the  fact  that 
they  are  the  same,  and  to  have  splendid  garments,  and  all 
other  things  for  display,  and  to  show  that  you  are  a  man 
honoured  by  the  great,  and  to  try  to  sup  at  their  houses, 
or  to  be  supposed  to  sup  there,  and  as  to  your  person 
to  employ  some  mean  arts,  that  you  may  appear  to  be 
more  handsome  and  nobler  than  you  are.  These  things 
you  must  contrive,  if  you  choose  to  go  by  the  second  path 
in  order  not  to  be  pitied.  But  the  first  way  is  both  im- 
practicable and  long,  to  attempt  the  very  thing  which  Zeus- 
has  not  been  able  to  do,  to  convince  all  men  what  things 
are  good  and  bad.1  Is  this  power  given  to  you?  This 
only  is  given  to  you,  to  convince  yourself;  and  you  have 
not  convinced  yourself.  Then  I  ask  you,  do  you  attempt 
to  persuade  other  men  ?  and  who  has  lived  so  long  with 
you  as  you  with  you^elf  ?  and  who  has  so  much  power  of 
convincing  you  as  you  have  of  convincing  yourself;  and 
who  is  better  disposed  and  nearer  to  you  than  you  are  to 
yourself?  How  then  have  you  not  yet  convinced  yourself 
in  order  to  learn?  At  present  are  not  things  upside  down? 
Is  this  what  you  have  been  earnest  about  doing,2  to  learn 
to  be  free  from  grief  and  free  from  disturbance,  and  not  to 
be  humbled  (abject),  and  to  be  free?  Have  you  not  heard 
then  that  there  is  only  one  way  which  leads  to  this  endy 
to  give  up  (dismiss)  the  things  which  do  not  depend  on 
the  will,  to  withdraw  from  them,  and  to  admit  that  they 
belong  to  others  ?  For  another  man  then  to  have  an  opinion 
about  you,  of  what  kind  is  it  ? — It  is  a  thing  independent 

1  Here  it  is  implied  that  there  are  things  which  God  cannot  do. 
Perhaps  he  means  that  as  God  has  given  man  certain  powers  of  will 
and  therefore  of  action,  he  cannot  at  the  same  time  exercise  the  contra- 
dictory powers  of  forcing  man's  will  and  action ;  for  this  would  be  at  the 
same  time  to  give  power  and  to  take  it  away.  Butler  remarks  (Analogy, 
chap.  5)  "the  present  is  so  far  from  proving  in  event  a  discipline  of 
virtue  to  the  generality  of  men  that  on  the  contrary  they  seem  to  make 
it  a  discipline  of  vice."    In  fact  all  men  are  not  convinced  and  cannot 
be  convinced  in  ttae  present  constitution  of  things  *  what  things  are  good 
and  bad/ 

2  Something  IB  perhaps  wrong  in  the  text  here.    Bee  Schweig.'s  note. 


EPICTETUS.  341 

of  the  will — Then  is  it  nothing  to  you? — It  is  nothing — • 
When  then  you  are  still  vexed  at  this  and  disturbed,  do 
you  think  that  you  are  convinced  about  good  and  evil  ? 

Will  you  not  then  letting  others  alone  be  to  yourself 
both  scholar  and  teacher  ? — The  rest  of  mankind  will  look 
after  this,  whether  it  is  to  their  interest  to  be  and  to  pass 
their  lives  in  a  state  contrary  to  nature :  but  to  me  no  man 
is  nearer  than  myself.  What  then  is  the  meaning  of  this, 
that  1  have  listened  to  the  words  of  the  philosophers  and  I 
assent  to  them,  but  in  fact  I  am  no  way  made  easier  (more 
content)  ?  Am  I  so  stupid  ?  And  yet  in  all  other  things 
Huch  as  I  have  chosen,  I  have  not  been  found  very  stupid; 
but  I  learned  letters  quickly,  and  to  wrestle,  and  geometry, 
and  to  resolve  syllogisms.  Has  not  then  reason  convinced 
asae?  and  indeed  no  other  things  have  I  from  the  beginning 
so  approved  and  chosen  (as  the  things  which  are  rational)  : 
and  now  I  read  about  these  things,  hear  about  them,  write 
about  them ;  1  have  so  far  discovered  no  reason  stronger 
than  this  (living  according  to  nature).  In  what  then  am 
I  deficient?  Have  the  contrary  opinions  not  been  eradi- 
cated from  me  ?  Have  the  notions  (opinions)  themselves 
not  been  exercised  nor  used  to  be  applied  to  action,  but  as 
armour  are  laid  aside  and  rusted  and  cannot  fit  me  ?  And 
yet  neither  in  the  exercises  of  the  palaestra,  nor  in  writing 
or  reading  am  1  satisfied  with  learning,  but  I  turn  up  and 
down  the  syllogisms  which  are  proposed,  and  I  make 
others,  and  sophistical  syllogisms  also.3  But  the  necessary 
theorems  by  proceeding  from  which  a  man  can  become 
free  from  grief,  fear,  passions  (affects),  hindrance,  and  a 
free  man,  these  I  do  not  exerci.se  myself  in  nor  do  I  prac- 
tise in  these  the  proper  practice  (study).  Then  I  care 
about  what  others  will  say  of  me,  whether  I  shall  appear 
to  them  worth  notice,  whether  I  shall  appear  happy. — 

Wretched  man,  will  you  not  see  what  you  are  saying 
about  yourself?  What  do  you  appear  to  yourself  to  be  ?  in 
your  opinions,  in  your  desires,  in  your  aversions  from 
things  (&  TU>  cKK\tvctv),  in  your  movements  (purposes, 
ev  6/fyifl)  in  your  preparation  (for  anything),  in  your  de- 

*  In  place  of  fieiravlirrovras  Schweig.  suggests  that  Arrian  wrote 
teal  r&\\a  kffabrus  or  something  of  the  kind.  On  MTcnriirTovras  see 
Epictetus,  i.  7. 


342  EPICTETUS. 

signs  (plans),  and  in  other  acts  suitable  to  a  man?  But  do 
you  trouble  yourself  about  this,  whether  others  pity  you  ? 
— Yes,  but  I  am  pitied  not  as  I  ought  to  be. — Are  you  then 
pained  at  this  ?  and  is  he  who  is  pained,  an  object  of  pity  ? 
— Yes — How  then  are  you  pitied  not  as  you  ought  to  be? 
For  by  the  very  act  that  you  feel  (suffer)  about  being 
pitied,  you  make  yourself  deserving  of  pity.  What  then 
says  Antisthenes?  Have  you  not  heavd?  *  It  is  a  royal 
thing,  0  Cyrus,  to  do  right  (well)  and  to  be  ill  spoken  of.'4 
My  head  is  sound,  and  all  think  that  I  have  the  head  ache. 
What  do  I  care  for  that  ?  I  am  free  from  fever,  and  people 
sympathize  with  me  as  if  I  had  a  fever,  (and  say),  Poor 
man,  for  so  long  a  time  you  have  not  ceased  to  have  fever. 
I  also  say  with  a  sorrowful  countenance,  In  truth  it  is  now 
a  long  time  that  I  have  been  ill.  \Vhat  will  happen  then? 
As  God  may  please :  and  at  the  same  time  I  secretly  laugh 
at  those  who  are  pitying  me.  What  then  hinders  the 
same  being  done  in  this  case  also  r  I  am  poor,  but  I  have 
a  right  opinion  about  poveity.  Why  then  do  I  care  if 
they  pity  me  for  my  poverty  ?  I  am  not  in  power  (not  a 
magistrate) ;  but  others  are :  and  I  have  the  opinion  which 
I  ought  to  have  about  having  and  not  having  power.  Let 
them  look  to  it  who  pity  me  :5  but  I  am  neither  hungry 
nor  thirsty  nor  do  I  suffer  cold ;  but  because  they  are 
hungry  or  thirsty  they  think  that  I  too  am.  What  then 
shall  I  do  for  them?  Shall  I  go  about  and  proclaim  and 
say,  Be  not  mistaken,  men,  I  am  very  well,  I  do  not  trouble 
myself  about  poverty,  nor  want  of  power,  nor  in  a  word 
about  anything  else  than  right  opinions.  These  I  have 
free  from  restraint,  I  care  for  nothing  at  all. — What  foolish 
talk  is  this  ?  How  do  I  possess  right  opinions  when  I  am 
not  content  with  being  what  I  am,  but  am  uneasy  about 
what  I  am  supposed  to  be  ? 

But  you  say,  others  will  get  more  and  be  preferred  to 
me — What  then  is  more  reasonable  than  for  those  who 
have  laboured  about  any  thing  to  have  more  in  that  thing 
in  which  they  have  laboured?  They  have  laboured  for 
power,  you  have  laboured  about  opinions ;  and  they  have 
floured  for  wealth,  you  for  the  proper  use  of  appearances. 

4  M.  Antoninus,  vii.  3(>. 
'  frlwrau    See  L  4,  note  4. 


EPIOTETUS.  343 

See  if  they  have  more  than  you  in  this  about  which  you 
have  laboured,  and  which  they  neglect;  if  they  assent 
better  than  you  with  respect  to  the  natural  rules  (measures) 
of  things ;  if  they  are  less  disappointed  than  you  in  their 
desires ;  if  they  fall  less  into  things  which  they  would 
avoid  than  you  do  ;  if  in  their  intentions,  if  in  the  things 
which  they  propose  to  themselves,  if  in  their  purposes,  if  in 
their  motions  towards  an  object  they  take  a  better  aim ;  if 
they  better  observe  a  proper  behaviour,  as  men,  as  sons,  as 
parents,  and  so  on  as  to  the  other  names  by  which  we 
express  the  relations  of  life.  But  if  they  exercise  power,. 
and  you  do  not,  will  you  not  choose  to  tell  3rourself  the 
truth,  that  you  do  nothing  for  the  sake  of  this  (power),  and 
they  do  all?  But  it  is  most  unreasonable  that  he  who 
looks  after  anything  should  obtain  less  than  he  who  does- 
not  look  after  it. 

Not  so :  but  since  I  care  about  right  opinions,  it  is  more 
reasonable  for  me  to  have  power. — Yes  in  the  matter  about 
which  you  do  care,  in  opinions.  But  in  a  matter  in  which 
they  have  cared  more  than  you,  give  way  to  them.  The 
case  is  just  the  same  as  if  because  you  have  right  opinions, 
you  thought  that  in  using  the  bow  you  should  hit  the 
mark  better  than  an  archer,  and  in  working  in  metal  you 
should  succeed  better  than  a  smith.  Give  up  then  your 
earnestness  about  opinions  and  employ  yourself  about  the 
things  which  you  wish  to  acquire ;  and  then  lament,  if 
you  do  not  succeed ;  for  you  deserve  to  lament.  But  now 
you  say  that  you  are  occupied  with  other  things,  that  you 
are  looking  after  other  things;  but  the  many  say  this 
truly,  that  one  act  has  no  community  with  another.6  He 
who  has  risen  in  the  morning  seeks  whom  (of  the  house  of 
Caesar)  he  shall  salute,  to  whom  he  shall  say  something 
agreeable,  to  whom  he  shall  send  a  present,  how  he  shall 
please  the  dancing  man,  how  by  bad  behaviour  to  one  he 
may  please  another.  When  he  prays,  he  prays  about 

9  Schweig.  says  that  he  has  not  observed  that  this  proverb  is  men- 
tioned by  any  other  writer,  and  that  he  does  not  quite  see  the  meaning 
of  it,  unless  it  be  what  he  expresses  in  the  Latin  version  (iv.  10.  24  /, 
•ftlterum  opus  cum  altero  nihil  commune  habet.'  I  think  that  ib* 
context  explains  it :  if  you  wish  to  ohtain  a  particular  end,  employ  tb« 
proper  means,  and  not  the  means  which  do  not  make  for  that  end. 


344  EPICTETUS. 

these  things;  when  he  sacrifices,  he  sacrifices  for  these 
things :  the  saying  of  Pythagoras 

Let  sleep  not  come  upon  thy  languid  eyes  7 

he  transfers  to  these  things.  Where  have  I  failed  in  the 
matters  pertaining  to  flattery  ?  What  have  I  done  ?  Any 
thing  like  a  free  man,  any  thing  like  a  noble  minded  man  ? 
And  if  he  finds  any  thing  of  the  kind,  he  blames  and  accuses 
himself :  "  Why  did  you  say  this  ?  Was  it  not  in  your  power 
to  lie  ?  Even  the  philosophers  say  that  nothing  hinders 
us  from  telling  a  lie."  But  do  you,  if  indeed  you  have 
cared  about  nothing  else  except  the  proper  u.^e  of  appear- 
ances, as  soon  as  you  have  risen  in  the  morning  reflect, 
"  What  do  I  want  in  order  to  be  free  from  passion  (affects), 
and  free  from  perturbation?  What  am  1  ?  Am  I  a  poor 
body,  a  piece  of  property,  a  thing  of  which  something  is 
said?  1  am  none  of  these.  But  what  am  I?  I  am  a 
rational  animal.  What  then  is  required  of  me  ?  "  Keflect 
on  your  acts.  Where  have  I  omitted  the  things  which 
conduce  to  happiness  (rfpoiav)  ?  What  have  I  done  which 
is  either  unfriendly  or  unsocial  ?  what  have  I  not  done  as 
to  these  things  which  I  ought  to  have  done  ? 

So  great  then  being  the  difference  in  desires,  actions, 
wishes,  would  you  still  have  the  same  share  with  others  in 
those  things  about  which  you  have  not  laboured,  and  they 
have  laboured  ?  Then  are  you  surprised  if  they  pity  you, 
and  are  you  vexed  ?  But  they  are  not  vexed  if  you  pity 
them.  Why  ?  Because  they  are  convinced  that  they  have 
that  which  is  good,  and  you  are  not  convinced.  For  thig 
reason  you  are  not  satisfied  with  your  own,  but  you  desire 
that  which  they  have:  but  they  are  satisfied  with  their 
own,  and  do  not  desire  what  you  have :  since  if  you  were 
really  convinced,  that  with  respect  to  what  is  good,  it  is 
you  who  are  the  possessor  of  it  and  that  they  have  missed 
it,  you  would  not  even  have  thought  of  what  they  say 
about  you. 

1  See  iii.  i.  note  2.  Epictetus  is  making  a  parody  of  the  verses  of  Pytha- 
goras. See  Schweig.'s  remarks  on  the  words  '  He  who  has  risen  etc/  I 
have  of  necessity  translated  Ka.K<ynQiv&^vos  in  an  active  sense;  but  if 
this  is  right,  I  do  not  understand  how  the  word  is  Ubed  so. 


EPICTETUS.  345 

CHAPTEK  VIL 

ON   FREEDOM  FROM   FEAB. 

WHAT  makes  the  tyrant  formidable?  The  guards,  yon 
Bay,  and  their  swords,  and  the  men  of  the  bedchamber  and 
those  who  exclude  them  who  would  enter.  Why  then  if 
you  bring  a  boy  (child)  to  the  tyiant  when  he  is  with  his 
guards,  is  he  not  afraid ;  or  is  it  because  the  child  does 
not  understand  these  things?  If  then  any  man  does 
understand  what  guards  are  and  that  they  have  swords, 
and  comes  to  the  tyrant  for  this  very  purpose  because  he 
wishes  to  die  on  account  of  some  circumstance  and  seeks 
to  die  easily  by  the  hand  of  another,  is  he  afraid  of  the 
guards  ?  No,  for  he  wishes  for  the  thing  which  makes  the 
guards  formidable.  If  then  any  man  neither  wishing  to 
die  nor  to  live  by  all  means,  but  only  as  it  may  be  per- 
mitted, approaches  the  tyrant,  what  hinders  him  from 
approaching  the  tyrant  without  fear  ?  Nothing.  If  then 
a  man  has  the  same  opinion  about  his  property  as  the  man 
whom  I  have  instanced  has  about  his  body  ;  and  also  about 
his  children  and  his  wife.-  and  in  a  word  is  so  affected  by 
some  madness  or  despair  that  he  cares  not  whether  he 
possesses  them  or  not,  but  like  children  who  are  playing 
with  shells  care  (quarrel)  about  the  play,  but  do  not  trouble 
themselves  about  the  shells,  so  he  too  has  set  no  value  on 
the  materials  (things,),  but  values  the  pleasure  that  he  has 
with  them  and  the  occupation,  what  tyrant  is  then  for- 
midable to  him  or  what  guards  or  what  swords  ? 

Then  through  madness  is  it  possible  for  a  man  to  be  so 
disposed  towards  these  things,  and  the  Galilaeans  through 
habit,1  and  is  it  possible  that  no  man  can  learn  from  reason 

1  See  Schweig.'s  note  on  the  text.  By  the  Galilaeans  it  is  probable 
that  Kpictctus  means  the  Christians,  whose  obstinacy  Antoninus  also 
mentions  (xi.  3).  Epictetus,  a  contemporary  of  St.  Paul,  knew  little 
about  the  Christians,  and  only  knew  some  examples  of  their  obstinate 
adherence  to  the  new  faith  and  the  fanatical  behaviour  of  some  of  the 
converts.  That  there  were  wild  fanatics  among  the  early  Christians  is 
proved  on  undoubted  authority ;  and  also  that  there  always  have  been 
cuoh,  and  now  are  such.  The  abuse  of  any  doctrines  or  religious 
opinions  is  indeed  no  argument  against  such  doctrines  or  religious 
opinions ;  and  it  is  a  fact  quite  consistent  with  experience  that  the  best 
thiners  are  liable  to  be  perverted,  misunderstood,  and  misused. 


346  EFICTETUS. 

and  from  demonstration  that  God  has  made  aJl  the  J 
in  the  universe  and  the  universe  itself  completely  free 
from  hindrance  and  perfect,  and  the  parts  of  it  for  the  use 
of  the  whole?  All  other  animals  indeed  are  incapable  pf 
comprehending  the  administration  of  it ;  but  the  rational 
animal  man  has  faculties  for  the  consideration  of  all  these 
things,  and  for  understanding  ihat  it  is  a  part,  and  what 
kind  of  a  part  it  is,  and  that  it  is  right  for  the  parts  to  be 
subordinate  to  the  whole.  And  besides  this  being  naturally 
noble,  magnanimous  and  free,  man  sees  that  of  the  things 
which  surround  him  some  are  free  from  hindrance  and  in 
his  power,  and  the  other  things  are  subject  to  hindrance 
and  in  the  power  of  others ;  that  the  things  which  are  free 
from  hindrance  are  in  the  power  of  the  will;  and  those 
which  are  subject  to  hindrance  are  the  things  which  are 
not  in  the  power  of  the  will.  And  for  this  reason  if  he 
thinks  that  his  good  and  his  interest  be  in  these  things 
only  which  are  free  from  hindrance  and  in  his  own  power, 
h^  will  be  free,  prosperous,  happy,  free  from  harm,  mag- 
nanimous, pious,  thankful  to  God2  for  all  things ;  in  no 
matter  finding  fault  with  any  of  the  things  which  have 
not  been  put  in  his  power,  nor  blaming  any  of  them.3 
But  if  he  thinks  that  his  good  and  his  interest  are  in 
externals  and  in  things  which  are  not  in  the  power  of  his 
will,  he  must  of  necessity  be  hindered,  be  impeded,  be  a 
slave  to  those  who  have  the  power  over  the  things  which 
he  admires  (desires)  and  fears ;  and  he  must  of  necessity  be 
impious  because  he  thinks  that  he  is  harmed  by  God,  and 
he  must  be  unjust  because  he  always  claims  more  than 
belongs  to  him ;  and  he  must  of  necessity  be  abject  and 
mean. 

What  hinders  a  man,  who  has  clearly  separated  (com- 
prehended) these  things,  from  living  with  a  light  heart 
and  bearing  easily  the  reins,  quietly  expecting  every  thing 
which  can  happen,  and  enduring  that  which  has  already 
happened  ?  Would  you  have  me  to  bear  poverty  ?  Come 
and  you  will  know  what  poverty  is  when  it  has  found  one 
•who  can  act  well  the  part  of  a  poor  man.  Would  you 

*  •  This  agrees  withEph.  v.  20:  '*  Giving  thanks  always  for  all  things 
to  God.'"  Mrs.  Carter.  The  words  are  the  same  in  both  except  that 
tho  Apostle  has  €vxapitrrovvTcst  and  Epictetus  has  x^P'1'  *XOV* 

8  See  Schweig.'s  note. 


EPICTETUS.  347 

have  me  to  possess  power  ?  Let  me  have  power,  and  also 
the  trouble  of  it.  Well,  banishment  ?  Wherever  I  shall  go, 
there  it  will  be  well  with  me ;  for  here  also  where  I  am,  it 
was  not  because  of  the  place  that  it  was  well  with  me,  but 
because  of  my  opinions  which  I  shall  carry  off  with  me : 
for  neither  can  any  man  deprive  me  of  them ;  but  my 
opinions  alone  are  mine  and  they  cannot  be  taken  from 
me,  and  I  am  satisfied  while  I  have  them,  wherever  I  may 
be  and  whatever  I  am  doing.  But  now  it  is  time  to  die. 
Why  do  you  say  to  die?  Make  no  tragedy  show  of  the 
thing,  but  speak  of  it  as  it  is:  it  is  now  time  for  the 
matter  (of  the  body)  to  be  resolved  into  the  things  out  of 
which  it  was  composed.  And  what  is  the  formidable 
thing  here  ?  what  is  going  to  perish  of  the  things  which 
are  in  the  universe?4  what  new  thing-  or  wondrous  is 
going  to  happen  ?  Is  it  for  this  reason  that  a  tyrant  is 
formidable  ?  Is  it  for  this  reason  that  the  guards  appear 
to  have  swords  which  are  large  and  sharp  ?  Say  this  to 
others ;  but  I  have  considered  about  all  these  things ;  no 
man  has  power  over  me.  I  have  been  made  free ;  I  know 
his  commands,  no  man'  can  now  lead  me  as  a  slave.  I 
have  a  proper  person  to  assert  my  freedom ; 5  I  have  proper 
judges.  (J  say)  are  you  not  the  master  of  my  body? 
What  then  is  that  to  me  ?  Are  you  not  the  master  of  my 
property  ?  What  then  is  that  to  me  ?  Are  you  not  the 
master  of  my  exile  or  of  my  chains  ?  Well,  from  all  these 
things  and  all  the  poor  body  itself  I  depart  at  your 
bidding,  when  you  please.  Make  trial  of  your  power,  and 
you  will  know  how  far  it  reaches. 

Whom  then  can  I  still  fear  ?  Those  who  are  over  the 
bedchamber?6  Lest  they  should  do,  what?  Shut  me 
out?  If  they  find  that  I  wish  to  enter,  let  them  shut  me 
out.  Why  then  do  you  go  to  the  doors  ?  Because  I  think 
it  befits  me,  while  the  play  (sport)  lasts,  to  join  in  it. 
How  then  are  you  not  shut  out  ?  Because  unless  some 

4  He  says  that  the  body  will  be  resolved  into  the  things  of  which  it  is 
composed :  nr.ne  of  them  will  perish.  The  soul,  as  he  has  said  elsewhere, 
will  go1'  to  him  who  gave  it  (iii.  13.  note  4).  But  I  do  not  suppose  that 
he  means  that  the  soul  will  exist  as  having  a  separate  consciousness. 

6  mpviffrJiv,  see  iv.  1. 113. 

e  See  i.  19.  note  6. 


348  BPICTETUS. 

one  allows  me  to  go  in,  I  do  not  choose  to  go  in,  but  ain 
always  content  with  that  which  happens ;  for  I  think  that 
what  God  chooses  is  better  than  what  I  choose.7  I  will 
attach  myself  as  a  minister  and  follower  to  him ;  I  have 
the  same  movements  (pursuits)  as  he  has,  I  have  the  same 
desires ;  in  a  word,  1  have  the  same  will  (orw^eAio).  There 
is  no  shutting  out  for  me,  but  for  those  who  would  force 
their  way  in.  Why  then  do  not  I  force  my  way  in? 
Because  I  know  that  nothing  good  is  distributed  within 
to  those  who  enter.  But  when  I  hear  any  man  called 
fortunate  because  he  is  honoured  by  Caesar,  I  say,  what 
does  he  happen  to  get  ?  A  province  (the  government  of  a 
province).  Does  he  also  obtain  an  opinion  such  as  he 
ought  ?  The  office  of  a  Prefect.  Does  he  also  obtain  the 
power  of  using  his  office  well  ?  Why  do  1  still  strive  to 
•enter  (Caesar's  chamber)  ?  A  man  scatters  dried  figs  and 
nuts :  the  children  seize  them,  and  fight  with  one  another ; 
men  do  not,  for  they  think  them  to  be  a  small  matter. 
But  if  a  man  should  throw  about  shells,  even  the  children 
•do  not  seize  them.  Provinces  are  distributed:  let  chil- 
dren look  to  that.  Money  is  distributed:  let  children 
look  to  that.  Praetorships,  consulships  are  distributed: 
let  children  scramble  for  them,  let  them  be  shut  out, 
beaten,  kiss  the  hands  of  the  giver,  of  the  slaves :  but  to 
me  these  are  only  dried  figs  and  nuts.  What  then  ?  If 
you  fail  to  get  them,  while  Caesar  is  scattering  them 
about,  do  not  be  troubled :  if  a  dried  fig  come  into  your 
lap,  take  it  and  eat  it ;  for  so  far  you  may  value  even  a 
fig.  But  if  I  shall  stoop  down  and  turn  another  over,  or 
be  turned  over  by  another,  and  shall  flatter  those  who 
have  got  into  (Caesar's)  chamber,  neither  is  a  dried  fig 
worth  the  trouble,  nor  any  thing  else  of  the  things  which 
are  not  good,  which  the  philosophers  have  persuaded  me 
not  to  think  good. 

Show  me  the  swords  of  the  guards.  See  how  big  they 
are,  and  how  sharp.  What  then  do  these  big  and  sharp 

f  *  Nevertheless  not  as  I  will,  but  as  thou  wilt/  Matthew  xxvi.  39, 
Mrs,  Carter.  'Our  resignation  to  the  will  of  God  may  be  said  to  be 
perfect,  when  our  will  is  lobt  and  resolved  up  into  his ;  when  we  rest  in 
his  will  as  our  end,  as  being  itself  most  just  and  right  and  good/ 
Bp.  Butler,  Sermon  on  the  Love  of  God. 


BPICTETUS.  349 

«wcrds  do?  They  kill.  And  what  does  a  fever  do? 
Nothing  else.  And  what  else  a  (falling)  tile  ?  Nothing 
else.  Would  you  then  have  me  to  wonder  at  tho^e  things 
and  worship  them,  and  go  about  as  the  slave  of  all  of 
them  ?  I  hope  that  this  will  not  happen :  but  when  I 
have  once  learned  that  every  thing  which  has  come  into 
existence  must  also  go  out  of  it,  that  the  universe  may  not 
stand  still  nor  be  impeded,  I  no  longer  consider  it  any 
difference  whether  a  fever  shall  do  it  or  a  tile,  or  a  soldier. 
Bnt  if  a  man  must  make  a  comparison  between  these 
things,  I  know  that  the  soldier  will  do  it  with  less- 
trouble  (to  me),  and  quicker.  When  then  I  neither  fear 
any  thing  which  a  tyrant  can  do  to  me,  nor  desire  any 
thing  which  he  can  give,  why  do  I  still  look  on  with 
wonder  (admiration)?  Why  am  I  btill  confounded? 
Why  do  I  fear  the  guards?  Why  am  I  pleased  if  be- 
speaks to  me  in  a  friendly  way,  and  receives  me,  and 
why  do  I  tell  others  how  he  spoke  to  me?  Is  he  a 
Socrates,  is  he  a  Diogenes  that  his  praise  should  be  a  proof 
of  what  I  am?  Have  I  been  eager  to  imitate  his  morals? 
But  I  keep  up  the  play  and  go  to  him,  and  serve  him  so 
long  as  he  does  not  bid  me  to  do  any  thing  foolish  or  un- 
reasonable. But  if  he  says  to  me,  Go  and  bring  Leon 8  of 
Salamis,  I  say  to  him,  Seek  another,  for  I  am  no  longer 

flaying.  (The  tyrant  says) :  Lead  him  away  (to  prison), 
follow ;  that  is  part  of  the  play.  But  your  head  will 
be  taken  off — Does  the  tyrant's  head  always  remain  where* 
it  is,  and  the  heads  of  you  who  obey  him  ? — Bnt  you  will 
be  cast  out  unburied? — If  the  corpse  is  I,  I  shall  be  cast 
out ;  but  if  I  am  different  from  the  corpse,  speak  more 
properly  according  as  the  fact  is,  and  do  not  think  of 
frightening  me.  These  things  are  formidable  to  children 
and  fools.  But  if  any  man  has  once  entered  a  philosopher's- 
school  and  knows  not  what  he  is,  he  deserves  to  be  full  of 
fear  and  to  flatter  those  whom  afterwards 9  he  used  to 
flatter ;  (and)  if  he  has  not  yet  learned  that  he  is  not  flesh 
nor  bones  nor  sinews  (vtvpa),  but  he  is  that  which  makes 

•  See  iv.  1.  note  59. 

»  I  do  not  see  the  meaning  of  vvTepov :  it  may  perhaps  mean  '  after 
leaving  the  ichool.'    See  Schweig.'s  note. 


350  EPICTETUS. 

use  of  these  parts  of  the  body  and  governs  their  and 
follows  (understands)  the  appearances  of  things.10 

Yes,  but  this  talk  makes  us  despite  the  laws — And  what 
kind  of  talk  makes  men  more  obedient  to  the  laws  who 
employ  such  talk?  And  the  things  which  are  in  the 
power  of  a  fool  are  not  law.11  And  yet  see  how  this  talk 
makes  us  disposed  as  we  ought  to  be  even  to  these  menf 
(fools) ;  since  it  teaches  us  to  claim  in  opposition  to  them 
none  of  the  things  in  which  they  are  able  to  surpass  us. 
This  talk  teaches  us  as  to  the  body  to  give  it  up,  as  to 
property  to  give  that  up  also,  as  to  children,  parents, 
brothers,  to  retire  from  these,  to  give  up  all;  it  only 
makes  an  exception  of  the  opinipns,  which  even  Zeus  has 
willed  to  be  the  select  property  of  every  man.  What 
transgression  of  the  laws  is  there  here,  what  folly? 
Where  you  are  superior  and  stronger,  there  I  gave  way  to 
you :  on  the  other  hand,  where  I  am  superior,  do  you 
yield  to  me ;  for  I  have  studied  (cared  for)  this,  and  you. 
have  not.  It  is  your  study  to  live  in  houses  with  floors 
formed  of  various  stones,12  how  your  slaves  and  dependents 
shall  serve  you,  how  you  shall  wear  fine  clothing,  have 
many  hunting  men,  lute  players,  and  tragic  actors.  Do  I 
claim  any  of  these  ?  have  you  made  any  study  of  opinions, 
and  of  your  own  rational  faculty?  Do  you  know  of  what 
parts  it  is  composed,  how  they  are  brought  together,  how 

10  Here  Epietetus  admits  that  there  is  some  power  in  man  which 
uses  the  body,  directs  and  governs  it.    He  does  not  say  what  the  power 
is  nor  what  be  supposes  it  to  be.    "  Upon  the  whole  then  our  organs  of 
sense  and  onr  limbs  are  certainly  instruments,  which  the  living  persons, 
ourselves,  make  use  of  to  perceive  and  move  with/'    Butler's  Analogy, 
chap.  i. 

11  The  will  of  a  fool  does  not  make  law,  he  says.    Unfortunately  it 
does,  if  we  use  the  word  law  in  the  strict  sense  of  law  :  for  law  is  a 
general  command  from  a  person,  an  absolute  king,  for  example,  wh® 
has  power  to  enforce  it  on  those  to  whom  the  command  is  addressed 
or  if  not  to  enforce  it,  to  punish  for  disobedience  to  it.    This  strict  use 
of  the  word  *  law '  is  independent  of  the  quality  of  the  command,  which 
may  be  wise  or  foolish,  good  or  bad.    But  Epictetus  does  not  use  the 
word  '  law '  in  the  strict  sense. 

12  The  word  is  faQoa-rpdrois,  which  means  what  we  name  Mosaic 
floors  or  pavements.    The  word  XiQ6<rrp<oTov  is  used  by  John  xix.  13, 
*nd  rendered  in  our  version  by  *  pavement/ 


EPICTETUS.  351 

they  are  connected,  what  powers  it  has,  and  of  what  kind  ? 
Why  then  are  you  vexed,  if  another  who  has  made  it  his 
study,  has  the  advantage  over  you  in  these  things  ?  But 
theso  things  are  the  greatest.  And  who  hinders  you  from 
being  employed  about  these  things  and  looking  after  them  ? 
And  who  has  a  better  stock  of  books,  of  leisure,  of  persons 
to  aid  you  ?  Only  turn  your  mind  at  last  to  these  things, 
attend,  if  it  be  only  a  short  time,  to  your  own  ruling 
faculty 13  (ifycjuionKoV) :  consider  what  this  is  that  you  pos- 
sess, and  whence  it  came,  this  which  uses  all  other  (facul- 
ties), and  tries  them,  and  selects  and  rejects.  But  so  long 
as  you  employ  yourself  about  externals  you  will  possess 
them  (externals)  as  no  man  else  does ;  but  you  will  have 
this  (the  ruling  faculty)  such  as  you  choose  to  have  it, 
sordid  and  neglected. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

AGAINST  THOSE  WHO  HASTILY  RUSH  INTO  THE  USE  OP  THE 
PHILOSOPHIC  DRESS. 

NEVER  praise  nor  blame  a  man  because  of  the  things 
which  are  common  (to  all,  or  to  most),1  and  do  not 
ascribe  to  him  any  skill  or  want  of  skill ;  and  thus  you 
will  be  free  from  rashness  and  from  malevolence.  This 
man  bathes  very  quickly.  Does  he  then  do  wrong  ?  Cer- 
tainly not.  But  what  does  he  do  ?  He  bathes  very 

18  This  term  (r^  vwepoviKov)  has  been  often  used  by  Epictetus  (i.  26. 
15.  etc),  and  by  M.  Antoninus.  Here  Epictetus  gives  a  definition  or 
description  of  it :  it  is  the  faculty  by  which  we  reflect  and  judge  and 
determine,  a  faculty  which  no  other  animal  has,  a  faculty  which  in 
many  men  is  neglected,  and  weak  because  it  is  neglected  ;  but  still  it 
ought  to  be  what  its  constitution  forma  it  to  be,  a  faculty  which 
"  plainly  bears  upon  it  marks  of  authority  over  all  the  rest,  and  claims 
the  absolute  direction  of  them  all,  to  allow  or  forbid  their  gratification  " 
(Bp.  Butler,  Preface  to  his  Sermons).  The  words  in  the  text  (&• 
\ey6pwov,  av€Ktey6fjLwov,  selection  and  rejection)  are  expressed  by 
Cicero  (De  Fin.  ix.  ii.  11)  by  *  eligere '  and  4  rejicere,' 

1  See  iv.  4.  44. 


352  EPICTETUS. 

quickly.  Are  all  things  then  done  well  ?  By  no  means : 
but  the  acts  which  proceed  from  right  opinions  are  done 
well ;  and  -those  which  proceed  from  bad  opinions  are  done 
ill.  But  do  you,  until  you  know  the  opinion  from  which 
a  man  does  each  thing,  neither  praise  nor  blame  the  act. 
But  the  opinion  is  not  easily  discovered  from  the  external 
things  (acts).  This  man  is  a  carpenter.  Why  ?  Because 
he  uses  an  axe.  What  then  is  this  to  the  matter  ?  This 
man  is  a  musician  because  he  sings.  And  what  does  that 
signify?  This  man  is  a  philosopher.  Because  he  wears  a 
cloak  and  long  hair.  And  what  does  a  juggler  wear? 
For  this  reason  if  a  man  sees  any  philosopher  acting 
indecently,  immediately  he  says,  See  what  the  philosopher 
is  doing ;  but  he  ought  because  of  the  man's  indecent 
behaviour  rather  to  say  that  he  is  not  a  philosopher.  For 
if  this  is  the  preconceived  notion  (71730X77^15)  of  a  philosopher 
and  what  he  profes-es,  to  wear  a  cloak  and  long  hair, 
men  would  say  well;  but  if  \vhat  he  professes  is  this 
rather,  to  keep  himself  free  from  faults,  why  do  wo  not 
rather,  because  he  does  not  make  good  his  professions, 
take  from  him  the  name  of  philosopher  ?  For  so  we  do  in 
the  case  of  all  other  arts.  When  a  man  sees  another 
handling  an  axe  badly,  he  does  not  say,  what  is  the  use 
of  the  carpenter's  art?  See  how  badly  carpenters  do 
their  work;  but  he  says  just  the  contrary,  This -man  is 
not  a  carpenter,  for  he  uses  an  axe  badly.  In  the  same 
way  if  a  man  hears  another  singing  badly,  he  does  not 
say,  See  how  musicians  sing ;  but  rather,  This  man  is  not 
a  musician.  But  it  is  in  the  matter  of  philosophy  only 
that  people  do  this.  When  they  see  a  man  acting  con- 
trary to  the  profession  of  a  philosopher,  they  do  not  take 
away  his  title,  but  they  assume  him  to  be  a  philosopher, 
and  from  his  acts  deriving  the  fact  that  he  is  behaving 
indecently  they  conclude  that  there  is  no  use  in  philo- 
sophy. 

What  then  is  the  reason  of  this  ?  Because  we  attach 
value  to  the  notion  (iFp6\i$w)  of  a  carpenter,  and  to  that 
of  a  musician,  and  to  the  notion  of  other  artisans  in  like 
manner,  but  not  to  that  of  a  philosopher,  and  we  judge 
from  externals  only  that  it  is  a  thing  confused  and  ill 
defined,  And  what  other  kind  of  art  has  a  name  from  the 


EPICTETUS.  353 

Iress  and  the  hair ;  and  has  not  both  theorems  and  a 
naterial  and  an  end  ?  What  then  is  the  material  (matter) 
>f  the  philosopher  ?  Is  it  a  cloak  ?  No,  but  reason.  What 
s  his  end  ?  is  it  to  wear  a  cloak  ?  No,  but  to  possess  the 
•eason  in  a  right  state.  Of  what  kind  are  his  theorems  ? 
Lre  they  those  about  the  way  in  which  the  beard  becomes 
jreat  or  the  hair  long  ?  No,  but  rather  what  Zeno  says, 
o  know  the  elements  of  reason,  what  kind  of  a  thing  each 
>f  them  is,  and  how  they  are  fitted  to  one  another,  and 
vhat  things  are  consequent  upon  them.  Will  you  not 
hen  see  first  if  he  does  what  he  professes  when  he  acts 
n  an  unbecoming  manner,  and  then  blame  his  study 
pursuit)  ?  But  now  when  you  yourself  are  acting  in  a 
ober  way,  you  say  in  consequence  of  what  he  seems  to 
rou  to  be  doing  wrong,  Look  at  the  philosopher,  as  if  it 
vere  proper  to  call  by  the  name  of  philosopher  one  who 
loes  these  things ;  and  further,  This  is  the  conduct  of  a 
philosopher.  But  you  do  not  say,  Look  at  the  carpenter, 
vhen  you  know  that  a  carpenter  is  an  adulterer  or  you 
ee  him  to  be  a  glutton  ;  nor  do  you  say,  See  the  musician. 
L1hus  to  a  certain  degree  even  you  perceive  (understand) 
he  profession  of  a  philosopher,  but  you  fall  away  from  the 
totion,  and  you  are  confused  through  want  of  care. 

But  even  the  philosophers  themselves  as  they  are 
ailed  pursue  the  thing  (philosophy)  by  beginning  with 
hings  which  are  common  to  them  and  others :  as  soon  as 
hey  have  assumed  a  cloak  and  grown  a  beard,  they  say, 

am  a  philosopher.2  But  no  man  will  say,  I  am  a 
ausician,  if  he  has  bought  a  plectrum  (fiddlestick)  and 
,  lute :  nor  will  he  say,  I  am  a  smith,  if  he  has  put  on 
,  cap  and  apron.  But  the  dress  is  fitted  to  the  art ;  and 
hey  take  their  name  from  the  art,  and  not  from  the 
.ress.  For  this  reason  Euphrates  3  used  to  say  well,  A 
:>ng  time  I  strove  to  be  a  philosopher  without  people 
nowing  it  ,*  and  this,  he  said,  was  useful  to  me :  for  first 

knew  tbat  when  I  did  any  thing  well,  I  did  not  do  it 

*  Compare  Horace,  Ep.  u  19,  12  etc. 

Quid,  si  quis  wilto  torvo  ferus  et  pede  nudo 
Exiguaeque  toga*  simulet  textore  Catonem, 
Virtutemne  repri  jsentet  moreeque  Catonis  ? 

*  See  iii.  15.  6 


354  EPICTETUS, 

for  the  sake  of  the  spectators,  but  for  the  sake  of  myself: 
I  ate  well  for  the  sake  of  myself ;  I  had  my  countenance 
well  composed  and  my  walk  :  all  for  myself  and  for  God. 
Then,  as  1  struggled  alone,  so  I  alone  also  was  in  danger : 
in  no  respect  through  me,  if  I  did  anything  base  or  unbe- 
coming, was  philosophy  endangered  ;  nor  did  I  injure  tho 
many  by  doing  any  thing  wrong  as  a  philosopher.  For 
this  reason  those  who  did  not  know  my  purpose  used  to 
wonder  how  it  was  that  while  I  conversed  and  lived 
altogether  with  all  philosophers,  I  was  not  a  philosopher 
myself.  And  what  was  the  harm  for  me  to  be  known  to 
be  a  philosopher  by  my  acts  and  not  by  outward  marks  ?4 
See  how  I  eat,  how  I  drink,  how  I  sleep,  how  I  bear  and 
forbear,  how  I  co-operate,  how  I  employ  desire,  how  T 
employ  aversion  (turning  from  things),  how  I  maintain 
the  relations  (to  things)  those  which  are  natural  or  those 
which  are  acquired,  how  free  from  confusion,  how  free 
from  hindrance.  Judge  of  me  from  this,  if  you  can.  But 
if  you  are  so  deaf  and  blind  that  you  cannot  conceive  even 
Hephaestus 6  to  be  a  good  smith,  unless  you  see  the  cap  on 
his  head,  what  is  the  harm  in  not  being  recognized  by  so 
foolish  a  judge  ? 

So  Socrates  was  not  known  to  be  a  philosopher  by  most 
persons ;  and  they  used  to  come  to  him  and  ask  to  be  in- 
troduced to  philosophers.  Was  he  vexed  then  as  we  are, 
and  did  kf>  say,  And  do  you  not  think  that  I  am  a  philo- 
sopher? No,  but  he  would  take  them  and  introduce  them, 
being  satisfied  with  one  thing,  with  being  a  philosopher  ; 
and  being  pleased  also  with  not  being  thought  to  be  a 
philosopher,  he  was  not  annoyed:  for  he  thought  of  his 
•own  occupation.  What  is  the  work  of  an  honourable  and 
good  man  ?  To  have  many  pupils  ?  By  no  means.  They 
will  look  to  this  matter  who  are  earnest  about  it.  But 
was  it  his  business  to  examine  carefully  difficult  theorems  ? 
Others  will  look  after  these  matters  also,  In  what  then 

4  "  Yea  a  man  may  say,  Thou  hast  faith,  and  I  have  works :  shew  me 
thy  faith  without  thy  works,  and  I  will  shew  thee  my  faith  by  my 
works,"  Epistle  of  James,  ii.  18.    So  a  moral  philosopher  may  say,  I 
show  my  principles,  not  by  what  I  profess,  hut  by  that  which  I  do. 

5  See  the  statues  of  Hephaestus,  Montfauoon,  Antiq.  vol.  i.  lib.  iii. 
c.  1.    Uptou. 


EPICTETUS.  355 

was  he,6  and  who  was  lie  and  whom  did  he  wish  to  be  ?  lie 
was  in  that  (employed  in  that)  wherein  there  was  hurt 
(damage)  and  advantage.  If  any  man  can  damage  me,  he 
gays,  I  am  doing  nothing  :  if  I  am  waiting  for  another  man 
to  do  me  good,  J  am  nothing.  If  I  wish  for  any  thing,  and 
it  does  not  happen,  I  am  unfortunate.  To  such  a  contest 
he  invited  every  man,  and  I  do  not  think  that  he  would- 
have  declined  the  contest  with  any  one.7  What  do  you 
suppose  ?  was  it  by  proclaiming  and  saying,  I  am  such  a 
man?  Far  from  it,  but  by  being  such  a  man.  For 
further,  this  is  the  character  of  a  fool  and  a  boaster  to 
say,  I  am  free  from  passions  and  disturbance:  do  not 
be  ignorant,  my  friends,  that  while  you  are  uneasy  and 
disturbed  about  things  of  no  value,  I  alone  am  free  from 
all  perturbation.  So  is  it  not  enough  for  you  to  feel  no 
pain,  unless  you  make  this  proclamation :  Come  together 
all  who  are  suffering  gout,  pains  in  the  head,  fever,  ye 
who  are  lame,  blind,  and  observe  that  I  am  sound  (free) 
from  every  ailment — This  is  empty  and  disagreeable  to 
hear,  unless  like  Aesculapius  you  are  able  to  show  imme- 
diately by  what  kind  of  treatment  they  also  shall  be 
immediately  free  from  disease,  and  unless  you  show  your 
own  health  as  an  example. 

For  such  is  the  Cynic  who  is  honoured  with  the  sceptre 
and  the  diadem  by  Zeus,  and  says,  That  you  may  see, 
0  men,  that  you  seek  happiness  and  tranquillity  not  where 
it  is,  but  where  it  is  not,  behold  I  am  sent  to  you  by  God 
as  an  example,8  I  who  have  neither  property  nor  house, 
nor  wife  nor  children,  not  even  a  bed,  nor  coat  nor  house- 
hold utensil ;  and  see  how  healthy  I  am :  try  me,  and  if 
you  see  that  I  am  free  from  perturbations,  hear  the  re- 
medies and  how  I  have  been  cured  (treated).  This  is  both 
philanthropic  and  noble.  But  see  whose  work  it  is,  the 
work  of  Zeus,  or  of  him  whom  he  may  judge  worthy  of 
this  service,  that  he  may  never  exhibit  any  thing  to  the 
many,  by  which  he  shall  make  of  no  effect  his  own  tes- 

6  'In  what  then  was  he 'seems  to  mean*  in  what  did  he  employ 
himself? 

1  The  text  of  Schweighaeuser  is  OVK  by  /xoi  SOKT;  ta<rri}i'ai  ovSevt .  he 
lays  *  temere  ofoc  &?  /tot  8o/ce?  ed.  Bas.  et  seqq/  But  SOKC*  is  right. 

•  Compare  iii.  c.  22, 

2  A  2 


356  EPICT2TUS. 

timony,  whereby  he  gives  testimony  to  virtue,  and  bears 
evidence  against  external  things : 

His  beauteous  face  pales  not,  nor  from  his  checks 
He  wipes  a  tear. — Odyssey,  xi.  528. 

And  not  this  only,  but  he  neither  desires  nor  seeks  any 
thing,  nor  man  nor  place  nor  amusement,  as  children  seek 
the  vintage  or  holidays;  always  fortified  by  modesty  as 
others  are  fortified  by  walls  and  doors  and  doorkeepers. 

But  now  (these  men)  being  only  moved  to  philosophy, 
as  those  who  have  a  b;id  stomach  are  moved  to  some  kinds 
of  food  which  they  soon  loathe,  straightway  (rush)  to- 
wards the  sceptre  and  to  the  royal  power.  They  let  the 
hair  grow,  they  assume  the  cloak,  they  show  the  shoulder 
bare,  they  quarrel  with  those  whom  they  meet;  and  if 
they  see  a  man  in  a  thick  winter  coat,9  they  quarrel  with 
him.  Man,  first  exercise  yourself  in  winter  weather :  see 
yotir  movements  (inclinations)  that  they  are  not  those  of 
a  man  with  a  bad  stomach  or  those  of  a  longing  woman. 
First  strive  that  it  be  not  known  what  you  are:  be  a 
philosopher  to  yourself  (or,  philosophize  to  yourself)  a 
short  time.  Fruit  grows  thus  :  the  seed  must  be  buried 
,  for  some  time,  hid,  grow  slowly  in  order  that  it  may  come 
to  perfection.  But  if  it  produces  the  ear  before  the 
jointed  stem,  it  is  imperfect,  a  produce  of  the  garden  of 
Adonis.10  Such  a  poor  plant  are  you  also :  you  have 
blossomed  too  soon ;  the  cold  weather  will  scorch  you  up. 
See  what  the  husbandmen  say  about  seeds  when  there  is 
warm  weather  too  early.  They  are  afraid  lest  the  seeds 
should  be  too  luxuriant,  and  then  a  single  frost  should  lay 
hold  of  them  and  show  that  they  are  too  forward.  Do  you 
also  consider,  my  man :  you  have  shot  out  too  soon,  you 
have  hurried  towards  a  little  fame  before  the  proper 

*  The  word  is  <patv6\v),  which  seems  to  be  the  Latin  *  paenula.' 
10  *  The  gardens  of  Adonis '  are  things  growing  in  earthen  vesaete, 
carried  about  for  show  only,  not  for  use.  *The  gardens  of  Adonis '  is 
a  proverbial  expression  applied  to  things  of  no  value,  to  plants,  for 
instance,  which  last  only  a  short  time,  have  no  roots,  and  soon  wither. 
jKuch  things,  we  may  suppose,  were  exhibited  at  the  festivals  of  Adonic 
Bch  weigf.'s  note. 


EPICTETUS.  357 

season :  you  think  that  you  are  something,  a  fool  among 
fools:  you  will  be  caught  by  the  frost,  and  rather  you 
have  been  frost-bitten  in  the  root  below,  but  your  upper 
parts  still  blossom  a  little,  and  for  this  reason  you  think 
that  you  are  still  alive  and  flourishing.  Allow  us  to 
ripen  in  the  natural  way:  why  do  you  bare  (expose)  us? 
why  do  you  force  us  ?  we  are  not  yet  able  to  bear  the  air. 
Let  the  root  grow,  then  acquire  the  first  joint,  then  the 
second,  and  then  the  third :  in  this  way  then  the  fruit 
will  naturally  force  itself  out,11  even  if  I  do  not  choose. 
For  who  that  is  pregnant  and  filled  with  such  great 
principles  does  not  also  perceive  his  own  powers  and 
move  towards  the  corresponding  acts?  A  bull  is  not 
ignorant  of  his  own  nature  and  his  powers,  when  a  wild 
beast  shows  itself,  nor  does  he  wait  for  one  to  urge  him 
on ;  nor  a  dog  when  he  sees  a  wild  animal.  But  if  I  have 
the  powers  of  a  good  man,  shall  I  wait  for  you  to  prepare 
me  for  my  own  (proper)  acts  ?  At  present  I  have  them 
not,  believe  me.  Why  then  do  you  wish  me  to  be 
withered  up  before  the  time,  as  you  have  been  withered 
np? 


CHAPTER  IX. 

TO   A   PERSON   WHO  HAD  BEEN   CHANGED    TO    A    CHARACTER    OF 
SHAMELESSNESS.1 

WHEN  you  see  another  man  in  the  possession  of  power 
(magistracy),  set  against  this  the  fact  that  you  have  not 
the  want  (desire)  of  power;  when  you  see  another  rich, 
see  what  you  possess  in  place  of  riches :  for  if  you  possess 
nothing  in  place  of  them,  you  are  miserable ;  but  if  you 
have  not  the  want  of  riches,  know  that  you  possess  more 
than  this  man  possesses  and  what  is  worth  much  more. 
Another  man  possesses  a  handsome  woman  (wife) :  you 

11  See  Schweig.'s  note. 

1  *  They,  who  are  desirous  of  taking  refuge  in  Heathenism  from  the 
itrictnesa  of  the  Christian  morality,  will  find  no  great  consolation  ia 
reading  this  chapter  of  E^ictttus.'  Mrs.  Carter. 


358  EPICTETUS. 

have  the  satisfaction  of  not  desiring  a  handsome  wife.  Do 
those  things  appear  to  you  to  be  small  ?  And  how  much 
would  these  persons  give,  these  very  men  who  are  rich,  and 
in  possession  of  power,  and  live  with  handsome  women,  to 
be  able  to  despise  riches,  and  power  and  these  very  women 
whom  they  love  and  enjoy  ?  Do  you  not  know  then  what 
is  the  thirst  of  a  man  who  has  a  fever  ?  lie  possesses  that 
which  is  in  no  degree  like  the  thirst  of  a  man  who  is  in 
health :  for  the  man  who  is  in  health  ceases  to  be  thirsty 
after  he  has  drunk ;  but  the  sick  man  being  pleased  for  a 
short  time  has  a  nausea,  he  converts  the  drink  into  bile, 
vomits,  is  griped,  and  more  thirsty.  It  is  such  a  thing  to 
have  desire  of  riches  and  to  possess  liches,  desire  of  power 
and  to  possess  power,  desire  of  a  beautiful  woman  and  to 
sleep  with  her:  to  this  is  added  jealousy,  fear  of  being 
deprived  of  the  thing  which  you  love,  indecent  words, 
indecent  thoughts,  unseemly  acts. 

And  what  do  I  lose  ?  you  will  say.  My  man,  you  were 
modest,  and  you  are  so  no  longer.  Have  you  lost  nothing  ? 
In  place  of  Chrysippus  and  ^eno  you  read  Aristides  and 
Evenus ;  2  have  you  lost  nothing  ?  In  place  of  Socrates 
and  Diogenes,  you  admire  him  who  is  able  to  corrupt  and 
seduce  most  women.  You  wish  to  appear  handsome  and 
try  to  make  yourself  so,  though  you  are  not.  You  like  to 
display  splendid  clothes  that  you  may  attract  women; 
and  if  you  find  any  fine  oil  (for  the  hair),3  you  imagine 
that  you  are  happy.  But  formerly  you  did  not  think  of 
any  such  thing,  but  only  where  there  should  be  decent 
talk,  a  worthy  man,  and  a  gencious  conception.  There- 
fore you  slept  like  a  man,  walked  forth  like  a  man,  wore  a 
manly  dress,  and  used  to  talk  in  a  way  becoming  a  good 

2  Aristides  was  a  Greek,  but  his  period  is  not  known.  He  was  tho 
author  of  a  work  named  Milesiaca  or  Milesian  stories.  All  that  we 
know  of  the  work  is  that  it  was  of  a  loose  description,  amatory  and 
licentious.  It  was  translated  into  Latin  by  L.  Cornelius  Sisenna,  a 
contemporary  of  the  Dictator  Sulla ;  and  it  is  mentioned  by  Plutarch. 
(Life  of  Crassus,  c.  32),  and  several  times  by  Ovid  (Tristia  ii.  413  etc.). 
Evenus  was  perhaps  a  poet.  We  know  nothing  of  this  Evenus,  but  we 
may  conjecture  from  being  here  associated  with  Aristides  what  hia 
character  was. 

8  See  Schweig.'s  note  on  the  word  pvpaXeiQiov,  which  he  has  in  hia 
text.  It  should  be  nvpu\oi<piov,  if  the  word  exists. 


EPICTETUS.  359 

man ;  then  do  you  say  to  me,  I  have  lost  nothing  ?  So  do 
men  lose  nothing  more  than  coin  ?  Is  not  modesty  lost  ? 
Is  not  decent  behaviour  lost  ?  is  it  that  he  who  has  lost 
these  things  has  sustained  no  loss?  Perhaps  you  think 
that  not  one  of  these  things  is  a  loss.  But  there  was  a 
time  when  you  reckoned  this  the  only  loss  and  damage, 
and  you  were  anxious  that  no  man  should  disturb  you 
from  these  (good)  words  and  actions. 

Observe,  you  are  disturbed  from  these  good  words  and 
actions  by  nobody,  but  by  yourself.  Fight  with  yourself, 
restore  yourself  to  decency,  to  modesty,  to  liberty.  If  any 
man  ever  told  you  this  about  me,  that  a  person  forces  me 
to  be  an  adulterer,  to  wear  such  a  dress  as  yours,  to  per- 
fume myself  with  oils,  would  you  not  have  gone  and  with 
your  own  hand  have  killed  the  man  who  thus  calumniated 
me?  Now  will  you  not  help  yourself?  and  how  much 
easier  is  this  help  ?  There  is  no  need  to  kill  any  man, 
nor  to  put  him  in  chains,  nor  to  treat  him  with  contumely 
nor  to  enter  the  Forum  (go  to  the  courts  of  law),  but  it  is 
only  necessary  for  you  to  speak  to  yourself  who  will  be 
most  easily  persuaded,  with  whom  no  man  has  more  power 
of  persuasion  than  yourself.  First  of  all,  condemn  what 
you  are  doing,  and  then  when  you  have  condemned  it,  do 
not  despair  of  yourself,  and  be  not  in  the  condition  of 
those  men  of  mean  spirit,  who,  when  they  have  once 
given  in,  surrender  themselves  completely  and  are  carried 
away  as  if  by  a  torrent.  But  see  what  the  trainers  of  boys 
do.  Has  the  boy  fallen  ?  Eise,  they  say,  wrestle  again 
till  you  are  made  strong.  Do  you  also  do  something  of 
the  same  kind :  for  be  well  assured  that  nothing  is  more 
tractable  than  the  human  soul.  You  must  exercise  the 
Will,4  and  the  thing  is  done,  it  is  set  right :  as  on  the 
other  hand,  only  fall  a  nodding  (be  careless),  and  the 
thing  is  lost :  for  from  within  comes  ruin  and  from  within 
comes  help.  Then  (you  say)  what  good  do  I  gain  ?  And 

4  The  orginal  is  eeKfoai  8e?.  Seneca  (Ep.  80) :  *  Quid  tflbi  opus  est 
nt  sis  bonus  ?  Velle/  Upton. 

The  power  of  the  Will  is  a  fundamental  principle  with  Epictetus. 
The  will  is  strong  in  some,  but  very  feeble  in  others ;  and  sometimes, 
as  experience  seems  to  show,  it  is  incapable  of  resisting  tee  power  of 
old  habits. 


860  EPICTETUS. 

what  greater  good  do  you  seek  than  this  ? 5  From  a  shame- 
less man  you  will  become  a  modest  man,  from  a  disorderly 
you  will  become  an  orderly  man,  from  a  faithless  you  will 
become  a  faithful  man,  from  a  man  of  unbridled  habits  a 
sober  man.  If  you  seek  any  thing  more  than  this,  go  on  doing 
what  you  are  doing :  not  even  a  God  can  now  help  you. 


CHAPTER  X. 

WHAT  THINGS  WE  OUGHT  TO    DESPISE,   AND  WHAT  THINGS  \VB 
OUGHT  TO   VALUE. 

THE  difficulties  of  all  men  are  about  external  things,  their 
helplessness  is  about  externals.  What  shall  I  do,  how 
will  it  be,  how  will  it  turn  out,  will  this  happen,  will 
that?  All  these  are  the  words  of  those  who  are  turning 
themselves  to  things  which  are  not  within  the  power  of 
the  will.  For  who  says,  How  shall  I  not  assent  to  that 
which  is  false?  how  shall  I  not  turn  away  from  the 
truth  ?  If  a  man  be  of  such  a  good  disposition  as  to  be 
anxious  about  these  things,  I  will  remind  him  of  this, 
Why  are  you  anxious  ?  The  thing  is  in  your  own  power  : 
be  assured :  do  not  be  precipitate  in  assenting  before  you 
apply  the  natural  rule.  On  the  other  side,  if  a  man  is 
anxious  (uneasy)  about  desire,  lest  it  fail  in  its  purpose 
and  miss  its  end,  and  with  respect  to  the  avoidance  of 
things,  lest  he  should  fall  into  that  which  he  would 
avoid,  I  will  first  kiss  (love)  him,  because  he  throws  away 
the  things  about  which  others  are  in  a  flutter  (others 

8  Virtue  is  its  own  reward,  said  the  Stoics.  This  is  the  meaning  of 
Epictetus,  and  it  is  consistent  with  his  principles  that  a  man  should 
live  conformably  to  his  nature,  and  so  he  will  have  all  the  happiness  of 
which  human  nature  is  capable.  Mrs.  Carter  has  a  note  here,  which  I 
do  not  copy,  and  I  hardly  understand.  It  seems  to  refer  to  the  Christian 
doctrine  of  a  man  being  rewarded  in  a  future  life  according  to  his 
works :  but  we  have  no  evidence  that  Epictetus  believed  in  a  future 
life,  and  he  thereiora  could  not  go  further  than  to  maintain  that 
virtuous  behaviour  is  the  best  thing  in  this  short  life,  and  will  give  a 
man  the  happiness  which  he  can  obtain  in  no  other  way. 


EPICTETUS.  361 

desire)  and  their  fears,  and  employs  his  thoughts  about 
his  own  affairs  and  his  own  condition.  Then  1  shall  say 
to  him,  if  you  do  not  choose  to  desire  that  which  you  will 
fail  to  obtain  nor  to  attempt  to  avoid  that  into  which  you 
will  fall,  desire  nothing  which  belongs  to  (which  is  in  the 
power  of)  others,  nor  try  to  avoid  any  of  the  things  which 
.are  not  in  your  power.  If  you  do  not  observe  this  rule, 
you  must  of  necessity  fail  in  your  desires  and  fall  into 
that  which  you  would  avoid.  What  is  the  difficulty  here  ? 
where  is  there  room  for  the  words,  How  will  it  be  ?  and 
How  will  it  turn  out  ?  and  will  this  happen  or  that  ? 

Now  is  not  that  which  will  happen  independent  of 
the  will  ?  Yes.  And  the  nature  of  good  and  of  evil  is  it 
not  in  the  things  which  are  within  the  power  of  the  will? 
Yes.  Is  it  in  your  power  then  to  treat  according  to 
nature  every  thing  which  happens?  Can  any  person 
hinder  you  ?  No  man.  No  longer  then  say  to  me,  How 
will  it  be  ?  For  however  it  may  be,  you  will  dispose  of 
it  well,1  and  the  result  to  you  will  be  a  fortunate  one. 
What  would  Hercules  have  been  if  ho  said,  How  shall  a 
great  lion  not  appear  to  me,  or  a  great  boar,  or  savage 
men  ?  And  what  do  you  care  for  that  ?  If  a  great  boar 
appear,  you  will  fight  a  greater  fight :  if  bad  men  appear, 
you  will  relieve  the  earth  of  the  bad.  Suppose  then  that 
I  lose  my  life  in  this  way.  You  will  die  a  good  man, 
doing  a  noble  act.  For  since  we  must  certainly  die,  of 
necessity  a  man  must  be  found  doing  something,  either 
following  the  employment  of  a  husbandman,  or  digging,  or 
trading,  or  serving  in  a  consulship  or  suffering  from 
indigestion  or  from  diarrhoea.  What  then  do  you  wish 
to  be  doing  when  you  are  found  by  death?  I  for  my 
part  would  wish  to  be  found  doing  something  which 
belongs  to  a  man,  beneficent,  suitable  to  the  general 
interest,  noble.  But  if  I  cannot  be  found  doing  things 
so  great,  I  would  be  found  doing  at  least  that  which  I 

1  See  a  passage  in  Plutarch  on  Tranquillity  from  Euripides,  the  great 
storehouse  of  noble  thoughts,  from  which  antient  writers  drew  much 
good  matter :  and  perhaps  it  was  one  of  the  reasons  why  so  many  of 
Eis  plays  and  fragments  have  been  preserved. 

We  must  not  quarrel  with  the  things  that  are, 
For  they  care  not  for  u0  •  but  he  who  feela  then> 
If  he  disposes  well  of  things,  fares  well. 


362  EPICTETUS. 

cannot  be  hindered  from  doing,  that  which  is  permitted 
me  to  do,  correcting  myself,  cultivating  the  faculty  which 
makes  use  of  appearances,  labouring  at  freedom  from  the 
affects  (labouring  at  tranquillity  of  mind),  rendering  to 
the  relations  of  life  their  due ;  if  I  succeed  so  far,  also 
(1  would  be  found)  touching  on  (advancing  to)  the  third 
topic  (or  head)  safety  in  the  forming  judgments  about 
things.2  If  death  surprises  me  when  I  am  busy  about 
these  things,  it  is  enough  for  me  if  I  can  stretch  out  my 
hands  to  God  and  say :  The  means  which  I  have  received 
from  thee  for  seeing  thy  administration  (of  the  world) 
and  following  it,  1  have  not  neglected :  I  have  not  dis- 
honoured thco  by  my  acts  :  see  how  I  have  used  my  per- 
ceptions, see  how  I  have  used  my  preconceptions :  have  1 
ever  blamed  thee?  have  I  been  discontented  with  any 
thing  that  happens,  or  wished  it  to  be  otherwise?  have 
I  wished  to  transgress  the  (established)  relations  (of 
things)  ?  That  thou  hast  given  me  life,  I  thank  thee 
for  what  thou  hast  given :  so  long  as  I  have  used  the 
things  which  are  thine  I  am  content;  take  them  back 
and  place  them  wherever  thou  mayest  choose ;  for  thine 
were  all  things,  thou  gavest  them,  to  me 3 — Is  it  not 
enough  to  depart  in  this  state  of  mind,  and  what  life  is 
better  and  more  becoming  than  that  of  a  man  who  is  in 
this  state  of  mind  ?  and  what  end  is  more  happy  ? 4 

2  See  iii.  c.  2. 

3  **  Thine  they  were,  and  thou  gavest  them  to  me."    John  xvii.  6. 
Mrs.  Carter. 

4  *  I  wish  it  were  possible  to  palliate  the  ostentation  of  this  passage, 
by  applying  it  to  the  ideal  perfect  character :  but  it  is  in  a  general 
way  that  Epictetus  hath  proposed  such  a  dying  speech,  as  cannot 
without  shocking  arrogance  be  uttered  by  any  one  born  to  die.    Un- 
mixed as  it  is  with  any  acknowledgment  of  faults  or  imperfections,  at 
present,  or  with  any  sense  of  guilt  on  account  of  the  past,  it  must  give 
every  sober  reader  a  very  disadvantageous  opinion  of  some  principles 
of  the  philosophy,  on  which  it  is  founded,  as  contradictory  to  the  voice 
of  conscience,  and  formed  on  absolute  ignorance  or  neglect  of  the  con- 
dition and  circumstances  of  such  a  creature  as  man.'    Mrs.  Carter. 

I  am  inclined  to  think  that  Epictetus  does  refer  to  the  '  ifleal  perfect 
character ';  but  others  may  not  understand  him  in  this  way.  When 
Mrs.  Carter  says  *  but  it  is  in  a  general .  .  .  dying  speech/  she  can  hardly 
suppose,  as  her  words  seem  to  mean,  that  Epictetus  proposed  sucli  a 
dying  speech  for  every  man  or  even  for  many  men,  for  he  knew  and 
has  told  us  how  bad  many  men  are,  and  how  few  are  good  according 
to  his  measure  and  rule  :  in  fact  his  meaning  is  plainly  expressed.  The 


BPICTETUS.  363 

Bat  that  this  may  be  done  (that  such  a  declaration  may 
be  made),  a  man  must  receive  (bear)  no  small  things,  nor 
are  the  things  small  which  he  must  lose  (go  without). 
You  cannot  both  wish  to  be  a  consul  and  to  have  these 
things  (the  power  of  making  such  a  dying  speech),  and  to 
be  eager  to  have  lands,  and  these  things  also ;  and  to  be 
solicitous  about  slaves  and  about  yourself.  But  if  you 
wish  for  any  thing  which  belongs  to  another,  that  which 
is  your  own  is  lost.  This  is  the  nature  of  the  thing: 
nothing  is  given  or  had  for  nothing.5  And  where  is  the 
wonder?  If  you  wish  to  be  a  consul,  you  must  keep 
awake,  run  about,  kiss  hands,  waste  yourself  with  ex- 
haustion at  other  men's  doors,  say  and  do  many  things 
unworthy  of  a  free  man,  send  gifts  to  many,  daily 
presents  to  some.  And  what  is  the  thing  that  is  got? 
Twelve  bundles  of  rods  (the  consular  fasces),  to  sit  three 
or  four  times  on  the  tribunal,  to  exhibit  the  games  in  the 
Circus  and  to  give  suppers  in  small  baskets.6  Or,  if  you 

dying  speech  may  even  be  stronger  in  the  sense  in  which  Mrs.  Carter 
understands  it,  in  my  translation,  where  I  have  rendered  one  passage 
in  the  text  by  the  words  *  I  have  not  dishonoured  thee  by  my  acts/ 
which  she  translates,  '  as  far  as  in  me  lay,  I  have  not  dishonoured 
tiiee;'  which  apparently  means,  'as  far  as  I  could,  I  have  not  dis- 
honoured thee/  The  Latin  translation  *  quantum  in  me  fuit,'  seems 
rather  ambiguous  to  me. 

There  is  a  general  confession  of  sins  in  the  prayer  book  of  the 
Church  of  England,  part  of  which  Epictetus  would  not  have  rejected, 
I  think.  Of  course  the  words  which  form  the  peculiar  Christian  cha- 
racter of  the  confession  would  have  been  unintelligible  to  him.  It  is 
a  confession  which  all  persons  of  all  conditions  are  supposed  to  make. 
If  all  persons  made  the  confession  with  sincerity,  it  ought  to  produce 
a  corresponding  behaviour  and  make  men  more  ready  to  be  kind  to  one 
another,  for  all  who  use  it  confess  that  they  fail  in  their  duty,  and  it 
ought  to  lower  pride  and  banish  arrogance  from  the  behaviour  of  those 
who  in  wealth  and  condition  are  elevated  above  the  multitude.  But  I 
have  seen  it  somewhere  said,  I  cannot  remember  where,  but  said  in  no 
friendly  spirit  to  Christian  prayer,  that  some  men  both  priests  and 
laymen  prostrate  themselves  in  humility  before  God  and  indemnify 
themselves  by  arrogance  to  man. 

a  See  iv.  2.  2. 

6  These  were  what  the  Bomans  named  'sportulsB/  in  which  the  rich 
used  to  give  some  eatables  to  poor  dependents  who  called  to  pay  their 
eapeots  to  the  great  at  an  early  hour. 

Nunc  sportula  prime 
Limine  parva  sedet  turbuc  rapieuda  togatae. 

Juvenal.  Sat.  i.  95. 


EPICTETU8. 

do  not  agree  about  this,  let  some  one  show  me  what  there 
is  besides  these  things.  Jn  order  then  to  secure  freedom 
from  passions  (o/n-atfaW),  tranquillity,  to  sleep  well  when 
you  do  sleep,  to  be  really  awake  when  you  are  awake,  to 
fear  nothing,  to  be  anxious  about  nothing,  will  you  spend 
nothing  and  give  no  labour  ?  But  if  any  thing  belonging 
to  you  be  lost  while  you  are  thus  busied,  or  be  wasted 
badly,  or  another  obtains  what  you  ought  to  have 
obtained,  will  you  immediately  be  vexed  at  what  has 
happened?  Will  you  not  take  into  the  account  on  the 
other  side  what  you  receive  and  for  what,  how  much  for 
how  much  ?  Do  you  expect  to  have  for  nothing  things  so 
great?  And  how  can  you?  One  work  (thing)  has  no 
community  with  another.  You  cannot  have  both  external 
things  after  bestowing  care  on  them  and  your  own  ruling 
faculty : 7  but  if  you  would  have  those,  give  up  this.  If 
you  do  not,  you  will  have  neither  this  nor  that,  while  you 
are  drawn  in  different  ways  to  both.8  The  oil  will  be 
spilled,  the  household  vessels  will  perish :  (that  may  be), 
but  I  shall  be  free  from  passions  (tranquil). — There  will 
be  a  fire  when  I  am  not  present,  and  the  books  will  be 
destroyed:  but  I  shall  tieat  appearances  according  to 
nature — Well ;  but  I  shall  have  nothing  to  eat.  If  I  am 
so  unlucky,  death  is  a  harbour ;  and  death  is  the  harbour 
for  all ;  this  is  the  place  of  refuge ;  and  for  this  reason 
not  one  of  the  things  in  life  is  difficult :  as  soon  as  you 
choose,  you  are  out  of  the  house,  and  are  smoked  no  more.9 
Why  then  are  you  anxious,  why  do  you  lose  your  sleep, 
why  do  you  not  straightway,  after  considering  wherein 
your  good  is  and  your  evil,  say,  Both  of  them  are  in  my 
power?  Neither  can  any  man  deprive  me  of  the  good, 
nor  involve  me  in  the  bad  against  my  will.  Why  do  I 
not  throw  myself  down  and  snore  ?  for  all  that  I  have  is 
safe.  As  to  the  things  which  belong  to  others,  he  will 
look  to  them  who  gets  them,  as  they  may  be  given  by 
him  who  has  the  power.10  Who  am  I  who  wish  to  have 

7  **  You  cannot;  serve  God  and  Mammon."    Matthew  vi.  24.    Mrs, 
Carter. 

8  See  iv.  2,  5. 

9  Compare  i.  25, 18,  and  1  9,  20. 
lf  See  the  note  in  Schweig.'s  ed. 


EPICTETUS.  365 

them  in  this  way  or  in  that?  is  a  power  of  selecting  them 
given  to  me?  has  any  person  made  me  the  dispenser  of 
them?  Those  things  are  enough  for  me  over  which  I 
have  power :  I  ought  to  manage  them  as  well  as  I  can : 
and  all  the  rest,  as  the  master  of  them  (God)  may  choose. 
When  a  man  has  these  things  before  his  eyes,  does  he 
keep  awake  and  turn  hither  and  thither  ?  What  would 
he  have,  or  what  does  he  regret,  Patroclus  or  Antilochus 
or  Menelaus?11  For  when  did  he  suppose  that  any  of  his 
friends  was  immortal,  and  when  had  he  not  before  his 
eyes  that  on  the  morrow  or  the  day  after  he  or  his  friend 
must  die?  Yes,  he  says,  but  I  thought  that  he  would 
survive  me  and  bring  up  my  son. — You  were  a  fool  for 
that  reason,  and  you  were  thinking  of  what  was  un- 
certain. Why  then  do  you  not  blame  yourself,  and  sit 
crying  like  girls  ? — But  he  used  to  set  my  food  before  me. 
— Because  he  was  alive,  you  fool,  but  now  he  cannot :  but 
Automedon 12  will  set  it  before  you,  and  if  Automedon  also 
dies,  you  will  find  another.  But  if  the  pot,  in  which 
your  meat  was  cooked,  should  be  broken,  must  you  die  of 

11  Epictetus  refers  to  the  passage  in  the  Iliad  xxiv.  5,  where  Achilles 
is  lamenting  the  death  of  Patroclus  and  cannot  sleep. 

12  "  This  is  a  wretched  idea  of  friendship ;  hut  a  necessary  consequence 
of  the  Stoic  system.    What  a  fine  contrast  to  this  gloomy  consolation 
are  the  noble  sentiments  of  an  Apostle  ?    Value  your  deceased  friend, 
says  Epictetus,  as  a  broken  pipkin ;  forget  him,  as  a  thing  worthless, 
lost  and  destroyed.    St.  Paul,  on  the  contrary,  comforts  the  mourning 
survivors ;  bidding  them  not  sorrow,  as  those  who  have  no  hope :  but 
remember  that  the  death  of  good  persons  is  only  a  sleep ;  from  which 
they  will  soon  arise  to  a  happy  immortality,"    Mrs.  Carter. 

Epictetus  does  not  say,  4  value  your  deceased  friend  as  a  broken 
pipkin.'  Achilles  laments  that  he  has  lost  the  services  of  his  friend  at 
table,  a  vulgar  kind  of  complaint;  he  is  thinking  of  his  own  loss, 
instead  of  his  friend.  The  answer  is  such  a  loss  as  he  laments  is  easily 
repaired :  the  loss  of  such  a  friend  is  as  easily  repaired  as  the  loss  of  a 
cooking  vessel.  Mrs.  Carter  in  her  zeal  to  contrast  the  teaching  of  the 
Apostle  with  that  of  Epictetus  seems  to  forget  for  the  time  that  Epictetus, 
so  far  as  we  know,  did  not  accept  or  did  not  teach  the  doctrine  of  a 
future  life.  As  to  what  he  thought  of  friendship,  if  it  was  a  real 
friendship,  such  as  we  can  conceive,  I  am  sure  that  he  did  not  think  of 
it,  as  Mrs.  Carter  says  that  he  did ;  for  true  friendship  implies  many  of 
the  virtues  which  Epictetus  taught  and  practised.  He  has  a  chapter 
on  Friendship,  ii.  22,  which  I  suppose  that  Mrs.  Carter  did  not  think 
of,  when  she  wrote  this  note. 


366  EPICTETUS. 

hunger,  because  you  have  not  the  pot  which  you  are 
accustomed  to?  Do  you  not  send  and  buy  a  new  pot? 
He  says : 

No  greater  ill  than  this  could  fall  on  me.    (Iliad  xix.  321.) 

Why  is  this  your  ill  ?  Do  you  then  instead  of  removing 
it  blame  your  mother  (Thetis)  for  not  foretelling  it  to  you 
that  you  might  continue  grieving  from  that  time?  What 
do  you  think  ?  do  you  not  suppose  that  Homor  wrote  this 
that  we  may  learn  that  those  of  noblest  birth,  the 
strongest  and  the  richest,  the  most  handsome,  when  they 
have  not  the  opinions  which  they  ought  to  have,  are  not 
prevented  from  being  most  wretched  and  unfortunate  ? 


CHAPTER  XL 

ABOUT  PURITY  (CLEANLINESS). 

SOME  persons  raise  a  question  whether  the  social  feeling * 
is  contained  in  the  nature  of  man;  and  yet  I  think  that 
these  same  persons  would  have  no  doubt  that  love  of 
purity  is  certainly  contained  in  it,  and  that  if  man  is 
distinguished  from  other  animals  by  any  thing,  he  is  dis- 
tinguished by  this.  When  then  we  see  any  other  animal 
cleaning  itself,  we  are  accustomed  to  speak  of  the  act 
with  surprise,  and  to  add  that  the  animal  is  acting  like  a 
man :  and  on  the  other  hand,  if  a  man  blames  an  animal 
for  being  dirty,  straightway  as  if  we  were  making  an 
excuse  for  it,  we  say  that  of  course  the  animal  is  not  a 
human  creature.  So  we  suppose  that  there  is  something 
superior  in  man,  and  that  we  first  receive  it  from  the 
Gods.  For  since  the  Gods  by  their  nature  are  pure  and 
free  from  corruption,  so  far  as  men  approach  them  by 
reason,  so  far  do  they  cling  to  purity  and  to  a  love  (habit) 

1  The  word  is  T&  KOUKOVMOV.    Compare  i.  23, 1,  ii  10,  14,  ii.  20,  6. 


EPICTETUS.  367 

of  purity.  But  since  it  is  impossible  that  man's  nature 
(ovcrca)  can  be  altogether  pure  being  mixed  (^composed)  of 
such  materials,  reason  is  applied,  as  far  as  it  is  possible, 
and  reason  endeavours  to  make  human  nature  love 
purity.2 

The  first  then  and  highest  purity  is  that  which  is  in  the 
soul ;  and  we  say  the  same  of  impurity.  Now  you  could 
not  discover  the  impurity  of  the  soul  as  you  could  dis- 
cover that  of  the  body :  but  as  to  the  soul,  what  else 
could  you  find  in  it  than  that  which  makes  it  filthy  in 
respect  to  the  acts  which  are  her  own  ?  Now  the  acts  of 
the  soul  are  movement  towards  an  object  or  movement 
from  it,  desire,  aversion,  preparation,  design  (purpose), 
assent.  What  then  is  it  which  in  these  acts  makes  the 
soul  filthy  and  impure  ?  Nothing  else  than  her  own  bad 
judgments  (Kpt/xara).  Consequently  the  impurity  of  the 
soul  is  the  soul's  bad  opinions  ;  and  the  puriti cation  of  the 
soul  is  the  planting  in  it  of  proper  opinions;  and  the 
soul  is  pure  which  has  proper  opinions,  for  the  soul 
alone  in  her  own  acts  is  free  from  perturbation  and 
pollution. 

Now  we  ought  to  work  at  something  like  this  in  the 
body  also,  as  far  as  we  can.  It  was  impossible  for  the 
defluxions  of  the  nose  not  to  run  when  man  has  such  a 
mixture  in  his  body.  For  this  reason  nature  has  made 
hands  and  the  nostrils  themselves  as  channels  for  carrying 
off  the  humours.  If  then  a  man  sucks  up  the  defluxions, 
I  say  that  he  is  not  doing  the  act  of  a  man.  It  was  im- 
possible for  a  man's  feet  not  to  be  made  muddy  and  not 
be  soiled  at  all  when  he  passes  through  dirty  places.  For 
this  reason  nature  (God)  has  made  water  and  hands.  It 
was  impossible  that  some  impurity  should  not  remain  in 
the  teeth  from  eating :  for  this  reason,  she  says,  wash  the 
teeth.  Why  ?  In  order  that  you  may  be  a  man  and  not 
a  wild  beast  or  a  hog.  It  was  impossible  that  from  the 
sweat  and  the  pressing  of  the  clothes  there  should  not 
remain  some  impurity  about  the  body  which  requires  to 
be  cleaned  away.  For  this  reason  water,  oil,  hands, 

2  In  the  text  there  are  two  words,  KaQapts  which  means  *  pure/  and 
which  means  *  of  a  pure  nature,'  *  loving  purity.1 


368  EPICTETUS. 

towels,  scrapers  (strigils),3  nitre,  sometimes  all  other  kinds 
of  means  are  necessary  for  cleaning  the  body.  You  do 
not  act  so :  but  the  smith  will  take  off  the  rust  from  the 
iron  (instruments),  and  he  will  have  tools  prepared  for 
this  purpose,  and  you  yourself  wash  the  platter  when  you 
are  going  to  eat,  if  you  are  not  completely  impure  and 
dirty :  but  will  you  not  wash  the  body  nor  make  it  clean  ? 
Why  ?  he  replies.  I  will  tell  you  again ;  in  the  first  place, 
that  you  may  do  the  acts  of  a  man ;  then,  that  you  may 
not  be  disagreeable  to  those  with  whom  you  associate. 
You  do  something  of  this  kind  even  4  in  this  matter,  and 
you  do  not  perceive  it :  you  think  that  you  deserve  to 
stink.  Let  it  be  so :  deseive  to  stink.  Do  you  think 
that  also  those  who  sit  by  you,  those  who  recline  at  table 
with  you,  that  those  who  kiss  you  deserve  the  same?5 
Either  go  into  a  desert,  where  you  deserve  to  go,  or  live 
by  yourself,  and  smell  yourself.  For  it  is  just  that  you 
alone  should  enjoy  your  own  impurity.  But  when  you 
are  in  a  city,  to  behave  so  inconsiderately  and  foolishly, 
to  what  character  do  you  think  that  it  belongs?  Jf 
nature  had  entrusted  to  you  a  horse,  would  you  have  over- 
looked and  neglected  him  ?  And  now  think  that  you  have 
been  entrusted  with  your  own  body  as  with  a  horse ; 
wash  it,  wipe  it,  take  care  that  no  man  turns  away  from 
it,  that  no  one  gets  out  of  the  way  for  it.  But  who  does 
not  get  out  of  the  way  of  a  dirty  man,  of  a  stinking  man, 
of  a  man  whose  skin  is  foul,  more  than  he  does  out  of  the 
way  of  a  man  who  is  daubed  with  muck  ?  That  smell  is 
from  without,  it  is  put  upon  him ;  but  the  other  smell  is 

1  The  |i5<rrpa,  as  Epictetus  names  it,  was  the  Eoman  'strigilis,' 
•which  was  used  for  the  scraping  and  cleaning  of  the  body  in  bathing 
Persius  (v.  126)  writes — 

'  I,  pner,  et  striglles  Crispin!  ad  balnea  defer.' 

The  strigiles  "  were  of  bronze  or  iron  of  various  forms.  They  wen 
applied  to  the  hody  much  in  the  game  way  as  we  see  a  piece  of  hoop 
applied  to  a  sweating  horse."  Pompeii,  edited  by  Dr.  Dyer. 

*  See  Schweig.'s  note. 

*  See  Schweig.'s  note.   If  the  text  is  right,  the  form  of  expression  is 
inexact  and  does  not  clearly  express  the  meaning ;  but  the  meaning 
may  be  easily  discovered. 


EPICTETUS.  369 

from  want  of  care,  from  within,  and  in  a  manner  from  a 
body  in  putrefaction. 

But  Socrates  washed  himself  seldom — Yes,  but  his  body 
was  clean  and  fair:  and  it  was  so  agreeable  and  sweet 
that  the  most  beautiful  and  the  most  noble  loved  him,  and 
desired  to  sit  by  him  rather  than  by  the  side  of  those  who 
had  the  handsomest  forms.  It  was  in  his  power  neither  to 
use  the  bath  nor  to  wash  himself,  if  he  chose ;  and  yet  the 
i^are  uso  of  water  had  an  effect.  [If  you  do  not  choose  to 
wash  with  warm  water,  wash  with  cold.6]  But  Aristo- 
phanes says 

Those  who  are  pale,  unshod,  'tis  those  I  mean. 

(Nubes  v.  102.) 

For  Aristophanes  says  of  Socrates  that  he  also  walked  the 
air  and  stole  clothes  from  the  palaestra.7  But  all  who 
have  written  about  Socrates  bear  exactly  the  contrary 
evidence  in  his  favour ;  they  say  that  he  was  pleasant  not 
only  to  hear,  but  also  to  see.8  On  the  other  hand  they 
write  the  same  about  Diogenes.9  For  we  ought  not  even 
by  the  appearance  of  the  body  to  deter  the  multitude  from 
philosophy;  but  as  in  other  things,  a  philosopher  should 
show  himself  cheerful  and  tranquil,  so  also  he  should  in 
the  things  that  relate  to  the  body :  See,  ye  men,  that  I 
have  nothing,  that  I  want  nothing :  see  how  I  am  without 
a  house,  and  without  a  city,  and  an  exile,  if  it  happens  to 
be  so,10  and  without  a  hearth  I  live  more  free  from 
trouble  and  more  happily  than  all  of  noble  birth  and  than 
the  rich.  But  look  at  my  poor  body  also  and  observe  that 
it  is  not  injured  by  my  hard  way  of  living — But  if  a  man 
says  this  to  me,  who  has  the  appearance  (dress)  and  face 
of  a  condemned  man,  what  God  shall  persuade  me  to 
approach  philosophy,  if11  it  makes  men  such  persons? 
Far  from  it;  I  would  not  choose  to  do  so,  even  if  I 

See  what  is  said  of  this  passage  in  the  latter  part  of  this  chapter. 
Aristophanes,  Nubes,  v.  225,  and  v.  179. 
Xenophon,  Memorab.  iii.  12. 
See  iii.  22,  88. 

0  Diogenes,  it  is  said,  was  driven  from  his  native  town  Sinope  in 
Asia  on  a  charge  of  having  debased  or  counterfeited  the  coinage 
Upton.    It  is  probable  that  this  is  false. 
"  On  the  word  &<rre  aee  Schweig.'o  note. 

2  B 


370  EPICTETUS. 

were  going  lo  become  a  wise  man.  I  indeed  would  rather 
that  a  young  man,  who  is  making  his  first  movements 
towards  philosophy,  should  come  to  me  with  his  hair 
carefully  trimmed  than  with  it  dirty  and  rough,  for 
there  is  seen  in  him  a  certain  notion  (appearance)  of 
beauty  and  a  desire  of  (attempt  at)  that  which  is  be- 
coming; and  where  he  supposes  it  to  be,  there  also  he 
strives  that  it  shall  be.  It  is  only  necessary  to  show  him 
(what  it  is),  and  to  say :  Young  man,  you  seek  beauty, 
and  you  do  well :  you  must  know  then  that  it  (is  pro- 
duced) grows  in  that  part  of  you  where  you  have  the 
rational  faculty :  seek  it  there  where  you  have  the  move- 
ments towards  and  the  movements  from  things,  where 
you  have  the  desires  towards,  and  the  aversion  from  things : 
for  this  is  what  you  have  in  yourself  of  a  superior  kind ; 
but  the  poor  body  is  naturally  only  earth :  why  do  you 
labour  about  it  to  no  purpose  ?  if  you  shall  learn  nothing 
else,  you  will  learn  from  time  that  the  body  is  nothing. 
But  if  a  man  comes  to  me  daubed  with  filth,  dirty,  with  a 
moustache  down  to  his  knees,  what  can  I  say  to  him,  by 
what  kind  of  resemblance  can  I  lead  him  on  ?  For  about 
what  has  he  busied  himself  which  resembles  beauty,  that 
I  may  be  able  to  change  him  and  say,  Beauty  is  not  in 
this,  but  in  that  ?  Would  you  have  me  to  toll  him,  that 
beauty  consists  not  in  being  daubed  with  muck,  but  that 
it  lies  in  the  rational  part  ?  Has  he  any  desire  of  beauty? 
has  he  any  form  of  it  in  his  mind  ?  Go  and  talk  to  a  hog, 
and  tell  him  not  to  roll  in  the  mud. 

For  this  reason  the  words  of  Xenocrates  touched  Pole- 
mon  also,  since  he  was  a  lover  of  beauty,  for  he  entered 
(the  room)  having  in  him  certain  incitements  (evavcr/AaTa) 
to  love  of  beauty,  but  he  looked  for  it  in  the  wrong 
place.12  For  nature  has  not  made  even  the  animals  dirty 
which  live  with  man.  Does  a  horse  ever  wallow  in  the 
mud,  or  a  well  bred  dog?  But  the  hog,  and  the  dirty 
g^ese,  and  worms  and  spiders  do,  which  are  banished 
furthest  from  human  intercour&e.  Do  you  then  being  a 
man  choose  to  be  not  as  one  of  the  animals  which 
live  with  man,  but  rather  a  worm,  or  a  spider?  Will 

12  As  to  Polemon  see  iii.  c.  1, 14. 


EPICTETUS.  371 

you  not  wash,  yourself  somewhere  some  time  in  such 
manner  as  you  choose?13  Will  you  not  wash  off  the  dirt 
from  your  body  ?  Will  you  not  come  clean  that  those 
with  whom  you  keep  company  may  have  pleasure  in 
being  with  you  ?  But  do  you  go  with  us  even  into  the 
temples  in  such  a  slate,  where  it  is  not  permitted  to  spit 
or  blow  the  nose,  being  a  heap  of  spittle  and  of  snot? 

What  then  ?  does  any  man  (that  is,  do  I)  require  you 
to  ornament  yourself?  Far  from  it;  except  to  ornament 
that  which  we  really  are  by  nature,  the  rational  faculty, 
the  opinions,  the  actions ;  but  as  to  the  body  only  so  far  as 
purity,  only  so  far  as  not  to  give  offence.  But  if  you  aro 
told  that  you  ought  not  to  wear  garments  dyed  with 
purple,  go  and  daub  your  cloak  with  muck  or  tear  it.14 
But  how  shall  I  have  a  neat  cloak?  Man,  you  have 
water ;  wash  it.  Here  is  a  youth  worthy  of  being  loved,15 
here  is  an  old  man  worthy  of  loving  and  being  loved  in 
return,  a  fit  person  for  a  man  to  intrust  to  him  a  son's 
instruction,  to  whom  daughters  and  young  men  shall  come, 
if  opportunity  shall  so  happen,  that  the  teacher  shall 
deliver  his  lessons  to  them  on  a  dunghill.16  Let  this  not 
be  so :  every  deviation  comes  from  something  which  is  in 
man's  nature;  but  this  (deviation)  is  near  being  some- 
thing not  in  man's  nature. 

13  It  has  been  suggested  that  the  words  s.  19,  [if  you  do  not  choose 
to  wash  with  warm  water,  wash  with  cold,  p.  369]  belong  to  this  place. 

H  This  is  the  literal  translation  :  but  it  means,  '  will  you  go,  etc., 
tear  it?' 

15  t  iji}ie  yOUth,  probably,  means  the  scholar,  who  neglects  neatness ; 
and  the  old  man,  the  tutor,  that  gives  him  no  precept  or  example  of  it.' 
Mrs.  Carter. 

16  The  Greek  is  \4yri  rhs  (rxo\as.     Cicero  uses  the  Lalin  *  scholaa 
habore/  *  to  hold  philosophical  disputations : '  Tusc.  Disp.  '  4.    Upton. 


2  B  2 


372  EPICTETUS, 

CHAPTEE  Xll 

ON  ATTENTION 

WHEN  >ou  have  remitted  your  attention  for  a  short 
do  not  imagine  this,  that  you  will  recover  it  when  you 
choose ;  but  let  this  thought  be  present  to  you,  that  in 
consequence  of  the  fault  committed  to-day  your  affairs 
must  be  in  a  worse  condition  for  all  that  follows.  For 
first,  and  what  causes  most  trouble,  a  habit  of  not  attend- 
ing is  formed  in  3rou;  then  a  habit  of  deferring  your 
attention.  And  continually  from  time  to  time  you  drive 
away  by  deferring  it  the  happiness  of  life,  proper  be- 
haviour, the  being  and  living  conformably  to  nature.1 
If  then  the  procrastination  of  attention  is  profitable,  the 
complete  omission  of  attention  is  more  profitable ;  but  if 
it  is  not  profitable,  why  do  you  not  maintain  your  atten- 
tion constant? — To-day  I  choose  to  play — Well  then, 
ought  you  not  to  play  with  attention? — I  choose  to 
sing — What  then  hinders  you  from  doing  so  with  atten- 
tion? Is  there  any  part  of  life  excepted,  to  which 
attention  does  not  extend?  For  will  you  do  it  (any 
thing  in  life)  worse  by  using  attention,  and  bettor  by  not 
attending  at  all?  And  what  else  of  the  things  in  life 
is  done  better  by  those  who  do  not  iase  attention  ?  Does 
he  who  works  in  wood  work  better  by  not  attending  to 
it?  Does  the  captain  of  a  ship  manage  it  better  by  not 
attending  ?  and  is  any  of  the  smaller  acts  done  better  by 
inattention  ?  Do  you  not  see  that  when  you  have  let  your 
mind  loose,  it  is  no  longer  in  your  power  to  recall  it, 
either  to  propriety,  or  to  modesty,  or  to  moderation :  but 
you  do  every  thing  that  comes  into  your  mind  in  obedi- 
ence to  your  inclinations. 

To  what  things  then  ought  I  to  attend  ?  First  to  those 
general  (principles)  and  to  have  them  in  readiness,  and 
without  them  not  to  sleep,  not  to  rise,  not  to  diink,  not  to 

1  See  Schweig.'s  note  on  the  words  elcb&ci  virepTiQipevov,  in  place  of 
which  he  proposes  it<*6$  uirepTi0«Vevos.    Compare  Persius,  Sftt.  v.  66. 
"  Craa  hoc  Set."    Idem  eras  fiet,  eta, 

and  Martial,  v.  58. 


EPICTETUS.  373 

eat,  not  to  converse  (associate)  with  men  ;  that  no  man  is 
master  of  another  man's  will,  but  that  in  the  will  alone  is 
the  good  and  the  bad.  No  man  then  has  the  power  either 
to  procure  for  me  any  good  or  to  involve  me  in  any  evil, 
but  I  alone  myself  over  myself  have  power  in  these 
things.  When  then  these  things  are  secured  to  me,  why 
need  I  be  disturbed  about  external  things  ?  What  tyrant 
is  formidable,  what  disease,  what  poverty,  what  offence 
(from  any  man)?  Well,  1  have  not  pleased  a  certain 
person.  Is  he  then  (the  pleasing  of  him)  my  work,  my 
judgment?  No.  Why  then  should  I  trouble  myself 
about  him? — But  he  is  supposed  to  be  some  one  (of 
importance) — He  will  look  to  that  himself;  and  those 
who  think  so  will  also.  But  I  have  one  whom  I  ought  to 
please,  to  whom  I  ought  to  subject  myself,  whom  I  ought 
to  obey,  God  and  those  who  are  next  to  him.2  He  has 
placed  me  with  myself,  and  has  put  my  will  in  obedience 
to  myself  alone,  and  has  given  me  rules  for  the  right  use 
of  it ;  and  when  I  follow  these  rules  in  syllogisms,  I  do 
not  care  for  any  man  who  says  any  thing  else  (different)  : 
in  sophistical  argument,  I  care  for  no  man.  Why  then 
in  greater  matters  do  those  annoy  me  who  blame  me? 
What  is  the  cause  of  this  perturbation?  Nothing  else 
than  because  in  this  matter  (topic)  I  am  not  disciplined. 
For  all  knowledge  (science)  despises  ignorance  and  the 
ignorant;  and  not  only  the  sciences,  but  even  the  arts. 
Produce  any  shoemaker  that  you  please,  and  he  ridicules 
the  many  in  respect  to  his  own  work3  (business).  Pro- 
duce any  carpenter. 

First  then  we  ought  to  have  these  (rules)  in  readiness, 
and  to  do  nothing  without  them,  and  we  ought  to  keep 
the  soul  directed  to  this  mark,  to  pursue  nothing  external, 
and  nothing  which  belongs  to  others  (or  is  in  the  power 
of  others),  but  to  do  as  he  has  appointed  who  has  the 

1  Compare  iv.  4,  39,  i.  14, 12 ;  and  Encheirid.  o.  32,  and  the  remark 
of  Simplicius.  Sohweig.  explains  the  words  rots  JUST*  IKC'IVOV  thus : 
*qui  post  Ilium  (Deum)  et  sub  Illo  rebus  humanis  praesunt;  qui 
proximum  ab  Illo  locum  tenent.' 

3  Compare  ii.  13,  15  and  20;  and  Antoninus,  vi.  35:  •Is  it  not 
strange  if  the  architect  and  the  physician  shall  have  more  respect  to 
the  reason  (the  principles)  of  their  own  arts  than  man  to  his  own 
reason,  which  is  common  to  hio?  $nd  the  gods  ? ' 


374  EPICTETUS. 

power ;  we  ought  to  pursue  altogether  the  things  which 
are  in  the  power  of  the  will,  and  all  other  things  as  it  is 
permitted.  Next  to  this  we  ought  to  remember  who  we 
are,4  and  what  is  our  name,  and  to  endeavour  to  direct  our 
duties  towards  the  character  (nature)  of  our  several  rela- 
tions (in  life)  in  this  manner :  what  is  the  season  for 
singing,  what  is  the  season  for  play,  and  in  whose 
presence ;  what  will  be  the  consequence  of  the  act ; 5 
whether  our  associates  will  despite  us,  whether  we  shall 
despise  them;6  when  to  jeer  (awif/ai) ,  and  whom  to 
ridicule;  and  on  what  occasion  to  comply  and  with 
whom;  and  finally,  in  complying  how  to  maintain  our 
own  character.7  But  wherever  you  have  deviated  from 
any  of  these  rules,  there  is  damage  immediately,  not  from 
any  thing  external,  but  from  the  action  itself. 

What  then?  is  it  possible  to  be  free  from  faults,  (if  you 
•do  all  this)?  It  is  not  possible;  but  this  is  possible, 
to  direct  your  efforts  incessantly  to  being  faultless.  For 
we  must  be  content  if  by  never  remitting  this  attention 
we  shall  escape  at  least  a  few  errors.  But  now  when  you 
have  said,  To-morrow  I  will  begin  to  attend,  you  must  be 
told  that  you  are  saying  this,  To-day  I  will  be  shameless, 
disregardful  of  time  and  place,  mean ;  it  will  be  in  the 
power  of  others  to  give  me  pain ;  to-day  I  will  be 
passionate,  and  envious.  See  how  many  evil  things  you 
are  permitting  yourself  to  do.  If  it  is  good  to  use  atten- 
tion to-morrow,  how  much  better  is  it  to  do  so  to-day?  if 
io-morrow  it  is  in  your  interest  to  attend,  much  more  is 
it  to-day,  that  you  may  be  able  to  do  so  to-morrow  also, 
and  may  not  defer  it  again  to  the  third  day.8 

4  '  Quid  sumus,  aut  cjuidnam  victim  gignimur.'  Persius,  Sat.  iii.  67. 

*  Schweig.  thinks  that  the  text  will  be  better  translated  according 
to  Upton's  notion  and  H.  Stephen's  (hors  de  propos)  by  *  Quid  sit  aim 
re  futurum,*  *  what  will  be  out  of  season.'  Perhaps  he  is  right. 

6  Schweig.  says  that  the  sense  of  the  passage,  as  I  have  rendered  it, 
requires  the  reading  to  be  KaTaQpovfiarowi ;  and  it  is  so,  at  least  in  the 
better  Greek  writers. 

7  See  iii.  14,  7,  i.  29,  64. 

8  Compare  Antoninus,  viii.  22:  "Attend  to  the  matter  which  is 
before  thee,  whether  it  is  an  opinion,  or  an  act,  or  a  word. 

Thou  sufferest  this  justly,  for  thou  choosest  rather  to  become  good 
to-morrow  than  to  be  good  to-day." 


EFICTETUS.  S75 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

AGAINST  OK  TO  THOSE  WHO  READILY  TELL  THEIR  OWN  AFFAIRS. 

WHK:N  a  man  has  seemed  to  us  to  have  talked  with  simplicity 
(candour)  about  his  own  affairs,  how  is  it  that  at  last  we 
are  ourselves  also  induced  to  discover  to  him1  our  own 
secrets  and  we  think  this  to  he  candid  behaviour?  In  the 
first  place  because  it  seems  unfair  for  a  man  to  have 
listened  to  the  affairs  of  his  neighbour,  and  not  to  com- 
municate to  him  also  in  turn  our  own  affairs:  next, 
because  we  think  that  we  shall  not  present  to  them  the 
appearance  of  candid  men  when  we  are  silent  about  our 
own  affairs.  Indeed  men  are  often  accustomed  to  say, 
I  have  told  you  all  my  affairs,  will  you  tell  me  nothing 
of  your  own?  where  is  this  done? — Besides,  we  have  also 
this  opinion  that  we  can  safely  trust  him  who  has  already 
told  us  his  own  affairs ;  for  the  notion  rises  in  our  mind 
that  this  man  could  never  divulge  our  affairs  because  he 
would  be  cautious  that  we  also  should  not  divulge  his.  In 
this  way  also  the  incautious  are  caught  by  the  soldiers  at 
Borne.  A  soldier  sits  by  you  in  a  common  dress  and 
begins  to  speak  ill  of  Caesar ;  then  you,  as  if  you  had 
received  a  pledge  of  his  fidelity  by  his  having  begun  the 
abuse,  utter  yourself  also  what  you  think,  and  then  you 
are  carried  off  in  chains.2 

Something  of  this  kind  happens  to  us  also  generally. 
Now  as  this  man  has  confidently  intrusted  his  affairs  to 
me,  shall  I  also  do  so  to  any  man  whom  I  meet  ?  (No) , 

1  Schweig.  writes  nws  TTOT*.  etc.,  and  translates  *  cxcitamur  quodam- 
modo  et  ipsi/  etc.  He  gives  the  meaning,  but  the  irws  rrore  is  properly 
a  question. 

-  2  The  man,  whether  a  soldier  or  not,  was  an  informer,  one  of  those 
vile  men  who  carried  on  this  shameful  business  under  the  empire.  He 
was  what  Juvenal  iiames  a  *  delator.7  Upton,  who  refers  to  the  life  of 
Hadrian  by  Aelius  Spartianus,  speaks  even  of  this  emperor  employing 
soldiers  named  Frumentarii  for  the  purpose  of  discovering  what  was 
said  and  done  in  private  houses.  John  the  Baptist  (Luke  iii,  14)  in 
answer  to  the  question  of  the  soldiers,  *  And  what  shall  we  do  ? '  said 
unto  them  *  Do  violence  to  no  man,  neither  accuse  any  falsely;  and  be 
content  with  your  wages/  Upton. 


876  EPICTETUS. 

for  when  I  have  heard,  I  keep  silence,  if  I  am  of  such  a  dis- 
position ;  but  lie  goes  forth  and  tells  all  men  what  he  has 
heard.  Then  if  I  hear  what  has  been  done,  if  I  be  a  man 
like  him,  I  resolve  to  be  revenged,  I  divulge  what  he  has 
told  me;  I  both  disturb  others  and  ain  disturbed  myself. 
But  if  I  remember  that  one  man  does  not  injure  another, 
and  that  every  man's  acts  injure  and  profit  him,  I  secure 
this,  that  I  do  not  any  thing  like  him,  but  still  I  suffer 
what  I  do  suffer  through  my  own  silly  talk. 

True :  but  it  is  unfair  when  you  have  heard  the  secrets 
of  your  neighbour  for  you  in  your  turn  to  communicate 
nothing  to  him. — Did  I  ask  you  for  your  secrets,  my  man  ? 
did  you  communicate  your  affairs  on  certain  terms,  that 
you  should  in  return  hear  mine  also  ?  If  you  are  a  babbler 
and  think  that  all  who  meet  you  are  friends,  do  you  wish 
me  also  to  be  like  you?  But  why,  if  you  did  well  in 
intrusting  your  affairs  to  me,  and  it  is  not  well  for  me  to 
intrust  mine  to  you,  do  you  wish  me  to  be  so  rash?  It  is 
just  the  frame  as  if  I  had  a  cask  which  is  water-tight,  and 
you  one  with  a  hole  in  it,  and  you  should  come  and, 
deposit  with  me  your  wine  that  I  might  put  it  into  my 
cask,  and  then  should  complain  that  I  also  did  not  intrust 
my  wine  to  you,  for  you  have  a  cask  with  a  hole  in  it. 
How  then  is  there  any  equality  here?  You  intrusted 
your  affairs  to  a  man  who  is  faithful,  and  modest,  to  a 
man  who  thinks  that  his  own  actions  alone  are  injurious 
and  (or)  useful,  and  that  nothing  external  is.  Would  you 
have  me  intrust  mine  to  you,  a  man  who  has  dishonoured 
his  own  faculty  of  will,  and  who  wishes  to  gain  some 
small  bit  of  money  or  some  office  or  promotion  in  the 
court  (emperor's  palace),  even  if  you  should  be  going  to 
murder  your  own  children,  like  Medea  ?  Where  (in  what) 
is  this  equality  (fairness)?  But  show  yourself  to  me  to 
be  faithful,  modest,  and  steady :  show  me  that  you  have 
friendly  opinions ;  show  that  your  cask  has  no  hole  in  it ; 
and  you  will  see  how  I  shall  not  wait  for  you  to  trust  me 
with  your  affairs,  but  I  myself  shall  come  to  you  and  ask 
you  to  hear  mine.  For  who  does  not  choose  to  make  use 
of  a  good  vessel?  Who  does  not  value  a  benevolent  and 
faithful  adviser?  who  will  not  willingly  receive  a  man 


EFICTETUS.  377 

who  is  ready  to  bear  a  share,  as  we  may  say,  of  the  diffi- 
culty of  his  circumstances,  and  by  this  very  act  to  ease  the 
burden,  by  taking  a  part  of  it. 

True :  but  I  trust  yon ;  you  do  not  trust  me. — In  the 
first  place,  not  even  do  you  trust  me,  but  you  are  a 
babbler,  and  for  this  reason  you  cannot  hold  anything; 
for  indeed,  if  it  is  true  that  you  trust  me,  trust  your 
affairs  to  me  only ;  but  now  whenever  you  see  a  man  at 
leisure,  you  seat  yourself  by  him  and  say:  Brother,  I 
have  no  friend  more  benevolent  than  you  nor  dearer;  I 
request  you  to  listen  to  my  affairs.  And  you  do  this  even 
to  those  who  are  not  known  to  you  at  all.  But  if  you 
really  trust  me,  it  is  plain  that  you  trust  me  because  I  am 
faithful  and  modest,  not  because  I  have  told  my  affairs  to 
you.  Allow  me  then  to  have  the  same  opinion  about  you. 
Show  me  that  if  one  man  tells  his  affairs  to  another,  he 
who  tells  them  is  faithful  and  modest.  For  if  this  were 
so,  I  would  go  about  and  tell  my  affairs  to  every  man,  if 
that  would  make  me  faithful  and  modest.  But  the  thing 
is  not  so,  and  it  requires  no  common  opinions  (principles). 
If  then  you  see  a  man  who  is  busy  about  things  not  de- 
pendent on  his  will  and  subjecting  his  will  to  them,  you 
must  know  that  this  man  has  ten  thousand  persons  to 
compel  and  hinder  him.  He  has  no  need  of  pitch  or  the 
wheel  to  compel  him  to  declare  what  he  knows:3  but  a 
little  girl's  nod,  if  it  should  so  happen,  will  move  him,  the 
blandishment  of  one  who  belongs  to  Caesar's  court,  desire 
of  a  magistracy  or  of  an  inheritance,  and  things  without 
end  of  that  sort.  You  must  remember  then  among  general 
principles  that  secret  discourses  (discourses  about  secret 
matters)  require  fidelity  and  corresponding  opinions.  But 
where  can  we  now  find  these  easily?  Or  if  you  cannot 
answer  that  question,  let  some  one  point  out  to  me  a  man 
who  can  say :  I  care  only  about  the  things  which  are  my 
own,  the  things  which  are  not  subject  to  hindrance,  the 
things  which  are  by  nature  free.  This  I  hold  to  be  the 
nature  of  the  good :  but  let  all  other  things  be  as  they  are 
allowed ;  I  do  not  concern  myself. 

8  The  wheel  and  pitch  were  instruments  of  torture  to  extract  oom- 
fessions.  See  ii.  6, 18,  and  Schweig.'s  note  there. 


THE  ENCHEIRIDION,  OR  MANUAL.1 


I. 

OF  things  some  are  in  our  power,  and  others  are  not. 
In  our  power  are  opinion  (wroA^is),  movement  towards  a 
thing  (op//,?/),  desire,  aversion  (e/c/cXto-i?,  turning  from  a 
thing);  and  in  a  word,  whatever  are  our  own  acts:  not 
in  our  power  are  the  body,  property,  reputation,  offices 
(magisterial  power),  and  in  a  word,  whatever  are  not  our 
own  acts.  And  the  things  in  our  power  are  by  nature 
free,  not  subject  to  restraint  nor  hindrance  :  but  the' 
things  not  in  our  power  are  weak,  slavish,  subject  to 
restraint,  in  the  power  of  others.  Eemember  then  that  if 
you  think  the  things  which  are  by  nature  slavish  to  be 
free,  and  the  things  which  are  in  the  power  of  others  to 
be  your  own,  you  will  be  hindered,  you  will  lament,  you 
will  be  disturbed,  you  will  blame  both  gods  and  men: 
but  if  you  think  that  only  which  is  your  own  to  be  your 
own,  and  if  you  think  that  what  is  another's,  as  it  really 
is,  belongs  to  another,  no  man  will  ever  compel  you,  no 
man  will  hinder  you,  you  will  never  blame  any  man,  you 
will  accuse  no  man,  you  will  do  nothing  involuntarily 
(against  your  will),  no  man  will  harm  you,  you  will  have 
no  enemy,  for  you  will  not  suffer  any  harm. 

If  then  you  desire  (aim  at)  such  great  things,  remember 
that  you  must  not  (attempt  to)  lay  hold  of  them  with  a 
small  effort;  but  you  must  leave  alone  some  things  en- 
tirely, and  postpone  others  for  the  present.  But  if  you 
wish  for  these  things  also  (such  great  things),  and  power 


1  In  Schweighaeuser's  edition  the  title  is  '  'EirtKTJirov 
Epicteti  Manuale  ex  recensione  et  interpretatione  Joannis  Uptoni. 
Notftbiliorem  Lectionis  varietatem  adjecit  Job.  Schweighaeuser.' 
There  are  also  notes  by  Upton,  and  some  by  Schweighaeuser. 


380  EPICTETUS. 

(office)  and  wealth,  perhaps  yon  will  not  gain  even  tlio^a 
very  things  (power  and  wealth)  because  you  aim  also  at 
those  former  things  (such  great  things):1  certainly  y<m 
will  fail  in  those  things  through  which  alone  happiness 
and  freedom  are  secured.  Straightway  then  practise  say- 
ing to  every  harsh  appearance,2  You  are  an  appearance, 
and  in  no  manner  what  you  appear  to  bo.  Then  examine 
it  by  the  rules  which  you  possess,  and  by  this  first  arid 
chiefly,  whether  it  relates  to  the  things  which  are  in  our 
power  or  to  things  which  are  not  in  our  power :  and  if  it 
relates  to  any  thing  which  is  not  in  our  power,  be  ready  to 
say,  that  it  does  not  concern  you. 

II. 

Kemember  that  desire  contains  in  it  the  profession  (hope) 
of  obtaining  that  which  you  desire;  and  the  profession 
(hope)  in  aversion  (turning  from  a  thing)  is  that  yon  will 
not  fall  into  that  which  you  attempt  to  avoid :  and  he 
who  fails  in  his  desire  is  unfortunate ;  and  he  who  falls 
into  that  which  he  would  avoid,  is  unhappy.  If  then  you 
attempt  to  avoid  only  the  things  contrary  to  nature  which 
are  within  your  power,  you  will  not  be  involved  in  any  of 
the  things  which  you  would  avoid.  But  if  you  attempt 
to  avoid  disease  or  death  or  poverty,  you  will  be  unhappy. 
Take  away  then  aversion  from  all  things  which  are  not  in 
our  power,  and  transfer  it  to  the  things  contrary  to  nature 
which  are  in  our  power.  But  destroy  desire  completely 
for  the  present.  For  if  you  desire  anything  which  is  not 
in  our  power,  you  must  be  unfortunate :  but  of  the  things 
in  our  power,  and  which  it  would  be  good  to  desire, 
nothing  yet  is  before  you.  But  employ  only  the  power  of 
moving  towards  an  object  and  retiring  from  it ;  and  these 
powers  indeed  only  slightly  and  with  exceptions  and  with 
remission.3 

1  This  passage  will  be  obscure  in  the  original,  unless  it  is  examined 
well.  I  have  followed  the  explanation  of  Simplicius,  iv.  (i.  4.) 

8  Appearances  are  named  *  harsh '  or  •  rough '  when  they  are  *  con- 
trary to  reason  and  overexciting  and  in  fact  make  life  rough  (uneven) 
by  the  want  of  symmetry  and  by  inequality  in  the  movements. 
Simplicius,  v.  (i.  5.) 

*  See  the  notes  in  Schweig.'s  edition. 


EPICTETU8.  381 

III. 

In  every  thing  which  pleases  the  soul,  or  supplies  a 
want,  or  is  loved,  remember  to  add  this  to  the  (descrip- 
tion, notion) ;  what  is  the  nature  of  each  thing,  beginning 
from  the  smallest  ?  If  you  love  an  earthen  vessel,  say  it  is 
an  earthen  vessel  which  you  love ;  for  when  it  has  been 
broken,  you  will  not  be  disturbed.  If  you  are  kissing 
your  child  or  wife,  say  that  it  is  a  human  being  whom 
you  are  kissing,  for  when  the  wife  or  child  dies,  you  will 
not  be  disturbed. 

IV. 

When  you  are  going  to  take  in  hand  any  act,  remind 
yourself  what  kind  of  an  act  it  is.  If  you  are  going  to 
bathe,  place  before  yourself  what  happens  in  the  bath : 
some  splashing  the  water,  others  pushing  against  one 
another,  others  abusing  one  another,  and  some  stealing : 
and  thus  with  more  safety  you  will  undertake  the  matter, 
if  you  say  to  yourself,  I  now  intend  to  bathe,  and  to 
maintain  my  will  in  a  manner  conformable  to  nature. 
And  so  you  will  do  in  every  act :  for  thus  if  any  hindrance 
to  bathing  shall  happen,  let  this  thought  be  ready :  it  was 
not  this  only  that  I  intended,  but  I  intended  also  to 
maintain  my  will  in  a  way  conformable  to  nature ;  but  I 
shall  not  maintain  it  so,  if  I  am  vexed  at  what  happens. 

V. 

Men  are  disturbed  not  by  the  things  which  happen,  but 
by  the  opinions  about  the  things :  for  example,  death  is 
nothing  terrible,  for  if  it  were,  it  would  have  seemed  so 
to  Socrates;  for  the  opinion  about  death,  that  it  is 
terrible,  is  the  terrible  thing.  When  then  we  are  impeded 
or  disturbed  or  grieved,  let  us  never  blame  others,  but 
ourselves,  that  is,  our  opinions.  It  is  the  act  of  an  ill- 
instructed  man  to  blame  others  for  his  own  bad  condition ; 
it  is  the  act  of  one  who  has  begun  to  be  instructed,  to  lay 
the  blame  on  himself;  and  of  one  who^e  instruction  is 
completed,  neither  to  blame  another,  nor  himself. 

VI. 

Be  not  elated  at  any  advantage  (excellence),  which 
belongs  to  another.  If  a  horse  when  he  is  elated  should 


382  EPIOTETUS. 

say,  I  am  beautiful,  one  might  endure  it.  But  when  yon 
are  elated,  and  say,  I  have  a  beautiful  horse,  you  must 
know  that  you  are  elated  at  having  a  good  horse.1  What 
then  is  your  own  ?  The  use  of  appearances.  Consequently 
when  in  the  use  of  appearances  you  are  conformable  to 
nature,  then  be  elated,  for  then  you  will  be  elated  at 
something  good  which  is  your  own. 

VII. 

As  on  a  voyage  when  the  vessel  has  reached  a  port, 
if  you  go  out  to  get  water,  it  is  an  amusement  by  the 
way  to  pick  up  a  shell  fish  or  some  bulb,  but  your 
thoughts  ought  to  be  directed  to  the  ship,  and  you  ought 
to  be  constantly  watching  if  the  captain  should  call,  and 
then  you  must  throw  away  all  those  things,  that  you  may 
not  be  bound  and  pitched  into  the  ship  like  sheep :  so  in 
life  also,  if  there  be  given  to  you  instead  of  a  little  bulb 
and  a  shell  a  wife  and  child,  there  will  be  nothing  to 
prevent  (you  from  taking  them).  But  if  the  captain 
should  call,  run  to  the  ship,  and  leave  all  those  things 
without  regard  to  them.  But  if  you  are  old,  do  not  even 
go  far  from  the  ship,  lest  when  you  are  called  you  make 
default. 

VIII. 

Seek  not  that  the  things  which  happen2  should  happen 
as  you  wish ;  but  wish  the  things  which  happen  to  be  as 
they  are,  and  you  will  have  a  tranquil  flow  of  life. 

IX. 

Disease  is  an  impediment  to  the  body,  but  not  to  the 
will,  unless  the  will  itself  chooses.  Lameness  is  an 
impediment  to  the  leg,  but  not  to  the  will.  And  add  this 
inflection  on  the  occasion  of  every  thing  that  happens ; 
for  you  will  find  it  an  impediment  to  something  else,  but 
not  to  yourself. 

1  Upton  proposes  to  read  !<£'  imrov  ayaOy  instead  of  3ir\  lirircp  &ya8$. 
The  meaning  then  will  he  '  elated  at  something  good  which  is  in  the 
horse.'    I  think  that  he  is  right. 

2  The  text  has  T&  yev6^va :  but  it  should  he  T&  yiv6pci>eL.    See 
Upton's  note. 


EPICTETUS.  883 

X. 

On  the  occasion  of  every  accident  (event)  that  befals 
yon,  remember  to  turn  to  yourself  and  inquire  what 
power  you  have  for  turning  it  to  use.  If  you  see  a  fair 
man  or  a  fair  woman,  you  will  find  that  the  power  to 
resist  is  temperance  (continence).  If  labour  (pain)  be 
presented  to  you,  you  will  find  that  it  is  endurance.  If 
it  be  abusive  words,  you  will  find  it  to  be  patience.  And 
if  you  have  been  thus  formed  to  the  (proper)  habit,  the 
appearances  will  not  carry  you  along  with  them. 

XL 

Never  say  about  any  thing,  I  have  lost  it,  but  say  I 
have  restored  it.  Is  your  child  dead  ?  It  has  been  re- 
stored. Is  your  wife  dead  ?  She  has  been  restored.  Has 
your  estate  been  taken  from  you?  Has  not  then  this 
also  been  restored  ?  But  he  who  has  taken  it  from  me  is 
a  bad  man.  But  what  is  it  to  you,  by  whose  hands  the 
giver  demanded  it  back  ?  So  long  as  he  may  allow  you, 
take  care  of  it  as  a  thing  which  belongs  to  another,  as 
travellers  do  with  their  inn. 

XII. 

If  you  intend  to  improve,  throw  away  such  thoughts  as 
these :  if  I  neglect  my  affairs,  I  shall  not  have  the  means 
of  living  :  unless  I  chastise  my  slave,  he  will  be  bad.  For 
it  is  better  to  die  of  hunger  and  so  to  be  released  from 
grief  and  fear  than  to  live  in  abundance  with  perturbation ; 
and  it  is  better  for  your  slave  to  be  bad  than  for  you  to  be 
unhappy.1  Begin  then  from  little  things.  Is  the  oil 
spilled?  Is  a  little  wine  stolen?  Say  on  the  occasion, 
at  such  price  is  sold  freedom  from  perturbation ;  at  such 
price  is  sold  tranquillity,  but  nothing  is  got  for  nothing. 
And  when  you  call  your  slave,  consider  that  it  is  pos- 
sible that  he  does  not  hear ;  and  if  he  does  hear,  that 

1  He  means,  Do  not  chastise  your  slave  while  you  are  in  a  passion, 
lest,  while  you  are  trying  to  correct  him,  and  it  is  very  doubtful 
whether  you  will  succeed,  you  fall  into  a  vice  which  is  a  man's  great 
and  only  calamity.  Sehweig, 


384  EPICTETUS. 

he  will  do  nothing  which  you  wish.  But  matters  are  not 
go  well  with  him,  but  altogether  well  with  you,  that  it 
should  be  in  his  power  for  you  to  be  not  disturbed.1 

XIII. 

If  you  would  improve,  submit  to  be  considered  without 
sense  and  foolish  with  respect  to  externals.  Wish  to  be 
considered  to  know  nothing :  and  if  you  shall  seem  to 
some  to  be  a  person  of  importance,  distrust  yourself.  For 
you  should  know  that  it  is  not  easy  both  to  keep  your 
will  in  a  condition  conformable  to  nature  and  (to  secure) 
external  things :  but  if  a  man  is  careful  about  the  one,  it 
is  an  absolute  necessity  that  he  will  neglect  the  other. 

XIV. 

If  you  would  have  your  children  and  your  wife  and 
your  friends  to  live  for  ever,  you  are  silly ;  for  you  would 
have  the  things  which  are  not  in  your  power  to  be  in 
your  power,  and  the  things  which  belong  to  others  to  be 
yours.  So  if  you  would  have  your  slave  to  be  free  from 
faults,  you  are  a  fool ;  for  you  would  have  badness  not  to 
be  badness,  but  something  else.2  But  if  you  wish  not  to 
fail  in  your  desires,  you  are  able  to  do  that.  Practise 
then  this  which  you  are  able  to  do.  He  is  the  master  of 
every  man  who  has  the  power  over  the  things,  which 
another  person  wishes  or  does  not  wish,  the  power  to 
confer  them  on  him  or  to  take  them  away.  Whoever 
then  wishes  to  be  free,  let  him  neither  wish  for  any  thing 
nor  avoid  anything  which  depends  on  others  :  if  he  does 
not  observe  this  rule,  he  must  be  a  slave. 

1  The  passage  seems  to  mean,  that  your  slave  has  not  the  power  of 
disturbing  you,  because  you  have  the  power  of  not  being  disturbed. 
See  Upton's  note  on  the  text. 

2  ®e\eiv  is  used  here,  as  it  often  is  among  the  Stoics,  to  *  wish 
absolutely,'  *  to  will/    When  Epictetus  says  l  you  would  have  badness 
not  to  be  badness/  he  means  that  *  badness'  is  in  the  will  of  him  who 
has  the  badness,  and  as  you  wish  to  subject  it  to  your  will,  you  are  a 
fool.    It  is  your  business,  as  far  as  you  can,  to  improve  the  blave :  you 
may  wish  this.    It  is  his  business  to  obey  your  instruction:  this  ia 
what  he  ought  to  wish  to  do ;  but  for  him  to  will  to  do  this,  that  lies 
in  himself,  not  in  you,    Scbweig. 


JEPICTETUS.  i>83 

XV. 

Remember  that  in  life  you  ought  to  "behave  as  at  a 
banquet.  Suppose  that  something  is  carried  round  and  is 
opposite  to  you.  Stretch  out  your  hand  and  take  a 
portion  with  decency.  Suppose  that  it  passes  by  you. 
Do  not  detain  it.  Suppose  that  it  is  not  yet  corne  to  you. 
Do  not  send  your  desire  forward  to  it,  but  wait  till  ii 
is  opposite  to  you.  Do  so  with  respect  to  children,  so 
with  respect  to  a  wife,  so  with  respect  to  magisterial 
offices,  so  with  respect  to  wealth,  and  you  will  be  some 
time  a  worthy  partner  of  the  banquets  of  the  gods.  But 
if  you  take  none  of  the  things  which  are  set  before  you, 
and  even  despise  them,  then  you  will  be  not  only  a  fellow 
banqueter  with  the  gods,  but  also  a  partner  with  them  in 
power.  For  by  acting  thus  Diogenes  and  Heracleitus  and 
those  like  them  were  deservedly  divine,  and  were  sa 
called. 

XVI. 

When  you  see  a  person  weeping  in  sorrow  either  when  a, 
child  goes  abroad  or  when  he  is  dead,  or  when  the  man  has 
lost  his  property,  take  care  that  the  appearance  do  not 
hurry  you  away  with  it,  as  if  he  were  suffering  in  external 
things.1  But  straightway  make  a  distinction  in  your 
own  mind,  and  be  in  readiness  to  say,  it  is  not  that  which 
has  happened  that  afflicts  this  man,  for  it  does  not  afflict 
another,  but  it  is  the  opinion  about  this  thing  which 
afflicts  the  man.  So  far  as  words  then  do  not  be  un- 
willing to  show  him  sympathy,2  and  even  if  it  happens  so, 
to  lament  with  him.  But  take  care  that  you  do  not. 
lament  internally  also. 

1  This  is  obscure.    •  It  is  true  that  the  man  is  wretched,  not  because? 
of  the  things  external  which  have  happened  to  him,  but  through  the- 
fact  that  he  allows  himself  to  be  affected  so  much  by  external  things 
which  are  placed  out  of  his  power.'    Schweig. 

2  It  has  been  objected  to  Epictetus  that  he  expresses  no  sympathy 
with  those  who  suffer  sorrow.    But  here  he  tells  you  to  show  sympathy, 
a  thing  which  comforts  most  people.    But  it  would  be  contrary  to  hii 
teaching,  if  he  told  you  to  suffer  mentally  with  another. 


2y 


386  EncTETUS. 

XVII. 

Bemember  that  thou  art  an  actor  in  a  play,1  of  such 
a  kind  as  the  teacher  (author)2  may  choose ;  if  short,  of  a 
short  one ;  if  long,  of  a  long  one :  if  he  wishes  you  to  act 
the  part  of  a  poor  man,  see  that  you  act  the  part  naturally ; 
if  the  part  of  a  lame  man,  of  a  magistrate,  of  a  private 
person,  (do  the  same).  For  this  is  your  duty,  to  act  well 
the  part  that  is  given  to  you;  but  to  select  the  part, 
belongs  to  another. 

XVIII. 

When  a  raven  has  croaked  inauspiciously,  let  not  the 
appearance  hurry  you  away  with  it;  but  straightway 
make  a  distinction  in  your  mind  and  say,  None  of  these 
things  is  signified  to  me,  but  either  to  my  poor  body,  or 
to  my  small  property,  or  to  my  reputation,  or  to  my 
children  or  to  my  wife :  but  to  me  all  significations  are 
auspicious  if  I  choose.  For  whatever  of  these  things 
results,  it  is  in  my  power  to  derive  benefit  from  it. 

XIX. 

You  can  be  invincible,  if  you  enter  into  no  contest  in 
which  it  is  not  in  your  power  to  conquer.  Take  care 
then  when  you  observe  a  man  honoured  before  others  or 
possessed  of  great  power  or  highly  esteemed  for  any 
reason,  not  to  suppose  him  happy,  and  be  not  carried 
away  by  the  appearance.  For  if  the  nature  of  the  good  is 
in  our  power,  neither  envy  nor  jealousy  will  have  a  place 
in  us.  But  you  yourself  will  not  wish  to  be  a  general 
-or  senator  (TT/WTCIVIS)  or  consul,  but  a  free  man  :  and  there 
Is  only  one  way  to  this,  to  despise  (care  not  for)  the 
things  which  are  not  in  our  power. 

XX. 

Remember  that  it  is  not  he  who  reviles  you  or  strikes 
you,  who  insults  you,  but  it  is  your  opinion  about  these 
things  as  being  insulting.  When  tHen  a  man  irritates 
you,  you  must  know  that  it  is  your  own  opinion  which 

1  Compare  Antoninus,  xi.  6,  xii.  36, 
*  Note,  ed.  Schweig. 


EPIOTETUS.  357 

has  irritated  yon.  Therefore  especially  try  not  to  be 
carried  away  by  the  appearance.  For  if  you  once  gain 
time  and  delay,  you  will  more  easily  master  yourself. 

XXI. 

Let  death  and  exile  and  every  other  thing  which  appears 
dreadful  be  daily  before  your  eyes  ;  but  most  of  all  death  : 
and  you  will  never  think  of  any  thing  mean  nor  will  you 
desire  any  thing  extravagantly. 

XXIT. 

If  you  desire  philosophy,  prepare  yourself  from  the 
beginning  to  be  ridiculed,  to  expect  that  many  will  sneer 
at  you,  and  say,  He  has  all  at  once  returned  to  us  as  a 
philosopher;  and  whence  does  he  get  this  supercilious 
look  for  us?  Do  you  not  show  a  supercilious  look;  but 
hold  on  to  the  things  which  seem  to  you  best  as  one 
appointed  by  God  to  this  station.  And  remember  that 
if  you  abide  in  the  same  principles,  these  men  who  first 
ridiculed  will  afterwards  admire  you:  but  if  you  shall 
have  been  overpowered  by  them,  you  will  bring  on  your- 
self double  ridicule. 

XXIII. 

If  it  should  ever  happen  to  you  to  be  turned  to  externals 
in  order  to  please  some  person,  you  must  know  that  you 
have  lost  your  purpose  in  life.1  Be  satisfied  then  in 
every  thing  with  being  a  philosopher ;  and  if  you  wish 
to  seem  also  to  any  person  to  be  a  philosopher,  appear  so 
to  yourself,  and  you  will  be  able  to  do  this. 

XXIV. 

Let  not  these  thoughts  afflict  you,  I  shall  live  tin- 
honoured  and  be  nobody  nowhere.  For  if  want  of  honour 
(dn/u'a)  is  an  evil,  you  cannot  be  in  evil  through  the 
means  (fault)  of  another  any  more  than  you  can  be 
involved  in  any  thing  base.  Is  it  then  your  business  to 
obtain  the  rank  of  a  magistrate,  or  to  be  received  at  a 
banquet  ?  By  no  means.  How  then  can  this  be  want  of 

f  'If  I  yet  pleased  men,  I  should  not  be  the  servant  of  Christ/ 
Gal,  i,  10.  Mrs.  Carter. 

2  c  2 


388  EPICTETUS. 

honor  (dishonor)  ?  And  how  will  you  be  nobody  nowhere, 
when  you  ought  to  be  somebody  in  those  things  only 
which  are  in  your  power,  in  which  indeed  it  is  permitted 
to  you  to  be  a  man  of  the  greatest  worth?  But  your 
friends  will  be  without  assistance!  What  do  you  mean 
by  being  without  assistance?  They  will  not  receive 
money  from  you,  nor  will  you  make  them  Koman  citizens. 
Who  then  told  you  that  these  are  among  the  things  which 
are  in  our  power,  and  not  in  the  power  of  others  ?  And 
who  can  give  to  another  what  ho  has  not  himself  ?  Acquire 
money  then,  your  friends  say,  that  we  also  may  have 
something.  If  I  can  acquire  money  and  also  keep  myself 
modest,  and  faithful  and  magnanimous,  point  out  the  way, 
and  I  will  acquire  it.  But  if  you  ask  me  to  lose  the 
things  which  are  good  and  my  own,  in  order  that  you  may 
gain  the  things  which  are  riot  good,  see  how  unfair  and 
silly  you  are.  Besides,  which  would  you  rather  have, 
money  or  a  faithful  and  modest  friend?  For  this  end 
then  rather  help  me  to  be  such  a  man,  and  do  not  ask  me 
to  do  this  by  which  I  shall  lose  that  character.  But  my 
country,  you  say,  as  far  as  it  depends  on  me,  will  be 
without  my  help.  I  ask  again,  what  help  do  you  mean  ? 
It  will  not  have  porticoes  or  baths  through  you.1  And 
what  does  this  mean?  For  it  is  not  furnished  with  shoes 
by  means  of  a  smith,  nor  with  arms  by  means  of  a  shoe- 
maker. But  it  is  enough  if  every  man  fully  discharges 
the  work  that  is  his  own :  and  if  you  provided  it  with 
another  citizen  faithful  and  modest,  would  you  not  be 
useful  to  it?  Yes.  Then  you  also  cannot  be  useless  to  it. 
What  place  then,  you  say,  shall  I  hold  in  the  city  ?  What- 
ever you  can,  if  you  maintain  at  the  same  time  your  fidelity 
and  modesty.  But  if  when  you  wish  to  be  useful  to  the 
state,  you  shall  lose  these  qualities,  what  profit  could  you 
be  to  it,  if  you  were  made  shameless  and  faithless  ? 

XXV. 

Has  any  man  been  preferred  before  you  at  a  banquet, 

or  in  being  saluted,  or  in  being  invited  to  a  consultation  ? 

If  these  things  are  good,  you  ought  to  rejoice  that  he  has 

obtained  them :  but  if  bad,  be  not  grieved  because  you 

1  8ee  the  text. 


EPICTETUS.  389 

have  not  obtained  them  ;  and  remember  that  you  cannot, 
if  you  do  not  the  same  things  in  order  to  obtain  what  is 
not  in  onr  own  povrer,  be  considered  worthy  of  the  same 
(equal)  things.  Bor  how  can  a  man  obtain  an  equal 
share  with  another  when  he  does  not  visit  a  man's  doors 
as  that  other  man  does,  when  he  does  not  attend  him 
when  he  goes  abroad,  as  the  other  man  does ;  when  he 
does  not  praise  (flatter)  him  as  another  does  ?  You  will 
be  unjust  then  and  insatiable,  if  you  do  not  part  with 
the  price,  in  return  for  which  those  things  are  sold,  and 
if  you  wish  to  obtain  them  for  nothing.  Well,  what  is 
the  price  of  lettuces  ?  An  obolus  l  perhaps.  If  then  a 
man  gives  up  the  obolus,  and  receives  the  lettuces,  and  if 
you  do  not  give  up  the  obolus  and  do  not  obtain  the 
lettuces,  do  not  suppose  that  you  receive  less  than  he  who 
has  got  the  lettuces;  for  as  he  has  the  lettuces,  so  you 
have  the  obolus  which  you  did  not  give.  In  the  same 
way  then  in  the  other  matter  also  you  have  not  been 
invited  to  a  man's  feast,  for  you  did  not  give  to  the  host 
the  price  at  which  the  supper  is  sold ;  but  he  sells  it  for 
praise  (flattery),  he  sells  it  for  personal  attention.  Give 
then  the  price,'2  if  it  is  for  your  interest,  for  which  it  is 
•sold.  But  if  you  wish  both  not  to  give  the  price  and  to 
obtain  the  things,  you  are  insatiable  and  silly.  Have  you 
nothing  then  in  place  of  the  supper?  You  have  indeed, 
you  have  the  not  flattering  of  him,  whom  you  did  not 
choose  to  flatter ;  you  have  the  not  enduring3  of  the  man 
when  ho  enters  the  room. 

XXVI. 

We  may  learn  the  wish  (will)  of  nature  from  the  things 
in  which  we  do  not  differ  from  one  another :  for  instance, 
when  your  neighbour's  slave  has  broken  his  cup,  or  any 
thing  else,  we  are  ready  to  say  forthwith,  that  it  is  one 
of  the  things  which  happen.  You  must  know  then  that 
when  your  cup  also  is  broken,  you  ought  to  think  as  you 
did  when  your  neighbour's  cup  was  broken.  Transfer  this 
reflection  to  greater  things  also.  Is  another  man's  child 
or  wife  dead?  There  is  no  one  who  would  not  say,  this 

1  The  feixtb  parv,  of  a  drachma.  2  *  Price '  is  here  r 

3  See  Schweig.'g  note. 


390  EPICTETUS. 

is  an  event  incident  to  man.  But  when  a  man's  own 
child  or  wife  is  dead,  forthwith  he  calls  out,  Wo  to  me, 
how  wretched  I  am.  But  we  ought  to  remember  how  we 
feel  when  we  hear  that  it  has  happened  to  others. 

XXVII. 

As  a  mark  its  not  set  up  for  the  purpose  of  missing  the 
aim,  so  neither  does  the  nature  of  evil  exist  in  the 
world.1 

XXVIII. 

If  any  person  was  intending  to  put  your  body  in  the 
power  of  any  man  whom  you  fell  in  with  on  the  way,  you 
would  be  vexed  :  but  that  you  put  your  understanding  in 
the  power  of  any  man  whom  you  meet,  so  that  if  he 
should  revile  you,  it  is  disturbed  and  troubled,  are  you 
not  ashamed  at  this  ? 

XXIX.2 

In  every  act  observe  the  things  which  come  first,  and 
those  which  follow  it ;  and  so  proceed  to  the  act.  If  you 
do  not,  at  first  you  will  approach  it  with  alacrity,  without 
having  thought  of  the  things  which  will  follow;  but 
afterwards,  when  certain  base  (ugly)  things  have  shewn 
themselves,  you  will  be  ashamed.  A  man  wishes  to- 
concyuer  at  the  Olympic  games.  I  also  wish  indeed,  for  it 

1  This  passage  is  explained  in  the  commentary  of  Simplicius,  (xxxiv., 
in  Schweig/s  ed.  xxvii.  p.  26-1),  and  Schweighaeuser  agrees  with  the- 
explanation,  which  is  this :  Nothing  in  the  world  (universe)  can  exist 
or  be  done  (happen)  which  in  its  proper  sense,  in  itself  and  in  its 
nature  is  bad ;  for  every  thing  is  and  is  done  by  the  wisdom  and  will 
of  God  and  for  the  purpose  which  he  intended :  but  to  miss  a  mark  is 
to  fail  in  an  intention ;  and  as  a  man  does  not  set  up  a  mark,  or  does* 
not  form  a  purpose  for  the  purpose  of  missing  the  mark  or  the  purpose, 
so  it  is  absurd  (inconsistent)  to  say  that  God  has  a  purpose  or  design,, 
and  that  he  purposed  or  designed  anything  which  in  itself  and  in  its 
nature  is  bad.    The  commentary  of  Simplicius  is  worth  reading.    But 
how  many  will  read  it  ?    Perhaps  one  in  a  million. 

2  *  Compare  iii,  15,  from  which  all  this  passage  has  been  transferred 
to  the  Encheiridion  by  the  copyists.'    Upton.    On  which  Schweig- 
haeuser remarks,  *  Why  should  we  not  say  by  Ariian,  who  composed 
the  Encheiridion  from  the  Discourses  of  Epictetus  ? '    See  the  notes  of 
Upton  and  Schweig.  on  some  differences  in  the  readings  of  the  passage 
in  iii.  15,  and  in  this  passage. 


EP1CTETUS.  S91 

is  a  fine  thing.  But  observe  both  the  things  which  come 
first,  and  the  things  which  follow ;  and  then  begin  the 
act.  You  must  do  every  thing  necording  to  rule,  eat 
according  to  strict  orders,  abstain  from  delicacies,  exercise 
yourself  as  you  are  bid  at  appointed  times,  in  heat,  in  cold, 
you  must  not  drink  cold  water,  nor  wine  as  you  choose ; 
in  a  word,  you  must  deliver  yourself  up  to  the  exercise 
master  as  you  do  to  the  physician,  and  then  proceed  to 
the  contest.  And  sometimes  you  will  strain  the  hand, 
put  the  ankle  out  of  joint,  swallow  much  dust,  sometimes 
be  flogged,  and  after  all  this  be  defeated.  When  you 
have  considered  all  this,  if  you  still  choose,  go  to  the  con- 
test :  if  you  do  not,  you  will  behave  like  children,  who  at 
one  time  play  at  wrestlers,  another  time  as  flute  players, 
again  as  gladiators,  then  as  trumpeters,  then  as  tragic 
actors:  so  you  also  will  be  at  one  time  an  athlete,  at 
another  a  gladiator,  then  a  rhetorician,  then  a  philosopher, 
but  with  your  whole  soul  you  will  be  nothing  at  all ;  but 
like  an  ape  you  imitate  every  thing  that  you  see,  and  one 
thing  after  another  pleases  you.  For  you  have  not  under- 
taken any  thing  with  consideration,  nor  have  you  sur- 
veyed it  well ;  but  carelessly  and  with  cold  desire.  Thus 
some  who  have  seen  a  philosopher  and  having  heard  one 
speak,  as  Euphrates  speaks, — and  who  can  speak  as  he 
does? — they  wish  to  be  philosophers  themselves  also.  My 
man,  first  of  all  consider  what  kind  of  thing  it  is :  and 
then  examine  your  own  nature,  if  you  are  able  to  sustain 
the  character.  Do  you  wish  to  be  a  pentathlete  or  a 
wrestler?  Look  at  your  arms,  your  thighs,  examine  your 
loins.  For  different  men  are  formed  by  nature  for  different 
things.  Do  you  think  that  if  you  do  these  things,  you 
can  eat  in  the  same  manner,  drink  in  the  same  manner, 
and  in  the  same  manner  loathe  certain  things  ?  You  must 
pass  sleepless  nights,  endure  toil,  go  away  from  your 
kinsmen,  be  despised  by  a  slave,  in  every  thing  have  the 
inferior  part,  in  honour,  in  office,  in  the  courts  of  justice, 
in  every  little  matter.  Consider  these  things,  if  you 
would  exchange  for  them,  freedom  from  passions,  liberty, 
tranquillity.  If  not,  take  care  that,  like  little  children, 
you  be  not  now  a  philosopher,  then  a  servant  of  the 
publicani,  then  a  rhetorician,  then  a  procurator  (manager) 
for  Caesar.  These  things  are  not  consistent.  You  must 


392  EPICTETUS. 

be  one  man,  either  good  or  bad.  You  must  either  cul&i- 
vate  your  own  ruling  faculty, "lor  external  things;  jow 
must  either  exercise  your  skill  on  internal  things  or  on 
external  things;  that  is  you  must  either  maintain  tho 
position  of  a  philosopher  or  that  of  a  common  person. 

XXX. 

Duties  are  universally  measured  by  relations  (rats 
<rx«r€<n).  1  s  a  man  a  father  ?  The  precept  is  to  take  care 
of  him,  to  yield  to  him  in  all  things,  to  submit  when  he  is 
reproachful,  when  he  inflicts  blows.  But  suppose  that  he 
is  a  bad  father.  Were  you  then  by  nature  made  akin  to 
a  good  father  ?  No ;  but  to  a  father.  Does  a  brother 
wrong  you?  Maintain  then  your  own  position  towards 
him,  and  do  not  examine  what  he  is  doing,  but  what  you 
must  do  that  your  will  shall  be  conformable  to  nature. 
For  another  wi  11  not  damage  you,  unless  you  choose  :  but 
you  will  be  damaged  then  when  you  shall  think  that  you 
are  damaged.  In  this  way  then  you  will  discover  your 
duty  from  the  relation  of  a  neighbour,  from  that  of  a 
citizen,  from  that  of  a  general,  if  you  are  accustomed 
to  contemplate  the  relations. 

XXXI. 

As  to  piety  towards  the  Gods  you  must  know  that  this 
is  the  chief  thing,  to  have  right  opinions  about  them,  to 
think  that  they  exist,  and  that  they  administer  the,  All 
well  and  justly ;  and  you  must  fix  yourself  in  this  prin- 
ciple (duty),  to  obey  them,  and  to  yield  to  them  in  every 
thing  which  happens,  and  voluntarily  to  follow  it  as 
being  accomplished  by  the  wisest  intelligence.  For  if 
you  do  so,  you  will  never  either  blame  the  Gods,  nor  will 
you  accuse  them  of  neglecting  you.  And  it  is  not  possible 
for  this  to  be  done  in  any  other  way  than  by  withdraw- 
ing from  the  things  which  are  not  in  our  power,  and  by 
placing  the  good  and  the  evil  only  in  those  things  which 
are  in  our  power.  For  if  you  think  that  any  of  the 
things  which  are  not  in  our  power  is  good  or  bad,  it  is 
absolutely  necessary  that,  when  you  do  not  obtain  what 
you  wish,  and  when  you  fall  into  those  things  which  you 
do  not  wish,  you  will  find  fault  and  hate  those  who  are 


EPICTETUS.  393 

the  cause  of  tliem  ;  for  every  animal  is  formed  by  nature 
to  this,  to  fly  from,  and  to  turn  from  the  things  which 
appear  harmful  and  the  things  which  are  the  cause  of  the 
harm,  but  to  follow  and  admire  the  things  which  are  use- 
ful and  the  causes  of  the  useful.  It  is  impossible  then 
for  a  person  who  thinks  that  he  is  harmed  to  be  delighted 
with  that  which  he  thinks  to  be  the  cause  of  the 
harm,  as  it  is  also  impossible  to  be  pleased  with  the  harm 
itself.  For  this  reason  also  a  father  is  reviled  by  his  son, 
when  he  gives  no  part  to  his  son  of  the  things  which  are 
considered  to  be  good :  and  it  was  this  which  made 
Polynices  and  Eteocles1  enemies,  the  opinion  that  royal 
power  was  a  good.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  cultivator 
of  the  earth  reviles  the  Gods,  for  this  reason  the  sailor 
does,  and  the  merchant,  and  for  this  reason  those  who 
lose  their  wives  and  their  children.  For  where  the  use- 
ful (your  interest)  is,  there  also  piety  is.2  Consequently 
he  who  takes  care  to  desire  as  he  ought  and  to  avoid 
(e/ctfXimv)  as  he  ought,  at  the  same  time  also  cares  after 
piety.  But  to  make  libations  and  to  sacrifice  and  to  offer 
first  fruits  according  to  the  custom  of  our  fathers,  purely 
and  not  meanly  nor  carelessly  nor  scantily  nor  above  our 
ability,  is  u  thing  which  belongs  to  all  to  do. 

XXXII. 

When  you  have  recourse  to  divination,  remember  that 
you  do  not  know  how  it  will  turn  out,  but  that  you  are 
come  to  inquire  from  the  diviner.  But  of  what  kind  it 
is,  you  know  when  you  come,  if  indeed  you  are  a  philo- 

»  See  ii.  22, 13,  iv.  5,  9. 

2  '  It  is  plain  enough  that  the  philosopher  does  not  say  this,  that 
the  reckoning  of  our  private  advantage  ought  to  be  the  sole  origin 
.and  foundation  of  pie'ty  towards  God/  Schweig.,  and  he  proceeds  to 
explain  the  sentence,  which  at  first  appears  rather  obscure.  Perhaps 
Arrian  intends  to  say  that  the  feeling  of  piety  coincides  with  the 
opinion  of  the  useful,  the  profitable ;  and  that  the  man  who  takes  care 
to  desire  as  he  ought  to  do  and  to  avoid  as  he  ought  to  do,  thus  also 
cares  after  piety,  and  so  he  will  secure  his  interest  (the  profitable) 
and  he  will  not  be  discontented. 

In  i.  27,  14  (p.  81)  it  is  said  &v  ^  iv  r$  avr$  $  rb  cixrc&s  Kal 
evpQipov,  ov  ftwarcu  ffwOqvai  rb  cucrcjSes  fr  rtvt.  This  is  what  is  said 
here  (s.  31). 


394  EFJCTETUS. 

sopher.  For  if  it  is  any  of  the  things  which  are  not  in 
our  power,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  it  must  be 
neither  good  nor  bad.  Do  not  then  bring  to  the  diviner 
desire  or  aversion  (Ifc/cAto-tv) :  if  you  do,  you  will  approach 
him  with  fear.  But  having  determined  in  your  mind  that 
every  thing  which  shall  turn  out  (result )  is  indifferent, 
and  does  not  concern  you,  and  whatever  it  may  be,  for  it 
will  be  in  your  power  to  use  it  well,  and  no  man  will 
hinder  this,  come  then  with  confidence  to  the  Gods  as 
your  advisers.  And  then  when  any  advice  shall  have 
been  given,  remember  whom  you  have  taken  as  advisers, 
and  whom  you  will  have  neglected,  if  you  do  not  obey 
them.  And  go  to  divination,  as  Socrates  said  that  you 
ought,  about  those  matters  in  which  all  the  inquiry  has 
reference  to  the  result,  and  in  which  means  are  not  given 
either  by  reason  nor  by  any  other  art  for  knowing  the 
thing  which  is  the  subject  of  the  inquiry.  Wherefore 
when  we  ought  to  share  a  friend's  danger  or  that  of  our 
country,  you  must  not  consult  the  diviner  whether  you 
ought  to  share  it.  For  even  if  the  diviner  shall  tell  you 
that  the  signs  of  the  victims  are  unlucky,  it  is  plain  that 
this  is  a  token  of  death  or  mutilation  of  part  of  the  body 
or  of  exile.  But  reason  prevails  that  even  with  these 
risks  we  should  share  the  dangers  of  our  friend  and  of 
our  country.  Therefore  attend  to  the  greater  diviner,  the 
Pythian  God,  who  ejected  from  the  temple  him  who  did 
not  assist" his  friend  when  he  was  being  murdered.1 

XXXIIL 

Immediately  prescribe  some  character  and  some  form  to 
yourself,  which  you  shall  observe  both  when  you  are  alono 
and  when  you  meet  with  men. 

And  let  silence  be  the  general  rule,  or  let  only  what 
is  necessary  be  said,  and  in  few  words.  And  rarely 
and  when  the  occasion  calls  we  shall  s*y  something; 
but  about  none  of  the  common  subjects,  not  about 
gladiators,  nor  horse  races,  nor  about  athletes,  nor  about 
eating  or  drinking,  which  are  the  usual  subjects;  and 

1  The  story  is  told  by  Aelian  (iii.  c.  44),  and  by  Siraplicius  in  his 
noinmentary  on  the  Encheiridion  (p.  411,  ed.  Schweig.).  Upton. 


EPICTETUS.  395 

especially  not  about  men,  as  blaming  them  or  praising 
them,  or  comparing  them.  If  then  you  are  able,  bring 
over  by  your  conversation  the  conversation  of  your  asso- 
ciates to  that  which  is  proper  ;  but  if  you  should  happen, 
to  be  confined  to  the  company  of  strangers,  be  silent. 

Let  not  your  laughter  be  much,  nor  on  many  occasions, 
nor  excessive. 

Kefuse  altogether  to  take  an  oath,  if  it  is  possible  :  if  it 
is  not,  refuse  as  far  as  you  are  able. 

Avoid  banquets  which  are  given  by  strangers  l  and  by 
ignorant  persons.  But  if  ever  there  is  occasion  to  join  in 
them,  let  your  attention  be  carefully  fixed,  that  you  slip 
not  into  the  manners  of  the  vulgar  (the  uninstructed). 
For  you  must  know,  that  if  your  companion  be  impure,  he 
also  who  keeps  company  with  him  must  become  impure, 
though  he  should  happen  to  be  pure. 

Take  (apply)  the  things  which  relate  to  the  body  as  far 
as  the  bare  use,  as  food,  drink,  clothing,  house,  and  slaves  ; 
but  exclude  every  thing  which  is  for  show  or  luxury. 

As  to  pleasure  with  women,  abstain  as  far  as  you  can 
before  marriage  :  but  if  you  do  indulge  in  it,  do  it  in  the 
way  which  is  conformable  to  custom.2  Do  not  however 
be  disagreeable  to  those  who  indulge  in  these  pleasures, 
or  reprove  them  ;  and  do  not  often  boast  that  you  do  not 
indulge  in  them  yourself. 

If  a  man  has  reported  to  you,  that  a  certain  person 
speaks  ill  of  you,  do  not  make  any  defence  (answer)  to 
what  has  been  told  you  :  but  reply,  The  man  did  not 
know  the  rest  of  my  faults,  for  he  would  not  have  men- 
tioned these  only. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  go  to  the  theatres  often  :  but  if 
there  is  ever  a  proper  occasion  for  going,  do  not  show 
yourself  as  being  a  partisan  of  any  man  except  your* 
self,  that  is,  desire  only  that  to  be  done  which  is  done* 
and  for  him  only  to  gain  the  prize  who  plains  the  prizo  ; 
for  in  this  way  you  will  meet  with  no  hindrance.  But 
abstain  entirely  from  shouts  and  laughter  at  any  (thing 

1  'Convivia  cum  hominibus  extraneis  et  rudibus,  disciplina  now 
imbutis  '  is  the  Latin  version. 


2  The  text  IB  us  vo^i^ov  :  and  the  Latin  explanation  is  '  qua  fas  eat 
uti  ;  qua  uti  absque  flagitio  licet.' 


396  EPICTETUS. 

or  person),  or  \iolent  emotions.  And  when  you  are 
come  away,  do  not  talk  much  about  what  has  passed  on 
the  stage,  except  about  that  which  may  lead  to  your  own 
improvement.  For  it  is  plain,  if  you  do  talk  much  that 
you  admired  the  spectacle  (more  than  you  ought).1 

Do  not  go  to  the  hearing  of  certain  persons'  recitations 
nor  visit  them  readily.2  But  if  you  do  attend,  observe 
gravity  and  sedateness,  and  also  avoid  making  yourself 
disagreeable. 

When  you  are  going  to  meet  with  any  person,  and  par- 
ticularly one  of  those  who  are  considered  to  be  in  a  superior 
condition,  place  before  yourself  what  Socrates  or  Zeno 
would  have  done  in  such  circumstances,  and  you  will  have 
no  difficulty  in  making  a  proper  use  of  the  occasion. 

When  you  are  going  to  any  of  those  who  are  in  great 
power,  place  before  yourself  that  you  will  not  find  the 
man  at  home,  that  you  will  be  excluded,  that  the  door 
will  not  be  opened  to  you,  that  the  man  will  not  care 
about  you.  And  if  with  all  this  it  is  your  duty  to  visit 
him,  bear  what  happens,  and  never  say  to  yourself  that  it 
was  not  worth  the  trouble.  For  this  is  silly,  and  marks 
the  character  of  a  man  who  is  offended  by  externals. 

In  company  take  care  not  to  speak  much  and  exces- 
sively about  your  own  acts  or  dangers :  for  as  it  is  plea- 
sant to  you  to  make  mention  of  your  own  dangers,  it  is 
not  so  pleasant  to  others  to  hear  what  has  happened  to 
3"ou.  Take  care  also  not  to  provoke  laughter;  for  this 
is  a  slippery  way  towards  vulgar  habits,  and  is  also 
adapted  to  diminish  the  respect  of  your  neighbours.  It  is 
a  dangerous  habit  also  to  approach  obscene  talk.  When 
then  any  thing  of  this  kind  happens,  if  there  is  a  good 
opportunity,  rebuke  the  man  who  has  proceeded  to  this 
talk  :  but  if  there  is  not  an  opportunity,  by  your  silence 
at  least,  and  blushing  and  expression  of  dissatisfaction  by 
your  countenance,  show  plainly  that  you  are  displeased  at 
such  talk. 

1  To  admire  (BavfJidfav)  is  contrary  to  the  precept  of  Epictetus  ; 
i.  29,  ii.  6,  iii.  20.    Upton. 

2  SiicK  recitations  were  common  at  Borne,  when  authors  read  their 
works  and  invited  persons  to  attend.     Tliese  recitations  are  often 
mentioned  in  the  letters  of  the  younger  Pliny.    See  Epictetus,  ill  23. 


EPICTETUS.  397 

XXXIV. 

If  you  have  received  the  impression  (^arrao-tc  v)  of  any 
pleasure,  guard  yourself  against  being  carried  away  by 
it ;  but  let  the  thing  wait  for  you,  and  allow  yourself  a 
certain  delay  on  your  own  part.  Then  think  of  both 
times,  of  the  time  when  you  will  enjoy  the  pleasure,  and 
of  the  time  after  the  enjoyment  of  the  pleasure  when  you 
will  repent  and  will  reproach  yourself.  And  set  against 
these  things  how  you  will  rejoice  if  you  have  abstained 
from  the  pleasure,  and  how  you  will  commend  yourself.  But 
if  it  seem  to  you  seasonable  to  undertake  (do)  the  thing, 
take  care  that  the  charm  of  it,  and  the  pleasure,  and  the 
attraction  of  it  shall  not  conquer  you :  but  set  on  the 
other  side  the  consideration  how  much  better  it  is  to  bo 
conscious  that  you  have  gained  this  victory. 

XXXV. 

When  you  have  decided  that  a  thing  ought  to  be  done 
and  are  doing  it,  never  avoid  being  seen  doing  it,  though 
the  many  shall  form  an  unfavourable  opinion  about  it. 
For  if  it  is  not  right  to  do  it,  avoid  doing  the  thing ;  but 
if  it  is  right,  why  are  you  afraid  of  those  who  shall  find 
fault  wrongly  ? 

XXXVI. 

As  the  proposition  it  is  either  day  or  it  is  night  is  of 
great  importance  for  the  disjunctive  argument,  but  for 
the  conjunctive  is  of  no  value,1  so  in  a  symposium  (enter- 
tainment) to  select  the  larger  share  is  of  great  value 
for  the  body,  but  for  the  maintenance  of  the  social  feel- 
ing is  worth  nothing.  When  then  you  are  eating  with 
another,  remember  to  look  not  only  to  the  value  for  the 
body  of  the  things  set  before  you,  but  also  to  the  value 
of  the  behaviour  towards  the  host  which  ought  to  be 
observed.2 

1  Compare  i.  25, 11,  etc. 

8  See  the  note  of  Sclrweig.  on  xxxvt 


398  EPICTETU8. 

XXXVIL 

If  you  have  assumed  a  character  above  your  strength, 
you  have  both  acted  in  this  matter  in  an  unbecoming 
way,  and  you  have  neglected  that  which  you  might  have 

fulfilled. 

XXXVIII. 

In  walking  about  as  you  take  care  not  to  step  on  a  nail 
or  to  sprain  your  foot,  so  take  care  not  to  damage  your 
own  ruling  faculty :  and  if  we  observe  this  rule  in  every 
act,  we  shall  undertake  the  act  with  more  kecurity. 

XXXIX. 

The  measure  of  possession  (property)  is  to  every  man 
the  body,  as  the  foot  is  of  the  shoe.1  If  then  you  stand 
on  this  rule  (the  demands  of  the  body),  you  will  maintain 
the  measure  :  but  if  you  pass  beyond  it,  you  must  then  of 
necessity  be  hurried  as  it  were  down  a  precipice.  As  also 
in  the  matter  of  the  shoe,  if  you  go  beyond  the  (necessities 
of  the)  foot,  the  shoe  is  gilded,  then  of  a  purple  colour, 
then  embroidered : 2  for  there  is  no  limit  to  that  which 
has  once  passed  the  true  measure. 

XL. 

Women  forthwith  from  the  age  of  fourteen  3  are  called 
by  the  men  mistresses  (icvpiai,  dominae).  Therefore  since 
they  see  that  there  is  nothing  else  that  they  can  obtain, 
but  only  the  power  of  lying  with  men,  they  begin  to 
decorate  themselves,  and  to  place  all  their  hopes  in  this. 

1  Cui  non  conveniet  sna  res,  ut  calceus  olim, 
Si  pede  major  erit,  subvcrtet ;  hi  minor,  uret. 

Horat.  Epp.  i.  10,  42,  and  Epp.  i.  7,  98. 

*  The  word  is  Kevrnirtv  *acu  pictum,'  ornamented  with  needle- 
work. 

8  Fourteen  was  considered  the  age  of  puberty  in  Roman  males,  but 
in  females  the  age  of  twelve  (Justin.  Inst.  I.  tit.  22).  Compare 
€aius,  i.  196. 


EPICTETUS.  390 

It  is  worth  our  while  then  to  take  care  that  they  may 
know  that  they  are  valued  (by  men)  for  nothing  else  than 
appearing  (being)  decent  and  modest  and  discreet. 

XLI. 

It  is  a  mark  of  a  mean  capacity  to  spend  much  time  on 
the  things  which  concern  the  body,  such  as  much  exercise, 
much  eating,  much  drinking,  much  easing  of  the  body, 
much  copulation.  But  these  things  should  be  done  as 
subordinate  things:  and  let  all  your  care  be  directed  to 
the  mind. 


When  any  person  treats  you  ill  or  speaks  ill  of  you, 
remember  that  he  does  this  or  says  this  because  he  thinks 
that  it  is  his  duty.  It  is  not  possible  then  for  him  to 
follow  that  which  seems  right  to  you,  but  that  which 
seems  right  to  himself.  Accordingly  if  he  is  wrong  in  his 
opinion,  he  is  the  person  who  is  hurt,  for  he  is  the  person 
who  has  been  deceived;  for  if  a  man  shall  suppose  the 
true  conjunction2  to  be  false,  it  is  not  the  conjunction 
which  is  hindered,  but  the  man  who  has  been  deceived 
about  it.  If  you  proceed  then  from  these  opinions,  you 
will  be  mild  in  temper  to  him  who  reviles  you  :  for  say  on 
each  occasion,  It  seemed  so  to  him. 

XLIII. 

Every  thing  has  two  handles,  the  one  by  which  it  may 
be  borne,  the  other  by  which  it  may  not.  If  your  brother 
acts  unjustly,  do  not  lay  hold  of  the  act  by  that  handle 
wherein  he  acts  unjustly,  for  this  is  the  handle  which 
cannot  be  borne:  but  lay  hold  of  the  other,  that  he  is 
your  brother,  that  he  was  nurtured  with  you,  and  you  will 
lay  hold  of  the  thing  by  that  handle  by  which  it  can  be 
borne. 

1  Sec  Mrs.  C.'s  note,  in  which  she  says  *  Epictetus  seems  to  be  in 
part  mistaken  here,'  etc.  ;  and  I  think  that  he  is. 

2  rb  a\t;0£s  ffvp.v€ir\€yfjL€vov  is  rendered  in  the  Latin  by  '  vernm  con- 
junctum,'    Mrs.  Carter  renders  it  by  *  a  true  proposition/  which  I 
•impose  tc  be  the  meaning. 


400  EPICTETUS. 

XLIV. 

These  reasonings  do  not  cohere :  I  am  richer  than  you* 
therefore  I  am  better  than  you ;  I  am  more  eloquent  than 
you,  therefore  I  am  better  than  you.  On  the  contrary 
these  rather  cohere,  I  am  richer  than  you,  therefore  my 
possessions  are  greater  than  yours :  I  am  more  eloquent 
than  you,  therefore  my  speech  is  superior  to  yours.  But 
you  are  neither  possession  nor  speech. 

XLV. 

Does  a  man  bathe  quickly  (early)  ?  do  not  say  that  he 
bathes  badly,  but  that  he  bathes  quickly.  Does  a  man  drink 
much  wine?  do  not  say  that  he  does  this  badly,  but  say 
that  he  drinks  much.  For  before  you  shall  have  deter- 
mined the  opinion,1  how  do  you  know  whether  he  is  acting 
wrong  ?  Thus  it  will  not  happen  to  you  to  comprehend 
some  appearances  which  are  capable  of  being  compre- 
hended, but  to  assent  to  others. 

XLVI. 

On  no  occasion  call  yourself  a  philosopher,  and  do 
not  speak  much  among  the  uninstructed  about  theorems 
(philosophical  rules,  precepts) :  but  do  that  which  follows 
from  them.  For  example  at  a  banquet  do  not  say  how  a 
man  ought  to  eat,  but  eat  as  you  ought  to  eat.  For 
remember  that  in  this  way  Socrates2  also  altogether 
avoided  ostentation :  persons  used  to  come  to  him  and  ask 
to  be  recommended  by  him  to  philosophers,  and  he  used  to 
take  them  to  philosophers:  so  easily  did  he  submit  to 
being  overlooked.  Accordingly  if  any  conversation  should 
arise  among  uninstructed  persons  about  any  theorem,  gene- 
rally be  silent;  for  there  is  great  danger  that  you  will 
immediately  vomit  up  what  you  have  not  digested.  And 
when  a  man  shall  say  to  you,  that  you  know  nothing,  and 
you  are  not  vexed,  then  be  sure  that  you  have  begun  the 
work  (of  philosophy).  For  even  sheep  do  not  vomit  up 

1  Mrs,  Carter  translates  this, tl  Unless  yoa  perfectly  understand  the 
principle  [from  whicb  anyone  acts]/* 
*  See  iii.  23,  22  ;  iv.  8,  2. 


EPICTETUS.  401 

their  grass  and  show  to  the  shepherds  how  much  they 
have  eaten;  but  when  they  have  internally  digested  the 
pasture,  they  produce  externally  wool  and  milk.  Do  you 
also  show  not  your  theorems  to  the  uninstructed,  but  show 
the  acts  which  come  from  their  digestion. 

XLVIL 

When  at  a  small  cost  you  are  supplied  with  every  thing 
for  the  body,  do  not  be  proud  of  this ;  nor,  if  you  drink 
water,  say  on  every  occasion,  I  drink  water.  But  consider 
first  how  much  more  frugal  the  poor  are  than  we,  and  how 
much  more  enduring  of  labour.  And  if  you  ever  wish  to 
exercise  yourself  in  labour  and  endurance,  do  it  for  your- 
self, and  not  for  others :  do  not  embrace  statues.1  But  if 
you  are  ever  very  thirsty,  take  a  draught  of  cold  water, 
and  spit  it  out,  and  tell  no  man. 

XLVIIL 

The  condition  and  characteristic  of  an  uninstructed  per- 
son is  this :  he  never  expects  from  himself  profit  (advan- 
tage) nor  harm,  but  from  externals.  The  condition  and 
characteristic  of  a  philosopher  is  this :  he  expects  all  ad- 
vantage and  all  harm  from  himself.  The  signs  (marks) 
of  one  who  is  making  progress  are  these :  he  censures  no 
Knan,  he  praises  no  man,  he  blames  no  man,  he  accuses  no 
man,  he  says  nothing  about  himself  as  if  he  were  some- 
body or  knew  something ;  when  he  is  impeded  at  all  or 
hindered,  he  blames  himself:  if  a  man  praises  him,  he 
ridicules  the  praiser  to  himself:  if  a  man  censures  him,  he 
makes  no  defence :  he  goes  about  like  weak  persons,  being 
careful  not  to  move  any  of  the  things  which  are  placed, 
before  they  are  firmly  fixed :  he  removes  all  desire  from 
himself,  and  be  transfers  aversion  (tKKXurw)  to  those  things 
only  of  the  things  within  our  power  which  are  contrary  to 
nature :  he  employs  a  moderate  movement  towards  every 
thing:  whether  he  is  considered  foolish  or  ignorant,  he 
cares  not :  and  in  a  word  he  watches  himself  as  if  he  were 
an  enemy  and  lying  in  ambush. 

1  See  iii.  12. 

2  D 


402  EPICTETUS. 

XLIX. 

When  a  man  is  proud  because  he  can  understand  and 
explain  the  writings  of  Chrysippus,  say  to  yourself,  If 
Chrysippus  had  not  written  obscurely,  this  man  would 
have  had  nothing  to  be  proud  of.  But  what  is  it  that  I 
wish  ?  To  understand  Nature  and  to  follow  it.  I  inquire 
therefore  who  is  the  interpreter :  and  when  I  have  heard 
that  it  is  Chrysippus,  I  come  to  him  (the  interpreter). 
But  I  do  not  understand  what  is  written,  and  therefore  I 
seek  the  interpreter.  And  so  far  there  is  yet  nothing  to 
be  proud  of.  But  when  I  shall  have  found  the  interpreter, 
the  thing  that  remains  is  to  use  the  precepts  (the  lessons). 
This  itself  is  the  only  thing  to  be  proud  of.  But  if  I  shall 
admire  the  exposition,  what  else  have  I  been  made  unless 
a  grammarian  instead  of  a  philosopher?  except  in  one 
thing,  that  I  am  explaining  Chrysippus  instead  of  Homer. 
When  then  any  man  says  to  me,  Eead  Chrysippus  to  me, 
I  rather  blush,  when  I  cannot  show  my  acts  like  to  and 
consistent  with  his  words. 

L. 

Whatever  things  (rules)  are  proposed l  to  you  [for  the 
conduct  of  life]  abide  by  them,  as  if  they  were  laws,  as  if 
you  would  be  guilty  of  impiety  if  you  transgressed  any  of 
them.  And  whatever  any  man  shall  say  about  you,  do 
not  attend  to  it :  for  this  is  no  affair  of  yours.  How  long 
will  you  then  still  defer  thinking  yourself  worthy  of  the 
best  things,  and  in  no  matter  transgressing  the  distinctive 
reason?2  Have  you  accepted  the  theorems  (rules),  which 
it  was  your  duty  to  agree  to,  and  have  you  agreed  to 
them?  what  teacher  then  do  you  still  expect  that  you 
defer  to  him  the  correction  of  yourself?  You  are  no  longer 
a  youth,  but  already  a  full-grown  man.  If  then  you  are 

1  This  may  mean, *  what  is  proposed  to  you  by  philosophers,'  and 
especially  in  this  little  book.  Schweighaeuser  thinks  that  it  may  mean 
*  what  you  have  proposed  to  yourself : '  but  he  is  inclined  to  understand 
it  simply, *  what  is  proposed  above,  or  taught  above/ 

8  rbv  Siaipovvra  \6yovt  'Earn  partitionem  rationis  intelligo,  qua 
initio  dixit,  Quaedam  in  potestate  nostra  ease,  quaedam  non  ease.' 
Wolf. 


EPICTETUS.  403 

negligent  and  slothful,  and  arc  continually  making  pro- 
crastination after  procrastination,  and  proposal  (intention) 
after  proposal,  and  fixing  day  after  day,  after  which  you 
•will  attend  to  yourself,  you  will  not  know  that  you  are 
not  making  improvement,  but  you  will  continue  ignorant 
(uninstructed)  both  while  you  live  and  till  you  die.  Im- 
mediately then  think  it  right  to  live  as  a  full-grown  man, 
and  one  who  is  making  proficiency,  and  let  every  thing 
which  appears  to  you  to  be  the  best  be  to  you  a  law  which 
must  not  be  transgressed.  And  if  any  thing  laborious,  or 
pleasant  or  glorious  or  inglorious  be  presented  to  you, 
remember  that  now  is  the  contest,  now  are  the  Olympic 
games,  and  they  cannot  be  deferred ;  and  that  it  depends 
on  one  defeat  and  one  giving  way  that  progress  is  either 
lost  or  maintained.  Socrates  in  this  way  became  perfect, 
in  all  things  improving  himself,  attending  to  nothing 
except  to  reason.  But  you,  though  you  are  not  yet  a 
Socrates,  ought  to  live  as  one  who  wishes  to  be  a  Socrates. 

LI. 

The  first  and  most  necessary  place  (part,  TOTPOS)  in 
philosophy  is  the  use  of  theorems  (precepts,  0€<opi?/iaTa), 
for  instance,  that  we  must  not  lie :  the  second  part  is  that 
of  demonstrations,  for  ing'  ,«,nce,  How  is  it  proved  that  we 
ought  not  to  lie :  the  third  is  that  which  is  confirmatory 
of  these  two  and  explanatory,  for  example,  How  is  this  a 
demonstration?  For  what  is  demonstration,  what  is  con* 
sequence,  what  is  contradiction,  what  is  truth,  what  i& 
falsehood  ?  The  third  part  (topic)  is  necessary  on  account 
of  the  second,  and  the  second  on  account  of  the  first ;  but 
the  most  necessary  and  that  on  which  we  ought  to  rest  is 
the  first.  But  we  do  the  contrary.  For  we  spend  our 
time  on  the  third  topic,  and  all  our  earnestness  is  about 
it:  but  we  entirely  neglect  the  first.  Therefore  we  lie; 
out  the  demonstration  that  we  ought  not  to  lie  we  have 
ready  to  hand. 


2  D  2 


404  EPIOTETUS. 

LIT. 

In  every  thing  (circumstance)  we  should  hold  these 
maxims  ready  to  hand : 

Lead  me,  0  Zeus,  and  thou  0  Destiny, 

The  way  that  I  am  bid  by  you  to  go : 

To  follow  I  am  ready.    If  I  choose  not, 

I  make  myself  a  wretch,  and  still  must  follow.1 


We  hold  him  wise,  and  skill'd  hi  things  divine.* 

And  the  third  also :  0  Crito,  if  so  it  pleases  the  Gods,  so 
let  it  be ;  Anytus  and  Melitus  are  able  indeed  to  kill  me, 
but  they  cannot  harm  me.3 

1  The  first  four  verses  are  by  the  Stoic  Cleanthes,  the  pupil  of  Zeno,| 
and  the  teacher  of  Chrysippus.    He  was  a  native  of  Assus  in  Mysia ; 
and  Simplicius,  who  wrote  his  commentary  on  the  Encheiridion  in  the 
sixth  century,  A.D.,  saw  even  at  this  late  period  in  Assus  a  beautiful 
statue  of  Cleanthes  erected  by  a  decree  of  the  Roman  senate  in  honour 
of  this  excellent  man.    (Simplicius,  ed.  Schweig.  p.  522.) 

2  The  two  second  verses  are  from  a  play  of  Euripjdes,  a  writer  who 
has  supplied  more  verses  for  quotation  than  any  antient  tragedian. 

8  The  third  quotation  is  from  the  Criton  of  Plato.  Socrates  is  the 
speaker.  The  lest  part  is  from  the  Apology  of  Plato,  and  Socrates  is 
also  the  speaker.  The  words  *  and  the  third  also/  Schweighaeuser 
says,  have  been  introduced  from  the  commentary  of  Simplicius. 

Simplicius  concludes  his  commentary  thus :  Epictetus  connects  the 
end  with  the  beginning,  which  reminds  us  of  what  was  said  in  the 
beginning,  that  the  man  who  places  the  good  and  the  evil  among 
the  thing*  which  are  in  our  power,  and  not  in  externals,  will  neither 
be  compelled  by  any  man  nor  ever  injured. 


FRAGMENTS  OF  EPICTETUS. 


THESE  Fragments  are  entitled  "  Epicteti  Fragmenta  maxime 
ex  loanne  Stobaeo,  Antonio,  et  Maximo  collecta"  (ed. 
Schweig.).  There  are  some  notes  and  emendations  on  the 
Fragments ;  and  a  short  dissertation  on  them  by  Schweig- 
haeuser. 

Nothing  is  known  of  Stobaeus  nor  of  his  time,  except 
the  fact  that  he  has  preserved  some  extracts  of  an  ethical 
kind  from  the  New  Platonist  Hierocles,  who  lived  about 
the  middle  of  the  fifth  century  A.D.  ;  and  it  is  there- 
fore concluded  that  Stobaeus  lived  after  Hierocles.  The 
fragments  attributed  to  Epictetus  are  preserved  by  Sto- 
baeus in  his  work  entitled  'Av6o\6yiov9  or  Florilegium  or 
Sermones. 

Antonius  Monachus,  a  Greek  monk,  also  made  a  Flori- 
legium, entitled  Melissa  (the  bee).  His  date  is  uncer- 
tain, but  it  was  certainly  much  ]ater  than  the  time  of 
Stobaeus. 

Maximus,  also  named  the  monk,  and  reverenced  as  a 
saint,  is  said  to  have  been  a  native  of  Constantinople,  and 
born  about  A.D.  580. 

Some  of  the  Fragments  contained  in  the  edition  of 
Schweighaeuser  are  certainly  not  from  Epictetus.  Many 
of  the  fragments  are  obscure ;  but  they  are  translated  as 
accurately  as  I  can  translate  them,  and  the  reader  must 
give  to  them  such  meaning  as  he  can. 


406  EPICTETUS. 


I. 

THE  life  which  is  implicated  with  fortune  (depends  on 
fortune)  is  like  e  winter  torrent :  for  it  is  turbulent,  and 
full  of  mud,  and  difficult  to  cross,  and  tyrannical,  and 
noisy,  and  of  short  duration. 

II. 

A  soul  which  is  conversant  with  virtue  is  like  an  ever 
flowing  source,  for  it  is  pure  and  tranquil  and  potable  and 
sweet 1  and  communicative  (social),  and  rich  and  harmless 
and  free  from  mischief. 

III. 
If  you  wish  to  be  good,  first  believe  that  you  are  bad. 

IV. 

Tt  is  better  to  do  wrong  seldom  and  to  own  it,  and  to 
act  right  for  the  most  part,  than  seldom  to  admit  that  you 
have  done  wrong  and  to  do  wrong  often. 

V. 

Check  (punish)  your  passions  (ira-Orf),  that  you  may  not 
be  punished  by  them. 

VI. 

Do  not  so  much  be  ashamed  of  that  (disgrace)  which 
proceeds  from  men's  opinion  as  fly  from  that  which  comes 
from  the  truth. 

VII. 

If  you  wish  to  be  well  spoken  of,  learn  to  speak  well 
(of  others)  :  and  when  you  have  learned  to  speak  well  of 
them,  try  to  act  well,  and  so  you  will  reap  the  fruit  of 
being  well  spoken  of. 

VIII. 

Freedom  and  slavery,  the  one  is  the  name  of  virtue,  and 

the  other  of  vice:  and  both  are  acts  of  the  will.    But 

where  there  is  no  will,  neither  of  them  touches  (affects) 

:  Consult  the  Lexicons  for  tVs  sense  of 


EPIOTETUS.  407 

these  tilings.  But  the  soul  is  accustomed  to  be  master  of 
the  body,  and  the  things  which  belong  to  the  body  have 
no  share  in  the  will.  For  no  man  is  a  slave  who  is  free  in 
his  will.1 

IX. 

It  is  an  evil  chain,  fortune  (a  chain)  of  the  body,  and 
vice  of  the  soul.  For  he  who  is  loose  (free)  in  the  body, 
but  bound  in  the  soul  is  a  slave :  but  on  the  contrary  he 
who  is  bound  in  the  body,  but  free  (unbound)  in  the  soul, 
is  free. 

X. 

The  bond  of  the  body  is  loosened  by  nature  through 
death,  and  by  vice  through  money:2  but  the  bond  of  the 
soul  is  loosened  by  learning,  and  by  experience  and  by 
discipline. 

XL 

If  you  wish  to  live  without  perturbation  and  with  plea- 
sure, try  to  have  all  who  dwell  with  you  good.  And  you 
will  have  them  good,  if  you  instruct  the  willing,  and 
dismiss  those  who  are  unwilling  (to  be  taught) :  for  there 
will  fly  away  together  with  those  who  have  fled  away 
both  wickedness  and  slavery ;  and  there  will  be  left  with 
those  who  remain  with  you  goodness  and  liberty. 

XII. 

It  is  a  shame  for  those  who  sweeten  drink  with  the 
gifts  of  the  bees,  by  badness  to  embitter  reason  which  is 
the  gift  of  the  gods. 

XIII. 

No  man  who  loves  money,  and  loves  pleasure,  and 
loves  fame,  also  loves  mankind,  but  only  he  who  loves 
virtue. 

1  See  Schweig.'s  note. 

3  "  He  does  not  say  this  *  that  it  is  bad  if  a  man  by  money  should 
redeem  himself  from  bonds/  but  he  moans  that  *  even  a  bad  man,  if 
he  has  money,  can  redeem  himself  froa  the  bonds  of  the  body  and  so 
eecure  his  liberty/  *  Schweig. 


408  EPICTETU8. 

XIV. 

As  you  would  not  choose  to  sail  in  a  large  and  decorateJ 
and  gold-laden  ship  (or  ship  ornamented  with  gold),  and 
to  be  drowned ;  so  do  not  choose  to  dwell  in  a  large  and 
costly  house  and  to  be  disturbed  (by  cares). 

XV. 

When  we  have  been  invited  to  a  banquet,  we  take  what 
is  set  before  us :  but  if  a  guest  should  ask  the  host  to  set 
before  him  fish  or  sweet  cakes,  he  would  be  considered  to 
be  an  unreasonable  fellow.  But  in  the  world  we  ask  the 
Gods  for  what  they  do  not  give  ;  and  we  do  this  though 
the  things  are  many  which  they  have  given. 

XVI. 

They  are  amusing  fellows,  said  he  (Epictetus),  who  are- 
proud  of  the  things  which  are  not  in  our  power.  A  man 
Bays,  I  am  better  than  you,  for  I  possess  much  land,  and 
you  are  wasting  with  hunger.  Another  says,  I  am  of 
consular  rank.  Another  says,  I  am  a  Procurator  (CTR- 
TpOTros).  Another,  I  have  curly  hair.  But  a  horse  does 
not  say  to  a  horse,  I  am  superior  to  you,  for  I  possess 
much  fodder,  and  much  barley,  and  my  bits  are  of  gold 
and  my  harness  is  embroidered :  but  he  says,  I  am  swifter 
than  you.  And  every  animal  is  better  or  worse  from  his 
own  merit  (virtue)  or  his  own  badness.  Is  there  then  no 
virtue  in  man  only?  and  must  we  look  to  the  hair,  and 
our  clothes  and  to  our  ancestors  ? 


XVII. 

The  sick  are  vexed  with  the  physician  who  gives  them 
no  advice,  and  think  that  he  has  despaired  of  them.  But 
why  should  they  not  have  the  same  feeling  towards  the 
philosopher,  ana  think  that  he  has  despaired  of  their 
coming  to  a  sound  state  of  mind,  if  he  says  nothing  at  all 
that  is  useful  to  a  man? 


EPICTETUS.  409 

XVIIL 

Those  who  are  well  constituted  in  the  body  endure 
both  heat  and  cold :  and  so  those  who  are  well  constituted 
in  the  soul  endure  both  anger  and  grief  and  excessive  joy 
and  the  other  affects. 

XIX. 

Examine  yourself  whether  you  wish  to  be  rich  or  to  be 
happy.  If  you  wish  to  be  rich,  you  should  know  that  it 
is  neither  a  good  thing  nor  at  all  in  your  power :  but  if 
you  wish  to  be  happy,  you  should  know  that  it  is  both  a 
good  thing  and  in  your  power,  for  the  one  is  a  temporary 
loan  of  fortune,  and  happiness  comes  from  the  will. 


XX. 

As  when  you  see  a  viper  or  an  asp  or  a  scorpion  in  an 
ivory  or  golden  box,  you  do  not  on  account  of  the  costli- 
ness of  the  material  love  it  or  think  it  happy,  but  because 
the  nature  of  it  is  pernicious,  you  turn  away  from  it  and 
loathe  it ;  so  when  you  shall  see  vice  dwelling  in  wealth 
and  in  the  swollen  fulness  of  fortune,  be  not  struck  by 
the  splendour  of  the  material,  but  despise  the  false  cha- 
racter of  the  morals. 

XXI. 

Wealth  is  not  one  of  the  good  things ;  great  expenditure 
is  one  of  the  bad ;  moderation  (crox^poowr/)  is  one  of  the 
good  things.  And  moderation  invites  to  frugality  and  the 
acquisition  of  good  things :  but  wealth  invites  to  great 
expenditure  and  draws  us  away  from  moderation.  It  is 
difficult  then  for  a  rich  man  to  be  moderate,  or  for  a  mode- 
rate man  to  be  rich.1 

1  '  How  hardly  shall  they  that  have  riches  enter  the  kingdom  of 
God.'  Mark  x.  23  (Mrs.  Carter).  This  expression  in  Mark  sets  forth 
the  danger  of  riches,  a  fact  which  all  men  know  who  use  their  observa- 
tion. In  the  next  verse  the  try.th  is  expressed  in  this  form,  *  How 
hard  it  is  for  them  that  trust  in  riches  to  enter  into  the  kingdom  of 
God.'  The  Stoics  viewed  wealth  as  among  the  things  which  are 
indifferent,  neither  good  nor  bad. 


410  EPICTETUS. 

XXII. 

As  if  you  were  begotten  or  born*  in  a  ship,  you  would 
not  be  eager  to  be  the  master  of  it  (icvficpvrjrris),  so — .* 
For  neither  there  (in  the  ship)  will  the  ship  naturally  be 
connected  with  you,  nor  wealth  in  the  other  case ;  but 
reason  is  every  where  naturally  connected  with  you.  As 
then  reason  is  a  thing  which  naturally  belongs  to  you 
and  is  born  in  you,  consider  this  also  as  specially  your 
own  and  take  care  of  it. 

XXIIL 

If  you  had  been  born  among  the  Persians,  you  would 
not  have  wished  to  live  in  Hellas  (Greece),  but  to  have 
lived  in  Persia  happy  :  so  if  you  are  born  in  poverty,  why 
do  you  seek  to  grow  rich,  and  why  do  you  not  remain  in 
poverty  and  be  happy  ?  2 

1  The  other  member  of  the  comparison  has  been  omitted  by  some 
accident  in  the  MSS.  Wolf  in  his  Latin  version  supplied  by  conjecture 
the  omission  in  this  manner :  '  ita  neque  in  terris  divitiae  tibi  expo  • 
tendae  sunk*    Schweig. 

2  To  some  persons  the  comparison  will  not  seem  apt.    Also  the 
notion  that  every  man  should  be  taught  to  rise  above  the  condition  ID 
which  he  is  born  is,  in  the  opinion  of  some  persons,  a  better  teaching 
I  think  that  it  is  not.  Few  persons  have  the  talents  and  the  character 
which  enable  them  to  rise  from  a  low  condition ;  and  the  proper  lessor 
for  them  is  to  stay  in  the  condition  in  which  they  are  born  and  to  be 
content  with  it.    Those  who  have  the  power  of  rising  from  a  low 
condition  will  rise  whether  they  are  advised  to  attempt  it  or  not :  and 
generally  they  will  not  be  able  to  rise  without  doing  something  useful 
to  society.    Those  who  have  ability  sufficient  to  raise  themselves  from 
a  low  estate,  and  at  the  same  time  to  do  it  to  the  damage  of  society, 
are  perhaps  only  few,  but  certainly  there  are  such  persons.    They  rise 
by  ability,  by  the  use  of  fraud,  by  bad  means  almost  innumerable. 
They  gain  wealth,  they  fill  hi^h  places,  they  disturb  society,  they  are 
plagues  and  pests,  and  the  world  looks  on  sometimes  with  stupid 
admiration  until  death  removes  the  dazzling  and  deceitful  image,  and 
honest  men  breathe  freely  again, 

In  the  Church  of  England  Catechism  there  are  two  answers  to  twc 
questions,  one  on  our  duty  to  God,  the  other  on  our  duty  to  our 
neighbour.  Both  the  answers  would  be  accepted  by  Epictetus,  except 
jsuch  few  words  as  were  not  applicable  to  the  circumstances  of  his  age. 
The  second  answer  ends  with  the  words  4  to  learn  and  labour  to  get 
mine  own  living  and  to  do  my  duty  in  that  state  of  life  unto  which  it 
•hall  please  God  to  call  me.' 


EPICTETU8.  411 


XXIV. 

As  ii,  is  better  to  lie  compressed  in  a  narrow  bed  and  be 
healthy  than  to  be  tossed  with  disease  on  a  broad  couch, 
so  also  it  is  better  to  contract  yourself  within  a  small  com- 
petence and  to  be  happy  than  to  have  a  great  fortune  and 
to  be  wretched. 

XXV. 

It  is  not  poverty  which  produces  sorrow,  but  desire  ; 
nor  does  wealth  release  from  fear,  but  reason  (the  power 
of  reasoning,  Aoyioyxos).  If  then  you  acquire  this  power 
of  reasoning,  you  will  neither  desire  wealth  nor  complain 
of  poverty. 

XXVL 

Neither  is  a  horse  elated  nor  proud  of  his  manger  and 
trappings  and  coverings,  nor  a  bird  of  his  little  shreds  of 
cloth  and  of  his  nest  :  but  both  of  them  are  proud  of  their 
swiftness,  one  proud  of  the  swiftness  of  the  feet,  and  the 
other  of  the  wings.  Do  you  also  then  not  be  greatly 
proud  of  your  food  and  dress  and,  in  short,  of  any  external 
things,  but  be  proud  of  your  integrity  and  good  deeds 


XXVII. 

To  live  well  differs  from  living  extravagantly  :  for  the 
first  comes  from  moderation  and  a  sufficiency  (aurapKeias) 
and  good  order  and  propriety  and  frugality  ;  but  the  other 
comes  from  intemperance  aud  luxury  and  want  of  order 
and  want  of  propriety.  And  the  end  (the  consequence)  of 
the  one  is  true  praise,  but  of  the  other  blame.  If  then 
you  wish  to  live  well,  do  not  seek  to  be  commended  for 
profuse  expenditure. 

XXVIII. 

Let  the  measure  to  you  of  all  food  and  drink  be  the  first 
satisfying  of  the  desire  ;  and  let  the  food  and  the  pleasure 
be  the  desire  (appetite)  itself  :  and  you  will  neither  take 
more  than  is  necessary,  nor  will  you  want  cooks,  and  you 
will  be  sativfied  with  the  drink  that  comes  in  the  way. 


412  EPICTETUS. 

XXIX. 

Make  your  manner  of  eating  neither  luxurious  n<l 
gloomy,  but  lively  and  frugal,  that  the  soul  may  not  lr 
perturbed  through  being  deceived  by  the  pleasures  of  the 
body,  and  that  it  may  despise  them ;  and  that  the  soul 
may  not  be  injured  by  the  enjoyment  of  present  luxury, 
and  the  body  may  not  afterwards  suffer  from  disease.1 

XXX. 

Take  care  that  the  food  which  you  put  into  the  stomach 
does  not  fatten  (nourish)  you,  but  the  cheerfulness  of  the 
mind  :  for  the  food  is  changed  into  excrement,  and  ejected, 
and  the  urine  also  flows  out  at  the  same  time  ;  but  the 
cheerfulness,  even  if  the  soul  be  separated,  remains  always 
uncorrupted.2 

XXXI. 

In  banquets  remember  that  you  entertain  two  guests, 
body  and  soul :  and  whatever  you  shall  have  given  to  the 
body  you  soon  eject :  but  what  you  shall  have  given  to 
the  soul,  you  keep  always. 

XXXII. 

Do  not  mix  anger  with  profuse  expenditure  and  serve 
them  up  to  your  guests.  Profusion  which  fills  the  body 
is  quickly  gone ;  but  anger  sinks  into  the  soul  and  remains 
for  a  long  time.  Consider  then  that  you  be  not  trans- 
ported with  anger  and  insult  your  guests  at  a  great 
expense ;  but  rather  please  them  with  frugality  and  by 
gentle  behaviour.3 

1  Mrs.  Carter  says,  '  I  have  not  translated  this  fragment,  because  I 
do  not  understand  it.'     Schweighaeuser  says  also  that  he  does  not 
understand  it.    I  have  given  what  may  be  the  meaning ;  but  it  is  not 
an  exact  translation,  which  in  the  present  state  of  the  text  is  not 
possible. 

2  This  fragment  is  perhaps  more  corrupt  than  XXIX.  See  Schweig.'a 
note.    I  see  no  sense  in  eirawos,  and  I  have  used  the  word  oSpos,  which 
is  a  possible  reading.    The  conclusion  appears  quite  unintelligible. 

•  See  Schweig.'s  note. 


EPICTETUS.  413 

XXXIIL 

In  your  banquets  (meals)  take  care  that  those  who 
serve  (your  slaves)  are  not  more  than  those  who  are 
served ;  for  it  is  foolish  for  many  souls  (persons)  to  wait 
on  a  few  couches  (seats). 

XXXIV. 

It  is  best  if  even  in  the  preparations  for  a  feast  you 
take  a  part  of  the  labour,  and  at  the  enjoyment  of  the 
food,  while  you  are  feasting,  you  share  with  those  who 
serve  the  things  which  are  before  you.  But  if  such 
behaviour  be  unsuitable  to  the  occasion,  remember  that 
you  are  served  when  you  are  not  labouring  by  those  who 
are  labouring,  when  you  are  eating  by  those  who  are  not 
eating,  when  you  are  drinking  by  those  who  are  not 
drinking,  while  you  are  talking  by  those  who  are  silent, 
while  you  are  at  ease  by  those  who  are  under  constraint ; 
and  if  you  remember  this,  you  will  neither  being  heated 
with  anger  be  guilty  of  any  absurdity  yourself,  nor  by 
irritating  another  will  you  cause  any  mischief.1 

xxxv. 

Quarrelling  and  contention  are  every  where  foolish,  and 
particularly  in  talk  over  wine  they  are  unbecoming :  for 
a  man  who  is  drunk  could  not  teach  a  man  who  is  sober, 
nor  on  the  other  hand  could  a  drunken  man  be  convinced 
by  a  sober  man.  But  where  there  is  not  sobriety,  it  will 
appear  that  to  no  purpose  have  you  laboured  for  the  result 


of  persuasion.2 


XXXVI. 


Grasshoppers  (cicadae)  are  musical :  snails  have  no 
voice.  Snails  have  pleasure  in  being  moist,  but  grass- 
hoppers in  being  dry.  Next  the  dew  invites  forth  the 
snails  and  for  this  they  crawl  out :  but  on  the  contrary 
the  sun  when  he  is  hot,  rouses  tbe  grasshoppers  and  they 
sing  in  the  sun.  Therefore  if  you  wish  to  be  a  musical 

1  I  am  not  sure  about  tbe  exact  meaning  of  tbe  conclusion.    See 
Schweig.'s  note. 

2  Tbis  is  not  a  translation  of  tbe  conclusion.    Perhaiw  it  is  some- 
thing like  the  meaning.    See  Scbweig.'s  note. 


414  EPICTETUS. 

man  and  to  harmonize  well  with  others,  whet!1  °ver  the 
cups  the  soul  is  bedewed  with  wine,  at  that  tim,e  do  not 
permit  the  sonl  to  go  forth  and  to  be  polluted ;  buvs  wh^n 
In  company  (parties)  it  is  fired  by  reason,  then  bid  ht?r  ^o- 
•itter  oracular  words  and  to  sing  the  oracles  of  justice. 

XXXVII. 

Examine  in  three  ways  him  who  is  talking  with  you, 
as  superior,  or  as  inferior,  or  as  equal :  and  if  he  is  supe- 
rior, you  should  listen  to  him  and  be  convinced  by  him  : 
but  if  he  is  inferior,  you  should  convince  him;  if  he 
is  equal,  you  should  agree  with  him ;  and  thus  you  will 
never  be  guilty  of  being  quarrelsome. 

XXXVIIL 

It  is  better  by  assenting  to  truth  to  conquer  opinion, 
than  by  assenting  to  opinion  to  be  conquered  by  truth. 

XXXIX. 

If  you  seek  truth,  you  will  not  seek  by  every  means  to 
gain  a  victory ;  and  if  you  have  found  truth,  you  will 
have  the  gain  of  not  being  defeated. 

XL. 

Truth  conquers  with  itself;  but  opinion  conquers  among 
those  who  are  external.1 

XLI. 

It  is  better  to  live  with  one  free  man  and  to  be  without 
fear  and  free,  than  to  be  a  slave  with  many. 

XLIL 

What  you  avoid  suffering,  do  not  attempt  to  make 
others  suffer.  You  avoid  slavery :  take  care  that  others 
are  not  your  slaves.  For  if  you  endure  to  have  a  slave, 
you  appear  to  be  a  slave  yourself  first.  For  vice  has  no 
community  with  virtue,  nor  freedom  with  slavery, 

1  This  is  not  clear. 


KPIOTETUS.  415 

XLIIL 

As  lie  who  is  in  health  would  not  choose  to  be  served 
(ministered  to)  by  the  sick,  nor  for  those  who  dwell  with 
him  to  be  sick,  so  neither  would  a  free  man  endure  to  be 
served  by  slaves,  or  for  those  who  live  with  him  to  be 
slaves. 

XLIV. 

Whoever  you  are  who  wish  to  be  not  among  the  number 
of  slaves,  release  yourself  from  slavery  :  and  you  will  be 
free,  if  you  are  released  from  desire.  For  neither  Aris- 
tides  nor  Epaminondas  nor  Lycurgus  through  being  rich 
and  served  by  slaves  were  named  the  one  just,  the  other  a 
god,  and  the  third  a  saviour,  but  because  they  were  poor 
and  delivered  Hellas  (Greece)  from  slavery.1 

XLV. 

If  you  wish  your  house  to  be  well  managed,  imitate  the 
Spartan  Lycurgus.  For  as  he  did  not  fence  his  city  with 
walls,  but  fortified  the  inhabitants  by  virtue  and  pre- 
served the  city  always  free  ;  2  so  do  you  not  cast  around 
(your  house)  a  large  court  and  raise  high  towers,  but 
strengthen  trie  dwellers  by  good  will  and  fidelity  and 
friendship,  and  then  nothing  harmful  will  enter  it,  not 
even  if  the  whole  band  of  wickedness  shall  array  itself 
against  it. 

XLVI. 

Do  not  hang  your  house  round  with  tablets  and  pictures,. 
but  decorate  it  with  moderation  (crw^pocn/n;)  :  for  the  one 
is  of  a  foreign  (unsuitable)  kind,  and  a  temporary  decep- 
tion of  the  eyes  ;  but  the  other  is  a  natural  and  indelible, 
and  perpetual  ornament  of  the  house. 

1  It  is  observed  that  the  terra  'just'  applies  to  Aristides;  the  term 
«  god  '  was  given  to  Lycurgus  by  the  Py  thia  or  Delphic  oracle  ;  the 
name  *  saviour  '  by  his  own  citizens  to  Epaminondas. 

55  Schweig.  quotes  Polybius  ix.  10,  1,  'a  city  is  not  adorned  by 
external  things,  but  by  the  virtue  of  those  who  dwell  in  it.'  Alcaeiu 
saya,  22,  Bergk,  Poetae  Lyrici  Graeci,  1843,— 


of  wtfpyos  o 


416  EPICTETUS. 

XLVII. 

Instead  of  an  herd  of  oxen,  endeavour  to  assemble  herds 
of  friends  in  your  house. 

XLVIII. 

As  a  wolf  resembles  a  dog,  so  both  a  flatterer,  and  an 
adulterer  and  a  parasite,  resemble  a  friend.  Take  care 
then  that  instead  of  watch  dogs  you  do  not  without  know- 
ing it  let  in  mischievous  wolves. 

XLIX. 

To  be  eager  that  your  house  should  be  admired  by  being 
whitened  with  gypsum,  is  the  mark  of  a  man  who  has  no 
taste :  but  to  set  off  (decorate)  our  morals  by  the  goodness 
of  our  communication  (social  habits)  is  the  mark  of  a  man 
who  is  a  lover  of  beauty  and  a  lover  of  man. 

L. 

If  you  begin  by  admiring  little  things,1  you  will  not 
be  thought  worthy  of  great  things  :  but  if  you  despise  the 
little,  you  will  be  greatly  admired. 

LI. 

Nothing  is  smaller  (meaner)  than  love  of  pleasure,  and 
love  of  gain  and  pride.  Nothing  is  superior  to  magnani- 
mity, and  gentleness,  and  love  of  mankind,  and  beneficence. 

LII. 

They  bring  forward  (they  name,  they  mention)  the 
peevish  philosophers  (the  Stoics),  whose  opinion  it  is  that 
pleasure  is  not  a  thing  conformable  to  nature,  but  is  a 
thing  which  is  consequent  on  the  things  which  are  con- 
formable to  nature,  as  justice,  temperance,  freedom.  What 

1  Schweig.  says  that  in  tho  reading  &v  Sav^dCys  r&  fuicpk  irpvrov 
the  "word  vp&rov  is  wanting  in  four  MSS.,  and  that  Schow  omitted 
irp&Tov,  and  that  he  has  followed  Schow.  But  vcwrov  is  in  Schweig.'a 
test. 


EPICTETCS.  417 

then  ?  is  the  soul  pleased  and  made  tranquil  by  the  plea- 
sures of  the  body  which  are  smaller,  as  Epieurus  says ; 
and  is  it  not  pleased  with  its  own  good  things,  which  are 
the  greatest?  And  indeed  nature  has  given  to  me 
modesty,  and  I  blush  much  when  I  think  of  saying  any 
thing  base  (indecent).  This  motion  (feeling)  does  not 
permit  me  to  make  (consider)  pleasure  the  good  and  the 
end  (purpose)  of  life.1 

LIIL 

In  Eome  the  women  have  in  their  hands  Plato's  Polity 
(the  Republic),  because  it  allows  (advises)  the  women  to 
be  common,  for  they  attend  only  to  the  words  of  Plato, 
not  to  his  meaning.  Now  he  does  not  recommend  mar- 
riage and  one  man  to  cohabit  with  one  woman,  and  then 
that  the  women  should  be  common  :  but  he  takes  away 
such  a  marriage,  and  introduces  another  kind  of  marriage. 
And  in  fine,  men  are  pleased  with  finding  excuses  for 
their  faults.  Yet  philosophy  says  that  we  ought  not  to 
stretch  out  even  a  finger  without  a  reason.2 

LIV. 

Of  pleasures  those  which  occur  most  rarely  give  the 
greatest  delight. 

LY. 

If  a  man  should  transgress  moderation,  the  things  which 
give  the  greatest  delight  would  become  the  things  which 
give  the  least. 

LVI. 

It  is  just  to  commend  Agtippinus  for  this  reason,  that 
though  he  was  a  man  of  the  highest  worth,  he  never 
praised  himself;  but  even  if  another  person  praised  him, 
he  would  blush.  And  he  was  such  a  man  (Epictetus  said) 
that  he  would  write  in  praise  of  any  thing  disagreeable 
that  befel  him ;  if  it  was  a  fever,  he  would  write  of  a 
fever ;  if  he  was  disgraced,  he  would  write  of  disgrace ; 
if  he  were  banished,  of  banishment.  And  on  one  occasion 
(he  mentioned)  when  he  was  going  to  dine,  a  messenger 

4  See  Schweig.'s  note.  *  See  Schweig.'s  note. 

2  B 


418  EPICTETUS. 

brought  him  news  that  Nero  commanded  him  to  go  into 
banishment ;  on  which  Agrippinus  said,  Well  then  we  will 
dine  at  Aricia.1 

LVIL 

Diogenes  said  that  no  labour  was  good,  unless  the  end 
(purpose)  of  it  was  courage  and  strength  (TWOS)  of  the  soul, 
but  not  of  the  body. 

LVIII. 

As  a  true  balance  is  neither  corrected  by  a  true  balance 
nor  judged  by  a  false  balance,  so  also  a  just  judge  is  neither 
corrected  by  just  judges  nor  is  he  judged  (condemned) 
by  unjust  judges. 

LIX. 

As  that  which  is  straight  does  not  need  that  which  is 
straight,  so  neither  does  the  just  need  that  which  is  just.2 

LX. 

Do  not  give  judgment  in  one  court  (of  justice)  before 
you  have  been  tried  yourself  before  justice.3 

LXI. 

If  you  wish  to 'make  your  judgments  just,  listen  not 
to  (regard  not)  any  of  those  who  are  parties  (to  the  suit), 
nor  to  those  who  plead  in  it,  but  li&ten  to  justice  itself. 

LXII. 

You  will  fail  (stumble)  least  in  your  judgments,  if  you 
yourself  fail  (stumble)  least  in  your  life. 

LXIII. 

It  is  better  when  you  judge  justly  to  be  blamed  un- 
deservedly by  him  who  has  been  condemned  than  when 
you  judge  unjustly  to  be  justly  blamed  by  (before) 
nature.4 

1  See  i.  1,  note  13  and  14. 

2  Bather  obscure,  says  Schweig.    Compare  Frag,  Iviii.  and  Ixvi 
*  Compare  lyiii.    Schweig. 

4  See  Schweig.*s  note. 


EP1CTETUS.  419 

LX1V. 

As  the  stone  which  tests  the  gold  is  not  at  all  tested 
itsolf  by  the  gold,  so  it  is  with  him  who  has  the  faculty  of 
judging.1 

LXV. 

It  is  shameful  for  the  judge  to  be  judged  by  others. 

LXVL 

As  nothing  is  straighter  than  that  which  is  straight,  so 
nothing  is  juster  than  that  which  is  just. 


LXVIT. 

Who  among  us  does  not  admire  the  act  of  Lycurgus  the 
Lacedaemonian  ?  For  after  he  was  maimed  in  one  of  his 
eyes  by  one  of  the  citizens,  and  the  young  man  was  deli- 
vered up  to  him  by  the  people  that  be  might  punish  him 
as  he  chose,  Lycurgus  spared  him  :  and  after  instructing 
him  and  making  him  a  good  man  he  brought  him  into  the 
theatre.  When  the  Lacedaemonians  expressed  their  sur- 
prise, Lycurgus  said,  I  received  from  you  this  youth  when 
he  was  insolent  and  violent :  I  restore  him  to  you  gentle 
and  a  good  citizen.2 

LXVIII. 

Pittacus  after  being  wronged  by  a  certain  person  and 
having  the  power  of  punishing  him  let  him  go,  saying, 
Forgiveness  is  better  than  revenge  :  for  forgiveness  is  the 
sign  of -a  gentle  nature,  but  revenge  the  sign  of  a  savage 
nature.3 

1  Schweig.  suggests  that  &  \6yos  has  been  omitted  before  the  words 
d  rb  Kptrfyiov  ^xwv> 

See  the  fragment  of  Chilo  on  the  stone  which  tries  gold.  Bergk, 
Poetae  Lyrici  Graeci,  ed.  1,  p.  568. 

2  See  Schweig.'s  note. 

8  Pittacus  was  one  of  the  seven  wise  men,  as  they  are  named.  Some 
authorities  state  that  he  lived  in  the  seventh  century  B.C.  By  thia 
maxim  he  anticipated  one  of  the  Christian  doctrines  by  six  centuries. 

2  E  2 


420  EP10TETUS. 

LXIX. 

But  before  every  thing  this  is  the  act  of  nature  to 
bind  together  and  to  fit  together  the  movement  towards  the 
appearance  of  that  which  is  becoming  (fit)  and  useful. 


LXX. 

To  suppose  that  we  shall  be  easily  despised  by  others, 
if  we  do  not  in  every  way  do  some  damage  to  those  who 
first  show  us  their  hostility,  is  the  mark  of  very  ignoble 
and  foolish  men :  for  (thus)  we  affirm  that  the  man  is 
considered  to  be  contemptible  because  of  his  inability  to 
do  damage ;  but  much  rather  is  a  man  considered  to  be 
contemptible  because  of  his  inability  to  do  what  is  good 
(useful).1 

LXXL 

When  you  are  attacking  (or  going  to  attack)  any 
person  violently  and  with  threats,  remember  to  say  to 
yourself  first,  that  you  are  (by  nature)  mild  (gentle) ;  and 
if  you  do  nothing  savage,  you  will  continue  to  live  with- 
out repentance  and  without  blame. 


LXXII. 

A  man  ought  to  know  that  it  is  not  easy  for  him  to 
have  an  opinion  (or  fixed  principle),  if  he  does  not  daily 
say  the  same  things,  and  bear  the  same  things,  and  at  the 
same  time  apply  them  to  life. 


LXXIII. 

[Nicias  was  so  fond  of  labour  (assiduous)  that  he  often 
asked  his  slaves,  if  he  had  bathed  and  if  he  had  dined.]2 

1  See  Mrs.  Carter's  note,  who  could  only  translate  part  of  this 
fragment :  and  Schweig.'s  emendation  and  note. 

2  LXXIII.-LXXV.— Schweig.  has  inclosed  these  three  fragments 
ifn  [  ].    They  are  not  from  Epictetii%  but  from  Plutarch's  treatise 

'  ft 


EPICTETUS.  421 

LXXIV. 

[The  slaves  of  Archimedes  used  to  drag  him  by  force 
from  his  table  of  diagrams  and  anoint  him ;  and  Archi- 
medes would  then  draw  his  figuies  on  his  own  body  when 
it  had  been  anointed.] 

LXXV. 

[Lampis  the  shipowner  being  asked  how  he  acquired 
his  wealth,  answered,  With  no  difficulty,  my  great 
wealth ;  but  my  small  wealth  (my  first  gains),  with  much 
labour.] 

LXXVI. 

Solon  having  been  asked  by  Periander  over  their  cups 
(irapa  TTOTOV),  since  he  happened  to  say  nothing,  Whether 
he  was  silent  for  want  of  words  or  because  he  was  a  fool, 
replied :  No  fool  is  able  to  be  silent  over  his  cups.1 

LXXVII. 

Attempt  on  every  occasion  to  provide  for  nothing  so 
much  as  that  which  is  safe :  for  silence  is  safer  than 
speaking.  And  omit  speaking  whatever  is  without  sense 
and  reason. 

LXXVIIL 

As  the  fire-lights  in  harbours  by  a  few  pieces  of  dry- 
wood  raise  a  great  flame  and  give  sufficient  help  to  ships 
which  are  wandering  on  the  sea;  so  also  an  illustrious 
man  in  a  state  which  is  tempest-tossed,  while  he  is  him- 
self satisfied  with  a  few  things  does  great  services  to  his 
citizens. 

LXXIX. 

As  if  you  attempted  to  manage  a  ship,  you  would 
certainly  learn  completely  the  steersman's  art,  [so  if  you 
would  administer  a  state,  learn  the  art  of  managing  a 
state].  For  it  will  be  in  your  power,  as  in  the  first  case 
to  manage  the  whole  ship,  so  in  the  second  case  also  to 
manage  the  whole  state.2 

1  See  Schweig.'s  note. 

*  See  Schweig.'s  note.  There  is  evidently  something  omitted  in  the 
text,  which  omission  is  supplied  hy  the  words  inclosed  thus  [  1. 
Sohweig.  proposes  to  change  Mfapvyv  into  KV&KTTW.  See  his  remark 
on  »a<w . .  vfaw.  Perhaps  he  is  right 


422  EPICTETUS. 

LXXX. 

If  you  propose  to  adorn  your  city  by  the  dedication  of 
offerings  (monuments),  first  dedicate  to  yourself  (decorate 
yourself  with)  the  noblest  offering  of  gentleness,  and 
justice  and  beneficence. 

LXXXI. 

You  will  do  the  greatest  services  to  the  state,  if  you 
shall  raise  not  the  roofs  of  the  houses,  but  the  souls  of  the 
citizens:  for  it  is  better  that  great  souls  should  dwell 
in  small  houses  than  for  mean  slaves  to  lurk  in  great 
houses. 

LXXXIL 

Do  not  decorate  the  walls  of  your  house  with  the 
valuable  stones  from  Euboea  and  Sparta;  but  adorn  the 
minds  (breasts)  of  the  citizens  and  of  those  who  administer 
the  state  with  the  instruction  which  comes  from  Hellas 
YGreece).  For  states  are  well  governed  by  the  wisdom 
-(judgement)  of  men,  but  not  by  stone  and  wood.1 

LXXXIII. 

As,  if  you  wished  to  breed  lions,  you  would  not  care 
•about  the  costliness  of  their  dens,  but  about  the  habits  of 
the  animals;  so,  if  you  attempt  to  preside  over  your 
•citizens,  be  not  so  anxious  about  the  costliness  of  the 
buildings  as  careful  about  the  manly  character  of  those 
who  dwell  in  them. 

LXXXIV.2 

As  a  skilful  horse-trainer  does  not  feed  (only)  the  good 
colts  and  allow  to  starve  those  who  are  disobedient  to  the 
rein,  but  he  feeds  both  alike,  and  chastises  the  one  more 

1  The  marbles  of  Carystus  in  Euboea  and  the  marbles  of  Taenarum 
near  Sparta  were  used  by  the  Romans,  and  perhaps  by  the  Greeks 
also,  for  architectural  decoration.     (Strabo,  x.  446,  and  viii.  367,  ed. 
Gas.)    Compare  Horace,  Carm.  ii.  18. 

Non  cbur  neque  aureum 

Mea  renidet  in  dumo  lacunar,  etc. 

2  This  fragment  contains  a  lesson  for  the  administration  of  a  state. 
The  good  must  be  protected,  and  the  bad  must  be  improved  by  dis- 
cipline and  punishment. 


EPICTETU8.  423 

and  forces  him  to  be  equal  to  the  other : l  so  also  a  careful 
man  and  one  who  is  skilled  in  political  power,  attempts  to 
treat  well  those  citizens  who  have  a  good  character,  but 
does  not  will  that  those  who  are  of  a  contrary  character 
should  be  ruined  at  once;  and  he  in  no  manner  grudges 
both  of  them  their  food,  but  he  teaches  and  urges  on  with 
uiore  vehemence  him  who  resists  reason  and  law. 

LXXXV. 

As  a  goose  is  not  frightened  by  cackling  nor  a  sheep  by 
bleating,  so  let  not  the  clamour  of  a  senseless  multitude 
alarm  you. 

LXXXVI.2 

As  a  multitude,  when  they  without  reason  demand  of 
you  any  thing  of  your  own,  do  not  disconcert  you,  so  dc 
not  be  moved  from  your  purpose  even  by  a  rabble  when 
they  unjustly  attempt  to  move  you. 

LXXXVIL 

What  is  due  to  the  state  pay  as  quickly  as  you  can,  and 
you  will  never  be  asked  for  that  which  is  not  due. 

LXXXVIII. 

As  the  sun  does  not  wait  for  prayers  and  incantations 
to  be  induced  to  rise,  but  immediately  shines  and  is 
saluted  by  all :  so  do  you  also  not  wait  for  clappings  of 
hands,  and  shouts  and  praise  to  be  induced  to  do  good, 
but  be  a  doer  of  good  voluntarily,  and  you  will  be  beloved 
as  much  as  the  sun. 

LXXXIX. 

Neither  should  a  ship  rely  on  one  small  anchor,  nor 
should  life  rest  on  a  single  hope. 

XO. 

We  ought  to  stretch  our  legs  and  stretch  our  hopes 
only  to  that  which  is  possible. 

1  I  am  not  sure  what  pepd  means. 

*  See  in  the  Index  Graecitntis  the  word 


424  EPTCTETUS. 

XCI. 

When  Thales  was  asked  what  is  most  universal,  he 
answered,  Hope,  for  hope  stays  with  those  who  have- 
nothing  else. 

XCIL 

It  is  more  necessary  to  heal  the  soul  than  the  body,  for 
to  die  is  better  than  to  live  a  bad  life. 

XCIIL 

Pyrrho  used  to  say  that  there  is  no  difference  between 
dying  and  living:  and  a  man  said  to  him,  Why  then 
do  you  not  die?  Pyrrho  replied,  Because  there  is  no 
difference. 

XCIV.1 

Admirable  is  nature,  and,  as  Xenophon  says,  a  lover  of 
animated  beings.  The  body  then,  which  is  of  all  things 
the  most  unpleasant  and  the  most  foul  (dirty),  we  love 
and  take  care  of;  for  if  we  were  obliged  for  five  days  only 
to  take  care  of  our  neighbour's  body,  we  should  not  be 
able  to  endure  it.  Consider  then  what  a  thing  it  would 
be  to  rise  in  the  morning  and  rub  the  teeth  of  another, 
and  after  doing  some  of  the  necessary  offices  to  wash  those 
parts.  In  truth  it  is  wonderful  that  we  love  a  thing  to 
which  we  perform  such  services  every  day.  I  fill  this  bag, 
and  then  I  empty  it;2  what  is  more  troublesome?  But  I 
must  act  as  the  servant  of  God.  For  this  reason  I  remain 

1  Compare  Xenophon,  Memorah.  i.  4, 17. 

The  body  is  here,  and  elsewhere  in  Epictetus,  considered  as  an 
instrument,  which  another  uses  who  is  not  the  body ;  and  that  which 
so  uses  the  body  must  be  something  which  is  capable  of  using  the 
body  and  a  power  which  possesses  what  we  name  intelligence  and 
consciousness.  Our  bodies,  as  Bishop  Butler  says,  are  what  we  name 
matter,  and  differ  from  other  matter  only  in  being  more  closely 
connected  with  us  than  other  matter.  It  would  be  easy  to  pass  from 
these  notions  to  the  notion  that  this  intelligence  and  power,  or  to  use 
a  common  word,  the  soul,  is  something  which  exists  independent  of  the 
body,  though  we  only  know  the  soul  while  it  acts  within  and  on  the 
body,  and  by  the  body. 

*  This  bag  is  the  body,  or  that  part  of  it  which  holds  the  food  which 
IB  taken  into  the  mouth. 


EPICTETU8.  425 

(here),  and  I  endure  to  wash  this  miserable  body,  to  feed 
it  and  to  clothe  it.  But  when  I  was  younger,  God  im- 
posed on  me  also  another  thing,  and  I  submitted  to  it. 
Why  then  do  you  not  submit,  when  Nature  who  has  given 
us  this  body  takes  it  away  ?  I  love  the  body,  you  may 
say.  Well,  as  I  said  just  now,  Nature  gave  you  also  this 
love  of  the  body:  but  Nature  says,  Leave  it  now,  and 
have  no  more  trouble  (with  it). 

XCV. 

When  a  man  dies  young,  he  blames  the  gods.  When 
he  is  old  and  does  not  die,  he  blames  the  gods  because  he 
suffers  when  he  ought  to  have  already  ceased  from  suffer- 
ing. And  nevertheless,  when  death  approaches,  he  wishes 
to  Jive,  and  sends  to  the  physician  and  intreats  him  to 
omit  no  care  or  trouble.  Wonderful,  he  said,  are  men, 
who  are  neither  willing  to  live  nor  to  die.1 

XCVI. 

To  the  longer  life  and  the  worse,  the  shorter  life,  if  it  is 
better,  ought  by  all  means  to  be  preferred. 

XCVIL 

When  we  are  children  our  parents  deliver  us  to  a 
paedagogue  to  take  care  on  all  occasions  that  we  suffer 
no  harm.  But  when  we  are  become  men,  God  delivers  us 
to  our  innate  conscience  (cruvctSi/orct)  to  take  care  of  us. 
This  guardianship  then  we  must  in  no  way  despise,  for 
we  shall  both  displease  God  and  be  enemies  to  our  own 
conscience.2 

XCVIIL 

[We  ought  to  use  wealth  as  the  material  for  some  act, 
not  for  every  act  alike.] 

1  See   Schweig.'s   excellent   note   on    this  fragment.     There  is 
manifestly  a  defect  in  the  text,  which  Sohweig/s  note  supplies. 
9  Mrs.  Carter  suggests   that   fadpecrrov  in  the  text   should  be 
oi:  and  so  Schweig.  has  it. 


426  EPICTETU8. 

XCIX. 

[Virtue  then  should  be  desired  by  all  men  more  than 
wealth  which  is  dangerous  to  the  foolish ;  for  the  wicked- 
ness of  men  is  increased  by  wealth.  And  the  more  a  man 
is  without  sense,  the  more  violent  is  he  in  excess,  for  he 
has  the  means  of  satisfying  his  mad  desire  for  pleasures.] 

0. 

What  we  ought  not  to  do,  we  should  not  even  think  of 
ioing. 

CL 

Deliberate  much  before  saying  or  doing  anything,  for 
you  will  not  have  the  power  of  recalling  what  has  been 
said  or  done. 

OIL 

Every  place  is  safe  to  him  who  lives  with  justice* 

GUI. 

Grows  devour  the  eyes  of  the  dead,  when  the  dead  have 
no  longer  need  of  them.  But  flatterers  destroy  the  souls  of 
the  living  and  blind  their  eyes. 

CIV. 

The  anger  of  an  ape  and  the  threats  of  a  flatterer  should, 
be  considered  as  the  same. 


0V. 

Listen  to  those  who  wish  to  advise  what  is  useful,  but 
not  to  those  who  are  eager  to  flatter  on  all  occasions ;  for 
the  first  really  see  what  is  useful,  but  the  second  look  to 
that  which  agrees  with  the  opinion  of  those  who  possess 
power,  and  imitating  the  shadows  of  bodies  they  assent  to 
what  is  said  by  the  powerful. 


1SPIOTETTJS.  427 


CVI. 

The  man  who  gives  advice  ought  first  to  have  regard  to 
the  modesty  and  character  (reputation)  of  those  whom  he 
advises ;  fur  those  who  have  lost  the  capacity  of  blushing 
are  incorrigible. 

CVII. 

To  admonish  is  better  than  to  reproach :  for  admonition 
is  mild  and  friendly,  but  reproach  is  harsh  and  insulting ; 
and  admonition  corrects  those  who  are  doing  wrong,  but 
reproach  only  convicts  them. 

CVII1. 

Give  of  what  you  have  to  strangers  (Depots)  and  to  those 
who  have  need :  for  he  who  gives  not  to  him  who  wants, 
will  not  receive  himself  when  he  wants. 

CIX. 

A  pirate  had  been  cast  on  the  land  and  was  perishing 
through  the  tempest.  A  man  took  clothing  and  gave  it 
to  him,  and  brought  the  pirate  into  his  house,  and  sup- 
plied him  with  every  thing  else  that  was  necessary. 
When  the  man  was  reproached  by  a  person  for  doing  kind- 
ness to  the  bad,  he  replied,  I  have  shown  this  regard  not 
to  the  man,  but  to  mankind.1 

CX. 

A  man  should  choose  (pursue)  not  every  pleasure,  but 
the  pleasure  which  leads  to  the  good.2 

CXI. 

It  is  the  part  of  a  wise  man  to  resist  pleasures,  but  of  a 
foolish  man  to  be  a  slave  to  them. 

1  Mrs.  Carter  in  her  notes  often  refers  to  the  Christian  precepts, 
but  she  says  nothing  here.    The  fragment  is  not  from  Epietetus ;  but, 
whether  the  story  is  true  or  not,  it  is  an  example  of  the  behaviour  of 
a  wise  and  good  man. 

2  See  Soliweig.'s  interpretation  and  emendation,     I  doubt  if  he  if 
right. 


428  EPICTETUS. 

CXII. 

Pleasure,  like  a  kind  of  bait,  is  thrown  before  (in  front 
of)  every  thing  which  is  really  bad,  and  easily  allures 
greedy  souls  to  the  hook  of  perdition. 

CXIII. 

Choose  rather  to  punish  your  appetites  than  to  be 
punished  through  them. 

CXIV. 
No  man  is  free  who  is  not  master  of  himself. 

cxv. 

The  vine  bears  three  bunches  of  grapes  :  the  first  is 
that  of  pleasure,  the  second  of  drunkenness,  the  third  of 
violence. 

CXVI. 

Over  your  wine  do  not  talk  much  to  display  your 
learning  ;  for  you  will  utter  bilious  stuff.1 

CXVII. 

He  is  intoxicated  who  drinks  more  than  three  cups: 
and  if  he  is  not  intoxicated,  he  has  exceeded  moderation. 

CXVJII. 

Let  your  talk  of  God  be  renewed  every  day,  rather  than 
your  food. 

CXIX. 

Think  of  God  more  frequently  than  you  breathe. 

cxx. 

If  you  always  remember  that  whatever  you  are  doing 
in  the  soul  or  in  the  body,  God  stands  by  as  an  inspector, 
you  will  never  err  (do  wrong)  in  all  your  prayerd  and 
in  all  your  acts,  but  you  will  have  God  dwelling  with 
you.2 


1  x<>\€p&  y&p  faoQQiyty.    See  Sohweig.'s  note. 

•  This  la  the  doctrine  of  God  being  in  man.    See  the  Index. 


EPICTETUS.  429 

CXXL 

As  it  is  pleasant  to  see  the  sea  from  the  land,  so  it  is 
pleasant  for  him  who  has  escaped  from  troubles  to  think 
of  them.1 

CXXI1. 

Law  intends  indeed  to  do  service  to  human  life,  but  it  is 
not  able  when  men  do  not  choose  to  accept  her  services ; 
for  it  is  only  in  those  who  are  obedient  to  her  that  she 
displays  her  special  virtue. 

CXXIII. 

As  to  the  sick  physicians  are  as  saviours,  so  to  those  also 
who  are  wronged  are  the  laws. 

CXXIV. 

The  justest  laws  are  those  which  are  the  truest. 

cxxv. 

To  yield  to  law  and  to  a  magistrate  and  to  him  who  is 
wiser  than  yourself,  is  becoming. 

CXXVL 

The  things  which  are  done  contrary  to  law  are  the  same 
as  things  which  are  not  done. 

CXXVII. 

In  prosperity  it  is  very  easy  to  find  a  friend;  but  in 
adversity  it  is  most  difficult  of  all  things. 

CXXVIII. 

Time  relieves  the  foolish  from  sorrow,  but  reason  relieves 
the  wise. 

CXXIX. 

He  is  a  wise  man  who  does  not  grieve  for  the  thinga 
which  he  has  nut,  but  rejoices  for  those  which  he  has. 

1  Compare  Lucretius  ii,  the  beginning. 


430  EPICTETUS. 

cxxx. 

Epictetus  being  asked  how  a  man  should  give  pain  to 
his  enemy  answered,  By  preparing  himself  to  live  the  best 
life  that  he  can.1 

CXXXI. 

Let  no  wise  man  be  averse  to  undertaking  the  office  of  a 
magistrate  (rov  ap\€w)  :  for  it  is  both  impious  for  a  man  to 
withdraw  himself  from  being  useful  to  those  who  have 
need  of  our  services,  and  it  is  ignoble  to  give  way  to  the 
worthless  ;  for  it  is  foolish  to  prefer  being  ill-governed  to 
governing  well. 

CXXXIL 

Nothing  is  more  becoming  to  him  who  governs  than  to 
despise  no  man  and  not  show  arrogance,  but  to  preside 
over  all  with  equal  care.2 

CXXXIII. 

[In  poverty  any  man  liv.es  (can  live)  happily,  but  very 
seldom  in  wealth  and  power  (apxcus).  The  value  of  poverty 
excels  so  much  that  no  just  man  (vo/xt/xos)  would  exchange 
poverty  for  disreputable  wealth,  unless  indeed  the  richest 
of  the  Athenians  Themistocles,  the  son  of  Neocles,  was 
better  than  Aristides  and  Socrates,  though  he  was  poor  in 
virtue.  But  the  wealth  of  Themistooles  and  Themistocles 
himself  have  perished  and  have  left  no  name.  For  all 
things  die  with  death  in  a  bad  man,  but  the  good  is 
eternal.]3 

CXXXIV. 

Eemember  that  such  was,  and  is,  and  will  be  the  nature 
of  the  universe,  and  that  it  is  not  possible  that  the  things 
which  come  into  being  can  come  into  being  otherwise 
than  they  do  now  ;  and  that  not  only  men  have  partici- 
pated in  this  change  and  transmutation,  and  all  other 
living  things  which  are  on  the  earth,  but  also  the  things 

1  Compare  M.  Antoninus,  vi.  6. 

2  For  ouS^y  Mrs.  Carter  prefers  o&Sev  juaAAov:  and  also  Schweig, 


does,  or    o&Sev  &\\o  jua 

8  This  fragment  is  not  from  Epictetus.    See  Schweig.'s  note. 


EPIOTETUS.  431 

which  are  dhine.  And  indeed  the  very  tour  elements  are 
changed  and  transmuted  up  and  down,  and  e;u  th  becomes 
water  and  water  becomes  air,  and  the  air  again  is  trans- 
muted into  other  things,  and  the  same  manner  of  trans- 
mutation takes  place  from  above  to  below.  If  a  man 
attempts  to  turn  his  mind  towards  these  thoughts,  and 
to  persuade  himself  to  accept  with  willingness  that  which 
is  necessary,  he  will  pass  through  life  with  complete 
moderation  and  harmony. 

cxxxv. 

He  who  is  dissatisfied  with  things  present  and  what  is 
given  by  fortune  is  an  ignorant  man  (tStwT^s)  in  life  :  but 
he  who  bears  them  nobly  and  rationally  and  the  things 
which  proceed  from  them  is  worthy  of  being  considered  a 
good  man. 

CXXXVI. 

All  things  obey  and  serve  the  world  (the  universe), 
earth  and  sea  and  sun  and  the  rest  of  the  stars,  and  the 
plants  of  earth  and  animals.  And  our  body  obeys  it  also 
both  in  disease  and  in  health  when  it  (the  universe) 
chooses,  both  in  youth  and  in  age,  and  when  it  is  passing 
through  the  other  changes.  What  is  reasonable  then  and 
in  our  power  is  this,  for  our  judgment  not  to  be  the  only 
thing  which  resists  it  (the  univeise)  :  for  it  is  strong  and 
superior,  and  it  has  determined  better  about  us  by  admin- 
istering (governing)  us  also  together  with  the  whole.  And 
besides,  this  opposition  also  is  unreasonable  and  does 
nothing  more  than  cause  us  to  be  tormented  uselessly  and 
to  fall  into  pain  and  sorrow. 


The  fragments  which  follow  are  in  part   assigned  to 
Epictetus,  in  part  to  others. 

CXXXVIL 

Contentment,  as  it  is  a  short  road  and  pleasant,  has 
great  delight  and  little  trouble. 


432  BPIOTETUS. 

OXXXVIII. 

Fortify  yourself  with  contentment,  for  this  is  an  im- 
pregnable fortress. 

CXXXIX. 

Let  nothing  be  valued  more  than  truth :  not  even  selec- 
tion of  a  friendship  which  lies  without  the  influence  of  the 
affects,  by  which  (affects)  justice  is  both  confounded  (dis- 
turbed) and  darkened.1 

CXL. 

Truth  is  a  thing  immortal  and  perpetual,  and  it  gives 
to  us  a  beauty  which  fades  not  away  in  time  nor  does  it 
take  away 2  the  freedom  of  speech  which  proceeds  from 
justice ;  but  it  gives  to  us  the  knowledge  of  what  is  just 
and  lawful,  separating  from  them  the  unjust  and  refuting 
them. 

CXLI. 

We  should  not  have  either  a  blunt  knife  or  a  freedom  of 
speech  which  is  ill  managed. 

CXLII. 

Nature  has  given  to  men  one  tongue,  but  two  ears,  that 
we  may  hear  from  others  twice  as  much  as  we  speak. 

CXLIII. 

Nothing  really  pleasant  or  unpleasant  subsists  by  nature, 
but  all  things  become  so  through  habit  (custom).3 

CXLIV. 

Choose  the  best  life,  for  custom  (habit)  will  make  it 
pleasant. 

CXLV. 

Be  careful  to  leave  your  sons  well  instructed  rather  than 
rich,  for  the  hopes  of  the  instructed  are  better  than  the 
wealth  of  the  ignorant. 

1  The  meaning  of  the  second  part  is  confused  and  uncertain,  tiee 
Schweig.'s  note. 

*  In  place  of  &$cupeT  rty  Mrs.  Carter  proposes  to  read 

*  See  Schweig.'a  note. 


EPICTETUS.  433 

CXLVL 

A  daughter  is  a  possession  to  her  father  which  is  not 
his  own. 

CXLVII. 

The  same  person  advised  to  leave  modesty  to  children 
rather  than  gold. 

CXLVIIL 

The  reproach  of  a  father  is  agreeable  medicine,  for  it 
contains  more  that  is  useful  than  it  contains  of  that  which 
gives  pain. 

CXLIX. 

He  who  has  "been  lucky  in  a  son  in  law  has  found  a  son  : 
but  he  who  has  been  unlucky,  has  lost  also  a  daughter. 

CL. 

The  value  of  education  (knowledge)  like  that  of  gold  is 
valued  in  every  place. 

CLI. 

He  who  exercises  wisdom  exercises  the  knowledge  which 
is  about  God. 

CLII. 

Nothing  among  animals  is  so  beimtiful  as  a  man  adorned 
by  learning  (knowledge).1 

OLIII. 

We  ought  to  avoid  the  friendship  of  the  bad  and  the- 
enmity  of  the  good. 

CLIV. 

The  necessity  of  circumstances  proves  friends  and 
detects  enemies. 

CLV. 

When  our  friends  are  present,  we  ought  to  treat  them 
well ;  and  when  they  are  absent,  to  speak  of  them  well. 

1  Bee  Schweig.'s  note. 

2  F 


434  EPICTETUS. 

CLVI. 

Let  no  man  think  vhat  he  is  loved  by  any  man  when  he 
loves  no  man. 

CLVII. 

You  ought  to  choose  both  physician  and  friend  not  the 
most  agreeable,  but  the  most  useful. 

CLVIIL 

If  you  wish  to  live  a  life  free  from  sorrow,  think  of  what 
is  going  to  happen  as  if  it  had  already  happened. 

CLIX. 

Be  free  from  grief  not  through  insensibility  like  the 
irrational  animals,  nor  through  want  of  thought  like  the 
foolish,  but  like  a  man  of  virtue  by  having  reason  as  the 
consolation  of  grief. 

CLX. 

Whoever  are  least  disturbed  in  mind  by  calamities,  and 
in  act  struggle  most  against  them,  these  are  the  best  men 
in  states  and  in  private  life. 

CLXI. 

Those  who  have  been  instructed,  like  those  who  have 
been  trained  in  the  palaestra,  though  they  may  have  fallen, 
rise  again  from  their  misfortune  quickly  and  skilfully. 

CLXII. 

We  ought  to  call  in  reason  like  a  good  physician  as  a 
help  in  misfortune, 

CLXIII. 

A  fool  having  enjoyed  good  fortune  like  intoxication  to 
a  great  amount  becomes  more  foolish. 

CLXIV. 
Envy  is  the  antagonist  of  the  fortunate. 


EPICTETU8.  435 

CLXV. 

He  who  bears  in  mind  what  man  is  will  never  be  trou- 
bled at  any  thing  which  happens. 

CLXVI. 

For  making  a  good  voyage  a  pilot  (master)  and  wind 
are  necessary :  and  for  happiness  reason  and  art. 

CLXVIL 

We  should  enjoy  good  fortune  while  we  have  it,  like  the 
fruits  of  autumn. 

CLXVIII. 

He  is  unreasonable  who  is  grieved  (troubled)  at  the 
things  which  happen  from  the  necessity  of  nature. 


SOME  FRAGMENTS  OF  EPICTETUS  OMITTED  BY  UPTON  AND  BY 
MEIBOMIUS. 

CLXIX. 

Of  the  things  which  are,  God  has  put  some  of  them  in 
our  power,  and  some  he  has  not.  In  our  own  power  he 
has  placed  that  which  is  the  best  and  the  most  important, 
that  indeed  through  which  he  himself  is  happy,  the  use  of 
appearances  (favracriuv).  For  when  this  use  is  rightly 
employed,  there  is  freedom,  happiness,  tranquillity,  con- 
stancy :  and  this  is  also  justice  and  law,  and  temperance, 
and  every  virtue.  But  all  other  things  he  has  not  placed 
in  our  power.  Wherefore  we  also  ought  to  be  of  one  mind 
with  God,  and  making  this  division  of  things,  to  look  afte* 
those  which  are  in  our  power ;  and  of  the  things  not  in 
our  power,  to  intrust  them  to  the  Universe  (r<S  KOO-HW),  and 
whether  it  should  require  our  children,  or  our  country,  or 
our  body,  or  any  thing  else,  willingly  to  give  them  up.1 

1  This  is  a  valuable  fragment,  and  I  think,  a  genuine  fragment  of 
Epictetus. 

There  is  plainly  a  defect  in  the  text,  which  Schweighaeuser  has 
Judiciously  supplied, 

2  F  2 


436  EPICTETUS. 

CLXX. 

When  a  young  man  was  boasting  in  the  theatre  and  say- 
ing, I  am  wise,  for  I  have  conversed  with  many  wise  men ; 
Epictetus  said,  I  also  have  conversed  with  many  rich 
men,  but  I  am  not  rich. 

CLXXI. 

The,  same  person  said,  It  is  not  good  for  him  who  has 
been  well  taught  to  talk  among  the  untaught,  as  it  is  not 
right  for  him  who  is  sober  to  talk  among  those  who  are 
drunk. 

CLXXII. 

Epictetus  being  asked,  What  man  is  rich,  answered, 
He  who  is  content  (who  has  enough). 

CLXXIII. 

Xanthippe  was  blaming  Socrates,  because  he  was  making 
small  preparation  for  receiving  his  friends  :  but  Socrates 
said,  If  they  are  onr  friends,  they  will  not  care  about  it ; 
and  if  they  are  not,  we  shall  care  nothing  about  them. 

CLXXIV. 

When  Archelaus  was  sending  for  Socrates  to  make  him 
rich,  Socrates  told  the  messengers  to  return  this  answer : 
At  Athens  four  measures  (choenices)  of  meal  are  sold  for 
one  obolus  (the  sixth  of  a  drachme),  and  the  fountains  run 
with  water  :  if  what  I  have  is  not  enough  (sufficient)  for 
me,  yet  I  am  sufficient  for  what  I  have,  and  so  it  becomea 
sufficient  for  me.  Do  you  not  see  that  it  was  with  no 
nobler  voice  that  Polus  acted  the  part  of  Oedipus  as  king 
than  of  Oedipus  as  a  wanderer  and  beggar  at  Colonus? 
Then  shall  the  good  man  appear  to  be  inferior  to  Polus, 
and  unable  to  act  well  every  character  (personage)  im- 
posed on  him  by  the  Deity?  and  shall  he  not  imitate 
Ulysses,  who  even  in  rags  made  no  worse  figure  than  iu 
the  soft  purple  robe? l 

1  See  Schweig.'e  note  on  this  fragment;  and  his  remark  on  ths 
Words  OVK  ev<t>uv6T€pw  ou8fy  and  his  proposed  emendatiou. 


EPICTETUS.  437 

CLXXV. 

What  io  I  care,  lie  (Epictetus)  says,  whether  all  things 
are  composed  of  atoms  (aTo/xxov),  or  of  similar  parts 
(o/Aoto/xcpwv)  or  of  fire  and  earth  ?  for  is  it  not  enough  to 
know  the  nature  of  the  good  and  the  evil,  and  the  mea- 
sures (fjierpa)  of  the  desires  and  the  aversions  (c/c/cXwrewv), 
and  also  the  movements  towards  things  and  from  them ; 
and  using  these  as  rules  to  administer  the  affairs  of  life, 
but  not  to  trouble  ourselves  about  the  things  above  us  ? 
For  these  things  are  perhaps  incomprehensible  to  the 
human  mind  :  and  if  any  man  should  even  suppose  them 
to  be  in  the  highest  degree  comprehensible,  what  then  is 
the  profit  of  them,  if  they  are  comprehended?  And  must 
we  not  say  that  those  men  have  needless  trouble  who 
assign  these  things  as  necessary  to  the  philosopher's  dis- 
course ?  Is  then  also  the  precept  written  at  Delphi  super- 
fluous, which  is  Know  thyself?  It  is  not  so,  he  says. 
What  then  is  the  meaning  of  it  ?  If  a  man  gave  to  a 
choreutes  (member  of  chorus)  the  precept  to  know  himself, 
would  he  not  have  observed  in  the  precept  that  he  must 
direct  his  attention  to  himself?  l 

CLXXVI. 

You  are  a  little  soul  carrying  a  dead  body,  as  Epictetus 
eaid.2 

CLXXVIL 

He  (Epictetus)  said  that  he  had  discovered  an  art  in 
giving  assent ;  and  in  the  topic  (matter)  of  the  move- 
ments he  had  discovered  that  we  must  observe  attention, 
that  the  movements  be  subject  to  exception,  (fte^vrrcfcupe- 
ireos),  that  they  be  social,  that  they  be  according  to  the 
worth  of  each  thing ;  and  that  we  ought  to  abstain  entirely 
from  desire,  and  to  employ  aversion  (cK/cAt'crei)  to  none  of 
the  things  which  are  not  in  our  power.3 

1  See  Schweig.'s  note,  and  his  remark  on  the  last  line  of  the  text. 

2  See  M.  Antoninus,  iv.  41. 

8  See  the  translation  of  M.  Antoninus,  xi.  37 ;  where  I  have  trans- 
lated this  passage  a  little  differently  from  the  present  translation.  The 
meaning  is  tha  same.  I  do  not  know  which  is  the  better  translation. 


438  EPIOTETUS. 


CLXXVIII. 

About  no  common  thing,  he  said,  the  contest  (dispute  J 
is,  but  about  being  mad  or  not.1 


CLXXIX, 

AUL.  GELLIUS,  xrn.  19. 

Favorinum  ego  audivi  dicere  Epictetum  philosophum 
dixissef  *  plerosque  istos  qui  philosophari  videntur,  phi- 
losophos  esse  hujuscemodi,  oVev  TOV  Trparreti/,  fte^pt  rov  Aeyav.'2 
Id  significat,  factis  procul,  verbis  tenus.  Jam  illud  est 
vehementius,  quod  Arrianus  solitum  eutn  dictitare  in 
libris,  quos  de  Dissertationibus  ejus  composuit,  scriptum 
reliquit.  Nam,  *  quum,5  inquit,  l  animadverterat  homineru 
pudore  amisso,  import un a  industria,  corruptis  moribus, 
audacem,  confidentem  lingua,  caeteraque  omnia  praeter 
animum  procurantem ;  istiusinodi,'  inquit,  4  hominem 
quum  viderat  studia  quoque  et  disciplinas  philosophiae 
contrectare,  et  physica  adire  et  meditari  dialectica, 
multaque  id  genus  theoremata  suspicari  sciscitarique, 
inclamabat  deum  atque  hominum  fidem,  ac  plerumque, 
inter  clamandum  his  eum  verbis  increpabat :  vAi/0po>7re,  TTOV 
CTKC^CU  ct  K€KaOapraL  TO  dyyctov.  av  yap  cts  rrjv  olrjcriv 
dTTwXcro.  yv  (raTrfj,  r;  ovpov  rj  o^os  yevotr*  av,  77  rt  TOVTOOV 
Nihil  profecto  his  verbis  gravius,  nihil  verius, 
quibus  declarabat  maximus  philosophorum,  '  literas  atque 
doctrinas  Philosophiae,  quum  in  hominem  falsum  atque 
degenerem,  tamquam  in  vas  spurcum  atque  pollutum 
influxissent,  verti,  mutari,  corrumpi,  et  (quod  ipsa 
KwiKwrepov  ait)  urinam  fieri,  aut  si  quid  est  urina  spurcius/ 
Praeterea  idem  ille  Epictetus,  quod  ex  eodem  Favorino 
audivimus,  solitus  dicere  est :  '  duo  esse  vitia  multo 
omnium  gravissima  et  taeterrima,  intolerantiam  et  incon- 
tinentiam,  quum  aut  injurias  quae  sunt  ferendae  non 
toleramus  neque  ferimus,  aut  a  quibus  rebus  volupta- 
tibusque  nos  tenere  debemus  non  tenemus.  Itaque/ 
inquit,  '  si  quis  haec  duo  verba  cordi  habeat,  eaque  sibi 

1  See  M.  Antoninus,  xi.  38.  *  Arrian,  Dissert,  ii.  19. 


EPICTETUS.  439 

imperando  atque  observando  curet,  is  erit  pleraque 
impeccabilis  vitamque  vivet  tranquillissimam.  Verba 
duo  haec  dicebat,  *Ave^ov  K<U  'ATrev' 


CLXXX. 

AUL.  GELLIUS,  xix.  1. 

Phiiosophus  in  disciplina  Stoica  celebratus  .  ...  ex 
sarcimila  sua  librum  protulit  Epicteti  pbilosophi  quintum 
AiaAefc'av:  quas  ab  Arriano  digestas  congruere  scriptis 
Zenonis  et  Chrysippi  non  dubium  est.  In  eo  libro  Graeca 
scilicet  oratione  scriptum  ad  hanc  sententiam  logimus: 
4  Visa  animi,'  quas  ^avracrtag  philosophi  appellant,  '  qui 
bus  mens  bominis  prima  statira  specie  accidenti*  ad  ani 
mum  rei  pellitur,  non  voluntatis  sunt,  neque  arbitraria, 
sed  vi  quadam  sua  inferunt  sese  hominibus  noscitanda. 
Probation  es  autem  quas  a-vy/caraflco-eis  vocant,  quibus 
eadem  visa  noscuntur  ac  dijudicantur,  voluntariae  sunt 
fiuntque  bominum  arbitratn.  Propterea  quum  sonus 
uliquis  aut  caelo  aut  ex  ruina  aut  repentinus  [nescius] 
periculi  nuntius  vel  quid  aliud  ejusmodi  factum,  sapientis- 
quoque  animum  paulisper  mover!  et  contrahi  et  pallescere 
necessum  est,  non  opinione  alicujus  mali  praecepta,  sed 
quibusdam  motibus  lapidis  et  inconsultis  officiuin  mentis 
atque  rationis  praevertentibus.  Mox  tamen  ille  sapions 
ibidem  [idem?]  ras  rotavra?  c^avracrtas,  id  est,  visa  istaec 
animi  sui  terrifica  non  approbat :  hoc  est  ou  o-vyKarariOerai 
ovfe  TT/aoo-eTrtSo^et,  sed  abjicit  respuitque,  nee  ei  metu- 
endum  esse  in  his  quidquam  videtur.  Atque  hoc  inter 
insipientis  sapientisque  animum  differre  dicunt,  quod 
insipiens,  qualia  esse  primo  animi  sui  pulsu  visa  sunt 
saeva  et  aspera,  talia  esse  vero  putat,  et  eadem  incepta 
tainquam  jure  metuenda  sint,  sua  quoque  assensione 
approbat  Kat  7rpoo-€7ri8o£a£et  (hoc  enim  verbo  Stoici  quum 
super  ista  re  disserunt  utuntur).  Sapiens  autem  quum 
breviter  et  strictim  colore  atque  vnltu  motus  est,  ou  onry- 
KarariOerai,  sed  statum  vigoremque  isententiae  suae  retinet, 
quam  de  hujuscemodi  visis  semper  habuit,  ut  de  minima 
metuendis,  sed  fronto  falsa  et  formidine  inani  territantibus.1 


440  EPICTETUS. 

CLXXXI. 

A.RNOBIUS  ADVERS.  GENTES,   IN   FINE  LIBRI  SECtTNDI. 

Qirftm  de  animarum  agitur  salute  ao  de  respectu  nostri; 
'aliquid  et  sine  ratione  faciendum  est,'1  ut  Epictetum 
dixisse  approbat  Arrianus. 

1  *Nempe  ubi  ratio  deficit,  ibi  sola  flducia  in  Deum  reposita  et 
obsequio  voluntati  ejus  ab  ipso  declaratae  unioe  subjeoto  agendum 
«*t.'  Sohweig.  See  Enclieirid.  uuui 


(    441    ) 


INDEX. 


ACADEMICS,  the,  17 

,  the  folly  of  they,  171, 172 

,  the,  cannot  blind  their  own 

senses  though  they  have  tried, 

176 

Achilles,  40 

Act,  every,  consider  what  it  is,  381 
Acts  which  bear  testimony  to  a 

man's  words,  94 
,  indolence  and  indifference  as 

to,  Epictetus  blames,  130 
Actor  in  a  play,  man  an,  386 
Admetus,  father  of,  242 
Administrator  of  all  things,  the 

proof  that  there  is  an,  144 
Adonis,  gardens  of,  356 
Adultery,  107 

Affect,  an,  how  it  is  produced,  202 
Affection,  natural,  37 
Affectionate,  how  to  become,  277 
Agamemnon  and  Achilles,  quarrel 

of,  191 

'Arya/)«(a,  a  press,  305 
Agrippinus,  Paconius,  7,  9,  417 
Aloibiades,  200 
Alexander  and  Menelaus,  179 

and  Hephaestion,  178 

Aliptio  art,  the,  136 
Anaxagoras,  114 
Avfyov  K<tl  'Airc^ov,  439 
Animals,  what  they  are  made  for,  50 
Annonae,  Praefectus,  35 
Antipater,  136 
Antisthenes,  Xenophon,  and  Plato, 

157, 158 

— ,  noble  saying  of,  342 
—  made  Diogenes  free,  278 


Anxiety,  on,  136 
Anytus  and  Melitus,  88 
'A^op^af,  22 

'A7TOT€fX*/f^J',  307 

Appearances,  ^cu/rarfeu,  right  use 
of,  4,  20, 45,  64 

,  and  the  aids  to  be  provided 

against  them,  80 

,  we  act  according  to,  86 

,  the  nature  of  Good  and  also 

of  Evil  is  in  the  use  of,  97 

,  the  faculty  of  understanding 

the  use  of,  118 

drive  away  reason,  161 

lead  on ;  and  must  be  resisted, 

161 

,  right  use  of,  free  from  re- 
straint, 167 

often  disturb  and  perplex,  176 

,  how  we  must  exercise  our- 
selves against,  218 

should  be  examined,  380 

Aqueduct,  Marcian,  at  Borne,  150 

Archedemus,  108 

Archelaus  and  Socrates,  436 

Archimedes,  421 

Arguments,  sophistical,  23,  25 

Argument,  he  who  is  strong  in. 
193 

Aristides,  415 

and  Evenus,  358 

Aristophanes  and  Socrates,  369,450 

Arnobius,  440 

Arrian,  1 

Arrogance,  self-conceit,  otrj(m,  28 

and  distrust,  233 

,  boasting,  and  pride,  advice 


442 


INDEX. 


against,  286,  384   387,  394,  395, 

Assent,  cause  of,  83 

• to  that  which  appears  false 

cannot  be  compelled,  253 
Asses,  shod,  306 
Attention,  on,  372 
Aversion,  lKK\i(ns,  54 


Babbler,  a,  376,  377 
Bath,  the,  68 
Beauty,  195, 196 

• ,  where  it  is,  370 

Beggars,  remarks  on,  290 
Belief  cannot  be  compelled,  304 
Best  men,  the,  434 
Body,  the,  could  not  be  made  free 

from  hindrance,  309 
• and  spirit  must  be  separated, 

99 
• ,  the,  an  instrument  used  by 

another  power,  424 
Books,  what  used  for,  327 

,  a  few  better  than  many,  79* 

Brotherhood  of  men,  4fi      " 

B  aMF*  3>  **•'  "*• 326' 33Sl 

•  aesar's  friend  is  not  happy,  300 

Cages,  birds  kept  in,  by  the  Romans, 
297 

Carystus  and  Taenarum,  marbles 
of,  422 

Cassiope  or  Cassope,  213 

Catechism  of  the  Ohurch  of  Eng- 
land, 410 

Caution  about  familiar  intercourse 
with  men,  236 

Character,  on  assuming  a,  above 
your  strengtli,  398 

Characters,  different,  cannot  be 
mingled,  323 

Christianity,  Mrs.  Carter's  opinion 
of  the  power  of,  234 

Christians,  promise  of  future  happi- 
ness to,  on  certain  conditions,  311 

Chrysippus,  14,  17,  36,  43,  53,  54, 
113,  402 

•— — ,  the  Pseudomenos  of,  157 

on  Possibilities,  1G3 


Chrysippus  on  the  resolution  of 
syllogisms,  188 

and  Antipater,  203 

and  Zeno,  358 

Circumspection,  on,  234 

Circumstances,  difficult,  a  lesson 
for,  96 

show  what  men  are,  70 

Cleanliness,  368 

Cleanthes,  31, 163,  404 

-,  an  example  of  the  pursuit 

of  knowledge  under  difficulties. 
292 

Codicillus,  a,  217 

Colophon,  the,  143 

Common  sense,  212 

Company,  behaviour  in.  394,  396, 
400 

Conceit  of  thinking  that  \ve  know 
something,  158 

Confess,  some  tiring  wl>i:h  a  man 
will  not,  173 

^011^.ision,  general,  of  sins  in  th« 
Prayer  Book  of  the  Church  of 
England,  363 

Conflagration,  the  groat,  229 

Conjunctive  or  complex  axiom,  124 

Conscience,  rb  crwei5<k,  power  of, 
262 

Consciousness  that  he  knows  no- 
thing, a  man  who  knows  nothing 
ought  to  have  the,  174 

Contest  unequal  between  a  charm- 
ing young  girl  and  a  beginner  in 
philosophy,  227 

Contradictions,  effect  of  demon- 
strating, 193 

Convince  himself,  a  power  given  to 
man  to,  340 

Courage  and  caution,  97,  98 

and  caution,  when  they  are 

applicable,  101 

Cowardice  leads  men  to  frequent 
divination,  117 

Crates,  a  Cynic,  and  his  wife,  260 

Criton,  Plato's  Dialogue,  named, 
319 

Cynic,  the  true;  his  office  corre- 
sponds to  the  modern  teacher  of 
religion,  250 


INDEX. 


443 


Cynic,  a,  does  not  wish  to  hide 
anything,  250 

,  the  true,  a  messenger  from 

Zeus,  250 

— -,  the  father  of  all  men  and 
women,  261 

Cynic's  ruling  faculty  must  be  pure, 
262 

power  of  endurance,  263 

Cynic,  the,  sent  by  God  as  an  ex- 
ample, 855 

Cynism,  a  man  must  not  attempt 
'it  without  God,  248 

• ,  on,  248 

Daemon,  every  man's,  48 
Darkness,   men   seek,    to   conceal 

their  acts,  249 
Death,  81 

,  fear  of,  54 

or  pain,  and  the  fear  of  pain 

or  death,  98 
,    what    a    man    should    be 

doing  when  death  surprises  him, 

209 

,  what  it  is,  230,  282 

,   exhortation    to    receive    it 

thankfully,  310 
• and  birth,  how  viewed  by %  a 

savage  tribe,  335 
• ,  the  resolution  of  the  matter 

of  tho  body  into  the  things  of 

which  it  was  composed,  347 
• ,  a  man  must  be  found  doing 

something  when  it  comes;  and 

what  it  should  be,  361 
— ,  when  it  comes,  what  Epictetus 

wishes  to  be  able  to  &ay  to  God, 

362 

is  the  harbour  for  all,  364 

should  be  daily  before  a  man's 

eyes,  887 

Demetrius,  a  Cynic,  75 
Demonstration,  what  it  is;  and  con- 
tradiction, 189,  190 
De  Morgan's  Formal  Logic,  28 
Design,  19 
Desire  of    things    impossible    is 

foolish,  272 
Desires,  consequences  of,  358 


Desire  aid  aversion,  what  they  are, 

380 
Determinations,  right,  only  should 

be  maintained,  145 
Deviation,  every,  comes  from  some- 

thing which  is  in  man's  nature, 

371 

Dialectic,  to  be  learned  last,  291 
Difficulties,  our,  are  about  external 

things,  360 
Diodorus  Cronus,  162 
Diogenes,  71,  139,  203,  226,  369,418 

-  ,  when  he  wus  asked  for  letters 
of  recommendation,  106 

-  -  and  Philip,  250 

-  in  a  fever,  256 

-  a  friend  of  Antisthenes,  257 

-  -  and  the  Cynics  of  Epictetus1' 

time,  260 

-  ,  his  personal  appearance,  261 

-  ,  how  he  loved  mankind,  278 
Diogenes'  opinion  on  freedom,  298 
Diogenes  and  Antisthenes,  312 

-  ,  free,  317,  318 

-  and  Heraclitufi,  385 
Dion  of  Prusa,  2G6 

Dirty  persons,  not  capable  of  being 

improved,  370 

Disputation  or  discussion,  133 
Divination,  116,  393 
Diviner,  internal,  116 
Doctors,  travelling,  280 
Domitian    banishes    philosophers 

from  Rome,  71 
Door,  the  open,  72,  99 
Duty,  what  is  a  man's,  112 

-  to  God  and  to  our  neighbour, 
410 

Duties  of  life  discovered  from  names, 
127 

-  of  marriage,  begetting  chil- 
dren and  other,  216 

-  are   measured    by   relations 

ri),  392 


Education,  Epictetus  knew  what  it 
ought  to  be,  58,  58 

-  ,  what  it  is,  67 

-  ,  what  ought  to  be  the  purpose 
of,  245 


444 


INDEX. 


rfc,     the    governing 

faculty,  49,  332 
•— -,  the  ruling  faculty,  described, 

351 

Encheiridion,  1 
End,  man's  true,  20 
End,  every  thing  that  we  do  ought 

to  be  referred  to  an,  264 
Enthymema,  28 
Envy,  the  notion  of;  Socrates  and 

Bp,  Butler,  134 
Epaminoiidas,  415 
Epaphroditus,  6,  62,  78 
Epictetus,  1,  2,  220 
,  and  the  style  of  the  Gospela, 

13 
• ,  mistake  of,  31 

•  misunderstood,  56,  811 

and    the    New    Testament 

writers,  resemblances  between,  93 

— ,  extravagant  assertion  of,  114 
•  perhaps  confounds  Jews  and 

Christians,  126 
,  how  he  could  know  what  God 

is,  141 
,  what  was  the  effect  of  his 

teaching,  149 
disclaims  knowledge  of  certain 

things,  82, 163 

,  his  purpose  in  teaching,  166 

— ,  great  good  sense  of,  in  educa- 
tion, 245 
— — ,  some  unwise  remarks  of,  289, 

293 
affirms  that  a  man  cannot  bo 

compelled  to  assent  1o  that  which 

seems  to  him  to  be  false,  303 
—  advises   not   to  do  as  yonr 

friend  does  simply  because  he  is 

your  friend,  322 
— ,  what  reflections  he  raom- 

mends,  344 
misunderstood  by  Mrs.  Carter, 

365 
Epictetus'  advice  as  to  giving  pain 

to  an  enemy,  430 
Epictetus,  wise  sayings  of,  436 
Epicurus,  69,  417 
— ,  doctrines  of,  65,  66 
,  the  opinions  of,  125 


Epicurus,  his  opinions  disproved, 

168, 169 

,  his  opinion  of  honesty,  179 

,  on  the  end  of  our  being,  and 

other  Tforks  of,  185 
Epicurus' opinion  of  injustice,  2H 
Epicureans  and  Academics,  167 
Epicureans  and  catamites,  274 
Epicurean,  an,  213 
Epirus,  governor  of,  207 
Eriphyle  and  Amphiaraas,  181 
Error,  the  property  of,  192 
Errors  of  others,  we  should  not  be 

angry  with  the,  56 
Eteocles  and  Polynices,  177, 337 
Eucharist  in  the  Church  of  England 

service,  120 

Euphrates,  the  philosopher,  235 
did  not  act  well  for  the  sake 

of  the  spectators,  353 
Euripides,  113, 178,  404 
Euripides'  Medea,  83 
Euripides,  fragmentof,on  death,  336 
,  the  great  storehouse  of  noble 

thoughts,  361 

Events,  all,  how  to  use,  883 
Evidence,  the   assertion   that    all 

things  are  incapable  of  sure,  167 
Evil,  the  origin  of,  is  the  abuse  of 

rationality  and  liberty,  123 
,  the,  in  everything,  is  that 

which  is  contrary  to  the  nature 

of  the  thing,  313 
,  the  nature  of,  does  not  exist 

in  the  world,  390 
to  men,  the  cause  of  all  their, 

is  the  being  unable  to  adapt  the 

preconceptions  (irpo\-fityeis)  to  the 

several  things,  299 
Exercise,  on,  225 
Exercising:  himself,  method  of  a 

man,  206 

Externals  to  the  will,  92 
,  some  according  to  nature,  and 

others  contrary,  111 
,  men  admire   and  are  busy 

about,  148 

,  judgment  from,  fallacious,  352 

things,  that  advantage  can  b« 

derived  from,  241 


INDEX. 


415 


Face,  the,  does  not  express  the 

hidden  charaolw,  106 
Faculty,  rational,  3 
— ,  ruling,  236 
— — ,  the  ruling,  how  restored  to 

the  original  authority,  159 
— ,  the  ruling,  the  material  for 

the  wise  and  good  man,  204 
Faith  and  works,  354 
False,  impossibility  of  assenting  to 

that  which  appears,  215 
Familiar  intimacy,  on,  322 
Faults,  not  possible  for  a  man  to  be 

free  from  all,  374 
Favorinus,  438 

Fever,  a  goddess  at  Rome,  60,  68 
Firmness  in  danger,  109 
Fool,  a,  cannot  be  persuaded,  146 
Forgiveness  betterthan  revenge,  419 
Fragments  of  Epictetus,  405 
Free  persons  only  alldwed  to  be 

educated,  100 
Free,  what  is,  253,  254 

1  no  bad  man  is,  295 

,  who  are,  the  question   an- 
swered, 301,  302 
Freedom  is  obtained  not  by  desires 

satisfied,  but  by  removing  desire, 

322 

and  slavery,  406 

Friendship,  176 

,  the  test  of,  177 

9  advice  about,  181 

,  what  it  depends  on,  180 

,  Epictetus'  opinions  of,  365 

Galilaeans,  126,  345 
Games,  Greek,  287 
Gellius,  A.,  438,  439 
Gladiators,  91 

Glorious  objects  in  nature,  the,  151 
God,  what  is,  65 

— — ,  nature  of;  how  far  described 
by  Epictetus,  118 

,  the  works  of,  122 

,  a  guide,  117,  246 

God's  gifts,  23 

God  knows  all  things,  141 

——in  man,  48 

— -  in  man,  an  old  doctrine,  119 


God,  the  spirit  of,  in  man,  the  doc- 
trine of  Paul  and  of  Epictetus, 

120, 121 

dwelling  with  a  man,  428 

Gods  everywhere,  250 
God's  law  about  the  Good,  87 
law  that  the  stronger  is  always 

superior  to  the  weaker,  88,  89 
God  and  man,  kinship  of,  30 
and  man,  and  man's  opinions 

of  God,  141, 142 

,  address  to,  152 

,  the  wise  and  good  man's  ad- 
dress to ;  and  his  submission  to 

God's  will,  284 
beyond  man's  understanding, 

21,65 

ought  to  be  obeyed,  373 

,  obedience  to,  the  pleasure  oft 

285,  286 
God's  will,  330 
will  should  be  the  measure  of 

our  desires,  156 
will,  absolute  conformity  to, 

taught  by  Epictetus,  308,  309 
will,  when  resignation  to  it  is 

perfect,  Bp.  Butler,  348 
God,  blaming,  166 
God's  power  over  all  things,  46,  47 
God,   supposed  limitation  of  his 

power,  340 
,  what  a  man  should  be  able  to 

say  to,  209 

,  the  father  of  all,  12, 23,  61 

,  a  friend  of,  157 

,  without,  nothing  should  be 

attempted,  256 
— ,  what  he  chooses  is  better  than- 

what  man  chooses,  348 
and  his  administration  of  the 

world,  those  who  blame,  254 
God's  existence,  to  deny,  and  eat 

his  bread,  172 
God  only,  looking  to,  and  fixing 

your   affections   on    him    only, 

153 
• has  se^t  a  man  to  show  how  a 

life  under  difficulties  is  possible, 

254 
— -  has  made  all  things  perfect, 


INDEX. 


and  the  parts  of  the  universe  for 

the  use  of  the  whole,  346 
God  and  the  gods,  12 
Gods,  various  opinions  on  the,  41, 

42 

— ,  actions  acceptable  to  the,  45 
,  man  must  learn  the  nature  of 

ene,  and  try  to  be  like  them,  141 
— ,  we  ask  for  what  they  do  not 

give,  408 
Goethe,  19,  251 

Gold  tested  by  a  certain  stone,  419 
Good  and  bad,  each  a  certain  kind 

of  will,  87 
• ,  bad,  and  things  indifferent, 

164 
— *—  and  evil  consist  in  the  will, 

intention,  130 

—  could  not  exist  without  evil, 
43 

—  and  evil ;  Chrysippus  and  Sim- 
plicius,  43 

• ,  the,  where  it  is,  253 

,  the  nature  (ofoia)  of,  118 

. man,  a,  not  unhappy,  272 

Gospel  precepts  which  Christians 

do  not  observe,  289 
Gyarus,  Gyara,  75 
Gyara,  284,  285,  S30 

Habit,  how  to  oppose,  80 

• and  faculty,  how  maintained 

and  increased,  158, 159 
- — ,  how  weakened  and  destroyed. 

160 
Habits  must  be  opposed  by  contrary 

habits,  226,  227 
Habit  cherished  by  corresponding 

acts,  288 
Halteres,  15,  327 
Hand-kissing,  62 

Handles,  two,  every  thing  has,  399 
Happiness  and  desire  of  what  is  not 

present  never  come  together,  272 
— ,  only  one  way  to,  331 
Harpaston,  a  ball,  110 
Hearing,  he  who  is  fit  for,  moves 

the  speaker,  192 
Hector's  address  to  Andromache, 

264 


Hellenes,  quarrels  among  the, 
Helvidius,  Priscus,  10 
Heraclitus,  229 

and  Zeno,  99 

Hercules,  152,  161,  256,  361 

Hippocrates,  154 

Homer,  what  he  meant  when  he 

wrote  certain  things,  366 
Hope,  Thales'  opinion  of,  424 
Human  intelligence  is  a  part  of  the 

divine,  44 
race,  the,  continuance  of,  how 

secured,  187 

being,  a,  definition  of  198 

Hypocrite,  the,  356 
Hypothesis  (Wfleens),  91 

Ideas  innate,  of  good  and  evil,  131 
Idiotes,  ISiuTys,  the  meaning  of,  95 

,  itiit&Tiis,  a  common  person,  240 

Ignorance  the  cause  of  doing  wrong, 

78 

Ignorant  man,  description  of  an,  190 
Iliad,  the,  is  only  appearances  and 

the  use  of  appearances,  84 
Immortality  of  the  soul;  Socrates 

and  Epictetus,  231 
Impressions,      <pavraarlat9      guard 

against,  397 

Indifferent,  things  which  are,  64 
Indifference  of  things ;  of  the  things 

which  are  neither  good  nor  bad, 

112 

Informers  at  Eome,  375 
Initiated,  the,  pforai,  310 
Injustice,  an  act  of,  a  great  harm  to 

the  doer,  334 
Inn,  an,  irw5o/ce?oj>,  187 
Interest,  self;  and  common  interest 

or  utility,  61 
,  every  animal  attached  to  its 

own,  178 

Invincible,  how  a  man  should  be,  59 
,  how  a  man  can  be,  386 

Jesus,  prayer  of,  31 

and  Socrates    compared   by 

Baur,  321 
,  and  of  Socrates,  the  death  of. 

contrasted  by  Eousseau,  321 


INDEX. 


447 


K*\  ayaQfc,  201 
Know  thyself,  the  maxim,  58, 197 
—  thyself,    the    beginning  of 

knowledge,  320 

Know  thyself,  the  precept  written 
at  Delphi,  437 
s,  sense  of,  282 
s,  the  use  of,  92 

Laius,  197 

Lateranus,  Plautius,  6 

Laticlave,  the,  72 

Law  of  life  is  the  acting  conform- 
ably to  nature,  77 

,  the  divine,  150 

Laws,  the,  sent  from  God,  325 

Law,  what  it  is,  350 

• ,  nature  of,  429 

Learning  and  teaching,  what  they 
mean,  125 

Levin's  Lectures,  17,  80,  82 

Liberty,  what  men  do  for,  321 

Life  and  practice  of  the  civilized 
world,  the,  245 

— -,  human,  a  warfare,  273,  274 

,  the  science  of,  303,  312 

of  the  dead  rests  in  the  re- 
membrance of  the  living,  320 

Lions,  tame,  297 

Logic  is  necessary,  proof  that,  192 

Logical  art  is  necessary,  the,  52 

Love,  a  divine  power,  316 

Loves  mankind,  who,  407 

Love,  to,  is  only  in  the  power  of  the 
wise,  176 

Lycurgus,  170,  415 

Lycurgus'  generous  behaviour,  419 

Man  and  other  animals,  5,  20 
and  beasts,  how  distinguished, 

123 
- —  a  spectator  of  God  and  his 

works,  and  an  interpreter,  20 
Man's  powers,  73,  74, 182 
Man,  powers  in  often  no  exercised, 

73 
•        and  a  stork,  the  difference 

between,  85 
„ —  what  is  a,  111 
— .  what  is  he?  123 


Man  is  improved  or  destroyed  by 

corresponding  acts,  124 
,  a,  who  has  looked  after  every 

thing  rather  than  what  he  ought, 

143 
Man  supposed  to  consist  of  a  soul 

and  a  bodj,  252 
Man's  own,  what  it  ia,  277 
Man,  for  what  purpose  God  intro- 
duced him  into  the  world,  310, 

311 
,  character  of  a,  who  is  a  fool 

and  a  beast,  336 
Man's  nature  is  to  seek  the  Good ; 

and  Bp.  Butler's  opinion,  338 
,  a,  opinions  only  make  his 

soul  impregnable,  337 

great  faculties,  346 

Man  is  that  power  which  uses  the 

parts  of  his   body  and   under- 
stands the  appearances  of  things, 

350 
,  a,  contemptible  when  he  is 

unable  to  do  any  good,  420 
Manumission,  100 
Marry,  not  to ;  and  not  to  engage 

in  public  affairs,  were  Epicurean 

doctrines,  215 
Marriage,  187 
,  the  Koman  censor  Metellus 

on,  187 
,  Paul's  opinion  of;   and  the 

different    opinion  of  Epictetus, 

258 
of  a  minister  of  God,  in  the 

opinion  of  Epictetus  in  the  pre- 
sent state  of  things,  259 
,  the  true  nature  of,  not  under  • 

stood  by  Paul,  317 
Massurius    and    Cassius,   Roman 

lawyers,  325 
Masters,  our,  those  who  have  the 

power  over  the  things  which  we 

love  and  hate  and  fear,  302 
Materials,  #Ac»,  are  neither  good  nor 

bad,  108 

Matthew,  c.  vi,,  31,  33 
Measure  of  every  act,  84 
Medea,  155 
Menoeceus,  242 


448 


INDEX.. 


Milesiaca,  358 

Money  not  the  best  thing,  388 
Murrhina  vasa,  221 

Names,  examination  of,  the  begin- 
ning of  education,  53 

— ,  a  man  must  first  understand, 
142 

Nature,  acting  according  to,  37,  38 

,  power  of,  169 

>  ,  following ;  a  manner  of  speak- 
ing, just  and  true,  Bp.  Butler, 
198 

*— ,  living,  according  to;  Zeno's 
principle,  198 

of  man,  313 

—  of  every  thing  which  pleases 
or  supplies  a  want,  consider  what 
is  the,  381 

,  tiie  will  of,  how  known,  389 

— ,  the,  of  evil  does  not  exist  in 

the  world,  390 
Nero,  9 

,  coins  of,  335 

News,  not  to  be  disturbed  by,  239 

Nicias,  420 

Nicopolis,  63,  71, 112, 174 

Obstinacy,  on,  144 

Obstinate  person  who  is  persuaded 
to  change  his  mind,  instance  of 
an,  145 

Opinion,  162,  386 

Opinions,  right,  the  consequences 
of  the  destruction  of,  85 

put  in  practice  which  are  con- 
trary to  true  opinions,  125 

—  disturb  us,  150 

—  about  things  independent  of 
the  will,  207 

Opinion  the  cause  of  a  man's  acting, 

219 
— ,  when  the  need  of  it  comes, 

ought  to  be  ready,  222 
Opinions,  the  power  of,  338 

,  right  and  wrong,  and  their 

consequences,  346 
— ,  not  thiugs  disturbjnen,  881 
— ,   fixed   principles,"  how  ac- 
quired, 420 


Organs  of  sense  and  limbs  are  in* 

strumeuts  used  by  the  living  man, 

Bp.  Butler,  350 
'Opju^,  15 
Ostentation,  those  who  read  and 

discuss  for,  264 
Oiicria,  29,  87 
,  substance  or  nature  of  Good. 

214 
,  Nature  of  man   cannot   be 

altogether  pure,  367 

Paedagogue,  a,  425 
Pancratium,  Pentathlon,  195 
Paradoxes,  paralogies,  76 
Partisan,  an  unseemly,  207 
Patronus,  the  Koman  word,  221 
Paul,  imperfect  quotation  from,  by 

Mrs.  Carter,  243 
and  Epictetus  contemporary, 

283 
• and  Epictetus  do  not  agree 

about  marriage,  317 
Penalties  for  those  who  disobey  the 

divine  administration,  225 
Perception,  82 

Periodical  renovation  of  things,  99 
Peripatetics,  the,  165 
Persons  who  tell  you  all  their  affairs 

and  wish  to  know  yours,  375 
Persuasion,  a  man  has  most  power 

of,  with  himself,  359 

b :  </>arra<rm,  86 
,  visa  animi,  161 
,  visa  animi,  Gellius,  439 
Qwraaia,  an  imagination  of  things 

to  coine,  which  will  bring  good, 

322 

Phidias,  21, 121, 122 
Philosophy,  387 

,  what  it  promises,  49,  230 

,  the  beginning  of,  79, 132 

should  be  practical,  815 

,  how  to  know  that  we  have 

made  progress  in,  400 
Philosopher,  a,  401 

,  the  work  cf  a,  140, 141 

,  first  business  of  a,  153 

,  a  real,  described,  166 

Philosophers  in  words  only,  162 


INDEX. 


Philosophers'  rules  applied  to  prac- 
tice, 328 

Piety  and  a  man's  interest  must  be 
in  the  same  thing,  81 

• ,  and  sanctity  are  good  things, 

170 

• to  the  Gods,  what  it  is,  392 

• and  a  man's  interest,  how 

they  are  connected,  393 

Pirate,  how  treated  by  a  wise  and 
efood  man,  427 

Pittacus1  teaching,  that  forgive-' 
ness  is  better  than  revenge,  419 

Plato  and  Hippocrates,  28 

says  that  every  soul  is  un- 
willingly deprived  of  the  truth, 
83 

Plato's  saying,  160 

doctrine  that  every  mind  is  de- 
prived of  truth  unwillingly,  181 

Polity  read  by  the  women  in 

Rome,  417 

Pleasure,  nature  of,  416 

Polemon  and  Xenocrates,  196 

Polybius  on  the  Roman  state,  170 

Polynices  and  Eteocles,  393 

Poor,  if,  be  content  and  happy,  410 

Poverty  and  wealth,  411,  430 

Practice  in  hearing,  necessary  for 
those  who  go  to  hear  philoso- 
phers, 189 

Praecognitions  (irpoXfyeis),  adapta- 
tion of,  to  particular  cases,  66, 67 

Preconception,  irp<f\7j^iy,  8 

Preconceptions,  how  fitted  to  the 
several  things,  131 

— » how  to  be  adapted  to  their 
correspondent  objects,  154 

Principle,  the  ruling,  of  a  bad  man 
cannot  be  trusted,  180 

Principles,  general;  and  their  ap- 
plication, 77 

ought  always  to  be  in  readi- 
ness, 105 

Principle,  the,  on  which  depends 
every  movement  of  man  and  God, 
205 

Principles,  he  who  has  great,  knows 
his  own  powers,  357 

Procrastination  dangerous,  374 


in  the  larger  sense,  183 

Protagoras  and  Hippias,  211 

Providence,  19,  41,  50,  51 

• ,  irp6voiat  141 

,  on  ;  irpovoias,  ircpl,  238 

Publicani,  ei/coo-rc^ai,  298 

Purity,  cleanliness,  a  man  is  dis- 
tinguished from  other  animals 
by.  366 

Pyrrho,  80 

and  the  Academics,  81 

Pyrrho's  saying,  424 

Pythagoras'  golden  verses,  222 

Pythagoras,  344 

Pythian  God,  the,  394 

Quails,  how  used  by  the  Greeks,  287 

Reading,  Bp.  Butler's  remarks  on, 

326 
,  what  ought  to  be  the  purpose  • 

of,  326,  331 
Reason ;  reasoning,  the  purpose  of, 

24,  52,  64 
— ,  power  of  communing  with 

God,  30 

,  how  it  contemplates  itself,  6$ 

not  given  to  man  for  the  pur- 
pose of  misery,  271 
Reasoning,  26 
Recitations,  houses  lent  for,  267 

at  Rome,  396 

Reformation  of  manners  produced; 

by  the  Gospel,  149 
Relations,  three,  between  a  man. 

and  other  things,  141 
Resurrection  of  Christ ;  and  Paul's 

doctrine  of  man's  resurrection. 

283 
of  the  body,  various  opinions 

of  divines  of  the  English  Church 

on,  284 

Riches  and  happiness,  409 
Rings,  golden,  worn  by  the  Roman 

Equites,299 
Rome,  dependents  wait  on  great 

men  at,  331 
Rufus,  0.  Musonius,  7,  27,  34, 212, 


2  0 


450 


INDEX. 


Kale,  a,  the  value  of,  86 

Bules,  by  which  things  are  tried, 
must  be  fixed;  and  then  the 
rules  may  be  applied,  133 

Rules,  certain,  should  be  in  readi- 
ness, 373 

Sacred  are  the  words  by  themselves, 

men  say,  246 

Sarpedon,  son  of  Zeus,  81 
Saturnalia,  74,  80,  302 
Savigny  on  free  will,  55 
Sceptics,  the,  deny  the  knowledge 

and  certainty  of  things,  81 
Scholasticus,  a,  41 
School,    who    come    to   the,   for 

the  purpose  of  being  improved? 

174 
,  the,  with  what  mind  it  ought 

to  be  entered,  175 

,  philosopher's,  a  surgery,  268 

Secret  matters  require  fidelity  and 

corresponding  opinions,  377 
Seeming  to  be  is  not  sufficient,  132 
Self-knowledge,  yv&Qi  creavrdv,  256 
Self-love,  self-regard,  61 
Sickness,  how  we  ought  to  bear,  222, 

223 
Signal  to  quit  life,  God's,  89 

,  the,  to  retire,  99 

,  the,  to  retreat,  293 

Simplicius,  1 

— ,  commentary  of,  on  the  En- 

cheiridion,  390, 404 
Slave,  a,  why  he  wishes  to  be  set 

free,  298 
,  a,  does  not  secure  happiness 

by  being  made  free,  298, 299 
Socrates,  12,  30,  83,  41,  53,  76,  99, 

101, 103, 104, 110,  115,  139,  160t 

227,  228,  233,  237,  251, 267,  268, 

284,  354, 400,  403 
and  his  treatment  by   the 

Athenians,  88 
preferred  death  to  saying  and 

doing  things  unworthy  of  him, 

90 

—  and  tho  Phaedon  of  Plato,  95 
— -  taught  that  we  must  not  do 

wrong  for  wrong,  129 


Socrates,  the  method  of,  134, 135 
knew  by  what  the  rational 

soul  is  moved,  193 
,  what  he  says  to  his  judges, 

197 
Socrates  did  not  profess  to  teach 

virtue,  210 

,  imitators  of,  217 

• loved  his  children,  how,  277 

,  Diogenes,  and  Cleanthes,  as 

examples,  292 

,  what  he  taught,  299 

,  heroic  acts  of,  319 

,  a  brave  soldier  and  a  philo- 
sopher, 319 
— — ,  remembrance  of  what  he  did 

or  said  in  his  life,  even  more 

useful  now,  320 
• in  his  prison  wrote  a  hymn  to 

Apollo,  329 

avoided  quarrels,  333 

,  how  he  managed  his  house- 
hold, 338 

,  why  he  washed  seldom,  369 

'  opinion  on  divination,  394 

and  Diogenes,  151,  247,  275, 

349,  358 
Solitary,  he  is  not,  who  sees  tho 

great  objects  of  nature,  231 
Solitude,  on,  228 
Solon's  wise  sayings,  421 
Sophists,  against  the,  244 
Sorrow  of  another,  how  far  Epictetua 

would  endeavour  to  stop,  272 
Souls,  human,  parts  of  God,  47 
Soul,  body  and  things  external  re- 
late to  man's,  213 
and  body,  severance  of,  no 

harm  in  the,  224 
,  existence  of  the,  independent 

of  the  body,  perhaps  not  taught 

byEpictetus,  282 
,  the  probable  opinion  of  Epic- 

tetus  on  the,  347 
,  the  impurity  of  the,  is  her 

own  bad  judgments  (opinions), 

867 

Speaking,  the  power  of,  182 
Spirit,  TrvfVjua,  182 
Sportulae,  363 


INDEX. 


451 


Stars,  number  of,  neither  even  nor 
odd,  83 

,  number  of  the,  147 

Stobaeus,  405 

Stoics,  doctrine  of  the,  35 

• ,  the  language  of  the,  formed 

long  before  that  of  the  New 
Testament  writers,  93 

Stoic  opinions,  the  mere  knowledge 
of,  does  not  make  a  man  a  Stoic, 
126 

• ,  who  is  a,  165 

Stoics  taught  that  a  man  should 
live  an  active  life,  and  should 
marry  and  beget  children,  187 

,  the,  say  one  thing  and  do 

another,  215 

,  practical  teaching  of  the,  244 

—  and  the  Pyrrhonists  and  Aca- 
demics, dispute  between,  82 

Sufferings  useful,  whether  we  choose 
or  not,  288 

Suicide,  32,  33 

Superiors,  the  many  can  only  imi- 
tate their,  207 

Swedenborg,  47, 120, 123 

Sympathy,  Epictetus*  opinion  on, 
385 

Symposium  of  Xenophon,  135, 333 

Teacher,  fitness  of,  and  ordering  of 
a,  247 

©aujue£f€iK,  admirari,  to  overvalue, 
87 

Oau/*(£ff iv,  admirari,  305 

0&«j>,  BofoeerflcM,  308,  384 

Themistocles,  430 

Theopompus,  154 

G>€u>p^ardj  403 

Theorems,  why  they  are  said  to  be 
useless,  175 

,  the  use  of,  220 

Thermopylae,  the  Spartans  who  died 
at,  171 

Thersites,  249 

Things,  bond  of  union  among,  46 

— -  under  the  inspection  of  God, 
46 

— ,  the  power  of  using  and  esti- 
mating, 182 


Things,  a  man  is  overpowered  by 

before  he  is  overpowered  by  a 

man,  279 
— — ,  some  in  our  power  and  some 

not,  378, 435 

not  lost,  but  restored,  383 

— -,  some,  incomprehensible ;  and 

what  is  the  use  of  them,  if  they 

are  comprehended  ?  437 
Thirty  tyrants  of  Athens,  the,  139 
Thrasea,  Paetus,  6 
Three  things  in  which  a  man  should 

exercise  himself,  201 
Toreutic  art,  216 
Tranquil  life,  a,  how  secured,  382 
Tranquillity,  the  product  of  virtue 

14,17 

,  of,  103 

of  mind  and  freedom,  man 

should  strive  to  attain,  152 
— ,  to  those  who  desire  to  pass 

life  in,  325 
Treasure,  the,  where  it  is,  there  the 

heart  is  also,  179 
Trifles  on  which   men   employed 

themselves,  265,  269 
Triumphs,  Roman,  281 
Truth,  in,  the  nature  of  evil  and 

good  is,  104 

,414 

,  the  nature  of,  432 

Tyranny  in  the  time  of  Epictetus, 

96 
under  the  Boman  Emperors, 

102 

Ulysses  and  Hercules,  271 

and  Nausicaa,  294 

Unbelievers,  the  creed  of,  170 
Unhappiness  is  a  man's  own  fault, 

270 
Universe,  21 

,  the  nature  of  the,  431 

Unjust,  that  which  is,  a  man  cannot 

do  without  suffering  for  it,  312 
Untaught,  the,  is  a  child  in  life, 

241 

Vespasian,  10 
Victory,  figure  of,  121 


452 


INDEX. 


Virtue's  reward  is  in  the  acts  of 

virtue,  276 

Virtue  is  its  own  reward,  360 
Visa  animi,  Gellius,  439 

Wealth,  409 

— -,  how  gained,  421 

What  is  a  man?  123 

Will,  irpoatp€(ris,  6,  16,  23,  40,  45, 

67 
—,109 

to  act,  39,  67 

—  cannot  be  compelled  to  assent, 

54 
,  things  independent  of  the,  are 

neither  good  nor  bad,  62 

,  good  and  evil  in  the,  73, 147 

only  conquers  will,  88 

— ,  the,  nothing  superior  to  the 

faculty  of,  127 
—,  .friendship  depends  on  the. 

179, 180 
— ,  the  faculty  of  the,  and  its 

powers,  182, 184 

« ,  perverted,  184 

•— -,  a  faculty,  and  set  over  the 

other  faculties,  184 
•— ,  when  it  is  right,  uses  all  the 

other  faculties,  185 
*— ,  the  cause  of  happiness,  or  of 

unhappiness,  186 

•— — ,  the  Good  is  in  a  right  deter- 
mination of  the,  205 
•— ,  doing  something  useful  for 

the  exercise  of  the,  209 


Will,  the,  can  only  hinder  or  damage 

itself,  241 
• of  the  Cynic  and  his  use  of 

appearances,  263 
,  things  out  of  the  power  of  the, 

329 

,  the,  must  be  exercised,  359 

,  man's,  put  by  God  in  ooc- 

dience  to  himself  only,  373 

of  God,  conformity  to,  42 

Woman,  war  about  a  handsome, 

179 
Women  being  common  by  nature ; 

what  does  i*  mean?  107 

,  slaves  w>,  296,  297 

World,  the,  one  city,  271 

Wrong,  a  man  never  do<ss,  in  oTie 

thing  and  suffers  in  another,  210 

Xanthippe,  the  ill-tempered  wife  of 
Socrates,  338 

and  Socrates,  436 

Xenocrates  and  Poleinon,  370 
Etforpa,  the  Roman  strigilis,  368 

Zeno,  founder  of  the  Stoic  sect,  65, 

107 

and  Antigonus,  138 

and  Socrates,  274 

Zeno's  opinions,  353 

Zeus,  God,  12,  21 

and   the  rest  of  the 

156 

,  the  occupation  of,  229 

the  father  of  men,  272 


:  PRINTED  BY  WILMAM  OlOWBB  AND  SONS,  UMITBI* 
WAMFQBD  8THEBT  AND  CHAR1KG  CROSS. 


AN 


ALPHABETICAL   LIST 

OF  BOOKS  CONTAINED  IN 

BOHN'S   LIBRARIES. 


Detailed  Catalogue^  arranged  according  to  the  various 
Libraries^  will  be  sent  on  application. 


ADDISON'S  Works.  With  the 
Notes  of  Bishop  Kurd,  Portrait, 
and  8  Plates  of  Medals  and  Coins. 
Edited  by  H,  G.  Bohn.  6  vols. 
3^.  6W.  each. 

JESCHYLUS,  The  Dramas  of. 
Translated  into  English  Verse  by 
Anna  Swanwick.  4th  Edition, 
revised.  5*. 

The  Tragedies  of.  Trans- 
lated into  Prose  by  T.  A.  Buckley, 
B.A.  y.frf. 

AGASSIZ  and  GOULD'S  Out- 
line of  Comparative  Physi- 
ology. Enlarged  by  Dr.  Wright. 
With  390  Woodcuts.  5*. 

ALFIERI'S  Tragedies.  Tran*- 
lated  into  English  Verse  by  Edg>t 
A.  Bowring,  C.B.  2  vols.  3*.  6d. 
each. 

ALLEN'S  (Joseph,  R.  N.)  Battles 
of  the  British  Navy.  Revised 
Edition,  with  57  Steel  Engravings. 
2  vols.  $s.  each. 

AMMIANUS  MARCELLINUS. 
History  of  Rome  during  the 
Reigns  of  Constantius,  Julian, 
Jovianus,  Valentinian,  and  Valens, 


Translated  by  Prof.  C.  D.  Yonge, 
M.A.    7j.6fl?. 

ANDERSEN'S  Danish  Legends 
and  Fairy  Tales.  Translated 
by  Caroline  Peachey.  With  120 
Wood  Engravings.  5*. 

ANTONINUS  (M.  Aurellua),  The 
Thoughts  of.  Trans,  literally, 
with  Notes  and  Introduction  by 
George  Long,  M.A.  3*.  6ct. 

APOLLONIUS  RHODIUS. 
'The  Argonautioa.'  Translated 
by  E.  P.  Coleridge,  B.A. 

APPIAN'S  Roman  History. 
Translated  by  Horace  White, 
M.A.,  LL.D.  With  Maps  and 
Illustrations.  2  vols.  6s.  each. 

APULEIUS,  The  Works  of 
Comprising  the  Golden  Ass,  God 
of  Socrates,  Florida,  and  Dis- 
course of  Magic.  5-?. 

ARIOSTO'S  Orlando  Furioso. 
Translated  into  English  Verse  by 
W.S.Rose.  With  Portrait,  and  2  \ 
Steel  Engravings.  2  vols.  5 s.  each 

ARISTOPHANES'  Comedies. 
Translated  by  W.  J.  Hickie.  2 
vols.  5*.  each. 


An  Alphabetical  List 


ARISTOTLE'S  Nicomachean 
Ethics.  Translated,  with  Intro- 
duction and  Notes,  by  the  Vener- 
able Archdeacon  Browne.  $s. 

Politics      and   Economics. 

Translated  by  E.  Walford,  M.A., 
with  Introduction  by  Dr.  Gillies. 

5*- 

Metaphysics.    Translated  by 

the    Rev.   John    II.    McMahon, 
M.A.     $J. 

History  of  Animals.    Trans. 

by  Richard  Cresswcll,  M.A.    5*. 

Organon ;  or,  Logical  Trea- 
tises, and  the  Introduction  of 
Porphyry.  Translated  by  the 
Rev.  O.  F.  Owen,  M.A.  2  vols. 
3_y.  6d.  each. 

Rhetoric    and    Poetics. 

Trans,  by  T.  Buckley,  B.A,     5*. 

ARRIAN'S  Anabasis  of  Alex- 
ander, together  with  the  Indie  a. 
Translated  by  E.  J.  Chinnock, 
M.A.,  LL.D.  With  Maps  and 
Plans.  5*. 

AtPHEN^EUS.  The  Deipnoso- 
phists;  or,  the  Banquet  of  the 
Learned.  Trans,  by  Prof.  C.  D. 
Yonge,  M.A.  3  vols.  5*.  each. 

BACON'S  Moral  and  Historical 
Works,  including  the  Essays, 
Apophthegms,  Wisdom  of  the 
Ancients,  New  Atlantis,  Henry 
VII.,  Henry  VIII.,  Elizabeth, 
Henry  Prince  of  Wales,  History 
of  Great  Britain,  Julius  Cscsar, 
ind  Augustus  Csesar.  Edited  by 
J.  Devey,  M.A.  35.  6d. 

Novum  Organum  and  Ad- 
vancement of  Learning.  Edited 
by  J.  Devey,  M.A.  5*. 

BASS'S  Lexicon  to  the  Greek 
Testament.  2j. 


BAX'S  Manual  of  the  History 
of  Philosophy,  for  the  use  ot 
Students.  By  E.  Belfort  Bax.  5.?. 

BEAUMONT  and  FLETCHER, 

their  finest  Scenes,  Lyrics,  and 
other  Beauties,  selected  from  the 
whole  of  their  works,  and  edited 
by  Leigh  Hunt.  35-.  &/. 

BECHSTEIN'S  Cage  and 
Chamber  Birds,  their  Natural 
History,  Habits,  Food,  Diseases, 
and  Modes  of  Capture.  Translated, 
with  considerable  additions  on 
Structure,  Migration,  and  Eco- 
nomy, by  IT.  G.  Adams.  Together 
with  SWEET  BRITISH  WARKLKRS. 
With  43  coloured  Plates  and 
Woodcut  Illustrations.  5-r. 

BEDE'S  (Venerable)  Ecclesias- 
tical History  of  England.  To- 
gether with  the  ANOLO-SAXON 
CHRONICLE.  Indited  by  J.  A. 
Giles,  D.C.L.  With  Map.  5*. 

BELL  (Sir  Charles).  The  Ana- 
tomy and  Philosophy  of  Ex- 
pression, as  connected  with 
the  Pine  Arts.  By  Sir  Charles 
Bell,  K.H.  7th  edition,  revised. 
5*- 

BERKELEY  (George),  Bishop 
of  Oloyne,  The  Works  of. 
Edited  by  George  Sampson.  With 
Biographical  Introduction  by  the 
Right  Hon.  A.  J.  Baltour,  M.P. 
3  vols.  5-y.  each. 

BION.    See  THEOCRITUS. 

BJORNSON'S  Arne  and  the 
Fisher  Lassie.  Translated  by 
W.  H.  Low,  M.A.  $s.  6d. 

BLAIR'S  Chronological  Tables 
Revised  and  Enlarged.  Compre- 
hending the  Chronology  and  His- 
toiy  of  theWorld,from  the  Earliest 
Times  to  the  Russian  Treaty  of 
Peace,  April  1856.  By  J.  Wil- 
loughby  Rosse.  Double  vol.  IOJ. 


Contained  in  BoJnfs  Libraries. 


BLAIR'S  Index  of  Dates.  Com- 
prehending the  principal  Facts  in 
the  Chronology  and  Hibtory  of 
the  World,  alphabetically  ar- 
ranged ;  being  a  complete  Index 
to  Blah's  Chronological  Tables. 
By  J.  W.  Rosse.  2  vols.  $s.  each. 

BLEEK,  Introduction  to  the 
Old  Testament.  By  Friedrich 
Bleek.  Edited  by  Johann  Bleek 
and  Adolf  Kamphausen.  Trans- 
lated by  G.  II.  Venablef.,  under 
the  supei  vision  of  the  Rev.  Canon 
Venables.  2  vols,  $s.  each, 

BOETHITIS'S  Consolation  of 
Philosophy.  King  Alfred's  Anglo- 
Saxon  Version  of.  With  a  Uieial 
English  Translation  on  opposite 
pages,  Notes,  Introduction,  and 
Glossary,  by  Rev.  S.  Fox,  M.A. 
5*- 

BOHN'3  Dictionary  of  Poetical 
Quotations.    4th  edition.     6$. 

Handbooks  of  Athletic 

Sports.  In  8  vols.,  each  con- 
taining numerous  Illustrations. 
3^.  6d.  each. 

I. — Cricket,    Lawn    Tennis, 
Tennis,  Rackets,  Fives, 
Golf. 
II. — Rowing     and     Sculling, 

Sailing,  Swimming. 
III. — Boxing,  Broadsword, 
Single  Stick,&c.,  Wrest- 
ling, Fencing. 

IV.— Rugby  Football,  Associa- 
tion Football,  Baseball, 
Rounders,  Fielclball, 

8uoits,  Skittles,  Bowls, 
urling. 

V.— Cycling,  Athletics,  Skat- 
ing. 

VI. — Practical  Horsemanship, 
including  Riding  for 
Ladies. 

VII. — Camping  Out,  Canoeing. 
VIII.— Gymnastics,  Indian  Clubs. 


BOHN'S  Handbooks  of  Games. 
New  edition.  In  2  vols.,  wilh 
numerous  Illustrations  3-v.  6</. 
each. 

Vol.  I.— TABLE  GAMI*  :— Bil- 
liards, Chess,  Draughts,  Back- 
gammon, Dominoes,  Solitaire, 
Reversi,  Go-Bang,  Rouge  et  Noir, 
Roulette,  E.G.,  Hazard,  Faro. 

Vol.  II.  —  CARD  GAMES  :  — 
Whist,  Solo  Whist,  Poker,  Piquet, 
Ecarte,  Euchre,  Bezique,  Crib- 
bsige,  Loo,  Vingt-et-un,  Napoleon, 
Newmarket.,  Pope  Joan,  JSpecula- 
tion,  &c.,  &c. 

I  BOND'S  A  Handy  Book  of  Rules 
I  and  Tables  for  verifying  Dates 
I  with  the  Christian  Eiii,  &c.  Giving 
i  an  account  of  the  Chief  Eras  and 
|  Systems  used  by  various  Nations  ; 
|  with  the  easy  Methods  for  deter- 
mining the  Corresponding  Dates. 
j  By  J.  J.  Bond.  5*. 

J  BONOMI'S  Nineveh  and  its 
i  Palaces.  7  Plates  and  294  Wood- 
j  cut  Illustrations.  $s. 

I  BOSWELL'S  Life  of  Johnson, 
|  with  the  TOUR  IN  THE  HEBRIDES 
and  JOHNSONIANA.  Edited  by 
the  Rev.  A.  Napier,  M.A.  With 
Frontispiece  to  each  vol.  6  vols. 
3$.  6</.  each. 

BRAND'S  Popular  Antiquities 
of  England,  Scotland,  and  Ire- 
land. Arranged,  revised,  and 
greatly  enlarged,  by  Sir  Henry 
Ellis,  K.IL,  F.R.S.,  &c.,  &c.  3 
vols.  51.  each. 

BREMER'S  (Frederika)  Works. 
Translated  by  Mary  Howitt.  4 
vols.  3-f.  6ct.  each. 

BRIDGWATER  TREATISES. 
Bell  (Sir  Charles)  on  the  Hand. 

With  numerous  Woodcuts.  5-r. 
Kirby  on  the  History,  Habits, 

and   Instincts    of  Animals. 

Edited    by    T.   Rymer   Jones. 

Wiih  upwards  of  100  Woodcuts. 

2  vols.     5-r.  each. 


An  Alphabetical  List  of  Books 


BRIDGWATER  TREATISES  continued. 

Kidd  on  the  Adaptation  of  Ex- 
ternal Nature  to  the  Physical 
Condition  of  Man.  3;,  6d. 

Chalmers  on  the  Adaptation 
of  External  Nature  to  the 
Moral  and  Intellectual  Con- 
stitution  of  Man.  5;. 

BRINK  (B.  ten)  Early  English 
Literature.  By  Bernhard  ten 
Brink.  Vol.1.  ToWyclif.  Trans- 
lated by  Horace  M.  Kennedy. 
3J.  6<f. 

Vol.  II.  Wyclif,  Chaucer,  Ear- 
liest Drama  Renaissance.  Trans- 
lated by  W.  Clarke  Robinson, 
Ph.D.  y.  6d. 

Vol.  III.  From  the  Fourteenth 
Century  to  the  Death  of  Surrey. 
Edited  by  Dr.  Alois  Brandl. 
Trans,  by  L.  Dora  Schmitz. 


Five   Lectures  on  Shake- 
speare.  Trans,  by  Julia  Franklin. 


BROWNE'S  (Sir  Thomas)  Works 
Edited  by  Simon  Wilkin.  3  vols, 
35.  &/.  each. 

BURKE'  S  Works.  8  vols.  3*.  6d. 
each. 

I.  —  Vindication  of  Natural  So- 
ciety —  Essay  on  the  Sub- 
lime and  Beautiful,  and 
various  Political  Miscel- 
lanies. 

II.  —  Reflections  on  the  French 
Revolution  —  Letters  re- 
lating to  the  Bristol  Elec- 
tion —  Speech  on  Fox's 
East  India  Bill,  &c. 

III.  —  Appeal  from  the  New  to  the 
Old  Whigs—  On  the  Na- 
bob of  Arcot's  Debts— 
The  Catholic  Claims,  &c. 


BURKE'S  WORKS  continued, 

IV.  —  Report  on  the  Affairs  of 
India,  and  Articles  of 
Charge  against  Warren 
Hastings. 

V.  —  Conclusion  of  the  Articles  of 
Charge  against  Warren 
Hastings  —  Political  Let- 
ters on  the  American  War, 
on  a  Regicide  Peace,  to 
the  Empress  of  Russia. 
VI.  —  Miscellaneous  Speeches  — 
Letters  and  Fragments  — 
Abridgments  of  English 
History,  &c.  With  a 
General  Index. 

VII,  &  Vlll.-Speeches  on  the  Im- 
peachment of  Warren 
Hastings  ;  and  Letters. 
With  Index.  2  vols. 
3-r.  6d.  each. 

-  Life.     By  Sir  J.  Prior.  3^.  6d. 

BURNEY'S  Evelina.  By  Frances 
Burney  (Mme.  D'Arblay).  With 
an  Introduction  and  Notes  by 
A.  R.  Ellis.  3-r.  6d. 

-  Cecilia.    With  an   Introduc- 
tion and  Notes  by  A.   R.   Ellis. 
2  vols.     3-f.  6d.  each. 

BURN  (R  )  Ancient  Rome  and 
its  Neighbourhood.  An  Illus- 
trated Handbook  to  the  Ruins  in 
the  City  and  the  Campagna,  for 
the  use  of  Travellers.  By  Robert 
Burn,  M.A.  With  numerous 
Illustrations,  Maps,  and  Plans. 


BURNS  (Robert),  Life  of.  By 
J.  G.  Lockhart,  D.C.L.  A 
new  and  enlarged  Edition.  Re- 
vised by  William  Scott  Douglas. 
3*.  6d. 

BURTON'S  (Robert)  Anatomy  of 
Melancholy.  Edited  by  the  Rev. 
A.  R.  Shilleto,  M.A.  With  In- 
troduction by  A.  H.  Bullen,  and 
full  Index.  3  vols.  31.  6d.  each. 


Contained  in  Bohris  Libraries. 


5 


BURTON  (Sir  R.  P.)  Personal 
Narrative  of  a  Pilgrimage  to 
Al-Madlnah  and  Mecoah.  By 
Captain  Sir  Richard  F.  Burton, 
K.C.M.G.  With  an  Introduction 
by  Stanley  Lane-Poole,  and  all 
the  original  Illustrations.  2  vols. 
3J.  6d.  each. 

#%  This  is  the  copyright  edi- 
tion, containing  the  author's  latest 
notes. 

BUTLER'S  (Bishop)  Analogy  of 
Religion,  Natural  and  Revealed, 
to  the  Constitution  and  Course  of 
Nature ;  together  with  two  Dis- 
sertations on  Personal  Identity  and 
on  the  Nature  of  Virtue,  and 
Fifteen  Sermons.  $s.  6d. 

BUTLER'S  (Samuel)  Hudibras. 
With  Variorum  Notes,  a  Bio- 
graphy, Portrait,  and  28  Illus- 
trations. 5*. 

or,  further  Illustrated  with  60 

Outline  Portraits.  2  vols.  51. 
each. 

C-33SAR.  Commentaries  on  the 
Gallic  and  Civil  Wars,  Trans- 
lated by  W.  A.  McDevitte,  B.A. 
5*. 

CAMOENS'  Lusiad  ;  or,  the  Dis- 
covery of  India.  An  Epic  Poem. 
Translated  by  W.  J.  Mickle.  5th 
Edition,  revised  by  E.  R.  Hodges, 
M.C.P.  3J.  6rf. 

CARAFAS  (The)  of  Maddaloni. 
Naples  under  Spanish  Dominion. 
Translated  from  the  German  of 
Alfred  de  Reumont.  y.  6d. 

CARLYLE'S  Sartor  Resartus. 
With  75  Illustrations  by  Edmund 
J.  Sullivan.  51. 

CARPENTER'S    (Dr.    W.    B.) 

Zoology.     Revised   Edition,   by 

W.  S.  Dallas,  F.L.S.    With  very 

numerous  Woodcuts.     Vol.  I.  6s. 

[  Vol.  //.  out  of  print. 


CARPENTER'S  Mechanical 
Philosophy,  Astronomy,  and 
Horology.  181  Woodcuts.  55. 

Vegetable  Physiology    and 

Systematic   Botany.       Revised 
Edition,  by  E.  Lankester,  M.D., 
&c.     With  very  numerous  Wood- 
cuts.    6.T. 

Animal  Physiology.   Revised 

Edition.     With  upwards  of  300 

i       Woodcuts.     6s. 

CASTLE  (E.)  Schools  and 
j  Masters  of  Fence,  from  the 
i  Middle  Ages  to  the  End  of  the 
!  Eighteenth  Century.  By  Egerton 
j  Castle,  M.A.,  F.S.A.  With  a 
Complete  Bibliography.  Illus- 
|  trated  with  140  Reproductions  of 
j  Old  Engravings  and  6  Plates  of 
1  Swords,  showing  114  Examples, 
j  6,. 

i  CATTERMOLE'S  Evenings  at 
j  Haddon  Hall.  With  24  En- 
I  g  ravings  on  Steel  from  designs  by 
j  Cattermole,  the  Letterpress  by  the 
i  Baroness  de  Carabella.  $s. 

I  CATULLUS,  TibuUus,  and  the 
i  Vigil  of  Venus.  A  Literal  Prose 
j  Translation.  5*. 

CELLINI  (Benvenuto).  Me- 
moirs of,  written  by  Himself. 
Translated  by  Thomas  Roscoe. 
y.  6</. 

CERVANTES'  Don  Quixote  de 
la  Mancha.  Motteaux's  Trans- 
lation revised.  2  vols.  31.  6a7. 
each. 

Galatea.      A    Pastoral    Ro- 
mance.    Translated  by  G.  W.  T. 
Gyll.     35.  6rf. 

Exemplary  Novels.  Trans- 
lated by  Walter  K.  Kelly.  $s.  6d. 

CHAUCER'3  Poetical  Works. 
Edited  by  Robert  Bell.  Revised 
Edition,  wilh  a  Preliminary  Essay 
by  Prof.  W.  W.  Skeat,  M.A.  4 
vuls.  3.r.  6d.  each. 


An  Alphabetical  List  of  Books 


CHESS  CONGRESS  of  1862. 
A  Collection  of  the  Games  played. 
Edited  by  J.  Lowenthal.  5*. 

OHEVRETJL  on  Colour.  Trans- 
lated from  the  French  by  Charles 
Mattel.  Third  Edition,  with 
Plates,  5-f. ;  or  with  an  additional 
series  of  16  Plates  in  Colours, 
7*.  6d. 

OHILLINGWORTH'S  Religion 
of  Protestants.  A  Safe  Way  to 
Salvation.  $s.  6d. 

CHINA,  Pictorial,  Descriptive, 
and  Historical.  With  Map  and 
nearly  100  Illustrations.  51. 

CHRONICLES  OF  THE  CRU- 
SADES. Contemporary  Narra- 
tives of  the  Crusade  of  Richard 
Cceur  de  Lion,  by  Richard  of 
Devizes  and  Geoffrey  de  Vinsauf ; 
and  of  the  Crusade  at  St.  Louis, 
by  Lord  John  de  Joinville.  51. 

CICERO'S  Orations.  Translated 
by  Prof.  C.  D.  Yonge,  M.A.  4 
vols.  5*.  each. 

Letters.  Translated  by  Evelyn 

S.  Shuckburgh.  4  vols.  5*.  each. 

On    Oratory   and    Orators. 

With    Letters    to    Quintus    and 
Brutus.     Translated  by  the  Rev. 
J.  S.  Watson,  M.A.     5*. 

On  the  Nature  of  the  Gods, 

Divination,    Fate,    Laws,   a   Re- 
public,  Consulship.      Translated 
by  Prof.  C.  D.  Yonge,  M.A.,  and 
Francis  Barharn.     5-r. 

Academics,  De  Finibus,  and 

Tuscuian    Questions.      By   Prof. 
C.  D.  Yonge,  M.A.     5*. 

CICERO'S  Offices  ;  or,  Moral 
Duties.  Cato  Major,  an  Essay 
on  Old  Age;  Lgelius,  an  Essay 
on  Friendship;  Scipio's  Dream; 
Paradoxes ;  Letter  to  Quintus  on 
Magistrates.  Translated  by  C.  R. 
Edmonds,  $s.  6d. 

CORNELIUS  NEPOS.—.?*; 
JUSTIN. 


CLARK'S  (Hugh)  Introduction 
to  Heraldry.  i8th  Edition,  Re- 
vised and  Enlarged  by  J.  R. 
PJanche,  Rouge  Croix.  With 
nearly  1000  Illustrations.  5-r.  Or 
with  the  Illustrations  Coloured, 
IS'- 

CLASSIC  TALES,  containing 
Rasselas,  Vicar  of  Wake  field, 
Gulliver's  Travels,  and  The  Senti- 
mental Journey.  31. 6d. 

COLERIDGE'S  (S.  T.)  Friend. 
A  Series  of  Essays  on  Morals, 
Politics,  and  Religion.  31.  6d. 

Aids  to  Reflection,  and  the 

CONFESSIONS  OF  AN  INQUIRING 
SPIRIT,  to  which  are  added  the 
ESSAYS  ON  FAITH  and  the  BOOK 
OF  COMMON  PRAYER.     31.  6d. 

Lectures    and    Notes    on 

Shakespeare  and  other  English 
Poets.    Edited  by  T.  Ashe.  3^.6^. 

Biographia    Literaria;    to- 
gether with  Two  Lay  Sermons. 
3/.  6d. 

Table- Talk   and    Omniana. 

Edited  by  T.  Ashe,  B.A.     31.  6ct. 

Miscellanies,  JEsthetio  and 

Literary;    to  which    is    added, 
THE  THEORY  OF   LIFE.      Col- 
lected and  arranged  by  T.  Ashe, 
B.A.    3*.  6d. 

COMTE'S  Positive  Philosophy. 
Translated  and  condensed  by 
Harriet  Martineau.  With  Intro- 
duction  by  Frederic  Harrison. 
3  vols.  5-r.  each. 

COMTE'S  Philosophy  of  the 
Sciences,  being  an  Exposition  of 
the  Principles  of  the  Cours  de 
Philosophic  Positive.  By  G.  H. 
Lewes.  5$. 

CONDE'S  History  of  the  Do- 
minion of  the  Arabs  in  Spain. 
Translated  by  Mrs.  Foster.  3 
vols.  3-r.  6d.  each. 


Contained  in  Bohn's  Libraries. 


COOPER'S    Biographical   Dio-   | 
tlonary.       Containing     Concise  j 
Notices   (upwards  of  15,000)   of 
Eminent  Persons  of  all  Ages  and 
Countries.    By  Thompson  Cooper, 
F.S.A.      With    a    Supplement, 
bringing  the  work  down  to  1883. 
2  vols.     5J.  each. 

COXE'S  Memoirs  of  the  Duke  of 
Marlborough.  With  his  original 
Correspondence.  By  W.  Coxe, 
M.A.,  F.R.S.  Revised  edition 
by  John  Wade.  3  vols.  $s.  bd. 
each. 

\*  An  Atlas  of  the  plans  of 
Marlborough's    campaigns,    4to. 


History    of   the   House    of 

Austria  (1218-1792).  With  a 
Continuation  from  the  Accession 
of  Francis  I.  to  the  Revolution  of 
1848.  4  vols.  31.  6tf.  each. 

CRAIK'S  ( O-.  L.)  Pursuit  of  Know- 
ledge under  Difficulties.  Illus- 
trated by  Anecdotes  and  Memoirs. 
Revised  edition,  with  numerous 
Woodcut  Portraits  and  Plates.  51. 

CRUIKSHANK'S  Punch  and 
Judy.  The  Dialogue  of  the 
Puppet  Show  ;  an  Account  of  its 
Origin,  &c.  With  24  Illustra- 
tions, and  Coloured  Plates,  de- 
signed and  engraved  by  G.  Cruik- 
shank.  $s. 

CUNNINGHAM'S  Lives  of  the 
Most  Eminent  British  Painters. 
A  New  Edition,  with  Notes  and 
Sixteen  fresh  Lives.  By  Mrs. 
Heaton.  3  vols.  3^.  6d,  each. 

DANTE.  Divine  Comedy.  Trans- 
lated by  the  Rev.  H.  F.  Gary, 
M.A.  3*.  6</. 

Translated  into  English  Verse 

by  I.  C.  Wright,  M.A.  3rd  Edi- 
tion, revised.  With  Portrait,  and 
34  Illustrations  on  Steel,  after 
Flaxraan, 


DANTE.  The  Inferno.  A  Literal 
Prose  Translation,  with  the  Text 
of  the  Original  printed  on  the  same 
page.  By  John  A.  Carlyle,  M  JX 


-  The  Purgatorio.  A  Literal 
Prose  Translation,  with  the  Text 
printed  on  the  same  page.  By 
W.  S.  Dugdale.  5*. 

DJS  COMMINES  (Philip),  Me- 
moirs  of.  Containing  the  Histories 
of  Louis  XL  and  Charles  VIII., 
Kings  of  France,  and  Charles 
the  Bold,  Duke  of  Burgundy. 
Together  with  the  Scandalous 
Chronicle,  or  Secre*  History  of 
Louis  XL,  by  Jean  de  Troyes. 
Translated  by  Andrew  R.  Scobk. 
With  Portraits.  2  vols.  3*.  6rf» 
each. 

DEFOE'S  Novels  and  Miscel- 
laneous Works.  With  Prefaces 
and  Notes,  including  those  attri- 
buted to  Sir  W.  Scott.  7  vois. 
3$.  6d.  each. 

I.  —  Captain  Singleton,  and 
Colonel  Jack. 

II.—  Memoirs  of  a  Cavalier, 
Captain  Carleton, 
Dickory  Cionke,  &c. 

III.—  Moll  Flanders,  and  the 
History  of  the  Devil. 

IV.  —  Roxana,  and  Life  of  Mrs* 
Christian  Davies. 

V.  —  History  of  the  Great  Plague 
of  London,  1665  ;  The 
Storm  (1703)  j  and  the 
True-born  Englishman* 

VI.—  Duncan  Campbell,  New 
Voyage  round  -the 
World,  and  Political 
Tracts. 

VII.  —  Robinson  Crusoe. 

DE  LOLME  on  the  Constitution 
of  England.  Edited  by  John 
Macgregor.  3*.  6d. 


An  Alphabetical  List  oj  Books 


DEMMIN'S    History   of    Arms 

and  Armour,  from  the  Earliest 

Period.       By  Auguste   Demmin. 

Translated  by  C.  C.  Black,  M.A. 

With   nearly   2000    Illustrations. 

7*.  6d. 
DEMOSTHENES'  Orations. 

Translated  by  C.  Rann  Kennedy. 

5  vols.     Vol.  I.,   3>y.   6d. ;    Vols. 

II. -V.,  5*.  each. 

DE  STAEL'S  CorinTie  or  Italy. 
By  Madame  de  Stael.  Trans- 
lated by  Emily  Baldwin  and 
Paulina  Driver.  35.  6^. 

DEVEY'S  Logic,  or  the  Science 
of  Inference.  A  Popular  Manual. 
By  J.  Devey.  5^. 

DICTIONARY  of  Latin  and 
Greek  Quotations ;  including 
Proverbs,  Maxims,  Mottoes,  Law 
Terms  and  Phrases,  With  all  the 
Quantities  marked,  and  English 
Translations.  With  Index  Ver- 
borum  (622  pages).  55. 

DICTIONARY  of  Obsolete  and 

Provincial  English.  Compiled 
by  Thomas  Wright,  M.A.,  F.S  A., 
&c.  2  vois.  5*.  each, 
DIDRON'S  Christian  Icono- 
graphy: a  History  of  Christian 
Art  in  the  Middle  Ages.  Trans- 
lated by  E.  J.  Millington  and 
completed  by  Margaret  Stokes. 
With  240  Illustrations.  2  vols. 
5*.  each. 

DIOGENES  LAERTIUS.  Lives 
and  Opinions  of  the  Ancient 
Philosophers.  Translated  by 
Prof.  C.  D.  Yonge,  M.A.  51. 

DOBREE'S  Adversaria.  Edited 
by  the  late  Prof.  Wagner.  2  vols. 
5_r.  each. 

D  ODD'S  Epigrammatists.  A 
Selection  from  the  Epigrammatic 
Literature  of  Ancient,  Mediaeval, 
and  Modern  Times.  By  the  Rev. 
Henry  Philip  Dpdd,  M.A,  Ox- 
ford.  2nd  Edition,  revised  and 
enlarged.  6x. 


DONALDSON'S  The  Theatre  of 
the  Greeks.  A  Treatise  on  the 
History  and  Exhibition  of  the 
Greek  Drama.  With  numerous 
Illustrations  and  3  Plans.  By  John 
William  Donaldson,  D.D.  5*. 

DRAPER'S  History  of  the 
Intellectual  Development  of 
Europe.  By  John  William  Draper, 
M.D.,  LL.D.  2  vols.  $s.  each. 

DtTNLOP'S  History  of  Fiction. 
A  new  Edition.  Revised  by 
Henry  Wilson.  2  vols.  51.  each. 

DYER  (Dr  T.  H.).     Pompeii :  its 

Buildings  and  Antiquities.  By 
T.  H.  Dyer,  LL.D.  With  nearly 
300  Wood  Engravings,  a  large 
Map,  and  a  Plan  of  the  Forum. 
7s.  6d. 

The  City  of  Rome :  its  History 

and  Monuments,  Witn  Illustra- 
tions. 5J. 

DYER  (T.  P.  T.)  British  Popular 
Customs,  Present  and  Past. 
An  Account  of  the  various  Games 
and  Customs  associated  with  Dif- 
ferent Days  of  the  Year  in  the 
British  Isles,  arranged  according 
to  the  Calendar.  By  the  Rev. 
T.  F.  Thiselton  Dyer,  M.A.  51. 

EBERS'  Egyptian  Princess.  An 
Historical  Novel.  By  George 
Ebers.  Translated  by  E.  S. 
Buchheim.  3^.  6d. 

EDGEWORTH'S  Stories  for 
Children.  With  8  Illustrations 
by  L.  Speed.  3^.  6d. 

ELZE  S  William  Shakespeare. 
— See  SHAKESPEARE. 

EMERSON'S    Works.      3   vols 

y.  6d.  each. 

I. — Essays,  Lectures  and  Poems. 
II. —English  Traits,  Nature,  and 
Conduct  of  Life. 


Contained  in  BoJiris  Libraries. 


EMERSON'S  WORKS  continued. 

III. — Society  and  Solitude — Letters 
and  Social  aims  —  Miscel- 
laneous Papers  (hitherto 
uncollectecl)  —  May  Day, 
and  other  Poems. 

ELLIS  (G.)  Specimens  of  Early 
English  Metrical  Romances. 
With  an  Historical  Introduction 
on  the  Rise  and  Progress  of 
Romantic  Composition  in  France 
and  England.  Revised  Edition. 
By  J.  O.  Halliwell,  F.R.S.  5*. 

ENNEMOSER'S  History  of 
Magic.  Translated  by  William 
Howitt.  2  vols.  5^.  each. 

EPICTETUS,  The  Discourses  of. 
With  the  ENCHEIRIDION  and 
Fragments.  Translated  by  George 
Long,  M.A.  55. 

EURIPIDES.  A  New  Literal 
Translation  in  Prose.  By  E  P. 
Coleridge,  M.A.  2  vols.  5^.  each. 

EUTROPIUS.— See  JUSTIN. 

EUSEBIUS  PAMPHILUS, 
Ecclesiastical  History  of.  Trans- 
lated by  Rev. C.F. Cruse, M.A.  55. 

EVELYN'S  Diary  and  Corre- 
spondendence.  Edited  from  the 
Original  MSS.  by  W.  Bray, 
F.A.S.  With  45  engravings.  4 
vols.  5$.  each. 

FAIRHOLT'S  Costume  in  Eng- 
land. A  History  of  Dress  to  the 
end  of  the  Eighteenth  Century. 
3rd  Edition,  revised,  by  Viscount 
Dillon,  V.P.S.A.  Illustrated  with 
al>ove  700  Engravings.  2  vols. 
5-f.  each. 

FIELDING'S  Adventures  of 
Joseph  Andrews  and  his  Friend 
Mr.  Abraham  Adams.  With 
Cruikshank's  Illustrations.  3$.  6</. 

History  of  Tom  Jones,  a 

Foundling.  With  Cruikshank's 
Illustrations.  2  vols.  35.  6</.  each. 

Amelia.  Writh  Cruikshank's 

Illustrations.  $s. 


FLAXMAN'S  Lectures  on  Sculp- 
ture. By  John  Flaxman,  R.A. 
With  Portrait  and  53  Plates.  6s, 

FLORENCE  of  WORCESTER'S 
Chronicle,  with  the  Two  Con- 
tinuations :  comprising  Annals  of 
English  History,  from  the  De- 
parture of  the  Romans  to  the 
Reign  of  Edward  I.  Translated 
by  Thomas  Forester,  M.A.  5*. 

FOSTER'S  (John)  Life  and  Cor- 
respondence. Edited  by  J.  E. 
Ryland.  2  vols.  $s.  6//.  each. 

Critical  Essays.     Edited  by 

J.   E.  Ryland.     2  vols.      3J-.  6d. 
each. 

Essays  :  on  Decision  of  Cha- 
racter ;  on  a  Man's  writing  Me- 
moirs of  Himself ;  on  the  epithet 
Romantic ;    on   the    aversion    of 
Men  of  Taste  to  Evangelical  Re- 
ligion.    31.  6^. 

Essay  son  the  Evils  of  Popular 

Ignorance  ;  to  which  is  added,  a 
Discourse  on  the  Propagation  of 
Christianity  in  India.     3-f.  6</. 

Essays  on  the  Improvement 

of    Time.  With     NOTES     OK 

SERMONS  and     other      Pieces. 
3*.  6d. 

GASPARY'S  History  of  Italian 
Literature.  Translated  by  Her- 
man Oelsner,  M.A.,  Ph.D. 
Vol.  I.  3J,  6</. 

GEOFFREY  OF  MONMOUTH, 
Chronicle  of.— See  Did  English, 
Chronicles. 

GESTA  ROMANORUM,  or  En- 
tertaining Moral  Stories  invented 
by  the  Monks.  Translated  by  the 
Rev.  Charles  Swan.  Revised 
Edition,  by  Wynnard  Hooper, 
13.A.  5*. 

GILDAS,  Chronicles  cf.— See  Old 
\       English  Chronicles. 


IO 


An  Alphabetical  List  of  Books 


OIBBON'S  Decline  and  Fall  of 
the  Roman  Empire.    Complete  I 
and  Unabridged,  with  Variorum  i 
Notes.      Edited    by  an   English  | 
Churchman.    With  2  Maps  and 
Portrait.     7  vols.     $s.  6d.  each. 
GILBART'S  History,  Principles, 
and  Practice  of  Banking.    By 
the  late  J.  W.   Gilbart,   F.R.S. 
New   Edition,   revised   by  A.   S. 
Michie.     2  vols.     lOJ, 
OIL  BLAS,  The  Adventures  of. 
Translated   from    the   French   of 
Lesage    by  Smollett.      With   24  , 
Engravings  on  Steel,  after  Smirke,    \ 
and  10  Etchings  by  George  Cruik- 
shank.     6s. 

GIRALDUS  CAMBRENSIS' 
Historical  Works.  Translated 
by  Th.  Forester,  M.A.,  and  Sir 
R.  Colt  Hoare.  Revised  Edition, 
Edited  by  Thomas  Wright,  M.A., 
F.S.A.  5*. 

GOETHE'S  Faust.    Part  I.    Ger- 
man Text  with  Play  ward's  Prose 
Translation  and  Notes.     Revised 
by  C,  A,  Buchheim,  Ph.D.    51. 
GOETHE'S    Works.     Translated 
into    English  by   various  hands. 
14  vols.     3-J.  6V.  each. 
I.  and  II. — Autobiography  and 

Annals. 

III.— Faust.      Two    Parts,    com- 
plete.    (Swan  wick.) 
IV. — Novels  and  Tales. 
V. — Wilhelm  Meister's  Appren- 
ticeship. 
VI.— Conversations   with   Ecker- 

mann  and  Soret. 
VIII.— Dramatic  Works. 
IX.— Wilhelm  Meister's  Travels. 
X. — Tour  in  Italy,  and  Second 

Residence  in  Rome. 
XL—Miscellaneous  Travels. 
XII,—  Early     and     Miscellaneous 

Letters. 

XIII. — Correspondence  with  Zelter. 
XIV,— Reineke  Fox,  West-Eastern 
Divan  and  Acfcilkid. 


GOLDSMITH'S  Works.    A  new 

Edition,  by  J.  W.  M.  Gibbs.     5 
vols.     35.  6d.  each. 

GRAMMONT'S  Memoirs  of  the 
Court  of  Charles  II.  Edited  by 
Sir  Walter  Scott.  Together  with 
the  BOSCOBEL  TRACTS,  including 
two  not  before  published,  &c. 
New  Edition.  5^. 

GRAY'S  Letters.  Including  the 
Correspondence  of  Gray  and 
Mason.  Edited  by  the  Rev. 
D.  C.  Tovey,  M.A.  Vols.  I. 

and  II.  3J.  6<*.  each. 

GREEK  ANTHOLOGY.  Trans- 
lated by  George  Burges,  M.A.  51. 

GREEK  ROMANCES  of  Hello- 
dorus,  Longus,  and  Achilles 
Tatius— viz.,  The  Adventures  of 
Theagenes  &  Chariclea  ;  Amours 
of  Daphnisand  Chloe  ;  and  Loves 
of  Clitopho  and  Leucippc.  Trans- 
lated by  Rev.  R.  Smith,  M.A. 
S-f- 

GREGORY'S  Letters  on  the 
Evidences,  Doctrines,  Sc  Duties 
of  the  Christian  Religion.  By 
Dr.  Olinthus  Gregory.  3-r,  6d. 

GREENE,  MARLOWE,  and 
BEN  JONSON.  Poems  of. 
Edited  by  Robert  Bell.  31.  6</. 

GRIMM'S  TALES.  With  the 
Notes  of  the  Original.  Translated 
by  Mrs.  A.  Hunt.  With  Intro- 
duction by  Andrew  Lang,  M.A. 
2  vols.  31.  6d.  each. 

Gammer  Grethel;  or,  Ger- 
man Fairy  Tales  and  Popular 
Stories.  Containing  42  Fairy 
Tales.  Trans,  by  Edgar  Taylor. 
With  numerous  Woodcuts  after 
George  Cruikshank  and  Ludwig 
Grimm.  3*.  6ct, 

GROSSI'S  Marco  Ylsconti. 
Translated  by  A.  F.  D.  The 
Ballads  rendered  into  English 
Verse  by  C.  M.  P.  31.  6rf. 


Contained  in  Bohn's  Libraries. 


GUIZOT'S  History  of  the 
English  Revolution  of  1640. 
From  the  Accession  of  Charles 
I.  to  his  Death.  Translated  by 
William  Hazlitt.  3*.  6d. 

History  of  Civilisation,  from 

the  Fall  of  the  Roman  Empire  to 
the  French  Revolution.  Trans- 
lated by  William  Ilazlitt.  3  vols. 
31.  6r/.  each. 

HALL'S  (Rev.  Robert)  Mtscei- 
laneous  Works  and  Remains. 
31.  &/. 

HAMPTON  COURT:  A  Short 
History  of  the  Manor  and 
Palace,  l*y  Ernest  Law,  E.A. 
With  numerous  Illustrations,  q.f. 

HARDWICK'S  History  of  the 
Articles  of  Religion.  By  the  late 
C.  Hard  wick.  Revised  by  the 
Rev.  Francis  Procter,  M.A.  $.y. 

HATJFF'S  Tales.    The  Caravan—- 
The  Sheik  of  Alexandria— The 
Inn  in  the  Sprssarl.     Trans,  from 
the  German  by  S.  Mendel.  3*.  6a, 
HAWTHORNE'S  Tales.    4  vols. 
3?.  6d.  each. 
I. — Twice-told   Tales,   and  thn 

Snow  Image. 
II.—  Scarlet  Letter,  and  the  House 

with  the  Seven  Gables. 
III. — Transformation  [The  Marble 
Faun],  and  Ulithedale  Ro- 
mance. 
IV.— Mosses  from  an  Old  Manse. 

HAZLITT'S  Table-talk.     Essays 

on  Men  and  Manners.     Hy  W. 

Hazlitt.     3*.  6r/. 
Lectures  on  the  Literature 

of  the  Age  of  Elizabeth  and  on 

Characters  of  Shakespeare's  Plays. 

y.  &/. 
Lectures   on    the   English 

Poets,  and  on  the  English  Comic 

Writers,    y.  6W. 
The  Plain  Speaker.  Opinions 

onBooks,Men,and  Things.  y.6tt. 

Round  Tab!c.    3;.  f>d. 


ll 


and 


HAZLITT'S     Sketches 
Esfcays.  3.$.  6 a'. 

The  Spirit  of  the  Age;   or, 

Contemporary  Portraits.  Edited 
by  W.  Carew  Hazlitt.  3*.  6W. 

HEATON'S  Concise  History  of 

Painting.  New  Edition,  revised 
by  Cosmo  Monkhouse.  5$. 

HEGEL'S  Lectures  on  the  Philo- 
sophy of  History.  Translated  by 
J.  Sibree,  M.A. 

HEINE'S  Poems,  Complete 
Translated  by  Edgar  A.  Bowring, 
C.B.  35.  6^. 

Travel-Pictures,  including  the 

Tour  in  the  ITarz,  Norderney,  and 
Book  of  I  de-is,  together  with  the 
Romantic  School.  Translated  by 
Francis  Storr.  A  New  Edition, 
revised  throughout.  With  Appen- 
dices and  Maps.  34.  6af. 

HELP'S  Life  of  Christopher 
Columbus,  the  Discoverer  of 
America.  By  Sir  Arthur  Helps, 
K.C.B.  3,  6d. 

— -  Life   of  Hernando   Cortes, 

and  the  Conquest  of  Mexico.  2. 
vols.  3^.  6J.  each. 

Life  of  Pizarro.    3^.  (yd. 

Life  of  Las  Casas  the  Apostle 

of  the  Indies.    3j.  6*/. 

\  HENDERSON  (E.)  Select  His- 
\  torical  Documents  of  the  Middle? 
I  Ages,  including  the  most  famous 
Charters  relating  to  England,  the 
Empire,  the  Church,  &c.,  from 
the  6th  to  the  I4th  Centimes. 
|  Translated  from  the  I,atm  and 
J  edited  by  Ernest  F.  Henderson, 
j  A.B.,  A.M.,  Ph.D.  5.. 

I  HENFREY'S  Guide  to  English 
Coins,  from  the  Conquest  to  the 
present  time.  New  and  revised 
Edition  by  C.  F.  Keary,  M.A.* 
F.S.A.  6s. 

HENRY  OF  HUNTINGDON'S 
History  of  the  English.  Trans* 
lited  by  T.  Forester,  M.A,  5** 


12 


An  Alphabetical  List  of  Rooks 


HENRY'S  (Matthew) Exposition 
of  the  Book  of  the  Psalms.  55. 

HELIODORUS.  Theagenes  and 
Chariclea.  —  See  GREEK  RO- 
MANCES. 

HERODOTUS.  Translated  by  the 
Rev.  Henry  Gary,  M.A.  35.  6d. 

Notes  on,  Original  and  Se- 
lected from  the  best  Commenta- 
tors. By  D.  Wr.  Turner,  M.A. 
With  Coloured  Map.  55. 

Analysis  and  Summary  of 

By  J.T.  Wheeler.    5*. 

HESIOD,  CALLIMACHUS,  and 
THEOGNIS,  Translated  by  the 
Rev.  J.  Banks,  M.A.  $s. 

HOFFMANN'S  (E,  T.  W.)  The 
Serapion  Brethren.  Translated 
from  the  German  by  Lt. -Col.  Alex. 
Ewing.  2  vols.  35.  6d.  each. 

HOLBEIN'S  Dance  of  Death 
and  Bible  Cuts.  Upwards  of  1 50 
Subjects,  engraved  in  facsimile, 
with  Introduction  and  Descrip- 
tions by  Francis  Douce  and  Dr. 
Thomas  Frognall  Dibden.  5^. 

HOMER'S  Iliad.  Translated  into 
English  Prose  by  T.  A.  Buckley, 
B.A.  $s. 

Odyssey.  Hymns,  Epigrams, 

and  Battle  of  the  Frogs  and  Mice. 
Translated  into  English  Prose  by 
T.  A.  Buckley,  B.A.  5*. 

See  also  POPE. 

HOOPER'S  (G.)  Waterloo  :  The 
Downfall  of  the  First  Napo- 
leon :  a  History  of  the  Campaign 
of  1815.  By  George  Hooper. 
With  Maps  and  Plans.  3s.  6d. 

The  Campaign  of  Sedan : 

The  Downfall  of  the  Second  Em- 
pire, August  -  September,  1870. 
With  General  Map  and  Six  Plans 
of  Battle.  3s.  6d. 

HORACE.  A  new  literal  Prose 
tianslation,  byA.  Hamilton  Bryce, 
LL.D.  3*.  &/. 


HUGO'S  (Victor)  Dramatic 
Works.  Hernani  — Ruy  Bias— 
The  King's  Diversion.  Translated 
by  Mrs.  Newton  Crosland  and 
F.  L.  Slous.  35-.  6d. 

Poems,  chiefly  Lyrical.  Trans- 
lated by  various  Writers,  now  first 
collected  by  J.    H.  L.  Williams. 
31.  M. 

HUMBOLDT'S  Cosmos,  Trans- 
lated by  E.  C.  Ott£,  B.  H.  Paul, 
and  W.  S.  Dallas,  F.L.S.  5  vols. 
3^.  6d.  each,  excepting  Vol.  V.  $s. 

Personal   Narrative   of   his 

Travels  to  the  Equinoctial  Regions 
of  America  during  the  years  1799- 
1804.     Translated  by  T.  Ross.    3 
vols.     5-f,  each. 

Views  of  Nature.   Translated 

by  E.  C.  Ott£  and  H.  G.  Bohn. 

5* 

HUMPHREYS'  Coin  Collector's 
Manual.  By  H.  N.  Humphreys, 
with  upwards  of  140  Illustrations 
on  Wood  and  Steel.  2  vols.  5-r. 
each. 

HUNGARY :  its  History  and  Re- 
volution, together  with  a  copious 
Memoir  of  Kossuth.  3$.  6d. 

HUTCHINSON  (Colonel).  Me- 
moirs of  the  Life  of.  By  his 
Widow,  Lucy :  together  with  her 
Autobiography,  and  an  Account 
of  the  Siege  of  Lathom  House. 
31 .  6d. 

HUNT'S  Poetry  of  Science.  By 
Richard  Hunt.  3rd  Edition,  re- 
vised and  enlarged.  5$. 

INDIA  BEFORE  THE  SEPOY 
MUTINY.  A  Pictorial,  De- 
scriptive, and  Historical  Ac- 
count, from  the  Earliest  Times 
to  the  Annexation  of  the  Punjab. 
with  upwards  of  100  Engravings 
on  Wood,  and  a  Map.  5*. 

INGULPH'H  Chronicles  of  the 
Abbey  of  Croyland,  with  the 
CONTINUATION  by  Peter  of  Blois 
and  other  Writers.  Translated  by 
H.  T,  Riley,  M.A.  5*. 


Contained  in  Bolins  Libraries. 


IRVING'S   (Washington)  Com- 
plete  Works.  i5vols.  With  Por- 
traits, &c.     3-y.  6d.  each. 
I.-— Salmagundi,     Knicker- 
bocker's History  of  New 
York. 

II.— The  Sketch-Book,  and  the 

Life  of  Oliver  Goldsmith. 

III.— Bracebridge  Hall,   Abbots- 

ford  and  Newstead  Abbey. 

IV.— The  Alhambra,  Tales  of  a 

Traveller. 

V. — Chronicle  of  the  Conquest 
of  Granada,   Legends  of 
the  Conquest  of  Spain. 
VI.  &  VII.— Life    and   Voyages  of 
Columbus,  together  with 
the  Voyages  of  his  Com- 
panions. 
VIII.— Astoria,    A    Tour    on    the 

Prairies. 
XL — Life  of  Mahomet,  Livesof  the 

Successors  of  Mahomet. 
X. — Adventures  of  Captain  Bon- 
neville,  U.S.A.,  Wolfert's 
Roost. 

XL — Biographies   and    Miscella- 
neous Papers. 

XII.-XV.— Life  of  George  Wash- 
ington.   4  vols. 

Life   and   Letters.     By  his 

Nephew,  Pierre  E.  Irving.   2  vols. 
3-T.  6d.  each. 

ISOCRATES,  The  Orations  of. 
Translated  by  J.  H.  Freese,  M.A. 
.Vol.1.     5J. 

JAMES'S  (G.  P.  R.)  Life  of 
Richard  Coeur  de  Lion.  2  vols. 
3^.  6d.  each. 

The  Life  and  Times  of  Louis 

XIV.     2  vols.     3-y.  6ct.  each. 

JAMESON'S  (Mrs.)  Shake- 
speare's Heroines.  Character- 
istics of  Women:  Moral,  Poetical, 
and  Historical.  By  Mrs.  Jameson. 
<%s.  6d. 

JESSE'S  (E.)  Anecdotes  of  Dogs. 
With  40  Woodcuts  and  34  Steel 
Engravings.  $/. 


JESSE'S  (J.H)  Memoirs  of  the 
Court  of  England  during  the 
Reign  of  the  Stuarts,  including 
the  Protectorate.  3  vols.  With 
42  Portraits.  5-r.  each. 

Memoirs  of  the  Pretenders 

and  their  Adherents.  With  6 
Portraits.  $s. 

JOHNSON'S  Lives  of  the  Poeta. 
Edited  by  Mrs.  Alexander  Napier, 
with  Introduction  by  Professor 
Hales.  3  vols.  3^.  6</.  each. 

JOSEPHUS  (Flavius),  The  Works 
of.  Whiston's  Translation,  re- 
vised by  Rev.  A,  R.  Shilleto,  M.A 
With  Topographical  and  Geo. 
graphical  Notes  by  Colonel  Sir 
C.  W.  Wilson,  K.C.B.  5  vols, 
3^.  6d.  each. 

JOYCE'S  Scientific  Dialogues. 
With  numerous  Woodcuts.  5^. 

JUKES-BROWNE  (A,  J.),  The 
Building  of  the  British  Isles: 
a  Study  in  Geographical  Evolu- 
tion. Illustrated  by  numerous 
Maps  and  Woodcuts.  2nd  Edition, 
revised,  7*-  6</. 

Student's  Handbook  of 

Physical  Geology.  With  nu- 
merous Diagrams  and  Illustra- 
tions. 2nd  Edition,  much  en- 
larged, 7*.  6i/. 

JULIAN,  the  Emperor.  Contain- 
ing  Gregory  Nazianzen's  Two  In- 
vectives and  Libanus*  Monody, 
with  Julian's  extant  Theosophical 
Works.  Translated  by  C.  W. 
King,  M.A.  5J-. 

JUSTIN,  CORNELIUS  NEPOS, 
and  EUTROPIUS.  Translated 
by  the  Rev.  J.  S.  Watson,  M.A. 
5*. 

JUVENAL,  PERSIUS,  SUL- 
PICIA  and  LUOILIUS.  Trans- 
lated by  L.  Evans,  M.A.  $s. 

JUNIUS'S  Letters.  With  all  the 
Notes  of  Woodfall's  Edition,  and 
important  Additions.  2  vols. 
3-f.  6d.  each. 


An  Alphabetical  List  of  Books 


KANT'S  Critique  of  Pure  Reason. 
Translated  by  J.  M.  D.  Meikle- 
john.  55. 

Prolegomena  and  Meta- 
physical Foundation  s  of  Natural 
Science,  Translated  by  E.  Belfort 
Bax,     5..?. 

KEIGHTLEY'S  (Thomas)  My- 
thology of  Ancient  Greece  and 
Italy.  4th  Edition,  revised  by 
Leonard  Schmitz,  Ph.D.,  LL.D. 
With  12  Plates  from  the  Antique. 
$s. 

Fairy  Mythology,  illustrative 

of  the  Romance  and  Superstition 
of   Various    Countries.     Revised 
Edition,     with    Frontispiece    by 
Cruikshank.     5$. 

LA  FONTAINE'S  Fables.  Trans- 
lated into  English  Verse  by  Elizur 
Wright,  New  Edition,  with  Notes 
by  J.  W.  M.  Gibbs.  3*.  6d. 

LAMARTINE'S  History  of  the 
Girondists.  Translated  by  H.  T. 
Ryde.  3  vols.  35-.  6r/.  each. 

History  of  the  Restoration 

of  Monarchy  in  France  (a  Sequel 
to  the  History  of  the  Girondists). 
4  vols.  3;.  6d.  each. 

History  of  the  French  Re- 
volution of  1848.  35.  (yd. 

LAMB'S  (Charles)  Essays  of  Elia 
and  Eliana.  Complete  Edition. 
31 .  6d. 

Specimens  of  English  Dra- 
matic  Poets  of  the   Time    of 
Elizabeth.    31.  6a. 

Memorials  and  Betters   of 

Charles  Lamb.  By  Serjeant 
Talfourd.  New  Edition,  revised, 
by  W.  Carew  llazlitt.  2  vols. 
31.  6d.  each. 

LANZI'S  History  of  Painting  in 
ttaly,  from  the  Period  of  the 
Revival  of  the  Fine  Arts  to  the 
End  of  the  Eighteenth  Century. 
Translated  by  Thomas  Roscoe. 
3  vols.  3*.  6d.  each, 


LAPPENBERG'S  History  of 
England  under  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  Kings.  Translated  by 
B.  Thorpe,  F.S.A.  New  edition, 
revised  by  E,  C.  Otte.  2  vols. 
3.5-.  6d.  each. 

LECTURES    ON     PAINTING, 

by  Barry,  Opie,  Fuseli.     Edited 
by  R.  Wornum.     51. 

LEONARDO  DA  VINCI'S 
Treatise  on  Painting.  Trans- 
lated by  J.  F.  Rigaud,  R.A., 
With  a  Life  of  Leonardo  by  John 
William  Brown.  With  numerous 
Plates.  5*. 

i  LEPSIUS'S  Letters  from  Egypt, 
j      Ethiopia,  and  the  Peninsula  of 
I       Sinai.      Translated    by   L.    and 
J.  B.  Homer.     With  Maps.     5*. 

LESSING'S  Dramatic  Works, 
Complete.  Edited  by  Ernest  Bell, 
M.A.  With  Memoir  of  Leasing 
by  Helen  Zimmern.  2  vols. 
3_r.  6d.  each. 

Laokoon,  Dramatic  Notes, 

and    the    Representation     of 
Death  by  the  Ancients.   Trans- 
lated by  E.  C.  Beasley  and  Helen 
Zimmern.       Edited    by    Edward 
Bell,  M.A.     With  a  Frontispiece 
of  the  Laokoon  group.     %s.  6d. 

LILLY'S  Introduction  to  Astro- 
logy. With  a  GRAMMAR  OF 
ASTROLOGY  and  Tables  for  Cal- 
culating Nativities,  by  Zadkiel.  5^. 

LIVY'S  History  of  Rome.  Trans- 
Jated  byDr,  Spillan,  C.  Edmonds, 
and  others.  4  vols.  5*.  each. 

LOCKE'S  Philosophical  Works. 
Edited  by  J.  A.  St,  John.  2  vols. 
3-j.  6d.  each. 

Life  and  Letters:     By  Lord 

King.     S.T.  6d. 

LOCKHART  (J.  G.)— J«  BURNS- 


Contained  in  Bohn's  Libraries. 


LODGE'S  Portraits  of  Illustrious 
Personages  of  Great  Britain, 
with  Biographical  and  Historical 
Memoirs.  240  Portraits  engraved 
on  Steel,  with  the  respective  Bio- 
graphies unabridged.  8  vols.  5$. 
each. 

LONGFELLOW'S  Prose 
"Works.  With  16  full- page  Wood 
Engravings.  $s. 

LOUDON'S  (Mrs.)  Natural 
History.  Revised  edition,  by 
W.  S.  Dallas,  F.L.S.  With 
numerous  Woodcut  Illus.  $s. 

LOWNDES'  Bibliographer's 
Manual  of  English  Literature. 
Enlarged  Edition.  By  H.  G. 
Bohn.  6  vols.  cloth,  $s.  each. 
Or  4  vols.  half  morocco,  2/.  2s. 

LONGUS.  Daphnis  and  Chloe. 
— See  GREEK  ROMANCES. 

LUCAN'S  Pharsalia.  Translated 
by  II.  T.  Riley,  M.A.  5*. 

LUCIAN'S  Dialogues  of  the 
Gods,  cf  the  Sea  Gods,  and 
of  the  Dead.  Translated  by 
Howard  Williams,  M.A.  55. 

LUCRETIUS.  Translated  by  the 
Rev.  J.  S.  Watson,  M.A.  $s. 

LUTHER'S  Table-Talk.  Trans- 
lated and'!  Edited  by  William 
Hazlitt.  3*.  6J. 

Autobiography.  —  See 

MlCHELET. 

MAOHIAVELLI'S  History  of 
Florence,  together  with  the 
Prince,  Savonarola,  various  His- 
torical Tracts,  and  a  Memoir  of 
Machiavelli.  $s.  &£ 

MALLET'S  Northern  Antiqui- 
ties, or  an  Historical  Account  of 
the  Manners,  Customs,  Religions 
and  Laws,  Maritime  Expeditions 
and  Discoveiies,  Language  and 
Literature,  of  the  Ancient  Scandi- 
navians. Translated  by  Bishop 
Percy.  Revised  and  Enlarged 
Edition,  with  a  Translation  of  the 
PROSE  EDDA,  by  J.  A.  Black- 
well.  5*. 


MANTELL'S  (Dr.)  Petrifactions 
and  their  Teachings.  With  nu- 
merous illustrative  Woodcuts.  6s. 

Wonders  of  Geology.     8th 

Edition,  revised  by  T.  Rupert 
Jones,  F.G.S.  With  a  coloured 
Geological  Map  of  England, 
Plates,  and  upwards  ol  200 
Woodcuts.  2  vols.  7-r.  6</.  each. 

MANZONI.  The  Betrothed: 
being  a  Translation  of  *I  Pro- 
messi  Sposi.'  By  Alessandro 
Manzoni.  With  numerous  Wood- 
cuts. 51. 

MARCO  POLO'S  Travels;  the 
Translation  of  Marsden  revised 
by  T.  Wright,  M.A.,  F.S.A.  5*. 

MARRYAT'S  (Capt.  R.N.) 
Masterman  Ready.  With  93 
Woodcuts.  3*.  6rf. 

|  Mission ;  or,  Scenes  in  Africa. 

|       Illustrated  by  Gilbert  and  Dalziel. 
i       35.  6d. 

Pirate  and  Three  Cutters. 

With  8  Steel  Engravings,  from 
Drawings  by  Clarkson  Stanfield, 
R.A.  3*.  6d. 

Privateersman.  8  Engrav- 
ings on  Steel.  3^.  6a 

Settlers  in  Canada.  10  En- 
gravings by  Gilbert  and  Dalziel. 


Poor  Jack.  With  16  Illus- 
trations after  Clarkson  Stansfield, 
R.A.  31.  6J. 

Peter  Simple.  With  8  full- 
page  Illustrations.  3*.  6ct. 

Midshipman  Easy.    With  8 

full- page  Illustrations.    3*.  bd. 

MARTIAL'S  Epigrams,  complete. 
Translated  into  Prose,  each  ^ac- 
companied by  one  or  mow  Verse 
Translations  selected  from  the 
Works  of  English  Poets,  and 
other  sources.  71.  &/. 


•16 


An  Alphabetical  List  of  Books 


MARTINEAU'S  (Harriet)  His- 
tory of  England,  from  1800- 
1815.  35. 6d. 

History  of  the  Thirty  Years' 

Peace,  A.D.  1815-46.  4  vols. 
3$.  6d.  each. 

See  Conite's  Positive  Philosophy . 

MATTHEW  PABIS'S  English 
History,  from  the  Year  1235  to 
1273.  Translated  by  Rev.  J.  A. 
Giles,  D.C.L.  3  vols.  55.  each. 

MATTHEW  OF  WESTMIN- 
STER'S Flowers  of  History, 
from  the  beginning  of  the  World 
to  A.D.  1307.  Translated  by  C.  D. 
Yonge,  M.A.  2  vols.  5*.  each. 

MAXWELL'S  Victories  of  Wei- 
tag  ton  and  the  British  Armies. 
Frontispiece  and  5  Portraits.  55. 

MENZEL'S  History  of  Germany, 
from  the  Earliest  Period  to  1842. 
3  vols.  3*.  6d.  each. 

MICHAEL  ANGELO  AND 
RAPHAEL,  their  Lives  and 
Works.  By  Duppa  aud  Quatre- 
mere  de  Quincy.  With  Portraits, 
and  Engravings  on  Steel.  55. 

MICHELET'S  Luther's  Auto- 
biography. Trans,  by  William 
Hazlitt.  With  an  Appendix  (no 
pages)  of  Notes.  31.  6d. 

History  of  the  French  Revo- 
lution from  its  earliest  indications 
to  the  flight  of  the  King  in  1791. 
35.  6d. 

MIGNET'SHistory  of  theFrench 
Revolution,  from  1789  to  1814. 
3*.  6d. 

MILL  (J.  S.).  Early  Essays  by 
John  Stuart  Mill.  Collected  from 
various  sources  by  J.  W.  M.  Gibbs. 
3s.  M 

MILLER  (Professor).  History 
Philosophically  Illustrated,from 
the  Fall  of  the  Roman  Empire  to 
the  French  Revolution.  4  vols. 
3*.  6d.  each, 


MILTON'S  Prose  Works.  Edited 
by  J.  A.  St.  John.  5  vols.  3*.  6d. 
each. 

Poetical  Works,  with  a  Me- 
moir and  Critical  Remarks  by 
James  Montgomery,  an  Index  to 
Paradise  Lost,  Todd's  Verbal  Index 
to  all  the  Poems,  and  a  Selection 
of  Explanatory  Notes  by  Henry 
G.  Bohn.  Illustrated  with  120 
Wood  Engravings  from  Drawings 
by  W.  Harvey.  2  vols.  3*.  6d, 
each. 

MITFORD'S  (Miss)  Our  Village 
Sketches  of  Rural  Character  and 
Scenery.  With  2  Engravings  on 
Steel.  2  vols.  3^.  6d.  each. 

MOLIERE'S    Dramatic  Works. 

A   new  Translation    in  English 

Prose,  by  C.   H.  Wall.  3  vols. 
3-r.  6d.  each. 

MONTAGU.  The  Letters  and 
Works  of  Lady  Mary  Wortley 
Montagu.  Edited  by  her  great- 
grandson,  Lord  Wharncliffe's  Edi- 
tion, and  revised  by  W.  Moy 
Thomas.  New  Edition,  revised, 
with  5  Portraits.  2  vols.  $s.  each. 

MONTAIGNE'S  Essays.  Cotton's 
Translation,  revised  by  W.  C, 
Hazlitt.  New  Edition.  3  vols. 
3-r.  6d.  each. 

MONTESQUIEU'S  Spirit  01 
Laws.  New  Edition,  revised  and 
corrected.  By  J.  V.  Pritchard, 
A.M.  2  vols.  3^.  6d.  each. 

MOTLEY  (J.  L.).  The  Rise  of 
the  Dutch  Republic.  A  History. 
By  John  Lothrop  Motley.  New 
Edition,  with  Biographical  Intro- 
duction by  Moncure  D.  Conway. 
3  vols.  3-r.  6d.  each. 

MORPHY'S  Games  of  ChesB. 
Being  the  Matches  and  best  Games 
played  by  the  American  Champion, 
with  Explanatory  and  Analytical 
Notes  by  J.  Lowenthal.  5*. 


Contained  in  Bohrfs  Libraries. 


MUDIE'S  British  Birds;  or,  His- 

tory  of  the  Feathered  Tribes  of  the 
British  Islands.  Revised  by  W. 
C.  L.  Martin.  With  52  Figures 
of  Birds  and  7  Coloured  Plates  of 
Eggs.  2  vols. 

NEANDER  (Dr.  A.).  History 
of  the  Christian  Religion  and 
Church.  Trans,  from  the  German 
byJ.Torrey.  rovols.  3^.6^.  each. 

Life  of  Jesus  Christ.  Trans- 
lated by  J.  McClintock  and  C. 
Blumenthal.  31.  6W. 

History  of  the  Planting  and 

Training  of  the  Christian 
Church  by  the  Apostles. 
Translated  by  J.  E.  Ryland. 
2  vols.  3-r.  6<y.  each. 

Memorials  of  Christian  Life 

in  the  Early  and  Middle  Ages  ; 
including  Light  in  Dark  Places. 
Trans,  by  J.  E.  Ryland.  3*.  6d. 

NIBELUNGEN  LIED.  The 
Lay  of  the  Nibelungs,  metrically 
translated  from  the  old  German 
text  by  Alice  Horton,  and  edited 
by  Edward  Bell,  M.A.  To  which 
is  prefixed  the  Essay  on  the  Nibe* 
lungen  Lied  by  Thomas  Carlyle. 
$*• 

NEW  TESTAMENT  (The)  in 
Greek.  Griesbach's  Text,  with 
various  Readings  at  the  foot  of 
the  page,  and  Parallel  References 
in  the  margin  ;  also  a  Critical 
Introduction  and  Chronological 
Tables.  By  an  eminent  Scholar, 
with  a  Greek  and  English  Lexicon. 
3rd  Edition,  revised  and  corrected. 
Two  Facsimiles  of  Greek  Manu- 
scripts. 900  pages.  5*, 

The  Lexicon  may  be  had  sepa- 
rately, price  2S. 

NICOLINI'S  History  of  the 
Jesuits :  their  Origin,  Progress, 
Doctrines,  and  Designs.  With  8 
Portraits.  5$. 


NORTH  (R.)  Lives  of  the  Right 
Hon.  Francis  North,  Baron  Guild- 
ford,  the  Hon.  Sir  Dudley  North, 
and  the  Hon.  and  Rev.  Dr.  John 
North.  By  the  Hon.  Roger 
North.  Together  with  the  Auto- 
biography of  the  Author.  Edited 
by  Augustus  Jessopp,  D.D.  3  vols. 
31.  6</.  each. 

NUGENT'S  (Lord)  Memorials 
of  Hampden,  his  Party  and 
Times.  With  a  Memoir  of  the 
Author,  an  Autograph  Letter,  and 
Portrait.  5*. 

OCKLEY  (S.)  History  of  the 
Saracens  and  their  Conquests 
in  Syria,  Persia,  and  Egypt. 
By  Simon  Ockley,  B.D.,  Professor 
of  Arabic  in  the  University  of 
Cambridge.  31.  6d. 

OLD  ENGLISH  CHRON- 
ICLES, including  Ethelwerd's 
Chronicle,  Asser's  Life  of  Alfred, 
Geoffrey  of  Monmouth's  British 
History,  Gildas,  Nennius,  and  the 
spurious  chronicle  of  Richard  of 
Cirencester.  Edited  by  J.  A. 
Giles,  D.C.L.  5*. 

OMAN  (J.  C.)  The  Great  Indian 
Epics :  the  Stories  of  the  RAMA- 
YANA  and  the  MAHABHARATA. 
By  John  Campbell  Oman,  Prin- 
cipal of  Khalsa  College,  Amritsar. 
With  Notes,  Appendices,  and 
Illustrations.  3^.  6d. 

ORDERICUS  VITALIS'  Eccle- 
siastical History  of  England 
and  Normandy.  Translated  by 
T.  Forester,  M.A.  To  which  is 
added  the  CHRONICLE  OF  ST. 
EVROULT.  4  vols.  5.7.  each. 

OVID'S  Works,  complete.  Literally 
translated  into  Prose.  3  vols. 
5.$-.  each. 

PASCAL'S  Thoughts.  Translated 
from  the  Text  of  M.  Auguste 
Molinier  by  C.  Kegan  Paul.  3rd 
Edition.  31.  6d. 


i8 


An  Alphabetcial  List  of  Book* 


PAULI'S  (Dr.  R.)  Life  of  Alfred 
the  Great.  Translated  from  the 
German.  To  which  is  appended 
Alfred's  ANGLO-SAXON  VERSION 
OF  OROSIUS.  With  a  literal 
Translation  interpaged,  Notes, 
and  an  ANGLO-SAXON  GRAMMAR 
and  GLOSSARY,  by  B.  Thorpe.  55. 

PATJSANIAS'  Description  of 
Greece.  Newly  translated  by  A.  R. 
Shilleto,  M.A.  2  vois.  5^.  each. 

PEARSON'S  Exposition  of  the 
Creed.  Edited  by  E.  Walford, 
M.A.  5*. 

PEPYS'  Diary  and  Correspond- 
ence. Deciphered  by  the  Rev. 
J.  Smith,  M.A.,  from  the  original 
Shorthand  MS.  in  the  Pepysian 
Library.  Edited  by  Lord  Briy- 
brooke.  4  vols.  With  31  En- 
gravings. 5-r.  each. 

PERCY'S  Heliquea  of  Ancient 
English  Poetry.  With  an  Essay 
on  Ancient  Minstrels  and  a  Glos- 
sary. Edited  by  J.  V.  Pritchard, 
A.M.  2  vols.  3-f.  6<f.  each. 

PERSnjS.-~-.SVd  JUVENAL. 

PETRABCH'S  Sonneta,  Tri- 
umphs, and  other  Poems. 
Translated  into  English  Verse  by 
various  Hands.  With  a  Life  of 
the  Poet  by  Thomas  Campbell. 
With  Portrait  and  15  Steel  En- 
gravings. 5-r. 

PHILO  -  JUIXffiUS,  Works  of. 
Translated  by  Prof.  C.  D.  Yonge, 
M.A.  4  vols.  $s.  each. 

PICKERING'S  History  of  the 
Races  of  Man,  and  their  Geo- 
graphical Distribution.  With  AN 
ANALYTICAL  SYNOPSIS  OF  THE 
NATURAL  HISTORY  OP  MAN  by 
Dr.  Hall.  With  a  Map  of  the 
World  and  12  coloured  Plates.  55. 

PINDAR.  Translated  into  Prose 
by  Dawson  W.  Turner.  To  which 
is  added  the  Metrical  Version  by 
Abraham  Moote.  $s. 


PLANCHE.    History  of  British 
Costume,  from  the  Earliest  Time 
to  the  Close  of  the  Eighteenth 
Century.       By    J.    R.    Planche, 
Somerset  Herald.    With  upwards 
of  400  Illustrations.     «JJ. 
PLATO'S  Works.    Literally  trans- 
lated,    with     Introduction     and 
Notes.    6  vols.     51.  each. 
I. — The   Apology   of    Socrates, 
Crito,  Ph.iedQ,  Gorgias,  Pro- 
tagoras, Phnedrus,  Theoetetus, 
Euthyphron,  Lysis.      Trans- 
lated by  the  Rev.  H.  Carey. 
II. — The  Republic,    Timreus,    and 
Critias.  Translated  by  Henry 
Davis. 

III.— Meno,  Euthydemus,  The 
Sophist,  Statesman,  Cratylus, 
Parmenides,  and  the  Banquet. 
Translated  by  G.  Burges. 
IV. — Philebus,  Channidcs,  Laches, 
Menexenus,  llippias,  Ion, 
The  Two  Alcibiades,  The- 
ages,  Rivals,  llipparchus, 
Minos,  Qitopho,  Epistles. 
Translated  by  G.  Burges. 
V. — The  Laws.  Translated  by 

G.  Burges. 

VI.— The  Doubtful  Works.    Trans- 
lated by  G.  Burges. 

Summary  and  Analysis  of 

the  Dialogues.  With  Analytical 
Index.  By  A.  Day,  LL.D.  5*. 
PLAUTUS'S  Comedies.  Trans- 
lated by  II.  T.  Riley,  M.A.  2 
vols.  5-r.  each. 

PLINY'S  Natural  History. 
Translated  by  the  late  John 
Bostock,  M.D.,  F.R.S.,  and  H.T. 
Riley,  M.A.  6  vols.  5<r.  each. 
PLINY.  The  Letters  of  Pliny 
the  Younger.  Melmoth's  trans- 
lation, revised  by  the  Rev.  F.  C. 
T.  Bosanquet,  M.A.  $s. 
PLOTINUS,  Select  Works  of. 
Translated  by  Thomas  Taylor. 
With  an  Introduction  containing 
the  substance  of  Porphyry's  Plo- 
tinus.  Edited  by  G.  R.  S.  Mead, 
B.A.,  M.R.A.S.  5*. 


Contained  in  Bo/tiis  Libraries. 


PLUTARCH'S  Lives.  Translated 
by  A.  Stewart,  M,A.,and  George 
Long,  M.A.  4  vols.  31.  bd.  each. 

Morals.  Theosophical  Essays. 

Translated  by  C.  W.  King,  M.A. 

Morals.      Ethical    Essays. 

Translated  by  the  Rev.  A.  R. 
Shilleto,  M.A.  51.  | 

POETRY  OF  AMERICA.  Se- 
lections from  One  Hundred 
American  Poets,  from  1776  to 
1876.  By  W.  J.  Linton.  31.  6tt. 

POLITICAL    CYCLOPAEDIA. 
A  Dictionary  of  Political,  Con-    j 
stituliontil,    Statistical,   and    Fo-    ' 
rensic    Knowledge ;    forming    a 
Work  of  Reference  on  subjects  of 
Civil     Administration,     Political 
Economy,    Finance,   Commerce, 
Laws,  and   Social  Relations.     4 
vols.     3r.  6t/.  each. 

POPE'S  Poetical  Works.  Edited, 
with  copious  Notes,  by  Robert 
Carruthers.  With  numerous  Illus 
trations.  2  vols.  5.?.  each. 

Homer's  Iliad.      Edited    by 

the  Rev.  J.  S.  Watson,  M.A. 
Illustrated  by  the  entire  Series  of 
Flaxman's  Designs.  $s. 

Homer's  Odyssey,  with  the 

Battle  of  Frogs  and  Mice,  Hymns, 
&c.,  by  other  translators.  Edited 
by  the  Rev.  J.  S.  Watson,  M.A. 
With  the  entire  Series  of  Flax- 
man's Designs.  $s. 

Life,  including  many  of  his  \ 

Letters.     By  Robert  Carruthers.    ; 
With  numerous  Illustrations.    5$.   i 

POUSHKIN'S  Prose  Tales:  The  j 

Captain's  Daughter — Doubrovsky  j 
—  The  Queen  of  Spades  —  An 

Amateur  Peasant  Girl— The  Shot  j 

—The  Snow  Storm— The  Post-  | 

master  —  The    Coffin    Maker  —  j 

Kirdjali— The  Egyptian  Nights—  I 
Peter  the  Great's  Negro.    Trans- 
lated by  T.  Keane.    3*.  6rf. 


PRESCOTT'S  Conquest  of 
Mexico.  Copyright  edition,  with 
the  notes  by  John  Foster  Kirk, 
and  an  introduction  by  G.  P. 
Winship.  3  vols.  3*.  6'/.  each. 

Conquest  of  Peru.  Copyright 

edition,  with  the  notes  of  John 
Foster  Kirk.    2  vols.   3$.  6d.  each. 

—  Reign  of  Ferdinand  and 
Isabella.  Copyright  edition, 
with  the  notes  of  John  Foster 
Kirk.  3  vols.  $s.  6V.  each. 

PROPERTIUS.  Translated  by 
Rev.  P.  J.  F.  Gantillon,  M.A., 
and  accompanied  by  Poetical 
Versions,  from  various  sources. 
y.  6d. 

PROVERBS,  Handbook  of.  Con- 
taining an  entire  Republication 
of  Ray's  Collection  of  English 
Proverbs,  with  his  additions  from 
Foreign  Languages  and  a  com- 
plete Alphabetical  Index;  in  which 
are  introduced  large  additions  as 
well  of  Proverbs  as  of  Sayings, 
Sentences,  Maxims,  and  Phrases, 
collected  by  II.  G.  Bohn.  5*. 

PROVERBS,  A  Polyglot  of 
Foreign.  Comprising  French, 
Italian,  German,  Dutch,  Spanish, 
Portuguese,  and  Danish.  With 
English  Translations  £  a  General 
Index  by  II.  G.  Bohn.  5*. 

POTTERY  AND  PORCELAIN, 
and  other  Objects  of  Vertu.  Com- 
piising  an  Illustrated  Catalogue  of 
the  Bernal  Collection  of  Works 
of  Art,  with  the  prices  at  which 
they  were  sold  by  auction,  and 
names  of  th  e  possessors.  To  which 
are  added,  an  Introductory  Lecture 
on  Pottery  and  Porcelain,  and  an 
Engraved  List  of  all  the  known 
Marks  and  Monograms.  By  f  lenry 
G.  Bohn,  With  numerous  Wood 
Engravings,  5$ . ;  or  with  Coloured 
Illustrations,  10?,  6W. 

PROUT'S  (Father)  Relieves.  Col- 
lected and  arranged  by  Rev.  F. 
Mahony.  New  issue,  with  21 
Etchings  by  D.  Maclise,  R.A. 
Nearly  600  pages.  5*. 


2O 


An  Alphabetical  List  of  Books 


QUINTILIAN'S  Institutes  of 
Oratory,  or  Education  of  an 
Orator.  Translated  by  the  Rev. 
J.  S.  Watson,  M.A.  2  vols.  $s 
each. 

RACINE'S  (Jean)  Dramatic 
"Works.  A  metrical  English  ver- 
sion. By  R.  Bruce  Bos  well,  M.A, 
Oxon.  2  vols.  35.  6d.  each. 

RANKE'S  History  of  the  Popes, 
their  Church  and  State,  and  espe- 
cially of  their  Conflicts  with  Pro- 
testantism in  the  i6th  and  i;th 
centuries.  Translated  by  E. 
Foster.  3  vols.  31.  6</.  each. 

History  of  Servia  and  the 

Servian  Revolution.  With  an 
Account  of  the  Insurrection  in 
Bosnia.  Translated  by  Mrs.  Kerr, 
3J.  6d. 

RECREATIONS  in  SHOOTING. 
By '  Craven.'  With  62  Engravings 
on  Wood  after  Harvey,  and  9 
Engravings  on  Steel,  chiefly  after 
A.  Cooper,  R.A.  5*. 

RENNIE'S  Insect  Architecture. 
Revised  and  enlarged  by  Rev. 
J.  G.  Wood,  M.A.  With  186 
Woodcut  Illustrations.  $s. 

REYNOLD'S  (Sir  J.)  Literary 
Works.  Edited  by  II .  W.  Beechy. 
2  vols.  3-r.  bd.  each. 

RICARDO  on  the  Principles  of 
Political  Economy  and  Taxa- 
tion, Edited  by  E.  C.  K.  Conner, 

M.A.    5-r. 

RICHTER  (Jean  Paul  Friedrich). 
Levana,  a  Treatise  on  Education: 
together  with  the  Autobiography 
(a  Fragment),  and  a  short  Pre- 
fatory Memoir.  $s.  6d. 

Flower,  Fruit,  and  Thorn 

Pieces,  or  the  Wedded  Life,  Death, 
and  Marriage  of  Firmian  Stanis- 
laus Siebenkaes,  Parish  Advocate 
in  the  Parish  of  Kuhschnapptel. 
Newly  translated  by  Lt.-Col.Alex. 
Ewing.  3;.  &/, 


ROGER  DE  HOVEDEN'S  An- 
nals of  English  History,  com- 
prising the  History  of  England 
and  of  other  Countries  of  Europe 
from  A.D.  732  to  A.D.  1201. 
Translated  by  H,  T.  Riley,  M.A. 
2  vols.  5^.  each. 

ROGER  OF  WENDOVER'S 
Flowers  of  History,  comprising 
the  History  of  England  from  the 
Descent  of  the  Saxons  to  A.D. 
1 235,  formerly  ascribed  to  Matthew 
Paris.  Translated  by  J.  A.  Giles, 
D.C.L.  2  vols.  5$.  each. 

ROME  in  the  NINETEENTH 
CENTURY.  Containing  a  com- 
plete Account  of  the  Ruins  of  the 
Ancient  City,  the  Remains  of  the 
Middle  Ages,  and  the  Monuments 
of  Modern  Times.  By  C.  A.  Eaton. 
With  34  Steel  Engravings.  2  vols. 
5*.  each. 

See  BURN  and  DYER. 

ROSCOE'S  (W.)  Life  and  Ponti- 
ficate of  Leo  X.  Final  edition, 
revised  by  Thomas  Roscoe.  2 
vols.  3-f.  6d.  each. 

Life  of  Lorenzo  de'  Medici, 

called   *  the  Magnificent.'     With 
his    poems,    letters,    &c.       loth 
Edition,  revised,  with  Memoir  of 
Roscoe  by  his  Son.     35.  6d. 

RUSSIA.  History  of,  from  the 
earliest  Period,  compiled  from 
the  most  authentic  sources  by 
Walter  K.  Kelly.  With  Portraits. 
2  vols.  $s,  6d.  each. 

SALLUST,  FLORUS,  and  VEL- 
LEIUS  PATERCULUS. 

Translated  by  J.  S.Watson,  M.A. 
5*- 

SCHILLER'S  Works.  Translated 
by  various  hands.  7  vols.  31.  6^. 
each : — 

I.— History  of  the  Thirty  Years' 
War. 


Contained  in  Bo  Jin's  Libraries. 


21 


SCHILLER'S  WORKS  continued. 

II. — History  of  the  Revolt  in  the 
Netherlands,  the  Trials  of 
Counts  Egmont  and  Horn, 
the  Siege  of  Antwerp,  and 
the  Disturbances  in  France 
preceding  the  Reign  of 
Henry  IV. 

III.— Don  Carlos,  Mary  Stuart, 
Maid  of  Orleans,  Bride  of 
Messina,  together  with  the 
Use  of  the  Chorus  in 
Tragedy  (a  short  Essay). 
These  Dramas  are  all 
translated  in  metre. 

IV.— Robbers  ( with  Schiller's 
original  Preface),  Fiesco, 
Love  and  Intrigue,  De- 
metrius, Ghost  Seer,  Sport 
of  Divinity. 

The    Dramas    in    this 
volume  are  translated  into 
Prose. 
V.— Poems. 

VI.— Essays, /Esthetical  and  Philo- 
sophical 

VII.— Wallenstein's  Camp,  Pic- 
colomini  and  Death  of 
Wallenstein,  William  Tell. 

SCHILLER  and  GOETHE. 
Correspondence  between,  from 
A.D.  1794-1805.  Translated  by 
L.  Dora  Schmitz.  2  vols.  3-f.  6d. 
each. 

SCHLEGEL'S  (F.)  Lectures  on 
the  Philosophy  of  Life  and  the 
Philosophy  of  Language.  Trans- 
lated by  the  Rev.  A.  J.  W.  Mor- 
rison, M.A.  3*.  6d. 

Lectures  on  the  History  of 

Literature,  Ancient  and  Modern, 
Translated  from  the  German.  31.60. 

Lectures  on  the  Philosophy 

of  History.  Translated  by  J.  B. 
Robertson.  3;.  6d. 

SCHLEGEL'S  Lectures  on 
Modern  History,  together  with 
the  Lectures  entitled  Caesar  and 


Alexander,  and  The  Beginning  of 
our  History.  Translated  by  L. 
Purcell  and  R.  H.  Whitetock. 
3S.6J. 

^Esthetic  and  Miscellaneous 

Works.  Translated  by  E.  J. 
Millington.  3^.  6d. 

SCHLEGEL  (A.  W.)  Lectures 
on  Dramatic  Art  and  Literature. 
Translated  by  J.  Black.  Revised 
Edition,  by  the  Rev.  A.  J.  W. 
Morrison,  M.A.  $s.  6d. 

SCHOPENHAUER  on  the  Four- 
fold Root  of  the  Principle  of 
Sufficient  Reason,  and  On  the 
Will  in  Nature.  Translated  by 
Madame  Hillebrand.  5-r. 

Essays.  Selected  and  Trans- 
lated. With  a  Biographical  Intro- 
duction and  Sketch  of  his  Philo- 
sophy, by  E.  Belfort  Bax.  51. 

SCHOUW'S  Earth,  Plants,  and 
Man.  Translated  by  A.  Henfrey. 
With  coloured  Map  of  the  Geo- 
graphy of  Plants.  5*. 

SCHUMANN  (Robert).  His  Life 
and  Works,  by  August  Reissmann. 
Translated  by  A,  L.  Alger.  3^.  6d. 

Early  Letters.  Originally  pub- 

blished  by  his  Wife.  Translated 
by  May  Herbert.  With  a  Preface 
by  Sir  George  Grove,  D.C.L. 
3*.  6d. 

SENECA  on  Benefits.  Newly 
translated  by  A.  Stewart,  M.A. 
3J.  6d. 

Minor  Essays  and  On  Clem- 
ency. Translated  by  A.  Stewart, 
M.A.  5J. 

SHAKESPEARE  DOCU- 
MENTS. Arranged  by  D.  H. 
Lambert,  B.A.  $s.  6d. 

SHAKESPEARE'S  Dramatic 
Ajft.  The  History  and  Character 
of  Shakespeare's  Plays.  By  Dr. 
Hermann  Ulrici.  Translated  by 
L.  Dora  Schmitz.  2  vols.  3;.  6^. 
each. 


22 


An  Alphabetical  List  of  Books 


SHAKESPEARE  (William).  A 
Literary  Biography  by  Karl  Elze, 
Ph.D.,  LL.D.  Translated  by 
L.  Dora  Schmitz.  5*. 

SHARPE  (S.)  The  History  of 
Egypt,  from  the  Earliest  Times 
till  the  Conquest  by  the  Arabs, 
A.D.  640.  By  Samuel  Sharpe. 
2  Maps  and  upwards  of  400  Illus- 
trative Woodcuts.  2  vols.  5$.  each. 

SHERIDAN'S  Dramatic  Works, 
Complete.  With  Life  by  G.  G.  S. 
3*.  to. 

SISMONDFS  History  of  .the 
Literature  of  the  South  oi 
Europe.  Translated  by  Thomas 
Roscoe.  2  vols.  3-f,  6d.  each. 

SYNONYMS  and  ANTONYMS, 
or  Kindred  Words  and  their 
Oppositea,  Collected  and  Con- 
trasted by  Yen.  C.J.  Smith,  M.A. 
Revised  Edition.  5^. 

SYNONYMS  DISCRIMI- 
NATED. A  Dictionary  of 
Synonymous  Words  in  the  Eng- 
lish Language,  showing  the 
Accurate  signification  of  words 
of  similar  meaning.  Illustrated 
with  Quotations  from  Standard 
Writers.  With  the  Author's 
latest  Corrections  and  Additions. 
Edited  by  the  Rev.  H.  Percy 
Smith,  M.A,,  of  Balliol  College, 
Oxford.  6s. 

SMITH'S  (Adam)  The  Wealth  of 
Nations.  Edited  by  E.  Belfort 
Bax.  2  vols.  3*.  6d.  each. 

Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments ; 

with  his  Essay  on  the  First  For- 
mation of  Languages ;  to  which  is 
added  a  Memoir  of  the  Author  by 
Dugald  Stewart.  3* .  6</, 

SMYTH'S  (Professor)  Lectures 
on  Modern  History;  from  the 
Irruption  of  the  Northern  Nations 
to  the  close  of  the  American  Re- 
volution. 2  vols.  31.  6d.  each. 


SMYTH'S  (Professor)  Lectures- 
on  tlie  French  Revolution. 
2  vols.  3-r.  6d.  each. 

SMITH'S  (  Pye )  Geology  and 
Scripture.  2nd  Edition,  5*. 

SMOLLETT'S  Adventures  or 
Roderick  Random.  With  short 
Memoir  and  Bibliography,  and 
Cruikshank's  Illustrations.  3 j.  6d. 

Adventures  of  Peregrine 

Pickle,  in  which  are  included  the 
Memoirs  of  a  Lady  of  Quality. 
With  Bibliography  and  Cruik- 
shank's Illustrations.  2 vols.  3;.6</. 
each. 

The   Expedition  of   Hum- 
phry Clinker.  With  Bibliography 
and     Cruikshank's    Illustrations. 

3JT.   &/. 

SOCRATES  (surnamed  'Scholas- 
ticus ' ) .  The  Ecclesiastical  His- 
tory of  (A.D.  305-445).  Translated 
from  the  Greek.  5*. 

SOPHOCLES,  The  Tragedies  of. 
A  New  Prose  Translation,  with 
Memoir,  Notes,  &c.,  by  E.  P. 
Coleridge.  $.». 

S  OUT  KEY'S  Life  of  Nelson. 
With  Facsimiles  of  Nelson's  writ- 
ing, Portraits,  Plans,  and  upwards 
of  50  Engravings  on  Steel  and 
Wood.  55. 

Life  of  Wesley,  and  the  Rise 

and  Progress  of  Methodism.     5-r. 

Robert  Southey.    The  Story 

of  his  Life  written  in  his  Letters. 
WTith  an  Introduction,    Edited  by 
John  Dennis.     3*.  6d. 

SOZOMEN'S  Ecclesiastical  His- 
tory. Comprising  a  History  ot 
the  Church  from  A.D.  324-440. 
Translated  from  the  Greek.  To- 
gether with  the  ECCLESIASTICAL 
HISTORY  OF  PHILOSTORGIUS,  as 
epitomised  by  Photius.  Trans- 
lated from  the  Greek  by  Rev.  E. 
Walford,  M.A.  $*. 


Contained  in  Bokris  Libraries. 


^SPINOZA'S  Chief  Works.  Trans- 
lated, with  Introduction, by  R. H . M. 
Elwes.  2  vols.  5j,  each. 

STANLEY'S  Classified  Synopsis 
of  the  Principal  Painters  of  the 
Dutch  and  Flemish  Schools. 
By  George  Stanley.  $s. 

STARLING'S  (Miss)  Noble  Deeds 
of  Women;  or,  Examples  of 
Female  Courage,  Fortitude,  and 
Virtue.  With  14  Steel  Engrav- 
ings. 5-r, 

^STAUNTON'S  Chess  -  Player's 
Handbook.  A  Popular  and  Scien- 
tific Introduction  to  the  Game. 
With  numerous  Diagrams.  $s. 

Chess  Praxis.    A  Supplement 

to  the  Chess-player's  Handbook. 
Containing    the    most    important 
modern  improvements  in  the  Open- 
ings ;  Code  of  Chess  Laws ;  and 
a  Selection  of  Morphy's  Games. 
Annotated.     $s. 

Chess-player's   Companion. 

Comprising  a  Treatise  on  Odds, 
Collection  of  Match  Games,  and  a 
Selection  of  Original  Problems.  5*. 

Chess  Tournament  of  1851. 

A  Collection  of  Games  played  at 
this  celebrated  assemblage.    With 
Introduction  and  Notes.     $s. 

STOCKHARDT'S  Experimental 
Chemistry.  A  Handbook  for  the 
Study  of  the  Science  by  simple 
experiments.  Edited  by  C.  W. 
Heaton,  F.C.S.  With  numerous 
Woodcuts.  New  Edition,  revised 
throughout.  55. 

STRABO'S  Geography.  Trans- 
lated by  W.  Falconer,  M.A., 
and  H.  C.  Hamilton,  3  vols, 
5J.  each. 

-STRICKLAND'S  (Agnes)  Lives 
of  the  Queens  of  England,  from 
the  Norman  Conquest,  Revised 
Edition.  With  6  Portraits.  6  vols. 
5;.  each. 


STRICKLAND'S  Life  of  Mary 
Queen  of  Scots.  2  vols.  5^,  each. 

Lives  of  the  Tudor  and  Stuart 

Princesses.    With  Portraits.     5*. 

STUART  and  REVETT'S  Anti- 
quities of  Athens,  and  other 
Monuments  of  Greece;  to  which 
is  added,  a  Glossary  of  Terms  used 
in  Grecian  Architecture.  With  71 
Plates  engraved  on  Steel,  and 
numerous  Woodcut  Capitals.  5*. 

SUETONIUS'  Lives  of  theTwelve 
Caesars  and  Lives  of  the  Gram- 
marians.  The  translation  of 
Thomson,  revised  by  T.  Forester. 

SWIFT'S  Prose  Works.  Edited 
by  Temple  Scott.  With  a  Bio- 
graphical Introduction  by  the  Right 
lion,  W.  E.  H.  Lecky,  M.P. 
With  Portraits  and  Facsimiles. 
12  vols,  3.?,  6d.  each, 
[  Vols.  /.-  VI.  &  VIII.-X. ready. 

I.— A  Tale  of  a  Tub,  The  Battle 
of  the  Books,  and  other 
early  works.  Edited  by 
Temple  Scott.  With  a 
Biographical  Introduction 
by  the  Right  Hon. 
W.  E.  H.  Lecky,  M.P. 

II.— The  Journal  to  Stella.  Edited 
by  Frederick  Ryland,  M.  A. 
With  2  Portraits  of  Stella, 
and  a  Facsimile  of  one  of 
the  Letters. 

III.&  IV.— Writings  on  Religion  and 
the  Church.  Edited  by 
Temple  Scott. 

V. — Historical  and  Political 
Tracts  (English).  Edited 
by  Temple  Scott. 

VI.—  The  Drapier's  Letters. 
With  facsimiles  of  Wood's 
Coinage,  &.c.  Edited  by 
Temple  Scott. 

VI  I. —Historical  and  Political 
Tracts  (Irish). 

[fn  the  press. 


An  Alphabetical  List  of  Books 


SWIFT'S  PROSE  WORKS  continued. 

VIII.— Gulliver's  Travels.  Edited 
by  G.  R.  Dennis.  With 
Portrait  and  Maps. 

IX. —Contributions  to  the  *  Ex- 
aminer,' 'Tatler,'  'Spec- 
tator,' &c.  Edited  by 
Temple  Scott. 

X.~ Historical  Writings.  Edited 
by  Temple  Scott. 

XI. — Literary  Essays. 

[/«  preparation, 

XII.— Index  and  Bibliography. 

[/#  preparation. 

STOWE  (Mrs.  H.B.)  Uncle  Tom's 
Cabin,  or  Life  among  the  Lowly. 
With  Introductory  Remarks  by 
Rev.  J.  Sherman.  With  8  full- 
page  Illustrations.  $s.  6d. 

TACITUS.  The  Works  of.  Liter- 
ally  translated.  2  vols.  $s.  each. 

TALES  OF  THE  GENII;  or, the 
Delightful  Lessons  of  Horam,  the 
Son  of  Asmar.  Translated  from 
the  Persian  by  Sir  Charles  Morell. 
Numerous  Woodcuts  and  12  Steel 
Engravings.  5-r. 

TASSO'S  Jerusalem  Delivered. 
Translated  into  English  Spenserian 
Verse  by  J.  II.  Wiffen.  With  8 
Engravings  on  Steel  and  24  Wood- 
cuts by  Thurston.  $s. 

TAYLOR'S  (Bishop  Jeremy) 
Holy  Living  and  Dying,  with 
Prayers  containing  the  Whole  Duty 
of  a  Christian  and  the  parts  of  De- 
votion fitted  to  all  Occasions  and 
furnished  for  all  Necessities.  3.1. 6d. 

TEN  BRINK.— See  BRINK. 

TERENCE  and  PH^EDRUS. 
Literally  translated  byH.T.  Riley, 
M.A.  To whichis  added,  SMART'S 
METRICALVERSION  OF  PH^DRUS. 

5'- 

THEOCRITUS,  BION,  MOS- 
CHUS,  and  TYRTJEUS.  Liter- 
-*lly  translated  by  the  Rev.  J. 


Banks,  M.A.  To  which  are  ap- 
pended the  Metrical  Versions  of 
Chapman.  5-r. 

THEODORET  andEVAGRIUS. 
Histories  of  the  Church  from  A.D. 
332  to  A.D.  427;  and  from  A.D. 
431  to  A.D.  544.  Translated  from 
the  Greek.  5*. 

THIERRY'S  History  of  the 
Conquest  of  England  by  the 
Normans;  its  Causes,  and  its 
Consequences  in  England,  Scot- 
land, Ireland,  and  the  Continent. 
Translated  by  William  Hazlitt. 
2  vols.  35.  6d.  each. 

THUCYDIDES.  The  Pelopon- 
nesian  War.  Literally  translated 
by  the  Rev.  H.  Dale.  2  vols. 
3-r.  6d,  each. 

An  Analysis  and  Summary 

of.  With  Chronological  Table  of 
Events,  &c.  By  J.  T.  Wheeler.  5*. 

THUDICHUM  ( J.  L.  W.)  A  Trea- 
tise on  Wines:  their  Origin, 
Nature,  and  Varieties.  With  Prac- 
tical Directions  for  Viticulture  and 
Vinification.  By  J.  L.  W.  Thudi- 
chum,  M.D.,  F.R.C.P.  (Lond.). 
Illustrated.  5*. 

URE'S  (Dr.  A.)  Cotton  Manufac- 
ture of  Great  Britain,  systemati- 
cally investigated.  Revised  Edit, 
by  P.  L.  Simmonds.  With  150 
original  Illustrations.  2  vols.  51. 
each. 

Pnilosophy  of  Manufactures. 

Revised  Edition,  by  P.  L.  Sim- 
monds. With  numerous  Figures. 
Doublevolume.  TS.  6d. 

VASARI'S  Lives  of  the  most 
Eminent  Painters,  Sculptors, 
and  Architects.  Translated  by 
Mrs.  J.  Foster,  with  a  Commen- 
tary by  J.  P.  Richter,  Ph.D.  6 
vols.  3*.  6d,  each. 

VIRO-IL.  A  Literal  Prose  Trans- 
lation by  A,  Hamilton  Bryce, 
LL.D-,  F.R.S.E.  With  Portrait. 


Contained  in  BoJuis  Libraries. 


VOLTAIRE'S  Tales.  Translated 
by  R.  B.  Boswell.  Vol.  L,  con- 
taining Bebouc,  Memnon,  Can- 
dide,  L'Ingenu,  and  other  Tales. 


WALTON'S  Complete  Angler, 
or  the  Contemplative  Man's  Re- 
creation, by  Izaak  Walton  and 
Charles  Cotton.  Edited  by  Ed- 
ward Jesse.  To  which  is  added 
an  account  of  Fishing;  Stations, 
Tackle,  &c.,  by  Henry  G.  Bohn. 
With  Portrait  and  203  Engravings 
on  Wood  and  26  Engravings  on 
Steel.  $J. 

-  Llvea  of  Donne,  Hooker,  &o. 
New   Edition   revised   by  A.  H. 
Bullen,  with  a  Memoir  of  Izaak 
Walton  by  Wm.  Dowling.     With 
numerous  Illustrations.     51. 

WELLINGTON,  Life  of.   By  'An 

Old  Soldier.'  From  the  materials 
of  Maxwell.  With  Index  and  18 
Steel  Engravings.  51. 

-  Victories  of.    See  MAXWELL. 

WERNER'S  Templars  in 
C  Tprus.  Translated  by  E.  A.  M. 
Lewis.  3.?.  &/. 

WESTROPP  (H.  M.)  A  Hand- 
book of  Archeology,  Egyptian, 
Greek,  Etruscan,  Roman.  By 
II.  M.  Westropp.  2nd  Edition, 
revised.  With  very  numerous 
Illustrations.  55. 

WHITE'S  Natural  History  of 
Selborne,  with  Observations  on 
various  Parts  of  Nature,  and  the 
Naturalists'  Calendar.  With  Notes 
by  Sir  William  Jardine.  Edited 
by  Edward  Jesse.  With  40  Por- 
traits and  coloured  Plates.  $s. 


WHEATLEY'S  A  Rational  Illus- 
tration of  the  Book  of  Common 
Prayer.  $s.  6d. 

WHEELER'S  Noted  Names  of 
Fiction,  Dictionary  of.  Includ- 
ing also  Familiar  Pseudonyms, 
Surnames  bestowed  on  Eminent 
Men,  and  Analogous  Popular  Ap- 
pellations often  referred  to  in 
Literature  and  Conversation.  By 
W.  A.  Wheeler,  M.A.  5*. 

WIESELER'S  Chronological 
Synopsis  of  the  Four  Gospels. 
Translated  by  the  Rev.  Canon 
Venables.  35.  6d. 

WILLIAM  of  MALMESBURY'S 
Chronicle  of  the  Kings  of  Eng- 
land, from  the  Earliest  Period 
to  the  Reign  of  King  Stephen. 
Translated  by  the  Rev.  J.  Sharpe. 
Edited  by  J.  A.  Giles,  D.C.L.  5*. 

XENOPHON'S  Works.  Trans- 
lated by  the  Rev.  J.  S.  Watson, 
M.A.,  and  the  Rev.  H.  Dale.  In 
3  vols.  S.T.  each. 

YOUNG  (Arthur).  Travels  in 
France  during  the  years  1787/ 
1788,  and  1789.  Edited  by 
M.  Betham  Edwards.  3*.  6d. 

Tour  in  Ireland,  with 

General  Observations  on  the  state 
of  the  country  during  the  years 
1776-79.  Edited  by  A.  W. 
Hutton.  With  Complete  Biblio- 
graphy by  J.  P.  Anderson,  and 
Map.  2  vols.  3-r.  6</.  each. 

YULE-TIDE  STORIES.  A  Col- 
lection of  Scandinavian  and  North- 
German  Popular  Tales  and  Tra- 
ditions, from  the  Swedish,  Danish, 
and  German.  Edited  by  B.  Thorpe. 
5*- 


(        26        ) 
NEW   AND    FORTHCOMING    VOLUMES    OF 

BONN'S  LIBRARIES. 


THE  PROSE  WORKS  OF  JONATHAN  SWIFT.  Edited  by 
Temple  Scott.  With  an  Introduction  by  the  Right  Hon,  W.  E.  H. 
Lecky,  M.  P.  In  1 1  volumes,  3^.  6d.  each. 

Vol.  I.—*  A  Tale  of  a  Tub,'  *  The  Battle  of  the  Books,'  and  other 
early  works,  Edited  by  Temple  Scott.  With  Introduction  by  the 
Right  Hon.  W.  E,  II.  Lecky,  M.P.  Portrait  and  Facsimiles. 

Vol.  II.—*  The  Journal  to  Stella.'  Edited  by  F.  Ryland,  M.A. 
With  a  Facsimile  Letter  and  two  Portraits  of  Stella. 

Vols.  III.  and  IV.— Writings  on  Religion  and  the  Church. 
Edited  by  Temple  Scott.  With  portraits  and  facsimiles  of  title  pages. 

Vol.  V. —Historical  and  Political  Tracts  (English).  Edited  by 
Temple  Scott.  With  Portrait  and  Facsimiles. 

Vol.  VI.— The  Drapier's  Letters.  Edited  by  Temple  Scott.  With 
Portrait.  Reproductions  of  Wood's  Coinage  and  facsimiles  of  title 
pages. 

Vol.  VIII.— Gulliver's  Travels.  Edited  by  G.  R.  Dennis.  With 
the  original  Maps  and  Illustrations. 

Vol.  IX.— Contributions  to  c  The  Tatler,'  *  The  Examiner,'  '  The 
Spectator,' and  'The  Intelligencer.'  P^dited  by  Temple  Scott.  With 
Portrait. 

Vol.  X.— Historical  Writings.  Edited  by  Temple  Scott.  With 
Portrait, 

pRESCorrs  CONQUEST  OF  MEXICO,    copyright  edition, 

with  the  author's  latest  corrections  and  additions,  and  the  notes  of 
John  Foster  Kirk.  With  an  introduction  by  George  Parker  Winship. 
3  vols.  35-.  6c/.  each. 

PRESCOTT'S  CONQUEST  OF  PERU.  Copyright  edition. 
Edited  by  John  Foster  Kirk.  2.  vols.  3^.  6d.  each. 

PRESCOTT'S  FERDINAND  AND  ISABELLA.  Copyright 
edition.  Edited  by  John  Foster  Kirk.  3  vols.  3*.  f>d.  each. 

GRAY'S  LETTERS.  Edited  by  Duncan  C.  Tovey,  M.A.,  Editor  of 
'Gray  and  his  Friends,'  &c.,  late  Clark  Lecturer  at  Trinity  College, 
Cambridge.  Vols.  I.  and  II.  31.  6d.  each. 

CICERO'S  LETTERS.  The  whole  extant  Correspondence.  Trans- 
lated by  Evelyn  S.  Shuckburgh,  M.A.  In  4  vols.  51.  each. 


BELL'S   HANDBOOKS 


OF 


THE   GREAT   MASTERS 

IN  PAINTING  AND  SCULPTURE. 

EDITED  BY  G.  C.  WILLIAMSON,  Lrrr.D. 
Post  8vo.     With  40  Illustrations  and  Photogravure  Frontispiece.  5*.  net  each. 


The  following  Volumes  have  been  issued  : 
BOTTICELLI.    By  A,  STRKETER. 
BRUNELLESCHI.    By  LEADER  SCOTT. 
CORREGGIO.    By  SELWYN  BRINTON,  M.A. 
CARLO    CRIVELLI.      By  G.    MCNEIL    RUSHFORTH,    M.A. 
DELLA  ROBBIA.    By  the  MARCHESA  BURLAMACCHJ. 
ANDREA  DEL  SARTO.    By  II.  GUINNESS.    2nd  Edition. 
DONATELLO.    By  HOPE  REA. 

GERARD  DOU.     By  Dr.  W.  MARTIN.    Translated  by  Clara  Bell. 
GAUDENZIO  FERRARI.    By  ETHEL  HALSEY. 
FRANCIA.    By  GEORGE  C.  WILLIAMSON,  Litt.D. 
GIORGIONE.    By  HERBERT  COOK,  M.A. 
GIOTTO.    By  F.  MASON  PERKINS. 
FRANS  HALS.    By  GERALD  S.  DAVIES,  M.A, 

BERNARDINO  LUINI.  By  GEORGE  C.  WILLIAMSON,  Litt.D.  2nd  Edition. 
LEONARDO  DA  VINCI.    By  EDWARD  McCuRDY,  M.A. 
MANTEGNA.    By  MAUD  CRUTTWELL. 
MEMLINC.    By  W.  H.  JAMES  WEALE. 
MICHEL  ANGELO.     By  Lord  RONALD  SUTHERLAND  GOWER,  M.A., 

F.S.A.  . 

PERUGINO.    By  G.  C.  WILLIAMSON,  Litt.D. 
PIERO  DELLA  FRANCESCA.    By  W.  G.  WATERS,  M.A. 
PINTORICCIIIO.    By  EVELYN  MARCH  PHILLIPPS. 
RAPHAEL.    By  H.  STRACHEY.    2nd  Edition. 
REMBRANDT.    By  MALCOLM  BELL. 
LUCA  SIGNORELLI.    By  MAUD  CRUTTWELL.    2nd  Edition. 
SODOMA.    By  the  CONTESSA  LORENZO  PRIULI-BON. 
TINTORETTO,    By  J.  B.  STOUGHTON  HOLBORN,  M.A. 
VELASQUEZ.    By  R.  A.  M.  STEVENSON.    $rd  Edition. 
WATTEAU.    By  EDGCUMBE  STALEY,  B.A. 
WILKIE.    By  Lord  RONALD  SUTHERLAND  GOWER,  M.A,,  F.S.A. 

In  preparation. 

EL  GRECO.    By  MANUEL*  B.  Cossio,  Litt.D.,  Ph.D. 
PAOLO  VERONESE.    By  ROGER  E.  FRY. 
RUBENS.    By  HOPE  REA, 

Others  to  follow. 


THE 


CHISWICK  SHAKESPEARE. 

Illustrated  by  BYAM  SHAW. 
WITH  INTRODUCTIONS  AND  GLOSSARIES  BY  JOHN  DENNIS. 


Printed  at  the  Chiswick  Press,  pott  8vo.,  price  is.  6d.  net  per  volume 
also  a  cheaper  edition,  is.  net  per  volume ;  or  2s.  net  in  limp  leather ;    Is 
a  few  copies,  on  Japanese  vellum,  to  be  sold  only  in  sets,  price  $s.  net  per 
volume. 

Now  Complete  in  39  Volumes. 

ALL'S  WELL  THAT  ENDS     LOVE'S  LABOUR'S  LOST. 


WELL. 

ANTONY  AND  CLEOPATRA. 
AS  YOU  LIKE  IT. 
COMEDY  OF  ERRORS. 
CORIOLANUS. 
CYMBELINE. 
HAMLET. 
JULIUS  C^SAR. 
KING  HENRY  IV.    Part  I. 
KING  HENRY  IV.    Part  II. 
KING  HENRY  V. 
KING  HENRY  VI.     Part  I. 
KING  HENRY  VI.    Part  II. 
KING  HENRY  VI.    Part  III. 
KING  HENRY  VIII. 
KING  JOHN. 
KING  LEAR. 
KING  RICHARD  II. 
KING  RICHARD  III. 


MACBETH. 

MEASURE  FOR  MEASURE. 

MERCHANT  OF  VENICE. 

MERRY  WIVES  OF  WINDSOR. 

MIDSUMMER-NIGHT'S  DREAM. 

MUCH  ADO  ABOUT  NOTHING. 

OTHELLO, 

PERICLES. 

ROMEO  AND  JULIET. 

THE  TAMING  OF  THE  SHREW. 

THE  TEMPEST. 

TIMON  OF  ATHENS. 

TITUS  ANDRONICUS. 

TROILUS  AND  CRESSIDA. 

TWELFTH  NIGHT. 

TWO  GENTLEMEN  OF  VERONA. 

WINTER'S  TALE. 

POEMS. 

SONNETS. 


'  A  fascinating  little  edition.'— Notts  and  Queries. 

'A  cheap,  very  comely,  and  altogether  desirable  edition.'— Westminster  Gazette. 
But  a  few  years  ago  such  volumes  would  have  been  deemed  worthy  to  be  considered 
Edition*  de  luxe.    To-day,  the  low  price  at  which  they  are  offered  to  the  public  alone 
prevents  them  being  so  regarded.'— i$Y«<#0. 

1  Handy  in  shape  and  size,  wonderfully  cheap,  beautifully  printed  from  the  Cam* 
bridge  text,  and  illustrated  quaintly  yet  admirably  by  Mr.  Byam  Shaw,  we  have  nothing 
but  praise  for  it.  No  one  who  wants  a  good  and  convenient  Shakespeare— without 
excursuses,  discursuses,  or  even  top  many  notes— can  do  better,  in  our  opinion,  than 
subscribe  to  this  issue :  which  is  saying  a  good  deal  in  these  days  of  cheap  reprints.1— 
Vanity  Fair. 


speares.?-  PaU  Mall  Gazette, 


New  Editions,  fcap.  8vo.  2».  6d.  each  net. 

THE    ALDINE    EDITION 


BRITISH     POETS. 

'This  excellent  edition  of  the  English  classics,  with  their  complete  texts  and 
scholarly  introductions,  are  something  very  different  from  the  cheap  volumes  of 
extracts  which  are  just  now  so  much  too  common.'— St.  James'*  Gazette. 

*  An  excellent  series.    Small,  handy,  and  complete.* — Saturday  Review. 


Akenside.  Edited  by  Rev.  A.  Dyce. 
Beattie.  Edited  by  Rev.  A.  Dyce. 
•Blake.  Edited  by  W.  M,  Roseetti. 
Edited  by  G.  A.  Aitken. 


*  Burns. 

3  vols. 

Butler. 
2  vols. 

Campbell.    Edited  by  His   Son- 
v.  A.  W. 


Edited  by  R.  B.  Johnson. 


in-law,  the  Rev.  A.  W.  Hill. 
Memoir  by  W.  Allingham. 


With 


Chatterton.    Edited  by  the  Rev. 

W.  W.  Skeat,  M.A.    2  vol*. 

Chaucer.  Edited  by  Dr.  R.  Morris, 
with  Memoir  by  Sir  H.  Nicolas.  6  vols. 

Churchill.  Edited  by  Jas.  Hannay. 

2  vole. 
*Coleridge.     Edited  by  T.  Ashe, 

B.A.    2  vols. 
Collins.       Edited    by    W.    Moy 

Thomas. 

Cowper.    Edited  by  John  Bruoe, 

F.S.A.    3  vols. 

Dryden.    Edited  by  the  Rev.  R. 
Hooper,  M.A.    5  vols. 

Goldsmith.     Revised  Edition  by 

Austin  Dobson.    With  Portrait, 
"Gray.    Edited  by  J.  Bradshaw, 

LL.D. 
Herbert.    Edited  by  the  Rev.  A.  B, 

Groaart. 
*Herrlok.       Edited     by    George 

Saintebury.    2  TO!S. 
*Keats.    Edited  by  the  late  Lord 

Houghton. 


Klrke   White.      Edited,   with   a 

Memoir,  by  Sir  H.  Nicolas. 
Milton.    Edited  by  Dr.  Bradshaw. 

2  vols. 

Parnell.    Edited  by  G.  A.  Aitken. 
Pope.     Edited  by  G.  R.  Dennis. 

With  Memoir  by  John  Dennis.    3  vols. 
Prior.    Edited  by  R.  B.  Johnson. 

2  vols. 

Raleigh  and  Wotton.  With  Se- 
lections from  the  Writings  of  other 
COURTLY  POETS  from  1640  to  1650. 
Edited  by  Yen.  Archdeacon  Hannah, 
D.C.L. 

Rogers.    Edited  by  Edward  Bell, 

M.A. 
Scott.     Edited  by  John  Dennis. 

5  vols. 

Shakespeare's  Poems.    Edited  by 

Rev.  A.  Dyce. 

Shelley.      Edited  by  H.  Buxton 

Forman.    5  vols. 

Spenser.  Edited  by  J.  Payne  Col- 
lier. 5  vols. 

Surrey.    Edited  by  J.  Yeowell. 

Swift.     Edited    by   the   Rev.    J. 

Mitford.  3  vols. 
Thomson.  Edited  by  the  Rev.  D. 

C.  Tovey.  2  vols. 
Vaughan.  Sacred  Poems  and 

Pious  Ejaculations.      Edited   by  the 

Rev.  H,  Lyte. 

Wordsworth.      Edited   by  Prof. 

Dowden.    7  vols. 

Wyatt.    Edited  by  J.  leowell. 
Young.     2  vole.    Edited  by  the 

Rev.  J.  Mitford. 


*  These  volumes  may  also  be  had  bound  in  Iiish  linen,  with  design  in  gold  on  sido 
and  back  by  Gleeson  White,  and  gilt  top,  3s.  6d.  each  net. 


THE    ALL-ENGLAND    SERIES. 

HANDBOOKS  OF  ATHLETIC   GAMES. 

The  only  Series  Issued  at  a  moderate  price,  by  Writers  who  are  in 
the  first  rank  In  their  respective  departments. 

1  The  best  instruction  on  games  and  sports  by  the  beat  authorities,  at  the  lowest 
prices.' — Oxford,  Magazine. 

Small  8vo.  oloth,  Illustrated.    Price  Is.  each. 


Cricket.    By  FBED  C.  HOLLAND. 
Cricket.    By  the  Hon.  and  Rev. 

E.  LYTTELTON. 
Croquet.    By  Lieut -Col.  the  Hon. 

H.  C.  KKEDHAM. 
Lawn   Tennis.     By    H.  W,   W. 

WILBEJWOBCE.     With  a  Chapter  for 

Ladies,  by  Mrs.  Hi  LI, YARD. 
Squash  Tennis.     By  EUSTACE  H. 

MILES.    Double  vol.    2s. 

Tennis  and  Backets  and  Fives. 

By  JULIAN  MARSHALL,  Major  J.  SPEHS, 
and  Rev.  J.  A.  ABJTAK  TAIT. 
Oolf.      By    H.    S.    C.    EVERABD. 

Double  vol.    2s. 

Rowing  and  Sculling.     By  GUY 

RIXUN. 
Rowing  and  Sculling.    By  W.  B. 

WOODGATE. 

Sailing.  By  E.  F.  KNIGHT,  dbl.vol.  2*. 
Swimming.    By  MARTIN  and  J. 

RACSTER  COBBBTT. 
Camping  out.    By  A.  A.  MACDON- 

KLJL,.    Double  vol.    2s. 
Canoeing.    By  Dr.  J.  D.  HAYWARD. 

Double  vol.    2s. 
Mountaineering.     By  Dr.  CLAUDE 

WILSOM.    Double  vol.    2s. 
Athletics.    By  H.  H.  GBIFFIN. 
Riding.     By   W.  A.   KERB,    V.C. 

Double  vol.    20. 

Ladies' Riding.  By  W.A.KEBB,V.C. 
Boxing.   By  K.  G.  AiiLAN80N-WiNN. 

With  Prefatory  Note  by  Bat  Mulline. 


Fencing.   By  H.A.  COLMOBBDUNN. 
Cycling.  By  H.  H.  GRIFFIN, L.A.C., 

N.C.U.,  O.T.C.  With  a  Ohaptor  for 
Ladies,  by  Miss  AG.SES  WOOD.  Double 
vol.  2s. 

Wrestling.     By  WALTER  ABM- 

STEONG.    New  Edition. 
Broadsword     and     Singlestick. 
By  R.  CK  ALLANSON-WINN  and  C.  PHIL- 

LIPPS-WOLLEY. 

Gymnastics.     By  A,  F.  JENKIN. 

Double  vol.  2s. 

Gymnastic  Competition  and  Dis- 
play Exercises.  Compiled  by 
P.  GBAF. 

Indian  Clubs.  By  G.  T.  B.  COB- 
BETT  and  A.  F.  JENKIN. 

Dumb-bells.    By  F.  GRAF. 

Football  —  Rugby    Game.      By 

HARRY  VASSALL. 

Football — Association  Game.  By 

0.  W.  ALOOCK*    Bovwed  Edition. 
Hookey.     By    F.    S.    CBBSWELL. 

New  Edition. 

Skating.     By    DOUGLAS     ADAMS. 

With  a  Chapter  for  Ladies,  by  Misa  L. 

OHKKTHAM,  and  a  Chapter  on  Speed 

Skating,  by  a  Pen  Skater.  DhU  vol.  2*. 
Baseball.    By  NEWTON  CRANE. 
Rounders,  Fieldball,  Bowls, 
Quoits,   Curling,   Skittles,   <&o. 

By  J.  M.  WALKER  and  0.  0.  MOTT. 
Dancing.      By   EDWABD   SCOTT. 

Double  vol.    2s. 


TKS  CLUB  SERIES  OP  CABD  AND  TABLE  GAMES. 
*  No  well-regulated  club  or  country  house  should  be  without  this  useful  series  of  books. 
Small  8vo.  cloth,  Illustrated.     Price  Is.  each.  Glofce. 

Bridge.    By  <  TBMPLAR.'  '  Dominoes  and  Solitaire. 

Whist.    By  Dr.  WM.  POLK,  F.B.S.        By  • 
Solo  Whist.  By  ROBERT  F.  GBBEN. 
Billiards.     By  Major-Gen.  A.  W.  | 

DRATSON,  F.RJLS.     With  a  Preface 
„    byW.J.Peall.  ! 

Hints   on   Billiards.      By  J.  P. 

BUCHJLNAN.     Double  vol.    2a. 

Chess.    By  EGBERT  F.  GBEBN.         ! 
The  Two-Move  Chess  Problem. 

By  B.  Or.  LAW*.  ! 

Chess  Openings.  By  I.  GuN«B«i0. 

Draughts  and  Backgammon* 


By  * 
Reversi  and  0o  Bang. 

By  *  BERKELEY.' 


Bezique  and  Cribbage. 

By  *  BKBXVX.E7.' 

£oarU  and  Euchre. 

By '  BEBKELEY.' 
Piquet  and  KubioonPiquetv 

By '  BBRKKLET.' 
Skat    By  Louis  DWHL. 

*»*  A  Skat  Scoringibook.    It, 

Bound  Games,  including  Poker, 

Napoleon*  Loo,  Vingt-et-un,  Ac.     By 
BAXTER- W&AY.  » 

Parlour  and  Playground  Gamef . 
By  Mm.  LAUBXKCX  QOXKB.V 


BELL'S  CATHEDRAL  SERIES. 

Profusely  Illustrated,  cloth ,  crown  8m   is.  6d.  net  each. 

ENGLISH  CATHEDRALS.  An  Itinerary  and  Description.  Compiled  by  JAMES  G. 
GILCHRIST,  A.M  ,  M.D.  Revised  and  edited  with  an  Introduction  on  Cathedral 
Architecture  by  the  Rev.  T.  PERKINS,  M.A.,  F.R.A.S. 

BRISTOL.    By  H.  J.  L.  J.  MASSE,  M.A, 

CANTERBURY.    By  HARTLEY  WITHERS.    5th  Edrtion. 

CARLISLE.    By  C.  KING  ELEY. 

CHESTER.     By  CHANLKS  Hi  ATT.    2nd  Edition,  revised. 

CHICHESTER.    By  H.  C.  COHT.^TTE,  A.R.I. B.A. 

DURHAM.    ByJ.  E.  BVGATB,  A.R.C.A.    and  Edition,  revised. 

ELY.     By  Rev.  W.  D.  SWHETING.    M.A. 

EXETER.    By  PERCY  ADDLESHAW,  B.A.     and  Edition,  revised. 

GLOUCESTER.     By  H.  J.  L.  J.  MASS*,  M.A.    and  Edition. 

HEREFORD.    By  A.  HUGH  FISHER,  A.R.K.    2nd  Edition,  revised. 

LICHF1ELD.     By  A.  B.  CLIFTON,    and  Edition. 

LINCOLN.    By  A.  F.  KBNDRICK,  B.A.    3rd  Edition. 

MANCHESTER.     By  Rev.  T.  PERKINS,  M.A. 

NORWICH.    By  C.  H.  B.  QUENNELL.    and  Edition. 

OXFORD.    By  Rev.  PERCY  DRARMBR,  M.A.    and  Edition,  icvLed. 

PETERBOROUGH.    By  Rev.  W.  D.  SWEETING.    2nd  Edition,  revised. 

RIPON.    By  CECIL  HALLETT,  B.A. 

ROCHESTER.     By  G.  H.  PALMER,  B.A.    2nd  Edition,  revised. 

ST.  ALBANS.    By  Rev.  T.  PERKINS,  M.A. 

ST.  ASAPH.     By  P.  B.  IRONSIDE  BAX. 

ST.  DAVID'S.    By  PHILIP  ROB<-ON,  A.R.I. B.A. 

ST.  PATRICK'S,  DUBLIN.    By  Rev.  J.  H.  BERNARD,  M.A.,  D.D. 

ST.  PAUL'S.    By  Rev.  ARTHUR  DIMOCK,  M.A.    3rd  Edition,  revised. 

SALISBIfRY.    By  GLEESON  WHITE.    3rd  Edition,  revised. 

SOUTHWELL.     By  Rev.  ARTHUR  DIMOCK,  M.A.     and  Edition,  revised. 

WELLS,    By  Rev.  PERCY  DEARMER,  M.A,    srd  Edition. 

WINCHESTER.    By  P.  W.  SKRGEANT.'  and  Edition,  revised. 

WORCESTER.    By  E.  F.  STRANGE,    and  Edition. 

YORK.    By  A.  CLUTTON-BKOCK,  M.A.    3rd  Edition. 

Uniform  with  above  Serits*    Now  ready,    is.  6d.  net  each. 
ST.    MARTIN'S   CHURCH,    CANTERBURY.      By  the  Rev.  CANON  ROUTLKDGB, 

M.A.,  F.S.A. 

BEVERLEY  MINSTER.     By  CHARLES  HIATT. 
WIMBORNE    MINSTER    and    CHRISTCHURCH    PRIORY.      By   the   Rev,  T. 

PERKINS,  M.A. 

TEWKESBURY  ABBEY  AND  DEERHURST  PRIORY.  By  H.  J.  L.  J.  MASS*,  M.A, 
RATH  ABBEY,  MALMESBURY  ABBEY,  and  BRADFORD-ON-AVON  CHURCH. 

By  Rev.  T.  PERKINS,  M.A. 
WESTMINSTER  ABBEY.    By  CHARLES  HIATT. 
STRATFORD-ON-AVON  CHURCH.    By  HAROLD  BAKER. 

BELL'S    HANDBOOKS    TO    CONTINENTAL    CHURCHES. 

Profusely  Illustrated.    Crown  8w,  cloth%  2s.  6d.  net  each. 
AMIENS.    By  the  Rev.  T.  PERKINS,  M.A. 
KAYEUX.    By  the  Rev.  R.  S.  MYLNE. 

CHARTRES  :  The  Cathedral  and  Other  Churches.   By  H.  J.  L.  J.  MASS*,  M*A. 
MONT  ST.  MICHEL.    By  H.  J.  L.  J.  MASSED. A. 
PARIS  (NOTRE-DAME).    By  CHARIES  HIATT. 
ROUEN  :  The  Cathedral  and  Other  Churches.  By  the  Rev,  T.  PERKINS,  M.A, 


The  Best  Practical  Working  Dictionary  of  the 
English  Language. 

WEBSTER'S 

INTERNATIONAL 

DICTIONARY. 

2348  PAGES.       5000  ILLUSTRATIONS. 

NEW  EDITION,  REVISED  THROUGHOUT  WITH  A 

NEW  SUPPLEMENT  OF  25,000  ADDITIONAL 

WORDS  AND  PHRASES. 


The  Appendices  comprise  a  Pronouncing  Gazetteer  of  the  World, 
Vocabularies  of  Scripture,  Greek,  Latin,  and  English  Proper  Names, 
a  Dictionary  of  the  Noted  Names  of  Fiction,  a  Brief  History  of  the 
English  Language,  a  Dictionary  of  Foreign  Quotations,  Words,  Phrases, 
Proverbs,  &c.,  a  Biographical  Dictionary  with  10,000  names,  &c.,  £c. 


Dr.  MURRAY,  Editor  of  the  '  Oxjord  English  Dictionary ,'  says  :— '  In  this  its 
latest  form,  and  with  its  large  Supplement  and  numerous  appendices,  it  is  a  wonderful 
volume,  which  well  maintains  its  ground  against  all  rivals  on  its  own  lines.  The  '  defini- 
tions,' or  more  properly,  '  explanations  of  meaning  '  in  '  Webster '  have  always  struck  me 
as  particularly  terse  and  well-put ;  and  it  is  hard  to  see  how  anything  better  could  be 
done  within  the  limits.' 

Professor  JOSEPH  WRIGHT,  M.A.,  Ph.D.,  D.C.L..  LL.D.,  Editor  of 
the  '  English  Dialect  Dictionary,'  says : — '  The  new  edition  of  "  Webster's  International 
Dictionary  "  is  undoubtedly  the  most  useful  and  reliable  work  of  its  kind  in  any  country. 
No  one  who  has  not  examined  the  work  carefully  would  believe  that  such  a  vast  amount 
of  lexicographical  information  could  possibly  be  found  within  so  small  a  compass.' 

Professor  A.  H.  8AYCE,  LL.D.,  D.D.,  says:— 'It  is  indeed  a  marvellous 
work  ;  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  a  Dictionary  more  exhaustive  and  complete.  E very- 
thing  is  in  it — not  only  what  we  might  expect  to  find  in  such  a  work,  but  also  what  few 
of  us  would  ever  have  thought  of  looking  for.' 


Rev.  JOSEPH  WOOD,  D.D.,  Head  Master  of  Harrow,  says  :— '  I  have  always 
thought  very  highly  of  its  merits.  Indeed,  I  consider  it  to  be  far  the  most  accurate 
English  Dictionary  in  existence,  and  much  more  reliable  than  the  "Century."  Fot 
rad  hourly  reference,  "Webster  "  seems  to  me  unrivalled.1 

Prospectuses^  with  Prices  and  Specimen  Pages \  on  Application. 


LONDON :  GEORGE  BELL  <Sr»  SONS,  YORK  HOUSE, 

PORTUGAL  STREET,  W.C. 
50,000.  S.  &S.  11.04.