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1 


THE  DOCTRINE   OF  THE  JESUITS. 


THE   DOCTRINE 


OF   THE 


JESUITS. 


BY   PAUL   BERT. 

MEMBER  OF  THE  GHAMBEB  OF  DEPUTIES. 

PB  OFF  S  SOB  AT  THE  FACULTY  OF  SCIENCES. 

—  WITH   A  — 

DEDICATION 

TO  MONSIEUR  FREPPEL,   BISHOP  OF  ANGERS. 


BOSTON,  MASS.: 

B.   F.   BRADBURY  &  COMPANY, 

443  Washington  Street. 


10  N'02 


The  members  of  the  Society  are  dispersed  in  every  comer  of  the  world, 
and  divided  into  as  many  nations  and  kingdoms  as  the  earth  has  limits  : 
division,  however,  marked  only  by  the  distance  of  places,  not  of  senti- 
ments; by  the  difference  of  languages,  not  of  affection;  by  the  dissem- 
blance of  faces,  not  of  manners.  In  that  family  the  Latin  thinks  as  the 
Greek,  the  Portuguese  as  the  Brazilian,  the  Hibernian  as  the  Sumatran, 
the  Spaniard  as  the  French,  the  English  as  the  Flemish  ;  and  amongst  so 
many  different  geniuses,  no  controversy,  no  contention;  nothing  which 
gives  you  a  hint  to  perceive  that  they  are  more  than  One.  .  .  .  Their 
birthplace  offers  them  no  motive  of  personal  interest.  .  .  .  Same  aim, 
same  conduct,  same  vow,  which  like  a  conjugal  knot  has  tied  them 
together.  ...  At  the  least  sign,  one  man  turns  and  returns  the  entire 
Society,  and  shapes  the  revolution  of  so  large  a  body.  It  is  easy  to  move, 
but  difficult  to  shake. 

Imago  primi  sœcuU  Societatis  Jesu  ;  published  with  the  author- 
ization of  Mutio  Vitelleschi,  General  ;  1640. 


These  doctrines,  the  consequence  of  which  would  destroy  natural  law, 
that  rule  of  morality  which  God  himself  has  implanted  in  the  hearts  of 
men,  and,  consequently,  would  break  all  the  ties  of  civil  society,  in  author- 
izing theft,  lying,  perjury,  the  most  criminal  impurity,  and  generally 
all  passions  and  all  crimes,  by  the  teaching  of  secret  compensation,  of 
equivocation,  of  mental  restrictions,  of  probabilism  and  philosophical 
sin;  destroy  all  feelings  of  humanity  among  men,  in  authorizing  homi- 
cide and  parricide,  annihilate  royal  authority,  etc.,  etc.  .  .  . 

Decree  of  the  Parliament  of  Paris,  5th  of  March,  1762. 


Notice 


FOR   THE    THIRTEENTH    EDITION. 


The  invitation  that  I  have  addressed  in  my  preface  (page  23), 
*'  to  my  enemies*'  has  been  heard.  They  have  been  kind  enough 
to  indicate  a  certain  number  of  mistakes  in  the  translation,  which 
I  have  corrected  in  the  present  edition.  I  may  safely  say  besides, 
that  they  were  of  no  importance,  except  one,  pointed  out  by 
Monsieur  I'Abbe  Danglas,  who  appears  to  have  made  a  deep 
study  of  my  book. 

We  believe  after  so  many  criticisms,  coming  from  men  so  compe- 
tent, and  surely  not  blinded  by  their  friendship  for  my  person, 
that  my  translation  may  henceforth  be  considered  sufficiently  per- 
fect and  labelled  ne  varietur. 

We  will  then  let  it  stand  as  it  is.  However,  it  is  my  duty,  in 
offering  to  the  reader  this  13th  corrected  edition,  to  thank  those 
who  have  made  themselves  my  fellow-workers,  without  inquiring 
about  the  feelings  that  have  inspired  them.  I  hope  that  their 
satisfaction  will  equal  my  sincerity  in  offering  them  the  expression 
of  my  gratitude. 

Paris,  the  18th  of  May,  1880. 


PUBLISHERS'    PREFACE. 


In  sending  forth  the  present  work,  it  will  not  be  necessary 
to  say  much  by  way  of  introduction.  M.  Paul  Bert,  who 
translated  Gury's  works  from  the  Latin  into  the  French  (from 
which  French  this  translation  has  in  turn  been  made) ,  was  a 
statesman  of  great  ability,  having  the  courage  of  his  convic- 
tions. He  saw  the  harm  done  to  society  by  allowing  the 
Jesuits  to  become  educators  of  the  French  youth,  and  strug- 
gled successfully  to  have  them  disqualified  by  law  from  man- 
agement of  such  education.  This  book  is  a  terrible  exposure 
of  the  principles  of  these  would-be  teachers  of  religion. 
Their  religious  principles  are  simply  statutable  crimes,  un- 
natural and  repugnant  to  all  good  men  ;  and  how  we  Ameri- 
cans can  let  them  train  our  children,  when  the  great  French 
nation  across  the  water  have  decided  that  they  are  unfit  to 
control  the  instruction  of  its  youth,  it  is  not  easy  to  tell. 
Surely,  we  should  have  as  much  concern  that  our  future  cit- 
izens be  not  indoctrinated  in  crime,  as  the  French. 

The  value  of  a  book  like  that  in  the  hands  of  the  reader 
is,  that  it  settles  a  controversy  as  to  the  moral  worth  of  the 
principles  of  the  Society  of  Jesus.  Protestants  have  claimed 
that  those  principles  are  abominable  ;  Rome,  on  the  other 
hand,  has  said  that  they  are  holy  and  good.  The  book  tells 
what  those  principles  are  :  namely,  murder,  lying,  stealing, 
perjury,  and  the  like.  And  thus,  out  of  their  own  mouth 
these  bad  men  stand  self-condemned. 

As  to  the  translation — there  may  be  some  errors  ;  it  would 
be  wonderful  if  there  were  not.     But  we  believe  the  sense  at 


X  Publishers'  Preface, 

least  of  the  original  is  preserved.  However,  if  the  reader 
sees  anything  that  should  be  changed  to  make  it  more  exactly 
accord  with  the  original,  we  shall  be  happy  to  correct  it  in 
future  editions,  upon  notification.  If  the  Jesuit  does  not 
like  the  translation  here  given,  we  will  print  his  own  render- 
ing, provided  we  are  satisfied  it  is  true  to  the  original  text. 

Hoping  all  will  give  aid  as  they  are  able  to  help  extend 
the  circulation  of  this  book,  we  remain 

THE  PUBLISHEKS. 


Betïtcatton 

To  M.  FREPPEL,  Bishop  of  Angees, 

WHO    HAS     PUBLICLY    CALLED    ME    A    CALUMNIATOR   AND    A    FALSIFIER 

OF   TEXTS. 


Monsieur  l  '  Eveque  : 

To  you  I  dedicate  this  book  ;  and  that  is  justice  ;  for  without  you 
it  would  not  have  been  born.  On  the  morrow  after  my  speeches 
of  Jul}^  1879,  an  avalanche  of  pamphlets,  letters,  articles,  either 
anonymous  or  signed  with  names  more  or  less  authentic,  from 
Jesuits,  or  from  persons  pretending  to  be  so,  fell  on  me.  I  cared 
little  about  the  vulgar  insults,  threatenings  even,  that  were  heaped 
in  them,  and  returned  to  my  studies  without  otherwise  heeding 

•*  This  lot  of  iasulters  howling  at  my  breeches." 

As  for  you,  coming  into  line,  you  have  bluntly 'called  me  a  ca- 
lumniator and  falsifier  of  texts.  This,  from  a  former  colleague  in 
Sorbonne,  paid  by  the  State,  and  of  about  the  same  rank  as  I  in  the 
administrative  hierarchy,  could  not  remain  without  an  answer. 
To  that  answer  I  gave  the  form  of  this  present  book.  Why  ?  I 
am  going  to  give  the  explanation  in  a  preface  which  will  interest 
others  than  you.  And  it  is  the  public  at  large  to  whom  I  appeal, 
who  shall  judge  between  you  and  me. 

You  have  deeply  offended  me,  Monsieur  I'Eveque  ;  but,  let  me 
tell  you,  although  that  maj^  be  very  indifferent  to  you,  I  bear  you 
no  grudge.  It  is  clear  for  me  that  you  have  not  been  able  to 
understand  the  value,  applied  to  a  man  of  science,  of  the  expres- 
sions used  by  you. 

Calumniator,  falsifier,  impostor,  are,  in  fact,  words  of  frequent 
use  in  the  language  of  the  thaumaturgists  ;  and  which  they  com- 
monly exchange  between  each  other,  without  appearing  to  attach 
any  importance  to  them,  by  those  who  live  on  human  credulity  and 


xii  Dedication, 

foolishness.    Let  them  throw  at   each  other's  heads    the    famous 
"Mentiris  impudentissime,"  nobody  cares. 

But,  do  3'ou  not  know,  Monsieur  TEveque,  what  is  a  man  Oi' 
science  ;  with  what  a  pure  worship  he  devotes  his  life  to  the  seek- 
ing of  the  Truth,  the  eternal  and  holy  Truth,  which  he  invokes 
and  pursues,  in  spite  of  the  anathemas  of  bewildered  super- 
stition? Do  you  not  know  that  his  respected  word  cannot  be 
impugned?  Do  you  not  know  that  the  least  suspicion  of  his 
veracity  inflicts  on  him  the  most  deadly  injury  ;  that  lying  is  for 
him,  what  prevarication  is  for  the  judge,  and  cowardice  for  the 
soldier?  "No,  surely,  you  are  not  accustomed  to  speak  to  men  of 
science. 

And  now  here  are  the  documents  of  the  prosecution.  Your 
*'  eminent  moralist,"  as  you  call  him, — that  Gury  the  text  of  whom 
3'ou  accuse  me  of  having  mutilated,  and  falsified  the  intentions,  is 
going  to  be  appreciated  by  every  one.  I  went  to  seek  him  in  his 
den  ;  I  have  stripped  him  of  the  impure  Latin  behind  which  he  was 
hiding  ;  I  have  reduced  him  to  his  simplest  expression  ;  and  I  bring 
him  forth  before  the  public,  in  the  light  of  day,  ashamed  of  his 
nakedness  and  blinking  in  the  rays  of  the  sun. 

Compare  now  my  requisitions  of  the  5th  and  7th  of  July  with 
the  text  of  the  Jesuit,  the  justificative  document.  Calmly  I  wait 
for  the  judgment,  having  remained  far  beneath  the  truth. 

Ah  !  the  Jesuits  called  me  a  falsifier,  a  calumniator  ;  and  you  put 
yourself.  Monsieur  I'Eveque,  at  their  head  or  in  their  train.  It 
matters  little  !  Ah  !  Bazile  has  veiled  his  face,  Tartuffe  has  blushed 
at  last  !  They  who  made  of  calumny  a  system,  and  of  lying  a 
theory,  they  felt  the  whip,  and  cried  :  Imposture  !  Who  were  the 
impostors?     Themselves! 

Ah  !  It  is  their  usual  game. 

Who  has  not  seen  in  the  streets  of  our  large  cities,  running 
before  a  group,  bound  to  overtake  him,  a  frightened  man,  crying 
louder  than  all:  ''Stop  thief!"  Who  is  he?  The  simpletons 
alone  are  deceived.  .  .  . 

Monsieur  I'Eveque,  to  you  I  dedicate  this  book. 

Paul  Bert. 
Paris,  the  27th  of  February,  1880. 


PREFACE. 
I. 

Am  AND  Plan  of  the  Book. 


On  the  21st  of  June,  1879,  was  opened,  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  the  discussion  of  the  scheme  of  law  touching  "Liberty  of 
Superior  Education  ;  "  a  scheme  in  which  the  most  important 
clause  (Article  7),  interdicted  teaching  in  all  degrees  to  the 
Jesuits,  and  other  members  of  religious  congregations  not  recog- 
nized by  the  laws  of  the  State. 

On  that  day  I  made  a  speech,*  in  which  I  tried  to  demonstrate, 
from  a  purely  political  point  of  view,  the  dangers  of  an  education 
given  by  that  sect,  to  the  tranquility  and  moral  unity  of  our  coun- 
try. Where  that  sect  has  been  tolerated,  it  has  always  carried 
with  it  the  germs  of  civil  war  ;  that  all  those  countries  have  ex- 
pelled and  cursed  it  ;  and  that,  according  to  the  terms  of  exist- 
ing French  legislation,  its  members  ought  to  be  immediately 
expelled. 

A  few  days  later,  the  Minister  of  Public  Instruction  brought  to 
the  tribune,  to  second  the  same  proposition,  some  quotations  drawn 
from  books  of  history  by  the  Jesuits,  which  excited  the  indignation 
of  the  Chamber,  and  clearly  proved  the  imminence  of  the  peril. 

This  called  me  again  to  the  Parliamentary  stage,  and  forced 
me  more  deeply  into  the  question.  The  historical  judgments  and 
previsions  are  but  one  of  the  applications  of  morality  ;  it  is,  then, 
the  Jesuits'  doctrine  of  morality  that  I  attacked  and  summoned 
to  the  bar  of  the  Chamber,  on  the  5th  of  July,  1879. f  Briefly,  I 
recalled  the  eloquent  attacks  of  Pascal  ;  then,  passing  to  a  more 

*  See  page  495.        f  See  page  637. 


xiv  Preface, 

recent  time,  I  borrowed  freely  from  the  justificative  documents  of 
the  famous  sentence  rendered  by  the  Parliament  of  Paris  on  the 
5th  of  March,  1762  ;  at  last  I  came  to  modern  times,  and  exposed 
the  persistence  of  those  odious  doctrines,  together  with  their  intro- 
duction into  the  teaching  not  only  of  youth,  but  even  of  the 
smallest  children. 

From  a  devoted  friend,  I  received  next  day  some  interesting 
extracts  *  from  the  works  of  the  Jesuit  Gury,  who  was  then  com- 
pletely unknown  to  me.  I  must  confess,  I  took  advantage  of 
them,  and  inserted  them  in  a  reply  to  M.  de  la  Bassetièrcf 

The  effect  of  my  speech  on  the  5th  of  July  was,  I  may  say 
without  vanity,  truly  extraordinary.  The  emotion  in  the  Chamber 
was  intense.  A  newspaper  which  published  it  in  extenso,  sold 
more  than  100,000  copies,  solely  on  account  of  it.  I  received 
numerous  letters  of  felicitations  and  even  of  thanks  ;  friendly 
hands  were  stretched  towards  me  from  all  parts  of  France, 
Belgium,  Switzerland,  Canada,  and  from  all  the  countries  invaded 
by  the  sons  of  Loyola,  under  cover  of  silence  and  shadow. 

It  was  not  the  fault  of  the  Jesuits  if  the  picture  had  no  dark 
side,  and  that  the  deep  joy  I  felt  in  being  the  recipient  of  so  many 
marks  of  sympathy  was  not  troubled  by  the  violence  of  their 
insults  and  threats.  But  their  arrows  fell  short  of  the  mark  ; 
scorn  made  me  insensible  to  their  attacks.  J 

The  most  moderate  among  my  defamers  said  I  had  made  use  of 

*  Unfortunately  an  error  of  the  copyist  was  found,  for  which  I  have 
been  harshly  reproached,  although  in  reality  it  was  of  no  importance  what- 
ever.    See  page  586. 

t  See  page  582. 

X  Reasonable  people  who  do  not  know  the  resources  that  hate  furnishes 
to  the  devotees  of  Rome,  will  never  understand,  cannot  have  an  idea,  of 
the  insults,  of  the  vulgarities,  that  the  Jesuits,  as  well  as  their  natural 
allies,  poured  over  me.  It  was  an  impotent  rage  :  spumat  rabies  vcsana 
pel'  ora.  A  medical  newspaper  of  Vienna,  which  had  honored  me  in  pub- 
lishing a  long  biographical  notice,  sums  up  all  these  products  of  Catholic 
charity  in  the  following  terms  :  ''  The  Catholic  papers  call  him  a  libertine, 
a  shameless  materialist,  a  man  infected  with  all  the  vices  and  turpitudes  of 
Paris,  a  shame  to  the  French  tribune,  a  wretch,  a  rake,  a  mischief-maker! 
Oue  can  see  by  this  furious  inundation,  tliat  Paul  Bert  has  struck  right 
in  the  bull's  eye."  And  I  can  affirm  that  the  Austrian  paper  has  remained 
far  beneath  the  reality.  I  mention  also  the  more  characteristic  aggres- 
sions for  which  the  Police  Court  of  Paris  has  jusi  punished  the  authors. 


Preface,  .  xv 

falsified  texts,  that  I  had  falsified  some  of  them  myself.  Falsi- 
ficators  Pascal,  Dumoulin,  Pasquier,  La  Chalottais,  and  so  many 
others  !  Falsificators,  the  Commissaries  of  Parliament  !  I  found 
myself  in  good  company. 

I  would  not  have  been  otherwise  disturbed,  if,  among  my 
accusers,  I  had  not  found  some  ecclesiastical  functionaries,  besides 
two  or  three  bishops,  one  of  whom,  M.  Freppel,  called  me  directly 
to  account,  using  the  harshest  of  terms. 

I  resolved  to  answer,  and  began  a  pamphlet  threatening  to 
become  very  extensive.  Jt  was,  up  to  this  time,  an  exposure 
of  Jesuitical  doctrines  ;  an  accumulation  of  new  citations  drawn 
from  the  very  sources,  accompanied  by  keen  comments  and 
indignant  tirades  ;  in  brief,  an  imitation  more  or  less  happy  of 
the  immortal  Provinciales. 

But  my  plan  was  suddenly  changed,  after  a  glance  at  the  cata- 
logue of  the  National  Library.  I  saw  that  after  an  ephemeral 
success,  my  book,  on  that  subject,  would  have  the  same  fate,  and 
fall  into  the  same  abyss  where  so  many  books  sleep  the  sleep  of 
forgetfulness.  Numbers  of  those  works  are  marvels  of  indepen- 
dent spirit,  logic,  erudition,  eloquence,  and  the  Provinciales  them- 
selves have  not  escaped  oblivion. 

How  are  we  to  account  for  and  justify  such  public  and  general 
indifference?  What  can  be  the  cause  of  it?  How  is  it  possible  to 
escape  it?  Whence  comes  the  uselessness  of  so  many  efforts  often 
so  powerful?  I  struggled  with  the  problem,  and  I  believe  I  have 
solved  it. 

I  suppose  a  book  conceived  such  as  the  one  I  had  at  first  made. 
I  adorn  it  with  all  imaginable  qualities  :  the  bitter  raillery  of  Pascal, 
tlie  highly-strung  indignation  of  La  Chalottais,  the  sensitive  elo- 
quence of  Michelet,  the  winged  poetry  of  Quinet.  I  hand  it  to  a 
wise,  moderate,  liberal  man,  in  whom  the  Jesuits  cause  a  certain 
and  secret  apprehension,  but  who  refrains  from  appearing  an  enemy 
of  religion  :  this  species  is  not  rare,  it  constitutes  to-dayalmost  the 
totality  of  the  French  ^'•bourgeoiseie;'*  this  man  must  be  convinced 
before  anything  is  done,  firstly,  because  it  is  his  own  opinion,  the 
public  opinion  ;  then,  because  he  has  children,  with  prowling  Jes- 


xvi  •  Preface, 

uits  around;   and  if  his  wife  belongs  to  them,  his  daughter  is  al- 
ready in  the  meshes,  and  his  son  threatened. 

Our  good  man  opens  the  book  and  reads  it  to  the  end  ;  I  adm't 
that  he  is  at  first  interested,  then  indignant.  Call  on  him  a  month 
later. 

*'Well  !  You  have  read  !  What  quotation  !  It  is  odious,  as- 
tounding !'* 

"Yes,  yes,"  he  answers  ;  "  but,  do  3'ou  see,  I  have  thought  about 
it;  it  does  not  prove  much.  They  are  verj^  old,  those  quotations. 
Those  men  of  the  sixteenth,  seventeenth,  eighteenth  centuries  even, 
could  not  have  on  morality,  any  more  than  on  politics,  the  same 
ideas  that  we  now  have.  To  reproach  the  Jesuits  of  Lhomond  Street 
for  the  maxims  of  Tolet,  Emm  Sa,  Fagundez,  Suarez,  Filliuclus 
and  so  many  others  already  dead  in  the  time  of  Pascal,  is  to  stretch 
the  rights  of  polemic  ;  it  is  to  mix  up  a  dead  theology  with  the  ac- 
tual, living  morality.  Periods  of  history  would  be  systematically 
confused  !  As  well  compare  the  League  with  the  French  Revolution 
and  make  the  one  responsible  for  the  other. 

"The  language,  moreover,  is  quite  different  :  the  gross  vulgarities 
of  those  times  would  in  our  days  rouse  indignation.  One  could  not 
reprint  Sanchez  !  Think  of  Rabelias,  of  Brantone,  the  delight  of 
ladies  at  Court  !  What  princess  to-day  would  pass  the  whole  night, 
like  young  Mary  of  Prussia,  copying  "La  Pucelle,'*  and  would 
boast  of  it?  Those  ignominies  of  old  casuists  have  lost  their 
effect  in  these  times  of  ours. 

"  Further,  you  can  not  put  any  confidence  in  those  extracts.  I 
know  well  that  the  author  has  copied  them  accurately  ;  the  rascals 
who  accuse  their  adversaries  of  falsifying  the  texts  prove  only 
that  they  are  mean  enough  to  do  it.  Besides,  one  can  hardly 
verify  them  ;  the  books  are  rare,  and  can  be  found  only  in  laige 
libraries.  Then,  the  author  belongs  to  a  party,  he  is  a  soldier 
a  fighting  man  ;  he  had  to  write  accordingl}'.  The  Jesuits  have 
written  much,  and  a  great  many  volumes  ;  hundreds  in  folio  form. 
One  looks  through  them  in  every  corner,  with  no  distinction  of 
epochs,  countries,  characters  ;  one  selects  phrases,  parts  of  phrases, 
some  odious  things,  I  admit,  that  startled  me.  But  what  of  it? 
All  that  is  artisticallj''  arranged  ;    lines  w:i'tni  centuries  apar*  are 


preface,  xvii 

brought  to  complete  one  another  ;  they  are  prepared  and  framed 
m  a  skillful  exposition.  What  is  more  serious,  they  are  torn 
from  their  former  setting  ;  they  are  isolated  from  the  principles 
constituting  their  philosophical  value,  or  from  the  application 
which  gave  them  their  practical  utility.  It  is  the  difference 
between  a  herba:ium  and  a  green  field.  Who  knows  if  the  rule 
has  not  been  taken  oftentimes  for  the  exception,  the  incidental 
phrase  for  the  principal,  the  reserve  for  the  principle  ;  add  to  this 
the  unavoidable  errors,  the  alterations  of  texts  often  quoted  from 
former  cuttings,  and  at  last,  errors  of  translation,  inevitable  in 
such  arduous  matters.  .  .  .  No,  decidedly,  I  cannot  be  convinced  ; 
it  is  skillful  arguing,  I  admit,  and  sincere,  I  am  sure  of  it  ; 
at  least,  so  far  as  it  is  possible  for  a  party-man  to  be  sincere.  But 
the  more  I  think  of  it,  the  less  I  agree  with  it.  It  is  again 
the  eternal  Truth  :  'Give  me  four  lines  from  the  hand  of  a  man, 
and  I  can  have  him  hung.'  Yours  is  a  curious  book,  but  it  proves 
nothing." 

Such  is  bis  defence  :  many  times  did  I  hear  such  language. 
Surely,  this  is  not  hard  to  refute  ;  but  the  book  itself  cannot  do  it. 
Besides,  you  will  very  seldom  be  listened  to  ;  the  reader  has  made 
up  his  mind  ;  be  has  got  rid  of  an  irritating  problem  ;  perhaps  lie 
has  found  the  means  to  avoid  household  quarrels  ;  to  discuss  with 
him  would  be  as  wise  as  to  pull  out  a  nail  by  striking  on  its  head 
with  a  hammer. 

What  is  to  be  done,  then?     Ask  him,  and  he  will  answer  you. 

''What  is  necessary,  you  see,  is  to  show  me  that  the  modern 
Jesuits,  those  with  whom  we  live,  those  to  whose  school  my  wife 
wants  me  to  send  my  son,  teach  actually  the  same  doctrines, 
speak  the  same  language,  that  the  old  ones  spoke.  I  readily  admit 
they  were  not  worth  much.  We  know  truly  that  none  of  them  can 
publish  a  book  without  the  consent  of  their  Superiors,  and  so  no 
personal  opinion  can  be  entertained.  I  have  even  read  some- 
where that  they  boast  to  have  but  one  language  and  but  one 
thought,  so  that  one  of  their  generals  said  : 

That  they  would  be  what  they  are,  or  they  would  uot  be. 
''  But  all  these  are  general  maxims,  things  written  for  effect,  for 


xviii  Preface. 

show,  if  you  wf.l  allow  ire  to  say  so.  It  is  said  also,  lliat  they 
aie  so  skilful,  so  conciraling,  so  insinuating,  so  supple!  There 
is  contradiction  in  the  two  ways  of  looking  at  them.  As  for  mo, 
I  believe  they  stand  on  the  level  of  circumstances,  and  that  they 
are  living  up  to  the  spirit  <  f  modern  times. 

"  I  know  full  well  that  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  clear  up  that 
question.  There  are  books  q'lite  recently  written,  in  whicli 
Jesuits,  actually  living,  cx[jose  the  compondium  of  their  d  ctriurs. 
This  is  what  I  would  like  to  read  !  There,  I  should  have  a  true 
idea  of  things,  seeing  them  well  set  in  order,  without  the  interven- 
tion of  a  third  party,  always  suspected.  But  they  are  big  volumes, 
very  tiresome,  tliey  sa}',  and  I  have  no  time.  Besides,  they  aro 
written  in  Lutin  ;  and,  between  us,  my  consciones  is  pretty  rusty, 
and  it  has  never  been  my  forte. 

"What  I  would  like  is  a  modern  book,  a  complete  book  writ- 
ten by  a  Jesuit,  having  f  ill  authority,  and  having  been  translated 
without  any  abridgment,  cutting  off  only  what  does  not  interest 
me  ;  for  I  care  little  about  metaphysics,  and  still  less  about 
theology.  That  wou'd  be  indeed  to  render  a  grent  service  to 
myself  and  to  many  oth(  rs.  We  would  read  and  judge  for  our- 
selves, without  needing  help  fiom  fabricated  phrases;  we  are  a 
people  with  common  sense  and  honor." 

The  s(dution  was  found,  and  our  bourgeois  was  right.  Yes,  the 
authors  who  have  written  abjiit  Jesuits  have  put  too  much  self  into 
their  books.  We  must  change  all  that,  and  replace  the  subjective 
metiioel  by  the  objective  one. 

This  was  un<lerstood  :  I  threw  my  work  into  the  waste-basket, 
nfter  having  gathered  a  small  part  relating  to  the  alterations  of 
text  of  which  I  was  accused,*  and  I  set  about  to  find  a  Jesuit  who 
might  answer  my  purpose. 

I  found  him  easily  ;  indeed,  Gury  was  all  that  coulel  be  desired. 
He  died  quite  recently,  after  having  taught  morals  for  a  long  time 
in  t'je  college  Romain,  the  Jesuit's  college  in  Rome.  He  has  pub- 
lished two  voluminous  works  in  two  large  volumes,  each  represent- 

*M  s  falsifications  :  Letter  to  the  Director  of  the  Eppiihlique  Française 
(see  2t)lh  of  Au.içust,  187D)  publiislied  in  a  pamplilet  by  the  Editor  of  tiie 
Ftiite  Ii< publique  Française. 


Preface,  xix 

ing  ten  times  the  matter  treated  in  lli3  present  book,  C )mpenduLm 
Theologiœ  Moralls^  and,  a  Casus  Conscientiœ.  Those  books  have 
had  several  editions  ;  the  lactone  beiiig  puWli-hed  in  1875  :  tliey 
are  in  the  hands  not  only  of  all  Jesuits,  but  also  in  those  of  a 
large  number  cf  priests;  and,  by  the  testimony  of  M.  Guibert, 
archbishop  of  Paris,  they  have  happi'y  transformeil,  in  the  last 
thirty  years,  the  spirit  of  the  Fieneh  CK-r^jy.*  So,  in  Giiry  was 
to  be  found  the  two  prominent  qualities  required,  actuality  and 
authority.  Besides,  it  was  frorn  him  I  had  quoted,  about  whom  I 
had  committed  an  involuntary  error,  and  him  I  was  accused  of 
having  calumniated.     There  could  not  be  an}'  possible  hesitation. 

I  took  then  the  four  volumes  of  the  last  edition, f  and  began  the 
most  ardous  of  works  to  compile  the  present  book.  I  proceeded 
thus  : 

The  Compendium  is  a  theoretical  book,  divided  into  a  series  of 
treatises  (on  human  actions,  on  conscience,  on  laws,  etc.,  etc.  ) 

The  Casus  Conscientiœ  is  a  compilation  of  cases,  species,  anec- 
dotes, which  constitute  as  many  problems  on  theological  morality  : 
they  are  grouped  by  treatises  corresponding  to  those  of  the  Co7n- 
pendium.  I  began  to  dismember,  so  to  speak,  those  two  works, 
and  melt  them  into  one,  each  treatise  of  the  Compendium  being 
followed  by  the  cases  relating  to  them,  each  theoretical  exposition 
followed  by  its  practical  application.  Different  typographical 
symbols  help  to  recogniz.;  them  at  a  glance. 

Let  us  sec  now  the  mode  of  abridgment. 

For  the  Compendium^  I  have  carefully  preserved  all  the  general 
as[)ect  of  the  book.  Each  treatise  is  divitled  into  parts,  sections, 
chapters,  articles,  paragraphs  ;  I  have  reproduced  tlie  same  order  ; 
I  have  even  kept  the  numbers  which  correspond  to  ench  new 
idea,  in  each  paragraph.  In  a  word,  the  ind  x  is  absolutely 
intact.  This  done,  I  took  care  not  to  analyze  anything  whatever  ; 
there  is  not,  in  the  whole  book,  a  single  hne  written  by  myself. 

*  "  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  two  works  of  P.  Gury  have  powerfully 
contributed  to  extend  among  the  French  Cleriry  the  easiest  solutions  of 
probahilistn."   (P.  Matignon  S.  J.  :  Etudes  Beligieuses,  18G0). 

t  Revised,  corrected,  augmented,  put  in  order  \v  Henri  Dumas,  S.  J.  ; 
second  edition.  Lyon:  Briday,  1875.  Casus  Conscientiœ,  tiftii  edition. 
Lyon,  Briday,  1875. 


XX  Preface, 

"Wlieu  the  saying  of  the  casuists  seemed  interesting,  I  translated  it 
textually  and  completely  ;  otherwise,  I  set  it  aside  and  replaced  it 
by  a  line  of  dots  whose  very  changeable  value  is  easy  to  measure 
b}'  the  number  of  missing  numbers. 

In  that  distinction  between  what  appeared  to  me  worthy  of 
reproduction  and  what  I  thought  better  not  to  mention,  I  was 
guided  by  very  diverse  considerations.  At  first,  I  systematically 
omitted  all  that  had  but  a  purely  theological  interest  or  ecclesias- 
tical discipline.  The  treatise  on  Theological  Virtues,  Church  Pre- 
cepts, Sacraments,  (principally  those  of  Bnptism,  Confirmation, 
Euiharist,  Extreme  Unction,  Order,)  Censures,  Irregularities, 
Indu'gences,  have  been  ver}'  much  shortened.  In  t'le  otiier 
treatises,  I  have  retained  only  what  may  interest  the  l.iity,  viz: 
the  general  principles,  and  their  most  important  deductions,  the 
exceptions  so  often  destructive  of  the  rule,  reserves,  subterfuges  ; 
also,  occasionally,  the  odd  questions,  the  odious  vices,  that  Gury 
borrows  from  former  casuists,  or  invents  ;  for  he  was  a  man  of  a 
very  fertile  imagination.  But  bear  in  mind  that  I  have  not  trans- 
lated only  that  which  seemed  tome  reprehensible  ;  far  from  it,  and 
I  am  ready  to  take  the  responsibility  of  a  great  number  of  the 
propositions  reproduced  further  ;  those  not  mentioned  seem  also 
to  me  very  often  blameless.  My  aim  has  not  been  to  expose  an 
extract  of  bad  or  dangerous  maxims  ;  but  to  give  an  outline,  as 
complete  as  the  method  permits,  of  the  Jesuitical  doctrines  of 
the  present  day. 

As  for  the  cases,  a  sort  o^Anas^  often  fastidious,  but  sometimes 
strange  and  ingenious,  whose  multipliciLV  in  the  oral  teaching 
gave,  it  seems,  to  the  Lectures  of  Rev.  Father  Gury,  a  parti- 
cular savor,  the  choice  has  been  a  great  deal  easier.  I  took 
at  first  a  good  part  of  those  on  the  Jesuitical  solution  not  in 
accord  with  the  lay  moralitv  ;  then,  those  which  are  interesting"  in 
themselves  ;  .either  because  they  reveal  the  crafty  dodges  that 
often  take  place  in  the  confessional  between  confessor  and  peni- 
tent ;  or  because  they  set  in  action  some  grotesque  superstitions  ; 
or  because  the}-  show  the  proof  of  the  eratic  preoccupation  which 
haunts,  in  all  circumstances  and  in  all  places,  the  imagination  of 


Preface.  xxi 

the  Jesuit,  and  compels  him  to  introduce  Ihe  "  res  venercae''  in  all 
casuistical  matters. 

A  certain  number  of  notes  are  added  to  the  text.  Some  of 
them  demonstrate  the  persisting  accord  that  exists  between  the 
ancient  Jesuitical  rules,  and  the  actual  doctrine  formulated  by 
Gury.*  Also  it  will  be  clearly  seen,  that  in  spite  of  certain  attenu- 
ations of  form,  imposed  by  the  spirit  of  the  times,  the  Jesuits 
have  renounced  none  of  their  ancient  doctrines.     Not  even  those 

*  The  texts  that  I  quote  are  borrowed  from  the  celebrated  ''  Extracts 
of  the  dangerous,  and  as  pernicious  assertions  of  eveiy  sort  of  ihe 
so-called  Jesuits,  verified  and  collected  by  tlie  Commissaries  of  the  Parlia- 
ment of  Paris  1762."  1  vol.,  4to,  of  544  pages."  Erom  this  volume  I 
drew  the  numbers  of  my  citations. 

It  is  known  that  the  Jesuits  have  tried  to  contest  this  formidable 
accumulation  of  facts,  in  taking  advantage  of  a  certain  number  ot'  en-ors 
of  no  importance,  which  they  have  collected  and  compiled  ;  and  liiis  fear- 
ful number,  758,  they  zealously  show  up  before  the  vvorld.  Her»;  is  liow 
they  were  classified  after  the  answer,  in  four  voluminous  books,  edited  by 
the  R.  F.  Grou  and  Sauvage  : 

In  the  Latin  extracts. 

Errors  against  the  letter  and  the  sense  of  the  text  of  the  author  41 

Suppression  of  phrases  in  the  text 2GI 

Mutilation  of  the  text Gl 

Mistakes 94  457 

In  the  French  version. 

Grammatical  errors  in  the  Latin  construction         ...  IG 

Alteration  of  the  sense  in  the  words 220 

Alteration  of  the  sense  in  the  phrase 05  301 

758 

In  all  justice,  a  defalcation  of  the  errors  in  the  French  version  ought  to 
be  made;  the  "  Extracts  of  Assertions  "  give  the  Latin  text  in  juxtaposi- 
tion to  it.  Then,  looking  more  attentively,  we  see  that  the  "  Suppression 
of  phrase,"  and  the  "Mutilation  of  text"  in  Latin,  have  absolutely  no  sig- 
nificance in  the  immense  majority  of  cases.  The  Jesuit,  to  sustain  Ids 
accusation,  is  obliged  to  drown  himself  in  page  after  page  of  explanation  ; 
this  indicates  that  his  answer,  which  ought  to  have  been  so  brief  and  so 
simple,  forms  four  large  volumes,  4to. 

Again,  the  Arclibishop  of  Paris,  thinking  to  be  able  to  find  twenty- 
seven  errors  in  those  texts,  the  Parliament  named  in  17G4  a  numerous 
Committee,  who  carefully  received  the  questions  and  answered  these 
allegations. 

From  all  this,  there  remained  only  one  more  proof  of  the  impudence 
of  the  Jesuits.  The  seven  hundred  and  fift3'-eight  falsifications  are  to  be 
added  to  the  twenty-four  with  which  I  have  been  reproached,  one  among 
these  being  the  falsification  of  the  name  of  Casaedi,  being  written  Gas- 
sendi by  the  proof-reader  of  the  ''Official." 


xxii  Preface, 

denounced  by  Pascal,  which  were  condemned  in  1679  by  Pope 
Innoccno  XI.  Other  notes  show  those  doctrines  used  in  the 
teaching  of  childhood  by  recent  catechisms,  and  especiall}'  in  the 
one  b\'  "  Grand  Vicaire  Marotte.''  I  took  this  catechism  as  a 
type,  being  the  official  book  of  our  primary  and  normal  schools. 
]SIany  allusions  to  recent  facts  are  found  in  them,  and  one  may 
safely  consider  these  facts  as  logical  applications  of  the  Jesuitical 
maxims. 

The  analysis  of  Gury's  books  under  the  conditions  indicated 
above,  do  not  constitute  the  whole  of  the  present  volume. 

At  first,  I  added  to  it  the  analysis  of  a  work  (page  448)  exten- 
sivel}'  spread  among-it  the  clergy  of  the  South  of  France,  perfect- 
ing on  one  point  tiie  work  of  the  Jesuit.  It  is  a  "Dissertation  on 
the  6th  and  9th  Precepts  of  the  Decalogue,"  from  the  authorized 
pen,  so  dear  to  the  Jesuits,  of  Ahhe  Mousselot.,  professor  in 
the  grand  Seminary  of  Grenoble,  and  principal  author  (after 
Mademoiselle  de  la  Merlière)  of  that  shameful  comedy  called  the 
apparition  of  "  Za  Salette."  Here  I  made  numerous  abbreviations 
and  left  a  good  deal  of  Latin,  for  special  reasons  that  every  one 
will  understand.  I  beg  pardon  for  having  almost  completely  trans- 
lated, although  softening  the  terms,  the  corresponding  passages 
of  Gury  !  I  felt  that  it  was  necessary  to  show  to  everyliody 
what  degree  of  aberration  the  casuistic  mania  may  reach;  and  how, 
in  leality,  the  odious  Sanchez  is  living  still,  if  not  perfected. 
And  when  we  know  that  this  book  is  for  the  special  use  of  young 
confessors  and  pupils  of  grand  seminaries,  we  ma}^  well  ask  our- 
selves what  must  be  the  effect  of  these  descriptions  and  medita- 
tions on  the  mind  of  youth. 

A  second  addition  (page  486)  is  the  list  of  the  65  propositions 
condemned  by  Pope  Innocent  XI.  on  the  16th  of  March,  1679. 
Pascal's  calumnies,  as  the  Jesuit's  saying  is,  will  have  some  piac- 
tical  value;  because  most  of  tliese  propositions  had  been  taken  from 
the  Jesuitical  text,  and  denounced  in  his  '•'•Lettres  a  un  Provincial." 
From  that  time  the  Jesuits  have  avoided  condemnation  with  an 
admirable  skil fulness,  and  set  on  foot  all  those  propositions  that 
might  be  of  practical  interest  for  them  as  soon  as  they  were 
overturned. 


Preface,  xxiii 

At  l\stl  close  this  book,  by  thereproiluction,  after  the  "  Journal 
Official^''  of  the  speeches  which  have  been  the  cause  of  the 
present  conflict. 

Such  is  this  book.  Tlie  common  sense  and  Ihe  good  judgment 
of  the  reader  will  decide.     Let  me  acki  only  one  Inst  observation. 

Errors  of  translations  may  have  escai)ed  me;  it  could  not  be 
otherwise  in  so  tedious  a  work,  done  so  quickly,  with  a  Latin 
so  strange  and  oftentimes  so  obscure.  I  depend  on  my  enemies 
to  point  them  out,  and  beg  them  instantly  to  set  themselves  to 
work,  in  order  that  I  may  profit  by  their  criticisms.  My  excellent 
publisher  has  kept  the  stereotype  plates  in  view  of  these  correc- 
tions. 

As  for  these  errors,  as  well  as  for  other  similar  ones,  T  can 
do  no  better  than  to  put  myself  under  cover  of  a  very  reasonable 
passage  of  the  Jesuit  publisher  of  the  famous  '•^Réponse  aux 
assertions  du  Parlement.''* 

**Accurac3^  and  precaution  must  be  our  first  duty  in  such  a  work, 
where  it  is  difficult  that  no  errors  could  escape  us  which  will 
not  be  infallibly  pointed  out  and  magnified  by  our  enemies  in 
the  eyes  of  the  public,  and  treated  as  capital  faults,  no  matter  how 
light  they  may  be.  We  are  convinced  that  the  work  itself  leaves 
no  ground  for  contest,  and  that  all  the  resource  that  remains 
to  them  will  be  to  attack  a  few  oversights  which  will  not  better 
their  cause." 

This  caution  was  singular  from  his  pen.  It  answered  in  advance 
all  its  complaints  and  the  work  of  the  Commissaries  of  Parlia- 
ment.    I  adopt  it  for  myself  in  its  true  light. 

The  books  of  Gury  are  at  the  disposition  of  the  public  at  a  very 
moderate  price,  so,  those  who  are  tormented  by  the  critical  spirit, 
may  easily  alleviate  their  thirst  for  truth  by  comparing  the 
original  with  my  extracts  and  translation. 


i 


n. 

Summargi  of  ti}e  îSooft. 


The  first  impression  felt  by  a  lay  realer,  in  looking  over  a 
Jesuitical  Compendium,  is  wonder  and  dread.  This  book  is 
all,  or  at  least  pretends  to  be  all  :  canon  law,  civil  law,  penal  law, 
even  commercial  law,  jurisprudence,  and  also  divine  and  human 
science,  all  may  be  found  here.  One  feels  that  the  disciple  who 
in  the  course  of  his  studies  has  been  thoroughly  impregnated  with 
it,  who  carries  it  with  him  out  from  the  Seminary,  often  into  the 
very  heart  of  the  countr}',  where,  by  the  side  of  the  breviary,  of 
the  Catechism  and  Confessor's  Manual,  it  will  form  all  his  library, 
must  persuade  himself  Chat  all  is  found  there  which  will  guide  his 
conduct  towards  men  as  well  as  his  relations  with  Heaven.  Noth- 
ing escaped  the  casuist,  and  on  all  things  the  priest  will  find  the 
ready  prepared  solution  ;  he  will  be  able,  book  in  hand,  to 
discuss  the  origin  of  morality,  or  the  validity  of  trusts,  the  Sacra- 
ment of  the  Eucharist,  or  matters  of  Exchange.  Society  can  have 
no  hold  on  him,  nor  teach  him  anything;  everything  has  been 
foreseen  by  his  chiefs. 

When  from  tliis  he  comes  to  the  study  of  a  part  of  that  Ency- 
clopaedia at  once  profane  and  sacred,  the  layman  is  struck  by 
the  absence  of  any  general  principle,  of  any  rule  comprising  a 
considerable  number  of  facts  or  ideas.  Everywhere,  on  the  con- 
trary, a  need  of  curtailed  definitions,  and  above  all,  of  divisions 
and  classifications,  which  crumble  the  principle,  shorten,  chill,  and 
cause  the  bringing  up  of  a  large  number  of  small  aphorisms,  that 
will  be  later  easily  opposed  to  eaca  other.  Let  us  take  for 
instance,  the  chapter  on  conscience.  Immediately  after  a  defini- 
tion which  seems  the  very  negation  of  free  will,  we  htive  the 
divisions  :  Conscience  is  upright  or  erroneous,  certain  or  doubtful, 
etc.,  etc.  (page  61)  ;   then  the  subdivisions  and  secondary  divi- 


xxvi  Preface. 

sions  :  vincibly  erroneous  or  invincibly  erroneous  ;  invincibly  erron- 
eous wliicli  commands,  vincibly  erroneous  which  permits,  etc., 
etc.  As  much  as  to  say,  the  trre  truth,  the  doubtful  truth,  the 
false  trutli.  These  sublime  worcis  lose  thus  all  elevated  and  holy 
signification,  and  this  is  just  what  the  casuist  is  aiming  at:  he  will 
soon  have  the  best  of  it. 

A  thud  surprise  for  the  reader  not  used -to  that  sort  of  books  is 
the  facility  with  which,  out  of  an  excellent  principle,  he  deduces 
the  most  monstrous  consequences.  It  is  always  the  old  sophism 
about  the  splittii  g  («f  a  hair.  Circumstances, added  one  to  the 
other  to  the  primitive  truth,  like  water  added  drop  by  drop  to  gen- 
erous wine,  transforms  the  one  into  a  sour  beverage  and  the  other 
into  scandalous  error,  without  knowing  at  what  precise  moment  the 
transmutation  hai)pened.  One  fee^s  full  of  anguish  and  drav.n 
towards  a  fattil  declivity,  the  tufts  of  ^lass  tearing  (  ff  under  our 
crisped  hands.  It  is  the  strength  of  the  casuist,  and  the  ne 'plus 
ultra  (  f  his  art  :  he  knows  that,  at  last,  tired  and  bruised,  the  pa- 
tient will  roll  into  the  abyss. 

And  what  shall  he  tind  there?  The  downiest  of  beds,  soft  as  the 
inire  :  probabilism.  This  is  the  true  pillow  of  doubt,  but  not  in 
the  sense  pointed  out  by  Monta-gne.  No  more  principles  !  Their 
fragments  alone  fell  into  the  abyss,  and  over  each  one  of  them  a 
casuist  cavils  and  disserts.  For  any  question,  he  holds  the  solu- 
tion well  in  hand;  he  offers  it  to  the  passer-by;  and  as  he  is,  accord- 
ing to  the  formula  of  the  Jesuits,  doctor,  honest  man  and  savant,  his 
opinion  becomes  probable,  and  the  passer-by  may  choose,  in  the 
tranquility  of  his  errii  g  conscience,  what  best  suits  him,  practi- 
cally, between  all  these  s(;lutions  handed  to  him  by  those  doctoral 
hands.  Remark,  that  if  he  avails  himself  of  one  to-day,  he  may 
hold  to-moirow  the  contrary  o[)iuion,  if  it  is  his  interest  to  do  so 
(pages  G9,  77,  etc.)  The  confessor,  however,  master  in  so  many 
Ihiiigs,  can  do  nothing  about  it,  and  he  mu^t  submit  and  absolve 
when  the  penitent  can  refer  to  the  opinion  of  a  director,  had 
he  sought  him  for  a  long  time.  (Pages  70,  75,  etc.)  How  is  it 
})<)ssible  not  to  rejoice  at  such  a  convenient  doctrine,  and  echo 
the  thanksgivings  of  Escobar:  "Verily,  when  I  consider  so 
many  diverse   sentiments   on  the   matter  of   morals,  I  think   it  is 


Preface.  xxvii 

a  happy  dispensation  of  Providence,  such  a  variety  of  opin- 
ions helping  us  to  bear  along  more  agreeably  the  yoke  of  the 
Lord  !  " 

I  do  not  insist  on  Pascal's  revengeful  imprecations,  which  vibrate 
yet  in  all  memories.  But  it  will  be  sufficient  to  look  over  the  present 
book  to  see  that  the  Jesuits  have  in  no  point  renounced  the  famous 
doctrines  of  probabilism,  (pages  65-72,)  and  of  philosophical  sin, 
cause  of  the  invincibly  erroneous  conscience  (page  62-72.)  This 
may  have  burlesque  or  monstrous  consequences. 

See  what  becomes  in  the  skilful  hands  of  the  Jesuits  of  this  evi- 
dent and  primoidial  principle:  "When  there  is  no  wicked  inten- 
tion there  can  be  no  error  of  conscience."  While  there  is  no  fault, 
says  he,  there  is  no  obligation  to  compensate  an  evil  committed 
quite  involuntarily.  Then  he  brings  the  case  of  Adalbert,  (page 
56)  who,  wanting  to  kill  his  enemy  Titius;  kills  his  friend  Caiu-i  ; 
and  he  gravely  declares  that  Adalbert,  being  in  nothing  culpable  of 
the  homicide  committed,  can  not  be  held  to  any  restitution  by  the 
heirs  of  the  one  he  has  assassinated. 

A  step  further:  let  us  take  another  principle,  infinitely  less  sure 
but  admissible  in  practice  under  reserve,  viz.  :  that  one  is  not 
obliged  to  denounce  one's  self  for  a  wicked  act  that  one  has  com- 
mitted ;  and  let  us  introduce  it  in  the  following  category.  We 
have  then  the  case  of  Julius  (page  228),  who  inadvertently  drinks 
the  poisoned  wine  offered  to  Didyme  by  Cursius  in  order  to  kill 
him.  Cursius,  says  the  casuist,  was  not  obliged  to  warn  Julius, 
for  it  would  have  been  to  denounce  himself;  and  he  is  not  held  to 
indemnify  his  heirs  because  he  has  no  intention  to  kill  him  ;  he  has 
been  the  occasion,  not  the  efficacious  cause  of  the  death,  and  Julius 
killed  himself  !  Stretching  the  point  a  little  further,  one  can  feel 
that  Cursius  might  sue  for  damages  ! 

Another  principle,  better  yet:  "  One  is  held  to  indemnify  but 
the  wrong  that  one  has  really  caused."  Then,  if  Jacob  (page  242) 
has  killed  Marc,  who  was  ruining  his  family  through  luxurious 
living  and  drunkenness,  he  owes  nothing  to  the  family  of  his  vic- 
tim, because  he  has  not  wronged  it  in  any  way.  Moreover,  he 
has  been  of  service  to  that  familj-,  having  prevented  a  more  com- 


XXV  iii  Preface, 

plele  ruin  !  If  we  draw  the  consequence,  he  might  ask  for  a 
reward  ! 

We  can  see  that  nothing  prevents  such  a  way  of  looking  at 
these  principles:  of  that  method,  frequent  examples  are  given  in 
the  present  book.  I  shall  not  indicate  any  other  ;  I  will  content 
mvself  to  make  here  a  remark  of  the  highest  importance. 

Gury  complains  somewhere  (page  246),  with  a  charming 
naivete,  "of  the  difficulty  that  exists  in  harmonizing  the  law^s  of. 
conscience  with  those  of  the  civil  code."  I  will  say  that  this  is 
easily  understood  ;  and  that,  a  priori^  there  must  be  ver}'  often 
important  differences  between  the  decision  of  the  judge  of  con- 
science, that  is  to  sa}^,  of  intention,  such  as  the  priest  must  under- 
stand, and  the  solution  of  the  lay  magistrate,  in  fact,  otherwise 
of  the  civil  law  in  principle.  But  in  what  sense  must  we  under- 
stand the  difference?  In  the  sense,  it  seems,  of  a  greater  severity 
on  the  part  of  the  religious  judge.  In  fact,  the  civil  magistrate 
cannot  condemn,  except  when  the  act  is  added  to  the  wicked 
intention,  the  commencement  of  its  execution.  Rightly,  the  civil 
law,  which  has  not  for  its  mission  to  appease  the  conscience,  but  to 
maintain  order  in  society,  is  obliged  to  pass  condemnation  on 
many  acts  that  ought  to  be  condemned  by  the  religious  judge. 

Is  it  thus  that  the  Jesuits  view  the  question?  Far  from  it; 
examples  abound.  Here  is  a  thief  :  he  must  indemnify,  there  is  no 
doubt  of  it,  and  the  civil  magistrate  will  constrain  him  by  all  ways 
and  means.  But  he  consults  the  casuist,  and  he  authorizes  him 
to  defer  the  restitution,  when  he  cannot  do  it  "without  losing  a 
position  legitimately  acquired,"  that  is  to  say,  acquired  by  theft 
(page  201).  Here  is  a  simpleton,  Simplicius,  who  let,  foolishly, 
his  borrowed  horse  be  stolen  from  him.  "  So  much  the  worse  for 
you,"  will  say  the  civil  judge;  "you  shall  pay  for  the  horse."  *'0h, 
no,"  will  say  the  soft  casuist;  "Simplicius  is  so  stupid  !"  (page  230). 
Here  is  Quirinus,  who  enters  a  store  during  the  night  to  steal,  hold- 
ing a  candle  :  a  cat  jumps;  the  candle  falls,  and  sets  the  house  on 
fire;  everything  is  burned.  What  will  be  the  decision  of  the  civil 
judge?  I  don't  know  ;  I  know,  however,  the  lay  morality  in  such  a 
case:  as  for  the  casuist,  he  does  not  hesitate:  "  Poor  Quirinus  ! 
He  owes  nothing;  it  is  not  his  fault,  it  is  the  cat"   (page  196)  ! 


f 

Preface,  xxix 

Here  is  Zepliiriu,  who  digs  a  hole  in  his  field;  and  who,  knowing 
that  Andre  is  going  to  pass  thnt  wa}^,  takes  care  not  to  warn  him. 
Andre  fulls  and  breaks  his  leg.  The  civil  judge  will  lose  his 
suit  in  this  case,  but  the  moral  judge!  have  no  fenr  :  Zo[)hirin 
owes  nothing  (page  225.)  There  is  Phileas,  a  seminarist,  who  let 
one  of  his  comrades  be  expelled  as  culpable  of  a  theft  that  he  has 
himself  committed  ;  the  consequences  of  which  are  grievous  for 
the  poor  Alliin.  Here  again  the  civil  judge  can  do  nothing;  the 
Jesuit,  without  hesitation,  exempts  Phileas  from  all  indemnity  (page 
227.)  Olympius,  during  an  auction  sale,  went  into  coalition, 
liable  to  fine  and  even  imprisonment  by  the  civil  judge  ;  the  casuist 
absolves  him  (page  287.)  At  last,  not  to  multiply  the  examples 
to  excess,  we  come  «back  to  Adalbert,  the  murderer  of  Cains:  we 
see  that  surely  the  civil  judge  will  condemn  him  to  pay  damages 
to  tiie  family  of  iiis  victim  ;  and  perhaps,  as  having  attempted  tlie 
assasination  of  Titius.  The  Jesuit  washes  his  hands  of  all  this  : 
Adalbert  did  not  do  it  on  purpose,  that  is  sufficient. 

I  call  the  attention  of  the  reader  to  this  general  observation  : 
he  will  find  in  the  book  a  number  of  precepts  or  cases  which  are, 
without  doubt,  in  harmony  with  the  spirit  of  the  civil  law,  but  to 
that  the  law  permits  rather  than  approves,  and  which  it  com- 
mands, not  on  account  of  the  honesty  of  the  act  or  formula,  but 
because  there  would  be  grievous  social  inconvenience  to  proceed 
otherwise.  I  will  mention  only  one  :  On  his  death-bed,  a  father 
commands  his  son  to  make  a  certain  gift.  Truly,  in  civil  procedure, 
there  is  not  here  any  will,  and  it  is  a  case  calling  fur  the  judge  of 
conscience  ;^  well,  the  casuist  discharges  the  son  of  executing 
the  will  of  his  dying  father  (page  278.)  In  a  word,  the  casuist 
always  accepts  the  solutions  of  civil  law  when  they  are  in  favor  of 
moral  culpability  ;  but  when  the  guilty  one  is  condemned  by  them, 
the  Jesuit  strives  to  find  a  looi>hole  through  which  he  may 
escape. 

It  is  one  of  the  features  of  Jesuitical  casuistry  to  always  take 
the  part  of  the  sinner,  and  this  is  not  the  least  cause  of  his  definite 
triumph  over  the  Jansenist's  rigoiisra.  lieLweon  the  thief  and  his 
viciiiu  the  Jesuit  never  hesitates  :  betakes  the  j)a)t  of  the  thief. 
See  the  examples  I  have  just  related.     When  it  is  a  question  of 


t 

XXX  '  Preface. 

avoiding  restilution,  he  is  nil  honey  for  tlie  tliicf  ;  lie  mu^t  not  be 
foicc'l  tj  he  "  (loprivod  of  his  servants,  oi*  friends;"  hut  the 
victim,  meanwhile,  may  quielly  die  of  hunger:  he  exem[)ls 
Simitlice,  wiîliout  an}-  compensation  to  the  stableman  who  loses 
his  liurse  ;  for  the  merchant,  al  lif)Ugli  innocent,  burnt  out  by 
Qurinus,  he  c.ires  not  a  straw;  neither  for  Andre  and  his  broken 
leg  ;  nor  for  the  poor  devil  of  whom  Oîympius  lias  clogged  the 
sale  ;  neither  for  Albin,  disgraced  and  ruined  ;  nor  for  the  innocent 
heirs  of  murdered  Caius.  No  ;  his  sympathies  are  elsewhere. 
Do  you  wonder  that  Parliaments  have  expelled  him? 

A  great  deal  might  be  said  about  secret  compensaHon,  so 
energelicall}'  condemned  by  the  civil  law  and  by  lay  morality  ;  so 
completely  approved,  and  oftentimes  so  spirit^iallj'  taught,  by  the 
Jesuit  (pages  88,  187,  272,  282,  291).  The  theory  and  practice 
of  this  thieving  art  is  found  in  many  passages  of  the  book,  and 
one  shudders  in  thinking  how  many  delufled  persons  sucli  teaching 
has  sent  before  the  criminal  tribunals  when  it  fell  on  well-disposed 
natures.  What  of  the  theory  of  theft,  so-called?  Its  gravity  is 
according  to  the  fortune  of  the  victim  ;  and  not,  as  in  our  codes, 
according  to  the  circumstances  of  escalade,  infraction,  etc.,  etc. 
(page  183).  And  the  light  th,  f t,  which  is  not  passable  for  dam- 
ages! And  indulgence  for  thievish  servants  (page  184)  !  And 
necessity  excusing  theft  (page  184)  !  And  the  possibility  of  in- 
teresting God  for  the  success  of  a  theft  (page  103)  ! 

What  yet  remains  to  be  spoken  of?  Absurd  superstitions  (pages 
111,  112)  :  the  deviltry  of  turning  tables,  for  instance  (p;ige  113); 
diabolical  possession  (page  113);  carnal  intercourse  with  devils! 
Political  formulas  :  kings  holding  their  power  only  from  the  churcli 
(page  78)  !  Doctrines  of  the  most  savage  intolerance  ;  heretics 
considered,  though  rebels,  as  subjects  of  the  church,  and  under  its 
laws  (pages  80,  356,  382);  terrible  phrase,  which  logically  calls  for 
the  auto  dafe;  their  children  baptized  in  spite  of  them  ([)ages  329, 
34G)  ;  interdiction  to  notifying  a  Protestant  minister  that  his  co- 
religionist is  dying  and  calls  for  him  (pnge  108)  ;  audacious  in- 
fractions of  the  prescriptions  of  civil  law  taught  and  justified 
(pages  83,  311,  326)  ;  donation  for  causing  death  (page  253)  ; 
denial  of  the  equality  of  shares   (page  253)  ;    state  and  property 


Preface,  xxxi 

of  the  monks  (pig"î311,  325)  ;  substitution  find  trusts  (pnge  254)  ; 
dHsimuhitiou  of  inheritance  (page  253)  ;  fraud  of  duties  ([)ages  91, 
205),  etc  ;  the  difference  of  gravity  of  sins  according  to  their  being 
advantageous  or  not  ;  wonderful  Jesuitical  discovery  (pages  127, 
13G)  ;  the  murder  of  an  innocent  one,  the  excuse  for  which  is  hidden 
under  obscure  and  fearful  conditions  (page  137)  ;  the  theory  of 
denunciation,  commended  by  the  constitution  of  Ignatius  (Uog. 
Comm.  XX),  introduced  in  the  lay-world,  and  highly  recom- 
mended (page  104)  ;  destiuction  of  books  under  interdiction,  and 
thtir  tlieft  openly  preached  (page  106)  ;  contempt  for  paternal 
authority,  when  it  is  a  question  of  entering  into  religious  orders; 
and  ferocious  heartlessness  towards  parents  (pages  131,  133, 
319)  ;  the  art  of  cheating  at  play  (page  297)  ;  the  legitimacv 
of  slavery  and  the  slave-trade  (page  177)  ;  illegil  opening  of 
bodies  (page  330)  ;  the  most  brazen-faced  usury,  hidden  beliind 
the  prescription  of  the  church  which  proUibits  it  (pages  255,  259, 
261)  ;  *  violation  for  money  of  a  promise  of  marriage  (pages  373, 

*  I  cannot  resist  the  pleasure  of  analyzing  the  interesting  cliapter 
relative  to  usury,  that  is  to  say,  lending  at  interest.  We  know  that  tlie 
Catholic  Cluirch  proscribes  it  absolutely,  and  we  lil?e  to  see  here  an  appli- 
cation which,  in  spite  of  its  exagirerarion,  is  an  honor  to  the  Christi^ui 
moralist  exercising  the  principle  of  charity.  Let  us  see  how  the  casuist 
has  done  away  with  the  difficulty:  this  was  important,  for  the  Jesuits 
were  admirable  manipulators  of  money.  But  that  was  difficult,  in  face  of 
proposition  41,  condemned  by  Innocent  XL 

So,  it  is  forbidden  to  me  to  lend  you  a  thousand  francs  that  you  must 
g-ive  me  back  in  ten  years,  to  tell  you  :  "  Each  year  you  will  give  me  fifty 
francs  of  interest." 

But  first,  in  lending  you  that  money,  T  may  suffer  a  certain  loss;  I 
know  not  exactly  what,  but  I  have  to  foresee  it.  It  is  just  tlien  that  I 
should  take  my  precautions,  in  stipulating,  fur  instance,  that  in  ten  years 
yon  will  give  me  back,  not  a  tliousand  francs,  but  two  thousand  francs; 
"for  1  deem  the  los^  suffered  by  me  worth  a  thousand  francs. 

Then,  tliat  borrovved  money  I  cannot  use  any  more  in  my  business  or 
in  my  industry;  I  would  have  put  it  to  good  usage.  I  estimate  at  a 
tliousand  francs  the  benefit  I  might  have  realized  with  it  during  ten  years. 
You  have  prevented  me;  it  is  then  another  thousand  francs  that  you  will 
have  to  give  me  at  the  fixed  time. 

But  this  is  not  all.  Who  is  guarantee  that  you  will  pay  me  back?  Ten 
years— it  is  a  long  time.  I  run  a  risk  tliere;  that  is  well  worth  live 
hundred  francs,  m  good  conscience.  Besides,  you  are  not  quoted  as  very 
solvent. 

Last,  it  is  well  understood  that  you  will  pay  me  at  the  fixed  day.  But 
if  that  were  not  Ihc  case?  1  f  you  were  late  in  your  payment?  Thinlc  that  [ 
depend  on  that  money  at  the  precise  moment.    If  you  do  not  pay  me  then, 


xxxii  Preface, 

404)  ;  the  injustice  of  the  civil  marriage  (page  380),  the  numerous 
causes  for  the  destruction  of  the  marriage  tie  (pages  376,  384)  ; 
scorn  for  the  people,  and  crawling  before  the  great  (pages 
103,384,400,  412)  ;  false  witness  (page  157)  ;  lies  (page  165)  ; 
perjury,  mental  restriction  (page  156)  ;  the  nullity  of  marriage 
with  infidels  or  heretics  ;  distinction  between  the  value  of  legacies 
not  under  legal  formalities  ;  void  if  profane,  valid  if  pious  (pages 
252,  280)  ;  the  chase  in  prohibited  time  (page  180)  ;  the  auda- 
cious clerical  impertinence  of  taking  up  the  old  thesis  that  the 
clergy  are  not  under  the  civil  law  (page  80),  and  setting  in  the 
first  rank  of  crimes,  the  fact  of  having  (even  as  a  child)  struck  a 
priest,  or  violated  the  monastic  claustration. 

But  it  would  take  a  long  time  to  exhaust  the  matter,  and  the 
reader  will  do  me  the  justice  that  I  did  nothing  but  to  graze  the 
subject.  I  leave  him  to  his  own  reflections  ;  and  he  shall  judge  if 
the  condemnation  of  the  Parliament  of  Paris,  inscribed  in  epigraph 
on  this  volume,  can  be  applied  justly  to  the  modern  Jesuits. 

But  yet,  I  bog  to  call  his  attention  to  the  error  with  which 
Gury  seems  impregnated,  like  all  the  casuists  who  preceded  him. 
That  lubric  licentiousness  of  imagination  is  seen  in  two  different 
manners:  first,  in  the  study  of  what  they  call  the  "shameful 
matters,"  that  is  to  say,  the  Vlth  and  IXth  Precepts  of  the  Decalogue 
(pages  142,  153),  and  the  duties  of  married  people  (pages  388, 
399, 425, 435)  ;*  it  is  manifested  by  a  luxury  of  lascivious  researches, 
a  love  of  obscene  details,  an  invention  of  unclean  circumstances, 

it  will  be  ten  francs  a  day  for  the  delay  :  take  it  or  leave  it  at  your  pleasure  ! 

This  is  more  than  necessary,  it  seems  ;  and  the  poor  borrower  would  pre- 
fer a  ji:ood  deal  to  pay  5  per  cent  out  of  his  capital;  so  the  Casuist's  pupil 
might  be  done  for,  in  spite  of  all  his  ingenious  foresight.  But  be  easy  :  if 
the  civil  law  allows  the  loan  at  interest,  that  is  to  say,  the  limit,  as  this 
takes  place  in  France;  immediately,  that  practice,  solemnly  prohibited  by 
the  Church,  "in  virtue  of  natural,  divine  and  ecclesiastical  rights,"  becomes 
permitted;  and  more,  the  lender  may  stipulate  the  interest  of  the  inter- 
ests; besides,  he  can  exceed  the  allowance  of  the  legal  rate  if  his  debtor  is 
not  in  great  distress  :  at  last  let  his  mind  be  easy,  if  he  is  a  banker,  be- 
cause he  may  exact  something  from  everybody  in  remuneration  for  his 
trouble. 

Here  is,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  a  situation  very  much  simplified  ;  but  what 
would  Benoit  XIV.  say  to  it?  and  wliat  would  become  of  his  "  Bull  Vix 
pervenit"  against  the  loan  at  interest? 

*  See  also  Rousselut,  page  449-485. 


Preface,  xxxiii 

which  leaves  far  behind  all  that  has  been  imagined  by  the  authors 
of  Justin  and  of  Gamiani.* 

But  what  is  far  more  interesting,  is  to  see  the  genetic  preju- 
dices haunting,  in  so  constant  a  manner,  the  mind  of  the  Jesuit, 
that  he  is  dominated  by  them  in  many  cases  where  they  have 
absolutely  nothing  to  do  with  the  subject.  Is  it  a  question  of 
invincible  ignorance?  he  takes  for  an  example  children  '-'- qui 
egerunt  de  se  illicita"  (page  49)  ;  of  the  indirect  will?  it  is  Lubain, 
wilh  his  carnal  temptations  (page  5Q)  ;  an  effect  of  violence?  it 
is  Suzanne  (page  51),  or  Bertine  and  her  master  (page  57)  ;  of  the 
erroneous  conscience?  it  is  Ferdinand,  George,  Gustave,  a  child 
ten  years  old,  and  his  '•'•  tactus  turpes''  with  his  first  cousin 
(page  73)  etc.,  (see  especially  the  cases  on  confession).  Is  it  a 
question  of  the  general  theory  of  intentional  sin  ?  the  only  example 
that  comes  into  his  mind  is,  that  "in  confession  one  accuse^  one's- 
self  of  fornication  :  it  is  necessary  to  declare  the  parental  degree, 
affinity,  marriage,  chast'ty,  which  relates  to  the  person  in  question  " 
(compendium.  Vol.  I.,  No.  167).  Then,  with  what  ingenuity  he  de- 
tails the  reserved  cases  (pages  351  and  fol.) ,  opposition  to  marriage 
(page  412  and  fol.),  with  the  unclean  story  of  &4idimille  (page 
412)  ;  together  with  hundreds  of  cases  cropping  out  from  all  parts 
of  the  book. 

What  sha  1  we  sa}'  of  the  shameless  way  he  treats  tlie  marriage 
question;  conjugal  duty;  marriage  consummation,  petition  and 
surrender  to  duty?  He  thinks  of  nothing  else.  And  what  skillful 
solutions,  in  order  to  have  mastery  over  the  husband  through  the 
wife. 

But  the  most  interesting  fact  that  is  brought  out  in  this  part  of 
our  study  is,  the  deep  scorn  that  the  Jesuit  has  for  woman.  In 
the  daily  practice  of  life,  there  is  no  kind  of  mystic  caresses, 
nor  wheedling  undulations  of  voice  and  gesture,  that  he  does 
not  resort  to,  in  order  to  seduce  her.    Here  are  the  mysterious  and 

♦Do  not  wonder,  after  this,  that  those  who  are  impregnated  with  such  a 
doctrine  are  drawn  to  the  most  monstrous  results.  I  liave  pointed  out  in 
my  report  on  the  proposition  of  law  of  M.  Barodet  (primary  instructicm) 
that  in  Mie  last  two  years,  our  tribunals  little  suspected  of  partiality,  have 
condemned  for  crimes  and  attempts  a^rainst  morality,  about  four  times 
more  (in  proportion  to  number)  congregational  teachers  than  lay  ones. 


xxxiv  Preface. 

nocturnal  meetings  ;  where  they  go,  with  eyes  down- cast,  under  the 
veil,  and  grazing  the  walls,  with  sighs,  predications,  ronsic,  incense, 
intoxication  of  the  inferior  senses,  in  the  depths  of  obsciue  and 
sonorous  chapels,  where  the  step  grows  furtive,  and  where  the 
lustre^  hung  high,  hypnotizes.  Elsewhere,  the  propaganda  or 
charity  societies  confraternities,  where  the  Jesuit  knows  how  to 
set  in  motion  the  multiple  attractions  of  vanity  in  playing  some 
part — a  need  not  satisfied  by  modern  society, — even  in  the  noblest 
aspirations  of  the  heart  of  feminine  generosity.  Everywhere 
there  are  manifestations  of  respect,  gratitude  and  love  :  they  have 
placed  the  woman  upon  the  altar,  and  have  exempted  ''the  Mother 
of  God"  not  only  from  all  sin,  but  even  from  original  sin.  Mari- 
olatry  dominates  Christianity,  and  this  after  the  sous  of  Loj'ola. 

Very  well  ;  this  is  for  the  world,  for  the  outside,  for  policy,  for 
domination  ;  because  the  master  of  the  woman  is  the  master  of 
the  man.  But  listen  how  they  speak  when  they  are  together,  far 
from  the  mystic  ears  of  the  zealots  and  banner-bearers.  They 
take  for  themselves  the  harsh  words  of  the  ecclesiastic:  "From 
the  cloak  comes  the  scurf;  through  the  woman,  the  evil  to  man." 
(page  306).  '.'  Bear  this  truth  well  in  mind,"  says  Gury,  "  better 
feel  the  evil  will  of  a  man,  than  the  good  will  of  a  woman"  (page 
368).  In  all  their  dissertations,  their  deep  scorn  for  the  daughter 
of  Eve,  the  first  corrupter,  is  often  manifested  under  the  most 
vulgar  form.  I  could  show  hundreds  of  examples  that  the  reader 
will  meet  along  the  way  :  let  me  quote  only  one  —  very  curious  in 
man}'  points  of  view.  The  casuist  asks  himself,  if  it  is  necessary 
to  baptize  the  children  born  of  a  beast  and  a  human  being.  Fes, 
be  answers,  if  it  is  a  question  of  a  man  with  a  beast  ;  -Ao,  if  it  is 
of  a  woman  and  a  beast  ;  for  in  the  first  case  only  the  child 
may  be  considered  as  a  descendant  of  Adam  !     (ppge  483). 

So  the  woman  is  nothing  to  the  Jesuit,  but  a  kind  of  ground 
where  the  human  plant  germinates  :  she  belongs  to  mankind  only 
as  a  feeding  receptacle.  Do  not  ask  the  casuist,  then,  to  under- 
stand anything  about  the  noble  sentiments  which  are  the  honor  of 
humanity.  He  knows  not  what  is  love  ;  he  knows  only  forni- 
cation. He  pollutes,  with  his  unclean  reveries,  all  that  is  most 
holy,  most  pure  in  the  world.     It  is  n  t  o.  ly  the  nuptial  bed, 


Preface,  xxxv 

the  mysteries  of  whioli  ho  scrutinizes  with  an  insatiable  hibricity, 
tormented  l)y  a  quivering  jealousy  ;  he  surveys  obliquely  the 
chaste  conversation  of  a  married  couple  ;  the  kiss  of  the  sister 
and  brother,  father  and  daughter,  mother  and  little  child  (page 
144)  ;  he  blights  them  with  his  impure  suspicion,  and  also  the  first 
quivering  of  the  awakening  soul,  and  the  games  of  childhood,  that 
he  hates  and  calumniates  (Page  144).  Over  this  joy,  this  tender- 
ness, these  exquisite  graces,  we  see  his  viscous  trace,  like  the  slime 
of  the  snail  on  the  most  brilliant  flowers. 

If  he  does  not  know  what  is  love,  nor  even  decency,*  no 
more  does  he  know  what  is  delicacy,  generosity,  devotedness,t 
friendship,  personal  dignity,  civic  duty,  love  of  countiy  :  he 
ignores  so  thoroughly  these  noble  things,  that  he  does  not  know 
even  their  name. 

You  will  not  find  a  single  one  of  these  words  in  Gii-y's  volumes. 
Everytliing  that  makes  the  heart  of  himxnity  palp  tit3,  leaves 
him  cool.  Do  not  speak  to  him  of  progress,  of  fraternity,  of 
science,  of  liberty,  of  hope  ;  he  understands  not  :  he  rehearses,  in 
his  obscure  corner,  erroneous  consciences,  secret  compensations, 
mental  restrictions,  shameful  sins  ;  and  with  all  that,  he  tries 
to  compose  I  know  not  what  electuary,  in  order  to  stupify  and 
enslave  human  ty. 

For  he  degrades  everything  he  touches.  Suppressing  conscience, 
delivering  free-will  into  the  hands  of  a  director,  practising  deceit 
—  even  towards  the  confessor,  who  by  h'm  is  suspected  of  being 
tinged  with  secularism  —  a  means  for  governing  the  souls  of  men, 
narrowing  the  horizons,  cutting  the  wings,  eternizing  twilight 
around  thought  and  conscience,  worse  than  the  night,  because  all 
becomes  doubtful  and  takes  a  fantastic  aspect  :  see  what  he  lias 
done  with  all  those  he  has  set  his  hand  on  !     I  say  nothing  of  the 

*  See  the  incredible  thesis  defended  by  the  Jesuit,  that  for  a  ffirl  to 
abandon  herself  to  others,  and  have  children  by  them,  is  not  to  wroiii?  her 
affianced  husband.  (Page  404). 

t  Neither  for  his  conntry,  which  is  never  mentioned  amon^:  Jesuits, 
they  having  no  country  of  their  own;  neither  for  his  fellow-men,  for  no 
one  is  obliged  to  devote  himself  to  others;  nor  even  for  a  sick  husband, 
whose  abandonment  is  excused,  ordered  even,  iu  case  of  danger.  (Page 
629;.  o        V      fo 


xxxvi  Preface, 

French  clergy,  whose  actual  members  would  take  in  bad  part  the 
iustituLing  of  a  contrast  between  themselves  and  their  predeces- 
sors. But  the  French  nobility,  so  bright,  so  proud,  so  generous, 
in  spite  of  their  levit}',  regard  it,  though  distasteful,  as  without 
power,  barbed  not  with  iron,  as  of  old,  but  with  scapularies  and 
blessed  nick-nacks.  As  for  the  bourgeoisie^  with  its  strong  and 
wise  spirit,  loving  wo:k,  progress  and  libcrt}' ;  see  it,  powerless, 
affrighted,  the  victim  of  reactions.  And  they  were  going  to  seize 
the  magitttracj'  ;  they  were  stretching  their  hands  over  the  army  ; 
those  two  safeguards  of  a  nation  !  Ah  !  it  was  time,  truly,  to  open 
our  eyes  ;  for,  more  skillful  than  Simon,  the  cursed  magician,  they 
were  selling  for  money,  not  only  the  holy  things,  but  also  material 
properties,  giving  in  exchange  a  few  pious  tomfooleries  ! 

Happily,  among  those  they  brutify,  they  themselves  ma}'  be 
reckoned  in  the  first  line.  During  tliree  centuries,  it  has  been  often 
remarked,  the}'  have  not  produced  one  man  of  the  first,  nor  even 
of  the  second  rank  ;  but  they  do  not  seem  to  perceive  it.  To 
Richelieu  they  oppose,  impudently,  Bellarmin,  Suarez  to  Pascal, 
Rapin  to  Corneille,  and  Nonotte  to  Voltaire. 

Ah  !  it  is  not  with  impunity  that  one  submits  one's  heart  and 
mind  to  such  a  discipline!  In  reading  the  Jesuits,  I  have  of  ten 
evoked  before  my  mind  the  image  of  wliat  would  be  a  complete 
specimen  of  their  intellectual  and  moral  fabrication.  We  can 
almost  see  him,  while  I  write,  stealing  on  over  there,  discreetly, 
in  the  shadows  of  the  wall.  It  is  not  that  he  always  puts  on  the 
mask  of  humility  given  to  him  in  the  comedy  :  often,  he  is  loud  in 
talk,  and  of  arrogant  bearing.  But  you  will  recognize  him  in  this, 
you  can  never  see  his  eyes  :  the  Constitution  of  his  masters  have 
taught  him  "to  look  lower  than  the  one  to  whom  he  speaks."  His 
secret  thought  will  escape  you,  and  his  close-shut  lips  will  not 
betray  him.  But  such  as  he  is,  young  or  old,  if  he  is  well  impreg- 
nated with  his  authors,  with  Gury  only,  be  on  your  guard,  all  of 
you! 

Trust  him  not,  O  young  maiden  !  do  not  say  that  thou  art  with- 
out fear,  because  he  is  betrothed  to  thee  a  half  sacrament.  If  thy 
fortune  disappears,  or  if  his  increases,  he  will  abandon  thee  witli- 
out  remorse,  with  authority  from  his  director  (pnges  373,  404;  ;  it 


Preface.  xxxvii 

is  his  right  to  do  so,  if  between  thee  and  him  lliere  is  a  notable 
difference  of  situation  (page  400),  and  that  whatever  may  have 
been  his  previous  protestations  (page  4G3).  Be  on  your  guard  ; 
because,  if  warmed  up  by  his  immoral  reading,  he  incites  tiiee  to 
evil-doing,  even  after  a  solemn  promise  of  marriage,  he  may  aban- 
don thee  with  thy  child  (pag  s  203,  267,  417).  Trust  him  not, 
even  if  he  marries  thee  ;  for  he  can,  by  the  simplest  of  processes, 
sever  the  bond  two  months  after  marriage,  if  he  declares  its 
requirements  not  to  have  been  fulfilled  (page  376),  and  leave  thee 
mercilessly,  and  dishonored.  Trust  him  not;  because  if,  in  pro- 
nouncing the  sacramental  words,  he  has  had  the  intention  not  to 
contract  marriage,  the  act  will  be  void  :  mind  it  (pages  407,  408). 
Trust  him  not  ;  because  he  will  not  trust  thee,  knowing  tliat,  if 
thou  art  a  pupil  of  the  same  masters,  thou  canst,  without  remorse, 
and  persuaded  that  thou  dost  him  "no  wrong,"  abandon  thyself 
to  others  before  thy  marriage,  and  hide  from  him  the  existence  of 
children  born  of  thee  (pages  375,  405). 

Trust  him  not,  ye  his  wife  !  if  some  contagious  sickness  is  upon 
thee  ;  for  his  moral  law  does  not  oblige  him  to  take  care  of  thee 
(page  468).  Trust  him  not,  as  he  will  not  trust  thee;  because 
thou  hast  the  right  to  abandon  him  in  the  same  case  ;  and  besides, 
the  casuist  authorizes  thee  to  borrow  from  his  purse  recklessly 
(pages  178,  215). 

Trust  him  not,  ye,  his  father!  for  if  he  dares  not,  in  this  19th 
century,  denounce  thee  to  the  criminal  judge  when  thou  becomest 
a  heretic  or  an  exile,  he  will  be  authorized  to  torment  thy  con- 
science at  tiie  supreme  hour  (pnge  129)  ;  for,  in  order  to  hide  in 
some  convent  unknown  to  thee,  or  in  spite  of  thee  (page  130),  he 
will  abandon  thee,  old  and  miseiable,  persuaded  that  his  at t  is 
agreeable  to  God  (i)age  319).  Trust  him  no*^,  ;  because,  if  he  cnn 
no  more  rejoice  in  the  possession  of  his  inheritance,  after  having 
killed  ihee  (page  100),  it  will  be  at  least  allowable  to  "rejoice 
in  the  inheritance  that  liis  murder  will  have  procured  him"  (page 
100).  Look  out  for  him  ;  for  if  on  thy  death-brd  thou  entrust  him 
with  a  gift  for  a  friend,  he  has  the  right  to  disobey  thy  last  will 
(page  253). 

Trust  h  m   not,   ye,   his   child  !    for  he  is   permitted    to   wi-h 


xxxviii  Preface, 

for  thy  death,  either  in  view  of  thy  etei'Dal  happiness,  in  view 
of  diminishing  the  cares  of  his  family,  or  of  delivering  thee  f lom 
the  risks  of  a  sinful  life  (page  109). 

Trust  him  not,  ye,  his  brother  !  because  he  may,  calumniating 
thee  at  the  death-bed  of  thy  father,  deprive  thee  of  thy  legitimate 
inheritance,  provided  he  does  not  do  it  through  hate  for  thee 
(page  227)  ;  because  he  may  leave  in  misery  thee  and  tliy  family, 
without  remorse,  and  carry  his  fortune  to  a  neighboring  convent 
(page  319)  ;  because  he  will  be  authorized  to  make  up  skillfully 
fiom  the  paternal  inheritance  for  what  he  may  consider  an  in- 
justice committed  against  him  (page  208). 

Trust  him  not,  you,  his  friends  !  because  he  is  authorized  to 
betra}^  your  secrets,  even  the  most  intimate,  when  he  judges 
that  so  to  act  is  in  the  interest  either  of  the  Church,  or  of  a 
third  person  (page  407)  ;  trust  not  a  letter  into  his  hands  ;  because 
he  will  always  find  some  good  reason  to  open  it  without  sin  (pages 
164,  169)  ;  and  if  j'our  secret  is  a  bad  action,  remember  that 
he  can  divulge  it  to  any  one  who  is  interested  in  knowing  it  (page 
161).  Do  not  lend  him  any  books;  because,  if  he  deems  them 
bad  from  his  point  of  view,  he  is  authorized  not  to  give  them  back, 
unless  he  is  threatened  with  a  good  thrashing  (page  106). 

Tru^t  him  not,  all  of  you  !  who  have  with  hira  business  inter- 
course ;  because,  in  case  of  a  doubtful  transaction,  he  can  interpret 
it  either  in  one  sense  or  the  other,  with  all  safety  of  conscience, 
according  to  his  interests  (pages  69,  76).  For  instance,  if  he  sur- 
renders his  goods,  he  may  secretly  keep  part  for  himself  and  family 
(page  251),  and  even  dissimulate  his  intlebtedness  (page  240)  ; 
yea,  he  may  even  invent  ingenious  secret  compensations,  grazing 
the  swindle  (page  219).  Because,  if  j^ou  make  a  will,  he  will 
always  find  the  means  to  have  the  benefit  of  it  without  executing 
the  clauses  of  it  (pages  268,  280)  ;  and  he  will  know,  without 
any  heart-anguish,  how  to  dissimulate  the  errors  of  form  (page 
91),  and  even  to  set  right  the  material  ambiguity  (pages  277, 
304)  ;  if  you  refuse,  be  careful  to  declare  that  he  owes  you 
money;  without  that,  he  will  find  a  reason  not  to  give  it  back  to 
your  heir  (page  276).  Because,  if  you  lend  him  your  horse,  and 
he  should  be  stolen  from  him,  he  can  refuse  to  pay  you  (page  283) 


Preface.  xxxix 

Betause,  if  you  convey  an}'  money  to  him,  he  will  use  it  in  trade, 
and  keep  tlie  benefit  for  himself  (page  284.)  Because  he  is 
persuaded  tiiat  he  does  no  injustice  iu  combining  with  others  to 
hinder  your  auction-sale  (pages  2G2,  287.)  Because  he  has  a 
thousand  ways  to  dispense  himself  from  paying  back  what  he 
owes  you  (page  192.)  Because, —  and  this  is  worth  a  poem! — 
he  can  wish  you  a  temporal  injury,  and  rejoice  at  it,  with  a  good 
end  in  view!   (page  104.) 

Do  not  bet  with  him  ;  because  he  is  full  of  resources  to  make 
dishonest  bets  without  sinning  (page  297.)  Do  not  pla^^  with 
him  ;  because  he  will  conduct  himself  as  an  infamous  Greek,  with 
all  safety  of  conscience  (pages  297,  298.) 

Do  not  believe,  under  the  thought  that  he  is  pious,  in  his 
promises,  nor  in  his  oath,  when  he  sells  something  to  you  :  those 
are  little  peccadillos  permitted  to  merchants  (page  261.) 

Do  not  take  him  as  a  servant  ;  because  he  knows  thoroughly  the 
theory  of  little  thefts,  thefts  of  article  of  food,  with  the  conditions 
of  restitution  (page  184)  ;  and  if  he  judges  that  you  do  not  pay 
him  enough,  or  make  him  work  too  much,  he  will  find  a  way  to 
establish  the  just  equilibrum  (pag 'S  188,  218.) 

Look  out  for  him,  clerks  of  the  toll-office,  clerks  of  custom  duty, 
whoever  you  may  be  !  because  he  does  not  admit  the  legitimacy 
of  your  tax,  and  he  will  avoid  it  by  any  means  possible  :  do  not 
interrogate  him,  he  will  lie,  under  oath,  if  that  is  necessary  :  he  is 
authorized  (pages  91,  205,  219)  ;  and  watch  him  well,  if  he  is  a 
notary,  because  he  will  help,  in  conscience,  to  defraud  the  tax- 
galher  (pages  244,  317.) 

Trust  him  not,  members  of  the  council  of  revision  !  because  he 
is  held  to  no  restitution,  if  he  has  somebody  ready  to  take  his 
place  (pnge  206.)  Look  out  for  him  colonel!  he  will  desert 
legitimately,  if  he  does  not  find  in  the  regiment  facilities  for  con- 
fessing (page  205.) 

Beware  of  him,  judge  !  when  he  appears  before  you  as  plaintiff, 
accused,  or  witness.  In  vain  you  compel  him  to  lift  up  his  hand 
and  give  his  oath  before  Christ,  his  God.  Almost  in  all  circum- 
stances he  will  find  means  to  escape  you  (pages  157,  164, 165,  168, 
272,  303,  316,  etc.)  ;  and  if  you  condemn  him,  he  can,  if  he  deems 


xl  .  Preface. 

his  conscience  free,  compensate  himself  secretly,  to  your  condem- 
nation. 

Beware  of  him,  all  of  you,  and  avoid  him  as  the  plague!  neither 
your  goods,  nor  3'our  life,  nor  3'our  honor  are  in  safety  with  him. 

Because,  if  he  advises  and  induces  a  thief  to  phmder  your 
house,  he  owes  you  nothing  (pages  194,  198,  233)  ;  because  if  he  is 
a  judge  and  renders  against  you,  for  complicity  with  his  colleagues, 
an  unjust  sentence  bought  with  a  bribe,  he  owes  you  nothing  (page 
234)  ;  because,  if  his  children  or  his  servants  have  destroyed  some 
of  your  property,  he  owes  you  nothing  (page  235)  ;  because,  if 
he  sees  a  thief  take  away  your  goods,  and  he  receives  money  as  a 
bribe  for  his  silence,  he  owes  you  nothing  (pages  237,  249)  ; 
because,  if  he  has  set  fire  to  your  house,  wanting  an  occasion  to 
steal,  he  owes  you  nothing  (page  196)  ;  because,  if  he  has 
killed  your  cow,  in  firing  wilfully  at  your  donkey,  lie  owes  you 
nothing  (pages  56,  196,  247)  ;  because^  if  he  has  burned  your 
house,  wanting  to  burn  your  neighbor's,  he  owes  you  nothing  (pages 
196,  228,  233)  ;  because,  if  he  is  the  thief  and  j'ou  are  accused 
and  condemned  for  his  theft,  he  owes  you  nothing;  even  should 
he  have  committed  that  theft  in  order  to  have  you  suspected  of  it 
(pages  195,  216)  ;  because,  if  you  are  the  creditor  of  a  man  whom 
he  has  assassinated,  he  owes  you  nothing  (page  203)  ;  because,  if 
3'ou  are  the  wife  or  the  cliild  of  a  man  murdered  by  him,  and  if 
that  man  was  leading  a  bad  life  (page  242),  or  even  was  soon  to 
die  (page  203),  he  owes  you  nothing;  because  he  in  no  case  owes 
you  an3'thing,  if  in  killing  your  father  he  believed  he  was  killing 
another  man  (page  228)  ;  neither  if,  having  voluntarily  murdered 
your  father,  he  deems  that  you  are  able  to  provide  for  yourself 
(page  203). 

Because  he  can  defame  you  freely,  if  he  is  skillful  and  has 
profited  well  by  his  lessons  (pages  161,  168)  ;  and  even  when  the 
defamation  is  without  excuse  and  compels  damages,  he  can  avoid 
paying  them,  if  he  deems  the  conservation  of  his  good  reputatio  i 
''useful  to  religion"  (page  162)  ;  because  he  can  seduce  a  young 
girl,  even  under  promise  of  marriage,  and  have  children  by  her, 
and  then  abandon  her  mercilessly,  if  he  can  argue  a  certain 
inequality  of  situation  either  previous  or  subsequent  to  tae  promise 


Preface,  xli 

(page  463)  ;  and  do  not  spoak  to  him  of  coming  to  the  lielp  of 
the  poor  girl,  because  he  wouhl  answer  you  loftily,  that  '^  tiie  loss 
of  virginit}^  can  neither  be  estimated  nor  indemnified"  (pages  204, 
243)  ;  because,  if  you  take  in  his  house  some  poisoned  nourish- 
ment destined  for  another,  he  is  not  bound  to  warn  you,  and 
besides,  after  your  death  he  will  owe  nothing  to  anybody  (i)age 
223). 

Run  away  from  him  ;  because  he  has  at  his  disposal  "  the 
largel}'  mental  restrictions  and  ambiguous  words  '  (page  156), 
which  allow  him,  in  fact,  to  lie  every  time  it  is  for  his  interest 
to  do  so. 

Run  away  from  him  ;  because  the  doctrine  of  probabilism  allows 
him  always  to  find  out  a  grave  doctor  whose  opinion  will  lie  suffi- 
cient to  legitimatize  his  action,  and  will  authorize  him  to  act 
according  to  his  own  welfare. 

Avoid  him  ;  because,  once  his  opinion  is  grounded,  he  can 
violate  with  safety  of  conscience  all  civil  laws,  and  if  condemned 
by  the  judge,  can  extensively  and  quietly  use  secret  reparation 
(page  188)  ;  it  is  on  this  point  that  it  is  necessary  to  insist.  \\\ 
virtue  of  the  doctrine  of  intention,  he  comes  to  substitute  his  own 
authority  for  all  other.  The  laws  exist  no  more  for  him  ;  neither 
the  civil  law  nor  the  sacred  ties  of  the  family  ;  neither  the  laws  of 
honor  nor  anything  constituting  that  cement  which  binds  together 
the  elements  of  society.  He  will  do  such  a  thing  if  he  deems  it 
good,  according  to  his  point  of  view  ;  for,  having  on  his  side  a 
renowned  doctor,  he  has  a  right  to  find  it  good.  In  all  cases, 
having  performed  the  act  according  to  a  conscience  invincibly 
erroneous,  as  he  has  not  committed  any  theological  fault,  he  is  held 
to  no  reparation  whatever;  and  if  the  civil  judge  dares  to  order 
oi:e,  he  will  compensate  himself  accordingly. 

Such  would  be,  in  the  maximum  of  development,  the  best  pupil 
of  Jesuitical  doctrines.  Fortunately,  the}'  have  never,  I  believe, 
furmed  one  so  complete.  Honesty,  which  is  in  the  depth  of  human 
nature,  takes  the  upper  hand  in  the  pupil,  as  well  as  in  the  teacher  ; 
and  this  above  all  in  France,  the  abode  of  generosity.  It  is  with- 
out doubt  for  this  reason,  that,  for  three  centuries,  not  a  sii;gle 


xlii  Preface. 

Frenchman   has   been   impregnated   thoroughly  enough  with  the 
Jesuitical  spirit  to  deserve  the  rank  of  General. 

But  is  not  such  teaching,  even  mitigated  by  common  sense  and 
native  honor,  a  true  social  peril?  Who  can  say  how  many  strug- 
gling generations  would  pass  away,  before  all  the  noble  qualities 
which  yet  exist  would  be  blighted  and  vanquished  for  ever?  As 
for  me,  I  cannot  think  of  it  without  shivering.  Maj^  the  reading 
of  the  present  book  communicate  to  all  my  sincere  and  profound 
terror  !  May  liberals,  the  most  compromised  to-day  by  a  generous 
logic,  understand  that  principles  are  not  made  for  the  sake  of 
those  who  act  in  opposition  to  principles,  as  the  freedom  of  ex- 
change is  not  violated  when  pestiferous  bales  are  seized  in  our 
ports  ! 


ANALYSIS 


OF   THE- 


Works  of  Father  Gury,  S.  J., 

Professor  of  Moral  Theology  in  the  College  Eomain. 


A .-  COMPENDIUM  OF  MOEAL  THEOLOGY, 


The  art  of  arts  is  the  government  of  souls. 
{S.  Gregory.) 


B- CASES  OF  CONSCIENCE. 


Long  is  the  way  through  precepts  ;  brief  and 
efficacious  through  examples. 

(^Seneca.) 


MORAL    THEOLOGY 


CASES   OF   CONSCIENCE. 


BOOK  I. 
TREATISE   0]S^  IIUISIAIS^  ACTIOXS, 


OF   THE   NOTIONS   OF   HUMAN   ACTS. 

1.  Definition.  The  act,  in  general,  is  the  determination  of 
power,  or  the  faculty  to  act,  consisting  in  exercise,  or  even  the 
use  of  this  acting  faculty.  Power,  in  circumstances  in  which 
it  may  become  action,  is  ordinarily  called  first  act,  and  its  deter- 
mination, second  act. 

But  the  liuman  act  proceeds  from  the  deliberate  will  of  man,  or 
from  his  free  will,  turned  towards  good  or  evil.  The  human  is 
thon  a  moral  act.   .   .   . 

The  human  act  differs  from  the  act  produced  in  man  without 
deliberation,  such  as  the  involuntary  acts,  or  spontaneous  move- 
ments {primo -primi)^  or  the  heedless  acts  of  man,  in  sleep,  delir- 
ium, folly,  drunkenness,  when  he  is  not  under  the  control  of  his 
reason. 

2.  —  Division.     The  human  acts  are  multiple  : 

1.  Spontaneous  or  commanded.   .  .   . 

2.  Internal  or  external.   .    .   . 

3.  Good,  bad,  or  indifferent. 

4.  Natural  or  supernatural.   .   .   . 

5.  Valid  or  void.   ... 


46  77^e  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

CHAPTER  II. 

Principles  of  the  Acts. 

3.  They  are  :  knowledge,  will,  and  liberty. 

They  constitute  those  acts,  and  are  necessaiy  for  each  one  of 
them,  as  it  results  from  the  definition  of  the  human  act.   .   .   . 

ART.   I.  —  Of  the  voluntary  act. 

Section  1.  — Of  the  voluntar}^  act  in  general. 

4.  The  voluntary  act  proceeds  from  the  will  with  the  intellectual 
knowledge  of  the  end.  The  reason  of  that  definition  results  from 
what  has  just  been  said,  or  from  the  necessity  of  a  previous  knowl- 
edge, so  that  the  will  could  be  induced  to  act. 

It  differs  :  first,  from  the  wilful  act  which  is  only  the  object  of 
the  will,  and  as  such,  does  not  proceed  from  nor  depend  on  it  ; 
so  the  rain  falling  on  a  barren  land  will  be  called  wilful  by  the 
farmer,  but  not  voluntary;  second,  from  the  spontaneous  act, 
"wdiicli  is  produced  by  a  knowledge  purely  material  and  sensual, 
and  so  imperfect,  such  as  one  may  recognize  in  beasts. 

5.  —  There  are  several  wills  : 

1.  Perfect  or  imperfect. 

2.  Simply  voluntary,  or  dependent  on  something  {secundum 
quid).  .  .  .  Thus  to  throw  goods  into  the  sea  when  one  is  threat- 
ened with  a  wreck,  is  said  to  be  an  act  simply  voluntary,  though 
involuntary  in  relation  to  something,  on  account  of  the  reluctance 
without  efficiency  of  the  will. 

3.  Direct  or  indirect.  .   .  . 

4.  Positive  or  negative.  .  .  . 

5.  Formal  or  tacit.   .   .   . 

6.  Actual,  virtual,  habitual  and  interpretative.   .  .   . 

6.  —  In  the  same  act,  there  may  be  a  direct  will  in  itself,  indirect 
in  its  cause,  and  involuntai-y. 

Example  :  Titius  wanting  to  kill  Cains,  his  enemy,  attacks  him, 
risking  to  wound  his  comrade  who  is  with  him  ;  but  the  bullet, 
besides  the  two  men,  strikes  also  Simpronius,  that  Titius  could  n  )t 
see,  not  knowing  him  to  be  there.     Ca'us  is  strucls:  by  the  direct 


Cases  of  Conscience,  47 

will  of  Titius,  his  comrade  by  the  indirect  will,  and  Sympronias 
outside  of  any  will. 

Section  2. — Of  the  voluntary  act  in  particular. 

There  is  no  particular  difficulty  in  the  other  wills,  we  shall 
speak  only  of  the  indirect  will. 

7. — That  will,  as  it  has  been  said,  has  not  a  direct  aim  in  itself, 
])nt  results  from  something  else  directly  thought  of,  as  t!ie  eiï  ct 
from  the  cause.  Who  wants  the  cause,  wants  the  effect  which 
follows  it,  if  that  effect  has  been  foreseen.   .   .   . 

There  are  several  sorts  of  causes  : 

1.  Physical  or  moral.   .   .   . 

2.  Immediate  or  mediate.   ... 

3.  Near  or  far  off.   .   .   . 

4.  Cause  by  itself  {per  se)  or  by  accident  (per  accidens).  .  .  . 

The  first  one  tends,  by  its  nature,  to  produce  the  effect.  Thus, 
drinking  too  much  is  the  cause  in  itself  of  drunkenness.  The 
second,  although  not  being  destined  in  its  nature  to  produce  the 
effect,  may,  however,  bring  it  out  through  circumstances.  Thus 
homicide  may  result  from  drunkenness. 

8. — ^A  bad  effect  proceeding  from  indirect  will,  that  is  to  say, 
from  a  cause  indirectly  willed,  must  not  always  be  imputed  as  a 
fault  to  its  author. 

In  order  that  there  should  be  fault,  these  conditions  are  neces- 
sarj'  :  That  the  author  has  forseen  the  effect,  at  least  confusedly  ; 
that  he  may  not  have  been  able  to  produce  the  cause  ...  ;  that 
he  has  been  detained  from  producing  the  cause,  or  to  have  sup- 
pressed it,  if  it  already  existed.   .   .  . 

9. — It  is  permitted  to  i)roduce  a  cause  good  or  indifferent,  from 
which  follows  immediately  a  double  effect,  a  good  one  and  a  bad 
one,  if  the  cause  is  serious  and  the  intention  honest,  not  directed 
towards  the  bad  effect.* 

*  Q.  "  Are  we  always  obliired  to  abstain  from  an  act  from  which  we 
f()re>eo  some  bad  eftect  caused  by  the  malice  of  a  third  person? 

A.  No,  wlioii  we  liave  a  le.içitimite  motive  to  do  that  act,  and  when  we 
have  a  riiriit  to  the  ad vui taises  it  must  brim;  out,  one  is  not  obli<red  to 
sacrifice  the  good  that  will  result  fro:n  it."  {Petit.    Catéchisme  de  Marotte.) 


48  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Because  if  this  was  not  allowed,  the  author  would  sin,  either  by 
the  intention  of  a  had  eflTect,  by  the  production  of  the  cause,  or 
by  the  prevision  of  the  bad  effect.  Nothing  of  this  can  be  sus- 
tained.  .   .   . 

10. — Examples:   .   .  . 

A  young  girl  sins  gravely  if  she  miscarries  in  order  to  avoid  dis- 
honor. Tlie  reason  of  it  is,  that  the  miscarriage  is  directly  a 
means  to  liberate  herself  from  infamy,  and  that  she  seeks  good 
through  evil.* 

Article  II.     Of  free  will. 

11. — Free  will  is  what  proceeds  from  the  will  acting  upon  itself, 
with  power  not  to  act.  Then,  liberty  is  the  faculty  to  act  or  not, 
or  of  choosing  one  thing  rather  than  another.  So,  all  that  is  free 
is  voluntary,  but  the  converse  is  not  true. 

Although  free  will  and  will  differ  between  themselves,  neverthe- 
less, in  the  acts  by  v\hich  man  travels  upon  this  earth,  tending  to 
his  end,  they  are  never  separated  in  reality.   ... 

There  are  several  kinds  of  liberty  : 

1.  Liberty  without  constraint,  or  of  indifference,  or  of  choice. 

2.  Liberty  without  an}-  outweighing  power,  exempted  from  any 
exterior  violence. 

3.  Liberty  of  contradiction,  faculty  to  act  contrariwise. 

4.  Liberty  of  contrariety,  by  which  one  can  choose  either  one 
thing  or  its  opposite. 

5.  Liberty  of  specification,  faculty  to  employ  one's  self  in 
different  things. 

*  This  is  indeed  what  decided  Innocent  XI.  to  condemn  the  following 
proposition,  on  the  2(1  of  March,  1679:  "It  is  permitted  to  provoke 
abortion  before  the  animation  of  tlie  foetus,  for  fear  tliat  the  girl  should 
be  exposed  to  death  or  infamy."  (Prop.  34). 

But,  if  we  may  be  allowed  to  believe  they  have  to  make  apology  to-day, 
the  Jesuits  did  not  always  avow  tlieniselves  vanquislied  l)y  the  decree  of 
the  Papacy.  Jean  Marin  wrote,  in  1720:  "One  could  perhaps  admit 
the  doctrine  of  the  condemned  proposition,  to  avoid  infamy,  if  no  other 
means  is  to  be  found  to  liide  the  crime  and  avoid  tlie  infamy.  And 
perliaps  he  would  not  be  in  the  ca-^e  of  tlio  condemned  propt)>ition  wiio 
would  say  that  abortion  is  permitted,  not  to  avoid  liii  own  iuiamy,  but  that) 
of  a  religious  community. "  (^Page  423). 


Cases  of  Coascience,       *  49 

ARTICLE  III. 

Obstacles  to  free  will  and  to  will. 

There  are  four  of  them  :  Ignorance,  concupiscence,  fear  and 
violence. 

Section  I.  —  Of  ignorance. 

13.  —  Generally  speaking,  ignorance  is  the  want  of  knowledge. 
We  distinguish  :    1st,    The  ignorance  positive  or  negative,  from 

what  we  ought  to  know  or  what  we  ought  not.   .   .  . 

2.  Of  right  or  of  fact.    .   .   . 

3.  Supcrable  or  insuperable,  that  is  to  say,  that  one  can  over- 
come by  one's  efforts,  or  not  ;  physically,  by  any  means,  morally, 
by  any  moral  attention.  .   .  . 

4.  Antecedent  or  consequent.   .   .   . 

Wc  distinguish  three  superable  ignorances  :  Firstly,  Simply 
such,  when  in  order  to  conquer  it  vre  bring  some  attention,  but 
not  enough  ;  Secondly,  Vulgar,  when  no  effort,  or  scarcely  any,  is 
made  to  discover  the  truth  ;  Thirdly  Affected,  when  one  seeks, 
directly  and  positively,  to  ignore,  either  to  sin  more  freely,  or  in 
order  to  have  an  excuse  for  sinning. 

14.  —  Insuperable  ignorance  effaces  the  will.*  Then  no  act 
proceeding  from  it  can  be  imputed  to  its  author.   .   .   . 

Superable  ignorance  does  not  take  away  the  will  .  .  .  but 
diminishes  it.   .   .   . 

The  vulgar  ignorance  and  the  affected  ignorance  diminish  the 
will  a  good  deal  less, and  consequently  the  sin.  .   .   . 

Examples  : 

A  husband  sinning  with  a  woman  that  he  ignores  in  an  insuper- 
able manner,  as  the  sister  of  his  wife,  is  culpable  of  adultery,  but 
not  of  incest. 

Children  who  have  made  an  illcit  U5e  of  their  own  bodies,  with- 
out remorse  of  conscience,  have  not  sinned  in  principle,  thouo^h 
having  attained  the  age  of  reason.   .   .   . 

*  Insuperable  i<;norance.  that  is  to  say,  tlie  one  we  are  not  able  to  over- 
come by  ordinary  means,  take;^  away  the  will  auU  excuses  the  sin.  (Mar- 
ottii  Petit  Catéchisme) . 


50  TJte  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

Section  2. — Of  concupiscence. 

15.  —  Concupiscence  is  the  movement  of  the  sensual  appetite 
whicli  incites  the  will  to  a  sensual  pleasure. 

There  are  two  of  tbern  ;  the  one  antecedent  which  precedes  the 
voluntary  act,  the  other  consequent,  which  follows  it.   .   .   . 

Antecedent  concupiscence,  far  from  effacing  the  will,  rather 
augments  it,  if  we  bear  in  mind  the  inclination  of  the  will  ;  but  it 
diminishes  it,  and  even  takes  it  away  altogether,  if  we  understand 
the  judgment  of  reason  and  the  deliberation  of  will.   .   .   . 

Section  3.  — Of  fear. 

17.  —  Fear  is  the  agitation  of  the  mind  in  presence  of  actual  or 
future  danger,for  one's  self  or  relations. 

Fear  is  subdivided  thus  : 

1.  Grievous  or  light.  ...  It  may  be  grievous,  absolutely  or 
relatively.   .   .    . 

2.  Intrinsical  or  extrinsical.   .   .   . 

3.  Just  or  unjust.   .   .   . 

18.  —  The  act  proceeding  from  fear,  though  grievous,  is  simply 
and  absolutely  voluntary  and  free. 

Section  4. — Of  violence. 

20. — Violence  is  a  constraint  brought  by  an  exterior  and  free 
force,  in  spite  of  the  will.   ... 

Violence  is  absolute  and  relative.   .    .   . 

Examples  : 

21. —  1.  A  woman  who  resists  by  all  possible  means  what  is 
offered  her  does  not  sin,  although  the  victim  of  a  rape  ;  because 
no  one  sins  in  spite  of  himself. 

2.  Women  sin  grievously  in  submitting  to  violence,  without 
resistance,  through  timidity  or  fear,  for  instance,  in  order  not  to 
offend  the  aggressor,  even  in  setting  aside  all  danger  of  consent  ; 
because  although  they  do  not  consent  to  the  sensual  pleasure, 
however,  not  resisting  as  they  might,  they  agree,  which  is  equiva- 
lent,to  their  own  ravishment,  and  co-operate  in  the  crime  of  tlie 
man. —  But  a  woman  overcome  by  force,  who  does  not  cry  for 
help,  for  fear   of    death,    does   she    sin  ?     There    is   controversy. 


I 


Cases  of  Conscience,  51 

According  to  tlie  probable  opinion,  one  may  sa}'  no,  putting  aside 
llie  danger  of  consent.  And  so,  the  woman  is  not  obliged  to  cry 
if  she  runs  the  danger  of  suffering  some  notable  injury,  either  to 
lose  her  reputation,  or  to  be  called  a  prude;  besides,  if  she  has 
resisted  as  much  as  she  could,  she  is  not  held  to  fight  against 
violence,  to  expose  herself  to  so  great  an  injury.  This  is  the 
opinion  of  St.  Liguori.  However,  as  there  is  almost  always  the 
danger  of  consent,  in  practice,  the  contrary  is  advocated.*  .   .   . 

CHAPTER   III. 

Morality  of  Human  Acts. 

Essence  of  Morality.     Its  Sources. 

ART.  1.  —  Of  the  essence  of  morality. 

22.  —  The  essence  of  morals  consists  in  the  relation  of  human 
acts  to  the  eternal  law,  which  is  the  divine  reason,  otherwise,  the 
will  of  God.t  .   .   . 

ART.  2.— Of  its  sources. 

They  are  three  :  The  object,  the  circumstances,  the  end. 

Section  I.  — Of  the  object. 

26.  —  The  object  is  the  immediate  aim  of  the  moral  act,  but  to 
which  converges  most  nearly  and  naturally  the  will  of  the  acting 
agent. 

It  is  good,  bad,  or  indifferent.  .  .  . 

Section  II. — Of  circumstances. 

*  It  is  here  that  is  found,  in  the  ancient  casuist,  the  case  of  the  chaste 
Suzanne,  to  the  exaiï^eratecl  riiu:orisni  of  whom  they  do  not  spare  criticism  : 
"  Suzanne,"  says  Jacques  Tirin,  "might  have  avoided  her  troubles  if,  fenr- 
ino;  infamy  and  death,  she  had  let  the  adulterers  satisfy  their  lewdness, 
without  consent  or  co-operation,  permitting  only,  and  remaining  neutral. 
In  fact,  to  preserve  her  ctiastity,  she  was  not  obliged  to  call  for  help, 
and  in  so  doing  defame  her  reputation  and  even  endanirer  her  own  life; 
for  the  integrity  of  the  body  is  of  a  less  consequence  tlian  reputation  or 
life."  (page  291.)  It  is  also  the  opinion  of  Cornelius,  Dicastille,  etc.,  etc. 

t  All  tills  passage  may  be  summed  up  in  these  bold  words  of  Joan  Ger- 
son  :  "  God  does  not  will  certain  actions  because  they  are  good  ;  but  they 
are  good  because  He  wills  them.  Just  the  same  as  others  are  bad  because 
He  forbids  them. 


52  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

27. — Circumstances  are  the  accidental  determination  of  tlie 
act,  without  which  it  mght  exist  in  its  substance,  but  nevertheless 
injure  in  some  way,  its  morality.  Circamstauces  are  not  the 
object  of  the  act,  because  will  reaches  them  only  in  the  second 
degree.  .   .  . 

Sectiois^  III.  —  Of  the  end. 

28. — The  end,  in  general,  is  the  reason  for  acting.  There  are 
two  :  The  end  of  the  act  being  the  crowning  of  the  act,  and  the 
end  of  the  agent,  that  is  to  say,  that  on  which  the  agent  directs 
his  intention. 

ON   THE   MERITS    OF   THE   ACTS. 

33. — A  meritorious  act  is  a  good  work,  worthj^  through  grace,  of 
reward  or  retribution.  Acts  are  of  two  kinds  :  The  meritorious 
act  de  condigno,  to  which  a  reward  is  due  in  justice,  that  is  to  say, 
by  the  promise  of  God  ;  and  the  act  de  congrao^  which  has  a  right 
to  a  reward,  not  by  the  justice  of  God,  but  by  a  certain  agreement, 
and  through  God's  generosity.   .   .   . 

34.  — What  is  necessary  in  order  that  an  act  should  be  merito- 
rious de  condignof 

It  should  be  :  1st,  Free  ...  ;  2nd,  honest  ...  ;  3(1,  produced 
by  grace  ...    ;  4th,  the  agent  must  be  in  a  state  of  grace.  .  .  . 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  ï^uman  ^cts> 


Case  I. 
Of   AYill. 


t 


Arnulfe,  an  honest  man  but  imperious,  meets  his  enemy  ; 
harassed  by  him  with  insults  and  blows,  burning  with  a  desire  to 
kill  him,  he  seizes  a  dagger  and  springs  upon  him.  But  he 
masters  his  anger  and  runs  away.  Then,  becoming  calmer,  and 
fearing  he  has  committed  an  attempt  against  life,  throws  himself 
at  the  feet  of  his  confessor  and  avows  his  fault. 

In  another  instance,  knowing  that  when  in  a  state  of  drunken- 
ness he  is  of  a  quarrelsome  disposition,  he  takes  good  care  not  to 
drink  to  excess.  But  it  happens  that,  excited  by  his  friends  to 
drink  more  than  usual,  he  gets  drunk  before  thinking  of  his  danger, 
and  becoming  furious,  he  quarrels  with  the  others.  Coming  to 
himself,  he  hurries  to  do  penance  and  goes  to  his  confessor. 

Ques.  Has  Arnulfe  sinned  in  both  cases? 

Ans.  Arnulfe  does  not  seem  to  have  sinned  in  any  case,  at  least 
grievously  ;  because  he  had  not  a  knowledge  full  and  perfect  (if 
evil,  and  there  was  no  premeditation,  as  we  can  see  in  the  i)eru- 
sal  of  cases  of  conscience.  Besides,  Arnulfe,  being  subject  to  anger 
in  the  first  case,  we  may  think  that  he  has  followed  his  first  im[)ulse 
{ex  mota,  primo-primo  egisse).  As  for  the  second  case,  he  could 
not  sin  if  he  did  not  think  of  all  the  perils  of  drunkenness. 

Case  II. 

Of  Will. 

1. —  Elpidius,  a  drunkard  and  fighter,  who  grows  furious  in  a 
state  of  drunkenness,  quarrels  with  Titius,  and  decides  to  revenge 
himself  on  him;  however,  he  puts  off  his  project  to  another  time. 
Then,  he  repairs  to  a  tavern  in    the    neighborhood  to  drown    his 


54  .  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

anger  ;  but  coming  out  during  the  night  in  a  state  of  drunkenness, 
be  meets  Titius,  and  beats  him  fearfully,  so  that  he  (Titius)  is 
forced  for  many  weeks  to  leave  his  woik,   and  sustains  great   loss. 

2. — Blazius,  in  order  to  cause  injury  to  Caius,  takes  his  gun,  and 
shoots  at  the  donkey  of  the  latter.  But  alas  !  a  double  misfortune 
happens.  He  misses  the  donkey,  which  escapes  safe  and  sound, 
and  kill-s  Tttius'  cow,  resting  quietly  behind  a  hedge,  and  which  he 
had  not  seen. 

Ques.  1.  Must  the  injury  caused  to  Titius  during  the  drunkenness 
of  Elpidius,  be  imputed  to  the  latter,  and  must  he  be  held  for  dam- 
ages? 

2.  Quid,  in  the  case  in  which,  not  being  in  the  habit  of  dri:.kiiig 
to  excess,  he  would  have  dune  it  through  inadvertence? 

3.  Can  Blazius  be  held  to  a  restitution  for  the  donkey  that  he 
missed,  or  for  the  cow  which  he  killed? 

Ans.  Question  1. —  Yes,  the  reason  of  it  is,  tliat  the  iiijuiy 
is  plainly  voluntar}',  and  foreseen  in  its  cause,  at  least  vaguely  {in 
confuso).  Elpidius  wanted,  in  fact,  to  wrong  Titius;  he  drank 
in  danger  of  getting  drunk,  being,  by  nature,  a  drunkard.  Besides, 
he  must  have  foreseen,  impliedly  at  least,  that  he  would  cause  some 
wrong  in  such  a  state,  being  aware  t!iat  he  becomes  fuiious,  and 
that  he  may  ii  jure  some  one.  Elpidius  can  not  then  be  absolved 
from  a  grievous  sin  against  justice,  nor  dispensed  from  the  obligation 
to  compensate  the  injury. 

Ans.  Question  2.  —  In  this  hypothesis,  the  evil  committed  by 
Elpidius  cannot  1  e  imputed  to  him  ;  because  he  is  not  voluntarily 
in  the  act  {in  actu)^  the  reason  missing,  neither  in  the  cause  {in 
causa)  the  evd  not  having  been  foreseen. 

Ans.  Question  3. —  Blazius  is  bound  to  no  restitution.  Certainly 
not  for  the  donkey,  which  ran  away  safe  and  sound  ;  neither  for 
the  cow,  having  not  foreseen  that  misfortune,  nor  sup[)()sed  it. 
Then,  in  conscience,*  and  before  the  sentence  of  the  judge,  he  can 
not  be  constrained  to  any  reparation  for  the  injurv.  Quid,  if  the 
donkey  and  cow  had  belonged  to  the  same  Caius?  I  an^wvr,  in 
the  widest  acceptation  of  principles,  that,  not  even  in  that  case, 

*  "Inconscience,  one  is  exempted  from  restitution  if  the  wroni;.  even 
grievous,  has  been  doue  without  Uieological  faults.  "  (Fracliala  175D). 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Human  Ads,  55 

should    Blazius    be    held    to    repair    the    injur}',    having  done    it 
involuntarily. 

Case  IV. 

Of  the  Indirect  Will. 

Richard,  an  inn-keeper,  happy  in  having  a  large  patronage, 
furnishes  abundantly  wine  to  the  drinkers,  incited  by  the  love  (^f 
lucre,  and  also  by  the  desire  to  prevent  blasphemous  talk,  though 
foreseeing  that  many  of  them  will  get  drunk  ;  in  his  conscience,  he 
is  not  sinning.  He  harbors,  even  cheerful!}',  men  who  hold  impious 
or  obscene  conversations,  and  he  does  not  reproach  them  for  it, 
because,  says  he,  he  is  not  responsible  for  their  conducl. 

Ques.  1.  Does  Richard  sin  gravely  in  furnisliing  wine  to  peo- 
ple who  will  get  drunk,  without  any  better  reason  than  his  love  for 
gain? 

Ques.  2.  Does  he  sin  grievously  in  trying  in  such  a  manner  to 
prevent  the  drinkers  from  blaspheming? 

Ans.  Question  1. —  1st,  Yes^  in  certain  particular  cases;  for 
instance,  if  it  is  a  question  of  a  toper  almost  drunk,  who  asks  for 
more  wine.  The  reason  for  it  is,  that  in  this  precise  case,  he  is 
only  subject  to  a  slight  loss,  in  order  to  avoid  a  certain  and 
determined  sin. 

2(1,  Generally,  in  theory.  No;  because  the  inn- keeper  is  not 
held  to  sustain  a  considerable  loss  in  order  to  prevent  the  habitual 
sin  of  drunkenness  in  his  clients  ;  charity  does  not  force  upon  us 
such  a  sacrifice. 

The  love  of  gain,  understood  in  a  vague  and  general  manner,  is 
sufficient  for  not  0[)posing  those  sins.  They  are  committed  acci- 
dentally, and  against  the  intention  of  the  innkeeper  ;  besides,  he 
cannot  lefuse  to  serve  the  drink  called  for  without  sustaining  con- 
siderable loss,  because  it  is  hard  to  find  a  tavern  where  a  large 
number  of  clients  do  not  drink  to  excess,  quarrel,  etc.,  etc.  ho 
if  the  publican  refuses  what  is  asked  for,  his  customers  will  go 
somewhere  else,  and  he  will  sustain  great  loss. 

Ans.  Question  2. — No  ;  the  desire  to  prevent  blasphemies  is  suflS- 
cient  to  allow  drunkenness  ;  because,  of  two  evils  we  must  choooe 


50  TAe  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

the  least.     Now  the  greatest  is  blasphemy  ;  for,  according  to  Ilicr- 
onymus,  nothiDg  is  more  odious  than  blaspliemy. 

Case  V. 
Of  the  Indirect  "Will. 

Lubanus,  to  amuse  himself,  is  in  the  habit  of  going  on  horse- 
back. But  often,  during  that  exercise,  ho  i^  subjected  lo  carnal 
temptations,  and  even  oftentimes  to  pollutions.  Al  hough  ho 
deeply  regrets  these  sorrowful  occurrences,  he  fears  to  soil  his 
conscience,  and  he  asks  his  confessor  if  he  must  no  more  enjoy  that 
exercise. 

Ques.    Has  Lubanus  sinned? 

Ans.  Let  not  Lubanus  be  troubled.  Though  it  is  only  for 
amusement,  it  would  be  hard  for  him  to  renounce  it  forever.  It 
would  be  otherwise  if  it  was  a  question  of  only  one  or  two  parli- 
cular  cases. 

Case  VI. 

Effects  of  Ignorance, 

Adalbert  makes  this  confession  :  1st,  Wanting  to  murder  my 
enemy,  Titius,  I  have  killed  m}'  friend  Caius  ;  2nd,  Firing  on  a 
deer,  I  struck  my  enemy  hidden  in  a  bush,  and  whom  I  wanted  to 
kill;  3d,  Ignoring  that  I  was  in  the  time  of  fasting,  I  ate  meat; 
but,  through  laziness,  I  had  not  been  to  mass  on  Sunday  when  tie 
obligations  for  the  week  had  been  announced. 

Ques.  1.  Was  there  an  ignorance  excusing  sin,  and  what  was  it? 

Ques.  2.  What  must  we  t'jink  of  Adalbert? 

Ans.  Question  1. —  1st,  Insuperable  ignorance  excuses  from  all 
sin  ;  because  it  entirely  prevents  knowledge  of  evil,  and  suppresses 
the  will.  In  presence  of  that  ignorance,  the  obligation  or  prohibi- 
tion of  the  law  cannot  be  known,  and  so  cannot  compel;  because 
"  Nothing  is  willed  if  not  preconceived."  2nd,  Insuperable 
ignorance  does  not  excuse  from  sin,  not  suppressing  will  ;  and  in 
presence  of  that  ignorance,  there  is  a  sufficient  and  vague  know- 
ledge which  obliges  us  to  search  for  the  truth. 

Ans.  Q  lestion  2.  —  I:i  t!i3  first  case,  Alalbcrt  muit  be  excused 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Human  Acts,  57 

from  all  sin  for  the  homicide  committed,  if  he  has  not  foreseen 
the  death  of  Caius  ;  for  instance,  if  he  took  good  care  to  strike 
an}^  other  than  Titiiis.  The  reason  of  it  is,  that  this  outward 
act  does  not  constitute  an  injustice  toward  Caius,  killed  involun- 
tarily. So,  he  cannot  be  held  for  any  restitution  to  his  heirs.  It 
would  be  otherwise  if  he  had  omitted  the  precautions  that  Ik^ 
onght  to  take,  or  if  he  had  vaguely  foreseen  the  danger  of  killing 
Caius. 

In  the  second  case,  we  must  distinguish  :  either  he  has  taken  the 
necessary  precautions  to  avoid  injuring  another,  or  not.  If  he 
took  them,  Adalbert  cannot  have  sinned  in  the  absence  of  will, 
even  trying  to  kill  his  enemy,  because,  although  he  wanted  to  kill 
him,  he  was  not  ready  to  do  it  at  that  particular  moment. 

In  the  third  case,  we  must  also  distinguish  :  if  Adalbert,  avoid- 
ing to  assist  at  mass  on  Sunday,  has  had  a  grave  doubt  on  the 
obligation  that  would  be  imposed  for  the  week,  and  if  he  has 
neglected  to  inform  himself,  or  to  interrogate  prudently  others  on 
the  subject  ;  because  then,  his  ignorance  has  been  superable,  and 
he  has  sinned  against  the  commandment  of  the  Church.  But  if, 
neither  at  that  moment  nor  later,  he  thought  of  the  obligation  in 
question,  though  he  has  sinned  in  not  going  to  mass,  he  has  not 
sinned  in  breaking  the  fast. 

Case   IX. 
Of   Fear  and  Violence. 

Bertdœ,  a  servant  fearing  God  and  having  a  horror  of  sin,  fre- 
quently solicited  to  do  evil  by  her  master,  resists  him  every  time. 
Her  confessor  exhorts  her  to  avoid  the  occasion  of  sin  :  she  asks 
him,  she  begs  of  him,  to  let  her  stay  in  the  same  house,  because 
her  wages  are  well  paid,  and  she  cculd  only  with  difficulty  find 
another  situation.     The  confessor  consents  to  it. 

Soon  after,  her  master  presses  her  again  to  sin  with  him,  and 
she  is  ensnared.  What  will  the  unfortunate  servant  want  to  do? 
She  dares  not  cry,  for  fear  of  losing  both  her  own  and  her  mas- 
ter's reputation.  Then,  as  she  begins  to  cry  out,  her  master, 
blinded  by  passion,  threatens  her  with  death.    But,  however,  find- 


58  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

ing  herself  in  her  such  embarrassment,  she  remains  purelj 
passive,  and  from  the  bottom  of  her  heart  curses  the  sin. 

Ques.  1.  Was  Bertine  obliged  to  avoid  the  occasion  of  sin,  an^ 
be  constrained  by  her  confessor,  and  even  if  he  refused  hei 
absolution  ? 

Ques.  2.  Did  she  sin  grievously  in  not  calling  for  help  for  the 
reasons  mentioned  by  her? 

Ques.  3.  Did  she  sin  grievously  in  not  defending  herself  to  the 
last,  and  in  abandoning  herself,  passiv^^ly,  for  fear  of  death? 

Ans.  Question  1. —  Bertine  ought  to  have  been  advised  to  avoid 
the  actual  occasion  of  sin,  if  she  could  have  found  another  situa- 
tion ;  but,  as  it  was  a  question  only  of  a  probable  occasion,  she 
could  not  be  constrained  to  leave  her  place. 

Ans.  Question  2. —  There  is  controversy.  According  to  some, 
she  has  grievously  sinned  in  principle  ;  first,  in  not  calling  out, 
unless  she  is  excused  for  her  good  intention.  Because  she  had 
an  easy  remedy  against  the  danger  that  her  chastity  incurred,  and 
her  excuses  have  no  weight.  There  was  no  risk  of  losing  her 
reputation  ;  because,  only  honest  women  cry  out  in  such  circum- 
stances. As  for  the  reputation  of  her  master,  he  could  impute  its 
loss  but  to  his  own  perversity. 

Ans.  Question  3. —  There  is  controversy.  But  according  to 
Lacroix  and  others,  she  must  be  excused  for  the  fear  of  death  ; 
inasmuch  as  there  was,  on  her  part,  no  co-operation  whatever. 

Case   X. 
Of  Concupiscence. 

Marchand,  1st,  reads  different  novels,  foreseeing  that  he  will 
take  pleasure  in  obscene  subjects;  2nd,  occasionally,  he  looks  at 
the  nakedness  of  statues,  but  resists  the  temptations  caused  b^'  the 
sight  ;  3rd,  he  takes  pleasure  in  shameful  acts,  but  does  not  know 
lor  certain  if  he  was  sleeping  or  awake  ;  4th,  obliged  by  his 
position  as  a  merchant,  to  have  relations  with  persons  of  both 
sexes,  he  finds  that  he  takes  a  great  deal  more  pleasure  in  the 
society  of  women  than  of  men. 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Human  Acts,  59 

Qiies.  What  shall  the  confessor  decide  in  each  one  of  these 
cases  ? 

Ans.  1.  If  he  reads  for  an  honest  motive  he  does  not  sin,  pro- 
vided he  resists  temptation,  because  the  movements  of  concupis- 
cence are  quite  involuntary  ;  and  besides,  there  is  a  sufficient 
cause  for  permitting  them.  If  he  reads  for  curiosity  things  a  lit- 
tle dangerous,  l)e  comuiiLs  a  sin,  it  is  true,  but  venial,  always 
supposing  that  there  was  no  consent.  But  if  he  reads  without 
cause  some  very  obscene  books,  he  sins  grievously,  at  least,  on 
the  ground  of  the  danger  of  giving  way  to  ti-mptation,  except 
however  the  case  where,  reading  f  r  puie  curiosity,  in  considera- 
of  his  o'd  îige,  cold  temperament,  or  for  soM.e  other  particular 
reasons,  he  is  not  in  grave  danger  of  succumbing. 

Ans.  2.  iHe  sins  grievously  if  the  statues  are  in  a  state  of 
complete  nakedness,  and  if  he  looks  at  them  designedly,  closely, 
and  for  a  long  time  ;  because,  without  reason,  he  exposes  himself 
to  shameful  temptations,  and  runs  the  risk  of  sinning  grievousl}'. 
Jt  would  be  different  in  principle  if  he  sees  them  in  passing  by 
from  a  distance,  or  even  if  the  statues  are  of  no  artistic  merit. 
This  is  the  opinion  of  St.  Liguori  on  pictures,  which  may  be  applied 
to  statues. 

Ans.  3.  One  may  presume  tliat  it  has  happened  during  sleep  ; 
becaufse  the  acts  of  a  man  awake  are  easy  to  recognize.  Tlien, 
in  doubt,  it  must  be  thought  that  it  happened  during  sleep. 

Ans.  4.  He  has  not  sinned,  provided  he  remains  honest  and 
resists  temptation.  No  matter  if  he  is  attracted  more  towards 
women  than  men  ;  because  this  tendency  does  not  come  from  the 
heart  nor  from  the  will,  but  rather  from  nature  :  then,  in  princi- 
ple, there  is  no  harm  done.  But  it  must  be  admitted,  that 
such  a  tendency  is  disagreeable  for  a  chaste  mind,  and  even 
dangerous  for  an  imprudent  man.  It  is  necessary  to  advise 
Marchand  to  moderate  that  inclination,  and  repress  it  accord- 
ing to  his  strength. 

Case  XI. 

Of  the  Object  of  IMorality. 

'  ^    Monigue,  inn-keeper,  ...  in    order  to    [)revent  quarrels  and 


60  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

Masphemies,  a  custom  to  which  her  husband  is  addicted,  very 
often  tells  white  lies  ;  experience  has  shown  her  that  this  is  quite 
necessary  to  keep  peace  in  the  household. 

Ques.  Must  we  approve  this  way  of  correcting  her  husband  ? 

Ans.  It  is  never  permitted  to  lie,  not  even  in  view  of  an  advan- 
tage ;  for,  we  must  not  do  evil  in  order  to  benefit  by  the  good  that 
Tïiay  come  out  of  it.  Now,  lying  is  in  very  nature  an  evil, 
although  it  may  be  onl}'  a  venial  sin  ;  but  although  Monigue 
must  abstain  carefully  from  lying,  she  is  not  obliged  to  tell  all 
tlie  truth  to  her  angered  husband.  We  will  explain  more  fully  in 
treating  the  eighth  precept  of  the  Decalogue. 

Case  XIV. 
Of  the  Intention  of  the  Agent. 

Blondine,  vain-glorious,  seeing  other  women  of  her  own  con- 
dition go  very  often  to  confession,  communion,  masses,  etc., 
receives  the  same  sacraments,  and  goes  very  devotedly  to  mass,  in 
order  not  to  appear  less  pious  than  they.  Learning  that,  her 
Confessor  declares  that  Blondine's  confession  and  communions  are 
sacrilegious,  and  that  the  masses  heard  are  useless  for  her  own 
eternal  salvation,  because  good  proceeds  from  a  pure  motive,  evil 
from  an  imperfection,  whatever  it  may  be. 

Ques.  Are  Blondine's  confessions  meritorious?  and  what  do  we 
think  of  her  other  actions  ? 

Ans.  The  Confessor  seems  rather  severe.  Why  should  Blon- 
dine's confessions  and  communions  be  sacrilegious?  The  motive 
of  vanity  has  not  been  the  prime  idea  ;  at  least,  we  may  suppose 
so.  Now,  if  this  is  admitted,  there  is  but  a  venial  sin  in  each  case  ; 
but  a  sacrilege  does  not  result  from  a  venial  sin  committed  in  the 
reception  of  the  Sacrament  of  Penitence  or  of  the  Eucharist,  unless 
such  a  hypocris}'  should  be  the  principal  aim  of  the  person.  Acts 
produced  by  vanity  are  not  always  without  merit,  because  that 
vanity  is  not  the  principal  motive  of  the  person.  We  may  apply 
the  axiom  :  "  Good  is  the  product  of  a  pure  motive,"  because  a 
motive  is  pure  :  1st,  by  its  object,  2d,  by  its  end,  at  least  partially, 
3(1,  by  its  circumstances.  It  would  not  be  good  if  it  had  none  of 
these  conditions  of  purity. 


Kunti^t  on  Conscience. 


36.  Conscience  is  the  practical  voice  of  reason,  or  the  practical 
judgment  by  which  we  think  that  we  can  or  may  do  a  thing, 
because  it  is  good  or  commendable  ;  or  that  we  must  not  do  it, 
because  it  is  bad.  So  it  differs  from  reason,  which  gives  only  the 
general  principles. 

It  is  subdivided  thus  : 

1.  Conscience  is  sound  or  unsound. 

2.  Conscience  is  certain  or  doubtful. 

3.  Conscience  is  scrupulous  or  lax. 

4.  Conscience  is  probable  or  improbable. 

CHAPTER  I. 
Sound  and  Unsound  Conscience. 

37.  The  sound  conscience  represents  the  object  such  as  it  is  in 
itself  ;  otherwise  it  is  called  unsound  ;  and  the  unsound  one  is 
called  vincible  or  invincible,  as  to  whether  ignorance  or  error  is 
culpable  or  not. 

The  conscience  invincibly  unsound  which  commands,  must  be 
obeyed  in  all  cases.* 

The  invincible  conscience  which  permits,  suppresses  all  sins.f 

*  Do  we  not  recognize  several  cases  of  conscience? 

Ans.  Yes,  we  recognize  the  true  and  the  false  conscience,  the  certain  and 
the  doubtful,  the  probable  and  the  improbable,  the  scrupulous  and  the  lax. 
{Pttit  Catéchisme  de  Marotte). 

t  This  is  the  origin  of  the  doctrine  of  philosophical  sin,  the  name  of 
which  is  hidden  by  the  modern  Jesuits,  througli  prudence,  but  without 
having  renounced,  in  spite  of  tlie  numerous  condemnations  of  tlie  Cliurch, 
any  of  the  principles  from  which  it  is  deduced.  In  order  to  have  a  com- 
plete idea  of  it,  it  is  necessary  to  refer  to  what  they  wrote  before  our 
unhappy  epoch  of  distrust  and  free  investigation.  They  have  never 
denied  those  odious  doctrines,  the  trace  of  which  is  found  in  all  the  acts 
of  their  pupils;  but  they  content  themselves  to-day  with  making  it  an 


62  T/te  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

CHAPTER  II. 
The  Certain  or  Doubtful  Conscience. 
ART.  I.  —  Of  the  certain  conscience. 

39.  —  The  certain  conscience  judges,  without  any  fear  of  mis- 
take, whether  a  thing  is  good  or  bad. 

There  are  three  sorts  of  certainties  :  1st,  Metaphysical  ...  ; 
2d,  Physical  ...  ;  3d,  Moral  ...  ;  the  latter  subdivided  into 
perfect  or  imperfect.  .   .   . 

There  are  also  the  direct  certainty  and  the  indirect  cer- 
tainty.  .   .  . 

The  certain  conscience  is  the  onl}^  rule  of  morals.   .   .  . 

The  conscience  morally  certain,  even  imperfect,  is  sufficient.  .  . 

ART  II.  —  Of  the  doubtful  conscience. 

40.  — This  is  one  which  hesitates  to  pronounce  on  the  honesty 
of  an  action.  ...  It  differs  then  from  the  probable  opinion  and 

object  of  oral  teaching.  We  find  it  also  in  some  of  the  cases  of  conscience 
printed  even  in  our  days.  Here  are  citations  as  odious  as  tiiey  are  ludi- 
crous. 

Sanchez:  "  In  order  that  a  man  should  sin  mortally,  he  must  consider 
eitlier  that  his  action  is  bad,  tliat  there  is  danger  from  malicious  intention, 
or  he  must  have  some  doubt  or  scruple.  If  nothing  of  that  exists,  ignor- 
ance, inadvertence,  forgetfulness,  ought  to  be  acknowledged,  as  quite 
natural  and  invincible."  (page  107.) 

De  Lugo  :  "St.  Paul  said  to  the  Corinthians  :  If  you  are  adulterers,  you 
shall  not  possess  the  Kingdom  of  God.  .  .  . 

"  But  if  the  Corinthians  had  paid  no  attention  to  the  offence  to  God 
they  would  have  committed  a  philosophical  adultery,  but  not  a  theological 
one,  the  latter  being  a  mortal  bin. 

"  Homicide  becomes  so  grievous  by  the  prohibition  of  God,  that  from  a 
philosophically  moral  evil,  it  becomes  a  mortal  sin,  if  that  prohibition  is 
known;  because,  if  it  was  ignored,  and  that  without  any  fault,  it  would 
have  but  the  philosophical  gravity  which  comes  from  its  nature."  (page 
109.) 

Dicastille:  "A  theft,  in  default  of  deliberation,  may  be  a  venial  sin.  .  .  . 
This  may  happen  by  tiie  violence  of  the  temptation;  above  all, when  there 
is  such  haste  that  there  can  be  no  time  to  deliberate." 

Tambourin  :  "  The  one  who  through  inveterate  habit  swears  falsely, 
without  any  attention,  is  generally  excused.  ...  He  may  also  be  excused 
from  confessing  it."  (page  111.) 

Georges  de  Khodes  :  "  As  there  is  no  sin  where  there  is  no  attention  to 
the  malice  of  the  act,  so,  there  cannot  be  any  mortal  sin  when  one  does 
not  perceive  the  gravity  of  the  malice,  or  the  danger  of  that  gravity. 

"For  instance,  one  man  kills  another,  thinking,  indeed,  that  it  is  an 
evil,  but  thinking  it  only  a  slight  evil  :  such  a  man  does  not  sin  grievously  ; 


i 


Treatise  on  Conscience,  63 

conscience  which  does  not  suspend,  but  gives  its  assent,  though 
with  fear,  to  the  truth  of  the  contrary  opinion. 

We  distinguish  several  doubts  : 

1.  Positive  or  negative. 
I   2.  Of  right  or  of  fact. 

3.  Speculative  or  practical.  The  speculative  doubt  is  subdivided 
into  simple  speculative  and  practical  speculative. 

41.  —  The  practically  doubtful  conscience  is  not  to  be  depended 
on  altogether,  and  we  must  follow  the  safest  way.  But  one  may 
sometimes  be  satisfied  with  the  speculatively  doubtful  con- 
science. ... 

A  doubt  purely  negative,  is  held  to  be  void.   .  .   . 

Ques.  What  is  to  be  done  is  case  of  a  perplexing  conscience  ? 

Ans.  Consult  a  confessor,  if  possible. 

because  it  is  knowledge  alone  which  applies  to  the  will  its  malice  or  its 
gravity.  So  malice  is  imputed  in  proportion  to  the  knowledge  that  we 
have  had  of  it. 

"  If  some  one  commits  an  adultery,  or  a  homicide,  knowing  well,  but 
however,  in  an  imperfect  and  superficial  manner,  tlie  malice  and  the  gravity 
of  these  actions,  that  man,  however  grievous  is  the  act,  sins,  nevertheless, 
but  lightly.  The  reason  is,  that,  as  the  knowledge  of  malice  is  neces- 
sary for  the  sin,  so,  to  commit  a  grave  sin  we  must  have  a  full  and 
clear  idea  of  it,  and  consider  it  as  such.  .  .  .  My  opinion  is,  that  there 
will  be  only  venial  sin  every  time  that  one  will  tliink,  in  general,  of  the 
malice  of  the  act,  without  thinking  that  such  an  act  may  be  mortal."  (page 
114.) 

riatel  :  "  A  sin,  however  contrary  to  reason  it  may  be,  committed  by  a 
man  who  ignores  invincibly,  or  bears  not  in  mind  that  there  is  a  God,  or 
that  God  is  oflfended  by  his  sin,  is  not  a  mortal  sin  .  .  .  ;  it  is  a  philo- 
sophical wrong." 

Casnedi:  "When,  to  a  morally  insuperable  ignorance  of  the  prohibi- 
tion and  malice  of  the  action,  is  added  an  invincible  error  upon  the 
honesty  of  the  object  or  precept,  the  action  made  in  consequence  of  that 
ignorance  and  of  that  error,  is  always  honest  and  meritorious,  if  the 
otiier  circumstances  are  to  be  found  there."  (page  119.) 

Georgelin:  "In  order  to  sin,  some  consideration  or  attention,  even 
actual,  to  the  moral  malice,  is  necessary.  .  .  .  This  is  true  of  the  venial 
sin,  as  of  the  mortal."  (page  120.) 

Jesuits  of  the  College  of  Caen:  "There  is  no  law,  either  natural  or 
positive,  which  commands  us  to  attribute  all  and  each  of  our  actions  to 
an  end  naturally  good  and  honest.  Even  if  such  a  law  existed,  either 
positive  or  natural,  it  could  not  be  enforced,  because  it  would  not  be 
sufficiently  promulgated."  (114.) 

Le  Moyne,  Professorat  the  College  of  Auxerre:  "It  is  true  that  the 
natural  law  teaches  that  one  must  not  lie  ;  but  this  same  law  ordains  us 


64  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

CHAPTER    III. 
The  Scrupclous  and  Lax  Conscience. 
ART.  I. — The  Scrupulous  Conscience. 

The  scrupulous  conscience  is  that  which,  for  a  vain  and  slight 
motive,  doubts  the  honesty  of  an  action,  and  fears  to  sin,  where 
there  is  no  occasion  for  sin.   .  .   . 

I.  Causes  of  scruples. 

They  are  : 

1st.  The  divine  permission. —  It  is  God  who  permits  false  appre- 
hensions, by  taking  the  light  from  us. 

2nd.  The  operation  of  the  devil.     Because  the  devil  is  very 

to  follow  conscience,  which  by  an  insuperable  ignorance  can  teach  that 
one  may  lie."  (page  129). 

Mathieu  Stoz  :  "To  commit  any  sin,  venial  or  even  mortal,  it  is  not 
sufficient  to  have  a  habitual  knowledge  of  the  malice  of  the  action  ;  that  is 
to  say,  it  does  not  suffice  to  have  had  it  yesterday,  or  a  few  days  previous  ; 
but  it  is  necessary  that  the  advertence  should  be  actual,  and  at  the  very 
time  when  the  will  commits  the  bad  action,  or  begins  to  commit  it.  More- 
over, one  cannot  say  that  a  man  sins  at  the  moment  when  he  has  not  an 
actual  knowledge  of  the  moral  malice  of  the  action,  although  he  had  it  a' 
little  while  before. 

Then  the  actual  and  invincible  inadvertence  of  the  malice  of  the  object 
excuses  the  sin."  (page  138.) 

Busembaum  and  Lacroix  :  *'  Although  we  all  know  that,  by  the  natural 
law,  lying  is  ordinarily  forbidden,  and  also,  that  it  is  ordinarily  permitted 
not  to  kill  anybody  upon  one's  own  authority;  notwithstanding,  such 
circumstances  may  be  found  in  which  we  think,  invincibly,  that  these 
things  are  permitted  at  the  present  moment. 

This  is  the  opinion  of  the  saintly  and  learned  Cassien.  .  .  .  And  others 
think  that  official  lying  is  sometimes  permissible.  .  .  .  Vasquez  relates, 
that  a  vulgar  man  thought  that  he  could  act  honestly  and  piously  by  turn- 
ing over  a  sick  man  and  occasioning  a  prompt  death,  and  thus  deliver 
him  from  considerable  pain.  .  .  . 

Sarasa,  in  his  book,  ''Art  de  se  rejouir  iowjowrs,"  relates,  that  another 
man,  through  zeal  for  the  glory  of  God,  and  for  the  salvation  of  souls, 
baptized  the  children  of  the  Moors  brouirht  to  him  by  their  parents,  and 
killed  them  immediately  after;  to  make  sure  of  their  salvation,  and  for  fear 
that,  carried  back  to  their  parents,  Ihey  would  not  be  taught  the  faith  of 
the  church."  (pac:e  143.) 

At  last,  the  Petit  Catéchisme  de  Marotte  sets  this  beautiful  doctrine  before] 
the  eyes  of  little  children,  in  the  following  terms  : 

"  (jues.  Is  it  permitted  to  follow  a  conscience  invincibly  erroneous? 

"  Ans.  Yes,  it  is  permitted  to  act  according  to  the  inspiration  of  a  false 
conscience,  when  the  error  comes  from  an  insuperable  ignorance;  because 
that  error,  not  being  voluntary,  cannot  be  removed,  and  the  acting  a.irent 
does  not  wish  to  commit,  and  does  not  believe  that  he  is  committing,  evil." 


Treatise  on  Conscience,  65 

skilful  in  discovering  scruples,  urging  the  course  of  the  blood, 
changing  humors,  and  calling  forth  vain  apparitions. 

3.  The  melancholy  and  phlegmatic  complexion.  .  .  . 

4.  The  weakness  of  the  judgment.  .  .  . 

5.  Too  great  uneasiness.   .   .   . 

6.  Relations  with  scrupulous  people.  .  .  . 

IT.  Consciences  inclined  to  be  scrupulous. 
Iir.  Inconvenience  of  scruples. 

IV.  Remedies  against  scruples. 

V.  Rules  for  scrupulous  peo[)le. 

48. — They  must  obey  absolutely  and  blindly  their  confessor,  and 
show  in  everytliing  the  greatest  humility  and  confidence.   .   .   . 

Art.  II. —  The  Lax  Conscience. 

49. —  This  is  the  one  which,  for  too  slight  a  motive,  believes  that 
to  be  permitted  which  is  not  so. 

There  are  three  kinds: 

The  conscience  simply  lax.  .  .  .  hardened.  .  .  .  Pharisai- 
cal. ... 

CHAPTER    IV. 
Thb  Probable  and  Improbable  Conscience. 

We  must  treat  :  1st,  of  the  nature  ;  2nd,  of  the  efficacy  ;  3rd,  of 
the  probability. 

Art.  I. — The  Nature  of   Probability. 

50. —  Opinion,  in  geneial,  is  tiie  assent  to  either  of  two  idea^i,  or 
the  adhesion  to  either  of  two  contrary  opinions,  through  fear  that 
the  other  may  be  the  true  one. 

Probable  o[)inion  is  based  on  a  grave  motive,  although  one 
fears  the  truth  of  the  contiary  opuiiou.  Improbable  opinion  is  a 
judgment  that  is  not  based  on  a  solid  reason. 

Probability  is  subdivided  thus  : 

1.  Intrinsic  or  extrinsic,  according  as  it  is  based  either  on  rea- 
sons drawn  from  the  thing  itself,  or  from  authority. 


L 


6Q  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

2.  Of  right  or  of  fact,  ba'sed  on  the  existence  of  a  right  and  of 
its  application,  or  on  some  fact. 

3.  Spéculative  or  practical,  as  we  consider  the  thing  in  an 
abstract  manner,  or  in  relation  to  th^  action. 

4.  Absolute  or  relative,  whether  it  appears  such  to  everybody, 
or  only  to  one  or  a  small  nutnber. 

5.  Solitary  or  comparative,  according  as  it  appears  such  con- 
sidered in  itself,  or  compared  with  the  contrary  opinion. 

6.  Certain,  doubtful  or  slight,  according  to  the  motives  on 
which  it  is  based. 

We  distinguish  three  kinds  of  comparative  probabilities  : 

1.  Major,  2.  minor,  3.  equal. 

Any  proposition  may  be  more,  less,  or  equally  as  probable  as  the 
contrary  proposition,  according  to  motives  more,  less,  or  as 
steadfast  on  which  it  is  based.  But  the  more  probable  admits 
different  degrees  ;  for  it  is  less  or  notably  more  probable  than 
those  of  the  contrary  opinion.  It  is  called  very  probable,  if  it  is 
caused  by  a  very  serious  m-jtive.  It  is  that,  said  St.  Liguori, 
which  is  based  on  a  very  serious  foundation.  The  contrary 
opinion  is  called  probable  in  a  slight  or  doubtful  manner. 

Moreover,  an  opinion  is  sure,  if  it  simply  favors  the  law,  mo7'e 
sure  if  it  favors  it  more,  less  sure  if  it  favors  it  less.  Then,  the 
more  probable  opinion  is  not  always  more  sure,  because  a  greater 
probability  may  favor  liberty. 

Different  Systems  on  Probability. 

1.  Absolute  tutorism  or  rigorousness,  according  to  which  one 
must  always  follow  the  surest  opinion  ;  that  is  to  say,  the  one 
which  favors  the  law.  {legi  favens)  ;  unless  there  is  certainty  in 
favor  of  liberty.  This  opinion  has  been  disapproved  by  the 
church. 

2.  Mitigated  Tutorism,  according  to  which  it  is  o\i\y  permitted 
to  follow  the  most  probable  opinion,  which  favors  liberty. 

3.  Probabiliorism,  by  wiiich  one  must  follow  the  opinion 
favoring  the  law,  unless  the  contrary  opinion  be  more  probable. 

4.  u^quiprobabilism,  according  to  which  it  is  not  permitted  to 


Treatise  on   Conscience.  67 

follow  the  less  sure  opinion,  unless  it  should  be  as  probable,  or 
nearly  so,  as  the  contrary  opinion. 

5.  Frobabilism,  according  to  which  one  may  follow  the  less  sure 
and  less  probable  opinion,  provided  that  its  probability  is  true  and 
solid. 

6.  Laxism,  according  to  which  it  is  always  permitted  to  follow 
the  slightly  probable  opinion  ;  but  this  system  has  been  condemned, 
as  we  shall  see  later. 

Theologians,  according  to  their  opinion  on  probability,  have 
received  different  names  :  rigorists,  tutorists,  mitigatists,  etc.  .  .   . 

1.  Probabilit}^,  by  its  nature,  excludes  necessary  moral  certain- 
ty ;  because  it  is  in  this  only  that  it  may  differ  from  it. 

2.  Any  probabilit}^,  however  great  it  may  be,  in  the  presence  of 
the  contrary  opinion  having  become  certain,  is  destroyed. 

3.  One  must  surely  accept  as  probable  an  opinion  considered  as 
such  by  most  theologians,  or  even  looked  upon  as  absolutely  true 
by  five  or  six  theologians,  distinguished  for  their  honesty,  judg- 
ment and  science  ;  unless  there  should  be  a  sure  reason  against  that 
0[)inion. 

4.  An  honest  and  learned  man  regards  as  surely  probable  an 
opinion  that  he  has  carefully  examined,  and  which  he  believes  to 
be  true,  or  surely  probable,  for  serious  motives,  when  he  judges  it 
aside  from  all  irregular  passion. 

5.  As  to  the  intrinsic  probability  of  right,  only  theologians, 
very  wise  and  well  versed  in  morals,  can  judge  ;  because  they 
alone  know  that  nothing  certain  can  be  brought  against  their 
decision. 

6.  A  man  indifferently  learned  ma}^  jiidge  of  the  extrinsic 
probability  of  an  opinion,  if,  knowing  the  question  thoroughly,  he 
sees  it  affirmed  by  superior  authority,  that  is  to  say,  approved  by 
theologians. 

7.  A  single  authority  above  all  exception,  bringing  a  reason  that 
the  others  have  not  examined  or  sufficiently  explained,  and  itself 
explaining  well  the  reasons  of  others,  renders  its  opinion  surely 
probable,  though  opposed  to  the  common  opinion. 

8.  An  ignorant  man,  hearing  one  whom  he  looks  upon  as  honest, 
prudent  and   learned,   say   to  another,  that  an   ojfiniun  is    surely 


68  Ti\e  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

probable,  may  consider  it  as  such  ;  because  he  cannot  jndge  for 
himself,  and  he  has  no  other  means  of  knowing  the  intrinsic 
probability. 

ART.  II. —  Efficacy  OF  Probability  to  Form  Conscience. 

.55. — This  efficacy  consists  in  the  strength  of  probability  to 
make  the  voice  of  conscience  practically  certain.   .   .   . 

FIRST  THESIS. 

56.  — It  is  not  permitted  to  follow  the  probable,  nor  the  more 
probable  opinion,  leaving  aside  the  more  sure  opinion,  every  time 
that  there  is  an  absolute  obligation  to  obtain,  with  efliciency,  a 
determined  end,  that  could  be  compromised  by  the  use  of  means 
probabl}'  ill  appropriate  to  that  end.  Then,  we  must  follow  the 
more  sure  opinion.   .   .  . 

SECOND     THESIS. 

58.  It  is  not  permitted  to  follow  an  opinion  slightly  probable, 
leaving  aside  the  more  sure  one.   .   .   . 

THIRD    THESIS. 

59.  It  is  permitted  to  follow  tlie  most  probable,  and  even  the- 
more  probable  opinion,  leaving  aside  the  more  sure  opinion,  if  it  is 
a  question  only  of  the  honesiy  of  the  action.   .   .   . 

FOURTH    THESIS. 

60.  It  is  permittexl  to  follow  an  opinion  truly  and  strongly 
probable,  leaving  aside  the  more  sure  opinion,  equally  and  even 
more  probable,  if  it  is  only  a  question  of  what  is  permitted  or  for- 
bidden. 

This  proposition  is  demonstrated  by  three  kinds  of  arguments 
drawn  from  :  Iht,  reason  ;  2d,  authority  ;  3d,  contee(piences  of  the 
contrary  opinion. 

This  is  the  demonstiation  by  reason  :  there  is  no  obligation  to 
obey  a  law  the  exi^tence  of  which  is  not  certain;  a  law  has  no 
certain  existence  if  a  true  and  strong  probability  exists  against  it. 
Then,  thcie  is  no  obligation  to  follow  the  more  sure  opinion,  and 
set  aside  the  truly  probably  opinion,  leaving  aside  the  more  sure, 
even  the  more  probable.   .   .   . 


Treatise  on   Conscience,  69 

ART.  III.    The  Use  of  Probability. 

75  —  Outside  of  the  general  principles  which  constitute  the 
theory  of  probabilisra,  viz  :  No  obligation  can  he  imposed  unless 
one  is  sure  of  the  thing  ;  or,  a  doubtful  law  does  not  oblige,  there 
are  certain  special  rules,  confirming  those  principles,  to  be  applied 
in  particular  cases. 

I.  In  doubt,  we  must  hold  to  what  we  presume.   .   .  . 

II.  In  doubt,  we  must  judge  after  what  ordinarily  happens.   .   .   . 

III.  In  doubt,  we  must  consider  the  value  of  the  act.   .   .   . 

IV.  In  doubt,  we  must  jDrefer  what  is  favorable,  and  leave  what 
is  odious.   ... 

V.  In  obscure  things,  we  must  do  what  is  the  less  onerous.   .   .   . 

VI.  1st,  In  doubt,  one  presumes  not  a  fact  ;  it  must  be  demon- 
strated. 2d,  In  doubt,  one  presumes  as  a  fact  what  was  to 
be  done  according  to  rights  ;  3d,  In  doubt,  nobody  is  presumed  to 
be  malicious,  unless  he  is  proved  so. 

VII.  In  doubt,  one  must  follow  the  more  sure  opinion.  This 
rule  must  be  applied  onl}"  to  practically  doubtful  cases.  .  .  .  As 
for  speculative  doubts,  it  is  no  more  a  rule,  but  a  simple  advice. 

80. —  .  .  .  Among  several  probable  opinions,  is  it  permitted  to 
follow  sometimes  the  one,  sometimes  the  other  which  is  contrary 

toit? 

Yes!*  .  .  . 

*  Here  is,  in  full,  tliat  doctrine  of  probabilism,  "  that  miserable  doctrine," 
said  the  Bishop  of  lihodez,  "source  of  so  much  corruption  in  morals  and 
so  opprobrious  for  religion,  that  the  enemy  of  man  (the  Jesuit)  had  sown 
in  the  scliools  during  darkness  and  the  sleep  of  the  pastors,  and  which 
has,  at  last,  been  banished  forever.  It  has  come  back  triumpliantly  to- 
day, in  spite  of  the  coalition  of  Popes  and  Bishops,  Pastors,  Theologians 
and  laymen,  conspiring  against  it  in  order  to  destroy  it." 

It  is  easy,  in  fact,  to  see,  by  the  preceding  abridged  chapters,  and  by 
many  following  cases,  that  the  Jesuits  have  renounced  nothing  of  that 
odious  doctrine. 

Moreover,  in  order  to  have  it  in  all  its  splendor,  it  is  good  to  have 
recourse  to  the  ancient  casuists,  expressing  more  freely  their  thoughts  : 

Henriquez  said,  in  IGOO  :  "  A  scrupulous  man  is  safe,  if  he  chooses  against 
his  scruples  what  he  judges  to  be  probable,  tliough  he  thinks  that  the 
other  opinion  is  more  probal)le;  and  the  confessor  must,  against  his  own 
opinion,  conform  himself  to  that  of  the  penitent,  considering  that  it  excuses 
the  latter  before  God."  (page  9.) 


Cases  of  Conscience. 


Case  I. 
Erroneous   Conscience. 

Florins  makes  this  confession  :  I  have  lied,  but  I  did  not  believe 
I  was  sinning,  because  I  was  constrained  by  a  very  grave  motive  ; 
it  was  to  excuse  my  cousin,  and  save  him  from  a  severe 
chastisement. 

Ques.  Can  Florine  be  excused  from  sin,  and  is  her  action 
commendable  ? 

Jean  de  Salas  :  "  It  is  a  true  opinion,  that  it  is  not  permitted  to  follow 
the  more  probable  sentiment,  although  tlie  less  sure;  but  one  may  even 
take  also  the  less  sure  opinion,  when  there  is  equality  of  probability. 

"The  most  powerful  motives  are  necessary  to  a  person  in  the  religious 
orders  to  believe  tliat  a  revelation  is  probably  true,  by  which  God  exempts 
him  from  contracting  marriage,  in  spite  of  the  common  law;  because 
God  has  never  given  such  a  dispensation.  If,  nevertheless,  he  had  a  true 
probability,  he  could,  to  avoid  inconvenience,  make  use  of  a  doubtful 
and  only  probable  dispensation." 

Grégoire  de  Valence  :  "  It  is  asked  if  a  judge  may,  without  respect  for 
persons,  determine,  according  to  the  interests  of  his  friends,  his  judgment 
in  favor  of  a  probability,  indistinctly  applicable  to  one  or  the  other 
opinion,  when  a  point  of  law  divides  the  jurists.? 

"I  say:  If  the  judge  thinks  that  both  opinions  are  equally  probable,  he 
may,  legally,  to  favor  his  friend,  judge  according  to  the  opinion  which 
authorizes  the  pretension  of  his  friend.  Moreover,  he  could  even,  to 
serve  his  friend,  judge  sometimes  by  one  opinion  and  sometimes  by  the 
contrary  one,  provided  no  scandal  results  from  his  decision  "  (page  14). 

Gilles  of  Coninck  :  "When  the  opinion  of  the  Doctors  is  divided  on 
some  point,  we  can  follow  the  sentiment  which  most  pleases  us,  though 
the  least  sure  and  the  least  probable,  provided  it  is  truly  probable." 

Vasquez:  "  It  is  sufficient  for  an  ignorant  man  to  follow  the  opinion 
that  he  believes  probable  and  which  he  sees  taught  by  honest  and  leained 
men,  though  this  opinion  should  be  neither  the  more  sure  nor  the  best 
known.  Sylvester  says,  it  is  sufficient  for  an  ignorant  man  to  follow 
the  advice  of  his  master  and  doctor.  " 

Laymann  :  "  A  doctor  may  advise  whoever  consults  him,  not  only  accord- 
ing to  his  own  opinion,  but  also  according  to  the  contrary  and  probable 
opinion  of  others,  if  this  last  advice  is  more  favorable  or  agreeable  to  the 
one  who  consults  him,  .  .  .  although  the  same  doctor  is  persuaded  that 


Cases  of  Conscience,  71 

Ans.  She  ougbt  to  be  excused  from  the  sin  of  lying,  because  of 
an  invincibly  erroneous  conscience. 

Moreover,  she  has  acted  well.  What  might  be  opposed  to  this 
decision  is,  that  she  might  have  had  in  view  a  formal  evil  :  now 
that  cause  does  not  exist,  because  ib  is  sufficient,  in  order  to  be 
meritorious,  that  the  end  in  view  shou'd  be  good  in  principle  ;  so 

certainly  his  sentiment  is  speculatively  false,  and  that  he  could  not  follow 
it  himself  in  practice  .  .  .  From  this  we  conclude,  that  a  learned  man  may 
give  opposite  advices  according  to  the  probable  sentiments  opposed  to 
each  other,  observing,  nevertlieless,  discretion  and  prudence." 

Filliucius  :  "  The  authority  of  an  honest  and  learned  doctor  makes  a 
probable  opinion,  because  such  an  authority  is  no  slight  foundation  for  a 
decision."  (page  29). 

Escobar:  "Verily,  when  I  consider  so  many  diverse  sentiments  on  the 
matter  of  morals,  I  think  it  is  a  happy  dispensation  of  Providence,  such  a 
variety  of  opinions,  helping  us  to  bear  along  more  agreeably  the  yoke  of 
the  Lord. 

"  Then  Providence  has  willed  that  there  should  be  several  ways  to  follow 
in  the  moral  actions,  and  that  the  same  action  might  be  found  to  be  good, 
either  in  acting  according  to  one  opinion  or  its  opposite. 

"  We  are  permitted  to  consult  different  doctors'  authorities  until  we  find 
anansvver  in  harmony  with  our  desires  .  .  .  on  condition  of  having  right 
intention  in  seeking  a  probable  opinion  which  is  in  our  favor,  and  in 
being  firmly  resolved  to  do  nothing  contrary  to  the  probable  conscience." 
(page  35) 

Busembaum  says,  yet  more  clearly  :  **  We  must  not  condemn  those  who 
consult  diflerent  doctors  until  they  find  one  in  harmony  with  their  way  of 
tliinking,  provided  such  a  one  is  looked  upon  as  prudent  and  pious  and 
not  peculiar." 

Tambourin:  "  Ignorant  confessors,  who  always  imagine  they  do  good 
in  obliging  their  penitents  to  restitution,  because  it  is  more  safe,  ought  to 
be  blamed.  Assuredly,  if  those  penitents  had  sought  to  know  what  is 
more  sure,  they  would  not  have  waited  for  their  advice,  but  they  would 
have  made  the  restitution  themselves."  (page  38.) 

De  Lugo  :  "  If  his  advice  is  called  for,  in  order  to  know  if  the  penitent 
is  obliged  to  make  restitution,  the  confessor  must  f  oho w  the  opinion  of 
the  penitent,  if  it  is  probable,  and  absolve  him." 

Louis  de  Scildere  :  "An  inferior,  who  probably  believes  that  his  superior 
has  no  jurisdiction,  must  not  obey  him,  even  if  the  superior  is  in  possession 
of  lus  office. 

"  Likewise,  an  inferior  who  thinks  that  his  superior's  command  exceeds 
the  limits  of  his  authority,  must  not  obey  him. 

"  Tiien,  an  accused  person,  who  probably  believes  that  the  judge  has  no 
legitimate  authority  to  interrogate  him,  is  not  obliged  to  answer." 

Georges  de  Rhodes  :  "  A  good  reason  is  sufficient  to  make  an  opinion 
probable.  Now,  the  authority  of  a  renowned  and  pious  doctor  is  a  good 
reason  ;  because,  I  suppose  that  lie  is  in  the  possession  of  a  good  reason  ; 
as  his  opinion  is  not  rejected  by  the  doctors  as  too  old  and  absurd.  Then 
the  authority  of  one  doctor  is  sufficient  to  make  a  probable  opinion." 

Térille  :  "  Generally,  in  matters  of  faith  as  well  as  of  morals,  any  man  is 
permitted  to  follow  any  opinion  directly,  the  least  probable  and  the  least 


72  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

that,  in  conscience,  one  should  be  convinced  of  its  excellency. 
Do  not  say  that  an  object  materially  bad  is  opposed  to  the 
divine  will  ;  because,  though  it  is  opposed  to  the  primaiy  divine 
will,  it  is  not  opposed  to  the  secondary  one,  by  which  God 
orders  or  permits  us  to  do  something,  in  supposing  our  ignorance 
insuperable.  God,  indeed,  hj  His  consequent  will,  wants  man  to 
do  what  he  feels  uncontrollably  obliged  to  do. 

sure,  though  he  believes  that  the  contrary  opinion  is  the  most  probable 
and  the  most  sure,  and  that  it  really  should  be  so.  Bat  what  I  say  is  re- 
stricted to  the  opinion  whose  practical  probability  is  certain  lor  the  acting 
agent."  (page  43.) 

Gobat,  who  accepts  and  develops  this  doctrine,  gives  it  yet  more  savor, 
and  suppresses  the  caution  of  Térille,  in  declaring  with  Oviedo,  "  that  an 
opinion  speculatively  probable  is  also  probable  in  practice."  (page  5G.) 

Eabri  :  "  Two  contrary  opinions,  truly  and  certainly  probable,  are  both 
safe,  materially  and  formally. 

'*  It  is  allowable  to  follow  a  less  probable  moral  opinion,  provided  that 
its  probability  is  certain  .  .  .  The  opinion  which  permits  one  to  follow 
the  lea.st  probable,  is  in  itself  the  most  probable.  Thus  in  following  the 
least  p.-obable,  in  actu  exf-rcito,  one  follows  really  the  most  probable,  in 
actu  signato."    This  is  the  quintessence. 

Casnedi:  •' It  is  always  allowable,  and  in  all  matters,  .  .  .  to  follow  the 
opinion  the  least  sure  and  the  least  probable  in  practice,  without  taking  into 
account  any  stronger  speculative  probability  attached  to  the  contrary  and 
more  sure  opinion  ;  and  this  every  time  that  the  less  sure  and  less  probable 
opinion  certainly  preserves  its  safety  and  its  practical  probability,  though 
less  sure  than  the  other."  (page  67.) 

Lacroix:  "  One  is  justified  in  acting  according  to  what  is  probable, 
although  it  is  evident  that  the  contrary  sentiment  is  more  probable.  .  .  . 

"  It  is  justifiable  to  follow  what  is  less  probable,  not  only  in  regard  to 
positive  human  rights,  but  also  in  regard  to  divine  and  natural  rigiits.  . 
.  .  Because,  if,  with  all  respect  to  the  human  legislator,  I  can  say  to  him  : 
*  Although,  according  to  the  force  of  direct  judgment,  it  is  more  probable 
for  me  that  your  law  exists,  however,  in  virtue  of  my  deliberate  judgment, 
less  probable,  I  will  not  do  its  command.'  Such  language  would 
not  be  contrary  to  the  respect  due  to  the  author  of  the  divine  or 
natural  laws." 

Muszka:  "If  we  meet  in  the  matter  of  morals  two  opinions  certainly 
probable,  one  is  not  always  obliged  to  follow  the  one  which  is  the  most 
probablj  and  the  most  sure.  Consequently,  it  is  sometimes  permitted  to 
act  according  to  the  least  probable  and  the  least  sure  opinion.'*  (page  103). 

At  last,  to  close  by  a  recent  and  practical  application,  here  is  how  the 
Petit  Catéchisme  de  Marotte,  the  disseminator,  par  excellence,  of  these 
doctrines,  expresses  itself  on  this  subject: 

"  Ques.  Can  we  act  according  to  a  conscience  probable? 

*'  Ans.  In  what  concerns  faith,  the  validity  of  sacraments  and  in  all, 
cases  when  one  is  held  to  procure  an  effect  that  one  is  not  sure  to  obtain, 
without  taking  the  opinion  the  more  sure,  we  must  choose  that  opinion; 
but  outside  of  this  case,  one  may,  without  sin,  follow  the  most  probable, 
though  the  least  sure  ;  acting  thus,  is  to  act  prudently." 


Cases  of  Conscience.  73 

Besides,  a  man  can  certainly  sin  in  acting  against  a  conscience 
which  is  insupcribly  mistaken,  then  he  may  also  deserve  reward 
in  acting  according  ta  its  orders.* 

Case  II. 
Erroneous  Conscience. 

1.  The  mind  of  Ferdinand  is  often  haunted  by  wicked  desires, 
for  instance,  to  revenge  himself  on  an  enem}^,  to  commit  shame- 
ful attempts  against  decency,  by  contact  or  otherwise,  or  the 
desire  for  fornication.  But  he  has  never  acknowledged  them  in 
confession,  thinking  that  these  acts,  purely  internal,  were  not 
sins. 

2.  Georges,  during  childhood,  has  had  for  many  ^-ears  the  habit 
of  polluting  himself,  but  did  not  admit  it  in  confession,  not  think- 
ing it  was  an  evil.  But  later,  knowing  the  truth,  he  doubts  the 
validity  of  those  confessions,  and  asks  himself  if  he  is  in  duty 
bound  to  make  a  general  confession. 

2.  Gustave,  a  child  ten  years  old,  has  abandoned  himself  to 
obscene  touchings  on  the  person  of  his  first  cousin  ;  he  has  avowed 
it  in  confession,  but  omitting  the  circumstance  that  it  was  his 
cousin,  because  he  was  ignorant  that  a  sin  was  more  grievous  on 
that  account.  Later  he  recognizes  his  error,  and  inquires  if  he 
must  confess  anew,  indicating  that  circumstance. 

Qiies.  1.  Had  Ferdinand  an  erroneous  conscience  relative  to 
his  wicked  desires? 

Qiies.  2.  Did  Georges  ignore  invincibly  the  malice  of  pollution? 

Ques.  3.  Is  Gustave  obliged  to  recommence  the  confession  of 
his  sin, — yes  or  no? 

*Charli:  "We  discern  in  God  two  kind^  of  will,  which  constrain  the 
will  of  man,  a  will  antecedent,  pri.nitive,  which  is  such  by  Itself;  and  a 
will  consequent,  which  comes  alter  and  accidentally.  By  the  antecedent 
will,  God  connnands  directly  with  a  primary  intention,  that  men  slioidd  or 
should  not  do  a  thing.  Such  is  the  will  by  which  God  .  .  .  forbids 
lying.  The  consequent  will  is  the  one  by  which  God  commands  indirectly; 
and  in  the  supposition  of  an  error  on  man's  side,  that  he  should  or  should 
not  do  a  thing. 

"  Thus  it  is  God  who  wills  that  a  man  should  lie,  if  we  suppose  that  by 
an  invincible  error  that  man  believes  that  it  is  good  to  lie  in  such  circum- 
stance."  (page  126.) 


74  Tlie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Ans.  Question  1. —  Many  affirm  it,  as  Elbel,  Sanchez,  Lacroix; 
but  the  contraiy  must  be  admitted,  with  St.  Liguori. 

Ans.  Question  2. — Georges  may  have  been  in  good  faith  at  the 
beginning.  But  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  his  good  faith  has 
lasted  so  long. 

Ans.  Question  3.  —  Gustave  is  not  obliged  to  a  new  confession 
in  order  to  add  the  omitted  circumstance,  if,  at  the  moment  when 
he  committed  the  sin,  he  was  not  aware  that  in  such  a  case  there 
was  a  particular  gravity,  because  the  difference  is  not  in  the  act 
but  in  the  principle.  In  principle,  insuperable  or  absolute  igno- 
rance excuses  him  from  the  sin  of  incest.  Let  not  his  peace  of 
mind  be  disturbed. 

Case  III. 
DouBTFCL  Conscience. 

Faustiue,  a  young  lady,  twenty  j^ears  old,  finds  herself  in  an  in- 
extricable embarrassment.  She  has  made  a  vow  of  chastity  at  the 
time  of  her  first  communion,  but  she  doubts  that  there  was  suffi- 
cient deliberation,  either  on  account  of  her  age,  or  of  devotion,  and 
asks  if  she  may  accept  an  advantageous  marriage  that  is  proposed 
to  her. 

Ques.    How  can  we  solve  Faustine's  doubts  ? 

Ans.  With  St.  Liguori,  the  vow  must  be  observed,  even  in  doubt 
of  sufficient  deliberation.  That  must  be  admitted  in  theory,  because 
the  utterance  of  the  vow  is  considered  as  having  the  value  of  an 
act.  But  that  doctrine  does  nor  seem  to  be  absolute  ;  it  may  hap- 
pen, in  certain  circumstances,  that  the  necessary  deliberation  can 
not  be  easily  determined,  and  it  may  even  be  presumed  that  it  was 
missing  altogether. 

The  advice  of  the  bishop  is  necessar}^  in  this  case. 


Case   VII. 
On  Probability. 


41 


Philibert,  a  professor  of  theology,  after  having  discarded  all  the 
svstems  on  probability,  has  imagined  a  new  one  that  he  believes 
will  solve   all   difficulties   in   cases   of  conscience.     Here   is   the 


Cases  of  Conscience.  75 

foundation  of  bis  opinion,  ...  a  well-known  law  compels,  an  un- 
known law  does  not.  Then,  for  the  same  reasons,  a  law  imper- 
fectly known  obliges  but  injperfectly,  more  or  less  according  to 
the  degree  of  knowledge  ;  but  there  is  alwa3's  a  certain  obligation, 
because  there  is  always  more  or  less  danger  of  materially  violating 
the  law.  Moreover,  if  a  law  constrains  us  more  or  less,  according 
to  the  degree  of  our  knowledge,  the  motive  which  excuses  us  from 
obeying  the  law,  must  be  in  proportion  to  the  gravity  of  the 
obligation.  This  is  why  a  not  very  powerfid  motive  excuses  us 
from  an  obligation  imperfectly  known. 

Ques.  What  shall  we  think  of  the  new  system? 

Ans.  Philibert  supposes,  without  foundation,  that  it  is  not  allow- 
able to  run  the  risk  of  materially  violating  the  law  when  it  is  not 
very  well-known. 

What  evil  is  there  in  that  material  violation,  if  I  ignore  the 
obligation?  How  can  I  commit  a  sin  if  I  ignore  what  makes  it  a 
sin  ?  Besides,  this  assertion  would  lead  us  to  a  condemned  tutelege  ; 
for,  if  we  admit  it,  it  would  not  be  possiWe,  any  more,  to  act  from 
an  opinion,  however  probable  it  may  be  ;  because  we  would  be  in 
a  perpetual  fear  of  materially  violating  the  law,  if  the  surest  way 
was  not  chosen.  Moreover,  if  that  material  violation  exists,  it  is 
not  voluntar}^  ;  because,  not  knowing  the  law,  there  is  no  intention 
but  ignorance. 

Case  IX. 
Authority  of  the  Confessor  Relative  to  Opinions. 

The  following  dialogue  takes  place  in  confession  between 
Lucanus  and  the  priest  Aquilinus  : 

Confessor. —  Have   you  not  made  an  usurious  contract? 

Penitent. —  My  father,  it  is  true  ;  but  I  know  that  honest  men 
do  so  with  the  approbation  of  learned  men. 

Confessor. —  That  doctrine  is  not  mine,  and  3-ou  must  tear  up 
that  contract,  or  at  least  indemnify  your  partner,  in  giving  back 
what  you  owe  him. 

Penitent. —  I  beg  your  pardon,  my  father,  while  honest  and 
learned  men  approve  of  such  a  contract,  I  think,  at  least  probably, 
that  it  is  not  forbidden. 


76  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Confessor. —  It  is  not  my  doctrine,  and  I  profess  tlie  contrary 
opinion.  Go,  my  friend,  I  cannot  absolve  you;  look  for  another 
confessor  who  will  share  your  own  opinion. 

Lucanus  goes  to  Pancrace,  another  confessor,  and  sets  the 
case  before  him:  "Do  not  trouble  yourself,"  sad  Pancrace,  ''your 
opinion  is  not  probable  for  me,  but  I  know  that  it  is  looked  upon 
as  such  by  many  very  learned  men,  you  may  set  your  conscience 
at  rest;  go  in  peace." 

Ques.  May  a  confessor,  lookinoj  upon  an  opinion  as  not  probable, 
but  approved  by  renowned  theologians,  permit  his  penitent  to 
follow  it? 

Ans.  The  confessor  cannot  permit  the  p3nitent  to  follow  false 
opinion,  because  his  duty  is  to  lead  him  from  error  ;  but  if  the  penitent 
wants  to  follow  an  opinion  admitted  as  probable  by  well-known 
theologians,  the  confessor  has  no  right  in  the  case,  though  he  looks 
upon  that  opinion  as  not  probable.  Because,  if  an  opinion  advo- 
cated by  several  theologians  ;  for  instance,  b}^  five  or  six  of  them 
recommended  for  their  honesty,  science  and  prudence, — if  it  has  not 
been  condemned,  if  it  is  not  in  apposition  to  a  law  then  in  force, 
if  it  has  not  against  it  evident  reasons,  that  opinion  maybe  admitted 
as  probable,  and  consequently,  cannot  be  prohibited  by  a  common 
confessor.* 

Case  XI. 
On  the  Change  of  Opinion. 

Lucien,  an  heir,  recognized  as  valid  a  will  made  in  his  favor, 
though  in  it  certain  necessary  formalities  are  missing  ;  he  relies 
for  that  on  the  probable  opinion  of  doclors.  Another  day, 
changing  his  opinion,  he  asks  for  and  obtains  through  the  Court  of 

*  It  is  exactly  what  was  said  more  clearly  by  Jean  de  Salas,  as  early  as 
1607:  "Any  confessor  may,  against  his  own  sentiment,  absolve  the  peni- 
tent who  follows  a  probable  opinion,  though  tlie  least  sure,  no  matter  if 
that  opinion  is,  or  is  not  prejudicial  to  others."  (page  11.)  And  Sotus, 
Vasquez,  Buserabaura,  etc.:  "  Xc^t  only  may  he,  but  lie  must."  The 
Jesuits  have  never  changed  their  opinion  on  this,  any  more  than  on 
anytliing  else. 

But  tlie  confessor  Aqiiilinus  would  have  done  much  better  by  holding 
his  tongue,  according  to  the  pure  doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

"  When,"  says  the  celebrated  Jean  INIarin,  "  the  confessor  beli(-ves  with 
probability  that  his  advice  will  be  rejected,  he  must  not  say  anything; 


Cases  of  Conscience,  77 

Justice,  the  setting  a^ide  of  a  will  equally  irregular,  made  in  favor 
of  Cuius,  in  order  that  himself,  the  nearest  of  kin,  shall  inherit. 

Ques.  1.  Is  it  permitted  to  change  one's  opinion,  and  if  so, 
when? 

Ques.  2.  Same  as  Lucien's  case. 

Ans.  to  the  first  question.  —  It  is  permitted  to  change  one's 
opinion  if  there  is  no  compability  between  tiiat  decision  and  a 
true  probability;  that  is  to  say,  provided  that  in  changing  one's 
mind,  one  follows  another  probable  opinion,  and  that  there  would 
be  no  ccmtradiction  either  theological  or  practical.  Because  one 
who  follows  one  of  two  probable  opinions,  does  not  cease  to  look 
upon,  the  other  as  probable,  and  he  remains,  as  before,  in  the 
same  uncertainty  towards  the  other.  Then,  occasionally,  if  it  is 
fur  his  advantage,  he  ma}'  follow  that  other  oi)inion,  though  pre- 
viously he  had  followed  the  contrary  one,  except  in  cases  when 
that  change  of  opinion  would  suppress  all  probability. 

Ans.  to  the  2d  question.  —  Lucien,  having  always  followed  a 
probable  opinion,  may  have  legitimately  changed  his  mind  in 
practice  on  the  validity  of  the  illegal  will,  according  to  diverse 
circumstances  ;  for,  in  keeping  his  iuheritance,  before  the  decision 
of  the  judge  and  in  spite  of  its  irregularity,  ho  has  acted  accord- 
ing to  his  rights,  having  followed  a  probable  opinion  ;  but  he  has 
not  ceased  for  that  to  look  upon  the  contrary  opinion  as  probable, 
and  he  has  not  renounced  the  right  belonging  to  any  citizen  of 
asking  the  setting  aside  of  the  other  will  if  it  is  for  his  advan- 
t:!ge  to  do  so.  Then  he  has  used  his  right  in  asking  fortlie  annul- 
ling of  the  will  before  the  court,  and  he  must  not  be  disturbed.* 

even  if  the  sin  in  question  should  be  a  continued  action,  injurious  to 
others.  For  instance,  the  p(  nitent  exercises  usury,  and  is,  on  tliis  matter, 
in  a  state  of  invincible  iirnorance,  on  account  of  reasons  i>iven  to  him  by 
otlicrs  whom  he  has  consulted.  Tlie  confessor  sees  that  his  advice  will 
be  of  no  avail,  neitlier  to  make  a  restitution  of  illicit  jrains,  nor  to  prevent 
it  for  tlie  future;  therefore,  he  must  not  say  anything."  (page  125.)  It  is 
also  the  opinion  of  Suarez,  Escobar,  Gobat,  Trachala,  etc.,  etc. 

*  Tambourin  was  of  that  opinion  when  he  wrote  in  IHSO  :  "  It  is  prob- 
able that  one  can  be  indemnitied  for  the  loss  of  one's  reputation,  by  ni')ney  ; 
It  is  also  probable  that  one  cannot  be  indemnified  at  all.  Can  I,  then,  to- 
day, I,  whose  reputation  has  been  blackened,  exact  from  the  clef  amer  an 
indemnity  in  money;  and  to-morrow,  and  even  to-day,  can  I,  mvself,  who 
has  defamed  the  reputation  of  another,  refuse  to  indemnily  him  by  that 


Erratise  on  îLatos. 


Law  is  the  external  rule  for  human  acts,  as  conscience,  the  prac- 
tical voice  of  reason,  is  the  internal  rule  for  the  same  acts. 

PART  FIRST. 
laws  in  general. 

Natdke  and  Qualities  of  the  Law. 

81 .  —  Law  is  a  disposition  of  order  in  view  of  the  common  good, 
promulgated  by  the  one  who  has  the  care  of  the  community.   .   .   . 

We  distinguish  several  kinds. 

1.  Divine  or  human.  .   .   . 

2.  Natural  or  positive.  .  .   . 

3.  Ecclesiastical  or  civil.   .   .   . 

4.  Moral  or  penal  or  mixed.  .   .   . 

5.  Affirmative  or  negative.   .   .   . 

6.  Prohibitory,  annulling,  or  tolerant.   .  .  • 

7.  Favorable  or  odious.   .   .   . 

8.  Written  or  transmitted  by  custom.   .  .  • 

82.  —  What  are  the  qualities  or  conditions  of  the  human  law? 
It  must  be:  possible,  honest,  useful,  just,  permanent  or  stable, 

and  promulgated.   .   .   . 

CHAPTER  II. 

The    Legislator. 

83.  —  We  call  the  legislator,  the  sovereign  who  has  the  powei', 
independent  and  supreme,  or  subordinate,  to  make  laws  for  tlie 
community  which  he  governs.   .   .   . 

same  money,  for  the  loss  of  his  reputation?  I  am  sure  that  one  can  legally, 
in  such  a  case,  do  tlie  one  or  ihe  other,  according  to  one'«  own  opinion." 
(Page  88.) 


Treatise  on  Laws.  79 

I.  God  alone  is  the  supreme  legislitor.   .  .  . 

II.  The  cliurch  has  the  power  to  make  laws  in  order  to  accom- 
plish the  end  which  she  has  in  view.  .   .   . 

84.  —  HI.  Princes  can  make  laws  in  view  of  the  temporal 
happiness  of  their  subjects,  .  .  .  because  they  have  received  from 
Grod  the  power  to  govern  tlieir  subjects.*  .   .  . 

IV.  We  must  always  obey  the  just  laws  of  legitimate  superiors  ; 
their  authority  coming  directly  from  Goi,  or  from  Goi  through 
the  medium  of  the  people.  .   .   . 

When  honest  and  learned  men  are  not  agreed  upon  the  injustice 
of  a  law,  we  must  look  upon  it  as  just.f 

*  But  it  is  on  condition  that  tliey  shall  govern  accordinî?  to  the  divine 
law,  tiiat  is  to  say,  according  to  tlie  will  of  the  Catholic  Church. 

"Any  Christian  prince,"  said  Philopater,  "as  soon  as  he  manifestly  sets 
aside  the  Catholic  Faith,  and  wants  others  to  do  the  same,  forfeits  all  power 
and  dignity  through  human  and  divine  rights  ;  this  is  not  only  certain,  but, 
of  faith,  (page  445.) 

Bellarmine  has  clearly  expressed  this  principle,  in  a  passage  of  his  Con- 
troversies which  Father  Clair  qualifies  as  "immortal." 

"Spiritual  power  is  independent  of  temporal  things,  but  it  lets  them 
operate  as  they  did  before  they  were  united,  provided  they  are  not  an 
obstacle,  or  are  not  necessary  to  the  spiritual  end  in  view.  For  if  there  is 
at  times  a  resemblance,  the  spiricual  power  can  and  ought  to  repress  the 
temporal  one,  by  all  means  and  expedients  which  it  judges  to  be  necessary. 
...  It  has  the  right  to  transform  kingdoms,  to  take  them  from  one  and 
give  them  to  another  as  a  sovereign  spiritual  prince,  if  this  is  necessary 
to  the  salvation  of  souls. 

"It  is  not  permitted  to  Christians  to  tolerate  an  infidel  or  a  heretical 
king,  if  that  king  tries  to  lead  his  subjects  into  heresy  or  infidelity;  but 
it  is  to  the  Sovereiijn  Pontiff,  who  has  the  care  and  the  cliarge  of  religion, 
that  belongs  the  ritrht  to  judge  if  the  king  leads  or  nf)t  into  heresy.  It  is 
the  Sovereign  Pontiff  who  should  judge  if  the  king  must  be  deposed, 
or  not.  ... 

"  If  Christians  have  not  formally  deposed  Nero,  Diocletian,  .Tiilian  the 
apostate,  Valens,  Arian,  etc.,  it  is  because  they  were  not  powerful 
enough."  (page  447.) 

Jean  Ozorius:  "The  power  of  the  keys  is  given  to  Peter  and  to  his 
successors;  this  power  is  sufficient  to  make  kings,  and  to  depose  them, 
wiien  they  turn  aside  from  the  faith  or  oppose  its  doctrines. 

"  When  the  spiritual  good  demands  it,  the  Pope  can  remove  lords, 
kings,  and  emperors,  and  deprive  of  their  kingdoms  tliose  impious,  dis- 
obedient kings  who  prevent  the  publication  of  the  Gospel."    (page  4G1.) 

t  What  shall  we  think,  according  to  this  expression,  of  laws  establishing' 
taxes? 

Escobar  explains  the  question  in  the  following  very  easy  terms  for  the 
tax-payers: 

"  The  subjects  are  excusable  for  not  paying  taxes,  by  reason  that:  as 
the  prince  justly    imposes   the   tribute  according    Lo  the   opinion    which 


80  Tlie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

CHAPTER   III. 

Object  and  Subject  of  the  Law. 

ART.    1. —Object  of  the  law. 

d)^. — The  object  of  the  law  is  all  that  it  can  command  oi 
forbid.   .   . 

ART.  IL  —  Subject  of  the  law. 

91.  —  I.  Man  is  born  under  and  remains  subject  to  the  natural 
law   .   .   . 

IL  Those  alone  who  have  the  habitual  use  of  reason  are  undei 
submission  to  the  himan  law.   .   .   . 

92.  Children  not  having  reached  the  age  of  reason,  and  the  in- 
sane, are  not  under  submission  to  the  laws.  Taey  may  conse- 
quently, eat  meat  when  the  Church  forbids  it. 

However,  insane  persons  having  the  use  of  their  reason  at  certain 
intervals,  people  under  the  elïects  of  drink,  or  when  asleep,  are 
under  the  laws,  because  they  usually  possess  the  use  of  their  rea- 
son ;  they  mny  be  exempted  occasionally  when  they  are  not  undei' 
tbe  control  of  their  reason.  It  is  not  permitted  to  give  them  meat 
on  the  prohibited  dnys. 

Heretics,  schismatics  and  others,  being  baptized,  although  not 
Catholics,  are  subject  per  se  to  the  eccUs  astical  laws,  because,  al- 
tlH'Ugh  rebels,  they  do  not  cease  to  be  subjects  of  tlie  Church.   .  .  . 

93. — Ques.    Are  ecclesiastics  obliged  to  obey  the  civil  laws? 

Ans.  No  ;  not  the  laws  in  force  which  are  contrary  to  their  pro- 
fession, or  to  their  sacred  canons.*  .   .  . 

assures  with  probability  that  it  is  jnst;  in  the  same  way,  the  snt->ject  may 
justly  refuse  to  pay  the  tribute,  in  following  the  o})inion  which  aftinnsj 
piobably  tliat  sucli  tribute  is  unjust.  It  is  the  sentiment  of  Sanchez, 
Lessius,  Lopez,  Molina,  Filliucius.     I  approve  this  sentiment."  (page  35. )j 

*  These  are  timid  formulas,  and  such  as  are  required  by  the  rigor  of  the] 
time.  But  the  truth,  which  oral  teaching  alone  dares  to  proclaim  in  its  in- 
tegrity, is  contained  in  the  words  of  Emm  Sa:  '-The  revolt  of  an  ecclesi- 
astic against  the  I%ing  is  not  a  crime  of  high  treason,  because  he  is  not  a| 
subject  of  the  king." 

Ferdinand  de  Castro  Palao  said  no  less  clearly  :  "An  ecclesiastic,  as  such, 
being  exempted  from  the  lay  jurisdiction,  it  follows  certainly  that  lit 
cannot  be  condemned  by  a  lay  judge." 

Jac(ines  Gordon  :  'T  assert  liere,  that  ecclesiastics  are  exempted  from  civil 
authority.  .  .  . 


Treatise  on  Laws.  81 

94. — Qiies.  Mast  foreigners  obey  the  laws  of  the  country  in 
which  they  find  themselves  ? 

Ans.  Yes,  they  must  fulfil  contracts,  and  obey  the  laws  neces- 
sary to  the  public  good. 

As  for  other  laws  there  are  three  probable  opinions  : 

The  first  exempts  them,  setting  scandal  aside,  because  the  law 
has  its  effect  on  subjects  only. 

The  second  obliges  them  to  obey  all  the  laws  ;  because  the  one 
wJio  eiijoyes  the  advantages  must  also  bear  the  burdens. 

The  third  one  makes  a  distinction  :  they  must  obey   all  laws   if 

"It  would  be  a  great  indecorum  to  aver  that  ecclesiastics  are  liable  to 
condemnation  by  civil  laws.  .  .  ." 

Dicastille  :  "That  the  cler^ïy  must  be  exempted  from  lay  authority,  even 
In  temporal  things,  is  evident,  because  nobody  is  under  subjection  to  one 
who  has  no  jurisdiction  over  him.  Now,  the  prince  has  no  jurisdiction  over 
ecclesiastics,  or  clergy.  .  .  .  Tliey  are  exempted  from  the  lay  power,  not 
only  by  canonical,  civil,  and  human  rights,  but  also  by  divine  rights." 

Jacques  Platel  :  "Ecclesiastics  and  religious  orders  are,  but  indirectly, 
under  the  civil  laws;  because,  not  being  under  the  jurisdiction  of  secular 
magistrates,  they  are  not  obliged  directly  and  immediately  to  obey  their 
laws,  but  only  in  consequence  of  the  law  of  nature,  and  with  the  pre- 
sumed consent  of  the  Pope,  on  account  of  the  conformity  of  these  laws 
to  natural  equity. 

**The  laws  which  dispose  directly  or  indirectly  of  the  properties  or 
persons  of  ecclesiastics  are  contrary  to  their  immunities.  ...  It  follows 
then,  that  they  are  not  obliged  to  obey  the  laws  concerning  the  payment 
of  tributes  and  taxes."   (page  514.) 

J.  D.  Taberna:  "Are  the  clergy  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  civil 
laws? 

"As  to  the  directive  force,  the  clergy  are  obliged,  at  least  indirectly,  to 
submit  to  the  common  laws  of  the  Republic  in  which  they  live,  if  the 
object  of  these  laws  concerns  tliem  somewhat,  and  are  in  no  way  relative 
to  the  clerical  profession,  the  holy  canons,  or  exemptions  of  the  church. 

"I  have  said,  as  for  the  directive  force,  because  speaking  absolutely, 
aside  from  the  prerogatives  accorded  to  princes  and  the  consent  of  the 
Pope,  secular  princes  have  no  compulsory  power  over  the  clergy;  but 
when  the  latter  are  culpable,  they  must  be  punished  by  their  superiors 
only."     (page  525.) 

Laymann  :  "Ecclesiastics  are  in  submission  to  the  laws  of  secular 
princes  according  to  the  directive  force  .  .  .  but  not  according  to  the 
compulsory  force,  because  they  do  not  incur  the  judgment  of  the  civil 
law.  ... 

"  So  the  civil  laws  which  annul  a  contract,  a  will,  by  incapacitating  per- 
sons to  contract,  to  make  a  will  .  .  .  have  no  power  on  ecclesiastics." 

Busembaum  :  "  The  clergy  being  exempted  by  divine  right  from  civil 
authority,  civil  laws  do  not  bind  them  directly  or  by  the  compulsory  force  ; 
it  follows  that  the  secular  prince  cannot  punish  them. 

"  To  strike  an  ecclesiastic,  to  arraign  before  a  secular  tribunal,  is  a 
personal  sacrilege. 


82  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

that  country  is  the  end  of  their  journey  ;  otherwise,  only  negative 
laws.  Such  is  the  opinion  of  Suarez,  who  recognizes  that  the  first 
opinion  is  also  probable.   .  .  . 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Promulgation  and  Acceptation  of  the  Law. 
ART.  1  —  Promulgation. 

97  —  This  is  the  publication  of  the  law  by  legitimate  authority, 
to  impose  its  obligation  on  subjects.  .  .  . 

ART.  2  —  Acceptation. 

98  —  This  is  the  submission  with  which  the  subjects,  at  least 
the  best  and  wisest  part  of  them,  accept  the  law  formally  or 
virtually. 

I.  By  itself,  for  its  power,  the  law  does  not  depend  in  any  way 
on  the  acceptation  of  the  people  ;  otherwise  all  legal  authority 
would  disappear,  and  a  subversion  of  social  order  would  follow. 

II.  Accidently,  a  law  that  is  not  accepted  has  no  power,  by 
the  tacit  or  express  consent  of  the  superior,  because  of  a  privilege, 
or  of  a  tolerated  custom. 

99  —  Ques.  Is  a  law  in  force  if  the  best  and  wisest  part  of  the 
people  has  not  accepted  it? 

Ans.  There  is  controversy.  .  .  . 

Ques.  Must  we  obey  a  law  of  the  church  which,  prohibited  by  a 
civil  government,  has  not  been  accepted  ? 

Ans.  Yes  ;  because  the  church  has  received  her  authorit}^  from 
Christ,  not  from  a  civil  power,  from  which  she  is  quite  independent. 
Christ  said  :  ''  Whatever  thou  sbalt  bind  on  earth,  shall  be  bound 
in  heaven."  (Math.  16  :  19). 

CHAPTER  V. 

Obligation  of  the  Lavt. 

ART.  I  —  The  force  of  the  obligation.   .  .  . 
ART.  II  —  Manner  of  satisfying  the  obligation  of  the  law.  .  .  . 
ART.  Ill  —  Causes  exempting  from  obeying  the  law. 
Section  1  :  Naiure  of  these  causes. 


Treatise  on  Laws.  83 

108. —  These  causes  are  eitlier  eximious  or  prohibitive. 

The  first  exonerate  us  completely  from  the  power  of  the 
law  ;  for  instance,  if  we  retire  into  a  country  where  the  law  is 
not  enforced.  The  second  are  those  which  prevent  the  sub- 
ject from  remaining  under  the  power  of  the  law,  or  from  fulfilHng 
it,  or  which  excuses  him  from  it.  They  are  subdivided  into 
iynorance  and  impotency.   .  .   . 

Section  2.    Voluntary  application  of  these  causes. 

110. — They  may  be  applied  directly  or  indirectl}'  ;  as  to  whether 
the  author  wishes  to  escape  the  obligation  of  t^ie  law  oris  impelled 
by  another  motive,  having  foreseen,  however,  the  impossibility  of 
obeying  that  law. 

Besides,  those  causes  may  be  near  or  removed  ;  near,  if  tlie  law 
constrains  immediately  ;  removed,  if  it  allows  a  certain  interval  of 
time. 

1.  One  may  always  applj^  eximious  causes,  and,  according  to  the 
opinion  the  most  probable,  in  a  direct  and  near  manner.    .   .    . 

IT.  But  one  cannot  apply  directly  prohibitive  causes,  near  er 
removed.  .   .  . 

III.  Nor  even  indirectly  prohibitive  causes  of  the  near  manner, 
if  there  is  not  any  proportionate  nei  essity  besides.   .   .   . 

IV.  According  to  the  more  probable  opinion,  one  may  apply, 
even  without  motive,  removed  and  indirectly  prohibitive  causes. 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Interpretation  of  the  Law  and  of  Epikeia. 

Section  1.     Interpretation. 

112. —  The  interpretation  of  the  law  is  its  natural  explanation 
according  to  the  legislative  spirit. 

It  is  authentical,  doctrinal  and  usual,  being  made  either  by  the 
sovereign,  by  learned  men,  or  by  custom. 

Strict  or  liberal.  .   .  . 

Simple,  comprehensive  or  extensive  ;  if  we  give  to  the  words 
their  proper  sense,  or  a  larger  one. 

Section  2.     Moderation.     (Epikeia). 


84  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

115. —  This  is  the  kind,  but  just  interpretation  of  the  law,  by 
which  it  is  understood  that  the  law  does  not  include  a  case  which 
is  not  mentioned  in  the  text  ;  as  if  the  legislator,  though  prudent, 
had  not  wished  to  foresee  or  mention  it.  For  instance,  the  law 
forbids  the  carrying  of  arms  in  the  night  ;  I  may  carry  some  if  I 
am  obliged  to  go  out,  and  if  I  risk  being  attacked  by  my  enemy, 
who  has  sworn  to  take  my  life. 

CHAPTER   VII. 

Dispensation  op  the  Law. 

114.  —  Dispensation  is  the  relaxation  of  the  law  in  a  particular 
case. 

It  may  be  : 

1.  Legal  or  illicit,  if  the  cause  is  just  or  not. 

2.  Valid  or  void,  if  it  exempts  us  from  obeying  the  law  or  not. 

3.  Absolute  or  conditional,  if  it  is  accorded  with  or  without 
conditions. 

4.  Surreptitious  or  obreptitious,  if  we  mention  exactly  what  is 
to  be  done,  or  if  we  present  a  case  in  a  false  light. 

ART.  1.  —  Power  which  exempts.   .  .  . 
ART.  2.  — Causes  required  in  order  to  be  exempted.  .  .  . 
ART.  3.  —  End  of  the  exemption. 

It  can  cease  for  three  reasons  :  1st.  When  the  cause  is  at  an 
end  ;  2nd.  Its  annulment  ;  3rd.  Renunciation. 

CHAPTER   VIII. 
Cessation  of  the  Law, 


PART   SECOND. 


different  Sorts  of  ILabJS. 

Natural  and  divine  law.  — Ecclesiastical  and  civil  law.  — Annul- 
ing  and  penal  law. — Unwritten  or  traditional  law.  —  Favorable 
law. 

CHAPTER   I. 
Natural  and  Divine  Law. 
ART   I.  —  Natural  law. 

122. — The  natural  law  is  the  divine  will  manifested  by  a 
natural  light,  commanding  what  is  necessary  to  the  preservation 
of  good  order.   .   .  . 

ART.    II. — Positive  divine  law. 

There  are  two  kinds,  the  ancient  and  the  modern. 

CHAPTER  II. 

Ecclesiastical  and  Civil  Law. 

ART.  I  —  Ecclesiastical  law. 

125. — This  law  is  established  by  the  ecclesiastical  power,  for 
the  good  government  of  the  church  and  the  eternal  salvation  of 
souls. 

The  compendium  of  the  ecclesiastical  laws  constitute  the  canon 
laws,  which  make  three  volumes.   .  .   . 

126.  —  What  are  the  Roman  Congregations? 

There  are  eight  of  them.   .   .  . 

5.  The  Congregation  of  the  Index,  founded  by  St.  Pius  V.,  com- 
prises the  cardinals  and  several  learned  doctors.  Its  unique  func- 
tion is  of  great  importance  for  the  good  of  society,  ecclesiastical 
as  well  as  civil  ;  because  it  inspects  all  the  published  books,  in 
order  that  they  should  propagate  nothing  contrary  to  religion  and 


86  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

good  morals.  Those  that  are  judged  injurious  to  the  faithful  are 
noted  carefully,  forbidden,  and  inserted  in  the  Index,  which  is 
called,  for  that  reason,  '•  The  Index  of  Forbidden  Books,"  to  pre- 
vent the  faithful  from  reading  them.  Sometimes,  however,  books 
are  condemned  by  the  Congregation  of  the  Holy  Office,  and  by  the 
Sovereign  Pontiff  himself  in  brief  and  dogmatical  particular  con- 
stitutions, and  especially  if  they  are  infected  with  heresy. 

6.  The  Congregation  of  the  Holy  Office,  or  Sacred  Universal 
Inquisition,  is  called  supreme,  and  is  composed  of  cardinals,  pre- 
lates and  theologians. 

They  attend  to  heresy,  and  to  doctrines  suspected  of  heresy  or 
contrary  to  religion.  It  was  founded  by  Paul  HI.,  and  confirmed 
by  Sixtus  V.  .  .  . 

ART.  II.  —  Civil  law. 

131.  —  The  law,  or  civil  rights,  is  the  collection  of  laws  and 
decrees  made  by  temporal  princes  in  view  of  the  good  of  society. 

CHAPTER   III. 
Penal  and  Annulling  Law. 

ART,  I.  —  The  Penal  law. 

133.  —  This  is  the  one  which  obliges  one  to  do  something,  or  to 
avoid  it,  only  under  threat  of  a  temporal  punishment,  that  is  to  say, 
that  such  law  should  be  accepted  as  just. 

I.  —  There  cannot  be  any  purely  penal  law,  that  is  to  say,  one 
which  does  not  oblige  conscience  at  all  ;  because  anj'  order  from 
the  sovereign  must  oblicje  in  some  wav. 

II.  But  a  law  simply  penal  can  be  established  :  it  obl'ges  in 
con-cience  either  to  obey  the  law,  or  to  suffer  the  penalty  in  cases 
where  the  law  is  violated.  .  .  . 

ART.  II.  —  The  Annulling  law. 

135.  — This  is  the  one  which  establishes  that  an  act  is  not  va'id 
in  its  principles,  or,  that  it  may  be  invalidated  by  a  judgment. 
Thore  are  then  annulling  laws,  ipso  facto  ;  of  others  only  after  the 
sentence  of  the  judge. 


Treatise  on  Laws.  87 

CHAPTER   IV. 
Unwritten  and  Traditional  Laws. 

137.  —  Custom,  considered  in  its  cause,  is  the  way  of  acting 
which  is  induced  by  the  acts  of  the  community,  or  of  the  majority  ; 
io  its  principle,  it  is  a  right  constituted  by  morals,  which  is  accepted 
as  law   when  the  law  is  wanting. 

There  are  :  1st.  Custom  according  to  rights,  or  according  to 
liw.  .  .  , 

2.  Outside  of  the  law  or  right.  .  .  . 

3.  Against  the  law  or  right. 

CHAPTER  V. 
Favorable  or  Privileged  Law. 

141.  — Privilege  is  a  constant  and  permanent  favor  accorded  to 
certain  persons,  or  certain  digiiilies,  by  the  sovereign,  against  the 
common  law,  or  outside  of  that  law. 

It  is  :  1.  Personal,  local,  or  real. 

2.  Against  the  law,  or  outside  of  the  law. 

3.  Agreeable  or  odious. 


Cages  of  Conscience  on  tfje  îLabJS. 


Case  XII.* 


Are  we  under  Obligation  by  a  Law,  or  an  Opinion  Founded 
ON  A  False  Presumption? 

1.  The  shepherd  Titj're  watching  prudently  his  flock,  goes 
inadvertent!}'  into  a  deep  sleep.  Tlie  flock  goes  grazing  in  the 
adjoining  fields  ;  the  rural  constable  appears,  summons  Tityre 
before  the  justice,  and  the  shepherd  is  fined  and  condemned  to  pay 
damages.  The  latter,  looking  upon  this  judgment  as  unjust,  does 
not  hesitate  to  indemnify  himself,  partly  on  private  property  and 
partly  at  the  expense  of  the  public  treasury. 

2.  One  night  his  donkey  is  carried  away  by  a  thief  ;  but  he 
escapes  into  the  neighboring  fields,  where  he  causes  damages. 
Tityre  is  again  condemned  ;  but,  indignant,  has  recourse  to  the 
same  compensation. 

3.  At  another  time,  the  unfortunate  man  is  condemned  to  pay 
a  debt  which  he  had  already  discharged.  As  he  has  no  means  to 
prove  it  before  the  judge,  he  hastens  to  calm  his  grief  by  a  new 
secret  compensation. 

Ques.  1.  Must  we  obe}'  a  law  or  a  judgment  founded  on  a  false 
presumption? 

Ques.  2.  Ought  Tityre  to  have  accepted  the  sentence  ;  or  had  he 
any  right  to  compensate  himself  in  these  three  cases? 

Ans.  Question.  1. — First,  No,  if  the  judgment,  that  is  to  say 
the  law,  is  founded  only  on  the  presumption  of  a  particular  fact, 
on  error,  fraud,  or  damage  ;  because  if  the  truth  of  the  fact  does 
not  exist,  the  obligatory  principle  disappears  also. 

2.  Yes,  if  the  judgment  is  founded  on  the  presumption  of  the 
general  danger  of  error  ;   because  the  common  interest  demands 

*  See  my  speech  of  tlie  7tli  of  Juh',  1879. 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  the  Laios.  89 

that  all  should  be  hekl  by  that  obligation,  on  account  of  the  danger 
of  temptation  (hallucinatio),  and  because  the  judge  can  deal  only 
with  exterior  facts. 

Ans.  Question  2.  —  First,  Tityre  has  acted  badly  in  seeking 
a  secret  compensation  in  the  first  case,  because  he  has  been 
justly  condemned.  The  damage  exists  really  ;  and,  besides,  the 
sljepherd  has  committed  a  fault  at  least  judicial,  which  justifies 
the  sentence.  The  law,  in  fact,  seeks  to  make  men  more  prudent 
and  more  vigilant  in  order  to  prevent  damages  :  Tityre  is  then 
obliged  to  make  restitution. 

2.  In  the  case  of  the  donkey,  the  presumption  of  the  judge  is 
false,  the  shepherd  having  committed  no  fault;  not  even  judicial. 
He  could  not  be  punished  for  his  lack  of  vigilance  ;  because  he  has 
not  been  able  to  prevent  the  damage,  which  must  in  no  way  be 
imputed  to  him.  If  he  has  been  condemned  on  presumption  of 
neglect,  which  he  has  not  and  could  not  commit,  the  judgment  is 
false  and  materially  unjust.  Then,  as  for  Tityre,  it  is  a  case  in 
which  he  has  no  responsibilit}'  and  he  must  be  absolved.  There  is 
no  injustice  on  his  part,  and  he  has  the  right  to  exact  compensa- 
tion. 

3.  If  he  has  paid  already,  he  cannot  be  obliged  to  pay  over 
again,  because  the  motive  of  the  judgment  is  false  :  then  the 
judgment,  being  based  on  a  false  principle,  is  materially  unjust  ; 
and  Tityre  cannot  be  accused  of  injustice  if  he  has  sought  a  co-m- 
pensalion,  this  being  the  only  means  to  compensate  himself. 

Case  XVII. 

License  at  First  Refused  and   Later  Accorded  by  the  same 
Superior,  who  does  not  Remember  the  First  Refusal. 

Leopold,  bound  by  a  perpetual  vow  of  chastity,  wishes  to  marry 
Sylvia.  In  order  to  obtain  a  dispensation,  he  writes  to  the  Holy 
Penitentiary,  under  the  Hetitious  name  of  Titius,  for  instance, 
as  is  done  in  secret  affairs.  He  alleges  as  a  reason,  the  serious 
temptation  to  which  he  is  exposed,  making  his  vow  very  difficult 
to  keep. 

He  is  refused.     Not   being   discourao^ed,  he    tries  once  more. 


90  Tlie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

After  a  month  or  two,  he  writes  again  to  the  same  Congregation  ; 
but  using  another  name,  Simpronius  for  instance,  and  without 
speaking  of  the  first  refusal,  mentioning  however  tlie  same  motive. 
His  ruse  is  successful  this  time,  and  he  obtains  the  dispensation. 

Qiies.  1.  What  is  it  that  we  call  an  obreptitious  or  a  surreptitious 
dispensation,  and  when  is  it  of  no  value? 

Ques.  2.  Is  Leopold's  request  surreptitious  and  of  no  value? 

Ans.  Question  1. — We  call  obreptitious  dispensation,  the 
one  in  which  a  false  reason  is  alleged  as  the  principal  motive, 
which  reason,  had  it  been  known,  would  have  prevented  the  dis- 
pensation. 

We  call  it  surreptitious,  when  a  truth  is  hidden  which  ought 
to  have  been  indicated,  according  to  the  rights  and  regula- 
tions of  the  Curia,  above  all,  if  any  ruse  or  fraud  is  used.  It  is 
evident  that  such  a  dispensation  is  of  no  value.  But  if  the  false 
reason  is  but  a  determining  motive,  without  which  the  dispensation 
would  have  been  accorded,  but  with  greater  difficulty  ;  or  if  we  hide 
a  truth  which  is  not  directly  and  intrinsically  related  to  the  sub- 
ject of  the  dispensation,  or  that  one  is  not  obliged  to  declare  after 
the  regulations  of  the  Curia,  the  dispensation  is  valid  ;  because  the 
superior  is  supposed  to  have  been  willing  to  give  it,  provided  the 
principal  motive  is  mentioned. 

Ans.  Question  2. — No,  this  dispensation  is  not  at  all  surrepti- 
tious, though  perhaps  the  superior  would  have  refused  it  if  he 
had  recalled  to  mind  his  first  refusal  ;  the  presumption  that  the 
superior  would  have  refused  has  no  foundation.  If  he  accords  it 
on  account  of  the  same  reasons  given  before,  it  is  a  proof  that 
those  reasons  are  sufl3cient  for  the  dispensation.  No  matter  about 
the  first  refusal,  because  it  has  no  relation  to  the  case  ;  and  to  refuse 
the  dispensation  for  that  reason  only,  would  be  a  breach  of  common 
sense.  This  is  evident  ;  for  if  there  is  a  just  reason,  it  is  better  to 
palliate  the  rigor  of  the  first  refusal  that  to  confirm  it.  Then  the 
circumstances  of  the  first  refusal  has  no  relatioa  with  the  validity 
of  the  subsequent  dispensation.  Leopold  was  not  obliged  to  recall 
it  to  the  superior,  and  that  dispensation,  not  being  surreptitious,  is 
valid.  Do  not  object,  because  Leopold,  gave  another  fictitious 
name  ;  no  attention   is  paid  to  names  by  the  Holy  Penitentiary, 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  the  Law.  91 

since  pseudonyms  are  used  so  habituall}'.  No  matter  whether  the 
name  is  Titius  or  Simpronius.  Do  not  say  that  Leopold  can  be 
accused  of  the  criminal  intention  of  deceiving  the  superior  ;  be- 
cause we  cannot  deceive  when  we  use  our  rights. 

Case  XIX. 
The  Annulling  Law. 

Thirsus  having  become  an  heir,  perceives  that  the  will  made  in 
his  favor  lacks  an  essentially  legal  formality.  However,  without 
saying  anything  about  it,  he  receives  the  inheritance  and  enjoys  it 
quietly. 

Ques.  What  should  we  advise  Thirsus  to  do? 

Ans.  The  most  probable  opinion  commands  that  Thirsus  should 
not  be  troubled,  if  no  judgment  interferes  ;  because,  according  to 
many  theologians,  an  annulment  of  such  a  nature  does  not  exist 
{ipso  facto)  ^  but  must  be  declared  by  judgment. 

Case  XX. 
The  Penal  Law. 

Sapricius  is  accustomed  to  carry  in  his  wagon,  on  his  horse,  or 
in  some  other  way,  wheat,  wine,  and  other  goods  under  toll-duty. 
He  evades  it  whenever  he  can  do  so,  without  fear  of  a  fine,  either 
in  passing  during  the  night  by  an  out-of-the-way  road,  avoiding  the 
custom  officers,  deceiving  them  by  ruse,  etc.  He  does  not  think 
he  is  doing  any  harm  ;  because  the  duty  charged  is  considerable, 
and  often  established  uselessly  for  the  public  interests,  and  because 
the  law  which  establishes  it  is  purely  penal.  However,  going  to 
confession  and  feeling  a  scruple,  he  asks  if  he  has  done  well. 

Ques.  1.  Do  we  establish  simply  penal  laws? 

Ques.  2.  Has  Sapricius  sinned?  is  lie  obliged  to  make  restitution? 

Ans.  to  the  1st  Question.  —  1.  Laws  of  such  a  nature  can  be 
established,  that  is  to  say,  to  be  enforced  in  a  disjunctive  manner, 
either  to  obey  the  law,  or  to  i)ny  the  penalty  if  the  offender  has 
been  taken  in  the  very  act.  A  law  has  obligatory  force  only  by 
the  will  of  the  legislator;  and  the  legislator  can  only  enforce 
the    penalty  if  it  is  necessary   to    the    common  interest.     Now, 


92  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

this  suffices  for  certain  laws  not  very  important  for  the  good  order 
of  society. 

2.  Certain  purely  penal  laws  seem  to  be  established,  at  least  in 
certain  localities,  so  think  man}^  theologians.  St.  Liguori  says  : 
"  The  laws  of  the  cities  interdicting  the  cutting  of  wood,  grass, 
etc.,  or  fishing  or  hunting,  do  not  create  obligations  under  the 
penalty  of  sin  ;  such  is  the  custom. —  But  what  are  the  purely 
penal  laws  in  each  locality?  Learned  and  experienced  men  of  the 
place  alone,  can  judge. 

Ans.  to  the  2d  Qur^stion. — There  is  controversy  between  the 
theologians.  Some  say,  Yes,  others  say,  No.  This  is  the  opinion  of 
Sanchez  and  others,  recalled  by  St.  Liguori,  who  does  not  express 
any  personal  opinion  :  "Sanchez  thinks  that  nobody,  going  straight 
along  on  his  way,  is  obliged  to  pay  toll  for  passing  a  door  or  a 
bridge  established  for  the  keeping  of  roads  in  order  ;  because  it 
would  be  hard  to  oblige  strangers  to  know  this  regulation  about 
doors  and  bridges."  And  Sanchez,  with  others,  looked  upon  that 
opinion  as  probable,  even  if  goods  are  hidden,  or  if  one  hid  himself  ; 
because  those  duties  established  are  only  to  be  paid  if  they 
are  asked  for.  In  a  general  way,  spsaking  of  all  duties, 
Lugo  thinks  tliat  the  people  ou^ht  to  be  informed  before- 
hand, in  order  to  oblige  them  to  pay.  One  cannot  oblige 
an  individual  to  make  a  restitution  for  that  of  which  he  has  de- 
prived the  treasur}',  if  he  is  persuaded,  in  a  probable  manner, 
that  amongst  a  great  number  of  duties,  he  has  paid  some  unjust 
ones,  or  that  he  has  sufficiently  contributed  to  the  expenses  of  the 
State." 

According  to  these  authorities,  Sapricius  must  not  be  disturbed.* 

*  See  Treatise  on  Justice  and  Rights.  No.  744. 


^Treatise  on  ^ins. 

PART  I. 

Sins  in  General,  Their  Nature,  Gravity  and  Distinction. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Nature  of  Sin. 

143. —  Generall}',  sin  is  thus  defined  :  It  is  a  free  transgression 
of  divine  law,  in  otlier  words,  of  any  law  which  obliges  in  con- 
science. 

There  are  several  sorts  of  sins  : 

1.  Present  or  habitual. 

2.  Mortal  or  venial. 

3.  By  commission  or  by  omission. 

4.  Against  God,  others,  and  one's  self. 

5.  Of  malignity,  ignorance  or  weakness. 

6.  Formal  or  matej'ial. 

For  a  formal  sin,  besides  the  objective  malignity  of  the  act,  the 
attention  of  the  mind  and  the  consent  of  the  will  are  necessary. 

I.  Attention  of  the  mind.  .  .  . 

II.  Consent  of  the  will.  .  .  . 

145. —  There  is  no  obligation  to  positively  resist  the  allurements 
of  the  flesh,  when  such  a  resistance  does  nothing  but  excite  them 
more  ;  a  material  resistance  is  yet  less  necessary.   .   .   . 

Likewise,  we  are  not  compelled  to  oppose  a  positive  resistance 
to  any  temptation  of  long  duration  ;  because  it  would  be  too  diffi- 
cult, and  we  would  be  exposed  to  imnumerable  scruples. 


94  Tlie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

CHAPTER  II. 

Gravity  of  Sin,  and  Especially  of  Mortal  and  Venial 
Sin.   .  .  . 

CHAPTER  III. 

Distinctions  of  Sin. 

ART.  I. —  Specific  distinctions. 

The  specific  distinction  of  sin  comes  from  a  particular  malign  it}', 
that  is  to  say,  from  a  different  fault,  by  which  a  sin  differs  essen- 
tially from  another  one. 

159. —  Example:  Four  sins  are  committed  by  the  one  who, 
bound  b}'  a  vow  of  chastity,  sins  with  a  married  relation  ;  because 
he  violates  four  different  virtues:  chastity,  religion,  piety  and 
justice.  .   .  . 

ART.  II. —  Numerical  distinction. 

We  treat  numerical  distinctions  in  the  same  manner  ;  for  it  is 
evident  that  sins  distinguished  by  their  kinds,  may  also,  and  for 
better  reason,  be  distinguished  by  their  number  ;  so  there  is  no  par- 
ticular rule  to  give  on  that  subject.   .   .   . 

160.  —  Example  :  A  single  sin  is  committed  when,  in  view  of 
fornication,  one  indulges  in  sensual  contact  with  a  woman,  kissing, 
holding  obscene  talk,  and  then  fornicating  ;  because  all  these  acts, 
in  their  nature,  precede  and  bring  out  the  completion  of  the  final 
act.  But  if  in  the  beginning  the  touching  only  was  intended,  and 
that  later,  blinded  by  passion,  fornication  had  resulted,  there  would 
have  been  two  sins  then,  and  to  confess  fornication  only  would  j 
not  be  sufficient.  ...  ' 

Several  sins  are  committed  when  more  than  one  act  is  accomp- 
lished sucessively  with  the  same  woman  ;  because  each  act  is  final 
in  itself,  and  constitutes  a  complete  intention. 


Treatise  on  Sins,  95 

PART   II. 
Kinds    of    Sins. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Internal   Sins. 

167. —  They  are  divided  into  three  classes:  1st.  The  pleasure 
in  which  one  delights  {delectatio  morosa^)  when  one  delights  freely 
in  the  evil  represented  by  the  imagination,  without  desiring  it. 

2nd.  The  joy,  when  one  takes  pleasure,  and  with  deliberation, 
in  thinking  of  the  accomplished  evil. 

3rd.  The  desire,  or  act  of  the  will,  in  view  of  obtaining,  and  later 
of  accomplishing,  a  bad  action.  It  is  called  efficacious  if  there  is 
intention  or  absolute  design  in  obtaining;  Inefficacious,  if  there  is 
but  a  feeble  desire,  or  conditional  consent  ;  for  instance,  if  we  say  : 
I  would  like  to  steal,  if  I  only  could  ;  I  would  like  to  possess  that 
woman,  if  1  was  not  afraid  of  losing  her  or  my  reputation.   .  .  . 

170.  —  Does  the  pleasure  in  which  one  delights  receive  a  par- 
ticular malignity  froii  the  circumstances  in  view,  as  the  desire 
and  the  joy  ?  t  •  •  • 

Ans.  Controversy.  .  .  . 

Ques.  Can  we  desire  to  do  evil,  if  that  evil  is  permitted? 

Ans.  Controversy.  .  .  . 

172.  —  Ques.  Can  we  rejoice  at  the  voluntary  omission  of  some 
forgotten  precepts?  .   .  . 

Ans.  Controversy.   .   .  . 

173. — The  doctrine  of  St.  Thomas  teaches  that  there  is  no 
sin  if  a  nocturnal  pollution  pleases  us,  as  being  a  natural  relief  ; 

*  I  do  not  find  any  expression  to  translate  the  morosns  spoken  of  by  the 
casuist.  It  is  a  word  of  low  Latin  which  has  nothiiijï  in  common  with  the 
norosîis  of  the  ancient  authors.  In  theological  dialect,  that  mornsus  has 
)een  deduced  from  morari.  Delectio  morosa  signifies  a  pleasure  in  which 
me  delights. 

t  This  is  the  right  place  to  insert  the  ingenious  species  imagined  by  St. 
Liguori  and  recalled  by  Moullet  :  "If  any  one  takes  delight  in  thoughts  of 
criminal  relations  with  a  married  woman,  not  because  she  is  married,  but 
because  she  is  beautiful,  abstracting  the  circumstance  of  marriage,  such  a 
deliberation  has  not  the  malignity  of  adultery,  but  of  simple  fornication." 
(Compendium,  vol.  1,  page  ]26,  1834). 


96  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

but  the  pleasure  inherent  to  the  pollution,  being  shameful,  is  cul- 
pable in  Itself.  This  is  the  explanation  of  the  holy  doctor.  St. 
Liguori  does  not  want  even  that  it  should  be  so  understood  for  the 
pollution  resulting  from  touch  or  obscene  dreams  ;  because,  in  this 
manner,  it  is  culpable  objectivel}'.  It  is  otherwise  if  it  is  a  question 
of  a  purely  natural  pollution,  when  nature  relieves  herself.  Besides, 
in  practice,  we  must  avoid  taking  pleasure  in  it,  although  honest 
in  principle,  for  fear  of  the  danger  which  may  result.   .  .  . 

CHAPTER  II. 

Capital  Sins. 

We  call  them  thus,  because  they  are  as  the  source  of  the  other 
sins.  Considered  in  general,  they  are  rather  vices,  than  sins, 
properly  so  called. 

There  are  seven  of  them  :  pride,  avarice,  luxury,  envy,  anger, 
laziness,  and  gluttony.   .   .   . 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  <Stns. 


Case  I. 
Gravity  of  Sin. 


Mœvius,  a  kind-hearted  and  pious  man,  tormented  and  pursued 
night  and  day  by  temptations,  does  not  know  if  he  has  given 
his  consent  or  not.  He  is  particularly  troubled  on  account  of 
certain  hallucinations,  or  even  indecent  actions,  whose  victim  he 
has  been  during  a  light  sleep,  so  it  seems  to  him. 

Ans.  Has  Mœvius  grievously  sinned? 

Ans.  He  must  be  advised  to  be  at  peace,  because  he  does  not 
seem  to  have  given  his  consent  ;  at  least,  in  a  perfect  manner,  to 
the  temptation. 

Case  II. 

Specific  Distinction  of  Sins. 

Alexander  confesses  himself  to  have  bad  desires,  but  without 
indicating  either  the  object  or  the  condition  of  the  persons. 

Qiies.  Ought  he  to  confess  all  these  circumstances? 

Ans.  Yes;  his  confession  is  incomplete  ;  .  .  .  if  the  woman  he 
was  desiring  was  married,  a  relation  of  his,  or  bound  by  the  vow 
of  chastity,  he  ought  to  have  declared  it. 

Case  III. 
Specific  Distinction  of  Sins. 

Nicolinus,  on  a  Sunday,  and  also  on  a  day  on  which  he  had 
received  the  holy  communion,  sinned  with  Bertha  his  servant,  who 
is  his  cousin  in  the  third  degree  ;  in  his  confession  he  says,  only, 
that  he  has  had  relations  {rem  habuisse)  with  a  woman. 

Ques.  Has  he  sinned  against  the  integrity  of  the  confession? 

Ans.  His  confession  is  bad,  having  omitted  the  specific  cir- 


98  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

cumstance  of  the  sin  committed  with  a  relation.  But  he  is  not 
obliged  to  declare  that  she  was  his  servant  ;  because  the  sin  does 
not  become,  by  this,  a  new  kind  ;  unless  it  should  be  a  question  of 
a  young  girl  confided  to  a  master  by  her  parents  ;  in  which  case 
the  contract  would  have  been  broken. 

Case  IV. 

Numerical  Distinction  of  Sins. 

Basile,  induced  by  a  grave  temptaticm  against  chastity,  gave  his 
intimate  consent  to  a  bad  desire  ;  he  proposes  to  himself  to  sin 
really  {efficaciter),  and  looks  out  for  the  occasion  all  day  long, 
with  his  desire  always  present,  and  making  no  effort  to  overcome 
it.  At  last,  improving  the  occasion,  after  obscene  talk  and 
indecent  gestures,  he  accomplishes  the  external  act  of  sin. 
Repenting,  he  made  this  confession  :  "  I  have  committed  once,  the 
sin  of  fornication." 

Ques.  Is  Basile's  confession  correct? 

Ans.  His  confession  is  complete,  because  he  has  committed  but 
one  sin.  In  fact,  the  antecedent  acts  had  but  the  same  bad  aim, 
and  involve  themselves  with  it  in  the  same  action. 

Case  VI. 
Numerical  Distinction  of  Sins. 

Delphin,  wishing  to  seduce  a  young  girl,  uses  different  means 
for  that  purpose,  unchaste  and  endearing  talk,  love  letters,  obscene 
engravings,  sensual  contact  ;  but  the  sin,  through  fortuitous  circum- 
stances, could  not  be  consummated. 

Ques.  Has  he  committed  several  feins? 

Ans.  He  has  committed  as  many  sins  as  there  are  bad  acts  of 
different  species,  .  .  .  because  the  sin  not  having  been  consum- 
mated, all  its  divers  means,  each  one  ba^l  in  itself,  cannot  be  attrib- 
uted to  a  common  aim,  and  be  assimilated  with  the  consummation 
of  the  sin. 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Sins,  99 

Case  VIII. 

Internal  Sins. 

Blaise,  a  man  of  joyful  disposition,  experiences  great  pleasure 
for  several  motives  : 

1.  At  the  deatli  of  bis  brother,  because  he  remains  the  only 
heir. 

2.  At  the  death  of  his  boy  five  years  old,  on  account  of  his 
future  happiness,  and  the  diminution  of  the  burden  for  the 
family. 

3.  Because,  on  the  day  before  not  knowing  that  it  was  a  fast  day, 
he  escaped  that  painful  obligation  without  sinning. 

4.  For  seeing  women  maltreating  each  other,  blaspheming  and 
cursing  ;  and  also  in  hearing  of  a  theft  skilfully  accomplished. 

Ques.  What  is  to  be  thought  of  Blaise's  joy  in  each  one  cf  these 
cases  ? 

Ans.  Blaise,  in  several  cases,  ought  to  regret  his  joy,  if  that 
joy  was  not  spontaneous,  but  the  result  of  fully  deliberated  act  ; 
in  almost  all  the  cases,  he  must  be  excused. 

1.  He  sins  grievously  in  rejoicing  at  the  death  of  his  brother, 
if  it  is  for  the  death  itself,  though  he  does  not  do  it  through  h:ite, 
but  because  he  remains  alone  to  inherit  ;  for  it  is  not  permit' ed  to 
rejoice  at  an  evil  happening  to  another,  above  all  to  a  brother,  on 
account  of  the  advantage  which  will  result  from  it.  This  is  estab- 
lished by  the  Xlllth  and  XlVth  propositions  condemned  by  Inno- 
cent XI.* 

*  These  propositions,  condemned  on  the  2nd  of  March,  1779,  are  the 
following  : 

13.—^"  If  it  is  done  with  moderation,  one  may,  without  sin,  complain  of 
the  life  and  rejoice  at  the  natural  death  of  a  person,  to  ask  for  it  and  to 
wish  it  with  an  inefficacious  desire,  not  through  hate  for  the  person,  but 
iu  view  of  a  temporal  advantage." 

14:  — "  It  is  allowable  to  wish  for  the  death  of  one's  father;  not  in  view 
of  the  harm  he  will  experience,  but  in  virtue  of  the  advantage  which  will 
result  from  it,  that  is  to  say,  some  rich  inheritance." 

There  was  besides  a  proposition  : 

15. — "A  son  may  lawfully  rejoice  for  having,  while  drunk,  killed  his 
father,  on  account  of  the  riches  coming  to  him  by  inheritance." 

This  last  monstrosity  emanates  from  tlie  Jesuit  Fagundcz  (Vol.  IX  in 
Decalogum).  The  Jesuit  Gobat,  who  accepts  it,  explains  himself  exten- 
sively on  this  subject. 

L.oi^C. 


100  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Because  he  could  not  wish  for  the  death  of  Lis  brother  for  that 
reasoD,  then  he  cannot  rejoice  at  it.  It  wouki  be  otherwise  if  he 
did  not  rejoice  at  the  death  of  his  brother,  but  only  at  the  inheri- 
tance which  comes  to  him  from  it. 

2.  Blaise  must  be  excused  in  the  second  case  ;  because  the 
motive  which  directs  him  is  not  a  transgression  of  the  principle  of 
cbarity,  thinking  only  of  the  good  of  his  son  and  family.  But  he 
must  not  be  excused  for  the  joy  he  feels  from  that  death  on 
account  of  the  relief  which  results  at  it  for  the  family.  This 
would  be,  in  reality,  contrary  to  the  principle  of  charity.   .   .   . 

*'  As  it  is  supposed  that  the  parricide  has  been  innocently  committed  by 
a  lack  of  deliberation  caused  by  druukeuness,  and  that  there  hatl  been  no 
premeditation  ;  besides,  that  parricide  has  for  effect  the  gaining  of  great 
riches,  an  effect  which  is  good,  or  at  least,  certainly,  not  bad  ;  it  follows 
that  the  doctrine  of  F.  Fagundez,  which  may  seem  paradoxical,  is  true  in 
speculation,  although  dangerous  in  practice."  (page  437) 

Tambourin  multiplies  the  species,  and  makes  a  more  complete  cata- 
logue : 

"  May  a  son  wish  for  the  death  of  his  father,  ...  in  order  to  enjoy  his 
inheritance? 

"  May  a  mother  wish  for  the  death  of  her  daughter,  in  order  not  to  be 
obliged  to  leed  and  endow  her? 

"  Can  a  priest  wish  for  tlie  death  of  his  prelate  in  the  hope  of  succeed- 
ing him,  or  to  be  delivered  from  that  prelate  who  is  contrary  to  him,  and 
otlier  such  things? 

"  If  you  only  desire  or  learn  with  joy  of  those  events,  \\z.  an  inheritance, 
the  end  of  your  grief,  a  prelacy,  etc.,  tlie  answer  is  easy;  because  it  is 
permitted  to  di^sire  these  things  and  to  receive  them;  because  you  do  not 
rejoice  at  the  evil  of  others,  but  at  the  good  which  comes  to  you."  (page 
429.) 

La  Croix:  "  It  is  permitted  to  wish  for  the  death  of  someone,  or  to  rejoice 
at  it,  when  a  great  good,  even  a  temporal  one,  results  from  it  to  the  public 
or  to  the  Church." 

Cardenas  :  "  It  is  allowable  to  a  son  to  rejoice  at  the  inheritance  which 
comes  to  him  througli  the  death  of  his  father,  without  rejoicing  at  the 
death  itself."  (page  422.) 

Casnedi  :  "  I  may  w^is h  for  the  death  of  my  father,  either  as  being  for 
him  an  evil,  and  that  is  not  permitted  ...  or  being  advantageous  to  me, 
and  then  we  must  distinguish:  firstly,  I  can  rejoice  as  much  at  tiie  good 
which  comes  to  me  through  the  death  of  ray  father  as  in  my  father's 
death  itself,  which  is  the  cause  of  that  great  good;  .  .  .  secondly,  I  can 
rejt)ice  fully  at  the  good  which  comes  through  the  death  of  my  father, 
and  not  at  his  death  which  procures  to  me  that  good. 

"  The  first  manner  is  not  permitted  .  .  .  but  the  second  one  is;  because 
then  I  make  an  abstraction,  but  I  rejoice  only  at  the  good. 

"  This  doctrine  must  become  familiar;  because  it  is  useful  to  all  those   , 
who  wish  for  some  good  which  tliey  can  have  only  through   the   death  of 
someone;   as  when  it  is  a  question  of   some   profession  or  situations,  in 
peace  or  in  war,  or  some  ecclesiastical  or  secular  dignity."  (page  438.) 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Sins,  101 

Case   XV. 
On   Drunkenness. 

Gaudiosns,  an  inveterate  drinker,  remains  for  whole  hours 
drinking  with  his  comrades,  and  especially  on  Sunday. 

But  though  his  head  feels  heavy  and  he  staggers,  he  does  not 
lose  his  reason  ;  and  swears,  blasphemes,  and  sings  obscene  songs. 

Ques.   Has  Gaudiosns  grievously  sinned? 

Ans.  Theologians  generally  admit,  that  drunkenness  is  not  a 
mortal  sin  if  there  is  no  voluntary  and  total  loss  of  reason.  Now, 
in  principle,  Gaudiosns  is  not  culpable  of  mortal  sin,  althougli  he 
diank  more  than  the  others  ;  I  say  in  principle  ;  because  he  com- 
mits a  grave  sin  when,  in  provoking  others,  he  co-operates  in 
their  sin,  in  inducing  them  to  lose  their  reason. 

Case  XVI. 
On   Drunkenness. 

Gaudentius  gets  drunk  on  very  little.  Having  many  occasions, 
he  is  often  drunk.  Most  of  the  time,  when  in  such  a  state,  he 
goes  to  sleep  ;  but  one  day  he  grew  furious,  and  broke  a  very 
precious  crystal  vase,  belonging  to  Titus. 

Ques.   1.  Does  Gaudentius  sin  gravely? 

Ques.  2.  Is  he  obliged  to  pay  for  the  vase? 

Ans.  Question  1. — Gaudentius  cannot  be  excused  from  a 
grave  sin  ;  because  he  knows  by  experience,  that,  with  the  com- 
pany he  frequents,  and   the    little    quantity  that   is    necessary  to 

"We  see  by  these  extracts  and  even  by  Gury's  case,  that  the  condemnation 
pronounced  by  Innocent  XI  has  been  easily  evaded  by  tiie  Jesuits. 

But  wliat  is  more  shockin.i;,  is  to  see  such  an  infamous  doctrine  preached 
to  little  children,  in  our  XlXth  century.  Open  the  Petit  Catéchisme  vj 
Marotte,  (fourth  edition,  1870,  page  181),  and  read  : 

"  Qnes.  Is  it  allowable  to  wish  for  a  bad  action  or  to  rejoice  at  it,  on 
account  of  the  advantai>e  which  on^ht  to  result? 

"Ans.  It  is  never  allowable  to  wish  for  a  bad  action,  nor  to  rejoice  at 
it,  whatever  may  be  the  advantage  resulting  .from  it;  thus,  a  sou  cannot 
rejoice  at  the  murder  of  his  father  on  account  of  the  rich  inheritance 
which  comes  to  him.  But  it  is  allowable  to  rejoice  at  an  atlvantai^e, 
though  it  results  from  an  evil;  for  instance,  a  son  may,  with  pleasure, 
take  possession  of  the  inheritance  which  comes  to  him  through  the 
murder  of  his  father." 


102  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

make  him  druak,  he  is  liable  to  becom3  miscbievous.  He  on^ht 
eilher  to  have  abstained  totally,  or  have  mixed  a  notable  quantity 
of  water  with  his  wine,  an  1  shunned  his  habitual  boon  companions. 
It  would  be  otherwise  if  he  seldom  got  drunk  and  against  his  will. 
Ans.  Question  2.  — But  he  cannot  be  made  to  pay  for  the  dam- 
age ;  it  is  evident  that  he  has  not  foreseen  the  harm  he  has  caused. 
Then,  this  harm  has  been  voluntary,  neither  in  the  act  nor  in  the 
cause  ;  there  is  no  theological  fault;  and  in  conscience,  he  is  not 
obliged  to  make  a  restitution. 

Case   XYII. 
On   Drunkenness. 

Hypacus,  a  physician,  every  tim3  he  performs  a  difficult  surgical 
operation,  an  amputation  for  instance,  gives  to  his  pitient  a  large 
dose  of  intoxicating  liquor,  opium,  or  ether,  to  make  him  insensible. 

Ques.  AVhat  is  to  be  tliougljt  of  Hypacus? 

Ans.  According  to  St.  L'guori,  and  the  other  theologians  gen- 
erally, Hypacus  sins  gravely  in  admi^ilstering  an  intoxicating 
potion  in  order  to  procure  insensibility  ;  because  in  acting  thus  he 
seeks  good  from  evil  :  now,  we  must  never  commit  an  evil  deed 
even  if  good  is  to  result  from  it.  But,  according  to  some,  Hypacus 
does  not  sin,  because  he  does  not  seek  directly  inebriety  ;  the 
effect  directly  in  view  being  insensi  ùlity,  and  the  effect  purely  per- 
mitted the  suppression  of  reason.  Now,  the  suppression  of  reason 
for  a  short  time  and  for  a  grave  motive  does  not  seem  to  be  an 
intrinsic  evil  ;  and,  in  realit}',  as  one  uses  opium  and  ether  in  such 
a  case,  one  may  also  use  wine. 


ÎI 


^Treatise  on  Uirtues. 


185. — Virtue  is  the  habit  of  acting  honestly,  in  other  words, 
according  to  good  order. 
We  distinguish  virtues'  as  : 

1.  Natural  or  supernatural,  if  we  acquire  and  preserve  them  by 
our  own  natural  strength  or  by  supernatural  grace. 

2.  Innate  or  acquired,  if  they  are  given  by  G-od  or  acquired  by 
repeated  struggles. 

3.  Theological  or  moral,  if  they  are  immediately  related  to  God, 
or  if  they  have  honesty   for  their  immediate  object. 

There  are  four  moral  and  cardinal  virtues  :  prudence,  justice, 
fortitude,  and  temperance. 

We  shall  speak  here  chiefly  of  theological  virtues  :  faith,  hope, 
and  charity. 

CHAPTER  I. 
Faith. 

186. — Faith,  in  general,  is  acquiescence  in  the  authority  of 
a  word.  Relatively  to  our  subject,  and  as  a  virtue  so-called,  it 
is  an  inspired  supernatural  disposition,  which  calls  on  our  intellect 
to  acquiese  firmly  in  the  truth  revealed  by  God  and  proposed  by 
the  church,  in  virtue  of  the  authority  of  the  divine  revelations. 

ART.  1.  — Necessity  of  faith.   ... 

ART.  2.  —  Object  of  faith.   .   .   . 

ART.  3.  — Vices  opposed  to  faith.   .  .  . 

CHAPTER  II. 

Hope. 

211. —  Hope  is  a  supernatural  virtue,  by  which,  according  to  the 
promise  of  God,  we  look  for  future  happiness,  and  the  means  of 


104  2116  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

CHAPTER  III. 
Charity. 

217. — Chanty  is  a  virtue  by  whicli  we  cherish  God  as  the 
sovereign  Good,  on  account  of  himself,  and  our  neighbor  on 
account  of  God. 

ART.  I. —  Love  to  God.   .  .  . 

ART.  II.  —  Love  to  our  neighbor. 

Section  I.     Precept  for  the  love  of  our  neighbors. 

223. — Ques.  Is  it  contrary  to  charity,  to  wish  for  a  temporal 
evil  to  another,  or  to  rejoice  at  it,  for  a  good  end  ? 

Ans.  1.  No,  if  the  order  desired  through  charity  is  not  violated  ; 
in  other  words,  if  it  is  done  in  view  of  a  greater  good  or  a  lesser 
evil.  It  is  then  permitted  :  1st,  for  the  spiritual  good  of  others  ; 
2nd,  for  the  spiritual  or  temporal  common  good  ;  3rd,  for  the  good 
of  a  large  number  and  of  greater  importance,  as  for  the  good  of 
the  family,  or  of  the  community. 

2.  Yes,  when  the  order  willed  by  charity  is  violated.  Thus, 
a  woman  cannot  wish  for  the  death  of  her  husband,  because  she 
is  maltreated  by  him.   .   .   . 

225.  —  Ques.  Can  we  wish  for  a  public  punishment  for  our 
enemy,  and  even  ask  for  it? 

Ans.  Yes,  in  principle,  provided  that  any  sentiment  of  revenge 
be  set  aside  ;  but  it  is  dangerous  in  practice. 

Ques.  Must  the  offender  ask  pardon  for  the  offence? 

Ans.  Yes,  in  principle,  if  there  are  no  other  means  of  reconcili- 
ation. Except  the  case  in  which  the  offender  would  be  tlie  superior 
of  the  offended  ;  or  if  the  offended  deemed  it  prudent  to  pardon  the 
offence.   .   .   . 

226. —  .  .  .  We  must  not,  without  examination,  accuse  of  sin, 
especially  of  a  grave  sin,  penitents  who  confess  that  they  hate 
some  one  ;  because  they  often  confound  the  proy;e?*  appelation  for 
enmity  with  hatred  of  abomination,  or  of  rank,  or  oi  failure,  where 
they  feel  but  a  natural  and  overmastering  aversion.  However,  it 
is  necessaiy  to  take  care  that  the  aversion  for  rank  or  for  characler 
does  not  degenerate  gradually  into  hate  for  the  person. 


Treatise  on  Virtues.  105 

Section  2.     Works  of  mercy,  alms,  and  brotherly  correction. 

Brotherly  correction:  this  is  an  admonition  by  which,  in  virtue 
of  charity,  one  endeavors  to  prevent  others  from  sinning.   .   .   . 

231. — Ques.  Does  the  precept  of  brotherly  correction  oblige 
under  grievous  sin  ? 

Ans.  Yes,  in  principle.  .   .   . 

232.  Ques.  What  order  must  we  keep  in  brotherly  correction? 

Ans.  1st,  To  reprimand  secretly;  2nd,  Before  witnesses,  if  the 
first  admonition  is  not  sufficient  ;  3rd,  To  report  to  a  superior.  .  .  . 
Sometimes,  one  can  and  must  change  this  order.   .   .   . 

233. — In  regular  communities,  colleges,  seminaries  etc.,  it  is 
convenient  that  correction  should  be  made  by  denunciation,  either 
directly  or  by  an  intermediate  agent.*  School-fellows  and  com- 
rades cannot  be  absolved  if  they  do  not  consent  to  make  such  a 
denunciation,  when  it  is  a  question  of  great  damage  to  the  com- 
munity. 

Section  3.    Vices  opposed  to  charity  for  our  neighbors. 

The  principal  are:  hatred,  envy,  quarreling,  scandal,  and  co- 
operation in  the  sins  of  others. 

ART.  I.  — Scandal. 

234.  —  Scandal  is  a  speech,  or  an  act  scarcely  honest,  giving 
occasion  for  a  spiritual  fall.   ... 

237. — Ques.  Is  it  permitted  to  advise  some  one  to  commit  a 
lesser  evil,  when  he  has  resolved  to  commit  a  greater  one? 

Ans.  Yes,  more  probably.  .  .   . 

*  "When  the  sin  of  another  is  secret,  w^e  must  warn  the  guilty  one 
secretly.  If  lie  !^ilOvvs  himself  intractable,  he  must  be  censured  in  the 
l)resence  of  one  or  two  prudent  persons;  if  he  perseveres  in  his  sin,  his 
superior  must  be  warned.  But  it  may  happen  that  it  is  necessary  to 
change  this  order,  and  immediately  denounce  the  ofiender  to  the  superior." 
— Marotte. 

This  is  the  theory  of  espionage  between  comrades  which  is  tlie  rule  in 
.TcsuiL's  establisinnents,  and  contributes  so  powerlully  to  deirradation  of 
ciiaracter;  it  is  known  liow  tattlers  are  treated  in  our  colleges. 

The  newspapers  exposed  recently  to  public  indignation,  an  article  of 
tlie  regulations  in  the  military  school  of  Saint  Cyr,  which  is  evidently  dic- 
tated by  the  Jesuitical  spirit  : 

"The  pupils  of  the  first  division  are  in  duty  bound  to  inform  the  author- 
ities of  any  pupil  of  the  second  division,  whose  bearinij,  deeds,  and  gcs- 
tnies,  when  outside,  might  injure  the  g(;od  reputation  of  the  school,  for 
which  ail  pupils  are  responsible." 


106  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Ques.  Can  we  allow  sin  occasionally,  in  order  to  correct  the 
guilty  one? 

Ans.  Yes  ;  because  to  permit  it,  is  not  to  engage  in  it. 

238.  —  Ques.  Is  it  allowable  for  a  just  motive  to  create  an 
occasion  for  sin? 

Ans.   Controvers}'. — The  affirmative  is  more  probable.   .   .   . 

Ques.  What  are  we  to  think  of  the  relations  between  the  faith- 
ful and  the  Jews  ? 

Ans.  In  order  to  guard  safe!}'  the  dignity  of  the  Christian 
religion,  and  to  avoid  the  peril  of  perversion,  it  has  been  decreed 
by  the  church  :  1st,  That  Christians  should  not  live  with  Jews  ;  2d, 
That  they  should  not  attend  their  feasts  ;  3d,  That  they  should  not 
liave  the  same  masters  ;  4th,  That  they  should  not  eat  of  their 
unleavened  bread  ;  5th,  Tuat  Christian  women  should  not  suckle 
Jewish  children.   ... 

On  bad  books.  —  Of  all  kinds  of  scandal,  none  is  more 
abominable  than  that  resulting  from  impious  and  obscene  books. 
It  is  an  invention  of  the  devil,  the  most  efficacious  of  all,  to  preci- 
pitate crowds  of  souls  into  the  bottomless  pit  of  hell.  It  is  an 
awful  scourge,  which  infects  not  only  a  country  or  a  generation, 
but  diffuses  itself  everywhere,  in  all  time,  making  numberless 
victims.  Who  could  tell  the  frightful  evils  which  have  come  out  of 
.them,  as  from  a  poisoned  source,  to  assail  religion, —  evils  which 
will  be  propagated  and  multiplied  to  the  end  of  the  world? 

Let  the  ministers  of  God,  preachers  and  confessors,  multiply 
their  efforts.  Let  them  sacrifice  themselves  to  oppose  that  torrent 
of  iniquity,  and  snatch  from  the  infernal  abyss  the  souls  in  danger. 

Permission  to  read,  print,  or  publish  books  contrary  to  the  Chris- 
tian faith  and  manners,  must  never  ba  given.   .   .   . 

241.  —  Ques.  Must  such  books,  if  burrowed,  be  given  back  to 
their  owners  ? 

Ans.  No  ;  unless  some  great  inconvenience  is  to  be  feared.  This 
results  from  the  principle  we  gave.  There  is  a  grave  inconvenience 
in  quarrels,  blasphemies,  hate,  and  other  similar  things,  which  are 
to  be  feared  from  the  owner.  A  slight  contrarietv,  or  the  fear  of 
losing  his  friendship,  is  not,  most  of  the  time,  a  sufficient  reason.   .  • 

Art.  IL  —  Co-operaf.on. 


Treatise  on  Virtues.  107 

248.  — It  is  :   1.  Mediate  or  immediate.   .   .   . 

2.  Near  or  removed.   .   .   . 

3.  Positive  or  negative.   .  .   . 

4.  Formal  or  material.   .   .   . 

There  is  also  co-operation  direct  or  indirect,  physical  or 
moral.   .   .   . 

250.  —  Ques.  Is  a  servant  allowed  to  open  the  door  of  a  house 
to  a  courtesan  ? 

Ans.  Controversy.  St.  Liguori  concludes  in  the  affirmative,  if 
there  is  some  other  person  who  would  do  it.   .   .   . 

In  cities.  .  .  it  is  allowable  to  let  a  house  to  courtesans,  if  no 
other  tenants  are  found,  or  if  they  could  easily  find  some  other 
house.  .   .   . 

251.  —  Ques.  Can  a  servant  harness  a  horse  for  his  master  who 
is  setting  out  to  commit  a  sin,  and  can  he  accompany  him? 

Ans.  It  does  not  appear  to  be  forbidden  to  get  the  horse  read}^, 
because  the  servant  no  more  co-operates  in  his  master's  sin  than  by 
opening  the  door  to  the  courtesan.  But  be  cannot  accompany  his 
master,  unless  in  case  of  serious  damage.  ...  Or  if  he  is  not  certain 
about  the  design  of  his  master.   .   .   . 

Ques.  Is  a  servant  permitted  to  carry  his  master's  love-letters  to 
a  concubine? 

Ans.    No  ;  at  least,  not  without  a  weighty  reason.   .   .  . 

Ques.    Is  a  servant  permitted  to  carry  gifts  lo  a  courtesan? 

Ans.    No  ;  unless  tliere  is  a  very  weighty  reason. 

256.  — Qiies.  Are  inn-keepers  permitted  to  give  newspapers  to 
tlieir  customers,  to  read  ? 

Ans.  They  cannot  subscribe  to  papers  which  are  evidently  and 
oidinarily  contrary  to  religion  and  good  mjrals,  even  if  tliey  run 
the  risk  of  losing  their  customers. 


t 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Ftriues> 


Case   VII. 
Relation  with  Heretics. 

Leocadie,  a  nun,  a  hospital  nurse,  where  Catholic  and  heretic 
patients  are  received,  is  requested  by  Quirinus,  a  very  sick 
Protestant,  to  send  for  a  minister  of  his  sect,  in  order  to  receive 
from  him  the  consolations  of  religion. 

Leocadie  does  not  know  if  she  must  obey. 

Qiies.  May  Leocadie  send  for  a  Protestant  minister? 

Ans.  No;  it  is  evident  that  she  cannot  ;  that  would  be  communi- 
cation with  heretics  in  a  religious  case,  and  co-operation  also.  Here 
is  the  decision  of  the  Holy  Congregation  of  the  Inquisition  on  the 
loth  of  March  1848: 

"  Venerable  Father, 

"  D.  N.  humbly  informs   your  Holiness  that,  in  the  city 

of  M ,  there  is   a  hospital  of  wliich  he  is  the  chaplain,  and 

wliere  the  patients  are  under  the  care  of  nuns.  Others  than 
Catholics  are  received,  and  often  Protestant  ministers  are  sent  for. 
It  is  asked  if  nuns  areperraittetl  to  bring  in  mniisters  of  tiie  false 
religion?  Is  it  slUo  allowahie  to  call  for  a  Protestant  minister 
when  some  heretic  is  treated  in  the  private  house  of  a  Catholic?'* 


In  the  General  Con^rogation  of  the  Ivoman,  Universal  and  Holy 
In(piisition,  deliberating  m  Council,  in  presence  ofTlieir  Eminences 
an<l  Reverences  S.  R.  E.  Cardinals,  especially  delegated  by  the 
Holy  See  in  order  to  figiit  heresy  all  over  the  world  :  After  having 
heard  the  reading  ot'the  above  request,  and  the  wish  of  the  Doctors 
consulted  being  known,  their  Eminences  and  Reverend  Lords 
have  said  :  "  According  to  what  has  been  said,  such  a  thing  is 
not  allowable,"  and  added  :  ''  Let  them  keep  a  passive  attitude." 

Angelus  Argenti. 

S.  Rom.  and  Univ.  Inquisit.  Secretarius. 


Cases  of  Conscience  on    Virtues.  109 


Case  XII. 

CuARiTY  Towards  our  Neighbor.     Maternal  and  Conjugal 

Love. 

Calpurnie,  the  mother  of  a  large  family,  wishes  for  the  death  of 
a  new-born  child,  of  another  one  five  3'ears  old,  deaf  and  dumb, 
and  also  of  another,  nine  years  old,  an  invalid,  in  order  that  they 
should  enjoy  happiness  in  heaven.  She  wishes  also  for  the  death  of 
her  daughter,  not  being  able  to  marry  on  account  of  her  poverty 
and  homeliness,  who  if  dead,  would  be  prevented  from  sinning. 
She  desires  also  the  death  of  her  husband,  an  old  and  sickly 
man  always  complaining.  Sometimes,  in  a  moment  of  passion, 
she  would  send  her  children  to  the  devil-,  and  an  instant  after, 
moved  by  piety,  she  would  devote  them  to  God  and  wish  them 
dead.  But  she  falls  sick,  and  her  husband,  Culpurnius,  runs  to  the 
nearest  monastery  and  prays  for  the  death  of  his  wife. 

Ques.  1. —  Did  Calpurnie  sin  in  these  divers  cases,  and  how? 

Ques.  2. —  What  is  to  be  thought  of  her  husband? 

Ans.  Question  1. —  1.  Calpurnie  has  not  sinned  in  her  first  wish 
about  her  three  sons  and  daughter,  because  she  is  not  influenced 
by  passion,  but  by  the  thought  of  a  better  state  for  them.  She 
did  not  sin  against  charity,  or  against  the  virtue  of  piety. 

2.  In  wishing  for  the  death  of  her  husband,  she  sinned  griev- 
ously against  charity  and  piety  ;  because  her  motive  is  a  perverse 
one,  and  her  wish  is  caused  by  annoyance,  impatience,  or  hate  for 
her  husband. 

3.  She  committed  a  grave  sin  in  devoting  her  children  to  the 
devil,  unless  she  acted  through  anger  ;  or  again,  what  often  hap- 
pens, not  meaning  seriously  what  she  said.  However,  as  the 
movement  of  passion  is  seen,  and  the  imprecations  heard  by  the 
children,  it  is  diflScult  to  avoid  a  grave  scandal.  But  she  did  not 
sin  in  wishing  that  God  would  gather  her  family  and  place  it  in 
heaven,  provided  she  was  moved  only  by  faith  and  piet^'. 

Ans.  Question  2. —  It  is  evident  that  the  husband  has  grievously 
sinned  against  charity  and  piety. 


110  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits» 

Case  XIII. 
On   Dancing. 

Lucile,  foreseeing  that  she  would  soon  be  obliged  to  dance  at 
her  sister's  wedding,  and  also  at  balls,  public  or  private,  when 
introduced  into  society  by  her  father,  asks  her  confessor  if  she  is 
obliged  to  obey  her  father. 

Ques. —  What  is  the  decision  in  Lucile's  case? 

Ans. —  Lucile  naust  be  praised  for  her  scrupulous  and  timid 
conscience  ;  and  also,  because,  seeing  the  peril,  she  comes  to  ask 
the  advice  of  her  confessor.  I  advise  that  good  girl  to  seek 
for  some  means  to  avoid  dancing  ;  but  I  do  not  impose  that 
obligation.  If  she  cannot  escape  it,  let  her  think,  while  dancing, 
of  death  and  divine  justice. 


Exmti^t  on  tlie  precepts  of  tïje  ©ecalogue. 

I  am  the  Lord  thy  God.  .  .  .  Thou  shall  have  uo  other  gods  before  rae. 
(Exodus  XX.  2,  3). 


PRECEPT    I. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Acts  Relative  to  the  Virtue  of  Religion. 

Art.  1. —  On  Adoration. 
Art.  2. —  On  Prayer. 

CHAPTER  II. 

Vices  Opposed  to  Religion. 
Art.  I. —  On  superstition. 

263.  —  Superstition  is  a  vice  contrary  to  religion  by  its  excess, 
and  by  which  we  render  to  Goil  a  worship  we  do  not  owe  him,  or 
to  creatures  a  worship  we  owe  only  to  God. 

Section  1.  —  On  Idolatry.   .   .   . 

Section  2.  —  Forbidden  worship.   .   .   . 

265.  — It  is  a  superstition  to  address  prayers  to  St.  Bridget,  or 
others,  and  expect  from  them  an  infallible  effect.  Notwithstanding, 
we  must  not  blame,  but  praise,  those  wlio  wear  medals,  pious 
images,  or  relics,  with  the  hope  of  receiving  divine  help.  .  .  . 

Section  3.  — On  divination. 

266.  —  This  is  the  searching  of  sacred  things  with  the  help  of 
the  devil. 

It  is  expressed  if  one  invokes  the  devil  expressly,  and  implied  if 
that  invocation  consists  only  in  forbidden  practices. 


112  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

We  disfnguish  several  kinds  of  divination,  tlie  principal  are  : 

1.  Judicial  astrology,  b}-  the  stars  ; 

2.  Augury,  by  the  songs  of  birds  ; 

3.  Aruspicy,  by  their  flight  ; 

4.  Aruspicy,  by  the  entrails  of  animals  ; 

5.  Clnromancy,  by  the  lines  of  the  lumd  ; 
G.  Geomancy,  by  the  signs  of  the  earth  ; 

7.  Presage,  1  y  chance  ; 

8.  Necromancy,  by  the  invocation  of  the  dead  ; 

9.  Oneiromancy,  bv  dreams  ; 

10.  Sorcery,  by  spell  ; 

11.  Oracle,  by  idols  ; 

12.  Prophecy,  by  soothsayer  or  cards  ;  .   .  . 

270. —  Ques.  Is  it  possible  to  foretell  the  future  by  dreams? 

Ans.  No,  generally  ;  .  .  .  because  the  dreams  sent  by  God 
are  very  rare,  and  present  signs  easily  distinguished  from  natural 
dreams  or  diabolical  ones. 

Ques.  Is  it  permitted  to  use  the  divining  rod  ?  .   .   . 

Ans.  We  must  not  quite  condemn  that  means  of  discovering 
water  and  metals,  provided  the  rod  should  move  equally  if  we 
search  for  them  or  not  ;  but  we  protest  against  any  diabolical 
intervention,  and  exclude  all  spirit  of  superstition. 

Section  4.  —  On  magic  and  witchcraft. 

271. — In  its  strict  sense,  magic  is  the  art  of  wonder-working, 
which,  though  not  supernatural,  is  above  the  strength  of  man, 
and  can  be  obtained  implicitly  or  explicitly  only  with  the  help  of 
the  devil  who  has  been  invoked. 

Witchcraft  is  the  art  of  doing  injury  with  the  intervention  of 
the  devil.  There  is  an  amorous  witchcraft  and  an  envenomed 
witchcraft.  The  first,  the  philter  or  love-charra,  is  a  diabolical 
art  consisting  in  creating  a  sensual  love  or  a  violent  hate  for  some 
one.  The  second  is  the  art  of  injuring  by  causing  sickness,  in- 
sanity, etc.,  etc.* 

*  Ques.     What  is  magic? 

Ans.  It  is  the  art  of  doing  astonishing  things  above  the  power  of  man, 
and  consequently  hy  the  intervention  of  Satan. 


Treatise  on  the  Precepts  of  the  Decalogue,         113 

Appendix  I.  —  Table  turning.   .   .  . 

273.  —  Pious  men,  who  had  seen  in  turning  tables  a  purely 
physical  phenomena,  have  recognized  in  it,  with  no  doubt  what- 
ever, an  infernal  divination. 

274.  — Is  it  possible  to  question  marble  or  wooden  tables  and 
expect  answers  from  them?  Nobody  is  foolish  enough  to  believe 
that  ;  so  people  think,  generally,  that  spirits  are  moving  the  tables, 
and  they  have  been  called  spirit-rappers  ;  now,  they  cannot  be 
good  spirits;  it  would  be  blasphemy  to  affirm  that  angels  and 
saints  enjoying  an  eternal  happiness  would  intervene  in  such  a 
cliildish  game  of  men,  obeying  them  and  giving  satisfaction  to 
their  insane  curiosity.  Moreover,  it  would  be  impious  to  affirm 
tliat  God,  who  abominates  divination  and  forbids  it  so  severely, 
should  permit  the  inhabitants  of  heaven  to  interpret  them.  Spirits 
of  that  sort  then  are  bad  spirits,  cursed  by  God  for  eternity,  and 
seeking  to  entrap  men  in  their  meshes.  Now,  shall  we  not  refuse 
with  indignation  to  entertain  relations  with  those  unclean  spirits, 
to  evoke  them,  or  render  to  them  a  true  worship?  Is  not  this  the 
crime  of  divination    forbidden  by  God  as  abominable?* 

Appendix  II. —  Animal  magnetism. 

279.  —  The  Roman  Curia,  questioned  on  the  use  of  magnetism 
in  general,  answered  through  the  Congregation  of  the  Holy  Office 
on  the  21st  of  April,  1841  :  The  use  of  magnetism,  as  it  is 
explained,  is  not  permitted.   .   .  . 

Appendix  III.  —  Consultation  of  Spirits,  or  Spiritualism. 

282.  —  This  is  a  new  superstition,  the  worst  of  all,  sent  by  hell 
for  the  destruction  of  souls.   ... 

Qiies.     What  is  witchcraft? 

Ans.  It  is  magic  aimini»-  at  injurinj^  others  by  the  intervention  of  the 
devil.  It  tal\es  also  tlie  name  of  sorcery;  because  it  consists  in  tlirovviniï 
ppells,  with  the  help  of  the  Uevil,  over  our  enemies. — Petit  Catéchisme  de 
Norotte. 

Here  is  what  is  thought  in  the  19th  century,  in  face  of  the  light  of 
modern  science. 

*  Ques.     What  is  to  be  thought  of  turning  and  speaking  tables? 
Ans.     The  experiments  on  turning  and  speaking  tables  are  nothing  elso 
than  buperslitioas  and  di^ibolicul  Dractices. — Petit  Catéchisme  de  Marotte- 


114  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

It  is  clear  that  it  is  a  diabolical  consnltation,  a  so-called  divina- 
tion, severely  forbidden  by  tlie  Church.  Those  who  coiistdt 
spirits  or  spiritualists,  in  order  to  diffuse  more  easily  their  pesti- 
lential error,  have  formed  a  sect,  which  grows  from  day  to  day  in 
large  cities.  .  .  . 

Art.  II.     Irreligion. 

This  is  a  particular  lack  of  respect  wliichad<lresses  itself  to  God, 
either  immediately,  or  through  the  medium  of  i)er.sons  and  sacred 
tilings.  The  principal  kmds  are;  temptation  relative  to  God, 
sacrilege,  simony,  and  perjury. 

Section  I.     Temptation  relative  to  God. 

283. — This  is  a  word  or  an  act  by  which  one  seeks  to  know  if 
God  is  powerful,  wise,  merciful,  or  gifted  with  some  olherqualities. 

Section  II.     Sacrilege. 

284. — This  is  a  violation,  or  an  unworthy  treatment  inflicted  on  a 
sacred  thing.     It  is:   1,  personal  ;  2,  local  ;  3,  real.   .   .   . 

285.  —  A  personal  sacrilege  is  committed  :  1st.  in  laying  violent 
hands  on  one  of  the  clergy,  or  on  a  monk  ;  2nd.  in  luxuriously  vio- 
lating persons  devoted  to  God,  even  by  simple  sensual  contact; 
3id.  in  traducing  ecclesiastics  before  a  tribunal.* 

Section  III.    Simony. 

288. —  Simony,  so  called  from  Simon  the  maç^ician,  is  the  desire 
which  seeks  to  sell,  or  to  buy  a  spi'-itual  benefit  for  a  temporal 
price.     It  is  called,  seeking  will  or  deliberate  will. 

The  canon  laws  recognize  three  soits  of  temi)oral  prizes:  Gift 
of  the  liand  ;  .  .  .  Gift  of  the  tongue  ;  .  .  .  (praises,  etc.,)  Gift 
of  obsequiousness.   .   .   . 

Simony  is  subdivide!  into  mental;  .  .  .  conventional;  .  .  . 
actual.   .   .   . 

*  St.  Ligiiori  has  imairined  a  very  inscenioiis  species  which  makes  it 
doubly  sacrile*rious  :  "  If  a  priest  in  administering^  sacraments  or  in  tlie 
act  of  saying  mass,  when  clothed  in  sacred  vestments  or  leaving  the  altar, 
pollutes  himself  vohmtarilv,  or  delights  in  venereal  pleasures,  he  commits 
asncrilege"  (Book  III.,  No.  3G3). 

With  a  little  imagination,  one  could  invent  a  triple  sacrilege.  This  is  a 
pretty  problem,  that  I  present  to  any  one  concerned  in  the  matter. 


Treatise  on  the  Precepts  of  the  Decalogue.  115 

"We  distinguish  the  simony  of  divine  rights  (indulgences,  sacra- 
ments)   .   .   .  and  that  of  eccZesias^'ca^  n^/i/s  (benefices).   .  .   . 

289.  —  Simony  is  a  very  grave  sin.*  It  comprehends  no  trifling 
reasons  in  natural  and  divine  rights  ;  ...  in  ecclesiastical  rights 
it  may. 

290.  —  Ques.  Is  it  simony,  to  give  temporal  things  to  conciliate 
a  superior  in  view  of  obtaining  a  favor? 

Ans.    No,  if  the  principal  intention  is  to  give  it  gratuitously  .   .   . 

Ques.  Is  there  simony  if  one  exercises  sacred  functions  especiall3^ 
in  view  of  his  salary  ? 

Ans.  No,  at  least  according  to  the  probable  opinion  ;  because 
one  does  not  receive  the  salary  as  the  price  of  the  sacred  functions, 
but  as  something  due  to  a  person  working  for  the  good  of  others.   .   . 

291. —  Is  there  simony  in  giving  or  receiving  something  for  enter- 
ing a  religious  Order? 

Ans.  It  is  evident  that  a  poor  convent  is  permitted  to  exact  some- 
thing for  the  feeding,  etc.,  of  the  new  comer  ;  because  then  one  does 

*  Do  not  be  frightened  by  such  a  show  of  severe  principles.  Already 
the  exceptions  indicated  by  Gury  teach  us,  t  at  there  are  ways  and  means 
of  conipromisin.i?  matters  with  Heaven.  The  ancient  Jesuits,  even  in  pro- 
claiming the  same  theoretical  horror,  expressed  themselves  more  clearlv 
yet: 

P.ram.  Sa:  "It  is  not  simony  to  give  something  to  a  man  in  order  to 
gain  his  friendship,  i)y  means  of  which  a  l^enetice  will  be  obtained; 
neitiier  to  give  a  benefice  secondarily,  and  not  principally, /or  j9erso?i«^ 
(jood;  .  .  .  nor  with  the  agreed  condition  tliat  the  beneficiary  shall  resign 
it  when  he  shall  have  a  better  one  ;  nor  with  tliis  other  condition,  that  he 
will  remit  a  debt  not  valid  in  justice;  nor  with  tlie  equally  express  con- 
dition, but  nevertlieless  without  a  contract,  that  he  will  give  it  to  some 
one  else."     (page  148.) 

To  let  :  •*  Any  one  promising  money  in  order  to  receive  a  benefice,  but 
M'hose  promise  is  insincere,  taking  the  resolution  not  to  keep  it,  if  he 
tlius  obtains  the  benefice,  is  he  guilty  of  simony?  No;  because  it  is  the 
intention  which  determines  the  natuie  of  exterior  acts.  This  is  the  opin- 
ion of  Lessius,  Suarez,  de  Valence,  Fabri,  Laymann,  etc.,  etc." 

Grégoire  de  Valence:  "It  is  not  simony  to  render  some  service  to  a 
bisiiop,  or  to  present  liim  witli  some  tempoiul  gifts,  in  the  hope  of  obtain- 
ing from  him,  in  gratitude,  some  spiritual  benefice." 

Filliucius  :  "If  some  sacred  thing  was  given  for  an  immodest  pleasure 
and  tliis  as  the  price  of  it,  and  not  simply  out  of  gratitude  or  kindness, 
then  tliis  would  be  simony  and  sacrilege;  as  for  instance,  if  the  collect- 
ion, election,  or  presentation  of  a  benetice  was  the  price  of  lewdness 
committed  with  the  beneficiary's  sister.  I  have  said  not  out  of  gratitude; 
because  in  this  case  there  wouUl  be  neitlier  sacrilege  nor  simony,  but  only 
a  sort  of  irreverence  in  rewnrding  a  sliamelul  and  i)rorane  action  by  a 
thing  sacred  and  dedicated  to  God."  (page  151) 


V 


116  Tlie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

not  exchange  a  spiritual  thing  for  a  temporal  one  ;  and  besides, 
equity  demands  something,  so  that  the  convent  shall  not  be  ruined 
hy  expenses.   .   .    . 

It  is  evident  that  nuns  are  permitted  to  exact  a  dowry  from  the 
new  comer,  as  it  is  established  everywhere  by  custom.   .   .   . 

292. —  Ques.  Is  there  simony  when  a  priest  offers  a  mass  to  a 
la3'man  for  a  stake,  whilst  his  companion  exposes  a  material  stake? 

Ans.  No,  in  principle  ;  because  a  spiritual  thing  is  not  balanced 
by  a  temporal  one  in  this  manner  ;  it  is  just  as  when  a  mass  is  said 
for  a  specified  price  ;  it  is  only  offering  a  spiritual  payment  instead 
of  a  temporal  one.   .   .  . 

Ques.  Is  there  simony  when  a  priest  exacts  for  a  mass  a  price 
above  the  habitual  tariff,  or  that  fixed  by  the  bishop? 

Ans.  No,  in  conscience  and  before  God,  unless  there  is  a 
thought  of  simony  ;  as  long  as  he  has  a  right  to  exact  a  renumera- 
tion,  no  exchange  of  a  spiritual  thing  for  a  temporal  one  is  in- 
tended.  ... 

295. — One  is  not  guilty  of  simony  when,  through  gratitude  lie 
gives  a  temporal  benefit  for  a  spiritual  benefit  rec^eived,  and  vice 
versa.  Thus,  there  would  be  no  sin  on  the  part  of  a  chaplain 
who  willingly  puts  himself  at  the  service  of  a  bishop  out  of  grati- 
tude for  former  kindness  ;  such  things  are  not  looked  upon  as  a 
price.  Moreover,  it  is  honorable  and  praiseworthy  to  show  one's 
self  grateful  for  past  favors.   .  .   . 

Ques.  Is  it  necessary  to  restore  the  price  of  simony  which  has 
been  received  for  a  spiritual  thing? 

Ans.  If  the  crime  of  simon}'  only  has  been  committed,  and  if 
justice  has  not  been  violated,  there  is  no  obligation  to  pay  back  be- 
fore you  are  condemned  to  do  it  by  a  judgment  ;  unless  the  price 
is  above  the  estimation  of  the  temporal  good  given  to  the  other  in 
exchansje.   .   .   . 


Cases  on  tïje  Jirst  precept    of  tlje  ffiecalogue. 


Case  IX. 
On  Divination. 


Lazare  has  heard  that  a  ring  or  a  stone  hung  to  a  thread,  held 
between  the  thumb  and  the  index  in  such  a  way  as  to  strike  a 
glass,  indicates  the  hour.  Drawn  b\'  curiosity,  he  was  going  to 
test  it  ;  when  some  one  told  him  that  it  is  not  allowable,  because 
it  is  a  superstitious  practice.  He  asks  for  the  advice  of  his  con- 
fessor. 

Ques.  Can  he  make  the  experiment?  Is  it  a  superstitious  prac- 
tice? 

Ans.  Lazare  must  not  make  the  experiment,  as  it  is  evidently 
a  superstitious  practice.  This  is  no  natural  cause  for  indicating  the 
hour,  since  such  indications  proceed  neither  from  pulsation,  nor 
from  the  imagination,  nor  from  the  attraction  of  the  stars. 

Case  X. 
Magic  and  Witchcraft. 

Sabellus,  betrothed  to  Sigolena,  is  on  the  point  of  marrying 
her.  But  Dafrosa,  the  step-mother  of  Sigolena,  and  a  fast  woman, 
hears  of  it,  and  does  all  she  can  to  prevent  it,  but  in  vain.  Then, 
in  anger,  she  said  to  Sigolena:  "  Let  my  curse  fall  upon  thy 
head  !"  After  the  marriage,  Sabellus  conceives  such  an  aversion 
for  his  wife  that  he  cannot  see  her  without  disgust.  Sigolena  sus- 
pecting Dafrosa  of  having  thrown  a  spell  over  her,  complains  to 
Dafrosa  of  her  husband's  aversion,  and  asks  if  she  knows  a  remedy, 
"Yes,"  answers  Dafrosa,  "but  I  will  not  give  it  thee,  until  I 
receive  one  hundred  pounds.'* 

Ques.  Can  we  reasonably  conjecture  that  in  this  case  there  is 
intervention  of  magic,  or  witchcraft? 


118  TJte  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Ans.  Yes,  this  seems  to  be  the  result  of  all  the  circumstances. 
Assuredly,  a  natural  aversion  may  come  l)etween  man  and  wife,  as 
we  see  many  examples  of  it  ;  but  it  does  not  come,  without  a 
known  cause,  with  such  rapidity  an  I  violence.  Add  to  this  the 
threats  of  Dafrosa,  a  courtesan,  and  the  remedy  she  claims  to 
have  at  her  disposal,  if  she  is  paid  for  it.  In  the  Scriptures,  we 
see  there  were  magicians,  witches,  and  sorcerers  ;  this  is  also 
established  in  different  passages  of  the  canon  laws,  with  abundant 
proofs.  So  we  cannot  refuse  to  have  faith  in  all  the  diabolical 
facts  of  this  nature,  in  general  and  in  particular,  when  there  are 
unquestionable  indications  of  it.  In  all  ancient  times  there  have 
always  been  perverse  men,  selling  themselves  to  the  devil,  in 
order  to  have  his  intervention  in  revenging  themselves  on  others 
in  a  strange  and  frightful  manner.  Why,  in  so  corrupt  a  time  as 
this,  should  there  not  be  also  magicians  and  sorcerers?  But  we 
must  avoid  believing  too  easily  everything  that  is  related  :  most 
of  these  are  intentions,  and  the  people,  too  credulous,  often  attrib- 
ute to  witchcraft  the  calamities  and  plagues  which  result  from 
natural  causes. 

Case  XII. 
Table  Turning. 

Camille,  mother  of  a  family,  drawn  by  feminine  curiosity,  has 
often,  of  her  own  free-will,  attended  meetings  in  which  the  attend- 
ants, forming  a  circular  chain  by  means  of  a  light  contact  at  the 
extremity  of  the  fingers,  make  tables  turn,  stop  them  at  will,  make 
them  walk,  go  back,  answer  by  conventional  signs,  and  even,  oh 
stupefaction  !  make  them  write  with  a  pencil  fixed  to  one  of  the 
legs,  all  the  answers  asked  of  them.   .  .   . 

Ques.     What  must  we  think  of  these  practices? 

Ans.  Assuredly,  we  must  attribute  to  the  devil  everything  that 
is  done  in  the  form  of  divination,  all  that  is  relative  to  divination  ; 
and  those  questions  asked  of  tables  on  things  secret  or  future,  and 
the  answers  received  by  signs  or  characters.  In  reality,  why 
put  questions  to  a  wooden  or  marble  table,  and  expect  answers? 
You  are  not  foolish  enough  for  that.  You  believe,  then,  that  you 
are  in  communication  with  an  intelligent  being,  or  some  spirit,  who 


Canes  on  the  First  Precept  of  the  Decalogue,         119 

can  move  an  inert  t:»ble.  Now,  such  beings  cannot  be  good. 
Who  would  dare  to  affirm  that  it  iy  God  himself,  or  an  angel  sent 
by  Him,  who  intervenes  in  these  foolish  games  of  men,  and  who 
always  zealously  yields  to  their  vain  curiosities  and  impious 
notions?  It  would  be  a  horrible  blasphemy.  And  it  could  not  be 
either  from  souls  expiating  in  Purgatory  that  we  can  expect  the 
knowledge  of  sacred  things  ;  because  they  can  do  it  only  accord- 
ing to  God's  will.  Of  course,  it  is  the  devil  himself  who  is  im- 
plicitly invoked  ;  it  is  he  who  is  worshipped,  in  spite  of  God's 
prohibition. 

Case  XIII. 
Animal  Magnetism. 

There  are  three  degrees  in  the  effects  of  magnetism:  1.  The 
state  of  sleep,  which  consists  only  in  the  torpor  of  the  senses  ;  2. 
The  state  of  somnambulism,  in  which,  in  spite  of  the  torpor  of  the 
senses,  one  sees,  one  speaks,  one  answers  ;  3.  The  marvelous 
knowledge  of  one's  position  and  the  requisite  remedies  necessary 
to  it,  as  well  as  the  sight  of  things  which  happen  far  from  there. 
This  granted  : 

1. — The  third  degree  must  certainly  be  condemned  as  forbidden, 
and  full  of  superstition.  It  is  nothing  else,  in  fact,  than  an  evi- 
dent divination,  which  we  must  abominate  in  all  cases. 

2. —  The  second  degree,  the  somnambulism,  can  in  no  way  be 
considered  as  natural,  and  must  be  attributed  to  the  intervention  of 
the  devil.  Because  nobody  can  see  with  his  eyes  shut.  No  one, 
in  a  state  of  deep  sleep,  can  answer  clearly  and  distinctly  any 
question  whatever. 

3. —  The  first  degree,  if  we  consider  only  the  state  of  sleep,  could 
be  looked  upon  as  natural  ;  but  this  cannot  be  admitted  in  any 
way.  .  .  . 

Then  the  first  degree  must  be  called  superstitious,  and  must 
certainly  be  prohibited. 

Case  XVI. 
On  Sacrilege. 

Renatus  went  to  church  on  a  feast  day,  not  to  worship  God> 
but  to  meet  and  see  his  betrothed.     During  all  the  divine  service. 


120  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

he  looked  at  her  with  unchaste  desires  ;  he  allowed  his  mind  to  be 
filled  with  depraved  thoughts,  and  did  nothing  else,  but  de  se 
toucher  et  polluer.*  The  mass  being  over,  he  invited  the  young 
girl,  by  signs,  to  abandon  herself  to  him  {copulam  liabendam)  in 
some  other  place. 

Ques.  1. —  Has  he  committed  one  or  several  sacrileges? 

Ques.  2. —  Has  the  church  been  profaned? 

Ans.  Question  1. —  He  has  not  committed  any  sacrilege  by  his 
obscene  thoughts  .  .  .  neither  by  his  immodest  looks  .  .  .  nor  by 
the  signs  to  his  betrothed. 

But  he  has  committed  a  sacrilege  by  polluting  himself,  even 
secretly,  and  this  as  often  as  it  took  place  ;  .  . ..  and  also,  at  least 
with  probability,  because  of  his  self- contact. 

Ans.  Question  2. —  The  church  has  not  been  profaned  by  Rena- 
tus'  pollution,  though  he  has  committed  a  sacrilege  ;  because  the 
pollution  was  a  secret  one. 

*  The  vilest  phrases  will  remain  untranslated. 


Srcontï  Precept  of  tlje  ÎSecalogue. 


Thou  shalt  not  take  the  name  of  the  Lord  thy  God  in  vain." 

Exodus  XX.  7. 


CHAPTER  I. 
Vain  Usurpation  of  the  Name  of  God,  and  Blasphemy. 

ART.  I. —  Vain  usurpation  of  God's  holy  name. 

296. —  It  is  a  vain  usurpation  of  the  name  of  Gorl,  when  it  is 
pronounced  without  reasonable  cause,  and  without  the  respect  it 
deserves. 

ART.  II.— Blasphemy. 

299. —  Blasphemy  is  a  word,  or  an  expression,  insulting  to 
God.   ... 

CHAPTER  II. 

Oaths. 

306. —  An  oath  is  an  invocation  of  the  divine  Name  to  attest 
the  truth.  .   .   . 

ART.  I. —  The  conditions  of  an  oath. 

Section  1. —  Conditions  required  for  the  validity  of  an  oath. 

307. —  There  are  two  of  them:  1st,  The  intention,  at  least 
virtual,  of  taking  an  oath  ;  because  without  this  intention  there 
can  be  no  valid  oath.  2d,  A  formula  for  the  oath  ;  in  other  words, 
a  sign  by  which  we  express  sufficiently,  either  explicitly  or 
implicitly,  that  we  take  God  as  our  witness.  .  .  . 


122  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

ART.  TI.—  The  obligation  of  the  oath. 

312. —  That  obligation  must  be  strictly  interpreted,  and  ranst 
conform  itself  to  the  nature  of  tiie  act  or  of  the  contract  to  which 
it  is  added,  as  well  as  to  all  their  conditions. 

The  first  reason  is,  that  the  one  who  gives  his  oath,  is  regarded 
as  wishing  to  be  bound  the  least  possible  ;  the  second  reason  is, 
that  the  oath  does  not  change  the  nature  of  the  act,  but  onl}'  adds 
to  it  a  religious  obligation  ;  and,  consequently,  must  be  under  the 
same  conditions  and  be  bound  by  the  same  limits.   .   .   . 

315. —  One  is  not  bound  b}'  an  oath  given  in  a  promise  of 
marriage  to  a  young  lady,  rich,  healthy,  a  virgin,  and  of  good 
reputation,  if  she  falls  into  poverty,  sickness,  infam}^  or  fornica- 
tion ;  because  a  simple  pi'omise  does  not  oblige  in  this  case.*  .   .   . 

Appendix  on  Adjuration. 

316.  Adjui'ing  is  a  supplication,  made  with  authority  and 
prayer  in  the  name  of  God,  of  the  saints,  or  of  a  sacred  thing,  in 
order  to  induce  someone  to  do  or  avoid  something.   .   .   . 

318.     Ques.     Concerning  what  may  we  question  the  devil? 

Ans. —  Concerning  everything  related  to  his  expulsion;  for 
instance,  on  the  time  and  cause  of  his  taking  possession,  etc.   .   .   . 

Ques.     What  are  the  signs  of  a  true  possession  by  the  devil? 

Ans.     The  principal  are:   1.    Speaking  a  language  not  known 
before  the  possession  ;  2.    Divulging  secret  and  strange  things 
not  known  by  men  ;  3.    Obeying  the  purely  internal  orders  of  the 
priest;  4.    Experiencing  greater  suffering  or  greater  tranquilit}', 
induced  by  the  devil,  when  ignorantly  touching  sacred  things.  .  .  . 

In  general,  we  must  not  believe  easily  that  some  one  is  pos- 
sessed ;  because  true  possessions  very  seldom  happen    in  our  time. 

CHAPTER  III. 

Vows. 

319. — A  vow  is  a  deliberate  promise  made  to  God  concerning  a 
a  better  welfare. 

*The  promissory  oath  does  not  oblige:  1st,  when  it  cannot  be  kept 
without  iiicuiTiiig  grave  claiiiaj^es,  etc.     {Marotte). 


Second  Precejit  of  the  Decalogue.  123 

Vows  are  : 

1.  Solemn  or  simple.   .   .   . 

2.  Selfish  or  real.   .   .   • 

3.  Temporary  or  perpetual.   .   .   . 

ART.  I. — Conditions  required  for  vows. 

There  are  two  principal  ones  included  in  the  definition:  1,  a 
true  intention  ;  2,  a  qualified  motive. 

Section  I.     The  intention  required  bj  the  vow.   .   .   . 

322. — Ques.  Is  one  held  by  a  vow  if  he  doubts  that  he  has 
pronounced  a  vow  or  onlj'  a  simple  proposition  ;  or,  that  there  has 
been  sufficient  deliberation? 

Ans. — 1.  No;  in  consequence  of  what  has  been  said  on  the 
subject  of  probability.  But  if,  when  promising,  he  believed  that  it 
would  be  a  sin  not  to  fulfil  the  vow,  it  is  to  be  judged  that  the 
vow  is  valid. 

Ans. — 2.  No,  for  the  same  reason  ;  if  we  have  positive  and 
serious  doubts  about  a  suflHcient  deliberation.  Most  of  the  time, 
the  question  must  be  decided  after  the  examination  of  the  circum- 
stances.  .  .  . 

Section  II.     Motive  for  the  vow. 

324. — Ques.  Is  a  vow  valid,  if  it  has  a  perverse  aim,  or  evil 
conditions? 

Ans.  1. — No,  if  the  bad  aim  is  attached  to  the  vow;  for 
instance,  if  you  vow  to  give  alms  in  order  to   steal  successfully. 

Ans.  2. — Yes,  if  when  the  vow  is  made,  one  is  influenced  by 
good  sentiments  ;  it  is  valid  then,  though  having  a  bad  cause  or 
evil  conditions  :  for  instance,  to  vow  to  give  alms  if  one  is  not 
caught  stealing.  Because,  if  to  steal  is  an  evil,  not  to  be  caught 
is  not  one,  but  certainly  a  gift  of  God;  now,  the  vow  does 
not  bear  upon  evil,  but  on  good,   insomuch  it  is  good  by  itself. 

ART.  II.     Obhgation  of  the  vow.  .  .  . 


124  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

ART.  III.     Cessation  of  the  vow. 

329. — The  obligation  of  the  vow  may  cease  : 

1.  For  intrinsic  causes,  for  instance,  by  the  cessation  of  the 
aim  or  of  the  motive,  the  change  of  the  motive,  a  moral  or  physi- 
cal impossibility. 

2.  For  extrinsic  causes,  by  annulment,  dispensation  or  change. 

Section  I.     Annulment  of  the  vow.  .  .  . 
Section  II.     Dispensation  from  the  vow.  .  .  . 
Section  III.     Chansje  of  vow.  .  .  o 


Cases  on  tfje  Scrontf  î^recept  of  tfje  Hecalogue. 


Case  VII. 

The  Value  of  Vows. 


Gervais,  a  youth,  vowed  :  1st,  to  preserve  a  perpetual  chastity, 
which  he  thought  easy  to  do,  but  later  difficult  to  keep  ;  2d,  not 
to  eat  the  heads  of  animals,  in  honor  of  St.  John  the  Baptist,  the 
beheaded.   .   .   . 

Qiies.     Are  these  vows  valid? 

Ans.     Yes,  for  the  first.   .  .   .  No,  for  the  second. 

Case  VIII. 
The  Value  of  Vows. 

Veronica,  mother  of  a  family,  observing  wnth  grief  that  her 
daughter  Martine  is  pregnant  by  Titus,  and  fearing  dishonor  for 
the  family,  vows  before  God  and  the.  holy  Virgin  to  give  a 
hundred  pieces  of  gold  to  the  church  if  her  daughter  dies  ^before 
giving  birth  to  the  child. 

Ques.     Is  the  vow  valid? 

Ans.  Though  valid  as  to  the  object  of  the  vow,  it  is  illicit  as 
to  the  end.  .  .  .  Indeed,  thounh  one  cannot  condemn  a  mother 
who,  to  avoid  such  dishonor,  wishes  for  God  to  take  away  her 
daughter;  however,  as  there  is  here  an  eternal  injury  for  her 
child,  and  as  tlie  desire  of  the  mother  is  not  sul^ject  to  the  condi- 
tion of  her  eternal  salvation^  but  is  absolute,  that  desire  is  illicit. 


Eljirti  33rrcrpt  of  i]}z  Bccalogue. 

"R.member  the  Sabbath  day,  to  keep  it  hoh'."    Exodus  xx.  8. 


CHAPTER    I. 
What  is  Commanded  ox  Feast  Days. 
ART.  I.     What  is  to  be  done,  generall3%  on  Feast  Days. 

338. —  All  the  faithful  iiaving  reached  the  age  of  reason,  are 
obliged,  under  penalty  of  a  grave  sin,  to  attend  mass  every  Sun- 
day and  feast  day,  unless  there  should  be  a  legitimate  reason.   .   .   . 

ART.  II.     The  hearing  of  mass  in  particular. 

341. —  .  .  .  One  attends  mass,  according  to  the  more  probable 
opinion,  if  one  is  in  a  house  in  the  neighborhood  from  which  one 
can  see,  through  the  door  or  window,  the  allar  or  the  attendants, 
provided  a  little  space  only  separates  t'.ie  house  from  the  church. 
It  would  be  otherwise  if  there  was  a  large  space  or  square.   .   .   . 

344. —  In  order  to  hear  ma-s  properly,  at  ention,  at  lea^t  ex- 
ternal, is  required. 

Some  internal  attention  is  also  necessary,  at  least,  the  desire  to 
hear  mass.   .   .   . 

One  of  the  three  following  internal  attentions  is  sufficient: 
attention  to  tlie  words  and  acts  of  the  priest  ;  to  ihe  meaning  of 
the  words  and  of  the  mysteries  ;  to  God  himself.   .   .   . 

347. —  .  .  .  Mass  is  sufficiently  listened  to,  if  one  is  involuntari'y 
diverted,  even  during  the  whole  ceremony  ;  unless  one  should  be  so 
much  absorbed  by  other  thoughts  as  to  lend  no  attention  what- 
ever.  .   .   . 

The  one  who  goes  to  sleep  from  time  to  time  does  not  commit  a 
grave  sin,  if  once  in  a  while  his  attention  is  called  to  what  happens 
around  him. 


Third  Precept  of  tJie  Decalogue,  127 

Those  who  are  diverted,  do  not  commit  a  grave  sin,  if  they  lend 
a  virtual  attention.  I'hat  is  to  say,  if,  liaving  had  in  the  b'^gin- 
ning  the  intention  of  listening,  they  have  been  disturbed  during 
all  the  time  of  the  naass,  without  changing  their  first  intention.   .   .   . 

353. —  Ques.  Can  the  realization  of  a  notable  gain  be  alleged  as 
a  sufficient  excuse  for  non-attendance  at  mass? 

Ans.  Yes,  according  to  the  ])robable  opinion,  because  the  pre- 
cepts of  the  Church  do  not  oblige  us  to  suffer  a  serious  loss,  as 
has  been  said  in  the  Treatise  on  Laws,  No.  100,  but  such  gain 
must  be  extraordinary. 

CHAPTER  II. 
Things  Forbidden  on  Sundays  and  Feast  Days. 

ART.  1.     Forbidden  work  on  Feast  Days. 

355. —  In  principle,  all  manual  labor  {servilia)  properly  so  called, 
is  forbidden  to  the  faithful.   .   .  . 

But  liberal  works,  common  works,  and  the  manual  labors  nec- 
essary to  eveiy  day  life,  are  permitted.   .  .   . 

357. —  Ques.  Is  it  permitted:  1,  to  write  ;  2,  to  transcribe 
anything,  on  a  feast  day? 

Ans.  1.     Yes,  because  it  is  a  liberal  art. 

Ans.  2.     Yes,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion. 

It  is  permitted  then  to  draw,  to   copy  music,  to  correct  books. 

Ques.     Is  it  permitted  :   1,   to  sculpture  ;  2,  to  paint? 

Ans.  1.  No;  sculpture  is  generally  classified  as  a  mechanical 
art. 

Ans.  2.     For  painting,  controversy.   .   .   . 

358. —  Ques.     Are  fishing  and  hunting  permitted! 

Ans.  Yes,  because  they  are  not  manual  works,  provided  no 
great  noise,  bustle,  and  great  preparations  are  made.   .   .   . 

Ques.  What  is  tlie  serious  motive  for  woik  done  on  a  fast 
day? 

Ans.  According  to  many,  if  it  is  a  purely  mnnunl  work,  two 
hours  are  sufficient;  if  it  is  scarcely  manual,  three  hours.   .   .   . 


128  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

Ques.  Is  it  a  grave  sin  to  order  one's  servants  to  work  each 
one  one  hour  on  a  feast  day? 

Ans.  No,  in  principle,  and  according  to  the  more  probable 
opinion,  whether  the  servants  work  together,  or  one  after  the 
other;  because  their  works  do  not  form  a  totalit}^  but  they  sin 
only  venially  each  one  in  particular  ;  then  the  master  commits  but 
a  venial  sin  in  ordering  them  to  do  a  work  forbidden  under  venial 
sin. 

ART.  II.  Causes  for  which  salaried  works  are  permitted  on 
feast  days.   .   .   . 


Casts  on  t}}e  ®{)trtr  ^Precept  of  tje  ©ccaloguc* 

They  are  of  special  order,  and  not  interesting,  except  as 
indicating  the  cunning  used  by  parishioners  to  deceive  their 
pastors,  or  elude  the  rules. 


JFcurtlj  ï^rccept  of  tlje  ÎBecalogue. 

*'  Honor  thy  father  and  thy  mother."     Exodus  xx.  12. 


,  That  precept  aims  primarily  and  in  a  direct  manner  at  the 
obligations  of  children  towards  their  parents  ;  and  secondarily,  in 
an  implicit  manner,  at  the  obligations  of  parents  towards  their 
children  ;  as  well  as  at  the  reciprocal  obligations  of  other  superiors 
and  inferiors. 

CHAPTER   I. 

Obligations  of  Children  Towards  their  Parents. 

363. —  Children  are  bound  towards  their  parents  by  wholly 
special  obligations.  They  have  their  duties  to  fulfil  ;  to  love, 
respect,  and  obey.   .  .  . 

Section  I.     Love.* 

*  Ques.  In  what  consists  the  assistance  which  children  owe  to  their 
parents  in  their  spiritual  needs? 

Ans.  It  consists  :  1,  in  respectfully  recalling  to  them  the  truths  of 
the  faith,  the  fear  of  God,  and  love  and  zeal  ior  religious  duties,  when 
Ihey  see  them  indifferent  to  their  salvation  ;  2,  to  warn  them  of  their  state 
when  they  are  dangerously  sick,  to  exhort  them  to  receive  the  sacra- 
ments, and  take  care  that  they  shall  be  administered  at  a  propitious  time, 
and  before  they  are  at  the  point  of  death. —  Petit  Catéchisme  de  Marotte. 

One  is  astonished  and  indignant  at  hearing  of  so  many  odious  scenes  at 
death-beds. 

We  must,  however,  recognize,  that  in  Gury  no  trace  is  found  of  the 
infamous  doctrine  resumed  by  Escobar  in  the  following  terms  :  "A  son  is 
and  is  not  obliged  to  feed  an  inlidel  father  who  is  in  the  greatest  laeces- 
sity,  if  the  latter  tries  to  induce  him  to  abandon  the  faith." 

*'  He  is  absolutely  obliged  to  it.  .  .  . 

"  He  is  not  at  all  obliged  to  it.  .  .  . 

"This  last  sentiment  must  be  held  absolutely;  because  Catholic  child- 
ren are  obliged  to  denounce  their  fathers  or  relations  guilty  of  heresy, 
.  .  .  even  should  they  know  that  their  fathers  ought  to  be  delivered  to 
the  flames,  according  to  the  teachings  of  Tolet.  .  .  .  Then  .  .  .  they 
may  refuse  them  nourishment,  and  even  let  them  die  of  hunger.  Fagnn- 
dez  .  .  .   adds,  that  they  may  even  kill  them;   keeping,   however,  the 


130  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

Section  II.     Respect.  ... 
Section  III.     Obedience. 

367. —  Children  must  obey  their  parents  in  all  Inwful  nnd  honest 
things  relative  to  them,  so  long  as  they  are  in  their  power.  .  .  . 
But  in  bad  things,  children  neither  mu->t  nor  can  obey  ;  this  is 
evident  by  natural  right. 

369. —  Ques.  Are  children  obliged  to  obey  their  parents  in  the 
choice  of  a  profession  ? 

Ans.  No,  in  principle  ;  because  every  mnn  in  view  of  sure 
means  of  drawing  himself  towards  God,  his  highest  aim,  or 
in  order  to  regulate  his  life  fully  and  freely  for  such  an  end, 
is  quite  independent  of  others.  So  parents  sin  gravely  by 
forcing  their  children  directly,  or  even  indirectly,  to  choose  a 
profession,  either  monastic,  ecclesiastical,  or  conjugal  ;  and  also,  if 
without  any  just  motive,  they  prevent  them  from  following  one  of 
those  profession. 

I  have  said  in  principle,  because  it  would  be  otherwise  if,  for 
weighty  or  reasonable  causes,  the  parents  were  opposing  the  will 
of  their  children  ;  for  instance,  if,  being  in  poverty,  they  were 
obliged  to  have  recourse  to  them,  the  children  not  being  able  to 
succor  their  parents  without  remaining  with  them. 

Ques.  Are  children  permitted  to  enter  religious  orders  in  spite 
of  their  parents  ? 

Ans.  Yes,  in  principle  ;  moreover,  the  child  being  attracted 
by  vocation  to  a  religious  profession,  and  believing  that  he  will  be 
unjustly  opposed  by  his  parents,  will  act  more  wisely  if  he  hides 
his  intentions  from  them,  and  obeys  the  Divine  will.  However, 
this  advice  must  not  be  given  to  minors  when  it  is  not  an  urgent 
case,  or  when  one  is  not  sure  of  his  vocation.  In  France  esi)e- 
cially,  good  care  must  be  taken  not  to  advise  minors  thus,  because 
the  parents,  with  the  help  of  the  secular  power,  can  take  them 
from  any  institution,  and  carry  them  back  home.   .   .   . 

moderation  proper  to  a  legitimate  defence,  as  with  enemies  violatinc?  the 
rights  of  humanity,  if  they  want  to  force  their  cliikh'en  to  abandon  the 
true  faith  ;  but  nevertheless,  they  must  not  bind  them  to  make  them  die 
of  hunger."     (page  436.) 


Fourth  Precept  of  the  Decalogue,  131 

CHAPTER   II. 

Obligations  of  Parknts  towards  their  Children. 
They  owe  them  love  and  education. 
Section  I.     Love.  ... 
Section  II.     Education. 
It  must  be  material  and  spiritual. 

372. —  Material  education  requires  a  triple  foresight  on  the  part 
of  parents:    for  the  life,  for  nourishment,  and    for   profession. 

374. —  Parents  must,  above  all,  procure  spiritual  education  for 
their  children;  because  man,  besides  his  material  body,  in  com- 
mon with  other  animals,  received  from  God  a  soul  reasonable  and 
noble,  created  in  the  image  of  divinity  ;  he  was  born  to  draw 
nearer  to  God  through  time  and  eternity.  .   .  . 

This  education  requires:  1,  doctrine;  2,  correction;  3,  exam- 
ple. .  .  . 

CHAPTER   III. 

Conjugal  Obligations. 

378. —  Married  people  owe  each  other  reciprocally: 

1.  Mutual  affection.  .  .   . 

2.  Conjugal  society  and  cohabitation.   .   .  . 

3.  Nourishment,  and  what  is  necessary  for  an  honorable 
position.  .  .  . 

4.  Conjugal  duty,  when  it  is  seriously  asked  for,  there  being 
no  reason  to  refuse.   .   .   . 

379. —  The  husband's  duty  is  particularly  : 

To  see  that  his  wife  fulfils  her  religious  duties,  and  follows  the 
precepts  of  the  divine  law  and  of  the  law  of  the  church  ;  because 
he  is  the  head  and  the  chief  of  the  familj^  and  so  must  attend  to 
the  good  direction  of  his  wife  and  other  members  of  the  family. 

To  punish  his  wife  when  she  commits  a  fault,  when  it  is 
necessary  to  correct  her  and  prevent  a  scandal.   .   .  . 

381. —  ...  In  the  beginning  he  must  gently  reprove  her,  in 


132  TJte  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

order  to  correct  her  ;  or,  if  that  is  of  no  effect,  to  have  recourse 
to  rnore  severe  punishments.   .   .   . 

The  confessor  must  not  immediately  believe  a  woman  who 
complains  of  her  husband,  because  women  are  habitually  given  to 
lying.   .   .   . 

CHAPTER   IV. 

Obligations  of  other  Superiors  and  Inferiors. 
ART.  I.     Obligations  of  masters  and  servants. 
Section  I.     Master's  obligations. 

382. —  Masters  must  treat  their  servants  well  ;  instruct,  correct 
and  pay  them  sufficiently.   .   .   . 

ART.  II.     Obligations  of  masters  and  pupils.  .  .  . 

ART.  III.  Obedience  and  respect  towards  temporal  author- 
ity. .  .  . 


I 


Cases  on  t]}t  Jourtlj  îPrecept  of  tïje  ©ecaloguc* 


Case  III. 
The  Duties  of  Sons. 


1.  Agatha,  a  young  girl  born  of  honorable  parents,  is  asked 
in  marriage  by  a  noble  and  brave  soldier,  richer  in  qualities 
than  in  temporal  goods,  and  she  accepts  his  proposal.  But  her 
father  opposes  it,  and  protests  that  he  never  will  give  his  consent 
to  the  marriage  of  his  daughter  with  that  wandering  soldier, 
exposed  to  a  tliousand  perils.  But  the  indignation  of  that  excel- 
lent father  is  of  no  avail  with  Agatha.  On  the  contrary,  after 
having  asked  her  father's  consent  in  the  legal  way  several  times 
in  vain,  she  contracts  the  marriage  in  spite  of  him. 
*  2.  Eulalie,  after  deep  reflections,  decides  to  enter  a  convent. 
Her  father  refuses  his  consent  and  a  dowry.  But  Eulalie,  distin- 
guished by  her  intellectual  and  moral  qualities,  obtains  the  privi- 
lege to  be  admitted  free,  and  without  warning  her  father,  she  takes 
refuge  in  the  convent. 

Ques.  1 .  Must  children  obey  their  parents,  when  it  is  a  question 
of  vocation? 

Ques.  2.     What  is  to  be  thought  of  Agatha  and  Eulalia? 

Ans.  Question  1. — No,  in  principle;  because  a  man  is  free  to 
chooï^e  his  own  profession.  Parents,  then,  sin  gravely  by  using 
constraint  to  turn  children  away  from  their  vocation  ;  they  may, 
however,  oppose  them  when  there  are  just  reasons  for  it. 

Ans.  to  Ques.  2. — 1.  In  regaid  to  Agatha,  it  is  a  difficult  ques- 
tion. However,  it  would  be  well  to  advise  lier  to  obey  her 
father,  or  renew  her  supplications.  If  these  two  means  were  not 
successful,  she  could  not  be  accused  of  mortal  sin  in  marrying  an 
honorable  man. 

Moreover,  her  father  commits  a  great  fault  in  refusing,  without 
reasonable  motives,  his  consent  to  the  marriage  ;    it  would    have 


134  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

been  a  more  grievous  sin  if  slie  had  become  pregnant  in  her  rela- 
tions with  the  soldier. 

2.  We  must  excuse  Eulalie  ;  because,  having  a  vocation  for  it, 
she  has  embraced  the  religious  profession  only  after  sufficient 
deliberation,  and  after  having  respectfully  asked  for  the  consent 
of  her  parents.  She  must  be  condemned  for  having  secretly  run 
away,  seeing  no  other  way  to  obey  the  divine  will.  But  the  father 
has  committed  a  grave  sin  by  unjustl}^  opposing  her  vocation  and 
disappointing  his  daughter  of  her  dowry. 

Case  YI. 
The  Duties  of  Parents. 

Mathurin,  a  godless  father  of  a  family,  takes  suitable  care  of 
his  sons,  in  a  temporal  point  of  view,  but  seems  ver}'  unconcerned 
about  their  education.  The  oldest,  almost  deprived  of  Christian 
instruction,  he  employs  in  his  own  trade;  the  second  is  appren- 
ticed in  a  shop  to  learn  a  trade  in  company  with  dissolute  young 
men  ;  the  third  is  sent  to  a  college  very  little  recommended  for  its 
teaching  of  morals  and  the  faith. 

Ques.     What  is  to  be  thought  of  Mathurin  ? 

Ans.  Mathurin  has  committed  a  mortal  sin -about  each  one  of 
his  sons.   .   .  .  Alas  !   How  man}*  such  men  we  see  in  our  days  ! 

Case  VII. 
The  Duties  of  Masters. 

Titius,  careless  of  his  own  salvation,  is  unconcerned  about  the 
morals  of  his  servants.   .   .   . 

They  do  not  go  to  mass  on  Sunday  and  at  Easter-time  ;  they 
neitlier  go  to  confession,  nor  to  communion.  Titius  sees  all  that, 
and  does  not  reprove  them. 

Ques.     What  is  to  be  said  of  Titius? 

Ans.  Titius  is  a  bad,  detestable  master,  and  has  committed  a 
sin  in  each  one  of  these  cases.  .  .  .  Alas  !  How  many  masters  in 
our  days  are  just  like  Titius  ! 


jFtftï}  Precept  of  tJ)e  ©ecalogue. 

«'Thou  Shalt  not  kill."     Exodus  xx.  13. 


CHAPTER   I. 

Suicide. 


389. — One  is  not  permitted  to  kill  himself  directly  ;  that  is  to 
say,  with  intention,  without  the  intervention  of  divine  authority. 

390. — Ques.     Ought  a  virgin  to  prefer  death  to  dishonor? 

A.  No,  according  to  the  probable  opinion,  provided  her  will 
protests,  and  that  there  is  no  peril  in  consent,  because  that 
permission  is  not  formal  co-operation,  but  only  material,  to  the 
sin  of  another,  and  there  is  a  just  motive  for  permission,  tha 
danger  of  death.  But  this  practice  must  not  be  advised  when  one 
may  prudently  fear  the  peril  of  consent.   .   .  . 

391. —  ....  A  virgin  is  not  obliged  to  undergo  an  operation 
at  the  hands  of  a  doctor,  even  in  danger  of  death,  if  through 
modesty  she  looks  upon  it  as  very  grave,  and  has  more  horror  of 
it  than  of  death  itself.  -  .  .  . 

CHAPTER  II. 

Murder. 

ART. — The  murder  of  a  guilty  person,  or  of  a  criminal. 

394. — Ques.     Is  it  allowable  to  kill  a  tyrant?  * 
Ans.     Upon  the  whole.  No. 

*  Here  is  one  of  the  few  questions  on  which  Jes^uits  have  completely 
changed  their  opinion.  Formerly  there  was  uo  doubt  in  their  mind  as  to 
the  legitimacy  of  killing  a  tyrant  or  usurper.  It  is  interesting  to  notice 
that  this  change  took  place  at  the  time  of  the  first  Empire,  when  they  di>- 
owned  their  former  doctrine.  And  this  doctrine  was  not  left  as  a 
theoretical  teaching.  Practically,  they  sustained  their  as«:ertion.  IJsten 
to  Mariana,  bpeaking  of  the  murderer  of  lleury  III.,  a  legitimate  king  : 


k 


136  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

ART.  II. — Murder  of  an  unjust  ag^^ressor. 

395. — May  one  defend  his  own  life,  even  by  killing  an  unjust 
aggre:^sor  ?  * 

396. — Ques.  Is  it  permitted  to  kill  an  unjust  aggressor  for  the 
preservation  of  one's  limbs  ? 

Ans.     Yes,  according  to  the  common  opinion. f 

Ques.  Is  it  permitted  to  kill  one  who  steals  considerable 
property,  if  there  is  no  other  way  of  keeping  it? 

"Jacques  Clement,  a  Dominican,  born  in  Serbonne,  a  little  villa<re  of 
Autumois,  was  studyini^  theology  in  a  college  of  his  Order,  when, 
instructed  by  the  theologians  that  it  was  permitted  to  kill  a  tyrant, 
he  mortally  wounded  the  kins:,  striking  him  in  the  stomach  with  apoisoned 
knife  he  kept  hidden  in  his  iiand.     A  bold  and  memorable  action.  .  .  . 

"Tlie  murder  of  tlie  king  gave  him  a  world-wide  reputation.  .  .  . 

"Thus  perished  Jacques  Clement  at  24  years  of  age,  a  young  man  of 
simple  character  and  weak  constitution  ;  but  a  great  virtue  sustained  his 
strength  and  his  courage."     (p.  452.) 

*  Theologians  battled  a  great  deal  on  this  point,  especially  when  the 
murderer  was  a  priest  or  a  monk.  We  shaU  not  speak  of  these  quarrels  : 
Legitimate  defense  in  a  case  of  actual  necessity,  has  been  justly  admitted 
by  our  Code  (Art.  328)  ;  but  the  Jesuitical  spirit  has  placed  the  application 
very  far  from  the  principle. 

Valere  Eeginald  sets  down  the  following  case  :  "  You  bear  fal'^e  witness 
against  me,  and  a  sentence  ofd^ath  will  result,  and  I  cannot  escape  any 
other  way,  I  am  permitted  to  kill  you."     (p.  399.) 

Lessius  :  "  You  have  resolved  to  arm  your  servant  or  a  murderer  to  kill 
me;  if  I  have  no  otiier  hope  of  escaping  death  than  by  anticipating  your 
intention,  I  am  permitted  to  do  it,  let  tae  danger  be  present  ...  or  far 
off.  .  .  ."     (p.  401.) 

De  Lugo:  "Can  you  kill  one  who,  by  calumnies  and  false  witness, 
causes  you  to  be  sentenced  by  the  judge  ? 

"  The  affirmative  is  probable  enough."     (p.  415.) 

Escobar  :  "  It  is  quite  allowable  to  kill  one  bearing  false  against  you,  if 
snch  act  compromises  your  life  or  yjurhonor.  »  .  .  It  maybe  done  also 
if  the  false  witness  has  temporal  good  in  view.      (p.  416.) 

"  One  may  secretly  kill  a  calumniator,  if  there  are  no  other  means  of 
warding  off  the  peril."     (p.  419.) 

Busembaum  adds:  "  Every  time  that  some  one  has  the  right  to  kill 
another,  according  to  wliat  his  been  said  on  the  question,  some  one  else 
can  do  it  for  him  and  in  his  place,  seeing  that  charity  allows  it."  (p.  441.) 

+  Our  penal  laws  are  more  severe.  But  we  shall  not  insist.  Only  it  is 
marvelous  to  see  what  consequences  the  Jesuits  have  drawn  for  this 
dauiierous  principle. 

Hcnriques,  for  instance,  supplied  the  ingenious  case  following:  "If  an 
adulterer,  even  a  priest,  well  aware  of  the  danger,  has  called  at  the 
adulteress'  house,  and,  surprised  by  the  husband,  he  kills  the  latter 
to  save  his  own  life  and  limbs,  it  does  not  seem  that  he  iucura  irregu- 
larity."    (p.  396.) 


Fijth  Precept  of  the  Decalogue,  137 

Ans.  Yes,  at  least  more  probably.  Every  one  has  the  right  to 
kerp  considerable  property  for  his  own  enjoyment.* 

398. — Qiies.  Is  a  woman  permitted  to  kill  the  one  who  makes 
an  attempt  on  her  modesty? 

Ans.  Yes,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion  ;  because  it 
is  à  property  more  precious  than  riches  ;  then,  if  it  is  allowable  to 
kill  to  defend  our  property,  there  is  more  reason  for  it  when  it  is 
to  defend  modest}'. 

399. — A  young  girl  is  not  permitted  to  kill,  after  the  crime,  the 
one  who  attempted  to  destroy  her  honor.  She  may,  however, 
strike  him,  and  treat  him  with  the  greatest  harshness  ;  because,  in 
not  showing  her  perseverance  and  repugnancy  in  this  way,  the 
guilty  man  would  not  go  away,  or  might  be  induced  to  repeat  the 
crime. 

ART.  III.     Murder  of  an  innocent  person. 

400. — 1.  It  is  never  allowable  to  kill  directly  an  innocent  per- 
son, by  private  or  public  authority,  even  in  view  of  the  common 
good  ;  because  it  is  an  intrinsically  guilt}"  action,  positively  for- 
bidden by  the  divine  law. 

2.  It  is  allowable,  for  a  grave  reason,  to  do  an  action  good  in 
itself,  from  which,  against  our  intention,  results  the  death  of  an 
innocent  person.f 

*  This  is  more  serious,  and  quite  contrary  to  the  doctrine  of  our  penal 
Code. 

The  Jesuits  had  içone  very  far  in  this,  they  having  said  that  one  can 
reii;ulai'ly  kill  a  thief  to  save  a  crown;  a  proposition  rightly  coudeinued  by 
Innocent  XL 

i)e  Lugo,  a  cardinal,  wants  the  stolen  sum  to  be  at  least  one  ducat,  and 
that  there  should  be  no  violence,  (p.  422.)  But  most  of  them  take 
refuge  in  apprec-iations  vaguely  formulated  on  this  point. 

Marotte  does  not  hesitate  to  preach,  in  his  Vetit  Catéchisme,  the  Jesuitical 
doctrine,  little  disturbed  about  its  unlawfulness. 

"  Ques.  Can  we  kill  a  thief  to  save  the  property  he  tries  to  take  away 
from  us?" 

"Aus.  No,  we  are  not  permitted  to  kill  a  thief  to  save  temporal 
property,  inferior  to  the  life  of  man;  but  if  the  thief  tries  to  take  away 
property  of  a  very  consideral)le  value,  its  owner  would  have  the  right  to 
resist  him  by  violence,  even  to  striking  and  wounding  him." 

fit  is,  in  fact,  Escobar's  doctrine  of  sayingr  "The  murder  of  an 
innocent  person  is  al)s()lutely  forbidden,  unless  iu  some  case  it  should  be 
necessary  for  the  good  of  t  le  l{epul)lic." 

Marotte  does  not  fear  to  otft-r  it  to  the  meditation  of  little  children. 


T 

I 


138  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

3.  One  is  not  guilty  of  liomicide  wlien,  even  without  motivée, 
but  acting  carefully,  one  does  an  action,  not  causing  death  by 
itself,  but  from  which  results  homicide  hy  accident ^  because  that 
homiciJe  is  quite  fortuitous  and  involuntary.   .   .   . 

Abortion. 
403. —  ...  In  no  way  can  ph3'sicians  be  excused  from  homi- 
cide, who,  in  order  to  save  the  mother  in  childbirth,  being  in 
danger  of  death,  as  well  as  the  child,  have  recourse  t^  cepha- 
lotom}'  or  embryoctony;  in  other  words,  by  the  help  of  forceps,  to 
crush  the  child's  cranium  in  the  mother's  womb,  and  then  take  out 
the  dead  fœlus.   .   .   .* 

CHAPTER  III. 

Dueling,  t 

Dueling  is  never  permitted  by  private  authority.   .   .   . 

405. — One  cannot  accept  a  duel,  even  to  revenge  an  ignominious 
offence.   .  .   . 

A  soldier  cannot  accept  a  duel,  even  if  his  refusal  leads  to  his 
losing  a  commission  necessary-  for  the  support  of  his  family. 

It  is  not  allowable  to  engage  in  a  duel  on  condition  that  the  fight 
will  cease  at  the  first  blood  drawn,  or  after  a  determined  number 
of  wounds.  .   .   . 

Qnes.  "  Is  it  sometimes  permitted  to  kill  an  innocent  person?  '' 
Ans.  "  It  is  never  permitted  to  kill,  directly,  an  innocent  person,  even 
in  view  of  public  interest  :  but  one  can,  in  a  grave  and  urgent  case,  do  an 
action  good  in  itself,  although  liable  to  cause  the  death  of  one  or  several 
innocent  persons,  provided  the  one  who  does  the  action  should  have 
nothing  else  in  view  than  the  good  which  n\\\  result  from  it,  and  does 
what  is  possible  to  remove  the  bad  effect  dreaded." — Petit  Catéchisme. 

*  "  It  is  forbidden,  under  penalty  of  a  very  grave  sin,  to  surgeons  and 
midvvives,  to  cause  the  death  of  a  child  in  his  raotlier's  womb,  in  order  to 
deliver  the  mother  from  a  dangerous  situation,  unavoidable  without  that 
action."     {Marotte.) 

t  "  Of  all  kinds  of  homicides,  dueling  is  the  most  criminal."  {Marotte.') 
The  horror  of  dueling  was  so  great  with  tlie  Jesuits,  tliat  we  read  in 
Navarre,  Sanchez,  Escobar:  "  One  is  obliged  to  refuse  the  duel,  if  one  can 
secretly  kill  the  calumniator;  because  then,  one  does  not  expose  one's  self 
to  loss  of  life,  and  the  other  is  prevented  thereby  from  committing  a  new 
sin  in  accepting  the  duel  or  offering  it."     (p.  419). 

This  has  not  prevented  the  Je-uits  from  having,  in  all  times,  and  even 
to-day,  bravos  and  bullies  in  their  employ. 


Fifth  Precept  of  the  Decalogue,  139 

CHAPTER   IV. 
War. 

407. — War  is  the  strife  of  a  multitude  of  men  with  another 
foreign  multitude,  to  avenge  or  defend  the  State.  .   .  . 

408. — Ques.  .  .  .  May  the  soldiers  fight,  if  they  doubt  the 
justice  of  tlie  war? 

Ans.  If  it  is  a  question  of  a  soldier  not  yet  enlisted,  he  must 
inform  himself  about  it,  and,  if  he  doubts,  he  cannot  enlist; 
because  no  one  must  aid  in  the  despoiling  of  others,  if  he  is  not 
sure  that  the  possession  has  been  unjustly  acquired.  ... 

Q  les.     Can  a  victor  kill  the  innocent,  as  well  as  the  guilty? 

Ans.  The  guilty,  that  is  to  say,  the  soldiers  who  have  fought, 
can  sometimes  be  killed,  if  it  is  necessary  for  the  establishment  of 
l)eace,  for  security,  or  to  avenge  an  injustice,  unL^ss  they  should 
have  surrendered  with  the  condition  of  having  their  lives  spared. 

As  for  the  innocent  women,  old  men,  foreigners,  priests, 
monks,  etc., — they  can  not  be  killed  directly,  unless  it  shuuLl  be 
proved  that  they  co-operated  in  the  war.  But  they  can  be  killed 
indirectly,  before  the  end  of  the  fight,  if  the}-  are  mixed  with  the 
guilty,  and  in  such  a  way  that,  if  they  were  spared,  soldiers  could 
escape. 

409. — Soldiers  cannot  kill  the  enem^^  in  an  unjust  war,  even  in 
self-defence.  If  they  cannot  run  away,  they  are  to  take  care  not 
to  strike  the  enemy  ;  because  they  are  the  unjust  siggressors,  and 
in  one  cause  there  cannot  be  two  contrary  right.   .   .   . 

It  is  sometimes  permitted  to  pillage  a  captured  city,  but  only  for 
very  weighty  reasons. 


Cases  on  tfje  jFiftlj  precept  of  tî}e  Btcalogue* 


Case    III. 
Admirable  'Expedient  of  a  Virgin. 

Eulalie,  a  pious  virgin,  very  careful  of  her  chastity,  being 
pressed  by  a  soldier,  and  threatened  with  lust  without  means  of 
escape,  spoke  thus  to  her  would-be  seducer:  "  Listen,  and  I  will 
teach  you  a  marvelous  thing.'*  He  desisted.  "  Here  it  is  ;  spare 
me,  and  1  will  tell  3'ou  a  way  to  risk  nothing  in  battle.  See,  I  rub 
my  neck  with  this  ointment  ;  now  take  your  sword,  strike  my 
neck,  and  you  will  see  the  virtue  of  my  art."  The  soldier, 
induced  b}'  curiosity  and  love  of  novelty,  makes  the  experiment, 
and  cuts  off  the  head  of  Eulalie,  who,  by  this  means,  was  saved 
from  the  danger  of  losing  her  viiginity. 

Ques.  1.  Did  Eulalie  act  lawfully?  Was  it  necessary  to  resort 
to  death,  in  order  to  save  her  chastity? 

Ques.  2.  Could  she  throw  herself  through  a  high  window  to 
escape  violence  and  preserve  her  virginity? 

Ans.  Question  1.  No,  in  principle  ;  except  in  case  of  celestial 
inspiration,  or  of  good  faith.  The  reason  is,  that  she  directly 
procured  her  own  death. 

Ans.  Question  2.  Yes,  because  death,  although  the  conse- 
quence of  the  fall,  was  not  directly  desired. 

Case   IX. 

Ab  ortion  . 

Gaspard,  a  physician,  making  a  general  confession,  avows  to 
his  confessor  that  :  1,  to  a  pregnant  woman,  on  the  point  of  death, 
he  gave  a  remedy  tliat  was  a  sure  cure,  but  foreseeing  that  the 
foetus  would  perish  ;  2,  to  another  one,  on  the  point  of  certain 
death,  he  had  given  a  remedy  the  effect  of  which  was  to  kill  the 


Oases  on  the  Fifth  Precept  of  the  Decalogue,         141 

foetus  and  expel  it,  in  order  that  the  woman  delivered  should 
get  cured. 

Ques.     What  is  to  be  thought  of  Gaspard  ? 

Ans.     In  the  frst  case,  he  is  not  repreliensible.   .   .   . 

In  the  second  one,  he  has  gravely  sinned,  by  committing  a  direct 
homicide.  In  fact,  though  the  intention  was  good,  he  obtained 
the  result  by  unlawful  means. 

Case  X. 
Abortion  ; 

Cure  of  a  mother  through  the  death  of  her  child. 

Pélagie,  pregnant  for  four  or  five  months*  is  dangerously  sick, 
and  on  the  point  of  death.  Besides  the  family  doctor,  three 
others  are  called  in  consultation.  After  deep  deliberation,  here 
is  the  decision  :  If  the  art  of  the  physician  can  procure  the 
expulsion  of  the  fœtus,  the  latter  will  perish,  but  may  probably 
be  baptized  before  death,  and  the  mother  will  be  saved  from 
certain  death.  Otiierwise,  mother  and  child  will  both  die,  and 
the  child  will  be  deprived  of  the  benefit  of  baptism.  After  tliis 
decision,  they  prepared  to  effect  the  expulsion.  The  result  con- 
firmed Iheir  prevision  ;  the  child  was  expulsed,  and  after  having 
been  baptized  died  immediately,  and  the  mother  was  saved. 

Ques.  Is  this  justifiable?  In  this  case  can  one  procure  an 
abortion  ? 

Ans.  No,  absolutely  ;  because  abortion  is  in  its  nature  cer- 
tainly a  homicide.  It  is  employed,  and  is  destimd  in  itseJJ,  so 
say  the  doctors,  to  effect  the  cure  of  the  mother  and  the  baptism 
of  the  child.  Nevertheless,  though  they  apply  it  to  a  useful  end, 
they  directly  seek  and  procure  homicide. 


âixtJj  anîï  Nmtlj  îPreccpts  of  tlje  ©rcalogue* 


**  Thou  sbalt  not  commit  adultery.     Thou  shalt  not  covet  thy  neighbor's 
wife."    Exodus  20:  U,  17. 


410. — Let  us  repeat  the  words  of  St.  Ligiiori  :  .  .  .  ''As  this  is 
a  matter  most  frequently  and  abundantly  treated  in  confession,  I 
have  been  obliged,  for  the  instruction  of  those  studying  moral 
science,  and  in  order  to  be  clear,  to  discuss  particular  cases.  But  I 
beg  of  the  students  who  are  preparing  themselves  to  be  confessors, 
in  reading  this  treatise  and  the  other  one  on  conjugal  duty,  to  reject 
all  curiosity,  to  often  lift  up  their  souls  to  God,  and  to  recommend 
themselves  to  the  immaculate  Virgin."  *  .    .   . 

411. — Lust  is  an  unrultd  appetite  in  love,  and  consists  in  a 
carnal  pleasure  {delectatio  venerea)  tasted  voluntarily  outside  of 
marriage.  Now,  that  pleasure  is  produced  by  the  excitation  of 
the  genital  organs,  and  must  not  be  confounded  with  a  purely 
sensual  pleasure  from  the  contact  of  a  sensible  object  on  someone 
of  the  senses  ;  for  instance,  from  a  visible  object  on  sght.  Lust 
and  sensuality  have  then  a  different  object.  A  sensual  pleasure 
either  is  not  guilty,  or  does  not  exceed,  most  of  the  time  and  in 
principle,  a  venial  sin. 

There  are  several  sorts  of  lust.  There  is  a  difference  between 
bodily  contact  and  immodest  looks,  between  solitary  acts  and 
those    done   with   others,    between    consummated  acts  and  those 

*  This  is  a  good  precaution  ;  but  we  must  also  remember  how  the  ancient 
(?)  Jesuits,  while  coudeuming  lustliil  sins  with  indignation  and  a  cliaste 
horror,  found,  nevertheless,  that  there  are  practical  accommodations. 

Escobar,  quibbling  on  the  sins  wliich  Pius  V.  saw  himself  obliged  to 
proliibit  to  priests  addicted  to  sodomy,  makes  very  clever  distinctions, 
which  a  low  an  excuse:  "1,  Priests  who  have  unnatural  relations  wiih 
women;  2,  who  are  patients  ;  ...  3,  who  have  co  nmitted  the  prohibited 
act  but  one,  two  and  three  times  ;  4,  who  commit  the  crime  of  bestiality." 

And  as  tJie  rape  of  a  woman  is  punished  with  death,  he  concludes  that 
the  rape  of  a  young  man  by  a  man  (causa  Ubldiiiis)  is  not  punishable, 
(p.  290.) 


Sixth  and  Ninth  Precepts  of  the  Decalogue.       143 

which  are  not,  between  acts  done  according  to  nature  and  those 
done  against  nature.  These  species  are  yet  subdivided,  as  we 
shall  see  later. 

There  is  lust  directly  sought  out,  and  lust  indirectly  sought  out. 
The  first  one  exists  where  one  has  precisely  in  view  a  carnal 
pleasure  ;  the  second  one  is,  when  something  else  being  sought  out, 
the  pleasure  comes  against  our  intention,  as  immodest  reading 
done  through  curiosity,  or  for  any  other  motive. 

412.  Lust  of  every  kind  and  species,  is,  in  principle,  a  grave 
sin.  .  .  . 

Lust,  directly  voluntary,  never  admits  of  light  matters.   .   .  . 

CHAPTER   I. 
Lustful  Sins  Not  Consummated. 

ART.  I.     Immodest  kisses  and  bodily  contact. 

413. — 1.  L^nchaste  contact,  made  without  motive,  with  a  per- 
son's shameful  parts,  are  almost  always  under  the  penalty  of 
mortal  sin,  even  leaving  aside  the  sensual  pleasure,  on  account  of 
a  grievous  Indecency,  and  the  danger  of  débaucher}^  brought 
thereby. 

However,  it  is  more  easily  excused  from  mortal  sin,  if  it  is  per- 
formed on  a   person  of  the  same  sex. 

2.  Kissing,  or  feeling  of  the  honorable  or  slightly  dishonorable 
parts,  constitutes  mortal  sin,  if  carnal  pleasure  is  the  motive  of 
these  ac's  ;  venial,  if  there  is  nothing  more  than  lightness,  joking 
or  curiosity,  etc.  They  are  not  guilty  if  it  is  the  custom,  or  if  it 
is  done  out  of  politeness  or  benevolence. 

414. — 3.  Kissing  or  touching  even  the  honorable  bodily  parts 
cannot  be  easily  excused  from  mortal  sin,  if  it  takes  phice  in 
a  protracted  manner  among  young  people,  especially  of  dtfjrent 
sexes,  without  any  necessity,  because  those  repeated  and  pro- 
longed acts  produce  an  excitation  and  a  carnal  pleasure. 

4.  Kissing,  touching,  embracing  for  a  carnal  pleasure,  in  view 
of  carnal  desires,  are  evils  of  different  gravity,  according  to  the 
person's  circumstances,  because  they  are  supposed  to  be  of  the 
same  species  as  the  consummated  act,  to  which  they  lead  by  their 


144  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

nature.  So,  in  confession,  it  is  necessary  to  specify  with  what 
persons  they  have  been  practiced, —  if  it  is  the  same  sex  or  of  a 
different  one,  married  or  not,  etc.,  etc. 

415. — 1.  There  is  no  fault  in  the  kisses  given  hy  mothers  and 
nurses  to  little  children.  Neither  with  those  who  kiss  those  chil- 
dren, even  of  another  sex,  setting  aside  any  depraved  sentiment. 

2.  We  must  not  readily  accuse  of  a  grave  sin  young  people 
who,  in  certain  games,  without  any  bad  intention,  kiss  eacli  olber 
decently  ;  although  it  is  prudont  to  advise  t'lem  not  to  play  those 
games,  on  account  of  the  perils  which  they  bring. 

3.  The  opinion  of  Sanchez,  Salmant  and  others,  afRi-ming  that 
there  is  no  sin  in  the  chaste  kisses  and  embraces  of  young  people 
betrothed  to  each  other,  though  they  seek  a  carnal  pleasure,  and 
there  exists  a  slight  excitation  of  the  genital  organs,  setting  aside 
the  peril  of  pollution  and  of  consent  to  the  sexual  union,  is  looked 
upon  as  little  probable  in  practice  by  St.  Liguori,  who  thinks 
much  more  probable,  even  in  theory,  the  opinion  after  which  such 
acts  are  forbidden  to  engaged  young  people,  just  as  much  as  to 
other  free  persons.  The  reason  is,  tliat  betrothed  people  have 
yet  neither  reciprocal  rights  on  their  bodies,  nor  a  right  to  sexual 
union  to  which  such  acts  generally  tend. 

4.  But  kissing  other  more  hidden  parts  of  the  body,  for 
instance,  the  bosom,  must  be  looked  upon  as  a  mortal  sin, 
especially  between  persons  of  different  sex  ;  and  also  protracted 
kisses  on  the  mouth,  especially  if  the  tongue  is  brought  into  play. 

416. — 5.  One  does  not  sin  in  principle,  when  one  is  obliged  to 
touch  one's  self  in  order  to  wipe  out  the  bodily  filth,  to  appease 
pruiienc}',  or  attend  to  some  infirmities  ;  however,  if  the  itchings 
is  supportable,  one  must  abstain  from  touching  one's  self.  But  if 
one  touch  his  body  without  motive,  only  a  venial  sin  is  committed, 
provided  the  carnal  pleasure  is  set  aside,  as  it  is  done  only  with- 
out reflection,  through  lightness  or  pure  curiosity,  when  one  does 
not  run  the  risk  of  inflaming  the  passion. 

6.  Feeling  of  the  shameful  parts  or  about,  even  over  the 
clothes,  constitutes  a  grave  sin  :  unless  it  is  done  only  through 
petulance,  joke,  lightness,  or  in  passing  by.  The  same  may  be 
said  of  women  touching  each  other's  bosoms, on  account  of  the 


sixth  and  Ninth  Precepts  of  the  Decalogue, 


145 


sympathy  of  those  parts  with  the  sense  of  touch.     There  is  a  near 
danger,  or  carnal  pleasure. 

7.  More  than  that,  unless  in  a  case  of  necessity,  there  is  a 
mortal  sin  in  touching  the  shameful  parts  of  a  person  of  a  different 
sex,  even  for  a  little  time,  because  it  is  done  only  through  errotic 
passion  ;  and  besides,  it  is  a  gross  attempt  on  decency,  leading  to 
the  danger  of  pollution  and  carnal  pleasure.  However,  servants 
coming  in  contact  with  the  shameful  parts  of  children  while 
dressing  them,  must  not  be  accused  of  a  great  sin,  unless  it  is 
done  in  a  protracted  manner,  and  feeling  sensual  pleasure  in 
doing  it. 

8.  There  is  a  venial  sin,  in  principle,  in  touching  slight!}',  and 
in  passing  by,  the  fingers,  hands,  or  face  of  a  person  of  a  different 
sex,  putting  aside  all  thoughts  of  a  bad  aim,  all  sentiments  and 
danger  of  del>aucheiy,  if  this  is  only  through  pure  curiosity,  there 
being  no  danger  for  us  or  others. 

Besides,  as  in  so  lubric  a  matter,  it  is  not  always  eas}'  to  see 
clearly  what  is  venial  or  mortal  ;  and  as  there  is  often  a  grave 
danger  of  sinning,  even  in  cases  which  do  not  exceed  in  principle 
a  light  sin  ;  for  instance,  if  this  takes  place  frequently  and  in  a 
protracted  manner  between  persons  addicted  to  debauchery,  the 
confessor  ought  to  make  an  effort  to  prevent  the  penitent,  espe- 
cially the  young  one,  from  iudulg  ug  in  sensual  contact  with 
persons  of  the  different  sex. 

ART.   II.      Looking  on  obscene  things. 

417. —  1.  Looks  cast  without  motive  on  shameful  things,  con- 
stiiute  grave  or  light  sins,  according  to  the  intention  of  the  person, 
the  degree  of  turi)itu(le,  and  the  danger  of  consent  to  debauchery. 
The  sin  is  not  so  gi  levons  when  acting  on  our  own  person  as 
when  it  is  a  question  of  somebody  else,  because  there  is  less 
excitation  ;  it  is  also  less  grave  when  it  is  a  question  of  a  person 
of  the  same  sex. 

2.  Looks  gravely  immodest,  wilhoul  serious  motives,  especially 
on  persons  of  another  sex,  constitute,  in  principle,  a  mortal  sin, 
even  in  the  absence  of  all  carnal  passion  ;  because  ordinarily,  there 


146  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

is  a  ne?.r  danger  of  debauchery,  as  it  has  been  said  above  about 
guilty  bodily  contacts. 

Ques.  Is  it  necessary,  in  looks  as  in  contacts,  to  take  account 
of  the  circunostances  of  ]>ers()ns  looked  at  in  an  ol)scene  manner? 

Ans.  No,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion,  if  there  is 
no  desire  ;  because  they  are  not  supposed  to  tend  to  the  consum- 
mation of  the  act  ;  so  the  act  of  looking  in  such  a  manner  at 
parents,  married  people,  or  sacred  persons,  do  not  constitute  a 
fault  dependent  on  adultery,  incest,  or  sacrilege. 

418. —  1.  There  is  no  mortal  sin,  in  principle,  when  persons 
of  the  same  sex  lo^^k  lightly  at  each  other  being  naked,  bathing, 
or  swimming,  especially  when  they  have  not  reached  the  age 
of  pubertv. 

2.  To  look  at  the  shameful  parts,  or  near  to  them,  of  a  person 
of  another  sex,  constitutes  a  njortal  sin,  unless  it  is  from  afar,  or 
for  a  short  time  ;  because  these  looks  excite  passion,  or  lead  to 
sin.  One  is  not  excused  even  if  they  are  seen  through  a  very 
light  and  transparent  veil  ;  in  this  case,  passion,  far  from  being 
diminished,  is  increased  thereby.  Except:  1,  if  it  is  a  question 
of  a  child,  or  of  an  old  man,  quite  passionless,  because  they  are 
not  much  excited;  2,  if  one  looks  at  a  very  young  chid,  there 
being  not  much  of  excitation.  So  servants  and  nurses  do  not 
commit  a  grave  sin  in  looking  in  this  way  at  the  children  confided 
to  their  care,  unless  the}'  do  it  in  a  protracted  manner,  at  differ- 
ent intervals,  or  \Nith  a  guilty  sentiment. 

3.  To  look  at  the  lionoiable  parts  of  a  person  of  anotlier  sex, 
even  being  beautiCul,  is  not  a  sin  in  principle,  if  it  is  not  done 
through  curiosity  or  with  persistence  ;  the  sin  is  generally  venial, 
but  it  is  a  mortal  one  when  one  looks  for  a  long  time,  running 
the  near  danger  of  a  shameful  concupiscence  or  of  a  protracleii 
pleasure,  especially  if  the  mind  is  excited,  and  with  more  reason 
if  one  loves  the  person  inordinaleh'. 

4.  To  look  at  the  parts  slightly  dishonorable,  but  not  shameful, 
of  a  woman,  as  the  bosom,  aims,  limbs,  do  not  constitute  a 
mortal  sin  in  principle,  putting  aside  luwever,  the  near  danger 
of  a  guilty  satisfaction,  VNhich  would  easily  be  produced  if  the  act 
was  protracted.     Bu'  generally,  those  who  look  without  motive  at 


sixth  and  Nln'li  Precepts  of  the  Decalogue.        147 

the  bare  bosom  of  a  beautiful  woman,  with  a  notable  insistance, 
are  generally  guilty  of  mortal  sin  ;  because  of  the  peril  encoun- 
tered by  the  sight.  But  there  is  not  a  grave  sin  when,  leaving 
aside  all  special  peril,  one  looks  at  mothers  and  nurses  suckling 
children,  also,  by  looking  on  the  uncovered  bosom  of  an  old 
woman,  or  of  one  too  young  to  be  physically  developed. 

5.  To  look  at  obscene  paintings  through  pure  curiosity  is  not 
a  mortal  sin,  if  there  is  no  shameful  pleasure,  nor  any  near 
danger.  But  in  practice,  it  would  be  difficult  to  excuse  of  mortal 
sin  a  man  who  would  look  at  the  shameful  part  of  a  woman  in  a 
painting;  because  he  could  not  avoid  very  well  experiencing 
shameful  pleasure  at  the  sight,  unless  for  a  short  time,  from 
a  distance,  or  that  the  state  of  decay  of  the  painting  should 
attenuate  the  strength  of  the  temptation.  Billuard,  with  others, 
excuse  from  mortal  sin  those  who  look  slightly,  passing  by, 
through  curiosity,  or  if  the  paintings  represent  oni}'  children, 
because  painted  pictures  do  not  excite  as  living  things  do.  This 
oi)inion  seems  probable,  unless  it  should  be  necessary  to  judge 
otherwise,  on  account  of  the  weakness  of  the  looker-on. 

ART.  III.     Immodest  reading  and  conversation. 

419. —  1.  To  say,  sing,  and  listen  to  ol>scene  things  with  the 
intention  of  finding  in  them  a  carnal  pleasure,  or  run  the  danger 
of  consent,  is  a  great  sin.  But  if  there  is  no  guilty  intention, 
no  peril  of  consent,  and  there  being  a  legitimate  cause  to  say, 
write,  or  listen  to  them,  there  is  no  sin. 

2.  To  read  obscene  books  without  a  legitimate  reason  is  a 
grave  sin,  even  if  it  is  done  out  of  curiosity  or  for  distractiou, 
in  princij)le,  such  reading  leading  to  debauchery.  Exce[)t  occa- 
sionally, and  taking  into  consiikralion  the  case  where  the  readers, 
out  of  personal  curiosity,  advanced  age,  cool  tenii)erament,  and 
their  knowledge  of  these  things,  would  not  run  into  the  grave 
danger  of  giving  way  to  passions. 

3.  To  read  books  about  love,  or  that  are  slightly  obscene,  is 
not  a  mortal  sin  in  principle,  though  it  is  very  dangerous  in 
practice,  especially  for  young  people.  As  for  obscene  books  up 
to  a  certain  point  being  also  scieuLific,  it  is  not,  in  principle,  a  sin 


148  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

lo  read  them,  in  order  to  instruct  one's  self  or  for  a  beneficial 
purpose,  setting  aside  the  peril  of  carnal  pleasure  always  to  be 
feared  in  young  people. 

420. —  1.  It  is  a  grave  sin  generally,  to  speak  even  in  joke  of 
the  conjugal  act,  or  what  is  permitted  or  forbidden  between 
married  people,  of  the  means  to  prevent  conception,  or  to  j)rocuie 
pollution,  especially  if  it  is  between  young  people  of  different 
sex. 

2.  It  is  a  grave  sin  to  tell  shameful  things  for  the  only 
pleasure  that  is  found  in  thinking  of  them.  There  is  no  excuse 
for  those  who,  In  joking,  have  recourse  to  equivocal,  but  clear 
sayings,  meaning  to  tell  the  thing  in  order  to  amuse  themselves. 

3.  It  is  a  grave  sin  to  boast  of  one's  own  shameful  sins,  and 
generally  for  three  reasons  :  Because  one  finds  pleasure  in  it,  on 
account  of  the  scandal,  and  also  the  sin  of  pride. 

4.  In  principle,  it  is  not  a  sin  to  tell  shameful,  but  slightly 
obscene  things,  if  it  is  for  joke  or  to  console  one's  self  ;  unless  the 
hearers  are  weak-minded  enough  to  be  scandalized  about  it. 
Thus,  usually,  there  is  no  grave  sin  in  the  shameful  talk  of  the 
reapers,  vintagers,  and  waggoners,  because  generally  they  say  it 
only  for  a  joke. 

5.  Gallant  conversations  between  persons  of  different  sex  must 
not  always  be  consideied  as  mortal  sins,  although  ihov  are  full  of 
dangcu-,  unless  they  are  repeated,  prolonged,  or  held  in  solitary 
places. 

What  shall  we  think  of  love-making,  as  it  is  called,  especially 
among  young  people?  It  is  not  to  be  called  mortal  sin,  wiihouc 
distinction  ;  though'geneially  there  is  in  it  a  near  danger  of  mortal 
sin,  at  least  in  its  progress  and  circumstances  ;  for  instance,  if  the 
lovers  are  left  alone  too  long,  or  during  the  night,  etc.,  clc. 

6.  There  is  no  great  sin  to  read  light  books  out  of  curiosity, 
because  they  do  not  excite  passion  very  much,  and  do  not  expose 
the  reader  to  great  danger,  such  as  many  comedies  and  poems  do. 
But  if  that  reading  has  for  object  instruction,  or  the  study  of  elo- 
quence, there  is  no  sin  in  it. 


Sixth  and  Ninth  Precepts  of  the  Decalogue.       149 

CHAPTER   II. 

Lustful  Sins  Consummated. 

ART.  I.     Sins  consummated  according  to  nature. 

Section  1.     Fornication. 

421. — Fornication  is  the  sexual  union  {copula)  of  a  free  man 
witli  a  free  woman,  by  mutual  consent.   .   .  _. 

Section  2.     Adultery. 

422. — Adultery  is  the  sexu:»l  union  with  the  husband  or  wife  of 
another  ;  it  is  to  enter  into  a  bed  that  is  not  one's  own  .   .  . 

Section  3.     Incest. 

423. — This  is  the  sexual  union  with  parents  or  relations,  of 
degrees  forbidden  by  the  Church.   .   .   . 

Section  4.     Sacrilege. 

424. — According  to  the  sin  of  lust,  it  is  the  violation  of  a 
person  or  of  a  secret  place  by  a  carnal  act.   .   .   . 

Section  5.     Defloration. 

425. — 1.  In  the  large  sense  of  the  word,  it  means  all  forbidden 
venereal  commerce  ;  theologians,  in  its  pro})er  meaning,  and  as 
far  as  its  particular  species  is  mentioned  in  the  canon  law,  describe 
it  thus:  it  is  the  defloration  of  a  virgin,  which  happens  when  she 
is  soiled  for  the  first  time  by  the  contact  and  the  consummated  act 
of  a  man. 

Defloration  violently  consummated,  besides  the  sin  against 
chastity,  contains  another  one  against  justice,  which  must  be 
acknowledged  in  confession. 

426. — 1.  It  is  defloration  to  fornicate  with  an  insane  virgin 
drunk  or  asleep,  because  she  is  violated  against  her  consent,  aiid 
then  receives  a  great  injury. 

2.  According  to  the  opinion  more  common  and  more  probable, 
it  is  not  defloration  to  fornicate  with  a  young  girl  formally  con- 
senting to  it,  who  is  in  nowise  constrained,  though  she  is  soiled  for 


150  T'..e  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

the  first  time  ;  because  the  defloration,  ou  account  of  the  formal 
outrage  made  to  the  honor  of  a  viigin,  may  be  looked  U[)on  as  a 
special  sin  against  chastit}'.  Tlien,  in  this  case,  a  virgin  being 
the  mistress  of  her  own  body,  can  use  it  freely,  and  cedes  her  own 
right.     Then  ...  it  follows  that.   .   .   . 

3.  The  defloration  of  a  virgin,  if  she  consented  to  the  act,  is 
not  forcibly  to  be  declared  in  confession,  according  t  )  the  more 
probable  opinion  ;  because,  in  principle,  it  is  not  to  be  looked  upon 
as  a  defloration,  but  as  a  simple  fornication. 

4.  However,  and  though  pliysical  strength  or  violence  are  not 
required  as  a  condition  for  the  defloration,  it  is  sufficient  that  a 
girl  is  induced  to  consent,  in  spite  of  herself,  through  craft,  threats, 
repeated  prayers,  which  triumph  over  her  constancy. 

Besides,  Lsssius  warns  us  very  wisely,  that  the  violation  of  a 
young  girl  who  gives  her  full  consent,  though  not  containing  the 
special  malignity  of  defloration,  mny  contain  a  giave  fault,  a 
special  one,  which  it  is  necessary  to  declare  in  confession,  because 
of  the  grief  and  shame  resulting  from  it  for  the  parents. 

Section  6.     RAVisHiiENT. 

427. — Ravishment  ...  is  defined  ;  a  violent  act  performed  on 
a  person,  or  on  those  on  whom  she  depends,  in  view  of  satisfying 
a  lustful  desire.   .   .   . 

If,  after  the  ravishment,  the  passion  is  satiated,  not  only  the 
sin  of  lust,  in  other  words,  fornication,  adultery,  or  sodom^s  etc., 
but  the  ravishment  itself  must  be  expressly  declared  in  con- 
fession. 

ART.  IT.     Sins  committed  against  nature. 

There  are  three  kinds  :  pollution,  sodomy  and  bestialit}'.  AYe 
must  add  onanism,  or  Onan's  sin  ;  which  is  the  sexual  act  com- 
menced but  consummated  outwardly,  to  avoid  conception,  either 
between  married  people  or  other  persons.  We  shall  speak  of  it 
a  propos  to  marriage. 

Section  1.     On  Pollution. 

428. — Pollution  consists  in  expending  one's  sperm  without  any 
commerce  with  another. 


Sixth  and  Ninth  Precepts  of  the  Decalogue,        151 

Tlie  voluntary  pollution,  the  only  one  with  which  we  occupy 
ourself,  is  sought  for  direcll}'  or  indirectly.  It  differs  from  the 
distillation,  in  which  a  more  liquid  fluid  is  expended.  In  pollution, 
the  sperm  is  ejaculated  with  intense  pleasure  and  great  commotion. 
Distillation  takes  place  without  any  pleasure,  or  with  a  slight  one. 

429. — 1.  Direct  and  perfectly  voluntary  pollution  is  always  a 
mortal  sin.   .   .   . 

2.  The  indirect  pollution,  or  only  voluntary,  in  its  cause,  is  a 
great  sin  if  .   .   .  and  venial  sin  if  .   .   . 

3.  The  voluntar}'  indirect  pollution  leads  to  no  sin,  when  there 
is  no  sutficient  reason  to  expose  one's  self  to  it  ;  .  .  .  because, 
when  two  effects  must  follow  an  indifferent  cause,  a  good  one  and 
a  bad  one,  it  is  permitted  to  expose  one's  self  to  the  cause,  having 
the  good  in  view  though  permitting  the  bad. 

430. — Involuntary  pollution  is,  in  no  way,  a  sin.  Thus,  there  is 
no  fault  in  the  pollution  felt  by  a  doctor,  a  surgeon,  or  a  con- 
fessor, in  fulfilling  the  duties  of  their  charges,  provided  their 
intention  is  pure,  and  gives  no  consent  to  pleasure.   .   .   . 

431. — 4.  Any  spermatic  effusion  done  deliberately,  and  how- 
ever weak  it  mny  be,  is  a  pollution,  and  consequently  a  mortal 
sin.  Snch  is  the  case  if  one  gives  his  consent  to  the  pleasure  of 
pollution,  even  for  a  little  time,  even  if  it  is  produced  without  any 
intention,  spontaneously,  for  some  motive  ;  so  much  the  more  if  it 
is  called  forth  by  some  effort.   .   .   . 

G.  It  is  not  a  sin,  in  principle,  to  go  on  horseback  in  order  to 
amuse  one's  self  reasonably,  to  la}'  down  in  a  certain  position,  to 
nourish  one's  self  with  heating  food,  to  speak  with  a  person  of 
another  sex  for  an  honest  motive,  to  be  in  the  service  of  sick 
persons,  to  help  them  in  bath,  to  practice  surgery  and  other 
things,  though  one  foresee  that  a  pollution  will  result  from  it,  pro- 
vided there  is  no  intention,  that  one  should  be  decided  not  to 
consent,  whatever  the  case  may  be,  and  that  there  should  be  no 
danger  of  consent. 

432. — 7.  The  voluntary  distillation,  even  indirect,  if  it  is 
notable  and  accompanied  l)y  a  commotion  of  the  genital  organs, 
may  be  a  mortal  sin,  because  it  is  a  grave  disorder,  which  leads  to 


152  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

the  near  danger  of  pollution.  But  if  it  is  a  weak  one  and  withont 
any  notable  commotion,  it  is  to  be  distinguished:  1,  if  it  is 
directl}'  voluntary  there  is  a  mortal  sin,  because  all  seminal  loss 
brings  with  it  some  commotion  and  effusion  ;  2,  if  it  is  indirectly 
voluntary,  one  may  easily  excuse  it  from  all  sin,  because  it  is 
nothing  else  but  an  excretion. 

8.  Unruled  movements,  accompanied  by  venereal  pleasures, 
whether  grave  or  light,  are  mortal  sins  if  .  .  .  venial  sins  if  .  .  . 
and  sinless  if  .   .   . 

9.  When  a  violent  itching  is  felt  in  the  shameful  parts,  it  is 
permitted  to  soothe  it  with  the  hjlp  of  the  hand,  though  a 
pollution  should  result  from  the  act  ;  provided  that  such  itching 
is  caused  by  the  acrity  of  the  blood,  and  not  by  lustful  passion  ; 
because,  if  pollution  is  produced,  b}'  setting  aside  the  peril  of 
consent  it  is  accidental^  and  so  there  is  no  fault  in  it. 

Section  2.     On  Sodomy. 

433. —  The  horrible  crime  of  sodomy  consists  in  cohabitation 
with  a  person  of  the  same  sex  or  of  the  different  one,  but  in  a 
manner  against  nature  (in  vase  indebito.)  Tiiere  is  then  perfect 
sodomy,  which  consists  in  having  relations  with  a  person  of  the 
same  sex  ;  and  the  imperfect  sodomy,  with  a  person  of  different 
sex,  but  outside  of  the  natural  laws,  {extra  vas  naturale)^  or  with 
a  passion  contrary  to  nature  (affectas  ad  vas  innaturale.)  .  .   . 

434. —  1.  Perfect  sodomy  is  not  of  the  same  species  as  the 
imperfect  one,  because  in  the  first,  one  man  is  drawn  towards 
the  same  sex  and  against  nature  ;  in  the  second  one,  he  is 
attracted  only  against  nature. 

2.  The  act  of  a  man  with  a  woman  against  nature,  is  an 
imperfect  sodomy,  distinct  in  species  from  the  perfect  one. 

3.  One  could  not  call  sodomy  si  Jleret' tantum  appHcatio  manus, 
aut  pedis ^  ad  partes  génitales  alter ius,  because  there  would  be 
no  sensual  connection. 

4.  More  probably,  one  must  not  declare  in  confession  who  has 
been  the  agent  or  patient,  because  the  species  of  sin  is  the  same. 
But  pollution,  if  there  has  been  any,  as  it  happens  more  easily  to 
the  agent,  must  be  fully  related. 


Sixth  and  JSfinth  Precepts  of  the  Decalogue,        153 

Section  3.     On  Bestiality. 

435. —  The  infamous  and  abominable  crime  of  bestiality  con- 
sists in  having  relation  with  a  beast.   .   .   . 

436. —  Unclean  handling  of  a  beast,  though  not  a  sin  of  bestial- 
ity, so  called,  must  be  declared  in  confession,  if  carnal  i)leasui'e 
has  been  in  view.  But  the  circumstances  must  not  be  necessarily 
declared,  si  quis  mediante  lingua  jumenti^  aut  alterius  bestiœ, 
voluptatem  veneream  aut  poUutionem  in  se  excitet.  It  is  not  neces- 
sary to  declare  in  confession  what  kind  of  beast  it  was,  if  it  was 
a  male  or  a  female. 


Cases  on  tfje  Stxlî)  anïï  Ntnttj  Precepts  of  tfie 
©ecalogue* 


Gury  does  not  think  it  is  urgent  to  study  any  particular  case, 
because  "if  every  thing  pertaining  to  this  lustful  matter  is 
extremely  frequent  in  practice,  there  is  no  serious  difficulty  in 
explaining  them." 


Kxcutm  on  tïje  Sebcntî}  antï  Etnt\}  î^rccrpts  of  tije 
©rcalogue. 

"Thou  slialt  not  steal."    Exodus  20:  15-17. 


The  Seventli  Precept  of  the  Decalogue  forbids  any  attempt  en 
the  pro|)erty  of  others. 

Tlie  Tenth  Precept  forbids  the  internal  sin  of  concnpiscence,  in 
other  word^,  the  desire  for  others'  property  and  uiijnst  action 
towards  them.  We  shall  speak  of  the  different  sins  of  injustice 
regarding  goods,  in  the  treatise  on  justice  and  rights. 


Cas:s  on  tijc  Srùcnti^  anïï  Erntî]  î^rrcrpts  of  t\}t 
©tcalogur. 


They  are  to  be  found  in   the   special   treatise  on   justice  and 
contracts. 


3Etfîl)tI}  îPrrcrpt  of  t!}e  Brcalogue, 

'Thou  shalt  not  bear  false  witness."     Exodus  20  :  16. 


CHAPTER   I. 

Lying. 


ART.  I.     Lying  in  general. 

438. — A  lie  is  a  word  or  a  sign  contrary  to  the  thought, 
with  tiie  intention  of  deceiving.  If  it  is  made  b}'  sign  or 
by  action,  it  is  called  pretence  ;  pretence  in  its  turn  takes  the 
name  of  hypocrisy,  when  one  simulates  to  be  other  than  one  is  ;  for 
instance,  a  sinner  who  pretends  to  be  just. 

There  are  three  kinds  of  lies  :  prejudicial  lies,  by  which  one 
wrongs  another  ;  officious  lies,  by  which  one  helps  one's  self  or 
another  ;  and  joyous  lies,  to  make  people  laugh. 

439. — Lying,  properly  so-called,  is  always  an  evil.  .  .  .  the 
prejudicial  lie  has  a  gravity  proportioned  to  the  wrong  done,  and 
which  one  is  obliged  to  compensate. 

The  officious  lie  is  a  venial  sin,  in  principle  ;  because  it  does  not 
occasion  a  grave  disorder  ;  for  belter  reason,  the  same  may  be 
said  of  the  joyous  lie.   .   .   . 

ART.  II.     Mental  restriction. 

441. — This  is  an  act  of  the  mind  turning  aside,  or  restricting  the 
true  meaning  of  words  about  some  sul)ject,  to  another  sense  than 
the  natural  one  ;  whence  it  follows  that  it  is  not  true,  unless  it  is 
taken  in  the  same  sense  given  by  the  speaker. 

Mental  restriction  is  :  1,  purely  and  strictly  mental,  if  the  sense 
attributed  by  the  speaker  can  in  no  way  be  understood,  whence  it 
is  called  properly  mental;  2,  largely  ov  imjvoperly.meWixl^  if  the 
sente  c  in  be  understood  by  what  is  added  to  it.     Mental  restric- 


k 


156  The  D  ctrlne  of  the  Jesuits. 

tion  comprises  equivokes  or  amphibologies,  words  with  two  mean- 
iDg>«,  the  one  more  natural,  and  the  olher  less  * 

442. — 1.  It  is  not  permitted  to  make  use  of  the  purel}'  and 
properly  mental  restriction. 

443. — 2.  It  is  sometimes  permitted  to  make  use  of  the  restriction 
largeh' ;  that  is  to  say,  improperly  mental,  and  also  of  equivocal 

*  Jacques  Platel  has  explained  this  difference  in  the  most  luminous 
terms,  (1680)  : 

"God  caimot  (and  this  is  never  permitted  to  men,  for  any  cause  what- 
ever) use  purely  mental  restrictiou,  in  other  words  a  restriction  wliicli  in 
no  way  lets  itself  be  perceived,  neither  by  circumstances  nor  by  any 
external  marks. 

"God  can,  however  ("and  this  is  also  permitted  to  m^^n  for  a  just  cause), 
use  the  restriction  which  is  not  purely  mental,  when  the  words  externally 
pronounced  are  joined  with  external  circumstances,  which  ^ives  such  help 
to  the  sense  of  words  that  an  intelliiifent  hearer  is  able  to  understand  tlie 
restriction  internally  retained,  or  at  least  suspect  it."     (Page  322.) 

Pope  Innocent  XL  had  con-lemned  ampliibolo-ry  ;  but  tlie  Jesuit^  had 
victoriously  answered.  Jean  de  Cardenas,  who  publislied  iji  1702  a  special 
dissertation  on  the  Papal  decreee,  expresses  himself  in  such  a  way  as  to 
take  all  scruples  away  : 

••Thomas  Sanchez,"  says  he,  "proposes  two  kinds  of  amphibologies 
which  he  looks  upon  as  certaiulj^  allowable,  supposing  there  is  a  justcau«e 
for  seeking  for  the  truth  ;  the  tirst  one  is,  when  the  words  used  are  equivo- 
cal, and  that  tlie  one  wlio  speaks  uses  it  in  one  sense,  while  the  hearer 
thinks  he  is  speaking  in  another  sen^e.  In  this  case,  if  there  is  no  just 
cause  for  hiding  the  truth,  such  an  ampliiljology  is  not  allowable,  but  it  is 
not  a  lie.  For  instance,  if  any  one  hail  killed  a  man  of  French  nationality, 
in  Latin  Galium,  he  says,  without  lying,  tliat  he  did  not  kill  Galium, 
meaning  that  Latin  word  ^a//wm,  which  means  a  rooster.  It  is  such  an 
amphibology  that  is  mentioned  in  the  reflection  on  the  chapter  He  qnis 
22,  question  2,  in  these  terms:  Let  the  one  who  is  interrogated  acutely 
deceive  his  interrogator,  by  answering  in  Latin,  He  U  not  Iiere,  meaning 
lie  eats  not  here,  being  favorised  by  the  equivocation  of  the  Latin  word  is, 
which  means  equally  he  is.  and  he  eats. 

"It  is  certain  that  this  kind  of  amphibology  is  not  condemned  by  Inno- 
cent XL;  because  he  comlemns  only  tlie  amphibologies  which  are  made 
by  means  of  a  mental  restriction  adding  to  the  spoken  words  a  thought 
inwardly  retained. 

"Now  in  the  kind  of  amphibology  of  which  it  is  questioned  here,  no 
inward  thought  is  added  to  the  uttered  words;  because  these  dittereut 
significations  are  equally  proper  to  the  equivocal  words  in  themselves." 
(Page  324.) 

Here  is  the  precious  doctrine  offered  to  the  meditation  of  little  children  : 

Ques.    "  Is  it  justifiable  to  use  equivocal  words,  or  mental  restrictii  ns?" 

Aiis.  "It  is  not  justifiable  to  use  them,  when  they  are  such  that  the 
sense  cannot  be  understood  by  the  hearers;  because  then,  they  are  actual 
lies.  But  when,  according  to  custom  or  circumstances,  the  true  meaning 
can  readily  be  understood  l)y  the  hearers,  they  may  be  used,  if  there  is  a 
legitimate  reason  for  doing  so."     {PetU  Catéchisme  de  Marotte.) 


Eighth  Precept  of  the  Decalogue,  157 

words,  when  the  meaning  of  the  speaker  can  be  understood.  The 
icuson  is,  that  in  itself  h  is  not  an  evil,  others  not  being  properly 
deceived  ;  but  for  a  just  motive,  they  are  placed  in  a  situation  to 
deceive  themselves.  Besides,  the  good  of  society  demands  tliat 
there  should  be  a  means  to  lawfully  hide  a  secret  ;  now  there  is  no 
other  way  than  by  equivocation  or  restriction,  largely  and 
improperly  mental. 

One  is  permitted  to  use  this  restriction,  even  under  oath.  .  .   . 

444. — A  culprit  interrogated  judicially,  or  not  lawfully,  by  the 
judge,  may  answer  that  he  has  done  nothing,  meaning:  "about 
which  you  have  the  right  to  question  me  ;"  or,  "  that  I  am  obliged 
to  avow."  * 

♦This  is  Emmanuel  Sa's  own  formula,  in  the  year  IfiOO  :  "Any  one  not 
lei^itimately  interrogated,  may  answer  that  he  does  not  know  anythiui^ 
about  what  is  asked,  understanding  mentally,  in  such  a  manner  that  he  is 
obhged  to  tell  it."     (.Page  295.) 

Lessius  speaks  in  the  same  way  :  "If  a  judge  interrogates  on  an  action, 
which  must  have  been  committed  without  sin,  at  least  a  mortal  one,  the 
witness  and  the  culprit  are  not  obliged  to  answer  according  to  the  judge's 
intention." 

We  see  that  the  docftrine  has  remained  intact  till  our  day.  We  find  tlie 
proof  of  ic  in  more  recent  facts,  when  a  civil  judge  allows  himself 
to  question  a  clerk  about  matters  about  which  the  latter  beheves  that  he 
need  answer  nothing  to  the  civil  authority. 

For  instance  :  On  the  11th  and  18th  of  December  1879,  the  priest  Vincent 
was  arraigned  before  the  police  court  of  St.  Julien  (Haute-Savoie), 
incriminated  for  having  illegally  opened  a  free  school.  The  sitting  was 
marked  by  a  curious  incident,  reported  as  follows-  by  the  Patriote 
Sacoisien  : 

"  Bad  faith,  lies,  concealments  of  all  kinds,  have  not  been  lacking  to  the 
culprit  and  professors  of  the  school  called  as  witnesses. 

"  At  the  beginning  of  the  examination  of  a  young  priest,  the  president 
of  tlie  court  deemed  it  useful  to  lecall  to  him  tiie  importance  of  the  oath, 
on  account  of  his  sacerdotal  character. 

"  The  reserved  bearing  of  this  witness,  his  efforts  to  escape  the  incisive 
and  precise  questions  of  the  magistrate,  brought  him  this  sharp  and  witty 
reprimand  : 

"I  was  not  wrong,  sir,  to  recall  to  yon  the  importance  of  your  oath 
before  justice  ;  I  see,  with  grief,  that  your  calculated  concealments  show 
me  that  1  was  entirely  right." 

"  Tlie  attorney  of  the  Republic,  in  his  turn,  did  not  fear  to  tell  the 
culprit:  'As  a  magistrate,  1  am  indignant  at  your  attitude;  and  as  a 
Catholic,  I  am  ashamed  of  it.'" 

Those  words,  from  the  mouth  of  a  good  communicant  Catholic 
magistrate,  have  a  signification  understood  by  everybody. 

If  the  words  (;f  the  wortliy  magistrate  have  been  understood,  it  seems 
that  those  of  tlie  priest  have  not.  The  latter  remained  in  the  strict  right, 
and  obeyed  (Jury.     The  right  to  teach  belongs  to  the  Church  and  to  the 


158  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

This  mode  of  restriction  may  be  used  by  all  public  functionaries 
questioned  on  things  confided  to  their  discretion  ;  or  secretaries, 
ambassadors,  generals,  magistrates,  law3'ers,  physicians,  and  ail 
those  who  have  reasons,  to  hide  some  truth  relative  to  their  charge. 
Because,  if  the  secrets  confided  to  those  persons  were  violated, 
grave  inconvenience  would  result  for  society.* 

Church  alone;  the  civil  law,  in  this  matter,  is  purely  penal;  the  incrimi- 
nated act  was  nothing  else  than  a  sin.  Then  the  jncige  had  truly  no  riglit 
t(>  interrogate,  and  the  priest  could  answer  whatever  lie  liked,  even  being 
under  oath.  He  would  have,  if  he  had  dared  to  do  it  (but  tiie  revolution- 
ary spirit  has  mollified  the  strongest  courages,)  answered  with  Taberna: 

*'  A  prie»t  cannot  be  obliged  to  bear  witness  before  a  secular  judge  ;"  or 
with  Tambourin  : 

"The  culprit,  if  he  is  a  priest,  may  swear  equivocally  before  a  secular 
judge,  that  he  has  not  committed  the  olft-nee;  .  .  .  because  the  judge  is 
incompetent  towards  ecclesiastics.  .  .  ."  Or  better  yet,  with  Faguudez  : 
'•  If  the  judge  questions  an  action  done  without  sin,  at  least  a  mortal  one, 
the  witness  and  culprit  are  not  obliged  to  answer  according  to  the  judge's 
intention,  in  a  case  where  the  judge  might  believe  that  there  is  fault  on 
the  part  of  the  accused  one,  and  for  that  reason  would  think  that  he  is  in 
duty  bound  to  punish  him  severely."     (Page  315.) 

"  He  might  have  even  victoriously  sustained  the  same  thesis,  in  a  far 
more  important  matter  than  the  illegal  opening  of  a  sciiool,  Has  he  not 
with  him,  besides  other  illustrious  doctors,  Georges  Gobat,  (1701)? 

"  If  you  have  killed  Peter  in  self  defence,  you  can  swear  before  the  judge 
that  you  did  not  kill,  restricting  mentally  nnjasth/,  if  you  cannot  prove 
what  is  true,  nevertheless,  that  your  defence  has  been  really  legitimate. 
.  .  .  In  tiie  same  way,  when  it  is  more  probable  that  tlie  profit  on  certain 
goods  is  too  low,  and  that  on  account  of  this  you  use  false  weights 
secretly,  you  can,  in  presence  of  the  judge,  d'-nt/  under  Odth,  timt  you  have 
bei'n  using  false  weights,  (adding  mentally,)  from  which  the  buyer  has 
unjustly  bufltered."     (Page  322.) 

*  The  hardness  of  the  times  and  the  sarca«;ms  of  infidels  have  com- 
pelleil  the  Good  Fathers  to  attenuate  very  much,  in  theoretical expositii^n, 
the  compliances  of  their  doctrines.  l3oubtless  the  ground  work  has 
remained  the  same,  as  is  easily  recognized  by  a  perspicacious  eve,  and 
as  facts  of  experience  demonstrate,  but  tliey  speak  with  less  ck-arne^-s. 
Ah  !  what  a  good  time  when  the  true  doctors  could  speak  freely  !     I.i>ten  : 

Tolet  :  ''A  culprit  is  not  permitted  to  tell  a  lie.  .  .  .  However,  lie  can 
say:  I  have  not  done  it;  or,  I  have  not  had  any  accomplices.  But  he 
must  take  good  care  to  say  these  words  in  a  sense  true  and  conforiiial)le 
to  the  intention  he  has  in  his  mind.  For  instance,  if  lie  answers  :  I  have 
not  done  it,  it  is  necessary  that  his  thought  should  be  to  say,  I  have  not 
done  it  since  1  am  in  prison!  If  he  answers  :  I  have  not  had  any  accoii- 
plices;  he  must  mean  by  that  answer,  in  some  other  crime  than  the  one 
about  wdiich  he  is  interrogated,  or  some  other  similar  intention;  otlu-r- 
wise  he  would  tell  a  lie,  wuilst  lie  does  not  tell  any  in  this  way  ;  because, 
in  this  ca<e,  the  words  must  be  con'-idered  not  according  to  the  judge's 
intention,  but  according  to  that  of  the  culprit  "     (Paire  297.) 

Suarez:    "A   lie   is   something   said   against   the  very  thought  of  the 


Elijldh  P)'<cei)t  of  the  Decalogue,  159 

CHAPTER   II. 

Defamation. 
ART.  I.     On  the  Sin  of  Defamation. 

445. — Defamation  is  the  unjust  violation  or  reviling  of  another's 
reputation  by  words  not  expressed  in  public  .   .   . 

speaker  himself;  because  it  is  the  one  who  speaks  who  is  obliged  to 
conform  his  words  to  his  own  intention,  and  he  is  not  always  obliged 
to  conform  them  to  tlie  listener's  intention.  Now  one  cannot  say  that 
such  a  one  speaks  against  Ids  tliouglits  who  uses  equivocal  terms  in  a 
sense  conformable  to  his  own  intention.  Then  he  does  not  lie;  then  he 
does  not  utter  an  untruth  ;  then,  to  speak  thus  is  not  intrinsically  an  evil; 
because  it  would  be  only  on  account  of  the  lie  that  evil  could  exist.' 
Whence  another  conclusion  would  be,  that  there  is  no  perjury  in  affirming 
under  oath  what  is  said  in  such  a  manner;  because  by  that  oath  one  does 
not  take  God  as  a  witness  for  a  lie,  there  being  no  lie."     (Page  300.) 

"If  some  one  who  has  promised,  or  externally  contracted  without  inten- 
tion of  promise,  is  questioned  by  the  judge,  and  is  called  upon  to  declare 
under  oath  if  he  has  promised  or  contracted,  he  may  simply  say.  Mo; 
because  that  may  have  a  legitimate  sense,  viz.  :  /  have  not  promised  by  a 
promise  which  binds  me;  and  he  has  a  legitimate  reason  for  answering 
thus;  because  otherwise,  not  being  able  to  prove  the  lack  of  intention, 
he  would  be  condemned  to  pay  what  he  does  not  owe  in  fact,  or  to 
cohabit  with  a  person  with  whom  he  has  not  truly  contracted.  Navarre 
teaches  this  thoroughly. 

Filliutius:  "We  must  distinguish  two  ways  by  which  persons  with 
judgment  may  use  amphibology.  The  tirst  one  consists  in  having  the 
intention  to  say  outwardly  but  material  words;  and  for  greater  safety, 
when  one  commences  by  saying:  'I  swear,'  must  add  inaudibly,  'that  £ 
say;  '  and  answer  aloud,  '  tliat  I  have  not  done  this  or  that;  '  because  tlie 
saying  is  true  in  this  way.  The  second  one  consists  in  having  the  intention 
not  to  finish  the  sentence  by  external  words  only,  but  aL>«o  witli  a  mental 
restriction;  every  one  beini;- free  to  express  his  thouglit  fully  or  in  i);irt. 
As  for  ignorant  people,  who  do  not  conceive  of  amphibology  in  particu- 
lar, it  is  sufficient  that  they  should  have  the  intention  of  affirming  or 
denying  in  a  sense  true  in  itself,  and  for  that,  it  is  necessary  that  they  can 
also  deny  in  some  truthful  sense,  otherwise  they  could  not  speak  in  a 
sense  confoiniable  to  the  ti nth."     (Page  oOD.) 

F.  de  Castro  Palao,  shows  in  this  a  spirit  of  foresight  and  prudence 
above  all  praise  :  "Every  time  that  a  just  subject  for  disguising  the  tiutli 
presents  itself,  one  can,  without  sin,  give  an  aniphibological  oath,  as  is 
proved  by  the  examples  quoted,  and  the  reasons  alleged;  because  such  an 
oath  contains  justice  and  truth;  and  inasmuch  as  the  oath  is  useful  it 
does  not  invalidate  the  judgment.  It  is  then  in  no  way  vicious.  .  .  .  So, 
even  if  the  questioner  should  exclude  all  equivoke,  and  if,  besides  the 
oath  taken,  he  should  ask  for  another  oath  not  to  calumniate,  and  should 
exact  you  to  swear  to  tell  the  truth  sincerely  and  without  equivocation, 
you  would,  even  then,  use  an  amphibological  oath,  mixed  up  with  restric- 
tion; because  you  can  mentally  reserve  that  you  swear  without  any  unjust 


160  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits» 

Defamation  is  called  simply  such,  if  the  reputation  of  a  person  is 
violated  by  the  revelation  of  a  true  crime  ;  it  is  called  calumnious 
if  a  false  crime  is  invented.    Defamation  can  be  direct  or  indirect. 

446. — Any  direct  defamation,  simple  or  calumnious,  is  mortal 
in  itself;  because  it  is  a  graver  sin  than  theft.  But  the  gravity  or 
slightness  of  defamation  ought  to  be  estimated  especially  in  con- 
sideration of  the  gravity  of  the  damage  caused,  and  not  of  that  of 
the  crime  attributed  to  the  defamer.  One  must  then  take  into 
account  the  value  of  the  defamer,  and  that  of  the  defamed. 

equivoke.  There  is,  in  fact,  no  proposition  in  whatever  large  spirit  it  is 
taken,  which  is  not  susceptible  of  some  mental  restriction."     (page  313.) 

Buseubaum:  "It  is  not  a  mental  restriction  if  some  one  answers 
according  to  the  thought  of  the  questioner,  though  the  words  tie  utters  in 
tlie  answer  are  false  in  themselves,  if  tliey  were  n(jt  said  regarding  such 
circumstances.  For  instance,  if  some  one  aslvs  me  if  I  have  Ivilled  Caius, 
I  answer:  I  have  not  killed  him.  Though  1  did  kill  him,  1  do  not  lie,  I 
do  not  sin."     (Page  339.) 

But  Charles  Antoine  Casnedi  carries  the  day  by  having  profited  by  the 
experience  of  his  pred  ces^ors,  so  far  as  the  judgment  of  an  humble  lay- 
man, incompetent  in  morals,  can  go. 

"  Now,"  says  this  grt-at  man,  '*  I  am  going  to  examine  a  new  manner  of 
telling  no  lies  while  hiding  the  truth;  and  this,  not  in  shuttmg  one's 
mouth,  but  by  the  speaking  itself. 

"  This  manner  consists  in  speaking  but  materially,  and  in  pronouncing 
words  with  the  intention  of  giving  them  no  signification,  as  if.  in  fact, 
tliey  had  no  meaning  whatever;  just  as  when  I  i)rouounce  the  word  hlicLri, 
or  as  when  some  one  pror.ounces  woids  wliicli  he  does  not  hear.  Because 
words  drawing,  so  to  speak,  Iheir  life  irom  llie  intention  that  one  lias  of 
giving  tliem  a  signification,  it  follows  that  without  tliat  intention,  tlie 
prolfered  words  are  like  dead  words,  or  some  kind  of  skeletons  of  words; 
they  have  then  no  formal  sense  to  mean  what  they  ought  to  signify  by 
their  institution.     (Tage  325.)  .  .  . 

"But  supposing  once  that  these  words  :  I  do  not  know,  I  have  not  done 
it,  or  other  similar  ones,  do  not  signify  anythinii'.  in  a  case  when  speak- 
ing is  necessary,  and  notwitlistanding,  at  the  same  time  hide  the  heart's 
secret,  one  explains  how  easily  :  "  Not  only  is  there  none,  but  even  these 
cannot  be  any  lie  in  the  one  who  speaks,  because  no  one  lies  but  by 
words  which  signify  sonietliitig  opposed  to  what  is  in  the  mind. 

"The  one  who  swears  materially  does  not  swear,  because,  in  order  to 
swear,  the  use  of  the  words  "I  svvear"  is  necessary,  as  signification 
of  the  oath.  Then  the  one  who  uses  the  words  "I  svvear"  as  not  being 
significant,  does  not  swear."     (page  327.) 

Gre'goire  de  Valence  (that  illustrious  man),  says  the  Jesuit  Clair,  wlio 
was  taken  in  the  flagrant  ofi'ence  of  falsifying  texts  before  tlie  Pope, 
Clement  VIII.,  (See  La  Fusee  d^un  Jésuite,  by  Lanjninais,  1879,  page  G  I) 
had  the  same  idea,  but  did  not  express  it  so  clearly.  He  proposed  to  give 
to  the  word  horse  the  value  of  the  word  man,  to  obolas  the  value  of  ducat, 
etc.     But  it  was  not  very  practicable." 


Eigldh  Precept  of  the  Decologue.  161 

447. — It  is  never  allowable  to  attribute  a  crime  to  some  one 
without  cause,  as  results  from  the  44th  proposition  condemned  by 
Innocent  XI.  But  one  can  reveal  the  tiue  and  hidden  crime  of 
someone,  when  he  has  a  just  cause.  These  just  causes  are:  1, 
The  notable  interest  of  the  revealer,  for  instance,  in  order  to  ask 
for  aid  and  advice  in  a  grave  matter,  but  taking  care  not  to  have 
the  desire  to  defame  ;  2,  the  interest  of  the  delinquent,  for  his 
instruction,  his  correction,  etc.  ;  3,  the  public  interest,  to  prevent 
some  evil  threatening  the  State,  religion,  or  some  community; 
4,  the  grave,  even  private  interest  of  the  one  who  listens,  or  of 
somebody  else.* 

448. — Ques.  Is  it  a  grave  sin  to  reveal  the  one  mortal  sin  of 
another  ? 

Ans.  It  is  not  always  a  mortal  sin,  even,  when  it  has  been 
revealed  to  several  persons. 

449. — Ques.  Can  one  reveal  a  published  crime  to  those  who 
are  ignorant  of  it? 

Ans.     Yes,  without  any  grave  siij. 

Ques.  Can  one  reveal  a  published  crime  iû  a  pl^ce  where  it  is 
ignored? 

Ans.  Yes,  more  probably  to  one's  self,  and  without  any  grave 
sin,  if  it  is  a  question  of  a  neighboring  place.   .   .   . 

455. —  ...  It  is  not  sinning  mortally  to  speak  evil  of  some  one 
unknown  and  indeterminate  ;  to  say,  for  instance  :  there  are  in 
such  a  place  many  thieves,  drunkards,  and  immodest  persons  ; 

*  The  Petit  Catéchisme  de  Marotte  does  not  fail  to  reproduce  this  excep- 
tion which  destroys  the  whole  rule,  taking  care  to  pick  out  some  admissi- 
ble species,  in  order  to  make  the  principles  pass  : 

Ques.  "Is  it  never  permitted  to  publish  the  faults  or  defects  of 
others? 

Ans.  "  It  is  permitted  to  publish  them  when  there  is  a  necessity  for  it; 
m  other  words:  1,  wiien  it  is  for  the  good  of  religion  or  the  State;  2, 
when  the  one  who  reveals  the  faults  or  vices  of  another  does  it  for  his  own 
advantage;  for  instance,  to  defend  himself  against  calumny,  to  ask  for 
advice  or  aid  in  an  important  affair;  3,  when  tlie  good  of  the  one  wlio 
committed  the  fault,  or  vvlio  has  secret  defects  demands  that  his  conduct 
should  be  known  to  those  being  in  position  to  correct  him  ;  4,  at  last, 
when  other  persons  have  an  interest  in  knowing  the  life  and  manners  of 
the  ofiender,  in  order  to  guard  themselves  against  the  damage  they  can 
receive  from  them." 


162  The  Doctrine  of  /he  Jesuits. 

because  nobody  suffers  a  grave  injurv.  lu  the  same  way,  it  is  not 
a  grave  matter  to  report  the  crime  of  some  one  whom  the  hearers 
do  not  know  and  will  never  be  acquainted  with,  even  if  his  name 
is  mentioned  :  even  this  contains  no  fault  in  itself.   .   .  . 

456. — There  is  no  sin,  at  least  grievous,  if,  in  order  to  soothe 
one's  self,  leaving  aside  any  reviling  intention,  one  relates  to  a 
friend  the  injury  which  has  been  done  him,  though  dishonor  may 
result  from  this  to  the  author.  So,  according  to  tlie  probable 
opinion,  servants  relating  injuries  done  them  by  their  masters, 
wives  those  by  their  husbands,  children  by  their  fathers,  ecclesias- 
tics by  their  prelates,  etc.,  are  excused  at  least  from  mortal  sin  ; 
because  the  author  of  the  injustice  cannot  reasonably  get  angry 
about  it,  and  exact  so  difficult  a  thing  that  the  injured  persons 
shall  be  deprived  of  consolation  and  necessary  advice.  .  .  . 

ART.  II.     Reparation  for  outraged  honor. 

457. — The  defamer  is  obliged,  by  justice,  as  much  as  possible: 
1,  to  make  a  reparation  for  the  honor  unjustly  defamed  ;  2,  to  pay 
all  damages  resulting  from  the  defamation,  and  foreseen  in  some 
way. 

460. — Ques.  What  are  the  reasons  exempting  from  that  repa- 
ration ? 

Ans. — 1.  If  the  fault  divulged  by  you  to  one  or  several  persons 
has  got  abroad  to  the  public  in  some  other  way,  or  if  the  repara- 
tion has  been  made  in  another  manner  ;  for  instance,  by  a  judg- 
ment. 

2.  If  one  prudently  judges  that  the  remembrance  of  the  crime 
is  effaced  in  the  course  of  time. 

3.  If  the  reparation  cannot  be  made  without  endangering  the 
life  of  the  defamer  ;  because  life  is  a  gift  preferable  to  reputation. 
In  the  same  way,  if  the  honor  of  the  defamed  one  is  of  less 
importance  than  the  injury  to  which  the  defamer  would  be  liable; 
for  instance,  if  the  reparation  had  to  be  made  by  an  honorable 
man,  very  useful  to  society  and  religion. 

4.  If  the  reparation  is  morally  impossible,  on  account  of  dis- 


Elijhlli  Precept  of  the  Decalogue,  163 

tance  or  other  difficulties  ;  for  instance,  if  those  who  heard  the 
defamer  could  be  brought  to  change  their  opinion. 

5.  If  it  is  judged  that  those  who  heard  have  not  given  faith  to 
the  defamation,  as  it  often  happens  when  done  in  a  moment  of 
anger. 

6.  If  the  reviled  person  has  remitted  the  reparation  expressly 
or  tacitly^  provided  she  can  do  so,  even  this  presumed  pardon  is 
oftentimes  satisfactory. 

461. — Ques.  Is  one  obliged  to  give  money  for  compensation,  if 
the  reparation  of  honor  cannot  be  made  ? 

Ans.  No,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion  ;  because 
justice  demands  a  return  of  only  what  has  been  taken,  or  the 
equivalent  of  it.  Now,  one  has  not  taken  money  by  reviling,  and 
it  is  not  the  equivalent  of  honor,  since  it  belongs  to  another 
order. 

CHAPTER   III. 

Outrage. 

462. — Outrage  is  an  attempt  on  the  honor  of  a  person  present, 
and  knowing  it  ...  . 

CHAPTER   IV. 
Rash  Judgments,  Suspicions  and  Rash  Doubts. 

Appendix  :  On  Violation  of  Secrecy. 

468. — Secrecy,  in  general,  is  all  that  is  hidden  :  as  for  what 
concerns  us,  it  is  all  that  ought  to  remain  hidden  by  its  nature,  or 
by  special  convention. 

There  are  three  kinds  of  secrets  : 

The  natural.  .  .  . 

The  promised.  .   .  . 

The  confided.  .  .   . 

470. — Ques.     What  are  the  just  causes  for  divulging  a  secret? 

Ans. — 1.  The  well-presumetl  consent  of  the  person  who  is 
interested  in  hiding  that  secret  ;  2,  If  it  has  been  divulged  already 


104  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

elsewhere;  3,  the  damage  which  ma}-  be  caused  by  the  secret  to 
the  public  good,  or  to  private  interests. 

Ques.  Can  one  reveal  a  secret  if  he  has  promised  to  keep  it, 
even  at  the  risk  of  his  life? 

Ans.  Yes,  if  the  public  good  demands  it  :  because  any  promise 
contrary  to  the  public  good  is  void.   .   .   . 

471. — Ques.  Do  we  sin  gravely  by  divulging  a  secret  to  one  or 
two  honest  persons,  enjoining  them  to  keep  it? 

Ans.  No,  in  principle,  according  to  the  probable  opinion; 
because  in  tliis  case  one  does  not  do  a  great  wrong. 

Ques.     Is  it  a  grave  sin  to  open  or  read  the  letters  of  another? 

Ans.     Yes,  in  principle  .   .   . 

Except  in  the  following  cases  : 

1,  If  there  is  a  tacit  or  presumed  consent  of  the  writer,  or  of  the 
one  to  whom  it  is  written  ;  2,  if  one  knows  or  presumes  that  the 
letter  does  not  contain  anything  of  importance  ;  3,  if  one  has  a 
legitimate  reason  ;  for  instance,  to  prevent  a  public  or  private 
misfortune,  provided  one  reads  only  what  is  necessary  for  that 
purpose  ;  4,  if  one  opens  it  carelessly,  or  through  inadvertence.* 

472. — You  must  keep  a  covfided  secret,  even  if  j'ou  are  ques- 
tioned about  it  b}^  a  superior,  a  judge,  etc.  You  must  answer 
them:  '' I  do  not  know  anything  about  it;"  because  that  knowl- 
edge is  for  you  absolutely  as  if  it  did  not  exist  ;  and  this,  should 
the  secret  be  confided  expressl}^  or  tacitly.   .   .   . 


*  Marotte  has  not  failed  to  present  these  elegant  formulas  to  children  : 
Ques.   "Is  it  permitted  to  open  and  read  sealed  letters  addressed  to 
someone  else? 

Ans.  No.  it  is  forbidden  under  penalty  of  a  grave  sin  to  open  letters 
sealed  and  addressed  to  another:  and  even  to  read  those  found  unsealed 
and  placed  on  a  desk  or  some  other  place  of  that  kind  ;  unless  we  have 
rea!<on  to  believe  in  the  consent  of  the  author  of  the  letter,  or  of  the 
person  to  whom  it  is  addressed." 


dases  on  tîje  iEisfjtlj  Precept  of  tïje  ÎBecalogue. 


Case  II. 
Mental  Restriction. 


1.  Theofride,  having  received  an  inheritance  and  hidden  his 
riches  in  order  not  to  pay  his  creditors,  answers  that  he  has 
hidden  nothing.  Another  time,  having  returned  some  money  he 
had  borrowed,  interrogated  by  the  judge,  he  denies  having  received 
it.  At  a  third  time,  questioned  by  an  officer  of  customs  if  he 
was  carrying  goods  liable  to  duty,  he  answered  negatively. 

2.  Anna,  guilty  of  adultery,  as  her  suspicious  husband  was 
questioning  her,  answered  him  at  first  that  she  had  not  broken 
her  marriage  vow.  Then,  having  received  absolution  for  her  sin, 
she  answered  :  "I  am  innocent  of  such  a  crime."  A  third  time, 
to  the  entreaties  of  her  husband,  she  absolutely  denied  the  fault: 
"  I  have  not  committed  it,"  said  she;  meaning  "adultery  such 
as  I  am  obliged  to  reveal;"  in  other  words,  "I  have  not  com- 
mitted an  adultery." 

Ques.  1.     Must  Theofride  be  condemned  as  a  liar? 

Ques.  2.     Must  Anna  be  condemned? 

Ans.  Question  1.  Theofride  has  not  sinned  against  truth  in 
the  first  case  ;  because,  in  reality,  he  has  hidden  nothing,  accord- 
ing to  the  sense  of  the  questioner,*  or  in  the  sense  in  which  one 

♦This  is  exactly,  in  spite  of  the  reticence  of  the  Compendium,  the  true 
and  primordial  doctrine.     Listen  to  Emm.  Sa: 

"  It  is  not  a  mortal  sin  to  swear  falsely  as  to  the  words,  when  your  oath 
is  true  as  to  the  intention  of  the  one  who  interro<>ates  you;  as,  if  you 
swear  in  pestiferous  times  that  you  do  not  come  from  such  and  such  a 
place,  adding  mentally,  where  the  plague  exists;  or  that  you  have  not 
spoken  to  a  certain  man  of  tlie  things  that  your  interlocutor  suspects. 
In  this  way  many  thinlv  with  probability  what  d  )es  not  seem  to  me  quite 
sure,  and  which  I  would  not  advise  anyone  to  do;  without,  nevertheless, 
disapproving  one  who  would  do  it.  According  to  the  same  doctors,  you 
can  swear  before  the  judge  that  you  have  not  done  a  thing,  viz.  :  in  his 


166  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

ciuld  justly  interrogate  him.  So  by  answering  that  lie  has  hidden 
nothing,  it  is  as  if  he  said  :  I  have  committed  no  injustice  against 
my  creditors  ;  this  being  the  only  sense  in  which  the  judge  and 
creditors  can  interrogate  him. 

And  he  has  not  sinned  in  the  second  case,  for  the  same  reason  ; 
because  he  is  questioned  only  on  his  debt,  whether  he  has  received 
the  borrowed  money,  and  if  he  has  not  returned  it. 

Neither  in  the  third  case,*  at  least  according  to  the  probable 
and  common  opinion,  which  looks  upon  those  laws  concerning  the 
transfer  of  objects  from  one  place  to  another  as  purely  penal. 
So  to  say  "  I  have  nothing,"  it  is  as  if  one  was  saying,  "  I  have 
nothing  to  declare  of  myself;  it  is  j'our  duty  to  look  for  it  your- 
self, instead  of  questioning."  But  we  advise  ecclesiastics  to  tell 
the  truth,  to  avoid  a  scandal  by  denying  the  thing,  if  it  comes  to 
be  known. 

Ans.  Question  2. — In  the  three  cases  Anna  may  be  excused 
from  any  lie  ;  because  : 

In  the  first  case,  she  could  say  that  she  had  not  broken  the  mar- 
riage bond,  it  being  existent  yet.t 

own  way  of  thinking;  and  to  answer  one  who  would  constrain  you  to 
do  something  not  permitted,  or  which  you  are  not  obliged  to  do,  that 
you  will  do  it;  viz.  :  if  that  is  permitted,  or  if  you  are  forced  to  it;  and 
also  to  one  who  tries  unjustly  or  by  force  to  draw  a  secret  from  you, 
that  you  are  ignorant  of  it,  viz.  :  in  such  a  way  that  you  are  obliged  to 
reveal  it. 

"  Moreover,  they  say  that  when  you  are  not  obliged  to  swear  conform- 
ably to  the  intention  of  your  questioner,  you  can  swear  relatively  to  your 
own;  this  others  deny,  saying  that  such  a  way  of  understanding  one's 
own  intention  does  not  exclude  absolutely  false  expressions.  But  both 
parties  are  learned  men,  who,  respectively,  think  with  probability." 

*  Gury  reproduces  here  the  case  already  imagined  by  Sanchez.  (1614). 
And  even  Sanchez's  man  is  more  excusable  than  Gury's,  according  to  lay 
morality.  "The  one  who  has  hidden  some  property  for  fear  that  it 
should  be  seized  by  his  creditors  and  he  should  be  reduced  to  poverty, 
such  a  man,  I  sav,  questioned  by  the  judge,  can  swear  that  In;  has  hidden 
nothing.  And  those  also  who  know  of  it,  may  swear  to  the  same  thing, 
provided  they  are  assured  that  he  lawfully  hid  that  property  for  such  an 
aim,  understanding  mentally  that  he  hid  nothing  about  which  he  is 
obliged  to  declare  to  the  judge."     (Page  302). 

t  This  is  almost  as  good  as  the  Case,  of  Fegeli:  "A  man  being  asked  if 
the  tiiief  has  pas><cd  that  way,  can  answer,  lawfully,  putting  his  foot  upon 
a  paving-stone  :  He  did  not  pass  this  way  ;  meaning,  on  this  paving  stone. 


Cases  on  the  Eighth  Precept  of  the  Decalogue.     167 

In  the  second  case,  she  could  call  herself  innocent  of  adultery  ; 
because,  after  having  been  to  confession  and  having  received 
absolution,  her  conscience  is  at  rest,  having  the  moral  certainty 
that  her  sin  was  pardoned.  She  could  even,  according  to  St. 
Liguori,  afBrm  it  under  oath. 

In  the  third  case,  she  could  deny  her  sin,  according  to  the 
probable  opinion,  meaning:  "In  such  a  way  that  she  was  not 
obliged  to  reveal  it  to  her  husband  ;  "  as  a  culprit  may  say  to  a 
judge  who  does  not  question  him  legitimately  :  "I  have  not  com- 
mitted any  crime,"  adding  mentally,  "in  such  a  manner  that  I 
should  reveal  it."  This  is  the  opinion  of  St.  Liguori,  and  of 
many  others. 

Case  V. 

Defamation. 

Pascal,  knowing  of  a  crime  committed  very  secretly  by  Peter, 
reveals  it  to  Paul,  and  uses  an  oath  to  enforce  the  belief  on  Paul's 
mind.  But  he  makes  Paul  promise  also,  under  oath,  that  he  will 
never  divulge  it  to  anyone.  Soon,  however  Paul  violates  his  oath, 
îind  reveals  Peter's  crime.  .  .  .  Later,  Paul  repents,  .  .  .  and 
forms  the  resolution  to  acknowledge  that  he  has  been  mistaken, 
when  he  learns  that  Peter  has  previously  defamed  him  (Paul)  ; 
then  he  decides  not  to  retract  anything  until  Peter  sets  the 
example. 

Ques.  1.  Has  Pascal  sinned  equally  by  reveaUng  Peter's  crime 
to  one  man  only  ? 

Ques.  2.  Has  he  sinned  against  religion,  by  making  an  oath  to 
confirm  Peter's  crime? 

Ques.  3.     What  is  the  sin  of  Paul  in  violating  his  own  oath? 

Ques.  4.  Does  the  obligation  to  repair  the  honor  cease  ;  or  is 
it  only  postponed,  if  the  defamed  one  has  equally  defamed  his 
defamer? 

Ans.  Question  1.  Pascal  sinned  gravely  if  he  has  foreseen, 
even  confusedly,  that  Paul  would  reveal  the  secret.  In  the  con- 
trary hypothesis,  there  is  controversy  ;  most  of  the  theologians 
say,  Yes  ;  more,  probably  ;  because  there  is  no  actual  defamation 
in  relating  the  crime  to  one  man  only  ;  however,  more  trustworthy 


168  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

authors  deny  this  probability,  reputation  being  dependent  on  the 
opinion  of  the  generality  of  men. 

Ans.  Question  2.  Pascal  has  sinned  against  religion  b}"  taking 
an  oath  to  confirm  his  saying,  because  he  swore  without  a  cause, 
and  uselessly  invoked  God's  name.   .   .   . 

Ans.  Question  3.  Paul  has  sinned  gravely  against  religion  and 
against  justice. 

Ans.  Question  4.  There  is  controversy  to  know  whether  the 
defamer  is  exempt  from  retracting  until  the  one  who  has  defamed 
shall  retract.  Both  opinions  are  probable,  according  to  8t. 
Liguori. 

Case  VI. 

Defamation. 

Sylvia,  a  servant,  leaves  her  master,  an  honorable  man,  and 
learns  that  Veronica,  an  honest  girl,  has  entered  his  service  ;  she 
tries  all  means  to  induce  her  to  leave  him,  affirming  that  he  is  a 
hard  and  fuss}^  master.  As  she  was  not  believed  by  Veronica,  she 
adds  that  he  is  an  immoral  man,  and  very  dangerous  to  the  virtue 
of  his  servants. 

Ques.     Did  Sylvia  sin  by  defaming  her  master? 

Ans.  Not  at  all  ;  because  defamation  includes  an  unjust  revil- 
ing of  another.  Now,  Sylvia's  defamation  has  not  been  unjust, 
having  been  done  for  a  grave  and  just  motive,  for  the  good  of  the 
soul,  or  the  salvation  of  Veronica.   .  .  .  Then  .  .  . 

Case  X. 
Oh  Secrecy. 

Amand,  promised,  under  oath,  to  Marinus,  that  he  would  never 
reveal  a  theft  committed  by  the  latter,  and  about  which  Marinus 
told  liim,  making  him  promise  the  secret  under  oath.  But,  as  the 
thing  was  not  suspected,  Amand  was  called  as  a  witness  before 
the  judge,  and  revealed  the  secret,  after  interrogation. 

Ques.  Was  Amand  right,  and  was  it  his  daty  to  reveal  the 
confided  secret? 

Ans.  He  ought  not  to  have  revealed  the  theft  known  secretly 
under  oath;  but  he  ought  to  have  answered:    "I  do  not  know 


Cases  on  the  EigJdh  Precept  of  the  Decalogue.     169 

an\tliing,"  understanding,  "nothing  that  I  am  obliged  to  reveal," 
]  y  usijig  a  mental  restriction.  Because  such  a  secret  constrains 
in  all  cases,  by  natural  rights,  except  in  a  case  of  public  interest. 
A  superior  or  a  judge  cannot  compel  one  to  violate  natural  rights  : 
tlien  .  .  .  and  here,  the  reason  of  common  interest  does  not  exist  ; 
because  society  does  not  run  so  great  a  danger  from  a  theft  not 
brought  to  light.  So  Amand  has  committed  a  grave  sin  against 
religion  and  justice,  by  revealing  publicly,  before  the  couit,  a 
confided  secret  which,  under  oath,  he  had  promised  to  keep. 

Case  XI. 
Open  Letters. 

Olivier,  having  fallen  in  love  with  Rosa,  committed  several 
times  with  her  shameful  acts.  Sometime  later,  Rosa  declares  that 
she  is  pregnant,  and  that  she  will  divulge  his  conduct  towards  her, 
if  he  does  not  give  ber  two  hundred,  pounds  to  provide  for  future 
expenses.  Olivier  was  going  to  let  her  have  the  money,  when  he 
learns  that  the  girl  keeps  company  with  Titius.  Then  he  begins 
to  doubt  if  slie  is  not  pregnant  of  Titius.  What  is  to  be  done  in 
order  to  know  the  truth?  Susi)ecting  that  the  lovers  keep  up  a 
correspondence,  he  profits  by  an  opportunity  to  secretly  open 
Rosa's  trunk  ;  he  takes  some  letters  and  reads  them,  and  finds  one 
in  which  Titius  avows  himself  to  be  the  father  of  the  child,  and 
declares  himself  to  be  ready  to  take  care  of  him,  and  pay  all 
expenses.  Olivier  decides  to  show  the  letter,  in  order  to  reveal 
Rosa's  trickery  and  falsehood  ;  but  before  doing  this,  he  asks  for 
his  confessor's  advice. 

Ques.  1.     Is  it  a  grave  sin  to  open  and  read  somebody's  letter? 

Ques.  2.  Has  Olivier  sinned  gravel}'  in  reading  letters  addressed 
to  Rosa,  and  can  lie  make  use  of  them  f(Jr  his  defence? 

Ans.  Question  1.  Yes,  in  principle;  because  natural  rights  and 
the  lights  of  nations  command  us  to  respect  the  secrecy  of  letters, 
for  public  security  and  common  confidence  ;  otherwise,  social 
relations  would  be  absolutely  compromised. 

P^xcept  in  the  following  cases  :  1,  when  there  is  a  tacit  or  pre- 
sumed consent  of  the  writer,  or  of  the  one  addressed  ;  2,  when 


170  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

there  is  a  reasonable  motive  ;  for  instance,  to  prevent  a  public  or 
private  misfortune  ;  3,  if  it  is  supposed  that  the  matters  treated 
in  the  letter  are  of  very  little  importance.  In  these  cases,  the 
reader  of  the  letters  would  not  commit  a  very  grave  sin. 

Ans.  Ques.  2.  Olivier  has  committed  no  sin,  either  grave  or 
slight,  by  taking  Rosa's  letters  and  reading  them  ;  because  he  did 
it  for  a  grave  and  just  motive,  in  other  words,  to  avoid  a  consider- 
able loss.  Theologians  generally  teach,  that  one  is  justified  in 
reading  another's  letters,  or  in  revealing  a  secret,  when  there  is 
necessity  for  it,  in  order  to  defend  one's  self  or  another  person 
for  a  just  motive. 


Ktmtiôt  on  tïje  precepts  of  tlje  CIjurcfj. 


473. — When  there  is  a  grave  motive,  the  Church  has  the  power 
to  establish  precepts  obligatory  on  the  faithful,  for  Christ  liimself 
has  given  legislative  powers  to  her,  as  has  been  said  in  the 
Treatise  on  Laws,  No.  83. 

PRECEPTS   I,   II. 
On  the  Keeping  of  Feast  Days. 


PRECEPT   III. 
On  Annual  Confession. 

PRECEPT   IV. 
On  Communion  at  Easter. 


PRECEPT   V. 

On  Abstinence  from  Meats,  Other  than  During  the  Time  of 

Fasting. 


486. — Qiies.  Is  it  a  mortal  sin  to  eat  pies,  etc.,  prepared  with 
meat  and  butter  ? 

Ans.  Yes,  if  that  dish  contains  a  notable  sauce  ;  otherwise 
there  is  only  a  venial  sin.  It  is  a  mortal  sin  if  the  sauce  has  been 
prepared  with  a  large  quantity  of  meat.   .  .  . 


172  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

PRECEPT   VI. 
On  the  Ecclesiastical  Fast. 

CHAPTER   I. 
The  Essence  and  Obligation  of  the  Fast. 
ART.  I.     On  the  one  meal  and  lunch. 

499. — Ques.     Is  fish  permitted  at  lunch? 

Ans.  Yes,  if  it  is  a  question  of  small  fishes,  and  especially  of 
preserved  ones;  also,  according  to  the  probable  opinion,  larger 
fishes  are  allowed.  However,  St  Liguori  thinks  that  those  fishes 
must  not  weigh  more  than  two  or  three  ounces.  .  .  . 

ART.  IL     On  abstinence  from  meat  in  fasting.   .  .  . 

ART.  III.     Hours  for  meals.  ... 

CHAPTER   II. 
On  Causes  Which  Exempt  From  Fasting. 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  tfje  îPreeepts  of  tfje  Cî)urcfj> 


They  are  numerous,  but  of  little  interest  to  lay  readers.  I  will 
quote  only  a  few  of  them  as  examples  ;  such  puerilities  are  curious 
only  for  the  craftiness  they  inspire  in  the  faithful,  and  this  with 
the  intention  to  deceive  their  priests  and  their  God. 

Case  VIII. 
On   Fasting. 

Castor,  not  once,  but  on  several  occasions,  drinks  copiously  of 
wine,  beer,  etc.,  on  days  of  fasting,  putting  into  practice  the 
axiom:  "Liquid  does  not  break  the  fast;"  and,  con3equentl3% 
passes  the  whole  of  fast-time  with  scarcely  any  suffering.  More 
than  this,  from  time  to  time  he  dips  a  small  piece  of  bread  in 
wine,  and  eats  it,  saying:  "In  this  way  the  drink  will  not  huit 
me."  Also,  in  the  morning,  he  takes  some  chocolate,  tea,  coffee, 
sugar,  with  a  piece  of  bread,  saying:  "That  these  things  are 
taken  as  a  remedy  " 

Ques .     What  is  to  be  thought  of  Castor  ?  .  .  . 

Case  XII. 
On  Excusing  from  the  Fast. 

Strigonius  would  not  be  willing  to  violate  the  fast,  though  he 
finds  it  different  in  practice.  Then  he  imagines  a  way  of  satisfy- 
ing his  appetite,  without  the  risk  of  sinning.  ...  1,  He  under- 
takes very  heavy  work,  in  order  to  profit  by  the  dispensation  from 
fasting  in  such  a  case,  on  account  of  extreme  fatigue  ;  2,  with 
tiie  same  aim  in  view,  he  passes  the  whole  day  hunting  up  hill  and 
down  dale;  3,  he  sets  out  on  a  pious  pilgrimage,  obliging  him 
to  walk  fifteen  or  twenty  miles,  always  with  the  same  object 
in  view. 

Ques.     What  shall  we  think  of  Strigonius?  .  .  . 


174  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Case  XIII. 
On  Abstinence  from  Meat. 

Nicodemus  eats,  without  an}^  scruples,  on  prohibited  days,  one 
or  two  small  pieces  of  meat  ;  because,  sa3'S  he,  "  so  very  little 
cannot  be  of  any  account."  At  other  times  he  eats  readily  of 
stews,  of  pies,  of  vegetables,  seasoned  with  meat-gravy,  lard, 
etc.  ;  and  in  so  doing  he  does  not  think  he  sins  grievously, 
because  meat  alone  is  forbidden  by  the  church. 

Ques.  1.     Wliat  is  a  light  and  a  grave  matter  in  this  law? 

Ques.  2.     What  are  the  prohibited  meats? 

Ques.  3.     Quod,  of  Nicodemus? 

Ans.  Question  1.  There  is  controversy.  St.  Liguori  says  that 
it  is  a  matter  of  gravit}^  when  we  eat  the  eighth  part  of  an 
ounce.  Voit  thinks  that  a  slight  matter  is  the  equivalent  of  a 
large  hazelnut. 

Ans.  Question  2.  The  prohibited  raeats  are  those  of  all  animals 
living  on  the  earth.  So  fishes,  frogs,  snails,  etc.,  are  not  pro- 
hibited. 

Ans.  Question  3.  Nicodemus  sinned  gravely,  if  the  little  piece 
of  meat  was  larger  than  that  above  indicated. 

He  has  sinned  mortally,  in  principle,  by  eating  of  pastry,  pies, 
etc.,  and  of  dishes  prepared  with  meat  gravies,  grease,  lard,  etc., 
unless  very  little  of  this  has  been  used. 


STreatfee  on  3miict  anîï  Migl)t5> 


PART   I. 

Nature  and  Principles  of  Justice  and  Rights. 

CHAPTER  I. 

General  Notions  on  Justice  and  Rights. 

ART.  I.     Nature  of  Justice. 

517. —  The  word  justice  seems  to  be  a  derivation  of  just.  That 
is  called  just  which  is  adequate,  and  measured  with  the  rule. 
Whence  justice,  in  general,  is  that  tendency  of  the  soul  which 
strives  for  that  adequateness  and  that  measure.   .   .   . 

518. — We  distinguish  four  kinds  of  justice:  legal,  distributive, 
vindicative,  communicative.   .   .  . 

ART.  II.     Nature  of  Rights. 

521. — We  distinguish  especially,  the  right  in  the  thing  and  the 
right  to  the  thing.   .   .   . 

ART.  III.     General  Principles  of  Rights  and  Justice. 

Section  1.     General  principles  of  Rights. 

522. —  Proposition  1.  God  alone  is  truly  and  absolutely  the 
Master  of  all.  .  .  . 

523. —  Proposition  2.  Man  may  be  a  proprietor  to  another 
man.   .   .   . 

524. —  Propositions.  If  a  man  has  acquired  some  property 
legitimately^  he  has  acquired  an  inviolable  right  in  himself  to 
the  said  property.  .  .   . 

Section  2.     General  principles  of  Justice. 
532. —  Proposition    1.     Commutative    justice    obliges   under   a 
grave  penalty,  and  at  the  same  time  imposes  restitution. 


176  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

533. —  Proposition  2.  Other  kinds  of  justice  oblige  under  grave 
penalty,  but  do  not  compel  restitution.  .  .  . 

CHAPTER   II. 
Principal  Kinds  of  Right. 
They  are  :  Ownership,  usufruct,  usage,  servitude. 
ART.  I.     Ownership. 

536.  Ownership  is  the  legitimate  power  of  disposing  of  a  thing 
as  of  yourself. 

There  is  the  perfect  ownership  and  the  imperfect  one,  according 
to  the  right  that  we  have  of  disposing  both  of  the  thing  itself  and 
of  its  benefits,  or  of  either  the  one  or  the  other  only. 

The  imperfect  one  is  subdivided  into  direct  and  indirect,  or 
useful. 

There  is  also  high  ownership  and  low  ownership.  The  first  one 
is  the  right  of  the  supreme  power  to  dispose  sometimes  of  })rivate 
properties  for  the  good  of  the  community.  The  second  one  is 
individual  ownership. 

Section  1.     Object  of  ownership. 

537. — 1.  Man  has  the  useful  ownership  of  what  belongs  to  him 
intrinsically,  viz.  :  the  soul  and  the  body.  So  he  may,  without 
doing  wrong  to  anyone,  use  them  for  his  own  benefit,  for  any  pur- 
pose not  interdicted  by  law. 

However,  the  Holy  Scriptures  establish  that  he  has  not  the 
direct  ownership  of  them. 

538. — 2.  Man  may  have  the  useful  and  direct  ownership  of 
external  goods  legitimately^  acquired.    .   .   . 

539. — Ques.  Can  a  man  have  the  right  of  ownership  of  another 
man?  .  .   . 

Ans.  1.  A  man  can,  by  natural  rights,  sell  himself  for  life  to 
another  man  as  useful  property.  Because,  if  he  can  do  it  for  a 
time,  he  can  do  it  for  life,  being  able  to  cede  that  which  he 
possesses.   .   .   . 

2.     Slavery,  or  perpetual  subjection,  by  which  one  disposes  of 


Treatise  on  Justice  and  Rights,  111 

all  of  one's  work  to  another,  in  exchange  for  food,  is  not,  in  prin- 
cii)le,  contrary'  to  natural  riglits.* 

540. — Q  es.     What  ar^  the  titles  to  slavery? 

Ans.  Slavery  may  come  ...  4,  from  birth  in  slavery; 
because,  by  right,  those  born  from  slaves  are  slaves  themselves. 
It  is  thus,  by  the  rights  of  nations,  according  to  the  common 
opinion. 

541, — Qaes.     Is  the  slave  trade  permitted?  f 

Ans.  It  is  absolutely  forbidden  ami  contrary  to  all  rights.  .  .  . 
But  if  it  is  a  question  of  negroes,  or  otliers,  being  in  legitimate 
slaveiy,  in  principle,  it  is  not  absolutely  forbidden  ;  because, 
admitting  slavery  to  be  legitimate,  the  master  has  a  legitimate 
right  over  his  slaves  and  their  work,  and  so  it  follows  that  he  may 
transmit  it  to  others.  I  said,  in  principle,  because  circumstances 
may  be  in  opposition  to  it  ;  for  instance,  if  it  is  necessary  to 
separate  a  woman  from  her  husband,  or  if  the  civil  law  forbids  it; 
since  slavery  is  generally  forbidden  in  Europe. 

Section  2.     The  subject  of  ownership. 

542. —  The  master  of  a  thing  is  the  one  to  whom  it  belongs. 

l.-t  point:  —  Ownership  of  the  sons  of  the  family.   .   .   . 

2d  point:  —  Ownership  of  wives.   .   .   . 

554. — A  wife  does  not  sin  in  stealing  something  for  the  food 
and  clothing  of  her  fnmily,  whose  husband  does  not  employ 
himself,  aft^r  having  asked  him  in  vain. 

If  a  husband  wustes  or  squanders  his  property,  to  the  prejudice 

of  his  family,  his  wife  may  hide  and  keep  what  she  can  for  the  use 

of  the  family.]: 

*  "  Slavery  does  not  constitute  a  crime  before  any  law,  divine  or 
human.  .  .  .  What  reason  can  we  have  for  underminin*^  the  foundations 
of  slavery  with  the  same  zeal  tliat  ou,i>:ht  always  to  animate  us  in  over- 
coming evil?  "  (Oôservaiio/is  ou  67at;ery,  by  Rigord,  Priest,  Fort  Royal, 
Martinique.) 

t  "  When  one  thinks  of  the  state  of  degradation  in  which  the  hordes  of 
Atricalive,  tlie  slave  trade  may  be  considered  as  a  providential  act,  and 
one  almost  repudiates  that  pinlanthropy  vvhicii  sees  in  man  but  one  thing, 
material  liberty. '\lvigord,  1  riest,  Fort  Royal  Martinique.) 

t"lf  the  wife  apprehends  trouble  witli  the  heirs  of  her  husband, 
becau>e  of  the  dissipation  of  the  latt»  r,  she  can,  if  she  survives  him,  com- 
pensate hcraelf  honestly  and  secretly."     (J.  Gordon,  lOol.) 


178  Tlie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

The  wife  does  not  act  unjustly,  if,  without  the  knowledge  of  her 
husband,  she  takes  something  which  the  latter  would  readily 
accord  if  it  was  asked  for  ;  because  she  has  the  presumed  permis- 
sion, and  oftentimes  a  legitimate  reason  ;  she  must  not  conduct 
herself  as  a  servant. 

The  wife  can,  in  the  absence  of  her  husband,  pay,  out  of  the 
common  property,  what  is  necessary  to  avoid  a  gross  injury  to  the 
family.   .   .   . 

555. — Ques.  May  the  wife  give  alms  out  of  the  common 
property  ?  , 

Ans.  Yes,*  even  when  she  has  property  of  lier  own.  .  .  .  The 
husband  is  presumed  to  consent  to  everything  liis  wife  d(jes,  pro- 
viding it  is  conformable  to  her  habits  and  position  ;  it  would  be 
wholly  unreasonable  for  him  to  oppose  it.   .   .   . 

556. — Ques.  Is  restitution  obligatory  to  the  husband  who  has 
squandered,  or  unwisely  spent,  a  notable  part  of  the  common 
property? 

Ans.     Yes,  probably  ;  no,  probably  :  controversy. 

557. — Ques.  Is  it  a  bin  for  a  wife  to  subscribe  something  from 
the  common  fund,  or  from  the  interest  of  her  dowry,  and  apply  it 
to  the  maintenance  of  her  parents,  or  of  children  by  a  first 
marriage  ? 

Ans.  No,  if  she  has  no  property  of  her  own,  and  if  her 
husband  refuses  to  give  her  tiie  necessary  money;  because,  by 
natural  right,  she  must  feed  her  parents,  and  the  husband  must 
consent  to  it. 

Ques.  Is  the  wife  obliged  to  make  restitution  for  this,  if  it 
hapi»ens  that  she  shares  au  inheritance  with  the  husbuutl,  or 
recovers  her  dowry  ? 

"  If  a  husband,  at  his  death,  leaves  his  property  indebted  for  more  than 
its  value,  his  wile  can  subtract  what  is  uecessary  for  her  maintenance  and 
that  of  tne  family,  .  .  .  This  is  the  reason  why,  if  she  is  called  to  swear 
that  she  has  taken  notliing,  she  can  do  it  lawfully,  because  the  sense  of 
the  question  asked  would  be  to  know  if  she  had  not  subtracted  something 
that  does  not  belong  to  her."     (Heater,  J.,  1758,  page  389.) 

*'*A  wife  may  give  alms  either  for  her  husband's  spiritual  needs, 
(because,  then  she  makes  of  her  husband's  property  a  use  beneticial  for 
him)  or  in  following  the  custom  of  women  of  her  rank;  if  her  husband 
forbids  it,  he  is  supposed  to  forbid  only  the  excess.     (J.  Gordon,  1634.) 


I 


Treatise  on  Justice  and  Rights.  179 

Ans.  No,  if  those  subtractions  are  not  considerable:  because, 
then,  they  are  considered  as  common  alms  which  need  no  reslitu- 
tution. 

Several  say  equally  no,  even  if  the  wife  has  taken  a  consider- 
ble  part  ;  because  the  burden  and  charges  of  the  family  are  to  be 
borne  by  both. 

3d  point  :  —  Ownership  of  the  Clergy. 

562. — Ques,  Ought  pensioned  ecclesinstics  to  give  to  the  poor 
what  they  possess  in  excess  of  their  need  ? 

Ans.  No  ;  because  the  Holy  Father,  for  a  legitimate  reason,  by 
paying  these  pensions  out  of  his  own  mone}',  already  makes  use  of 
it  for  a  pious  end  ;  they  are  not  obliged  then  to  use  it  for  another 
pious  purpose. 

5G3. — Ques.  Ought  the  pension  paid  in  France  to  ecclesiastics 
to  be  likened  to  ecclesiastical  property? 

Ans.  Yes;  because  after  the  Concordat  of  1801,  the  above 
pension  was  established  as  a  compensation  for  the  properly 
taken  during  the  Revolution.  Then,  it  is  of  the  same  nature  as 
that  property  of  which  it  takes  the  place.   .   .  . 

4th  point  :  —  Ownership  of  Authors. 

566. — It  is  certain  that  every  man  ought  to  enjoy  the  fruit  of 
his  work  ard  talent  by  natural  right.   .   .   . 

508. — Ques.  Has  the  i)ublisher  of  a  book  the  riglit  to  prevent 
the  sale  and  printing  of  it,  to  the  injury  of  the  author  or  liookseller 
to  whom  the  author  has  transmitted  liis  right? 

Ans.  1.  Yes,  according  to  positive  right  in  force  in  France  and 
in  some  other  countries. 

1.     If  it  a  question  of  natural  right,  there  is  controversy.   .   .  . 

Section  3.     The  Acquisition  of  Ownership. 

It  ma}'  take  place  : 

1,  By  occupation  ;  2,  discovery;  3,  prescription;  4,  occasion; 
5,  by  contracts,  of  which  we  shall  speak  in  a  particular  treatise. 

First  point. — By  Occupation. 

569. — Occupation  consists  in  taking  possession  of  something 
belonging  to  nobodv,  with  t'le   att-ntion   of  apijropriating   it  to 


180  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

one's  self.  It  is  a  legitimate  way  of  acquiring  property,  provided 
there  are  the  required  conditions,  viz.  ;  1,  the  object  must  be 
susceptible  of  private  proprietorship,  and  must  not  belong  to  any- 
body ;  2,  the  first  occupant  must  have  the  intention  to  appropriate 
it  when  he  takes  it  ;  3,  there  must  be  no  law  reserving  it  to  a 
determined  master,  as  for  example,  the  State,  as  sooiething 
previously  occupied. 

The  most  frequent  cases,  relating  to  the  possession  of  animals, 
we  will  mention  only  this  one  : 

We  distinguish  three  kinds  of  animals  :  wild  ones,  .  .  .  domes- 
tics,  .   .   .  and  the  tamed  ones.   .   .   . 

571. — Ques.  Do  we  sin,  and  how,  by  hunting  and  fishing  in 
spite  of  the  prohibition  of  the  law? 

It  is  a  question  only  of  those  who  hunt  or  fish  in  a  prohibited 
time  or  place,  without  a  permit. 

Ans.  The  probable  opinion  denies  that  there  is  any  sin  against 
justice,  or  even  against  obedience  ;  because,  according  to  custom 
and  the  common  opinion  of  men,  such  law  seems  to  be  a  penal 
one  only.   .   .   . 

572. —  Ques.  Do  we  sin  again'-t  commutative  justice  I  y  hunt- 
ing on  another's  property  without  his  permission? 

Ans.  1,  No;  if  tliut  property  is  nceessible  there  is  no  sin, 
unless  some  otlier  dannge  result;  because  beasts  ought  not  to  be 
considered  as  the  production  of  the  land. 

2.  No  ;  if  the  pioperty,  though  inclosed,  for  in-tnnce,  a  forest 
by  a  hedge-row,  was  very  huge,  in  such  a  way  t!iat  the  animals 
may  easily  escape  from  the  hunter  or  fisher  ;  because,  not  being 
seized  and  used  by  the  proprietor,  they  do  not  belong  to  him. 

574. —  A  swnrm  of  bees,  escaped  from  your  bee-hive,  belongs 
to  you  so  long  as  you  can  see  and  pursue  it  easily.  Otherwise,  it 
belongs  to  the  first  occupier.  By  French  law,  it  belongs  to  the 
mister  of  the  land  on  which  it  alights. 

Those  who  buy  from  the  Sta;e  the  light  of  fishing,  cannot  be 
deprived  of  that  right  without  injustice  ;  but  those  who  would 
take  or  destroy  such  a  quantity-  of  fishes  as  to  cause  a  notable 
wrong,  may  be  calkd  upon  to  compensate  it.     It  is  diffeieut  if 


Treatise  on  Justice  and  Rights,  181 

only  a  small  quantity  is  taken  ;  because  then,  tlie  right  of  the 
])roprietor  of  the  place  does  not  suffer,  as  the  fishes  can  escape, 
and  it  is  not  certain  that  they  can  be  caught  in  that  place.   .   .   . 

2d  Point. —  By  objects  that  are  fonnd. 

575. —  Tiiere  are  four  kinds:  treasures,  recently  lost  objects, 
abandoned  property,  and  unoccupied  pro[)erty.   .   .   . 

577. —  Ques.  Is  a  workman,  working  about  a  house,  and 
finding  a  sum  of  money  hidden  in  a  wall,  or  in  an  old  coffer, 
perniiited  to  keep  part  of  it? 

Ans.  It  is  necessary  to  distinguish.  If  there  are  indications 
that  it  belongs  to  some  member  of  the  family,  it  must  be  given 
up  to  him,  the  propei  ty  being  considered  as  recently  lost  ;  other- 
wise, the  workman  may  keep  half  of  it,  because  it  is  like  finding  a 
treasure. 

3d  Point. —  By  prescription.   ... 

4th  Point. —  By  accession.   .  .   . 

ART.  II.     Of  usage  and  usufruct. 

593. —  Usage  is  the  right  of  using  another's  property  in  sparing 
their  substance.  Usufruct  is  the  right  to  make  use  of  and  gather 
the  fruits  of  another's  propertj',  sparing  also  their  substance.   .  .  . 

ART.  III.     By  servitudes.   .   .  . 


PART    SECOND. 
Violation  of  Right,  or  Injustice. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Injustice  in  General. 

599. —  Injustice  is  the  violation  of  the  rights  of  another.  It 
is  formal  or  material^  according  to  its  being  done  knowingly  or 
willingly,  or  outside  of  the  knowledge  of  our  will. 

Grave  or  slight^  according  to  the  injury  caused  to  others. 


182  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Direct  or  indirect,  if  we  seek  it  deliberately,  or  only  permit  and 
foresee  it  in  its  cause. 

603. — Qiies.     Can  an  internal  act  make  an  external  one  bad? 

Ans.  1.  No,  if  the  external  act  does  not  wrong  materially,  in 
principle,  the  rights  of  another,  notwithstanding  tlie  guilt}'  inten- 
tion of  injuring  by  the  act.  It  is  because,  where  there  is  no  right 
injured,  there  is  no  injustice.  So,  one  does  not  sin  against  justce 
by  refusing,  through  hate,  to  succor  another,  unless  one  is  com- 
pelled to  it  by  right. 

Ans.  2.  No,  again,  when  the  author  lias  the  right  to  do  directly 
an  external  act  injurious  to  another,  even  with  the  intention  to 
injure  ;  because  a  guilly  intention  cannot  make  unjust  what  is  just 
in  itself,  not  being  able  to  change  the  nature  of  the  external  act. 
So,  a  judge  does  not  sin  by  an  external  act  against  justice,  by 
condemning,  through  hate,  to  a  capital  punishment  well  deserved; 
nor  a  mercliant  selling  at  low  prices,  to  do  wrong  to  others.   .   .   . 

604. — Ques.  What  will  be  the  decision,  if  the  external  act  was 
proceeding  from  a  bad  intention,  but  with  uncertainty  as  to  the 
evil  which  will  result? 

Ans.  There  is  controversy  between  the  most  serious  theolo- 
gians. Examples  will  help  to  clear  up  the  question  :  1,  some  one 
l^laces  poison  or  a  trap  in  a  place  very  little  frequented  by  his 
enemy,  but  with  the  intention  to  kill  him  if  he  happens  to  pass 
that  way;  2,  a  physician  prescribes  for  his  hated  patient  just 
what  he  is  obliged  to,  nothing  more,  because  he  hates  him  ;  and 
the  patient  dies.     Have  they  caused  these  unjusc  deaths? 

There  are  two  opinions  :  the  first  one,  which  seems  the  more 
common,  answers  No  ;  because  in  one  wa}^  the  external  act  is  not 
unjust,  since,  in  human  acts,  we  must  not  think  of  the  real  possi- 
bility of  doing  wrong  to  another.  Besides,  the  internal  act  does 
not  contain  any  injustice  on  account  of  the  intention,  the  intention 
having  no  influence  over  the  efficiency  of  the  cause  ;  in  other  words, 
over  the  risk  of  damage.  Tims,  it  is  a  purely  accidental  cause, 
and  the  guilty  intention  does  not  change  its  nature. 

The  second  opinion  answers,  Yes.  .  .   . 


Tieatise  on  Justice  and  Rights,  183 

CHAPTER  IL 

Injustice  in  its  Kind,  ok,  Sins  Against  Justice. 

ART.  I.     Nature  of  Theft. 

605. — Theft  consists  in  taking  what  does  not  belong  to  you,  in 
spite  of  the  reasonable  will  of  the  master. 

We  distinguish  :  i 

Simple  theft,  committed  in  secret. 

Rapine  p?«?ide?',  done  with  open  violence. 

/Sacrilegious  theft,  if  it  is  a  question  of  a  sacred  thing. 

Theft,  in  its  species,  is  a  very  grave  sin  ;  because  it  is,  in  prin- 
cii)le,  quite  contrary  to  natural  law.   .   .   . 

606 — Ques.     When  is  there  a  grave  matter  in  a  theft? 

Ans,     1.  It  cannot  be  determined.   .   .  . 

607. — Ans.  1,  In  order  that  a  theft  should  be  looked  upon  as 
grave,  relatively,  ...  it  must  be  of  the  value:  1,  of  one  franc 
for  the  poor,  and  a  little  less  for  the  very  poor  :  2,  about  two  or 
three  fiancs  for  workmen  who  live  day  by  day  ;  3,  about  three  or 
four  francs  for  moderately  rich  people  ;  4,  about  six  or  seven 
francs  for  rich  people. 

In  order  that  the  matter  should  be  absolutely  grave,  two  or 
three  pieces  of  gold,  of  the  value  of  one  dollar  each,  are  necessary. 
But  we  must  remember  that  the  more  scarce  the  money,  the  greater 
is  its  value.* 

*Tn  all  times  the  Jesuits  have  established  criminal  des^rees  of  theft; 
not  according  to  the  circumstances,  as  does  the  lay  laws,  but  accordliiir  to 
the  amount  of  the  stolen  sum  and  the  position  of  the  victim.  It  is  the 
opinion  of  Tolet,  Navarre,  Sotus,  Gordon,  etc.,  quoting  only  the  most 
eminent  ones. 

Such  a  preoccupation  of  the  stolen  sura  lead  them  to  very  curious  con- 
sequences : 

Vasquez  says,  "that  the  theft  of  thirty  pieces  of  gold  is  a  graver  sin 
than  sodomy;"  and  Guimenius  explains  tliis  very  learnedly,  thus:  "Tlie 
gravest  sin  Is  the  one  which  violates  the  greatest  virtue.  Now,  theft  is 
the  contrary  of  justice,  one  of  tlie  greatest  virtues;  the  sodomy  of 
chastity  being  least,  it  follows  .   .  .   (pnge  3(!5) 

Such  a  doctrine  is  accepted  and  taught  to  little  children. 

Ques.  "What  is  the  quantity  required,  in  a  matter  of  theft,  for  a  mortal 
sin.? 

Ans.  '<  It  is  difficult  to  determine,  with  reasonable  precision,  the 
required  quantity  necessary  to  constitute  a  mortal  sin  ;  this  depends,  not 


184  TJte  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

608. — Qiics.  When  is  the  thefts  committed  by  wives,  chilclren 
and  servants,  a  grave  matter? 

Ans.  It  is  admitt  d  by  everybody  that  more  is  necesary  to 
establish  a  grave  matter  in  thefts  by  wives,  children  and  servants, 
than  by  strangers.   .   .   . 

More  probably,  the  sum  must  be  double  ;  but  there  is  no  general 
rule  indicated. 

For  servants,  it  depends  a'so  on  the  severity  or  liberality  of 
the  masters,  on  the  quality  and  nature  of  tlie  stolen  object  ;  for 
instance,  if  it  is  eatable  or  not,  kept  under  key  or  not  ;  according 
to  many  authors,  small  thefts  of  food  or  beverage  never  become 
mortal  sins.  .  .   . 

Ô60. — Qu8S.  Can  small  thefts  become  a  grave  matter  by  their 
totality  ? 

Ans.  1.  Yes,  absolutely,  if  it  is  a  question  of  small  thefts  to 
the  injury  of  the  same  person.   ... 

2.  Yes,  according  to  common  opinion,  if  it  is  a  question  of 
small  thefts  to  the  injur}'  of  different  persons. 

610. — Ques.  Are  small  thefts  united  to  form  a  whole,  if  they 
are  separated  by  a  long  interval  of  time  ? 

Ans.  1.  No,  according  to  the  common  opinion  ;  l)ccause  after 
a  certain  lapse  of  time,  small  thefts  are  not  supposed  to  unite,  and 
so,  do  not  constitute  a  common  object  in  morality.  Besides,  one 
does  not  see  grave  prejudice  done  to  the  owner,  not  being  aware 
of  it,  and  he  is  not  supposed  to  be  gravely  opposed  to  it. 

Ques.     What  is  the  time  which  must  elapse  between  the  thefts? 

Ans.  According  to  the  more  probable  opinion,  no  more  than 
two  months  ;  according  to  others,  one  j^ear  is  necessary.   .   .  . 

611. — Ques.     AVhen  is  there  a  grave  matter  in  small  thefts? 

only  on  the  stolen  object  considered  in  itself,  but  also  on  the  condition 
and  need  of  the  theft's  victim,  on  the  damage  snÔ'cred  by  that  person,  etc. 
So,  a  theft  of  ten  francs'  value,  even  to  the  prejudice  of  the  richest,  is 
always  a  mortal  sin  ;  but,  relatively,  to  the  poor,  to  workmen,  to  those  who 
have  a  competency,  a  theft  of  one,  two,  three,  four  or  five  francs,  is  also 
a  mortal  sin. 

Ques.  Can  several  little  thefts  constitute  a  grave  matter,  sufficient 
enough  for  a  mortal  sin? 

Ans.  Yes;  and  also  when  these  little  thefts  are  morally  united,  and  a 
notable  damage  results  from  them." — Fetit  Catéchisme  de  Marotte. 


I 


Treatise  on  Justice  and  Mi'jids.  185 

Ans.  1,  If  thoy  take  place  at  different  intervals  to  the  preju- 
dice of  the  same  person,  the  matter  will  he  grave  when  the}'  con- 
stitute the  half  the  sum  necessary  for  a  mortal  sin. 

2,  If  thoy  lake  place  to  the  prejudice  of  several^  there  is  a 
grave  matter,  in  principle,  when  the  stolen  sum  is  twice  as  large. 

Qu(  s.  Does  a  retraction  of  the  will  prevent  subsequent  thefts 
from  uniting  with  the  preceding  ones? 

Ans.  1,  Yes,  if  tlie  retraction  has  been  efficacious,  in  other 
words,  if  restitution  has  b.-en  made  for  the  first  thefts;  because, 
restitution  being  made,  they  do  not  exist  any  more. 

2,  Yes,  even  if  the  retraction  has  not  yet  been  efficacious,  if 
the  second  theft  is  done  for  a  particular  motive. 

612. — Ques.  Is  it  a  grave  sin  to  steal  some  small  objects,  after 
having  committed  a  theft  liable  to  be  considered  grave? 

Ans.     Controversy.   .   .   . 

613. — Ques.  Is  it  a  grave  sin  to  complete  by  a  small  theft  the 
grave  matter  commenced  by  other  persons  to  the  prejudice  of  the 
same  owner? 

Ans.  1,  No,  if  one  is  ignorant  of  the  first  theft;  because,  one 
has  no  knowledge  of  the  prejudice  done  to  the  owner. 

2.  No  ;  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion,  even  if  one 
is  aware  of  that  prejudice,  but  setting  a^ide  the  case  of  con- 
spiracy.  .   .   . 

614. —  Ques.  If  several  persons,  without  agreeing  with  one 
another,  but  induced  by  example,  commit  slight  thefts,  consti- 
tuting a  grave  totality,  does  each  one  sin  gravely? 

Ans.  No  ;  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  prejudice  done.* 

♦All  that  is  summed  up  in  a  masterly  manner  by  Trachala  (1759)  : 
"  Observe  that  it  is  m  liieater  quantity  of  small  tlietts  that  are  necessary 
to  constitute  a  mortal  sin,  wiien  they  fall  on  ditlerent  persons,  than  when 
one  and  the  same  person  is  the  victim.  Thus,  says  Laymann,  if  there  are 
thirty  merchants,  from  each  one  of  whom  you  steal  a  small  quantity,  it 
may  happen  that  you  do  not  sin  mortally;  because  you  are  not  doing 
considerable  wron^  to  any  of  them  individually.  In  the  second  ]">lacc, 
if  you  steal  from  one  or  several  persons,  when  the  thefts  are  done  at 
long  intervals  of  time,  a  jireater  quantity  is  necessary  to  constitute  a 
mortal  sin.  So,  when  a  servant  steals  each  time  one  cent,  which  amounts 
after  four  years  to  a  fjolden  ducat,  I  do  not  tuink,  says  he,  that  one 
must  look  upon  him  as  guilty  of  a  mortal  sin.    In  the  third  place,  if  you 


186  •  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

ART.  II.     On  causes  excusing  from  theft. 

There  are  two  of  them  :  1,  necessity  :  2,  occult  compensation. 

Section  1.     Necessity  excusing  from  theft. 

Necessity  is  extreme,  grave,  or  common.  Extreme,  if  there  is 
a  danger  of  death,  or  threatening  of  a  very  serious  evil  ;  grave, 
wlien  life  is  full  of  inconvenience  ;  common,  as  in  the  habitual 
case  of  poor  beggars. 

616. —  INIan  can,  in  a  case  of  extreme  need,  use  the  property  of 
others,  so  far  as  it  is  necessary  to  get  himself  out  of  that  posi- 
tion ;  because  there  is  here  no  derogation  to  natural  rights  when 
one  shares  and  takes  for  one's  self  what  is  necessary  in  a  ease  of 
absolute  need.  In  this  case,  everything  becomes  common  ;  and 
the  one  who  takes  the  property  of  another  in  a  case  of  need,  takes 
the  common  property,  which  he  appropr'ates  to  himself,  as  tliis 
took  place  before  the  division  of  property.  Then  he  does  not 
commit  any  theft. 

617. —  .  .  .  What  is  said  of  extreme  need,  may  also  be  said  of 
very  grave  necessity.* 

steal  to-day  from  Caius  six  cents,  him  from  whom  you  have  already 
stolen  many  times,  but  to  whom  you  have  made  restitution,  the  last  six 
cents  have  no  relation  to  the  first  ones,  and  consequently  do  not  consti- 
tute a  uiortal  sin.  In  the  fourth  ])lace.  when  several  persons  commit 
successively  several  thefts  from  some  one,  wliich.  taken  together,  does 
tliat  person  a  considerable  wrong',  then,  if  each  thief  is  ignorant  of  tlie 
thefts  of  tlie  others,  no  one  sins  grievously.  If  tliey  formed  together  the 
same  thieving  project,  each  one  of  tiiem  sins  grievously;  finally,  if 
r^'spectively  they  know  of  their  thefts,  but  if  no  one  of  them  should  be 
the  cause  of  the  theft  of  the  other,  it  is  more  probable  that  there  is  no 
mortal  sin  committed."     (Page  392.) 

*  The  excusing  of  theft  is  also  a  very  old  Jesuitical  doctrine.  We  read 
in  Pierre  Alagon  (1620):  '-Is  one  permitted  to  steal  on  account  of  the 
need  in  which  he  finds  himself? 

"He  is  permitted,  either  secretly  or  openly,  if  he  has  no  other  moans 
of  providing  for  himself.  It  is  neitlier  tlieft  nor  rapine;  because  then, 
according  to  natural  rights,  everything  is  in  common.  A  third  persou 
is  alï»o  permitted,  furtively  to  take  property  and  give  it  to  some  needful 
person,  as  in  the  above  case."     (Page  357.) 

Longuet:  "When  one  man  finds  hims(lf  in  such  indigence,  and  an- 
other one  in  such  affluence  that  the  latter  may  be  obliged  to  help  tiie 
former,  the  poor  man  can  take  secretly,  in  a  rigiit  way,  from  the  rich 
one  witliont  sinning,  or  being  obliged  to  make  restitution."     (Page  303.) 

Doubtless  it  is  to  this  way  of  stealing  tiiat  ('asnedi  referred,  when  he 
wrote  the  following  obscure  sentence:  *•  God  forbids  stealing  only  when 


Treatise  on  Justice  and  Rights,  187 

C18. — Ques.  May  one  take  some  of  the  property  of  another, 
not  only  to  help  one's  self,  but  also  others. 

Ans.  Yes,  according  to  the  C(^nimon  opinion  ;  because,  in  a 
way,  one  substitutes  himself  for  the  indigent,  and  shows  by  the 
act  that  one  loves  his  neighbor  ay  himself. 

619. —  In  a  case  of  extreme  need,  or  nearly  so,  wliatcver  may 
be  the  cause  of  it,  can  we  steal  an  object  of  great  value,  or  a  huge 
sum,  if  we  are  in  need  of  it? 

Ans.  There  are  two  opinions  :  the  first  one  answers  No  ;  the 
second  one,  more  probable  and  more  common,  answers  Yes, 
provided  the  rich  one  is  not  brought  by  that  theft  to  an  equal 
needful  situation,  and  the  poor  one  takes  only  what  he  needs.* 

Stction  2.     Secret  compensation. 

it  is  looked  upon  as  bad  in  itself,  but  not  when  it  Is  acknowledged  good." 
(Pa^eSGS.) 

Busembaum  is  clearer,  and  more  complete:  "One  who  is  very  poor 
may  take  what  is  necessary  for  his  maintenance,  etc.  ;  and  what  a  man 
can  do  for  himself,  he  can  do  also  for  another  who  is  in  extreme 
poverty  " 

De  Coninck,  Lessius,  Dlcastill-^,  Tambourin,  add  that  "a  poor  man 
could  even  kill  one  who  wouhl  prevent  him  from  taking  the  thimj;  need- 
ful to  him;  as  one  can  kill  a  thief  who  takes  away  something  of  ,i»reat 
importance,  or  at  least  needful,  or  who  retains  them  by  violence." 
(Pao-e  385.) 

Marotte  culminates  in  an  answer  admirably  laconic,  the  theory  of 
excusing  theft,  and  of  occult  compensaticm  : 

Qnes.     "Are  we  always  guilty  of  theft  when  we  take  other's  property? 

Ans.  "No;  it  may  happen  that  the  person  from  whom  the  property 
is  taken  has  not  the  right  to  oppose  the  theft.  This  takes  place,  for 
instance,  when  the  one  who  takes  is  in  a  state  of  extreme  need,  and 
takes  only  what  is  necessary  to  get  out  of  that  state;  or,  when  he  takes 
secretly  from  another  by  way  of  compensation,  not  being  able  otherwi»e 
to  get  what  is  justly  due  him." — Petit  Catéchisme  de  Marotte. 

♦Besides,  if  those  thefts  were  to  result  in  quarrels  and  wars,  we  must 
not  be  frightened  about  it,  according  to  Busembaum  :  "  It  is  more  prob- 
able that  a  person  cannot,  in  a  case  of  extreme  need,  take  a  thing  of  great 
value;  for  instance  8,000  crowns  ...  ;  as  however,  the  contrary  senti- 
ment is  also  probable,  the  indiaent  can,  by  hohling  this  last  sentiment  as 
probable  for  him  in  his  sitnatioji  and  at  the  last  moment,  take  even  some 
l)recious  things,  and  the  rich  one  could  also  oppose  it  by  holding  the 
other  opinion.  From  this  it  vill  not  follow  that  the  war  declared  would 
be  materially  and  absolutely  just,  but  only  a  war  formally  just,  and  in 
the  supposition  of  two  contrary  opinions,  being  both  probable,  which 
is  without  any  inconvenience."     (Page  385.) 


188  Tlie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

620. —  It  consists  in  recovering  a  thing  belonging  to  us  by 
taking  something  which  is  not  our  own. 

621. —  Seci\t  compensation  may  be  just  and  permissible,  if  it 
presents  tlie  required  conditions.   .   .   . 

622. — These  conditions  are  the  following:  1,  that  the  debt  is 
certain  ;  ...  2,  that  il  cannot  be  recovered  in  any  other  way  ; 
...  3,  that  the  thing  must  be  recovered  by  taking  natural  prop- 
erty, if  possible  ;  ...  4,  that  a  damage  is  not  inflicted  on  the 
debtor  ;  for  instance,  that  he  is  not  obliged  to  pa}'  twice.   .   .   .* 

623. — Ques.  Can  servants,  judging  that  they  are  not  paid 
enough,  have  recourse  to  secret  compensation  ? 

Ans.  No,  in  general  ;  because  that  proposition  has  been  con- 
demned by  Innocent  XI.   .  .   .  Except,  after  manyf  .   .   .   1,  If 

*  There  is  absolutely  nothins:  changed  in  the  famous  doctrine  of  occult 
compen-^a  ion.  Already,  in  1601,  Tolet  said:  "Wlien  someone  takes  what 
is  due  him  from  another  who  is  not  wuhini;  to  pay  back;  for  instance,  if 
a  person  was  tal^in<^  from  his  debtor  the  sum  owed  him,  he  does  not  steal 
in  that  case,  and  is  not  obli.ijed  to  make  restitution. 

"He  does  not  sin  if  he  observes  certa'n  conditions  : 

'  The  lirst  one  is,  that  he  must  be  very  sure  that  tlie  sums  are  due  to 
him. 

'•The  second  is,  that  he  cannot  easily  obtain  the  payment  by  way  of 
justice;  either  because  liis  debtor  is  a  man  of  i)o\ver,  or  that  he  can  show, 
11  )  proof  of  the  debt,  or  that  he  tears  some  harm  from  the  debtor,  or  that 
it  may  cau^e  scandal. 

"The  tliinl  is,  that  no  damage  or  scandal  will  result  for  others. 

"The  fourth  is,  he  nnist  take  all  possil)le  precautious,  so  that  the  debtor 
from  whom  lie  has  already  taken  the  amount  of  tlie  debt,  and  so  made 
hun  pay  it  in  spite  of  himself,  should  not  pay  it  a  se  ^ond  time. 

"Tlie  fifth  is,  he  must  take  nothing  more  than  what  was  owed  him." 
(page  349.) 

])e  Lugo,  who  accepts  that  doctrine  with  all  the  Jesuits,  ha«!,  besides, 
found  a  very  ingenious  species,  which  allows  him  to  ally  the  occult  com- 
pensation with  mental  restriction  :  "If  I  know  that  yoy\  are  not  disposed 
to  pay  me  in  one  month,  and  that  I  cannot  avoid  the  wrong  you  are  doing 
to  me  without  anticipating  you  and  taking  what  belongs  to  you  in  order 
to  defend  myself,  I  can  take  it,  and  there  is  nothing  in  this  that  exceeds 
what  I  can  do  for  the  defense  of  my  property;  becanseif  I  know  that  you 
are  to  come  tomorrow  to  steal  one  iiundred  pounds  from  me,  who  can  say 
that  I  cannot  take  as  much  from  you  to-day,  to  indemnify  myself  of  the 
wrong  you  are  to  do  me  to-morrow.-* 

"From  this,  we  conclude  .  .  .  that  if  the  judge  questions,  and  even 
exacts  the  oath,  from  one  who  compensated  himself,  he  can  deny  ;  bi'cause 
the  sense  of  his  oath  is,  that  he  has  not  taken  or  does  not  retain  anything 
unjustly,  and  in  such  a  way  as  to  oblige  liim  to  restitution."    (page  3G1.) 

t  This  beautiful  maxim  was  familiar  to  the  Jesuits  of  old.  Thus» 
Fernaud  Rebelle  says  clearly  :  "If,  for  a  service  rendered  by  a  servant,  a 


Treatise  on  Justice  and  Ulyhts,  189 

under  the  pressure  of  need,  the  servant  has  accepted  the  h)w  price, 
in  a  time  when  the  master  coul  I  not  have  found  anyone  at  the  same 
rate,  or  if  he  has  not  taken  him  through  pity,  tlie  servant  begging  to 
enter  his  service;  2,  if  the  servant  is  overwhelmed  with  work  that 
he  ought  not  to  do. 

Ques.  Can  a  servant  compensate  himself,  if  he  does  more  than 
he  ought  to? 

Ans.  Yes,  if  it  is  by  the  express  or  tacit  will  of  the  master 
that  he  works  excessively  ;  because  one  who  works  must  be  paid 
in  proportion  to  his  work,  by  rights.  .  .  .  The  value  of  this  just 
compensation  may  be  left  to  the  judgment  of  tlie  servant,  provided 
he  is  prudent,  careful,  and  distrustful  of  self,  a  thing  which  seldom 
happens. 

624. — Ques.  Can  we  have  recourse  to  secret  compensations,  if 
we  are  condemned  by  judgment  to  pay  a  debt  which  we  have  not 
contracted,  or  which  we  have  already  paid? 

pecuniary  salary  was  due  him  larger,  according  to  the  common  estimation 
of  tlie  ';ime  when  the  contract  between  that  servant  and  his  master  was 
signed,  and  if  lie  could  not  recover  it  easily  by  ri;;htful  ways,  in  this  case 
he  will  be  permitted  to  subtract  secretly,  and  without  scandal,  the  surplus 
over  tlie  lowest  price  owed  legitimately." 

S.  de  Lessau  :  "Servants,  or  others,  do  not  sin  by  taking:  something, 
presuming  the  master's  consent;  because  tliey  persuade  tlicmselves, 
acc(»rdin-4- to  the  light  of  reason,  that  t.ieir  master  will  not  be  unjust." 
(Pa-eB-.a.) 

The  Jesuits  had,  at  least  one  time,  to  repent  of  their  teaching.  In  1G47, 
a  man,  Jean  d'Alba,  who  was  iu  their  service,  st(;le  from  them,  pretending 
they  owed  him,  tliirty  pounds.  Trachiced  before  tlie  Chatelct,  lie  argued 
from  the  teachings  he  liad  received  from  his  masters,  viz  :  "That  a  per- 
son can  pay  himself  for  his  wages."  The  judge,  on  the  4th  of  April,  set 
him  at  liberty,  with  a  simple  admonition  .    (Page  360  ) 

After  Innocent  XL  had  condemned  them,  they  were  compelled  to  give 
in  ;  but  soon,  however,  they  set  about  quibl)ling. 

J.  de  Cardenas  says:  ''The  sovereign  J\intiff,  in  this  condemnation, 
does  not  speak  of  the  case  in  wiiich  it  is  clenr  as  daylight  that  masters 
commit  ail  injustice,  either  by  (iiminishinu-  the  salary  that  justice  obliges 
them  to  give,  or  by  not  paying  tlie  pri  e  agreed  upon. 

"In  fact,  in  so  evident  a  case  of  inju.?tice,  it  i-^  permitted  to  servants  or 
others,  to  get  through  justice  the  remainder  of  the  salary  due  them;  or, 
If  not  possible,  to  take  justice  into  their  own  hands,  and  use  secret 
compensation."     (Page  306.) 

And  J.  Taberna,  while  bowing  re.'spectfully,  does  not  hesitate  to  write: 
"The  one  who  judges  that  he  is  not  paid  enough,  may  compensate  himself 
secretly,  if  lie  is  justly  sure  that  more  is  owed  him."     (Page  374.) 

Is  not  this  the  very  condp.  nned  proposition? 


190  Thç  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Ans.  Yes  ;  because  the  ju  Igment  is  unjust,  being  based  on  tlie 
false  presumption  of  a  fact,  and  docs  not  oblige  in  conscience.  In 
matters  of  right,  we  must  alwa3s  obey  the  jiulguient;  unless  tlie 
law  or  the  judgment  should  be  evidently  false. 

However,  it  would  be  different,  setting  aside  the  scandal,  if  the 
judge  is  certainly  decided  about  a  fact  upon  which  he  looks  as 
true  ;  moreover,  the  judge  has  not  the  power  tf)  change  the  prop- 
erty, and  the  one  who  gained  the  suit,  after  having  discoveied 
the  error,  cannot  keep  that  which  has  been  paid  over  again  to  hnn. 

625. — Ques.  Is  it  a  grave  sin  and  against  justice,  to  compen- 
sate one's  self,  without  first  having  recourse  to  the  judge? 

Ans.  1.  No,  not  against  justice,  in  principle,  provided  one 
takes  nothing  more  thaa  what  is  owed  ;  and  so,  one  is  not  under 
obligation  to  m  ike  restitution.  The  reason  is  that,  after  this 
compensation,  equality  is  re-established.  I  have  said,  in  principle  ; 
because  a  prejudice  on  the  subject  of  a  thing  determined  might 
result  to  the  debtor. 

2.  In  gsneral,  there  is  no  grave  sin  ;  because  no  scandal  results 
from  it  ordinaril}',  nor  any  grave  disorder  for  the  State. 

3.  Tliere  is  no  sin,  if  it  is  difficult  to  have  recourse  to  the 
judge,  if  there  is  danger  of  scandal,  or  extraordinary  expenses, 
etc.  ;  because  then  the  recourse  is  morally  impossible. 


THIRD   PART. 
On  Restitution 
Section  1.     Restitution  in  general. 

CHAPTER   I. 

Obligatory  Restitution. 

Restitution  consists,  so  far  a-;  the  name  is  concerned,  in  replacing 
a  thing  in  its  first  state  ;  its  object  is,  tj  repair  the  wrong  done  lo 
others'  property. 


Treatise  on  Justice  and  Rights,  191 

626. — Restitution  for  itself,  or  at  least  in  the  desire,  is  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  salvation,  in  principle,  if  it  is  a  a  question  of  a 
grave  matter.   .   .   . 

Ques.  Can  we  make  restitution  with  a  different  kind  of  prop- 
erty? 

Ans.  No,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion  ;  because 
there  is  no  comparison  between  properties  of  a  different  order,  and 
no  compensation  can  then  be  given.  One  could  never  arithraeli- 
cally  compute  what  ought  to  be  restored,  there  being  no  common 
measure  between  properties  of  different  orders.   .    .   . 

However,  by  vindictive  justice,  it  may  happen  that  a  judge  or  a 
superior  requires  that,  for  an  injury  to  a  certain  property,  ona  should 
give  something  of  a  different  kind  ;  but  according  to  the  more 
probable  opinion,  this  is  a  penalty,  and  not  justice.  Besides,  the 
wronged  person  has  the  right  to  denounce  his  offender,  and  to 
receive  money  for  not  denouncing  him  ;  for  instance,  a  violated 
woman  can  traduce  before  the  Court  the  guilty  person,  or  exact 
money  from  him  in  order  to  renounce  her  rights.   .  .  . 

631.— Ques.  Is  a  thief,  having  stolen  a  large  sura  of  money, 
obliged,  under  heavy  penalty,  to  make  restitution  of  the  whole  sum? 

Ans.  No,  he  must  restore  only  what  constitutes  a  grave  matter  ; 
because  after  this,  the  amount  retained  is  no  more  a  grave  matter. 
One  niay  be  obliged,  under  heavy  penalty,  t)  restore  a  slight  mat- 
ter, but'the  obligation  does  not  come  from  the  slightness  of  the 
thing,  but  from  the  grave  quantity.   .   .   . 


CHAPTER  II. 

TiiK  Roots  of  Restitution. 

633. — They  are  the  causes  for  which  one  is  obliged  to  make 
restitution.  They  have  a  treble  origin  :  1,  the  acceptance  of  an- 
other's property  ;  2,  for  a  wrong  unjustly  done  ;  3,  for  an  unjust 
co-operation.  The  last  can  be  assimilated  with  either  of  the  pre- 
ceeding  ones  ;  but  it  shall  be  treated  by  itself,  in  order  to  establish 
a  greater  distinction  ])etvveen  what  is  to  be  said  about  each  one. 


192  Tlie  Doctrine  of  tlce  Jesuits. 

ART.  I.     The  acceptance  of  another's  property.  .  •  • 
Section  I.     The  owner  in  good  faith.   .   .   . 
Section  II.     The  owner  in  bad  faith.   .   .  . 

646. —  Ques.  Must  a  thief  make  restitution  for  having  stolen  a 
thing  which  wouhl  have  been  lost  anyhow? 

Ans.  Yes,  deducting  however  the  expenses  and  the  price  of  the 
work  done  to  save  it  ;  because,  though  being  in  peril,  that  thing 
had  not  ceased  to  belong  to  its  master. 

Except,  according  to  many,  by  the  probable  opinion,  if  the  thief 
consumes  the  thing  in  peril  ;  for  instance,  some  fo^d  or  drink,  which 
were  going  to  be  destroyed  in  a  fire  ;  because  the  thing  unsaved 
would  be  of  no  more  value  to  the  master. 

Several  extend  this  exception  to  the  case  in  which  the  property 
snatched  from  peril  is  consu  ned  right  off;  for  instance,  if  one  takes 
wine  which  is  going  to  fall  iiito  the  possession  of  the  enemy,  and 
drinks  it  among  the  family  and  friends. 

647. —  Ques.  Is  a  t'lief  obliged  to  make  restitution  if  the  stolen 
thing  is  lost  in  his  own  house? 

Ans.  1.    Yes,  absolutely.  .    .  . 

3.  No,  if  the  property  would  have  been  lost  as  its  master's,  in 
the  same  tiuie  and  in  the  same  case,  by  some  intrinsic  <Lfect  ; 
bcc'iuse  there  is  then  no  prejudice  to  the  owner.  According  to 
the  more  probable  opinion,  it  would  be  the  same  case,  if  the  prop- 
erty came  to  be  lost  in  the  same  tim3  and  was  exp  )sed  totliesame 
danger  as  when  in  the  thief's  possession  ;  for  instance,  in  the  same 
fire,  or  public  calaniit}'.  The  reason  is,  that  the  theft  has  not  been 
the  cause  of  the  damage,  the  thing  being  fated  to  be  lost  in  the 
samC'^way  and  at  the  same  moment. 

By  the  French  and  Roman  code,  in  whatever  way  the  tiling  is 
lost  when  in  the  hands  of  the  dishonest  possessor,  the  latter  is 
obliged  to  make  restitution  ;  but  it  does  not  seem  that  he  should 
be  obligiMl  to  do  it  before  a  judgment  ;  unless,  by  natural  rights, 
be  is  evidentl}'  under  the  obligation  to  do  it.   .   .   . 

649. — Must  a  thief,  besides  the  capital,  restore  also  the  interest? 


Treatise  on  Justice  and  Rights,  103 

Ans,  Yes,  if  he  is  sure,  or  if  it  is  presumable  that  the  possessor 
would  iiave  madj  tîiat  gain  ;  because  ha  must  be  in  lerauified.  It 
is  different,  aecoiding  to  the  probable  opinion,  if  one  is  not  su,re 
of  it.   .    .   . 

Section  3.     The  owner  of  doubtful  faith.   .  . 

ART.  II.     Unprofitable  Wrong-doing. 

657. —  This  is  doing  wrong  toothers,  injuring  the  property  of 
otliers,  without  any  profit  to  one's  self  by  the  act. 

In  this  act,  there  are  two  f anlts  :  the  theological  fatilt,  which 
includes  an  offence  towards  God,  in  other  words,  which  contains  a 
formal  sin,  mortal  or  venial;  and  the  judicial  one,  which  consists 
in  negligence,  the  cause  of  the  wrong,  whether  it  is  formal  sin  or 
not.  .   .  . 

658. — I.  The  author  of  the  injury  must  restore:  1,  the  entire 
equivalent  of  tlie  wrong  done  ;  for  instance,  if  he  has  set  fire  to  a 
house,  the  value  of  the  house;  2,  the  full  equivalent  of  the  dam- 
age foreseen,  besides  the  prejudice  caused.  .  .   . 

659. — II.  Three  conditions  are  required  in  order  that  the  pre- 
judicial act  should  compel  restitution  :  that  it  is  unjust  ;  that  it  is 
the  efficacious  cause  of  the  damage  ;  and  that  it  should  be  theologi- 
cally condemnable,  in  other  words,  that  it  should  be  unjust  ;  in  a 
manner  true,  efficacious,  formal.  .   .   . 

660. —  A  cause  only  occasional  of  prejudice,  is  not  sufficient  to 
compel  to  restitution  ;  because  it  is  not  an  efficacious  cause,  but 
only  the  occasion  of  an  efficacious  cause.  Thus,  if,  on  the  occa- 
sion of  a  theft  committed  by  yourself,  another  is  accused  and 
condemned,  you  are  not  obliged  to  make  reparation  for  that  wrong. 

661. — Qaes.  Is  a  theological  fault  sufficient  to  oblige  to  resti- 
tution for  a  wrong  caused  to  another  by  detaining  his  property,  by 
virtue  of  a  contract,  for  instance,  a  lease,  a  deposit? 

Ans.  The  opinion  which  seems  more  probable  absolutely 
affirms  it.   .  .   . 

662. — Qiies.  Is  a  theological  fault  sufficient  to  oblige  to  restitu- 
tion for  the  wrong  done  to  another  in  fulfilling  the  duties  of  one's 
charge,  as  in  the  execution  of  a  quasi-contract;  for  instance,  if  a 
physician  gives  by  mistake  an  injurious  potion  to  his  patient? 


104  Tiie  Doctrine  nf  the  Jesuits. 

Ans.     Yes,  according  to  the^more  probable  opinion.  .  .   . 

663. — Ques.  If,  doing  some  forbidden  work,  we  cause  an  injury 
accidently,  are  we  obliged  to  make  reparation  for  that  injury? 

Ans.  No,  because  that  injury  is  not  vohmlary,  not  having  been 
foreseen.  No  matter  if  the  act  is  illicit,  justice  has  nothing  to  do 
with  it.  If  an  ecclesiastic,  in  hunting,  in  spite  of  the  church's  de- 
fence, kills  a  man  instead  of  a  beast,  he  is  no  more  reprehensible 
than  a  layman.  And  even  the  prejudice  caused  iiy  accident  must 
not  be  repaired,  thougli  it  results  from  an  unjust  action,  it  having 
no  relation  to  it.  So,  we  owe  no  reparation  if  we  kilted  Titius, 
not  seen  by  us  and  not  known  to  be  there,  instead  of  Caius,  the  one 
we  wished  to  kill. 

664. — Ques.  Are  we  obliged  to  make  reparation  for  the  wrong 
done  by  mistake,  wishing  to  injure  another  ;  for  instance,  by  set- 
ting fire  to  Caius'  house,  mistaking  it  for  that  of  Tit'us? 

Ans.  Yes,  seems  the  right  answer  ;  because  the  three  conditions 
required  for  restitution  are  here.  Do  not  say  that  your  action 
was  not  unjust,  relatively,  to  Caius,  because  you  wanted  to  destroy 
a  determined  thing.  Now,  b}^  destroying  it,  you  impose  on  your- 
self the  obligation  to  compensate  for  the  damage.  No  matter  to 
whom  it  belongs  ;  the  question  is  not  about  the  name,  but  about 
the  object.  Some  deny  it,  however,  (St.  Alphonse,  l-ugo, 
Lacroix)  because  the  act  has  not  been  voluntarily  perpetuated 
towards  the  wronged  person,  coming  from  an  involuntary  ignor- 
ance of  right.     This  reason  seems  to  have  but  little  value. 

665. — Ques.  What  is  the  case  of  one  having  caused  a  grave 
prejudice  through  a  slight  fault  ;  for  instance,  through  careless- 


ness 


An*s.  He  is  liable  for  nothing,  according  to  the  more  probable 
opinion.  He  cannot,  in  fact,  be  under  obligation  of  a  grave 
penalty  ;  because  a  grave  penalty  would  not  be  in  proportion  to  a 
slight  fault  ;  nor  under  a  light  penalty,  because  a  light  obligation 
is  not  in  proportion  with  something  of  gravity.   .   .   . 

%Ç>&. — Ques.  If  one  thinks,  by  unconquerable  error,  that  the 
prejudice  caused  is  much  more  considerable  than  it  really  is,  are 
we  under  obligation  to  restore  the  whole,  if  later,  the  true 
value  is  known  ;  for  instance,  if  we  throw  into  the  sea  a  precious 


Treatise  on  Justice  and  Rights.  195 

stone    worth    a    Imadred    francs,    thinking    it    is    worth    only  ten 
francs  ? 

Ans.  According  to  the  probable  opinion,  we  must  make  repar- 
ation only  for  that  which  one  thought  to  destroy  ;  because,  what 
is  ignored  in  an  invincible  manner,  is  not  supposed  to  be  a  wrong 
willingly  done. 

667. — Ques.  Must  a  master  make  reparation  for  the  damage 
caused  by  his  animals? 

Ans.  1.  Yes,  if  by  theological  fault  he  has  neglected  to  h)ok 
after  his  animals.  Because,  every  one,  by  natural  right,  ought  to 
watch  and  prevent  them  from  damaging  another's  property. 

2.  But  if  there  is  no  theological  fault,  he  is  not  obliged  to  do 
so  before  a  judgment. 

Ques.  Ought  we  to  make  restitution  if,  showing  bad  example, 
we  induce  others  to  wrong  doing,  having  foreseen  the  evil? 

Ans.  The  more  probable  opinion  denies  it,  because  example  is 
not  the  cause,  but  the  pure  occasion  of  the  wrong.  Because  the 
bad  action  does  not  tend,  in  principle,  to  excite  others  to  imitate 
it.  Then  the  others  determine  themselves  to  commit  the  evil 
deeds.  .  .   . 

668. — Ques.  1.  If  we  are  in  doubt  that  we  have  been  ourselves 
the  cause  of  the  prejudice,  is  restitution  obligatory? 

Ans.  1.  If  the  existence  of  the  prejudice  is  doubtful,  more 
probably  there  is  no  obligation. 

2.  If  the  influence  of  the  action  over  the  evil  done  is  doubtful, 
there  is  controversy,  and  two  probable  opinions.   .   .   . 

669. — Ques.  Must  we  make  reparation  for  the  wrong  done  to 
some  one,  occasioned  by  an  unjust  action  of  our  own;  for 
instance,  if  you  had  stolen  something  and  he  should  be  accused  of 
the  theft? 

Ans.    1.    No,  certainly,  if  the  wrong  has  not  been  foreseen. 

2.  No,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion,  even  if  it  has 
been  foreseen  ;  because  your  action,  done  with  the  onl}-  prevision 
of  the  wrong  done,  is  not  the  cause,  in  principle,  but  only  by 
accident. 

3.  No,  according  to  the  probable  opinion,  even  if  you  have 
done   so    with    the   intention   that   he    should  be   accused  of   it  ; 


196  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

because  that  action  is  only  the  accidental,  not  the  original  cause  of 
the  wrong,  since  it  hau  no  etlicaciuus  influence  on  it,  by  its 
nature.   .   .   . 

G 72. — Case  I.  Didacus  places  in  a  corner  of  his  house,  where 
nobody  was  to  pass,  a  very  precious  vase,  belonging  to  Caius, 
expecting  to  put  it  the  next  morning  in  a  safer  place.  But 
Bazile,  entering  during  the  night  without  any  light,  knocks  the 
vase  down  and  breaks  it.  Quid  juris?  —  Ans:  Neither  Didacus 
nor  Bazile  are  to  be  held  for  reparation  ;  because  there  is  no 
theological  fault  from  them  ;  neither  thought  of  harm  or  danger. 
They  would  not  be  under  obligation  even  if  they  iiad  thought  of  a 
remote  danger  ;  because,  in  matters  of  morals,  we  must  not  mind 
pure  possibilit}'. 

Case  II.  Q  lirinus,  wanting  to  steal  some  cloth,  enters  a  store 
during  the  night  and  lights  a  candle,  taking  good  care,  however, 
to  prevent  a  fire  ;  but  a  cat  upsets  tlie  candle,  which,  falling  on 
straw,  sets  it  on  fire,  and  the  house  is  burned  ;  the  thief  runs  away 
and  escapes. — What  is  to  be  thought  of  Quirinus'  case? 

He  is  under  no  obligation  to  make  restitution  ;  because  he  has 
nf)t  foreseen  the  danger.  He  is  not  even  obliged  to  pay  for  the 
clothes  he  wished  lo  steal,  even  had  he  ran  away  with  the  goods; 
because  the  damage  is  involuntary,  since  the  fact  of  stealing  the 
cloth  is  not  the  cause  of  the  damage,  and  the  fact  of  carrying  the 
candle  does  not  induce  the  danger  of  fire,  when  reasonable  pre- 
cautions are  taken. 

Case  III.  Poraponius,  blinded  by  revenge  and  not  being  seen 
hy  anyone,  shoots  at  Maurus'  goat,  quietly  browsing  ;  but  he 
misses  it,  and  instead,  kills  Mairus'  cow,  resting  behind  a  hedge. 
AYhat  of  this  case  ?  He  owes  nothing.  Nothing  for  the  goat, 
having  missed  it  ;  nor  for  the  cow,  not  foreseeing  tiie  misfortune. 
— Quid,  If  the  cow  had  belonged  to  the  same  master?  The  diflS- 
culty  is  increasing,  the  aggressor  trulv  striving  to  wrong  tlie 
person  ;  because,  though  he  does  not  destroy  the  animal  he  had  in 
mind  to  kill,  as  in  principle  he  seeks  to  injure  his  enemy,  his 
action  causes  him  a  formal  prejudice.  However  rigorously,  in  prin- 
ciple, he  may  be  excused,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion, 
if  he  has  not  at  all  foreseen  that  evd,  not  even  confusedly,  one 


IVeatise  on  Justice  and   Rights,  197 

can  pay  that  it  happened  purely  through  ar  cident,  and  the  inten- 
tion to  do  injury  to  some  man  does  not  make  the  prejudice  caused 
on  the  subject  of  a  thing  unknown  become  voluntary. 

Case  JV.  Babin,  by  dint  of  prayers  and  flattery,  but  without 
having  recourse  to  any  knavish  tricks,  prevails  over  Roger,  on  liis 
death- bed,  to  tear  up  a  will  m  ide  in  favor  of  Paul,  in  order  that 
he  (Babin),  or  some  relations  of  his,  should  become  the  heir. 
Now,  Babin  not  only  does  this  for  his  own  or  his  friend's  advan- 
tage, but  also  from  hate  for  Paul. — Ques.  Is  he  guilty  of 
injustice? — Ans.  Not  at  all;  because,  thou'^h  he  has  sinned 
gravely  against  charity,  he  did  no  violence  or  injustice,  not  having 
violated  any  strict  rights  of  Roger.  So  would  it  be  for  the  one 
who,  through  hate,  would  have  prevailed  on  Roger  to  change  hi^ 
mind  and  make  his  will  in  favor  of  another  one  than  Paul,  or 
choose  another  heir  in  his  stead. 

ART.  III.     On  unjust  co-operation. 

Section  1.     One  who  orders  evil. 

673. — He  must  make  reparation  for  all  the  wrong  he  com- 
manded to  do  :  it  would  be  different,  if  he  had  only  approved  of 
the  evil  done  in  his  name.   .   .   . 

674. — Ques.  Must  the  one  who  gives  the  order  make  repara- 
tion, if  he  changed  his  idea  before  the  prejudice  has  been  caused  ? 

Ans.  No,  if  the  proxy  knew  of  it  before  the  execution  of  the 
mandate  ;  it  would  be  different  if  he  did  not  know  of  it,  or  if  it 
came  too  late  to  his  knowledge  ;  because,  in  the  first  case,  the  one 
who  gave  the  order  did  not  have  any  influence  on  the  evil,  whilst 
in  the  second  case  he  had  some. 

Ques.  Must  the  one  who  gives  the  order  make  reparation  for 
the  injustice  which  the  proxy  caused  to  another  by  an  invincible 
error  ? 

Ans.  No,  because  the  true  cause  of  the  prejudice  is  the  error 
of  the  proxy.  This  is  the  common  opinion,  unless  it  proceeds 
from  the  nature  of  the  prejudicial  action  itself,  or  from  its  neces- 
sary results,  so  that  he  has  been  forced  into  an  error  which  he 
C(juld  scarcely  foresee  ;  then  the  one  who  gave  the  order  has  been 
the  cause  of  the  error,  and  the  prejudice  resulting  from  it.   .   .   . 


198  Tiie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

Section  2.     One  who  advises  evil. 

C76. —  .  .  .  The  counsellor  is  not  obliged  to  make  restitution, 
if  t'le  author  of  the  evil  would  have  caused  the  prejudice  in  the 
same  manner  without  his  advice  ;  because  that  advice  has  not 
been  efficacious  for  the  prejudice.*   .   .   . 

678. —  Is  the  one  who  only  advises  the  means  of  injuring  an- 
other obliged  to  make  reparation  ? 

Ans.  No,  if  the  means  are  purely  accidental,  such  are,  gener- 
ally, the  circumstances  of  time,  place,  and  manner. 

Ques.  Ought  one  to  make  reparation,  if  he  advises  that  the 
injury  be  done  more  quickly? 

Ans.  No,  if  it  is  certain  that  the  other  was  determined  to  do 
wrong,  t 

Section  3.     The  one  who  gives  consent. 

681. —  He  must  make  reparation  for  each  time  he  has  giv^en, 
knowingly  and  freely,  his  consent  or  advice,  from  which  directly 
resulted  the  wrong  done  to  another  ;  in  other  words,  ever}'  time  he 
gives  an  efficacious  consent  causing  prejudice  to  others.  If  his 
consent  was  not  efficacious,  he  could  not  be  held  to  make  repara- 
tion, having  given  his  consent  to  the  evil  in  an  affective,  and  not 
effective  manner.   .   .   . 

Section  4.     The  flatterer.  .   .   . 

*  Escobar  :  "Can  j^ou  advise  Antonio,  getting  ready  to  steal  some 
wheat,  to  steal  rather,  through  frieudship'for  you,  a  sum  of  money,  be- 
cause you  desire  to  buy  that  wheat  from  Antonio?  or  could  you  advise 
somebody  who  wishes  to  steal  something  from  Feter,  or  from  John,  not 
being  decided  to  steal  from  one  rather  than  from  the  other,  to  steal  from 
Peter,  because  Jolin  is  your  friend?  .  .  . 

"  I  believe  more  probably  that  such  a  counsellor,  would  not  be  obliged 
to  make  restitution, — such  is  Sanchez's  opinion."     (Page  365), 

fTrachala:  "You  ask  me  if  you  are  obliged  to  make  restitution  in  a 
case  in  which  some  one,  being  disposed  to  commit  a  tlieft,  receives  en- 
couragement from  you,  by  advice  or  exhortation,  to  commit  tiiat  crime 
witli  more  promptness  and  ease? 

I  answer  negatively,  with  probabilitv. 

But  wliat  would  have  been  the  answer  if  you  had  been  only  the  material 
cause  of  tlie  damage?  For  instance,  if  you  liad  held  the  ladder  while  the 
thief  was  stealinj;,  tliougli  he  could  have  gone  up  tlie  ladder  just  the  same 
if  you  had  not  held  it.  I  answer,  that  yf)U  are  under  no  obligation.  It  is 
also  the  opinion  of  Laymaun."   (Page  391.) 


Treatise  on  Justice  and  Rights.  199 

Section  5.     The  receiver  of  stolen  goods.   ... 
Section  6.     The  participator. 

There  are  two  kinds  :  the  one  participates  in  the  plunder  ;  the 
other,  in  the  guilty  act  which  procures  it. 

686. — The  first  one  must  restore  what  he  has  received  and  what 
he  detains. 

The  second  one,  who  co-operates  with  others,  in  a  mediate  or  an 
immediate  manner  to  do  the  evil,  must  restore,  in  general,  everj' 
time  that  his  co-operation  has  had  a  real  influence  on  the  sub- 
stance of  the  prejudice.   ... 

687. —  Qu(s.  Jn  the  matter  of  justice,  does  one  permit,  and 
at  what  moment,  an  immediate  co-operation  to  the  prejudice? 

Ans.  .  .  .  For  temporal  fortunes,  three  cases  are  admitted,  in 
which,  in  consequence  of  a  grave  fear,  co-operation  is  permitted; 
because  the  owner  is  not  supposed  to  oppose  it  reasonably  :  1,  if 
the  co-operator  can  and  will  make  reparation  for  the  prejudice  ; 
2,  if  the  grave  prejudice  would  have  been  caused  just  the  same 
by  the  principal  author  without  that  co-operation  ;  3,  if  the  loss 
is  slight  for  the  owner,  who,  by  charity,  ought  to  suffer  it  will- 
ingly.  .   .   . 

Section  7.  Those  who  keep  silent,  make  no  opposition,  do  not 
divulge  ;  or,  negative  co-operators. 

692. —  Ques.  Must  a  superior  make  reparation  for  the  wrong 
done  by  his  inferiors? 

Ans.     1,  Outwardly:  Yes,  after  the  Roman  and  French  codes. 

2,  Inwardly  :  1,  Yes,  if  the  silence  of  the  superior  is  the  equiva- 
lent of  a  tacit  advice  ;  2,  No,  if  there  is  no  theological  fault  ;  3, 
No,  according  to  the  probable  opinion,  although  he  has  sinned 
gravely  by  not  preventing  the  wrong,  if  his  silence  had  no  in- 
fluence, above  all  when  it  is  a  question  of  wrong  done  to  others 
than  to  his  inferiors. 

693. —  Ques.  Is  restitution  obligatory  if  one  receives  money 
from  a  thief  to  keep  silent,  when  duty  does  not  command  hiui  to 
call  for  help? 


200  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits.  ■ 

Ans.  No,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion,  at  least  in 
principle  ;  because  justice  does  not  oblige  you  to  call  for  help. 
Likewise,  if  they  give  or  promise  some  gift  to  keep  you  quiet. 


CHAPTER   III. 

On  the  Circumstances  of  Restitution. 
AKT.  I.     How  much  it  is  necessary  to  restore. 

694. —  The  quantity  to  be  restored  must  be  measured  b}"  the 
quantity  of  the  stolen  object,  of  the  wrong  committed,  or  of  the 
influence  on  the  wrong  caused  to  others.   .   .   . 

695. —  Any  co-operator  concurring  in  an  efficacious  manner  in 
the  wrong  done,  so  that  one  could  morally  impute  to  him  all  the 
evil,  must  make  restitution  for  the  whole. 

696. —  Ques.  Is  one  obliged  to  make  restitution  for  all  when 
the  co-operation  has  influence  on  the  individual  wrong,  but  is  not 
Sufficient  or  necessary,  or  does  not  come  from  a  direct  plot  ;  fur 
instance,  if  four  carry  away  a  beam  which  three  might  have 
carried  ? 

Ans.  No,  because  the  only  reason  for  the  obligation  is  the 
influence  on  the  wrong  act. 

697. —  Ques.  Are  you  obliged  to  restore  the  whole,  if  3^our 
auction  has  been  sufficient  to  cause  all  tlie  prejudice,  but  not  at  all 
necessary,  nor  coming  from  a  plot?  For  instance:  if  you  and 
seveial  others  set  fire  to  a  house  at  the  same  time? 

Ans.  There  is  controversy  :  yes,  according  to  the  prol)able 
opinion,  and  even  more  probable,  of  many  ;  no,  according  to  tlie 
probable  opinion  of  others.  ...  St.  Liguori  finds  both  opinions 
probable. 

ART.  11.    To  whom  is  it  necessary  to  make  restitution?  .   .   . 

ART.  III.     In  what  order  is  it  necessary  to  make  restitution? 

That  order  may  be  considered  either  in  relaion  to  those  who 
must  restore,  if  several  have  co-rperated  ;  or  relatively  to  those  to 
whom  the  restitution  mubt  be  made.   •  .   . 


Treatise  on  Justice  and  Rights,  201 

.  703.  — .  .  .  The  one  who  a<lvises  and  the  one  who  consents, 
are  not  obliged,  in  priuci[)le,  to  restore  l)efore  the  one  who  exe- 
cutes :  this  one  is  the  first  to  make  restitution  ;  because,  outsi(le  of 
the  one  who  gave  the  order,  he  is  the  p  incipal  cause  of  the  preju- 
dice.  .   .   . 

ART.  IV.     How  is  the  restitution  to  be  made  ?  .  .  . 

708.  We  may  say,  in  general,  that  it  is  necessary  and  sufficient 
if  the  restitution  be  made  in  such  a  way  that  justice  shall  be  satis- 
fied and  the  injured  party  indemnified.   .   .   . 

ART.  V.     When  is  the  restitution  to  be  made? 

713. —  As  for  the  things  owed,  they  must  be  restored  aa  soon  as 
possible  without  any  great  inconvenience.  .  .  . 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Cases  Which  Exempt  From  Restitution. 

715. — Excuse  for  a  time  :  1,  physical  powerlessness,  or  impossi- 
bilit}'  of  all  sorts,  which  happen  in  extreme  or  even  very  grave  neces- 
sity to  the  debtor  or  to  his  family  ;  2,  moral  powerlessness,  or  grave 
dilTiculty  to  make  the  restitution,  when  it  cannot  bo  done  without 
great  inconvenience  ;  for  instance,  without  losing  a  situation  justly 
acquired;  because  then,  there  is  a  true  impossibility  to  make  resti- 
tution :  since,  in  moral  things,  we  cull  impossible  what  isdiflleult, 
and  that  which  cannot  be  done  decently  and  honorably.  Thus,  if 
a  man  of  the  nobility  cannot  restore  without  depriving  himself  of 
his  servants,  horses,  arms  ;  or  one  of  the  first  citizens,  without 
taking  a  manual  trade  to  which  he  is  not  accustomed,  they  may 
postpone  the  restitution,  and  pay  little  by  little  what  they  owe.* 

♦Marotte,  in  his  '^ Petit  ChatechUme,'''  reproduces,  for  the  use  of  little 
childreu,  these  dangerous  distinctions,  all  in  favor  of  the  thieves  : 

Ques.     "What  are  the  causes  whicli  permit  one  to  postpone  restitution? 

Ana.  "These  causes  are  :  1 ,  piiysical  powerlessness  ;  in  other  words,  the 
condition  of  the  debtor,  who  is  in  extreme  need;  2.  moral  powerlessness, 
in  other  words,  the  situation  in  which  the  debtor  could  not  make  restitu- 
tion without  notably  fallinj^j  from  a  position  justly  acquired,  without 
plunginjç  himself  and  family  into  poverty,  or  exposing  himself  to  the  danger 
of  losing  his  reputation." 


202  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

716. — Excusing  forever  ;  .  .  .  remittance  of  tlie  debt*,  .  .  • 
compensation  ;   .   .   .   thirty  years*  prescription. 

718. — Ques.  Could  some  one,  overwhelmed  with  debt,  enter  a 
monastery  ;  and  has  he  got  rid  of  his  debts,  once  he  has  entered  it? 

Ans.  1.  No,  if  the  payment  can  be  promptly  effected.  It 
would  be  different,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion,  in 
principle,  if  a  notable  time  must  elapse.  However,  if  the  debts 
are  considerable,  such  an  instance,  though  valid,  is  forbidden  by 
the  Canon  Law. 

2.  The  Church  is  not  obliged  to  pay  those  debts  out  of  her 
own  property.  A  monk  is  obliged  to  pay  his  debts  out  of  the 
property  he  had  before  his  entrance  into  religion  ;  or  out  of  what 
he  inherits  by  will,  if  he  took  only  simple  vows.  It  would  be 
different,  if  he  had  taken  solemn  vows.   .   .   . 

722. — Ques.  Does  a  reasonably  presumed  allowance  excuse 
from  all  restitution  ? 

Ans.  Yes,  at  least,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion  ; 
because,  to  detain  the  property  of  others,  or  not  to  make  restitu- 
tion for  it,  is  an  unjust  action  only  if  it  is  against  the  will  of  the 
owner.*  The  allowance  does  not  occur  in  spite  of  him,  if  it  is 
done  by  his  permission  reasonably  presumed.  But  it  is  necessary 
to  guard  agaiu&t  abuse,  in  order  to  prevent  great  injustice. 

Section  II.     Different  kinds  of  restitution. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Restitution  for  Injcry  Done  to  the  Welfare  of  the   Soul. 


In  his  Cours  Complet,  Le  imagines  anew  cause,  not  lackini?  in  ori.irinality  : 
"Another  legitimate  cause  for  postponing  restitution,  is  whenoaie  foresees 
that  the  creditor  will  make  an  abuse  of  it  for  his  own  harm,  or  to  the 
detriment  of  another." 

What  a  touching  solicitude  of  the  thief  for  the  interest  and  salvation  of 
his  victim  ! 

*  "7i5  is  not  a  mortal  sin  to  take  secretly  from  some  one  what  he  would 
give  if  it  was  asked  of  him-,  though  he  does  not  wish  it  to  be  taken  in 
secret;  and  it  is  not  liable  to  restitution." — Emm.  Sa. 


Treatise  on  Justice  and  Rights.  203 

CHAPTER   II. 

Restitution  for  InjuIiy  to  the  Body. 
ART.  I.     Restitution  for  homicide. 

725. — Homicides  (those  who  have  wounded  somebody),  and 
their  heirs,  must  make  restitution  to  the  mutilated  or  wounded 
ones,  for  all  loss  resulting  from  that  mutilation  or  homicide  before 
his  death.  But,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion,  the}" 
ought  to  compensate  nothing  for  life  or  limbs  ;  because,  in  strict 
rights,  those  things  cannot  be  subject  to  any  estimation.* 

If  the  person  died  before,  the  restitution  must  be  made  to  his 
heirs  ;  or,  if  there  are  none,  to  the  poor.  .   .   . 

726. — Ques.  Is  a  homicide  obliged  to  make  restitution  to  the 
wife  and  children  of  his  victim,  even  for  future  prejudice,  if  they 
can  shift  for  themselves? 

Ans.  There  is  controversy.  The  more  common  opinion  says 
Yes  ;  t'le  probable  opinion  says  No. 

Qnes.     Must  we  i)ay  something  to  the  creditors  of  one's  victim? 

Ans.  No,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion  ;  though  the 
murderer  should  have  foreseen  it,  provided  he  has  had,  direc'ly, 
no  intention  of  wronging  them,  since  this  wrong  is  but  an  acci- 
dental consequence.   .   .   . 

Ques.     Must  onj  wlio  kills  another  in  a  duel  make  reparation  ? 

Ans.  No,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion,  no  matter 
whether  he  is  the  provoker  or  the  provoked  one.   .   .   . 

ART.   II.     Restitution  for  rape  and  fornication. 

728. — For  a  purely  natural  injury — for  the  destroying  of  the 
body's  integrity — for  having  caused  the  loss  of  purily,  restitution 
is  not  obligatory,  at  least,  according  to  the  more  probable 
opinion  ;   because  such  injury  cannot  be  compensated  with  money. 

729. — Ques.  Must  the  ravisher  marry  the  young  girl  he  violated 
under  promise  of  marriage? 

*  It  is  in  deduction  of  these  principles  that,  in  the  opinion  of  Lacroix, 
Casuists  aj^ree  that:  "  LMie  one  who  killed  a  man  who  was  soou  to  die  a 
natural  or  justlv  deserved  dciatli,  is  not  obli.ijetl  to  rnal\e  restituiion,  since 
he  is  not  supposed  to  iiave  done  any  i^reat  damage."     (Paye  366.) 


204  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

Ans.     The  first  opinion  affirms  it.   .   .   . 

The  second,  followed  b}'  a  very  few,  denies  it. 

The  first  is  common,  and  must  be  followed  ;  however,  it  admits 
several  excerptions  discussed  by  St.  Liguori.  Thus,  there  will  be 
exemption  :  if  sorry  consequences  from  that  marriage  aie  appre- 
hended ;  if  a  great  dishonor  results  for  the  family  from  the  differ- 
ence of  condition,  etc.  But  then,  one  is  obliged  to  give  a  dowry 
to  the  girl. 

Qnes.  Does  the  ravisherowe  something  to  the  girl's  parents,  if 
she  freely  consented  to  the  act  ? 

Ans.  No,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion  ;  because 
none  of  their  strict  rights  have  been  violated,  and  they  cannot 
prevent  their  daughter  from  giving  up  her  right,  relatively,  to 
temporal  injury.*   .    .   . 

AKT.  II.     Restitution  for  adulter}'. 

The  obligations  of  both  adulterers  ought  to  be  examined  nccord- 
ing  to  différent  circumstances,  as  to  whether  the  adulteiy  has  been 
fully  voluntary  in  bot'i  participants,  or  not  ;  and  if  it  has  caused 
injury  to  the  family,  or  not.  .   .    . 

732. —  Ques.  Is  a  woman  obliged  to  reveal  her  crime,  if  there 
is  no  other  way  of  repairing  the  evil? 

Ans.     No,  in  gene  ral.    .   .    . 

733.— Ques.  What  is  to  be  done  when  there  is  doubt  if  the 
child  is  legitimate,  or  illegitimate  ;  or  if  he  proceeds  from  this 
adultery,  or  from  another  one? 

Ans.  According  to  the  more  probable  opinion,  adulterers  are 
under  no  obligation  ;  because  the}"  have  no  knowledge  of  the 
injury  caused.  Other  say,  that  reparation  must  be  made  propor- 
tionally.  .   .    . 

Ques.  Must  a  son  bolieve  his  mother,  who  tells  him,  under 
oath,  that  he  is  illegiumate? 

Ans.     No,   because,  by  right    and   common    sense,   no    one    is 

*Ques.  "What  Is  to  be  expected  as  a  restitution  from  one  who  has 
caused  the  defloration  of  a  virijjiu  ? 

Ans.  "If  the  girl  lias  consented,  nothing  but  to  do  penance;  because 
she  had  the  riijht  to  concede  the  use  of  lier  body,  and  the  parents  cannot 
prevent  it."— F.  X.  Fegeli,  1750,  (Page  294.) 


I 


Tnaiise  on  Justice  and  Rights,  205 

obliged  to  believe  oae  witness,  even  if  there  is  no  doubt  whatever 
of  liis  good  faith.   .   .   . 

734.  —  Ques.  If  the  children  of  rich  adulterers  or  fornicators 
are  sent  to  the  House  of  R.-fuge,  must  they  pay  for  their  ex- 
penses ? 

Ans.  There  is  controversy.  The  first  opinion,  more  probable 
and  more  common,  affirms  it.     The  second  one  denies  it.   .   .   . 


CHAPTER    in. 

On   Restitution   for   the    Injury   Caused   to  Temporal 
Fortune  in  Particular  Cases. 

ART.  I.     Of  Taxes. 

736. —  Subjects  pay  an  income-tax,  out  of  their  own  properties, 
to  the  government  or  sovereign,  to  cover  the  public  expenses 
of  the  Stite. 

Tiiere  is  the  direct  tax,  and  the  indirect  one.   .   .   . 

737. —  1.  The  action  of  establishing  the  incomo-tax  is  incum- 
bent on  the  legitimate  and  supreme  authority  ;  which  alone  has 
the  right  to  exact  from  the  citizens  what  is  necessary  to  the 
public  good. 

2.  The  sovereign  has  the  right  to  establish  taxes  ;  because  his 
power  extends  to  everything  relative  to  t.ie  public  good.   .   .   . 

4.  Laws  relating  to  taxes,  considered  in  general,  are  not 
purely  penal,  but  oblige  in  conscience.   .   .   . 

738. —  Ques.  Must  one  constrain  the  people  to  pay  indirect 
taxes,  and  compel  restitution  for  frauds  committed? 

Ans.     The  solution  is  difficult. 

744. — Ques.  Is  it  a  sin,  and  is  reparation  obligatory,  if  one 
imports  prohibited  goods? 

Ans.  1.  As  for  the  restitution,  no,  absolutelj' ;  because  no 
strict  rights  are  violated,  neither  the  sovereign's  rights  who  did 
not  reserve  these  goods,  nor  impose  duty  on  them,  nor  an}'  par- 
ticular rights,  nobody  having  tlie  privilege  to  sell  them. 

2.     As  for  the  sin,  there  ia  controversy.   .   .   . 


206  Tlie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

ART.  II.     Of  injuiy  caused  on  the  occasion  of  military  service. 

747 — Ques.     Under  what  obligation  are  refractory  conscripts? 

Ans.  1.  By  obedience,  or  legal  justice,  they  must  join  their 
corps.  Except:  1,  if  there  was  a  gi-ave  danger  for  their  salva- 
tion ;  for  instance,  if  tliey  had  not  the  facility  of  confessing,  as 
it  happens  in  some  pi  .ces  ;  2,  if,  when  reintegrated,  they  were 
going  to  suffer  the  penalty  of  death,  imprisonment,  or  some  other 
grave  penalty  ;  3,  if  the  war  is  evidently  unjust. 

2.  Deserters  are  under  no  obligation  to  make  restitution,  if 
the  law  takes  nobody  in  their  place  ;  because  tlu-y  do  not  wrong 
commutative  justice,  since  they  do  wrong  to  no  one. 

749. — Ques.  Under  what  obligation  are  conscripts  who  run 
away,  or  obtain  exemption  under  false  pretence? 

Ans.  If  the  law  does  not  fill  their  places,  they  sin  against 
legal  justice,  but  they  owe  no  reparation  ;  but  if  the  law  takes 
somebody  : 

1 .  Those  who  bribe  magistrates  or  doctors,  in  order  to  be  declared 
improper  for  service,  must  make  reparation. 

2.  And  also,  according  to  the  more  common  opinion,  those  who 
deceive  magistrates  with  lies,  frauds  or  deliberate  mutilations  done 
beforehand. 

However,  several  authors,  whose  opinion  seems  probable  enough, 
deny  it;  because  these  conscripts  are  not  the  efficacious  cause  of 
the  departure  of  others,  their  dupery  inducing  neither  physically 
nor  morally  the  magistrates  to  take  others.  .  .  . 

ART.  III.  On  confiscation  of  property  in  the  revolutions  in 
France. 

Section  I.     Ecclesiastical  property. 

750. — The  Church's  property  has  been  pillaged  (direspta),  some 
by  the  governments,  some  by  individuals.   .   .   . 

751. — Those,  who  have  usurped  the  Church's  property,  have 
committed  a  grave  sin,  if  they  did  it  of  their  own  authority,  and 
are  obliged  to  restore  it  ;  for  they  are  thieves,  and  have  never  been 
pardoned.  .  .  . 

Section  II.     Individual  property. 


Treatise  on  Justice  and  THyhts,  207 

752. — The  property  of  emigrants,  unjustly  expelled,  has,  like  the 
Cliurch's  property,  been  confiscated  by  the  State  and  by  individu- 
als.  .   .   . 

753. — Individuals  who,  of  their  own  authority,  have  confiscated 
tliis  propert}^  are  under  obligation  to  make  restitution,  and  cannot 
invoke  prescription,  since  they  have  been  possessors  in  bad  faith. 


(Eases  of  Conscience  on  Smtitt  anti  Etgljt 


On  Patrimony. 

Case  I. 

Of   the  Propp:rty  of  Children. 

Leopold,  a  merchanl's  son,  after  the  death  of  his  fatlier, 
remains  in  the  paternal  home,  and  conducts  business  so  skilfully, 
that  in  eight  years  lie  gains  two  thousand  pounds.  At  this  time 
his  mother  dies  without  making  a  will,  and  he  wants  the  largest 
part  of  the  fortune.  But  two  young  and  invalid  sisters  of  his,  who 
liad  gained  nothing  themselves,  object  to  his  greed,  and  ask  for 
an  equal  share  ;  as,  by  the  law,  when  there  is  no  will,  the  rights  of 
children  are  equal.  Leopold,  having  protested  in  vain,  keeps 
secretlj'  for  himself  an  important  sum  of  money  he  had  in  his  pos- 
session. 

Ques.  Is  Leopold  right  in  coveting  the  greatest  part  of  the 
inheritance  ;  and,  after  the  refusal  of  his  sisters,  can  he  justly 
compensate  himself? 

Ans.  Natural  right  commands  that  Leopold  can  demand  the 
greatest  part  of  the  money  he  gained  himself,  for  this  seems  con- 
loimable  to  equity  ;  because  that  enormous  gain  realized  does  not 
proceed  only  from  the  money  belonging  to  the  family,  but  from 
the  particular  skill  and  extraordinary  work  of  Leopold,  and  not 
from  the  sisters.  Besides,  the  aasociation  of  brother  and  sisters^ 
at  tlieir  father's  death,  relative  to  the  paternal  inheritance,  left 
intact  in  order  to  continue  the  business,  seems  to  be  likened  to  a 
contract  of  commercial  association.  Then,  it  is  equitable  that  the 
one  who,  in  the  contract,  brings  more  money  and  w  jrk,  should 
also  have  a  larger  part  in  the  profit.  Then,  Leopold,  having 
brought   not  only  a  larger  sum,   but  also  more  work  and   skill, 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Justice  and  RirjJd.         209 

should  have  a  larger  share  in  the  gain  in  question  ;  for,  although 
civil  law  does  nut  make  any  difference  in  such  a  case,  at  least  it 
seems  to  authorize  a  certain  compensation,  in  proportion  to  the 
unpaid  extraordinary  work  of  one  of  the  associates,  as  estimated 
by  an  honest  third  party.  Then,  Leopold  can  ask  a  compensation 
from  his  sisters.  Now,  if  he  has  evidently  a  right  to  a  compensa- 
tion, rigorously  he  can  procure  it  ;  secretly,  if  he  has  no  other  way 
of  claiming  it. 

Case  II. 

Of  the  Property  of  Children. 

Marins,  a  wine-merchant's  son,  is  sent  by  his  father,  an  aged 
man,  to  many  places,  to  buy  wines.  But  Marins,  a  clever  man, 
buys  at  a  very  low  price,  and  makes  his  father  believe  that  he  has 
paid  a  good  deal  more  for  it.  So,  with  the  gain  thus  realized, 
and  also  with  the  economies  he  made  in  his  travels,  he  buys  a 
barrel  of  wine  on  his  own  account,  which  he  sells  secretly  on  his 
return,  and  realizes  a  profit  of  fift}^  pounds. 

Ques.  Is  Marius  obliged  to  make  restitution  for  that  money,  or 
part  of  it? 

Ans.  1.  Marius  is  under  obligation  to  restore  the  money  he 
made  by  deceiving  his  father  on  the  price  of  the  wine  ;  because  in 
no  way  can  he  keep  it  justly  ;  for,  if  he  had  the  luck  to  buy  at  a 
low  rate,  being  his  father's  representative,  he  owes  him  the  benefit 
of  it,  being  already  paid  to  make  the  business  prosperous  ;  except 
tlie  case  in  which  he  would  have  shown  an  extraordinary  amount 
of  work  and  skill. 

He  is  not  obliged  to  give  back  the  money  he  made  by  economy  ; 
because  his  father  owes  him  an  honorable  living  proportionate  to 
his  condition.  But  if  he  saved  something  on  it,  and  took  better 
care  of  his  purse  than  his  stomach,  his  father  cannot  reasonably 
find  fault  with  it.  For,  if  a  merchant's  son,  for  instance,  meets 
along  the  way  a  traveling  companion  willing  to  pay  for  his 
expenses,  he  is  not  obliged  to  give  back  to  his  master  the  money 
he  would  have  had  to  spend  for  general  expenses.  Then,  even 
so,  a  son  of  a  good  family  is  not  obliged  to  remit  to  his  father  the 
money  he  saved  by  living  with  economy. 


210  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

3.     He  is  not  obliged  to  give  bnck  the  fifty  pounds.  .  ,  , 

Case  VI. 

Of  Occupa  I  ion. 

Fortunatus,  after  the  taking  and  pillage  of  a  city  by  the  soldier*?, 
buys  for  a  song  from  one  of  them  a  lot  of  clothing.  But 
later,  looking  at  them  carefully,  he  finds  a  considerable  sura  of 
money  sewed  up  in  the  lining  of  a  c  )at  ;  attributing  this  Incky 
discovery  to  the  gof  dness  of  Providence,  he  keeps  it  without  any 
remorse  of  conscience. 

Ques.  Can  Fortunatus  keep  the  money  found  in  the  coat  ;  or 
must  he  give  it  back  to  the  soldier,  or  to  the  owner,  if  he  knows 
him? 

Ans.  1.  Fortunatus  is  not  obliged  to  give  the  money  back  to 
the  soldier;  because  even  if  the  latter  has  justly  acquired  the 
clothing,  for  instance,  in  a  just  war,  he  has  not  acquired  the  pos- 
session of  the  money  hidden  in  them,  and  it  has  no  relation  wiih 
their  price  ;  since  the  soldier,  being  ignorant  of  its  existence,  can- 
not pretend  to  the  possession  of  the  money.  Now,  what  you 
îgnore  you  do  not  desiie,  nor  consequenll}'  possess.  2.  If  lie 
should  find  the  true  possessor,  he  ought  to  give  him  back  the 
money  ;  for  the  owner  has  never  renounced  the  possession  of  his 
pro^Derty.  The  soldier's  booty  exists  rather  in  practice  than  in 
principle,  and  does  not  include  the  hidden  money,  and  it  is  not 
opposed  to  the  civil  possession  by  the  first  master.  However,  one 
would  not  be  obliged  to  give  back  the  money  even  to  the  proprie- 
tor, were  he  known,  if  the  coat  had  been  taken  in  a  just  war  ; 
because,  in  this  case,  the  possession  having  been  acquired  through 
the  enemy  was  not  an  unjust  one. 

Case  VIII. 
Of  Occupation. 

The  hunter  Attilius  kills  a  hare  in  Caius'  open  field.  The  pro- 
prietor, present  by  chance, 'prevents  the  hunter  from  carrying  away 
his  game,  and  takes  it  himself,  and  disposes  of  it  with  his  friends. 

Ques.      To  whom  belongs  the  game  ? 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Justice  and  Right.         211 

Ans.  The  game  belongs  to  the  huntsman  who  acquired,  by 
killing,  the  property  of  it,  although  he  took  it  in  an  illicit  manner, 
without  the  owner's  permission.  Then  the  latter  acted  unjustly  by 
taking  and  eating  the  game  ;  for  it  was  not  a  production  of  his 
field,  and  he  must  restore  the  value  of  it.  His  permission  was 
necessary,  but  it  was  his  duty  to  give  it  ;  and  if  Attilius  has 
caused  some  damage  in  Caius'  field,  he  must  indemnify  him. 

Case  XII. 
Of  Things. 

Gaudentius  learns  that  a  treasure  is  hidden  in  a  certain  field  ;  he 
buys  it  at  the  ordinary  rate,  digs  in  the  earth,  and,  O  happiness  ! 
he  discovers  the  treasure,  and  keeps  the  whole  of  it  for  himself. 

Ques.  Did  Gaudentius  act  unjustly  in  buying  the  field  at  the 
ordinary  price,  though  he  presumed,  and  even  was  certain,  that  a 
treasure  was  hidden  in  it  ? 

Ans.  Gaudentius  can  keep  the  treasure,  because,  in  reality,  he 
found  it  in  his  own  field;  and  he  was  not  obliged  to  pay  more 
for  it,  because  the  treasure  is  not  assimilated  to  any  production  of 
the  field.  Do  not  object  the  presumption,  nor  even  the  certainty 
of  the  thing,  because  this  is  quite  accidental,  and  does  not  cause 
any  injury  to  the  seller  ;  just  as  an  apothecary  need  not  pay  more 
for  a  load  of  hay  because  some  medicinal  plants  are  in  it. 

Case  XVIl. 
Of  the  Prescription. 

1.  Sylvain  has,  for  nine  years,  enjoyed  the  half  of  a  field, 
through  inheritance  ;  the  field  belonging  to  two  masters,  Peter 
and  Paul. 

Peter  discovers,  looking  over  some  documents,  that  he  lias  a 
right  to  a  part  of  the  field,  claims  and  obtains  it  before  justice. 
Six  months  later,  Paul  claims  it  also  ;  but  he  is  opposed  by  a 
right  of  prescription. 

2.  Hippolyte  occupies,  in  good  faith,  a  house  belonging  to  two 
brothers,  John  and  Jacob.  After  nine  years,  John  claims  posses- 
sion with  a  document  altered  with  erasure,  but  obtains  nothino^. 


212  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

Ten  years  later,  by  a  lucky  chance,  Jacob  discovers  the  authcn- 
tical  document  without  erasure,  which  proves  the  validity  of  the 
deed.  Immediately  he  claims  the  house  ;  but  Hippolyte  opposes 
the  prescription. 

3.  Medard  possesses  in  good  faith,  for  nine  years,  a  field, 
which  he  gives  to  his  heir  Gustave,  when  he  is  at  the  point  of 
death.  Two  years  later,  Victorin  proves  that  the  field  belongs 
to  him,  and  claims  it.  Gustave  refuses  to  give  it  back,  invoking 
the  prescription. 

Ques.  1.     Is  Sylvain's  prescription  valid,  in  the  first  case? 

2.  What  of  Ilippolyte's  in  the  second? 

3.  And  Gustave's  in  the  third? 

Ans.  Question  1.  That  depends  :  if  the  right  of  both  masters 
is  founded  on  the  same  common  deed,  Sylvain  cannot  oppose 
prescription,  because  his  bad  faith  ought  to  be  proved  in  judg- 
ment. But  if  they  have  two  different  deeds,  it  may  happen  that 
Sylvain  is  in  good  faith,  and  opposes  prescription. 

Ans.  Question  2.  Hippolyte  is  right  in  opposing  prescription, 
for,  in  principle,  his  possession  has  not  been  interrupted  ;  because, 
although  there  has  been  a  suit  at  law,  the  adversary  has  lost  it. 
Add  to  this,  that  the  authentical  document  brought  in  b\'  Jacob 
has  been  found  too  late,  the  time  fixed  by  prescription  being 
elapsed. 

Ans.  Question  3.  The  prescription  of  the  heir  Gustave  is 
valid,  because  it  continues  and  completes  the  legal  time,  which 
commenced  with  the  first  possession. 

Such  would  be  the  case  also  if  Gustave  had  acquired  his  field 
by  a  deed  of  sale  ;  for  one  may  add  together  the  time  of  the 
different  possessors  in  order  to  have  prescription,  provided  all 
were  in  good  faith  in  detaining  it. 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Injustice  antr  Cfjeft. 


SECRET   COMPENSATION. 

Case  I. 
The  Gravity  of  Theft. 

Nestor,  in  his  passion  for  stealing,  takes  advantage  of  every 
occasion,  and,  tempted  by  the  devil,  steals  either  from  the  rich  or 
from  the  poor,  three,  four,  five,  or  six  francs.  One  day  he  takes 
twelve  francs  from  a  very  rich  prince  ;  but,  a  little  after,  having 
heard  an  eloquent  sermon,  he  makes  a  sincere  confession,  and 
asks  if  he  has  sinned  grievously  in  each  case. 

Qiies.  1.     When  is  there  a  grave  matter  in  a  theft? 

Ques.  2.  Did  Nestor  sin  gravely  in  these  cases,  especially  by 
stealing  twelve  francs  from  a  prince? 

Ans.  Question  1.  According  to  the  common  opinion,  the  mat- 
ter in  a  theft  is  relatively  grave,  but  not  absohitely  in  relation  to 
all;  in  oiher  words,  the  matter  may  be  grave  or  slight  according 
to  the  superior  or  inferior  condition  of  the  victim.  A  theft  of 
five  or  six  francs  constitutes,  according  to  the  probable  opinion, 
rigorously,  a  grave  matter  in  relation  to  the  rich  ;  but  a  less  grave 
matter  is  sufficient  for  a  mortal  sin  if  the  injured  individual  is  of 
inferior  condition.  Thus  a  theft  of  a  franc,  or  half  a  franc,  in 
relation  to  a  poor  person,  may  constitute  a  grave  matter. 

Theologians  generally  pretend,  says  St.  Liguori,  that  there  is  a 
grave  sin  when  the  stealing  is  sufficient  to  feed  a  family  for  a  day, 
according  to  their  condition,  including  food,  clothing,  and  lodg- 
ing. But  this  very  obscure  and  vague  rule  could  not  be  applied 
to  all  thefts.  It  is  necessary  to  determine  a  relatively  grave 
matter  according  to  the  different  conditions  of  men.  ...  It 
seems  that  one  franc  in  relation  to  the  poor,  and  sometimes  less 


214  The  Doctrine  of  /lie  Jesuits, 

for  very  neerly  persons  ;  two  or  three  francs  in  relation  to  work- 
men who  eain  their  living  by  working  by  the  cl.iy  ;  four  or  five 
francs  in  relation  to  people  with  a  competency;  six  or  seven 
francs  for  ordinarily  rich  ones  ;  and  a  little  more  in  relation  to 
very  rich  people.     This  is  the  common  doctrine. 

Ans.  Question  2.  We  can  determine  by  this  the  gravity  of 
Nestor's  sins.  He  has  committed  a  mortal  sin  each  time  he  stole 
six  or  seven  francs,  even  from  the  rich,  and  ten  or  twelve  francs 
from  a  prince.  As  for  his  other  thefts,  he  must  be  questioned,  in 
order  to  clear  up  the  matter,  and  to  be  able  to  apply  the  above 
rules  concerning  the  grave  mjitter.  Moreover,  in  practice,  often 
this  giavity  cannot  be  determined,  and  the  confessor  cannot 
know  if  his  penitent's  sin  is  grievous  or  light.  He  must  then 
depend  on  Divine  justice. 

Case   II. 
Of  Small  Thefts. 

Damase,  a  peasant,  living  on  Gerard's  patrimony,  stole  from 
him  during  several  years,  and  at  several  times  each  year,  either  a 
little  wheat  in  the  harvest  time,  or  a  few  grapes  in  the  vintage 
time.  However,  he  never  had  the  intention  of  keeping  up  his 
evil  course  ;  but  reflecting  that  these  little  thefts  constitute  a 
grave  matter,  he  asks  of  his  confessor  if  he  has  grievously  sinned, 
and  if  he  must  make  restitution  under  grave  penalty. 

Ques.     What  is  to  be  decided  al^out  Damase's  case? 

Ans.  He  has  not  sinned  grievously  if  he  had  no  intention  of 
causing  a  grave  injury  ;  but  he  must  restore,  under  grave  penalty, 
for  he  has  committed  a  grave  wrong,  unless  the  intervals  between 
these  thefts  are  such  that  they  are  not  supposed  to  constitute 
a  grave  matter.     This  supposition  may  be  apj^lied  in  his  case. 

Case  III. 

The  Thefts  of  Children  and  Servants. 

1.  Romaritus,  the  son  of  a  good  family,  stole  from  his  father, 
a  pretty    wealthy   man,  once    eight   francs,  and  after   a   certain 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  L) justice  arid  Theft.        215 

interval,  ten  francs,  by  different  small  thefts  :  he  spent  the  whole  of 
the  money  in  gambling  and  drinking. 

2.  Quirinus,  a  servant,  stole  six  francs  from  his  master,  a  rich 
man,  and  several  months  later  he  committed  several  little  thefts, 
of  food  and  drink.  In  the  same  month,  he  stole  the  value  of  about 
eight  francs. 

Ques.     Did  Romaricus  and  Quirinus  sin  gravely? 

Ans.  As  to  Romaricus,  he  must  not  be  accused  of  a  grave  sin, 
either  in  the  first  or  in  the  second  case.  Not  in  the  first,  because, 
according  to  the  more  probable  opinion,  the  grave  matter  for  the 
cliild  of  an  honorable  family  must  be  ten  francs  ;  neither  in  the 
second  case,  because,  if  ten  francs  constitute  a  grave  sin  for 
Romaricus,  when  he  steals  that  sum  at  one  time,  the  value  of  fif- 
teen francs  in  little  thefts  is  necessary. 

As  for  Quirinus,  he  has  sinned  gravel}'  b}'  stealing  six  francs 
from  his  master,  it  is  the  common  opinion  of  theologians  ;  but  not 
by  committing  small  thefts  of  food,  in  principle,  as  results  from 
what  has  been  said. 

Case  IV. 
Thefts  op  Wives. 

Ger.asine,  the  wife  of  Ludomire,  a  rich  man,  but  close-fisted  and 
grasping,  not  to  say  avaricious,  often  steals  little  sums  from  her 
husband  to  keep  her  poor  and  unfortunate  mother,  though  she  well 
knows  that  her  husband  would  get  angry  if  he  knew  of  it.  She 
steals  also  to  provide  for  future  need  ;  for,  as  she  brought  but  a  very 
small  dowry  and  has  had  no  children  by  Ludomire,  she  foresees 
that,  in  the  case  of  her  husband's  death,  she  will  want  the  neces- 
sar}^  means  for  keeping  her  rank  in  societ}'. 

Ques.     Did  Gera^ne  sin  gravely? 

Ans.  The  prudent  wife  must  not  be  easily  excused,  for  she  has 
overstepped  tlie  limits  of  human  prudence,  and  has  not  trusted 
enough  in  the  goodness  of  divine  Providence.  For  why  such  cal- 
culation in  view  of  an  uncertain  future  time?  Why  does  she  thus 
gather  riches  which  does  not  belong  to  her?  II ow  does  she  know 
tliat  she  will  not  die  before  her  husband,  but  a  long  time  after? 
However,  up  to  a  certain  point  she  must  be  pardoned,  if  her  husband 


216  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

is  old  and  an  invalid,  and  if  it  is  evident  that  he  will  leave  nothing 
at  his  death  to  his  almost  penniless  wife  ;  because,  in  such  circum- 
stances, the  husband  ought  to  think  of  his  wife.  Moreover,  it 
would  not  be  just  to  condemn  a  wife  who,  while  her  husband  would 
squander  his  patrimony,  would  steal  some  money  which  she  would 
keep  for  the  future  need  of  her  children  or  of  herself,  if  she  held 
the  property  in  common  with  the  husband. 

Case  V. 
A  Tailor's  Cleverness. 

Genesius,  a  tailor,  very  skilful  in  his  craft,  knows  how  to  make 
suits  with  less  cloth  than  others,  and  keeps  the  remainder  to 
pay  for  his  skill.  Having  an  order,  from  a  man  of  nobility,  to  buy 
ten  yards  of  cloth  for  the  making  of  a  suit,  he  goes  to  the  dealer 
and  agrees  with  him  for  a  price.  But  unfolding  the  cloth,  he  dis- 
covers a  few  tears  ;  but  calculating  that,  in  spite  of  these,  he  can 
make  the  suit  just  the  same,  he  obtains  a  reduction  of  a  third  on 
the  price  from  the  dealer,  and  asks  the  same  pay  from  his 
customer  for  the  work. 

Ques.     What  is  to  be  thought  of  Genesius? 

Ans.  Our  tailor  can  congratulate  himself  for  his  cleverness, 
without  any  remorse  of  conscience  ;  because  he  has  obtained  a  just 
reduction  from  the  dealer,  and  it  is  owing  to  his  skill  that,  in  spite 
of  the  tears,  it  can  make  a  splendid  suit.  He  does  not  cause  any 
injury  to  his  customer,  for  he  uses  a  cloth  of  good  and  solid 
quality. 

Case  VII. 

The  Innocent  Condemned,  Instead  of  the  Guilty  Oîte. 

Audifax,  in  the  absence  of  Rudolph,  secretl}'  breaks  into  his 
house,  forces  open  the  safe,  takes  three  hundred  pounds,  and  runs 
away.  Rodolph,  coming  back,  is  struck  with  astonishment  at 
seeing  his  safe  open,  and  asceitaining  the  theft  he  gets  angry.  But 
who  is  the  thief?  He  does  not  know.  Soon  he  begins  to  suspect 
Titius,  his  servant.  The  servant  is  arrested  and  put  into  jail. 
Through  unfortunate  circumstances,  grave  suspicions  weigh  upon 
him.     Witnesses  are  foimd,  sayi:^g  that,  ia  the  absence   of   his 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Injustice  and  Theft.        217 

master,  he  was  alone  in  the  house.  TiLius,  frightened,  makes  inco- 
herent and  even  contradictory  answers  to  the  judge.  Accused  of 
thift,  he  is  condemned  to  perpetual  imprisonment.  Audifax, 
tormented  by  remorse  of  conscience,  goes  to  a  priest,  avows  liis 
crime,  and  asks  of  him  what  is  to  be  done  in  such  a  direful 
emergency. 

Ques.  1.  Must  Audifax  deliver  himself  to  justice.  Was  it  his 
duly  to  do  it  before  the  judgment? 

Ques.  2.  Is  he  under  obligation  to  make  reparation  for  the 
wrong  done  to  the  servant? 

Ques.  3.     What  must  be  the  confessor's  answer? 

Ans.  Question  1 .  Here  he  is  brought  by  repentance  to  his  con- 
fessor's feet,  waiting,  full  of  tears,  for  his  sentence.  What  is  the 
duty  of  the  priest?  Shall  he  oblige  his  penitent  to  restore  integ- 
rally for  the  evil  ?  Shall  he  command  him  not  only  to  give  back  the 
stolen  money,  but  also  to  deliver  himself  to  the  judge?  Not  at  all. 
It  is  sufficient  that  he  should  secretly  indemnify  Rodolph,  and  do 
penance  for  his  sin.  I  say  that  Audifax  is  not  under  obligation  to 
deliver  himself,  even  before  the  servant's  sentence  was  pronounced, 
even  though  he  could  have,  by  this  means,  prevented  the  condem- 
nation of  the  innocent.  The  reason  is,  that  Audifax  has  not  been 
the  efficacious  cause  of  the  condemnation,  but  simply  the  occasion, 
the  occasional  cause,  or  the  removed  cause.  Now,  no  one  is  held  to 
repair  an  evil,  if  he  has  not  been  the  true  and  efficacious  cause  of  it. 
Then  .  .  .  The  misfortune  of  tlie  servant  must  be  imputed  to  the 
witnesses'  and  judge's  error  ;  but  Audifax  has  not  been  the  effica- 
cious cause  of  that  error  ;  then  he  is  not  obliged  to  deliver  him- 
self in  order  to  prevent  or  repair  that  evil.  Except  in  the  case 
when  Audifax  would  have  foreseen  that  unhappy  result  in  such 
circumstances,  that  the  accusation  and  condemnation  were  very 
probably  to  strike  the  servant  ;  which  does  not  happen  usually. 

Ans.  Question  2.  No,  according  to  what  has  been  said, 
Audifax  has  not  been  the  cause  of  the  servant's  sentence, 
but  it  is  the  error  of  the  judge.  Then,  he  is  not  obliged  to  make 
reparation.  However,  charity  commands  him  to  deliver  an  inno- 
cent one  from  a  grave  penalty,  if  he  can  do  it  easily,  without  giv- 
ing himself  up. 


218  TJte  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

Ans  Question  3.  Generally,  in  so  great  an  embarassment,  the 
confessor's  advice  will  be  of  little  avail  ;  but  it  would  be  prudent  to 
atlvise  him  to  take  steps  by  himself,  or  through  others,  to  interest 
some  influential  person,  who,  without  divulging  the  case,  could, 
from  the  Chief  of  the  State,  obtain  tlie  release  of  the  innocent  one. 

Case  IX. 
A  Servant's  Ruse. 

Ursani,  a  gourmand,  wants  for  his  table  the  best  of  dishes,  but 
he  does  not  want  to  pay  the  riglit  price  for  the  necessary  pro- 
visions. Being  quick-tempered,  he  has  the  habit  of  getting  angry 
and  blasphemous  at  everythiiig,  if  he  is  not  quickly  obeyed  in 
whatever  he  desires.  His  cook  is  continually  between  the  hammer 
and  the  anvil.  At  last,  she  finds  the  means  to  settle  the  matter. 
She  buys  of  the  best  the  market  offers  at  a  reasonable  price,  and 
feigns  to  her  master  that  she  has  bought  them  cheaper.  In  order 
to  act  so,  she  takes  care  to  carry  about  her  the  necessary  mone}", 
without  her  master's  knowledge. 

Ques.     Does  Suzanne  act  unjustly  towards  her  master? 

Ans.  Suzanne  commits  no  injustice  towards  her  master,  for 
she  cannot  a;  t  otherwise  in  her  situation.  However,  we  advise 
her  to  cease  the  deception  as  soon  as  possible  ;  for  it  is  not  with- 
out danger  and  seduction  ;  especially,  let  her  avoid  lying. 

C\«E   X. 
Secret  Compensation. 

I.  Augustin  is  compelled  b}'  the  judge  to  pay  to  Antony  a 
debt  which  he  has  already  paid.  He  obeys  the  sentence,  but  C(»m- 
pensates  himself  secretly,  b}'  taking  something  from  Antony  when 
the  occasion  offers  itself. 

II.  Albert,  a  servant,  is  engaged  by  Medard  to  enter  his  ser- 
vice ;  he  accepts  without  any  agreement  as  to  salary,  trusting  in 
Medard's  honesty.  The  year  over,  he  receives  wages  inferior  to 
those  of  servants  of  the  same  kind.  So  Albert,  without  any  scru- 
ples, has  recourse  to  secret  compensation,  to  make  up  for  the 
diffvrence  between  his  wages  and  the  leact  ones  of  the  same  order. 

III.  Marc,  another  servant,  attending  to  the  work  of  his  charge, 
breaks  unintentionally  a  ciystal  vase.     His  master,  angry  of  it, 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Injustice  and  Theft.        219 

retains  from  his  wages  the  vakie  of  the  vase.     Marc  indemnifies 
himself  secretly. 

Qiies.  1.  Is  Augustin  warranticl  in  having  recourse  to  such  a 
compensation? 

Qiies.  2.  Also  Albert,  to  complete  the  least  wages  given  to 
such  servants? 

Qiies.  3.  And  Marc,  could  he  make  up  secretly  for  the  reduc- 
tion on  his  wages? 

Ans.  Question  1.  By  natural  right,  Augustin  can  have  recourse 
to  secret  compensation,  if  he  has  no  other  way  t>  get  back  what 
belongs  to  him.  He  causes  no  injuiy  to  Antony,  doing  nothing 
else  but  taking  back  his  own.  Do  not  reproach  the  judge's  sen- 
tence. The  judge  has  no  power  to  give  to  some  one  what  d(jes  not 
belong  to  him  ;  and  his  sentence,  founded  on  an  error  of  facts,  is 
materially  unjust.  Now,  right  cannot  proceed  from  injustice, 
though  material. 

Ans.  Question  2.  Rightly  speaking,  Albert  cannot  be  con- 
demned ;  for,  though  there  is  no  agreement,  he  has  perfect  right 
to  the  lowest  wages  i)aid  to  other  servants.  So,  he  claims  noth- 
ing but  his  just  due. 

Ans.  Question  3.  He  is  not  to  be  condemned  if  he  has  had 
recourse  to  secret  compensation  to  indemnify  himself,  in  the  case 
of  the  involuntary  breaking  of  the  vase,  without  committing  any 
theological  fault  ;  because  no  one  is  obliged  to  repair  an  involun- 
tary misfortune,  except  inwardly,  afier  the  judge's  sentence,  as  we 
shall  see  later  about  unjust  condemnation.  Then,  the  master  has 
no  rglit  to  exact  reparation,  and  the  servant  is  warranted  in  tak- 
ing back  what  he  was  not  obliged  to  pay  for  ;  for  Marc  could  only 
be  obliged  by  his  conscience,  or  b}"  a  judgment.  Now,  there  is  no 
judicial  obligation  in  this  hypothesis,  there  having  been  no  judg- 
ment, nor  any  obligation  of  conscience  ;  for  one  is  obliged  in  con- 
science to  make  restitution  only  when  the  fault  has  been  committed 
with  guilty  intention. 

Case  XI. 
Secret  Compensation. 

Ferdinand  owed  one  iiundred  pounds  to  Aurolius.  Before  tlie 
day  of  the  payment,  Ferdinand  made  a  friendly  cull  at  his  debtor's, 


220  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

and  told  him  he  was  to  send  his  servant  with  the  money  on  the 
next  day.  Aurelius,  full  of  confidence,  gives  a  recei[)t  to  Ferdi- 
nand. Having  received  it,  Ferdinand  rejoices  in  having  found  a 
good  occasion  to  repay  himself  one  hundred  pounds  owed  by  Aur- 
elius' father  to  his  own,  and  which  he  had  never  been  able  to 
prevail  upan  him  to  pay.  Then,  as  Aurelius  claims  his  money, 
Ferdinand  absolutely  refuses  it,  affirming  that  he  will  keep  that 
sum  to  acquit  the  debt  of  Aurelius'  father.  The  creditor  claimed 
in  justice  the  sum,  but  the  debtor  Ferdinand  said  he  had  paid  it, 
and  proved  it  by  showing  the  receipt;  the  unfortunate  creditor 
lost  the  suit,  and  was  condemned  to  i)ay  expenses. 

Ques.  1.  Had  Ferdinand  any  right  to  keep  the  borrowed  money 
and  use  the  receipt  as  he  did  ? 

Ques.  2.     Could  he  swear  that  his  debt  was  paid? 

Ques.  3.  Is  he  under  obligation  to  pay  to  Aurelius  the  expenses 
of  judgment? 

Ans.  Question  1.  Yes,  Ferdinand  was  right  in  keeping  a  bor- 
rowed sum,  and  in  using  the  receipt,  so  skilfully  obtained,  in  order  to 
prove  he  was  clear  with  Aurelius,  because  the  debts  of  both  parties, 
being  equal,  destroy  each  other.  Ferdinand  did  not  act  wrongfully 
by  showing  the  receipt,  for  it  proves  nothing  else  than  that  the 
money  borrowed  by  Ferdinand  from  AureUus  has  been  paid  off, 
which  is  quite  conformable  to  the  truth. 

Ans.  Question  2.  Yes,  also,  according  to  St.  Liguori's  doctrine, 
Ferdinand  can  swear  that  he  has  paid  the  debt,  having  no  other 
means  to  get  it  without  wronging  some  one.  For  he  swears  accord- 
ing to  the  truth  and  for  a  grave  motive,  affirming  under  oath  that 
he  owes  nothing,  this  being  the  truth,  both  debts  cancelling  each 
other.  Then,  nothing  prevents  that  affirmation  for  a  grave  motive 
from  being  confirmed  under  oath. 

Ans.  Question  3.  No,  the  expenses  must  be  paid  hy  the  one 
who  unjustly  arraigned  the  other  before  justice,  and  not  by  the 
gainer.     Then,  Aurelius  alone  must  pay  them. 


Cases  on  ÎÊlestttutton  in  ffieneral 


Case  III. 
Obligatory   Restitution. 

Carpopborius  has  contracted  many  debts,  by  his  high  living  and 
his  luxurious  table  ;  and  his  wife  Bertha  has  contributed  to  it  a 
great  deal.  But  the  husband  died  suddenly,  and  the  creditors 
swooped  down  from  all  parts  on  tlie  unfortunate  widow,  who 
possessed  nothing  from  her  husband  but  a  large  family  and  a 
very  small  fortune.  Slie  asks,  in  tears,  of  her  confessor,  if  she 
is  obliged  to  satisfy  so  many  creditors  with  so  small  a  fortune. 

Ques.  Is  Bertha  obliged  to  pay  the  creditors  out  of  what 
remains? 

Ans.  In  principle,  Bertha  should  be  obliged  to  satisfy  the 
creditors,  even  with  the  little  remainder  left  by  her  liusband  ; 
because,  by  natural  equity,  she  must  indemnify  them.  However, 
as  she  has  a  large  family  and  a  very  small  fortune,  she  must  be 
exempted  from  the  obligation  of  restitution,  at  least  for  a  time, 
until  she  has  become  richer  ;  because  the  moral  powerlessness  in 
which  she  finds  herself  furnishes  her  a  pretext  for  deferring  that 
restitution.  Except  in  a  case  in  which  the  creditors,  or  one  of 
them,  should  be  in  the  same  need  ;  because  then  the  condition 
of  debtor  would  be  the  best. 

Case  V. 

A  Baker  Taken  in  His  Own  Meshes. 

Monica,  having  got  some  bread  at  the  house  of  the  baker 
Rufus,  carries  it  home,  and  peiceives  with  astonishment  that  it  is 
not  of  the  usual  quality  and  quantity.  She  goes  to  the  chief  of 
police  and  explains  her  case.     They  proceed  to  the  baker's,  but 


222  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jtsuits. 

he  pretends  that  he  never  saw  Monica  before.  "Yon  know  me 
very  well,"  says  Monica;  "  do  you  not  remember  that  I  owe  yoa 
eighty  francs.  Here  is  a  bill  you  sent  me  a  fuw  days  ago." 
The  baker  d  nies  again.  "That  is  all  right,"  said  the  police 
oflScer,  "3'ou  do  not  owe  him  anything."  So  snying,  the  latter 
takes  the  bill  and  tears  it  up.  Then  they  come  out  of  the  shop, 
leaving  in  it  a  crestfallen  baker. 

Ques.  1.     Is  Monica  acquitted? 

Ques.  2.  Had  the  police-officer  the  right  to  punish  the  baker 
in  such  a  way? 

Ans.  Question  1.  Yes,  Monica  must  not  be  disturbed,  because 
the  remittance  took  place,  at  least  implicitly,  on  the  baker's  part. 
He  does  not  wish  to  recognize  Monica  ;  then  he  denies  that  she 
is  his  debtor  :  thus  he  implicitly  acquits  her  debt.  He  can  better, 
indeed,  lose  the  money  due,  than  submit  to  a  greater  injury  by  a 
judgment.  For  it  is  sufficient,  in  order  that  there  should  be  a 
true  remittance,  that  the  creditor  should  have  the  integral  posses- 
sion of  the  thing  and  be  willing  to  remit  it.  This  is  just  what 
happened  in  this  case;  and  do  not  say  that  the  baker  acted  by 
Com[)ulsion,  and  that  his  remittance  is  not  valid  :  he  acted  freely, 
under  the  influence  of  a  legitimate  fear,  for  he  was  always  able 
to  choose  some  after  means  :  in  other  words,  avow  his  fault,  and 
be  punished  for  it.  Then  he  has  really  the  tacit  intention  of 
implicitly  discharging  that  debt. 

Ans.  Question  2.  The  officer  acquitted  Monica  in  a  valid  and 
just  manner,  for  he  had  the  right  either  to  punish  the  baker  or 
denounce  him  to  the  judge  ;  but  the  baker  prefers  to  escape  a 
just  vexation  by  remitting  the  debt,  rather  than  suffer  the  penalty. 
Then  the  officer,  satisfied  with  such  a  punishment,  gives  up  his 
right  to  have  a  greater  one  imposed  upon  him  by  a  judgment, 
and  leads  the  guilty  one  to  inflict  a  punishment  on  himself  by 
remittino;  the  debt. 


I 


(Cases  on  tï)e  îëolîicrs  of  ©tïjc.s'  îPropcrtg^ 


Case  VI. 
The  Dishonest  Holder. 

Agathon  makes  this  confession  :  He  stole  a  horse,  bought  for 
two  hundred  francs  by  his  master,  and  sold  the  animal  for  two 
hundred  and  fifty  francs. 

Ques.  Is  it  sufficient  for  him  to  pay  two  hundred  francs  to  the 
horse's  master,  and  keep  fifty  francs  as  payment  for  his  sharp- 
ness ? 

Ans.  Agathon  must  pay  to  his  master  the  money  he  has 
received  ;  unless  he  can  attribute  the  benefit  he  realized  to  his  own 
ability. 

Case  VII. 
The  Possessor  Dishonestly. 

I.  Zachary  stole  a  hundred  pounds  from  Charles.  As  he  is  a 
very  clever  man,  he  used  them  so  effectively  in  business  transac- 
tions that  he  soon  realized  a  notable  gain.  But  later,  wishing  to 
mjike  reparation  for  the  wrong  he  has  caused,  he  asks  of  his  con- 
fessor if  it  is  sufficient  for  him  to  give  back  the  stolen  sum  ;  or 
if  he  is  also  obliged  to  give  up  the  profit  made  with  it. 

II.  Sisinus  stole  from  Titius  a  hen,  worth  fifteen  cents  ;  from 
the  hen  he  gets  a  large  number  of  eggs.  Having  some  of  these 
eggs  hatched,  he  became  the  owner  of  a  number  of  chickens.  He 
sold  some  of  them,  and  kept  the  otliers,  in  order  to  have  more  eggs 
and  more  chickens.  Indeed,  his  thelt  was  a  very  profitable  one. 
But  later,  in  confession,  having  accused  himself  of  it,  he  is 
sentenced  by  the  confessor  to  give  back  hen,  money,  eggs  and 
chickens,  or  their  estimated  value. 


k 


224  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Ques.  1.  Is  Zacbary  obliged  to  restore  the  whole  of  the  profit 
made  with  ihe  stolen  money? 

Ques.  2.  And  Slsinus,  besides  the  hen,  must  he  give  back  the 
profit? 

Ans.  Question  1.  Znchary  is  under  obligation  to  give  back  the 
whole  of  the  profit,  if  the  master  of  the  money  would  have  realized 
a  profit  equal  to  it  ;  for  instance,  if  he  had  used  that  money  in 
business,  which  is  presumable  when  the  owner  of  the  money  is  a 
merchant  ;  or  some  one  using  his  money  in  that  way.  In  the  con- 
trary case,  Zachary  would  not  be  obliged  to  restore  the  gain, 
because  it  might  be  called  the  result  of  his  cleverness. 

Ans.  Question  2.  It  is  sufficient  for  Sisinus  to  give  back  the 
value  of  the  hen.  In  an  absolute  manner,  rigoroussl}',  he  ought  to 
restore  the  whole  of  the  profit,  deducting  expenses  ;  because  the 
thing  is  profitable  to  the  master,  and  the  latter  might  have  made 
all  the  profit  himself  from  his  hen.  However,  moraliter  loquendo, 
when  it  is  a  question  of  the  theft  of  a  common  object  of  little 
importance,  it  is  sufficient  to  restore  its  value  ;  for,  according  to 
the  common  appreciation,  the  master  suflE'ered  no  other  wrong  tiian 
the  value  of  the  hen  belonging  to  him  ;  for,  if  he  had  the  intention 
of  getting  another  hen,  he  could  procure  it  very  easily. 


Cases  on  aEroug  ^anjustlg  Bone. 


Case  I. 
A  Guilty  Man,  Though  Being  in  the  Right. 

Zephirin  made  a  deep  excavation  in  his  field,  in  order  to  get 
sand  therefrom.  He  knows  that  Andrea  very  often  passes  that 
way  duriug  the  night,  but  he  does  not  warn  him  of  the  danger. 
Andrea  falls  into  the  hole  and  breaks  his  leg  ;  so  he  cannot  attend 
to  his  work  for  two  or  three  months. 

Ques.     Is  Zephirin  obliged  to  pay  for  thé  accident? 

Ans.  Zephirin  has  sinned  gravely  against  charity  by  not 
warning  Andrea,  but  not  at  all  against  justice  ;  for  he  had  a  just 
motive  for  digging  a  hole  in  his  field.  (Then,  he  owes  no  repara- 
tion.) 

Case  II. 
Threat  to  Denounce  a  Guilty  One. 

Eligius  surprises  Caius  in  the  very  act  of  committing  a  theft. 
He  threatens  to  denounce  him,  if  the  latter  does  not  give  him  one 
dollar.     Caius  pays  it,  in  order  to  avoid  the  denunciation. 

Ques.  Can  Eligius  keep  that  money  either  :  1,  if  he  meant 
seriously  to  denounce  Caius  ;  or,  2,  if  it  was  only  to  frighten  him? 

Ans.  1.  Yes,  if  hé  means  to  denounce  him;  because  any  citi- 
zen has  the  right  to  denounce  an  offender  for  the  public  interest, 
and  consequently  to  receive  something  to  give  up  that  right. 

2.  Yes,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion,  though  Eligius 
only  made  believe.  The  reason  here  is,  that  he  has  the  right  to 
accuse  him,  and  gives  up  that  right,  which  is  payable.  Then, 
Eligius  has  justly  received  the  money. 


226  Tlie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

Case  J II. 
The  Oxe  Doing  Wrong  in  Spite  of  Himself. 

Medarcl  enters  a  shop,  with  two  friends  of  his,  to  buy  something. 
While  lie  is  bargaining,  he  steals  a  gold  watch  from  a  tray, 
believing  it  was  a  copper  one.  Coming  home,  he  looks  at  it  and 
perceives  that  it  is  gold.  However,  he  does  not  keep  it  long  ;  for 
the  very  same  day  he  lost  it,  taking  a  walk  about  town.  A  little 
later,  Medard,  struck  by  repentance,  wishes  to  make  restitution, 
but  only  of  the  value  he  put  on  the  watch  when  he  stole  it. 

Ques.  1.  Are  we  obliged  to  make  restitution  for  the  whole 
value  of  a  stolen  object,  if  we  thought,  b}'  an  invincible  error,  that 
the  object  was  of  a  less  value  when  it  was  stolen  ? 

Ques.  2.  What  must  Medard  do  in  this  case?  Must  he  restore 
the  full  value,  or  only  part  of  it? 

Ans.  Question  1.  There  is  controversy.  According  to  the 
more  probable  opinion,,  the  one  who  caused  the  wrong  is  obliged 
to  repair  only  the  wrong  he  thought  he  had  done,  provided  there 
is  an  invincible  error  ;  inasmuch  as  there  is  no  theological  fault 
relatively  to  the  surplus  of  the  wrong,  that  is  to  say,  of  an  ignored 
wrong,  such  a  surplus  not  being  at  all  voluntary,  and  not  being 
likened  to  an  injustice  properly  so  called. 

Ans.  Question  2.  Medard  is  under  obligation  to  restore  the 
full  value  of  the  gold  watch  ;  because  it  is  hardly  presumable  that 
he  thought  it  was  certainly  a  copper  one  ;  for  there  was  too  much 
haste  in  the  theft  to  form  a  sure  conviction  on  that  subject.  .   .   . 

But  if  Medard  had  been,  from  the  first,  in  a  truly  invincible 
error  on  the  subject  of  the  watch's  value,  and  if,  later,  having 
recognized  its  full  value,  and  having  formed  the  resolution  to 
restore  it  immediately,  he  was  prevented  by  some  involuntaiy 
cause  ;  and  if,  during  this  time,  he  had  lost  it, — in  this  hypo- 
thesis, according  to  the  probable  opinion,  Medard  should  be 
dispensed  from  refunding  the  surplus  value  unknown  at  the  time 
of  the  theft  ;  for  he  would  have  exposed  on  his  side  the  probable 
opinion  in  the  answer  to  the  first  question. 


Cases  on    Wrong    Unjastlj  Done.  227 

Case  V. 
Prevented  Benefaction. 

Gaston  had  made  a  will  in  favor  of  r  abien,  his  nephew.  But 
another  nephew,  Florian,  tells  the  uncle  that  Fabien  has  on 
several  occasions  spoken  very  irreverently  of  him.  The  angry 
testator  tears  up  his  will,  makes  Florian  his  heir,  and  dies  soon 
after. 

Qiies.     Must  Florian  restore  the  inheritance  to  Fabien? 

Ans.  Yes,  in  principle  ;  because  Florian,  through  unjust  means, 
defamation  and  calumny,  has  deprived  Fabien  of  his  inheritance; 
for  Fabien,  as  it  appears,  would  have  certainly  obtained  it,  being 
already  made  the  heir  ;  and  his  uncle,  dying  soon  after,  it  is  not 
to  be  presumed  that  he  would  have  changed  his  mind.  But  the 
answer  would  be  different  if  Florian,  instead  of  being  induced  by 
hate  or  cupidity,  had  shown  to  Gaston,  equitably,  or  for  a  reason- 
able motive,  grave  defects,  which  would  have  demonstrated  that 
FaHoien  was  to  be  judged  quite  unworthy  of  the  inheritance. 

Case  VII. 

Lamentable  Error. 

Phileas,  a  seminarist,  blinded  by  human  weal^ness,  commits  a 
grave  larceny  in  the  seminary;  Albin,  his  comrade,  suspected 
and  accused  of  it,  is  turned  out  of  the  seminary.  Another  mis- 
fortune befalls  him  ;  drawing  an  unlucky  number,  he  is  obliged 
to  go  to  the  army  ;  however,  he  buys  a  substitute  for  two 
thousand  francs.  As  for  Phileas,  as  soon  as  he  knew  of  the 
accusation  intended  to  Albin,  full  of  repentance,  he  secretly 
restores  the  stolen  money,  and  confesses  his  fault  to  another 
priest  than  his  usual  confessor,  without  mentioning  Albin's  case. 
Later,  a  remorseful  conscience  induces  him  to  tell  everything 
to  his  usual  confessor,  who  obliges  him  to  repair  all  the  wrong 
done  to  Albin,  obliged  to  pay  for  a  substitute  ;  because  Phileas 
might  have  easily  overcome  the  difficulty,  even  in  not  denouncing 
himself,  by  informing  the  superior  of  his  fault,  either  through  his 
confessor  or  some  other  prudent  person. 


228  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Ques.  1.  What  ought  to  be  said  about  Pbileas'  first  con- 
fession ? 

Qiies.  2.  Has  Phileas  sinned  gravely  against  justice  and 
charity? 

Ans.  Question  1.  There  is  nothing  to  reprove  in  Phileas'  first 
confession.  .  .  .  No  matter  if  he  has  kept  silence  concerning  the 
circumstance  relating  to  Albin.   .   .   . 

Ans.  Question  2.  Phileas  has  sinned  gravely  against  charity, 
in  principle,  if  he  has  thought  this  the  easy  way  to  defend  his 
fellow-student.  For  one  is  «held  by  charity  to  prevent  the  wrong 
experienced  by  another,  when  one  can  do  so  easily. 

But  he  has  not  sinned  against  justice  ;  because  he  has  not  been 
the  efficacious  cause,  but  only  the  occasion  of  Albiu's  misfortune. 
Then  he  has  been  unjustly  condemned  by  his  confessor  to  make 
reparation.  ...  It  results  upon  the  whole,  that  he  has  sinned 
against  charity,  but  not  against  justice. 

Case  IX. 
Mistake  in  the  Wrong  Done  bt  Some  One. 

I.  Codes,  rising  up  during  the  night,  with  the  intention  of 
ravaging  his  enemy's  vineyard,  makes  a  mistake,  in  the  darkness, 
and  ravages  that  of  his  friend  Lucius. 

II.  Curtius  gives  to  Didyme,  who  asks  drink  of  him,  a  poisoned 
beverage,  with  the  intention  of  killing  him.  Julius,  who  was 
present,  in  joking,  took  the  cup,  drank  the  whole  of  it,  and  died 
soon  after.* 

Ques.   1.     Shall  the  one  who  does  the  injury  be  held  to  make 
reparation  for  the  evil  he  has  committed  without  any  intention  ? 
Ques.  2.     Must  Curtius  indemnify  Julius'  unhappy  family? 

*  Gury  has  not  even  had  the  deplorable  merit  of  Inventing  this  infamy. 
He  took  it  from  Lacroix:  '*If  Caius  has  poisoned  wine,  and  pat  it  l)efore 
Senipronius  with  tlie  intention  of  killing  him  ;  and  supposin»^  tiiat  Titiiis, 
having  no  kuowled2,e  abont  it,  drinks  the  wine  antl  dies,  and  tliat  Cains 
allows  him  to  do  it  through  fear  of  revealing  his  crime, — in  this  case 
Caius  is  not  a  murderer,  and  he  is  not  obliged  to  repair  the  harm  which 
resulted  in  the  death  of  Titius;  because  the  death  of  Titius  is  not  the 
voluntary  woik  of  Cains,  who  could  not  foresee  the  case,  and  was  not 
obliged  to  advise  Titius  that  the  beverage  v»'as  poisoned."     (rage  443.) 


Cases  on    Wrong    Unjustly  Done.  229 

Ques.  3.  Should  Codes  be  lielcl  to  repair  the  damage  which  he 
has  caused  to  Lucius'  vineyard  ? 

Ans.  Question  1.  1.  No,  if  he  has  not  foreseen  the  evil,  even 
confusedly  ;  because  then  the  evil  committed  is  not  a  voluntary  act 
of  the  author,  and  cannot  be  imputed  to  him.  For  instance, 
Titius  wishes  to  kill  Peter,  his  enemy,  whom  he  believes  is  alone  ; 
but  without  injuring  Peter  he  kills  Paul,  whom  he  did  not  see,  and 
whom  he  had  no  suspicions  of  finding  there.  Titius  is  not  obliged 
to  indemnify  the  family  of  Paul  ;  because  the  homicide  was  only 
fortuitous,  and  not  at  all  voluntary. 

2.  But  if  he  wishes  only  to  destroy  an  object,  or  to  deface  it, 
thinking  it  belongs  to  his  enemy  Paul,  when  it  is  Peter's  property, 
in  this  case  he  is  held  to  repair  the  damage  ;  because  he  was 
willing  to  destrov  a  determined  object. 

However,  St.  Liguori  looks  upon  the  contrary  opinion  as  prob- 
able, with  Lugo,  etc. 

Ans.  Question  2.  Codes  seems  to  be  held  to  repair  the  damage, 
at  least  according  to  the  common  and  probable  opinion,  as  it  was 
said  above.  However,  according  to  St.  Liguori's  opinion,  we  can- 
not constrain  Codes  to  make  reparation. 

Ans.  Question  3.  Curtius  is  not  obliged  to  repair  the  evil,  if  he 
was  able  to  prevent  Julius  from  drinking  the  poisoned  wine  ; 
neither  to  avow  his  crime,  nor  to  run  the  danger  of  death.  The 
reason  of  that  is  ;  Julius'  death  was  not  the  effect  of  Casius'  will  ; 
because  he  has  not  foreseen  the  case,  and  he  was  not  obliged  to 
run  into  danger  of  sure  death  to  prevent  a  wrong  which  he  did  not 
foresee.  Then  it  is  only  by  accident,  and  against  Curtius'  will, 
that  Julius'  death  has  happened.  Therefore,  Curtius  has  not  been 
the  cflficacious  cause,  but  the  simple  occasion  ;  since  Julius  killed 
himself  in  drinking  a  beverage  which  was  not  prepared  for  him. 

Case  X. 

Mistake  in  the  Wrong  Done  by  Some  One. 

Lupien,  in  seeking  for  a  way  to  wrong  his  enemy  Sylvain,  finds 
Sylvain's  calf  feeding  in  his  master's  field,  and  immediately  shoots 


230  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits.  - 

at  him  ;  but  instead  of  the  calf,  he  kills  the  marshal's  ox  grazing 
behind  a  hedge. 

Ques.  Must  Lupien  repair  the  damage  he  has  done  by  uninten- 
tionally killing  the  ox?  Quid. —  If  the  ox  and  calf  were  the 
property  of  the  same  person? 

Ans.  Lupien  cannot  be  held  to  repair  the  damage  resulting 
from  the  death  of  the  ox  ;  because  he  had  no  intention  of  killing 
him,  and  by  no  means  could  he  foresee  this  misfortune.  He  owes 
nothing,  either  for  the  calf  which  is  uninjured,  or  for  the  ox  ; 
because  he  killed  him  unintentionally,  and  without  foreseeing. 
But,  what  if  both  animals  had  belonged  to  the  same  master?  The 
solution  ought  to  be  the  same  ;  for  it  would  remain  true  that  the 
evil  was  not  foreseen. 

Case  XI. 
The  Fashionable  Novice. 

Simplicius,  young,  fashionable,  beardless,  joyful,  arrives  at 
Paris,  with  the  intention  of  amusing  himself.  Everything  pleases 
him,  and  in  his  happiness  he  smiles  at  everything.  He  had  not 
yet,  the  imprudent  youth,  experienced  the  uncertainty  of  human 
things.  One  day  he  hires  a  beautiful  horse,  in  order  to  give  him- 
self a  ride  on  horseback,  his  greatest  pleasure.  All  yield  to  him 
instantly  ;  everybody  looks  and  admires  him.  But  alas  !  he 
scarcely  arrives  in  the  suburb,  when  two  men,  dressed  in  black 
suits,  like  sheriff's  officers,  summoned  him,  by  saying:  ''Hallo! 
friend,  stop,  that  horse  does  not  belong  t^  you."  ''That  is  true," 
answers  Simplicius,  astonished;  "he  does  not  belong  to  me:  I 
hired  him."  '-Well,  well,"  reply  the  men  dressed  in  black,  '"we 
know  it  ;  we  must  seize  him  on  account  of  a  judgment,  with  all  his 
master's  goods,  in  order  to  pay  the  creditors."  At  these  words 
the  men  take  the  horse,  and  run  away.  Sheepish  and  raging,  our 
fashionable  comes  back  on  foot,  and  tells  the  stor}'  to  the  owner  of 
the  horse  ;  who,  astounded,  gots  out  of  temper,  and  exacts  from 
Simplicius  the  price  of  the  horse. 

Qies.  Is  Sim[)liciu3  obliged  to  pay,  before  judgment,  the 
value  of  tl:e  horse? 


Cases  on    Wrong    Unjustly  Done.  231 

Ans.  What  must  we  decide. on  the  subject  of  our  fashionable? 
Shall  we  condemn  him  to  pay  for  the  horse?  Do  not  hasten  to 
resolve  the  difficult}-.  You  see  this  poor  fellow  punished  enough 
bv  his  misfortune.  A  young  man  without  any  experience,  deceived 
l)y  so  much  knavishness  ;  does  it  not  appear  to  you  that  our  pity 
will  be  better  for  him  than  condemnation?  But  will  j'ou  acquit 
him?  You  hear  the  indignant  master  cry  out,  complain,  vocifer- 
ate, and  protest  against  your  sentence.  Then,  there  is  a  grave  law- 
suit to  debate.  What  will  Themis  do,  who  is  impartial?  Who 
shall  be  favored?  And  you,  what  do  you  decide?  If  j'ou  will 
believe  me,  before  the  sentence  of  the  judge,  we  must  forgive 
Simplicius.  You  are  astonished  at  it,  looking  for  the  justice  in 
this  solution.  Listen  a  little.  The  solution  is  derived  by  itself 
from  principles.  Because  one  cannot  constrain  to  make  repara- 
tion, in  conscience,  only  when  a  theological  and  grave  fault  exists, 
in  a  grave  matter.  Now,  who  will  accuse  Simplicius  of  a  grave 
theological  fault?  Kobody,  assuredly;  then  his  cause  is  gained. 
But,  will  you  say  he  is  foolish  because  he  acted  foolishly?  Then, 
if  he  is  silly,  he  has  not  sinned  gravely,  and  he  is  not  held  to  make 
reparation.  But,  sa}'  you,  he  ought  to  have  paid  attention  to  the 
knavishness  of  the  thieves  ;  then  he  is  guilty. 

He  ought,  that  is  true,  if  he  had  been  thinking  of  it,  and  if  he 
suspected  the  ruse  before  a  certain  point  ;  now,  it  is  contrarj-  to 
the  hypothesis.  Therefore  we  must  acquit  Simplicius;  at  least, 
according  to  the  more  probable  opinion. 

Case   XII. 

A  Hare  for  One  Sou. 

Georgias,  a  peasant,  meets  two  soldiers  in  his  way,  and  offers  to 
sell  them  a  hare  that  he  has  just  killed.  For  a  joke,  the  soldiers 
pretend  to  be  willing  to  buy  such  beautiful  game.  Immediately 
they  show  to  the  hunter  a  new  sou,  brilliant  as  a  louis.  Deceived 
by  its  appearance,  and  thinking  it  is  a  louis,  Georgias  is  ready  to 
give  them  back  the  remainder  of  the  value  in  change.  ''Keep  all, 
friend,"  say  the  soldiers.  Tlie  peasant,  lea[)ing  with  joy,  immedi- 
ately runs  away.     "Hi  !  down  there,  come,  come,"  cry  out  the 


232  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits» 

soldiers  with  all  the  strength  of  their  lungs.  But  the  peasant  turns 
a  deaf  ear:  the  more  he  hears  them  cry,  the  faster  he  runs,  and 
the  soldiers  cannot  stop  him,  nor  catch  him  by  any  means.  What 
is  to  be  done  with  the  hare?  It  is  easy  to  settle  the  difficulty  ;  we 
will  eat  him,  so  it  will  not  be  lost.  The  hare  was  scarcely  swal- 
lowed, when  the  poor  peasant,  having  perceived  his  mistake,  comes 
to  the  barracks  and  claims  more  money.  "My  friend,"  say  the 
soldiers,  "you  are- come  too  late  ;  we  had  no  intention  of  buying  a 
hare,  we  had  not  monej^  enough  ;  we  have  eaten  him  to  3'our  health. 
You  were  not  willing  to  hearken  to  our  call  ;  then,  leave  us  in 
peace." 

Ques.     Should  the  soldiers  be  held  to  make  restitution  ? 

Ans.  No,  in  principle.  In  this  case  we  must  apply  the  rules  of 
the  possessor  of  good  faith.  Because,  in  this  hypothesis,  the  sol- 
diers being  unable  to  find,  and  not  able  to  wait  for  him,  regarded 
the  hare  as  an  abandoned  object,  and  ate  him.  Therefore  they 
have  neither  the  hare  nor  the  price  of  him,  and  are  no  richer  than 
before.     They  must  make  no  restitution. 


Cases  on  Co=©}jerati0n  in  ©rîïcr  to  Injure  ©tljers^ 


Case  I. 
The  One  Wno  Commands. — The  Employer. 

I.  Castor  bas  commanded  Pestus,  his  servant,  to  steal  some 
money  from  Jacob  ;  the  servant  takes  more,  and  keeps  the  surplus 
for  himself. 

II.  Another  time,  moved  by  a  desire  to  revenge  himself,  he 
commands  Caius,  another  servant,  to  crush  the  shrubbery  in 
Paul's  field.  Caius  goes  out  in  order  to  obey,  but  he  makes 
a  mistake  and  spoils  John's  field,  which  is  adjacent  to  Paul's. 

Ques.  1.  Should  Castor  be  held  to  make  restitution  for  the 
surplus  of  the  tlieft  committed  by  his  servant? 

Ques.  2.  Should  he  repair  the  damage  made  bj'  his  proxy's 
error  in  the  second  case  ? 

Ans.  Question  1.  Castor  cannot  be  held  to  give  back  anything 
for  the  surplus  of  the  theft,  because  that  surplus  results  not  from 
the  eflScacy  of  the  order,  but  from  the  proxy's  own  will.  Except 
the  case  where  he  should  have  foreseen  that  his  servant  would 
exceed  his  orders  ;  because  then,  in  employing  as  proxy  such  a 
man,  he  is  supposed  to  be  responsible  for  the  damages  caused 
by  him. 

Ans.  Question  2.  No,  because  the  damage  must  be  attributed 
to  the  proxy  only,  and  not  to  the  employer  ;  there  is  no  mistake, 
only  on  the  part  of  the  proxy,  who,  consequently  is  obliged  to 
repair  the  damage. 

Case  II. 

The  Employer. 

Leon  commands  Titius  to  steal  at  night  some  fruits  from 
Baudouin's  fiehl  ;  but^the  poor  fellow,  caught  by  the  proprietor's 


234  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

servants,  is  beaten,  robbed,  barely  escapes,  falls  into  a  ditch  and 
breaks  his  arm. 

Qups.  Ought  Leon  to  repair  the  injury  which  has  happened  to 
Tiiius? 

Ans.  Leon  is  responsible  for  the  injury  fell  by  Titius,  by  the 
blows  of  Baudoiiiu's  servants,  because  he  could  have  easily  fore- 
seen this  evil  in  a  confused  manner.  But  he  is  not  held  to  repair 
the  other  injuries  suffered  bj"  Titius  ])eing  robbed,  and  breaking 
liis  arm  by  falling  into  a  ditch,  because  he  could  not  have  fore- 
seen them. 

Case  IV. 

The  One  Who  Advises. 

Rifax,  seeing  Bazile's  shop  open,  in  the  absence  of  his 
master,  says  to  Lucius:  "If  3'ou  were  to  steal  something  from 
Bazile,  nobody  would  see  you."  Upon  this,  Lucius  immediately 
steals  several  articles. 

Ques.  Is  Rifax  obliged  to  make  restitution,  if  Lucius  does 
not? 

Ans.  No,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion.  Rifax  is 
not  held  to  make  restitution,  because  he  has  been  only  the  occa- 
sion and  not  the  cause  of  the  wrong,  for  he  has  given  neither 
order  nor  advice  ;  one  cannot  explain  what  kind  of  influence  he 
has  had,  for  he  simply  indicated  the  thing,  without  attempting  to 
induce  his  comrade  to  steal.  Therefore,  he  has  not  had  any 
eflScacious  influence  in  the  wrong. 

Case  V. 
The  One  Who  Consents. 

Philetus  brings  an  action  against  Rufus.  The  judges,  five  in 
number,  bribed  with  the  presents  of  Philetus,  gives  him  the  case, 
contrary  to  equity.  But  two  judges  who  did  not  vote  in  the  last 
place,  maintain  they  are  not  obliged  to  make  restitution  ;  because, 
as  they  say,  although  they  gave  their  consent  to  the  injustice,  their 
influence  was  not  the  cause  of  it. 

Ques.     Are  the  said  judges  held  to  make  restitution? 


Cases  on  Co-Ojieration  in  Order  to  Injure  Others,     235 

Ans.  The  last  two  judges,  like  the  others,  sinned  gravely 
against  justice,  and  are  held  to  make  reparation  jointly  and 
severally,  if  they  have  voted  secretly  ;  because,  in  that  case,  there 
lias  been  only  one  unjust  common  action,  and  we  do  not  distin- 
guish the  former  from  the  latter.  Yet,  if  they  have  voted  pub- 
licly, openly,  they  ought  to  be  dispensed,  according  to  the  probable 
opinion,  of  an  injustice  effective  and  efficacious;  because  it  does  not 
appear  that  they  are  the  cause  of  the  injustice  already  sufficiently 
prepared  and  determined  by  the  others. 

Case  VI. 
The  One  Who  Consents. 

Sylvie,  Marins'  wife,  approves  the  conduct  of  her  husband  when 
he  mingles  wheat  of  an  inferior  quality  with  a  superior  one.  The 
mistake  cannot  be  perceived,  and  he  sells  the  whole  as  wheat  of 
first  quality. 

Ques.  Does  Sylvie  take  part  in  the  injustice  committed  by  her 
husband? 

Ans.  No,  if  she  has  only  sanctioned  or  ratified  this  injustice  ; 
provided  she  does  not  incite  her  husband  to  do  so  again. 

Case  XL 
Negative  Co-Operation. 

1.  Baldus,  the  father  of  a  family,  either  b}'  a  grave  careless- 
ness or  by  silence,  though  seeing  the  wrong,  or  by  indolence,  did 
not  prevent  the  injury  done  to  his  neighbors,  by  his  wife,  children, 
or  servants,  although  he  could  easily  have  prevented  it. 

When  asked  to  make  reparation  for  the  damage  done,  he 
answers  calmly  :  "  I  have  not  wronged  any  one.'*  His  youngest 
son  having  broken  a  precious  vase  which  belongs  to  Caprasius, 
the  latter  calls  at  Baldus'  in  order  to  claim  the  price  of  the  vase. 
Baldus  turns  him  out  of  his  house  with  a  pitchfork. 

2.  Sabellus  had  intrusted  his  flock  to  the  care  of  the  shepherd 
Tityre.  At  one  time  the  shepherd  being  sound  asleep,  at  another 
having  been  tied  to  a  tree  against  his  will,  by  his  comrades,  who 


236  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

were  amusing  themselves,  the  flock  spoil  the  field  of  Hilariusj 
who  asks  Sabellus  to  make  reparation. 

Ques.     What  must  we  think  of  Baldus  and  Sabellus? 

Ans.  1.  Baldus  is  not  held  to  repair  the  damages  committed 
b}-  his  family,  before  the  judgment,  although  he  is  gravely  culpable. 
But  the  manner  in  which  he  turned  Caprasius  away  will  appear 
justly  too  boorish. 

2.  Sabellus  is  not  held  in  any  case,  before  the  judgment,  to 
repair  the  damages  caused  to  HLlarius.  More  than  that,  for  the 
damage  committed  in  the  last  case,  the  jadges  can  condemn  neither 
Tityre  nor  Sabellus  ;  because  the  shepherd  was  not  free  at  all. 

Case  XIII. 
Negative  Co-Operation. 

Janvier,  a  tailor  workman,  laboring  in  his  master's  shop  with 
two  comrades  younger  than  himself,  steals  some  golden  and  silver 
remnants,  coming  from  the  clothing  of  a  nobleman,  unconscious 
that  his  master  sees  him.  The  other  two  workmen  seeing  this, 
immediately  follow  his  example.  Although  their  thefts,  considered 
separately,  do  not  constitute  a  grave  matter,  on  account  of  Jan- 
vier's theft,  however,  united  together,  they  doubtless  make  a 
notable  matter. 

Ques.  1.     Have  the  youngest  workmen  sinned  against  justice? 

Ques.  2.     What  should  we  say  about  the  older  one,  Janvier? 

Ans.  Question  1.  The  two  youngest  workmen  have  not  sinned 
gravely,  but  only  slightly  against  justice  ;  because  each  one  of 
them  has  committed  only  a  slight  theft.   .   .   . 

Ans.  Question  2.  And  Janvier  also  has  not  sinned  gravely 
against  justice,  at  least  has  not  caused  an  unjust  injury,  and  con- 
sequently he  is  not  held  jointly  and  severally  to  make  restitution  ; 
because,  like  the  others,  he  has  only  committed  a  slight  theft,  and 
is  not  the  efficacious  moral  cause  of  the  theft  of  tiie  others,  but 
only  the  occasion,  at  least,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion. 


Cases  on  Co- Operation  in  Order  to  Injure  Others.     237 

Case  XIV. 
The  One  Who  Says  Nothing. 

Canut  sees  a  thief  taking  away  some  wheat  from  Paul's  field. 
He  does  not  oppose  it  nor  cry  out,  though  it  is  easy  for  him  to 
prevent  the  theft.  More  than  that,  far  from  stopping  or  denounc- 
ing the  thief,  he  receives  money  from  him,  in  order  to  keep 
silence  in  the  matter.  But  when  he  goes  to  confession  his  confes- 
sor accuses  him  of  a  grave  sin,  and  obliges  him,  at  the  same  time, 
to  give  to  the  poor  the  money  he  has  received,  and  to  repair  the 
wrong  done  to  Paul. 

Ques.  1.     Has  Canut  sinned  gravely  in  not  preventing  the  theft? 

Ques.  2.     Is  he  obliged  to  make  restitution  to  Paul? 

Qucs.  3.  Shall  he  give  the  money  he  has  received  from  the 
thiel  to  the  poor,  give  it  back  to  the  thief,  or  keep  it  for  himself? 

Ans.  Question  1.  1.  Canut  assuredly  has  sinned  gravely 
against  charity  in  taking  care  not  to  cry  out  or  stop  the  thief, 
although  duty  would  not  require  him  to  defend  Paul's  field  ; 
because  every  one  of  us  is  held  by  the  general  precept  of  charity 
to  prevent  evil  to  another,  whenever  we  can  do  it  easily  without  a 
serious  prejudice  for  us. 

2.  But  Canut  has  not  sinned  against  justice  in  accepting  money 
for  his  silence,  if  the  theft  was  already  consummated  ;  because,  in 
promising  to  be  silent,  he  has  not  been  the  efficacious  cause  of  the 
theft  ;  he  has  not  defended  the  thief,  but  has  only  defended  him 
against  an  accusation  of  theft,  against  the  danger  of  incurring  a 
penalty,  and  consequently  he  cannot  have  an  influence  upon  the 
theft,  as  an  efficacious  cause.  It  would  be  otherwise  if  he  had 
received  some  money  before  the  execution  of  the  theft,  so  as  to 
protect  the  thief. 

Ans.  Question  2.  Canut  must  make  restitution  to  Paul,  as  hav- 
ing participated  of  an  efficacious  manner  in  the  theft,  if  he  has 
received  money  from  the  thief  before  the  act,  in  order  to  protect 
him  to  such  a  degree  that  he  ma}^  have  a  stronger  passion  for 
stealing.  And  in  this  case  Canut  must  repair  the  wrong,  instead 
of  the  thief.     With  still  more  reason  one  would  accuse   him  of 


I 


238  Tite  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

having  participated  ia  the  theft,  if  he  had  received  some  money  in 
order  to  keep  watch,  or  to  protect  the  escape  of  tlie  thief. 

Ans.  Question  3.  If  Canut  has  not  contributed  t  >  the  tlieft, — 
for  instance,  if  he  has  received  the  money  after  the  theft  was 
accomplished,  for  his  silence,  and  not  to  denounce  t)ie  thief, —  he 
can  keep  back  the  money;  because  a  contract  weighing  upon  an 
indifferent  thing  is  valid.  But  if,  in  receiving  some  money  before 
the  theft,  he  has  protected  the  thief,  and  has  made  him  more 
ardent,  according  to  a  great  many  theologians,  he  ought  to  give 
back  the  money  to  the  thief  himself  ;  because  then  the  contract  is 
void,  as  countenancing  an  unjust  thing.  But,  according  to  ver}^ 
many  others,  Canut  would  participate  in  the  theft,  even  in  prom- 
ising to  keep  silence  ;  nevertheless  he  could  keep  the  money  afler 
the  theft,  as  a  reward  for  the  service  given  to  the  thief. 


erases  on  tl}e  ffi^trcumstances  of  îacstttution. 


Case  I. 
Joint   Responsibility. 


Meliton,  seeing  two  men  stealing  a  bale  of  goods,  joins  lii-nself 
to  tliem,  helps  them  to  carry  tiie  load,  and  receives  his  part  of  lh3 
plunder.  Another  time,  knowing  that  three  men  go  in  order  to 
set  Damien's  barn  on  fire,  he  also  goes,  and  sets  the  fire  wilh 
them. 

Qiies.  Ought  Meliton  to  make  restitution  of  the  whole  if  the 
others  do  not  return  their  shares,  in  the  matter  of  the  bale  and 
fire? 

Ans.  One  ought  to  dispense  Meliton  from  a  joint  and  sever.d 
liability  restitution:  1,  He  is  not  to  be  held  to  it  for  the  bale, 
because  then  his  co-operation  was  not  necessary  for  the  cause  of 
the  prejudice,  inasmuch  as  the  other  thieves  were  carrying  away 
the  bale  without  his  aid.  2,  Nor  for  the  fire,  at  least  according  to 
the  probable  opinion  ;  because,  although  his  action  might  have  been 
sufficient  to  occasion  the  damage,  it  was,  however,  only  a  partial 
influence,  seeing  that  it  cannot  be  called  either  necessary  or 
common. 

Case  V. 

Time  of  Restitution. 

Mirocles,  on  account  of  being  obliged  to  provide  for  his  parents, 
has  postponed  for  a  notable  time  the  payment  of  certain  damages 
and  debts  which  he  has  contracted.  At  the  death  of  his  parents, 
as  he  goes  to  pay  his  creditors,  he  learns  that,  in  consequence  of 
this  delay,  they  have  suffered  a  loss  of  gain,  and  that  a  great 
injury  has  resulted  from  it.  .  .  . 


210  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Ques.  Sliould  Mirocles  repair  the  injury  caused  to  bis  creditors 
by  this  delay? 

Ans.  1.  No,  he  ought  not  to  repair  it,  because  this  delay  was 
neither  voluntary  nor  culpable. 

2.  And  he  even  ought  not  to  repair  the  injury  resulting  from 
the  delay  in  the  payment  which  he  was  to  make  for  damages,  be- 
cause this  prejudice  did  not  result,  properly  speaking,  from  an 
offence,  and  was  not  foreseen. 

Case  X. 

Causes  which  Dispense    with  Restitution. 

Mayloire,  overwhelmed  by  debts,  in  consequence  of  hard  times, 
has  not  more  than  six  thousand  francs,  which  he  needs  to  support 
himself  and  famil3^  especially  an  insane  son. 

Ques.     Is  Mayloire  released  from  obligation  to  pay  his  debts? 

Ans.  Mayloire  ought  to  be  easily  excused  from  making  resti- 
tution. But  in  this  case  it  is  difficult  iu  theory  to  give  a  sure  and 
precise  solution  ;  that  depends  upon  circumstances. 

Case   XIV. 
Release  of  Property. 

Olibrius,  is  overwhelmed  by  debts,  and  he  is  utterly  unable  to 
pay  ;  therefore  he  is  obliged  to  sell  all  his  properties.  But  the 
unfortunate  man,  to  support  his  wife  and  a  numerous  family, 
threatened  with  poverty,  secretly  puts  aside  a  certain  sum,  and 
hides  it  carefully.  At  another  time  he  omits  to  declare  a  very 
secret  debt  that  Titius  owes  to  him  ;  and  he  advises  his  debtor  to 
keep  profound  silence  on  this  subject. 

Ques.  What  must  we  think  of  Olibrius?  Ought  he  to  make 
restitution  ? 

Ans.  Olibrius  must  not  be  disturbed  in  those  two  cases,  if  the 
money  which  he  has  put  aside  is  very  necessary  to  avoid  pov- 
erty. 

Case    XV. 
Embarrassed    Debtors. 

Adrien,  being  unable  to  pay  a  debt,  obtains  from  the  Court  a  ^ 


Cases  on  the  Circumstances  of  Restitution,  241 

division  of  the  properly  between  himself  and  his  wife,  in  order 
tliat  their  common  property  may  not  be  seized  by  the  creditors. 

Qiies.     What  must  we  think  of  Adrien  ? 

Ans.  Adrien  must  not  be  molested,  in  principle  ;  for  his  wife 
has  the  right  to  ask  this  division,  provided  she  does  it  without 
knavery,  or  did  not  participate  in  anything  to  the  injustice  of  her 
husband,  for  instance,  relatively  to  debts  contracted  with  injustice 
or  prodigality. 


Cases  on  Special  destitutions. 


Case  II. 
Restitution  for  Homicide. 

Jacob  has  killed  Marc,  who  was  ruining  his  family  by  his 
luxury  and  habits  of  drunkenness.  His  Confessor  orders  him  to 
give  a  sum  of  money,  as  an  indemnity,  to  Marc's  family.  Jacob 
answers,  that  the  death  of  Marc,  instead  of  being  a  misfortune, 
is  a  profit  to  his  family.  The  Confessor  insists  ;  and  as  Jacob 
persistently  refuses  to  obey,  the  Confessor  sends  him  away  with- 
out giving  him  absolution. 

Ques.  Ought  Jacob  in  reality  to  indemnify  the  famil}'  of  Marc 
whom  he  has  killed  ?  Should  the  Confessor  order  him  to  give  this 
compensation  ? 

Ans.  No  ;  for  Jacob  has  not  caused  any  damage  to  the  family, 
and  he  has  even  prevented  it  from  being  more  ruined.  Then  the 
confessor,  by  reason  of  justice,  could  not  order  him  to  indemnify 
the  family,  threatening  him  with  a  refusal  of  absolution.  He 
could  only  impose  on  him  a  penance,  either  of  giving  some  money 
to  the  family,  if  it  was  in  need,  or  of  giving  it  as  alms  to  the 
poor. 

Case  III. 

Restitution  for   Rape. 

Sylvie,  a  girl  of  good  morals,  was  seduced,  or  rather  violently 
seized  by  Lupin,  under  unfortunate  circumstances.  Deploring 
the  loss  of  her  virginity,  and  almost  in  despair,  she  goes  two  or 
three  months  later  to  Lupin,  and  assuring  him  that  she  is  preg- 
nant by  him,  demanls  of  him  two  thousand  francs;  as  much  fori 
the  loss  of  her  virginity,  as  in  order  to  avoid  dishonor  and  biin^j 
her  child  up  elsewhere  ;  if  not,  she  threatens  to  sue  him  at  law, 


Cases  Oil  Special  Restitution.  243 

and  publish  his  fault  eveiywhere.  Lupin,  in  order  to  avoid 
dishonor  and  to  bring  up  the  child,  rehictantly  gives  her  the 
money  asked  for,  although  with  regret.  But  going  to  confession, 
she  asks  if  she  can  keep  that  money.  The  Confessor  declares  that 
she  ought  to  return  it  to  Lupin. 

Ques.  Can  Sylvie  keep  the  money  obtained  by  a  knavery,  as 
a  compensation  for  the  loss  of  her  virginity,  or  for  some  other 
claim? 

Ans.  1.  Sylvie  cannot  keep  any  money  for  the  loss  of  her 
virginity*, —  a  loss  that  one  cannot  estimate,  and  that  no  one  can 
indemnify. 

2.  Neither  under  the  pretext  of  bringing  up  her  child  ;  because, 
as  soon  as  there  is  an  error  in  the  principal  motive  which  impels 
us, —  error  which  is  the  cause  of  the  contract, —  this  contract 
becomes  null.  Now,  the  final  cause,  at  least  partially,  does  not 
subsist,  inasmuch  as  there  is  no  child  to  bring  up.  Then  the 
contract,  as  far  as  something  has  been  given  to  Sylvie  to  bring 
up  her  child,  is  null  by  natural  right.  Therefore,  Sylvie  cannot 
keep  anything  for  that  reason. 

3.  But  she  can  keep  part  of  the  money  for  relinquishing  her 
right  to  denounce  Lupin,  or  to  disclose  his  fault. 

Case  IV. 
Restitution  for  Fornication. 

Laban,  by  dint  of  prayers  and  caresses,  has  induced  the  young 
Romelie  to  sin  with  him.  She  resists  at  Erst  ;  and  at  last  con- 
sents. A  child  is  the  result  of  it,  who  dies  at  his  birth.  But  the 
fault  having  been  divulged,  Romelie  cannot  find  any  honest  man 
who  will  marry  her.  Consequently,  indignant,  she  claims,  with 
a  great  outcry,  a  compensation  from  Laban. 

Ques.     Does  Laban  owe  anything  to  Romelie? 

Ans.  Laban  owes  nothing,  in  principle,  unless  he  may  have 
divulged  the  matter  himself.  For,  from  what  has  been  said,  from 
the  moment  when  the  woman  consents  to  sin,  the  man  owes 
nothing,  except  his  part  in  the  expense  of  bringing  up  the  child. 
Now,   in  this  case,  there  is  no  expense,  the  child   having  died 


244  TJœ  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

immediatel3\  Then  Romelie  shall  attribute  to  herself  onh'  the 
misfortune  which  results  from  her  fault.  She  ought  to  have 
foreseen  it  before  she  committed  that  fault.  How  many  tears 
flow  too  late  from  her  eyes  ! 

Case  X. 
Fraud  to  the  Prejudice  of  the  Treasury. 

Severin,  a  priest,  carefully  questions  his  penitents,  in  order  to 
know  if  they  have  not  committed  some  fraud  in  order  to  avoid 
paying  the  duty  in  the  purchase,  sale,  or  transportation  of  goods  ; 
if  they  have  evaded  the  custom  officers  ;  if  they  have  refrained 
from  reporting  their  goods  themselves  when  not  questioned. 
When  the  penitents  confess  to  either  of  these  frauds,  Severin 
obliges  them  to  make  restitution  to  the  custom  officers,  and  exacts 
from  them  a  serious  promise,  even  under  refusal  of  absolution,  not 
to  sin  in  the  future  on  this  matter. 

Ques.     What  should  we  think  of  Severin's  way  of  acting? 

Ans.  The  indiscretion  of  Severin  ia  all  his  conduct  is  clearer 
than  noon  day.  He  must  refrain  in  the  future  from  tormenting 
his  penitents  who  say  nothing  on  this  subject.  It  will  be  safer 
for  him  to  keep  silence  on  this  matter.  If  one  of  his  penitents 
interrogates  him,  lie  can  exhort  him  to  pay  the  duties.  But  let 
him  keep  himself  from  solving  difficulties  that  more  learned  men 
than  him  cannot  determine  about. 

Case  XI. 

Fraud  to  the  Prejudice  of  the  Treasury. 

Forbin  sells  to  Gilbert  a  field  for  thirty  thousand  francs.  But 
they  do  not  want  to  pay  the  tax  established  b}^  the  government 
upon  the  sale  of  properties.  What  shall  they  do?  The  way 
is  well  known,  and  used.  Thc}^  agree  to  declare  only  twenty 
thousand  francs  on  the  deed,  and  they  go  to  the  notary's.  Attiiis 
declaration,  the  notary,  smiling,  because  he  knows  the  true  value  of 
the  field,  says  to  Gilbert:  "  It  will  be  a  good  bargain  for  you, 
rascal  !  "  and  without  saying  anything  more,  he  draws  up  the 
deed. 


Cases  on  Special  Restitution.  245 

Qnes.  1.  Is  it  sinning  gravely  against  justice  to  feign  an 
inferior  price  in  the  purchase  of  a  field,  in  order  to  pay  less  taxes? 

Ques.  2.  Should  the  notary  make  restitution  in  this  case  ;  for 
he  knows  the  fraud,  and  yet  draws  up  the  deed? 

Ques.  3.  Quid. — If  he  had  himself  advised  the  contracting 
parties  to  do  it? 

Ans.  Question  1.  There  is  controverse'.  .  .  .  The  opinion 
which  seems  the  more  probable,  exempts  the  contracting  parties 
from  the  obligation  to  declare  the  true  price  ;  because  thé  law  does 
not  appear  to  seek  more  than  to  be  assured  of  the  validity  of  a 
public  contract,  and  the  delivery,  like  ad  the  payment,  of  the  thing 
sold,  and  to  give  some  securities  in  case  of  suit  in  law  ;  for 
instance,  if  there  was  an  eviction.  This  is  why  it  does  not  appear 
that  there  is,  in  conscience,  any  obligation  to  declare  either  the 
price  paid  or  the  value  of  it,  at  least,  the  smallest  that  one  can 
assign  to  the  thing.  But  those  who  diminish  this  value  beyond 
reason,  expose  themselves  to  the  danger  of  paying  a  fine.  As  for 
inheritance,  it  shall  be  sufRcient  to  declare  the  value  based  upon 
the  annual  income,  as  one  does  usually. 

Ans.  Question  2.  No  ;  because  the  notary  is  not  obliged  by 
his  duty  to  enforce  the  payment  of  the  tax,  like  government 
employees,  but  to  draw  up  the  valid  deeds. 

Now,  the  declaration  of  the  price  has  not  any  relation  with  the 
validity  of  the  deed.  Moreover,  ])e  does  not  participate  in  the 
fraud,  and  does  not  sin  against  justice  ;  because,  according  to  the 
probable  opinion,  the  contracting  parties  do  not  sin  themselves. 

Ans.  Question  3.  The  difficulty  is  greater.  Some  assert  that 
the  notary,  in  this  case,  ought  to  repair  the  vrrong  done  to  the 
Treasury  ;  because  if  he  is  not  held  to  prevent  the  fraud,  at  least 
he  is  held  not  to  participate  in  it  in  a  positive  manner.  But  others 
excuse  him  ;  because,  if  the  contracting  parties  do  not  sin,  the 
notary  does  not  sin  either,  even  in  co-operating  in  a  positive  man- 
ner. For  the  notary  has  not  change  of  the  taxes,  and  is  not  held 
by  his  duty  to  colL'ct  them.  Then,  in  regard  to  this,  he  must  be 
likened  to  a  private  person. 


SEreatfee  on  CTontracfs. 


The  science  which  treats  of  contracts,  especially  at  the  pres- 
ent time,  ought  be  regarded  as  necessary.  For  trade  extends 
itself  so  far — arts,  not  liberal,  improve  themselves  so  much — that 
for  the  equity  of  contracts,  one  has  recourse  more  and  m  )re  often 
to  the  sacred  tribunal.  But  it  is  there  especially  that  appears  the 
difficulty  to  conciliate  the  laws  of  conscience  with  the  civil 
code.  However,  with  the  help  of  God,  as  we  hope,  we  will  pro- 
ceed with  so  much  prudence  that,  guided  by  the  most  renowned 
doctors,  we  will  be  accused  neither  of  supreme  severity  nor  of 
supreme  indulgency. 


PART   FIRST. 
Contracts  in  General. 

754.  One  calls  a  contract  a  covenant,  by  which  one  or  several 
persons  agree  with  one  or  several  others  to  give,  to  do,  or  not  to 
do  something. 

One  distinguishes  contracts  as  : 

1.  Unilateral  or  reciprocal.  ... 

2.  Gratuitous  or  onerous.   .   .   . 

3.  Solemn  or  sim[)le.   .   .   . 

4.  Named  or  unn:imed.   .   .   . 

5.  Bare  or  covered.   .   .   . 

6.  Formal,  express  ;  or  virtual,  tacit.   *   .   . 

7.  Absolute  or  conditional  ;  pure  or  not  pure.   •   .   . 

In  all  contracts,  one  distinguishes  three  things:  the  essence,  the 
nature,  and  the  accidents. 


Treatise  on   Contracts.  247 

CHAPTER   I. 

Conditions  Required  for  the  Contract. 

There  are  three  of  them  :  the  qualified  reason,  the  capable 
person,  the  legitimate  consent. 

ART.  I.     The  reasons  for  the  contract. 

These  are,  in  general,  the  properties  and  the  points  in  question  ; 
that  is  to  say,  all  that  may  become  the  property  of  tlie  man,  and 
all  of  which  the  contracting  parties  have  the  free  administration. 

The  reason  ought  to  be  :  possible  .  .  .  existing  .  .  .  honor- 
able .  .  .  belonging  to  the  contracting  party  .  .  .  certain  .  .  . 
and  able  to  be  appraised.   .   .   . 

760. — Ques.  Should  the  thing  accepted  in  virtue  of  a  shame- 
ful contract,  be  always  given  back? 

Ans.  1.     Before  the  accomplishment  of  the  act,  yes. 

2.  After,  there  is  controversy.  The  more  common  opinion 
says  :  that  the  price  can  be  accepted  ;  more  than  that,  the  price  is 
merited  in  conscience,  .  .  .  because  the  shameful  act,  although 
unworthy  of  price,  as  well  as  illicit,  deserves  as  much  for  it  as 
laborious,  repugnant,  perilous  or  useful  acts.  * 

*  Here  takes  place  the  elegant  dissertation  of  Tambourin,  in  his  explana- 
tion of  the  Decalogue:  "How  much  can  a  woman,"  asks  to  himself  the 
famous  Jesuit,  "exact  justly  for  the  Uif-e  of  her  body?" 

"The  ordinary  answer,"  says  he  "is  that  it  is  necessary  to  keep  count 
of  all  the  circumstances,  viz  :  Nobleness,  beauty,  age,  honesty  y  etc.  For 
an  honest  woman,  to  whom  everybody  is  not  admitted,  is  worth  more 
tlian  one  who  abandons  herself  to  every  one.  But  that  is  not  satisfac- 
tory. 

'♦Some  distinguish  between  a  courtesan  and  an  honest  woman.  The 
courtesan  can,  in  fact,  neither  claim  nor  accept  only  what  she  is  accus- 
tomed to  ask  of  other  persons;  because  tiiere  is  a  contract  of  purchase 
and  .-ale  between  her  and  the  man  :  he  gives  the  price,  and  she,  the  use 
of  her  own  body.  ... 

"As  for  the  honest  woman,  she  can  a'<k  and  accept  as  much  as  she  is 
willing  to  .  .  .  because  an  honest  girl  can  esiimate  dearly  her  honesty 
.  .  .  This  is  why  the  courtesan  can  sell  herself  dearer  at  her  llrst  steps. 
.  .  .  (Page  290.) 

It  is  also  convenient  not  to  forget  Doctor  J.  Gordon^  who,  after 
having  shortly  recalled  Tambourin's  principles,  raises  up  a  particular 
species,  full  of  intei-est:  "When  the  courtesan  is  married,  to  whom  l)e- 
loiigs  the  product  of  her  debauchery,  prostitution,"  as  he  says  in  ])recise 
terms.  "She  ou^ht,"  answers  he,  "to  count  the  sums  received,  into  the 
conimunity,  up.m  which  her  husband  shall  have  his  right."  (Page  289.) 


'248  The  Dociriie  of  the  Jesuits. 

The  second  opinion  denies  it,  and  declares  the  contract  invaUd. 

ART.  ir.     Subject  of  the  contract. 

Section  1.     Minors.   ... 

Section  2.     Wives.   .   .  . 

Section  3.     People  dead  in  law.   .  .  . 

Section  4.     Interdicted  persons  and  spendthrifts.  .  .  . 

ART.  III.     Required  consent. 

Section  1.     Qualities  of  the  legitimate  consent. 

772. —  This  consent  shall  be  :  external,  internal,  reciprocal, 
free  and  deliberate.   .    •   . 

774. — Ques.  Is  a  contract  valid  if  it  is  made  with  the  intention 
of  contracting,  hut  not  of  binding  one's  self  to  fulfil  it? 

Ans.  According  to  the  more  probable  opinion,  no;  because 
one  has  added  a  contrary  condition  to  the  substance  of  the  con- 
tract. From  some  others,  it  is  according  as  the  will  of  the  con- 
tract prevails  or  not. 

Section  2.     Faults  opposed  to  the  consent. 

The  principal  are  :    Error,  ruse,  violence  and  fear. 

777. — Ques.  Can  error  or  ruse  on  the  subject  of  the  quality, 
which  is  the  cause  of  the  contract,  annul  an  onerous  contract? 

Ans.     No,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion.   .   .   . 

But  when  the  error  comes  from  a  ruse  of  which  one  of  the  con- 
tracting parties  is  the  author  or  co-operator,  some  have  judged 
that  natural  rig'it,  others  that  positive  right,  annuled  tiie  con- 
tract ;  but  the  common  and  more  probable  opinion  establishes  that 
it  is  valid  according  to  the  one  or  other  right,  although  it  miglit 
be  torn  up  by  the  one  who  has  been  di'ceived  ;  for  the  substantial 
and  voluntary  consent  has  not  failed.  On  the  other  hand,  the  de- 
ceiver is  held  to  repair  the  wrong  which  he  has  done,  which  cannot 
be  done  unless  in  re-establishing  the  thing  wholly,  or  unless  the 
contract  be  broken.  If  the  ruse  has  been  used  by  a  third  party, 
without  the  fault  of  the  second  one,  necessaril}'  the  contract  is 
valid  ;  but  some  pretend  that  one  can  tear  it  off,  the  others  no, 
yet,  that  the  deceived  party  has  a  recourse  against  the  deceiver  in 
order  to  obtain  reparation.   .-.   . 


Treatise  on   Contracts,  249 

778. — Ques.  Can  error  or  ruse  on  the  subject  of  the  motive 
annul  a  contract? 

Ans.  1.  Yes,  if  the  errors  fall  upon  final  motive  ;  for  instance, 
if  one  bestows  charity  on  Titius,  believing  he  is  poor,  when  he  is 
rich. 

2.  No,  iftlie  error  falls  only  on  the  engaging  motive;  for  in- 
stance, if  one  bestows  cliarit}'  on  Peter  who  is  poor,  whom  one 
believes  very  honest,  when  he  is  only  a  little  so,  for  that  error  is 
purely  accidental. 

779. — If  wishing  to  buy  some  Bordeaux  wine,  you  receive 
some  Burgundy,  the  contract  is  valid  in  principle,  in  spite  of 
the  error  or  ruse  ;  because  the  error  is  not  a  substantial  one. 

780. — 1.  A  contract,  inconsequence  of  an  intrinsic  fear  or  of  a 
natural  or  necessary  cause,  is  not  deprived  of  value  and  cannot  be 
torn  up,  unless  the  one  who  has  contracted  through  fear  may  not 
have  been  the  master  of  himself.  No  injustice  has  been  done  to 
the  contracting  party  who  keeps  a  sufficient  liberty. 

2.  It  is  the  same  if  the  fear  comes  from  a  free  cause,  or  has 
been  inspired  by  a  man  for  a  legitimate  motive.   .    .   . 

782. — Ques.  Can  one  rescind  a  contract  made  under  the  influ- 
ence of  a  reverential  fear? 

Ans.  No,  according  to  tlie  more  probable  opinion;  because 
that  does  not  appear  a  sufficient  cause  for  tearing  up  a  contract, 
unless  one  ma}'  understand  by  it  the  fear  of  a  serious  evil,  for  in- 
stance, a  long  indignation.  Likewise  prayers,  the  most  importune, 
do  not  constitute  a  grave  fear,  unless  there  may  be  joined  to  t!ie 
prayers  a  reverential  fear  towards  a  superior. 

Ques.  Is  a  contract  void,  or  can  it  be  torn  up  by  private 
autliority,  if  a  grave  and  unjust  fear  has  been  inspired  only  by  a 
third  party,  without  the  second  one  participating:  in  the  injustice? 

Ans.  There  is  controversy.  The  first  [probable  opinion  affirms 
it.    .   .   . 

The  second  one,  also  probable,  denies  it.   .   .   . 

783. — Ques.  And  if  a  grave  fear  has  been  inspired  unjustly, 
but  not  in  oider  to  extort  the  contract? 

Ans.     There  is  controversy.   .   .   . 


250  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

denounce  him  to  the  wronged  proprietor,  or  to  the  police  or  judge, 
unless  he  promises  you  a  certain  gift,  his  promise  has  some  value, 
and  3'ou  are  not  held  to  give  back  the  gift  received,  unless  that 
gift  appears  extreme  in  the  judgment  of  a  prudent  man.  This  is 
true,  even  if  you  did  not  have  the  intention  to  denounce  him,  but 
only  to  frighten  him  ;  because  you  yield  a  part  of  your  riglits, 
the  value  of  which  can  be  estimated.   .   .   . 

If  some  one  meditates  wronging  you,  out  of  pure  malice,  and 
asks  nothing  from  you,  and  if  you  yourself  promise  money  to  him 
in  order  to  have  nothing  to  fear  from  him,  you  are  not  held  to 
keep  your  promise  ;  because,  although  fear  constrained  you  to 
that  contract,  its  only  object  was,  however,  to  prevent  the  wrong 
that  would  have  been  done  to  you.  Now,  the  one  who  seeks  to 
wrong  you  cannot  sell  his  withdrawal  ;  consequently,  all  that  he 
is  acquiring  in  that  manner  he  receives  as  a  possessor  in  bad 
faith,  and  ought  to  restore  it. 

CHAPTER  II. 

Obligation  of  the  Contract. 

This  is  the  tie  by  which  one  is  constrained,  by  the  strength  of 
,the  contract,  to  give,  to  do,  or  not  to  do  something. 

786. —  Ques.  Are  contracts  valid  and  obligatory,  in  conscience, 
in  which  the  formalities  required  by  law  are  missing? 

Ans.     There  are  three  probable  opinions  : 

The  first  one  affirms  it  ;  because,  by  natural  right,  nothing  less 
than  the  consent  of  the  i)arties  is  sufficient  to  oblige,  and  the 
human  lavr  does  not  suppress  the  natural  obligation  between 
persons  elsewhere  capable,  though  it  renders  the  civil  action  void. 

The  seccmel  one  denies  it  ;  because  the  laws  annuliiig  contracts 
rest  upon  the  presumption  not  only  of  ruse,  but  also  of  common 
danger,  inasmuch  as  the  common  interest  requires  that  one  sup- 
press the  occasion  of  no  matter  what  fraud  ;  and,  consequently,  the 
law  can  and  ought  to  suppress,  in  the  spiritual  tribunal,  the 
obligation  of  an  annuled  contract. 

Thethiid  opinion  requires,  that  in  those  contracts  one  should 


Treatise  on   Contracts.  251 

favor  tlie  possessor,  until  he  is  condemned  to  make  restitution  by 
a  judgment.   .   .   . 

788. —  Qiies.  Can.  one,  in  ceding  his  property,  secretly  reserve 
something  for  himself? 

An-!.  If  one  finds  himself  in  great  need,  he  does  not  sin 
against  justice  in  reserving  for  himself  enough  to  provide  for  his 
family  until  the  judge  may  provide  for  it.  Even  after  the  judg- 
ment, one  must  not  trouble  those  who  have  reserved  for  themselves 
things  really  necessary,  and  of  little  value.  .  .  . 


CHAPTER   III. 

Modification  of  the  Contracts. 
ART.  I.     The  oath  joined  to  the  contract. 

793.  —  Ques.  Are  oaths  valid  which  are  extorted  by  fear,  in 
order  to  consolidate  some  contracts  not  valid,  in  principle,  on 
account  of  fear? 

Ans.  The  first  opinion,  more  common,  affirms  it  ;  because,  for 
a  religious  motive,  one  should  be  faithful  to  one's  oath,  whenever 
one  can  do  it  without  sin. 

The  second  opinion  denies  it.   .  .  . 

ART.  II.     Some  specified  modes  of  contract. 
ART.  III.     Conditions  of  the  contract. 


PART   SECOND. 

Different  Kinds  of  Contracts. 

There  is  tlie  gratuitous  contract  and  the  onerous  one. 
Section  1.    Viz.  :  Promise,  donation,  loan,  deposit  and  seques- 
tration, c>;mmission,  administration  of  property,  exchange. 


252  The  Doctrine  of  the  JtsuUs, 

CHAPTER   I. 

Promise. 

797. — This  is  a  contract  by  which  one  engages  freely  and 
spontaneously,  to  do  or  not  to  do,  gratuitously,  something  in 
favor  of  another.   .   .   . 


CHAPTER   II. 

Gifts. 

ART.  I.     Gifts  in  general. 

801. —  A  gift  is  the  free  transfer  of  a  thing,  in  favor  of 
another.  ... 

ART.  II.     Different  kinds  of  gifts. 

812. — Ques.  Is  a  gift  valid  if  the  giver  dies  before  its  accept- 
ance? 

Ans.  The  negative  is  more  probable  ;  the  affirmative  is  not 
improbable. 

Ques.  Can  the  heir  of  the  receiver  accept  the  gift  at  the  death 
of  the  above-mentioned? 

Ans.     The  negative  is  more  probable. 

Ques.  Is  a  gift  binding,  which  is  solemnly  promised,  but  not 
ace  pled? 

Ans.     No,  says  St.  Liguori  ;  Yes,  says  Laymann. 

Section   2.     Wills. 

817. —  .  .  .  Ques.  Are  wills  valid,  in  the  spiritual  tribunal, 
which  have  profane  causes  for  the  motive,  and  lack  some  of  the 
required  formalities? 

There  are  three  probable  opinions:  the  first  one  declares  them 
valid  ;  the  second  one,  null  ;  the  third  one,  preferred  by  St.  Lig- 
uori, is  in  favor  of  the  possessor  until  the  judge  may  have  decided. 

818 — Are  wills  valid  which  have  pious  causes  for  the  motive, 
even  if  the  legal  formalities  are  missing? 

Ans.     Yes;  and  this  opinion  is  very  common  an  1  certain.    .    .   . 


Treatise  on  Contracts,  253 

827. — Ques.  Is  there  sin  asain^t  justice,  in  the  spiritual  tribu- 
nal, when  parents  wrong  their  legitimate  children  by  a  will,  or  hy 
gifts  during  the  lifetime  of  the  parents,  or  by  feigned  contracts  ? 

Ans.     Yes,  in  principle. 

But,  there  is  no  sin  when,  for  a  legitimate  reason,  they  partially 
wrong  their  child.-en,  in  some  particular  cases.  For  then  the  law 
has  no  more  bearing,  not  seeking  to  extend  itself  to  those  particu- 
lar cases  which  are  useful  to  the  famil}^,  and  that  do  not  injure  the 
common  interest;  for  instance,  if  a  father  made  a  gift  as  a  reward 
to  an  honest  child,  to  the  detriment  of  a  spendthrift  one. 

According  to  this,  t'lose  children  who  have  received  the  larger 
part  of  the  inheritance,  to  the  detriment  of  the  other  heirs,  must 
not  be  disquieted,  when  one  can  conjecture,  from  the  circum- 
stances, that  the  parents  wished  to  favor  them  for  a  just  reason  ; 
especially  if  they  are  of  good  faith,  and  if  one  can  fear  with  reason 
why  they  refuse  to  fulfil  their  obligations.  Man}'  theologians  even 
think  that  the  civil  law  cannot  oblige  parents  to  keep  equality  be- 
tween children.  Therefore  parents  are  exempt,  in  principle,  from 
all  fault,  if  they  have  provided  bjsides  for  the  wants  of  their  chil- 
dren, and  if  they  are  not  impelled  by  a  guilty  motive. 

828. — Ques.  Can  parents  make  gifts  from  hand  to  hand  to  one 
of  their  children,  to  strangers,  or  to  some  pious  causes? 

Ans.  Yes,  all  kinds  of  gifts  in  principle,  with  the  income  onl}', 
leaving  intact  the  capital,  which  constitutes  the  patrimony,  prop- 
erly so  called;  because  parents  are  by  no  means  obliged,  in 
principle,  to  increase  the  patrimony,  by  their  income  or  their 
work.  .  .  . 

830. —  Ques.  Ought  a  legacy,  given  by  natural  right  to  a 
young  girl  in  order  that  she  may  marry,  to  be  given  to  her  if  she 
enters  a  convent? 

Ans.  Yes,  if  the  legacy  has  been  left  to  a  determinated  per- 
son.  .   .   . 

Section  3.     The  gift  by  reason  of  death. 

835.  According  to  French  law,  the  gift  by  reason  of  death  is 
not  allowed.  For  Article  893  declares,  that  :  nobod\^  can  freely 
dispose  of  his  properties,  only  by  gifts  during  the  lifetime  of  the 
donor,  or  by  will  in  the  legal  form.   .  .  . 


254  Tlte  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

836. — Ques.  Can  one  to  whom  has  been  given  a  piece  of  per- 
sonal property,  in  consequence  of  death,  take  it  after  the  death  of 
the  giver? 

Ans.  Yes,  at  least  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion, 
provided  that,  he  is  sure  of  the  gift,  and  the  last  will  of  the  de- 
ceased. For  he  has  the  riglit  to  it,  and  he  is  only  using  his  riglit. 
Then,  the  thing  was  not  given  in  order  to  be  paid  for,  but  in  order 
to  be  received  by  him. 

Ques.  Is  a  gift  from  hand  to  hand  valid,  if  made  by  a  sick 
person,  on  condition  that  the  gift  will  be  restored  to  him  if  he  re- 
covers ? 

Ans.  Yes;  1,  Because  the  gift  is  valid  as  made  in  case  of 
death,  even  according  to  French  law,  which  does  not  oppose  itself 
to  the  gift  from  hand  to  hand  ;  2,  It  is  valid  as  a  gift  dnring  the 
lifetime  of  the  donor,  if  it  is  not  revocable  by  the  will  of  the  giver, 
but  only  if  he  recovers  ;  because  then,  it  may  be  looked  upon  as  a 
conditional  gift  during  the  lifetime  of  the  donor. 

Ques.  Is  the  gift  valid  if  made  on  condition  that  it  shall  be 
re>tored  if  one  asks  for  it? 

Ans.  Yes,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion,  although 
it  may  not  be  valid  as  a  gift  during  the  lifetime  of  the  donor  ; 
because  then  the  donor  ought  to  deprive  himself  irrevocably  of 
his  property  ;  however,  it  can  be  valid  as  a  gift  in  case  of  death, 
on  account  of  the  actual  delivery  of  the  thing,  which  onght  not 
to  have  less  force,  although  one  may  make  no  mention  of  the 
death. 

Section  4.     Entailment  and  trust. 


840. —  Ques.  Are  secret  trusts  valid,  in  the  spiritual  tribunal, 
for  some  pious  causes,  under  form  of  a  feigned  gift,  a  will,  or  a 
legacy,  in  favor  of  a  private  person  ? 

Ans.  1.  Yes,  if  it  is  a  question  of  a  gift  from  hand  to  hand, 
or  of  things  which  cannot  be  preserved  for  a  long  time  before  the 
transfer,  or  which  ought  not  to  be  preserved  until  the  death  of 
the  donor,  and  ought  to  be  regarded  for  that  as  things  bequeathed 


Treatise  on    Contracts,  255 

for  a  time  or  on  a  coDdition,  because  that  it  is  not  forbidden  by 
the  law. 

2.  As  for  what  concerns  the  other  gifts,  it  must  be  answced 
the  same  as  for  the  wills  in  favor  of  the  pious  causes,  where  the 
leofal  formalities  are  missing. 


CHAPTER   III. 

Loan   to   Custom. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
Deposit,  and  Deposit  by  Sequestration. 


CHAPTER  V. 
Commission  and  Administration  of  Property. 


CHAPTER  VI. 
Loan. 
ART.  I.     Nature  of  the  contract  of  the  loan. 

ART.  II.     Interest  or  gain  received  from  the  loan. 

Interest  (usura)  understood  in  a  broad  sense,  is  the  gain 
received  from  the  loan  or  on  its  occasion,  with  or  without  kgit  - 
mate  title.  In  its  strict  meaning,  and  understood  in  bad  })ait, 
it  is  an  unjust  profit  proceeding  immediately  from  the  loan  ;  tliat 
is  to  say,  from  its  intrinsic  strength,  and  without  other  joint 
title.  .  .  . 


256  TJte  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

853.  —  All  interest,  properly  speaking,  in  putting  aside  all  exter- 
nal t^tle,  is  prohibited  hy  natural,  divine,  and  ecclesiastical  law. 
"  Such  was,  and  is,  the  perpetual  doctrine  of  the  Catholic  Churcli, 
confirmed  1)3'  the  unanimous  approval  of  all  councils,  fathers,  and 
theologians."     (Benoit  XIY.) 

Interest  may  be  excused  from  all  injustice,  if  there  is  a  just 
title  ;  for  instance,  in  consequence  of  a  wrong  ;  because,  then  tiie 
gain  does  not  come  from  the  loan,  but  from  the  external  title, 
for  it  is  permitted  for  you  to  receive  as  much  as  you  have  given. 
Now,  then,  if  lending  one  hundred  francs  you  are  losing  ten 
francs  by  it,  you  lend  really  one  hundred  and  ten  francs.  Then 
you  shall  receive  one  hundred  and  ten  francs.   .   .   . 

854. —  Ques.  Can  the  lender  retain  what  the  borrower  has 
given  to  him  out  of  dread,  fearing  to  meet  with  a  refusal  some- 
where else? 

Ans.  Yes,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion  ;  because 
one  requires  for  the  interest,  that  this  interest  shall  come  from 'the 
strength  of  the  contract  itself,  as  being  due  from  justice.   .   .   . 

Qiies.  Can  one  insert  in  the  agreement  a  gift,  in  return  {aiiXi- 
dorale),  that  one  makes  out  of  gratitude? 

Ans.  No  ;  because  same  agreements  are  a  title  of  justice,  and 
not  a  gift  given  purely  out  of  gratitude. 

ART.  III.     Titles  which  excuse  the  interest. 

There  are  five  principal  ones  :  1,  loss  experienced  ;  2,  depriva- 
tion of  a  gain  ;  3,  risks  of  loss  ;  4,  conventional  penalty  ;  5,  the 
civil  law. 

I.     Loss  Experienced. 

856. —  This  is  the  detriment  that  the  lender  undergoes  from  the 
occasion  of  a  loan  made  to  another. 

If  the  lender  sustains  a  prejudice  on  account  of  his  loan,  there 
is  a  legitimate  title  for  receiving  more  mone}'. 

857. —  Ques.  Is  it  permitted,  from  the  very  first  of  the  loan, 
to  agree  to  a  certain  benefit,  if  the  resulting  loss  is  only  probable 
in  the  future? 

Ans.     Yes.   ... 


Treatise  on  Contracts,  257 

II.     Deprivation  of  a  Gain. 

858. —  This  is  the  loss  of  what  the  lender  might  have  gained  if 
he  had  kept  his  property  or  money,  and  had  used  it  in  another 
legal  contract.   .   .   . 

Qiies.  Can  one  exact  something  for  the  deprivation  of  a  gain^ 
on  account  of,  a  loan,  if  the  lender  might  not  have  used  his  own 
money  for  an^'thing? 

Ans.  1.  Yes,  if  one  had  reserved  it  for  the  wants  of  his  family, 
or  in  order  not  to  compromise  his  own  position  ;  because  one  is 
not  obliged  to  neglect  his  own  affairs  on  account  of  making  a 
loan. 

2.  Yes,  according  to  the  probable  opinion,  in  all  other  causes  ; 
because  the  loan  is  the  true  cause  of  the  deprivation  of  the  gain. 

III.     Risk  of  Loss. 

859. —  This  is  the  reasonable  fear  that  one  feels  in  apprehend- 
ing that  he  may  not  be  able  to  retrieve  what  he  has  lent. 

This  risk  constitutes  a  just  title  for  gain.  For,  if  one  can 
estimate  the  value  of  the  expectation,  a  fortiori^  one  can  estimate 
the  risk  of  a  probable  damage. 

IV.     Conventional  Penalty. 

861. —  This  consists  in  what  the  borrower  binds  himself  to  pay 
in  addition,  if  he  does  not  return  the  loan  at  the  fixed  time. 

It  is  a  legitimate  title  to  accept  something  more  than  the 
borrowed  money,  by  which  one  secures  himself  against  the  negli- 
gence of  the  borrower. 

V.     Title  Coming  from  the  Civil  Law. 

862. — Laws  authorizing  a  certain  profit  on  loans,  exist  among 
almost  all  people  to-day.  In  France,  the  law  enacted  on  the  3d 
of  September,  1807,  fixed  at  5  per  cent,  the  interest  on  civil 
matters,  6  per  cent,  in  the  commercial  ones. 

As  for  knowing  whether  the  civil  law  creates  a  legitimate  title 
in  the  spiritual  tribunal,  in  order  to  get  some  gain  from  a  loan, 
there  is  controversy.  The  opinion  which  answers  yes,  is  the  more 
probable  and  common.     It  follows,  then,  that  : 


258  The  Doctrine  of  lite  Jesuits. 

The  title  of  the  civil  law,  according  to  the  more  probable 
opinion,  is  a  just  and  honest  reason  for  exacting  sometliing  in 
addition,  even  in  the  absence  of  any  otlier  title.   .   .   . 

872. —  Qucs.  Is  one  permitted  to  exceed  the  legal  rate,  on 
account  of  loss  experienced,  or  the  dcpiivation  of  a  gain? 

Ans.  If  the  money  is  given  for  the  profit^  and  not  for  the 
necessity  of  the  borrower,  there  is  controversy,  and  two  opinions. 
The  first  one  affirms  it  by  reason  of  indemnity,  or  just  compensa- 
tion ;  so  thinks  Pages  de  Lyon,  in  spite  of  his  severity,  so  known 
in  matters  of  usury.   .   .   . 

873. —  Ques.     Is  it  permitted  to  receive  interest  on  interests? 

Ans.     Yes,  in  the  civil  law.   .   .   . 

1.  Yes,  also,  in  the  spiritual  tribunal,  if  there  has  been  ante- 
rior, explicit,  or  implicit  agreement. 

2.  If,  in  consequence  of  a  delay  in  the  payment,  the  creditor 
experiences  a  loss. 

Ques,  Is  it  permitted  to  collect  the  legal  interest  when  it 
exceeds  5  or  6  per  cent.  ? 

Ans.  Yes,  if  the  law  seems  just  when  one  has  considered  all 
the  circumstances  ;  that  is  to  say,  if  one  sees  there  is  equality 
between  the  interest  permitted  by  the  law,  and  the  value  of  the 
use  of  the  money.   .   .   . 

875. —  One  can,  and  even  ought,  to  absolve  those  who  do  not 
exceed  the  legal  rate  of  interest,  seeing  that  they  commit  no 
injustice,  and  one  cannot  constrain  them  to  make  restitution.   .   .   . 

876. — One  must  not  accuse  of  injustice  those  wlio  draw  the 
interest  of  the  money  lent  to  a  poor  man  who  does  not  find 
himself  in  a  grave  necessity.   ... 

877. —  The  one  who  borrows  at  the  legal  rate,  should  not  exact 
10  per  cent,  in  lending  in  his  turn  to  another  person  ;  because  he 
has  no  title  to  exact  5  per  cent.  more.  However,  many  permit 
bankers,  who  borrow  often  to  lend  in  their  turn,  to  exact  some- 
thing more  than  the  legal  rate  ;  for  instance,  one  per  cent,  on 
account  of  their  work,  time,  and  expenses  ;  according  to  the 
bankers,  they  could  ask  7  per  cent.,  for  they  are  considered  as 
merchants,  and  as  such  couhl  already  ask  6  per  cent.  The 
custom  of  man}'  count. ies  authoiizLS  them.     Likewise,  it  is  not 


Treatise  on   Contracts.  259 

contrar}'  to  natural  or  civil  law  to  borrow  at  3  or   4  per  cent., 
and  to  lend  at  5.   .   .   . 

Appendix  :  On  Loan-Banks. 

879. —  .  .  .  This  institution  is  permitted,  and  is  not  a  usurer, 
independently  of  any  other  title  to  gain.  .   .   . 

880. —  Ques.     Can  a  private  person  establish  a  loan-bank? 

Ans.  Yes,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion,  because  it 
matters  little  for  the  interest  whether  it  may  be  a  public  or  private 
institution,  provided  the  principal  person  exact  only  what  is 
necessary  in  order  to  indemnify  himself. 

Section  2.     Onerous  contracts. 

Of  sale  and  purchase,  society  and  trinaire  contracts,  letting  and 
hiring,  exchange,  quit-rent,  security,  pledge  and  mortgage,  assur- 
ance, promise,  lottery,  game. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Sale  and  Purchase. 
ART.  I.     Nature  of  the  sale  and  purchase. 

881. — The  contract  of  sale  and  purchase  is  thus  defined:  the 
exchange  of  money  for  merchandise,  or  vice  versa  ;  or  :  an  onerous 
contract  by  which  one  engages  one's  self  to  give  a  just  and 
determined  price  for  merchandise,  and  vice  versa. 

882. —  Ques.  Is  the  seller  obliged  to  declare  the  defects  in  his 
thing? 

Ans.  It  is  necessar}'  to  distinguish  :  according  as  those  defects 
are  substantial  or  accidental,  manifest  or  hidden,  and  if  the  seller 
is  questioned  or  not  on  the  subject. 

If  the  defects  are  Substantial,  he  is  held  to  reveal  them.  .   .   . 

Interrogated,  he  shall  reveal  all  the  hidden  defects.  .  .  .  Not 
interrogated,  no.  .  .  .  He  is  not  held  to  reveal  the  accidental 
defects.  .   .  . 


k 


ART.  II.     Fair  price. 


260  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

889.  There  is  the  price  Zep^a/,  or  determined  by  the  law,  and  tlie 
natural  and  popular  price,  fixed  by  the  common  opinion  of  men. 

890. —  The  legal  price,  or  the  one  fixed  by  civil  authority, 
ought  to  be  considered  as  adequate  to  the  value  of  the  thing,  and 
kept  on  condition  of  restitution. 

Sometimes  it  is  permitted  to  deviate  from  it  : 

1.  If  the  majority  itself  deviates. 

2.  If,  the  circumstances  changing,  the  price  becomes  unjust. 

3.  If  the  goods  are  notably  dear,  more  or  less,  than  the  cus- 
tom. 

In  the  absence  of  a  legal  price,  one  should  consider  as  only  just, 
the  price  deterinined  by  common  opinion,  if  one  is  capable  of  esti- 
mating it;  because  this  price,  adequate  for  the  things  of  same 
species,  is  deduced  by  their  utility  for  common  uses,  and  could 
not  be  better  estimated  than  by  the  common  opinion.   .   .   . 

891. — Qiies.  Can  a  seller  sell  an  object  dearer,  on  account 
of  a  particular  attachment  he  has  for  it,  or  of  the  advantage  that 
he  receives  from  it? 

Ans.  1.  Yes  ;  because  that  attachment  can  be  appraised,  inas- 
much as  the  privation  of  it  is  more  laborious. 

2.  Yes,  with  more  reason,  if  the  privation  of  a  special  advan- 
tage makes  the  thing  much  more  precious  to  the  seller;  it  is  just 
that  he  increase  the  price  of  it,  by  reason  of  the  loss  which  he 
undergoes. 

893.  Ques.  Can  one  buy  at  a  low  price  in  order  to  please  a 
seller  who  seeks  a  buyer? 

Ans.  Yes,  for  the  things  are  undervalued  by  a  voluntary  offer; 
and  the  price  diminished,  when  the  thing  is  of  little  use  to  the 
buyer,  and  the  latter  buys  it  only  out  of  kindness  towards  the 
seller. 

Ques.  Can  one  buy  at  a  low  price  when  the  sale  takes  place  on 
account  of  poverty  ? 

Ans.  Yes,  according  to  the  probable  opinion  ;  because  the 
article  loses  its  value  in  the  common  estimation.  The  poverty  of 
the  seller  does  not  change  the  common  estimation.  However, 
others  deny  it,  with  probable  opinion. 


Treatise  on   Contracts,  261 

894. — Qnes.  Can  one  buy  a  promissoiy  note,  or  a  claim  upon  a 
person,  at  a  low  price,  on  account  of  an  anticipated  payment? 

Ans.  1.  Yes  assuredly,  if  the  payment  is  uncertain  or  ditficult; 
because  the  claim  loses  a  great  deal  of  its  value. 

2.  Yes,  according  to  the  probable  opinion  ;  even  if  the  pay- 
ment of  this  promissory  note  or  claim  is  certain  and  easy  ; 
because:  1,  one  buys  not  the  money  itself,  but  the  action  upon 
him,  and,  consequently,  the  price  given  for  such  promissory  notes 
is  supposed  fair;  2,  because  there  is  equivalence  in  the  money 
lent  ;  but  also,  for  the  same  reason,  it  is  permitted,  with  the  loan, 
to  realize  a  moderate  gain,  at  the  legal  rate. 

895. — Ques.  Can  one  buy  at  a  greatly  inferior  price  some 
debts  very  difficult  to  collect,  on  account  of  special  circumstances 
which  renders  the  collection  easy  to  you  ? 

Ans.  Yes,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion  ;  because 
easiness  to  obtain  the  payment  does  not  depend  on  the  thing  sold, 
but  on  the  buyer  himself.  Now,  the  value  of  a  thing  is  not  deter- 
mined by  a  particular  circumstance  to  the  buyer,  but  by  the  com- 
mon estimation. 

896. — Ques.  Can  one  sell  at  the  current  price  a  merchandise 
mingled  with  another  of  inferior  quality  ? 

Ans.  ...  1.  If  your  merchandise  is  of  an  extraordinary  qual- 
ity, you  can  probably,  after  having  mixed  it,  sell  it  at  the  common 
price  ;  2,  If  you  mix  inferior  merchandise  with  superior,  in  such  a 
manner  that  the  value  of  the  superior  one  is  diminished,  you  can 
sell  it  at  the  customary  price.   .   .  . 

897. — Ques,.  Are  dealers  held  to  make  restitution  when,  by 
their  lies,  they  induce  the  buyers  to  pay  for  their  goods  dearer 
than  they  ought  to  do,  however,  without  exceeding  the  highest 
price  ? 

Ans.  In  principle,  it  may  be  necessary  to  declare  it  ;  because 
there  has  been  a  cause  of  damage.  However,  ordinarily,  the  lies, 
or  even  perjuries,  by  which  dealers  affirm  that  their  goods  cost  so 
much  to  them,  or  that  such  a  price  was  offered  to  them,  ouglit  not 
to  be  considered  as  frauds  really  prejud'cial  ;  because  these  frauds 
are  so  frequent  with   them,  that  almost  nobody  trusts  in  them. 


262  The  D  >ctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

900. — Ques.  Does  one  sin  against  justice  in  buying,  at  a  low 
price,  some  precious  objects  exposed  for  sale  by  dealers  of  an- 
tiquity ? 

Ans.  No  ;  because  those  things  are  supposed  to  have  lost  their 
former  price,  for  another  price  admitted  by  custom  and  the  agree- 
ment of  the  contracting  parties.  Consequent!}',  there  exists  the 
greatest  latitude  in  the  price  of  these  objects.  It  is  for  that  rea- 
son that  one  buys  for  a  few  francs  some  books  which  might  have 
•been  sold  for  five  or  ten  francs.  Likewise,  in  the  purchase  of 
second  hand  pieces  of  ancient  furniture,  which  are  commonly 
regarded  as  having  an  inferior  value. 

ART.  III.     Principal  kind  of  sales. 
Section  1.     Retrovendition  and  mohatra. 

903. — Metrovendition  is  a  contract  b}^  which  the  seller  reserves 
the  right  to  buy  his  property  back,  under  condition  that  he  will 
take  account  of  the  improvements,  outlays,  etc. 

Mohatra  is  a  sort  of  re-sale,  or  contract,  by  which  one  sells  a 
thing  at  a  higher  price,  under  condition  that  the  buyer  sells  it 
again  at  an  inferior  price  after  having  paid  for  it.   .   .   . 

906. — Ques.     What  must  we  think  of  the  mohatra  contract. 

Ans.  It  is  a  usurious  and  illicit  contract,  in  principle,  which 
was  condemned  b}'  Innocent  XI.  Prop.  40th. 

However,  we  must  not  condemn  this  contract,  if  the  gain  does 
not  exceed  the  legal  rate  of  interest  for  the  lent  money. 

There  is  a  recent  commercial  transaction,  included  in  the  re-sale, 
called  Report.  .  .  .  This  kind  of  re-sale  should  not  be  condemned, 
in  principle,  provided  the  overplus  does  not  exceed  the  legal  rate  ; 
for  one  would  fall  easily  into  usury  and  mohatra,  if  one  did  not 
keep  himself  within  those  just  limiis. 

There  are  some,  however,  who  enlarge  those  limits,  and  that 
from  an  opinion  not  im[)robable. 

Section  2.     Auction  sale.  .   .  . 

910. —  Ques.  Can  a  puichaser  make  an  agreement  with  others 
not  to  outbid  him,  or  offer  more  than  he  ? 

Ans.     No,  at  least  in  the  case  of  a  forced  auction  sale,  because 


Treatise  on  Contracts.  2G3 

the  seller  has  the  \\%\\i  to  require  that  the  purchasers  be  perfectly 
fiee,  ill  Older  to  increase  the  bids.  However,  Cardinal  Luî^o,  with 
Diana  and  others,  seem  to  have  the  contrary  opinion,  at  least,  as 
to  the  sin  of  injustice. 

911. — Ques.  Can  a  purchaser  request  others  not  to  bid  in  the 
auction  ? 

Ans.  Yes,  because  in  so  doing,  the  right  of  tlie  seller  is  not 
violated,  inasmuch  as  the  liberty  of  outbidding  is  not  suppressed, 
and  the  purchaser  only  watches  his  own  interests.  However,  the 
requests  should  not  be  importunate.* 

Skction  3.     Monopoly. 

914. — Ques.  Do  merchants  sin  ngainst  justice  or  charity  when, 
at  tlij  time  of  the  harvest  or  vintage,  they  buy  at  low  and  current 
prices  all  the  wheat  or  wine  of  the  country,  in  order  to  sell  them 
dearer? 

Ans.  1.  No,  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion,  as  to 
the  justice,  provided  they  do  not  exceed  the  maximum  price  that 
one  can  obtain  outside  of  the  monopoly  ;  for  they  do  not  violate 
111  y  law. 

2.  No,  according  to  the  probable  opinion,  as  to  charity,  pro- 
vided they  do  not  induce  others  to  sell  dearer,  nor  exceed  the 
maximum  price  ;  for  merchants  use  their  rights,  and  no  one  is 
held  to  neglect  his  own  interests  in  order  to  avoid  a  loss  to  others, 
inasmuch  as  one  is  not  constrained  to  it. 

Section  4.     Sale  by  middle-men.  .  .   . 

CHAPTER  ir. 

Partnership  and  Treble  Contracts. 

ART.  I.     Partnership. 

917. —  A  partnership-contract  is  an  agreement  concerning  a 
thing  to  be  possessed  in  common  for  the  common  interest,  or  lor 
a  proportional  gain. 

*  See  the  Penal  Code,  Art.  412,  which  punislies  such  actions  with  im- 
prisonment, Irotii  tifteeu  days  to  three  months,  and  a  tine  of  from  one 
liuudied  to  live  thousand  francs. 


264  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

ART.  II.     Treble  contract.   .  .  . 

CHAPTER  III. 
Renting. 


CHAPTER  TV. 

929. —  Ques.  Ought  the  exchange,  commonly  called  of  Frank- 
fort^ to  be  allowed,  in  which  the  money-changer  lends  money  tliat 
one  ought  to  pay  back  at  the  next  stock-market,  so  that  the  piotit 
increases  in  proportion  to  the  delay? 

Ans.  Yes,  if  it  is  in  virtue  of  a  discontinuance  of  gain,  conse- 
quent loss,  etc.,  etc.     Otherwise,  there  is  controversy. 

CHAPTER  V. 

Quit- RENT. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Subsidiary  Contracts. 
ART.  I.     The  Bondsman.   .  .•  . 
ART.  IL     The  Security.   .   .  . 
ART.  HI.     The  Mortgage.  .   .  . 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

Contingent  Contracts. 

940. —  These  are  of  different  kinds:  insurance,  betting,  the 
lottery,  and  gambling.  They  are  called  contingent,  because  they 
are  exposed  to  the  vicissitudes  of  fate. 

ART.  I.     Insurance.   .   .  . 

ART.  II.     Betting.   ... 


Treatise  on   Contracts,  265 

ART.  III.     The  Lottery.   .  .  . 
ART.  IV.     Gambling.   .   .  . 

There  are  three  kinds  of  o^ambling  :  Ingenious,  where  the  suc- 
cess depends  upon  the  skill  of  the  gambler  ;  Contingent,  vvhicli 
depends  especially  on  chance  ;  Mixed,  where  cleverness  and  hazard 
mix  themselves. 

945. —  Any  one  of  them  is  illicit  in  itself,  under  certain  con- 
ditions.  .   .  . 

948. —  Ques.  Is  the  winner  in  a  prohibited  game  obliged  to 
make  restitution  to  his  victim  ? 

Ans.  No,  because  this  contract  is  not  declared  void,  but  illicit 
only.  ... 


Cases  on  ffontracts  in  fficncraL 


Case  I. 
Motive  of  the  Contkactoii. 

Marius  says  to  Antoine:  "I  will  deliver  3'ou  of  your  enemy 
Titius,  if  3'ou  will  proniise  me  one  lumdred  louis,  fifty  immediatel}-, 
the  remainder  alter  the  death  of  Titius."  Antoine  consents  to  it. 
Marius  receives  fifty  louis,  and  kills  Titius. 

Ques.  Can  Marius,  the  homicide  committed,  keep  the  money 
which  he  has  received,  and  claim  the  rest  which  is  promised  to 
him? 

Ans.  There  is  controversy  ;  according  to  the  probable  opinion, 
Marius  can  keep  what  was  promised  to  him  by  contract.  Tiiis  is 
the  opinion  of  St.  Liguori,  contrary  to  those  of  many  others  ; 
because,  allhoiigh  the  contract  may  not  be  valid  on  account  of  its 
sliamef ui  and  bad  object  intrinsically,  nevertheless,  after  the  crime 
is  committed,  it  seems  to  have  been  a  contract  whose  nature 
exacts  that,  whenever  one  of  the  two  contracting  parties  has  kept 
his  word,  the  other  ought  to  keep  his,  if  he  can  do  it  justly.  For, 
althougii  this  shameful  action  mav  be  unworthy  of  any  reward,  yet 
it  deserves  some  recompense,  as  difficult,  perilous  or  shameful  for 
the  author.  Then,  after  the  crime,  there  is  no  sin  if  the  party 
who  has  promised  the  money  gives  it.  Then,  Marius,  according 
to  the  probable  opinion,  can  keep  what  he  has  received,  and  claim 
what  Titius  has  promised  him. 

Case   II. 

Motive  of  the  Contract. 

Armeline,  a  young  girl,  having  received  some  money  from 
Loelius,  who  urges  her  to  sin  with  him,  after  having  refused  to 
commit  the  shameful  act,  keeps  the  money. 


I 


Cases  on   Contracts   in   General.  267 

Ques.     Can  Armeline  keep  the  money  received  from  Lœlkis? 

Ans.  Yes,  without  any  injustice  ;  for  there  was  no  agreement 
to  commit  the  sin,  inasmuch  as  the  money  was  used  only  to  solicit 
the  young  girl. 

Case  III. 

Contracts  for  a  Shameful  Object. 

1.  Valfrid  has  induced  Elodie  to  sin  with  him,  on  condition 
that,  if  she  yields  to  his  wishes,  he  will  marry  her.  But,  after  the 
crime,  he  refuses  to  keep  his  promise  ;  because,  says  he,  no  child 
will  come,  and,  consequently,  he  has  no  damage  to  repair. 

2.  Léonce  induced  Camille  to  sin  with  him,  by  promising 
money  to  her  ;  but  after  the  sin,  the  rogue  gives  nothing  to  the 
unhappy  woman.  Having  declered  this  to  his  confessor,  he  is 
constrained  by  the  latter  to  give  money  for  a  grave  motive. 

Qiies.  1.     Is  Valfrid  held  to  marry  Elodie? 

Ques.  2.  Has  Léonce  sinned  gravely  in  not  giving  the  promised 
money?     If  he  had  given  it,  could  Camille  keep  the  money? 

Ans.  Question  1.  Valfrid,  according  to  the  more  common 
opinion,  onglit  to  marry  Elodie  ;  because  there  has  been  a  contract 
having  no  special  denomination  du  ut  des.  .  .  .  However,  others 
more  recent  oppose  the  plea  of  nullity  drawn  from  the  shameful 
contract. 

But  St.  Liguori,  and  the  majority  of  doctors,  make  some  excep- 
tions :  1,  if  one  fears  that  the  marriage  may  have  a  disagreeable 
result  ;  ...  2,  if,  when  Valfrid  made  the  acquaintance  of  Elodie, 
he  believed  that  she  was  a  virgin  and  discovered  that  she  was  not  ; 
3,  if,  from  the  marriage,  shame  should  reflect  upon  the  family;  4 
more  probably,  if  the  condition  of  the  man  is  very  superior  to  that 
of  the  woman. 

Ans.  Question  2.  Léonce,  according  to  the  probable  opinion,  is 
not  held  to  pay  the  promised  money,  if  there  is  no  wrong  to  repair, 
as  most  frequently  happens  ;  because  a  contract  having  for  its 
subject  a  shameful  object  has  no  value,  and  there  is  evidently  no 
obligation  coming  from  another  motive.  But  if  the  woman  had 
received  the  money,  according  to  the  probable  opinion,  she  would 
not  be  obliged  to  give  it  back,  from  what  was  said  above. 


268  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits» 

Case  XI. 
Condition  in  the  Contract. 

Frederic,  a  rich  man,  without  children,  on  the  point  of  death 
makes  the  following  will:  1,  he  gives  to  Rose,  a  poor  young  girl 
one  thousand  louis  if  she  marries  ;  2,  to  Rosalie,  his  God-daushter 
one  hundred  louis  if  she  enters  a  convent.  But  after  his  death 
Rose  wishes  to  enter  a  convent,  and  Rosalie  to  marry. 

Ques.  1.  Can  Rose  keep  the  legacy,  although  she  may  not  hav( 
fulfilled  the  condition? 

Ques.  2.  Has  Rosalie  a  right  to  the  legacy  which  has  been  lef 
to  her? 

Ans.  Question  1.  Rose  has  a  right  to  the  legacy,  because  th( 
testator  wished  evidently  to  favor  her  in  forcing  her  to  embrace  an 
honorable  condition,  where  the  body  and  soul  would  encounter  no 
peril.  Moreover,  the  religious  state  is  a  true  spiritual  marriage  ; 
and  if  it  was  excluded  by  the  testator,  it  would  be  a  shameful 
condition,  which  would  not  be  considered  as  having  been  added. 
Thus  the  testator  is  presumed  to  have  wished  to  protect  Rose,  who 
could  thus  make  an  honorable  marriage,  or  choose  another  honor- 
able condition.  However,  it  is  necessary  to  examine  the  circum- 
stances ;  for  if  the  testator  had  said  :  ''I  leave  one  thousand  louis 
to  Rose  if  she  marries  my  cousin  Peter,"  the  disposition  falls  if 
the  marriage  does  not  take  place  ;  for  the  testator  wished  to  favor 
not  only  Rose,  but  also  his  cousin  Peter. 

Ans.  Question  2.  The  legacy  is  owed  also  to  Rosalie  ;  because, 
from  the  circumstances,  one  can  presume  that  the  testator  had 
wished  to  favor  her  in  a  a  special  manner,  inasmuch  as  she  is  his 
God-daughter  ;  and  he  is  not  considered  as  having  wished  to 
deprive  her  of  this  legacy  if  she  felt  no  vocation  for  the  religious 
state. 

Case  XIV. 
The  Disemboweled  Dog. 

Fulgence  lends  one  thousand  francs  to  Drusille.  At  the  fixed 
time  the  latter  goes  to  Fulgence,  in  order  to  pay  his  debt.  He 
finds  him  taking  his  breakfast  with  his  family.  Received  with  affa- 
bility and  invited,  he  takes  a  seat  at  the  table.     He  leaves  on  the 


Cases  on  Contracts  in   General.  269 

table  a  one-tliousand-franc  bill,  without  thinking  of  what  will  hap- 
pen. Wliile  the  guests  give  themselves  up  to  mirth,  a  gust  of  wind, 
coming  unexpected!}',  raises  the  bill  and  dashes  it  into  a  dish  full 
of  sauce.  Fulgence  pulls  it  out  immediately,  and  holding  it  by 
one  corner,  drains  it  at  the  end  of  the  table.  But,  alas  !  there  is 
a  dog  who,  seeing  the  bill  covered  with  sauce,  seizes  and  swallows 
it.  Immediately  it  is  decided  to  kill  the  dog  ;  but  the  animal  runs 
away,  and  comes  back  only  in  the  evening.  He  is  soon  disem- 
boweled, but  too  late,  the  bill  was  entirely  digested.  From  this 
proceeds  a  suit  in  law  between  Fulgence  and  Drusille. 

Ques.     Which  one  of  these  two  should  suffer  the  loss? 

Ans.  Here  is  a  dog  uselessly  killed  ;  his  death  cannot  present 
a  very  grave  suit  in  law.  It  is  necessary  to  solve  the  question  ; 
butin  favor  of  whom,  creditor  or  debtor?  Will  the  two  parties  be 
compelled  to  divide  the  loss?  I  think  that  Drusille,  the  debtor, 
should  be  exempted  from  the  obligation  to  pay  the  sum.  You  will 
yield  the  right  to  me,  if  ever  so  little  you  examine  the  matter  ;  for 
Drusille  has  shown  the  bill  before  all  the  guests,  and  placed  it  on 
the  table  before  Fulgence,  who  saw  it.  Who  of  the  guests  doubted 
that  the  payment  was  made?  Nobody,  assuredly-.  Then,  the 
creditor  is  considered  as  having  received  what  was  owed  to  him. 
Then,  if  the  bill  comes  to  be  lost,  it  is  lost  for  its  owner,  Fulgence. 
Besides,  was  the  bill  not  lost  in  his  own  hands,  rather  by  his  dog, 
when  he  held  it?  Therefore,  Fulgence  alone  ought  to  undergo  the 
loss  of  the  money  and  dog. 


Cases  on  ^promises  anîï  Bonations. 


Case  I. 
Promise. 

1.  Marcel  has  promised  to  give  three  hundred  louis  dowry  to 
Appolonie,  if  she  consents  to  marry  Albert.  For  a  while,  the  young 
girl  does  not  know  what  to  do  ;  but  her  father  gladly  accepts  in 
her  behalf.  H  )wever,  Marcel,  changing  his  mind,  promises  to 
give  that  monej^  partly  to  a  hospital,  partly  to  the  poor,  and 
partly  to  a  cousin  of  his,  five  years  of  age.  But  he  changes  his 
mind  once  more,  and  finally  keeps  the  money  for  himself. 

2.  Victorin,  a  priest,  promises  to  his  friends,  besides  a  special 
mention  in  his  daily  prayers,  that  he  will  celebrate  a  mass  for 
them  ;  but  he  often  neglects  to  keep  his  promise. 

Ques.     To  what  extent  has  Marcel  or  Victorin  sinned? 

Ans.  Marcel  has  not  sinned  by  refusing  the  money  promised  to 
Appolonie  ;  because,  as  it  was  a  question  of  an  onerous  contract, 
the  young  girl's  father  could  not  very  well  accept  in  her  behalf. 
And  he  has  not  sinned  by  changing  his  mind  a  second  time  ; 
because  no  ac  reptation  resulted  from  these  various  promises. 

Victorin  has,  in  fact,  committed  but  a  venial  s'n,  had  he  strictly 
promised  ;  but  in  most  instances  such  promises  are  simply  an 
intention  suggested,  and  are  not  strict  promises.  However,  you 
will  notice  that  the  most  part  of  the  time,  the  acceptation,  which 
should  be  given,  is  missing. 

Case  III. 

Donation  Between  Living  Parties. 

Benno,  on  his  death-bed,  resolves  to  give  one  thousand  francs 
to  Margaret,  his  wife,  as  a  reward  for  her  kindness,  care  and 
services  to  him,  and  also  that  she  should  not  be  disrespectfully 


Cases  on   Promises  and  Donations.  271 

treated,  and  even  scorned,  by  his  only  son.  lie  therefore  requests 
her  to  take  the  money,  which  is  placed  in  a  safe.  She  accepts; 
but  thinking  more  of  relieving  her  husband  than  of  looking  after 
her  own  interests,  she  only  takes  that  money  after  the  donator's 
death. 

Ques.  Is  the  donation  valid?  Is  a  wife  allowed  to  take  the 
money  after  her  husband's  death?  Would  the  son  be  entitled  lo 
contest  the  donation  ? 

Ans.  The  donation  made  to  Margaret  by  her  dying  husband  is 
quite  valid,  for  there  are  all  the  required  conditions  :  it  was  freely 
made,  clearly  determinated,  accepted  and  made  between  living 
parties,  by  a  man  fit  to  make  a  gift  :  so  it  is  to  be  supposed  that 
the  son's  legitimate  rights  can  not  be  wronged.  The  transfer  of 
the  money  has  therefore  been  made  in  favor  of  the  wife  when  her 
husband  was  still  living.  Consequentl}',  the  wife  is  at  liberty  to 
take  the  money  as  slie  thinks  fit,  either  before  or  after  her  husband's 
death.  The  question  of  circumstances  makes  no  difference  in  such 
a  case.  The  son,  therefore,  cannot  contest  the  donation,  inasmuch 
as  it  is  entirely  valid,  having  been  made  between  living  parties. 

Case  IV. 
Conditional  Donation. 

Qnidonius,  a  merchant,  had  promised  tliree  thousand  francs  to 
his  niece,  Bibiane,  who  was  upon  being  married;*  but  a  few 
years  later,  having  sustained  misfortunes,  and  besides,  Bibiane's 
husband  not  giving  him  satisfaction,  he  thinks  he  is  released  from 
his  promise. 

Ques.     Is  Quidonius  discharged  from  his  promise? 

Ans.  If  it  is  question  of  a  simple  promise,  Quidonius,  for  the 
two  alleged  reasons,  is  exempted  f  ro;n  any  obligation  ;  for  had  he 
foreseen  what  happened,  he  would  not  have  promised  anvthing. 
But  if  it  is  a  question  of  a  donation  between  living  parties,  it  is 
much  harder  to  withdraw  it  ;  for  tiie  decrease  of  his  fortune  is  not 
a  suflficient  cause  to  cancel  the  donation,  and  the  other  reason  is  of 
DO  value,  if  it  were  merely  based  on  the  bad  conduct  of  the  niece's 


272  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

husband  ;  unless  Qaidoni,us  had  been  most  outrageously  ill-treated 
by  his  son-in-law. 

Case  VI. 

Donation  for  Cause  of  Death. 

Privatus,  very  sick,  calls  his  servant,  and  says  to  her:  *'If  I 
happen  to  die,  you  will  take  from  my  safe  a  box  containing  one 
hundred  francs,  that  I  wish  to  give  you  after  my  death."  Beliue, 
exalted  with  joy  and  sorrow,  gives  many  thanks  to  her  master. 
But  the  heirs  were  present,  anxiously  waiting.  As  soon  as  Priva- 
tus liad  passed  away,  all  his  propert}^  is  put  under  seal,  and  conse- 
quently the  unfortunate  servant  cannot  take  hold  of  the  said 
box.  She  makes  a  claim,  but  without  result,  and  is  rebuked  by 
the  heirs.  What  is  she  to  do  ?  She  catches  a  good  opportunity 
to  secure  a  secret  compensation. 

Ques.     Has  she  misused  secret  compensation? 

Ans.  Beline  had  a  right  to  take  such  a  compensation  ;  because 
she  was  entitled  to  receive  the  present,  and  it  happened  but  acci- 
dentally that  the  heirs  had  refused  it  to  her,  as  the}^  were  not 
certain  about  the  fact.  A  secret  compensation  is  allowed  by 
theologians  when  the  debt  is  positive,  and  the  creditor  cannot 
obtain  payment  by  any  other  means.  • 

Case  VII. 
Donation  for  Cause  of  Death. 

Galdinus,  being  without  children  and  severely  sick,  gives  to 
Monique,  his  wife,  one  hundred  francs,  and  his  word  that  she 
should  receive  three  hundred  francs  after  his  death.  When  he  is 
deceased,  his  wife  hastens  to  comply  with  his  last  wishes.  But 
soon  after,  Pontius,  the  heir  to  all  the  estate,  sues  her  in  court, 
requesting  her  to  swear  that  she  has  not  taken  anything  from  th( 
dead  man's  property. 

Ques.     Shall  Monique  swear  she  has  not  taken  anything? 

Ans.  Yes  ;  because  she  has  only  taken  what  belonged  t( 
her  ;  for  at  the  death  of  the  husband,  the  property  of  the  givei 
money  is  granted  to  the  wife  ;  the  money,   therefore,   belongec 


Caftes  on  Promises  and  Donations.  273 

to  lier.  Consequently,  she  lias  not  taken  wliat  did  not  belong 
to  her.  Nobody  has  a  right  to  ask  her  questions  on  the  man- 
nei'  she  disposed  of  her  propert}'.  She  is  therefore  right  in  swear- 
ing that  she  has  not  received  anything  of  the  estate  of  thj  deceased  ; 
that  is  to  say,  nothing  whicli  was  belonging  to  liim.  Do  not  say 
the  donation  for  cause  of  death  is  declared  null  by  the  French  law  ; 
for  it  is  only  rendered  void  by  a  judgment,  but  not,  probably,  ipso 
facto.,  as  will  be  further  stated  regarding  wills  having  a  lack  of 
legal  formalities.  Moreover,  as  it  has  been  above  meniioned,  the 
donations  made  from  hand  to  hand  are  not  considered  as  void. 

Case  VIIL 
Donation  for  Cause  of  Death. 

Philemon,  being  dangerously  sick,  says  to  Anna,  his  wife:  "I 
give  you  one  thousand  francs,  which  you  will  find  in  our  safe,  in 
order  to  reward  your  good  care  and  solicitude  towards  me." 
Anna  accepts  with  thankfulness.  But  the  sons  that  Philemon  has 
had  from  a  former  marriage,  endeavor  to  persuade  their  father  to 
give  up  his  decision,  but  without  success.  Consequently,  after 
his  death,  they  contest  the  donation  as  being  prejudicial  to  their 
interests. 

Ques.  Shall  Anna  receive  and  keep  the  given  money,  at  least 
before  the  judge's  verdict  ? 

Ans.  Anna  could,  without  any  remorse  of  conscience,  keep  the 
n  oney,  at  least  before  the  judgment:  unless  she  ma}'  have 
encroached  on  her  legitimate  rights.  In  the  latter  case,  she  should 
keep  only  a  fixed  sura  in  proportion  to  the  surplus.  For  a  legiti- 
mate donation  transmits  the  disposable  property  from  one  party  to 
another.     Now,  this  donation  was  legitimate. 

Case  IX. 

Donation  Made  by  a  Dying  Man,  and  Denied  by  His  Heir. 

Gennadius  had  lent  to  his  brother  Henry,  a  dealer,  one  thousand 
louis,  without  interest,  for  two  years,  in  order  to  help  him  out  of  a 


27'1-  TJie  D'ctrine  q/  (he  Jesuits. 

great  misfortiiue.  One  year  later,  Gennadins  is  taken  very  sick, 
and  is  iu  great  danger  of  death.  Henr}',  giving  him  a  call,  ui  gently 
asks  his  brother  to  give  him  discharge  of  his  debt.  ''  I  gladly  give 
you  that  money/'  answers  Gennadins,  "as  my  only  son  has  enough 
for  himself.  However,  I  desire  you  to  say  nothing  to  anybody  about 
it."  After  the  death  of  Gennadins,  his  son  Nestor  finds  a  letter  iu 
which  his  Uncle  Henry  thanked  Gennadins  for  the  money  which 
the  latter  had  lent  him  for  two  years  without  interest.  When  tbo 
time  is  over,  the  son  claims  tlie  amount.  Henry»  astonished, 
refuses  to  pay,  declaring  that  Nestor's  father  had  given  him  tliis 
money.  But,  not  being  able  to  prove  that  assertion,  he  is  con- 
demned to  pay. 

Ques.  Will  Henry  have  a  right  to  secure  a  secret  compensa- 
tion after  the  judgment  is  over? 

Ans.  Yes,  that  is  clear,  from  what  has  been  said  ;  for  Henry 
was  no  longer  Gennadius'  debtor  before  God,  as  he  had  obtained 
the  remittance  of  his  debt.  Therefore,  the  judgment  is,  at  least 
materially,  unjust  and  null,  as  bused  on  a  false  presumption  of  a 
peculiar  fact,  that  is  to  say,  of  a  debt  contracted  and  not  paid  or 
given  up.  Now,  as  soon  as  the  judgment  is  materially  unjust,  one 
is  not  obliged  to  obey  it  in  conscience.  Henry,  therefore,  was 
unjustly  forced  to  pay  ;  consequently  he  is  entitled  to  take  back 
what  he  has  paid  l)y  constraint.  In  fact,  Nestor  has  received  what 
was  not  belonging  to  him.  Therefore  his  uncle  would  not  wrong 
him,  if  he  were  to  take  back,  without  saying  a  word,  the  money  he 
had  to  pay  by  force. 

Case  X. 
Parents'  Donation. 

Augustus  has  two  sons  ;  one  is  endowed  with  remarkable 
qualities,  the  other  is  a  coarse  drunkard  and  a  spendthrift.  Besides 
the  third  of  his  property,  left  by  a  will  to  the  first  one,  Augustus 
gives  him  some  notable  gifts,  while  recommending  to  him  to 
relieve,  in  the  future,  his  ])rother  from  poverty. 

Ques.     What  mu»t  we  think  of  Augustus? 


Cases  on  Promises  and  Donations.  275 

Ans.  Augustus,  far  from  having  committod  the  sin  of  injustice, 
has  shown  very  praiseworthy  prudence  and  wisdom  ;  as  by  so 
dealing  he  has  thought  of  the  future  of  his  spendthrift  son,  so  tiiat 
he  miglit  be  able  to  secure  some  bread,  after  having  squandered 
all  his  share.     Therefore,  we  must  not  blame  him. 


Cases  on  EEills  anîi  îLrgacîcs^ 


Case  II. 
Value  of  the  "Will. 


Sabas,  having  no  consideration  for  his  brother  Potamius, 
appoints  Placide,  bis  second  cousin,  as  his  heir  ;  but  before  he  can 
sign  the  will,  Sabas  suddenly  dies,  and  Potamius  receives  the 
inheritance.  Placide,  frustrated,  keeps,  without  sa3'ing  a  word, 
one  thousand  francs,  which  the  testator  had  lent  him. 

Ques.     Has  Placide  a  right  to  keep  the  above  sum  ? 

Ans.  Yes,  most  probably.  For,  the  party  apponited  heir  by 
an  illegal  will  is  entitled  to  keep  the  inheritance  by  jmlural  right, 
until  he  may  be  deprived  of  it  by  a  judgment  ;  moreover,  he  has  a 
rigl.t  to  keep  a  part  of  it.  For,  in  this  case,  no  judgment  inter- 
feres. Therefore,  Placide  may  quietly  retain  the  money  which  was 
lent  to  him. 

Case  III. 

Value  of  the  Will. — Xocturnal  Spectre. 

Vulpin,  a  cunning  man,  having  two  marriageable  daughters,  and 
not  being  able  to  give  them  a  dowrj',  imagines  a  good  scheme  to 
get  out  of  his  trouble.  Not  far  from  the  borough  was  a  beautiful 
cottage,  where  was  residing  Euphemie,  an  old  lady,  without  any 
near  heirs.  Desiring  to  secure  the  succession,  Vulpin  conceives  a 
plan  to  secure  it  for  himself  or  his  daughters.  During  a  very  dark 
night,  a  great  noise  was  heard  in  her  h»  use.  Eupluniie,  fright- 
ened, trembling,  cries  out.  Same  noise  takes  ]»lace  for  many 
nights,  with  the  same  anguishes  of  the  old  lady.  But  Vulpin,  who 
was  the  author  of  it,  calls  upon  her,  under  some  pretext,  learns 
from  her  what  he  well  knew,  comforts  her,  and  gives  lier  the  advice 
to  leave  this  cursed  house  and  to  shelter  in  his  own.    She  consents, 


Cases  on  Wills  and  Legacies.  '211 

and  is  welcomed.  Treated  with  the  greatest  care  and  consideration, 
in  return,  she  makes  a  will  in  favor  of  Vulpin's  daughters,  and 
dies  soon  after. 

Ques.  1.  Ought  Vulpin's  daugliters,  having  inherited  in  good 
faith,  to  give  back  tlie  monej-,  if  they  learn  in  course  of  time  the 
trick  of  their  father  ? 

Qnes.  2.  Should  Vulpin  return  the  money  in  behalf  of  his 
daughters?    Qaid^  or  in  case  he  had  been  appointed  heir  himself? 

Ans.  Question  1.  Vulpin's  daughters,  who  became  heiresses  in 
good  faith,  bhould  be  dispensed  of  any  restitution.  They  have 
not  acted  unjustly  in  any  way  ;  on  the  contrary,  with  true  eliarity, 
they  have  shown  themselves  ver}'  serviceable  to  Eui)hemie,  and 
they  do  not  possess  what  does  n(-t  belong  to  them,  as  they  have 
received  it  through  a  legitimate  will. 

Ans.  Question  2.  Vulpin  should  not  make  restitution  for  his 
daughters  ;  because  he  was  not  the  cause,  but  only  the  occasion  of 
the  will  made  in  their  favor;  inasmuch  as  ftar  had  no  influence, 
in  a  direct  and  efficacious  manner,  upon  the  deed  which  lias 
appointed  his  daughters  heiresses  ;  for  Euphemie  was  free  to  do  it 
or  not  ;  to  revoke  it,  or  pay  the  young  girls'  services  by  some  other 
gifts.  If  he  had  himself  inherited,  the  case  should  be  resolved  in 
the  same  manner,  for  the  same  reasons  would  be  valid. 

Case  VI. 
Will  Destroyed  by  Hazard,  and  Reconstructed  by  Artfulness. 

Chrysanthe,  before  dying,  leaves  to  Adrian  a  will  written  by  his 
own  hand,  in  his  favor.  After  Ch3'sanlhe's  dt-ath,  the  hapi)y 
Adrian  reads  over  the  will  witli  delight,  then  places  it  on  a  table, 
and  goes  to  blow  the  fire.  Unluckily  the  door  opens  itself,  and  a 
di  aught  throws  the  sheet  of  paper  in  the  fire.  Adrian  hastens  and 
endeavors,  but  without  success,  to  save  it  from  the  flames.  But 
it  is  entirely  burnt.  Adrian,  in  despair,  thinks  to  use  a  queer 
process,  lie  imitât  s  perfectly  the  dead  man's  handwriting  and 
signature,  and  thereby  reconstructs  the  whole  will. 

Ques.  Should  he  by  right  make  restitution  to  the  natural 
heirs? 


278  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

Ans.  No,  as  having  been  appointed  legitimate  heir,  through  a 
valid  will,  immediately  after  the  death  of  the  testator,  he,  there- 
fore, has  evidently  acquired  a  certain  and  strict  right  to  the 
inheritance.  Now,  this  right  once  acquired,  cannot  be  lost  by  the 
destruction  of  the  deed,  but  only  by  a  voluntary  assignment,  or  a 
legitimate  transfer  of  property.  Consequently,  Adrian  has  not 
lost  his  right  ;  for,  why  should  the  right  in  itself,  or  the  strict 
right,  be  burnt  and  reduced  to  ashes,  like  the  paper-title  which 
is  the  proof  of  it?     Not  at  all. 

Now,  if  Adrian  has  a  strict  right  to  the  inheritance,  he  cannot 
act  unjustly  by  using  such  means,  although  they  may  be  unlawful, 
in  order  to  secure  his  rights,  and  he  does  not  wrong  the  otiier 
relatives  by  shrewdly  preventing  their  inheriting,  as  they  have  no 
right  to  it. 

Case  XI. 
Legacies. 

Mercorus  had  promised  to  leave  one  hundred  louis  to  Publius,  in 
his  will.  But  being  suddenly  taken  ill,  and  in  danger  of  death,  he 
calls  bis  son  Andrea,  and  says  to  him  :  "  I  wish  3'ou  to  give  one 
hundred  louis  to  Publius."  Just  after  these  words  he  die;?,  without 
leaving  any  written  will. 

Ques.     Should  Andrea  give  the  money  to  Publius? 

Ans.  Probably,  he  is  not  held,  at  least  on  principle,  to  settle 
his  father's  legacy;  because  this  manner  of  disposing  of  his 
property  is  not  in  accordance  with  the  law  ;  for  probably  a  legacy 
is  effective  when  it  is  based  on  a  valid  will,  except  in  case  the  son 
should  have  promised  his  father  to  comply  with  his  desire  ;  as 
there  would  have  been  tacit  contract,  by  which  the  son  would  be 
bound  to  settle  the  legacy  ;  for  the  father,  trusting  in  the  promise 
of  his  son,  abstains  from  transferring  the  legacy  in  a  safer  way. 
I  said  probably^  as  there  exists  a  great  controversy  before  the 
judgment  ;  for  there  are  two  probable  opinions.  Some  bind  the 
heir,  by  natural  right,  to  fulfil  the  dead  man's  desire  ;  and  others 
are  opposed  to  it,  by  maintaining  the  regular  disposition  of  the 
law. 


Cases  on  Wills  and  Legacies,  279 

Case   XII. 
Conditional  Legacies. 

Calopodius,  before  dying,  without  children,  thus  disposes  of  his 
piopeity  by  a  will.  First,  lie  leaves  liis  m.ansioQ  to  his  wife,  and 
the  value  of  this  house  to  his  niece,  providing  both  live  in  the 
greatest  chastity.  Second,  he  leaves  one  thousand  francs  dowry 
lo  a  young  orphan  giil,  to  be  named  by  the  parson. 

But  after  a  few  3'ears  of  widowhood,  his  wife  naarries  again. 
His  niece  secretly  commits  the  crime  of  fornication.  The  pardon 
chooses  a  young  girl  having  yet  father  and  mother,  veiy  poor,  old 
and  infirm,  intending  to  give  her  the  above  dowry. 

Ques.  1.  May  Calopo  lius'  wife  and  niece  enjoy  the  above- 
named  legacy  without  remorse  of  conscience? 

Ques.  2.  Should  the  dowry  be  given  to  the  young  girl  having 
patents  miserable  and  infirm? 

Ans.  Question  1.  Yes,  reganling  the  wife,  she  was  able  to 
marry  again  without  losing  the  legacy.  She  has  not  violated  the 
condition  to  live  chastely  ;  as,  properly  speaking,  chastity  is  not 
lost  by  this  marriage,  inasmuch  as  a  second  marriage  is  chaste. 
As  for  the  niece,  it  seems  that  there  must  also  be  shown  some 
indulgence  towards  her,  although  she  may  have  sinned,  for  the 
fault  was  kept  secret^  and  she  is  commonly  considered  as  a 
virgin.  And  it  mu-^t  not  be  presumed  that  the  testator  has  wished 
lo  cast  away  his  niece,  in  case  she  should  secretly  "commit  a  sin 
against  purity.  And  she  does  not  appear  herself  to  be  obliged 
to  confess  that  sin,  while  renouncing  ihj  inheritance. 

Ans.  Question  2.  The  priest  is  not  to  blame.  The  3'oung  girl 
he  has  chosen  may  enjoy  the  dowry,  although  she  may  not  be  a 
true  orphan;  because  she  has  an  equivalent  situation.  As  the 
testator  has  wished  to  give  the  dowry  to  an  unfortunate  girl,  in 
oidjr  to  save  her  from  dang  r,  therefore  his  intentions  are 
fulfilled. 

H  )wever,  in  accordance  with  many  theologians,  if  there  was 
another  young  girl  equally  miserable,  and  a  true  orphan,  she 
ought  to  be  preferred  ;  as,  in  case  the  intentions  of  the  testator 
may  ])ossib]y  bo  lulfilled  iu  their  proper  meaning,  they  shoukf  not 


280  TJie  Djctrlae  of  the  Jesuits. 

be  fulfilled  in  a  larger  sense.  But  a  great  many  think  otherwise. 
For  the  girl  who  has  infirm  an  1  incapable  parents  is  more  unfor- 
tunate than  the  one  who  has  not  any.  lier  soul  and  body  run 
more  dangers  ;  and,  consequently,  the  aim  which  the  douator 
proposed  to  attain,  is  indeed  properly  fulfilled. 

Case  XIF. 
Profane  Legacies  Showing  a  Lack  of  Legal  Formalities. 

Hector,  heir  of  Matthew,  by  the  latter's  will,  learns  through 
trustworthy  witnesses,  or  uotes  received  secretly,  that  he  has  to 
settle  certain  profane  legacies.  He  refuses  to  do  so,  because  the 
law  does  not  bind  him. 

Ques.     Should  Hector  pay  these  legacies? 

Ans.  No,  according  to  the  probable  opinion.  Hector  is  not 
held  to  pay  these  legacies  ;  unless  he  has  made  previous  agree- 
ment or  special  promise.  Tlie  reason  is,  that  these  dispositions, 
made  by  the  testator's  desire,  are  not  valid,  according  to 
the  probable  opinion,  even  before  the  judgment,  as  they  contain 
quite  a  lack  of  legal  formalities  ;  therefore,  the}^  ought  to  be 
considered  as  not  existing.  And  do  not  make  the  obj>  ction  that 
the  heir  knows  the  testator's  wishes  regarding  these  conditions  ; 
because  such  desire,  although  binding  by  the  natural  law,  become 
null  before  the  civil  law,  according  to  the  probable  opinion,  as 
lacking  ihe  legal  conditions  required. 

Case  XIV. 
Piocs  Legacies  Having  a  Lack  of  Legal  Formalities. 

Toussaint,  a  pious  man,  before  dying,  recommends  urgently  to 
his  son  Germain,  to  whom  he  leaves  a  rich  legacy,  to  have  two 
hundred  masses  celebrated  for  the  repose  of  his  soul,  and  to  give 
one  thousand  francs  for  the  relief  of  the  poor,  and  other  pious  uses. 
Germain,  after  his  father's  death,  pays  for  ten  masses,  but 
neglects  the  other  prescriptions  of  the  dead  man,  as  they  are  not 
in  accordance  with  the  conditions  required  by  the  law,  and  that 
consequently  he   is  not  held,  in  conscience,  to  fulfill  them.     His 


Cases  on  Wills  and  Legacies,  281 

confessor  learning  that,  refuses  to  give  him  absolution,  until  lie 
may  have  accomplislied  the  prescriptions  of  his  father. 

Qiies.  1.  Should  one,  in  conscience,  pay  pious  legacies,  even 
wlien  they  bear  a  lack  of  legal  condition? 

Qiies.  2.  Would  the  priest  in  this  case  be  able  to  give  absolu- 
tion to  Germain? 

Ans.  Question  1.  Yes,  this  opinion  is  positive,  whatever  con- 
troversy may  have  existed  formerly  on  this  subject.  It  is  the 
common  opinion,  followed  by  St.  Liguori  ;  because  pious  motives 
are  relative  to  the  church,  and  are  submitted  to  her  jurisdiction. 
No  ;  the  church  is  free  and  indei)endent  from  any  civil  power  for 
all  cases  submitted  to  her  jurisdiction.   .   .   . 

Ans.  Question  2.  From  what  has  been  said,  it  is  clear  that  the 
priest  must  not  show  any  indulgence  towards  Germain,  and  that 
he  cannot  be  granted  absolution.   ... 

Solution  1.  If  the  heir  is  certain  that  the  testator's  desire  was 
to  spend  some  money  for  pious  use,  although  it  may  not  be  pioved, 
practically,  however,  he  is  bound  in  his  conscience  to  comply 
with  the  desire  of  the  testator  ;  for  one  does  not  seek  the  proof 
when  sure  of  the  truth. 

2.  If  the  priest,  after  the  death  of  his  parishioner,  shows  a 
note  in  which  are  written  various  pious  legacies,  then,  if  one  recog- 
nizes, or  if  two  witnesses  are  able  to  i)rove  they  are  written  in  the 
handwriting  of  the  deceased  testator,  the  son  must  obey  his 
pious  will.  Rut  if  the  priest  has  simply  t:iken  note  of  the  lega- 
cies he  will  not  be  believed,  unless  there  is  another  witness. 
M  )reover,  priests  or  confessors  shall  not  receive  such  pious  lega- 
e  es  until  having  called  two  witnesses,  male  or  female.  However, 
one  witness  only  will  be  sufficient  in  addition  to  the  priest. 

3.  Pious  legacies  are  valid,  and  should  be  executed,  even  when 
they  are  stated  in  a  will  having  no  value  a'.nong  profane  matters. 

4.  If  the  dead  man,  having  commenced  to  write  his  wi  1,  is  Sur- 
prised by  death,  and  has  no  time  to  finish  it,  this  will,  though  null 
for  other  matters,  has  some  value  regarding  pious  legacies,  iu  spite 
of  its  imperfect  dispositions. 


282  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

Case  XV. 

Pious  Legacies. 

Philibert,  a  rich  and  pious  man,  without  necessary  lieirs, 
appoints  as  heirs,  by  a  will  in  due  form,  three  nephews  of  his, 
Marius,  Marin  and  Marie n,  providing  that  each  one  of  them  shall 
spend  one  thousand  francs  for  pious  uses.  But,  after  Philibert's 
death,  Marius  and  Marien,  more  avaricious  than  pious,  secure  by 
a  judgment  annulation  of  the  pious  legacies.  Marien  does  not 
know  what  to  do.  He  asks  for  advice,  and  is  answered  in  various 
manners. 

Qiies.  1.  Have  the  heirs  of  Philibert  a  right  to  put  aside  the 
pious  legacies  by  a  judgment? 

Qiies.  2.  Is  Marien  entitled  to  get  a  benefit  from  this  judgment, 
without  hurting  his  conscience? 

Ans.  Question  1.  No;  as  these  pious  legacies  are  stated  in  a 
valid  will.  If  they  accept  this  will  which  favors  them,  they 
should  also  accept  tbe  burden  which  results  from  it.  ("That  he 
who  looks  for  an  advantage  should  also  think  of  the  trouble.") 
Do  not  say  that  these  legacies  may  injure  the  rights  of  the  heirs  ; 
for  they  are  not  necessarily  heirs,  and  have  no  legal  right  to  the 
legacy  but  through  the  will.  Even  if  there  were  necessary  heirs, 
their  legitimate  rights  would  not  be  wronged  by  these  legacies,  as 
might  be  supposed  in  this  ca^e.  Are  pious  matters  inferior  to 
worldly  things?  If  Philibert,  by  a  lawful  will,  hud  left  fifteen 
thousand  francs  to  Bertha,  a  courtesan,  could  one  content  and 
break  this  legac}'?  Why  then  should  it  be  broken  when  it  is  in 
favor  of  the  poor  and  orphans?  Moreover,  from  what  has  been 
said  in  the  former  case,  pious  legacies  must  be  paid  even  when 
showing  a  lack  of  legal  conditions  ;  especiall}'  if  they  are  stated 
in  a  valid  will,  and  do  not  injure  the  right  of  the  heirs.  Therefore, 
those  heirs  ought  to  pay  those  pious  legacies,  or  renounce  the 
will. 

Ans.  Question  2.  Marien  cannot  enjoy  the  benefit  of  the  judg- 
ment which  bleaks  the  legacies,  although  he  may  not  have  pro- 
voked it,  it  is  clear  from  what  has  been  said  ;  he,  therefore,  should 
execute  the  legacy  for  what  concerns  himself. 


Cases  on  Cammotiate,  ©eposit,  fManîrate  ant!  îLoan> 


Case  I. 
Commodate. 


Exupere  has  lent  to  Tibule  some  carpets,  to  improve  rooms 
where  he  shall  receive  a  guest  of  high  rank.  After  the  latter's 
departure,  as  Tibule  was  taking  up  the  carpets  to  return  them,  his 
house  is  burnt  out  by  a  thunder-stroke,  with  all  things  borrowed. 
He  would  nevertheless  have  been  able  to  save  them,  if  he  had  not 
been  exclusively  thinking  to  save  his  own  furniture.  Exupere 
claims  of  Tibule  the  price  of  these  his  carpets,  who  refuses  to 
make  up  for  the  damage.  From  that,  a  suit  in  law  takes  place 
between  them. 

Ques.   1.     ShouULTibule  make  up  for  the  damage? 

Ques.  2.  Should  the  tenant  restore,  if  the  carpets  were  stolen, 
without  fault  of  his? 

Ans.  Question  1.  Tibule  should  not  give  anything,  if  he  was 
not  able  to  save  the  carpets,  because  tiie  d:im;ige  ought  to  be 
attributed  to  the  hazard,  and  that  nobody  is  responsible  for,  not 
even  before  the  law. 

Ans.  Question  2.  No;  because  as  there  is  no  theological  fault, 
there  is  consequently  no  obligation  to  make  restitution. 

Case  IT. 

Unfortunate  Borrower. 

Pibert,  a  dealer,  one  morning  discovers,  with  surprise,  that 
the  most  of  his  goods  has  been  stolen  during  the  night.  One  or 
two  days  later,  he  learns  that  the  thief  has  started  away  with  his 
goods  for  another  town,  distant  about  fifteen  miles.  Immediatel}^ 
he  asks  Marc,  his  neighbor  and  debtor,  to  lend  him  a  horse  to  run 
after  the  thief.     Riding  on  his  Buceplialus,  he  speedily  arrives  at 


284  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

tlio  (lirocted  place.  But,  nl^is  !  during  tlie  night,  while  lodging  nt 
the  hotel,  a  new  misfortune  happens  to  liim.  The  next  morning 
he  discovers,  with  astonishment,  that  his  horse  is  stolen.  Losing 
all  hope  to  recover  either  lii»  goods  or  his  horse,  he  is  obliged 
t  )  return  home  without  havmg  done  anything. 

Qiies.   1.     Should  Pibert  pay  the  [)rice  of  the  horse  to  Marc? 

Ques.  2.  If  Pibert,  with  the  help  of  the  horse,  had  recovered 
his  goods,  would  he  be  entitled  to  keep  the  horse,  not  being  able 
to  secure  otherwise  the  pajment  of  what  Marc  owes  him? 

Ans.  Question  1.  Pibert  is  not  held  to  pay  for  the  horse, 
before  a  judgment,  if  he  has  placed  him  in  a  safe  stable,  closed  to 
strangers  ;  because  the  borrower,  in  his  conscience,  is  not  held  to 
repair  the  damage  happening  to  loaned  things,  if  lie  has  not 
made  a  gross  theological  mistake.  Now  Pibert,  in  this  case,  has 
not  committed  such  a  fault.  Therefore,  in  his  conscience,  he  is 
not  held  to  any  compensation  for  the  loss  of  the  horse. 

Ans.  Question  2.  Yes,  in  his  own  judgment,  the  borrower 
could  retain  the  horse  as  long  as  the  proprietor  of  the  horse  has 
not  pd.id  his  debt.  Therefore  the  confessor  could  not  overlook  a 
compensation  of  that  kind,  unless  he  foresees  greater  inconven- 
ience resulting  from  it.  For  the  creditor  who  is  not  able  to 
obtain  payment,  has  a  right,  by  the  natural  law,  to  pay  himself  in 
taking  some  of  the  debtor's  property,  at  least  in  principle,  unless 
provoking  a  scandal,  or  other  inconveniences  which  would  result 
from  it. 

Case  VI. 
Deposit. 

Canut,  treasurer  for  a  prince,  invests  in  private  speculations 
the  money  trusted  to  him,  without  his  master's  knowledge,  and  by 
so  doing  secures  a  very  lair  profit. 

Ques.  Ma\'  Canut  consider  the  benefit  as  belonging  to  him,  or 
should  he  make  restitution  of  it? 

Ans.  Canut  has  a  right  to  keep  the  profit  secured  with  the 
help  of  the  prince's  money,  because  there  results  from  it  no 
wrong  to  the  latter,  since  that  money  would  not  otherwise  have 


Cases  on  Commodate^  D^yosit,  Mandate^  and,  Loan.   285 

been  made  use  of .     The  gain  which  results  from  it  ought  simply 
to  be  attribueed  to  the  cleverness  of  that  one  who  uses  it. 

Case  VIII. 
Mandatory. 

Saluste,  steward  for  a  rich  man,  has  orders  every  year  to  buy 
at  a  certain  price  all  the  clothes  needed  by  the  family,  from  a 
dealer  named  Cyrille.  But  Saluste  buys  cheaper  from  another 
dealer.  Sometimes  he  even  goes  to  another  town  in  order  to  buy 
the  cloth  cheaper.  He  keeps  for  himself  the  surplus  of  the  sum 
allowed  by  his  master,  and  which  he  has  not  spent. 

Ques.  Is  Saluste  entitled  to  keep  what  he  economizes  by  buy- 
ing in  another  town  ? 

Ans.  Yes,  because  the  gain  he  secures  by  going  somewhere 
else  and  buying  cheaper,  is  to  be  credited  to  his  work,  and  pecu- 
liar cleverness.     He  therefore  must  not  be  blamed. 

Case  XIY. 
Reason  Which  Excuses  Usury. 

Lucillus,  had  bought  a  large  quantity  of  wheat,  expecting  to 
find  a  favorable  opportunit}'  to  sell  it  with  a  large  profit.  In  the 
meantime,  Bibanius  requests  him  to  loan  him  fifty  francs.  '"That 
is  all  I  liave,"  says  he,  '"to  buy  some  wheat;  but  if  you  agree  to 
terms,  I  will  give  them  to  you,  providing  you  pay  me  the  interest 
over  the  legal  rate,  proportionately  to  the  profit  I  would  have  had 
with  the  wheat."  Bibanius  consents,  and  later  on  he  is  obliged 
to  pay  twelve  or  fifteen  per  cent,  on  account  of  the  profit  he  has 
prevented  Lucillus  from  realizing. 

Ques.     What  should  we  think  of  Lucillus? 

Ans.  Lucillus  should  not  be  bothered,  as  he  has  sustained  this 
loss  by  lending  his  money.  But  he  must  carefully  look  out  for 
the  danger  of  the  gambling  passion. 


I 


(îases  on  Sale  antï  its  Species* 


Case  VII. 
Remarkable  Picture  Bought  at  a  Low  Price. 

Basile,  a  parson,  buys  for  five  francs  of  a  peasant,  a  picture 
representing  the  Blessed  Virgin  Mary,  blackened  by  smoke.  The 
peasant  rejoices,  as  he  was  never  able  to  sell  that  picture,  even  at 
a  lower  price.  The  parson  hastens  to  clean  it,  and  place  it  in  his 
church.  Ten  d-iys  later,  a  renowned  English  painter,  walking  by 
chance  in  the  church,  examines  the  picture  and  offers  six  thou- 
sand francs  for  it,  for  he  has  recognized  a  master-piece  of  Raphael. 
The  parson  is  perfectly  astounded.  However,  he  thinks  that  it  is 
necessary  to  inquire  carefully  about  the  price  of  the  picture,  and 
he  conseqie.iLly  obtains  twenty  thousand  francs  from  the  English- 
man, which  money  he  devotes  to  some  repairs  in  his  ciuirch.  But 
soon  after,  while  thinking,  lie  doubts  whether  he  should  give  all 
his  benefit  to  the  peasant,  or  keep  it  for  himself. 

Ques.  Shall  the  priest,  in  this  case,  give  the  money  to  the 
peasant? 

Ans.  Bazile  must  not  be  annoyed,  as  that  precious  picture  was 
not  estimated  at  more  than  five  francs  by  both  contracting  parties, 
and  there  was  neither  swindling  nor  artfulness  in  the  contract. 
You  might  make  an  objection  perhaps,  that  this  error  is  substan- 
tial? No,  the  error  does  not  bear  on  the  substance,  but  only  on 
the  value  of  the  matter.  The  present  contract  is  therefore  almost 
insignificant^  and  he  who  is  protected  by  Providence  can  keep  his 
gain  with  full  justice. 

Case   XIV. 
Cunning   Seller. 
Valerius,  a  dealer,  has  imagined  various  smart  tricks  to  secure 


Cases  on  Sale  and  its  Sjiecies.  287 

an  advance  on  the  piice  of  liis  goods,  without  however  getting 
much  heyoud  the  limits  of  a  fair  price.  Often  he  tells  lie  after  lie, 
oalli  after  oath,  while  declaring  to  his  customers  that  he  cannot 
sell  cheaper,  that  he  has  sold  at  higher  figures  to  others,  or  that 
be  loses  on  his  goods. 

Ques.     Does  Valerius  act  unjustly? 

Ans.  Valerius  does  not  sin  in  priyiciple,  or  according  to  the 
common  opinion  ;  for  althougli  by  his  lies  and  oaths  lie  induces 
the  customer  to  buy  dearer,  he  is  not  however  held  to  make  resti- 
tution, because  everyone  knows  that  it  is  customary  with  dealers 
to  tell  such  lies.  Consequent  y,  customers  who  would  be  caught 
by  these  words,  should  impute  to  themselves  only  the  wrong  which 
Ihey  suffer. 

I  have  said,  in  principle  ;  because,  after  what  St.  Liguori  says, 
if  the  seller  noticed  that  in  one  special  iiist;ince  the  buyer  is  partic- 
ularly deceived  in  paying  too  high  prices,  the  seller  would  commit 
au  injustice  which  should  not  be  excused. 

Case  XVIII. 
Auction   Sale. 

I. — Olympius,  at  an  auction  sale,  desires  to  buy  a  picture,  and 
requests  his  friends  to  abstain  from  increasing  his  bid,  so  that  he 
can  secure  it  at  a  low  price.     His  friends  comply  with  his  request. 

II. — At  an  auction  sale  of  books,  from  the  library  of  a  deceased 
man,  three  priests  agree  that  each  time  one  of  them  wishes  to  buy 
a  book,  the  others  will  abstain. 

Ques.  1.     Has  Olympius  acted  unjustly? 

Ques.  2.  Might  the  priests,  without  injustice,  make  that  agree- 
ment? 

Ans.  Question  1.  No;  because  he  has  wronged  nobody:  not 
his  friends,  who  have  ceded  to  him  their  right  willingly,  nor  to  the 
seller  has  he  put  any  obstruction  to  the  lil>erty  of  bidding,  and 
the  buyer  may  take  this  course,  which  is  neither  base  nor  unjust. 
However,  his  request  should  not  go  so  far  as  to  hinder  other  buy- 
ers. 

Ans.  Question  2.     The  priests  have  not  committed  any   injus- 


288  The  Doctrine  o/  fJœ  Jesuits. 

tice,  if  there  does  not  exist  between  them  a  regular  ngreenient, 
but  onh'  an  intenlion  of  not  injuring  one  another.  This  case  is  as 
the  former  one,  as  there  is  no  contract,  so  to  speak.  Otherwise, 
that  will  become  injustice,  because  the  seller  may  compel  the  buy- 
ers to  remain  perfectly  independent,  and  that  no  one  sliould  prevent 
the  higlier  bid.  However,  according  to  the  probable  opinion, 
there  might  be  made  an  exception  to  this  rule,  iu  favor  of  relatives 
and  partners  in  trade,  because  they  act  morall}-  as  one  and  the 
same  person  only,  and  they  cannot  be  compelled  to  make  a  higher 
bid  against  themselves.  Friends  also  would  be,  according  to 
many  theologians,  excepted  from  this  rule,  being  practically  con- 
sidered as  partners. 

Case  XIX. 
Miraculous  Image  of  the  Blessed  Virgin. 

Gertrude,  a  godly  woman,  but  very  poor,  was  not  able  to  pay 
her  creditors.  Tiie  result  was,  that  all  her  furniture  was  sold  by 
auction,  on  a  public  square.  There  was,  among  the  lot,  a  picture 
of  the  Blessed  Virgin  Mary,  badly  painted,  and  covered  with  dust. 
The  woman  cries  out  that  she  has  a  g-eat  devotion  for  that 
picture,  because  it  can  perform  miracles  ;  she  insists  that  the 
picture  might  not  be  sold.  The  auctioneer  and  creditors  replv 
that  miracles  exist  no  longer,  and  that  the  Virgin  is  smothered 
with  dust.  Witness  to  this,  the  priest  Laurianus,  who  was 
there  by  chance,  feeling  indignant,  conceives  a  scheme  to  punish 
them  for  their  impiousness.  He  looks  carefully  at  the  picture, 
wi[)es  off  the  dust,  admires  it  ;  and  consequently  the  price  soon 
becomes  higher  and  higher,  until  the  debts  were  entire)}^  covered 
by  the  price  of  the  picture  alone.  Buyers,  surprised,  and  believ- 
ing it  a  precious  picture,  outbid  also.  Then  the  priest  says  to 
them:  "It  is  a  new  miracle,  Blessed  Virgin  Mary  has  sentenced 
to  a  great  fine  her  detractors,  and  with  an  image  of  no  value  she 
has  paid  all  the  debts  of  the  poor  woman,  and  saved  her  furni- 
ture." 

Ques.  Has  the  priest  Laurianus  acted  unjustly,  and  should  he 
make  restitution  ? 


Cases  on  Sale  and  its  Species.  289 

Ans.  Must  we  accuse  of  injustice  this  pious  priest,  who,  I  y 
charity  and  piety,  came  to  help  tliis  poor  wonnan,  almost  reduced 
to  poverty?  Must  we  condemn  that,  by  the  intermediary  of  which 
the  Blessed  Virgin  IMary  lias  worked  a  miracle?  Decidedh',  when 
considering  his  good  faith,  lie  must  be  excused.  But  what  are  we 
to  lliink  of  the  case  in  itself?  I  affirm,  that  when  examining  the 
rantter  as  it  stands,  I  find  the  priest  blameless.  For  one  is  not 
unjust  when  using  one's  own  right,  and  in  this  case  Laurianus 
has  used  his  right  ;  he  has  not  made  use  of  any  artful  means  to 
deceive  anyone;  he  has  not  had  any  partners  to  make  a  ficli- 
tious  higher  bid  ;  he  has  not  made  an  agreement  with  anybody  ; 
but  alone  he  has  shown  up  the  price  in  competition  with  many 
others.  Therefore,  he  has  not  acted  fiaudulently.  Do  not  say, 
the  priest  has  made  use  of  artfulness,  by  shamming,  to  outbid,  as 
this  outbidding  was  not  a  sham,  but  quite  true:  he  ran  the  ri.>k 
of  it  ;  he  should  have  been  comi)elled  to  keep  the  picture  if  the 
others  had  stopped.  And  do  not  say  he  has  deceived  others  by 
admiring  the  image,  as  he  has  not  shown  himself  at  all  as  a 
connoisseur,  and  often  ignorant  amateurs  seem  to  show  admira- 
tion more  than  otheis. 

Case  XXII. 
Compromise. 

Bcrtulfe,  having  a  discussion  with  Paulus  regarding  a  meadow, 
and  not  being  able  to  settle  the  difficulty,  decided  to  bring  the 
affair  before  the  judge,  when  his  adversary  pro{)Osed  to  him  to 
settle  everything  amicably,  so  as  to  avoi<l  the  costs  and  scandal 
of  a  suit  at  law.  Tin  y  consequently  conclude  a  compromise, 
from  which  Bertulfe  will  have  the  meadow,  but  will  have  to  pay 
one  thousand  francs  to  the  other  party.  After  the  affair  was  so 
arranged,  and  Paulus  had  received  the  money,  Bertulfe  lii.ds  a 
deed  which  clearly  proves  that  the  meadow  iiad  been  sold  by  his 
grandfather  to  Paulus*  father,  and  that  it  therefore  belongs  to 
P;iu!us  ;  but,  without  saving  a  word,  he  destroys  the  title  and 
ke(>ps  the  meadow. 

Qiies,     Has  Beitulfc  îvriglit  to  keep  the  meadow? 


290  TJte  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Ans.  Yes,  because  the  compromise  is  a  peculiar  contract  which 
favors  equally  both  parties,  compels  them  to  fulfill  similar 
obligations,  as  it  is  supposed  that  the  matter  is  doubtful  on  both 
sides  ;  consequently  each  one  abandons  his  rights,  to  avoid  prob- 
able damages  ;  that  is  to  say,  each  one  cedes  the  half  of  a  doubt- 
ful right,  in  order  to  guarantee  the  other  half.  Therefore,  the 
compromise  once  seriously  made,  nothing  shall  be  restored  by 
the  one  who  learns  later  on  that  the  land  belonged  to  the  olher, 
and  nothing  can  be  claimed  by  the  other  party.  Consequently, 
Bertulfe  is  entitled  to  keep  the  meadow  as  belonging  to  him,  on 
the  strength  of  a  contract  by  which  Paulus  has  abandoned  his 
riglit,  in  consideration  of  the  thousand  francs  obtamed  for  so 
doing. 

Case  XXIII. 
Commercial  Dealings. 

Armand,  a  merchant,  when  bu3'ers  refuse  to  him  what  he  asks 
for,  has  the  custom  to  lie,  by  declaring  that  he  has  bought  these 
goods  at  such  a  price.  It  results  from  this  that  the  buyers  pay  too 
high  a  price. 

Ques.  Has  Armand  a  right  to  receive  and  keep  that  price 
increased  b}'  his  lies? 

Ans.  Armnnd  does  not  seem  under  obligation  to  make  restitu- 
tion, as  he  simply  sins  against  truth,  and  not  against  justice,  as 
long  as  he  does  not  exceed  the  highest  price  ;  for  he  agrees  on  the 
price  with  his  customers,  and  only  receives  what  belongs  to  him. 
Besides,  everybody  knows  that  the  dealers  are  accustomed  to  state 
such  claims. 


Cases  on  î^enttng,  ant»  ©tï}er  ©nerous  Contracts. 


Case  IV. 
Long-Term  Lease. 


Farmer  Marculfe  has  hired  for  ten  years,  by  a  long-term 
lease,  the  estate  of  Palmatius,  at  a  comparatively  low  rent.  After 
the  owner's  death,  his  son,  Narcisse,  thinks  immediately  of  putting 
up  the  rent,  and  suggests  to  the  farmer  that,  if  he  will  not  pay 
one  hundred  and  fifty  louis,  instead  of  one  hundred,  he  must 
give  up  the  place  to  another  who  is  willing  to  pay  a  still  higher 
rent.  What  shall  the  unfortunate  man  do?  Caught  between  the 
hammer  and  the  anvil,  he  consents,  although  reluctantly,  and  gives 
the  price  asked  for. 

Ques.  Has  the  farmer  a  right  to  secure  a  secret  compensation, 
if  he  has  consented  in  spite  of  all  to  pay  too  high  a  rent? 

Ans.  That  is  not  allowed  to  him,  if  he  can  prove  his  right  through 
a  judgment  ;  because  theologians  permit  a  secret  compensation 
only  when  one  cannot  recover  his  property  by  other  means.  It 
should  he  otherwise,  if  he  could  not  prove  his  right  ;  for  instance, 
if  the  contract  was  not  made  under  a  form  of  authentical  deed,  or 
if  the  deed  was  lost.  However,  this  compensation  should  not  be 
blamed  as  being  unjust. 

Case  VIL 

Exchange. 

Albin,  a  Frenchman,  on  his  way  to  Spain,  arrived  at  Bayonne, 
asks  Lampinius,  a  money-changer,  to  give  him  Spanish  money  for 
French  gold.  The  latter  consents  ;  but  as  Spanish  money  has 
decreased  in  value  in  France,  Albin,  who  asked  for  a  great  quantity 
of  it,  undergoes  a  great  loss,  and  the  money  changer  secured  by  it  a 
large  profit.     But  as  soon  as  he  arrives  in  Spain,  Albin,  for  an 


292  The  Doctrine  of  the  JtsuUs. 

urgent  matter,  is  compelled  to  return  home.  He  calls  again  at  the 
same  money-changer's  to  make  another  exchange,  and  he  has  to 
sustain  once  more  a  great  loss. 

Ques.  1.  Are  these  two  exchanges  in  accordance  with  justice,  as 
regards  the  money-changer? 

Ques.  2.  If  Lampidius  knew,  by  some  private  information,  that 
Spanish  money  would  soon  lessen  in  value,  should  he  righteously 
reckon  to  a  foreigner,  who  ignores  this  fact,  that  the  mone^'  is  at 
its  actual  value? 

Ans.  Question  1.  Yes;  because  as  long  as  the  merchant  does 
not  exceed  the  limits  of  a  fair  price,  he  does  not  sin  against 
justice.  The  monej'-changer,  who  is  only  a  money-dealer,  is  in  the 
same  case.  Now,  Lampidius  did  not  exceed  these  limits,  although 
he  may  have  accepted  French  money  at  its  least  value,  and  b}' 
exchanging  it  for  Spanish  money  at  its  greatest  value.  For,  if  one 
exchanged  bread  at  lowest  price  for  wine  at  highest  price,  there 
would  be  no  injustice.  Therefore,  Lampidius  is  not  guilty  ;  because, 
while  accepting  French  money  at  its  mean  value,  he  has  given  in 
exchange  Spanish  money  at  its  highest  value.  Now,  if  he  was 
entitled  to  do  so  a  first  time  when  Albin  was  starting,  he  had  a 
right  to  do  it  again  when  he  came  back.  No  matter  whether 
Albin  may  have  lost  a  great  deal  ])y  it,  that  merely  took  place 
accidentally,  and  Lampidius,  in  this  loss,  has  only  acted  passively. 
Therefore  he  has  not  behaved  unjustly,  and  he  must  not  be 
hindered  nor  blamed. 

Ans.  Question  2.  Yes  ;  because  that  money,  according  to  the 
common  appreciation,  has  preserved  its  material  value.  It  would 
be  quite  different  if  it  were  stated  that  this  money  has  lost  some  of 
its  former  value  :  because,  in  this  case,  the  money-changer  should 
not  have  paid  for  the  money  at  its  true  actual  value. 

Case  XL 

Money  Dealings. 

Candid,  a  merchant,  often  b  )rrows  money  from  Vulpin,  and  sub- 
scribes promissory  notos  in  acknowledgment  of  tiie  debt  ;  but 
Vulpin  enters  Candid's  account  in  his  books,  not  as  a  sim[)le  bor- 


Cases  on  Renting,  and  Other  Onerous  Contracts.     293 

rower,  but  as  if  it  was  between  tlicm  a  statement  of  account.  He 
proceeds  in  the  following  m-iuner  :  if,  for  instance,  Candid  bor- 
rows ten  thousand  francs,  reimbursable  within  six  months,  he 
requests  him  to  subscribe  a  note  fur  ten  thousand  three  hundied, 
in  order  to  be  able,  when  the  bill  becomes  due,  to  claim  not  only 
the  principal,  but  also  the  interest  for  six  months.  Then,  he  enters 
to  Candidas  debit  ten  thousand  three  hundred  francs,  and  to  his 
credit  nine  thousand  nine  hundred  and  ninety-one  (as  credit  for  tlie 
amount  of  the  note,  with  deduction  of  six  months'  interest).*  He 
considers  both  amounts  productive  of  interest,  in  such  a  way  that 
Candid  finds  himself  debtor  for  the  interest  on  the  difTerence 
between  ten  thousand  three  hundred  francs  and  nine  thousand  nine 
hundred  and  ninety  one.  Now,  at  the  end  of  three  months,  he 
claims  the  interest  on  that  difference,  besides  one  per  cent,  com- 
mission on  the  sum  loaned,  declaring  that,  in  case  of  non-immediate 
payment,  the  sums  claimed  for  will  constitute  a  new  principal. 

Ques.  1.  Was  Vulpin  entitled  to  add  on  the  note  the  interest 
to  the  principal  ? 

Ques.  2.  Had  he  a  right  to  claim  interest  on  the  difference  of 
the  two  amounts  entered  in  his  book  ? 

Ques.  3.  Could  he  claim  a  right  of  commission  for  the  money 
loaned  ? 

Ques.  4.  Could  he  righteously  add  to  that  difference  the  com- 
mission, and  thereby  constitute  after  three  months  a  new  principal? 

Ans.  I  answer  affirmatively  to  the  first  question.  The  notes, 
in  fact,  are  productive  of  interest  only  at  maturity  and  from  the 
day  of  protest.  Thus,  he  has  been  able  to  repay  the  loaned  sum 
productive  of  interest  from  the  very  day  of  the  loan.  In  fact, 
interests  being  effectively  considered  as  part  of  the  principal,  they 
will  produce  interest  through  being  due  for  less  than  a  year.  This 
inconvenience  would  be  done  away  with  by  simply  specifying  on 
the  note  the  principal  really  loaned,  with  obligation  from  the 
borrower  to  pay  interest  from  the  day  of  the   loan.     But   such 

*  I  recall  this  case,  not  to  criticise  its  solutions,  but  to  show  with  what 
care  questions  of  usury  have  been  deeply  examined  by  those  Jesuits  hav- 
ing pretended  to  reject  with  horror  and  in  principle  even  the  simple  loan 
with  interests.  There  is  another  case,  yet  more  curious  and  complicated, 
the  Case  IX.  of  Onophrius  and  Argyropliilus. 


294  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jemits, 

method  of  proceeding,  iinu-ual  in  business,  would  render  harder 
the  circulation  of  drafts.  It  therefore  seems  reasonable  to  pre- 
sume that  debtors  submit  willing'y  to  such  a  prejudice  in  order  to 
facilitate  business  transactions,  inasmuch  as  they  are  to  avoid  it 
by  paving  off  at  the  appointed  time,  or  by  renewing  the  note. 

I  answer  negatively  to  the  second  question  ;  for,  in  that  way, 
Vulpin  has  capitalized,  the  ver}-  da}'  of  the  loan,  the  interest  not 
yet  due  on  ten  thousand  francs,  and  even  the  interest  on  that 
interest.  In  fact,  the  difference,  whose  interests  he  claims,  is 
composed:.  1,  of  the  sum  of  three  hundred  francs,  interest  of  the 
loaned  principal,  and  which  have  been  fictitiously  added  to  it, 
though  not  being  included  in  the  loan  ;  2,  of  the  sum  of  nine  francs 
interest  on  these  same  three  hundred  francs. 

I  answer  negatively  to  the  third  question  ;  because  the  loan  has 
not  been  preceded  by  any  promise  compelling  Vulpin  to  procure 
the  sums  to  be  put  at  Candid's  disposal.  It  was  therefore  a  question 
here  of  a  simple  loan  only,  on  the  strength  of  which  the  loaner, 
although  a  banker,  has  no  further  right  but  to  claim  legal 
interest. 

I  answer  to  the  fourth  question,  by  saying,  that  those  sums,  not 
being  due,  cannot  be  productive  of  interest. 

Case  XIII. 
On  Security. 

Ques.  Is  a  wife  entitled  to  become  securit}'  without  her  husband's 
knowledge  ? 

Ans.  Yes,  by  natural  right,  if  she  has  property  which  she  is  able 
to  dispose  of.  As  regards  positive  right,  it  is  necessar}"  to  study 
the  laws  of  each  country.  In  France,  she  cannot  do  so  in  princi- 
ple, because  the  wife  is  not  granted  the  management  of  her  estate, 
neither  can  she  make  a  contract  or  sign  a  deed  without  the  author- 
ization of  her  husband.  There  are,  however,  some  cases  in  which 
the  wife  would  be  held,  in  conscience,  to  give  this  security,  at 
least  after  the  death  of  her  husband,  or  after  separate  maintenance  ; 
for  instance,  when  applying  urgently  to  borrow  for  her  husband, 
overwhelmed  by  debts,  she  could   not  obtain  money   unless   she 


Cases  on  Renting,  and  Other  Onerous  Contracts.     295 

promises  to  pay  herself  in  case  of  need,  in  })lace  of  her  husband, 
and  she  should  have  to  promise  to  pay  in  reality. 

Case  XV. 
Guaranty. 

Menesippe,  expecting  goods  from  England,  and  fearing  they 
might  be  lost  at  sea,  writes  to  Gratien  to  look  specially  after  them. 
Tlie  latter  replies,  that  he  will  hold  himself  responsible  for  the  whole 
cargo,  providing  Menesippe  will  give  him  one  thousand  francs. 
The  goods  were  worth  ten  thousand  francs  ;  and  Gratien  possessed 
but  five  hundred  francs.  The  goods  arrive  in  good  order  all  right, 
and  Gratien  receives  one  thousand  francs. 

Ques.  Is  Gratien  entitled  to  keep  these  one  thousand  francs, 
though  he  would  not  have  been  able  to  repair  himself  all  the 
damage,  if  the  goods  had  been  lost  at  sea? 

Ans.  It  seems  that  he  has  a  right  to  keep  half  of  it,  and  nothing 
more  ;  because,  in  case  of  wreck,  he  would  not  have  been  able  to 
pay  more  than  half  of  the  loss  by  giving  away  all  he  had  of  his 
own.  Therefore,  it  seems  fair  that  he  keep  half  of  tlie  money. 
Others  would  answer,  that  Gratien  has  a  right  to  keep  the  whole  ; 
because,  in  case  of  misfortune,  he  would  have  lost  a  great  deal  more. 
Others  would  say,  that  he  should  not  keep  anything  ;  because  tlie 
contract  was  null,  because  he  was  able  to  guaranty  only  half  of 
the  value  of  these  goods. 

Case  XVI. 

Mortgage. 

1.  Eusebe,  Gaspard's  heir,  having  noticed  that  the  succession 
was  encumbered  with  mortgages,  will  accept  the  inheritance  only 
on  condition  of  not  paying  debts  beyond  the  amount  of  assets,  in 
order  that  one  might  not  compel  him  to  pay  more  than  he  would 
have  to  receive.  After  liaving  received  the  inheritance,  he  pays 
in  full  the  different  creditors  on  note  of  hand.  But  later  on, 
Hilaire,  a  mortgagee,  calls  upon  him  and  claims  what  is  owed  to 
him.     *'You  come  too  late,"  says  Eusebe,  "all  the  succession  has 


296  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

been  used  up  to  pay  the  debts."  "You  have  acted  badly,"  says 
Hilaire  ;  "I,  the  mortgagee,  had  a  right  to  precede  all  others. 
So  you  should  be  responsible  with  your  own  properly." 

11.  Barberin  and  Barberius,  Antoine's  creditors,  had  secured  a 
mortgage  on  his  property.  Florus  and  Florence  had  onh'  obtained 
written  promises  to  prove  the  value  of  their  debts.  After 
Antoine's  death,  Philon,  his  heir,  not  knowing  the  amount  of 
debts  and  neglecting  to  draw  a  statement  of  the  estate,  takes  hold 
of  the  inheritance.  The  two  mortgagees  immediately  claim  what 
is  owed  to  them.  But  the  legacy  being  already  spent,  they 
do  not  obtain  full  satisfaction.  Consequently,  Barberin  and  Bar- 
berius,  putting  forward  their  right  of  precedence  of  others,  ask  to 
be  paid  with  the  heir's  own  property,  before  the  creditors  holders 
of  notes  of  hand. 

Ques.  1.  Should  Eusebe,  in  the  first  case,  pay  Hilaire  with  his 
own  property? 

Ques.  2.  Should  the  mortgagees,  in  the  second  case,  be  piid 
before  others,  not  only  with  the  dead  man's  property,  but  in  the 
absence  of  it,  with  the  heir's  property? 

Ques.  3.  Sliould  the  heir,  who  has  neglected  to  draw  a  state- 
ment of  the  estate,  give  satisfaction  to  the  creditors  with  his  own 
property,  even  in  his  conscience? 

Ans.  Question  1.  The  mortgagee  ought  to  be  paid  with  the 
heir's  property,  as  he  has  the  strict  right  to  be  preferred,  at  least  in 
a  worldly  point  of  view.  But  in  a  true  spiritual  sense  of  justice, 
the  heir  must  not  be  compelled  to  do  so,  if  he  has  not  made  a  grave 
theological  error. 

Ans.  Question  2.  The  mortgagees  ought  to  be  preferred  to 
others  on  the  strength  of  their  mortgage  only.  Therefore,  when 
the  succession  encumbered  with  mortgagees  is  dissolved,  their 
rights  do  not  exist  any  longer,  as  the  title  of  their  privilege  has  dis- 
appeared.    Therefore,  they  ought  to  be  treated  as  other  creditors. 

Ans.  Question  3.  The  heir  who  takes  hold  of  the  inheritance 
without  drawing  a  legal  statement  of  the  estate,  is  compelled,  in  a 
worldly  point  of  view,  to  pay  the  debts  with  his  own  property,  if 
the  legac}^  funds  are  not  sufficient.  But,  most  probably,  he  is  not 
held  to  do  so  in  his  own  conscience  ;  because  nobody  can  compel 


Cases  on  Renting,  and  OtJter  Onerous  Contracts.     2S7 

him,  l)y  natural  right,  to  pay  the  testator's  debt,  unless  he  has 
leceived  a  gift  from  him.  Therefore,  if  the  dehts  exceed  the 
amount  (  f  the  legacy,  the  latter  funds  being  exhausted,  he  owes 
nothing  more. 

Case  XVII. 
On  Betting. 

Nicon  knows  three  candidates  for  a  government  ofBce  ;  there  are 
no  others  ;  one  of  them  must  l)e  cliosen,  bat  which,  nobody  knows. 
Nicon  bets  ten  francs  with  each,  that  he  will  not  be  elected.  He 
is  sure,  in  this  case,  to  win  agains*^  two  and  to  lose  with  the  other, 
and  so  to  win  twenty  francs,  and  to  lose  ten  only.  He  thinks  he 
can  make  this  bet,  because  he  has  no  certainty  for  an}'  one 
separately.  However,  later  on,  he  wonders  whether  he  has  acted 
according  to  justice. 

Ques.  Has  Nicon  a  right,  in  this  case,  to  bet  and  to  keep  the 
money  ? 

Ans.  Yes,  probably  ;  because  there  are  just  three  contracts 
separately  ;  for  one  is  placed  in  a  different  situation  on  account  of 
the  other,  and  in  each  one  Nicon  runs  the  risk  of  losing;  as  with 
every  one  who  bets,  he  doubts  of  the  result.  Therefore,  as  he 
may  lose  with  one,  he  may  on  the  otlier  hand  win  against  another. 
Moreover,  every  one  of  these  contracts  considered  separately  is 
lawful  ;  because  one  does  not  prevent  the  other  being  just,  and  one 
cannot  say  which  of  the  three  contracting  parties  will  be  wronged. 

Case   XXir. 

On  Gambling. 

Lucas,  a  passionate  gambler,  but  playing  badly,  asks  Sylvius, 
whom  he  knew  as  being  very  smart,  to  play  a  game  with  him  for  a 
big  stake.  Sylvius  declines,  considering  as  illicit  the  gain  which 
would  result  from  a  disproportionate  gime.  '"Well,"  says  Sylvius, 
*Mf  you  like  to  amuse  yourself,  let  us  gamble  for  fun  only,  or  let 
us  be  gambling  for  prayers,  which  the  loser  will  have  to  say  in  be- 
half of  the  winner. I'  Lucas  declines,  and  still  insists  once  more, 
with  Sylvius,  but  at  last  consents.     First,  the  latter  is  very  lucky  ; 


298  Tite  Doctrine  of  (lie  Jesuits. 

but  later  on,  getting  tired  of  playing,  he  takes  so  little 
care  about  the  game  that  he  often  foigets  to  take  up  a  counter,  so 
favoring,  without  knowing  it,  his  fellow-gambler.  Lucas,  wlio 
notices  the  fact,  does  not  mention  it.  Consequently,  carrying  the 
day  against  his  adversary,  he  wins  a  large  sum  out  of  hira. 

Ques.  Has  Lucas  been  acting  badly  by  keeping  silent  on  the 
omission  of  his  adversary-,  and  should  he  make  restitution? 

Ans.  No  ;  because  each  had  no  other  duty  but  to  look  at  his 
own  cards  :  therefore  the  gambler  who  is  noticing  that  his  adver- 
sary is  mistaken  in  marking  or  counting,  is  not  liable  for  it  if  he 
does  not  caution  him,  as  he  does  not  commit  any  fraud,  nor  does 
he  deceive  his  companion  ;  but  it  is  the  latter,  who  by  his  careless- 
ness, or  absence  of  mind,  wrongs  himself.  Then  he,  therefore, 
ought  to  undergo  this  loss  as  a  punishment  for  his  carelessness. 

Case   XXIII. 
For  the  Want  of  One  Trick,  Martin  Lost  His  Donkey. 

Martin,  a  very  shrewd  peasant,  riding  on  his  donkey,  was  go- 
ing dow^n  town  on  business.  Having  stopped  at  an  inn,  he  meets 
there  with  strangers  bus}^  at  gambling.  Invited  by  liernard  to 
play  a  game  he  consents,  knowing  he  was  clever  enough.  First, 
luck  smiles  upon  him  ;  but  next,  it  turns  against  him  so  badly, 
that  he  loses  all  his  money.  With  the  hope  of  getting  back  what 
he  had  lost,  he  decides  to  continue.  Having  only  his  donkey'  left, 
he  plays  on  it.  The  gamblers  strive  with  nervousness.  The 
chances  are  even.  Bystanders  are  waiting  for  the  end  with  anxi- 
ety. Cards  are  dealt  for  the  last  time.  But,  alas  !  Martin,  in  de- 
spair, is  beaten  for  one  trick.  From  this  story  is  the  saying  :  "For 
want  of  one  trick,  Martin  lost  his  donkey."  Then  he  came  back 
home  on  foot,  sorrowfully,  and  hal  t  )  listen  to  the  lamentations  of 
his  wife.  But  where  would  be  the  trouble  in  this  case?  There 
would  not  be  any,  if  it  had  not  happened  that  Bernard,  noticing 
Martin  did  not  hide  his  cards  properly,  had  looked  at  them  by 
chance. 

Ques.     Shall  Bernard  give  back  the  donkey? 

Ans.     No  ;  if  he  has  looked  at  his  adversary's  cards  on  account 


Cases  on  Renting,  and  Other  Onerous  Contracts.     21)9 

of  the  carelessness  of  the  latter,  and  if  he  has  not  sought  to  know 
them  before,  and  if  he  has  not  marked  them  ;  because  this  act  of 
looking  at  the  cards,  without  malice,  is  not  considered  as  swind.ing, 
but  as  a  sort  of  smartness,  commonly  approved  by  gamblers.  It 
would  be  the  same  if  he  had  learned  to  know  the  back  of  the  cards 
of  his  adversary,  without  having  marked,  or  known  them  before- 
hand. 


BOOK  SECOND, 


Kxmtm  on  Peculiar  Situattonsf* 

I,   Laics. —  U.    Ecclesiastics. —  III.    Regular  Friars. 


PART  FIRST. 

Lay  Situations. 

Already,  in  reference  to  the  fourth  precept  of  the  Decalogue,  we 
Lave  spoken  of  the  various  and  reciprocal  duties  of  superiors  and 
inferiors.  In  the  following  treatise,  we  will  talk  on  the  duties 
which  are  connected  without  mutual  interest,  especially  concerning 
public  officers. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Judge's  Duties. 

1.  The  judge  is  held  to  pass  a  judgment  in  accordance  with  the 
law  and  the  regulations  stated  by  the  law.   .   .   . 

In  criminal  affairs,  the  person  accused  must  be  favored,  unless 
the  crime  is  evident. 

When  in  doubt  regarding  the  property,  and  also  the  possession 
by  right  or  by  fact,  it  is  necessary  to  judge  from  the  more  proba- 
ble reasons.   .   .   .* 

*  The  contrary  proposition,  imagined  hy  the  ancient  Jesuits,  had  been 
condemned  by  Innocent  XI. 

But  Gary  remains  silent  on  the  question  of  what  it  is  advisable  to  do  in 
case  two  opinions  are  equally  probable,  and  when  one  of  the  parties  wonld 
be  a  friend  of  the  judge.    Without  any  doubt,  he  accepts  the  solution  of  a^ 
man  of  the  highest  intellect  belonging  to  the  Company  of  Jesus,  Grégoire 
de  Valence,  '-the  illustrious  man"  of  the  Jesuit  Clair. 

"One  asks  if  a  judge  may,  without  showing  a  personal  preference, 
decide  on  his  judgment  according  to  his  friend's  interest,  on  the  strength 


Treatise  on  Peculiar  Situai  ions.  301 

When  in  doubt  regarding  the  propert}'  alone,  it  is  necessary  to 
judge  in  favor  of  the  true  [possessor.   .   .   . 

2. — Q'les.  Should  t!ie  judge  condemn:  1,  a  person  accusecî, 
that  lie  considers  guilty,  only  on  his  private  information  ?  and,  2,  a 
man  whom  he  knows  to  be  innocent,  but  who  is  legally  declared 
guilty? 

Ans.     1.    Certainlv  not,  after  all  theologians.    .   .   . 

2.  There  is  controversy.  St.  Thomas  affirms  it.  St.  Bonaven- 
ture  denies  it.   .   .   . 

3. — Ques.  Is  a  judge  held  to  make  restitution  of  what  he  has 
received  b}'  an  agreement,  in  order  to  pass  a  judgment? 

Ans.  1.     Yes,  if  he  has  received  it,  to  pnss  a  just  judgment. 

2.  If  it  is  for  an  unjust  judgment,  he  should  restore  before  he 
has  passed  his  judgment;  but  after  that  there  is  controversy,  from 
what  has  been  said  on  the  subject  of  the  contract  for  a  shameful 
matter.   (Book  First,  No.  760  ) 

Ques.  Is  one  held  by  a  judoment:  1,  on  the  justice  of  which 
one  doubts  ;  or  2,  of  the  injustice  of  which  one  is  certain? 

Ans.  1.  Yes,  positively;  for  the  presumption  is  in  favor  of 
the  superior,  or  f'e  judge.   .   .   . 

2.  No,  by  princi[)le  ;  unless  if  there  results  from  it  some  scan- 
dal or  disorder  in  the  state.  .   .   . 

Appendix  First.     On  jurors. 

Appendix  Second.     O.i  arbiters. 

CHAPTER   ir. 

Obligations  of  the  Advocates  and  Attorneys. 
13. — Ques.     Does  an  advocate  sin,  and  how,  when  defending  a 

of  a  probability  applicable  indistinctly  to  one  or  another  opinion,  where  a 
point  of  right  divides  the  jurisconsult-*. 

"I  say,  lirstly  :  if  the  judge  cousiilers  that  both  opinions  may  be  equally 
probable,  he  may  lawfulhj,  in  order  to  favor  his  friend,  judge  in  accordance 
with  the  opinion  wliich  authorizes  the  pretension  of  iiis  Iriend.  More- 
over, he  miglit,  for  the  purpose  of  serving  his  friend,  judge  .'■ometimefi 
according  to  one  opininn,  and  sometimes  folloitniu/  the  contrary  opinion,  pi'o- 
vided,  nevertheless,  that  scandal  may  not  result  from  this."     U>i>ge  14.) 


302  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

just  cause  b}'  unjust  means  ;  for  instimce,  by  subitltutiug  a  new 
promissory  note  for  a  lost  one? 

Ans.  1.  He  sins  against  fidelity  and  truth,  morj  or  less,  pro- 
portionately to  the  injustice  of  the  means  used. 

2.  In  principle^  he  does  not  sin  against  justice,  as  one  sup- 
poses a  just  cause.   .  .  . 


CHAPTER   III. 

Solicitor's  Duties. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Duties  of  Registers  and  Notaries. 

22. — Ques.  Should  a  notary  make  restitution  to  the  treasury, 
if,  when  drawing  up  a  deed  of  sale  or  an  inventory,  on  the  request 
of  the  parties,  or  even  of  his  own  consent,  he  does  not  insert  the 
true  price  of  the  matter,  but  an  inferior  quotation,  in  order  to  pay 
a  lower  tax. 

Ans.     There  is  cont^overs3^ 

CHAPTER   V. 

Duties  of  Prosecutors  and  Defendants. 

25. —  Ques.  Is  the  defendant,  when  questioned  by  the  judge, 
held  to  confess  the  truth  ?  * 

Ans.  1.  No,  if  he  is  not  questioned  legitimately;  as  happens 
when  the  jivlge  is  not  legititnate,  or  when  he  does  not  follow 
legal  proceedings  ;  for  instance,  if  he  were  questioning  without 
preliminary  accusation,  or  even  when  the  offence  appears  to  be 
only  half  proved. 

2.  Yes,  if  he  is  questioned  legitimately';  becnuse  he  should 
'>bey  the  just  orders  of  the  judge.     Except,  according  to  the  prob- 

'  See  note,  paije  157. 


Treatise  on  Peculiar  Situations,  303 

able  opînion,  if  it  is  a  question  for  him  to  suffer  a  seveie  punish- 
ment. 

26. —  Ques.  Is  it  allowed  for  an  innocent  defendant  to  run 
away,  or  resist  the  armed  force? 

Ans.  Yes,  it  may  be  allowed  for  him  to  run  away,  or  escape 
from  the  hands  of  the  armed  force. 

Ques.     Has  a  de  fen  Î  ant,  truly  guilty,  a  riglit  to  run  away? 

Ans.  Yes,  if  he  is  not  yet  sentenced  by  a  ju  gintnt  ;  because 
no  one  is  held  to  submit  to  a  penalty  before  the  sentence.  Jt  is 
the  same  if  he  is  sentenced  to  a  very  severe  punishment,  and  if 
he  should  be  imprisoned  until  he  gels  through. 

But  the  more  common  opinion  denies  it,  if  he  has  been  already 
sentenced  to  imprisonment:  because  the  guilty  man  is  held  to 
suhinit  to  a  righteous  judgment.  Except,  however,  according  to 
a  few,  if  he  is  not  given  his  necessaries,  or  if  the  prison  regula- 
tions are  very  hard. 

Ques.  Has  the  guilty  party  a  right  to  run  awa}',  even  by  doing 
some  harm  to  his  jailers? 

Ans.  Yes,  because  he  uses  his  right,  and  does  not  wrong  any- 
one ;  unless  charity  suggests  to  him  tiie  use  of  another  scheme, 
not  cau->ing  too  great  harm  to  his  guarditins.  However,  he  is  not 
allowed  to  seduce  them  wilh  money,  because  the  latter,  being 
under  obligation  not  to  release  the  prisoner,  would  co-operate  in 
the  bin. 

CHAPTER   Vr. 

Witnesses'   Duties. 

28. —  Ques.  To  what  is  a  witness  held  who  has  not  told  the 
trutli  by  ignorance,  accident  or  omission,  and  unwillingly? 

Ans.  He  should  confess  his  falsehood,  and  repair  the  wrong 
the  best  he  can  ;  however,  he  is  not  bound  to  repair  the  prejudice 
already  accomplished,  because  he  has  not  made  auy  theological 
error.  The  same  should  be  said,  even  if  he  had  committed  a 
venial  sin,  as  has  been  said  regarding  Restitution,  No.  6G2. 

Ques.    What  are  we  to  tliiuk  of  tiiose  who  make  up  or  alter  deeds 


304  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

or   notes,   to  replace   lost  titles,   or  to   protect   their  true,  good 
right  ? 

Ans.  1.  There  is  a  venial  sin  of  lying,  because  the  promissory 
note,  whatever  it  ma}'  be,  is  different  from  that  which  proves 
gooil  faith  in  justice. 

2.  One  is  occasionally  liable  to  sin  grievously  against  charily, 
even  with  respect  to  one's  self,  by  running  in  danger  of 
suff'oring  a  very  severe  punishment,  if  one  was  arrested  as  a 
foiger. 

3.  One  sins  by  no  means  against  commutative  justice,  and 
consequently,  is  not  compelled  to  make  any  restitution. 

29. — Ques.  Is  a  witness  held  to  reveal  a  crime  kept  entirely 
secret,  in  case  he  is  the  only  one  who  kuews  it? 

Ans.   1.     Yes  ;  according  to  the  law  in  force  in  France.   .   .   . 

2.  No;  most  probably,  by  the  Roman  right,  which  requires 
two  witnesses  to  declare  the  defendant  giiilty,  even  if  he  confes- 
ses the  crime  :  thereby  the  axiom  :    ''Only  witness,  witness  nul." 

30. — Ques.  Does  a  witness  sin,  and  how,  by  hiding  himself, 
not  to  be  summoned  to  appear  in  Court? 

Ans.  1.  He  does  not  sin  agiiust  legal  justice,  that  is,  against 
obedience  ;  because  no  one  is  hehl  to  comply  with  the  order  of  a 
superior  before  being  compelled  to  do  so  ;  2,  nor  against 
commutative  ju>t'ce,  as  he  behaves  in  a  merely  negative  manner. 
He  however  is  likely  to  sin  against  charity  owed  to  his  fellow- 
brother. 

Ques.  If  a  witness,  who  is  legitmately  questioned,  hides  the 
truth,  without  telling  a  lie,  should  he  make  restitution? 

Ans.  No,  probably  ;  because  in  this  case  the  witness  behaves 
in  a  merely  negative  manner,  and  is  not  held  to  toll  the  truth,  un- 
less by  order  of  the  judge  ;  and  consequently,  by  hiding  it,  he  sins 
solely  against  the  obedience  owed  to  the  judge,  or  against  religion, 
because  of  the  oath  taken. 

CHAPTER  VIÎ. 
Ox  Duties  of  Physicians,  Slrgeons  and  Pharmacists. 
31.  .'  é  ;     They  nre  compelled  to  follow  the  sure  aiîd  fouudcci 


Treatise  on  Peculiar  Situations,  305 

prescriptions  of  doctors,  at  least  ordinarily,  as  the  danger  of  the 
disease  cannot  be  injured  by  probabilities. 

A  physician  sins  grievously  ...  if  he  uses  non-tested  medicines 
to  make  a  trial.  .  .  . 

83. — Ques.  To  what  is  a  physician  especially  held,  regarding 
the  soul  of  the  patient  under  his  care? 

Ans.  He  should,  in  principle,  and  under  heavy  penalty,  caution 
him  of  the  danger  he  is  running  into,  and  of  the  necessity  for  him 
to  receive  the  sacraments,  in  order  not  to  die  without  absolution, 
the  viaticum,  and  extreme  unction.   .   .  . 

34. — Ques.  ...  Is  the  physician  entitled  to  use  doubtful  reme- 
dies? 

Ans.  No  ;  but  in  this  case  he  should  wait,  and  leave  the 
patient  to  the  influence  of  nature.  This  is  the  opinion  of  St.  Anto- 
nin,  who  said:  *'If  the  physician  doubts  whether  the  medicine 
will  be  useful  or  injurious,  he  is  doing  wrong  in  giving  it,  because 
if  in  doubt,  he  should  preferably  leave  the  patient  in  the  hands  of 
the  Creator." 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
On  Duties  of   Rural  Constables. 

36. — Ques.     Should  rural  constables  always  prosecute  offenders  ? 

Ans.  Yes,  in  every  instance  that  the  damage  is  important,  un- 
less the  offenders  themselves  offer  a  secret  compensation.  They 
may  occasionally  not  act  so  severely  towards  the  offenders,  if  the 
damage  is  of  slight  importance,  if  it  is  not  customary,  or  if  it 
should  be  presumed  that  the  proprietor  did  not  wish  to  prosecute 
the  offender,  because  the  latter  is  very  poor,  and  is  not  in  the 
habit  of  doing  wrong.  But  rural  constables  must  be  careful  not 
to  show  more  lenience  than  is  necessary. 

CHAPTER  IX. 
On  Artists  and  Laborers. 
87. — The  confessor  should  question  them  carefully.     For  the 


306  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

most  part  of  the  time  they  do  not  mention  in  their  confession 
wrong  doings  and  sins  concerning  their  condition. 


PART   SECOND. 

Situation  of  Clergymen. 
CHAPTER   I. 
Common,  Positive  and  Negative  Obligations  op  Clergymen. 
ART.  I.     Positive  obhgations. 

They  are  bound:  1,  to  sanctity  of  life:  2,  to  celibacy;  3,  to 
ecclesiastical  robe  and  tonsure  ;  4,  to  canonical  hours. 

42. — Ques.  Is  the  obligation  of  celibacy  universal  in  the 
clmrch  ? 

Ans.  The  church  tolerates  some  exception,  in  those  among 
Orientals.  In  Eastern  countries,  priests  can  never  marry  after  the 
sacerdotal  ordination  and  even  after  the  deaconry  ;  but  those  wlio 
are  married  before  the  deaconry  can  attain  to  the  ultimate  orders, 
and  also  live  with  their  wives. 

ART.  II.  Negative  obligations  of  clerg3'men,  or  what  is  for- 
bidden to  them. 

98. — As  a  general  rule,  priests  are  forbidden  to  practice  what 
is  not  suitable  to  the  ecclesiastical  state  ;  for  instance,  to  be 
dealers,  inn-keepers,  physicians,  surgeons,  except  under  extraor- 
dinary circumstances  ;  to  be  judges  in  criminal  cases,  attorneys, 
defenders,  notaries  hi  secular  agreements,  to  go  out  with  arms,  to 
enter  saloons  and  many  other  places  ;  but  above  all  ;  1,  to  reside 
with  women  ;  2,  to  take  a  part  in  games  of  hazard  ;  3,  to  hunt  or 
carry  arms  ;  4,  to  engage  in  commercial  transactions. 

99. — Do  not  stay  among  women.  From  the  Garment  comes 
the  Scurf,  from  Woman  the  Iniquity  of  Man. 


Treatise  on  Peculiar  Situations.  307 

105. — Ques.  Is  it  allowed  to  clergymen  to  buy  shares  from 
joint-stock  companies? 

Ans.     There  are  three  different  opinions  : 

The  first  one  affirms  it  in  all  cases. 

The  second  one  denies  it  in  all  cases. 

The  third  one  makes  a  distinction  between  companies  called 
commercial  (banks,  trusts,  commercial  com[)anies),  and  industrial 
societies  (railroads,  mines,  factories)  ;  shares  of  the  former 
siiould  not  be  bought  by  clergymen,  but  they  may  purchase  some 
of  the  latter. 


CHAPTER   ir. 

Special  Obligations  of  Clergymen. 
ART.    I.     Obligations  of  bishops. 


ART.    II.     Obligations  of  parsons. 
ART.    III.     Obligations  of  prebendaries. 
Appendix  1.     Privileges  of  priests. 
Appendix  II.     Advantages  of  priests. 


PART   THIRD. 

Situation  of  Kkiars. 

CHAPTER   I. 

On  the  Nature  of  the  Religious  State. 

140.— Ques.     To    what   is   a   bishop   held   towards   the  young 
ladies  who  wish  to  enter  a  religious  order  ? 


308  Tlie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

Ans.  He  is  held,  under  a  heavy  penalty,  by  a  statute  of  the 
Council  of  Trent,  to  examine  himself,  or  if  he  is  prevented,  by  a 
vicar  or  a  delegate,  the  intention  of  these  young  ladies,  before  their 
taking  the  veil,  also  before  the  profession.  But  the  omission  of 
one  of  these  two  examinations  would  not  be  considered  a  serious 
matter.  Moreover,  the  profession  would  be  valid  if  both  examin- 
ations were  omitted,  provided  the  3'oung  ladies  may  have  been 
free  of  mind  when  making  their  profession.  Such  an  examination 
is  required,  even  if  the  convent  in  which  the  young  ladies  should 
enter  has  been  deprived  of  the  episcopal  jurisdiction  ;  because  the 
bishop  acts,  in  this  case,  as  the  delegate  of  the  Holy  See. 

CHAPTER  II. 
On  Religious  Vocation. 

151. — Do  parents  and  guardians  grievously  sin,  by  leading  away 
their  children  or  pupils  from  the  religious  state? 

Ans.  1.  Yes,  if  they  lead  them  away  unjustly,  by  threats,  vio- 
lence, artfulness  or  intrusive  requests  ;  because  they  so  prevent 
them  from  obtaining  a  great  blessing  to  which  they  have  a  right, 
and  they  expose  them  to  the  great  danger  of  losing  their  eternal 
salvation. 

2.  Yes,  for  the  most  part  of  the  time,  even  if  they  lead  them 
away  only  by  requests  or  promises  ;  because  they  can  not  do  so 
without  causing  them  a  great  prejudice. 

Ques.  Do  children  sin,  by  entering  a  religious  order  in  spite  of 
their  parents,  or  without  their  knowlerlge? 

Ans.  No,  in  principle,  though  this  behavior  may  not  be  gener- 
ally profitable  in  practice  ;  unless  the  children  may  have  a  good 
reason  to  fear  unjust  vexations  or  impediments  ;  because,  unless 
parents  may  be  opposed  to  it  for  a  legitimate  purpose,  children 
are  entirely  free  to  choose  their  profession.* 


♦  Marotte  does  not  dare,  on  this  delicate  point,  explain  himself  so 
plainly.  But  the  reader  will  readily  understand  the  meaning  of  the 
following  words  : 

'*  Qiies.  In  which  instance  should  children  especially  show  respect  and 
obedience  to  their  pareutsi* 


Treatise  on  Peculiar  Situations.  309 

CHAPTER  III. 
On  the  Obligations  of  Yows. 
ART.  I.     Vow  of  poverty. 

153. — A  friar,  bound  by  a  solemn  vow  of  povert}',  that  is  to  say, 
having  made  a  solemn  profession  to  an  Order  approved  by  the 
Holy  See,  at  least  from  the  strength  of  tlie  ecclesiastical  law,  and 
putting  aside  all  Pontifical  dispense,  is  completely  incapable  in  imr- 
ticular,  that  is  to  say  personally,  of  possessing  any  temporal  goods 
whatever,  property  which  might  be  valued,  even  witJi  the  permis- 
sion of  his  superior.  (Statutes  of  the  Council  of  Trent,  Session 
XXV.,  c.  ii.)  But  the  community  may,  either  by  itself  or  by  its 
members,  acquire  and  possess  properties,  unless  its  statutes  may 
be  so  opposed.  Wherefrom  is  the  well  known  axiom  of  the  Canon 
right:  ''All  that  a  monk  acquires,  he  acquires  not  for  himself, 
but  for  the  monastery." 

Consequently,  a  friar  having  made  profession,  is  perfectly  incap- 
able to  make  or  assign  any  deed  of  property  concerning  a 
property  belonging  either  to  the  monastery,  or  to  his  parents,  or 
to  strangers;  therefore  he  is  not  entitled,  without  permission, 
general  or  special,  of  his  superior,  to  dispose  of  anything,  either 
legally,  or  in  due  form,  by  acceptation,  donation,  sale,  borrowing, 
etc.  .  .  . 

157. —  Ques.  Is  a  friar  allowed  to  give  what  he  has  saved  out 
of  what  he  is  supplied  by  the  monastery  with  for  his  own  use  ? 

Ans.     No,  as  a  general  rule.   .   .   . 

Ques.  Does  a  friar  sin  by  receiving  from  a  stranger  money  to 
spend  as  he  chooses  for  pious  use  ? 

Ans.  Yes,  if  he  receives  it  as  solely  for  himself,  to  give  it  in 
his  own  name. 

158. — Does  a  friar  sin  against  the  vow  of  poverty  by  refusing 
what  is  offered  to  him  by  strangers  ? 

"Ans.  It  is  when  it  is  a  question  to  choose  a  situation  of  life;  tliey 
should  then  ask  and  follow  their  parents'  advice,  unless  it  may  b(!  reccg- 
nized  that  the  desire  of  their  parents  is  op[)o^ed  to  the  will  of  God." 
{Pttil  C(itechisme),  Who  will  have  ability  to  recognize  the  will  of  God? 
The  confessor  ! 


310  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

Ans.  Yes,  if  it  is  a  question  of  things  already  acquired  ;  for 
instance,  legacies,  salaries  as  a  reward  for  his  work,  gifts  already 
accepted,  etc.,  because  the  monastery  immediately  acquires  a  right 
in  those  things,  according  to  the  above-qnoted  axiom.   .   .   . 

161.— A  friar  sins  against  the  vow  of  poverty,  if,  without  the 
consent  of  his  superior,  in  the  monastery  or  outdoors,  even  for 
what  concerns  clothing  or  food,  he  accepts,  retains,  exchanges, 
gives,  or  lends  something.  Also  if,  without  permission  of  his 
superior,  he  borrows  or  lends  money  to  strangers. 

He  sins  against  the  vow  of  poverty  by  eating  or  drinking  with 
strangers  without  permission  of  the  prelate  ;  because  by  receiving 
something  without  permission  he  acts  as  proprietor.  In  general, 
however,  there  is  no  mortal  sin. 

He  sins  against  the  vow  of  poverty,  by  retaining  beyond  the 
appointed  time  a  thing  which  he  was  allowed  to  make  use  of,  b}^ 
using  it  for  another  purpose,  or  by  spoiling  it  ;  by  keeping  it  with 
a  spirit  of  master^  that  is  to  say,  with  intention  to  spare  it  from 
the  free  disposition  of  his  superior  ;  for  instance,  by  hiding  it  so 
that  it  may  not  le  seen  ;  and  he  cannot  be  excused  because  he 
was  previously  granted  the  permission  to  use  it. 

He  sins  against  the  vow  of  poverty  by  buying  anything,  even 
for  the  communit}',  without  permission  of  the  superior,  because  by 
so  doing  he  is  acting  as  a  proprietor. 

ART.  II.     Vow  of  chastity. 

164. —  The  vow  of  chastit}'  should  be  considered  as  more  impor- 
tant than  the  vow  of  poverty.*   .   .   . 

ART.  III.     Vow  of  obedience. 

It  is  the  most  important  of  all  religious  vows,  for  it  is  through 
it  that  the  friar  offers  and  consecrates  absolutely  to  God  his  most 
intimate  and  most  excellent  gilts,  his  independence  and  intellect. 

*In  his  general  theory  on  vows  made  "with  intention  to  make  a 
promise,  but  with  intention  not  to  be  bound  to  it,"  J.  Gordon  draws  up 
a  very  pretty  illustration  concerning  the  vow  of  chastity  :  "  The  priest," 
says  the  learned  man,  "wlio,  when  being  sworn  to  a  sacred  oiTler,  pur- 
poses expressly  not  to  bind  himself  to  chastity,  ([  mean  the  obligation, 
not  the  execution),  is  not  lield  on  the  strength  of  the  vow  connected  to  it, 
to  keep  to  chastity."     (Page  310). 


Treatise  on   Peculiar  Situations,  311 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Privilkge  of  Regulars. 


Appendix:   On  the  actual  state  of  Regulars  in  France. 

At  tiie  end  of  the  18th  century,  there  was  in  France  a  great 
number  of  monasteries  for  msn  and  women.  Bat  in  the  awful 
revolution  of  all  things  which  followed,  all  were  dissolved.   .   .   . 

184. — Qnes.  Should  vows  of  friars  in  France  be  considered 
now  as  solemn  ? 

Ans.     Yes.  .  .  . 

186. —  First  objection.  Civil  law  is  opposed,  in  fact,  to  a 
solemn  profession  ;  for  it  declares  that  all  citizens  are  quali^ed  to 
make  contracts,  or  receive  legacies.  ^ 

Ans.  Civil  law  cannot  oppose,  by  any  means,  either  solemn 
or  perpetual  vows,  because  the  nature  of  the  vow  being  perfectly 
spiritual,  cannot  be  attained  by  civil  law,  not  even  indirectly  ;  for 
if  it  were  otherwise,  civil  power  could  abrogate  the  laws  of  the 
church,  which  would  be  contrary  to  reason.   .   .   . 

8ecK)nd  objection.  It  is  not  permitted  by  the  law  to  renounce 
a  succession  which  has  not  yet  commenced.  Therefore,  a  friar 
can  not  renounce,  before  his  profession,  his  future  properties; 
for  instance,  to  a  filial  inheritance,  when  his  father  is  still  living. 
But  he  could  not  do  so  after  his  solemn  profession  when  the 
succession  has  commenced,  as  he  has  become  incapable  to  dispose 
of  anything  whatsoever.  Therefore,  this  law  makes  impossible  the 
solemn  profession. 

Ans.  1.  A  friar,  even  after  a  solemn  profession,  miy,  witli  his 
superior's  consent,  accept  an  inheritance,  g.ft,  or  legacy  for  the 
monastery,  as  is  permitted  by  the  statutes  of  the  canon  right, 
although  he  has  no  right  to  accept  anything  for  himself;  excei)t  in 
a  small  number  of  religious  orders,  the  regulations  of  which  are 
opposed  to  it. 

Ans.  2.  A  friar,  before  his  solemn  profession,  may,  without 
fearing  that  tlie  civil  law  may  be  opposed  to  it,  dispose  of  his 
future  property  to  parties,  for  instance,  to  his  brothers.   .   .  . 


Cases  on  Special  Situations. 


LAY  PERSONS. 
Case  I. 

TïIE     JtJt)QE. 


Judge  Lambert,  altbongh  knowing  quite  well  that  Casimir  is 
innocent,  though  under  a  terrible  accusation,  sentences  him  never- 
theless to  imprisonment  for  life;  because,  on  account  of  allega-' 
tions  judicially  proved,  it  appeared  to  him  that  the  man  was 
really  guilty.  In  course  of  time,  deeply  anxious,  he  asks  whether 
be  has  acted  rightl}^,  and  what  he  should  do. 

Ques.  May  or  should  a  judge  sentence  him  whose  crime  is 
juridically  proved,  but  whom,  through  private  information,  he 
considers  perfectly  innocent  ? 

Ans.  Theologians  are  divided  in  their  opinion.  St.  Thomas 
says  yes,  because  the  judge  should  pass  judgment  in  view  of 
the  common  good,  from  allegations  and  proofs.  But  St.  Bona- 
venture  denies  it,  because  the  judge  should  never  condemn  an 
innocent  person.  This  last  opinion  must  be  followed,  according 
to  St.  Liguori,  in  great  criminal  cases  ;  especially  if  an  innocent 
man  is  liable  to  be  sentenced  to  death. 

Case  IL 

The  Judge. 

Judge  Pestus,  greedy  for  money,  receives  gifts  from  his  clients, 
being  convinced  that  this  is  permitted  to  him,  whereas  he  is 
always  disposed  to  render  justice  to  every  one.  One  day,  Pliilon 
calls  upon  him  :  thinking  his  suit  a  bad  one,  he  brings  him  a 
present,  in  order  to  win  his  benevolence.     Pestus,  after  having 


I 


Cases  on  Special  Situations,  313 

thoroughly  examinée  tlie  case,  finds  that  it  is  a  good  suit,  pro- 
nounces a  judgment  in  favor  of  Philon,  and  retains  the  present. 
Another  time,  doubting  whether  he  ought  to  judge  for  Titius  or 
for  Caius,  whose  aiguments  are  equally  good,  he  decides  in  favor 
of  Titius,  from  whom  he  had  received  a  gift. 

Ques.  1.  Is  it  allowed,  is  it  just,  that  a  judge  should  receive 
presents  from  the  defendant? 

Ques.  2.  Is  he  entitled  to  keep  the  presents  which  he  has 
accepted  in  a  suit,  either  just  or  unjust? 

Ans.  Question  1.  The  judge  surely  sins  by  accepting  those 
presents  ;  it  is  contrary  to  all  rights  that  justice  should  be  bought 
so  easily  by  means  of  tips.  However,  most  probably,  he  docis  not 
sin  against  justice,  and  he  is  not  compelled  to  restitution,  because 
the  gifts  are  freely  made  to  him. 

Ans.  Question  2.  He  cannot  keep  at  all  the  presents  received 
to  pass  a  righteous  judgment,  because  that  cannot  be  the  object  of 
a  contract,  as  being  justice,  which  is  priceless.  But  probably  ho 
may  keep  the  presents  received  to  pass  an  unrighteous  judg- 
ment.* 

Case  IV. 
The  Barrister. 

Florimond,  a  lawyer,  was  defending  a  cause  probably  good,  but 
in  the  debate  he  notices,  that  all  the  chances,  even  the  strongest, 
are  against  it.     However,  he  continues  to  defend  it. 

*  Busembaum  explains  more  plainly  this  very  delicate  case: 
"  Ques.     Is  a  judge  compelled  to  make  restitution  of  the  price  he  has 
received  to  pass  a  sentence? 

"Ans.  If  he  has  received  it  for  the  purpose  of  a  just  sentence,  he 
should  make  restitution  ;  because  it  was  his  mere  duty  to  render  justice 
to  the  defendant,  independently  of  what  he  received  ;  and  consequently 
the  defendant  has  had  nothing  for  his  money  but  what  was  already  his 
own  right.  But  if  the  judge  has  received  the  gift  for  an  unjust  sentence, 
lie  is  not  held,  by  natural  right,  to  make  restitution,  as  per  the  teachini^s 
of  Sanchez,  Soto,  Navarre,  G.  de  Valence,  Molina,  Tolet,  Lessius, 
de  Lugo,  and  a  great  number  of  other  theologians,  among  whom  are 
Moya,  the  apologist  de  Taberna,  etc.  The  reason  is,  that  tiie  judge  was 
not  held  to  pass  this  unjust  sentence  :  it  turns  to  the  defendant's  benefit, 
and  through  this  injustice  the  judge  is  exposed  to  a  great  danger,  espe- 
cially with  regard  to  his  reputatit)n,  in  case  lie  happens  to  be  cauglit  at 
such  a  dealing.  Now,  to  run  such  a  risk  at  the  service  of  another  man, 
is  a  matter  really  worth  a  big  pecuniary  reward."     (^Page  348). 


314  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

Ques.  Sboukl  Floiimond  have  kept  silence  when  he  found  ont 
that  the  opposite  part}'  had  better  arguments  than  his  own  client? 

Ans.  Florimond  has  not  sinned,  neither  against  justice  nor 
charity,  by  continuing  a  cause  yet  really  probable^  although  he 
considers  the  adversary's  cause  as  more  probable,  because  he 
hopes  that  the  truth  will  be  brought  to  light.  Lawyers  are  not 
compelled,  like  judges,  to  follow  onl}'  the  opinion  which  seems  to 
them  to  be  most  probable. 

Case  YI. 
The  Defendant  before  the  Court. 

Palemon,  having  previously  committed  seci'etly  a  most  grievous 
theft,  is  easily  suspected  to  be  the  offender,  on  account  of  his  bad 
antecedents.  Consequently,  being  seized  by  policemen,  he  is 
taken  to  jail.  He  tries  to  escape  several  times,  but  without 
success.  On  being  questioned  by  the  judge,  he  denies  his  crime 
several  times.  He  is  thereby  sentenced  to  imprisonment  for  life. 
However,  he  does  not  stay  long  in  his  cell,  for  he  makes  a  hole 
in  the  wall,  with  tools  furnished  him  by  Paul,  his  friend,  and  so 
escapes.  Arrested  anew,  he  defends  himself  by  knocking  down 
the  policemen,  tearing  off  their  clothes  ;  he  luckily  escapes  from 
their  hands,  and  hastily  runs  away,  until  he  has  crossed  the 
frontier. 

Ques.  1.     Had  Palemon  a  right  to  deny  his  crime? 

Ques.  2.  Was  he  entitled  to  escape  from  [)rison,  either  before 
or  after  the  sentence,  even  by  making  a  hole  in  the  wall,  or  by 
breaking  in  the  doors? 

Ques.  3.  Has  his  friend  Paul  sinned  grievously  by  supplying 
him  with  tools,  which  helped  him  to  esca[)e  ? 

Ques.  4.  Has  the  cui[)rit  sinned  by  defending  himself  against 
the  policemen  while  escaping  from  their  hands? 

Anso  Question  1.  Yes  ;  the  reason  is,  according  to  the  common 
opinion,  that  the  prosecuted  party  is  not  compelled  to  confess  his 
crime,  if  there  is  not  against  him  at  least  a  half  proof.  Now, 
when  questioned  by  the  judge,  he  does  not  seem  yet  to  be  con- 
vinced of  his  crime,  for  he  is  only  suspected  on  account  of  the 


I 


Oases  on  Special  Situations.  315 

tlioft  he  had  previously  committed,  but  this  suspicion  is  not  suffi- 
cient to  make  up  at  least  a  half  proof.  Moreover,  according  to  a 
great  number  of  theologians  of  the  highest  autiiority,  a  guilty 
]»arty  is  not  held  to  confess  the  truth,  even  after  a  lialf  pro(;f, 
when  it  is  a  question  of  a  death  penalty  ;  because  it  is  a  heroic 
act,  so  it  seems,  to  acknowledge  one's  self  guilty  ;  and  the  judge 
is  not  supposed  to  insist  on  this  point  rigorously.  During  the 
examination,  he  tries  especially  to  judge  the  culprit  from  his  own 
declarations,  and  to  declare  him  guilty  out  of  his  own  words. 
St.  Liguori  admits  the  probability  of  this  opinion,  which  has  the 
more  authority,  because  of  the  new  method  of  examining  now 
used  in  France  and  in  other  countries.  The  defendant  is  not 
questioned  directly  on  what  he  has  done,  but  on  the  various 
circumstances  alleged  by  the  witnesses. 

Ans.  Question  2.  1.  It  is  allowed  to  the  culprit  to  run  away, 
according  to  the  common  opinion,  if  he  has  not  been  sentenced 
yet  ;  because  no  one  is  compelled  to  undergo  his  pennlt}'  before 
the  judgment.  Some  affirm  it,  even  if  the  guilty  party  has  been 
sentenced  to  a  very  severe  penalty,  and  if  he  is  sentenced  to 
imprisonment  preventively,  until  he  has  undergone  his  indictment. 
2.  But  the  most  part  of  them  deny  it,  if  the  imprisonment  has 
been  fixed  by  the  judge's  sentence,  because  a  just  sentence  must 
be  obeyed,  unless,  however,  if  the  prison-life  is  very  hard,  because 
it  would  be  a  heroic  act  to  suffer  a  very  severe  penalty,  when  one 
can  easily  escape  it.  3.  Now,  considering  that  it  is  not  for- 
bidden tiie  guilty  party  to  escape,  he  does  not  sin  by  breaking  in 
the  doors  or  by  making  holes  in  the  walls  ;  because,  if  the  end  is 
l)ermittcd,  the  means,  insignificant  by  themselves,  are  permitted 
also.     It  is  St.  Liguori's  probable  opinion. 

Ans.  Question  3.  No  ;  because,  if  it  is  occasionally  allowed  to 
the  culprit  to  run  away,  it  is  not  forbidden  to  help  him  in  his 
escaping,  not  oui}'  by  good  advice,  but  also  with  tools  ;  for 
instance,  with  ropes,  as  long  as  such  escape  is  not  dangerous  to 
soeiet}'. 

Ans.  Question  4.  Palemon  sinned  by  resisting  justice's  agents, 
and  tearing  off  their  clothes  ;  because  it  is  never  permitted  to 
resist  authority.     However,  his  sin  might  be  excused,  if  he  had 


316  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

escaped  without  resistance  from  tlie  hands  of  the  policemen. 
Even  the  action  of  knocl<ing  down  a  policeman,  and  other  facts 
of  that  kind,  for  the  purpose  of  an  escape,  when  it  is  a  question 
to  avoid  so  great  a  penalty,  should  be  looked  upon  as  a  trifle,  and 
even  as  nothing.  At  least  the  sin  is  not  a  great  one,  if  he  has 
done  them  a  slight  harm  to  escape  a  great  evil,  and  in  case  his 
resistance  has  not  been  serious. 

Case  VII. 
Witness  Called  Before  the  Court. 

Barbaut,  having  secretly  stolen  some  silver  plate  from  Armand's 
house,  is  summoned  before  justice,  being  suspected  of  the  theft, 
and  he  denies  having  committed  the  offense.  Two  friends  of  his 
are  called,  who  have  witnessed  tlie  theft,  and  are  perfectly  aware 
where  is  hidden  the  cause  of  the  offence.  One  of  them  runs  away 
to  a  far  otf  country  and  does  not  appear  ;  the  other  presents  him- 
self before  the  court,  but  affirms,  under  oath,  that  he  knows  abso- 
lutely nothing  about  it.  Consequently  Barbaut  is  dischargcfl,  and 
Armand  is  forever  beyond  possibility  of  recovering  his  property. 

Ques.  1.  Should  restitution  be  demanded,  in  this  case,  from 
this  liar  and  perjured  witness? 

Ques.  2.  Is  a  witness  compelled  to  declare  the  truth,  if  he  has 
learned  the  fact  by  a  secret  opportunity,  or  by  a  natural  secret? 

Ques.  3.  Is  a  witness  held  to  denounce  a  crime  which  has  been 
kept  perfectly  secret? 

Ans.  Question  1.  The  witness  who  has  remained  silent,  or 
maintained  that  he  knew  nothing,  has  committed  a  grievous  sin 
against  the  obedience  he  owed  to  the  judge,  and  a  great  perjury  ; 
however,  in  a  probable  manner,  he  has  not  sinned  against  justice, 
because  he  has  kept  a  perfectly  negative  attitude,  and  he  is  not 
the  cause  of  the  damage  which  happened  to  Armand.  For  a 
witness  is  compelled  to  declare  the  truth  only  by  the  judge's 
order  ;  and  consequently,  by  hiding  it,  he  sins  only  against  legal 
justice  ;  therefore  he  is  not  obliged  to  make  restitution. 

Ans.  Question  2.  No,  if  mutual  interest  does  not  compel  him  ; 
for  a  witness  is  not  held  by  himself  to  obey  the  judge,  when  the 


Cases  on  Special  Situations.  317 

knowledge  of  the  tratli  comes  from  a  natural  secret  or  a  con- 
fidence ;  because,  putting  aside  the  special  reason  of  the  common 
interest,  the  judge  cannot  compel  us  to  violate  a  principle  of 
natural  law.  Therefore,  in  this  case,  the  witness  is  entitled  to 
say  that  he  knows  absolutely  nothing  about  it. 

Ans.  Question  3.  No,  is  the  more  probable  opinion,  drawn 
from  the  common  right,  if  the  witness  is  quite  certain  that  the 
crime  is  known  only  by  himself,  because,  before  declaring  a  man 
guilty,  two  witnesses  are  necessary.  From  this  the  axiom  :  Testis 
unus,  testis  nullus. 

Case  IX. 
The  Notary. 

Darius,  a  notary,  in  drawing  up  a  deed  of  sale,  notices  that  the 
contracting  parties  are  not  declaring  the  true  value  of  the  estate, 
but  a  price  much  inferior,  in  order  to  pay  less  to  the  register  office  ; 
in  spite  of  which,  he  makes  up  the  deed. 

Ques.  1.  Should  Darius  make  restitution  to  the  State  for 
having  so  deprived  the  Treasury  of  its  lawful  income? 

Ques.  2.  Qaid.^  if  he  has  himself  suggested  to  the  contracting 
parties  to  make  such  a  reduction  ? 

Ans.  Question  1.  It  does  not  appear  that  Darius  should  be 
blamed  ;  firstly,  because  by  his  situation  he  is  not  obliged  to 
collect  taxes  ;  and  next,  because  the  collecting  of  taxes  has  no 
relation  with  his  profession. 

Ans.  Question  2.  The  notary  Darius  must  not  be  charged 
either  with  injustice  or  sin,  even  if  he  has  suggested  to  the 
contracting  parties  to  reduce  the  price  ;  because,  if  the  contract- 
ing parties  do  not  sin,  as  has  been  above  said  regarding  taxes,  it 
is  at  least  probable  that  the  notary  will  not  sin  by  helping  them, 
as  he  is  not  held  by  his  profession  to  oppose  their  action.  For 
the  notary,  although  a  public  officer,  is  not  commissioned  to  look 
after  the  taxes,  and  consequently  is  not  held  b}^  his  situation, 
either  to  collect  them  or  to  prevent  frauds.  Therefore,  in  regard 
to  taxes,  he  must  be  treated  as  another  piivate  person. 


318  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits.  "     ' '"" 

Ca^e  X. 
The   Rural  Constable. 

Barbatien,  a  rural  constable,  fulfills  bis  duty  quite  well.  But  ig 
it  so  in  all  cases?  That  is  the  question.  Frequently  he  reciives 
money  from  off  ndcrs,  and  often  is  even  invited  to  dine  vvitli  them, 
and  loaded  with  presents,  he  then  to  show  himself  very  h  nient, 
to  the  prejudice  thereby  of  the  proprietors,  who  are  not  indemni- 
fied ;  and  of  the  Treasury,  which  should  have  received  a  fine,  and 
so  is  deprived  of  this  benefit.  Moreover,  while  preventing  others 
from  C(nnmitting  offences,  he  has  committed  some  himself;  and 
did  not  disclose  the  above  circumstances  of  his  professional  func- 
tions, when  confessing  to  the  priest. 

Ques.  1.  Should  he  indemnify  the  Treasury  for  the  fines  of 
which  it  was  deprived,  b}^  not  reporting  tlie  offences? 

Ques.  2.  Should  he,  when  confessing  his  own  offtnce,  have 
dii^closed  his  professional  circumstances? 

Ans.  Question  1.  After  the  more  probable  opinion,  he  is  not 
compelled  to  m»ke  restitution  for  the  fines  which  should  have 
been  paid  by  the  offenders  if  he  had  prosecuted  them  ;  because 
be  is  not  commissioned  to  supi)ly  the  public  treasury. 

Ans.  Question  2.  After  the  probable  opinion,  he  has  made  a 
full  confession  whde  omitting  the  above  circumstances  ;  because, 
by  stealing,  he  has  not  committed  a  d(juble  sin,  but  onl}^  a  single 
one,  that  is  to  sny,  the  theft  ;  for  he  is  not  compelled  to  oppose 
his  own  offences,  but  those  of  other  people. 


Cases  on  tlje  îiXeUçjtous  State. 


Case  V. 
Religious  Vocation. 


Florent,  a  noble  and  intelligent  young  man,  followed  a  lucrative 
profession,  and  was  wisely  preparing  to  marry.  In  the  meanwhile, 
he  is  taken  very  sick,  and  being  threatened  by  deatli,  struck 
by  fear  of  the  divine  judgment,  he  makes  a  vow  to  become  a  monk 
if  he  survives.  Being  cured,  he  advises  his  fatlier  of  his  desire 
to  fulfill  his  vow.  But  the  father,  who  is  ruined,  living  in  distress, 
and  having  placed  all  his  hope  on  his  son,  tries  to  influence  him, 
and  to  convince  him  not  to  follow  his  idea.  ''  See,"  says  he  to 
his  son,  "  I  am  old,  my  condition  of  fortune  is  miserable  ;  your 
elder  brother,  from  want  of  ability,  has  so  badly  managed  his 
business  that  he  is  not  able  to  provide  either  for  his  own  wants 
or  for  those  of  his  numerous  family,  and  he  needs  your  help." 
But  Florent,  not  moved  at  all  by  these  arguments,  and  thinking 
only  of  his  soul's  salvation,  turns  friar,  and  after  his  novitiate 
makes  the  solemn  vows.  However,  his  old  father,  having  ex- 
hausted his  last  resources,  is  obliged  to  become  book-keeper  in  a 
lawyer's  office  ;  and  his  brother,  in  order  to  provide  for  his  family, 
hires  himself  as  servant  to  a  rich  man,  to  the  great  scandal  of  his 
family.  Learning  this,  Florent,  who  was  serving  God  with  much 
piety  and  joy,  is  struck  with  anxiety,  and  doubts  whether  he 
should  give  up  his  vocation,  in  order  to  come  to  the  help  of  his 
father  and  brother. 

Ques.  1.  Is  a  son  allowed  to  enter  a  religious  Order  when 
abandoning  his  needy  futhcr  and  sisters? 

Ques.  2.  Is  it  permitted  to  abandon  brothers  and  sisters  in 
need,  to  enter  a  convent? 

Ques.  3.     Under  what  ol)ligation  is  Florent? 


320  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

* 

Ans.  Question  1.  A  son  ought  not,  by  principle  {per  se),  to 
enter  a  religious  order,  if  he  leaves  his  parents  in  great  need.  It 
is  dififerent  if  they  are  only  in  slight  want.  .  .  . 

I  say  per  se;  because,  if  the  son's  salvation  is  running  too  great 
a  danger  in  worldly  society,  he  is  not  compelled  to  stay  there 
for  the  sake  of  assisting  his  parents.  .   .  . 

Ans.  Question  2.  It  is  not  allowed  to  abandon  brothers  and 
sisters  in  great  need  ;  but  it  is  permitted  to  do  so  for  capital 
reasons.   .  .  . 

Ans.  Question  3.  Florent  is  not  held  to  come  out  from  a 
religious  Order  to  assist  his  brother,  as  the  latter  is  only  in  great 
need.  .  .  .  Strictly  speaking,  he  is  not  compelled  to  come  out 
from  a  convent  to  assist  his  father  ;  because  he  should  do  so  only 
in  case  of  extreme  want.  ...  He  may  leave  the  convent,  but  he 
is  not  strictly  compelled  to  do  so. 

Case  YI. 

On  the  Parents'  Consent. 

Laurence,  a  young  lady  of  good  morals,  educated  from  her 
youth  in  a  convent,  having  attained  the  age  of  eighteen,  and 
being  requested  to  return  home,  beseeches  her  parents  to  permit 
her  to  stay,  and  embrace  the  religious  vocation.  But  they 
take  no  notice  of  her  desire.  Sorrowful,  afflicted,  Laurence 
comes  home,  and  so  is  compeled  to  live  among  this  worldly 
society  she  despises.  But  far  from  weakening,  her  desii'e  for 
the  religious  life  increases  every  day.  For  three  years  she  does 
not  discontinue  to  beseech  her  parents  for  their  consent,  with 
tears  and  prayers,  but  in  vain.  The  father  was  about  to  give 
way  to  his  daughter's  supplications,  but  the  mother  uiged  him  to 
resistance.  At  last,  the  poor  girl,  Seized  with  a  fatal  sickness, 
comes  to  an  extreme  state  ;  and  before  dj'ing,  she  says  to  her 
weeping  and  despairing  mother:  "You  were  not  willing  that  I 
should  be  on  earth  the  spouse  of  Christ  ;  but  lo  !  here  is  my 
heavenly  Betrothed,  who  calls  me  to  Him."  And  after  having 
said  this,  she  gave  up  her  innocent  soul. 


Vases  on  the  Religious  State,  321 

Ques.  1.  Do  the  parents  commit  a  grievous  sin  by  being 
opposed  to  the  religious  vocation  of  their  children,  or  by  lead- 
ing them  away  from  it  with  threats,  artfulness,  ruse,  or  earnest 
requests? 

Ques.  2.  Have  sons,  in  spite  of  their  parents'  authority,  a 
right  to  enter  a  religious  Order? 

Ques.  3.     Quid,  in  this  case? 

Ans.  Question  1.  Yes,  parents  sin  grievouslj'  by  leading  their 
children  away  for  no  right  purpose,  by  threats,  violence,  or  art- 
fulness. *'No  excuse  can  exempt  from  a  mortal  sin,"  says 
St.  Liguori,  "parents  who  lead  them  away  by  requests  or  prom- 
ises." **  We  should  go  by,"  says  St.  Alphonsius,  "the  common 
opinion  of  doctors  ;  after  which,  parents  commit  a  grievous  sin." 
The  reason  is,  that  it  is  to  cause  a  great  harm  to  him  who  is  taken 
away  from  religious  orders.  Therefore,  either  by  violence,  artful- 
ness, or  requests,  there  is  grievous  sin  which  cannot  be  excused; 
Moreover,  many  theologians  charge  with  a  mortal  sin,  not  only 
parents,  but  also  strangers  who  lead  any  one  away  from  the 
religious  vocation  ;  because  it  is  quite  contrary  to  charity.  But 
parents,  by  leading  their  sons  away  from  religion,  commit  two 
grievous  sins,  one  against  charity,  and  the  other  against  piety  ; 
because  their  duty  compels  them  to  take  care  of  the  education  and 
spiritual  progress  of  their  sons.  "  However,"  concludes  the  holy 
doctor,  "it  must  not  be  denied  that  manj^  parents  should  be 
excused  from  a  mortal  sin,  at  least  for  a  time,  on  account  of  the 
ignorance  or  carelessness  so  natural  in  such  a  case,  and  which  are 
caused  by  the  deep  natural  affection  they  have  for  their  sons." 

Ans.  Question  2.  Yes,  by  principle  ;  because  sons  are  perfectly 
free  to  choose  their  profession.  This  reason  is  valid  above  all, 
regarding  the  religious  state.  Therefore,  when  choosing  the  reli- 
gious state,  sons  are  not  held  to  wait  for  the  consent  of  their 
parents  ;  and  there  is  no  advantage  even  to  expect  it,  because 
in  that  parents  have  not  only  a  lack  of  experience,  but  they 
become  adverse  to  their  own  interest.  However,  if  the  son  is  able 
to  wait  easily  and  safely  for  his  parent's  consent,  it  is  more 
proper  that  he  should  wait  a  while,  in  order  to  secure  it.  But,  if 
he  fears  that  his  parents  may  be  opposed  to  his  religious  vocation, 


322  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

he  is  free  from  all  blame,  if,  without  their  knowledge,  he  abandons 
his  parents  home  to  consecrate  himself  to  religion. 

Ans.  Question  3.  Laurence's  parents  have  not  acted  right- 
eously, especially  her  mother,  by  opposing  so  unkindly  the  vow 
of  their  daughter  ;  and  without  any  doubt  they  have  committed  a 
grievous  sin.  .  .  .  How  many  such  parents,  by  being  unjustly 
opposed  to  the  vocation  of  their  children,  have  been  punished  by 
their  death!  "Why  weep,  impious  mother,  over  the  body  of 
thy  daughter?     Is  it  not  thyself  who  has  killed  her  ?  "  * 

Case  VIII. 

Vow  OF  Poverty. 

Damaris,  a  professional  nun,  learning  that  her  father  was  just 
deceased,  would  like  to  dispose  of  the  share  of  the  inheritance 
belonging  to  her,  not  having  renounced  it  before  her  profession, 
and  desiring  to  do  so  partly  for  pious  use  and  partly  in  favor  of 

*It  is  interesting  to  bring  together  with  this  illustration,  where  the 
ferocity  of  fanaticism  is  displayed,  tliis  other,  that  we  read  in  the  Annals 
of  Holy  Childhood,  1877:  "...  The  devil,  furious,  has  tried  to  take  two 
souls  away  from  us,  to  avenge  himself  of  those  he  had  just  been  missing. 

"  In  the  orphan  asylum,  v/e  had  two  children,  one  four  years  of  age, 
the  other  two  months  old.  I  had  baptized  m  extremis,  the  mother  of 
tiiose  two  poor  young  creatures,  who  became  orphans  shortly  after. 
Before  dying,  and  in  presence  of  several  witnesses,  the  mother  had  given 
h«  r  children  away  to  our  nuns.  But  she  had  not  signed  a  regular  deed, 
wliich  would,  in  case  of  need,  prove  in  court  the  right  of  the  nuns  over 
those  two  cliildren. 

"It  tlierefore  might  be  fean^d  the  children  should  be  taken  away  from 
the  orphan  asylum,  if  tliey  were  claimed  l)y  near  relatives.  Tlie  grand- 
mother calls  at  the  above  place  and  insists  upon  taking  back  her  two 
grand-children  tt)  lier  home. 

'•  First,  tiiis  was  refused  to  her. 

"  She  went  out  greatly  excited,  and  threatening  to  bring  an  action 
against  the  convent.  In  tlie  meanwliile,  all  the  nuns  were  in  prayer; 
tiiey  asked  God  to  call  back  to  Him  these  two  souls,  rather  than  to  see 
them  thrown  back  into  paganism. 

"  One  month  later,  a  police  inspector  called  in  to  take  some  informa- 
tion for  an  official  repv)rt  against  the  nuns  charged  with  theft  of  children, 
a  crime  punishable  by  hard  labor. 

"  They  showed  the  inspector  a  register  of  the  deceased  inmates,  legally 
signed  by  the  civil  commissioner,  in  which  he  could  read  that  the  two 
young  or|)hans  had  taken  their  flight  to  heaven  the  same  week.  God  had 
heard  fa\  orably  the  prayers  of  our  holy  nuns,  and  consequently  the  devil 
had  to  acknow  Ictlge  ihat  Ly  v»us  vanquished  once  more!" 


Cases  on  the  lîdigious  State,  323 

her  brother.  But  having  asked  her  superior's  permission  in  order 
to  act  in  accordance  with  her  vow.  "  Great  God,"  says  the  latter, 
astounded,  "what  are  you  asking  for,  sister?  Don't  you  know  that 
this  is  not  possible,  even  with  a  dispensation  from  the  Bishop,  or 
from  the  Pope,  but  only  with  the  permission  of  God  Almight}',  to 
whom  you  liave  made  a  solemn  profession  ?" 

Ques.  1.  What  is  the  effect  of  the  vow  of  poverty,  either  simple 
or  solemn  ? 

Ques.  2.     Qaid  of  Daraaris? 

Ans.  Question  1.  The  solemn  vow  of  poverty  renders  a  man 
incapable  of  possessing,  personally,  anything  of  value.  As  re- 
gards the  simple  vow,  it  does  not  make  nuns  incapable  of  pos- 
sessing under  the  form  of  a  direct  possession  ;  but  it  does  not 
allow  them  to  use  or  dispose  of  anything  without  the  permission 
of  their  Superior. 

Ans.  Question  2.  Damaris,  by  common  rights,  cannot  dispose 
of  her  share  of  inheritance,  neither  in  pious  intention  nor  in  the 
interest  of  her  brother  ;  because  her  religious  profession  has  ren- 
dered her  incapable  of  disposing  of  her  property.  And  this  in- 
capacity cannot  be  taken  off,  either  by  her  Superior,  or  the 
Bishop,  but  by  the  Pope  only,  as  has  been  said  above.  It  would 
be  different  if  Damaris  were  living  in  some  community  in  France  ; 
because,  in  that  counlry,  on  account  of  modern  hard  times,  the 
Holy  See  does  not  acknowledge  the  solemnity  of  vows.  This  is  why 
nuns  in  France,  under  the  present  circumstances,  are  not  called 
nuns  in  the  strict  meaning  of  the  word  ;  however,  in  the  true  and 
proper  sense,  they  are  nuns,  but  not  such  in  the  strictest  sense 
as  seems  to  result  from  various  answers  by  the  oLh  Penitentiary. 

Case  IX. 

Vow  OF  Poverty. 

Florin,  a  French  monk,  had  scarcely  made  his  profession,  than 
an  omission  he  had  made  in  the  disposition  of  his  property  comes 
to  his  mind.  But  he  thinks  that,  with  the  permission  of  his  Supe- 
rior, he  will  be  able  lo  make  up  for  this  act  of  carelessness,  at  least^ 
if  he  disposes  of  it  according  to  what  may  be  interpreted  from  his 


324  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

intention,  especially  while  following  this  opinion,  by  wbicli  it  is 
acknowledged  that,  in  France,  there  are  solemn  vows.  But  the 
Superior,  having  a  contrary  opinion,  refuses  decidedly  to  give  his 
consent. 

Ques.  1.  Must  we  acknowledge  the  solemn  profession  of  nuns, 
in  France,  under  the  actual  circumstances? 

Ques.  2.     Must  we  acknowledge  it  for  raonks  and  friars? 

Ques.  3.     What  is  to  be  done  in  this  case? 

Ans.  Question  1.  No;  this  has  been  declared  very  often  by 
the  church  through  the  medium  of  the  St.  Penitentiary  ;  namely,  in 
answer  to  the  bishop  of  Limoges,  1820.  However,  nuns  living 
in  Savoy  still  make  a  solemn  profession,  although  that  country 
has  been  annexed  to  France,  because  religious  affairs  are  not 
controlled  by  civil  supervision. 

Ans.  Question  2.  Yes,  although  in  spite  of  what  man}^  have 
said,  without  any  authority,  when  foolishly  declaring  that  monks 
and  nuns  ought  to  be  assimilated. 

In  fact:  1.  Nothing  has  been  changed  by  the  ecclesiastical 
power  regarding  the  vows  of  monks  in  France  ;  therefore  they 
remain  bound  by  solemn  vows,  as  before  the  political  troubles. 
For  religious  affairs  do  not  follow  the  fluctuations  of  political 
revolutions,  and  remain  unalterable  until  thoy  mny  be  changed  by 
the  Apostolic  Holy  See.  Now,  no  change  has  been  made  by  the 
Holy  See  with  regard  to  the  vows  of  monks,  but  onh'  concerning 
those  of  nuns. 

2.  It  results  from  a  declaration  of  the  Holy  Congregation  of 
Bishops  and  Regulars,  that  the  Benedictine  monks  of  the  monas- 
teiy  of  Solesmes,  in  France,  make  solemn  vows.  Therefore  the 
new  civil  legislation  of  that  countrj'  does  not  oppose  solemn  vows, 
and,  consequently,  the  same  thing  may  be  said  regarding  other 
religious  Orders  making  a  solemn  profession. 

Ans.  Question  3.  It  is  too  late  for  Florin  to  make  up  for  his 
act  of  carelessness  ;  his  profession  has  rendered  him  perfectly  in- 
capable of  possessing  anything  whatsoever.  He  therefore  should 
act  as  if  he  were  dead.  Neither  with  a  dispensation  of  the  Super- 
ior, nor  of  the  Bishop,  can  he  recover  his  capacity  in  this  case  ; 
and  he  cannot  rely  upon  the   opinion  of  a  few,  who  pretends  that 


Cases  on  the  Religious  State.  325 

tlie  vows  of  Regulars  are  not  solemn  in  France,  because  this  opin- 
ion is  not  probable,  not  being  based  on  any  positive  fact. 

Case  XII. 
Vow  OF  Poverty. 

Florine,  a  nun,  earnestly  keeping  to  her  vow  of  poverty,  but  not 
losing  any  opportunity  to  do  acts  of  charity  and  mercy,  by 
living  too  parsimoniously,  often  deprives  herself  of  food,  or  other 
things  supplied  to  her  for  her  own  use,  in  order  to  give  them  to 
the  poor,  or  to  young  girls  educated  in  the  convent.  One  day, 
being  obliged  to  go  on  the  road,  she  makes  the  whole  trip  on  foot, 
without  stopping  at  any  hotels,  and  uses  the  money  she  had  so 
economized  for  pious  purposes.  She  hurries  up  her  duties,  in 
order  to  have  some  time  to  spare,  when  she  can  work  for  her 
nieces  educated  in  the  convent.  Florine  rejoices  because  she  may 
occupy  herself  in  some  pious  work  without  any  prejudice  to  her 
vow  of  poverty,  and  without  being  obliged  alwa^'s  to  depend  upon 
her  Superior. 

Ques.  1.  What  are  we  to  think  of  Florine's  conscience,  gen- 
erally ? 

Ques.  2.     And  in  each  special  case? 

Ans.  Question  1.  Florine's  conscience  is  mistaken.  It  is  false 
that  a  nun  may,  without  prejudice  to  her  vows  of  poverty  and  obe- 
dience, occupy  herself  so  easily  with  works  of  charity.  But  is 
Florine  placed  in  a  vincible  or  invincible  ignorance?  This  cannot 
be  determined  in  general.  That  depends  on  various  circumstances, 
if  she  has  been  well  instructed  upon  her  vow  of  poverty.  Why 
does  she  not  question  her  confessor,  if  he  is  capable  ;  or  any  other 
person  well  skilled  in  religious  affairs?  She  seems  not  only  to  be 
inclined  to  acts  of  charity  and  mercy,  but  also  desirous  of 
following  her  own  fancies,  while  she  rejoices  so  much,  being  able, 
so  she  thinks,  to  act  independently  of  her  Superior's  authority. 

Ans.  Question  2.  Florine  acts  contrary  to  her  vow  of  poverty 
in  each  of  the  following  cases  :  1.  When  she  distributes  to  the 
poor,  or  to  young  girls  educated  in  the  convent,  what  she  deprives 
herself  of  by  living  parsimoniously  ;  because  these  things  are  given 


326  The  D  ctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

to  ber  for  her  own  use,  and  not  for  another  purpose.  2.  It  is  the 
same  regarding  the  money  she  economized  in  the  course  of  lier 
trip,  reserving  it  for  the  same  purpose.  3.  Neither  can  she  keep 
what  she  gains  by  working  quickly,  or  b}'  attending  to  her  nieces 
during  the  time  she  has  to  spare.  Tliis  may  be  said  in  general  ; 
but  there  maj'  be  some  exceptions  in  some  monastic  orders,  where 
the  vow  of  poverty  is  not  so  strictly  interpreted. 

Case  XV. 
On  the  Property  of  Monks. 

Ques.  Has  a  monk,  in  France,  the  right  to  dispose  of  his 
property  ?     And  how  ? 

Ans.  There  is  a  disposition  in  civil  law  interfering  with  relig- 
ious obligations.  No  matter  if  it  acknowledges  or  not  the  re- 
ligious state.  The  canonical  law  has  its  obligations  outside  of  the 
civil  law  ;  for,  if  the  dispositions  of  the  latter  are  contrary  to  the 
canonical  law,  they  are  void  for  the  conscience.  Thus,  monks  an(î 
religious  communities  keep  their  rights.  Therefore,  civil  French 
law  does  nut  suppress  either  obligations  or  faculties  which  are 
denied  from  common  right.  There  is  nothing  to  take  away,  noth- 
ing to  cut  off.  Therefore  a  monk,  in  France,  as  elsewhere,  should 
dispose  of  his  properties  irrevocably,  although  he  might  be  con- 
sidered as  proprietor  by  the  law,  or  as  a  man  having  a  right  to 
possession.  Civil  law,  to  him,  is  neither  prejudicial  nor  favorable. 
Then,  he  cannot  be  compelled  to  act  as  a  proprietor. 

Case  XVIII. 
Vow  OF  Obedience. 

Ques.  What  is  to  be  done  if  doubts  arise  against  the  legitimacy 
of  the  Superior's  orders  ?     Is  then  the  use  of  probability  permitted  ? 

Ans.  In  doubt,  we  must  side  with  the  Superior.  The  pre- 
sumption is  on  his  side,  to  demand  good  order  and  the  inter- 
ests of  religion  ;  if  it  were  otherwise,  the  inferiors  might  easily 
express  doubts  on  the  opportunity  and  value  of  the  orders,  to 
the  great  disadvantage  of  authority.  Thus,  in  this  case,  the 
use  of  probabilism  must  be  prevented  in  practice  ;  because,  fioin 
what  has  been  said,  we  deny  the  supposition,  in  other  words,  we 
deny  that  probability  exists  against  the  Superior's  orders. 


ffirneral  Ereattse  on  ti}t  Sacraments* 


CHAPTER   I. 
Definition,  Number  and  Division  of  the  Sacraments. 


CHAPTER   II. 

Matter  and  Form  of  the  Sacraments. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Minister  of  the  Sacraments. 
ART.    I.     Required  conditions   for   administering    the   Sacra- 
ments ;  or  of  the  attention,  intention,  good  faith  and  honesty  of 
the  Minister. 


ART.  11.     Duty  of  the  Minister. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
Person  who  Receives  the  Sacraments. 

ART.  I.     Required   conditions  in   order  to  receive  the  sacra- 
ments in  a  valid  manner. 

ART.  ir.     Required  conditions  in  order  to  receive  the  sacra- 
ments in  a  lawful  manner. 


Ereatfee  on  ÎSapttsm* 


CHAPTER  T. 
Nature,  PROPRiETr  and  Necessity  of  Baptism. 


CHAPTER  II. 
Matter  and  Form  of  Baptism. 

ART.  I.  Matters  to  be  avoided,  and  matters  preferred,  concern- 
ing baptism. 

236. —  The  only  valid  matter  is  natural  water,  or  elemen- 
tary. .  .  . 

237. —  Valid  matters  are:  1,  Water  from  springs,  wells, 
brooks,  seas,  ponds,  swamps,  cisterns,  lakes;  2,  water  coming 
from  ice,  snow,  or  melted  hail;  because  it  retains  its  own  sub- 
stance, though  its  color,  savor  or  smell  may  be  modified  acciden- 
tally ;  3,  sulphurous  or  mineral  water,  coming  from  steam,  dew, 
wateriness  of  walls,  of  leaves,  etc.  ;  4,  troubled  water,  adulter- 
ated, mixed  with  another  substance,  as  long  as  water  is  really  the 
true  predominant  matter,  so  that  according  to  custom  and  the 
common  opinion  of  men,  it  may  be  called  water. 

2.  Invalid  matters  are  :  1,  milk,  blood,  tears,  sweat,  sa- 
liva, pus,  urine  ;  2,  wine,  oil,  beer,  thick  fat,  gravy,  etc.  ;  3d. 
mud,  ink  ;  4,  snow,  ice,  frost  and  similar  things  not  melted,  be- 
cause in  such  a  state  they  are  not  natural  water. 

3.  Doubtful  matters  are  :  1,  verj'  thin  gravy,  laundry  suds,  light 
beer,  water  coming  from  melted  salt  ;  2,  the  liquid  which  comes 
out  from  the  vine  and  other  plants. 


Treatise  on  Baplism,  329 

ART.  II.     Formula  of  baptism. 

241. — The  formula  of  baptism  is:  "  I  baptize  thee  in  the  name 
of  the  Father,  of  the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost."  .   .   . 

Ques.  Is  the  formula  valid,  if  one  says  :  "I  baptize  thee  ;  1,  in 
the  name  of  the  Holy  Trinity?"  or  2,  '-in  the  name  of  Christ?" 

Ans.  1.  No;  at  least  according  to  the  more  probable  opinion.  .  .  . 

Ans.  2.    No  ;  for  a  still  better  reason. 

CHAPTER  III. 
Minister  of  Baptism. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

On  the  Subject  of  Baptism. 


248. — Ques.     Can  one  lawfully  baptize  the  children  of  infidels? 

Ans.  1.  Yes,  in  the  following  cases:  1,  if  they  have  reached 
the  age  of  reason,  and  if  they  consent  ;  even  in  spite  of  their  par- 
ents ;  2,  if  their  parents  have  forsaken  the  Catholic  religion,  like 
heretics  ;  because  the  Church  has  a  right  to  repress  parents  ;  3,  if 
such  children  are  on  the  point  of  death  ;  because  there  is  an  urgent 
necessity,  and  no  danger  to  fear  ;  4,  if  one  of  the  parents  has  con- 
sented, in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  the  other. 

2.  No,  in  all  other  cases  ;  for  instance,  if  both  parents  are  op- 
posed, and  if  the  children  are  to  be  under  dependence  upon  their 
parents.     The  reason  is  drawn  from  the  danger  of  perversion. 

CHAPTER  V. 

Accessory   Solemnities   of   Baptism,  God-Fathers,  and 

Ceremo^iies. 


330  Tlte  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

ART.  I.     God  fathers. 

ART.  II.     Ceremonies  of  baptism. 

Appendix  on  Caesarian  operation,  to  baptize  a  child  who  is  not 
yet  born. 

258. — Should  it  be  performed,  and  when? 

Ans.  1.  After  the  death  of  the  mother,  it  must  be  decidedly 
performed,  under  severe  j^enalti/ ;  even  if  her  relatives  refuse,  or  are 
opposed,  in  case  it  can  be  performed. 

It  is  necessary  to  use  all  possible  means  to  retain  the  warmth 
in  the  womb  of  the  deceased  mother,  until  the  operation  is  per- 
forïïied  ;  if  not,  the  child  would  easily  perish  before  having  been 
baptized. 

2.  It  is  necessary  to  perform  the  operation,  even  if  the  mother 
is  yet  alive  ;  if,  according  to  the  opinion  of  expert  persons,  the 
child  cannot  be  baptized  by  any  other  means.  The  mother  is 
held  by  principle.,  speaking  in  a  speculative  manner^  to  suffer  it, 
under  severe  penalt}',  if  it  may  be  done  without  directly  causing 
her  death. 


^Treatise  on  Confirmation* 


CHAPTER  I. 

Matter  and  Form  of  Confirmation. 
AKT.  I.     Matter  of  confirmation. 

261. — The  remote  matter  of  confirmation  is  the  chrism,  made 
with  olive  oil  and  balm,  and  blessed  by  a  Bishop. 

262. — Qiies.    Is  balm  necessarily  required  for  the  sacrament? 

Ans.     Yes,  according  to  the  most  probable  opinion. 

Qiies.  Should  the  oil  necessarily  be  made  of  olives,  to  render 
the  sacrament  valid  ? 

Ans.  Yes,  because  olive  oil  is  the  only  true  kind  of  oil  ;  thus 
oil  made  of  any  other  substances,  for  instance,  of  nuts,  is  not  a 
valid  matter  ;  because  it  is  not  sold  under  the  simple  name  of  oil 
only. 

ART.  II.     Form  of  Confirmation. 


CHAPTER  11. 

Minister  of  the  Confiiimation. 

CHAPTER  III. 
Person  Who  Receives  Confirmation. 


2Creati50   on  t\}t  1£ucl}artst* 


PART  FIRST. 

TnE  Eucharist  as  a  Sacrament. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Nature  and  Efficacy  of  the  Eucharist. 

271-9. — How  long  does  Christ  really  remain  present  within  the 
Eucharist  ? 

Ans.  So  long  as  the  elements  of  bread  and  wine  are  intact  ; 
but  He  ceases  to  be  therein  when  the  elements  are  altered  so 
much  tliat,  according  to  the  opinion  of  men,  there  does  not  seem 
to  be  any  more  bread  and  wine  left.  But,  then,  after  the  law  es- 
tablished by  God,  their  elements  are  replaced  by  the  same  matter 
which  replaces  altered  bread  and  wine. 

Ques.  How  long  are  sacred  elements  supposed  to  remain  in- 
tact, after  one  has  received  the  sacrament? 

Ans.  There  is  nothing  agreed  on  this  point  ;  some  say  one 
minute  ;  others,  five  ;  and  others,  seven.  But  they  remain  intact 
longer  with  a  priest,  who  takes  the  communion  with  the  two  ele- 
ments and  with  a  larger  consecrated  wafer,  than  with  a  layman, 
who  receives  only  a  small  one  ;  although  it  seems  certain  that 
fifteen  minutes  after  the  communion,  even  with  a  priest,  provided 
he  is  in  good  health,  the  elements  are  dissolved. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Matter  and  Form  of  the  Eucharist. 

ART.  I.     Matter  of  the  Eucharist. 

276.  —  ...  Wheat  bread  and  grape  wine  are  the  only  matters 
fit  for  the  Eucharist 


Treatise  on  the  Eucharist,  333 

278.  — Ques.     Is  bread  made  of  barley  or  rye  a  valid  matter? 

Ans.  There  is  controvers3\  Some  affirm  it  ;  but  others,  ac- 
coiding  to  the  more  common  and  probable  opinion,  deny  it. 

Ques.  Is  bread  made  of  spelt,  or  fine  wheaten  meal,  a  valid- 
matter? 

Ans.     There  is  controversy,  also,  on  this  point. 


ART.  II.     Form  of  the  Sacrament  of  the  Eucharist. 

CHAPTER  III. 
Minister  who  Gives  the  Eucharist. 
ART.  I.     Power  of  this  minister. 

ART.  II.     Obligation  to  administer  the  Eucharist. 

ART.  III.     Special  conditions  required  to  properly  administer 
the  holy  Eucharist. 


ART.  IV.     Manner  of  giving  the  Eucharist  to  the  sick. 


ART.  V.     Manner  of  keeping  the  holy  Eucharist. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

The  Person  who  Receives  the  Eucharist. 
ART.  I.     Obligation  to  receive  the  Eucharist. 

ART.  II.     Required  dispositions  for  receiving  the  Eucharist. 


334'  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

330. — Ques.  Does  the  absorption  of  the  remahis  of  aliments, 
sticking  to  tlie  teeth,  break  the  fast? 

Ans.     No,  if  it  is  involuntary.   ... 

There  would  be  controvers}-,  if  it  were  done  voUintarilj.   .   .   . 

331. — Ques.     Does  a  pinch  of  snuff  break  the  fast? 

Ans.  No,  even  if  part  of  it  goes  into  the  stomach  ;  because, 
although  such  a  matter  may  be  nourishing,  one  does  not  take  it  as 
food.   .   .   . 

Ques.  Does  the  smell  of  tobacco,  or  similar  matters,  break  the 
fast? 

Ans.  No,  according  to  the  more  common  and  probable  opin- 
ion, because  smoke  is  neither  an  aliment  nor  a  drink.   .   .   . 


PART   SECOND. 

Thi:  Eucharist  as  a  Sacrifice. 


CHAPTER   I. 

Nature  and  Virtue  of  the  Sacrifice  of  the  Mass. 

CHAPTER   II. 

Application  of  the  Sacrifice  of  the  Mass. 

3.")4. —  This  is  tlie  intention  with  wh'ch  the  priest  wishes  this 
Saciiflce  to  be  useful  to  a  determined  person. 

CHAPTER   III. 
Obligations  to  Celebrate  this  Sacrifice. 
ART.  I.     Obligation  to  celebrate  it,  created  by  priesthood. 

ART.  II.     Obligation  created  by  duty. 


Treatise  on  the  EucJiarist.  335 

ART.  III.     Obligation  created  by  salary. 


367.   ...  A  priest  mny  lawfully  reçoive  a  salary,  or  aln-,  for  a 
mass  vvhicli  he  is  compelled  to  say,  for  another  person's  sake. 


Appendix.     For  the  priests  of  the  Society  of  Jesus. 

378. — A  priest  belonging  to  this  society  must  not  accept,  either 
for  himself  or  for  another,  a  salary  for  masses  said  by  him.  So 
also  is  it  for  all  charges  of  the  sacred  ministry.   ... 

He  may  accept  money  offered  liberally,  and  generously  j^tomise 
in  return  to  say  masses  ;  but  in  such  a  manner  that  this  ).^?.omise 
should  not  be  like  a  compensation  or  a  manner  of  discharging  him- 
self for  the  money  received  ;  but  it  is  necessary  tiiat  such  money 
should  be  given  as  a  simple  aim,  in  such  a  way  that  the  donor 
should  understand  that  it  cannot  be  received  under  any  otiier  con- 
sideration, and  that  he  is  giving  it  himself  as  a  matter  of  air» 
only. 

CHAPTER    IV. 

Time  and  Place  of  the  Celebration. 
ART.  I.     Time  of  the  celebration. 
..••..«••  •• 

ART.  II.     Place  of  the  celebration. 

386. — It  is  generally  allowed  to  celebrate  a  mass  only  in  a  dedi 
cated  church,  or  at  least  a  blessed  one. 

CHAPTER  V. 

Mkthod  of  the  Celebiîation. 
ART.  I.     Required  conditions  for  celebrating  mass. 

ART.  II.     Rubrics. 


^Treatise  ott  tlje  Sacrament  of  Jl^tmntt. 


PART  FIRST. 


On  the  Essence  of  the  Sacrament  of  Penance  ;  its  >jature, 
Matter  and  Form. 

CHAPTER  I. 
Nature  of  Penance. 

CHAPTER  II. 
Matter  of  the  Sacrament  of  Penance. 

CHAPTER  III. 
Form  of  the  Sacrament  of  Penance. 


PART  SECOND. 

The  Person  Who  Receives  the  Sacrament  of  Penance  ;  or  on 
THE  Penitent's  Duties. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Contrition. 
ART.  I.     Contrition,  properly  so  called. 


ART.  II.     Pu.  pose. 


Treatise  on  the  Sacrament  of  Penance,  337 

CHAPTER  II. 
On  Confession. 
ART.  I.     Necessity  of  Confession. 


ART.  ir.     Quality  of  Confession. 
ART.  III.     Repetition  of  Confession. 
ART.  I.     Assessment  of  Penance. 
ART.  II.     Accomplishment  of  Penance. 


•         • 


PART  THIRD. 
Minister  of  Penance. 

CHAPTER  I. 
Power  of  the  Minister. 
ART.  I.     Approbation. 

ART.   II.     Jurisdiction. 
ART.  III.     Reserved  Cases. 

Appendix  First:  On  the  absolving  of  an  accomplice  to  a 
a  shameful  sin. 

584. — No  confessor  can  absolve  his  accomplice  in  a  shameful 
sin  ;  and  whoever  has  the  presumption  to  do  so,  incurs,  by  the 
fact  itself.    Papal  excommunication. 

585. — Ques.  What  is  to  be  understood  under  the  name  of 
a  shameful  sin  ? 

Ans.  All  grievous  sins  against  the  sixth  precept  of  the  Deca- 
logue, though  the  shameful  act  may  not  have  been  consummated  ; 
even  a  single  shameful  touching  .  .  . 


338  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

Qiies.  Does  one  understand  by  accomplice,  not  only  women, 
but  even  men? 

Ans.  Yes,  because  the  text  of  the  Bull  is  taken  entirely  in 
general.  It  is  said  therein  :  ''That  whosoever  dares  to  receive  tlie 
'sacramental  confession  of  an  accomplice,  against  the  sixth  precept 
of  the  Decalogue,  for  a  shameful  sin."  The  application  of  the 
statute  is  not  confined  to  the  feminine  sex  only. 

586. — Ques.  Can  a  priest  absolve  his  accomplice  when  in  danger 
of  death,  if  another  priest  cannot  be  called  in,  or  cannot  come  at 
once  without  causing  dishonor  and  scandal  ? 

Ans.  Yes,  in  a  lawful  and  valid  manner.  However  a  guilty  priest 
is  held  to  prevent  such  dangers  of  dishonor  and  scandal,  if  he  can 
help  it  ;  for  instance,  by  retiring,  under  some  pretext.  Otherwise, 
he  can  not  escape  the  established  penalties,  although  his  absolution 
is  valid. 

Ques.  Is  a  priest  entitled  to  absolve  his  accomplice,  when  in 
danger  of  death,  and  refusing  to  confess  to  another  priest? 

Ans.  Yes,  as  in  the  former  case,  if  the  penitent  has  been  pre- 
pared for  it  in  some  other  way,  so  that  he  should  not  perish,  or  at 
least  that  his  eternal  salvation  should  not  be  compromised. 

587.  — Ques.  Can  a  priest  absolve  his  accomplice  for  other 
sins  which  do  not  concern  his  own  offence,  after  the  penitent  has 
been  absolved  by  another  confessor  ? 

Ans.  Yes  ;  because  he  is  only  deprived  of  the  jurisdiction  on 
this  penitent  for  what  concerns  the  sin  in  which  he  had  a  part  ; 
therefore,  when  the  latter  sin  has  been  redeemed  by  the  absolution 
allowed  to  be  given  by  another  confessor,  the  prohibition  ceases, 
and  jurisdiction  is  no  longer  taken  away  from  him.   .   .   . 

Appendix  II.  —  Solicitation  to  sin  in  course  of  the  confession. 

It  never  could  be  regretted  enough,  that  within  the  sheep-house 
of  Christ  there  are  occasionally  unscrupulous  wolves,  who,  estab- 
lished as  being  appointed  guardians  of  Israel's  home,  degrade  and 
break  into  it  most  cruelly. 

593. — Ques.  Should  a  priest  be  prosecuted  because  while  hear- 
ing the  confession  of  a  lady,  he  solicits  her  to  sin? 


Tredtlse  on  the  Sacrament  of  Penance,  339 

Ans.  Yes,  if  the  solicitation  takes  place  in  the  confessional,  or 
where  the  confession  is  made.  No,  if  it  is  outside  of  that  place, 
and  under  another  pretence  than  confession. 

595. — Ques.  Should  one  prosecute  a  priest,  who,  having  learned 
through  confession  the  weakness  of  a  woman,  solicits  her  to  sin  ut 
her  home  ? 

Ans.  Yes,  if  he  has  so  solicited  her  as  a  person  of  whom  he 
has  learned  through  confession  the  character  and  frailty,  and  if  he 
impresses  the  fact  upon  her  mind,  either  by  a  word  or  otherwise. 

Ques.  Must  we  always  believe  women  who  accuse  a  priest  of 
having  solicited  them  to  sin  ? 

Ans.  No  ;  because  it  has  often  been  heard  of  women  ;  who 
calumniate  innocent  clerks  through  jtalousy,  hate,  zeal,  or  some 
other  perverse  motive.  .  .  . 

When  superiors  have  acquired  the  certainty  of  such  a  crime, 
they  should  proceed  with  prudence,  and  punish  the  guilty  priest 
according  to  the  extent  of  his  sin,  without  placing  on  the  same 
level  a  fault  already  forgotten,  or  caused  by  human  frailty,  with  a 
fault  recently  committed,  and  which  is  his  customary  sin. 

597. — Ques.  What  are  the  penalties  pronounced  against  those 
who  solicit  to  sin  ? 

Ans.  According  to  the  Bull  of  Gregory  XV,,  they  are:  Sus- 
pension from  the  exercise  of  the  sacred  ministry  ;  deprivation  of 
any  benefits,  dignities  and  pensions  whatever;  and  a  perpetual 
incapacity  to  obtain  such  privileges  ;  besides,  regarding  priests 
belonging  to  religious  Orders,  the  deprivation  of  all  active  and 
passive  voices. 

CHAPTER  II. 
Duty  of  the  Minister  Dlring  and  After  the  Confession. 
ART.  I.     Duty  of  the  minister  in  course  of  the  Confession. 
Parag.  1.     Confessor's  part. 

He  should  practice  the  quadruple  part  of  father,  doctor,  physi- 
cian and  judge. 


340  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

ART.  II.     Duty  of  the  minister  after  confession. 

663. — Ques.  Can  a  confessor  order  a  penance  to  an  accomplice 
(with  the  permission  of  the  penitent)  ;  or  must  he  leave  the  care 
of  so  doing  to  another  confessor? 

Ans.  Yes,  because  the  accomplice  has  not  acquired,  by  the  con- 
fession of  the  other  accomplice,  any  right  to  sacramental  secret, 
for  this  secret  was  instituted  in  favor  of  penitents  only  ;  conse- 
quently the  right  to  the  secret  is  acquired  only  by  the  one  who 
gives  it  up  confidentially. 

But,  ordinarily,  it  is  not  proper  that  the  confessor  should  take 
such  a  liberty. 


i 


SCreatfee  on  3Extreme  Sanction* 


CHAPTER  I. 

Nature  and  Effects  of  Extreme  Unction. 


CHAPTER  II. 
Matter  and  Form  of  Extreme  Unction. 
ART.  I.     Matter. 


ART.  II.     Form. 


CHAPTER  III. 
Minister  of  Extreme  Unction. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
Person  who  Receives  Extreme  Unction. 


treatise  on  ©rtrcr. 


CHAPTER  I. 
Nature  and  Division  of  Order. 


'''^7\ 


CHAPTER  II. 

Matter  and  Form  of  Order. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Minister  of  the  Sacrament  of  Order. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
Person  who  Receives  the  Sacrament  of  Order. 


Casts  of  Conscience  on  Sacraments  in  fficneraX. 


These  cases  are  of  no  iuterest  for  a  la3'n]an,  and  treat  of  trifling 
matters.  In  order  to  give  an  idea  of  the  cliildish  subjects,  we 
will  give  a  few  examples  : 

Case  III. 

Change  of  Matter. 

Trophime,  a  midwife,  hearing  for  the  first  time  Sabin,  a  5'oung 
priest,  singing  the  mass,  exclaims  enthusiastically  of  his  beautiful 
voice  :  "  Very  good,  indeed  !  How  much  he  has  improved  !  I  am 
not  surprised.  I  baptized  him  myself,  and  1  mixed  some  milk 
with  the  water." 

Ques.     What  are  we  to  think  of  Sabin's  baptism? 

Ans.  In  order  to  know  if  it  is  valid,  it  will  be  necessary  to  ask 
Trophime  if  the  milk  was  in  less,  equal,  or  superior  proportion 
to  the  water.  In  the  first  case,  the  baptism  is  valid  ;  in  the 
second,  it  is  not;  therefore  Sabin  should  receive  a  new  baptism, 
and  sacred  orders. 

Case  IV. 

'*  Lapsus  Ltngujl." 

Sidon,  a  priest,  instead  of  "  Hoc  est  enim  corjyus  meum^  "  says, 
when    consecrating:    ^' lire  est  corpus  meus  ^'^  or  ^'' Corpus  meu.'* 
Ques.     Is  the  consecration  valid?  etc.,  etc. 


Case  VI. 

Interruption. 

Cornelius,  a  priest,  baptizing  a  child,  said:   "  I  baptize  thee," 
-then  he  says  to  some  children  who  are   playiig  :   "  Silence  !  bad 


344  lite  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

boys,  stupid  children!" — and  he  adds:  "In  the  name  of  the 
Father,  of  the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy  —  at  this  moment  he  sneezes 
and  coughs  —  Ghost.  " 

Ques.     Is  this  baptism  valid?  etc.,  etc. 

•         •         Î         • 

The  following  may  be  a  more  grievous  fact,  from  a  social  point 
of  view  : 

Case  XVIII. 

The  Person  who  Receives  the  Sacrament. 

Florian,  a  priest,  requested  to  call  on  Titius,  a  dying  man,  hears 
his  confession,  and  administers  to  him  the  holy  Eucharist,  which 
he  freely  accepts.  But  when  he  tries  to  administer  Extreme 
Unction,  Titius  refuses  to  receive  it,  declaring  that  he  is  not  in 
danger  of  death.  But  the  priest,  noticing  that  Titius  is  losing  all 
consciousness,  begins  to  anoint  him  with  the  holy  oil,  and  adminis- 
ters the  sacrament  till  the  end,  although  the  dying  man,  opening 
his  eyes  and  seeing  what  is  being  done  upon  him,  shows  his  ill  will 
by  shaking  his  head. 

Ques.     Has  Florian  acted  validly  and  lawfully? 

Ans.  Yes,  he  has  acted  validly,  because  the  consent  of  Titius 
was  not  lacking. 

And  lawfully,  because  every  time  it  is  possible  to  administer  the 
sacraments  it  must  be  done,  when  there  is  necessity.  .  .  . 

Therefore  Florian  should  not  only  be  absolved,  but  praised 
for  it. 


Cases   of  Conscience  on  Baptism. 


Case  I. 
The  Matter  of  Baptism. 
Ques.     Is  baptism  valid  when  a  woman  weeps  upon  the  head  of 
the  child,  while  saying  the  sacramental  words? 
Ans.     No  ;  because  tears  are  not  natural  water. 

Case  VI. 
Minister  of  Baptism. 

Ameline,  a  Catholic  woman,  married  to  a  Protestant,  desires  to 
take  her  new-born  child  to  the  curate  to  have  it  baptized  ;  but  her 
husband  commands  her  to  take  the  child  to  a  priest  of  his  creed. 
The  pious  mother  laments  and  weeps,  not  being  able  to  satisfy  her 
heart's  desire.  But  an  idea  comes  to  her  mind,  as  a  remedy  to 
this  situation  ;  she  herself  baptizes  her  child  at  home,  before  she 
carries  it  to  the  minister. 

Ques.     What  must  we  think  of  Ameline? 

Ans.  Ameline  has  acte<l  badly  ;  for  she  was  the  cause  of  the 
child  being  baptized  twice.  And  there  is  less  grievance  in  having 
a  child  baptized  by  a  heretic,  than  in  having  it  baptized  twice.  .  . 

Case  IX. 
A  Child  Baptized  Four  Times. 
Honorine,  a  midwife,  requested  to  call  for  a  delivery,  and  fear- 
ing the  foetus  would  perish  with  the  mother,  who  is  in  danger  of 
death,  baptizes  it  with  a  surgical  instrument  in  its  mother's  womb  ; 
later  on,  an  arm  of  the  child  showing  out,  and  the  danger  being 
thereby  increased,  she  baptizes  it  upon  this  member.  Then,  not 
feeling  satisfied  about  the  validity  of  these  baptisms,  and  the  child 
being  nearly  dead  at  his  birth,  she  baptizes  him  once  more.  Finçil- 
ly,  the  priest  arrives,  and  doubting  the  validity  of  these  ceremo- 
nies, performs  the  sacrament  for  the  fourth  time,  under  conditi-^ns. 


346  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

Case  X. 
Baptism  of  the  Children  of  Heretics. 

1 .  The  priest  Faustus  receives  for  baptism  a  child  born  from 
Protestant  parents,  and  christens  it  solemnly  with  the  holy  water, 
but  under  condition  that  the  god-father  be  a  Catholic,  although  he 
well  knows  that  his  parents  will  educate  their  son  in  heresy. 

2.  Another  time,  a  Jewish  married  couple  who  had  come  to 
reside  in  his  parish,  with  intention  to  stay  a  short  time  on  account 
of  their  business,  leave  in  trust  of  the  servant  of  the  house  where 
they  had  stopped  their  two  children,  a  son  seven  years  of  age,  and 
and  a  daughter  three  years  old.  One  day  the  priest  learned, 
through  this  servant,  that  the  Jewish  young  girl  is  seriously  sick 
and  in  danger  of  death,  and  that  her  brother,  whom  she  had  initia- 
ted into  the  Catholic  religion,  had  eagerly  asked,  in  many  instances, 
to  be  baptized.  What  should  he  do  then?  The  good  priest  calls 
at  the  indicated  house  during  the  absence  of  the  parents,  and  bap- 
tizes secretly  the  two  Jewish  children.  The  little  girl  recovered 
after  a  short  time,  and  the  parents,  having  settled  their  business, 
went  to  another  country,  in  consequence  of  which  the  priest  is 
greatly  anxious  regai  ding  the  fate  of  the  young  baptized  children. 

Ques.  1.  May  children  of  heretics  be  baptized  b}'  a  Catholic, 
either  with  the  consent  of  or  unknown  to  their  parents? 

Ques.  2.  May  the  children  of  infidels  be  baptized  unknown  to 
their  parents,  or  in  spite  of  them  ?  Quid.  If  the  mother  consents, 
when  the  father  is  opposed?  or  if  the  grandfather  consents,  while 
the  parents  refuse? 

Ques.  3.  What  should  be  done  with  a  child,  if  the  use  of  rea- 
son is  certain?  and  what  is  to  be  done  if  it  is  doubtful? 

Ques.  4.     What  must  we  think  of  Priest  Faustus'  behavior? 

Ans.  Question  1.  Children  of  heretics  miy  bef  baptized  with 
the  consent  of  their  parents  ;  or  else,  parents  who  adoiit  baptism 
in  their  creed,  would  have  their  children  baptized  by  a  heretical 
minister.  But  it  is  not  allowed  to  baptize  the  children  of  heretics 
without  the  knowledge  of  their  parents,  except  in  case  of  neces- 
sity, when  the  parents  are  going  to  have  their  children  baptized 
according  to  their  creed,  so  that  they  should  not  be  obliged  to  be 
baptized  again. 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Baptism,  347 

Ans.  to  Question  2.  It  is  not  allowed  to  baptize  the  children  of 
infidels  in  spite  of  parents,  except  in  case  of  necessity,  or  unless 
the  children,  enjoy ing  their  full  reason,  request  themselves  to  be 
baptized.  The  excuse  is  found  in  the  danger  they  are  running  of 
losing  their  salvation. 

If  oneof  tlie  parents  is  in  favor  of  baptism  and  the  other  against 
it,  the  priest  should  side  with  the  one  who  is  favorable  to  the  bap- 
tism and  the  salvation  of  the  child,  providing  the  latter  is  to  be 
afterwards  educated  in  the  true  religion.  It  would  be  the  same  if 
the  father,  being  deceased,  the  grandfather  w^as  in  favor  of  the 
baptism  and  the  mother  against  it. 

Ans.  to  Question  3.  In  case  the  use  of  reason  is  certain  with 
an  infidel's  child,  if  he  seems  to  be  sufficiently  educated  and  asks 
to  be  baptized,  and  if  he  is  not  running  the  danger  of  perversion, 
even  in  spite  of  parents.  If  the  use  of  reason  is  doubtful,  the 
child  having  reached  the  age  of  seven,  it  is  commonly  said  that 
the  priest  must  presume  the  use  of  reason,  because  it  must  be 
j  idged  from  what  commonly  happens.  If  the  child  has  not  reached 
the  age  of  seven,  there  is  controversy.  But,  according  tp  St. 
Liguori,  it  is  better  to  wait  until  it  may  be  ascertained  regarding 
the  perfect  use  of  reason. 

Ans.  to  Question  4.  Faustus  has  acted  well  by  baptizing  the 
child  presented  to  him  by  heretical  parents  ;  for  if  it  had  not  been 
redeemed  by  him,  and  had  been  baptized  by  a  Protestant  minister, 
it  would  not  have  secured  the  advantage  of  being  sanctified  by  the 
Catholic  doctrine. 

2.  Faustus  might  and  should  baptize  the  Jewish  young  girl  in 
danger  of  death.  If  she  has  recovered,  the  good  priest  must  not 
be  charged  with  impudence  because  he  has  given  help  to  her  poor 
little  soul  in  a  great  danger.  And  there  is  no  occasion  to  accuse 
him  for  the  seven-year-old  boy  enjoying  his  full  reason,  well  ac- 
quainted with  religion,  and  asking  the  sacrament  of  redemption. 
For,  if  led  away  by  his  parents,  he  is  later  on  exposed  to  perver- 
sion, there  is,  however,  good  hope  to  presume  that,  with  the  grace 
of  baptism,  be  will  remember  so  great  a  blessing,  and  will  so  obtain 
eternal  salvation. 


I 


erases  of  Conscience  on  Confirmation. 


(They  are  of  no  interest.) 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  llje  lEucfjartst 


Case  I. 

Substance  With  Which  the  First  Consideration  Should  be 

Made. 

The  priest  Vitalis,  living  in  a  country  where  wheat  does  not 
grow  and  is  not  easy  to  be  had,  uses  for  the  sacrament  of  the 
Eucharist  consecrated  wafers,  made  sometimes  of  spelt,  of  rye  or 
of  barle}',  and  at  other  times  of  all  these  substances  mixed  together. 

Qiîes.  1.  What  is  the  substance  with  which  the  first  consecra- 
tion should  be  made  ? 

Ques.  2.     Is  Vitalis'  consecration  valid  ? 

Ans.  to  Question  1.  The  substance  with  which  wafers  should 
be  consecrated  is  wheaten  bread  ;  in  other  words,  such  bread  as  is 
generally  considered  as  bread,  properly  so  called. 

Ans.  to  Question  2.  Vitalis'  consecration  is  not  valid  with  bar- 
ley bread  ;  because  it  is  not  bread  properly  so  called.  This  sub- 
stance, being  doubtful,  should  therefore  be  prohibited  in  this  case. 
For  the  same  reason,  also,  spelt  or  meal.  However,  in  some  places, 
a  sort  of  wheat  is  supplied  under  the  name  of  spelt,  and  of  it  is 
made  bread,  properly  so  called. 

The  mixture  made  by  Vitalis  is  also  doubtful,  and  even  if  the 
proportion  of  barley  is  larger,  the  substance  is  not  valid. 

Case  VIII. 
Ministry  of  the  Eucharist. 
Nicaon,  a  priest,  having  a  sore  hand,  and  not  being  able  to  use 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Confirmation,  349 

his  fore-finger  at  the  communion,  takes  and  oîfers  the  consecrated 
wafer  between  the  thumb  and  middle-finger. 

Ques.     What  are  we  to  think  of  Nicaon  ? 

Ans.  It  is  not  allowed  to  give  the  Eucharist  with  other  fingers 
than  the  thumb  and  fore-finger.  .  .  .  And  consequently,  I^icaon 
has  sinned  grievously,  in  principle. 

Case  XXI. 
The  Holy  Viaticum. 

The  priest  Lucain,  learning  that  Romarin,  a  nobleman,  is  se- 
verely sick,  calls  in  haste  upon  him.  First,  he  is  refused  admis- 
sion by  the  patient's  family.  After  his  earnest  entreaties,  he  is 
permitted  to  enter  the  chamber  on  condition  that  he  shall  speak 
neither  of  death  nor  of  the  sacraments,  in  order  not  to  frighten  the 
patient.  In  spite  of  this,  the  priest  endeavors  to  prepare  the  sick 
man,  and  manages  it  so  cleverly  that  he  soon  receives  his  confes- 
sion. But,  later  on,  when  it  is  a  question  to  administer  to  him  tlie 
Holy  Viaticum,  the  priest  finds  the  wife  very  sick  also  ;  for  that 
reason  he  is  sent  away  as  an  unlucky  visitor,  and  it  so  happens 
tliat  Romarin  dies  the  same  night  without  having  received  the 
Viaticum. 

Ques.     Is  one  obliged  to  give  and  receive  the  Holy  Viat'cum? 

Ans.  Yes  ;  the  two  obligations  are  grave,  by  themselves,  ac- 
cording to  all  authorities  ;  for:  1,  The  pastor  of  souls  is  held  by 
duty  to  administer  the  Eucharist  to  his  parishioners  during  their 
life,  every  time  they  request  it  reasonably,  and  with  more  reason 
when  there  is  danger  of  death  ;  because  it  is  his  duty  to  supply  all 
things  necessary  or  helpful  to  salvation  ;  2,  the  faithful,  after  the 
recommendation  of  Christ  and  the  Church,  should  often  receive 
communion  in  the  course  of  their  life,  and  with  more  reason  are 
they  obliged  to  do  so  when  in  danger  of  death,  in  order  to  be 
strengthened  against  spiritual  enemies  by  such  divine  help. 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  tîie  Jflass. 


Case  XII. 
Change  of  Application. 

Titien,  a  parson,  lias  received  from  a  noble  and  very  pious  lady 
a  piece  of  gold,  to  say,  on  Saturday,  a  roass  in  her  behalf  at  the 
Viigin's  altar.  But  the  same  day,  he  has  to  say  a  mass  to  the  in- 
tention of  a  deceased  man.  What  should  he  do?  He  asks  Tiburce, 
a  priest,  his  friend  :  ''  Will  you  celebrate  a  complimentary  mass  to 
my  intention  next  Saturday  ;  and  on  Monday,  in  return,  I  will 
celebrate  one  to  your  intention?"  Tiburce  accepts,  and  by  so 
doing  the  parson  has  complied  with  both  of  his  obligations,  and 
has  been  able  to  keep  the  piece  of  gold. 

Qiies.     What  are  we  to  think  of  Titien? 

Ans.  Titien  has  acted  lawfully,  according  to  the  most  probable 
opinion. 


(ïï^asfs  of  Conscience  on  Confession. 


Case  XI. 
Circumstances  of  Sins. 

Young  Paschasius  has  committed  the  shameful  sin  with  his  own 
sister,  his  first  cousin,  and  his  brother's  wife.  Havinoj  returned 
to  better  ieelings,  he  goes  and  throws  himself  at  his  confessor's 
feet,  and,  with  the  greatest  repentance,  declares  he  has  acted 
shamefully  with  three  women  of  his  relatives. 

Ques.  Has  Paschasius  so  made  a  plenary  confession  ;  or  should 
he  have  named  the  degrees  and  species  of  relationship? 

Ans.  1.  Paschasius  has  not  made  a  plenary  confession,  as  he 
has  omitted  to  state  the  circumstance  of  adultery  with  his  brother's 
wife.  He  should  have  at  least  added  that  one  of  those  three 
ladies  was  a  relation  of  his  by  marriage. 

2.  He  should  have  even  named  the  incest  with  his  own  sister  ; 
that  is  to  sa}^  with  a  relative  of  the  first  degree  in  collateral  line. 
The  reason  is,  that  the  respect  which  is  due  to  sisters  and  brothers 
is  of  another  kind  than  that  due  to  other  collateral  relatives. 
This  results  from  the  fact  that  the  Church  never  grants  a  dispen- 
sation for  marriage  with  that  degree  of  relationship.  It  is  the 
common  opinion  of  Lugo  and  Lacroix.  But  St.  Liguori  professes 
a  contrary  opinion  as  probable;  because  such  an  union  {talis 
copula)  is  not  forbidden  by  natural  right;  as  follows,  says  he, 
from  the  example  given  by  Adam's  children.  But  it  may  be  re- 
plied to  this,  that  this  union  is  forbidden,  at  least,  by  natural 
right  in  the  largest  sense,  and  more  ytt  than  polygamy,  the  only 
exception  being  when  compelled  by  necessity. 

3.  The  more  probable  opinion  is,  that  Paschasius  could  not 
very  well  name  the  degree  of  relationship  as  regards  his  cousin, 
because  other  degrees  produce  but  an  aggravated  circumstance  ;  St. 


352  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Liguori  and  others,  according  to  the  more  common  opinion  ;  on 
the  contrary,  Concina,  etc.  And  he  was  not  compelled  to  state 
the  degree  of  relationship  of  his  sister-in-law  ;  because,  with  the 
exception  of  the  first  degree,  —  in  almost  direct  line  in  other 
words,  —  between  father-in-law  and  daughter-in-law,  and  between 
son-in-law  and  mother-in  law,  the  more  probable  opinion  is,  that 
the  sin  of  lust  does  not  change  of  nature  according  to  the  various 
degrees,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  make  a  distinction  between 
relationship  by  blood  and  relationship  by  marriage.  St.  Liguori 
proves  that  this  is  the  common  opinion  of  theologians. 

Case  XIII. 
Denunciation  of  the  Accomplice. 

I.  Bertoldus  has  committed  the  horrible  crime  of  incest  on  his 
own  sister,  who  is  well-known  by  the  priest  of  the  parish,  whose 
nephew  she  is  shortly  to  marry.  Paschal-time  is  near,  and  the 
unfortunate  man  can  confess  only  to  his  pastor.  He  hesitates  a 
long  time  whether  he  should  and  may  declare  the  incest  committed 
on  his  own  sister,  dishonoring  her  in  the  priest's  eyes.  He  was 
ready  to  omit  his  sin  ;  but,  while  thinking  over  it,  he  hits  upon  a 
scheme  to  get  out  of  his  trouble,  and  so  makes  the  following  con- 
fession :  "  1  once  committed  incest  on  a  relative  of  mine." 

II.  Œgidius,  noticing  that  his  sister  is  pregnant  from  Caius, 
her  lover,  becomes  furious,  strikes  her  severely,  and  so  causes  her 
to  have  a  miscarriage.  Repenting  of  his  action,  he  confesses  that 
he  has  severely  struck  his  sister  ;  but  he  neither  states  that  she 
was  pregnant,  nor  that  she  had  a  miscarriage,  in  order  not  to  declare 
this  crime  to  his  confessor,  by  whom  he  is  well  known,  together 
with  all  his  family. 

Ques.  1.  Should  one  confess  a  sin  that  one  cannot  tell  without 
naming  the  accomplice? 

Ques.  2.  Must  one  declare  the  sin  to  the  confessor  who  knows 
the  accomplice,  if  able  to  secure  another  confessor? 

Ques.  3.  Is  there  obligation  to  declare  a  mortal  sin  of  which 
one  cannot  accuse  one's  self  without  dishonoring  another  party 
who  was  the  object  or  occasion  of  such  a  sin  ? 

Ques.  4.     What  should  be  done  in  these  two  cases  ? 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Confession,  353 

Ans.  Question  1.  Yes,  it  is  the  more  common  and  probable 
opinion,  as  there  is  no  legitimate  reason  which  excuses  us  from 
confessing  a  sin.  For  the  prejudice  which  results  from  the  denun- 
ciation of  an  accomplice  is  inherent  to  the  confession  itself. 
Otherwise,  in  many  places,  where  all  the  faithful  are  known  by  the 
parsons  and  deacons,  confession  would  not  be  in  force  ;  as  parents, 
sons,  husbands  and  wives  would  be  dispensed  in  many  instances 
from  declaring  their  sins,  which  would  be  absurd.  However, 
quite  a  number  of  other  theologians  deny  it,  after  a  probable 
opinion. 

Ans.  to  Question  2.  No,  if  one  is  able  to  secure  easily  another 
priest  ;  but  one  finds  out  easily  some  motives  for  dispensation. 
Moreover,  putting  aside  these  motives  for  dispensation,  the  sin 
would  not  generally  be  very  great  if  one  kept  to  the  usual  confes- 
sor. 

Ans.  to  Question  8-  Yçs,  this  is  what  follows  from  the  answer 
to  the  first  question,  aa  the  reason  drawn  from  the  integrity  of  the 
confession  does  not  dispense  any  one  from  denouncing  the  person 
who  is  not  an  accomplice  as  well  as  he  who  is  such,  when  the  in- 
tegrity cannot  otherwise  be  respected. 

Ans.  to  Question  4.  In  the  first  case,  Bertoldus  is  compelled  to 
confess  that  he  has  committed  incest  with  a  relative  of  the  first 
degree  in  collateral  line,  or  more  direct,  on  his  own  sister,  which 
results  from  the  answer  to  the  first  question.  However,  according 
to  St.  Liguori,  it  would  be  satisfactory  to  simply  state  :  "I  have 
sinned  with  a  relative  of  mine."  This  opinion  is  not  mine  at  all; 
but  while  it  is  that  of  so  great  a  doctor,  I  must  not  oppose  it. 

In  the  second  case,  how  does  it  seem  to  you  about  Œgidius? 
This  is  a  delicate  matter.  On  one  side,  it  does  not  seem  likely 
that  he  vras  able  to  declare  his  sin  without  stating  the  above  cir- 
cumstances. However,  according  to  many,  he  might  confess  these 
two  sins  separately  ;  that  is,  of  having  first  struck  his  sister,  and 
having  caused  a  woman  to  have  a  miscarriage.  Do  not  say  he 
would  omit  thus  the  special  circumstance  of  relationship  concern- 
ing the  fœtus'  murder  ;  as,  m.ost  probably,  ill-treatment  of  relatives 
does  not  constitute  a  new  kind  of  sin,  unless  it  is  a  question  of 
parents  in  direct  line,  to  first  and  second  degrees.     Now  the  mur- 


354  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

dered  child,  the  sister's  son,  is  a  relative  to  tlio  third  degree  in  col- 
lateral line  ;  therefore,  with  regard  to  him,  Œgediiis  did  not  vio- 
late, in  any  special  manner,  the  virtue  of  piety.  Consequently  if 
instead  of  his  sister,  Œgedias  had  struclc  his  widowed  mother, 
criminally  pregnant,  he  could  not  find  any  means  to  get  ont  of  the 
diflSculties,  and  he  then  should  be  compelled  to  declare  all  the 
above-named  circumstances. 

Case  XIV. 
Inquiries  About  the  Accomplice's  Name.* 

I.  Thersile  calls  on  Rufin,  her  confessor,  and  declares  she  has 
committed  the  grievous  sin  of  lust  with  a  man.  "Is  he  your  rel- 
ative?" asks  Rufin.  '•  Yes,  by  Adam."  "  Is  he  your  neighbor?" 
"  More  or  less."  "  Who  is  he,  then?  What  is  his  name?"  "  He 
is  called  by  his  Christian  name."  "  Impudent  woman  !  I  cannot 
give  you  absolution,  as  I  am  not  able  to  know  the  opportunity  and 
extent  of  the  sin  you  have  committed." 

II.  Jules,  a  man  of  importance  in  his  county,  comes  to  confess 
to  the  same  Rufin,  and  charges  himself  with  havii  g  committed  the 
shameful  sin  with  a  woman  several  times.  But  Rutin,  remember- 
ing that  Jules  had  formerly  led  a  bad  life  with  his  servant,  whom 
he  was  obliged  to  send  av\ay,  strongly  suspects  him  to  have  hired 
another,  and  so  to  have  a  new  opportunity  near  at  hand.  He  a^ks 
him  :  "  Is  she  a  slave?"  "  She  is  free."  *'  Is  she  a  servant?  " 
"  She  is  a  servant  of  God,  Eve's  daughter."  "Does  she  live  in 
your  house?"  "  But,  Father,  that  has  nothing  to  do  with  confes- 
sion." The  confessor,  not  being  able  to  get  more  out  of  him,  ab- 
solves him,  and  sends  him  away. 

Case  XXI. 

Absolution  of  a  Dying  Heretic. 

Oliver,  the  priest,  travelling  in  heretical  countries,  stops  at  a 
hotel,  and  there  meets  with  a  heretic,  who  is  unconscious  and  near 
to  death.     Oliver  is  unaware  whether  he   is   a  heretic  by  practice 

*  I  quote  these  two  cases  only,  as  a  matter  of  curiosit}'  ;  tliey  throw^  a 
good  light  on  the  little  comedies  of  the  confessional. 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Confession.  355 

(mat  erf  alls),  or  hy  piinciplo  {formalin),  ami  whether  or  not  he  has 
the  u^e  of  reason.  What  should  be  done?  At  first  he  is  in  great 
uncertaint}'  ;  but  as  there  is  danger  in  waiting  longer,  soon  pre- 
suming and  accepting  his  act  of  contrition,  and  his  desire  to  con- 
fess, he  absolves  him  under  conditions. 

Ques.     Does  he  act  properly  ? 

Ans.  Oliver  must  be  praised  for  having  thought  of  the  here- 
tic's salvation,  as  much  as  he  could.  He  had  not  assurance  that 
he  was  a  heretic  in  principle,  and  therefore  could  entertain  hope, 
although  very  slight,  of  giving  Jiim  a  valid  absolution. 

Case  XXII. 
Absolution  of  a  Dying  Heretic. 

Cesarin,  a  heretic,  but  a  man  of  good  morals  and  who  seemed 
to  be  only  in  material  error,  is  taken  severely  sick,  and  is  in  danger 
of  death,  without  having  lost  the  use  of  his  reason.  Sylvien,  the 
parson  of  the  parish,  calls  on  him  immediately,  to  prepare  him  for 
eternal  salvation,  and  speaks  to  him  in  the  following  manner: 
"My  friend,  I  guess  you  adhere  to  the  Lutheran  religion 
merely  because  you  consider  it  the  true  religion  ?  Would  you  not 
forsake  it  immediately,  if  you  thought  it  bad?  Do  you  not  con- 
fess to  God  that  you  have  sinned  ?  and  will  you  confess  it  to  a 
man  who  is  able  to  give  you  absolution?  Would  you  not  confess 
to  me,  if  you  knew  it  to  be  your  duty  to  do  so?"  To  each  ques- 
tion, the  patient  answers  "Yes;"  and  the  priest  then  says  to 
him:  "If  this  confession  is  sufficient,  I  will  give  you  absolu- 
tion," etc.,  etc. 

Ques.  1.  May  absolution  be  given  to  a  practical  heretic,  he 
being  quite  conscious,  and  refusing  in  good  faith  to  embrace  the 
Catholic  religion? 

Ques.  2.     Has  the  confessor  acted  properly,  in  this  case? 

Ans.  Question  1.  Theologians  deny  it  generally.  .  .  .  But 
Lacroix,  Renter  and  others  affirm  it,  in  case  of  extreme  neces- 
sity, because  the  conditions  absolutely  required  for  the  sacra- 
ment of  penance  are  to  be  found  here  implicitly,  by  some  means. 
In  fact,  this  heretic  may  very  well  repent  of  his  sins  and  desire 


356  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

implicit!}^  the  confession  ;  for  instance,  if  lie  declares  to  the  priest 
who  questions  him,  that  he  would  like  to  confess  were  he  a  be- 
liever in  the  Catholic  religion  as  the  true  religion.  This  opinion 
should  be  adopted  in  practice,  so  it  seems.  ...  So  it  happens 
often  in  some  parts  of  Switzeiland  and  Germany,  where  such 
heretics  are  absolved  just  before  their  death. 

Ans.  Question  2.  Sylvien  must  not  be  blamed  for  having  given 
absolution  to  a  heretic  (in  prnctice)  who  was  perfectly  conscious. 
He  has  acted  with  prudence,  if,  in  this  cxtremil}',  he  had  no  time 
to  instruct  and  convince  the  heretic.  For,  if  he  bad  said  to  him 
that  his  religion  was  false,  he  would  have  run  the  risk  of  spoiling 
his  good  faith,  without  any  chance  of  bringing  him  to  tlie  true 
religion. 

Objection:  To  secure  a  valid  absolution,  an  act  of  faith  is 
required  :  now,  from  a  heretic,  one  cannot  expect  a  supernatural 
act  of  faith  ;  therefore  absolution  should  not  be  given  to  a  heretic. 

Ans.  An  act  of  faith  cannot  be  expected  from  a  heretic  by 
principle,  but  it  may  be  from  a  heretic  by  practice.  The  reason 
is,  that  a  heretic  by  practice  belongs  to  the  soul  of  the  Church, 
although  he  is  separated  from  its  body  ;  *  he  therefore  may  per- 
form an  act  of  hope,  of  charity,  and  of  contrition,  based  on  this 
act  of  faith. 

*This  terrible  doctrine,  which  set  on  fire  so  many  stakes  in  the 
good  old  time,  is  exposed  by  Marotte  to  the  young  children  in  the  follow- 
ing terms  : 

"  Ques.     Are  heretics  subject  to  the  laws  of  the  Church  ?" 
"  Ans.     Heretics,  although  unfaithful  to  the  Church,  remain  subject  to 
her  authority,  and  consequently  are  compelled  to  observe  her  laws,  unless 
exempted  from  so  doing.  "     {Pttit  Catechism). 


erases  of  Conscience  on  Se&eral  Cases. 


Case  II. 
Cause  of  Reserve. 


Laurien,  travelling  outside  bis  diocese,  confesses  to  the  priest 
Justin  a  sin  of  incest  committed  on  bis  cousin,  of  the  second  de- 
gree. Immediately  Justin  warns  him  that  this  sin  is  a  reserved 
one,  and  that  he  cannot  give  him  absolution  for  reserved  sins. 
Laurien  answers,  as  a  man  who  is  not  ignorant  regarding  religious 
affairs,  that  such  a  sin  is  not  reserved  in  his  diocese,  as  he  knows 
well.  "But,"  saj's  the  priest,  "it  is  reserved  here  where  you 
make  your  confession."  "  I  don't  care,"  says  the  penitent,  "I 
have  not  sinned  here,  but  elsewhere  ;  I  therefore  have  not  com- 
mitted a  reserved  sin."  "Go,  my  friend,  and  confess  where  you 
have  sinned  ;  I  cannot  give  you  absolution." 

Case  XIV. 

Absolution  of  an  Accomplice. 

I.  Titien,  the  priest,  taking  advantage  of  an  opportunity  to 
satisfy  his  passion,  has  committed  with  Anna  a  grievous  sin  against 
the  sixth  commandment.  Soon  afterwards,  the  two  guilty  ones 
repent  of  their  fault.  As  no  other  priest  is  near,  Titien  goes  to 
another  town  to  confess.  But  Anna,  retained  at  home  by  sickness, 
cannot  go  out  to  find  another  priest.  OverwUelmed  with  sadness, 
she  earnestly  requests  Titien  to  hear  her  confession.  The  latter 
at  Erst  hesitates,  as  on  one  hand  he  is  prevented  by  the  law  of  the 
church,  which  forbids  to  give  absolution  to  an  accomplice  ;  on  the 
other  hand,  he  desires  to  help  this  unfortunate  woman,  who  runs 
the  risk  of  having  no  confessor  for  a  long  time.  Presently,  moved 
with  compassion,  he  hears  Anna's  confession,  and  gives  her  abso- 


358  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

lution,  feeling  convinced  that  be  is  not  held  by  the  inhibition  of 
the  church  in  this  difficult  case. 

II.  Calliste,  a  priest,  commits  the  shameful  sin  with  Julia  ;  he 
receives  her  confession  as  accomplice,  but  refuses  to  give  her  abso- 
tion.  Later  on,  he  does  not  know  whether  he  has  incurred  Papal 
excommunication . 


Case   XV. 

Absolution  of  an  Accomplice. 

Hermodore,  a  priest,  gives  absolution  to  Rosalie,  his  accomplice, 
who  is  at  the  point  of  death,  u  ged  by  the  following  reasons  :  1, 
he  is  entitled  to  give  absolution  for  reserved  sins  ;  2,  at  the  point 
of  death  all  reservations  cease  ;  3,  there  is  no  other  priest  except  a 
young  vicar,  who  surel}'  would  be  much  shocked  ;  or  a  new  priest 
not  yet  approved,  and  who  would  excite  the  astonishment  of  the 
people  were  he  to  hear  Rosalie's  confession. 


Case  XVII. 

Absolution  of  an  Accomplice. 

Dydime,  a  priest,  dressed  in  lay  clothes,  meets  Eulalie  during 
the  night,  with  whom  he  does  not  hesitate  to  commit  the  shameful 
sin.  Next  morning,  Eulalie  calls  on  Dydime,  and  confesses  the  sin 
that  she  committed  the  previous  night  with  a  man  entirely  un- 
known to  her.  From  what  she  adds,  Dydime  understands  clearly 
that  the  woman  is  his  accomplice.  What  shall  the  unfortunate 
man  do?  What  a  trial  for  him  !  .  .  .  If  the  penitent  woman  knew 
it,  she  would  cry  out  in  her  sorrow  :  '^You  are  the  man  !  "  .  .  .  But 
she  is  unaware  of  the  fact,  and  Dydime  dares  not  tell  her.  Besides 
he  has  no  pretext  to  refuse  her  absolution.  What  shall  he  do 
then?  In  his  uncertainty  he  gives  her  absolution,  and  later  on  in- 
quires whether  the  absolution  is  valid  or  not.   .   .   . 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Several  Cases,  359 

Case  XVII. 
Absolution  of  an  Accomplice. 

I.  Lelius,  a  parson,  while  hearing  a  confession,  learns  from  a 
w(iman  that  sliehascommiltcd  the  shameful  sin  with  a  priest.  He 
does  not  know  what  to  think,  as  he  recoUecis  having  sinned  one 
night  recently  with  a  woman  with  a  voice  almost  like  hers.  How- 
ever, he  dares  not  tell  her  of  his  doubt,  and  absolves  his  accom- 
plice. 

II.  Narcisse,  a  simple  priest,  hears  the  confession  of  Leonie,  on 
whom  he  had  tried  to  satisfy  liis  passion.  She  had  resisted  exter- 
nally, but  consented  inwardlj'.  A  few  days  later  she  asks  him  to 
jicar  her  confession,  and  declares  her  sin  committed  internally. 
Narcisse  does  not  know  whether  he  should  absolve  her,  but  finally 
grants  her  the  blessiug  of  absolution. 

1.  If  a  priest  has  taken  advantage  of  a  woman  drunk  or  asleep, 
to  satisfy  his  passion,  he  does  not  lose  by  it  the  right  to  absolve 
her,  because  she  cannot  be  considered  as  his  accomplice. 

2.  If  a  priest  has  persuaded  and  led  a  woman  to  believe  that 
she  does  not  sin  by  allowing  him  shameful  contact  ;  and  the  woman, 
thus  deceived,  lets  him  do  what  he  pleases,  she  is  not  his  accom- 
plice, and  the  priest  mny  absolve  her  for  her  other  sins. 

•  •....•.**•• 

Case  XVIII. 
Absolution  of  an  Accomplice. 

I.  Komain,  a  priest,  having  committed  the  shameful  sin  with 
Riitilie,  and  knowing  that  he  cannot  absolve  her,  .  .  .  sends  her 
to  another  priest. 

IL  Julie,  who  had  had  shameful  relations  with  her  parson,  was 
taken  ^everd}'  sick.  S  lie  knew  her  accomplice  could  not  absolve 
liL-r,  and  might  easily  have  requested  the  visit  of  another  priest. 
lint  the  unfortunate  woman,  fearing  to  di-^close  her  shame  to  an- 
otiier  priest,  uses  the  following  strat;  gem  :  She  requests  hastily 
her  parst^n  to  bring  her  the  holy  viaticum,  as  she  hatl  received 
absolution  from  another  priest.     The  [;arsou,  not  bu>pectii.g  any- 


360  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

thing,  arrives.  Tlien  Julie  confesses  to  him  before  tlie  commnn- 
iou,  and  is  absolved  in  good  faitli  b}^  him,  as  being  at  the  point  of 
death. 


Case  XIX. 

Absolution  of  an  Accomplice. 

I.  Geline,  a  courtesan,  who  Lad  committed  shameful  sins  with 
the  priest  Valere,  dei-pibing  her  infamous  life  from  the  bottom  of 
his  heart,  comes  back  sincerely  to  a  better  course.  IShe  makes  an 
exact  confession  of  her  whole  life  to  Albert  ;  but,  by  an  innocent 
act  of  forgetfulness,  she  omits  to  state  the  sin  committed  with 
Yaleie.  Later  on,  she  confesses  to  her  accomplice,  declares  this 
sin  to  him,  and  receives  absolution. 

II.  Thérèse  was  almost  dead.  Near  her  death-bed  is  Flavien,a 
suspended  priest,  who  is  disposed  to  absolve  her.  But  Albin,  who 
was  the  accomplice  of  Thérèse  in  her  shameful  sin,  takes  the  place, 
receives  the  confession  of  the  dying  woman,  and  absolves  her. 

Case  XX. 

Absolution  of  an  Accomplice. 

Lucienne,  accomplice  of  the  priest  Romain  in  libidinous  sins, 
threatened  with  death,  calls  for  a  priest,  and  loses  the  use  of 
speech.  Romain  arrives,  questions  her,  and  she  answers  him  by 
gestures.  But  it  happens  that,  after  a  short  time,  Lucienne  gets  up 
again  and  is  better  ;  her  apoplexy  was  a  feebleness  only.  Romain 
does  not  know  whether  he  should  terminate  the  confession. 
Finally,  he  gives  the  absolution. 

Case  XXL 

Absolution  of  an  Accomplice. 

Marcel,  the  priest,  has  used  obscene  words,  and  the  most  shame- 
ful touching  with  Aurelus,  his  boy-friend.  While  hearing  confes- 
sions of  penitents  Aurelus  arrives,  and  confesses  the  sins  committed 


Canes  of  Conscience  on  Several  Cases.  3GI 

witli  Marcel  not  yet  confessed,  ^larcel  doubts  at  first  whether  he 
slioiild  absolve  him  ;  but  he  soon  throws  away  all  scruples,  because 
reserved  cases  do  not  include  either  words  or  touchings  alone,  nor 
sins  committed  with  a  man.  Besides,  says  he,  in  absence  of  all 
jurisdiction  and  before  a  common  error,  the  Church  will  make  up 
for  it. 


Case  XXII. 

Absolution  of  an  Accomplice. 

Liborius,  a  candidate  for  the  priesthood,  before  taking  Orders, 
has  committed  a  grievous  sin  against  chastity  with  young  Flavie. 
.  .  .  Having  become  a  priest,  Flavie  calls  on  him,  declares  to 
him  that  she  has  hidden  in  her  previous  confessions  the  sin  she  had 
committed  with  him,  and  asks  him  to  receive  her  confession. 

Liborius  hesitates  at  first  ;  then  he  decides  to  hear  and  absolve 
his  accomplice. 

Case  XXIII. 

Absolution  of  an  Accomplice. 

I.  Bruno,  a  priest,  having  committed  a  shameful  sin  with 
Martha,  has  recourse  to  the  Bishop,  hiding  his  name,  and  obtains 
the  privilege  to  hear  and  absolve  his  accomplice. 

II.  Elegius,  another  priest,  has  unfortunately  committed  a 
grievous  sin  against  the  sixth  commandment  ;  and,  more  unfor- 
tunately, absolves  his  accomplice,  and  by  so  doiilg  incurs  Papal 
excommunication. 

Case  XXIY. 
Shameful  Solicitations. 
Viliane,  a  woman  of  light  morals,  has  committed  several  shame- 
ful acts  with  her  confessor,   by  whom   she   had  been  solicited,  as 
much  during  confession  as  outside  it.     She  has  hidden  these  sacri- 
leges in  several  confessions.     Finally  .   .   . 


362  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Case  XXV. 

Shameful  Solicitations. 

Cornelie  declares  in  confession,  to  parson  Sulpice,  while  weep- 
ing, that  she  has  committed  the  shameful  crime  with  Evrald,  her 
confessor,  whom  she  was  pursuing  with  her  guilt}'  love.  Sulpice 
questions  her.   ... 

Case  XXVI. 

Shameful  Solicitations. 

Rufine,  solicited  to  sin  by  Sylvain,  her  confessor,  has  yielded  to 
him.  But,  during  fifteen  years,  she  has  not  dared  to  declare  her 
crime  in  confession.  Finally,  she  states  it  to  a  new  confessor, 
who  requests  her  to  name  her  accomplice.     She  refuses.     1.   .   .   . 

Case   XXVIII. 
Shameful  Solicitations. 

I.  Brixius,  the  priest,  in  course  of  a  confession,  has  solicited 
from  Rutilie  some  slight  immoralities.  Rutilie  calls  on  another 
confessor,  and  declares  to  him  the  facts.  The  latter,  having  heard 
the  confession,  compels  her  to  name  the  seducer  ;  and,  on  her  re- 
fusal, sends  her  away  without  absolulion,  until  she  denounces  him. 

III.  Sigolena,  tells  conûdeutially  to  Valfride,that  she  was  ex- 
cited to  immoral  actions  by  her  confessor  Paulin,  during  confes- 
sion. Valfride^  anxious,  tells  the  whole  affair  to  her  confessor; 
when  the  latter  compels  her  to  denounce  Paulin,  in  spite  of  the 
promised  secrecy,  threatening  her  with  a  lefusal  of  absolution. 

III.  Priest  Ripasius,  solicited  by  Bertha  to  receive  her  confes- 
sion on  the  morrow,  excites  her  immediately  to  sin.  She  calls  on 
another  confessor,  who  compels  her  lo  denounce  Ripasius. 

Ques.  1.  Should  we  denounce  a  confessor  who  urges  us  to 
slightly  immoral  acts  ? 

Ques.  2.  Should  a  penitent  make  this  denunciation  ;  not  only 
the  one  who  has  b^en  excited  to  dbaudiery,  but  also  the  one  who 
hears  of  it? 


I 


I 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Several  Cases,  363 

Ques.  3.  What  is  to  be  done,  if  he  had  learned  the  excitation 
to  (lebaucheiy  in  confidence  ? 

Ans.  Question  1.  No;  at  least  in  the  most  probable  manner. 
The  reason  is  :  that  to  denounce  a  seducer,  it  is  required  that  the 
act  of  excitation  be  a  grievous  sin,  so  that  one  should  think  he  has 
sinned  gravely  in  this  case.  For  Benedict  calls  this  crime  of  exci- 
tation a  sacrilegious  trick,  because  it  certainl}' denotes  a  grave  sin. 

Besides,  an  act  contrary  to  chastity  in  itself,  does  not  become 
grave  because  it  took  place  during  confession,  or  on  the  occasion 
of  confession  ;  as  otherwise,  all  venial  sins,  in  matter  of  veracity, 
humility,  patience,  etc.,  would  become  grave  in  this  sacrament, 
which  nobody  affirms.  And  it  should  not  be  objected  that  a  slight 
fault  should  become  grave  on  account  of  the  respect  due  to  this 
sacrament  ;  as  otherwise,  all  sins  would  become  grave  in  confes- 
sion, for  want  of  respect  to  this  sacrament  ;  which  is  false.  More- 
over, the  outrage  does  not  exist  so  far,  since  this  sacrament  is 
given  with  a  bad  intention  ;  therefore,  if  the  action  is  but  slightly 
bad,  the  outrage  made  to  the  sacrament  would  be  only  slight. 
{St.  Liguori.) 

Ans.  Question  2.  Yes  ;  the  reason  is,  it  matters  little  that  it 
might  be  a  question  of  the  person  excited  to  debauchery,  or  of 
another  acquainted  with  the  whole  affair  ;  for  the  object  itself  of 
the  law  remains  adequate,  viz.,  that  the  seducer  be  punished.  In 
fact,  this  case  is  a  rare  one  ;  because,  most  of  the  time,  the  excita- 
tion is  known  to  the  excited  penitent  only. 

Ans.  Question  3.  A  person  who  knows  of  the  excitation  con- 
fidentially, is  nevertheless  held  to  make  denunciation  of  it.  The 
reason  is,  that  nobody  is  held  to  keep  a  secret,  even  promised 
\vitli  an  oath,  when  this  secret  brings  a  common  prejudice.  However, 
it  is  right  to  except  a  case  when  confidence  is  reposed  in  order 
simply  to  ask  advice  ;  for  the  divulgence  of  the  secret  would  be 
contrary  to  the  relations  of  men,  and  even  to  the  general  welfare, 
which  intervenes  when  askins:  advice. 


Clases  on  t\]z  Biitn  of  Contesors. 


Case  VI. 

Occasion  of  Sinning. 

Goodman,  a  confessor,  absolves,  without  any  objection,  tlie 
following  penitents:  1,  a  stranger  who  is  still  keeping  liis  concu- 
bine at  his  home  ;  2,  a  merchant  who  goes  every  year  to  the  fair 
of  Beaucaire,  and  sins  each  time  with  the  same  woman  ;  2,  a  lady 
who  has  ceased  to  sin  for  a  year,  but  however  meets  her  lover 
from  time  to  time  without  sinning,  writes  to  him  honest  letters, 
and  keeps  his  portrait  at  her  house. 


Case  VII. 

Occasion  of  Sinning. 

Young  Julienne  sinned  often  with  Caius,  her  father's  servant, 
and  a  family  relative.  She  confesses  with  great  repentance  ;  and 
she  is  given  absolution  once,  twice,  tliree  times.  However,  she 
falls  again  ;  and  throwing  herself  at  her  confessor's  feet,  in  weep- 
ing, she  avows  her  fault.  The  confessor  liesitates  ;  but,  moved 
with  compassion,  he  absolves  Julienne  for  the  fourth  time,  and 
even  many  others. 

Case  VlII. 

Occasion  of  Sinning. 

I.  Lampridius  has  sinned  once  or  twice  with  his  servant  ;  he 
confesses  it  three  months  later,  affirming  that  he  repents  from  the 
bottom  of  his  heart,  and  that  he  will  try  all  means  to  avoid  a  repe- 
tition ;  but  he  cannot  discharge  his  servant,  who  is  very  useful  to 


Cases  on  the  Duty  of  Confessors.  3G5 

him.      After  having  considered  all  these  reasons,  the   confessor 
absolves  him. 

II.  Priest  Radulphey  obstinately  declines  to  send  away  his 
servant,  with  whom  he  has  used  too  gieat  familiarities  many 
times,  and  even  very  often  :  1,  because,  if  he  were  to  do  so,  what 
had  been  reported  would  be  confirmed  ;  2,  because,  with  another 
servant,  he  would,  perhaps,  be  exposed  to  a  greater  danger  ;  3, 
because,  in  the  spiritual  exercises  he  followed  lately,  he  was  advised 
to  act  so  by  his  confessor. 


Case  IX. 
Occasion  of  Sixning. 

I.  Ludimille,  for  the  last  ten  years,  is  in  the  service  of  Ulderic, 
a  bachelor  of  doubtful  morals.  The  public  opinion  is  that  tiiey 
are  living  in  concubinage.  She  calls  on  a  missionary,  who  was 
conducting  some  revivals  in  her  town.  She  denies  having  had 
shameful  intercourse  with  her  master,  and  asks  to  be  granted  the 
sacraments. 

II.  Young  Oh'mpia,  having  the  intention  of  marrying  Baldius, 
though  she  notices  that  her  presence  and  his  conversation  furnish 
her  betrothed  the  opportunity  of  numerous  internal  sins,  refuses  to 
avoid  him,  because  she  fears  that  by  keeping  him  away,  she  may 
lose  the  chance  of  getting  married. 

Case  X. 

Occasion  of  Sinning. 

I.  Bertha,  a  servant,  also  sins  with  her  master.  Her  confes- 
sor insists  ui)on  her  leaving  him,  but  she  refuses  to  obey  ;  because 
her  master  has  promised  to  amend;  because,  for  many  years,  he 
has  not  paid  her,  and  if  she  were  to  leave  her  situation  he  would 
not  pay  her  at  all.  The  confessor  gives  her  absolution.  Six 
months  later  Beitha  calls  again,  having  sinned  again,  and  giving 
the  same  reasons  ;  she  is  absolved  once  more  by  her  confessor. 

II.  Young    Pascasius  is   fond   of  frequenting  a   neighboring 


366  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jem  Its, 

house,  where  he  spends  many  hours  with  young  girls,  and  beauti- 
ful, spiritual  and  graceful  women,  joking  and  hiugliing,  although 
he  meets  with  frequent  temptations  against  ciiastity,  movements 
entirely  dissolute,  and  even,  somelimos,  pollutions.  The  con- 
fessor having  insisted  on  his  abstainii  g  from  going  to  these  meet- 
ings, Pa?casius  declines  to  obey,  because,  says  he,  he  is  not  giving 
his  consent  to  temptations,  at  least,  for  the  most  part  of  the  time. 


Case  XI. 

Habitual  Sinners. 

Maurice,  a  confessor,  is  well-known  for  his  kindness  in  absolv- 
ing penitents  who  repeat  the  same  fault.  .  .  .  Tluis,  he  absolved 
the  following  penitents:  1,  Nigritius,  a  young  man,  who  has 
been  deep  in  shameful  living  for  ten  years,  and  his  concubine's 
death  brings  forth  better  feelings;  2,  Gaudeus,  a  drunkard,  who 
has  not  made  a  confe^ssion  for  foity  years  ;  3.  Jueunda,  a  young 
girl,  who  is  going  to  get  married  the  following  day,  and  for  the 
last  six  months  has  sinned  against  i)urity  with  her  betrothed. 

Case   XIII. 

Relapses. 

Caprasius,  for  a  long  time,  has  the  bad  habit  of  polluting  him- 
self. Often  sent  awa}'  without  absolution,  he  comes  finally,  not  cor- 
rected at  all,  and  even  guilty  of  a  greater  number  of  relapses,  but 
deeply  moved  by  the  unexpected  death  of  a  friend  of  his,  who  has 
died  without  confession. 


Case  XVI. 

The  Confessor  Before  Dying  Persons. 

Alinus,  a  new  priest,  is  appointed  vicar,  as  assistant  to  Parson 
Gerondius,  who  is  getting  old.  Just  after  his  arrival,  Geroudius 
learns  that  Titius,  who  had  been  living  in  concubinage  with  a 
c'  urtesan  for  years,  is  dying.  '•  Go,"  says  Gerondius  to  his  new 
vicar,  "you  are  young,  and  will  get  there  sooner  than  I  would; 


Cases  on  the  Duty  of  Confessors.  367 

so  as  to  assist  the  j^oung  man  avIio  is  in  danger.  Do  not  lie  a^'î'ai'l 
if  this  case,  which  comes  unexpectedly,  is  very  grave  ;  for  it  is 
just  the  way,  my  friend,  to  acquire  experience."  The  young 
vicar  hastens  to  the  house,  though  trembling  with  f<  ar.  Immedi- 
ately he  gives  orders  to  send  away  the  concubine  ;  Titius  refuses 
to  obey:  1,  because  th.is  woman  is  necessaiy  to  him,  and  t  >  his 
family;  2,  because  he  has  had  several  children  from  her;  3,  be- 
cause, during  a  whole  y(  ar,  he  has  not  sinned  with  her,  and  that 
he  will  soon  leave  this  woild.  Albiuus  does  not  know  Mduther  he 
should  give  him  absolution,  sti-engtheu  him  with  the  Eucharist, 
and  administer  to  him  Extreme  Unction.  Finally,  he  decides  not 
to  admit  him  to  the  sacraments,  and  comes  back  to  the  presbytery 
filled  with  sadness.  Titius  gave  up  the  ghost,  to  appear  before 
the  tribunal  of  the  redoubtable  Judge. 

Ques.  What  sliould  be  done  if  the  concubinage  was  secret  ;  in 
other  words,  if  the  servant  had  secret  relations  with  her  master? 

Ans.  If  the  concubinnge  is  secret,  it  is  not  necessaiy  to  insist 
upon  the  separntion  itself,  by  refusing  absolution,  on  account  of 
the  scandal  which  would  generally  result  by  sending  away  a  con- 
cubine under  such  circumstances,  for  the  secret  relations  would 
thus  be  brought  to  light.  But  it  is  necessary  to  obtain  from  the 
dying  man  the  promise  to  send  away  his  servant  if  he  recovers; 
and  in  the  meantime,  to  watch  that  their  rof  ms  be  separated,  and 
the  servant  approaches  her  master  only  in  case  of  necessity.  If 
death  was  not  certainly  expected,  the  sick  man  should  not  be  ab- 
solved régulai  ly,  until  the  separation  had  taken  place,  if 
convenient. 


Case  XVII. 

The  Confessor  with  Ladies. 

Urban,  a  priest,  with  a  sweet  temper  and  tender  heart,  .  .  . 
welcomes  all  his  lady  penitents  with  the  greatest  amiability  ;  makes 
the  kindest  remarks  to  them  ;  encourages  them  to  speak  ;  and, 
above  all,  lets  them  babble  as  long  as  they  like,  listening  to  their 
tales  with  the  greatest  patience  and  most  perfect  gentleness.      As 


» 


368  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

the  feminine  sex  is  liy  its   nature  talkative  and  loquacious  in  the 
highest  degree,  this  method  was  very  pleasant  to  them. 


St.  Augustine  says:  "It  is  necessary  to  keep  a  short  and 
severe  language  with  women,  and  the  most  pious  are  not  the  least 
to  be  fea.red  ;  for  the  more  pious  they  are,  the  more  attraction 
they  have." 

Coneina  says  :  "The  Confessor,  when  hearing  women,  ought 
to  be  armed  and  supplied  with  a  divine  help,  as  if  going  to  dure 
the  hissing  of  serpents." 

Impress  this  truth  in  your  mind  :  "  The  wickedness  of  a  man, 
is  better  than  tlie  kindness  of  a  woman." 


Case  XXIIU 

Confkssob's  Erkoe. 

Sylvia  asks  the  confessor  Didjme,  whether  she  can  many 
Sabin  ;  she  alleges  the  following  reason  :  She  has  sinned  often 
with  Sabin's  second  cousin,  although  she  was  never  pregnant. 
Didyme  tells  her  that  she  can  marry,  thinking  the  obstacle  to  mar- 
riage, on  account  of  shameful  relations  {ex  copula  illicit  a) ,  âoes  not 
extend  beyond  the  first  degree  ;  and  besides,  he  believed  the 
shameful  act  consummated  onl}^  when  tlie  woman  becomes  preg- 
nant. Later  on,  anxious  about  the  correctness  of  his  decision,  he 
does  not  know  what  he  should  have  done. 


ffases  Dit  tlje  Secret  of  Confession. 


Case  III. 

Exterior  Use  of  the  Knowledge  of  Confession. 

Parson  Camille,  hearing  the  confession  of  Bertha,  his  servant, 
who  is  sick,  learns  she  is  pregnant  as  a  result  (  f  shameful  rela- 
tions. Astounded,  and  full  of  sorrow,  he  does  not  know  what  to 
do,  in  presence  of  the  danger  of  such  a  dishonor.  He  puts  off  to 
another  da}'  the  solution  of  so  delicate  a  case  until  he  may  be 
enlightened  upon  it.  But  in  the  meantime  Bertha  recovers.  Light 
comes  into  Camille's  mind.  A  few  days  later  he  sends  his  servant 
away,  saying,  it  is  because  of  her  bad  health.  Then,  having  de- 
cided to  take  Rosine  as  servant,  and  after  having  heard  her  con- 
fession, he  learns  that  she  has  been  seduced  recently.  Thus, 
instructed  by  a  fatal  experiment,  he  comes  back  to  his  first  decis- 
ion, in  order  not  to  be  obliged  to  send  his  servant  away  again. 


Case  IV. 

Exterior  Use  of  Confession. 

Priest  Ugolin,  hearing  the  confession  of  young  Adrienne,  at  the 
point  of  death,  learns  that  she  is  ju-t  about  being  confined.  The 
jiood  priest  advises  her  to  tell  her  condition  to  a  doctor  or  mid- 
wife, so  as  to  save  her  offspring.  But  she  will  not  listen  to  him, 
and,  fearing  dishonor,  declares  that  slie  will  not  speak  of  it  to  any- 
body. The  priest,  full  of  sorrow,  leaves  the  unfortunate  woman 
without  giving  her  absolution.  Soon  after  Adrienne  dies,  and  she 
is  buried,  with  her  offspring  unbaptized. 


370  TJie  Doctrine  of  fJœ  Jesuits, 

Case  VII. 

Accomplices  Before  the  Same  Confessor. 

Ranulfe  and  Florine,  betrothed  to  each  other,  just  before  thoir 
marriage,  come  to  confess  to  Lampridius.  Floriue  is  first,  and 
confesses,  among  other  things,  that  she  lias  sinned  often  with  her 
betrothed.  Ranulfe  comes  next,  and  completes  his  confession 
without  mentioning  the  sin,  and  asks  for  absolution.  The  confes- 
sor, in  great  trouble,  interrogates  him,  both  witli  general  questions 
and  particular  ones.  He  urges  and  plies  his  penitent,  who  still 
denies  ;  and  while  tormenting  him,  Lampridius  is  liimself  the  prey 
of  the  greatest  torments.  ^Vhat  shall  the  unfortunate  confessor 
do?  If  he  absolves  his  penitent,  the  result  is  a  horrible  sacrilege  ; 
if  he  sends  him  away  without  absolution,  he  violates  the  secret  of 
confession  ! 


Case  Vtll. 

The  Secret  for  a  Layman. 

Ferfellius,  recently  married,  confessing  immediately  after  his 
wife,  said,  among  other  things:  ''Father,  I  am  very  unhappy! 
Just  now  I  heard  my  wife  charging  herself  with  having  committed 
fornication  with  my  brother  before  her  mariinge.  I  have  made  up 
my  mind  to  send  her  awa}^  I  will  not  acknowledge  her  any  longer 
as  my  wife.  The  confessor,  surprised,  does  not  know  what  he  may 
or  should  answer,  without  either  betraying  the  secret  of  confes- 
sion, or  telling  a  lie.  To  get  out  of  the  difïieulty,  he  blames  his 
penitent  much  for  having  listened  to  his  wife's  confession.  Fer- 
fellius, indignant,  retires  ;  sends  Lis  wife  away,  after  having  cursed 
her  ;  and  tells  the  story  to  her  parents,  who  were  astonished  at  her 
return. 


Casts  cf  Ccnscicncr  on  (Sxttcmt  ffllnction,  antr 
on  ©rticr. 


(These  do  not  present  Jiny  interesting  leaturcs.) 


Ereattse  on  Jfiarriage. 


The  faithful  must  be  tauojlit  carefully  on  the  excellency  of  mar- 
riage and  its  sanctity,  although  the  virtue  of  chastity  *  must  be  ex- 
tolled above  all. 

*  Marotte  does  not  fail  to  expose  this  doctrine  to  t'lie  faithful  of  ten 
years  : 

"  Qiies.    Is  marriage  a  proper  and  holy  state?" 

*'  Ans.     Yes,  marriage  is  a  proper  and  holy  state.   .  .  . 

'*  Ques.     Is  there  not  a  more  perfect  state  than  marriage? 

"Alls.  Yes;  Christian  virgUiUii  is  a  st'Ue  more  perfect,  and  more  arjree- 
able  to  God  than  marriage.'"    (Petit  Catéchisme.) 

There  are  autliors  who  insist  more  on  the  subject: 

♦'  Ques.     Is  it  possible  to  keep  virginity.? 

"Ans.     Yes,  it  is  possible  to  keep  virginifij,  with  the  help  of  grace. 

{Catechism  of  the  Diocese  of  Nevers,  1877.) 

In  fact,  writers  of  that  school  talvc  and  i-eeni  t  >  IooIî:  lor  every  oppor- 
tunity of  attracting  the  attention  of  young  children  to  tliese  dangerous 
questions;  and,  consequently,  provoking  the  most  shocking  explanatioiis. 
1  had  the  meritorious  patience  to  read  over  a  numerous  series  of  small 
tracts,  all  very  silly,  which  are  published  by  Mame's,  under  the  title  of 
"Library  of  Pious  Children."  As  frequently  as  opportunity  offers,  there 
is  a  question  of  virgins  and  virginity. 

I  will  quote  at  random  : 

Saint  JRose  of  Lima,  made  a  vow  to  remain  a  virgin,  but  her  friends 
nrged  her  to  marry  ;  and  in  order  to  get  rid  of  their  solicitations,  and  to 
accomplish  her  vow  more  easily,  she  entered  a  convent.  Saint  Eitpthrasie, 
VIRGIN,  SEVEN  YEAKS  OLD,  exclaims.'  "  I  wiU  uot  havc  any  other  spouse 
but  you."  Saint  Julienne,  a  virgin,  "makes  a  vow  of  virginity."  That 
is  one  book.  Let  us  take  some  others  :  Saint  Gemvieve,  seven  years  of 
age,  declares  :  "  For  a  long  time,  she  had  been  wishing  to  live  in  perpet- 
ual virginity."     Saint  Catherine  of  Sienne,  same  age,  "  promised  to  re- 


372  The  D  drine  of  the  Jesuits, 

CHAPTER   I. 

Affiancings. 

ART.  I.     Nature  of  affiancings. 

722. —  Affiancings  are  a  deliberate  promise  (with  a  sufficient 
deliberation  to  involve  a  mortal  sin),  reciprocate,  and  expressed 
by  a  sufficient  token,  of  future  marriage  between  capable  persons. 

723. —  In  order  that  the  affiancings  may  be  valid,  there  are  re- 
quired all  the  conditions  named  in  the  application,  so  that,  if  one 
of  the  conditions  fails  to  be  executed,  the  affiancing  contract 
should  be  considered  as  void. 

725. — Ques.  Should  the  promises  made  to  contract  marriage  be 
considered  as  tiue  affiancing? 

Ans.  It  seems  not;  for,  very  often,  such  promises  are  consid- 
ered as  a  mere  project,  and  not  as  a  true  promise.  In  practice,  it 
is  necessary  one  therefore  should  be  very  careful  regarding  the 
particular  intention  of  those  who  are  affianced.* 

main  a  virgin  forever;"  but  God  allavved  her  resolution  to  be  subjected  to 
a  severe  test.  When  she  had  scarcely  reached  twelve  years  of  aiie,  her 
parents  thought  to  engage  her  in  the  state  of  marriage.  In  vain  Catharine, 
refusing  to  obey,  tried  to  maintain  hn'  reasons, —  her  reasons  for  remain- 
ing a  virgin,  at  twelve  years  of  age  !  !  After  that,  you  need  not  be  as- 
tonished that  this  precocious  young  girl  saw  the  devil  "attacking  her 
heart  with  the  most  humiliating  temptations  for  a  virgin!  "  Saint  Mary 
Magdalen  of  ParU,  "when  ten  years  of  age,  made  a  vow  to  remain  all 
her  life  united  to  the  celestial  Spouse  by  the  ties  of  virginity,"  A  year 
later,  her  parents  wished  her  to  marry:  "She  tlien  declared  to  them  her 
vow  of  virginity,  atHrming  that  she  never  would  have  any  other  spouse 
but  Jesus."  Saint  Victory,  "in  order  to  unite  the  crown  of  martyrdom  to 
tiie  beautiful  lily  of  virginity,  offered  to  God  the  sacrifice  of  her  own," 
and  jumped  through  a  window  so  as  to  run  away,  the  very  day  of  her 
marriage.  Saint  L^icie,  long  before  having  reached  the  age  to  be  married, 
"completely  absorbed  with  the  charms  of  virginity,  promised  to  God  to 
have  Him  only  as  spouse  "  Saint  Lahelle,  when  a  mere  child,  engaged 
lierself  "by  a  vow  of  chastity."  Saint  Radpgonde  would  have  given  up  tlie 
world  "to  live  in  a  perpetual  virginity."  Saint  CeciJe^  from  childhood,  "had 
made  a  vow  to  embrace  the  holy  state  of  virginity,  and  deolired  nil  mar- 
riage proposals.  .  .  .  Finallv,  obliged  to  marry  a  young,  noble  and  wealthy 
lord,  she  obeyed;  hut  nevertheless  remained  faiihful  to  tkevow  she  had  inudu 
to  God."    Saint  Ursule^  .  .  .  But  that  is  enougli  I 

♦  For  the  oral  instruction  is  reserved  the  inore  delicate  studies  on  rela- 
tions between  the  affianced,  to  which  Sanchez  devotes,  in  his  classical 


Treatise  on  Marriage.  373 

ART.  II.     Obligations  and  Purpose  of  Affiancings. 

726. — Affiancings,  from  civil  jusiice,  compel,  under  penalty  of 
a  grievous  sin,  to  contract  marriage  within  a  limited  time  ;  either 
fixed,  or  as  soon  as  one  of  the  two  parlies  requests  it  reasonably  ; 
because,  where  there  have  been  true  sfiBancings,  there  also  exists 
a  true  contract  in  a  grave  matter  ;  and,  consequently,  a  grave 
obligation. 


730. — Ques.  Can  it  be  accepted  as  true  affiancings,  the  marriage 
being  merely  civil,  such  as  takes  place  in  France  before  a  magis- 
trate? 

Ans.  Some  authors  sffirm  it,  if  the  contracting  parties  have 
the  intention  to  apijly  to  the  C  hurch  afterwards.  .  .  .  But  it  is 
better  to  say  that  this  contract  conlains  no  promise,  and  cannot 
be  accepted  as  aflSancings. 


ART.  III.     Dissolution  of  Affiancings. 

731. — Ques.  Is  it  a  sufficient  cause  for  dissolution,  if  a  rich 
inheritance  falls  to  the  fiancé? 

Ans.  There  is  controversy  :  many  theologians  deny  it,  because 
nothing  is  changed  in  n  gard  to  the  y(  ung  lady;  others  affirm  it, 
because  between  them  the  same  condition  of  wealth  no  longer 
exists,  and  if  the  fiancé  had  foreseen  such  a  change,  he  would  not. 
have  engaged  to  the  same  person.  This  opinion  is  approved  by 
St.  Liguori,  in  a  case  where  the  fiancé  having  become  richer,  he 
was  offered  in  marriage  a  young  lady  much  richer  than  the  former. 

Ques.  Are  aflfiancings  broken  by  the  vow  of  chastity,  or  the 
vow  to  enter  Holy  Orders  ? 

treatise  De  matrimonii  sacramento,  several  dissertations,  the  titles  of 
which,  by  a  lucky  ciiance,  can  be  translated  into  the  French  lan.2;ua,i;e  : 

"Are  shameful  gestures,  irlances  and  speeches  permitted  between  per- 
sons betrothed?    (There  are  upon  that  subject  55  Articles  !) 

•'Is  it  permitted  to  the  attianced  to  take  delight  by  anticipation,  in  ihink- 
ing  of  the  enjoyment  they  will  obtain  in  their  future  s.xual  relations?" 
etc.,  etc.     (Lib.  IX.,  Disp.  XLVl.,  XLVII.) 


374  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

Ads.  1.  If  the  vow  precedes  the  affiancings,  it  is  evident  tbat 
tboy  become  void  ;  because  tbe  promise  of  marriage  is  then  au 
unlawful  act,  and  consequeutly  does  not  bind. 

2.  If  tbe  vow  follows  tbe  affiancings,  according  to  the  more 
probable  opinion,  they  are  broken  also  ;  because  such  a  promise  is 
supposed  to  be  contracted  on  the  following  tacit  condition, 
*'  unless  I  may  choose  a  better  state."  * 

732. —  ...  Qiies.  .  Shouhl  one  of  the  contracting  parties 
having  a  hidden  physical  defect,  declare  it  before  the  affiancings  ; 
or  if  they  are  made,  before  the  marriage? 

Ans.  ÎSO,  if  this  defect  doesn  t  render  the  marringe  prejudicial, 
but  only  less  attractive  ;  for  instance,  if  the  young  girl  who  is 
considered  a  virgin  is  not  so  ;  because,  as  has  been  established  by 
custom,  nobody  is  held  to  disclose  to  another  any  such  things. 
Beside,  no  one  is  held  to  disclose  his  defects,  at  the  risk  of  dis- 
honoring one's  self,  when  it  does  not  injure  any  grave  right  of 
another  person.    .  .  . 

CHAPTER   II. 

Publication  of  Bans. 
ART.  I.     Necessity  of  bans. 


ART.  II.  Circumstances  of  bans. 
ART.  III.  Dispensation  of  bans. 
ART.  IV.     Revelation  of  the  impediments. 


*  Sanchez:  "Every  thue  a  man,  who  has  made,  either  sincerely  or  in 
a  simulated  manner,  a  promise  of  marriage,  is  dispensed  hy  some  motive 
from  fulfilling  his  promise,  he  may,  wiien  summoued  before  ajudiie.  aftirin 
on  oath  that  he  has  promised  notliing,  wiili  tlie  understanding,  so  as  he 
shnvld  he  coinpcUed  to  faliïl  th>s  engagement,    (p.  303.) 

De  Castrj  i*alao,  and  uLlier  casuisLic  Jesuit j,  speak  in  the  same  way. 


Treatise  on  Marriage,  375 

CHAPTER   III. 

The  Nature  and  Purpose  of  Marriage. 

ART.  I.     On  the  nature  of  marriage. 

744. —  .  .  .  Marriage,  so  far  as  it  is  a  contract,  is  an  agree- 
ment by  which  the  man  and  wife  give  to  each  other,  reciprocateiy 
and  legitimately,  the  use  of  their  body,  for  all  acts  proper  to  gen- 
eration ;  and  engage  themselves  to  live  together. 

As  far  as  it  is  a  sacrament,  it  is  defined  thus  :  Sacrament  of  the 
new  law,  sanctifying  the  legitimate  union  of  man  and  woman,  so 
as  to  bring  up  piously  and  holily  their  childi'cn. 

There  is  a  distinction  between  the  marringe,  legitimate  .  .  . 
concluded  .  .  .  consummated:  when  the  conjugal  acts  have  been 
completed.* 

^Justice  must  be  granted  to  Gary,  that  he  shortens  singularl}^  the  disser- 
tation so  dear  to  casuistic  Jesuits  on  the  consummation  of  marriage.  It  is 
reserved  for  oral  instruction.  This  is  progress,  from  tlie  laymen's  point 
of  view,  who  are,  iu  fact,  incompetent  in  matters  of  morality.  But  times 
\h\\<l  l)e  hard,  tliat  one  no  more  dares  to  speal^  witli  tlie  same  holy 
straiiihtforwarchiess  whicli  old  Sanchez  used  with  regard  to  this.  Here 
are,  in  Jact,  the  titles  of  some  delicate  circumstances  wuicli  he  names, 
Mitli  full  details,  in  Part  II.  of  his  famous  work  : 

1.  '' Disp.  XXI.     Quando  conseatur  matrimonium  consumraatum? 

2.  Quando  semen  non  recipitur  in  vase  naturali,  non  est  consumma- 
tiim. 

3.  Quacunque  arte,  aut  dœmonum  ministerio  is  vase  recipiatur,  est 
coiisummatum. 

4.  Quid,  si  vir  penetret  vas  faemineum,  non  tamen  intra  vas  seminet? 
Quid,  si  fremina  sola  seminet? 

10.  Utruui  satis  sit  virun»  seminare  intra  vas,  fœmina  non  seminate? 

11.  An  semen  faiinineum  sit  necessarium  ad  generatiunem,  et  possii 
did  Virgiiiem  illnd  ininistrasse  in  Christi  incarnatione?" 

This  last  illustration,  which  should  raise  the  indi«j;nation  and  reproba- 
tion of  all  worshippers  of  the  Immaculate  Virgin,  was  specially  dear  to  the 
Jesuits.     Sanchez  comes  back  to  this  subject  in  another  part  of  Book  II  : 

"Suarez  fatetur  cum  aliis  esse  probabile  adfuisse  semen  in  Virgine, 
absque  omni  prorsus  ordinatione,  nt  ministraret  conception!  Christi 
maleriam.  .  .  .  Quod  idem  défendit  Pf^ro  Mato  in  appt^nd.  at  tract,  de  smi- 
ine.  §An  vera  Maria  virgn,  et  probat  absque  omni  iuordinatione  et  concu- 
piscentia  posse  decidi  semen. 

"Quare  conchnlo,  esse  probabile  non  oonsummari  matrirhonium  nisi 
etiam  fagmina  seminet,  quia  ad  matrimonii  consutnmationem  requisitur 
copula  ex  qua  sequi  protest  generatio,  etc.,  etc."     Disp.  21. 

Note,  that  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to  be  instructed  on  these  different 
points,  because,  if  the  marriage  is  or  is  not  consummated,  it  can  or  can- 
not be  dissolved  by  the  l'ope,  or  by  the  religious  i)rofes-ion. 


376  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

ART.  II.     Purpose  of  Marriage. 
Section  1. —  Its  Unity. 

757. —  Unity  of  marriage  coDsists  in  marriage  being  the  union 
of  one  man  only  with  one  woman  only. 

Section  2. — Duration  of  Marriage. 

There  are  distinctions  regarding  duration,  viz  :  As  to  the  tie^ 
and  as  to  the  bed. 

1st  Point.     As  for  the  tie. 

758 — Marriage  is  indissoluble  ;  that  is  to  say,  when  it  is  once 
contracted,  it  cannot  be  dissolved  by  divorce  in  regard  to  the  tie, 
according  to  the  positive,  divine  law. 

759. — However,  three  exceptions  should  be  made  : 

1.  The  marriage  of  Christians,  concluded  but  not  consummated^ 
can  be  dissolved  for  a  grave  cause,  through  a  dispensation  from 
the  Pope,  the  representative  of  the  Divine  Power. 

2.  Marriage  concluded  and  not  consummated^  can  be  dissolved 
by  a  solemn  Religious  l^rofession,  made  by  one  of  the  married 
couple. 

But  in  order  that  the  newly  married  couple  might  think  over  the 
use  of  this  privilege,  it  is  granted  to  them,  by  right,  two  months 
after  their  wedding,  during  which  they  are  not  compelled  to  fulfil 
their  conjugal  duty.  Even  after  that  time,  if  marriage  has  not 
been  consummated,  on  account  of  an  unlawful  refusal  of  the  con- 
jugal duty,  this  privilege  still  exists.  Tn  fact,  it  is  not  destroyed 
by  fornication  between  fiances  before  the  celebration  of  marriage. 

3.  The  marriage  of  ivfidds^  even  consummated^  can  be  dis- 
solved by  Divine  permission,  when  one  of  the  married  couple  is 
converted  to  the  Christian  faith  by  baptism,  and  the  other  refuses 
to  live  in  peace  with  the  former  ;  or  does  so,  insulting  the  Creator, 
despising  the  Christian  religion,  and  trying  to  lead  the  faithful  one 
to  sin.         ......  .  ... 

2d  Point  :     As  for  the  bed  : 

760. — Divorce,  so  far  as  separation  of  bed  and  residence,  may 
be  requested  for  just  causes,  though  t!ie  conjugal  tie  fctill  exists,  so 


Treatise  on  Marriage.  Zll 

tliat  neither  of  the  spouses  can  marry  again  before  the  death  of 
the  other. 

Causes  which  excuse  divorce  are  :  a  mutual  consent  ;  a  grave 
danger  for  soul  or  l)ody  ;  or  adultery  by  one  of  the  married  couple. 

764 — Ans.  Is  divorce  by  private  authority  to  be  considered 
valid? 

Ans.  1.  Yes,  as  for  the  bed:  if  there  is  a  legitimate  reason, 
and  especially  adultery. 

2.     As  for  residence  :  1,  Yes,  in  case  of  adultery But 

the  crime  must  be  certain  ;  and  that  the  separation  should  not 
cause  a  scandal  which  could  not  be  mended  otherwise.  2.  Yes, 
also,  if  there  is  danger  to  soul  or  body,  providing  that  danger  is 
very  grave.  But  in  practice,  it  is  proper  to  ask  the  advice  of  a 
prudent  man,  especially  of  a  confessor.  The  latter  should  pio- 
ceed  with  great  prudence,  and  not  believe  too  easily  wives 
complaining  of  their  husbands. 


CHAPTER   IV. 
Matter  and  Form  of  Marriage. 

765. — The  matter,  far  form  the  sacrament  of  marriage,  is  the  body 
of  the  fiancés,  that  they  reciprocately  give  up  to  each  other  in  the 
execution  of  the  contract. 

The  nearer  matter  is  the  delivery  itself  of  these  bodies,  which 
is  made  by  words  or  signs  ex[)ressing  their  consent. 

706. —  The  form  consists  in  the  reci[)r(jcate  acceptation  of  the 
coutracting  parties,  expressed  by  words  or  signs. 


CHAPTER  V. 
Minister  who  Gives  and  Person  who  Receives  Marriagk 
ART.  I.     Minister. 

ART.  II.     Person. 


378  The  Doctrine  of  t. 'te  Jesuits, 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Obstacles  to  Marriage. 
They  are  of  two  kinds  ;    some  prohibit  only  ;  others  nullify  the 
marriage.     The  former  render  the  marriage  unlawful;  the  latter 
make  it  invalid. 

ART.  I.     PRoniBiTiVE  Obstaclejs. 

776. — There  are  four,  viz:  1,  prohibition  by  the  Church  for 
different  causes  ;  2,  prohibition  by  the  Cliurch  to  celebrate  tlie 
ceremony  of  marriage  during  a  particular  time  ;  3,  contract 
of  affiaiicings  made  with  another  person  and  not  legitimately 
broken  off;  4,  a  vow  which,  on  account  of  its  nature,  can  not  be 
fulfilled  in  the  contract  or  in  conjugal  society.   .   .   . 

779. — There  are  four  kinds  of  vows  forbidding  marriage:  1, 
the  vow  of  chastity  ;  2,  the  vow  not  to  marry  ;  3,  the  vow  to  enter 
a  religious  Order  ;  4,  the  vow  to  receive  Holy  Orders. 

780 — Vow  of  cJiastity.  After  marriage,  whoever  has  made  such  a 
vow  can  neither  ask  for  nor  do  his  conjugal  duty  the  first  two  months  ; 
because,  by  a  Divine  privilege,  husband  and  wife  are  dispensed 
from  this  obligation  during  that  time. 

Later  on,  he  or  she  can  fulfill  this  duty  and  give  satisfaction  to 
the  other's  right  ;  but  cannot  ask  for  it  without  having  been 
dispensed  from  his  or  her  vow. 

The  latter  should  entirely  abstain,  if  the  other  consents,  or  has 
lo.st  the  right  to  it;  for  instance,  beca-ise  of  adultery,  or  incest.  If 
too  hard  to  live  without  it,  he  or  she  should  make  an  early  appli- 
c:ition  for  a  dispensation. 

781. —  Vow  not  to  marry  ;  or  vow  of  virginity.  After  marriage, 
one  may,  in  this  case,  do  and  ask  for  the  conjugal  duty,  because 
the  observance  of  this  vow  is  impossible. 

782. —  Vow  to  enter  a  religious  Order.  .  .  .  Before  marriage  i^ 
consummated,  the  one  who  has  made  such  a  vow  is  held  to  ful 
fill  it.  He  sins  mortally  if  he  consummates  marriage,  by  asking 
for  or  doing  the  conjugal  duty;  because  the  vow  ought  to  be 
accomplished  when  it  is  possible.  Now,  one  can  fulfill  it  by  not 
consummating  marringe  the  first  two  months;   vihjle,  b^*  a  divine 


Treatise  on  Marriage-  379 

privilégie,  one  can  enter  a  religious  Order,  and  the  other  spouse  is 
then  free  from  the  marriage  lie,  after  the  solemn  profession  has 
been  made. 

After  the  marriage's  consnramntion,  one  can  ask  for  and  do  the 
conjugal  diitv  ;  because  the  fulfillment  of  the  vow  has  become  im- 
possible, and  the  request  for  tlie  conjugal  act  is  not  contrary  to 
this  vow,  as  one  has  not  made  a  vow  of  chast.tj,  but  a  vow  to 
enter  a  religious  Order, 

783.  —  Vow  to  receive  Holy  Orders.  .  .  .  He  who  has  made  tiiis 
vow,  after  tlie  marriage  celebration,  can  consummate  it,  if  he  can- 
not longer  fulfill  his  vow. 

ART.  II.     Detrimental  obstacles. 

The  Holy  Church  alone  is  able  to  state  these  obstacles,  and 
consequently,  secular  princes  cannot  do  so  for  their  Christian  sub- 
jects, except  as  regards  mere  civil  matters. 

787. — Ques.  Is  a  contracted  marriage  annulled  for  an  obstacle 
not  perceived  at  the  time  of  contract? 

Ans.  Yes,  because  the  law  stating  such  an  impefliment  has 
been  made  for  the  purpose  of  cancelling  the  contract  itself. 


If,  after  marriage,  the  wife  perceives  a  detrimental  obstacle  which 
annuls  marriage,  she  cannot,  even  under  threats  of  death,  eitiier 
ask  for  or  do  her  conjugal  duty  ;  because  such  a  union  wouKl  be  a 
fornication,  which  is  not  permitted  in  any  case  ;  except,  according 
to  a  few  authors,  the  wife  were  to  keep  merely  passive,  so  as  to 
give  but  a  material  co-operation  to  this  act;  but  one  cannot  make 
such  a  concession,  as  it  is  a  question  of  a  regularl}'  bad  thing,  un- 
it, ss,  according  to  the  probable  oi)inion,  the  wife  should  be  foiced 
to  comply  with  it  under  threats  of  death,  avoiding  with  care  the 
danger  of  consentin":. 


790. — Ques.  Is  it  allowed  to  spouses  to  make  use  of  marria<:e, 
if,  after  their  wediling,  ihey  have  doubt  regarding  a  ceriain  im[)ed- 
iment? 


380  The  Doctrine  nf  the  Jesulh. 

Ans.  to  Question  1.  No,  until  they  have  made  sufficient  investiga- 
tion for  the  trntli.  However,  if  onl3'one  of  the  spouses  is  in  duu.)t, 
he  may,  although  not  being  able  to  ask  for  the  conjugal  duty,  do 
it  t  )  the  other,  who  is  so  requL-sting  in  good  faith. 

Ans.  to  Q  lestion  2.  Yes,  if  alter  having  used  every  elTort  to 
obtain  the  truth,  one  is  still  in  doubt;  because,  in  doubt,  the  act 
must  be  considered  as  valid. 

791. — Qiies.  Is  a  marriage  valid,  when  contracted  with  an  ob- 
stacle presumed  but  not  real? 

Ans.  Yes,  if  the  contiacting  party  is  not  certain  of  the 
impedinaent,  but  if  he  has  merely  a  doubt  on  the  subject.   .   .   . 

If  he  believes  with  certainty  in  this  impediment  regarding  it  as 
a  secondary  matter,  and  decides  to  live  in  concubinage,  the  mai-- 
riage  is  evidently  not  valid  ;  because  the  intention  to  contract 
marriage  is  not  the  main  object. 

793. — Among  Christians,  any  union  of  man  and  woman  outsi(îe 
the  Sacrament,  and  made  on  the  strength  of  no  matter  what  civil 
law,  is  nothing  else  but  a  shameful  and  fatal  conculiinage, 
condemned  by  the  Church  ;  and,  consequently,  the  conjugal  con- 
tract cannot  exist  outside  this  sacrament,  and  has  entirely  to  do 
with  the  power  of  the  Roman  Church.* 

Various  Kinds  of  Obstacles.  ^ 

794. — There  are  fifteen,  expressed  in  four  Latin  verses  : 

Ki  ror,  condition,  vow,  relationship,  crimi^  ; 

Difference  of  worship,  violence.  Order,  connection,  honesty; 

Age,  alliance,  secrec}',  powerlessness,  elopement  of  the  woman, 
not  })laced  in  the  hands  of  a  trustworth}'  person  : 

Ail  these  impediments  prevent  marriage,  and  cancel  it  if  it  has 
taken  place. 

**'Qiies.     Are  clandestine  marriages  void? 

"A.  Yes.  Marriages  which  are  celebrated  otherwise  than  in  presence 
of  the  priest  and  two  witnesses  are  entirely  void  ;  thus,  in  Fnince,  <nii/ 
mnrriagp.  contracted  solely  before  an  (iffi( er  of  the  state,  is  by  right  perfectly 
void,  and  is  but  a  phantom  ff  marriage.     (  Petit  Catéchisme  o/  Marotte.) 

"Qiies.     Is  the  uiiiou  calljd  civil  in  irria.iÇ.i  lei^itiinate? 

"  Ans.  No;  this  uuioa  is  void  and  criminal  before  God."  (^Catechism 
of  Xtvers,  1SS7.) 


Treatise  on  Marriage.  381 

795. — All  errors  regarding  personal  identity  cancel  the  marriage, 
by  natural  right. 

An  error  relative  to  the  servile  condition  prevents  marri;ige  by 
ecclesiastical  rig' t.  But  that  cause  exists  no  longer  in  Europe 
and  the  United  States,  where  slavery  is  abolished. 

Obstacle  for  Cause  of  Alliance. 

810. — Alliance  is  a  tie  established  with  the  relatives  of  the  per- 
son with  whom  one  has  a  carnal  connection  ;  or,  further,  a  tie 
arising  from  a  carnal  connection  between  one  and  the  otiier. 
There  is  consequently  alliance  between  the  husband  and  wife's 
cousins  ;  and  vice  versa. 

Alliance  is  acquired  throuih  either  lawful  or  conjugal  connec- 
tion ;  or  through  an  unlawful  one,  like  fornic^ition,  adultery, 
incest. 

811. — Alliance  coming  from  a  lawful  connection  prevents  mar- 
riage until  the  fourth  degree,  inclusive  ;  if  from  an  unlawful 
connection,  until  the  second  degree  only. 

An  alliance  is  contracted  solely  through  a  sexual  act,  thorouglily 
accomplished  and  consummated,  in  such  a  way  that  generation 
may  be  the  result  of  it.   .   .   . 

812. —  .  .  .  He  who  has  sinned  with  two  sisters,  or  two  cousins, 
or  m/^ther  and  daughter,  cannot  marry  any  one  of  them. 

The  husband  who  has  sinned  with  his  wife's  sister,  cousin,  or 
aunt,  is  compelled  to  do,  but  cannot  ask  for  the  conjugal  duty  ; 
because,  as  it  is  a  question  of  a  merely  prohibitory  law,  tiie 
innocent  party  should  not  suffer  for  the  fault  of  the  guilty. 

A  husband  is  not  deprived  of  the  right  to  ask  for  the  conjuizal 
duty  for  having  sinned  with  his  own  cousins  ;  because  he  does 
not  contract  thereby  any  alliance  with  his  wife's  relatives. 

]f  one  of  the  married  couple  has  formed  an  alliance  wi;h  the 
other's  relatives,  in  consequence  of  an  incest,  neither  of  them  is 
entitled  to  claim  the  conjugal  duly  an}^  more;  because  they  have 
botii  lost  their  right,  and,  consequently,  neither  of  them  is  held 
nor  even  has  a  right,  to  ask  the  other  for  it. 


L 


382  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

Obstacle  for  Difference  of  Worship. 

824. — Difference  of  worship  existing  between  a  baptized  person 
and  an  infidel,  renders  llie  marriage  invalid. 


Obstacle  for  Cause  of  Clandestinity. 

836. — A  clandestine  marriage  is  that  which  is  contracted  with- 
out tlie  required  religious  solemnities  ;  that  is  to  say,  without  the 
attendance  of  the  parson,  and  two  witnesses  at  least. 

837. —  The  Council  of  Trent  has  decided:  "Those  who  try- 
to  contract  marriage  otherwise  than  in  presence  of  the  parson  or 
another  priest,  with  authorization  of  the  bishop  or  the  parson,  and 
two  or  three  witnesses,  such  persons  are  declared  by  tlie  Holy 
Synod  to  be  absolutely  incapable  of  contracting  marriage,  and  the 
contract  is  cancelled."  Moreover,  it  declares  that '"this  decree 
shall  be  in  force  in  each  parish  after  thirty  days  ;  which  must  be 
reckoned  from  the  day  of  the  first  publication  of  it  in  the  same 
parish." 


839. — Ques.  Is  a  marriage  valid,  when  the  contracting  parties 
leave  a  place  where  tlie  decrees  of  the  Council  of  Trent  are  in 
force,  so  as  to  go  to  another  place  where  they  are  not? 

Ans.     It  is  not  valid. 

Qiies.  Is  it  valid,  when  one  leaves  a  place  where  these  decrees 
are  not  in  force,  so  as  to  contract  marriage  clandestinely  in  another 
place  ? 

Ans.  No,  even  if  contracted  while  passing  through  this  place 
only.  .   .   . 

841. — Ques.  Should  heretical  marriages  be  considered  as  valid, 
in  places  where  those  decrees  are  not  in  force  ? 

Ans.     Positively  no  ;  for  the  following  reasons  : 

1.  Because  in  all  countries  where  decrees  have  been  proclaimed, 
they  oblige  all  people  indiscriminately,  heretics  or  Catholics,  as 
the  former  are  subject  also  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Roman 
Church. 


Treatise  on  Marylage.  383 

2.  Because,  if  heietics  were  excluded  from  this  «reneral  law  of 
tlie  Roman  Church,  they  would  so  be  granted  a  privilege  for  their 
rebellion,  which  would  be  absurd. 


852. — Ques.  May  a  priest,  constrained  by  violence  and  fear, 
grant  a  valid  attendance? 

Ans.  Yes  ;  because  it  is  sufRiient  that  he  is  present  and  knows 
what  is  done,  either  willingly  or  unwillingly,  evea  if  he  pretends 
not  to  understand;  for  instance,  by  closing  bis  eyes,  or  by  stop- 
ping his  ears. 


& 


Obstacle  through  Powerlessness. 

855. — Poweilessness  to  fulfill  the  marringe  duties,  or  capacity  to 
accept  the  carnal  act  efficaciously,  with  the  result  of  generation, 
is  of  various  kinds,  viz  : 

1.  Certain,  or  doubtful. 

2.  Antecedent,  or  consequent,  with  regard  to  marriage. 

3.  Temporary,  or  perpetual. 

4.  Natural,  or  accidental. 

5.  Absolute,  or  relative,  as  existing  between  the  man  and  all 
women  ;  or  between  the  m  in  and  a  special  woman,  or  vice  versa. 

855. — 1.  Antecedent  and  perpetual  powerlessness,  either  abso-. 
lute  or  relative,  renders  marriage  invalid,  by  natural  right,  because 
the  purpose  of  the  conjng  il  contract  does  not  exist  any  longer 
when  sexual  intercourse  is  impossible. 

2.  Consequent  powerlessness,  and  antecedent  temporar}^  pow- 
erlessness, do  not  cancel  the  marriage;  because  the  actual  use  of 
marriage  has  no  connection  with  its  essence,  and  it  is  sufficient 
that  the  performance  might  have  been  possible  at  the  moment  of 
the  contract,  or  ma}-  be  so  in  future. 

3.  Powerlessness,  positively  ascertained,  renders  unlawful  the 
use  of  marriage,  even  for  a  single  trial  ;  because,  so  long  as  the 
sexual  intercourse  cannot  be  i)erfect,  the  end  which  renders  lawful 
this  connection  does  not  longer  exist. 


381  The  D'jcirlne  of  the  Jesuits. 

^bO). — Are  ennuchs,  deprived  of  the  two  testicles,  considered 
poweiless,  and  not  those  who  have  only  one? 

When  in  doubt  regarding  antecedent  powerlessness,  one  should 
consider  the  mariiage  as  valid,  and  allow  a  trial  of  the  sexual  act. 
Even  three  years  are  granted,  in  spite  of  the  greater  probability, 
for  perpetual  powerlessness. 

When  in  doubt  regarding  consequent  powerlessness,  trials  also 
are  allowed,  until  certainty  is  reached  that  they  cannot  be  effec- 
tive. 

Distinction  must  be  made  between  powerlessness  and  sterility  ; 
for  barren  women  are  not  powerless  for  the  conjugal  act  ;  they  con- 
sequently have  the  right  to  marry  old  men  able  to  perform  such 
acts.  It  is  the  same  for  women  who  can  receive  the  semen  without 
being  able  to  keep  it. 

Obstacle  for  Cause  of  Abduction. 

857; —  Abducti  )n  consists  in  violently  leading  away  a  woman 
from  a  safe  place  to  another  where  she  is  in  the  power  of  the 
seducer,  with  the  purpose  of  marriage. 

Abduction  annuls  the  marriage  between  the  seducer  ;  that  is,  the 
man  for  whom  the  woman  is  carried  awa}^,  and  the  woman  who  is 
carried  away. 


8G0. —  There  is  no  obstacle  when  one  leads  away  the  woman 
from  one  room  to  anotiier  in  the  same  house,  because  she  is  not 
really  under  the  power  of  the  seducer  ;  but  to  constitute  an  abduc- 
tion, she  must  be  led  away  from  one  house  to  another. 

There  is  no  obstacle  when  the  woman  is  carried  away  for  another 
purpose  than  marriage  ;  for  instance,  in  order  to  satisfy  the  carnal 
l)assion,  etc.  ;  because  tlie  Council  of  Trent  had  mainly  in  view, 
by  this  impediment,  to  favor  the  freedom  of  marriage. 


III.     Dispensation  for  Invalidating  Obstacles. 

The  Dispensing  Power. 
861. —  The  Pope  can  remove  all  obstacles,  of  ecclesiastical  right. 


Treatise  on  Marriage.  385 

A  Bishop  cannot  ordinaril}'  and  by  his  own  right  remove  invalida- 
ting obstacles. 

866. —  Qies.  What  are  the  lcgitiraat3  motivjs  for  removing 
sucii  obslaeles? 

Ans.  Smallness  of  the  place,  if  there  is  fear  that  on  this 
account  the  3'oung  girl  cannot  get  snitabh'  married  to  another  ; 
that  is,  such  a  place  as  does  not  contain  more  than  300  families, 
(this  reason  is  valid,  although  the  betrothed  woman  intends  to  go 
and  live  elsewhere)  ;  2,  absence  of  a  sufficient  dowry,  when  a 
dowry  is  offered  by  a  cousin  or  a  stranger  on  condition  that  the 
young  girl  shall  marry  her  cousin  ;  3,  advanced  age,  above  an 
adult,  of  the  woman  ;  when  she  is  over  twenty-four  years  of  age, 
and  has  not  the  means  to  marry  a  man  of  her  rank  ;  4,  carnal  con- 
nection already,  witli  a  cousin  or  another  person,  causing  an  obsta- 
cle, aid  also  the  dinger  of  dishonor,  as  a  result  of  it;  5,  too 
great  familiaritj'  between  parties,  leading  to  fear  of  a  scandal, 
in  case  they  were  not  to  contract  marriage  ;  6,  a  child  to  legitima- 
tize, born  or  conceived  of  fornication  ;  7,  to  make  peace  between 
parents,  cousins  or  relatives,  by  the  marriage  of  applicants  ;  8, 
Christian  virtues,  which,  perhaps,  could  not  be  secured  any  other 
way;  9,  the  excellency  of  merits  towards  the  Church;  10,  the 
preservation  of  property  in  a  noble  family  ;  11,  abundant  alms  for 
pious  work;  12,  the  poverty  of  a  widow,  having  many  children, 
which  the  husband  promises  to  provide  for. 


871. —  Ques.  Is  a  new  dispensation  required  for  the  one  who, 
after  having  been  granted  a  dispensation  for  an  alliance  obstacle, 
on  account  of  a  forbidden  connection,  for  instance,  with  his  fian- 
ce's cousin,  sins  again  with  the  same  woman  before  marriage? 

Ans.  1.  No  ;  if  the  dispensation  was  not  trusted  for  execution 
by  the  delegate  ;  because  sucii  dispensations  become  effective  only 
from  the  day  of  execution,  and  not  from  the  date  of  issue. 

2.  No,  even  if  the  dispensation  was  trusted  for  execution  ; 
because  the  obstacle  of  alliance  was  already  removed  by  dispensa- 
tion, in  view  of  marriage. 


L 


386  Tue  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

But  if,  after  marriage,  he  has  sinned  again  with  the  same 
cousin  of  bis  wife,  he  is  deprived  of  the  right  to  ask  for  the  con- 
jugal dut}',  because  this  dispensation,  according  to  the  Curia's 
st3'le,  was  granted,  "for  the  purpose  of  contracting  marriage," 
and  not  of  sinning  more  freely. 

But  another  dispensition  would  be  necessary,  if  he  had  sinned 
with  another  cousin  before  his  marriage,  even  after  the  issue  of 
the  dispensation  ;  because,  by  so  doing,  he  would  have  contracted 
a  new  alliance. 

871. —  Qiies.  Is  a  new  dispensation  necessary,  when,  after 
having  obtained  a  dispensation  for  relationship's  obstacle,  incest- 
uous connection  has  taken  place  between  the  fiancés? 

Ans.  1.  Yes,  if  the  connection  has  taken  place  before  tlie 
execution  of  the  dispensation.  It  is  the  common  opinion,  accord- 
ing to  the  Curia's  style,  which  requires  tlie  declaration  of  an  incest 
of  that  kind  ;  for  when  it  is  declared,  the  Pope  sentences  the 
supplicant  to  a  more  severe  penance. 

2.  .  No,  if  the  connection  has  taken  place  after  the  execution 
of  the  dispensation  ;  because  it  being  granted,  and  prohibition 
removed,  the  crime  of  incest  thereb\"  ceases. 

873. —  Ques.  Is  a  new  dispensation  required  for  relatives  who, 
after  having  been  granted  pardon,  repeat  sexual  acts? 

Ans.  No,  because  the  incest  is  morally  the  same,  and  the 
number  of  acts  need  not  be  declared. So  anew  soxual  act  does  not 
render  the  dispensation  void,  whether  it  has  taken  place  before 
or  after  the  issue  of  this  dispensation. 


It  is  not  necessar}'  to  tell  in  the  request  how  many  times  sexnal 
connection  had  taken  place  with  the  fiance's  cousin,  because  these 
different  relations  form  but  a  single  alliance.  But  it  should  be 
declared,  if  such  is  the  case,  when  such  a  connection  has  taken 
place  with  several  cousins  of  the  fiancé,  because  there  wf  uld  have 
been,  then,  several  alliances  ;  and,  although  these  obstacles  are  of 
the  same  nature,  it  is  necessary  to  be  precise  as  to  their  number. 


Treatise  on  Marriage,  387 

CHAP  TER  VII. 

Marriage  Made  Valid  Again. 

890. — Marriao^e  may  be  invali(t  :    1,  for  lack  of  consent  ;    2,  for 
lack  of  the  pre-rcribed  forms  ;  3,  for  incapacity  cf  tlie  parlies. 


ART.  I.     Marriage  made  valid  again,  in  case  of  lack  of  con- 
sent. 


ART.  ir.     Marriage  made  valid  again,  in  case  of  lack  of  the 
prescribed  foims. 


ART.  Tir.     Marriage  made  valid  again,  in  case  of  inca]>acity  of 
the  parties. 


CHAPTER  Viri. 

On  Conjugal  Duty. 

Let  us  hear  St.  Liguori  tonching  this  question  :  "T  am  ashamed 
to  speak  upon  this  subject,  full  of  lepulsive  matters,  and  of  which 
the  name  alone  disturbs  chaste  souls.  But  would  that  this  matter 
were  not  so  frequent  in  confession,  and  that  the  confessor  had 
simply  to  know  merely  the  main  points.  The  chaste  reader  will 
forgive  me,  if  I  remain  long  on  this  subject,  and  even  proceed  into 
particular  cases,  which  bring  to  light  so  much  vileuess. 


388  The  Doctrine  of  lite  Jesuits, 

[The  following  paragraphs  are  too  indecont  to  appear  in  Eng- 
lish ;  so  they  are  left  in  the  original  French. — The  Publishers.] 

ART.  I. —  De  la  Légitimité  de  L'acte  Conjugal:    1°  en  soi, 
2°  Par  Rapport  aux  Circonstances. 
§1.    Légitimité  de  l'acte  conjugal  en  soi.     , 

907. —  L'acte  conjugal  entre  époux  légitimes  est  honnête  et 
licite  par  lui-même  ;  car  c'est  le  moyen  établi  et  réglé  par  le  Créa- 
teur pour  la  propcgation  légitime  de  l'espèce  humaine. 

Les  fins  qui  rendent  cet  acte  honnête  sont:  1°  la  génération, 
l'une  des  principales  ;  2°  le  moyen  de  satisfaire  à  ses  oitligations 
envers  l'autre  époux  ;  ^°  le  moyen  d'éviter  l'incontinence  cliez  soi 
et  chez  l'autre  ;  4°  le  désir  de  ranimer  ou  de  faire  naître  uu  amour 
honnêie,  de  montrer  ou  de  provoquer  l'affection  conjugale. 

908. —  L'usage  du  mariage  est  illicite  s'il  a  lieu  en  vue  du  seul 
j)laisir,  ce  qui  lésulte  de  la  9^  proposition  condamnée  par  Innocent 
XL,  piopositiou  ainsi  conçue  :  "  L'acte  conjugal  accompli  eu  vue 
du  plaisir  seulement  est  exempt  de  faute  et  de  péché  véniel."  En 
principe,  cependant,  il  n'y  auiait  qu'un  péché  véniel,  comme  lors- 
qu'on mange  en  vue  du  plaisir  seul  qu'on  éprouve.  Mais  il  n'y  a 
pas  de  faute  si  c'est  pour  remédier  à  la  concupiscence  ou  pour  une 
autre  fin  honnête  que  l'on  cherche  le  plaisir,  soit  expressément,  soit 
implicitement. 

L'usage  du  mariage  est  gravement  illicite  s'il  a  lieu  dans  un 
esprit  d'adultère,  de  telle  sorte  qu'en  s'approchant  de  son  épouse, 
on  se  figure  que  c'est  une  autre  temrae. 

L'usage  du  mariage  est  permis  aux  gens  stériles,  et  parce  qu'au- 
cune loi  qui  ne  s'y  oppose  et  parce  que  les  gens  stériles  sont  a[)tes 
à  l'acte  conjugal  ;  si  aucune  génération  n'en  résulte,  c'est  tout  à 
fait  accidentel  ;  et,  en  dehors  de  la  génération,  il  y  a  d'autres  fins 
honnêtes  qui  légitiment  cet  acte. 

Même  les  vieillards,  dont  la  semence  n'est  plus  prolifique,  peu- 
vent user  du  mariage,  pourvu  qu'ils  puissent  accomplir  suffisain-  Il 
mont  l'acte  ou  qu'ils  aient  un  espoir  fondé  de  l'accomplir,  pour  les 
mêmes  raisons  que  nous  avons  exposées  à  propos  des  gens  stéi'iles  ; 
ce  qui  est  confirmé  par  la  pratique  de  l'Eglise,  qui  bénit  le  inaiiage 
des  vieillards. 


I 


TreatUe  on  Marriage.  389 

§  II.    Léj2;it:mi:e  do  l'acte  conjugal  par  rapport  aux  circonstances. 
I. —  Circonstances  de  personne. 

Il  Y  a  ttois  circonstances  ou  empêchements  de  personne  qui  peu- 
vent s'opposer  à  la  demande  du  devoir  conjuL'al  :  1°  vœu  de  chas- 
teté, 2°  alliance  par  suite  d'inceste,  3°  impuissance  corporelle. 

Quant  à  la  parenté  S|  irituelle,  il  y  a  controverse. 

909. —  Tout  ép(  ux  lé  par  un  vœu  de  chasteté,  ou  empêché  pnr 
une  alliance,  ne  peut  demander  le  devoir  conjugal  sous  peine  de 
l;éclié  grave  ;  mais  il  peut  le  rendre  à  l'autre  qui  le  lui  demande, 
et  même  il  y  est  tenu,  parce  que  l'autre  partie  ne  doit  pas  être  pri- 
>ée  de  son  droit. 

Aucun  des  deux  ne  peut  le  demander,  s'ils  sont  liés  tous  les  deux 
par  un  vœu  de  chasteté  ou  empêchés  par  une  alliance. 

910. —  On  doit  rendre  le  devoir  conjugal  et  même  on  y  est  tenu 
si,  non  seulement  avant  le  mariage,  mais  encore  après  le  mnriage, 
on  a  fait  un  vœu  contraire  au  droit  de  l'autre  ;  car,  bien  qu'on  ait 
péché  en  contractant  le  mariage,  on  a  remis  cependant  d'une  man- 
ière valable  à  l'auti'e  é[)Oux,  ce  qu'on  avait  pomis  à  Dieu  ;  d'ail- 
leurs l'autre,  ignoiant  le  vœu,  a  acquis  le  droit  à  la  chose  en  vertu 
d'un  contrat  valable. 

On  peut  le  demander  et  le  rendre,  si  après  le  mariage,  on  fait 
vœ;i  d'entrer  en  religion  ou  de  recevoir  les  Ordres  sacrés  après  la 
mort  de  l'autre  époux  ;  et  l'on  n'a  pas  besoin  de  dispense,  car  ces 
vœux  n'obligent  qu'après  la  dissolution  du  mariage. 

Selon  l'opinion  i)lus  commune  et  plus  probable,  un  époux,  lié 
par  un  vœux  ou  empêché  par  une  alliance,  peut  demander  le  devoir, 
b'il  remarque  que  l'autre  n'osant  pas  le  demander  est  en  danger 
d'incontinence;  il  le  peut,  même  toutes  les  fois  que  l'autre  le 
demande,  d'une  manière  interprétative  par  exemple,  lorsque  la 
f(mme  est  retenue  par  la  honte  et  que  le  mari  sent  sa  volonté  de 
le  demander,  parce  qu'alors  cela  est  plutôt  rendre  que  demaneler. 

Mais  l'époux  em[)êché  par  un  lien  ne  peut  exiger  le  devoir,  pas 
même  pour  éviter  l'incontinence,  car  ce  danger  d'incontinence  est 
une  raison  d'obtenir  une  dispen  e  ou  une  suspension  du  vœu,  et 
non  de  demander  le  devoir. —  Excepté,  selon  l'opinion  probable, 
s'il  s'agit  d'empêcliements  imi)Ofcés  par  l'Eglise,  et  si  la  dispense 


390  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

ne  pouvant  être  obtenue   proraptement,   il  y  a  un  grand  danger 
d'incontinence  en  attendant. 

II.  —  Des  Circonstances  de  Position. 

911. —  La  position  tout  à  fait  licite  est  celle  que  la  nature 
enseigne,  c'est-à-dire  la  femme  couchée  dessous,  et  l'homme 
dessus,  parce  que  les  autres  positions  sont  contraires  à  l'ordie  de 
la  nature  et  conséquemment,  portent  quelque  atte'inte  à  cet  ordre. 

Aucune  position,  quoique  contre  nature,  n'est  en  principe 
gravement  défendue,  pourvu  que  l'acte  conjugal  puisse  être  accom- 
pli, parce  qu'il  n'y  a  pas  d'obstacle  à  la  génération. 

Toute  position  contre  nature,  pour  un  motif  légitime,  est 
exemptée  de  faute,  car  parfois  ces  positions  sont  plus  commodes 
ou  seules  possibles  ;  et  tonte  commodité  ou  nécessité  peut  rendre 
légitime  cette  dérogation  à  l'ordre,  légère  en  elle-même. 

912. — 11  n'y  a  aucun  péché  à  changer  la  position  à  cause  du 
danger  d'avortement  au  moment  de  la  grossesse,  à  cause  de  l'em- 
bonpoint {pinguedinem  vel  curvitatem)  de  l'homme,  ou  de  la  fatigue 
de  la  femme,  ou  même  de  la  froideur,  lorsqu'on  est  plus  excité 
dans  cette  position.* 

La  position  qui  seule  est  possible,  n'est  condamnée  en  aucune 
façon  quelle  qu'elle  soit,  bien  qu'il  en  résulte  une  perte  notable  de 
semence,  parce  que  cette  partie  de  semence  n'est  pas  nécessaire 
à  la  géi.éralion,  et  se  perd  accidentellement,  malgié  les  époux. 


III. —  Des  Circonstances  de  Temps. 

Elles  ont  rapport  aux  temps  de  la  grossesse,  de  l'allaitement, 
des  menstrues,  de  la  maladie,  des  fêtes,  et  de  la  sainte  communion. 

913. —  1°  Dans  aucun  tem[)s,  l'acte  conjugal  n'est  interdit  en 
principe  sous  peine  de  péciié  grave,  parce  qu'il  n'y  a  aucune  loi 
empêchant  cet  acte  ])Our  raison  de  temps.  J'ai  dit  en  principe., 
parce  qu'à  cause  des  circonstances  il  peut  y  avoir  un  proche  danger 
d'avortement  ou  de  maladie  ;  ce  qui  est  ti  es -rare  et  ne  peut  être 
piévu  dans  certains  cas. 

*  Si  riiomme  ne  pent  être  amené  a  connnîtro  sa  fomnip.  ]iormi«î  finns  mie 
ceitaiiie  ))()sitioii,  qui  doiitrra  que  la  fdiimo  est  icuuc  Ue  Li  preuclre? 
yaucliez,  c/e  m^trimoui,  (Lib.  vu,  Disp.  xcii.) 


Treatùe  on  Marriage,  391 

Bien  p1u«,  selon  beaucoup  de  théologiens,  l'acte  conjugal  n'est 
pas  même  légèrement  défendu  pour  raison  de  temps,  parce  qu'd 
n'y  a  aucune  loi  pouvant  l'interdire  même  sous  peine  de  péché 
léger.  Cependant  saint  Liguori  admet  plutôt  l'opinion  qui  trouve 
un  i)étlié  véniel  dans  l'acte  sexuel  au  moment  de  la  grossesse,  à 
moins  qu'il  n'y  ait  danger  d'incontinence,  ou  quelqu'autre  raison 
honnête. 

D'apiès  l'opinion  plus  commune,  l'acte  sexuel  au  moment  des 
menstrues  est  un  péché  véniel,  à  cause  de  l'indécence  qu'il  cause, 
à  moins  qu'il  n'y  ait  quelque  raison  qui  le  rende  légitime.  ...  Il 
faut  en  dire  autant  de  l'acte  sexuel  dans  les  jours  qui  suivent 
l'accouchement. 

914. —  l/acle  conjugal  n'est  pas  défendu  au  moment  de  l'allaite- 
ment, parce  qu'il  n'y  a  aucune  loi  qui  l'empêche  et  aucun  danger, 
d'après  l'expérience,  de  supprimer  le  lait.  Los  é[)oux  n'ont  donc 
aucune  raison  de  s'abstenir  de  cet  acte  à  ce  moment,  en  craignant 
de  pécher. 

L'acte  conjugal  au  moment  de  la  maladie  n'est  défendu  ni  sous 
peine  d'un  péché  grave,  ni  sous  peine  d'un  péc'ié  léger,  parce  qu'il 
n'en  résulte  aucun  préjudice  pour  les  époux  ;  l'eff.  t  qui  accom- 
pagne l'ticte  ne  peut  avoir,  au  moins  ordinairement,  d'influence  sur 
la  maladie. 

Selon  l'opinion  plus  probable,  il  n'est  pas  défendu  les  dimanches 
et  jours  de  lête  solennelle,  et  paico  qu'aucun  droit  ne  s'y  oppose, 
et  parce  que  cet  acte  n'empêche  [)as  les  é[)  ux  d'observer  les  fêtes. 
La  plupart  des  SS.  Pères  qui  font  des  objections  à  ce  sujet,  parais- 
sent plutôt  donner  des  conseils  que  des  préceptes.  On  peut  en 
conclure  que  cet  acte  n'est  pas  défendu  non  plus  en  temps  d'Avent 
ou  de  Carême. 

Enfin,  en  principe,  il  n'est  pas  défendu,  même  sous  peine  de 
péché  léger,  le  jour  de  la  sainte  communion,  bien  que  les  époux 
communient  seulement  par  piété,  pourvu  qu'ils  accomplissent  cet 
acte  pour  une  fin  honiiêie  ;  parce  que  l'indécence  qui  naît  de  la 
voliiplé  charnelle  est  com[)ensée  par  l'honnêteté  d'une  foi  droite  et 
voulue  par  Dieu,  fin  que  se  proposent  les  é[)oux.  .  .  .  Voir 
Sanchez,  L.  IX,  D.  XII L,  qui  a  traité  cette  question  avec  soin, 
et  mieux  que  personne. 


392  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

ART.  IL  —  De  l'Obligation  d'Accomplir  l'Acte  Conjugal. 
915. —  Il  y  a  une  obligation  de  justice,  grave  en  principe,  de 
rendre  le  devoir  conjugal  à  l'autre  époux  qui  le  demande  sérieuse- 
ment et  raisonnablement,  parce  que,  d'api  es  la  nature  du  contrat 
conjugal,  les  époux  se  donnent  mutuellement  la  puissance  sur  leur 
corps,  pour  l'usage  conjugal.  .  .   . 

II.  Eu  principe  il  n'y  a  aucune  obligation  de  demander  le  devoir 
conjugal,  parce  qu'aucun  des  époux  n'est  tenu  d'user  de  son  droit, 
et  tous  deux  peuveni  en  faire  remise.  Cependant,  accidentelle- 
ment, il  3:  a  obligation  de  le  demander  par  charité  ou  à  cause  d'une 
autre  vertu,  surtout  de  la  part  de  l'homme,  par  exemple  s'il  juge 
que  sa  c;)mpagne  est  en  danger  d'incontinence  parce  qu'elle  n'ose 
le  lui  demander,  ou  si  la  demande  est  nécessaire  pour  entretenir 
ou  ranimer  Tamour  conjugal. 

III.  L'obligation*  de  le  rendre  cesse  pour  l'un  des  époux 
lorsque  cesse  pour  l'autre  le  droit  de  l'exiger,  ce  qui  arrive  dans 
les  cas  suivants  ;  1°  si  l'un  des  époux  a  commis  un  adultère  ;  2** 
si  celui  qui  le  demande  n'a  pas  l'usage  de  la  raison,  parce  que  sa 
demande  n'est  pas  humaine  ;  3°  si  celui  qui  le  rend  peut  craimlre 
raisonnablement  un  piéjudice  ou  un  danger  pour  sa  santé  ;  car  les 
époux  ne  sont  pas  censés  s'obliger  à  rendre  le  devoir  en  subissant 
un  SI  grand  préjudice  ;  4**  si  celui  qui  le  demande  a  perdu  ce  droit 
à  cause  d'un  inceste  avec  les  parents  de  l'autre  époux  au  premier 
ou  au  deuxième  degré,  ou  pour  une  autre  cause. 

916. —  Les  époux  sont  tenus  d'habiter  ensemble,  et  l'un  ne  peut 
s'absenter  longtemps  sans  le  consentement  de  l'autre  ou  sans 
nécessité  ;  car  cette  obligation  découle  de  celle  de  rendre  le  devoir 
conjugal.  Or,  les  causes  légitimes  de  s'absenter  pour  longtem[)s 
sont  l'intérêt  public,  la  subsistance  ou  le  salut  de  la  famille,  un 
mal  à  éviter  de  la  part  de  ses  ennemis,  etc.  Mais  le  mari  qui 
va  habiter  longtemps  ailleurs,  doit  emmener  son  épouse,  pour 
qu'elle  habite  avec  lui. 

Un  époux  qui  refuse  le  devoir  conjugal  pèche  gravement,  s'il  y 
a  danger  d'incontinence  ou  d'un  grave  ennui  chez  l'autiv;  de 
même  s'il  le  refuse  à  l'autie  qui  le  demande  sérieusement.  M.iis 
il  en  est  autrement  si  celui-ci  u'insiste  pas,  ou  ne  le  demande  que 
mollement. 


Treatise  on  Marriage,  393 

II  no  pèche  pas  en  le  refusant  lorsque  l'autre  le  demande  avec 
excès  i)ar  exemple  trois  ou  quutre  fois  dans  la  même  nuit  ;  ni  s'il 
le  remet  à  un  temps  rapproché,  par  exemi)le  à  la  nuit,  ou  du  soir 
au  matin,  en  mettant  de  côté  le  danger  d'incontinence. 

Il  faut  hlâmer  les  épouses  qui  refusent  le  devoir  sans  raison 
suffisante  à  leurs  maris  qui  le  demandent  mêtne  mollement,  ou  qui 
ne  cèdent  que  contraintes,  ou  qui  leur  reprochent  c^-S  demandes 
avec  dureté. 

Une  épouse  n'est  pas  dispen^^ée  de  rendre  le  devoir  à  cause  des 
inconvénients  ordinaires  de  l'accoucliement,  de  la  grossesse,  de 
l'allaitement,  ni  à  cause  de  douleurs  vives,  mais  courtes,  ni  à  cause 
de  douleurs  longues  m  lis  modérées,  par  exemple  de  douleurs  de 
tête  pendant  plusieurs  mois  après  l'accouchement,  ni  à  cause  d'un 
petit  affaiblissement  dans  la  santé,  parce  que  tous  ces  inconvén- 
ii'uts  sont  inhérents  à  la  condition  du  mariage  ;  il  en  serait  autre- 
ment s'il  y  avait  un  grave  danger  i\^  mort  ou  d'une  maladie  série- 
use, d'après  le  jugement  d'un  médecin  prudent. 

Un  époux  n'est  pas  obligé  de  rencire  le  devoir  conjugal  à  l'autre 
souffrant  d'une  grave  maladie  contagieuse,  par  exem[)le,  de  la 
peste,  d'une  maladie  vénérienne.  Dj  même,  à  cause  du  notable 
affai'ilissement  du  corps,  on  en  dispense  ceux  qui  sont  atteints 
d'iuie  forte  fièvre  ou  d'une  grave  maladie. 

Un  époux  n'est  pas  dispensé  de  le  rendre,  parce  qu'il  craint 
d'avoir  trop  d'enfants,  car  la  proc  éati on  des  enfants  est  la  fin 
principale  du  mariage,  et  n'est  pas  un  inconvénient  intrinsèque 
pour  ce  même  mariage. 

ART.  III. — Des  Pèches  des  Epocx. 

917. — Il  y  a  les  péchés  venant  de  l'acte  conjugal  accompli  par 
excès,  c'est-à-dire  avec  des  actes  inutiles  à  la  génération,  et  les 
péchés  venant  de  l'acte  conjugal  par  défaut,  lorsque  l'îicte  essen- 
tiel manque,  ou  lorsqu'on  souille  le  lit  conjugal  par  le  crime  de 
l'Onanisme. 

§  1.     Des  [)échés  des  époux  par  excès. 

Il  y  en  a  trois  soi  tes  : 

P  Ceux  qui  soi.t  nuisibles  à  la  génération,  comme  la  sodomie,  la 
pollution  ; 


394  The  Doctrine  oj  fJi.e  Jesuits. 

2°  Cenx  qui  sont  utiles,  comme  les  attouchements  qui  entretien- 
nent et  excitent  l'amour  ; 

3°  Ceux  qui  ne  sont  ni  nuisibles,  ni  utiles,  sont  dits  en  dehors  de 
la  nature. 

918. — I.  Tout  ce  qui  est  nécessaire  pour  accomplir  l'acte  conju- 
gal ou  pour  le  rendre  plus  facile,  plus  prom[>t  ou  plus  paifait,  est 
absolument  permis  aux  é[)oux  ;  parce  que  ctlui  qui  a  droit  à  la 
chose  a  droit  aux  moyens  nécessaires,  utiles  et  non  défendus,  pour 
y  arriver  ;  et  si  l'on  permet  la  chose  principale,  on  peimet  aussi  la 
chose  accessoire,  ou  le  moyen  qui  y  conduit. 

II.  Tout  ce  qui  est  nuisible  à  la  génération  dnns  l'acte  conjugal, 
tout  ce  qui  procure  une  pollution  en  dehors  de  l'union  naturelle,  est 
gravement  défendu,  parce  q'ie  l'effusion  volontaire  de  la  semence 
n'est  permise  qu'en  vue  de  la  génération,  et  par  suite  le  mar. 
inge  ne  donne  aux  époux  le  droit  que  de  répandre  la  semence  uliiB 
à  la  génération.  Autrement  si  les  hommes  pouvaient  jouir  de  ce 
plaisir  sans  avoir  la  charge  subséquente  de  nourrir  et  d'élever  leurs 
enfants,  on  ne  songerait  guère  à  la  génération  des  enfants,  même 
on  l'éviterait,  et  la  société  inclinerait  vers  sa  fin. 

m.  Tout  ce  qui  est  inutile  ou  indifférent  à  la  génération,  même 
d'une  manière  indirecte  ou  éloignée,  ou  à  l'amour  corjugal  qu'on 
veut  exciter,  est  un  péché,  mais  seulement  véniel  :  Pc'esst  un  péché, 
parce  qu'on  ne  cherche  que  le  plaisir,  et  qu'il  y  a  une  subversion 
de  la  fin  et  une  jouissance  déiéglée,  dans  une  chose  permise  en 
elle-même,  aux  é^)oux  ;  2*^  il  n'y  a  qu'un  pécliéveniel,  parce  qu'on 
ne  cherche  pas  la  volupté  en  dehors  du  mariage  et  que  l'acte,  par 
sa  nature,  vise  à  des  rapports  permis.  Il  est  vrai  que  la  circon- 
stance de  la  fin  légitime  manque,  mais  ce  défaut  n'amène  qu'un 
dérèglement  léger  et,  par  suite,  seulement  un  péché  véniel. 

On  peut  donc  ain.>i  résumer  ces  trois  lè^les  :  tout  ce  qui  Qs,i pour 
est  permis,  tout  ce  qui  est  contre  est^.éché  mortel,  tout  ce  qui  est 
en  dehors  est  péché  véniel. 

919. —  Il  n'y  a  pas  de  faute  dans  des  baisers  honnêtes,  dans  des 
attouchements  sur  les  parties  honnêtes  ou  m  )ins  honnêtes,  destinés 
à  montrer  l'affection  conjugale  ou  à  entretenir  l'amour,  même  si 
accidentellement  il  en  résulte  une  pollution  involontaire ,  parce  que 
toute  mai  que  honnête  d'amour,  même  tendre,  est  permise  à  ceux 


Treatise  on  Marriage.  395 

qui,  d'après  le  lien  du  mariage,  ne  doivent  faire  qu'un  seul  cœur^ 
une  sevle  chair. 

Il  n'y  a  pas  de  faute  en  principe  dans  los  attoucliements  et  les 
regards  peu  honnêtes,  s'ils  visent  immédiatement  à  l'acte  sexeul.  Il 
en  est  de  même,  s'ils  sont  simplement  désliouuêtes,  mais  néces- 
saires ou  utiles  pour  exciter  la  nature  ;  car  alors  il^sontcomme  une 
préparation  à  l'acte,  comme  des  préliminaires.  Il  n'y  a  que  des 
péchés  véniels,  si  l'on  cherche  seulement  le  plaisir,  même  si  ces 
actes  précèdent  immédiatement  l'acte  ;  mais  il  y  a  péché  mortel 
s'ils  exposent  l'un  des  deux  époux  ou  tous  les  deux  au  danger 
d'ime  pollution  avant  l'union  charnelle,  ce  qui  arrivera  facilement 
si  on  les  i)rolonge  avant  l'acte  conjugal. 

Il  y  a  péché  véniel  dans  les  attouchements,  les  regards  et  les 
propos  honteux  qui  ne  visent  pas  immédiatement  l'acte  sexuel,  et 
n'ont  pas  p^  ur  but  d'entretenir  l'amour  légitime  d'une  manière 
modérée  et  raisonnable. 

Il  n'y  a  pas  i)éché  grave,  même  si  ces  attouchements  sans  inten- 
tion d'union  conjugale  amènent  un  ébranlement  des  esprits  ou  des 
membres  propres  à  la  génération,  ou  s'il  en  résulte  des  pertes  sém- 
inales, bien  que  ces  actes  soient  péché  moitel  chez  les  personnes 
libres  ;  parce  qu'en  dehors  du  crime  de  pollution  volontaire  ou  de 
sodomie,  on  ne  fait  rien  de  contraire  au  mariage.* 

Mais  on  doit  prendre  garde  de  ne  pas  courir  le  danger  de  pollu- 
tion, ce  qui  arrivera  facilement  si  les  mouvements  sont  déréglés. 
Aussi,  bien  qu'en  principe  les  époux  ne  commettent  pas  de  péché 
mortel  qui,  ayant  commencé  l'acte  conjugal,  s'entendent  pour  ne 
pas  le  terminer,  et  ne  se  mettent  pas  en  danger  de  pollution,  saint 
Alphonse  fait  remarquer  avec  raison  qu'ordinairement  il  y  a  péché 
mortel,  parce  que,  ordinairement,  ce  danger  existe. 

*  Sanchez,  Lib.  TX.,  Disp.  XLV.,  traite  ex  professa  et  avec  uu  luxe  inoui 
de  détails,  ces  graves  questions  : 

'Utrutn  conju,uil)ns  liceant  delectatlones  morosge,  tactus,  aspectus,  ver- 
bi  i  turpia,  cuin  polkitioiiis  prajvisaî,  sed  mm  intentîB  ixTicnlo?  Ec  gen- 
eral! ter  quando  pi>lluti()nis  pt-riciiluin  eiticiat  novaiii  culpaiu  mortalem,  vel 
talein,  quae  an  tea  inortalis  mininie  erat?" 

Il  y  là  dessus  quarante;  et  uu  articles;  je  me  contente  d'extraire  le  prob- 
lème posé  par  l'article  34.  La  solution  importe  peu  ;  tout  le  génie  consiste 
à  av-()ir  iiuaginéle  problème: 

'•Q  lid.  si  vir  a  fœmina  petat,  nt  ejus  virilia  attrertet,  moveatqup,  nu 
vf'li t  digitv)s  in  uxoris  vas  intromiltere,  ib'qu';  persistere,  (iua.>i  copuuuii 
exorceudo,  uteus  digitis  instar  inembri  virilia  i'' 


396  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

920. — Tl  n'y  a  pas  de  péché  grave  et  même  léger,  selon  l'opinion 
plus  commune  et  p'ns  probable,  de  la  part  d'une  épouse  qui  s'ex- 
cite par  des  attouchements  à  répandre  la  semence  aussitôt  npiès 
l'acte  dans  lequel  le  mari  seul  l'a  répandue  :  1°  parce  que  cette  se- 
mence est  destinée  à  accomplir  l'acte  conjugal,  pour  que  les  époux 
ne  soient  proprement  qu'une  seule  chau*  et,  de  même  que  l'épouse 
peut  se  préparer  à  l'acte  par  des  attouchements,  elle  peut  égale- 
ment le  terminer  par  des  attouchements  ;  *  2°  parce  que,  si  les 
femmes,  après  une  telle  excitation,  étaient  tenues  de  réprimer  les 
mouvements  naturels,  elles  risqueraient  de  pécher  gravement. 

Les  attouchements  sur  soi-même,  en  vue  du  plaisir  vénérien,  en 
l'absence  de  l'autre  époux,  selon  l'opinion  de  plusieurs,  constituent 
un  péché  grave,  même  en  mettant  de  côté  le  danger  de  pollution, 
parce  que  l'époux  n'a  pas  le  droit  de  se  servir  de  son  propre  corps 
pour  son  plaisir,  mais  seulement  pour  l'acte  conjugal.  Cependant^ 
beaucoup  d'autres,  d'après  saint  Alphonse,  ne  voient  là  qu'un  péché 
véniel.  Saint  Alphonse  regarde  la  première  opinion  comme  plus 
probable,  et  comme  devant  être  suivie  en  pratique. 

*0n  doit  même  le  Uii  conseiller  :  "Conjugi  tardiori  ad  seminandum  con- 
sulendum  est  ut  ante  concubitum  tactibus  veiierem  excitet,  ut  vel  sic 
possit  in  ipso  concubitu  simul  eff'iiiidere  semen."  Cependant  "non  est 
îiecessario  et  conjnx  prias  seminniis  non  teuetur  alium  exspectare."  Ainsi 
parle  Sanchez,  et  il  se  po<e  à  ce  propos  une  série  d'incroyables  et  intradu- 
isibles questions,  auxquelles  il  répond  avec  les  plus  ujinutieux  details  : 
"An  sit  inortale,  quoties  non  simul  conjuues  semen  consulte  effiuidunt? 
.  .  .  QnicU  si  vir  se  provocet  ad  prius  seniinandum?  .  .  ,  Nuni  fas  viro 
sit  coutinuare  concubitum,  ubi  prius  seminaverit,  ut  faemina  seniinet? 
.  .  .  An  sit  culpa  lethalis,  sive  coujnges,  sive  soluti,  a  copula  iuchoata 
désistant  ante  utriusque  seminationem,  maxime  si  alter  semiuarit?  .  .  . 
Quando  sit  licitum,  et  quando  culpa,  et  qnalis  si  vir,  fœmina  non  semi- 
liante,  nec  seniinaudi  periculum  patiente,  de  ejus  consensu  ante  consum- 
matiouem  se  retrahat  a  copula  incepta?  .  .  .  Quid,  si  jam  faemina  semina- 
verit, aut  seminandi  periculum  subeat?  .  .  .  Quid,  si  è  contra  vir  semiua- 
rit, et  fagniina  non  seminet,  sed  se  retrahat,  iiitaturque  non  seminare?  .  .  . 
Au  ubi  Si  lia  fœmina  semiuarit,  possit  vir  se  retrahere,  si  advertat  sibi 
mortis  periculum  immiuere,  si  seminet;  vel  quia  supervenit  liostis  aut 
fera. 

"Conjugibus  inhoneste  coëuntibus  subito  adessent  aliqni,  non  damnan- 
dus  esset  vir,  qui  post  fœraiuae  seminationem,  ante  propriam,  ex  bis 
uruentissimis  causis  recederet,  quamvis  ita  Venus  in  eo  irrita  esset,  ut 
membro  virdi  ex  vase  fseminœo  extracto,  fore  auimadverteret,  ut  ipso 
invito  semen  extra  fiueret.    Quare.  .  .  . 

"Quid,  de  conjujie  semetip>um  tangente?  Quid  si  se  tangat,  sciens  fore 
ut  praeveuiat  semen  fœmineum,  vel  fœmina,  quaj  noudum  semiuarat,  se 
lactu  provocet,  ubi  vir  membtum  contraxit.'"  etc.,  etc. 

Sanchtz,  Du  matrimonio ,  Lib.  IX.,  Di.sp,  XVII.,  XIX  et  XLIV. 


Treat  Le  on  ^larrlaje.  397 

S"  l'on  prend  plaisir  d'une  manière  prolongée  à  poncer  à  nn  acte 
scx.iel  passé  ou  qui  doit  avoir  lieu  à  un  moment  éloigné,  en  deliors 
du  d:inger  de  poiliilion,  il  n'y  a  qu'uu  péché  \éniel  selon  l'opinion 
couimune  :  1**  Il  y  a  un  péché,  car  ce  plaisir,  n'étant  pas  rapporté 
à  un  note  proche,  est  un  dérèglement,  puisqu'il  n'a  pas  de  fin  hon- 
nête et  qu'on  excite  inutilement  les  esprits  génitaux  ;  2"  un  péché 
véniel,  car  l'acte  étant  permis  en  princi[)e  aux  époux,  il  ne  peut 
êlre  gravement  défendu  d'y  penser  avec  plaisir.  Mais  il  n'y  a  pas 
de  faute  dans  une  simple  pensée  sur  les  rapports  passés  ou  futurs. 
Même,  ni  le  désir  au  sujet  d'un  acte  futur,  ni  le  plaisir  à  penser  à 
un  acte  passé,  ne  sont  illicites  en  principe,  à  moins  qu'ils  ne  soient 
rapportés  qu'au  seul  plaisir  de  l'union  charnelle,  car  le  désir  au 
sujet  d'une  chose  permise  ne  peut  être  défendu. 


§  2.    De  rOnanisme  en  particulier. 

921. —  L'Onanisme  consiste  en  ce  qu3  l'homme,  lorsque  l'acte 
sexuel  est  commencé,  se  retire  avant  devoir  ré[)andu  sa  semence 
qui  se  perd  en  dehors,  afin  d'empêclier  la  génération.  Tout  le 
monde  voit  que  c'est  chercher  le  plaisir,  siius  vouloir  assumer  les 
chai-ges  du  mariage. 

Il  tire  son  nom  d'Onan,  deuxième  fils  du  patriarche  Juda  qui, 
après  la  mort  de  son  frère  lier,  fut  forcé,  selon  la  coutuine, 
d'épouser  sa  veuve  Thamar,  pur  donner  une  postérité  à  son  frère  ; 
mais  *"s'approchant  de  l'épouse  de  son  frère,  il  répandait  sa 
semence  à  terre  pour  que  des  enfants  ne  naquissent  pas  sous  le 
nom  de  son  frère.  Aussi  le  Seigneur  le  frappa  parce  qu'il  faisait 
une  chose  abominable."     Genèse,  XXXVIII,  9  et  10. 

922. —  L'Onanisme  volontaire  est  toujours  un  péché  mortel,  en 
tant  que  contraire  à  la  nature  ;  aussi  il  ne  peut  jamais  être  permis 
aux  époux,  parce  que  ;  \°  il  est  contraire  à  la  fin  principale  du 
mariage,  et  ten  1  en  principe  à  l'extinction  de  la  société,  et  par 
suite  renverse  l'ordre  naturel  ;  2°  parce  qu'il  a  été  défendu  stricte- 
ment par  le  Législateur  suprême  et  Créateur,  comme  il  résulte  du 
texte  de  la  Genèse  cité  tout  à  l'heure  ;  3**  parce  qu'il  a  été 
condamné  par  Innocent  XI. 

Le  mari  Onaniste  commet  toujours  un  péché  grave  et  ne  peut 


398  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesalis. 

être  absous,  à  moins  de  regretter  sincèrement  son  péché  et  da  se 
proposer  de  l'éviter  à  l'avenir. 

L'épou  0  pent  èlre  excn^ée  du  jieclie  si,  pour  de  graves  raisons, 
ell  ;  cbt  forcée  de  rendre  le  devoir  conjugal,  pourvu  qi'en  elle- 
même,  elle  ne  donne  pas  son  assentiment  à  ce  péché,  et  qu'à 
l'extérieur,  elle  manifeste  sa  répu;^nance  par  des  avertissements 
sérieux  et  par  des  marques  de  mécontentement.  La  raison  est 
que:  1°  elle  accomplit  un  acte  licite,  et  use  d'un  droit  dont  elle 
ne  peut  être  privée  par  la  faute  de  son  mari  ;  elle  ne  coopère  pas 
jjroprement  à  son  péché  puisqu'elle  reste  passive,  et  que  l'action 
coupable  intrinfcèqueraent  ne  consiste  que  dans  l'acte  du  mari  se 
retirant  contre  la  nature  ;  2°  parce  qu'elle  n'est  pas  obligée  par  la 
charité  d'empêcher  le  péché  de  son  mari  en  subissant  un  grave 
préjudice  ;  3°  i)arce  qu'il  est  établi  par  les  ré[)onses  du  Saint- 
Pénitentiaire,  qu'il  ne  faut  inquié  ef  aucune  femme  à  ce  sujet. 

923. —  Une  épouse  pèche  gravement  quand  elle  pousse  son  mari 
à  mésuser  de  niaringe,  même  indirectement  ou  tacitement,  par 
exemple  en  se  })lnignant  du  grand  nombre  de  ses  enfaits,  des 
douleurs  de  l'enfnntement,  ou  en  ré[)étant  qu'elle  a  failli  mourir 
dtins  ses  dernières  couches.  A  plus  forte  raison,  elle  })èche  grave- 
ment si,  malgré  son  mari,  elle  se  retire  avant  l'effusion  de  la 
semence. 

Elle  pèche  gravement  aussi  en  consentant  elle-même  à  l'acte 
détestable  du  mari,  tout  en  manifeb.tant  sa  répugnance  extérieure- 
ment. Si,  cependant,  il  n'y  a  de  sa  part  qu'une  satisfaction 
inefficace,  non  au  sujet  de  l'acte  cou[)able  en  soi,  mais  de  ses 
conséquences,  par  exemple  des  inconvénients  de  la  grossesse,  des 
dangers  de  l'acconchement,  en  principe  elle  ne  i)èche  i)as,  bien  que 
cette  satisfaction  ne  soit  pas  sans  péril.  Mais  elle  doit  éviter  tout 
à  fait  qu'en  la  manifestant  à  son  mari,  elle  ne  le  rende  plus 
ardent  à  pécher  plus  librement  et  plus  souvent. 

L'épouse  est  tenue,  du  moins  ordinairement,  d'avertir  l'époux 
de  l'obligation  d'agir  selon  la  règle,  et  de  le  détourner,  autant  que 
possible,  de  sa  manièie  d'agir  coupable.  Elle  ne  doit  pas  se 
contenter  de  l'avertir  une  fois,  mais  réitérer  ses  avertissements, 
à  moins  qu'elle  ne  soit  assurée  que  cela  ne  servira  de  rien. 
Cependant  elle  doit,  même  dans  ce  cas,  montrer  sa  répugnance  de 


Treatise  on  Marriage.  399 

quelque  manière,  pour  ne  pas  paraître  donner  son  assentiment  au 
péché  de  son  mari. 

Le  devoir  de  l'épouse  est  aussi  d'engager  son  mari  par  dos 
caresses,  |)rir  différentes  marques  d'amour,  par  des  prières,  des 
exljortations,  à  accomplir  l'acie  conjugal  selon  la  règle,  ou  à  s'en 
abstenir  absolument.  L'exi)érience  montre  que  beaucoup  de  maris 
onanistes,  ainsi  engagés  par  leurs  femmes,  se  sont  corrigés. 

925. —  D.  Une  épouse  peut-elle  demander  le  devoir  conjugal 
à  son  mari  Onanibte? 

R.  Oui,  selon  l'ojinion  ])lus  probable,  pour  un  motif  grave,  par 
exemple,  si  elle  est  expo^ée  au  danger  d'incontinence  ;  en  effet 
elle  a  droit  au  rapport  sexuel. 

926. —  D.  Une  épouse  i)éehe-t-elle  en  donnint  son  consente- 
ment interne  à  la  volupté,  lorcsqu'elle  peut  permettre  l'acte  conjugal 
à  son  époux  onanisle? 

R.  Non,  pourvu  qu'elle  ne  donne  pas  son  assentiment  au 
péché  du  mari.  Car,  puisqu'elle  ne  i)éche  pas  en  permettant  cet 
acte,  elle  ne  i)écbe  i)as  en  consentant  au  plaisir  qui  en  résuite,  bien 
qu'elle  sache  que  son  mari  ne  terminera  pas  l'acte  conjugal  :  car 
cet  acte  est  en  soi  honnête  et  peimis  à  la  femme,  et  il  ne  dépend 
pas  d'elle  qu'il  soit  accompli  selon  la  règle. 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  3[fRances. 


Case  II. 
Value  of  Promises. 

Qiiirinus,  a  younoj  man  of  noble  birth,  having  fallen  blindly  in 
love  with  Rosalie,  a  young  girl  of  common  extraction,  promised 
to  marry  lier  without  the  knowledge  of  his  parents.  The  latter, 
learning  of  bis  foolish  promise,  lost  no  opportunity  of  opposing 
such  a  scandalous  maniage.  Quirinus,  seeing  his  parents  so 
afflicted,  and  being  unwilling  to  crush  them  with  sorrow,  is  himself 
in  great  trouble.  What  shall  the  unfortunate  man  do?  He  begins 
by  showing  less  affection  to  Rosalie,  and  finally  comes  down  to 
coldness  ;  then,  pleading  the  opposition  of  big  parents,  he  breaks 
off  the  engagement  with  his  betrothed. 

Ques.  1.  What  value  have  promises  made  without  the  approval 
of  one's  parents  ? 

Ques.  2.     May  promises  be  made  in  spite  of  parents? 

Ques.  3.  Had  Quirinus  the  riglit  to  persuade  Rosalie  to  cancel 
her  promises? 

Ans  to  Question  1.  They  have  some  value  m  themselves.  The 
reason  is,  that  the  choice  of  a  situation  or  state  should  be  free  and 
independent  of  any  foreign  influence.  Marri:;ge  contracted  with- 
out the  approbation,  and  in  spite  of  the  wish  of  parents,  being 
valid  ;  so  are,  with  more  reason,  ihe  promises  leading  to  marriage, 
although  they  are  less  subtanlial. 

I  have  said  *•'  in  themselves,"  because  there  are  some  cases  in 
which  promises  made  in  spite  of  parents  would  be  worthless  ;  for 
instance, if  a  grave  scandal  should  result  from  the  marriage,  serious 
quarrels  between  parents,  etc.  Justice  does  not  compel  to  an  act 
which  cannot  be  done  without  sinning.  However,  différence  of 
rank  does  not  necessarily  invalidate  promises,  if  the  affianced  are 
aware  of  its  importance. 


-I 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Affiances,  401 

Ans.  lo  Question  2.  No,  in  a  general  manner,  because  sons  are 
held  to  respect  thtir  parents,  and  in  so  grave  a  matter  to  ask  their 
consent  or  advice;  except  in  cases  in  which  sons  foresee  that  their 
parents  would  be  opposed  to  an  honorable  and  suitable  marriage. 
But.  above  all,  one  should  be  careful  not  to  trust  one's  own  judg- 
ment. 

Ans.  to  Question  3.  There  is  controversy  between  theologians 
as  to  whether  the  opposition  of  parents  is  a  sufficient  cause 
for  breaking  off  a  promise  of  marriage.  But  it  is  necessary  to  make 
a  distinction,  after  St.  Liguoii:  if  parents  are  making  an  unjust 
opposition  to  marriage,  i)romises  cannot  be  broken  ;  it  is  diffeient 
if  the  opposition  is  justifiable  :  for  instance,  if  the  marriage  would 
bring  dishonor  on  the  family.  Tlierefore,  in  this  case,  Quirinus 
was  right  in  breykmg  off  these  promises,  though  they  may  have 
been  valid  at  the  start  ;  because  the  opposition  of  his  parents  was 
justifiable.  But  it  was  useless  for  him  to  try  to  persuade  his 
betrothed,  through  hardheartedness,  to  retract  her  promise  ;  it  would 
have  been  sufficient  for  him  to  retire,  pleading  the  just  and  very 
grave  opposition  of  his  parents. 


Case  VI. 

Conditional  Consent. 

Odilon  and  Odilia,  cousins  of  the  second  degree,  are  affianced, 
U[)on  condition  that  they  can  obtain  a  dispensation  from  the  Pope. 
On  that  understanding,  by  common  agreement,  they  send  a  sup- 
plication to  Rome,  in  order  to  obtain  the  said  dispensation.  In  the 
meantime  Odilon,  having  become  acquainted  with  another  young 
girl,  more  beautiful,  named  Virginia,  with  a  largeur  dowry,  who  has 
not  heard  of  his  first  promises,  makes  her  new  proposals.  A 
little  while  after,  on  the  eve  of  the  marriage  between  Odilon  and 
Vn-ginia,  Odilia  receives  the  dispensation,  and  immediately  claims 
from  Odilon  the  fulfillment  of  his  promises.  Odilon,  perplexed, 
asks  his  confessor  what  he  should  do.  The  latter  does  not  know 
what  advice  to  give. 


402  Tlie  Doctrine  nf  the  Jesuits. 

Qiies.  1.  What  must  we  think  of  the  first  and  last  promises  of 
Odilon? 

Ques.  2.     What  should  he  be  advised,  or  ordered  to  do? 

Ans.  to  Question  1.  His  first  promises  were  worthless;  for,  in 
the  first  place,  they  were  conditional,  and  the  betrothed's  consent  was 
given  before  the  realization  of  the  condition;  in  the  second  place, 
they  had  been  made  when  an  obstacle  existed,  as  follows  from 
what  has  been  said. 

Ans.  to  Question  2.  As  regards  the  promises  made  to  Virginia, 
it  is  not  a  very  clear  case.  The  opinion  of  a  theologian  considers 
it  of  no  value.  The  reason  is  :  although  Odilon  was  not  tied  to  his 
espoused  by  the  regular  obligations  of  betrothal,  be  was  engaged  to 
ber  by  true  obligations  of  affiances,  on  the  strength  of  the  promise 
made  to  her,  and  by  which  he  was  held  to  wait  for  the  result  of 
the  request  for  a  dispensation.  He  therefore  was  not  at  liberty  to 
make  a  new  promise  without  violating  this  grave  obligation.  Con- 
sequently, this  new  promise  cannot  be  authorized  ;  and  moreover  it 
is  entirely  worthless,  as  he  made  it  to  the  prejudice  of  his  first 
betrothed. 

Another  opinion,  probable  in  a  positive  manner  for  me,  acknowl- 
edges that  this  last  promise  is  of  some  value  ;  for,  from  what  has 
])een  said,  if  the  former  is  worthless,  the  latter  is  valid  ;  as  the  first 
engagement  being  void,  cannot  oppose  the  validity  of  the  second 
one  ;  and  the  consent  given  ])y  Odilon  to  wait  for  the  result  of  the 
request  to  the  Pope  cannot  be  in  opposition  to  the  validity  of  the 
second.  For  it  would  result  that  the  engaged  man  sinned  onl}"  by 
breaking  his  eiigagement  ;  that  is  to  say,  he  has  violated  the  prom- 
ised faith  ;  but  the  new  promise  he  contracted  is  not  worthless. 

Ans.  to  Question  2.  In  presence  of  the  above  controversy,  one 
cannot  compel  Odilon  to  wed  Odilia  ;  but  he  may  be  allowed  tc 
marry  Viiginia  ;  as,  from  what  has  been  said,  in  a  probable  man- 
ner, the  promise  made  to  her  is  valid,  and  he  is  tied  to  her.  He 
must,  therefore,  be  left  in  peace. 

Case  VII. 

Breaking  off  Affiances. 

Leopi/ld,  a  law  student,  made  a  promise  of  marriage  to  Dorai- 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Affiances.  403 

tilla,  a  most  honorable  Tonng  girl,  after  lie  had  gradua^i'd  and 
become  a  lawyer.  "Within  the  space  of  three  years  her  met  her  fre- 
quently, and  renewed  to  her  the  word  given  ;  which  attached  her 
fco  to  him  that  she  did  not  hesitate  to  decline  another  very  honor- 
able offer.  But  Leopold,  having  heard  an  eloquent  sermon  on  the 
vanity  of  worldly  things,  decided  to  bid  farewell  to  the  seductions 
of  this  world.  Hence,  to  act  with  more  prudence,  lie  wished  to 
lake  spiritual  exercises  in  a  convent  of  Regulars  ;  after  which,  with 
his  confessor's  consent,  he  makes  a  vow  of  chastity,  and  enters  the 
Order.  Without  delay  he  wears  the  religious  dress,  receives  minor 
orders,  and  for  a  whole  year  he  occupies  himself  studying  theol- 
ogy. Learning  this,  Domitilla  charges  bim  with  having  broken 
his  promise,  while  she,  on  the  contrary,  had  kept  faithful,  even  to 
the  refusing  of  another  offer.  By  numerous  letters  and  unceasing 
complaints,  she  endeavors  to  make  him  change  his  mind.  Leopohl, 
in  his  perplexity,  asks  advice  of  his  confessor. 

Qties.  1.     How  mny  valid  promises  be  broken  off? 

Ques.  2.     What  must  Leopold  be  advised,  or  ordered  to  do? 

Ans.  to  Question  1.  Valid  promises  may  be  broken  off,  if  one  of 
theafllanced  chooses  a  more  perfect  state  ;  because,  while  contract- 
ing a  promise,  he  is  not  deemed  to  renounce  forever  the  option 
of  a  more  perfect  situation. 

Ans.  to  Question  2.  Leopold  should  be  advised  to  fulfill  faith- 
fully his  two  vows,  and  to  recommend  his  affianced  to  God  b}^  ear- 
nest prayers.  If  she  has  refused  another  favorable  engagement  to 
keep  true  to  Leopold,  it  is  an  ac(tidental  case,  a  misfortune,  which 
she  should  endure  peaceably,  until  she  iinds  another  party  to  suit 
her. 

Case  VIIL 
Breaking  off  Affiances. 
Corneille,  betrothed  to  Eleonore,  has  the  weakness  to  indulge  in 
fornication.  A  short  time  afterwards,  Eleonore  soils  herself  with 
the  same  crime.  Corneille,  already  sorry  for  not  having  chosen  a 
richer  woman,  seeks  this  opportunity  to  break  off  from  her,  in  spite 
of  her  claims. 

Ques.     Quid^  in  this  case? 


4  04  The  Doctrine  of  fhe  Jesuits. 

Ans.  Corneille  was  free,  more  probably,  according  to  St.  Ligiiori, 
to  disengage  himself,  on  account  of  the  fornication  of  his  fiancé, 
although  he  had  also  himself  committed  the  same  crime. 

Case  IX. 
Breaking  off  Affiances. 

Edmund  became  engaged  to  Ellen,  a  young  girl  of  the  same  rank 
and  fortune  as  himself.  But  on  the  eve  of  their  marriage',  he 
comes  into  the  inheritance  of  a  deceased  uncle.  He  consequently 
takes  his  leave  of  Ellen,  to  marry  another  woman  as  rich  as  him- 
self. 

Qiies.  1.  Is  the  change  of  fortune  of  one  of  the  affianced,  suffi- 
cient to  break  off  promises? 

Ques.     Qidcl,  in  this  particular  case  ? 

Ans.  to  Question  1.  If  one  of  the  affianced  loses  considerable 
money,  it  is  a  sufficient  reason  for  the  other  to  withdraw  on  account 
of  this  change  of  fortune.  But  if  one  of  them  becomes  much 
richer,  for  instance,  by  receiving  a  good  inheritance,  is  that  one 
at  liberty  to  withdraw?  One  is  disposed  to  answer  in  the  affirma- 
tive ;  because,  in  fact,  the  result  is  a  great  difference  of  fortune 
between  the  two  parties.  St.  Liguori,  Voit,  et(î.,  proves  that  this 
this  is  the  opinion  of  the  greater  number.  However,  there  is  a 
common  opinion  which  affirms  the  contrary  ;  because  notiiing 
being  changed  regarding  the  other  party,  the  fortunate  fiancé 
should  not  abandon  her. 

Ans.  to  Question  2.  Edmond  must  not  be  molested,  such,  at 
least,  is  the  probable  opinion,  for  having  broken  off'  his  promise 
after  he  had  received  a  large  inheritance  ;  because  tliere  follows 
from  this  a  great  difference  of  weabh  between  him  and  his  betrothed. 
This  reason  is  valid  only,  if  the  inheritance  was  not  expected,  as 
it  is  supposed  to  be  in  this  case. 

Case  X. 

Breaking  off  Affiances. 
Bibiane,  a  young  lady  endowed   witli  the  finest  physical  and 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Affiances.  405 

intellectual  qualities,  attracts  the  attention  of  many  young  men. 
Several  ask  her  m  marriage  ;  but  she  prefers  Sidonius,  to  whom 
she  is  engaged.  The  wedding-day  being  near,  Bibiane  goes  to 
confess,  and,  among  other  sins,  she  declares  that:  1,  she  has  lost 
her  virginit}',  by  repeated  fornication  ;  2,  she  is  one  month  on  in 
pregnancy,  through  shameful  relations  with  the  latter  young  man  ; 
3,  she  has  had  a  child  alread}',  without  anybody  knowing  it  except 
the  midwife,  who  took  it  to  an  orphan  asylum.  Hearing  these 
words,  the  confessor,  astounded,  is  perplexed  to  know  whether  he 
must  compel  her  to  declare  these  facts  to  ner  betrothed,  or  break 
off  her  promise.  But,  he  thinks,  after  all,  that  it  is  better  to 
keep  perfectly  silent  ;  he  therefore  gives  her  absolution,  and  she 
is  married  on  the  morrow. 

Ques.  1.  Should  engaged  persons  declare  grave  sins  committed 
b}'  them  before  the  celebration  of  marriage  ? 

Ques.   2.     Was  Bibiane  under  obligation  to  declare  the  sirs? 

Qaes.  3.     What  must  we  think  of  her  confessor? 

Ans.  to  Question  1.  1,  Yes,  if  such  sins  are  likely  to  be  prejudicial 
to  the  other  betrothed,  to  or  cause  dishonor  to  him  or  to  her  ;  for 
instance,  if  the  affianced  man  has  a  venereal  disease,  or  if  the 
affianc  d  woman  is  pregnant  from  ai  other  man.  In  such  a  ciise 
the  affianced  is  obliged  to  confess  the  truth  to  the  other,  or,  to  with- 
draw. The  reason  is,  by  contracting  marriage  under  such  cir- 
cumstances the  affianced  would  cause  prejudice  to  the  other  party. 

2.  No,  if  such  sins  are  not  gravely  prejudicial  to  the  other 
betrothed,  or  do  not  cause  him  particular  harm  :  for  instance,  if  the 
affianced  woman  has  lost  her  virginity,  if  she  is  quarrelsome,  etc., 
etc.  The  reason  is,  that  no  one  is  held  to  degrade  one's  self  by 
confessing  publicly  sins  not  gravely  prejudicial  to  others. 

Ans.  to  Question  2.  1,  Bibiane  is  not  held  per  se  to  confess  that 
she  has  committed  fornication  and  lost  her  virginity,  because  this 
sin  is  not  prejudicial  to  her  betrothed.  Although,  when  learning  the 
truth,  he  may  have  the  right  to  withdraw  ;  however,  as  long  as  he 
does  not  make  any  opposition,  the  betrothed  woman  can  maintain 
her  rights  to  affiances.  And,  although  she  should  not  deceive  a 
man  by  making  him  believe  she  is  free  from  reproach,  she  is  not 
held  to  confess  her  sin  to  him  ;  and  she  ma}',  if  questioned  about 


406  TJie  Doctrine  of  t.'ie  Jesuits. 

it,  even  dissimulate,  and  answer  equivocally  :  as,  by  so  doing,  she 
does  not  lie,  but  only  conceals  a  sin  she  desires  to  keep  secret. 

2.  Nor  is  she  held  to  confess  to  her  betrothed  tLat  she  has  had  a 
child  ;  and  that  she  sent  it  to  an  orphan  asyhm  or  some  other 
secret  place,  providing  she  pays  for  and  has  the  means  to  provide 
for  her  child,  in  case  a  charge  is  made  on  this  account.  Tha 
reason  is,  that  in  such  a  case  he  does  not  wrong  her  betrothed,  as 
no  prejudice  will  result  to  hira  therefrom.  It  would  be  different 
if  the  fact  could  not  be  kept  sufficiently  secret  to  be  concealed 
from  her  betrothed  forever  ;  because,  from  the  knowledge  of  such 
sins,  very  grave  quarrels  might  follow  after  marriage. 

3.  But  she  is  held  m  principle,  per  se  loquendo^  to  confess  to  her 
betrothed  that  she  is  actually  pregnant,  or  to  withdraw  her  promise  ; 
because,  otherwise,  she  would  greatly  wrong  him,  by  introducing  a 
stranger  child  into  his  family  ;  that  is,  a  child  for  which  he  would 
liave  to  provide  and  to  make  his  heir,  in  common  with  his  legit- 
imate children.  There  is  to  be  added,  the  grave  inconveniences 
which  would  result  should  the  matter  be  made  public  ;  which 
might  easily  occur  should  the  child  be  born  in  the  eighth  month 
after  marriage.  Several  make  an  exception,  in  case  on  the  eve  of 
the  wedding  the  young  girl  could  save  her  honor  only  by  marriage  ; 
because  she  is  not  expected  to  incur  so  great  a  prejudice  as  the 
loss  of  her  honor  for  the  sake  of  sparing  her  betrothed  such  a  passing 
prejudice.     This  exception  seems  to  be  approved  bj'  St.  Liguori. 

Ans.  to  Question  3.  What  should  we  think  of  the  confessor? 
From  what  has  been  said,  it  is  clear  enough  that  Bibiane's  con- 
fessor has  dealt  with  the  matter  very  lightly  indeed,  by  keeping 
completely  silent.  In  principle,  he  could  not  grant  her  absolution 
without  compelling  her  to  declare  her  situation  to  Sidonius,  or  to 
retract  her  promise,  as  has  been  aforesaid.  However,  the  trouble 
of  this  unfortunate  woman  might  have  been  such,  that,  in  order  to 
save  her  reputation,  or  the  honor  of  a  noble  family,  and  avoid  a 
great  scandal,  the  confessor  may  have,  and  even  should,  let  her  go 
in  peace.  Would  to  God  that  such  situations  were  met  with  less 
frequently  !  How  many  betrothed  persons  deceive  one  another  ! 
Before  their  marriage,  it  should  be  repeated  to  them:  ^'  Niniiicin 
ne  crede  cotori,''  Do  not  trust  appearances  I 


Cas^s  on  ^Publication  of  tlje  îSans. 


Case  IV. 
Obligation  to   Declare  Obstacles  to  Marriage. 

Codes,  at  the  point  of  mairying  Marine,  after  the  publication 
of  tlie  bans,  declares  to  his  intitnaie  friend,  Fabius,  whom  he  re- 
quests to  swear  to  keep  the  secret,  that  he  has  had  shameful  relations 
with  Marine's  si>ter.  Fabius,  much  exercised,  is  doubtful  whether 
he  should  be  failhiul  to  his  word,  or  to  the  Church,  which  requires 
witnesses  to  make  known  all  obstacles  to  marriage. 

Ques.     Is  Fabius  excusable  for  not  declaring  the  above  obstacle  ? 

Ans.  No,  because  the  secret,  either  promised  or  intrusted,  even 
sworn  to,  does  not  bind,  in  itself,  when  a  great  damage  is  likely  to 
result  therefrom  either  to  the  community  or  to  a  third  person. 
Now,  the  making  known  of  such  an  obstacle  is  useful  to  the 
Church,  and  to  the  contracting  parties  themselves,  etc. 


Case  V. 

Obligation  to  Declare  Obstacles  to  Marriage. 

I.  Lesoadie  confesses  to  having  sinned  formerly  with  Antoine, 
her  sister's  betrothed.  Hubert,  her  confessor,  urged  by  his  zeal, 
after  having  admonished  her  seriously,  orders  her  to  declare  imme- 
dintely  to  lier  parson,  outside  of  confession,  the  obstacle  to  marriage 
caused  by  her  fault. 

IL  Siagrius  and  Melitina  are  soon  to  be  married;  Valerius  i-î 
positive  that  Siagrius  has  sinned  with  Melitina's  sister.  He 
declares  the  fact  to  the  parson  ;  but  he  cannot  furnish  any  positive 
proofs,  and  desires  that  his  name  should  not  be  mentioned.  The 
priest  does  not  know  what  to  do,  etc.,  etc. 


Cases  of  eTansctence  on  t\)t  Nature  of  JSarrtage. 


Case  II. 
Consent  of  the  Spouses. 

Jorinius,  a  married  man,  leaves  his  country  on  business,  and  has 
guilty  relations  with  Thérèse.  Representing  himself  to  be  a  single 
man,  he  marries  her  ;  but  soon  after  abandoning  her,  he  returns  to 
his  own  country.  Upon  his  arrival,  he  learns  tbat  his  wife  was 
dead  at  the  time  he  married  Thérèse.  He  thinks  of  going  to  fetch 
Thérèse  to  bring  her  back  with  him,  when  he  learns  that  Emilie,  a 
very  rich  widow,  intends  to  marry  again.  Seizing  the  opportunity, 
he  makes  proposals  for  her  hand.  This  new  wedding  over,  com- 
ing to  better  feelings,  he  goes  to  the  priest  and  confesses  the  whole 
matter.  The  confessor  doubts  the  validity  of  the  two  marringcs, 
the  former  with  Thérèse,  and  the  latter  with  Emilie.  His  doubts 
comes  from  the  fact  that  Jorinius  could  not  be  considered  as  being 
seriously  married,  he  knowing  in  each  instance  that  he  was  not 
free,  as  this  had  happened  in  both  cases. 

Ques.   1.     Is  the  marriage  of  Jorinius  with  Thérèse  valid? 

Ques.  2.     Is  his  marriage  with  Emilie  valid? 

Ans.  to  Question  1.  No  ;  for  having  no  doubt  of  the  existence  of 
his  wife,  he  was  not  able  to  give  a  true  consent.  His  consent  was 
but  fictitious  in  his  marriage  with  Thérèse.  That  is  to  say,  he  had 
simply  intended  to  live  with  her  in  concubinage,  under  the  pretense 
of  marriage  ;  which  is  clear  from  all  the  circumstances  of  the 
case  :  this  marriage  therefoie  was  of  no  value.  But  there  was  no 
obstacle  on  the  ground  of  criminality;  firstly,  because  Jorinius* 
wife  luas  dead  when  he  had  relations  with  Thérèse,  and  had 
promised  to  marry  her  ;  next,  because,  even  if  he  had  committed 
adultery  by  promising  marriage  to  Thérèse,  this  adultery  would 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Nature  of  Marriage,         409 

not  have  existed  in  principle  on  either  side,  and  one  of  the  con- 
ditions required  to  constitute  an  obstacle  by  crime  was  lacking. 

Ans.  to  Question  2.  Yes,  as  it  results  from  what  has  been  said  ; 
for,  if  sometliing  was  opposed  to  the  validity  of  this  marriage, 
there  would  be  tlie  marriage  contracted  with  Thercse  ;  but  that 
was  wortliless.  Therefore,  .  .  .  And  there  cannot  exist  any 
difficulty  llnough  Jorinius  having  married  Emilie,  while  considering 
himself  tied  to  Tlierese  ;  for,  not  knowing  whether  his  wife  was 
living  or  not,  he  was  not  certain  of  the  validity  of  his  marriage 
with  Thérèse  ;  and,  consequently,  he  married  Emilie,  as  he  had 
the  right  to  do,  for  there  was  no  obstacle  in  this  case.  There- 
fore his  union  with  Emilie  is  valid,  and  he  ought  to  be  left  in 
peace. 

Case  III. 

Conditional  Consent. 

Patricius,a  young  man  belonging  to  a  noble  family,  but  himself 
poor,  has  a  very  rich  aunt,  who  will  make  him  her  heir  providing 
he  marries  a  person  to  her  liking.  Travelling  in  a  foreign  port, 
and  having  the  oppoitunity,  lie  dishonored  Martine,  Ihrougli  prom- 
ise of  marriage,  and  even  caused  her  to  be  pregnant.  Threatened 
by  the  young  girl's  father,  he  marries  her,  upon  condition  X\\\\t 
his  aunt  will  consent  to  it,  because  he  cannot  contract  marriage  in 
spite  of  her  without  losing  a  great  inheritance.  But  he  was  posi- 
tive that  his  aunt  would  never  consent  to  it.  Martine's  father, 
however,  assisted  by  a  friend,  takes  such  successful  steps  that 
the  aunt  at  last  consented.  Patricius  learning  this,  runs  away, 
comes  back  to  his  own  country,  and  gets  married  to  another  young 
lady. 

Ques.  What  are  we  to  think  of  this  case?  and  what  ought 
Patricius  to  do? 

Ans.  Patricius' first  marringe  is  worthless,  in  the  absence  of  a 
true  consent  ;  for,  not  wishing  in  fact  to  marry  Martine,  he  gave 
but  an  insincere  consent.  The  reason  is,  that  when  giving  a  con- 
ditional consent,  he  was  sure  that  the  condition  would  not  be  real- 
ized.  Therefore,  this  consent  in  fact  is  void  ;  and  consequently  the 


410  TlLe  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

marriage  contract  is  void  also.  The  best  proof  is  that,  when  1  nrn- 
ing  that  the  condiLiou  was  realized,  contrary  to  his  exptctalious, 
he  ran  away,  not  considering  himself  bound  by  the  marriage. 


As  for  the  second  marriage,  it  is  valid  ;  .  .  .  therefore,  he  may 
live  in  peace  with  his  second  wife. 

Case  IV. 
Dissolution  of  Marriage. 

Benjamin,  a  Jew,  had  contracted  and  consummated  marriage 
with  Anna.  About  two  years  later,  converted,  througii  the  zeal  of 
a  Catholic  priest,  and  iniiiated  into  the  mysteries  of  the  Christian 
religion,  he  embraced  this  religion  with  greatest  sincerit}'.  He 
uses  his  earnest  efforts  to  bring  his  wife  to  acknowledge  the  truth, 
but  without  success  ;  for  Anna,  although  not  refusing  to  live  in 
peace  with  him,  declares  that  she  will  remain  faitliful  to  tha  .lew- 
i^li  law  forever.  What  shall  Benjamin  do?  Deserting  his  wife, 
he  bids  farewell  to  society,  and  to  serve  God  in  a  more  perfect 
manner  lie  enters  a  religious  commuiiity,  where  he  makes  his  vows, 
after  one  year  of  no\iciate.  Several  years  later,  Anna,  who 
had  not  married  again,  receives  baptism,  and  expresses  a  desire  to 
live  with  her  husband.  Benjamin  is  uncertain  whether  this  is 
allowed,  or  if  he  may  return  home. 

Ques.  1.  What  are  we  to  think  of  this  case?  and  what  should 
Benjamin  do? 

Ques.  2.  Might  Benjamin  have  contracted  another  marriage,  if 
he  had  not  entered  into  rel  gious  Ordjrs  ? 

Ans.  to  Question  1.  Benjamin  has  the  right  to  desert  his  wife, 
entt'r  a  reli„'ious  Order,  and  make  valid  vows. 

Ans.  to  Question  2.  There  is  controversy.  Many  answer  neg- 
atively. ...  A  great  number  answer  in  the  affirmative.  St. 
Liguori  considers  the  latter  opinion  as  more  probable. 

Case  V. 
Dissolution  of  INIarriage. 
Félicien  having  married  Sylvie,    the    marriage   not  being  yet 


» 


Cases  of  Consclenco  on  JVaUcre  of  Marriage.         411 

coin[)leted,  says  farewell  to  his  wife  and  the  world  to  enter  a 
religious  Order,  and  malies  solemn  vows.  Sylvie  herself  enters  a 
nunnery,  and  in  presence  of  the  bishop  maizes  a  simple  vow  of 
chastity.  Soon  after,  her  fervor  decreasing,  Sylvie  leaves  tlie  con- 
vent and  returns  to  society.  Then  she  goes  to  a  foreign  country, 
where  she  marries  Hermann,  from  whom  she  hides  her  former  life. 
But,  acquainted  with  the  facts,  Hermann,  consider  n^  his  marriage 
void,  sends  Sylvie  avvay,  and  decides  to  contract  anotiier  m  ir- 
riage.     But  before  so  doing,  he  asks  the  advice  of  his  confessor. 

Ques.  1.     Do  solemn  vows  cancel  marriage? 

Ques.  2.  Is  Sylvie's  marriage  with  Hermann  valid  and  permis- 
sible? What  is  to  be  thought  of  Hermann's  intention  of  marry- 
ing again  ? 

Ans.  to  Question  1.  Yes,  provided  the  marriage  is  only  con- 
cluded, but  not  consummated. 

Ans.  to  Question  2.  This  marriage  is  valid.  But  Sylvie  sinned 
gravely  by  marrying  again,  because  she  broke  her  vow  of  chastity, 
b}'  which  she  was  bound.  She  should  have  requested  a  dispensa- 
tion from  the  Pope.  As  regards  Hermann,  whose  marriage  is 
valid,  he  cannot  marry  again.  He  must  be  advised  to  live  in  peace 
with  Sylvie. 

Case  VI. 

Separation  of  Bed  and  Residence. 

Marcellin  obtains  separation  from  liis  wife,  convicted  in  adultery 
by  a  court  of  justice  ;  he  makes  up  his  mind  to  enter  a  monastery, 
and  successively  he  receives  the  sacred  orders.  But  scarcely  has 
he  received  ordination,  before  his  wife  proves  her  innocence  in 
court,  and  requests  her  husband  to  return  home. 

Ques.  Is  Marcellin  hdd  to  come  back  to  his  wife,  and  live 
with  her  as  man  with  wife? 

Ans.  Yes  ;  because  his  wife,  unjustly  deprived  of  her  rights, 
can  re-claim  them.  Then,  if  she  does  so,  they  must  be  given  back 
to  her.  Marcellin,  therefore,  should  return  to  lay  life.  Butas  he  has 
made  a  vow  of  chastity,  he  cannot  ask  for  the  conjugal  duty,  but  only 
render  when  requested.  But,  so  as  to  pay  to  the  priesthood  the 
respect  which  is  due  to  it,  he  should  request  his  wife,  and  never 
try  to  persuade  her,  to  give  up  her  rights  and  leave  him  aioue. 


Cases  on  ©bstacirs  to  JHarriage* 


Case  I. 
Value  of  Obstacles. 

Celine,  a  young  girl,  under  peculiar  circumstances,  being  invol- 
untarily in  a  state  of  drunkenness,  was  dishonored  b}'  Tilius,  being 
unconscious  of  tlie  fact.  Several  years  after,  Celine  marries  Caius, 
Titius'  brotlier.  Later  on,  having  learned  of  the  event  from  Titius* 
own  mouth,  she  has  doubts  about  the  validity  of  her  marriage.  In 
haste  she  runs  to  Parson  Germain,  and  explams  the  circumstances. 
But  he  tells  her  :  ''Have  no  fear,  my  daughter,  there  is  no  penalty 
where  there  is  no  sin  ;  and  besides,  an  unknown  law  does  not  bind 
any  one." 

Ques.     Quid. 

Ans.  Germain  made  a  scnndalous  and  very  gross  error;  in  fact, 
it  is  not  question  of  penaltv,  but  of  the  law  of  the  Chuich,  which 
annuls  such  a  marriage  ;  therefore,  Celine's  marriage  is  not  valid, 
and  cannot  become  so  without  a  dispensation.  Germain  should  be 
sent  back  to  the  study  of  Moral  Theology. 

Case  XIII. 

A  "Woman  wno  is  Sister,  Daughter  and  Wife  of  Her 
Husband. 

Ludimille,  a  widow  of  a  noble  famil}^,  who  had  fallen  in  a  shame- 
ful love  with  her  own  son,  Jules,  finds  out  that  during  the  night 
he  goes  to  sleep  with  the  servant.  Then  she  imagines  an  abomin- 
able scheme.  She  finds  a  pretext  to  send  her  servant  awa}^  and 
slips  into  the  latter's  bed.  Jules,  Avithout  the  least  suspicion, 
arrives  at  the  appointed  time,  and  unknowingly  commits  with  Ids 
mother  the  most  horrible  incest.     However,  her  son  resides  for 


Cases  on   Obstacles  to  Marriage.  413 

about  fiflecn  years  in  far-off  countries,  engaged  in  bnsiness  trans- 
actions. During  his  absence  fiom  homo,  Ludimille  secretly  gives 
biith  to  a  girl,  wlio  at  firbt  she  places  under  the  care  of  a  unrse, 
and  later  on  takes  back  witli  herself  as  an  orphan  child.  Jnles, 
coming  back  home,  falls  in  love  with  this  young  girl.  He  asks 
his  mother  as  to  her  rank  and  birth-place.  His  mother  replies  that 
she  is  a  child  of  the  lowest  extraction,  whom  she  has  laken  home 
and  brought  up  for  charity's  sake.  Jules,  feeling  his  passion 
increasing,  declares  to  his  mother  that  he  will  many  her. 
The  mother  steadfastly  refuses,  because  such  an  alliance  would 
bring  dishonor  upon  the  family,  for  the  young  girl  has  neither  for- 
tune nor  family.  Jules,  becoming  obstinate,  in  spite  of  his  mother, 
marries  the  young  girl.  Consequently,  the  true  and  natural  father 
has  m.arried  his  own  daughter,  and  the  step-brother  his  own  step- 
sibter. 

Ques.  Can  a  dispensation  be  obtained  from  the  Pope?  Should 
the  spouses  be  admonished  to  separate  from  each  other? 

Ans.  (The  answer  is  of  little  interest.  The  interesting  fact  is 
this  little  romance  of  clerical  lubricity  ;  and  in  all  this,  there  is  not 
a  single  word  of  indignation  ;  but  the  casuist  recommends  perfect 
silence.) 

Case  XIV. 
Spiritual  Relationship. 

Silver,  a  married  man,  had  adulterous  relations  with  Lucie, 
liis  servant,  and  tlie  birth  of  a  child  was  the  result.  Fearing  scan- 
dal,  he  had  it  baptized  secretly,  and  left  it  at  the  door  of  an  orphan 
asylum.     His  wife  being  dead,  he  marries  Lucie. 

Ques.     What  are  we  to  think  of  this  marriage? 

Ans.  It  is  void  ;  for  Silvie,  hy  baptizing  the  child  lie  had  with 
Luc  e,  contracted  witli  her  spiritual  relationship. 

Case  XVI. 

Affinity. 

Albin,  engaged  to  Blandine,  had  shameful  intercourses  with 
Catherine,    Blandine's   cousin   of   the   bccond   and   thiid   degrees. 


414  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

mixerl.  In  spite  of  that,  lie  marries  Blandine.  The  lattei"  having 
dt  erased,  he  marries  Agathe,  second  coubin  of  Catherine,  and  tiiird 
cousin  of  Blandine. 

Quos.  1.     What  are  we  to  think  of  this  donble  marriage? 

Qiies.  2.      Quid^  if  Albion  had  not  fulfilled  the  first  one? 

Ans.  to  Quebtion  1.  The  first  maniage  is  valid,  becjiu-^e  illegiti- 
mate relations  constitute  an  obstacle  up  to  the  second  degree  only. 

'J  he  second  marriage  is  void  for  two  reasons,  if  considered  eitiitr 
with  reference  to  proper  or  improper  relations  :  1,  as  Agathe  was 
Blandine's  relative  of  the  second  d(  gree  ;  2,  proper  relations  hin- 
der marriage  up  to  the  fourth  degree. 

Ans.  to  Question  2.  This  marriage  would  not  be  valid,  for  the 
first  reason.  .  .  . 

Case  XVIII. 

HONEbTY. 

I.  Kilian,  calling  on  Rosalie,  his  betrotlied,  who  had  been 
seduced  by  him,  takes  some  liberti^^s  with  Euphemia,  his  sister, 
who  presently  becomes  pregnant.  However,  Rosalie  is  taken  sick 
and  dies.  In  order  to  hide  his  crime  and  avoid  dishonor,  Kilian 
immediately  marries  Euphemia. 

II.  Daniel,  eng.'ged  to  Eulalie,  has  sinned  with  Anna,  her  sis- 
ter. Eulalie,  learning  that  her  sister  is  pregnant  from  Daniel, 
gives  np  her  rights,  so  that  her  betrothed  might  marry  Anna,  and 
save  the  honor  of  the  family. 

Ques.  1.     Is  the  marriage  of  Kilian  with  Euphemia  valid? 

Ques.  2.      Qidd^  the  marriage  of  Daniel  with  Anna? 

Ans.  to  Question  1.  The  maniage  of  Kilian  with  Euphemia  is 
not  valid,  for  two  reasons  :  first,  an  obstacle  caused  by  alliance  ; 
next,  an  obstacle  arising  from  public  morality. 

Ans.  to  Question  2.  The  marriage  of  Daniel  with  Anna  is  not 
valid  on  account  of  the  obstacle  of  public  morality,  in  consequi  nee 
of  the  preceding  promise  to  Eulalie. 

Cask  XX. 
Murder. 
Martial,  during  his  wife's  sickness,  commits  adulle-y  with  Flor- 


Cases  on   Obstacles  to  Marriage.  415 

îne  through  promising  to  many  her,  she  not  suspecting  liim  to  he 
mairied.  His  wife  being  dead,  and  the  promised  marriage  with 
Fiorine  fulfilled,  Martial  commits  adultery  a^ain  with  Mœvia.  See- 
ing the  latter  pregnant,  he  poisons  his  second  wife  to  marry  Mœ- 
via, and  to  keep  his  good  reputation. 

Ques.     Are  these  two  marriaues  valid? 

Ans.  Martial's  marriage  with  Fiorine  is  valid,  because,  not 
knowing  that  her  husband  is  married  already,  she  had  not  commit- 
ted adultery  in  principle,  but  only  in  practice.  .  .  .  His  further 
marriage  with  Mœvia  is  valid  also,  as  there  existed  no  obstac  e. 
None  has  been  caused  by  the  adultery  alone,  as  he  had  not  made 
ber  a  promise  of  marriage.  Nor  has  there  any  obstacle  arisen  from 
the  mui-der  alone,  there  being  no  mutu  il  co-operation.  Neither  is 
any  obstacle  caused  by  both  of  them,  as  Martial  had  not  informed 
his  accomplice  of  his  intention  to  marry  her,  and  such  previous 
infoimation  must  be  considered  as  probably  required  lo  make  her 
his  accomplice. 

Case  XXI. 
Murder. 

Leonilla,  disgusted  with  her  husband,  a  very  old  man  full  of 
disease,  wished  hundreds  of  times  he  would  die.  One  da}',  1<  eked 
in  her  chamber  alone,  she  exclaimed  :  "  Good  God  I  If,  at  last,  I 
should  be  delivered  from  this  terrible  plague,  with  what  pleasure 
I  would  replace  this  disgusting  old  man  by  marrying  my  young 
servant  !"  The  latter,  hearing  this,  goes  at  once  to  the  bedside  of 
the  poor  sick  man,  and  causes  his  speedy  death,  by  giviug  him  an 
extra  dose  of  strong  drugs.  Then,  the  mourning  time  over,  he 
marries  Leonilla. 

Ques.     Is  this  marriage  valid? 

Ans.  This  marriage  is  valid  ;  because  there  has  been  neither 
plot  to  put  to  death,  nor  mutual  consent  to  kill,  the  unfortunate  old 
man.  For,  although  Leonilla  had  u;tered  complaints  heard  by  her 
servant,  and  had  expressed  the  desire  of  marrying  again,  no  nni- 
tual  consent  had  been  exchanged  to  cause  the  death  of  her  hus- 
band ;  and  in  fuel  t  ;e  servant  killed  his  master  without  the  knowledge 


416  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

of  his  mistress  ;  consequently,  there  is  no  obstacle  caused  by  the 
crime,  and  their  marriage  is  valid. 

Case  XXII. 
Crime. 

Melany,  a  married  woman,  is  induced  to  commit  adultery  with 
Donat,  he  artfully  promising  her  marriage.  Her  husband  dies 
soon  after,  and  leaves  her  the  inheritance  of  the  whole  of  his  prop- 
erty. Don.'it,  in  the  iiope  of  possessing  the  fortune,  fulfills  his 
promise  of  marriage;  but  soon,  quarrelling  with  his  wife,  lie  aban- 
dons her;  and  learning  that  marriage  is  often  cancelled  by  a  crime, 
iie  asks  the  advice  of  his  confessor,  and  inquires  of  him  if  he  can 
marry  another  wife. 

Ques.     Is  there  any  obstacle  to  his  second  marriage? 

Ans.  No  ;  the  second  marriage  is  valid,  because  the  promise  to 
the  first  wife  was  sincere,  and  such  a  promise  does  not  bind. 


Cask  XXIII. 
Crime. 

I.  Evrald,  a  married  man,  not  aware  that  Julia  is  married  also, 
induces  her  to  commit  a  crime  through  promise  of  marriage  as 
soon  as  he  is  free  from  his  prissent  relation.  Julia  accepts.  Soon 
after  both  become  free,  and  are  united  in  marriage. 

II.  Leofrild,  a  bachelor,  urges  Tarsile  a  married  woman,  to 
commit  adulteiy  with  him,  and  promises  to  marry  her  when  her 
husband  dies.  Tarsile  is  sedu(;ed  thereby  ;  but  promises  nothing, 
and  remains  silent.  Soon  after  her  husband  dies,  and  the 
marriage  takes  place. 

Ques.  1.     Is  there  an  obstacle  through  crime,  in  the  fir*t  case? 

Ques.  2.     Quid^  of  the  value  of  the  marriage,  in  the  second  case  ? 

Ans.  to  Question  1.  An  obstacle  has  been  caused  by  crime,  as 
there  was  positive  adultery,  and  an  accepted  promise  of  marriage. 

Ans.  to  Question  2.  The  marriage  is  valid.  .  .  .  Tarsile  did 
not  consent,  though  yielding  her  body.     It  must  not  be  inferred, 


Cases  on   Obstacles  to  Marriage,  417 

from  her  silence,  that  she  was  accepting  ;  she  was  simply  excited, 
and  led  away  through  sensu  d  desire. 

Case  XXIV. 
Crhif:. 

Chrysante  promised  Flavie,  who  is  married  already,  to  marry 
her  after  the  deatli  of  her  husband.  Then,  falling  in  love  with 
Riifine,  he  marries  her.  Nevertheless  Chrysante  commits  adultery 
with  Flavie.  Later  on,  it  happens  that  Chrysanta's  wife  dies,  and 
Flavie  loses  her  husband.  They  take  consolation  in  their  mourn- 
ing, through  the  pleasure  of  preparing  for  a  new  marriage. 

Ques.     Is  this  marriage  valid? 

Ans.  There  is  no  obstacle  to  this  marriage  ;  an  adultery  and  a 
promise  of  marriage  did  not  happen  in  this  case  ;  the  promise 
made  by  Chrysante  to  Flavie  having  been  withdrawn  before  the 
adultery,  at  least  in  effect,  when  he  married  Rufine,  after  having 
made  a  promise  to  Flavie,  and  before  the  adultery  was  committed. 
Consequently,  there  was  no  united  adultery  and  promise  of  mar- 
riage :  so  the  marriage  is  valid. 

Case  XXVL 
Fear. 

Leonard,  after  having  made  a  vow  of  chastity,  dishonored 
Véronique,  under  promise  of  marriage.  Then  he  refuses  to  fulfill 
his  promise,  pleading  his  vow.  Alberic,  brother  of  Véronique,  a 
student  in  theology,  says  that  Leonard  should  make  application 
for  a  dispensation,  Leonard  being  no  more  bound  by  his  vow  of 
chastity.  But  the  other  two  brothers  of  Véronique,  not  being 
a(quainted  with  theology,  have  recourse  to  another  kind  of  argu- 
ment :  the  most  terrible  threats  are  made  against  Leonard  if  he  does 
not  marry  Véronique  right  off.  What  shall  the  unfortunate  3'oung 
man  do?    He  marries  Véronique,  so  as  to  avoid  greater  misfortune. 

Ques.  1.  Was  Leonard,  in  spite  of  his  vow,  compelled  to  marry 
Véronique? 

Ques.  2.     Is  the  marriage  valid?  and  what  should  be  done? 

Ans.  to  Question  1.  No,  for  two  reasons:  1,  The  promise  of 
marriage  made  after  his  vow  was  of  no  value  ;  and  consequently 


418  T/te  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

was  not  bin 'ing;  upon  him.     2,  Leonard  couM  not  promise  to  a 
human  being,  what  he  had  ahead}'  promised  to  God  by  vow. 

Ans.  to  Question  2.  This  marriage  seems  worthless.  IfLjonard, 
constrained  by  threats,  gave  only  an  insincere  consent  while  simu- 
lating the  celebration  of  marriage,  it  is  clear  that  it  is  worthless  ; 
for,  in  the  absence  of  consent,  a  contract  does  not  exist.  If 
Leonard  had  given  a  true  consent,  the  marriage  is  likewise  worth- 
less as  being  contracted  under  the  excitement  of  a  violent  fear  ; 
for  the  threats  made  by  Veronique's  brothers,  to  urge  Leonard  to 
marrj',  form  a  grave  and  unjust  proceeding,  at  least  as  means  of 
reparation.  It  would  be  a  different  case  if  the  young  girl's  brothers 
had  threatened  Leonaid,  not  in  view  of  marriage,  but  to  revenge 
their  honor  ;  and  if  Leonard  had  seriously  consented  to  the  mar- 
riage to  appease  them.  Then,  the  fear  would  not  be  unjust,  not 
having  for  its  aim  the  compelling  him  to  marry. 

Case  XXXIII. 

Marriage  of  Heretics. 

• 

Tarsille,  a  heretical  woman,  married  to  Drusille,  also  a  heretic,  in 
a  place  where  the  law  of  the  Council  of  Trent  is  in  force,  is  struck 
by  divine  grace  and  embraces  the  true  faith,  in  spite  of  her  hus- 
band, who  remains  in  his  error.  Anxious,  she  calls  on  Bernard, 
her  confessor,  and  asks  him  what  she  should  do.  The  priest 
answers  :  "  Thou  shouldst  desert  thy  husband  for  the  sake  of  thy 
salvation,  and  because  thy  marriage  is  cancelled.  Thou  canst  also 
marry  another  man." 

Ques.  Can  Tarsile  continue  to  live  in  marriage  relationship 
with  Drusille? 

Ans.     In  principle,  the  confessor's  answer  is  to  be  admitted.  .  . 

Case  XXXIY. 

Attendance  of  the   Priest. 

I.  Sabin  had  promised  Sabine  to  marry  her,  in  spite  of  his 
parents.  The  priest,  called  by  them  to  celebrate  their  marriage, 
and  at  the  same  time  requested  by  Sabiu's  father  not  to  assist 


Cases  on  Obstacles  to  Marriage,  419 

tbcm,  declines  lo  comply  willi  tlieii*  request  as  long  as  the  futlier 
is  opposed  to  their  marriage.  But  during  the  celebration  of  the 
mass,  wliile  the  priest  turns  towards  the  people,  tlie  betrothed  step 
to  the  altar,  with  two  witnesses,  and  declare  that  they  take  each 
other  f  jr  man  and  wife.  Then  they  retire,  and  thereafter  live 
together. 

IE.  Gétule,  having  made  a  promise  to  Clara,  abandons  her,  to 
marry  Blandine.  Learning  tliis.  Parson  Abundius  refuses  to  help 
them.  Wnat  shall  Gétule  and  Bhmdine  do?  They  ask  an  inti- 
mate friend  to  invite  the  parson  to  dinner,  with  two  other  friemls, 
who  will  stand  as  witnesses.  During  the  repast,  Gétule  and 
Blandine  present  themselves,  and  declare  before  all,  in  a  loud  and 
clear  voice,  that  they  take  each  other  as  man  and  wife  on  the  s[)ot. 
The  parson,  astounded,  exclaims  that  he  was  not  thinking  to  atteml 
a  marriage  ceremony,  and  that  a  mai'riago  is  not  celebiated  during 
the  progress  of  a  dinner.  On  his  refusal,  the  betrothed  retire, 
and  commence  living  together. 

Ques.     Are  such  marriages  valid  ? 

Ans.  The  marriage  is  valid,  in  the  first  case.  For  it  was  sufR- 
cient  that  the  priest  had  been  notified  that  the  betrothed  wished 
to  contract  marringe  in  his  presence,  and  had  knowledge  that  their 
consent  was  reciprocate. 

In  the  second  case,  the  marriage  is  valid  also  ;  becau-^e  it  is 
evident,  under  the  circumstances,  that  the  priest  was  a  witness, 
and  in  fact  has  witnessed,  knowing  and  having  seen  the  marriage. 


Case    XXXVI. 
Attendance  of  the  Priest. 


l^,.... ..„.,., 

^ïyear  of  speiiding  the  month  of  September  in  a  distant  province. 
Improving  an  opportunity,  although  a  septuagenarian,  he  decided 
to  marry  Flavienne,  in  spite  of  hiu  relatives,  who  coveted  his 
inheritance.  He  desired  the  marriage  to  take  place  in  his  country 
mansion,  while  residing  there,  so  as  to  celebrate  it  with  splendor. 
The  parish  priest  is  called  ;  he  blesses  the  marriage,  and  takes 


420  TJte  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

pait  in  the  joyful  feast.  Later  on,  BertoLl  dies  childless,  leaving 
by  will  all  liis  property  to  liis  wife.  But  his  legitimate  heirs  pre- 
tend that  Flavienne  was  not  Bertold's  legitimate  wife,  because  the 
priest  had  given  an  unlawful  assistance  to  the  marriage,  and  that, 
consequenth^  it  was  worthless. 

Ques.     Is  the  marriage  valid? 

Ans.  This  marriage  is  not  lawful  ;  because  one  month's  resi- 
dence is  required  for  contracting  legal  marriage  in  French  provinces. 


Cages  on  dispensation  for  fHarriage* 


Case  II. 
Exposition  of  the  Case. 

Nicetas  has  committed  the  crime  of  incest  with  two  sisters,' 
Rutine  and  Lawrence,  his  third  and  fourth  cousins.  Later  on, 
wisliing  to  marry  Rufine,  he  requests  of  the  Pope  the  necessary  dis- 
pensation, naming  only  the  fourth  degree  condition,  but  not  men- 
tioning either  his  third  cousin,  or  his  criminal  relations  with  iiis 
betrothed  and  her  sister.  In  another  request,  he  mentions  only 
the  obstacle  resulting  from  alliance.  Once  marritd,  he  tells  the 
whole  story  to  his  confessor,  who  does  not  know  what  to  think 
touching  the  validity  of  the  marriage. 

Ques.  Is  this  marriage  void  on  account  of  the  omission  in  the 
request  of  the  circumstances  relative  to  I  he  improper  connection 
between  the  betrothed  ? 

Ans.  Yes  ;  .  .  .  Nicetas,  therefore,  must  make  a  new  applica- 
tion for  a  dispensation,  and,  while  awaiting  the  answer,  must  ab- 
stain entirely  from  giving  or  asking  for  the  conjugal  duty. 

Case  II. 
Exposition  of  the  Case. 

Gilbert  has  sinned  with  Delphin,  his  third  cousin  ;  both  had  the 
intention  to  do  so  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  more  easily  the 
rt  quired  dispensation  from  the  Pope.  He  asks  for  the  dispensa- 
tion by  reason  of  relationship,  confessing  the  sexual  intercourse, 
but  omitting  the  true  motive  which  had  prompted  it.  After  his 
marriage,  Gilbert,  exercised  by  scruples  of  conscience,  confesses 
that  motive.  His  confessor  does  not  know  if  a  new  dispensation 
is  necessary  to  perfect  the  marriage. 

Ques.     What  is  the  value  of  this  dispensation? 

Ans.     It  is  without  any  value,  and  the  man  i.ige  is  void.   .   .   . 


422  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

If  only  one  of  the  betrolhed  has  had,  when  committing  the  sex- 
ual act,  the  hope  of  obtaining  the  dispensation  more  easily  through 
this  very  fact,  there  would  be  controversy  about  the  validity  of  the 
marriage. 

Case  IV. 
Surreptitious  Dispensation. 

Fabius  and  Agnès,  second  and  thiid  cousins,  send  a  request  to 
Rome  for  a  dispensation  to  get  married.  They  affirm  in  the  request, 
that  they  never  had  between  themselves  any  sexual  intercourse. 
The  dispensation  is  granted  and  forwarded  to  the  p.irson,  who 
leceives  instructions  to  dispense  them  if  their  rt  quest  is  based  on 
the  truth.  The  priest  has  a  talk  with  the  betrothed,  and  questions 
them,  to  ascertain  if  they  have  positively  had  no  criminal  inter- 
C(  urse  together.  They  both  answer  in  the  negative  with  reference 
to  the  time  before  their  application,  but  they  acknowledge  their 
guilt  since  sending  the  said  request.  The  priest  is  very  undecided 
as^o  whether  the  dispensation  is  valid.  Besides,  seeing  all  the 
preparations  for  the  expected  marriage,  and  the  relatives  already 
ariived  and  waiting,  he  feels  in  the  gieatest  trouble. 

Ques.     Is  a  new  dispensation  required? 

Ans.  It  is  necessary,  if  the  relations  took  place  before  the 
issue  or  execution  of  the  dispensation.  .  .  .  Jt  would  be  a  differ- 
ent case  if  the  act  had  taken  place  after  ;  because,  once  the  dis- 
pensation is  granted,  there  is  no  more  incest  to  fear. 

Case  V. 

Surreptitious  Dispensation. 

Quirinus  and  Germaine,  not  aware  that  they  are  fourth  cousins, 
have  committed  the  shameful  sin.  Subsequently,  learning  of  their 
relationship,  they  still  renew  the  incest  several  times.  After  their 
betrothal  and  the  publication  of  the  bans,  this  obstacle  prevents 
tlieir  marrying,  and  they  petition  for  a  dispensation  from  the  Holy 
See.  But  they  mention  only  having  \\-  d  improper  connection  not 
knowing   their   relationship,   and    keep   &i.cnt  as   to  the  fuither 


Cases  on  Dispensation  for  Marriage,  423 

sins   commifcted  after  tliey  knew  of    their    alliance  ;    they  conse- 
quently are  h  d  to  doubt  the  validity  of  their  marriage. 

Ques.     What  is  the  value  of  this  dispensation  ? 

Ans.     It  is  of  no  value. 


Case  VI. 
SuRREPTi-rtous  Dispensation. 

Longin  and  Pélagie,  thiid  cousins,  became  engaged,  with  the 
intention  of  asking  for  the  required  dispensation.  The  party 
appomted  by  them  to  draw  up  the  petition  mentions  in  it  that  the 
betrothed  have  had  connections  together,  .  .  .  which  was  not 
liue.  Tlie  priest  considers  the  dispensation  as  obreptitious  and 
void,  and  postpones  the  marriage  to  a  later  date.  But  it  happens 
that  the  betrothed  fall  mto  crime,  and  a  child  is  the  result.  Then 
they  ask  again  fora  disi)ensation,  so  as  legitimatize  their  child.  But; 
tiie  child  dies  just  on  the  receipt  of  the  document,  and  the  mar- 
riage celebration. 

Ques.     What  was  the  value  of  those  two  dispensations? 

Ans.     Both  were  valid. 

Case  VII. 

Dispensation  for  Guilty  Relations,  with  Relapse. 

I.  Reculfe,  wishing  to  marry  Martine,  asks,  for  a  dispensation, 
because  he  has  sinned  carnally  several  times  with  his  betrothed's 
sec(;nd  cousin.  But,  before  the  receipt  of  the  document,  Reculfe, 
under  the  impulse  of  human  frailty,  falls  again  into  the  same  act 
with  the  same  person.  The  confessor  is  in  doubt  whether  he  should 
give  the  dispensation  its  true  value. 

W.  JMarius  and  Anne,  cousins,  request  the  Holy  See  for  a  dis- 
pensation to  marry,  confessing  that  they  have  committed  incest 
together.  But  after  having  obtained  the  dispensation  they  fall 
agiin  ;  thus  they  committed  the  act  before  and  after  its  receipt. 
Hearing  the  facts,  the  priest  does  not  know  whether  a  new  dispen- 
sation is  necessaiy.  However,  presuming  its  validity,  he  blesses 
t.ieir  marriaiie. 


424  The  Doctrine  of  Ike  Jesuits, 

Ques.  1.  Is  the  dispensation  valid  in  the  first  case,  notwith- 
standing the  repeated  sexual  relations? 

Ques.  2.  Would  it  be  valid  if  ileculfe  bad  sinned  after  the  issue 
of  the  dispensation? 

Ques.  3.  Has  Marius  and  Anne's  dispensation  been  valid, 
although  the}'  have  committed  incest  again  and  again,  before  and 
after  the  issue  of  that  dispensation? 

Ans.  to  Q'.iestion  1.  The  dispensation  is  valid,  in  spite  of  the 
repeated  sexual  acts.  The  reason  is,  that  Recul fe,  by  renewing 
the  crime  with  the  same  relative,  has  not  made  a  second  obstacle 
to  his  marriage.   .   .   . 

Ans.  to  Question  2.     Yes,  also.   .  .  . 

Ans.  to  Question  3.     Yes.  ... 

Case  X. 
The  Validity  of  Marriage  Restored. 

Ranulfe  and  Tarsile  contracted  a  clandestine  marriage  ;  in  other 
words,  a  civil  marriage  only;  and  remained  for  many  years  in  that  re- 
grettable state.  At  last,  while  attending  spiritual  exercises  in  her 
parish  church,  Tarsile,  deeply  impressed  1  y  a  sermon  on  God's 
judgment,  comes  to  a  better  mind,  and  earnestly  desires  to  receive 
the  matrimonial  blessing.  But  Renulfe,  th(Aigh  urged  by  his  wife, 
declines  to  go  to  church,  where  he  has  not  been  for  twenty  years. 
The  priest,  with  two  missionaries,  calls  on  the  man,  to  advise  hiui 
to  change  his  mind,  but  in  vain.  "  Leave  me  alone,"  said  he,  "■  I 
am  sufficiently  married  !  I  live  happy  and  satisfied  with  my  wife, 
and  do  not  wish  for  anything  else."  Having  received  this  unsatis- 
factory answer,  the  priest  and  his  company  leave  the  house. 

Ques.  What  are  we  to  think  of  the  prie&t's  behavior?  and  what 
was  his  duty? 

Ans.  He  should  have  advised  Ranulfe  to  renew  his  consent  in 
his  presence,  and  in  that  of  his  two  missionary  friends,  as  wit- 
nesses of  his  declaration;  which  might  have  been  easily  obtained, 
considering  his  words,  '•!  live  happy  and  satisfied  with  my  wife." 
Why  did  they  did  not  think  of  it?  They  showed  a  lack  of  wisdoui. 
But,  if  Ranulfe  had  refused  to  renew  his  consent?  He  then  should 
have  been  induced  to  do  so  in  some  other  way,  either  by  proxy,  or 
to  make  request  for  a  dispensation. 


Casts  on  direction  of  JHairteti  Persons, 

[The  following  is  too  suggestive  to  translate. — Publishers.] 


Cas  I. 
Obligation  de  Remplir  ses  Devoirs. 

I.  Ursule,  femme  mariée,  craignant  les  douleurs  de  l'enfante- 
ment  et  les  ennuis  de  l'allaitoinent,  se  décide  à  refuser  à  son  mari 
d'accomplir  le  devoir  conjugal.  Ne  voulant  pas  changer  de  résolu- 
lion,  elle  ne  peut  obtenir  l'absolution  de  son  confesseur. 

II.  Germaine,  mère  de  famille,  refuse  égalment,  parce  qu'elle  a 
déjà  une  famille  trop  nombreuse,  et  qu'elle  est  fort  pauvre.  II 
vaut  mieux,  dit-elle,  ne  pas  mettre  au  monde  des  enfants  que  de 
les  vouer  à  la  misère. 

m.  Agnès  refuse  aussi,  parce  qu'elle  sait,  et  par  sa  propre 
expérience,  et  par  une  consultation  des  médecins,  qu'elle  ne  peut 
enfanter  sans  s'exi)oser  à  un  danger  de  mort. 

IV.  Victoire  est  fort  affligée  parce  que  tous  ses  enfants  sont 
morts  :  elle  ne  veut  plus  en  mettre  au  monde,  et  refuse  à  son  mari 
le  devoir  conjugal. 

V.  Tècle  a  la  conscience  fort  tourmentée  parce  que  son  mari 
s'acquitte  souvent  du  devoir  conjugal  d'une  manière  véniellement 
coupable,  par  exemple,  en  se  plaçant  dans  une  position  contraire 
à  la  nature. 

D.     Que  faut-il  penser  dans  ces  différents  cas? 

1°  Ursule  n'est  pus  exemple  de  péché,  et  de  péché  grave  ;  son 
confesseur  a  bien  fait  de  lui  refuser  l'absolution.  Car  une  épouse 
ne  peut  être  excu-sée  de  rendre  le  devoir  à  cause  des  incommodités 
ordinaires  de  l'accouchf  ment  ou  de  l'allaitement,  ni  par  des  dou- 
leurs médiocres,  ou  même  fortes,  mais  non  continues,  par  exemple 
des  maux  de  tê'e  pendant  plusieurs  mois  api  es  les  couches,  ni  à 
cause  de  l'affaiblissement  de  sa  santé,  parce  que  tout  cela  fait 
partie  das  c  aiges  du  mariage.     Et  la  femme,  par  la  puissance  du 


k 


426  The  Doctrine  nf  the  Jesuits, 

contrat,  en  livrant  son  corps  dans  le  but  de  la  fiénération,  a  été 
censée  s'obliger  à  supporter  toutes  les  IncoinniodiLés  qui  accom- 
pagnent ou  suivent  la  génération. 

2°  Germaine  ne  peut  être  dispensée  du  devoir  conjugal  que  par 
le  consentement  de  son  mari.  La  raison  en  est  que  la  procréation 
des  enfants  est  le  but  principal  du  mariage,  et  qu'il  comprend  tous 
les  inconvénients  qui  ne  sont  pas  extraordinaires.  Autrement,  la 
femme  pourrait  trop  facilement  et  trop  souvent  décliner  le  devoir, 
au  grand  ennui  du  mari,  et  au  risque  pour  lui  d'incontinence. 
Germaine  devait  penser  à  ces  inconvénients  avant  de  se  marier  ; 
maintenant  elle  doit  les  supporter.  Qu'elle  se  confie  à  la  Prov- 
idence. 

3°  Il  faut  pardonner  à  Agnès.  Une  femme  réduite  à  de  telles 
extrémités,  n'est  pas  tenue  de  rendre  le  dovoir,  car  son  accom- 
plissement ne  peut  pas  être  exigé  en  face  d'un  grave  dommage  ; 
car  la  femme  qui  se  marie  n'est  i)as  censée  s'ohliger  à  des  charges 
tout  à  fait  extraordinaires,  et  à  risquer  sa  vie  pour  obéir  a  sou 
mari.  Mais  le  plus  souvent,  il  ne  faut  pas  tenir  compte  des 
douleurs  du  premier  accouchement,  qui  sont  habituellement  très 
fortes. 

4°  Il  ne  faut  pas  inquiéter  Victoire  en  principe,  si  ce  malheur 
résulte  de  quelque  vice  de  c  )nstitution  qui  rende  l'accouchement 
diffî^^ile,  compromette  la  vie  du  fœtus  avant  qu'il  vienne  au 
monde.  .  .  .  Mais  il  faut  faire  exception,  si  le  refus  du  devoir 
doit  entraîner  des  querelles  entre  les  époux. 

5*"  Que  répondre  à  Tècle?  En  principe  elle  doit  être  dispensée 
de  son  devoir,  parce  que  l'acte  conjugal  pratiqué  de  la  sorte  est 
illégitime.  Or,  un  mari  ne  peut  exiger  un  acte  illégitime.  Cepen- 
dant on  peut  permettre  à  l'épouse  d'accomplir  son  devoir  de  la 
sorte,  par  quelque  motif  raisonnable,  par  exemple,  si  le  refus  en- 
traîne des  désagréments  notables  ;  par  exemple,  outrage  de  la  part 
du  mari  (Saint  Liguori). 

Cas  II. 

Obstacle  au  Devoir  Conjugal. 

I.  Léonie,  jeune  fille  de  vingt  ans,  a  prononcé  un  vœu  perpét- 
uel de  chasteté.     Plu  leurs  années  ap:ès,  i)ous.«iée  par  ses  parents, 


Cases  on  Direction  of  Married  Persons,  427 

elle  accepte  de  tout  cœur  un  mariage  favorable  qui  se  présente. 
Mais  elle  songe  à  son  vœu,  et  n*ose  en  parler  à  i)ersonne.  Nonob- 
stant, elle  se  marie  ;  mais  alors  commence  son  embarras.  Elle  se 
décide  à  cbcrcher  un  moyen  de  se  délier  de  son  engagement  ;  mais 
en  attendant,  elle  est  forcée  d'accomplir  son  devoir  conjugal,  et 
même,  pour  plaire  à  son  mari,  elle  le  réclame  quelquefois.  Enfin, 
tourmentée  par  sa  conscience,  elle  va  trouver  son  confesseur  et 
avoue  lout. 

ir.  Rosalie,  mariée  de  bonne  foi,  a  bientôt  des  doutes  au  sujet 
de  quelque  em[)êehement  venant  d'une  alliance.  Elle  continue 
cependant  à  habiter  avec  son  mari,  ju-qu'à  ce  qu'elle  soit  assurée 
de  la  nullité  de  son  mariage.  Lorsqu'elle  en  a  la  certitude,  elle 
demande  à  son  confesseur  ce  qu'elle  doit  faire  :  "  Lui  refuser  tout 
commerce,  répond  celui-ci,  jusqu'à  ce  que  vous  ayez  obtenu  une 
dispense."  Mais  ce  conseil  a  un  résultat  déplorable.  Rosalie  est 
amenée  à  accorder  le  devoir  conjugal  à  son  mari  furieux  ;  elle  est 
menacée  de  violences  terribles,  même  de  mort,  et,  pour  sortir  d'un 
tel  embarras,  elle  obéit  à  son  mari. 

D.  1".  Que  doit  faire  le  confesseur  dans  le  premier  cas?  Doîf- 
il  permettre  à  Léonie  de  demander  et  de  remplir  le  devoir  conjugal, 
sur  les  instances  de  son  mari,  jusqu'à  ce  qu'elle  soit  dispens»ée  de 
son  vœu? 

D.  2^  Rosalie  doit-elle  remplir  le  devoir  conjugal  pour  éviter 
un  mauvais  traitement  ou  mêuie  un  danger  de  mort? 

D.     3*.  Peut-elle  du  moins  avoir  une  attitude  passive? 

R.  à  la  1"  D.  1"  Léonie  ne  peut  demander  ni  remplir  le  devoir 
conjugal  pendant  les  deux  premiers  mois,  depuis  la  célébration  du 
mariage,  si  ce  temps  n'est  pas  encore  écoulé.  C'est  que,  pendant 
ce  temps,  les  époux,  en  vertu  d'un  privilège  divin  reconnu  par 
l'Eglise,  sont  dispensés  de  l'obligation  d'accomplir  leur  devoir 
conjugal,  afin  de  voir  s'ils  voudraient  embrasser  l'état  religieux. 
2"  Léonie  peut  remplir  son  devoir  apiès  cet  espace  de  temps,  pour 
satisfaire  aux  droits  de  son  époux  ;  mais  elle  ne  peut  le  demander 
jusqu'à  ce  qu'elle  soit  dispensée  de  son  vœu,  parce  qu'elle  le  viole- 
rait. 3'^  Mais  elle  doit  s'abstenir  si  l'autre  y  consent,  ou  a  perdu 
le  droit  de  l'exiger,  par  exemple  à  la  suite  d'un  adultère  ou  d'un 
inceste. 


428  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

R.  à  la  2^  D.  Non,  absolument  ;  parce  que  la  nullité  du 
mariage  étant  reconnue,  l'acte  conjugal  serait  une  fornication,  ce 
qui  est  un  mal  intrinsèque,  et  ce  qui  n'est  jamais  permis,  même 
])Our  éviter  la  mort.  Et  peu  importe  que  le  mari  ignore  l'empêche- 
ment de  bonne  foi  et  pense  être  dans  son  droit,  parce  que  le 
mariage  étant  nul,  il  n'a  aucun  droit,  bien  qu'il  croie  en  avoir. 

R.  à  la  3^  D.  11  y  a  controverse.  Ce  qui  revient  à  examiner 
si  une  femme  accablée  par  la  violence  doit  plutôt  se  laisser  tuer 
que  violer.  Il  y  a  deux  opinions  probables  :  La  première  répond 
non,  parce  que  la  femme,  en  restant  passive  coopère  à  un  acte 
mauvais,  intrinsèquement.  La  deuxième  répond  oui,  parce  que  la 
femme  restant  passive,  n'agit  pas,  mais  seulement  pour  un  motif 
très  grave,  par  crainte  de  la  mort,  ne  fait  aucune  résistance 
extérieure  et  refuse  tout  consentement  intérieur  ;  en  laissant  faire 
elle  ne  coopère  pas  en  principe,  mais  seulement  en  fait,  et  se 
trouve  suffisamment  excusée  par  la  crainte  de  la  mort.  Mais  on 
doit  supposer  toujours  qu'elle  ne  court  aucun  danger  de  consentir 
au  plaisir  charnel. 

Objections. —  Si  la  femme  peut  rester  passive  d'après  cette  opin- 
ion probable,  elle  peut  simplement  accomplir  le  devoir  conjugal, 
puisque  pour  la  femme  c'est  rester  dans  une  situation  passive. 

Je  nie  la  conséquence  et  la  similitude,  parce  que  comme  on  dit 
communément,  accomplir  son  devoir  n'est  pas  du  tout  la  même 
chose  que  rester  passif,  car  en  accomplissant  sou  devoir  on  coopère 
à  l'acte,  puisqu'on  donne  son  consentement  à  l'acte  du  mari  et 
qu'on  soumet  franchement  son  corps  à  sa  volonté  ;  tandis  qu'une 
femme  restant  passive,  d'après  ce  qu'on  a  dit:  1"  Ne  donne  pas 
son  consentement  à  l'acte  du  mari  ;  2^  refuse  toujours  de  con- 
sentir au  plaisir;  3"  ne  cède  qu'à  la  force,  et,  seulement  à  cause 
d'une  crainte  très  grave,  ne  fuit  aucune  résistance  extérieure. 

Cas  m. 

Obstacle  au  Devoir  Conjugal. 

Basilisse,  femme  pieuse,  s'étant  mariée,  résolut  de  rester! 
chaste,  autant  que  possible,  sans  porter  atteinte  aux  droits  de  souj 
mari.     Elle  prononce  un  vœu  à  ce  sujet.     Mais  ensuite,  elle  s( 


Oases  on  Direction  of  Married  Persons.  429 

demande  comment  elle  pent,  et  si  elle  doit,  y  rester  fidèle  ;  peut- 
elle  se  montrer  c:iressante  envers  son  mari  et  lui  fournir  ainsi 
l'occasion  de  réclamer  le  devoir  conjugal?  Mais  elle  est  si  attachée 
à  son  vœu  qu'elle  ne  veut  le  rétracter  en  aucune  façon.  Hiparque, 
son  mari,  prenant  le  chemin  contraire,  se  souille  en  secret  par 
l'adultère  et  même  par  l'inceste,  avec  la  cousine  de  sa  femme 
Basilisse. 

D.  V.  Comment  peut-on  perdre  le  droit  de  réclamer  le  devoir 
conjugal  ? 

D.  2^.  Un  époux  peut-il  se  lier  par  le  vœu  de  ne  point  réclamer 
ce  devoir? 

D.     4^.  Que  penser  de  ces  cas? 

R.  à  la  V^  D.  On  perd  le  droit  de  réclamer  ce  devoir  : 

1"  Par  l'adultère.  Un  époux  innocent  n'est  pas  tenu  d'accom- 
plir le  devoir  conjugal  envers  son  conjoint,  coupable  d'adultère. 

2"  Par  une  alliance  survenant  pendant  le  mariage,  c'est-à-dire 
quand  l'un  des  époux  a  commis  un  inceste  avec  un  parent  de 
l'autre,  au  premier  ou  au  second  degré. 

3"     Par  le  vœu  de  chasteté  émis  soit  avant,  soit  après  le  mariage. 

R.  à  la  2^  D.  Il  faut  distinguer.  L'un  et  l'autre  époux  ne 
peuvent  séparément  émettre  le  vœu  de  ne  point  réclamer  le  devoir 
conjugal,  simidement,  sans  restriction,  parce  que  ce  vœu  pourrait 
être  un  jour  gênant  pour  l'autre,  et  porter  atteinte  à  ses  droits. 
Ainsi  le  mari  q'u  a  l'habitude  de  réclamer  ce  devoir  comme  c'est 
l'habitude  des  maris,  ne  peut  émettre  le  vœu  de  nei)as  le  réclamer, 
l)arce  qu'il  créerait  un  ennui  notable  à  son  épouse.  L'épouse  peut 
émettre  beaucoup  plus  facilement  ce  vœu,  parce  qu'elle  n'a  pas 
coutume  de  le  réclamer,  ou  en  ne  le  réclamant  pas  ne  ciée  pas 
d'ennui  à  son  mari.  La  léponse  dépend  donc  des  circonstances 
seules  où  se  trouvent  les  gens.* 

R.  à  la  3^  D.  Le  vœu  de  Basilisse  est  valable,  parce  qu'il  n'est 
pîis  gênant  pour  son  mari  et  ne  porte  pas  atteinte  à  ses  droits. 
Elle  ne  peut  donc  pas  réclamer  le  devou*  conjugal,  mais  elle  doit 
le  rendre  jusqu'à  ce  que  son  mari  perde  son  droit.     D'ailleurs,  elle 

*I1  existe  dans  plusieurs  villes  de  France  des  sociétés  de  femmes  qui 
font  de  seuiblables  vœux;  les  hommes  y  s-ont  admis  du  couseutement  de 
leurs  6pouses  et  preuueut  le  même  en<5agemeut. 


430  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

peut  se  conduire  envers  son  raari  comme  d'autres  femmes  honnêtes 
qui  donnent  à  leurs  maris  les  marques  d'affection  convenables,  et 
se  montrent  caressantes  pour  réchauffer  leur  affection.  Mais 
lorsque  le  mari  a  perdu  son  droit  par  l'adultère  ou  par  l'inceste, 
elle  ne  peut  plus  rendre  le  devoir  conjugal  ;  car  elle  a  fait  vœu  de 
garder  sa  chasteté  aussi  bien  qu'elle  le  pourrait,  sans  porter 
atteinte  aux  droits  de  son  mari,  et  en  refusant  ce  devoir  elle  ne 
viole  aucun  droit,  puisque  le  mari  n'en  a  plus.     Donc.  .  .  . 

Cas  IV. 
Obstacle  au  Devoir  Conjugal. 

I.  Narcisse,  mari  d'Agathe,  a  commis  un  triple  inceste  :  1"  avec 
la  sœur  d'Agutlie,  Blandine,  un  j<ur  q  l'il  é'tuit  ivre;  2"  avec  la 
fille  de  Blandine,  qu'il  prenait  pour  une  autre,  la  nuit  ;  o^'  avec 
Sylvie,  sa  cousine  au  second  degré.  S  "étant  confessé  de  ces  fautes, 
il  apprend  de  son  confesseur  qu'il  se  trouve  dans  un  triple  empê- 
chement pour  réclamer  le  devoir  conjugal. 

II.  Rosalie,  femme  de  Rafin,  sous  l'impression  d'une  crainte 
violente,  pèche  avec  Vulpin  frère  de  son  mari.  Aussi  son  con- 
fesstur  lui  signifie  un  empêchement  de  réclamer  le  devoir  conjugal, 
ju-qu'à  ce  qu'il  ait  reçu  une  dispense  levant  cet  empêchement. 

D.     l""^.    L'ignorance   des  lois  d^  l'Eglise  ou  des  personnes  est- 
elle  un  obstacle  à  la  piivation  des  droits  de  l'époux? 
D.  2^.     QuicU  d'une  crainte  violente? 
D.  3^    Que  penser  des  deux  cas? 

R.  à  la  F®  D.  L'ignorance  du  fait  excuse  certainement,  lorsqu'on 
ignore  que  la  personne  avec  laquelle  on  pèche  est  une  parente, 
parce  que  la  privation  du  droit  conjugal  est  une  peine  infligée  à 
l'inceste  ;  oi\  il  n'y  a  pas  d'inceste,  il  ne  peut  y  avoir  de  peine. 

L'opinion  plus  probable  est  que  l'ignorance  du  droit  excuse, 
lorf-qtie  le  pécheur  ignore  la  loi  de  l'Eglise  établissant  cette  peine  : 
parce  que,  quand  une  peine  est  imposée  par  une  loi  humaine,  celui 
qui  par  ignorance  la  transgresse  est  exempté  de  la  peine,  comme 
(lu  péché  d'avoir  transgressé  la  loi.  Car  il  faut  d'abord  manquer 
à  la  loi  avant  de  manquer  à  la  peine  qu'elle  impose.  C'est  l'opin- 
ion plus  commune  suivie  par  saint  Liguori. 


Cases  on  Direction  of  Married  Persons,  431 

R.  à  la  2®  D.  Oui,  suivant  l'opinion  plus  probable,  bien  que  la 
crainte  n'excuse  pas  du  péché.  C'est  qu'une  crainte  violente  ex- 
empte de  suivre  les  lois  humaines,  sans  nous  exempter  de  suivre  la 
loi  naturelle.  Opinion  plus  commune  suivie  par  saint  Liguori, 
contrairement  à  d'autres. 

R.  à  la  3^  D.  Q'iant  à  Narcisse,  il  n'a  pas  perdu  son  droit,  con- 
jugal dans  le  premier  cas,  n'ayant  pas  péché  en  principe,  comme 
étant  privé  de  raison  ;  il  ne  l'a  pas  perdu  dans  le  second  cas,  car  il 
n'a  commis  l'inceste  qu'en  fait  et  non  en  principe,  ignorant  que  sa 
complice  était  cousine  de  son  épouse  ;  ni  dans  le  troisième  cas, 
parce  qu'il  n'a  pu  former  une  alliance  incestueuse  en  péchant  avec 
sa  propre  cousine,  ce  qui  n'existe  que  par*le  commerce  d'un  homme 
avec  les  cousines  de  son  épouse  et  vice  versa. 

Quant  à  Rosalie,  elle  n'a  pas  perdu  son  droit  conjugal  si  elle  a 
subi  une  violence  absolue,  comme  il  est  evident,  puisque,  s'il  n'y  a 
pas  de  péché,  il  n'y  a  pas  de  peine.  Même,  d'après  l'opinion  plus 
probable,  elle  n'est  pas  privée  du  droit  d'exiger  le  dev^oir  conjugal, 
quoi-qu'ayant  péché  giavement  puisque,  par  suite  d'une  crainte 
violente,  elle  est  censée  exemptée  de  la  peine  ecclésiastiqie  infligée 
pour  l'inceste,  comme  on  a  dit  plus  haut.  Donc  le  confesseur  a  eu 
tort  d'empêcher  Rosalie  de  demander  le  devoir  conjugal,  jusqu'à  ce 
qu'elle  ait  obtenu  la  dispense,  car  elle  n'avait  besoin  d'aucune  dis- 
pense. 

Cas  V. 

Instruction  Pour  les  Fiances  et  les  Epoux. 

T.  Domitille,  jeune  fille,  va  se  confesser  :  "  Mon  père,  dit-elle, 
je  vais  me  marier.  J'ignore  complètement  les  obligations  du  mar- 
iage. J'ai  entendu  dire  qu'on  y  trouvait  de  giands  périls  pour 
noire  salut  éternel,  c'est-à-dire  de  fréquentes  occasions  de  pécher. 
Je  veux  cependant  sauver  mon  âme  Veuillez  donc,  mon  i)ère, 
m'indiquer  ce  qui  est  défendu  sous  peine  de  péché  mortel  ou  vén- 
iel." 

II.  Venefiide,  mariée  depuis  peu  de  jours  ou  peu  de  mo's,  va 
se  confesser,  fort  embarrassée  au  sujet  de  ce  qui  est  i)ormis  ou 
défendu  dans  le  mariage,  et  elle  demande  instamment  à  en  être 
instruite. 


432  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

D.  1™.  Q;ie  répondre  à  Domitille?  Convient-il  de  l'instruire 
CD  détail? 

D.  2*.     Que  faire  avec  Venefride? 

R.  à  la  1"  D.  Le  confesseur  doit  procéder  avec  prudence  et  de 
grandes  précautions  en  instruisant  Domitille  d'une  manière  géné- 
rale, sans  aborder  en  rien  les  détails  :  il  doit  éviter  de  scandaliser 
sa  pénitente,  en  lui  expliquant  en  détail  les  devoirs  des  époux. 
Voici  ce  qu'il  peut  dire  :  "Le  mariage  est  saint  l'Apôtre  l'appelle 
grand  dans  le  Christ  et  dans  l'Eglise,  et  il  faut  vivre  saintement 
dans  cette  liaison  sacrée.  Tout  n'est  pas  permis  dans  le  mariage, 
mais  seulement  ce  qui  a  rapport  à  son  but.  Eu  général  tu  dois 
obéir  à  ton  mari,  à  moins  que  tu  ne  comprennes  clairement  qu'il 
te  commande  ou  te  réclame  quelque  chose  de  mal.  Alors  viens 
vite  au  tribunal  de  la  pénitence,  et  si  tu  t3  trouves  embarrassée, 
dis-le  franchement  à  ton  confesseur." 

R.  à  la  2^D.  Il  faut  user  de  la  même  prudence  envers  Venefride 
récemment  mariée.  Eu  général,  que  le  confesseur  n'interroge  pas, 
mais  réponde  d'une  manière  générale  aux  demandes  de  la  péni- 
tente, à  savoir  qu'il  est  permis  aux  époux  de  faire  tout  ce  qui  a 
rapport  à  la  procréation  des  enfants,  mais  rien  de  ce  qui  s'oppose 
à  cette  fin  du  mariage  ;  qu'il  faut  tout  faire  honnêtement,  en  sui- 
vant l'ordre  indiqué  par  la  nature.  Qu'il  ne  descende  pas  aux  dé- 
tails, mais  laisse  la  femme  lui  exposer  ses  embarras,  si  elle  en  a, 
qui  la  tourmentent,  et  qu'il  lui  réponde  en  peu  de  mots. 

Cas  VI. 

L'Onanisme. 

Romaine  a  un  mari  impie  qui  veut  non  pas  procréer  d'enfants, 
mais  satisfaire   sa   passion,   et  que   accomplit    toujours   le    crime 
affreux  d'Onan.     Romaine  le  sait  fort  bien,  et  la  pieuse  femme  eu 
est  tout  affligée.     Si  elle  avertit  son  mari  de  l'irrégularité  de  soni 
acte  conjugal,  ou  si  elle  lui  refuse   paice  qu'il   en   abuse,  elle  est] 
accablée  d'outrages  et  de  coups.     Craignant  d'offenser  Dieu,  elle' 
ne  sait  que  faire,  elle  est   fort  embarrassée.     Elle  va  trouver  son 
confesseur  pour  lui  demander  conseil.     Peut-elle  rendre  le  devoir, 
conjugal  à  son  mari  lorsqu'il  lui  demande,  peut-elle  le  demauderj 


Cases  on  Direction  of  Married  Persons.  433 

sans  commettre  un  crime  ?  Le  confesseur  affirme  que  ces  deux 
choses  sont  criminelles,  parce  que  le  crime  d'Onan  est  un  mai 
intrinsèque,  même  de  la  part  de  l'épouse  qui  y  coopère.  Aussi 
elle  doit  souffrir  tous  les  maux,  et  même  la  mort  plutôt  que  de  se 
souiller  par  ce  crime.  Romaine  revient  toute  triste  et,  dans  sa 
douleur,  souhaite  la  mort. 

D.   Que  faut-il  faire  et  penser  dans  ce  cas? 

R.  Il  ne  faut  pas  inquiéter  Romaine,  qui  est  forcée  pour  un 
grave  motif  d'obéir  à  son  mari,  coupable  d'Onanisme.  Le  con- 
fesseur a  fait  une  erreur  grave  en  la  condamnant  pour  péché  mor- 
tel et  coopération  intrinsèquement  criminelle.  Beaucoup  de  théo- 
logiens l'affirmaient  autrefois  ;  mais  les  derniers,  ayant  mieux 
examiné  la  chose,  affirment  que  la  femme  ne  commet  pas  un  crime 
intrinsèque  en  obéissant  pour  un  grave  motif  à  son  mari  Onaniste. 
Ce  confesseur  doit  donc  changer  d'opinion  et  consoler  aussitôt 
Romaine,  de  peur  qu'elle  n'invoque  la  mort  dans  son  affliction. 

Cas  VIIL 
Onanisme. 

Humbert,  confesseur,  examine  les  cas  suivants  : 

1"  Il  est  persuadé  qu'il  est  difficile  de  croire  les  maris  qui  pro- 
mettent de  se  corriger  dans  l'usage  du  mariage,  et  il  leur  refuse 
généralement  l'absolution,  jusqu'à  ce  qu'il  ait  la  preuve  de  leur 
persévérance  après  un  long  espace  de  temps. 

2"  Il  ne  donne  l'absolution  aux  épouses  que  lorsqu'elles  opposent 
une  résistance  extérieure  et  très  violente  à  leur  mari  coupable 
d'Onanisme,  et  lorsqu'elles  craignent  les  plus  déplorables  suites  en 
refusant  le  devoir  conjugal. 

3"  Il  condamne  l'épouse  à  un  péché  mortel  lorsqu'elle  consent 
avec  un  plaisir  sensible  à  cet  abus  du  mariage,  bien  qu'elle  ait  hor- 
reur du  péché  de  son  mari  et  lui  témoigne  sa  répugnance. 

4**  Il  blâme  vivement  les  épouses  qui  désirent  intérieurement  ne 
pas  avoir  d'enfants,  tout  en  voulant  remplir  leur  devoir  conjugal 
régulièrement,  et  en  a3"ant  horreur  du  péché. 

D.  1"*.  Peut-on  absoudre  les  maris  Onanistes  s'ils  promettent  de 
se  corriger? 


434  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

D.  2*.  Que  faire  à  l'égard  de  leurs  épouses  qui  ne  voudraient 
pas  offenser  Dieu,  mais  voudraient  ne  pas  avoir  d'enfants  ? 

D.  3^  Que  penser  de  la  doctrine  et  de  la  conduite  d'Humbert 
dans  chaque  cas? 

R.  à  la  1^"  D.  Il  faut  traiter  les  Onanistes  récidivistes  comme 
les  autres  qui  retombent  dans  les  autres  péchés.  Les  règles  qu'on 
a  établies  pour  les  autres  doivent  leur  être  appliquées.  Aussi,  s'ils 
paraissent  affligés  de  leurs  péchés  et  promettent  de  se  corriger,  il 
faut  les  absoudre. 

R.  à  la  T  D.  On  trouve  beaucoup  d'épouses  ainsi  embarrassées  ; 
elles  ont  horreur  du  péché  mortel,  ne  voulant  pas  encourir  la  dam- 
nation éternelle,  mais  elles  craignent  de  procréer  des  enfants.  Eu 
pratique  on  demande  :  1'^  qu'elles  ne  coopèrent  au  péché  du  mari 
par  aucun  acte  positif,  par  aucune  parole,  par  aucun  signe,  pas 
même  par  des  plaintes  au  sujet  de  leurs  enfants  trop  nombreux 
déjà,  etc.  ;  2"  qu'elles  manifestent  un  déplaisir  extérieur  pour  le 
péché  de  leur  mari.  A  ces  conditions,  il  ne  faut  pas  les  inquiéter 
au  sujet  de  l'Onanisme,  bien  qu'elles  éprouvent  une  répugnance,  un 
éloignement  notables  pour  faire  des  enfants  ;  car  cette  répugnance 
est  naturelle,  à  cause  des  douleurs  de  l'enfantement  et  de  la  crainte 
de  la  mort  qui  peut  résulter  de  l'enfantement.  Et  il  ne  faut  pas 
blâmer  les  femmes  mariées  de  ce  qu'elles  ne  désirent  pas  avoir 
beaucoup  d'enfants,  puisque  ce  désir  n'est  pas  criminel  par  lui- 
même,  pourvu  qu'elles  ne  coopèrent  pas  au  péché  de  leur  mari  et 
ne  s'y  complaisent  pas.  Il  faut  même  faire  cesser  les  scrupules 
(les  épouses  timorées  qui  craignent  de  trouver  un  plaisir  intérieur 
dans  la  mauvaise  action  de  leur  mari,  en  désirant  n'avoirs  pas  d'en- 
fants ;  parce  que,  comme  la  plupart  du  temps  elles  ont  horreur  de 
ce  grave  péché,  elles  ne  sont  j^as  censées  s'y  complaire,  et  il  faut 
les  absoudre  sans  difficulté. 

R.  à  la  3®  D.  1"  cas.  Humbert  s'est  montré  trop  sévère  pour 
les  maris  qui  promettent  de  se  corriger  ;  s'ils  trompent  le  confes- 
seur, c'est  leur  affaire.  Celui-ci  doit  avoir  la  conscience  tranquille, 
en  principe,  du  moment  qu'ils  affirment  qu'ils  sont  affl  gés  de  leur 
péché  passé  et  promettent  de  se  corriger  à  l'avenir  ;  on  n'a  rien  de 
plus  à  leur  demander.  Il  ne  faut  pas  admettre  non  plus  la  con- 
duite  d'Humbert    au    sujet    des   preuves    de  persévérance   qu'il 


Cases  on  Direction  of  Married  Persons,  435 

demande  pour  un  long  esp-^ce  de  temps,  parce  qu'une  rechute  ne 
prouve  pas  du  tout  que  l'intention  n'y  était  pas,  puisque  même 
ceux  qui  montrent  l'intention  la  plus  ferme  de  ne  plus  pécher,  y 
retombent. 

2®  cas.  Sa  conduite  est  encore  trop  sévère,  car  il  n'est  pas  néc- 
essaire que  les  épouses  manifestent  chaque  fois  leur  déplaisir  à 
leur  mari  ;  il  suffit  de  le  faire  de  temps  en  temps,  afin  que  le  mari 
sache  bien  que  sa  manière  de  faire  déplaît  à  son  épouse.  Et  il 
n'est  pas  nécessaire  que  l'épouse  craigne  des  suites  déplorables,  en 
refusant  le  devoir  conjugal  ;  mais  il  sufifit  qu'elle  craigne  un  grave 
inconvénient  quelconque,  par  exemple,  si  son  mari  cessait  de  lui 
témoigner  des  marques  d'affection  en  se  montrant  fort  offensé  ;  car 
alors  leurs  relations  deviendraient  désagréables  et  il  en  résulterait 
de  grands  inconvénients  pour  l'épouse. 

3®  cas.  Humbert  se  trompe  évidemtment.  Car  l'épouse  peut 
toujours,  dans  l'acte  conjugal,  admettre  un  plaisir  sensible,  tout  en 
prévoyant  que  son  mari  commettra  le  péché  d'Onan  ;  car  cet  acte 
est  en  lu-même  honnête  et  permis  à  la  femme,  et  il  suflSt  qu'elle  ne 
donne  pas  son  consentement  au  péché  de  son  mari. 

4®  cas.  Nouvelle  erreur  du  confesseur,  blâmant  les  épouses  qui 
souhaitent  intérieurement  n'avoir  pas  d'enfants  ;  car  il  suffit,  comme 
il  a  été  dit  plus  haut,  qu'elles  ne  coopèrent  par  aucun  acte  positif 
à  l'abus  de  leurs  maris  et  ne  consentent  pas  à  leur  péché.  Cepen- 
dant, que  ces  femmes  prennent  garde  de  ne  pas  avoir  trop  long- 
temps ce  désir,  d'ailleurs  permis.  Car  cette  considération  fâcheuse 
trouble  parfois  leur  esprit,  et  devient  périlleuse  pour  quelques- 
unes. 


SCreatfee  on  Cntsurcs. 


CHAPTER   I. 

Of  Censures  in  General. 

ART.  I.     Nature,  Division,  and  Conditions  of  Censures. 

I.     Of  the  Nature  of  Censure. 

932. —  Censure  is  a  spiritual  punishment  with  the  intention 
of  correcting  a  baptized  man,  offending  and  contumacious,  by 
which  he  is  deprived  of  the  use  of  certain  spiritual  advantages. 

(     ART.  II.     The  originator  or  promulgator  of  the  censure. 


935. —  Excommunication  against  noxious  animals,  for  instance, 
grasshoppers,  is  not  excommunication  properly  so  called,  but  an 
adjuration,  in  view  of  their  destruction,  in  order  to  prevent  them 
from  being  hurtful. 


ART.  III.     The  one  who  undergoes  the  censure. 


ART.  IV.     Removal  of  the  censure. 


i 
CHAPTER   II. 


ro    r.     r. 


Different  Species  of  Censures. 
ART.  I.     Excommunication. 
956. —  There  is  the  7nojor  excommunication,  which  deprives  of 


Treatise  on  Censures.  437 

all  the  blessings  of  the  Church  ;  and  the  minor  excommunication, 
which  deprives  of  certain  blessings  only. 

Among  the  persons  subjected  to  the  major  excommunication, 
some  are  called  tolerated,  and  the  faithful  are  not  obliged  to  avoid 
these  ;  others  are  called  non-tolerated,  or  to  be  aooided^  and  the 
faithful  must  avoid  them.* 

959. —  .  .  .  There  are  eight  effects  from  excommunication  : 
1,  Deprivation  of  the  sacraments  ;  2,  deprivation  of  divine  ser- 
vices; 3,  deprivation  of  the  suffrages  of  the  Church;  4,  depriva- 
tion of  ecclesiastical  burial;  5,  deprivation  of  ecclesiastical  juris- 
diction ;  6,  deprivation  of  benefices  ;  7,  deprivation  of  communi- 
cation with  justice  ;  8,  deprivation  of  civil  societj', 

960. —  Unless  he  is  excused  by  an  invincible  ignorance,  or  a 
grave  fear,  ....  an  excommunicated  person,  who  is  to  be 
avoided,  or  simply  tolerated,  sins  gravely  by  receiving  the  sacra- 
ments, because  he  is  violating  a  grave  law  of  the  Church. 

I 

Deprivation  of  Ecclesiastical  Burial. 

965. —  Ecclesiastical  sepulture  is  that  which  takes  place  in  a 
sacred  and  blessed  place,  set  apart  for  the  burial  of  the  faithful. 

An  excommunicated  person,  who  is  to  be  avoided,  cannot  be 
buried  in  a  sacred  place  ;  if  he  has  been  put  there,  his  dead  dody 
should  be  exhumed,  if  it  is  yet  possible  to  do  it,  and  the  blessed 
place,  polluted  b}^  such  contact,  purified.  .  .  . 

Deprivation  of  Communication  with  Justice. 

9G8. —  This  is  that  which  has  connection  with  things  concerning 
civil  or  ecclesiastical  justice. 

The  excommunicated  person,  who  should  be  avoided,  is  de- 
prived of  his  right  to  acts  relating  to  civil  justice.  He  cannot  be 
judge,  lawyer,  witness,  notaiy,  etc.  ;  neither  tutor,  curator  nor 
executor.  But  to-day  this  disposition  of  rights  is.  no  longer  in 
force  in  many  places. 

*  We  do  not  judjçe  as  homicides  those  who,  burning  with  zeal  for  their 
mother,  the  Catholic  Church,  against  tlie  excommunicated,  slaugliter  some 
of  them.     (Decretals,  Part  2,  Caus.  23,  Ques.  5,  Cap.  47.) 


438  Jhe  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

With  more  reason,  he  is  deprived  of  all  communication  with 
ecclesiastical  justice.  However,  he  can  appeal  to  the  supreme 
court,  and  prosecute  his  appeal.  The  excommunicated  person 
who  is  tolerated,  is  not  deprived  of  communication  with  justice, 
but  may  use  it  in  a  valid  manner  ;  however,  his  adversaries  can 
reject  him  juridicially,  by  pleading  the  exception. 

Deprivation  of  Civil  Society. 

969. —  Those  civil  acts  in  which  one  cannot  have  any  relations 
with  an  excommunicated  person,  who  ought  to  be  avoided,  are 
contained  in  a  Latin  verse  : 

Os,  orare,  vale,  communis,  mensa  negatur. 

To  such  are  refused  :  1,  the  mouth  ;  in  other  words,  conversa- 
tion, letters,  marks  of  kindness.  2,  prayers  ;  in  other  words,  all 
communication  in  divine  things;  for  instance,  mass,  services.  3, 
salutations  ;  even  quite  private.  4,  intercourses  ;  or  all  partner- 
ship in  trade,  habitation,  contracts,  etc.  5,  table  ;  or  reciprocal 
invitations  to  be  a  guest  at  a  dinner. 

The  excommunicated  are    ... 

995. — Those  who  do  violence,  under  the  devil's  direction,  to 
ecclesiastics,  or  religious  of  both  sexes. 

996. — Ques.     What  do  we  mean  by  doing  violence? 

Ans.  It  is  to  strike,  in  a  violent  manner,  either  with  feet,  hands, 
stick  or  sword,  etc.,  an  ecclesiastic  or  a  religious,  or  injuring  him 
in  such  a  manner  as  wounds  his  person  outwardly. 

Those  are  excommunicated  who  fight  a  duel,  who  provoke  or 
accept  it,  or  are  even  accomplices  ;  likewise,  all  those  who  assist 
and  are  interested  in  it,  who  permit  it,  or  even  do  not  prevent  it 
as  much  as  possible,  whatever  their  dignity^  even  though  royal  or 
imperial. 

998. — Ques.     Is  a  duel  a  reason  of  excommunication,  which, 
through  agreement,  ceases  when  one  of  the  fighters  is  wounded  ? 
Ans.     Yes  ;  by  the  Bull  of  Clement  VIII.,  illius  vices.  ... 


Treatise  on  Censures,  439 

Those  are  excommunicated  who  are  members  of  the  order  of 
Fiee  Masonry,  Carbonari,  and  other  like  societies,  which  plot 
Oj)only  or  secretly  against  the  church  or  the  legitimate  power  ; 
also  those  who  are  members  of  other  societies  favoring;  tliem. 


Those  are  excomrfiunicated  Who  command  the  rash  violation,  or 
who  themselves  violate  the  immunity  of  the  ecclesiastical  asylum. 

1002. — Ques.  What  ought  be  understood  by  this  immunity? 
and  is  it  obligatory  everywhere? 

Ans.  It  consists  in  this,  that  certain  offenders,  protected  by 
canon  rights,  cannot  be  expelled  violently,  in  a  lawful  manner,  from 
a  sacred  place,  especially  from  churches. 

It  is  beyond  doubt  that  this  immunity  has  not  been  abolished 
by  the  Church  ;  which,  on  the  contrary,  maintains  it  yet  by  penal- 
ties inflicted  on  transgressors  ;  and  it  cannot  be  abolished  legit- 
imately by  the  civil  power,  inasmuch  las  thiîi  immunity  of  the  church 
and  of  ecclesiastics  was  established  and  regulated  by  God,  and  is 
sanctioned  by  Church  canons. 

Those  are  excommunicated  who  violate  the  monastical  claustra- 
tion. 

1004.  .   .   .  Ques.     Who  have  the  right  to  enter  a  monaster}'? 

Ans.  The  Bishops,  in  a  circumstance  outweigliing  power,  pas- 
toral visitation  accompanied  by  several  serious  persons  ;  2,  regular 
prelates,  once  a  year,  in  order  to  visit  them  ;  3,  the  ordinary  con- 
fessor, to  administer  the  sacraments,  but  clothed  in  surplice  and 
stole  ;  4,  the  ordinary  physician,  who  should  have  his  permission 
renewed  every  quarter  ;  5,  workingmen  and  other  indispensable 
people  who  cannot  do  their  work  outside  the  monastery. 


Those  making  a  traffic  of  indulgences,  or  other  divine  bless- 
ings, are  under  the  ban  of  excommunication  by  the  Constitution  of 
8t.  Pius  v.,  Qitam  Plenum  (2d  of  January,  1569.) 

1008. — Ques.  Ought  all  those  making  such  a  traffic  to  be  ex- 
communicated? 


440  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Ans.  No.  St.  Pius  Y.'s  Bull  excommunicates  only  those  infe- 
rior to  bishops  ;  as  for  bishops,  cardinals,  etc.,  they  are  under  the 
penalty  of  suspension  of  right  to  enter  the  church  and  receive  the 
revenues,  a  penalty  which  is  imposed  on  them  by  the  Sovereign 
Pontiff,  and  from  which  they  cannot  be  absolved  until  they  have 
made  satisfaction. 


ART.  II.     Suspension. 

1032.  Suspension  is  a  censure  by  which  an  ecclesiastic  is  de- 
prived, for  a  certain  time,  either  partially  or  wholly,  of  the  use  of 
the  power  conferred  on  him  by  Holy  Orders,  of  his  function,  or  of  a 
benefice. 


Appendix  of  Deposition  and  Degradation. 


ART.  III.     Interdict. 

1051. —  Interdict  is  the  censure  by  which,  as  punishment  for  a 
crime,  the  use  of  divine  services,  certain  sacraments,  and  ecclesi- 
astical burial  is  forbidden  to  certain  persons  and  in  certain  places. 


Appendix  I.     Interdiction  of  divine  things. 

1057. —  It  is  prohibiting  an  ecclesiastic  from  celebrating  divine 
services,  administering  sacraments,  or  giving  ecclesiastical  burial  in 
certain  places. 


Appendix  II.     On  ecclesiastical  sepulture. 

1058. — The  bodies  of  the  faithful  deceased,  ought,  according  to 
the  precept  of  the  church,  to  be  buried  in  a  holy  place,  blessed  and 
consecrated,  or  even  in  the  church.  Those  who  are  not  members 
of  the  church  cannot  be  buried,  either  in  an  ecclesiastical  manner 
or  in  a  holy  place.     Ecclesiastical  sepulture  must  be  refused  even 


Treatise  on  Censures,  441 

to  the  faitljf Lil  who  liave  appeareil  unworthy  of  it,  either  because  of 
having  forsaken  the  faith,  or  having  died  in  a  state  of  contumacy 
or  impenitence  ;  hkewise  if  they  have  been  rebellious  children. 


1052. — When  one  blesses  a  cemetery,  the  farthest  part  should 
be  left  unblessed,  to  serve  for  the  sepulture  of  children  who  die 
unbaptized,  for  unbelievers  who  die  in  a  Christian  country,  and  for 
all  those  to  whom  ecclesiastical  burial  must  be  refused.  It  is  not 
absolutely  required  that  this  part  be  separated  from  the  cemetery 
by  a  wall,  bush,  ditch,  etc.,  but  it  is  sufficient  that  the  place  should 
be  set  off  some  way  or  another. 


k 


^treatise  on  Irregularities. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Irregularities  IN  General. 

1063. — Irregularity,  in  its  strict  meaning,  is  a  canonical  imped- 
iment, specifying  that  a- person  can  neither  become  an  ecclesiastic, 
reach  a  superior  grade,  nor  exercise  the  sacred  functions  conferred 
on  him.  ... 

CHAPTER  II. 
Irregularities  in  Particular. 
ART.  I.     Irregularities  through  defects. 

There  are  eight  of  them  :  1,  of  soul  ;  2,  of  body  ;  3,  of  birth; 
4,  of  age;  5,  of  freedom  ;  6,  of  sacrament;  7,  of  kindness  ;  8,  of 
reputation.  .  ,   . 

Through  Defect  of  Body. 
1071. —  This  irregularity  has  two  causes:    1,  unfitness  for  the 
service  of  Orders  ;   2,  some  unbecoming  and  notable  deformitj' . 
Those  considered  irregularities  are  : 

1.  Mutilated  persons,  who  have  no  use  of  their  hand,  thumb  or 
index  finger  ; 

2.  Blind  persons,  or  shortsighted,  not  being  able  to  read  eas- 
ily the  Missal  ; 

3.  Deaf  persons,  who  cannot  hear  the  clerk's  voice  ; 

4.  Dumb  persons,  or  stutterers,  who  cannot  distinctly  pronounce, 
at  least  without  great  difficulty;  provoking  laughter,  or  scorn  from 
attendants  ; 

5.  Lame  persons,  who  cannot  stand  up  without  a  cane  ; 

6.  Those  who  are  noseless,  twisted,  flattened  or  lengthened  in 
an  exaggerated  manner; 

7.  The  deformed  ;  for  instance,  those  who  are  hunchbacked. 
1072. — Ques.     Is  a  one-eyed  man  irregular? 


Treatise  on  Irregularities.  443 

Ans.  No,  if  he  is  deprived  onl}'  of  his  right  eye,  which  is  less 
necessary  for  the  celebration  of  the  Mass  ;  providing  that  no  de- 
formity results  from  it. 

Yes,  if  he  is  deprived  of  his  left  eye,  called  the  canonical  eye  ; 
because  this  is  necessary  for  the  reading  of  the  Canon  of  the 
Mass.  ... 

Through  Defect  -of  Kindness. 

1076. —  Irregularities  by  defect  of  kindness,  are  all  those  co- 
perating,  voluntarily,  actively,  and  in  an  efficacious  and  near 
manner,  in  the  death  or  mutilation  of  some  person  ;  although 
according  to  justice,  by  an  action  having  relation  to  it. 

So  are  executioners  irregulars  ;  also  judges,  and  all  participating 
in  judgments. 

The  following  are  excepted  :  1,  constrained  witnesses  ;  2,  those 
who  bring  accusation  for  reparation  for  a  wrong  or  prejudice 
suflfered.   .  .  . 

Through  Defect  of  Reputation. 

1078. —  ...  Ques.  Are  innocent  persons,  condemned  by  false 
witnesses  to  ignominious  penalties,  irregulars  ? 

Ans.     Yes  ;  because,  by  this  fact,  they  are  infamous. 

Ques.     Are  executioners'  sons  irregulars? 

Ans.  No,  in  principle.  But  they  must  be  sent  to  another  dio- 
cese, for  fear  the  Church  should  suffer  dishonor  from  them. 


I 


ART.  II.     Irregularities  through  defect.  .  . 
Appendix  :  On  Indulgences  and  Jubilee. 

CHAPTER  I. 
Indulgences. 


i 


CHAPTER   II. 
Jubilee. 


Cases  on  Censures  anlr  Irregularities. 


These  are  of  little  interest.  I  will  quote  only  two  of  them,  for 
very  diverse  reasons,  which  the  reader  will  easily  understand  : 

Case  VII. 

Censures. 

Religious  Claustration. 

1.  Justine,  a  nun,  moved  by  thoughtlessness,  places  herself  in 
the  turning  box,  which  is  inside  the  convent  ;  then  she  let  herself 
ride  outside  ;  after  this,  without  leaving  the  turning  box,  she  went 
back  into  the  convent. 

II.  Damaris,  a  nun,  standing  on  the  threshold  of  the  convent 
door,  which  is  open,  puts  one  of  her  limbs  outside  the  door. 
Another  time  she  exposed  her  head  and  bust  outside  the  door. 

Ques.     Have  Justine  and  Damaris  incurred  excommunication? 

Ans.  1,  Justine  has  incurred  censure  ;  because  she  went  out- 
side the  limits  of  the  convent,  as  she  went  into  a  place  where  laics 
could  pass  by. 

2.  Damaris  has  not  incurred  censure,  either  in  the  first  or  the 
second  cases.  She  should  therefore  be  exempted  from  the  penal- 
ty of  excommunication. 

Case  I. —  Irregularities. 

Irregularities   in   General. 

Anatole,  a  child  twelve  years  of  age,  in  order  to  become  the  only 
heir  of  his  parents,  chokes  his  brother,  a  little  child,  by  putting  his 
own  finger  into  his  mouth.  Later,  having  done  penance  for  his 
crime,  he  studies  to  become  a  priest.  Already  ordained,  he  reads 
that  homicide  is  a  cause  of  irregularity.  What  will  the  unhappy 
man  do  ?     He  does  not  know  who  to  ask  for  advice,  and  what  must 


Cases  on  Censures  and  Irregularities,  445 

be  done?  In  expectation  of  being  able  to  consult  some  theologian, 
he  continues  saying  mass. 

Ques.  1.  Can  children  under  age  incur  irregularity  through  a 
fault? 

Ques.  2.  Did  Anatole  sin  by  celebrating  mass  with  a  doubt 
concerning  his  regularity? 

Ans.  to  Question  1.  There  is  controversy.  Some  affirm  it, 
with  Sanchez  ;  because,  by  right,  no  one  is  excepted  but  children 
under  seven  years  of  age  ;  many,  with  Castro  Palao  excuse  from 
all  faults  all  persons  under  age,  except  the  one  who  strikes  a 
clerk,  or  violates  religious  claustration. 

Ans.  to  Question  2.  Probabl}'  Anatole  is  not  in  the  condition 
of  irregularity,  because  he  committed  the  fault  when  under  age.  No 
matter  if  it  is  a  question  of  homicide.  .  .  .  Moreover,  as  has  been 
said,  many  think  that  persons  under  age  are  free  from  all  penal- 
ties, excepting  those  incurred  for  having  struck  a  clerk,  or  forced 
an  entrance  into  a  monastery.  ... 


» 


J.  G.  SETTLER 


lê^^^T&xt^ 


ON   THE 


6th  Precept  of  the  Decalogue 


©bligattonsi  of  $pousei5  antr  some  Questions  relatifae  to 

JKarriage* 


Extracts  from  his  "Universal  Moral  Theology,  Enlarged  by  Notes  and 
New  Questions." 

— BY — 

ROUSSELOT, 

(Professor  of  Theology  at  the  great  Seminary  of  Grenoble.) 


FOR  THE  USE  OF  NEW  CONFESSORS  AND  PUPILS. 


i 


NEW    EDITION 


Grenoble,    1844 


SUR  LE  SIXIEME  PRECEPTE  DU  DECALOGUE 

Sur  les  ©bltgations  très  Epoux 

ET    SUR 

QUELQUES  QUESTIONS  RELATIVES  AU  MARIAGE, 


CHAPITRE  PREMIER 
Sur  le  Sixième  Précepte  du  Decalogue. 

Question  I.*  Comment  sont  conçus  le  sixième  et  le  neuvième 
préoepte  du  Decalogue,  et  ce  qu'ils  défendent. —  II.  Ce  qu'est 
la  c-linsteté. 

Le  sixième  précopte  dit  :  Tu  re  forniqueras  pas,  le  neuvième  : 
Tu  ne  désireras  i)as  la  femme  de  ton  prochain.   .   .   . 

*'  Il  y  a  trois  sortes  de  chasteté  •  coijugale,  viduale,  virginale. 

''  La  conjugale  défend,  en  état  de  mariage,  les  v(>lui)lés  illicites 
de  la  chair,  et  ordonne  d'user  médiocrement  des  voluptés  licites. 
La  viduale  défend  d'user  après  la  dissolution  du  mariage,  tant  des 
licites  que  des  illicites.  La  virginale,  chez  les  personnes  qui  n'ont 
jamais  éprouvé  les  voluptés  charnelles,  en  entraîne  l'abstinence 
perpétuelle  et  générale,  tant  des  licites  que  des  illicites." 

La  virginité  est  une  venu  spéciale,  meilleure  et  plus  excellente 
que  le  mariage." 

Suit  une  substantielle  dissertation  sur  les  conditions  dans  les- 
quelles se  perd  la  virginité  :  sur  la  perte  réparable,  alors  qu'elle  n'a 
eu  lieu  "  que  par  le  simple  consentement  à  l'acte  vénérien,  pourvu 
que  ce  consentement  soit  tel  qu'il  ne  s'en  soit  pas  suivi  et  n'ait  pu 
s'ensuivre  de  pollution,"  et  sur  la  perte  irréparable  ^*par  pollution, 

♦  J'ai  conservé  toute  Tapparence  et  la  disposition  fin  livre  et  reproduit 
tontt^s  les  questions  posées,  alors  iiiCiiic  que  la  iépi)U.-e  ne  m'a  pa?  paru 
mériter  d  être  hiuiialée. 


450  llie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

et  par  tout  acte  libidineux  volontairement  sans  pollution,  commis 
par  celui  qui  est,  en  vertu  dé  son  âge,  capable  de  semination." 

Puis,  cette  remarque  répugnante,  qui  prépare  aux  monstruosités 
du  livre:  "Comme  les  petites  filles  sont  capables  de  séminatioa 
avant  l'âge  de  la  puberté,  et  même  dès  l'âge  de  six  ans,  elles  peu- 
vent plutôt  perdre  irréparablement  leur  virginité  que  Ls  garçons" 
(p.  9).  Ceci  entraînera  des  interrogations  spéciale»,  dès  l'âge  de 
six  ans  ! 

ART.  I.  —  De   la   LrxuRE    en    General    et   des   Espèces    de 
Luxure  Consommée. 

Ques.  I.     Ce  qu'est  la  luxure,  et  de  ses  espèces. 

"  La  luxure  est  un  appétit  déréglé,  ou  un  usage  immodéré  des 
choses  vénériennes,  c'est-à-dire  des  volu[)tés  vénériennes. 

"Elle  est  parfaite  et  consommée,  quse  consi^tit  in  voluntaria 
seminis  effusione,  ou  imparfaite,  quae  fit  sine  effusione  seminis. 
On  la  dit  aussi  naturelle,  lorsque  sont  conservées  toutes  les  con- 
ditions que  demande  la  nature  pour  la  génération  de  l'homme,  ou 
innaturelle  dans  le  cas  contraire." 

II.  Combien  il  y  a  de  sortes  de  délectation  dans  la  luxure  ou 
volupté  et  délectation. 

"Il  y  a  trois  sortes  de  délectation:  spirituelle,  organique  et 
vénérienne." 

Le  professeur  insiste  sur  cette  dernière  "  qnœ  sentitur  circa 
parte  vencras,  et  orilur  ex  commotione  spirituum,  seu  humorum 
speimaticorum  geneiationi  inseivienlium."  Il  la  divise  de  nouveau 
en  légère  :  "  levis  est  si)irituum,  seu  Innnorum  si)ermaticoruni  gen- 
eration! inservientium  commotio  quiedam  levis  tantum,  ac  ex  lum- 
bis  decisio,  adhuc  longe  distans  ab  effusione  seminis.  .  .  .,"  et  en 
véhémente:  "  spirituum  spermaticorum  conimotio  fortis  et  notabi- 
lis,  quae  in  humine  sano  prcximum  seminis  effundendi  pericului^ 
continet*   .    .   ." 

*Sanchez  sera  toujours  en  ces  matières  nn  maître  qu'on  peut  imiter, 
mais  non  surpasser.  Kousselot  paraît  fade  à  côté  de  cette  phrase  ardente 
et  émue,  où  semblent  se  trahir  ensemble  et  l'expérience  et  les  regrets; 
"  Adeo  vehemens  in  seminis  eft'iisione  delectatio  sentitur,  utillam  homines 
taiiqiiam  summum  bonnin  prosequantur,  illiqne,  velnti  suae  felicitati 
,iailha3ieaut."    Et  pourtant  Kous;eiot  tievait  s'y  connaître  I 


Cases  on  Sixth  Precejyi  of  Decalogue,  45 1 

III.  Combien  il  y  a  de  causes  de  délectation  et  d'émotion 
charnelles. 

Il  y  a  deux  causes  :  per  se,  et  per  accidens  ;  on  pourrait  dire 
directe  ou  indirecte,  celle-ci  pouvant  être  légère  ou  grave,  suivant 
ses  conséquences  sur  les  sens  du  patient.  Ce  dernier  point  est 
assez  difficile  à  déterminer,  car  "  sic  dantur,  qui  ex  solo  mulieris 
aspectu  vel  tactu,  etiara  honesto,  motus  inordinatos  experiuntur  :" 
tel  était  Tartuffe  ;  "  alii  e  contra,  qui  ex  mulieris  etiam  nudae  con- 
spectu  vix  commoventur  :"  telle  était  Dorine. 

IV.  Combien  il  y  a  d'espèces  de  luxure  naturelle  consommée. 
Quel  péché  est  la  simple  fornication. 

"  Il  y  a  sept  sortes  de  luxure  naturelle  consommée:  la  simple 
fornication,  le  stupre,  l'adultère,  l'inceste,  le  rapt,  le  sacrilège,  le 
proxénétisme. 

"  La  fornication  simple  est  le  rapport  humain  et  naturel  de  deux 
personnes  libres."  On  la  divise  en  trois  sortes:  simplement  dite, 
concubinage  et  prostitution. 

Suit  une  longue  dissertation. 

V.  S'il  y  a  quelque  malice  particulière  dans  la  fornication  : 
r  d'un  fiancé  avec  une  tierce  personne  ;  T  d'un  baptisé  avec  un 
non-baptisé  ;  3"  d'un  catholique  avec  un  non-catholique  ;  4"  d'un 
tuteur  avec  sa  pupille  ;  5"  avec  un  eunuque,  un  impuissant,  une 
veuve  ;  6"  d'une  servante  avec  son  maître. 

De  cette  très  instructive  étude,  et  très  détaillée,  je  ne  retiens 
qu'une  ré[)onse,  qui  montre  bien  le  point  de  vue  tout  grossier 
auquel  se  place  le  casuiste. 

"'  Copula  ab  eunucho  vel  frigido  habita  specialem  continet  mali- 
tiam,  quia,  cum  semen  non  habeat,  intervenit  finis  naturalis  frus- 
trât io." 

VI.  Comment  le  confesseur  doit  se  conduire  avec  les  concubines. 

VII.  Si  les  prostituées  peuvent  être  tolérées,  et  s'il  est  permis 
de  leur  louer  sa  maison. 

On  peut  les  tolérer,  pour  éviter  un  plus  grand  mal  ;  on  peut  leur 
louer  sa  maison,  si  tout  le  monde  leur  refuse  et  que  leur  absence 
occasionne  un  plus  grand  mal. 

VIII.  Quel  péché  est  le  stupre. 

t       "Stïuprum  est  defloratio  virginis  invitœ." 


452  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Suit  la  longue  description  de  la  valeur  de  chacun  de  ces  trois 
mots,  définition  sans  doute  pleine  d'intérêt  pour  le  "jeune  con- 
fesseur et  disciple  :" 

*'  1°  Defloratio  est  virginalis  claustri  illicita  corruptio  per  pri- 
mam  copulam  carnalem  ;  2"  nomine  virginis  venit  omnis  persona 
quse  necdum  ullam  cum  altera  copulam  habuit,  et  quidam  etiamsi 
ea  se  per  moUitiem  poUuisset,  aut  turpibus  desideriis  consensisset, 
vel  signaculi  virginalis  integritatem  casu,  aut  arte  violusset,  quia 
nempe  bis  non  obstantibus  retineri  censetur  curnis  integritas.  .  .  " 

IX.  Quel  péché  est  le  rapt. 

Voici  une  question  fort  intéressante  et  fréquemment  agitée  par 
les  casuistes,  à  propos  de  l'aventure  de  la  chaste  Suzanne,  dent  ils 
blâment  presque  tous  l'excessive  susceptibilité. 

"  D.  Que  doit  faire  la  femme  enlevée  pour  ne  pas  pécher  devant 
Dieu?  —  R.  1^'  Résister  intérieurement  à  la  jouissance,  et  ne  pas 
du  tout  y  consentir.  ...  2"  Résister  extérieurement  à  l'aggres- 
seur,  se  défendre  des  pieds,  des  mains,  des  ongles,  des  donts.  .  .  . 
en  remuant  le  corps,  et  même  en  appelant  s'il  y  a  chance  de  se- 
cours.  .   .   . 

*'  Mais  elle  n'est  pas  tenue  de  crier,  quand  il  y  a  danger  pour  sa 
vie  ou  sa  renommée.  .  .  .  Cependant,  si  elle  e^t  en  péril  de  con- 
sentn-,  ce  qui,  selon  Billuart,  ne  manque  presque  jamais,  elle  doit 
alors  crier. 

"  Peut-elle  tuer  son  aggresseur?  Settler  le  nie,  avec  la  plupart, 
disant  que  la  pudicité  est  un  moindre  bien  que  la  vie  tem[)orelle  et 
la  vie  éternelle,  lesquelles  perdrait  l'aggresseur,  s'il  était  tué.   .   ." 

X.  Quel  péclié  est  l'adultère. 

'•Il  y  a  trois  sortes  d'atlultères  :  homme  libre  avec  femme 
mariée  ;  homme  marié  avec  femme  libre  ;  homme  marié  avec 
femme  mariée  :  d'où  adukère  simple  et  adultère  double." 

Un  botaniste  n'tût  pas  fait  une  meilleure  classihcation. 

XI.  Quel  péché  est  l'inceste. 

XII.  Quel  }>éclié  est  le  sacrilège. 

**Le  péché  sacrilège  de  luxure  est  celui  dans  lequel  une  personne 
sacrée,  un  litu  sacré,  une  chose  sucrée,  est  profané.  D'oii  trois 
sories  de  sacnlèiies." 


Jases  on  Sixth  Precept  of  Decalogue.  453 

Quel  besoin  de  classiûcalion  !  Et  chaque  sorte  se  divise  à  son 
tour. 

Pour  la  personne  sacrée,  il  faut  distinguer.  "  1"  Si  la  personne 
sacrée  pèche  luxurieusement  ou  désire  pécher  avec  une  personne 
non  sacrée,  ou  pèjhe  avec  elle-raôine,  se  polluendo,  tav^tus,  vel 
aspectus  turpes  habendo,  etc.-=-  2"*  Si  une  personne  non  sacrée, 
pèche  luxurieusement  avec  une  personne  sacrée,  ou  le  désire  ;  3"  Si 
une  personne  sacrée  pèche  luxurieusement,  ou  désire  pécher  avec 
une  autre  personne  également  sacrée:  le  sacrilège  est  double  alors." 

Pour  le  lieu,  les  distinctions  sont  plus  subtiles  encore,  et  plus 
étranges  surtout.  Il  faut  savoir  ce  qu'est  le  lieu  sacré,  et  définir 
les  actes  coupables.  Pour  donner  un  échantillon  des  difficultés  de 
la  question,  je  citerai  cet  exemple:  "  Violatur  ecclesia  per  effu- 
sionem  seminis,  quae  quidein  debet  esse  voluntaria  in  se  ;  .  .  . 
proinde  ecclesia  non  poUuitur  per  pollutionem  nocturnam,  etsi 
voluntariam  in  sua  causa.  Nec,  si  fiat  aliquot  solum  guttarum 
eflfusio.  .  .  .  Effusio  non  snfficicns  ad  violationem  templi,  sufficit 
tamen  ad  sacrilegium  :  "  admirable  sujtt  de  réflexions  et  de 
dissertations  ! 

La  question  de  la  chose  sacrée  n'est  pas  moins  remai-qnable- 
ment  traitée.  Le  disciple  y  apprendra  qu'il  sera  sacrilège  si 
*' rebus  sacris  vel  alios  vel  seipsum  irapudice  taugit;  si  ipsum 
polluit,  dum  sacram  Eucharistiara  circumfert  ...  ;  si  sacris 
vestibus  indutus  turpia  exterius  perpétrât  (hœ  tamen  vestes  non 
ideo  benedictionem  suam  amittunt),  etc."  Mais  s'il  "commet 
quelque  turpitude  en  portant  des  reliques  sacrées,  il  n'est  pas 
sacrilège,  parce  qu'il  n'a  pas  l'intention  de  mépriser  les  reliques 
...  ;  si  cependant  il  a  employé  ces  reliques  à  une  fin  dépravée," 
etc.,  etc. 

XIII.  I.  Quelles  sont  les  espèces  de  luxure  consommée  contre 
la  nature.  II.  Ce  que  sont  moUities  et  distillatio  :  pour  quoi  on 
les  prohibe,  et  quel  péché  est  molli  ties. 

La  réponse  à  la  1'®  question  énumère:  "  mollities  bestialitas 
Bodomia,  et  modus  coeundi  qui  generationem  impedire  queat." 

Et  quelle  admirable  précision  dans  le  détail  !  Ecoutez  :  "  Ordo 
a  natura  praescriptus  exigit  :  1"  ut  fiat  commixtio  duorura  ;  2^'  ut  hi 
duo  sint  ejusdem  naturae,  seu  speciei  ;  3^  ut  sint  diversis  sexus,  et 


4  54  The  Doctrine  of  11  Le  Jesuits. 

coQant  in  vase  debito  ;  4"  ut  coëant  eo  modo,  qui  generationem 
promovere  valeat,  et  non  impedire. 

Réponse  non  moins  topique  et  toute  expérimentale  à  la  seconde 
question:  "  Mollities,  vulgo  dici  solita  pollutio,  est  fluxiis,  seu 
efïusio  seminis  humani  voluntarie  procurata  extra  copulam  et 
concubitiim.  Distillatio  est  fluxns  hiimoris  ciijiisdam  medii  inter 
semen  et.  urinam,  qui  nempe  differt  ab  urina,  eo  qnod  sit  magis 
viseosus  et  glutinosus,  vero  autem  semine,  eo  qnod  sit  illo  minus 
viscosus  et  minus  mordax.  .  .  .  Mollities  coramitti  potest  luin  a 
maribus  turn  a  femines  ;  a  maribus  quidem  extra  vas,  a  feminis 
vero  turn  extra  vas,  sed  raro,  turn  et  communius  in  ipso  vase."  * 

Suit  une  page  de  détails  sur  les  divers  moyens  de  produire 
mollities  et  distillatio,  sur  les  circonstances  qui  peuvent  servir 
d'excuses,  sur  les  moyens  de  l'arrêter  en  chemin,  etc. 

Le  professeur  fait  montre  dans  cette  dissertation,  non  seulement 
de  science,  mais  de  lettres  latines,  en  citant  Martial  : 

Ipsara  crede  tibi  naturam  dicere  verum  : 
Istud  quod  digitis,  Poutice,  perdis,  homo  est. 

Il  n'y  fait  pas  moins  preuve  d'imaginat'on  et  de  haute  expé- 
rience: "  Liceret  tamen  in  fornicatiouis  aclu  copulam  abrumpere, 
ex  odio  et  displicentia  peccati,  quamvis  sit  necessario  tune  semen 
effundere  extra  vas."  f 

XIV.  Quand  la  pollution  est  censée  volontaire  dans  sa  cause  ; 
quand  et  comment  elle  est  coupable. 

11  y  a  quatre  règles  pour  décider  sur  ces  graves  questions. 

*  "  Indicium  est  istius,  si  scilicet  mulier  sentiat  seminis  solutionem  cum 
magno  voluptatis  sensu,  quâ  compléta,  passio  satiatur  (  BiVuart). 

Kousselot  passe  très  rapidement  sur  la  pollution  chez  les  lemmes.  Le 
R.  P.  I)ebre3'ne  le  lai  reproche  et  s'écrie:  *'  Est-il  étonnant,  après  cela,  de 
voir  tant  de  jeunes  prêtres  ignorants  sur  cette  matière?"  Aussi,  afin  de 
combler  cette  lacune,  il  entame  une  savante  dissertation  en  ces  termes: 
"  Très  apud  nos  masturbationis  species  vel  potius  formae  in  feminis  dis- 
tinguntur:  l'' raasturbatio  clitorina;  2"  vaginalis;  3"  uteriua."  {Mœchia- 
logie,  p.  65,  1874.) 

t  Cependant  il  ne  faudrait  pas  attribuer  à  Rousselot  le  mérite  de  l'inven- 
tion de  cette  intéressante  espèce.  Deux  cents  ans  avant  lui,  Diana,  dans 
son  petit,  mais  succulent  livre  des  ISolutiuns  pratiques,  avait  dit:  '-Qui 
tormcaXnY  tenetur  se  retrahere  ante  spermaticum,  etsi  complex  jam  seminat  : 
imo  etsi  ex  vi  prioris  commotionis  post  retractionem  esset  futura  semina- 
tio."  Et  il  avait  montré  la  laison  de  main  de  maître:  "Quia  onmi 
momento  tenetur  opus  pravum  abrumpere."     (P.  385). 


Cases  on  Sixth  Precej)t  of  Decalogue,  455 

Dans  la  quatrième,  il  est  question  de  la  pollution  sans  vrai 
péché,  pai'ce  que  "si  la  cause  n'es^t  pas  péclié  par  elleniême,  et 
qu'il  y  ait  une  raison  légitime  de  nécessité  ou  d'utilité  de  s'y 
livrer,  ou  d'y  persévérer,  la  pollution  qui  s'ensuit  n'est  pas  un 
péché  elle-même,  bien  que  prévue  pourvu  qu'elle  ne  soit  pas 
voulue." 

Aces  conditions  embrouillées  répondent:  "  le  cas  des  confes- 
seurs" qui  n'est  pas  sans  danger,  comme  on  voit;  celui  de 
'•l'étudiant  en  m&f.ères  honteuses;"  il  en  est  de  même  pour 
*' celui  qui  monte  à  cheval,  qui  mange  avec  modération  des  mets 
échauffants,  qui  regarde  ou  touche  impudiquement  une  autre 
personne  pour  la  soigner  ou  la  laver,  qui  cause  honnêtement  avec 
une  femme,  ou  l'embrasse  honnêtement  suivant  la  coutume.'* 
Quels    gaillards  susceptibles,  et  prompts  à  la  tentation.* 

XV.  I.  Si  les  pollutions  nocturnes  sont  un  péché  et  quel. 
]I.  S'il  est  permis  de  les  désirer  et  de  s'en»  réjouir.  III.  ÎSi  la 
distillation  est  un  péché,  et  quand. 

Il  faut  bien  de  la  souplesse  pour  se  tirer  de  telles  difficultés; 
mais  que  ne  peut  l'habileté?  La  réponse  définitive  à  la  deuxième 
question  est:  "Licet,  detestando  pollutionem,  gaudere  de  felici 
effectu  quem  ipsa  habuit." 

Mais  le  professeur  paraît  fort  empêché  de  répondre  à  la  troisième 
question  :  "  Si  fiat  praeter  inlentionem  et  sine  commotione  spirituuni 
vitalium  ac  sensuum  carnis,  aut  cum  sensu  tantum  levissimo,  non 
est  peccatum  ;  si  vero  fiat  cum  commoti(me  spirituum  vitalium  aut 
voluntario  sensu  carnali  ac  venereo,  est  peccatum.  "Il  est  diffi- 
cile de  ne  pas  se  déclarer  satisfait. 

XVI.  Si  les  menstrues  des  femmes,  la  pollution,  les  actes 
conjugaux,  sont  des  empêchements  à  la  sainte  communion. 

La  réponse  à  la  troisième  question  est  particulièrement  intéres- 
sante ;  elle  donne  des  conseils  aux  femmes  sur  la  grave  question 
de  savoir:  "An  maritas  debitum  reddere  debeant  eo  die,  vel  pridie, 

*  Sanchez,  le  maître,  offre  encore  une  ressource  que  Rousselot  ne  refuse 
pas,  ressource  précieuse,  car  elle  peut  servir  alors  même  qu'il  y  a  faute 
manifeste  de  la  part  du  patient: 

"  Ubi  poUutio  cœpit  culpa  patientis,  si  in  ipso  fluxu  prœteritas  culpae 
eum  pœniteat,  non  tenetur  fluxum  reprimere  quia  jam  pœnitentia  inter- 
rnpit  actionem  prœteritam,  nunc  autem  solum  patitur."  On  n'est  pas  plus 
accommodant,  et  il  devient  viaiment  difficile  de  pécher  en  cette  matière. 


I 


456  Tlie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

quando  communicaturae  sunt."  Elle  tient  sagement  compte  des 
intentions  et  des  habitudes. 

Jl  est  enjoint  au  confesseur  d'expliquer  aux  femmes  ces  règles 
subtiles,  et  d'exhorter  les  maris  à  s'abstenir  de  l'acte,  par  respect 
pour  la  sacrée  communion. 

XVII.  Quels  péchés  sont  la  bestialité,  la  sodomie,  et  modi 
coeundi  innaturales. 

Définitions  savantes  ;  distinction  sagace  de  "  sodomia  perfrc'a» 
id  est  concubitus  personarum  ejusdem  sexus,  et  imperfecta.  .  .  ." 
Le  sodomiste  devra  donner  à  son  confesseur  maints  détails  lon- 
guement énumérés,  et  entre  autres  "an  agens  fuerit  an  patiens, 
.  .  .  quia  conditio  agentis  longe  turpior  est  quam  conditio 
patientis."  * 

Il  ne  faut  cependant  pas  être  trop  curieux  :    "  Qui  coïtum  habuit 

*  Les  Casuistes  sont  d'accord  sur  ce  dernier  point,  et  aussi  sur  ceci  : 
•'  Gravius  est  sodomiam  habere  cum  fœinina  quam  cum  mare." 

L'abbé  Craisson,  auteur  dun  de  Behus  venereis  fort  estimé,  et  pu- 
blié à  Paris  en  1870  dans  le  but,  principalement,  de  corri<>er  les  ou- 
vrages antérieurs  sur  le  même  sujet,  parce  que  ces  ouvrajies  "  ne  sont 
pas  suffisamment  débarrassés  du  rigorisme  introduit  par  les  jansénistes, 
et  présentent  une  sévérité  qui  rend  trop  difficile  la  fonction'  de  confes- 
seur." l'abbé  Craison,  dis-je,  fait  montre  ici  de  l'imagination  la  plus 
rafiinée. 

Il  se  demande  s'il  y  a  sodomie,  "si  vir  coierit  extra  vas,  v.  g.  inter 
crura,  brachia  aut  alias  mulieris  partes,"  et  consacre  un  paragraphe  spé- 
cial à  la  question  de  savoir:  "An  poUutio  in  ore  sit  diversse  speciei? 
Affirmant  uonnuUi,  dit-il,  vocantes  hoc  peccatum  irrumationem.  Froba- 
bilius  habet  S.  Liguori,  quod  sit  poUutio  cum  inchoata  fornicatione  si 
vir  polluatur  in  ore  f  œmiuse  ;  si  vero  pollutur  in  ore  maris,  hoc  est  sodomia 
proprie  dicta." 

C'est  encore  à  ce  grand  saint  que  revient  l'honneur  d'avoir  découvert 
pourquoi  c'est  un  péché  mortel  "si  vir  immitat  pudenda  in  os  fœminae." 
La  raison  est  que  "  ob  calorem  oris,  adest  proximum  perlculum  poliu- 
tionis."     (S.  Liguori,  t.  VI.) 

Il  y  a  encore  des  choses  intéressantes,  par  exemple  de  savoir  "  si  la 
sodomie  entre  parents  est  un  inceste."  Diana,  que  nous  connaissons  déjà, 
le  niait  tout  à  fait  :  "Quia  ad  incestum  requiritur  coitus  in  vase  debito 
cum  mixtione  sanguinis."  La  dissertation  sur  ce  point  est  longue  et  ins- 
tructive. 

Craisson  rapporte  ensuite  les  peines  édictées  par  S.  Pie  V  contre  les 
clercs  sodomistes  et  déclare,  comme  le  faisait  jadis  Escobar  (V.  ci-des- 
sus, p.  131)  que  pour  les  encourir,  les  clercs  devront  s'en  être  fréquem- 
ment rendus  coupables:  "celui  qui  n'a  péché  qu'une  ou  deux  fois  sera 
excusé"  (p.  104).  Il  convient  aussi  de  rechercher  si  ces  peines  s'appli- 
quent aux  clercs  sodomistes  patients,  à  ceux  "  qui  bestialitatera  exercent;" 
pour  les  premiers  il  y  a  controverse,  mais  non  pour  les  derniers,  que  saint 
Liguori  exempte,  parce  qu'en  matière  pénale  on  ne  peut  pas  procéder  par 
analogie. 


Cases  on  Sixth  Precept  of  Decalogue,  457 

dim  bruto,  non  tenetur  exprimere  cejiis  speciei  illud  fiierit,  nisi 
forte  adeo  turpe  sit  ac  sordidum,  ut  in  ejus  congressu  sese  prodat 
libido  quœdam  singulariter  humanitatem  dedecens.  Nee  necesse  est 
dt'clarare  an  congressus  factus  fuerit  in  alvo,  an  vero  in  alia  parte 
corporis  bruti.  .  .  ."  Quel  dévergondage  d'imagination  monacale, 
hantée  par  des  rêveries  solitaires  !  * 

II  y  a  aussi  un  article  pour  le  "  coitus  cum  daeraone,  qui,  en 
outre  de  l'horreur  de  la  bestialité,  contient  une  malice  particulière, 
un  péché  contre  la  religion,  puisque  c'est  un  commerce  avec  le 
plus  furieux  ennemi  de  Dieu."  t 

Mais  voici  qui  dépasse  toutes  choses:  "Reperire  est  etiam 
raulieres  et  puellas  quje,  cum  veneream  voluptalem  ex  minoris 
bestiœ  lingua  lambente  ceperint  aut  poUutionem  sint  expert ae, 
valde  cruciantur,  nec  illud  declarare  audent.  .  .  .  Expedit  igitiir 
prudenter  ...  a  mulieribus  et  etiam  a  puellis,  qiiserere  utrum 
cum  bestia  aliquid  inhoneste  egerint,  v.  g.,  bestiain  in  lec  turn  intro- 
mittendo  seque  ab  ea  lambente  tangi  procurando.'*  Et  la  pratique 
est  favorable  :  *'  Ita  exonerari  conscientias  non  semel  experieutia 
docet  !  " 

Remarquez  que  ce  paragraphe  est  tout  moderne,  signé  Rousselot. 
Et  maintenant,  oyez,  pères  de  famille,  cyez  ce  qu'au  fond  du 
confessionnal  obscur  et  redouté,  dans  la  chapelle  embaumée  et 
silencieuse,  un  jeune  et  vigoureux  vicaire  pourra  et  devra  deman- 
der à  vos  filles,  .  .  .  dès  l'âge  de  six  ans  !  J 

Enfin,  pour  tirer  l'échelle  :  "  Quîeritur  ad  quam  speciem  pertineat 
horrendus  cum  muliere  mortua  concubitus  1"  § 

♦  Il  y  a  cependant  une  sanction  pratique  à  ces  monstruosités,  s'il  faut 
en  croire  Billuart,  qui  "  non  reputat  consummatam  bestialitatem  nisi  Hat 
intra  vas  bruti,  proinde,  saltern  ut  plurimum,  cunsummari  nequit  a  mulier- 
ibus !  " 

t  Cette  même  insanité  des  rapports  avec  le  démon,  succube  ou  incube, 
est  encore  i^ravement  étudiée  en  1870  dans  le  livre  de  Craisson,  et  avec  un 
étrange  luxe  de  détails,  (p.  100). 

X  II  faut  pourtant  rendre  à  Rousselot  cette  justice  qu'il  passe  sous 
silence  la  "  sodomia  fœniinarum."  tant  étudiée  par  les  anciens  jésuites,  et 
si  savamment  distinguée  par  eux  du  "  tribadismus." 

§  Saint  Lignori  discute  très  posément  la  question  de  savoir  si  cette 
horrible  invention  doit  s'appeler  "  pollutio,  fornicatio,  sodomia,  aut  bes- 
tialitas;"  et  Billuart  tranclie  la  question  en  déclarant  que  cela  dé|)en(i 
*'  secundum  varias  conditiones  quae  concumbens  apprehendit  in  cadavere, 
et  de  quibus  delectatur." 


458  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

XVIII.  Quel  péclié  est  le  proxénétisme  (Icnociniiim). 

XIX.  Comment  doivent  eLre  interrogés  les  penitents  qui  se 
confessent  de  quelque  pécbé  de  luxuie  consommé. 

La  tâche  n'est  pas  facile,  et  les  questions  scabreuses  sont  innom- 
bral)les  à  poser. 

La  première  est  de  savoir  "  utrum  ex  metu  piolis  semen  effuderit 
extra  vas  .  .  .?  Ipsa  muliere  interrogetur  num  semen,  compléta 
copula,  ejicei-e  conata  sit?"  Et,  ne  croyez  pas  que  cette  cnriosi;é 
ne  puisse  servir  aux  progrès  de  la  science  morale.  D.  Vernier, 
thél'^gien  expérimenté,  a  remarqué  ce  fait  curieux  que  les  femmes 
mariées  commettent  plus  souvent  ce  supplément  de  faute  que  les 
simples  "  fornicarise  ;  "  et  notre  auteur  s'étonne  assez  judicieuse- 
ment de  ce  résultat. 

"  Interrogandus,  interrogandus,"  etc.  ;  l'imagination  jésuitique 
met  toutes  voiles  dehors  :  un  mousquetaire  s'y  pourrait  instruire. 

Un  seul  de  ces  cas  est  intéressant:  "Interrogandus  pœnitens 
an  actus  sodomiticos  exercuerit,  quod  non  raro  contingit  Iibidini 
valde  d^ditis."  Les  médecins  légistes  sont  uninimement  d'un 
avis  opposé,  ce  qui  indique  dans  la  clientèle  des  confessionnaux  e- 
chez  les  confesseurs  eux-mêmes  un  point  de  vue  tout  si)écial. 

XX.  Comment  doit  se  conduire  le  confesseur  avec  un  pénitent 
pollutionis  consuetudine  misère  irretitum. 

Pour  les  enfants  impubères,  mais  qu'il  y  a  lieu  de  soup  çonner 
et  cela,  dés  l'âge  de  dix  ans  pour  les  garçons,  et  pour  les  lilies 
même  dès  l'âge  de  sept  ans,  car  alors  déjà  on  en  trouve  qui 
"  voluptatera  carnalem  venereosque  motus  sibi  per  tactus,  situ  m 
corporis,  femorum  compressionem,  tibiarum  extensionem  procu- 
rant," il  faut  agir  très  prudemment,  et  par  des  questions  progres- 
sives, "en  procédant  du  plus  connu  au  moins  connu."  Voici  un 
exemple  de  ces  interrogations  prudentes  et  progressives,  à  adresser 
aux  petites  filles:  "Utrum  honesto  situ  cubent;  vestes  modeste 
induant  vel  exuant  ;  utrum  seipsos  nudos  aspiciant,  langantve  ; 
utrum  ab  aliis  aspici  se  et  tangi  passi  sint  ;  .  .  .  utrum  ex  tactil 
proprio  vel  alieno  motus  inhonestos  et  delectationem  magnain 
experti  sint;  utrum  factns  sœpius  repetiti  et  diuturni  fm-rint: 
utrum,  percepta  maxima  voluptate,  moLus  a  seipsis  cessaverint  et! 


Cases  on  Sixth  Precept  of  Decalogue,  459 

ip^simot   qnieverint;     .    .    .     ntrura    madefacti    fueriiit."       Quelle 
délicate  gradation,  et  quelle  discrétion  exquise  I 

Puis  viennent  les  petits  garçons,  puis  les  adultes,  bmnmes  et 
femmes,  et  cela  dure  pendant  quatre  pages  ! 

ART.  II.     Des   Espèces    du   Luxure   non   Consommée,  des 
Consequences,  Peines,  etc.,  de  la  Luxuue. 

Q.  I.  1"  Quelles  sont  les  espèces  de  luxure  non  consommées. 
2°  Si  les  baisers  sont  des  péchés,  et  quels. 

Ces  espèces  sont  les  baisers,  les  regards,  les  contacts,  les  paroles, 
écritures,  lectures,  compositions,  peintures,  etc.,  honteuses,  les 
pensées,  désirs,  délectations,  etc.,  impures. 

Quant  aux  baisers,  quand  ils  sont  libidineux,  et  comme  il  est 
bon  de  préciser,  "  sive  inter  ejusdem,  sive  inter  diversi  sexus 
personas  fiant*  .  .  .  etiamsi  non  subsit  periculum  ulterioris 
consensus  in  copulam." 

II.  Si  les  péchés  peuvent  être  commis,  quand  et  de  quelle 
sorte,  par  les  regards,  les  contacts,  les  tableaux  et  statues,  les 
paroles,  etc. 

Quelle  expérience  ou  quelle  érudition  !  Les  cas  particuliers  s*y 
comptent  par  centaines,  et  quelques-uns  bien  curieux,  et  bien 
dignes  de  fixer  l'attention  des  jeunes  étudiants  en  théologie  !  Ils 
apprendront,  par  exemple,  que  ''  si  matres  libères  suos  in  partibus 
inhonestis  tangunt,  aut  deosculantur  ex  amore  stulto,  potius  quain 
obsceno,  ut  non  raro  evenit,  peccant  leviter."  Q  le  *'  graviter 
peccant  qui  seipsos  in  partibus  inhonestis  tangunt  cum  delectatione 
venerea  ...  ;  qui  vero  id  faciunt  solum  ex  levitate,  aut  causa 
manu  calefnciendi,  peccant  venialiter.  .  .  .  Quod  si  vero  se 
tangant  morose  et  repetitis  vicibus,  etiam  peccant  mortaliter, 
qnamvis  non  agant  ex  affectu  libidinoso."  On  voit  qu'il  n'est  pas 
facile  de  s'y  reconnaître.  Ils  apprendront  encore  que  "qui 
animalium  ut  canis,  felis,  etc.,  genitalia  aspicit,  tangit,  fricat, 
usque  ad  effusionera  seminis,  mortaliter  peccare  videlur.  .  .  . 
Quod  si  autem  non  usque  ad  seminis  effusionem  tangantur.  .  .  . 
non  est  nisi  peccatum  levé."     Cependant  *'peccato  excusandus 

*In  pectus,  in  maraillas,  vel  more  columbarum,  linîîuam  in  os  intromit 
tendo."     {Bouvier,  dissertatio  in  sextum  Decalogi  prœceptuiu). 


k 


460  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

videtur,  qui  ea  usque  ad  seminationis  effusionem  fiicat,  ut  sic 
eorum  naturam  et  c  nstitutionem  melius  agnoscat." 

Et  bein  d'autres  choses  encore  qui  expliquent  l'expérience  précoce 
et  quasi-spontanée  qu'on  a  remarquée  dans  tant  d'affaires  de  cor- 
rectionnelle et  d'assises  !     11  y  en  a  six  pages.  * 

m.  Comme  il  faut  se  conduire  par  rapport  aux  mouvements 
qui  naissent  dans  les  parties  inférieures. 

Je  renonce  ici  à  la  citation  trop  longue,  et  à  ranal3'se  impossi- 
ble. 

IV.  Quels  péchés  sont  les  désirs,  les  délectations  et  les  pen- 
sées. 

V.  S'il  peut  y  avoir  matière  peu  grave  dans  la  luxure. 

VI.  Quels  péchés  sont  fils  de  la  luxure. 

VII.  Quelles  peines  contre  la  luxure  sont  établies  par  les  lois 
humaines. 

VIII.  Quelles  sont  les  excitations  de  la  luxure. 

IX.  Ce  qu'on  doit  dire  des  spectacles  et  des  livres  erotiques. 

X.  Ce  qu'on  doit  penser  des  danses. 

XI.  Quels  sont  les  lieux  et  les  temps  où  les  bals  sont  particu- 
lièrement inconvenants. —  Dans  quels  cas  les  bals  peuvent  avoir 
une  fin  honnête. 

Pour  la  deuxième  question,  il  est  une  circonstance  qui,  puis- 
qu'elle donne  une  fin  honnête  à  la  danse,  suflfît  à  elle  seule  dans 
presque  tous  les  cas:  *' 4"  quand  on  est  invité  et  qu'on  ne  peut 
s'excuser  convenablement." 

XII.  Quand  les  bals  peuvent  être  permis  ou  fréquen'és 

XIII.  Ce  que  doivent  spécialement  observer  par  rapport  aux 
danses  les  confesseurs  et  les  curés. 

XIV.  Ce  qu'il  faut  penser  de  la  toilette  des  femmes. 

Grave  question,  et  jadis  fort  agitée  par  les  jésuites,  qui  y  ont 

*  Et  cependant  il  faut  avouer  que  Kousselot  est  resté  bien  au-dessous 
de  Bouvier  qui  invente  l'espèce  monstrueuse  d'un  lils  "qui  pudenda 
matris  suse  libidinose  conspexisset!  "  Et  surtout  au-dessous  de  Bur- 
chard,  évèque  de  Worms,  qui  me  paraît  avoir  décidément  guigné  la 
palme  de  l'ignominie  par  cette  question  quMI  enjoint  d'adresser  aux  pé- 
nitentes :  'Tecisti  quod  quœdam  mulieres  facere  soient,  ut  cum  filio 
tuo  parvulo  fornicationem  faceres,  ita  dico  ut  filium  tuum  supra  tur- 
pitudinem  tuam  poueres  ut  sic  imitaberis  fornicationem?"  (Cité  par  le 
P.  Chiniquy,  1880). 


Cases  on  Sixth  Precept  of  Decalogue,  461 

gpgiié  le  nom  de  tliéologiens  maramillaires  ;  notre  auteur  ne  lui 
consacre  que  trois  pages  ;  mais  c'est  une  quintessence.  Le  jeune 
prêtre  saura  à  quelle  région  commence  et  finit  le  péché,  ''  quae  ila 
nulant  pectus  ut  media  ubera  nuda  appareant,  aut  quae  tenui  adeo 
vélo  pectus  obtegunt  ut  ubera  adhuc  remaneant  translucida,  pec- 
cant mortaliter."  Il  est  fâcbeu:x  que  le  dernier  point,  qui  manque 
de  précision,  piête  à  l'interprétation,  et  appelle  une  étude  de  fait 
qui  peut  être  périlleuse.  Le  confesseur  débutant  est  mieux 
renseigné  pour  le  péciié  véniel  que  commettent  les  jeunes  filles  "quae 
turgcntes  sibi  addunt  mammas."  Pourquoi  mammas  seulement? 
Il  V  a  là  une  lacune. 

XV.     Quels  remèdes  existent  contre  la  luxure  en  général. 

XVL  Quels  moyens  le  curé  peut  ou  doit  employer  contre  elle 
et  ses  causes. 

Le  principal  moj^en  recommandé  quand  il  s'agit  des  enfants,  et 
recommandé  évidemment  de  bonne  foi,  est  piécisément  celui  qui, 
de  l'aveu  unanime  des  moralistes  biiques,  est  le  plus  capable  de 
faire  naître  dans  les  jeunes  imaginations  les  idées  et  les  désirs  dan- 
gereux. *'Le  prêtre,  au  catéchisme,  s'efli'orcera  de  saisir  des  occa- 
sions fréquentes  d'inspirer  l'horreur  de  ce  }jéché,  de  mettre  devant 
les  yeux  des  enfants  ses  débuts,  ses  progrès,  ses  suites  funestes, 
d'en  citer  des  exemples  tragiques.  ...  Il  montrera  les  innombra- 
bles manières  dont  on  peut  être  induit  à  y  tomber  ;  il  en  décrira 
les  diverses  espèces  non  pas  en  détail,  mais  avec  une  demi-obscur- 
itè  (Kub  obscure  insinuare),  qui  ne  puisse  scandaliser  les  âmes 
innocentes.   .   .  ." 

Les  prédications  et,  bien  mieux,  les  livres  d'éducation  et  de  lec- 
ture de  la  secte  portent  en  efl^'et  la  marque  de  cette  préoccupation 
dé[)lorable,  et  qui  souvent  se  traduit  de  la  manière  la  plus  eros- 
sièie.  Un  de  mes  amis,  professeur  d'une  de  nos  Facultés  de  méde- 
cine, entrant  un  jour  par  hasard  dans  une  église  d'une  villj  du 
Midi  au  moment  du  catéchi-^me,  entendit  le  vicaire  dii  e  aux  petites 
fiiles  :  '•  Il  est  un  autre  péclié  que  vous  apprendrez  à  counuîa-e,  et 
qu'on  nomme  le  péché  mignon."*  ^ 

V 

*  Tl  s'aifit  bien  hi  fl'une  méthode  générale  d'enseignement;   j'en  citerai 
deux  preuves  <Mitre  mille. 
J'ai  hoiis  les  yeux  un  euhler  d'Iii'^lructiou  religieuse  rédigé  par  un  élève 


462  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

Qu'on  se  rappelle  les  affaires  toutes  récentes  de  l'abbé  Galbin  et 
de  l'abbé  Régnier,  et  l'embarras  de  la  magistrature  devant  cette 
excilalion  à  la  débauche  que  n'avait  pas  prévue  la  loi  pénale.* 

du  college  d'Etain  (Meuse)  ;  la  mention  très  bien  y  est  fréquemment  écrite 
de  la  main  de  l'auinouier. 

Aux  6e  et  9e  commandements,  je  lis  :  art.  l^"",  une  définition  des  pécliés 
de  luxure;  art.  2«^  une  étude  t^ur  la  gravité  de  ces  péchés,  où  sont  étudiés 
successivement  les  regards,  les  baisers  les  attouchements  et  la  délectation. 
Enfin,  la  définition  fort  claire  de  la  fornication,  de  l'adultère,  du  sacrilèue 
et  tie  l'inceste.  "L'espèce  du  péché,  est-il  dit  savamment,  varie  également 
pour  les  pensées,  les  désirs,  les  regards,  les  attouchements  et  les  baisers, 
suivant  qu'ils  ont  lieu  avec  quelqu'une  de  ces  diverses  circonstances."  Le 
pauvre  petit  garçon  qui  écrivait  ces  belles  choses  avait  \6  ans! 

Voilà  pour  les  garçons,  voici  pour  les  filles  •  ici  le  pittoresque  se  mêle  à 
l'odieux.  Je  possède  une  belle  carte  manuscrite,  dessinée  non  sans  grand 
travail  par  une  jeune  fille  âgée  de  15  ans,  élève  de  l'école  communale 
d'Are^ches.  Elle  a  pour  titre  l'Empire  du  vice.  On  y  voit  le  dit  empire, 
confinant  aux  royaumes,  de  la  Justice  et  de  la  Société,  enveloppé  par  les 
Mers  de  riulamie  et  de  l'Ennui,  et  1  Océan  de  la  Tristesse,  séparé  du  pays 
de  la  Vertu  par  le  détroit  des  Soupirs,  etc. 

Il  est  divisé  en  sept  provinces,  qui  sont  les  sept  péché  capitaux.  La 
Luxure  y  étale  une  surf  ace  prépondérante;  elle  est  arrosée  par  une  rivière, 
la  fan<j;e;  son  clief-lieu  est  l'impudicité;  elle  compte  neuf  chefslieux  d'ar- 
rondissement (sic),  qui  sont:  la  dél)auche,  la  volupté,  l'immoralité,  l'adul- 
tère, l'inceste,  la  prostitution,  le  cynisme,  le  viol,  l'impureté,  et  onze 
communes,  à  savoir  la  séduction,  les  mauvais  désirs,  le  relâchement,  la 
turpitude,  la  fornication,  la  dépravation,  les  faux  plaisirs,  l'orgie,  la  sensu- 
alité, l'impudeur,  le  rapt. 

La  pauvre  jeune  flUe  a  dfi  non  seulement  bien  mettre  en  place  les  élé- 
ments de  cette  stupide  et  ignoble  géographie,  mais  reprendre  en  un  tab- 
leau soi<>né,  sur  trois  colonnes,  avec  accolades  et  soins  calligraphiques, 
cette  enumeration,  produit  d'une  cervelle  monacale  en  délire  éroti()ue. 

J'ai  appris  qu'une  carte  analogue  avait  été  saisie  par  l'inspecteur 
d'Académie  de  Vaucluse. 

♦Reproduisons  ici  quelques  considérants  du  jugement  du  tribunal  de  la 
Flèche,  acquittant  l'abbé  Galbin  (18  Juin  1879)  ;  et  aussi  quelques-uns  de 
ceux  du  tribunal  d'Auxerre,  acquittant  l'abbé  Kégnier  (Septembre  1879)  : 

Ce  dernier  d'abord  : 

'Attendu  qu'il  résulte  de  l'instruction  et  des  débats  qu'à  différentes  re- 
prises, dans  le  cours  des  années  1877,  1878  et  1879  au  confessional  ou  dans 
réii:lisede  Lucy-^ur-Yonne,  l'abbé  Régnier,  s'adressaut  aux  petites  filles  du 
catéchisme,  leur  a  posé  des  questions  et  tenu  des  propos  dont  le  caractère 
licencieux  ne  peut  être  contesté; 

*'Que  ces  questions  et  propos  étaient  de  nature  à  surexciter  l'imagina- 
tion de  très  jeunes  enfants,  et  à  développer  dans  leur  esprit  des  idées  nul- 
saines; 

•'Que  cela  est  d'autant  plus  regrettable  que  déjà,  en  1873,  une  instruc- 
tion judiciaire  a  relevé  à  la  charge  du  prévenu  des  faits  absolument  analo- 
gues." 

Et  maintenant,  l'abbé  Galbin  : 

"Considérant  que  l'abbé  Galbin,  dans  des  conversations  particulières, 
dans  sa  chambre,  dans  le  jardm  du  presb^  tére  et  dans  la  sacriste,  voulut 


RestUiLtlon  on  Account  of  Lustful  Sins,  4G3 


CHAPITRE  II. 

De  la  Restitution  à  cause  des  péchés  de  luxure,  principalement  à 
cause  du  stupre  et  de  l'adultère. 

ART,  I.     De  l'Obligation  de  Restituer  ex  stupre  (p.  78). 

Q.  L     A  quoi  est  tenu  le  stuprator. 

1^"  '^Celui  qui,  sans  violence,  fraude,  dol,  prière,  imposture  et 
promesse  de  mariage,  a  défloré  une  vierge  qui  consentait  librement, 
Ji'est  tenu  à  rien  envers  elle,  d'après  la  justice  et  dans  le  for  intér- 
ieur, en  princii>e  ;  parce  qu'aucun  dommage  ne  lui  a  été  fait,  à  elle 
sachant  et  voulant." 

O  séducteurs,  quel  tranquille  maxime  !  pauvre  fille,  naïve  et 
amoureuse! 

Mais  si  rien  n'est  dû  à  la  pauvre  fille,  il  en  est  autrement  pour  les 
parents  ''s'ils  ont  connu  l'affaire  et  s'en  offensent  ;  car  alors  il  fau- 
dra leur  donner  quelque  satisfaction  d'honneur  pour  les  apaiser." 
Le  passage  mérite  d'être  rapporté  en  entier,  parce  qu'il  montre 
bien  avec  quel  grossier  dédain  de  tout  sentiment  de  pudeur  et  de 
dignité  humaine  les  casuistes  traitent  ces  questions,  qui  touchent  à 
ce  qu'il  y  a  de  plus  délicat  pour  nous  autres  laïques  :  *'  Plus  prob- 
ablement, le  séducteur  n'est  pas  tenu  à  donner  aux  parents  de  l'ar- 
gent bien  qu'ils  «oient  forcés  d'augmenter  la  dot  de  leur  fille  pour 
pouvoir  la  marier «uivant  sa  condition.  Car  la  fille,  en  consentant 
à  sa  défloration,  a -consenti  en  même  temps  soit  à  ne  pas  se  marier, 
soit  à  se  marier  au-dessous  de  sa  condition;  par  suite,  ses  pareuls^ 
ne  sont  pas  forcés  de  ia  marier  suivant  sa  C('ndition,et  s'ils  le  veu- 
lent faire,  et  augmenter  sa  dot  dans  ce  but,  ils  le  font  librement, 

d'abord  gagner  la  confiance  des  enfants  ;  qu'il  a  reconnu  avoir  embrassé  na 
certain  nombre  de  petites  filles,  mais  qu'il  e^t  démontré  que  ces  caresses, 
dans  la  pensée  du  prêtre,  n'avaient  rien  d'immoral; 

"Considérant  que,  pour  prémunir  les  jeunes  filles  contre  les  attentats 
dont  elles  pouvaient  être  l'objet,  l'abbé  Gall)in  leur  a  parlé  souvent  d'actes 
contrain  s  à  la  pudeur,  qu'il  les  a  engagées  à  ne  pas  se  laisser  corrompre 
par  les  petits  garçons,  et  que,  pour  mieux  se  faire  co  nprendré,  il  a  pu 
indiquer  aux  enfants,  par-dessus  leurs  vêtements,  les  parties  du  corpî,^ 
qu'elles  ne  devaient  pas  toucher;  mais  qu'eu  somme,  dans  tous  les  faits 
incriminés, il  n'existe  aucun  acte  suffisamment  caractérisé  pour  constituer, 
soit  le  délit  d'attentat  aux  mœurs,  soit  le  délit  d'outrage  public  à  la  pu- 
deur." 


464  Tlie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

et  ne  peuvent  par  suite  rien  exiger  du  séducteur  dans  ce  but.  Cela 
d'autant  plus  que  la  fille  a  pu  abuser  de  son  corps  sans  commettre 
une  injustice  envers  ses  parents,  et  par  suite  n'est  tenue  à  rien 
envers  eux,  d'après  la  justice  ;  donc  le  séducteur  pas  davantage, 
puisqu'il  n'est  pas  le  coopérateur  d'un  acte  injuste  en  soi." 

2"  ''  Le  séducteur  qui,  par  force,  crainte,  dol,  menaces,  prières 
trop  importunes,  fausses  promesses,  mais  sans  promesse  de  ma- 
riage, a  défloré  une  vierge,  .  .  .  doit  l'indemniser  de  son  dommage, 
et  indemniser  ses  parents,  en  la  dotant  assez  pour  qu'elle  se  marie 
bien,  ou  même  en  l'épousant,  si  le  dommage  ne  peut  être  autre- 
ment réparé." 

3"  Celui  qui  a  défloré  une  vierge,  .  .  .  sous  promesse  de 
mariage,  est  tenu  en  principe  (per  se  loquendo)  de  l'épouser,  que 
la  promesse  ait  été  sincère  ou  non.   ..." 

Voilà  qui  est  bien.  Mais  Lyonnet,  célèbre  casuiste,  dans  son 
Traité  de  justitia  et  jure,  publié  à  Lyon  en  1836,  déclare  que  ''le 
séducteur  sous  promesse  sincère  de  mariage  n'est  tenu  à  rien.'  'Et 
la  raisonnement  est  vraiment  admirable:  '•  Jl  n'est  pas  tenu  eu 
raison  d'une  fraude,  puisqu'il  eîait  de  bonne  foi;  ni  en  raison  de 
la  promesse,  car  un  contrat  sous  condition  honteuse  n'oblige  pas, 
alors  même  que  la  condition  est  remplie."  Or,  l'autorité  de  Lyonnet 
est  certes  suffisante  pour  rendre  son  opinion  i)robable,  en  telle 
sorte  que  le  séducteur  pourra  la  suivre  s'il  y  trouve  sou  avantage" 
(voir  ci-dessus,  page  33). 

Mais,  il  aura  d'autres  moyens  de  se  tirer  d'affaire.  Car  il  n'est 
tenu  d'épouser  qu'en  principe,  et  les  exceptions  ne  lui  feront  pas 
faute. 

En  effet  "  il  ne  sera  pas  tenu  d'épouser:  1"  Quand  il  découvre 
ou  s'il  survient  une  cause  suffisante  pour  rompre  les  fiançailles, 
comme  si  la  jeune  fille  s'abandonne  à  un  autre  ou  si  elle  est  de 
mœurs  corrompues,  bien  qu'elle  se  ftit  donnée  pour  vierge,  ou  si 
elle  s'est  fait  passer  pour  noble  ou  pour  riche,  sans  l'être  ;  2^'  Si  la 
promesse  était  feinte  et  que  ce  mensonge  ait  dû  être  présumé  à 
cause  de  l'ambiguïté  des  paroles,  ou  de  la  manière  de  les  pronon- 
cer, de  leur  exagération,  ou  du  caractère  léger  (inconstantiam)  du 
jeune  homme,  de  la  grande  disparité  des  conditions  ou  des  rich- 
esses  connue  de    la  jeune    fille,  ou  d'autres    indices   semb'aMes. 


Restitution  on  Account  of  Lustful  Sins,  465 

car  elle  ne  peut  imputer  sa  déce[)tion  qu'à  elle-même.  Bien 
])Uis  :  3  Quand  même  la  jeune  fille  n'aurait  pu  être  avertie  du 
m;  nsonge,  soit  qu'elle  n'ait  pas  connu  l'inégaliié  des  conditions, 
soit  que  le  jeune  homme  ait  protesté  que  cela  n'empêcherait  pas  le 
manage,  il  n'est  cependant  pas  tenu  d'épouser  s'il  doit  résulter  du 
mariage  des  conséquences  mauvaises,  de  graves  inconvénients,  des 
scandales,  des  rixes,  des  discordes  de  famille,"  etc. 

Voilà  la  situation  bien  facile  pour  les  séducteurs,  même  sous 
promesse  de  mariage. 

II.  Si  le  stuprator  est  tenu  de  réparer  le  dommage  qu'il  a  causé, 
si  ayant  offert  le  mariage  à  celle  qu'il  a  séduite,  elle  le  refuse,  ou 
si,  ayant  de  légitimes  raisons  de  ne  pas  l'épouser,  il  refuse  de  le 
faire.  S'il  est  tenu  d'épouser  celle  qu'il  a  séduite  sous  promesse 
de  mariage  s'il  a  fait  vœu  de  chasteté,  ou  s'il  est  au  degré  prohibé 
de  parenté. 

III.  A  quoi  est  tenu  le  stuprator  par  rapport  à  l'enfant.  A 
quoi  sont  tenus  les  parents  qui  ont  exposé  leurs  enfants  à  l'hôpital. 

ART.  IL 

De  l'Obligation  de  Restituer  Venant  l'Adultère  (p.  85). 

Q.  I.  A  quelle  restitution  sont  tenus  la  femme  adultère  et  son 
complice.  ' 

"S'il  n'est  pas  survenu  d'enfant  et  que  la  chose  soit  restée 
cachée,  ils  ne  sont  tenus  à  rien,  sinon  à  pénitence.  S'il  n'est  pas 
né  d'enfant,  mais  si  le  mari  apprend  le  crime,  le  complice  devra 
demander  le  pardon  du  mari  en  lui  offrant  une  satisfaction  honor- 
able (honorariam  satisfactionem)  ou  en  donnant  d'autres  signes  de 
douleur,  si  le  mari  est  supposé  l'exiger. 

*'  S'il  est  né  un  enfant,  la  mère  devra  le  nourrir  pendant  trois 
ans,  et  ensuite  le  père." 

Mais  si  l'on  peut  douter  justement  (  !)  si  l'enfant  est  du  mar  ou 
de  l'adultère,  celui-ci  doit-il  quelque  chose?  Non,  disent  beaucoup 
d'auteurs,  parce  que  dans  le  doute  on  doit  prendre  la  solution  la 
plus  favorable.  Saint  Liguori  trouve  cette  opinion  assez  probable, 
mais  le  contraire  lui  semble  très  probable.  Ce  qui  signifie,  en 
langage  de  jésuite,  qu'on  peut  faire  ce  qu'on  veut,  exiger  ce  qu'on 
veut,  suivant  son  intérêt  :  cela  est  fort  commode. 


466  TJœ  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

JI.     Ce  qu'il  faut  restituer  pour  le  dommage  cau-é  par  l'adullère. 

II r.  Comment  la  femme  adultère  peut  et  doit  s'opposer  au 
préjudice  que  son  enfant  causerait  à  son  mari  ou  à  ses  héritiers,  et 
comment  elle  pourra  le  réparer. 

Un  des  moyens  indiqués,  et  ce  n'est  pas  le  moins  original,  con- 
siste en  ce  que  la  femme  adultère  conseillera  à  son  enfant  de  rester 
célibataire,  afin  qu'apiès  sa  mort  ses  biens  retournent  aux  héritiers 
légitimes. 

CHAPITRE   III. 
De  plusieurs  questions  relatives  au  mariage. 

ART.  I. — Des  Trois  Empêchements  du  Mariage  ;  C'est-a-Dire 
DU  Crime,  du  Rapt  et  de  l'Impuissance  (p.  92). 

Q.  I.     Ce  qu'est  l'empêchement  du  crime. 

11  résulte  de  l'adultère  ou  de  l'homicide. 

Mais  il  faut  s'entendre  : 

"  Debet  adulterium  esse  non  attentatum  modo,  sed  consumma- 
tum  ;  videtur  tamen  sufficere  sola  vasis  penetratio,  quia  haec  ad 
adulterium  sufïîcit,  et  alias  per  novum  seminis  extra  vas  effundendi 
peccatum  facile  eluderentur  Canones."  ^ 

Mais  les  docteurs  sont  partagés,  et  Saint  Liguori  affiime, 
*'nequaquam  incurri  impedimentum,  si  vir  vere  non  seminet  in 
vase  muliebri."     C'est  une  question  à  l'étude. 

II.  Si  l'empêchement  du  crime  est  reconnu  par  le  Code  civil. 

III.  Ce  qu'est  l'empêchement  venant  de  l'impuissance. 

"  L'impuissance  est  l'incapacité  de  consommer  le  mariage,  id  est 
habendi  copulam  perfectam,  quae  nempe  per  se  suffîciat  ad  genera- 
tionem  :  vocatur  etiam  impotentia  coëundi,  et  differt  ab  impotentia 
generandi.  Porro  ad  veram  copulam,  quse  ad  generationem 
sufficiat,  requiritur,  ut  veri  nominis  semen  a  viro  in  vas  muliebre 
immittatur  et  in  hoc  recipiatur."  Voilà  une  savante  définition, 
moins  savante  encore  que  l'énumération  qui  suit  des  causes  phys- 
iques de  l'impuissance,  chez  l'homme  et  chez  la  femme. 

Puis  vient  une  série  d'ingénieuses  distinctions  entre  l'impuissance 
naturelle  ou  accidentelle,  absolue  ou  relative,  perpétuelle  ou  tem- 
poraire, antérieure  ou  postérieure  au  mariage. 


Questions  Relative  to  Marriage.  467 

Aux  causes  physiques,  il  faut  aj'uter  les  maléfices,  "  perdœmon- 
is  aitilicium,"  auquel  cas  l'évêque  interviendra. 

IV.  Si  l'empêclieinent  d'impuissance  est  reconnu  par  le  Code 
civil. 

V.  Si  la  femme  est  tenue- de  subir  une  incision,  ut  viro  fiat  apta. 
Admirable  sujet  de  méditations  pour  un  célibataire  de  20  ans  ! 
Rousselot  distingue  suivant  que  l'opération  doit  ou  non   être 

grave.     Si  elle  doit  entraîner  rii:que  de  la  vie,  le  mariage  est  nul, 
et  après  la  guér'son  la  femme  pourra  convoler  à  d'autres  noces.* 

VI.  Ce  qu'est  l'empêchement  tiré  du  rapt. 

VII.  Ce  qu'il  advient  en  droit  civil  de  l'empêchement  tiré 
du  rapt. 

ART.  II.     Des  Obligations  des  Epotjx.   (p.  102). 

§  I. —  De  l'obligation  des  époux  relativement  à  la  cohabitation 
et  de  la  fcéparation  de  ht  et  d'habitation. 

I.     Quelles  sont  les  obligations  des  époux. 

Elles  sont  rangées  sous  six  chefs  : 

1"  Cohabitation,  communauté  de  table  et  de  lit, 

6"  "  Uterque  conjux  tenetur  alteri  rationabiliter  petenti  reddere 
debit um  conjugale,  hoc  est,  corpus  suum  dare,  ad  copulam  con- 
jugalem." 

JI.  Devoirs  spéciaux  aux  conjoints,  touchant  la  cohabitation 
et  l'entretien. 

*  Sanchez  semble  très  supérieur,  car  il  étudie  le  droit  dn  mari  de  faire 
opérer  sa  femme,  et  le  devoir  par  la  femme  de  se  laisser  opérer, 

l'^  An  possit  vir  dauslrum  virginis  aliquo  inatrumento  reserarf,  ut  sibi 
reddatur  apta. 

2"  An  fœmina  virgo  vel  arcta,  ac  mipta,  teneatur  incisionem  pati,ut  viro 
aptetur. 

Il  distinjrue  deux  cas  !  1'^  Quando  mulier  natnraliter  est  prœ  cœteris 
arcta.  2"  Quando  arcta  non  est,  sed  solum  naturale  viriïineum  si.unaculum 
congressul  virili  obatat.     {De  Ma(rimonio,  Lib.  VII,  Disp.  XCIII.) 

Et  Diana  fait  intervenir  ici  une  distinction  des  plus  lumineuses  entre  le 
cas  où  il  y  a  disproportion  entre  l'homme  et  la  femme  "  quia  uxor  est 
nimis  arcta"  et  celui  où  la  cause  en  est  "  quia  vir  membruni  habet  nimis 
Improportionatum."  Dans  le  premier  cas,  opération  obligatoire  si  elle 
n'est  pas  trop  dangereuse  ;  dans  le  second,  non. 


468  TJie  Doctrine  of  tJie  Jesuits. 

Entre  autres  réponses,  je  relève  celle-ci  :  "  1"  Si  l'un  des  con- 
joints est  atteint  de  maladie  contagieuse,  l'autre  n'est  pas  tenu  de 
rester  avec  lui,  ou  de  s'en  aller  avec  lui,  quand  il  y  a  p6iil  probable 
d'infection.  .  .  .  Cela  lui  est  même  interdit  s'il  y  a  péril  de  mort, 
car  il  n'a  pas  le  droit  de  s'exposer  ainsi,  n'étant  pas  maître  de  sa 
vie."     Le  texte  dit  :  "  Quia  non  est  vit  se  suae  domina-" 

Et  remarquez  combien  cette  belle  formule  promet  de  dévoue- 
ment en  cas  de  choléra  ! 

III.  Quelles  sont  les  prescriptions  du  Code  civil  à  l'égard  des 
obligations  mutuelles  des  conjoints. 

IV.  Si  la  dissolution  du  mariage  peut  jamais  avoir  lieu,  en 
tant  que  lien  (quoad  vinculum). 

Jamais,  entre  catholiques,  quand  il  est  consommé  ;  mais  jusque- 
là  il  peut  l'être,  seulement  pour  entrer  en  religion.  "  Ratum 
dissolvi  potest  per  professionem  in  religione  approbata.  .  .  ." 

Mais  ici  interviennent  une  foule  de  précautions  sur  lesquelles 
doivent  s'exercer  l'esprit  inventif  du  casuiste  et  Tesprit  investiga 
teur  du  confesseur. 

"  Le  conjoint  qui  veut  entrer  en  religion  peut,  pendant  deux 
mois,  refuser  le  devoir  conjugal  à  son  conjoint,  qui  se  rendrait 
coupable  de  péché  en  insistant  (si  cppulam  ei  jnvito  extorqueat). 
Le  bimestre  accompli,  s'il  n'entre  pas  en  religion,  il  doit  rendre  le 
devoir;  mais  s'il  ne  le  rend  pas  et  veut  entrer  en  religion,  il  le 
peut,  même  malgré  son  conjoint.  S'il  y  entre,  le  conjoint  attendra 
qu'il  ait  fait  profession,  et  alors  le  mariage  étant  dissous,  il  peut' 
convoler  à  d'autres  noces  ;  mais,  s'il  quitte  après  son  noviciat, 
il  est  tenu  de  consommer  le  mariage.  ...  Si  le  conjoint,  pendant 
qu'il  délibérait,  "  copulam  extorserit,"  le  mariage  est  consommé 
et  ne  peut  plus  être  dissous  ;  si  l'extorsion  a  eu  lieu  après  le  pre- 
mier bimestre,  il  ne  peut  plus  entrer  en  religion  sans  l'assentiment 
du  conjoint,  parce  que  désormais  il  lui  doit  le  devoir  conjugal,  et 
qu'en  le  lui  extorquant  on  ne  lui  a  pas  causé  de  dommage  ;  mais  si 
l'extorsion  a  eu  lieu  pendant  le  premier  bimestre,  alors  il  y  a  eu 
dommage,  ...  et  il  peut  entrer  en  religion,  le  conjoint  ne  pou- 
vant plus  désormais  se  remarier." 

V.  Si  la  dissolution  du  mariage  peut  avoir  lieu,  au  point  de  vue 
de  la  cohabitation  (quoad  torum  et  cohabitationem). 


Questions  Relative  to  Marriage,  469 

Elle  peut  avoir  lieu:  1"  Pour  caus«  d'adultère  "  moraliter  cer- 
tum,  et  coDSummatum  per  copulam  perfoctam,"  et  aussi,  car  les 
confesseurs  n'oublient  jamais  ces  points  que  le  Code  pénal  a  volon- 
tairement passés  sous  silence,  à  cause  de  "  sodomia  compléta 
exercita  cum  persona  aliéna,  sive  masculo  sive  femina  ;  item  bes- 
tialitas  consummata." 

2"     Par  l'entrée  en  religion. 

3"     Par  la  chute  en  hérésie  ou  en  apostasie. 

4"  Par  la  sollicitation  au  crime,  y  compris  l'hérésie  et  l'inévi- 
table *'  congressum  sodomiticum." 

5"  Par  les  embûches  et  menaces  ;  si  l'un  des  conjoints  est  atteint 
d'une  maladie  contagieuse  qu'il  y  ait  chance  de  contracter  par  la 
cohabitation." 

6^'     Par  les  coups,  rixes,  traitements  cruels,  etc.   ... 

VI.  Si  pour  les  causes  sus-énoncées  la  séparation  non  seule- 
ment peut,  mais  doit  avoir  lieu. 

VIF.     Si  la  séparation  peut  être  faite  d'autorité  privée. 

VIII.  Si,  après  la  séparation,  les  époux  peuvent  changer 
d'état  ;  s'ils  peuvent  ou  doivent  se  réconcilier. 

JX.  Aupiès  de  qui  et  aux  frais  de  qui  doivent  être  élevés  les 
enfants. 

X.     Quelles  sont  les  causes  de  séparation  dans  le  Code  civil. 

§  2. —  Des  Obligations  des  Epoux  Touchant  le  Devoir 
Conjugal. 

Q.  I.  Quelle  obligation  incombe  aux  époux  de  demander  et  de 
rendre  le  devoir  conjugal. 

Ils  ne  sont  pas  tenus  en  principe  à  le  demander,  puisqu'ils  peu- 
vent y  renoncer  ;  mais  en  fait  "per  accidens  "  ils  peuvent 
y  être  tenus  par  charité.  ...  "  T'  Lorsque  cela  est  nécessaire 
pour  écarter  le  péril  d'incontinence  ;  2^'  quand  il  convient  de 
réchauffer  l'amour  mutuel  des  époux  ;  3"  quand  l'engendrement  est 
jiécessaire  à  la  paix  de  la  famille  ou  au  bien  public,  comme  chez 
les  princes  ;  4"  quand  il  est  évident  que  le  conjoint  le  désire,  ou 
souffre  d'en  être  privé,  bien  que  n'osant,  ])ar  pudeur,  le  réclamer. 

"  Si  l'un  des  conjoints  réclame  sérieusement  le  devoir  conjugal, 
l'autre  est  tenu,  en  justice  de  le  rendie,  à  moins  d'excuse  légitime. 


470  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits* 

Les  époux  doivent  donc  prendre  garde  de  se  rendre  impuissants.  .  . 

"  Le  conjoint  pèciie  donc  gravement  qui  refuse,  même  une  seule 
fois,  le  devoir  à  son  conjoint  qui  le  réclame  raisonnablement  et 
sérieusement,  ...  et  cela,  qu'il  le  demande  soit  explicitement, 
soit  implicitement,  seulement  par  des  caresses  et  autres  signes  qui 
sont  connus  pour  exprimer  ce  désir,  comme  cela  arrive  fréquem- 
ment aux  femmes  qui  n'osent  le  demander  autrement." 

Suit  une  longue  dissertation,  foi t  instructive,  sur  ce  que  doit  ou 
peut  faire  le  conjoiat  passif,  lorsque  l'actif  est  ivre,  ou  demi-ivre, 
fou,  ou  demi-fou,  avec  ou  sans  intervalles  lucides,  ou  malade. 
L'apprenti  confesseur  y  apprendra,  entre  autres  choses  intéressantes, 
que  si  le  mari  seul  est  fou,  la  femme  peut  lui  rendre  et  lui  réclamer 
le  devoir,  mais  n'y  est  pas  tenue  ;  que  le  mal  de  dents  ne  peut  ser- 
vir d'excuse  pour  refuser  le  devoir  ;  qu'on  peut  le  refuser  pendant 
le  premier  bimestre  du  mariage  ;  et  aussi  s'il  est  réclamé  trop  sou- 
vent, "  comme  trois  ou  quatre  fois  dans  la  même  nuit  ;"  que  le  droit 
de  le  réclamer  se  perd  par  l'adultère  aussi,  etc.  Admirables  sujets 
à  traiter  par  le  menu,  avec  une  jeune  femme,  au  fond  d'un  con- 
fessionnal.    Il  y  en  a  comme  cela  cinq  pages  pleines. 

ir.  Quelles  conditions  sont  exigées  pour  que  l'usage  du  mariage 
soit  licite,  et  quelles  doivent  spécialement  être  observées  relative- 
ment à  la  fin. 

Il  faut  :  1"  que  les  époux  ne  soient  liés  par  aucun  empêchement  ; 
2"  qu'ils  se  proposent  une  fin  honnête  ;  3"  "  ut  servent  modum 
debiium  coëundi  ttini  quoad  substantiam,  tùm  quoad  situm,  locum 
et  tempus." 

III.  Quelles  conditions  sont  exigées  pour  que  l'usage  soit  licite  ; 
et  quelles  doivent  être  spécialement  observées  lelativement  au  mode, 
à  la  substance,  à  la  position,  au  lieu  et  au  temps. 

Ici,  il  faut  citer  textuellement,  et  se  garder  de  traduire.  Le 
pauvre  jeune  séminariste  fera  bien,  suivant  la  recommandation  de 
Kousselot,  de  réciter  maintes  prières  à  la  Vierge  ! 

*'  1°  Modus  debitus  quoad  substantiam  est,  quod  servetur  vas 
naturale,  et  semen  in  illud  immitatur  ac  retiueatur  ;  hicque  modus 
servandus  est  sub  moitali. 

Hinc  graviter  peccant  :  1"  conjuges  actum  conjugalem  in  vase 
non  naturali  consummaules,  vel  inchoanles  etiam  cum  inlentione 


I 


Questions  Relative  to  Marriage,  471 

enm  consummandi  in  vase  naturali.  2°  Vir  seminationem  ante 
ci^pulam  ijclioando,  vel  hac  habita  se  retraliendo,  antequam  semi- 
naverit  ;  probabilius  taraen  potest  sese  post  seminationem  retra- 
licre,  non  exspcctata  seminalione  mulieris,  quia  haec  non  est  ad 
gcnerationem  necessaria.  Quod  si  intendens  legitime  congredi, 
ante  congressuui  extra  vas  piœter  intentionem  seminet  ob  senium 
vel  uxoris  indispositionem,  non  peccat,  quia  hoc  ex  corruptse  nat- 
urae festinatione  proven  it.  3''  Mulier  semen  recoptum  ejiciens,  vel 
cjiceie  enitens,  vel  copulam  abrumpens  ante  viri  seminationem, 
licet  ipsa  jam  seminaverit.  Quod  si  vir  post  suam  seminationem 
sese  retrahat,  et  mulier  nonduin  seminaverit,  seautem  postmodum, 
attamen  sine  mora,  ad  id  excitet  ac  seminet,  a  peccato  excusari 
solet,  quia  hsec  ejus  seminatio  censetur  esse  ejusdem  actus  conju- 
galis  consummatio. 

*'  2"  Situs  magis  naturalis  et  ordinarius  est,  ut  jaceant  con- 
juges,  et  vir  mulieri  incumbat.* 

Hinc  graviter  peccant  conjuges,  si  stantes  rem  habeant,  vel 
mulier  viro  incumbat,  aut  vir  a  tergo  accédât, f  cum  periculo,  ne 
semen  effundatur,  vel  a  muliere  retineri  nequeat  (rarum  tamen  est, 
quod  retineri  nequeat),  vel  ue  procuretur  abortus,  aut  grave  saltern 
iucotnmodum  fetus  in  utere  latentis.  Seposito  veroomni  ejusmodi 
periculo,  peccant  venialiter,  si  id  faciant  ex  voluptate,  vel  majoris 
prseoisè  comraoditatis  gratia  ;  nuUatenus  autem,  si  tjusmodi  situm 
exigat  nécessitas,  vel  suadet  rationabilis  causa,  quia,  v.  g.,  ordina- 
rium  situm  non  patitur  disposilio  corporis  mulieris  gravidae.J  .   .  . 

''  3"     Actus  conjugalis  exerceri  debet  in  loco  profano  et  secrete. 

♦^S*.  Liguori  donne  la  raison  physiologique  (physioloijie  de  jésuite)  de  ce 
précepte  :  "  Hic  modus  est  aptior  efi'usioui  semiuis  viriUs  et  receptioui  in 
vas  femineum." 

t  Craismn  est  plus  varié  :  "  Si  coitus  fiat  sedendo,  stando,  de  latere,  vel 
prœpostere  more  pecudum,  vel  si  vir  sit  succubus  et  mulier  iucuba,  innat- 
uralis  est."  (p.  155.) 

î  Sanchez,  Lib.  IX.,  Disp.  XVTI.  Utrum  pit  culpa  lethalis,  quotics  in 
acta  conjugali,  vase  naturali  omisso,  iunaturale  usurpatur,  aut  utriusque 
conjugis  semen  data  opera  non  siinul,  vel  extra  legitimuni  congressum 
emlttitur  :  aut  ex  impotentia  supervenienii.  extra  vas  ett'unditur. 

*-N"  4. —  Quid,  si  maritus  velit  sodomaicecopulam  inchoare,  non  animo 
consummandi,  nisi  intra  vas  naturale? 

"Qualis  culpa  sit,  si  vir  volens  leiritime  nxori  copulari,  quo  se  excitet, 
vel  majoris  voluptatis  taptandiU  gratia  iuclioet  coi)UlaaJ  cuiii  ea  sodouiil- 


472  TJie  Doctrine  of  lite  Jesuits. 

4"  Tempus  aptum  est  tempus  nocturnum.  .  .  ."  Avec  dis- 
sertation sur  letat  de  grossesse,  de  lactation,  de  menstrues,  la 
jcommunion,  lejeûie,  etc. 

Est-ce  assez  immonde?  Et  quel  mari  ne  frémira  à  l'idée  d'une 
interrogation  devant  lévéler  à  un  homme  tous  ces  secrets  de  la 
couche  nuptiale,  que  les  plus  cyniques  ne  s'avoueraient  pas  â  eux- 
mêmes? 

IV.  Comment  les  époux  peuvent  encore  pécher  dans  l'acte  de 
mariage.  Si  demander  ou  rendre  le  devoir  est  licite,  quand  il  y  a 
doute  sur  la  validité  du  mariage,  etc. 

"Graviter  peccat,  qui  actum  conjugalem  exercet  cum  affectu 
fornicario,  ad  conjugem  nempe  accedendi,  quamvis  non  esset  con- 
jux  ;  vel  cum  affectu  adulterino  ad  alienam  personam,  hanc  scilicet 
optando,  aut  turpiter  dilectam  sibi  repi  aesentando  ;  quod  si  sim- 
pliciter  ejus  pulchritudine  delectetur,  non  est  peccatum,  periculosa 
tamen  res,  et  serio  dissuadenda." 

La  seconde  question  est  longuement  traitée  en  trois  pages,  pleines 
de  tours  et  détours  au  milieu  des  plus  subtils  détails  ;  on  sent  que 
dans  chaque  cas  particulier  des  séries  de  questions  devront  être 
posées  au  pénitent  pour  arriver  à  la  solution.  Il  faut  distinguer 
soigneusement  entre  la  petitio  et  la  redditio  du  devoir,  Tune  pou- 
vant être  licite  quand  l'autre  est  défendue.  Il  faut  s'informer  "  si 
actus  conjugalis  exercendus  sit  modo  qui  répugnât  illius  substan- 
tive, vel  m  circumstantia  actum  ipsum  vitiante,  v.  g.,  in  vase 
indebito,"   ...     ou  bien  "si  petens   agat  ex   pravo  affectu  vel 

icam,  non  animo  consummaucli,  nisi  intra  vas  legitiraum,  nec  cura  periculo 
etlïisiouis  extra  ilkul.   ... 

"  Tactus  hic,  iusta  tactunm  mombri  virilis  cnm  manibus,  aut  ux<jris 
crnribu><,  reliquisqne  partibus  potest  ad  copulam  conjugalem  referri,  .  .  . 
esset  culpa  veuiahs.  ' 

Lib.  JX.,  Disp.  XVI.  An  concubitus  conjugalis  vitiosus  sit  ratione  mo- 
di, quaudo  variatur  situs,  servato  tamen  vase  legitime. 

Modus  naturalis  is  est,  si  mulier  succuha,  vir  autem  incubus  sit.  Quia 
modus  hic  ap  ior  esteftusioni  virilis  serainis,  receptionique  in  vas  fœmi- 
iieum,  ac  retentioni;  et  congruentior  est  I'erum  uaturaj,  cum  vir  a^ens, 
lœmina  vero  sit  [)atiens.  Quamobrem  omnis  deviatio  al)  hoc  modo  adver- 
f-atur  aliqnaliter  naturaî:  eoque  ma^^is,  quo  Uni  huic  situs  contrarias  est. 
Unde  minor  est  deviatio,  cum  conjucfes  a  latere,  aut  sedendo,  standove, 
«onjuniruntur :  pesbima  tamen  dum  prœpostere,  pecudum  more,  aut  viro 
succnmbenre." 

On  voit  une  fois  de  plus  que  les  jésuites  d'aujourd'hui  n'ont  rien  changé 
aux  doctrins,  ni  au  lanjiaire,  de  leurs  aînés  du  xvi'  siècle. 


Questions  Relative  to  Marriage.  473 

intcntione,"  on  encore  "  si  vir  debitum  petat  ex  affcclu  adiilterino 
aiit  fornicario,"  et  si,  dans  ce  cas,  il  y  a  péiil  d'inconlinence  :  car, 
suivant  la  réponse  de  la  femnoe,  le  confesseur  déclare  la  redditio 
obligatoire  ou  non;  ou  encore  "si  conjux  soleat  semen  frustare, 
V.  g.,  vir  sese  retrahere  ante  seminationem,  vel  uxor  semen  recep- 
tum  ejicere,"  cas  graves,  dans  lesquels  il  faut  distinguer  suivant 
que  ces  déplorables  actes  sont  habituels  ou  non,  car  la  solution  est 
différente.  Encore  intervient  ici  la  considération  des  inconvén- 
ients de  santé,  d'incontinence,  etc.,  véritable  dédale  de  rêveries 
malsaines  au  milieu  desquelles  il  importe  que  la  jeune  confesseur 
ne  perde  pas  le  fil  délié  qui  le  conduit  et  ne  s'égare  pas  à  regarder 
trop  longtemps  eu  route.  Ou  encore  "  si  petatur  ex  affectu  aut 
fine,  vel  cum  circumstantia  aut  modo  venialiter  tantum  culpabili, 
V.  g.,  stando,  a  tergo,  attamen  citra  poUutionis  periculura,  vel  ex 
sola  voluptate."  Enfin,  tout  un  paragraphe  sur  les  vieillards  et 
leur  impuissance  douteuse,  dont  les  préceptes  sont  une  merveille 
d'application  de  la  méthode  expérimentale. 

V.  S'il  est  licite  de  demander  et  de  rendre  le  devoir,  quand  les 
époux  sont  liés  par  le  vœu  de  chasteté,  d'entrée  en  religion,  de 
prise  des  ordres  sacrés,  ou  de  non-mariage  :  1"  si  ce  vœu  a  été 
émis  avant  le  mariage  ;  2"  s'il  l'a  été  pendant  le  mariage,  mais 
sans  l'assentiment  du  conjoint  ;  3"  s'il  l'a  été  avec  cet  assentiment. 

Encore  et  partout,  dans  les  cinq  pages  du  long  développement 
de  ces  questions,  cet  amour  des  détails  périlleux,  des  distinctions 
savantes  et  subtiles,  qui  devront  rendre  bien  souvent  nécessaire 
l'invocation  protectrice  à  la  vierge  Deipara. 

VI.  1"  Ce  qu'on  doit  dire  des  attouchements  obscènes,  des 
regards,  des  baisers  entre  époux.  2"  An  peccet  conjugatus,  qui 
in  absentia  compartis  seipsum  impudice  tangit,  vel  delectatur  de 
copula  habita  vel  habenda  ;  S**  An  peccent  soluli,  ipsiqiie  adeo 
sponsi,  qui  de  copula  post  initum  matrimonium  habenda,  vel  vidui 
qui  de  copula  tempore  matrimonii  habita  dc4ectaiitur. 

Nous  retrouvons  ici  les  descriptions  immondes  de  la  question 
III.  ;  et  la  gravité  en  est  ici  augmentée  par  ce  fait  qu'il  n'y  a  pas 
seulement  description  d'actes  obscènes,  mais  appréciation  de  l'in- 
tention de  ceux  qui  les  commettent. 


474  TJte  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits* 

''  Si  talia  fiant  cum  proximo  polUitionis  periculo  sive  ntrique, 
sive  alterutri  conjugum  imminenti,  semper  sunt  mortaliter  peccam- 
inosa,  quia  pollutio  est  grave  peccatum.  ...  Si  tales  actus  ex  se 
ad  copulam  onlinati  sint,  et  fiant  in  ordine  ad  earn  nee  solius  volup- 
tatis  causa,  culpa  vacant,  quia  licita  est  copula.  ...  Si  vero  hi 
actus,  etiam  ad  illam  ordinati,  ex  sola  voluptate  fiant,  sunt  peccata 
venialia.  ...  Si  conjuges  invicem  exerceant  actus  inhonestos, 
Don  tamen  singulariter  infâmes,  sine  animo  et  ordine  ad  copulam 
hie  et  nunc  habendam,  seposito  tamen  poUutionis  periculo,  est 
peccatum.  .  .  .  Quod  si  tamen  inter  conjuges  exerceantur  ejus- 
modi  actus  omniuo  turpes  ac  singulariter  infâmes,  ita  ut  inter 
membrum  tangens  et  tactum  sit  summa  disproportio,  sunt  peccata 
mortalia,  quamvis  etiam  conjuges  intendant  qos  ordinare  ad  copu- 
lam, ut  si  maritus  membrum  virile  immittat  in  os  mulieris,  vel 
ejus  verenda  osculetur,  vel  propria  verenda  perfricet  circa  vas  ejus 
praeposterum.*     Ratio  est.   .   .  . 

Cependant,  même  en  ces  circonstances  extrêmes,  tout  n'est  pas 
perdu,  car  "  l'opinion  contraire  a  aussi  ses  défenseurs." 

Du  reste:  "Conjuges  non  eiunt  peccati  mortalis  arguendi,  si 
bona  fide  asserant  se  his  infamiis  non  commoveri,  nec  ad  polhition- 
em  excitari.  Saltem  peccati  venialis  damnanda  non  videtur  pia 
uxor  quœ  ex  metu,  timidilate,  vel  servandœ  concordiae  causa,  hos 
tactus  in  se  a  marito  fieri  permittit,  siraulque  asserit  ex  illis  aut 
nuUos  aut  levés  tanUim  carnules  motus  se  experiri." 

Pour  les  deux  autres  questions,  l'auteur  répond  qu'il  y  a  péché 
mortel,  parce  que  ces  désiis  et  souvenirs  comportent:  "  1"  reprae- 
sentatiouem  coitus  habemd  vel  habiti  ;  2"  gandium  ex  tali  rep- 
rsesentatione  actu  profluens  :  igitur  coitum  apprehendunt  ut  actum 
delectabilem." 

Mais  au  moment  de  quitter  ce  sujet,  cisel'e  avec  tant  d'art  et 
d'amour,  le  savaut    professeur  s'aperçoit  que  tous  ces  crimes  et 

♦Ces  ignominies  datent  de  loin:  "Quid,  si  vir  introraittat  membrum' 
in  os  fœininœ,  vel  in  vas  praeposterum,  non  animo  ibi  cousumraaudi,  vel 
tangat  membro  superflciem  illiiis  vasis?  {Sanchez,  lib.  IX.)  Et  tous  les 
casuistes  les  ont  recueillies  pieusement,  tout  eu  y  apportant  chacun  d'in- 
génieuses variantes.  Le  même  Sanchez,  à  lui  seul  plus  inventif  que  tous, 
condamne  le  mari  qui  "in  actu  copulœ  immiteret  diiritum  in  vas  prœpos- 
terum  uxoris."  S.  Liguori  considère  qu'il  y  a  là,  en  effet,  des  rapports 
avec  la  bodomie. 


Questions  Relative  to  Marriage,  475 

pécliés  commis  entre  époux  peuvent  être  des  suppléments  de  nrimes 
pour  les  relations  illicites,  ou,  comme  il  dit  délicatement,  "  in 
coitu  extra  matrimonium."  Aussi,  recommande-t-il  au  confesseur 
de  demander  à  ses  pénitents,  lorsqu'ils  s'accusent  de  fornication, 
"  an  copulam  perfecerint  eo  modo,  quo  licita  est  in  matrimonio,  an 
vero  in  ea  admiserint  inordmationera  in  ipso  matrimonii  usu  non 
permissam  "  et,  dans  ce  dernier  cas,  de  rechercher  "  qiiaenam  f  uerit 
ea  inordinatio."  * 

Mais  écoutez  comment  aprè=5  avoir  scandalisé  les  époux,  souillé 
le  lien  conjugal,  traîné  au  plein  jour  les  secrets  de  l'alcôve,  l'imag- 
ination dépravée  du  casuiste  tient  en  suspicion  les  chastes  élans  de 
l'amour  des  fiancés,  et  comment  il  va,  dans  ces  moments  sublimes 
où  tout  s'épure,  vautrer  l'âme  innocente  de  la  fiancée  dans  ses 
fangeuses  dissertations  sur  "les  attouchements,  regards  et  baisers 
déshonuêtes." 

"Les  fiancés  que  se  confesseront  seront  avertis  que  tout  ne  leur 
est  pas  permis,  et  il  faudra  leur  exposer  particulièrement  ce  qui 
leur  est  gravement  interdit."  Cependant,  pris  de  quelque  pudeur, 
il  ajoute  :  "S'ils  ont  vécu  chastement  ju«que-là  ...  il  suffira  d'une 
indication  générale,  et  de  l'ordre  donné  d'exposer,  après  le  ma- 
riage, leurs  doutes  au  confesseur,  et  d'en  implorer  une  instruction 
plus  étendue:  instruction  que  le  confesseur  ne  devra  pas  avoir 
honte  de  donner,  bien  qu'avec  modestie  et  prudence."  Avec  modes- 
tie :  "an  marilus  membrum  virile,  etc.  I  '* 

§  3. — De  la  manière  dont  les  confesseurs  doivent  se  conduire  avec 
les  ci)Oux  et  les  fiancés. 

Ce  paragraphe  est  tout  entier  de  la  main  de  M.  Rousselot.  Il 
est  destiné  à  développer  le  dernier  membre  de  phrase  que  nous 
venons  de  citer.  Voyons  comment  le  professeur  de  Grenoble,  qui 
écrit  en  1844,  se  sera  efforcé  de  réfréner  les  ardeurs  du  zèle  ques- 
tionneur, que  toutes  les  immondices  précédentes  auront  allumé 
dans  les  cœurs  des  "néo-confesseurs   et  discii)les."     Aussi   bien, 

♦  C'est  bien  cet  ordre  de  préoccupations  qui  inspirait  Sanchez,  lorsqu'il 
se  deniandait  : 

"  Utiuin  abusiis  uxoris  contra  natiiram,  sive  sodomiae  sive  sollus  inol- 
litiœ  ciilpam  admittendo,  sit  irravior  culpa  qiiam  inter  solutos,  habeat  que 
circuiustuntiaui  adulteiii  ncces.  uriu  cuntitcudam?  " 


I 


476  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

avec  quelque   prudence  on  peut,  sinon  empêcher  le  mal,  du  moins 
dégager  sa  responsabilité  professorale.    Voyons  donc  : 

1"  Point. —  Avec  les  Epoux. 

Q.  I.  Comment  doit  se  conduire  le  confesseur:  1°  en  général; 
2"  spécialement  avec  ceux  qui  se  souillent  du  crime  d'Onanisme. 

Voilà  déjà  qui  promet.  Le  confesseur  devra  d'abord  apprendre 
à  fond,  "percalleat,"  les  obligations  des  époux  ci-dessus  exposées, 
et  les  fera  sérieusement  pénétrer  dans  l'esprit  ''saepius  inculcet," 
de  ses  pénitents.  Il  les  interrogera  sur  leurs  violations  en  matière 
grave,  mais  avec  prudence  et  chasteté,  "caute  et  caste."  * 

Mais  quittons  ces  formules  générales,  et  voyons  le  cas  particu- 
lier, pris  comme  modèle,  des  questions  à  adresser  aux  époux  soup- 
çonnés de  commettre  le  crime  d'  ''Onaa,  le  plus  exécrable,  et  dont 
se  souillent  très  fréquemment  les  époux,  surtout  les  plus  jeunes, 
non  seulement  dans  les  villes,  mais  aux  champs." 

Le  confesseur  mettra  tous  ses  soins  à  découvrir  l'existence  de  ce 
vice.  Mais  de  peur  de  l'enseigner  à  ceux  qu'il  veut  confesser,  il 
demandera  avec  adresse,  "caute,"  au  péuitant:  "s'il  n'a  aucun  re- 
mords relativement  à  l'acte  conjugal,  s'il  craint  d'avoir  beaucoup 
d'enfants,  s'il  se  pollue  en  dehors  de  l'acte,  etc."  "Il  faudra  inter- 
roger sur  ces  points  les  femmes,  qui  sont  très  souvent  causes  du 
viceOnanique,  dont  se  souillent  leurs  maris,  et  les  avertir  sérieuse- 
ment, etc." 

Voilà,  je  pense,  qui  est  adroit,  et  délicat,  et  j'espère  que  ce  seul 
exemple  va  rassurer  nos  lecteurs  sur  la  manière  dont  les  jeunes 
piètres  peuvent  faire  passer  et  rendre  innocentes  dans  la  pratique 
ces  matières  de  spéculation  périlleuse. 

II.  Ce  que  doit  faire  le  confesseur  à  l'égard  de  la  femme  dont 
le  mari  est  Onaniste. 

'•Il  reste  une  grande  difficulté  ;  si  la  femme  sait  avec  certitude 
que  son  mari,  dédaigneux  de  ses  prières,  copulam  abrupt uium 
esse,  ut  semen  extra  vas  fundat,  peut-elle  en  conscience  sûre  lui 
rendre  le  devoir?  " 

11  y  a  là-dessus  quatre  solutions,  et  tout  les  casuistes  sont  entrés 
en  ligne.     C'est  que  ce  point  a  toujours  tenu  à  cœur  aux  jésuites. 

*  Voir  la  note  de  la  pa<?e  5-1:7. 


Questions  lîélaiive  to  Marriage.  All\ 

Le  crime  cl'Onan,  défini  comme  il  vient  d'être  dit,  est  en  effet  ex- 
trêmement fréquent.  L'aveu  obtenu,  le  confesseur  a  désormais 
main  mise  sur  la  femme  ;  il  en  devient  le  maître  obsolu  ;  mais  cela 
mj  lui  suffit  pas,  il  veut  l'être  du  mari,  il  veut  l'avoir,  lui  aussi, 
dans  sa  main,  et  le  tenir  par  le  lien  même  du  mariage,  dont  il  auto- 
risera ou  prohibera  le  nœud. 

Aujourd'hui,  du  reste,  la  question  semble  tranchée.     La  Sacrée 
Pénitencerie   romaine,  interrogée  par  les  professeurs  du  séminaire 
de  Besançon,  que  tourmentait  cet  intéressant  problème,  a  réi)ondu. . 
Et  il  est  fort  curieux  de  voir  quelle  solution  elle  a  consacrée. 

Les  solutions  extrêmes  (désarmaient  le  confesseur,  tantôt  par 
leur  indulgence  complète,  tantôt  par  leur  sévérité  excessive.  Rome 
adopte  une  réponse  inteimédiaire,  qui  pourra  servir  pour  tous  les 
cas,  et  permettra  l'indulgence  lorsqu'il  n'y  aura  rien  à  gagner 
à  la  sévérité  ;  "la  femme  ne  peut  ni  demander,  ni  rendre  le  devoir, 
à  moins  d'une  raison  grave,  qui  l'excuse  d'une  coopération  néga- 
tive et  matérielle  dans  le  péché  de  son  mari."  Quant  aux  raisons 
graves,  il  n'}'  a  que  l'embarras  du  choix,  ne  fût-ce  que  la  crainte 
de  voir  le  mari  '^blasphémer  Dieu,  la  religion,  injurier  les  confes- 
seurs et  les  prêtres,  etc." 

III.  Quels  avertissements  et  renseignements  le  confesseur  doit 
en  outre  donner  aux  époux. 

Je  ne  trouve  à  signaler  d'intéressant  sur  ce  chapitre  que  cette 
formule  générale  du  moraliste  :  '"Il  y  a  lieu  de  s'étonner  de  la  sag- 
acité des  enfants  même  d'un  âge  tendre,  en  matière  de  luxure." 

Pauvres  petits  !  Cœurs  purs  et  âmes  candides,  nous  le  savons, 
nou^,  pères  de  famille  !  Qui  leur  excite  et  leur  pervertit  l'imagina- 
tion, sinon  ces  livres  idiots  ou  obscènes  où  il  n'est  question  que  de 
saintes  vouant  au  Seigneur  leur  virginité  dès  l'âge  de  six  ans, 
résistant  au  mariage  afin  de  conserver  leur  chasteté,  se  faisant  en- 
fermer dans  des  lupanars,  et  en  sortant  plus  vierges  que  jamais  ; 
sinon  ces  livres  où  on  les  invite  à  méditer,  en  les  aidant  par  des 
descriptions  colorées,  sur  la  circoncision,  l'incarnation,  la  concep- 
tion immaculée,  la  situation  de  Jésus  dans  le  sein  de  sa  mère  ; 
sinon  ces  cantiques  aux  mystiques  ejaculations,*  que  toute  mère 

*  Je  prendrai  comme  unique  exemple  la  prétendue  prière  suivante,  qui 
termine  un  volume  dû  à  l'un  des  éci'ivainsj  religieux  actuels  les  plus  en 


478  Tlie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

de  famille  jetterait  avec  horreur,  si  quelque  plaisant  y  subtituait 
Aithur  à, Jésus?  Pauvres  enfants!  que  ces  célibataires  veulent 
instruire,  et  qu'ils  poursuivent  sans  cesse  de  leurs  honteux  so(ip- 
çons,  et  de  leurs  suggestions  lubriques  !  N'est-ce-pas  notre  Rous- 
selot  lui-même  qui,  dans  ce  manuel  que  j'analyse  le  dégoût  aux 
lèvres,  s'enquiert  à  quel  âge  les  petites  filles  peuvent  perdre  irré- 
parablement, c'est-à-dire  "par  un  acte  libidineux  volontaire"  leur 
virginité,  et  le  fixe  dès  six  ans.  "Cum  sint  capaces  seminationis 
.  .  .  etiam  in  sexto  aetatis  anno"?  C'est  sans  doute  aussi  l'âge 
auquel  le  confesseur  peut  leur  poser  l'immonde  question  :  "Utrum 
cum  bestia  aliquid  inhoneste  egerint,  v.  g.,  bestiam  in  lectuin 
intromittendo,  seque  ab  eâ  lambente  tangi  procurando?  {V.  ci- 
dessus,  p.  518)." 

vogue,  au  confident  de  saint  Joseph,  le  R.-P.  Hujçuet  :  "Les  perles  de 
saint  François  de  Sales."  Lyon-Paris,  1863  (F.  Girard  éd.)  Elle  est  inti- 
tulée "Vive  Jésus!"  et  n'occupe  pas  moins  de  11  pages. 

AUX  CHERES  FILLES  DE  SAINTE  MARIE,  ETC. 

Vive  Jésus,  vive  sa  loi  ! 
Vive  Jésus,  ma  douce  vie; 
Vive  Jésus,  ma  seule  amie; 
Vive  Jésus,  de  qui  l'amour 
Me  va  consumant  nuit  et  jour; 


Vivent  ses  liens  précieux. 

Qui  tiennent  mon  cœur  amoureux; 

Vive  Jésus  et  son  empire. 

Vive  la  douceur  qu'il  m'inspire; 

Vive  Jésus,  vivent  ses  traits, 

Vivent  ses  aimables  attraits. 


Vive  Jésus  qui  me  possède. 

Et  donne  à  mes  maux  le  remède; 

Vive  Jésus,  vive  sa  force. 
Vive  son  a^çréable  amorce  ; 


Vive  Jésus  en  ma  poitrine,      j 
Vive  son  image  divine; 
Vive  Jésus  en  tous  mes  pas, 
Vivent  ses  amoureux  appas  ; 

Vive  Jésus  quand  nuit  et  jour, 
Il  me  remplit  de  son  amour; 


Questions  lîtlative  to  Marriage.  479 

Point  2"  :    Avec  les  Fiances. 

Q.  I.  Combien  de  fois. et  comment  les  futurs  époux  doivent 
être  entendus  en  confession  avant  le  mariage. 

Quand  ils  doivent  être  absous. 

La  confession  doit  être  répétée  trois  fois.  "Le  confesseur  ne 
devra  parler  de  ce  qui  touche  au  devoir  conjugul  qu'à  la  dernière 
confession,  qui  précède  immédiatement  les  noces." 

II.  Quand  et  comment  ils  doivent  être  avertis  d'un  empêche- 
ment caché  découvert  par  la  confession. 

III.  Comment  les  fiancés  doivent  être  instruits  du  but  du  mar- 
iage." 

Vive  Jésus  quand  il  m'enivre 
D'une  cloaceur  qui  me  fait  vivre; 


Vive  Jésus,  lorsque  sa  bouche, 
D'uu  baiser  amoureux  me  touche; 

Vive  Jé'^us,  quand  son  œillade 
Me  rend  heureusement  malade  ;       ♦ 

Vive  Jésus,  lorsque,  pâmée. 
Je  me  trouve  en  lui  transformée; 
Vive  Jésus,  quand  ses  riuueurs, 
Kérliiisent  mon  âme  en  laiij»ueur; 
Vive  Jé-us,  quand  il  m'attire 
8i  fort,  qu'd  semble  que  j'expire; 
Vive  Jésus,  quand  le  tourment, 
Me  fait  perdre  le  sentiment; 
Vive  Jésus,  quand  tout  à  l'aise, 
Il  me  permet  queje  le  baise  ; 

Vive  Jésus,  quand  il  m'appelle. 
Ma  sœur,  ma  colombe,  ma  belle; 

Vive  Jésus,  quand  sa  bonté. 
Me  réduit  dans  la  nudité; 
Vive  Jésus,  quand  ses  blandices, 
Me  comblent  de  cliastes  délices; 

Enfin  vive  et  règne  toujours, 
Jésus  l'objet  de  nos  amours  ! 

Et  combien  d'autres,  encore  moins  présentables,  et  souvent  odieuse- 
ment grossiers  ! 


I 


480  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

"Dans  la  dernière  confession  avant  le  manage,  les  fiancés  doi- 
vent être  instruits  du  but  du  mariage." 

Suit  une  série  de  préceptes  fort  sages  sur  les  précautions  à  pren- 
dre avec  ceux  qui  ont  bien  vécu  jusque-là.  Mais  bientôt  le  naturel, 
ou  mieux  l'habitude,  l'emporte,  et  les  questions  ou  plutôt  les  en- 
seignements périlleux  commencent. 

Le  confesseur  parle  à  la  jeune  fiancée: 

"Le  but  du  mariage  est  la  génération  et  la  multiplication  des 
créatures.  .  .  .  Pour  y  arriver,  bien  des  choses  te  seront  permises 
qui  t'ont  été  jusqu'ici  interdites  et  qui  t'ont  fait  horreur,  ô  cliaste 
jeune  fille  ;  d'autres  seront  toujours  illicites.  Pour  les  distinguer 
les  unes  des  autres,  je  vais  t'indiquer  trois  caractères  :  Tout  ce  qui 
tend  à  la  fin  voulue  par  le  Créateur,  c'est-à-dire  à  la  génération 
des  enfants,  te  sera  permis  avec  ton  mari,  et  tu  y  coopéreras  licite- 
ment. Tout  ce  qui  est  contre  cette  fin,  c'est-à-dire  contre  la  géné- 
ration, est  illicite  et  défendu  sous  péché  mortel.  Tout  ce  qui  n'est 
ni  favorable  ni  défavorable  à  cette  fin,  comme  les  embrassements, 
les  baisers,  les  familiarités,  etc.,  ...  ou  bien  est  péché  véniel,  si 
cela  est  fait  uniquement  par  sensualité,  ou  bien  n'est  pas  péché, 
s'il  provient  d'amour  honnête  et  licite  entre  époux.  Confie  donc  à 
ta  mémoire  ces  trois  mots  :  pour  la  fin,  permis  ;  contre  la  fin,  péché 
mortel  ;  ni  pour  ni  contre,  véniel  ou  non  péché.  Veux-tu  me  répé- 
ter cette  explication,  pour  que  je  sache  si  tu  l'as  bien  comprise? 

"Je  veux  maintenant  t'avertir  d'une  chose  encore:  Dans  la  con- 
fession prochaine  et  dans  les  suivantes,  tu  ne  rougiras  pas  de  me 
questionner  sur  ce  que  tu  n'aurais  j)as  bien  compris  aujourd'hui,  ou 
sur  les  doutes  qui  te  seraient  survenus,  ou  sur  tout  ce  qui  te  trou- 
blerait ou  te  chagrinerait.  Et  si  tu  obéis  à  mes  conseils,  tu  auras 
le  bonheur  en  mariage,  la  sainteté  dans  la  vie,  la  prédestination  à 
la  mort,  la  béatitude  au  ciel." 

Ainsi,  tu  croyais  ô  jeune  époux,  que  ta  chaste  fiancée  ne  devait 
recevoir  que  de  sa  mère  les  mstruc  ions  suprêmes.  Apprends  que 
c'est  l'homme  du  confessionnal,  le  célibataire,  qui  les  lui  donnera, 
et  qu'il  s'arrangera  de  manière  à  savoir  dans  quelques  jours  ce  que 
tu  veux  cacher  à  tous,  ce  dont  tu  n'oserais  parler  même  à  ta  nou- 
velle é[)ouse  ;  car  dorénavant  l'alcôve  nuptiale  n'aura  pas  de  ride- 
aux pour  lui.     Et  toutes  ses  précautions  sont  prises  : 


Abortion  and  Sacred  Embryology.  481 

"Le  confesseur  ne  devra  pas  renvoyer  les  fiancés  pour  ces 
instructions  à  leur  père  ou  à  leur  inère  ;  car  ou  bien  ceux-ci  n'ose- 
raient les  interroger^  ou  bien  ils  seraient  mal  instruits  par  des  maî- 
tres mal  intruits  eux-mêmes  "à  male  edoctis  male  edocebuntur." 


CHAPITRE  IV. 
De  l'avortement  et  de  l'embryologie  sacrée. 

ART.  I. — De  l'Avortement. 

Q.    I.  Ce  qu'est  l'avortement  et  s'il  est  permis  de  le  procurer. 

Il  n'y  a  rien  à  reprocher  aux  solutions  données  dans  la  première 
partie  de  l'article.  Cependant,  on  ne  peut  s'empêcher  de  remar- 
quer avec  quelle  sécheresse  d'âme  sont  traitées  ces  matières.  Aucun 
appel  à  un  sentiment  généreux,  à  l'amour  maternel.  La  femme 
est  traitée  exclusivement  comme  une  machine  à  fabriquer  l'homme, 
machine  qui  n'a  pas  le  droit  de  s'arrêter  dans  sa  fabrication.  Pas 
davantage  d'idées  générales,  tirées  du  bien  de  l'Etat  et  de  la  soci- 
été. 

Je  relève  en  outre,  des  maximes  singulièrement  dangereuses  eu 
pratique  :  "Si  une  jeune  fille  enceinte  se  montre  absolument  déter- 
minée à  détruire  elle  et  son  fruit,  et  ne  puisse  en  être  détournée 
autrement,  il  est  permis  de  lui  conseiller  de  détruire  le  fœtus  seul, 
et  de  se  conserver  vivante." 

II.  S'il  y  a  des  peines  et  ce  qu'elles  sont,  contre  l'avortement, 
en  droit  canonique. 

"Relativement  à  l'avortement  d'un  fœtus  non  animé,  il  n'y  a 
dans  le  droit  canon  aucune  peine,  pas  plus  que  contre  la  stérilité 
procurée." 

Génin,*  qui  cite  ce  passage,  le  commente  fort  sagement  par 
ces  paroles:  "La  cour  d'assises  a  plus  d'une  fois  constaté  que  des 
piètres  traduits  devant  elle  pour  attentat  aux  mœurs  avaient  fait 
avorter  leurs  maîtresses  ;  n'est-il  pas  possible  de  penser  que  les 
malheureux  s'autorisaient  peut-être  en  conscience  de  leur  cours  de 
théologie  morale  ?  " 

Quant  à  l'époque  de  l'animation  du  fœtus,  rien  de  moins  précis, 
en  telle  sorte  qu'on  peut  avoir  jusqu'au  quatre-vingtième  jour  à  ne 


L 


Ses  Jésuites  et  l'Université — Paris  1844. 


AS2  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

pas  pécher,  s'il  s'ngit  d'un  foetus  femelle,  ear  pour  un  mâle,  on  n*a 
que  jusqu'au  quarantième. 

III.  Quelles  peines  frappent  l'avortement,  d'après  le  droit 
civil. 

IV.  Comment  le  confesseur  doit  interroger  en  cas  d'avorte- 
ment. 

ART.  II. — Embryologie  Sacrée. 

C'est  une  science  qui  "traite  de  l'octroi  du  baptême  aux  fœtus 
arrivés  prématurément  au  monde,  à  ceux  qui  sont  encore  dans  le 
sein  de  leur  mère,  ou  à  ceux  qui  ne  peuvent  naître  naturellement, 
question  de  la  plus  haute  importance,  car  il  est  de  foi  que  le  bap- 
tême est  nécessaire  au  salut  de  tout  être  possédant  une  âme  rai- 
sonnable." 

Q.  I.  De  ceux  qui  peuvent  être  baptisés,  et  particulièrement 
si  les  enfants  qui  n'ont  pas  encore  vu  le  jour  peuvent  être  bap- 
tisés. 

Réponse  :  "  Nul  ne  peut  être  baptisé  quand  il  est  renfermé  dans 
l'utérus  maternel.'*  Mais  si  l'enfant  a  passé  la  tête  ou  un  membre, 
ou  si  l'on  peut  lui  porter  de  l'eau  soit  avec  la  main,  soit  avec  un 
instrument,  on  doit  le  baptiser. 

II.  Si  le  fœtus  venu  prématurément  au  monde  peut  être 
baptisé. 

Oui,  "  s'il  a  déjà  la  figure  et  les  premiers  linéaments  du  corps 
humain."  Mais  il  y  a  toujours  là  de  grands  embarras  :  à  quelle 
époque  de  la  vie  intrà-utérine  l'âme  descend-elle  s'incarner  dans  la 
chair  fœtale? 

III.  Si  les  fœtus  qui  ne  donnent  aucun  signe-  de  vie  peuvent 
être  baptisés. 

IV.  Si  le  fœtus  ne  peut  venir  au  monde,  est-il  permis  de  faire 
l'opération  dite  césarienne? 

La  réponse  peut  se  résumer  par  ces  deux  propositions  ;  1"  Si  la 
mère  est  morte,  il  faut  faire  l'opération.  La  loi  l'ordonne  ainsi 
dans  le  royaume  de  Naples  et  de  Sicile,  même  pour  les  femmes 
enceintes  depuis  peu  de  jours;  et  cela  est  très  bien,  parce  qu'ouj 
n*est  pas  sûr  de  l'époque  oii  le  fœtus  est  animé  et  a  besoin  duj 


Abortion  and  Sacred  Embryology,  483 

baptême.     2°  Il  le  faut  aussi,  alors  qu'elle  vit  encore,  s'il  n'est  pas 
moralement  sûr  que  l'opération  la  tuera. 

V.  S'il  faut  et  si  l'on  peut  baptiser  les  monstres.* 
Oui,  avec  des  réserves  prudentes. 

Signalons, une  espèce  intéressante  :  *'  Un  monstre  étant  né  de  la 
bestialité  et  ayant  apparence  humaine,  on  le  baptisera  s'il  est 
le  produit  d'un  homme  et  d'une  bête,  mais  s'il  provient  d'une 
femme  et  d'une  bête,  il  ne  faut  pas  le  baptiser.  C'est  que  dans  le 
premier  cas,  mais  non  dans  le  second,  il  peut  être  homme  descend- 
ant naturellement  d'Adam." 

En  dehors  de  l'absurdité  de  l'hypothèse,  il  est  curieux  de  retrou- 
ver ici  toujours  le  mépris  de  la  fomme,  qui  ne  peut  communiquer 
seule  à  son  fruit  la  qualité  humaine. 

VI.  Si  les  enfants  exposés  doivent  être  baptisés. 

Jusqu'ici,  ces  questions  n'ont  qu'une  valeur  théologique,  mais 
voici  qui  est  plus  sérieux  et  entre  dans  le  domaine  des  faits. 

VII.  Quel  est  le  devoir  des  curés  et  des  confesseurs  relative- 
ment au  baptême  du  fœtus,  aux  avortements,  à  l'opération  césar- 
ïenne. 

"Ils  devront  enseigner  aux  femmes,  aux  accoucheuses,  etc., 
qu'il  est  de  leur  devoir  strict  d'ouvrir  la  femme  enceinte  aussitôt, 
après  sa  mort,  pour  baptiser  l'enfant  qu'on  en  tirera  le  plus  souvent 
en  vie.*  .  .   . 

"  Ils  devront  même  apprendre  à  faire  l'opération  césarienne, 
pour  pouvoir  l'enseigner  si  roccasi(  n  s'en  présente." 

Suit  le  manuel  opératoire  :  ''Avec  un  scalpel  ou  un  rasoir,  sur  la 
partie  la  plus  proéminente  du  ventre,  etc.   .   .   ." 

Peuvent-ils  faire  eux-mêmes  l'opération?  Tous  les  cisuistes 
répondent  affirmativement,  mais  Rousselot  ne  s'avance  pas  autant. 

♦Craisson  rapporte  ici  une  amusante  preuve  de  l'incroyable  ignorance 
de  ces  dissertateurs  en  matière  embryologique-  "Un  enfant  naquit  sous 
la  forme  d'un  poisson;  une  servante,  qui  avait  été  chargée  de  faire  dis- 
paraître un  tel  monstre,  eut  l'inspiration  heureuse  d'ouvrir  l'enveloppe 
poissonneuse,  qui  lui  fit  découvrir  un  très  bel  enfant,  plein  de  vie,  qui  put 
être  bapti^é,  et  qui  devint  plus  tard  un  docteur  illustre."  (p.  191). 

♦A  défaut  de  médecin  et  de  sajje  femme,  ''toute  personne  peut  et 
même  doit  faire  cette  opération,  si  elle  n'est  pas  tout  à  fait  incapable." 
(Crnisson,  p.  205)  et  l'opération  devra  être  faite  "en  hâte,  aussitôt  la 
mort  constatée."     Mais  constaiée  comment,  et  par  qui? 


I 


484  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

"On  devra,  dit-il,  se  conduire  d'après  les  ordres  de  Tévêque,  qui 
déterminera  comment  cette  obligation  peut  s'accorder  avec  les  lois 
actuelles  et  les  mœurs." 

Et  maintenant,  que  tous  ceux  qui  se  sont  tant  indignés  aux 
récits  récents  (1878)  de  la  femme  de  Champoly  (Loire)  éventrée 
par  le  charcutier  du  village,  et  de  celle  de  Néaiilphe  sous-Essai 
Orne  ouverte  avec  un  canif  par  une  voisine  aussitôt  après  la 
mort,  dans  les  deux  cas  sur  l'ordre  du  curé,  se  taisent  et  compren- 
nent !  Leur  indignation  prouve  d'abord  leur  ignorance  ;  mais  elle 
prouve  encore,  hélas!  que  la  dureté  des  temps  et  l'incrédulité  du 
siècle  ont  rendu  fort  rare,  et  par  suite  fort  remarquée,  l'exécution 
d'une  loi  canonique. 

Ce  qu'il  y  a  de  plus  intéressant  dans  tout  ceci,  c'est  que  la 
préoccupation  de  sauver  la  vie  soit  à  la  mère,  soit  à  l'enfant, 
n'entre  pour  rien  dans  l'esprit  des  casuistes.  On  devra  ouvrir  le 
ventre,  alors  que  l'enfant  ne  sera  certainement  pas  viable  ;  il  suffit 
qu'il  puisse  être  vivant.* 

Appendice  (p.  168). —  Des  Clercs  Coupables  de  Turpitudes 

EN    PÉCHANT    CONTRE    LA    ChASTETE. 

Chapitre  prudent,  et  qui  doit  être  considéré  comme  la  morale  de 
ce  livre,  si  instructif  en  ces  matières,  pour  les  néo-confesseurs  et 
les  disciples. t 

*  C'est  qu'en  effet  il  n'y  a  d'intéressant  que  le  salut  éternel  de  l'enfant. 
Cette  préoccupation  dominante  s'est  manifestée  l'année  dernière  dans  des 
conditions  extrêmememt  dramatiques.  La  cour  d'assises  du  Calvados  a 
condamné  deux  femmes,  la  mère  et  la  fille,  qui  avaient  tué  le  nouveau-né 
de  celle-ci  ;  auparavant,  ces  deux  ferventes  catholiques  avaient  eu  le  soin 
de  le  baptiser,  afin  qu'il  pût  devenir  un  ange. 

t  Voir  à  ce  propos  le  tout  récent  et  très  curieux  livre  du  P.  Chiniquy  : 
Le  prêtre,  la  femme  et  le  confessionnal.     Paris,  1880. 

NOTE    SE    RAPPORTANT   A  LA   PAGE   538. 

1.  Je  cite  ici,  pour  montrer  que  ces  odieuses  pratiques  ne  sont  pas 
spéciales  à  Rousselot,  un  extrait  d'un  autre  livre  du  même  genre,  les 
Instructions  pratiques  sur  le  mariage,  par  M.  l'abbé  Rabkyrolle.  vicaire 
général,  officiai  de  M.  l'P^vêqne  de  Mende. —  Ouvrage  publié  avec  l'appro- 
bation de  l'Kvêque  de  Mende;  enseigné  au  Grand-Séminaire  de  Mende. 
Toulouse,  1843. 


Appendix.  485 


PKUXIKME   rARTIE. 

Devairs  des  époux. 


"  Gommes  les  personnes  mariées  se  déterminent  difficilement  à  faire 
part  au  confesseur  des  péchés  qu'elles  commettent  contre  la  sainteté  du 
mariage,  il,  suit  qu'un  confesseur  qui  par  une  pudeur  mal  entendue,  pren- 
drait le  parti  de  ne  faire  aucune  interrogation  sur  cette  matière,  serait 
cause  que  plusieurs  de  ses  pénitents  croupiraient  toute  leur  vie  dans  une 
foule  de  péchés,  qu'ils  tâchent  même  de  se  dissimuler,  cherchant  à  se  per- 
suader que  le  mariage  donne  droit  à  plusieurs  actions  que  la  loi  de  Dieu 
condamne." 

Si  chaque  mari  d'une  femme  dévote  interrogeait  sa  femme  sur  ce  point, 
et  eu  obtenait  l'aveu  de  la  vérité,  on  verrait  d'étranges  scènes  ! 


Sppentrtx* 


Propositions  Condemned  by  Innocent  XI.,  on  the  16th  op 
March,  1679. 

It  is  hardly  possible  to  have  a  full  idea  of  the  height  of  cynicism 
the  Jesuitical  doctrine  had  attained  in  the  old  time,  without  having 
read  the  sixty-five  propositions  condemned  by  Innocent  XI.,  all  of 
them  supported  by  the  old  Jesuit  casuists.  The  reader  has  been 
able  to  judge,  in  a  great  number  of  particular  cases,  of  the  mighty 
efforts  of  imagination  the  modern  Jesuits  have  made  to  preserve 
the  benefit  of  these  easy  and  convenient  doctrines,  while  avoiding 
open  contradiction  of  the  Papal  interdiction. 

Here  are  those  propositions,  several  of  them  being  merely  of  a 
theological  nature,  seemingly  not  of  much  interest  in  our  day  ; 
besides  these  are  others,  which  belong  to  general  morals,  and 
which  do  not  need  any  explanation. 

1.  It  is  not  incorrect  fur  the  collation  of  sacraments  to  follow 
a  probable  opinion  on  the  value  of  the  administered  sacrament, 
putting  aside  a  more  positive  opinion,  in  case  it  is  not  forbidden 
by  a  law  or  regulation,  or  there  is  not  a  grave  prejudice  to  be  feared. 
This  is  why  only  the  collation  of  baptism,  of  the  sacerdotal,  or  of 
the  episcopal  order  must  not  be  made,  according  to  a  probable 
opinion. 

2.  I  presume,  with  probability,  that  a  judge  may  give  sentence 
after  a  least  probable  opinion. 

3.  In  general,  as  long  as  we  take  for  guidance  a  probability, 
either  intrinsic  or  extrinsic,  however  slight  it  may  be,  providing 
we  do  not  go  beyond  the  limits  of  that  probability,  we  act  always 
with  prudence. 

4.  The  infidel  will  be  forgiven  for  his  lack  of  faith,  if  his  in- 
credulity is  caused  through  his  following  a  less  probable  opinion. 


Appendix.  487 

5.  lïe  who  performs  but  one  act  of  love  towards  God  in  his 
whole  life,  is  he  in  a  state  of  mortal  siii?  We  dare  not  condemn 
him. 

6.  It  is  probable  that  the  precept  of  love  towards  God  does 
not  oblige  strictly  by  itself  to  do  so  every  five  years. 

7.  There  is  obligation  only  when  we  are  compelled  to  justify 
ouiselves,  there  being  no  other  possible  means  of  justification. 

8.  Eating  and  drinking  to  satiety,  for  the  alone  pleasure  of 
eating  and  drinking,  is  not  a  sin,  so  long  as  health  does  not  suffer 
from  it;  because  natural  appetite  may  legitimately  take  enjoynient 
from  those  acts  proper  to  its  nature. 

9.  The  matrimonial  act,  practiced  in  view  of  pleasure  alone,  is 
entirely  free  from  sin,  even  venial. 

10.  We  are  under  no  obligation  to  love  our  neighbor  by  any 
inward  and  earnest  acts. 

11.  We  may  fulfill  the  precept  of  love  to  our  neighbor,  by  mere 
outward  acts. 

12.  There  is  scarcely  any  obligation  to  give  alms,  as  we  are 
held  to  give  away  only  the  superfluous  part  of  our  fortune.  The 
reason  is,  that  rich  persons,  and  even  kings,  have  seldom  any  su- 
perfluous fortune  to  dispose  of. 

13.  Keeping  the  required  moderation,  you  can,  without  mortal 
sin,  feel  grieved  about  the  life  of  a  person,  rejoice  at  his  natural 
death,  wish  it,  hope  for  it,  with  an  inefficacious  desire,  not  through 
hate  for  that  person,  but  in  view  of  a  material  advantage  result- 
ing to  yourself. 

14.  It  is  allowed  to  wish,  with  an  absolute  desire,  for  the  death 
of  your  father,  not  as  an  evil  for  him,  but  as  an  advantage  to  the 
wisher  ;  for  instance,  if  a  large  inheritance  is  to  result  from  that 
death. 

15.  It  is  permitted  to  a  son,  who  has  killed  his  father  while  in 
a  state  of  drunkenness,  to  rejoice  at  his  death,  when  a  considerable 
inheritance  results  from  his  murder. 

16.  Faith  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  lying  under  the  regulation 
of  a  special  and  particular  precept. 

17.  One  act  of  faith  is  sufficient  in  a  life- time.  '^ 

18.  I  approve  that  when  answering  the  questions  of  a  public 


»^ 


488  Tlte  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

officer,  a  man  confess  openly  his  faith,  as  it  is  a  praise-offering 
to  God  and  faith  ;  but  silence  does  not  seem  to  me  condemnable 
as  being  in  itself  a  cause  of  sin. 

19.  The  will  cannot  make  the  assent  given  to  faith  have  in 
itself  more  strength  than  the  value  of  the  reasons  by  which  su'ch 
assent  is  determined. 

20.  It  follows  from  this,  that  one  may  prudently  throw  aside  an 
assent  which  has  been  considered  supernatural. 

21.  The  supernatural  assent,  needed  for  the  salvation  which  is 
granted  to  faith,  is  consistent  with  a  merely  probable  knowledge 
of  revelation,  and  also  with  the  idea  of  those  fearing  t.hat  God 
may  not  have  spoken. 

22.  The  belief  in  a  sole  God  is  the  only  point  which  seems  to 
require  a  certain  limit;  but  it  is  different  when  there  exists  an  ear- 
nest belief  in  a  future  judgment. 

23.  Faith,  in  a  large  sense,  based  on  the  testimony  of  creat- 
ures, or  some  such  motive,  is  sufficient  for  justification. 

24.  To  invoke  God  as  a  witness  for  a  slight  lie  is  not  such  a 
great  irreverence  as  that  a  man  should  be  condemned  for  it. 

25.  It  is  allowed  to  take  an  oath  when  there  is  a  certain  reason 
for  it,  without  having  the  inward  intention  to  swear,  whether  the 
matter  be  light  or  grave. 

26.  If  alone,  or  in  presence  of  witnesses,  to  answer  a  question 
of  one's  own  accord,  for  a  joke  or  for  any  other  reason,  one  swears 
he  has  not  done  what  has  been  really  done,  inwardly  thinking  of 
something  else  which  has  not  been  done,  or  of  different  means  than 
those  actually  used,  one  does  not  lie,  and  is  not  a  perjurer. 

27.  A  person  has  always  a  just  reason  to  make  use  of  such 
equivocations  when  it  is  necessary  or  useful  for  personal  safety, 
the  preservation  of  honor  or  fortune,  or  for  any  other  act  of  such 
a  nature  that  dissimulation  of  the  truth  may  then  be  considered  as 
advantageous  and  worthy  of  our  ZLal. 

28.  Anyone  on  whom  has  been  conferred  a  magistracy  or  office 
by  means  of  a  reference  or  a  present,  ma}-,  with  mental  restriction, 
take  the  oath  required  by  the  king  for  such  functions,  without  tak- 
ing into  consideration  the  intention  of  the  person  to  whom  the  oath 
is  made,  because  he  is  not  compelled  to  confess  a  hidden  crime. 


I 


Appendix,  489 

29.  A  pressing  and  grave  fear  is  a  just  motive  for  seeming  to 
administer  a  sacrament. 

30.  An  honorable  man  is  allowed  to  kill  the  offender  trying  to 
ruin  his  character,  if  the  injury  cannot  be  repaired  in  any  other 
way  ;  the  same  may  be  said  if  receiving  a  slap  in  the  face,  or  a 
blow  with  a  stick,  when  the  assaulter  runs  away  after  having  com- 
mitted the  offence. 

31.  Rightly,  I  can  kill  a  thief,  for  the  preservation  of  a  single    «^ 
dollar. 

32.  Manslaughter  is  not  only  allowed  to  preserve  what  we  act-    ^ 
ually  possess,  but  also  anything  to  which  we  have  positive  right 
and  which  we  hope  to  possess. 

33.  The  same  means  may  be  used,  either  by  the  heir  or  testa- 
tor, when  unjustly  prevented  from  getting  an  inheritance  or  receiv- 
ing a  legacy  ;  the  same  may  be  said  of  any  one  when  unjustly 
prevented  from  getting  possession  of  a  seat  or  an  advantageous 
situation. 

34.  Abortion  is  allowed  before  the  animation  of  the  foetus,  to 
save  the  life  or  reputation  of  a  young  girl  who  is  pregnant. 

35.  It  is  probable  that  every  foetus  (as  long  as  it  remains  in 
the  uterus),  lacks  a  reasonable  soul,  and  that  the  soul  takes  posses- 
sion at  the  time  of  birth  ;  consequently,  it  may  be  said  that  no 
homicide  is  committed  by  the  act  of  abortion. 

36.  Theft  is  allowed  in  a  case  of  extreme  necessity,  or  great 
need  only. 

37.  Servants  may  steal  secretly  from  their  masters  what  they    ^ 
deem  a  compensation  for  extra  work  not  sufficiently  rewarded  by 
their  wages. 

38.  One  is  not  obliged,  under  penalty  of  mortal  sin,  to  restore 
what  has  been  stolen  in  successive  small  thefts,  whatever  may  be 
the  amount  of  the  total  sum  thus  stolen. 

39.  Any  one  who  advises  or  induces  another  to  cause  a  grave 
prejudice  to  a  third  party,  is  not  under  obligation  to  compensate 
the  latter  for  the  damage. 

40.  A  usurious  contract  is  lawful,  even  when  made  without  an 
intermediary,  and  wiih  a  contract  concluded  in  advance  author- 
izing another  sale,  with  the  intention  of  getting  an  extra  profit. 


490  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

41.  As  ready  cash  is  better  than  money  in  prospect,  and  as 
every  one  prefers  the  former  to  the  latter,  the  creditor  may  exact 
from  his  debtor  more  than  the  capital,  and,  on  the  strength  of  this 
argument   be  excused  of  u-ury. 

42.  It  is  not  usury  when  more  than  the  capital  is  exacted,  not  as 
a  mark  of  kindness  and  gratitude,  but  only  in  the  name  of  justice. 

43.  How  could  it  be  otherwise  that,  when  making  false  state- 
ments to  destroy  a  great  authority  who  does  you  harm,  you 
should  be  free  even  from  venial  sin? 

44.  It  is  probable  that  mortal  sin  is  not  committed  when  one 
falsely  accuses  a  person  to  protect  his  rights  and  honor.  And  if 
this  is  not  probable,  there  should  be,  so  to  speak,  no  probable 
opinion  in  theology. 

45.  To  give  temporal  goods  for  spiritual,  when  the  former  is 
not  meant  to  be  a  price  paid  for  the  latter,  is  not  simony,  but 
only  a  reason  to  confer  or  produce  the  spiritual  ;  or  even  when  the 
temporal  would  be  but  a  gratuitous  compensation  for  the  spiritual, 
and  vice  versa. 

46.  The  same  may  be  said  when  the  temporal  is  looked  upon 
as  the  principal  motive  to  decide  upon  the  donation  of  the  spirit- 
ual, or  even  as  the  aim  of  the  spiritual,  so  far  as  leading  one  to 
estimate  the  former  as  worth  more  than  the  spiritual. 

47.  When  the  Council  of  Trent  says  that  one  has  fallen  into  a 
state  of  mortal  sin  by  communicating  of  the  sins  of  others,  if  one 
confers  ecclesiastical  dignities  on  other  persons  than  those  judged 
more  worthy  and  useful  to  the  Church,  either:  1,  the  Council 
seems  to  imply  by  these  words  more  worthy,  simply  the  merit  of 
those  worthy  to  be  chosen,  by  taking  the  comparative  for  the  posi- 
tive ;  or  2,  an  improper  expression  is  used,  more  worthy,  so  as  to 
exclude  the  unworthy  ones,  but  not  those  who  are  worthy  ;  or, 
also,  in  the  third  place,  the  Council  means  a  competition. 

48.  It  seems  evident  that  fornication  in  itself  is  not  stained  b}' 
evil,  and  that  it  is  bad  only  because  it  is  forbidden  ;  the  contrary 
seems  quite  unreasonable. 

49.  Masturbation  is  not  prohibited  by  natural  right.  It  follows 
that,  if  God  had  not  forbidden  it,  it  would  often  be  good,  and 
sometimes  obligatoi-y,  under  penalty  of  mortal  sin. 


Ajjpendix,  491 

50.  Connection  with  a  married  woman,  when  the  husband 
consents,  is  not  adultery;  and  this  is  the  reason  why,  in  confes- 
sion, it  is  sufficient  to  accuse  one's  self  of  having  committed  for- 
nication. 

51.  The  servant  who,  by  bending  his  shoulders,  knowingly 
helps  his  master  to  reach  a  window  in  order  to  violate  a  young 
girl,  and  frequently  assists  him  by  bringing  him  a  ladder,  opening 
a  door,  and  furnishing  him  cooperation  in  a  similar  manner,  does 
not  commit  a  mortal  sin  if  he  so  acts  through  fear  of  a  grave  dam- 
age ;  as,  for  instance,  to  suffer  ill  treatment  from  his  master,  to 
be  considered  as  a  fool  and  discharged. 

52.  The  precept  of  the  celebration  of  feast  days  does  not  oblige 
under  penalty  of  mortal  sin,  aside  from  scandal,  if  there  is  no 
scorn  displayed  in  regard  to  it. 

53.  The  precept  of  the  Church  ordering  the  hearing  of  the 
mass,  is  complied  with  when  two  parts  of  it  are  heard,  and  even 
four  said  by  several  priests  at  the  same  hour. 

54.  One  who  is  not  able  to  remember  matins  and  lauds,  but  is 
able  to  say  the  rest  of  the  prayers,  is  under  no  obligation,  because 
the  more  covers  the  less. 

55.  The  precept  of  the  annual  communion  is  complied  with  by 
eating  the  Lord  in  a  sacrilegious  manner. 

56.  Frequent  confessions  and  communions  are  a  mark  of  pre- 
destination, even  in  those  who  live  irreligiously. 

57.  It  is  probable  that  natural  attrition  is  sufficient,  providing 
it  is  earnest. 

58.  We  are  not  compelled  to  confess  to  a  questioning  confes- 
sor  that  we  are  in  the  habit  of  committing  a  particular  sin. 

59.  It  is  allowed  to  grant  sacramental  absolution  to  persons 
who  have  made  but  half  their  confession,  by  reason  of  a  large 
number  of  penitents,  as  may  happen,  for  instance,  on  a  festival,  or 
indulgence  day. 

60.  One  must  neither  refuse  nor  defer  absolution  to  a  penitent 
in  a  state  of  habitual  sin  against  the  laws  of  God,  nature  or  the 
Church,  even  when  there  is  no  hope  of  amendment,  providing  he 
openly  declares  he  repents,  and  shows  his  intention  to  lead  a  bet- 
ter life. 


492  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

61.  One  may  sometimes  absolve  a  person  who  is  in  a  near 
opportunity  of  falling  into  sin,  being  able  but  not  willing,  to  resist 
temptation,  or  who  even  directly  seeks  it  with  premeditation,  or 
cooperates  with  it. 

Q2.  One  must  not  avoid  a  near  occasion  of  sin,  when  there  is 
a  useful  or  honest  reason  not  to  avoid  it. 

63.  It  is  allowed  to  seek  directly  a  near  opportunity  to  sin  for 
our  spiritual  or  temporal  good,  or  for  the  good  of  our  neighbor. 

64.  A  man  may  receive  absolution,  although  he  be  ignorant  of 
the  mysteries  of  the  Faith,  even  if  it  be  through  blameable  neglect 
that  he  is  without  knowledge  of  the  mysteries  of  the  Holy  Trinity 
and  of  the  incarnation  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ. 

65.  It  is  sufficient  to  have  at  least  once  believed  those  myste- 
ries. 

All  these  propositions  are  condemned  and  forbidden  by  the 
Popes,  as  being  at  least  scandalous,  and  harmful  in  practice. 


SUPPLEMENT. 


««^\*'S»'>.'^«/^«i<'"'>i^'k/"V*'\<'>. 


SPEECHES 


DELIVERED   BY 


M.   PAUL    BERT, 


IN  THE 


CHAMBER    OF    DEPUTIES, 

Sittings  of  tjje  21st   of  3une,   anti  6tf)  ant»   8t{j   of 

Sulg,  1879, 

AT  THE 

Debate  on  the  Law  Kelative  to  the  Liberty  of  Higher 
Teaching. 


SPEECH 

Î3eliberetr  at  tîje  Stttmg  of  tîje  21st  of 
3une,  1879. 


Opening  of  the  General  Discussion. 
M.  Paul  Bert,  President  of  the  Commission  : — 

Gentlemen  :  It  is,  I  believe,  superfluous  to  call  the  attention  of 
the  Chamber  to  the  importance  and  gravity  of  the  questions  sub- 
mitted to  it  by  the  new  Bill  suggested  by  the  Government.  Per- 
haps it  would  be  more  correct  to  confine  such  debate  within  the 
limits  nearest  the  truth  of  facts.  A  sort  of  tumultuous  agitation 
has  already  manifested  itself  throughout  the  country.  Cries  of 
oppression,  of  martyrdom,  have  been  heard  ;  and  even  in  the 
speech  of  the  honorable  orator  who  occupied  the  tribune  at  the 
beginning  of  this  discussion,  such  fears  constantly  appear.  It 
seems  that  the  very  foundations  of  society  are  shaken  ;  that  the 
question  itself  has  to  be  debated  anew.  .  .  . 

M.  de  Baudry  d' Assort  —  That  is  true. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  It  seems  that  the  liberty  of  teaching,  written  in 
our  laws  since  1833  for  primary  instruction,  since  1850  for  second- 
ary teaching,  since  1875  for  higher  education,  is  compromised; 
it  seems  that  this  liberty  of  conscience  for  which  we,  the  sons  of 
the  Revolut'on, —  of  tlie  Revolution  that  proclaimed  it,  of  the 
Revolution,  unpardonable  in  the  mind  of  many  for  having  pro- 
claimed it, —  it  seems  that  tliis  liberty  of  conscience  itself  is 
threatened. 

Well,  I  think  there  exists  nothing  of  the  kind  ;  I  think  that  the 
question,  although  really  important,  is  not  connected  with  these 
great  principles. 


496  TJte  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

In  my  opinion,  and  according  to  the  feelings  of  the  Commission 
who  did  me  the  honor  of  electing  me  its  president,  the  law  sub- 
mitted to  you  is  neither  a  law  of  doctrine,  nor  a  law  of  organiza- 
tion.  .   .  . 

M.  de  Baudry  d* Assort  —  It  is  a  law  of  disorganization  ! 

Speaker  —  Please  don't  interrupt,  or  I  shall  have  to  call  you  to 
order. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  It  is  simply  a  law  of  social  defertce.  .  .  . 
(Good,  from  the  Left).  It  is  not  a  law  of  doctrine  ;  for  it  does  not 
interfere  with  the  principle  of  liberty  of  teaching:  moreover,  it 
restores  it  to  its  true  meaning  and  its  true  authority  ;  it  suppresses 
from  former  laws  the  despotical  regulations  which  had  destroyed 
freedom  of  teaching  for  all  citizens  ;  it  only  regulates  it  upon  a 
new  basis  ;  it  creates,  so  to  speak,  a  new  incapacity  for  a  class  of 
citizens. 

It  is  not  a  law  of  organization  ;  because  it  does  not  alter  in  any 
way  the  regulations  which  the  law  imposed  by  vote  of  the  National 
Assembly  of  1875,  relative  to  the  opening,  creation,  and  main- 
taining of  establishments  for  higher  instruction. 

It  does  nothing  else  but  take  away  from  them  a  title  constitut- 
ing a  regular  usurpation.  (Marks  of  approbation  from  the  Center 
and  the  Left. —  Reclaraalions  from  the  Right). 

3L  de  la  Rochefoucauld^  Duke  of  Bisaccia  —  Then  this  is  a  law 
of  usurpation  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Finally  it  is  a  law  of  social  defence  ;  and  this 
for  two  reasons  :  the  first  is,  that  it  restores  to  the  State  the  full 
possession  of  a  prerogative,  .  .  . 

M.  de  la  Biliais — Of  a  monopoly  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  ...  which  could  never  be  seriously  disputed 
—  that  of  freely  choosing  the  jurymen  commissioned  for  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  required  grades,  either  for  the  obtaining  of  certain 
State  functions,  or  giving  access  to  certain  professions,  entrance 
into  wh  ch  require  proofs  of  capacity. 

The  second  reason  is,  that  it  requests  you  to  take  away  the 
right  of  teaching  at  all  degrees, —  primary,  secondary,  and  supe- 
rior,—  from  a  body  of  men  which  it  judges  (rightly  or  wrongly, 
we  will  discuss  this  point  presently)  is  using  this  right  simply  to 


Speech  of  M,  Paul  Bert.  497 

fight  n^ainst  our  liberties  ;  to  attack  the  very  foundations  on  which 
rests  our  civil,  democratic,  and  'lay  society!  (Applause  from  the 
Left  and  Center  —  Reclamation  from  the  Right.) 

M.  Ernest  de  la  Rochette  —  There  are  two  ministers  here  who 
have  been  educated  by  the  Jesuits! 

The  Speaker  —  Do  not  interrupt;  please  listen  to  M.  Paul  Bert, 
as  M.  Boyer  has  been  listened  to. 

M.  Huon  de  Penanster  —  They  did  not  listen  to  him  ! 

The  Speaker  —  I  beg  your  paidon,  he  has  been  listened  to,  as 
he  deserved  to  be,  for  the  talent  he  displayed. 

j\T.  Paul  Bert  —  And  it  is  not  only  for  reasons  of  doctrine  that 
the  suggested  bill  takes  away  from  that  class  of  men  the  right 
of  teaching  granted  to  them  by  existing  laws  ;  it  is  besides, 
because  those  men  pretend  to  live  in  the  bosom  of  our  society  in 
a  state  of  secret  association,  without  having  presented  their 
statutes  for  the  approbation  of  the  State.  (Good  !  good  !  from 
Left  and  Center) . 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  Their  statutes  are  public  ;  they  have  been 
published,  and  everybody  knows  them. 

The  S  leaker  —  M.  de  la  Bassetiere,  your  name  is  down,  you 
shall  have  your  turn  ;  in  the  meantime,  please  do  not  interrupt. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  And  among  those  groups  of  men  there  is  one, 
—  among  those  companies  there  is  one, —  whose  name  is  so  cele- 
brated, whose  performances  are  so  well  known,  who  so  many 
times  have  incurred,  in  our  country  as  well  as  in  many  others,  the 
judgments  of  tribunals,  the  legitimate  proscriptions  of  govern- 
ments, that  the  law  seems  directed  solely  against  it  ;  so  that,  in 
the  public  mind,  in  the  national  opinion,  according  to  our  electors, 
the  law  submitted  to  you  has  for  its  aim  to  take  away  from  the 
Jesuits  the  right  to  teach  the  French  youth  ;  and  the  vote  for  or 
against  it  will  be  equivalent  to  voting  for  or  against  the  existence 
and  the  right  of  teaching  acccrded  to  the  Society  of  Jesus.  (Thai's 
it  !  good  !  from  the  Left). 

M.  Ilumi  de  Penanster  —  That  is  a  proof  that  you  are  afraid  of 
them. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  It  is  for  that  reason,  Gentleraen,  that  your 
<' .)mmission,  with  an  unanimity    disturbed  only   l)y  the  dissident 


I 


498  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

voice  of  our  honorable  colleague  M.  Gaslonde,  has  rejected  the 
amendments  proposed  before  the  submitting  of  the  report,  and  has 
discouraged  those  members  who  had  some  intention  to  suggest 
others.  It  is  for  that  reason  that  its  president  has  voluntarily 
withdrawn  a  previous  proposition  of  law  on  the  same  subject,  and 
on  which  he  cannot  help  throwing  now  and  then  a  glance  of  pater- 
nal regret.  (Smiles  from  the  Left).  It  is  for  that  reason  that  we 
declined  to  ascertain  whether  it  was  possible  to  do  more,  and  even 
better  ;  that  we  declined  to  amend  the  Government's  proposed  bill  ; 
and  that  we  present  it  to  you,  apart  from  some  details  of  no  impor- 
tance, exactly  as  it  has  been  submitted  to  us. 

We  thought  that  tlie  moment  when  the  Government  we  put  at 
our  head  was  taking  position, —  the  moment  when  the  Government 
which  the  assembly  of  363  had  put  at  its  head  was  marching 
toward  the  enemy, —  was  inopportune  for  making  parliamentary 
flirtage,  and  separating  ourselves  from  him  on  points  of  details. 

From  the  Right  —  Whom  do  you  call  "  the  enemy"?  you  have 
no  right  to  call  us  "  enemies  "  !  No  one  has  the  right  here  to  call 
Frenchmen  enemies  ! 

A  Member  of  the  Left  —  They  are  no  Frenchmen  ! 

31.  Paul  Bert  —  It  has  been  said  to  you.   .   .   . 

M.  Huon  de  Penanster  —  We  would  have  been  called  to  order 
long  ago,  if  such  a  word  hud  been  used  by  us. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  It  has  been  said  1o  you  from  this  tribune,  with 
an  unexcelled  eloquence  ;  and  you  know  that  it  is  through  that 
very  word  that  you  have  been  turned  away  from  this  House. 

M.  Huon  de  Penanster  —  But  we  are  still  within  this  House  ! 

31.  Paul  Bert  —  Gaml)etta  proclaimed  it  here:  **  Clericalism, 
there  is  the  enemy  "  ! 

3f.  de  Baud ry  d' Assort  —  Then  I  will  say,  that  the  Republican 
majority  is  the  devouring  leprosy  of  society!  .  .  .  (  Oh  !  oh! 
from  the  Left.) 

The  Speaker  —  M.  Baudry  d'Asson,  I  call  you  to  order.  (Ex- 
clamations from  tiie  Right.) 

3f.  de  la  Rochefoucauld,  Duke  of  Bisaccia — Should  it  be  allowed, 
to  say  that  we  are  enemies? 

27ie  Speaker  —  When  there  is  a  question  of  Jesuits,  we  do  not 


L 


Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert.  499 

moan  the  members  of  this  Chamber.  (Protestations  from  the 
Riglit.) 

M,  de  la  Bassetiere  —  There  is  a  nice  law  of  liberty  and  pacifi- 
cation ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  It  is  for  that  reason,  Gentlemen,  that  we  joined 
unanimously  together;  hoping  that  an  immense  majority  of  the 
Chamber  will  unite  to  bacic  the  Government,  the  moment  when  it 
endeavors  to  snatch  from  the  party  of  anti- Revolution  the  most 
recent  and,  one  may  say,  the  most  audacious,  and  one  of  its  most 
precious  conquests  ;  the  moment  when  it  intends  to  take  away 
from  those  who  made  themselves  the  adversaries  of  society,   .   .   .  . 

The  Count  of  Perrochel  —  There  is  no  party  here  attacking 
society. 

The  Speaker  —  Do  not  interrupt  !  You  are  not  allowed  to 
speak. 

M.  de  Baudry  d'Aftfion  —  Call  us  to  order,  if  you  like  ;  what  is 
that  to  us,  after  you  have  said  that,  by  calling  us  enemies,  we  are 
not  attacked  ! 

The  Speaker  —  No,  you  are  7io^  attacked.  (Emphatic  exclam- 
ations from  the  Right.) 

M.  de  Baudry  d'Asson  —  "We  protect  our  rights  as  fathers  of 
families,  and  no  one  can  i)revcnt  us. 

The  Speaker  —  You  iiave  the  ri^ht  to  answer  from  this  tribune, 
but  not  by  interru[)lion  ;  I  shall  not  allow  it. 

Continue,  M.  Pnul  Bert. 

The  Count  of  Kerjegu  —  No  one  has  the  right  to  insult  us,  Mr. 
President. 

The  Speaker  —  But,  once  more,  you  are  not  insulted  ;  I  can  not 
allow  you  to  sa}-  this.      (New  iuterruplions  from  the  Right.) 

M.  de  la  Bochefoucauld,  Duke  of  Bisaccia  —  We  are  called 
''  enemies  "  ! 

M.  de  Baudry  d'Asson  —  We  ask  that  the  orator  should  with- 
draw that  word  ! 

The  Speaker  —  You  are  not  allowed  to  speak. 

M.  Paul  Bert —  What  word  hiive  1  to  withdraw? 

M.  de  Baudry  d' Asson  —  The  word  ''enemies."  You  may  de- 
cliiiu  ;  but  we  request  it,  emphatically. 


500  TJie  Doctrine  r>f  the  Jesuitic. 

The  Speaker  —  You  have  no  right  to  ask  for  it. 

M.  de  Baudry  d'Asson  —  Beg  your  pardon  ! 

The  Speaker  —  Not  at  all  !  I  call  you  to  order,  with  special 
record  in  the  Official  Report  !  (Good  !  from  Center  and  Left. 
Exclamations  from  the  Right.) 

31.  de  Baudry  d'Asson  —  Oh  !  you  can  make  use  of  it  as  long 
as  you  like  !     (Noise.) 

31.  Paul  Bert  —  Your  protestations  do  not  astonish  me.  They 
prove  one  thing  :  it  is,  that  a  regular  confession  exists  over  this 
discussion  :  that  there  is  an  equivoque  which  has  not  been  ex- 
plained, neither  in  1850  nor  in  1875  ;  yes,  it  is  now  time  to  speak 
openly;  and  it  is  time  it  should  be  dissipated.  (Ah!  ah!  from 
the  Right.)  We  use  the  same  words,  but  they  have  not  the  same 
meaning.     (New  interruptions  from  the  Right.) 

3f.  de  Ba^idry  d' Assort  —  You  ought  to  have  spoken  in  that  way 
before  the  elections  ;  if  you  had  done  so,  you  would  not  be  here. 

The  Speaker  —  I  make  an  appeal  to  the  members  sitting  on  this 
side  (he  turns  to  the  Right.)  When  an  orator  of  the  talent  and 
competency  of  M.  Paul  Bert  undertakes  such  a  mighty  debate, 
during  which  it  is  necessary,  more  than  ever,  to  maintain  in  full 
the  liberty  of  the  tribune,  it  is  not  possible  that  his  speech  should 
be  hacked  in  pieces  by  interruptions  of  which  the  Chamber  can 
appreciate  Ihe  consequences.      (Applause  from  the  Left.) 

3L  Paul  Bert  —  We  do  not  speak  the  same  langunge  :  we,  the 
sons  of  the  Revolution  (I  have  said  it,  and  it  is  sufficient)  ;  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  representatives,  champions  and  protectors 
of  the  Catholic  Church, — it  being  alone  the  subject  of  this  debate. 

3f.  de  la  Basset iere —  Ah  !  Good  ! 

3f.  Paul  Bert  —  No,  we  do  not  speak  the  same  language. 

3f.  Blachere  —  We  speak  but  French. 

3f.  Paul  Bert — I  know  some  other  models  of  yours,  Sir! 
(Laughter  from  the  Left.)  We  use  the  same  words,  but  with  a 
different  meaning  ;  we  appeal  to  principles  having  the  same  label  ; 
but  not  the  same  source,  nor  the  same  end.  (Good  !  good  !  from 
the  Left.)  And  when  we  speak  of  liberty,  we  can  neither  agree 
nor  understand  each  other.  (Good  !  good  !  from  tlie  Left.)  But 
1  must  be  precise.     Liberty  for  us  — oh  !  1  shall  not  speak  meta- 


Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert.  501 

physicall}^  ;  I  intend  to  speak  of  nothing  else  but  of  the  liberty  of 
teaching,  —  liberty  of  teaching,  for  us,  is  the  setting  forth  of 
personal  liberty. 

M.  Charles  Floquet  —  ThaVs  it  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  It  is  a  particular  case  of  that  precious  liberty, 
censecrated  by  the  first  Declaration  of  Bights  of  1791  ;  of  that 
liberty  for  every  citizen  to  express  his  thoughts  in  all  forms  and 
circumstances  possible,  under  the  guardianship  and  supervision  of 
the  laws. 

It  is  that  liberty  which  means  liberty  of  teaching,  for  us  who 
believe  in  progress,  in  perfectability,  in  translating  and  teaching  to 
others  what  we  have  learned  ourselves.  It  is  our  right.  I  should 
say  more  :  it  is  our  duty.  And  I  feel  honored  to  have  written, 
long  ago,  these  words  :  "  They  speak  of  ^  the  right  of  teaching  ;  ' 
they  should  say,  '  the  duty  '  of  teaching.  No  one  can,  without 
being  a  guilty  egotist,  keep  to  himself  a  part  of  the  truth." 
(Good!  good!  and  applause  from  the  Left.)  That  liberty,  like 
all  others.  Gentlemen,  has  in  its  display  and  execution  but  one 
limit,  which  has  been  determined  by  the  Declaration  of  Rights, — 
that  is,  liberty  for  others:  personal  liberty  ends  only  at  the  point 
where  the  liberty  of  other  citizens  is  interfered  with. 

Can  we  say  the  same  of  that  liberty  as  understood,  and  which 
must  be  so  understood,  by  the  Catholic  Church?  It  is  impossible  ! 
We  proceed  from  human  right  :  the  Catholic  Church  proceeds  from 
divine  right.  She  has  received  her  institution  from  above  ;  she 
has  been  erected  on  a  sacred  foundation  ;  she  has  been  given  the 
mission  and  order  to  teach.  It  has  been  said  to  her  :  ''  Ite  et 
docete.'* 

The  Count  of  Perrochel  —  That  is  theology. 

From  the  Left  —  Do  not  interrupt. 

The  Sj^eaker  —  Truly,  M.  de  Perrochel,  you  will  compel  me  to 
call  you  to  order,  and  I  would  regret  it  very  much  for  your  sake  : 
for,  generally,  you  are  not  in  the  habit  of  interrupting.  I  request 
you  to  have  patience  and  listen  to  M.  Paul  Bert,  as  you  intend  to 
answer  him. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  I  am  told  "  this  is  theology  !  "  Gentlemen,  is  it 
meant  by  this    that  these  words  are  not  historical?     If  it  is,  I 


502  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

accept  the  interruption.  (Laughter  from  the  Left.)  I  was  saying 
tliut  the  Catholic  Church  declares  that  she  has  received  tlie  mission 
—  the  divine  mission  —  to  teach  the  truth,  the  whole  trutli,  as  all 
facts  concerning  this  world,  as  well  as  heaven,  has  been  revealed 
to  her;  that  no  one  has  any  right  to  contradict  her  ;  that  she  possesses 
tlie  sacred  sign  ;  that  light  is  not  careful,  and  needs  not  wrestle  witli 
darkness;  tliat  error  must  disappear  before  t:uth:  she  possesses 
absolute,  immutable,  eternal,  supreme  trutli  ;  consequently,  she  is 
intolerant,  and  this  is  her  right. 

Gentlemen,  for  the  reason  that  she  has  obtained  her  institution 
from  regions  to  which  we  cannot  attain,  for  that  reason  her  liberty 
is  not  only  like  ours,  —  the  right  to  tell  the  truth,  and  to  teach  all 
which  concerns  her  doctrine,  —  but  her  liberty  falls,  offended,  by 
the  mere  fact  that,  in  her  face,  some  one  tells  and  teaches  some- 
thing which  contradicts  her  doctrine.      (Good  !  from  the  Left.) 

Such  liberty  cannot  admit  competition  :  it  cannot  allow  it,  and  it 
refuses  to  accede  to  it. 

The  Count  of  Maille  —  Competition!  It  is  just  what  she  is 
sticking  for  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert — Beware  of  heresy,  if  you  speak  so,  (laughter 
from  the  Left)  ;  for  it  is  written  that  no  one  can  limit  the  right  of 
the  Catholic  Church  ;  that  it  must  have  the  direction  and  super- 
vision of  all  instruction  ;  that,  when  the  infected  schools  —  those 
which  are  not  exclusively  Catholic — dare  stand  before  the  Church, 
it  IS  an  attempt  against  its  liberty  ! 

I  well  understand  by  your  silence,  that  you  accept  this  doctrine. 
(Denials  from  the  Right). 

A  Member  of  the  Might — Not  at  all  !  The  Church  never  said  such 
a  thing  ! 

A  Voice  from  the  Left — Can  you  not  let  him  speak? 

M.  de  Baudry  d'Asson  —  Let  our  Chairman,  then,  allow  us  to 
answer. 

The  Count  of  Maille^  to  the  Orator — If  this  is  your  theology,  I 
do  not  congratulate  you  upon  it. 

M.  Paul  Bert — As  you  do  not  agree  with  my  reasoning,  because 
you  think  that  my  interpretation  of  the  thinking  and  doctrines  of 
the  Catholic  Church  is  erroneous — of  which  I  am  not  surprised  — 


S}:>e€ch  of  M.  Paul  Bert.  503 

allow  me  to  streugllieii  my  argument  with  the  help  of  more  compe- 
tent nuLhorit^es. 

I  was  saying  tliat  the  Catholic  Chinch  must  have  not  onlylibert}' 
but  also  the  monopoly  ;  she  needs  it,  she  will  have  it,  and  she  in- 
sists upon  having  it.  I  sa}^  that  she  is  right  ;  for  intolerance  is  one 
of  the  signs  of  positivism  ;  and,  in  religious  matters,  tolerance  is 
one  of  the  forms  of  scepticism.  She  insists  upon  it;  and  she  exacts 
also  that  governments  come  to  her  help  and  suppress  all  that  of- 
fends, contradict  or  injures  her.  (Exclamations  fiom  the  Right.) 
Listen  to  this  if  you  do  not  believe  me  : 

'*The  duty  of  the  State  is  to  come  to  the  help  of  the  Church  .  .  . 
in  the  work  of  pubhc  education  and  teaching.  .  .  .  The  State  has 
certainly  the  right  to  propose,  build  and  open  public  schools,  chairs 
for  all  kinds  of  universities  and  branches  of  teaching  ;  she  may 
transfer  the  teaching  to  all  sorts  of  persons,  lay,  religious  or  eccle- 
siastical ;  but  alwaj's  on  condition  that  the  Church,  which  is  the 
only  depository  of  the  faith  and  of  the  interests  of  Christ  and  souls, 
should  supervise  the  same  and  direct  the  teaching,  so  as  to  pre- 
vent error  from  spreading  in  those  places,  under  pretence  of  sci- 
ence, literature  or  history  (Smiles  from  the  Left);  and  may 
find  in  the  teachers  true  auxiliaries  for  the  great  work  intrusted  to 
her  by  God. 

"Such  is,  in  its  entire  meaning,  the  thesis  of  liberty  of  teaching 
and  education. 


"We  are  hap]>y  when  we  really  enjoy  that  wretched  equality 
between  falsehood  and  truth,  between  heresy  and  faith, — which  in 
modern  style  is  called  liberty  of  teaching.  For  us,  it  is  indeed 
liljerty,  though  not  full  and  complete  ;  lor  others,  for  the  ration- 
alist, protestant,  free-thinking  teachers,  it  is  simple  license.  When 
they  clamor  for  liberty  of  teaching,  they  ask  but  for  license  for 
leaching.  They  claim  and  obtain,  not  the  noble  right  of  using,  but 
the  disastrous  faculty  of  abusing  teaching. 

"In  our  unfortunate  France,  such  is  the  case  with  University 
teaching." 

There  is  the  doctrine  of  the  Church  ! 
From  the  Right — Who  is  the  author  of  that? 
M.  Paul  Bert — I  am  quite  ready  to  tell  you.     The  author  is  a 
distinguished   and   well-known  ecclesiastical   dignitary,  Mgr.  de 


504  The  Doctrine  of  /he  Jesuits, 

Segur  ;  and  the  book  from  which  I  quote  is  approved  by  a  Papal 
brief.      (Laughter  and  applause  from  the  Left.) 

The  Count  of  Maille — You  always  confound  dogmatic  with  prac- 
tical questions  !      (Exclamations  and  laughter  from  the  Left.) 

M.  Paul  Bert — The  honorable  M.  de  Maille  is  right,  and  I  thank 
him  for  his  interruption,  not  that  I  had  confounded  between  the 
theoretical  and  the  i)ractical  question,  but  I  had  to  mention  the 
former  before  speaking  of  the  latter.  In  Rome,  this  year,  schools 
have  been  opened  under  the  direction  of  Protestants  ;  or,  as  is 
said,  of  Free-thinkers. 

Well,  it  is  not  a  question  here  of  Mgr.  de  Segur,  but  of  the 
Pope  himself.  It  is  not  now  a  question  of  theory,  but  of  facts. 
What  is  the  sa^'ing  of  the  Pope  ? 

"We  cannot  keep  silence  on  the  strange  impudence  with  wliich 
they  dared  to  open  anti-Catholic  schools  under  our  own  eyes,  at 
the  very  doors  of  the  Vatican.   .   .   . 

"...  Our  situation  is  consequently  such  that  we  are  obliged 
to  let  error  be  free  to  raise  up  its  chairs  m  our  city,  as  we  are  not 
at  liberty  to  use  efficacious  means  to  destroy  it,  and  compel  it  to 
silence."     (Laughter  from  the  Left.) 

Is  this  not  the  practical  question?  And  now,  if  you  do  not  well 
understand  this  text,  you  have  only  to  recall  the  Middle  Ages,  and 
read  this  phraseology  by  the  light  of  Vanini  and  Giordano  Bruno's 
burning  piles  !  (Applause  from  the  Center  and  Left. — Exclama- 
tions and  ironical  interruptions  from  the  Right.) 

Such  is  the  thesis.  Gentlemen  !  And  now,  if  one  of  you  laughs 
or  protests,  I  shall  say  to  him  :  '•* Anathema!''' 

"Anathema"  to  whosoever  says:  The  ent're  direction  of 
the  public  schools,  in  which  is  educated  the  youth  of  a  Christian 
State, — with  the  exception,  in  a  certain  proportion,  of  the  episco- 
pal seminaries — should,  and  must  be  placed  under  the  supervision 
of  civil  authority  ;  and  this  in  such  a  manner  that  no  other 
authority  should  have  the  right  to  influence  the  discipline  of  the 
schools,  the  direction  of  studies,  the  arrangement  of  grades,  and 
the  choice  or  approbation  of  teachers. 

Anatliema    to   whosoever  says  :    Catholics  may    approve  of  a 
mt-thod  of   education  outside  the  Catholic  faith   and   the  Church's 
autliorit}',  and  which  has  for  its  purpose,  at  least  for  its  chief  pur- 
pose, the  knowledge  of  merely  uutural  maiters  and   the  interests 
of  social  life  on  this  earth.'* 


Speech  of  M.   Paul  BtrL  505 

Tliis  is  the  tnitli  ;  this  is  the  situation. 

Was  I  right  in  saying  that  when  you  pronounce  "Liberty,"  when 
yon  say  ''Liberty,"  we  cannot  understand  each  other?  Was  I 
right  in  saying,  that  wiien  you  say  ^'' Liberty^'*  you  mean,  and  we 
nnderstand,  "monopoly"  ?  (Good!  good!  from  the  Center  and 
Left.) 

Ah  !  I  well  know  that  the  times  are  hard  and  difficult  ;  that  one 
is  obliged  now  and  then  to  bow  before  the  spirit  of  the  century, 
and  content  one's  self  with  half-liberties. 

Yes  ;  Mgr.  de  Segur  says  also  : 

"The  Church  may  find  herself  face  to  face,  either  with  unfriendly, 
indiffèrent  or  friendly  powers. 

'^Slle  says  to  the  tii'st:  Why  do  you  strike  me?  T  have  the  right 
to  live,  to  speak,  to  fulfill  my  divine  mission,  which  is  entuely  one 
of  benevolence  ;  you  are  wrong  to  do  me  harm,  to  work  against 
liberty  ! 

"She  says  to  the  second  :  He  who  is  not  with  me  is  against  me. 
Why  do  you  remain  indifferent  to  God's  cause?  Why  do  you  treat 
falsehood  as  on  the  same  footing  with  truth,  evil  like  good,  Satan 
like  Christ?     You  have  no  right  to  remain  in  such  indifference  ! 

*'She  says  to  the  third  :  You  live  in  the  truth  and  you  act  ac- 
cording to  the  will  of  God  ;  help  with  all  yuur  might  to  bring  about 
the  glorious  reign  of  Christ,  and  at  the  same  time  to  make  shine, 
through  him,  truth,  justice,  peace,  happiness  ;  help  me  to  destroy 
and  suppress  as  completely  as  possible,  everything  Mdiich  is  con- 
trary to  the  most  holy  will  of  God,  and  the  true  welfare  of  men. 

'*8ueh  IS  the  language  of  the  Church  amidst  the  world  ;  in  fact, 
it  claims  only  one  thing  :  the  liberty  to  do  good,  the  only  true 
liberty." 

Gentlemen,  I  maintain  that  when  you  say  "liberty,"  you  mean 
"monopoly."  And  I  say,  that,  when  we  pass  a  law  of  the  nature 
of  that  brought  before  this  tribune,  you  may,  perhaps,  in  tlie  name 
of  the  logic  of  our  principles,  attack  us  and  tell  us  :  "You  are  in 
contradiction  with  your  principles  ;  you  go  against  them  ;  you  are 
not  logical;  and  we  are  going  to  prove  it  to  you."  It  is  your 
right,  this  discussion.  But  there  is  something  you  have  no  right 
to  do  :  namely,  to  get  angry,  because  that  anger  contradicts  your 
own  principles.  Well,  Gentlemen,  the  proof  of  all  this  is  eabily 
found  in  the  history  of  liberty  of  teaching  in  our  country. 


506  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Before  the  Revolution,  was  it  ever  a  question  of  liberty  cf  teach- 
ing? Tliere  was  then  a  great  and  flourishing  University,  that  uf 
Paris,  besides  a  certain  number  of  smaller  ones,  most  of  them  in 
a  state  of  decay,  and  some  almost  closed.  No  school  ould  be 
open  outside  of  them,  without  the  assent  of  the  King.  And  no  de- 
grees were  conferred  in  those  universities,  but  by  du-ect  delegation 
of  the  secular  i)ovver  ;  it  was  not  a  question  whatever  of  liberty  of 
teaching.  Here  and  there,  some  congregations  opened  a  few  col- 
leges ;  but  the  arrangement  of  grades  was  severely  interdicted  to 
them  ;  sometimes  even  the}'  were  foibidden  any  preparation  of  de- 
grees, and  they  could  open  their  establishments  only  after  having 
received  a  license  from  the  King. 

It  was  a  monopoly.  And  why  did  the  Church  stand  it  so 
patiently?  Because  it  had  the  whole  control  of  it;  because  those 
universities  were  receiving  canonical  instruction  ;  and  nothing  — 
absolutely  nothing  —  could  be  taught  having  in  it  a  shadow  of 
heres}'.  It  was  because  the  composition  of  the  teaching-body,  the 
supervision  of  the  bishops,  and  the  King  himself  strictly  guaran- 
teed the  orthodoxy  of  the  doctrines  ;  because  the  burning-piles  of 
the  Soibonne  (however  harmless  they  had  become,  burning  noth- 
ing else  but  books  in  the  last  century,)  were  yet  an  efficacious 
protection. 

And  moreover,  the  King  was  conservator,  protector,  defender, 
executor  of  the  rights  of  the  Catholic  Church. — these  are,  I  believe, 
Domat's  very  expressions, — the  King,  who  swore  under  oath  at 
his  coronation  to  exterminite  heretics, — always  sufficiently  edu- 
cated against  any  dangerous  teaching.  Who  would  have  dared, 
then,  to  claim  and  insist  upon  liberty  of  teaching? 

Philosophers  had  to"  make  use  of  clandestine  presses,  or  the 
presses  of  Holland.  As  regards  Protestants,  so  recent'y  as  1787, 
thev  had  to  petition  for  civil  rights  to  be  granted  to  their  cail- 
dren.   .   .    . 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere — Louis  XVI.  granted  it  to  them. 

M.  Paul  Bert — Yes,  Louis  XVL  accorded  it  ;  but,  almost  unan- 
imously, the  members  of  tlie  clergy,  in  1789,  protested  against  this 
decision.     (Applause  and  laughter  on  the  Left  and  Center.) 

It  is  at  the  time  of  the  Revolution  that  the  thesis  and  doctrine 


Speech  of  M.  Paid  Bert,  507 

of  liberty  of  teaclnug  first  appear.  It  was  contained  impliedly  in 
tlie  Declaration  of  Rights  of  1791  ;  it  is  formally  stated  in  the  leg- 
islation, by  the  decree  of  the  29  Frimary,  year  II.,  whose  first  arti- 
cle reads  :   ''Teaching  is  free." 

But  at  the  same  time,  conditions  were  imposed  on  those  intend- 
ing to  teach  ;  and  there  is  the  true  ground. 

Liberty  of  teaching,  by  natural  right,  as  understood  by  the  Rev- 
olutions,—  such  as  we  understand  it  ourselves, —  consists  in  the 
free  expression  of  one's  thoughts.  Therefore,  free  liberty  must  be 
granted  ;  all  facilities  must  be  accorded  by  the  law  to  him  who  })ub- 
licly  addresses  himself  to  citizens  like  himself,  with  sound  and  fully 
developed  minds  ;  who  proclaims  to  them  certain  doctrines,  certain 
theories,  and  tries  to  enlist  them  in  a  particular  scientific,  histori- 
cal, literary  or  doctrinal  party. 

But  when  it  is  a  question  of  addressing  one's  self  not  to  adults, 
but  to  children  ;  when  it  is  a  question  of  speaking,  not  in  public 
but  in  a  class-room,  in  a  school  with  closed  doors  ;  when  it  a 
question  of  holding  3'oung  minds  under  secret  guardianship  ;  to 
keep  them  away  from  any  foreign  contact,  to  have  over  them  an 
unique  influence,  often  isolated  from  the  control  of  their  family  ; 
when  it  is  a  question,  at  such  a  tender  age,  to  impress  on  their 
soft  brain  a  mark  which  will  last  forever;  then  the  legislation  must 
interfere.  As  earl}'  as  Fiimary  year  II.  of  the  Revolution,  there 
were  required  certain  conditions  of  ca[)ability  and  of  respectabil- 
ity, without  which  it  was  not  allowed  to  o]>en  schools  ;  and  schools 
once  opened,  it  was  necessary  that  precautions  should  be  taken  for 
supervision  as  to  their  proper  management. 

The  legislator  therefore  appointed  inspectors  to  constantly  watch 
if  anything  in  the  doctrines  or  proceedings  of  the  teachers  consti- 
tuted a  danger  to  the  public  peace  or  morality.  This  is  the  true 
thesis,  such  as  was  proclaimed  by  the  Revolution  !  (Good  !  Good  ! 
from  the  Left.     Exclamations  from  the  Right.) 

I  hear  protestations  against  what  I  say.  I  know  very  well  that 
nowadays  such  protestations  are  not  made  with  very  considerable 
energy  ;  but  whoever  has  followed  the  campaign  for  the  laws  on 
primary  and  secondary  teaching, —  which  commenced  in  1830  and 
ended  only  in  1850, —  is  aware  how  emphatic  were  the  arguments 


508  Tlte  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

against  this  doctrine.  It  was  said  to  interfere  witli  the  rights  of 
fathers  of  family, — as  is  said  also  to-day, — by  preventing  them 
from  choosing  the  teachers  they  wished  for  their  children  ;  ])y 
obliging  those  children,  and  the  professors  appointed  by  their 
fathers,  to  pass  certain  examinations.  It  was  said  that  the  State, 
by  substituting  itself  for  the  fathers  of  families,  was  assuming  a 
privilege  of  which  it  was  unworthy  ;  because  it  had  no  doctrine, 
and  consequently  could  have  no  authority  in  regard  to  teaching. 

I  noticed  m  the  speech  of  the  honorable  M.  Boyer  a  trace  of 
that  way  of  thinking,  when  he  said  that  "  the  State  has  no  doc- 
trme,  and  no  morals  ;"  and  I  felt  much  astonished  at  hearing  such 
a  thing  come  from  such  a  deep-thinking  mind,  from  a  man  so 
highly  esteemed  by  the  Chamber  and  the  Nation.  (Warm  approval 
from  the  Center  and  Left). 

And  could  you  not,  at  the  heading  of  our  Codes, —  as  is  printed 
on  the  title-page  of  oth^r  books  :  "Commandments  of  God  and  of 
the  Church," — could  you  not  write  these  words  :  "Commandments 
of  the  State"? 

The  State,  therefore,  has  morals  and  doctrines.  What  you 
might  have  said,  and  what  should  have  been  said, —  instead  of 
using  the  famous  phrase  of  Roger  CoUard  on  the  teaching  of  the 
State, —  is,  that  the  State  has  neither  religion  nor  metaphysics. 
(Renewed  approval  from  the  Left.) 

It  was  alleged  that  the  primary  conditions  and  supervision  were 
interfering  with  the  rights  of  fathers  of  families.  Oh!  those  riglits 
of  fathers  :  we  have  the  right  to  invoke  them  ;  but  we  may  feel  sur- 
prised that  they  of  the  other  side  (the  Right,)  dare  invoke  them. 

The  passion  and  grief  of  the  father  of  the  family  have  been  ex- 
pressed in  eloquent  terms  :  poor  father  !  compelled  to  send  his 
children  to  a  school  where  will  be  taught  them  doctrines  offensive 
to  his  conscience,  compromising,  in  his  eyes,  their  eternal  salva- 
tion and  their  worldly  morality. 

All  this  has  been  said,  and  with  reason  ;  but  those  who  were  so 
indignant  might  congratulate  themselves  that  they  spolve  in  the 
nineteenth  century,  and  were  Catholics  ;  for  if  they  had  happened 
to  live  in  1686,  and  they  had  been  Prote«4tants,  they  would  have 
suffered  the  effect  of  that  edict  of  Louis  XIV.  by  which  the  chil- 


Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert,  509 

clren  of  Protestants  were  taken  away  from  their  families  at  the 
age  of  five  j^ears,  and  sent  to  CatlioUc  schools  ! 

M.  Bourgeois  —  That  is  a  proof  that  we  wish  to  live  according 
to  our  time. 

M.  Paid  Bert  —  Do  you  mean  to  say  that  you  want  to  acknow- 
ledge modern  progress  and  civilization?  (M.  Bourgeois  and 
several  other  Members  of  the  Right:  Oh! — Fiom  the  Left:  Ah! 
Ah!) 

M.  Bourgeois  —  There  is  room  enough  for  both  God  and  Science 
in  the  world  !     (A  Member  of  the  Left  :    "The  Pope  says,  No  !  ") 

M.  Clemenceau,  ironically  —  Science  is  heretical! 

The  Count  of  Maille — Liberty  of  conscience  was  granted  for 
the  first  time  in  1814  by  the  "  Chart  ;  "  and  I  defy  any  one  to  say 
or  prove  the  contrary  !     (ELxclamations.) 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  We  are  told  that  things  are  going  to  change; 
that  new  doctrines  are  suggested  ;  that  it  is  desired  to  live  accord- 
ing to  modern  times,  being  willing  to  make  a  compromise  with 
liberty  and  progress  ;  that  now  there  is  a  Catholic  liberalism.  I 
do  not  wish  to  refer  you  to  the  Univers  or  to  the  Civitta  CatJiolica; 
but  listen  to  the  last  anathema  of  the  Syllabus  of  1864  : 

"Anathema  to  whomsoever  shall  say  :  The  Roman  Pontiff  should, 
and  must,  reconcile  liiaiself  to,  and  harmonize  with  progress, 
liberalism  and  modern  civilization."  (Repeated  applause  from  the 
Left  and  Center.) 

M.  Bourgeois  —  You  must  not  quote  that  anathema  without 
giving  the  explanation. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  You  have  no  right  to  explain  it. 

M.  Bourgeois  —  I  shall  explain  it  I 

M.  Paul  Bert  — The  Pope,  in  a  Brief  of  1869,  has  declared,  that 
no  one  is  allowed  to  explain  or  interpret  those  words  ;  that  they 
must  be  taken  literally.  1  will  read  that  Brief  to  you,  if  you 
wish  it. 

M.  de  Soland  —  He  nas  congratulated  the  Bishop  of  Orleans, 
who  made  a  commentary  upon  it. 

^  M.  Paul  Bert  —  Read  to  the  end  of  that  letter  of  congratulation. 
lit  belongs  to  the  category  of  correspondence,  of  wliich  it  has  been 
said:   "  Sileuoe  is  tîie  best  policy."      (Ah!   Ah!   froiu  the  Left.) 


r>10  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

The  right  of  the  State,  which  has  been  contested,  —  can  it  he 
doubted?  No  ;  as  I  said,  the  State  has  no  scientific  doctrines  ;  it 
leaves  to  the  church  the  right  to  have  an  astronomy,  a  geology,  a 
physic,  a  history  of  her  own.  (Smiles  from  the  Left.)  The  State 
has  no  scientific  doctrines:  it  has  moral  doctrines  —  doctrines 
of  social  preservation  ! 

On  this  ground,  the  State  is  sovereign  master;  on  this  ground, 
it  must  scrupulously  examine,  if  the  men  to  whom  it  entrusts,  or 
grants  the  right  to  entrust,  the  education  of  the  young  citizens, 
are  worthy  of  that  confidence;  it  has  the  right  to  examine  if  their 
doctrines  are  not  dangerous  to  the  public  peace,  to  the  social  order  ; 
it  has  the  right  to  examine  if,  by  entrusting  those  young  men  to 
them,  it  does  not  prepare  for  a  civil  war  m  a  longer  or  shorter 
period.      (Good  !  good  !   from  the  Center  and  Left.) 

M.  M.  de  la  Billais  and  Ernest  de  la  Eochette  —  It  is  an  insult  ! 
We  have  been  brought  up  in  that  establishment.     "We  protest. 

The  Speaker  —  Gentlemen,  do  not  interrupt. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  I  do  not  understand  these  interruptions. 

M.  Ernest  de  la  Rocliette  —  We  cannot  allow  anybody  to  attack 
us. 

The  Speaker  —  The  orator  has  the  right  to  judge  and  examine 
those  doctrines  which  at  various  periods  and  under  the  judicial 
and  royal  authority — appealed  to  by  yourselves  awhile  ago  — 
have  been  considered  as  liable  to  le^d  to  the  disastrous  excesses 
condemned  by  the  oiator.  When  your  turn  comes,  you  may  refer 
to  history  and  explain  your  doctrines;  but,  in  the  meantime,  I 
request  you  to  kt  the  discussion  proceed.  (Good  !  good  !  from 
the  Left.) 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  I  beg  your  pardon,  Gentlemen,  I  have  not  come 
to  the  point  yet.  Once  there,  I  will  understand  your  interruptions 
and  protestations.  We  stand  on  the  ground  of  general  doctrines, 
where  monarchy  placed  itself  before  the  Republic  followed,  namely, 
that  the  State,  in  an  absolute  manner,  or,  rather,  in  an  abstract 
manner,  has  the  right  to  concern  itself  as  to  the  consequences  of 
doctrines  impressed  on  the  minds  of  youth.  There  is  no  doubt 
about  that. 


Si)€ech  of  M.  Paul  Bert.  511 

I  would  understand  yonr  protestations  if  it  were  a  question  of 
a  monarch  !  I  do  not  know  if  j'ou  would  make  them  then  ;  but  I 
should  understand  them.  It  would  be  a  question  of  a  single  and 
supreme  will  —  of  the  will  of  a  man  set  on  the  throne  b}'  heredit}' 
or  usurpation,  (Applause  from  the  Center  and  Left. — Protesta- 
tions from  the  Right) . 

But  I  stand  on  simple  doctrines,  and  I  confess  that  I  do  not 
understand  your  protestations  :  this  lets  me  foresee  terrible  storms 
for  the  moment  when  I  shall  reach  the  region  of  facts. 

I  Gay,  that  if  the  power  of  the  State  were  remitted  to  the  hands 
of  a  monarch,  fatal  consequences,  and  its  degeneration  into  tyr- 
anny, might  be  the  result.  We  have  had  many  examples  of  it  ; 
but  this  suspicion,  justified  by  the  authority  of  one  man,  how  can 
you  have  it  in  a  democratic  Republic?  Who  is  master  here,  if  not 
the  Nation?  Who  makes  laws  and  imposes  conditions,  if  not  the 
universality  of  citizens  ;  consulted,  and,  so  to  speak,  concentrated 
into  one  or  two  Chambers?  And  who  shall  be  sovereign  in  the 
nation,  if  not  the  Nation  itself?  Who  can  judge  the  nation,  if  not 
the  Nation  ? 

Will  you  say  that  it  is  the  Church?  Acknowledge,  then,  t'lat 
you  proclaim  again  your  thesis  of  absolutism,  and  you  will  tell  the 
ti"ulh  ;  but  do  not  talk  to  me  of  liberty  of  teaching. 

To  the  liberty  of  teaching  proclaimed  by  the  Revolution,  the 
University  succeeds. 

That  conception  had,  indeed,  its  magnitude  :  it  has  shown  it,  and 
shows  it  yet.  But  the  University  contained  in  itself  a  vice  — 
ISIoNOPOLY  ;  and  the  monopoly  consisted  in  the  fact,  that,  instead 
of  saying,  as  stated  by  the  Republican  thesis,  "You  shall  have 
libeity  of  teaching,  under  the  condition  of  having  previously 
fulfilled  certain  foimalilies,  and  furnished  certain  certificates  of 
capability  and  morality;"  the  Universitj^  said  :  "Notwithstanding 
your  certificates  are  in  good  order,  you  shall  not  be  allowed  to 
open  schools  without  my  authorization." 

This  is  monopoly  ! 

However,  the  teaching  given  by  the  schools  of  the  State  was  so 
wise,  so  moderate,  so  rauc h  in  accoidîjnce  with  the  moral  need  of 
the  majority  of  the  nation,  that  liberal  minds  did  not  protest.     The 


512  TJie  Doctrine  of  ilte  Jesuits. 

Cliiiicb  alone  protested,  and  with  an  ardor  and  intolerance  that  is 
unparalleled. 

Actually,  the  thesis  has  been  rendered  much  easier,  and  they 
have  been  obliged  to  give  up  a  good  deal  !  It  is  generally  acknowl- 
edged that  the  University  is  respected.  One  feels  honored  to 
have  been  its  pupil  —  to  reckon  some  friends  among  its  teachers. 
All  that  is  very  pleasant.  But  it  was  not  so  when,  formerly,  it 
was  directly  attacked. 

M.  Bourgeois  —  I  don't  know  about  that.     I  was  not  born  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  At  that  time,  the  University  was  the  infected 
school  ;  it  was — for  this  expression  has  been  a  kind  of  watchword 
— "a  great  repository  of  public  instruction."  Listen  how  it  was 
spoken  of:  It  was  "  the  negation,  the  annihilation  of  all  notions 
of  good  and  evil,  of  all  divine  and  human  laws,  of  all  true  sanc- 
tions ;  it  was  fatalism,  suicide,  crimes  of  all  kinds,  destruction  of 
all  morality."  (-^The  Monopoly  of  the  University  ;  "  Paris,  1843.) 
This  is  one  extract  among  a  thousand. 

Some  Bishops,  by  their  insults,  were  appealed  b}'  writs  of  ex- 
cess. 

Then,  the  Church  alone  protested  against  the  monopoly  of  the 
University.  And  why  did  they  protest  so  much,  while  acceptino- 
so  cheerfully  the  monopoly  of  the  old  monarchial  government? 
Merel}'  and  always  for  the  same  reason  ;  because  they  were  the 
high  supervisors  of  the  ancient  teaching  ;  and  the  University,  with- 
out excluding  them  f r<  m  the  direction — far  from  it — had  left  them 
absolute  sovereigns  neither  of  the  programs,  the  teaching,  nor  of 
the  teaching  staff. 

However,  the  legislation  of  1808  had  written  at  the  head  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  University:  ''The  teaching  shall  be  given  ac- 
cording to  the  doctrine  of  the  Catholic  religion." 

Yet,  in  1814,  the  Catholic  Church  having  become  the  State 
Ciuirch,  her  principlec  were  imposed  on  the  nation  with  still  more 
1  igor. 

But,  no  matter!  The  time  bad  passed  :  the  Revolution  had  done 
its  work.  The  idea  of  liberty  of  conscience  had  become  incorpor- 
ated with  the  custon^s  ;  and,  while  respecting  the  general  dogmas 
of  the  Church,  the  teaching  of  religion  was  set  ix{MX\:i  in  the  tuition 


I 


Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert,  513 

of  the  University.  It  did  not  predominate  over  everything.  From 
tliat  arose  the  quarrel  ;  the  raising  of  shields  in  the  name  of  liberty; 
the  campaign  of  1831  ;  and  finally,  the  triumphant  campaign  of 
1850. 

If  the  Church  had  dared,  at  that  time,  to  state  her  claims  in 
the  way  that  I  pointed  out  at  the  beginning  of  this  speech,  they 
would  doubtless  have  been  rejected  by  the  good  sense  and  wisdom 
of  the  country.  But  they  had  taken  shelter  under  the  liberty  of 
the  father  of  the  family, — behind  this  sacred  liberty,  the  least  clash- 
ing with  which  infringes  on  what  is  nearest  and  most  sensitive 
within  us.  This  liberty  was  used  as  a  shield  by  those  who  asked 
for  the  monopoly  of  the  Church,  by  those  who  would  have  returned, 
if  they  could  be  the  masters,  to  the  Declaration  of  1686  ;  that  is  to 
say,  to  the  suppression  of  the  liberty  of  the  father  of  the  family  ! 

You  know  through  what  complicity  of  generous  illusions,  to  say 
the  least,  the  law  of  1850  was  voted,  and  also  the  law  of  1876. 
Had  we  then  secured  liberty?  Was  it  liberty  of  teaching  which  was 
proclaimed  in  1875?  It  is  easy  to  ascertain  that  it  wa^  not,  and 
this  simply  by  one  characteristic  point. 

I  have  said  to  you,  that,  for  us,  liberty  of  teaching  proceeds 
from  personal  right.  Now,  it  is  a  rule  in  every  legislation,  and 
hence  in  French  legislation,  that  when  individual  rights  are  united 
they  are  not  considered  in  their  totality  ;  for  always  by  associa- 
tion they  lose  something  of  their  whole  importance.  Then  the 
State  interferes. 

Now,  strange  to  say,  a  phenomenon,  unique  in  our  legislation, 
happened  regarding  this  law  of  1875  ;  the  individual  right  is  re- 
duced b}-  the  law  of  1875  to  regularly  mean  conditions,  so  far  so 
that  it  was  impossible  to  practice  it, —  of  which  we  see  the  proof 
in  the  denunciation  of  certain  newspapers  against  the  conferences 
of  the  school  of  anthropology.  Well,  these  limits  placed  upon  each 
individual's  rights  disappeared  when  these  individual  rights  were 
united:  from  this  juxtaposition,  from  this  union  of  incomplete 
rights,  rights  more  complete  were  born  ;  such  rights  which  go  so 
far  as  even  to  extend  over  the  dominion  of  public  power.  (Good  ! 
Good  !  from  the  Left) . 


514  Tilt  Doctrine  of  /he  Jesuits. 

I  do  not  believe  Hint  our  legislation  shows  us  another  example 
of  such  a  peculiar  heres}'. 

The  scheme  of  law  placed  for  discussion  before  you,  re-estab- 
lishes things  nearly  in  tiieir  normal  state  ;  it  reconstitutes  this  true 
liberty  of  teaching;  it  gives  this  liberty  of  teaching  to  all  those 
who  show  a  proof  of  capacity  and  raoralit)'  in  some  particular  con- 
dition. This  scheme  of  law  is  not  a  coming  back  to  monopoly,  as 
it  does  not  recall  the  preliminary  authorization  ;  it  leaves  standing 
what  actually  exists  for  the  liberty  of  men  grouped,  associated  ; 
but  it  re-establishes  this  liberty  upon  its  true  basis,  the  indi- 
vidual liberty. 

What  is  tlie  noveltj'  in  it,  then?  What  is,  then.  Article  7?  for 
it  is  necessary  that  we  come  to  it,  inasmuch  as  it  excites  so  much 
passion.  It  is  the  addition  to  the  conditions  already  required  of 
a  new  condition.  (That's  it!  That's  it  !  from  the  Left  and  Cen- 
ter.) 

It  is  the  institution, —  I  do  not  insist  upon  this  word,  I  know 
how  offensive  it  ma}^  appear. —  it  is  the  institution  of  a  new  order 
of  particular  indignity,  which  will  weigh  upon  a  certain  class  of 
citizens. 

M.  riichon — Tlie  most  honest  citizens,  too  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert — That  is  what  it  is  ;  and  the  question  is  to  know 
if  this  indignity  is  justified,  if  this  incapacity  is  justified,  if  tlie 
State  was  right  in  bringing  out  to  light  this  indignity,  this  inca- 
pncity.  That  is  the  question.  (Signs  of  approval  from  Left  and 
Center.) 

The  Count  of  Maille — That  is  worth  the  dogmatic  anathema. 

The  Speaker — Do  not  interrupt  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert — Our  honorable  colleague,  M.  de  Maille,  does  a 
very  great  honor  to  our  Minister  of  Public  Instruction,  by  placincj 
Art.  7  on  the  same  footing  as  the  Encyclical  Letter,  '■'Quanta 
Cvra  "  !    (Laughter  from  the  Left.) 

The  principle  of  liberty  itself  is  not  touched  upon  ;  but  a  new 
condition  of  indignity, —  justified  or  not  justified,  we  will  see 
about  that  later  on, —  a  new  condition  of   indigniiy  is  established. 

Is  it  justified?  That  is  a  discussion  which  would  take  a  great 
deal  of  time,  and  require  the  production  at  this  time  of  many  doc- 


Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert.  515 

uments,  which  prevents  me  going  further  into  it  for  the  present, 
by  its  very  importance  ;  we  shall  see,  when  we  reach  the  special 
discussion  of  the  Article,  if  the  non-authorized  congregations  really 
deserve  to  be  placed  under  the  heading  of  indignity  of  which  there 
is  here  a  question. 

Art.  7  has  principally  the  Jesuits  in  view,  besides  all  non- 
authorized  congrtgMtions. 

P'irst:  Is  this  indignity  so  extraordinary  and  so  new  a  subject? 
Is  it  an  invention  of  our  honorable  Minister?    Is  it  a  novelty? 

To  the  indignation  raised  by  this  article,  a  feeling  of  surprise 
seems  to  be  added.  I  do  not  know  about  the  value  of  this  indig- 
nation ;  but  such  surprise  cannot  be  very  serious. 

As  early  as  1828,  the  well-known  Ordinances  had  decided,  that 
in  certain  establishments  teaching  could  not  be  authorized,  unless 
by  the  signing  of  a  declaration  that  one  did  not  belong  to  any  un- 
authorized congregation. 

M.  Blacker e  —  That  was  monopoly,  then! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  I  know  very  well  that  it  is  said  these  Ordinances 
do  not  signify  anything  ;  as  it  is  said  that  the  decree  of  Mes- 
sidor, year  XII.,  is  a  work  of  passion,  and  that  it  was  to  pay  the 
ransom  of  M.  de  Villède,  that  Charles  X.  was  compelled  to  expel 
the  Jesuits  from  the  secondary  teaching. 

Ah,  Gentlemen  !  that  would  show  only  one  thing  :  namely,  that 
the  Jesuits  were  really'  very  much  hated  by  the  whole  population, 
so  as  to  afford  the  hope  that,  by  the  sacrifice  of  the  former,  the 
Villède  ministry,  compromised  as  it  was,  could  be  saved.  Yes, 
they  must  have  been  very  unpopular,  for  a  man,  who  certainly 
was  not  a  radical,  M.  de  Carné,  to  be  able  to  proclaim  bi-fore  the 
Chambers  of  Deputies  that  the  measure  had  been  received  with  en- 
thusiasm all  over  France  !  (Laughter  and  applause  from  the 
Left.) 

In  1844,  when  the  law  on  secondary  teaching  was  in  discussion, 
a  man,  who  was  not  a  Radical  either  —  nor  will  I  presume  what 
place  he  would  occupy  actually  in  this  Chamber,  nor  make  any 
comparison  which  might  be  offensive  to  somebody  here, —  but 
finall}',  a  man  who  was  certainly  not  a  radical,  the  honorable  Duke 
of  Brogile,  said  : 


516  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

*'To  Ih'i  diploma,  the  private  teacher  .  .  .  shoulrl  add  a  writ- 
ten certificate  that  lie  belongs  nei'.h'  r  to  any  association,  nor  to 
any  congregation  wliich  is  not  authorized  by  law.  This  obligation 
has  nothing  new  in  it." 

I  am  one  of  those  who  think,  that  the  Ordinances  of  1828,  hav- 
ing been  voted  under  the  empire  of  raonoply,  and  the  law  of  1850 
having  given  liberty  of  teaching  to  every  citizen,  the  members  of 
the  non-authorized  religious  associations  have  the  actual  right  to 
teach  the  three  different  degrees.  (Good  !  from  the  Right)  It  is 
precisely  for  that  reason  that  the  honorable  Minister  of  Public 
Instruction  rcqiests  you  to  deprive  them  of  this  right.  (Good! 
from  the  Left  and  Center. —  Exclamations  and  laughter  from  the 
Right.) 

That  is  very  clear,  indeed  ;  and  I  am  astonished  at  your  laugh- 
ter. 

It  is  to  say,  besides,  that  this  Art.  7  is  dangerous  from  this  fact, 
that  it  seems  to  annul  existing  legislation  in  the  matter  of  the  ex- 
istence of  the  non-authorized  religious  congregations.  B}'  taking 
away  from  them  the  right  of  teaching,  which  the  existing  legisla- 
tion grants  to  them,  many  people  think  you  thus  recognize  their 
true  existence,  and  all  previous  legislation  is  made  void. 

I  do  not  believe  this.  I  am  one  of  those  who  think, —  and  some 
jurists,  more  learned  than  a  simple  licentiate  at  law  shall  be  heard 
from  this  tribune  pleading  this  important  thesis, —  lam  one  of 
those  who  think  that  the  law  of  1790,  that  the  law  of  1792,  that 
the  decree  of  Messidor,  year  XII.,  are  in  force  yet.  I  am  one  of 
those  who  say,  as  did  M.  Thiers  in  1845,  tliatif  these  laws  prohibit- 
ing the  religious  congregation  are  now  void,  then  the  congrega- 
tions fall  under  the  execution  of  Art.  291  of  the  Penal  Code  of 
the  law  of  1834  on  Associations.  I  will  add,  that  if  these  last  laws 
do  not  apply  to  congreaations,  the  reason  is,  the  latter  are  regu- 
lated by  the  laws  of   1790  and  1792. 

M.  Bourgeois  —  You  might  speak  to  us  of  M.  Thiers  in  1850. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Thus,  either  they  fall,  as  congregations,  under 
the  execution  of  the  law  of  1 790  ;  or  they  fall  as  associations  un- 
der the  execution  of  Art.  291  of  the  Penal  Code. 


Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert,  517 

Because,  Ênally,  you  cannot  imagine  that  these  associations  are 
regulated  by  no  law  whatsoever! 

A  man  of  great  authority,  Chancellor  Pasquier,  who  cannot  be 
suspected  of  radicalism,  said,  in  1827:  "It  is  an  eternal  principle, 
independent  of  positive  laws,  which  does  not  allow  a  societv,  what- 
ever it  may  be,  to  be  formed  in  a  State,  without  the  approval  of 
the  great  Powers  of  the  Nation." 

Congregations,  therefore,  are  in  view  of  and  under  the  control, 
either  of  the  law  of  1790,  or  of  Art.  291  of  the  Penal  Code  ;  or  if 
it  became  impossible  that  either  of  these  laws  apply  to  them,  it  is 
necessary  to  immediately  make  a  law  for  the  congregations,  which 
would  have,  I  am  sure,  nothing  to  gain  by  it. 

But,  suppose  that  the  Minister  of  Public  Instruction  and  the 
State  Secretary,  following  that  thesis  which  declares  that  Art.  291 
of  the  Penal  Code  applies  to  religious  congregations,  proceed 
against  their  members  and  secure  judgment  against  them  to  the 
full  penalties  of  this  severe  law  of  1834,  whose  abrogation  I  hope 
we  shall  soon  note  ;  then,  immediately,  on  the  strength  of  Art.  26 
of  the  Law  on  Primary  and  Secondary  Teaching,  and  of  Art.  8  of 
the  Law  on  Higher  Education,  congregations  would  be  placed 
under  prohibition,  through  incapacity  of  teaching.  I  believe.  Gen- 
tlemen, that  it  would  have  been  more  })rudent  for  the  congrega- 
tionists  to  have  accepted  this  lenient  and  moderate  compromise, 
prepared  by  the  Minister  of  Public  Instruction,  and  have  used  it 
as  a  tacit  acknowledgment  of  their  existence. 

M.  Baudry  d' Assort — You  are  vtry  kind  towards  us,  indeed  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  The  Members  of  the  Commission  had  before 
them  an  Amendment,  on  which,  doubtless,  a  considerable  debate 
will  be  raised  in  this  Chamber.  It  was  sail  to  us  :  "What  do  you 
fear  from  the  teaching  of  the  religious  congregations?  What  do 
you  wish  to  fight  against,  by  Art.  7  of  the  scheme  of  law?  You 
propose  to  fight  against  the  doctrines  they  are  teaching,  because 
you  consider  them  dangerous.  You  believe,  rightly  or  wrongly, 
that  there  exists  in  the  bosom  of  this  society,  based  on  national 
sovereignty,  some  associations  teaching  scorn  for  the  sovereignty 
of  this  nation.  You  believe  that,  in  this  country,  in  which  politics 
rest  on  universal  suffrage,  a,nd  which  is  characterized  by  a  Kepub- 


518  TJte  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

lican  government,  there  exists  some  associations  which  teach  scorn 
for  universal  sutfrage  and  our  Republican  form  of  government. 
You  fear  a  social  danger  from  the  doctrines  of  the  Jesuits,  —  such 
doctrines  as  were  [)roscribed  so  many  times,  and  which  have  raised 
against  them  universal  reprobation,  at  least  in  the  last  cenury. 
And  you  say  that,  because  of  these  doctrines,  Jesuits*  teaching 
Uiust  be  prohibited. 

But  look  out  !  these  doctrines  were  simply  Jesuitical  doctrines 
in  the  last  century  ;  they  are  no  more  Jesuitical  now-a-day  ;  they 
have  become  the  doctrines  of  the  Catholic  Church  itself.  All  con- 
giegations,  and,  moreover,  all  members  of  the  secular  clergy,  — 
all  those  who  receive  Catholic  investiture, —  are  compelled,  b}'' 
duty  to  conscience,  to  teach  the  doctrines  of  the  Jesuits.  The 
Catholic  Church  has,  so  to  speak,  crystalized  itself  around  Jesuit- 
ism !     (Good  !  from  several  seats  on  the  Left.) 

If,  therefore,  it  is  in  consequence  of  these  doctrines  you  will 
interdict  non-aulhorized  congregations,  be  logical,  and  extend  this 
interdiction  to  the  secular  clergy  ;  because  teaching  will  be  just  as 
dangerous  in  their  hands  as  in  those  of  the  Jesuits.  This  is. 
Gentlemen,  the  thesis  which  has  been  proclaimed  by  the  Commis- 
sion, and  which  will  doubtless  be  brought  to  this  tribune  by  our 
eloquent  colleague,  M.  Madier  de  Montjau.  The  Commission 
declined  to  follow  him  in  that  way  ;  it  so  declined  for  two  reasons. 
First,  we  said  to  ourselves,  that  if  the  Government  thought  of 
making  such  a  distinction  between  these  two  classes  of  persons, 
who  may  be  assimilated  in  the  doctrinal  point  of  view,  it  is  be- 
cause it  has  doubtless  some  reasons  to  think,  that  if  certain  dan- 
gers exist  on  one  side,  they  are  attenuated  on  the  other  ;  perhaps 
it  has,  through  private  inquiries  made  at  home,  and  particularly 
outside  the  frontiers,  some  reasons  to  believe  that  some  changes 
are  in  progress  ;  perhaps  it  perceives  some  symptoms  of  modi- 
fications acknowledged  as  necessary  by  many  serious-minded  men, 
by  man}'  sincere  Catholics,  bringing  back  some  harmbny  between 
the  Church  on  one  side,  and  progress,  liberalism,  and  modern 
civilization  on  the  other. 

In  fact,  we  inwardly  think  perfect  logic  does  not  exist  in  this 
world  ;  and  if  the  Government  requests  us  to  draw  a  line  between 


/SpeecA  of  M.  Paul  Bert,  519 

authorized  congregations  and  those  not  authorized,  it  is  likely 
it  is  because  it  has  some  reasons  for  so  doing.  Tlieu  we  recall  a 
mnxinû  of  St.  Augustine.     (Laughter  from  the  Left.) 

Saint  Augustine  said  somewhat  as  follows:  "God,  who  is  Al- 
mighty, tolerates  in  this  world  a  little  evil,  though  he  could  pre- 
vent it,  fearing,  doubtless,  that  by  preventing  it,  more  good  might 
be  destroyed,  and  greater  evil  might  be  occasioned." 

*'  Likewise  governments,"  —  it  is  still  St.  Augustine  who  speaks, 
— "  are  of  ten  compelled  to  tolerate  certain  evil,  for  fear  of  pre- 
venting more  good,  or  of  letting  an  evil  become  greater." 

This  is  our  first  reason  :  I  did  my  best  to  sustain  it  with  such 
authority  as  would  render  it  acceptable  to  everybody.  (Good  ! 
and  laughter  from  the  Left.) 

Here  is  our  second  reason  :  It  is  that  the  secular  clergy  are  prac- 
tically far  different  from  religious  congregations  ;  the  recognized 
congregations  are  far  from  being  like  the  unauthorized  societies. 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  Not  as  regards  doctrine  ;  they  have  given 
proof  to  the  contrary. 

M.  Paul  Bert — Without  a  doubt  ;  I  do  not  place  myself  now  at 
the  doctrinal  point  of  view.  I  say  there  is  a  wide  difference  —  all 
of  you  know  it  ;  therefore  it  is  useless  to  insist  upon  the  point  — 
between  the  religious  orders  and  the  secular  clergy,  the  hitter  being 
appointed  by  the  bishops,  functionaries  of  the  St^ite,  composed 
of  officers  appointed  by  tlie  State,  and  paid  by  the  State. 

This  clergy  has  our  confidence  ;  it  deserves  to  have  it.  We 
cannot  forbid  their  teaching  in  a  private  way.  Religious  orders, 
authorized  or  not,  are  similar  as  to  their  doctrines  ;  but  in  the 
judgment  of  the  lay  State,  there  is  a  wide  margin  between  associa- 
tions which  submit  to  the  conditions  required  by  law,  presenting 
their  regulations  for  approval,  modifying  them  when  so  requested, 
—  as  did  the  Brethren  of  Saint- Yron  at  the  beginning  of  this 
century,  who  claimed  the  assistance  and  acknowledged  the 
rights  of  the  State  ;  and  some  groups  of  men  who  associate 
themselves  outside  of  the  law,  outside  of  the  State,  refusing  to 
exhibit  their  statutes,  to  submit  to  the  rules  of  civil  society,  or  even 
to  recognize  its  rights  and  supremacy.  (Applause  from  the  Left 
and  Center.^ 


^20  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

A  Member  of  the  Right  —  That  is  an  error. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Why,  then,  do  they  not  ask  for  the  recognition 
of  their  laws  ? 

M.  Pliclion  —  Because  they  know  civil  society  and  all  its  laws. 

M.  Blachere  —  If  they  act  contrary  to  the  law,  prosecute  them. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  In  general,  those  who  get  round  the  laws,  are 
those  who  know  them  best.  (Good  !  and  laughter  from  the  Left). 
Oh,  I  do  not  deny  that  they  are  well  acquainted  with  them. 

Wliat  is  sure  is,  that  they  will  not  submit  to  the  State  : 
that  they  do  not  recognize  the  Nation  as  sovereign.  AViiat 
is  certain  is,  that  they  are  continually  opposing  the  princi- 
ple proclaimed  by  Chancellor  Pasquier  :  '"That  eternal  principle, 
independent  of  positive  laws,  which  does  not  allow  that  a  society, 
whatever  it  may  be,  should  be  constituted  in  a  State,  without  the 
approval  of  the  great  Powers  of  the  Nation  !  " 

I  say,  that  those  congregations  are  putting  themselves  in  a  state 
of  rebellion  against  the  State  ;  that  they  do  injury  to  the  State 
(Noise  from  the  Right)  ;  and  I  say,  that  the  State  has  the  right  to 
say  to  them  :  "You  will  not  recognize  my  authority;  therefore, 
I  will  not  permit  you,  who  are  despising  my  rights,  to  teach  the 
national  youth  !  "     (Renewed  interruptions  from  the  Right). 

M.  Bourgeois  —  The  proof! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Proof  is  requested  !  What  proof?  The  proof 
that  those  societies  are  not  acknowledged  by  law  ? 

M.  Bourgeois  —  That  they  do  not  acknowledge  the  law. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  That  they  will  not  present  their  statutes.  It  is 
a  frict. 

M.  Bourgeois  —  Expel  them,  if  they  act  contrary  to  the  law. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  I  was  saying,  that  there  is  between  these  non- 
authorized  associations  and  the  acknowledged  congregations  the 
immense  distance  which  separates  people  who  do  not  submit  to 
law  and  those  who  do.  This  is  the  reason  why  we  accepted  Art. 
7,  with  the  distinction  it  made  between  these  two  ditl'erent  kinds 
of  congregations. 

Another  formal  objection  is  made.  We  have  been  told,  "That 
Art.  7  is  not  in  its  proper  place  ;  it  refers  to  religious  congrega- 
tions.    It  should  not  have  been  found  in  a  law  on  Education."    It 


Speech  of  M.  Paul  BevL  521 

is  ndded  also:  "This  Article  has  for  its  object  primary  and  sec- 
ondary teaching  ;  it  is  too  general  a  subject  to  be  inserted  in  a 
law  dealing  specially  with  higher  instruction." 

'Jhe  honorable  Minister  of  Public  Instruction  will  reply  to  this 
argument  ;  he  certainly  will  answer  triumphantly.  We,  the  Mem- 
bers of  the  Commission,  did  not  feel  inclined,  through  a  sort  of 
parliamentary  modesty  —  through  legislative  scruples  —  to  put 
ourselves  in  contradiction  with  the  Government  at  the  very  mo- 
ment of  its  execution  of  an  eneri^etic  action,  and  decline  to  vote 
for  an  article  approved  by  us,  under  the  pretence  that,  perhaps,  it 
was  out  of  place.  And  wh}'  did  we  not  do  so  ?  Because  the  real 
value  of  our  decision  would  not  have  been  understood.  This  is 
the  right  of  political  parties.  It  would  not  have  been  said  that 
we  rejected  the  article  for  reason  of  formalism,  but  because  we 
were  not  satisfied  as  to  its  principle.  We  are  not  willing  to  afford 
that  satisfaction  to  our  adversaries. 

Here  are,  Gentlemen,  the  reasons  which  have  compelled  us  to 
vote  Art.  7,  t'le  most  important,  considerable  and  novel  part  of 
the  proposed  law. 

Besides,  there  is  a  disposition  which  seems  actually  to  have 
passed,  in  the  second  place  ;  and  the  exi)ressions  of  excitement 
which  it  has  aroused  are  nothing  but  the  echo  of  ancient  and  far- 
off  passion.  It  is  the  Article  which  restores  to  the  State  the 
bestowing  of  degrees. 

About  two  years  ago,  when  the  honorable  M.  Wadington  pro- 
posed a  very  similar  law,  its  opponents  provoked  a  great  agitation 
throughout  the  country,  and  a  scheme  of  petitions,  which  came  in 
covered  with  two  or  three  hundred  thousand  signatures,  —  which 
signatures  are  mostly  the  same  as  those  which  have  been  more 
recently  presented  to  us,  affixed  by  but  a  very  small  number  of 
active  citizens. 

A  Member  of  the  Right  —  There  are  fifteen  hundred  thousand  of 
them. 

A  Member  of  the  Left  —  Including  cliildren  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert—  1,500,000  !  I  am  willing  to  believe  it.  I  don't 
know  anything  about  it:  only  a  small  qaantily  has  been  received 


522  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

by  us  — 126,153, — reserving  the  honor  of  the  big  lump  for  the 
Senate. 

It  would  be  fair  to  strike  off  the  signatures  of  women  and 
children,  which  form  a  considerable  quota. 

The  Count  of  Kerjegu  —  Not  so  many,  though. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Also,  to  deduct  such  signatures  as  are  written 
by  the  same  hand.     (Laughter  from  the  Left.) 

I  have  seen  a  certain  number  of  those  fiilse  signatures, — as 
man}'  as  eight  of  them  following  one  another  in  u  single  petition. 
These  should  be  deducted,  as  well  those  gathered  a  few  days  ago 
in  one  of  the  prisons.      (Laughter). 

M.  de  la  Biliais  —  As  for  those  who  are  dwelling  there,  they  are 
deprived  of  their  liberty. 

M.  Paut  Bert  —  Let  us  leave  these  trifles.  Lf^t  us  take  your 
figures,  and  accept  your  statement  of  1.500.000  signatures.  I  say, 
those  1,500,000  signatures  ought  not  to  be  mentioned  here,  before 
this  Assembly.  We  represent  a  far  larger  number.  Two  years 
ag:>,  after  an  order  of  the  day    .    .    . 

A  Voice  frcm  the  Left —  There  are  not  1,500,000. 

The  Speaker  —  We  cannot  verify  tlie  statement  just  now.  It  is 
therefore  better  for  both  parties  to  refrain  from  such  exclamations. 

M.  Paul  Bert —  .  .  .  After  an  order  of  the  day  relative  to 
ultramontane  intrigues,  and  voted  by  363  members,  a  campaign 
commenced,  during  which  this  Chamber  had  to  give  way.  Tlie 
consequence  was  dissolution,  and  we  returned  to  our  electors  :  we 
requested  them  to  judge  between  the  acts  of  those  who  had  caused 
the  dissolution  and  our  own  conduct.  We  denounced  to  them  the 
clerical  intrigues, —  or  rather  the  Jesuitical  intrigues,  to  call  them 
by  their  right  name.  You  know  their  answer  :  they  elected  us 
again;  not  only  363,  but  385!  We  do  not  represent  1,500,000 
signatures,  including  those  of  women,  children,  and  prisoners;  we 
represent  here  6,000,000  electors.  (Hurrah!  and  applause  from 
the  Left  and  Center). 

M.  Anisson- Duper ron  —  And  we,  5,000,000! 

M.  Ernest  de  la  Pochette  —  Tiiis  is  the  art  of  grouping  figures  ! 

M.  de  Maille  —  Masonic  lodges,  that  is  what  you  represent  ! 
(Noist) .... 


Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert,  523 

M.  de  Baudry  d'Asson  —  You  represent  the  dying  EepuLlic,  the 
agonizing  Republic!  (Exclamations  from  the  Left. —  Laughter 
from  the  R-ght). 

The  Speaker  —  M.  de  Baudry  d'Asson,  this  is  an  intolerable 
system  of  interruption  !  (Exclamations  from  t  le  Right.)  Gentle- 
men, I  understand  very  well  certain  interruptions,  and  as  you  see, 
I  do  not  repress  them  ;  but  it  is  impossible,  even  when  done  iucon- 
siderateh'  (Laughter  from  the  Left)  and  without  authority,  to 
allow  anyone  to  say,  that  *' the  Republic  is  dying."  There  are 
enough  people  here  who  know  very  well  that  it  is  living,  aud  that 
it  shall  live  !     (Applause  from  the  Center  and  Left.) 

M.  de  Baudry  d'Asson  —  We  ought  to  take  you  as  a  model, 
Mr.  Chairman,  to  learn  the  art  of  interrupting,  as  taught  by  you 
when  sitting  on  these  benches  !     (Noise.)   .   .   . 

The  Speaker  —  M.  de  Baudry  d'Asson,  if  \o\xv  mind  is  made  up 
to  interrupt,  I  shall  take  the  advice  of  the  Chamber,  and  request 
it  to  put  a  stop  to  that  system  !  (Approbation  from  the  Center 
and  Left.)     Let  this  notice  be  sufficient  !   .   .   . 

Continue,  M.  Paul  Bert,  and  do  not  let  yourself  be  disturbed 
from  your  discussion. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  The  honorable  M.  de  Baudry  d'Asson  was  say- 
ing that  we  represent  here  the  dying  Republic  !   .   .   . 

M.  de  Baudry  d'Asson — Exactly  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Decency  prevents  me  telling  which  is  the  dying 
part}^  to-day.*     (Good  !  good  !  from  the  Center  and  Left.) 

3f.  Bourgeois  —  I  guess  you  are  not  addressing  us  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Gentlemen,  the  restoration  to  the  State  of  a 
prerogative  which  no  one  can  contest,  has  been  in  187G  the  object 
of  very  forcible  claims,  which  have  since  become  more  moderate, 
for  those  concerning  Ait.  7  were  to  be  expressed  previously, 
and  more  emphatically,  if  possible.  These  claims  were  expressed 
more  particularly, — and  will  surel}'  be  so  again  in  the  speeches  of 
orators  who  will  succeed  each  other  at  this  tribune, —  on  acquired 
rights,  and  on  the  great  princii)le  of  the  stability  of  the  laws. 

We  may  likely  be  told:    "You  interfere  with  acquired  rights. 

♦The  death  of  the  "  Imperial  Prince  "  (Napoleon  III.'s  heir,)  hatl  been 
made  known  tliat  very  day. 


I 


524  The  Doctrine  of  lite  Jesuits, 

Upon  the  faith  of  the  law  of  1875  capital  has  been  accumulated, 
colleges  have  been  erected,  mutual  agreements  have  been  made 
between  professors  and  those  establishments,  great  expenses  have 
been  incurred.  You  have  no  right,  by  the  stroke  of  a  pen,  to 
annul  those  contracts,  to  make  those  expenses  of  no  account." 

We  may  also  be  told:  "  What  becomes  of  the  principle  of  the 
stability  of  the  laws,  when  a  law  voted  in  1875  is  suppressed  in 
1879  ;  when  everytliing  is  to  be  repeatedly  and  unceasingly  dis- 
cussed,—  shall  the  Republic  be  the  government  of  perpetual  insta- 
bility?'^ 

Gentlemen,  when  such  language  is  used  on  the  stability  of  the 
laws — when  it  is  desired  to  have  a  law  of  long-lasting  force, —  it 
must  be  voted  at  a  time  when  the  Assembly  which  makes  it  has 
full  power  of  action  and  really  represent  the  national  opinion  ! 
It  should  not  be  delayed,  as  was  done  in  1875,  until  a  Chamber, 
having  prolonged  its  sitting  beyond  every  limit  and  expectation, 
—  and  even,  according  to  nearly  half  of  its  members,  beyond  its 
rights, — should  have  come,  dying  and  in  the  spasms  of  agony,  to 
vote  a  law  with  onl}'  50  majorité'  !   .   .   . 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere — It  was  that  very  Assembly  which  instituted 
the  Republic  ! 

J/.  Paul  Bert  —  Even  during  the  discussion  of  the  law,  warn- 
ings were  not  lacking  :  several  orators  declared  that  such  a  law 
would  scarcely  survive  to  the  National  Assembly.   .   .   . 

During  the  parliamentary  vacations  following  the  vote  of  the 
12th  of  July,  1875,  some  authorized  voices, — voices  whose  author- 
ity and  power  were  soon  to  be  extended, —  have  declared  that  the 
law  would  soon  be  abrogated. 

Many  among  us  liave  made  such  a  promise  in  the  course  of  the 
electoral  period  ;  so  that  on  its  entry  to  office,  the  Government,  in 
its  message,  and  soon  after  in  a  proposition  of  law,  requested  us 
to  revise  what  was  excessive  m  the  law  on  liberty  of  higher  teach- 
ing, the  collation  of  degrees,  and  the  mixed  jury. 

This  bill,  voted  by  us,  was  rejected  in  the  Senate,  by  a  majority 
of  two  votes  !     You  know  that. 

I  ask  you,  in  good  faith,  whether  it  was  possible  to  think  that 
law  was  going  to  be  of  long   duration  ?   if   those  capitalists  who 


Sj^eech  of  M.  Paul  Bert.  525 

united,  at  the  request  of  the  French  bishops  —  in  contradiction  of 
the  concordat,  but  let  ns  not  insist  upon  it, —  to  establish  the 
Universities  of  Lille,  of  Lyons,  etc.,  could  in  good  faith  say,  that 
they  will  be  surprised  the  day  when  this  excess  of  power  will  be 
taken  away  from  thenj. 

Oh,  if  it  were  a  question  of  destroying  those  establishments,— 
of  closing  them,  of  di -charging  the  totality  of  the  teaching  body 
as  well  as  the  pupils,  —  1  concede  that,  in  spite  of  all  these  warn- 
ings, you  might  have  some  good  reasons  to  give,  some  sound 
motives  for  complaining  of  persecution, 

A  Voice  from  the  Left  —  Apparent  reasons  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert — Those  reasons,  the  Chamber  would  judge;  but 
in  the  actual  situation,  I  maintain  that  you  have  no  appearance  of 
reason  to  give  :  I  maintain  that  it  has  been  impossible  for  any 
University  founder,  or  any  appointed  teacher,  to  think  tliat  the 
mixed  jury  would  continue  to  exist  beyond  a  few  months  after  the 
meeting  cf  the  Assembly  of  1876. 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  Why  not  ? 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  It  is  said,  also,  that  the  collation  of  degrees 
does  not  touch  questions  of  principle;  that  there  is  in  it  nothing 
fundamental  or  vital  ;  that  the  Government  is  seeking  only  aggra- 
vating and  ruinous  measures,  so  as  to  prevent  Catholic  universities 
from  existing. 

I  believe,  on  the  contrary,  and  the  Chamber  thought  in  1879, 
with  an  immense  mnjority,  that  it  is  a  question  here  of  a  right  of 
which  it  is  impossible  to  despoil  the  State,  the  reason  of  which  is 
very  simple  :  In  every  country  of  the  world,  in  all  times,  tlie 
State  has  required  from  its  oflicers  certain  pledges  of  capability  ; 
and  those  pledges  could  be  furnished  only  before  delegates  of  the 
State. 

From  this  it  clearly  follows,  that  the  State  must  be  entirely  free 
in  the  choice  of  its  delegates.  Now,  what  is  the  object  of  the  law 
of  1875?  It  takes  away  that  liberty.  It  compels  it  to  take  from 
certam  bodies,  constituted  outside  of  itself,  on  whose  recruitment 
it  has  no  kind  of  action,  over  which  it  has  but  a  right  of  insi)ection 
extremely  vague  and  not  really  known  —  it  compels  the  State  to 
take  into  the  bosom  of  those  bodies  a  part  of  the  members  of  its 


526  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Jury  of  Examination,  when  it  ought  to  be  absolutely  and  perfectly 
free  in  its  choice. 

There  may  be  some  attractive  point  in  the  thesis  of  the  special 
State  Jury,  which  certainly  will  be  presented  to  you  from  tliis 
tribune.  The  Commission  has  not  faih  d  to  attend  to  it.  It  has 
not  failed  either  to  take  into  consideration  the  solution  ju&t  ac- 
cepted in  Belgium,  which  consists  in  granting,  through  a  direct 
and  special  delegation  of  the  State,  to  all  free  Universities,  the 
right  to  confer  their  own  degrees.  In  fact,  one  of  our  honorable 
colleagues,  the  Duke  of  Feltre,  has  proposed  the  same  plan  in  his 
sugtrestion. 

But  if,  taking  it  at  the  worst,  one  may  see  in  this  a  contradic- 
tion of  the  principles  1  have  just  named,  —  when  it  is  a  question, 
as  in  Belgium,  of  Universities  which  had  already  been  of  long 
duration,  had  given  certain  pledges,  had  made  themselves  appre- 
ciated by  the  public  and  the  Stale  for  twenty  or  thirty  years,  —  it 
is  impossible  to  discuss  the  question  to  ascertain  whether  the  State 
is  going  to  withdraw  and  deliver  the  collation  of  degrees,  for  the 
only  reason  that  a  University  would  be  established,  with  the  help 
of  teachers!  Consequently,  we  have  rejected  the  proposition  of 
the  Duke  of  Feltre  as  insufficient,  dangerous,  and  premature. 
(Good!  good!  from  the  Center  and  Left.) 

There  remains  the  thesis  of  the  State  Jury  :  that  Jury  where  it  is 
to  be  gathered. 

No  one  ever  had  the  thought  of  depriving  the  State  professors 
of  the  right  to  grant  degrees  to  their  own  pupils  ! 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  To  be  both  judge  and  defendant  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Consequently,  it  would  have  been  necessary  to 
institute  a  jury  for  free  universities.  This  would  be  giving  two 
origins  to  the  same  degree,  which  is  the  most  foolish  and  reckless 
action  imaginable.     We  have  rejected  that  system. 

The  true  State  Jury  we  found  already  constituted  :  it  is  the  body 
teaching  and  examining  the  faculties  of  the  State. 

Here  are  the  reasons  for  which  we  have  voted  the  Article  restor- 
ing to  the  State  the  collation  of  degrees. 

But  we  are  told  :  ''  This  article  is  harmful  and  ruinous  ;  it  will 
close  the  doors  of  Uuiverbities  !     And  to    that   ruin  dishonor  is 


Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert,  527 

added  ;  bccniise  you  take  away  from  them  titles  they  had  boine 
since  the  13th  Century  ;  for,  through  a  peculiar  and  genealogical 
miracle,  universities  established  three  years  ago  invoke  the  remem- 
brance of  ancient  faculties,  and  consider  themselves  as  their  heirs." 
(Laughter  from  the  Left.) 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  That  is  true;  they  are  their  legitimate 
danghters. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  We  are  told:  "You  deprive  them  of  a  title 
they  possessed  since  the  13th  century,"  excepting  a  certain  inter- 
val. (New  laughter  from  the  Left.)  They  add  that,  "  We  do 
injury  to  those  universities."  I  have  been,  indeed,  astonished  to 
see  that  thesis  developed  in  one  of  our  most  important  reviews,  by 
the  pen  of  a  writer  bearing  a  name  much  respected  in  tlie  Uni- 
versity. This  writer  protests  and  affirms  that  things  did  not  get 
along  in  the  same  way  in  1850  ;  that  such  an  insult  had  not  then 
been  made  to  places  for  secondary  teaching  ;  that  they  had  not  been 
refused  the  right  to  bear  the  titles  of  High  School  and  College. 
It  is  certain  that  this  interdiction  had  not  been  enacted.  But  what 
is  sure,  also,  is,  that  under  the  Empire,  a  decree  of  1860  restricted 
to  State  establishments  the  exclusive  right  to  bear  the  title  of 
Colleges  and  High  Schools  ;  and  for  this  reason  they  were  inter- 
dicted to  others,  under  the  pretence  that  such  titles  are  State  titles, 
—  that  is,  the  property  of  the  State  ;  that  such  an  usurpation  con- 
stituted a  regular  ofïence  against  the  right  of  property  ;  and,  at  the 
same  time,  there  is  involved  a  question  of  loyalty. 

Now,  while  speaking  on  the  subject,  I  recommend  the  too-long- 
nrglected  execution  of  this  decree  to  the  attention  of  the  Minister 
of  Public  Instruction,  who  may  find  more  than  one  opportunity  to 
enforce  the  said  decree. 

Gentlemen,  I  do  not  think  that  the  fact  of  depriving  schools  for 
higher  teaching  of  their  titles  of  Colleges  and  Universities,  —  as  well 
as  taking  away  from  them  the  collation  of  degrees,  for  restoring 
them  to  the  State  Jury,  —  may  be  of  such  importance  as  to 
threaten  the  very  existence  of  those  institutions. 

I  dare  say,  that  those  very  men  who  protest  with  such  bitter- 
ness, have  neither  the  intention  of  closing  their  establishments, 
nor  the  fear  that  they  will  be  deserted  by  their  pupils. 


k 


523  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

We  have,  in  this  instance,  several  examples  to  present  :  A 
school  which  is  growing  in  authority  and  becoming  renowned,  even 
abroad,  the  School  for  Political  Science,  instituted  in  Paris  a  few 
years  ago,  is  actually  prospering,  and  has  numerous  pupils.  It 
does  not  call  itself  a  ^'  University  ;"  it  does  not  confer  any  degrees  ; 
or,  at  least,  the  certificates  of  capacity  granted  by  its  directors 
are  of  no  official  value  ! 

The  same  may  be  said  relative  to  a  more  recent  school,  but 
which  nevertheless  will  eurely,  also,  attain  celebrity  —  1  mean  the 
School  of  Anthropology  ! 

And  I  cannot  help  mentioning  that,  this  very  day  is  celebrated 
the  centennial  of  the  foundation  of  that  illustrious  Central  School, 
although  not  bearing  the  title  of  University,  and  whose  coveted 
diplomas  are  of  no  State  authority  !  (Good  !  good  !  from  the 
Left.) 

No,  you  have  nothing  to  fear,  if  you  do  what  you  propose,  — 
if  you  desire  to  provide  for  certain  things  that  are  lacking,  to  give 
certain  instruction  neglected  by  the  State,  or  even  do  better  in 
teaching  than  the  State  schools  ;  if  you  earnestly  mean  to  work 
actively  for  the  progress  of  science,  the  improvement  of  higher 
teaching,  youv  educational  institutions  will  prosper. 

But  if  such  is  not  your  intention,  —  if  you  feel  no  interest  in 
the  true  progress  of  science,  — if  you  appealed  to  Catholics,  dis- 
quieted and  impassioned,  only  for  tlie  sake  of  increasing  the  funds 

of  free  establishments, (Laughter  from  the  Center  and 

Left)  ;  if,  as  per  the  report  of  certain  calumniators,  you  wish 
—  and  that  "you"  does  not  apply  to  anyone  present,  —  if  you 
want  only  to  have,  in  the  cheapest  way,  the  greatest  number 
possible,  within  medical  universities,  physicians  who  dispose  or 
prepare  their  patients  (renewed  laughter  from  the  Center  and 
Left)  ;  if  you  wish  to  have  in  all  law  universities  notaries  giving 
advice  on  the  disposition  of  wills,  (Applause,  on  the  same  seats. — 
Protestations  from  the  Right.)   .... 

M.  de  la  Rochefoucauld^  Duke  of  Bisaccia  —  These  are  terrible 
insinuations. 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  Mr.  Chairman,  it  is  impossible  to  allow 
such  insinuations  ;  and  I  refer  them  to  your  highest  sense  of  jus- 


S:peech  of  M,  Paul  Bert.  52i) 

tlce.     It  can  not  be  allowed  to  bring  forth  at  a  French  tribune 
such  allegations  without  accompanying  proof. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  I  said,  Gentlemen,  that  the  "you"  did  not 
apply  to  any  one  here  present.  (Exclamations  from  the  Right.) 
Do  you  want  me  to  say  now,  that  it  does  not  apply  to  any  one 
of  the  existing  universities,  and  that  I  am  merely  drawing  a 
hypothesis  of  what  is  not  likely  to  exist? 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  Wh}'  do  you  talk  about  it? 

M.  Paul  Bert — Well,  I  ask  you,  Gentlemen,  if,  by  any  possi- 
bility, there  were  such  universities,  having  no  other  purpose  but 
the  preparation,  in  those  conditions  and  for  that  end,  of  notaries, 
lawyers, 

The  Count  de  Maille  —  Being  a  talented  man,  why  do  you  not 
discuss  like  a  man  of  talent? 

M.  de  Kerjegu  —  Why  do  you  discuss  an  impossible  hypoth- 
esis? 

M.  Paid  Bert  —  Gentlemen,  it  is  almost  as  difficult  to  speak  in 
this  case  of  hypothesis  as  of  reality.  (Applause  from  the  Center 
and  Left.) 

Finally,  if  the  so-called  universities  do  not  accomplish  the  mis- 
sion for  which  they  have  been  instituted, 

A  Member  of  the  Riyht  —  Let  them  live  ;  you  shall  see  !  .   .   . 

M.  Paul  Bert —  .  .  .  it  is  entirely  possible  that  the  actual  law 
gives  them  a  mortal  blow  ;  and  then,  of  what  would  they  have  to 
com])lain? 

I  did  not  see  with  satisfaction  the  institution  of  that  liberty  of 
higher  teaching.     Not  because  1  am  hostile  to  its  principles,  .... 

M.  de  la  Pochette  (ironically)  — On  the  contrary  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert — .  .  .  .  but  I  confess  that  I  feared  the  conse- 
quences. I  explained  myself  on  this  point  at  the  tribune  of  the 
National  Assembly,  and  you  will  please  allow  me  to  recall  the 
hypothesis  I  then  suggested. 

I  said,  while  speaking  first  of  the  monopoly  system  :  Here  are 
two  children,  who  were  born  in  tlie  same  village,  the  sons  of  two 
friends  ;  they  go  together  to  the  village  school  ;  then  to  the  com- 
mercial college,  or  to  the  high  school  ;  and  from  thence  to  the 
State  University.      They  meet  again  on  the  same  scats,  follow  tht> 


530  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

same  teaching:  they  are  not  cast  in  the  same  mould;  as  it  his 
been  said,  they  will  not  be  the  effigy  of  the  same  stamp, —  and 
our  own  discussions,  we  who  have  been  brought  up  in  these  condi- 
tions, are  a  sufficient  proof  of  it, —  but,  at  least,  they  will  have 
learned  to  know  each  other,  and  to  love  each  other. 

Among  their  teachers  —  among  their  older  schoolmates  —  they 
will  have  met  with  the  expression  of  diverse  feelings,  opinions  and 
doctrines  ;  they  will  have  compared  them  with  those  directly 
taught  in  the  bosom  of  their  families  :  and  then  they  will  have 
formed  for  themselves  a  conviction  and  a  doctrine  of  their  own, 
which  might  be  erroneous,  but  whicb,  at  least,  will  be  impregnated 
with  that  spirit  of  tolerance  which  is  the  fruit  of  an  earnest  convic- 
tion.    (Exclamations  from  the  Right.) 

That  is  the  consequence  of  monopoly.  It  has  its  inconveniences, 
I  said  so  ;  but  you  see  that  it  has  also  its  usefulness  and  greatness. 

And  now,  in  the  actual  state  of  things,  what  may,  or  what  is 
going  to  happen  ?  One  of  these  children  is  going  to  follow  tlie 
evolution  I  just  spoke  of  ;  he  goes  to  the  public  secular  school,  to 
the  State  college,  and  to  the  State  university  ;  and  on  his  way  he 
receives  that  instruction  alluded  to  —  that  education  impregnated 
with  tolerance.     (Laughter  from  the  Right.) 

Yes,  Gentlemen,  it  is  precisely  because  it  is  impregnated  with 
tolerance,  because  it  is  the  enemy  of  fanaticism,  that  fanatics 
themselves  have  alleged  that  it  causes  degradation  of  character. 

The  other  child  Avill  go  to  the  Brothers'  school,  to  the  Jesuits' 
college,  and,  finally,  to  the  Catholic  university,  not  seeing  his 
friend  for  many  years, —  and  what  kind  of  instruction  has  he 
received?  I  do  not  speak  of  the  scientific  teaching;  that  is  not 
of  much  interest  for  the  Chamber,  although  I  cannot  help  recalling 
that  maxim  whicb  will  have  directed  all  his  education,  —  that 
maxim  of  a  celebrated  and  eloquent  doctor,  Joseph  de  Maistre, 
who,  if  he  were  living  to-day,  would  defend  Catholic  universities, 
namely;  ''Ignorance  is  better  than  science;  for  science  comes 
from  men,  and  ignorance  comes  from  God."  (Laughter  from  the 
Center  and  Left.) 

M.  de  la  BiUais — lie  did  not  put  that  maxim  into  practice. 
(Exclamations  from  the  X^eft.) 


SpeecJi  of  M,  Paul  Bert.  531 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Oh  !  Sir,  these  are  maxims  which  are  practised 
on  others  —  on  those  over  whom  one  wishes  to  dominate,  —  and 
are  simply  used  as  instruments  of  power.  (Renewed  applause 
from  Center  and  Left.) 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  Please  quote  to  us  the  words  of  Voltaire, 
who  wanted  for  the  people  only  a  plow,  a  yoke,  and  some  hay  ! 

The  Speaker  —  Do  not  interrupt  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Gentlemen,  if  you  do  not  like  me  to  quote  De 
Maistre,  I  will  relate  to  you  some  facts  I  witnessed  personally  ;  1 
will  speak  to  you  of  pupils  who  present  themselves  for  the  higher 
diplomas,  after  having  poured  into  their  inkstands  a  few  drops  of 
the  water  of  Our  Lady  of  Lourdes,  so  as  to  ensure  their  success. 
(Double  salvo  of  applause  from  the  Left.  —  Protestations  from 
the  Right.) 

M.  Bourgeois  —  Perhaps  his  lay  teacher  will  not  be  learned 
enough  to  chemically  analyze  it. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  As  regards  moral  teaching,  we  shall  talk  about 
it  when  we  reach  Article  7,  — vt'hen  we  shall  commence  its  special 
discussion,  and  we  shall  see  wliether  the  modern  casuistry  has 
sufficiently  rejected  the  disgusting  maxims  of  Sanchez  and  Liguori. 
(Noisy  exclamations  from  the  Right.) 

You  will  then  judge  if  this  word  is  ovcrstrong.  As  I  do  not 
give  the  proof  to-day,  I  will  withdraw  it  if  you  like;  but  when  I 
come  to  its  explanation,  you  will  ask  me  yourselves  to  recall  it. 
(Guod!  from  the  Left.) 

So  much  for  science;  that  is  fur  morals:  but  we  are  here  a 
polilical  assembly  :  let  us  see  what  the  child  will  have  learned  in 
respect  of  practical  politics. 

He  will  have  learned  that  the  Catholic  Church  must  be  the  only 
Master  and  Sovereign  in  the  world,  and  completely  dominate  and 
rule  all  secular  governments,  which  have  only  duties  to  fulfill  to- 
wards it,  while  it  has  all  the  rights,  '*for  it  is  King  and  Emperor, 
or  nothing  at  all,"  according  to  the  saying  of  M.  de  Montalembert. 

And  if  he  has  been  in  the  school  of  law  at  Lyons,  he  will  have 
learned  that,  *'even  in  questions  of  simple  social  utility,  the  Gov- 
ernment can  do  nothing  without  the  assent  of  the  Church." 

He  will  have  learned  — these  aie  sacred  words  —  that  •'  tin  re  is 


532  •  The  Doctrine  of  the  Je.mits. 

an  anathema  against  whomsoever  pretends  that  it  pertains  to  the 
secular  power  to  determine  wliat  are  the  rights  of  the  Church,  and 
the  limits  within  which  she  may  exercise  them." 

He  will  have  learned  from  the  mouth  of  Gregory  XVI.  that 
*'  liberty  of  conscience  is  a  delirium  —  '  del Ir amentum.'  " 

He  will  have  learned  from  the  mouth  of  the  late  Pope,  that 
*' universal  suffrage  is  an  universal  lie;  that  it  is  a  delirium  to 
pretend  that  citizens  have  any  right  to  the  liberty  of  expressing 
their  opinion." 

He  will  have  learned,  in  short,  to  despise  — and  from  that  to  hate, 
there  is  but  one  step  —  all  the  principles  which  are  the  founda- 
tion of  our  social  state  and  our  political  state  ;  and  he  will  be  very 
fortunate  if  he  has  not  been  brought  up,  for  instance,  in  the 
diocese  of  Toulouse,  and  if  he  has  not  been  compelled  to  enlist  in 
the  sacred  militia,  in  the  Papal  militia  ;  if  it  has  not  been  said  to 
him,  in  inflammatory  language,  that  the  hour  has  come,  that  the 
sacred  bugle  has  sounded,  that  the  flag  is  unfurled,  and  now  is  the 
time  for  the  new  Maccabees  to  draw  the  sword  and  march  to  vic- 
tory or  martyrdom  ! 

Well,  I  ask  you,  when  the  young  man  who  has  received  such 
instruction  meets  the  friend  of  his  childhood,  how  will  he  look  upon 
him  ?  What  terrible  preparation  you  will  so  have  made  against  the 
public  peace?  I  said  it,  and  I  repeat  it  to  you:  You  will  have 
prepared  civil  war  in  the  public  mind.  (Warm  applause  from  the 
Center  and  Left.)  Yes,  you  will  have  prepared  civil  war  in  the 
public  mind  !  Would  to  God  that  good  national  sentiment  and 
public  common  sense  prevent  it  from  going  farther!  (Good! 
good  !    from  the  Left.) 

But  we  have  been  told,  "  It  is  the  consequence  of  liberty  !  " 

M.  de  Baudry  d' Assoit —  But  there  are  two  ministers  here,  who 
have  been  brought  up  by  the  Jesuits  ! 

M.  Bourgeois  —  Those  who  were  just  applauding  you,  have  their 
sons  educated  by  Jesuits  !     It  is  a  great  inconsistency  ! 

The  Speaker —  Please  do  not  interrupt. 

M.  Paid  Bert  —  I  ask  you.  Gentlemen,  if  the  quotations  I  made 
awhile  ago,  emanating  from  authorized  moutlis,  and  often  from 
sacred   mouths,  are  not  actuilly  tanglit  in  the  instruction  of  the 


Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert,  533 

congregations?  I  ask  you,  if  it  is  not  true,  the  word  of  a  man 
^vliom  1  regret  not  to  see  here  any  more,  because  he  was  not  one 
of  those  men  who  dissimulate  their  thoughts,  —  I  mean  the  hon- 
orable Comte  Albert  de  Mun 

From  the  Right  —  You  rejected  him;  yon  invalidated  him.  .  .  , 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  I  invalidated  him?  Yes,  for  the  sake  of  justice, 
but  witli  deep  regret  ;  for  his  character  and  talent  did  honor  to  this 
Chamber.      (Good  !    good  !    from  many  seats  of  the  Left.) 

Well,  you  know  what  he  said  from  this  tribune  ;  you  remember 
the  words  which  were  gathered  and  published  in  the  educational 
books  and  in  Catholic  Universities,  especially  in  the  University  of 
Lyons:  "It  is  not  possible  for  you,  Gentlemen,  to  say  where  the 
Catholic  Church  begins  and  v^here  it  ends;  its  authority  extends 
over  all." 

But  we  are  tohl,  "  That  is  the  consequence  of  liberty  !  "  I  do 
not  believe  it  ;  I  think  liberty  might  have  been  secured  on  other 
conditions  ;  I  believe  that  liberty  could  be  organized  even  in  State 
institutions. 

I  expected  it  to  be  quite  different.  I  had  imagined  liberty  in 
full  light,  in  the  full  sunshine,  in  full  contradiction  :  I  had  thought 
that  we  might  reopen  the  great  universities  in  which  all  doctrines 
could  be  taught,  and  all  theories  and  opinions  freely  expressed 
and  brought  to  light.  I  was  not  afraid  of  contradiction.  One  of 
my  honorable  colleagues  was  saying  to  me  yesterday  :  "  You 
would  not  be  worthy  of  the  name  of  a  man  of  science  if  you  feared 
contradiction."  I  am  not  afraid  of  it,  but  on  one  condition.  I 
repeat  it,  it  is  that  it  should  be  with  equal  arms,  and  in  full  light. 
(Applause  from  the  Left.) 

M.  Annison-Duperron  —  You  should  not  have  excluded  your 
adversaries.   .   .   . 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  That  was  not  the  case  :  they  wanted  to  hold 
minds  in  close  restriction  ;  they  were  constantly  watching  ;  they 
endeavored  that  no  contradiction  should  reach  them,  because  it 
was  the  best  way  to  prepare  men  for  future  events.  (Good  !  from 
the  Left.) 

This  was  not  very  secretly  done.  I  do  not  speak  of  political 
meetings,  where  one  is  more  prudent  ;   but  of  certain  books,   in 


534  The  Doctrine  of  lite  Jesuits, 

whicli  it  is  said:  "Our  duty  is  to  make  use  of  the  poor  limited 
liberties  left  to  us,  to  prepare  a  large  nucleus  of  Christiau  gene- 
rations, strongly  bteeped  in  faith,  devoted  to  the  cause  of  the 
Church,  kuowing  true  liberty  thoroughl}',  in  order  that  the  future, 
at  least,  should  be  better  than  the  present,  and  that  a  bright 
spring  should  succeed  to  our  interminable  winter  !  "  (Good  !  from 
the  Right.) 

M.  de  la  Biliais  — We  want  to  think  of  the  future,  as  a  consola- 
tion for  the  present. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  That  is  their  intention,  which  can  be  summed 
up  in  one  word  :  They  are  invoking  the  name  of  liberty,  so  as  to 
prepare  slavery  !  '*     (Good  !    good  !   from  the  Centre  and  Left.) 

I  ask  you,  a  political  assembly,  if,  when  such  doctrines  are 
taught,  if,  when  they  are  taught  secretly,  you  can  disinterest  your- 
selves to  the  point  of  disarming  the  State  of  that  poor  and  in- 
sufficient right  it  will  have  to  make  inquiries,  by  questioning  pupils 
whether  those  doctrines  did  not  prevent  them  from  acquiring,  at 
least,  some  positive  knowledge  ? 

I  ask  you,  if,  when  some  men  have  refused  to  submit  to  the 
laws  of  the  State  b}'  refusing  to  show  their  statutes,  so  as  to  ob- 
tain its  authorization 

Voice  from  the  Bight  —  They  have  not  been  asked  to  present 
them. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Do  you  mean  to  say,  that  it  belongs  to  the 
Government  to  ask  for  the  statutes  of  a  secret  society  ?  That  is  a 
strange  doctrine. 

Can  you  deny  to  the  Government  the  right  of  refusing  to  those 
who  wish  to  teach  the  youth,  the  possibility  of  doing  what  I  have 
just  pointed  out?     (Noise  from  the  Right.) 

What  you  want  is  a  deaf  Government,  an  impotent  Government, 
an  incapable  Government  :  governmental  nihilism,  governmental 
abdication.     (Exclamations  from  the  Right.) 

Well,  we  shall  not  consent  to  that  abdication  ;  and  as  long  as  a 
breath  of  life  remains  in  us,  we  shall  figlit  to  maintain  for  the 
Nation  that  it  should  be  sovereign  at  home,  and  receive  orders 
from  nobody  !     (Interruptions  from  the  Right.) 

M.  de  Baudry  d'Asson  —  You  will  not  be  alone  to  fight,  M.  Paul 


Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert.  535 

Bert,  I  tell  you  ;  there  is  Catholic  France  beliind  you,  do  not 
forget  it  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  These  Gentlemen  are  eager,  I  believe,  for  a 
liomage  which  I  am  quite  disposed  to  pay  to  them.  I  well  know 
that  when  the  call  to  arms  was  made  at  the  frontier,  when  the 
foot  of  the  eneiny  trampled  the  soil  of  fatherland,  you  were  found 
tliere.   .   .   . 

Voice  from  the  Right  —  Yes  !  yes  !  we  were  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert —  ...  If  I  had  forgotten  it,  you  have  repeated 
it  often  enougli  for  it  to  be  remembered.  (Good  !  good  !  from  the 
Left) . 

M.  Viette  —  They  were  not  alone  to  defend  fatherland  !  Every 
one  took  part  in  her  defence  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  You  were  not  the  only  ones  who  did  it;  and 
this  does  not  signify  anything  for  the  past,  except,  perhaps,  that 
your  liberty  of  teaching  has  not  yet  borne  all  its  fruits.  (Good  ! 
from  the  Left). 

1  believe  that  I  have  demonstrated  that  you  must  restore  to  the 
State  a  prerogative  belonging  to  it,  and  the  return  of  which  will 
not  excite  even  a  legitimate  surprise  ;  I  believe  I  have  demon- 
strated that  there  are  dangerous  doctrines,  and  that  you  have  the 
right  to  prevent  those  who  teach  them,  and  did  not  set  themselves 
aright  towards  the  State,  from  teaching  them  to  the  national 
youth.     That  is  the  whole  thesis  of  the  law. 

Now,  l)efore  descending  from  this  tribune,  will  you  allow  me,  I 
do  not  say  an  advice, —  you  would  not  permit  it  —  but  a  kind  of 
warning?  That  warning  I  took  the  liberty  of  giving  when  the 
discussion  of  the  law  presented  b}'  the  honorable  M.  Wadington 
took  place  ;  it  has  not  been  listened  to.  I  said  then  to  many  of 
its  adversaries,  that  they  would  have  done  wisely  to  have  accepted 
that  law. 

If  accepted,  said  I,  it  may  be  considered  as  a  transaction. 

M.  de  Bauclry  d' Assort  —  We  do  not  want  any  transaction. 
(Exclamations  from  the  Center  and  Left). 

M.  Paid  Bert  —  It  is  not  to  you  I  wish  to  give  advice,  M.  de 
Baudry  d'Asson  ! 

M.  de  Baudry  d'Asson  —  You  are  right  ;  because  I  would  not 
accept  it  ! 


536  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

The  Speaker  —  Then  do  not  interrupt.    (Good  !  from  the  Left.) 

M.  Paul  Bert — If  it  is  voted,  said  I  then,  that  law  will  constitute 
a  kind  of  transactional  ground  from  which  it  will  be  difficult  to  come 
out,  and  what  you  call  the  libert}'  of  teaching  will  be  singularly 
protected  by  that  law  voted  by  Republican  Chambers.  Jf  you 
reject  it,  your  triumph  will  not  be  of  long  duration.  We  are  soon 
to  have  new  elections  ;  senatorial  elections  are  shortly  to  re-estab- 
lish harmony  between  the  two  Chambers  ;  and  this  time  it  will  not 
be  a  question  merely  of  this  modest  collation  of  degrees  :  you  may 
lose  much  for  not  having  been  willing  to  give  up  a  little  ! 

A  Member  of  the  Right — We  may  also  gain  much  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  I  have  not  been  listened  to  ;  I  shall  not  be 
listened  to,  if  I  repeat  the  same  warning  in  about  the  same  terms. 

Gentlemen,  the  law  submitted  to  you  may  be  summed  up  by 
this  formula,  given  by  the  illustrious  Leibnitz:  "They  have  no 
right  to  liberty,  who  want  to  use  it  for  teaching  hate  and  the  over- 
throw of  all  liberties."     (Good  !  from  the  Center  and  Left). 

That  is  the  meaning  of  the  actual  scheme  of  law. 

And  I  say  to  you  now  :  Take  care  !  for  if  the  proposed  law  be 
rejected, —  if  intolerance  of  sects,  if  Jesuitical  and  ultramontane 
intrigues  continue  to  excite  public  feelings,  it  might  happen  some 
da}^  in  another  Chamber  may  be,  that  more  audacious  men, — 
surely,  less  prudent,  doubtless,  less  wise,  I  am  inclined  to  believe, 

Jf.  Bourgeois  —  More  logical  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  But  more  logical,  as  it  is  suggested  to  me,  will 
ask  for  the  translation  into  legislative  and  administrative  language 
of  the  formula  of  the  above-named  great  philosopher  :  "  Tolerance 
itself  is  not  due  to  intolerant  people  !  "  (Renewed  applause  from 
Left  and  Center.  The  orator  on  resuming  his  seat  was  warmly 
congratulated  by  a  great  number  of  his  colleagues.) 


SPEECH 

Î9eli&erclï  at  tfje  Sitting  of  tje  5tlj  of 

Sulïï,  1879. 


Discussion  of  Article  7.* 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Gentlemen  :  I  am  called  to  the  tribune  by  the 
word  of  the  honorable  orator, f  who  just  left  it.  He  said  a  minute 
ago,  "that  one  would  not  dare  to  mention  again  that  series  of 
lies  —  that  is  his  expression  —  which  for  several  centuries  have 
been  heaped  up  around  the  history  of  the  Jesuits  !'*... 

M.  Keller  —  Tliat  word  was  not  addressed  to  you  personally. 

From  the  Left  —  We  liope  not  ! 

M.  F  cud  Bert  —  The  idea  never  entered  my  mind  that  such  a 
word  could  have  been  meant  for  me  personally  ! 

From  the  Left  and  Center  —  Good  !  good  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  If  I  had  been  called  to  this  tribune  by  an 
expression  which  goes  somewhat  beyond  the  limits  of  parlia- 
mentary language,  I  would  deceive  the  Chamber, —  and  I  should 
try  in  vain  to  do  that,  because  it  would  not  let  itself  be  taken  in, 
—  if  I  said  that  my  intervention  is  absolutely  improvised  and 
unforeseen.  (The  orator  shows  them  a  pile  of  books  and  docu- 
ments. Laughs  of  approbation  from  the  Left  and  Center.)  No: 
I  come  here  to  fulfill  a  promise  I  made  in  the  course  of  a  first 
speech,  at  the  beginning  of  tlie  discussion  on  the  project  of  the 
law  in  question. 

*Article  7  reads  as  follows:  "No  one  is  permitted  to  take  an  active  part 
in  public  or  free  teachin*:,  nor  in  the  direction  of  a  teacliin<;  institution, 
of  whatever  order  it  may  be,  who  belongs  to  an  unrecognized  religious 
congregation." 

t  M.  Keller. 


538  T/te  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

I  said,  that  iu  Article  7,  liberty  of  teaching  is  not  interfered 
with.  .   .   . 

From  the  Right  —  Oh  !  oh  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  I  said  that  the  actual  law  consecrates  the  prin- 
ciple of  liberty  of  teaching  ;  but,  that  it  however  adds  to  it  condi- 
tions of  incapacity,  to  preliminary  conditions  of  exclusion, — 
wisely  instituted  by  the  laws  of  1850  and  1875,  for  all  those  who 
wish  to  keep  even  a  private  school, —  that  it  adds  to  those  regu- 
lations a  new  condition. 

I  said,  that  it  adds  to  the  class  of  those  people  to  whom  it  is 
not  allowed  to  open  schools,  to  whom  it  is  not  allowed  to  teach, 
the  members  of  non-acknowledged  congiegations  ;  and  that  it 
places  them  ut  singulis  according  to  the  expression  of  our  honor- 
able reporter,  M.  SpuUer. 

This  principle  being  stated,  I  said, —  and  I  have  not  been 
interrupted,  and  this  thesis  has  been  accepted, —  I  said  that  it  is 
only  a  question  of  proving  that  such  exclusion  is  right  ;  and  I 
added  that  this  proof  could  be  brouaht  out  effectively  only  when 
the  discussion  on  Article  7  should  take  place  ;  and  that  it  would 
be  inopportune  to  try  and  give  it  in  the  course  of  the  general 
discussion. 

From  the  Left  and  Center  —  It  is  true  !  good  ! 
M.  Paul  Bert  —  Now  the  discussion  of  Art.  7  is  opened. 
It  is,  therefore,  a  question  actually  to  know  if  the  Minister  of 
Public  Instruction,  if  the  Government,  has  liad  good  reasons  to 
request  that  the  members  of  non-authorized  congregations  should 
no  longer  take  an  active  part  in  teaching  ;  and  especially  if  that 
exclusion  is  justified  towards  the  celebrated  Order  of  Jesuits,  which 
is  particularly  iu  view  by  public  opinion,  and  around  which  — 
everybody  acknowledges  it  —  all  other  religious  Orders  are  con- 
centrating themselves  ;  for  they  consider  it  now-a-day  as  their  chief 
and  master. 

The  Minister  of  Public  Instruction,  at  the  time  of  his  first 
speech,  brought  to  this  tribune  documents  which  have  particu- 
larly struck  and  moved  the  Chamber.  He  has  shown  that  the  pro- 
visions stated  by  several  orators  tending  to  exi)Ose  as  dangerous 
the  consequences  of  the  teaching  of  history,  the  teaching  of  law. 


Second  Speech  of  M.  Paul  BerL  539 

and  of  everytliing  touching  the  very  foundation  of  our  modern 
society, — he  lias  clearly  shown  that  those  provisions  were  perfectly 
right  ;  he  did  so  by  quoting  to  you  several  pages  of  books  of  his- 
tory, which  are  used  for  teaching  in  all  schools  belonging  to  reli- 
gious congi-egations. 

The  discussion  took  place  on  some  points  of  detail.  M.  Keller 
endeavored  to  explain,  "That  the  books  of  history  in  ques- 
tion were  not  the  only  ones  used  in  the  institutions  directed  b}- 
the  Jesuits  ;  that  they  represent  a  very  small  number  of  copies  : 
and  that  it  has  been  necessary  to  use  a  ladder  to  find  a  single 
one." 

I  shall  not  insist  on  this  trifling  matter  ;  the  Minister  is,  better 
than  myself,  in  a  situation  to  reply  to  that  sort  of  argument.  I 
shall  not  insist  upon  this  order  of  particular  facts,  although  it 
would  be  eas}^  to  put  unfler  your  eyes  several  texts  having  a  great 
analogy  with  those  quoted  by  the  Minister;  but  that  would  be 
falling  into  useless  repetitions. 

In  m}'  opinion,  we  must  consider  the  question  from  a  higher 
point  of  view. 

Gentlemen,  the  teaching  of  history  and  all  other  teachings,  are 
but  a  consequence  of  the  general  moral  principles  of  those  who 
teach  them.  What  it  is  necessar}'  to  do  to  find  out  or  to  ascertain 
if  the  teaching  of  a  certain  body  of  men  is  dangerous  and  preju- 
dicial to  public  morals,  is  not  to  find  fault  with  some  texts  drawn 
from  secondary  works  ;  no,  we  must  go  straight  to  the  very  books 
in  which  those  men  have  recorded  their  feelings  and  thoughts. 
We  can  see,  then,  how  they  understand  the  principles  of  our 
society.  We  must  study  —  skipping  mere  details  —  the  veiy  edu- 
cation they  give,  as  it  is  said  that  therein  lies  their  triumph  ;  and 
that  it  is  that  education  which  is  so  strongly  recommended  to  all 
mothers  and  fathers  of  families  ;  we  must  seek  out  what  relates 
not  to  the  student,  but  to  the  man  ;  what  tends  to  make  the  man 
himself  ;  that  is  to  sa}-,  the  principle  and  basis  of  morals. 

Well,  let  us  see  how  the  Jesuits,  in  all  times,  from  the  organiza- 
tion of  their  Order  until  now  —  this  ver}'  day  included,  —  let  us 
see  how  they  understand  those  principles  of  morality  ;  how  they 
understand  the   great   truths   on   which   rests,    not  only  modern 


540  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

society,  but  the  whole  social  world.  (Applause  from  the  Center 
ami  Left.) 

One  day,  Mgr.  Dupanloup,  bishop  of  Orleans,  eloquent!}'  said, 
from  the  tribune  of  the  national  Assembly:  "People  are  dying 
through  disobedience  to  the  Decalogue  —  through  not  knowing  the 
Decalogue.  "  * 

Let  us  see  how  the  Jesuits  know  and  understand  the  Decalogue  ; 
let  us  see  what  they  are  doing  with    those  eternal  principles  of 

morality  in  respect  of  family,  of  property,  of  sworn  faith 

(Renewed  applause  from  the  Left  and  Center,) of  human 

life  ;  and,  when  we  have  seen  all  that,  it  will  be  little  interesting 
to  know  how  they  name  those  principles  in  the  records  of  history. 

What  the  Jesuits  were  about  two  hundred  years  ago,  I  do  not 
think  it  is  necessar}'  to  recall.  In  an  immortal  pamphlet  which 
has  attained  a  place  in  history,  and  is  classed  among  the  master- 
works  of  French  literature,  Pascal  has  described  them  sufficiently. 
We  may  all  recall  to  mind  those  quotations  of  facts,  as  really  re- 
pulsive as  they  are  ridiculous. 

We  all  know  the  composition  of  their  morality  :  mental  restric- 
tions, unlawful  compensations,  philosophical  doubts  and  sins,  prob- 
abilism  and  amphibology  !  Everybody  is  aware  how  moral  prin- 
ciples were  shaken  and  set  aside  ;  how  free  will  was  enervated 
and  weakened  :  this  was,  in  fact,  all  that  was  necessary  to  deliver 
man  into  the  hands  of  a  director  ! 

A  Member  of  the  Right —  This  is  a  pretty  old  story  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  I  hear  a  justified  interruption.  I  am  told, 
"  This  is  very  old."  Yes,  that  is  old  ;  as  far  back  as  1656,  when 
the  "Provinciales"  were  published;  before  1662,  the  year  of 
Pascal's  death.  It  is  indeed  very  ancient  ;  therefore  I  shall  not 
inquire  of  any  of  the  old  casuists  ;  I  shall  ask  nothing  of  Tambou- 
rin, Decastille,  Filliucius,  Emmanuel  Sa,  Suarez,  Sanchez,  or 
Escobar,  the  most  celebrated  of  all. 

A  Member  of  the  Left  —  You  were  going  to  forget  him. 

M.  Paul  Bert —  I  shall  not  ask  what  they  thought  about  morals  : 

*  This  quotation  has  been  taken  as  an  epigraph  by  an  anonymous  Jesuit, 
who  pubhshed  in  Arras  a  vulgar  pamphlet,  entitled,  The  Scruples  of  Paul 
Bert.  But  the  scoundrel  deems  it  witty  and  smart  to  put  in  my  mouth  the 
words  of  M.  Dupanloup.     Ob  uno  disce  omnes. 


Second  Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert.  541 

you  would  reply:  ''Times  are  different  nowaday;  morals  of  onr 
age  are  not  the  same  as  those  of  the  sixteenth  and  the  beginning 
of  the  seventeenth  centuries." 

However,  Gentlemen,  we  read  in  the  "  History  of  the  Jesuits" 
a  celebrated  word,  whose  origin  seems  not  to  be  well  known  ;  for 
my  honorable  friend,  M.  Spuller,  having  repeated  after  others  that 
it  came  from  the  celebrated  and  unfortunate  General  Ricci,  was 
very  much  blamed  for  it  ;  yes,  it  appears  that  it  was  not  a  Jesuit 
who  said,  ^^  Sint  ut  sunt,  aut  not  sint,'*  but  Pope  Clement  XIII. 
But,  at  least,  it  is  a  Jesuit  who  said,  long  after  Pascal's  time, 
^^ Siimus  tales  guales."     Was  he  not  talking  the  truth? 

Let  us  see,  then,  what  the  Jesuits  were  a  hundred  years  after 
Pascal. 

At  that  moment,  in  1762,  a  great  event  happened  in  the  history 
of  French  Jesuits. 

The  adventures  of  several  Orders,  which  had  called  public  atten- 
tion to  them  —  I  use  a  mild  word,  in  order  to  avoid  interrup- 
tion at  this  time  —  had  determined  Parliament  to  look  into  their 
case,  and  in  1762,  a  celebrated  decree  requested  the  King  for  their 
proscription. 

A  Member  of  the  Right  —  Louis  XV. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  If  you  refuse  to  Louis  XV.  royal  homage, 
surely  1  shall  not  substitute  myself  to  you.  (Laughter  and  ap- 
plause from  the  Left.) 

That  decree  asked  the  King  to  take  immediate  steps  against 
men  whose  ''  Doctrines  would  tend  to  destroy  natural  law,  that 
rule  of  morality  which  God  himself  has  implanted  in  the  heart  of 
man  ;  and  consequently  to  break  all  ties  of  civil  societ}',  by  author- 
izing theft,  lying,  perjury,  the  most  criminal  impurity,  and,  gene- 
rally, all  passions  and  crimes,  by  teaching  secret  compensation, 
equivocation,  mental  restrictions,  probabilism  and  philosophical 
sin  ;  to  destroy  all  human  feelings  among  men,  by  authorizing 
murder  and  parricide  ;   to  annihilate  royal  authority,"  etc 

Then  come  accusations  having  no  interest  for  us,  as  we  are  not 
a  theological  assembly. 

Such  sokmu  and  terrible  formulas,  issued  by  the  first  constituted 
body  France  possessed,  llicu  the  Parlitiment,  debating  v^itli  united 


542  Tlie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Chambers,  cannot  be  alleged,  as  it  has  been  said  so  often  in 
regai'd  of  Pascal's  pamphlet,  to  be  the  expression  of  a  mean  and 
nariow  religious  passion. 

Besides,  the  Parliament  took  necessary  care  ;  for  to  its  decree 
we  find  annexed,  in  considerable  number,  documents  which  are 
precisely  the  basis  and  proof  of  the  accusation  brought  forth  by 
Parliament  against  the  Order  of  Jesuits. 

Those  documents,  no  one  can  deny  their  true  origin,  nobody 
ever  denied  it.  It  has  been  said  that  they  were  gathered  for  the 
purpose.  Such  an  objection  is  made  by  all  culprits  about  the 
charges  made  against  them.  Generally,  one  seeks  in  the  acts  of 
the  defendant  what  is  particularly  criminal.  This  was  done  by 
the  Parliament. 

Here  is.  Gentlemen,  the  volume  containing  them.  It  is  bulky, 
and  printed  in  very  small  type  ;  consequently  it  does  not  relat<^  the 
particular  doctrine  of  one  Jesuit  only  ;  it  is  not  a  single  individual 
taken  from  the  rank  cum  super  iorum  per  mi  ssu  ;  it  is  not  a  man 
taken  at  random  who  expresses  himself  in  these  pages  ;  it  is  the 
whole  Order  of  Jesuits  ! 

And  here  must  be  made  a  general  observation,  and  I  will  take 
the  liberty  to  present  it,  relative  to  the  last  quotations  brought  out 
by  M.  Keller. 

Every  party  has  its  fanatics  ;  but,  when  following  a  method 
formerly  in  use  b}-  the  National  Assembly  —  and  which  seems  not 
to  have  formed  many  pupils  here,  I  can  not  sa}'  why  —  according 
to  an  ancient  method,  our  opponents  draw  from  Republican  books 
or  newspapers  quotations  exaggerating  the  doctrine  of  our  party, 
they  have  not  the  right  to  compare  these  extracts  with  those  we 
make  in  the  inverse  sense  from  your  books  and  newspapers. 

And  here  is  the  reason  :  because  those  quotations  are  secured 
from  persons  placed  in  the  front  rank,  who  adhere  to  extreme 
principles  and  sometimes  shoot  at  the  body  of  the  troops  ;  those 
quotations  do  not  represent  the  opinion  of  the  majority  of  our 
Republican  party  ;  they  are  not  accepted  by  it  ;  but  are  the  result 
of  the  exaggeration  and  ardor  of  certain  reckless  sharp-shooters, 
or  the  doings  of  certain  personalities  a  Utile  out  of  rank,  of 
outcasts  ! 


Second  Speech  of  M.  Paid  Bert,  543 

On  yoar  side,  it  is  otherwise  :  the  more  excessive  the  quotations, 
the  more  violent  the  expressions,  the  more  absohite  or  aggressive 
the  doctrines,  so  much  as  to  raise  sometimes  public  indignation, 
the  nearer  we  approach  the  bulk  of  3'our  array  ;  the  nearer  we  are 
the  center  of  those  doctrines  ;  the  more  certain  we  are  of  meeting, 
behind  the  work  of  those  soldiers  who  publish  nothing  without  the 
authorization  of  their  General,  the  approbation  of  their  sui)reme 
chief,  often  more  violent  than  themselves,  I  mean  the  Pope. 
(Good  !  good  !  from  the  Center  and  Left). 

That  is  the  difference,  and  you  must  always  bear  it  in  mind. 

Let  us  come  back  to  the  Jesuits. 

The  main  charges  for  which  they  have  been  sentenced  by  the 
Parliament  of  Paris,  are  eighteen  in  number.  Several  are  of  no 
interest  to  us  ;  it  does  not  matter  much  to  us  to  know  in  what 
they  were  guilty   at  the  point  of  view  of  religion,  or  of  idolatry. 

But  the  moral  question  is  treated  under  various  titles  ;  the  first 
of  them  all  is  entitled  "  Probabilisra."  You  all  know  what  that 
means.  In  fact,  the  quotations,  which  I  am  going  to  have  the 
honor  of  presenting  to  your  appreciation,  will  recall  it  to  you  in  a 
very  precise  manner. 

This  is  how  a  Jesuit,  who  was  at  the  same  time  a  cardinal,  has 
explained  probabilism.     He  says  : 

''In  general,  either  in  matter  of  faith  or  in  matter  of  morah, 
(Please  notice,  Gentlemen,  that  this  is  the  formula  of  Papal  infal- 
libility," vel  Jide^  eel  monbas), — "-In  general,  either  in  matter  of 
faith  or  in  matter  of  morals,  it  is  allowed  to  everyone  to  follow 
whatever  opinion  is  directly  less  probable  and  less  certain, 
although  the  contrary  opinion  be  more  probable  and  more  sure, 
and  is  considered  as  such.  But  it  is  necessary  to  restrict  the 
proposition,  and  understand  it  of  an  opinion  whose  practical 
probability  is  certain  for  the  party  who  acts."  (Laughter  from 
the  Left) . 

Consequently,  when  a  man  finds  himself  in  doubt,  and  is 
obliged  to  choose  between  two  solutions  for  any  act  of  his  life, 
he  is  perfectly  free  to  follow  the  worst,  even  though  it  be  criminal, 
on  condition  that  there  is  a  pmctical  probability  which  seeme  t;i. 
his  mind  certain  —  and  useful.      (Noise  fium  the  Right). 


»/ 


544  The  Doctrine  of  fhe  Jesuits, 

Several  Members  of  the  Right  —  That  is  theology  ! 

J/.  Paw?  ^e?-^  —  Gentlemen,  I  am  told:    '*This  is  theology!" 

A  Member  of  the  Right  —  Badly  interpreted  theology  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  I  should  know  very  little  indeed  of  those  to 
whom  I  speak  if  I  had  not  expected  this  interruption  ! 

But,  as  long  as  this  seems  to  you  to  be  theology,  we  are  going 
to  see  what  are  the  applications  of  that  principle,  on  a  ground 
which  is  not  theological. 

"It  is  asked,"  says  Grégoire  of  Valence,  "if  a  judge  may, 
without  respect  of  persons,  give  sentence  according  to  the  interests 
of  a  friend,  in  favor  of  a  probability  indistinctly  applicable  to  one 
opinion  or  another,  when  a  point  of  law  divides  the  attorneys.  I 
say  :  first,  if  the  judge  thinks  that  both  opinions  are  equally  prob- 
able, he  may  righteously,  in  order  to  favor  his  friend,  give 
sentence  according  to  the  opinion  which  authorizes  the  claim  of 
his  friend.  Moreover,  he  might,  even  in  view  of  being  of  service 
to  his  friend,  judge  sometimes  according  to  the  one  opinion,  and 
sometimes  to  the  contrary.  (Laughter  and  applause  from  the 
Left). 

A  Member  of  the  Left  —  It  is  the  height  of  the  art  ! 

M.  Haentjens  —  It  is  the  doctrine  of  validations  and  invalida^ 
tions.      (Approving  laughter  from  the  Right) . 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  You  complained  enough  about  it,  that  you 
should  not  approve  the  formula.  But  I  must  proceed,  for  the  end 
is  precious:  "providing,  however,  no  scnndal  results  from  his 
decision."  (Ah!  ah!  f  rum  the  Left).  That  is  to  sa}-,  for  instance, 
in  the  particular  case  named  a  while  ago  by  M.  Keller,  "  providing 
no  telegraphic  messages  are  found  later  on."  (Laughter  and 
applause  from  the  Left) . 

M.  Louis  le  Provost  de  Launay  —  The  telegrams  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  National  Defence  are  very  interesting  I 

The  Speaker  —  You  can  read  them  at  your  leisure,  but  do  not 
interrupt  I 

M.  Louis  le  Provost  de  Lauyiay  —  A  short  time  ago  the  Left 
were  interrupting  as  they  pleased. 

The  Speaker  —  I  request  ot*  you,  for  the  seconc\  tim.e,  not  to 
inUMiupt. 


( 


Second  Sjjcech  of  M.  Paid  Bert,  545 

M,  Paul  Bert —  So  much  for  judgments,  which  are  not  a  theo- 
logical matter  ;  but  they  certainly  are  a  particular  matter. 

This  is  now  for  single  personalities  : 

''Is  it  allowed  to  follow  sometimes  a  probable  opinion  and 
sometimes  another,  on  the  same  matter?  It  is  probable,  for 
instance,  that  a  certain  tax  has  been  unjustly  levied  ;  it  is  also 
probable  that  it  may  have  been  justly  imposed.  Now  may  I,  who 
have  been  appointed  by  the  king  to  collect  that  tax,  insist  upon  it? 
And  in  another  instance,  because  I  am  a  merchant,  may  I  defraud 
the  State  secretly  of  that  duty  ? 

"  Likewise,  it  is  probable  that  one  may  be  compensated  with 
money  for  the  loss  of  one's  reputation  ;  it  is  also  probable  that 
one  cannot  be  so  compensated. 

"Then,  may  I,  whose  reputation  has  been  injured,  compel  the 
offender  to  Indemnify  me  with  money  ;  and  in  another  instance 
may  I,  supposing  I  have  injured  the  reputation  of  another,  decline 
to  indemnify  him  pecuniarily  for  the  loss  of  his  reputation?'* 

Now,  what  saj's  the  learned  Jesuit  ? 

*'  I  assert  that  one  can  righteously,  in  such  a  case,  act  one  way 
or  the  other,  as  he  deems  best  to  his  interests."  (Laughter  from 
the  Left). 

Gentlemen,  I  must  proceed  very  quickly  ;  for  if  you  are  not  con- 
vinced, I  have  some  other  quotations  at  your  disposal. 

A  Member  of  the  Right — We  have  read  the  '•''Provinciales'* 

M.  Paul  Bert — I  will  add  only, —  as  I  was  just  told  that  I  was 
talking  about  theology  and  not  mstruction, — a  quotation  relative 
to  teaching  : 

'•Doctors  and  professors  occupying  chairs  of  universities,  are 
not  obliged  to  teach  the  feelings  which  seem  to  them  most  proba- 
ble ;  for  those  sentiments  are  often  least  accepted  and  least  author- 
ized, and  would  cause  scandal  ;  and  it  would  be  imposing  a  heavy 
burden  on  teachers  if  they  were  under  the  obligation  of  teaching 
what  seems  to  them  most  probable." 

I  consequently  fear,  Mr.  Minister,  that  you  will  have  much 
trouble,  even  with  the  help  of  your  inspectors,  in  ascertaining  what 
is  taught  by  the  Jesuits,  especially  touching  the  opinions  which 
seem  most  probable  to  the  teachers  of  those  institutions. 


546  The  Djctrlae  of  the  Jesuits, 

After  the  great  chapter  on  Probabilism,  which  is  full  of  extracts 
very  similar  to  those  I  just  read,  comes  another  on  philosophical 
sin.  It  is  not  less  interesting,  nor  less  detailed.  I  shall  pick  up 
only  one  : 

"  Although  we  all  know,"  (it  is  Father  Lacroix  who  wrote  tliis 
in  1757), — "although  we  all  know  this  natural  law,  that  a  lie  is 
forbidden  in  principle,  as  also  that  it  is  not  generally  allowed  to 
kill  anybody  of  one's  own  authority  ;  however,  such  circumstances 
may  occur  where  we  think  forcibly  that  these  things  are  permitted 
at  the  present  moment.  It  is  thus  that  Cassien,  a  holy  and  learned 
man,  .  .  .  and  others  have  thought,  that  the  official  lie  is  some- 
times permitted,  ...  It  is  thus,  according  to  the  narrative  of 
Vasquez,  that  a  vulgar  man  thought  that  he  could  honestly  and 
piously  act  in  such  a  manner,  by  turning  over  a  sick  person,  thereby 
to  cause  his  earlier  death,  and  so  deliver  him  from  excruciating 
pains.  ...  It  is  thus,  that  another  man,  as  relates  Sarasa  in  his 
book,  'The  Art  of  Ever  Rejoicing,'  "...  that  recalls  to  mem- 
ory the  confraternity  of  "  Smilings,"  which  has  been  instituted  in 
Vaucluse,  I  believe  ;  but  seriously,  I  call  to  this  passage  the  atten- 
tion of  those  who  are  so  jealous,  and  with  reason,  of  the  rights  of 
fathers  of  families.  "It  is  thus  that  another  man,  through  his  zeal 
for  the  glory  of  God  and  for  the  salvation  of  souls,  baptized  the 
children  of  Moors  brought  to  him  by  their  parents,  and  killed  them 
immediately  afterwards,  in  order  that  their  salvation  might  be  cer- 
tain, and  for  fear  that  being  returned  to  their  parents  they  would 
not  be  taught  the  faith  of  the  Catholic  Church."     (Oh  !  oh  !) 

Let  us  pass  over  quickly.  Gentlemen.  You  see,  I  skip  hundreds 
of  pages  at  a  time  ;  and  I  will  quote  a  little  at  random,  as  the  hon- 
orable M.  Keller  said  just  now.     (Laughter  from  the  Left.) 

I  come  to  the  title  of  Falsehood  and  Perjury.  Is  it  theology 
again  ? 

"It  is  asked,  what  precautions  are  to  be  taken  in  the  use  of  am- 
phibology? I  answer  ;  1,  that,  without  rejecting  what  has  been 
said  in  the  preceding  question,  in  order  to  well  understand  ami)hi- 
bology,  we  must  distinguish  two  different  manners,  according  to 
which  persons  of  judgment  can  make  use  of  it.  The  first  consists 
in  having  the   intention  of  expressing,  outwardly,  but   mattrial 


Second  Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert,  547 

words  ;  so,  for  greater  safety,  when  one  begins  to  say:  "I  swear  !  " 
one  must  add  mentally  ''that  to-day,"  and  proceed  then  aloud  :  '-I 
did  not  do  this,  or  that."  Because  all  is  true,  in  this  manner." 
(Renewed  laughter  from  the  Left.) 

In  1719,  Father  Gassendi  declared  that  he  had  found  a  new  way 
of  never  telling  a  lie,  and  at  the  same  time  of  hiding  the  truth  ! 
(Laughter  from  the  Center  and  Left.)  And  this  not  in  keeping 
silence,  as  the  old  Casuists  used  to  do,  but  b}'  speaking  out  : 

"This  manner  consists  in  speaking  but  ma'erially,  and  pronoun- 
cing words  without  the  intention  of  giving  them  any  meaning,  as    ^ 
if  they  really  had  no  meaning  whatever.    Just  as  when  I  pronounce, 
for  Instance,  the  word  :  '  Clictri.' 

"If  supposing  once  that  this  word,  '  I  do  not  know,  I  have  not 
done  it,'  or  other  similar  statements,  do  not  signify  anything  in  a 
case  where  there  is  obligation  to  speak  and  at  the  same  time  to 
hide  the  heart's  secret,  it  is  easily  explained  how,  not  only  there 
is  not,  but  even  there  cannot  exist,  any  lie  in  the  mind  of  him  who 
speaks  ;  because  no  one  lies  but  by  words  meaning  the  opposite  of 
what  is  really  in  the  mind. 

"It  is  allowed  to  make  use  of  merely  material  oaths,  every  time 
that,  besides  a  grave  motive  which  compels  one  to  use  some  words 
without  signification,  there  is  yet  a  better  reason  for  taking  an 
oath  in  a  merely  material  form. 

"He  who  swears  materially,  does  not  swear;  because,  in  order 
to  really  swear,  it  is  requisite  to  use  this  word,  '  I  swear,'  as  men- 
tally significative  of  the  oath.  Therefore,  he  who  uses  this  word 
*I  swear,'  as  not  being  significant,  does  not  really  swear."  (Ironi- 
cal applause  from  the  Left.) 

You  see.  Gentlemen,  tiiat  the  doctrine  of  the  Jesuits  is  improved  ; 
this  was  in  full  in  the  eighteenth  century,  fifty  years  after  Pascal's 
time  ! 

Oh,  there  is  a  great  deal  more  like  it  ;  but  to  bring  it  out,  T 
should  have  to  quote  the  whole  volume  ;  for  the  Rev.  Fathers 
were  not  contented  with  presenting  these  general  principles.  The 
priests  may  have  to  deal  sometimes  with  dull-minded  people,  un- 
able to  apply  such  rule  to  particular  cases.  Well,  Fathers  Buzem- 
baum  and  Lacroix  teach  them  by  giving  examples  : 


548  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

"Tims,  as  the  word  Gallus  in  Latin,  may  signify  in  French  a 
rooster,  or  a  Frenchman,  if  one  asked,  while  talking  in  the  latter 
language,  if  I  have  killed  a  Frenchman, —  though  I  have  really 
killed  one, —  I  may  outwardly  answer  *No,'  while  meaning  a  'roos- 
ter.'   (Exclamations  and  laughter  from  the  Left.) 

"Likewise  the  verb  esse  in  Latin  means  to  be,  or  to  eat.  There- 
fore, when  I  am  asked  if  Titus  is  at  home,  I  may  outwardly  answer 
*  No,'  though  he  is  in,  while  mentally  meaning  that  he  is  not  eat- 
ing."    (Oh!  oh!  from  the  Left. —  Laughter  from  the  Right.) 

I  don't  very  well  understand  whnt  makes  you  laugh  ;  1  would 
feel  obliged  by  having  the  explanation.  I  do  not  think  you  mean 
by  so  doing  to  show  disrespect  to  the  Order  of  the  Society  of 
Jesus  !  .  .  . 

The  above  quotation  is  from  Buzembaum,  in  1757  ;  that  is  ten 
years  after  the  publication  of  Montesquieu's  "L'Esprit  des  Lois," 
(The  Spirit  of  Law.) 

I  pass  on.     The  following  is  about  secret  compensation  : 

"  One  does  not  sin  against  justice,"  says  Longuet,  "  and  one  is 
not  obliged  to  make  restitution  when  one  receives  money  for  com- 
mitting a  murder,  for  striking  somebody,  or  for  any  other  act 
against  justice. 

*'  When  a  man  is  so  miserably  situated,  and  another  man  is  in 
such  a  wealthy  situation  that  the  latter  is  obliged  to  help  the  for- 
mer, he  who  is  poor  may  take  secretly,  in  a  good  way,  the  prop- 
erty of  the  rich  man,  without  incurring  sin,  or  being  compelled  to 
make  restitution." 

"A  wife  can,  even  against  her  husband's  wish,  contract  or  give 
alms,  or  make  valid  donations,  and  spend  at  her  pleasure,  either 
for  gambling  or  other  honest  recreations,  or  for  her  fancies  and 
dress." 

"Servants  or  others  do  not  sin  bj'  taking  something,  presuming 
of  their  master's  intention,  because  they  feel  convinced  through  the 
light  of  reason,  that  their  master  would  not  like  to  be  unjust." 

"A  son  does  not  sin  when  he  steals  something  from  his  father, 
against  the  latter's  desire,  in  order  to  help  others  who  are  in  need." 

"If  children  believe,  in  good  faith,  that  their  father  would  have 
given  them  what  they  stole  from  him,  if  they  had  dared  to  ask  him 


Second  Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert.  549 

for  it,  they  are  not  held   to  make  restitution,  as  such  may  be  the 
custom  among  people  of  the  same  situation." 

Secret  compensation,  the  crime  of  theft,  has  very  much  occupied 
the  good  Fathers,  at  the  point  of  view  of  the  amount  required  to 
constitute  a  mortal  sin.  The  value  of  that  sin, — the  only  one  com- 
pelling to  restitution, — has  singularly  varied  from  century  to  cen- 
tury ;  that  is  eas}'  to  understand,  as  the  value  of  mone}-  changes 
(Laughter  from  the  Left);  besides,  appreciations  may  vary,  and 
they  do  vary  in  fact,  according  to  the  state  of  fortune  of  the  per- 
Gon  who  suffers  the  theft.  So  many  casuists,  so  many  different 
amounts;  every  one  considering  the  case  from  his  own  point  of 
view.  We  shall  see  presently,  how  casuists  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury have  resolved  the  question. 

Father  Buzembaum,  the  last  one  quoted, — and  for  that  reason 
he  has  concentrated,  while  perfecting  it,  the  whole  doctrine, — went 
further  yet  :  ''  For  he  who  is  very  poor  may  take  all  that  is  neces- 
sary for  him,  etc.  ;  and  what  a  man  can  do  for  himself,  he  can  do 
also  for  another  who  is  in  extreme  poverty."  That  is  the  doctrine 
of  the  Jesuits. 

But  this  is  better  yet:  ''A  poor  man  in  this  case,  could  even 
kill  him  who  would  prevent  him  from  taking  the  thing  needful  to 
him,  as  one  can  kill  a  thief  for  taking  awu}' something  of  great  im- 
portance, at  least  needful,  or  who  retains  it  by  violence  "  accord- 
ing to  what  it  was  said  above. 

Thus,  here  is  organized  theft — and  murder,  when  the  one  suffer- 
ing the  theft  has  the  notion  to  be  opposed  to  it, — under  the  insuffi- 
cient pretext  that  he  does  not  want  to  give  it  up. 

You  seem  to  become  indignant  at  hearing  that  one  could  find  in 
such  a  thesis  an  excuse  for  homicide.  Well,  I  liave  quotations  far 
more  direct  to  read  to  you,  and  you  will  see  presently  that  they 
are  of  a  particular  interest,  for  we  find  again  their  very  principle 
in  the  19th  century  : 

*'Can  a  son,"  it  is  said  there,  "  wish  for  the  death  of  his  father, 
in  order  to  enjoy  his  inheritance?  Can  a  motiier  wish  for  the 
death  of  her  daugliter,  so  as  not  to  be  obliged  any  longer  to  feed 
and  give  her  a  dowry  ? 

"  If  you  only  desire  or  learn  with  joy  such  events,  the  answer  is 


550  TJie  D)ctruie  of  the  Jesuits, 

easy  ;  as  it  is  allowed  to  desire  these  things  and  to  receive  them, 
because  you  do  not  rejoice  at  the  evil  of  others,  but  at  the  good 
which  comes  to  you."  (Exclamations  and  laughter  from  the 
Left). 

The  question  is  put  further,  even  to  inquiring  if  a  son  is  per- 
mitted to  kill  his  father,  when  under  proscription.  (Noise  from 
the  Left).  But  if  I  moreover  told  you  that  Father  John  De 
Castille  affirms  that  this  ma}^  be  possible,  you  would  answer  me, 
that  such  things  w^ere  said  in  1641,  and  that  everything  has 
changed  since  then  ;  let  us  then  proceed  to  more  recent  times. 

Now  the  following  happened  in  the  18tli  century  :  Father  George 
Gobat  asks  himself,  "If  it  is  permitted  to  a  son  to  rejoice  at  the 
murder  of  his  own  father,  which  he  has  committed  himself  while 
in  a  state  of  intoxication,  on  account  of  the  riches  coming  to  him 
by  the  consequent  inheritance."  And  he  answers  "yes,"  with  the 
following  ingenious  explanations  : 

"As  it  is  supposed  that  the  parricide  has  been  innocently  com- 
mitted, through  lack  of  reason,  caused  by  drunkenness,  and  that 
there  had  been  no  premeditation  ;  that  besides,  the  parricide  has 
for  aim  the  acquirement  of  great  riches,  an  effect  which  is  good, 
or  at  least  certainly  not  bad  ;  it  follows,  consequently,  that  the 
above  doctrine,  which  may  seem  paradoxical,  is  true  in  speculation, 
altliough  dangerous  in  practice."  (Hearty  laughter  from  the 
Left.) 

It  would  be  necessary  to  quote  the  whole  book.  Gentlemen  ; 
and  there  are  but  two  things  to  do  in  presence  of  those  quota- 
tions :  either  deny  their  existence,  which  is  impossible  ;  or  else 
feel  a  deep  impression  of  indignation  and  disgust  !  (That's  true  ! 
good  !  from  the  Left). 

One  gets  thoroughly  sick  at  such  reading.  I  however,  perused 
the  book  all  through  :  it  is  truly  a  swamp,  in  which  it  is  iuipossi- 
ble  to  step  anywhere  on  a  solid  bottom.  Everything  in  it  is  mud 
and  filth  !      (Numerous  signs  of  approval). 

We  see,  with  astoniahment,  that  a  great  number  of  those 
doctrines  and  quotations  have  not  been  written  by  mere  theolo- 
gians, casuists,  or  philosophers  addressing  grown-up  men,  but 
they  have  been  writlen  by  teachers,  and  have  been  seized  on  the 


Second  Speech  of  M.   Paul  Bert,  551 

copy-books  of  pupils  in  the  Jesuits'   colleges  —  of  Amiens    and 
Sens,  for  instance. 

Tiiese  are,  Gentlemen,  the  morals  of  the  Jesuits  at  the  end  of 
the  18ih  century.  I  shall  not  conclude  yet,  because  you  would 
tell  me:  ''Well  that  occurred  one  hundred  years  ago!  The 
sumus  tales  quotes  is  perhaps  out  of  fashion,  that  doctrine  may 
have  changed  ;  it  reaches  nearer  the  Gospel  ;  the  Decalogue  does 
not  receive  any  more  such  violations  from  those  who  present  them- 
selves to  us  as  its  most  authorized  defenders. 

Let  us,  then,  skip  another  century  :  let  us  come  to  present  times, 
and  see  the  writing  of  those  who  give  themselves  the  mission  of 
teaching  youth,  and  from  whom  the  Minister  for  Public  Instruc- 
tion, the  Government,  and,  I  think,  the  Chamber,  will  take  away 
that  mission  ;  of  which  we  believe  them  to  be  unworthy  ! 

Well,  here  is  a  Compendium^  dated  1834. 

Perhaps  you  are  going  to  find  it  too  old  ;  but  I  confess  that  I 
have  not  got  any  more  recent  at  hand.  It  however  has  since  had 
a  great  many  further  editions. 

Rev.  Father   Moullet,    in   his  Compendium  tlieologiœ   moralis^     ^ 
etc.   .   .   .  cum   superior um  permissu,    (Laughter   from  the  Left) 
Fribourg,  1834  : 

"  It  is  doubted,"  says  he,  '*  whether  it  is  allowed  to  kill  a  man 
who  wants  to  appropriate  to  himself  a.  material  property  of  great 
value,  but  not  necessary  however  to  his  existence. 

**  The  affirmative  opinion  seems  the  most  probable.  (Interrup- 
tions and  laughter  from  the  Right). 

''The  reason  is,  that  charity  does  not  compel  us,  in  order  to 
save  our  life,  or  the  life  of  our  neighbor,  to  lose  a  notable  part  of 
our  wealth." 

M.  de  la  Bassttiere  —  That  is  the  theory  of  all  property-owners 
against  thieves  ! 

M.  Bene  Goblet,  State  Secretary  for  Justice  Department  —  It  is 
not  the  theory  of  the  Penal  Code  ! 

M.  Louis  Le  Provost  de  Launay  —  You  don't  want  us,  then,  to 
protect  ourselves  against  house  breakers?  .   .   . 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  I  request  simply  that  the  Stenographer  register 
these  approbutive  interruptijns  !    (Good!  good!  from  the  Left). 


552  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

But,  as  this  is  causing  discussion  on  tliis  side  (the  Right),  we  are 
going  to  talk  on  something  else  : 

On  page  221,  it  is  asked,  to  what  is  a  man  held  who  gives  his 
oath  in  a  sham  manner,  with  intention  to  deceive  ? 

Answer:  "He  is  held  to  do  nothing,  relative  to  religion, 
because  of  not  havinj  taken  a  true  oath  "  (exclamations  and 
laughter  from  the  Left)  ;  "  but  he  is  held  by  justice  to  fulfill  what 
he  has  sworn  in  a  sham  and  deceitful  manner." 

I  firmly  believe  it,  for  it  is  not  likely  that  tribunals  would  be 
satisfied  with  the  answer,  that  one  is  held  to  do  nothing  for  the 
only  reason  that  one  has  not  taken  a  true  oath.  (Noise  from  the 
Right). 

M.  Louis  Le  Provost  de  JjCiunay  — What  of  those  who  took  an 
oath  of  fidelity  to  the  Empire?     (Noise). 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Gentlemen,  those  theories  are  very  often 
troublesome  for  the  pupils  of  the  Rev.  Fathers  ;  here  is  an 
example:  One  day,  at  an  examination  for  doctorship,  in  a  phil- 
osophical composition  on  the  universalitj'  of  moral  laws,  a  pupil 
of  the  Jesuits  found  liimself  in  great  doubt  how  to  answer  this 
general  thesis:  "Theft  is  forbidden."  And  he  made  this  objec- 
tion :  "  Why,  then,  did  God  allow  the  Hebrews  on  leaving  Egypt, 
to  take  along  with  them  everything  they  could  carry  ?  Was  not 
this  a  theft?  Did  not  the  property  taken  belong  to  Pharaoh's 
subjects  ?  " 

Such  was  the  objection  of  an  honest  young  man.  But  hold  on  ; 
be  sure,  his  good  education  has  sheltered  him  from  his  own  con- 
science :  "Doubtless,  but  all  those  things  first  belonged  to  God, 
who  is  sovereign  Master  of  the  whole  world.  And  he  can,  at  his 
will,  take  back  from  some  what  he  has  given  them,  so  that  others 
may  enjoy  it."     (Exclamations  and  laughter). 

Do  you  wish  to  bear  of  another  nature  of  acts,  which  constitutes 
a  whole  long  chapter  of  the  big  book  I  have  before  my  eyes,  and 
on  which  subject  I  however  could  not  make  any  quotation,  because 
there  is  none  which  could  be  decently  made  in  public. 

A  Member  of  the  Left  —  Not  even  in  Latin  ? 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Not  even  in  Latin  !      (Oh  I  oh  !  —  Laughter). 

The  Count  of  Douville-Mailkfen  — Ask,  then,  for  the  secret  com- 
mittee !     (Noise). 


Second  Speech  of  M.    Paul  Bert.  553 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  It  is  true  that  Rev.  Father  MouUet,  in  his 
MaiKial  of  Morality,  finds  out  the  way  to  turn  the  difficulty,  by 
Uding  words  which  can  be  read  aloud  : 

"If  someone,"  says  he,  page  126,  "takes  delight  in  keeping 
up  guilty  relations  with  a  married  woman,  not  because  she  is  t^ 
beautiful  "  (hearty  laughter  from  the  Center  and  Left)  ;  "  abstract- 
ing the  circumstance  of  marriage,  such  a  delectation  does  not 
imply  the  crime  of  adultery."  (Laughter  and  applause  from  the 
Left). 

"  This  is,"  says  he,  "  a  very  ancient  opinion  of  St.  Liguori." 

Mind,  Rev.  Father  Liguori  was  beatified  by  the  Holy  Catholic 
Church!      (Laughter.) 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  St.  Alphonsus  of  Liguori  was  not  a 
Jesuit  !     (Exclamations  from  the  Left.) 

M.  Paul  Bert — Well,  then,  I  will  quote  to  you  some  facts  from 
Jesuits.  In  fact.  Gentlemen,  this  point  does  not  much  matter, 
and  we  shall  have  to  talk  in  a  few  moments  about  this  argument 
which  consists  in  saying  :  "  That  man  is  not  a  Jesuit  !*'... 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  I  interrupted  you  merely  to  ascertain  a 
simple  fact;  but  not  at  all  witli  the  intention  to  say  that  his 
doctrine  is  not  the  Catholic  Doctrine.  The  Catholic  Church  has 
approved  St.  Alphonsus  of  Liguori's  doctrines,  therefore  we  have 
no  right  to  declare  that  it  is  not  the  true  doctrine.  We  are 
Catholics,  and  shall  so  remain  to  the  very  end.  (Noisy  exclama- 
tions and  applause,  and  ironical  laughter  from  the  Left  and 
Center). 

Several  Members  of  the  Left  —  Then  it  is  your  doctrine  ? 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  1  demand  to  speak  ! 

A  Member  —  This  is  an  argument  in  favor  of  divorce  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Here  is,  Gentlemen,  The  Christian  Instructions      ^ 
for  Young  Men  and  Young  Girls,  with  approbation  of  Mgrs.  the 
Archbishops  and   Bishops    of   Lyons,    Besançon,    Bordeaux    and 
Nancy,  published  at  Lyons  in  1840,  by  the  Rev.  Father  Humbert. 

Well,  Gentlemen,  it  is  absolutely  impossible  for  me  to  make 
quotations  from  it.  I  leave  them  at  the  disposal  of  those  who 
wish.      (Numerous  interruptions.) 

From  various  sides  —  Read  !  read  I 


554  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

The  Viscount  of  Bel  izal  —  No  insinuations!  read! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Well,  as  you  are  insisting,  I  will  quote  only  the 
most  presentable  part.      (Laughter.) 

A  Member  —  In  Latin? 

M.  Haentjens  —  Say  it  in  Greek  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Here  is  first  a  part  which  is  addressed  to  young 
girls.  The  Rev.  Father  sa3's  to  young  maidens:  "  How  can  you 
have  the  leniency  to  allow  frequent  kisses,  liberties,  and  familiar 
and  too  free  carresses?  What  does  your  conscience  tell  you  on  all 
this?" 

Further,  speaking  to  young  boys,  and  in  order  to  lead  them 
away  from  drunkenness,  he  relates  to  them  the  adventure  of  a 
certain  Cyrillus,  "  who,  coming  out  of  a  saloon,  went  so  far  in  the 
open  street  as  to  strike  his  own  mother,  who  was  pregnant  !  "  * 

"The  woman  made  such  violent  efforts  to  protect  herself,  that 
she  had  a  miscarriage.  That  unfortunate  drunkai'd  attempted 
another  day  the  violation  of  one  of  his  sisters,  who  preferred  being 
stabbed  by  her  unworthy  brother,  rather  than  consent  to  such  a 
crime.  Their  father,  hearing  a  noise,  hurried  in  ;  but  his  madly 
furious  son  then  dipped  his  hands  in  the  blood  of  the  author  of  his 
life  by  cutting  his  throat  ;  he  stabbed  also  another  of  his  sisters, 
who  came  in  and  took  upon  her  her  father's  defence." 

It  is  certain  that  the  Rev.  Father  does  not  present  this  Cyrillus 
as  a  model  ;  but,  finally,  I  ask  you,  if  it  is  not  really  abominable 
to  put  into  the  hands  of  young  boys  and  girls  —  for  it  is  a  book 
given  to  both  young  boys  and  young  girls  —  narratives  and  exam- 
ples of  facts  of  such  a  monstrous  nature, —  I  would  say  filthy,  if 
this  word  could  be  said  from  this  tribune, —  it  is  a  book  of  instruc- 
tion, a  book  of  morality,  a  school-reader.  .   .  . 

*  In  order  not  to  raise  the  indignation  of  the  Chamber  too  much,  and 
fear.ng  to  be  interrupted,  I  attenuated  tliis  odious  text.  I  reestablish  it 
here  in  all  its  entirety.  "  The  young  man  used  to  frequent  saloons.  One 
dav,  coming  out  of  such  a  place  of  debauchery,  in  a  thorough  state  of 
drunkenness,  he  had  tlie  imprudence  (impudence,  in  several  editions)  to  at- 
tack his  axon  mother,  icho  icas  pregnant,  solicited  her  to  a  shamcfnl  crime,  and 
resolved  to  use  violence  upon  her.  The  woman  had  therefrom  a  miscarriage.''' 
But  there  are  many  other  abominations  in  this  little  book,  which  seems 
written  by  a  man  taken  with  erotomauia! 


Second  Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert,  555 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  It  is  not,  and  it  cannot  be  a  book  of 
instruction.*     (Exclamations  from  the  Left.) 

From  the  Left  —  What  is  it,  then? 

The  Viscount  of  Belizal  —  Where  was  it  printed? 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Gentlemen,  as  I  am  told  that  these  quotations 
are  not  taken  from  educational  books,  I  am  going  to  read  to  you 
some  which  I  picked  out  of  a  book  of  instruction. 

And,  as  one  could  think  and  say, —  and  it  was  in  fact  so  said 
but  a  short  time  ago  —  that  all  those  quotations  were  of  a  philo- 
sophical nature,  and  could  not  be  applied  to  children  themselves, 
I  am  going  to  take  up  a  book  which  is  intended  for  young  children, 
even  the  youngest.   .   .   . 

M.  Ilaentjens  —  Was  the  book  just  cited  presented  to  children? 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  ...  And  you  will  easily  recognize  therein  the 
monstrous  doctrines  of  the  Jesuits  of  the  last  centurj-,  doctrines 
which  a  moment  ago  raised  the  indignation  of  the  members 
of  the  Left  of  the  Chamber,  and  which  caused  the  laughter  of  the 
deputies  on  the  other  side  : 

"Can   one    act  according   to  a  probable  opinion?*'    asks  M. 
Marotte,  Vicar-general  of  the  Bishop  of  Verdun,  in  his  abridged     ^ 
(in  form  of  Catechism)  "  Complete  Course  of  Christian  Instruc- 
tion, for  the  Use  of  Christian  schools."     (4th  edition.) 

I  think  that  is  a  book  of  instruction  !  It  dates  from  1870  ;  and 
so  I  hope  you  will  not  say  that  these  doctrines  are  of  another  age  ! 

The  Viscount  of  Belizal  —  It  is  not  written  by  a  Jesuit  :  a  Jesuit 
can  not  be  a  Vicar-general  ! 

The  Speaker  —  Nobody  is  telling  you  that  it  is  written  by  a 
Jesuit.  It  is  told  to  you  that  it  is  a  book  of  Instruction.  (Laugh- 
ter from  the  Left.) 

From  the  Left  —  Yes,  he  is  a  Jesuit  ! 

*  In  order  to  answer  M.  de  la  Bassetiere's  interruption,  I  will  say  that 
Eev.  Father  Humbert's  book  was,  and  is  yet  widely  spread  in  conijrejia- 
tional.  and  even  in  lay  schools.  (See  my  Report  on  the  Law  of  Primary 
Instruction,  Paris,  1880). 

This  book,  which  is  intended  for  little  children,  and  of  which  the  Bishop 
of  Nimes  undertook  the  defence,  in  a  mandamus  posterior  to  my  speech, 
v/as  published  in  the  course  of  the  XVlIIth  Century  ;  but  it  has  under- 
gone, since  then,  in  the  present  century.  172  editions,  of  wliich  32  were 
posterior  to  1840.  Now  it  is  a  question  of  a  book  worth  abi>ut  tlve  cents, 
and  consequently,  eacli  edition  has  had  several  thousands  of  copies! 


556  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  Then  it  must  be  now  well  understood, 
that  it  is  not  the  Jesuits  alone,  but  the  whole  Catholic  Church  that 
}ou  are  attacking  !  (Exclamations  from  the  Left.)  Please  allow 
me  :  we  have  authority  to  believe  .   .   .   (Noise.) 

From  the  Left  —  Let  the  orator  speak  ! 

21ie  Speaker  —  M.  de  la  Bassetiere,  your  name  is  set  down; 
ycu  may  speak  immediately  after  M.  Bert;  I  therefore  request 
you  not  to  interrupt,  so  that  I  may  likewise  request  silence  when 
it  will  be  your  turn  to  speak  at  the  tribune. 

The  Count  of  Maille  —  But  the  calumny  remains  ! 

The  Speaker  —  M.  de  Maille,  I  call  you  to  order!  You  cannot 
talk  about  calumny  when  the  first  page  of  this  book  has  just  been 
read  to  you  textually  ! 

The  Count  of  Maille — I  demand  to  speak  !  • 

The  Speaker — You  may  speak  at  the  end  of  the  sitting. 

M.  Paul  Bert — Gentlemen,  the  question  is  to  know  if  the  odious 
doctrines  of  morality  exposed  by  Pascal,  and  condemned  by  the 
Parliament  of  Paris,  remain  the  Jesuits'  doctrine  ;  if  they  are  act- 
ually taught  by  the  Jesuits  !   (That's  it  !   Good  !  from  the  Left.) 

The  Viscount  of  Kermenguy  —  I  was  educated  by  the  Jesuits  ; 
m}'  sons  also  ;  and  I  affirm,  sir,  that  neither  my  teachers,  nor  m^^ 
sons'  teachers,  have  ev«r  presented  to  any  of  us  the  books  which 
you  are  talking  about.     (Noise  from  the  Left.) 

M.  Paul  Bert — Well,  now,  almost  all  the  orators  on  this  side 
of  the  Chamber  [the  Right]  who  came  to  this  tribune,  said  to  us 
that  there  was  no  distinction  to  be  made  any  longer  between  Jes- 
uits, the  other  religious  congregations,  or  even  the  secular  clergy  ; 
they  said  to  us, —  and  this  is  the  truth, —  that  the  whole  Catholic 
world  adheres  to  Jesuitical  ideas  and  doctrines  ;  consequently  we 
have  the  right  to  declare,  when  we  find  those  doctrines  expressed  • 
by  a  member  of  a  congregation,  whatever  it  may  be,  or  a  member 
of  the  secular  clergy,  we  have  the  right  to  declare:  ''Those  doc- 
trines are  Jesuitical  doctrines,"  without  needing  to  look  for  any- 
thing else  !     (Approbation  from  the  Left.) 

The  Viscount  of  Belizal  —  It  is  the  Catholic  Church  itself  you 
are  attacking  ! 
M.  Paul  Bert — I  quoted  some  Jesuits  to  you.    Ah  !  I  know  very 


Second  Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert,  557 

well  that  they  actually  have  the  great  shrewdness  to  conceal  them- 
selves behind  members  of  other  religions  congregations,  behind 
members  of  the  secular  clergy,  and  even  behind  laymen  ;  but  when 
it  is  a  question  of  a  book  having  official  authorization  approved  by 
Bishops  or  the  Pope,  one  can  openly  declare  that  this  book  pro- 
fesses the  Jesuitical  doctrines,  and  I  have  the  right  to  take  hold  of 
it. 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  Then,  it  is  the  whole  Church  you  wish  to 
proscribe. 

The  Viscount  of  Belizal  —  At  least,  give  us  the  name  of  the 
writer. 

The  Speaker — But   the  orator  has  already  named  him. 

From  the  Left  and  Center — Read  !    Read  on  ! 

M.  Paid  Bert — "Question  :  Can  one  act  according  to  a  probable 
consc'ence?"  etc.   .   .  . 

"Answer:  In  what  concerns  faith,  the  validit}'  of  sacraments," — 
I  pass  rapidly  over  this  first  part,  because  you  might  tell  me  again 
1  am  talking  theology, — ''outside  these  circumstances,  that  is  to  ^ 
say,  outside  the  question  of  faith,  one  can,  without  committing  sin, 
follow  the  more  probable  opinion,  though  the  less  certain  ;  by  so 
acting,  it  is  acting  with  prudence."     (Laughter.) 

Gentlemen,  do  you  not  recognize  here  the  judge's  theory  of 
*'probabilism,"  quoted  to  you  a  short  time  ago,  referring  to  that 
merchant  who  was  willing  to  pay  the  tax,  because,  as  a  merchant, 
he  did  not  consider  it  justly  levied,  but  who,  however,  exacted  the 
payment  of  it  as  Collector  for  the  Treasury,  because,  after  all,  the 
tax  might  be  just,  and  that  in  the  latter  case  he  was  drawing  profit 
out  of  it.     (Good  !  from  the  Left.) 

Please  notice,  it  is  no  longer  a  question  of  a  work  of  1750  ;  this 
refers  to  a  book  printed  in  1870. 

I  read  further,  page  181  : 

"Question  :  Is  it  allowed  to  wish  for  a  bad  action,  or  to  rejoice 
about  it,  on  account  of  the  advantage  resulting  from  it  ? 

"Answer  :  It  is  never  allowed  to  wish  for  a  bad  action,  or  to  re- 
joice about  it,  on  account  of  the  advantage  which  is  the  result  of 
it.  .   .  .  But  .   .   ." 

There  is  in  all  this,  Gentlemen,  a  remarkable  similarit}'  to  one 


K 


558  TJte  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

of  the  ancient  quotations.     I  read  to  yon  a  short  time  ago  a  coin- 
cidence very  peculiar  indeed,  if  M.  Marotte  is  not  a  Jesuit.    Listen  : 

"But  it  is  allowed  to  rejoice  of  an  advantage,  although  it  may 
result  from  an  evil.  For  instance,  a  son  may  receive  with  pleas- 
ure the  inheritance  he  has  secured  through  the  murder  of  his 
father."     (Exclamations  from  the  Left  and  Center.) 

A  Member  from  the  Center — Who  approved  this  book? 

M.  Albert  Jolly — Some  bishops  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert — This  book  you  can  buy  ;  its  seventh  or  eighth 
edition  has  been  published  ;  which  is  a  proof  that  the  approbation 
of  our  Monseigneurs  has  brought  good  luck  to  it,  and  that  it  might 
not  deserve  the  marks  of  indignation  it  excites  on  certain  benches. 
(Laughter  from  the  Left.) 

A  Member  of  the  Right — Not  at  all  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert — Ah  !  you  are  not  indignant.  The  stenographer 
will  take  it  down.     (Laughter  and  applause  from  the  Left.) 

I  proceed  further,  page  259  : 

''Question  :   Is  it  sometimes  allowed  to  kill  an  innocent  person? 

"Answer  :  It  is  never  allowed  to  kill  directly  an  innocent  per- 
son, even  in  view  of  the  public  interest  (exclamations  from  the 
Left)  ;  but,  one  may,  in  a  grave  and  urgent  necessity,  do  an  action 
good  in  itself,  although  it  may  cause  the  death  of  one  or  several 
innocent  persons,  providing  lie  who  does  this  action  has  only  in 
view  the  good  which  can  result  from  it,  and  turns  aside  with  all 
his  power  from  the  bad  effect  he  fears." 

That  is  the  doctrine  of  secret  intention,  of  which  we  have  hun- 
dreds of  samples  in  the  large  volume  published  by  the  Parliament. 

I  was  telling  you  a  moment  ago,  that  the  Jesuit  Fathers  have 
tried  to  ascertain  at  what  precise  point  theft  begins,  regarding  the 
value  of  things. 

M.  Marotte  feels  the  same  embarassment  ;  but,  as  he  writes  in 
1870,  he  knows  the  value  of  money,  and  he  explains  : 

"That  depends,"  says  he,  "not  only  upon  the  value  of  the  thing 
stolen,  but  also  upon  the  wealth  and  situation  of  the  person  to 
whom  the  thing  belongs,  the  damage  that  person  suffers,  etc.  .  .  . 
So,  a  theft  of  ten  francs,  made  to  the  prejudice  even  of  the  richest 
person,  is  always  a  mortal  sin  ;  but  towards  poor  people,  working- 


I 


Second  Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert,  559 

men,  those  who  have  a  bare  competency,  a  theft  of  one  franc, 
two  or  three  francs,  four  or  Eve  francs,  is  a  mortal  sin  also." 

Thus,  till  ten  francs  it  is  not  .   .   . 

A  Member  of  the  Eight — Mortal  sin  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert —  .  .  .  Mortal  sin,  is  to  steal  from  rich  persons  ! 
Page  266  : 

''Question.  Must  one  always  be  considered  as  guilty  of  theft, 
when  he  takes  the  property  of  his  neighbor?  " 

That  is  a  question  plain  and  explicit,  put  by  M.  Marotte,  Vicar- 
general,  to  a  child  of  the  Christian  schools,  regarding  the  precept 
of  the  Decalogue  :  "  Thou  shalt  not  steal  !" 

Well,  now  !  the  boy  will  likely  first  answer  :  "  No  !  "  The  first 
direction  given  to  that  young  mind  towards  this  question  :  "  Must 
one  always  be  considered  as  guilty  of  tlieft,  when  he  takes  away 
the  property  of  his  neighbor?"  —  the  dominative  and  guiding 
thought,  is:  "No!" 

"It  may  happen  that  the  one  from  whom  the  property  is  stolen 
has  no  right  to  be  opposed  to  the  theft  ;  which  takes  place,  for 
instance,  when  the  one  who  takes  what  belongs  to  his  neighbor  is 
in  extreme  need  ;  and  when  he  takes  only  what  he  badly  needs  ;  or 
when  he  takes  it  secretly,  as  a  compensation,  not  being  able  to 
secure  in  a  different  way  what  is  owed  him  by  right  of  justice." 
(Exclamations  from  the  Left  and  Center)-  I  fear  I  shall  annoy 
the  Chamber  with  all  these  quotations. 

From  the  Left  and  Center  —  No  !   no  !     Speak  !  speak  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  1  of  course  pass  over  many  chapters,  but  I 
believe  that  I  am  pointinoj  out  the  most  interesting  .   .   . 

From  the  Left  —  We  will  get  up  a  book  of  them  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Page  276  :  "  Question.  Can  one  be  sometimes 
dispensed  from  the  obligation  of  making  restitution  when  the  theft 
is  committed  ? 

"Ans.     Yes! 

"  Question.  What  are  the  cases  which  may  allow  the  post- 
ponement of  restitution? 

"Ans.     They  are  : 

"1.  Physical  powerlessness  ;  that  is  to  say,  the  bad  financial 
state  of  the  debtor,  who  has  nothing  of  his  own,  or  who  is  in 
extreme  need. 


5 GO  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

*'  2.  Moral  powerlessness,  in  other  words,  the  state  in  which 
the  debtor  is  unable  to  make  restitution  without  falling  from  his 
justly  acquired  rank,  (exclamations  from  tlie  Left)  ;  without  fall- 
ing or  draojging  his  family  into  misery,  or  exposing  himself  to  the 
danger  of  losing  his  reputation."  (Renewed  exclamations  from 
the  Left). 

Other  facts  are  of  but  little  interest  compared  with  these  great 
and  solemn  principles,  so  remarkably  engiaven  in  a  work  devoted 
to  youth  Î     (Noise  from  the  Right) . 

M.  Louis  Le  Provost  de  Launay  —  This  book  is  the  work  of  a 
madman.* 
y/        M.  Paul  Bert  —  You  are  very  harsh,  Gentlemen,  for  our  Mgrs. 
the  Bishops  and  Archbishops  who  approved  it,  are  Louis,  Bishop 
of  Verdun,  Andre,  Bishop  of  Strasbourg,  etc.,  etc. 

I  do  not  think  they  would  have  approved  the  work  of  a  madman, 
nor  a  book  which  would  not  teach  pure  doctrines  !  That  book 
Gentlemen,  is  pure  doctrine  ! 

M.  Laroche  Joubert  —  The  Bishops  did  not  read  it  before. they 
approved  it. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  This  book  is  spread  everywhere  ;  it  is  the 
abridgment  of  a  complete  course  of  Cliristian  instruction,  where 
you  will  find  these  maxims  developed  with  a  luxury  of  preambles 
which  recalls  exact I3"  the  big  book  from  which  I  quoted  some 
extracts  a  few  minutes  ago. 
i/  M.  Albert  Joly  —  There  is  a  new  edition  of  it  printed  in  1874,  it 
is  more  than  that  one,  and  is  intended  for  schools  also  ! 

M.  Haentjens  —  Is  it  expurgated  ?  (Hearty  laughter  —  ironical 
applause  on  several  benches  of  the  Left). 

M.  Paul  Bert — The  word  "expurgated"  might  seem  a  little 
severe  for  some  members  on  this  side  (the  Right)  ;  but,  finally, 
I  can  give  satisfaction  to  the  request  which  has  just  been  made. 
The  last  edition  is  expurgated  ;  some  passages  which  I  quoted  are 

*  I  did  not  know  at  that  moment  that  Marotte's  Catechism  and  Christian 
V  Instruction  were  the  official  books  for  religious  education  in  our  Normal 
Primary  Schools.  Keceutly,  the  Director  of  one  of  our  Colleiçes  (La  Re- 
union), having  opposed  tlie  introduction  of  this  odious  little  book,  the 
Chaplain  made  a  complaint  ou  the  subject,  and  the  Director  was  dis- 
charged. 


Second  Sjyeech  of  M.  Paul  Bert,  561 

blotted  out,  particular!}'  that  where  it  is  a  question  of  the  son  who 
rejoices  at  the  murder  of  his  father. 

Here  is  the  edition  of  1870,  which  was  taught  for  a  long  time  in 
the  public  schools  of  Paris;  it  is  the  fourth  edition.  And,  if  I 
could  make  some  abstracts  for  you  from  the  various  catechisms 
which  are  taught  in  our  country  scliools,  I  would  easily  show  you 
that  exactly  the  same  doctrines  are  taught. 

With  regard  to  those  questions,  I  wish  to  justify  myself  from  a 
reproach  which  was  made  against  me  the  other  day.  I  was  told 
that  I  made  hypotheses  ;  I  was  told  that  nobod}'  could  ever  think 
that  the  teaching  of  Catholic  universities  have  gone  so  far  astray  : 
that  it  would  become,  in  reality,  an  art  of  getting  around  the  civil 
and  penal  code,  without  running  the  risk  of  meeting  its  disagreeable 
effects. 

I  have  here, —  he  is  not  a  Jesuit,  that's  true;  it  is  the  Count 
Anatole  de  Segur, —  I  have  here  some  extracts  from  a  pamphlet 
recently  published,  in  1872,  by  the  Religious  Weekly  of  the  diocese 
of  Montpellier,  a  pamphlet  which  is  honored  with  the  approval  of 
Mgr.  the  Bishop  of  Montpellier  ;  those  extracts,  therefore,  can  be 
considered  as  representing  also  the  pure  doctrines,  or  at  least  — 
for  there  must  be  made  a  distinction,  you  saw  it,  between  spec- 
ulation and  practice  —  as  representing  some  directions  which, 
althougli  disngreeable  on  the  side  of  speculation,  are  well  worth 
at  least  l>eing  put  into  practice. 

The  Count  of  Segur  trou))les  his  mind  very  much  about  the 
prudent  steps  taken  by  the  Civil  Code  in  order  to  prevent  legacies 
and  gifts  being  received  by  persons  who  have  no  lawful  right  to 
be  heirs  ;  that  is  to  say,  persons  who  are  not  considered  regular 
citizens.  He  explains  very  openly,  with  a  truly  juridicial  art, — that 
is  the  proof,  Mr.  Minister,  that  the  pupils  of  Catholic  Colleges  will 
not  be  perplexed  before  the  professors  of  the  Universit}', — The 
Count  of  Segur  explains  in  a  very  particular  manner,  with  a 
thoroughly  juridicial  science,  the  delicate  points  of  what  he  calls 
'*  the  points  of  contact  of  charitable  and  religious  liberty  — 
another  and  new  kind  of  liberty  ! — with  civil  legislation." 

'*  Those  points  once  known,"  says  he,  "  it  will  be  easy  to  avoid 
them."  That  is  very  simple  ;  in  f;u:t,  it  {?hould  t>e  done  so  at  first  ; 
he  gives  g(X)d  aUvi(^c  fui*  all  [)ossibIc  cases. 


562  Tlœ  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

"Many  pious  persons,"  said  he,  "  wlio  wish  to  give  a  part  of 
their  fortune  to  a  good  purpose,  are  prevented  from  doing  so  by 
the  strictness  of  this  principle.  They  would  like  to  choose  the 
mediums  of  their  liberalities  ;  to  unite  the  spiritual  aim  to  their 
material  gifts  ;  and  they  do  not  care  to  intrust  to  other  hands  but 
those  of  pious  i>ersons  the  execution  of  their  charitable  desires." 

In  other  words,  those  persons  would  like  to  overturn  the  law  ; 
but  how  ?  And  then  follows,  I  repeat,  a  series  of  practical  direc- 
tions, very  useful  to  those  who  are  disturbed  by  the  law. 

Next,  M.  de  Segur  adds,  with  a  charming  simplicity  : 

*'.  .  .  By  means  of  these  perfectly- legitimate  and  moderate  ways 
of  very  easy  use,  the  benefactors  of  the  poor  can  harmonize  respect 
of  the  severe  rules  of  the  law  with  their  preferences  and  the 
accomplishment  of  their  pious  intentions." 

I  stop  here.  Gentlemen,  I  have  made  you  acquainted  with  some 
samples  of  what  teaching  is  in  the  hands  of  those  men  who  were 
presented  to  you  at  this  tribune,  and  everywhere,  as  the  safe 
guardians  of  the  purest  doctrine  and  of  the  highest  morality.  It 
is  constantly  said,  that  Society  is  running  away  with  the  revolu- 
tionary torrent  ;  that  they  are  the  salvation  anchor  ;  that  it  is 
necessary  to  be  fastened  to  them  in  order  to  be  on  solid  ground, 
or  to  keep  afloat. 

Now,  Gentlemen,  yo^i  know  what  ideas,  what  principles  of 
morality,  used  to  guide  them  in  olden  times,  and  which  lead  them 
novv-a-days, —  ideas  which  are  very  eas}'  for  them  to  transfer  from 
the  domain  of  speculation  into  the  field  of  practice  !  (Signs  of 
approbation  from  the  Left). 

If  I  were  speaking  of  the  pedagogical  art  with  which  those  prin- 
ciples are  impressed,  there  would  be  much  to  say,  and  interesting 
facts  also  ;  but  you  would  reply,  "that  I  was  critidsing  private 
schools,  not  only  at  the  point  of  view  of  morality,  but  mainly  re- 
garding their  pedagogical  value  ;  and  that  I  was  praising  the  Uni- 
versity schools,  by  contrast  with  the  Jesuitical  and  congregational 
colleges." 

I  would  be  told  that  such  a  proceeding  could  not  be  in  place  at  the 
French  tribune.  That  is  exactly  what  I  think  ;  and  consequently,  I 
shall  not  follovv  an  exan]])le  of  the  same   kind,  but  in  the  inverse 


Second  Speech  of  M.   Paul  Bert.  563 

way  to  wliat  was  given  to  me  by  our   adversaries.     (Renewed  ap- 
probation from  the  Center  and  Left.) 

This  is,  Gentlemen,  for  the  boys'  instruction. 

But  for  the  last  century  or  so,  a  quite  particular  and  new  event 
has  taken  place.  The  girls'  education,  until  the  Revolution,  was 
almost  exclusively  in  the  hands  of  religious  congregations.  Those 
congregations  were  giving  a  peculiar  teaching,  which,  at  the  point 
of  view  of  instruction,  so  to  speak,  was  generally  very  weak,  ex- 
cept only  in  a  few  famous  and  renowned  private  institutions.  But 
from  the  documents  of  that  time,  the  3'oung  girls  received  then  a 
very  good  education,  at  the  point  of  view  of  morality. 

Great  care  was  taken  in  the  convents  not  to  bring  up  the  young 
girls  like  future  nuns;  those  young  girls  who  should  return  into  so- 
ciety and  become  mothers  of  families.  The  mystic  sentiment  was 
not  excited  in  them.  Truly  religious  feelings  were  impressed  upon 
them,  but  of  an  elevated  nature,  in  harmony  with  the  purest  mo- 
rality. The  result  of  this  was,  that  social  tranquility,  that  calm  in 
the  bosom  of  the  family  of  which  the  disappearance  is  sometimes 
regretted  in  the  present  time. 

But,  since  the  beginning  of  last  century, — since  the  famous  tale 
of  Abbot  Girard  and  Miss  la  Cadiere, — since  the  more  celebrated 
adventure  of  Mary  Alascoque,  the  Jesuits  have  endeavored  to  take 
hold  of  the  education  of  young  girls.  They  could  not  do  it  directly. 
Their  regulations  forbad  it  to  them.  So  they  raised  up  a  great  num- 
l)er  of  congregations  which  have  no  similarity  to  the  old  congre- 
gations known  by  our  fathers  and  mothers. 

In  fact,  most  of  them  bear  the  titles  of  the  "  Sacred  Heart  of 
Jesus,"  the  ^'Sacred  Heart  of  Mary,"  etc.,  which  shows  they  are  of 
recent     institution. 

The  Jesuitical  congregations  are  trying,  in  opposition  to  the  old 
and  wise  congregations,  to  impress  the  young  girls'  minds  witli  an 
excessive  and  peculiar  mysticism  ;  for  these  intellectual  congrega- 
tions are  united  vvilh  what  might  be  called  the  most  material  or- 
ganization ! 

From  the  Left  —  That's  it  !    Good  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert — Formerly,  great  care  was  taken  as  to  dogmatical 
questions,  legendary  narratives  and   religious  stories,  and   lo  pass 


564  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

rapidly  over  certain  delicate  circumstances  on  which  it  is  not  very 
good  to  awaken  the  minds  of  children,  especially  of  3'oung  girls  ; 
to-day  it  seems,  on  the  contrary,  that  a  certain  pleasure  is  taken  to 
call  their  attention  to  them,  by  means  of  intellectual  processes  which 
are  the  most  strange  and  dangerous  imaginable.  I  do  not  know 
of  a  book  more  interesting  to  read,  in  relation  to  this,  than  the 
"Meditation  on  the  Life  and  Mysteries  of  Our  Lord  Jesus  Christ, 
according  to  St.  Ignace's  method."  You  see,  it  is  truly  a  question 
of  Jesuits,  and  after  the  renowned  exercises  of  the  founder  of  the 
Order  of  Jesuits.  These  books  are  intended  for  young  girls  ;  con- 
sequently, I  do  not  get  out  of  our  subject.  This  book,  for  instance, 
is  specially  dedicated  to  young  ladies,  and  is  taught  in  the  colleges 
of  the  Sacred  Heart  of  Jesus. 

While  perusing  it.  Gentlemen,  it  is  astonishing  to  see,  at  the 
point  of  view  of  the  subjects  studied  and  the  manner  of  studying 
them,  what  really  terrible  means  are  used  in  the  bosom  of  those 
institutions,  which  all  belong  to  non-authorized  congregations.  At 
the  point  of  view  of  the  method  itself,  it  is  an  exaggeration  of 
mysticism  which  is  tending  to  placing  the  young  person  absolutely 
outside  of  the  world,  her  exterior  friends  and  the  temporal  impres- 
fiions  which  surround  her.  She  should  keep  in  an  obscure  and  quiet 
place  ;  she  should  live  apart,  mentally  speaking,  from  all  worldly 
things,  concentrate  her  mind  on  a  particular  point  of  a  religious 
story,  fix  her  senses  and  soul  upon  that  point  with  an  absolute  at- 
tention. In  the  course  of  her  meditations  there  are  preludes,  prelim- 
inai'y  prayers,  a  combination  of  ways  and  proceedings,  through 
which  she  forcibly  becomes  perfectly  isolated  from  the  rest  of  the 
woild. 

And  then, —  what  is  very  strange  indeed, —  that  young  girl,  in 
this  state  of  semi-somnambulism,  almost  asleep,  her  whole  mind  far 
off  from  this  world,  is  all  of  a  sudden  called  upon  to  exercise  all  her 
senses,  one  after  another,  and  apply  them  to  the  only  object  on 
which  her  mind  was  fixed,  and  which  is  there  present  and  living 
before  her  eyes. 

Tliere  are,  in  this.  Gentlemen,  I  do  not  hesitate  to  sny,  all  the 
required  conditions  of  a  criminally  prepared  and  organized  hallu- 
tiiialiuii.     (Good!  Good!  from  the  Left). 


Second  Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert,  565 

After  each  one  of  those  meditations  comes  what  is  called  the 
application  of  tlie  senses  ;  that  is,  the  sight,  hearing,  smell,  tasie, 
finally  touch.     So  much  for  the  method  ! 

Think,  gentlemen,  how  dangeious  this  is.  Those  who  have 
invented  it,  or  rather  those  who  have  put  it  into  practice,  not  only 
for  nuns,  as  wished  by  St.  Ignace,  but  for  young  girls  who  are 
expected  soon  to  become  wives  and  mothers  of  families,  living  in 
society,  such  are  truly  guilty  and  rrsponsible  for  so  many  insane 
cases.  And,  if  those  who  write  such  books  do  not  feel  the  conse- 
quence of  what  they  have  done,  I  send  them  back  to  the  treatise, 
"Young  Ladies'  Education,"  by  Fenelon.  They  will  find  in  it 
severe  and  profitable  lessons  !     (Interruptions  from  the  Right). 

M,  de  la  Bassetiere  —  This  book  is  simply  intended  for  future 
nuns  ! 

M.  Paid  Bert  —  I  beg  your  pardon,  M.  de  la  Bassetiere.  It 
is  not  a  question  of  nuns,  but  of  young  girls.  There  are  two 
editions. 

T/ie /S/)eaA:e7'  (addressing  the  Right)  —  I  will  remark  to  you. 
Gentlemen,  that  w^e  have  given  to  this  debate  sucli  an  extension 
and  ampleness,  that  all  of  your  orators  have  been  able  to  review 
all  historical,  political,  and  religious  subjects  ;  the  same  liberty 
must  be  given  to  your  opponents,  so  that  it  may  be  maintained 
presently  for  you.    (Good).     Please  continue,  M.  Paul  Bert. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  M.  de  la  Bassetiere  says  to  me,  that  this  book 
is  merely  intended  for  nuns.  I  wish  to  reply  to  that  point  —  for 
the  argument,  without  being  largely  extended,  might  seem  to  have 
a  little  value.  I  say,  that  M.  de  la  Bassetiere  is  mistaken  :  there 
are  two  editions  of  this  book,  one  dedicated  to  nuns  —  which  I 
have  not,  as  it  is  of  no  value  to  me  ;  I  remain  in  the  domain  of 
instruction  —  and  the  other  devoted  to  young  girls  ;  and  you  cer- 
tainly are  better  able  than  I  to  know  that  this  book  is  of  daily 
use  in  the  colleges  of  the  Sacred  Heart  of  Jesus,  and  many  other 
congregational  schools. 

That  is  for  the  method  !  I  was  not  embarrassed  until  now,  be- 
cause I  did  not  go  beyond  the  limits  of  what  might  be  called  the 
application  of  Medicine  to  Pedagogy  ;  but  I  should  be  very  embar- 
rassed to  speak  on  the  subjects  which  are  treated  in  those  médita- 


5G6  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

tions,  and  to  quote  some  of  tliem  textually.  Nevertheless  tliey 
must  be  pointed  out.  Now,  do  you  know  to  what  the  attention  of 
young  girls  is  called?  There  is  the  Annunciation,  for  mstance. 
There  are  a  dozen  meditations  on  the  Annunciation  of  tlie  Holy 
Pregnancy,  and  its  consequences  !  (Laughter  from  the  Left) .  There 
are  three  or  four  medit.itions  on  the  hidden  life  of  Jesus  in  his 
mother's  bosom  ;  meditations  on  which  the  young  girl  is  requested 
not  only  to  reflect,  but  to  place  herself  in  a  state  to  interroo^ate, 
by  each  one  of  her  senses,  the  actual  position  of  Jesus.  (Indig- 
nant exclamations  from  Left  and  Center). 

I  could  read  them. 

And  after  the  Annunciation,  there  is  the  Visitation.  The  same 
order  of  questions  is  followed.     One  even  goes  farther.   .  .  . 

M.  Margaine  —  And  what  of  the  explanation  of  the  Holy 
Ghost's  operation? 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Here  are  two  full  pages  of  tlio«e  meditations: 
first,  it  is  the  contemplation  ;  next,  the  application  of  the  senses  on 
the  Circumcision  !     (Exclamations  and  laughter.     Read  !) 

The  33d  contemplation  on  the  Circumcision  shows  three  pre- 
ludes, three  points,  one  colloquy,  and  one  resolution.    (Laughter). 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  It  is  very  easy  to  dress  up  all  that  ;  but 
the  ground  work  cannot  be  true  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  M.  de  la  Bassetiere  reproaches  me  that  I  dress 
all  this  :  I  am  going,  therefore,  to  read  it  out  quite  naked. 
(Good  !  good  !  from  the  Left.     Read  !  read  !) 

M.  du  Bodan  —  That  is  not  possible;  there  are  ladies  and 
young  girls  in  the  galleries  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Our  honorable  and  respected  colleagne,  M.  du 
Bodan,  says  to  me,  we  are  not  here  alone  ;  but  that  there  are 
ladies  and  young  persons  in  the  galleries.   .   .  . 

M.  Faure  —  Please  wait  until  the  galleries  are  empty. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  I  recognize  it  ;  and  from  that  comes  all  my 
hesitation.  But  you  will  acknowledge  that  it  is  a  very  strange 
situation,  to  be  standing  at  a  French  tribune,  before  an  assembly 
of  men,  before  an  audience  of  adults,  without  daring  to  read  what 
is  done  and  written,  to  be  read,  meditated,  and  thought  over  in 


Second  Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert.  5()7 

private  hy  a  3'oung  Uidy,  M.  du  Boduu  !     (Warm  approbation  and 
prolonojed  applause  from  the  Center  and  Left) . 

3f.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  I  ask  very  respectfully  from  Mr.  President 
(Noise). 

The  Sj-tealer  —  You  will  speak  soon!  you  cannot  be  allowed  to 
constantly  interrupt  ! 

3f.  Paul  Bert  —  You  reproach  us  for  dressing  up  the  citations, 
and  you  do  not  cr)nsent  that  we  read  them  aloud  ! 

From  the  Left —  Read  !  read  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  We  will  read,  and  we  shall  make  justice  from 
all  this  ! 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  T  ask  for  the  title  of  the  work,  the 
writer's  name,  and  the  date  of  the  edition. 

The  Speaker  —  M.  de  la  Bassetiere  .  .  .  (Interruption  from 
the  Left) . 

A  Member  of  the  Left  —  There  are  no  explanations  to  be  given  ! 
(Noise). 

The  Speaker  —  Allow  me,  Gentlemen,  I  am  the  only  judge  on 
the  question  to  know  if  explanations  should  be  given  or  not. 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  asks  a  question,  which  was  answered  about 
fifteen  minutes  ago. 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  I  did  not  hear  it  ! 

The  Speaker  —  But  I  think  it  useful  to  repeat  it:  M.  de  la 
Bassetiere  asks  for  the  writer's  name,  the  title  of  the  work,  and 
the  date  of  its  publication. 

M.  Paul  Bert,  will  you  please  answer.  (Interruptions  and 
noise). 

Please,  Gentlemen,  listen  to  the  answer! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  We  will  ask  for  a  special  sitting  for  interrup- 
tions!     (Laughter  from  the  Left). 

I  am  reading  : 

"  Meditation  according  to  St.  Tgnace's  Method  on  the  Life  and     ^ 
Mysteries  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ — 4  volumes  in  12mo,  published 
by  Lecoffre,  1867,  with  a  dedication  to  St.  Joseph,  and  another  to 
the  Young  Ladies  of  the  Sacred  Heart  of  Jesus." 

M.  de  Bosredon  —  By  whom  has  this  book  been  approved  ? 


568  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  It  is  used  everj'wbere  ;  it  has  had  I  do  ^not 
know  how  many  editions  ! 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  Who.  is  the  author? 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  There  is  no  name  on  it.  (Exclamations  from 
the  Right). 

M.  delà  Bassetiere  —  We  protest  .  .  .  (Noise)  ...  If  there 
is  not  the  name  of  the  writer  .  .  .  (Noise)  .  .  .  ]f  tliere  is  not 
the  name  of  the  writer  .   .   .    (To  order!) 

The  Speaker  —  I  shall  be  compelled  to  call  you  to  order,  M.  de 
la  Bassetiere  !    Please  do  not  mterrupt! 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  I  say,  if  there  is  no  name  of  the  autlior, 
and  if  there  is  no  episcopal  approval,  this  book  is  perfectly  worth- 
less.     (Good!  from  the  Right  —  Exclamations  from  the  Left). 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Worthless?  that's  ver}-  hard  for  a  book  which 
is  used  in  houses  of  religious  education  ! 

M.  de  la  Bassetiere  —  That  is  just  what  ought  to  be  proved  ! 

M.  Paid  Bert  —  It  is  its  seventh  or  eighth  edition  ! 

From  the  Might  —  That  is  not  a  reason. 

A  Member  of  the  Right  —  The  "Assommoir  "  has  had  more  than 
fifty  editions  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  It  was  published  by  Lecoffre.  You  can  make 
against  this  publisher  the  accusation  of  heresy,  and  settle  the 
matter  with  him. 

But,  in  fact,  those  various  meditations,  according  to  the  method 
of  St.  Ignace,  seldom  bears  an  author's  name  ;  many  of  them  are 
approved,  others  do  not  mention  any  approval. 

Here  is  a  catalogue  full  of  that  kind  of  works,  they  are  all 
conceived  in  the  same  spirit  ;  all  of  them  devote  a  meditation  to 
each  one  of  those  so  dangerous  particular  cases  which  I  pointed 
out  a  little  while  ago.  I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  I  have  not 
chosen  the  more  favorable  quotations  for  the  thesis  I  am  sustaining. 
The  last  one  I  wished  to  read  to  you  is  more  complete,  perhaps, 
than  the  others,  but  I  remember  that  all  are  very  dangerous. 

It  is  not  so  much  the  diabolical,  shameful  and  abominable 
details  which  the  author  has  entered  upon,  which  are  of  such  a 
nature  as  to  upset  the  imagination  of  young  girls  ;  but  it  is  tlie 
situation  itself  in  which  they  are  placed  when  inviting  them  to 


Second  Speech  of  21.  Paul  Bert.  5G9 

contemplate  such  scenes,  and  after  the  preliminary  prayer  to 
apply  to  it  all  their  senses  ;  first,  the  sight  ;  second,  the  hearing  ; 
third,  the  taste  ;  fourth,  the  smell  ;  fifth,  the  touch.   .   .   . 

Here  are,  in  })articular,  the  dispositions  which  should  be  brought 
to  the  studj-  of  tlie  Circumcision.     (Noise  from  the  Right). 

Tlie  Count  Jean  de  C albert- Lo place  —  I  ask  for  the  doors  to  be 
closed. 

M,  Laroche- Jouhert  —  The  secret  committee  should  be  re- 
quested. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  I  ask  of  you  permission  not  to  read  it.  In 
fact,  I  gave  some  directions  ;  every  one  can  look  throngli  the 
book,  at  the  National  Library,  for  instance,  unless  some  are 
pretesting,  and  they  again  would  say,  that  it  is  in  order  to  put  a 
dress  on  those  quotations  that  I  do  not  care  to  read  them  ! 

The  Count  of  Perrochel  —  There  is  on  it  neither  the  writer's 
name  nor  the  episcopal  approval. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Do  you  wish  for  some  books  which  have  the 
episcopal  approval  ?     Here  they  are. 

But  now  I  declare,  it  is  not  a  question  of  school  books  !  (Ah  ! 
ah  !  from  the  Right). 

It  is  a  question  of  books  given  to  the  pupils  as  prizes  (Laughter 
from  the  Left) ,  of  reading  books  ;  it  is  a  question  of  those  small 
books  which  are  presented  to  the  Christian  youth,  and  approved 
by  Mgr.  the  Bishop  of  Limoges  ! 

Here  is  an  extract  from  this  Christian  and  moral  library.  Very 
trulj-,  if  only  a  popular  almanac  had  published  the  first  story  of 
this  book  —  I  do  not  mean  to  say  the  commission  on  peddling 
would  not  let  it  go,  many  others  are  passed  over  without  a  word  — 
but  the  general  public  attorneys  would  have  stopped  it. 

From  the  Bight  —  Read  it  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  It  is  "  Charity's  Triumph,"  by  M.  Baudran,  at 
Limoges  ;  Bardon  Brothers,  publishers. 

There  is  no  date  on  it. 

This  "Triumph"  consists  in  a  dialogue  between  Eustachius, 
Mayor  of  Alexandria,  one  of  the  most  violent  persecutors  of  reli- 
gion, and  a  virgin  named  Theodora. 


570  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

The  ISIayor  summoned  the  Virgin  to  sacrifice  to  false  gods  ;  the 
Virgin  declined,  and  the  Mayor  then  said  to  her  : 

'•There  is  a  decree  from  Emperors  which  ordains  that  virgins 
wlio  refuse  to  sacrifice  to  tlie  gods  shall  be  exposed  in  a  shameful 
place.   .   .   ." 

M.  Margaine  —  He  was  a  prefect  of  the  moral  order  !  (Laugh- 
ter from  tlie  Left). 

M.  Paul  Bert — Then  follows  a  dialogue  between  the  Virgin,  who 
shows  a  legitimate  anxiety  and  raikes  proof  of  a  pretty  complete 
sort  of  special  instiuction,  and  the  Mayor,  who,  after  a  most  dis- 
agreeable insistance,  sentences  the  young  girl  to  be  sent  to  a  place 
of  debauchery.  The  rakes  immediately  crowd  round  her  ;  but 
Jesus  Christ  comes  and  protects  her,  and  she  is  thereby  drawn  out 
from  the  situation,  to  her  great  honor,  by  a  young  man,  who  puts 
himself  in  her  place  and  dresses  her  with  his  clothes. 

The  Count  Jean  de  Colbert- Laplace  —  Read  entirely  ! 

From  Various  Seats — No  ;  that  will  do  ! 

21ie  Speaker — There  are  limits  to  curiosity  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert — As  you  are  insisting,  I  can  read  a  few  lines  more. 
You  will  see  what  is  written  for  j^oung  children,  with  approval  of 
the  Bishop  of  Limoges  !     (Laughter.) 

Theodora  says,  "The  only  grace  I  ask  from  you,  is  that  nobody 
will  attempt  my  pudicity." 

The  Mayor  answered  her:  "  Sacrifice  to  the  gods,  or  else  in  a 
short  time  you  will  have  lost  that  virginity  of  which  you  are  so 
proud." 

From  the  Left  and  Center — That's  enough  !    That's  enough  ! 

M.  Edouard  Lockroy — And  you  say  that  this  is  approved  by  a 
Bishop  ? 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  We  have  yet  more  recent  document',  and  which 
belong  to  the  class  of  school  l)ooks.  Such  are  dictations  made  by 
a  vicar  in  a  girl's  normal  school.  Of  those  dictations,  for  instance, 
I  can  name  only  the  titles  : 

"Are  there  different  ways  of  sinning  against  purity?" 

"Sin  against  purity  can  be  committed  in  five  diflTerent  ways  :  by 
acts,  words,  looks,  desires  and  thoughts." 

Until  there,  that's  all  right,  although  it  seems  very  singular  that 


I 


» 


Second  Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert.  571 

a  young  vicar  be  appointed   to  dictate  to  young  girls,  sixteen  to 
twenty  years  old,  the   number  and  nature  of  the  various  ways  of 
sinning  against  purity.    (Approbative  laughter  from  the  Left.) 
But  he  is  not  satisfied  with  this  entirely  ritual  enumeration,  for 

he  then  says  : 

*' One  can  sin  by  actions  in  three  principal  ways."  (Noisy  ex- 
clamations from  the  Left.) 

Several  Members  —  That  is  too  bad  ! 

The  Baron  Etienne  de  Ladoucette  —  This  must  be  the  story  of  a 
priest  afflicted  with  a  sick  mind,  of  whom  it  was  spoken  in  Nancy, 
and  who  was  excluded  from  the  teaching  board. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Gentlemen,  I  wish  you  to  excuse  me  for  having 
entered  into  so  many  sickening  details,  and  brought  out  to  light 
things  which  have  never  been  mentioned  at  a  French  tribune.  But 
it  is  not  my  fault  ;  it  is  the  fault  of  those  who  say  and  declare  with 
boldness  that,  urbi  et  orbi,  they  are  the  guardians  of  all  morality  ! 
(Applause  from  the  Center  and  Left.) 

Now,  then,  what  are  they  doing  with  morality?  You  have  seen 
a  few  examples  of  it.  You  may  imagine  what  their  oral  education 
can  be,  from  what  you  know  of  their  written  teaching. 

You  see.  Gentlemen,  what  the}'  did  for  boys  and  what  they  tried 
to  do  for  girls.  It  is  now  your  duty  to  see  if  you  will  not  stop 
this  strange  teaching, — not  to  say  something  worse, — and  to  stop 
it  by  voting  Article  7. 

Let  us  put  aside  all  this  shame  and  ignominy.  Let  us  look  at  the 
question  from  another  point  of  view  ;  let  us  look  upon  it  from  the 
political  standpoint.  It  was  already  pointed  out  in  this  debate,  or 
rather  it  was  only  slightly  touched. 

In  order  to  understand  properly  the  political  side  of  this  ques- 
tion, for  what  concerns  Jesuits  particularh',  and  consequently  re- 
ligious congregations  who  have  gathered  around  them,  it  is  neces- 
sar}'  to  see  under  which  circumstances  this  famous  Order  was 
formed,  and  how  those  conditions  are  singularly  similar  to  those 
in  which  we  ourselves  are  actually  placed. 

Tlie  Jesuit's  Society  dates  from  1534.  The  Reformation  was 
just  born  ;  a  wind  of  free  thought  was  blowing  over  the  West  of 
Europe.    The  treaty  of  Nuremberg  had  taken  Germany  away  from 


i^ 


572  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jemlts, 

tlie  Papac}',  by  securing  liberty  of  worship.  France  itself  was 
threatened.  Calvin  had  just  published  his  first  book.  Then  ap- 
peared Ignace  de  Loyola. 

He  was  neither  an  ordinary  nor  a  middling  man;  he  soon  under- 
stood that,  besides  the  old  monastic  orders,  wearing  various  cos- 
tumes, devoted  to  particular  works,  there  was  room  for  a  special 
militia,  which  would  have  for  its  onl}-  purpose  to  fight  against  free 
thought,  and  to  bring  back  to  obedience  to  the  Pupe  the  nations 
who  were  straying  away  from  him.  As  a  military  troop,  abso- 
lute and  passive  obedience  was  indispensable  to  this  militia. 

He  then  founded  the  Society  of  Jesus.  And  this  society 
answered  such  an  urgent  emergency,  tliat,  as  soon  as  it  was 
founded,  it  had  an  outbreak  which  was  similar  to  an  explosion  ! 
Less  than  a  hundred  years  later,  the  Jesuits  had  spread  all  over 
the  world,  ruling,  acting  and  also  irritating  public  opinion,  so  much 
so  that  the  old  hymn  was  sung  : 

*'Gubernant  spirituale, 
Gu bernant  et  temporale, 
Guberuant  omnia  male." 


With  the  chorus  : 


'Oros,  qui  cum  Jesu  itis, 
Non  ite  cum  Jesuitis!  " 


Already,  in  that  time,  they  had  excited  first  the  jealousy,  next 
the  passion,  and  even  sometimes  the  indignation  of  the  people. 

However,  their  work  was  done;  the}'  had  torn  from  heresy 
France,  Belgium,  Spain,  Portugal,  Italy,  and  Savoy  already  threat- 
ened. 

What  more  could  they  do  ? 

Germany,  England  and  Scandinavian  countries  were  lost  to 
Catholic  faith  ! 

In  France,  Spain  and  Italy,  on  the  contrary,  the  Catholic  faith 
had  nothing  more  to  fear.  After  the  "Renaissance"  time  in  Latin 
countries,  liberty  of  conscience  and  political  liberty  had  both  been 
wrecked. 

Some  almight}'  kings,  anointed  in  the  name  of  the  Lord,  elected 
by  divine  right,  and  professing  the  Catholic  faith  as  a  State  r«li- 
gion,  swore  to  fulfill  the  laws  of  the  Catholic  Church,  of  which 


Second  Speech  of  JSl.  Paul   Bert.  573 

thoy  declared  themselves  the  devoted  sons,  and  swore  to  extermi- 
nate all  heretics:  those  kinoes  had  offered  a  safe  guarantee  to  Rome 
and  the  Catholic  Church.  Thence,  almost  nothing  was  left  for  the 
Jesuits  to  do,  either  in  political  or  in  temporal  matters.  Popes 
used  to  deal  directly  with  Kings,  and  those  two  powers  mutually 
granted  to  one  another  certain  privileges  ;  on  the  temporal  ground 
on  one  side,  and  on  the  spiritual  on  the  other. 

In  the  midst  of  all  that,  the  Jesuits  occupied  themselves  with 
instruction,  business  and  traffic.  You  know  it  did  them  no  good. 
They  were  very  busy  with  confession,  causists;  the}'  presented  the 
rulers  of  the  people  with  that  "  velvet  way"  leading  to  Heaven  of 
which  Escobar  spoke.  But  with  all  that,  they  lost  a  great  deal  of 
their  importance. 

Assuredl}',  some  eminent  individuals  of  their  Order  were  not 
without  having,  thanks  to  their  situation  as  kings'  confessors,  an 
influence  on  the  fate  of  the  people  ;  but  the  mass  of  the  Society 
abandoned  the  merely  political  platform. 

However,  among  their  struggles  about  casuistics  or  dogmas,  they 
did  not  forget  the  principal  purpose  for  which  they  were  instituted. 
On  one  hand,  the  attack  was  made  again  by  them  against  the  least 
show  of  free  thought,  and  Port  Royal  fell  under  their  blows.  On 
the  other  hand,  they  endeavored  to  make  triumphant  e\eiy where, 
and  in  every  instance,  the  power  of  the  Papacy. 

So,  whilst  kings  sometimes  prosecuted  them,  sometimes  protected 
them,  according  to  the  caprice  of  a  favorite  or  mistress, — like  Main- 
tonon,  Pompadour,  or  Pombal, —  Popes  alone,  thankful  and  fore- 
seeing, always  sustained  their  best  soldiers.  So  that,  it  was  with 
a  great  and  earnest  sorrow  that  Clement  XIV.  suppressed  this 
CO  g  egation,  understanding  very  well  that  the  Order  of  Jesuits 
wa-  a  niihtia  entirely  devoted  to  the  interest  of  the  Holy  See  and 
th  •  Catholic  Church. 

Tien  came  the  Revolution. 

The  Revolution  did  not  proclaim,  did  not  create  a  State  religion, 
as  the  '-Renaissance"  had  done.  After  a  short  period  of  persecu- 
tion, it  rendered  free  all  religions,  all  worship  ;  but  by  so  dinng,  it 
just  enableil  the  Jesuits  to  appear  again  and  take  back  their  author- 
ity over  the  Catholic  woild. 


574  T/te  Doctrine  of  Uie  JtsuUs. 

In  fact,  the  danger  was  the  same  for  the  Papacy  as  in  the  sixteenth 
century.  It  was  then  no  longer  Protestantism  which  threatened, 
but  Rationahsm.  Civil  power  had  finally  become  secularized. 
The  Church  may  be  sometimes  consulted,  but  she  will  never  com- 
mand again.  AVas  this  Révolution  without  appeal,  without  ho[)e. 
for  them?  The  Jesuits,  who  contributed  to  save  the  Papacy  in  tlie 
great  cri.-is  of  the  Reformati(;n,  are  going  to  place  themselves  at 
the  head  of  the  new  movement  to  save  the  Papacy  from  the  Revo- 
lution. But  the}'  will  ask  reward  for  their  assistance,  and  the  whole 
of  Catholicism  will  have  to  pay  dearly  for  it,  too  !   .   .   . 

It  is  thus,  that  after  having  passed  over  a  long  period,  during 
which  they  performed  no  more  important  part  than  other  religious 
Orders,  they  have  succeeded,  since  the  Revolution,  in  making  pre- 
dominant their  particular  opinions  in  the  Church,  to  such  an  ex- 
tent that  these  opinions  have  become  regular  articles  of  faith. 

At  the  same  time  while  they  were  fighting  for  the  Pope  and  the 
Church  ;  at  the  same  time  that  the  old  Society  of  Jesus  —  and  the 
following  woi-d  must  be  interpreted  in  a  military  sense,  for  in  tak- 
ing it  Loyola  remembered  the  heroic  acts  of  his  youth, — was  taking 
arms  again  for  the  Pope's  service,  they  stated  their  conditions  : 
they  compelled  the  whole  Catholic  world  to  consider  as  true  their 
private  opinions,  and  forced  it  to  accept  the  dogmas  of  tiie  Im- 
maculate Conception  and  of  Pa[)al  Infallibihty  (speaking  ex- 
cathedra).     (Good!  good  !  from  tiie  L?ft  and  Center). 

Yes.  Gentlemen,  the  Society  of  Jesus  had  for  mission  to  draw 
back  the  modern  world  from  its  tendency  towards  free  thought  ! 
First,  they  hope  to  bring  back,  repentant,  to  the  Pope  and  the 
Church,  their  beloved,  rich,  and  powerful  daughter.  Fiance,  who 
has  separated  herself  from  them.  This  Society  has  for  mission, 
to  put  their  hands  upon  our  societ}'  in  the  name  of  the  Church  ; 
not  in  a  brutal  manner,  far  from  that,  for  the  Pope  is  not  iu tend- 
ing to  command  directly  Princes  and  Republics  ;  but  the  Society  of 
Jesus  acts  in  such  a  manner  that  those  Kings  and  Republics  shall 
give  back  of  themselves  to  Catholicism,  to  the  Church,  her  lost 
power  and  authority. 

And  it  is  for  that  reason,  in  this  countiy  and  neighboring  lands, 


Second  Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert,  575 

a  supreme  struggle  is  now  taking  place  ;   it  is  why  Art.  7  is  only  a 
momentary  event,  or  rather  the  first  act  of  this  great  fight  ! 

From  the  Eight  —  That  is  full  of  promise  ! 

M.  Paid  Bert — Truly  speaking,  there  is  not, — allow  me  this  com- 
parison, which  shall  be  very  short, —  there  is  not  only  the  Catholic 
religion  thus  placed  face  to  face  with  the  secular  governments  ; 
another  religion,  just  as  important  at  the  point  of  view  of  the 
number  of  its  members,  shows  the  same  spectacle.  The  Mussul- 
mans also,  are  seeing  their  chiefs,  who  formerly  used  to  unite  to- 
gether the  civil  and  religious  powers,  progressively  compelled  un- 
der the  pressure  of  circumstances  to  give  preeminence  to  the  civil 
element,  and  to  become  secularized  more  and  more.  The  Chritj- 
tians,  the  Jews  themselves,  are  allowed  to  take  part  in  their  coun- 
cils. 

What  happens  then  ?  As  you  see  in  our  countr}-,  the  Catholic 
Church  fights  against  the  civil  power,  with  the  Society  of  Jesus  at 
her  head  ;  so  you  see  sultans,  beys,  emperors,  khédives,  forced  to 
act  against  the  secret  religious  opposition  of  their  people,  wliich  is 
excited  and  led  by  that  congregation  of  Khouans  from  which  Ignace 
de  Loyola  has  borrowed  his  motto. 

And  it  is  a  strange  fact,  to  which  it  is  interesting  to  call  the  at- 
tention of  historians,  namely,  in  his  supreme  constitution,  Ignace 
has  copied,  neither  the  ancient  monastical  orders,  nor  the  work  of 
Dominique  or  François  d'Assise,  but  the  Khouans'  organization, 
with  its  passive  obedience,  its  provincials,  its  powerful  general  ! 

It  can  be  be  read  in  Ignace  de  Loyola's  history,  the  narrative  of 
a  long  and  curious  conversation  of  Ignace  with  a  Moor  in  the  Ara- 
gon mountains,  from  which  it  is  allowable  to  think  that  the  founder 
of  the  Jesuits  was  acquainted  with  the  laws  of  the  Order  of  Khou- 
ans.* 

I  beg  your  pardon.  Gentlemen,  for  this*  detailed  statement. 
Nevertheless,  there  is  a  very  strange  coincidence.  (Speak  ! 
Speak  !) 

You  know  the  formula  of  the  Company  of  Jesus'  Order  :  "Thou 
shalt  be  in  the  hand  of  th}'  director  like  a  corpse." 

*  Or  of  some  other  simihir  Arabic  religious  Orders,  for  Moha;nniedaii 
creeds  of  that  kind  are  very  numerous. 


) 


576  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

A  Member — Yes  !    ^^Perinde  ac  cadaver  !  " 

M.  Paul  Bert — Well  !  Khouans  have  a  chief,  a  regular  general, 
similar  to  that  of  the  Jesuits,  and  the  Khouans'  formula  is  :  "Thou 
shalfc  be  in  the  hand  of  thy  chief,  like  a  corpse  in  the  hand  of  the 
washer  of  the  dead,  who  turns  and  turns  it  again  at  his  will." 

Now  there  is,  in  all  the  South  Mediterranean  countries,  a  con- 
stant fight  between  the  various  Mohammedan  governments  and  the 
Khouans  ;  the  same  kind  of  struggle  which  is  now  commen- 
cing in  France  between  the  Government,  the  Catholics  and  the 
Jesuits.  And  b}^  a  strange  and  very  queer  coincidence,  we  French- 
men who  have  to  govern  on  the  northern  side  of  the  Mediterranean 
Sea  a  Catholic  population,  and  on  the  southern  side  Mahomme- 
dan  people  —  we  fight  here  against  the  Jesuits  about  Art.  7,  and 
over  there  with  the  Khouans,  in  the  Aurès.  (Approbation  from 
the  Left.) 

Gentlemen,  you  should  think  deeply  over  the  nature  of  the  fight 
which  is  started  against  lay  governments  b}*  the  Society  of  Jesus, 
marching  in  front  of  and  commanding  the  Catholic  Church.  It  is 
not  a  political  disturbance  ;  it  is  a  social  war  !  And  we  must  ac- 
knowledge the  fact,  that  it  is  not  the  Catholic  Church  who  lias 
made  the  declaration  of  war.  She  may  consider  herself  provoked 
by  the  lowliness  to  which  governments  want  to  reduce  her  ;  for 
she  affirms  that,  from  divine  investitiite  and  authority,  she  has  the 
right  to  command  them.  She  sim[)ly  requests  them  to  let  her  take 
the  place  slie  was  occupying,  and  which  she  believes  to  be  legiti- 
mately due  to  her. 

M.  Keller  was  saying  a  little  while  ago,  and  he  was  undoubtedly 
right:  "The  Church  does  not  deal  with  politics  ;  the  Jesuits  do  not 
interfere  with  politics."  That  is  true  ;  but  under  conditions  that 
that  you  understand  the  word  "  politics  "  in  its  narrowest  sense. 
No  ;  the  Jesui's  are  »eit!ier  monarchists  nor  republicans.  And,  I 
believe,  even  if  they  had  to  choose,  they  would  prefer  to  turn  re- 
publicans ;  for  in  a  republic  there  is  no  king  claiming  a  share  of 
the  power;  and  they  could,  if  circumstances  were  favorable  to 
them,   monopolize  the  whole  of  it. 

So,  in  the  countries  where  they  have  been  able  to  become  abso- 
lute masters,  in  South  America,  what  have  they  done?    Tlioy  look 


Secmid  Speech  o^  M.  Paul  BerL  hll 

great  care  not  to  help  the  chance  of  a  king.    They  founded  several 
Eepublics. 

Likewise,  they  will  accept  very  gladly  the  French  Republic,  pro- 
viding they  can  get  hold  of  her,  and  make  use  of  her  as  the  hum- 
ble servant  of  the  Catholic  Church. 

How  can  they  reach  that  point?  It  is  no  longer  a  question  here 
of  a  king,  and  a  confessor  alone  would  not  be  sufficient.  It  is  the 
nation  which  is  sovereign  ;  then  they  have  to  win  the  whole  nation. 
The  middle  classes  are  directing  the  nation  ;  it  is  necessary,  there- 
fore, to  get  hold  of  them.  And  then,  they  have  displayed  their 
marvellous  and  habitual  resources. 

They  said  to  themselves,  The  world  always  follows  the  stronger, 
or  at  least  he  who  seems  to  be  strongest,  and  says  so.  And  then, 
with  the  help  of  a  thousand  diverse  causes,  with  the  secret  com- 
plicity of  governments,  (which  greatly  mistake  in  these  matters  in 
believing  they  can  make  use  of  the  Jesuits  ;  while,  on  the  contrary, 
the  Jesuits  are  making  use  of  and  laughing  at  them,  and  are  at  the 
same  time  taking  advantage  of  the  complicity  of  governments,)  the 
fear  of  the  middle  classes  after  our  civil  war,  the  fright  of  souls 
after  the  disasters  to  our  fatherland,  and  the  support  of  the  clergy 
all  gathered  around  them,  which  brought  to  them  the  help  of  its 
power,  its  authority,  and  even  of  the  income  from  worship  and  of 
the  inexhaustible  resources  which  they  know  so  well  to  secure 
among  the  faithful  ;  taking  advantage  of  all  these  means  and  all 
these  circumstances,  they  have  constituted  the  clerical  party. 

Please  notice  that  I  take  great  care  not  to  say  the  Catholic 
party. 

For  there  is  an  important  distinction  to  be  made.  Catholics  are 
citizens  who  simply  ask  from  civil  society  to  be  protected  in  the 
free  exercise  of  tlieir  faith.  (That's  it!)  The  Clerical  party  requests 
that  civil  society  be  subjected  to  the  dogmas  of  Catholicism! 
(Applause  from  the  Left  and  Center.)  It  is  quite  a  different 
thing. 

Well,  they  have  constituted  the  clerical  party  !  This  party  is 
everywhere  and  nowhere;  it  is  the  fairy  to  which  the  honorable  M. 
Keller  was  alluding,  and  whom  one  meets  everywhere  without 
being  able  to  seize  her  anywhere  !     This  party  is  in  the  adminis- 


578  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

tration,  the  magistracy,  the  array,  civil  society,  and  in  all 
l)ranches  of  iiuman  activity,  and  at  every  degree  of  the  social  hier- 
archy. This  party  constitutes  a  body  which  is  at  the  same  time 
ppread  all  over  the  world  regarding  its  members,  but  as  regards  its 
interests  powerfully  concentrated.  Why?  Because  its  numerous 
members  hold  together,  help  each  other,  depend  upon  one  another, 
protect  and  push  forward  one  another;  because  the  French  mid- 
dle class  were  convinc(^d  and  made  to  believe,  that  if  they  wished 
to  succeed  in  the  various  branches  of  the  administration,  (Good! 
That's  it  !)  to  obtain  high  grades  in  the  army,  to  shine  in  the  first 
ranks  of  the  magistracy  or  diplomacy,  and  secure,  as  physician  or 
lawyer,  a  good  patronage  at  the  first  start  ;  and  even  in  commerce 
to  have  a  blessed  store,  with  plentiful  capital  and  good  customers, 
it  was  sufficient  to  join  the  clerical  party,  and  so  show  it  respect, 
help  and  affection.  And  the  Society  of  Jesus  alone  is  responsible 
for  these  new  merits. 

That  IS  what  was  suggested  to  the  French  middle  classes  ;  and 
when  they  were  convinced  of  the  fact,  it  had  to  be  acknowledged 
that  it  was  unfortunately  the  truth.      (Applause). 

And  so  the  Jesuits  hoped  that  the  French  nation  was  finally 
in  their  hands,  and  that  with  her  they  had  secured  the  power. 

However,  such  triumphs  could  not  satisfy  the  Company  of 
Jesus.  It  would  have  been  very  imprudent  to  trust  much  in  such 
troops.  Men  who  join  an  army  for  mere  interest,  do  not  deserve 
to  be  depended  upon.  Who  knows,  if  the  pole  towards  which 
they  gravitate  happened  to  change,  doubtless,  as  a  faithful  com- 
pass, they  would  follow  it,  and  change  also? 

After  having  secured  possession  of  those  who  fight  through, 
and  for  interest,  they  wanted  to  possess  those  also  who  fight 
through  and  for  faith  :  in  order  to  form  them,  they  must  not  try 
to  take  hold  of  grown-up  men,  but  of  young  children.  To  obtain 
that  result,  they  had  to  secure  the  right  of  teaching  youth.  I  now 
come  back  to  my  subject,  Gentlemen,  so  as  to  get  through  with  it 
sooner. 

The  Count  of  Maille  —  Yes,  you  are  entering  upon  the  subject! 
(Noise  from  the  Left). 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Yes,  the  Jesuits  then  decided  to  capture  the 


Second  Speech  of  M,  Paul  Bert.  579 

education  of  j-ontli,  because  it  is  only  by  taking  the  child  when 
very  young,  by  keeping  him  from  childhood  in  close  watch  and 
under  severe  rule,  that  he  can  be  impressed  with  feelings  of  long 
duration.  This  is  the  only  way  they  could  be  certain  that  the 
child  would  not  escape  them,  and  that  they  could  retain  him 
incorporated,  fanaticized,  unassailable  by  temptations. 

Then  what  did  they?  With  an  admirable  shrewdness,  the  very 
first  day  the  clerical  party  became  master  in  the  Assembly  of  1850, 
they  asked  for  the  liberty  of  primary  and  secondary  teaching. 

The  second  time,  twenty  years  later,  when  the  clerical  party 
became  master  once  more,  in  the  Assembly  of  1871,  it  completed 
its  work  by  obtaining  the  liberty  of  superior  instruction.  And  so 
at  all  degrees  soldiers  were  prepared,  the  true  soldiers  of  Loyola's 
army.     (Good!  good.) 

For  me,  here  is  where  lies  the  danger  ;  it  is  on  this  ground  that 
we  must  fight,  without  truce  or  rest.  What  France  does  fear, 
what  she  struggles  against,  is  the  impression  upon  the  mind  of  the 
young  generations  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Society  of  Jesus,  which 
is  the  domination  of  the  whole  civil  world  by  the  clergy.  For,  if 
they  ever  could  take  hold  of  the  public  power,  national  liberty 
would  soon  be  suppressed,  and  it  would  be  all  over  with  what 
is  dearest  to  us  !  .  .   . 

The  danger  lies  there  ! 

It  is  in  order  to  remove  it  that  the  Minister  of  Public  Instruc- 
tion laid  before  us  his  scheme  of  law,  and  that  the  Chamber  will 
vote  it  by  an  immense  majority. 

Politics  were  spoken  of.  No,  have  no  fear.  It  is  not  on  the 
political  ground,  in  its  narrowest  sense,  that  the  question  has  to 
be  put. 

The  Jesuits,  through  the  clerical  party,  which  is  their  banner 
and  their  means  of  action,  have  committed  a  great  political  error, 
—  let  them  allow  me  to  say  so,  with  all  the  respect  due  to  their 
skillfulness.  (Smiles).  .  .  .  That  they  have  unfortunately  tied 
themselves  to  a  party  whose  name  is  not  very  popular,  you  will 
be  obliged  to  acknowledge,  and  even  I  could  say,  without  offend- 
ing you,  this  party  arouses  somewhat — it  is  a  prejudice  perhaps  — 
the  popular  wrath,  the  passion  of  universal  suffrage  ! 


580  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

They  committed  this  supreme  mistake.  That  party  has  gone  to 
nothing.  The  danger  is  no  longer  on  that  side  ;  it  is  on  the  side 
of  the  future  ;  the  greatest  danger  is  to  see  them  becoming 
republicans  !      (Applause  from  the  Left  and  Center) . 

The  danger  for  the  future  is  to  see  them  give  up  a  dangerous 
alliance,  break  off  from  the  old  monarchy,  and  throw  away  that 
old  government  which  was  used  by  them  as  a  mark,  as  a  sign, 
before  the  populace. 

Now,  Gentlemen,  it  is  sufficient  for  us  to  have  unmasked 
beforehand  those  intrigues,  to  have  pointed  them  out  to  the 
generous-hearted  and  wise  French  people.  We  may  be  tranquil  ; 
never  in  a  countr}-  like  ours,  never  in  this  France,  whose  name  is 
synonymous  of  frankness,  no,  never,  will  the  Jesuits  reign.  (Re- 
peated applause.  The  orator,  when  returning  to  his  seat,  was 
warmly  congratulated  by  his  colleagues,  who  received  him  with 
repeated  salvos  of  applause.) 


SPEECH 

Î9eliberctï  at  tîje  Sitting  of  tï)e  7tï)  of 
Sulg,  1879. 


Sequel  to  thé  Discussion  of  Article  7. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  I  wish  to  speak  on  a  personal  matter. 

The  Speaker  —  M.  Paul  Bert  is  allowed  to  speak  on  a  personal 
matter. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Gentlemen,  I  asked  to  speak  concerning  a 
private  fact.  My  name  has  been  mentioned  very  often  since  the 
beginning  of  this  sitting,  and  it  appears  that  I  look  like  a  man 
overwhelmed  with  reproaches  !  .   .   . 

Gentlemen,  some  one  said  that  my  quotations  were  inexact. 

A  Member  of  the  Eight  —  Mutilated  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Yes,  mutilated.  I  have  been  represented  as  a 
calumniator  ;  and  I  must  say,  bj^  the  side  of  a  certain  Pascal,  a 
well-known  mathematician  and  philosopher  (smiles  on  the  Left 
and  Center),  I  have  been  nailed  to  the  pillory  of  history  by  the 
revengeful  taunts  of  M.  de  la  Bassetiere.  (Laughter  on  the  same 
seats) . 

I  could  get  over  it.  Gentlemen,  providing  these  so-called  refuta- 
tions were  true  denials,  and  that  something  else  besides  vague 
allegations  had  been  brought  forth. 

What  has  been  done?  I  quoted  two  kinds  of  texts  :  the  ancient 
books  gathered  by  order  of  the  Parliament  of  Paris  in  1762, 
collated  by  the  Commissaries  with  the  texts  themselves,  as  men- 
tioned in  the  said  decree.     (Noise  from  the  Right.) 

Gentlemen,  you  are  very  particular  about  the  respect  due  to 
magistrates,  and  you  are  right  ;  but  please  first  respect  your  own 
magistracy,  your  antique  parliament  ! 


582  The  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

M.  Louis  Le  Provost  de  Launay  — Which  you  afterwards  guil 
lotinecl  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  I  never  guillotined  nor  killed  anybody,  you 
know  it  quite  well.      (Laughter  from  the  Left). 

M.  Louis  Le  Provost  de  Launay  —  Republicans  like  you  did  it, 
if  you  prefer. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Gentlemen,  no  one  could  doubt  the  exactness 
of  the  text  ;  now  that  is  just  what  ought  to  have  been  done  ! 

A  Member  of  the  Right  —  It  was  not  said  "  inexact  texts,"  but 
"mutilated  texts." 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  It  is  impossible  for  anybody  to  read  at  the 
tribune  a  whole  big  book,  such  as  the  decree  of  the  Parliament  ! 

M.  Granier  de  Cassagnac  —  You  have  faithfully  quoted  the 
book  ;  it  is  incontestible.  Now,  what  is  the  value  of  the  work  ? 
that  is  the  question. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  That  is  logical,  and  the  remark  is  correct. 
But,  I  repeat,  it  is  not  my  business  to  do  the  work  of  M.  de  la 
Bassetiere  ;  as  proof  of  his  saying,  he  should  have  brought  here 
the  original  books  themselves,  and  shown  us  that  the  abstraets 
compiled  by  the  Commissaries  of  the  Parliament  aro  mulitated  and 
inexact.  This  is  what  ought  to  have  been  done  ;  now  until  you 
give  proof  to  the  contrary,  I  have  the  right  to  say  that  what 
was  presented  to  the  Parliament,  what  was  authorized  by  the 
Parliament  of  Paris,  is  the  real  expression  of  the  truth,  and 
proves  my  assertions. 

M.  de  Baudry  d' Assort  —  There  are  758  falsifications  of  that 
book  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  Find  out  one  only,  and  bring  it  to  us,  that  will 
do! 

M.  de  Baudry  d'Asson  —  I  shall  bring  them  to  you. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  1  pass  to  another  kind  of  works,  to  the  more 
recent  books  from  which  I  quoted.  Was  there  any  doubt  about 
them?  Was  the  exactness  of  my  quotations  contested  ?  *  Certainly, 
they  are  shortened,  as  you  say,  because  I  did  not  wish  to  read  the 
whole  book,  but  do  you  deny  their  exactness?  No,  nobody  did 
so  ;  and  nobody  can  do  so  !  Consequently,  I  have  the  right  to  say 
that  I  told  the  truth  ! 


Third  Speech  of  M.    Paul  Bert.  583 

I  liave  quoted  M.  Moiillet,  who,  it  seems,  is  not  a  Jesuit;  but 
I  would  say,  he  at  least  deserves  to  be  one,  for  he  taught  morals 
at  the  Jesuits'  college  in  Fribourg,  during  several  years,  and  his 
doctrine  is  certain  to  be  the  doctrine  of  the  Jesuits.  The  book 
published  by  him  in  1845  or  1846,  bore  the  approval  of  the  Bishop 
of  Lausanne.  Do  3'ou  not  think  my  quotation  is  good?  Let  us 
pass  to  something  else.     (Applause  from  the  Left.) 

As  regards  Abbot  Marotte,  the  cause  is  heard,  I  believe?* 

Numerous  voices  from  the  Center  and  Left  —  Yes  !  3'es  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  A  certain  Baudran  has  been  spoken  of,  who,  it 
was  said,  deserved  the  title  of  Abbot  ;  1  did  not  know  it  ;  the 
book  I  quoted  from  did  not  give  him  that  title. 

What  1  said,  and  what  could  not  be  denied,  is  that  M.  Baudran, 
in  this  perfectly  disgusting  book,  was  backed  by  the  approval  of 
the  bishop  of  Limoges.  This  could  not  be  denied,  and  is  inter- 
esting to  the  cause. 

Anotlier  fact  was  also  pointed  out.  I  found  in  the  Official 
Journal  an  interruption  which  I  had  not  heard  ;  but  I  am  not 
surprised,  though  I  am  usually  very  attentive.  (Smiles).  It  wns 
said  tliat  the  Vicar  of  Nancy,  who  had  dictated  those  obscenities 
(whose  texts  I  have  here,  but  I  dare  not  read.)  to  high  schools  of 
young  girls,  was  insane.  That  is  easy  to  say  ;  but  the  proof 
should  be  given.  What  is  certain  is,  that  for  several  months  the 
said  Vicar  has  taught  those  abominations,  dictated  those  copy- 
books ;  that  the  school-mistress  made  complaints  to  the  parson, 
and  that  they  were  without  the  slightest  effect.  What  is  certain 
is,  that  after  a  few  months,  the  sitting  of  the  departmental 
Council  having  taken  place,  the  whole  affair  was  brouglit  before  it, 
and  in  i)resence  of  the  consequent  scandal,  the  vicar  was  not 
interdicted,  but  sim[)ly  sent  away  from  that  school.  Where?  We 
do  not  know  anything  about  him  ;  for  it  is  very  hard  for  the 
Minister  of  Justice  himself  to  know  exactly  what  becomes  of  the 
vicars  and  teachers  of  religious  congregations  who  are  sent  ou 
vacations  on  account  of  mischief  !  (Laughter  and  applause  from 
the  Leit  and  Center). 

*M.  Albert  Joly  had  just  quoted  to  tlie  Chamber  a  whole  series  of  new 
abatraclti  Iiuui  that  odious  '*  liLLlc  Catcclusiu  of  MuroLLc." 


584  TJie  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits. 

Eegarding  quotations,  I  will  not  accumnlate  them  indefinitely. 
However,  there  are  a  few  points,  in  tlie  long  series  of  cases  of 
conscience  I  successively  named  before  you,  which  had  ])een 
forgotten  by  the  Casuists  I  quoted  ;  but  which  are  very  carefully 
dissected  by  modern  Jesuits. 

It  is  not  a  question  here,  as  I  was  reproached  regarding  Rev. 
Father  Humbert,  of  an  author  dead  in  1771,  but  of  a  book 
reprinted  in  1840  ;  it  is  a  question  of  principles  taught  in  full  in 
the  19th  century,  especially  by  the  Rev. father  Gury.  Perliaps 
some  one  will  say  that  I  am  wrong  again  in  calling  him  Rev. 
Father?  All  I  know  is,  that  he  is  a  professor  of  the  College  of 
Rome,  and  that  his  ^^ Compendium  TheoJogiœ  Moralis"  was  pub- 
lished in  1868,  with  the  appioval  of  several  bishops  I 

I  think  he  is  sure  to  teach  the  true  doctrines  ;  for  otherwise, 
the  Papal  thunderbolts  near  at  hand  would  not  fail  to  fall  upon 
him! 

I  will  read  three  quotations  from  him  : 

From  the  Left — "Are  clerks  held  to  obey  the  laws?  Answer: 
Certainly  not,  when  they  are  contrary  to  ecclessiastical  immuni- 
ties." * 

So  much  for  politics.  That's  very  simple,  it  is  a  good  general 
formula. 

Now,  let  us  see  some  particular  cases.  If  the  Minister  of  Fi- 
nance was  present,  I  do  not  know  how  he  would  look  upon  the  fol- 
lowing advices  : 

"Question  :  Is  it  a  sin,  and  is  one  held  to  make  restitution  when 
prohibited  goods  are  imported?  Answer:  As  regards  restitution, 
the  answer  is  certainly  negative,  for  it  does  not  strictly  cause  any 
prejudice  to  the  rights  of  anybody." 

But  here  are  more  serious  cases  concerning  the  Minister  of  Jus- 
tice, who  is  sitting  over  there,  I  see. 

First,  one  question  concerning  every  one  at  the  point  of  view  of 
general  honesty  : 

*'He  who  has  promised  to  marry  a  rich  young  girl,  of  good 
health  and  character,  is  not  held  to  fulfill  his  promise  if  she 
falls  into  poverty,  sickness,  or  vice  ;  because  then  it  is  a  simple 

*See  above  page  (48.) 


Tllird  Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert.  585 

promise  which  does  not  oblige."  (Exclamations  and  laughter  from 
the  Left.) 

Next,  about  secret  compensation,  of  which  I  quoted  some  exam- 
ples from  comparatively  old  casuists,  dating  one  hundred  years 
ago.  I  have  shown  that  Abbot  Marotte  had  entirely  adopted  and 
reproduced  the  whole  of  their  doctrines.  But  the  Honorable  M. 
de  la  Rochefoucauld,  Duke  of  Bisaccia,  said:  "The  Abbot  Marotte 
has  nothing  to  do  with  us  :  he  was  no  authority,  he  is  not  a  Jesuit, 
and  it  is  here  only  a  question  of  Jesuits  !  "  Then,  it  will  be  use- 
ful to  demonstrate  that  modern  Jesuits  have  exactly  the  same 
teaching  as  the  ancient  casuists.  Here  is  a  secret  compensation, 
which  is  meant  not  only  for  a  debt,  but  for  a  sentence  before  jus- 
tice. 

I  shorten  the  quotation,  as  it  is  a  very  long  one  :  it  may  be  found 
on  page  33  of  the  Cases  of  Conscience,  by  Gury  ;  you  can  verify 
the  text  for  yourselves  : 

"Tityre,  a  shepherd,  was  sentenced  by  the  Court  to  a  fine  and 
to  pay  damages  for  having  caused  havoc  in  a  field  with  his  flock  ; 
but  this  unfortunate  shepherd  thinks  the  sentence  is  unrighteous." 

The  casuist  asks  himself,  if  Tityre  may  compensate  himself  for 
the  damages  he  had  to  pa}'  by  helping  himself  to  the  property  of 
the  farmer  who  prosecuted  him,  and  to  the  property  of  the  Treas- 
ury, to  get  back  the  money  he  was  fined.  And  he  answers  affirm- 
atively, without  hesitation  !  * 

*  There  is  an  error  here,  which,  in  one  of  the  preceding  sittings,  M. 
Granier  de  Cassagnac  very  courteously  reproached  me  for.  But  I  am 
rather  inclined  to  believe  that,  wlien  the  interruption  occurred,  my  col- 
league had  no  more  Gury's  text  before  his  eyes  than  myself,  else  he  would 
not  have  said  that  I  was  conloundiui»-  the  thesis  \\\i\\t\\Q  solution  ;  no,  when 
I  interrupted  him  by  reading  again  my  quotation  and  saying,  "  There  are 
two  Tityres,"  he  should  have  answered  :  "  Just  so,  there  are  two  Tityres, 
the  objects  of  two  different  cases,  and  you  attributed  to  the  first  the  solution 
which  the  casuist  attributes  to  the  second."  For  such  is  really  the  fault 
wliich  a  mistake  of  copy  led  me  to  commit.  The  reader  will  easily  find 
out  the  truth,  by  reading  in  the  present  book  the  very  text  of  the  case. 
(See  page  58.) 

I  repeat,  the  copyist  made  me  attribute  to  Tityre  I.  condemned  by  Gury, 
the  absolution  which  he  grants  to  Tityre  II.  And  now,  please  let  the 
reader  refer  to  the  text  and  appreciate  the  way  of  acting  of  Tityre  II.  I 
should  like  to  ask  a  jurist,  whoever  he  may  be,  what  he  thinks  of  tliis  au- 
thorization to  compensate  one's  self;  in  other  words,  to  steal  cleverly  and 
in  secret,  granted  to  a  man  unjustly  sentenced?   I  admit,  although  the  fact 


586  TIlb  Doctrine  of  the  Jesuits, 

So  it  is  !  It  is  sufficient,  Gentlemen,  simply  to  think  that  the 
sentence  is  unjust.     (Laughter  from  the  Left.) 

A  Voice  from  the  Left — That  is  not  serious  ! 

M.  Paul  Bert — Those  Gentlemen  do  not  find  this  serious. 

I  will  continue  to  make  you  laugh  ;  for  here  is  the  story  of  a  man 
named  Pomponius,  who,  in  order  to  revenge  himself,  tried  to  kill 
with  a  gun  the  goat  of  a  certain  Maiirus  ;  he  missed  the  goat,  but 
the  cow  of  Marinus,  who  was  browsing  near  by,  was  killed  instead. 

It  is  asked,  to  what  reparation  is  Pomponius  held?  And  Gury 
answers  :  "To  nothing  !  "  * 

In  fact,  he  is  not  held  to  make  reparation  on  account  of  the  goat 
he  tried  to  kill,  having  missed  her  ;  and  he  is  not  held  to  make  re- 
paration to  the  owner  of  the  cow  which  was  killed,  as  he  did  not 
intend  kilHng  it.  (Applause  and  hearty  laughter  from  the  Left 
and  Center.) 

M.  Barodet — They  have  a  great  deal  of  wit. 

M.  Paul  Bert — Let  us  see.  Gentlemen,  if  3'ou  will  langh  at  the 
application,  on  the  human  species,  of  the  ingenious  method  imag- 
ined for  the  murder  of  cows  and  goats. 

This  may  be  seen  on  page  4  of  "  Cases  of  Conscience,"  by  the 
said  Gury,  published  at  Regensburg  in  1865. f  It  is  a  question 
here  of  a  man  named  Adalbert,  who,  intending  to  kill  his  enemy 
Titius,  killed  by  error  his  friend  Caius.  What  should  we  think  of 
Adalbert? 

"Adalbert  should  be  entirely  dispensed  from  the  sin  of  homi- 
cide ;  for  his  external  act  was  not  directed  positively  against 
Caius,  who  was  killed  involuntarily  by  him.  Consequently  he  is 
not  obliged  to  any  restitution  to  Caius'  heirs." 

seems  doubtful  and  depends  upon  circumstances,  I  should  like  to  ask  any 
magistrate  what  he  would  do  if  such  a  man,  arrested  in  the  very  act  of 
compensation  on  the  property  of  his  neighbor,  or  in  stealing  tlie  cash 
of  the  treasury,  were  brought  before  him?  Finally,  I  ask  any  sensible 
man,  what  he  will  thinli  of  the  situation  of  poor  Tityre,  who,  on  being 
brought  again  before  the  Court,  should  exclaim  :  '-Why  do  you  condemn 
me,  and  why  do  you  call  me  a  thief  ?  My  confessor,  a  good  Jesuit,  told 
me  that  I  might  act  as  I  have  done,  with  full  safety  of  conscience." 

*  See  page  196.  , 

1 1  had  only  the  German  edition,  or  rather  abstracts  of  that  edition,  i 
communicated  to  me  at  the  beginning  of  the  Sitting.  ^ 


Third  Speech  of  M.  Paul  Bert.  587 

So  we  have,  in  1865,  for  the  practice  of  murder,  a  very  handy 
doctrine.  If  you  wish,  without  committing  a  sin,  to  kill  some 
one,  the  scheme  is  very  simple  :  you  have  but  to  mentally  wish 
the  death  of  a  man,  and  then  shoot  at  the  person  by  his  side. 
(Ironical  applause  from  the  Left  and  Center. —  Interruptions  from 
the  Right). 

M.  de  la  JiocJiefoucauld,  Duke  of  Bisaccia  —  When  you  go  to 
confess,  they  will  be  indulgent  to  your  sins  !  That  is  all  there  is 
to  it. 

M.  Paul  Bert  —  I  will  never  have  to  accuse  myself  of  such 
actions  ;  but  it  seems  that  the  same  thing  cannot  be  said  of  those 
who  go  to  Father  Gury's  confessional  ! 

Here  are.  Gentlemen,  some  new  quotations.  I  have  here  a 
book  full  of  such  matters.  It  is  not  a  book  written  by  a  Parlia- 
ment, and  3'ou  can  consequently  reject  it,  so  to  speak,  a  priori. 
But  I  would  rather  advise  you  to  peruse  and  verify  my  quotations. 
I  have  named  the  texts,  pages,  works,  etc.,  and  until  you  have 
brought  to  this  tribune  the  proof  .   .   . 

A  Member  of  the  Might  —  We  shall  bring  it  ! 

M.  Paid  Bert  —  We  shall  see,  Sir;  in  the  meantime,  please 
listen  to  the  consequences  I  draw  myself  from  your  own  denials  : 

Until  you  bring  to  this  tribune  the  proof  that  the  texts  I 
quoted  are  —  I  will  not  say  shortened,  the  word  is  too  easy  when 
it  is  a  question  of  a  quotation  necessarily  incomplete,  but  —  short- 
ened to  such  an  extent  as  to  altogether  alter  the  meaning  (Good  ! 
from  the  Left)  ;  yes,  the  day  that  you  present  this  proof,  that 
day  you  will  have  the  right  to  say,  in  the  presence  of  the  Chamber, 
that  I  am  a  calumniator  !  But  until  then,  I  have  the  right,  and 
I  use  it,  to  return  that  epithet  to  those  who  have  made  use  of  it  ! 
(Hurrah  !  good  !  good  !  Prolonged  applause  from  the  Center  and 
Left.  The  orator,  on  returning  to  his  seat,  was  warmly  congratu- 
lated by  a  great  number  of  his  colleagues). 

The  End  !  ! 


INDKX. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  JESUITS. 


PAGE 

Epig:raph  to  Book        --_-..----  5 

Note  to  the  Thirteenth  Edition            .......  7 

Publishers'  Preface,             9 

Dedication            -.... H 

First  Preface  —  Aim  and  Plan  of  the  Book 13 

Second  Preface  —  Summary  of  the  Book 25 

Analysis  of  Gury 43 

BOOK  I. 

CASES   OF   CONSCIENCE. 

Treatise  on  Human  Actions. 

CHAPTER  I.     Of  the  Notions  of  Human  Acts         ....  45 

CHAPTER  II.     Principles  of  the  Acts 46 

Art.  I.     Of  the  Voluntary  Act 46 

Section  1.     Of  the  Voluntary  Act  in  General          -        -        -        -  46 

Section  2.     Of  the  Voluntary  Act  in  Particular      -        -        -        -  47 

Art.  II.     Of  Free  Will 48 

Art.  III.     Obstacles  to  Free  Will  and  to  Will          ....  49 

Section  1.     Of  Ignorance 49 

Section  2.     Of  Concupiscence -  50 

Section  3.     Of  Fear 50 

Section  4.     Of  Violence  -...-..-50 

CHAPTER  III.     Morality  of  Human  Acts  :   Essence  of  Morality, 

Its  Sources           ---..-.  51 

Art,  I.     Of  the  Essence  of  Morality          -        -        .        -        -        -  51 

Art.  II.     Of  its  Sources 51 

Section  1.     Of  the  Object 51 

Section  2.     Of  Circumstances          -        -        -        -        -        -        -  61 

Section  3.     Of  the  End 52 

Appendix.     On  the  Merit  of  the  Acts 52 


590  Index, 

PAGB 

Cases  of  Conscience  on  Human  Acts. 

Case  1.     Of  Will 53 

Case  2.     Of  Will ..53 

Case  4.     Of  the  Indirect  Will 55 

Case  5.     Of  the  Indirect  Will 56 

Case  6.     Effects  of  Ignorance 56 

Case  9.     Of  Fear  and  Violence            -        - 57 

Case  10.     Of  Concupiscence        ^..-----58 

Case  11.     Of  the  Object  of  Morality           - 59. 

Case  14.     Of  the  Intention  of  the  Agent GO 

T1ÎEATISE  ON  Conscience. 

CHAPTER   I.     Sound  and  Unsound  Conscience        -        -        -        -  61 
CHAPTER  II. 

Art.  I.     Of  the  Certain  Conscience           -        -        .        .        -        -  62 

Art.  II.     Of  the  Doubtful  Conscience 62 

CHAPTER  III.     The  Scrupulous  and  Lax  Conscience     -        -        -  64 

Art.  I.     The  Scrupulous  Conscience          -..--.  64 

Art.  IT.     The  Lax  Conscience 65 

CHAPTER  IV.     The  Probable  and  Improbable  Conscience    -        -  65 

Art.  I.     The  Nature  of  Probability. 65 

Different  Systems  on  Probability        -        -        -        -        -  Ç^Q 

Art.  II.     Efficacy  of  Probability  to  form  Conscience       -        -        -  68 

Art.  III.     The  Use  of  Probability 69 

Cases  of  Conscience. 

Case  1 .     Erroneous  Conscience          -...--.  70 

Case  2.     Erroneous  Conscience           -        -        -        -        -        -        -  73 

Case  3.     Doubtful  Conscience  .---..-74 

Case  7.     On  Probability -        -        -  74 

Case  9.     Authority  of  the  Confessor  Relative  to  Opinions        -        -  75 

Case  11.     On  the  Change  of  Opinion          -        -        -        -        -        »  76 

TREATISE  ON  LAWS. 

PART   I. 

Laws  in  General. 

CHAPTER  I.     Nature  and  Qualities  of  the  Law       -        -        -        -  78 

CHAPTER   II.     The  Legislator          - 78 

CHAPTER   III.     Object  and  Subject  of  the  Law     -        -        -        -  80 

CHAPTER   IV.     Promulgation  and  Acceptation  of  the  Law    -        -  82 

Art.  I.     Promulgation        -        -        - -  82 


Index.  591 

PAGE 

Art.  II.     Acceptation         ---------  s2 

CHAPTER   V.    Obligation  of  the  Law 82 

Art.  I.     The  Force  of  tlie  Obligation 82 

Art.  II.     Manner  of  Satisfying  the  Obligation  of  the  Law      -        -  82 

Art.  Ill     Causes  Exempting  from  Obeying  the  Law        -        -        -  82 

Section  1.     Nature  of  these  Causes 82 

Section  2.     Voluntary  Application  of  these  Causes        -        -        -  83 

CHAPTER  VI.     Interpretation  of  the  Law  and  of  Epikeia     -        -  83 

Section  I.     Interpretation -83 

Section  2.     Moderation  (Epik(;ia) 83 

CHAPTER  VII.     Dispensation  of  the  Law 84 

Art.  I.     Power  which  Exempts         -------  84 

Art.  II.     Causes  Required  in  order  to  be  Exempted        -        -        -  84 

Art.  III.     End  of  the  Exemption 84 

CHAPTER  VIII.     Cessation  of  the  Law 84 

PART   II. 

Different  Sorts  of  Laws. 

CHAPTER  I.    Natural  and  Divine  Law            85 

Art.  I.     Natural  Law ---85 

Art.  II    Positive  Divine  Law            85 

CHAPTER  II.     Ecclesiastical  and  Civil  Law            -        -        -        -  85 

Art.  I.     Ecclesiastical  Law 85 

Art.  II.     Civil  Law             86 

CHAPTER  III.     Penal  and  Annuling  Law 86 

Art.  I.     The  Penal  Law 8G 

Art.  II.     The  Annuling  Law      --------  86 

CHAPTER   IV.     Unwritten  and  Traditional  Laws            -        -        -  87 

CHAPTER  V.     Favorable  or  Privileged  Law           .        -        -        -  87 

Cases  of  Conscience  on  the  Laws. 
Case  12.     Are  we  under  Obligation,   by  a  Law  or  an   Opinion 

Founded  on  a  False  Presumption?        -        -        -        -  88 

Case  17.     License  at  First  Refused,   and  Later  Accorded,  by  the 
Same   Superior,  who   does   not  Remember  the  First 

Refusal -        -  89 

Case  19.     The  Annuling  Law 91 

Case  20.     The  Penal  Law 91 

TREATISE  ON  SINS. 

PART   I. 

Sins  in  General,  Their  Nature,  Gravity,  and  Distinction    -  93 


592  Index, 

PAGE 

CHAPTER   I.     Nature  of  Sin 93 

1.  Attention  of  tlie  Mind        -- 93 

2.  Consent  of  the  Will 93 

CHAPTER  II.     Gravity  of  Sin,   and  Especially  of   Mortal    and 

Venial  Sin 94: 

CHAPTER  III.     Distinction  of  Sin 94 

Art.  I.     Specific  Distinctions    -        -        -        -        -        -        --  94 

Art.  II.    Numerical  Distinction       -------94 

PART   II. 

Kinds  of  Sins. 

CHAPTER  I.     Internal  Sins 95 

CHAPTER   II.     Capital  Sins 96 

Cases  of  Conscience  on  Sins 

Case  1.     Gravity  of  Sin 97 

Case  2.     Specific  Distinction  of  Sins -  97 

Case  3.     Specific  Distinction  of  Sins 97 

Case  4.     Numerical  Distinction  of  Sins      ------  98 

Case  6.     Numerical  Distinction  of  Çius      ------  98 

Case  8.     Internal  Sins 99 

Case  15.     On  Drunkenness  -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -101 

Case  16.     On  Drunkenness          --------  loi 

Case  17.     On  Drunkenness -        -        -  102 

TREATISE   ON   VIRTUES. 

CHAPTER  I.     Faith 103 

Art.  I.     Necessity  of  Faith        - 103 

Art.  II.     Object  of  Failh 103 

Art.  III.     Vices  Opposed  to  Faith            103 

CHAPTER   II.     Hope         -        -        - 103 

CHAPTER   III.     Charity             104 

Art.  I.    Love  to  God 104 

Art.  II.     Love  to  Our  Neighbor 104 

Section  1.     Precept  for  the  Love  of  Our  Neighbor        -        -        -  104 

Section  2.     Works  of  Mercy,  Alms,  and  Brotherly  Correction     -  105 

Section  3.     Vices  Opposed  to  Charity  for  Our  Neighbors      -        -  105 

Art.  I.     Scandal 105 

Art.  II.     Co-operation 106 

Cases  of  Conscience  on  Virtues. 

Case  7.     Relations  with  Heretics        ---.----  108 


Index,  593 

PAGE 

Case  12.     Charity  Towards  Our  Neighbor  ;  Maternal  and  Conjugal 

Love 109 

Case  13.     On  Dancing 110 

Treatise  on  the  Precepts  of  the  Decalogue. 

precept  i. 

CHAPTER  I.     Acts  Relative  to  the  Virtue  of  Religion            -        -  111 

Art.  I.    On  Adoration -  111 

Art.  II,     On  Prayer Ill 

CHAPTER  II.    Vices  Opposed  to  Religion Ill 

Art.  I.    On  Superstition            Ill 

Section  1.     On  Idolatry Ill 

Section  2.     Forbidden  Worship Ill 

Section  3.     On  Divination       -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -111 

Section  4.     On  Magic  and  Witchcraft 112 

Appendix  1.     Table  Turning       -.----.-  113 

Appendix  2.     Animal  Magnetism        -        -        -        -        -        -        -113 

Appendix  3.     Consultation  of  Spirits,  or  Spiritualism     -        -        -  113 

Art.  II.    Irreligion             -        -        -        -  114 

Section  1.    Temptation  Relative  to  God         .        -        .        -        _  114 

Section  2.     Sacrilege 114 

Section  3.     Simony 114 

Cases  on  the  First  Precept  of  the  Decalogue. 

Case  9.     On  Divination 117 

Caise  10.     Magic  and  Witchcraft 117 

Case  12.     Table  Turning 118 

Case  13.    Animal  Magnetism     -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -119 

Case  16.     On  Sacrilege 119 

Second  Precept  of  the  Decalogue. 
CHAPTER  I.     Vain  Usurpation  of  tlie  Name  of  God  and  Blas- 
phemy              121 

Art.  I.     Vain  Usurpation  of  God's  Holy  Name        -        -     .    -        -  121 

Art.  II.     Blasphemy 121 

CHAPTER  II.     Oaths 121 

Art.  I.     The  Conditions  of  an  Oath 121 

Section  1.     Conditions  Required  for  the  Validity  of  an  Oath       -  121 

Art.  II.     The  Obligation  of  the  Oath 122 

Appendix  on  Adjuration 122 

CHAPTER  III.     Vows 122 

Art.  I.     Conditions  Required  for  Vows 123 


594  Index. 

PAGE 

Section  1.     The  Intention  Required  by  the  Vow           -       .        .  123 

Section  2.     Motive  for  the  Vow      -------  123 

Art.  II.     Obligation  of  the  Vow 123 

Art.  III.     Cessation  of  the  Vow 124 

Section  1.     Annulment  of  the  Vow         ------  124 

Section  2.     Dispensation  from  the  Vow 124 

Section  3.     Change  of  Vow 124 

Cases  ox  the  Second  Precept  of  the  Decalogue. 

Case  7.     The  Value  of  Vows 125 

Case  8.     The  Value  of  Vows 125 

Third  Precept  of  the  Decalogue. 

CHAPTER  I.     What  is  Commanded  on  Feast  Days         -        -        -  126 

Art.  I.     What  is  to  be  Done,  Generally,  on  Feast  Days           -        -  125 

Art.  II.    The  Hearing  of  Mass  in  Particular            _        -        _        .  i2(j 

CHAPTER  II.     Things  Forbidden  on  Sundays  and  Feast  Days      -  126 

Art.  I.     Forbidden  Work  on  Feast  Days 127 

Art.  II.    Causes  for  Which  Salaried  Works  are  Permitted  on  Feast 

Days 128 

Cases  on  the  Third  Precept  of  the  Decalogue       -        -       -  128 
Fourth  Precept  of  the  Decalogue. 

CHAPTER  I.     Obligation  of  Children  towards  their  Parents          -  129 

Section  1.     Love       -        -        - -        -129 

Section  2.     Respect         -        -        - 130 

Section  3.     Obedience 130 

CHAPTER   II.     Obligations  of  Parents  towards  their  Ciiildren       -  131 

Section  1.     Love 131 

Section  2.     Education 131 

CHAPTER  III.     Conjugal  Obligations 131 

CHAPTER  IV.     Obligations  of  other  Superiors  and  Inferiors        -  132 

Art.  I.     Obligations  of  Masters  and  Servants           .        .        .        -  132 

Section  1.     Master's  Obligations 132 

Art.  II.     Obligations  of  Masters  and  Pupils 132 

Art.  in.     Obedience  and  Respect  towards  Temporal  Authority    -  132 

Cases  on  the  Fourth  Precept  of  the  Decalogue. 

Case  3.     The  Duties  of  Sons 133 

Case  6.     The  Duties  of  Parents -        -  134 

Case  7.     The  Duties  of  Masters          -        -        -        -        -'       -        -  134 


Index. 


505 


PAGE 

Fifth  Precept  of  the  Decalogue. 

CHAPTER  I.     Suicide 135 

CHAPTER  II.     Murder -        -        -  l?,o 

Art.  I.     Tlie  Murder  of  a  Guilty  Person  or  of  a  Criminal        -        -  135 

Art.  II.     Murder  of  an  Unjust  Aggressor ]3() 

Art.  III.    Murder  of  an  Innocent  Person 137 

Abortion -  138 

CHAPTER  III.     Duelling 138 

CHAPTER  IV.     War          -        - 139 

Cases  on  the  Fifth  Precept  of  the  Decalogue. 

Case  3.     Admirable  Expedient  of  a  Virgin 140 

Case  9.     Abortion 14o 

Case  10.    Abortion     - 141 

Sixth  and  Ninth  Precepts  of  the  Decalogue. 

CHAPTER  I.     Lustful  Sins  not  Consummated.        -        -        -        -  143 

Art.  I.     Immodest  Kisses  and  Bodily  Contact          -        .        _        _  143 

Art.  II.     Looking  on  Obscene  Things       ------  145 

Art.  III.    Immodest  Reading  and  Conversation       ■        -        -        -  147 

CHAPTER  II.    Lustful  Sins  Consummated 149 

Section  1.     Fornication 149 

Section  2.     Adultery -  149 

Section  3.     Incest 149 

Section  4.     Sacrilege       - 149 

Section  5.     Defloration r.  149 

Section  6.     Ravishment           -        -        -        --        -        -        -  150 

Art.  II.     Sins  Committed  Against  Nature 150 

Section  1.     On  Pollution 150 

Section  2.     On  Sodomy 152 

Section  3.     On  Bestiality         -* 153 

Cases  on  the  Sixth  and  Ninth  Precepts  of  the  Decalogue  153 

Treatise  on  the  Seventh  and  Tenth  Precepts  of  T4e  Deca- 
logue         _  154 

Cases  on  the  Seventh  and  Tenth  Precept  of  the  Decalogue  154 

Eighth  Precept  of  the  Decalogue 155 

CHAPTER  I.     Lying 155 

Art.  I.     Lying  in  General -        -155 

Art.  II.     Mental  Restriction      -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -  155 


696  Index, 

PAGR 

CHAPTER  II.     Defamation 159 

Art.  I.     On  the  Sin  of  Defamation 159 

Art.  II.     Reparation  for  Outraged  Honor 162 

CHAPTER  III.     Outrage 163 

CHAPTER  IV.     Rash  Judgment,  Suspicious  and  Rash  Doubts       -  163 

Appendix.     On  Violation  of  Secrecy 163 

Cases  ox  the  Eighth  Precept  of  the  Decalogue. 

Case  2.     Mental  Restriction       -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -165 

Case  5.     Defamation  -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -167 

Case  6.     Defamation 168 

Case  10.     On  Secrecy 168 

Case  11.     Open  Letters 169 

Treatise  on  the  Precepts  of  the  Church. 

Precepts  1,2.     On  the  Keeping  of  Feast  Days          -        -        -        -  171 

Precepts.     On  Annual  Confession    - 171 

Precept  4.     On  Communion  at  Easter 171 

Precept  5.     On  Abstinence  from  Meats,  Other  Than  During  the 

Time  of  Fasting 171 

Precept  6.     Of  the  Ecclesiastical  Fast 172 

CHAPTER  I.     The  Essence  and  Obligation  of  the  Fast           -        -  172 

Art.  1.     On  the  One  Meal  and  Lunch 172 

Art.  II.     On  Abstinence  from  Meat  in  Fasting        -        -        -        -  172 

Art.  he.     Hours  for  Meals 172 

CHAPTER  II.     On  Cases  whicli  Exempt  from  Fasting           -        -  172 

Cases  of  Conscience  on  the  Precepts  of  the  Church. 

Case  8.     On  Fasting 173 

Case  12.     On  Excusing  from  the  Fast 173 

Case  13.     On  Abstinence  from  Meat           .._.>.  174 

TREATISE  ON  JUSTICE  AND  RIGHTS. 

PART   I. 

Nature  and  Principles  of  Justice  and  Rights          -       -       -  174 

CHAPTER  L     General  Notions  on  Justice  and  Rights    -        -        -  175 

Art.  I.    Nature  of  Justice 175 

Art.  il     Nature  of  Rights         -        -        - 175 

Art.  III.     General  Principles  of  Rights  and  Justice        -        -        -  175 

Section  1.     General  Principles  of  Rights 175 

Section  2.     General  Principles  of  Justice 175 


Index.  597 

PA  OR 

CHAPTER  IL     Principal  Kinds  of  Right 17(3 

Art.  I.     Ownership 176 

Section  1.     Object  of  Ownership 176 

Section  2.     Subject  of  Ownership 177 

Akt.  I.     Ownership  of  the  Sons  of  the  Family       ...        -  177 

Art.  II.     Ownership  of  Wives         .-.._..  177 

Art.  III.     Ownership  of  the  Clergy 179 

Art.  IV.     Ownership  of  Authors 179 

Section  3.     The  Acquisition  of  Ownership          ....  179 

Art.  I.     By  Occupation -        -        -  179 

Art.  I.    By  Objects  that  are  Found 181 

Art.  III.     By  Prescription -        -        -181 

Art.  IV.    By  Accession 181 

Art.  II.     Of  Usage  and  Usufruct 181 

Art.  III.    By  Servitudes 181 

PART   II. 

Violation  of  Right,  or  Injustice. 

CHAPTER  I.     Injustice  in  General 181 

CHAPTER  II.     Injustice  in  its  Kind,  or,  Sins  Against  Justice     -  183 

Art.  I.     Nature  of  Theft 183 

Art.  II.     On  Causes  Excusing  from  Theft 186 

Section  1.     Necessity  Excusing  from  Theft         -        -        -        -  186 

Section  2.     Secret  Compensation 187 

PART   III. 

ON  RESTITUTION. 

Section  1.     Restitution  in  General        -.-...  190 

CHAPTER  I.     Obligatory  Restitution 190 

CHAPTER  II.     The  Roots  of  Restitution 191 

Art.  I.     The  Acceptance  of  Another's  Property     -        -        _        .  192 

Section  1.     The  Owner  in  Good  Faith 192 

Section  2.    The  Owner  in  Bad  Faith 192 

Section  3.    The  Owner  of  Doubtful  Faith           -        -        -        -  193 

Art.  II.     Unprofitable  Wrong  Doing       ---...  193 

Art.  Ill    On  Unjust  Co-operation 197 

Section  1.     One  who  Orders  Evil 197 

Section  2.     One  who  Advises  Evil        ..-_..  193 

Section  3.    The  One  who  Gives  Consent 198 

Section  4.     The  Flatterer 198 

Section  5.     The  Receiver  of  Stolen  Goods           -        -        -        _  199 

Section  6.    The  Participator 199 


598  Index. 


Section  7.     Those  who  Keep  Silent,  Make  No  Opposition,  Do 

Not  Divulge;  or,  Negative  Co-operators        -        -  199 

CHAPTER  III.     On  the  Circumstances  of  Restitution           -        -  200 

Art.  I.     How  Much  it  is  Necessary  to  Restore?      -        .        -        -  200 

Art.  II.    To  Whom  is  it  Necessary  to  Make  Restitution  ?     -        -  200 

Art.  III.     In  What  Order  is  it  Necessary  to  Make  Restitution?    -  200 

Art.  IV.     How  is  the  Restitution  to  be  Made?        -        -        _        .  201 

Art.  V.     When  is  the  Restitution  to  be  Made?       .        -        .        .  201 

CHAPTER  IV.     Cases  which  Exempt  from  Restitution         -        -  201 

Section  2.     Diflferent  Kinds  of  Restitution            -        .        .        -  202 
CHAPTER  I.     Restitution  for  Injury  Done  to  the  Welfare  of  the 

Soul 202 

CHAPTER  II.     Restitution  for  Injury  to  the  Body        -        -        -  203 

Art.  I.     Restitution  for  Homicide 203 

Art.  II.     Restitution  for  Rape  and  Fornication      -        -        -        .  203 

Art.  III.     Restitution  for  Adultery 204 

CHAPTER  III.     On  Restitution  for  the  Injury  Caused  to  Tempo- 
ral Fortune  in  Particular  Cases         -        -        -  205 

Art.  I.     Of  Taxes .205 

Art.  II.     Of  Injury  Caused  on  the  Occasion  of  Military  Service  206 
Art.  III.     On   Confiscation  of    Property  in  the    Revolution    in 

France 206 

Section  1.     Ecclesiastical  Property -  206 

Section  2.     Individual  Property -        -  206 

CASES  OF  CONSCIENCE  ON  JUSTICE  AND  RIGHTS. 
On  Patrimony. 

Case  1.     Of  the  Property  of  Children 208 

Case  2.     Of  the  Property  of  Children 209 

Case  6.     Of  Occupation 210 

Case  8.     Of  Occupation 210 

Case  12.     Of  Things          .--......  211 

Case  17.     Of  the  Prescription 211 

CASES  OF  CONSCIENCE  ON  INJUSTICE  AND  THEFT. 
Secret  Compensation. 

Case  1 .     The  Gravity  of  Theft 213 

Case  2.     Of  Small  Thefts 214 

Case  3.     The  Thefts  of  Children  and  Servants        -        -        -        -  2U 

Case  4.     Theft  of  Wives 215 

Case  5.     A  Tailor's  Cleverness          -        -        -        -        -        -        -  216 

Case  7.     The  Innocent  Condemned,  instead  of  the  Guilty  One       -  216 


Index,  599 

PAGE 

Case  9.     A  Servant's  Ruse 218 

Case  10.     Secret  Compensation 218 

Case  11.     Secret  Compensation        -        -        -        -        -        -        -  219 

Cases  on  Restitution  ix  General. 

Case  3.     Obligatory  Restitution -        -  221 

Case  5.     A  Baker  Taken  in  His  Own  Meshes           .        .        -        .  221 

Cases  on  Restitution  of  Other's  Property. 

Cases.     The  Dishonest  Holder         -        -        -        -        -        -        -  223 

Case  7.     The  Possessor  Dishonestly         - 223 

Cases  on  Wrong  Unjustly  Done. 

Case  1.     A  Guilty  Man,  though  Being  in  the  Right         -        -        -  225 

Case  2.     Threat  to  Denounce  a  Guilty  One 225 

Cases.     The  One  Doing  Wrong  in  Spite  of  Himself      -        -        -  226 

Case  5.     Prevented  Benefaction 227 

Case  7.    Lamentable  Error 227 

Case  9.    Mistake  in  the  Wrong  Done  by  Some  One         -        .        -  228 

Case  10.     Mistake  in  the  Wrong  Done  by  Some  One       -        -        -  229 

Case  11.     The  Fashionable  Novice 230 

Case  12.     A  Hare  for  Un  Sou            231 

Cases  on  Co-operation  in  Order  to  Injure  Others. 

Case  1.     The  One  who  Commands— The  Employer          -        -        -  233 

Case  2.     The  Employer 233 

Case  4.     The  One  who  Advises         ->.-...  234 

Case  5.     The  One  who  Consents       -...--.  234 

Case  6.     The  One  who  Consents -        -  234 

Case  11.    Negative  Co-operation      ..----.  234 

Case  13.     Negative  Co-operation 236 

Case  14.     The  One  Who  Says  Nothing 237 

Cases  on  the  Circumstances  of  Restitution. 

Case  1.     Joint  Responsibility 239 

Case  5.     Time  of  Restitution    --------  239 

Case  10.     Causes  which  Dispense  with  Restitution         .        -        -  240 

Case  14.     Release  of  Property 240 

Case  15.     Embarassed  Debtors 240 

Cases  on  Special  Restitutions. 

Case  2.     Restitution  for  Homicide            .,--_-.  242 

Case  3.     Restitution  for  Rape            -------  242 

Case  4.     Restitution  for  Fornication 243 

Case  10.    Fraud  to  the  Prejudice  of  the  Treasury            -        -        -  244 

Case  11.     Fraud  to  the  Prejudice  of  the  Treasury            .        .        -  244 


600  Index, 

PAGE 

TREATISE   ON   CONTRACTS. 

PART   I. 

Contracts  in  General 216 

CHAPTER  I.     Conditions  Required  for  the  Contract     -        -        -  247 

Art.  I.     The  Reasons  for  the  Contract            247 

Art.  II.     Subject  of  the  Contract 248 

Section  1.    Minors 248 

Section  2.    Wives 248 

Section  3.     People  Dead  in  Law            248 

Section  4.     Interdicted  Persons  and  Spendthrifts        -        -        -  248 

Art.  III.    Required  Consent 248 

Section  1.     Qualities  of  Legitimate  Consent         _        _        -        -  248 

Section  2.     Faults  Opposed  to  Consent 248 

CHAPTER  II.     Obligation  of  the  Contract 250 

CHAPTER  III.     Modifications  of  the  Contracts    -        -        -        -  251 

Art.  I.    The  Oath  Joined  to  the  Contract        -        -        -        -        -  251 

Art.  II.     Some  Specified  Modes  of  Contract           -        -        -        -  251 

Art.  Ill    Condition  of  the  Contract 251 

part  n. 

Different  Kinds  of  Contracts 251 

CHAPTER  I.     Promise 252 

CHAPTER  II.     Gifts 252 

Art.  I.     Gifts  in  General 252 

Art.  II.    Difierent  Kinds  of  Gifts 252 

Section  2.     Wills            252 

Section  3.    The  Gift  by  Reason  of  Death 253 

Section  4.     Entailment  and  Trust 254 

CHAPTER  III.    Loan  to  Custom 255 

CHAPTER  IV.     Deposit,  and  Deposit  by  Sequestration        -        -  255 

CHAPTER  V.     Commission  and  Administration  of  Property        -  255 

CHAPTER  VI.     Loan 255 

Art.  I.    Nature  of  the  Contract  of  the  Loan           .        _        _        .  255 

Art.  II.     Interest  or  Gain  Received  from  the  Loan         ...  255 

Art.  II.     Titles  which  Excuse  the  Interest 256 

1.  Loss  Experienced 256 

2.  Deprivation  of  a  Gain 257 

3.  Risk  of  Loss 257 

4.  Conventional  Penalty 257 

5.  Title  Coming  from  the  Civil  Law    -' 257 

Appendix  :     On  Loan-Banks 257 


Index.  GOl 

PAGE 

Section  II. 

OxERous  Contracts 259 

CHAPTER  I.     Sale  and  Purchase            259 

Art.  I.    Nature  of  the  Sale  and  Purchase 259 

Art,  II.     Fair  Price 259 

Art.  III.     Principal  Kinds  of  Sales 262 

Section  1.     Retrovendition,  or  Mohatra 262 

Section  2.     Auction  Sale 262 

Section  3.     Monopoly 263 

Section  4.     Sale  by  Middle  Men 263 

CHAPTER  II.    Partnership  and  Treble  Contracts          ...  263 

Akt.  I.    Partnership          -        -        -        -        -        -        --        -  263 

Art.  II.    Treble  Contract 263 

CHAPTER  III.     Renting 264 

CHAPTER  IV.     Exchange        -        - 264 

CHAPTER  V.     Quit-rent           -        -        -        -        .        -        -        -  264 

CHAPTER  VI.    Subsidiary  Contracts     - 264 

Art.  I.    The  Bondsman 264 

Art.  II.     The  Security 264 

Art.  III.    The  Mortgage 264 

CHAPTER  VII.     Contingent  Contracts 264 

Art.  I.     Insurance    -- 265 

Art.  II.    Betting 265 

Art.  III.     The  Lottery 265 

\rt.  I.     Gambling 265 

Cases  on  Contracts  in  General. 

Case  1.     Motive  of  the  Contractor 266 

Case  2.     Motive  of  the  Contract 266 

Case  3.     Contracts  for  a  Shameful  Object       .....  267 

Case  11.     Condition  in  the  Contract 268 

Case  14.     The  Disemboweled  Dog    .--..-.  268 

Cases  on  Promises  and  Donations. 

Case  1.     Promise 270 

Case  3.     Donation  Between  Living  Parties 270 

Case  4.     Conditional  Donation 271 

Ca^e  6.     Donation  for  Cause  of  Death 272 

Case  7.     Donation  for  Cause  of  Death 272 

Case  8.     Donation  for  Cause  of  Death 273 


602  Index. 


Donation  Made  by  a  Dying  Man  and  Denied  by  His  Heir  273 

Parents'  Donation -  274 

Cases  on  Wills  and  Legacies. 

Value  of  the  Will 276 

Value  of  the  Will  :  Nocturnal  Spectre        -        .        -         -  276 
Will  Destroyed  by  Hazard,  and  Reconstructed  by  Artful- 
ness             277 

Legacies 278 

Conditional  Legacies -  279 

Profane  Legacies,  Showing  a  Lack  of  Legal  Formali- 
ties        -        .        -        - 280 

Pious  Legacies,  Having  a  Lack  of  Legal  Formalities     -  280 

Pious  Legacies -  282 

Cases  on  Commodate,  Deposit,  Mandate  and  Loan. 

Commodate          --....-._  283 

Unfortunate  Borrower -  283* 

Deposit 284 

Mandatory 285 

Reason  Which  Excuses  Usury          -        -        _        .        _  285 

Cases  on  Sale  and  Its  Species. 

Remarkable  Picture  Bought  at  a  Low  Price      -        -        -  286 

Cunning  Seller 286 

Auction  Sale 287 

Miraculous  Image  of  the  Blessed  Virgin         .        .        _  288 

Compromise       --._.-.--  289 

Commercial  Dealings 290 

Cases  on  Renting,  and  Other  Onerous  Contracts. 

Long-Term  Lease        .---.---291 

Exchange 291 

Money  Dealings 292 

On  Security 294 

Guaranty            -.----_..  295 

Mortgage            .---_-.--  295 

On  Betting        -        - 297 

On  Gambling -        -        -  297 

For  the  Want  of  One  Trick,  Martin  Lost  His  Donkey  298 


Case  9. 

Case  10. 

Case  2. 

Case  8. 

Case  6. 

Case  11. 

Case  12. 

Case  13. 

Case  14. 

Case  15. 

Case  1. 

Case  2. 

Case  6. 

Case  8. 

Case  14. 

Case  7. 

Case  14. 

Case  18. 

Case  19. 

Case  22. 

Case  23. 

Case  4. 

Case  8. 

Case  11. 

Case  13. 

Case  15. 

Case  16. 

Case  17. 

Case  22. 

Case  23. 

PAGE 
BOOK  SECOND. 

TREATISE  ON  PECULIAR  SITUATIONS. 

I. — Laics.     II. — Ecclesiastics.     III. — Regular  Friars. 

part  first. 

Lay  Situations. 

CHAPTER  I.     Judge's  Duties 300 

Appendix  1.     On  Jurors         -- 301 

Appendix  2.     On  Arbiters 301 

CHAPTER  II.     Obligations  of  the  Advocates  and  Attorneys         -  301 

CHAPTER  III.     Solicitor's  Duties           -        -        -        -        -        -  302 

CHAPTER  IV.     Duties  of  Registers  and  Notaries          -        -        -  302 

CHAPTER  V.     Duties  of  Prosecutors  and  Defendants          -        -  302 

CHAPTER  VI.     Witnesses'  Duties 303 

CHAPTER  VII.     On  Duties  of  Physicians,  Surgeons  and  Pharma- 
cists -        -        -        -*      -        -        -        -        304 

CHAPTER  VIII.     On  Duties  of  Rural  Constables  -        -        -        305 

CHAPTER  IX.     On  Artists  and  Laborers        -        -        -        -        -        305 

part  second. 

SITUATION  OF  CLERGYMEN. 

CHAPTER  I.     Common,  Positive  and  Negative  Obligations  of 

Clergymen     •- 306 

Art.  I.     Positive  Obligations           _--..-.        306 
Art.  II.     Negative  Obligations  of  Clergymen,  or  What  is  Forbid- 
den to  Them 306 

CHAPTER  II.     Special  Obligations  of  Clergymen  ...  307 

Art.  I.     Obligations  of  Bishops      .--..-_  307 

Art.  II.     Obligations  of  Parsons 307 

Art.  III.     Obligations  of  Prebendaries 307 

Appendix  1.    Privilege  of  Priests 307 

Appendix  2.    Advantages  of  Priests  307 

part  third. 

Situations  of  Friars. 

CHAPTER  I.     On  the  Nature  of  the  Religious  State      -        -        -        307 

CHAPTER  II.     On  Religious  Vocation 308 


604  Index. 


CHAPTER  III.     On  the  Obligations  of  Vows         .        .        .        . 

Akt.  I.     Vow  of  Poverty 

Art.  II.     Vow  of  Chastity 

Art.  III.    Vow  of  Obedience 

CHAPTER  IV.     Privilege  of  Regulars 

Appendix  :   On  the  Actual  State  of  Regulars  in  France 

CASES  ON  SPECIAL  SITUATIONS. 
Lay  Persons. 

Case  1.    The  Judge 

Case  2.     The  Judge 

Case  4.     The  Barrister 

Case  6.     The  Defendant  Before  the  Court       .        .        -        -        . 

Case  7.    Witness  Called  Before  the  Court 

Case  5.    The  Notary         --. 

Case  10.    The  Rural  Constable 

Cases  on  the  Religious  State. 

Case  5.    Religious  Vocation 

Case  6.     On  the  Parents'  Consent 

Case  8.    Vow  of  Poverty 

Case  9.    Vow  of  Poverty 

Case  13.    Vow  of  Poverty ._. 

Case  15.     On  the  Property  of  Monks 

Case  17.    Vow  of  Obedience  

GENERAL  TREATISE   ON  THE   SACRAMENTS. 
CHAPTER  I.     Definition,  Number  and  Division  of  the  Sacraments 
CHAPTER  II.     Matter  and  Form  of  the  Sacraments      - 
CHAPTER  III.     Minister  of  the  Sacraments  .... 

Art.  I.  Required  Conditions  for  Administering  the  Sacraments  ; 
or,  of  the  Attention,  Intention,  Good  Faith,  and  Hon- 
esty of  the  Minister       ..._--. 

Art.  II.    Duty  of  the  Minister 

CHAPTER  IV.    Person  who  Receives  the  Sacraments 

Art.  I.    Required  Conditions  in  Order  to  Receive  the  Sacraments 

in  a  Valid  Manner 

Art.  II.  Required  Conditions  in  Order  to  Receive  the  Sacraments 
in  a  Lawful  Manner 

TREATISE   ON   BAPTISM. 
CHAPTER  I.    Nature,  Propriety,  and  Necessity  of  Baptism 


Index,  605 

PACK 

CHAPTER  IL    Matter  and  Form  of  Baptism         -        -        -        -  328 
Akt.  I.     Matters  to  be  Avoided,  and  Matters  Preferred,  Concern- 
ing Baptism             328 

Art.  II.     Formula  of  Baptism 329 

CHAPTER  III.    Minister  of  Baptism 329 

CHAPTER  IV.     On  the  Subject  of  the  Baptism     -        -        -        -  329 
CHAPTER  V.    Accessory  Solemnities  of  Baptism,  God-Fathers, 

and  Ceremonies 329 

Art.  I.     God-Fathers 330 

Art.  II.     Ceremonies  of  Baptism 330 

Appendix  on  Caesarian  Operation,  to  Baptize  a  Child  who  is  not 

yet  Born -        -  330 

TREATISE   ON   CONFIRMATION. 

CHAPTER  I.    Matter  and  Form  of  Confirmation           -        -        -  331 

Art.  I.     Matter  of  Confirmation 331 

Art.  II.    Form  of  Confirmation 331 

CHAPTER  IL     Minister  of  Confirmation 331 

CHAPTER  III.     Person  who  Receives  Confirmation      -        -        -  331 

TREATISE   ON   THE   EUCHARIST. 

part  I. 

The  Eucharist  as  a  Sacrament. 

CHAPTER  I.    Nature  and  Efficacy  of  the  Eucharist      -        -        -  332 

CHAPTER  IL     Matter  and  Form  of  the  Eucharist         -        -        -  332 

Art.  I.    Matter  of  the  Eucharist 332 

Art.  IL    Form  of  the  Sacrament  of  the  Eucharist         -        .        -  333 

CHAPTER  III.     Minister  who  Gives  the  Eucharist        -        -        -  333 

Art.  I.    Power  of  this  Minister 333 

Art.  il     Obligation  to  Administer  the  Eucharist            .        -        .  333 
Art.  III.     Special  Conditions  Required  to  Properly  Administer 

the  Eucharist 333 

Art.  IV.    Manner  of  Giving  the  Eucharist  to  the  Sick           -        -  333 

Art.  V.     Manner  of  Keeping  the  Holy  Eucharist             -        -        -  333 

CHAPTER  IV.     The  Person  who  Receives  the  Eucharist      -        -  333 

Art.  I.     Obligation  to  Receive  the  Eucharist           .        .        .        .  333 

Art.  II.     Required  Dispositions  for  Receiving  the  Eucharist         -  333 

part  II. 

The  Eucharist  as  a  Sacrifice. 

CHAPTER   I.     Nature  and  Virtue  of  the  Sacrifice  of  the  Mass       -  334 


GOG  Index, 

PAGR 

CHAPTER  II.     Application  of  the  Sacrifice  of  tlie  Mass       -        -  334 

CHAPTER  III.     Obligations  to  Celebrate  the  Sacrifice           -        -  334 

Art.  I.     Obligation  to  Celebrate  it,  Created  by  Priesthood    -        -  334 

Art.  II.     Obligation  Created  by  Duty 334 

Akt.  Ill     Obligation  Created  by  Salary 335 

A{)pendix  :     For  the  Priests  of  the  Society  of  Jesus        .        -        -  335 

CHAPTER   IV.     Time  and  Place  of  the  Celebration        ...  335 

A  UT.  I.     Time  of  the  Celebration 335 

CHAPTER  V.     Method  of  the  Celebration      -        -        ...  335 

Art.  I.     Required  Conditions  for  Celebrating  Mass        ...  335 

Art.  II.     Rubrics 335 

TREATISE   ON   THE    SACRAMENT   OF  PENANCE. 

PART   I. 

On  the  Essence  of  the  Sacrament  of  Penance  ;  its  Nature,  Matter, 

and  Form 336 

CHAPTER   I.     Nature  of  Penance -  336 

CHAPTER  II.     Matter  of  the  Sacrament  of  Penance     -        -        -  336 

CHAPTER  III.     Form  of  the  Sacrament  of  Penance     -        -        -  336 

PART  ir. 

The  Person  who  Receives  the  Sacrament  of  Penance;   or.  On 
THE  Penitent's  Duties. 

CHAPTER  I.     Contrition 336 

Art.  I.     Contrition,  properly  so  called 336 

Art.  II.     Purpose      -        -        - 336 

CHAPTER   II.     On  Confession 337 

Art.  I.     Necessity  of  Confession     -..-..-  337 

Art.  II.     Quality  of  Confession -        -  337 

Art.  III.     Repetition  of  Confession         -        -        -    '    -        -        -  337- 

Art.  I.     Assessment  of  Penance      -------  337 

Art.  II.     Accomplishment  of  Penance    ------  337 

part  III. 

MINISTER  OF  PENANCE. 

CHAPTER  I.     Power  of  the  Minister 337 

Art.  I.     Approbation -        -  337 

Art.  II.     Jurisdiction --  337 

Art.  III.     Reserved  Cases 337 

Appendix  1.     On  the  Absolving  of  an  Accomplice  to  a  Shameful 

Sin -  337 


Index,  607 

PAGE 

Appendix  2.     Solicitation  to  Sin  in  Course  of  the  Confession    -  338 
CHAPTER  II.     Duty  of  the  Minister  During  and  After  the  Con- 
fession           339 

Art.  I.     Duty  of  the  Minister  During  the  Confession    -        -        -  340 

Art.  II.     Duty  of  the  Minister  After  the  Confession    -        -        -  340 

TREATISE  ON  EXTREME  UNCTION. 

CHAPTER  I.     Nature  and  Effects  of  Extreme  Unction          -        -  341 

CHAPTER  II.     Matter  and  Form  of  Extreme  Unction          -        -  341 

Art.  I.     Matter 341 

Art.  II.     Form 341 

CHAPTER.  III.     Minister  of  Extreme  Unction       -        -        -        -  341 

CHAPTER  IV.    Person  who  Receives  Extreme  Unction        -        -  341 

TREATISE  ON  ORDER. 

CHAPTER  I.     Nature  and  Division  of  Order          ....  342 

CHAPTER  II.     Matter  and  Form  of  Order 342 

CHAPTER  III.     Minister  of  the  Sacrament  of  Order    -        -        -  342 

CHAPTER  IV.     Person  who  Receives  the  Sacrament  of  Order    -  342 

Cases  of  Conscience  on  Sacraments  in  General. 

Case  3.     Change  of  Matter 343 

Case  4.     «'Lapsus  Linguae" 343 

Case  6.     Interruption .-_  343 

Case  18.     The  Person  who  Receives  the  Sacrament        -        -        .  344. 

Cases  of  Conscience  on  Baptism. 

Case  1.     The  Matter  of  Baptism 345 

Case  6.     The  Matter  of  Baptism 345 

Case  9.     A  Child  Baptized  Three  Times 345 

Case  10.     Bfiptism  of  the  Children  of  Heretics        ....  346 

Cases  of  Conscience  on  Confirmation 348 

Cases  of  Conscience  on  the  Eucharist 348 

Case  1.     Substance  With  Which  the  First  Consideration  Should 

be  Made 348 

Case  7.     Ministry  for  the  Eucharist 348 

Case  21.     The  Holy  Viaticum 349 

Cases  of  Conscience  on  the  Mass. 

Case  12.     Change  of  Application     -        -        -        -        -        -        -  350 


608  Index, 


Cases  of  Conscience  on  Confession. 

Case  11.     Circumstances  of  Sins      -------351 

Case  13.     Denunciation  of  tlie  Accomplice       -        .        .        .        _  352 

Case  14.     Inquiries  About  tlie  Accomplice's  Name          -        .        -  354 

Case  21.     Absolution  of  a  Dying  Heretic 354 

Case  22.     Absolution  of  a  Dying  Heretic 355 

Cases  of  Conscience  on  Several  Cases. 

Case  2.     Cause  of  Reserve 357 

Case  14.     Absolution  of  an  Accomplice 357 

Case  15.     Absolution  of  an  Accomplice           .        .        -        _        .  353 

Case  16.     Absolution  of  an  Accomplice 358 

Case  17.     Absolution  of  an  Accomplice           -        -        -        .        .  359 

Case  18.     Absolution  of  an  Accomplice 359 

Case  19.     Absolution  of  an  Accomplice 360 

Case  20.     Absolution  of  an  Accomplice           -        -        -        .        .  350 

Case  21.     Absolution  of  an  Accomplice            -        -        -        -        -  360 

Case  22.     Absolution  of  an  Accomplice 361 

Case  23.     Absolution  of  an  Accomplice            -        .        .        .        .  ^q\ 

Case  24.     Shameful  Solicitations      -------  361 

Case  25.     Shameful  Solicitations 362 

Case  26.     Shameful  Solicitations 362 

Case  28.     Shameful  Solicitations      ---•-.-  362 

Cases  on  the  Duty  of  Confessors. 

Case  6.     Occasion  of  Sinning 364 

Case  7.     Occasion  of  Sinning 364 

Case  8.     Occasion  of  Sinning            .----._  354 

Case  9.     Occasion  of  Sinning 365 

Case  10.     Occasion  of  Sinning           -------  365 

Case  11.     Habitual  Sinners        --------  366 

Case  13.     Relapses 366 

Case  16.     Tlie  Confessor  Before  Dying  Persons      -        -        -        -  366 

Case  17.     The  Confessor  with  Ladies       ------  367 

Case  23.     Confessor's  Error 368 

Cases  on  the  Secret  of  the  Confession. 

Case  3.     Exterior  Use  of  the  Knowledge  of  Confession          -        -  369 

Case  4.     Exterior  Use  of  Confession 369 

Case  7.     Accomplices  Before  the  Same  Confessor          -        -        -  370 

Case  8.     The  Secret  for  a  Layman             370 

Cases  of  Conscience  ox  Extreme  Unctiox  and  on  Order    -  371 


Index.  609 

PAGE 

Treatise  on  Marriage. 

CHAPTER  I.     Affiancings 372 

Art.  I.     Nature  of  Affiancings 372 

Art.  II.     Obligations  and  Purposes  of  Affiancings          -        -        -  373 

Art.  III.     Dissolution  of  Affiancings 373 

CHAPTER  II.     Publication  of  Bans 374 

Art.  I.     Necessity  of  Bans 374 

Art.  II.     Circumstances  of  Bans 374 

Art.  III.     Dispensation  of  Bans 374 

Art.  IV.     Revelation  of  the  Impediments 374 

CHAPTER  III.     The  Nature  and  Purpose  of  Marriage           -        -  375 

Art.  I.     On  the  Nature  of  Marriage 375 

Art.  II.    Purpose  of  Marriage 377 

Section  1.     Its  Unity 376 

Section  2.     Duration  of  Marriage 376 

Art.  I.     As  for  the  Tie 376 

Art.  II.     As  for  the  Bed 376 

CHAPTER  IV.     Matter  and  Form  of  Marriage      -        -        -        -  377 

CHAPTER  V.     Minister  who   Gives  and  Person   who  Receives 

Marriage 377 

Art.  I.     Minister 377 

Art.  II.     Person _..  377 

CHAPTER  VI.     Obstacles  to  Marriage           378 

Art.  Ill    Prohibitive  Obstacles 378 

Art.  III.     Detrimental  Obstacles 379^ 

Various  Kinds  of  Obstacles 380 

Obstacle  for  Cause  of  Alliance 381 

Obstacle  for  Difference  of  Worship -  382 

Obstacle  for  Cause  of  Clandestinity 382 

Obstacle  Through  Powerlcssness           ------  383 

Obstacle  for  Cause  of  Abduction 384 

Art.  III.     Dispensation  for  Invalidating  Obstacles        -        -        -  384 

The  Dispensing  Power 384 

CHAPTER  VII.     Marriage  Made  Valid  Again         .        -        .        .  387 
Art.  I.     Marriage  Made  Valid  Again  in  Case  of  Lack  of  Consent  387 
Art.  II.     Marriage  Made  Valid  Again  in  Case  of  Lack  of  tlie  Pre- 
scribed Forms -  387 

Art.  III.     Marriage  Made  Valid  Again  in  Case  of  Incapacity  of 

the  Parties 387 

CHAPTER  VIII.     On  Conjugal  Duty 387 


610  Index. 

PAGE 

Art.  I.     De  la  Légitimité  de  l'Acte  Conjugal;    1"  en  Soi;   2"  Par 

rapport  aux  Circonstances 388 

Section  2.     Légitimité  de  l'acte  Conjugal  par  rapport  aux  Cir- 
constances          388 

I.  Des  Circonstances  de  Personne 389 

II.  Des  Circonstances  de  Position 390 

III.  Des  Circonstances  de  Temps 390 

Art.  II.     De  l'Obligation  d'Accomplir  l'acte  Conjugal            -        -  392 

Art.  III.     Des  Pécliés  des  Epoux            393 

Section  1.     Des  Péchés  des  Epoux  par  Excès      .        -        -        -  393 

Section  2.     De  l'Onanisme  en  Particulier 397 

Cases  of  Conscience  on  Affiances. 

Case  2.     Value  of  Promises 400 

Case  6.     Conditional  Consent            401 

Case  7.     Breaking  of  Affiances          --.._..  402 

Case  8.     Breaking  of  Affiances 403 

Case  9.     Breaking  of  Affiances -  404 

Case  10.     Breaking  of  Affiances 404 

Cases  on  Publication  of  the  Bans. 

Case  4.     Obligation  to  Declare  Obstacles  to  Marriage    -        -        -  407 

Case  5.     Obligation  to  Declare  Obstacles  to  Marriage    -        -        -  407 

Cases  on  Conscience  on  the  Nature  of  Marriage. 

Case  2.     Consent  of  tlie  Spouses 408 

Case  3.     Conditional  Consent 409 

Case  4      Conditional  Marriage 410 

Case  5.     Conditional  Marriage 410 

Case  6.     Separation  of  Bed  and  Residence 411 

Cases  on  Obstacles  to  Marriage. 

Case  1.     Value  of  Obstacles -        -        -  412 

Case  13.     A  Woman  who  is  Sister,  Daughter  and  Wife  of  Her 

Husband         - 412 

Case  14.     Spiritual  Relationship 413 

Case  16.     Affinity 413 

Case  18.     Honesty     - 414 

€ase  20.     Murder 414 

Case  21.     Murder       - 415 

Case  22.     Crime          -        -        - 416 

Case  23.     Crime          - 416 

Case  2^.     Crime          ----- 417 

Case  20.     Fear -  417 


Index.  611 

PAGE 

Case  33.     Marriage  of  Heretics 418 

Case  34.     Attendance  of  the  Priest           ---__.  418 

Case  36.     Attendance  of  the  Priest 419 

Cases  ox  Dispensation  for  Marriage. 

Case  2.     Exposition  of  the  Case 421 

Case  3.     Exposition  of  the  Case 421 

Case  4.     Subreptitious  Dispensation        - 422 

Case  5.     Subreptitious  Dispensation 422 

Case  6.     Subreptitious  Dispensation        -        -        -        -        -        -  423 

Case  7.     Dispensation  for  Guilty  Relations,  with  Relapse      -        -  423 

Case  10.     The  Validity  of  Marriage  Restored          -        -        -        -  424 

Cases  ox  Direction  of  Married  Persons. 

Cas  1.     Obligation  de  Remplir  les  Devoirs 425 

Cas  2.     Obstacle  au  Devoir  Conjugal        -        -        -        -        -        -  426 

Cas  3.     Obstacle  au  Devoir  Conjugal 428 

Cas  4.     Obstacle  au  Devoir  Conjugal 430 

Cas  5.     Instruction  Pour  les  Firiiicés  et  les  Epoux           .        _        -  431 

Cas  6.     Onanisme 432 

Cas  8.     Onanisme       - 433 

TREATISE  ON  CENSURES. 

CHAPTER  I.     On  Censures  in  General 436 

Art.  I.     Nature,  Division  and  Conditions  of  Censures            -        -  436 

1.     Of  the  Nature  of  the  Censure 436 

Art.  II.     Originator  or  Promulgator  of  the  Censure       -        -        -  436 

Art.  III.     The  One  who  Undergoes  the  Censure    -        -        -        -  436 

Art.  IV.     Removal  of  the  Censure 436 

CHAPTER  II.     Different  Species  of  Censures         -        -        -        -  436 

Akt.  I.     Excommunication       .-- 436 

ARr.  II.     Suspension 44O 

Appendix  Of  Deposition  and  Degradation 440 

Art.  III.     Interdict 440 

Appendix  1.     Interdiction  of  Divine  Things        -        -        -        -  440 

Appendix  2.     On  Ecclesiastical  Sepulture    -        -        -  .      -        -  440 

TREATISE  ON  IRREGULARITIES. 

CHAPTER  I.     Irregularities  in  General 442 

CHAPTER  II.     Irregularities  in  Particular 442 

Art.  I.     Irregularities  Through  Defect 442 

AiJT.  II.     Irregularities  Through  Defect          .        .        .        .        .  443 

Appendix.     On  Indulgences  and  Jubilee        -----  443 


612 


Index, 


CHAPTER  I.     Indulgences 

CHAPTER   II.    Jubilee 

Cases  on  Censures  and  Irregularities. 

Case  7.     Censures  :  Religious  Claustration 

Case  8.    Irregularities  :  Irregularities  in  General  .        -        . 

Sur  le  Sixième  Précepte  du  Decalogue. 

Sur  les  Obligations  des  Epoux  et  sur  Quelques  Questions  Relatives 
au  Marriage 

APPENDIX. 

Propositions  Condemned  by  Innocent  XI.,  on  the  6th  of  March, 
1679 

Speech,  Delivered  at  the  Sitting  of  the  21st  of  June,  1879      - 
Speech,  Delivered  at  the  Sitting  of  the  5th  of  July,  1879 
Speech,  Delivered  at  the  Sitting  of  the  7th  of  July,  1879 


page 
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