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Documents of

RUSSIAN HISTORY

1914-1917

THE CEKTURY Co.

s ix 7

PREFACE

In a collection of documents one has always to explain why
he has selected this and not that. The only explanation usually is
that this document seemed more pertinent than that. One has to
begin and end somewhere.

The material for this book is taken from various places, but
largely from two newspapers, the **Riech" and the "Izvestiia."
These two papers contain most of the official documents of the
period and give opposing points of view. In the time of the Tsar
the "Riech," organ of the Constitutional Democrats (Cadets),
was regarded as a radical sheet but, in the days of the revolution,
was looked upon as a tool of the reactionaries* The "Izvestiia"
came into life with the Petrograd Soviet and represented the ad-
vanced socialistic thought until the Bolsheviks came on the scene.
Their paper, "Pravda," made the "Izvestiia" look as old fashioned
as the "Riech" appeared to the "Izvestiia."

About half or more of the material in this book has been trans-
lated by Mr, Emanuel Aronsberg, He has done it with the same
painstaking care with which he does all his work. Unfortunately
lie had not the time to translate all the documents and other per-
sons had to be called in to help out. For the sake of uniformity it
has been necessary to revise the whole translation and I assume re-
sponsibility for it as it stands. Many of the documents were penned
off on the spur of the moment by men not accustomed to such
work, who were careless in the use of terms and were often
carried away by fine sounding phrases. It has not always been
easy to translate these documents ami I have aimed at brevity
and clarity rather than literality.

In transliterating names I have, as a rule, followed the sys-
tem in use at the Library of Congress and Harvard University ;
but I have not always been consistent. Wherever the spelling of
a Russian name has become established in English I did not dis-

vi PREFACE

turb it. For example, I kept Tsar "Nicholas" and Grand Duke
"Nicholas" instead of "Nikolai" as I did iti the case of Grand
Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich. 1 have written Alexander, Michael
and not Aleksandr, Mikhail.

The dates in this book are everywhere in the new style, but
wherever certain events in Russian history, like the Manifesto of
October, have become associated with certain dates of the old
style, both the old and new are given (October 17-30).

Mrs. H. H. Fisher, Miss Virginia Fox and, in particular, Mrs.
L. N. Litoshenko have assisted me in various ways in the prepa-
ration of the manuscript and I take this opportunity of acknowl*
edging their help and expressing my gratitude.

F. A* GOLPER.
STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
JULY i, 1927.

INTRODUCTION

The World War and the Russian Revolution are the two great
events of recent times and it is as yet difficult to say which of the
two will exert the greater influence on the world. Much time is
given to the study of the one and comparatively little to the other
and yet we know so much more of the one than of the other. We
talk a good deal of Bolshevism, but what do we really know about
it? What is it aiming to do, what has it actually done, what is it
likely to do ? These arc questions which we should ask ourselves
in all seriousness. In 1925 I put such a question to a Russian econ-
omist of the old regime. This 5s what he replied; "What they
said they would do, they did not do, what we said they could
not do, they did." In other words, though the Bolsheviks had
not worked out their theories they had demonstrated certain other^
ideas which the orthodox economist had denied. The Bolsheviks
have failed along certain lines but have succeeded along others*
The world at large should know what is taking place in Russia.
If the Bolsheviks are succeeding let us follow in their footsteps;
if they are failing let us avoid their mistakes. In either case let
us study it objectively as we would any other social experiment.
A system that has been in operation for ten years and has made
the States of the world anxious for their future cannot be dis-
missed with a wave of the hand.

Some of us who were in Russia at the time of the famine and
had an opportunity to observe conditions returned to America
convinced that Bolshevism had a contribution to make to civiliza-
tion and that it should be investigated openmindedly. We laid
our ideas before a number of American statesmen and educators
and they agreed with our point of view. Secretary Herbert Hoover
and President Ray Lyman Wilbur of Stanford University were
particularly encouraging. One offered the resources of the Hoover
War Library and the other found the necessary money to under-

vii

viii INTRODUCTION

take the research. We next approached the Soviet Government,
which was equally glad to cooperate with us.

Thus encouraged we went to work on a modest scale in IQ-\V
This book of documents is the first result of our effort; the next
will be a study of Russian agriculture. Other studies, dealing with
political, social and economic problems, will follow from time to
time. We have no hide-bound plans ; we are feeling our way, am!
we are open to suggestions*

CONTENTS

BOOK I THE OLD REGIME

PART I
WAR AND PEACE

CHAPTER PAG!

I THE REACTIONARIES AND THE WAR 3

1 Durnovo's Memorandum, February 1914 3

2 Markov's Speech, May 1914 24

3 Rasputin's Views 28

II OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 29

1 Imperial Manifesto, August 2, 1914 ...... 29

2 Speeches on the Occasion of the Tsar's Reception at

the Winter Palace, August 8, 1914 30

3 Speeches at the Duma, August 8, 1914 ..... 32

4 Proclamation of Grand Duke Nicholas Regarding

Poland, August 14* 1914 37

5 BourtzefFs Letter in the London Times, September 18,

I9H 38

III SEPARATE PEACE 40

I Austro-German Proclamation 40

a Vasilchikova's Letters, March 10 — May 27, 1915 . . 41

3 Grand Duke Hesse's Letter, April 30, 1915 .... 48

4 Paleologue's Query about Separate Peace, June 27,

*9*5 49

5 Count Eulenburg to Count Fredericks, November 1915 50

6 Views of German Crown Prince ....... 51

7 Imperial Rescript. June 27, 1915 (See 'The War and

the Public") 51

8 Special Order of the Day, January 7, 1917' . — v -. •:""$!'

9 Tsar's Address to the Army, March 21, 1917 , , . 53

IV PEACE CONVERSATIONS 55

1 Telegram from Russian Ambassador in London, Sep-

tember 19, 1914 55

2 Delcasse to Pateologue, September 24, 1914 .... 56

3 Palcologue to Delcasse, September 14, 1914 .... 56

4 Pal&>logue to Dclca*s4, September 26, 1914 .... 58

5 Dragoumis to Vcnizelos, January 4, 1915 ..... 59

6 Memorandum of the Ambassador of Great Britain In

Petrograd, March 12* 1915 ,*.„.„,, 60

x CONTENTS

CHAPTER I*A»;K

V PEACE PREPARATIONS . , <>^

I Letters of Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich to Tsar,

May 5 to October 4, 1916 * . ry

PART II

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC
VI RODZIANKO'S MKMOIKS, 1914- njx/
VII SPECIAL l"ur\ni.st iYm.u- OK<;ANMATIONS. DVMA

1 Imperial Rescript, June «7, 1915 ..... . . uv

2 Special Councils, August 11)15 . ...... ifc*jl

3 War-Industry Committees and Labnr Participation,

September 1915 ............ i.'j

4 The Main Committees of the Al!-Ku>>iun t'nion* m

Zomstvos and Cities to Supply the Army . . , . *,«»

5 Progressive Bloc, SeptemlKT 1915 ....... 1^4

6 The Government and the Bloc ..... * , » i^»

VIII PtTBLZC CRITICISM OK THK (lOVKKXMKNT ..... , . 1 4*1

1 Prince G. K, Lvov» SeptemtxT 11,115 . ..... 14*1

2 Resolutions of the Congress of Cities and XcmstvuK,

September 1015 ...... ...... 140

3 Report of Prince Scherbatov, September Hji5 , . , 15.*

4 Miliukov's Speech in the Duma, Xovember 14^ 1916 , 154

5 Purishkevich's Speech in the Utimn. IVcvnubfr -t, ii)i6 106

6 Plot to Kill Rasputin, Ik'eemIxT io»f» . . . * . 175

7 Congress of the Nubility, ncccniltcr ir^Hi . ... 177

8 Resignation of Count Ignatiev, January 1917 ... 178

IX ECONOMIC AX» SOCIAL CuvmTioKs ........ 17*1

1 High Cost of Living and Low Wa^es . ..... 17^1

2 Rural Conditions ........... . 17*)

3 War Refugees ............. i$i

4 Cens< trship of the Press .......... 18**

5 Growing Agitation and I'nrest, August ifj!5-IVt»rtiary

............... 184

PART HI
ARMY AND NAVY

X PUMPAJ&ATION AND EFFICIENCY * . . „ , **&

XI THB SUPREME COMMAND .*..*,..,.. 197

XII WAR SECRETS, THE EMPRESS, RASPUTW * »I3

XIII EMPRESS AND RASPUTIN AS MIUTARV Aovtsrats » . * . ai6

XIV STATE OF MINJ> OF THE ARMV „ 220

CONTEXTS xi

PART IV
GOVERNMENT BY THE EMPRESS

OI.VtfTER PA<3«

XV I low A. N. KHVOSTOV BECAME MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR 227

XVI SUKHOMLIKOV AFFAIR 233

PART V
IMPERIAL FAMILY

XVII DIARIES AND LETTERS , . 239

1 Diary of Andrei VInclimirovich 239

2 Letters of Nikolai Mikhailovich 242

3 Letter of Empress 245

4 The Vladimir Line 246

5 Letter of Georgi Mikhailovich 247

6 Letters of Alexander Mikhailovich ...... 248

BOOK II THE NEW REGIME

PART VI
THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET

XVIII FIRST WEEK OP THE REVOLUTION 258

1 Shulgin's Memoirs 258

2 Prorogation and Resolution of the Duma, March 12 277

3 Telegrams of Rodzianko to Tsar, March n-12 , . . 278

4 Telegram of Members of State Council, March 12-13 ^79

5 Formation of Committees of Duma, March 12 ... 280

(a) Committee Appeals to Army ....... 280

(b) Committee is Supported by Allies, Public Or-

ganizations, War-Industry Committee, Army

Officers * . « 280

6 Formation of Soviet of Worker's Deputies, March 12 ^85

(a) Soviet Appeals to Soldiers and Workmen . . 286

(b) Soviet is Supported by Socialist-Revolutionists 290

7 Appeal of Committee and Soviet to the Population > . 29*

XIX ABDICATION OF THE ROMANOVS 294

1 Telegram from Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich . 3*94

2 Miliukov'a Speech of March 15, 1917 ^95

3 Shall the Romanov Dynasty Remain? 296

4 Abdication of Nicholas II * 207

5 Abdication of Michael Alcxandrovich . . . . * 298

6 Arrest of Nicholas and Other Members of the Romanov

Dynasty 399

xii CONTENTS

CHAPTER t *A<*I

7 The Tsar's Minister and the "Must August" Comman-

der-in-Chief ............ , 300

8 The Arrest of Nicholas Romanov ...... 301

9 Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholacvich ...... 3iu

XX THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT ANH TUK PKtKiKiiKAi* SDVIKT 303

1 Attitude of Executive Committee of Soviet on Ques-

tion of Participation in Provisional Government

Point of Mew of Kerenski ...... . 305

2 Formation and Program of Provisional (tovcrnmcnt » 3uS

3 Socialistic Support of Provisional ( lovvrmncnt . . . 30*)

4 Contact Commission ........... 310

5 First Declaration of Provisional Government, March

20, 1917 .............. 311

6 Differences Dot ween Provisional Government and Soviet 313

(a) Governors ami Vice-Governors ..... 313

(h) Rodxianko and Chkheidae ....... 314

ernment ....... . . , , . 315

XXI CLASH BETWEEN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND Sovn;r ox

Fo&EiirN POLICY ........... , . 3^0

1 Allied Pressure and Miliukov's Note of Marcli 18 i?n

Policy of Provisional Government ...... 3J3

2 Policy of Soviet : Call to Peoples of the World, March

3 Provisional Government and War Aims, April u» . . 3^

4 Soviet and War Aims* April 24 ....... 331

5 Miliukov's Note on War Aims, May I ..... 333

6 Soviet on Miliukov's Note ......... 334

(a) Demonstrations against Provisional Govern-

ment and Appeal of Soviet to Population * , 335

7 Explanation of the Provisional Government .... 336

8 Resolution of Soviet on Foreign Policy, May 4 » . , 33^

9 Bolshevik Resolution on Democratic Peace . . * . 337

10 International Socialist Conference and Appeal of So-

viet to the Socialists of AH Countries , , , * . 339

11 The United States, the Provisional Government, the

Soviet ............... 343

PART VI!
FIRST COALITION GOVERNMENT

XXII FORMATION OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT «.,„*»» 34$

I Lvov to Chkheidze * * . f « . 349

a Negotiations Between the Provisional Government and

the Soviet *

CONTENTS

3 The New Provisional Government; Its Declaration;
Its Foreign Policy. Promised Soviet Support.

Trotski Questions the Wisdom of Coalition . . . 353

XXIII FIRST ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS 359

I Summoning and Gathering of the Congress .... 360

a Clash Between Moderate Socialists and Bolsheviks . . 361

(a) Tseretelli's Speech 361

(b) Lenin's Speech » 363

3 Resolutions Adopted by Congress on Internal and For-
eign Policies 368

XXIV LAND QUESTION 372

1 Resolution of Peasants Union, April 8 373

2 Chernov's Interview and Speech 374

3 Resolution of All-Russian Congress of Peasants* Dep-

uties, June 7 375

4 Decree of Provisional Government, July 25 .... 378

5 Lawless Land Seizures and Demoralization in the Vil-

lages 380

6 Union of Executive Committees of Ail-Russian So-

viets of Workers' and Soldiers* Deputies with the

All-Russian Soviets of Peasants* Deputies . . . 383

XXV THE ARMY 384

1 German Propaganda 384

2 Misunderstanding between Officers and Soldiers . . 386

3 Orders I and 2 and their Interpretations .... 386

4 Attempt to Bring About Cooperation between Officers

and Soldiers 388

5 Rights of the Soldier 393

6 Army Demoralization 394

(a) Kerenski's Speech 394

(b) Fraternization 396

(d) Appeal of Soviet to the Army to Maintain Dis-

cipline and to be Ready to Fight 397

(e) Lawlessness by Soldiers 399

7 Loyal Units In the Army Appeal to the Provisional

Government to Restore Discipline, Fight or Make

Peace, October, November 400

XXVI GENERAL AUEXEEV '403

i General Alexeev's Order and the Soviet 403

a Rodzianko's Estimate of Alexeev ....... 404

3 General Alexeev's Speech and Dismissal 406

XXVII THE DUMA 407

i Meeting of the Four Dumas, May 10 , 407

XIV

CONTENTS

2 Comment of "Izvcstiia" on the Meeting 4°9

3 Attitude (if Ali-Kussian Con&rtiss of Soviets awl the

Duma 4»<>

4 Meeting of Duma, September -J 4**

5 Fourth Duma Dissolved 4*-*

XXVIII CONSTITl'BXT ASSEMBLY 4*4

1 Place and Time of Meeting 4M

2 Postponement 415

XXIX SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONWTIONS 4*T

1 Robbery, Drunkenness 417

2 Resumption of Work— Collective Agreements ... 418

3 Kronstadt Republic 4**"

4 Conscription of Women for War Work 4«-«*

5 Pogroms, Demoralization and Lawlessness .... 4***

PART VIII
JULY EVENTS

XXX JULY OFFENSIVE 4-*5

1 Order of Kerenski 4-s6

2 Appeal of Fxmttive Commit tot* to the Army . „ . 4.7

3 Break-Down of the UiYen.sivc ........ 4**K

4 Attack by Soldiers tin Mem! NTS of Executive Commit-

tee of Soviet , . . * . 4JJ

5 Counter- Revolutionary Ablation 434

6 Restriction of the Freedom of the Press* » » * . . 4,^4

XXXI THE UKRAINE ANI» THE MIKISTEKIAL CAISIS 4.15

i The Ministry of War and the Ukrainian Congress . 43ft

3 Manifest of Ukrainian Kada 436

3 Appeal of Provisional Giiverniruwt to the Ukraine , . 437

4 Declaration of the Provisional Government on Ukrain-

ian Question - . 4M

5 Resignation of Cadet Ministers 44*»

6 Explanation of Cadets . . 441

XXXI! JULY U»»XSIKO * 444

i The "ImathV Account of the Uprising . . . * 445

a Stalin's Report , . . 44#

3 Lunacharski's and Metelev's Accounts * . * - . 45°

4 Attempts to Iteutore Order * * . . 4S»1

(a) Appeals of Soviets to Soldiers . * . * * 453

(b) Appeal of Socialist-Revolutionists . . . . 4S5

(d) Prince Lvov Explains ...**,,* 4^>

(e) Trotski Explains 460

CONTENTS xv

PART IX

PAGE

"SAVE THE REVOLUTION" GOVERNMENT

XXXIII STKPS TOWARD ORGANIZATION OF NEW GOVERNMENT . . . 465

1 Joint Meeting of the Executive Committees ...» 465

2 Resolution of the McnshevJks and Socialist-Revolu-

tionists 466

3 Declaration of the Provisional Government .... 467

XXXIV RECONSTRUCTION OF* THE CABINET 470

1 Prince Lvov Leaves the Government 470

2 Kerenski Succeeds Lvov • . 471

3 Resolution of the Executive Committees 473

4 Resignation of Ministers ' . . 474

XXXV FORMATION OF NEW GOVERNMENT 477

1 Resolution of the Executive Committees 477

2 Declaration of Kerenski „ 477

3 Composition of the Ministry 479

PART X

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT TRIES TO
LEAN ON THE BOURGEOISIE

XXXVI THE Moscow CONFERENCE 482

1 Reasons for Calling It „ , . . 48.2

2 Position of Provisional Committee 483

3 Composition of the Conference 484

4 Caucuses by Bourgeoisie anil Proletariat .... 484

5 Before the Opening of the Conference 489

6 Account of the Moscow State Conference . . - . 491

7 Declaration of United Democracy 496

8 The Bolshevik Declaration 509

9 Results of the Conference 511

President Wilson's Greetings * 512

XXXVII THE KQRNILOV AFFAIR 513

1 Kornilov and the July Offensive 514

2 Keren ski's Explanation of Kornilov Affair » . » . 520

3 Kornilov's Explanation 521

4 "Izvestiia" Account of the Kornilov Affair . „ . . 523

5 General Lukomski*s Account * . * 527

6 Probable Results of Kornilov Affair * 53*

XXXVTIX DiR»cro*Y OP F*VB 533

1 Formation of a Government of Five ...... 534

2 The New Cabinet * . . - * 537

3 Proclamation of the Republic . . 539

xvi CONTENTS

PART XI

CHAPThR

PROVISIONAL GOVERXMKXT TRIES TO LEAN ON THK
DEMOCRACY

XXXIX THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE AND THE PROVISIONAL COUN-

CIL OF THE Rmmu? ............ 54-*

x Composition of Democratic Conference ..... 54*

2 Coalition or no Coalition ........ . $47

3 Formation of a Coalition Government ...... 555

4 Creation of a Provisional Council of the Russian Re-

public ............... $63

$ Resolution of Petrograd Soviet in Democratic Confer-

ence ...» .......... , 567

PART XII

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER
XL SPREAD OF BOLSHEVIK IDEAS. M.\KCii»Srj*TKUBcit . » , . 572
XLI CONTROL OF PETROCJKAO SOVIET ..... ..... 577

XLII FORMATION OF A REI* GUAIW AND W A K- REVOLUTIONARY Cow-

MITTEBL THE IHlKKNSK <»F W.TUOCKAH ....... 5fk)

XLIII CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF THK NORTHERN REGION .... 598

XLIV SECOND Au.-Rr.seii AN COKCKKSS OF SOHETS OF WOKKKHS*
SOLDIERS' DfinmKS

XLV PREPARATION FOR AN Ui>fti$tNG — LKXIN TO SMILGA .

XLVI BOLSHEVIK UPHXSIKG. FORMATION OF PEOPLE'S CO

PEACE AND LAND DECREES . . . . ...... (>n

APPENDICES
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Documents of

RUSSIAN HISTORY

1914-1917

DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

PART I
WAR AND PEACE

CHAPTER I
THE REACTIONARIES AND THE WAR

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Did Russia desire a war with Germany? Much has been
written to prove that the Izvolskis and Sazonovs were active in
promoting it, but little has been said about the men who tried to
prevent it. We give here the views of three ment influential in the
Court and in the Government. Dumovo had been Minister of
the Interior and was in 1914 a prominent leader in the State
Council, Markov the Second was a noted reactionary, organizer
of reactionary societies and publisher of reactionary papers.
Rasputin held a position, though not official, and was the power
behind the throne.

Of the three documents the one written by Durnovo is the
most noteworthy. Durnovo's analysis of the world situation, in
1914, his realization of Russia's unpreparedness and the possible
collapse of the Monarchies of Europe, show him to be a careful
student of European politics and a far-sighted statesman*

x. DURNOVO'S MEMORANDUM1

A FOTUtE ANGLO-OEfcMAN WAR WILL BECOME AN ARMED CO^FUCT
BETWEEN TWO GROUPS OF K>WE»S

The central factor of the period of world history through whicti
we are now passing is the rivalry between England and Germany.

1KnMoaift, Nov, VI; Nbv,-Decu, 1922; Presented to Nicholas It in
rowjv W4» by P* N* Dumovo, Member of tfae State Cornell *md KBnfote* <
the Interior in Witte's cabinet,

4 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

This rivalry must inevitably lead to an armed struggle between
them, the issue of which will, in all probability, prove fatal ten the
vanquished side. The interests of these two powers are far too in-
compatible, and their simultaneous existence as world powers will
sooner or later prove impossible. On the one hand, there is an
insular State, whose world imi>ortance rests upon its domination of
the sea, its world trade, and its innumerable colonies- On the other,
there is a powerful continental empire, whose limited territory is
insufficient for an increased population. It has therefore openly and
candidly declared that its future is on the seas. It has, with fabulous
speed, developed an enormous world commerce, built for its pro-
tection a formidable navy, and, with its famous trademark, "Made
in Germany/1 created a mortal danger to the industrial and economic
prosperity of its rival. Naturally, England cannot yield without a
fight, and between her and Germany a struggle for life or death
is inevitable.

The armed conflict impending as a result of this rivalry cannot
be confined to a dud between England and Germany alone. Their
resources are far too unequal, and, at the same time, they are not
sufficiently vulnerable to each other, Germany could provoke rebel-
lion in India, in South America,8 and, especially, a dangerous rel*el~
lion in Ireland, and paralyze English sea trade by nw&m of priva-
teering and, perhaps, submarine warfare, thereby creating for Great
Britain difficulties in her food supply ; but, in spite of all the daring
of the German military leaders, they would scarcely risk a landing
in England, unless a fortunate accident helped them to destroy or
appreciably to weaken the English navy. As for England, she will
find Germany absolutely invulnerable. AH that she may achieve is to
seize the German colonies, stop German sea trade, and. In the most
favorable event, annihilate the German navy, but nothing more.
This, however, would not force the enemy to sue for peace* Them
is no doubt, therefore, that England will attempt the means she has
more than once used with success, and will risk armed action only
sifter1 securing participation in the1 war, on' tier own side, of powers
stronger in a strategical sense. But m*®6 ,,$mm&y, for ber own pit*
will not be found isolated, ttte future AftglQ-German war will un-
doubtedly be transformed into an armed co^fliet between two groups
of powers, one with *t Cerman, the other with an English orientation,

. 'Probably intended for "South Africa,'*

WAR AND PEACE

IT IS HARD TO DISCOVER ANY REAL ADVANTAGES TO RUSSIA IN RAP-
PROCHEMENT WITH ENGLAND

Until the Russo-Japanese War, Russian policy had neither orien-
tation. From the time of the reign of Emperor Alexander III, Rus-
sia had a defensive alliance with France, so firm as to assure common
action by both powers in the event of attack upon either, hut, at the
same time, not so close as to obligate either to support unfailingly,
with armed force, all political actions and claims of the ally. At the
same time, the Russian Court maintained the traditional friendly
relations, based upon ties of blood, with the Court of Berlin. Owing
precisely to this conjuncture, peace among the great powers was not
disturbed in the course of a great many years, in spite of the presence
of abundant combustible material in Europe. France, by her alliance
with Russia, was guaranteed against attack by Germany ; the latter
was safe, thanks to the tried pacifism and friendship of Russia, from
revanclw ambitions on the part of France ; and Russia was secured,
thanks to Germany's need of maintaining amicable relations with her,
against excessive intrigues by Austria-Hungary in the Balkan penin-
sula. Lastly, England, isolated and held in check by her rivalry with
Russia in Persia, by her diplomats' traditional fear of our advance
on India, and by strained relations with France, especially notable at
the time of the well-known Fashoda incident, viewed with alarm
the increase of Germany's naval power, without, however, risking an
active step.

The Russo-Japanese War radically changed the relations among
the great powers and brought England out of her isolation. As we
know, all through the Russo-Japanese War, England and America
observed benevolent neutrality toward Japan, while we enjoyed a
similar benevolent neutrality from France and Germany. Here, it
would seem, should have been the inception of the most natural po-
litical combination for us. But after the war, our diplomacy faced
abruptly about and definitely entered upon the road toward rap-
prodhement with England. France was drawn into the orbit of
British policy; there was formed a group of powers of the Triple
Entente, with England playing the dominant part; and a clash,
sooner or later, with the powers grouping themselves around Ger-
many became inevitable. • ; ; '' , : ' - , < : , • - . • ;, \ ' • ' -,, .

Now, what advantages did the renunciation of our traditional
policy of distrust of England and the rupture of neighborly, if not
friendly, relations with Germany promise us then and at ; present? ,

6 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Considering with any degree of care the events which have taken
place since the Treaty of Portsmouth, we find it difficult to ixjroeive
any practical advantages gained by us in rapprochement with Eng-
land. The only benefit— improved relations with Japan--is scarcely
a result of the Russo-English rapprochement. There is no reason
why Russia and Japan should not live in peace ; there seems to l*e
nothing over which they need quarrel. All Russia's objectives in the
Far East, if correctly understood, are entirely compatible with
Japan's interests. These objectives, in their essentials, are very mod-
est, The too broad sweep of the imagination of overeealous executive
officials, without basis in genuine national interests, on the one hand,
and the excessive nervousness and impressionability of Japan, on
the other, which erroneously regarded these dreams as a consistently
executed policy— these were the things that provoked a clash which
a more capable diplomacy would have managed to avoid.

Russia needs neither Korea nor even Port Arthur. An outlet
to the open sea is undoubtedly useful, but the sea in itself is* after
all, not a market, but merely a road to a more advantageous delivery
of goods at the consuming markets. As a matter of fact, we do not
possess, and shall not for a long time possess any goods in the Hat
East that promise any considerable profits in exportation abroad*
Nor are there any markets for the export of our products. We
cannot expect a great supply of our export commodities to go to
industrially and agriculturally developed America, to poor, but like-
wise industrial, Japan, or even to the maritime sections of China
and remoter markets, where our exports would inevitably meet the
competition of goods from the industrially stronger rival powers*
There remains the interior of China, with which our trade is carried
on, chiefly overland. Consequently, an open port would aid the import
of foreign merchandise more than the export of our own products,

Japan, on her part, no matter what is said, has no desire for our
Par Eastern possessions. The Japanese are by nature a southern
people, and the harsh environment of our Far Eastern borderland
cpnfiot attract them. We krtow that even witWn Japan itself northern
Yezo is sparsely populated, while appattntly Japanese wtoniasatiom
is making little headway even in the southern part of Sakhalin Island,
ceded, to Japan tinder the Treaty of Portsmouth* After taking po»*
session of Korea and Formosa, Japan wilt hardly go farther north,
and her ambitions, it may be assumed, will turn rather in the direc-
tion of the Philippine Islands, Indo-China, Java, Sumatra, and
Borneo. The most she might desire would be the acquisition, for

WAR AND PEACE

purely commercial reasons, of a few more sections of the Manchurian
railway.

In a word, peaceable coexistence, nay, more, a close rapproche-
ment, between Russia and Japan in the Far East is perfectly natural,
regardless of any mediation by England. The grounds for agree-
ment are self-evident Japan is not a rich country, and the simul-
taneous upkeep of a strong army and a powerful navy is hard for her.
Her insular situation drives her to strengthen her naval power,
and alliance with Russia would allow her to devote all her attention
to her navy, especially vital in view of her imminent rivalry with
America, leaving the protection of her interests on the continent to
Russia. On our part, we, having the Japanese navy to protect our
Pacific coast, could give up once for all the dream, impossible to us,
of creating a navy in the Far East.

Thus, so far as our relations with Japan are concerned, the rap-
prochement with England has yielded us no real advantage. And it
has gained us nothing in the sense of strengthening our position in
Manchuria, Mongolia, or even the UHanghai territory, where the un-
certainty of our position bears witness that the agreement with
England has certainly not freed the hands of our diplomats. On the
contrary, our attempt to establish relations with Tibet met with sharp
opposition from England.

In Persia, also, our position has been no better since the conclu-
sion of this agreement. Every one recalls our predominant influence
in that country tinder the Shah Nasr-Eddin/ that is, exactly at a
time when our relations with England were most strained. From the
moment fcf our accord with the latter, we have found ourselves drawn
into a number of strange attempts to Impose upon the Persian peo-
ple an entirely needless constitution, with the result that we our-
selves contributed to the overthrow, for the benefit of our inveterate
enemies, of a monarch who was devoted to Russia. That is, not
only have we gained nothing, but we have suffered a loss all along
the line, ruining our prestige and wasting many millions of rubles,
even the precious blood of Russian soldiers, who were treacherously
slain and, to please England, not even avenged.

The worst results, however, of the accord with England— end
of the consequent discord with Germany—have been felt in the Near
East* As we know, it was Bismarck who coined that winged phrase
about Hie Balkan problem not being wortl* to Gern&any the bones
of a single Pomeranian grenadier. Later the Balkan complications

DOLVMKXTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

began to attract nnidh ntort* attention from (irnnan diplnmavy,
which had taken the "Sick Man" under its protection, hut rvrn thru
Germany, for a long time, failed to show any inclination to nntonj.;<T
relations with Russia in the interests of Balkan affairs The proofs
are patent. During the period of the Ru.sso-Japamw War and the
ensuing turmoil in our country, it would have been very ea\v fur
Austria to realize her cherished ambitions in the Balkan pcninrtiia.
Hut at that time Russia had not yet linked her destinies wilh Kn?*l;md,
and Austria-Hungary was forced to lose an opportunity most
auspicious for her purj>osc.s.

No sooner had we taken the road to closer accord with Knglnnd,
however, than there immediately followed the annexation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, a step which might have been taken s>o easily
and painlessly in 1905 or 1906, Next came the Albanian question
and the combination with the Prince of WiecL Russian diplomacy
attempted to answer Austrian intrigue by forming a Balkan league*
but this combination, as might have been expected, proved to f»e
quite unworkable. Intended to he directed against Austria, it imme-
diately turned on Turkey and fell apart in the process of dividing
the spoils taken from the latter. The final result was merely the
definite attachment of Turkey to Germany, in whom, not without
good reason, she sees her sole protector. In short the RUSKO-
British rapprochement evidently seems to Turkey as tantamount
to England's renouncing her traditional policy of closing the Dar-
danelles to us, while the creation of the Balkan league, under the
auspices of Russia, appeared as a direct threat to the continued
existence of Turkey as a European power,

To sum up, the Anglo- Russian accord has brought us nothing
of practical value up to this time, while for the future, it threatens
us with an inevitable armed clash with Germany.

FUNDAMENTAL ALIGNMENTS IN THE COM I KG WAR

Under what conditions will this clash occur and what will be its
probable consequences ? The fundamental groupings in a future war
are self-evident: Russia, France, and England, on the one side, with
Germany, Austria, and Turkey, on the other* It is more than likely
that other powers, too, will participate in that war, defending upon
circumstances as they may exist at the war's outbreak* But, whether
the immediate cause for the war is furnished by another clash of
conflicting interests in the Balkans, or by a colonial utciilcnt, such

WAR AND PEACH

as that of Algcciras, the fundamental alignment will remain
unchanged.

Italy, if she has any conception of her real interests, will not join
the German Mcle. For political as well as economic reasons, she un-
doubtedly hopes to expand her present territory. Such an expansion
may he achieved only at the expense of Austria, on one hand, and
Turkey, on the other. It is, therefore, natural for Italy not to join that
party which would safeguard the territorial integrity of the countries
at whose expense she hopes to realize her aspirations. Furthermore, it
is not out of the question that Italy would join the anti-German
coalition, if the scales of war should incline in its favor, in order
to secure for herself the most favorable conditions in sharing the
subsequent division of spoils.

In this respect, the position of Italy is similar to the probable
position of Rumania, which, it may be assumed, will remain neutral
until the scales of fortune favor one or another side. Then, animated
by normal political self-interest, she will attach herself to the victors,
to be rewarded at the expense of either Russia or Austria. Of the
other Balkan States, Serbia and Montenegro will unquestionably join
the side opposing Austria, while Bulgaria and Albania (if by that
time they have not yet formed at least the embryo of a State) will
take their stand against the Serbian side, Greece will in all probability
remain neutral or make common cause with the side opposing Turkey,
but that only after the issue has been more or less determined. The
participation of other powers will be incidental, and Sweden ought to
be feared, of course, in the ranks of our foes.

Under such circumstances, a struggle with Germany presents
to us enormous difficulties, and will require countless sacrifices. War
will not find the enemy unprepared, and the degree of his prepared-
ness will probably exceed our most exaggerated calculations. It should
not be thought that this readiness 5s due to Germany's own desire
for war. She needs no war, so long as she can attain her object, —
the end of exclusive domination of the seas. But, once this vital
object is opposed by the coalition, Germany will not shrink from war,
and, of course, will even try to provoke it, choosing the most auspi-
cious moment,

THE MAIN BUKDBN OF THE WAR WILL FALL ON RUSSIA

The main burden of the war will undoubtedly fall on us, since
England is hardly capable of taking a considerable part in a conti-
nental war, while France, poor in man power, will probably adhere

io DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

to strictly defensive tactics, in view of the enormous losses by which
war will be attended under present conditions of military technique.
The part of a battering-rain, making a breach in the very thick
of the German defense, will be ours, with many factors against us
to which we shall have to devote great effort and attention.

From the sum of these unfavorable factors we should deduct the
Far East. Both America and Japan— the former fundamentally, ami
the latter by virtue of her present political orientation-— are hostile
to Germany, and there is no reason to expect them to act on the
German side. Furthermore, the war, regardless of its issue, will
weaken Russia and divert her attention to the West, a fact which, of
course, serves both Japanese and American interests. Thus, our rear
will be sufficiently secure in the Far East, and the most that can
happen there will be the extortion from us of some concessions of
an economic nature in return for benevolent neutrality. Indeed, it
is possible that America or Japan may join the anti-German side, hut,
of course, merely as usurpers of one or the other of the unprotected
German colonies*

There can be no doubt, however, as to an outburst of hatred
for us in Persia, and a probable unrest among the Moslem* of the
Caucasus and Turkestan ; Jt is possible that Afghanistan, as a result
of that unrest, may act against us; and, finally, we must foresee
very unpleasant complications in Poland and Finland* In the latter,
a rebellion will undoubtedly break out if Sweden is found in the
ranks of our enemies. As for Poland, it is not to be expected that
we can hold her against our enemy during the war. And after she
is in his power, he will undoubtedly endeavor to provoke an insur-
rection which, while not in reality very dangerous, must be considered,
nevertheless, as one of the factors unfavorable to us, especially since
the influence of our allies may induce us to take such measures in
our relations with Poland as will prove more dangerous to us than
any open revolt.

Are we prepared for so stubborn a war as the future war of the
European nations will undoubtedly become? This question we must
answer, without evasion, In the negative. That much has teen done
for our defense since the Japanese war, I am the last person to
deny, but even so, it is quite inadequate considering the unpre-
cedented scale on which a future war will inevitably lie fought. The
fault lies, in a considerable measure, in our young legislative institu-
tions, which have taken a dilettante interest in our defenses, but are
far from grasping the seriousness of the political Situation arising

WAR AND PEACE 11

from the new orientation which, with the sympathy of the public,
has been followed in recent years by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The enormous number of still unconsidered legislative bills of
the war and navy departments may serve as proof of this : for exam-
ple, the plan of the organization of our national defense proposed
to the Duma as early as the days of Secretary of State Stolypin*
It cannot be denied that, in the matter of military Instruction, accord-
ing to the reports of specialists, we have achieved substantial
improvements, as compared with the time before the Japanese War.
According to the same specialists, our field artillery leaves nothing
to be desired; the gun is entirely satisfactory, and the equipment
convenient and practical. Yet, it must be admitted that there are
substantial shortcomings in the organization of our defenses.

In this regard we must note, first of all, the insufficiency of our
war supplies, which, certainly, cannot be blamed upon the war depart-
ment, since the supply schedules are still far from being executed,
owing to the low productivity of our factories. This insufficiency of
munitions is the more significant since, in the embryonic condition
of our industries, we shall, during the war, have no opportunity
to make up the revealed shortage by our own efforts, and the closing
of the Baltic as well as the Black Sea will prevent the importation
from abroad of the defense materials which we lack.

Another circumstance unfavorable to our defense is its far too
great dependence, generally speaking, upon foreign industry, a fact
which, in connection with the above noted interruption of more or
less convenient communications with abroad, will create a series of
obstacles difficult to overcome. The quantity of our heavy artillery,
the importance of which was demonstrated in the Japanese War,
is far too inadequate, and there are few machine guns. The organiza-
tion of our fortress defenses has scarcely been started, and even the
fortress of Reval, which is to defend the road to the capital, is not
yet finished.

The network of strategic railways is inadequate. The railways
possess a rolling stock sufficient* perhaps, for normal traffic, but
not commensurate with the colossal demands which will be made
upon them in the event of a European war. Lastly, it should not be
forgotten that the impending war will be fought among the most
civilized and technically most advanced nations. Every previous
war has invariably been followed by something new in the realm of
military technique, but the technical backwardness of our industries
4 1906- rpn.

12 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

does not create favorable conditions for our adoption of tin* new
inventions.

THE VITAL INTERESTS OF GERMANY AND RVSSJA DU NOT O*NKU<T

All these factors are hardly given proper thought by our diplo-
mats, whose behavior toward Germany ist in some respects, even
aggressive, and may unduly hasten the moment of armed conflict,
a moment which, of course, is really inevitable in view of our
British orientation.

The question is whether this orientation is correct, and whether
even a favorable issue of the war promises us such advantages as
would compensate us for all the hardships and sacrifices which mu.st
attend a war unparalleled in its probable strain,

The vital interests of Russia and Germany do not conflict. There
are fundamental grounds for a jx&ceable existence of these two
States, Germany's future lies on the sea, that is, in a realm where
Russia, essentially the most continental of the great powers* has no
interests whatever. We have no overseas colonies, and shall probably
never have them, and communication between the various parts of our
empire is easier overland than by water, No surplus population
demanding territorial expansion is visible, but, even from the view-
point of new conquests, what can we gain from a victory CUT?
Germany? Posen, or East Prussia? But why do we m»e<J these
regions, densely populated as they are by Poles, when we find it
difficult enough to manage our own Russian Poles? Why encourage
centripetal tendencies, that have not ceased even to this day in tin*
Vistula territory, by incorporating in the Russian State the ntstltw
Posnanian and East Prussian Poles, whose national demands even
the German Government, which is more firm than the Ru&tian,
cannot stifle?

Exactly the same thing applies to Galicia. It Is obviously disadvan-
tageous to us to annex, in the interests of national sentimentalism.
a territory that has lost every vital connection with our fafciierlamL
For, together with a negligible handful of Ctaltcians, Russian in
spirit, how many Poles, Jews, and Ukrainized Uniatts we wimM
receive! The so-called Ukrainian, or Mazeppbt, movement is not a
menace to us at present, but we should not enable it to expand by
increasing the number of turbulent Ukrainian elements, for in thi*
movement there undoubtedly lies the seed of an extremely dangerous
Little Russian separatism which, under favorable conditions, may
assume quite unexpected proportions.

WAR AND PEACE 13

The obvious aim of our diplomacy in the rapprochement with
England has been to open the Straits. But a war with Germany
seems hardly necessary for the attainment of this object for it
was England, and not Germany at all, that closed our outlet from
the Hlack Sea. Was it not because we made sure of the cooperation
of the latter power, that we freed ourselves in 1871 from the humili-
restrictions imposed upon us by England under the Treaty
Paris?

~s Also, there is reason to believe that the Germans would agree
* sooner than the English to let us have the Straits, in which they
JC""Thave only a slight interest, and at the price of which they would
(gladly purchase our alliance,

\ Moreover, we should not cherish any exaggerated hopes from
r-'our occupation of the Straits. Their acquisition would be advan-
//] tagcous to us only as they served to close the Black Sea to others,
^ making it an inland sea for us, safe from enemy attack.

The Straits would not give us an outlet to the open sea, however,
since on the other side of them there lies a sea consisting almost
wholly of territorial waters, a sea dotted with numerous islands
where the British navy, for instance^ would have no trouble whatever
in closing to us every inlet and outlet, irrespective of the Straits.
Therefore, Russia might safely welcome an arrangement which,
while not turning the Straits over to our direct control, would safe-
V guard us against a penetration of the Black Sea by an enemy fleet.
I/I Such an arrangement, attainable under favorable circumstances
'without any war, has the additional advantage that it would not
I/violate the interests of the Balkan States, which would not regard
Cy our seizure of the Straits without alarm and quite natural jealousy.
In Trans-Caucasia we could, as a result of war, expand territori-
ally only at the expense of regions inhabited by Armenians, a move
which is hardly desirable in view of the revolutionary character of
present Armenian sentiment, and of its dream of a greater Armenia ;
ancI in this region, Germany, were we allied to her, would certainly
place even fewer obstacles in our way than England. Those terri-
Qtorial and economic acquisitions which might really prove useful to
^us are available only in places where our ambitions may meet
^-opposition from England, but by no means from Germany. Persia,
''.the Pamir, Kuldja, Kashgar, Dzungaria, Mongolia, the Ulianghai
^territory— all these are regions where the interests of Russia and
y do not conflict, whereas the interests of Russia and England
have clashed there repeatedly.

I4 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

And Germany is in exactly the same situation with respect to
Russia. She could seize from us, in ca.se of a successful war, only
such territories as would be of slight value to her, and because of
their population, would prove of little use for colonization; the
Vistula territory, with a Polish-Lithuanian population, and the Baltic
provinces, with a Lettish-Ksthonian population, are all equally
turbulent and anti-German,

RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC ADVANTACSKS ANI> NERDS 1X> NOT CONFLICT

\vrru GERMANY'S

It may be argued, however, that, under modern conditions in the
various nations, territorial acquisitions are of secondary importance*
while economic interests take first rank. Rut in this field, again,
Russia's advantages and needs do not conflict with Germany's as
much as is believed. It is, of course, undeniable that the existing
Russo-German trade agreements are disadvantageous to our agricul-
ture and advantageous to Germany's, but it would be hardly fair to
ascribe this circumstance to the treachery and unfriendliness of
Germany.

It should not be forgotten that these agreements are in many of
their sections advantageous to us. The Russian delegates who con-
cluded these agreements were confirmed protagonists of a develop-
ment of Russian industry at any cost, and they undoubtedly madt*
a deliberate sacrifice, at least to some extent, of the interests of
Russian agriculture to the interests of Russian industry. Furthermore,
we ought not to forget that Germany is far from being the direct
consumer of the greater share of our agricultural exports abroad,
For the greater share of our agricultural produce, Germany acts
merely as middleman, and so it is for us and the consuming markets
to establish direct relations and thus avoid the expensive German
mediation. lastly, we should keep in mind that the commercial rela-
tions of States depend on their political understandings, for no
country finds advantage in the economic weakening of an ally but,
conversely, profits by the ruin of a political foe. In short, even
though it be obvious that the existing Russo-German commercial
treaties are not to our advantage, and that Germany, in concluding
them, availed herself of a situation that liappened to be in her favor tt
— in other words, forced us to the wall — -this action should have
been expected from Germany and thought of . It should not, however,
be looked upon as a mark of hostility toward us, but rattier as an
* Commercial treaty of 2904, the time of the Japanese War,

WAR AND PEACE 15

expression of healthy national self-interest, worthy of our emulation.
Aside from that, we observe, in the case of Austria-Hungary, an
agricultural country that is in a far greater economic dependence
upon Germany than ours, but nevertheless, is not prevented from
attaining an agricultural development such as we may only dream of.

In view of what has been said, it would seem that the conclusion
of a commercial treaty with Germany, entirely acceptable to Russia,
by no means requires that Germany first be crushed. It will be quite
sufficient to maintain neighborly relations with her, to make a careful
estimate of our real interests in the various branches of national
economy, and to engage in long, insistent bargaining with German
delegates, who may be expected to protect the interests of their
own fatherland and not ours.

But I would go still further and say that the ruin of Germany,
from the viewpoint of our trade with her, would be disadvantageous
to us. Her defeat would unquestionably end in a peace dictated from
the viewpoint of England's economic interests. The latter will exploit
to the farthest limit any success that falls to her lot, and we will only
lose, in a ruined Germany without sea routes, a market which, after
all, is valuable to us for our otherwise unmarketable products.

In respect to Germany's economic future, the interests of Russia
and England are diametrically opposed. For England, it is profitable
to kill Germany's maritime trade and industry, turning her into a
poor and, if possible, agricultural country. For us, it is of advantage
for Germany to develop her sea-going commerce and the industry
which serves it, so as to supply the remotest world markets, and at
the same time open her domestic market to our agricultural products,
to supply her large working population.

But, aside from the commercial treaties, it has been customary
to point out the oppressive character of German domination in Russian
economic life, and the systematic penetration of German colonization
into our country, as representing a manifest peril to the Russian
State* We believe, however, that fears on these grounds are consid-
erably exaggerated. The famous "Drang nach Osten" was in its
own time natural and understandable, since Germany's land could
not accommodate her increased population, and the surplus was driven
in the direction of the least resistance, i e., into a less densely popu-
lated neighboring country* The German Government was compelled
to recognize the inevitability of this movement, but could hardly
look upon it as to its own interests. For, after all, it was Germans
who were being lost to the influence of the German State, thus reduc-

16 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

ing the man power of their own country. Indeed, the (Icrmrtn
Government made such strenuous efforts lo preserve the connection
between its emigrants and their old fatherland that it adopted even
the unusual method of tolerating dual citizenship. It is certain,
however, that a considerable proportion of tienmn emigrants defi-
nitely and irrevocably settled in their new homes, and slowly broke
their ties with the old country. This fact, obviously incompatible with
Germany's State interests, seems to have been one of the incentives
which started her uj>on a colonial jx>Hcy and maritime commerce*
previously so alien to her. And at present, as the Cennan colonies
increase and there is an attendant growth of German industry and
naval commerce, the German colonization movement decreases, in &
measure, and the day is not remote when the "Drang nach Oaten"
will become nothing more, than a subject for history.

In any case, the German colonization, which undoubtedly conflicts
with our State interests, must be stopped, and heic, a^ain, friendly
relations with Germany cannot harm us. To express a preference for
a German orientation does not imply the advocacy of Russian vassal-
age to Germany, and, while maintaining friendly and neighborly
intercourse with her, we must not sacrifice our State interests to this
object But Germany herself will not object to measures against the
continued flow of German colonists into Russia* To her, it is of
greater benefit to turn the wave of emigration toward her own
colonies. Moreover, even before Germany had colonies, whet* her
industry was not yet sufficiently develojxxi to employ the entire popu-
lation, the German Government did not feel justified in protesting
against the restrictive measures that were adopted against foreign
colonization during the reign of Alexander III.

As regards the German domination in the field of our economic
life, this phenomenon hardly justifies the complaints usually voiced
against it. Russia is far too |X)or> IxHh in capital and hi industrial
enterprise, to get along without a large import of foreign capital
A certain amount of dependence upon some kind of foreign capital
5s, therefore, unavoidable, until such time as the industrial enter*
prise and material resources of our population develop to a point
where we may entirely forego the services of foreign investors and
their money. But as long as we do require them, German capital
is more advantageous to us than any other*

First and foremost, this capital is cheaper tlian any other, Inmtjj
satisfied with the lowest margin of profit- Thi>, to a large extent,
explains the relative cheapness of German products, and their gradual

WAR AND PEACE 17

displacement of British products in the markets of the world. The
lower demands of German capital, as regards returns, have for their
consequence Germany's readiness to invest in enterprises which,
because of their relatively small returns, are shunned by other foreign
investors. Also, as a result of that relative cheapness of German
capital, its influx into Russia is attended by a smaller outflow of
investors' profits from Russia, as compared with French and English
investments, and so a larger amount of rubles remain in Russia.
Moreover, a considerable proportion of the profits made on German
investments in Russian industry do not leave our country at all, but
are spent in Russia.

Unlike the English or French, the German capitalists, in most
cases, come to stay in Russia, themselves, with their money. It is
this very German characteristic which explains in a considerable
degree the amazing number of German industrialists, manufacturers,
and mill owners 'in our midst, as compared with the British and
French. '

The latter live in their own countries, removing from Russia the
profits produced by their enterprises, down to the last kopek. The
German investors, on the contrary, live in Russia for long periods, and
not infrequently settle down permanently. Whatever may be said
to the contrary, the fact is that the Germans, unlike other foreigners,
soon feel at home in Russia and rapidly become Russianized. Who
has not seen Frenchmen and Englishmen, for example, who have
spent almost their whole lives in Russia and yet do not speak a
word of Russian? On the other hand, are there many Germans
here who cannot make themselves understood in Russian, even
though it be with a strong accent and in broken speech? Nay, more —
who has not seen genuine Russians, orthodox, loyal with all their
hearts dedicated to the principles of the Russian State, and yet only
one or two generations removed from their German emigrant ances-
try? Lastly, we must not forget that Germany herself is, to a certain
extent, interested in our economic well-being. In this regard, Germany
differs, to our advantage, from other countries, which are inter-
ested exclusively in obtaining the largest possible returns from
capital invested in Russia, even at the cost of the economic ruin
of this country. Germany, however, in her capacity of permanent —
although, of course, not unselfish — middleman for our foreign
trade, has an interest in preserving the productive resources of
our country, as a source of profitable intermediary operations for
her.

18 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

EVEN A VICTORY OVER GERMANY PROMISES RUSSIA AN
UNFAVORABLE PROSPECT

In any case, even if we were to admit the necessity for eradicating
German domination in the field of our economic life, even at the
price of a total banishment of German capital from Russian industry,
appropriate measures could be taken, it would seem, without war
against Germany. Such a war will demand such enormous expendi-
tures that they will many times exceed the more than doubtful
advantages to us in the abolition of the Herman | economic j domina-
tion. More than that, the result of such a war will l>e an economic
situation compared with which the yoke of Gentian capital will
seem easy.

For there can l>e no doubt that the war will necessitate expendi-
tures which are beyond Russia's limited financial means. We shall
have to obtain credit from allied and neutral countries, but this will
not be granted gratuitously. As to what will 'happen if the war
should end disastrously for us, I da not wish to discuss now. The
financial and economic consequences of defeat can be neither calcu-
lated nor foreseen, and will undoubtedly spell the total ruin of our
entire national economy.

But even victory promises us extremely unfavorable financial
prospects ; a totally ruined Germany will not be in a position to com-
pensate us for the cost involved. Dictated in the interest of Knglantl.
the peace treaty will not afford Germany opportunity for sufficient
economic recuperation to cover our war exjxmditttres, even at n
distant time* The little which we may perhaps succeed in extorting
from her will have to be shared with our allies, and to our share
there will fall but negligible crumbs, compared with the war ccwt.
Meantime, we shall have to pay our war loans, not without pressure
by the allies. For, after the destruction of German power, we
shall no longer be necessary to them, Nay, more, our iwlitical might,
enhanced by our victory, will induce them to weaken us, at
least economically. And so it is inevitable that, even after a vic-
torious conclusion of the war, we shall fall into the same sort of
financial and economic dependence *ai>on our creditorst compared
with which our present dependence upon German capital will seem
ideal.

However, no matter how sad may be the economic prospects
which face us as a result of union with England, and, by that token,
of war with Germany, they are still of secondary importance when

WAR AND PEACE 19

we think of the political consequences of this fundamentally unnatural
alliance.

A STRUGGLE BETWEEN Rl'SSIA AND GERMANY IS PROFOUNDLY

rxDEsiKAnu«; TO BOTH SIDKR, AS IT AMOUNTS TO A

WEAKENING OF THE MONARCHIST PRINCIPLE

It should not be forgotten that Russia and Germany are the
representatives of the conservative principle in the civilized world, as
opixmed to the democratic principle, incarnated in England and, to an
infinitely lesser degree, in France, Strange as it may seem, England,
monarchistic and conservative to the marrow at home, has in her
foreign relations always acted as the protector of the most demagogi-
cal tendencies, invariably encouraging all popular movements aiming
at the weakening of the monarchical principle.

From this point of view, a struggle between Germany and Russia,
regardless of its issue, is profoundly undesirable to both sides, as
undoubtedly involving the weakening of the conservative principle in
the world of which the above-named two great powers are the only
reliable bulwarks. More than that, one must realize that under the
exceptional conditions which exist, a general European war is mortally
dangerous both for Russia and Germany, no matter who wins. It
is our firm conviction, based upon a long and careful study of all
contemporary subversive tendencies, that there must inevitably break
out in the defeated country a social revolution which, by the very
nature of things, will spread to the country of the victor.

During the many years of peaceable neighborly existence, the
two countries have Ixicome united by many ties, and a social upheaval
in one is bound to affect the other. That these troubles will be of a
social, and not a political, nature cannot be doubted, and this will
hold true, not only as regards Russia, but for Germany as well. An
especially favorable soil for social upheavals is found in Russia,
where the masses undoubtedly profess, unconsciously, the principles
of Socialism. In spite of the spirit of antagonism to the Government
in Russian society, as unconscious as the Socialism of the broad
masses of the people, a political revolution is not possible in Russia,
and any revolutionary movement inevitably must degenerate into a
Socialist movement* The opponents of the Government have no
popular supi>ort The people see tio difference between a govern-
ment official and an intellectual. The Russian masses, whether
yorkmen or peasants, are not looking for political rights, which they
neither want nor comprehend.

DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

The peasant dreams of obtaining a gratuitous share of some-
body else's land; the workman, of getting hold of the entire capita!
and profits of the manufacturer, Beyond this, they have no aspira-
tions. If these slogans are scattered far and wide among the populace,
and the Government permits agitation along these lines, Russia will
be flung into anarchy, such as she suffered in the ever-memuraUe
period of troubles in 1905-1906. War with Germany would create
exceptionally favorable conditions for such agitation. As already
stated, this war is pregnant with enormous difficulties for us^aml
cannot turn out to he a mere triumphal march to Berlin, ftnth military
disasters— partial ones, let us hope— and all kinds of shortcomings
in our supply are inevitable. In the excessive nervousness and spirit
of opposition of our society, these events will be given an exaggerated
importance, and all the blame will be laid on the Government.

It will be well if the Government does not yield, but declares
directly that in time of war no criticism of the governmental authority
is to be tolerated, and resolutely suppresses all opposition. In tin'
absence of any really strong hold on the people by the opposition,
this would settle the affair. The people did not heal the writers «if ilw
Wiborg Manifesto,* in its time, and they will not follow them nnw,

But a worse thing may happen: the government authority mav
make concessions, may try to come to an agreement with the opj*^-
tion, and thereby weaken itself just when the Socialist elements are
ready for action. Even though it may sound like a paradox, the fart
is that agreement with the opposition in Russia positively weakens
the Government. The trouble is that our opposition refuses to reckon
with the fact that it represents no real force. The Russian opposition
is intellectual throughout, and this is its weakness, because betwwn
the intelligentsia and the people there is a profound gulf of mutual
misunderstanding and distrust. We need an artificial election law,
indeed, we require the direct influence of the governmental authority,
to assure the election to the State Duma of even the most milmis
champions of popular rights. Let the Government refuse to support
the elections, leaving them to their natural course, and the tegfolattvc
institutions would not see within their walls a single intellectual.
outside of a few demagogic agitators. However insistent the member*
of our legislative institutions may be that the people confide in them,
the peasant would rather believe the landless government official
than the Octobristr landlord in the Duma, while the workingman

f Protest made by members of the Duma in July, 19061, at VVItorg, Finland*
T The name of a political party.

WAR AND PEACE 21

treats the wage-earning factory inspector with more confidence than
the legislating manufacturer, even though the latter professes every
principle of the Cadet party.

It is more than strange, under these circumstances, that the gov-
ernmental authority should be asked to reckon seriously with the
opposition, that it should for this purpose renounce the role of
impartial regulator of social relationships, and come out before the
broad masses of the people as the obedient organ of the class aspira-
tions of the intellectual and propertied minority of the population.
The opposition demands that the Government should tie responsible
to it, representative of a class, and should obey the parliament which
it artificially created. (Let us recall that famous expression of V.
Xahokov : "Let the executive power submit to the legislative power !")
In other words, the opposition demands that the Government should
adopt the psychology of a savage, and worship the idol which he
himself made.

RUSSIA WILL BE FLUNG INTO HOPELESS ANARCHY, THE ISSUE OF
WHICH WILL BE HARD TO FORESEE

If the war ends in victory,, the putting down of the Socialist
movement will not offer any insurmountable obstacles. There will be
agrarian troubles, as a result of agitation for compensating the
soldiers with additional land allotments ; there will be labor troubles
during the transition from the probably increased wages of war time
to normal schedules ; and this, it is to be hoped, will be all, so long
as the wave of the German social revolution has not reached us. But
in the event of defeat, the possibility of which in a struggle with a
foe like Germany cannot be overlooked, social revolution in its most
extreme form is inevitable.

As has already been said, the trouble will start with the blaming
of the Government for all disasters. In the legislative institutions a
bitter campaign against the Government will begin, followed by
revolutionary agitations throughout the country, with Socialist slogans,
capable of arousing and rallying the masses, beginning with the
division of the land and succeeded by a division of all valuables and
property. The defeated army, having lost its most dependable men,
and carried away by the tide of primitive peasant desire for land,
will find itself too demoralized to serve as a bulwark of law and
order. The legislative institutions and the intellectual opposition
parties, lacking real authority in the eyes of the people, will be power-
less to stem the popular tide, aroused by themselves, and Russia

22 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

will be flung Into hopeless anarchy, the issue of which cannot
be foreseen.

GERMANY, IN CASE OF DEFEAT, IS PECTIN KD TO Sl'FKKR SOCIAL
UPHEAVALS NO LKSS THAN THOSE OK Rl'SSIA

No matter how strange it may appear at first sight, considering
the extraordinary poise of the German character, Germany, likewise,
is destined to suffer, in case of defeat, no lesser social upheavals.
The effect of a disastrous war upon the population will be too severe
not to bring to the surface destructive tendencies, now deeply hidden.
The peculiar social order of modern Germany rests upon the actually
predominant influence of the agrarians, Prussian jttnkerdom and
propertied peasants.

These elements are the bulwark of the profoundly conservative
German regime, headed by Prussia. The vital interests of these
classes demand a protective economic policy towards agriculture,
import duties on grain, and, consequently, high prices fur all farm
products. But Germany, with her limited territory and increasing
population, has long ago turned from an agricultural into an indus-
trial State, so that protection of agriculture is, in effect, a matter of
taxing the larger part of the population for the benefit of the smaller.
To this majority, there is a compensation in the extensive develop-
ment of the export of German industrial products to the most distant
markets, so that the advantages derived thereby enable the industrial-
ists and working people to pay the higher prices for the farm products
consumed at home.

Defeated, Germany will lose her world markets and maritime
commerce, for the aim of the war— on the part of its real instigator »
England — will be the destruction of German eumjKtitioiK After this
has been achieved, the laboring masses, deprived not only of higher,
but of any and all wages, having suffered greatly during the war, and
being, naturally, embittered, will offer fertile soil for anti -agrarian
and later anti-social propaganda by the Socialist parties.

These parties, in turn, making use of the outraged patriotic senti-
ment among the people, owing to the IOHH of the war, their
exasperation at the militarists and the feudal burgher regime that
betrayed them, will abandon the road of peaceable evolution which
they have thus far been following so steadily, and take & purely
revolutionary path. Some part will also be played, especially in the
event of agrarian troubles in neighboring Russia, by the ekss of
landless farmhands, which is quite numerous in Germany. Apart

WAR AND TEACK 23

from this, there will be a revival of the hitherto concealed separatist
tendencies in southern Germany, and the hidden antagonism of
Bavaria to domination by Prussia will emerge in all its intensity.
In short, a situation will be created which (in gravity) will be little
better than that in Russia.

PEACE AMONG THE CIVILIZED NATIONS IS IMPERILED CHIEFLY BY

THE DESIRE OF ENGLAND TO RETAIN HER VANISHING

DOMINATION OF THE SEAS

A summary of all that has been stated above must lead to the
conclusion that a rapprochement with England does not promise us
any benefits, and that the English orientation of our diplomacy is
essentially wrong. We do not travel the same road as England; she
should be left to go her own way* and we must not quarrel on her
account with Germany.

The Triple Entente is an artificial combination, without a basis
of real interest. It has nothing to look forward to. The future belongs
to a close and incomparably more vital rapprochement of Russia,
Germany, France (reconciled with Germany), and Japan (allied to
Russia by a strictly defensive union). A political combination like
this, lacking all aggressiveness toward other States, would safeguard
for many years the peace of the civilized nations, threatened, not by
the militant intentions of Germany, as English diplomacy is trying
to show, but solely by the perfectly natural striving of England to
retain at all costs her vanishing domination of the seas. In this
direction, and not in the fruitless search of a basis for an accord
with England, which is in its very nature contrary to our national
plans and aims, should all the efforts of our diplomacy be
concentrated,

It goes without saying that Germany, on her part, must meet our
desire to restore our well-tested relations and friendly alliance
with her, and to elaborate, in closest agreement with us, such terms
of our neighborly existence as to afford no basis for anti-German
agitation on the part of our constitutional-liberal parties, which, by
their very nature, are forced to adhere, not to a Conservative German,
but to a liberal English orientation,

R N, DURNOVO
February, 19x4*

24 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

2. EXCERPTS FROM THE SPEECH OF .MARKOV
THE SECOND *

... In England, according to Miliukov,* the state of affairs is such
that she will not march with us to the end. I would add that not only
will England not march with us to the end, but it swns that she
does not even start with us; at least we have not noticed such a joint
procession. But, of course, Miliukov considers it natural that she
does not march with us. As if England would march to the end with
us poor, miserable Russians! In taking1 issue with the Minster's
speech,10 in which attention was called to the pernicious role of the
press, Russian as well as German, in straining the relations between
Germany and Russia, he [Miliukov] said: "Yes, at Berlin they
denounce the press, and at Petersburg they have denounced it today,
but at the 26th convention of the representatives of the press in
London, they praised it" Poor Professor Miliukov! Why do they
praise it in London ? Because it is carrying out the task dictated by
London, of getting Russia to quarrel with Germany. It is quite
obvious that If the Russian press and the German pn<ss arc carrying
out this purpose of England's, they are praised in Umdon. They arc
praised, for it is profitable for the English to have Russia and
Germany fight each other, because if these two should smash their
heads, England would grow more powerful. And it is strange that
such a simple thought should not have occurred to tlu*e professors
who want to debate with our Minister. . . . We have two grouping
in Europe : On the one hand, the strong Triple Alliance with Ger-
many, Austria, and England; (J/oiVwi No, not England, but Italy!")
and on the other, the alliance of the powers of the Triple Entente.
This entente contains one alliance — how stable, I do not know — of
France and Russia, and two friendships; one alliance and two
friendships: a Franco-English friendship and a Kusso- English
friendship, something like a re-insurance union. But, gentlemen, what
is a friendship? An alliance is understandable; nation* conclude :t
treaty which is signed by their plenipotentiaries, a treaty that mu*t
be observed* But a friendship— well, that is something pleasant, some-
thing that pleases the ear, but it is very hard to put down, not only

* Stenographic Record of the Duma, May 33, 19*4, 4*9-4?*. Markov, N. E,,
bom in 1866, member of the 3rd ami 4th Dumas, organiser of react icnuiry
societies, and director of a reactionary press subsidized by the Government,

* Speech made by MtHukov on the same day.
*Sazonov, S. D., Minister of Foreign Affairs,

WAR AND PEACE 25

on paper, but even to see as a clear mental picture. What kind of
friendship? Friendship between whom? Just recall here the words
of the great founder of the Franco-Russian Alliance, Emperor Alex-
ander III of blessed memory. Toasting the then Prince of
.Montenegro,11 he said: "I drink to the health of Russia's only friend,
the Prince of Montenegro!" Subsequent history has made certain
amendments even in this case. I shall not refer to them now,
(Uuighter) but, at any rate, this toast proved that the man who had
created the Franco-Russian Alliance believed that in Europe and all
over the world Russia had no friends. His speaking of Montenegro's
friendship was, of course, merely a nice compliment, since this
Montenegrin friendship obviously could not have any practical value.
Russia, as stated by Emperor Alexander III, had no real friends then,
as she has none now.

]>ut, gentlemen, if we have no friends, if Alexander III, who
formed an alliance but not an entente cordialc, declared that we are
without friends, then, gentlemen, it will not be a great mistake to
say that where there are no friends, there can be no friendship, and
that those who are basing any real expectations upon friendship are
only preparing for themselves the greatest of surprises and troubles.
Talking about the friendship of England and Russia, let me ask,
gentlemen, what is happening in Persia? In Persia, we are being
pushed out. We are being pushed out of there from every side, and
who is it that is driving us out? It is England, * . .

Again, take the case of the Bosphorus. Professor Miliukov cited
here the note of our Minister of Foreign Affairs, during that critical
moment in January,32 the note which stated that Russia would not
mind taking some active measures, but that not a single power had
been willing to join us. Mr. Miliukov cited that as, forsooth, an indict-
ment against Austria and Germany, because they refused to join
us* But I would add that it means that England and France, likewise,
refused to join us. There you have friendship! When real help was
needed, when the question of the Bosphorus was raised, England and
France did not join us, and, naturally enough, Russia wisely refrained
from active steps. I approve of her refraining, but I cannot help
saying that the friendship of the English lasts only so long as there
is no necessity for active assistance to Russia. This is where the
limits of English friendship He. I doubt very much if, in case of a
European war, such as is being prophesied with especial glee by those

* On the occasion of his visit. May 30, 1889.

** The speaker has seemingly confused the notes and dates*

26 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

on the left, the British navy would come to defend Petersburg and
the Baltic against the German fleet. I am by no means certain of
this, and, so long as I have no evidence to the contrary, I assume
that no such thing will happen. To put it succinctly, in all of the
more important problems arising in this or that complication, we may
expect practically nothing of real value from our friendship with
England.

But we are gradually dissipating our friendship with Germany,
and yet this friendship gave us, as recently as the Japanese War,
tangible evidence of being real and not fictitious ... I believe that,
so long as the final word has not been spoken, so long as the war
which will result from these group agreements is not yet here, it is
my duty, as a representative of a considerable portion of the nation,
if not the whole of it, to say: we should attempt up to the very last
moment to lessen the pernicious consequences of this combining with
England against Germany. We ought to see whether this grouping
can not be changed. The situation is this: In case of war, we need
the French troops and English warships; but only in case of war. In
time of peace, we clo not need them at all. Would it not be better if
we started first with the question of peace and next with the
problem of war ? Is not this possibility of war merely the consequence
of the alliance which we have entered? Are we not becoming involved
in an inevitable war for the sake of interests of which I know
nothing, and for no other reason than that we are associated with
France and England against Germany and Austria? Is there no
practical way out? Is it impossible to devise some sensible way out*
which might satisfy the dignity and interests of both Russia and
Germany? Are the conflicts between Russia and Germany really
unavoidable? What is there to divide us and Germany? In what way
does Germany interfere with us, or we with her?

We should not stick to old agreements just because they are
concluded, but try to find something new*

Let the progressivists face forward! ami not be conservative;*,
looking behind in matters of foreign policy* If for instance, am by no
means sure that the Straits, which we actually do need as an outlet
from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean— solely for this purpose-
are being withheld from us by no one but Germany, I have the
impression from history that it was not Germany at ail that kept us
out of the Straits, but rather England and France. (Pj*m/tAmcfc:
Undoubtedly!) All history shows that it is England which has been
keeping us out of the Straits, and now it is not Germany alone, not

WAR AND PEACE 27

General Liman von Sanders 1S alone, who has been keeping us out, but
our own, friendly England. Such is my own conviction, and I think
that very many of you, here, share that conviction. But it may be that
we can come to terms with Germany, so as to have the Straits opened
for Russia, even against the wishes of England. For England does
not wish to tie her hands with Russia. She reserves for herself her
freedom of action. She offers us only her friendship. Well, then, let
us give our friendship to her, but, at the same time, let us give our
friendship to Germany, in return for the Straits, sacrificing, it is
true, something which does not belong to us, and to which we are
vainly turning our eyes, for it will never be ours, anyway. . . .

I believe, gentlemen, as the average person believes, that it
were better if we had, in place of a great friendship with England,
a small alliance with Germany. That would prove a simpler matter,
and I believe we would find it much easier to come to an under-
standing. We have had no war with Germany for more than one
hundred years ; nay, I should say even more than one hundred years.
The Napoleonic wars cannot be considered as wars with Germany.
Why, we have not fought her since the days of Elizabeth Petrovna.14
We have no cause for war. There is need of war between France and
Germany. There is need of war between England and Germany.
Hut there is no need of war between Russia and Germany. Neither
Germany nor Russia needs it ; that is self-evident. Yet we are being
dragged into war, because, after all, we possess two million bayonets
and a small fleet of battleships, and these improve the chances of
England and France. From their point of view they are quite right.
But, no matter what their chauvinists may be writing, it is a fact that
both the French and English are expert calculators, whereas the
Russians are poor mathematicians, and frequently pursue a Don
Quixotian policy. It is time for us to abandon this policy, even though
it be called Slavophilism . . .

And so, gentlemen, summarizing what I have said here, I must
state that the first duty of our diplomacy at the present moment
should be to discover, if possible, a way to a peaceable understanding
with Germany, one that will respect the dignity of each side and not
violate our mutual interests. I deliberately refrain from mentioning
Austria-Hungary, speaking only of Germany, and I telieve that it is
in this direction that the able captains of our foreign policy will
find that solution which alone, in my opinion, answers the genuine,

* German officer who became Inspector-General of the Turkish army w 19x3-
** 1741-1761, Period of Seven Years* War*

28 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

real, and not fictitious interests of the Russian people, of the German
people, and of the whole world, since this is the only way of averting
a most terrible war, the consequences of which no one can
predict. . . .

3. RASPUTIN'S VIEWS
LETTER OF EMPRESS TO THE EMPEROR

June 24, 1915,"

, . . He [Rasputin] was much against the war. , . .

Norember 14, 19 IS-10

, . . Our Friend (Rasputin) was always against this war, saying
the Balkans were not worth the work! to fight about , ami that Serbia
would be as ungrateful as Bulgaria proved itself, . . .

"The war must be stopped — war must not be declared ; it will be
the end of all things/' 17

"Pisma Imperatritsy Aleksandry Fedorovny k Imperatortt Kiknlaiu II,
I, 463. (Irigori Eiimovich Rasputin- was Ijorn in 1871 ami diwi in 19x6.

"IbM., 579.

MDehnr Lili: "The Real Tsarhsa,'* 106. This telegram Rasputin sent tu
Anna Vyrubova when he heard of the order to mobilize.

CHAPTER II
OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Whatever differences of opinion existed between the reac-
tionaries and liberals before August, 1914, disappeared imme-
diately after the declaration of war. All parties in the Duma, from
the reactionaries to the moderate Socialists, rallied around the
Emperor and promised their support. They were carried away
by a spirit of idealism and by the vision of a better day for
Russia and the world. For the first time in his reign, the Tsar
was popular and in agreement with the representatives of the
people.

i. IMPERIAL MANIFESTO *

August 2, 1914.

BY the Grace of God, We, Nicholas II, Emperor and Autocrat of
all Russia, Tsar of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., etc., etc.,
proclaim to all Our loyal subjects:

Following her historical traditions, Russia, united in faith and
blood with the Slav nations, has never regarded their fate with
indifference* The unanimous fraternal sentiments of the Russian
people for the Slavs have been aroused to special intensity in the past
few days, when Austria-Hungary presented to Serbia demands which
she foresaw would be unacceptable to a Sovereign State.

Having disregarded the conciliatory and peaceable reply of the
Serbian Government, and having declined Russia's well-intentioned
mediation, Austria hastened to launch an armed attack in a bombard-
ment of unprotected Belgrad.

Compelled, by the force of circumstances thus created, to adopt
the necessary measures of precaution, We commanded that the army
and the navy be put on a war footing, but, at the same time, holding
the blood and the treasure of Our subjects dear, We made every

*"Riecb»" No, 193, August 4, 1914.

3o DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

effort to obtain a peaceable issue of the negotiations that had been
started.

In the midst of friendly communications, Austria's All>% Ger-
many, contrary to our trust in century-old relations of neighborliness,
and paying no heed to Our assurances that the measures \Ve had
adopted implied no hostile aims whatever, insisted upon their immedi-
ate abandonment, and, meeting with a rejection of this demand, sud-
denly declared war on Russia.

We have now to intercede not only for a related country, unjustly
attacked, but also to safeguard the honor, dignity, and integrity of
Russia, and her position among the Great Powers. We firmly believe
that all Our loyal subjects will rally sclf-sarrifictngly and with one
accord to the defense of the Russian soil.

At this hour of threatening danger, let domestic strife be for-
gotten. Let the union between the Tsar and His people be stronger
than ever, and let Russia, rising like one man, repel the insolent
assault of the enemy.

With a profound faith in the justice of Our cause, and trusting
humbly in Almighty Providence, We invoke prayerfully the Divine
blessing for Holy Russia and our valiant troops.

Given at Saint Petersburg, on the second day of August, in the
year of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, and the
twentieth year of Our reign.

NICHOLAS.

2. SPEECHES ON THE OCCASION OF THE TSAR'S

RECEPTION AT THE WINTER PALACE,

AUGUST 8, 1914

(a) THE TSAR'S RECEPTION OF THE MEMBERS op THR STATE DI'MA

AND STATE COUNCIL AT THE WINTER PAI.ACB.*

. . . The Emperor deigned ... to address the gathering in the
following words;

I greet you in these momentous, alarming days through which all
Russia is passing.

First Germany, and then Austria, has declared war on fta**ia.

The tremendous outburst of patriotic feeling, love of country,
and devotion to the Throne which has swept Our whole country like
a hurricane, serves in My sight and, I trust, in yours, too, as a pledge

*"RiecV August 8> 1914.

WAR AND PEACE 31

that Our great Mother Russia will carry to the desired conclusion
the war which the Lord God has sent her.

From this unanimous impulse of love and readiness for any
sacrifice, even of life itself, I derive sustaining strength and the ability
to look calmly and confidently towards the future.

We are not only defending Our honor and dignity within Our
Own country, but are fighting as well for Our Slav brothers, who
are one with Us in blood and faith.

And at this moment I see with joy, also, that the union of the
Slavs with all of Russia is strengthened and indissoluble.

I feel convinced that all of you, each in his own sphere, will help
Me bear the trial visited upon Me, and that each of Us, beginning
with Myself, will fulfil his duty to the end.

Great is the God of Russia.

(&) RODZIANKO'S ADDRESS AT THE TSAR*S RECEPTION OF DUMA
DEPUTIES IN THE WINTER PALACE.8

YOUR IMPERIAL MAJESTY!

All Russia has heard with great pride and deep enthusiasm the
words of the Russian Tsar, summoning his people to join him in a
perfect union at this difficult hour of sore trials which has come upon
our country.

Sire! Russia knows that your thoughts and desires have always
l>een to bring about conditions which would make it possible for the
nation to live and work in peace, and that your loving heart strove
for a stable peace in order to protect the lives of your subjects that
are dear to you.

But the terrible hour has struck. All of us, young and old, have
seized the significance and profundity of the historical events which
have unfolded themselves. A threat has been made against the pros-
perity and integrity of the State ; national honor has been offended ;
and national honor is dearer to us than life. It is time to show the
world how terrible the Russian people, which surrounds its crowned
leader with a firm faith in Divine Providence, like an impenetrable
wall, can be to the enemy.

Sire ! The time has come for a stubborn fight to protect our na-
tional dignity, a fight for the integrity and inviolability of the Russian
land. There is neither doubt nor hesitation among us. Summoned
to participate in the life of the State, at Your Majesty's will, the

f "Ricoh," August 8> 1914— Special edition, supplement to No, 197.

32 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

people's representatives now stand before you. The State Duma,
reflecting the unanimous impulse of every section of Russia, and
joined together in the single thought which unifies us all, has charged
me to say to you, Sire, that your people is ready to fight for the honor
and glory of the fatherland*

Without differences of opinions, views, or convictions, the State
Duma, speaking in the name of the Russian country, i* calmly and
firmly saying to its Tsar: "Dare, Sire! The Russian people is with
you and, trusting firmly in Divine mercy, will stop at no sacrifice until
the enemy is crushed, and the dignity of our native land secured/*

(r) THE TSAR'S RESPONSE 4

In response to the salutation of the Presidents of the two legisla-
tive chambers 5 the Emperor deigned to address the following words
to the Members of the State Council and the State Duma :

I thank you heartily, gentlemen, lor the sincere patriotic feelings
you have expressed, which I never doubted, and which have been
manifested in fact at this moment*

With all my soul, I wish you every success.

God is with Us !

3. SPEECHES AT THE DUMA, AUGUST 8, 1914

(a) RODZIANKO'S SPEECH IN THE DUMA *

Gentlemen, Members of the State Duma:

The Emperor lias deigned, in this difficult hour through which
our fatherland is passing, to convoke the State Duma* for the sake
of a union of the Russian Tsar with his loyal people. The State
Duma has already answered the Sovereign's call at today's reception
by His Majesty. We all know that Russia did not desire war, and
that the Russian i>eople has no idea of conquest, but fate itself ha*
seen fit to drag us into the fight. The lot is cast, and we are con-
fronted by the gigantic problem of defending the integrity and unity
of the State.

In this rapid whirl of events, unprecedented in the history of
the world, it is a comfort to see the majestic and dignified calm
which has taken possession of all of us, without exception, and

4 "Riech," August 8, 19*4— Special edition, supplement to No, 197.
* State Duma and State Council

Vtetoik," No. 165, Augu&t & 1914,

WAR AND PEACE 33

which emphasizes before the whole world, most strikingly and
without any superfluous words the might and greatness of the Russian
spirit. (Stormy applause. CVies of "Bravo!" and "Hurrah!" on all
benches.) Calmly and without blustering we may say to our attackers:
"Hands off!" (Applause and cries of "Hurrah!" throughout the
Duma*) "Don't dare to touch our holy Russia! Our people is peace-
loving and good, but terrible and powerful when forced to protect
itself." (Stormy applause.) "Look at us/' we might say to them.
"You thought we were divided by strife and hatred, and yet all the
nationalities dwelling in boundless Russia were welded into a single
fraternal family when danger threatened our common fatherland."
(Applause on all benches.) Nor will the Russian giant hang his head
in discouragement, no matter what trials he may have to undergo.
His ix)werful shoulders will bear everything and, after repulsing the
enemy, our common, inseparable native land will again shine forth
in peace, prosperity, and happiness in the full glory of its indestruct-
ible greatness, (Continued applause.)

Gentlemen, Members of the State Duma! At this hour our
thoughts and wishes are on our frontiers, where our gallant army,
our glorious navy go into. action unflinchingly. (Applause on all
benches.) Our thoughts are with our sons and brothers where they
personify the greatness of our country with their inherent bravery.
May the Supreme Lord aid them, strengthen and protect them. Our
fervent wishes for success and glory will always "be with them, our
heroes. We, who remain at home, will assume the obligation to work
unceasingly in caring for the families left without providers, and
may they know, in our army, that not merely in word, but in deed
we will see to it that they suffer no acute distress. (Stormy and con-
tinuous applause ; cries of u Bravo T The Deputies rise ; there are calls
for the national hymn, which is sung, accompanied by shouts of
"Hurrah!")

(b) KERENSKl'S SPEECH IN THE DUMA T

Gentlemen, Members of the State Duma:

The Labor Group lias instructed me to make public the following
declaration :

"A sore trial has been visited upon our native land and great
sorrow has overwhelmed the whole country ! Thousands upon thou-
sands of youthful lives are doomed to inhuman sufferings, and

* "Rfech" No. 198, August 9> W4-

34 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

poverty and hunger are about to ruin the welfare of the bereaved
families of the toiling masses.

"We are unshakably convinced that the great, irresistible power
of the Russian democracy, with all the other forces, will offer deter-
mined resistance to the attacks of the enemy (Applause on the left,
center, and right), and will defend the native land and culture, created
in the sweat and blood of generations! We believe that on the fields
of battle, in great sufferings, the brotherhood of all the nationalities
of Russia will be consolidated (Applause on the left, center awl
right), and that there will be born a single will to free the country
from its terrible internal shackles,

"The culpability of the Governments of all the European countries
which, in the interests of the ruling classes, drove their peoples to
this fratricidal war is unforgivable. The Socialists of all belligerent
countries— France, England, Belgium, and Germany— tried to protest
against the war that has now broken out. Only we, the Russian
democracy, were prevented, even in the last terrible hour, from lifting
our voice betimes against the approaching war. But, believing firmly
in the unity of the laboring classes of al! countries, we send our
fraternal greetings to all those who did protest against this fratricidal
slaughter among the nations, while it was being prepared.

"Citizens of Russia 1 Remember that you have no enemies among
the laboring classes of the belligerent countries. While defending to
the last everything that is our own, against attempted seizures by the
Governments of Germany and Austria, which are hostile to us,
remember that this frightful war would not have come had the great
ideals of democracy, liberty, equality, and fraternity inspired the
activity of Russia's rulers and the Governments of all other
countries.

"Unfortunately, our Government, even at this dreadful hour, has
no desire to forget internal strife, It denies amnesty to those who
are fighting for the freedom and the happiness of our country, and
it does not seek reconciliation with the non- Russian nationalities,
who have forgiven everything and are, with us, fighting enthusiast i-
cally for our common fatherland* And, instead of ameliorating the
condition of the laboring classes of the nation, it imposes upon these
very classes the main weight of war expenditures, increasing the
burdens of indirect taxation,

"You, peasants and workers, all you who desire the happiness
and welfare of Russia, strengthen your spirit in these sure trials,
gather all your forces, and then, having defended our country, set

WAR AND PEACE 35

it free. To you, our brothers, who are shedding their blood for our
native land, our humble homage and fraternal greetings." (Applause
on the left, center, and some seats on the right.)

(r) MILIUKOV'S SPEECH IN THE DUMA8

The Faction 0 of Popular Freedom has repeatedly spoken in the
Duma on the problems touched upon by the first two speakers on
this platform.10 Its opinions on these problems are generally known,
and, of course, cannot be altered by extraneous circumstances. When
the time comes, the Faction will again speak of these problems and
again point out the only possible road toward Russia's regeneration.
It trusts that in passing through the sore trials which confront us
the country may come nearer to its cherished aim.

At this moment, however, we have all been deeply impressed
by other matters. Another problem, terrible and awful, stands
before us and imperatively demands immediate solution. We must
concentrate all our forces upon defending the country from a foreign
foe, who is bent on pushing us aside, on his way towards world
dominion. Our cause is a righteous cause. We fight for the free-
dom of our native land from foreign invasion, for the freedom
of Europe and Slavdom from German domination (Voices on the
left: "Bravo!"), and the freedom of the whole world from the unen-
durable yoke of constantly growing armaments, ruinous to peaceful
labor (Voices cm the left: "Bravo !")» causing more and more
armed conflicts.

In this struggle we are all as one; we present no conditions or
demands ; we simply throw upon the scales of battle our firm deter-
mination to overcome the violator, (Applause on all benches. Cries::
" Bravo!") This is why the Central Committee of our party, guided
by these considerations, has addressed itself to its followers, in these
words, which the Faction whole-heartedly approves, and which we
consider our duty to proclaim from this high tribune:

At this difficult moment, when the foreign enemy is at the gate,
when our brothers have gone forth to meet him, when Russian blood
is ready to be shed for the salvation of our country, and when those
who remain behind arfe called upon, in the very nature of things,
to make great sacrifices, both spiritual and material, the leaders of
the Faction of Popular Freedom express their firm conviction that

•"Novoe Vremia," No. 13,7% August 9, 1914,

* Faction was the term applied to a group of party members in the Duma,

* A. F, Kerenski and V, I. Khaustov,

36 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

their political friends and followers, wherever they may be found
and in whatever condition the war may overtake them, will fulfil
their duty to the very end as Russian citizens in the impending
struggle. Whatever our attitude towards the internal policies of the
Government may be, our first duty remains to preserve our country,
one and inseparable (Stormy applause in the center, on the right,
and left), and to maintain for it that position in the ranks of the
world powers which is being contested by our foes.

Let us, then, lay aside our internal quarrels, let us give no cause
to the enemy for hope that discord may divide us ( Stormy applause
on the right, center, and left), and let us well remember that our
first and only duty now is to support our soldiers with faith in the
justice of our cause, to inspire them with a calm courage and confi-
dence in the success of our arms. May the moral support of the
whole country combine to give to our army all the effective strength
of which it is capable. May our defenders not look behind in alarm,
but go forward boldly, toward victory and a brighter future. (Stormy
applause on the right, left, and center.)

(rf) SPEECH OK DEPUTY HUIKDMAN IN THE DUMA11

The high honor of expressing those sentiments which inspire the
Jewish people at the present historical moment has fallen to me* In
this grand enthusiasm which has aroused all the tribes and national-
ities of great Russia, the Jews march on the battlefield, shoulder t"
shoulder with all the other nationalities. We, the Jews, have lived,
and continue to live, under exceptionally harsh legal conditions.
Nevertheless, we have always felt ourselves to be citizens of KiiMia,
have always been loyal sons of our fatherland. Xo jxtwer whatsoever
can tear us from our native Russia, from the soil to which we are
bound by ties, centuries old. In defending our country against ford&n
invasion, we act not only from a sense of duty, but also from a son**1
of profound attachment* In this hour of trial, following the call that
has come from the heights of the throne, wi% Russian Jews, will,
as one man, take our stand under the banners of Russia, and devote
all our strength to the repulsion of the enemy. The Jewish f>eople
will do their duty to the last. (Tumultuous applause of the entire
Duma.)

** "Novoe Vremia," No* 13,783, August 9, 1914.

WAR AND PEACE 37

(tf) RESOLUTION UNANIMOUSLY1" ADOPTED BY THE STATE
DUMA AT TUB ONE-DAY SESSION 13

Having heard the explanations of the Government, and having
satisfied itself that all means were exhausted for the preservation
of peace in keeping with Russia's dignity as a great power, the State
Duma expresses its unshakable conviction that in this grave hour of
trial, in the face of the approaching war storm, all nationalities of
Russia, united in the common sentiment of love for the native land,
and firmly believing in the righteousness of their cause, are prepared,
at the summons of their Sovereign, to stand up in defense of their
country, its honor, and its possessions. From this conviction the State
Duma derives the calm assurance of the invincible power and
glorious future of Russia.

Proceeding to regular business, and expressing its perfect readi-
ness to aid in the cause of national defense and the care of the
families of reservists, the State Duma sends its fraternal greetings
to the valiant defenders of the country, who have self-sacrificingly
entered upon the discharge of their heroic duty.

4. PROCLAMATION OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER-
IN-CHIEF" [GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS]

AUGUST 14, 1914
POLES t

The hour has struck for the cherished dreams of your fathers and
forefathers to be realized,

A century and a half ago the living body of Poland was torn
into parts, but her soul did not die. She lived in the hope that the
hour of the resurrection of the Polish nation, of its fraternal recon-
ciliation with Great Russia, would arrive.

The Russian armies are bringing you the glad message of this
reconciliation,

Let the boundary lines which have cut the Polish nation asunder
be obliterated. Let the Poles be reunited under the scepter of the
Russian Tsar,

Under that scepter Poland will be reborn, free in her faith,
language, and self-government.

**The extreme left, not wishing to vote against the resolution, left the hall
("Riech,*1 August 9, 1014.)

* "Pravitelstvenny Viestnik," No. 165, August g,
*0RIech/' No. 204* August 15, 1914.

38 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

There is only one thing that Russia expects of you,— an equal
regard for the rights of those nationalities with which history has
linked you.

With an open heart, with an extended, brotherly hand, Great
Russia greets you. She trusts that the sword that beat the foe at
Grunewald has not rusted.

From the shores of the Pacific to the seas of the North, the Rus-
sian hosts are on the march.

The dawn of a new life is breaking for you.

Let there shine forth in this dawn the sign of the Cross, the
symbol of the Passion and resurrection of nations.

The Supreme Commander-in-Chicf,

General-Adjutant NICHOLAS

5. BOURTZEFF'S LETTER IN THE LONDON "TIMES"

EXPECTANT RUSSIA **

To the Editor of "Thr Times':

Sir — May I be allowed to say a few words In connection with
the excellent letter by my compatriot, Professor Vinograilov, which
appeared in your paper today (September 14)? Professor Vino-
gradov is absolutely right when he says that not only is it desirable
that complete unity of feeling should exist in Russian political circles,
but that this unity is already an accomplished fact*

The representatives of all political parties and of all nationalities
in Russia are now at one with the Government, and this war with
Germany and Austria, both guided by the Kaiser, has already become
a national war for Russia.

Even we, the adherents of the parties of the Extreme Left, and
hitherto ardent anti-militarists and pacifists, even we believe in the
necessity of this war. This war is a war to protect justice and civiliza-
tion. It will, we hope, be a decisive factor in our united war affoinst
war, and we hope that after it, it will at last be possible to consider
seriously the question of disarmament and universal peace. There can
be no doubt that victory, and decisive victory at that (personally I
await this in the immediate future), will be on the side of the Allied
nations — England, France, Belgium, Servia, and Russia,

The German peril, the curse which has hung over the whole world
for so many decades, will be crushed, and crushed so that it will

"The London "Times," September 18, 1914, p, & Col D.

WAR AND PEACE 39

never agajn become a danger to the peace of the world. The peoples
of the world desire peace.

To Russia this war will bring regeneration.

We are convinced that after this war there will no longer be any
room for political reaction, and Russia will be associated with the
existing group of cultured and civilized countries.

Professor Vinogradov is right when he says that in Russia not
one of the political Left parties has at the present time modified its
program in any way in view of the war. The word on all lips in
Russia now is "Freedom," All are hungrily awaiting a general
amnesty, freedom of the Press and of national life.

All the parties without any exceptions have supported the Govern-
ment without even waiting for it to make any definite announcement
about these crying needs. This is the measure of the belief of the
people in the inevitableness of liberal reforms. The Government
unfortunately still seems irresolute, and has up till now only done the
minimum to justify the popular belief in it, but we are convinced that
circumstances will develop in such a way that the Government will
not be able to delay for long that which has become for Russia a
historical necessity. And the sooner this happens the better.

To ensure the complete success of Russia in this war against
Germany and Austria, and also for the time when the terms of peace
will be discussed, the strongest and most firm national unity is neces-
sary. And this unity of all nationalities and all parties will be possible
only when the Russian Government will frankly and resolutely inau-
gurate a new and free era in the political life of the country.

We are convinced that we have supporting us both the public
opinion of England and that of her Allies — France and Belgium.

Yours truly,

V. BOURTZEFF

CHAPTER III
SEPARATE PKACE

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The war had been going on but a few months when the
German Government set to work to make trouble in the Russian
camp and to separate Russia from her Allies. Being1 well-informed
of Russian internal conditions and of the growing1 jealousies
between the Tsar and Grand Duke Nicholas, the Germans pro-
ceeded to fan these sparks of jealousy into a flame by spreading
false information among the soldiers,

Th$ next move was to bring about a separate peace. For this
purpose use was made of people close to the Russian Court* The
Grand Duke of Hesse, brother of the Tsarina, and Maria
Vasilchikova, a friend of the Emperor and Empress, did their
test to draw Russia away from the Allies* When her letters re-
mained unanswered, Maria Vasilchikova came to Petrograd to
plead her case. When all their efforts failed, Count Rulenlmrg,
Marshal of the German Court, wrote to Count Fredericks of the
Russian Court on the same subject. But to all the flatteries, scares
of Yellow Peril, and promises of the Straits, Nicholas II turned
a deaf ear. His last words to the army were that the war "must
be continued and brought to a victorious end.'*

i. AUSTROGERMAN PROCLAMATION TO RUSSIANS «
SOLDIERS:

At the most difficult moment of his life, your Tsar i* addressing
you, soldiers.

This unfortunate war began contrary to my own will: It was
provoked by the intrigues of Grand Duke Nicholas NichoJaevich and
his adherents, who want to remove nief so Unit he himself may

^Seraetmikov, V. P,; Totitika Romanovykh Nakammie RmtiutsH," 94-5*
(From now on referred to as Semennikov, "Politika Rwmnovykh/*)

WAR AND PEACE 41

occupy the throne. Under no condition whatever would I have agreed
to the declaration of this war, knowing beforehand its sad issue for
Mother Russia; but my cunning relative and treacherous generals
prevent me from using the power given to me by God, and, fearing
for my life, I am forced to do everything they demand of me.

Soldiers! Refuse to obey your treacherous generals; turn your
weapons against all who threaten the life and the liberty of your
Tsar, the safety and security of your dear country.2
Your unfortunate Tsar,

NICHOLAS

2. VASILCHIKOVA'S LETTERS

(a) VASILCHIKOVA TO THE TSAR 3

Klein Vartenstein, Gloggnitz, Nieder Oesterreich

March 10, 1915
Your Majesty:

I fully realize the boldness of my step in writing to Your Imperial
Majesty, but only boundless love for You, Sire, and for my father-
land, induces me to do it, and I pray that Your Majesty will deign to
read through these lines which, though rambling, come from the
heart.

At the present sad time, I believe, I am the only Russian woman
who happens to be in an enemy country, and who has access to You,
Your Majesty. Moreover, owing to the presence here, last summer,
of the family of my nephew, Skoropadski,* and because of anony-
mous accusations that I protect Russian spies, I am in captivity, i.e.,
I dare not leave my garden. There have come to me here three — two
Germans and one Austrian, all three more or less influential persons,
and asked me, if possible, to report to Your Majesty "tKat every one
is now convinced of the bravery of the Russians, and that, so long
as all the belligerents are nearly in the same position, would not
You, Sire, the ruler of the greatest tsardom in the world, be not
only the Tsar of a victorious army, but also the Tsar of Peace?
You were the first to conceive the thought of international peace,
and on the initiative of Your Majesty the peace congress was called
at The Hague* Now simply one mighty word from you — and the

* This proclamation was scattered among the soldiers about January, 1915.

*Scmennikov; "Politika Romanovykh," 12-3.

4 Paul Skoropadski, Hetman of the Ukraine in 1918.

42 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

flow of the rivers of blood will stop. There is no hatred against
Russia, against the Russians, either here, in Austria, or in Ger-
many. In Prussia the Emperor, the army, the navy, realize the
bravery and ability of our army, and in these two countries there
is a large party for peace, for firm peace, with Russia. Now every-
thing is dying: men are dying; the wealth of the country is dying;
commerce is dying; prosperity is dying. — [While Europe is dying,
there looms up] the terrible yellow race, and Russia alone, having
You, Sire, at its head, can stand against it like a wall One word
from You, and You will acid the crown of immortality to Your
numerous laurels.

I was quite astonished when they told me all this. To my ques-
tion— what could I do? — they answered, "It is now impossible to use
diplomatic means, therefore bring our conversation to the notice of
the Russian Tsar, — and then it is necessary only for the most power-
ful of rulers, one who is not conquered, to say a word, and, of course,
his wishes will be met in every way/* — "Ami the Dardanelles?" I
asked. They replied, "The Russian Tsar has but to wish it — and the
straits will be free/'

The persons who spoke to me are not diplomats, but people of
jxwition, who are j>ersonally acquainted and in communication with
the imperial rulers of Austria and Germany. I recall Prince Lobanov *
— who was sincerely devoted to Your Majesty and Russia, and
always stood for the friendship of the three emi>erors — r Alliance <ies
trois Empereurs.

Here, let me repeat, there is no hatred, not even any real feeling
of enmity against Russia ; and the three who spoke to me have been
in Russia, know, and love her. Similarly, toward France and Japan,
too, tbere is no bitterness, — but, there is an enowtwus hatred for
England.

Your Majesty, I felt that I had no right not to transmit all that
has been stated above, which they came to tell me, because there is
no representative of Yours either in Germany or in England. { Aus-
tria?] I beg to be forgiven if Your Majesty finds that 1 did not
act properly*

Of course, if You, Sire, with Your love of peace, should wish
to convince Yourself of the correctness of the above through an
authorized, near person, these three who spoke to me could per-
sonally state everything in one of the neutral countries, but these

'Aleksei Borisovich Lobanov-Rostovski (1824-1896), Minister of Foreign
Affairs, March n, i80$»September r» 1896-

WAR AND PEACE 43

three— are not diplomats, but so to speak, the eclio of both enemy
countries.

Your Imperial Majesty's deeply devoted subject,

MARIA VASILCHIKOVA.

(6) VASILCHIKOVA TO THE TSAR 6

Klein Vartenstein, Gloggnitz, Nietfer Oesterreich

March 30, 1915
Your Majesty:

I don't know whether the letter I made bold to write to You
(March 10) has reached Your Majesty. Since that time a great
deal has happened — Przemysl has fallen, our brave warriors are
fighting desperately in the Carpathians. The three (two Germans
and one Austrian) came again to me, asking me to repeat what I
wrote in the first letter and which may not have reached Your
Majesty, namely, that there is a desire in Germany and Austria for
peace with Russia, and You, Sire, who conceived the sacred thought
of international peace and at whose wish there was called at The
Hague a peace congress, You, the ruler of the greatest country in
the world, You alone are the one who, as a victor, could first utter
the word, peace — and the rivers of blood will dry up, and the present
terrible grief will turn to joy.

They ask me to bring to the notice of Your Majesty that it is
known from a most secret source that England intends to keep
Constantinople for herself and to create in the Dardanelles another
Gibraltar, and that there are now going on secret* negotiations be-
tween England and Japan to turn over Manchuria to the latter.
The persons who tell me this are not diplomats, but love their father-
land sincerely, and they edw the popular desire. They ask that the
Russian Sovereign, not conquered, but conqueror, may in this ca-
pacity utter the word, peace, and his wishes will be satisfied in every
way. The question of the Dardanelles, of course, will be settled, not
in favor of England, but of Russia.

Again I beg forgiveness that I dare write all this, — but my Rus-
sian blood fclt happy when I heard everything these three, wko
know Russia well, said. They are, let me repeat, not diplomats, but
have relations with the reigning houses of both countries which are
at war with Russia.

* Semennikov ; "Politika Romanovykh/' 14-3.

44 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

My first letter I sent through Her Majesty,— but this one I make
bold to send directly to You, Sire !

Ah, would only the Easter chimes also proclaim peace !— Christ
is risen. God grant to You, Your Majeesty, to the Empress, and to
Your most august children everything that is bright and joyful
Your "imperial Majesty's deeply devoted subject.

MARIA YASIUTHIKOVA.

Should Your Majesty wish to send a trusted jnjrsnn to one of the
neutral countries, so as to convince Yourself, they will arrange it
here to release me from captivity, and I could introduce these three
persons to Your representative.

(f) VAS1LCH1KOVA TO THE TSAR T

Berlin, May 27, 1915
Your Majesty:

I make bold once more to write to You, Sire, ant! this time from
Berlin, where I have been asked to come. It wnuld be nearer the
facts to say that I was sent for at Klein Vartenstcin to come to
Berlin, under the pretext that I might see my nephew, who is here
in captivity, hut m reality to transmit to Your Majesty the conver-
sations I have had here*

It is known to Your Majesty that since the month of August
I have been in Klein Vartenstein more or less a prisoner-— I am for-
bidden to go outside of my garden. But here, in Berlin, I am enjoy*
ing perfect freedom, and I have been given all kinds of privileges,
such as none of the foreigners who are now living in Berlin and
Germany enjoy— and that with the knowledge of Kmperor William,
who is aware of the friendly attitude of Your Majesty and of the
Empress toward me.

I regret bitterly that I left Russia, and now, in these hard times,
I cannot be of service. Perhaps the Almighty has decreed it, and I
may yet be of service to my country, though far away. This is why
I make bold to transmit all I have heard.

Since the end of February they (three men] have been coming
to me at Klein Vartenstein to talk about peace — as I wrote to Your
Majesty. Now, although, of course, not officially* it to still possible
to see clearly from all talks that the desire for peace with Russia has
greatly increased- Here, many have visited me, and the Minister of
'Semennikov; "Politika Ronmnovyfch/' 15-9.

WAR AND PEACE 45

Foreign Affairs, von Jagow, whom I have known a long time, came
to see me several times and spoke at length about the present situa-
tion.— I may say more, it is with his wish and knowledge that I am
transmitting our conversations. As they were held in the French
language, I shall try to report them literally in the same language,
and You shall see that Germany is sincerely anxious to end the war
as soon as possible and to become, not an enemy, but a friend and
ally of Russia.

"Tous id sont d'accord que la paix entre rAllemagne et la
Russie est unc question vitale pour les deux pays qu'unissent tant
d'intcrcts commerciaux et en realite aucuncs divergences politiques ne
separent Certes, TAutriche devrait y etre comprise, car rAllemagne
ne peut et ne veut lachcr TAutriche, qui en tout cas sorfira de cette
guerre affaiblie. II faut faire cesser le carnage justement maintenant
oil, malgre les grandes pertes de part et d'autre, pas un des pays qui
est en guerre n'est battu. La Russie gagnerait beaucoup plus si elle
faisait une bonne paix avec FAllemagne meme dans la question des
Dardanelles, que rAllemagne admet est une question de premiere
importance pour la Russie* On est convaincu ici, que TAngleterre
voudra et insistera £ avoir les coudees Kbres dans la Mer Noire,
autrement dit, qu'elle voudra y dominer, car elle se dit etre *la
Maitresse de la Mer.'

"Ce serait un grand danger si un jour la Russie avait une guerre
avec FAngleterre. On m'a fait observer que TAngleterre n'a jamais
ete la vraie amie de ses allies, — elle aime qu'on lui tire les marrons
du feu. L'Angleterre vise a obtenir Tinfluence dominante a Con-
stantinople et malgre toutes ses promesses elle ne permettra jamais a
la Russie de prendre cette ville ou de la garder si la Russie Toccupe.

"En Allemagne on a besoin d'une Russie forte et monarchique et
les deux Maisons Voisines et Regnantes doivent soutenir les vieilles
traditions monarchiques et amicales. La prolongation de la guerre est
considerce comme un danger pour la Dynastie. On conqoit parfaite-
ment que la Russie ne veut pas abandonner la France, mais la encore
TAllemagne comprencl le point d'honneur russe et ne fera aucune
difficulte a un arrangement equitable,

"Ici on ne songe pas a creer un nouveau royaume de Pologne,
qui serait une source de cliscordes et outre cela finira bien vite par
etre suffoqu^e, n'ayant pas de libre issue i la mer, car ni la Russie,
ni TAllemagne ne songeront a sacrifier pour la Pologne un de ses
ports star la Mer du Nord,

**On comprend aussi que pour la s£curit6 de TEurope contre la

46 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

race jaune il faut une Russie puissante* Du reste, le testament de
Bismarck etait de laisser la politique dc la Russie Hbre en Asie.

uLa guerre avec Tltalie n'effraye personne. Depuis 1'automne tout
le sud du Tyrol est rempli de troupes autrichicnnes et les Allemands
clepuis quelque temps y out egaiement envoyc <les forces. la guerre
d'apres des sources certaines est faite avec 1'argent anglais et les
meneurs politiques, francs-macons, nulicaux et tutti quant i dont le
vrai but est de renverser les trones, ont recueilli quelqucs millions de
lires. Du reste, on croit savoir iex que Votre Majcste a etc centre que
ritalie se meldt a cetle guerre. Et de la manicre la plus positive on
m'a repete maintes fois qu'il n'y a aucune haine dans le pays contre
la Russie,

"On m'a aussi parle du mauvais traitemcnt des prisonniers alle-
mancls civils en Russie et on m'a raconte que \'otre Majeste Tayant
appris a daigne ecrire de Sa Main propre d'amoliorer le traitemcnt f
et qu'au Ministcre de la guerre on avait ajoute *sculemont avec ccux
de provenance slave/ A Petrograd les civils ne se phignent pas
autant, mais un secretaire de TAmbassade d'Ainerique a writ ici que
le traitement en province *is a scandal/ plus encore }x>ur les prison-
niers civils que militaircs. On est aussi fort impressionne du sort du
Consul Allemand a Kowno Baron Lcrctenfeld, qui depuis neuf mnij;
se trouv^ a la forteresse I^etro-Pavlowsk, ctant accuse d'avoir eu
chez lui des cartes editees dans la topographic militaire* Une autrc
chose qu'on ne comprend pas ici est la condamnation a mort des deux
officiers-aviateurs M. M. de Knobelsdorf et de Bubille, changee par
la grace de Votre Majestl i une condamnation a«x travaux forces*
Us auraient jete des proclamations, simple true de guerre dont on
se sert, parait-il, clans toutes les armees.

"Ea general de totites ces conversations il est clair de cornprcndre
que TAngleterre n'cst pas une vraic amie a la Russie et ccla n'eton-
nerait pas rAllemagne si en quelques anxu^s elle propose ses forces a
TAllemagne contre la Russie»— mais rAllemagne veut !a paix durable
avec la Russie/*

From the above Your Majesty will see that the first attempt at
rapprochement with Russia, even though not official, still comes from
Germany- Here it is said that Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevkh has
lately been making mistake after mistake, and that he has no mercy
whatever on the soldiers. The wounded and captured Russians also
say that— 'the life of a soldier means nothing to him/* By the sec-
ond or third of May, new style, the Russian war prisoners in Ger-
many were :

WAR AND PEACE 47

Officers 5,500

Soldiers 520,000

Since the recent fights in the Carpathians, the number of pris-
oners has increased considerably. The officers are in 25 camps, and
the soldiers in go (exact data from the War Ministry). In Austria
194,000 have lately been transported by the railways, but how many
Russian prisoners there are altogether in Austria, I don't know. . - .

My nephew Miloradovich, the son of my sister, with all the
officers who were at Burg, has been transferred to Mainz, and I ob-
tained permission to see him at Frankfort, to which he was taken by
automobile to the General Commando, where I saw him for two
hours without witnesses. Of course he feels very lonely, and it is pain-
ful to him that he is unable just now to serve his dear fatherland.
Together with him at Mainz are many Englishmen, French, and
Belgians. He says the English are more sympathetic than the others,
but they are saying plainly, without embarrassment, as soon as there
is peace, we shall immediately conclude am alliance with Germany,
to attack Russia!!! Yes, not in vain did Khomiakov8 say of Eng-
land, "perfidious Albion."

The Grand Duke of Hesse, on learning that I was at Frankfort,
at once telephoned for me to come to breakfast at Volfsgarten.
Needless to tell with what love he spoke of You and the Empress,
and how sincerely he wants peace and how glad he was that von
Jagow had decided to talk it over with me.

This letter will be taken to Tsarskoe Selo and handed to the
aide-de-camp on duty, to deliver into Your Majesty's own hands.
I make bold to ask that orders be given to send me the reply, which
I could transmit to von Jagow. I shall wait for it here, and then, alas !
I must return to Klein Vartenstein, which I have no right to leave
till the end of the war. If Your Majesty will resolve to pronounce
the word, peace, from the height of Your throne, You will decide
the fate of the nations of the whole world. If you will send a trusted
person for the first negotiations, a person with similar authority will
at the same time be sent from here.

Your Imperial Majesty's loyal subject, with a feeling of pro-

foundest devotion,

MARIA VASILCHIKOVA.

Should Your Majesty desire that I should personally tell of all
I have heard and all I have seen here and in Germany, my trip to
*A. S. Khonuakov, 1804-1860, one of the leaders of the Slavophils.

48 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Tsarskoe Selo will be facilitated in every way,— I shall, neverthe-
less, have to return to Austria until the end of the war.

3. GRAND DUKE HESSE'S LETTER

LETTERS FROM THE EMFKESS TO THE EMPEROR*

^ *9*S

... I had a long, dear letter fr. Krni 10— will show it you upon your
return. He says that "if there is someone who understands him (you)
& knows what he is going through, it is me." He kisses you tenderly.
He longs for a way out of this dilemma, that someone ought to
begin to make a bridge for discussion,

So he had an idea of quite privately sending a man of confidence
to Stockholm, who should meet a gentleman sent by you ( pri-
vately) that they could help disjxjrse many momentary difficulties.
He had this idea, as in Germany there is no real hatred against
Russia. So he sent a gentleman to be there on the 28 — (that is 2 days
ago & I only heard today) & can only spare him a week. So I at
once wrote an answer (all through Daisy) & sent it the gentleman,
telling him you are not yet back, so he better not wait— & that tho*
one longs for peace, the time has not yet come, -

I wanted to get all done before you return, as I know it would
be unpleasant for you,

W. [William II] knows of course absolutely nothing about this "
— He says they [Germany] stands as a firm wall in France, & that his
friends tell him, in the North & Carpathians too. They think they
have 500,000 of our prisoners, -

The whole letter is very dear & loving ; — I was intensely grateful

*"Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 451-2. During the war and white he was at the
front, the KmptTor and Kmpress corresponded regularly. Their tetter* arc
now in the archives of the Soviet Government, hut copies of her letters to
him were smuggled out to Berlin and published in 1<)«J2 under the title:
"Fisma Imperatntsy Ak*k*andry Fedorovny k Imperatoru Nikohmi II," The
original letters are in English and are published in that language hut the
English leaves much to l*e desired. This shortcoming may he due mon* to
the ignorance of the copyist and proofreader, than to thf writer. Srxin *tft**r
their appearance abroad the Soviet archivists brought out huh hi* and h**r
letters in a Russian edition under the title; "Perepfoka Nikolaia i AtekMtnclry
Romanovykh." Instead, however, of publishing them in the original Kngitah
they made a Russian translation* As it stands today we are not quite certain
of the exact language used by cither of the correspondents. In this book the
quotations of the Empress' letters are from the Berlin edition and the Em-
peror's from the Russian edition translated back into English from the Russian,

* Brother of the 'Empress, Grand Duke of Hesse,

ttThe Vasilchikova letters contradict this statement

WAR AND PEACE 49

to get it, tho' of course the question of the gentleman waiting there
& you away, was complicated ; — & E. will be disappointed.

4. PALEOLOGUE'S QUERY ABOUT SEPARATE PEACE

(<l) THE EMPRESS TO THE EMPEROR 12*

June 27, 1915

. . . Paul 1S came to tea & remained I & 3-4 hours, he was very nice
& spoke honestly & simply meaning' well, not wishing to meddle with
what does not concern him, only asking all sorts of things wh. I
now repeat to you, with Ms-knowledge, Well, to begin with, Paleolog 14
dined with him a few days ago & then they had a long private talk
& the latter tried to find out from him, very cleverly, whether he
knew if you had any ideas about forming a separate peace with
Germany, as he heard such things being spoken about here, & as tho'
in France one had got wind of it — & that there they intend fighting
to the very end. Paul answered that he was convinced it was not
true, all the more, as at the outset of the war we & our allies had
settled, that peace could only be concluded together on no account
separately. Then I told Paul that you had heard the same rumor
about France; & he crossed himself when I said you were not dream-
ing of peace & knew it would mean revolution15 here & therefore
the Germans are trying to egg it on. He said he had heard even the
German mad conditions posed to us. — I warned him he wld. next
hear, that I am wishing peace to be concluded, —

(&) THE EMPEROR'S ANSWER "

June 29, 1915

Thank you heartily for your long letter in which you tell of your
conversation with Paul. You gave him exactly the right answer on
the question of peace. This is the principal point in my rescript to old
Goremykin which will be published.

""Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 469.

** Grand Duke Paul Alexandrovich, uncle of the Tsar,

^M. Pateologue, French Ambassador.

11 The French and the Russian liberals predicted a revolution in case of a
separate peace, while the Germans and many of the Russian reactionaries
prophesied a revolution if Russia went on with the Allies to the end.

* "Perepiska Nikolaia i Aleksandry Romanovykh/' III, 223.

5o DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

5. COUNT EULENBURG TO COUNT FREDERICKS «

Att niois de novembre 1915, le cointe Iuilenbt>urg, niinistre de
la Cour de Prasse, adre^sa an comte Kreederieksx, ministre de la
Cour de Russie, une lettre dont voici Ics passages esscntiels :

Les confiantcs et cordialos relations qui news out tinis pendant
plus de t rente ans m'autorisont a vous ocrire ct'tto let t re.

Notre devoir cavers Dion, nos suuvcrains ct iu»s jmys nous
oblige a faire tout ce qui depend de nmi.% pour n;tuMir cm re nos
ernpereurs ramitie d'awtrefois. Xul dt>«te qiu% uushitot ecttt* amitic
retahlie, nos deux gouvernemcnts nc trouvcnt facilenicnt Ics bases
d'une paix honorable. . , .

La Lettre, confiec a un eniissaire secret, fut mise a la poste dans
un bureau de PctrDgradc. Ixs comte Fr<?o<Iericks7. la ctuninuniqtia
immedtatement a TEmpereur, qui apjwla sur-Ie-ohamp M. Sazoituvv.
Tous les trois s'accordiTcnt a pcnser qu'une u-lfc lettre n*avait pu
etre ecrite quo par ordre, et sann doute sous ia dictee de Tcmpcreur
Guillaume. Le Tsar dit alors a KT* Sa^onow :

"Vous connaissez xncs icl&s. Prej)are2 une repome que signera U?
cointe Freedericksz,*'

Le lendcmain, M. Sazonow apjx>rta a I'EnijKjrour un projet do
reponse ainsi concu :

'*Si vos sentiments sont tels qtte vous me les d&rrivez, obtcmx ilc
S. M. Tempereur Guillaume qu*il prescrive a son gouvernemi'ut
d'adresser une proposition collective de JKIIX 4 tous les goiwiw-
ments allies centre TAllemagne. Cest la seule procedure ptn^ihU1,"

L'etnpereur Nicolas lut ce projet de rqxinsc.

**Votre mlaction, dit-il, est parfaite. Aucun cle nos allies n'aurait
rien a y reprendre, Maisr dq>uis liier, j'ai r^ficchi. Et la lettre
cTEulenbourg restera sans a*jK)iise* Si corrects que soicnt les
dont vous vous etes servi, j'aurais Fair cFadmettre la jH>ssihilitc
correspondance directe entre nos deux Cours, Et cela, je n'en veux a
aucun prix/'

Puis, prenant des mains de Sazonow la lettre du comte Eukn-
bourg^ il relit It haute voix la phrase :**,., retablir entre 1105 Eni-
pereurs l'am!ti£ d'autrefois/' et i! ecrit en marge:

"Cette amitM est incite. Qu'on ne m'en parle plus jamais I* '

w Frederic Masson in **Le Gaulois/' No. 44^70. July i# mtl On this
episode see atao bttchinatif "My Mbston to Russia,*' Ir 351 ; Palcologuc/' ^Aa

Memoirs,*' II, 135-7*

WAR AND PEACE 51

6. VIEWS OF THE GERMAN CROWN PRINCE 1S

In any case, the chances of a separate arrangement with Russia
were excellent in the latter part of the summer of 1915, [1916]
when Russia was in very serious military difficulties and the Tsar
had appointed the admittedly pro-German Sturmer to the premier-
ship. I considered it, at the time, an unmistakable sign of willingness
to negotiate, and I urged our leaders to grasp the opportunity. As
a matter of fact, in the course of the summer and in the early
autumn, numerous deliberations of a general character were carried
on and terms considered; but all this took place privately among
German diplomatists or extended only to conversations between them
and the Higher Command. Practical deductions which might have
resulted in the inauguration of relations with Sturmer were not
discussed. We got no further than empty lamentations and futile
complaints that the war had completely cut us off from all possibility
of communicating with people across the frontier, that we could not
join them, "the water was much too deep."

[For document 7, Imperial Rescript see page 122,]

8. SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY10
BY His MAJESTY THE EMPEROR
December 25, 1916 [Ian. 7, 19x7]

More than two years ago, in time of profound peace, Germany,
wljp had long been secretly preparing to subjugate all the peoples
of Europe, attacked Russia and her faithful Ally, France, which
obliged England to join us and take part in the struggle. The com-
plete contempt for all bases of law, which manifested itself by Ger-
many's infringement of the neutrality of Belgium, and the merciless
cruelty of the Germans in regard to the peaceful populations of the
provinces occupied by their troops, gradually united all the Great
Powers of Europe against Germany, and her Ally, Austria-Hungary.

Under the pressure of the German armies, inordinately strong
owing to the superiority of their technical means, Russia, as well as
France, were obliged, in the first year of the war, to cede a part of

* Memoirs of the Crown Prince of Germany, 136-7.

* Loukomsky, A. ; "Memoirs of the Russian Revolution," 47-8.

52 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HTSTORY

their territory to the foe. This temporary reverse, however, did not
crush the spirit of our brave Allies, or yours, my gallant troops.
Meanwhile, by the united efforts of all the forces of the Empire, the
difference in our technical means and those of the Germans was grad-
ually disappearing. But, long before this, even since the autumn of the
past year of 1915, our enemy was unable to occupy another foot of
Russian territory, and in the spring and summer of this current
year, the German troops experienced a series of severe defeats, and
passed from aggression to a state of defense on the whole of our
front Their forces are obviously wearing themselves out, while the
might and power of Russia and her valorous Allies surely and
steadily grow. Germany feels that she will be completely routed,
that the hour of retaliation for all her cruelties and violations of the
law is near. And so — similarly to her sudden declaration of war at a
time when she felt her military superiority over her neighbors, Ger-
many, feeling her weakness, suddenly comes forward with an offer of
peace to the Allies, strongly united against her in an indissoluble
bond. She, very naturally, wishes to begin peace negotiations before
the measure of her weakness becomes evident to all before she defi-
nitely loses her fighting capacity. At the same time, [taking] advan-
tage of her temporary victory over Rumania— due to the latter's
want of military experience — she endeavors to give her enemies a
false idea of the strength of her armies. But, if Germany could
declare war and attack Russia and her Ally, France, at the most un-
favorable moment for them — at the present moment these two coun-
tries, supported by noble Italy and powerful England, and fortified
by the struggle, are able, in their turn, to enter into peace negotia-
tions with Germany when they consider the time favorable for it.
This time has not yet come : the enemy has not yet been expelled
from the provinces which have been seized by him ; Russia has not
yet attained the aim created by this war — the possession of Tzar-
grad*° and the Straits ; the formation of a whole and independent
Poland out of its three existing, but as yet separate parts,-— is still
not assured. To conclude a peace with Germany at present would
mean not to profit fully by the heroic efforts of the Russian Army
and Fleet. These efforts, and the sacred memory of those gallant
sons of Russia who have perished on the field of battle, forbid us
even to think of making* peace before achieving a final and com-
plete victory over the foe, who dares to think that, if he could begin
the war, he can end it whenever he likes.
* Constantinople.

WAR AND PEACE 53

I do not doubt for a moment that every loyal son of Russia,
whether forming part of my glorious Army, or working for the
might of that Army in the interior of the country, or pursuing his
own peaceful labor, is imbued with this sentiment, and thinks alike
on the subject. Peace can only be granted to the enemy when he is
definitely broken and defeated, and gives us and the Allies solid
proofs of the impossibility for him to renew his treacherous attack
. . * when we may rest assured that he will be obliged, by the very
force of circumstances, to keep his engagements, and fulfil the obli-
gations laid upon him by the Treaty of Peace.

Let us then remain firm and immovable in our assurance of vic-
tory, and the Almighty will bless our banners ; He will cover them
once more with undying glory, and will grant us a peace worthy of
your heroic deeds, my glorious troops, — a peace for which the com-
ing- generations will bless you, and which will render your memory

forever sacred to them.

NICHOLAS.

9. TSAR'S ADDRESS TO THE ARMY21

Headquarters, March 21, 1917

I appeal to you for the last time, my beloved troops. After the
abdication of myself and my son, all the authority has passed into
the hands of the Provisional Government, formed by the State Duma.
So may God help them to lead Russia on the way to prosperity and
glory!

And you, my valiant troops, God help you to defend our country
against the cruel foe ! For two and a half years you have daily and
hourly borne on your shoulders the heavy burden of war. Much
blood has been shed ; many efforts have been made ; and the day is
near when Russia, closely united to her gallant allies in their common
aspiration to victory, will break the resistance of the enemy. This
war, unprecedented in history, must be continued and brought to a
victorious end. Any one who dreams of peace at the present moment
is a traitor to his country. I know that every honest soldier thinks
so. Go on fulfilling your duty ; stand to guard your glorious father-
land; obey the Provisional Government, and your chiefs. Do not
forget that all disorder, all weakening of discipline, are so many
assets for the foe.

mLoukoxaskyf A*; "Memoirs of the Russian Revolution," 69-70,

54 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

I firmly believe that the love for your great country is, and ever
will be, alive in your hearts. God will give you his blessing, and St.
George, the Victorious, will help you to triumph over the foe !

NICHOLAS.

CHAPTER IV
PEACE CONVERSATIONS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

At the time of the declaration of war there was no clear
understanding as to peace terms. Nothing was said on the subject
until reports began to circulate that President Wilson contem-
plated offering mediation. This possibility forced the Allies to
talk things over and these conversations led tip to secret treaties.
The letters here given show the steps that led up to the treaties.

i. TELEGRAMME SECRET DE L'AMBASSADEUR A

LONDRES l

6-19 Septembre, 1914. No. 494.

Personnel. Tres confidentiel. Le Roi m'a dit ce matin qu'il se
pourrait que president Wilson soit tente jouer tres prematurement
role de Roosevelt, qu'il ne redoutait pas intrigues maladroites de
Bernstorff, mais que Dernbourg etait plus habile et pouvait engen-
drer une campagne amerieaine pour paix. Le Roi m'a rappele la
d&laration de son Gouvernement et paroles de son discours hier de
prorogation Chambre. II me repeta qu'il maintient plus que jamais
son opinion qu'aucune paix n'est possible avant que des £venements
decisifs permettent d'imposer une paix que assurerait Tecrasement
durable de rh£g£monie miKtaire de TAllemagne. Roi m'a dit qu'opi-
nion qu'il emettait vis-4-vis de son Gouvernement pour le cas d'ouver-
tures indirectes americaines serait de les laisser sans r6ponse aucune
en les ignorant tout-4-fait Roi pense qu'il n'y a aucune necessit<§ pour
les Gouverncments allies de se consulter, que si les Gouvernements
allies entraient dans cette voie, ces pourparlers parviendraient a
Berlin tr6s rapidement et y seraient consideres comme symptomes
d'irr&olution et de faiblesse. Le Roi m'a dit que tr£s confidentielle-
ment il avait voulu me mettre au courant de son opinion personnelle
i ce sujet Je remerciais Sa Majeste en Tassurant que j'avais rintinae
conviction que TEmpereur partageait enti^rement cette opinion. Le

*Pokrovski, M. N.; "Tsarskaia Rossiia i Voina," 66-7. "The Intimate
Papers of Colonel House," I, Chapter XI, throws some light on this subject.

56 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY _

Roi termina entretlen en me parlant situation militaire et m'exprima
son admiration pour succes de nos artnes. II me dlt que role d'Angle-
terre serait dans peu de mois de fournir a la France les ressourccs
necessaires et exprima espoir qu'Angleterre niettrait alors a la dis-
position des allies 500,000 honimcs an moins. II me dit que plus que
jamais la perseverance et la fermete sont necessaires, que le temps
est pour les allies et que c'est la-dessus qu'il basait son opinion sur
1'attitude absolument passive a opposer a toute tentative amerkaine

pour la paix.

BENCKENDOKFF 2

2. M. DELCASSE A II PALEOLOGUK A PKTROGRADK

Bordeaux, le 24 $cptcmlrrc> No". 123 *
[En chiffrcs]

Notre ambassadeur a Washington 4 me fait savoir que TAIlemagne
ne songe pas a la paix, mais continue en secret les pourparlers
inofficiels avec le colonel House, un ami du president Wilson que ce
dernier 1'avait charge Tan dernier d'une mission a Berlin pour la
limitation des armaments. M. House a dit a Fambassadeur d'Angle-
terre qu'U serait utile que I'Angleterre fixat ses points de paix qu'il
croyait etre d'apres les declarations anterieures de TAngleterre,
satisfaction de la Belgique et des garanties contre le militarismc allc-
mand. II ajoutait que le c. Bernstorff serait pret a causer avec 1'am-
bassadeur anglais.

Sir C. Spring-Rice s'est contente de reix>n<!re qu'une i\ireill(»
entrevue ne pouvait se faire ; que d'ailleurs les puissances de la Triple
Entente ne concluraient pas de ixiix separee.

3. M. PALEOLOGUE A M. DELCASSE A BORDEAl'X
Petrogradc, le Lf Septembre, No. 603 ft

[En chiffres}
Secret
Pour le ministre seuL

Pendant un cntretien tout amical M* Sasonow a d<!veI0ppc
devant Sir G. Buchanan 8 et moi ses idees non officiellcs sur la con-

*C A. Benckendorff (1849-1917)* Russian Ambansador in London,

* Fofcrovski, M. N. ; ^Tsarskaia Kossiia i Voina/* 71.
4J. J, Jusserand.

* Pokrovski, M, N* ; "Tsarskaia Rossiia i VoIna/F 73-S»
'Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador in Russia.

WAR AND PEACE 57

cluite que la Russie, TAngleterre et la France devraient tenir si le
sucees actuel de Icurs armees etait couronne par une victoire decisive.
"Nous devons," nous a-t-il dit, "elaborer immediatement un projet."

J'ai dit que scion moi Ics ministres cles affaires etrangeres de Rus-
sie, de France et d'Angleterre devraient encore se concerter entre eux
trois pour fixer les bases generates de Tordre nouveau a etablir en
Europe. Us communiqueraient ces bases a leurs allies secondaires —
Belgique, Serbie, Montenegro. Us les notifieraient ensuite collective-
ment a I'AlIemagne et a TAutriche. Le projet n'etablirait que les bases
pour fixer les conditions de paix et resoudre les difficultes.

M. Sasonow a de son cote approuve cette maniere de voir.
Allant plus loin dans la voie des confidences M. Sasonow nous a
communique a grands traits comment il conqoit les remaniements que
les trois allies auraient interet a operer dans la carte et la constitution
de PEurope.

1. L'objet principal des trois allies serait de briser la puissance
allemande et sa pretention de domination militaire et politique,

2. Les modifications territoriales doivent etre determinees par le
principe des nationalites.

3. La Russie s'annexerait le cours inferieur du Niemen et la
partie orientale de la Galicie. Mile annexerait au royaume de Pologne,
la Posnanie orientale, la Silesi r et la partie occidentale de la

( Jalicie.

4. I-a France reprendrait TAlsace-Lorraine en y ajoutant a sa
guise une partie de la Prusse rhenane et du Palatinat.

5. La Belgique obtiendrait dans r mi accroissement im-
portant de territoircs.

6. Le Sleswig-Holstein serait restitue au Danemark.

7. Le royaume de Hanovre serait restaure.

8. L'Autriche constituerait une monarchie tripartie, formee de
Fempire d'Autriche, du royaume de Boheme et du royaume de
Hongrie. L'empire d'Autriche comprenclrait uniquement les "pro-
vinces h&r-editaires." Le royaume de Boheme comprendrait la Boheme
actuelle et les Slovaques, la Moravie, I^e royaume de Hongrie aurait
a s'entendre avec la Roumanie au sujet de la Transylvanie.

9. La Serbie s'annexerait la Bosnie, la Herz6govine, la Dalmatic
et le nord de 1'Albanie*

10. La Bulgarie recevrait de la Serbie tine compensation en
Mac6doine.

T Undeciphered word.

58 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

11. La Grece s'annexerait le sud de TAlbanie, a rexception de
Vallone, qui serait devolue a Tltalie.

12. L'Angleterre, la France et le Japon se partageraient les
colonies allemandes.

13. L/Allemagne et 1'Autriche payeraient tine contribution de
guerre.

M. Sasonow nous a instamment pries, Sir G. Buchanan ct nioi,
de nattribuer aucune importance officielle "a cette esquissc d'un
tableau dont la trame n'est pas encore tissee." Mais quelques mots
qu'il m'a glisses a part m'ont fait comprendre qu'il tient a nous
mettre d'ores et deja dans 1'ordre de ses idces et qu'il attactic plus
de prix que jamais a ctre en etroit contact avec nous.

4. M. PALEOLOGUE A M. DKLCASSE A BORDEAUX

Petrogfodc, le 26 Septcmbrr 1914*

[En cfiiffrcs]
Secret.
Pour le ministre seul.

Le ministre de Tagriculture M. Krivocheiue * — qui par son auto-
rite personclle et par la confiancc dont il jouit auprcs de TEnipcreur,
est le veritable president du conseil— cst venu me voir hicr jx)ur ni 'ex-
poser a titre privc ses vucs sur les changements que les puissances cle
la Triple Entente devraient introduire dans Tordre europeen i Tissue
de la guerre.

Je resume ci-apres ses declarations :

1. Les hostilites peuvent clurer longtemps encore, mais il serait
raisonnable d'admettre que jxiur dcs raisons etrangeres? a la strategic
elles puissent se terminer clans tin dclai plus court, T-es gouviTiic-
rnents de la Triple Entente ne doivent pas se laisser sur pre wire par
une demande de paix; ils ont interct a fixer sans trop tarder leurs
intentions communes.

2. Sur les modifications d introduire dans la configuration de
TEurope M. Krivocheine n'avait fait que reproduire le programme
prevu le 14 septembre par M. Sasonow.

3. Concernant les D&roits, M, Krivocheine estime qu'ils doivent
etre libres ; que les turcs doivent passer en Asie et que Constantinople

'Pokrovski, M* N.; "Tsarskaia Rossiia i Voina/' 75-7.
* A. V. Krivoshein, Miniatcr of Agriculture,

WAR AND PEACE 59

doit devenir une ville neutre sous un regime analogue a celui de
Tanger.

JTai ccoute Mr, Krivocheine sans formtiler aucune opinion sauf
sur la question de Constantinople. **Cest la," lui ai-je clit, "une
question qui soulevera de la part de 1'Angleterre de fortes objections.1'

M. Krivocheine m'a demande si j'avais quelques idees de vos
intentions. Je lui ai repondu que je les ignore entierement. A mon
tour je lui ai demande s'il avait eu Toccasion d'exposer ses idees a
I'Empereur. "Oui, hier," a-t-il repris, "mais je vous assure que ces
idees me sont toutes personnelles."

Ce matin en presence de Tambassadeur d'Angleterre j'ai rap-
porte a M. Sasonow mon entretien avec M. Krivocheine. Sir G.
Buchanan s'est exprime comme moi au sujet de Constantinople.

Mr. Sasonow nous a dit alors : "Sur le sort de Constantinople je
ne suis pas entierement d'accord avec M. Krivocheine, mais je pense
comme lui que lors de la paix nous devrons nous assurer une fois
pour toutes le libre passage des Detroits."

D'un ton tres ferme il a continue: "Les turcs doivent rester a
Constantinople et aux environs. Quant a la liberte des Detroits die
nous doit etre garantie et a trois conditions : I, qu'aucune fortifica-
tion ne puisse etre erigee sur les flancs des Dardanelles, 2, qu'une
commission assistee d*une force navale fasse la police dans les Darda-
nelles et le Mer de Marmara, 3, que la Russie ait a Tentree interieure
du Bosphore — par exemple a Bouyoukdere — une station de charbon.
Cette question est pour nous d'un interet vital. Impossible de plus en
differer la solution."

Sir G. Buchanan et moi avons eu Timpression qu'en nous parlant
ainsi M. Sasonow ne nous confiait pas seulement un simple projet,
mais une resolution.

5. M. DRAGOUMIS A M. VENIZELOS

Petrograde, le 4 Jawvier igi 5 10

[En chiffres]
J'ai appris que le president du conseil s'&ait rendu au quarter

ou se trouva aussi TEmpereur.
Le ministre de Serbie tient de Tetat major que cette recontre a
eu pour but de discuter la question d'une paix separ^e avec TAutriche.

** Pokrovski, M, N.j "Tsankaia Rossiia i Vcina," 78- M. Dragowmis was
the diplomatic representative of Greece in Russia*

6o DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN TflSTORY

Les conditions du Gouvernement Russe seraient suivantes : la Galicic
reviendrait a la Russie, la Bosnie a la Scrbic, la Boheme recevrait
Tautonomie.

D'autre part j'apprends que 1'Allemagne et rAulrichc jx>ur sauve-
garder avant tout leurs proprcs territoires seraient disposees a recon-
naitre a la Russie le droit sur les Dctroits. Le ministre do Scrhie a
requ 1'ordre de proceder a une demarche aupres du fiouvernement
Russe en le priant de faire avancer scs troupes en Uongrio."

6. MEMORANDUM DE UAMBASSADK D'AXGLKTERRE
A PETROGRADE

27 Fevrlcr-i2 Mars 1915 ts

His Majesty's Ambassador has been instructed to make the fol-
lowing observations with reference to the Aidc-Memoire which this
Embassy had the honor of addressing to the Imperial Government
on February 27-March 12, 1915.

The claim made by the Imperial Government in their Aide-
Memoire of February ig-March 4, ^9*5 considerably exceeds the
desiderata which were foreshadowed by M, Sasonow as probable a
few weeks ago. Before His Majesty's Government have had time
to take into consideration what their own desiderata elsewhere would
be in the final terms of peace, Russia is asking for a definite promise
that her wishes shall be satisfied with regard to what is in fact the
richest prize of the entire war. Sir Edward Grey accordingly hope*
that M. Sasonow will realize that it is not in the power of IHs
'Majesty's Government to give a greater proof of friendship than
that which is afforded by the terms of the above-mentioned Aide-
Memoire. That document involves a complete reversal of the tradi-
tional policy of His Majesty's Government and is in direct opposition
to the opinions and sentiment at one time universally held in Eng-
land and which have still by no means died out. Sir Edward Grey
therefore trusts that the Imperial Government will recognize that
the recent general assurances given to M. Sasonow have been most
loyally and amply fulfilled. In presenting the Aide-Memoire now.
His Majesty's Government believe and hope that a lasting friendship
between Russia and Great Britain will be assured as soon as the
proposed settlement is realized.

From the British Aide-Memoire it follows that the desiderata of

"Pofcrovski, M. N.; "Tsarskaia Rossiia i Voina," 78.

WAR AND PEACE 61

His Majesty's Government, however important they may be to
British interests in other parts of the world, will contain no condi-
tion which could impair Russia's control over the territories described
in the Russian Aide-Mcmoire of February ig-March 4, 1915.

In view of the fact that Constantinople will always remain a trade
entrepot for South-Eastern Europe and Asia Minor, His Majesty's
Government will ask that Russia shall, when she conies in the pos-
session of it, arrange for a free port for goods in transit to and from
non-Russian territory. His Majesty's Government will also ask
that there shall be commercial freedom for merchant ships passing
through the Straits, as M. Sasonow has already promised.

Except in so far as the naval and military operations on which
His Majesty's Government are now engaged in the Dardanelles may
contribute to the common cause of the Allies, it is now clear that this
operation, however successful, cannot be of any advantage to His
Majesty's Government in the final terms of peace. Russia alone will,
if the war is successful, gather the direct fruits of these operations.
Russia should therefore, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government,
not now put difficulties in the way of any Power which may, on
reasonable terms, offer to cooperate with the Allies. The only Power
likely to participate in the operations in the Straits is Greece.
Admiral Garden has asked the Admiralty to send him more destroy-
ers, but they have none to spare. The assistance of a Greek flotilla,
if it could have l>een secured, would thus have been of inestimable
value to His Majesty's Government.

To induce the neutral Balkan States to join the Allies was one
of the main objects which His Majesty's Government had in view
when they undertook the operations in the Dardanelles. His Majesty's
Government hope that Russia will spare no pains to calm the appre-
hensions of Bulgaria and Rumania as to Russia's possession of the
Straits and Constantinople being to their disadvantage. His Majesty's
Government also hope that Russia will do everything in her power
to render the cooperation of these two States an attractive prospect
to them.

Sir E, Grey points out that it will obviously be necessary to
take into consideration the whole question of the future interests
of France and Great Britain in what is now Asiatic Turkey ; and, in
formulating the desiderata of His Majesty's Government with regard
to the Ottoman Empire, he must consult the French as well as the
Russian Government, As soon, however, as it becomes known that
Russia is to have Constantinople at the conclusion of the war, Sir E,

62 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Grey will wish to state that, throughout the negotiations, His Ma-
jesty's Government have stipulated that the Mussulman Holy Places
and Arabia shall under all circumstances remain under independent
Mussulman dominion.

Sir E. Grey is as yet unable to make any definitive proposal on
any point of the British desiderata; but one of the points of the
latter will be the revision of the Persian portion of the Anglo- Rus-
sian Agreement of 1907, so as to recognize the present neutral
sphere as a British sphere.

Until the Allies are in a position to give to the Balkan States,
and especially to Bulgaria and Rumania, some satisfactory assurance
as to their prospects and general position with regard to the terri-
tories contiguous to their frontiers, to the jxissession of which they
are known to aspire; and until a more advanced stage of the agree-
ment as to the French and British desiderata in the final JHMCC terms
is reached, Sir E. Grey points out that it is most 'desirable that the
understanding now arrived at between the Russian, French, and
British Governments should remain secret.

CHAPTER V
PEACE PREPARATION

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Early in the war the Governments of England and France
formed special commissions to prepare material for the Peace
Conference. Russia neglected to do so and that worried the
scholarly Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich. On May 5, 1916,
he raised the question with the Tsar and continued to urge upon
him the necessity of such a commission. The Grand Duke was
primarily a historian but his social position gave him opportu-
nities to meet the leading men "of his own and other countries.
In these letters he gives his views on men and affairs and his
general attitude toward the New Europe.

i. LETTERS FROM GRAND DUKE NIKOLAI MIKHAI-
LOVICH TO THE TSAR

(a) MAY 5, 1916 x

I am sorry to bother you this time with a question which does not
directly concern me, but in which I am personally deeply interested.
It is this: Soon it will be two years since this unprecedented war
broke out. I have an idea that -the end is not far off. I feel that
victory is on the side of Russia and the Allies. At the worst there
may be no victors and no vanquished ; the war may just stop because
both sides will become financially exhausted, I refuse to think that we
might lose the war.

In any case, it is necessary to make preparation now. People
should be selected to uphold the honor and greatness of Russia at
the coming congress or international conference. These men (prob-
ably 5 or 6) must not be bureaucrats, scribblers, or persons with the
souls of routine officials. We should have for this honorable task
men of broad education, men with backbone and courage, who fear
1 "Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia," 63-4*

64 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

neither the newspapers nor the various cliques of our intriguing
capital. It is not going to be an easy task to defend the interest of
Russia and the greatness of the Tsar against both enemies and Allies.
When I have turned over in my mind all the possibilities that might
arise even at the preliminary negotiations, I become quite alarmed at
what may happen when the conference reaches the point of the final
peace terms. It is because of this that I take the liberty of calling to
your serious attention this difficult problem and the need of selecting
qualified men, not only from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but
from the Ministries of War, Navy, and Finance as well. I should
like to be one of the men chosen for this work. I renounce in advance
all special considerations to which, as Grand Duke, I am entitled.

Obviously there is no precedent for this, and the Sazonovs and
Izvolskis may become frightened ; but then this war itself is not an
ordinary one, and has no precedent.

You know my abilities and my faults. My tongue is without bones,
I am liable to flare up and say what I think, but I am not afraid of
people or of calumny. I studied much when a young man and have
not stopped learning in my maturity. I seek nothing for myself.
All I ask is an opportunity to be of real service to you and our dear
Russia. I have several times discussed this topic with your mother
and sister Xenia, and they have encouraged me. I have, therefore,
decided not to put off longer making my request, but lay it, boldly,
perhaps, but honestly, for your consideration.

There is still plenty of time to consider and discuss. I should like
sometime to have a talk with you on the question [peace conference]
which is constantly before my mind and gives me no rest day or
night. When I recall, as historian,2 all the past congresses of sad
memory, I must confess that I am greatly worried

Sincerely yours,

NIKOLAI M{IKHAILOVICH]

(&) May 11, 1916*

Reverting to the question touched upon in my letter of May 5,
I invite your attention to the selection and the future roles of the
persons who attend the conference or congress at the end of this
international wan

If your choice is made in the course of the next few months, the

*The Grand Duke is known as a historian, the author of a life of Alex-
ander I. and other important historical works.
* "Nikolai II i Velfkie Kniazia," 65-9.

WAR AND PEACE 65

selected persons will have to start on the preliminary work without
the loss of a minute, for this reason:

First of all, they will have to get acquainted. Next, having received
general instructions from you or Sazonov, they will have to consider
those principal points on which an agreement has already been
reached with our Allies. These agreements must be gone into thor-
oughly as regards both the main points and the secondary ones,
because I, as well as many others in Russia, have somewhat lost
faith in the ability of the leaders of our foreign policy. They lack
the divine spark, and are dominated by mere routine which blocks
every flash of inspiration.

The arguments against an early selection of persons to work out
a unified program of action for the future conferences do not stand
up under criticism. The fear that it might afford occasion for peace
talk is groundless. Instead, it will produce a good impression, for
even the troops in the trenches will know that they are not dying
and being crippled in vain, but that the Government is even now
taking steps to work out a peace that will be not only honorable,
but profitable.

I make bold to think that our most amiable Sazonov himself
does not always possess the gift of foresight — "prevoir et puis
decider" — which would serve as a guarantee of success at the coming
judgment day of Germany by her present foes. Appetites will be
big. It will be necessary to reckon not only with the European
Allies, but with the Japanese, and, perhaps, with the Americans, too,
who are often forgotten behind those walls at the Pevcheski Bridge.4

If I am so insistent upon a good selection of our future Russian
representatives at the congress, it is to prevent the sending to this
gathering of people of such mental caliber as that well-known canary
with his never-ending warbling, represented by V. N. Kokovtsov,5
or the self-complacent snobbishness of the grand Izvolski,6 or the
venomous analyses of PolivanovJ We need men of action, new ones,
and men who are not bound up with the past and with mistakes
already made.

Scanning the lists of the War Department, I stop instantly at
the name of General Golovin,8 whose bold ideas have frightened our

4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

'Minister of Finance, 1903, 1906-1914. „. . . - .

«A. P. Izvolski, Russian Ambassador in Paris, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, 1906-1910. _

TA. A. Polivanov, Minister of War, June, 1915-March, 1916. t
* N. N. Golovin, author of many scholarly works on military subjects.

66 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

General Staff Academy, and who might select his own younger
assistants.

Of the Admirals, whose abilities are better known to you than
to me, good reports are heard of Admiral Kanin,9 and less unanimous
praise of Rusin.10

In the Department of Finance, it seems to me that Bark u himself
and, let us say, Pokrovski,12 would both prove very valuable for
the complicated financial problems which will be the most difficult
ones in these discussions with the Allies.

I am taking the liberty of making a brief survey of previous
congresses and conferences during the igth century, as negative
examples of our watchfulness.

In 1815 there were in Vienna the director of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Count Nesselrode, Count Pozzo di Sorgo, and
Prince Andrei Razumovski. The first, half German and half Jew;
the second, a crafty Corsican; and, the last, Razumovski, although
a Russian, was senile and quite debilitated (in his younger years
he was the lover of Paul Petrovich's first spouse). This trio was
hardly equal to the task, and the interests of Russia were repre-
sented very queerly. Of course, the personal influence of Emperor
Alexander I played the main part, especially in the affairs of the
Polish Kingdom, which stirred the rosy hopes of the Poles and
ended with the revolution of 1831*

After the Crimean campaign, a conference met at Paris in 1856.
Here, Russia's chief representative was Prince Alexci Orlov, and
some colorless officials. The results of the conference were worse
than lamentable for our interests.

Lastly, in 1878, after the Turkish War, the memorable Congress
of Berlin assembled. Counts Peter Shuvalov and [Paul] d'Oubril
acted as Russia's representatives, under the leadership of the Chan-
cellor himself, Prince Gorchakov, a sick and frail man, who would
appear now in Berlin to provoke general ridicule at the Congress,
and then in Petrograd to play a still sadder role.

Such were our representatives at the congresses of the nine-
teenth century, and what lamentable results we achieved!

At the coming congress the role of head of our interests will
probably fall to Sazonov, as the Allies generally send their Ministers

9 Admiral of the Baltic Fleet.

* Assistant Minister of the Navy*

11 P, L, Bark, Minister of Finance, 1014-1917,

**N. N. Pokrovski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, November, i9i6~March,

1917.

WAR AND PEACE 67

of Foreign Affairs. In connection with this possibility, I wrote to
Sergei Dmitrievich that I should be delighted to work under his
leadership like any other person, if you approved, of course.

On May 7, I received an answer from him which, although ami-
able, does not at all fit in with my plans, Later, Sazonov asked me
by telephone to call, and I spent over an hour with him in animated
conversation, but regret to say that we each stuck to our own ideas.
Sazonov takes the view that it does not behoove a Grand Duke to
act in a subordinate capacity, or to assume responsibilities, especially
in these times when the Grand Dukes, as a whole, do not enjoy the
love and respect of the Russian public. The only exception is
Nicholas [Nicholaevich] whose popularity is ever increasing.

I find it strange that N. N. can and did bear immense responsi-
bility, but that I cannot bear any. Sazonov tries to scare me by
saying that I am liable to lose even my reputation as a historian,
and that, moreover, the foreigners would look askance at me at the
congress.

There is little logic in this. Sazonov said that he would like to
put Count Benckendorff at the top of the list of his collaborators.
Although he merits respect, his German name and religious faith
would hardly produce a good effect upon the Russian public.

As I reported to you on the 6th, the name of Shebeko [N. N.] 18
would be more suitable, but Sazonov will hardly consent to that,
seeing in him a possible successor, while Benckendorff would not be
in his way.

This whole long talk, to tell the truth, grieved me, since, being
fond of Sazonov, I had hoped to find him capable of a broader and
clearer view.

He spoke at great length, also, on the Polish question.1* It may

** Russian Ambassador in Vienna before the war.

** Meeting of the Council of Ministers—July 29, 1915, Sazonov : "Such
an act [automony for Poland by an Imperial Manifesto] would produce an
excellent impression on our Allies, who are disturbed by the uncertain and
wavering policy which we pursue toward the Poles, [In this -act] the Poles
would see that although the luck of war forces Russia to leave Polish soil
temporarily, yet she is concerned about the fate of a brother people and is
trying to bring about conditions under which the two- nations can live together
in the future on a basis of justice. This manifesto should be issued at once
and posted on the walls of Warsaw before our troops leave that city. The
Poles are tired of waiting and are beginning to lose confidence in the Procla-
mation of the Grand Duke [August 14, 1914]. The Imperial Manifesto would
strengthen their hopes and would prevent Polish sympathies from turning
toward the Germans who are ready to do anything to win them. I am
certain that such an act, just as we are withdrawing from the Polish capital,
would leave behind it thousands of people friendly disposed to us and un-
friendly toward the Germans." This proposition of S. D- Sazonov met with

68 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

be that the promulgation of a manifesto now would be timely and
produce a certain effect, since the charms of the proclamation signed
by Nicholas [Nicholaevich] have already evaporated, and there
is danger that the Germans may place the Polish crown upon the
head of one of their numerous princes or archdukes , . .

I apologize for this lengthy epistle, and if I cannot contribute
my mite of usefulness in fact, I shall grieve in silence, that is all,—
the more so as I am alone, do not occupy any particular offices, and
desire nothing for myself personally.

Sincerely yours,

NIKOLAI M[IKXIAILOVICH]

0) AUGUST 8, 1916 15

Grushcvka (Kherson Gwbcmiia)

... I now turn to another matter, connected with the plans
for the coming conference. The question amounts to this: Who is to
be humiliated and dismembered— Austria or Germany, and in what
way shall they be rendered harmless for the future? Among us,
there is an inclination to harm only Austria, and our whole attention
is devoted to this ill-fated empire. The newspapers sharpen their
appetites for the dismemberment of Austria for the benefit of
Russia and the Slav States, but they talk very little about the humilia-
tion of Germany — so strong is the spirit of the Germans and the
Jews in our press.

To me it seems that, speaking of the Central Allied mon-
archies, all attention and all efforts ought to be concentrated upon
Germany. Should there be a complete partition of Austria, we will
have a situation like this : Hungary will become independent, possibly
Bohemia too; Galicia and part of the Bukovina will go to Russia;
Transylvania, probably to Rumania ; and all the rest will be grabbed
by the Serbs and Montenegrins, but especially by the Italians. What,
then, will be left of Austria ?--CarnioIa, Carinthia, Tyrol, and the
Archduchy of Austria in the strict sense? Obviously, Germany will
lay its hands on these provinces in the absence of something better,
and will augment her possessions at the expense of her ally.

One of the diplomatists of the igth century said: "Si FAutriche
n'existait pas — il faudrait la creer/' It seems to me he was right, as
it is more advantageous to have a multi-racial and weak Austria in

solid opposition in the Council of Ministers. . , . ("Arkhiv Russkoi Rev-
oliutsii," XVIII, 22.)

w "Nikolai II i Velikie Kmazia," 75-9-

WAR AND PEACE 69

the center of Europe, than a strong Germany. It is, therefore, neces-
sary to have recourse, in case of complete victory, to the humiliation
and dismemberment of Germany. Schleswig-Holstein should be
given back to Denmark; Alsace and Lorraine, to France; Luxem-
burg, to Belgium ; part of the mouth of the Rhine, to Holland ; Posen,
to Poland; part of Silesia (the Saxon part) and part of Bavaria,
to Austria, Germany should be compelled to reduce her navy to the
minimum, but there should be no interference in her domestic affairs.
Let her princes and dukes, burghers, Socialists, scientists, and beer-
brewers, — in a word, all the representatives of "Deutschland iiber
Alles," — quarrel among themselves.

However, having all this on paper and by word of mouth is
not sufficient. Historical examples are useful even after one hundred
years. In 1815 the armies of occupation of Russia, Prussia, Austria,
and England were left in France until 1818, i. e.f three years, until
everything was complied with and paid. Now we shall have to do
something similar, but we must come to an agreement right otway.
Russia, France, England, Italy, Japan, Serbia, and Belgium will have
to leave one army corps each in Germany till the execution of the
treaty, making seven army corps.

You will perhaps smile and think that I am again running too
far ahead, "mais bien gouverner, c'est prevoir," and it is necessary
to discuss all these things in advance and to come to an agreement
among the heterogeneous Allies. . . .

Sincerely yours,

NIKOLAI M[IKHAILOVICH]

(d) AUGUST 26, 1916 16

Petrograd

... Of the foreigners here, I have thus far had two conversa-
tions with the Italian Ambassador, Marquis Carlotti, the cleverest
among the ambassadors (after Motono). He no longer doubts that
Rumania will come out one of these days, but he strongly denounces
the Greeks, charging them with duplicity and sympathy for Ger-
many. He is still more suspicious of the role of the new Spanish
Ambassador in Petrograd, Marquis Villasinda, a noted pro-German,
through whom various German agents are attempting to carry on
their peace propaganda in government cliques. They are trying in
every way to reach you and Her Majesty to work on your feelings,

* "Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia," 80-1.

70 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

thinking that, especially now, with Stuermer's German name, this will
prove easier than before.

The Italian assured me that these same Spaniards have also
cleverly mixed tip the Polish question with the whole thing, in order
to defer as long as possible the proclaiming of the expected manifesto
on the destinies of Poland.

I am reiwrting all this for your information, and will add that
the worse things become for the Germans on the battlefields and at
home, the stronger will their efforts be here, and that every means,
from family connections down , . , to the most contemptible frauds,
will be made use of. This is my firm conviction, which I could later
confirm by other facts. Just as they employ all kinds of abominations
in war, asphyxiating gases, bombing the hospitals, and so forth,
just so will they use all means for the attainment of peace, especially
the ill-smelling ones.

Another diplomatist, Buchanan, who is almost my neighbor along
the Quai, has often visited me this summer, and after the sympathy
I expressed to him on the death of Kitchener and O'Beirne,17 he
became more friendly and communicative. Although I do not regard
him as a big man, he is really a confirmed enemy of the Germans
and, tinder the influence of the new Counselor of the Embassy,
Lindley, who is very able, Buchanan often talks to the point and
wisely. During my stay at Grushevka he wrote to me twice, and I
replied to his letters quite frankly. His second letter is interesting,
and so I am sending it to you to read, as it coincides entirely with
my views of the future fate of Austria and Germany.

Of the Frenchman, Paleologue, I say nothing, because that gen-
tleman only gets things mixed, wherever possible, prates nonsense
in various drawing-rooms, and, instead of being an efficient repre-
sentative of friendly France, thinks only of Ins own career and his
own hide, and therefore cannot Ixi trusted, * . ,

Sincerely yours,

NIKOLAI M[IKHAXLOVICH]

0) SEPTEMBER 2, 1916**

I take the liberty of recalling to your attention my report of
December 16, 1912, when I returned from Rumania, in view of
the fact that she has now joined us and the object of my voyage
was not in vain. My notes are in French.

* H, J. O'Beimc of the Foreign Office, formerly Counselor of the British
Embassy in Russia.

» "Nikolai II i V«likie Kniasia," 8s; 14^50.

WAR AND PEACE 71

CONVERSATION AVEC LE ROI

Ma neutralite est possible car j'ai toujours garde les souvenirs
les plus reconnaissants a feu TEmp. Alexandre II, quand nos troupes
ont marche ensemble. Mais jamais je n'aurais pu lever mon glaive
contre 1'Allemagne comme un Hohenzollern — ceci est exclu. Alliance
et intimite possible entre la Roumanie et la Bulgarie, mais aucun
accord avec Serbie et surtout avec la Grece. Je suis entierement
oppose a toute idee de confederation balkanique.

CONVERSATION AVEC TITO 'MAJORESCO, PRESIDENT DU CONSEIL

Vague. Neutralite peut-etre. Aurait voulu rester en dehors du
tout, pas de confederation balkanique, accord dangereux, pouvait
provoquer dans le pays des troubles et des tendances revolutionnaires.
II voudrait rester au mieux avec les trois voisins de la Roumanie : la
Russie, I'Autriche et la Bulgarie, gardant sa liberte d'action complete.

CONVERSATION AVEC TAKE-IONESCO

Vues plus larges que le president du Conseil. N'aurait lui pas voulu
froisser TAutriche, qu'il croit en etat "de decomposition complete
et de nervosite extreme/5 avant de s'engager avec la Russie en con-
cordant Faction de la Roumanie avec les vues de la Russie. Faut
surtout menager la subtilite du vieux roi, vu son age et son etat
de sante.

My comment.18 Intelligent, actif, faux, mais grand ami personnel
de Kiederlen-Waeehter,

CONVERSATION AVEC JEAN BRATIANO, LEADER DE I/OPPOSITION

Critique acerbe de la politique du Cabinet actuel, aussi de celle du
roi, Aurait desire que la Roumanie prenne position, f asse une politique
plus active et pose nettement ses pretentions. Faut absolument tacher
d'entrer dans la confederation balkanique "en passant par dessus
les petitesses" c. a. d. Inversion du roi pour la Serbie et celle du
pays pour la Grece,

My comment.10 Vues larges d'un homme qui sent arriver bientot '
son heure et prendre la pouvoir. Respect pour le monarque, mais
regret de le voir tellement attache aux indications venant de Berlin
et de Vienne.

** These words are written in Russian.

72 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

CONVERSATION AVEC BRATIANO

"Le pays saura se debrouiller dans la situation actuelle passant par
dessus les personnes/' — "La visite qtfil y a trois jours du Conrad von
Hetzendorf purement de politcssc avec lettrc de Temp. Francois-
Joseph et reponse du roi Carol qu'il etait dispose a soutenir towtes les
solutions pacifiques. On vent nous forcer d'aller avec la Tripliee,
meme les armes a la main, qtiitte a ne ricn avoir d*avantageux, surlout
si TAutriche touchait ce qu'elle desire." Puis Bratiano m'a insinue
assez vaguement quc si la Russic s'engageait dans line guerre avec
les austro-Allemands dans des conditions favorables pour clle, c. a. d.
avec la France et 1'Angleterre, les sympathies de la majorite des
roumains iraient incontestablement vers la Russie, niais celles du
vieux roi, meme en cas de gros succes, resteraicnt acquises pour la
gloire des Hohenzollern. — A ma question : "Et si Vous etes un jour
a la tete du gouvernement, feriez \rous des demarches pour avoir la
Bessarabie?" Silence niomentane et puis : "V. A. 1. veut me blaguer ; je
ne puis meme comme ardent j>atriote roumain desirer I'impossihle,
mais nioi au pouvoir je mettrai la question de Transylvanie en
premiere Kgne et ferait tout ix>ur me rapprochcr de la Russie. Mais
je Vous repete, avec le roi actucl cela sera tres dure> ax*ec le succes-
seur . * . on pourrait s'arranger . . . je ne puis helas Vous clire
plus." — Moi: **Puis-je renter cela attssi a mon souverain?" — **S\
vous insistez — out, autrement — plutot non."

My conclusion.20 Impression generate: la Roumame ne veut pas
s'engager a rien de precis ; le roi est tres ailemand et ne le cache pas ;
les hommes politiques sont tons faux. J, Bratiano m*a Tair dfun indi-
vidu de premier ordre. C'est QueIquTun.

(/) SEPTEMBER 9, 19x6**

Deeply touched by your dear lines, I make bold to submit a few
supplementary considerations concerning the questions referred to
in your letter,

I agree with you entirely that Austria was the instigator of the
war, that all through the past few years her policy has been treacher-
ous and base, and that she was in tow of the Germans. Consequently
she fully deserves proper punishment, and her dismemberment would
be justified as the logical consequence of her double-faced policy.
But just as Germany was prepared for the war, had weighed every-

* These words are written in Russian.
m "Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia/* 85-6.

WAR AND PEACE 73

thing, considered everything down to the last detail, so was Austria
unprepared and could only weakly support her powerful Ally,
especially during the 1914 period of the war.

When the Germans began to lord it in Vienna and took the whole
military business into their own hands, Austria temporarily improved,
in the course of 1915, but now she finds herself again on the eve of
a general debacle and complete disorganization. This is not surprising.
It was hard for the Germans to revive a corpse that had been
decomposing a long time. Hence, even though Austria merits dis-
memberment, against which I have nothing to say, it should not
be in such a way that the Germans would get something out of it.
The first question of the future will be a general demand by all
the Allies that Germany be weakened to such an extent that she
may never thereafter be able to threaten the peace of Europe. But
how is this to be realized, if she is to retain all of her possessions,
being deprived, perhaps, only of Alsace-Lorraine? To be sure, she
will lose her colonies, but Germany must be struck at her very roots.
If we want to finish with Austria, she, [Germany] too, must be
rendered harmless* The English will hardly be able to deprive Ger-
many of her entire navy, and to bring about the destruction of the
Krupp works. If these demands are found to be impossible of execu-
tion, then, to my mind, she ought to be trimmed territorially on all
sides. This is why I admitted the possibility of compensating Austria
at the expense of Germany, but not the Germans to the disadvantage
of an already stripped Austria.

There is still another circumstance to which attention ought to
be directed at this time, that there may be no misunderstandings
among the Allies later, during the peace negotiations. I have been
struck even before this by the benevolent attitude of the English,
and especially Buchanan, toward Bulgaria, but now it has begun to
express itself in a more definite form. If, as a general rule, the
English reckon only with countries that have outlets to the sea —
which is to the advantage of Bulgaria — there is now still another
tendency, namely, to draw the Bulgarians over to the side of the
Allies. This is no longer a secret desire, but a manifest attempt to
set apart the Bulgarians alone, to the disadvantage of the other
Balkan nationalities, and especially unfortunate Serbia, which has
no outlet to the sea anywhere. It is, therefore, necessary to take into
consideration betimes these English tendencies, and to prevent them
from developing so that there may be no unexpected conflict when
the peace negotiations begin. While the Counselor of the Embassy,

74 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Lindley, merely hints guardedly at the desirability of sparing Bul-
garia, the good-natured Buchanan has spoken of nothing but this in
recent weeks. Neither the French nor the Italians swallow the bait,
but it would be desirable to cut loose the cork, also. . . *

Sincerely yours,

NIKOLAI M.

(ff) OCTOBER 4, 1916 22

As I have been giving still more thought to the future peace
negotiations, but chiefly to the preliminary work in which everything
must be weighed and considered, I permit myself to submit the
following additional ideas:

Even if the war should continue, say, another year, we ought
nevertheless to prepare for the conference at this time. How is it
to be carried out in reality? I assume that it would be well to create
a commission not connected with any one Government department,
of persons selected by you, who should be furnished with quite
definite instructions, be familiarized with all the agreements and
treaties between the Allies, and should proceed to work at once.
Such a commission should also make a study of the historical,
geographical, and especially ethnographical factors, and get acquainted
with all the details of the scientific handling of the complex interna-
tional questions of the future.

If I were chosen to be chairman of such a commission, I guarantee
to carry the work through successfully, and / would not be talvn
unawares when the military orations end. But in selecting the
members of the commission, attention must be given to the compli-
cated situation in the country and the prevailing lack of confidence
in the Government. It would therefore be desirable to draw into the
commission persons whose public life would inspire with confidence
not only you, but a majority of your subjects. It must be remembered,
too, that the responsibility of the members of the commission will be
great, both to you and to our country.

Such a commission, in my conviction, must work in seclusion and
have a limited membership. I make bold to recommend from the
State Council, Samarin** and Naumov,*4 two former ministers, but
high-minded men, politically independent, and devoted to Russia;
from the State Duma, Shulgin ** and N. N. Lvov, who enjoy the
* "Nikolai II i Velikie Kniasrfa," 88-92.

A, D. Samarin, Oberprocurator of the Synod, July 18 to October 10, 1915,
»£' «' ^aum.ov' M««ster of Agriculture, November, i$i$ to July, 1916,

V. V • Shulgin.

WAR AND PEACE 75

confidence of their colleagues in the Duma and are of sterling char-
acter. The first is a Nationalist, the second belongs to the group of
independent deputies. All four are personally known to you, but I
do not know how you feel toward them. If we should add to these
four, one man each from the army, navy, finance, and foreign affairs
(for instance, Prince Gregory Trubetskoi26 or N. N. Shebeko27),
that would make a membership of nine (9), quite sufficient for
fruitful work.

In France and England such preparatory commissions have been
busy for a long time, and the work among the French is especially
successful under the initiative and guidance of Briand.

Now a few words about how I picture the organization of the
commission, the role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the
relations between him and the commission. There must be an effort
toward unity in the work, and the Minister should be made to see
that the commission is only a temporary, auxiliary organ, and not
an institution opposed to him. Only under such an arrangement would
I agree to become a member, or the chairman, of this commission.

If you do consider the creation of an extra-departmental com-
mission at all desirable, it should be unofficial, that is, established
not by publishing a ukaz in the "Pravitelstvenny Viestnik," but
simply on your verbal order — of course, through the Minister of
Foreign Affairs.

Should the ideas I have expressed as to creating such a commis-
sion merit your approval, and should you entrust me with the conduct
of this business, I would ask to have with me, as secretary, some one
with whom I am accustomed to work, for example, the member of
the Imperial Historical Society, Prince N. V. Golitsyn,28 or Professor
A, S. Lappo-Danilevski.29

The meetings of the commission could be held at my palace,
where all the necessary archives for this work would be concentrated.

It may be that you will consider this renewal of my efforts for an
early establishment of some organ or commission for the preparation
of materials for the peace treaties as an annoyance. In that case,
generously forgive me, since every man thinks his own geese are
swans. Arrive a Tage, plutot avance de presque 58 ans, on change
difficilement et j'implore, Sire, Votre indulgence, mais je sais que Vous
me connaissez assez pour me pardonner mes entrainements pour une

* Official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

** Russian Ambassador in Vienna before the war.

* Director of the Archives of State.

* Noted historian and member of the Academy of Sciences.

;6 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

cause sacree — celle de la grandeur et du bien-etre de notre chore
Patrie. In my excitement, I have commenced to chatter French, like
a diplomat of the epoch of Alexander I and Xapoleon!

The Japanese have safely departed, carrying away with them the
very best impressions.

Let me add a few more details to what I have already written.
As military member of the commission, General Beliacv,30 who is well
informed on everything, and now entirely free, would he very suit-
able; of the seamen, I don't know who is more sympathetic to you
— Admiral Rusin or Admiral Muraviev; as regards finance, Hark
would probably recommend Feoclosiev, who used to travel with
him abroad.

. AH the nine members of the commission would be genuine
Russians: Samarin, Naumov, Shulgin, Lvov, Prince Gregory Trubet-
skoi, General Beliaev, Admiral ?? and Feodosiev; and I, alone, have
German, blood, but it's cooling and there is little left of it,

I submit a very short outline of the problems which the com-
mission I am planning would have to deal with :

1. What territory should Russia acquire in Europe and the East?
What economic, political, and social advantages? What should be the
methods of administering the newly acquired territories?

2. What are the views of our Allies : France, England, Italy, and
Japan, as to their own territorial acquisitions ?

3. How can we assist in the territorial restoration of Serbia,
Montenegro, and Belgium?

4. Poland???

5. Acquisitions in Asia Minor — the formulation of the Armenian
question.

6. Future fate of Persia,

7. Promises to Rumania?

8. How shall we treat Bulgaria?

9. The same about Greece.

10. Views of our Government and of the Allied Powers on the
dismemberment of Austria,

11. The same questions as regards Germany*

12. Army and navy questions.

13. The future, in connection with The Hague Conference; how
to interpret international laws after the "scrap of paper" of Beth-
mann-Hollweg.

**M. A. Beliaev, Minister of War, January 18 to March 13,

WAR AND PEACE 77

14. Occupation of enemy countries by Allied troops till the execu-
tion of all points of the peace treaty.

15. The problem of indemnity; the financial aspect of the matter.

16. Shall the future peace conference consist solely of the Allied
Powers, or shall the enemy countries, Germany, Austria, Bulgaria,
and Turkey, be admitted?

17. What is of greatest advantage to us and to our Allies?

Such, approximately, are the principal questions which the prepa-
ratory commission would have to take up. The personality of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, no matter who he may be, is of no
consequence here, provided that he has the good of the country at
heart and looks upon the commission as collaborators and not as
enemies. Among the enumerated eight names, I should especially
appreciate the cooperation of three : Shulgin, N. N. Lvov, and Prince
Gregory Trubetskoi; upon the others I do not insist, but General
Beliaev, for example, although not clever, is well informed ; Samarin
is not an eagle, either, but he is held in esteem by Moscow; and
Naumov is personally sympathetic to me. You see that I am perfectly
frank, but, with our present dearth of men, one has to look hard
for sterling sons of the fatherland, who are Russian In spirit, honest,
unselfish, and not politicians.

I confess that I have become tired lately with reading and thinking
about these questions ; I should therefore like to rest up, for about a
fortnight, and to warm myself, as wet and cold are here earlier than
usual. I shall probably go to the Crimea at the end of the month to
see Xenia, stopping over, perhaps, at Kiev for a day or two.
I apologize once more for the annoyance.
With all my soul yours,

NIKOLAI M,

PART II
THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC

INTRODUCTORY" NOTE

In no other war did the civilian population play such a visibly
active part as in the World War. With the sound of the bugle,
party differences were laid aside, coalition governments were
formed, and national unity was achieved. England and France
made use of this unity to enlist in the service of the Government
captains of industry and commerce and public spirited citizens in
general. It seemed for a time as if Russia would pursue a similar
policy.

In his declaration of war Nicholas said :

. . . "let domestic strife be forgotten. Let the union between
the Tsar and His people be stronger than ever, and let Russia, rising
like one man, repel the insolent assault of the enemy."

These words were received with enthusiasm by his subjects. The
Russians felt that they were put on an equality with Englishmen
and Frenchmen, and they were eager to show that the confidence
of the Tsar was not misplaced. Those who were called to the
colors responded with a will and thousands of others went as
volunteers. Offers of assistance poured in from the four corners
of the Empire. It was believed that with such support, such allies,
and such preparedness (as the Minister of War assured) Russia
was bound to win not only the war but permanent unity of Tsar
and people,

The overwhelming defeat in East Prussia came as a terrible
shock to these trustful souls. They could not at first explain how
it happened, but in the course of a few weeks they learned that
unpreparedness in the rear and incompetence at the front were
largely responsible for the disaster. Though the defeat caused
great sorrow it did not bring on undue pessimism. The public still

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 79

had faith in the Government, accepted its explanations, gave it the
benefit of the doubt, trusted in its promises, and continued to
offer its services. With the exception of Red Cross assistance,
and that was accepted grudgingly, the bureaucrats declined all
offers. To have done otherwise would have been an ipso facto
reflection on their ability.

Whether they would admit their unfitness or not, the Russian
people became convinced of it after the Galician disasters in the
spring of 1915. Excuses no longer availed, and a cry was raised
that the worthless Ministers should be replaced by men who knew
how to work with the public in order to win the fight. For once
the Emperor listened to the voice of his people, removed the more
objectionable men from the ministerial posts and authorized the
formation of special war councils, composed in large part of
members of the legislative bodies. This was a concession to the
liberal elements and a curtailment of the power of the bureau-
crats. The one group rejoiced and the other gnashed their teeth.

These innovations and changes did not bring with them the
expected blessings, Unpreparedness in the rear and incompetence
at the front were not alone responsible for Russia's sad plight.
Among the other major causes was the almost total lack of co-
operation between the military and civil authorities. Russia had
two capitals — Headquarters and Petrograd — and one blamed the
other for the evils that befell the country. By creating the councils
and by handing over to them and to the public organizations (such
as the Union of Cities and Union of Zemstvos) governmental
functions the Tsar created a third center of jealousy. Every move
of these newly formed institutions was resented and, so far as
possible, blocked by the bureaucrats. The Duma took up the cause
of the public organizations and rallied around itself all the ele-
ments opposed to the Government, It bitterly attacked the
Ministers and the denunciatory speeches were loudly acclaimed
by the press and silently approved by the army. The Ministers
were unable to defend themselves, for the censorship was in the
hands of their foes the military men. A point was reached where
the poor Prime Minister dreaded the meetings of the Duma. He
was too haughty to strike a bargain with it and too cowardly to
face it Under the circumstances he had the Duma summoned only

So DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

in case of necessity and had it adjourned as soon as possible,
usually under irritating conditions. lie excused his actions by
saying that if he gave in to the Duma he would strengthen democ-
racy. To this argument his enemies replied that by discouraging
democracy he was actually encouraging the revolutionary
movement.

This irritating policy, these political attacks from within and
military defeats from without, for which the Government was
blamed, demoralized the Ministry and brought on dissensions.
Ministers resigned or were dismissed in such rapid succession
that a continued policy was quite out of the question. Members
of the Duma interpreted this chaotic condition as a premeditated
plan by the reactionary Ministers to overthrow the Duma and
bring on a separate peace with Germany.

That some of the Ministers were opposed to democracy is
obvious; that any of them worked for a separate peace with
Germany is not proved. It was, nevertheless, believed by a great
many people and gradually the idea took hold that with the
Ministers it was a question either of winning the war with democ-
racy or losing the war with autocracy. It was a good battle cry
and the Duma made the most of it. Its cries lx?came louder and
its demands bolder. In 1915, Duma members asked for a
Ministry of confidence, but in 1916 they clamored for a respon-
sible Ministry. Intoxicated by their own beautiful phrases and
the plaudits of the street, the Duma members competed with one
another in abuse of the defenseless Ministers and made them
appear worse than they really were. Each, Duma and Government*
regarded itself as more righteous; each exacted the other to
confess, repent and be forgiven; but neither would make the
first move. A working agreement was at all times possible.
Blinded by their passions, they stabbed at each other until they
weakened themselves by the loss of blood. In undermining the
Government, the liberal Duma did not see that it was digging its
own grave and feeding the smoldering fires of revolution.

What was the Emperor doing at this time? He was at Head-
quarters befogged, bewildered, crushed under a pile of military
reports. He was torn by conflicting accounts of the situation in
the interior. He usually desired to do what was right but ended

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 81

by doing what was wrong. He was too much influenced by the
Empress and those who surrounded her. After he had assumed
the Supreme Command at the front, he left the government of
the rear to her. The poor woman never understood and was always
misunderstood by Russia. She did not mingle in society and be-
cause of her retired life certain stories and legends spread about
her. She was lonely, friendless and distrusted in the big Empire.
Her unpopularity, worries of all kinds, especially the poor health
of her young son, broke her health. She suffered from insomnia
and heart trouble. She looked on the world through dark glasses,
suspected every one, especially the Grand Dukes and the Grand
Duchesses, — political foes became bitter personal enemies. Be-
lieving that her husband lacked the strength of character to defend
himself and his rights, she felt it to be her duty to help and protect
him. She reached out for more power and obligations ; she meddled
in things which she did not understand; she worked until she
became a nervous wreck, more fit for a sanitarium than a throne.
As she grew weaker, physically and mentally, she became more
bitter, more vindictive and more credulous. For a number of years
she had been under the influence of an ignorant, profligate but
clever and intelligent peasant by the name of Rasputin, and this
influence increased as her health declined. From September, 1915,
to the time of his death at the end of 1916, Rasputin governed
Russia through the Empress and the Emperor, In the meantime
the country sank lower and lower; and the wave of restlessness
mounted higher and higher. The Grand Dukes and Grand Duch-
esses became frightened and pleaded with her and the Tsar, but
all in vain. They next formed a conspiracy to kill Rasputin, whom
they regarded as the cause of all the troubles. His assassination,
the first act of the revolutionary drama, failed in its purpose, for
the Empress found another spiritual and political guide in
Protopopov, Minister of the Interior. Protopopov had been
gradually failing mentally and was hardly responsible for his
acts. The next move of the conspirators was to remove the
Empress herself. It was planned to lock her up in a convent and
force the Emperor to abdicate in favor of his son, with his brother
the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich as regent. But before this
palace coup d'etat came off the mob rose in revolt.

CHAPTER VI
RODZIANKO'S MEMOIRS *

Soon after the first battles, shocking reports came from the
front of the incoxnpetency of the sanitary department, of its in-
ability to handle the wounded at the front. There was great con-
fusion. Freight trains came to Moscow filled with wounded, lying em
the bare floor, without even straw, in many cases without clothing,
poorly bandaged, and unfed. At this time my wife was patroness
of the Elizabeth Society [Red Cross organization] and it was reported
to her that such trains passed the field units of her society, stopping
sometimes at the stations, but that those in charge would not allow
the sisters to enter the cars. There was a certain amount of undesir-
able rivalry between the Ministry of War and the Red Cross. Each
acted independently of the other and there was no coordination*

The War Department was particularly weak in first aid. Though
it had neither carts, horses, nor first aid material, yet it allowed no
other organization on the field. There seemed no other course than
to bring the state of affairs to the attention of Grand Duke Nicholas
Nicholaevich. I wrote him a letter in which I told him that patriotic.
enthusiasm had called forth a numter of volunteer sanitary organiza-
tions, but that they could do nothing because of Evdokimov, the
head of the sanitary division of the Ministry of War. Realizing that
the volunteer organizations were of a higher order than his, and not
willing to admit it, Evdokimov was doing everything that he could
to block their efforts. But wounded cannot wait ; they must be looked
after; the fighting line must be provided with first aid. There must
be no loss of time. In view of the fact that it was imjx^ssible to
bring about a working agreement between the sanitary division and
the volunteer organisations, it would be well to appoint sonic otw
with dictatorial powers to take charge of both and bring about
some order.

I went also to see the old Empress, Marie Fedorovna* who lived

"'Arkhiv Russkoi Revolmtmi/* XVII, 8aff, Eodmnko, M. V. (1859-19*4)'
President of the 3rd and 4th Dumas, was a very active and highly respected
public-spirited man*

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 83

on Elagin Island. When I told her the situation she was horrified.
"Tell me, what should be done?" asked the Empress.

I advised her to send a telegram to Nicholas Nicholaevich urging
him to command Evdokimov to put things in order and to allow the
Red Cross to go to work. She asked me to write such a telegram in
her name.

As a result of these efforts there came a telegram, followed by a
letter, from the Grand Duke stating that he agreed with the president
of the Duma, and that he would take the necessary measures. Soon
after that Evdokimov was called to Headquarters. A little later
Prince Alexander Petrovich of Oldenburg2 was made the head of
the sanitary-evacuation division with dictatorial powers.

Grand Duke Nicholas wrote me that he had long before insisted
on the removal of Evdokimov, but that it could not be done because
he had the protection of Sukhomlinov and the Empress Alexandra
Feclorovna, It was said that the young Empress persuaded the
Emperor to leave Evdokimov in his place in order to spite the old
Empress. . . .

Soon after my arrival at Warsaw in November [CX S.], 1914,
I had a call from Vyrubov [V. V.], a representative of the Zemstvo
Union, who asked me to go with him to the Warsaw- Vienna station
where there ' were about eighteen thousand men, wounded in the
battles near Lodz and Berezina. There I saw a frightful scene. On
the floor, without even a bedding of straw, in mud and slush, lay
innumerable wounded, whose pitiful groans and cries filled the air.
"For God's sake, get them to attend to us. No one has looked after
our wounds for five days."

It should be said that after these bloody battles the wounded were
thrown into freight cars without order, and thrown out at this station
without attention. The only medical aid they received was from
Warsaw doctors and nurses, about fifteen in all, belonging to a Polish
organization which volunteered its services. ... I do not know their
names, but with all my soul I hope that the hearty thanks of a
Russian may reach them, as well as my highest respect and praise.
When I was at the station, these good people had been steadily at
work for three days without rest. I was quite worked up over the
scene before me and at once telephoned to the head of the sanitary
division, General Danilov [N. A.], and the representative of the Red
Cross, General Volkov, to come to the station. When they arrived, we
four (these two, Vyrubov and I) took up the question of what to do.
*Unde of the Tsar.

Rj DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Oanilov and Volkov told me most positively that they could furnish
no medical help. But I recalled that while visiting1 one of the Her!
Cross hospitals, I had seen six doctors and about thirty nurses who
were doing nothing. I insisted that those men and women should I**
put to work at once to take care of the wounded. Onnilov replied
that it could not he done heeausc those doctors and mn>es hud Ix*t»n
detailed for a sanitary train which was being formed. This was said
at a time when eighteen thousand suffering men were lyiivjf on the
station platform. I demanded that General Danilov immediately
prepare a train of warm freight cars to take the wounded from the
station. He replied that he could not because, according to the instruc-
tions of the chief of the sanitary service, wounded could i»e moved
to the interior only on sanitary trains, of which he had about eight,
I was so outraged by this heartless attitude toward the suffering men
that I threatened to telegraph to the Prince of Oldenburg, demanding
that the officials be dismissed from the service and tried on a criminal
charge. This frightened Danilov and he went to work, Knough dwtnis
and nurses were found, so that in the course of two or three day*
the wounded were attended to and taken to the rear, . . „

While at Warsaw, I asked permission of (irand I hike Xiclwla*
Nicholaevich to go to Headquarters, 1 wished to tell him what I had
seen and heard at Warsaw. General Ruzski f X. V.j had eomplaiwd
to me of lack of ammunition and the fxw equipment »f the men,
There was a great shortage of boots. In the Carpathians, the soldier^
fought harefooted. . . .

The hospitals and stations of the Red Cross, which came under
my notice, were in excellent condition ; hut the war hospital*- wen?
disorganised. They were short of bandages and such thing*. The
great evil was, of course, the lack of cooperation iwtwwn the two
organizations. At the front, one had to walk about ten or more vrr>t* *
from the war hospitals to those of the Red Cros*. It was intfxttsthU1
to hire a cart because the inhabitants had either fled or lost all
they owned.

The Grand Duke received me In a very friendly manner, . , . He
approved my suggestion for collecting carts, filled with straw, for
the transportation of wounded. In the course of a few 4iysf cart*
and horses were being requisitioned in our gubemiia for u«e at
the front, . . .

The Grand Duke stated that he was obliged to stop fighting,
temporarily, for lack of ammunition and boots,
*A vcrst is two-thirds of a itiiJe.

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 85

"You have influence/' he said. "You are trusted. Try and get
boots for the army, as soon as possible/1

I replied that this could be done if the zemstvos and public organi-
zations were asked to help. There was plenty of material and
labor in Russia. But as it stood then, one guberniia had leather,
another nails, another soles, and still another cheap labor. The best
thing to do would be to call a congress of the heads of the guberniia
zemstvos and ask their cooperation. The Grand Duke was greatly
pleased with this idea.

When I returned to Petrograd, I asked members of the Duma
their opinion as to the best way to get boots. After considering the
matter, we decided to circularize heads of zemstvos and mayors of
cities. In a short time, we received very encouraging replies. Realiz-
ing that there might be objections from the Government to calling a
congress, I decided to talk it over separately with some of the
Ministers. Krivoshein, Sukhomlinov, and Goremykin 4 liked the idea
and promised to support it when it came up in the Council of Minis-
ters. My interview with Minister Maklakov4 was quite out of the
ordinary. When I explained that it was the wish of the Commander-
in-Chief to secure a supply of boots for the army quickly, through the
help of the zemstvos, and for that purpose there would be a meeting
of the heads of the cities and zemstvos, Maklakov said : "Yes, yes ;
what you tell me agrees perfectly with the information I get from
my agents."

"What information?"

"According to the information of my agents, the congress to
take up needs of the army has for its real object to discuss political
quevStions and demand a constitution/'

This announcement was so unexpected and so crude that I jumped
from my chair and answered him rather roughly.

"You are crazy. What right have you to insult me by supposing
that I, the President of the Duma, would take advantage of the war
needs to call a congress for revolutionary purposes. Besides, you are
greatly mistaken. We already have a constitution/' . . .

Maklakov, apparently realizing that he had made a bad blunder,
tried to explain.

"Michael Vladimirovich, please do not take this personally. In
any case, I cannot authorize such a meeting without the consent of

4 A. V, Krivoshein, Minister of Agriculture; V. A. Sukhomlii^ov, Minister
of War; I, L. Goremykin, Prime Minister; and N. A. Maklakov, Minister of
the Interior.

86 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

the Council of Ministers, and I shall bring the question before th,
body at the next meeting.11

I told him that some of the Ministers had already promised the
support, and left him rather excited.

Members of the Duma discussed the coining congress. Many <
the heads of the zemstvos had been told unofiicially of the wish <
the Commander-m-Chief to have the zemstvos help in the war worl
The response was encouraging. Some sent very useful informatit
and others came to Petrograd. Word was received that certai
zemstvos had already begun work, that material was being bough
and boots made. One of the zemstvos sent an agent to Argentine 1
buy tannin. Even some of the governors wrote that they approve
having the zemstvos help in the war work. Minister Maklakn*
however, interfered whenever he could. He ruled that all onlei
should pass through the hands of the governors, which ruling irritate
the public men and delayed matters. At this time he issued ill
famous order forbidding the export of the products of one gubernii
to another. This nearly ruined the whole scheme, which was base
on utilizing to the best advantage the products and resources <i
different guberniias. After a few days, a letter came from Maklakot
notifying the President of the Duma that his proposition to call
congress was not accepted by the the Council of Ministers and th«3
the order for boots had l)ecn placed in the hands of the head intendan
Shuvaev [D. S, — later Minister of War], who would put himscl
in touch with the zemstvos and cities. On the day following* Slwvae
called and told me frankly that he could not do the work, that h
had never had dealings with the zemstvos, did not think that th
zemstvos had sufficient confidence in the intcndaucy ami cloutac*
whether they would have any direct dealings with it. He asfked me t
help him. I told him that in view of the fact that the Council o
Ministers had decided against me in this matter, the best thing fo
me to do was to keep out of it-
Soon after that Goremykin came to ?ee me in regard to callinj
the Duma, I reminded him of our conversation and his promise t<
support my plan of a zemstvo congress.

"What congress?" asked Goremykin, in some astonishment, W\V<
never discussed this question in the Council of Ministers/* I then
showed him Maklakov's letter. He read it through in amazement
assured me, again, that the question had not been before the Couitci
of Ministers, and ended by saying that Maklakov **!ied» as uraal."
In spite of this obstruction on the part of the Government, tin

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 87

zcmstvos went on with their work. Shuvaev received boots. Makla-
kov's orders and rulings were resented. His order forbidding export
from one guberniia to another was especially irritating and worked
hardships. It came about that some districts had too much and others
too little, and that landowners having estates in different guberniias
could not move seed grain from one estate for use in another. . . .

In the beginning of April [1915] . . . I decided to go to Galicia.
... I heard the same report everywhere — the army was short of
munitions, the same complaint which Ruzski had made in the autumn
of 1914. When I told it to the Grand Duke at that time [autumn],
he quieted me by saying that it was a temporary shortage, that in
two weeks more there would be plenty of ammunition. Now, the
same complaints were heard everywhere. . . . We hardly had time
to return to Lemberg when our tragic retreat began. What my son
and all serious military men had foreseen, happened: the lack of
ammunition made all our victories and all the bloodshed vain. . . .

On my return from Galicia, I stopped at Headquarters to give
the Commander-in-Chief my impressions. . . . "Your Highness, you
are throwing away lives in vain. You should demand a definite report
from the artillery department of what it has ready and what you may
count on. So far its promises have not been carried out."

To this, the Grand Duke replied : "I can get nothing from the
artillery department My position is a very difficult one. They are
turning the Emperor against me."

The Grand Duke complained of Maklakov, who prevented an
inspection of the State factories. The Grand Duke had persuaded
the Emperor to appoint Litvinov-Falinski to visit the factories having
war orders . . * but when the Tsar reached Petrograd, he changed
his mind. . . ,

In bidding me good-bye, the Grand Duke asked what could be
done to save the situation. I laid before him my old plan, tKat is, to
organize a committee of members of the Duma, representatives of
industry, of the artillery, and other military departments, and give
this body full power to handle all munition questions.5 The Grand

"/tour 7 [1915]. . . • "Rodzianko's mixing up in this question has quite a
history of its own. The Duma constantly called attention to the fact that the
situation in the artillery department was quite unsatisfactory. ... It should,
however, be said that [Grand Duke] Sergei Mikhailovich undertook this big
task when he was still ill, when he could not even move. To many this seemed
quite wrong. It is likely that the present change, which takes this matter out
of the hands of the artillery department, has for its object to satisfy public
opinion and to enlist the support of the public. From that point of view it is
commendable As to results, the future will tell" ("Andrei VladimirovicV' 43.)

88 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Duke jumped at the idea and promised to bring it before the Emperor*
whom he was expecting. . . .

On my return to Petrograd I invited Litvinov-Falinski and the
deputies, Savich [la. L], Protopopov,6 and Dmitriukov, to meet me
and together we took up the question of forming a committee. Litvinov
and Savich reported that many factories had offered to make
more ammunition, but the military authorities refused their offers*
Orders were not given to private firms, and the State factories,
owing to their poor organization, produced only about one-fifth
of what they should. Even-body in the capita! talked openly of
the dishonesty and graft in the artillery department. . . . The
cartridge factory on the Liteiny was entirely without guard; the
same was true of other factories; and the blame for the explosion
in the powder mill was laid to the men at its head, who were
distrusted.

At the head of many of the State factories were German subjects,
who could not be removed because they were under the protection
of the Minister Maklakov, some of the grand duchesses, and the
court cliques. The situation suggested treason, otherwise some of the
things that were taking place right before our eyes could hardly
be explained. . . .

Having gathered this information, I wrote to the Grand Duke
at Headquarters. I repeated what I had told him at our interview.
This time, I supported nay statements with facts and dcx'tmicnts. 1
told him, also, of the dreadful situation in the army owing to the lack
of ammunition and the incompetence in the higher military circles,
and mentioned Sukhomlinov in particular. The Emperor went to
Headquarters, and I received the following telegram from the
Grand Duke: "Your project will have tn wait." The next day, there
came another telegram, calling me to Headquarters and asking that I
bring with me such persons as mi^ht IK» useful. I took Utvinov*
Falinski, Vyshnegradski, and Putilov. At Headquarters I was r«%iml
by the Em{>eror. I vigorously urged upon him the calling of a com-
mittee with public men in it, told him how people in the rear Ml,
of the army's lack of confidence in the military leaders in the rear,
and that this lack of confidence would grow as the army retreated.
The Emperor was greatly moved* His face was pale, and hi* hand*
shook. He was especially touched when he saw that I wan moved
almost to tears in telling him of the great love and loyalty of the

*A. D, Frotopopov, Vice- President of the Duma, later Minister of the
Interior; I. L Dmitriukov, member of the Duma.

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 89

troops to the Tsar and the country, and their readiness to offer their
lives in the fulfilment of their duty. . . .

My suggestion to form a special council pleased the Emperor,
and a general plan for its organization was quickly drawn up. It was
to be composed of representatives of industry, and of banks that
subsidized factories, public men, representatives of the legislative
chambers, and the war ministry. The men to be first named were
Litvinov-Falinski, Putilov [A. L], Vyshnegradski [A. I.], the
banker, Utin [la. L], Guchkov [A. I.], and others.

In answer to the Emperor's question as to who should preside
over the special council, I replied that it could be no other than the
Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, since the conference had to do with
military supplies. If any other person was put in that position,
the council would meet with difficulties at every turn.

The news, as yet unofficial, that a council would be organized,
disturbed the War Ministry. An attempt was made to prove to the
Emperor that such a council was illegal, that it would be, as it were,
a new Ministry for which a new law and certain formalities were
necessary, all of which would take time. Fortunately, the Emperor
swept aside all these objections and intrigues. The next move was
to tell him that since the Duma was not in session, there was no
presiding officer, and therefore my participation in the council was
illegal To this argument, the Emperor paid no attention.

In accordance with the law, the creation of a special council had
first to pass through the Council of Ministers and then be confirmed
by the Emperor, Against this new institution Ministers Maklakov and
Scheglovxtov [L G.j 7 made a vigorous fight. Maklakov called on
all those close to the Tsar and tried hard to get an audience, but
the Emperor would not receive him. Just before the ministers were
to meet, the Tsar sent for Sukhomlinov and said, "Tell the Council
of Ministers that I should like to see a special council formed, in
which members of the legislative bodies would be included." When
Sukhomlinov delivered this message at the meeting, Goremykin
announced that, under the circumstances, there was nothing to
deliberate, but they must do what His Imperial Majesty desired. Just
before voting, Sabler [V, K, Procurator of Synod] and Scheglovi-
tov agreed quietly between themselves to accept the measure, and
the only person to vote against it was Maklakov. (It was said that
this greatly displeased the Emperor.) The measure was confirmed
by the Tsar and the Special Council went to work,
1 Scheglovitov, Minister of Justice-

QO DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Before the formation of the Council was finally enacted as a law
by the legislative chambers, I felt it my duty to call members of the
Duma together to deliberate on the subject. At the end of May, the
Council of Elders [leaders of political parties in the Duma] met,
to whom I related all the events leading up to the idea of a council.
The attitude of the different parties to this question MS quite char-
acteristic. Parties of the right kept quiet as was expected; the
Nationalists and Octobrists warmly approved everything that I had
done; and the Cadets, much to everybody's surprise, came out,
through their leader Miliukov, against my scheme, saving that any
relation or cooperation with the War Minister, Sukhomlinov, would
be a disgrace to the Duma and therefore the Cadets would under no
circumstances take part in the Council. Rut an even greater surprise
awaited me when Kerenski bitterly attacked this point of view. He
warmed up to the subject and savagely denounced the absurd posi-
tion of Miliukov. "The Cadets/" said Kerenski, "always start with a
theory and fall into an abstraction, rejecting every proposal that
does not fit with their theory, even though the proposal is good in
itself. I am a political opponent of the President of the Duma, hut
I can see that he is greatly disturbed by our failures and is doing
his very best to find a remedy for some of the shocking defects in our
military organization. WeT Laborites, appreciate and approve what
he has done, and will support him/*

After listening to the opinions of my colleagues I put the question
of confidence, and my actions were unanimously approved. We had
great difficulty in persuading the Cadets to take part in the Council.
The extreme left wing declined, giving as their sole reason that
members of the Government would look upon them with suspicion
and prejudice.

In May, 1915, there was to be a congress of industrialists at Petro-
grad. I heard from all sides that the delegates were greatly excited
and that there were likely to be revolutionary sjwtvhes at the
congress. This was just the occasion Maklakov wanted to justify
his denunciations to the Tsar, to close the congress, and arrest its
leaders. Those who seemed to know said that the commerce-indus-
try circle of Moscow had prepared a radical resolution for the
congress, almost a demand for a Constituent Assembly,

On the morning of the day of the meeting, Prince G, E. Lvov
and V [A.] Maklakov, member of the Duma, came to my house.
They were frightened and excited over the congress and especially
over the Moscow resolution* They advised me not to attend, saying*

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 91

"Remember what responsibility you are taking upon yourself." But
to fear responsibility meant to do nothing. I decided to go, to save
the congress, and to calm disturbed minds.

These two men next tried to bring pressure through my wife to
keep me at home, but she told them that she did not mix in my affairs,
and that she had confidence in the outcome. [Rodzianko made a
speech which won the congress and the resolutions -were not against
the Government.]

At the end of May I asked the Emperor to receive me. Four or
five days passed without a reply. In the meantime, reports reached
me that Minister Maklakov was trying to arouse the Tsar against
the Duma, telling him that its president was coming to him with a
most unusual request, almost an ultimatum. Rumors of this even
reached Moscow. Young lusupov, who came from that city, said that
it was whispered that the President of the Duma had placed himself
at the head of a revolutionary movement, and, notwithstanding the
opposition of the Government, was trying to form a "Comite du
salut public," like that of the French Revolution. (This, apparently,
is how some people understood the Special Council.)

Finally the Emperor set a day, May 30 [June 12], for the
audience. When I entered his office he seemed disturbed, pale, and I
thought at once of Maklakov's intrigues. It was necessary to disabuse
his mind immediately.

"Your Majesty/' I began, "I come to you without demands and
without ultimatums/'

"Why do you speak of ultimatums? What ultimatum?"'

"Your Majesty, I have information that I have, been pictured
to you as a very dangerous man, coming to you not with a report,
but with a demand. You have even been advised not to receive me."

"Who told you that? To whom do you refer? Who sets me
against you?"

"Your Majesty, it may be that it is all gossip, but these rumors
come from such good authorities that I have decided to bring them
to your attention. Minister Maklakov talked to you about me. Your
Majesty, I have no report to make to you about Duma affairs. I
come to you to speak about affairs in general. I come to confess
as a son before a father, in order to tell you the whole truth, as I
know it. Have I your permission to speak?"

The Emperor turned, and while I was talking, looked me in
the eyes, to test me, as it were. I, also, kept my eyes on him. I told
him everything— of the artillery department ; the insignificant pro-

92 _ DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY _

duction in the war mills; the fact that Germans were at the head
of a majority of the factories ; the disorders at Moscow ; the condi-
tion of the army, which was sacrificing itself at the front and being
betrayed in the rear by people in charge of munition supplies; the
vileness and intrigues of Maklakov ; and many other things. In
speaking of the Miasoedov [spy] affair, I referred to the feeling
against Sukhomlinov, who was detested at the front and in the rear,
and was regarded as an accomplice of Miasoedov. I tried to explain
and prove that Maklakov. Sukhomlinov, Sabler, and Schegluvilov
could no longer be tolerated; that Grand Duke Sergei Miklmilnvu'h
must resign,8 since otherwise the feeling against the artillery depart-
ment would fall upon a member of the royal family and indirectly
on the Tsar's family. In short, I told him everything I knew, winch
the Emperor should know.

My report lasted more than an hour and during that time the
Emperor did not smoke a single cigarette, indicating how attentively
he followed. Towards the end he put his elbows on the table and
covered his face with his hands* When I stopped, he sat there in
the same position.

"Why did you rise?"

"Your Majesty, I am through. I have s*id all there is to say/'

The Emperor also rose, took my hand in both of his, and, looking
me straight in the eye with his soft, kindly eyes, pressed my hand and
said, "Thank you for your straight, sincere, and fearless report."

I bowed, feeling tears in my throat. The Emperor, seemingly, was
also moved, and after saying the last words, pressed my hand once
more and quickly went out through another door, so as to conceal
his emotion.

Only later, in the days of the revolution, when I was called
before the commission which did its best to find something criminal
in the acts of the Tsar, did I learn why he was so moved. I spoke
for five hours straight before that body, trying to show that there
was nothing criminal in the Tsar's actjbn, but only unsound and

* August 13 [19x5]* * * * "[General Danilov (G* X.) said that
constant concessions to the puma were not accidental, hut part of a plan,
By yielding to this body, he inevitably encourages the Duma to demand t more
and more, and it will end by transforming the Duma from a legislative to
a controlling body, which is a bad precedent. General Damlitv is quite riuhi
in saying that these concessions will sharpen the appetite of the Duma, and
that there is danger that the Duma will soon attack [Grand Duke) St-r^ti
'Mikhailovich, charging him with failing to supply gun* and ammunition. If
Poh'vanov should yield on this point also, then the Duma will call for the
dismissal of lanusnkevich, and after that will come the turn of others." , » .
("Andrei VlaoUmirovich," s&)

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 93

confused politics, harmful to the country, but not harmful in its
intent.

When I had finished, Senator Tagantsev came up to me and said,
"Now that you have finished, please read this paper."

The document was of the month of May, 1915, but I do not
remember the exact day. It was, however, about the time when I
was summoned to Headquarters after the celebrations in honor of
the Lemberg victory. The paper was written by Minister Maklakov
to the Tsar. I give it here from memory:

"I most humbly report to Your Imperial Majesty: I have had
the honor to inform Your Majesty on numerous occasions that the
Imperial Duma and its President are striving, whenever an oppor-
tunity presents itself, to exceed their power and influence in the
Empire, to seek popularity, and lessen the power of Your Imperial
Majesty. I have the honor to call your attention to the conduct of
the President of the Duma after you left Lemberg. The President,
making use of the Emperor's departure, received the honors of the
people of Galicia, as if he were the head of the State.

"In calling the attention of Your Majesty to the above, I wish
to remind you that I have more than once pointed out to Your
Majesty the necessity of reducing the rights of the Imperial Duma
and making it a legislative consultative body."

On the back of this document the Emperor had written:

"The time has really come to curtail the Duma. It will be inter-
esting to know how Rodzianko and Company will feel about it."

At the time when the Tsar made this comment, he was favoring
the work of the Duma and public organizations, and was discussing
with me the question of organizing a special council of defense. . , .

Rumors began to circulate that the Tsar desired to remove Grand
Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich and assume the supreme command. It
was said that this was the wish of the Empress, who hated the
Grand Duke and desired to relieve the Tsar from internal affairs,
and in this way while he was at the front she could govern the
rear. In the Duma and in public circles the removal of the Grand
Duke was looked upon as a serious blunder. It was easy to imagine
the possible consequences of such an act. Owing to the military
failures, all kinds of reports, true and false, spread among the
people, and the Empress' name was more and more associated with
these rumors. Something had to be done to prevent the threatening
misfortune. . . .
At the audience, I told the Emperor of the general desire to

94 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY _

replace lanushkevich [N. N.] by Alexeev. In reply, I heard, to my
great horror, "I have definitely determined to remove the Grand Duke
Nicholas Nicholaevich and put myself at the head of the army."^

"Against whom, Your Majesty, are you raising your hand? You
are the supreme judge. If there should be failures, who would judjr
you? How can you put yourself in such a position and leave the
capital at such a time? In case of failure [military 1, you and the
dynasty will be in danger."

But the Tsar would not listen and sternly said, 4*I know. Let me
be lost, but I will save Russia."

After this audience, I wrote the Emperor a long letter rc(K*atnv.;
my views and begging him to abandon his decision.

On September 5, an order was issued regarding the army and
navy, in which the Emperor announced his decision to stand at the
head of the troops. Many were in panic over this act. Primvss 7*. X.
lusupov called on us and with tears in her eyes told my wife: uThi>
is terrible, I feel that this is the beginning of the end. He will lead
us to revolution."

Contrary to the general fear and expectation, this change dul im:
produce much of an impression on the army. This may tern* be-on
because there was an increase in ammunition and therefore the army
had more confidence in itself. . . .

The Emperor went to the army, and the Empress liogan to mmutp'
internal affairs. The Ministers, especially (loremykin, went to hrr
with their reports, and there was an impression that she had
unofficially been made regent. ...

On September 9, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, Qirwii-
ykin raised the question of dismissing the Duma, on the ground
that it unsettled the public and interfered with the work of rtw* <kiv-
ernment* At this very time the Duma was* busily orcufNed with a
number of urgent questions connected with the war, . . . Tin* w*w
Ministry, with the exception of the Minister of Justice, Khvmtm%
[A. A.] did not agree with Goremykin. When the latter annmwm!
that the Emperor, in the main, agreed with him on this jxiim. the
Ministers suggested that in order not to arouse the country, it would
be well to come to some understanding with the President of the
Duma so that he would, on his own initiative, adjourn the «e**imi
on the pretext that the deputies should RO bcimc to vote at the zeimtvo

to Emptror* Stptmlkr 10, 1015 , . . "H* [Gmtmykinl *ays
all right shutting Duma, but Sunday holiday, v» Mttr Tucftdfty, h«? «re» you
before, Fiends ministers, wor»o than Doma." ("ISwwtfi Imiicratrltiy;' 1* St>3*>

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 95

election for members of the State Council. But Goremykin refused all
compromises and, without saying a word to any one, went to Head-
quarters a second time, returning with an order to dismiss the Duma.
When, at the next meeting of the Council, he told what he had done,
the Ministers resented his act, saying that he should not have taken
such a serious step without informing them. He tried to bring the
meeting to a close, and, when that failed, left without saying good-bye.
After he had gone, the Ministers decided to resign in a body. Poll
vanov and Scherbatov went to Headquarters, and the others gave
them their written resignations and told them to say that they could
not work with Goremykin. . . . When the two men came to Head-
quarters, the Emperor took the papers handed him, tore them into
small bits, and said, "This is childish. I do not accept your resignation.
I have confidence in Ivan Loginovich [Goremykin]." Scherbatov [N.
Y.] and Polivanov [A. A.] returned with empty hands, and
Goremykin felt himself stronger than ever.

On the evening of September 15, Goremykin called me on the
telephone to say that he had something very important to tell me,
but was very tired and hoped I would come to him. I had quite a
number of members of the Duma in my house at the time, talking
over the rumors that Goremykin planned to dismiss the Duma. It
seemed quite unbelievable that he would do this, and when the
telephone message came, it was generally assumed that Goremykin
wished to deny the false reports. When I saw him he came to the
point at once.

"Here is the order to adjourn the Duma. Read it tomorrow."

This is all he said.10

In hurrying the adjournment of the Duma, Goremykin thought
that, by so doing, he would deny the members of the Duma time to
form a plan and that, in case they made sharp speeches, he would

*Petrograd, October 12 [1915]. ... "I had a talk today with Prince V,
Volkonski, Assistant Minister of the Interior, and formerly Vice-President of
the Duma. . . - He spoke of the numerous mistakes made by the Government
lately. *I can not think of the dismissal of the Duma [September i6J without
fear and trembling. Why was it necessary to do that just now, when all
seemed to work so well and there came to be a certain amount of confidence
in the Government? ... It is not right to ignore public opinion ... we either
treat it with contempt or are indifferent to it. That's a great mistake. Public
opinion in Russia has grown of late, and has influence on public affairs. It
is said that we must have a war-dictatorship. I understand a dictatorship as
authority based on an army. But now that the whole army is on the war
front and none in Russia, there is nothing left for the Government to fall
back upon. That is a mere fiction. I can understand authority based on
public opinion. In this there is real strength/ "... ("Andrei Vladimlrovich/*

96 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY __ _

dissolve the Duma altogether. When I returned home and told the
news to the waiting deputies, they became quite worked up. It was
decided to ask all the party leaders, immediately, to come to the
Duma the following morning at nine, instead of eleven.

I was there at eight. A meeting was called of the party leaders,
who were boiling over with excitement. There was great indignation
and some of them were ready to come out with revolutionary sjwwhcs,
that the Duma should not adjourn and should declare itself a Con-
stituent Assembly. It took a great deal of work to cool dtnvn the
more fiery spirits and show them that such acts would ruin the
Duma, and the country, and play into GoremykiVs hands. . . .

When the Duma opened at eleven o'clock, there was such an
uproar as was never before heard in the hall. . . . The excitement
of the deputies was contagious. It was felt by the public, which
seemingly expected that the Duma would not be able to control ilM'lf,
that something would happen, . . „ It seemed that the Uunni tmi*l
accept the clefi, the insult of being adjourned at a time when MI
many urgent projects relating to the war were under consideration.
However, everything ended beautifully. . . . While the order \va*
being read, all was quiet; and at its conclusion 1 called, as usual, fur
a cheer for the Emperor, which was Riven by the deputies with a
right good will. After that every one started for home. The crowd-
dispersed feeling, as it were, that this was the only tiling to do. that
the Duma had risen above the petty provocation of the authorities
and, by so doing, given a fine example of hitfh statesmanship.

Public organizations resounded in the same way. Chdnokov { M,
V.], the mayor of Moscow, appealed to the workmen to go on with
their work, so necessary for the war. At meetings of the actiwtvos
and the nobles all over Russia, resolutions were passed asking t!uk
Emperor to take into consideration the people's desire fur a Ministry
with strong power and the confidence of the country.11 Th<* Moscow
nobility decided to send six representatives to the Emperor, but fu»
would not receive them,13 It seemed as if the whole of Russia were
asking for one and the same thing* that the criea of the suffering
land must be heeded, . . . Instead of calling j^eople who had the

"Empress to Emperor, Stpttmbtr aa, igik "Well look what they »pnkc
about at Mosccot, again those questions, wh. they had come to the omdmion
to drop and asking tor an answerable ministry which is quite impossible. . * .
("Pisma Imperatntsy," I, 5^.) . .

* Empress to Emperor, September 30, 1915. "Naw you dam, thank U*t
receive the Moscou deputation, al! the Ivetter— again they intend asking. awl
dent you give in, else it looks as tho' you acknowledge their existence (what-
ever you may even say to them)/* (/M&, $49-)

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 97

country's confidence, the two popular ministers, Samarin and
Scherbatov, -were forced to go.13

The dismissal of Samarin came about in the following manner.
While Varnava was bishop of Tobolsk, he found the relics of a
certain John and, not waiting for the canonization of the Synod, pro-
ceeded to render him the religious services due to a saint. Samarin
[A. D.] laid the matter before the Synod, which asked Varnava to
report at the capital to explain. He came, appeared before the Synod,
but refused to give any explanation, saying rather curtly, "I have
nothing to say to you."

He left the meeting and went into hiding, so that for a long
time no one knew his whereabouts. During that time he was living
at the home of Prince Andronnikov, one of Rasputin's friends.
Samarin wished to bring charges against Varnava and have his office
taken from him, but the Synod was given to understand that it must
not touch him, Varnava produced a letter written by the Emperor
himself, authorizing Varnava to perform special religious services to
St. John. This was against all canonic regulations.1* Samarin went to
see the Tsar, who was at Tsarskoe Selo, and took with him a detailed
report. As the report was rather long, Samarin asked the Emperor
whether he would prefer to have an oral report. Instead of giving

"Empress to Emperor, June 2§-Septcmbcr 30, 1915. "When Gregory heard
in town yesterday . . . that Samarin lOberprocurator of the Synod] was
named . , . lie was in utter despair as He, the last evening here . . . begged
you not to change him Sablcr just now, but that soon one might perhaps
find the right man — and now the Moscou set will be like a spider's net around
us, our Friends enemies are ours and Scherbatov will make one with them,
I feel sure. . . . Samarin goes on speaking against me— hope to get you a list
of names and trust can find a suitable successor before he can do any mate
harm. . . . Samarin knows yr. opinion and wishes and so does Scherbatov
and they dont care, thats the vile part of it. ... At once, my love, clear him
[Samarin] out and Scherbatov too. This night he sent out a circular to all
papers that they may print anything they like against the Government (your
government) — how dare he— only not against you. But they do all in a
hidden way . , . and he plays fast and loose a very fool indeed. . . . Scher-
batov must leave, a man who openly shows your telegrams and Gregory's
wh. he has kidnapped and Samarin too — are utterly unworthy ministers."
("Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 459, 473, 499, 5*4, 532.)

* Empress to Emperor, September n-Qctobcr i, 1915. "Perhaps you had
tetter give Samarin the short order that you wish Bishop Varnava to chant the
laudation of St. John Maximovitch because Samarin intends getting rid of
him, because we like him and he is good to Gr. . . . The article about Varnava
in the papers is untrue, he gave exact answers to all questions and showed
yr. telegram about the salutation. . . . Varnava implores you to hurry with
clearing out Samarin as he and Synod are intending to do more horrors and he
has to go there again, poor man, to be tortured. ... He [Goremykinl begged
me to let Varnava know that he must not appear at the Synod but say he is
ill. . . . Varnava has left for Tobolsk, our Friend said we were to send him
back. The old man said he was no more to show himself at the Synod."
(/MA, 504, 529, 530, 535, 555-)

98 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

him a straight answer, the Emperor reminded him that he should
hurry to the meeting of the Council of Ministers, The Emperor kept
the document, saying that he would look it over at his leisure, Samarin
departed and when he reached the meeting, before he could take
part in it, Goremykin took him aside to show* him a letter from the
Tsar, announcing to Samarin that he had been removed from the
office of the Oberprocurator of the Synod.

Samarin returned to Moscow where he was given a great recep-
tion, almost an ovation, at the meeting of the nobility.

Soon after Samarin was dismissed, Pritice Scherbatov handed
in his resignation, saying that he was tired of intrigues and that
under present conditions there was little to be done.

At this time, the cities were suffering from a lack of various
things, due, in part, to the inflow of refugees and, particularly, to
government mismanagement To fight the high cost of living, the
authorities fixed the prices for wholesalers and retailers. In some
cases, the fixed price was lower than the cost and, as a result, the
merchants withdrew their goods from the open market and sold them
secretly. Another reason for the high cost of living was the demorali-
zation in the railway service, especially the graft. The cost of the
freight was often more than the cost of the goods* A. F. Trepov, who
succeeded Rukhlov [S. V.] as Minister of Transportation, had never
had any railway experience and caused worse confusion than his
predecessor. As a result of these various troubles, Pctrograd was
threatened by famine. Therefore, the Council of Ministers decided
to stop all passenger traffic between Moscow and Petrograd for six
days, so that freight could be moved more readily*1* This measure*
however, was of little use because those in charge did not, at the
same time, see to it that freight was brought up from other places
to Moscow. Though passenger traffic came to a standstill, the freight
cars still returned from Moscow half empty. . . . The imnv the
Government tried, the more it failed, and there seemed to be no
doubt that it was both incompetent and unable to organise the rear*

In the meantime, the Special Council did excellent work in sup-

* Empress to Emperor, October *3, 1915, "Our Friend . * . is ntherwice
quiet about the war, flow another subject worries him very much and he
spoke scarcely about anything elae* It t$ this that you must give an order for
wagons with flour, butter and sugar should be obliged to pass . . . and
that then we shall have no strikes, . , . He would propose 3 days no other
trains should go except those with flour, butter and sugar . . . its «rveti more
necessary than meat or ammunition just now . . . if passenger trains only
very few would be allowed ami instead 01 alt 4 classes these days hang on
wagons with flour or butter fr. Siberia/* C'Pisnw* linperatritsy,1* I, 571.)

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 99

plying the army. The Zemstvos and War-Industry committees helped
very much, and in spite of the obstacles placed in the way by govern-
ment officials, the amount of ammunition and other war material
increased daily at the front. At this time something happened in flie
Special Council which showed clearly the evil influence of irrespon-
sible persons, even in the matter of army supplies. Putilov's was one
of the leading factories for war material. The leading stockholder
was Putilov, who was also director of the Russian-Asiatic Bank. He
wanted a subsidy of thirty-six million rubles from the Government
and so arranged that his own bank would refuse him credit. The
management of the factory then appealed to the Government for the
money, saying that unless it received the subsidy it would have to
close the factory. In view of the importance of this plant, it was
clear that the money would have to be handed over, even if it did
amount to thirty-six millions. Those who kept in touch with the
situation knew what was back of the demand. I proposed that instead
of paying, the property be sequestered. My suggestion was almost
unanimously approved by the Council, but all of a sudden there came
a request from His Majesty to reconsider. Rasputin, with whom
Putilov was on good terms, was back of this move. When the question
was taken up at the next meeting, all the representatives of the Gov-
ernment voted against sequestration, and one of them, Admiral Girs,
openly declared, "I have been ordered to vote against the measure/'
Members of the Duma and the [State] Council were divided. Some
of the best and most determined men, unfortunately, for one reason
or another, refused to vote. Sequestration was dropped. I was almost
the only one who voted for it. I was outvoted by gold. The Putilov
factory was only one of many questions of that kind with which
the Special Council had to deal.

At the beginning of the war a committee was formed in London
to centralize the foreign war orders. It was composed of various
industrialists, English and Russian. At first the chairman was Grand
Duke Michael Michaelovich, arid later General Germonius. Until
the Special Council was organized, this committee acted without any
kind of control When the committee was organized, the English
Government had stipulated that all Russian foreign war orders should
go through the hands of the committee. The result was that we were
not masters of our own affairs, but under the control of English
industrialists. American orders were delayed; there were endless
discussions and numberless unexpected obstacles. The ships which
delivered the orders were convoyed by English cruisers. Making use

IPO DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

of this situation, the English proposed that our whole merchant
fleet come under their control, in order to have a united command,
as they put it. Had we agreed to this, we would have become the
bond-servants of England. At the Headquarters of the Supreme
Commander-in-Chief, the proposition was acceptable. I raised the
question before the Special Council on January 15, 1916, and pointed
out that such a proposal had to come before our body. Only Gurko
[V. I.] supported me; the others would not commit themselves,
probably because they knew that it was against the wish of the
Emperor. After this meeting, Sir George Buchanan, the English
Ambassador, and Knox [Sir Alfred], the military attache, came to
see me. I told them frankly that I thought that the English were
taking advantage of our situation to force the Emperor to agreements
that were disadvantageous to Russia. "This extortion is unworthy
of a great nation and Ally. The Russians cannot tolerate such a
humiliation. The matter will be discussed in the Duma/'

When I had my next audience with the Tsar, I repeated what I
had said. After this the English dropped the matter. At the same
time Minister Grigorovich [I. N»] of the Navy, foreseeing difficulties
with England, ojxjned negotiations with Japan. I»y paying Ja[i&n the
cost of the reparation, we secured from her the return of the cruisers
rcaiag, Pcrcsvct, and Poltava, which were damaged in the Japanese
war. These vessels reached Archangel by way of Africa, and after
that we had our own convoys.

In the ukaz adjourning the Duma, it was indicated that the Dutm
would be summoned not later than November. But judging from
Goremykin's conduct and the rumors, there was doubt not only
whether the Duma would be called in XovemlxT. but whether it
would be called at all. November was already toward its end and not
a word had been uttered on this subject. Meantime, the hud&ct coin
mission was busily at work. The deputies were irritated and demanded
to know what the situation was. When I had an audience? with the
Emperor, I again called his attention to iioremykin, the way he
interfered, blocked, and delayed work in the rear, I told him, also,
about the part banks were playing in war orders. When I a«4ced that
the Duma be summoned soon, he said, "Yes, good. I will discuss it
with Ivan Loginovich [Gorernykin]/*

I had barely reached home from Tsarskoe Selo, in fact, it was
within half an hour of my arrival, when a rescript by the Tsar was
handed to me as President of the Duma. It said that as soon as
the budget commission had completed its work, the legislative chain-

THE WAR AND THE PUKLTC

hers would be summoned.10 This rescript put me in a very difficult
position. The budget commission always worked while the Duma
was in session, and there was no connection between the completion
of the work of the one and the summoning of the other. The rescript
was issued immediately after my audience with the Tsar and made
it seem as if it were in line with an agreement I had made with him.
It was a trick of Goremykin to ruin me in the eyes of the Duma. Of
course the deputies could not understand it, but hardly any one
believed that I was responsible for the ' delay. At the same time,
rumors circulated that the President of the Duma would receive
some high reward. Sure enough, on December 6 I learned that I
was awarded the Order of Anne of the first degree. I should like to
add that before this, Minister Polivanov, without my knowledge, had
recommended that I be rewarded for special service in connection
with army supplies, but his recommendation was not acted upon.
The award was given me now to make it appear that it was in
payment for concessions In summoning the Duma.17 In order to
prevent misunderstandings and show that the decoration did not come
for services in the Special Council, it was definitely stated in the
document of award that it was given to me as "Patron of the Novo-
moscow Men's Gymnasium/' that is, not as head of the Duma.

Conditions in the country went from bad to worse. Profiteering,
graft, and the accumulation of great riches by clever people reached
enormous proportions. In the cities, the cost of living mounted, due
to the disorganized transport service. In the factories doing war work,
there were strikes followed by arrests, usually of those who were for
order and against quitting work. . . ,

** Empress to Emperor, November ^December n, 1915. "Well, it's the
question about calling the Duma together now — he [GoremykinJ is against
it. They have no work to do. ... If they sit idle they will begin talks about
Varnava and Our Friend and mix into governmental questions to wh. they
have not the right . . . well, this is the old man's council ... he would
advise you writing two rescripts, one to Kulomzin [President of the State
Council] . . . and the other to Rodzianko — giving as reason that the budget
has not been worked through by the Duma. ... I am going to ask Ania to
quite privately speak of this to our Friend ... to ask what he would bless.
... He [Goremykin] intends asking you not at all to call the Duma to-gether
. . . and Gregory told Ijim it was not right to ask such a thing of you . . .
iwd as soon as their preliminary work is ready it would be wrong not to
call them to-gether — one must show them a little confidence/' ("Pisma Impera-
tritsy," I, 599, 607.)

™ Empress to Emperor, November 16, 1915. "Then about Rodzianko of
the Duma— Khvostov finds he ought to receive a decoration now, that wfd.
flatter him and he wld. sink in the eyes of the left party, for having accepted
a reward from you — Our Friend says, also, that it would be a good thing to
do — Certainly its most unsympathetic, but, alas, times are such just now, that
one is obliged out of wisdom sake to do many a thing one wld. rather not
have/' (/&&., 582,)

102 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

With some other members of the Duma, I went to the Putilov
works to find out about the war orders and talk to the workmen.
The laborers were quite frank. They assured us that the strikes had
no political motive, but were due to the fact that the wages were
falling below the high cost of the necessaries of life. After we had
talked it over with the management, the just demands of the workers
were granted. But, as if on purpose, the men with whom we talked
were arrested. These arrests led to more trouble, and it was only
after urgent demands that the workmen were freed.

At the beginning of December Prince Lvov, head of the Union
of Zemstvos, came to Petrograd, He called on me, and we sat up
until three in the morning discussing the situation. He told me that
Moscow was becoming more and more revolutionary. Some of the
most loyal people talked openly of the collapse of the Government
and laid the blame on the Tsar and Tsarina. . . .

After my talk with Prince Lvov „ * . I decided to write to
Goremykln.

Dear Ivan Loginovich:

I write you while the impressions, facts, and information which came out
at the recent meeting of the Special Council are still fresh jai my mind They
have to do with the terrible condition of our railways. Tilts question was
raised at the first session of the Special Council. A special committee was
appointed to look into it, hut aside from discussion, nothing was done, and
now the threatened catastrophe is on us.

The chairman of the Special Council has no doubt given you all the details
of the condition of the factories doing war work, which will, under present
conditions, l>e forced to close; also, of the approaching famine in Petrograd
and Moscow, with the disorders that may come in its train. H is clear to me,
as to members of the Council* that our country is <»n the road to ruin, thanks
to the complete apathy of the government authorities, who do nothing to
remove the causes that lead to ruin- It is the duty of the Council of MinisUTSk,
over which you preside, to occupy itself, without delay, with the fate of
Russia. What is happening now was foreseen by the memliers of the Special
Council six months ago* and you, Ivan Logimivich, cannot deny that I more
than once told you all the facts, and that the only answer I could get from
you was that you were not Interested in the war and did not care to mix in it.

Such replies arc now out of date. The war is corning to a decisive point,
In the rear of our brave and much-suffering army there B a growing, general
disorganization in all fields of national life, affecting the first necessities of
existence. Inaction on the part of the Government will break down the
people's belief in victory and In their own strength;

Your first duty is to do all that you can to remove, at otice, without the
loss of another minute, all the obstacles that stand in the way of victory, 1
wish to declare to you most emphatically that we, members of the Duma,
who have merely a consultative voice, do not assume responsibility for the
inevitable catastrophe.

If the Council of Ministers will not adopt such possible measures at can
save the country from shame and httmiliation, theft the responsibility i« on
you. If you, Ivan Loginovich, have not the strength to carry the heavy load

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 103

and to make use of such means as are present to lead the country to victory,
at least have the manhood to acknowledge it and to step aside for a younger
and stronger man. We are at a critical moment: threatening clouds are
moving toward us, full of fatal consequences for the honor of Russia. Do
not delay, I pray you. The country is in danger. . . .

When Goremykin received the letter he read it at the Council of
Ministers, seemed indignant at its "harsh tone," and announced that
he would report it to the Emperor.

In addition to the popular unrest created by the above indicated
events, a rumor started that Germany was offering Russia a separate
peace and that unofficial conversations were being carried on. There
seemed some ground for this report for in September [1915], I
received a strange letter from M, A. Vasilchikova, written in Austria,
in which she tried to persuade me to help bring about peace. The
letter was in sufficiently poor Russian to give the impression that
it was translated from the German. There was neither stamp nor
postmark on the envelope, and it was delivered by some unknown
man. Letters of the same kind were sent to the Emperor, Grand
Duchess Maria Pavlovna, Grand Duchess Elizabeth Fedorovna, A.
D, Samarin, Prince A. M. Golitsyn, and Minister Sazonov [S. D.]
— seven in all. I immediately sent mine to Sazonov, who told me
that he and the Emperor had each received one, and advised that
they be thrown into the waste basket. I could not help asking Sazonov
why he allowed this woman to keep her court title. . . .

To the great astonishment of all, M. A. Vasilchikova appeared at
the capital in December. She was met by a special messenger at
Torneo [Swedish-Finnish frontier], and special rooms were pre-
pared for her at the Astoria [hotel] . This was stated by Sazonov,
who added that he thought orders to that effect had been issued
at Tsarskoe [Selo], None of the lady's friends would have anything
to do with her, but she was received at Tsarskoe, a fact which was
kept secret. When the question of a separate peace and the rumors
along that line were raised in the budget commission, the Minister
of the Interior, Khvostov, declared that it was true that some one
was circulating such rumors but that no such question had ever
been raised in government circles, and that should it ever be raised,
he would resign in a minute. After this declaration, I told the meeting
about the letters and that Vasilchikova was at the capital. Khvostov
became confused and finally admitted that she had been there, but said
she had been sent out. After the meeting he told us privately that
the day after her arrival she went to Tsarskoe (He did not say whom

104 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

she saw) ; and that he, personally, made a search of her rooms at
the Astoria and found among her papers a letter from Frauds
Joseph to her and evidence indicating that she had seen William at
Potsdam, had received instructions from Bethmann-HoHwejj; as to
what to do at Petrograd, and had spent a whole month with the
Prince of Hesse and brought letters from him for his two sisters,
the Empress and Grand Duchess Elizabeth Fcclorovna. The Grand
Duchess returned her letter unopened. This was rqx>rtecl by Countess
Qlsuviev, mistress of her court.

It was said that the Eni{>cror was much displeased at the com-
ing of Vasilchikova and gave orders that she be sent to Solvyehe-
godsk [Convent], However, Vasilchikova lived quietly on the estate
of her sister Miloraclovich in Chernigov guberniia.

On January 27, 1916, Pitirim, the newly appointed Mcln>ix>Iitan
of Petrograd, rang me up on the telephone to say that he would
like to speak with the President of the Duma, Pitirim, former bishop
of many guberniias and exarch of Georgia, had succeeded, through
Rasputin, in winning the confidence of the Empress and receiving
the appointment of Metropolitan in place of Vladimir.1* Pitirim was
a great intriguer and there were all kinds of whispers about his char-
acter. He tried to play a part from the very beginning. Ministers
called on him and gave him consideration, and his name was always
in the papers, lie visited the Emperor at Headquarters,19 and it was
reported in the papers that he was authorized to notify the President
of the Duma of the time of calling the Duma.

He came to my home accompanied by the priest [Duma] deputy,
Nemertsalov, whom he brought, apparently, as witness. I ic plunged
at once into politics.

"I came to express to you my great delight over the letter which
you wrote to Goremykin. I ought to tell you that I Icadquaiter* has
heard of it1'

'This is no news to me for I sent a copy of it to the Emperor/*

** Empress to Kmptrar, September at, 1915. "I find thomfc * hfahopft ought
at once to be taken out of the Synod— Jet Pitirim c«im« atui sit there as
our Friend feared Nifcolasha would harm him if lit* heard that Pitirim ven-
erates our Friend" ("Pinna Imperttriuy," *» 5*4«)

"Empress to Emperor, January 23* 1916, "I hope you dotit mind I wimf
about Pitirim, but lit* wld, so much tike to see y«*u guictly and tctl you alt his
ideas and improvements he wUL like to make.** (/ftitt,

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 105

Pitirim calmly continued, "Ivan Loginovich [Goremykin] will
not remain in office much longer. He is a bit old. It is quite likely
that Sturmer [B. V.] will succeed him/'20

"Yes, I heard that, but it will not improve matters very much.
Besides he has a German name and in these days, it has not a
musical sound."

"He will change his name to Panin."21

"That will not fool anyone." . . .

Pitirim next turned the conversation to the Duma and intimated
that he would like "to come to an understanding with the representa-
tives of the people and work hand in hand with them."

I told him that I thought this was hardly possible because, out-
side of the Synod budget, there was no contact between the Duma
and the Metropolitan. . . .

What Pitirim had said came true. Goremykin was dropped, and
Sturmer was put in his place. This appointment made a bad impres-
sion. Those who had known Sturmer formerly had no respect for
him. His name was associated with the rumors of a separate peace.
His coming into office was interpreted to mean that it was done
to spite public opinion, and that the influence of the Empress and
Rasputin was once more predominant.22

The opening of the Duma was set for February 22. It was re-
ported that the members of the right would break up the session. . . .

** Empress to Emperor, November 19- January 22, 1916. "Well Lpvy, He
[Rasputin J thinks I better now see the old Gentleman and gently tell him, as if
the Duma hisses him, what can one do, one can not send it away for such
a reason. ... Me is so sorry as he venerates the old man. . . . Our Friend
told me to wait about the old man until he has seen Uncle Khvostov on Thurs-
day, . . . Well, I'saw Our Friend . . . yesterday at Anias. He cannot bear
the idea of the old man being sent away. ... He thinks better to wait
according to God one ought not to send him away. . . , You must get the old
man out and calmly tell him yr. decision-— now its easier as you dont agree
quite and he did not have that circular printed (showing he is a bit old and
tired and cant grasp, alas, everything, dear old man)." ("Pisxna Imperatritsy,"

n Emperor to Empress, January 18, 1916. "* . . I do not cease thinking
about the question of a successor to the old man [Goremykin]. On the train
I asked the fat Khvostov [A. N., Minister of the Interior] what he thought
of Sturmer. He praised him, but was of the opinion that he (Sturmer] was
somewhat old, and that his mind was not as active as before. By the way, this
old Sturmer sent me a petition that he be allowed to change his name to
Panin. I replied through Mamant [-oy, V. L, Chief of the Bureau of peti-
tions] that I could not grant the permission without first consulting the laving
members of the Panin family." ("Perepiska Nikolaia," IV, 24,)

* Empress to Emperor, January 22, 1916. ". . . Our Friend said about
Sturmer not to change his name and to take him for a time at least, as he is
such a decided loyal man and will hold others in hand,— let one scream if one
wishes, they always will at any nomination." ("Pisma Imperatritsy, I, 636.)

io6 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Ambassadors of the Allies, as well as many foreigners who had
war contracts, were quite worked up over the reports that the
Duma would be dissolved. . . . Something had to be done to dis-
sipate these rumors, to raise the spirit of the country, and to quiet
the public. It seemed to me that the best thing would be to persuade
the Emperor to visit the Duma. . . . When I raised the question
with Sturmer, his bureaucratic soul trembled, but in the end he
promised not to interfere, especially after I pointed out to him that
he personally would gain in popularity from such a move, for it
would be said that it was he, the new Prime Minister, who put the
idea in the Emperor's head. My next move was to ask the cooperation
of a certain Klopov, an old idealist and patriot, whom the Tsar knew,
loved, and received. Klopov also came to see me from time to time.
He granted my request, wrote to the Tsar on the subject, and soon
received a favorable reply.

On February 22, within half an hour of the opening of the
Duma, Sturmer came to announce that the Emperor would come
directly from Headquarters.28 A meeting of the Council of Elders
was called at once at which I told the glad news. All the deputies,
regardless of party lines, were greatly pleased and hoped that this
visit signified better days to come. It was decided to celebrate in
honor of the occasion— to notify and invite the representatives of
the Allies. News of the Emperor's visit spread through the city and
was joyfully passed along from mouth to mouth, "The Tsar in the
Duma— Thank God, now there will be a change for the better.1' All
the deputies were assembled. In the Catherine Hall the diplomats
of the Allies, members of the State Council, and Senators were
gathered. The President of the Duma with his associates, the Coun-
cil of Elders, greeted the Emperor at the entrance. He came accom-
panied by the Grand Duke 'Michael Alexandrovich and Count Fred-
ericks. After the greetings, the Emperor entered the Catherine Hall
to the shout of "Hurrah," and kissed the cross. His Majesty was
very pale and so excited that his hands shook. Service began ; the
choir sang wonderfully well ; everything went off with enthusiasm
and feeling; members of the Duma joined in singing, "Lord, Savt
Thy People" ; and even the public took part. The warm reception
and the service quieted the Emperor and the expression on his face
changed. When the choir sang the hymn in honor of those who had

* Emperor to Empress, February 17, 1916. "... I wish to return to be
present at the opening of the State Duma and the State Council For the tim?
being, please say nothing about it . * /' ("Porepisk* Nikoteia," IV, 83.)

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 107

fallen in battle, the Emperor fell on his knees, followed by all the
Duma.

At the end of the service he came to me with tears in his eyes
and remarked that he would like to say a few words to the Duma.
. . . His speech made a good impression and was received with
cheers. . . ,

Making use of the opportunity, I called his attention to his cordial
reception by the Duma and suggested that this would be a good time
to grant a responsible ministry. "You cannot imagine," said I, "the
greatness of such an act, its quieting influence on the country, and
its effect on the successful outcome of the war. You would be writing
a glorious page in the history of your reign."

"I shall think about it." . . .

Stunner's declaration, read after the Emperor left, had a de-
pressing effect . . . and it looked even worse when it came put in
the papers. His phrases were wordy and confused, and gave no idea
of his program. When he left the stand there was a deathly silence.
Some one on the extreme right clapped his hands and that was
about all His first act made it evident that he was a nonentity. . . .
When Polivanov appeared, he was given an ovation, and his business-
like speech was listened to with attention. Sazonov and Grigorovich
[I. K] were also warmly received by the Duma. The day's session
came to an end with the declaration of the Progressive Bloc in favor
of a ministry of confidence, by whose aid the resources of the coun-
try might be organized for victory, order brought about in the rear,
and all those responsible for our failures at the front called to account.
. . . The Government, by its acts, quickly spoiled the good effect of
the Emperor's visit. It followed the old course — it would be truer
to say the lack of course. In the Duma the right wing raised its
head, Markev Second came out in quite an unparliamentary way
against the public organizations, accusing them of arousing the popu-
lation and enriching themselves out of the war. He made these
charges without producing any evidence and for the sole purpose
of arousing distrust in these organizations. The congress which the
extreme right wing held at Nizhni-Novgorod did not satisfy them
and they proceeded to organize a new one in which they planned to
include peasants and clergy. At the head of this combination was
Scheglovitov, former Minister of Justice, and it was lavishly financed
by the Government. Alongside of these reports of intrigue there were
others that titoe Duma would be dissolved and there would be a
change in the ministry.

io8 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Profiting by the Tsar's arrival at Tsarskoe, I asked for an audi-
ence and was received by him on March 8. The audience lasted an
hour and a half. I told him everything— of the intrigues of the
Ministers who worked against each other through Rasputin, of the
lack, as formerly, of a definite policy, of the abuses everywhere, of
the failure to take public opinion into consideration, and of the
limit of public endurance. I reminded him of the adventures of
Rubinstein [D. L.] and Manus [I. P.I and other heroes of the rear,
of their contacts with Rasputin, of -his dissipations and orgies, and
that his relation to the Tsar and his family and his influence on
State matters in these war times deeply aroused honest people.
There was no doubt that Rasputin was a German agent and spy.

"If Your Majesty's Ministers were really free agents and had,
as their single object, the good of the country, the presence of a man
like Rasputin would carry no weight in State matters. But the trou-
ble is that they are dependent on him and draw him into their
intrigues. I must tell Your Majesty that this cannot continue much
longer. No one opens your eyes to the true role which this man is
playing. His presence in Your Majesty's Court undermines confi-
dence in the Supreme Power and may have an evil effect on the fate
of the dynasty and turn the hearts of the people from their Kmperor."

While I was enumerating these sad truths, the Tsar was either
silent or showed astonishment, but was at all times affable and cour-
teous. When I finished, he asked, "How do you think the war will
end — in our favor or against us?"

I replied that we could count on the army and the people, but that
it was the military leaders and the internal politics that stood in the
way of victory.

My report did some good. On March n an order was issued
sending Rasputin to Tobolsk ; but a few days later, at the demand of
the Empress, this order was canceled. . . „

On March 28 Minister of War, Polivanov, was dismissed.8* He
had just returned from Headquarters where he was kindly received.
His dismissal was unexpected by him and by everyone else, . „ „ This
act was quite depressing. The papers were full of his praise an<! of
his deeds. In the Duma and in public much was said of irresponsible
influence, of the ministerial leapfrog game, and of the fact that the

84 Empress to Emperor, JAarch 19, 1916. "Oh, how I wish you could g«t
rid of rolivanov, wn. means Guchkov. . . . Polivanov is hm [Stunner's]
despair — and longs you would change him. . , . Polivanov simply treftclicrou**
the way he repeats at once all that is spoken over in secret at the Council of
Ministers/1 ("Pistna Imperatritsy," II, 397.)

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 109

enemy was reaching out farther and farther and crushing those
who were harmful to Germany and beneficial to Russia.

People looked to the Duma, which was popular at that time and
enjoyed the confidence of the country. But the Duma realized that
so long as the influence of Rasputin and the Empress continued,
little could be accomplished either at the front or in the rear.

The disorders in the rear were assuming a threatening character.
In Petrograd there was a shortage of meat, but those passing through
the city could see a string of carts, loaded with spoiled carcasses
which were being taken to the soap factory. This was done in broad
daylight and made a bad impression, for while there was no meat on
the market, tons of it were being wasted.

Members of the Special Council went to examine the cold storage
houses near the Baltic Station. They found them in good order; the
meat they contained was not spoiled; but outside of them were
mountains of rotting carcasses.

On inquiry it came out that this meat was intended for the
army, but there was no place to keep it. When permission and money
were asked for new cold storage plants, they were refused. The
trouble was that the different Ministries did not cooperate. The
intendancy ordered the meat, the railways brought it, but there was
no place to store it, and it was not allowed to be placed on the
market. This was no worse than some other things. . . .

Members of the Special Council reported at the meeting what
they had seen. I wrote to Alexeev, and it was only then that some
interest was shown in the meat question. In the meantime, thousands
of puds of meat were ruined. Meat hauled from Siberia suffered the
same fate. Owing to disorganization and lack of transportation, not
only thousands but hundreds of thousands of puds went to waste.
It was hard to put a hand on the guilty party, for one blamed the
other, and all together blamed the general economic demoralization.
Polivanov said that this meat waste was not an accident, not even
the result of disorganization, but part of a German plan. . . .

In May, representatives of the French Government, Viviani and
Thomas, came to Russia. The Duma gave a banquet in their honor.
. . . The next day, Thomas desired to have a long talk on the
question of army supplies* He spent the evening with me, and his
knowledge of our situation greatly astonished S. I. Timashev, mem-
ber of the Special Council, In discussing our shortages, he enumer-
ated all our weak points and ended with a penetrating and significant
phrase :

no DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

"La Russie doit etre bien riche et sure de ses forces pour ^se
permettre le luxe d'un gouvernement comme le votre, car le premier
ministre— c'est un desastre et le ministre de la guerre— une catastro-
phe."

When, a day later, the Frenchmen were departing, I saw them off
and asked one of them, "Dites-moi, Monsieur, sincerement votre
opinion, qu'est ce que Vous manque en Russie." The Frenchman
replied :

"Ce qui nous manque? Cest Tautocratie de votre gouvernement car
si j'ose vous dire encore, M. le president, la Russie doit etre bicn forte
moralement pour supporter pendant le temps serieux que nous passons,
cet etat de douce anarchic que regne dans votre pays et se jette aux
yeux."

... A certain Manasevich— Manuilov [I. F.], who was a jour-
nalist of no importance but had contacts with the Rasputin circle,
played a prominent part in Stunner's affairs. Indeed, he was in-
strumental in getting Sturmer his post. He was a kind of private
secretary to Sturmer and made use of his position to extort money
from the banks. Count Tatischev [V. S,], director of the United
Bank, and Khvostov, Minister of the Interior, decided to trap
Manuilov. He took a bribe in five hundred ruble notes, which were
marked by Ivan Khvostov, nephew of the Minister. This was fol-
lowed by a search; some of the notes were found; and Manuilov
was arrested. All this took place while Sturmer was away. When
he learned what happened, he would not at first believe it, but when
there was no doubt about it, he started back to Headquarters, and
on his return, called his colleague, Khvostov, on the telephone to
say, "You gave me unpleasant news about the arrest of Manuilov ;
it is now my turn to give you news — you are no longer Minister
of the Interior."

In place of Khvostov (the elder), Protopopov, Vice-President of
the Duma, was appointed.25 After his return from abroad and his
meeting at Stockholm with a representative of Germany, his name
had appeared more and more in the papers. It was said that Protojx)-
pov, with some bankers, was planning to publish a paper, "Volia
Rossii." Tereschenko [M], Litvinov-Falinskl, and others had warned
me that Protopopov was surrounded by suspicious characters, that

* Empress, to Emperor, September 20, 27, *9*5- "• * • Gregory k*gs you

earnestly to name Protopopov there [Minister of the Interior]. You know

l«3*M *tM/4 1*n*4 ft,4ft\n ft *vf\f^A !*ftA*>Aee>J/*wt *\£ n **•«___ Vi«»«*V«»ri

earnestly tt> jiainc ariuiupuyuv tuvic ijtvjujuauc* w* «,<iv ***wv**w* \* * */** n»*ww*

him and had such a good impression of him — happens to be of the Duma (is
not left) and so will know how to be with them. . . , God bless yr.

not left) and so will know how to be with them. . . , God bless yr. n*w
choice of Protopopov— our Friend says you have done a very wise act w
naming him." O'Pisma Jmperatritsy/' II» 402, 406.)

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC m

his name was associated with Rasputin's, and that the Rasputin circle
was trying to make him Minister of the Interior. . . .

After his appointment, a report started that the President of the
Duma would be 'Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister.
Quite unexpectedly Protopopov came to see me and, "Do you know,
Michael Vladimirovich, that there is a move at Headquarters to
make you Minister of Foreign Affairs?"

"How can I be Minister of Foreign Affairs?" I said, laughingly.

"You will have assistants who will look after the technical work."

"Well, then, will it be necessary for me to be Prime Minister
as well?"

"Surely."

It was time to put an end to this comedy.

"Listen," said I to him. "You are carrying out somebody's com-
mission. You have been sent to get my opinion on this question. In
that case, tell the Emperor my conditions [if appointed], I am to
hold office for no less than three years ; I am to select my Ministers.
The Empress must not interfere in State affairs, and, until the end
of the war, she must live and stay at Livadia [Crimea]. All the
Grand Dukes must be removed from active service ; not one of them
should be at the front. The Emperor must make his peace with all
the Ministers who have been unjustly humiliated. Polivanov must be
assistant to the Emperor at Headquarters, and Lukomski [A], Min-
ister of War, Each week there must be a conference with the right
to vote on all but strategic questions." . . .

The Empress went oftener and oftener to- Headquarters, and
when she was at Tsarskoe, the Ministers went to her with their
reports. . , . She was never popular, and when it became generally
known what influence Rasputin had over her and the way she inter-
fered in State affairs, people began to condemn her, to call her
"German," and to blame her for everything that the Tsar did which
was harmful to Russia.28

Prince Nicholas of Greece, who was married to Grand Duchess
Elena Vladimirovna, came to Petrograd through Vienna and Berlin.27

"September 24 [1915]. ". . • It is strange how unpopular poor Alix is.
It can be stated most positively that she has never done a thing to justify the
charge that she is sympathetic toward the Germans, but nevertheless everyone
insists that she is. The only charge that can be made against her is that she
does not know how to be popular." ("Andrei Vladimirovich/' 85.)

*Ew#eroK t$ Empress, July 28, 1916. "... Yesterday I had a long and
interesting conversation' with Niki. He leaves today for Kiev to visit mother;
from there "he will return to Pavlovsk, and will, of course, call on you. He
looked aged and nervous, and I therefore let him have his say and explain

II2 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

It is said that he had some secret mission. He remained here sev-
eral months. He went to Headquarters. General Alexeev complained
that whenever he came to report to the Emperor, the Prince and
Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna were there. The Tsar asked Alexeev
to report in their presence, but he begged for a private interview.
Alexeev felt that the Greek prince had no business at Headquarters
and that he should not be allowed to return to Greece— at least not
through Berlin and Vienna. The military authorities insisted on this,
and when the Prince started back he was sent not through Torneo
[Swedish frontier], but by way of Archangel to England. He arrived
in Greece just in the midst of the trouble there. Later we read in
the paper that, "at the Court of Constantine, it is said that the mis-
sion of Crown Prince Nicholas was a great success."

After taking office, Protopopov announced that his main task
would be the solution of the food problem.2* At the Council of
Ministers, he raised the question of transferring the food question
from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of the Interior,
The press and the zemstvo leaders, who acted as agents for the
Ministry of Agriculture, came out against this proposal. They feared
that if the Ministry of the Interior got control, they would come
under the authority of the governors, police, ct al A majority of the
zemstvo leaders announced that they would not work with the
Ministry of the Interior. Their fear was quickly justified, as may be
seen from the following incident, which took place at Ekaterinoslav
guberniia. The governor of that guberniia telephoned to Gesberg,

the mission on which Tino [Constantino of Greece] sent him. It should be
admitted that the diplomats of the Allies have blundered as usual The
support of this Venizelos may react unfavorably on us* Tino thinks that
the policy of the Allies threatens the dynasty, and that it h unnecessary to
play with fire. Everything that Niki told me was supported by official docu-
ments, copies of some of which he brought along with him.** ("Perepiska
Nikolaia "IV 371.)

* Empress* to Emperor, June zz-November id 13, 1916. "WId. it not be
wiser to give over all that question about food and fuel to the minister of
the Interior, whom it concerns more than the minister of Agriculture— I he
Minister of Interior has his people everywhere, can give orders and direct
instructions to all the Governors* * . . Forgive me for what I have done,
. . . Our Friend said it was absolutely necessary . . . so I spoke to Stunner
yesterday and they both completely believe in our Friend's wonderful, /*<»d
sent wisdom. St. sends you by this messenger a new paper to.ftitfn giving
over the whole food supply now at once to the minister of Interior, St. begs
you to sign it and at once return it ... then it will come in time Iwforp
the Duma assembles on Tuesday, I had to take this step upon myself as Ur,
says Protop, will have all in his hands and finish up all the Unions and 1»>
that will save Russia, , , . Our Friend is dreadfully aagry that Frotopoppv,
who out of cowardice wld* not have it announced that the food supply question
shld. be in his hands now." ("Plsma Imperatritsy,1' II, 358, 43Q\ 439-)

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 113

the head of the zemstvo and agent for the Ministry of Agriculture,
that he should permit agents of the Ministry of the Interior to pur-
chase one and one-half million puds of barley for Petrograd. To
have allowed these inexperienced men to buy would have forced
up the prices and led to graft and other evils. Gesberg offered to
secure and ship the barley, but the governor would not have it that
way, saying that he must carry out the orders of the Minister of the
Interior, and that if it were not done, necessary steps would be taken.
To this Gesberg replied that he, as head of the zemstvo and agent
of the Ministry of Agriculture, could not take orders from the gov-
ernor on matters relating to food. This reply was sent to P'rotopopov,
who decided to send Gesberg to Siberia on the ground that he had a
German name. ... It was only after much difficulty that he was
persuaded not to do so.

Protopopov behaved very strangely and gave the impression that
he was not altogether normal. He came to the meeting of the budget
commission of the Duma dressed in the uniform of a police official.
The Duma received him coldly and his food plan was universally
condemned. This was also the attitude of the zemstvo and city
unions. Protopopov desired to have a conference with his former
colleagues of the Duma and asked me to help him. He, apparently,
thought that he would meet only representatives of the zemstvos,
Octobrists, but I called together all the leaders of the parties in the
Progressive Bloc. Protopopov behaved very strangely that evening.
He raised his eyes and with an enthusiasm which seemed unnatural
said, "I feel that I will save Russia. I feel that only I can save her."
Shingarev [A. L], who is a doctor by profession, gave it as his
opinion that Protopopov was a sick man. Protopopov remained with
me until three in the morning, being unable to make up his mind to
go, and finally I had to insist that he go to bed. . . .

At the opening of the Duma, Stunner and his Ministers were
present. After the President had spoken and as Sturmer got up to
make a speech, cries came from the left. "Put him out ; down with
the traitor, Sturmer." Stunner, followed by all his Ministers, walked
out . , .

At the session of the Duma on November 18 [19x6], something
happened which left a deep impression not only on the Duma, but
on the country as a whole. During the speech of Markov . . . there
walked into the hall Minister of War Shuvaev 29 and Minister of

* Empress to Emperor, March 26, 1916. "I am thinking so much about
Shuvaev and do greatly wonder whether he can fill such a place, know

114 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

the Navy Grigorovich. They asked permission to make a declaration.
Shuvaev, greatly excited, said that he, an old soldier, had con-
fidence in the Russian army, that the army was well supplied with
all its needs, thanks to the support of the people and their repre-
sentatives. He quoted figures showing how war supplies had gradu-
ally increased from the time the Special Council of Defense was
created. He ended by asking support and confidence in him in the
future. Grigorovich made a speech along the same line. The idea
back of their speeches was this: ulf the other Ministers disagree
with the Duma, we two, representing the army and navy, wish to
go hand in hand with the people." . . . These men came on their own
responsibility.30 After this Stunner and Protopopov pleaded with
the Empress to dissolve the Duma. . . ,

On November 22 [1916], Sturmer, Trepov, and Grigoro-
vich went to Headquarters. New changes in the ministry were
expected. Sure enough, Sturmer was dropped and Trepov made
Prime Minister,81 . . . When the Empress learned of the fate
of Stunner, she and Protopopov started at once for Head-
quarters.

On the day following, Trepov came to see me and assured me
that he would like to work with the Duma and that he would be
able to offset the influence of Rasputin. I told him that first of all
he should remove Protopopov, Shakhovskoi [V. N.J, and A. Bobrin-
ski (Minister of Agriculture), Otherwise, no one would have any
confidence in him. ... It was said that Trepov accepted his post

how to speak in the Duma, as one time one abused him and the ordinance
department" ("Pisma Imperatritsy," II, 306.)

Emperor to Empress, March 27, XQifi. "- . . I am fully convinced that
good, old Shuvaev is just the man for the Ministry of vvar. He is honest,
loyal, not in the least afraid of the Duma. . . /' ("Perepiska Nikolaia/' IV,

14 * Empress to Emperor, November 21, 19x6. "I find Grigoroviteh and
Shuvaev did not find the right note in their speech but Sfauvaev did the
worst thing— he shook hands with Miliukov who had just launched form
things against us." ("Pisma Imperatritsy," II, 445.)..,. - , . Ci

* Empress to Emperor, November 22, 23, 1016. "Our Friend says Sturmer
can remain still some time as President of the Council of Ministers, as that
one does not reproach him so much. ... He [Rasputin] implores either he
t Sturmer] should go on leave for a month or at once to name another man
UK his place as Minister of Foreign Affairs. . . . In that ministry, he is the
red flag and at once all will be quieter if he is changed. But leave him as
President of the Council of Ministers, , . , I received old Sturmer and ht»
told me yr. decision— God grant, all is for the good, thp* it gave me a painful
shock you also take him away fr. the Council of Ministers. ... He { Ras-
putin] is very sad, Sturmer did not understand he ought to have gone for
a rest not knowing Trepov, of course he is anxious for you/' (Ibtd.* 445*
446, 447-)

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 115

on condition that Protopopov be dismissed, but unfortunately this
did not take place.32 . . .

On December 29 [16], the Duma adjourned for the Christmas
holidays,83

On the night of December 30, Rasputin was killed,34 and this
event may be regarded as the beginning of the second revolution.
There is no doubt whatever that the principal actors in this tragedy
were actuated by patriotic motives. They saw that legal methods
failed to free Russia from the dangerous favorite, and therefore
decided that it was their sacred duty to free the Tsar's family and
Russia from the hypnotic influence. The result, however, was quite
contrary to their hopes. The country came to the conclusion that the
only way to advance the interests of Russia was by terror. . . .

Protopopov not only continued to play his part at Tsarskoe, but
even took Rasputin's place. It was said that he became interested in
spiritism and called forth Rasputin. . . .

The food situation became very bad. Cities were without food,
villages without shoes, and every one felt that there was plenty in

M Empress to Emperor, November 24, 1916. "I entreat you dont go and
change Protopopov now, he will be alright, give him the chance to get the
food supply matter into his hands and I assure you, all will go. ... Of course,
I more than regret that Trepov is at the head. . . . Protopopov is honestly
for us. ... Protopopov venerates our Friend and will be blessed . . . dont
change Protopopov. , , ." ("Pisma Imperatritsy," II, 447, 448.)

** Empress to Emperor, December 22, 26, 27, 1916. *\ . . Trepov has com-
bined with Rodzianko to let go the Duma from Dec. i7-Jan. 8, so as that the
deputies should have no time to leave Petrograd for the holidays and to keep
them here in hand. Our Friend and Kalinin entreat you to close the Duma
not later than* the I4th of Feb., ist or i$th even, otherwise there will be no
peace for you — In the Duma, they only fear this, a longer intermission and
Trepov intends to catch you, saying that it will be worse if the people return
home and spread their news — but our Friend says, nobody believes these dele-
gates when they are alone in their homesteads, only have strength when
lo-gether. ... I read in the papers that he [Trepov] told Rodzianko now,
that the Duma will be shut about on the i7th till first half of Jan. ... I did
so hard beg for sooner and longer — Thank God, you at last fixed no date in
Jan, and can call them to-gether in Feb. or not at all. . . . Trepov was very
wrong in putting off the Duma now and wishing to call it beginning of
January again, the result being (which he, Rodzianko and all counted upon),
that nobody goes home and afl will remain, fomenting, boiling in Petrograd.^
(Ibid., 456, 457, 461, 462.)

** Tsarskoe Selo, August 30 [1915]. "It is true that all these charges
[against Rasputin], like other charges, exaggerate, mislead, and confuse. But
the fact remains there is some truth in them. Who will undertake to
disprove them? The only thing to do now is to get up sufficient courage
to put an end to Rasputin, guilty or innocent. It does not matter what
he did, or who he is. The thing to be kept in mind is that he is the cause
of public" accusations of a rather unpleasant sort, against a certain person
[the Empress?] That in itself is sufficient reason for being careful, and
not arousing public discontent at a time when, even without that, all is not as
it should be," ("Andrei Vladirairovich," 750

n6 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Russia, but that nothing could be had because of the disorganiza-
tion in the rear. Moscow and Petrograd were without meat, while
at the same time, according to the papers, about half a million puds
of meat were piled up on Siberian stations and would spoil with
the first thaw. . . . Each minister and official laid the blame on
the other. All they could think of was to stop passenger traffic for
a time to allow freight to come through ; but they failed even in this.
... It seemed as if the ministers were working purposely against
Russia and in favor of Germany ... and that it all led to the
Empress through Protopopov.

In January, 1917, General Krymov came from the front and
asked to be allowed to tell the members of the Duma unofficially
of the tragic situation at the front. I invited many deputies of the
Duma, State Council, and members of the Special Council We lis-
tened excitedly to the report of the fighting general. ... He said
that, until the political horizon cleared, until the Government changed
its course or a new Government came in, which the army trusted,
there could be no victory. The rear interfered with the war and tem-
porary victories were of no account. He ended with the following
words :

"The feeling in the army is such that all will greet with joy the
news of a coup d'etat. It has to come ; it is felt at the front. Should
you decide to do this, we will support you. Seemingly, there is no
other way out. You, as well as others, have tried everything, but
the evil influence of the wife is mightier than the honest words
spoken to the Tsar. We cannot afford to lose time."

After Krymov finished, we sat there deeply depressed. The first
to speak was Shingarev.

"The General is right— a coup d'ftat is necessary. But who will
dare to undertake it?*'

Shidlovski exclaimed in anger, "We cannot waste pity on him
[the Tsar], if he ruins Russia."

Many of the members of the Duma agreed with Shingarev and
Shidlovski. They became noisy in their differences of opinion. Some-
one quoted Brusilov: "If it comes to a choice between the Tsar
and Russia, I will take Russia/1

Tereschenko spoke so harshly that he aroused me, I stopped him,
and said, "You are not thinking of what might happen after the
abdication. I will never raise my hand against the Emperor. I have
taken the oath of loyalty. I beg you not to discuss it in my house.

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 117

If the army desires the Tsar to abdicate, let it proceed through its
officers, but I shall try until the last minute to work through peace-
ful means and not by force."

We talked a long, long time that evening. We felt the storrn ap-
proaching, and feared the future. . . .

At about this time, I had a rather strange interview with Grand
Duchess Maria Pavlovna. . . . She spoke of the situation in the
interior, of the worthless Government, of Protopopov and of the
Empress . . . that it was necessary to change, remove, destroy.

I tried to find out what she was driving at and asked what she
meant by remove.

"Well, I don't know. It is necessary to undertake something.
You understand. The Duma should do something. . . . She should
be done away with."

"Who?"

"The Empress."

"Your Highness," said I, "let us forget this conversation." . . .

The idea that it was necessary to force the Tsar to abdicate
seemed to have taken hold of Petrograd at the end of 1916, and
the beginning of 1917. A number of people from the higher circles
declared that the Duma and its president should undertake this task
and save the army and Russia.

On January 21 [1917], there came to see me, quite unexpectedly,
Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich [brother of the Tsar] , who said,
"I should like to talk to you about what is going on and to consult
you as to what should be done. We understand the situation. ... Do
you think there is going to be a revolution?"

"As long as the war goes on, the people realize that division means
ruin for the army. But there is another kind of danger. The Govern-
ment and the Empress lead Russia toward a separate peace, to shame,
and into the arms of Germany. The nation will not tolerate it, and
should it prove true — and there are plenty of rumors to that effect —
we shall have a terrible revolution which will carry away the throne,
the dynasty, you and me. There is still time to save Russia, and even
now the reign of your brother could attain unheard-of greatness and
glory, if the policies of the Government were altered. It is necessary
to appoint 'Ministers whom the country trusts, who would not hurt
the people's feelings. I am sorry to say, however, that this could
be done only if the Empress were removed [from political affairs].
. . . She and the Emperor are surrounded by sinister and worth-

ii8 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

less characters. The Empress is hated and there is a general cry that
she should be removed. As long as she is in power we shall drift
toward ruin."

'Imagine, — Buchanan said the same thing to my brother. Our
family realizes how harmful the Empress is. She and my brother are
surrounded by traitors— all decent people have left them. But what

to do?"

"You, Your Highness, as his only brother, should tell him all
the truth; all the harm the Empress does; that the people regard
her as Germanophile, working against the interests of Russia/'

"Do you think that there must be a responsible ministry?"

"Not a single resolution calls for a responsible ministry. All that
is asked is a strong Government, with some one at its head who has
the confidence of the country. Such a person would form a cabinet
responsible to the Tsar/' . . .

This interview lasted more than an hour. The Grand Duke
agreed with everything and promised to help. . . .

On January 20, I had an audience with the Tsar.

"From my second report, Your Majesty may have seen that I
regard the situation as worse than ever. The frame of mind of the
country is such that very serious outbreaks may be expected. Politi-
cal divisions no longer exist, but Russia, as one, demands a change
in Government, and the appointment of a responsible Prime Minister
who has the confidence of the country. It is necessary to work in
agreement with the legislative bodies and public organizations in
order to organize the rear and conquer the enemy. To our great shame
in these war times, everything is in disorder. There is no govern-
ment, no system, and no cooperation between front and rear.
Wherever one looks he sees only disorder and betrayal The .con-
stant change of Ministers arouses irritation at first, but later indif-
ference, and leads to demoralization in the service from top to bot-
tom. It is believed by the people that you have removed all Ministers
who had the confidence of the Duma and public organizations, and
replaced them by incapable and untrustworthy persons. Let me re-
call them: Polivanov, Sazonov, Count Ignatiev [P, N.]» Samarin,
Scherbatov, Naumov [A. N.]. All these were loyal to you and
Russia and yet were removed without cause and without blame-
Recall such old State workers as Golubev and Kulomzin [A, N.]*
They were displaced for no other reason than that they refused to
close the mouths of honest people in the State Council. The idea
spreads that everything is done that harms Russia and benefits the

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 119

enemy. Strange rumors circulate about traitors and spies in the
rear of the army. There is not one honest man in your entourage;
all decent people have either been sent away or have left. ... It
is no secret that the Empress issues State orders without consulting
you; that Ministers go to her with their reports; and that at her
will those she disapproves of are removed and are replaced by others
who are totally unfit. . . . She is regarded as a partisan of Ger-
many, which she protects. Even the common people speak of it."

"Produce your facts," said the Emperor. "You have no evidence
to support your words."

'There are no facts, but her politics are such that the masses
draw that conclusion. In order to save your family, Your Majesty
must find a way to remove the Empress from politics. The hearts of
the Russian people are breaking at the threatening future. The people
are turning from their Tsar because after so much suffering, sacrifice
and bloodshed, they see nothing but trouble ahead."

I then turned the conversation to the front and recalled how I
had pleaded with him not to take the supreme command and that now,
after the failure on the Rumanian front, all blame fell upon him.

"Do not bring about a situation, Your Majesty, wfiich will force
your subjects to choose between you and the good of the country.
Until now, Tsar and country have been one, but lately a distinction
has been made."

The Tsar pressed his head with his hands and said, "Is it pos-
sible that for twenty-two years I have tried to do some good, and
that for twenty-two years I have failed ?"

It was a trying moment.

"Yes, Your Majesty, for twenty-two years you have followed the
wrong trail."

Notwithstanding this open expression of opinion which could
not be agreeable to the Emperor, he bade me good-bye in a friendly
way, without showing any ill-will. . . .

I have been informed that the Petrograd police are being' trained
in the use of machine guns. A number of machine guns in the capital
and other cities, instead of being sent to the front, have been handed
over to the police.

There is also a strange order which takes the Petrograd Military
District out of the Army of the Northern Front and puts it [the
district] under the direct command of the Government. . . .

It is said that there is some hidden reason for this move. Per-
sistent rumors are afloat that the Empress is determined to have a

120 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

separate peace with Germany, that Protopopov, who is helping her
in this matter, is stirring up the population to disorders because of
lack of provisions, with the idea of putting them down and using
them [the disorders] as a reason for a separate peace. These rumors
continue and have aroused considerable feeling not only among mem-
bers of the Duma, but among the representatives of the Allies. Mem-
bers of the Special Council of Defense decided to raise the question
of the French artillery and machine guns at their next meeting.
They asked Beliaev [M. A.], Minister of War, what right he had,
'without authorization of the Special Council, to transfer such a large
amount of weapons, needed at the front, to the Minister of the
Interior. He promised to give an answer but did not, and when we
insisted on a reply, he tried to end the discussion. . . . Not getting
anywhere, we decided to adopt radical measures and ask the Emperor
to preside at the next meeting. . . . Beliaev, however, said that he
would not ask him, that it was inopportune, and that the Tsar should
not be troubled about matters of secondary importance. Under the
circumstances, the members decided to write to the Tsar. I sent their
document, together with my report, but received no reply.

On February 23, I had an audience with the Tsar. „ . „ I was
received very coldly. ... I began to read my report The Emperor
listened not only with indifference, but with a kind of ill-will . . .
and he finally interrupted me with the request that I hurry a bit, as
Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich was waiting for him to have a
cup of tea. . . .

When I raised the question of the transfer of machine guns, he
remarked : ""Strange, I know nothing about this-" . . * When I spoke
of Protopopov, he became irritated. . . . When I called his atten-
tion to the threatening situation in the country and the possibility
of a revolution, he broke in again by saying: "The information I
have is quite contrary to yours, and as to the Duma, I should like
to say that if it permits itself such harsh speeches as last time, it
will be dissolved."

"Your Majesty, I regard it as my duty to tell you that I have a
foreboding, and a conviction that this is my last report to you/1

"Why?"

"Because the Duma will be dismissed, and the course which the
Government pursues will lead to no good results. . * . There is still
time and opportunity to turn back and form a Government respon-
sible to the chambers [legislative]. But this, seemingly, is not to be.
You, Your Majesty, do not agree with me, and things are as they

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 121

have been. The result will be a revolution and such anarchy as no
one will be able to control."

The Emperor made no reply, and bade me good-bye rather form-
ally.

The Duma was to begin its session on February 27. Some days
before, I was told that at the first meeting, Petrograd workmen would
come to make certain demands. At the same time, I learned that some
one, passing himself for Miliukov [P. N,] had visited factories and
incited the workers. Miliukov wrote a letter for the press exposing
the imposter and warning the workmen not to lend themselves to
provocation. The war censor would not allow its publication and
only after my persistent demands was the permission granted. . . .
Before the very opening of the Duma, all but two of the Labor
members of the War-Industry Committee were arrested. They were
moderate men and it was difficult to understand their arrest. The
two who were free appealed to the workmen to remain quiet, but
their appeal, like the letter of Miliukov, was not allowed to appear.

The opening of the Duma passed off quietly. . . . The Duma
had been in session about a week, when I learned indirectly that the
Tsar had called Prime Minister Golitsyn and some of the other
ministers to discuss the question of a responsible ministry. It was
agreed that the Tsar should appear at the Duma the following day
to announce his wish to grant a responsible ministry. Prince Golitsyn
was greatly pleased and went home quite happy. In the evening, the
Emperor sent for him once more to come to the Palace and told him
that he was going to Headquarters.

"But, Your Majesty, how about the responsible ministry? You
planned to go to the Duma tomorrow ?"

"That's true. But I have changed my mind, and am going to
Headquarters this evening/'

Golitsyn explained this sudden determination to go to Head-
quarters by the desire of the Emperor to escape new reports, con-
ferences, and discussions.

The Tsar departed; the Duma continued to debate the food
question. On the surface all looked well, but all of a sudden there
came a crash and the State locomotive jumped the rails. The threat-
ening and ruinous event, of which the Court had been warned but
which it would not take to heart, had taken place.

CHAPTER VII

SPECIAL COUNCILS, PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS,

DUMA

i. IMPERIAL RESCRIPT ISSUED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, GOREMYKIN '

June 27, 1915
IVAN LOGINOVICH :

From every corner of our native land addresses are reaching me
which testify to the great eagerness of the Russian people to devote
their energies to providing supplies for the army. From this unani-
mous expression of the nation, I derive an unshakable confidence
in a bright future.

The prolonged war demands ever fresh exertions. But in the
increasing difficulties and in the inevitable vicissitudes of war the
resolution becomes more firm and more rooted in our hearts to
prosecute the war, with God's help, to the complete triumph of the
Russian arms. The enemy must be crushed. Till then, there can be
no peace.

With a firm belief in the inexhaustible strength of Russia, I ex-
pect of the Government and of public institutions, of Russian indus-
try, and of all the loyal sons of our native land, without distinction
of opinion and position, harmonious, wholehearted cooperation for
the needs of our valiant army. Upon this national task, from now the
only task, must be concentrated all the thoughts of a united and,
consequently, unconquerable Russia,

Having created, for dealing with the problems of the army supply,
a Special Commission made up in part of members of the legislative
institutions and representatives of industry, I find it also necessary
to hasten the time of the summoning of the legislative institutions
themselves, so that we may hear the voice of Russia. I have, there-
fore, decided that the State Council and State Duma should resume
their work not later than August of the present year, and I ask the

lwRiech," No. 164, June 30, 1915.

122

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 123

Council of Ministers to work out, under my direction, the legislative
bills called for by the exigencies of war.

The original is signed in His Imperial Majesty's own hand :

NICHOLAS.

Headquarters, June 27, 1915.

2. SPECIAL COUNCILS 2

Law passed by tlw State Council, State Duma, and confirmed by His
Majesty, relating to the formation of Special Councils to deliber-
ate and coordinate measures relating to the national dejeiise, fuel,
transportation, State and public institutions, and undertakings
which work for the defense of the State, food supply, and the
transportation of fuel, food, <md war material:

I. The following acts of the Council of Ministers, [formerly]
confirmed by the Emperor, are hereby repealed:

1. April 13, 1915 (Collection of Laws, Chapter 865), relat-
ing to certain measures having to do with supplying fuel to the
army, navy, transportation, and private institutions working for
the State defense.

2. May 15, 1915 (Collection of Laws, Chapter 1091), ex-
tending the power of the Minister of Transportation, granted to
him on March 17, 1915, over the supply of fuel for state and
public institutions.

3. June i, 1915 (Collection of Laws, Chapter 1169), grant-
ing the Minister of Commerce and Industry special power to deal
with the food question in the Empire.

4. June n, 1915 (Collection of Laws, Chapter 1215) deter-
mining how hard fuel should be distributed among the users.

5. June 20, 1915 (Collection of Laws, Chapter 1280), ap-
proving a Special Council to bring together the various meas-
ures for providing the active army with war supplies and ma-
terials, and the Imperial Ukaz of March 17, 1915 (Collection
of Laws, Chapter 634), to bring under the control of the Minister
of Transportation all measures relating to fuel for the army, navy,
transport, and private institutions working for the defense of
the State.

'"Izvestiia Glavnago Komiteta po Snabzheniiu Attnii," No. i, September,
1915, 188-9.

124

DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

The Law on the Special Council to Deliberate and Coordinate
Measures for the National Defense.

The Special Council is the highest organ created by the State.
No government institution or official can issue orders to the Special
Council or demand accounting from it.

August 30, 1915.

COMPOSITION OF THE FOUR SPECIAL COUNCILS*

Members of
Councils

Name of _
Council

c/5

^ a

National Defense

Minister of

Food

'Minister of
Agriculture

Fuel

Minister of

Commerce and

Industry

Transportation

Minister of
Transportation

*"Izvestiia Vserossiiskago Soiuza Gorodov," No. 21*22, December,

II. For the duration of the war the above-noted laws are changed
and supplemented by the following laws:

1, A Special Council to deliberate and coordinate all meas-
ures for the defense of the state;

2. A Special Council to deliberate and coordinate all meas-
ures for supplying fuel for transportation purposes to state and
public institutions and undertakings working for the defense of
the country;

3, A Special Council to deliberate and coordinate all meas-
ures relating to food;

4. A Special Council to deliberate and coordinate all meas-

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 125

ures relating to the transportation of fuel, food, and war
material.

Signed: President of the State Council,

KULOMZIN.

On the original His Majesty has written : So Be It.
Tsatrskoe Sdo
August 30, 1915.

Countersigned by the State Secretary, KRYZHANOVSKI.

3. WAR-INDUSTRY COMMITTEES, AND LABOR
PARTICIPATION

(0) ORGANIZATION OF THE WAR-INDUSTRY COMMITTEES3

On September 9 [1915], His Majesty confirmed the following
regulations, recommended by the Council of Ministers, relating to
the War-Industry Committees :

1. To help government organizations supply the army and navy
with all necessary military and food supplies, there are being formed,
for the duration of the war, central, regional, and local war-industry
committees.

2. The war-industry committees are public organizations which
have no commercial aims. Consequently economic institutions be-
longing to them furnish military and food supplies at cost When
placing orders with private industries and business houses, the com-
mittees, to cover general expenses, may have a rebate, the amount
of which to be determined by the committees with the factories and
business houses, but in no case is it to be more than one per cent
of the cost of the order.

3. The composition, resources, relations [with other institutions]
and activities of the Central War-Industry Committee are deter-
mined by the committee itself. The composition, resources, relations
and activities of regional and local committees are determined by
these committees in accordance with the general principles of organi-
zation and activities of war-industry committees, in agreement with
the Central War-Industry Committee.

4. The relations between government institutions and war-indus-
try committees in the matter of supplying the army and navy with
military and food supplies is determined by mutual agreement be-
tween the committees and the military and civil authorities concerned.

* "Izvestiia Glavnago Komiteta po Snabzheniiu Armii," No. 2-3, October 14,

126 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

5. The Central War-Industry Committee has the right to take
over every kind of movable and immovable property; to conclude
contracts with private individuals, with government and public in-
stitutions; to assume all kinds of obligations; in particular,^ carry
out government orders for supplies and work ; to organize, in agree-
ment with the Ministries of War and Navy, methods of receiving and
delivering war materials, etc. ; to sue and be sued. Similar rights are
enjoyed by the regional committees, organized and confirmed by tRe
Central War-Industry Committee, as well as the local committees,
organized and confirmed by the regional committees,

6. All money, property, and resources in the hands of the war-
industry committees at the time of their liquidation go to the State.

(&) LABOR PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR-INDUSTRY COM'MITTEES *

Petrograd. On September 10, [1915] there was the first pre-elec-
tion meeting of the workmen in the factory, "Novyi Lessner." At the
end of the day's work, the day shift packed the court of the factory
and notified the management that they were to take up the question
of electing delegates to the Central War-Industry Committee. The
management told the men to go ahead, and they immediately elected
a presiding officer.

It has been a long time since the capital witnessed such a large
gathering. The night shift, instead of going to work, joined the clay
shift at the meeting. There were present alxmt 4,000 workmen.
After explaining the origin of the war-industry committees, the
chairman proposed that the workmen should give serious thought
to the idea of labor participation in the mobilization of industry, and
speak out freely before the election whether it*was possible or neces-
sary to have the elections.

After this talk, and as the discussion was about to 'begin, some-
thing happened. The gates of the factory flew open, the mounted
police rode in and told the workmen to disperse.

Those in charge of the meeting explained to the police officers that
it was a legal assembly, called at the request of the Central War-
Industry Committee. The police were not satisfied* A. L Guchkov
[President of the Central War-Industry Committee], members of
the Duma, and others were called by telephone and, finally, through
their mediation, the police allowed the meeting to go on, but re-
mained to listen.

4*lzvestna Glavnago Komiteta po Snabzheniw Armii," Nos. 2-3, October I4»

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 127

Representatives of the two wings of the Social-Democrats
[Mensheviks and Bolsheviks] and of the Narodniks [Socialist-
Revolutionists] made speeches.

All agreed that the workmen should have the right to organize,
that it was necessary to have unions, cooperatives, etc., to fight the
high cost of living. But when it came to questions in which Marxists'
and Narodniks' doctrines were involved, they disagreed. The Bolshe-
viks favored taking part in the primary election but opposed partici-
pating in the final. Instead of voting at that time they proposed to
proclaim their program.5 The Mensheviks took the stand that the
workmen should take a broader view, make use of the elections to
form factory and municipal committees, and attempt to call a labor
congress, etc. The Narodniks, though not advocating any particular
program, were yet not in favor of participating beyond electing
delegates.

By the time it came to the resolutions, it was already ten o'clock.
The political demands were accepted, with the exceptiovn of the point
relating to a responsible ministry, which the majority did not
support. It was decided to call a new meeting to take up the question
of election. . . .

On September II, there was a large meeting of workmen at the
Lessner factory to discuss the question of participation in the Cen-
tral War-Industry Committee. Police appeared and asked the work-
men to leave, but no attention was paid and the meeting continued.
It passed a resolution, emphasizing the need of utilizing the election
campaign to organize labor on a large scale and demand the calling
of a labor congress to decide whether the workmen should participate
in the War-Industry Committee. . . .

In connection with the election of representatives of labor to the
Central War-Industry Committee and the need of having free pre-
election meetings, chairman A. I. Guchkov and vice-chairman A. I.
Konovalov, of the Central War-Industry Committee, called on Prince
N. B. Scherbatov, Minister of the Interior. They impressed upon
him the importance of having free elections so as to interest the work-
men of the capital in the great work. Guchkov also went to see Gen-
eral Frolov, the chief of the Petrograd Military District, while
Konovalov called on Prince Obolenski, the head of the Petrograd
police.

'There were two elections. In the first one every factory having no less
than five hundred workmen elected one delegate for every thousand employees.
In the second election the delegates selected ten men to represent them in the
Central War-Industry Committee.

128 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

All the above-named representatives of the Government said that
they would place no obstacles to the election of such delegates. On
September 14, Konovalov and M. S. Margulies went to see Prince
Shakhovskoi, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, and asked
him to issue instructions along that line to the factory inspectors,
which he promised to do.

It was intended to ask all government factories to take part in
the election. With that in mind, Konovalov went ito the Ministries
of War and Navy and to the Red Cross to ask that elections be
permitted in their institutions. . . .

The Central War-Industry Committee sent 1,130,000 notices to
the different factories, calling upon the workmen to unite with the
public organizations to drive off the foe, notifying them that the
authorities had been asked to keep the police and inspectors from
interfering in the pre-election assemblies and the elections, and re-
questing the owners of factories to assist the workmen in every
possible way, provide them with halls, etc, for discussion and
election. . . .

In many factories there were large, orderly meetings, at which
labor decided to take part in the election. The workmen made some
changes in the electoral system suggested by the War-Industry Com-
mittee. They [workmen] proposed that commissions should be se-
lected in every factory to count votes, to take up with the city au-
thorities matters relating to the elections, etc. Workmen attach much
importance to these commissions, hoping that they may become per-
manent bodies and occupy themselves with the welfare of the work-
ers, cost of living, improvement in labor conditions, etc. . . * At
pre-election meetings, it was agreed to name candidates, one for
every thousand workmen. ... It is likely that the number of men
chosen will be greater than that supposed by the War-Industry
Committee. . . .

The appeal of the Central War-Industry Committee to the work-
men to participate in the mobilization of industry became the most
discussed question in all the large Petrograd factories. The original
plan of some groups, to elect workmen to the Central War-Industry
Committees, did not meet with much response in Labor circles. Sev-
eral pre-election meetings of workmen had already taken place and
the question was thoroughly discussed.

At the "Novyi Lessner" factory there was a large pre-election
meeting on September 25, The management set aside one of its
large shops for this purpose, erected a tribune for the speakers, and

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 129

placed a table for the chairman. In short, it offered the workmen
opportunities that they had not enjoyed for a long time. Representa-
tives of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and Narodniks made speeches.

The meeting did not end without differences of opinion. It was
decided to name a factory commission to count votes, prepare for
the election, etc. ...

It became clear immediately that there would be two tickets:
One of the Mensheviks and Narodniks combined, and the other of
the Bolsheviks. The majority voted for the combined ticket. Before
voting, it was proposed that the three parties be given an equal num-
ber of candidates and all go on the same ticket, but the Bolsheviks
declined. Consequently, the commission of twenty-six persons elected
were made up of Mensheviks and Narodniks. The next question
taken up was the selection of a committee of five to prepare for the
election of representatives to the War-Industry Committee. There
was no agreement even on this point.

At the time of selecting the committee, which will take place on
October 5, two tickets will be put in the field. When some people
present expressed their discontent with the way the political groups
were acting, the Bolsheviks left the hall. The meeting lasted five
hours, and the workers of the two shifts took part.

September 6, 1916

Scherbatov: Guchkov's Central War-Industry Committee has de-
cided to have elections in the factories for representatives to the
labor section. . . .

Shakhovskoi: I fear that the labor leaders will make use of this
opportunity to carry on agitation. . . . They are very much opposed
to Guchkov's Committee but they will not decline to form the begin-
ning of a labor center. ... It would be well to open Guchkov's eyes
so that he may see where his committee and its labor section is
leading to.

Khvotfov: Guchkov would not believe us. ...

* "Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 101.

1 30 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

4 THE MAIN COMMITTEES TO SUPPLY THE ARMY OF

THE ALL-RUSSIAN UNIONS OF ZEMSTVOS

AND CITIES 7

[Soon after the outbreak of the War the principal cities of Rus-
sia formed a Union of Cities and the zemstvos a Union of Zemstvos.
At the head of each union was a board of directors known as the
Main Committee. During the first ten months of the war^ these
unions rendered very valuable Red Cross services. The Union of
Zemstvos alone had 175,000 beds, sanitary trains, etc. Members of
the Union helped not only the soldiers but the refugees.

When after the Russian defeats in Galicia, in the spring of
1915, it became clear that the army was poorly supplied with cloth-
ing and ammunition and that the task was too big for the Govern-
ment, the unions offered their help. On June 12, 1915, there was a
joint meeting of the two Main Committees to discuss how they could
be of assistance. Before coming to a definite decision it was agreed
to call together the mayors of cities and representatives of zemstvos
in order to learn what they could do.

On June 18 the two unions met separately and deliberated several
days on the questions before them. The Union of Zemstvos agreed
that it was its duty to help supply the army with food, clothing and
ammunition, that this could be done best by working through the
Union as a whole rather than through the parts, that the executive
power of the Union should be in the hands of the Main Committee
and five others to be selected, and that in order to coordinate its
efforts with that of the War-Industry Committee it should have
representatives in that body. A somewhat similar resolution was
passed by the Union of Cities.

Each of the unions went to work separately. It put itself in touch
with the Government, with the War-Industry Committee, and other
organizations working for the Army. After a two months' trial, it
was con-eluded that for the sake of bringing about better coordina-
tion the two unions should work through one head, and they formed
the Main Committee to Supply the Army, This body was composed
of the president and four members of each union. It was the duty
of this new organization to receive Government credits and war
orders, to distribute these orders among the zemstvos and cities,
and to build such factories as were needed to fill the orders* The

'"Izvestiia GJavoago Komiteta po Snabzheniiti Anni!," No. I, Septem-
ber, 1915, i-34-

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 131

Union of Zemstvos was represented in the new body by its presi-
dent, Prince G. E. Lvov, and N. S. Lopukhin, D, M. Schepkin, S. M.
Leontev, N. N. Kovalevski ; the Union of Cities was represented by
the president, M. V. Chelnokov, and N. V. Nekrasov, N. A, Arteniev,
A. G. Khruschov, M. I. Tereschenko.]

RESOLUTION8 OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE HIGH COST OF LIVING

Moscow, July 24-26, 1915 9

The year of the war has put the country to a great test. The
results achieved and the great sacrifices offered show that the brave
Russian army was not sufficiently equipped with fighting material.
The necessary measures for providing the needed supplies were not
taken in time by the organs of the Government, which are not re-
sponsible to the country.

The great effort and sacrifice of our army is made more diffi-
cult by the internal disorganization of the food supply, trade, and
transport. The army and the civilian population are ready to make
sacrifices and to undergo hardships to defend the country and to
conquer the enemy who has crossed our border.

At the opening of the war all the elements of the population, con-
scious of their historic duty to the country and her future, united
in the struggle for victory. But this burst of enthusiasm and popular
exertion found no way of expressing itself.

The expectation that there would be a transformation in the
organs of Government was not realized.

1. In order to succeed in the fight it is necessary to bring together
all the forces of the land and to adapt, as quickly as possible, the
whole life of the country to a state of war.

2. In this time of danger, an act to conciliate and to forget the
old political fight would arouse the spirit of the population and would
bring back to work and to public service many citizens who, for
political reasons, have been kept away.

3. With the view of uniting all the forces of the country, an
end should be put to the legal differences that exist between the
different religions and nationalities in Russia.

4. For the same reason and in order to fight effectively against

8"Izvestiia Vserossiiskago Soiuza Gorodov," No. 16, August, 1915, 3*-2.
•Representatives of the Union of Cities, cooperatives, labor organizations,

fublic organizations, and learned professions were present at this conference,
t was the first meeting of its kind after the outbreak of the war and the.
first opportunity for the expression of public opinion.

I32 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

the high cost of living, as well as to provide steady and better
conditions of employment in factories and mills, it is necessary to
permit at once the free organization of labor, and to grant freedom
of speech and the press.

5. Without taking into consideration the different forms of popu-
lar representation which are proposed by the various political groups
and parties, the Conference agrees that at the present time, for the
successful carrying on of the war, the Government should at least
be made up of persons who have the confidence of the country.
Only such men will make the Government strong, vigorous, capable
of carrying this great country to victory.

MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 10
August 31, 1915-

MINISTRY OF CONFIDENCE

Scherbatov: At the home of Konovalov at Moscow there was a
secret meeting of the so-called progressive men, which, In other words,
means Cadets, and their sympathizers, to discuss the present position
of the country. The reports which have reached me indicate that those
present unanimously agreed to make use of the present favorable
situation to demand a new government, which has the confidence of
the country and possesses full power. . . ,

MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS n
September i, 1915

MINISTRY OF CONFIDENCE

Krivoshein: . . . The report of the Minister of the Interior
[that the Mos-cow Duma had passed a resolution asking for a Min-
istry of Confidence] disturbs me a great deal It agrees with the
news which I have received from Moscow. . , . There is no doubt
that other cities, zemstvos, and public organizations will make similar
demands and requests. Imagine our position when not only the press
and the War-Industry Committee but all the public organizations
start a loud clamor for a Ministry having the confidence of the
country. . . . Let us betimes find a way out, take a definite stand,
have a clear plan. . . . We should talk to the Emperor . , . and

""Arkhiv Russkoi RevoImtshY' XVIII, 77.
bid., 84.

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 133

tell him frankly the position in which His Government . . . finds
itself. . . . We should tell His Majesty . . . that there are but two
ways out of the difficulty: either a strong- war dictatorship, if a
strong person can be found, or an understanding with the public.
. . . Hesitation, middle courses, and waiting for something to
happen will not get us anywhere. . . .

MEETING OF THE IMPERIAL COUNCIL 12
September 3, 1915

MINISTRY OF CONFIDENCE

Goremykin: ... In my opinion the reply to the telegram [of
the Moscow Duma] should limit itself to the thanks of His Majesty
for their loyalty. . . .

Sasonov: This will not do, it sounds like irony. It is not a question
of loyalty. The telegram was written by people whose hearts are
bleeding for their country. ... It is very difficult to make a case for
a Government which is not strong and which has not the confidence
of the country.

Scherbatov: ... It is one of two, either ignore and be silent
about these public demands or meet them half way. . . .

Gofemykin: . . . The agitation which is now going on [discus-
sion shifted to the subject of the Tsar replacing the Grand Duke as
Supreme Commander] is bound up with the public clamor for a
Ministry of Confidence, I <?., limiting the power of the Tsar, and is
nothing else than an attempt of the left to make use of the Grand
Duke to discredit the Emperor. ...

Sazonov: . . . We categorically protest against this interpretation
of this public agitation. It is not the result of intrigue but a cry of
self-help and we should join in it.

Goremykin: . . . Believe me with concessions you will get
nowhere. It is clear that all these parties in favor of a change are
taking advantage of the unfavorable war situation to limit the power
of the Monarchy.

Khwstov: No matter how much you give, the Chkheidzes
and Kerenskis will still be dissatisfied and will not stop to agitate

the public. . . .

Sasonov: What have we to do with such insignificant fellows as
the Kerenskis and Chkheidzes and other revolutionists ? We are not

M"Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 90-7-

134 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

thinking of them but of Russia, which is being forced into the arms
of these men. . . ,

5. PROGRESSIVE BLOC

September 7, 1915 1S

The undersigned representatives of factions and groups of the
State Council and State Duma, actuated by the conviction that only
a strong, firm, and active authority can lead the fatherland to victory,
and that such an authority can be only that which rests upon popular
confidence and is capable of organizing the active cooperation of all
citizens, have arrived at the unanimous conclusion that the most
.important and essential object of creating such an authority cannot
be attained without the fulfilment of the following conditions :

1. The formation of a united Government, composed of individ-
uals who enjoy the confidence of the country, and who have agreed
with the legislative institutions upon the execution, at the earliest
date, of a definite program.

2. Decisive change in the methods of administration employed
thus far, which have been based upon a distrust of public self-help,
in particular :

(a) Strict observance of the principles of legality in the
administration.

(b) Abolition of the dual authority of civil and military
powers in questions having no direct bearing upon the
conduct of military operations.

(d) A sensible and consistent policy directed towards the
maintenance of internal peace and the removal of cause
of dissension between nationalities and classes.

For the realization of such a policy the following measures must
be adopted, by means of administration, as well as legislation :

i. By means of Imperial clemency* a discontinuation of cases
started on charges of purely political and religious crimes, not
aggravated by crimes of a generally felonious character ; the release
from punishment and the restoration of rights, including the right
of participation in the elections to the State Duma, Zemstvo, and
municipal institutions, etc., of persons <xmdemned for such crimes ;

u "Riech," No. 234, September S, 1915.

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 135

and the amelioration of the condition of others condemned for
political and religious crimes, with the exception of spies and traitors*

2. The return of those exiled by administrative order, in cases
of a political and religious character.

3. Absolute and definite cessation of persecution on religious
grounds, under any pretext whatsoever, and revocation of circulars
issued in restriction and distortion of the sense of the Ukaz of April
17 [30], 1905-

4. Solution of the Russo-Polish problem, vis.: abolition of restric-
tions upon the rights of Poles throughout Russia ; the prompt drafting
and presentation to the legislative institutions of a bill for the auton-
omy of the Kingdom of Poland, and the simultaneous revision of
the laws concerning Polish land ownership.

5. Entry upon the path of abolition of restrictions upon the rights
of the Jews, in particular, further steps towards the abolition o£
the Pale of Settlement, facilitation of admission to educational
establishments, and removal of obstacles to the choice of professions.
Restoration of the Jewish press.

6. A policy of conciliation in the question of Finland, in parti-
cular, changes in the composition of the Administration and Senate ;
cessation of persecution against officials.

7. Restoration of the Little Russian press; immediate revision
of cases of inhabitants of Galicia kept in confinement or exiled ; and
the release of those wrongfully subjected to persecution.

8. Restoration of activity of trade unions, and cessation of perse-
cution of workers' representatives in the sick-benefit organizations,
on suspicion of membership in an unlegalized party. Restoration
of the labor press.'

9. Agreement between the government and the legislative institu-
tions regarding the early introduction of:

a) All bills immediately concerned with the national defense,
the supply of the army, welfare of the wounded, care of the refugees,
and other problems directly related to the war.

&) The following legislative program aiming at the organization
of the country for cooperation towards victory and maintenance of
internal peace:

Equalization of peasants' rights with those of other classes.

Establishment of volost zemstvos.14

Change of zemstvo statutes of 1890.

Change of municipal statutes of 1892.
** Volost — unit corresponding to township.

136 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Establishment of zemstvo institutions in the border regions, such
as Siberia, Archangel Province, Don Territory, The Caucasus, etc.

A bill concerning the cooperative societies.

A bill concerning rest for commercial employees.

Improvement of the material condition of the post and telegraph
employees.

Confirmation of temperance for all time.

Concerning zemstvo and municipal congresses and unions.

Statutes concerning revisions.

Introduction of Courts of the Peace in those provinces where their
establishment was held back by financial considerations.

Inauguration of legislative measures that may be indispensable to
the administrative execution of the above outlined program of action.

For the progressive group of Nationalists,

COUNT V. BOBRINSKX.
For the faction of the Center,

V. Lvov.
For the faction of Zemstvo-Octobrists,

I. DMITRIUKOV
For the group of the Union of October *7th,

S. Srnm-ovsKi,
For the faction of Progressists,

I. EPREMOV.
For the faction of Popular Freedom,

P. MILIUKOV.

6. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BLOC"

(a) MEETING OF" THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

September 8, 1915

.ADJOURNMENT OF THE DUMA AND THE PROGRESSIVE BLOC

Goremykin: We should decide today the question of adjourning
the legislative bodies, . . .

Pottvanov: Was it not agreed last time that before deckling there
should be a conference with Rodzianko and other well disposed
deputies? We should like to hear the results of these conver-
sations. . . .

""Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 105-27.

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 137

Gorcmykin: I have as yet had no conversations. They are unnec-
essary until after the Council of Ministers has determined the time
of adjournment. If I should raise the question with that chatterbox
Rodzianko the whole world would know about it. I shall talk to
him when all is settled.

Sazonov: . . . There is no doubt that this act [adjournment]
will lead to disturbances, not only among public organizations associ-
ated with the Duma but . . . also among the workmen. . . . We
should examine the question from different angles. It may be that
the "meetings" of the Duma is a lesser evil than labor troubles without
the Duma.

Grigorovich: According to my information the adjournment of
the Duma will certainly lead to disorders. . . .

Goremykin: . . . The Government will be blamed no matter what
happens. . . .

S&zonov: . . . Our wish to become acquainted with the program
of the bloc [Progressive Bloc] is known to all. Would it be well to
dismiss the Duma without first discussing the acceptability of the
program with the majority [in Duma], ... I think that we could
come to an understanding. . . . After having come to an agreement
the deputies would go home feeling . . . that the Government is
ready to meet their just requests. It would be a great mistake to
turn our backs on them and give the adjournment the appearance
of forcible expulsion. . . .

Goremykin: . . . Talking with them will get us nowhere. There
is no reason for associating the labor troubles with the adjournment
of the Duma. . . . Labor leaders are handicapped by lack of organi-
zation. The organization is badly crippled by the arrest of five
members of the Duma.16 . . .

Sasonov: . . . There is a practical question before us: To what
extent will the adjournment affect the factories and mills? A majority
of the members of the Council of Ministers are of the opinion that
it will affect the workmen, the country and the national defense. . . .

Gorcmykin: I am not disputing the fact that the adjournment of
the Duma will be used for purpose of agitation. What guarantees
have we that the workmen will not be stirred up if the Duma is in
session? The moment that the labor leaders think they are strong
enough and are sufficiently organized they will act. . . . Whether
we are with the Bloc or against it is a matter of indifference to labor.

w G. L Petrovskii, A. E. Badaev, M. K. Muranov, F. N. Samoilov and N.
P. Shagov. They were arrested on November 24, 1914.

138 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

There are other ways of dealing with the labor movement. The
Minister o£ the Interior has always taken care of that.

Sasonov: I disagree. It is not right to ignore the public in war
time. It would be better to unite all classes of the population. . . .

Goremykin: The Bloc was formed to seize power. It will not
last long and its members will start fighting among themselves.

Sasonov: It seems to me that for the good of the State we should
support the Bloc because of its moderation. If it should go to pieces
its successor would be much more radical. . . . Who will benefit
by that ? In any case not Russia.

Polwanov: What effect will that have on the national defense,
and on the enemy who is carefully watching our internal disorgan-
ization. . . .

Sasonov: It is dangerous to excite the radicals and to take the
fight outside of parliament. . . . The situation is bad enough without
making it worse. . . .

Goremykin: I regard the Bloc itself ... as unacceptable. Its aim
— to limit the power of the Tsar — is poorly concealed. . . .

Shakhovskoi: . . . The Duma is not legislating but is having
"meetings," exciting the country and arousing the workmen. Its
adjournment may or may not lead to disorders. Of these two evils I
prefer the lesser ancl am in favor of adjournment at once, even
tomorrow. But we should do it in a nice kind of way. Have a talk
with representatives of the Bloc about their program, and come to
some understanding with them, et cetera. By following this conciliat-
ing policy we are making it possible for members of the Duma to
get out of a bad hole, for they realize the hopelessness of their situa-
tion and fear that they may in the end become the playthings of
the radical elements.

Schcrbatov: The Duma should be adjourned now . - * but not in
anger. ... [If done in a proper manner] the adjournment will he
to the credit of the Government and the country will know that we
work in harmony with the Duma. It will make it easier for us to
govern and to carry out some of the tasks of the war. . . *

Goremykin: You forget that one of the fundamental points in the
program of the Bloc is a prolonged session. * . .

Scherlatov: That is only for public consumption.

Sasonov: A majority of the Duma is against a long session.

Goremykin: Yes, but it will never admit it publicly.

Sasonov: But it will not stand in the way of adjourning the
session and, in case of necessity, will support us* But first of all we

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 139

must come to an understanding and agree on a joint program of
action during the adjournment.

Kharitonov: I, too, am in favor of adjournment but on the condi-
tions just suggested. Let's examine together the program of the
Bloc and throw away what we cannot accept.

Gorcmykin: About three-fourths of it will have to go.

Sch&rbatav: How can we tell before we have examined it? But
even so there will be enough left to form a basis for discussion and
compromise. . . .

Khvostov: I have not much faith in all this but I am not against
talking it over [with the Bloc] . . .

Goremykin: These talks should not bind the Government. We
cannot assume formal obligations. This is not the time for it.

Kharitonov: This is beside the mark. Just now it is not a question
of agreements but of getting information. . . .

Gorcmykm: . . . Let's take a look at the program of the Bloc
and see whether we can come to an agreement on it among
ourselves. . . . [Examination of the various points of the program
follows] .

Sasonov: It is now clear that between the Bloc and the Govern-
ment there can be no practical questions on which an agreement
cannot be reached. According to the opinion expressed here ... it is
evident that five-sixths of the program of the Bloc may be incorpo-
rated in the program of the Government.

Goremykin: I do not like to have it put that way. If the Govern-
ment finds to its aclvantage to carry out some of the proposed meas-
ures it may do so, but to accept the whole program of the Bloc and
tie our hands in war time is unthinkable.

So&onav: It is not a question of tying hands with a formal treaty,
but only to come to some understanding to make mutual concessions
and thereby gain mutual support.

Goremykin: Which means talk and more talk with the Bloc. . . .
What are we going to decide about the adjournment of the Duma?
In any case this decision should be made before a conference with
members of the Bloc. . . .

Polivwov: . . . We can set a definite date only after the con-
ference. . . .

Goremykin: I am going to ask the State Comptroller [Khari-
tonov] , assisted by the Ministers of Justice, Commerce, and Interior,
to enter into conversations with representatives of the Bloc. The
conversation should have as its object the getting of information and

140 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

the bringing about of an atmosphere of good-will so that we may part
as friends and not as enemies. . . . Just now there can be no question
of coming to an agreement. If no obstacles should arise we could
renew our conversations in November.

[Kharitonov and his associates met with members of the Bloc on
September 9 and on the day following reported the results of the
meeting. The Ministers were of the opinion that an understanding
could be reached with the Bloc and recommended that the discussions
continue a day or two longer. Goremykin, however, was unwilling
to waste any more time and put the question of adjournment to a
vote. Most of the Ministers favored adjournment, but insisted that
nothing should be done which might antagonize the Duma and public
organizations. They pointed out to Goremykin the tremendous influ-
ence these institutions had at the front and in the rear and that
without their support the war could not be won and the revolutionary
movement halted. Not being able to come to an agreement, Goremy-
kin went to see the Emperor at Headquarters. On his return the
Ministers were assembled.]

(5) MEETING OF THE COUNCIL 1T
September 15, 19:3

Scherbatov: Police agents are unanimously agreed that there
are going to be very serious labor troubles. , . . At the Putilov works
there was a clash between the workmen and the police. The workmen
demand that the Duma should not be adjourned, that the five radical
Duma deputies be freed, that their wages be increased fifteen per
cent., et cetera. These reasons are mere pretexts. The real object of
the unseen labor leaders 5s to make use of the unfortunate military
situation and internal unrest to bring on a social revolution and to
seize power.

Sazonov: The picture before us is gloomy indeed* On the one
hand labor troubles, seemingly organized, and on the other the cup
of discontent among the public organizations in Moscow is full and
running over. It is reported that, on the ground of carrying on the
war to a victorious end, members of the Duma together with the
Congresses of Zemstvos and Cities are aiming to declare themselves
a constituent assembly. Things are seething, brewing everywhere . . *
and at this threatening time it is proposed to adjourn the Duma. * * ,
lfl<Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 132-6.

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 141

Goremykin: ... I have His Majesty's command to close the
Duma not later than Thursday, September 16, which I shall do.

Sazonov: But we all remember that on September 3 His Majesty
was gracious enough to grant our petition to act on the question of
adjourning the Duma only after the Council of Ministers had
deliberated and reported. Does it mean that the Emperor has changed
his mind ? We should like to know the reasons for the change.

Goremykin: His Majesty's will, definitely expressed, is not subject
for discussion by the Council of Ministers. I should like to ask tfie
Minister of Foreign Affairs not to put such questions to me.

Sasonov: We are not mere figureheads, but men responsible for
the government of Russia. If we are not to discuss questions on
which the fate of Russia depends then what is the use of the
meetings of the Council of Ministers?

Goremykin: I reported to His Majesty everything that has been
said here on the adjournment of the Duma and the change in policy.
I gave Him the different opinions of the Ministers and all the details.
His comment was that I should close the Duma and that all Ministers
should remain at their posts. What else is there to be said?

Polivanov: The whole question is how you reported our opinions.

Sazonov: Just what did you say?

Goremykin: I reported how and what took place at the Council
meeting, I will not permit that question to be put to me in this
manner.

SaGonov: But in view of the fact that our humble advice was
declined we are naturally interested to know what caused His
Majesty to issue such a sharp order.

Goremykin: If you wish to know . . . ask the Emperor. I am
not obliged and do not think it necessary for me to reply.

Sazonov: Naturally, if I cannot get an answer here I shall turn
to the Emperor. . . .

Krvuoshdn: Of course, His Majesty's orders are not subject to
discussion. But I think that it is not only our right but our duty
to look into the possible consequences of the act about to take place.

Saxonav: It is clear to every Russian that the consequences will
be terrible, that the very existence of the state is in the balance.

Goremykin: His Majesty sees things differently. I called his
attention to the dangers brought out in the Council of Ministers, but
the Emperor did not change his opinion. What more is there to
say ? It is now time to act should any kind of disorders arise.

Scherbatov: In order to guide me in the future I should like to

142 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

have the opinion of the Council of Ministers on the Moscow Con-
gresses [zemstvo and cities]. The Governor [of the guberniia], the
Governor of the city, and the director of the police agree that the
situation in Moscow is very serious. The city is seething, aroused,
irritated, strongly anti-government, and looks for betterment through
radical changes. The flower of the intelligentsia opposition is gathered
there and demands authority to carry the war to a victorious end. The
workmen, and the population as a whole, have lost their heads and are
excellent inflammable material. An outbreak of disorder may come
any minute. Unfortunately there is hardly any force in Moscow to
put it down. There is on hand only one battalion of reserves of about
eight hundred men, only half of whom are available, for the other
half is on guard duty at the Kremlin and at other places. There is
in addition one hundred Cossacks, and finally a few companies of
armed volunteers in the suburbs. Even this force is not altogether
dependable and it would be difficult to get it to come out against
the mob. In the uiezd there are no troops at all Neither the city nor
the uiezd police is large enough to meet the needs of the situation,
I should also remark that Moscow has about thirty thousand con-
valescent soldiers. It is a turbulent, undisciplined band. It behaves
disgracefully and falls foul of the police (recently one of the
force was killed by them). . . . There is no doubt that in case of
disorders this horde will side with the mob. What would you advise
the Minister of the Interior to do under the circumstances? You must
keep in mind that he has not full authority for the military is there.
How can I oppose the congresses, which are out of legal bounds
but which may at any minute get the mob on their side and cause
an explosion? Legally we can interfere but practically what can we
do? Speaking generally, I should say that the Unions of Zenistvos
and Cities are ... a colossal Government blunder. Such organiza-
tions should not have been allowed without . * . definitely limiting
the sphere of their activities. They started out as charitable organiza-
tions, and have become tremendous institutions, possessing all kinds
of functions, some of a purely State character, and are taking the
place of government institutions. This was accomplished by
means of usurpation under the protection of the military authorities,
such as Danilov the red [General N« A.], who makes wide
use of them and supplies them with large means. Lately they have
even been referred to in the laws as official institutions, but
there is nothing in the law to determine the composition of
their personnel and the Government knows nothing of their

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 143

internal organization. They attract those who are trying to get
out of military service, the opposition elements, and all kinds of gen-
tlemen with political pasts. To close these institutions now is
impossible because they work for the army and because of the
political complications that would ensue. I suppose we must put up
with them. There is no doubt whatever that the congresses will be
occasions for political demonstrations or perhaps something worse.
There will be rousing speeches, fiery resolutions, and such like. . . .
What shall be done?. . .

Goremykin: If they just talk, let them talk. But if this talk is
directed against the safety of the State they should be dispersed.
... I call the attention of the Minister of the Interior to the need
of acting with a strong hand . . .

Krivoshein: Today's discussion has clearly demonstrated that
you, Ivan Loginovich [Goremykin] have lately drawn further and
further apart from the majority of the Council of Ministers on
matters of policy and in the evaluation of the present state of affairs.
You have reported to the Emperor these differences in our points
of view, and He agreed with you and not with us. You are now
going to carry out the Imperial Order [adjournment of the Duma]
and whatever comes out of it, but your collaborators, according
to the Imperial Order, are the same men who have come out sto
strongly against your policy. Pardon me, just one question. What
are you going to do when the Ministers are convinced that other
means of action are necessary, when the whole machinery of Gov-
ernment in your hands is opposed to you, when the internal and
external events become daily more and more threatening?

Goremykin: I shall do my duty to my Emperor to the end no
matter what opposition and unpleasantness I may run up against.
I told everything to the Emperor and begged him to put in my place
a more up-to-date man, but His Majesty's order followed that, that's
law to me. As to the future? His Majesty said that when he comes
he will personally look into the whole question.

Sazonov: It may then be too late. Tomorrow blood may flow in
the streets and Russia may be cast into the pit. Why ! It is terrible !
In any case, I say it loudly, that I assume no responsibility for your
[Goremykin] acts and for the adjournment of the Duma at the
present time.

Goremykin: I assume responsibility for my own acts and ask
no one to share them with me. The Duma will adjourn on the day
set and there will be no flowing of blood.

144 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Pottvanov: This is a debatable question which the events alone
can answer. May I ask just how the act of adjournment will take
place? Will there be some kind of an official announcement before
the legislative bodies?

Garemykin: I do not regard it as necessary to appear either in
the State Duma or in the State Council, and I do not intend to make
any announcements. It is useless and untimely.

Polwanov: This means that you intend to break completely with
the Duma. You do not intend to observe even outward respect for
the legislative bodies which the Emperor summoned to work for the
State.

Kharitonov: Never before was the Government present at
adjournment.

Khwstov: I see no reason for making a precedent.

Sazonov: What happened before is no argument. Times have
changed It is now a question of the fate of Russia.

Gorcmykin: This is exaggeration and without foundation. If you
are to be present at the adjournment of the Duma I see no obstacles
in the way of your going.

Sasonov: Thank you very much for the suggestion. Rut I would
rather not be associated with an act which means the commencement
of the ruin of our country.

Goremykin: In any case the Duma will adjourn and I shall not be
present. There is no more discussion. His Majesty's orders are not
to be criticized in the Ministerial Council I declare the meeting closed.

On September 10 the Council of Ministers met to hear the report
o£ P. A. Kharitonov on his meeting the day before with those
members of the legislative chambers who signed the program of the
parliamentary bloc. . . .

When he had made his report, P. A. Kharitonov stated his own
conclusions in general terms.

He noted the solidarity that existed among all the signatories
of the agreement, and pointed out that the fact that there was
such an agreement was worthy of serious attention, because the ideas
therein expressed attracted representatives of most diverse political
opinions, This, in itself, makes it necessary to treat this matter with
especial care. In his view, the program outlined in the agreement
did not contain anything censurable. If it were admitted that there is
**"Riech," No. 237, September n> 1915.

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 145

a possibility at the present moment of undertaking, in addition to
the problems raised by the war, legislative means of a general char-
acter, then the program outlined in the document need not arouse
any serious objections. But the practicability of this program, in
the opinion of Kharitonov, was a different question, which, in view
of the circumstances surrounding the Council of Ministers, he did
not undertake to answer in the affirmative.

But the main point of the whole problem, in the opinion of P. A.
Kharitonov, is Article i, which deals with the question of forming a
Government that would enjoy the confidence of the nation. While
not denying the correctness of such a principle, in general, P. A.
Kharitonov holds that this question is beyond the competence of
the Council, which, in this instance, can only bring it — should that be
found desirable — to the attention of the Sovereign Power, and a
desire for such action was emphatically expressed by the members
of the legislative chambers.

The report was followed by a discussion, from which it appears
that the Council of Ministers recognizes that the program drawn up
by the signatories of the parliamentary agreement does -not 'meet with
serious objections, but tfwt the Council of Ministers, as at present
constituted, cannot take upon itself the task of its realisation.

As regards Article I, dealing with the formation of a Govern-
ment enjoying the confidence of the country, the Council of Ministers
resolved to bring it to the attention of the Sovereign Power.

CHAPTER VIII
PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT

i. SPEECH OF THE CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE

ZEMSTVO UNION, PRINCE G. E. LVOV, AT THE

CONGRESS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF

PROVINCIAL ZEMSTVOS IN

MOSCOW, SEPTEMBER

20-22, 191 s1

Gentlemen: At the very start of the war, when Russia was
confronted with problems that were beyond the administrative ca-
pacities of our governmental machinery, and when the xmprogres-
sive methods which had become firmly and deeply rooted proved
themselves bankrupt in the face of those unexpected, feverish demands
of history which suddenly overwhelmed us, — we, men of the
Zemstvo, went to work without any hesitation for the good of the
State.

We knew that life itself would summon us to this work. To us,
the call did not come as a surprise. Recall to your minds the modest
proposals made to us at the beginning of the war, that we should take
part in the relief of the sick and wounded soldiers, and compare
them with our expectations at that titne and the present state of
affairs. We do not fight, and we do not now have to fight, for the
right to take part in the activities of the State. Life itself is giving
that right to us, and we have gradually gone ahead in our work, from
rendering hospital service to supplying the wants of the army in the
trenches, furnishing it with ammunition, preparing shells, constructing
lines of defense, and so on. Hospital, commissary, artillery, engineer-
ing services, every branch of the life of our army at the front and in
the rear, has become near and dear to us. We have actually teen
welded together with the army. National in its objects, the war has
become truly national in the manner of its conduct as well. * . *

x"Izvestiia Glavnago Komiteta po Snabzhenim Armix," Nos, 2-3, October
14, 1915, 4-7, published by the All-Russian Unions of Zemstvos and Cities,
Lvov, Georgi Evgenfevich (1862-1935) became Prime Minister o£ the Pro-
visional Government.

146

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 147

Gentlemen, this national war has turned upside down all the
old notions, traditions, and the old standards. In reality, we have
no longer those old divisions and cells among which the component
parts of the body politic had been distributed and artificially main-
tained. All distinctions between the nationalities composing our State,
all party differences, are obliterated. The age-old distribution of
functions among the different elements of the State is changing. It is
true that the force of habit still makes them hold on to the old forms,
but the new demands are more powerful than force of habit, and we
all feel that life itself is seeking, and finding, a fresh channel for its
mighty current. Life is stronger than laws that are written. Life
writes its laws in the hearts and in the minds of men before they
write them down on paper, and we do not even notice how we enter
a different kind of life, and that we are already living under new laws
that are still unwritten.

Before us, gentlemen, there are now arising the most weighty
and responsible tasks that ever could have confronted the citizens,
even of the most perfect political regime. This war has equipped the
forces of the public with all kinds of organs for performing the tasks
of the State, but we must not ignore the fact that the war demands of
us an ever-increasing exertion, and imposes upon us an ever-growing
responsibility. We have already abandoned the position of mere
passive objects of government. Actual events have in this particular
domain far outstripped our fondest wishes. Life has shown that we
have to be self-sufficing. Let us, therefore, rely upon ourselves, let
us grow strong in our self-confidence. Only such faith could give us
a firm basis for our attitude toward the historical events we are
passing through at present.

Upon our conference, gentlemen, history has laid a vast and
responsible task. In difficult moments of the national life, the
Zemstvos, in their capacity of leading public organization, ought to
maintain, like the keel of a ship in the face of the storm, the steady
course of the State. The country feels that everything is not as it
ought to be, and it is only natural that it should feel alarmed, and
that its heart should beat faster. And Russia now expects of you,
gentlemen, some weighty word. Speak it calmly, in the full conscious-
ness of your duty : Let not the Russian Land despair because of its
sore trials; let not the faith of the Russian people in their might be
shaken ; and let them have no doubt as to the ultimate happy issue.
For us, no peace is possible. No yoke will be accepted by the Russian
people. For themj there can be only one issue of this war — complete

148 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

victory. We are now retreating, yes, but we know that we shall again
advance. We are fully aware that our valiant army and our heroic
people are conquering, even while retreating. Their valor and their
self-sacrifice give strength also to our own spirit, the spirit of the
rear. And it is our sacred duty to uphold this spirit, this courage,
and to organize for a conquering spirit in the rear. But we must not
for an instant forget that the future of our national existence, of our
great country, hinges not only upon the issues of the war, but likewise
upon the things that happen in the course of the war. We are fully
aware that the loftier the ideal we are aiming at, the longer and
harder must be the road we have to travel, and the more we shall
require endurance and patience.

Our country is longing not only for the resumption of peaceful
existence, but for the reorganization of that existence. Never before
has the need of solidarity among all the forces of our country,
probably, been felt as keenly as at this time. Never before has this
unity, which was proclaimed from the heights of the throne as the
pledge of a victorious issue, been, needed as urgently as now.

We are happy to see how deep this unity has gone among the
masses of the people, a unity that has actually welded together all
the nationalities of the empire into a single unit with the army. To our
regret, however, we fail to observe solidarity between the ruling
powers and the people, and this we are bound to declare emphatically
to these powers, for that is the only thing that still obstructs our
organization of victory.

Exactly three months ago, when it was made clear to the Russian
people that our valiant army was forced to retreat before the enemy
because it was lacking shells, we,2 and the whole country with us,
unanimously agreed that the lawful popular representatives should
take part in the work for the national defense. We believed that it
was possible, on the basis of one single, common, sacred purpose — the
salvation of our native country — to organize the activities of the public
and governmental forces so as to be animated by a spirit of mutual
confidence. Today, after two months of work by the State Duma, we
feel even more convinced of that necessity.

Like a shining lamp in the dark labyrinth of events along the
mysterious paths of history, the State Duma has always been showing
the way out. And we cannot help recognizing- that this suspension *
of its sessions throws us back into darkness, that it harms the cause

" Meeting of Zemstvo Union, June 18, 1915.
'September 16, 1915.

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 149

of the national defense, that it weakens our army. So ardently desired
by the whole country, the powerful combination of governmental
and public effort has not been brought about. But this has by no
means rendered the consciousness of the necessity of mutual confi-
dence between the forces of the Government and the public less acute ;
on the contrary, it has only strengthened it. At the very first indication
that a certain section of our government was inclined to look upon
the work of the State Duma as superfluous, the whole of Russia
experienced something like a shock and declared that a new Gov-
ernment was needed. But we are faced with a fact : the Government
itself intends to organize for victory, and considers it unnecessary
for the popular representatives to take part.

At moments like these we have to manifest civic courage of a
high order, bearing in mind that it is not the Government, but the
people, that is fighting the war. The Government may hold itself
aloof from the people, but we shall be only still more confirmed in
our conviction that the organization of victory is possible only
through full union of the Government and people, through their
legal representatives, and we regard it as indispensable to have the
work of the State Duma resumed as soon as possible.

But in the face of the formidable foe, we must not be dismayed,
because of this situation that prevails. Let the purely formal respon-
sibility for the issue of the war and for the fate of our country rest
with the Government ; upon us will always rest the duty of true sons
of our fatherland, and this we are bound to discharge under any
circumstances. And so we shall continue unflaggingly to work and
to perform our national duty.

2. RESOLUTIONS

(a) RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONGRESS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE

CITIES OF RUSSIA

September 22, 1915 4

The Congress of Representatives of the Cities of Russia considers
it a sacred duty at this moment of sore trial to salute warmly our
steadfast, valiant army. May it rest assured that all the thoughts and
sentiments of Russia's citizens are united in the effort to win a
victory, in the fervent desire to assist our heroes with all our means

4"Izvestiia Glavnago Komiteta po Snabzheniiu Aram/' Nos. 2-3, October
14, 19*5, 38-9, published by the All-Russian Unions of Zemstvos and Cities.

ISO DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

in the trying struggle that has fallen to their lot. As heretofore, the
Russian people is determined to prosecute the war to final victory,
in perfect accord with our faithful Allies.

But fatal obstacles in the path of final victory, the old faults of
our State organization are still here: the irresponsibility of the
Government, and its lack of real contact with the people. A deter-
mined and real turning toward a new path is indispensable. It is
demanded by patriotic duty.

In the place of the present Government, there should be sum-
moned persons possessing the confidence of the nation; the
constructive work of the popular representatives should be resumed
without delay; and internal peace and solidarity of spirit — those
important conditions of victory — should be assured in our country
by reconciliation, the forgetting of the political strife of the past, and
the equality of all citizens before the law.

The Representatives of the Cities of Russia, inspired by a firm
belief in the future of our country, in perfect self-control and the
calm assurance of the righteousness of their cause and power, will
continue, in common with the whole nation, their tireless and con-
certed activity in aid of the army, mindful of the fact that every hour
of interruption in this work would defer the achievement of
victory. „ . .

The Congress of Representatives of the Cities of Russia has
appointed a special deputation of three persons,5 together with repre-
sentatives of the All-Russian Union of Zemstvos, to bring to the
notice of the Emperor the alarms and hopes which are agitating
the nation, and to express the view of this Congress on the necessity
of carrying the war to a victorious conclusion, the immediate resump-
tion of work in the legislative institutions, and the summoning to the
Government of such persons as enjoy the confidence of the nation,*

(i>) RESOLUTION OF THE CONGRESS OP REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE PROVINCIAL ZEMSTVOS

September 22, 191 5 7

At this dreadful hour of national trial, we, the Representatives
of the Provincial Zemstvos, united in the All-Russian Union of

*M. V. Chelnokov, P. P. Riabushinski, N. E. Astrov.
The Emperor refused to receive the combined deputation.
"Izvestiia Glavnago Komiteta po Snabzheniw Armii," Nos. 3-3, October
*4> 1915, io-7» published by the All-Russian Unions of Zemstvos and Cities.

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 151

Zemstvos and assembled at Moscow, reaffirm our unshaken faith in
the strength and courage of our army, and our firm trust in ultimate
victory, before which there should and could not be any thought
of peace.

In the consciousness of the great responsibility to our fatherland
which ought to unite all of its sons, we shall continue and expand
with unflagging energy our work for the benefit of the army. But,
although convinced of the possibility of utterly defeating the enemy,
we see with alarm the approaching danger of a fatal disruption of
that internal unity which, at the very beginning of the war, was pro-
claimed from the heights of the Throne as the true pledge of victory.

This peril can be averted only by a reformation of the Govern-
ment, which will be powerful only if it has the confidence of the
nation and is in unity with .its lawful representatives.

The indispensable work of the State Duma in strengthening our
defenses inspired courage and confidence not only among the popular
masses, but in the army itself.

In accord with- the wishes of the nation, the State Duma indi-
cated the road that would lead Russia out of the trials which have
been visited upon her. In this unprecedented unanimity of purpose
in the Duma, the Government failed to join. It rejected the indi-
cated program, and suspended the activities of the Duma. Cooperation
of the representative and governmental forces has not been realized,
although ardently desired by the whole country and indispensable to
victory. We know how profoundly the public mind has been disturbed
as a result of this.

It compels us once more to point out the need of the speediest
resumption of the work of the State Duma, which alone can afford
a reliable basis for a strong government. Then, and then only, will
the powers of the Russian people be manifested in all their fullness,
and Russia's capacity to bear the most difficult trials.

In the consciousness of our great responsibility and duty to our
native country, let each one of us redouble his efforts to attain
our common object, victory; and may concerted and zealous work
preserve the order and tranquillity that are needed for the salvation
of Russia.

The following resolution was also unanimously passed :
To instruct a deputation of three persons,8 specially selected by
this Convention, to report to His Imperial Majesty the views which

"Prince G. E. Lvov, P. V. Kamenski, S. N. Maslov.

152 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

appeared at the Convention of Representatives in connection with
current events, and were expressed in the above resolution.

Considering the fact that the Congress of Representatives of
Cities has also resolved to appoint a special deputation to report
to His Imperial Majesty the resolution passed by that Congress, it
is desirable that the deputations be presented to the Emperor together.

3. REPORT OF PRINCE SCHERBATOV, MINISTER
OF THE INTERIOR, TO THE TSAR*

September 29, 1915

At first, the prorogation of the State Duma caused great excite-
ment among its members.

Among the representatives of its Left groups, the view was
expressed that their members ought to be recalled from all govern-
ment commissions created to help in the national defense; that
pressure should be brought to bear on all public organizations devoted
to this work to stop their activities ; that a protest should be organized
among the laboring masses against the prorogation of the State
Duma; and that all means should be employed to force the Govern-
ment to accept the program of the Progressive Bloc, formed in
the Duma, demanding political amnesty, a responsible Ministry, and
equal rights for the nationalities. Later, however, a more moderate
view gained the upper hand among the members of the Duma, its
advocates expressing themselves in favor of preserving absolute tran-
quillity in the country and of lending all public support to the work
of organizing the country for victory. It was feared that the cessation
of this work and the excitement and disorder which would inevitably
follow the inauguration of the extremist program would, first of all,
and above all, cause irreparable harm to the country itself, and
weaken its efforts to fight the enemy.

In wider public spheres, too, the news of the prorogation of the
State Duma has produced a very tense atmosphere. After the first
moments of general consternation which followed this unexpected
event, two dominant opinions were noticeable among the public. One,
rather extreme, insisted upon the immediate presentation to the Gov-
ernment of a demand that it accept the program of the Progressive
Bloc, threatening, otherwise, to stop the work of all the public
organizations which serve the needs of the army. The other, more
•Semennikov; "Politika Romanovykh," 97-9.

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 153

moderate, considered such action untimely, for the reasons mentioned
above, i. e., injury to the national defense.

The agitation of the representatives of the extreme Left tendency
in Petrograd and Moscow met with some success among the laboring
masses, with the result that strikes broke out in many mills and
factories, accompanied by acts of violence against the police officers
and those workers who refused to join the strike.

But this movement among the workingmen not only failed to
carry the masses into the extremist camp, but, indeed, had a sobering
effect on the public, which was still under the impression of the May
riots in Moscow. This was expressed in the resolutions passed at an
extraordinary meeting of the Moscow City Council on September
1 8 to discuss the measures for ending the strike on the street
railways. A resolution proposed at this meeting by some of the
councilmen, to the effect that the public rejects all responsibility
for the consequences of the present governmental policy and de-
nounces its action in proroguing the State Duma, as a serious crime
against the country, met with determined opposition from the
majority which, following an appeal by Chelnokov, Mayor of
Moscow, passed a resolution of an entirely different nature. It con-
demned the strike movement and merely pointed out the need of an
early resumption of the sessions of the legislative chambers, and of
having persons in the Government who enjoy the confidence of
the nation.

A similar difference of opinion toward the prorogation of the
State Duma was noted at the congresses of the Zemstvo and City
Unions held at Moscow, September 20-22. Although their immediate
object was to take steps toward a proper evacuation of wounded
soldiers and refugees, they actually engaged in taking note of the
attitude of various groups of the public toward the events now taking
place in the country, and in framing a common plan of action.

Taking advantage of this situation, the representatives of the
extremist parties of the State Duma and of the working people in
the factories and mills were persistent in their attempts to exploit
these congresses, chiefly that of the City Unions, for the passage
of their own program, and with this object in view they tried to
take a direct part in the work of the latter congress. However,
thanks to the dominant influence of the adherents of the more
moderate tendency, but especially of the Mayor of Moscow, Chelno-
kov, who refused to admit these representatives of the State Duma
and the wcxrkingmen to any share in the congress of the City Unions,

I54 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

also thanks to the Member of the State Duma, Shingarev, who, in
his address, stressed the need of more moderate and careful tactics,
both conventions adopted resolutions which disappointed ttie expecta-
tions of the extreme Left parties.

4. MILIUKOV'S SPEECH IN THE DUMA10

November 14, 1916
Gentlemen, Members of the State Duma!

With a heavy heart, I ascend this tribune today. You remember
the circumstances under which the Duma met over a year ago, August
i, 1915. The Duma was then suffering from the blows of our military
failures. These were due to the scarcity of munitions; and for this
scarcity the Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, was responsible. You
recall how at that moment the country, under the influence of the
terrible peril that had become obvious to all, demanded a union of
the national forces and the formation of a Ministry composed of
persons in whom the country had confidence. And you recall how
even Minister Goremykin, at that time, admitted from this very
platform that "the course of the war demands 'an immense, extraor-
dinary spiritual and physical effort." You remember that the
Government then yielded. The Ministers n who were odious to the
public were then removed before the convocation of the Duma.
Sukhomlinov, whom the country regarded as a traitor, was removed
(Cries en the left: "He is a traitor"), and, in response to the demand
of the popular representatives, Polivanov, at the session of August
10 announced to us, amid general applause, as you may recall, that
a commission of investigation 12 had been appointed and a beginning
made toward bringing the former Minister of War to justice. And,
gentlemen, the public agitation at that time was not without conse-
quences. Our army obtained what it needed, and the nation entered
upon the second year of the war with the same enthusiasm as in
the first year.

What a difference, gentlemen, there is now, in the 27th month
of the war! A difference which is especially striking to me, after
several months spent abroad. We are now facing new difficulties, and
these difficulties are not less complex and serious, not less profound,

10 "Riech," No. 330, December 13, 1916.
* Sukhomlinov, Maklakov, Scheglovitov, Sabler.

w This commission, under the chairmanship of N. P* Petrov, was organized
on August 7, 1915.

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 155

than those that confronted us in the spring of last year. The Gov-
ernment needed heroic measures to combat the general disorganization
of the national economy.

We ourselves are the same as before ; we, in this 2/th month of
the war, are the same as we were in the tenth and in the first month.
As heretofore, we are striving for complete victory; as heretofore,
we are prepared to make all the necessary sacrifices ; and, as hereto-
fore, we are anxious to preserve our national unity. But, I must
say this candidly : there is a difference in the situation. We have lost
faith in the ability of this Government to achieve victory (Cries:
"That's true"), because, as far as this Government is concerned,
neither the attempts at correction nor the attempts at improvement,
which we have made here, have proved successful.

All the Allied Powers have summoned to the support of the Gov-
ernment the best men of all parties, all the confidence, and all those
organizing elements present in their countries, which are better
organized than our own country. What has our own Government
accomplished? Our declaration has told that. When there was
formed in the Fourth Duma a majority [Progressive Bloc], which
the Duma lacked before, a majority ready to vote its confidence in
a cabinet worthy of such confidence, then nearly all those men who
might in some slight degree have expected confidence were forced,
systematically, one after another, every one of them, to leave the
cabinet.18 And, if we have formerly said that our Government had
neither the knowledge nor the ability which were indispensable at
the moment, we say now, gentlemen, that this present Government
has sunk beneath the level on which it stood in the normal times
of Russian life. (Cries on the left: "True! Right!") And now the
gulf between us and that Government has grown wider and impass-
able. (Cries on the left: "True!") Gentlemen, a year ago, Sukhom-
linov was placed under judicial investigation. Then the hateful
Ministers were removed before the opening of the [Duma] session,
but now the number of such ministers has been augmented by one.
(Cries on the left: "True!" A mice on the right: "Protopopov?")
At that time, we did not appeal to the reason and the knowledge of
the Government, but, instead, to its patriotism and its conscience. Can
we do so now? (Cries on the left: "Of course, not!")

In the French Yellow Book there has been published a German

tt Scherbatov, October 9, 1915; Samarin,' October 13, 1915; Krivoshein,
November 8, 1915; Kharitonov, February 7, 1916; Polivanov, March 26, 1916;
Sazonov, July 20, 1916.

156 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

document in which rules are laid down for the disorganization of
the enemy's country, showing how to stir up trouble and disorder.
Gentlemen, if our own Government wanted deliberately to set itself
a task, or if the Germans wanted to employ their own means for the
same purpose— the means of influencing and of bribing— they could
not do better than to act as the Russian Government has acted.
(Cries on the left: "Correct!" Rodichcv: "Unfortunately, that is
true.") And now, gentlemen, you have the consequences. As early
as the a6th of June, 1915, I uttered a warning from this platform
that, "the poisonous seed of suspicion is already yielding abundant
fruit," and, "from one end of the Russian land to the other, there
are spreading the dark rumors of treachery and treason/' I am quoting
the very words which I then used. I pointed out at lhat time— and I
am again quoting my own words — that, "these rumors reach high
and spare none/'

Alas, gentlemen, that warning, like all the others, was not heeded.
Consequently, we find the following statements in the declaration
of the twenty-eight presidents of guberniia zemstvo boards,14 who met
at Moscow on the nth of November of the present year: "Painful,
terrible suspicions, sinister rumors of treachery and treason, of
occult forces fighting for the benefit of Germany and striving,
through the destruction of national unity and the sowing of dissen-
sion, to prepare the ground for a disgraceful peace, have reached
a point where it is generally felt that an enemy hand is secretly
influencing the course of our State affairs* It is but natural that
from such foundation there should arise the rumor that our governing
circles have admitted the uselessness of further struggle, the timeli-
ness for ending the war, and the necessity of a separate peace/'

Gentlemen, I should not like to dwell on those perhaps exag-
gerated, abnormal suspicions with which the alarmed conscience of
a Russian patriot reacts to all that is taking place here. But how are
you going to deny the possibility of such suspicions, when a handful
of sinister individuals, from personal and base motives, direct the
most important affairs of State? (On the left: applause and cries,
"True!") I hold in my hand the issue of the "Berliner Tageblatt" of
September 16, 1916, carrying an article entitled, "Manuilov,
Stunner." The information contained in this article is partly belated,
partly incorrect. Thus, the German writer is naive enough to assume
that it was Sturmer who had his personal secretary, Manasevich-
Manuilov, arrested. But, gentlemen, you all know that this is not
**Gubernskie Zemsfcie Upravy,

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 157

so, and that those persons who really arrested Manasevich-Manuilov,
without asking Stunner's consent, were removed from the cabinet in
consequence.15 No, gentlemen, Manasevich-Manuilov knows too much
for them to dare to arrest him. Sturmer did not arrest Manasevich-
Manuilov. Sturmer freed him (On the left: applause and cries,
"True!" Rodichev: "Unfortunately this is the truth!").

You may ask, "Who is this Manasevich-Manuilov? why should
he interest us?" I will tell you, gentlemen. Manasevich-Manuilov
is a former official of the Russian secret service in P'aris, the well-
known "Mask", of the "Novoe Vremia," who contributed to that
paper piquant details about the life of the underground revolutionists.
But — and this is of greater interest to us — he is also the executor of
special, secret missions. One of these missions may prove of immedi-
ate interest to us. A few years ago Manasevich-Manuilov attempted
to carry out a mission entrusted to him by the German Ambassador,
Pourtales, who set aside a large sum — it has been rumored that
there were 800,000 rubles — to bribe the "Novoe Vremia." I am very
glad to say that a member of the staff of the "Novoe Vremia" threw
Manasevich-Manuilov out of his house, and it cost Pourtales not a
little trouble to hush up this unpleasant story. This, gentlemen, is
the kind of mission on which, not so long ago, was employed the
private secretary of our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stunner. (On
the left, prolonged tumwlt and cries: "Shame!")

Presiding Officer: I ask that this noise be kindly stopped.

Miliukov, continuing: Why was that gentleman arrested? This
has been known a long time, and I shall add nothing if I repeat what
you already know. He was arrested because he accepted a bribe. But
why was he released? This, gentlemen, is no secret, either. (Tumult.
Rodichev: "Everybody knows that!" Tumult. Cries: "Let us hear
it! Silence!")16

Presiding Officer: I request the members of the State Duma to
observe silence.

Miliukov, continuing: Manuilov, Sturmer — two other names are
mentioned in that article,17 Prince Andronnikov and Metropolitan
Pitirim. (Tumult on the left.) Allow me to dwell in greater detail

"A. A. Khvostov, Minister of the Interior.

** Empress to Emperor, December 23, 1916: "On Manuilov paper I beg you
to write 'discontinue the case' and send it to Minister of Justice — an ugly story
got up by others to harm our Friend, Pitirim, etc." — ("Pisma Imperatritsy,"
?I> 457*) Emperor to Minister of Justice, December 27, 1916: "I order you
to discontinue the 'Manuilov case and not allow it to come to trial. Nicholas."
— (Sernennikov: "Politika Romanovykh," 122.)

™ Article in ''Berliner Tageblatt," mentioned above.

158 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

upon this appointment — I mean the appointment of Sturmer as
Minister of Foreign Affairs. I was abroad 1S when the appointment
was made, and it is interwoven with the impressions of my foreign
travels. Let me simply relate to you in consecutive order what I
learned on my way over and back, and you can then draw your
own conclusions.

Now, I had scarcely crossed the frontier, a few days after
Sazonov's retirement, when, first, the Swedish, next, the German and
Austrian newspapers carried a series of reports on the manner in
which Germany had reacted to the appointment of Sturmer. Here
is what those papers said. I will read the excerpts without any
comment. The "Berliner Tageblatt": "The personality of Sazonov
afforded the Allies a pledge of stability in the foreign policy of the
past five years. Sturmer is a blank sheet of paper in foreign politics.
Undoubtedly, he belongs to circles^ which look upon the war with
Germany without special enthusiasm." The "Koelnische Zeitung":
"We, Germans, have no cause to regret the latest change in the
Russian Government. Sturmer will not obstruct the desire for peace
in Russia." The "Neues Wiener Tageblatt" : "Although this is not
the day of diplomats, still it is a relief to see a man [Sazonov] retire
upon whom rests the guilt of starting the war." The "Reichspost" :
"Sturmer will, at all events, be freer in his dealings with Downing
Street." Especially interesting is the editorial article in the "Neue
Freie Presse" of July 25 : "No matter how well Russianized old Stur-
mer may be (Laughter), it still seems quite strange that in a war
which has issued from Pan-Slavism, the foreign policy should be
directed by a German (Laughter). Prime Minister Sturmer is free
from the error which caused the war. He has not promised" — gentle-
men, note this — "he did not promise never to conclude peace without
Constantinople and the Straits. In Sturmer's person, a weapon has
been acquired which may be employed as desired. Thanks to the
policy of weakening the Duma, Sturmer has become the man who
satisfies the secret wishes of the right wing, which is not at all
anxious to be allied with England. He will not insist, like Sazonov,
that it is necessary to render the Prussian military caste harmless/'

But whence do the German and Austrian newspapers derive
this confidence that Sturmer, in carrying out the wishes of the
right wing, will act against England and against the continuance of
the war? From the reports of the Russian press. At about that

"A group from the Duma, among whom was Miliukov, made an official
visit to England and France in May and June,

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 159

time, the Moscow papers published a memorandum of the extreme
right wing — again, gentlemen, a memorandum of the extreme right,
always a memorandum of the extreme right (Zamyslovski: "And
every time it turns out to be a lie !") , — which was sent to Headquarters
in July, before Stunner's second trip. In that memorandum it is
stated that, even though we ought to fight on to final victory, the war
should be ended in good time, for otherwise the fruits of our victory
would be lost through revolution. (Zamyslovski: "The signatures!
The signatures!") This is an old theme for our Germanophiles, but
is elaborated in a series of new attacks. (Zamyslovski: "The signa-
tures! Let us have signatures!")

Presiding Officer: Member of the State Duma Zamyslovski,
I request you not to speak from your seat.

Miliukov, continuing : I am citing Moscow newspapers.

Zatndylovski: Slanderer ! name the signatures. Don't slander !"

Presiding Officer: Member of the State Duma Zamsylovski, I
kindly ask you not to speak from your seat.

Zamyslovski: Give us the signatures, slanderer!

Presiding Officer: Member of the State Duma Zamyslovski, I
call you to order!

Vishnevski the First: We demand the signatures; he must not
slander !

Presiding Officer: Member of the State Duma Vishnevski the
First, I call you to order.

MiliukoVf continuing : I have given you my sources — they are the
Moscow newspapers from which reprints were published in foreign
papers. I am telling you how the announcement of Stunner's appoint-
ment was interpreted in the foreign press. I am telling you that from
this reprint of the Moscow papers the impression has spread abroad
that a memorandum was submitted to Headquarters by the extreme
right, stating the theory that this war ought to be ended soon because
otherwise things would go badly, as there would be a revolution.

Zamyslovski: "Slanderer! That is what you are!"

Markov the Second: "He merely communicated something he
knew to be untrue."

A voice on the left: Are such expressions from the benches
permissible, Mr. Presiding Officer?

Presiding Officer: I repeat, Member of the State Duma Zamy-
slovski, that I am calling you to order!

Miliwkov, continuing: I am not sensitive about the expressions
used by Mr. Zamyslovski. (Cries on the left: "Bravo !") I repeat that

i6o DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

the ancient theme is now being elaborated with new details. Who is
it that is planning revolution ? These are the culprits : the City and
Zemstvo Unions, the War-Industries Committee, the meetings of
liberal organizations ! These are the most certain signs of impending
revolution! "The left parties/' asserts that memorandum, "want to
go on with the war, in order to organize meanwhile, and prepare
for revolution."

Gentlemen, you know that, besides the just quoted memorandum,
there are a number of other memoranda developing the same thought.
There exists an act of indictment against the City and Zemstvo organi-
zations as well as other indictments of which every one knows. And
so, gentlemen, this idee fixe of a revolution coming from the camp
of the left wing, this idee fixe which absorbs every new member of
the Cabinet to the point of insanity19 (Cries on the left: "Correct!")
— to this idee fixe everything is sacrificed, lofty national enthusiasm,
the support of the war, the first buds of Russian freedom, and even
the solidity of our relations with the Allies.

Of this last circumstance I was especially convinced as I continued
my journey and reached London and Paris. There, I saw the first
impressions of Sazonov's retirement. I must testify that it was an
impression as of an act of vandalism. Just think of it, gentlemen.
The foundations for the existing international situation had been
laid as far back as 1907. Gradually, slowly, as is always the case,
old suspicions, old prejudices were removed, mutual confidence
attained, and a belief established that this state of affairs would go
on in the future. Gentlemen, it was on the strength of this belief, that
it was for the best national interests of Russia, that it was possible
to abandon the old ideas. Only on the basis of complete mutual
confidence could that agreement of which I spoke to you — the
agreement on Constantinople and the Straits — be signed. And, conse-
quently, the Allies displayed amazing persistence in the fight, and a
willingness to make sacrifices. In this respect they disappointed all
the hopes of our enemies, exceeding even our own expectations. It
seemed as if Russia was just about ready to gather the fruits of her
labors and of the labors of two Ministers of Foreign Affairs in a
period when an extraordinary, rare, political condition was created,
probably unique in history, the beginning of which was signalized by
the activity of King Edward VII.

And then, gentlemen, precisely at that moment, there appeared
in the place of experienced leaders who enjoyed personal confidence —
* Referring to Protopopov.

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 161

and this, too, is capital, and, moreover, the kind of capital which it
is hard to obtain — a "blank sheet of paper," an unknown individual,
ignorant of the alphabet of diplomacy, (Cries on the left: "Correct 1")
who is ready to serve any dubious influence from outside.

Gentlemen, you will understand the consequences of this change.
When Sazonov had charge of the Ministry, people in England and
France knew that whatever our Ambassadors said was said by the
Russian Government. But what faith could they place in the same
Ambassadors after Stunner had taken his place behind them? Of
course, it is true, gentlemen, that relationships built up in the course
of decades are not destroyed at the caprice of a single individual. In
this regard, the Allied and our own press was right when it claimed
that the change of a person had not changed Russian policy. But in
the delicate affairs of diplomacy there are nuances. There is fine
lace-work, as there is rough sewing, and lace-work is possible only
under special conditions and under particularly favorable circum-
stances. Gentlemen, I witnessed the destruction of these most slender,
most delicate threads of the international fabric ; I saw this destruc-
tion. It was going on before my very eyes in London and in Paris.
That is what Mr. Stunner has accomplished, and it was perhaps not
without reason that he did not promise the acquisition of Constanti-
nople and the Straits. I asked myself, then, "According to what
recipe is this being done?"

I continued my journey to Switzerland, intending to rest there,
and not to occupy myself with politics. But there, again, those somber
shadows were following me. On the shores of Lake Geneva, at Berne,
I found it impossible to get away from Mr. Stunner's former Depart-
ment— the Ministry of the Interior and the Department of Police.
Of course, Switzerland is the place where all kinds of propaganda
meet, where it is especially convenient to watch the machinations of
our enemies, and it is only natural that in such place the system of
"special missions" should be especially well developed.

However, there are among them some missions of a peculiar
nature, provoking our particular attention. People would come to me
saying: "Please ask at Petrograd what the notorious Rataiev is doing
here. Find out why a certain official, Lebedev, whom I don't know,
has come here. Ask why these officials of the Police Department
happen to be constant visitors at the drawing rooms of Russian
ladies, known for their pro-Germanism." It appears, gentlemen, that
Madame Vasilchikova has her successors and followers. I shall not
name here that lady, whose sympathy for an Austrian prince changed

ifa DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

into sympathy for a German baron, whose salon in the Via Curia
in Florence, and later at Montreux in Switzerland, was famed for
the outspoken pro-Germanism of its mistress. And then, at about
that time, the lady moved from Montreux to Petrograd. The papers
mentioned her name on higftly solemn occasions. Passing through
Paris on my return, I found still fresh the traces of her stay there.
The Parisians were scandalized by the German leanings of this lady,
as well as by — I have to add this, with mortification — her contacts
with the Russian Embassy, for which our Ambassador should not,
however, be blamed. Incidentally, this is the same lady who launched
the diplomatic career of Mr. Sturmer, having tried several years ago
to get for him the post of Ambassador to one of the secondary powers
of Europe. I must say that these recommendations were then con-
sidered ridiculous, and her request proved unsuccessful. (Laughter.)
What do I mean by referring to this ? Gentlemen, I do not pretend
to have positively discovered one of the channels of communication,
But it is one of the links in the solid chain which binds, very closely,
certain public circles. To uncover the ways and means of that propa-
ganda of which Sir George Buchanan told us openly not so long
ago, we need a judicial investigation such as was undertaken in the
case of Sukhomlinov. At the time when we accused Sukhomlinov,
as now, we did not possess the facts which were brought to light t>y
the investigation. We had only what we have today — the instinctive
voice of the who}e country and its subjective certainty. (Applause.)
Gentlemen, I might, perhaps, not have decided to speak of each
of my several impressions separately, had there been no general
impression, had there not been that confirmation which I obtained
when I went from Paris to London, (Cries on the left: "AhaP)
While in Switzerland and Paris, I asked myself whether there was
not some other diplomacy behind our official diplomacy, but here, I,
was forced to ask questions of a different nature. I beg to be excused
if, in telling of so important a matter, I cannot mention its source.
But if my statement is true, Mr. Sturmer will probably find traces of
it in his archives, (Rodichev: "He will destroy them!") I pass over
the Stockholm affair, which, as you know, preceded the appointment
of the present Minister of the Interior and made a painful impres-
sion upon our Allies. I am in a position to speak of that impres-
sion as an eyewitness. I should like to believe that this was merely
a manifestation of that quality so well known to the old acquain-
tances of Alexander Dmitrievich Protopopov— the inability to reckon
with the consequences of his own actions. (A voice on the left: "Fine

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 163

qualification for a Minister!" A voice on the right: "Your leader!'')
Fortunately, in Stockholm he was no longer a representative of the
delegation, since no delegation really existed at that moment : it was
getting back to Russia piecemeal The thing which Alexander Dmitrie-
vich Protopopov did at Stockholm was done in our absence.20 (Markov
the Second: "You did the same thing in Italy!")

Nevertheless, gentlemen, even though I do not entertain any
personal suspicions, I am unable to tell precisely what part that affair
played in the antechamber21 already known to us, through which,
hard on the heels of the others, Alexander Dmitrievich Protopopov,
also, passed on his way to the Ministerial seat. (Noise and cries an
the left: "Magnificent!") Over there [antechamber] they probably
like such things. (Cries on the right: "What antechamber?") I have
named those persons : Manasevich-Manuilov, Pitirim, Sturmer. They
are that "party" which, according to the "Neue Freie Presse,"
triumphed in the appointment of Sturmer. At all events, I have
some reason to believe that the proposals made to Alexander
Dmitrievich Protopopov by the German Counsellor, Warburg, were
repeated. This is why I felt not the least surprise on hearing from
the lips of the British Ambassador a severe indictment of the same
circle, charging it with the desire to prepare the way for separate
peace.

Perhaps I have dealt too long with Mr. Sturmer? (Cries: "No!
No!") but, gentlemen, it was mainly around him that the feeling
and sentiments of which I have spoken were concentrated. I believe
that those feelings and sentiments prevented him from occupying
this seat : he heard the outcries with which you greeted his appearance
here. Let us all hope that he will not return. (On the left, applause,
tumult, cries: "Bravo!")

Yes, gentlemen, there is a vast difference between that meeting
of ours, under Goremykin, which took place on the first of August,
1915, and even in February, 1916, and the meeting taking place
today. These meetings are just as different as is the general condi-
tion of the country. At that time we could talk about organizing the
country with the help of Duma legislation. Had we then been given
the opportunity to carry through the laws which we had planned and
prepared for passage, including the law on the volosts, Russia would
not now be so helpless in the face of the food supply problem. That
was the situation then. But now, gentlemen, the problem of legisla-

** Protopopov had conversations with the German agent, Warburg.
* Rasputin, Vyrubova, et al.

164 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

tion has been shifted to the background. Today we see and understand
that with this Government we cannot legislate, any more than we can,
with this Government, lead Russia to victory. (Cries on the left:
"Correct!") Formerly, we tried to prove that it was impossible to
start a fight against all the vital forces of the nation, that it was impos-
sible to carry on warfare within the country when there was war
at the front, that it was necessary to utilize the popular enthusiasm
for the achievement of national tasks, and that otherwise there could
be only killing oppression, which would merely increase the very
peril they were trying to avert by such oppression.

Today, gentlemen, it seems that everybody feels convinced that
it is useless to go to them with proofs; useless when fear of the
people, fear of their own country, blinds their eyes, and when the
fundamental problem has become that of hastening the end of the
war, were it even without gain, merely to be freed from the necessity
for seeking popular support. (Cries on the left: "Correct !") On the
23d of February, 1916, 1 concluded my speech with the statement that
we no longer dared to address our appeal to the "political wisdom
of the Government," and that I did not expect any answer from
the existing Cabinet to the questions which agitated us. At that time,
my words appeared to some people too pessimistic. But now we go
further, and perhaps those words will sound clearer and more hopeful
We are telling this Government, as we told it in the declaration of
the Bloc : "We shall fight you ; we shall fight with all legitimate means
until you go!" (Cries on the left: "Right! Correct!")

It is said that a member of the Council of Ministers, — and this
was correctly heard by Duma Member Chkheidze — on being told
that the State Duma would on this occasion speak of treason,
exclaimed excitedly: "I may, perhaps, be a fool, but I am not a
traitor." (Laughter.) Gentlemen, the predecessor of that Minister
was undoubtedly a clever Minister, just as the predecessor of our
Minister of Foreign Affairs was an honest Minister, But they are
no longer in the Cabinet. And, does it matter, gentlemen, as a prac-
tical .question, whether we are, in the present case, dealing with
stupidity or treason? When the Duma keeps everlastingly insisting
that the rear must be organized for a successful struggle, the Gov-
ernment persists in claiming that organizing the country means
organizing a revolution, and deliberately prefers chaos and disor-
ganization. What is it, stupidity or treason? (A voice on the left:
'Treason!" Adjemov: "Stupidity!" Laughter.) Furthermore, gen-

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC

tlemen, when the authorities, in the midst of this general discontent
and irritation, deliberately set to work stirring up popular out-
breaks, that is to say, when they purposely provoke unrest and
outbreaks, — is that being done unconsciously or consciously? We
cannot, therefore, find much fault with the people if they arrive at
conclusions such as I have read here, in the words of those repre-
sentatives of guberniia administrative boards.

You must realize, also, why it is that we, too, have no other
task left us today, than the task which I have already pointed out
to you : to obtain the retirement of this Government. You ask, "How
can we start a fight while the war is on ?" But, gentlemen, it is only
in wartime that they are a menace. They are a menace to the war,
and it is precisely for this reason, in time of war and in the name
of war, for the sake of that very thing which induced us to unite,
that we are now fighting them. (Cries on the left: "Bravo!" Ap-
plause.)

Gentlemen, you understand that I can deal with no other theme
today than this one. I cannot emulate Duma Member Chkheidze and
occupy myself with our internal [Duma] controversies. This is not
the time for it, and I shall make no reply to his references and
attacks upon me. For me, answer has been given in that declara-
tion which we read here. We have many, very many, different rea-
sons for dissatisfaction with the Government. When we have time,
we shall speak of them. But all those various reasons come down to
this one general reason : the incapacity of the Government as at pres-
ent composed. (Cries on the left: "Right!") This is our main evil,
the overcoming of which will be tantamount to the winning of the
whole campaign. (Cries on the left: "Right!")

And, therefore, gentlemen, for the sake of the millions of vic-
tims and the torrents of blood poured out, for the sake of the achieve-
ment of our national interestes, — which Sturmer does not promise
us — in the name of our responsibilities to that nation which has sent
us here, we shall fight on until we achieve that genuine responsibility
of government which has been defined by the three points of our
common declaration : an equal understanding by all the members of
the Cabinet of the immediate problems of the present; their agree-
ment and readiness to execute the program of the majority of the
State Duma ; their obligation, not only in the realization of this pro-
gram, but throughout their activity to look to the majority of the
State Duma for support. A Cabinet which does not satisfy these

166 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

three standards does not merit the confidence of the State Duma
and must go. (Cries: "Bravo!" Stormy and prolonged applause on
the left, in the center, and the left section of the right.) 22

5. PURISHKEVICH'S SPEECH IN THE DUMA 23

December 2, 1916

The State Duma has listened with profound attention to the
words of the President of the Council of Ministers.24 They offer
many brilliant prospects, and one must believe that the time will
come when the hopes and desires enunciated in the speech of the
President of the Council of Ministers will be realized. But at this
time, we must take notice of the sad and dark picture of Russian
reality. I am speaking here of conditions in the rear, for at the
front the situation is splendid, thanks to the incomparable courage of
our troops.

The situation in which we find ourselves at present, and in which
we have been placed, to a considerable extent, by the chaos pre-
vailing among our rulers, compels me to speak today on this tribune.
This tribune serves today as the only ventilator, the only air-valve,
through which Russian public sentiment can escape. This tribune is
at the present moment enjoying extraordinary confidence in Russia,
and we should, above all, see to it that the speeches that are heard
here reach the ears of the nation. (Cries; "Bravo!") We must see
to it that the honest, truthful words which go forth from this place
penetrate to the mass of the people, for there is not and cannot be
in Russia today any other watchword but that of "Victory!" (Cries:
"Bravo!" A voice on the left: uNo, there is still another!") Any
attempt against the honest and clean aims, communicated from this
place to the people, is a crime. (Cries on the left: "Bravo!" Applause
on the left and in part of the center.)

Gentlemen, I mount this tribune today with inexpressible emo-
tion, and this, not because I have left the ranks of my party. It is

* Empress to Emperor— Nov. 17, 1916: "Miliukov's speech yesterday when
he quotes Buchanan's words that Stunner is a traitor and Buchanan to whom
he turned in the box— held his tongue— vile behavior. We are living through
hardest times, but God will help us through, I have no fear. Let them
scream— we must show we have no fear and are firm. Wify is your staunch
One and stands as a rock behind you."— ("Pisma Imperatritsy/* II, 441-2.)

*"Novoe Vremia," December 3, 1916. Purishkevich, Vladimir Mitrofano-
vich (1870-1918),

* Sturmer was forced to resign on November 22, and A, F. Trepov suc-
ceeded him as President of the Council of Ministers.

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 167

impossible for me to abandon the ranks of the Right, for I am the
most extreme of the Rights. But there are moments when one can-
not speak from the belfry of a district or provincial town, but must
ring the alarm from the bell tower of Ivan the Great. Today, as
formerly, I am guided by infinite love for my native land, a bound-
less and most devoted allegiance to my Sovereign. I am living at this
moment with but a single thought — that of Russian victory. But
today, as before, I have within me no slavish submission to authority.
I cannot sign up in the ministerial antechamber. (Applause in center
and on the left. Cries in center: "Bravo!") I see clearly who it is
and what it is that hurts Russia, and postpones the hour of her vic-
tory. With soldiers and officers such as we have, we cannot be de-
feated. But the hour of victory may not be very near, because the
enemy is stubborn, and I want to add that, because of the chaos we
observe in the Government at this time, the hour of that victory
will be long delayed. . . .

The Government asks us to aid, and not to undermine it — a
peculiar request, I might say, to be heard within the walls of the
State Duma, which desires nothing more than that the Government
should act consistently and meet the demands of the army. Not
so very long ago, the late A. S. Suvorin 25 sang the praises of the
Government for its confidence in the public. How everything has
changed! Today it is the Government itself that pleads for the
confidence of the public, and fails to get it. The Government has
up to the present time been suffering, and is still suffering, from top
to bottom, from a disease of the will power. It may be that matters
will improve in the near future. But as regards the recent past,
covering something like a year, the Cabinet has represented nothing
but a dozen Sleeping Beauties. (Laughter.) I should like to believe
what the President of the Council of Ministers has said here. Un-
fortunately, the facts prove that words and deeds are at variance,
and while speeches are made about one thing, something entirely
different is actually being done.

Gentlemen, if there is so much shouting that there will be no
peace, it means that some one is striving for peace. (Cries on the left;
"Right I") Our gallant Allies say little of peace, for they have none of
those corrupting influences which reach the organs of the Govern-
ment and undermine the will of its highest representative. To us, the
will of the Sovereign is sacred. We remember his words — that so long
as even a solitary German foe remains within the borders of the
88 Editor of the "Novoe Vremia."

168 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Russian Empire, there shall be no peace. And now the representa-
tives of the Government appear here, one after another, and enter
denials. What is it that they deny? Are we not all agreed that we
seek no peace? Whom, then, do they contradict? They contradict
those sinister rumors, that mysterious, invisible work going on in
certain circles that are trying in one way or another to obtain a
separate peace. Time and again we have found valid reason to point
out that the ruling powers are far less patriotic than we are, not-
withstanding all our divisions into parties and factions, and that the
Government, although united, does not merit the public confidence
it would like to enjoy. One cannot accuse us, of the Right, of un-
willingness to work with the Government. We are very anxious for
that. But where was it all this time, this "united Government?"
Wherein has its activity been shown, lately, other than in the red
pencil of the censor on everything not directly connected with mat-
ters of national defense and the divulging of war secrets, but which
might impair the authority of this or that minister.

Russia has reached the end of her patience waiting for a strong
Government— not the authority of the police bigotry, such as Russia
has known since olden times— but a Government that could show us
that it has some program and some system. But the only strong
authority which we see is the systematic and consistent internal
disorganization of the State. (Cries on the left: "Right!") The dis-
organization of our rear is undoubtedly being carried out by the
enemy, and it is being done by a strong and relentless hand. This
system was set up by William himself and is being thoroughly prac-
tised with the aid of the German party working in our rear, and
of those elements — the scum of Russian society — who can bring
themselves to serve the enemy. (Cries on the left: "Right!") More
than any one else, it is the Government itself which, through Its lack
of a program, its lack of a system, has been killing the patriotism
of the nation. (A voice on the left: "Right!") It has had a depress-
ing effect upon popular enthusiasm; it has paralyzed the impulse
to work for the achievement of victory. (Cries on the left: "Right !")
Field-Marshal Hindenburg has said that what they need is patience
and silence. He who possesses the stronger will, the greater patience*
he says, will win. Yes, we shall suffer in patience. And, however
those who have gone out of this place may urge us, we shall not,
nor shall the people, rush into the streets, for we know only too
well that any act of that kind will be to the advantage of our enemies-
Suffer we shall, yes; but to observe silence at this moment, to re-

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 169

f rain from telling of what we are witnessing, that is a sin, because we
encourage impunity by our silence.

Turning now to the picture presented by our internal affairs,
we have before us a boundless ocean of gubernatorial orders which
show that each province, even each district, pursues its own policy,
particularly in questions of food. This is due to the fact that there
is no guidance from the center. . . . Really, at this time, when the
representatives of the highest authority are daily bursting like soap-
bubbles, one is at a loss to whom to turn, whom to question, from
whom to expect a word of truth. Every Minister is now playing his
own game, or, at all events, has been so far. He has his day and then
disappears without a trace. Public opinion and the Government are
unable to agree because of these constant changes of administrators,
and because of the divergent views prevailing among the Ministers
themselves. Show me a single moment, ever since Russia entered
upon the path of public activity in our legislative institutions, when
there has been such a thing as coordination between the acts of the
Government and those of the public. There is none. In our country
there are two different attitudes towards the public: one, of con-
fidence, which, from the point of view of the Right, implies a sur-
- render of every position of the State to the extreme Left; the
other, of suspicion, when the Government assails and strangles pub-
lic initiative with a long series of repressive measures. Never before
did these jumps from one policy to the other manifest themselves as
strikingly as at this time. Under these circumstances one cannot be
certain of the morrow, and one can neither live nor work. Every man
who enters upon and occupies the post of a Minister considers the
moment of his accession to power as the beginning of a new era.
We have one era dating from the birth 'of Christ to the Minister's
advent ; and the other era dating with his advent. And each time that
he delivers his program speech, he throws open new horizons, as if
no one had ever conceived of them before.

We, Russians, I believe, are not surprised that up there, in the
high places, they should be casting about for the right man to occupy
the proper post. A mistake up there is quite possible. But we are
certainly astonished that, at so grave and critical a moment, certain
people should so little know their own selves, or, perhaps, be so
passionately anxious to make careers for themselves, as to forget
the present condition of our country, to forget the enormous re-
sponsibility which rests upon each one occupying a position of im-
portance, to forget themselves to such an extent as to accept the prof-

I7Q DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

fered posts when they know full well, Alexander Dmitrievich,
(speaking to Protopopov in the ministerial box) that they lack the
strength to carry out honestly their duties to the State. (Loud ap-
plause in the center and on the left. President rings for order.)
. . . We do need, gentlemen, a united ministry and cabinet; but
instead of that, we have strife and dissension. Just look closely at
this same business of food supply. Look at the piles of projects on
food supply in the various ministries, and watch each chief clerk
in each separate room compose his own project, without the slightest
relation to any other plan. ... I repeat, gentlemen, by such methods
the Government is creating an opposition and preparing the ground
for a successor to the present State Duma — a Duma of an altogether
different character. . . . Alas ! Our Government is not noted for its
foresight or prudence. Under some of our Ministers we had an
agrarian policy, under others, a liberal, and under still others, a
conservative. Contemplating the policy now followed within the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, I cannot call it anything
but a strictly shoddy policy. (Laughter on the left. Applause.)

The principal scourges of Russian public and official life right
now are four in number : the first is the senseless censorship of that
which ought not to be censored at all; the second is the hypocrisy
and paralysis of the Government; the third is the dangerous symp-
toms of the triumph of pro-German tendencies among the organs
of the Government; and, in this connection, the fourth is absolute
uncertainty as to the morrow, with governmental decrees and legis-
lative bills framed and baked from day to day. I have here before
me two circular orders, one dated September 14, the other September
22. By these orders the newspapers are prohibited from writing any-
thing about changes in ministerial circles, and that A* D, Protopopov
and Count A. A. Bobrinski 26 tnay either be forced out or are likely
to leave their posts. But one of them has gone already, and so we
must assume that the other one, as well, will be compelled to resign
his post within the immediate future. (Noise, applause*) Zamyslovski
keep quiet, you do not sympathize with this! (Zamyslovski, from his
seat : "I was silent." Voices on the left: "But who signed that cir-
cular?") The signature under that circular reads, "Adabash." Now,
these two circular orders are absolutely meaningless, I should say,
because the fact of a transfer or retirement of Count Bobrinski
and Protopopov cannot have any effect upon the activities of our
allies and of our own troops, nor can it divulge one military secret
* Minister of Agriculture.

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 171

or another. Gentlemen, the activity of the censor now constitutes
one of the greatest evils of Russian life. What extremes it may reach
in its pettiness can be seen from a fact like the following, which
sounds like fiction. The censor — some young lady or noncombatant
lieutenant — crossed out in a news item about the action of our troops
the word "blue" in the phrase, "The sun shone brightly, the blue
sky was cloudless," because it was believed that such a blue sky
could be found only in the south, and that it might therefore reveal
that the action took place in the south. (Laughter and applause.)
Deletions of this sort are an almost daily occurrence and ought to
be the very first thing to attract the attention of the State Duma.

But this is not all. We know how complete has been the paralysis
thus far of our rulers in fighting the marauding profiteers in our
rear, . . .

But there are still worse things. While campaign plans are being
carried out at the Imperial Headquarters, a regular clique is organ-
izing a queer, totally incomprehensible German orgy. There are
numerous facts to show that this is not mere accident, that there is
in existence some evil will, some powerful hand, that is directing all
this. Allow me to dwell on several such facts.

Archangel is the only port by which we get the things we need
for the equipment of the army. But it is precisely to Archangel, to
the Province of Archangel, that we are sending numerous parties
of German war prisoners. The effects are already beginning to show ;
there have already been all kinds of explosions. Again, recall the
situation in Turkestan. To this outlying territory, which is so im-
portant and so necessary to us in a military sense, there were sent
veritable mobs of Germans, who, as instructors of the natives, stirred
up social unrest. Germans are being sent incessantly and without
surveillance to Siberia, where they escape by way of China, and I
do not doubt that in due course of time there will be raised along that
frontier a new regiment of those very Germans who were taken
prisoners by us. ...

Other pictures are still more sad. They show us that some hidden
hand has been at work these past two or three months, seeing to it
that the German influence is not squeezed too hard, that the Germans
are not fought so strenuously.

In the spring of this year, we had a Government commission or-
ganized, for the purpose of combating German domination. This
struggle found expression in the promulgation of a number of laws
under Article 87 of our Fundamental Laws, self-contradictory, it is

172 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

true, as well as mutually exclusive, but existing all the same. So long
as this committee was headed by Trepov, matters went along fairly
well. There was no remissness, and the liquidation proceeded
smoothly. But since August the committee has been headed by A. S.
Stishinski, a member of the Right in the State Council, and from
that moment the committee abruptly changed its policy and is trying
to satisfy nearly every German request, disregarding even contradic-
tory reports of governors, and even the wishes of the petitioners
themselves. For this committee not only grants their requests, but
gives them even more than they ask for. . . .

Let us take an instance in another field. Everything that tends
to put the activity of our Allies and the immense help they are ren-
dering us in the proper light is being stifled. Only a few days ago
two of our governors — Baron von Grewenitz of Chernigov and von
Bunting of Tver— prohibited the delivery of lectures on the subject
of "Our Ally, France, and her Part in this War," We know, more-
over, that one of the most powerful German spy organizations in
the East is the firm of Kunst & Albers, about which not a little has
been written. And yet this center of German espionage is flourishing
and at work. Look into our factories and you will see there, be-
cause of some queer, unfathomable combination of circumstances,
Germans on every hand. It is impossible to reveal here the situation
in some of the factories, such as the Obukhov, Petrogradski, Artil-
lery, and Putilov Works. All I want to say is that here, too,— ex-
cepting the Putilov Works, where the trouble is of a different char-
acter— Germans are at work. I am taking the liberty of turning
these facts over to the Minister of War. ( Purishkevich leaves the
rostrum and hands the papers to the Minister of War.) As a char-
acteristic instance, I want to call your attention to the fact that
right now large numbers of workers are being discharged, who would
like to go on working and increasing the output of these factories.
(Rodichev, from his seat: "They are being provoked to it by the
Police Department.")

Gentlemen, is there any assurance that all these doings will be
stopped? If a man with a strong will and a definite program stood
at the helm of the internal administration of Russia, a great deal
could be passed over in silence. To our profound regret this is not
the case. On the basis, not of mere individual statement, but of docu-
mentary evidence, I shall take the liberty of describing to you the
Minister of the Interior, Protopopov, not referring to his office of

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 173

Minister, but as a member of the Octobrist faction, up to the moment
when he obtained the post.

During one of those paroxysms of garrulousness, at the time
he received the appointment as Minister, Protopopov said he had
lost three or four pounds of weight, due to overwork. I make free to
say here, on the basis of documents in my possession, that Protopopov
has lost all his weight, all of his authority, in the eyes of the Russian
public. (Applause, cries: "Bravo!")

Gentlemen, in the course of this war a resolution was adopted
by a certain society, inviting the attention of the Presidium of the
State Duma and of the Simbirsk nobility to the strange spectacle of
the combination in one person of the highest elective office and the
part of figurehead in a newspaper 2T which was to cater to the inter-
ests of a bank with a pronounced German coloring, and they asked
us to call the attention of the Government to the peril of creating a
new factor of public opinion in the control of a privately owned,
financial institution under the influence of German capital. . . .

Regarding the share of the present Minister of the Interior, then
Vice-President of the State Duma, Alexander Dmitrievich Protopo-
pov, in the organization of that newspaper, I should like to say that
his part in the Stockholm pourparlers with the German diplomat 2S
was a mere trifle as compared with the part he played and still ap-
pears to be playing in this paper. (Commotion.) (Purishkevich here
recalls Protopopov's conferences with banking representatives, al-
ready reported in the press.) However, when the banks saw what
the trouble was, seven of them immediately withdrew. . . . This
paper is not going to come out bluntly with the statement that there
is no need of fighting the dominating German influence, but will
say: "You are now combatting the German influence, but in place
of it, you will only fall prey to English and French domination."
For I myself have been told by the Ex-President of the Council of
Ministers, Sturmer, that the appetites of our Allies ought to be
somewhat curbed, as they are demanding- too much of us. (Exclama-
tions: "A— A! O— O!" Rodichev: "Rejoice, you Sturmerites !")
These words were spoken to me by Sturmer. My memory is good, I
am not a fool, and I was amazed to see that at this moment, when
the Allies are rendering us all possible assistance, we could suspect
their loyalty, and that the representative of the Ministry of Foreign

""Volia Rossii."
* Warburg.

I74 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Affairs thinks we ought to act with a little more reserve. (Cries on
the left: "German flunkey!") I am giving you warning, gentlemen,
that you may know what Protopopov represented in his capacity
of Vice-President of the Duma, and what he may represent now that
he is Minister. If, in addition to this, you will recall that one of the
very first persons to come to him with his report was Hakebusch,
the editor of that same paper, which Protopopov has not relinquished,
and which he is going to manage after he retires. . . .

But the root of the evil is, after all, not in Protopopov. Such
people, after all, are merely small fry. (A voice on the left: "And
miserable!") without the outlook of the statesman, who have simply
bounded to the top. The real trouble comes from those occult powers
and those influences which shove this or that individual into position,
helping into high positions those who are incapable of holding them.
(Commotion, voices on the left: "Correct! Disgraceful!")

These nights I cannot sleep, you may take my word of honor
for it. I lie with open eyes, and I see visions of countless telegrams,
reports, notes, addressed now to one, then another minister, but
most often, it is said, to Protopopov. (President: "Please, do not
enlarge upon this theme.")

I shall take the liberty of addressing now, quite apart from the
Duma, the Council of Ministers. If the Ministers consider duty
above career,— and I believe that at this moment duty should precede
career— and if you really are a united cabinet, go to the Tsar and
say that things cannot go on" any longer in this way. This would
not mean sabotage, but a duty to the Sovereign. If you are really
loyal to your Sovereign, if the glory of Russia, her power, her
future, intimately and inseparably bound up with the grandeur am]
splendor of the Tsar's name, are dear to you, go to the Imperial
Headquarters, throw yourselves at the Tsar's feet, and beg per-
mission to open his eyes to the dreadful reality. (Applause on the
left. President: "I ask you again not to enlarge upon this theme.")
Let not those who are to shape the historical destiny of Russia be
the people who are brought up on German money, are betraying
Russia, and have found shelter in all kinds of institutions. (Applause
in the center and on the left. Cries: "Bravo I")

Let there disappear from our horizon, in these terrible days

through which we are now passing, days which demand the greatest

caution and statesmanlike tact, men like Andronnikov, and Varnava,

and Mardari,2* and Manasevich, and all those men who are the shame

* A protege of Volzhin, Oberprocurator of the Synod.

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 175

of Russian life. Trust me when I say that I know that all Russia,
irrespective of party affiliations, thinks the same way, and speaks the
sazne words, — a loyal Russia desires the happiness of her Tsar, her
Church, and her people. In her days of sorrow, self-sacrificing Rus-
sia is, as always, incapable of speaking the language of slaves, but
is ready to lay candidly at the foot of the throne, words of bitter
and unvarnished truth, for the sake of the good of Tsar and nation.
Gentlemen, we must plead with the Sovereign, and you, his
loyal servants, chosen to do his bidding, you, who bear the brunt of
responsibility for the course of the Russian ship of state, in common
with us, go to Headquarters and plead with the Sovereign ... to
deliver Russia from Rasputin3*. . . (Prolonged and general
applause.)

6. PLOT TO KILL RASPUTIN

PURISHKEVICH'S DIARY 31

December 2, 1916.

For the first time in many years I have had the moral satisfaction
to feel that I have done my duty honestly, conscientiously, and cour-
ageously. I made a speech in the Duma on the present state of Rus-
sia. I addressed myself to the Government, demanding that the truth
be laid bare before the Emperor, who is surrounded by clever in-
triguers. I demanded that the Monarch be warned against the danger
that threatens Russia from the obscure forces in the rear. . . .

Today, for the first time, I have gone back on my oath — oath of
silence. I did it not for political reasons, not for the sake of gaining
the good-will of the militant members of the hostile political parties,
but in order that the voice of the Russian people might reach the

throne.

*****

I expressed the thoughts of thousands of the best Russians, re-
gardless of political parties and opinions. I felt that I had done so
as I left the Duma platform after having spoken for two hours. I
felt it in the shouts of "Bravo;" in the clapping of hands, in the
faces of the excited crowd which gathered around me after my
speech. Among them were representatives of Russian society; for
on this day the Taurida Palace was filled with the intellectual and
social leaders of the nation and its highest functionaries.

" "Revue de Paris," 1923, Tome V, 721-46.

** Pourichkevitch, V. : "Comment J'ai Tu6 Raspoutine," 37-46.

I76 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

I know that I have expressed the feeling of Russia. I know that
there was not a single false note in my speech. . . .

December 3.

I have not had a moment's peace today. As I sat at my desk I
have been kept busy answering the telephone, which has not stopped
ringing for a second. From morning until evening all kinds of peo-
ple, known or unknown, call up to congratulate me. I must confess
that it has reached a point where I can no longer remain at my desk.
It is difficult to imagine a situation more stupid than the one I am
in, sitting listening to these nightingales singing my praise without

being able to stop them.

* * * * *

Among those who telephoned was a Prince lusupov, Count
Sumarokov-Elston. He has aroused my curiosity. After expressing
the usual compliments he inquired if he could see me to explain
certain things about Rasputin's relation with the Court, things which
he could not tell over the telephone. I made an appointment for to-
morrow morning at nine. I am anxious to know what he has to say

and what he wants.

December 4.

He was on time . . . and at once made a very good impression
on me. ... He looks as if he possessed a great deal of will power
and much strength of character. . . .

"Your speech will not have the results you expect/' said he.
"The Emperor does not like to have one bring pressure on him.
Rasputin's power will grow greater rather than less owing to his
boundless influence over the Empress. It is she who really governs
the State. The Emperor is at Headquarters much occupied with
military operations."

"Well, what are we going to do about it ?" I asked.

He gave a mysterious smile and looked me straight in the face,

"Get rid of Rasputin."

"That's easy to say. But who will do it ? Russia has nobody with
backbone enough for such a deed. The Government could do it
easily, but the Government dings to him and watches over him as
if he were a treasure,"

"Yes," said lusupov, "one can not count on the Government, but
I dare say there are men in Russia who would do it"

"Do you think so?"

"I know it. One of them is right before you, . , .M

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 177

I smiled. "Prince," said I to him, "I am no longer astonished
at anything that happens in Russia. I am not trying to get anything
for myself; I have no personal ambitions. But if you wish ... to
deliver Russia from Rasputin, here is my hand. We are going to
examine the means to bring it about, and we will undertake it if we
can find some others to join us. . . ." 32

7. CONGRESS OF THE NOBILITY88

December 11-16, 1916.
The resolution of the Congress reads :

The Twelfth Congress of the united associations of nobles, always
devoted to their sovereigns, notes with deep sorrow that in the ter-
rible historical moment through which Russia is passing, when the
monarchist principle is especially vital to the solidity and unity of
the State, this ancient basis of the State is being shaken to its
foundations.

In the administration of the State, irresponsible, dark powers,
alien to the legitimate authority, are gaining influence. These powers
are subjecting the heights of the Government to their influence and
are even encroaching upon the administration of the Church.

The worthiest pastors of the Church are troubled by the shame-
ful deeds that are taking place in the view of all. The Church, guard-
ian of the truth of Christ, does not hear the free word of its bishops
and knows that they are oppressed.

It is necessary to assure to the Church its internal administration
as established by the canons.

The civil administration of the country is not less shaken. More-
over, subjected to the same fatal influences, it lacks the necessary
solidity, singleness of thought and purpose, and does not enjoy the
confidence of the people.

Such a situation, ruinous at any time, is especially fatal at this
time of world war; and it has caused chaos in every branch of
the national life.

It is necessary to eliminate, once for all, the influence of the
dark powers in the affairs of State.

It is necessary to form a strong Government, Russian in thought

n They were joined by Grand Duke Dmitri Pavlovich, Doctor S. S. Laso-

vert, and Lieutenant S , and together they killed Rasputin on the night of

December 29-30, 1916.

• "Riech," No. 332, December 15, 1916.

178 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

and feeling, enjoying popular confidence, and capable of working in
common with the legislative institutions, but responsible to the Mon-
arch alone. It should be armed with the fullness of authority, in the
person of the President of the Council of Ministers, and firmly
united in a common program.

Only such a Government can assure the prosecution of the war
to final victory, without which the popular conscience does not admit
any conclusive peace.

8. RESIGNATION OF COUNT IGNATIEV, MINISTER OF

EDUCATION «

January 9, 1917
Your Imperial Majesty, Most Gracious Monarch:

At Your Majesty's Imperial Headquarters on December 2,
[1916] I felt bound by my duty, oath, and conscience to sound the
alarm over the part played by certain persons and the political situa-
tion of the country. I pray Your Imperial Majesty not to oblige me
to be an accomplice of these persons whose acts I regard as ruinous
to the throne and the State.

I am firmly convinced that the only kind of government that
could be useful to Your Imperial Majesty and the country is one
that is united in its conception of the state, in its understanding of
the fundamental objects of government and in the manner of realiz-
ing them. It is my duty as a loyal subject to beg most humbly Your
Imperial Majesty to relieve me of the unbearable burden of serving
against the dictates of my conscience. Believe me, my Sovereign, that
in making this petition I am guided by the traditions of my ancestors
who were from old devoted to the ancient [monarchic] principle.
It is in this principle and the union of Tsar and people that the
Russian State was created and grew strong.

While not directly participating in the affairs of Government,
I shall follow in the steps and obey the testament of my father and
remain the loyal servant of Your Majesty, the Throne, and the
Country,

Your Imperial Majesty's most loyal and devoted servant,

Master of the Horse,
COUNT PAUL IGNATIEV.

* "Padenie Tsarskogo Rezhuna," VI, 26.

CHAPTER IX
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

I. HIGH COST OF LIVING AND LOW WAGES

(a) MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 1

August 24, 1915.

... In conclusion, General Ruzski [who had been called in for
consultation] touched upon the condition of labor in the Petrograd
factories. He emphasized the fact that labor is carrying an exceed-
ingly heavy load and is bending under the weight of the high cost
of the necessaries of life. At the same time the employers have not
adjusted wages to the new conditions. In order not to starve, the
laborer is obliged to work overtime, which exhausts him. He [Gen.
Ruzski] suggested that serious attention should be paid to this ques-
tion and that something should be done quickly; otherwise there
may be strikes and disorders. If that should take place "the war
situation would be hopeless." . . .

2. RURAL CONDITIONS

(a) NIKOLAI MIKHAILOVICH TO THE TSAR2

August 8, 1916

Gfushevka (Kherson Guberniia)

In accordance with my promise, I am writing about my impres-
sions here. My estate represents an immense area of 75,000 desiatins.
It is situated in three uiezds of three guberniias: Kherson and
Ekaterinoslav, uiezds of the same names, and Taurida guberniia,
uiezd of Melitopol. There are sixteen villages on the estate, and
seven German colonies, one of which moved away last year on its
own initiative. The remaining colonies are waiting for the decision
of the Government ; most of them are Mennonites, who are inclined

V'Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 66,
'"Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia," 75-9-

179

i8o DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

to stay, and one, of Wurtembergers, intends to move. Thus far there
have been no misunderstandings with them.

The Mennonites emphasize the fact that they left Germany two
hundred years ago, spent a long time in Poland, migrated to us under
Emperor Alexander II, and have been dwelling here over fifty years.
Although they do not believe in war, they furnished soldiers who
serve as hospital orderlies. In conversation, they stress their anti-
German attitude, even though everywhere in their homes there are
portraits of the Kaiser, and also old Vasili Fedorovich,3 as well as
of Bismarck and Moltke. Personally, I hope that they will clear out
bag and baggage after the war.

Complete statistics of losses in men in our Russian villages could
not be obtained. For the present, I have data only for one village,
that of Grushevka. The figures are: 115 (10 killed, 34 wounded, 71
missing or in captivity) out of 829 souls mobilized. Consequently,
for the village of Grushevka the losses amount to 13 per cent of
the total population of 3,307 souls, of whom 829 souls were in the
army. In the village of Grushevka alone, more than five hundred
petitions have been presented by widows, wives, and mothers of sol-
diers in active duty. They are getting allowances regularly, but the
widows of the killed soldiers decorated with the order of St. George
have thus far received nothing. I have collected all the information
and turned it over to the proper authorities. We have also a goodly
number of refugees: the largest percentage comes from Kholm
guberniia, but there are also refugees from Grodno and Minsk
guberniias. They all receive allowances regularly.

The grain harvest is good — in some places all that can be desired.
Harvesting and threshing are going on everywhere, and there is hope
that the work will be finished on time in the fall. In addition to
women, children, and the aged, I have working for me 36 people from
the Kherson jail, and 947 Austrian war prisoners. There are no Ger-
mans. The Austrians are made up of Czechs, Ruthenians, Slovaks,
Croatians, -Poles, and Transylvania Rumanians. The latter are lazy
and grumbling ; the others work well and without driving. . . .

I shall probably remain at Grushevka until the 2Oth of August,
i.e., three whole weeks. The air here is incomparable. Space galore.
Cannot see the horizon. Fields, fields . . . without end. At dawn I
hunt anything that comes along. So far, with the aid of six urchins
who beat the bushes, I have bagged six foxes, fourteen quail, and
eight partridges.
a Kaiser William I.

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 181

I ask Alix and you to accept my best wishes for the birthday of
Alexei. May the Lord God protect you all.

Sincerely yours,
NIKOLAI M[IKHAILOVICH]

3. WAR REFUGEES

(a) MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF 'MINISTERS 4

August 12, 1915

[General discussion of the refugee question]. . . . Headquarters
has lost its head. . . . One cannot follow the precedent of 1812 and
make a desert of the territory abandoned to the enemy. . . . But
neither logic nor State interest has any weight with Headquarters.
. . , Everything has to bow to "military necessity." . . . There are
three [four] kinds of refugees: (i) Jews . . . who are driven with
a whip from the neighborhood of the front. They are accused as a
body, without differentiation of any kind, of spying, signaling, and
in other ways helping the enemy. . . . And this Jewish mass is
extremely embittered . . . and becomes revolutionary. The situa-
tion is further complicated by the fact that these hungry and home-
less Jews are not received any too well by the inhabitants of these
places . . . where they happen to settle anew; (2) Officials of civic
and military organizations in the rear with their dozens of loaded
freight cars. The tens of thousands of people who stumble along
the railway tracks are passed by trains piled full of furniture from
officers' clubs, including canary birdcages and other junk . . . ;
(3) Voluntary refugees who flee from their homes because of the
reports of German atrocities ; (4) Refugees who have "been ordered
by the military authorities to depart in order to remove all the popu-
lation from the territory about to fall into the hands of the foe.
This last category of refugees is the largest and the most embittered.
It is torn from its native home, given a few hours to collect its
worldly possessions and told to move on, no one knows where. What
it cannot take along is burned right in front of its eyes. ... All
this embittered mass of humanity spreads like a flood in all direc-
tions. . . . They die by the hundreds from hunger, thirst and dis-
ease . . . they accentuate the difficulties of war time conditions, they
bring on food crises, high cost of living, and excite the already
aroused population. . . .

4"Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 3*-

182 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

(&') MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 5

August 17,

Krivoshein: ... Of all the grave consequences of the war this
one [refugee] is the most unexpected, the most serious and the most
difficult to remedy. ... It has been worked out by the wise strate-
gists to frighten the enemy. , . . Misery, sickness, sorrow and pov-
erty go with them [refugees] all over Russia. They create panics
wherever they go and put out whatever still remains of the ardor
of the first days of the war. They move like a wall, knocking down
the grain, trampling down the plowed fields and destroying the for-
ests. . . . Their trail is like that of the flight of locusts or the bands
of Tamerlane on the warpath. The railways are. choked, and pretty
soon it will be impossible to move war freight and food supplies.
... I have an idea that the Germans watch with pleasure the result
of this attempt to repeat the tactics of 1812. If on the one hand they
[Germans] are deprived of certain local provisions, they are, on the
other hand, freed from the care of the population and have full
freedom of action in the depopulated areas ... In my capacity as
member of the Council of Ministers I should like to say that this
undertaking of Headquarters to bring about a second migration of
peoples will lead Russia into darkness, revolution and ruin.

4. CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS

(O) MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF ^MINISTERS *

August 29, 1915

Krwashein: . . . Indeed, our papers go not only beyond the
bounds allowed by law but also decency. . . . Until now it was prin-
cipally the Moscow journals, but lately it would seem as if the
Petrograd papers have gotten out of hand. They have taken a stand
which is intolerable, not only in a monarchy but even in a republic,
especially in war time. Their abuse, their sensational news, their
baseless criticism arouses public opinion against the Government.
. . . Have not we a war censorship, war censors, generals, lieuten-
ants, and finally a special officer at the head of the press ? What are
they doing? ...

8 "Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 37-
•/Wrf.,75-6.

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 183

Scherbatov: In the military zone the censorship is under the con-
trol of the military authorities ; and the Minister of the Interior and
the Chief of the Press are, as is well known to the Council of Min-
isters , . . mere spectators. The political censorship has been taken
out of the hands of the civilians and I have no means of interfering
with the lies and agitations with which our papers are filled. . . .

Kharitonov: If the almighty generals . . . are unwilling to help
the Minister of the Interior to fight against the scoundrelly press
then let's get rid of them and put in others. . . .

Polivanov: We are attacking the war generals because they fail
to put the screws on the press ; but it should be remembered that they
are soldiers and not politicians . . . they censor everything which'
might help the enemy. . . .

Krivoshein: But to alarm the public and to spread revolutionary
ideas ... is the greatest help to the enemy. . . .

Goremykin: We shall have to ask the Minister of the Interior
to put himself in touch at once with the military authorities . . .
and see what can be done to put the press in its place. . . .

Scherbatov: Very good. We will take the necessary measures and
immediately there will come protests, questions and alarms from the
Duma. How will we meet them when we have no right to a political
censorship?

Goremykin: The matter is so serious that we can issue warning
that interference by the Duma may lead to its dismissal.

Bark: I hardly think it will come to that. The Duma understands
that in war time the press cannot be allowed to kindle political fires.

Goremykin: I have not the optimism of Bark. . . .

(6) MEETING OF THE 'COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 7

September 10

Polivanov: . . , The war censorship, like other institutions of
the Russian Empire, is bound by law and in the law of the military
censorship no provision was made for political censorship. . . .

Scherbatov: . . . What can the Chief of the Press Control do
when the most important places where the most influential and widely
circulated papers appear are out of his control, being regarded
either as a part of the military or under military regulations ? . . .

Krivoshein: In this lies the whole tragedy — our tragedy, Russia's
tragedy, the root of all the discontent and restlessness. One hears
everywhere talk about a united front, union with the people, but
'"Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 127.

184 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

for a whole year the military and civilian authorities have tried to
get together and to cooperate but all in vain. The Council of Min-
isters deliberates, pleads, expresses a desire, indicates a request, issues
a demand, but the generals treat us with contempt and do noth-
ing. . . .

5. GROWING AGITATION AND UNREST

(a) MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF 'MINISTERS8

August 24, 1915

Scherbatov: The Council of Ministers knows that there were
disturbances in Moscow which ended in bloodshed. . , . There were
even more serious disorders at Ivanovo- Voznesensk when it was
necessary to fire on the crowd with the result that sixteen were
killed and thirty wounded. There was a critical moment when it was
uncertain what the garrison would do. ...

Shakhovskoi: I have information . . . that the workmen are
quite aroused. Any kind of spark may start a fire. . . .

Goremykin:. . . I should like to ask the Minister of the Interior
what measures he is taking to put an end to the lawlessness . . .
going on everywhere. His principal function is to protect the State
from disorder and danger.

Scherbatov: The Minister of the Interior is taking all the meas-
ures which his duty and present circumstances permit. I have more
than once called your attention to the abnormal position of the
Minister, Half of European Russia is out of his jurisdiction. Else-
where in the rear the real government is in the hands of lieutenants
who have despotic inclinations and little understanding. I have
brought to your notice the fact that even in Petrograd, which gives
tone to the whole of Russia, the Minister of the Interior is a mere
resident. He has only as much power as the war lords will grant
him. . . . How can you expect me to fight the growing revolu-
tionary movement when I am refused the support of the troops on
the ground that they are unreliable, that one can not be certain that
they will fire on the mob ? You can not quiet the whole of Russia by
the police alone, especially now when the ranks of the police are
being thinned out . , . hourly and the population is growing daily
more excited by the speeches in the Duma, by newspaper stories, by
continuous defeats, and rumors of disorders in the rear. The demon-
'"Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 63-6.

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC 185

strations and disorders come about from most unforeseen causes.
At Moscow patriotic reasons were responsible. Newspapers gave out
that the Dardanelles had been taken and that our troops had recap-
tured Kovno. One silver-tongued orator was arrested and trouble
started. ... I agree that something ought to be done. But how can
you do anything when you have no support, when those in responsible
places [ministers] can not get a hearing [Emperor] on questions on
which the fate of the State may depend? ... I have in my port-
folio several telegrams from governors. They inform me that the
flow of refugees, German-colonists and Jews driven out by the
military authorities is ever rising and that the local population is so
aroused against the newcomers that they receive them with clubs.
. . . The governors ask for instructions and help. What can the
Minister of the Interior reply. . . . Among the workmen, as among
the population in general, there are terrible reports of graft in con-
nection with war orders. . . .

(&) MILIUKOV CALLS ON THE WORKMEN NOT TO COME OUT ON THE

STREET 9

It has been brought to my attention that a person whom I do
not know and who represents himself as Duma Deputy Miliukov has,
during the past few days, been carrying on propaganda in the fac-
tories (in particular at Lessner's), calling upon the workers to go
out on the streets of Petrograd on February 14, the day when the
State Duma resumes its session, to demand, in a more determined
manner, action by the State Duma, and protest against the war.
From the same source I learn that certain persons claiming to be
members of the State Duma have been distributing arms among the
workers.

I hasten to warn those who believed such declarations that they
have been made the victims of the most brazen fraud. 'My views upon
the war and the work of national defense are too well known for me
to contradict the opinions that have been expressed in my name.
I merely wish to call to the attention of the workers that the evil
and dangerous suggestions which are being made to them by such
contemptible means spring, obviously, from a very dark source.
To listen to such counsels means playing into the hands of the enemy.
I, therefore, earnestly request all persons who have heard such
counsels and representations to refrain from any demonstration on
§ "Riech," February 23, 1917.

i86 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

February 14, and to remain calm on that day. Their calm will frus-
trate the plans of their enemies and most effectively help their friends.
The intelligent attitude of Labor toward the difficulties we are ex-
periencing makes me hopeful that my warning will be heard and
that the treacherous design will fail.

Member of the State Duma,

P. MILIUKOV.

(c LABOR MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA DURING THE WAR 10

Months

STRIKES OF ECONOMIC CHARACTER

No. of
Strikes

No. of
Strikers

No. of
Working
Days Lost

Average No.
Days Lost
Per Striker

1914

9
ii

9
14

21
20
103

149
162

9°
26

69
71
48
46

128
104
61
150
153
118
81

79
51

22,738
4,661
i,i53
i,75i
1,604

6,814
19,609
10,409
35,507
57,732
76,930
27,827
10,696
26,245
75,935
33,437
16,118

74,96i
82,528 •

47,792
96,302

I7,44S
190,459
64,402
38,491
46,850
48,603
28,579
39,649

142,123

7,831
1,285
5,46i
2,098

14,760
90,213
29,935
263,447
211,372
226,165
75.309
41,109
82,484
334,842

243,477
51,248

469,085
579,396
222,893
295,052
768,477
$81,357
325»448
147,920
166,868
246,282
74,473
98,966

6.25
1.68
jji
3.1 1
1.30

2.17
4.60

2,87

741
3.66
2.94
2.71
3.84
3.14
4.41
7.28
3.18

6,26

7.02

4.66
3,06
6.46
6.43
5-05
3.84
3.56
5-07
2,61

2-5O

October

1915

March « • *

April

Tilly

August .»

October

1916

February . ,....,...».

May

June « *..,,

Tulv

August .

September

October

November

December «

TOTAL ,

2,047

1,205,230

5,799>376

4.81

' Fleer, M. G,, "Rabochee Dvizhenie v Gody Voiny," 6, 7.

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC

187

STRIKES OF POLITICAL AND NON-
ECONOMIC CHARACTER

TOTAL FOR THE Two

No. of
Strikes

No. of
Strikers

No. of
Working
Days
Lost

Average
No. Days
Lost Per
Striker

No. of
Strikes

No. of
Strikers
Working

No. of
Working
Days Lost

Average

1,950

600

0.30

24,688

142,723

5.78

4,661

7,8'? I

1.68

AfjUW*.
I IS^

/ ,WO*

I 28^

i.n

89S

833

0.93

I§

*f*-,JO

2,646

i,*'*iJO

6,294

2.38

i 6od

2008

1.30

2,039

1,973

0.96

*,WV/T*
8,853

^f}\jy\j
16,733

1.89

3,498

2,618

0.74

23,107

92,831

4.01

4,959

1,201

0.24

15,368

3U36

2.02

220

I.OO

IO4

35,727

263,667

7.38

1,323
3,124

922
2,008

0.69
0.64

l62
164

59,055
80,054

212,294
228,173

3-59
2.85

27,827

75,309

2.70

43,929

6l,347

1.39

y\j
76

54,625

102,456

i.
1.87

115

87,621

141,998

1.62

184

113,866

224,482

1.97

2,057

2,281

1. 10

77,992

337,123

4-32

6,106

5,923

0.97

39,543

249,400

6,30

959

572

0.59

17,077

51,820

3-03

53,489

56,485

1.06

166

128,450

525,570

4.09

9,450

7,000

0.74

108

91,978

' 586,396

6.37

50,643

113,481

2.24

107

98,435

336,374

341

16,147

77,786

4.82

157

112,449

372,838

3.31

750

I.OO

154

118,198

769,227

6.51

9,870

14,531

1.47

123

100,329

595,888

5-94

12,115

23,606

1-95

76,517

349,054

4.56

8,428

7,700

9.14

104

46,919

155,620

3-31

46,850

166,868

3.^6

119

138,531

362,516

2.62

198

187,134

608,798

*j*«jw
3.25

10,877

9,246

0.85

39,456

83,719

2.12

<?7

39,649

98,966

2.49

465

468,980

895,597

1.91

2,512

1,674,210

6,694,973

4.00

PART III
ARMY AND NAVY; 1914-1917

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Every patriotic Russian had a just grievance against the
Government not only for mismanaging the war, but also for
misleading the public and arousing false hopes. Minister of War
Sukhomlinov prided himself on being a soldier of the old school.
He looked backward and not forward and from that point of view
he had some reason for believing that Russia "is prepared for
war/' Sukhomlinov was not alone to blame. The antiquated auto-
cratic system of government was largely responsible. The
Minister of War was not master of his own house. In his ministry
there was a Department of Artillery, with Grand Duke Sergei
Mikhailovich at the head, which was practically independent of
the Minister. The Grand Duke was certainly incompetent and if
he was not also corrupt tfiose near him were. It was he, more than
Sukhomlinov, who was responsible for the shortage of ammuni-
tion. But being a Grand Duke, he could not be touched and there-
fore the attacks were made on the Minister of War.

Ammunition and rifles were not the only things Russia lacked.
Such essentials as road maps did not exist and the army lost its
way on its own territory. The shortage of locomotives and cars,
the policy of Headquarters to drive the population from the war
zone into the interior choked the railway lines and highways,
interfered with the movement of troops and supplies, created
panic and famine in the rear. For this unhappy state of affairs
Headquarters threw the blame on Petrograd and Petrograd passed
it back to Headquarters.

The Empress and Rasputin, who distrusted the Grand Duke
Nicholas, persuaded the Emperor to assume the Supreme Com-
mand. Though they wished to get rid of the Grand Duke and
his Chief of Staff lanushkevich, the Ministers foresaw the evil

188

ARMY AND NAVY; 1914-1917 189

results that might follow the proposed change of command. They
pleaded with the Emperor, but all to no purpose. The Empress
never forgave them for what she regarded as a treacherous move ;
and before a year passed she had most of the objectionable
Ministers dismissed.

After taking command the Tsar spent most of his time at the
front. The Tsarina treated him as if he were a little boy, quite
incapable of taking care of himself. She watched over him, gave
him advice, and asked for confidential information which she
passed on to Rasputin. What he did with it is not clear. There is,
as yet, no evidence that he was a German spy, but that does not
necessarily mean that the Germans did not indirectly make use of
him. Rasputin and the Empress used to discuss the military
situation, pray over it, and send advice to the Emperor. How far
it influenced actual operations is not clear, but there is no doubt
that they influenced appointments of generals. A man's fitness to
command was determined by his loyalty to Rasputin.

The defeats, the causes of the defeats, the bickerings and
jealousies between Headquarters and Petrograd, the removal of
the Grand Duke from command, the interference of the Empress
and Rasputin (both of whom were reputed to be working for
Germany) completely demoralized the front and the rear. It was
difficult to get people into the army and those who went in tried
to get out by deserting and by surrendering. By 1916 the morale
of the army was so low that the commanders had lost confidence
in it. The army was a hot-bed of discontent in which the radical
agitators worked, preparing for the day of reckoning. It came
sooner than they expected. The revolutionists of March 1917 had
a comparatively easy task to turn the army against the Tsar and
his Government.

CHAPTER X

PREPARATION AND EFFICIENCY
i. RUSSIA WANTS PEACE, BUT IS PREPARED FOR WAR1

Under this title, the evening edition of the "Birzhevyia Viedo-
mosti" published the following article:

We have received information from an unimpeachable source
which leaves no doubt that Russia, which has increased the fighting
strength of its army at the command of its Supreme Leader, does not
contemplate war, but is prepared for all eventualities. We may say
with pride that the time has passed when Russia need fear external
threats. Russia cannot be intimidated. Russian public opinion, which
has treated with sensible serenity the saber-rattling started abroad
during the past few days, was right. We have no cause for alarm.

Russia is prepared!

From time to time in the course of the past five years, fragt
mentary reports have appeared in the press of the world telling of
various measures taken by the War Department for the military
preparation of our troops. We, therefore, state nothing new or
unknown. Fully aware of the great power of our native country,
so absurdly assailed in the foreign press, we give here a mere out-
line of the more important matters accomplished during this period
at the command of the Monarch.

Every one knows that our general plans for a possible war were
of a defensive character. Now, however, it is realized that the de-
fensive idea has been superseded and that the Russian army will
take the offensive.

Nor is it a secret that a number of fortresses, which were con-
sidered as bases of operations under the earlier war plans, are being
abandoned, while, in their stead, defensive lines of the greatest im-
portance as fortifications, are constructed.

The remaining fortresses Russia is well able to strengthen and

1''Riech/' No. 57, March 13, 1914. It was taken for granted at the time,
and it has never been denied, that this article was either written or inspired
by General V. A. Sukhomlinov, Minister of Wan

190

ARMY AND NAVY; 1914-1917 191

equip to the limit, for purposes of defense. Some of them have
been preserved only to protect certain strategical and tactical points
in the Western provinces.

The officers' corps has been considerably increased and its educa-
tional qualifications both raised and made uniform. The modern army
officer is not only drilled in theory, but is given training of a gen-
eral military character. The legislative bill concerning reserve lieu-
tenants settles the problem of the qualifications of reserve officers.
The second-lieutenants of the reserve are to discharge the duties of
both privates and the lowest commissioned officers.

Russian field artillery has been supplied with excellent guns, not
only equal to the French and German model guns, but in many re-
spects even superior to them.

Siege artillery has been reorganized and may be found with every
large fighting unit.

Our coast and fortress artillery is supplied with guns technically
far superior to those in many countries of Western Europe.

The lessons of the past have not been forgotten. In a future war,
the Russian artillery will never have to complain of a lack of shells.
The artillery is supplied with a large equipment and assured of a
properly organized delivery of shells.

In recent years the army engineering has been highly developed,
and who is not aware that the army automobile service in Russia has
been raised to a very high level ? The military telegraph has become
available to all branches of the service. Even the smallest unit of
the army has its telephone connection. The Russian army is abun-
dantly supplied with searchlights. Both officers and privates have
shown themselves experts at railroading and are able to function
without the help of the regular railway personnel.

Nor has aviation been overlooked. In the Russian army, as in
most European armies, the main emphasis has been on aeroplanes,
and not dirigibles, which make great demands, especially in time of
war. The type of aeroplane has not yet been definitely settled, but
who ignores the wonderful achievements of Sikorski's machines,
those aerial dreadnaughts of the Russian army — actual dreadnaughts,
and not little scouting planes 1

We have the right to expect that, if circumstances bring us to
war, the Russian army will be not only immense in numbers, but
well trained, well armed, and equipped with the latest inventions of
modern military science.

The Russian army, which has always been victorious, and has

I92 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

usually fought on enemy territory, will entirely forget the meaning
of "defense/' so persistently impressed upon it formerly. That army,
already increased by one-third in peace time, with regiments of uni-
form composition throughout, and with an improved officers' and
privates' corps, is the first in the world in both its quantitative rela-
tion to the cavalry and the completeness of its equipment.

It is important for the Russian public to realize that our coun-
try is prepared for any eventuality, but that it is so prepared only
for the sake of peace, as proclaimed by its Monarch, the noble
initiator of The Peace Conference.

Of course, any Power that has aggressive designs against Rus-
sia is not pleased with our new military strength. No one may now
cherish ambitions to take any portion of Russian territory.

"Si vis pacem, para bellum,"— "If you want peace, prepare for
war."

Russia, in perfect accord with its Supreme Leader, wants peace,
but is also prepared [for war] !

2. LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS2

Headquarters, December 2, 1914.

. . The only great and serious difficulty for our army is again
the lack of ammuntion. Because of that our troops are obliged, while
fighting, to be cautious and to economize. This means that the bur-
den of fighting falls on the infantry. As a result our losses are
enormous. Some army corps have been reduced to divisions, bri-
gades to companies, et cetera. . . .

3. MEMOIRS OF POLIVANOV*

... In this manner the question of -supplying artillery for the
army was practically out of the hands of the Minister of War, and
had it not been for the fact that all orders for military supplies had
to go through the hands of the War Council, of which the Minister
of War was chairman, it could be said that alongside the Minister
of War there existed a Ministry of Artillery Supplies with a Grand
Duke [Sergei Mikhailovich] as Minister. . . ,

•"Perepiska Nikolaia," III, 53-

* Polivanov, A. A. ; "Memuary," 153. Polivanov was born in 1855 and died
in 1920.

ARMY AND NAVY; 1914-1917 193

4. LETTER OF SUKHOMLINOV TO IANUSHKEVICH 4

May 22, 1915.

. . . The telegram of the Supreme Commander about ammunition
has been on my conscience. I tried, unknown to the artillery depart-
ment, to get in touch with the manufacturers, and Hereby enclose
certain data. If after looking it over you think it best to lay it before
His Imperial Highness, you may do so. It would be well if he brought
it to the attention of His Majesty. I could then, without interfering
with Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich,5 push matters without the
delays of the artillery department. . . .

I have just learned these facts. On September 22, 1914, I called
industrialists together and asked them to undertake the manufacture
of ammunition. "The Russian Company for the Manufacture of War
Materials'' offered its services, and on November 7, 1914 . . . the
office of the chief of the artillery department replied to this offer by
saying . . . "that the offer cannot be accepted because there is no
need for shrapnel." The order was finally placed on January 25,
1915, when I went after them [artillery department?]. That's the
kind of collaborators [that I have?]. It is a great pity they do not
work for the German army. . . .

5. LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS6

Headquarters, July 7, 1915.

. . . Again that cursed question of. shortage of artillery and rifle
ammunition — it stands in the way of an energetic advance. If we
should have three days of serious fighting we might run out of am-
munition altogether. Without new rifles, it is impossible to fill up the
gaps. The army is now almost stronger than in peace time ; it should
be (and was at the beginning) three times as strong. This is the
situation in which we find ourselves at present.

If we had a rest from fighting for about a month our condition
would greatly improve. It is understood, of course, that what I say
is strictly for you only. Please do not say a word of this to any one.

4"Krasny Arkhiv," III, 59-60. V. A. Sukhomlinov, Minister of War. N. N.
lanushkevich, Chief of the Staff of the Supreme Commander.
* Chief of the Artillery Department.
•"Perepiska Nikolaia," III, 241.

194 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

6. DIARY OF ANDREI VLADIMIROVICH *

October g [1915]-

. . . The directors of the "Pulemet" Company, organized quite
recently for the purpose of making guns, have sent rne a pile of docu-
ments to explain the object of the company. Among these papers
was a copy of a letter to the Minister of War, dated in August of this
year. In this letter one reads :

"To our great regret the offer of our organization to build a gun
factory has not yet been acted upon. . . . We wish to say that the
remarks of certain persons that the "Pulemet" Company has done
nothing, have no foundation because [i] it was organized only in
September of last year, that is to say, in war time, and [2] all its
offers to make ammuntion and all other kinds of war materials were
declined by the artillery department. For example, on November 6,
1914, our company proposed to the Assistant Minister of War to
make shrapnel. This offer was declined by the head office of the
artillery department on November 15, on the ground that "there is no
need of ammunition." . . .

7. LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS «

My 2, 1915.

. . . Owing to the heat we take long rides in automobiles and go
very little on foot. We selected new districts and explored the sur-
rounding country, being guided by our maps. Often we made mis-
takes because the maps we have were made eighteen years ago and
since then some of the forests have disappeared while new woods and
new villages have appeared. . . .

8. DIARY OF ANDREI VLADIMIROVICH *

May 6 [1915]-

. . . We get all our food from Russia. The Ministers have taken
upon themselves the organization of the food supplies needed for the

7 "Andrei Vladimirovich," 40. Other letters follow, showing that the "Pule-
met" Company made numerous offers to supply the army with guns,
ammunition, and other war supplies, and that nearly all of these offers were
pigeonholed.

'"Perepiska Nikolaia," III, 231.

""Andrei Vladimirovich," 31.

ARMY AND NAVY; 1914-1917 195

millions in the army. We have now reached the time when the supply
is less than the demand. To the continuous demands and to the in-
sistent arguments that the shortage leads to a crisis, the Ministers
answer quite coolly: "Cut down the demands. Give the horse ten
instead of twenty pounds of oats, five instead of fifteen pounds of
hay, or don't give him anything at all." The same is true of meat.
I have often discussed this question with the Chief of Supplies of
our front. He has been at Headquarters attending conferences with
the Ministers, and came away with the impression that they "have
stopped fighting/' They take the stand that the country has given
all that it can give, and any further attempt to squeeze more out
of it will lead to uprisings, which is, of course, undesirable. In reply
they were told that the war is first and foremost, and that an army
cannot fight without food. But they are, seemingly, little concerned
with the army, and are mainly interested in keeping the country quiet.
The truth is that the requisitions have called forth considerable
comment, due in large part to the fact that the whole burden of the
requisition has fallen on the propertyless classes. Take, for example,
the meat situation. All pure-bred, registered, listed and all such live
stock, none of which the peasant has, is exempted from requisition.
The poor peasant loses his last cow, but the rich man is not touched.
With feed it is somewhat different. Speculators, by concealing grain
from the Government, succeed in raising the price and enriching
themselves. Had we in Russia a proper system of registering all
products, we might have escaped this evil. The fact remains that
our front gets almost no oats or hay. What will come out of it ? ...

9. LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS 10

Imperial Headquarters, Jwne 24, 1916.

... He [Sturmer, Prime Minister] is an excellent, honest man,
but, it seems to me, unable to make up his mind to do what is needed.
The most important and immediate question is fuel and metal, — iron
and copper for ammunition. Without metals the mills can not supply
a sufficient amount of bullets and bombs. The same is true [lack of
fuel] in regard to the railways. Trepov [Minister of Transportation]
assures me that the railways work better this year than last and
produces proof, but nevertheless every one complains that they are
not doing as well as they might. These cursed affairs. They confound
me so much that I do not know where the truth lies. But it is neces-
*"Perepiska Nikolaia," IV, 306.

196 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

sary to act very energetically and to take definite steps to settle
these questions once and for all. Just as soon as the Duma
is adjourned, I will summon all the Ministers here to deliberate on
these questions, and I shall settle everything here. They continue
to come here almost daily and take up my time. I usually go to bed
after 1 130 A.M., spending all my time in hurried writing, reading,
and receiving ! ! ! It's terrible ! . . .

CHAPTER XI
THE SUPREME COMMAND

i.. DIARY OF ANDREI VLADIMIROVICH 1

October 10, 1915

... A few days ago mother had tea with Niki and Alix. She
[mother] reported that Niki was in good spirits. He is pleased
with his new position and the fact that he knows what is going
on. She reminded him that it was his wish at the very outbreak
of the war to put himself at the head of the army and that his minis-
ters dissuaded him. "Yes," said Niki, "that was my wish, but they
interfered." . . .

2. MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 2

July 29, 1915.

Goremykin: . . . The Empress ... as you know, was never fa-
vorably disposed toward Nicholas Nicholaevich and during the first
days of the war protested against his appointment as Commander-in-
chief. . . .

3. LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR3

October 2, 1914.

... I am so happy for you that you can at last manage to
go. ... It was a topic I on purpose did not touch, knowing and
perfectly well understanding your feelings, at the same time realizing
that it is better you are not out at the head of the army. . . .

4. LETTER OF EMPRESS TO1 EMPEROR4

November 30, 1914

.. . . It's good you can have a thorough talk with N. & tell him
your opinion of some people & give him some ideas. May again your
presence there bring good luck to our brave troops. . . .

1 Dnevnik B. Velikogo Kniazia Andreia Vladimirovicha, 96. To be referred
to as Andrei Vladimirovich. The Grand Duke was a cousin of the Tsar.

'"Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVII, 21.

* "Pisma Imperatritsy Aleksandry Fedorovny k Imperatoru Nikolam II,
It 378 (To be referred to as "Pisma Imperatritsy").

4"Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 398.

197

198 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

5. LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR6

December 7, 1914

... I don't listen to the gossip of town which makes one other-
wise quite nervous, but only believe what Nikolasha lets know.
Nevertheless I begged A. [Anna Vyrubova] * to wire to our Friend
[Rasputin] that things are very serious and we beg for his
prayers. . . .

6. LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR7

December 27, 1914

. . . Our Friend arrives tomorrow and says we shall have better
news from the war. ...

7. CONVERSATION BETWEEN GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS
NICHOLAEVICH AND RODZIANKO *

. . . When the conversation touched on Rasputin I told him of
the rumors that circulated at Petrograd. It was said that Rasputin
telegraphed for permission to visit the Headquarters and that Nicholas
Nicholaevich answered, "Come — I'll hang you." When I asked the
Grand Duke whether this was true, he laughed and said, "Not quite
that." It was quite evident, however, that something like that did
actually take place. . . .

8. LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR9

October 3, 1914

. . . Our Friend is happy for your sake that you have gone and
was so glad to have seen you yesterday. He always fears Bonheur,
that is to say, the crows10 want him [Grand Duke] to get the
P[olish] throne or in Galicia that that is there [their] aim but I said
she should quieten him, even out of thanks you would never risk such
a thing. Gr. [Rasputin] loves you jealously and can't bear N.
[Nicholas] playing a part.

8 "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 406.

* The mutual friend of the Empress and Rasputin.
T "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 412.

8 Rodzianko, M, V. ; "Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 85.
g "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 380.

* Princesses Militsa and Anastasiia of Montenegro, wives of the Grand
Dukes Nicholas Nicholaevich and Peter Nicholaevich.

ARMY AND NAVY; 1914-1917 199

. 9. LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR11

Pel. 11, 1915

. . . Our Friend came there [ Vyrubova] , as He wanted to see me
a second. ... I am so glad you had good talks with N. . . . others
influence him & he tries to play your part wh. is far from right —
except in military matters — and- ought to be put a stop to — one has
no right before God and man to usurp your rights as he does — he
can make the mess & later you will have great difficulty in mending
matters. Me it hurts very much. One has no right to profit of one's
unusually great rights as he does. . . .

io. DIARY OF ANDREI VLADIMIROVICH 12

Jme i [1915]

... We had a visitor at the Staff today, F. F. Palitsyn [formerly
Chief of Staff]. . . . F. F. was greatly displeased that Nicholas
Nicholaevich was given the title of "Supreme."

"It won't do," said F. F. "You can not pull the feathers out of
the crown and distribute them right and left. Supreme Commander-
in-Chief, Supreme [Chief] of Evacuation, Supreme Council — they
are all supreme except the Tsar. Wait, you will see some of the
evil results of this system. The Tsar alone is supreme; and no one
else can be supreme. What does it lead to? He [Grand Duke
Nicholas] is occupied with politics — Ministers come to see him — if
I were in his place I would not receive them — but is not commanding
the army. I told him so. I said that he has divided his authority
among his subordinates and that he is no longer master of the
situation. It won't do. It won't do to mix war and politics. They
do not go together and no good can come of it. Besides, he has no
competent organizations. Moltke has said — and that is true for all
times — that strategy in itself is not complicated — its formulas are
few and simple. But there is no strategy without supplies. The army
has to live, to be fed, to be kept up, to be supplied. It should have
everything and it would give everything. If you demand everything
from the army you must supply it with everything. He who demands
should give. As it is now, the Supreme Commander has neither
supplies, nor the control of the rear. He does not have all the
threads in his hands. He orders an offensive and is told that it is

""Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 424.
B "Andrei Vladimirovich,1' 35-6.

200 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

not ready. From the point of view of military technique, this won't
do at all. As long as he is not full master of everything, he is
nothing. He can not demand, if he himself gives nothing. . . ."

u. MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS13

July 29, 1915

Kriwshein: "It should be remembered that the law about putting
the government on a military basis was made on the supposition that
the Emperor himself would be the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
In that case there could have been no conflicts ... for all power
would have been in the hands of one person. But now that this is
changed [the Emperor is not Supreme Commander] there should
be a change in the law to meet the new situation. For 'no matter how
talented the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander may be, he
cannot take the place of the Council of Ministers and, in general, of
the machinery of government of the Russian Empire." . . .

12. MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS14

August 6, 1915

Krivoskein: Yesterday I received a letter from General lanush-
kevich of an unusual character. He writes that "one meets rarely the
hero, the idealist and altruist of the fairy-story book ... he is not
more than one per cent, and all the rest — are people who look forward
to pay day ... to fight for Russia is a beautiful idea but the masses
do not understand it ... a man from Tambov is ready to defend
Tambov guberniia to the last, but war in Poland has no meaning for
him . . . and therefore the soldiers surrender in large numbers. . . ,"
from all this General lanushkevich has come to the conclusion that "to
get the Russian soldier to fight the enemy it is necessary to interest him
[soldier] in a material way ... it is necessary to buy heroes." . . .

The writer of the letter is either unusually naive or unpardon-
ably stupid. ... At the front all goes to pieces, the enemy is nearing
the very heart of Russia, and Mr. lanushkevich is thinking only how
to throw off on others the responsibility for what is taking place.
In reading his letter I am impressed more and more by his desire
to prove an alibi. From the moment of the very first defeats there
came from Headquarters loud cries of lack of ammunition, lack of

u "Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 21.
"Ibid., 23-5.

ARMY AND NAVY; 1914-1917 201

activity in the rear. . . . Every one was to blame for the Russian
defeats, every one except Headquarters. . . . How can General
lanushkevich have the manhood to continue to conduct war operations
when he has no confidence in the army, does not believe in love of
country and in the Russian people. This is terrible ! Just think, gen-
tlemen, in what hands lies the fate of Russia, of the monarchy and
of the world. . . . What has poor Russia done to bring on herself
such a tragedy ? I can no longer be silent. No matter the consequences,
I cannot shout from street corners and squares but I must tell you
and the Tsar. I reserve for myself the right to lay the letter of
General lanushkevich tomorrow before the Emperor and tell His
Majesty what I think of it. ...

Sasonov: This shameful letter does not take me unawares. One
may expect anything from General lanushkevich. It is terrible to
think that the Grand Duke is a prisoner of such men. It is no secret
that he is hypnotized by lanushkevich and Danilov [G. N. Quarter-
master General], he is in their pocket. They jealously guard him
from contact with the outside world. . . .

13. DIARY OF ANDREI VLADIMIROVICH »

August 25 [1915] Tsarskoe Selo

. . . [S. D.] Sazonov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dined
at mother's. After dinner he told us the following:

"General lanushkevich [N. N.], Chief of the Staff of the Supreme
Commander-in-Chief, takes unheard of liberties. Under the cir-
cumstances it is quite impossible to do anything. Let me illustrate
by several incidents. When the Allies decided to carry on operations
at Gallipoli they asked us to take part. This would not only have
aided them but would have been of great importance to us,
the principal beneficiaries in case Constantinople was captured.
After negotiations with the Staff of the Supreme Commander,
the army corps of General Irmanov was brought together at
Odessa. I received from the Staff even the list of the officers,
which I passed on to the Allies, telling them that the expedi-
tionary force was ready to start in a few days. Some time later I
learned quite incidentally that this corps was in Galicia. When I
reported to the Emperor, I called his attention to this matter, and
he told me that he, too, had only recently and quite by accident,
learned of this change from the Grand Duke Georgi Mikhailovich,
* "Andrei Vladimirovich," 67-9.

202 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

whom he had appointed at the head of one of the battalions in the
corps. . . . Imagine my position in regard to the Ambassadors of
the Allies. It must be remembered that this corps was detailed with
the Tsar's authorization and all of a sudden, without even notifying
him, the corps is moved to' Galicia. His Majesty merely remarked
that' the whole army is at the service of the Supreme Commander
and that it is difficult to interfere with his orders.

"Another incident took place in March. Bark [P. L.], Minister
of Finance, received a telegram from lanushkevich, informing him
[Bark] that he was to send over to America, by January, 1916, 400
million rubles gold to pay for shrapnel. Bark was almost bowled over.
The amount in question is one-third of our total gold fund. Without
consulting any one, they [Grand Duke and lanushkevich] signed
the contracts. Such an attitude toward the finances of the country
can lead only to the ruin of the treasury. Poor Bark has not yet
recovered from the shock. In addition, he [lanushkevich] has taken
an impossible stand in our Persian policy. His Majesty found it
necessary to send one [military] division to Persia, where our
affairs are not advancing very well, as a punitive force in order to
re-establish our prestige and to bring order out of chaos. In reply
lanushkevich said that the division would not be sent. Such an atti-
tude toward the will of His Majesty cannot be tolerated, aside from
the fact that under such conditions it is impossible to carry on a
policy. As it stands we have two authorities at the same time, one
excluding the other. . . .

"Fortunately all this will soon come to an end. The Emperor
himself will assume command. He wished to do that a long time
ago, but hesitated, and at last, decided . . ."

Sazonov pointed out, however, the dangers of this act, for every
failure would lead to criticism of the Emperor. In view of this,
Sazonov asked the opinion of Boris [Vladimirovich] on the effect
the change in command would have on the troops. Boris was quite
1 certain that it would have a good effect, that the morale would be
improved, and that the news would be received with great enthusiasm.
He added that the removal of Nicholas Nicholaevich would pass
unnoticed. I am not of that opinion. During the year of the war,
notwithstanding the series of important defeats, he was very popular.
He carried out honestly the duties laid upon him in spite of the dif-
ficulties in the way. One of these is the composition of his staff,
which was given him ready-made and which he did not select

ARMY AND NAVY; 1914-1917 203

14. CORRESPONDENCE OF EMPEROR AND EMPRESS

LETTER OF EMPEROR TO ElMPRESS 16

Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in^Chief

October 6, 1914

. . . Ugh! Nikolasha [Grand Duke Nicholas], as I feared, does
not let me go to Osovets. This is intolerable because it prevents me
from seeing the troops that were recently in the fight. . . .

LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS 1<r

Headquarters, March 15, 1915

. . . N. [Grand Duke] would not even listen [to the suggestion]
that I go to Lomzha on the very first day. He says that German
aeroplanes are flying there over our troops in search of our reserves,
that all the roads are packed full of cars and wagons, and for these
reasons he advised General Po not to go in that direction. I shall
decide what to do. I sent Dzhunkovski [V. F.] to see what is going
on over there. He is a practical man and can judge whether the trip
is practicable. . , .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR 18

March 18, 1915

. . . Don't you tell N. & go off where it suits you & where
nobody can expect you — of course he will try to keep you back. . . .

LETTER 'OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS 19

March 18, 1915

... It seems to me that you think that N. is holding me and
takes pleasure in keeping me from the troops. As a matter of fact
it is not so at all. . . .

LETTER OF EMPEROR TO IMPRESS 20

April 18, 1915

. . . Nicholas proposed that I should go as soon as possible to
Lvov and Przeniysl. . . . Bobrinski said the same thing a few days

M "Perepiska Nikolaia i Aleksandry Romanovykh," III, 17. To be referred
to as "Perepiska Nikolaia."
1T /&«/., 124.

M "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 432.
» "Perepiska Nikolaia/1 III, 136.
"Ibid., 148.

204 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

ago. Nicholas will accompany me as this is my first visit to the
conquered area. ...

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR 21

April 19, 1915

. . . Well, I shall ask our Friend to quite particularly pray for
you there — but, forgive my saying so — its not for N. to accompany
you — you must be the chief one, the first time you go. You find me
an old goose, no doubt, but if others wont think of such thing's, I
must. He must remain & work as usual — really don't take him, as
the hate against him must be great there — & to see you alone will
rejoice those hearts that go out to you in love and gratitude. . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR 22 *

April 20, 1915

. . . When A. [Vyrubova] told Him in secret, because I want His
special prayers for you, he curiously enough said the same as me;
that on the whole it does not please Him "God will help; but it is
(too early) to go now, he will not observe anything, mil not see his
people, it is interesting, but better after the war." . . ,

LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS 28

April 20, 1915

. . . My dear, I do not agree with you that N. should remain
here while I go to Galicia. On the contrary, just because I go in
war time to the conquered area, the commander-in-chief should
accompany me. I believe that all in my circle here find this to be the
right thing to do. It is he who accompanies me and not I who am on
his staff . . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR 2*

June 25, 1915

. . . Would to God N. were another man & had not turned against
a man of Gods [Rasputin], that always brings bad luck to their
work & those women wont let him change. . . .

*"Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 441.
*ffid., 442.

""Perepiska Nikolaia," 154.
*"Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 465.

ARMY AND NAVY; 1914-1917 205

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR 25

June 23, 1915

. . . Remember you have reigned long, have far more experience
than they — N. has only the army to think of & success — you carry
the internal responsabilities on for years — if he makes faults (after
the war he is nobody), but you have to set all straight. No, hearken
unto our Friend, believe Him, He has yr. interest & Russians at
heart — it is not for nothing God sent Him to us — only we must
pay more attention to what He says — His words are not lightly
spoken — & the gravity of having not only His prayers, but His
advice — is great. . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO E'MPEROR26

June 29, 1915

.... I always remember what our Friend says & how often we
do not enough heed His words,

He was so much against yr. going to the Headquarters, because
people get round you there & make you do things, wh. would have
been better not done27 — here the atmosphere in your own house is
a healthier one & you would see things more rightly — if only you
would come back quicker. I am not speaking because of a selfish
feeling, but that here I feel quieter about you & there am in a
constant dread what one is concocting — you see, I have absolutely no
faith in N. — know him to be far fr. clever & having gone against a
Man of Gods, his work cant be blessed, nor his advice be good. . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR28

My 7, 1915

. . . you must show you have a way & will of yr. own, & are
not lead by N. & his staff , who direct yr. movements & whose per-
mission you have to ask before going anywhere. No, go alone,
without N., by yr. very own self, bring the blessing of yr. presence
to them — don't say you bring bad luck — at Lemberg & Przemysl it
happened because our Friend knew & told you it was too early, but
you listened instead to HEADQUARTERS. . . .

* "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 462-3.
mlbid., 473-

** Change in ministers.

* "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 485.

206 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR 29

My 8, 1915

... Ah my Nicky, things are not as they ought to be, & therefore
N. keeps you near, to have a hold over you with his ideas & bad
councels. Wont you yet believe me, my Boy?

Cant you realise that a man who turned simple traitor to a man
of Gods, cannot be blest, nor his actions be good — well, if he must
remain at the head of the army there is nothing to be done, & all
bad success will fall upon his head — but interior mistakes will be
told home upon you, as who inside the country can think that he
reigns beside you.

Its so utterly false & wrong. . . .

O, what joy, if you really return on Sunday.80 . . .

MEMOIRS OF POLIVANOV31

... On Tuesday, August 17, [1915] after my usual report which
took place at the Alexander Palace in Tsarskoe Selo, the Emperor
turned to me and said that he intended to assume the supreme
command of the army. He had had in mind doing this after the
declaration of the war, but yielded to the Council of Ministers, which
advised against it, But now that the army is in a difficult situation
he feels morally responsible to join it and to lead it during the
duration of the war. . . .

LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS 82

Imperial Headquarters

August 21, 1915

... It seems as if a year had passed since we took communion
together in those trying days before my coming here! I remember
quite well that, as I stood opposite the large image of the Savior, on
the high place in the big church, some inner voice seemed to urge me
to come to some definite decision independently of what our Friend
[Rasputin] told me, and to write my decision at once to Nik [Grand
Duke Nicholas]. . . .

" "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 486-7.

w After his return, July n, the Empress prevailed upon the Emperor to
dismiss the Grand Duke and make himself Supreme Commander, which he
did in September against the strong protest of his ministers and other
influential men. •

* Polivanov, A. A. ; "Memuary," 203. Polivanov, Minister of War.

* "Perepiska Nikolaia," IV, 406.

ARMY AND NAVY; 1914-1917 207

15. TELEGRAM OF EMPEROR TO GENERAL-ADJUTANT
COUNT VORONTSOV-DASHKOV*5

B or shorn

[August 23, 1915]

I am sending you Dmitri Sheremetev with a letter. It is necessary
to tell you that I have decided to take over the command of the
army. Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich will be freed from his
duties as Commander of the armies and will be appointed in your
place. I am sure that you will understand the serious reasons that
have caused me to make such an important change.

NICHOLAS

16. LETTER OF COUNT VORONTSOV-DASHKOV
TO THE TSAR3*

Your Majesty,

I have read the letter of my dear Sovereign, handed to me by
Dmitri Sheremetev, with a feeling of deep gratitude. It gives me the
right to live the remnant of my days with a clear conscience. I
cannot help repeating on this occasion what I have said so many
times, namely, that without Your Majesty's support and confidence, I
would not have been able to prove useful to You.

The telegram from Your Majesty, received on the 23-d, has
inspired me with the following ideas, which I allow -myself to express
to You with the frankness You have permitted me.

Your Majesty desires to assume command of the army. In this
case, considering future events connected with the administration
of the vast Russian State, the army under Your command must be
victorious. Failure would fatally affect Your further reign. Person-
ally I feel convinced of ultimate success, but I am not sure of an
early turn for the better. Much has been damaged by the present
command, and one can hardly expect a quick correction of the errors.
— It is necessary for You to select a worthy Chief of Staff in place
of the present incumbent. Voices from the western front reaching
the Caucasus name General Alexeev. The voice of the army probably
does not err.

The appointment of Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich as Your

"Semennikov; "Politika Romanovykh," 80-1. Vorontsov-Dashkov, Illarion
Ivanovich (1837-1016).

2o8 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Viceroy in the Caucasus I consider very desirable. It is easier for the
Grand Duke than for a common mortal to rule the Caucasus ; such
is the character of the Orient. I am convinced that the Grand Duke
will soon learn to love the Caucasus and its inhabitants, and that
the inhabitants will love him for his kindness and sympathy. But
will he care to take this place? Degradation from priesthood to
deaconship, deeply affecting his pride, cannot help proving very hard
for him, and he will be asking Your Majesty for retirement from
the high post he occupies, on grounds of ill-health, without any other
appointment, or for permission to rest for a more or less lengthy
period.

Should the Grand Duke agree to take the new post at once, I
would ask for Your permission not to wait for him in Tiflis, but to
meet him at the Caucasus boundary, in Rostov-on-the-Don.

Once more I beg my dear Sovereign to accept my expression of
deep gratitude for everything in Your letter. That letter will be
sacredly preserved in our family archives.

Christ be with You.

Devotedly Yours,

I. VORONTSOV

17. RODZIANKO'S LETTER TO THE TSAR8*

To His Imperial Majesty,
The Mast Humble Report of
The President of the State Duma

Your Imperial Majesty:

Supplementing my verbal report, which I had the honor to lay
before You on the twenty-fourth of August, I make bold to beg Your
Majesty again not to subject Your sacred person to the dangers in
which You may be placed by the consequences of Your decision.

Sire! You are the symbol and the standard around which all
the nationalities of Russia rally. This standard cannot and must
not be dragged into the stress and storm of the ordeals that have
come to us. It must shine radiantly as the torch for all the strivings
of the nation, and serve as the invincible bulwark of all the sons of
Russia and as the promise of security for their mitids, alarmed by
these events.

Sire ! You have no right, in the face of the nation, to allow

"Semennikov; "Politika Romanovykh," 84-5.

ARMY AND NAVY; 1914-1917 209

anything to happen that might possibly cast the faintest shadow to
fall upon this sacred standard.

At this dreadful hour of peril, unprecedented in the history
of Russia, when the possibility arises of a heavy Teuton yoke over
the Russian land, You, Sire, must be beyond and above those organs
of government which shoulder the duty of immediately repulsing
the enemy.

You cannot act as executive: You must be judge, a benign
encourager or implacable punisher.

But if You, Sire, should take over the direct command of our
glorious army— You, Sire, the last refuge of Your people — who will
then pass judgment, in the event of failure or defeat ? Is it not really
obvious, Sire, that You will then voluntarily have surrendered Your
inviolable person to the judgment of the people?— and that is fatal
to Russia.

Consider, Sire, what You are laying hands on — on Your own
self, Sire!

Our native land is going through a painful crisis. General mis-
trust surrounds the present Government, which has lost confi-
dence in itself and will power. All idea of authority has been
shattered by its disorderly measures, and yet, more than ever be-
fore, there has now grown up in the country a realization of
the need for a firm, unshakable faith in oneself and in the pop-
ular strength of the Government. The minds of all the Russians have
reached a state of an unprecedented strain, fearing for the fate of
Russia.

The nation is impatiently longing for a power which will instil
confidence and lead the country into the path* of victory. Yet at
such a time, Your Majesty, You decide to displace the Supreme
Commander-in-Chief , whom the Russian people still trusts absolutely,
The people will interpret Your step in no other way but as inspired
by the Germans around You, who in the minds of the people are
identified with our enemies and with treason to the Russian cause.

In the popular mind, the result of Your Majesty's decision will
be a realization of the hopelessness of the situation and of the chaos
which has invaded the administration.

Sire ! The situation will be even worse if the army, deprived of
a leader enjoying its absolute confidence, loses its courage.

In this event defeat is inevitable, and within the country revolu-
tion and anarchy will then break out, sweeping everything from
their path.

2io DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Your Majesty ! Before it is too late, revoke your decision, no
matter how hard it may be for you.

Retain Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich at the head of the
army.

Reassure alarmed and agitated minds by forming a government
of people who enjoy Your confidence and are known to the country
by their public activities.

Sire, it is not yet too late!

On bended knees I beg You fervently not to delay the decision
' which will protect the sacred person of the Russian Tsar and the
reigning dynasty.

Sire, give heed to this truthful word from the heart of Your
loyal servant.

The President of the State Duma,

MIKHAIL RODZIANKO

Petrograd, August 25, 1915.

18. COLLECTIVE ADDRESS OF THE MINISTERS
TO THE TSAR"

Most Gracious Sovereign:

Do not count against us our bold and candid address. We are
driven to this action by our duty as faithful subjects, our love for
You and our native country, and our alarmed consciousness of the
dire portent of the events now taking place.

Yesterday, at the meeting of the Council of Ministers under Your
personal chairmanship, we laid before You our unanimous appeal
that Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich should not be removed from
his part in the supreme command of the army. But we fear that
Your Imperial 'Majesty did not deign to incline to our plea, which,
in our opinion, is the plea of all loyal Russia.

Sire, we dare once more to tell You that, to the best of our under-
standing, Your decision threatens Russia, Yourself, and Your dynasty
with evil consequences.

At the same meeting the radical difference between the view of
the President of the Council of Ministers and our own became mani-
fest in estimating events within the country and considering the
course of action to be followed by the Government A situation such
as this, intolerable at any time, is fatal in these days.
*Semennikov; "Politika Romanovykh," 87-8.

ARMY AND ffAVY; 1914-1917

In these circumstances, we lose faith in the possibility of being of
service to You and the country.

Your Imperial Majesty's loyal subjects:
PETER KHABJTONOV PRINCE N. SCHERBATOV

PETER BARK ' PRINCE VSEVOLOD SHAKHOVSKOI

COUNT PAUL IGNATIEV SERGEI SAZONOV

ALEXANDER KRIVOSHEIN ALEXANDER SAMARIN

Sept. 3, 1915

19. LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR87

Sept. 4, 1915

. . . You have fought this great fight for your country &
throne — alone & with bravery & decision. Never have they seen
such firmness in you before & it cannot remain without good fruit.

Do not fear for what remains behind — one must be severe & stop
all at once. Lovy, I am here, dont laugh at silly old wify, but she
has "trousers" on unseen, & I can get the old man [Goremykin] to
come & keep him up to be energetic — whenever I can be of the
smallest use, tell me what to do — use me — at such a time God will
give me the strength to help you — because our souls are fighting
for the right against the evil. . . .

Only get Nikolasha's nomination quicker done — no dawdling, its
bad for the cause. . . .

Give me some news as soon as you can. . . .

Tell me the impression, if you can. Be firm to the end, let me
be sure of that otherwise shall get quite ill from anxiety.

Bitter pain not to be with you — know what you feel, & the
meeting with N. wont be agreeable — you did trust him & now you
know, what months ago our Friend said, that he was acting wrongly
towards you & your country & wife — its not the people who would
do harm to your people but Nikolasha & set Guchkov, Rodzianko,
Samarin, etc. ...

20. LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS '*

Headquarters, September 7, 1915

. . . Thank God it is over. Here I am again with a new respon-
sibility on my shoulders. God's will be done ! — I feel at peace as if
I had been at Holy Communion.

w "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 490-1.
""Perepiska Nikolaia," III, 266-8.

212 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

On the memorable morning of September 5 when I arrived, I
prayed long and reread without end your first letter [September 4].
As the moment for our meeting approached, I felt more and more

at peace.

N. entered with a smile and just asked when he was to leave. In
the same manner I replied that he might remain two days. Then we
discussed several questions relating to military operations, generals,
etc., & that was all. . . . This is the beginning of a new clean page
and what will be written on it God alone knows. Wify, dear, don't
you think you should help hubby while he is away ? It is too bad that
you have not done this before, at least during the period of the war.

I do not know of a more agreeable feeling than to be proud
of you as I have been these last months, when you have kept after
me to be firm and to stick to my opinion.

We had just finished playing dominoes when I received, through
Alexeev, a telegram from Ivanov that today our nth army in
Galicia attacked two German divisions. . . . With such good results
that we took more than 150 officers, 7,000 soldiers, 30 cannons, and
many machine guns.

This happened immediately after our troops learned that I
assumed the chief command. This is a mark of God's grace and so
soon! . . .

21. LETTERS OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR39

Sept. 28, 1915

, . . God grant only that nothing shld. succeed in the Caucasus,40
& the people show their devotion to you & allow no playing of a

grand part. . . .

April 19, 1916

« . . How splendid Trebizond has been taken by our splendid
troops — I congratulate you with all my loving heart. It makes me
sad that all the luck is down there — but the good will come here
too iti time. ...

" "Pisma Imperatritsy."

* Grand Duke Nicholas was made commander of the Russian army in
the Caucasus.

CHAPTER XII
WAR SECRETS

THE EMPRESS, RASPUTIN

i. LETTERS OF THE EMPEROR AND EMPRESS

LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS1

September 13, 1915

. . . Now I will say a few words about the military situation.
It is threatening toward Dvinsk and Vilna, serious in the center,
around Baranovichi, and good in the south (Gen. Ivanov) where
our success continues. The seriousness consists in the extremely weak
condition of our regiments, which are only about one- fourth full. It
will be impossible to fill their ranks before a month because the new
recruits will not be ready and because we have few rifles. . . .

I ask you, my dear, to say nothing of this to anybody. I am
writing this for you only. . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR2

November 16, 1915

. . . He brought yr. secret marcheroute ... to me & I won't say
a word about it except to our Friend to guard you everywhere. . . .

LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS a

June 18, 1916

... A few days ago we with Alexeev decided not to advance in
the north, but to concentrate our strength a little more to the south.
But I ask you to say nothing about it to any one, not even to our
Friend. . . .

LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS *

June 20, 1916

... I told Alexeev how much you are interested in war questions
and about all the details which you asked me in your last letter
No. 511. He smiled but said nothing. . . .

^'Perepiska Nikolaia," III. 290. ' "Perepiska Nikolaia," IV, 290-1.
'"Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 582. \IUd., 295.

213

214 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO ElMPEROR 5

September 29, 1916

... I begged our Friend to particularly pray for the success
of our new plans, & he does so & hopes God will bless them. . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR 6

October 6, 1916

. . . Our Friend says about the new orders you gave to Brusilov,
etc. : "Very satisfied with father's orders, all will be well." He won't
mention it to a soul, but I had to ask His blessing for yr. decision. . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR7

October 7, 1916

. . . Our Friend is much put out that Brusilov had not listened
to yr. order to stop the advance — says you were inspired from above
to give that order & the crossing of the Carpathians before winter &
God wld. bless it. — Now he says again useless losses. —

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR8

October 9, 1916

. . . Our Fr. worries that one did not listen to you [Brusilov] as
your first thought was the right one & a pitty you gave in, yr. spirit
was right wishing the change. . . .

2. KHVOSTOV'S TESTIMONY9

. . . Rasputin went to Tsarskoe and Rubinstein [D. L., banker]
asked him to find out whether the Russian army would advance or
not. . . . Rubinstein needed the information in order to determine
whether to buy timber in 'Minsk Guberniia or not. . . . Rasputin
went, and on his return related what took place at Tsarskoe. , , . It
should, however, be said that when sober, Rasputin said very little,
but when he had a few drinks in him, he talked a great deal. His
friends knew this and therefore took him to a restaurant, gave him
a bottle of madeira, and then he told them what had happened at
Tsarskoe. . . „

* "Pisma Imperatritsy," II, 408.
*Ibid., 419.
'Ibid., 420,
*Ibid., 423.

'"Padenie Tsarskogo Rezhiraa," I, 31-2. A. N. Khvostov, Minister of
the Interior,

ARMY AND NAVY; 1914-1917 215

"I came," said Rasputin, "to Tsarskoe, and walked in. Papa
[Tsar] sat there looking glum. I stroked his head and said, 'Why so
sad?' He replied, 'Scoundrels all about me! No boots, no guns; it
is necessary to advance, but to advance it is impossible.' . . .

" 'But when will you advance ?'

" We will have no guns before two months, that's the earliest
that we can advance/ ". . .

CHAPTER XIII

THE EMPRESS AND RASPUTIN AS MILITARY
ADVISERS

i. CALLING OF THE SECOND CLASS

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR

June 23, 1915

. . . The same about the question wh. our Friend takes so to heart
& wh. is the most serious of all, for internal peace's sake — the not
calling in the Second class — if the order has been given, you tell N.
[Nicholas Nicholaevich] that you insist upon its counterordering. . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR2

June 24, 1915

. . . Please, my Angel, make N. see with your eyes— don't give
in to any of the 2nd class being taken — put it off as long as only
possible— they have to work in the fields, fabrics, on steamers, etc. ;
rather take the recroutes for next year now — please listen to His
advise when spoken so gravely & wh. gave Him sleepless nights —
one fault & we shall all have to pay for it. ...

LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS 8

June 29, 1915

. . . When I said that I desire that the class of 1917 should be
called, all the ministers gave a sigh of relief. N. agreed at once.
It is understood of course that if the war goes on we might be obliged
to call some of the 2nd class, but for the time being the matter
is dropped. . . .

"'Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 462.

a Ibid., 463-4.

'"Perepiska Nikolaia," III, 223-4.

216

ARMY AND NAVY; 1914-1917 217

2. STRATEGY

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR*

November 19, 1915

. . . Our Friend, whom we saw yesterday evening, when he sent
you the telegram, was afraid that, if we had not a big army to pass
through Roumania, we might be caught in a trap from behind. —

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR 5

November 28, 1915

. . . Now, before I forget, I must give you over a message from
our Friend, prompted by what He saw in the night. He begs you
to order that one should advance near Riga, says it is necessary,
otherwise the Germans will settle down so firmly through all the
winter, that it will cost endless bloodshed and trouble to make them
move — now it will take them so aback, that we shall succeed in
making them retrace their steps — he says this is just now the most
essential thing and begs you seriously to order ours to advance, he
says we can and we must, and I was to write it to you at once. —

LETTER OF ElMPRESS TO EMPEROR6

January 4, 1916

. . . Our Friend is always praying & thinking of the war — He
says we are to tell him at once if there is anything particular — so she
did about the f ogg, & He scolded for not having said it at once —
says no more foggs will disturb. —

LETTERS OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR7

February 17, 1916

. . . Now a perfectly private question of my own — as one reads
always that the germans continue sending & artillery & troops to
Bulgaria, if, when we advance at last, they come from behind through
Rumania — who covers the back of our army? Or does the guard get
sent down to the left of Keller & to protect towards Odessa? These
are my own thoughts, because the enemy always finds -our weak
points — they prepare everywhere & for all emergencies always &
we very superficially as a rule, therefore lost in the Carpathians etc.

4"Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 586. 'Ibid., 620.

*., 597. 'Ibid., II, 281-2.

3i8 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

as had not sufficiantly fortified our positions. Now, if they force
their way through Rumania upon our left flank — what has remained
to protect our frontier. Excuse my bothering you — but involuntarily
all such thoughts come. . . .

LETTERS OF EMPRESS 8

June 17, 1916

... He [Rasputin] begs we should not yet strongly advance in
the north because' he says, if our successes continue being good in
the south, they will themselves retreat from the north, or advance &
then their losses will be very great— if we begin there, our losses
will be very heavy — He says this is an advise. —

3. GENERAL ALEXEEV

LETTER OF EfMPEROR TO EMPRESS9

September 9, 1915

... I cannot tell you how pleased I am with General Alexeev.
What a conscientious, wise, and modest man, and such a worker ! . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR 10

August 16, 1916

... If only Alexeev has taken our Friend's Image in the
right spirit, then God is sure to bless his work with you. Don't fear
to mention Gregory's name to him — thanks to Him that you remained
firm & took over the commandment a year ago, when all were against
you, tell him that & he will understand the wisdom then — & many
wonderful escapes to those he prays for at the war who know Him
— not to speak of Baby [crown prince] & Ania. . . .

LETTER OF ElMPRESS TO EMPEROR11

August 17, 1916

. . . Regret, I did not speak more vehemently at the Headquar-
ters & not to Alexeev — yr. prestige will be saved — . . . listen to
old wify who only thinks of yr. good & knows this step is the right
one. — Let Alexeev think otherwise — only better quite put him
away. . . .

a"Pisma Imperatritsy," II, 354.
•"Perepiska Nikolaia," III, 274.

**"P;e.*«.a T*vtftA..«*..;4.«., »' TT «Q^C

Pisma Imperatritsy," II,
., 387.

ARMY AND NAVY; 1914-1917 219

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR 12

November 18, 1916

... A man who is so terribly against our Friend as poor Alexeev
is — cannot have blessed work. . . ,

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO E'MPEROR 13

December 17, 1916

. . . Remember to forbid Gurko [General] speaking & mixing
himself into politics — it ruined Nikolasha & Alexeev, — the latter
God sent this illness clearly to save you fr. a man who was lossing
his way & doing harm by listening to bad letters & people, instead
of listening to yr. orders about the war & being obstinate. And one
has set him against me — proof — what he said to old Ivanov. — . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR x*

August 7, 1916

... I overtired myself — so remain quiet today & only go to A this
evening to see our Friend. — He finds better one shld. not advance
too obstinately as the losses will be too great — one can be patient
without forcing things, as ultimately it will be ours ; one can go on
madly & finish the' war in 2 months, but then thousands of lives
will be sacrificed — & by patience the end will also be gained & one
will spare much blood. . . .

LETTER OF IMPRESS TO EMPEROR15

August 21, 1915

, . . Wonder, what you are doing about the guard, — will they
keep quiet now for some time. — Our Friend hopes we wont climb
over the Carpathians and try to take them, as he repeats the losses
will be too great again. ...

M "Pisma Imperatritsy," II, 442.
"Ibid., 451.
Ibid., 385.
390.

CHAPTER XIV
STATE OF MIND OF THE ARMY

i. RECRUITING

(a) MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 1

17, 1915

Scherbatov: I should say that recruiting is going from bad to
worse. The police is unable to handle the slackers. They hide in the
forest and in the grain fields. If it should become known that the
recruits of the second class are called out without the approval of
the Duma I fear, that under the present conditions, we would not
get a single man. . . .

(&) ME!MOIRS OF

. . . The following letter of July 31, 1915, General lanushkevich
[Chief of Staff of Grand Duke Nicholas] wrote to me [General
Polivanov, Minister of War], . . .

"We get information that in the villages the new recruits are
being advised, under the inspiration of the left parties not to fight
to the point of getting hurt but to surrender in order to live. If we
should have two or three weeks of drilling with one rifle for every
three or four men in addition to this kind of teaching it will be
impossible to do anything with such troops. His Majesty has already
confirmed two measures: (i) that the families of those who sur-
render of their own free will shall be deprived of Government
support, and (2) that at the end of the war such [returned] war
prisoners will be sent to colonize Siberia. It would be exceedingly
desirable to impress upon the population that these two measures
will be rigidly enforced, and that the land portion [of those who
surrender] will be transferred to the landless men honestly doing
their duty. The pocket argument (land) is the most effective of all
arguments. An expression from the Duma on this subject will carry
more weight than that of any one else.

*"Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 38
'Polivanov; "Memuary," 184-5.

220

ARMY AND NAVY; 1914-1917 221:

"Not wishing to pass over the Government by appealing directly
to Rodzianko, the Grand Duke directed me to ask you whether you
would use your authority with members of the Duma to get through
a corresponding statement, even if made only in passing by Rodzianko
or leaders of the center, that it is quite evident that men who forget
their duty to their country and surrender of their own free will can
not expect the same treatment [as others who do their duty] and
that the two measures indicated above are justifiable. . . ."

2. THE BALTIC FLEET 3

November 30, 1915
Dear Sir, Ivan Logwovich:

[Goremykin, Prime Minister]

I have the honor to bring to the attention of Your Excellency
the information, which has been laid before me by agents, on the
state of mind of the men in the Baltic Fleet. —
Humbly yours,

A. KH^VOSTOV, [Minister of Interior]

Our recent temporary failures on land have had a bad effect on
the sailors of the Baltic Fleet. The seizure by the enemy of large
parts of the Vistula and Baltic regions and his reconquest of Galicia
from us, as well as certain shortcomings in our naval forces, are
attributed, by the sailors, to the traitorous acts of our military leaders
of German origin. . . .

Among the factors which tend to work on the sailors are: the
dismissal of the State Duma and the criticism of the Government
by the radical legal press, . . . especially the "Riech" which is widely
read by the rank and file. . . .

The excited state of mind of the sailors is evidenced (i) in their
interest in the activities of the left parties of the Duma, (2) in open
expression of dissatisfaction with the inactivity of the Russian Gov-
ernment, which, according to their opinion, has done little to win the
war and, in contrast to the German Government, has done nothing
for winning the war in the course of the year, and finally (3) in
their indignation at the weak efforts made to root out German dom-
ination by the Government which, they say, is in the hands of the
German party at Court. To this party these sailors attribute the

'"Krasny Arkhiv," IX, 97-102.

222 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

appointment [transfer] of the Supreme-Commander-in-Chief to the
Caucasus and they even think that this party may bring on a peace
favorable to Germany. Such a peace, according to them, would bring
about a revolution, the like of which has been unheard of until now
in history, and which would not only "wipe out the Romanovs but
would change completely the form of government in Russia/'

This being the state of mind of the Baltic Fleet, revolutionary
elements of all shades make use of it to spread this discontent among
large -circles of the army and navy, in order, as it were, to settle old
scores with the Government, For this purpose they realize the
importance of having the army with them. . . .

On November 3 trouble broke out on the ship Gmgut. The men
worked until evening coaling and at the end were given a thin
buckwheat mush. Being dissatisfied with this, the men protested and
declared that they are being worn out by unbearable hard labor, and
are given poor food. They demanded the removal of the Germans
from the fleet, especially the officer with the German name who was
in command and who wears them out by work and by constant
threats of shooting them. ... As a result 95 men were arrested. . , ,

The happenings on the Gangut aroused a great deal of excitement
on all the ships of the Baltic Fleet. . . . The sailors decided to make
demands . . . and if not granted to declare a general strike. . , .

The main reason for this discontent is evidently with the officers
of German origin. This dates back to the very beginning of the
war and increased, in particular, after the ostensible traitorous attempt
of Captain Von-Den, who while in command of the cruiser Novik
in May of this year, was surrounded by German ships and intended
to surrender. The other officers opposed this act, had him arrested,
and brought the cruiser into safety. On the return to Reval Von-Den
shot himself.

After the arrest of the sailors on the Gangut, feeling runs so high
that, according to sailors, it is possible that the objectionable officers
of some of the vessels will be thrown overboard.

3. REPORTS TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMIES

OF THE NORTHERN FRONT*

... A new form of agitation has appeared among ttie soldiers.
About the time of attack and when the artillery is in action, whole
4 "Krasny Arkhiv," IV, 417-21.

ARMY AND NAVY; 1914-1917 223

companies leave their positions and try, by wounding themselves in
the finger or cheek, to rush in a "mass" the sanitary train and thereby
escape punishment. This form of agitation is recommended as a
means of getting home. . . .

COLONEL SAZONOV.

According to information received, but not confirmed, anti-gov-
ernment propaganda has been at work among the men of the Siberian
Corps, and as a result there is a noticeable decline in the war spirit.
The soldiers are unwilling to attack and, as a general thing, they, like
the officers, stand for putting an end to the war regardless of the
consequences.

COLONEL [signature not clear].

October 28, 1915.

4 REPORT OF THE WAR-CENSORSHIP SECTION
OF THE TWELFTH ARMY5

February, i, 1917

Judging from the letters read and from the table here attached,
it is clear that the morale of the army has become noticeably better
of late, that is to say, since the end of last November. This change
for the better may be explained by the improvement in the ( I ) supply
of warm clothing and linen, (2) food, (3) living quarters, (4)
organization of soldiers' stores, and (5) entertainment for the
lower ranks.

The most important reason for the change is undoubtedly the
excellent and timely supply of warm clothing. This winter the lower
ranks do not suffer at all from cold and frost as they did last
winter. One seldom hears complaints on this subject. On the contrary
the letters show that the army is not freezing and that all units have
more warm clothing than they need. . . . One soldier writes that
he is sending home his "extra" warm linen.

In this manner, by having an abundance of warm clothing and by
improving the food situation, were removed the two most important
factors working on the morale of the army.

It is interesting that this improvement came about, as it were,
in spite of numerous evil influences affecting the army. Among these
are the long stay in the trenches, which came to an end only on

*Pokrovski, M. N., and lakovleva, la. A.; "Razlozhenie Armii v 1917
Godu," 7, &

224 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

January 5, alarming reports from home about high cost of fiving and
decline in the village economy, the misbehavior of the wives at home,
and live discussions about peace (seemingly in connection with the
German peace proposals, Wilson's speeches, .et cetera). Notwith-
standing the above enumerated influences for evil, the spirit of the
army is rising and since the first of the year (after the Decembe'r
fights) the number of cheerful letters has gone up two per cent.

INTEREST IN POLITICS

Among the interesting developments of the last mentioned period
should be noted :

(a) Intense interest of the soldiers and officers in the political
happenings in Russia and in the capital (the acts of the government,
State Duma, and German influence on certain circles) ;

(b) Complaints about the high cost of living.

COMPLAINTS ABOUT DELAY IN PROMOTION

(1) Officers of siege artillery complain that their promotion
comes more slowly than of those of field artillery.

COMPLAINTS REGARDING FURLOUGH

(2) Soldiers complain of the impossibility of getting a fur-
lough. . . .

BAD INFLUENCE OF WAR PRISONERS

(3) War prisoners, doing state work, are having a bad influence
on our soldiers. Here is what one writes. . . .

"In our district . . . work 2000 Czechs, building a military
railway. Their influence on our soldiers is very bad. The Czechs
boast openly that they are the only wise people on earth because they
refused to fight from the very beginning. As a consequence they are
well dressed while others rot in the trenches. They call our fighting
soldiers asses. Our men listen willingly to this kind of talk and
conclude that the Czechs are really wise people/'

I would suggest that the necessary steps be taken to isolate com-
pletely the war prisoners. . . .

Chief-Adjutant-Colonel
SOKOLOV

ARMY AND NAVY; 1914-1917 225

5. CONFERENCE OF THE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF 6

Headquarters, December 30, 31, 1916.

General Ruzski [Northern Front], Riga and Dvinsk— the mis-
fortunes of the Northern Front, especially Riga. These two places
are hot-beds of propaganda.

Brwilov [Southwest Front]. Quite right. When the Seventh
Siberian Corps came from the Riga district it was completely under
the influence of propaganda. The soldiers refused to fight. There
were cases of mutiny. One officer was killed. It was necessary to take
severe measures; to shoot several men, to change the commanding
officers, and now the corps is improving.

Evert [Western Front], ... It is necessary to put in supplies
into the empty central and food warehouses. Instead of having a
month's provisions on hand we live on daily imports. We are under-
supplied and undernourished . . . which reacts banefully on the
spirit of the soldiers ... the local supplies are also exhausted. . . .
' Ruzski. The Northern Front does not receive even its [meat]
allowance. The general opinion is that we have everything but it is
impossible to get anything. For example, in Petrograd the poor man
is in need but the rich man may have everything. We lack internal
organization.

Skuvaev [Minister of War]. At the outbreak of the war we had
to feed 1,300,000 soldiers and now we feed ten million. To this num-
ber should be added about two million workmen. It is not right to
give everything to the Army and nothing to those who work for
the Army. . . .

Gurko [Commander of Sixth Army]. There is plenty of meat in
Siberia but we can not get it here because we need three hundred
locomotives which we have not. Our railways are functioning badly,
all the railway men were sent to the front at the very beginning of
the war and there is no one to repair the locomotives.

6. GENERAL ALEXEEV AND THE GOVERNMENT 7

Several months before the revolution the following confidential
conversation took place between General Alexeev and a journalist:

'Pokrovski, M. N., and lakovleva, la. A.; "Razlozhenie Armii v 1917
Godu " 7, 8.

f"The Russian Revolution," by Alexander Petrunkeyitch, Samuel N.
Harper and Frank A, Golder— -pp. 51-2.

226 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Alexeev: I can get nothing from them [ministers]. My supplies
are decreasing. ... It is even necessary to think about bread. We
are already cutting down the rations. They have forgotten about
food for the horses. . . .

Jowndist: What are you going to do about it?

A: What shall I do? With these people there is nothing that can
be done.

J: Have you said anything to the Tsar about it?

A: I have ... but it does no good.

J: Why?

A: While you talk to him he pays attention, gets worked up, is
eager to do something . . . but as soon as he leaves you he forgets
about it. All kinds of pressure are brought to bear upon him ; he is
not a free man.

J : Is it true that the Tsarina has much influence ?

A : It is only too true. Her influence is irresistible. What is worse
she never comes out in the open. She interferes with everybody, but
works behind their backs. You never can tell what she will do next.
Every time she comes here she makes new trouble.

J : Do the ministers ever consult you ?

A: They come, they talk. What can they do? The honest men
leave and the worthless remain. ... If it were not for the war I
should resign too. If I should leave, what would not they do with
the army? Do I not understand that Sturmer and Company are
thinking only of an alliance with Germany ? . . . The home situation
is serious. They [Stunner and Company] are purposely instigating
hunger disturbances in order to provoke a revolution so as to have
an excuse for breaking away from the Allies and end the war. Our
army is now in condition to crush Germany, without which there
can be no real peace in Europe. But a permanent peace is not desired
by Sturmer and Protopopov ; they wish to keep the people under the
heel of a strong Germany. Apart from the Germans no one will pro-
tect them from the revolution. The pity of it all is that at the head
of the government there still are men who are interested in crushing
the people.

PART IV
GOVERNMENT BY THE EMPRESS

CHAPTER XV

HOW A. N. KHVOSTOV BECAME MINISTER OF THE

INTERIOR

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

How A. N. Khvostov got his appointment as Minister of the
Interior is an excellent illustration of the way the Empress gov-
erned the Empire. "Fat" Khvostov was a clever, unprincipled
young man. In order to secure office he made friends of Anna
Vyrubova, Prince Andronnikov and Rasputin. He made a study
of the Empress' strong and weak points and used them in dealing
with her. He quite won her over, and after that she kept after the
Emperor until he appointed Khvostov Minister of the Interior,
Goremykin and A. A. Khvostov, Minister of Justice and uncle of
A. N., who knew the young man, worked in vain against the ap-
pointment. But all in vain. As soon as Fat Khvostov came into
office he began to intrigue against his colleagues, against the Prime
Minister himself in order to get his place, and finally against his
benefactor Rasputin. Khvostov overreached himself, was be-
trayed by his own accomplice and was dismissed. Not long after
that he was succeeded by Protopopov, another protege of the
Empress, and equally unfit for the post.

I. LETTERS OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR1

Sept, n, 1915.

. . . Beloved, A. [Anna Vyrubova] saw Andr. [Andronnikov] 2 &
Khvostov & the latter made her an excellent impression (the old

^Tisma Imperatritsy," I, 505.

* Prince Michael Michaelovich. Andronnikov — adventurer, intriguer, go-be-
tween of Rasputin and those who wished to make use of him.

227

228 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

man [Goremykin] is against him, I not knowing him, dont know
what to say.) He is most devoted to you, spoke gently & well about
our Friend [Rasputin] to her, related that tomorrow has to be a
question about Gr. [Grigori Rasputin] in the Duma one asked for
Khvost's signature, but he refused & said that if they picked up
that question, amnestic would not be given — they reasoned & abol-
ished again asking about him. He related awful horrors about
Guchk. [ov] was at Gorem. [ykin] today, spoke about you, that
by taking the army you saved yourself. Khvost. took the question
about German overpowering influence & dearth of meat, so as the
left ones wld. not take it — now the right ones have this question
it is safe — she feels taken by him & has good impression. Gorem.
wanted to present Kryzhanovsky s but I said you would never agree.
Do talk him over except Neidhardt4 — I did not see his [Khvostov's]
article then — I mean his speech of the Duma its difficult to advise.
Are others against him, or only the old man, as he hates all the Duma.
Awfully difficult for you to decide again, poor Treasure. . . .

Sept. 13, 191 5 5

... I am glad you had a good talk with the old one as our Friend
calls Gorem. — what you mention as having put off till your return, I
suppose means the change of the Minister of the Interior — how
good if you could see Khvostov & have a real talk with him & see
whether he would make the same favorable, honest, loyal, energetic
opinion on you as upon A. ...

Sept. 20, 1915 6

•
. . . Your poor dear head must be awfully tired with all this work &

especially the interior questions? Then, to recapitulate what the old
man said: to think of a new minister of the interior, (I told him
you had not yet fixed upon Neidhardt; perhaps, when you return,
you can think once more about Khvostov). . . .

Sept. 24, 191 5 r

. . . Please take Khvostov in his place. Did you look through his
book? He wants very much to see me, looks upon me as the one to

3 Sergei Efimovich Kryzhanovski — Secretary of the State Council and one
time (1906-1911) Assistant Minister of the Interior.

4 A. B. Neidhardt— Director of one of the Sections of the Red Cross of
which the Empress was president

6 "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, $0%.
'Ibid., 521.
'Ibid., 532-3-

GOVERNMENT BY THE EMPRESS 229

save the situation whilst you are away (I told it Andronnikov) &
wants to pour out his heart to me & tell me all his ideas. — He is
very energetic, fears no one & colossally devoted to you, wh. is the
chief thing nowadays. — His gaffes, one can warn him against mak-
ing them — he knows the Duma people well, will not allow them to
attack one, he knows how to speak; please Sweetheart seriously
think of him, he is not such a coward & rag as Scherbatov. The
Government must be set to right & the old man needs good, devoted
& energetic men to help him in his old age working; he cannot go
on like this. . . .

Sept. 28, 1915 8

. . . Am so anxious, how it will be with the ministers — now you
cant change them once they come there & its so essential, only you
must get a look at the others first. Please remember Khvostov. . . .

Sept. 29, 1915 9

. . . Gregory . . . made us understand that Khvostov wld. be good.
You remember, he went once to see him (I think by yr. wish) to N,
Novgorod. . . .

Sept. 30, 1915 10

„ . . Deary. Khvostov came to Ania again & entreated to see me,
so I shall today. From all he told her one sees he thoroughly under-
stands the situation & that with skill & cleverness, he thinks, one
can manage to set all to rights. He knows that his Uncle11 and
Goremykin are against him, i. e. they are afraid of him as he is
very energetic. But he is above all devoted to you & therefore offers
his services to you, to try him & see whether he cannot help. He
esteems the old man very much & would not go against him. Once
already now he stopped the question in the Duma about our Friend
in time — now they intend bringing it up as one of the first questions.
. . . Now that Gregory advises Khvostov I feel its right & therefore
I will see him. He got an awful shock as in the evening papers one
said Krizhanovsky (is that the name) had left for the Headquarters,
he is a very bad man & you very much always disliked him & I told
the old 'Man so — God forbid him having advised him again. . . .
I do so pray to God always to make me be yr. Guardian Angel &
helper in everything — some look at me as that now — & others cannot
find nasty enough things to say about me. Some are afraid I am

8 "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 543.

•Ibid., 545*

"Ibid., 546, 547/549, 55?.

nA. A. Khvostov, Minister of Justice.

23o DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

meddling in state affairs (the ministers) & others look upon me as
the one to help as you are not here (Andronnikov, Khvostov,
Vaniava 12 & some others) that shows who is devoted to you in the
real sense of the word — they will seek me out & the others will avoid
me— is it not true, Sweetheart? . . . Really, my Treasure, I think he
[Khvostov] is the man & our Fr. hinted to A. in his wire; — I am
always careful in my choice — but I have not the feeling wh. I had
to Scherbatov when he came to me. And he understands one must
watch Polivanov since Guchkov has got into the Council of the
Empire, is not oversure of him. He sees & thinks like us — he did
nearly all the talking. — Try him now, because Scherbatov must leave,
a man who openly shows about your telegrams & Gregory's wh. he
has kidnapped & Samarin too — are utterly unworthy ministers & no
better than Makarov 13 who showed my letter to our Friend, to others
tooi — & Scherbatov is a rag & stupid. — If the old man grumbles —
does not matter — wait & see how he proves himself to be, worse than
Scherbatov he cannot be, but I think 1000 times better. God grant,
that I am not mistaken & I honestly believe I am not. I prayed before
seeing him, as was rather frightened of the talk. Looks one straight
into the eyes. . . .

Khvostov has refreshed me, my spirit was not down, but I
yearned to see a man at last — & here I saw & heard him. And you
together would keep each other going. . . .

Nobody is any the wiser I saw him. . . .

Sept. 30, 1915 14

. . . sent you two wires because of Khvostov & hoped you would
mention a wee word. . . .

With pleasure I continue thinking over Khvostov's talk & wish
you had been there too — a man, no petticoats — & then one who
will not let anything touch us, & will do all in his power to stop the
attacks upon our Friend, as then he stopped them & now they in-
tend beginning again. . . . Well dear, there is nothing to be done
with those Ministers, and the sooner you change them, the better.
Khvostov instead of Scherbatov. , . .

Fat Andronnikov telephoned to Ania that Khvostov was very
contented with his talk, [with the Empress] & other amiabilities wh.
I shan't repeat. . . .

u Bishop of Tobolsk and friend of Rasputin. See chapter on The War and
the Public.

" A. A. Makarov, former Minister of the Interior.
u "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 550-4.

GOVERNMENT BY THE EMPRESS 231

Khvostov also has ideas about the press. You will think, that I
have now got a tail 15 growing in. ...

Mogilev, Oct. i, 1915 16

... I have just received your last dear letter of September 30 in
which you speak of the good impression young Khvostov made on
you. ... In order not to lose time, I will see him at six o'clock on
the very day that I arrive. . . .

Oct. 3, 1915 17

. . . God grant, if you find Khvostov suitable, he will put a stop
to all.

Luckily he is still here & even went to Goremykin to place all
his ideas before the old man. Andronnikov gave Ania his word of
honor, that nobody shall know, that Khvostov comes to Ania (she
sees him in her house, not in the palace). . . .

Dec. g, 1915 18

. , . Our Friend dined with him [Khvostov] yesterday & was very
contented. . . .

Jan. I, 1916 19

. We talked a lot about the supply question with Khvostov, he
says the ministers really try working together (putting Polivanov
& Bark beside), but its the Duma's fault wh. hung commissions with
70 members onto them & the Minister of Interior's powers conse-
quently are greatly diminished & he can take no particular measures,
without it having passed through the commission. . . .

One person, whom not only the tail (Khvostov), but many good
intentioned people are against & find not at the hight of his place is
Bark. He certainly does not help Khvostov — ever so long one has
asked for money for him to buy the "Novoye Vremya" partly (the •
ministers, alas, told Bark to do it instead of Khvostov who wld.
certainly have succeeded, whereas Bark dawdles for his own rea-
sons)—& the result is Guchkov with Jews, Rubinsteins etc.20 buy
up the paper, put in their own mendacious articles. . . .

18 A play on the word Khvostov. Khvost in Russian means tail.

M "Perepiska Nikolaia," III, 37*. The Tsar arrived at Tsarskoe Seb on the
morning of October 6, and three days later Khvostov was made Minister of
the Interior.

17 "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 55<5.

"Ibid., 602.

"Ibid., 617- * 11- • . *

^D.'L. Rubinstein, Jewish banker, contractor, secured a controlling interest

in the "Novoe Vremia."

232 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY .

Jan. 20, 1916 21

. . . Lovy, I don't know, but I should still think of Sturmer, [as
successor to Goremykin] his head is plenty fresh enough — you see
Khvostov a tiny bit hopes to get that place — but he is too young. . . .

March 1 5, 1916 22

. . . Am so wretched that we, through Gregory recommended Khvos-
tov to you — it leaves me no peace — you are against it and I let myself
be imposed upon by them, tho' fr. the very first told Ania that I like
his great energy but that too self-love and something not pleasing
to me; and the devil got hold of him, one cannot call it otherwise.
I wld. not write to you about it last time not to bother you — but
we passed through trying times, and therefore wld. have been
calmer if, now that you go, something could be settled. As long
as Khvostov is in power and has money and police in hands — I
honestly am not quiet for Gregory and Ania.23 . . .

21 "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 632.

*Ibid.f II, 291.

23 As soon as he came into power, Khvostov proceeded to undermine his
colleagues. He tried to get Goremykin out of the way so as to take his place.
He turned even on Rasputin and plotted against him, but the plot was exposed
and Khvostov was dismissed on March 16, 1916.

CHAPTER XVI
SUKHOMLINOV AFFAIR

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The Sukhomlinov Affair is another illustration of the way
the Empress ran the Government and the way Rasputin governed
through her. The Emperor was not convinced that the Minister
of War was as black as painted but he yielded to the double
pressure of public opinion and Headquarters and dismissed
Sukhomlinov. The Empress seemed to approve. She got a certain
satisfaction out of it by laying his ruin to "his adventurer wife"
whom she detested. When it came to politics the Empress was
no match for Madame Sukhomlinov. She got Rasputin and Bad-
maev interested in the case and after Rasputin had spoken the
Empress changed her mind and from that time on she defended
Sukhomlinov until she had him free. This disgusted the public
and injured the reputation of the Government.

i. LETTERS OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR1

December n, 1914

... I do not wish Sukhomlinov harm, on the contrary, but his wife
is really most mauvais genre & has made every body, the military
especially, angry with her.

June 25, 191 5 2

... I saw Mme Hartwig yesterday — she told me many inter-
esting things when they left Lvov — & sad impressions of soldiers
being depressed & saying that they wont return to fight the enemy
with empty fists — the rage of the officers against Soukhomlinov is
quite colossal — poor man — his very name they loathe & yearn for
him to be sent away — well for his sake too, before any scandle arises,
it would be better to do so. It is his adventurer wife who has com-
pletely ruined his reputation — because of her bribes he suffers & so

1"Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 410.
a Ibid., 465.

233

234 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

on ; — one says it is his fault there is no ammunition wh. is our curse
now et. I tell you this to show you what impressions she brought
back. —

2. DIARY OF ANDREI VLADIMIROVICH 8

May 12, [1915]

... I called on the Emperor at Tsarskoe Selo. In our conversation
we touched on the Minister of War, Sukhomlinov. ... At the con-
clusion the Tsar said that he believed deeply in Sukhomlinov, that
the Minister of War was without doubt an honest and trustworthy
man. I remarked that I was very glad to hear that, for I, too, was
of this opinion, and felt there was a deep plot against the man.
Every one is jumping on him, which is quite unjust, for after all
he has done a great deal for the army. I turned to the Tsar and
inquired whether he had heard of the plot : "Whom do you ask this ?
I know only too well, but they shall not hurt him. Before it comes
to that I shall stand up for him. They shall not touch him. . . .
Many people are jealous of him. They have tried to drag him into
the Miasoedov 4 affair but they shall not succeed."

This brief conversation is very interesting. Many have said that
the Emperor is displeased with Sukhomlinov and would soon drop
him. This apparently is not so. On the contrary, the Emperor is for
him. It is strange that Grand Dukes Alexander and Sergei Mikhai-
lovich have not hesitated to say in public that Sukhomlinov is a
criminal. Why they do this is not at all clear to me. May it not be
due to the fact that the war has shown how poorly we are provided
with artillery, and the Grand Duke Sergei [in charge of this depart-
ment] is trying to draw attention away from himself, and therefore
accuses Sukhomlinov ? This is quite unjust. I. know from documents
that Sukhomlinov has more than once called attention to these
[artillery] questions, but because of personal enmity all his attempts
were frustrated. . . .

3. TSAR'S LETTER TO SUKHOMLINOV 5

Headquarters, June 24, [1915]
Vladimir Alexa/ndrovich:

After long deliberation I have come to the conclusion that for trie
good of Russia and the army your resignation is necessary at this

'"Andrei Vladimirovich," 31-2.

4 Miasoedov, an intimate friend of Sukhotnlinov, was accused, convicted
and executed as a German spy. 'Polivanov; "Memuary," 117-8.

GOVERNMENT BY THE EMPRESS 235

time. My talk with Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich has confirmed
me in this opinion.

I am writing you so that you may first learn the news from me.
I am pained to have to tell you this, the more so because it was
only yesterday that I saw you. We have worked together many years
and during all that time there was no misunderstanding between us.
I thank you for having put in so much strength and labor for our
army.

Impartial history will be kinder than the judgment of contem-
poraries.

Hand over the duties of your office to General Vernander [A. P].

May God bless you.

Respectfully yours,

NICHOLAS

4. WHY SUKHOMLINOV WAS NOT PUNISHED

LETTERS OF ElMPRESS TO EMPEROR e

March 17, 1916

... I saw by the papers you have said Sukhomlinov is to be
judged, — thats right, — have his aiguillettes been taken fr. him. One
says there will come out bad things against him, — that he took
bribes, — thats her for sure, — its so sad. . . .

March 28, 1916 T

... Is it true that things are going very bad with Sukhomlinov —
Igor had heard as tho' he wld. have to be shot — but I don't know
where he got the news from. Certainly he had his great faults — but
his successor [Polivanov] is yet a greater traitor to my mind. . . .

May 8, 1916 8

. . . Our Friend told Ania about one having shut up Sukhomlinov
that "it is a bit not well." . . .

May 15, 1916 9

... So I asked him [Stunner] to speak again to Khvostov [A. A.,
Minister of Justice] whether one could not keep Sukhomlinov in
another place at least, not there. . . *

• "Pisma Imperatritsy," II, 395.
'Ibid., 310.

'/&&, 335-
9 Ibid., 341.

236 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY _

May 31, 1916 10

... let him [Sturmer] know to bring Sukhomlinov's journal &
letters to his wife, wh. are compromising, better you should see for
yourself & judge rightly & not only go by their words. . . .

June 22, 1916 n

One more thing I was to tell you, that Gen. Selivanov is the
judge of Sukhomlinov & one says he cannot be unbiased as he had
formerly been discharged by Sukhomlinov from Siberia and that
it would be better to appoint the member of the Council of the
Empire, General Shumilov. I only tell you this as He [Rasputin]
wished me too, but I told Ania I doubt yr. mixing in this affair. . . .

July 27, 1916 12

... do say about Sukhomlinov being let home, the Drs. fear he
will go mad if kept shut up any longer — do this act of kindness of

your own sweet self. . . .

October 5, 191 6 13

. . . Then our Friend said: General Sukhomlinov should be set
free, so that he should not die in jail, otherwise things will not be
smooth, one should never fear to release prisoners, to restore sinners
to a life of righteousness — prisoners until they reach jail become
through their sufferings in the eyes of God — nobler than we — more
or less His words. . . .

October 9, 1916 l4

. . . Protop. [opov. Minister of the Interior] has asked to see you —
wont you tell him to let Sukhoml. out. . . .

October 10, 1916 15

. . . Speak to Pr. about: Sukh., order to find a way to get him
out. . . .

October 27, 1916 16
. . . Prot. saw Sukh. — so happy — . . .

November 13, 1916 17

... our Friend begs you absolutely to have Sukhomlinov's story
stopped, otherwise Gutchkov & others have prepared nasty things
to say — so do it at once, wire to Sturmer, I think it concerns him
first ? telegraph this :

"Pisma Imperatritsy," II, 343. * Ibid., 423.

., 435.

.,.
., 418. . "1^437.

GOVERNMENT BY THE EMPRESS 237

"Having got acquainted with the data of the preliminary investi-
gation in the case of the former Minister of War, General Sukhom-
linov, I find that there are absolutely no grounds at all for the
charges, and therefore the case should be discontinued." . . .

November 22, 1916 18

. . . Now one calls Mme. Sukhomlinov before judgement on Friday
& therefore I wired asking you to have the Sukhomlinov case at once
stopped through Senator Kuzmin. — Its vengeance because one let
the poor old man out of prison. So horribly unfair! . . .

November 23, 1916 19
. . . Thanks for Sukhomlinov, — here is a letter fr. S. to you. . . .

December 23, 1916 20

... I enclose a letter from Sukhomlinov to our Friend, please read
it through, as there he explains all clearly about his affair, wh. you
must send for & not all to go to the Council of the Empire as then
there will be no saving of poor Sukhomlinov. — He writes so clearly
everything — do read it through & act according — why shld. he suffer
& not Kokovtzev (who wld. not give the money). . . .

5. DR. BADMAEV TO NICHOLAS II 21

May 5, 1916

. , . Sukhomlinov is in disgrace. It is said he himself is to blame
. . . whether true or not true I cannot make out, but I do know. . .
that in any case ... he was a loyal and useful subject of your
Majesty. He made a serious mistake, but your Majesty will, of
course, judge this mistake from the loftiness of your throne and will
not hand him over to be devoured.

The Earthly Tsar, the anointed of the Heavenly Tsar, will al-
ways find a way to save him, even if he were guilty. . . .

M "Pisma Itnperatritsy," II, 445-6.

"/&&., 446.

»/WdL, 45?.

*"Za Kulisami Tsarizma, Arkhiv Tibetskogo Vracha Badmaeva," 25. Zam-
saran Badrnaev was born in Eastern Siberia in 1851 and was of Buriat origin.
He was baptized into the Orthodox church, became agent for the government
in the Far East, and was brought in contact with the royal family. In the
capital he was known as the Tibetan doctor and prescribed for Protopopov,
the crown prince, and other distinguished persons. He was an intimate friend
of Rasputin and other celebrities.

PART V
THE IMPERIAL FAMILY

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In reading the diaries and letters of the Romanov family one
is saddened by the tragic family situation. One member distrusted
the other and all united in hating the Empress who paid them back
in their own coin. Alexandra Fedorovna was always on the de-
fensive. She suspected Grand Duke Nicholas of scheming to get
the thronef Purishkevich assures us that Grand Duchess Maria
Pavlovna desired that same throne for her son Cyril Vladimiro-
vich. There were no doubt other members of this loving family
who could have been persuaded to assume the burdens of the
State.

When the course steered by the Empress in 1916 seemed to
take the ship towards the rocks, the Grand Dukes became fright-
ened and raised the cry of alarm. But as she suspected their mo-
tives, she paid no attention to their warnings, kept her course,
and wrecked the ship.

238

CHAPTER XVII

DIARIES AND LETTERS

I. DIARY OF ANDREI VLADIMIROVICH x

Petragrad, September 6, 1915

During the last few days there has been much talk of the
Emperor's taking command of the army and sending Nicholas
Nicholaevich to the Caucasus. . . . On this question there are two
opinions. One is that the Emperor should not be at the head of the
army because it would take him away from State affairs ; the other
that it is a good thing for him to be at the head but on condition
that Nicholas Nicholaevich remain where he is. On this last point
almost all are agreed. Indeed, Nicholas Nicholaevich came into his
position purely by accident, after the Council of Ministers at the
beginning of the war persuaded the Emperor not to take the chief
coTtnmand. In order to raise the prestige of Nicholas Nicholaevich, a
special prayer was made for him in the church service. The Emperor
showered upon him favors and as a result Nicholas Nicholaevich
came to be known all over Russia, and his popularity did not suffer
even on account of the continued reverse in the war when our army
had to retreat This brilliant result brought about by the efforts of
the Tsar, did not please A. [Alix, the Empress]. This is the reason
why Nicholas Nicholaevich is ordered to the Caucasus. Thoughtful
people believe that this step will cause general ill feeling and dis-
content and serious consequences. . . .

I paid a visit today to Aunt Minny [mother of the Tsar] on
Elagin Island. I found her in a terribly worried state. She was
especially excited over the question of Nicholas Nicholaevich, She
thinks that his removal will be the ruin of N. [Nicholas II] because
it will never be forgiven him. She exonerated Niki in all this and
laid all the blame on Alix. When Niki came to see her before going
off she [mother] begged and begged him to think over everything
carefully and not lead Russia to ruin. To her pleas he replied that
everybody deceived him, that he must save Russia, that it was his

1 "Andrei Vladimirovich," 7S-&

239

24o DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

duty. It was in vain that she pleaded with him that he was poorly
prepared for this hard task and that State affairs required his pres-
ence at Petrograd. He remained unpersuaded and would not even
promise to deal kindly with Nicholas Nicholaevich.

While they [mother and son] were talking, Alix was in another
room with Xenia [sister of the Tsar] who asked whether it was true
that Nicholas Nicholaevich, who was so popular, would be displaced.

"Again about Nicholas, everybody talks only about him," an-
swered Alix. "I am tired of hearing about him. Niki is much more
popular than Nicholas. He has commanded long enough; let him
now go to the Caucasus."

Aunt Minny, as she related to me all this, was so excited, so
stirred up, that I was frightened. She kept repeating the question:
"What are we coming to, what are we coming to ? That is not at all
like Niki — he is lovable, he is honest, he is good — it is all her work."

I asked aunt whether there was any hope that Nicholas Nicho-
laevich would remain. "Not the least. It is all settled — Alix has just
telegraphed me" — and she read me the telegram : "All went on bril-
liantly, the changement is done, leaving in two days." So it's done.
Niki also telegraphed that he arrived and was content with the
meeting. Tomorrow we will probably read all about it in the papers.
One thing is not clear — Niki is returning here on September 14.
Who will command the army in the meantime? No5ody knows. To
my question aunt replied : "I can't understand anything any more/*
Aunt Minny told me also that Uncle Alex [Prince Alexander
Petrovich of Oldenburg] had been to see her and begged her to
dissuade Niki from going to the army. He predicted terrible conse-
quences, including popular uprisings. Uncle was in a frightful state.
"He rolled on the floor," said Aunt Minny.

The dismissal of Dzhunkovski 2 and Vladia Orlov,3 two most
loyal men of whom Niki always spoke in warmest terms, made her

3 1 was at mother's today [August 30, 1915] and learned that Niki
[Emperor] has written! to the Minister of the Interior, Prince Scherbatov,
ordering the immediate dismissal of General [V. F.] Dzhunkovski. . . .

The reason for this act may be traced to Rasputin, who is trying to gel
even with the General because he ... reported to the Emperor . , , some of
the evil doings of Rasputin at Moscow* Rumor has it that Rasputin, while
drunk, boasted that he drove Nicholas [Grand Duke] from his position, that
he will drive the Oberprocurator of Our Holy Synod, Samarin, Dzhunkovski,
and the Grand Duchess Elizabeth Fedorovna [sister of Empress). Whether
this rumor is true or not it is difficult to say. . . . ("Diary of Andrei Vladimir-
ovich," 74-)

8 Prince V. N. Orlov, the Emperor's executive officer, was a friend of
the Grand Duke and that made him ipso facto persona-non-grata to the
Empress.

THE IMPERIAL FAMILY 241

quite sad. "It is not my dear boy; he is too good to do such a thing;
he liked them both very much. It is all she [Empress] ; she alone
is responsible for all that is happening now. It is too awful. Who
will now be near him; he will be quite alone with that awful
'Kuvaka' [Voeikov].4 Not a single devoted friend at his side. I
understand nothing. I cannot understand ... it is too awful for
words."

When mother called on her, Aunt Minny said that it reminded
her of the time of Paul I, who began in the last year of his reign
to drive away all his loyal subjects. She pictured to herself, in all
its horrors, the tragic end of our ancestor.

What will Russia say to this? How are you going to explain
to the army and people that Nicholas Nicholaevich, on whom the
Tsar showered all kinds of favors, is suddenly dismissed? It will
naturally be asked what he did to deserve such harsh treatment.
. . . When no satisfactory answer is given, it will be said that the
Grand Duke is a traitor, or, what is worse, the guilty party will be
sought for higher up. . . .

Petragrad, September 19 [1915] 5

A few days ago Alix with her two oldest daughters had a cup of
tea with mother at Tsarskoe Selo. It is worthy of note that this is
the first time in twenty years that Alix alone, without Niki, has
called on mother. The most interesting of all was the conversation.
Alix bitterly complained that everything she does is found fault with,
especially in Moscow and Petrograd. Everybody is against her and
in this way tie her hands. "Just now," she continued, "there came
from Germany Red Cross sisters. For the good of the cause I
should receive them but I cannot do that knowing that it will be
used against me." Mother asked whether it is true that she [Empress]
and the whole court are moving to Moscow. "Oh, even you have
heard of it ! No, I am not moving and will not move but 'they' hoped
for it so that 'they' might move here." (It was clear that by "they"
the Empress meant Grand Duke Nicholas and the Montenegrins
[wife and sister-in-law of the Grand Duke.])' "But [continued the
Empress] fortunately we learned about this in time and the neces-
sary measures were taken. 'He' [Grand Duke Nicholas] is now
going to the Caucasus. It was not possible to put up with it longer.
Niki knew nothing about the war. 'He' told him nothing, wrote him

4 General V. P. Voeikov, commandant of the palace. He put on the market
a mineral water known as "Kuvaka."

5 "Andrei Vladimirovich," 81-2.

DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

nothing. Niki's power was torn from him on all sides. They took
from him everything that was possible to take. This is intolerable.
At a time when a strong and firm hand is necessary in the midst
of this breaking up of authority. I begged Niki not to put away
Goremykin at this time. He was a true and loyal man, with firm
convictions and steadfast principles. It is not right to deprive him-
self of people who are devoted to him, who would be left to stand
by him/' . . .

In regard to Niki's being at the head of the army, she [Empress]
said that he is now in excellent spirits. Knowing what is going on
has put new life and new enthusiasm into him. . . .

This episode in our family life is very important because it
gives us the opportunity to understand Alix. During the whole time
that she has been with us [in Russia] she was enveloped in a kind
of misty impenetrable atmosphere through which the personality of
Alix was obscured. No one really knew her, understood her, and
this explains the puzzles and the guesses which grew into all kinds
of legends in the course of time. Where is the truth in this matter
it is difficult to say. It is a pity, the person of the Empress should
shine on the whole of Russia; she should be seen and understood.
Otherwise she falls into the background and loses the necessary
popularity. Of course, the above conversation with mother can not
repair the loss of twenty years, but I must say that for us, per-
sonally, the conversation is very important. We see her in a new
light; we see that many of the legends about her are not true; we
see that she is on the right path. If she said no more, if she did
what she did, we must assume that she had good reason. But it is
all very clear that she was boiling over with grief and the need of
letting some of it escape forced her to come to mother.

2. LETTERS OF NIKOLAI MIKHAILOVICH

(a) NIKOLAI MIKHAILOVICH TO THE TSAR 6

May ii, 1916

. . . Regarding the popularity of Nicholas [Nicholaevich], I will
say this : His popularity was masterfully prepared at Kiev by Militsa,
[wife of N. N.] quite gradually, during a long period of time, and
by making use of all means, such as distributing to the people
pamphlets, all kinds of booklets, pictures, portraits, calendars, etc.
'"Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia," 68-9-

THE IMPERIAL FAMILY 243

Thanks to this well-planned preparation, his popularity did not go
down after the loss of Galicia and Poland, and rose again after the
victories in the Caucasus.

From the very start of the campaign, I repeatedly wrote to your
dear mother, warning her of these Kiev intrigues, but I could not
write to you, without infraction of discipline, while I was attached
to the staff of Adjutant-General Ivanov.

Now I am speaking freely. I said, when you personally took the
Supreme Command of the armies, and I repeat now, that Militsa
is not asleep in the Caucasus.

I make bold to assure you, from a deep conviction, that this
popularity frightens me, in a dynastic sense, especially in the excited
state of our public opinion, which appears to take more and more
definite shape in the provinces.

This popularity does not contribute in the least to the benefit of
the Throne or the prestige of the Imperial family, but only to the
advertising of the husband of the Grand Duchess— a Slav woman,
[Montenegrin] and not a German— as well as of his brother and
nephew, Roman. In view of the possibility of all kinds of troubles
after the war, one has to be watchful and observe closely every move
in support of this popularity.

You are aware of my boundless devotion to your late father, your
mother, yourself, and your line, for which I am ready at any moment
to lay down my life, but I do not recognize any other possibilities,
in the dynastic sense, nor shall I ever recognize any. . . .

Sincerely yours,

NIKOLAI 'M[IKHAILOVICH]

(&) NIKOLAI MIKHAILOVICH TO THE TSAR7

August 8, 1916

Grushevka (Kherson Gubermia)

... I want to call your attention to still another circumstance,
in view of the fact that much is liable to change after the war and
'it is best to reckon beforehand with all symptoms of impending events
in the life of Russia. I don't know from what motives you dismissed
S. D. Sazonov, but here is what has happened. Almost the entire
press (with the exception of the "Novoe Vremia" and "Zemsch-
china") has put him on a pedestal, like a super-patriot; all the zems-
tvos, public organizations, Unions of Cities, War Industries Commit-
* "Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia," 75-9-

244 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY _

tees, and so on, have sent him their condolences on the occasion of his
departure and have made a hero of him, which he could hardly have
been had he continued as Minister of Foreign Affairs. This I regard
as a very dangerous symptom, and here is my reason : Now, during
war, such things are possible and even somewhat natural in the
general nervous excitement; but after peace has come, it will be
necessary to take measures in good time to prevent such a situation.
It is hardly desirable that, after several years of bloodshed, ^ there
should occur a break between the Government and the public, or
what is usually called the public opinion of Russia (from Metropoli-
tan Pitirim 8 to Chelnokov,9 and from Boris Vasilchikov 10 to Guch-
kov11). Ce n'est pas pour blaguer, mais vraiment le fait que je vous
signale a propos de la retraite de Sazonov est bien curieux et
instructif.

c LETTER OF GRAND DUKE NIKOLAI MIKHAILOVICH TO THE

You said more than once that you wish to carry the war to a
successful finish. Are you certain that with the present conditions
in the rear, this can be done? Are you acquainted with the internal
situation, not only in the interior of the Empire, but on the out-
skirts (Siberia, Turkestan, Caucasus) ? Are you told all the truth, or
is some of it concealed from you? Where is the root of the evil?
Allow me to tell you briefly the essentials of the case.

So long as your method of selecting ministers [with the aid
of Rasputin] was known to a limited circle only, affairs went on
somehow, but from the moment that this method became generally
known, it was impossible to govern Russia in that way. Repeatedly
you have told me that you could trust no one, that you were being
deceived. If that is true, then the same must be true of your wife,
who loves you dearly, but is led astray by the evil circle that sur-
rounds her. You trust Alexandra Fedorovna, which is easy to un-
derstand, but that which comes out of her mouth is the result of
clever fabrication and not the truth. If you are not strong enough to
remove these influences from her, at least guard yourself against
this steady and systematic interference by those who act through your
beloved wife. If your persuasion is ineffective, and I am certain

* Metropolitan of Petrograd.

* M. V. Chelnokov, Mayor of Moscow.

30 Prince Boris .Vasilchikov, Member of State Council.

nA. I. Guchkov, a public-spirited citizen who denounced the court clique.

M"Riech," No. 58, March 22, 1917.

THE IMPERIAL FAMILY 245

that you have more than once fought against this influence, try some
other means, so as to end with this system once and for all. Your
first impulses and decisions are always remarkably right and to
the point, but as soon as other influences come in, you begin to
hesitate and end up by doing something other than what you orig-
inally intended. If you should succeed in removing this continuous
invasion of the dark forces, the rebirth of Russia would take place at
once, and the confidence of the great majority of your subjects
would return to you. All other matters would soon settle themselves.
You could find people who under different conditions, would be will-
ing to work under your personal leadership. At the proper time, and
that is not far distant, you could, of your own free will, grant a
Ministry which would be responsible to you and to constitutional
legislative institutions. This could be done very simply, without
any pressure from outside, and not as was the case with the act
of October 17, [30] 1905. I hesitated a long time before venturing
to tell you this truth, and I finally decided to do so after being urged
by your mother and sisters. You are at the beginning of a new era
of disturbances; I will go further and say at the beginning of an
era of attempts at assassination. Believe me that in trying to loosen
you from the chains that bind you, I do it from no motives of per-
sonal interest, and of this you and Her Majesty are convinced, but
in the hope and in the expectation of saving you, your throne, and
our dear country from the most serious and irreparable conse-
quences.18

3. LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR14

November 17, 1916

. . . Warmest thanks for yr. dear letter just received. I read Niko-
lai's & am utterly disgusted. Had you stopped him in the middle
of his talk & told him that, if he only once more touched that subject
or me, you will send him to Siberia — as it becomes next to high trea-
son. He has always hated & spoken badly of me since 22 years &
in the club too (this same conversation I had with him this year). —
but during war & at such a time to crawl behind yr. Mama & Sisters
& not stick 'up bravely (agreeing or not) for his Emperor's Wife —
is loathsome & treachery. He feels people count with me, begin to
understand me & are for my opinion & that he cant bear. He is the

" This letter was written about November 14, 1916.
^"Pisma Imperatritsy," II, 441-2.

246 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

incarnation of all that's evil, all devoted people loathe him, even those
who do not much like us are disgusted with him and his talk. — And
Fredericks] old & no good & cant shut him up & wash his head &
you my Love far too good & kind & soft — such a man needs to be
held in awe of you— He & NIKOLASHA [Grand Duke Nicholas]
are my greatest enemies in the family, not counting the black women
[Montenegrin princesses] — & Sergei [Grand Duke Sergei Mikhai-
lovich] — He simply eld. not bear Ania [Vyrubova] & me — not so
much the cold rooms, I assure you. I don't care personal nastiness,
but as yr. chosen wife — they dare not Swetty mine, you must back
me up, for your & Baby's sake. Had we not got Him [Rasputin] —
all wold, long have been finished, of that I am utterly convinced. —
I am seeing Him a moment before STURMER. Poor old man
may die fr. the vile way his spoken to & of at the DUMA —
MILIUKOV'S Speech [November 14] yesterday when he quotes
BUCHANAN'S words that STURMER is a traitor & Buch to whom
he turned in the box — held his tongue — vile behavior. We are living
through hardest times, but God will help us through, I have no fear.
LET them scream — we must show we have no fear & are firm.
Wify is your staunch One & stands as a rock behind you. I'll ask
our Friend whether He thinks it advisable I go in a week's time,
or, as you cant move — whether I shld. remain here to help the
"weak'' minister. They have again chosen RODZIANKO & his
speeches are quite bad & what he says to the ministers.

I hope Sweetheart's [Crown Prince Alexei who was with the
Tsar] leg will soon be better. And ALEXEEV ill— all worries at
one time — but God will not forsake you & our beloved Country
through the prayers & help of our Friend. — Am glad you arranged
a place for Obolensky [Prince A. N.]

4. THE VLADIMIR LINE

PURISHKEVICH'S DIARY 15

December 9 [1916]

. . . Toward noon some one called up from the palace of Grand
Duke Cyril Vladimirovich to say that he would like to see me this
afternoon ... in regard to an important matter.

I replied that I would come . . . though Cyril as well as his
two brothers have always filled me with disgust. I feel no more
M Pourichkevitch, V.; "Comment JPai Tue Raspoutine/' 56-8.

' THE IMPERIAL FAMILY 247

kindly toward their mother, the Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna,
whose name has been hateful to me at the front from the very first
day of the war. I feel that these dukes and their mother have re-
mained German and are at heart Germanophil, that they do much
harm to our troops at the front, that they set traps for the Emperor
while proclaiming their devotion to Russia.

They have not given up the hope that some day the crown would
pass to their line. I shall never forget the story of Ivan Grigorevich
Scheglovitov, former Minister of Justice. He said that one day
Grand Duke Boris Vladimirovich asked him whether the descendants
of the Vladimir line have any legal rights to the throne and if not,
why not?

Scheglovitov . . . told him that the Grand Dukes had no rights
whatsoever because their mother continued in the Lutheran faith even
after marriage.

Boris left him but came back sometime later with a paper show-
ing that the Grand Duchess had given up her Protestant religion and
had embraced the Orthodox.

At two o'clock I presented myself at the Palace . , - and five
minutes later was shown into the Grand Duke's office. . . .

He expected me to give him the point of view of the circles
which I frequented. He wanted to know in particular whether I
was opposed to the Imperial Government or did my opposition go
further. ... In leaving the palace ... I carried an impression . . .
that he, together with Guchkov and Rodzianko, schemed something
against the Emperor. . . .

5. LETTER OF GRAND DUKE GEORGI MIKHAILOVICH
TO THE TSAR16

November 24, 1916

Berdichev
Dear Nicky:

Next, after long talks with the brave Adjutant-General Bru-
silov,1T who is exceptionally devoted to you, I consider it my duty
to write you about the unhappy state of affairs I have had occasion
to observe, not only in the rear, but even here.

Positively every one is worried about the rear, i.e., the domestic
situation within Russia. They say frankly that if things continue in

M "Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia," 122-4.
1T Commander of the Southwest Front.

248 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Russia as they have been thus far, we shall never be able to end the
war with a victory, and if this really happens, then it means the
end of everything. Hatred for Sturmer is extraordinary.

I tried to find out precisely what measures might cure the dis-
ease. On this subject, I can say that the general clamor is for the
removal of Sturmer and the establishment of a responsible ministry
to protect you from the deceit of various ministers.

This is considered the only measure that can avert a general
catastrophe. Had I heard this from people on the Left and various
Liberals, I should have paid no attention to it. But as I have been
told it, and am being told here, by men who are deeply devoted to
you and wish with all their hearts for nothing but the happiness of
yourself and of Russia, inseparably, I have decided to write it to you.

I confess that I never expected to hear here, in the army, the
very thing I had heard everywhere in the rear. This means that it
is a general desire — the voice of the people is the voice of God —
and I feel confident that the Lord will help you to meet the general
wish and to prevent the storm that threatens in the interior of
Russia.

Forgive me for writing so frankly, but my conscience compelled
me to write from the army itself, for I have heard this from the lips
of men who are most loyal to you, and thoroughly honorable and
brave, and I have written this letter as a loyal subject and as a
man who loves you dearly. 'May the Lord help you in all things. . . .

GEORGI.

6. LETTER OF ALEXANDER MIKHAILOVICH TO THE

TSAR18

January 7, 1917.
Dear Nicky:

On January 4, you were pleased to allow me to express my
opinion on ascertain subject, and I had to touch, at the same time,
upon nearly all the subjects that disturb us. I begged permission to
speak as frankly as at the confessional, and you granted it.

I take it that, since I have said so much, I am bound to say more.
You may unconsciously have thought, while listening to me:
"It is easy for him to talk, but how about me, who must see my
way through the existing chaos, and make decisions on the various
measures that are being suggested to me from all sides."
M "Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia," 117-22.

THE IMPERIAL FAMILY

You should understand that I, like all who are grieved by the
whole course of events, often ask myself what I would do in your
place, and so I want to let you know what my heart suggests, since
I am convinced that it speaks rightly.

We are going through the most dangerous moment in the his-
tory of Russia: the question is, Shall Russia be a great State,
free, and capable of developing and growing strong, or shall she sub-
mit to the iron German fist ? Every one feels this — one with his mind,
the next with his heart, still others with their souls — and this is
the reason every one, with the exception of the cowards and the
enemies of their country, offers up his life and all his possessions.

And at this solemn time, when we are, as it were, being tested
as men, in the highest sense — as Christians — certain forces within
Russia are leading you, and, consequently Russia, to inevitable ruin.
I say deliberately, You and Russia, because Russia cannot exist
without a Tsar; but it must be remembered that the Tsar alone
cannot govern a country like Russia. This should be realized once and
for all, and, therefore, it is absolutely indispensable that the min-
istries and the legislative chambers should work together. I say
legislative chambers because, although the existing organs are far
from perfect and are not responsible, they ought to be responsible and
should bear the whole burden of responsibility before the people. The
existing situation, with the whole responsibility resting on you, and
you alone, is unthinkable.

What do the people and the public want ? Very little : an authority
(I am not using hackneyed, meaningless words) that is firm, a strong
authority (for a weak authority is no authority), a wise one, meeting
the popular needs — and the opportunity to live freely and to let others
live freely.

A wise authority should be composed of persons who are, in the
very first place, clean, liberal, and devoted to the monarchist prin-
ciple — by no means those of the right or, worse yet, the extreme
right, because for this kind of person "authority" means to "govern"
with the aid of the police, to give the public no opportunity for free
development, and to grant liberties to our, in most cases, good-for-
nothing clergy. "The President of the Council of Ministers should
be a person in whom you have absolute confidence. He selects and is
responsible for all the other ministers, and they, all together, repre-
sent a single purpose, one mind and one will, while each, in his special
field, promotes the common policy and not his own, as is the case
now. No minister should have the right to give you his opinions as

250 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

to general policy; he should merely report in his own special, narrow
field. However, if you wish to know his opinions as to general
problems, he may express them, but only in the Council of Ministers,
with you personally in the chair, With a united ministry, it is un-
likely that you would hear any contradictory opinions, but, of course,
there might be various shades of opinion, in connection with the
work entrusted to each of them separately, and it is necessary for you
to hear them.

In principle, I am opposed to a so-called responsible ministry,
i.e., responsible to the Duma. This should not be permitted. It must
be remembered that in our country parliamentary life is in an em-
bryonic stage. With the best of intentions, ambition for power, fame,
and position would play not a minor, but a major, part, especially
where the parliamentary regime is not clearly understood, and in-
dividual envy, and other human frailties would cause even more
changes of ministers than now, though this may be hard to imagine.

The President, as well as all the ministers, should be chosen from
persons who enjoy the confidence of the country, and whose activi-
ties are known everywhere. Of course this does not exclude mem-
bers of the Duma. Such a ministry would meet with general sym-
pathy in all well-disposed circles. It should present to you a detailed
program of those measures which are necessary to the principal task
of the present, i.e., victory over the Germans, and should include
such reforms as can be introduced at the same time, without harm
to the main object, and for which the country is waiting.

This program, being approved by you, would have to be submitted
to the Duma and State Council, which, without doubt, would approve
it and give it their full support, without which the work of the
Government is impossible. Then, when you are supported by the
chambers, and have gained a firm foothold and a feeling that the
country is back of you, all movements by the left elements of the
Duma should be suppressed. I do not doubt that the Duma itself
would manage this ; but if not, the Duma would have to be dissolved,
and such a dissolution of the Duma would be acclaimed by the
country.

The main principle is that the program, once established, shall in
no case be altered, and the Government shall feel confident that no
outside influences can sway you, and that you, with all your unlim-
ited power, will support your own Government. At present, we see the
exact reverse. No minister knows what tomorrow may bring forth.
They are all isolated. Outside people, who enjoy no confidence what-

THE IMPERIAL FAMILY 251

ever, are appointed as ministers, while they themselves probably
wonder how they ever came to be named. But since, generally speak-
ing, there ar$ not many honest people, these persons lack the cour-
age to admit to you that they are unfitted for the positions to which
they are appointed and that their appointments only hurt the general
good. Their actions border on the criminal.

January 14, 1917

I wrote the first part of this letter in the car, on the way to Kiev.
Until today I have been so busy that I had not a minute to spare.

The appointments made since then show that you have definitely
resolved to pursue a domestic policy that runs absolutely against
the wishes of all your faithful subjects. This policy only plays into
the hands of the left elements, who look on the situation as "the
worse, the better." The unrest grows; even the monarchist prin-
ciple is beginning to totter; and those who defend the idea that
Russia cannot exist without a Tsar lose the ground under their
feet, since the facts of disorganization and lawlessness are manifest.
A situation like this cannot last long. I repeat once more, — it is im-
possible to rule the country without paying attention to the voice
of the people, without meeting their needs, without considering them
capable of entertaining opinions of their own, without a willingness
to admit that the people themselves understand their own needs.

Try as I may, I cannot understand what it is that you and your
advisers are fighting against, striving after. I have had two long talks
with Protopopov. He kept talking about a strong authority, about the
impossibility of concessions to public opinion, about how the Zemstvo
and City Unions, as well as the War-Industry Committees are
revolutionary organizations. Had his words been really true, there
could be no salvation, but fortunately that is not so. Of course, it
cannot be denied that people of the left do exist in these organiza-
tions, but the mass are not revolutionary, and yet, by prohibitive
measures of all kinds, by restrictions and suspicions, those who are in
doubt are now being artificially driven to the left.

One would think that some invisible hand was steering the whole
policy on a course to make victory unattainable. That same man,
Protopopov, told me that it would be possible to rely on the indus-
trialists, upon capital. What a mistake! To begin with, he forgets
that capital is in the hands of foreigners and Jews, to whom the
downfall of the monarchy is desirable, because there would then be
no obstacles in the way of their predatory appetites, and, again, that

252 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

our commercial class is not what it used to be — it is enough to recall
1905.

You could in a few words, by a stroke of the pen, quiet every one
and give the country what she wants : a ministry of confidence, and
the public organization the opportunity to develop, under control,
to be sure. If you were to do that, the Duma would, like one man,
stand behind such a Government ; there would be a tremendous en-
thusiasm; all the nation's forces would come to the front; and the
victory would be won. It is painful to feel that there are no men
whom you trust, men who understand the situation, but only those
who insinuate themselves into positions they know nothing about.

7. ALEXANDER MIKHAILOVICH TO THE TSAR19

February 7, 1917

As you see, a month has passed and still I have not mailed my
letter — I have been hoping all the while that you would follow the
road pointed out to you by people who are loyal to you and who
love Russia from the bottom of their hearts. Events show, however,
that your counsellors are still leading Russia and you to sure perdi-
tion. To keep silent under the circumstances is a crime against God,
against you, and against Russia.

Disaffection is spreading very fast and the gulf between you
and your people is growing wider. (When I say "people" I mean
those who understand the wants of the nation, and not those who
represent a mere herd that will follow the man who knows how to
sway a crowd.) People love you and believe firmly that complete vic-
tory and domestic reorganization are possible without any upheavals
with a Government composed of men who are clean and enjoy the
confidence of the country. Without this, there is no hope of saving the
throne and, with it, our native land.

Look at what is happening among our Allies. They have sum-
moned the most capable men, irrespective of their convictions, to
help govern their countries. Every one realizes that, at a moment
when the fate of the world is at stake, and when their very existence
as free states depends upon a victorious issue of the war, there can
be no room for personal feelings or for considering the interests of
this or that party. There is only one thing to do — to summon the
more capable people to work for the salvation of their country, yes,
""Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia," 117-22.

THE IMPERIAL FAMILY 253

the salvation of the country, for it is a question of the very existence
of Russia as a great, powerful State.

Actually, in the whole history of the Russian State, there have
never been more favorable political conditions. We have on our
side our ancient enemy, England, our recent enemy, Japan, and all
the other states which appreciate all our power and at the same time
witness the wholly inexplicable spectacle of our complete domestic
chaos, which grows worse every day. They see that it is not the best,
but the worst elements who are ruling Russia at a moment when
mistakes committed today will affect our whole history, and they
are compelled to begin to have some doubts about us. They see that
Russia does not understand her own interests and problems, ie., of
course, not Russia, but those who rule her.

Such a situation cannot last. You have probably read the address
presented to you by the Novgorod nobility. One speaks in this fash-
ion only when deeply conscious of the abyss on which we are stand-
ing, and I assure you that all persons really loyal to you feel exactly
the same way.

One is in utter despair at seeing that you do not want to hear those
who know Russia's situation and counsel you to take the steps that
would extricate us from the chaos we are in today.

You probably believe that the measures the Government has
taken will lead Russia out to the bright path, the path to victory and
complete regeneration, and you assume that all of us with the opposite
view are wrong. But, to test it, just glance behind you, and compare
the situation in Russia at the beginning of the war with that of today.
Is it possible that such a comparison does not convince you as to
which side is right?

In conclusion I want to say that, strange though it may ^be,
the Government itself is the organ that is preparing the revolution.
The nation does not want it, but the Government is doing everything
to make as many malcontents as possible, and is succeeding perfectly.
We are witnessing the unparalleled spectacle of revolution from above,

and not from below. „.,„,«

Your faithful SANDRO,

February 17,

BOOK II— THE NEW REGIME

PART VI
THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET

INTRODUCTORY' NOTE

The revolution which few people in Russia desired but which
many anticipated, was proclaimed at Petrograd on March 12,
1917. Every one in the capital was on the lookout for it and
when an insignificant crowd came out in the street begging for
bread, it was hailed as the long expected guest. The mob denied
the identity, claimed to be a pauper and not a prince, but in the
end allowed itself to be convinced of its importance, to be crowned,
worshiped and feared. One can but wonder whether there would
have been a revolution had there been less talk about it. ... To
this day we do not know who the leaders of the mob were or
what their object was. We do know that the men who assumed
the leadership on March 12 did not just then plan a revolution.
There is reason for believing that the mentally unbalanced
Minister of the Interior, Protopopov, instigated the uprising in
order to put it down. The movement got away from him and when
he could no longer control it he called it revolution and ran. He
was followed by the other Ministers, and the extreme reactionaries
in general, leaving the Liberals and Socialists to clean up the mess.

The Liberals were dazed by the passing events. They wrung
their hands and repeated "I told you so." When they came to,
they found the Socialists busily at work. Though equally taken
by surprise the Socialists were the first to recover. They were the
only people who really visualized and desired a revolution and had
some idea what to do with it. They had their 1905 experience,
the revolutionary manuals and Socialistic programs to guide them."

Of still greater importance was their understanding of the
masses. Many of the Socialists had either come from the prole-

255

256 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

tariat or had been closely associated with it in the labor movement.
They used slogans familiar to the man in the street though not
always understood by him. Young and enthusiastic, the Socialists
put their whole heart and soul into their work of building up the
Russia of their dreams. Against them the moderate, scholarly,
legalistic, cautious Liberals had no chance at all.

One can imagine the feeling of the men of this older genera-
tion as they saw the ideal of a constitutional monarchy of the
English type vanish before their eyes. Their attitude toward the
revolution and its leaders is strikingly portrayed in the pictures
drawn by Shulgin. Between the scholarly, stylishly dressed
Shulgin and the ignorant, unwashed workman there was not only
a social and intellectual gulf but a mountain of distrust. Somewhat
similar barriers divided the Miliukovs and Rodziankos from the
Kerenskis and Chkheidzes. In the days of the Duma the former
regarded themselves as statesmen and the latter as street-corner
agitators. After the disappearance of the monarchy, the tables
were turned and the leaders of the revolution did not wholly
conceal their opinion of the Council of Elders of the Duma. Iij
studying the political fights that took place between March and
November, 1917, one must not wholly lose sight of the fact that
memories of personal slights and injuries added to the bitterness.

On March 12 the Committee of the Duma was formed. After
hearing the order to adjourn, the members of the Duma did not
at first know what to do. To obey, with the Ministers in hiding,
meant to leave the ship of State to drift without the guidance
of even the sailors ; not to obey meant to side with the revolution.
As might have been expected, they compromised by forming the
Committee of the Duma, which had for its main object to mark
time until the Tsar made up his mind. On the evening of that
same day a body of men met and organized, on the model of 1905,
the Soviet of Workers Deputies for the definite purpose of uniting
the revolutionary forces and of depriving the Tsar of any choice
of action.

During the first four months (March- July) of the revolution
these two political forces struggled for control of the government.
On March 13, 14 and 15 each side tried to attract allies. But while
the Committee worked half-heartedly, not knowing the Emperor's

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 257

mind, the Soviet struck out boldly. Both sides appealed to the
Army and in the end the Committee got the officers and the Soviet
the soldiers. The Committee won over the employers of labor,
the middle class, the Allied Governments : the Soviet attached it-
self to the workers and the radical intelligentsia, at home and
abroad. On March 16 came the first test of strength in connection
with the abdication.

CHAPTER XVIII
THE FIRST WEEK OF THE REVOLUTION

i. SHULGIN'S MEMOIRS l

I awoke. It was nine in the morning. The telephone rang and rang.
"Hello I"

"Is that you, Vasil Vitalevich ?" asked Shingarev. "It is time to go
to the Duma. It has begun."

"What are you talking about?"

"It has begun. There is an order to dismiss the Duma, the city
is in an uproar. Let's hurry. They are occupying the bridges. We
may never get there. An automobile has been sent for me. Come
at once to my place, and we will go together."
"I am coming."

This happened on the morning of March 12, 1917. During the
last few days we have been living, as it were, .on a volcano. ^Petro-
grad was without bread — transportation had broken down because of
the unusually heavy snows, frosts, and principally, of course, the
war. There were street disturbances. It was not, of course, a question
of bread. It was the last straw. The trouble was that in that large
city it was impossible to find a few hundred people who felt kindly
toward the Government. That's not all. The Government did not
feel very kindly toward itself. There was not a single Minister who
believed in himself or in what he was doing. . . . There was not
one who could bang his fist on the table. , . . Lately the Ministers
even stopped coming to the Duma. . . .^

As we were driving Shingarev said : "That's the answer. Until
the last I continued to hope that they would somehow see the light
and make concessions. But no ; they dismissed the Duma. That was
the last opportunity. Any agreement with the Duma, no matter what
kind, was the last chance to escape revolution."

"Do you think this is the beginning of a revolution?"
"It looks like it/'
"Then this is the end."
"Perhaps the end. Perhaps the beginning."
lShulgin, V. V., "Dm," 102.

258

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 259

"No, but I cannot believe this. If it is revolution then it is
the end."

"You may be right. Unless we believe in miracles — but there
may be a miracle. In any case the Duma stood between the Govern-
ment and the revolution. If the Duma is brushed aside then we are
face to face with the street. If we could have held on two months
longer."

"Until the offensive?"

"Yes. Had the offensive tailed we should have had a revolution
anyway . . . had it succeeded . . ."

"Yes, had it succeeded all would have been forgotten."

We reached Kamenostrovski boulevard. Though it was early for
Petrograd yet the streets were full of people. It gave the impression
that the factories were on strike. Perhaps also the high schools, and,
who knows, the universities. As we approached the Neva the crowd
increased and finally became so thick that the 'automobile came to a
standstill.

"Automobile go back; there is no passage!" Shingarev put his
head out of the window and said: "We are members of the Duma.
Let us pass, we must get there."

A student ran to the window. "Are you Mr. Shingarev?"

"Yes, I am Shingarev, let us pass."

"Immediately."

He jumped on the foot-board. "Comrades, make way! These
are members of the State Duma— Comrade Shingarev.^ The crowd
opened up and we moved on, with the student still on the foot-board.
He kept shouting that "Comrade Shingarev" was in the car, and
we got through. At times the mob shouted back: "Hurrah for
Comrade Shingarev." The student accompanied us for a short time
only, until we came to the Troitski Bridge. Here the road was
blocked by a company of soldiers.

"You tell them," said the student, "that you are going to the
Duma," and with those words he disappeared. In his place appeared
an officer, and when he learned who we were he very politely
apologized for the delay.

"Open up. These are members of the Duma." As we hurried
across the deserted bridge, Shingarev remarked: "The Duma still
stands between the 'people' and the 'Government.' So far both
banks [of the Neva] 2 recognize her."

8 On the left bank, the Wiborg side, were the factories, the workmen's
quarters, and on the right, the stores, banks, palaces, Duma,

s6o DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

On this bank [right] all was as yet quiet. We hurried along the
quay, but all the familiar places looked queer. ... On the Shpaler-
naia we came up with a funeral procession. It was the funeral of M.
M. Alekeseenko, member of the Duma; To Pity or to Envy him?

Others came to the Duma. One told the other the news. 'The
workmen have assembled on the Wiborg Side. Their headquarters
are, seemingly, the station. Some kind of an election is going on
. . . hands are raised. A regiment has revolted. Apparently the
Volynski. They killed their commanding officer. The Cossacks have
refused to shoot — they fraternize with the people. There are barri-
cades on the Nevski. No one knows anything about the fate of the
Ministers. It is said that the police is being murdered. ... It was
reported that a mob of about thirty thousand people made up of
workmen, soldiers, and "all kinds" is on the way to the State Duma.

S. I. Shidlovski assembled the Bureau of the Progressive Bloc.
We found ourselves in the same room, No. n, where we always
met and made our decisions. There were present Shidlovski, Shin-
garev, Miliukov, Kapnist 2nd, Lvov, [V. N.], Polovtsev, Efremov,
Rzhevski, I and a few others. All who, during the last years, have
led the Duma . . . and led it to ... The meeting opened — opened
with the knowledge that a mob of thirty thousand is approaching.
What should be done? I do not remember what was said.. But I
remember that no one proposed anything worthy of attention. What
could be proposed? Were these people fit to direct a revolutionary
mob, to dominate it? Under the protection of its spears we could
call the Government all kinds of mean and dirty names, carry on a
"constitutional," i. e.y wordy war, and thereby hold the masses in
check. To talk in order that the country should be still — that the
army knowing that the Duma is on the watch, would do its duty
at the front and the workman in the rear, . . . But now this war
of words is over. It has failed in its purpose — it has not averted
the revolution. Perhaps it has even hastened it. Hastened or
postponed ?

Not all felt powerless. Some thought that we -could even now do
something, now that the masses have begun "to act."

Of course, we came to no decision in room No. n.

Later there was a meeting in the office of the President of the
Duma — a meeting of all the leaders of the political groups, ijot only
those of the Progressive Bloc. Rodzianko presided. The question was

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 261

what to do? We were caught between the Emperor's order to
adjourn and the approaching storm. Not to obey the order and
continue in session meant revolution — it meant that the Duma raised
the flag of revolt and would have to lead this revolt regardless of
consequences.

Neither Rodzianko nor the overwhelming majority of those
present were capable of this act. We were first of all loyal. We
respected the throne — and protested against the policy followed by
the Emperor, for we knew that it led to the ruin of the dynasty.
In the Duma we attacked the Ministers — and did not touch the
Monarchy.

I do not recall what was said, but remember the decision "to
obey the Imperial order, to consider the Duma as not in session [to
call] on the members of the Duma not to go away but to meet at once
for an informal conference." To emphasize the fact that it is an
"informal conference" and not a session of the Duma, we decided
not to meet in the White Hall but in the Semicircular Hall.

This place was hardly large enough to hold us — for the whole
Duma was present. Rodzianko and the Council of Elders sat around
the table and the rest of us sat or stood, or leaned against eacn other
as best we could. We were excited, alarmed, clinging, as it were,
spiritually to one another. Even opponents of long standing felt the
presence of a new element, equally dangerous, threatening, repulsive
to all. This new element was the . . . mob. ... It was approaching,
its breath was already, felt. At that time very few thought about it,
but judging from their paleness and beating hearts, a great many
undoubtedly felt unconsciously that death, surrounded by the mob,
was on the march. . . .

Rodzianko explained the situation and asked "What should be
done?"

From all sides, from the right and the left, excited speeches were
made, recommending that something should be done.

What? I do not know. Some one, it seems, proposed that the
Duma should declare itself as the Government . . . declare that it
will not disperse . . . will not obey the order . . . declare itself a
Constituent Assembly. This proposition did not receive, could not
receive, support. . . . Some one demanded that the Duma should
say whether it is with the old Government or with the people, the very
people now on the way, and to whom an answer must be given.

262 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Just then there was a commotion at the door, loud voices . . .
and an officer rushed into the room.

He interrupted the meeting with his loud, shrill voice :

"Gentlemen of the Duma. I implore your protection! I am the
head of the guard, your guard, the guard of the Duma. Some unknown
soldiers have forced their way in. They have severely wounded my
assistant. They tried to kill me. I barely escaped. . . . Help me!"
Rodzianko tried to pacify him, to tell him that he was in no danger.

At this moment Kerenski spoke up: "That which has just
happened proves that we must not delay ! I am constantly receiving
information that the troops are agitated. . . . They are coming out
on the street ... I am now going to visit the regiments. It is
necessary that I should know what to say to them. May I tell them
that the State Duma is with them, that it assumes all responsibility,
that it will stand at the head of the movement?"

I do not recall whether he received an answer . . . probably not,
but from that minute his figure stood out. He spoke with positiveness
as one having authority. His words and gestures were sharp, to the
point, his eyes flashed. . . .

"He is their dictator," I heard a whisper near me.

It was at this time, or perhaps a little before that, that I asked
to be allowed to say a word. I had the feeling that we were going
down, down ... and unconsciously prepared for death . . . and I,
it seems, wished to write an epitaph for all of us, to say that we died
as we lived.

"When we talk of those who are coming here we should, first
of all, know who they are. Friends or enemies? If they come here
in order to continue our work, the work of the State Duma, of
Russia; if they come here in order to pledge their new strength
to support us in our cry 'all for the war/ then they are to be
received as friends, and we are with them. But if they come here
with other thoughts, then they are the friends of the Germans, and
we should tell them firmly and clearly: 'You are enemies; we are
not for you but against you.' "

It may be that my words made some impression, but in any case
they brought no results. Kerenski said something more. He stood
there determined, ready to depart, uttering sharp, almost contemptu-
ous words. He grew on the mud of the revolution, mud on which he
was in the habit of jumping and running at a time when we could
not even walk.

The mob of thirty thousand with which we were threatened in

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 263

the course of the warning was not a myth, but a fact. It came like
a cloudburst, like a flood. It is said (I did not see it myself) that
Kerenski attempted to turn the first mass of soldiers, which appeared
at the Taurida Palace, into the "first revolutionary guard."

"Citizen Soldiers/' he said, "on you falls the great honor of
guarding the State Duma. ... I declare you to be the 'First Revolu-
tionary Guard/ " But this guard did not last a minute ... it was
swept away by the mob. . . .

This constant outpouring of humanity brought in sight new faces
but, no matter how many there were, they all had a kind of stupid,
animal, even devilish appearance. God, how ugly it looked ! So ugly
that I gritted my teeth. I felt pained and helpless and bitterly enraged.

Machine guns ! That's what I wanted. I felt that only the -tongues
of machine guns could talk to the mob, and that only machine guns
and lead could drive back into his lair the frightful beast. This beast
was no other than His Majesty the Russian people. That which we
feared, tried to avoid at all costs, was before us. The revolution had
begun.

From that time on the Duma practically ceased to exist. Even
physically . . . for the mob took possession of the building . . .
for sometime [only one room] the so-called "Rodzianko Cabinet"
was at our disposal. All the other rooms and halls were filled with
people. In the Rodzianko Cabinet we, Committee of the State Duma,
continued to meet.

Above the roar of the human sea sounds of brass instruments
penetrated into the Rodzianko Cabinet. ... It was the Marseillaise

Aux armes, citoyens!

Formez vos bataillons !

Marchons, marchons qu'un sang impur

Abreuve nos sillons.

Whose "impure blood" has to flow ? "Hurrah/* These noises continued
without end and without limit until the air became black and thick.
More "hurrahs," more speeches and more blowing of trumpets:

Entendez-vous dans les campagnes
Mugir ces feroces soldats:
Ils viennent j usque dans vos bras
Egorger vos fils, vos compagnes.

If we only had machine guns. But we could not have any. Our
great stupidity and irreparable mistake was that we had not prepared
any real force. If we had had even a single regiment on whom to

264 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

depend, a single general with determination, the situation mighs
been different. But we had neither the one nor the other . . .
what's more we could not have either. At this time Petrograd •
no dependable troops left or perhaps it had not had any as yet . ^e
Officers ! We will talk about them later. At this time, no one eve?1
thought of looking to "officers' companies" for support. Besides
. . . besides, although I was not the only one to feel that this is the
end ... to feel bitter hatred toward the revolution from the very
first day (I was quite prepared to hate her ... I hated her unto
death in 1905) . . . although, as I said I was not the only one, yet
there were not very many of us who felt that way. Nearly all the
others did not understand . . . they were in a state of dizziness. . . .

Police ? Yes, if you please. But who of us was fit to handle such
an instrument? What did we understand? . . . We were powerless.
We did not even know how to go about such things. . . .

Kerenski alone, accustomed to such things, knew how to dance
on the revolutionary bog . . . and he grew with each minute. . . .

The revolutionary mud of humanity which poured over us had
a few "lumps of support." One could not stand on them but could
jump across. These lumps were the revolutionary contacts which
Kerenski had. They were people who belonged not to some organiza-
tion, but who recognized his authority. This explains why during
the first period of the revolution (without taking into consideration
his personal qualities, for he was a first-class actor) Kerenski played
such a prominent part. There were people who listened to him. . . .
Perhaps it would be better to say that there were armed people who
listened to him. In time of revolution only those who have guns
count. It is true that these "armed people of Kerenski" were not
organized companies — they were merely "lumps of support." But
such as they were he had them, and that was a great deal more than
all the rest of us together possessed.

For example, to whom could I issue orders ? To the members of
the Duma? But they were not armed. Supposing even they were,
what could one have done with a battalion of old lawmakers. . . .

Interestingly enough, some such idea passed through the brain of
the Cossack Karaulov, a member of the Duma, He conceived the
idea of "arresting everybody" and making himself dictator, but
when he raised the subject in a speech before one of his "most
dependable" companies, he got such a look that he concluded if he
did not drop the subject quickly something might drop on him. . . .

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 265

Kerenski had these tiny contacts. You could not do anything
big with them, but they gave the illusion of power. For an actor
like Kerenski ... it was quite enough. Groups of armed men forced
their way through the human mess in the Duma to Kerenski to ask
him what to do, how to "defend liberty/' whom to seize. Kerenski
felt himself at once of those "who command/' His whole appearance
became different . . . the tone of his voice changed.

I do not know whether it was by Kerenski's orders, or the idea
just came of itself, that volunteer police ran all over the city
"arresting." With a student at the head followed by armed workmen
and soldiers, they ran here and there, breaking into this and that
apartment, grabbing "officials of the old regime" and dragging them
to the Duma.

One of the first to be brought was Scheglovitov. This was Keren-
ski's first chance to shine. With a look of inspiration he faced the
old tsarist statesman and said:

"Ivan Grigorevich Scheglovitov, you are arrested, . . . Your life
is spared. . . . Know that the Duma does not shed blood!"

What magnanimity ! It was beautifully done. This was Kerenski
— actor to the very bone, but a man who was honestly opposed to
the shedding of blood. "Ecclesia abhorret sanguinem," said the old
inquisitors as they burned their victims. This was Kerenski. He
burned Russia on the altar of freedom, while pronouncing the words
—"The Duma does not shed blood."

No matter how you interpret it, the fact remains that this slogan,
uttered in a decorative-dramatic manner, impressed itself on the
hearts and minds. How many lives it then saved!

I became hungry . . . and started to move toward the buffet.
Every room was crowded to the limit. ... I moved with the stupid
mob, and was carried along to the hallway which leads to the restau-
rant. Suddenly some one standing near me said something. I looked
up and saw a soldier.

"Do you happen to have it in the Duma?"

I thought at first that he wanted a cigarette, but when I looked
at him I realized that it was something else.

"Have what? What is it that you want?"

"Officers."

"What kind of officers?"

"Oh, any kind who will do."

I looked bewildered — "Any kind who will do/'

He continued : "I told our fellows that it won't do to be altogether

266 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

without officers . . . they are angry with those we have . . . but how
can we get along without them? It is not right. For order's sake
there must be officers. . . . Perhaps you have some in the Duma
who will do?"

I shall remember this soldier as long as I live. He came to the
Duma for officers "who will do." He did not find them . . . they
were not to be found . . . the Duma did not have them. Ah, if it had
them! . . . Even if only to the extent of the mobilized "opposing
side.". . .

The opposing side was not asleep. Throughout the city in every
barrack and factory, elections were going on. ... One for every
thousand ... for the workers' and soldiers' deputies. , . . The
mass "organized;" in other words it was organized so that it could
be used.

And we ? We had a very poor idea of what was going on. In any
case we did not know how it was done. We had no plan and no idea
how to oppose it. ...

Towards evening, I think, it became generally known that the Old
Government was no more. The Ministers ran home without putting
up a fight of any kind. On this day, if I remember correctly, not a
single 'Minister was arrested. The Ministers left, seemingly, much
sooner than was necessary.

The troops had also disappeared, that is to say, they had gone over
to the "people who had risen." But at the same time it seemed to
be understood that the troops "stood by the Duma/' There was a
misunderstanding. It appeared as if the Duma had "risen," that it
was the "center of the movement." This was not true. The Duma
had not "risen." But the soldiers in their "pilgrimages" to the Duma
gave the other impression.

The pity of it all is that this flow of good-will toward the Duma,
which was rather touching at times, could not be made use of, could
not be depended upon . . . because we did not know how, because
it was to the Duma as a symbol of the revolution and not to the
Duma per se3 because a hostile hand was at work against strengthen-
ing the Duma, which stood on a basis of patriotism. This was the
hand of the future Bolsheviks, undoubtedly, even then, guided by
the Germans. There was still another reason. These troops were no
longer disciplined soldiers but armed bands, without order and almost
without officers . . . nevertheless . . . when it became evident that
there was no longer a Government, it also became evident that the

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 267

country could not even, for a moment, be without a Government.
Therefore the Committee of the State Duma was forced to take
the Government upon itself. Rodzianko hesitated long. He could not
decide whether this would mean rebellion or not.

"I have no desire to revolt," he said. "I am not a rebel. I made
no revolution and do not intend to make one. If it is here, it is
because they would not listen to us. But I am not a revolutionist. I
shall not raise a hand against the Supreme Power, have no desire to
do so. But, on the other hand, there is no Government. I am torn
to pieces by all sides ; the telephone never stops ringing ; every one
wishes to know what to do. What shall I do ? Wash my hands and
step aside, leave Russia without a Government? But after all it is
a question of Russia. We have obligations toward our native land.
What shall I do? What shall I do?"

The reply, which I gave, surprised even myself:

"Take the responsibility, Michael Vladimirovich. It is not a
rebellion. Take it as a loyal subject. Russia can not be without a
Government. If the Ministers have deserted their posts some one must
take their places. Have they run away or have they not?"

"Yes, they have run away. No one knows where the President
of the Council of Ministers is to be found. The same is true of
the Minister of the Interior. They are all gone."

"Under the circumstances, there is nothing else for you to do
but take over the power. The situation is this. There are two possi-
bilities. The trouble may blow over, the Emperor will appoint a new
Ministry to whom we can hand back the power, or if the trouble
does not blow over then some one must take over the Government.
If we do not take it, then the others, those who selected certain
scoundrels in the factories, will take it. What in the devil can we do
when the Tsarist Ministers have so hidden that even the dogs can-
not find them!"

I was working myself into a passion. If we are no good, what
abotlt our Ministers. Look what their obstinacy has led to, and when
it came they ran away and left us to face the hundreds Q£ thousands
of revolted soldiers, in addition to the other 'riff raff. This was the
Ministry of a Great Empire, mollycoddles and not men. From that
moment I felt a change in me. I began to search for a way out . . .
any kind of an exit.

Until late in the night we had the same thing over and over
again: meeting in the Duma, flow of the mob through the halls,

268 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

coming of military units, playing the Marsellaise, ringing of tele-
phones, tens, hundreds of excited people inquiring what to do,
groups of armed men bringing in people arrested. To these should
be added the "calls'* of the Committee of the State Duma, Rodzianko's
Jong distance conversation with Headquarters, demanding immediate
decision as to what to do, how to £ct.

It is only later that it became known that the Empress telegraphed
to the Emperor that "concessions are necessary."

This telegram was a year and a half late. She should have given
him that advice in the autumn of 1915. "Concessions" should have
been made for the retreat "without ammunition." A majority of the
Fourth Duma proposed that this should be done. But at that time
they refused to pay for the loss of twenty guberniias^ Now—now it
is apparently too late. What kind of concessions can one make to
satisfy this stormy sea?

That night, if I remember correctly, the Duma made some kind
of an attempt to arm by creating the post of Commandant of the
State Duma. We slept in chairs . . . woke from time to time with the
thought "how to find a way out."

It was clearly apparent to me then as now, and as it has always
been, that Russia cannot be without a monarchy. The question that
ran through my head was "how to save the monarchy?" In that
sleepless night the idea probably passed through my mind, whether
good or bad history alone can tell — that by sacrificing the Monarch
it might be possible to save the Monarchy — to bring about the
abdication of Nicholas II in favor of the young heir — of course,
this idea came also to the minds of others.

That very night, if I am not mistaken the "Ispolkom Sovdepa"
occupied one of the rooms (room of the budget commission). This
name, which had .such a wild sound at that time, stood for "Ispol-
nitelnyi Komitet Sovieta Soldatskikh i Rabfochikh Deputatov."

What a nightmare of a night! Where are we? What is actually
happening? . . . What about Russia? the Army? . . . How will
they receive the news? What will happen?

We must have a center. We must, at all cost, pull off some kind of
a trick. Without that all will go to pieces . . . and there will be
complete anarchy. . . . Above all we must save the .army. ... If
the breakup begins there . . . and it will begin at once if the Army
has no one to obey . . . then all is lost. The Army must be given
a definite decision. . . . Let the soldiers believe that the Government

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 269

is in the hands of 'the Duma. ... It will take them some time to
understand that the Duma as it stands cannot possess such power.
. . . The "State Duma" is a good slogan for them and for
Russia. ... It will be good for at least several days . . . and by
that time the question of the Emperor will be settled.

The Emperor — there is the rub. Can he reign ? Can he ? How can
we find out ? No, he cannot, . . . After all that has passed who will
stand up for him ? He has no one, no one. . . . Rasputin has eaten up
all the friends, all the love for the Tsar . . . there are no more
truly loyal subjects . . . there are make-believe loyal subjects, and
declared rebels ; the latter will openly come out against him, and the
former will go in hiding. He is alone, worse than alone, for the
shadow of Rasputin clings to him. . , . The cursed muzhik! I
told Purishkevich not to kill him — Rasputin dead does more harm
than Rasputin alive. If he were alive he could be killed now, and
that would give some outlet to the feeling. But who should now be
killed? Who? This damn riffraff must kill somebody, will kill some-
body. The question is "Whom?" Of course. ... It is clear. . . .
But, no, this must not be allowed. We must save, save. In order to
save . . . one must either turn the guns on this dirty mob (and on
us too) or abdicate from the throne. . . , Yes, abdication is the
price to pay for saving the life of the Emperor . . . and the
Monarchy. . . .

Nicholas I hung five Decembrists and if Nicholas II could save
Russia by shooting 50,000 "Februarists" it would be a cheap price
to pay. That would mean that we have a real Tsar, a real Govern-
ment. . . . But if it fails? If for this purpose no regiments or regi-
mental leaders can be found? Then — of course — abdication. . . .
The young Tsarevich will reign under the regency — of Michael Alex-
androvich. . . . The Supreme Commander-in-Chief will be Grand
Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich — and the Government? . . . Who will
be the Government? Nobody in sight . . . we spurred . . . and broke
a lance — for whom? For no one in particular. Miliukov and Shin-
garev will, of course, be included in the Ministry . . . then Kerenski
. . . yes, we must have Kerenski. ... He is the most active . . .
just now. . . . Actor? Yes . . . but a talented actor ... we must
have him, at least at first. They listen to him . . . and in any case
we must have him because of the left parties. Rodzianko could occupy
only the post of Prime Minister, but the premiership is not for him
because the left parties, even the Cadets, will not permit it. ... Let

27Q DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

him .remain President of the Duma. . . . Will there be a Duma ?
Not likely. ... We are actually prisoners. . . . The damn riffraff.
... Is it possible that we shall have to go through the same night-
mare tomorrow ? Let's try and sleep, even if only for a minute, while
they are away. . . . They? The revolutionary rabble, I mean, the
people. His Majesty, the People. Oh, how I detest it!

March 13

The second day was even more of a nightmare. . . . "The revolu-
tionary people" again overflowed the Duma. ... So that it was
Impossible to move. Added to this were the bands or orators, the
beastly "hurrahs," the hateful Marseillaise, and the "deputations."
Frenzied mobs of people from numberless organizations, institutions,
societies, unions . . . desired to see Rodzianko and in his person
greet the State Duma and the new Government. All made speeches,
repeating the words "people and freedom/7. . . Rodzianko replied,
emphasizing "Country and Army." . . . One phrase does not
necessarily go with the other, but the mob shouted "hurrah7* just
the same. They shouted "hurrah" to the speeches of the radicals . . .
who used a different vocabulary: "dark forces of reaction, tsarism,
the old regime, revolution, democracy, power of the people, dicta-
torship of the proletariat, socialistic republic, land to the toilers/'
and again "svoboda, [liberty] svoboda, svoboda" until one felt sick
at the stomach. ... To all these various speeches the mob belched
out "hurrah." Some are beginning to greet the ''Soviet of Soldiers'
and Workers' Deputies." Its Executive Committee is in session along
side of us. ... We feel that this is a second Government. . . .
Kerenski and Chkheidze are elected also into that body, . . , They
are a bridge between these two heads. . . . Yes, one feels that there
is something- with a double head but it is not a double headed
eagle. . . .

As before, companies of soldiers are coming ... to pay their
respects. They call for Rodzianko. . ; . He goes out to them . . .
and makes speeches in a loud voice, and they shout "hurrah," —
play the Marseillaise until one's nerves are on the edge. . . *

Rodzianko is just the man for that kind of thing: he has the
figure, the voice, the presence and the enthusiasm. . . . Notwith-
standing all his shortcomings, he loves Russia and does all that he
can, that is to say, shouts with all his might, to defend the country.
. . . He gets everybody enthusiastic and they shout "hurrah." But

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 271

immediately following him there jumps up some kind of a Caucasus
monkey [Chklieidze] or somebody even worse and says all kinds
of defeatist stuff, arouses passion and greed. . . . Their every other
word is : "Landholders, Tsarist clique, Rasputin, serfs, police/' These
speakers are also greeted with "hurrah."

The days passed as a nightmare — no beginning, no ending, no
middle, all jumbled together. Deputations from regiments, continuous
telephone ringing, endless questions "What to do". . . sending of
members of the Duma to different places, discussions among ourselves,
long-distance telephoning by Rodzianko, growing conflict with the
Ispolkom of the Soviet.

What could we do ? At the very moment when a three-hundred-
year-old Government collapsed a thirty thousand mob deluge broke
over the heads of a few men who might have been able to do
something.

March 14

I worked my way to Rodzianko's office. What has happened?
"They" are here. Where are "we"?

The Committee of the State Duma has moved to other quarters.
These other quarters are two small rooms, facing the library at the
end of the hall. ... It is from this place that Russia is going to
be governed in the future. . . . Here I found our crowd. They sat
around a table covered with green velvet. At the head was Rodzianko,
around him all the others, except Kerenski, who was absent. I did
not finish my report about Petropavlovskaia [Shulgin had been sent to
that fortress to restore order] , when the doors flew open and Kerenski
"dramatically" stepped in. He was followed by two armed soldiers
and between them was a man holding a bundle. Kerenski took it
from him and said:

"You may go."

The soldiers faced about in a military manner, the official of
the bundle turned around, and all three went out.

Kerenski then looked at us, and threw the package on the table.

"Our secret treaties with the Allies. . . . Hide them," and disap-
peared as dramatically as he appeared. . . .

"Gentlemen, what are we going to do with them," said Shidlovski ;
"we have not even a cupboard."

"What's all this nonsense?" shouted Rodzianko. "Where did he
get it?"

Before he had time to get real angry his own secretary rushed

272 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

in ... announcing that sailors have come ... to see the President
of the Duma.

"To hell with them ! When am I going to do my own work ? There
ought to be an end to this sometime."

"Grand Duke Cyril Vladimirovich is with them/' said thfe
Secretary.

"You had better go," suggested some one.

Rodzianko grumbled and went , . . made a speech . . . about
the country . . . about "not allowing the enemy, the damned
Germans, to destroy our Mother Russia". . . and the auditors shouted
"hurrah." One could stand this kind of thing once, twice, thrice, but
when it continued without end ... it became unendurable. . . .

What to do with the secret treaties. . . . There was no closet, not
even a drawer in the table. . . .

Some one got an idea:

"Throw them under the table ; no one will see them — look," and
with these words the documents were kicked under the table. . . .

Some time passed and . . . again Kerenski, again with soldiers,
again with a bundle.

"You may go."

The soldiers departed.

"Here are two million rubles . . . brought from some Ministry.
. . . This can't go on ... we have got to appoint Commissars [to
act temporarily as Ministers]. Where is Michael Vladimirovich?
[Rodzianko]"

"Outside."

"Shouting hurrah? Enough of hurrah. Let's get down to work —
members of the Committee."

Off he went. . . .

We threw the two millions under the table to join the secret
treaties.

For the hundredth time Rodzianko returned. . . . He was all
excited ; nay more, he was in a rage. . . . He dropped into his chair.

"What happened? What's the matter?"

"What's the matter? These scoundrels."

He took a look around.

"You can talk, they are not here."

("They," that is, Chkheidze and others of the left.)

"What scoundrels! Everything went along nicely. ... I made
them a speech. Their greeting could not have been better. I gave
them a patriotic speech. . . . They shouted 'hurrah.' I looked around

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 273

—their spirit was all that could be desired. But just as I ended,
some one from them began."

"From whom?"

"Oh, from them . . . how do you call them . . . those sons-of-
a-dog deputies . . . from the Soviet Executive Committee . , . you
know, that riffraff."

"What was it they said?"

"Here is what they said :

" 'The President of the State Duma calls on you, comrades, to
save the Russian land. This is easy to understand, comrades. Mr.
Rodzianko has something to save. He has a considerable piece of that
Russian land in Ekaterinoslav Guberniia. And what land ! It is possi-
ble he may have land elsewhere. For example, in Novgorod? It
is said that you can drive there through forest and when you ask
whose it is, you are told that it belongs to Rodzianko. You see,
Rodzianko and the other landowners of the State Duma have some-
thing to save — their estates, princedoms, counties, and baronies. They
call this Russian land. They are calling on you, comrades, to save
it. Suppose you ask the President of the Duma if he would be as
concerned in saving the Russian land, if this Russian land of the
landowners became yours ?' The beasts 1"

"What did you answer?"

"What did I answer? I do not remember what I answered. The
scoundrels !"

He banged on the table with such force that the secret treaties
jumped.

"The scoundrels! We offer up the lives of our sons, and that
riffraff thinks that we begrudge our land. Damn the land! What
good is it to me if Russia perishes? Dirty scum! Take my shirt but
save Russia. That's what I told them."

By this time his voice became so shrill that we had to quiet him.

It took him some time to calm down. Then ... he explained
the course of events. He is in constant communication by direct wire
with Headquarters and General Ruzski. He tells Headquarters what
is taking place . . . that the situation is getting worse, that the Min-
isters have disappeared, that the Duma has temporarily taken charge
of the Government, but that its power is very shaky because (i)
the troops have revolted, and will not obey their officers, and even
threaten them; (2) alongside of the Committee of the State -Duma
there has grown up a new institution, namely the "ispolkom," which
strives to get all the power for itself and undermines the power of

274 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

the Duma; and (3) owing to the general demoralization and the
growing anarchy something out of the ordinary must be done. It was
believed at first that a responsible Ministry would satisfy the clamor,
but with each hour's delay the situation grows worse. It became quite
clear yesterday that the Monarchy itself is in danger. The idea seems
now to prevail that only the abdication of the Emperor in favor of his
son can save the dynasty. . . . General Alexeev is also of this opinion.

"This morning," continued Rodzianko, "I planned to go to Head-
quarters to see the Emperor, to report to him that abdication is the
only way out. But 'they' learned of my intentions . . . and when
I got ready to depart they informed me that they had given orders
not to give me a train. . . . Think of it! They declared that they
would not allow me to go alone, that Chkheidze, and some others,
would have to go with me. But, your humble servant is not going to
the Emperor with them. . . . Chkheidze was to be accompanied by
a battalion of 'revolutionary soldiers.* Imagine what they would have
done there? With that cattle I. . . /'

Just then some one called me out. . . .

[On my return] I found the Committee greatly excited . .- .
Rodzianko was bellowing, "Who wrote this? Of course, they, the
scoundrels. This was done purposely to help the Germans . . .
traitors. . . . What will happen now?"

"What is the matter?"

"Here, read this."

I took the piece of paper . . . and as I began to read a mist came
over my eyes. ... It was the famous Order No. i.

"Where did you get it?"

"It is stuck up all over the city ... on all the walls!"

I felt as if ... this was the end of the army. . . „

It must have been toward four o'clock in the morning when
Guchkov came in [from the street] a second time. He was greatly
aroused. Prince Viazemski, who sat in the automobile with him, had
just been killed ... by a shot fired at the "officer" from some
barracks. . . .

At this moment all the members of the Committee were not
present. Rodzianko, Miliukov and I were there; the others I do not
recall. . . . But I do remember that neither Kerenski nor Chkheidze
were on hand. Our own crowd was there, and consequently Guchkov
talked quite openly. Here is the substance of his remarks :

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 275

We must come to some decision. The situation grows worse every
minute, Viazemski was killed because he was an officer and for no
other reason. . . . Similar acts take place elsewhere ... if not
today . . . then tomorrow. On my way to this place I noticed officers
in the rooms of the Duma — they are hiding — they pray us to save
them. We must do something. . . . We must above all save the
Monarchy. . . , Russia cannot be without a Monarchy. ... It is
evident that the present Tsar can no longer reign. . . . Any command
that he might give would not be obeyed. ... If that is so, the time
is not far distant when this revolutionary riffraff will take matters
into its own hands and try to find a way out. ... It will settle
the question of the Monarchy in its own way. . . . This is inevitable
if we allow the initiative to slip out from our hands."

Here he was interrupted by Rodzianko.

"I intended to go to the Emperor this morning . . . but I was
prevented. . . . They informed me that I could not have a train
and demanded that I should be accompanied by Chkheidze with a
battalion of soldiers."

"I knew it," said Guchkov, "and for that reason it is necessary to
proceed in a different manner. . * . We must act quickly and secretly.
If we work with 'them' the results will be less advantageous for us.
. , . We must put them before a fait accowipE. . . . We must give
Russia a new Emperor and rally around his banner all the forces
for resistance. . . . For that purpose we must act quickly and

firmly "

"To be more specific — what do you have in mind?"

"I propose that some one should go at once to the Emperor and
bring about an abdication in favor of the crown prince,"

"Ruzski has telegraphed me/' said Rodzianko, "that he has already
spoken to the Emperor on the subject. . . . Alexeev has sent a query
on the same subject to the commanders of the front. A reply is
awaited/1

"I think that some one should go/' added Guchkov. "If you will
agree to it and will authorize me to do so I will go. But I should
like to have some one to come with me/'

We looked at each other '. . . and after a moment I said :

'Til go with you."

We exchanged a few words more. I tried to summarize and clarify
our ideas : The Committee of the State Duma is of the opinion that
the only way out of the present difficulty is the abdication of the

276 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Emperor. It authorizes the two of us to report this to His Majesty,
and if he should agree, to bring the act of abdication to Petrograd.
The abdication should be in favor of the heir, Alexei.Nicholaevich.
The two of us are to go together and in secret.

I fully realized what we were doing. I felt that the abdication
was unavoidable, that it would not do to have the Emperor face
to face with "Chkheidze" [revolution]. The abdication was to be
handed over to the Monarchists for the sake of saving the
Monarchy. . . .

At five in the morning Guchkov and I got into the automobile . . .
and reached Guchkov's home, where he wrote out a few words.
It was a poor attempt, but I was quite unable to improve on it. I was
completely exhausted.

Mvrch 15

It just began to get light when we drove up to the station. . . .
The revolutionary people were still asleep. . . . Guchkov introduced
himself to the Station Master and asked for a train to Pskov. ... In
twenty minutes a train, made up of one locomotive and one car, was

ready. . . .

Ten o'clock at night we arrived. . . . We stepped out on the
platform. . . . Some one came up to say that the Emperor was
waiting. He led us across the tracks . . . into the car of the Emperor.
He appeared in a few minutes. . . . We bowed. ... He shook
hands with us in a friendly way , . . motioned us to a seat. Guchkov
began to speak. ... He was quite excited. . . .. He related what
was taking place at the capital. ... He painted things as they
were in Petrograd. The Emperor sat there quite composed. . . .

When Guchkov had finished, the Emperor said in a calm and
matter-of-fact manner:.

"I have decided to abdicate from the throne. . . . Until three
in the afternoon I thought that I would abdicate in favor of my son
Alexei. . . . But at that time I changed my mind to abdicate in
favor of my brother, Michael/'. . .

We did not expect this. It seems to me that Guchkov raised some
objections . . . that I asked for a quarter of an hour to advise
with Guchkov ... but it did not take place ... we agreed. . . .
What else could we do ?

The Tsar rose . . , and we all stood up. ... Guchkov handed

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 277

him his .outline of the abdication act which the Emperor took and
walked out.

After a little while he returned with the text of the abdication,
which he handed to Guchkov.

It was then twenty minutes before midnight. The Emperor bid
us good-bye, shaking us by the hand . . . and his attitude was, if
anything, warmer than when we arrived.

We returned to our car ... and in the morning [March 16]
reached Petrograd.

2. PROROGATION AND RESOLUTION OF THE
STATE DUMA 8

By virtue of Article 99 of the Fundamental Laws of the state,
we command:

The work of the State Duma and State Council shall cease March
1 1 of this year, and the term for its renewal shall be not later than
April, 1917, depending upon extraordinary circumstances.

* "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. I, March 12,
1917. During the first week of the revolution -the regular newspapers did
not appear and the only news the public had was from a news sheet issued
by a committee of Petrograd journalists and scattered throughout the city.
This paper was known as "Izvestiia Revolutsionnoi Nedeli." There were ten
issues, i-io, between March 12 and 18. On March 13 there appeared the first
number of the Soviet 'Izvestiia." In the course of the following months, until
the Government was moved to Moscow, this paper changed its name a number
of times, as follows:

March 13-14, Nos. i, 2 — Izvestiia Petrogradskogo Sovieta Rabochikh Depu-
tatov.

March 15-August 13, Nos. 3-131— Izvestiia Petrogradskogo Sovieta Ra-
bochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov.

August 14-October u, Nos. 132-183— Izyestiia Tsentralnogo Ispolnitelnogo
Komiteta i Petrogradskogo Sovieta Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov.

October 12-November 8, Nos. 184-207 — Izvestiia Tsentralnogo Ispolnitel-
nogo Komiteta Sovietov Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov.

November 9- January 6, 1918, Nos. 208-260— Izvestiia Tsentralnogo Ispolni-
telnogo Komiteta i Petrogradskogo Sovieta Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Depu-
tatov.

January ic-March 3, Nos. 261-303— Izvestiia Tsentralnogo Ispolnitelnogo
Komiteta Sovietov Krestianskikh, Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov i Petro-
gradskogo Sovieta Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov.

March 5-10, Nos. 304-309 — Izvestiia Vserosiiskogo Tsentralnogo Ispolnitel-
nogo Komiteta Sovietov Krestianskikh, Rabochikh, Soldatskikh i Kazachikh
Deputatov i Petrogradskogo Sovieta Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov.

On March 12 the paper appeared at Moscow under the name of "Izvestiia
Tsentralnogo Ispolnitelnogo Komiteta Sovietov Krestianskikh, Rabochikh i
Soldatskikh Deputatov." This name it bears today. In this book the Izves-
tiia Revolutsionnoi Nedeli is referred to as "Izvestiia of the Committee of
Petrograd Journalists," and the various issues of the Soviet Izvestiia as
"Izvestiia."

278 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

The Governing Senate shall not fail to make proper disposition
for the execution of the present act.

The original is signed in His Imperial
Majesty's Own hand,

NICHOLAS

At the Imperial Headquarters,
March 10.

Countersigned:

President of the Council of Ministers,

PRINCE NICHOLAS GOLITSYN
March 12.

RESOLUTION OF THE STATE DUMA 4

[March 12, 1917]

The Senior Council,5 having met in special session and acquainted
itself with the decree of prorogation, has resolved:

The State Duma shall not disperse. All Deputies shall remain in
their places.

3. TELEGRAMS OF RODZIANKO TO THE TSAR6

FIRST TELEGRAM, MARCH II

The situation is serious. The Capital is in a state of anarchy. The
Government is paralyzed ; the transport service is broken down ; the
food and fuel supplies are completely disorganized. Discontent is
general and on the increase.. There is wild shooting on the streets;
troops are firing at each other. It is urgent that some one enjoying
the confidence of the country be entrusted with the formation of a
new Government. There must be no delay. Hesitation is fatal. I pray
God that at this hour the responsibility may not fall upon the monarch,

SECOND TELEGRAM, MORNING OF MARCH 12

The situation is growing worse. 'Measures should be taken imme-
diately, as tomorrow will be too late. The last hour has struck, when
the fate of the country and dynasty is being decided.

4 "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. i, March 12,

197-

* Leaders of the political parties.

6 "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. i, March 12,
1917.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 279

4. TELEGRAM OF MEMBERS OF THE STATE
COUNCIL TO THE TSAR 7

On the night of March 12-13, the undersigned members of the
State Council sent the following telegram to the Tsar :

"Your Imperial Majesty, We, the undersigned members of
the State Council by election, realizing the danger that threatens our
country, turn to you in fulfilment of our conscientious duty before
you and Russia.

"Owing to the complete collapse of transportation and the conse-
quent inability to bring, in the necessary materials, factories and mills
have shut down. This forced unemployment, combined with the acute
food crisis, brought on by the said breakdown of the transport, has
driven the popular masses into despair. This* situation, has been accen-
tuated by the feeling of detestation and grave suspicion of the
authorities which has sunk deeply into the hearts of the people.

"All these factors have brought on a popular uprising, which
the army has joined. Never having had the confidence of Russia and
now thoroughly discredited, the authorities are quite powerless to
handle the dangerous situation.

"Your Majesty, the further keeping of the present Government
in power means the complete breakdown of law and order and will
bring with it inevitable defeat in war, ruin of the dynasty, and great
miseries for Russia.

"We think that the last and only remedy is for Your Imperial
Majesty to make a complete change in the internal policy and, in
agreement with the repeated requests of the popular representatives,
classes, and public organizations, call together at once the legislative
chambers; dismiss the present Council of Ministers; and ask some
one who has the confidence of the people, to submit to you, for con-
firmation, a list of names for a new cabinet capable of governing
the country in complete harmony with the representatives of the
people. Every hour is dear. Further delay and hesitancy may bring
on uncountable miseries.

"Your Imperial Majesty's faithful subjects, members of the State
Council.

"DIAKOV, "SAVITSKI,

"PRINCE DRUTSKOI~SOKOLINSKI, "SHMURLO,
"GLEBOV, "SHUMAKHER,

'"Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 2, March 13,
1917-

28o DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

" GRIMM "STAKHEEV,

"GUCHKOV, "STAKHOVICH,

"IUMASHEV, "COUNT TOLSTOI,

"KOMSIN, "PRINCE TRUBETSKOI,

"LAPTEV, "VAINSTEIN,

"MARIN, "VASILIEV,

"MELLER-ZAKOMELSKI, "VERNADSKI,

"OLDENBURG, "ZUBASHOV."

5. FORMATION OF COMMITTEES OF THE
STATE DUMA

(a) THE EXECUTIVE COM'MITTEE OF THE STATE DUMA 8

On March 12, exactly at midnight, there was definitely organized
the Executive Committee of the State Duma, with the following
membership :

MICHAEL VLADIMIROVICH RODZIANKO I. I. DMITRIUKOV

A. F. KERENSKI V. A. RZHEVSKI

N. S. CHKHEIDZE S. I. SHIDLOVSKI

V. V. SHULGIN N. V. NEKRASOV

P. N. MILIUKOV V. N. Lvov

M. A. KARAULOV COLONEL ENGELHAKDT

A. I. KONOVALOV

(fc) PROVISIONAL COM'MITTEE OF STATE DuMA9

At half past two in the afternoon, a conference of the members
of the State Duma was held in the Semicircular Hall, under the
chairmanship of M. V. Rodzianko. It deliberated on the question of
organizing a Provisional Committee for maintaining order in Petro-
grad and establishing contact with various institutions and individuals.
In view of the fact that this meeting was too crowded, the choice
of the Provisional Committee was entrusted to the Senior Council.10

Following the conference of the State Duma, the Senior Council
held a meeting in M. V. Rodzianko's cabinet, at which the members
of the Provisional Committee of Members of the State Duma were
selected.

4 "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 2, March 13,

*W., No. i, March 12, 1917.
Leaders of the political parties.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 281

The Committee of the State Duma for Maintaining Order in

Petrograd and Establishing Contact with Institutions

and Individuals'1'1

The following persons were made members of the Provisional
Committee :

1. M. V. Rodzianko 7. V. V. Shulgin

2. N. V. Nekrasov 8. S. I. Shidlovski

3. A. I. Konovalov 9. P. N. Miliukov

4. I. I. Dmitriukov 10. M. A. Karaulov

5. A. F. Kerenski n. V. N. Lvov

6. N. E. CHKHEIDZE 12. V. A. Rzhevski

FIRST STEPS OF THE PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE OF
THE STATE DUMA 12

At two o'clock on the morning of March 13, the Provisional Com-
mittee of the State Duma issued the two following calls :

The Provisional Committee of the State Duma appeals to the
inhabitants of Petrograd, in the name of the general good, to protect
State and public institutions such as the telegraphs, water-supply
stations, electric-power houses, street railways, and Government
office-buildings. The Committee of the State Duma also asks the citi-
zens to look after mills and factories, whether working for the army
or for society in general. It is necessary to bear in mind that spoiling
and destroying institutions and properties benefit no one and cause
enormous harm to State and society because all stand in equal need
of water, light, etc. Needless to say, attempts upon the life, limb,
and property of private persons cannot be tolerated. Such acts blacken
the conscience of those committing them and bring much suffering
upon the entire population of the capital.

The President of the State Duma,

MICHAEL RODZIANKO

The Provisional Committee of the State Duma has found itself
compelled under the difficult conditions of internal chaos brought on

"Thi? Committee was originally created to guide members of the Duma
but when it became evident that the Government had broken down the .Com-
mittee assumed the additional functions of maintaining order and establishing
contact. (Shulgin, "Dni," 112.)

M "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 2, March 13,

282 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

by the old Government, to take into its own hands the restoration
of State and public order. Conscious of the vast responsibility it has
assumed, the Committee feels assured that the civilian population
and the army will assist in the difficult task of forming a new Gov-
ernment in accordance with the desire of the population, and worthy
of its confidence.

The President of the State Duma,

MICHAEL RODZIANKO
March 12, 1917

PROVISIONAL CdMMITTEE OF THE DUMA APPEALS TO THE ARMY 1S

In the morning of March 13, P. N. Miliukov was invited by the
officers of the First Reserve Regiment (Novo Cherkasski), which is
stationed in the Okhta section, to come to the barracks of the regiment.

P. N. Miliukov arrived at the Officers Club, where he was met
by all the officers of the regiment, with the commander at the head.

In the course of the conversation P. N. Miliukov declared that
there existed at the present moment only one authority which all
should obey — the Provisional Committee of the Imperial Duma.
There can be no dual authority.

The task of the Committee is the restoration of order and the
organization of the authority which has fallen from the hands of the
old Government. For this purpose the Provisional Committee needs
the cooperation of the military powers, which must not act dis-
jointedly, but in that organized state in which he is gratified to see
this regiment.

The officers of the regiment unanimously expressed their consent
and perfect readiness to acknowledge the authority of the Provisional
Committee and of the person in charge of the military section of
the Committee.

After this, P. N. Miliukov went out to the drill grounds, where
the regiment was drawn up. In the center, a high platform had been
erected, from which the Deputy addressed the soldiers. He stressed
the importance of cooperation between privates and officers, who
will go hand in hand with the Imperial Duma, at the present 'moment.

Miliukov was carried on their hands across the drill grounds to
the automobile.

tt "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 2, Mafyh 13,
1917-

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET ' 283

Miliukov/s Speech to the Life-Guard Grenadiers'3-4

When the power fell out of the hands of our enemies, it was
necessary to take it into our own. This has to be done at once ; it has
to be done today, for we know not what tomorrow may bring forth.

What then must be done today ; what must be done to take power
into our own hands ? We must first of all be organized, united, and
subject to one authority. This authority is the Provisional Committee
of the State Duma. One should be subject to it and to no other, for
in two authorities lies danger and division of strength.

I saw yesterday the first regiment that came here in full order,
with its officers, and recognized the authority of the Duma. Remem-
ber that our strength lies in organization. Only together, with your
officers, will you be strong. A disorganized mob does not represent
much power. If the whole army should become a disorganized mob,
it could be put to flight by an organized handful of the enemy. It is
necessary to organize today, and to do what the regiment did which
first appeared here. Find your officers, who are under the orders of
the Duma, and put yourselves under their orders.

Speech of M. V. Rodzianko to the Life-Guard Grenadiers 15

. . . Thank you for coming here to help us to restore order. I
hope that you are the brothers of those who are now shedding their
blood in the cold trenches for the honor of our native land. Uphold
the tradition of the glorious Russian regiment, which I, as an old
soldier, love and respect.

Listen to your officers, for without officers the military unit
becomes a mob unfit to restore order. The officers who brought you
here see eye to eye with the members of the State Duma. You should
help us to organize a Government that will have the confidence of
the whole country. Long live dear Russia ! Give a cheer for Mother
Russia. (Loud hurrahs filled the Catherine Hall.)

You will in a moment receive orders from your officers. I ask
you that, in agreement with them, you return quietly to your barracks
and do there what they ask you to do. I am happy that there is
complete understanding between us. Thank you once more for*
coming here.

* "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 2, March 13,

w'Z-.

284 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

The French and English ambassadors have officially notified the
presiding officer of the State Duma, M. V. Rodzianko, that the
Governments of France and England are entering into de facto rela-
tions with the Provisional Executive Committee of the State Duma,
the spokesman of the true will of .the people, and the only legal
Provisional Government of Russia.

(d) RESOLUTION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF PUBLIC
ORGANIZATIONS 17

On the evening of March 12, there was a meeting of representa-
tives of public organization,— the War-Industry Committee, Zemstvo
and City Unions, Petrograd Duma, sanitary and charitable
organizations, etc.

After a short discussion, the following resolution was unanimously
adopted :

"The representatives of the public organizations, meeting in
conference on March 12, greet the resolution of the Duma not to
disperse and its decision to take the power in its hands.

'The Provisional Committee made up of members of the
State Duma, drawing its strength from the intelligent part of the
army, workers, and inhabitants, will have the support of public
organizations and will, in the end, give Russia complete victory
over the external and internal foe."

(e) APPEAL BY THE CENTRAL WAR-INDUSTRY COMMITTEE 1S

CITIZENS!

The war goes on. The army needs ammunition and food. Every
lost hour weakens us, strengthens and emboldens our enemy,

A German victory would threaten us with the restoration of the
old power. By providing for defense, the army and people can save
the freedom which they won in a few days, and establish a power
based on the will of the people. But just now for the defense of
the Country, it is necessary to have a single provisional power, having

lfl "Izvestiia of the Committee of 'Petrograd Journalists," No. 4, March 14,

Ibid., No. 3, March 14, 1917.
**Ibid.f No. 6, March 15, 1917.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 285

the strong confidence of the inhabitants and the army. Such a gov-
ernment can come only from the State Duma, which alone can at
this present moment command authority in the eyes of the whole
free Country, the army, and our glorious Allies.

In the full realization of the great responsibility that rests on each
of us for the future of our Country, which is living through an
historical moment of tremendous importance, we invite all citizens,
all institutions and organizations, retaining complete calm and con-
tinuing their productiveness, to offer their services to the State Duma.

This is not the time for bickering, quarreling, and trouble-making.
Remember that only in union of purpose and in harmony^ lies the
safety of the Country, and in disunion her ruin.

Germany is not asleep. Her offensive goes on with new strength.
Supply the army with all its necessities. Do not betray your brothers

in the trenches.

THE CENTRAL WAR-INDUSTRY COMMITTEE

(/) THE OFFICERS, SOLDIERS, AND PEOPLE 19

Officers who are in Petrograd and who are in sympathy with the
people, held a meeting at the suggestion of the Executive Committee
of the State Duma. Realizing that for a triumphant ending of the
war it is most urgent that, at the earliest moment, order should be
restored and friendly collaboration take place in the rear, they
unanimously resolved to recognize the authority of the Executive
Committee of the State Duma in the government of the Russian
Empire, until the summoning of the Constituent Assembly.

A true copy.
PAUL MILIUKOV

Member of the Provisional Committee
A. F. KEREN SKI

Member of the Duma and Minister of Justice
M. A. KARAULOV

Member of the State Duma

6. FORMATION OF THE SOVIET OF WORKERS'
DEPUTIES 20

During the day ['March 12, 1917], representatives of workers
and soldiers, and several public leaders, assembled at the building of

M "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 7» March 16,

1917.

*0Ibid., No. I, March 12, 1917.

286 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

the State Duma. A Soviet of Workers' Deputies was organized which
resolved to issue a call to the people.

PROCLAMATIONS OF THE TOVIET OF WORKERS* DEPUTIES

The Soviet of Workers' Deputies resolved to address the following
proclamations to the inhabitants:

CITIZENS : The representatives of the workers, soldiers, and inhab-
itants of Petrograd, meeting in the State Duma, announce that the
first session of their representatives will take place at seven o'clock
tonight in the building of the State Duma. All those troops that have
joined the side of the people should immediately elect their repre-
sentatives, one for each company. Factory workers should elect one
deputy for each one thousand. Factories with less than one thousand
workers should elect one deputy each.

THE PROVISIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF
THE SOVIET OF WORKERS' DEPUTIES.

CITIZENS: The soldiers who have joined the side of the people
have been in the streets since morning without food. The Soviet of
Deputies, workers, soldiers, and inhabitants are making every effort
to feed the soldiers. But it is hard to organize the food supply at
once. The Soviet appeals to you, citizens, to feed the soldiers as best
you can.

THE PROVISIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF

THE SOVIET OF WORKERS' DEPUTIES
March 12, 1917

(d) SOVIET APPEALS TO SOLDIERS AND WORKMEN
To the Soldiers2*

Soldiers ! The people and all Russia thank you for rising in the
cause of liberty.

Eternal Glory to those who fell in the great fight!

Soldiers, some of you still hesitate to join your own comrades

who revolted. Soldiers, recall your hardships in the villages, factories,

and mills when the Government always oppressed you. Unite with

31 "Izvestiia," No. i, March 13,

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 287

the people and the people will give you and your families freedom
and happiness.

Soldiers, if you have lost contact with your units, go to the State
Duma where you will find your comrades and with them share your
joys and sorrows.

Soldiers, do not shoot wildly on the streets. Aim seldom, but hit
the mark!

On the roofs of houses and in certain apartments, there are still the
remnants of the police, Black Hundreds 2ia and other scoundrels.
Get them by a sure shot or regular attack.

Soldiers, observe good order wherever you are. Keep your military
formation and observe army regulations as in the presence of the
enemy. . . .

Soldiers, do not allow hoodlums to abuse peaceful citizens ; do not
allow the plundering of stores or homes. . . .

Stand firm in your determination to fight for liberty to the end.
Let us swear even to die rather than surrender liberty to the enemy.
Russia will ever remember your sacrifices, services, and manliness.
Long Live Liberty!

To the People of Petragrad and Russia from the Soviet
of Workers' Deputies 22

The old regime has brought the country to ruin and the population
to famine. It was impossible to bear this longer, and the inhabitants
of Petrograd came out on the street to express their dissatisfaction.
They were greeted by a volley of bullets. In place of bread, the Tsar's
Ministers gave them lead.

But the soldiers would not act against the people and turned
against the Government. Together with the people they seized guns,
arsenals, and important governmental institutions.

The fight is still on and must go on to the end. The old power must
be completely crushed to make way for popular government. In that
lies the salvation of Russia.

In order to succeed in this struggle for democracy, the people
must create their own governmental organ. Yesterday, March 12,
there was formed at the capital a Soviet of Workers7 Deputies, made
up of representatives of factories, mills, revolted troops, and demo-
cratic and socialistic parties and groups. The Soviet, sitting in the

** Reactionary organizations.

M "Izvestiia," No. i, March 13, 1917. Soviet of Workers' Deputies.

288 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Duma, has set for itself as its main task to organize the popular
forces, and to fight for the consolidation of political freedom and
popular government.

The Soviet has appointed commissars to establish the people's
authority in the wards of Petrograd. We invite the entire population
of the capital to rally at once to the Soviet, to organize local com-
mittees in their wards and take into their hands the management of
local affairs.

All together, with our forces united, we will fight to wipe out
completely the old Government and to call a constituent assembly on
the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage.

The Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet2*

The Executive Committee was elected at the very first meeting
of the Soviet, March 12. On the same day the first meeting of the
Executive Committee took place. No minutes of this meeting have
been found. The following items were on the agenda: i. The make-
up of the Executive Committee; 2. the organization of the city wards ;
3. the arming of the workers ; 4. selection of representatives to the
Military Commission of the Committee of the State Duma.

At the second meeting of the Executive Committee, on the morn-
ing of March 13, only one question was decided, i.e., the order of the
day for the plenary session of the Soviet set for that day.
The Soviet discussed the report of the Executive Committee
and confirmed the personnel of the Executive Committee, chosen
the day before, and decided to add to it "persons of left tendencies." 24
After the meeting of the Soviet, the third session of its Executive
Committee took place at which the question of organizing the sol-
diers was discussed. The next session of the Executive Committee
was held on March 14, when the text of Order No. i was accepted.
The fourth session was on March 15.

At the session of March 16, the Executive Committee appointed
a number of commissions, and at the session of March 27, it selected
a special Bureau, composed of seven members, to prepare all business
for the plenary sessions and conduct all current business. On April
25, the Executive Committee was completely reorganized, and all
current affairs were turned over to the sections, which were wholly
autonomous, within the limits provided by the Executive Commit-

28 "Petrogradskii Soviet Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov, Protokoly"
287-8. To be referred to as "Protokoly."
* "Izvestiia," No. 2, March 14, 1917.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 289

tee. Matters of great importance, or such as required solution as a
matter of policy, were transferred to the Bureau, which was com-
posed of representatives of the sections, chosen directly by the
Executive Committee. Questions of national importance were settled
by the plenary meeting of the Executive Committee, but nothing
could be submitted to the Executive Committee without its first
going through the Bureau. The decisions of the Bureau were subject
to the confirmation of the Executive Committee.

To Officers— Socialists**

The Soviet of Workers' Deputies has decided to form a militia
of workmen in the different wards of Petrograd. In view of this,
the Soviet asks officers who are Socialists to come to the aid of the
working class, to organize and drill it.

To Workmen

The working class is greatly in need of guns. The success of
the fight is closely bound up with the organization and arming of
the workers. Therefore, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies asks all
comrade-workers who have guns, to hand them over to the com-
missars appointed by the Soviet for the different wards of the
capital. If for some reason this is not possible, then deliver them
to the Soviet which meets in the building of the State Duma.

Comrade- Workers ! Keep in mind that in order to make a suc-
cess of the popular cause it is necessary to arm, to secure ammuni-
tion, and not to waste it. He who fires in the air without reason
creates a panic among the inhabitants and wastes precious fighting
material.

Comrades, Arm!

Greetings to Revolutionary Officers*6

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies send fraternal
greetings to the revolutionary officers who came out courageously in
defence of the people.

Having full confidence in the determination of the officers to
fight to the end for Russian freedom, the Soviet holds out its hand
to them, and calls on them to organize, with the people.

* "Izvestiia," No. 2, March 14,
*Ibid., No. 3, March 15, 1917.

ago DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

(&) SOVIET Is SUPPORTED BY SOCIALISTS-REVOLUTIONISTS

From the Petrograd Inter-Ward Committee of the Russian Social-
Democratic Labor Party <md the Party of Saridists-
Revoiutionists Z7

Proletariat of the World, Unite !

In struggle will you find your rights !

Comrade-Soldiers !

The great and decisive hour for action has come. The hard life
[at home] and the countless victims on the field of battle in the
interests of the capitalists and the Government should not be allowed
without some benefit to the people. The events of March 12 showed
that the army understood this and, in close union with the laboring
masses, took definite measures to destroy the shameful regime and
to put an end to the butchery.

Comrade-Soldiers !

This is the first day that the army and laboring classes have
come out in the street. We are as yet weak and the foe is still strong.
We must see to it at once that all those who have not joined the
people do so immediately and march with them, hand in hand.

We can not retreat ! Liberty or death !

The enemy is merciless and will destroy every one who betrays [ ?]
the revolted people. ORGANIZE, comrades! Know that the object of
the people will be attained not through pogroms and drunkenness,
but only by the revolutionary struggle. Organize, secure arms, stand
your watch day and night! The organized and revolutionary people
and the army will crush the bloody Government and put a stop to
the international slaughter.

What should the soldier do now?

He should seize the telegraph, telephone, electric, and railway
stations; he should secure possession of the State Bank and the
Ministries. He should not now go to the barracks or leave the city,
but wait for instruction leaflets. Elect your representatives for the
Provisional Revolutionary Government.

Long live the Second Revolution ! Long live the Provisional Revo-
lutionary Government! Long live the Revolutionary Army and
People!

THE PETROGRAD INTER- WARD COMMITTEE OF THE
RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY AND
THE PARTY OF SOCIALISTS-REVOLUTIONISTS
87 "Izvestiia," No. i, March 13, 1917.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 291

To the Revolutionary Students of Petrograd 28
In the City Duma there is being organized a citizen militia to
guard the capital, and the students are invited to join it. The spokes-
man of the revolutionary proletariat, the Executive Committee of
the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, has decided to combine the
central organ of the workers' commissars with this Duma organiza-
tion. For that reason we call on all comrade-students to sign up for
this guard duty.

Keep in mind that in taking part in this militia you are doing
it on the authority of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. Keep in
mind that the Soviet of Workers' Deputies is your highest authority.

STUDENT GROUP OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

STUDENT GROUP OF THE SOCIALISTS-REVOLUTIONISTS

STUDENT GROUP OF THE BUND
March 13, 1917.

In accordance with the resolution of the' Provisional Execu-
tive Committee of March 12, the representation of workmen in
the Soviet was one for every thousand, and for soldiers, one for
every company. At this rate the number of deputies quickly
reached 3,000, of whom more than 2,000 were soldiers. It became
necessary to reconstruct the Soviet, for as it stood there was not
room enough in the Duma and too many representatives to accom-
plish anything. Nothing came of the various projects of the Execu-
tive Committee, and the reduction of the number of delegates was
brought about by a stricter verification of credentials. In this way
the number of deputies was cut down to half.

List of Members of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies 80

President — N. S. CHKHEIDZE
Vice-Presldents — M. I. SKOBELEV and A. F. KERENSKI

Executive Committee Bwrecw:

N. S. CHKHEIDZE N. lu. KAPELINSKI

lu. M. STEKLOV P. I. STUCHKA

V. O. BOGDANOV P. A. KRASIKOV

K. A. GVOZDEV

* "Izvestiia," No. 2, March 14, 19*7.

""Protokoly," 292. * "Izvestiia," No. 27, April II, 1917.

292 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Executive Committee Members:

G. M. ERLICH M. I. GOLDMAN (LIBBER)

N. D. SOKOLOV K. K. KROTOVSKI

N. N. GlMMER (SUKHANOV) K. S. SHEKHTER (GRINEVICH)

M. N. KOZLOVSKI V. 'M. SKRIABIN (A. MOLOTOV)

V. M. ZENZINOV I. V. DZHUGASHVILLI (K. STALIN)

A. R. Goxz A. G. SHLIAPNIKOV (A. BELENIN)

V. B. STANKEVICH I. I. RAMISHVILLI

L. M. BRAMSON I. G. BARKOV

N. V. CHAIKOVSKI A. N. PADERIN

V. N. FILIPOVSKI A. D. SADOVSKI

G. G. PANKOV lu. A. KUDRIAVTSEV

V. A. DMITRIEVSKI V. I. .BADENKO

SOKOLOVSKI F. F. LlNDE

P. A. ZALUTSKI A. P. BORISOV

G. F. FEDOROV VAKULENKO

N. V. SVIATITSKI KLIMCHINSKI

I. G. TSERETELLI

In addition to the above, the following have the right to attend
the meetings of the Executive Committee and to be heard :

The factions of the Social Democrats of the Four Dumas; five
representatives of the Soldiers' Commission working- with the Execu-
tive Committee ; two representatives of the Central Bureau of Trade
Unions; representatives of the Ward Soviets of Workers' and Sol-
diers' Deputies, Editorial Staff of the Izvestiia of the Soviet of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and the Commissars.

7. CALL TO THE FARMERS, MERCHANTS AND

WORKERS 31
CITIZENS :

A great event has taken place. The old regime which ruined
Russia has fallen to pieces.

The Committee of the State Duma and the Soviet of Workers'
and Soldiers' Deputies took upon themselves provisional authority,
the establishing of order and the governing of the country. Their
present problem is to supply the military and civilian population with
food. They have organized a food commission which has charge of
this matter. It has inherited very little bread from the old Govern-
ment, and it is therefore necessary to make haste and prepare some.

81 "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 7, March 16,
1917.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 293

Citizens of Russia, agriculturists, landowners, merchants, railway
officials, and laborers, help the country. The army and civilian popu-
lation must be fed. The war still goes on. Let all, as one man, no mat-
ter what their rank or position may be, come to the aid of the country
in these trying days. Let not even one hand remain idle. Let no one
refuse to fulfil his civic duty; let each man's conscience tell him
what to do. Sell your grain quickly to the authorized parties ; give up
as much of it as you can. Haul it quickly to the railways or docks,
load it quickly and send it to its destination. The Fatherland awaits
your friendly help. Give bread to her fighters, workers, and servants.
Time does not wait. Every hour is precious. Do not delay.

Citizens, come to the aid of your country with your bread, with
your labor.

Chairman of the Committee of the State Duma,

M. RODZIANKO.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE O-F THE SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND
SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES.

CHAPTER XIX
ABDICATION OF THE ROMANOVS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The following pages give the more important documents
relating to the abdication and the setting aside of the Romanov
family. By March 15 the leaders of the Duma, as well as the
commanders of the Armies, came to the general conclusion that
only the abdication of the Tsar could save the Monarchy. With
that in mind Guchkov and Shulgin were secretly hurried to Head-
quarters to get the Act of Abdication in favor of the young crown
prince with his uncle Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich as re-
gent. It was the old Palace Revolution plan. Kerenski and
Chkheidze were not let into the secret for fear they would oppose
the idea. It was proposed to face them and the revolutionists as
a whole with a fait accompli. While these two men were speeding
toward Pskov, Miliukov let out the secret. This news raised such
a furor that he had to throw his words overboard to quiet the
storm. When on the day following (March 16) the two emis-
saries returned with the abdication act it was too late. The revo-
lutionary democracy would have nothing more to do with the
Romanovs. They would have them neither on the throne, nor in
the army, nor in any other position of trust. After deliberating
a few hours Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich decided not to
accept the throne. In this first clash the Soviet won and after this
it assumes a more and more aggressive attitude.

i. TELEGRAM FROM THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF

THE CAUCASUS ARMY, GRAND DUKE

NICHOLAS NICHOLAEVICH1

The President of the Executive Committee of the State Duma,
M. V. Rodzianko, received the following telegram :

1 "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists/' No. 6, March 15,
1917.

294

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 295

"General-Adjutant Alexeev agreeing, I have just now appealed,
with the prayer of a faithful subject, to His Imperial Majesty, for
the sake of saving Russia and for the victorious ending of the war,
to act on the measure which you regard as the only issue from the
fatal situation.

Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasus Army, General-Adjutant,

NICHOLAS
TtiKs, March 15, 1917, 1247 P. M."

2. MILIUKOV'S SPEECH OF MARCH 15, 19172

... I am very sorry that in answer to that question [program of
the Provisional Government] I cannot read to you the paper hav-
ing the program. The only copy of it, which was discussed until
late last night with the representatives of the Soviet of Workers'
Deputies, is at this moment in their hands for final examination. I
trust that in the course of the next few hours you will learn some-
thing about the program. Of course, I can give you right now some
of the more important points. (Shouts: "How about the dynasty ?")
You ask me about the dynasty. I know in advance that my answer
will not please all of you. But I will give it to you anyway. The
old despot who has led Russia. to the brink of ruin will either volun-
tarily abdicate, or will be set aside. (Applause.) The power will
go to the regent, Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich. (Continued
noise, applause, more noise.) The heir to the throne will be Alexei.
(Shouts: "That's the old dynasty.") Yes, gentlemen, that's the old
dynasty, which you may not like, and which I may not like. But the
question just now is not what one likes. We cannot leave unanswered
the question of the form of government. We have in mind a con-
stitutional monarchy. It is possible that others have something else
in view, but if we stop to quarrel about it now, we will come to no
decision, Russia will drift into a civil war, and we shall have a ruined
country. This we have no right to do. It does not mean that we have
made a final decision [in the form of government] . In our program,
you will find an article which provides that just as soon as the danger
is past and order is restored, we will proceed to prepare for the

a"Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 6, March 15,
1917. On the afternoon of March 15, after the Provisional Government had
been formed, Miliukov addressed a large crowd in front of the Duma. He
called on the soldiers and officers to work together, and named the different
ministers. When he had about concluded, some one shouted, "How about
the program?" The speech that follows begins at this point.

296 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

calling of a Constituent Assembly (applause), on the basis of uni-
versal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage. The freely elected popular
representatives will determine whether we, or our opponents, more
truly represent the public opinion of Russia. (Applause, shouts:
"Publish the program/') These shouts remind me of another impor-
tant question, the answer to which depends on the Soviet of Workers'
Deputies who control the printers. . . .

I trust that beginning with tomorrow the organs of the press will
appear regularly in, what is to be from now on, free Russia*

MILIUKOV FORCED TO MODIFY HIS STATEMENT REGARDING THE

REGENCY 3

By the end of the day [March 15] the announcement of P. N.
Miliukov regarding the regency of the Grand Duke Michael Alexan-
drovich aroused a great deal of feeling. Late in the evening a large
crowd of overexcited officers made their way to the Taurida Palace
and declared that they could not return to their units, if P. N.
Miliukov did not take back his words. In accordance with their re-
quest, P. N. Miliukov gave out that "his statement regarding the
provisional regency of Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich and the
succession of Alexei was his own personal opinion/' This was, of
course, not true, for the announcement which P. N. Miliukov had
made had been agreed to [by the Provisional Committee] .

3. SHALL THE ROMANOV DYNASTY REMAIN?*

The revolutionary people should carry through to the end the
revolution and the democratization of its political and social organi-
zation. To return to the old is unthinkable. The revolutionary people
should organize the State in the way that will best satisfy its inter-
ests, strength and great zeal, and will make impossible a new at-
tempt on its rights and liberty. This can be done by handing the
power over to the people, that is to say, by forming a democratic
republic, in which the officers of government are elected by universal
equal, secret, and direct suffrage. All the revolutionary elements in
Russia, who have made tremendous sacrifices in the fight and the
forging of freedom, should strive for such a government.

If the power were entrusted to a monarch, even a constitutional
one, with his responsible ministry, the latter might make an attempt

3 P. N. Miliukov; "Istoriia Vtoroi Russkoi Revoliutsii," I, 52.
* "Izvestiia," No. 3, March 15, 1917.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 297

on the liberty of the people and bind it with chains of slavery. Then
again, in a constitutional monarchy 'there is the right of succession
which again creates the possibility of rulers of the type of Nicholas,
the Last.

In a constitutional monarchy, the army serves not the people,
but -the monarch, giving him great power, which he could use to harm
the people.

The Romanov dynasty is now overthrown. . . . There must be
no going back to it. The revolutionary people will find enough
strength to form a new republican government, which will guarantee
its rights and freedom.

4. ABDICATION OF NICHOLAS II •

Deputy Karaulov appeared in the Duma and announced that the
Tsar, Nicholas II, had abdicated the throne in favor of Michael
Alexandrovich. Michael Alexandrovich in his turn abdicated the
throne in favor of the people.

At the Duma, there were large meetings and ovations. The en-
thusiasm was beyond description.

MANIFESTO OF NICHOLAS II 6

March 15, 1917.

In the midst of the great struggle against a foreign foe, who
has been striving for three years to enslave our country, it has pleased
God to lay on Russia a new and painful trial. Newly arisen popular
disturbances in the interior imperil the successful continuation of the
stubborn fight. The fate of Russia, the honor of our heroic army,
the welfare of our people, the entire future of our dear land, call
for the prosecution of the conflict, regardless of the sacrifices, to a
triumphant end. The cruel foe is making his last effort and the hour
is near when our brave army, together with our glorious Allies, will
crush him.

In these decisive days in the life of Russia, we deem it our duty
to do what we can to help our people to draw together and unite
all their forces for the speedier attainment of victory. For this
reason we, in agreement with the State Duma, think it best to abdi-
cate the throne of the Russian State and to lay down the Supreme
Power.

8 "Izvestija," Extra Supplement to No. 4, March 16, 1917.
""Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists/' No, 8, March 16,
1917.

298 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Not wishing to be separated from our beloved son, we hand down
our inheritance to our brother, Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich,
and give him our blessing on mounting the throne of the Russian
Empire.

We enjoin our brother to govern in union and harmony with the
representatives of the people on such principles as they shall see fit
to establish. He should bind himself to do so by an oath in the
name of our beloved country.

We call on all faithful sons of the Fatherland to fulfil their
sacred obligations to their country by obeying the Tsar at this hour
of national distress, and to help him arid the representatives of the
people to take Russia out of the position in which she finds herself,
and to lead her into the path of victory, well-being, and glory.

May the Lord God help Russia !

NICHOLAS.

March 15, 1917, 3 P. 'M.
City of Pskov.

Countersigned by the Minister of the Imperial Cowrt,

Adjutant-General, COUNT FREDERICKS.

5. ABDICATION OF GRAND DUKE MICHAEL
ALEXANDROVICH 7

A heavy burden has been laid on me by my brother who has
passed over to me the imperial throne of Russia at a time of un-
precedented war and popular disturbances.

Animated by the thought which is in the minds of all, that the
good of the State is above other considerations, I have decided to
accept the supreme power, only if that be the desire of our great
people, expressed at a general election for their representatives to the
Constituent Assembly, which should determine the form of govern-
ment and lay down the fundamental laws of the Russian Empire.

With a prayer to God for His blessings, I beseech all citizens of
the Empire to subject themselves to the Provisional Government,
which is created by and invested with full power by the State Duma,
until the summoning, at the earliest possible moment, of a Con-
stituent Assembly, selected by universal, direct, equal, and secret

7 "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 9, March 17,
1917*

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 299

ballot, which shall establish a government in accordance with the
will of the people.

MICHAEL
March 16, 1917

Petrograd

6. ARREST OF NICHOLAS AND OTHER MEMBERS OF
THE ROMANOV DYNASTY 8

[Minutes of the Petrograd Soviet, March 16, 1917]
"Resolved:

i. That the Workers' Deputies be informed that the Executive
Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has
resolved to arrest the dynasty of the Romanovs, and to propose to
the Provisional Government that it make the arrest, together with
the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. In case of a refusal, to inquire
what the attitude of the Provisional Government will be if the
Executive Committee itself makes the arrest. The reply of the Pro-
visional Government to be discussed at a later meeting of the Execu-
tive Committee.

2. As regards 'Michael, to make an actual arrest, but formally t'o
declare him to be subjected only to the actual surveillance of the
revolutionary army.

3. As regards Nicholas Nicholaevich, in view of the danger .of
arresting him in the Caucasus, first to summon him to Petrograd,
and to establish strict surveillance over him on the way.

4. The arrest of the women of the house of Romanov to be
made gradually, depending upon the part played by each one in the
activities of the old regime.

The question of how to make the arrests, as well as the organiza-
tion of the arrests, is to be turned over to the military commission
bf the Soviet of Workers' Deputies for further elaboration.
Chkheidze and Skobelev are instructed to communicate to the Gov-
ernment the resolution of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of
Workers' Deputies/'

THE ARREST OF THE iMPERlAL FAMILY 9

On March 20, the Provisional Government, yielding to the pres-
sure of the Executive Committee, resolved:

8 "Protokoly," 9.
* Ibid., 289-90.

300 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

1. To consider the abdicated emperor, Nicholas II, and his con-
sort as being under arrest, and to bring the abdicated emperor to
Tsarskoe Selo.

2. To instruct Adjutant-General Alexeev to give to the Duma
Deputies Bublikov, Vershinin, Gribunin, and Kalinin, who have been
commissioned to go to' Mogilev,10 a detail of soldiers to guard the
abdicated emperor.

However, in view of the fact that the Provisional Government,
at the same time that it resolved upon the arrest of Nicholas II,
also entered into negotiations with the British Government about the
former imperial family's going to England, the Executive Commit-
tee was again compelled to take up the question of Nicholas II's
fate. . . .

As a result of renewed negotiations between the Executive Com-
mittee and the Provisional Government, the following agreement was
reached :

1. The former imperial family will be permitted to go abroad
only by agreement between the Provisional Government and the
Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

2. The former imperial family is to be kept under arrest at
Tsarskoe Selo until a new place of confinement has been agreed to
between the Provisional Government and the Soviet of Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies.

3. A special commissar of the Executive Committee is to take
part in all matters relating to the guard over the prisoners, and other
special measures.

7. THE TSAR'S MINISTER AND THE "MOST AUGUST"
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF »

. . . Democracy should demand from the Provisional Govern-
ment that it announce clearly and without equivocation that it does
not recognize the validity of Nicholas II's appointment of Prince
Lvov. Failure to do this is ipso facta evidence of its monarchistic
sympathies, and goes to show that it is unworthy of the Provisional
Government set up by the revolutionary people. The Revolution does
not need the approval of the former monarch. It is announced in

10 The movements of these four deputies' and an account of the Tsar's last
day at Headquarters may be found in "Izvestiia," No. n, March 23, 1917.
a "Izvestiia," No. 17, March 19, 1917.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 301

the papers that in addition to the "appointment" of Prince Lvov,
Nicholas has also named Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich, Com-
mander-in-Chief. This rumor is not yet confirmed, but if true, is
even less admissible [than the Lvov appointment]. . . . The Com-
mander-in-Chief is subject to the new [Provisional] Government
and it, only, has the right to select him. An appointment by the old
Government is of no force and the new Government should at once
set it aside.

There is still another reason why Nicholas Nicholaevich can not
now hold a responsible position. He is a member of the old dynasty.
. . . Should the Provisional Government leave him in charge of the
army, it would be failing in its duty before the revolutionary people
which has put it in power. . . .

Democracy should demand from the Provisional Government the
removal of all officers (especially those in high positions), who
belong to the old dynasty. . . .

8. THE ARREST OF NICHOLAS ROMANOV 12

In view of information received, that the Provisional Government
has decided to permit Nicholas Romanov to depart for England, and
that he is at present on his way to Petrograd, the Executive Com-
mittee has resolved to take extraordinary steps, immediately, for his
detention and arrest. An order has been issued that our troops shall
occupy all railway stations, and commissars with extraordinary
powers have been despatched to the stations of Tsarskoe Selo, Tosno
and Zvanka.

It has been further decided to broadcast wireless messages to all
cities, with instructions to arrest Nicholas Romanov and take ex-
traordinary measures in general.

At the same time, it has been decided to inform the Provisional
Government at once that it is the determination of the Executive
Committee not to permit the departure of Nicholas Romanov for
England, and to arrest him. It has been decided to confine Nicholas
Romanov in the Trubetskoi Bastion of the Peter and Paul Fortress,
changing its commanding personnel for this purpose. The arrest of
Nicholas Romanov is to be made at all costs, even at the risk of a
severance of relations with the Provisional Government.
» "Protokoly," 29.

3Q2 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

9. GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS NICHOLAEVICH 1S

At three o'clock in the afternoon, Prince Lvov notified Grand
Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich that he was relieved from his duty as
Commander-in-Chief. For the present and until the appointment of
a Commander-in-Chief, the duties of that office are to be performed
by General Alexeev.

M "Izvestiia," No. 13, March 25, 1917,

CHAPTER XX

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE
PETROGRAD SOVIET

INTRO'DUCTO'RY NOTE

With the Romanovs and the Monarchy out of the way, the
question of a temporary and permanent form of government came
up for discussion. It was one of the tenets of the Russian revo-
lutionists that the permanent form of government as well as
other fundamental State questions, such as land ownership, should
be determined by a Constituent Assembly. Of course, it was taken
for granted that such an assembly would vote for a republic. The
Liberals, after the miscarriage of their abdication and constitu-
tional monarchy plans, fell in with the idea of a Constituent
Assembly in the hope that the people would decide in favor of a
constitutional monarchy. Both sides knew just what they wanted,
both sparred for time, for both needed time to prepare.

In view of the fact that the Constituent Assembly could not be
called at once it was necessary to make som£ arrangement for a
provisional government to "(i) prepare for the Constituent As-
sembly and (2) govern the Country until the Assembly meets."

The Committee of the Duma took that responsibility upon
itself. During March 14 and 15 Miliukov and some of his asso-
ciates had been preparing a list of available candidates for sub-
mission to Grand Duke Michael in case he should become Em-
peror. After his abdication the same list was put forward. All
the persons named in the list were members of the Duma ; all but
two belonged to the bourgeois parties. These two were Socialists.
Chkheidze was now President of the Soviet and Kerenski, the
idol of the revolutionary crowd, one of the vice-presidents of
the Soviet.

Before accepting the offer, the two Socialists asked the author-
ization of the Executive Committee of the Soviet. This body

303

304 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

refused to grant it on the ground that the revolution before them
was not a proletarian but a bourgeois revolution and therefore the
bourgeoisie should take the reins of government and be held
responsible. Responsible to whom? To the Soviet, of course, said
the Socialists. They, especially the Marxians, argued that the
relation between the Soviet and Provisional Government was
similar to "that of Parliament and the English Ministry. The
Provisional Government would not for a moment accept such a
relationship but at the same time the ministers were not quite
clear in their own minds as to whom they were responsible and
by what authority they were in office. Neither the Soviet nor the
Provisional Government could make out a good constitutional
case.

Chkheidze yielded to the judgment of the Executive Commit-
tee and declined the offer of the Ministry of Labor. Kerenski, on
the other hand, being less bound by socialistic theory, appealed
from the Executive Committee to the Soviet as a whole. In a very
dramatic speech he explained that he had already accepted the post,
outlined his great plans, and asked for approval of his acceptance.
It was given him most enthusiastically.

This act of the Soviet was interpreted differently by the
Executive Committee and the Duma leaders. The last named
looked upon Kerenski's entry into the Ministry in the light of a
coalition with the Soviet and therefore reasoned that the Soviet
was bound to approve all acts of the Provisional Government.
The Socialists would not 'for a moment admit this point of view.
Kerenski, they said, represented no one but himself. In so far as
the Provisional Government was concerned the Socialists "would
stand behind it ... in so far as it carries out the socialistic
program." To make sure that this was done the Soviet appointed a

". , . Contact Commission ... to keep the Soviet in-
formed regarding the intentions and acts of the Government ;
to keep the latter, in turn, informed regarding the demands
of the revolutionary people; to exert influence upon the
Government for the purpose of satisfying these demands;
and to exercise constant control over its actions."
The Provisional Government was in a helpless and humiliat-

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 305

ing position. It had responsibility but no power, or, what amounted
to the same thing, it thought it had no power. It had little confi-
dence in itself and was awed by the activities and resolutions of
the Soviet which gave the ministers the impression of an intelli-
gent directing force against which it was useless to struggle. The
poor Provisional Government found itself in an intolerable posi-
tion which led to conflicts, ill-will, and finally to an open break.

i. ATTITUDE OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF SOVIET
ON QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION IN
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

From the Minutes of the Session of the Soviet of {Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies on March 15^

Before the meeting, there was an informal conference with the
deputies of the soldiers who had become members of the Soviet.
They were informed what had been done on March 14. While this
conference was on, word was received of trouble in the Life-Guard
Regiment. Ten men from those present were instructed to proceed
at once to the different regiments to quiet them and explain to
them Order No. I.

The conference ended with a speech by N. S. Chkheidze, who
greeted the revolutionary army in the name of the laboring class. . . .

In the regular order of business, there was taken up the report
of the Executive Committee on its negotiations with the Provisional
Committee of the State Duma, on the subject of the formation of a
provisional government and the attitude of the Executive Committee
of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies towards such a
government. The Executive Committee declined to participate in the
Provisional Government and submitted the following demands :

1. Complete and immediate amnesty for all charged with political,
religious, terroristic crimes, military uprisings, etc.

2. Political freedom in all its forms: freedom of speech, press,
unions, meetings, and strikes ; this freedom to apply equally to the
army.

These two articles were accepted by the Duma Committee. It did
not accept the proposition that :

3. The army should be organized on the basis of self-government.
1 "Izvestiia," No. 4, March 16, 1017.

3o6 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

It was the opinion of the Duma Committee that it was impossible,
in time of war, to introduce a system which had not been tried out
by any other army in the world. After considerable discussion, the
Duma Committee did agree that while on duty, the soldier should
be subject to strict military discipline, but when offf duty, he should
have the sajtne rights enjoyed by other Russian citizens.

4. The organization of a citizen militia to enforce order; this
militia to be subject to the local authorities, elected on the basis of
universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage.

5. To remove all class, nationality, and religious restrictions.

6. The garrison of Petrograd not to be removed from the city
and not to be disarmed.

All the above were accepted by the Duma Committee.

The proposition to establish at once a democratic republic was
set aside on the ground that the form of government for the Rus-
sian Empire was a matter for the decision of the Constituent Assem-
bly, and that the Provisional Government would call such a body in
the very near future.

A. F. Kerenski was offered the office of Minister of Justice, and
N. S. Chkheidze that of Minister of Labor, but the Executive Com-
mittee did not give them its sanction to accept these offices.

The Executive Committee recommended that the Soviet of Work-
ers' Deputies take note of the intended declaration of the newly
formed Government, to appeal to the inhabitants to organize, to cease
disorder, and to support the Provisional Government in so far as it
followed the lines marked out in the above articles.

Following the report of the Executive Committee, Kerenski, in
a strong and ardent speech, appealed to the Soviet, as a whole, to
approve his action in accepting the duties of Minister of Justice in
the Provisional Revolutionary Government.

In the debate that followed, two points of view were brought
out, one against contact with the Duma Committee and for a pro-
visional government of the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers Depu-
ties ; and the other in favor of sending representatives of the Soviet
Deputies into the Provisional Government. . . .

After a lively discussion, all the recommendations of the report
of the Executive Committee were accepted with the following
corrections : *

i. The Provisional Government should proceed to carry out the
indicated measures, notwithstanding the fact that the country is in
a 'State of war.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 307

2. The 'Manifest of the Provisional Government should be signed
both by the Government and M. Rodzianko.

3. To include in the program of the Provisional Government an
article giving cultural and national self-determination to all na-
tionalities.

4. To form a committee of representatives from the Soviet of
Soldiers' and Workers Deputies to watch over the acts of the Pro-
visional Government.

All the corrections were accepted by an overwhelming majority
vote. The session lasted about seven hours. The next session was set
for six o'clock on the evening of March 16.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF A. F. KERENSKI IN THE SOVIET OF WORKERS*

DEPUTIES 2

March 15, 1917

After the organization of the new Government, the Minister of
Justice, A. F. Kerenski, appeared at the meeting of the Soviet of
Workers' Deputies and asked special permission to say a few words.
It was granted, and this is what he said :

"Comrades! Do you believe in me? ("We believe, we believe!")
I speak from the bottom of my heart, and I am ready to die if need
be. (Cheers, applause, and. prolonged ovation.) In view of the forma-
tion of the new Ministry and the offer that was made me to accept
the portfolio of the Ministry of Justice, I was obliged to give an
immediate answer without waiting for your formal approval. (Noisy
applause, general enthusiasm.) Comrades, the representatives of the
old Government were in my hands and I could not make up my mind
to let them out of my hands. (Cheers and shouts: "That's right.")
I accepted the offer made me and entered the new Government as
Minister of Justice. (Cheers, applause, and shouts: "Bravo!") My
first official act was to give an order to free all political prisoners,
without exception, and to bring from Siberia, with special honor,
our fellow deputies, the Social-Democrats [of Second and Fourth
Duma]. (Loud applause, general enthusiasm.)

Considering the fact that I took upon myself the duties of the

a "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists/' No. 7, March 16,
1917. The person reporting Kerenski's speech in the "Izvestiia," says, "It is
difficult to describe the enthusiasm which seized the audience. The few voices,
which here and there protested against Kerenski's acting without the formal
approval of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, were drowned by the shouts of
the great majority who approved what he had done. Such a stormy ovation
had probably never before been seen in the walls of the Taurida Palace."

3o8 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Ministry of Justice before having received your formal sanction, I
resign from the office of Vice-President of the Soviet of Workers'
Deputies. But I am ready to accept this honor at your hands again,
if you desire it. (Stormy applause.) Comrades, in going into the
new Ministry, I am as I have always been, a republican. (Loud ap-
plause.) I gave notice to the Provisional Government that I am In
its midst as representative of democracy, the exponent of democratic
demands, that it must take into consideration my opinions, which I
shall present as the spokesman of the democracy which has over-
thrown the old regime. Comrades, time does not wait ; every moment
is precious ; and I call on you to organize, to establish discipline, to
support us, your representatives, ready to die for the people and to
give their whole life for the people."

2. FORMATION AND PROGRAM OF PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT 3

Citizens, the Provisional Executive Committee of the members
of the Duma, with the aid and support of the garrison of the capital
and its inhabitants, has triumphed over the dark forces of the Old
Regime to such an extent as to enable it to organize a more stable
executive power. With this idea in mind, the Provisional Commit-
tee has appointed as ministers of the first Cabinet representing the
public, men whose past political and public life assures them the
confidence of the country.

PRINCE GEORGE E. Lvov, Prime Minister and Minister of the
Interior.

P. N. MILIUKOV, Minister of Foreign Affairs

A. I. GUCHKOV, Minister of War and Marine

M. I. TERESCHENKO, Minister of Finance

A. A. MANUILOV, Minister of Education

A. I. SHINGAREV, Minister of Agriculture

N. V. NEKRASOV, Minister of Transportation

A. I. KONOVALOV, Minister of Commerce and Industry

A. F. KERENSKI, Minister of Justice

VL. Lvov, Holy Synod1*

The Cabinet will be guided in its actions by the following
principles :

* "Izvestiia," No. 4, March 16, 1917.
*I. V. Godnev, Comptroller.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 309

1. An immediate general amnesty for all political and religious
offenses, including terrorist acts, military revolts, agrarian offenses,
etc.

2. Freedom of speech and press; freedom to form labor unions
and to strike. These political liberties should be extended to the
army in so far as war conditions permit.

3. The abolition of all social, religious and national restrictions.

4. Immediate preparation for the calling of a Constituent Assem-
bly, elected by universal and secret vote, which shall determine the
form of government and draw up the Constitution for the country.

5. In place of the police, to organize a national militia with
elective officers, and subject to the local self-governing body.

6. Elections to be carried out on the basis of universal, direct,
equal, and secret suffrage.

7. The troops that have taken part in the revolutionary move-
ment shall not be disarmed or removed from Petrograd.

8. On duty and in war service, strict military discipline should be
maintained, but when off duty, soldiers should have the same public
rights as are enjoyed by other citizens.

The Provisional Government wishes to add that it has no inten-
tion of taking advantage of the existence of war conditions to delay
the realization of the above-mentioned measures of reform.
President of the Duma, M. RODZIANKO
President of the Council of Ministers, PRINCE Lvov
Ministers MILIUKOV, NEKRASOV, MANUILOV, KONO
VALOV, TERESCHENKO, VL. Lvov, SHINGAREV,
KERENSKI.

3. SOCIALISTIC SUPPORT OF THE PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT 6

The Petrograd Socialists-Revolutionists, having met in confer-
ence on March 15 to consider the present political situation,
resolved :

i. In view of the fact that the danger of a counter-revolution
is not yet passed, and that the question of the moment is to make
fast the political revolutionary conquests already attained, this Con-
ference believes that it is urgently necessary to stand behind the
Provisional Government, in so far as it carries out its announced

6 "Izvestiia," No. 5, March 17, 1917.

3io DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

political program, consisting of amnesty, personal freedom, removal
of class, religious, and nationality restrictions, and preparation for
the Constituent Assembly. This Conference, however, reserves to
itself the right to change its attitude toward the Provisional Govern-
ment, should it decline to live up to its programs. At the same time,
the Conference realizes the urgent need to fight every attempt to
interfere with the organized work of the Provisional Government
in the realization of its proposed political plans.

2. Believing that control by the laboring mass of the actions of
the Provisional Government is necessary, the Conference welcomes
the entrance of A. F. Kerenski into the Provisional Government as
Minister of Justice. It looks upon him as the defender of the people's
interests and freedom. His line of action during the revolutionary
days shows that he understands the significance of the moment, and
the Conference fully approves everything that he has done.

3. In order to consolidate the political conquests already made,
and to reach out for more social-political rights for the people, the
Conference calls on all members of the Socialists-Revolutionists
Party to take active part in the organization of the popular masses
by participating in the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies,
by forming peasants' unions and other organizations having for their
object the defense of the interest of the people.

4. In addition to supporting the Provisional Government in the
realization of its political program, the Conference regards it as of
greatest importance to make energetic efforts to prepare for the
Constituent Assembly, and by means of propaganda to spread the
idea of a republican form of government and the adoption of all the
social-political demands which the Party of Socialists-Revolutionists
regards as a minimum in its program.

4. CONTACT COMMISSION6

Resolution adopted by the Soviet, March 20.

FIRST. — Pursuant to the decision of the Soviet of Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies, and in conformity with the general policy laid
down by the same, the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Work-
ers' and Soldiers' Deputies finds it necessary to adopt immediate
measures to keep the Soviet informed regarding the intentions and
acts of the Government ; to keep the latter, in turn, informed regard-

«"Protokoly,"26-7.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 311

ing the demands of the revolutionary people ; to exert influence upon
the • Government for the purpose of satisfying these demands; and
to exercise constant control over its actions.

SECOND. — To carry out this resolution, the Executive Committee
of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies elects a delegation
composed of the following comrades : Skobelev, Steklov, Sukhanov,
Filipovski, and Chkheidze; and instructs them to, enter at once into
negotiations with the Provisional Government.

THIRD. — After the result of these negotiations becomes known, a
delegation shall be elected for the establishment of permanent rela-
tions with the Council of Ministers, as well as with individual min-
isters and government departments, for the purpose of carrying into
effect the demands of the revolutionary people.

5. FIRST DECLARATION OF THE PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT 7

March 20, 1917

FROM THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

Citizens af RIASM:

A great event has taken place. By the mighty assault of the
Russian people, the old order has been overthrown. A new, free
Russia is born. The great revolution crowns long years of struggle.
By the act of October 17, [30] 1905, under the pressure of the
awakened popular forces, Russia was promised constitutional liber-
ties. Those promises, however, were not kept. The First State Duma,
interpreter of the nation's hopes, was dissolved. The Second Duma
suffered the same fate, and the Government, powerless to crush the
national will, decided, by the act of June 3, [16] 1907, to deprive
the people of a part of those rights of participation in legislative
work which had been granted.

In the course of nine long years, there were taken from the
people, step by step, all the rights that they had won. Once more
the country was plunged into an abyss of arbitrariness and despotism.
All attempts to bring the Government to its senses proved futile,
and the titanic world struggle, into which the country was dragged
by the enemy, found the Government in a state of moral decay,
alienated from the people, indifferent to the fate of our native land,

7 "Vestnik Vremennago Pravitelstva/' No. 2 (47), March 20, 1917,

3i2 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

and steeped in the infamy of corruption. Neither the heroic efforts
of the army, staggering under the crushing burdens of internal
chaos, nor the appeals of the popular representatives, who had
united in the face of the national peril, were able to lead the former
Emperor and his Government into the path of unity with the people.
And when Russia, owing to the illegal and fatal actions of her rulers,
was confronted with gravest disasters, the nation was obliged to take
the power into its own hands.

The unanimous revolutionary enthusiasm of the people, fully
conscious of the gravity of the moment, and the determination of the
State Duma, have created the Provisional Government, which con-
siders it to be its sacred and responsible duty to fulfil the hopes
of the nation, and lead the country out onto the bright path of free
civic organization.

The Government trusts that the spirit of lofty patriotism, mani-
fested during the struggle of the people against the old regime, will
also inspire our valiant soldiers on the field of battle. For its own
part, the Government will make every effort to provide our army
with everything necessary to bring the war to a victorious end.

The Government will sacredly observe the alliances which bind
us to other powers, and will unswervingly carry out the agreements
entered into by the Allies. While taking measures to defend the coun-
try against the foreign enemy, the Government will, at the same time,
consider it to be its primary duty to make possible the expression of
the popular will as regards the form of government, and will con-
voke the Constituent Assembly within the shortest time possible,
on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage, also
guaranteeing participation in the elections to the gallant defenders'of
our native land, who are now shedding their blood on the fields of
battle.

The Constituent Assembly will issue the fundamental laws, guar-
anteeing to the country the inalienable rights of justice, equality, and
liberty. Conscious of the heavy burden which the country suffers
because of the lack of civic rights, which lack stands in the way of
its free, creative power at this time of violent national commotion,
the Provisional Government deems it necessary, at once, before
the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, to provide the country
with laws for the safeguarding of civic liberty and equality, in order
to enable all citizens freely to apply their spiritual forces to creative
work for the benefit of the country. The Government will also under-
take the enactment of legal provisions to assure to all citizens, on the

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 313

basis of universal suffrage, an equal share in the election of local
governments.

At this moment of national liberation, the whole country remem-
bers with reverent gratitude those who, in the struggle for their
political and religious convictions, fell victims to the vindictive old
regime, and the Provisional Government will regard it as its joyful
duty to bring back from their exile, with full honors, all those who
have suffered for the good of the country.

In fulfilling these tasks, the Provisional Government is animated
by the belief that it will thus execute the will of the people, and
that the whole nation will support it in its honest efforts to insure
the happiness of Russia. This belief inspires it with courage. Only
in the common effort of the entire nation and the Provisional Gov-
ernment can it see a pledge of triumph of the new order.

March 19, 1917.

6. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROVISIONAL GOVERN-
MENT AND SOVIET

(a) CIRCULAR TELEGRAM OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT RE-
LATING TO THE REMOVAL OF GOVERNORS AND VICE-GOVERNORS 8

Prince Lvov, Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, sent
on March 18, the following telegram to the presidents of the
Guberniia Zemstvo Boards [Gubernskia Zemskia Upravy] : "The
Provisional Government finds it necessary to remove the governors
and vice-governors from their places, and therefore depends on you,
as Guberniia Commissars of the Provisional Government, to assume
the duties of that office with all the rights that legally belong to it,
retaining, at the same time, the administration of the Guberniia
Zemstvo Boards. Chairmen of the Uiezd Zemstvo Boards assume the
duties of Uiezd Commissars of the Provisional Government, retain-
ing, at the same time, the administration of the Uiezd Zemstvo
Boards. It is necessary to reorganize the police into a militia, and
this work is to be undertaken by the local self-government."

WHAT ARE THEY WAITING FOR?9

The Prime Minister's circular telegram of March 18, recognizes
the need of removing the governors and vice-governors; handing

8 "Izvestiia," No. 7, March 19, 1917.

9 Ibid., No. 8, March 20, 1917, Editorial.

314 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

over, temporarily, their functions to the chairmen of Guberniia and
Uiezd Zemstvo Boards, and organizing the police into a militia.

We know the worth of these gentlemen, chairmen 'of Guberniia
and Uiezd Zemstvo Boards. We know who these appointees of the
noble-landowners are. We remember that they are the very people
who were the first to come to the aid of Tsarism in 1905-1906, when
the masses for the first time took up arms against the old power.

It is only quite recently that the nobility has come out against
"the dark forces/' and even then very cautiously. Nevertheless, the
substitution of these people for the appointees of the old Government
is a step in advance, but it is not what democracy demands. The
local representatives of the Government should be chosen from those
public men who are well-known for their fight against the principles
of the old regime, and their appointment should be made in agree-
ment with the local Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies;

But that is not enough. We should ask the Provisional Gov-
ernment the following question: Why does it wait to liquidate the
old regime, in the persons of its most conspicuous and therefore
most harmful representatives?

(&) RODZIANKO AND CHKHEIDZE10

On March 28, there came to the State Duma in full military
equipment, and with music, the reserve battalion of the Life-Guards
of the Semenovski regiment with their commander, Colonel Nazi-
mov, at the head. It had a large red flag with the words, "Free
Semenovtsy." There were other flags with such words as, "Guard
Freedom in the Victory over William/' "Soldiers to Your Trenches,
Workmen to Your Benches," War to a Victorious End," "Land and
Liberty," "Long Live Free Russia," "Long Live the Republican
Form of Government."

In the Catherine Hall, the Semenovtsy were addressed first by
N. S. Chkheidze, who among other things told them of the Appeal
of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies to the workers of
all the world, and in particular to the German proletariat.

In continuing his political speech, Chkheidze called for a cheer
for, the Constituent Assembly and a democratic republic. The
Semenovtsy gave it with a will. After this, the elected commander
of the battalion congratulated the State Duma because it had waged
the fight against the old and cursed regime, and, thanks to its efforts,
the people had been able to overthrow the hated regime.
M "Izvestiia," No. 17, March 30, 1917.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 315

About twenty members of the Duma, with M. V. Rodzianko at
the head, came out to greet the Semenovski regiment. The appear-
ance of the President of the Duma called forth a great ovation. He
turned to the Semenovtsy and said :

"Thank you, brave comrade-Semenovtsy, for coming here to
show your strength and readiness to stand guard over the happiness
and freedom of our dear mother Russia."

Rodzianko's speech, which concluded with the appeal to the army
to fight with Russia's fiercest foe, the Germans, brought forth great
enthusiasm throughout the hall.

After Rodzianko's speech, N. S. Chkheidze, member of the Duma,
suggested to the soldiers that they ask Rodzianko's opinion on the
summoning of the Constituent Assembly, a democratic republic, and
in particular on the land question. These words were taken up by
one of the soldier-orators, who made a long speech on them and told
the soldiers to believe neither Rodzianko nor the State Duma. The
President of the Duma followed him immediately with this speech:

"Gentlemen: The State Duma and I are doing our very best to
summon the Constituent Assembly at the earliest possible moment.
We will allow no one to block this Constituent Assembly, which will
represent the actual will of the free people and determine who shall
govern Russia. All of us will submit to, and defend with all our
might, whatever form of government the will of the people may
decide upon. As to the land question, I say to you in the name of
the State Duma that, if the Constituent Assembly should decide that
the land should go to all the people, that decision will be carried out
without opposition. Do not, f ellow-Semenovtsy, believe all those who
tell you that either I or the State Duma will stand in the way of the
happiness and freedom of Russia. It is not true, we will do every-
thing that we can that the Russian people may live as it desires."

These words made a deep impression on all present. There was
loud and long applause. The soldiers carried the speaker, with loud
hurrahs, through the hall.

The attempts of unknown speakers to spoil this effect were not
successful.

(r) POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY OF PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT11

The Provisional Government has two tasks: (i) To prepare for
the Constituent Assembly; (2) to govern the country until the As-
sembly meets. The first task requires no discussion, but the second

11 Izvestiia," No. 24, April 7, 1917, Editorial.

316 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

needs some explanation. The point is that the Government has in its
hands a tremendous financial and administrative power and it can,
if it so desires, exert great influence on the elections for the Con-
stituent Assembly. It can do even more. It can bring about a state
of affairs which the Constituent Assembly, when it meets, must face
as accomplished facts, such, for example, as the conclusion of peace,
declaration of war, cancellation of commercial agreements, etc.
This tremendous power in the hands of the Provisional Government
raises the questions (i) whence comes so much power, and (2) how
to prevent its use for evil purposes.

First of all, it is important to state most emphatically (and it is
for the Provisional Government to say it) that it was not the abdica-
tion of Nicholas, and after him Michael Romanov, that called to
power the Council of Ministers with Prince Lvov at its head. The
Provisional Government was called to power by the will of His
Majesty, the Revolutionary People, and no one else. Its power and
composition were agreed to by the Committee of the State Duma
and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The last named,
the real incarnation of the revolution, did not, for weighty reasons,
take upon itself the executive power, but handed it to the Council of
Ministers, with the understanding that it would carry out immedi-
ately certain named reforms.

In addition to these reforms, the Soviet reserved to itself the
right of active control over the carrying out of the said reforms.
Does the Provisional Government have executive power over
the country? Yes, it has. Does it have full and unlimited power?
No, it has not. We have not overthrown one autocrat in order to
have twelve. What then limits the power of the Provisional Gov-
ernment?

In the first place, the vigilant and ever wakeful control of the
whole nation, organized and meeting freely. It can always stop, in-
stantly, those measures of the Provisional Government which
threaten popular liberty. In the second place, the actual control by
the organs of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies.

Now let us examine the forms of control over the actions of the
Government. We would say here that first in order comes the un-
limited right of free discussion, which we now enjoy and which far
exceeds the freedom of speech in England and France. The Govern-
ment hears all opinions and the voice of the people on all matters,
such, for example, as the aims and problems of the war. This should

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 317

continue in the future. The history of English public meetings teaches
us that this is a very effective means [of control] .

But we live at a time when everything is done at once. Under
certain conditions, when the interests of liberty require it, the revolu-
tionary people through its organ, the Soviet of Workers' and Sol-
diers' Deputies, may and should have a say in the affairs of the
Provisional Government. For example, it could not allow Nicholas
Romanov to be taken out of the country, and the Executive Com-
mittee of the Soviet was right when it took steps to keep the ex-
autocrat at Tsarskoe Selo. Such measures should, of course, be
taken only after mature deliberation and tactfully, for it is not our
purpose to shake the power of the Provisional Government.

How to avoid similar conflicts in the future? It is essential that
there should be some kind of tie between the Provisional Government
and the Soviet of Deputies, that the Soviet should be kept informed,
in good time, of the more important steps of the Provisional Govern-
ment, and that it should, in turn, report to the Government its more
important activities. There are bound to be clashes, but with mutual
good-will and understanding of the State problems of the moment,
they are not very dangerous. On some questions, an agreement has
already been reached ; on others, the Constituent Assembly will act.
Until the meeting of that body, the Provisional Government will have
to adjust itself as best it can to a certain amount of inconvenient
revolutionary control.

AGAINST THE SOWERS OF DISCORD12

The bourgeois public accuses us of standing in the way of na-
tional unity, of bringing about the destructive "Dual Government/'
of inciting the soldiers against the officers, and thereby interfering
with the successful course of the war. At the same time, the bourgeois
press does not cease to tell us of the great dangers that threaten
Russia from Germany, and lays the blame for military failures on
our internal situation.

All these charges and complaints have two specific objects. One
is to persuade the soldiers that it is necessary to go on with the
war, and the other to sow discord between the soldiers and the
workers.

As long as the workers and soldiers march hand in hand, the
interests of the working population are safe from all attacks of th$

13 "Izvestiia," No. 27, April 11, 1917, Editorial,

3i8 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

ruling classes. But if the attempt to divide them should succeed,
the cause of the people would be lost, and the bourgeoisie would
rejoice in their victory.

Comrades, do not listen to these sowers of discord among you.
Remember that in unity there is strength.

Attacks against the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies
go on.

The bourgeois papers and the bourgeois assemblies make some
serious charges against the Soviet.

The Soviet harms the prestige of the Government. The Soviet
makes for dual government in the country. The Soviet, a haphazard
organization containing a large number of members, can not govern
the country.'

These accusations remind us of the good old days when the
Octobrist-Black Hundred State Duma met in the Taurida Palace.
In those gloomy days, the country was governed by an "irresponsible"
bureaucracy, actually by the Romanov family and a crowd of the
more prominent landowning nobility. The bourgeoisie and part of the
landowners in the Duma protested against such a state of affairs and
tried to bring the Government under its control, just as today the
Soviet establishes its control over the Provisional Government. Let
us recall what the Black Hundred said about the attempts of the
State Duma. They said : "The Duma is injuring the prestige of the
Government. The Duma is trying to bring about a dual government.
The Duma, a haphazard organization containing a large number of
members, can not govern the country." All the charges now made
against the Soviet were at one time made against the Duma. This
is not a mere coincidence. It is always true that the group in power
desires to have all the power. The group in power always regards
as an attack on its power every attempt made by the inhabitants to
control it. All such attempts at control are called by the frightful
name of dual government and anarchy.

These are empty scares. Without control there can be no con-
fidence. Control does not injure prestige. Control may weaken or
lessen the importance of certain individuals in power, but it im-
proves the Government of the country.

The representatives of the botjrgeoisie understood this very well

u "Izvestiia," No. 27, April n, 1917.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 319

so long as they were in the opposition, but they quickly forgot these
simple truths as soon as they assumed power. They forgot where
they got the power. They forgot that the Provisional Government
was created by the revolution and assumed its duties with the consent
of 'the Petrograd Workers and Soldiers. They forgot that the people
is the highest source of power and that to the people, represented
by its elected organs, belongs the right to control all government.
The Proletariat remembers this.

Life has changed. In the Peter-Paul fortress, where formerly the
fighters for freedom were oppressed, now sit the old Ministers. The
Taurida Palace, which was formerly occupied by representatives
of landowners and capitalists, is now the meeting-place of workmen
and soldiers. In the Mariinski Palace, in the place of the old Min-
isters, are now the members of the bourgeoisie Provisional Govern-
ment. A tremendous change ! But in the future the change will be still
greater. The Proletariat will face it boldly, and will not let its ban-
ners out of its hands. The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies
will not resign what it regards as its right and duty, — the control of
the activities of the Government.

CHAPTER XXI

CLASH BETWEEN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
AND SOVIET OVER FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The first open break between the Provisional Government and
the Soviet was over a question of foreign policy. Most of the
members of the Government were ardent patriots, nationalists and
imperialists, at least to the extent of desiring Constantinople. A
great many members of the Soviet were patriots, all of them were
more or less internationalists and strong anti-imperialists. They
regarded the war as a struggle between capitalists at the expense
of the proletariat, and therefore agitated for a cessation of hostili-
ties at the earliest possible moment and a peace of understanding.
While they were arguing this policy, the representatives of the
Allies made it clear to the Provisional Government that it would
have to live tip to the various agreements and fight the war to a
victorious end. Miliukov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was
caught between the two fires. He accepted the point of view of the
Allies because it was also his own.

On March 18 he issued a statement that Russia

. . . will remain mindful of the international engagements en-
tered into by the fallen regime . . . and will fight by their
[Allies] side against the common enemy until the end. . . .

This note deeply offended the Socialists of the Soviet. So far
as the foreign policy was concerned, they could see no difference
between the old and the new Government. To them the revolution
was not merely a change of Ministers but a change in world out-
look. They felt that one of the first tasks of the revolution was
to stop the shedding of blood. They tried to bring it about through
the Provisional Government, but failing there and having no
confidence in England and France, the Soviet on March 27 ap-

320

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 321

pealed over the heads of the bourgeois Ministers to the People
of the World. It called upon them

... to take into their own hands the question of war and
peace ... to refuse to serve as an instrument of conquest
and violence in the hands of kings, landowners and bankers. . „

This call was followed up by rather pertinent editorials in the
"Izvestiia," the official organ of the Soviet

Pressure was also brought to bear on the Provisional Govern-
ment to modify its attitude on war aims. On April 10 the Gov-
ernment made a declaration. It was addressed to the Russian
people and not to the Allies. In this declaration the Government
said that Russia was fighting a war of defense, that "the purpose
of free Russia is not domination over other nations, or seizure
of their national possessions, or forcible occupation of foreign
territories, but the establishment of stable peace on the basis of
self-determination of peoples."

This declaration cheered the so-called revolutionary democ-
racy. On April 25 it published a resolution, promising that

. . . The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies will sup-
port with energy all the efforts of the Provisional Government
along this line.

It looked as if the two bodies had come to an agreement. But
a week later this understanding was torn all to pieces.

The Allies were greatly displeased with the declaration of
April 10 and the resolution of April 25, both of which were out
of harmony with the Miliukov note of March 18. England and
France inquired just where Russia stood. On May I Miliukov
issued another note which attempted to answer their questions.
It contained many fine phrases for home consumption, but be-
tween these nebulous phrases he told the Allies what they wished
to hear:

. . the Provisional Government while safeguarding the rights
of our own country, will, in every way, observe the obligations
assumed toward our Allies, Continuing to cherish the firm con-
viction of the victorious issue of the present war, in full accord
with our Allies, the Provisional Government feels also absolutely

322 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

certain that the problems which have been raised by the present
war will be solved in a spirit that will afford a firm basis for a
lasting peace. . . .

After six weeks of discussion Miliukov and the Soviet were
just as far apart as ever. This new note aroused a great deal of
feeling. There were popular demonstrations which led to street
fights. The Soviet issued a call to the population to remain calm
and promised to take up the question with the Provisional Govern-
ment. After prolonged conferences between these two bodies, the
Provisional Government issued an Explanation which appeared
on May 5. The Explanation is merely a repetition of the Decla-
ration of April 9. In referring to the Miliukov document it said:

It is, of course, understood that when the note speaks of a
decisive victory over the enemy, it has in mind the attainment
of those objects named in the Declaration of April 9. ...

The Soviet accepted the Explanation, but it no longer had
great confidence in the Government. It called on the "revolutionary
democracy of Russia to rally closer and closer around tfieir
Soviets." It issued another CALL but whereas the first one (March
27) was to the Peoples of the World, the second one (May 15)
was to the Socialists of All Countries. The Soviet was becoming
more and more class conscious. In its second appeal the Soviet
made it clear that it stood for a

. . . peace without annexation and indemnities on the , basis of
self-determination of peoples. . , . It furnishes a platform on
which the toiling masses of all countries — belligerent and neu-
tral—could and should come to an understanding in order to
establish a lasting peace. . . .

About this time President Wilson decided to send a mission
to Russia with a message in the hope of reconciling the views of
the Soviet with his own and the Allies. He failed in his purpose.
To the Russian Socialists in the Soviet, Wilson and Root were
representatives of the capitalists and could not be trusted to defend
the interest of the proletariat.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 323

i. ALLIED PRESSURE ON PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT1

After the Grand Duke Michael's renunciation of the crown, our
only possible policy was to strengthen the hands of the Provisional
Government in their struggle with the Soviet. The latter was ruin-
ing the army with its socialist propaganda, and though the majority
of its members professed themselves in favor of continuing the
war, those on the extreme left advocated ( peace at any price. The
speedy recognition of the Provisional Government was, therefore, in
my opinion, necessary; but when, on March 18, Miliukov broached
the subject to me, I told him that before acting on the authorization
already given me, I must have the assurance that the new Govern-
ment was prepared to fight the war out to a finish and to restore
discipline in the army. Miliukov gave me this assurance, but said that
they were obliged to proceed cautiously on account of the extrem-
ists, and that his own position was a difficult one. He was regarded
with suspicion for having supported the Grand Duke Michael's claim
to the crown and he must either make some concessions or resign.
Which course, he asked, would I prefer him to take? The former,
I unhesitatingly replied.

MILIUKOV'S NOTE ON POLICY OF PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 2

[March 18, 1917]

By an act dated from Pskov, March 15, Emperor Nicholas re-
nounced the throne for himself and his heir, Grand Duke Alexis
Nikolaievich, in favor of Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich. In
reply to a notification which was made to him of this act, Grand
Duke Michael Alexandrovich, by an act dated Petrograd, March 16,
in his turn, renounced assumption of supreme power until the time
when a Constituent Assembly, created on the basis of universal suf-
frage, should have established a form of government and new fun-
damental laws for Russia. By this same act, Michael Alexandrovich
invited the citizens of Russia, pending a definite manifestation of the
national will, to submit to the authority of the Provisional Govern-
ment. The composition of the Provisional Government and its politi-
cal program have been published and transmitted to foreign countries.

This Government, which assumes power at the moment of the

*Sir Geo. Buchanan; "My Mission to Russia," II, 90-1.
9 A. J. Sack; "The Birth of the Russian Democracy," 246-8,

324 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

greatest external and internal crisis which Russia has known in the
course of her history, is fully conscious of the immense responsibility
it incurs. It will apply itself first to repairing the overwhelming errors
bequeathed to it by the past, to insuring order and tranquillity in
the country, and, finally, to preparing the conditions necessary in
order that the sovereign will of the nation may be freely pronounced
as to its future fate.

In the domain of foreign policy, the Cabinet, in which I am
charged with the portfolio of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will
remain mindful of the international engagements entered into by the
fallen regime, and will honor Russia's word. We shall carefully
cultivate relations which unite us with other friendly and allied
nations, and we are confident that these relations will become even
more intimate, more solid, under the new regime established in
Russia, which is resolved to be guided by the democratic principles
of respect due to both small and great nations, to the freedom of
their development, and to good understanding among nations.

But the Government cannot forget for a single instant the grave
external circumstances under which it assumes power. Russia did not
will the war which has been drenching the world with blood for
nearly three years. But, victim of premeditated aggression prepared
long ago, she will continue, as in the past, to struggle against the
spirit of conquest of a predatory race, which has aimed at establishing
an intolerable hegemony over its neighbors and subjecting Europe
of the twentieth century to the shame of domination by Prussian
militarism. Faithful to the pact which unites her indissolubly to her
glorious Allies, Russia is resolved, like them, to assure the world*
at all costs, an era of peace among the nations, on the basis of stable
national organization, guaranteeing respect for right and justice.
She will fight by their side against the common enemy until the end,
without cessation and without faltering,

. The Government of which I form a part will devote all its energy
to bring the war to a victorious conclusion, and will apply itself to
the task of repairing as quickly as possible the errors of the past,
which hitherto have paralyzed the aspirations and the self-sacrifice
of the Russian people. I am firmly convinced that the marvelous
enthusiasm, which today animates the whole nation, will multiply
its strength in time, and hasten the hour of the final triumph of a
regenerated Russia and her valiant Allies.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 325

2. POLICY OF THE SOVIET

(a) CALL BY THE PETROGRAD SOVIET TO THE PEOPLES
OF THE WORLD 8

March 27, 1917
Comrade-proletarians, and toilers of all countries:

We, Russian workers and soldiers, united in the Petrograd Soviet
of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, send you warmest greetings
and announce the great event. The Russian democracy has shattered
in the dust the age-long despotism of the Tsar and enters your fam-
ily [of nations] as an equal, and as a mighty force in the struggle for
our common liberation. Our victory is a great victory for the free-
dom and democracy of the world. The chief pillar of reaction in the
world, the "Gendarme of Europe," is no more. May the earth turn
to heavy granite on his grave! Long live freedom! Long live the
international solidarity of the proletariat, and its struggle for final
victory !

Our work is not yet finished: the shades of the old order have
not yet been dispersed, and not a few enemies are gathering their
forces against the Russian revolution. Nevertheless our achievement
so far is tremendous. The people of Russia will express their will in
the Constituent Assembly, which will be called as soon as possible
on the basis of universal, -equal, direct, and secret suffrage. And it
may already be said without a doubt that a democratic republic will
triumph in Russia. The Russian people now possess full political lib-
erty. They can now assert their mighty power in the internal gov-
ernment of the country and in its foreign policy. And, appealing to
all people who are being destroyed and ruined in the monstrous war,
we announce that the time has come to start a decisive struggle
against the grasping ambitions of the governments of all countries ;
the time has come for the people to take into their own hands the
decision of the question of war and peace.

Conscious of its revolutionary power, the Russian democracy
announces that it will, by every means, resist the policy of conquest
of its ruling classes, and it calls upon the peoples of Europe for
concerted, decisive action in favor of peace.

We are appealing to our brother-proletarians of the Austro-
German coalition, and, first of all, to the German proletariat. From
the first days of the war, you were assured that by raising arms

* "Izvestiia," No. 15, March 28, 1917.

DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

against autocratic Russia, you were defending the culture of Europe
from Asiatic despotism. Many of you saw in this a justification of
that support which you were giving to the war. Now even this justi-
fication is gone: democratic Russia cannot be a threat to liberty
and civilization.

We will firmly defend our own liberty from all reactionary at-
tempts from within, as w£ll as from without. The Russian revolu-
tion will not retreat before the bayonets of conquerors, and will not
allow itself to be crushed by foreign military force. But we are
calling to you : Throw off the yoke of your semi-autocratic rule, as
the Russian people have shaken off the Tsar's autocracy; refuse to
serve as an instrument of conquest and violence in the hands of
kings, landowners, and bankers — and then by our united efforts, we
will stop the horrible butchery, which is disgracing humanity and is
beclouding the great days of the birth of Russian freedom.

Toilers of all countries : We hold out to you the hand of brother-
hood across the mountains of our brothers' corpses, across rivers of
innocent blood and tears, over the smoking ruins of cities and vil-
lages, over the wreckage of the treasuries of civilization; — we
appeal to you for the reestablishment and strengthening of interna-
tional unity. In it is the pledge of our future victories and the com-
plete liberation of humanity.

Proletarians of all countries, unite!

PETROGRAD SOVIET OF WORKERS* AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

(6) SECRET DIPLOMACY4

Without even looking into the archives of the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, each of us can say with confidence that the secret
diplomacy of Nicholas Romanov, Grigori Rasputin, Protopopov,
Sturmer, Sukhomlinov, Izvolski, Miasoedov, and other officials, high
and low, of the fallen Government, was not helpful to the people.
They were for the interest of the gang of Tsarist bandits, the most
dishonorable, untruthful, and plundering in the world.

You cannot pour new wine into old bottles. The new Govern-
ment created by the revolution must, in the field of foreign politics,
cut loose completely from the traditions of Izvolski and Sturmer.
But it can change our diplomacy only if it comes out before the
whole world against the traditional policies of conquest.

The revolutionary people has already expressed its will in fhe
Call to the Peoples of the World by the Soviet of Workers' and
* "Izvestiia," No. 18, March 31, 1917, Editorial.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 327

Soldiers' Deputies on March 27. In that now historical document, the
revolutionary proletariat and the revolutionary army have renounced
in a loud voice all conquests and oppression of other peoples. Only
on the foundations of a new foreign policy can. a new diplomatic
system be built, answering to the principles of freedom, and worthy
of such a people.

Clean dealings require clean hearts,

The Call of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, of
March 27, clearly and without double meaning stated the thought and
will of the Russian proletariat and revolutionary army. Its attitude
toward the war differs at its very roots from that of the bourgeois
parties and that part of the democracy which has joined them.

Yet, in spite of this, the bourgeois press and the democrat de-
f ensists pretend that nothing has happened — they try to conceal the
fundamental differences between the position of the Soviet and that
of the imperialistic bourgeoisie, and continue as before to shout for
"War to a victorious end." It is time, once for all, to put an end
to this confusion, to differentiate clearly, and contrast the two posi-
tions toward the war.

One position is that on which all bourgeois imperialist parties
of all the belligerents and, unfortunately, some of the representa-
tives of democracy, have stood, and still stand. .

-The official phraseology and declarations of the champions of
this first position, which justifies the "war to a victorious end," is
something like this :

The bourgeois press in England, Russia, France, and Italy assure
us that Germany and Austria desired to bring the whole of Europe
under their influence, to extend their dominions, and to subject to
the German "mailed fist" the free democracies of Europe, England,
France, and Belgium. From this point of view a victory of the
Austro-German Coalition over the opposing coalition would mean
"economic slavery" and the loss of the former freedom enjoyed by
the latter. Under the circumstances, it is a matter of self-defense to
gain a victory over the Austro-German Coalition. In order to protect
themselves against a possible Austro-German attack in the future,
there must be "a decisive victory," that is to say, complete ruin of the
enemy and the destruction of his war power.
* "Izvestiia," No. 18, March 31, 1917, Editorial.

328 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

The German and Austrian press and their allies in the democratic
camp (the party of Scheidemann and others) assure us, on the
other hand, that "treacherous England," "barbarous Russia/' "de-
generate France," and "traitorous Italy" have set for themselves as
a goal the wiping of the Austro-German States from the face of the
earth. Consequently in self-defense, there must be a clean-cut victory
over England, France, Russia, and Italy.

These points of view on the war ("chauvinism") have been
preached regularly in the bourgeois press of both belligerent camps,
day in and day out. Other points of view were not permitted by
the war censorship and could appear only in underground leaflets.
In the same way, no one was allowed to criticize this "chauvinism,"
and those who tried it were immediately charged with being "traitors
to the country." Thanks to this special situation the chauvinists were
enabled to impress their views on the masses of the population, who
in their ignorance and darkness have not been able to detect the lies
and hypocrisies they contained.

This lie and hypocrisy becomes evident when the principal posi-
tion of chauvinism is uncovered. It is this. The present war is due
to the rivalry of the ruling classes of the European states, which
attempted to seize and bring under their control lands and people
that did not belong to them. During the last twenty or thirty years,
these attempts have become more and more vigorous and, as neither
side would give in, both armed. Due to this increase in armaments
in the last ten years (since the Japanese war) and the obstinacy of
both sides, there were several occasions in recent years when it
seemed as if war would break out. In the spring of 1914, on the
very eve of this war, Russia adopted "a large war program," greatly
strengthening her military power. This was an important move
toward war. From the point of view of Germany and Austria, it was
better to fight now than to wait until Russia carried out her "large
war program."

We have no doubt whatsoever that the Austro-German Coalition
has conquests in mind. But this is equally true of Russia and her
Allies. Russia would like to get Constantinople, the Dardanelles, Ga-
licia, Armenia; to regain freed Poland. The English imperialists
have seized, and intend to keep, the German colonies and plan to get
hold of Mesopotamia. France demands Alsace-Lorraine, Germany to
the Rhine, Syria, and part of Asia Minor. Italy is asking for Tyrol
and Trentino and certain territories in the Balkans.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 329

When the chauvinists talk of "a victorious end" over the oppo-
nent, they mean the possession of these territories.

The second position in regard to the war is the one taken by the
Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. It is the position which
was taken at Zimmerwald and Kienthal.6 Conferences by the repre-
sentatives of the Socialist parties in Europe, by the left wing of
the Labor parties in Russia, France, England, Germany, Italy, Nor-
way, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, and the Balkan States, Ru-
mania, and certain of the Bulgarian and Serbian Socialists. Until
now, the working masses have had no opportunity to make their
voices heard. As far as we can judge from information that reaches
us, the workers' in all belligerent countries are with each month of the
year going over more and more to the side of the opponents of war.

The main point of this second position was made clear in the
Call of March 27. The Call came out against conquests, and declared
war against war. The Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies called on the
people of Europe to compel their governing classes to renounce
conquests and to come out for self-determination of nations.

We are striving not to take territory from other peoples, but to
help them attain liberty, especially the nationalities living in Russia.
We will oppose, with arms in hand, everything that stands in the
way of this liberty.

This explains our attitude toward the Austro-German Coalition.
We are striving for a final victory not over Germany, but over her
rulers. Just as soon as the people of the Austro-German Coalition
compel their rulers to lay down their arms and to give up the idea
of conquests, we will also lay down ours.

It is therefore evident that our attitude toward war is altogether
different from that of the bourgeoisie. No matter how hard the
bourgeois press may try to minimize these differences, the popular
masses will never again fall under this chauvinistic agitation. The
poisonous fog of chauvinism will disperse before the light of the
free word, which has been won and guaranteed.

3. THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND WAR AIMS

April 10, 1917 7

CITIZENS: The Provisional Government, having considered the
military situation of the Russian State, and being conscious of its

•Zimmerwald, September, 1915; Kienthal, April, 1916.
7 "Riech," No. 73, April 10, 1917.

33o DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

duty to the country, has resolved to tell the people directly and
openly the whole truth.

The overthrown government has left the defense of the country
in an utterly disorganized condition. By its criminal inactivity and
inefficient methods, it disorganized our finances, food supply, trans-
portation, and the supply of the army. It has undermined our eco-
nomic organization.

The Provisional Government, with the active and vigorous as-
sistance of the whole nation, will make every effort to remove the
dire consequences of the old regime. But time does not wait. The
blood of large numbers of the sons of our fatherland has been flow-
ing without limit during these two and a half years of war, and
still the country remains exposed to the blows of a powerful enemy,
who has seized entire provinces of our country, and is now, in the
days of the birth of Russian freedom, menacing us with a new,
determined assault.

The defense of our own inheritance by every means, and the
liberation of our country from the invading enemy, constitute the
foremost and most urgent task of our fighters, defending the na-
tion's liberty.

Leaving to the will of the people, in close union with our Allies,
the final solution of all problems connected with the World War
and its conclusion, the Provisional Government considers it to be
its right and its duty to declare at this time that the purpose of free
Russia is not domination over other nations, or seizure of their
national possessions, or forcible occupation of foreign territories, but
the establishment of stable peace on the basis of the self-determina-
tion of peoples. The Russian people does not intend to increase its
world power at the expense of other nations. It has no desire to en-
slave or degrade any one. In the name of the loftiest principles of
justice, it has removed the shackles from the Polish people. But the
Russian people will not permit their fatherland to emerge from this
great struggle humiliated and sapped in its vital forces.

These principles will be made the basis of the foreign policy of
the Provisional Government, which is unswervingly executing the
will of the people and defending the rights of our fatherland, fully
observing at the same time all obligations assumed towards our Allies,

The Provisional Government of free Russia has no right to with-
hold the truth from the people. The State is in danger. Every effort
must be made for its salvation. Let the answer of the nation to the
truth here revealed be, not fruitless despair, not discouragement, but

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 331

a concerted effort to create a single national will. This will give us
fresh strength to carry on the fight, and will lead us to salvation.

In this hour of severe trial, let the whole nation find within itself
the strength to consolidate the freedom it has won, and work tire-
lessly for the welfare of free Russia. The Provisional Government,
which has taken a solemn oath to serve the people, firmly believes
that, with the general and unanimous support of each and every one,
it will be enabled to do its duty to the nation to the end.

Prime Minister, PRINCE G. E. Lvov
April 9, 1917

4. SOVIET AND WAR AIMS 8

I. ON THE WAR

Resolution of the All-Russian Conference of the Soviet of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies

In the call to the people of the world on March 27, the Soviet of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies declared in clear words that in
the sphere of foreign policy the Russian democracy intended to bring
about the same ideas of freedom and right that it had adopted for
domestic life.

Numerous meetings of workers, soldiers, and citizens throughout
Russia have approved this stand and have expressed the will of the
people, that while defending its personal freedom it would not allow
the revolutionary enthusiasm of the nation to be used to oppress other
peoples, in the form of either open or concealed seizures of territory,
or indemnities.

The Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies took up the question with the Provisional Government and
pointed out that it was necessary for free Russia to make a public
statement renouncing the plans of conquest of the tsarist govern-
ment. On April 10, the Provisional Government published a
declaration to the citizens of Russia. It said, "that the purpose of
free Russia is not domination over other nations, or seizure of their
national possessions, or forcible occupation of foreign territories, but
the establishment of stable peace on the basis of self-determination of
peoples. The Russian people does not intend to increase its world
power at the expense of other nations. It has no- desire to enslave
or degrade any one."

8 "Izvestiia," No. 38, April 25, 1917-

332 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

The Russian democracy attaches tremendous importance to this
act of the Provisional Government, and sees in it a step in the
direction of the realization of democratic principles in foreign policy.
The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers5 Deputies will support with
energy all the efforts of the Provisional Government along this line.
They [Soviets] call on all the peoples, both Allied and enemy, to
bring pressure to bear on their Governments to give up their plans
of conquests. In addition to this, each nation, in both coalitions, should
insist that its Government persuade its allies to make a general
renunciation of annexation and indemnity. On its part, the Executive
Committee emphasizes the necessity for the Provisional Government
to enter into discussion with the Allies for the purpose of working
out a general agreement along the line indicated.

Russia's revolutionary people will continue to do its best to
bring about, as soon as possible, peace on the basis of the brother-
hood and equality of free nations. An official renunciation of all
ideas of conquest by all the governments would be a most powerful
means to bring the war to an end an these terms.

As long as these conditions do not exist, as long as the war
continues, the Russian democracy realizes that the weakening of
the army and a decline in its fighting efficiency would be a most
serious blow to the cause of freedom and to the life interests of the
country. For the purpose of most energetically protecting revolution-
ary Russia from all outside attacks and forcefully defending her
against all attempts to interrupt the progress of the revolution [on
the inside], the Conference of All-Russian Soviets of Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies calls on the democracy of Russia to mobilize all
the living force of the country in all branches of the national life
in order to strengthen the rear and front. This is the imperative
demand of Russia of the moment; this is necessary for the sake
of the success of the revolution.

The Conference of All-Russian Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies calls on all laborers in factories, mills, railways, mines, post
and telegraph, and all other enterprises for the army and the rear,
to work with the greatest zeal. The economic conquest by the working
classes and the hope for additional reforms require that the workers*
efforts should not be lowered, but that production should increase, so
as to provide the civilian population and the army with its necessaries.

The Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies
calls the attention of all citizens, especially those engaged in agricul-
ture and transportation, to the danger of a food crisis, an inheritance

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 333

of the old regime, and appeals to them to exert all their energies
to ward it off.

The Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies
sends its greetings to the revolutionary soldiers and officers who are
defending free Russia from its foes at the front and at home.

5. MILIUKOV'S NOTE ON WAR AIMS 9

May i, 1917

On May i, the Minister of Foreign Affairs instructed the Russian
representatives with the Allied Powers to transmit the following
note to the Governments to which they are accredited :

"On April 9 of the present year, the Provisional Government
issued a declaration to the citizens, containing the views of the Gov-
ernment of free Russia regarding the aims of the present war. The
Minister of Foreign Affairs has instructed me to communicate to
you the contents of the document referred to, and to make at the
same time the following comments :

"Our enemies have been striving of late to sow discord among
the Allies, disseminating absurd reports alleging that Russia is ready
to conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers. The text of
the attached document will most effectively refute such falsehoods.
You will note from the same that the general principles enunciated
by the Provisional Government are in entire agreement with those
lofty ideas which have been constantly expressed, up to the very
last moment, by many eminent statesmen in the Allied countries, and
which were given especially vivid expression in the declaration of
the president of our new Ally, the great republic across the
Atlantic.

"The Government under the old regime was, of course, incapable
of grasping and sharing these ideas of the liberating character of
the war, the establishment of a firm basis for the amicable existence
of the nations, of self-determination for oppressed peoples, and so
forth. Emancipated Russia, however, can now speak in a language
that will be comprehensible to the leading democracies of our own
time, and she now hastens to add her voice to those of her Allies.
Imbued with this 'new spirit of a free democracy, the declaration
of the Provisional Government cannot, of course, afford the least
excuse for the assumption that the revolution has entailed any slack-
'"Riech," No. 91, May 3, 1917.

334 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

ening on the part of Russia in the common struggle of the Allies.
Quite to the contrary, the aspiration of the entire nation to carry
the world war to a decisive victory has grown more powerful, thanks
to our understanding of our common responsibility, shared by each
and every one. This striving has become still more active, since it is
concentrated upon a task which touches all and is urgent, — the task
of driving out the enemy who has invaded our country. It is obvious,
as stated in the communicated document, that the Provisional Gov-
ernment, while safeguarding the rights of our own country, will, in
every way, observe the obligations assumed toward our Allies.

"Continuing to cherish the firm conviction of. the victorious issue
of the present war, in full accord with our Allies, the Provisional
Government feels also absolutely certain that the problems which
have been raised by this war will be solved in a spirit that will afford a
firm basis for lasting peace, and that the leading democracies, inspired
by identical desires, will find the means to obtain those guarantees
and sanctions which are indispensable for the prevention of sanguinary
conflicts in the future."

MILIXJKOV AND CONSTANTINOPLE 10

(From Mittukotfs Speech at the Congress of the Cadet Party on
May 22, 1917)

At the present time I am not a member of the Provisional
Government, but a free citizen and can, therefore, permit myself
the liberty, just as N. V. Nekrasov has done, to talk straight, and at
the same time to meet his wishes.

I admit quite frankly, and stand firmly by it, that the main thread
of my policy was to get the Straits for Russia. I fought, unfortunately
in vain, against those who favored the new formula [no annexation,
and no indemnity, and the right of self-determination], and that
Russia should free the Allies from their obligations to help her
secure sovereign rights over the Straits. I would say, and say it
proudly, and regard it as a distinct service to the country, that until
the last moment that I was in office, I did nothing which gave the
Allies the right to say that Russia has renounced the Straits.

6. THE SOVIET ON MILIUKOV'S NOTE OF MAY i11

On 'May 3, there was a special session of the Soviet. After a
speech by Chkheidze explaining the reason for the meeting, those

10 "Riech," No. 109, May 24, 1917.

11 "Izvestiia," No. 46. May 4. ioi7. Editorial.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 335

present approved his suggestion not to take any action on the Miliukov
note of May i, until after the Executive Committee had had its talk
with the Council of Ministers on the evening of May 3 in the Mariin-
ski Palace. [After the meeting] members of the Soviet went back to
the wards of the city to which they were assigned to quiet the inhabit-
ants. The speakers of the various garty groups agreed with the opinion
expressed by Chkheidze.

CALL OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET OF WORKERS*

AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES TO ALL CITIZENS 12
CITIZENS !

At the moment when the fate of the country is being decided,
every rash step is dangerous. The demonstrations against the Gov-
ernment's note on foreign affairs have led to fights on the streets.
There are wounded and dead. In the name of saving the revolution
from the trouble that threatens it, we appeal to you and beg you,
Be Calm, Keep Order, and Observe Discipline.

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies is deliberating
on the situation. Believe that the Soviet will find a way agreeable
to you. In the meantime, let no one disturb the run of peaceable life
in free Russia.
COMRADE SOLDIERS!

In these exciting days let no one come out on the street armed,
unless called out by the Executive Committee. Only the Executive
Committee has the right to give you orders. Everyorder for the mili-
tary to come out (except as a matter of routine) should be on a
written blank of the Executive Committee, stamped with its seal, and
signed by at least two of the seven men herein named : Chkheidze,
Skobelev, Binasik, Filipovski, SkaloV, Goldman, Bogdanov.

Confirm every order by telephoning to No. 104-06.
COMRADES, WORKMEN, AND MILITIA !

Your guns are for the protection of the revolution. You do not
need them for demonstrations or meetings. On such occasions they are
dangerous for the cause of freedom. When you go to meetings or
demonstrations, leave your arms behind.

The Executive Committee calls on all organizations to help it in
keeping peace and order.

No form of force by one citizen against another can be
permitted in free Russia.

u "Izvestiia," No. 47, May 5, 1917.

336 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Disturbances help only the enemy of the revolution, and he who
brings them on is an enemy of the people.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE S. W. S. D.

May 4, 1917

7. EXPLANATION OF THE PROVISIONAL

GOVERNMENT 1S

In view of the misunderstandings that have arisen over the inter-
pretation of the note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to accompany
the Provisional Government's Declaration of April 9, to the Allied
Governments, the Provisional Government feels that it should make
an explanation.

1. The note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs was considered
carefully and at some length by the Provisional Government, and
its contents unanimously approved.

2. It is, of course, understood that when the note speaks of a
decisive victory over the enemy, it has in mind the attainment of
those objects named in the Declaration of April 9, which are expressed
in the following terms :

The Provisional Government considers it to be its right and^ its ^ duty to
declare at this time that the purpose of free Russia is not domination over
other nations, or seizure of their national possessions, or forcible occupation
of foreign territories, but the establishment of stable peace on the basis of
self-determination of peoples. The Russian people does not intend to increase
its world power at the expense of other nations. It has no desire to enslave
or degrade any one. In the name of the loftiest principles of justice, it has
removed the shackles from the Polish people. But the Russian people will
not permit their fatherland to emerge from this great struggle humiliated and
sapped in its vital forces.

3. By the words in1 the note of May I, "guarantees and sanctions"
for a lasting peace, the Provisional Government had in view the
limitation of armaments, an international tribunal, etc.

The above explanation will be handed to the diplomatic repre-
sentatives of the Allies by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

8. RESOLUTION OF THE SOVIET ON FOREIGN POLICY 14

May 4, 1917

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies congratulates most
heartily the revolutionary democracy of Petrograd. Its meetings,
" "Izvestiia," No. 47, May 5, 1917. "Ibid.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 337

resolutions, and demonstrations have focused attention on questions
of foreign policy and the danger that this policy might follow the
channels of the old imperialism.

The whole-hearted protest of the Workers and Soldiers of Petro-
grad have made it clear to the Provisional Government, and to the
nations of the world, that the revolutionary democracy of Russia
will never agree to a return of the tsarist foreign policy, and that it
[Russian democracy] is working and will continue to work for
international peace.

As a result of these protests, the Provisional Government has
made a new explanation which has been published for general infor-
mation and which has been handed to the ministers of the Allies by
the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This explanation puts an end to the
possibility of interpreting the note of May I in a. spirit foreign to
the demand and interests of the revolutionary democracy. The fact
that the question of renunciation of forcible annexation has been
brought forward for international consideration should be regarded
as a great victory for democracy.

The Soviet is determined to continue to fight for peace along this
line, and it calls on the revolutionary democracy of Russia to rally
closer and closer around their Soviets. It firmly believes that the
peoples of all the belligerent countries will break the opposition of
their governments and compel them to begin peace discussion, on the
basis of no annexation and no indemnity.

9. DEMOCRATIC PEACE

RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONFERENCE OF
BOLSHEVIKS 16 AT PETROGRAD 1G

May 7-12, 1917

The present war is an imperialistic struggle between the capitalists
of all the belligerents for world domination, for markets, for financial
control, for the subjugation of weak nations, etc. Each day of war
enriches the financial and industrial bourgeoisie and impoverishes
the proletariat and the peasants of all the warring countries, and also
neutrals. In Russia, there is the additional danger that a prolongation
of the struggle may harm the revolution and stop its further
development.

15 At this Conference there were 151 delegates, representing about 79,000
members.

10 Piontkovski, S. A.; "Khrestoraatiia Po Istorii Oktiabrskoi Revoliutsii,"
87-90.

338 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

The passing of State power into the hands of the Provisional
Government, a government of landowners and capitalists, has not
and cannot change the character and purpose of the war, so far as
Russia is concerned. This new Government not only has failed to
publish the secret agreements, concluded between Nicholas II and
the capitalistic governments of England, France, etc., but, without
asking the people, has confirmed these secret understandings which
give Russian capitalists a free hand in China, Persia, Turkey, Austria,
etc. By the concealing of these treaties, the Russian people is being
deceived as to the true character of the war. For this reason, the party
of the Proletariat cannot support either the present war, or the present
Government or its loans, without breaking completely with interna-
tionalism,—that is to say, with the fraternal solidarity of the workers
of all lands in the war against capitalism. No reliance can be placed
in the promises of the present Government to renounce annexations,
that is to say, conquests of foreign territory, or forcible retention
within the confines of Russia of this or that nationality. Capitalists,
who are bound together by thousands of threads of banking capital,
would no more renounce annexations than they would give up the bil-
lions of profits they make from investments, concessions, and war
orders. After the new Government had declared against annexation in
order to deceive the people, Miliukov, on April 22 at Moscow, said that
the Government did not give up annexation. In the note of May I,
and in its explanation of May 5, the predatory policy of the Govern-
ment was confirmed. The Conference warns the people against these
empty capitalistic phrases. A difference should be made between
annexation in word and in deed. If in deed, then all the secret, plun-
dering treaties should be published at once, and all the nationalities
should at once be given the opportunity to vote freely whether they
wish to be independent States, or a part of some other State.

In regard to the most important question, how to bring this war
to an end as soon as possible and how to bring about a real, demo-
cratic, not an enforced peace, the Conference takes this stand. It is
not possible to end the war by the cessation of war activities by the
soldiers of only one of the belligerents. The Conference protests
again and again against the calumny spread by the capitalists against
our party, that it favors a separate peace with Germany. The German
capitalists are as bad as the Russian, English, French, et al, and
Emperor William, as big a crowned robber as Tsar Nicholas and
the kings of Italy, England, Rumania, etc.

With patience and perseverance, our party will explain to the

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 339

people that wars are conducted by Governments, that they are always
bound up with the interests of certain classes, that this war can be
brought to an end by a democratic peace, only by the passing of
power, at least in some of the belligerent countries, from the hands
of the State authorities directly to the proletariat and semi-proletariat
class which is really capable of putting an end to the yoke o"f
capitalism.

If the revolutionary class were to get control of the government
of Russia, it would take measures to break the economic domination
of the capitalists, and destroy their political power. It would imme-
diately and openly offer to all peoples a democratic peace, on the
basis of complete renunciation of every kind of annexation and
indemnity. Such measures and an offer of peace would establish
full confidence among the workers of the warring countries, and
would inevitably lead to the uprising of the proletariat against those
imperialistic governments that stood out against the proposed peace.

Until the revolutionary class in Russia gets complete control of
the government of Russia, our party will consistently support those
proletarian parties and groups abroad that are actually, in this war,
opposing their imperialistic governments and bourgeoisie. Our party
will particularly encourage the already-begun fraternization of the
soldier masses on the fronts of all belligerents, with the object of
transforming this unconscious solidarity of the oppressed into a
conscious and organized movement, leading to the taking over by
the revolutionary proletariat of all powers of government in all
belligerent countries.

10. INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONFERENCE

At the session of the Executive Committee on May 8, the follow-
ing resolution was adopted:

1. The Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies takes upon itself the initiative of calling an Inter-
national Socialist Conference.

2. All parties and factions of the proletariat International [that
are ready to accept the platform which was adopted by the Soviet
on March 27 in its Call to the people of the world] should be invited.18

1T "Izvestiia," No. 5^1 May 10, 1917,

" At the meeting of the Soviet on May 9, the resolution was carried, but the
Bolsheviks (90) abstained from voting. In the final draft, that part of Article
2 which is in brackets was left out. "Izvestiia," No. 52, May n, 1917.

34Q DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

3. The Executive Committee considers an essential condition of
the conference, the possibility for all socialist parties and factions
without exception to come to the place of meeting. The Executive
Committee calls this to the mind of the governments and most cate-
gorically demands from the majority factions an open and energetic
insistence that their governments should allow the minority delegates
to come to the conference.

4. The place of the conference should be in a neutral country.

5. To prepare for the conference and to lay out a program, a
special body, "The Commission for the Calling of the Conference,"
is being organized, in connection with the Executive Committee. This
commission is made up of members of the Executive Committee, and
representatives of parties who are members of the International and,
at the same time, members of the Executive Committee.

6. A call should be issued at once to all peoples, and in particular
to the socialists of the Allied countries, on the question of peace
and the conference.

7. A special delegation of the Executive Committee should be
sent to neutral and Allied countries to establish contact with the
socialists of these countries and with the delegation at Stockholm for
the purpose of making preparations for the conference.

APPEAL BY THE PETROGRAD SOVIET OF WORKERS* AND SOLDIERS*
DEPUTIES TO THE SOCIALISTS OF ALL COUNTRIES19

TO THE SOCIALISTS OF ALL COUNTRIES

May 15, 1917
Comrades:

The Russian Revolution was born in the fire o-f the world war.
This war is a monstrous crime on the part of the imperialists of all
countries, who, by their lust for annexations, by their mad race in
armaments, have prepared and made inevitable the world conflagration.

Whatever the vicissitudes of military fortune may be, the imperi-
alists of all countries are equally the victors in this war; the war
has yielded and is yielding them stupendous profits, concentrates in
their hands colossal capital, and endows them with unheard-of power
over the person, labor, and the very life of the toilers.

Just because of this, the toilers of all countries are equally losers
* "Izvesttfa," No. 55, May 15, 1917.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 341

in this war. On the altar of imperialism they lay many sacrifices, —
their lives, their health, their liberty, their property ; on their shoulders
rest unspeakable burdens.

The Russian Revolution, the revolution of the toilers, workers,
and soldiers, is not only a revolt against tsarism, but also against
the horrors of the world butchery. It is the first outcry of indignation,
from one of the detachments of the international army of labor,
against the crimes of international imperialism. It is not only a
national revolution, — it is the first stage of the world revolution, which
will end the baseness of war and bring peace to mankind.

The Russian Revolution, from the very moment of its birth,
realized clearly the international problem that confronted it. Its em-
powered organ, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies, in its appeal of the 27th of March, called upon the peoples
of the whole world to unite for the struggle for peace. The Russian
Revolutionary Democracy does not want a separate peace, which
would free the hands of the Austro-German Alliance.

The Revolutionary Democracy of Russia knows that such a peace
would be a betrayal of the cause of the workers' democracy of all
countries, which would find itself tied hand and foot, impotent before
the world of triumphant imperialism. It knows that such a peace
might lead to the military destruction of other countries, and thus
strengthen chauvinistic and revanche ideas in Europe, leaving it an
armed camp, just as after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, thus
inevitably precipitating a new bloody conflict in the near future.

The Russian Revolutionary Democracy desires a general peace
on a basis acceptable to the workers of all countries, who do not seek
annexations, who do not stand for robberies, who are equally inter-
ested in the free expression of the will of all nations, and the crushing
of the might of international imperialism. Peace without annexations
and indemnities on the basis of the self-determination of peoples is
the formula adopted without mental reservations by the proletarian
mind and heart. It furnishes a platform on which the toiling masses
of all countries — belligerent and neutral— could and should come
to an understanding, in order to establish a lasting peace and, with
concerted effort, heal the wounds caused by the bloody war.

The Provisional Government of Revolutionary Russia has adopted
this platform. The Russian Revolutionary Democracy appeals first to
you, Socialists of the Allied countries. You must not permit that
the voice of the Provisional Government should remain a lone voice

343 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

among the Allies. You must force your Governments to state definitely
and clearly that the platform of peace without annexations and
indemnities, on the basis of self-determination of peoples, is also
their platform. By doing this, you will add weight and strength to the
stand of the Russian Government. You will give our Revolutionary
Army, that has inscribed on its banner, "Peace among peoples/' the
assurance that its bloody sacrifices will not be used for evil purposes.
You will enable it to carry out, with all the fervor of revolutionary
enthusiasm, the war tasks that are falling to its lot. You will
strengthen its faith, if you enable it to realize that while defending
the conquests of the Revolution and our freedom, it is at the same
time fighting for the interests of International Democracy, and thus
cooperating in the hastening of the desired peace. You will put the
Governments of the enemy countries in such a position that they will
be forced either to repudiate irrevocably their policy of annexation,
robbery, and violence, or else openly to confess their criminal projects,
thus bringing upon themselves the full and just indignation of their
peoples.

The Russian Revolutionary Democracy appeals to you, Socialists
of the Austro-German Alliance: You cannot allow the Armies of
Your Governments to become the executioners of Russian liberty.
You cannot permit the Governments of your countries to take advan-
tage of the exultant spirit of liberty and fraternity with which the
Russian Revolutionary Army is imbued, to move their troops to
the West, in order to crush, first, France, next Russia, and, finally,
you and the international proletariat in the grip of world imperialism.

The Russian Revolutionary Democracy appeals to the Socialists

of the belligerent and neutral countries and urges them to prevent

the triumph of Imperialism. Let the work for peace, started by the

Russian Revolution, be brought to a conclusion by the efforts of the

. international proletariat.

In order to unite these efforts, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers'
and Soldiers' Deputies has decided to take the initiative in calling for
an international conference of all the Socialist parties and factions in
every country. Whatever the differences of opinion which have dis-
rupted Socialism for a period of three years of war may be, not a
single faction of the Proletariat should refuse to participate in the
general struggle for peace, which is on the program of the Russian
Revolution.

We believe, comrades, that all Socialistic groups will be repre-
sented at this conference. A united stand by the proletariat inter-

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 343

national will be the first victory of the toilers over the imperialist
international.

Proletarians of the world, unite !

ii. THE UNITED STATES, THE PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SOVIET

(a) WILSON'S MESSAGE TO RUSSIA 20
June 9, 1917

. . . But they must follow a principle, and that principle is plain.
No people must be forced under sovereignty under which it does not
wish to live. No territory must change hands except for the purpose
of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty.
No indemnities must be insisted on except those that constitute
payments for manifest wrongs done. No readjustments of power
must be made except such as will tend to secure the future peace
of the world and the future welfare and happiness of its peoples.

And then the free peoples of the world must draw together in
some common covenant, some genuine and practical cooperation that
will in effect combine their force to secure peace and justice in the
dealings of nations with one another. The brotherhood of mankind
must no longer be a fair but empty phrase : it must be a structure of
force and reality. The nations must realize their common life and
effect a workable partnership to secure that life against the aggressions
of autocratic and self-pleasing power.

For these things we can afford to pour out blood and treasure.
For these are the things we have always professed to desire, and
unless we pour out blood and treasure now and succeed, we may
never be able to unite or show conquering force again in the great
cause of human liberty. The day has come to conquer or submit.
If the forces of autocracy can divide us they will overcome us ; if
we stand together, victory is certain and the liberty which victory will
secure. We can afford then to be generous, but we cannot afford then
or now to be weak or omit any single guarantee of justice and
security.

COM'MENT ON PRESIDENT WILSON'S MESSAGE 21

. . . President Wilson is mistaken if he thinks such ideas can
touch the heart of the Russian revolutionary people. The Russian

* Scott, James Brown; "President Wilson's Foreign Policy, Messages . . .
Papers, etc.," 104.

** "Izvestiia," No. 78, June 12, 1917, Editorial.

344 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY _

revolutionary democracy knows that the only way to attain the
longed-for universal peace is through a union of the laboring classes
of the world, against world imperialism. It is no use trying to
confuse it with foggy and high-flown words.

(&) ROOT'S ADDRESS TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS,

June 15, 1917

The Mission for which I have the honor to speak is charged
by the Government and the people of the United States of America
with a message to the Government and the people of Russia.

The Mission comes from a democratic republic. Its members are
commissioned and instructed by a president who holds his high office
as chief executive of more than one hundred million free people, by
virtue of a popular election in which more than eighteen million votes
were freely cast and fairly counted, pursuant to law, by universal,
equal, direct and secret suffrage.

For one hundred and forty years our people have been struggling
with the. hard problems of self-government. With many shortcomings,
many mistakes, many imperfections, we have still maintained order
and respect for law, individual freedom, and national independence.

Under the security of our own laws we have grown in strength
and prosperity, but we value our freedom more than wealth. We
love liberty, and we cherish above all our possessions the ideals for
which our fathers fought and suffered and sacrificed, that America
might be free. We believe in the competence and power of democracy,
and in our heart of hearts abides a faith in the coming of a better
world, in which the humble and oppressed in all lands may be lifted
up by freedom to a heritage of justice and equal opportunity.

The news of Russia's new found freedom brought to America
universal satisfaction and joy. From all the land, sympathy and hope
went out towards the new sister in the circle of democracies ; and
this Mission is sent to express that feeling. The American democ-
racy sends to the democracy of Russia, greeting, sympathy, friendship,
brotherhood, and Godspeed.

| Distant America knows little of the special conditions of Russian
life, which must give form to the government and to the laws which

MElihu Root; "The United States and the War, the Mission to Russia."
Political Addresses, collected and edited by Robert Bacon and James Brown
Scott, 98-101.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 345

you are about to create. As we have developed our institutions to
serve the needs of our national character and life, so we assume that
you will develop your institutions to serve the needs of Russian
character and life. As we look across the sea we distinguish no- party
and no class. We see great Russia as a whole ; as one mighty striving
and aspiring democracy. We know the self-control, the essential kind-
liness, the strong common-sense, the courage and the noble idealism
of Russian character. We have faith in you all. We pray for God's
blessings upon you all. We believe that you will solve your problems ;
that you will maintain your liberty, and that our two great nations
will march side by side in the triumphant progress of democracy
until the old order has everywhere passed away and the world is free.

One fearful danger threatens the liberty of both nations. The
armed forces of military autocracy are at the gates of Russia and
her Allies. The triumph of German arms will mean the death of
liberty in Russia. No enemy is at the gates of America, but America
has come to realize that the triumph of German arms means the
death of liberty in the world; that we who love liberty and would
keep it must fight for it, and fight now when the free democracies
of the world may be strong in union, and not delay until they may
be beaten down separately in succession.

So America sends another message to Russia; that we are
going to fight, and have already begun to fight, for your freedom
equally with our own, and we ask you to fight for our freedom
equally with yours. We would make your cause ours, and our
cause yours, and with common purpose and the mutual helpfulness
of firm alliance, make sure the victory over our common foe.

You will recognize your own sentiments and purposes in the
words of President Wilson to the American Congress, when,, on the
second of April last, he advised the declaration of war against
Germany. He said:

"We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we
know that in such a government [the German Government] , following
such methods, we can never have a friend ; and that in the presence
of its organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know
not what purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic
governments of the world. We are now about to accept the gage of
battle with this natural foe to liberty and shall, if necessary, spend
the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and

346 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

its power. We ate glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of
false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of
the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples
included; for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege
of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience.
The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be
planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no
selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek
no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacri-
fices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the
rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been
made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make
them."

And you will see the feeling toward Russia with which America
has entered the great war in another clause of the same address*
President Wilson further said :

"Does not every American feel that assurance has been added to
our hope for the future peace of the world by the wonderful and
heartening things that have been happening within the last few
weeks in Russia? Russia was known by those who knew it best to
have been always in fact democratic at heart, in all the vital habits
of her thought, in all the intimate relationships of her people that
spoke their natural instinct, their habitual attitude towards life. The
autocracy that crowned the summit of her political structure, long
as it had stood and terrible as was the reality of its power, was not
in fact Russian in origin, character, or purpose; and now it has been
shaken off and the great generous Russian people have been added
in all their naive majesty and might to the forces that are fighting for
freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace. Here is a fit partner
for a League of Honor/'

That partnership of honor in the great struggle for human
freedom, the oldest of the great democracies now seeks in fraternal
union with the youngest.

The practical and specific methods and possibilities of our
allied cooperation, the members of the Mission would be glad to
discuss with the members of the Government of Russia.

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET 347

BAKHMETEFF, THE NEW RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR,

TO THE UNITED STATES

July 5, 1917 23

Mr. Ambassador: To the keen satisfaction which I derived from
the fact that the Government of the United States was the first to
welcome, by its official recognition, the new democracy of Russia to
the family of free States is added the exceptional pleasure which I
experience in now receiving from your hand the letters whereby
the Provisional Government of Russia accredits you as its ambassador
extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the United States and in accord-
ing to you formal recognition as the first ambassador of free Russia
to this country.

For the people of Russia the people of the United States have
entertained friendly feelings, which have now been greatly deepened
by the knowledge that, actuated by the same lofty motives, the two
Governments and peoples are cooperating to bring to a successful
termination the conflict now raging for human liberty and a universal
acknowledgment of those principles of right and justice which should
direct all Governments. I feel convinced that when this happy day
shall come no small share of the credit will be due to the devoted
people of Russia, who, overcoming disloyalty from within and
intrigue from without, remain steadfast to the cause.

The mission which it was my pleasure to send to Russia has
already assured the Provisional Government that in this momentous
struggle and in the problems that confront and will confront the
free Government of Russia, that Government may count on the
steadfast friendship of the Government of the United States and its
constant cooperation in all desired appropriate directions.

It only remains for me to give expression to my admiration of
the way in which the Provisional Government of Russia are meeting
all requirements, to my entire sympathy with them in their noble
object to insure to the people of Russia the blessings of freedom and
of equal rights and opportunity, and to my faith that through their
efforts Russia will assume her rightful place among the great free
nations of the world.

The Official Bulletin, Washington, July 6, 1917.

PART VII

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

When the storm raised by the Miliukov note had spent itself,
it became quite evident that things could not go on as they were.
Russia had two Governments, one working against the other,
and the result was demoralization in the front and rear. One or
the other had to abdicate or the two combine. It was with this
idea in mind that Prince Lvov wrote to Chkheidze asking the
Soviet "to participate in the responsible work of government."
If the Soviet was going to criticize, it should also assume respon-
sibility. On May 12 the question of forming a coalition with the
Provisional Government was debated by the Executive Com-
mittee and lost by the narrow margin of one vote. The day fol-
lowing Guchkov resigned and that created more confusion. By
this time the Executive Committee became split into two groups,
one favoring coalition and the other the taking over of all power
by the Soviet. On May 14 the question of coalition was reconsid-
ered and this time, thanks to the eloquence of Kerenski, the coali-
tionists won. When the question was brought before the Soviet on
the 1 5th it was carried.

In agreeing to a coalition, it was understood that the Provi-
sional Government would accept the Soviet's internal and foreign
policy. This meant that Miliukov would have to give up his post,
which he d,id on May 16. On the I7th, the Ministry was consti-
tuted and on the i8th issued its program.

348

CHAPTER XXII
FORMATION OF A COALITION MINISTRY

i. LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER, PRINCE G. E.
LVOV TO N. S. CHKHEIDZE1

My dear Nicholas Semenovich:

In the statement published by the Provisional Government on
May 9, it is pointed out, among other things, that the Government
will renew its efforts to widen its circle by asking to participate in
the responsible work of government those actively creative elements
of the country who have not until now had direct part in State
administration.

In view of this statement, I ask you, in the name of the Provisional
Government, to be good enough to bring this matter to the attention of
the Executive Committee of the parties represented in the Soviet of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, of which you are President.
Respectfully yours, Prime Mwister, PR. Lvov.

2. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT AND THE SOVIET

On the evening of May 14, there was a meeting of the Executive
Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, under
the chairmanship of Chkheidze, to deliberate on the present situation.

Minister of Justice, Kerenski, made a report. His speech made
a deep impression on the Executive Committee. After he had
spoken, there was a general discussion ; most of the speakers expressed
themselves in favor of once more looking into the question of a coali-
tion ministry.2 But before taking final action, it was decided to
allow each faction, composing the Executive Committee, to meet and
act separately. A recess was taken during which the factions met.

1 "Izvestiia," No. 52, May n, 1917.

3 On May 12, the Executive Committee, by a vote of 23 to 22, came out
against coalition. But the resignation of Guchkov on the following day, and^the
new situation it had created, forced the 'Executive Committee to reconsider
its stand. (See Miliukov, "Istoriia Vtoroi Russkoi Revoliutsii," I, 108-9.)

349

35Q DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

When the Executive Committee again went into session, the
question of a coalition ministry was put to vote. The Executive
Committee came out in favor of the principle of coalition. On the
first ballot, forty-four were in favor, nineteen opposed, and two
abstained from voting. On the final ballot, forty-one were in favor,
eighteen opposed, and three did not vote.

The Labor group [trudoviki], National Socialists, Social-Revolu-
tionists, and Mensheviks (except the Internationalists) voted in favor.
The Bolsheviks and International Socialists voted against the motion.
The Bolsheviks announced that they were in favor of the Soviet of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies taking over all the power.3

On the evening of May 15, there was a special session of the
Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies to act on the question
whether representatives of democracy should go into the Provisional
Government. The Executive Committee put the fundamental ques-
tion : Shall the official representatives of the revolutionary democracy
enter the Government? I. G. Tseretelli took the affirmative, and gave
the point of view of the Executive Committee. The Bolsheviks, Zino-
viev and Kamenev, took the negative, and criticized the decision of
the Executive Committee as ruinous to the revolution. Voitinski,
Lakson, Avksentiev, and others took the floor to take issue with the
Bolsheviks, and to defend the Executive Committee, A vote was
taken, and an overwhelming majority supported the stand of the
Executive Committee to allow its representatives to enter the Gov-
ernment, and empowered the Executive Committee to- continue
negotiations with the Government, as to the basis on which the
coalition government should be formed.4

(a) FORMATION OF A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT5

The Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers* and Soldiers'
Deputies has come to the conclusion that it is necessary for repre-
sentatives of the Soviet to join the Provisional Government.

The question of the so-called "coalition" government has recently
occupied a prominent place in the newspaper columns. The Prime
Minister himself brought it to the front in his letter to Chkheidze.
As it was composed, without the participation of representatives of
democracy, the Provisional Government could not govern, could not
save the State from threatened ruin.

8 "Riech," No. 101, May 15, 1917.
4 "Izvestiia," No. 56, May 16, 1917.
'Ibid., Editorial.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 351

The country is indeed in a dangerous position. Three years of
war have exhausted her strength. Finances are disorganized ; railways
are broken down ; there is a lack of raw materials and fuel, a need
of bread at the front and in the cities, — all these have brought on
discontent and mental unrest which tsarist tools are ready to make use
of. The army is breaking up. In certain places, a disorderly seizure
of* land is going on, a destruction of livestock and implements. Dis-
content is growing. No one pays any attention to the authorized agents
of the Government. Large masses have no confidence in the Govern-
ment, which feels itself powerless and helpless. Only a strong
revolutionary government, enjoying the confidence of the people, can
save the country, hold on to the conquests of the revolution, put an
end to the split in the army, and keep it on a war footing.

The Government finds itself in such an unenviable position that
A. I. Guchkov hastens to abandon the sinking ship, and lays down his
title of Minister of War and Navy. But it is not only the Govern-
ment, but the country itself, that is in a desperate situation.

The Executive Committee took all this into consideration. It
realized that the Russian revolutionary democracy, having carried
the load of the revolution on its shoulders, could not calmly look on,
as its own work perished. It had to take upon itself the responsibility
for the safety of the country.

The Soviet cannot take the Government into its own hands. Such
a step would alienate from the revolution and throw into the arms
of the partisans of the old regime large numbers of people who can
so far accept the revolution and democracy. Democracy has enough
enemies without adding more. . . .

It is necessary to send our representatives into the Provisional
Government, and to share the power. . . .

The participation in the Government by representatives of the
Soviet can have a salutary effect on the country only if the foreign
and internal policy, which the Government has long ago accepted in
principle, but has only weakly put into force, is carried out whole-
heartedly. Only on these conditions can the representatives of the
Soviet join the Government. Only under these circumstances can their
participation furnish the Government the backing of the revolutionary
democracy, the confidence of the army, and concentrate in its hands
the fullness of authority.

This is the reason why the Executive Committee has submitted
the terms on which the representatives of the Soviet would join the
Provisional Government.

352 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

(fe) CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS6

Between the representatives of the Executive Committee and the
Provisional Government, an agreement was reached on the subject
matter to go into the declaration which the new Government should

make. ...

[The next question was] the new Government and the distribu-
tion of portfolios. This question brought forth much disagreement
among the different party groups. . . .

Twice, on May 16 and 17, the Soviet met to settle definitely the
question of a coalition government, ... but nothing was settled.

On the morning of May 15, with the participation of 'Ministers
P. N. Miliukov and A. I. Shingarev, who had hurriedly returned
from Headquarters, and A. A. Manuilov, who had come from
Moscow, a discussion began of the program [submitted by the Soviet]
of the [new] Government. P. N. Miliukov expressed himself against
coalition, and objected to the proposed program because of its vague-
ness, because it contained the seeds of future conflicts, because the
part referring to foreign policy (which was clear) was not acceptable,
and, finally, because it did not come out for one Government, which
should have the full confidence of the revolutionary democracy. The
lack of such a declaration was the cause of the weakness and fall of
the first Ministry. On the basis of these objections, a final revision of
the text of the declaration of the new Government was undertaken.
... But before this was finished, A. F. Kerenski told P. N. Miliukov
at the evening session, that while he [Miliukov] was absent, seven
of the Ministers had decided that in the new Ministry, Miliukov
should have the Ministry of Education, in place of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Kerenski was to have the Ministry of War and
Navy. P. N. Miliukov did not feel that under such a division of
portfolios, and with this beginning of Zimmerwald influences in war
and foreign policy, he could assume collective responsibility for the
acts of a united Cabinet,, and he therefore declined the proposition of
his colleagues, and left the meeting.7

At six o'clock in the evening [May 16], it became known that
P. N. Miliukov had definitely left the Provisional Government.8

6 "Izvestiia," No. 5&, May 18, 1917.

7 Miliukov; "Istoriia Vtoroi Russkoi Revoliutsii," I, iio-i.

8 "Riech," No. 103, May 17, 1917.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 353

At two o'clock on the morning of May 17 and 18, an agree-
ment was reached between the representatives of the Executive
Committee and members of the Provisional Government [as to the
New Provisional Government].9

3. THE NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT10

Prince G. E, Lvov, Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior

A. F. Kerenski, Minister, of War and Navy**

P. N. Pereverzev, Minister of Justice

M. I. Tereschenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs

N. V. Nekrasov, Minister of Transportation

A. I. Konovalov, Minister of Commerce and Industry

A. A. Manuilov, Minister of Education

A. I. Shingarev, Minister of Finance

V. M. CHERNOV, Minister of Agriculture "

M. I. Skobelev, Minister of Labor3-2

I. G. Tseretelli, Minister of Post and Telegraph 12

A. V. Peshekhonov, Minister of Food 1S

Prince D. I. Shakhovskoi, Minister of Social Welfare

V. N. Lvov, Oberprocurator of the Synod

I. V. Godnev, Comptroller

May 18, 1917

On May 18, the Prime Minister, Prince G. E. Lvov, officially
notified the Provisional Committee of the State Duma of the composi-
tion of the new Provisional Government. The Provisional Committee
gave its approval.

(a) DECLARATION OF THE NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 14r

May 18, 1917

Reorganized and strengthened by the new representatives of the
Revolutionary Democracy, the Provisional Government declares
that it will resolutely put into practice the ideas of liberty, equality,
and fraternity, under the banner of which the great Russian Revolu-
tion came into being. The Provisional Government is particularly
united in the following fundamental principles for its action in
the future:

9 "Izvestiia," No. 58, May 18, 1917. M Social-Democrats.

M "Riech," No. 105, May 19, 1917. M National-Socialists.

11 Social-Revolutionists. ** "Riech," No. 105, May 19, 1917.

354 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

1. In matters of foreign policy, the Provisional Government, in
harmony with the people, spurns the idea of a separate peace, 'and
proclaims openly that it is its aim to bring about, at the earliest possi-
ble date, a general peace, without either imposing its domination over
any nation, or taking away any nation's possessions, or forcibly annex-
ing foreign territory, i. e., we wish peace without annexations, without
indemnities, and on the basis of self-determination of peoples. Firmly
convinced that with the overthrow of the Tsar's regime and the
establishment of democratic principles in our domestic and foreign
policies there was created for the Allied Democracies a new factor
making for a permanent peace and the brotherhood of peoples, the
Provisional Government is taking the preliminary steps towards effect-
ing an understanding with the Allies on the basis of the declaration
made by the Provisional Government on April 9.

2. Believing that the defeat of Russia and her Allies would not
only be the source of the greatest calamity for the people, but would
retard and make impossible the conclusion of a general peace on the
basis of the above-mentioned principles, the Provisional Government
trusts that the Revolutionary Army of Russia will not allow the
German troops to crush our Allies in the West, and then turn
against us. To strengthen the democratization in our Army, to
organize and strengthen its fighting power for both defensive and
offensive operations, is the most important task now before the
Provisional Government.

3. The Provisional Government will relentlessly and resolutely
fight the economic disruption by extending further state and social
control over production, transportation, exchange, and distribution
of products, and, in necessary cases, will also resort to the organization
of production.

4. Measures concerning the fullest possible protection of labor
will be developed further in the most energetic way.

5. Leaving it to the Constituent Assembly to decide the question
of transfer of land to the toilers, and making the requisite prepara-
tions for this, the Provisional Government will take all necessary
measures to secure the greatest production of grain in order to
satisfy the needs of the country, and to regulate the utilization of
land in the economic interests, of the country and the toiling
population.

6. Desiring to effect a gradual reorganization of our system
of finances on democratic principles, the Provisional Government
will pay special attention to the increase of direct taxation of the

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 355

property-owning classes (inheritance tax on excess war-profits,
property, etc.).

7. The work of introducing and strengthening the democratic
organs of self-government will be continued with determination and
speed.

8. The Provisional Government will, in like manner, make every
effort to convoke the Constituent Assembly in Petrograd as soon
as possible.

Considering it its object to put the above-mentioned program into
practice without hesitation, the Provisional Government categorically
declares that its work can bear fruit only on condition that the
revolutionary people place their fullest and unconditional faith in
the Government and enable it to exercise in reality its full power,
which is so indispensable in the matter of saf eguarding the achieve-
ments of the Revolution and their further development.

The Provisional Government urgently appeals to all citizens to
preserve the unity of power in its hand, and announces that it will
take the most energetic measures to save the country from all counter-
revolutionary and anarchistic attempts, unlawful acts of violence,
disorganization of the country, and preparation for counter-revolu-
tion. The Provisional Government believes that on this road it will
meet with the full support of all those to whom Russia's liberty
is dear.

(&) NOTE OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT15

June 15, 1917

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tereschenko, transmitted to
the Allied Governments the following note:

The Russian Revolution is not only a change in the internal
system of Russia, but a mighty movement of ideas which expresses
the will of the Russian people in their aspiration for equality, freedom,
and justice, both in the internal life of the State and in the realm
of international relations. The Russian revolutionary government
gets its authority from this will, and to carry out this will is its
duty and object

While defending in the foreign struggle the great principles of
liberty, Russia is striving to secure a general peace on a basis which
would exclude every kind of violence, regardless of its source, and
all imperialistic intentions, no matter under what guise they are

15 "Izvestiia," No. 82, June 16, 1917.

356 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

presented. Russia has no designs of conquest whatsoever, and
emphatically protests against any attempts in this direction. True to
these principles, the Russian people has firmly decided to struggle
against open or secret imperialistic intentions of our enemies in
the political, as well as in the financial and economic fields.

Should there arise differences of opinion as regards war aims
between us and the Governments of the Allies, we have no doubt
that the dose union between Russia and her Allies will insure complete
mutual agreement on all questions, on the basis of the principles
proclaimed by the Russian revolution.

The Russian democracy remains steadfastly loyal to the cause of
the Allies, and welcomes the decision of those of the Allied Powers
which expressed readiness to meet the desire of the Russian Pro-
visional Government to reconsider the agreements concerning the
ultimate aims of the war. We suggest that there be called for this
purpose a conference of representatives of Allied Powers, to take
place as soon as conditions are favorable for it. But one of the
agreements, the one which was signed in London on September 5,
1914, which has been published since then, and which excludes the
possibility of the conclusion of a separate peace by one of the Allied
Powers, must not be a subject of discussion at this conference.

(r) RESOLUTION OF THE SOVIET, MAY l8, 1917 16

WHEREAS, the renewed Provisional Government, invigorated by
the representatives of the revolutionary democracy, is in harmony
with the will of democracy and its way of solving the problems of
strengthening the conquests and the further development of the
revolution, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, resolves :

1. That representatives of the Soviet should join the Provisional
Government.

2. That until the formation of the All-Russian Soviet, those
representatives of the Soviet who join the Provisional Government
should consider themselves responsible to the Petrograd Soviet, to
whom they must account for their acts.

3. The Soviet expresses its fullest confidence in the new Pro-
visional Government, and calls on the democracy to give to this
Government its support and the full power necessary for the strength-
ening of the conquests and the further development of the revolution.

M "Izvestiia," No. 59, May 19,

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 357

(d) TROTSKl's SPEECH IN THE SOVIET17

May 18, 1917

News of the Russian Revolution found us in New York, but
even in that great country, where the bourgeoisie dominates as
nowhere else, the Russian Revolution has done its work. The Ameri-
can laborer has had some unfavorable things said about him. It is
said that he does not support the revolution. But had you seen the
American workman in February, you would have been doubly proud
of your revolution. You would have understood that it has shaken
not only Russia, not only Europe, but America. It would have been
clear to you, as to me, that it has opened a new epoch, an epoch
of blood and iron, not in a war of nations, but in a war of the
oppressed classes against the domineering classes. (Tumultuous
applause.) At all the meetings, the workers asked me to give you
their warmest greetings. (Applause.) But I must tell you something
about the Germans. I had an opportunity to come in close contact
with a group of German proletarians. You ask me where? In a war-
prison camp. The bourgeois English Government arrested us as
enemies and placed us in a war-prison camp in Canada. (Cries:
"Shame!") About one hundred German officers and eight hundred
sailors were here. They asked me how it happened that we, Russian
citizens, became prisoners of the English. When I told them that we
were prisoners, not because we were Russians, but because we were
Socialists, they said that they were slaves of their Government, of
their William. . . .

This talk did not please the German officers, and they made a
complaint to the English commandant that we were undermining
the loyalty of the sailors to the Kaiser. The English captain, anxious
to preserve the allegiance of the German sailors to the Kaiser, forbade
me to lecture to them. The sailors protested to the commandant.
When we departed, the sailors accompanied us with music and shouted
"Down with William! Down with the bourgeoisie! Long live the
united international proletariat!" (Great applause.) That which
passed through the brains of the German sailors is passing through
in all countries. The Russian Revolution is the prologue to the
world revolution.

But I cannot conceal that I do not agree with everything. I
regard it as dangerous to join the Ministry. I do not believe that

1T "Izvestiia," No. 60, May 20, 1917.

358 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

the Ministry can perform miracles. We had, before, a dual govern-
ment, due to- the opposing points of view of two classes. The coali-
tion government will not remove opposition, but will merely transfer
it to the Ministry. But the revolution will not perish because of
the coalition government. We should, however, keep three precepts
in mind: i. Trust not the bourgeoisie. 2. Control our own leaders. 3.
Have confidence in our own revolutionary strength.

What do we recommend ? I think that the next step should be the
handing over all power to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies. Only with the authority in one hand can Russia be saved.
Long live the Russian Revolution as the prologue to the world
revolution. (Applause.)

CHAPTER XXIII
FIRST ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

"Whom does the Provisional Government represent?" and
"Whom does the Petrograd Soviet represent?" were questions
heard on all sides. It was claimed by partizans of the Provisional
Government that Petrograd is not Russia and that the Petrograd
Soviet represented only the Petrograd proletariat and had no
right to speak for any one else. This was a just criticism and was
met by the Petrograd Soviet by calling an All-Russian Congress
of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies to meet at Petro-
grad in the middle of June.

It was at this Congress that the two important wings of the
Socialists, the moderates (Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolution-
ists) and extreme radicals (Bolsheviks and Internationalists)
gripped each other for what proved to be a death struggle.
Tseretelli and Kerenski were spokesmen for the one and Lenin for
the other. In foreign affairs the moderates advocated a revision of
the treaties, abandonment of all forms of imperialism, cooperation
with the Allies for a democratic peace by a collective agreement if
possible, by a collective attack if necessary. A similar policy of
cooperation with the bourgeoisie was advocated for the internal
administration. They stood by the idea of coalition and were op-
posed to "experiments dangerous to the revolution."

Lenin was against all compromise and cooperation with the
capitalists and their Governments, whether in or outside Russia.
These half-measures, in his opinion, gave "rise to numerous mis-
understandings, conflicts, divisions. . . . One of the two : either
a bourgeois or a Soviet government." He advocated the seizure
of power by the Soviet, the overthrow of the capitalistic class in
Russia, to be followed by an appeal to the workmen of the other
belligerent countries to overthrow their capitalistic Governments.
Such an overflow would, ipso facto, bring the war to an end.

After several days of warm debating each of the contending

359

360 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

groups presented resolutions and that of the Mensheviks and
Socialist-Revolutionists was adopted by a vote of 543 to 126.

i. CALLING AN ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF

SOVIETS OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS'

DEPUTIES 1

To all Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers? Deputies

and Army Committees:

The Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers'
and Soldiers' Deputies has resolved to call, June 14, an All-Russian
Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and army
organizations at the front.

To this Congress, all the existing Soviets of Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies and army organs are asked. Selections should be
made according to the regulations laid down by the All-Russian Con-
ference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies:

Soviets numbering from 25,000 to 50,000 have 2 delegates

50,000 to 75,000 " 3
75,000 to 100,000 " 4 "
100,000 to 150,000 " 5 "
150,000 to 200,000 " 6 "
Over 200,000 " 8

Delegates from the front should represent armies and not regi-
ments, etc. It would be best if the delegates were selected at the army
congresses. . . . Each army is entitled to no more than 8 dele-
gates. . . .

Soviets having less than 25,000 members should combine. . . .
THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PETROGRAD
SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

Composition of the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of
Workers? and Soldiers' Deputies2

Total number of delegates 1090

Full voting rights 882

Socialist-Revolutionists 285

Mensheviks 248

Bolsheviks 105

Internationalists 32

'"Izvestiia," No. 61, May 22, 1917. *"Riech," No. 136, June 26, 1917.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 361

Socialists not belonging to parties .... 73

United Social Democrats 10

Bund 10

Edinstvo (Plekhanov's followers) .... 3

National Socialists 3

Trudoviks £

Anarchist-Communist I

Number of Soviets and other organizations
participating, including peasant organiza-
tions 305

Number of ward and regional Soviets ... 53
Number of delegates from the army (repre-
senting 8 units in rear, and 5 in front) . 21

2. CLASH BETWEEN MODERATE-SOCIALISTS
AND BOLSHEVIKS

(a) TSERETELLf S SPEECH 8

June 17, 1917

... In taking upon itself the fight for universal peace, the
Russian revolution has also to take over the war, begun by other
governments, the end of which does not depend on the efforts of the
Russian revolution alone. . . .

In order that it may succeed in its object, the Provisional Govern-
ment must say clearly and emphatically . . . that it has broken with
the old imperialist policy, .and must propose to the Allies that the
first question in order of importance is to re-examine on a new basis
all agreements made until now. ... [so that] this general platform
of war and peace' may be given out, not only in the name of the
Russian revolution, but in the name of all those who are allied with
us. . . . We are moving in that direction. . . . We should do
nothing which would break our ties with the Allies. . . . The worst
thing that could happen to us would be a separate peace. It would
be ruinous for the Russian revolution, ruinous for international
democracy. ... A separate peace is both undesirable and impossible.
Should we bring about a situation that would break relations with
the Allies and necessitate a separate peace, the Russian revolution
would be obliged, immediately afterwards, to take up arms on the
3 "Izvestiia," No. 84, June 19, 1917.

362 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

side of the German coalition. Even if we brush aside the talk of a
possible attack by Japan . . . picture to yourself the condition of the
Russian revolution after the conclusion of a separate peace, while
the rest of the world goes on fighting. Her economic and financial
ties with the powers with which she is now united would be severed.
. . . Under the circumstances, can there be any doubt that the
German coalition, continuing with the war, would force the weaker
side to give military support? ... He who talks about a separate
peace talks about Utopia. . . .

We come to the question of taking the offensive, the actions of
the Minister of War, Comrade Kerenski, and the whole Provisional
Government, in their efforts to strengthen the front and the army.
It is said that due to pressure from the imperialist circles, the
Provisional Government, and the Minister of War in particular, are
taking steps to bring about immediate action at the front, in order
thereby to put an end to the political campaign for universal peace,
which this same Provisional Government is carrying on. ... We
believe that the measures: taken by Comrade Kerenski tend to
strengthen the cause of the revolution and prepare the way for the
success of our object in the field of international relations and
universal peace. It is clear to us that now, when our country is
threatened from the outside, the Russian revolutionary army should
be strong, able to take the offensive. . . . Comrades, this inactivity
which has been going on at the front does not strengthen, but
weakens and disorganizes our revolution and army. . . .

I should like to paint in a few strokes a picture of our internal
situation. . . . The Russian revolution has taken over the burden-
some inheritance of the three years' war and the ten years' reaction
of June i6.4 The economic disorganization, the crushing financial
difficulties, the food chaos which threatens to bring the country
into a state of famine — all these are the inheritance of the old
regime. We firmly believe that we can solve these problems, but we
know that they can be solved only if the Russian democracy will
make unheard-of sacrifices and self-denials. The most radical and
extreme fiscal measures could not at the present moment altogether
liquidate the financial crisis and bring the finances of the country
into a normal condition. A country that spends sixteen milliards
and has a net income of not more than half that amount cannot be
saved by mere financial reforms, by fundamental reorganization.
Only great self-sacrifice and mighty efforts can help at this moment.
* Electoral law of June 16, 1907.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 363

. . . All classes of the population should be called upon to make
these sacrifices and self-denials. . . . We are charged with not
having done anything so far [in economic regulation] but laws alone
will not benefit Russia. . . . Even that revolutionary organization 5
which criticizes the acts of the Government and demands a speeding-
up, has nothing better to offer than declarations and principles.
Time is necessary to put these into acts. ...

As to the land question — we regard it as our duty at the present
time to prepare the ground for a just solution of that problem by
the Constituent Assembly. We believe that the question of the pass-
ing of the land into the hands of the laboring class can be and should
be definitely settled by the Constituent Assembly. . . .

At the present moment, there is not a political party in Russia
which would say: Hand the power over to us, resign, and we will
take your place. Such a party does not exist in Russia. (Lenin: "It
does exist") . . . They [the Bolsheviks] say: When we have a ma-
jority, or when the majority comes over to our point of view, then
the power should be seized. Comrade Lenin, you said that. At least
the Bolsheviks and you with them say it in their official statements.

Gentlemen, until now, there has not been a single party in Rus-
sia which has come out openly for getting for itself all power at once,
although there have been such cries by irresponsible groups on the
Right and the Left. . . . The Right says, let the Left run the Gov-
ernment, and we and the country will draw our conclusions ; and the
Left says, let the Right take hold, and we and the country will draw
our conclusions. . . . Each side hopes that the other will make such
a failure, that the country will turn to it for leadership.

But, gentlemen, this is not the time for that kind of a play. . . .
In order to solve the problems of the country, we must unite our
strength and must have a strong Government . . . strong enough to
put an end to experiments dangerous for the fate of the revolution,
. . . experiments that may lead to civil war. . . .

This, gentlemen, is our policy. . . .

(&) LENIN'S SPEECH 6
June 17, 1917

. . . The first and fundamental question which we have to answer
is: What are these Soviets which are meeting in this All-Russian

'The Bolsheviks.

' Piontkovski, S. A.; "Khrestomatiia Po Istorii Oktiabrskoi Revpliutsii,"
133-41. Also, "Izvestiia," No. 84 June 19, 1917.

364 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Congress? What is this revolutionary democracy about which so
much is said? To speak of revolutionary democracy before the All-
Russian Congress of Soviets, and to keep silent about its formation,
its class character, its role in the revolution, at the same time pre-
tending that we are democrats, is a strange state of affairs. We had
presented to us a program of a bourgeois parliamentary republic,
a program of reform, which is accepted by all bourgeois governments,
including our own ; and, at the same time, we are told of a revolu-
tionary democracy. To whom do they say this? To the Soviets. I
ask you, is there any bourgeois, democratic, republican country in
Europe where an institution similar to the Soviet exists ? Of course,
you will say no. It does not exist and cannot exist, because it is
either a bourgeois government, with these "plans" of reform which
are presented to us, and which have been presented numerous times,
and have remained on paper; or this institution — this new type of
"government" which the revolution has created, and which has ap-
peared before in history, at a time of a great revolutionary enthusi-
asm, for example, in France in 1792 and 1871,— in Russia in 1905..
The Soviet is an institution that does not exist in any bourgeois
parliamentary government, and cannot exist alongside a bourgeois
government. The Soviet is that new, more democratic type of gov-
ernment which we called, in our party resolutions, peasant-prole-
tariat, democratic republic, and in which the whole authority belongs
to the Soviet of Workers9 and Soldiers' Deputies. It is vain to think
that it is a theoretic question, vain to imagine that it can be passed
over, vain to pretend that some other kind of institution can exist
together with the Soviet. Yes, they exist together. But it gives rise
to numerous misunderstandings, conflicts, and divisions. . . . One
of the two: either the ordinary bourgeois government [or the
Soviet], A bourgeois government would make the Soviets unneces-
sary. They would either be dispersed by the generals, the counter-
revolutionary generals who hold the army in hand, who pay no
attention to our eloquent Minister of War, or they would die an
inglorious death. There is no other alternative. We cannot stand still.
We must either go forward or backward.

The [Soviet] is the form of government which is not a child of
the Russian brain, but which the revolution itself brought forth.
Without it the revolution cannot conquer . . . the Soviets cannot
go on as they are now. . . . We are told that the first Provisional
Government was bad. At that time, when the Bolsheviks said : "Do
not support, do not have any confidence in that Government," we

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 365

were overwhelmed with charges of anarchism. Now everybody
admits that the Government was bad. In what respects is this
coalition-government of almost-socialistic ministers better than its
predecessor? Let us stop discussing programs, projects, and let's do
something. . . . We are asked, is it possible to establish Socialism
in Russia immediately, to reorganize the State from top to bottom?
. . . Nowhere in the world in time of war can you go from pure
capitalism to pure Socialism, but there should be something between,
something new, unheard-of, because hundreds of millions are dying in
this criminal war of the capitalists. It is not a question of reforms in
the future — these are empty words — but of doing something which is
needed to be done now. If you wish to appeal to the "revolutionary^'
democracy, then differentiate between it and the "reform" democracy
in a capitalist ministry. . . . That which is proposed is a transition to
reform-democracy in a capitalistic government. It may be excellent",
and looks well from the point of view of Western Europe. But just
now a whole series of countries are on the brink of ruin, and those
practical measures which are, seemingly, so complicated that it is
necessary to work out, as we were told by the previous speaker,
the Minister of Post and Telegraph, [can be put into force now?].
These measures are very clear. He [Tseretelli] said that there is not
a political party in Russia which would say that it is ready to take all
the 'power into its hands. I say there is. Our party is ready at any
minute to do that. (Applause and laughter.) Laugh all you want to.
. . . Our program in relation to the economic crisis is this — to
demand the publication of all those unheard-of profits, reaching to
500 to 800 per cent, which the capitalists make — on war orders ; to
arrest 50 or 100 of the more important capitalists, and in this way
break all the threads of intrigue. Without such a step, all this talk
of peace without annexation and indemnity is worthless. Our next
step would be to announce to all the nations, separate from their
Governments, that we regard all capitalists — French, English, all —
as robbers.

Your own "Izvestiia" has become confused. In place of peace
without annexation and indemnity, it proposes the status quo. [We
believe] that the Russian Republic should not oppress a single nation
— neither the Finns, nor the Ukrainians, with whom the Minister
of War is now quarreling. . . . We cannot make a peace without
annexation and indemnity until we are willing to give up our own
annexations. It is really funny, this play ! Every workman in Europe
is laughing at it. He says : They are calling on the people to over-

366 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY _

throw their 'bankers, while they, themselves, send their bankers into
the Ministry. Arrest them; lay bare their schemes; find out their
intrigues. But you will not do this, although you have the power.
. . . You have lived through 1905 and 1917. You know that revolu-
tion is not made to order; that in other countries it was brought
about through bloody uprisings, but in Russia there is no group or
class that could oppose the power of the Soviets. Today or tomorrow,
let us propose peace to all the peoples by breaking with all the capital-
istic classes, and in a short time the peoples of France and Germany
will agree to it, because their countries are perishing. . . .

If Russia were a revolutionary democracy, not merely in words,
but in deeds, she would lead on the revolutionary movement and not
make peace with the capitalists ; she would not talk so much of peace
without annexation and indemnity, but would put an end to all forms
of annexation in Russia, arid would announce that she considers
every annexation as robbery. If she were to do that, an imperialistic
military offensive would not be necessary. . . .

You can write on paper what you please. But as long as the
capitalists are in majority in the Government,- it makes no difference
what you say, and how well you say it; the fact is that the war
remains an imperialistic one. ... It is easy to write, peace without
annexations, but see what has - happened in Albania, Greece, and
Persia since the coalition government was formed. . . . The only
way to end the war is by going on with revolution. ... If you were
to take power into your own hands, if it were used against the Rus-
sian capitalists, then the laborers of other countries would believe
you, and you could offer them peace. . . . The question is: Shall
we advance or retreat? In revolutionary times, you cannot stand
still. A military offensive now is a setback for the revolution; it
means the continuation of the imperialistic butchery of millions.
. . . The taking over of the power by the revolutionary proletariat,
with the help of the poorest peasant, is the taking over of the revolu-
tionary fight for peace . . . and gives assurance that power and
victory will be given the revolutionary workmen in Russia, and in
the whole world.

(V) KERENSKl'S SPEECH r

June

Comrades:

You have been told of 1792 and of 1905. How did 1792 end in
France? It ended by the fall of the republic and the rise of a dictator.
n "Izvestiia," No. 85, June 20, 1917.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 367

How did 1905 end? With the triumph of reaction. And now, in
1917, we are doing that which we could have done earlier. The
problem of the Russian Socialist parties and the Russian democracy
is to prevent such an end as was in France — to hold on to the revolu-
tionary conquests already made ; to see to it that our comrades who
have been let out from prison -do not return there; that Comrade
Lenin, who has been abroad, may have the opportunity to speak here
again, and not be obliged to fly back to Switzerland. (Applause.)
We must see to it that the historic mistakes do not repeat themselves ;
that we do not bring on a situation that would make possible the
return of reaction, the victory of force over democracy. Certain
methods of fighting have been indicated to us. We have been told that
we should not fight with words, not talk of annexation, but should
show by deeds that we are fighting against capitalism. What means
are recommended for this fight? To arrest Russian capitalists.
(Laughter.) Comrades, I am not a Social-Democrat. I am not a
Marxist, but I have the highest respect for Marx, his teaching, and
his disciples. But Marxism has never taught such childlike and
primitive means. I dare say that it is likely that Citizen Lenin has
forgotten what Marxism is. He cannot call himself a Socialist, be-
cause Socialism nowhere recommends the settling ol questions of
economic war, of the war of classes in their economic relations, the
question of the economic reorganization of the State, by arresting
people, as is done by Asiatic despots. . . . Every Marxist who
knows his Socialism would say that capitalism is of an international
character, that the arrest of a few capitalists in a certain State
would not affect the iron law of the economic development of a
given period. . . . You [Bolsheviks] recommend childish prescrip-
tions— "arrest, kill, destroy." What are you — Socialists or the police
of the old regime? (Uproar. Lenin: "You should call him to order/')

This gathering of the flower of the Russian democracy under-
stands its problems. Such prescriptions do not excite it, but among
the masses such words will be taken seriously. We do not cater to
the mob;' we are not demagogues. What we say now, we said ten
years ago. We are warm defenders of the autonomy of Finland and
the Ukraine. We say this : Members of the Provisional Government
have, not and do not desire to have absolute power, and until the
meeting of the Constituent Assembly, they have no right to declare
the independence of this or that part of Russian territory. . . .

As to fraternization — why is it that while German officers frater-
nize in our trenches, they do not fraternize on the French front?

368 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Why is it that while our front is inactive, the German forces attack
the English? . . . Why is it that this policy of fraternization falls
in so well with the plan of the German General Staff on the Russian
front? . . .

I can understand that there are people who are naive enough to
believe that an exchange of a piece of bread for a glass of vodka
by a Russian soldier brings the kingdom of Socialism nearer, but we,
who have borne the brunt of the old regime on our shoulders, can-
not afford the luxury of such a naivete. . . .

You [Bolsheviks] recommend that we follow the road of the
French revolution of 1792. You recommend the way of further dis-
organization of the country. . . . When you, in alliance with reac-
tion, shall destroy our power, then you will have a real dictator.
It is our duty, the duty of the Russian democracy, to say: Don't
repeat the historic mistakes. You are asked to follow the road that
was once followed by France, and which will lead Russia to a new
reaction, to a new shedding of democratic blood.

3 RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE ALL-RUSSIAN
CONGRESS OF SOVIETS

(a) RESOLUTION OP THE MENSHEVIKS AND SOCIALIST-
REVOLUTIONISTS 8

June 21, 1917

The Congress, having listened to the report of the Executive
Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionists and Social-Democrats,
agree that:

1. In view of the situation brought about by the first ministerial
crisis, it would have been a hard blow to the revolution to have
handed over the power to the bourgeoisie alone ; and

2. That it would have greatly weakened and threatened the
revolution to have handed over all the power, at this time, to the
Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, for such an act would
have alienated certain elements of the population that are still able
to serve the cause of the revolution.

For these reasons, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of
Workers' and Soldiers* Deputies approves the action of the Petro-
grad Soviet during May 3 and 4, in forming a coalition government
*"Izvestiia, No. 87, June 22, 1917.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 369

on a definite democratic platform, both in foreign and domestic
affairs.

Having heard the explanations of the comrade-ministers on the
general policy of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, and
having expressed full confidence in them, the Ail-Russian Congress
agrees that this policy answers the interests of the revolution.

The Congress calls on the Provisional Government to carry out
resolutely and systematically the democratic platform which has
been adopted, and in particular

a. To strive persistently for the earliest conclusion of a general
peace without annexation, indemnity, and on the basis of self-
determination ;

&. To continue further the democratization of the army, and to
increase its fighting power ;

c. To undertake, with the direct participation of the toiling
masses, the most energetic measures for combating the financial-
economic disruption and disorganization of the food-supply, pro-
duced by the war and made acute by the policy of the propertied
classes ;

d. To conduct a systematic and resolute fight against counter-
revolutionary attempts ;

e. To bring about the speediest realization of the measures affect-
ing the questions of land and labor, in accordance with the demands
of the organized toiling masses and dictated by the vital interests of
public economy, greatly undermined by the war ;

/. To aid in the organization of all forces of the revolutionary
democracy, by means of rapid and radical reforms on a democratic
basis in the systems of local government, and self-government and
the speediest introduction of zemstvos and municipal autonomy,
where there is none as yet :

g. Particularly does the Congress demand the speediest convoca-
tion of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

The Congress is of the opinion that, in order to carry out the
indicated program more speedily and determinedly, and to unite all
the strength of the -democracy and make its will felt in all State
affairs, it is necessary to form one organ with full power to repre-
sent all the revolutionary democratic organizations of Russia. This
organ should have representatives of the All-Russian Congress of
Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the All-Russian
Congress of Peasant Deputies.

37Q DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

The Socialist-ministers should be responsible to such an Ail-
Russian representative organ- for all the domestic and foreign poli-
tics of the Provisional Government. Such a responsibility will assure
the country that as long as the minister-socialists are in the Pro-
visional Government, it carries out the will of the democracy and is
therefore entitled to full power and the support of all the democratic
strength of the country.

The Congress calls on all the revolutionary democracy of Russia
to gather around the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' and Peasant
Deputies, and to support the Provisional Government energetically
in all its efforts to strengthen and broaden the conquests of the
revolution.

This resolution . . . was accepted by a vote of 543 to 126 (52
not voting), but all other resolutions were voted down by large
majorities.

(b) FIRST RESOLUTION OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS ON

THE WAR9

The present war was brought on by the ruling classes of all
countries in their imperialistic attempts to get new markets and
bring small and weak states under their economic and political con-
trol. This conflict is leading all countries and peoples to economic
exhaustion and the Russian revolution to ruin. The destruction of
millions of lives and milliards of property threatens to increase the
disorder left by the old regime, drives Russia to famine, and prevents
the carrying out of the necessary measures for strengthening the
revolution.

The All-Russian Congress of Soviets realizes that an early end
of the war is the most important object of the revolutionary democ-
racy. It is needed for the sake of the revolution and for the sake of
the laboring classes of all countries. They must reestablish the fra-
ternal union and work together for the full freedom of humanity.

The All-Russian Congress resolves (i) That to end the war
by the destruction of one group of belligerents would merely lead
to new wars, would intensify the hate between peoples, would lead
to complete exhaustion, famine, and ruin; (2) That a separate peace
would strengthen one of the belligerents, make possible a victory
over the other, encourage the predatory ambitions of the ruling
classes, would not free Russia from the clutches of world imperial-
ism, and would make difficult the international union of labor. For
* "Riech," No. 136, June 26, 1917.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 371

this reason the Congress is categorically opposed to all attempts
aiming to bring on a separate peace or a separate truce.

In view of the fact that war can be brought to an end only
through the united efforts of the democracies of all countries, the
Congress regards as essential (a) that the Russian revolutionary
democracy, through its organ, the All-Russian Soviet, should ad-
dress itself to the democracies of all States, asking them to join in
the rallying cry : "Peace without annexation and indemnity, and on
the basis of self-determination of peoples" — and try to influence
their governments along these lines; (b) that it [Russian democracy]
should make every effort to reestablish the revolutionary interna-
tional and call together an international Socialist Congress to re-
establish the international labor solidarity, to work out definite
peace terms, and means to put them into force; (c) that it should
call to the attention of the democracies of all warring countries that
their failure to contradict with sufficient energy the last declarations
of their governments on the question of war aims puts the Russian
revolution in a very difficult position and stands in the way of inter-
national labor union.

In order to accomplish these tasks, a mission should be dispatched
at once to the Allied and neutral States to invite them to send to
Russia representatives of the different Socialist groups. The Con-
gress firmly protests against the obstacles placed in the way of
Socialist delegations by the imperialist governments.

Realizing that the Provisional Revolutionary Government has
made the foundation of its foreign policy the carrying out of the
democratic program of peace, the Congress urges the Government to
do all that it can ... to persuade the Allies to accept this program.

The Congress urges that the Government should now do all that
it can to have a reexamination of the treaties with the Allies with a
view to abandoning the policy of conquests. In order to hasten -this
step, it is necessary to change the diplomatic and foreign office per-
sonnel, with a view to making it more democratic.

The Congress takes the stand that until the war is brought to
an end by the efforts of the international democracy, the Russian
revolutionary democracy is obliged to keep its army in condition to
take either the offensive or defensive. The destruction of the Russian
front means defeat for the Russian revolution and a heavy blow to
the cause of international democracy. The question whether to take
the offensive should be decided from the purely military and strategic
point of view.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE LAND QUESTION AND THE FIRST ALL-
/ RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF PEASANTS'
DEPUTIES

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

"Land and Liberty" was the slogan of the Russian revolu-
tionists from the very beginning of their organized existence. As
soon as they had won liberty, they proceeded to secure the land
for the peasants. They had in mind taking it from the landowners
without compensation and handing it over to the toilers. There
were differences of opinion as to just how this should be done.
The Bolsheviks were for outright seizure, but the moderate
Socialists favored legalizing it through the Constituent As-
sembly. The bourgeois parties naturally fell in with the latter view,
for it gave them a fighting chance.

Though feeling quite certain that the Constituent Assembly
would work on the principle of "All the land to all the laboring
people," the Socialists were determined to leave as little as possible
to chance. In March and April they began to organize the peasants.
In May they brought them together at Petrograd in an All-
Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies. At that time the new
Minister of Agriculture was Victor Chernov, a Socialist-Revo-
lutionist He heartily advocated the giving of the land to the
toilers, but being a member of the Government, he could not
carry out his ideas in an official capacity, and therefore worked
through the peasant organizations. He suggested that the peas-
ants organize local land committees to study the land question and
prepare recommendations for the Constituent Assembly. "This,"
said Chernov, "will be a training school." They took the hint and
in their resolution on June 7- came out for "the transfer, without
compensation, of all lands now belonging to the State, monasteries,
churches and private persons into the possession of the nation, for
equitable and free use by agricultural workers/'

372

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 373

What the Peasants' Deputies had in mind was to face the
Constituent Assembly with a situation and not a theory. When
Chernov and some of his associates were charged with doing this
very thing they said that in forming the land committees they
hoped to solve the problem legally and do away with lawless seiz-
ure of land. Toward the end of July, Chernov succeeded in having
the Provisional Government pass a decree aiming to put a stop to
the transfer of land and indicating that the Constituent Assembly
would pay no attention to land transactions after March i.

As the spring passed into summer and the country became
more and more demoralized, the peasants ignored committees,
Soviets, and the Provisional Government, and listened more to
the advice of the Bolsheviks (which fell in with their own inclina-
tions) to help themselves to the land. This procedure made matters
worse and agriculture sank lower and lower.

The peasants' organizations were at first largely dominated by
the Socialist-Revolutionists. Between the left wing of the Cadet
Party and the right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionists there
were no great differences. They had enough in common to make
it possible to work together. The Socialist-Revolutionists theorized
less and compromised more than the Social-Democrats.

When the two All-Russian Congresses of Soviets of Workers'
and Soldiers', and of Peasants' Deputies, came to a close they left
Executive Committees to watch over their interests and that of
the country as a whole. On July I the two Executive Committees
united for common action, against both the Provisional Govern-
ment and the Bolsheviks.

i. RESOLUTIONS OF THE PEASANTS' UNION1

I. The meeting of the Peasants' Union in the Morskoi Ko'rpus
on April 8, 1917, in which three thousand citizens, peasants, and
soldiers participated, resolved:

That it is necessary to go on with the war for freedom, but that
the Russian people has no need of conquests; .that the Russian

1 "Izvestiia," No. 27, April n, 1917. An editorial mote says that the resolu-
tion was called to the attention of the Provisional Government with the com-
ment of the authors that the peasants should abstain from any high-handed
seizure of land of any kind.

374 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

people, after freeing the areas ruined by the belligerents, needs a
peace in the interest of the laboring classes of the world. Having
taken into consideration the Call of the 0Soviet of Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies to the people of the world, a call which guarantees
liberty and self-determination to all peoples and opposes new con-
quests, the meeting greets the Minister of Justice, Kerenski, and
empowers him to defend before the Provisional Government ques-
tions of war and peace and to strive to persuade the Provisional
Government to renounce, at once, all aims of conquest.

2. The meeting of the Peasants' Union thinks that the Russian
people, having thrown off the yoke of the autocracy, desires neither
a limited nor an unlimited tsar government, but a democratic
republic.

3. The meeting of the Peasants' Union believes that the land
should be handed over to the workers, and that each person who
tills the soil with his own hands has the right to the use of it.

4. The meeting greets the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies and all Socialist parties ... in their fight for land and
freedom.

5. To make it possible at once to plant the idle fields no matter
to whom they belong.

2. INTERVIEW AND SPEECH BY -CHERNOV

(a) INTERVIEW2

The former [First Provisional] Government was a creation of
the revolution and should have guided it in the right course. It did
not do so, because it -did not lead, but trailed the revolution. We,
Socialists, have been called to carry out this task. . . . We should
lead, and in the right direction. This is the reason why we joined
the new Government. ... As regards my own ministry, I ought to
say that we have before us three important problems. The first is to
prepare the land question for the Constituent Assembly. We must
so prepare as to have full and exhaustive information on all questions
that might be raised. The second problem is to settle the local land
conflicts. It is no secret that the Constituent Assembly, in solving
the land question, will work on the principle, "all the land to all
the laboring people." That this is the solution to the problem is
recognized even by those who do not approve of it. We would,
a "Izvestiia," No. 61, May 22, 1917.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 375

therefore, not be usurping the authority of the Constituent Assem-
bly if, in settling the local conflicts, we were guided by this prin-
ciple. The third problem is to organize all over Russia, Soviets of
Peasant Deputies and local land committees, made up not only of
elected statisticians and others of the more educated population, but
also of the agriculturists, so that the representatives of the peasants
at the Constituent Assembly might have a clear understanding of the
problem, and a program.

(&) SPEECH OF CHERNOV, MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE3

June 6, 1917

"Allow me to report to you some of the new phases in the land
question. The most important problem just now is to guard the
reserve of land which the Constituent Assembly will dispose of. In
order to keep it intact, I, as Minister of Agriculture, will propose
to the Provisional Government a law dealing with buying, selling,
and mortgaging of land."

The Minister commented on the value of the new law about to
be published, regarding the new volost and uiezd zemstvos. He went
on to say that, from the moment of its publication, all local land
questions will be put into the hands of the organized inhabitants.
The Provisional Government, though it has Socialist 'Ministers in
it, does not undertake to prepare the land reform for the Constitu-
ent Assembly, but hands over all these questions to the toilers them-
selves. He asked his hearers to bear in mind that the elections for
the volost and uiezd zemstvos and .land committees give the people
an opportunity to take part in the preparation for the land reforms.
This will be a training school. The first real practice will be in the
elections for the Constituent Assembly. . . .

3. RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE ALL-RUSSIAN CON-
GRESS OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES

June 7, 1917 4

The All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies announces to the
entire Russian peasantry that henceforth not only the final solution
of the agrarian problem in the Constituent Assembly, but all the

a "Riech," No. 120, June 7, 1917. This Congress was in session from May
17 to June 10, 1917.

4 Ibid., No. 121, June 8, 1917.

376 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

preparatory work to be done by the local and central land commit-
tees passes into the hands of the working people themselves. For this
reason, the first, most important, and most responsible task of the
more progressive part of the peasantry is the organization of elections
to the volost and uiezd zemstvos, and the establishment of land
committees in connection with these zemstvos. The work of these
committees in the preparation of land reforms is to be based on the
following principles: The transfer, without compensation, of all
lands now belonging to the state, monasteries, churches, and private
persons into the possession of the nation, for equitable and free use
by agricultural workers.

Firmly believing in the growing strength, organization, and in-
telligence of the toiling peasantry, the All-Russian Congress of Peas-
ants' Delegates is deeply convinced that, private ownership of land
with its forests, water power, and mineral resources will be abolished
by the National Constituent Assembly, which will establish a funda-
mental law as regards the land, the conditions of its transfer to the
workers, and its distribution for use.

The Ail-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies is also convinced
that in all land committees, from that of the volost to the Central
Committee, the working peasantry, taking advantage of the elective
system, will see to it that all the preparatory work for the agrarian
reform shall be carried out with the object of emancipating the land
from the bonds of private property, without any compensation.

The All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies expects the
Provisional Government to assist, as far as it lies within its power,
in the free expression of the working people's opinion on the im-
portant problem of reorganization, now confronting Russia, and to
prevent all attempts at interference with this work by persons who
put their personal and party interests above those of the country.

The All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies urges the Pro-
visional Government to issue an absolutely clear and unequivocal
statement which will show that on this question the Provisional Gov-
ernment will allow nobody to oppose the people's will.

The All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies resolves that:

The necessity of settling the food-supply crisis, and of a suc-
cessful struggle with the economic disorder throughout the country,
in this hour of an oppressive and exhausting world war, imperatively
demands that all private and party interests yield to the higher inter-
ests of the whole people and the State.

In view of this, all land, without exception, must be given over

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 377

to the land committees, which should have the power to issue regula-
tions for cultivation, sowing, harvesting, haying, etc.

Because of the drafting for war service of an enormous number
of workers, and their extreme scarcity in the harvest season, it is
necessary that all able-bodied workers, voluntary agricultural organi-
zations, artels, and war prisoners be put at the disposal of the above
land committees, and be distributed not to the advantage of in-
dividuals, but in the interests of all the toiling population.

Because of the lack and the worn condition of the agricultural
machinery, most energetic measures are necessary for the requisition-
ing and putting to use on a public and a cooperative basis of all
agricultural machines and tools which Russia can make available,
and for inviting technical men to run them. Also, in view of the
number of peasants' horses requisitioned and the extreme scarcity of
live farm stock, it is necessary to utilize the live stock to be found
outside of farms.

Haying, harvesting, storing of grain, fishing, preparation of tim-
ber, firewood and other forest materials must be put under the
control of the land committees and other authorized public organiza-
tions, in order to prevent individual hoarding of the greatly needed
supplies or exploiting the natural resources of the land.

The fixing of land rents and payments, the fixing of wages for
agricultural labor, and similar questions must be given over entirely
to the local land committees. In disputed cases, the rent is to be kept
in the local State treasury.

- Until the putting into force of national reforms, the local land
committees shall be allowed complete freedom of initiative and
activity in all the above-mentioned land questions. With this in mind,
all interference on the part of guberniia and uiezd commissars must
be removed. One-sided selection of staffs, from among the land-
owning class, must also be done away with.

In order to preserve intact the amount of land available for
the coming land reform, it is necessary [to pass a strict law] to
be enforced by the land committees, prohibiting the buying, selling,
willing and mortgaging of land, until the Constituent Assembly.

The All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies is of the opin-
ion that only under such arrangements is it possible to prepare, for
the land reform, without too many disturbances, lawless seizures, civil
dissensions, and other illegal acts. Only under such arrangements is it
possible to bring to life a new agrarian order, worthy of free Russia,
able to unite in one fraternity, one State, all toilers of the land, with-

3;8 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

out distinction of nationality, religion, and condition — Great Rus-
sians and Little Russians, Christians and Mohammedans, peasants
and Cossacks, natives of Russia and of outlying regions. . . . Each
of these groups will feel the beneficial results of the great reform,
and will bless it,

The Ail-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies invites the whole
peasantry to remain peaceful, but to work with determination and
steadfastness for the realization in a legal manner of the cherished
thoughts and hopes of the agricultural laborer, which have long since
found expression in the motto, so dear to each peasant, "Land and
liberty/1 5

The Congress decided in favor of the following special appeal
to the population:

The All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies appeals to the
peasants and the whole wage-earning population of Russia to vote,
at the elections to the Constituent Assembly, only for those candidates
who pledge themselves to advocate the nationalization of the land,
without reimbursement, and on principles of equality.

This was followed by a few remarks by Rivkin . . . who called
attention to the bands of deserters, and pointed out that all the efforts
to organize committees and Soviets would be of no value, if they were
to live in fear of these armed bands. It was necessary, he said, to
form a committee of self-defense, and to arm the population; other-
wise they could have no assurance that they would live long enough
to see the Constituent Assembly.

4. DECREE OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 6

My 25, 1917

For the purpose of stopping land speculation, preventing fictitious
transactions, mortgages, sales to foreigners, and other such land
deals which may impede the free disposition of the available lands
by the Constituent Assembly, the Provisional Government has
decreed :

5 The resolution was almost unanimously adopted ; two voted against, and
one delegate refused to vote.

6"Vestnik Vremennago Pravitelstva," No. 104 (150), July 27, 1917,

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 379

First. — The execution of deeds for the vesting or transfer of
the right of ownership, mortgage, or other title in rural lands used
for agricultural purposes or under standing timber, must in each
separate case be authorized by the local provincial land committees
and confirmed by the Minister of Agriculture.

Second. — The validity of the present decree shall not interfere
with the confirmation of deeds concerning immovable properties men-
tioned in Section One, which were executed prior to March I, 1917.

Third. — In all cases of landed properties put up for sale by
public auction, notice shall be given to the Ministry of Agriculture,
which shall have the right, upon consultation with the local pro-
vincial land committees, to withdraw them from the auction and turn
them over for temporary economic management to the branch of
the Peasant Land Bank and the State Land Bank of the Nobility,
and to the Administration of the National Domains, with a transfer
to the State of the current interest payments on mortgage loans,
pending the final disposition of such lands by the Constituent
Assembly.

Fourth. — The Minister of Justice shall be authorized to put the
present decree into effect telegraphically, pending its publication by
the Governing Senate.

A. KERENSKI, Prime Minister
CHERNOV, Minister of Agriculture

July 25, 1917

, FROM THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 7

The Provisional Government considers it .necessary to point out
that any kind of title deed executed after March i, 1917, in volun-
tary transactions as well as in forced sales, by whomsoever executed
and concerning whomsoever, affecting the vestment or transfer of
property rights, mortgages, or any other right to rural lands used
for agriculture or under standing timber, cannot be construed to
restrict the freedom of action by the Constituent Assembly and
cannot serve as a basis for extending any exemptions and privileges
to such lands and to persons who will be parties to such acts, during
the settlement of the knd question.

July 25, 1917
T "Riech," No. 102, May 16, 1917.

380 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

5. LAWLESS LAND SEIZURES

Delegates, representing landowners in the guberniias of Simbirsk,
Nizhni-Novgorod, Samara, Saratov, Tver, Kharkov, Poltava, Kursk,
Kherson, and Ekaterinoslav, submitted the following report to the
Provisional Government and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies :

In the full consciousness of the great moral responsibility before
the country, imposed upon us by the Provisional Government, namely,
the duty to produce food and fodder for the army and the population,
we proceeded to carry out the obligation imposed upon us, totally
oblivious to our own interests. However, at the very first steps in
this direction, we met with the strongest opposition from village
committees and commissars, who are acting illegally and carrying out
undisguised propaganda for the abolition by every possible means of
private landownership in these guberniias. A situation has thus been
created which will compel the above named guberniias, which serve
the needs of the largest sugar factories and are for this reason en-
gaged in intensive farming, to cease producing cereals, vegetables,
and sugar. The general situation in these guberniias at the present
time is as follows :

1. Public organizations and their representatives, contrary to the
law, fix the rent on land so low that it does not even cover the neces-
sary payments due on the land.

2. Land is forcibly taken from its owners and handed over
to the peasants. In some cases, the land thus seized either remained
fallow or was speculated with by being leased to a third party at a
higher rate.

3. Wages for labor are arbitrarily set, interfering with freedom
of labor and freedom of contract.

4. The sanctity of the home is being violated by searches and
by confiscation of movable property. Landowners and their managers
are deprived of liberty, without due process of law, for refusing to
obey the unlawful demands of the committees and commissars.

5. The committees and their agents usurp the functions of courts,
and, contrary to the express provisions of Article I of the Civil
Statutes, examine conflicts relating to land and labor.

If the above situation continues, Russia, notwithstanding its rich
8 "Riech," No. 102, May 16, 1917.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 381

black earth, will in the very near future become a wilderness cov-
ered with weeds, a country with a population poverty-stricken, both
morally and materially, with an insignificant amount of low-grade
grain, insufficient even for the needs of its cultivators. Her highly
efficient agriculture will be ruined, and there will be a total destruc-
tion of the starch, syrup, and sugar-beet production, and pure-bred
stock.

Russia's economic ruin is unavoidable. We, the representatives
of the guberniias named above, consider it our moral obligation to
call this condition to the attention of the Provisional Government
and the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies.

Landowners: LIEUTENANT B. A. IUST, COLONEL K. V.
MQLOSTOV, V. N. KUKOL-!ASNOPOLSKI.

(6) LETTERS FROM VILLAGES9

After arriving home (Podolskaia guberniia), I was elected to the
volost committee. In our village there is no order. People live as they
did before the revolution. They make moonshine and sell it for two
rubles a bottle. Drunkenness and robbery are on the increase.

The Cossacks who live in the neighborhood steal from the land-
holders and peasants and insult the women. They do not even respect
the church. In one village the store of the Consumers' Society was
looted, and in another the home of a very popular doctor. . . .

With the landlords, it is not as it should be. They have planted
sugar-beets, and to harvest them they offer labor one and one-half
rubles per day, which is not enough to pay for board.

Livestock for the army has been bought in the villages at the
rate of eleven rubles the pud. It was driven on the land of a certain
landholder where many have perished from hunger. . . .

Committees are organized in the villages but have no idea where
their authority begins or ends. Can the committee dismiss a worth-
less priest ? Can a landowner sell a piece of timber land without the
authorization of the committee ? . . .

The cost of living and profiteering are on the increase. Speculators
buy up bread and sell it later for five rubles the pud. There are those
who have on hand one thousand or more puds of grain and yet
buy more for speculative purposes. Merchants hide manufactured
goods and allow only a limited amount on the market, for which they
charge high prices. There is an abundance of money in the village
* "Izvestite," No. 120, July 31, 1917.

382 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

and with it, dissipation and debauchery. For the first time in the
history of the village we have a house of ill-fame.

The military unit which was sent here to protect, robs the people
of their cattle, fowl, and bread, and insults the women. . . .

Village of Teliazh, Orlov Guberniia:

Each year the peasants rented their land from the landholder.
This year they went to him as usual and he asked the usual rent.
The peasants refused to pay it, and without much bargaining went
home. There they called a meeting and decided to take up the land
without paying. They put the plows and harrows on their carts and
started for the field. When they arrived, they got into an argument
as to the division of the land because it was not all the same quality.
When they had quarreled for a time, one of the party proposed
that they proceed to the landholder's warehouse, where some good
alcohol was kept. They broke into the place, where they found fifty
barrels. They drank and drank, but could not drink it all. They be-
came so drunk that they did not know what they were doing and care-
lessly set the place on fire. Four burned to death ; the ninety others
escaped. A few days later they returned to the field and once more
quarreled. It ended in a fight in which thirteen were left dead, fif-
teen were carried off badly injured, and, of these, four died.

Soon after that a quarrel started over the rich peasants. In the
village there were eighteen farmers who had from twenty-five to
thirty desiatins of land. They had a reserve of grain of various kinds.
About thirty of the villagers seized this reserve. Another village
meeting was called. A few of the more intelligent peasants came out
strongly against this act of robbery. It ended in another fight in
which three were killed and five badly wounded. One of these peas-
ants, whose son was killed, shook his fist and shouted, "I will make
you pay for my son."

Three days later one of the village houses caught fire. People
came running and asking, "How did it get on fire ?" Some one sug-
gested that the man who a few days ago threatened to get even was
the incendiary. The mob started for his place and killed him. When
that was done, it was learned that the fire was due to the carelessness
of the housewife. On that day (April 24) a strong wind was blow-
ing straight down the street, and one hundred thirty-two homes were
burned.

" "Izvestiia," No. 121, August I, 1917.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 383

On June 7 there was a village meeting. There were present two
students (from Malo- Archangel) and thirteen soldiers. The soldiers
and students were quite friendly. At the gathering one of the church
readers made a speech, calling on those present to plunder the land-
holders and rich peasants. He was applauded and carried around.
When quiet was restored, one of the students took the floor and
pleaded, especially with the old men, not to believe what the psalm
reader said. He reminded his hearers of what had come out of the
last attempt at plundering. He was not allowed to finish, for from the
crowd shouts came, "Kick him out. He is a burzhui." The student
continued, but the audience left him.

6. UNION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES OF THE
ALL-RUSSIAN SOVIETS OF WORKERS5 AND SOL-
DIERS' DEPUTIES WITH THE ALL-RUSSIAN SO-
VIETS OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES «

Realizing the need of uniting all the activities of the revolutionary
democratic organizations to protect and extend the conquests of the
revolution and to carry on active warfare against counter-revolu-
tionary undertakings, the Executive Committee of the Ail-Russian
Soviet of Peasants' Deputies regards it as very necessary to unite at
once with the Executive Committee of the Congress of the Soviets
of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Together they will decide all
current political questions, act on an equal footing, and in the name
of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Peasants', Work-
ers', and Soldiers' Deputies. . . .
11 "Izvestiia," No. 95, July I, 1917.

CHAPTER XXV
THE ARMY

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The Russian army which was falling to pieces under the
monarchy continued to disintegrate under the revolution and for
more or less the same reasons. These were German propaganda,
Bolshevik agitation, economic want, physical suffering, war weari-
ness, lack of cooperation between the military and civil authori-
ties, and lack of confidence of the lower ranks in their leaders.

In the tsarist army the ignorant and coarse soldier was treated
as an inferior. He had few rights which his superior was bound
to take into consideration. Between the two men there did not
exist the loyalty and respect found in many of the more demo-
cratic armies.

When the Petrograd garrison found that its unwillingness to
fire on the crowd brought on a revolution, it was greatly fright-
ened. Some of the soldiers dared not return to the barracks, but
fled to the Duma and the Soviet for protection.

Being occupied with other things and eager to quiet the
soldier, the Soviet issued Order No. i with the object of defining
the mutual relations of soldiers and officers. It took authority
from the officers and gave it to soldiers' committees.

Some of the leaders of the Soviet believed that if the common
soldier were treated as a self-respecting citizen and put on his
honor and manhood, he would make a better man and fighter
than under the fist system. No doubt many soldiers rose to the
occasion, but the great mass of them were too far down to be
raised quickly to the standard in the minds of the idealists. Self-
government by committees broke down and the soldiers, finding
themselves without control, became a mob. In many cases they
attacked and drove out their officers. The Soviet pleaded with the
soldiers, and Kerenski argued with them, but they listened only to
those who approved their wild acts and. told them to go home.

384

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 385

The failure of the July offensive showed how low the morale
of the troops was. Kornilov went to work to restore discipline but
the policy of hesitation pursued by Kerenski made this task diffi-
cult. After the collapse of the Kornilov adventure the army situa-
tion grew worse. Agitators made use of the affair to incite the
soldiers against the officers by telling the ignorant men that it
was a plot of officers against the soldiers. In some parts of the
country brutal soldiers condemned and executed innocent officers
in a beastly way. These murderers went unpunished, because it
was neither politically wise nor physically safe to touch them.
That there were still loyal and self-sacrificing troops as late as
November is evident from the appeals sent out by the First and
Nth armies.

i. GERMAN PROPAGANDA1

(Reported by the Military Commission)

SOLDIERS : — There is revolution in Petrograd. Don't you see that
you are being deceived? Don't you see that the English are leading
Russia to ruin? The English have deceived your Tsar and incited
him to fight, so that with his aid they may conquer the whole world.
In the beginning the English were with your Tsar, but because he
did not agree to their selfish demands, they have turned against him.
They have cast your God-given Tsar from his throne.

Why has this happened ? Because he has realized and made public
the cunning and treacherous English schemes. The English are get-
ting countless millions of rubles from Russia for war munitions they
supply, and they alone are interested in the continuation of the war.
But who is fighting this bloody war? Your own brother, the brave
muzhik, who lays down his life without a murmur, not realizing
that it is for England that he sheds his blood. Who else is suffering
through this bloody war? Your mothers, wives, and children, whose
sons and husbands were taken away almost three years ago, and
who now live in hunger and destitution, suffering from the high
prices and lack of food. How can we explain this want and the high
prices? By the fact that profiteers, allied with England, are holding
back all foodstuffs and other articles of prime necessity, so as to
obtain an even higher price. The English and the speculators grow

1 "Izvestiia," No. 14, March 27, 1917.

386 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

rich on the war. Open your eyes, Russian 'people! England is re-
sponsible for your ruin. England now acts in Russia as if it belonged
to her. Soldiers, England has cast your Tsar from his throne. There
is revolution in Petrograd. England is your enemy.

2. MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN OFFICERS AND

SOLDIERS

ORDER NOT TO TAKE AWAY ARMS 2

In the name of the new commandant of the Nikolaevsk [railway]
station notices have been posted on the walls of the station, forbid-
ding the soldiers to take away the officers' arms. Armed officers who
arrive in the city are ordered to appear at the Hall of the Army and
Navy to receive instructions and credentials. It is stated in the order
that the State Duma has issued nothing authorizing the taking of
arms from officers.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE PETROGRAD
GARRISON 3

On March 14, a rumor spread among the Petrograd garrison that
the officers are taking guns from the soldiers. Investigations in two
regiments proved that there is no truth in these stories.

As Head of the War Commission of the Provisional Committee
of the State Duma, I give notice that such acts on the part of officers
will not be tolerated. Those found guilty will be severely punished
even tmto death.

Member of the State Dwna, B. ENGELHARDT

3. ORDERS NOS. i AND 2 AND THEIR INTERPRETATION

(a) ORDER No. I *

March 14, 1917

To the garrison of the Petrograd District, to all the soldiers of
the guard, army, artillery, and navy, for immediate and strict execu-
tion, and to the workers of Petrograd for their information : —

Tzvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 4, March 14,

*Ibid., No. 5, March 15, 1917.

4 "Izvestiia," No. 3, March 15, 1917.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 387

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has resolved:

1. In all companies, battalions, regiments, parks, batteries,
squadrons, in the special services of the various military administra-
tions, and on the vessels of the navy, committees from the elected
representatives of the lower ranks of the above-mentioned military
units shall be chosen immediately.

2. In all those military units which have not yet chosen their
representatives to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, one representa-
tive from each company shall be selected, to report with written
credentials at the building of the State Duma by ten o'clock on the
morning of the fifteenth of this March.

3. In all its political actions, the military branch is subordinated
to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and to its own
committees.

4. The orders of the military commission of the State Duma
shall be executed only in such cases as do not conflict with the
orders and resolutions of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies.

5. All kinds of arms, such as rifles, machine guns, armored auto-
mobiles, and others, must be kept at the disposal and under the con-
trol of the company and battalion committees, and in no case be
turned over to officers, even at their demand.

6. In the ranks and during their performance of the 'duties of
the service, soldiers must observe the strictest military discipline,
but outside the service and the ranks, in their political, general civic,
and private life, soldiers cannot in any way be deprived of those
rights which all citizens enjoy. In particular, standing at attention
and compulsory saluting, when not on duty, is abolished.

7. Also, the addressing of the officers with the title, "Your Excel-
lency," "Your Honor/' etc., is abolished, and these titles are replaced
by the address of "Mister General, "Mister Colonel," etc. Rudeness
towards soldiers of any rank, and, especially, addressing them as
"Thou," is prohibited, and soldiers are required to fcring to the
attention of the company committees every infraction of this rule,
as well as all misunderstandings occurring between officers and
privates.

The present order is to be read to all companies, battalions, regi-
ments, ships' crews, batteries, and other combatant and non-com-
batant commands.

388 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

THE PETRO'GRAD SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS* DEPUTIES.

(6) OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 5

Order No. I of the Soviet of Workers5 and Soldiers' Deputies,
published in the last number of the "Izvestiia," defines in full the
mutual relations of soldiers and officers. Nevertheless there are those
who, at this critical historical moment, are trying to disturb the
unity which has been achieved at the price of so many sacrifices. We
have in mind the proclamation, fortunately not widely scattered,
signed in the name of the two Socialist parties.

Let us compare the two documents [Order No. I and the Procla-
mation] .

The "Order" defines the position of the officers. It gives them
authority only in time of military service. When drilling, when on
duty, when in war, the soldiers and all lower ranks must observe
military discipline. Off duty and off service, the officers have no
power over the soldiers. The soldier has become a citizen ; he has
ceased to be a slave. This is the idea of the "Order" :

In the above-mentioned proclamation, we note a strange rage
against the officers, without excepting even those who have come
out on the side of the people and are actually our friends. . . .

We have no doubt, we firmly believe, that the intelligent comrade-
soldiers will pay no attention to these calls and will not follow the
advice of the light-minded authors of this leaflet.

(0 ORDER No. II 6

To the troops of the Petrograd district, to all the soldiers o-f
the guard, army, artillery, and navy, for strict execution, and to the
workers of Petrograd for information: —

In explanation and amplification of Order No. I, the Executive
Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has
resolved :

i. Order No. i of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies proposed to
all companies, battalions, and other military units to elect commit-
tees (company, battalion, etc.), appropriate to each particular unit,
but that Order did not provide that these committees should elect
the officers of each unit. These committees are to be chosen in order
that the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison may be organized and

* "Izvestiia," No. 4, March 16, 1917.
'"Protokoly," 296-7.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 389

enabled, through their committee representatives, to share in the
general political life of the country and, specifically, to make known
to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies their views regard-
ing the necessity for action of any kind. The committees must also
attend to the general needs of each company, or other unit.

As regards the question of the limits within which the interests
of the military establishment may be compatible with the right of the
soldiers to choose their own commanders, it has been submitted for
consideration to a special commission.

All elections of officers up to the present time and confirmed, or
submitted for confirmation, by the army authorities, must remain in
force.

2. Pending the time when the question of elective commanders
is definitely settled, the Soviet grants to the committees of the various
units the right of objection to the appointment of any officer. Such
objections must be addressed to the Executive Committee of the
Soviet of Workers' Deputies, by whom they will be laid before
the military commission in which representatives of the Soviet of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, together with other public organi-
zations, are participating.

3. Order No. i showed the significance of the Soviet of Work-
ers' and Soldiers' Deputies as an institution directing all the POLITI-
CAL actions of the soldiers of Petrograd. To this elective organ of
their own choice, the soldiers are bound to submit in matters of their
public and POLITICAL life. As for the military authorities, the sol-
diers are bound to submit to all their orders that have reference to
the military service.

4. To remove the danger of an armed counter-revolution, the
Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies presented the demand
that the Petrograd garrison, which won for Russia her political
liberty, be not disarmed, and the Provisional Government has as-
sumed the obligation to prevent such disarmament, in accordance
with its official declaration. In conformity with this declaration, com-
pany and battalion committees are required to see to it that the arms
of the Petrograd soldiers are not taken from them, as was Indicated
in Order No. I.

5. Reaffirming the demands made under points 6 and 7 of
Order No. i, the Executive Committee notes the fact that some of
these are already being carried into effect by the Provisional Gov-
ernment.

The present Order is to be read to all companies, battalions, regi-

3QQ DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

merits, ships' crews, batteries, and other combatant and non-com-
batant commands.

THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET
OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

This is a true copy of the original :

THE CHAIRMAN or THE MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

(d) SPEECH OF N. S. CHKHEIDZE T
March 15, 1917

Deputy Chkheidze, in a fiery speech, greeted the achievement of
Russian freedom attained through the united efforts of the prole-
tariat and the revolutionary army. He vehemently protested against
the reactionary attempts of the still-living old regime, and among
others the scattering of provocative leaflets, with the object of set-
ting the soldiers against the officers,8 and signed in the name of the
Social-Democratic organization. The deputy appealed for the union
of all revolutionary forces, for only through union could the revolu-
tion succeed.

(0-) CALL OF THE OFFICERS TO THE SOLDIERS, s

Soldiers, our Comrades in battle! The hour of the liberation of
the people has come. The army, fleet, and the people, together with
you, have raised the sacred flag of freedom. And we, who have
fought with you side by side at the front, who have faced death
with you, who have shed and mingled our blood with yours on
the field of battle, appeal to you to believe us that the freedom of
our country is dearer to us than all. Only a free Russia can crush
the German power. Keep in mind that the welfare and victory of
Russia depend on our mutual trust and cooperation.

Let the old autocratic system rot forever. For two years it has
not been able to bring about a decisive victory over the enemy.
United with you, we will give it bur curse.

Comrade-soldiers! Don't throw away your guns; take care of
them. You need them here just as much as in the trenches. Help

7 "Izvestiia," No. 4, March 16, 1917.

8 Ibid., No. 7, March 16, 1917. According to the report of his speech in this
paper, Chkheidze said that the .leaflets called on the soldiers to kill the officers.

Ibid. , No. 5, March 15, 1917.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 391

to put an end to plundering ; restore order ; return to your units to
work harmoniously with us. To our great shame some of the officers,
just as some of the soldiers, have betrayed the popular cause, and
their betrayal has been the cause of many victims among the honest
fighters for liberty.

But we will join our efforts in the common cause, bringing about
a decisive victory over the enemy, at the front as well as in the
interior of Russia.

Long live great free Russia !

YOUR COMRADE-OFFICERS
[Assembled in the] State Duma

(/) FROM THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET OF WORKERS'
AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES10

Comtrode-Citizens:

The new Government, formed from the moderate elements ©f
society, has today announced the reforms which it binds itself to
carry out, some of them while still fighting the old regime, and others
at the end of the fight. Among- these reforms are political freedom,
the preparation for the Constituent Assembly, civil liberties, and the
abolition of nationality restrictions, which should meet with the hearty
approval of the large democratic circle. We would say that in so far
as the new Government works in the direction of carrying out these
obligations and makes a determined fight against the old Government,
democracy should give it her support.

Comrades and citizens ! Complete victory of the Russian people
over the old regime is near. But to attain this victory tremendous
efforts, patience, and determination are needed. There must be no
disunion and anarchy. There must be an end to lawlessness, rob-
bing, breaking into private homes, stealing and spoiling all sorts
of property, and aimless seizure of public buildings. Decline in disci-
pline and anarchy will ruin the revolution and popular liberty.

The possibility of a military movement against the revolution
is not yet removed. In order to prevent such an event, it is exceed-
ingly important to have cooperation between soldiers and officers.
Officers to whom the freedom and progressive development of Russia
are dear, should use all their efforts to bring about a working agree-
ment with the soldiers. They should respect the soldier, as a man
and a citizen, and treat him in an honorable manner. On their side,

30 "Izvestiia," No. 4, March 16, 1917.

392 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

the soldiers should remember that the army is strong only when
soldiers and officers are united, that one should not blame all the
officers for the bad behavior of a few. For the sake of the success
of the revolutionary struggle, it is necessary to be patient and to
forget the sins against democracy committed by some of the officers,
who have since joined in the determined and decisive fight which you
are leading against the old regime.

THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOLDIERS' AND
WORKERS' DEPUTIES

PROCLAMATION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE
PETROGRAD SOVIET11

Comrades — Soldiers !

The old Russia no longer exists. There is a New, Free, Revolu-
tionary Russia. But the old regime is not yet dead. It has been
captured only to an insignificantly small extent. The task of forming
a new regime is not yet done. It may even be said that the most
difficult part of the task is yet before us, — to preserve and consolidate
the liberty achieved.

Comrades ! We must not forget this task for an instant. Let us
guard and strengthen our conquests. We succeeded in overthrowing
the old monarchical regime only because we joined our forces. And
we must not now disrupt them. We must remember that any dissen-
sion divides our strength and aids those who are already organizing
a campaign against liberty. These old forces are taking every expedi-
ent to carry strife into our ranks. They stop at nothing. Be on your
guard.

At this moment they are trying to sow dissension between you
and the officers who have joined the revolution. Do not fall into
the traps of the provocateurs; remember that the revolutionary
officers are now our comrades. Fights and insults which are without
basis, or are based solely on dark rumors, are inadmissible and dan-
gerous. Do not believe these rumors ; take no rash steps against our
comrades, the officers. Only in case of indisputable evidence, report
immediately to the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers'
and Soldiers' Deputies. Do not believe speakers who are not author-
ized to represent the Executive Committee.

11 "Izvestiia," No. 6, March 18, 1917.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 393

4. RIGHTS OF THE SOLDIER12

RESOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC MEETING OF THE SOVIET OF
SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

March 22, 1917

I
Soldiers enjoy all the rights of citizens.

1. Every soldier has the right to be a member of any political,
national, religious, economic, or professional organization or union.

2. Every soldier has the right to utter freely and publicly, by word
of mouth, writing, or print, his political, religious, social, and other
views.

Note: Obligatory public religious service is done away with,
together with other restrictions on religious freedom.

3. Soldiers, like officers, have the right to wear civilian dress when
off duty.

4. All censorship on letters and telegrams, except those strictly mil-
itary, is now abolished.

5. All publications, without exception, whether appearing regularly
or irregularly, should be delivered immediately, without discussion,
to the persons addressed.

Officers should address soldiers, and soldiers, officers, in a manner
becoming citizens.

The office of orderly is abolished.

Ill
Soldiers have the right of internal organization.

Without any exception.

3. Corporal punishment is abolished. Not a single case of cor-
poral punishment, whether in the rear or at the front, should remain
unpunished. Every officer who, after the publication of this Order, is

M "Izvestiia," No. 15, March 28, 1917. Many of the articles in this document
have not been translated because they are repetitions of Orders No. i and
No. 2.

394 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

found violating it, should be at once handed over for trial . . .
regardless of his rank, and removed from duty. If found guilty,
the court should sentence him to a punishment not less heavy than
degradation to the ranks. . . .

5. ARMY DEMORALIZATION

(a) KERENSKI'S SPEECH BEFORE THE CONGRESS OF DELEGATES
FROM THE FRONT

May 11, 1917 ls

It is two months since the birth of Russian freedom. I did not
come here to congratulate you. We sent you our felicitations a long
time ago, when you were in the trenches. Your sorrows and your
hardships were among the reasons for the revolution. We could no
longer bear the reckless and senseless way in which the old Gov-
ernment shed your blood. During these two months I believed, and
still believe, that the only power that is able to save the country and
lead her out into the light is the conscious realization that each one
of us, without exception, Is responsible for each word and act. I
cannot conceal from you, representatives of the front, that I am
disturbed, I am alarmed. I shall talk to you openly, regardless of
the consequences. . . .

The time for the isolated State is gone. The world is one united
family which, though its members often fight among themselves, is
nevertheless bound together by cultural, economic, and other ties.
To tear out one State from its unit, to separate it from the outside
world, means to cut it loose from its living members, to send it to
its death from the loss of blood, as it were.

Just now we are celebrating our new ideals and the creation of
a new democratic State in Europe. This puts us in a position to
play a colossal role in world history — if we can force other people
to go our way, if we can compel our friends and enemies to respect
our freedom. But for this, time is needed — time to see that it is
impossible to fight the ideas of the Russian democracy. We can pass
through this period only as an organized, strong, and united body,
commanding respect If we, like unworthy slaves, will not organize

""Riech," No. 100, May 13, 1917.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 395

a strong State, then a dark and bloody period of mutual distrust
will come on us, and our ideas will be crushed under the heel by
those who believe that might makes right and not that right makes
might. Every one of us, from soldier to minister, has a right to do
what he pleases, but he should do it with his eyes open and with
the thought of the greater good.

Comrades, you have endured in quiet for ten years ; you carried
out the obligations which the old Government laid upon you, even
to firing on the people. Why can you not be a bit patient now? Is
it possible that the free State of Russia is nothing more than a State
of revolted slaves? (Excitement among the auditors.)

Comrades, I cannot and do not know how to tell the people what
is not so, and how to conceal the truth from them.

I have come to you because I find myself losing confidence; I
have not the courage I once had. I am not so sure as I once was
that before me are not slaves in insurrection but rather conscientious
citizens, trying to create a new State worthy of the Russian people.

We are told that we no longer need a front, that fraternization
is going on. But is fraternization taking place on two fronts? Is it
on the French front? If we are going to have fraternization, let us
have it on all fronts. Is it not true that the forces of the enemy have
been shifted to the Anglo-French front and that the offensive of
our Allies has come to a standstill? We have not a Russian, but a
united Allied front.

We are on the way toward peace. I would not be in the
Provisional Government if putting an end to this slaughter
were not its aim. But there are ways and ways. There are broad,
open highways, but there are also narrow and dark trails
which lead to destruction. We are anxious to bring this fratricidal
war to an end, but to bring this about we must follow the open
and clear road. We are not a gathering of tired men — we are a
State.

There are ways, complicated and long, requiring calm and endur-
ance. If we propose new war aims, then it is necessary that we be
respected by friend and foe. No one respects a weakling.

I am sorry that I did not die two months ago. I could have died
then with the beautiful vision that, once for all, a new life had come
to Russia, that we could respect one another without whip or club,,
and that we could govern our State not the way the old despots
governed it. ...

396 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

(6) FRATERNIZATION14

In yesterday's "Pravda" there is a resolution adopted by the
Bolsheviks on the question of fraternization in the trenches. [It reads
as follows:]

"The [Bolshevik ] Party will especially support the fraternization
of the soldiers of the belligerent countries which has begun at the
front and which has for its object the transformation of that uncon-
scious solidarity of the oppressed into an understanding and a more
organized movement toward taking the power from the hands of the
Government of the belligerent countries and handing it over to the
revolutionary proletariat."

We think it very important to call this resolution to the attention
of our comrades and to warn them that it is dangerous for the defense
of the revolution at the front.

We receive resolutions and telegrams on fraternization daily from
the front, and their general tenor is that fraternization in the trenches
is dangerous and suspicious. Under the guise of fraternization, spying
is going on. ...

On May 13, A. T. Guchkov handed the following letter to Prime
Minister, Prince G. E. Lvov:

My Dear Prince Lvov: In view of the position which the Pro-
visional Government holds in the country, and in particular the
Ministry of War and Navy in regard to the army and fleet, a position
which I am unable to change and which threatens to have fatal
consequences for the army and fleet and for the freedom and the very
existence of Russia, I cannot conscientiously continue longer as Min-
ister of War and Navy and share the responsibility for the capital
sin which is being carried out against the country ; and I, therefore,
ask you to release me from these duties.

A. GUCHKOV

Gnchkotfs Interview™

It is impossible to direct the army and navy when, without your
knowledge, orders are given out altogether contrary to those you
•have issued. ... It is impossible to direct the army and navy when
you give an order, for example, to occupy this or that strategic point,

** "Izvestiia," No. 54, May 13, 1917.
V' No. 101, May 15, 1917.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 397

and the soldiers begin to bargain with the officers and demand to
know : "Why this force and not another is to take part ; why today
and not tomorrow; why this point and not another?". . . At this
time, when the enemy is at the gate, it is more than ever necessary
to have one strong authority. Only under such a condition can
the war be concluded in an honorable manner. Only under such
a condition can we develop and make the most of the change that
has come into our lives with the overthrow of the old order. Unfor-
tunately, such a fundamental condition is to be found neither in the
country nor in the army.

(d) APPEAL OF SOVIET TO THE ARMY 16
Comrade-Soldiers at the Front! •

A heavy burden has fallen to your lot. With the price of your
blood you have paid for the criminal act of the Tsar, who has sent
you to fight and has provided you with neither guns, ammunition, nor
bread. The working class did not need the war; they did not start
the conflict. The tsars and the capitalists of all countries are responsi-
ble. For the people as a whole, every additional day of war is one
more day of sorrow. Having overthrown the Tsar, the Russian
people has set for itself, as its first task, the bringing the war to an
end just as soon as possible.

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has appealed to
all peoples to bring the war to an end. It has appealed to the French,
Germans, and Austrians. Russia awaits the answer to this appeal.

Remember, comrade-soldiers, that our appeal would be worthless
if the regiments of William should crush revolutionary Russia before
our fellow workmen and the peasants of other countries respond
to our appeal. Our appeal would be but a blank piece of paper if the
whole might of the revolutionary people did not stand back of it.

The workers and peasants of Russia are striving for peace. But
this peace must be universal, for all peoples, and by general consent.
What would happen if we should make a separate peace, if the
Russian army should today stick its bayonets into the ground and
say that it did not wish to fight any more, that it was not concerned
with what happened to the rest of the world? This is what would
happen : after crushing our Allies on the West, German imperialism
would turn on us with all its might; the German Emperor, the
German landholders and capitalists would place their heavy heels on
* "Izvestiia," No. 55, May 15, 1917.

398 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

our neck ; they would seize our cities, villages, and land ; they would
lay a tribute on our people. Did we overthrow Nicholas so as to fall
at the feet of William?

Comrade-soldiers 1 The Soviet calls you to peace by another way.
It leads you to peace by appealing to the revolutionary workers and
peasants of Germany and Austria to rise ; it leads you to peace by
the promise of our Government to give up the policy of conquest
and to demand that the Allied powers do likewise; it leads you to
peace by calling an international conference of the Socialists of the
whole world to take a definite stand against the war. Time is
needed, comrade-soldiers, to arouse the people of all countries.

But remember, comrade-soldiers, that this -time will never come
if you do not hold the enemy at the front. . . . Remember that at
the front, in the trenches, you are standing guard over Russian
freedom. You are defending not the Tsar, Protopopov, Rasputin,
wealthy landowners and capitalists, but the Russian Revolution, your
brother workers and peasants.

Having sworn to protect Russian liberty, do not refuse to take
the offensive if the war situation should demand it. The freedom
and happiness of Russia is in your hands.

In defending this freedom, beware of provocation; beware of
traps. The fraternization which is now developing at the front can
easily become a trap. The revolutionary army should fraternize with
a revolutionary army, equally ready to die for peace and freedom. At
the present moment there is no such army in Germany and Austria-
Hungary, no matter how conscientious and honest certain individuals
may be. Over there [Germany and Austria] there is no revolution
yet. There the army is still for William, for Karl, for landowners
and capitalists, for annexation of other peoples' territories, .for
plunder and force. There the military staff will take advantage not
only of your credulity, but of the blind submissiveness of its own
soldiers.

You go to fraternize with an honest thought, and from the enemy
trenches there comes an officer from the General Staff, dressed in the
uniform of a common soldier. While you are talking frankly with
your opponent, his officers photograph the place. You stop firing in
order to fraternize ; he builds fortifications and moves his artillery
and troops, to fight elsewhere.

Comrade-soldiers ! Not through fraternization, not through silent
and separate understandings concluded at the front by individual
companies, battalions, , and regiments, will you get peace. Not in

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 399

separate peace, not in separate truces, is the salvation of the revolu-
tion and the peace of the world. Those who tell you that fraternization
is the way to peace, are leading both you and Russian treedom to
destruction.

(e) LAWLESSNESS BY SOLDIERS 1T
Comrade-Soldiers!

During the last few days there have been disorders on the
railways brought about by the soldiers trying to get on the trains.

In certain cases, the soldiers fought for a place in a train. At one
station the infantry got into a fight with the sailors as to who should
go first. At another station the soldiers put the passengers out of the
cars. There have also been cases of the soldiers using force on the
railway employees.

Comrade-Soldiers !

Such disgraceful misbehavior fills us with shame and makes the
heart ache. It is shameful and painful that men who carry the hon- '
orable title of soldier behave in such a manner. From the moment
of the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, the soldier became pro-
tector of the country's freedom. Citizens expect from the soldiers
protection and help. Instead of that they behave disgracefully on the
railways. Their acts bring about a loss of confidence in the army,
disorganize the transport service, and cause much harm to the cause
of revolution and liberty.

Put an end to this lawless conduct on the railways !

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE
SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND

SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

DISHONORABLE DISCHARGE 1S

The Provisional Government has ordered dishonorable discharge
of the 45th, 46th, 47th and 5^d regiments for refusal to obey orders
to go to the front. They were ordered to proceed to relieve other

regiments in the trenches but decided to remain in the rear.

# * * *

On June 5 , an excited group of soldiers of regiment No. —
arrested its commander and seven officers, pulled off their shoulder
straps, gave one of the officers several blows in the face, knocked
down another, and left him lying in an unconscious state.

17 "Izvestiia," No. 59, May 19, 1917.
M Ibid., No. 78, June 12, 1917.

4QQ DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

KILLING OF OFFICERS19

The Provisional War Committee received a report of the hap-
penings at Wiborg [Finland]. It gives a frightful picture of lynch
law. The mob dragged out from the guardhouse three generals
and one colonel, kicked them off the bridge into the water, and killed
them. These men had been arrested just before by the Executive
Committee of the Soviet and the army committees of the 42nd Corps,
on the charge of being implicated in the Kornilov affair. After these
men had been murdered, the mob went after other officers in the regi-
ments. These, too, were thrown into the water and then killed.
Altogether about fifteen officers were killed, although it is difficult
to give the exact figures because some of the officers escaped. The
killing continued until night. . . .

At Helsingfors, the sailors killed four naval officers, ... At Abo
one naval officer was killed.

6. LOYAL UNITS IN THE ARMY APPEAL TO
THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

FIGHT OR "MAKE PEACE 20

Prime Minister Kerenski and the Central Executive Committee
of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies received the following
telegram from the chairman of the executive committee of the N.
army:

"The material and spiritual forces of the army are exhausted.
The committee, which has been at work to hold up and raise the
efficiency of the army, has come up against insurmountable obstacles
which are daily growing higher. It is impossible to make an army
fit for fighting when it is naked, hungry, forgotten, when its ranks
are not filled, when it is betrayed by its own country. It is impossible
to make an efficient army when there is no authority in 'the rear,
when the country is in a state of anarchy, when the peasants hide
their food from military requisition, the workers refuse to labor for
the defense, the bourgeoisie declines to pay war taxes, and the
reserves are unwilling to go to the front. It is impossible to make an
army capable of defending freedom and revolution when liberty has
become license and revolution has turned into pogroms. We realize
that the immediate conclusion of peace, which would provide Russia

M "Izvestiia," No. 160, September 15, 1917.
"Ibid., No. 195, October 25, 1917.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 401

with freedom, is just now impossible, but the continuation o£ the war
under present conditions is equally impossible. In the full conscious-
ness of our responsibility before our native land, we representatives
of the N. army declare to the Government that together with its fight
for a democratic peace, it should also make it possible to go on with
the war. Either 'put an end to the disorganization in the rear, or
declare openly that Russia is crushed and surrenders herself to the
mercies of the German Emperor, Either restore the army by
restoring order in the rear, or make peace and bow to the victorious
German imperialists. There is no other alternative. Here are some
things that must be done without the least delay :

"i. Feed, shoe, and clothe the army; get all the necessaries in the
rear by merciless requisition.

"2. Put an end to the anarchy which reigns in the rear.

"3. Send reserves to the front. To carry through these measures
the Government needs force and we of the N. army offer our services.
Moreover, in the name of the revolutionary democracy at the front,
we send a last word to the lawless gang in the rear.

"We warn them of our readiness to defend by all means the
national property, the lives of peaceful citizens against the unbridled
attempts of the mobs, the enemies of revolutionary order."

VILENKIN,

Chapman of the Executive
Committee of the N. army
DURITSKI,

Secretary

APPEAL OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE FIRST ARMY a

The German troops are preparing to give us a death blow. We
should muster our last bit of strength to ward off the ruin of the
country and the slavery of the people. Our strength is exhausted, our
soul is torn, the efforts of the committees to raise the fighting efficiency
of the army meet with difficulties from the rear. Our determination
to defend the country and the revolution is not supported by a
majority of the population. It is not supported by the bourgeoisie,
it is not whole-heartedly supported by the peasants or the laboring
masses. The soldiers in the rear do not wish to go to the front, and
they have turned liberty into license and revolution into pogroms.
In the midst of the death convulsions, we appeal to you for the last

21 "Izvestiia," No. 201, November I, 1917.

402 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

time: give us food, ammunition, reserves to fill our ranks, put an
end to lawlessness and pogroms, occupy yourselves only with the
salvation of the country and the revolution. Alone, we cannot pro-
tect the country and the revolution. We need the assistance of all
the people and this assistance we demand. If we are not given bread,
shoes, and reserves at once, we, in the name of the revolutionary
democracy at the front, appeal to the Provisional Government. Either
provide us with our necessaries and we will save the country and the
revolution and will lead the land to a peace on democratic principles,
or say : "We are not in a position to do this and you had better throw
yourself on the mercy of the victor." We realize that you, too, have
insurmountable obstacles, but know! That having appealed for the
last time we place ourselves at your service ; we are ready by means
of force to make the rear come to our aid, and to compel the conscious
or unconscious foes of the revolution to grant our requests. At the
same time we appeal to all true defenders of the country and the
revolution, to those who are in the trenches that stretch from the
Baltic to the Black Sea, to those on the Caucasus front, and to those
in the fleet, to be patient, to wait with us for the answer to this cry
of torn and bleeding souls. Gather your last forces and hold off the
treacherous enemy, deprive him of the possibility of striking us a
final blow while we are gathering in strength. , Let history be our
judge, let all the world know that we are loyal defenders of our
suffering mother country and revolution, and if we are fated to die,
let the curse not be on those who at the fatal moment called for help,
but on those who refused to give it

CHAPTER XXVI
GENERAL ALEXEEV

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

During the World War General Alexeev was, next to Grand
Duke Nicholas, the best known Russian army officer. The docu-
ments that follow throw sidelights on the man. It should be said
that Rodzianko's opinion of Alexeev was held by many other
prominent men.

i. GENERAL ALEXEEV'S ORDER1

General Alexeev has telegraphed the following order :
As a result of a telegram from the Chief of Staff of the Western
Front, to the effect that a deputation of fifty men from the new
Government is traveling from Velikie Luki in the direction of
Polotsk, and disarming the gendarmes, an inquiry on this subject
was addressed to the President of the State Duma, who replied that
no deputation whatever had been sent. It seems, therefore, that purely
revolutionary, disorderly gangs are beginning to arrive from Petro-
grad, trying to disarm the gendarmes along the railways. Later they
will, of course, also try to seize power on the railways, as well as in
the rear of the army, and will probably attempt to invade the army
itself. The most vigorous measures must be adopted; surveillance
must be established over all railway junction points In the rear ; and
such stations must be guarded by reliable troops under the command
of dependable officers. Wherever such self-appointed delegations make
their appearance, it is desirable that they should not be driven off
but arrested, court-martialed on the spot, if possible, and their sentence
executed at once.

ALEXEEV
March 16,^1917, No. 1925

1 "Izvestiia," No. 9, March ai, 1917. Gen. Alexeev was born in 1857 and
died in 1918.

403

404 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Comment on General Alexeetfs Order 2

This is a remarkable document. Many naive people think of Gen-
eral Alexeev as a liberal and a friend of the new order. But the
above order shows the real character of his liberalism. He regards
disarming of the gendarmes as a capital crime. The seizure of power
by the revolutionists, even in the rear, he looks upon in the same
light

General Alexeev is worthy of his overthrown master, Nicholas
II. The spirit of the bloody Tsar lives in the Chief of Staff of the
Commander-in-Chief. By signing the above order, General Alexeev
has signed his own condemnation in the eyes of all true partisans of
the new order. Fortunately for the Russian people, and unfortunately
for General Alexeev, he will not find "reliable troops" that will be
willing to wash their hands in their brothers' blood. After the happen-
ings of the last few days, there may not even be found very many
"dependable officers" to carry out the orders. It would seem that the
lessons of the last few days have been lost on General Alexeev. . , .

2. RODZIANKO'S ESTIMATE OF ALEXEEV

LETTER TO PRINCE LVOV 3

April I, 1917
Dear Sir, Prince George Evgenevich:

From my conversation yesterday with the Minister of War, A. I.
Guchkov, I became convinced that the Government intends to place
General Alexeev, formerly Chief-of-Staff, at the head of the active
army, as Supreme-Commander-in-Chief. His appointment will not
lead to a successful ending of the war. I am very much in doubt
whether General Alexeev has the necessary talent, will power, ability,
the broad grasp of the present political situation in Russia and in
the army.

Recall the fact that General Alexeev was constantly opposed to
the measures which the rear proposed and regarded as of immediate
need. General Alexeev was always of the opinion that the army
should command the rear, should lay down the law to the people,
should include within itself the government and its measures. Recall
the charge which General Alexeev made against the national repre-
sentatives. He openly stated that one of the parties largely

a "Izvestiia," No. 9, March 21, 1017, Editorial.
'"Krasny Arkhiv," II, 284-5.

FIRST COApTION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 405

responsible for the approaching catastrophe was the Russian people
itself, in the person of its national representatives. Do not forget
that it was Gen. Alexeev who insisted on an immediate formation
of a military dictatorship. In my eyes General Alexeev is worthy of
the highest respect; he is a brilliant and loyal soldier who will be
faithful to the cause, but will lead it closely along his ideas. But it is
just this that makes me think that he has no broad vision, no ability
to meet the tremendously complicated conditions of the war. Finally,
the name of Gen. Alexeev, perhaps through no fault of his own, is
associated with the surrender of all the forts, Warsaw and Poland,
and therefore, is not popular and is, besides, little known in Russia.

In my opinion the men to lead the war should be those who have
shown themselves capable of understanding the State problems of
Russia, both military and non-military. From the last letter of Gen.
Alexeev which I, and probably you, received, telling how the army
reacted toward the news of the passing events, it is clear to me that
the southwest front is the only one that stands out on a high plane.
It would seem that there alone discipline reigns, that at the head
of that front is a man with ideas, who understands what is going
on. I am referring to Gen. Brusilov. 'My observations on my many
journeys to the front lead me to the conclusion that Brusilov is the
only general who has the brilliant strategic talent, the broad grasp
of Russia's political problems, and who is capable of quickly
evaluating the present situation.

Another man with a statesmanlike mind, but perhaps less experi-
enced in war, is General Polivanov.

If these two men were put at the head of our brave army and
given, as aides, such wise, able and respected men as Generals Klem-
bovski and Lukomski, they would form the center of a supreme
war command which, in my opinion, is the only one capable of leading
the army and the country out of the pitiful position into which it
has fallen. If in connection with this combination, weekly war councils
were held, in which the commanders of the fronts and the above-
mentioned staff officers participated; then we would not need to
lose hope of a successful issue of the campaign. I am calling these
matters to your attention in the hope that it is not yet too late to
change the decision made, and that the army may not be left in the
hands of a man who is, without doubt, incapable of handling the
tasks before him.

Believe me with highest regard and devotion,

M. RODZIANKO

4o6 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

3. SPEECH OF GENERAL ALEXEEV AT THE

CONGRESS OF OFFICERS OF THE

ARMY AND NAVY *

May 20, 1917

Before you begin your work, I should like to say a few words.
They will not be particularly happy words, but they will be open
and honest, and will express the state of mind of your Commander-
in-Chief.

Russia is perishing ; she is on the brink of the abyss ; another push
or two, and she will go over completely. The enemy has seized one-
eighth of Russia's territory. You cannot buy him off with such
phrases as "peace without annexation and indemnity." He says
openly, "with annexation and with indemnity." He says openly that
he will not leave our territory. His paw is reaching out even into
places where no enemy soldier has ever been. . . .

What are we going to do about it? ... Let us be frank. The
war spirit of the Russian army is fallen. Only yesterday it was
mighty and threatening; today, it stands a pitiful weakling before
the enemy. The former tradition of devotion to the country has
changed to a desire for peace and rest. Instead of doing something,
there has been aroused in each warrior the primitive instinct of self-
preservation. If you look toward the interior you ask, where is that
strong power which could compel each citizen to do his duty by his
country ? You will be told that it will come soon. For the time being,
it does not exist. Where, gentlemen, is patriotism? Where is love
of country? On our banners is inscribed the big word "fraternity,""
but it is not inscribed on hearts and minds. Class hatred reigns among
us. Whole classes, that were honestly doing their duty by the country,
are kept under suspicion. . . .

REMOVAL OF GENERAL ALEXEEV5

General Alexeev, whose speech on the foreign policy of the
Provisional Government aroused a great deal of alarm among the
democracy, was removed from command by the Minister of War.

General Brusilov was named in his place.

4"Riech," No. 108, May 23, 1917.
5 "Izvestiia," No. 73, June 6, 1917.

CHAPTER XXVII
THE DUMA

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

What the legal status of the Duma was after its prorogation
on March 10 is not clear. It never again met as a body for the
transaction of business. Some of the members claimed that the
Duma continued as a living body until November 7, 1917, when
its term expired. On the other hand partizans of the Soviet denied
this and said that the Duma was nothing but a corpse. The Com-
mittee of the Duma, which pretended to represent the Duma,
insisted on its right of being consulted on matters of State policy
and changes in the Ministry. On June 22 the All-Russian Congress
of Soviets ruled that the Duma did not exist and asked the Pro-
visional Government not to appropriate money for the support of
its members. But as the Duma did not recognize the Soviet it
ignored its ruling. After the July uprising and the drift of public
opinion to the right the four Dumas were invited to the Moscow
Conference and made their voices heard. But after the Kornilov
plot and the charge that Duma members .were implicated, the Pro-
visional Government dissolved the Duma.

i. MEETING OF THE FOUR DUMAS1
May 10, 1917

SPEECH OF V. V. SHULGIN

I would not say that the Duma as a whole desired revolution, for
that would not be true. No, many of us felt strongly that it is dan-
gerous to change horses while crossing the stream. We feared that
the revolution would weaken our military strength. But, gentlemen,
even if we did not desire it, we made it. The State Duma, by turning
strong lights on the Government, brought out in view of the whole

No. 98, May n, 1917.

407

408 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

country all its defects and the impossibility of continuing it in power.
Perhaps the conservative parties contributed to that no less than
the liberals and radicals, because the attacks of the Left were not
taken seriously, but those of the Right carried weight and conviction.
For these reasons, gentlemen, we cannot separate ourselves from the
revolution. We are tied up with it; we have a moral responsibility.

Two months ago today, the overturn took place, and I cannot
hide from you that many of us are filled with doubt. . . . During
this time our military situation has grown worse. If you try to account
for it, the first thought that comes to your mind is that the Govern-
ment, the one which is here before us, which we regard as honest
and talented, which we should like to see invested with full power,
is actually under suspicion. I would not say that it is in the same
situation as the old Ministers, who are in P'eter P'aul fortress, but
I would say that it is, as it were, under domestic arrest. It is almost
as if a guard had been posted over this Government with instruc-
tions : "Keep your eye on them ; they are burzhui [bourgeois] and,
if they try something, do your duty." Gentlemen, on May 3, you
had evidence that the guard knows and honorably does his duty. But,
gentlemen, this raises the question whether those who have placed
the guard have done the right thing or not. This question applies
in general to all Socialist parties. I ask them publicly: Are you,
gentlemen, acting as you should, when you put a watchman over
the Government? Would it not be better to find some other form of
control ? This is by no means all that we fear.

The behavior of certain Socialist parties, fortunately only a few
of thejn, recalls the fatal words, now historic, which were asked in
this hall on November 14, 1916 [by Miliukov], "What is this —
stupidity or treason?" It was put to Sturmer, because he was
charged with trying to bring about bad feeling between us "and our
Allies, particularly England. Let us see what is happening now. A
few days ago open and vicious propaganda was carried on in the
street against England, trying to show that she is the source of
all capitalistic and imperialistic movements, and that Russia should
free the world from this monster. I ask you, is this stupidity or
treason? (Voice from the hall: "Treason!") No, I think it is stupidity.
When agitators are sent to the villages who incite anarchy and
discord, the only consequences of which will be that Petrograd,
Moscow, the army, and the northern guberniias will be without
food, I ask you, gentlemen, what is it ? I think that, too, is stupidity.
Or when our brave soldiers are aroused against their officers, (I

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 409

am well aware that there are all kinds of misunderstandings, and
that all our officers are not above criticism) against the officers as a
class (as it is done against the intelligentsia), which may lead to the
ruin of the army, I ask again whether it is stupidity or treason. Gen-
tlemen, this, too, is stupidity. But when they [agitators] put all these
together into one and say, "You are on the. point of breaking with
the Allies; you have no army; you have no food; and therefore
you must conclude peace, no matter what the consequences," — this,
I say, is treason. (Applause. Shouts of "-Bravo!")
Tseretelli (from his seat) — "Who says this?"
Voice from the left — "Shulgin says it." (Uproar.)
Presiding Officer— "I ask you not to interrupt the speaker."
Shulgin — I will answer the question. Cross over, if you please, to
the "Petrograd" side of the city and listen to what is said. I live there
and have heard these words many times. Lenin is merely a name for
agitators of all kinds, who preach whatever conies into their heads.
Please remember, gentlemen, that our people are poorly prepared for
political action, and can with difficulty make out what it is all about;
and so, that kind of talk has effect on it. ...

2. COMMENT OF "IZVESTIIA" ON THE MEETING2

On May 10, members of the Four Dumas assembled at the
Taurida Palace. In the White Hall, where during the last two months
the representatives of the revolutionary democracy, soldiers, and
workmen met daily, there appeared the [political] corpses buried by
the revolution. Purishkevich, Shulgin, Rodzianko, priests and land-
holders from the (?) appeared again.

Why did they come to the Taurida Palace? A steady campaign
against the Soviet has been carried on lately, abroad. The bourgeois
press has announced that the Soviet has arbitrarily seized the power
belonging to the State Duma. These [bourgeois] papers have advised
the Provisional Government to renew the sessions of the Duma, as
that would ipso facto put an end to the Soviet.

On May 10, an attempt was made to resurrect the Fourth Duma.
But in order to minimize the distance that separates the people from
that Duma, the partizans of renewing the sessions of the Duma hit
on a plan, turning the rays of glory of the First and Second Dumas
on the Fourth. With that in mind, they celebrated the Eleventh
Anniversary of the Summons of the First Duma.
7 "Izvestiia," No. 53, May 12, 1917, Editorial

4io DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

But this first attempt of these revived corpses showed that the
renewal of the sessions of the Duma is as impossible as the recall
of the tsarist ministers.

He may speak in the name of the people, who has the confidence
of the people. The popular masses of revolutionary Russia have no
confidence in the State Duma ... but believe in the Soviet of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. . . . The Fourth State Duma can
not silence the voice of the Soviet. It can not even represent the
views of those classes which followed it until the revolution. The
changes brought about by the revolution have made the Fourth
Duma too conservative even for the bourgeoisie.

Not only Shulgin, but Rodzianko in speeches on the tenth talked
like people who had been asleep, who had stepped out from the
grave. . . .

The Duma is dead forever. This is the lesson of the meeting
on 'May 10.

From now on it should be clear to every one that until the meeting
of the Constituent Assembly, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies is the only body that has the right to speak in the name of
democracy, and in the name of the people.

3. THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF
SOVIETS AND THE DUMA8

RESOLUTION OF THE MENSHEVIKS AND SOCIAL-REVOLUTIONISTS

June 22, 1917

By a vote of 491 to 216 (41 abstaining from voting), the Congress
accepted the resolution of the Social-Democrats, Mensheviks, and
Socialist-Revolutionists. It reads:

"Wheretts: A group of former members of the Duma appeared
recently in the name of the Duma and, taking advantage of the posi-
tion held by that institution during the first days of the revolution,
are now attempting to make of it a center for working against the
revolution and democracy, the All-Russian Soviet declares that the
revolution, in destroying the foundations of the old regime, has,
among other things, (a) put an end to the State Duma and the State
Council as legislative organs of the State, and (fe) done away with
the titles granted to the members of these institutions by the old order.

* "Izvestiia," No. 88, June 23, 1917,

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 411

Be it therefore resolved: (i) that the Provisional Government
should not in the future make appropriations for the support of the
State Duma and State Council as legislative bodies, and (2) that all
actions of members of these two institutions have no more importance
than actions of any other private group of citizens of free Russia.

4. PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE DUMA AND
THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT4

At the Taurida palace on September 2, there was an informal
meeting of members of the Duma with Rodzianko in the chair.
The question discussed was: The State Duma and the Constituent
Assembly.

Rodzianko opened the meeting by asking for an exchange of
opinion on the position of the Provisional Committee until the expira-
tion of the power [term] of the State Duma. "As you know," said
Rodzianko, "the Duma is not dismissed. Until its power expires it
remains as it is. There have been suggestions that the Provisional
Committee should make its headquarters at Moscow, but I do not
think this is possible. In the first place, such a move would stir up
a great many wild guesses, and in the second place, the Provisional
Committee should remain in the capital. I would ask that some
members of the Duma should, by turn, remain right along at
Petrograd."

"What is the work that the Provisional Committee plans to do ?"
asked V. M. Purishkevich.

"The Provisional Committee/' replied Rodzianko, "is regarded
as the source of power, and is always on the watch that, in case of
a crisis, the question of the composition of the Government is not
decided without the Committee. As you know, both times when we
had crises, the Government turned to us for our approval of its
make-up. The Provisional Committee has at its disposal all the sums
that are at the disposal of the State Duma. Furthermore, the Pro-
visional Committee takes the place of the conferences of the State
Duma, etc."

"How can the Provisional Committee influence the Government,"
asked Purishkevich, "when the Government anticipates the will of
the Constituent Assembly? Is it possible, for example, by revolution-
ary means, to change the customs of the Cossack army? Such an act
4"Riech," No. 196, September 4, 1917.

412 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

would mean anticipating the will of the Constituent Assembly. Is it
possible for the Provisional Committee to raise its voice and tell the
Provisional Government that it has no right to do this until the
Constituent Assembly ?"

"The Provisional Committee," replied Rodzianko, "has raised its
voice a number of times, and has insisted that it is not permissible
to predetermine the will of the Constituent Assembly."

Prince V. M. Volkonski raised the question, when will the full
powers of the Duma come to an end? "Now that a Constituent
Assembly is being summoned/' continued Prince Volkonski, "it would
be natural that the full powers of the Duma should not end in
October, but never having been dismissed by an act of the Govern-
ment, the Duma, the only legal assembly, the only legal institution,
("the only source of authority," corrects Rodzianko) should continue
to function until the calling [meeting] of the Constituent Assembly."

Rodzianko said that he fully agreed with Prince Volkonski. It
should, however, be remembered that the power of the Duma ends
November 28 and the meeting of the Constituent Assembly is set for
December u, and, should it meet on time, there would be an interim
of only thirteen days. In case, however, the Constituent Assembly
should not meet on time, then the Provisional Committee would take
up the question of the powers of the State Duma.

COMMENT OF THE "iZVESTIIA" ON THE DU'MA MEETING 5

The political ghosts are talking again. On the day when our
bleeding army heroically opposed the hordes of the German Emperor,
when it was forced to retreat from the Dvina, when it received a
terrible blow the consequences of which it is yet difficult to estimate,
the gentlemen of the State Duma met again in conference to prepare
for counter-revolution, to undermine by their speeches the govern-
ment of revolutionary Russia and the plenipotentiary organs of the
revolutionary democracy.

5. THE FOURTH DUMA DISSOLVED6

In accordance with the resolution of the Provisional Government
of August 22, 1917, to set November 25 as the date for the election
to the Constituent Assembly, and in view of the fact that the prepara-
tions for said election are to begin on October 16, the Fourth Duma

8 "Izvestiia," No. 151, September 5, 1917.
No. 191, October 20, 1917.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 413

is dissolved, and the authority of the elected members of the State
Council is void.

CO'MMENT BY "IZVESTIIA" ON TH£ DUMA 7

The Fourth State Duma has at last ceased to exist. It is not likely
that tears will be shed on its grave. It was as incapable of. dying
betimes and with dignity, as of living with dignity.

RODZIANKO AND THE DUM 8

In conversation with newspapermen, M. V. Rodzianko said that
the order of the Provisional Government to dissolve the Duma came
as a great surprise to him. Those in authority, he continued, did not
think it was even necessary to give me notice. You will agree that
this was rather strange — to dissolve an institution and not say a
word about it to its chairman. Why this was done is more than I
can understand, especially in view of the fact that its term expired
anyway on November 7.

In my opinion the State Duma has played a great part in the
past. I underline the word "past," for the Duma is not taking part
in present affairs and is not responsible for them.

It would seem that the role of the Duma had been such that its
President might have been1 notified, as a matter of courtesy, of
its dissolution.

T "Izvestiia," No. 192, October 21, 1917.
8"Riech," No. 238, October 23, 1917.

CHAPTER XXVIII
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

All parties agreed on the necessity of calling a Constituent
Assembly to determine the political, social and economic future
of Russia, but they disagreed as to the time when this body should
meet. The Duma men asked for sufficient time to make the proper
preparations and a thorough study of the subject. Above all they
were anxious that nothing should be done which would in any
way interfere with the war. The Soviet leaders were eager to have
the Constituent Assembly meet as soon as passible for they re-
garded it pretty much as a matter of form. They had already
decided on the way the government and land question should be
settled. But even the Soviet men could not hurry matters beyond
a certain point. It was necessary to appoint committees and com-
missions, and to get in touch with the different parts of the vast
empire. In this manner one postponement of meeting followed
another, which was on the whole bad for the country and gave
the Bolsheviks excellent material for attack-.

i. PLACE AND TIME OF MEETING OF THE
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY'1

It has been reported in the papers that the Provisional Govern-
ment purposes to summon the Constituent Assembly to meet at
Moscow. It is hinted that the President of the Council of 'Ministers
is influenced in this matter by the fact that Petrograd is a "city of
office holders." These rumors have caused considerable excitement
among the population of Petrograd. It is supposed that the Provisional
Government desires to get away from the control of the revolutionary
people, the center of which is, at the present time, Petrograd, and to
seek the protection of Moscow, the seat of an old, rich, industrial, and
1 "Izvestiia," No. 13, March 25, 1917.

414

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 415

commercial bourgeoisie, There the revolutionary movement has not
developed such extreme forms as at Petrograd, and consequently
there does not exist the same high revolutionary spirit as in our city.

THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 2

On March 26, at the time of the joint meeting of the delegates of
the Executive Committee of the Soviet and the Provisional Govern-
ment, the question of summoning the Constituent Assembly was
discussed.

The representatives of the Executive Committee insisted that the
Constituent Assembly should be summoned at the earliest moment
because delay, under the present circumstances, would be harmful
to democracy. Members of the Provisional Government agreed in
principle, and gave definite assurances that the place of meeting
would be Petrograd and the time of meeting as soon as possible.

They stated clearly that the war would in no way interfere with
the calling of the Constituent Assembly, unless, of course, unusual
war conditions should arise. In any case, according to the proposal
of the Provisional Government, the summoning of the Constituent
Assembly should be about the middle of the summer. Representatives
of the Executive Committee found that this date was a bit too far
removed.

Discussions on this point will go on. But it can now be definitely
stated that the army will take part in the elections for the Con-
stituent Assembly. It can also be said that the exact time of summon-
ing the Constituent Assembly, the questions relating to the election,
and the program of the meeting will be determined by agreement
between the Provisional Government and the Soviet of Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies.

2. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY POSTPONED s

In the endeavor to summon the Constituent Assembly as soon as
possible, the Provisional Government set September 30 as the date
for the election. It was intended that all the work of preparing the
lists should fall on the municipal governments and the newly created
volost zemstvos. The amount of work necessary to carry on the
elections in the local institutions requires a great deal of time. In
view of the time required to organize these local institutions on the

* "Izvestiia," No. 14, March 27, 1917.

* "Riech," No. 186, August 23, 1917.

416 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

basis of direct, universal, equal, and secret suffrage, the Provisional
Government has set the day for the election to the Assembly,
November 25, and the day of the meeting, December n, 1917.

A. F. KERENSKI,

Prime Minister
ZARUDNI,

• Minister of Justice

22, 1917

CHAPTER XXIX

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The revolution, the dismissal of the old police, the general
let-down in watchfulness and the growth of poverty, tended to
increase lawlessness. There was at the same time a falling off in
production. The new Socialistic theories went to the heads of the
uneducated workmen and caused them to make impossible de-
mands in the matter of wages and hours. Some of the agitators
preached labor control in the industries and in some cases the
managers and employers were driven off. These, as well as other
factors, which usually come with the change of political and social
systems, brought on demoralization and lawlessness.

i. ROBBERY, DRUNKENNESS

THE APARTMENT OF DEPUTY L. A. VELIKHOV ROBBED1

Yesterday a number of unknown individuals, dressed in soldiers'
clothes, invaded the apartment of L. A. Velikhov, member of the
Duma, and under the pretext of search, cleaned out the place, taking
jewels, clothing, and among other things, three hundred visiting
cards.

Mr. Velikhov asks us to warn the public against these impostors,
in case they try to make use of these cards.

Similar lawless acts have taken place in many other homes,
where unknown characters have appeared, made a search, and carried
off money and valuables.

TO ALL CITIZENS

Lately there has been an increase in drunkenness in Petrograd,
as well as in other parts of Russia. Drunkards are seen in the streets,

1"Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 6, March 15,
1917.

* "Izvestiia," No. 67, May 29, 1917..

417

418 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

railways, factories, mills, and barracks. Vodka has made its appear-
ance in the city, and in the villages at the front and in the rear.
Drunkenness has brought on lawlessness, fights, pogroms.

In free Russia, alcohol is for use as medicine and for industry, and
not to befog the brain. No one has a right either to make vodka or to
sell it to others. No one should either buy vodka or drink it.
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET
OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

2. RESUMPTION OF WORK— COLLECTIVE
AGREEMENTS 3

At its meeting of March 18, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies voted, 1170 to 30, that it is now possible to resume work in
the Petrograd: area, such work to be stopped again at the first call.

This decision was adopted by the Soviet in view of the fact that
its first determined attack was crowned with success and has ren-
dered the position of the working class in its revolutionary struggle
sufficiently secure, but in a continuation of the strikes there is
extreme danger of disorganizing still more the economic forces of
the country.

Therefore, the workers of Petrograd should leave the streets,
where they have been for a week creating popular freedom, and return
to their work-benches and lathes, so as to revive our economic life
and bring it back to its normal course.

But even this the workers cannot do successfully, except under
certain conditions which are not yet guaranteed to them.

Is it possible to think of productive, energetic work, if the workers
of factories and mills are again ignored by the employers who do
not observe even the miserable factory laws of pre-war times? Is it
possible to work calmly and methodically, when there is no assurance
that capital will be bound by collective agreements in its relations
with the workers? Is it possible to restore and develop the country's
power, weakened by the old regime, when the conditions of labor are
almost unchanged?

If not, the comrade-workers in resuming work as a matter of
necessity, should bring forward certain questions and ask for an
immediate answer.

6 "Izvestiia," No. 8, March 20, 1917.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 419

First of all, they should demand immediate pay for the days
they spent outside the factories and mills, conquering freedom for
the whole nation. This is their right, and he who dares to deny it
covers himself with shame forever. The workers have no savings.
They spend what they earn. The champions of liberty cannot be left
without bread for themselves, their wives, and their children, simply
because they fought tsarism, and so could not work.

They should insist on collective agreements ancl see to it that
they are at once put into force, and that the employers live up to
them. This will guarantee to them that no worker is removed by the
autocratic will of an employer from the execution of a task appointed
by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

For the control of factory and shop administration, for the
proper organization of work, factory and shop committees should be
formed at once. They should see to it that the forces of labor- are
not wasted and look after working conditions in the place.

The workers should protect themselves against exhaustive and
excessive labor in those industries which are working full time.
Shift work will guarantee production and will, at the same time,
permit the workers to rest and to take part in public life. In taking
their places at the benches, the workers do not cease to be citizens.

In those establishments which are forced to work only part time
because of special circumstances, for lack of raw material, etc., the
workers should divide the work equally, and so protect their comrades
from the horrors of unemployment.

The comrades must not forget that the refusal of an employer,
for personal motives, to go on with production cannot serve as a
reason for stopping work. In such cases, they must insist resolutely
that the work be turned over to them, under the direction of a
commissar of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, a repre-
sentative of the trade union involved and the party organization of
the district.

The workers must also insist upon the immediate regulation
of women's and children's work, which has been exploited with
redoubled intensity since the declaration of the war. The weak must
find protection with the strong.

Lastly, the workers must bear in mind that tsarism is over-
thrown, but not completely vanquished. Its followers are still trying,
and will continue to try, to harm the people in every possible way by
disorganizing whatever is still accessible to their scattered forces.
Therefore, the workers must guard the factories and mills with

420 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

armed forces, and coordinate such protection with the local militia
and the general protective organizations of the capital.

With the observance of all these conditions, work can proceed
at full blast. Without these conditions, there will never be any firm
ground under our feet.

CARE OF PUBLIC PROPERTY 4

Citizens, the old lords are gone, leaving a great inheritance which
now belongs to the people as a whole.

Citizens ! Take care of this inheritance ; take care of the palaces
— they will become the palaces of art of the people; take care of
pictures, statues, buildings — they are the expressions of your spiritual
power and that of your ancestors. Art is that beauty which people
of talent have been able to create even under the yoke of despotism,
and which testifies to the beauty and power of the human soul.
Citizens, do not touch even a single stone. Take care of monuments,
buildings, antiquities, documents — all these are your history, your
pride. Remember that they are the soil out of which will grow your
new art of the people.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET
OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

APPEAL OF THE SOVIET TO THE WORKMEN
TO THE COMRADE-WORKERS 5

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies voted to recom-
mend to all the workers of Petrograd that they return to work on
March 19, 1917. With insignificant exceptions, the working class
of the capital has shown remarkable discipline, returning to its tasks
with the same unanimity with which it abandoned them several days
ago, to give the signal for the great revolution. But, according to
information in our possession, the resumption of work has been ac-
companied from the very start by a series of misunderstandings and
conflicts. In some of the factories and mills, the workers presented
economic demands to their employers and, failing to obtain satisfac-
tion, stopped work again, while in some cases they did not return to
work at all.

In adopting its resolution on the resumption of work, the Soviet
of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies believed that such sporadic

4 "Izvestiia," No. 9, March 21, 1917.
*Ibid., No. 10, March 22, 1917.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 421

actions in separate factories would not take place. It was assumed
that our comrades, the workers, would not stop work in case of
misunderstandings with their employers, but would move in an
orderly fashion toward the realization of their demands, with the
aid of the factory and district committees, trade unions, and, lastly,
the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. For this purpose,
the Soviet decided to appoint a special commission to prepare a list
of general economic demands, to be presented to the manufacturers
and the Government on behalf of the working class. Therefore, we
urge you, comrades, in every case where hope of settlement is not yet
lost, to remain at work, to insist, at the same time, upon the satisfac-
tion of your demands, and to bring them to the attention of the
Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. It goes without saying
that excesses, such as the damaging of materials, breaking of machin-
ery, and personal violence, are absolutely forbidden, since they harm
the cause of Labor, especially at the present dangerous time.

On the other hand, reports are being received of some employers
who discharge their workers at the very first presentation of demands,
and shut down their establishments. Such an attitude toward those
who fought for the freedom of our native country is entirely for-
bidden, and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies will be
obliged to fight with the greatest energy against such abuses, which
are especially disgraceful in the days we are now passing through. In
cases of the closing of factories, the Soviet will be compelled to bring
before the working class, the municipality, and the Provisional Gov-
ernment, the question of handing over such enterprises to the
municipality, or of turning them over to the workers' organizations.
THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET

OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

3. THE KRONSTADT REPUBLIC6

A delegation of the Petrograd Soviet, with Chkheidze at the
head, is going today to Kronstadt. This delegation is to learn the
truth 6f the report which has flown over Russia that the people of
Kronstadt do not recognize the Provisional Government.

Whatever the facts are, one thing is true. In some parts of
Russia — more so at Kronstadt than elsewhere — there is a tendency
to form independent revolutionary principalities. Each principality

c "Izvestiia," No. 72, June 3, 1917.

422 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

pays no attention to the Provisional Government, nor even to the
organ of the united Russian revolutionary democracy which is the
Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

4. CONSCRIPTION OF WOMEN FOR WAR WORK7

In recognition of the fact that the extraordinary conditions through
which our country is at the present moment passing, demand a full
accounting and mobilization of all forces that are capable of reviving
and increasing the physical and spiritual forces of the nation, I
consider it timely to proceed to a solution of the problem of utilizing
the ability and capacity of Russian women (whose rights have already
been recognized in principle), in concrete, direct form to take the
place of male labor in all the central administrative offices and
auxiliary organizations of the Ministry of War.

To carry out this task, I order :

1. A special commission organized, under the Principal Bureau
of the General Staff, to examine the possibilities and conditions for the
employment of women in the Ministry of War.

2. That if the Commission agrees in principle that the conscription
of women for work is practicable, it shall at once prepare an appro-
priate bill for submission to the higher governmental institutions.

3. That representatives of the Union of Women's Democratic
Organizations and other women's associations (which have taken
the initiative in the matter here discussed), be invited to cooperate
with the Commission, as well as representatives of other ministries
and public organizations whose participation may be necessary.

4. As the chairman of the Commission, I designate O. K.
Nechaeva.

5. The Commission must complete its work in two weeks and
submit its report to me for confirmation.

A. KERENSKI,
Minister of War

5. POGROMS, DEMORALIZATION AND
LAWLESSNESS 8

We get daily reports about pogroms. There is destruction in the
cities and in the villages, destruction of stores and landlords'
warehouses. Arson, looting, and violence is everywhere.

T "Izvestiia," No. 93,. June 29, 1917. *Ibid., No. 187, October 16, 1917.

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 423

These shameful pogroms are due to the widespread discontent
of the masses with their condition. Peace did not arrive as quickly
as they expected, bread did not become cheaper, there is now just
as great a shortage of clothing, shoes, and agricultural tools as before.
The revolution, which in its first days gave the impression of a holi-
day, an easy way to peace, happiness, food, and freedom, has now
shown its stern and worried face. Alongside of this news comes other,
of the disorganization of the army, of the shameful flight of whole
army corps, of bestial acts such as at Tarnopol.9

* # * Jj«

The attention of the Government is taken up with lawlessness in
the country. At its last meeting the question of the anarchy in the
Donetz Basin was- discussed. Production [of coal] has fallen so
low that the railroads may be forced to stop running. Another bit of
sad news was from Kaluga, where a pogrom has been going on four
days and, unfortunately, some of the troops are involved. Freight
handlers -at Moscow are on strike and freight is not moving.10

THE MILITIA OF THE CAPITAL u

At the last meeting of the Financial Commission of the city
government, the demands of the city militia [police] were considered.

The Commission was against the granting of the demands, and in
the course of the discussion it came out that the Petrograd militia
was a great joke. The men did not even know what was required of
them . . . They had lost the weapons that had been given to them
. . . the greater part of these arms fell into the hands of the Red
Guard.

THE MOSCOW STRIKE 12

Moscow is to have a general strike on the 28th. There was a
meeting yesterday of the delegates of the local committee of city
employees [clerks and workmen]. Their demands were discussed with
one of the members of the city Council, who pointed out that the
city treasury was empty, and consequently the demands of the em-
ployees could not be granted. The delegates said that the fact that
the city had no money did not help them in any way. It was voted
to strike. ... In addition to the presidium, there was selected a
committee of twenty-four to direct the strike. The plan, for the strike
is as follows:

9 "Izvestiia," No. 187, October 16, 1917.
M "Riech," No. 238, October 23, 1917.
31 Ibid., No. 239, October 24, 1917.
u "Izvestiia/' No. 107, October 27, 1017.

424 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

First in order, the street cars will stop running on the 28th, with
the exception of sanitary cars and freight trucks. - . . Factories,
shops . . . working for the war . . . will close. . . . Charitable
institutions ... the central heating stations, power houses . . . [will
be abandoned by their workmen with few exceptions.]

If the first strike fails to get results within three days, then the
second strike will be called. This will take in gas plants, and slaugh-
ter houses. If within two days there are still no results, then a third
strike will be called in the waterworks, fire department, electric
stations, municipal laundry, and city militia. If after all these strikes
there are no results, then the strike will take in everything, including
the hospitals.

DIFFICULT POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT 1S

On October 22 the Bureau of the Central Committee of Soviets
was visited by a group of workmen from the Taganrog District.
They said that if the Cossacks were not removed from the mining
area, there would be a strike.

The Bureau resolved to do what it could to support the demands
of the workmen of the Donetz Basin before the Provisional Govern-
ment, to regulate the question of the Cossacks at the mines, and to
delegate some members of the Executive Committee to study the
question on the spot and to take the necessary measures. , . .

On October 22 the Minister of the Interior was visited by P. P.
Kalmykov, representative of the Don Cossacks. The latter objected
to the appointment of the Government Commissar for the Donetz
coal mining area. Kalmykov claimed that the Government had no
right to do such a thing without first consulting the Cossacks. In
reply the Minister said that conditions in the Donetz Basin were so
bad that the Government could no longer delay taking definite steps
to put an end to the anarchy in that region. But in regard to the
authority of the Government commissar, that would be regulated
by an interdepartmental commission, with the participation of the
Cossacks.

"""Ricoh," No. 238, October 23, 1917.

PART VIII
JULY EVENTS

CHAPTER XXX
THE JULY OFFENSIVE

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Chkheidze, Kerenski, Tseretelli and other prominent Social-
ists were eager to bring the war to an end as soon as possible.
They could do it in one of two ways : either by a separate peace
with Germany, or by a joint peace with the Allies. In addition to
regarding* it as dishonorable, these men believed that a separate
peace would fail to give Russia the relief predicted by its cham-
pions. A separate peace would turn friends into enemies and throw
abandoned Russia into the lustful arms of Germany. A joint
peace was the only thing to save Russia and the revolution, but
in 1917 the Allies were not in the mood for peace on the Soviet
formula.

"If you wish peace/' said the Allies, "you must fight for it."

"Fight for what object?" asked the Socialists.

"To make the world safe for democracy. Read Wilson's
speeches and you will see/' replied the Allies.

"If you accept the Fourteen Points, let us abandon the secret
treaties and revise the war aims. If we could convince our soldiers
that we are continuing in the war for an ideal and not for acqui-
sition of territory we could get some fight into them/' pleaded
Kerenski.

"This is not the time to discuss such things. While we talk, the
enemy acts. Let's fight," urged the Allies.

March, April, May and June passed without either side yield-
ing. All kinds of missions were sent to Russia and to all the
pleadings of the Russians for peace and treaty revision the diplo-
mats had but one word : "Fight."

While these conversations were going on the Russian army

425

426 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

was breaking up. The old officers had lost control, discipline was
relaxed, and self-government by soldiers' committees was for
the time being ineffective. Under these circumstances Kerenski
and his associates in the Provisional Government and the Soviet
decided to fight. They hoped that success would give Russia more
influence in the council chambers of the Allies and that activity
would raise the morale of the troops.

At the Congress of Soviets the Moderate Socialists put
through a resolution leaving it to the military authorities to take
the offensive or not. Immediately after this representatives of the
Soviet were sent to the front to put some manhood into the sol-
diers and get them to fight. On June 29 Kerenski, as Minister of
War, issued an order to advance on the Southwest front. His
order was supported by an Appeal to the Army, signed by the
two Executive Committees.

The first few days of the offensive all went well. The Aus-
trians showed little resistance and the Russian patriotic troops
in the vanguard drove them back. But when the enemy rallied
and showed fight the demoralized Russian soldiers quit. They
killed their heroic officers and comrades who took the lead, threw
away their guns, deserted by the hundreds and in their flight
robbed and killed civilians. Members of the Soviet who tried to
arouse or shame the soldiers into action were roughly treated.

The offensive failed shamefully and Russia was worse off
than ever. Her military weakness was disclosed and from now
on the Allies were rather indifferent as to whether she stayed
in the fight or not. Until now the Allies had been afraid that
Russia would leave them, but after this event Russia feared that
the Allies would leave her. The failure of the offensive also dis-
closed how weak the Provisional Government was and thus en-
couraged attacks upon it from the extreme political right and left.

i. KERENSKI'S ORDER TO THE ARMY AND THE FLEET l

June 29, 1917

Russia, having thrown off the chains of slavery, has firmly
resolved to defend, at all costs, its rights, honor, and freedom.
*"Izvestiia/' No. 96, July 3, 1917.

JULY EVENTS 427

Believing in the brotherhood of mankind, the Russian democracy
appealed most earnestly to all the belligerent countries to stop the
war and conclude a peace honorable to all. In answer to our fra-
ternal appeal, the enemy has called on us to play the traitor. Austria
and Germany have offered us a separate peace and tried to hoodwink
us by fraternization, while they threw all their forces against our
Allies, with the idea that after destroying them, they would turn on
us. Now that he is convinced that Russia is not going to be fooled,
the enemy threatens us and is concentrating his forces on our front.

WARRIORS, OUR COUNTRY is IN DANGER ! Liberty and revolution
are threatened. The time has come for the army to do its duty. Your
Commander-in-Chief, beloved through victory, is convinced that
each day of delay merely helps the enemy, and that only by an imme-
diate and determined blow can we disrupt his plans. Therefore, in
full realization of my great responsibility to the country, and in the
name of its free people and its Provisional Government, I call upon
the armies, strengthened by the vigor and spirit of the revolution, to
take the offensive.

Let not the enemy celebrate prematurely his victory over us ! Let
all nations know that when we talk of peace, it is not because we
are weak! Let all know that liberty has increased our might.

Officers and soldiers ! Know that all Russia gives you its blessing
on your undertaking, in the name of liberty, the glorious future of
the country, and an enduring and honorable peace.

Forward !

KERENSKI,
Minister of War and Navy

2. APPEAL OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES
TO THE ARMY2

Soldiers and Officers:

The Provisional Government of revolutionary Russia has called on
you to take the offensive. Organized as you are, on the foundations
of democracy, welded in the fire of the revolution, you boldly moved
forward to fight. The Ail-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers'
and Soldiers' Deputies, and the Executive Committee of the Ail-Rus-
sian Congress of Peasants' Deputies send their fraternal greetings to
you, who are shedding your blood on the field of battle in the cause
of the revolution and universal peace.
1 "Izvestiia," No. 96, July 3,

428 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY _

A long time ago the Russian revolution called on the peoples of
the world to fight for a general peace. Until now our call has remained
unanswered. It is not our fault that the war goes on. Your offensive,
organization, and might will add weight to the voice of revolutionary
Russia in its call to enemies, Allies, and neutrals, and will bring
nearer the end of the war. Our thoughts are with you, sons of the
revolutionary army.

In this decisive hour, the Ail-Russian Congress of Soviets of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Committee of
the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies appeal to the country
to gather all its strength and come to the help of the army. Peasants
— give bread to the army. Workmen — see to it that the army does
not lack ammunition. Soldiers and officers in the rear — be ready to
go to the front at the first call. Citizens — remember your duty. In
these days no one dares to decline to do his duty to the country.
The Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies will
continue to stand guard over the revolution.

Soldiers and officers, let not your hearts be in doubt. You are
fighting for the freedom and happiness of Russia, for the universal
peace.

Hearty greetings to you, brothers.

Long live the revolution; long live the revolutionary army!

ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF

WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE

ALL-RUSSIAN SOVIETS OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES

3. BREAKDOWN OF THE OFFENSIVE
(a) TELEGRA'MS FROM THE SOUTHWEST FRONT 8

22, 1917

The German offensive which began on July 19 at the front of
the XI Army is turning into an unheard-of disaster, threatening the
very existence of revolutionary Russia. The troops which have
recently been brought up to the fighting line were influenced largely
by the heroic efforts of a small number of conscientious soldiers, but
the enthusiasm of the offensive was quickly exhausted. The majority
of the troops are becoming more and more demoralized. No one
listens to authority or orders. Persuasion and pleading are in vain, and

8 "Riech," No. 160, July 24, 1917.

JULY EVENTS 429

are answered by threats and even by shots. In some cases the men
deserted their posts at the first shot of the enemy, and in other cases
they did not even wait for the enemy to show himself. In some
instances military units deserted in a body. Orders for hurried rein-
forcements were debated for hours at a meeting, and were carried
out a day late. For a distance of a hundred versts in the rear one
can see deserters on the move, with or without guns, able-bodied, bold,
shameless, and fearless of consequences. Commissars and members
of the army committees at the front are unanimously agreed that the
situation calls for extreme measures and efforts, and that we should
stop at nothing to save the revolution. Today the Commander-in-
Chief of the Southwest front and the Commander of the XI Army,
with the consent of the commissars and committees, gave orders to
shoot at every one who runs from his post. Let the country know all
the truth of what is going on here ; let it tremble with rage, and let it
find the determination to punish unmercifully the cowards who ruin
and betray Russia and the revolution.

[Signed by the commissars and cliairmen of the army committees
at the front]

July 24, 1917 4

I, Boris Savinkov, former commissar of the VII Army, and my
assistant, Vladimir Gobechia, brought up the VII Army to a point
of taking the offensive. The heroes fell in battle, and the army,
carried away by their bravery, fought courageously ; but now that
they are no more, the army is on the run. How can I answer for the
blood that is shed if I do not demand that order and discipline be
enforced at once with an iron hand, so that cowards may not with
impunity leave their posts, open the front, and by so doing sacrifice
their comrades, faithful to their duty, and bring disgrace on Russia
and the revolution? There is no choice. Death punishment to those
who refuse to risk their lives for their country, for land and liberty.

SAVINKOV and GOBECHIA,
Commissar and Assistant Commissar

of the Soutkutest Front

(b) RESTORATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY 5

July 25, 1917

The shameful behavior of certain military units, both at the front

and in the rear, who forgot their duty to their country and thereby

4"Riech," No. 161, July 25, 1917. * "Izvestiia," No. 116, July 26, 1917.

430 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

•" •" •*•; "" '"" •--•-"• ------ - — . _ - - - - ----- - --- -

placed Russia and the revolution in a perilous position, has forced
the Provisional Government to take extreme measures to restore
order and discipline in the army. Fully conscious of its heavy
responsibility for the fate of the country, the Provisional Govern-
ment finds it necessary , . . for the duration of the war, to restore
the death penalty for men in the army who are guilty of gravest

crimes.

A. KERENSKI,

Prime Minister
F. EFREMOV,

Minister of Justice

We print today a letter of a son to his mother (the sister of a
noted writer) who has sent to the front her two sons as army officers
and an only daughter as nurse.

After graduating from the university at the time of the out-
break of the war, the older son joined the army as a volunteer. He
was wounded three different times. While he was convalescing from
the injuries last received news reached Petrograd of the tragic situa-
tion at the front [July disasters in Galkia]. Without telling his
mother the young man enlisted in the "Battalion of Death" [made
up in large part of young officers] and two days later set out once
more for the front. On his departure he left the following letter:

"My Dew Mother:

"You will read this on your return from the station and when the
train is bearing me away from you. Why am I writing this? To
keep you from being so lonely at home.

"Mother dear, my soul is in this letter, it is now with you, and
you are no longer lonely. The purpose of my letter is, first, to tell
you this, and secondly, to try again to explain my act.

"Recall, dear mother, the beginning of the war and why I then
enlisted as a volunteer. There were two reasons, or, to be more
accurate, many reasons, but two stand out : namely, first, to die for
my country, to die young, while all ideals are not yet shattered (this
seemed to me the best kind of a death) ; and secondly, to be true to
myself. I had marched in all processions, and I felt that it was my
duty to seal my words with deeds. These ^rere the main reasons.

6 This letter appeared In one of the Petrograd papers, probably the "Novae
Vremia," toward the end of July, 1917. The clipping is in the Hoover War
Library, but, unfortunately, has no date on it.

JULY EVENTS 431

Mingled with these motives was also a desire for novel and thrilling
adventures, a thirst for new experiences.

"If you should recall these things, you would find my present
step quite consistent, and would understand everything. At the pres-
ent time I realize, and am trying to get others to realize, that only
law and order and a favorable issue of the war can save our country
from disgrace and ruin. That these sentiments may not remain mere
fine words, I am ready once more to face anything that may be in
store for me and to suit the action to the words.

"Mother darling, believe me when I say that it is only this pro-
found conviction that has irresistibly compelled me to act as I have.

"I cannot compromise with my conscience, dear mother, and ex-
cuse myself by saying that I am still too weak, too ill to do my duty
to my country. Both before and after I was sent back to the rear,
to the hospital, I had been thinking of the danger of losing my life
at the hands of my own soldiers, and more such thoughts. But by
joining the Battalion of Death I know that, God willing, I shall be
able to render useful service.

"Darling mother, do not grieve that I have gone away. Men who
are far worse in health than I are also going. The more invalid the
deeper the impression, the better chance to rally those who have
lost courage at this critical moment.

"Believe me, darling mother, that these lines come from the
bottom of my heart, and that they are not idle words. I was never
fond of lies, and now I have forgotten such things entirely.

"But why all this? Let me tell you frankly that I should have
enjoyed immensely going away to the country, to — . But what can
a man do when we live in times like these? I feel that now, at this
time, all of us ought to try to forget ourselves entirely, and lose our-
selves, so to speak, in the common cause. Ah, were it only, possible
to impress everybody with this! One should not, however, become
a hopeless pessimist, and should engrave on his heart and mind these
lines from our dear poet :

'Trust, the time will come
For Baal to pass away,
And love will once again
On earth exert its sway.'

"This, darling mother, is all I want to write to you in parting.
Until we meet again. I kiss you fondly. Be not angry at me.
"Loving you deeply and sincerely, always,

"Your son, KOLIA."

432 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

(rf) THE REVAL BATTALION OF DEATH r

The All-Russian Central Committee to Organize a Volunteer
Army reports the fate of the Reval Battalion of Death.

Having been given the order to take two lines of trenches, the
battalion took four. With a view to fortifying them the battalion
asked for reinforcements, but in place of receiving help they were
fired on from behind. Being caught between two fires, the battalion
began to retreat to its original position. The loss was terrible. Out
of three hundred sailors who made up the battalion, only fifteen came
out unhurt. Three of the officers committed suicide rather than
retreat. The leader of the battalion died from thirteen wounds.

4. ATTACK ON MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COM-
MITTEE OF THE SOVIET 8

June 3, 1917

On June 30, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet
and the All-Russian Congress received telegrams from the Western
front asking for delegates to come to the Tenth Army for confer-
ence with certain units of the army. In compliance with this request,
the Executive Committee delegated R. S. Verbo, A. A. Rosenberg,
N. D. Sokolov, and F. G. lasaitis to this work.

On July 2, this delegation arrived at its destination and had a
talk with the Committee of the Front and the Staff. It came out in
the conversation that certain units of the army had broken away
from the central organs of democratic Russia . . . and had refused
to obey orders. . . . They declared that they would not take part
in any offensive, or even obey any orders which might prepare for
the offensive. They gave as a reason that an offensive contradicts the
Idea of a defensive war, which the Russian democracy stood for.
The Committee of the Front had taken measures to explain to these
people the point of view of the Russian democracy. During the last
few weeks members of the Committee visited a number of regi-
ments. In most cases the visits were crowned with success, but in
others members of the Committee were told that the soldiers would
not recognize their authority, the Petrograd Soviet, or the Minister

1 "Riech," No. 166, July 31, 1917.
8 "Izvestiia," No. 101, July 8, 1917.

JULY EVENTS 433

of War, and would not go on the offensive. . . . They did not intend
to die, when there was freedom in Russia and a chance to get some
land. In concluding its report, the Committee emphasized the fact
that the situation in regiments 703 and 704 seemed to be quite
hopeless. ... It was also reported that during the period of "frater-
nization," members of the 7O3rd and 7O4th regiments quite often
visited the Germans and were visited by them, and that there was
reason to believe that a number of Germans were at that very time
in the [703, 704] regiments, dressed as Russian soldiers, but it was
difficult to get at the real facts, owing to lack of discipline in those
regiments. . . .

The Petrograd delegation decided to ... go to the 7O3rd regi-
ment . . . The regiment gathered on the open field . . . toward
eight o'clock on the evening [of July 3], Sokolov talked for an hour,
and Verbo followed him for forty minutes. . . . Neither of these
speeches was well received but there was order and attention. After
delegate lasaitis had made a few remarks, two of the local orators
made short replies, which were applauded. The last of these orators
ended his oration with these words : "We had already come to an
agreement among ourselves not to take the offensive, and here come
these speakers urging us to obey the order of Kerenski. From here
they will go to other parts of the front We must not allow this.
Let us arrest them. I shall be the first to do so." Saying this, he took
off his metal helmet and hit Verbo over the head . . . knocking him
down. ... He next struck Sokolov. The others, following his ex-
ample, threw themselves on Sokolov, beating him on the head until
he was covered with blood. . . . The question then arose what to do
with the delegates.

Some advised drowning; others, shooting; still others, hanging.
... In the meantime, the four delegates had been dragged into the
building of the regimental staff, where the question of what to do
with them was again up for discussion. ... It was decided to lock
them up temporarily. . . . These discussions dragged on until two
in the morning.

Toward five in the morning, a delegation arrived from the N.
regiment, where Sokolov was known. As soon as the N. regiment
learned what had happened, it called a meeting and sent word to
the 7O3rd regiment to free the men, or it would come armed and
do it. While 703 was deliberating, a similar ultimatum arrived from
another regiment, and pretty soon from the whole Seventh Division.
Finally a deputation came from the 7O4th regiment, and on express-

434 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

ing its indignation at what had been done, the delegates of the Petro
grad Soviet were at once released.

5. COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY AGITATION9

Yesterday the Central Executive Committee learned that in a
certain printing office Black Hundred proclamations were being pre-
pared ... [a search was made,] and the following appeal was
found set up in type :

"Misfortune has come upon us. The Germans have broken
through our front ; they have seized Tarnopol ; they have captured
our cannons, the same which the English gave us. Russia is faced
with defeat and humiliation. There are cowards in the army who
desert their posts and thereby help the enemy. Formerly the Rus-
sian soldier fought like a hero; now he runs. Think it over, and
honestly answer to yourself the question : What is the cause of all
this misery?

"The army and the rear are one. The restlessness in the rear has
made itself felt at the front. At the present time we have no govern-
ment; some one has stolen it. Who is the thief, who is it that betrays
and ruins Russia ? The power has been seized by the Central Com-
mittee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. It is this
body that appoints ministers. Who are these ministers ? The greater
number of them have been in prison. Among these are Tseretelli,
Shingarev, Chernov, and Nekrasov. They selected Kerenski as their
chief. He is a good orator, and brave, but after all he is chief of
convicts, and agrees with them. . . ."

6. RESTRICTION OF THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 10

As a temporary measure, the Provisional Government has author-
ized the Ministry of War and Ministry of the Interior, (i) to close
periodical editions which call on the people to disobey military orders,
to refuse to do military service, to use force and incite civil war,
and (2) to bring action against the editors.

* "Izvestiia," No. 116, July 26, 1917.
"Ibid.

CHAPTER XXXI
THE UKRAINE AND THE MINISTERIAL CRISIS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

At the very time that the July offensive was so pitifully
collapsing the Ukrainian question came up to worry and to break
up the Provisional Government. The "right of self-determina-
tion" was an old revolutionary cry and as soon as liberty was
proclaimed many of the nationalities in the Empire, particularly
the Finns, Poles and Ukrainians, began clamoring for independence
or autonomy. The Provisional Government took the stand that
the future relations of the nationalities with the Empire should
be determined by the Constituent Assembly. This view did not
please the political leaders and the nationalities who wished to have
their status settled at once. The Ukrainian question was compli-
cated by the fact that many thinking people were unconvinced
that the Little Russians were any different from the Great Rus-
sians. There was reason for believing that Austrian agents were
behind the agitation in order to disorganize the Russian Army and
to break up the Empire.

Until June members of the Provisional Government exchanged
opinions on the Ukrainian question without coming to an under-
standing. By that time the Ukrainian leaders lost patience and
undertook to force the issue. On June 24 they published a
"Manifest of the Ukrainian Rada." Five days later the Provisional
Government came out with an appeal to the Ukrainians not to act
hastily and to wait for the Constituent Assembly. As this appeal
failed in its purpose, Kerenski, Tseretelli and Tereschenko were
sent to Kiev, and as a result of their efforts a compromise was
reached. The Ukrainians gained political advantages but yielded
on the military side. When on their return the three Ministers
reported the results of their efforts the Cadets in the Cabinet re-
signed on the ground that the Provisional Government was usurp-
ing the rights of the Constituent Assembly.

436 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

i. THE MINISTRY OF WAR AND THE UKRAINIAN
CONGRESS 1

The 'Main Ukrainian Military Committee calls a congress of
Ukrainian army men to meet at Kiev on June 17. The Committee
asks the War Ministry to give orders to send delegates of Ukrainian
soldiers, sailors, officers, and officials.

The ministry does not look favorably on such a congress, which
might disorganize the army. A definite answer will not be given until
the return of Kerenski from the front. . . .

2. MANIFESTO OF THE UKRAINIAN RADA2

June 24, 1917.

"Without separating from Russia, and without breaking away
from the Russian State, let the Ukrainian people on its own terri-
tory have the right to dispose of its life, and let a proper Govern-
ment be established in the Ukraine by the election of a Ukrainian
National Assembly, a Diet, on the basis of universal, equal, direct,
and secret suffrage. Only such an assembly has the right to issue
laws which are to establish permanent order in the Ukraine, while
those laws which affect the entire Russian State must be issued by
an All-Russian Parliament No one knows better than ourselves
what we want, and what are the best laws for us. No one better
than our own peasants knows how to manage our own land.

For that reason we wish, after all private, State, Tsarist, Minis-
terial, and other lands have been handed over throughout Russia to
the various peoples, and after a constitution has been drawn up by
the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, that the constitution and
public order in our Ukrainian territories should be entirely in our own
hands, that is, in the hands of a Ukrainian Diet. . . . We thought
at first that the Central Russian Government would lend us a hand
in this work, and that we, the Ukrainian Central Rada, would be
able, in cooperation with it, to organize our country; but the Pro-
visional Russian Government has rejected our demands and has
refused the stretched-out hand of the Ukrainian people. We have
sent out delegates to Petrograd to submit to the Russian Provisional
Government our demands, the principal of which are as follows:

a"Izve$tna," No. 75, June 8, 1917.
a "The New Europe/' Vol. 4, 180-1.

JULY EVENTS 437

"That the Russian Government should publicly, by a special Act,
proclaim that it is not opposed to the national will of the Ukraine
and to the right of our people to autonomy.

"That the Central Russian Government should, for the decision
of all affairs affecting the Ukraine, have by its side our High Com-
missioner.

"That the local authority in the Ukraine itself should be vested
in the person of a Commissioner elected by ourselves, acting as the
representative of the Central Russian authority; and

"That a definite portion of the taxes collected from our people
into the State Exchequer should be handed over to us, the representa-
tives of the Ukrainian people, for cultural and national needs.

"All these demands have been rejected by the Central Russian
Government, which did not want to say whether it recognized our
people's right to autonomy and to dispose of its own life. It has
evaded a direct reply by referring us to the future All-Russian Con-
stituent Assembly. It has refused to have by its side our High Com-
missioner. It has refused to cooperate with us in bringing about a
new order in our country, and it has refused to appoint a Commis-
sioner for the Ukraine in order that we may administer our country
in harmony and in order.

"The Government further refuses to hand over to us the taxes,
collected from our people, for the needs of our schools and our
organization, and now the Ukrainian people has compelled us to
assume the entire responsibility. . . .

"It is for this reason that we are issuing this Universal Act to
our people, proclaiming that henceforth we alone shall regulate our
life. . . .

"The Central Rada hopes that the non-Ukrainian peoples living
on our land will also concern themselves with the maintenance 01
law and order in our country, and will, in this grave hour of gen-
eral political anarchy, cooperate cheerfully with us to organize the
autonomy of the Ukraine."

3. APPEAL OF PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT TO THE

UKRAINE8

UKRAINIAN CITIZENS! Jme *9' I9*7

In these trying days the Provisional Government turns to you in

the name of free Russia. Our country is passing through serious
* "Riech," No. 140, June 30,

438 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

trials to secure freedom, which will give the people happiness and
restore to all nationalities their rights.

The conquests of the revolution are in danger. If the external
foe crushes Russia, or if the [internal] enemies of freedom get
the upper hand, then the common cause of all nationalities living in
Russia is lost.

The [Provisional] Government has taken upon itself the task
of leading the country through these dangers until the meeting of
the National Constituent Assembly. At this gathering all the na-
tionalities of Russia will meet on an equal footing and will express
their desires openly and firmly. This is your task, citizens of the
Ukraine. Are you not a part of free Russia? Is not the fate of
the Ukraine bound up with the fate of all free Russia? Who can
doubt that Russia, standing under the banner of popular government,
will assure the rights of all nationalities living within her borders?

At the Constituent Assembly the nationalities, through their rep-
resentatives, can work out such forms of political and economic or-
ganization as will best answer their national aspirations.

The Provisional Government is bringing to life the cultural self-
determination of the nationalities in Russia ; and, feeling as it does
very friendly to the Ukrainians, and conscious of its obligation to
them, it will strive to wipe out all traces of their oppression.

The Provisional Government, has given thought to this question
and regards itself as obligated to come to an agreement with the
public-democratic organizations of the Ukraine on the temporary
measures to be adopted to provide the Ukraine with local self-gov-
ernment in schools and courts. These measures will pave the way
to the final form of government which the All-National Constituent
Assembly will decide upon.

It is not possible, however, to make over the Russian Govern-
ment and army while the enemy's guns are directed against us from
without and freedom is threatened from within.

Brother-Ukrainians ! Do not go on the ruinous road of splitting
up the forces of freed Russia. Do not tear yourselves away from our
common native land. Do not break up the common army in time of
danger. Do not introduce fratricidal quarrels in the ranks of the
people at the very time when all our strength is needed to defend the
country against the warlike foe and to put an end to internal dis-
turbances. In your impatience to carry through a form of govern-
ment for the Ukraine, do not inflict a mortal wound on the whole

JULY EVENTS 439

State and on yourselves. If Russia should perish, you would perish
with her.

Let all the nationalities of Russia draw closer together to ward
off the dangers threatening the country from within and from
without. Let the final solution of all fundamental problems be left
to the Constituent Assembly which is to meet in the not distant
future, and where the nationalities themselves will determine the
fate of Russia and the fate of its parts.

PRINCE Lvov,

Prime Minister.

4, DECLARATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
ON THE UKRAINIAN QUESTION 4

July 15, 1917

On the evening of July 15, there was a special secret session
of the Provisional Government at the home of Prime Minister
Prince Lvov to discuss the Ukrainian question. It was decided to
make the following declaration to the Ukrainian Rada :

• "After having heard the report of Ministers Kerenski, Tseretelli,
and Tereschenko on the Ukrainian question, the Provisional Gov-
ernment has come to the following decision :

"To appoint a General Secretariat as the highest organ for set-
tling of local questions in the Ukraine. The composition of this body
will be determined by the Government, in agreement with the
Central Ukrainian Rada. It should be supplemented by representa-
tives of democratic organizations of other [than Ukrainian] na-
tionalities living in the Ukraine. All matters relating to the Ukraine
and its government will be in the hands of this organ.

"The Provisional Government believes that the national-political
form of the Ukraine and the land problem, the way the land should
pass into the hands of the toilers, are matters for the decision of the
Constituent Assembly. It [Provisional Government] is therefore
deeply interested in the plans of the Ukrainian Central Rada for the
solution of the above indicated problems, which will be submitted
to the Constituent Assembly.

"While the war is going on, the Provisional Government regards

it as necessary to preserve the unity of the army. Nothing must be

done to destroy the unity of its organization and command, as, for

4"Riech," No, 154, July 17,

44Q DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

example, the changing of the present plans of mobilization into the
immediate formations of territorial units or the commanding by
public organizations* At the same time, the Government thinks it
possible to cooperate with the efforts to bring the Ukrainians in the
army together, or to form special Ukrainian units, in so far as such
attempts do not interfere with the efficiency of the army and meet
with the approval of the Minister of War,

"In order to work out a plan and to realize the above desire
at the present moment, the Provisional Government regards it as
feasible to invite, in agreement with the Central Rada, Ukrainian
army men to help in this task. These delegates will be attached to
the Ministry of War, to the General Staff, and to the Supreme
Commander-in-chief.

"As to the local Ukrainian Military Committees, they can carry
on their functions on general lines, but in harmony with other public
military organizations."

5. RESIGNATION OF MEMBERS OF THE CADET PARTY
FROM THE MINISTRY *

July 1 6, 1917

[At the meeting in Prince Lvov's home] the Cadet-ministers
announced that they were not satisfied with the text of the declara-
tion. It was neither clear nor complete. They also raised the point
that Tseretelli and Tereschenko were delegated to- go to the Ukraine
for the exclusive purpose of coming to an agreement with the
Ukrainians, but not to conclude a declarative act. As far as the act
as a whole was concerned, the Cadet-ministers said that they could
not accept it, because it put an end to the authority of the Provisional
Government in the Ukraine. It was, they said, for the Constituent
Assembly to determine the form of government, for the Ukraine,
and not for the Ukraine itself, as it appeared in the agreement
reached by Tseretelli and Tereschenko. In addition to the enumer-
ated objections, there were others, relating to the land question, na-
tional and social problems, etc.

Tseretelli and Tereschenko, supported by all the Socialist min-
isters, argued that the agreement reached at Kiev was final and no
changes could be allowed; that it cost them much labor to get
even that much; that there should not be so much fault-finding in
regard to details; that it was not a law but a declaration; and that
'"Riech," No. 154, July 17,

JULY EVENTS 441

it did not finally settle the Ukrainian question, but simply discussed
the limits of the autonomy, etc.

The Cadet-ministers insisted that the settlement of the ques-
tion belonged to the Constituent Assembly. After this debate, a vote'
was taken.

The Socialist ministers, Prime 'Minister Lvov, and Oberpro-
curator of the Synod, Lvov, voted in favor of accepting, without
change, the agreement reached at Kiev. Ministers Shakhovskoi,
Manuilov, Stepanov, and Godnev voted against it. They said that
they had no objection to the creation of a special regional organ
for the governing of the Ukraine until the meeting of the Constitu-
ent Assembly, but they could not agree to the publication of tfie
document as it stood.

When the objections raised by the Cadet-ministers were over-
ruled, ministers Shingarev, Manuilov, and Shakhovskoi announced
that in their opinion the agreement created a chaotic relation between
the Government and the organs of government in the Ukraine,
opened the door for the Rada to make of the Ukraine, in a legal
way, an autonomous state, and that under the circumstances, they
could not assume the responsibility, and therefore resigned from
the Cabinet. . . .

At one in the morning [July 16], the members of the Cadet party
left the meeting place. . . .

CADETS EXPLAIN THEIR RESIGNATION6

The Central Committee of the Party of Popular Freedom, having
been obliged to recall its representative from the Provisional Govern-
ment, considers it to be its duty to explain to the country why this
act was unavoidable at this trying moment for the country.

From the very first days of the revolution, the Party of Popular
Freedom was of the opinion that the only way to save the freedom
won and to drive off the enemy was to form a united national gov-
ernment, resting upon the population as a whole. When, therefore, at
the beginning of May, there came a call to form a so-called coalition-
ministry, the Party responded in the hope that such a government
would follow a middle course and carry out the national will. Un-
fortunately, it did not work out that way. The fundamental idea of
a coalition, an all-national agreement, was not realized in its true
form, and that explains why the coalition was incapable of giving
the country a united and strong government. In a large number of

• "Riech," No. 155, July 18, 1917.

442 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

questions, both foreign and domestic, which touched the principles
of unity and power of the Government, the members of the Party
of Popular Freedom were left in a minority. The latest and espe-
cially striking illustration of this was the approval of the Government
of the action of three members of the Government, who went to
Kiev for preliminary negotiations with the Ukrainian Rada, but
concluded a ready-made agreement, so that it was impossible to make
amendments to it. This was done notwithstanding the warnings given
by our colleagues as to its possible consequences.

In regard to the Ukrainian question, the Central Committee
admits the necessity of preparing a plan for the territorial autonomy
of the Ukraine for submission to the Constituent Assembly, and
the Committee has even started work on this measure. It is the opin-
ion of the Committee that the immediate creation of a local gov-
ernment, responsible to a local public organization with indefinite
authority over an undefined area, and the premature approval of
such a project of territorial autonomy by the Government, without
even knowing its contents, is inadmissible, because it is a most dan-
gerous precedent and contrary to the oath of the members of the
Government, which binds them to leave to the Constituent Assembly
the determination of the fundamental question relating to the future
State organization of Russia. The Central Committee takes the stand
that, in view of the fact that its adherents in the Government were
not given an opportunity to influence this act and harmonize it with
the State law and the interest of Russia, they should not bear the
responsibility and the consequences for it.

The Party of Popular Freedom holds that a united and strong
government can be formed either of one group of like-minded peo-
ple, or of different groups, if they agree for the general good, to com-
promise and to come to a mutual understanding on national funda-
mental questions. There can be no strong [coalition] government,
when the majority group tries to force its will on the minority.

The Party would like to believe that the Government about to
be formed will stand back of the offensive which has just com-
menced at the front, and will find some way to reestablish normal
life in the interior. The Party will support whole-heartedly the
Provisional Government in its efforts for the good of Russia and
in its fight against the external foes.

The heroic deeds of our army, which is making final, deter-
mined efforts to hasten peace by a mighty offensive, should call
forth the unconditional and steady support of all the citizens regard-

JULY EVENTS 443

less of party lines. Today, as heretofore, the Party of Popular Free-
dom urges all the people to stand together and fulfil their patriotic
duty for the sake of Russia's welfare, for the sake of her regenera-
tion and reconstruction on foundations of popular government and
social justice.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY OF POPULAR FREEDOM

CHAPTER XXXII
JULY UPRISING

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The utter failure of the military campaign and the resignation
of the bourgeois ministers strengthened the radical Socialists
who were against the offensive and the coalition. But now that
their objections and predictions had been justified they did not
know what to do. They, themselves, were not just then strong
enough to take over the Government, and to> put into life the
slogan "All Power to the Soviets" meant placing the power in
the hands of the moderate Socialists, who were almost as hateful
to the Bolsheviks as the Cadets. Lenin and some of the more
brainy Bolsheviks, who had not as yet the influence among their
followers they acquired later, held back. But while they hesitated
some of the hot-heads of the Bolsheviks and other irresponsible
persons got the soldiers and the workmen out on the street shout-
ing for "All Power to the Soviets" and "Down with the Capitalist
Ministers." It was only when the movement got under way that
the Bolsheviks, as a party, put themselves at the head of it and
controlled it as much as they could. It should be remembered
that by July they had not acquired the prestige which they
enjoyed in November, and that they were by no means all-
powerful.

The moderate Socialists and their Executive Committees did
their best to stop the demonstration but were unsuccessful. After
three days of turmoil, wild shooting, bringing of troops from the
front, Petrograd quieted down little by little.

The Bolsheviks were blamed for the uprising. Some of their
enemies published documents to prove that many of the Bolsheviks
were German agents. Feeling against Lenin aaid some of his
associates ran so high that they hid in Finland to escape arrest,

444

JULY EVENTS 445

i. THE "IZVESTIIA'S" ACCOUNT OF THE UPRISING1

Petrograd is again passing through tragic days, brought on in
part by the resignation of the three Cadet-Ministers — Shingarev,
Manuilov, and Shakhovskoi — and in part by the agitation of the
Bolsheviks.

Early in the morning [July 16], reports reached the Executive
Committee that the soldiers of the First Machine-Gun Regiment
had decided to come out on the street, armed, to demand the over-
throw of the Provisional Government. These soldiers worked in
groups throughout the city, seized whatever automobiles came in
their way, and called on the workers and soldiers to come out on
the street. The Executive Committee took immediate action to put
an end to this movement. It issued a special appeal and sent its mem-
bers and members of the Commission on Agitation to different parts
of the city. Notwithstanding these efforts, by five o'clock in the
afternoon the regiment above named, part of the Moscow, Pavlovsk,
and Grenadier regiments, came out, armed, and were joined by mobs
of workmen.

Near the Kshcsinski Palace

Parts of the First Machine-Gun, Moscow, and Grenadier regi-
ments, in full fighting order, with red banners and signs (the same
that they used on July I ) calling for the resignation of the bourgeois
Ministers, appeared before the Kshesinski palace, the headquarters
of the Bolsheviks, towards eight o'clock in the evening. The wings
of the palace were surrounded by machine-guns mounted on trucks
and armed automobiles. There was a constant stream of troops from
the Field of Mars, across the Troitski bridge, and on the Kamen-
nostrovski Boulevard. . . . The soldiers seemed to be very much in
earnest. In answer to questions, they said that they were going in
search of the Ministers, especially Kerenski. After a time this mass
broke up into smaller units, going in different directions — some to
the Mariinski palace, others to the Taurida palace, still others to
the Peter and Paul fortress. The two groups, first named, were fol-
lowed by men and women workers, waving flags and singing songs.
They were accompanied by mounted machine-guns,

*"Izve$tua," No, 108, July 17, 1917.

446 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

At the Taurida Palace

About 10:30 in the evening, the First Machine-Gun Regiment
came to the palace, called a meeting, and selected delegates to talk
things over with the Central All-Russian Committee of Soviets of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. In place of Chkheidze, who had
a sore throat, Voitinski addressed the men, as follows:

"Comrades, I greet you in the name of the All-Russian Execu-
tive Committee of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. I
know what brought you here. You fear that liberty is in danger,
that our liberty born in blood and pain is threatened by counter-
revolution. Comrades, believe me that tomorrow, when we have our
meeting, your requests will be taken into consideration. But I must
speak to you frankly, and you must listen to the truth. We represent
the whole revolutionary democracy, and if we do not agree with you,
that means that your requests are only your own requests. I, there-
fore, call upon you to accept the will of the whole democracy. If,
on the other hand, at tomorrow's meeting your idea wins, then all
honor and glory is yours, for it means that you foreshadow the
thought of all Russia."

After Voitinski, others spoke. The attitude of the men was
peaceful.

Attempt to Arrest the Ministers

At 9:40 P. M., there drove up to the home of Prince Lvov an
automobile with machine-guns and ten men, six of whom were
armed. They asked for all the Ministers in the house, and gave
notice that they would requisition all the automobiles of the Pro-
visional Government At this time the Ministers, Prince Lvov,
Tseretelli, Chernov, and Nekrasov, were having a conference, and
when they were told what the soldiers had said, Tseretelli offered
to go out and speak to them. But by the time he came out, the
automobile was nowhere in sight. Exactly at ten o'clock it reappeared,
but during the time that it took to call it to the attention of the
Ministers, the soldiers ran off with one of the two automobiles belong-
ing to the Provisional Government, which stood in the driveway.
When the porter protested and repeated Tseretelli's request not to
touch the machine, the soldiers said, "One automobile is enough for
them."

JULY EVENTS 447

Attempt to Seise Kerenski

At 7:45 P. M., six armed automobiles came to the Baltic rail-
way station in the hope of preventing Kerenski from going to the
front. He, however, had departed at six o'clock.

On the Corner of the Nevski and Nikolaev Streets

On the corner of these streets, the public stopped four automo-
biles and took away machine-guns from the soldiers and rifles from
the civilians. Those who followed the automobiles, fearing that they
too would be disarmed, fired off their rifles and machine-guns in
the air, and according to reports, some people were killed and
wounded. Farther down on the Nevski, near Ekaterinenski Canal,
there was some more shooting. In the panic that ensued, the public
ran in all directions, in some cases store windows were smashed
in order to get inside [public] buildings, and even in private houses.
In a very short time the Soviet posted guards at these broken
windows.

Stopping Work at the "Novoe Vremia"

At II : 30 P. M., four trucks with armed soldiers and machine-
guns came to the printing offices of the uNovoe Vremia" [news-
paper], told the workers to stop work, and threatened "to use more
serious measures," if their orders were not obeyed,

On the Nevski

About midnight an automobile, full of soldiers and machine-guns,
appeared on the Nevski near the Liteiny. Here was gathered a mob
of excited people who demanded that the soldiers should get off .and
disarm. The soldiers were called names — "inciters, traitors," etc.
The soldiers, of course, paid no attention to these demands. While
the argument was becoming heated, a shot was fired. Immediately
the mob scattered in great disorder. Army officers who happened to
be present shouted, "Lie down; they have machine-guns." Sure
enough, a moment later there was the crack of a machine-gun.
Fortunately, no one was hurt, and the automobile which fired on
defenseless people went on its way.

448 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Nikolaevski Station

About ii P. M., an automobile with machine-guns drove up.
Cossacks, who were there, stopped it. All the men in the automo-
bile were drunk.

Demands of the Soldiers

[Among the demands made by the soldiers were these] — Down
with the ten bourgeois Ministers ; all power to the Soviets of Work-
ers' and Soldiers' Deputies ; stop the offensive ; confiscate the bour-
geois press ; nationalize the land ; control industrial production. .

Cossacks Killed2

The Cossacks, with light artillery, started for the State Duma
at the order of the Commander-in-Chief. Near where the French
quay turns into the Liteiny, some one from the Liteiny bridge shot
off a gun and later a machine-gun. . . . (Just then a battalion of the
First Army came out from Shpalernaia into the Litemy and think-
ing that the Cossacks did the shooting, opened fire on them. The
armed mob fired from the opposite side, and in this manner the Cos-
sacks were caught in a cross fire.) Six of them were killed, twenty-
five wounded. Twenty-nine horses were left dead on the street.

Tatirida Palace 2

About 6 P. M., there was a mass meeting at the Taurida palace.
The 1 76th regiment surrounded the place. Some one fired a shot
and although the soldiers were fully armed, they started to run and
fire wildly. . . . Fifteen were wounded.

Total Killed and Wounded 2

According to the best information, 400 people were killed or
wounded on July 16 and 17.

2. STALIN'S REPORT ON THE JULY EVENTS MADE AT
THE BOLSHEVIK CONGRESS 8

August 9, 1917

The end of June and beginning of July were marked by a politi-
cal offensive. There were rumors of a return to capital punishment,

a "Izvestiia," No. 109, July 18, 1917.

* Vladimirova, V. ; "Revoliutsiia 1917 Goda," III, 307-8.

JULY EVENTS 449

the breaking up of certain regiments, and the brutal treatment of
others at the front. Delegates from the front reported arrests and
abuse in their ranks. The Grenadier and Machine-Gun regiments
made the same complaints. ... I am now coming to the part which
interests you most, the events of July 16-18.

At three in the afternoon of July 16, there was a general city
conference on municipal questions at the Kshesinski palace. All of
a sudden two delegates of the Machine-Gun regiment rushed in
shouting, "They are trying to disband us ; they are scheming against
us. We cannot wait longer and have decided to come out on the
street; we have sent delegates to the factories and regiments."

The presiding officer of the conference, Volodarski, announced
that the [Bolshevik] party had decided not to come out, for to the
Central Committee [of the party] it was clear that both the bour-
geoisie and Black Hundred were trying to get us to come out, in
order that they might throw on us the responsibility for the adven-
turous [military] offensive. We, on the other hand, had come to the
conclusion not be driven, to do nothing while the military operations
were on, but to wait until the war offensive became politically offen-
sive in the eyes of the masses, and the Provisional Government was
discredited. Volodarski told the delegates that the party had decided
not to corne out, and that members of the party in the regiment
should abide by this decision. The delegates went away protesting.

At four o'clock a meeting of the Central Committee was called
at the Taurida palace, which decided not to come out. I was in-
structed to report our decision to the Central Executive Commit-
tee [of the Soviet], This I did, and reported at the same time what
the delegates of the Machine-Gun regiment had told us. I proposed
that everything should be done to prevent the demonstration, and at
our request this proposition was recorded. The Socialist-Revolution-
ists and Mensheviks, who are now saying that we planned the up-
rising, seem to have forgotten this fact. At five o'clock, the city
conference took a stand against demonstration, and all the members
of the Conference returned to their wards and factories, with the
idea of keeping the masses in check. At seven o'clock, two regi-
ments, with banners, on which were the words, "All Power to the
Soviets," came to the Kshesinski palace. Two of our comrades,
Lashevich and Kuraev, spoke to them and asked them to return
to their barracks. The soldiers shouted, "Away with them!" —
something that had never before occurred. By that time there ap-
peared a crowd of workmen shouting, "All Power to the Soviets I"

450 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

It became quite evident that it was impossible to stop the demon-
stration. There was a hurried conference of members of the party,
and it was agreed to participate in the demonstration, to get the
soldiers and workers to work in an orderly manner, and go peace-
fully to the Taurida palace, select delegates, and through them make
their demands known. When this plan was announced to the soldiers,
they applauded and played the "Marseillaise." At ten o'clock, there
was a meeting of the Central Committee and members of the city
conference, representatives of the regiments and factories. It was
decided to repeal our previous stand, and to take part and control
the movement already begun. It would have been criminal just then
for the party to wash its hands of the whole affair. Having come
to an understanding, the Central Committee went to the Taurida
palace, in which direction the soldiers and workers were moving.
At that time there -was a meeting of the Labor Section of the
Soviet. Zinoviev raised the question as to the part it should take in
connection with the movement already under way. Considering all
the facts in the case, it was proposed that the Labor Section take
part and keep the movement orderly, for it was feared that without
guidance the mob might get out of hand. This question split the
Section. A third of the members were against the motion and left
the meeting ; the other two-thirds remained, and named a committee
of fifteen to act. At eleven o'clock, agitators and delegates reported
what was going on in their wards. The question was raised as to
July 17. It was moved not to have a demonstration, but the ma-
jority voted it down on the ground that it was Utopian. The demon-
stration would take place anyway. . . . Both the Central Executive
Committee and the Petrograd Soviet agreed to have a peaceful
demonstration on July 17. ...

3. LUNACHARSKI'S ACCOUNT OF THE JULY UPRISING4

In addition to the lack of a clear plan for action, there was also
something vague about the watchword, as was inevitable in the then-
prevailing state of affairs. The fact is that, with the exception of a
momentary vacillation, we [Bolsheviks] held firmly to the slogan
"All power to the Soviets !" at a time when the majority in the
Soviet was composed of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionists.
In practice, therefore, the slogan meant "All power to the party of
the Socialist-Revolutionists and Mensheviks." It was now even un-
'Piontkovski; "Khrestoraatiia," 150-1.

JULY EVENTS 451

certain whether we would join an all-socialist ministry, in case the
Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionists, contrary to our expecta-
tions, should consent to drive the capitalist ministers out of the
Government.

But what if they should consent? They might do so. What then?
It was quite evident at the time that an attempt to seize power by
the Bolsheviks was extremely risky and might lead to a temporary,
perhaps not very serious, defeat. For such an attempt the time was
not yet ripe, at least not in the provinces and at the front, and above
all in Moscow.

All these considerations led to vagueness and indecision. When
on the morning of July 17, I found myself, together with Lenin and
Sverdlov, at the Kshesinski palace, and joined them in encouraging
from the balcony the endless files of armed soldiers and workmen
passing by, I clearly realized that, after all, no one could predict
how the day would end.

Jacob Mikhailovich [Sverdlov], with his stentorian voice, shouted
to the various detachments coming to a halt before the balcony to
"Demand the expulsion of the capitalist ministers from the Gov-
ernment/' and "All Power to the Soviets!" or "We are going- to
demand of the Soviets that they take the whole power into their own
hands. Should they refuse to do that, the situation would become
clear. Then wait for further slogans."

We are bound to admit that the Party knew no way out of the
difficulty. It was compelled to demand of the Mensheviks and So-
cialist-Revolutionists, through a demonstration, something they were
organically unable to decide upon, and, meeting with the refusal the
Party had expected, it did not know how to proceed further; it
left the demonstrators around the Taurida palace without a plan and
gave the opposition time to organize its forces, while ours were
breaking up; and consequently we went down to temporary defeat
with eyes quite open. '

METELEV'S ACCOUNT — AT THE TAURIDA PALACE *

In serried ranks, we approach the Taurida Palace. . . *
The driveway and the square adjoining the Taurida palace are
blocked by the people. We stop in Shpalernaia Street, and we request
the crowd to press as close as possible around the platform erected
at the main entrance to the palace. On the platform, greeted by the
silence of the masses, appears the President of the Central Executive
f Piontkovski ; "Khrestomatiia," 151-2.

452 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Committee, Chkheidze. In a hoarse voice, he tries to calm the masses,
promising to consider the demands of the soldiers and workers who
have come to. the palace, and to do everything that the Central
Executive Committee can do.

Chkheidze's speech is interrupted several times by outcries of
protest, the masses demanding a definite answer to the question:
Will the Central Executive Committee take the governmental power
into its own hands? Chkheidze, avoiding a direct answer, advises
the gathering to disperse to their homes, and to wait patiently for
what "their" organ, the Central Executive Committee, will do. But
this proposal starts even more noise and protests among the masses.
They do not want to listen any longer to the empty phrases about
"live forces," "democracy," and so on and so forth, of which they
have grown tired during these four months.

The confused "head of the All-Russian revolutionary" organ
leaves the • platform, which is then taken by representatives of the
factories and of the Machine-Gun regiment. The speakers declare
that the workers and soldiers have come here to announce to the Cen-
tral Executive Committee that they can no longer remain calm spec-
tators, while the Government helps the bourgeoisie fill its pockets
by trafficking, wholesale and retail, in the blood of the laboring
masses.

"We demand peace, bread, liberty I" the orators declare, "the ces-
sation of the war, publication of the secret treaties, organization of
workers' control, confiscation of all privately owned lands for the
benefit of the peasantry, and the complete removal of the bourgeoisie
from power. We demand an end to the exploitation of our strength
and the reckless traffic in our blood. To realize these objects, it is
necessary, first of all, that the governmental power should pass to .
the Soviets. ... All Power to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers',
and Peasants* Deputies!"

More and more detachments of men and women workers, and
soldiers keep arriving before the palace. Light artillery is also ap-
proaching, and its commander announces that all the batteries in his
division will join the workers. In other places around the palace,
more platforms are quickly put up. Before the masses appears Zino-
viev, who wants Chkheidze to realize at last that the clamor for
Soviet rule is that of large masses and not the invention of single
individuals. Riazanov makes a speech in which he urges the masses
to be firm and not to disorganize their ranks in these days of mighty

JULY EVENTS 453

events. A number of other men take the platform. Shpalernaia
Street is filling with army reservists of the oldest classes, carrying
on their banners inscriptions demanding that they be allowed to go
home.

4. ATTEMPTS TO RESTORE ORDER

(a) APPEALS OF SOVIETS TO SOLDIERS 6

Comrade-Soldiers:

Both the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies and the All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Depu-
ties have agreed that, while the war is on, the Russian army must
be strengthened and put in condition either to take a defensive posi-
tion or to assume the offensive. The workers, soldiers, and peasants,
who came from different parts of Russia and of the front, recog-
nized that the place and time of the offensive was a matter for the
decision of those in command.

Those in command, acting directly under the orders of our com-
rade, Minister of War, Kerenski, have given orders to take the offen-
sive. The revolutionary army on the southwest front is heroically
carrying out this order, knowing that by so doing, it is serving the
cause of freedom, peace, and revolution.

The offensive is on. Our brothers are shedding their blood for
the common cause. This is the time for all quarrels to cease. It is
the duty of all to help those who are facing the enemy's fire. Not
to come to their assistance now is to hand them over to the enemy, to
betray the country and the revolution.

Yet there are papers which, by their articles and appeals, trouble
the hearts of those who are ready to hasten to the aid of the heroic
army, and weaken their enthusiasm to support the soldiers on the
Southwest front

Know, comrades, that these papers, whether they call themselves
"Pravda" [Truth] or "Soldatskaia Pravda" [Soldiers' Truth] are
not truly representing the will of the workers, peasants, and soldiers,
as it was clearly expressed by them at their All-Russian Congresses.
Know, comrades, that very often spies and the old police gang make
use of these thoughtless articles and appeals to do their dirty work,
* "Izvestiia," No. 108, July 17, 1917.

454 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

to make you betray your brothers who are sacrificing themselves for
the common good.

Comrade- Warriors !

In the name of the All-Russian Soviets of Workers', Soldiers',
and Peasants' Deputies, we say to you : Listen only to the calls of the
All-Russian Soviets. Obey all the war orders of your military com-
manders. Be ready to go to the assistance of your brothers at the
first call !

Let them know that all revolutionary Russia is back of them!

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN SOVIETS OF
WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES AND SOVIET OF
PEASANTS' DEPUTIES

July 1 8, 1917
Comrade Workers and Soldiers: 7

Yesterday several Ministers, belonging to the Cadet party, re-
signed. In view of this, there was a joint meeting of the Executive
Committees of the All-Russian Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and
Peasants' Deputies, the fully authorized organs of the revolutionary
democracy of all Russia, to act in the crisis. But this work was in-
terrupted, notwithstanding the repeated warnings of the Soviet of
Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies.

Certain units of the army came out on the streets with arms in
their hands, in an attempt to get control of the city. They seized
automobiles, arrested individuals, and acted in a high-handed and
threatening manner. At the Taurida palace, they demanded that the
Executive Committees should take all power. Having offered power
to the Soviets, they were the first to encroach upon it. The All-
Russian Executive organs of the Soviets indignantly refuse to yield
to force. It is outrageous that a part of the garrison in one city
should attempt to force its will on the whole of Russia.

On those who dared to call out an armed uprising lies the
blood that was shed on the streets of Petrograd. It is a betrayal
of our revolutionary army, which is defending the revolution at the
front He who stirs up trouble in the rear against the organs of
democracy and brings about civil war in its ranks, is sticking a dagger
in the back of the revolutionary army which is fighting the soldiers
of William.

The All-Russian organs of the Soviets protest against these evil
* "Izvestiia," No, 109, July 18, 1917.

JULY EVENTS 455

signs of undermining popular government, even the Constituent
Assembly. The All-Russian organs of the Soviet demand that these
shameful uprisings in revolutionary Petrograd be put to an end, once
for all. The Executive Committees of the All-Russian Soviets of
Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies call on all those who
stand guard over the revolution and its conquests to await the decision
of the fully empowered organs of democracy on this governmental
crisis. All those to whom the -cause of freedom is dear will accept
the decision as the voice of all revolutionary Russia.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES OF ALL-RUSSIAN SOVIET OF
WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES AND SOVIET
OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES

(&) APPEAL OF THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONISTS8

July 18, 1917
IN BATTLE YOU WILL WIN YOUR RIGHT.

To all Socialist-Revolutionists of the City of Petrograd:

At this dangerous moment, when the conquests of the revolution
are being threatened, the party calls. you to its standards. The Petro-
grad Committee has resolved that:

All the members of the party must by every means support the
measures taken by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet
of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies. Enough manifesta-
tions! Enough wild turmoil! Enough idle and senseless parading
in the streets ! Enough shedding of brothers' blood ! The revolution
needs' discipline and the firm union of all the workers and soldiers
of Petrograd. Every member of the party is duty bound at factory,
company, and battalion meetings, at street meetings, and in single
groups, to restrain the masses from ill-considered actions, such as
have already resulted in a criminal shedding of blood.

No one has the right to refuse to carry out this obligation. All
ward committees will establish connection with factories and army
units, and maintain constant guard. The members of the party are
to report to the ward committees for information and instructions.
All Socialist-Revolutionist soldiers and sailors are to report to the
ward committees all incitements to trouble, and demand that those so
inciting shall produce documents to identify them, and the wards will
report to the Pefrograd Committee. All available speakers, and
*Piontkovski; "Khrestomatiia," 160-1.

456 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

workers and soldiers capable of addressing meetings, must place
themselves at the disposal of the Committee.

The party demands of all its members absolute and undivided
submission to revolutionary discipline.

The present proclamation is to be made known to workers and
soldiers at all gatherings and meetings, partizan as well as public.
THE PETROGRAD COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY OF
SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONISTS

TO ALL MEN AND WOMEN WORKERS:

Comrades!

The sad and sinister events in Petrograd, which have also partly
affected the provinces and the front, oblige all of us to consider
more seriously the fate of the Russian revolution and the problems
of the working class.

What happened in Petrograd during the days of July 16-18?

The armed action of several regiments, led by unscrupulous agi-
tators of the Bolshevik Party, and in some cases simply by adven-
turers, attracted into the streets, also, a section of the workers. All
demanded, in a threatening manner, the overthrow of the Provisional
Revolutionary Government and the transfer of all power to the con-
trol of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies.

The Taurida palace, where the Central Executive Committees of
the Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies were in session, was
besieged with bayonets and machine-guns. Violence was done to
individual members of the Committees, and even to Comrade
Chernov.

Groups of soldiers, joined by notorious spies and agents provoca-
teW$, drove about the streets in stolen automobiles and fired upon
the citizens with rifles and machine-guns.

As a result, there are scores of killed, hundreds of wounded,
enormous losses through the strike, looted stores and residences, more
bitterness against the workers by the petty bourgeoisie, and an alarm-
ing consolidation of counter-revolutionary forces.

Those who threateningly demanded the transfer of power to the

Soviets proved that they themselves do not respect these Soviets.

The Bolsheviks and Anarchists did everything in their power, at

first, to undermine confidence in the Soviets, refused to abide by their

"Piontkovski; "Khrestomatiia," 161-4.

JULY EVENTS 457

decisions, fought them in every way, and then demanded that these
same Soviets should seize all the power in the country.

They announced as their watchword, "Down with the capitalist
ministers !" but in reality they incited the ignorant masses against the
Soviets, which support the Provisional Government, and against the
Socialist parties and their leaders.

And now all this is being utilized by the secret as well as open
enemies of the revolution, beginning with the Black Hundreds, agents
provocateurs, and German spies, and ending with the bourgeoisie
and the bourgeois press, who are anxious to restrain, stop, and even
turn back altogether, the revolution. They attack in one breath the
Socialists, the Soviets, and the Provisional Government, where
Socialists play such an important part.

And the Black Hundreds and spies, who at first came out with
with the slogans of the Leninites and Anarchists, now openly engage
in counter-revolutionary, pogrom agitation. And the worst of it is that
the ignorant masses are beginning to pay attention to them. The
soldiers at the front and the masses in the rear are exhausted by
the terrible three-year carnage and by the grave economic chaos.
Their patience is almost exhausted, and they listen favorably to
every incitement to mistrust, to seizure of power, land, and factories.

The Leninites promised the masses an early peace and bread,
and the masses followed them. Today, disillusioned with the Lenin-
ites, these masses may turn th£ir wrath on all the Socialists, and
begin to listen to those who will, in a similar manner, whisper all
kinds of promises in their ears and at the same time put the blame
for all calamities and misfortunes upon the entire democracy, the
Soviets, and the revolution.

The revolution is in danger, comrade- workers ! You have started
it, and you must save it, for there is not another class that needs
so much the liberties won in the revolution, as the working class.

What threatens the revolution most of all?

It is the war, — the principal cause and source of all the calamities
we are now suffering.

But all Russians are agreed that it is impossible to end the war
by a separate peace with Germany. Peace must be general. Only
such a peace will serve the common interests of all nations. We
are not going to secure peace by urging the already launched offensive
to stop by disorganizing the army, as the Leninites have done.
Their tactics are a direct stab in the back of those who are perish-
ing* by the thousands on the battlefields* It has already resulted in

458 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

serious military defeats; it will cause mutual bitterness, fratricidal
hatreds among the soldiers at the front, disintegration of the revolu-
tionary army, and perhaps, a new invasion by Hindenburg.

No, at this time, when the whole Russian democracy and the
Russian Government have come out in favor of peace on a democratic
basis, all our incessant appeals should be directed not to our army,
which is doing its difficult duty to the revolution, and which we
are all bound to aid to the limit of our strength, but to the European
democracy, to the workers of the Allied as well as enemy coun-
tries, that they may at last compel their governments to accept our
basis for peace. . . .

Not fraternizing at the front, but the fraternization of the prole-
tarians of all countries at an international Socialist conference, a com-
mon struggle for peace, will end the war. These are the objects to
which all our thoughts should be devoted.

The other peril threatening the revolution is our internal chaos,
the disruption of our entire economic life, the imminent famine,
and unemployment. Will that seizure of power which the Leninites
propose help in this case? No, because no seizure whatever will
furnish bread to the people ; on the contrary, it will merely aggravate
the general disorganization, will create a panic, that is, an absurd,
senseless fear, mutual distrust, and bitterness. And that slogan, "All
Power to the Soviets !" which many workers follow, is a dangerous
one. The Soviets are supported only by a minority of the population,
and we must strive by all means to have those bourgeois elements,
which are, still able and willing to defend with us the conquests of the
revolution, take over with us the difficult legacy which has been left
to us by the old regime, and the enormous responsibility for the
fate of the revolution, which rests upon us in the sight of the nation.

This is why the conduct Of the Cadet Party must be regarded as
treacherous and criminal. It refused to submit to the demands of the
democracy and deserted the Government, so as to leave the still
inadequately organized and struggling revolutionary democracy, but
especially the proletariat, to fight alone against chaos and the growing
counter-revolution. Equally treacherous and criminal is the conduct
of the industrialists, who are secretly contributing to the disorgani-
zation of economic life, so as to force the helpless working class to
accept their own terms. . . . But what our opponents desire cannot
be to our advantage.

While refusing to seize all the power, we must take into con-
sideration the growing economic disintegration, and the bankruptcy

JULY EVENTS 459

that threatens the State. We must carefully weigh the demands
that are to be presented, and we must not act in a disjointed manner,
but only under the guidance of our trade unions, so that the struggle
with the industrialists may not lead to the destruction of industry
itself.

This is why it should be our immediate aim to help the State in
its struggle against the economic chaos by means of regulation and
control of industry. Mere criticism and shouting, "Down with the
Capitalists!" will get us no bread.

Pressure must be exerted upon the organs of the Government,
but we ourselves must also show independent action, display creative
ability and initiative.

Organization, close rallying around our organizations, around
the Soviets, around our elected representatives in the municipal
councils, these must be our principal means of combating the chaos.

Lastly, the third peril which endangers our revolution and our
freedom is the union of all the dark forces, of all the secret and
open counter-revolutionists.

Counter-revolution can derive strength only from mass support;
without it, the counter-revolutionists are not formidable. In order
that the masses may not succumb to the agitation of the enemies of
the revolution and the people, we need incessant educational and
organizational activity. The best way to disarm the counter-revolution
is to combat and overcome ignorance and darkness in our own ranks
by extensive and intensive participation in trade unions, educational
organizations, cooperative societies, and, especially, in our own Social-
Democratic Party.

We, Menshevik Social-Democrats, warned you continuously,
comrade-workers, against the ruinous tactics of the Leninites and
Anarchists.

You have convinced yourselves that we were right. Join, then, the
ranks of the Menshevik organizations. Only [by being] a large, well-
organized and powerful party, shall we be able to save the country
and lead it safely to the Constituent Assembly. Only then will the
voice of the working class make itself impressively heard and felt
in the Constituent Assembly, which will settle the future of Russia
for many years to come. To work, comrades! Everybody join the
unions and our Party!

Long live the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party !
THE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-
DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY

460 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

(d) PRINCE LVOV EXPLAINS10

Telegram sent by the Prime Minister to the Gwberniia Commis-
sars on July 17, 1917-

In reply to the alarming inquiries, the Ministry of the Interior
notifies you that the rumors of the arrest of the Provisional Govern-
ments are without foundation. The report that there was an armed
fight between the troops until noon of July 17 is equally untrue.
The call to overturn the Government by an armed uprising, and
to hand all the power to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies came from an irresponsible, radical minority and was re-
ceived in a hostile manner by the masses of the inhabitants. The
Executive Committees have publicly denounced this uprising as
inimical to the interest of the revolution. 'Moreover the Provisional
Government, with Prince Lvov at the head, in full agreement with
the Executive Committees of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers',
and Peasants' Deputies, is taking measures to ward off events that
might be harmful to the State as a whole. The occurrences of yes-
terday and today have temporarily interrupted the discussion in
regard to the formation of a full government, but just as soon as
order is once more restored, the discussions will be renewed with
the idea of organizing a ministry of the same political complexion as
the former one. This plan has the full approval of the Executive
Committees of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants'
Deputies.

PRINCE Lvov
Prime Minister and Minister of Interior.

(0} TROTSKl'S LETTER TO THE PROVISIONAL COVER N(M ENT u

July 23, 1917
Citizen Ministers:

I have learned that in connection with the events of July 16-17,
a warrant has been issued for the arrest of Lenin, Zinoviev, and
Kamenev, but not for me. I should like, therefore, to call your atten-
tion to the following:

i. I agree with the main thesis of Lenin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev,
have advocated it in the journal "Vpered" and in my public speeches.

* "Izvestiia," No. in, July 20, 1917.
M Trotski, L,, 1917, I, 165-6.

JULY EVENTS 461

2. My attitude toward the events of July 16-17 was the same
as theirs.

a. Katnenev, Zinoviev, and I first learned of the proposed
plans of the Machine-Gun and other regiments at the joint meet-
ing of the Bureaus [Executive Committees] on July 16. We took
immediate steps to stop the soldiers from coming out. Zinoviev
and Kamenev put themselves in touch with Bolsheviks, and I
with the "interward'1 organization to which I belong.

&. When, however, notwithstanding our efforts, the demon-:
stration did take place, my comrade Bolsheviks and I made
numerous speeches in front of the Taurida palace, in which we
came out in favor of the main slogan of the crowd : "All Power
to the Soviets/' but we, at the same time, called on those demon-
strating, both the soldiers and civilians, to return to their homes
and barracks in a peaceful and orderly manner.

c. At a conference which took place at the Taurida p-alace
late in the night of July 16-17 between some Bolsheviks and ward
organizations, I supported the motion of Kamenev that everything
should be clone to prevent a recurrence of the demonstration on
July 17. When, however, it was learned through the agitators,
who arrived from the different wards, that the regiments and fac-
tory workers had already decided to come out, and that it was
impossible to hold back the crowd until the government crisis
was over, all those present agreed that the best thing to do was to
direct the demonstration along peaceful lines and to ask the masses
to leave their guns at home.

d. In the course of the day of July 17, which I spent in the
Taurida palace, I and the Bolshevik comrades more than once
urged this course on the crowd.

3. The fact that I am not connected with the "Pravda" and am
not a member of the Bolshevik Party is not due to political differ-
ences, but to certain circumstances in our party history which have
now lost all significance.

4. The attempt of the papers to convey the impression that I
said that I have "nothing to do" with the Bolsheviks has about as
much truth in it as the report that I have asked the authorities to
protect me from the 'Violence of the mob/' or the hundred other
false rumors of that same press.

5. From all that I have said, it is clear that you cannot logically
exclude me from the warrant of arrest which you have made out for

462 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Lenin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev. There can also be no doubt in your
minds that I am just as uncompromising a political opponent of
the Provisional Government as the above named comrades. Leaving
me out merely emphasizes the counter-revolutionary high-handedness
that lies behind the attack on Lenin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev.

LEV TROTSKI

PART IX
"SAVE THE REVOLUTION" GOVERNMENT

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The July offensive, the resignation of the Cadet Ministers,
and the uprising greatly weakened the Provisional Government.
When, on July 21, Prime Minister Lvov laid down his office, it
seemed as if chaos had come to reign. These July events clearly
demonstrated that the Provisional Government was defenseless at
the front and helpless in the rear. The moderate Socialists on
whom fell, from now on, all the burdens of government, were
caught between the bourgeois legalists and the Bolshevik theorists.
With each day the former grew weaker and the latter stronger,
so that it bcame actually a struggle between two groups of
Socialists.

The position of the Cadets and the Socialists had been com-
pletely reversed in the course of the four months that had passed.
In March the bourgeoisie were in control of the Provisional
Government and asked the support of the Socialists who promised
it "in so far as" the Provisional Government carried out the pro-
gram of the Socialists. After -July the Socialists controlled the
Provisional Government and asked the support of the Cadets, who
promised it "in so far as" the Government carried out their pro-
grain. The program of the Cadets and their associates was to go
on with the war to a victorious end and to stand still, at least
until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, with fundamental
political and social changes. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand,
insisted that the war be brought to a close at once and urged, as a
means to that end, fundamental political and social changes. The
Provisional Government tried to steer a middle course but not-
withstanding all its efforts it found that the strong revolutionary
current was forcing it more and more to the Left After the May
disturbances it had to admit a large number of Socialists into the

463

464 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Cabinet and swallow Chernov's land committees; after the July
uprising it bound itself to "establish a democratic republic, carry
out some of the delayed legislation on land, labor, local self-
government. . . ." All of these measures, according to the Cadets
and Prince Lvov, came under the jurisdiction of the Constituent
Assembly and not the Provisional Government.

Kerenski succeeded Lvov as Prime Minister. When the new
Premier proceeded to reconstruct his Cabinet, he ran into diffi-
culties. He believed in a coalition government on both theoretical
and practical grounds. On theoretical grounds because he feared
that, being so very impressionable, the revolution would be led
astray by one side or the other; on practical grounds because he
realized that the trained men needed to carry on the affairs of
government were to be found only in the bourgeois camp. When,
however, he invited the Cadets to join the Ministry, they laid
down a number of conditions, such as that no fundamental
changes be made, that the war be pushed on vigorously, and that
neither Provisional Government nor any of its Ministers be
responsible to the Soviet. Though favoring a coalition govern-
ment, the moderate Socialists could not accept these conditions.
Unable to move forward, the Ministers one by one, including
Kerenski, retreated and resigned. For a moment there was no
Provisional Government This situation frightened the moderate
•Socialists and Cadets. They came together for a heart to heart
talk and, after separating, the Socialists authorized "Comrade
Kerenski to form a Cabinet, made' up o-f representatives of differ-
ent parties which stand by the program adopted by the Provisional
Government over which Kerenski presided and proclaimed on
July 21"; the Committee of the Duma urged that "all should
unite for one purpose — to save the country . . . [and that] all
party and class interests and disagreements should disappear"
and entrusted Kerenski with the task of forming a Ministry; and
the Cadets passed a resolution "to empower A. F. Kerenski to
form a Provisional Government, which shall stand on an All-
National platform and which shall be made up of men who are
not responsible before any organization or committees." In ac-
cepting the responsibility Kerenski made one of those declara-
tions which could be interpreted differently by the different
parties. On August 6 the Second Coalition Ministry was formed

CHAPTER XXXIII

STEPS TOWARD ORGANIZATION OF NEW
GOVERNMENT

i. JOINT MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES l

My 17, 1917

Having taken into consideration the crisis brought on by the
resignation of the three Cadet-Ministers from the cabinet, the
Executive Committees in joint meeting have come to the conclusion
that there is nothing in this event that should cause the revolutionary
democracy to withdraw its support from the Provisional Government.
On the other hand, the resignation of these men gives the democracy
a reason for examining its relation to the organized government at
this historical moment.

Even in the ordinary course of revolutionary development, such
a question would have had to be discussed by the full Executive
Committees of Soviets of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Depu-
ties, together with local representatives. This is especially necessary
now, in view of the present governmental crisis, when a part of the
Petrograd garrison and workers attempted to force the will of the
minority upon the governmental organs of the revolutionary democ-
racy, by means of an armed uprising leading to civil strife in the
ranks of democracy.

In view of these circumstances, this meeting resolves to call
together, in the course of two weeks, a full attendance of the Execu-
tive Committees of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies, to-
gether with local representatives, to act on the question of the organi-
zation of a new government, and the temporary filling of vacancies
caused by these resignations, which is being done in agreement with
the Central Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies, and the Executive Committee of All-Russian Soviets of
Peasants' Deputies.

Being the guardian of the will of the Ail-Russian democracy, this
meeting takes the stand that until the full attendance of the Execu-

1 "Izvestiia," No. in, July 20, 1017.

465

466 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

tive Committees, the carrying on of the affairs of State should be
left in the hands of the present Government, which should be guided
by the resolutions of the Ail-Russian Congresses of the Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies and the All-Russian Soviets of Peasants' Depu-
ties. Whether all the power should go to the Soviets can be decided
only by the full meeting of the Executive Committees.

2. RESOLUTION OF THE MENSHEVIKS AND SOCIALIST-
REVOLUTIONISTS 2

My 20, 1917

On the night of July 20, there was a meeting, behind closed
doors, of the Central Executive Committee and the Executive Com-
mittee of Peasants' Deputies. Tseretelli made a report on the condi-
tion of the country and on the sad events of July 16 and 17.

After a number of other speeches, the following resolution, pro-
posed by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionists, was adopted
by a very large majority :

1. The armed uprising against the Provisional Government has
caused an abrupt change in the attitude of the masses. This uprising
was prepared by the Anarchists and Bolsheviks, but under their Hag
were also the dark forces, inciters, and -Black Hundreds. This situa-
tion shows that the country is in a real danger of a counter-revolu-
tion. On the other hand, the measures to which the Government
and military forces (in agreement with the All-Russian Central
Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies and the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet
of Peasants' Deputies) has resorted to to crush the uprising of July
16-18, prepare the ground for the counter-revolutionary dema-
gogues. Just now they call for the restoration of revolutionary order,
but they may attempt to establish a military dictatorship.

2. In view of this threatening danger, it is necessary that the
safeguarding of revolutionary freedom and order should be taken
in hand at once by the Provisional Government, in agreement with
the Central Executive Committee, and with the cooperation of the
revolutionary democratic organs — political parties, workers1 and
soldiers' organizations, and organs of local government. Special
measures may be taken toward individuals, but not toward
political parties, or movements as a whole. In every case, every one
should be entitled to legal protection. Only in this way is it possible

a"Izvestiia," No. 112, July 21, 1917.

"SAVE THE REVOLUTION" GOVERNMENT 467

to reduce to a minimum extraordinary measures, to obviate pogroms
and taking the law into one's own hands, and to put an end, in time,
to all counter-revolutionary attempts.

3. While taking energetic measures to reestablish revolutionary
order, it is necessary to declare that the revolution is in danger, and,
without loss of time, to put into life the measures indicated by the
All-Russian Congress of Soviets, aiming to wipe out all traces
of the old regime, establish a democratic republic, carry out some
of the delayed legislation on land, labor, local self-government, prepa-
ration for tfye elections of the Constituent Assembly, regulation of
the economic life of the country, and, in particular, the food question.

3. DECLARATION OF THE PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT 8

July 21, 1917
Citizens:

The terrible hour is here. The forces of the German Emperor
have broken through the front of the Russian national revolutionary
army. In this they were helped by the light-mindedness and blind
fanaticism of some, the treachery and betrayal of others. The former,
as well as the latter, have been threatening the very foundations of
newly freed Russia with ruin and disintegration. At this critical mo-
ment, when the counter-revolutionary forces that have been in hiding
are in a position to take advantage of the general turmoil, the reor-
ganized Provisional Government fully realizes the responsibility
with all its heavy burden which falls upon its shoulders. But the
Government has firm faith in the might of the great Russian people ;
it believes in the rapid recovery of the political life of the country,
now that the contagious disease which has undermined the people's
constitution has come to the surface and has ended in an acute crisis.
The Provisional Government believes that this crisis will lead to
life and not to death.

Believing strongly in this, the Provisional Government is ready
to act and will act with all the energy and determination that the
extraordinary times require. Its first and fundamental task is to con-
centrate its forces against the external foe and against the anarchists
and counter-revolutionists in their attempts to upset the internal order.
The Provisional Government will stop at nothing to bring this about.
In regard to its foreign policy, the Government wishes to repeat
'"Izvestiia," No. 113, July 22, 1917.

468 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

what it has said again and again: that the revolutionary army can
go into the battle with the fullest assurance that not a drop of Rus-
sian blood will be shed for aims that are against the ideals of the
Russian democracy, as openly expressed before the world in its
peace formula.

With these objects in mind, and on the basis of the declaration
of its foreign policy made on May 19, the Provisional Government
plans to propose to the Allies that they have a conference some time
in August to discuss their foreign policies, in the light of the prin-
ciples put forward by the Russian revolution. At this conference,
Russia's spokesmen will be not only the diplomats but the repre-
sentatives of the Russian democracy.

In other fields of State activity, the Provisional Government
will likewise be guided by the declaration of May 19.

The Provisional Government will see to it that the elections for
the Constituent Assembly take place on time, September 30, and
that the preparatory measures be finished in good season, so as to
make it possible to have orderly and free elections.

One of the most important internal undertakings of the Gov-
ernment is to work out and put into force as quickly as possible a
system of local self-government on the basis of universal, direct,
equal, and secret suffrage. The Provisional Government attaches
great importance to the idea that the local self-government bodies
should have the confidence of all the population. For that reason it
is now inviting public organizations to form local governments by
means of uniting the guberniias into larger units, administered by
collegiate organs of government.

In its striving to carry out consistently the principles of civic
equality, the Provisional Government will abolish in the near future
all class distinction, all ranks, orders of merit, except those earned
on the field of battle.

For the purpose of fighting the economic disorganization and
taking measures for further protection of labor, it is necessary to
form, under the Provisional Government, an economic council and
main economic committee to proceed at once to work out a general
plan for organizing the national economy and labor, to draw up
laws for regulating the economic life and industry, and to work out
practical plans for carrying out these laws. There are already worked
out, and soon will be published, a number of labor laws dealing with
the freedom of labor unions, employment bureaus, and arbitration
boards. There are being prepared measures on an eight-hour day, all

SAVE THE REVOLUTION" GOVERNMENT 469

kinds of labor safeguards, all kinds of social insurance for all kinds
of hired labor.

The agrarian measures of the Provisional Government are now,
as formerly, based on the conviction that the principle underlying
land reform should be to hand it over to the toilers, which is in
accordance with the fundamental needs of our economic life, the
often repeated wishes of the peasants, and the programs of all
democratic parties. It is with this in mind that a land reform law
is being prepared for the consideration of the Constituent Assembly.

The Provisional Government will in the near future proceed
with the following measures :

1. Put a complete stop to the former land policy which disorgan-
ized and ruined the villages.

2. Enact measures which will give the Constituent Assembly
full freedom in disposing of the land- fund of the country.

3. Regulate the land relations with an eye to the national defense
and the food question of the -country. This can be done by widening
the scope of and strengthening the land committees formed by the
State. Their power to settle land questions should be defined by law.
They should not touch upon the problem of private land ownership,
which the Constituent Assembly alone can solve.

4. To remove by this legal land regulation all serious danger to
the State, to land reform, and to the principles of the future State
plan of land reform, which reform and plan are threatened by illegal
seizures and other lawless acts, to satisfy local needs.

In stating its plans the Provisional Government hopes that all
live forces will come to its aid in carrying out its heavy and respon-
sible task. The Government demands a readiness to sacrifice all
strength, riches, and even life for the great cause of saving the
country, which is no longer a stepmother to the nationalities, but is
trying to unite them all on the basis of complete equality and freedom.

July 21, 1917

CHAPTER XXXIV

RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CABINET
i. PRINCE LVOV LEAVES THE GOVERNMENT1

On July 20, 1917, after the suppression of the Petrograd armed
revolt by the Socialists of the radical wing, the Provisional Gov-
ernment decided to accept, for immediate carrying out, the program
proposed by the Socialist ministers.

I can accept only those parts of the program that confirm and
develop those principles which the Provisional Government has
adopted in previous declarations. But I cannot accept the program
as a whole, because it departs from the former non-partizan prin-
ciples and pursues purely socialistic aims, especially in those parts
which were formerly brought before the Provisional Government
and against which I stood out. Among these is the immediate proc-
lamation of a republican form of government for the Russian Empire.
Such an act is an usurpation of the supreme power of the Constituent
Assembly, the only organ for the expression of the popular will. A
similar usurpation of the power of the Constituent Assembly is the
indicated agrarian program. If I were to agree to it, I would be
violating my oath of office. There are also, in the program, articles
about the dismissal of the State Duma and State Council, and other
secondary matters which in themselves are of no great importance but
which seem to have a demagogic purpose, play to the galleries, and
sacrifice the prestige of the State for the sake of satisfying the
masses.

Though in favor of having the land pass into the hands of the
toiling peasantry, I cannot accept the agrarian laws which the Minister
of Agriculture has laid before the Provisional Government. They are
unacceptable in their contents and unacceptable in their politics. The
May 19 declaration of the Provisional Government intended to regu-
late the use of the land in the interest of the national economy and
toiling population. In my opinion, the Minister of Agriculture has
not only abandoned that idea, but is introducing laws tending to

1"Riech,w No. 159, July 22, 1917.

470

"SAVE THE REVOLUTION" GOVERNMENT 471

destroy the popular respect for law. These laws not only do not
attempt to fight the tendency to illegal seizures, not only do not
normalize the land situation, but justify, as it were, these ruinous
and high-handed seizures, give the stamp of approval to land already
seized, and try to place the Constituent Assembly before an accom-
plished fact. This is a party program and not a measure that answers
the need of the State. Its carrying out will disappoint the expecta-
tions of the people and will stand in the way of a [real] State land
reform. I regard the land program of the Minister of Agriculture as
ruinous for Russia. It will bankrupt her materially and morally, and
I greatly fear that it will bring about in the interior of the country
a situation similar to the one which the Provisional Government
had to contend with in the last few days in Petrograd.

I am not referring here to the numerous differences of opinion
between myself and the majority of the Provisional Government
over the various State questions with which we have to deal as a
government. But I cannot pass over the resolution adopted on July
17 by the Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers',
and Peasants' Deputies, and in which the Socialist ministers took part.
This resolution obligates the whole Provisional Government to be
guided in its action by the decision of the All-Russian Congresses of
these deputies.

Lately these differences of opinion have been especially noticeable.
They have made it clear that it is impossible for me to remain at
the head of the Government. Realizing the difficult times our
country is going through, I' tried until now to find some way of
working in harmony and of keeping the ministry together. But in view
of the deep differences in our points of view in regard to the questions
before the Government, I cannot, in justice to myself and the country,
participate in carrying out the program of the Provisional
Government.

I leave the Provisional Government and lay down my duties as
Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior.

PRINCE Lvov

fitly 20, 1917

2. KERENSKI SUCCEEDS LVOV2

The Provisional Government resolved to appoint the Minister of
War and Navy, Kerenski, as Prime Minister, allowing him to retain
his portfolios of War and Navy.
No. 113, July 22, 1917.

472 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

FORMING A MINISTRY3

At a meeting of the Provisional Government on July 26, the
question of the reconstruction of the Cabinet was once more dis-
cussed. Realizing the seriousness of the situation, a number of the
Ministers expressed their willingness to leave to Kerenski the disposi-
tion of their posts.

LETTER OF THE CADETS TO KERENSKI 4

July 28, 1917
Dear 5V, Alexander Fedorovich:

You were pleased to invite us to join the Provisional Govern-
ment. We realize that at this difficult moment no one has a right to
refuse to share in the labor of the Government, provided conditions
are such that results can be attained. After having considered your
proposition, we are now ready to indicate the basis on which we
can accept your offer.

We recognize that the question of the moment is to form an all-
national ministry that has the confidence of all the people and sets
for itself the task of saving the country from foreign destruction
and internal disintegration. We can join the ministry only on condi-
tion that all members of it are independent, and that the cabinet is
composed of men who have full confidence in one another and work
on a basis of mutual understanding for the good of the country. With
this in mind, we consider the following [fundamentals] necessary:

1. That all members of the Government, regardless of their party
affiliations, are responsible to their conscience, and that their actions
and presence in the cabinet are no reason for interference in the
direction of State affairs by any kind of committees and organizations,

2. In matters of internal policy, the Government is to limit itself to
guarding the conquests of the revolution and not to undertake
measures that might lead to civil strife. Therefore, the carrying
out of all basic social reforms and the determination of all questions
relating to the form of government are to be left absolutely to the
Constituent Assembly.

3. In matters of war and peace, the Government is to be guided
by the principles of complete union with the Allies.

4. Steps are to be taken to develop a mighty army by restoring

9 "Riech," No. 163, July 27, 1917.
*Ibid.t No. 166, July 31, 1917.

"SAVE THE REVOLUTION" GOVERNMENT 473

strict military discipline and putting a definite stop to interference
by soldier committees in questions of war tactics and strategy.

5. As a fundamental in internal administration, an end is to be
made to the many authorities ; order reestablished in the country ; a
vigorous fight waged on anarchistic, anti-governmental and counter-
revolutionary elements; and a stable local administration organized
as soon as possible, so that the new, regularly selected local organs
of government can begin to function.

6. State courts are to be brought back to a position that will
enable them to carry on their procedure in a proper manner. Prose-
cuting attorneys and judges are not to be interfered with by politicians
or other outside influences. /

7. Elections for the Constituent Assembly are to be conducted
in a manner to enable the people to express the true national will.
Elections are to be under the supervision of the legally selected
organs of local government or institutions formed by them. They
are to guarantee the freedom of electioneering campaigns.

N. ASTROV
N. KISHKIN
V. NABOKOV
July 28, 1917

3. RESOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES 5

Unanimously Adopted on the Night of July 30-31

Confirming its resolution about proclaiming the Provisional Gov-
ernment the Save-the-Revolution Government and clothing it with full
power, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers'
and Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Committee of the Soviet of
Peasants' Deputies resolves :

I. The country and the revolution are in the greatest danger
from the threatening military defeat, as well as from anarchistic
outbreaks and counter-revolutionary intrigues.

3. Under the circumstances, the only way to save the country and
the revolution is to form a strong revolutionary government, clothed
with proper authority and wide power to carry out the democratic
and social reforms, outlined in the last declaration of the Save-the-
Revolution Government, to rouse the army and people to defend the
9 "Izvestiia," No. 120, July 31, 1917.

474 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

country, to avert an economic catastrophe, and to cut the ground
from under the feet of both anarchy and counter-revolution.

4. In order to succeed with these objects, the Provisional Gov-
ernment must draw its strength from all the live forces of the
country, and should therefore do its best to include in the govern-
ment those of the bourgeois groups that understand that the condi-
tion of the country imperatively demands that all classes who look to
the future should guard and strengthen the conquests of the
revolution.

5. The passive opposition shown by certain bourgeois circles to
the measures of the P ovisional Government— by boycotting the
government, by trying to prevent the carrying out of the much
needed political, agrarian, and financial-economic reforms, and by
putting off the calling of the Constituent Assembly— is nothing else
than an attempt to get power into their own hands by taking advantage
of the difficult situation of the country. Such opposition helps the
most reactionary counter-revolutionary elements and leads to the
complete disorganization of the country.

6.. A working basis on which a coalition Government of the revolu-
tionary democracy and the organized bourgeoisie could be formed
would be to accept all the conquests of the revolution ; to agree to
put into force the delayed labor and agrarian measures ; to submit to
State control of production, transportation, and distribution ; to recog-
nize the necessity of a very definite financial policy; to take all
necessary steps to summon the Constituent Assembly on time ; and to
stand, to the end, by the program proclaimed by the Provisional Gov-
ernment of a universal peace without annexation, without indemnity,'
on the basis of self-determination.

7. The unavoidable measures of repression which the Provisional
Government is taking in its fight against counter-revolution and
anarchy are not to be understood as diminishing the rights and the
further development of the democratic organization of the toiling
peasant, worker, and soldier, in the rear as well as at the front. . . .

4. RESIGNATIONS OF MINISTERS *

Minister of Agriculture, V. M. Chernov, handed in his resignation
to enable him, as a private citizen, to defend himself against the
rumors that are being spread against him [August 2].
• "Riech," No. 169, August 3, 1917.

"SAVE THE REVOLUTION" GOVERNMENT 475

Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. I. Tereschenko, has handed
in his resignation and has turned over his department to the Assistant
Minister [August 2],

No agreement has been reached between the Provisional Govern-
ment and the Cadet Party on the question of members of the Party
entering the Cabinet. Negotiations have been broken off.

LETTER OF KERENSKI TO ASSISTANT PRI"ME MINISTER NEKRASOV T

August 3, 1917

"Notwithstanding all my efforts, I have been unable to complete
the Provisional Government so that it would answer the needs of
the historical moment in which the country is living. I can no
longer conscientiously and intelligently carry the responsibility before
the State, and I, therefore, ask the Provisional Government to
release me from all the positions which I now hold/'

A. R KERENSKI

NEKRASOV LEAVES THE MINISTRY

The letter of Kerenski was followed by the resignation of some
other members of the Provisional Government.

Nekrasov announced that it was his turn to resign, because fie
had accepted his post for two weeks only and the time had expired
. . . but he would not do so, for otherwise there would be no Pro-
visional Government to act on Kerenski's letter.

Following Nekrasov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tere-
schenko, and other ministers declared that they would, for the time
being, withdraw their resignations. They voted as a body not to
accept the resignation of Kerenski, but to summon at once a con-
ference of representatives of five political parties (Cadets, Radical-
Democrats, Labor National-Socialists, Social-Democrats, and Social-
ist-Revolutionists) and representatives of the three revolutionary
organizations (Provisional Committee of the Duma, Executive Com-
mittee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, Executive
Committee of Soviet of Peasants' Deputies). Almost immediately
after this resolution . . . members of the Government went in person
to the leaders of the parties and organizations to extend the
invitation. , . .

At ten o'clock in the evening [August 3], those invited to the
conference began to appear at the Winter Palace, . . . and about

T "Riech," No. 170, Aug. 4>

476 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY _

half an hour later the meeting opened with Nekrasov in the chair.
He read Kerenski's letter . . . and announced the decision of the
Provisional Government not to accept the resignation. He pointed
out that the Government had discussed three ways of getting out of
the difficult situation in which it found itself: I. Hand back its
authority to the organ from which it came; 2. Hand the whole
authority of the Provisional Government to one person to form a
cabinet; or, 3. Appeal to the important political and public groups
to express their opinion. The last alternative was adopted.

[Speeches were made by I. V. Godnev, M. I. Tereschenko, I.
G. Tseretelli, V. N. Lvov, P. N. 'Miliukov, I. N. Efremov, A. V.
Peshekhonov. A short recess was taken, and at about one in the
morning the discussion was resumed . . .Nekrasov impressed
upon those present the need of coming to a decision at once, for the
country was in the greatest danger. He continued as follows :] 8

"I am leaving the Government; my political career is ended.
This gives me the freedom to tell you, comrades from the Soviet,
the truth. You, also, are responsible for that which is now taking
place. Did you not always hold over the heads of the Socialist min-
isters the threat of a vote of lack of confidence? Did you not
oblige the Socialist ministers to report to you twice a week every
petty detail? When they appeared before you, they were frightened
lest they slip, lest they step on a piece of orange-peel and fall. Under
the circumstances, the Provisional Government was deprived of that
peace of mind so necessary in these responsible days. If one of the
ministers should slip, it would inevitably bring on a crisis. You did
nothing to make it easier for us.

"Better take all the power in your hands, and with it the respon-
sibility for the fate of Russia. But if you have not the courage to do
that, hand over the power to a coalition government and do not inter-
fere with its labor. Tonight there can be no half measures. Either you
put full trust in Kerenski and those whom he invites into the Gov-
ernment, or you do not If not, then form a purely Socialist cabinet,
and we hand over the power to you/'

Nekrasov was followed by Miliukov [who said that he agreed
with Nekrasov]. ...

"Riech," No. 171, Aug. 5,

CHAPTER XXXV

FORMATION OF NEW GOVERNMENT
i. RESOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES x

The conference of the representatives of the revolutionary de-
mocracy with members of the Provisional Government and central
committees of parties, which began at ten o'clock on the night of
August 3, at the Winter Palace, came to an end at half-past five on
the morning of the 4th, While this conference was on, members of
the executive committees of the two Soviets waited at the Taurida
palace. At six o'clock the Socialist ministers and representatives of
the Socialist parties arrived. [For three hours there was a warm
debate in which the Bolsheviks and Socialists attacked each other's
policies, and then a vote was taken on the following resolution :]

"The joint meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the
Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Com-
mittee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies declares that
it fully entrusts Comrade Kerenski to form a cabinet, made up of
representatives of different parties which stand by the program
adopted by the Provisional Government over which Kerenski presided,
and proclaimed on July 21"

One hundred and forty-seven voted in favor of the resolution,
forty-five against it, and forty-two refused tojvote. At nine-thirty
(A. M.), Chkheidze declared the meeting closed.

2. DECLARATION OF KERENSKI2

Having found it impossible to bring together on a common
platform the Socialist and non-Socialist parties, and to form a strong
revolutionary government such as the country must have now, I was
obliged to resign.

On August 3 there was a conference between representatives of
the leading socialistic, democratic and liberal parties. After a long

1 "Izvestiia " No. 125, August 5, 1917.
'"Riech," No. 171, August 5, 19*7-

477

478 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

debate, they authorized me to reorganize the ministry. Considering
that the country is threatened by destruction from outside and disor-
ganization from inside, I do not feel that I have the right to decline
to assume this heavy burden. I regard it as a command from the
country to form, in the shortest time possible and in face of all
obstacles, a strong revolutionary government.

The task of saving the country and the republic demands that
there should be an end to political strife, that all citizens work in a
spirit of self-sacrifice, doing whatever is necessary to carry on the
war, put the army in a fighting condition, and reconstruct the country
economically.

Having been in the Provisional Government from the moment
when the people took over full power, I regard it as necessary in
reforming the Government to hold close to the principles which it
has worked out, developed, and embodied in its declarations.

At the same time I, as head of the Government, find it necessary
to make changes in the order and in the division of labor of the
Government so as to enable it to accomplish its task, even if by so

doing: my responsibility is increased.

A. KERENSKI

August 4, 1917

RESOLUTION OF THE PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE DUMA s

On August 4, there was a special meeting of the Provisional
Committee of the Duma under the chairmanship of Rodzianko. He
opened the meeting by relating what had taken place at the Winter
Palace on the night of August 3-4. Considerable discussion followed,
and then this resolution was introduced :

"After learning from the President of the Duma what had passed
at the Winter Palace on the night of August 3-4, the Provisional
Committee of the Dutfia is convinced that there is no time to be lost
in forming a strong government Time does not wait. All should
unite for one purposer— to save the country. In the presence of this
patriotic duty at this difficult time, all party and class interests and
disagreements should disappear.

"Adhering to its previous stand, the Provisional Committee of the
Duma regards it as necessary to entrust Kerenski with the formation
of a ministry by inviting to it people who are united in the one thought
of saving Russia at all costs."

8 "Izvestiia," No. 125, August 5, 1917-

"SAVE THE REVOLUTION" GOVERNMENT 479

RESOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CADET PARTY4

Yesterday, at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Cadet
Party, the question of members of the party joining the ministry
was discussed. At seven o'clock in the evening the following resolution
was introduced:

"Being guided by the stand of the Cadet Party at the conference
of August 3-4 in the Winter Palace [we declare] that it is necessary
to empower A. F. Kerenski to form a Provisional Government,
which shall stand on an all-national platform and which shall be
made up of men who are not responsible before any organizations
or committees.

"Bearing in mind the declaration of the Prime Minister that his
fundamental idea in forming a strong Government was to carry on
the war, to raise the fighting ability of the army, and to reconstruct
the economic power of the State, the Central Committee of the Party
of Popular Freedom leaves its comrades at liberty to accept such posts
in the Cabinet as Kerenski may offer."

3. COMPOSITION OF THE MINISTRY 5

August 6, 1917
A. F. KERENSKI, Prime Minister and Minister of War and Navy.

Assistant Ministers of War and Navy are B. V. Savinkov and

Lieutenant V. I. Lebedev.
N. V. NEKRASOV, Assistant Prime Minister and Minister of Finance.

Assistant Minister of Finance, Professor M. V. Bernatski.
M. I. TERESCHENKO, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
M. I. SKOBELEV, Minister of Labor.
A. V. PESHEKHONOV, Minister of Food.
V. M. CHERNOV, Minister of Agriculture
S. F. OLDENBURG, Minister of Education.
A. S. ZARUDNI, Minister of Justice.
I. N. EFREMOV, Minister of Social Welfare.
P. P. IURENEV, Minister of Transportation.
S. N. PROKOPOVICH, Minister of Commerce and Industry
A, M. NIKITIN, Minister of Post and Telegraph.
F. F. KOKOSHKIN, State Comptroller.
A. V. KARTASHEV, Oberprocurator of the Synod.
N. D. AVKSENTIEV, Minister of the Interior,
4 "Izvestiia," No. 126. August 7. 1917.

PART X

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT TRIES TO
LEAN ON THE BOURGEOISIE

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

For the misfortunes of July, the Bolsheviks and other extreme
radicals were blamed. Immediately succeeding these events
public opinion swung toward the Right. Though they did not
admit it publicly, both Kerenski and other moderate Socialists
were more or less on the defensive for having yielded so much
to the clamor of the Left. The Right felt its importance, walked
around with the air of "I told you so/' and demanded, though not
in so many words, that the Provisional Government should com-
pletely cut loose from the Soviet and seek its support from "all
honest and loyal elements in the country/' With that in mind the
Provisional Government called an Ail-Russian Conference at
Moscow for the end of August. Moscow was the bourgeois center
in the same way that Petrograd was the hot-bed of revolution.
It was understood that "to this conference will be invited all
responsible organizations, State Dumas, and Municipalities."

This was more than a conference. It was a test of strength,
with the bourgeoisie on the offensive and the proletariat on the
defensive. More than half of the delegates were by education,
tradition, and business connection opposed to socialistic pro-
grams.

On the eve of the conference the different groups held cau-
cuses and drew up programs. Each side put forward a champion :
the Socialists cheered for Kerenski, the bourgeoisie hailed
Kornilov. Former members of the Duma and tsarist generals
lashed the Socialists, and their speeches were greeted with ap-
plause. But when the representatives "of the revolutionary de-
mocracy" attempted to defend themselves they got little encourage-
ment, and Chkheidze's monotonous reading of the long Declara-
tion of the United Democracy called forth groans.

480

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 481

The conference was picturesque, full of dramatic incidents
and thrills. It was the last dress parade of the old nobility and
intellectual aristocracy and had they known what was ahead of
them they would have repeated the words of "Morituri
salutamus."

While the Cadets and Socialists were calling each other names
and shaking fists at each other inside the hall, the Bolsheviks were
haranguing the mob outside. They denounced both groups and
called on the "international proletariat . . . [to] make an end
of the domination of capital over enslaved humanity."

When the conference was over, Miliukov said : "I should like
to believe that the Moscow Conference will not be without re-
sults." This was said in a tone of optimism. As we glance back
the only result seems to have been to bring out more sharply the
wide gulf that separated the Miliukovs, Tseretellis, and Lenins.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE MOSCOW STATE CONFERENCE
i. REASONS FOR CALLING THE CONFERENCE l

On July 25, the Provisional Government discussed the serious
situation in the country and the need of taking most energetic
measures. ... It came to the conclusion that it was necessary to
get the consent and the backing of all honest and loyal elements in
the country in carrying out the heavy mission laid upon it. With
that in view, the Provisional Government decided to call, in the very
near future, a conference at Moscow.

KERENSKl'S SPEECH BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES2

At the All-Russian Conference at Moscow, the Provisional Gov-
ernment has resolved to appeal and demand that it be supported in
its great work of saving the country and saving the revolution. To
this conference will be invited all responsible organizations, State
Dumas, and municipalities. Above all, I appeal to you in the name
of the Provisional Government that the Executive Committee of the
All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies and the Central Com-
mittee of the All-Russian Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies
be present in corpore at Moscow, together with the All-Russian
Cooperatives, Central Trade Union Soviet, universities, and other
organizations.

At this conference we shall with all frankness lay bare the real
condition of the State, and show that under the present circumstances
Russia must be governed by a coalition ministry, for the time has not
yet come when the Russian democracy can take upon itself the respon-
sibility for all power. We believe that all live forces of the State
should rally around the Provisional Government. . . .

In the name of the Provisional Government, I give you a most
solemn promise that every attempt to establish a monarchical form
of government in Russia will be crushed most energetically and
unmercifully, , . .

1 "Izvestiia," No. 116, July 26, 1917.
*Ibid.t No. 117, July 27, 1917.

482

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 483

2. POSITION OF THE PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE3

On July 27, there was a meeting of the Provisional Committee
of the State Duma, under the chairmanship of Rodzianko. He
reported that Kerenski had called upon him, laid before him the
program of the Moscow Conference, and invited the State Duma
to take part in the conference. To this invitation Rodzianko replied
that the Duma, as such, could not take part, because the Govern-
ment had not as yet a very definite plan, nor was it clear who woul3
compose the conference. . . . Individual deputies of the Duma could
attend the conference on the invitation of Kerenski, but the President
could not invite them. Rodzianko also told Kerenski that the Gov-
ernment should be formed before the conference, and laid down as
an absolute condition of the Duma's participation in the conference
that the Provisional Committee of the Duma should take part in the
discussion leading to the formation of the Government.

* # *

On August io,4 there was a closed meeting of the Provisional
Government with Kerenski in the chair. [Among other things] the
question of holding an all-national conference at Moscow was con-
sidered. Judging from the discussion, there is not much likelihood
of there being a Moscow conference. If called at all, it will not be
very soon.

Although a majority of the members of the Government had not
given up the idea of "calling an all-national conference at Moscow,
they believed that the present was not the time for such a meeting.

* * *

The indecision in regard to the calling of the Moscow Conference
is at last over. At the meeting of the Provisional Government on
August 12 ... it was decided to call the conference on August
23-4. ... It will be attended by about two thousand people. ... It
is proposed to invite members of all the four Dumas, representatives
of municipalities, zemstvos, Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' and
Peasants* Deputies, and other outstanding public and political

organizations.5

* * *

Yesterday . . . [August 13] the Provisional Government had a
closed meeting at the Winter Palace. Kerenski presided. The ques-

* "Riech," No. 164, July 28, 1917.

4 "Izvestiia," No. 130, August u, 1917.

'"Riech/1 No. 177, August 13, 1917.

484 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

tion of the Moscow Conference . . . was touched upon. Minister
Nikitin said that he had received a letter from the Mayor of Moscow,
who thought that August 25 would be a convenient day for the con-
ference. By that time Moscow could make the proper arrangements
for the meeting. Members of the Government had nothing to say
against this proposition.6

3. APPROXIMATE NUMBER AND COMPOSITION OF
THE CONFERENCE 7

Members of the Four Dumas 488

Representatives of Peasants 100

Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies 229

Municipalities 147

Zemstvos and City Unions 118

Commerce, Industry, Finance 150

Technical Organizations 99

Intelligentsia [teachers, lawyers, etc.] 83

Army and Navy 117

Clergy 24

Nationality Groups 58

Food Committees 90

Agricultural-Economic Societies 51

Cooperatives 313

Trade Unions 176

Commissars of Government 33

War Ministry 16

Representatives of Allied Armies 3

Judicial Bench of Moscow 4

Members of Government and Ministries 15

Since August 26, about one hundred more have come.

In round figures, the number of delegates at the conference,
judging by the admission tickets, is more than twenty-five hundred.

4. CAUCUSES BY BOURGEOISIE AND PROLETARIAT

CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC MEN 8

The conference of leaders of public organizations at Moscow
passed a resolution. Among other things, it said:

0 «

t it

Tzyestiia," No. 132, August 14, 1917.
"Riedb," No. 190, August 28, 1917.
*/Mrf., No. 188, August 25, 1917.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 485

[The first part of the resolution paints in dark colors the condi-
tion of the country.]

". . . It is time to acknowledge openly that the country, in following
the course it does, is approaching ruin, and the Government, if it
realizes its duty, must confess that it has led the State on the wrong
road, which should be abandoned at once for the sake of saving
the country and freedom. The Government should immediately and
definitely put. an end to the utopianism which has proved so ruinous
in its work. Let discipline be restored in the army, and power to the
commanding officers; let there be a resurrection of understanding
of the national interests of Russia and the faith of the Allies in
her valor; let the Central Government, united and strong, put an
end to the system of irresponsible collegiate organs of State admin-
istration ; let the demands of the separate nationalities be harmonized
with law and justice, and not threaten the destruction of the national
unity. Let us leave it to the Constituent Assembly to lay down the
fundamental principles of the Russian State and bring about the
desired reforms. Until then, let no one part of the people claim to
speak for all. Only a government that recognizes all these problems
as national, and not partizan, can stop the country from drifting on
the rocks and with sure hand steer her to safety. The only non-
partizan government is one that completely cuts itself free of all
dependence on committees, Soviets, and similar organizations. . . ." 9

MOSCOW CONFERENCE AND MOSCOW DEMOCRACY10

Yesterday there was a very important joint meeting of the Execu-
tive Committees of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
The question of the day was whether the democracy should support
the State Conference called by the Provisional Government. In view
of the importance of the question, representatives of the ward Soviets
and labor unions were invited to attend. . . .

The spokesman of the Central Trade Union made an official
statement . . . showing that his organization passed a resolution
of protest against the conference, which is regarded as a move to
strengthen the counter-revolutionary elements. He said, also, that the
Central Trade Union is in favor of declaring a one-day strike-protest
on Saturday against the conference. This report called forth much
discussion. The Bolsheviks supported the stand of the Union and

'This resolution was drawn up by Miliukov and was adopted by a large
majority on August 23. "Riech," Nos. 185, 187, August 22, 24, 1917.
w "Izvestiia," No. 141, August 24, 1917.

486 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

argued against participation in the conference. They also approved
the decision of the Union to read its resolution at the conference
and then walk out.

Minister of Post and Telegraph, Nikitin, was present at this
meeting. In his speech he stated that the Bolsheviks and the Union
are pursuing a mistaken policy. He went into the history of the
conference, called attention to the fact that the idea of calling such a
conference originated with the ministers on the Left, .Skobelev and
Tseretelli, and that the Cadets fought it. ...

After a stormy debate, the resolution of the Mensheviks was
adopted.

This resolution says that in view of the fact that this conference
is not made up of representatives authorized to act in the name of
the people, its decisions are not, therefore, of a binding character*
The conference should be regarded as a gathering of public organi-
zations for the purpose of exchanging opinions. The revolutionary
democracy, taking part in this conference, will strive to have the
conference stand on the principles of the program of July 21. The
resolution also takes up those points which the revolutionary democ-
racy will insist upon in particular.

1. To call the Constituent Assembly on the date set.

2. To take energetic measures to stop the economic disorganiza-
tion of the country. For this purpose it is necessary to have control
over production, consumption, and taxation.

3. To make a determined fight against the attackers of democratic
institutions, in the rear as well as at the front.

4. To carry out, without wavering, all the land projects worked
out to this time.

5. To abolish capital punishment.

CENTRAL CO'MMITTEE OF THE SOVIET "

At the meeting of the Central Committee of the Soviet of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on August 23, the question was
raised as to the attitude of the Central Committee toward the
Moscow State Conference and the tactics to be pursued. . . .

Mr. Weinstein made a report on the subject, in which he said
that the Government, in order to draw support from the people
and to widen the platform on which to stand, decided to call a State
conference at Moscow. The dark forces have in mind taking advantage

11 "Riech," No. 187, Aug. 24, 1917.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 487

of this event to attack the revolution and the present make-up of the
Ministry. For that reason the revolutionary democracy can not decline
taking part in the conference. The revolutionary democracy should
give national publicity to its program and call on those to make sacri-
fices who have until now done nothing but enrich themselves out of
the war. The revolutionary democracy should indicate to the Pro-
visional Government that it must pursue an active foreign policy to
secure peace and not abandon the platform outlined in the declaration
of July 21. Weinstein said that the program of the Central Com-
mittee was not a class, but an all-national program. He offered the
following resolution in the name of the presidium :

"The All-Russian Central Committee of the Soviet of Workers*
and Soldiers' Deputies, standing at the head of the all-revolutionary
democracy, accepts the invitation of the Government to take part
in the Moscow Conference, in order to defend before the whole
country the course pursued by the revolutionary democracy in its
efforts to save the weakening country. The Central Executive Com-
mittee will show that the only way to save the country and the
revolution is for all the live forces of Russia to gather around a
strong revolutionary government, carrying on a stubborn defense of
the country and fighting for her salvation both in external and
internal affairs, on the basis of the all-national platform of July 21.
To carry out this program the toiling democracy is ready to make
the greatest sacrifices, but demands that the other classes do likewise,
Every attempt to use the conference for the purpose of attacking
the revolutionary democracy will be regarded by the Central Execu-
tive Committee as a direct betrayal of the cause of the people, and
it will take all the necessary steps to gather around it all democratic
participants at the conference, in order to strike the enemy of the
people and the revolution."

After this report of Weinstein's, the Committee went into secret
session to hear the declarations of the representatives of the left
wing of the Social-Revolutionists. They announced . . . that there
were rumors afloat that on the day of the conference there would be
two attempts against it: one by the Bolsheviks to call a strike and
demonstration on August 25, and the other by the counter-revolu-
tionists, who had something in mind. . . .

B. I. Bogdanov [Menshevik] explained the tactics which the
Central Executive Committee had decided to pursue at the
conference. , . .

I. At the Moscow Conference members of the Central Execu-

488 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

tive Committee take part as delegates of the Central Executive
Committee.

2. Member delegates of the Central Executive Committee have
no right to speak in their own name, or in the name of any faction,
without the permission of the presidium of the Central Executive
Committee.

3. 'Member delegates of the Central Executive Committee cannot
sign the declarations of this or that group at the Moscow Conference,
without the permission of the presidium of the Central Executive
Committee.

4. Only those groups and individuals may be delegates of the
Central Executive Committee who accept the three points just
indicated.

5. Individuals and groups belonging to the Central Executive
Committee who violate its regulations will immediately be deprived
of their mandates.

6. The delegation of the Central Executive Committee cannot
make a single declaration without a previous preliminary deliberation
by the delegation as a whole.

7. The delegation of the Central Executive Committee has all
the rights of the Central Executive Committee at the Moscow
Conference.

8. In order to attend to current matters needing immediate atten-
tion, the Central Executive Committee authorizes a committee of five
to act in its name.

9. A general meeting of the Central Executive Committee at
Petrograd, during the Moscow Conference, can take place only under
point 8.

These points aroused much discussion. The Bolsheviks, Interna-
tionalists, and United (Social Democrats) refused to accept
them. . . .

The resolution of Weinstein and the points of Bogdanov were
adopted by a majority vote. It was also decided that in view of
the fact that the Bolsheviks, * Internationalists, and United refused
to accept the points, they should be kept out of the conference
until they had changed their attitude.

REPRESENTATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT12

The meeting of the Provisional Government on August 20 was
taken up with the question of the Moscow Conference. A majority
M "Izvestiia," No. 138, August 21, 1917.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 489

of the members were of the opinion that the conference was not to
have a decisive role. It was the hope of the Government that the
conference would serve as a means of removing the differences
existing between groups and parties and would tend to bring about
a feeling of unity.

The Provisional Government will be represented by the following
men:

A. F. Kerenski, as Prime Minister and War Minister, will discuss
the general problems of the Government and the war situation.

N. D. Avksentiev, as Minister of the Interior, will tell of the
internal condition of the country.

S. N. Prokopovich, as vice-chairman of the Economic Conference,
will discuss the economic status of Russia.

N. V. Nekrasov, as Minister of Finance, will take up the financial
condition and the financial policy of the Government.

The Provisional Government has asked the ministers who are
to make reports to submit them for preliminary examination on

AugUSt 22.

OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 18

This evening there was a meeting, under the chairmanship of
Rodzianko, of the members of the four Dumas. Rodzianko gave
an outline of the basic points of the speech which he is to deliver. . . .

The attitude which the commercial-industrial group is to take at
the conference is not yet clear. The Petrograd and Moscow delega-
tions seem to be unable to agree. . . .

This evening at nine o'clock there was a meeting in the Zimin
theater of representatives of democratic organizations. Chkheidze
presided. Tseretelli made a long speech. ... A bureau was organized,
made up of the presidiums of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers',
and Peasants' Deputies, representatives of municipal and zemstvo
self-governments, trade unions, and public organizations.

5. BEFORE THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE14

[Moscow, August 25]

The conference opens under rather unusual conditions. Street
cars are not running; coffee houses and restaurants are closed. At
yesterday's meeting of the Soviet it was resolved to ask the Moscow

M "Izvestiia," No. 142, August 25, 1917.
MIbid., No. 143, August 26, 1917.

49Q DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

proletariat not to strike ; but the attitude of the Moscow proletariat
toward the conference is so hostile that late, at night there was a
meeting of the Central Trade Union, attended by delegates of all
the wards, representing about 400,000 proletarians. This delegation
voted, almost unanimously, to strike. Only the printers and the union
of commercial and industrial workers voted against the resolution.
Papers will appear tomorrow at Moscow.

At the Bolshoi Theater, where the conference is to have its
sessions, large crowds began to gather early in the morning. One may
guess there were probably more than 10,000 people on hand. The
whole square in front of the theater was occupied by three chains
of soldiers and cadet officers. The police, on horse and on foot, kept
order. There was no disturbance and no demonstration. All the
organizations, including the Bolsheviks, strongly appealed to the
workers not to demonstrate.

The delegates, as they made their way to the theater, were received
coldly. A few showed approval, but the great majority of the crowd
was hostile; some whistled. The scene recalled the day the First
State Duma was called at Petrograd.

Among the delegates are all the presidents of the State Dumas :
Rodzianko, Guchkov, Golovin, Khomiakov ; only the late Muromtsev
is missing. One sees, also, the veterans of the revolution — Kropotkin,
Breshko-Breshkovskaia, Lopatin, et aL Here are also military leaders
headed by Alexeev and Brusilov, and captains of industry and finance.
The general impression is that the representatives of the so-called
"bourgeoisie" predominate over the democratic elements. Breakfast
coats, Prince Alberts, and starched shirts are more in evidence than
soft collars. But it is impossible to define exactly the composition of
the conference. It is particularly difficult to make out the so-called
"intelligentsia," representing local and municipal government.

August 25

Kerenski16 drove from the station to the Kremlin, where he
had a brief conference with members of the Provisional Government.
He announced that the Provisional Government had no new declara-
tion to make. The one made on July 21 was still good, and there were
no changes in it. ...

The Central Committee of the Bolshevik party published an
appeal to workmen. It declared its strong opposition to the confer-
15 "Izvestiia," No. 143, August 26, 1917.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 491

ence and asked the workers to hold meetings of protest in the
factories, but not to come out on the street.

It was learned today that the Bolsheviks who arrived at Moscow
with the delegation had decided, contrary to the decision of the
Central Executive Committee, to read their declaration and then
leave the meeting as a mark of protest. The Bureau which was
selected yesterday unanimously agreed to deny them the right to be
present at the conference. [There was an exchange of notes on this
subject between Nagin, of the Bolsheviks, and Chkheidze.]

August 25, 1917

General Kornilov16 was expected in Moscow today, but he had
not arrived by the end of the session of the conference. He wired to
Kerenski asking what he should do. His idea was to address the
conference along the line laid down by Savinkov for increasing the
fighting power of the army; but now that Savinkov had resigned,
Kornilov did not know what to do.

At 4:00 P. M., there was another telegram from General Kor-
nilov, saying that he had difficulty in making up his mind whether to
come to the conference, in view of the indefiniteness of the position
of the Provisional Government on the army.

At 9:00 P. M., Kornilov left Headquarters for Moscow. It was
agreed to let him make a report, but before that, to have a conference
with members of the Provisional Government.

6. ACCOUNT OF MOSCOW STATE CONFERENCE17

The Moscow State Conference opened in an atmosphere charged
with alarm and nervous expectation. The caucuses held by the various
groups before the opening of the conference showed clearly that a
clash between the two camps was inevitable. Certain groups that have,
during the course of the revolution, been deprived of the means of
cooperating in determining the fate of the country, but who took
part in the public movements which brought on the revolution and
gave it a national color — have united in an association of public men
and have decided to make known loudly their existence and their
demands for a national Government. These demands were formulated
in the resolution adopted by the Conference of Public Men.

** "IzvestHa/* No. 143, August 26, 1917.
""Riech," No. 189, August 26, 1917, Editorial.

492 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

On the other side are the Socialist parties and groups united in
Soviets. They, too, have taken quite a definite stand and regard the
program, worked out by the Soviets, which is embodied in the declara-
tion of the Provisional Government of July 21, as a minimum beyond
which they can not retreat. This fundamental stand of the Socialist
groups of Soviets was formulated at Petrograd and at the meeting
at Moscow on the night before the opening of the State Conference.
At that time the position was taken that all those who do not accept
the declaration of July 21 are to be looked upon as counter-
revolutionists, . . .

OPENING OF THE CONGRESS

On the left of the chairman are members of the Soviet of
Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies. ... On the right are
members of the State Dumas with their presidents. ... In this
group one notices, also, the Cadet leaders: Miliukov, Shingarev,
Dolgorukov. . . .

Punctually at 3 :oo P. M., Prime Minister Kerenski appeared on
the scene and was warmly received. . . . His speech was punctuated
with loud applause. His remark that the officers were the brains of
the army . . . and his statement that he would not tolerate any
armed uprising against the Government were applauded in
particular. . . .

Judging from the discussions that followed during the recess
immediately after his speech, it was evident that Kerenski did not
entirely satisfy either the right or the left or the center. . . .

FROM THE BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
[AT PETROGRAD] TO ALL THE REGIMENTAL AND

BATTALION COMMITTEES OF THE GARRISON
OF PETROGRAD AND SUBURBS 18

August 27, 1917

"Moscow informs us : Yesterday there were meetings of various
factions, followed by a joint meeting of the delegates of democratic
organizations. On our side are the representatives of the Soviets,
municipalities, public and local organizations, cooperatives, etc.;
against us are the union of men decorated with the cross of St.
George, Cossacks, members of the Duma, commerce-industry group,
etc. The democratic element predominates in the conference. At
u "Izvestiia," No. 144, August 28, 1917.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 493

yesterday's session the democratic group had more than one thousand
men.

"Tseretelli spoke for us, and Chkheidze read the declaration, which
was based on our program of July 21.

"All is quiet in Moscow."

BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

SECOND DAY, ['MONDAY, AUGUST 27] 19

The Bolshoi Theater was today definitely divided in two parts —
bourgeois and democratic. . . . This was especially noticeable when
the ataman of the Cossacks, General Kaledin, made his fiery speech.
Feeling ran so high that the chairman had some difficulty in preventing
outbreaks.

Today, as on Saturday, the theater square was surrounded by a
large crowd of people and three rows of soldiers. On the whole,
there was a smaller and different public. The intelligentsia was very
much in evidence, but the common people were not in sight. Today
all the factories and mills are working. ...

At 11:30 A. M., the theater began to fill up. The delegates,
in groups, were heatedly discussing yesterday's speeches at the party
meetings. All agreed on one thing — there can be no peace between
the different groups. Today many of the delegates are in new places,
nearer their party brethren.

At 11:15 A. M., General Kornilov drove up and was given a
triumphal reception. Flowers were showered • upon him, until his
automobile was filled with them. ... At 11:50, he walked into the
hall. As soon as he showed himself, the audience began to clap, and
when he entered the box, where Generals Alexeev and Kaledin were
seated, he was given a long and noisy ovation. . . . He was cheered
by members of the Dumas, by the representatives of commerce and
industry, by all the bourgeoisie groups and representatives of officers.
But the delegates of the soldiers' committees sat quietly, without
applauding. When, however, a few moments later, Kerenski with
his ministers appeared on the stage, the left side of the theater had
its revenge and gave Kerenski an ovation that lasted more than five
minutes. This time the right was motionless. Motionless, also, were
the representatives of the officers and the generals in their box.

The applause died down to break out with renewed strength a
second later. Shouts were heard, "Long live Kerenski; long live

w "Izvestiia," No. 144, August 28, 1917.

494 I DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

the Provisional Government." Again the noise subsided ; again some
one cried out, "Long live the revolution" ; and again the house was
in an' uproar. But the right sat through it all with hands folded, as
if it did not concern them. "

. Kerenski had difficulty in restoring order. He finally made himself
heard : "The meeting is now open. I beg you to keep order and to
think only of the good of the country. . . ."

[After Nabokov, Semenov, Golovin, and Alexinski had made
their speeches] General Kornilov took the floor. It should be said
that all kinds of rumors are circulating in the city in regard to the
General. There is no doubt that a certain part of the conference is
expecting great results from the General's speech. Some invisible
hand has pasted all over the city, posters with the General's portrait
and biographical sketch. It cannot be said that the General's speech
justified the expectations of the right. It gave many facts, but it could
hardly be construed as the speech of the future military dictator. It
was more like the speech of a general of a republic.

When Kornilov stepped forward, the right gave him a long and
noisy ovation, but the left and the soldiers sat still. Shouts were
heard: "Stand up, soldiers," but the soldiers never budged. The
cries became louder and louder. Kerenski added to the noise by calling,
"Please come to order and listen to the first soldier of the army, with
the attention due him." This announcement called forth more
applause. . . .

[Among other things, Kornilov said :] "The army must be revived
at all costs, for without a strong army there can be no free Russia
and no salvation of the country. In order to revive the army, it is
necessary to accept, at once, the recommendations which I made to
the Provisional Government. My report was countersigned, without
any reservations whatsoever, by the acting War Minister, Savinkov,
and Commissar Filonenko, attached to the Supreme Command.". . .
[Kornilov was followed by a number of other speakers and then
came General Kaledin.]

In his speech Kaledin, without any attempt to soften or to mince
words, presented the point of view and the hopes of the so-called
counter-revolutionists.

He said that he spoke in the name of twelve Cossack divisions,
and protested against the accusation that the Cossacks are counter-
revolutionists and are engaged in counter-revolutionary plots. He
continued by declaring, in a firm voice, that the Soviets and army

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 495

committees must be done away with. . . . These words were greeted
with applause from the right and by shouts of "Never; we will
not allow it/' from the left.

Kaledin went on and said that there should be soldier committees,
but their functions should be limited to the question of supplies. The
declaration of the rights of the soldiers should be revised and supple-
mented with a declaration of the obligations of the soldiers. Discipline
should be reestablished; the former disciplinary punishment must
be brought back.

This proposition was greeted by applause from the right and by
shouts of "counter-revolution" from the left, from the representatives
of the soldiers' committees.

Kaledin's speech made a deep impression, especially the direct and
uncompromising manner in which he expressed himself. He empha-
sized each of his points with the exclamation, "The Cossacks demand,"
etc. The Cossacks demand the dismissal of the Soviets, the call of the
Constituent Assembly at Moscow. Just then Kerenski interrupted
to tell the speaker to restrain his speech and not to issue any
demands, that the conference was called for the purpose of exchang-
ing opinions and not for laying down demands. In reply, Purishke-
vich shouted from Ms seat, "We did not come here to be decorations
for the Government."

Kaledin finished his speech amidst great applause from the right
and shouts of protest from the left

As if to counter-balance Kaledin, the united democracy put
forward Chkheidze, chairman of the Central Executive Committee of
the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. His appearance was
the signal for a stormy ovation, accompanied by the cries, "Long live
the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies." Chkheidze began
his speech with these words: "Notwithstanding the fact that the
speaker who has just concluded demanded the immediate abolition
of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and democratic
committees, I am here to speak in their name." He followed it by
naming the different organizations he represented . . „ and by
reading a declaration. [He was succeeded by many other speakers,
among them Professor Grimm, Guchkov, Shulgin, Rodzianko, Mak-
lakov, Tseretelli, and Miliukov.]

496 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

7. DECLARATION OF UNITED DEMOCRACY
READ BY CHKHEIDZE20

August 27, 1917

Russia is now passing through terrible, almost mortal, days. The
armies of the enemy are invading the interior of the country, while
our army is retreating. The finances of the country are undermined.
The railways are completely disorganized. Industry is being ruined
and can satisfy neither the demands of the army nor of the popula-
tion. Famine is creeping up on the cities. And at the same time
the disintegration of the army and the anarchistic outbreaks in the
rear show that the discontent of the popular masses, exhausted by
three years of war, threatens to take forms that endanger the very
existence of the State. All the open and secret enemies of the revolu-
tion eagerly take advantage of every calamity at the front, of every
difficulty and trouble within the country, to gain their own point at
the price of Russia's ruin and to turn back the great revolutionary
country to conditions that drove her to the brink of perdition and
which were unanimously condemned by the nation.

At this terrible and difficult hour, the united organizations of the
revolutionary democracy once more declare to the whole of Russia
their unshakable determination not to stop at any effort and any
sacrifice to save the country and to save the revolution.

From their very inception, these organizations aimed at the
unification of all the vital forces of the country for the execution of
those tasks which the revolution imposed upon Russia, and for the
struggle against the decay and dissolution with which the poison of
the autocracy infected every part of the national organism.

The revolutionary democracy, as represented by its Soviets of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, did not strive for power and did
not seek monopoly for itself. It was prepared to support any authority
that might be able to defend the interests of the country and the
revolution. Amidst the chaos of destruction, the Soviet strove to
organize and discipline the popular masses for creative statesman-
ship, to direct the elemental forces of the giant nation, that had cast
off century-old chains, into orderly channels, to labor for the restora-
tion of the fighting powers of the army, which had been sapped to
its foundations by the old regime, to organize the national economy,
and, always and in all things, to place the interests of the whole, the
*° "Izvestiia," No. 144, August 28, 1917.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 497

interests of the nation and the revolution, above the interests of
separate classes or groups of the population.

Considering the innumerable difficulties which revolutionary
Russia has to overcome, the unbearable burdens from which the
popular masses are striving to free themselves, the lack of experience
in organized activity, due to the centuries of slavery in which the
nation was kept, and in the face of that opposition which the activities
of the revolutionary democracy encountered among all those who
defend special privileges and selfish interests, — much has been left
undone and some things have not been done as well as they might
have been. When, however, we turn our eyes from the dissolution
in the ranks of the army and the anarchistic outbreaks, both of them
fatal legacies of the old regime, to the reconstruction of this immense
country, that has been going on during the past five months of the
revolution under the fire of the enemy, we are justified in saying
that it is due to the organizations of the revolutionary democracy
that the creative spirit of the revolution has been maintained and the
country saved from dissolution and anarchy. And only with the
active cooperation of this democracy is it possible to regenerate the
army, reconstruct the country, save Russia and the revolution. De-
mocracy is inseparable from a revolutionary country. In these
unprecedented trials that have come to Russia, it is only the self-
reliance and intelligence of the people that can save the country which
has already breathed the invigorating air of freedom. Only a govern-
ment that rests upon the many millions of this nation, as represented
in its innumerable organizations, is able to extricate the country from
its tragic situation and to resist the pressure of the foreign and
domestic enemies.

Under these circumstances every attempt to destroy the democratic
organizations, to undermine their influence, to dig a trench between
them and the Government, and to turn the Government into a
weapon to serve the interests of the privileged and propertied classes,
is not only treason to the cause of the revolution, but a direct betrayal
of our native country, which will perish on the day that it ceases
to be watched over by the intelligent, disciplined, self-reliant and
organized masses of the laboring people.

In demanding of the Government a more determined and con-
sistent inauguration of the program of July 21, the revolutionary
democracy defends not the exclusive interests of any particular class
or group, but the common interests of the nation and revolution.
The program of July 21 is not the exclusive program of the demo-

498 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

cratic classes ; it does not embody the totality of their demands. This
program is nothing but a further development of that of . May 19,
on the basis of which the coalition • government was created, and
which included only such points as are essential for organizing the
defense of the country, raising the standard of the national economic
life, reconstructing the political life of Russia, and preserving the
conquests of the revolution.

In these days, when the very existence of the revolutionary State
is jeopardized by foreign invasion, the democracy demands of all
citizens and of the Government the exertion of every resource for
the organization of the defense of the country against armed conquest.

The Government should bear in mind that it will be able to solve
this enormous problem only by relying upon the active cooperation
of the democratic organizations in the rear and at the front.

This idea it should impress upon the entire commanding per-
sonnel of the army, and it must stop every attempt at reviving, under
the pretext of organizing the national defense, those methods which
disintegrate the army and inevitably lead to defeat and to a betrayal
of our country. It must demand of 'the army authorities unconditional
submission to itself, the supreme power in the State.

The Government should bear in mind that a vigorous continua-
tion of our foreign policy in the spirit of a repudiation of all
imperialistic aims, and a striving for the earliest possible attainment
of universal peace on a democratic basis, will serve as a powerful
instrument for increasing the fighting capacity of the army and the
defense of the country. The clear realization that the attainment of
such a peace, so imperative for the regeneration of the country,
constitutes the sole aim of the Government, will inspire the revolu-
tionary army, which is now shedding its blood, with courage, enthu-
siasm, and readiness for noble self-sacrifice.

The Government must realize that the organization of the rear,
the proper management of the economic life of the country, are
imperatively demanded in the interest of the national defense. At
a time when the blood of the people is pouring out in torrents, when
the wealth of the nation is being squandered, and the democracy
is prepared for any sacrifice to save the country and the revolution,
the privileged and propertied classes, to whom the very calamities of
these three years of war have served as sources of unlimited enrich-
ment, should also yield their interests to the higher interests of
the State.

In consideration of all the foregoing facts, the united revolution*

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 499

ary democracy finds that the vital interests of the country and
revolution imperatively demand the immediate introduction of the
following measures:

Faod and Supplies

The providing of the army and population with food and supplies
we regard as one of the most important problems, and we recognize
the necessity of a single and clear governmental policy in this field.
We therefore propose :

1. Bread monopoly, set and stationary prices on agricultural
products, regardless of the hardships it may impose on the peasants.
To return under present conditions to free trade, fluctuating prices
on agricultural products, would be ruinous for the country and would
lead inevitably to the breakdown of the economic life.

2. This method of providing the army and population with food
makes it obligatory, on the other hand, to supply the agricultural
population with the products of industry, in so far as that is at
present possible. To bring this about, it is necessary to regulate
wages and fix prices on industrial products. It is only in this way
that fixed prices on agricultural products will not ruin agriculture
in these times of the declining value of the ruble.

3. The successful carrying out of this food and industrial policy
cannot be thought of without the widest participation, both in the
production and distribution of agricultural and industrial products, of
the cooperatives under the general guidance of the State food
organizations.

4. In addition to the cooperatives, use should also be made of the
remaining machinery of private trade, in so far as that is possible,
necessary, and for the good of the State. It should be under the strict
control of the State food organizations and prevented from becoming
speculative.

Commerce <md Industry

1. The interest of national defense and the organization of supply
demand the most determined measures to put order in tHe transport
service and to raise the productivity of industry.

2. In order to increase industrial production, the State must do
the following: Assume control over industry and introduce State
participation in the management of enterprises to the point of bring-
ing about State syndicates, trusts, and monopolies.

SOP DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

3. The only way to make this control serve the interest of ^the
country, and not of separate groups, is to have democratic organiza-
tions participate on a large scale.

4. An immediate regulation of industry is one of the ^important
factors in increasing production, which has declined, owing to the
lack and the worn-out condition of machinery, the breakdown of the
transportation, the shortage of raw material, undernourishment of
labor, and the mobilization of some of the industrial workers^

5. In so far as the decline in production may be due to indifference
and lack of understanding among the working masses, the labor
organizations will continue with still greater energy to fight these
factors, which tend to bring about a still greater chaotic condition
and thereby increase the danger to the cause of the revolution.

6. The Government should not delay to carry out the program of
safeguarding labor, which would continue to increase production.
It is necessary to create labor bureaus to keep account of and
distribute labor. There should be arbitration boards and the right
for all kinds of labor to form unions and coalitions.

On their side, labor organizations should strive to increase the
productivity of labor, for the sake of saving the country and the
revolution. With that in view, they should: (a) Determine the mini-
mum of production in each enterprise, depending on the technical
facilities ; (b) observe strictly the eight-hour day, but permit overtime
when there is no unemployment in the particular industry, and when
it is to the interest of the country and the revolution; (c) do their
best to avoid labor troubles by means of arbitration, and strike only
when all other possible means of settling conflicts have been used
up. Labor organizations, while energetically condemning violence
on members of the administration of the factory, should turn over
to the arbitration boards all personal conflicts between the workers
and the administrative personnel; (d) labor organizations should
strive with all their might to conclude collective wage-agreements
as a normal condition of labor.

7. The above-mentioned regulation of production, supplies, and
price-fixing should be accompanied by a regulation of the relations
of labor and capital, wages, day's labor, and also, if necessary,
labor conscription, which should apply to all classes of society, and
which should have as its only object the interest of the country, and
under no consideration should assume the form of militarization of
labor, which might in the end disorganize the national economy.

8. While doing all that it can to advance the interest of defense,

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 501

the Government should at the same time take preparatory measures
for the gradual and painless demobilization of the national economy
and to reduce as much as possible the inevitable catastrophe of unem-
ployment. There should, even now, be worked out plans for public
works having as their object the reconstruction of the economy torn
down by the war.

Finance

1. In the field of finance it is necessary to put into force, without
any cutting or limitation, the last laws of the Provisional Govern-
ment relating to tax on income and war profits, to carry out also
the reforms in inheritance tax and tax on luxuries and surplus profits,

2. Alongside of these measures, it is necessary to introduce in
the near future others of an exceptional character in order to avoid
a financial crash. There must be one high capital levy, the only possible
source for covering the extraordinary expenditures of the State.

3. If the tax on propertied classes and loans should prove insuf-
ficient to meet the extraordinary needs of the State, it would be
necessary to increase the tax on articles used by the masses and to
raise new taxes. These taxes should be primarily in the form of
monopolies, and the cooperatives and other organizations should be
asked to participate to a large degree in the distribution of the
monopolistic products.

4. To carry out successfully the revised taxation system, it is
necessary to reorganize the taxation machinery so that no one should
escape paying his just tax.

5. The Government should take decisive measures to make the
loan [war] compulsory.

6. With these financial measures, the Government should go
slow in issuing paper money and keep it down to a minimum. This
can be done by fixing prices on the most important products, by
determining wages and profits in connection with the general regula-
tion of the economic life of the country as a whole, by cutting down
the outgo of the State treasury, and by doing away with useless
expenditures.

7. In order to increase the revenues of the State treasury, it is
necessary to take certain steps to attract more money into the State
bank, which should be reorganized. It would be exceedingly worth
while to encourage the population at large to make deposits. Results
might be attained best of all through loan-savings associations and
other cooperative organizations and unions.

502 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

8. Private credit institutions should be under strict control, so
that they would not work against the interest of the State.

9. On its part, the United Democracy thinks it necessary to do
its best to support the financial measures of the Government in the
successful collection of taxes and placing of a liberty loan.

The Land Question

Land tenure prior to the revolution was not regulated by explicit
legislation, and was determined, with the aid of the tsarist govern-
ment, in the interests of the propertied classes. Until the downfall of
the old regime, there was no legal land-regulation of any kind. Because
of this, as well as the desire of the toiling peasantry to satisfy its
need for land, there has been brought about a situation whereby, in
many localities, the peasants have made use of the primitive law of
force and have helped themselves. This attitude has complicated the
land problem, has brought on conflicts, misunderstandings, and
quarrels. It has in addition, affected the supply of articles of prime
necessity, and has raised obstacles in the way of an orderly settle-
ment of the land question in the Constituent Assembly. A vigorous,
proper, and systematic regulation of the land question is necessary
for the period of transition, that is to say, until the meeting of the
Constituent Assembly. In making this regulation, the fallowing
fundamental principles should be kept in view:

1. Repudiation of any kind of seizure of any other person's land,
whether by individual persons or groups of persons or associations.

2. Direct settlement of land relationships must be entrusted to
the local land committees. They should have jurisdiction, without
violating the existing forms of land tenure, over such lands as are
of agricultural use, so that they may be better utilized and save the
national economy from complete disorganization. With this end in
view, the central government must immediately pass laws and issue
instructions that will -clearly define the rights and duties of the land
committees, and provide them with a plan of procedure. These laws
and instructions must in every possible way safeguard the interests
of the farming population as regards land tenure, as well as the
interests of the food supply and agricultural production as a whole.

The Ofgwwzation of the Army

Believing that the salvation of the country and the revolution at
this present moment depend upon a revival of the strength of the
army, the Democracy insists upon the following measures:

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 503

1. The right and duties of the commanding personnel, commis-
sars, and army organizations should be clearly and definitely
indicated.

a. The commanding personnel must have absolute indepen-
dence in the domain of active operations, and a decisive voice in
the domain of drill and war preparation.

b. The commissars must carry out the revolutionary policy
of the Provisional Government and watch over revolutionary le-
gality in the army. The work of the commissars must be brought
into close relation to the army organizations.

c. The army committees are to be regarded as organs of the
soldiers as a whole, as guides in their public and political life.
As such, the rights of the committees must be defined by legis-
lation, so as to enable them to play their part in the life of the
army.

2. Extraordinary measures of revolutionary compulsion may be
taken in extraordinary circumstances, but only in agreement with
the commissars, and must never be applied to the sound elements
of the army. The abuse of the system of coercion and repression
destroys the fighting spirit and fighting power of the army. For this
reason the restoration of personal disciplinary authority to com-
manding officers is inadmissible. In order to enhance the prestige of
the commanding personnel, all those who have plainly shown them-
selves to be counter-revplutionists should be removed from high
command, and their places filled with individuals who have come
to the front from the ranks of the lower officers and who have, in
most cases, shared courageously and self-sacrificingly all the burdens
of the war with the soldiers.

3. There should be increased activity in the rear to provide for
the needs of the rank and file. It is also necessary, in this connec-
tion, that the State and the public recognize their obligations to the
disabled war veterans and their families, and make fuller provision,
within the limits of financial resources, for the families of all those
mobilized for the war.

Self-Government and Local Government

1. An early organization of local self-government and govern-
ment is necessary, both in the interest of strengthening the revolu-
tion and of carrying out systematically some of the measures of the
Provisional Government.

2. The organs of local self-government, elected on the basis of

504 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

the general election law, should carry out the functions of local State
government, and they should not be opposed by any other organs of
local self-government. Representatives of the central government
should have supervision over the legality of the acts of the local
self-government.

3. In connection with this change, it is necessary to work over
the old municipal and rural codes and harmonize them with the new
militia regulations, and to widen the sphere of competency of local
self-government in questions of public order, safety, finance, labor

laws, etc.

4. Commissars of the central government, locally elected and
confirmed at the center, are the organs of administrative government
only for the transitory period of the revolution.

5. As soon as the organs of local self-government are elected,
the full powers of the executive committees of public organizations
come to an end.21

"IZVESTIIA'S" COMMENT 22

The second day of the conference is over, and the tragic situa-
tion in which the country and revolution find themselves stands out
clearer than ever. The tragedy does not consist in the fact that the
foreign foe is gathering all his forces to crush us and our freedom,
that the country is disorganized and has been left in a beggarly con-
dition by the old regime. History can point to other peoples who
were down as low as we and yet managed to save their State and
their ideals. Our tragedy lies in this: that in face of the great
danger that threatens to destroy our land there is no national out-
burst, no willingness to sacrifice, no readiness to give up class and
group interests for the interests of the country as a whole.

Every one shouts, "The country is in danger!" and those who
shout the loudest are the men who are using patriotism as a means
of increasing their political influence. While repeating these words,
they push the country into civil war. Just now we are all talking of
counter-revolution, of the attempt of reaction to regain its lost
influence. These are not mere words, exaggerated fears, but facts.
This in itself is not alarming, but the fact that there are people who,
for the sake of the triumph of their class interests, are ready to
hand over the country to the first comer, to the blackest reaction.

*• The recommendation of the United Democracy on the nationality question
is omitted in this translation.

22 "Izvestiia," No. 144, August 28, 1917*

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 505

In reading the account of yesterday's events, of the warmth with
which certain groups of the propertied classes greeted every counter-
revolutionary gesture, every utterance of a possible hero of reac-
tion, like General Kaledin, the reader will understand how little hope
there is left of really stirring up an all-national outburst of feeling
for saving the country and the revolution. The democracy is now face
to face with an exceptional task.

From the very begining, the leaders of democracy have taken
the only true course. The fate of the country is bound up with the
fate of the revolution, and that which ruins the revolution ruins
the country also. The country can be saved only by saving the revolu-
tion. But the propertied classes do not accept this point of view;
they do not wish to save the country, at the cost of strengthening the
revolution. They would save themselves, even if the country went
to perdition. The Moscow Conference, called to find a way out of
this contradiction, has not done so and may not do so.

The revolutionary democracy must be ready for anything. It
should now gather all its strength and rally around the Soviets.
Should it happen that the propertied classes finally betray the revolu-
tion, it will be up to the democracy, by its own efforts, to save the
conquests of the people.

THIRD DAY — AUGUST 28 2S

Moscow has already taken the conference as a matter, of course.
The Bolshoi Theater is empty. Although today is a holiday, there
are few people around the building. It is seldom that the public stops
to look at the theater as it passes.

It is drab and gray inside. There are vacant places everywhere,
on the floor, boxes, balconies, and stage. Many of the delegates have
gone home, some are asleep, others are attending the opening of the
All-Russian Church Convocation. . . ,

At 10:15, Kerenski appeared and was applauded by the Left.
He opened the meeting without any special remarks. . , .

It seemed that after yesterday's open encounter between the
leaders of the revolutionary democracy and the bourgeoisie, interest in
the State Conference was waning. But this was not quite so. Both
camps followed with closest attention today's outcome, to see which
course would be followed to save the country and the revolution.

It was evident, even early in the morning, that the victory was
not on the side of the bourgeoisie. The only real basis for agree-
* "Izvestiia," No. 145, August 29, 1917.

506 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

ment which the democratic organizations offered in their declaration
was warmly received by Salazkin, the delegate of the zemstvos. He
opened his speech by saying that he wished the zemstvos to be
included in those organizations which Chkheidze represented. "All
democratic masses agree heartily with the resolution and desire of
the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers7 Deputies." This was the first
swallow. It summed up the results of the State Conference and
showed which side would come out with its position strengthened and
which with its hopes shattered.

The first swallow was followed by others. But before looking
at them, let us listen to the discussion of a very important question,
the role of the army committees. ...

General Alexeev, in a long speech, brought forward the question.
In the matter of form, the speech of the former Supreme Commander
differed from that of the present Supreme Commander, but in sub-
stance it was very similar. His picture of the disorganization of the
army was closely followed. ... He referred to Order No. I, to
the army organizations, and to the committees of one kind or an-
other; he did not come out openly -and say that they interfered with
military discipline. But he talked about them and looked upon them
in the only way that an officer of the former order could look on
democratic organizations. He does not see in them the wonderful
creative engines which were so glowingly described by Kushin, a
representative of the committees.24

The speech of Bublikov, a representative of big industry, clearly
emphasized the value of the position assumed by the Russian democ-
racy. He openly and straightforwardly announced : "Yes, we accept
the agreement you propose; the hand which you held out to us will
not be left dangling in the air," and with these words he stepped
down from the platform to where Tseretelli was seated and shook
his hand.

It was worth while being in the hall at that moment. 'Every one
stood up, and a tremendous ovation came from the right and the
left. It was then quite evident that the revolutionary democracy had
won, that the Moscow Conference was not in vain, and that the agree-
ment proposed by the democratic organizations was recognized as the
only one which could and should save Russia and the revolution.

When Sokolovski, representing the industry of South Russia,

who followed Bublikov, said that notwithstanding all this unanimous

demonstration that had just taken place, he did not believe that the

*Kushin's speech may be found in "Izvestiia," No. 148, September I,

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 507

unity was general, there came cries from the right and left, "It is!
It is !" This reply called forth more cheers. Even Guchkov could not
resist this enthusiasm and after a time announced, "Yes, we will
work and sacrifice with you for the common cause. We will join you
as collaborators, but not as figureheads."

It seemed as if all were over, that these fine words had summed
up the results of the conference. The atmosphere of the hall was
almost that of a holiday.

Unfortunately, this holiday spirit quickly vanished, owing to a
very sad incident brought on by a group of officers in the box of
General Kaledin.

When the chairman gave the floor to a Cossack officer, Nagaev,
some one in the box called out, "He is' no Cossack ; he denied it
yesterday," etc. . . .

When Nagaev came on the stage, he said that he would answer
the questions. He began his speech by stating that he spoke as a
representative of the congress held at the front by the seven Cossack
army units of the Caucasus and of the Cossack section of the Soviet
of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

He commented on the declaration which was read yesterday, and
then turning to the box of General Kaledin he said, "I should like
to tell General Kaledin . . ."

At this point he was interrupted by the chairman, who informed
him that he had to address the assembly as a whole and not indi-
viduals. Nagaev continued, "Do not tear the Cossacks from the
people. Even in 1905 there were unknown martyrs among our Cos-
sacks, and now you desire to set the Cossacks against the people.
We were then loyal servants of tsarism." This remark brought cheers
from one side and a commotion in the box of General Kaledin, with
shouts, "You will answer for this/' and finally, "German mark."
This term aroused the audience, and many jumped from their seats.
After considerable difficulty, Kerenski restored some order and
called "on the person who made the insulting remark to have the
manhood to name himself." All eyes turned toward the box. Some of
the officers who sat in the front of the box looked back. In the
meantime, cries of "coward" were hurled from the floor.

Kerenski then turned to the public with these words, "Nagaev
and all Russian people here are satisfied with the silence of the
coward."

Just then there stepped forward to the front of the box yester-
day's orator,- the one-armed Captain Skarzhinski, on whose breast

508 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

hung the cross of St. George, "Although," said he, "I did not utter
these words, I agree with them."

The chairman considered the incident closed and told Nagaev
to proceed. In the interior of the box some one held up a hand,
as if desiring to say something, but Kerenski did not notice him.
This man, white as a sheet, with a cross of St. George on his coat,
dressed in the full uniform of a colonel, came forward to the edge
of the box and stood up alongside of Captain Skarzhinski. . . .

During the recess at eleven o'clock, every one discussed this
affair. It was learned that the officer who made the insulting remark
started for the main hall but was detained by the commandant in
charge. After he had returned to his box, a guard was placed outside
of it.

When the session was resumed, Kerenski said, "Before the recess
a very sad incident took place. An officer was insulted. The man
who did the insulting gave his name, but owing to bad acoustics and
distance I could not hear it. His name is Sakharov, a colonel of the
general staff. Without considering the present incident, I am glad
to have my opinion confirmed that representatives of the Russian
army are always ready to answer for their words. . . ."

Sakharov, who stood all this time at the edge of the box, shouted
when Kerenski had finished, "I am ready to give satisfaction to
Nagaev. . . "

The Moscow Conference came to an end at i : 30 P. M. with
the speech of the Prime Minister. He declared that from this day
forth he would govern the country with a strong hand. His one task
and aim would be to preserve the country as a whole, to serve all the
people of Russia and not any one party.

His statement that "It is necessary to forget the heart when serv-
ing the country," made a deep impression and was listened to in
deathly silence. One felt himself in the presence of a strong and really
revolutionary power, for the Prime Minister declared that to save
the State the Provisional Government would fight without mercy,
with the anarchy on the left and the counter-revolution on the right.
When the Prime Minister had finished his speech, the audience rose
and shouted: "Long live the republic! Long live the Provisional
Government ! Long live Kerenski !"

A little while ago one might have thought that the Government
could not count on some groups in Russia, but now one can say
that Kerenski in his last speech found a common line of action

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 509

which united all parties, with the exception, of course, of those on
the extreme right and left.

The Government can now proceed on the road laid out, without
glancing to the right or to the left, but looking straight forward
to the goal of saving the country and the revolution.

8. THE BOLSHEVIK DECLARATION25

A mortal danger threatens the cause of the revolution: The
landlords and the bourgeois parties are preparing bloody reprisals
against the workers, soldiers, and destitute peasants. They are plan-
ning the restoration of unlimited oppression and force over the popu-
lar masses and the regaining of full power over them.

At such a time, the government that calls itself a "Save-the-
Revolution" Government takes no action against the counter-revolu-
tion, against the parties which are defending a restoration of the
landlord-bourgeois bondage and demanding a continuation of the
robber war. On the contrary, it invites notorious counter-revolution-
ists to the State Conference in Moscow, assures them an overwhelm-
ing majority there, intends to come to a definite understanding with
them and to rely upon them openly in its future work. The Provi-
sional Government hails publicly the sworn enemies of the people as
the saviors of the country and proclaims the grave diggers of the
revolution as its life-giving forces. Thus the Provisional Govern-
ment rounds out its entire policy which has been directed against
the workers, their newspapers and their organizations; against the
soldiers, by restoring capital punishment; against the peasants, by
not giving them land.

The Provisional Government itself has become the tool of the
counter-revolution and international reaction. It has summoned the
Moscow Conference in order to draw here fresh strength for a new
campaign against all conquests of the revolution. Encouraged by this
friendly policy, the enemies of the people — landlords, bankers, manu-
facturers— have rallied around the Cadet Party to save their war
profits, estates, and capital. The Moscow Conference affords the
counter-revolutionary hangmen the most convenient opportunity to
come to an understanding among themselves, the most convenient
screen behind which to organize an all-Russian counter-revolutionary
^Piontkovski; "Khrestomatiia," 174-6.

5io DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

conspiracy. The preliminary Cadet conference has already created
a permanent political center for the counter-revolution, which relies
upon the armed support of the commanding leaders of the army and
of the reactionary section of. the Cossacks.

The Moscow Conference represents a crude falsification and dis-
tortion of the popular will. While this is being summoned, the convo-
cation of the Constituent Assembly, which would be the real popular
representative body, is again postponed for two months^ owing to
the machinations of the bourgeoisie, which is going straight after
its object, the complete break-up of the Constituent Assembly and
its replacement by some other body, in which it will be sure to have
a majority.

In addition to undermining the Constituent Assembly, the bour-
geois counter-revolution places the Moscow Conference in open oppo-
sition to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. With its
[conference] help, it [counter-revolution] hopes to deliver decisive
blows to these organs upon which the working class has laid the
duty of protecting the interests of the revolution, the obligation to
fight for peace, for land, for bread. Yet the Socialist-Revolutionist
and Menshevik parties, which now have a majority in the Central
Executive Committee of the Soviets, did not oppose the calling of
the Moscow Conference, did not attempt to fight against this plot,
which is clearly in the interest of the counter-revolution. They could
not fight against it, for they stood for agreement, for cooperation
with the bourgeois-landlord coalition, for always making concessions
to it. They refused to turn over full power to the workers, soldiers,
and peasants, and proposed to share power with the bourgeois
counter-revolution.

The Moscow Conference demonstrates to the widest sections of
the urban and rural poor the need of a vigorous struggle against the
counter-revolution. The working class, as the most reliable guardian
and bulwark of the revolution, was the first to utter its protest,
openly, against the Moscow muster of the forces of the counter-
revolution which the Provisional Government is organizing. The
general strike of the Moscow proletariat expresses the thought and
the will of the whole enlightened proletariat of Russia, which
sees through the game of the counter-revolution. To the war cry
of the mobilized bourgeoisie, the working class has opposed its
watchword of a proletarian and peasant revolution.

We, members of the revolutionary party of the proletariat, came
here not to enter into negotiations with the enemies of the revolu-

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 511

tion, but for the purpose of protesting on behalf of the workers and
poorest peasants against the calling of a counter-revolutionary assem-
bly, and to expose its real nature to the country. But it was decided
to shut our mouths, and this decision was taken with the aid of the
Socialist-Revolutionists and Mensheviks belonging to the Soviet ma-
jority. We feel certain, nevertheless, that our voice and our pro-
test will reach the popular masses, who are more and more rallying
around us, the revolutionary party of the proletariat. In its name,
we declare that the proletariat will not permit the triumph of the
bourgeois oppressors. The proletariat will carry the revolution to
the end ; it will give land to the peasants, and peace, bread, and free-
dom to the people.

The Russian proletariat, in common with the international pro-
letariat, will make an end of the domination of capital over enslaved
humanity.

BOLSHEVIST DELEGATES OF THE MUNICIPAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT

BOLSHEVIST DELEGATES OF THE TRADE UNIONS
BOLSHEVIST MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION OF THE

WORKERS' COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES
BOLSHEVIST REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMITTEES

OF PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

BOLSHEVIST DELEGATES OF THE UNION OF MUNICI-
PAL EMPLOYEES
BOLSHEVIST DELEGATES OF THE ARMY AND NAVY

COMMITTEES

BOLSHEVIST MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION FROM
THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF SOVIETS
BARRED FROM THE CONFERENCE

9. RESULTS OF THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE 2e

MILIUKOV'S OPINION

"Just now it is difficult to say what will be the results of the
Moscow Conference. Of course something has been accomplished,
the roads run a little closer together, but I fear that this rapproche-
ment is not for long. According to the speeches, it seems as if unity
had almost been achieved, but whether it exists in fact is a question.
The speeches and declarations of separate groups, Socialist and non-

98 "Izvestiia," No. 146, August 30, 1917.

512 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Socialist, promise concessions. Especially noteworthy was the declara-
tion of I. G. Tseretelli, which holds out compromises. In this declara-
tion there is indicated a real desire for collaboration. How this will
actually work out, the near future will tell. I should like to believe
that the Moscow Conference will not be without results."

TSERETELLl'S OPINION

"It seems to me that the declaration of the United Democracy
formed a bridge between her and the bourgeoisie. The strength of
this bridge will depend largely on future events, and on the amount
of support the propertied classes will give to the reforms outlined
by the Government. The conference gave results in that it laid bare
before the country the true situation and united, in so far as that was
possible, the living forces of the land."

PRESIDENT WILSON SENDS GREETINGS TO THE 'MOSCOW CONFERENCE 27

The following telegram has been sent:

President of the National Council Assembly, Moscow: I take
the liberty to send to the members of the great council now meeting
in Moscow the cordial greetings of their friends, the people of the
United States, to express their confidence in the ultimate triumph
of ideals of democracy and self-government against all enemies
within and without, and to give their renewed assurance of every
material and moral assistance they can extend to the Government
of Russia in the promotion of the common cause in which the two
nations are unselfishly united.

WOODROW WILSON.
31 Official Bulletin, Washington, August 27, 1917.

CHAPTER XXXVII
THE KORNILOV AFFAIR

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Because of his daring, manliness, honesty, straightforward-
ness, and devotion to his service, General Kornilov was well
known in military circles long before he came to the notice of the
general public. He was a soldier first and last, and viewed the
world from the military saddle. He did not play politics, was
not mixed in the intrigues in or out of court. He was loyal to
his Tsar as long as he reigned and when he abdicated Kornilov
accepted, at least outwardly, the new state of affairs in the hope
that the revolution would go on with the war until Russia was
free of the Germans.

The Provisional Government trusted him, and named him
Commander of the Petrograd Garrison. When Kornilov found
that the Soviet decrees and pacifist propaganda were interfering
with his duties and ruining the army, he resigned and went to
the fighting lines. He was made Commander of the Southwest
front and woriced hard to put his army on a war footing. The
failure of the July offensive grieved him deeply both as a patriot
and as a commander. The cause of the failure was obvious and
without paying attention to the feeling of the revolutionists he
proceeded to put back the old discipline in the army. He prohibited
meetings, made it clear that military commands are not subject
to debate, and gave orders to shoot scoundrels without trial. He
knew just what to do and did it. Kerenski was pleased and offered
to make him Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Before accepting the
offer General Kornilov demanded a free hand, and restoration
of the old time military discipline both at the front and in the
rear, for the civilian population as well as the soldiers. Had these
demands been granted Kornilov would have had dictatorial powers
and he would have tried to put an end to the Soviets and the

513

514 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

revolutionists. Whether he would have tried to restore the mon-
archy no one knows. Kerenski and his Socialists, being politicians
and revolutionists, could not grant all of Kornilov's demands.
They might overlook his acts, but they could not openly come out
for a policy which would put them and the revolution in the hands
of the militarists. At the same time they could not break with
Kornilov, for he seemed to be the only man who might do some-
thing with the army.

A month of very precious time was wasted in fruitless con-
versation, in sending messages and messengers from one to the
other. During that month Kornilov grew in popularity with the
Duma crowd, the Nationalists, Militarists, and all those who were
opposed to the Soviet. At the Moscow Conference they made him
their hero, and it is possible that they also tried to make him their
tool. As Kornilov grew in popularity with one group he became
unpopular with the other. Whatever confidence and trust Kornilov
and Kerenski had in each other before August I disappeared
before September i. It was a great pity, for both were ardent
patriots and wished only the good of their country.

We have not as yet and may never have all the details of the
so-called Kornilov plot. We are not even sure whether it was a
plot or a misunderstanding. For the time being we can do no
better than give the two versions of the affair, the one of the
"Lzvestiia," organ of the revolutionists, and the, other of General
Lukomski, right-hand man of Kornilov.

i. KORNILOV AND THE JULY OFFENSIVE

ORDER OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SOUTHWEST FRONT1

In view of the exceptionally serious time which we are passing
through, when all thoughts should be concentrated solely on the
question how, with arms in hand, to save the country from the
Austrians and Germans, I order:

i. That there should be no meetings of any kind in the war
zone, and any that take place are to be regarded as against the law

1 "Izvestiia," No. 120, July 31, IQI7- Kornilov, Lavr Georgievich (1870-
1918).

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 515

and broken up by force of arms; 2. That this is a military order
and not subject to debate, not even by the committees.

GENERAL KORNILOV
[My 30, 1917.]

AR'MY APPOINTMENTS 2

My 31, 1917

The Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest front, General Korni-
lov, is made Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

War Commissar of tifie Southwest front, Savinkov, is made
Assistant-Minister of War, with the duty of replacing Kerenski
during his absence from Petrograd.

TELEGRAM OF GENERAL KORNILOV B

Having received a report from the commander of the XI Army
that the soldiers under him, in retreating from Tarnopol, robbed the
inhabitants, violated women and children, killed peaceful citizens,
and murdered one another, I gave orders to shoot such scoundrels
without trial. In obedience to this order, fourteen caught in the act
were shot. In announcing this to the armies on the front entrusted
to me, I wish to add that I have given orders to shoot without trial
all those who rob, use force on, or kill peaceful citizens or fellow
soldiers, and all those who refuse to carry out war orders at this
minute when the very existence of the country, freedom, and the
revolution is at stake, I will stop at nothing to save the country from
destruction due to the despicable behavior of traitors, betrayers,
and cowards. This order is to be read in all companies, etc.

GENERAL KORNILOV

GENERAL KORNILOV ACCEPTS SUPREME COMMAND *

On August 9, Minister Tereschenko returned from the
Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. At two o'clock
Tereschenko called on Kerenski to report the results of his con-
versations with Kornilov. An agreement seems to have been reached
and the conditions laid down by Kornilov for taking command ac-
cepted. Tereschenko said that Kornilov would like to have a confer-
ence in the very near future at Headquarters, with the participation

* "Riech," No. 168, August 2, 1917.

* Ibid., No. 170, August 4, *9*7«
4 Ibid., No. 175, August 10, 1917.

5i6 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

of the ministers of food and transportation, to take up questions
relating to army supplies.

GENERAL KORNILOV MAKES DEMANDS 5

On the morning of August 16, the Supreme Commander-in-
Chief, General Kornilov, arrived at Petrograd. From the station he
went to the Winter Palace, where he was received by the Prime
Minister, Kerenski. At noon, at the home of Kerenski, he met
Savinkov, Nekrasov, and Tereschenko, and reported on the situa-
tion at the front. Later, Kornilov attended a session of the Pro-
visional Government at the Winter Palace. . . .

To the journalists Kornilov gave out the following interview :

"Thanks to the decisive measures of the Government, the condi-
tion of the army is satisfactory . . . but this does not mean that
everything has been done to put the army in a healthy state. There
is still much to be done to bring the army up to the point where it
should be."

General Kornilov proposed certain measures for the improvement
of the army. He is convinced, and feels that the Provisional Govern-
ment is of the same mind, that without these measures, the publica-
tion of which he expects in the next few days, it is impossible to
restore the fighting ability of the army. ... It is very necessary
that the Provisional Government should confirm these measures* . . .
In regard to the relation of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to the
elected soldiers' committees, General Kornilov remarked that he did
not care for the present to go into details on the subject, other than
to say that he recognized these organizations, but had proposed to
the Provisional Government that they be reformed on a different
basis. . . .

At three o'clock in the morning, General Kornilov returned to
Headquarters.

GENERAL KORNILOV AND THE DEMOCRACY6

The demands of General Kornilov, in the form of an ultimatum,
supported by the possibility of a new attack by the enemy, puts the
Provisional Government in a very difficult position, and the future
alone knows how it will act This, however, may be said now, that
the sympathy of the democracy is not on the side of General
Kornilov.

'"Riech," No, 181, August 17, 1917.
c "Izvestiia," No. 135, August 17, 1917.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 517

DEMANDS OF GENERAL KORNILOV 7

We learn from a reliable source that at the meeting of the Pro-
visional Government on August 16, General Kornilov -made a de-
tailed report of the situation at the front. ... [He pointed out] that
the severe penalties, including capital punishment, that are admin-
istered in the active army should also be put into force in the rear
wherever soldiers are found guilty of crimes that require severe
punishment. . . .

General Kornilov's report made a deep impression on the mem-
bers of the Government. Some of his recommendations, especially
the one about capital punishment in the rear, met determined opposi-
tion from a majority of the ministers. The questions will be acted
upon in the near future. . . .

RUMORS ABOUT KORNILOV's RESIGNATION 8

All rumors of a change in the Supreme , Command are without
foundation. General Kornilov has the confidence of the Provisional
Government, and the recommendations he has made for raising the
fighting power of the army did not meet with serious opposition.

GENERAL KORNILOV'S DEMANDS 9

General Kornilov arrived at Petrograd on August 23. He was
immediately received by the acting War Minister B. V. Savinkov,
and together they went to the meeting of the Provisional Government.
The coming of the General was closely bound up with the conference
at Moscow. At this meeting of the Provisional Government, military
questions were discussed, bearing on the propositions made by Gen-
eral Kornilov in his report, which he, with B. V. Savinkov, sub-
mitted to the Provisional Government. Both Kornilov and Savinkov
insisted 'that the institution of commissars be considerably developed
and its power increased in the strengthening of the army. General
Kornilov came out in favor of greatly weakening the influence of
the army committees on military life. He thought that- it was neces-
sary to take out of the hands of these organizations all questions that
had any bearing, direct or indirect, on military operations, Savinkov,
in his report, insisted that the authority of the commissars should be
raised to the point where they, only, would be the voice of the
Provisional Government. General Kornilov agreed that the revolu-

* "Izvestiia," No. 136, August 18, 1917.

*"Riech," No, 183, August 19, 1917.

' "Izvsstiia," No. 141, August 24, 1917.

5i8 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

tionary democracy could not wholly trust the high command, but
thought that the commissars were quite capable of taking the place
of the committees in their work of controlling the command. Some
of the other measures of Kornilov and Savinkov touched not only
the life at the front, but even more so the rear. In his report, Gen-
eral Kornilov strongly emphasized the fact that the chaos in the rear,
the complete disprganization of the regiments in the rear, the
total unpreparedness of those who are sent to fill up the gaps at
the front, and, what is even more serious, their lack of discipline,
demoralizes the active army. . . . General Kornilov insisted that
definite measures be taken at once against this chaos in the rear.
He categorically demanded that the revolutionary courts, which are
at work at the front, should be set up in the rear, with authority
to inflict the same punishments as at the front, including the death
penalty. On this point General Kornilov was supported by acting
War Minister Savinkov.

General Kornilov's report had to do, also, with food at the front
and the necessity of taking steps to regulate transportation. Owing
to the lawless acts of the soldier masses, the railways have com-
pletely broken down. He thought that the railways and factories
working for the army should be militarized. If this were not done,
he feared that the army and navy would be left without food and
artillery supplies.

Attention has already been called to the fact that General Korni-
lov's propositions, especially those relating to decisive measures in
the rear, are meeting with bitter opposition from the left wing of
the Provisional Government,

In any case, the Provisional Government thinks that it must come
to a decision on these questions before the opening of the Moscow
Conference, otherwise there might be a split between the Govern-
ment and the representatives of the front.

We may assume that the Government will reach some half-way
decision which will make it possible for those at the head of the war
ministry to carry out the measures necessary for strengthening our
front.

At 10 : 30 P. M., the members of the Government met with Gen-
eral Kornilov in Kerenski's office. After an exchange of opinions, it
was decided that the Supreme Comtnander-in-Chief should lay be-
fore the Moscow Conference such measures as he thinks are needed
for strengthening the front.

At i A. M., General Kornilov left the capital for Headquarters.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 519

SAVINKOV RESIGNS 10

As we have already indicated, owing to differences of opinion
with Prime Minister Kerenski on the question of strong authority,
the acting Minister of War, B. V. Savinkov, has handed in his
resignation. At the meeting of the Government on August 24, the
resignation was accepted. How this will affect the Supreme Com-
mander-in-Chief, General Kornilov, and the acting Minister of the
Navy, V. E. Lebedev, who agree with the point of view of Savin-
kov, is not clear.

INTERVIEW WITH SAVINKOV 1X

"I may say to you that I am to continue as Acting-Minister of
War. I am happy to say that, according to the announcement of
Kerenski, I can again work with him in fullest agreement to carry
out the program which he touched upon in different places in his
speech at the Moscow Conference, and which is also the program
of the Supreme Commander, General Kornilov, and mine. I may
also say to you that in the near future the Ministries of War and
Navy will submit to the Provisional Government a law for bringing
about order in the rear.

"I do not foresee changes in the personnel of the ministry.
All the commissars will remain in their present places, among them
commissar M. M. Filonenko, attached to the Supreme Commander.
The institution of commissar will undergo no changes."

On the soldier organizations Savinkov expressed himself as fol-
lows: "The accounts which appeared in the papers that I contem-
plate reducing the proportions of. these organizations is both untrue
and misleading. Neither General Kornilov nor I has ever proposed
such a plan. Both Kerenski and we have stood for preserving and
strengthening the soldiers' organizations, but they should not have
the right to change war orders and to interfere in the appointment
of the command.

"I shall continue to defend the war organizations against all
encroachments in so far as the organizations keep within their sphere.

"Again I must confirm that I am very happy that there are no
differences of opinion between Kerenski, General Kornilov, and
myself."

*"Riech," No. 188, August 25, 1917. Savinkov, Boris Victorovich (1879-

1925).

ft "Izvestiia," No, 147, August 31, 1917.

520 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

PLOT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT 12

In reply to the question whether rumors which are circulating,
that the object of the plot is to free the former Emperor from
Tobolsk, prosecuting attorney A. F. Staal said that there was no truth
in the report. The aim of the plot is purely political. It began before
the Emperor's departure for Tobolsk, and it set for itself the task
of overturning the existing Government and restoring the old regime.

Grand Dukes Michael Alexandrovich and Paul Alexandrovich
were placed under domestic arrest on the night of September 3.

2. KERENSKTS EXPLANATION OF THE KORNILOV

AFFAIR 13

RADIO-TELEGRAM SENT OUT

On September 8, General Kornilov sent to me Vladimir Lvov,
member of the Duma, with a demand that the Provisional Govern-
ment hand over to General Kornilov all civil and military power
so that he may, according to his own judgment, form a new Gov-
ernment. I called up General Kornilov on long distance, and he con-
firmed that he had authorized Lvov to deliver said message.

This demand on the Provisional Government, through me, is
an attempt of certain circles of the Russian public to take advantage
of the difficult situation in the State to establish a regime opposed
to the conquests of the revolution.

In view of this the Provisional Government, in order to save
the country, freedom, and the republican form of government, has
found it necessary to authorize me to take quick and sure steps
to cut at the roots all attempts against the supreme power in the
State and the rights of the citizens won by the revolution.

All necessary measures to safeguard liberty and order in the
country are being taken, and the people will be informed about them
iti due time.

In addition to this, I order:

I. That General Kornilov give up his office of Supreme Com-
mander to General Klembovski, commander of the armies of the
Northern front, which bars the way to Petrograd, General Klem-

n "Izvestiia," No. I'SJ, September 5, 1917.
""Riech," No. 202, September n, 1917.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 521

bovski is to assume the Supreme Command temporarily and to re-
main at Pskov.

2. That Petrograd and Petrograd uiezd be placed under martial
law, subject to all war regulations. . . .

I call upon all citizens to preserve the order and quiet necessary
to save the country.

I call upon the army and navy to carry out in a cool and self-
sacrificing manner their duty in defending the country from the
foreign foe.

A. F. KERENSKI,

Prime Minister, Minister of War and Navy.
September 9, 1917.

KERENSKl'S CALL TO THE RAILWAY MEN 14

Kerenski sent the following appeal:

"Railway men, the fate of Russia is in large part in your hands.
You helped to overturn the old regime. You should protect the con-
quests of revolutionary Russia from the dark attempts of a military
dictatorship. You should not carry out a single order issued by
General Kornilov.

"Be on your guard. Obey only the will of the Provisional Gov-
ernment, which is the will of the Russian people."

3. PROCLAMATIONS OF GENERAL KORNILOV18

Headqmrters of the Supreme Comm<mder-in-Chief:

For Petrograd, to be transmitted to the Minister of War, all
railway lines, all railway officials, railway committees, the "Russkoe
Slovo," other newspapers, and as circulars for Russian cities, office
holders, and as copy for newspapers :

The entire first part of the telegram, Number 4663, of the Prime
Minister is a lie from beginning to end. It is not I who sent VI. N.
Lvov, member of the Duma, to the Provisional Government, but it
was the Prime Minister who sent him to me as his emissary. Al.
Aladin, member of the Duma, can testify to this.

In this way there came about a great provocation which threatens
the fate of the country.

People of Russia, our great country is dying. Her end is near.

Forced to speak openly, I, General Kornilov, declare that the

14 "Riech," No. 202, September n, 1917.
**"Novoe Vremia," No. 14866, September n, 1917.

522 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Provisional Government, under the pressure of the Bolshevik ma-
jority in the Soviets, is acting in complete harmony with the German
General Staff and, simultaneously with the expected landing of the
enemy troops near Riga, is killing the army and shaking the country.

The terrible conviction of the inevitable ruin of the country
compels me in these frightful times to call upon all Russians to save
their dying land. All in whose breast a Russian heart beats, all who
believe in God, in the Church, pray to Him for the greatest miracle —
the saving of our native land.

I, General Kornilov, son of a Cossack peasant, declare to one
and all that I desire nothing for myself other than the salvation of
our Great Russia, and vow to lead the people, through victory over
our enemies, to the Constituent Assembly, where it can determine
its future destiny and the form of its future political life.

I cannot betray Russia into the hands of her ancient enemy,
the Germans, who would make slaves of the Russian people. I prefer
to die honorably on the field of battle so that I may not see the shame
and degradation of our Russian land.

People of Russia, the life of your native land is in your hands.

GENERAL KORNILOV

No. 64.4.2, September 10, Headquarters 16

(Appeal to the People to Be Circularized in All Cities and Railways)

I, General Kornilov, Supreme Commander-in-Chief, declare be-
fore the whole nation that my duty as a soldier, as a self-sacrificing
citizen of free Russia, and my boundless love for my country oblige
me at this critical hour of Russia's existence to disobey the orders of
the Provisional Government and to retain the Supreme Command
over the Army and Navy. I am supported in this decision by all the
commanders-in-chief of the fronts, and declare to the Russian people
that I prefer to die rather than give up my post of Supreme Com-
mander-in-Chief. A true son of Russia remains at his place to the
end and is always ready to make for his country the greatest of all
sacrifices, which is his life.

In these terrible moments through which our country is passing,
when the approaches to both capitals are almost open to the victorious
advance of the triumphant foe, the Provisional Government forgets
the great question of the independence and the very existence of the
land and frightens the people with phantoms of counter-revolution,
M"Novoe Vremia," No. 14866, September n, 1917.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 523

which it is calling forth by its inability to govern, by its weakness
and indecision.

Is it not for me, son of the people, who has devoted himself,
heart and soul, to the services of the people, to stand guard over
the great liberties and great future of Russia? But at the present
moment this future is in weak and hesitating hands. The arrogant
foe, by using bribery and treachery, has made himself master here
as if he were at home, and carries destruction not only to liberty but
to the very existence of the Russian nation.

Russian people, shake off your madness and blindness and look
into the bottomless pit into which our country is rushing.

Desiring to avoid all collision, all shedding of Russian blood in
civil war, and forgetting all insults and injuries, I, in the presence
of the whole nation, say to the Provisional Government: Come to
Headquarters where your safety and freedom are guaranteed by my
word of honor, and together we will work out and form such a gov-
ernment of national defense as will assure liberty and will lead the
Russian people to its great future, worthy of a free and mighty
people.

GENERAL KORNILOV

4. "IZVESTIIA" ACCOUNT OF THE KORNILOV AFFAIR 17

September 8-9.

At 4:00 P. M., there was to be a meeting of the Provisional
Government. Before it began, the Prime Minister was called out
to talk with Headquarters by long distance telephone. From this con-
versation he got the impression that all was not as well as it should
be and asked his adjutant to find V. N. Lvov. He was found and
brought to the home of Kerenski. . . .

Lvov said that General Kornilov authorized him to demand that
Kerenski, as Prime Minister, hand over his power to General Korni-
lov to form a new Government.

Lvov did not conceal the fact that this was the wish not only of
Kornilov, but of a certain group of public men who were just then
at Headquarters. This group had nothing against Kerenski's occupy-
ing the post of Minister of Justice in the new Cabinet. The Ministry
of War was, however, to be in the hands of Savinkov.

If Kerenski agrees to this combination, then the public men invite

* "Izvestiia," Extra, September 9, 1917-

524 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

him and Savinkov to come at once to Headquarters for further and
final discussion. Lvov gave his word of honor that the Prime Min-
ister would not be arrested at Headquarters; and if no agreement
should be reached, then he could freely depart

After listening to Lvov's propositions, Kerenski said that they
were quite unexpected and that he was astonished at the boldness
of General Kornilov. ... It did not seem possible that General
Kornilov would make such a demand, and therefore Lvov was
asked to- wait a little while Kerenski called up General Kornilov.

General Kornilov confirmed Lvov. When Kerenski came back
into the room, he told Lvov that he could not accept the propositions
of General Kornilov and that he would take measures to crush this
new plot against the free country and republic. . . .

About 8 : oo P. M., the Provisional Government met. It discussed
until late in the night this unexpected question. ... In the end, the
text for the call to the people was prepared and accepted. It removed
Kornilov from command and declared Petrograd in a state of war.

In the course of the night a telegram was received from Gen-
eral Lukomski, the inspirer and ringleader of this plot. . * .

When the Government, after its discussion with Lvov, telegraphed
to Lukomski to take over the command, he wired back his refusal.
According to the contents of the telegram, General Lukomski will,
it would seem, not stop even at the point of betraying his country.
He threatened that a failure of the Government to carry out the
demand of Kornilov would lead to civil war at the front, the open-
ing of the front, and a shameful separate peace. All this would tend
to show that there is a determination to come to an agreement with
the Germans in order to succeed with the plot. , . .

At 4: oo A. M., September 9, Kerenski got Headquarters by long
distance. Generals Kornilov and Lukomski would not give a straight
answer to the question whether they would lay down their command,
• but said that they had not been understood and that Lvov had misled
them.

Kerenski insisted that Kornilov should immediately lay down
his command and come at once to Petrograd.

But General Kornilov refused to take orders from the Prime
Minister. . . .

Kerenski thought that in view of the critical position, the Gov-
ernment should select from its number a small group of men and
endow them with full power for the purpose of quickly and definitely
paralyzing the plot of Kornilov. Kerenski was of the opinion that

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 525

such a group, in order to get quick results, must be made up of men
who see eye to eye in current matters.

This project of Kerenski aroused a strong protest from mem-
bers of the Government belonging to the Cadet Party. They said that
they would remain in the Ministry only if all measures to crush the
uprising and all important political questions be decided by the Cabi-
net as a whole. As the majority of the Ministers did not agree with
the Cadets, they handed in their resignation. . . .

During Kerenski's discussions with representatives of the revolu-
tionary democracy, it was suggested that it would be well to call a
special conference, similar to the one at Moscow, where there would
come together the live forces of the country, with the exception of
the . . . Four Dumas and organizations (like the St. George
Knights and others compromised in the plot).

After this conference the Government, as such, will be respon-
sible to this body until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly.

Until the calling of this conference, the representatives of the
revolutionary democracy that enter the Directory will not be form-
ally connected with the central organs of the revolutionary democ-
racy. ... In connection with this counter-revolutionary plot, eighty
people have been arrested, among them members of the Duma.

September 9 18

On this day uprisings were expected from the Right and Left . . .
but, fortunately, nothing happened.

September io19

Early on the morning of the loth, word was received at Pavlovsk
station that nine units of rebellious troops left the station Dno.
An order was sent at once by telegraph to tear up the track. This
was done in three different places between the stations Semrino and
Susanino, which are about forty-two versts from Petrograd. . . .

At 4:00 P. M., word was received that two units of rebellious
troops passed Viritsa. These troops were mainly native Moham-
medans from the Caucasus. [To talk with them, men of their own
kind were sent from Petrograd. At 6 : oo P. M., near Semrino, they
met officers of the Caucasus division who would not permit the Petro-
grad delegation to talk with the troops.]

u "Izvestiia," Extra, September ID, 1917.
**Ibid.f No. 156, September n, 1917. '

526 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

September ii20

The Government has taken the necessary measures to put an end
to the rebellion. General Denikin, who announced that he joined
Kornilov, has been arrested with all his staff. General Erdeli was
also arrested because he refused to obey the orders of the Provisional
Government.

Contact between Kornilov and his army is broken. The troops
under his command have come to a standstill. Among his troops
there is a great deal of disagreement. Some of the Cossacks have
gone over to the side of the Government The Wild Division is also
divided in opinion. Judging from the attitude of some of the Korni-
lov troops, it may be -said that they were drawn into the 'rebellion
by deceit. They were led to believe that they were being taken to
Petrograd to save the Provisional Government from a new Bolshevik
attempt. . . . The Provisional Government hopes that civil war will
be avoided.

The Government has issued an order to the commissars of all
the guberniias not to allow the publication of the proclamations of
Kornilov or of others in agreement with him. Nothing is to be pub-
lished about Kornilov except official reports.

The "Novoe Vremia" published in full the Kornilov proclama-
tions, but only extracts of the orders of the Government and appeals
of those organizations fighting counter-revolution. Because of this,
orders have been given to close the "Novoe Vremia." . . . For
similar reasons the "Russkoe Slovo" is also closed. . . .

In the course of the day, it was learned that Kornilov's Head-
quarters are surrounded from all sides. . . . Streets are quiet. . . .
People are waiting in line for the evening papers. . . * People are
nervous because they know not what to expect. ... All kinds of
wild rumors spread. . . ,

September 12 21

Generals Kornilov and Lukomski have announced that they were
ready to appear before a revolutionary court to answer the charge of
organizing the rebellion.

According to the latest information, Generals Kornilov and
Lukomski have surrendered and are on the way to Petrograd.

"° "Izvestiia," No. 157, September 12, 1917.
*Ibid., No. 158, September 13, 1017.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 527

5. GENERAL LUKOMSKI'S ACCOUNT OF THE KORNI-
LOV AFFAIR 22

During his [Kornilov's] sojourn in Moscow he had several times
met with the Ataman of the Don, Kaledin, with the President of the
State Duma, Rodzianko; and the representatives of different public
organizations and political parties. His intercourse with them had
given him the impression that all his requests would be supported, and
had fortified his belief in the justice of his decisions.

After his return to Mohilev, General Kornilov waited impa-
tiently for the final solution of the questions he had raised at the
Conference, and before Kerenski and Savinkov wired to say that
they were working out a plan of the necessary measures for restor-
ing discipline in the Army; that Savinkov would arrive in a few
days at Mohilev in order to discuss them finally with Kornilov and
come to an agreement with him, after which these measures would
immediately be ratified by the Provisional Government.

Meanwhile, information from Petrograd confirmed the rumors of
an intended rising of the Bolsheviks which was to take place at the
beginning of the next month. ,

Some time before this a secret society had been formed in Petro-
grad, which had for its object the organization of detachments for
self-defense in case of a rising of the Bolsheviks. Colonel Lebedev,
of the General Staff, who was in touch with the heads of this organi-
zation, asked General Kornilov to enter into immediate intercourse
with them and to invite them to Mohilev.

General Kornilov consented, and two engineers, belonging to the
organization in question, arrived at Mohilev.

They informed General Kornilov that they had about two thou-
sand men at their disposal, perfectly well armed, but were short of
officers. They did not risk enrolling them from among the officers of
the Petrograd garrison for fear they should be indiscreet and betray
the organization. They begged General Kornilov to send about one
hundred officers to Petrograd at the end of August, and vowed that
they would play an important role in case of a rising of the

Bolsheviks.

General Kornilov consented to this, saying that he would send
officers from the front, under the pretext of giving them leave of
"Loukorasky, "Memoirs of the Russian Revolution," 103-5, 108-13.

528 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

absence. The necessary dispositions would be taken by the "Officers'
Union."

It was agreed among them that everything must be ready by
September 8, and that, in case of a rising of the Bolsheviks, at
the approach of General Krymov on Petrograd, this organization
should step forward, occupy the Smolny Institute (Headquarters of
the Council of Workmen and Soldiers' Deputies), and try to arrest
the Bolshevik leaders.

After the Conference in Moscow, Kornilov unfortunately spoke
to many people who came to the Stavka of his intention to deal a
decisive blow to the Bolsheviks, and to the Council of Workmen and
Soldiers' Deputies. This intention had, in fact, ceased to be a secret,
and part, if not all, of his plan had got to be known in Petrograd.
I am deeply persuaded that these rumors, which had evidently
reached the Council of Workmen and Soldiers' Deputies, made them
postpone the proposed rising of the Bolsheviks and insist on putting
Kornilov out of the way.

Kerenski, on the other hand, who looked upon Kornilov as a
dangerous rival, was only too glad to seize this opportunity for pro-
voking what he called "a revolt" on the part of the Supreme Com-
mander-in-Chief and then getting rid of him. . . .

On the morning of September 7, when I came to make my
daily report to General Kornilov, he told me the following:

In the evening of September 6, Mr. Lvov (formerly Procurator
of the Holy Synod) had arrived at Mohilev and demanded to see
the Supreme Commander-in-Chief at once. The latter, being occupied,
could not receive him, and he presented himself to General Kornilov
on the following morning.

Mr. Lvov informed Kornilov that he had come as delegate of the
Minister-President, Kerenski, in order to learn the point of view
of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the best and most expedient
way of creating a strong authority.

The Minister-President, it appeared, considered the three follow-
ing courses as possible :

1. Kerenski himself as Dictator, at the head of a new Government.

2. A Government of three or four members (one of which must
be the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Kornilov) invested
with unlimited powers.

3. General Kornilov as Dictator and Supreme Commander-in-
Chief, at the head of a new Government.

Mr. Lvov inquired whether General Kornilov considered it

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 529

desirable — in the latter case — for Kerenski and Savinkov to form
part of the new Government.

General Kornilov voted for the latter of these three 'variants,
saying that Kerenski and Savinkov must be members o£ the new
Government, and charged Mr. Lvov to inform them that he invited
them both urgently to the Stavka, as he feared for their personal
safety in case of a rising in the capital ; and it would, moreover, be
necessary to discuss a whole series of questions which would,
naturally, arise in connection with the expected events.

I inquired whether Mr. Lvov had brought any written proof of
his mission.

"No," replied Kornilov, "he had no letter with him. The questions
he put were written down in his notebook, and he entered my answers
in the same. Mr. Lvov is an irreproachably honest man and a gentle-
man, and I had no reason to distrust him."

"I know him for a perfect gentleman," said I, "but I also know
that he has the reputation of a blunderer, and is quite capable of
making a mess of things. The very fact of Kerenski's charging a
third person with this mission seems suspicious to me. I am afraid he
is hatching some plot against you. All this is very, very strange.
Why did not Savinkov say anything about it? Why is Lvov entrusted
with this mission at the very moment of Savinkov's arrival at the
Stavka? God grant I may be mistaken, but I do not like the look
of it all, and I profoundly distrust Kerenski."

Kornilov said that I was too suspicious, that Lvov had left Petro-
grad after Savinkov, which explains why the latter knew nothing
about the subject of this mission. He believed that Kerenski was
sincere in this case, as the question of Dictatorship had been discussed
by him before. . . .

On September 8, Kerenski called General Kornilov to the direct
cable and begged him to confirm whether "he had actually charged
Mr. Lvov to inform him, Kerenski, of his plans and purposes."

General Kornilov replied: "Yes, I have charged Mr. Lvov to
inform you of my plans and purposes."

Kerenski then inquired whether General Kornilov still con-
sidered it urgent for him and Savinkov to come to the Stavka.

Kornilov replied affirmatively, after which Kerenski said: "It is
too late to start today, Saturday, but we shall leave for the Stavka
on Sunday."

General Kornilov said that he would expect them on Monday,
September 10.

53Q DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

I must note here what General Kornilov himself owned later on
— that the latter acted most thoughtlessly in this case, for, in speaking
by direct cable with Kerenski, he omitted to ask him itilint it was that
Lvov had said to him.

Now this was most advantageous for Kerenski, and helped him
to play his treacherous game. He denied that it was he who had
despatched Lvov on a mission to Kornilov ; he declared, at the sittings
of the Provisional Government, that Kornilov had Insolently claimed
to be invested with the rights and powers of a Dictator, and ended
by requesting the Provisional Government to dismiss him from the
post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Meanwhile, Kornilov was sure that everything was going on well
and that he was acting in full accordance with the Provisional Gov-
ernment. When I entered his study, late on the evening of September
8, to report on something, I found him poring over the project
of a new list of Ministers.

"I am elaborating the project of a new Cabinet," said he. "I
want to have it ready for the arrival of Kerenski and Savinkov and
come to a full agreement with them. I will be glad, however, if I am
freed from the necessity of being Dictator. It will be best, after all,
to form a strong Government of three or four members, in which I
must, of course, take part, as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the
Army/'

On that same evening, Kornilov sent a telegram to Moscow, to
the President of the State Duma, Rodzianko, begging him and other
public leaders to come to the Stavka on the morning of September
10. When the subsequent events took place, however, neither Rod-
zianko nor any other of the public leaders who had so warmly
supported Kornilov at the State Conference in Moscow put in an
appearance at the Stavka.

At seven of the morning, on September 9, General Romanovski,
Quartermaster-General at the Stavka, brought me a telegram
addressed both to General Kornilov and me.

This telegram informed us that General Kornilov was dismissed
from his post and ordered to start at once for Petrograd. I was
invited to take over temporarily the duties of Supreme Commander-
in-Chief.

The telegram was simply signed "Kerenski/' and did tiot bear
any number.

I took it to General Kornilov.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 531

This was a terrible blow to him. All hope of saving the Army
and saving Russia was now lost. It was clear that Kerenski was
bent on setting Kornilov aside and on going further towards concili-
ating the Council of Workmen and Soldiers' Deputies ; it was clear
that the Bolsheviks would get the uppermost hand, and that all that
remained yet of the Army and the mechanism of the State, would
irretrievably crumble away.

After reading the telegram, General Kornilov asked what I
intended to do.

I replied that I considered it impossible to take over the duties
of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and that I would immediately
draft an answer in that sense.

Kornilov then said to me :

"Yes, under the existing conditions, it is my duty to remain at my
post to the end. I must have my own way, and force the Provisional
Government to carry out my requests. Please wire at once to General
Krymov and tell him to hasten with the concentration of the troops
near Petrograd."

I sent a long telegram to the President of the Provisional Gov-
ernment. All who were acquainted with military questions, I said,
realized perfectly that, under the existing conditions, when home
policy was directed, de facto, by irresponsible organizations which
had the most depraving influence on the Army, it would not be
possible to regenerate it. The Army, as such, would inevitably and
definitely go to pieces in two or three months' time, and Russia would
be obliged to sign a shameful separate peace with Germany and
Austro-Hungary, the consequences of which would be terrible for
Russia. The Government had taken half-measures which did not
actually relieve the situation, and only prolonged the agony and
"saved the revolution," but did not save Russia. It was necessary,
I said, in order to save her, to create a really strong authority and
restore order in the rear.

I further went on to say that General Kornilov had put forward
a whole series of requests which had never been fulfilled. Kornilov
had no personal ambitions and designs but considered it indispensable
to take energetic measures in view of restoring order in the Army
and in the whole of the country. The arrival of Savinkov and Lvov —
who has made a proposal in the same sense to Kornilov in Kerenski's
name— had only obliged the former to take a definite decision, which
it was now too late to renounce. My telegram ended as follows :

532 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

"Having only the welfare of my country in view, I consider it my duty
to declare most decisively, and with a clear conscience, that it is now too late
to stop the enterprise begun with your consent. This would only lead to a civil
war, to the definitive ruin and decomposition of the Army, and to an ignomini-
ous separate peace. . . .

"For the sake of the salvation of Russia, you must enter into General
Kornilov's views, instead of dismissing him. ...

"As for me, I cannot take upon myself the responsibility for the Army, if
even for a short time, and do not consider it possible to take over the duties
of Supreme Commander-in-Chief. . . "

On September 10 the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief
was offered to the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern front, Gen-
eral Klembovski, who was invited to remain at Pskov.

General Klembovski took advantage of this to refuse the offer,
saying* that it was impossible to direct the movements of the Army
from Pskov.

All the Commanders-in-Chief and many of the Army Command-
ers sent telegrams to Kerenski, and to the Stavka, expressing their
solidarity with General Kornilov.

6. PROBABLE RESULTS OF THE KORNILOV AFFAIR 2S

This is the question every one is asking. It is generally agreed
that 'the Bolsheviks will make use of it for their own ends. They
have already come out with a declaration that Kornilov's undertaking
was not his own doing but of the whole bourgeoisie. In connection
with this, the Bolsheviks have called on the workmen to wage war
against the enemies of the proletariat and the revolution. On the
streets one may see crowds of armed workmen frightening peaceful
inhabitants. At the Soviet meetings the Bolsheviks insistently demand
that their 'comrades be let out of prison.

In this connection it is generally assumed that just as soon as
the Kornilov affair has been liquidated, the Bolsheviks, whom the
majority of the Soviet no longer regards as betrayers of the revolu-
tion, will make every effort to force the Soviet to accept at least
a part of their program.

Both Kokoshkin and Nekrasov are fully convinced that the
Bolsheviks will do their best to bring pressure to bear on the
Government, but the latter believes that they will have little
influence. . . ,

99 "Riech," No, 204, September 13,

CHAPTER XXXVIII
DIRECTORY OF FIVE

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

One of the results of the Kornilov affair was to force public
opinion to the Left. Before the trouble was quite over there came
a demand from the Soviet group that the Cadets, who were ac-
cused of being implicated in the plot, should leave the Ministry.
Kerenski insisted on a free hand, "on having a Government of a
few men who are of one mind, with full power to act strongly
and quickly against Kornilov. ... If, however, the democracy
will not agree to this proposition, he can no longer assume
responsibility. B- . ."

Kerenski apparently wished to get rid of some of his col-
leagues in order to get others with whom he could work more in
harmony. Since March, and during these months of carrying
great responsibilities on his shoulders, a change had come over
Kerenski. He was drifting farther and farther away from the
Soviet without, however, quite approaching the Duma. He was
nowhere at home. At this time the moderate Socialists had aban-
doned the idea of a coalition with the bourgeoisie, but Kerenski
still clung to it. Unable to come to an understanding, his sup-
porters in the Soviet began to leave him. This parting of company
weakened both and strengthened the Bolsheviks.

For the time being a make-shift government was formed. It
was composed of five men, with Kerenski at the head, and all the
other Ministers remained at their posts as directors of their
departments.

533

534 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

i. FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT OF FIVE

MEETING OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE1

September 9.

Chairman Dan, having approved the text of the appeal of the
Provisional Government, said . . . that all the revolutionary democ-
racy should gather around one center. . . .

Comrade Richter spoke in the name of the Socialist-Revolution-
ists. He suggested that a delegation should be sent to Comrade
Kerenski to propose to him the best way out of the present situation,
to keep the Provisional Government as it is, but to put in the place
of the Cadets such other men as may seem best to Kerenski. If a
Directory or some other form of Government is necessary, his party
will support it, provided that this new Government will fight counter-
revolution and will stand by the program of July 21. ...

Comrade Weinstein spoke in the name of the Mensheviks. . . .
He was of the opinion that the Provisional Government should be
elastic. The Mensheviks fully agreed with the Socialist-Revolution-
ists that the Cabinet should continue as before, but that democratic
elements should replace the Cadets. . . .

Comrade Sokolnikov spoke for the Central Committee of the
Bolsheviks. He said that the Bolsheviks had already taken the
necessary measures to explain to the masses the threatening danger
. . . which his party had foreseen and had warned against The Gov-
ernment which you recognize or form without the proletariat will
not have the support of the proletariat. It is not a question of tomor-
row but of killing counter-revolution at the roots. « . . As soon as
Kerenski learned of the plot of Kornilov, he asked the Bolsheviks
to use their influence with the revolutionary soldiers to defend the
revolution. In conclusion, the speaker said that only the carrying out
of a definite program can inspire the masses with confidence in the
Government. This program consists of: republic, peace, and
bread. . . .

Comrade Dan, speaking for the Mensheviks, took the position that
the members of the Party [in the democratic government] should be
responsible to the Party, and that the Government should call a
conference similar to the Moscow Conference, leaving out, however,
members of the four Dumas, that this conference should continue
in existence until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, and that
1 "Izvestiia," Extra, September 10,

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 535

the Provisional Government should be responsible to this conference.
He went on to say that the Mensheviks would continue to agitate with
the Government to come out for a democratic republic, immediate
dismissal of the Duma, the carrying out of the agrarian reforms, and
an appeal to the workers and peasants to stand by the revolution. . . ,

[After many others had made speeches] Tseretelli proposed that
the meeting proceed with the discussion of practical measures. . . .
After many such were proposed, the chairman brought them together
under three points: i. the composition of the ministry; 2. the relation
between the democracy and the Government; 3. the future activity
of the Government.

The vote was unanimous (the Bolsheviks not participating) to
accept the recommendations of the Socialist-Revolutionists and the
Mensheviks to have a government similar to the one in existence,
but to replace the Cadets with such democratic elements as might
seem best to the Government.

A large majority voted against the second point, that is, a
Directory, . . .

In regard to the third point, a democratic conference (a dem-
ocratic parliament) which is proposed by the Socialist-Revolutionists
and Mensheviks, Lunacharski announced that the Bolsheviks would
vote for it if the composition of this conference was to be revolution-
ary, A vote was taken, and a majority was in favor of point three.

After this vote the chairman announced that the meeting would
temporarily adjourn to give the presidium time to take up these
questions with the Provisional Government. At 2:00 A. M., the
presidium departed for the Winter Palace. . . .

September 10*

At 3:45 A. M,, the Central Executive Committee was again in
session. It was reported that Kerenski insisted on a government of
six persons with full power to act. . , .

Lunacharski was opposed to a government of six . . * and pro-
posed that the Soviet should form a government. Martov in a long
speech came out against the idea of Lunacharski but said that he
did not see how a Directory would save the situation. The Mensheviks
and Socialist-Revolutionists were in favor of standing by the Govern-
ment, according to the formula "in so far as" [it stood by the
program].

After a long discussion without coming to an agreement, it was

'"Izvestiia," No. 156, September n, 1917,

536 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

decided to appeal once more to Kerenski to accept the first point, a
government along the line of the old one. Just then word came*
from Kerenski that Tseretelli and Gotz should at once come to the
session of the Provisional Government. A little later Chernov also
was asked to come to the Winter Palace. Under the circumstances,
the Central Executive Committee adjourned the meeting. . . .

At 7 A. M. it was renewed. . . . The first to appear was Cher-
nov . . . followed by Tseretelli, Gotz, and Skobelev.

[The latter took the floor to give an account of the plot, the
measures the Government was taking to crush it, and the difficulty
of doing anything, owing to the crisis in the Government. This
crisis cannot go on another minute.] He was followed by Tseretelli,
who said . . . that Kerenski insisted on having a Government of
a few men who are of one mind, with full power to act strongly
and quickly against Kornilov. Such a Government should have the
fullest support of the revolutionary democracy. If, however, the
democracy will not agree to this proposition, he can no longer assume
responsibility. ... In reply to Tseretdli's question whether the
proposed Government would . . . fight with all its might against
counter-revolution, Kerenski replied that it was just that very thing
that he had in mind. Under the circumstances, declared Tseretelli,
we should support the Government unconditionally. . .*.

Chernov announced that he resigned as Minister of Agriculture
to make it easier for Kerenski to form a new ministry. . . .

A representative of the Bolsheviks said that his group was against
the proposition of Tseretelli, but if the Government will really fight
counter-revolution, the Bolsheviks will cooperate with it and will
conclude with it a technical military alliance, . . .

The following resolution moved by Tseretelli was passed:

"We leave it to Comrade Kerenski to form a government, the main
object of which should be a most determined fight against the plot
of General Kornilov. In this fight he is promised the vigorous support
of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Committee of the Soviet of
Peasants* Deputies."

September 1 1 8

The report that the Provisional Government does not exist Js
not true. It does exist. For the time being it has handed over all its
power to Kerenski, but all the ministers are at their posts. . . .

* "Izvestiia," No. 157, September 12,

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE 537

September 12, 13*

The question of appointing Kerenski Supreme Commander, and
General M, V, Alexeev Chief of Staff, was settled at last night's
meeting of the Provisional Government. It is said that the Idea of
Kerenskfs becoming Supreme Commander came from the Soviet,
but it has the approval of other circles. Members of the Provisional
Government have come to the conclusion that under the present
circumstances there is little confidence in a General as Supreme Com-
mander, and therefore the appointment of Kerenski is necessary.
Then, again, the appointment of Kerenski makes impossible the
rqx'tition of a Kornilov affair, . . .

From an exchange of opinion which took place at the meeting of
the Provisional Government and from private conversations with
Ministers belonging to the Cadet Party, it was evident that the
Cadets are not opposed to entering the Government. But lurenev
announced at the conference of the Government that if he entered
he would lay clown three conditions :

1. That military men should occupy military posts in the Gov-
ernment.

2. That the Government should have in it representatives of
commerce and industry.

3. That the crushing of the Kornilov uprising should not be
carried to the point of breaking up the unity of the army.

2. THE NEW CABINET5

From the very beginning, Kerenski was of the opinion that the
new Cabinet should be constructed on a coalition basis. By this he
means that it should contain not only socialist but bourgeois elements
. . . such as Cadets and representatives of commerce and industry.

In conversation with Ministers and other jx>litical leaders he
i-aicl that he did not agree with certain revolutionary organs which
insisted that no Cadets should enter the new Cabinet. Of course, the
leaders of that party should not he-taken in because their very position
would compel them to assume a sharp partizan attitude. . . .

REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY AND THE CADETS6

Late in the evening of September 14, members of the Executive
Committee, Tserctelli, Dan, Gotz, and others came to the Winter
4*'Ri<?cIC No. 204, September 13, 19x7.
* Ibid., No. 205, September 14, *9*7-
* '*Issvc8t5ia/* JNo. 160, September 1

538 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Palace and told Kerenski the decision of the Mensheviks and Social-
ist-Revolutionists : that their representatives would leave the Ministry
if the Cadets entered it. Kerenski. pointed out that if the Cadets were
kept out, the representatives of other bourgeois classes would not
stay in. Under the circumstances Kerenski raised the question whether
it was worth his while to remain in power. The situation is exceed-
ingly critical. . . , What adds to the difficulty is the report that
General Alexeev would not accept the post of Chief of Staff if Cadets
were not in the ministry.

THE COUNCIL OF FIVE 7

When it became clear that it was impossible to come to an under-
standing, the members of the Central Executive Committee left the
Winter Palace for Smolny.

After they had departed, Skobelev announced that in view of
the fact that a majority of the Government did not accept the
point of view of the revolutionary organs, he could no longer remain
in the Government. ... A little later Ministers Zarudni and
Avksentiev made similar statements.

The resignation of these three men brought up the question of
organizing a Government of Five: A. F. Kerenski, M. I. Tere-
schenko, A. M. Nikitin, General Verkhovski, and Admiral Verderev-
ski. All the other Ministers, outside of this group of five, are to remain
at their posts as directors of their departments. It was thought that
in this way the crisis would be solved and a directory formed. This
plan was approved.

The Directory of Five 8

[At its meeting on September 14] the Provisional Government
resolved that until the final formation of the cabinet, and in view
of the present extraordinary circumstances, the government of the
State should be entrusted directly to Prime Minister A. F, Kerenski,
Minister of Foreign Affairs; M. I. Tereschenko, Minister of War;
General Verkhovski, Minister of the Navy ; Rear Admiral Verderev-
ski ; and Minister of Posts and Telegraph, A. M. Nikitin.

* "Riech," No. 206, September 15, 1917.
8 "Izvestiia," No. 161, September 16,

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BOURGEOISIE S39

3. PROCLAMATION OF REPUBLIC9

The rebellion of General Kornilov is suppressed, but the turmoil
which it has brought into the army and to the country is great. Again
the danger threatening the country and its freedom is grave. Thinking
it necessary to terminate the outward vagueness of the form of gov-
ernment, and mindful of the whole-hearted and enthusiastic acceptance
of the republican idea that was shown at the Moscow State Confer-
ence, the Provisional Government declares that the political form
under which the Russian State is governed is a republican form, and
it proclaims the Russian Republic,

The urgent necessity of taking immediate and decisive measures
to restore the impaired order of the State has induced the Provisional
Government to transfer the fullness of its power of government to
five of its members, headed by the Prime Minister.

The Provisional Government regards its main task to be the
restoration of order in the State and the fighting power of the army.
Convinced that only a rallying of all the vital forces of the country
can lead the country out of the difficult situation in which it now finds
itself, the Provisional Government will strive to enlarge its mem-
bership by taking in the representatives of all those elements who
place the lasting and common interests of our country q,bove the
transitory and private interests of separate classes or parties. The
Provisional Government has no doubt that it will bring this about
in the course of the next few days.

A. F, KERENSKI,

Prime Minister
ZARUDNI,

Minister of Justice
September 14, 1917.

DURATION OP THE NEW GOVERNMENT 10

With the formation of the Government of Five, we may consider
the Government crisis at an end* * . * However, it is not likely that
this Government will be long-lived. No doubt the democratic confer-
ence which is being called will organize a more enduring and a more
uniform ministry. . . *

*"I*v«stila/' No. 161, September *6, 1917.

PART XI

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT TRIES TO LEAN
ON THE DEMOCRACY

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

After each blow the country grew weaker and her steps more
unsteady. By the middle of September men like Avksentiev and
Chkheidze had lost hope of cooperation with the propertied classes
and turned to the "democracy for salvation. " A Democratic Con-
ference was summoned to meet at Petrograd on September 27,

". . . to help with the internal organization and to say the de-
cisive word on the formation of a strong government, capable
of uniting all of revolutionary Russia to drive off the foreign
foes and to crush every attempt against the freedom won."

The Conference opened on the day named with a speech by
Kerenski.'He was heckled by the Bolsheviks, lost his temper, put
himself in a bad light, and ended by making threats. The
Bolsheviks were not frightened and told those present that they
had "lost all confidence in the policies which Kerenski now
recommends."

One of these policies was a coalition with the bourgeoisie.
Kerenski and some of his friends were in favor of it as the only
possible way to conduct the Government; the Bolsheviks were
opposed to it and urged "all power to the Soviets/' Debate on
this question dragged on for several days and when it came to a
vote on October 2, there was a good deal of confusion in the
minds of those present. The first vote was for coalition in general,
the second was against coalition with the Cadets, and the third,
on the motion as a whole, was against coalition. The Conference
adjourned for a time to clear tip the mess and while doing so it
got into a snarl which caused the Bolsheviks to leave the meeting.

When the Conference met again on October 4, it resolved to

540

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 541

form a Government in which the democratic element should pre-
dominate. The question of ministerial responsibility came up and
it was decided to create a new organ before which the Ministers
should be held responsible. This new organ was named Provi-
sional Council of the Republic, and its members were drawn from
the Democratic Conference.

The next problem was the formation of a Government.
Kerenski invited the bourgeoisie to join him but they declined on
the ground that they were not willing to be responsible to the
Council of the Republic. A counter-proposal was made to give
the bourgeoisie representation in the Council of the Republic and
to limit the power of that body to asking questions. Though
worded somewhat differently to make possible different interpre-
tations, the agreement as reached was practically the same as the
counter-proposal. On October 8 the new coalition ministry was
formed and issued a declaration on the same day. It took a few
days longer to organize the Council of the Republic.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE AND THE

PROVISIONAL COUNCIL OF THE

REPUBLIC

i. COMPOSITION OF THE DEMOCRATIC
' CONFERENCE1

In these sad days through which the country is passing, when
treachery and betrayal threaten the State with military defeat and
internal trouble, revolutionary Russia must look to democracy for
her salvation. .

It is necessary to gather all the forces of the country to prepare
the defense, to help with the internal organization and to say the
decisive word on the formation of a strong government, capable of
uniting all of revolutionary Russia, to drive off the foreign foe, and
to crush every attempt against the freedom won.

With this in mind, the Central Executive Committee of the
Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Com-
mittee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants* Deputies have resolved
to have a meeting at Petrograd on September 25 and to invite all
democratic organizations of Russia to send their representatives*

N. S. CHKHEIDZE, Chairman of the Executive Committee

of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies
N, D. AVKSENTIEV, Chairman of Exewtfiw Committee,

All-Russian Peasants* Deputies

List of Organizations No. of Delegates

1. Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers'

and Soldiers' Deputies. ........ .»..,* 100

2. Regional Committee of Soviets of Workers1 and Soldiers'

Deputies. *•„....*,.„,....•., 50

3. Executive Committed of Soviets of Peasants* Deputies. * 100

4. Regional Committee of Soviets of Peasants* Deputies 50

5. Cooperatives ... * ...... .'.„ ,..,..,„ ...,••„,.„„ 150

6. Trade Unions, •.•„*...• .„.*..*. 100

7. War Organizations ; . . „• ...... 84

* • 'Izvestiia," No. 161, September 16,

54*

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 543

List of Organizations No. of Delegates

8. Railway Men's Union * 20

9. Commerce-Industry Union 20

10. Post-Telegraph 10

1 1. Teachers1 Union 15

12. Workers in City and Zemstvo Unions 3

13. Workers in Provisional Government Committee 2

14. Pharmacists I

15. Assistants to Doctors 2

16. Doctors 2

1 7. Journalists 2

18. Lawyers 2

19. Engineers 2

20. Architects * i

21. Zemstvo , 50

22. Nationality Groups 59

23. Peasants' Union 10

ATTEMPTS TO BREAK UP THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE 2

Many organs of the press, as well as separate political groups,
have set for themselves the task of breaking up the Democratic
Congress. When this is done by the Central Committee of the Cadets
and by their paper "Riech," there is nothing to be wondered at, but
when democratic, even socialist, organs are busy with the same kind
of thing, we are bound to ask, "Do they know what they are doing?"

DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE POSTPONED TO SEPTEMBER 27 *

Taking into consideration the numerous notices received from
delegations invited to the All-Russian Democratic Conference, of
their inability to reach Petrogracl on September 25, the presidiums of
the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Sol-
diers' Deputies and the Executive Committee of Peasants' Deputies
have resolved to open the session promptly at 4 : oo P. M. on Septem-
ber 27, at the Alexander Theater,

OPENING OF THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE SEPTEMBER 27*

The Democratic Conference opened at 5 -.25 P. M., with Chkheidae
in the chair, , „ ,

* **I*vest«V No. 165, September 21, 1917.

* "Riech," No. 214, September 25, 1917.

4 "Ixvestiia," No, 171, September 28, 1917.

544 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

KERENSKl'S SPEECH

[He began by reviewing the Kornilov affair and then continued:]
"The Provisional Government, in welcoming this conference, author-
ized me to say that today, more than ever before, it is necessary to
bring to bear all the strength and all the brains of the country. The
Provisional Government receives telegrams from all corners that
anarchy is spreading all over the land. ...

"No matter what is said on the Right or Left, the Provisional
Government is still of the same mind. Let them call us dreamers and
visionaries, but we feel and know that in the moment of danger ^all
will come and unite and give us the strength to save the revolution
and the country, to save the life of the people, who are deserving of
a bright future.

"As Supreme Commander, I would bear witness that, with ah
insignificant exception, the army from top to bottom has shown
itself true to the new fatherland which it is serving.

"All of us leaders of the army are in favor of the army organiza-
tions, based on good sense and harmonious work of all elements."

"How about the death penalty, Marat?" somebody on the left*
shouted.

Kerenski paused for a second, then in a quiet and restrained
voice proceeded.

"Yes, in the beginning of the revolution the death penalty was
done away with ; later, not only at the demand of the commanders,
but also of the public organizations at the front, it was brought
back."

Cries— "Shame!"

"The Front curses and calls to shame those who, notwithstanding
warnings, have demoralized ignorant people to such a point that
young children and nurses were violated by the dozen.

"But I say to you, to you who shout from over there, that when
I sign even one death penalty, then you may curse me. . . .

"Do not forget that the army has others besides soldiers. It has
brave officers who are giving their lives for their country. ... I
ought to say that no matter what tomorrow may bring forth, what the
future has in store for us, we shall remain the same defenders of
freedom, native land, and the happiness of the people as heretofore."

"What native land?" came a call from the left.

"Silence! Down with the friend of William 1 Down, with the
Germanophile !"

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 545

"It is you who are the curse of the native land!" some one called
from a box*

From all sides came shouts and protests, so that the chairman
had difficulty in restoring order.

When the noise had died down somewhat, KerenskI continued.
"It is an unbearably heavy cross which I carry and which forces
me to be always away from you. When I am in your midst, I forget
the conditions and the position which I occupy, and I speak to you
as a private man. But there are those who do not understand this". I
must therefore speak as one having authority. Any one who dares
to attack the free republic, to stick his knife in the back of the Russian
army, will learn the power of the revolutionary Government. , . „"

KAMENEV'S SPEECH

"Comrades : The Prime Minister and Supreme Commander asked
that the truth be spoken here. It is true that he accompanied this
with a threat. We shall pay no attention to the threat, but shall
speak the truth.

"The first true word of the Party which I have the honor to
represent is that after six months of labor of the different Govern-
ments, we have lost all confidence in the policies which Kerenski
now recommends. * . . Kerenski makes a mistake in assuming that
lack of confidence in him means lack of confidence in the Russian
republic, I am of the opinion that we should decline to settle the
question of government by loud declamations, but on the basis of
the real experience of the last six months of coalition government.
„ . , These months show us how a certain political party signs the
programs of democracy in order not to live up to them. It is no longer
a question of long-winded programs. Democracy has no time to
bargain.

"Look facts in the face. If you desire a coalition with the bour-
geoisie, make an honest coalition with the Cadets ; but if the Kornilov
plot has taught you what the proletariat has tried to tell you from
the very beginning, then you should realize that the only way to
save Russia, to reestablish confidence in the army, confidence of the
soldiers in the officers, of the peasant in the promise that he will
receive the land, of the workmen that they are living in a republic,
is to take all the power into the hands of the workers', soldiers', and
peasants* organizations. , * .

"Can there be a new coalition ? I say, no. And this is my reason.
If we stick by the program of the Moscow Conference, what political

546 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

groups, what power will carry out the said program? Among tlie
bourgeoisie there is just one such party — the Cadet — but it will not
accept the program. We can make no coalition with the Cadets on
this platform, and if we turn away from them, there is no other
group with whom we can form a coalition. Let's not fool ourselves.
Neither Kishkin, Tereschenko, nor Nekrasov can take the place of
a large political party, the only one that represents the propertied
elements in Russia. . . ."

SKOBELEV'S SPEECH 5

The fundamental question which we have to decide is whether we
should keep the bourgeoisie in the Government. It is said that in the
past they not only did no creative work, not only were they merely
passive, but they even sabotaged. . . .

The elimination of the representatives of the industrial bour-
geoisie does not mean that the Provisional Government will have
no more difficulties. What we call revolutionary democracy in the
broad sense of the word is by no means of uniform social composi-
tion. It is true that it is easier to come to an agreement within the
group, but there is yet much to do to coordinate the various interests
in the democracy itself. During the four months which I was at the
head of the Ministry of Labor I had to face this very problem. I
should like to say this to the workmen: If you remove the industrial
bourgeoisie from the Government, you will have on your hands no
fewer difficulties in harmonizing your interests with those of the
peasants. . . .

When we speak of coalition we do not, of course, mean coalition
with the nobility, with the large landowners, but with the industrial
bourgeoisie. I should like to say it here and now, that without putting
upon them the responsibility for the running of our economic machin-
ery, we shall not be able to make it run at all. Those who say that
the bourgeoisie in the Government sabotages, and should therefore
be removed, forget that if it had no responsibility it would sabotage
still more. There are those who say that the way to bring them to
terms . , . is to imprison some of the representatives of the financial
bourgeois class and to hang a few landholders. . . . The old regime
imprisoned a great many but by so doing did not settle any State
problem, and we, the representatives of Labor in the Duma, were
the first to denounce these methods of solving problems. , . .

'"Izvestiia," No. 173, September 30,

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 547

A government of the democracy without the bourgeoisie means a
socialistic government of Socialists only, perhaps also of Bolsheviks.
But the experience of the last four months justifies me in saying
that in the field of economics this new Socialistic Government will
have no more brilliant success than the old type of Provisional
Government. . . .

2, COALITION OR NO COALITION «
October 2, 1917

Yesterday morning [October 2] the different factions met to
discuss how to formulate the question of organizing a Government.
This was followed by a special meeting of the presidium on the same
topic. This body decided on the following order of voting :

1. General question of coalition;

2. If this should be voted on favorably, then the second question
for voting would be — coalition with or without the Cadets [as a
party?};

3. If this should be voted down, then the third question would be
whether [practical and useful] Cadets should be taken into the
Government. . . .

The next question was whether to have a viva voce vote or secret
ballot. The vote waks 660 for znz>a ytoce and 575 for secret ballot. * . .
At 4:30 P. M., the voting began on the question for or against a
coalition.

Not

Groups For Against voting

Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. . 83 192 4

Soviets of Peasants' Deputies 102 70 12

Economic and Food Organizations ,. 34 16 i

Trade Unions 32 139 2

Cooperatives 140 23 I

Army Organizations 64 54 7

Nationalities 15 40

Municipalities 114 101 8

Zemstvo & Guberniia Exec. Cornm.. 98 23 2

Other Organizations 84 30 i

TOTAL,.. 766 688 38
MAJORITY 78
* "Imstiia/9 No. 176, October 3,

548 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Recess was taken. When the meeting resumed, Avksentiev was
in the chair. He proposed two amendments: (i) To exclude from
the coalition those who were mixed up in the Kornilov affair, whether
Cadets or others; and (2) to exclude the Cadet Party from the
coalition. The chairman said that the amendments would be voted on
in the order indicated. Cries came from the Bolsheviks and others
that the amendments should be voted on in the reverse order. This
question aroused so much excitement that a vote was necessary,
which sustained the chairman. . . .

The vote on the first amendment was 798 for exclusion, 139
against, and 196 not voting. . . . On the second amendment the vote
was 595 for, 493 against, and 72 not voting. . . . The next was a
vote on the motion as a whole. . . .

GOTZ'S DECLARATION

"Comrades, in view of the fact that the second amendment makes
a coalition impossible, I announce that we, partizans of coalition,
will vote against the motion as a whole and disclaim responsibility
for the political situation that is created."

KAMENEV'S DECLARATION

". . . When the Democratic Conference met, we predicted that
you would not be able to settle the question of the Government,
which question should be determined by the All-Russian Congress.
You have now voted to- have a coalition without the Cadets, but we
wish to say that we are still of the same mind, that the Government
should belong to the Soviets, and we shall therefore vote against the
motion and in favor of the Soviets. . . ."

On the motion as a whole [coalition or no coalition] the vote stood
183 for coalition, 813 against, and 80 not voting.

After this a recess was taken . . . [during which the] presidium
was busy trying to find a way out of the difficulty. . . . When the
meeting was again called to order, Chairman Avksentiev announced
that the presidium had worked out a plan for further procedure and
asked Tseretelli to explain it. [Tseretelli said that in view of the
difficulty of coming to an agreement, the presidium proposed that
representatives of the different groups that had as yet no representa-
tion on the presidium should meet with that body the following day
at Smolny and try to come to an understanding. This proposal was
adopted.]

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 549

BOLSHEVIK DECLARATION AT THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE 7

October 3, 1917

The revolution has reached its most critical point. After this, it
will go either forward with new enthusiasm or backward to destruc-
tion. The people is exhausted by the war, but perhaps even more so
by the indecision, by the vacillations of the leading political parties.
It is a little more than six months since the overthrow of tsarism,
and after a series of attempts to form a revolutionary Government
upon a basis of a coalition of the representatives of the democracy
with the representatives of the propertied bourgeoisie, after the mis-
erable performances of the personal rule that led directly to the
Kornilov affair, the revolution is once more face to face with the
urgent question of forming a Government.

Every new governmental combination began with the publication
of a program of things to be done, but within a few weeks it showed
its utter incapacity to move forward even a single step. Repeated
bargains with the bourgeoisie, even after the ruinous effects of coali-
tion have been made clear, fill the consciousness of all laboring and
oppressed classes in the country with consternation, alarm, and unrest.
Not only the city worker, not only the soldier, already languishing
three years in the trenches, but even the peasant of the most remote
and backward village cannot help understanding that the land question
cannot be settled by compromise with the Lvovs and the Rodziankos.
It is impossible to entrust the democratization of the army to the
generals of the old regime — the Kornilovs and the Alexeevs; to
exercise control over industry through industrialist ministers; to
carry out financial reforms through bankers and war profiteers or
their direct agents — the Konovalovs, Palchinskis, Tretiakovs, or
Buryshkins. Lastly, it is impossible to inaugurate a single serious
measure to regulate the food supply and transportation, a single
reform in the realm of justice, education, and so on, while retaining,
in a period of greatest upheavals, both locally and at the center, the
old organization of officials and administrative personnel, with its
lack of confidence in the people and its dull bureaucratism.

Notwithstanding all the efforts of the Government to push aside
and weaken the Soviets, and in spite of the suicidal policy of the
official Soviet [war] defeatists, the Soviets demonstrated the full
force of the invincible revolutionary power and popular mass mitia-

* Piontkovski ; "Khrcstomatiia," 193-6,

55Q DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

tive represented by them during the Kornilov revolt. At the same
time, the Provisional Government forever compromised itself in the
judgment of the people and of history, partly by direct abetment of
the Kornilov movement, and partly by a readiness to place in Kor-
nilov's hands the conquests of the revolution. After this new tribula-
tion, which nothing will ever erase from the consciousness of the
workers, soldiers, and peasants, the battle cry raised at the very start
of the revolution by our party — "All Power to the Soviets, both at the
center and locally !"— became the cry of the entire revolutionary
country.

Only a Government that relies directly upon the proletariat and
poorest peasants, that keeps account of all material resources of the
country and of its economic possibilities, that does not stop in its
measures at the threshold because of the selfish interests of propertied
groups, that mobilizes all the scientific and technically valuable forces
for the good of the national economy, is capable of introducing a
maximum of whatever systematic work may be possible at this
moment in the tottering economic life; can help the peasantry and
farm laborers to utilize to best advantage the available means of
agricultural production, restrict profits, fix wages, and, in keeping
with regulated production, assure genuine labor discipline based upon
the self-government of the workers and their centralized control over
industry, and assure a demobilization of all business with the least
disturbance.

In view of the fact that the counter-revolutionary Cadet Party,
which fears most of all a transfer of power to the Soviets, constantly
scares the less enlightened elements of the democracy with the
specter of an armed uprising of the Bolsheviks, we deemed it neces-
sary here once more to declare in the hearing of the entire country
that, while fighting for power in order to realize our program, our
Party never strove and is not now striving to gain power against
the organized will of a majority of the laboring masses of the country.
Transfer of all power to the Soviets would not eliminate the class
struggle nor the struggle of the Party within the camp of the democ-
racy. But, given the condition of absolute and unlimited freedom of
agitation, and a constant renewal of the Soviet membership from
below, the struggle for influence and power would unfold itself
within the framework of the Soviet organizations. On the other hand,
a continuation of the present policy of violence and repression
against the working clars and the revolutionary elements of the

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 551

army and peasantry, with the object of stemming the further progress
of the revolution, is inevitably bound — quite independently of any
deliberate will on the part of revolutionary organizations — to lead
to a colossal clash, such as was rarely seen in history.

Under the existing circumstances, a coalition Government becomes
inevitably a government of violence and oppression by those on the
top against those at the bottom. Only he who wants to foment a
civil war at any cost, so as to put the responsibility for it, afterwards,
upon the laboring masses and our party, could recommend, after all
the experiences we have had, that the democracy should conclude
another alliance with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

The people thirst for peace. Coalition government means a
continuation of the imperialistic war. Until now the Provisional
Government has fallen in with the demands of the Allied imperialists,
who are the deadly foes of the Russian revolutionary democracy.
The fatal offensive of July I, against which our party persistently
warned ; the Kornilov methods of keeping the army in check, which
had the sanction of the coalition ministers, were either directly
or indirectly suggested by the Allied imperialists. On this path the
Russian revolution has already managed to squander an immense
amount of its moral authority, without in the slightest degree strength-
ening its physical power. It becomes increasingly clear that, having
sapped the inner strength of the Russian revolution, the Allied imperi-
alists will not stop at concluding peace at the expense of the Russian
people* At the same time a continued, helpless prolongation of the
war, without any popular faith in the war aims and in the Provisional
Government that is conducting it, affords an immense advantage to
the counter-revolutionists, who may attempt to play their game for
separate peace with the German robber-imperialists. The establish-
ment of the Soviet power means, first of all, a straightforward, open,
definite offer of an immediate, honorable, just, and democratic peace
to all nations. If such a peace were rejected, a revolutionary army
could accept the inevitableness of war. But everything speaks for
the likelihood that such a proposal by the revolutionary government
would meet with such a powerful response by the exhausted laboring
masses, by all the fighting masses, that a continuation of the war
would become impossible. A Soviet government means peace.

Enough vacillation! Enough of this policy of indecision and
timidity! It is impossible with impunity to torment and torture the
peasantry for half a year, promising them land and liberty, but

552 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

refusing, in actual practice, to abolish private ownership of landlords'
estates without compensation and to turn them over at once to the
control of the local peasant committees until the meeting of the
Constituent Assembly.

Enough wavering! Enough of that policy of ambiguity that has
until now been followed by the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionists
and Mensheviks. Enough delay! Enough words! The last hour to
decide has struck.

The revolutionary Government should take as a basis for its
action the following measures, which are urged by numerous influ-
ential revolutionary organizations, led by the Petrograd and Moscow
Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies:

1. Abolition of the right of private property in land belonging to
the large landowners, without compensation, and the handing it
[land] over to the peasant committees pending the decision of the
Constituent Assembly. The poorest peasants to be supplied with
equipment.

2. Introduction of workers' control over production and distri-
bution on a nation-wide scale; the centralization of the banking
business, control over banks, and nationalization of the most impor-
tant branches of industry, such as : oil, coal, iron, and steel ; general
labor conscription; immediate steps to demobilize industry and to
supply the peasantry with industrial products at fixed prices. Drastic
taxation of big capital and property, and the confiscation of war
profits in order to save the country from economic ruin.

3. Proclamation of the invalidity of the secret treaties, and the
immediate offer of a general, democratic peace to all the peoples of
the belligerent States.

4. Guarantee of self-determination for the nationalities inhabiting
Russia. Immediate abolition of all repression against Finland and
the Urkaine.

As urgent, immediate measures, there should be decreed at once :

1. Cessation of all repression aimed at the working class and its
organizations. Abolition of capital punishment at the front, restoration
of complete liberty of agitation, and the reestablishment of all demo-
cratic organizations in the army. Purging the army of counter-
revolutionary elements.

2. Allow local organizations to elect commissars and other
officials.

3. General arming of the workers and the organization of a red
guard.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 553

4. Dissolution of the State Council and State Duma. Immediate
summoning of the Constituent Assembly.

5. Abolition of all class (nobility, etc.) privileges, and absolute
equality of rights for the citizens,

6. Establishment of the eight-hour day and introduction of all
kinds of social insurance.

As an emergency measure, needed for the purifying of the
political atmosphere and showing up the sores of the judiciary, we
demand the immediate appointment of an investigating commission,
acceptable to the democracy, for a thorough study of ffie events of
July 16-18, and for the review of the acts of all judiciary authorities,
agents of the old regime, who now concentrate in their hands the
cases against the proletariat

The immediate release of all arrested revolutionists, and the setting
of an early public trial for all cases that have been started.

MEETING OF THE PRESIDIUM WITH DELEGATES OF ALL FACTIONS 8

[October 3]

In the course of yesterday there was a meeting at Smolny of the
presidium of the democratic conference, supplemented by delegates
from those groups that are not represented on the presidium. . . .
At this meeting Kerenski appeared. He said that he favored coalition,
that the economic and financial condition of the country was very bad
. . . which is in part responsible for anarchistic outbreaks . . .
pogroms. The demobilization of the army will require the coopera-
tion of all organized forces. . . . Under these conditions, to assume
the exclusive responsibility for the fate of the State would be suicidal.
. . . He went on to say that he was not opposed to a pre-parlia-
ment, provided it did not make the Constituent Assembly a myth
and provided it was organized on an all-national basis. By a Coalition
Government he meant the inviting of liberal bourgeoisie and
commerce-industry groups to join the democracy. Although a homo-
geneous ministry might seem ruinous for the cause of the revolution,
Comrade Kerenski thought that if the Democratic Conference would
decide on such a ministry, it would not meet with opposition. But so
far as he was concerned, he would not wish to be a member of such
a homogeneous government. . . ,

* "Imstiia," No, 177, October 4, *9*7-

554 . DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

RENEWAL OF THE MEETING OF THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE 9

[October 3]

At II :iS P. M., the Democratic Conference was called to order
by Avksentiev. [After Tseretelli, Trotski, Gotz, and others had
spoken] Tseretelli introduced the following resolution :

The Democratic Conference resolves: (i) That in settling the
question of the formation of a strong revolutionary government, it
is necessary to demand the carrying out of the program of August
27, an active foreign policy having for its object the attainment of
universal peace, and the responsibility of the Government to the
representative institutions which reflect the will of the country until
the meeting of the Constituent Assembly.

(2) In appointing a permanent representative organ from among
its members, the Conference instructs it to assist in the formation of
a government upon the above mentioned principles. In case the
bourgeois elements also are invited to share in the Government, this
organ may and shall be augmented by delegates from the bourgeois
groups.

(3) In this organ the democratic elements should predominate.

(4) The Government must be accountable and responsible to
that organ.

(5) The Conference instructs the presidium to submit to the
Conference by tomorrow a plan for the selection of a permanent
body from among the members of the Conference, and to appoint five
of its own members to take at once the necessary practical steps to
aid in forming a government on the above indicated principles. These
representatives shall render an account of their work to the repre-
sentative organ just mentioned and submit their decisions to its
approval.

The vote on point:

1 was 1150 for, 171 against, 24 not voting

2 was 774 " 383 •" 84 " 9J

3 was 941 " 8 " 274 "

4 was 1064 " i " 123 " "

5 was 922 » 5 " 233 "

[While the vote was being taken, the Bolsheviks protested on the
wording of some of the points.10 These protests obliged Tseretelli to

* "Izvestiia," No. 177, October 4, 1917.

* Ibid., No. 178, October 5, 1917.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 555

make explanations. He was followed by numerous other speakers.
The debate between the Bolsheviks and opponents became warm and
personal Finally Tseretelli said: ] "It would seem that whenever
one makes a political agreement with the Bolsheviks, he should call
a notary public and witnesses." This remark called out strong- protests
from the Bolsheviks. Nagin declared that if the presidium did not
reprimand Tseretelli, the Bolsheviks would leave the hall. [The
presidium did not see fit to make the reprimand, and consequently
the Bolsheviks left the meeting,]

A recess followed. About 4:00 A. M., the meeting was again
called to order to vote on the resolution as a whole.

For the resolution there were 829 votes; against it 106, not
voting 69.*°*

3. FORMATION OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT
[October 4-7, 1917]

Between 10:00 and n :oo of the morning of October 4, Kerenski
received, at the Winter Palace, Avksentiev, Gotz, Tseretelli, and
Chkheidze.

These members of the presidium of the Democratic Conference
informed Kerenski of the decision reached by the Democratic Con-
ference during the night. From the conversation that took place, it
would seem that the organs of the democracy recognized that the
initiative in the matter of forming a cabinet belonged to the
Provisional Government. . . .

At n :oo A. M., there was a meeting of the Directory. . . .

Kerenski made a report on his conversation with Avksentiev,
Gotz, Tseretelli, and Chkheidze. He said that the Democratic Con-
ference, in the persons of the presidium, has apparently taken a more
moderate stand and will not place obstacles in the way of a coalition
government. As to a pre-parliament, the idea is quite acceptable,
provided the bourgeois elements are admitted into it. - . ,

After this report, it was decided to hasten to form a coalition
government with the persons already in mind: Kishkin, Buryshkin,
Tretiakov, Konovalov, and Smirnov. . . . [It was decided] to call on
the Moscow group to come to Petrograd at once. At the same time,
Kerenski called Moscow by long distance. Late at night, after con-
siderable telephoning, it became evident that the Moscow industrialists
** "Izvestiia," No. 178, October 5,

556 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

have categorically declined to enter the Ministry ... on the ground
that they refused to be responsible to the pre-parliament. In their
conversation with Kerenski, the industrialists made it clear that
they would join the ministry if war were made on anarchy, the army
made more fit for war, etc. But in view of the fact that the pre-par-
liament would be purely democratic (the bourgeois elements in the
minority), it would stand in the way of carrying out the above
platform. According to the industrialists, it is impossible for the Pro-
visional Government to be responsible to the pre-parliament and at
the same time keep its promise to the industrialists.11

On October 5 there was a meeting of the Provisional Government
at the Winter Palace. There were present representatives of the
Democratic Conference, public men of Moscow, and several members
of the Central Committee of the Cadets. The question for discussion
was the organization of a government. . . .

In his speech Kerenski said that the Provisional Government
should be guided only by its own program, which combines the
interests of all elements which strive to support a republican govern-
ment. With this in mind, the Provisional Government, in coming out
in favor of a provisional conference, does not think that it [confer-
ence] should anticipate the will of the Constituent Assembly, or that
it can have the functions of a regularly organized parliament. The
Provisional Government cannot be responsible to the Conference
but should keep in touch and work in agreement with it. We are
convinced of the necessity of a coalition government. It is not a
question of what persons, but of the relative strength of the groups
that enter into it.12. . .

At i : oo P. M. on October 6 there was another meeting of repre-
sentatives of the Socialists and the bourgeoisie. Members of the
Provisional Government appeared from time to time to give
information. . . .

The program proposed by Chkheidze on August 27 at the
Moscow Conference was taken up, ...

The next topic was the pre-parliament. Without much discussion,
it was agreed that the democracy should hold as many places as was
decided upon at the Democratic Conference, and that the bourgeois
elements should have from 120 to 150 representatives. . . . The

w "Izvestiia," No. 178, October 5, 1917.
**lbid.t No. 179, October 6, 1917.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 557

pre-parliament is to have the right to ask questions of the Govern-
ment but not to interpellate, to work on legislation and deliberate
on questions submitted to it by the Government, It was not considered
possible to make the Government responsible to the pre-parliament.
It was agreed that if the pre-parliament proves itself really strong,
the Government would in any case have to take it into consideration.
In regard to the Duma, it was recognized that the dissolution of this
institution was not a political necessity. From the very beginning of
the revolution, the Duma has not pretended to play an active part
and is not attempting to bring any pressure to bear on the revolution.
In any case its term is soon to expire anyway,

In regard to the question of the democracy's sending a repre-
sentative to the interallied conference at Paris, it was indicated that
the democracy could suggest some one to the Government, but he
would represent the Government and not the democracy.

At the end of the meeting the representatives of democracy
announced that they would give a definite reply next Sunday noon,
October 7, whether or not there would be a coalition government.13

AGREEMENT REACHED14

On October 7, there was another meeting at the Winter Palace
between the representatives of the democracy and representatives
of non-socialist groups, when an agreement was reached on all dis-
puted points.

At the very beginning of the meeting, the question was raised in
regard to the resolution adopted by the Soviet on the night of Octol>er
6-7. This resolution can be taken in two different senses. It says
in one place that "the Democratic Council thinks it necessary to
establish a formal responsibility of the Government before the pre-
parliament/' and in another place "that under present conditions
the agreement reached by the delegation is acceptable. . . ."

Tseretelli replied . . . that the Soviet approved the terms of the
agreement as concluded by both parties on October 6 at the Winter
Palace. At the same time, the Democratic Council is a believer in
the formal responsibility of the Government before the pre-parliament
but does not insist on this point now. It hopes, however, to succeed
in its object later, in the pre-parliament. „ . .

M "Imstiit ," No. 180, October 7, 1917.
*• "Riech," No. 226, October 9, 1917-

558

DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

THE NEW MINISTRY15

October 8, 1917

Parties Ministers

S. R. A. F. KERENSKI

A. I. VERKHOVSKI

D. V. VERDEREVSKI

S, D. A. M. NIKITIN

M. I. TERESCHENKO

S. D. S. N. PROKOPOVICH

R. D.- M. V. BERNATSKI

S. S. SALAZKIN

S. R. A. V. LIVEROVSKI

K D. A. I. KONOVALOV

K. D. N. M. KISHKIN
K. D. S. A. SMIRNOV
K. D. A. V. KARTASHEV
S. D. P. N. MALIANTOVICH
S. D. K. A. GVOZDEV
S. R. S. L. MASLOV
S. N. TRETIAKOV

Portfolios
Prime Minister
Minister of War
Minister of Marine
Minister of Interior, Post, and

Telegraph

Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Food
Minister of Finance
Minister of Education
Minister of Transportation
Minister of Commerce and

Industry

Minister of Social Welfare
State Comptroller
Minister of Religious Affairs
Minister of Justice
Minister of Labor
Minister of Agriculture
Cfiainnan of Economic Council

In this ministry there are 3 Socialist-Revolutionists, 4 Social
Democrats, 4 Cadets. Verkhovski, Verderevski, and Salazkin are
Socialists, but not members of any group. Bernatski is a member of
the Radical-Democratic Party. Tereschenko and Tretiakov do not
belong to any party.

DECLARATION OF THE PROVISIONAL <3OVERNMENTie

October S, 1917

Great trouble has come once more into the life of our country.
Notwithstanding the swift suppression of the revolt of General
Kornilov, the shocks caused by it are threatening the very existence
of the Russian Republic.

Waves of anarchy are sweeping over the land, pressure from
the foreign foe is increasing, counter-revolution is raising its head,
hoping that the prolonged governmental crisis, coupled with the

18 "Riech," No. 226, October 9, 1917.
w "Izvestiia," No. 182, October 10, 1917.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 559

weariness which has seized the entire nation, will enable it to crush
the freedom of the Russian people.

The Provisional Government has a great and unusual responsibility
before the people. History has laid upon it the obligation to lead
Russia to the Constituent Assembly. This responsibility is made
bearable by the sincere belief that, united in the general desire to
save the country and guard the conquests of the revolution, the
representatives of all classes of the Russian people will understand
the common task of cooperating with the Provisional Government in
establishing a strong authority, capable of solving the State problems
as they come up, and leading the country, without more shocks, to
the Constituent Assembly, the summoning of which, according to
the deep conviction of the Provisional Government, cannot be
postponed a single day.

Leaving to the Constituent Assembly, as the sovereign of Russia,
the final determination of all important questions on which the
welfare of the Russian people depends, the Provisional Government,
as now completed, is of the opinion that only by carrying on with
energy a series of measures in different spheres of State activity
can it fulfil its duty and satisfy the pressing national needs.

The Provisional Government believes firmly that only a universal
peace will enable our great country to develop its creative forces*
It will continue, therefore, its active foreign policy in the spirit
of the democratic principles proclaimed by the Russian revolution,
which has made them a national possession and which has for its
object the attainment of universal peace, peace without violence on
either side, •

The Provisional Government, working in full harmony with the
Allies, will, in the near future, take part in the interallied confer-
ence* At this gathering the Government will have among its pleni-
potentiaries some one who has the special confidence of democratic
organizations.

At this conference, where general war questions common to all
the Allies will be decided, our delegates will also strive to come to
an understanding with the Allies on the basic principles laid down
by the Russian revolution.

While eager for peace, the Provisional Government will, never-
theless, with all its might defend the common Allied cause, protect
the country, resist all attempts to take national territory and impose
a foreign yoke, and will drive the enemy's troops from the borders
of our native land.

560 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

In its efforts to raise the fighting efficiency of the army, the
Provisional Government will follow the democratic way, which is the
only one that can give successful results and which has already been
announced in the order of the Supreme Commander and proclaimed
by the Minister of War, in the name of the Provisional Government.
The selection of the commanding officers will be based on technical
preparation to handle the problems of the present war, as well as
loyalty to the republican form of government and ability to cooperate
closely with the commissars, and army and navy organizations in the
rear and at the front.

By these measures the necessary way to military discipline will
be found, without which a mighty army is not to be thought of.
In a special law that is to follow, the status, the rights, and obliga-
tions of army and navy organizations will be laid down with definite-
ness. Among the necessary measures that are most essential for rais-
ing the fighting efficiency of the army is the reduction in size of the
various units in the rear, which have increased out of proportion,
by demobilizing at first the older soldiers. To keep them longer in
service would throw an additional load on the army, a heavy burden
on the State treasury, and would be a loss to the national economy.

In order to keep firm the bond between the rear and front, to
guard the national economy from further disorganization, to reduce
the poverty which lies so heavily on the shoulders of the laboring
masses, the Provisional Government has been moved to undertake
without delay the carrying out of the following measures, supple-
menting and developing what has already been done by the Provi-
sional Government.

National Economy

The Provisional Government will strive to set a fixed price on
the basic articles of industry, and at the same time regulate the
mutual relations of capital and labor, wages and hours of work. It
will make wide use of the cooperatives, under general State control,
both in the preparation [production] and the distribution of agricul-
tural and all kinds of industrial products. It will also make wide u«e
of private trade, under direct State supervision. It will pass special
legislation relative to State control over industry, with the partici-
pation of the laboring and industrial classes, and active interference
in the management of enterprises, with the object of raising their
productivity. It will further increase the number of labor bureaus

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 561

and arbitration boards. It will defend the right of all kinds of labor
to organize, and will protect the technical personnel from all lawless
attacks. It will prepare measures for the gradual and painless de-
mobilization of the national economy and will reduce the misery due
to the unavoidable unemployment. It will, in particular, work out a
plan for public works, having for its object the reconstruction of
regions devastated by the war, . . „

Finance

Reform the assessment of the inheritance tax, introduce a tax
on surplus profits, on luxuries, and on property ; increase in the neces-
sary proportion the indirect taxes ; and introduce new indirect taxes
in the form of financial monopolies, with the participation of coop-
eratives and other public organizations in the distribution of monop-
olistic goods.

Reform the taxation machinery and introduce a system of inspec-
tion, so that no one shall escape the proper payment of tax. Strict
economy in the expenditure of the State treasury and the elimination
of all useless expenses. Attract deposits into the State bank through
mutual loan and savings banks and other cooperative institutions
and have State supervision over private credit institutions.

Local Government

Put into force and further develop the democratic laws on local
self-government, with the view of gradually handing over all the
functions of local government to the organs of local self -government,
while preserving for the Government commissars the right to watch
over the legality of the acts of the local self-government, and bring
to an end the authority of the executive committees of public organi-
zations, at the moment of the election of the local organs of self-
government.

Nationality Qwstion

Recognize for all nationalities the right of self-determination on
such principles as the Constituent Assembly shall determine. Work
out and issue laws that will give minorities, in places of their per-
manent residence, the right to use their native languages in schools,
courts, institutions of self-government, and in their dealings with
the local State organs. Establish, in connection with the Provisional
Government! a council on nationality affairs, in which all the na-

562 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

tionalities of Russia will be represented for the purpose of preparing
material on the nationality question for the Constituent Assembly.

In undertaking these tasks, the Provisional Government realizes
that not all of them can be carried out in the short time that still
remains before the meeting- of the Constituent Assembly. But the
very attempt to carry them out will facilitate the work of the Con-
stituent Assembly and will give the Government solid support in the
field of national defense and reconstruction of national economy,
as well as in its energetic, determined, and systematic struggle with
all attempts of counter-revolution and anarchy, which ruin the
country and the revolution.

In this struggle, as in all its activities, the Provisional Govern-
ment, being the spokesman of the will of the revolutionary people,
will closely collaborate with the organizations of that people. It sees
in this collaboration the best means for solving some of the problems
before the country.

In order that the revolutionary government may be closely in
contact with the organized public forces and thereby gain the neces-
sary stability and strength, the Provisional Government will, in the
very near future, work out and publish a decree about a Provisional
Council of the Republic, which should function until the meeting of
the Constituent Assembly. This Council, made up of representatives
of all classes of the population, including tfwsc delegates already
chosen at the Democratic Conference, will have the right to ask ques-
tions of the Government and to receive answers by a certain time,
to work out legislative measures, and to deliberate on all questions
that may be laid before it by f the Provisional Government, or that
may arise from its own initiative.

Drawing strength Irom such a council, the Government, preserv-
ing in accordance with its oath the inviolable unity and succession of
State power created by the revolution, regards it as its duty in all its
activities to take into consideration the important public significance
of the Council, until the Constituent Assembly shall give full and
complete representation to all classes of the population of Russia,

Standing firmly on this program which expresses the hope of
the people, and calling on all for active and immediate participation
in the preparation for the calling of the Constituent Assembly in
the shortest possible time, the Provisional Government trusts that
all Russian citizens will rally around it in the spirit of friendly
cooperation in the name of the fundamental and dominant problems
of our day — defense of our native land against the foreign foe,

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 563

restoration of law and order, and guidance of the country to the
sovereign Constituent Assembly.

A. F. KERENSKI,
October 8, 1917, Petrograd. Prime Minister.

4. CREATION OF A PROVISIONAL COUNCIL17 OF THE

REPUBLIC 18

October 4, 1917.

Chairman Avksentiev opened the meeting at 7:00 P. M. The
Bolshevik seats were unoccupied. Question for discussion was the
organization of a democratic council. The committee appointed to
take up this topic had prepared a report, which had been approved
by the presidium. Comrade Voitinski made a report and introduced
the following resolutions:

1. The All-Russian Democratic Conference is to select from its
own lx>dy an All-Russian Democratic Council, which is to have all
the rights of the Conference.

2. The All-Russian Democratic Council will work out its own
program of activity.

3. The selection from the Conference is to be made on the
basis of proportional representation of all those groups Invited to
attend the Conference.

4. Each group selects for the council 15 per cent of its repre-
sentatives in the Conference.

5. The factions in the different groups may be represented sepa-
rately, and in that case each faction retains whatever rights to which
its proportional representation in the group entitles it.

6. Every organization, has the right to change its representa-
tives in the Ail-Russian Democratic Council* The person recalled
loses his rights the moment his successor is appointed. . . .

Number of

Organisations Representatives

Cities 45

Zemstvos 45

Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies 38

Soviets of Peasants* Deputies 38

Cooperatives 23

** Also known as Pre-Parliatnent, Democratic Council*
* "Izvestiia," No. 178, October 5, 1917.

564 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Number of
Representatives

Organisations (Continued) (Continued)

War Organizations 2®

Fleet 3

Economic Organizations "

Trade Unions 2I

Commerce-Industry Workers 5

Railway men 5

Post-telegraph Workers 2

Cossacks ®

Nationalities 25

Land Committees 7

Peasants' Union 2

Teachers' Union 2

Lawyers 1

Women's Organizations *

Other Organizations I2

TOTAL 3*3

It was decided that the various groups should elect their repre-
sentatives on the following day.

BOLSHEVIKS AND PRE-PARLIA'MENT ie

At a closed meeting* of the Bolshevik faction, tlie question of
taking part in the Democratic Council was discussed. By a vote of
77 to 50 it was decided to send representatives to the Council

ALL-RUSSIAN DEMOCRATIC COUNCIL 20

The first meeting of the All-Russian Democratic Council took
place yesterday [October 6] ... in the municipal duma. At 3:00
o'clock, the session was to have opened, but the hall was half
empty. * * .

The following named men were elected to the presidium:
Chkheidze, Dan, and Mandelberg from the Mensheviks; Trotski
and Kamenev from the Bolsheviks ; and Minor, Kamkov, Avksentiev,
and Gotz from the Socialist-Revolutionists. . , .

[Tseretelli made a report on the negotiations of his delegation
with the Provisional Government and representatives of the bour-

19 "Izvestiia," No. 179, October 6, 1917*
., No. 180, October 7, 1917*

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 565

geoisie.] He said that the point on which it was most difficult to
come to an agreement was the pre-parliament and its relation to the
Provisional Government. After long and warm discussions, the fol-
lowing agreement was reached: The Democratic Council is officially
summoned and organized by the Government and is to contain be-
tween 100 and 120 representatives of the bourgeoisie. Both the
bourgeoisie and the democracy select, each in its own way, its repre-
sentatives. The Council has the right to ask questions of the Govern-
ment, which is obliged to answer them. But the Government is not
by legal formality responsible before this body, although it is, of
course, self-evident that no government can exist which has not the
confidence of the pre-parliament. . . .

Trotski, speaking for the Bolsheviks, declared that the Tseretelli
delegation had exceeded its powers in coming to an agreement with
the Cadets and in giving up the idea of government responsibility.
He went on to say that the agreement with the Cadets is a provoca-
tion to civil war, and therefore the Bolsheviks, together with over-
whelming majorities of all the Soviets, recommend that all discus-
sions be broken off and that a popular government be formed draw-
ing its strength from the Soviets* . . .

Dan, representing the Mensheviks, said that his party was never
in favor of coalition at all costs, that it was far from satisfied with
the agreement, but that he did not see any way out of the difficulty
except through coalition. The democracy alone has not the strength
to save the country. Dan introduced the following resolution : ". , .
The Democratic Council thinks it necessary to establish a formal
responsibility of the Government before the pre-parliament and,
believing that under the present conditions the agreement reached
by the delegation is acceptable, declares that [only] that government
can enjoy power which has the confidence of the pre-parliament."
The resolution was adopted.

October 9**

Yesterday [October 9] at 9:00 P. M., there was a joint meet-
ing of the presidium and the council of elders [leaders of political
groups] of the All-Russian Democratic Council. ... It was de-
cided to postpone the reconstruction of the present presidium until
the democratic council was made over into a pre-parliament. . . .
It was also decided that the council of elders in the democratic coun-
cil should be made up of representatives of various groups and
* "IzvestHa," No. 182, October 10,

566 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

should contain no less than ten persons. ... It was resolved to
call the pre-parliament as soon as possible, so that it should meet
not later than October 14. ...

October 13 2S

On October 13, the Provisional Government decided to keep the
name of the Provisional Council of the Russian Republic for the
new State institution about to be created. It is to have 555 members,
of whom 388 are to represent the democracy and 167 the bourgeoisie,
Cossacks, nationalities, and others. ... It is to be opened formally
by a member of the Provisional Government. . . .

The Council is to be opened on October 20 and close a week before
the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. . , . The Council selects
its own officers. Members of the Council are to receive fifteen rubles
a day.28 . . .

FIRST MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC 24

October 20 — Mariinski Palace

[Kerenski formally opened the meeting by welcoming the dele-
gates and explaining the general policy of the Government. He was
followed by the oldest delegate present, who was "Grandmother of
the Revolution," Breshko-Breshkovskaia. After making a short
speech, she called for the election of a permanent chairman. N. D.
Avksentiev (Socialist-Revolutionist) was chosen. He made a short
address and called for the election of a presidium. V, N. Krokhmal
(Social-Democrat), A. V. Peshefchonov (National-Socialist), and
V. D; Nabokov (Cadet), were elected. The fourth place was to go
to the Bolsheviks, but in view of the fact that they had decided to
leave the meeting, the place was not filled.

After the election Trotski got the floor and in a fiery speech
denounced the personal regime of Kerenski, the part that the Cadets
and other bourgeois elements have in the Council, and accused the
bourgeoisie of trying to break up the Constituent Assembly and
provoking the peasants to revolt, so as to crush them, He bitterly
criticized the policy of the Government in not making peace, but
continuing the war. He concluded with these words: "We , . *
Bolsheviks, declare that with this traitorous Government we have
nothing in common." After having read his declaration Trotski and

* "Riech," No. 231, October 14, 1917.
*Ibfd.t No. 232, October 16, 1917.
*Ibid., No. 237, October 21, 1917.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 567

the other Bolsheviks walked out of the hall, followed by jeers, hoots,
and shouts ("Get into German railway cars").

COUNCIL OF ELDERS25

, . . After the meeting of the presidium of the Provisional Council
on October 21, there was a meeting of the Council of Elders, which
decided that the Council of Elders should contain four representa-
tives from each of the three parties, Socialist-Revolutionists, Men-
she viks, and Cadets, and one or two from the other political groups,
depending on their numbers . . . that the Provisional Council should
appoint twelve different committees, dealing with defense, foreign
affairs, etc. . . . that the Council of Elders should meet three times
a week, Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, from 11:00 until
7:00. . . ,

5. RESOLUTION OF PETROGRAD SOVIET ON DEMO-
CRATIC CONFERENCE26

'The Petrograd Soviet declares that after the Kornilov experi-
ence, which has shown that all bourgeois Russia occupies a counter-
revolutionary position, any attempt at coalition means nothing else
than the utter capitulation of the democracy to the Kornilov men.
As evidence of this capitulation is the composition of the Ministry
now being formed, where the leading places are given to the mer-
chants and manufacturers, the inveterate foes of the workers', sol-
diers', and peasants' democracy. The so-called democratic Ministers*
responsible to no one and to nothing, are unable either to offset or
extenuate the anti-popular character of the new Government, which
will go down in the history of the revolution as the Government of
civil war.

"The Petrograd Soviet declares that the workers and garrison
of Petrograd will not support a Government of bourgeois omnip-
otence and of counter-revolutionary oppression. It is firmly con-
vinced that the news of the newly formed Government will meet with
one answer from the entire revolutionary democracy : 'Retire T And
relying upon this unanimous vote of the democracy, the Ail-Russian
Congress of Soviets will form a real revolutionary government. At
the same time, the Petrograd Soviet urges the proletarian and soldier
organizations to increased activity in rallying around their Soviets,
but to refrain from separate action/'

*"Izvestiia»" No. 193, October 23* 1917*
* "Riech/' No, 226, October 8,

PART XII
HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

At the time of the outbreak of the revolution in March the
Bolsheviks were hardly in evidence. They were never very numer-
ous and at this time some of their ablest men were in exile.
Lenin and associates came to Russia in April and began to or-
ganize their forces. The first days after his arrival Lenin made a
rather poor impression and a number of men who now worship
his memory then denounced and ridiculed both him and his
theories. Lenin had a theory, a plan of action, and the ability to
organize. As Socialists he and his associates had a right to be
heard at the meetings of the Soviet, From the rostrum of the
Soviet hall he and his followers flayed the capitalists and the
moderate Socialists. To Lenin the enemy to fight was not Germany
but capitalism. He painted the propertied classes in blackest colors
and aroused the masses against them. To get a larger audience
the Bolsheviks published several papers which were read at the
front and in the rear and made converts "in both places. They
urged the Russian workers and soldiers to stop killing their
German brother toilers, to seize the machinery of government,
the land, the instruments of production, and offer peace to the
world. They assured their readers and hearers that if the Russians
were to do these things the proletariat of the world would follow
in their footsteps.

These words were uttered with earnestness and conviction and
fell on the ears of a war-weary, suffering people ready to grasp at
anything that promised peace and bread. The opponents of the
Bolsheviks had no constructive program, no unity and little en-
thusiasm. They held up before the ignorant and crying peasants
the cloak of patriotism which had been worn thin by three years

568

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 569

of hard usage and was full of imperialistic grease spots which
neither the fine words of Miliukov and Kerenski, nor those of the
Allied statesmen could remove. Under the circumstances the
Bolsheviks carried the masses with them and brought on the
revolution of November 1917.

In the following pages are shown some of the steps that led
up to this world event.

In June the Bolsheviks planned to attract attention in a public
demonstration against the action of the Government and Con-
gress of Soviets in putting the anarchists out of the Durnovo
place. As soon as the Provisional Government and the Congress
heard of this plan they tried to stop it. The Bolsheviks, not feel-
ing strong enough to cross swords with their opponents and
having gained a certain amount of publicity, called off the demon-
stration. In order not to disappoint the demonstration-loving
public the Congress of Soviets called for a demonstration of its
own. The Bolsheviks heartily approved, took part in it, displayed
their banners, and waved their slogans in sight of all.

The Bolsheviks got a great deal of notoriety in connection
with the July Uprising which has been discussed elsewhere.
Lenin had to go in hiding for a time but from his place of con-
cealment he watched the course of events and directed his asso-
ciates at liberty. They carried on a vigorous and successful propa-
ganda campaign. The first visible fruits of their efforts were the
gains in the Petrograd elections. Their next move was to capture
the Petrogracl Soviet and make Trotski its chairman. Having now
a base of operation, a definite plan of action, and an aim in view,
they made rapid progress.

They realized that they would not attain their object by words
alone and they therefore proceeded to organize a fighting force.
At the time of the Kornilov affair Kerenski appealed to all revo-
lutionary elements, including the Bolsheviks, to take up arms in
the defense of the freedom won. At Moscow, Petrograd and, no
doubt, other industrial centers, Red Guards were formed. When
the Kornilov storm had passed, Kerenski gave orders to disband
these committees and to put a stop to the "unauthorized formation
of detachments under the pretext of fighting counter-revolutionary
outbreaks/' but no attention was paid to this order. The Bolshe-

57Q DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

viks saw to it that more and more of their followers armed, and
vigorous efforts were made to win over army units.

Early in September, Riga fell and Petrograd was threatened.
The Petrograd Soviet took the stand that Kerenski and his bour-
geois associates in the Ministry could not be depended upon, that
in case of danger they would abandon the capital and run to
Moscow. To protect the city and the country the Soviets were
called upon "to mobilize their forces so as not to be caught un-
prepared and to be ready to meet the new counter-revolutionary
wave. . . . The revolutionary committees which they formed at
the time of the Kornilov affair should have ready their whole
machinery. Wherever the Soviets have not full power they should
gradually strengthen their positions, have their organizations in
readiness to create, as the need may arise, special organs to keep
watch on the organized strength of the enemy and to fight counter-
revolution/*

On October 22 the Petrograd Soviet proposed a War-
Revolutionary Committee "to make a question of the defense of
Petrograd and its approach and work out a plan for the protec-
tion of the city with the active support of the laboring class." A
few days later such a committee was created and gradually got
control of the Petrograd garrison. This body of troops was or-
dered to go to the front, where it could best defend the city, but it
preferred to stay at the capital and support the Bolsheviks. By
November 7, when the uprising took place, Kerenski had few
troops he could depend upon.

Force was only a means to get control of the Government.
The Bolsheviks were disgusted with Kerenski, his Ministers,
Council of the Republic and all these other outer evidences of
power that did not exist. They proceeded to undermine the Pro-
visional Government and build up a Government of their own.
One of the flrst steps was to call a Regional Congress, made up
of the Petrograd district, Finland, Esthonia, Novgorod, Pskov,
etc,, where the Bolsheviks had a dependable following; The Key-
note of the Congress of the Northern Region was : "All Power
to the Soviets, Down with the Existing Provisional Government."
Before breaking up, the Congress called for a Second All-Russian
Congress of Soviets "to propose immediately an armistice on all

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 571

fronts, to transfer the land to all peasants. . , ." The Executive
Committees protested, the Provisional Government threatened, but
the Bolsheviks went their way.

By the end of October it became evident that the Bolsheviks
were serious and meant to get control, but the "Riech" reported
that "In Government circles no attention is paid to the rumors of a
Bolshevik uprising on November 2. In any case the Government
is prepared to keep order/* On the night of November 6 the
offensive began and in less than twenty- four hours the Provisional
Government fell and the Bolsheviks were in power. They organ-
ized quickly and on November 8 issued their Peace and Land
Decrees.

CHAPTER XL

SPREAD OF BOLSHEVIK IDEAS— MARCH,
SEPTEMBER

i. SEIZURE OF THE DURNOVO PLACE BY THE

ANARCHISTS l

REPORT BY GOTZ

Comrade Anisimov and I have just had a conversation at the
Durnovo place with representatives of the anarchistic organization
which has taken possession of it They announced that it is not
merely a question of the said place, but of other things. They made
certain demands, in addition to the place itself. They demanded:
(i) the release from prison of all Socialists and Anarchists arrested
during the revolution, regardless of the charges against them; (2)
the confiscation of the printing offices of the "Novoe Vremia/' "Russ-
kaia Volia," and "Riech," and their transfer to Socialist and Anarchist
organizations.

I think that in view of these demands the All-Russian Congress
should speak out strongly on this subject. . . .

DEMONSTRATION BY THE BOLSHEVIKS8

. . . Tomorrow [June 24] the Bolsheviks plan to organize a demon-
stration as a protest against the action of the Presidium of the Ail-
Russian Congress and the action of the Minister of Justice, Perever-
zev, in putting the anarchists out of the Durnovo place. Comrade
Kamenev says the demonstration is to be peaceful in character.

DEMONSTRATIONS FORBIDDEN BY FIRST ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF

SOVIETS 3

The All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers* and Soldiers*
Deputies has resolved that during the tfiree days, June 23, 224, and
25, all kinds of demonstrations are forbidden in the streets of Pet-

*"Izvestiia," No. 88, June 23, 1917,

* Ibid.

*Ibid.

57*

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 573

rograd. Violation of this resolution is a blow to the revolution. He
who incites to its violation is an enemy of the revolution.

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT CALLS FOR ORDER 4

In view of the alarming rumors that are spreading throughout
the city, the Provisional Government calls on the population to pre-
serve order, and warns that all attempts to use force will be put
down.

June 23, 1917

2. DO NOT LISTEN TO PROVOCATIVE CALLS 5

Comrade-Soldiers and Workmen:

The Bolshevik Party is calling you to come out on the street.
This appeal is made without the knowledge of the Soviet of
Workers' and Soldiers* Deputies, without the knowledge of the
Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, or any of the Socialist parties. It is
made at the very alarming time when the All-Russian Congress re-
minds the workers of the Wiborg district that demonstrations now
are likely to harm the revolution-
Comrades, we appeal to you, in the name of millions of workers,
peasants, and soldiers at the front and rear, not to do what you are
called out to do.

You are called out to demand the overthrow of the Provisional
Government, whose importance the All-Russian Congress has just
recognized. Those who call on you cannot help knowing that your
peaceful demonstration may lead to bloody encounters.

Knowing your devotion to the cause of the revolution, we tell
you: You are being called to a demonstration in favor of fhe revolu-
tion, but we know that counter-revolutionists want to take advantage
of your demonstration. We know that the counter-revolutionists are
eagerly awaiting the moment when strife will develop in the ranks
of the revolutionary democracy and will enable them to crush the
revolution.

Comrades ! In the name of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies, in the name of the Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, in the
name of the active army and the Socialist parties, we tell you : Not
a single division, not a regiment, not a group of workers must go
out into the street. Not a single demonstration should be held. . . .

4"I*v<s$tna," No, 88, June 23, 19*7-
* Ibid.

574 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

When Russian freedom is really threatened by counter-revolution,
we will call on you. Disorganized demonstrations are the ruin of
the revolution. Save yow strength. Keep friendly contact with aU
revolutionary Rwsia.

Signed by: THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS,
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PETROGRAD

SOVIETS,

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ALL-RUS-
SIAN SOVIET OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES,
[AND NUMEROUS OTHER REVOLUTION-
ARY ORGANIZATIONS].

THE BOLSHEVIKS CALL OFF THE DEMONSTRATION *

Taking into consideration the fact that the Congress of Soviets
and the Executive Committee of the Peasants' Soviets, in view of
special circumstances, have resolved to prohibit all kinds of demon-
strations, even peaceful, for three days, the Central Committee has
resolved to call off the demonstration set for two o'clock on Satur-
day afternoon.

The Central Committee asks all members and sympathizers to
carry out this decision.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMO-
CRATIC LABOR PARTY.

ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS CALLS FO& DEMONSTRATIONS

[At the session of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets on June
25] the Presidium proposed that on some Sunday in the near future
a demonstration should be organized at Petrograd and other cities.7

The All-Russian Congress of Soviets has set aside July I as the
day for laying wreaths on the graves of those who fought for the
revolution. On that day political demonstrations by the revolutionary
democracy should be organized at Petrograd and other important
Russian cities. - . . Let the counter-revolutionists [of all colors)
realize on July i that the fight for a universal peace without an-
nexation and indemnity and on the basis of self-determination will
go on. Let both the friends and enemies of democratic Russia, at
home and abroad, take note.

Counter-revolutionists have not given up hope of preventing the

' "Izyestiia," No. 88, June 23, 1917* * • . This notice was received by the
"Jzvestiia" at 3:15 A.M., June 23,
* "Riech," No. 136, June 26, 1917.

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 575

establishment in Russia of a democratic republic which will give the
land to the peasants and will satisfy the immediate demands of the
workmen. . . .

Comrades! If we wish to inflict a deadly blow to all these dark
plans of the counter-revolutionists, let us on July i put them face
to face with their deadly enemy, — the united strength of the whole
revolutionary democracy of Russia.8

Every Person Taking Part in Today's Demonstration Should
Remember

1. That the demonstration has for its object to show that the

REVOLUTIONARY FORCES ARE UNITED.

2. That the demonstration indicates the striving of the revolu-

tionary democracy for a UNIVERSAL PEACE.

3. That the slogan should be THROUGH THE CONSTITUENT AS-

SEMBLY TO A DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC.

4. That the demonstration should be a PEACEFUL ONE.

5. That on this day every citizen should KEEP ORDER.

6. That all, without exception, who come to demonstrate should

do so WITHOUT ARMS.*

3. BOLSHEVIK CONGRESS 10

On August 8 there was an All-Russian Congress of the Bolshevik
and Internationalist organizations of the Social-Democratic Party.
One hundred delegates were present* The Congress elected as hon-
orary chairmen Lenin and Zinoviev (who are sought by the police
and whose whereabouts are unknown), as well as Kamenev, Trotski,
Lunacharski, and Kollontai (who are under arrest and charged with
State treason).

A majority of the delegates from the provinces said in their
speeches that the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party took
into consideration merely the views of the Petrograd workers, and
consequently there were differences between the Central Committee
and the provincial organizations. Nevertheless, the provincial dele-
gates fully approved the tactics of the Central Committee at Petro-
grad on July 16- 1 8 and pointed out that the Central Committee had
to participate in the events in order to give a peaceful character to
the acts of the Petrograd workers.
1 "Izvestiia," No, 91* June 27, 1917.

10,

*#., No. 95, July xf 1917.
"Riech," No. X7S, August

576 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

The announcement that Lenin and Zinoviev have not gone abroad,
as the papers say, but are in Russia and in contact with the Central
Committee, made a deep impression. Among other things, our speaker
said that Lenin, under the name of Him, had an article in the "Rabo-
chii i Soldat," which paper appears in the place of the suppressed
"Pravda."

THE SOVIET MOVES TO THE SMOLNY INSTITUTE u

All the bureaus of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies
have been moved from the Taurida palace to the Smolny Institute.

""Riech," No. 178, August 14, 1917.

CHAPTER XLI
CONTROL OF PETROGRAD SOVIET

i. RESULT OF PETROGRAD ELECTIONS TO THE CITY

DUMA

(September 2, 1917)

Representatives1 Representatives1 Total Vote2

Principal Parties in Old Duma in New Duma Cast

Socialist-Revolutionists 54 75 205,666

Bolsheviks 37 67 183,694

Cadets 47 42 114485

Mensheviks 40 8 23,552

Others 22 7 21,982

"IZVESTIIA" EDITORIAL ON THE CITY ELECTION 8

At this election about fifty per cent of the electors voted, as
against seventy- four per cent at the last election. The difference shows
the decline in interest in public-political questions among large masses
of the city population.

The failure of many people to vote is explained, first of all,
by the present tragic condition of our revolution* The large masses
of the population demand immediate results from the revolution and
from their participation in public life, and when the revolution is
unable to make daily conquests, these people become greatly disillu-
sioned with the revolution. They reason that if their words and votes
do not bring about a noticeable change in their lives, there is no use
in voting*

Another manifestation of the same truth [disillusionment] is the
growing strength of the two extreme wings — the Cadets and the
Bolsheviks. I-arge circles of the revolutionary democracy are drifting
toward the left.

The further development of the revolution meets with more and
more opi>osition from the masses of the bourgeoisie. This explains
," No. 200, September 8,

F« No, 198, September 6, 19x7.
* "Izvestiia," No. 152, September 6, 1917*

577

578 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

why the right wing is growing stronger. It places new obstacles in
the further development of the revolution and stands in the way of
carrying out the present tasks which are forced upon us by life
itself. Naturally, every delay will create discontent among the masses
and will throw them into the camp of those who promise to satisfy
at once their daily needs, even if the promises cannot be kept, even
if the revolutionary democracy should be isolated from the rest of the
country . . . even if the immediate battle [attempt] should mean
a defeat for democracy.

Just the same, the right and left wings are growing and will con-
tinue to grow until the revolution is able to remove the obstacles in
its way, if by that time the revolutionary democracy is not defeated
in hopeless fight. . . .

2. THE PRESIDIUM OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET

RESIGNS *

At the last general meeting of the Petrograd Soviet there was
adopted the resolution of the Bolsheviks on the policy of the Soviet.

It is true that the meeting was not fully attended and that the
resolution passed by a vote of only 279 against 115, 51 not voting,
yet the adopted resolution stands and obligates the carrying out of
said policy for which the present composition of the presidium is
unwilling to assume responsibility.

Under the circumstances, the presidium, in the persons of the
president, Chkheidze, and vice-presidents Anisimov, Gotz, Dan, Sko-
belev, Tseretelli, and Chernov, have laid down their offices*

At the next meeting of the Soviet, which, let us hope, will be
better attended, a new election will take place, and it will be possible
to determine whether the last vote on the resolution was accidental
or whether the point of view of the majority of the Petrograd Soviet
has really changed. In order that the question may be decided on its
merits, all the seven members of the old presidium are coming up as
a unit for the election.

MEETING OP PETROGRAD SOVIET *

September 21

. . . Kamenev introduced the following resolution: 'That the pre-
sidium be reformed on the basis of proportional representation; that

4 it

Tzvestiia," No, 163, September 19, 1917.
*Ibid,, No, 167, September 23, 1917.

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 579

is to say. that to the present presidium there be added representatives
of those factions that are not fully represented." This motion was
carried by a vote of 519 against 44, 67 not voting.

In announcing the result, Chkheidze declared that under these cir-
cumstances there was no presidium. . . . Saying this, he left the
chairman's seat and went out of the hall. He was followed by Tsere-
telli, Dan, and others.

CHAPTER XLII

FORMATION OF A RED GUARD AND WAR-
REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE

i. THE RED GUARD

At Kronstadt a Red Guard has been organized. All the workmen
of the fortress have been supplied with arms. . . . They are being
drilled daily in the use of rifles. ... At Shlusselburg the former con-
victs have formed a "Battalion of Death to all Kornilovs." *

There was a meeting today [at Moscow] of the inter-ward Soviet
to discuss the question of a Red Guard. It was decided to arm the
workers just as soon as possible.2 * . *

2. TO THE ARMY AND NAVY8

In connection with the action of General Kornilov, the normal
life of the army has been completely upset. To restore order, I
command :

1. The army shall cease political strife and devote all efforts to
the war, upon which alone the salvation of the country depends.

2. All army organizations and commissars shall limit themselves
strictly to activities within their competence, without political intol-
erance and suspicion. They should not interfere in the strategic and
directive work of commanding officers.

3. The commanding personnel should not be hindered in the
transportation of troops.

4. The arrest of officers shall cease immediately. This right be-
longs exclusively to the legal authorities, the State attorneys, and the
extraordinary investigation commission which I have appointed and
which is already at work,

5. The dismissal and appointment of commanding officers shall
stop entirely. This right belongs only to the properly authorized
organs of the Government and by no means to the organizations*

*"Riech," No. 206, September 15, 1917.
* "Izvestiia," No. 161, September 16, 1917.
*Ibid.f No. 160, September 15, 1917.

580

HOW THE .BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 581

6, The unauthorized formation of detachments under the pre-
text of fighting counter-revolutionary outbreaks shall stop at once.

7. The supervision established by the army organizations over
telephones and telegraphs shall be removed at once.

The army, which has in these difficult, troubled days expressed
its absolute confidence in the Provisional Government and in me, as
Prime Minister, responsible for the fate of the country, has the good
sense to understand that the salvation of the country lies solely in
proper organization, preservation of perfect order, discipline, and
solidarity. Therefore, I, clothed with the confidence of the army,
appeal to all. Let each one's conscience awaken and let it guide him
in his great duty to the country at this terrible hour, when its fate
is to be decided. As Commander-in-Chief, I demand of all command-
ing officers, commissars, and army organizations the unswerving exe-
cution of all that has been ordered here, and I serve warning that
those shirking or failing to comply with my orders will be prose-
cuted with all the might of the Government and severely punished.

A. KERENSKI,
Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

ALEXEEV,
Chief of Staff, General of Infantry.

DISBAN0MENT OF SELF-APPOINTED COMMITTEES 4

At the time of the Kornilov plot, there were organized in cities,
villages, railway stations, at the front and in the rear, voluntary
citizens' committees with the object of saving and protecting the
revolution. They, together with the local organs loyal to the revolu-
tion, became the centers of government These committees succeeded
in defending and strengthening the conquests of the revolution
against the attempts of the rebels, and rendered real assistance to
the Government in liquidating the crisis in a peaceful and bloodless
manner.

Now that the rebels have surrendered, have been arrested and
handed over to the courts, now that order is restored and the Govern-
ment organs have come out of the crisis with increased strength, the
object for which the committees to save the revolution have been
formed has been attained.

In making acknowledgment, in the name of the whole nation, of
the extraordinary services rendered by the committees, the Provi-

4 "Izvestaa," No. 162, September x8, 1917.

582 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

sional Government asks that now, when the Government organs are
reestablished, all citizens resume the normal course of life.

The courts of the Russian Republic are occupied with the cases
.of all those guilty of taking part in the rebellion. Everything relat-
ing to the plot should be brought to their attention.

From now on self-appointed administrators of justice will not
be tolerated, and the Government will fight against them as against
any other high-handed acts harmful to the Republic.

Only by a careful division of the rights and obligations of the
citizens and the State can the revolutionary order strengthen the
republican form of government in Russia.

A. F. KERENSKI,

Prime Minister and Supreme Conwiander-in-Chief.
September 17, 1917

"IZVESTIIA" EDITORIAL ON DISBANDMENT OF COMMITTEES 5

What shall we say to yesterday's order by Kercnski to disband
at once all the committees that waged war on counter-revolution^ the
same committees that came to life in those terrible days and became
at once the center of all the public forces that were loyal to the
revolution? . . .

To disband them now, when there is yet so much to do to quiet
the soldier and to inspire him with confidence that no one will cover
up counter-revolutionary plots ... to disband them now, when only
thanks to them the revolutionary masses are organized and disci-
plined ; to disband them now shows little understanding of conditions.

3. RESOLUTION OF PETROGRAD SOVIET*

[October 4, 1917]

The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, hav-
ing deliberated in special session on the state of affairs which has
developed, believes:

I. That the country is in danger of an attempt by the counter-
revolutionists. International imperialism, working closely together
with the Russian bourgeoisie, is preparing measures to crush the
revolution of the workers, soldiers, and peasants,

*"Izvestiia," No. 163, September 19, 1917.
9 Ibid, , No. 178, October 5, 1917.

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 583

The counter-revolutionary organizations of the capitalists are
still alive and are in session at this very moment at Moscow in the
so-called Conference of Public Men, which was the center of the
Kornilov movement. The Provisional Government by its decrees is
striving to disorganize the revolution. All these facts have brought
about a very strained situation and bring the proletariat, soldiers, and
peasants face to face with the question of preparing for a possible
counter-revolutionary attempt in the near future.

2. The confused situation was not improved by the artificial
Democratic Conference. This body was incapable of settling the
question of a revolutionary government because of the very artificial
selection of its members and gives the impression of a helpless revolu-
tionary democracy. At the same time, anti-democratic elements have
gathered around the Democratic Conference and are forcing it by
their demands to move more and more to the right, and they are
making ready to go over openly to the counter-revolutionary camp.

The so-called pie-parliament is becoming in fact an organization
where the more conservative portions of the democracy are to have
the final voice at the expense of the revolutionary organizations of
the workers, soldiers, and peasants. Such a pre-parliament threat-
ens to become a cover for new bourgeois schemes, for new delays
of the Constituent Assembly, for the prolongation of imperialistic
policies, which means the further economic disorganization of the
country.

3* The only power that can strike back at counter-revolution
is the organized centers of the revolutionary democracy — the Soviets
of Workers', Soldiers*, and Peasants' Deputies and their affiliated
organizations,

4. The Soviets should immediately mobilize their forces so as
not to be caught unprepared, and to be ready to meet the new counter-
revolutionary wave. Wherever they have all the power in their hands,
they .should under no consideration let it go. The revolutionary com-
mittees which they formed at the time of the Kornilov affair should
have ready their whole machinery. Wherever the Soviets have not full
power they should gradually strengthen their positions, have their
organizations in readiness to create, as the need may arise, special
organs to keep a watch on the organized strength of the enemy and
to fight counter-revolution.

5. For the purpose of uniting and harmonizing the acts of the
Soviets in their fight against the approaching danger and in order

584 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

to decide questions in relation to the organization of a revolutionary
government, it is important to call at once a Congress of Soviets of
Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies.

4. TROTSKI ELECTED CHAIRMAN OF PETROGRAD

SOVIET 7

The meeting of the Soviet on October 8 opened with a report
on the reelections to the Executive Committee of the Soviet and its
presidium. A great many of the members of the Soviet did not vote.
Out of the 400 votes cast, 230 were for the Bolsheviks, 102 for the
Socialist-Revolutionists, 54 for the Mensheviks, and 10 for the
Menshevik-Internationalists. According to this vote, the Bolsheviks
get 13, the Socialist-Revolutionists 6, and the Mensheviks 3 places
on the Executive Committee. ... In the new presidium are 4 Bol-
sheviks, 2 Socialist-Revolutionists, and I Menshevik. . . . Trotski
was elected chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. . . .

Kamenev proposed that no confidence should be placed 3n the new
Government, which, in his opinion, is a coalition against the workers,
soldiers, and peasants. . . ,

The . . . resolution proposed by Trotski was adopted.

"IZVESTIIA" CHANGES ITS NA'ME*

Petroffrad, October 13

The official organ of the revolution is singing its last song. This
does not mean that the "Izvestiia" is going out of existence. For the
time being the revolutionary democracy closes only "bourgeois"
papers. But Trotski [Chairman of Petrograd Soviet] demanded from
the "Izvestiia" that it should remove the words "PctrogracI Soviet''
from its name, and not only was this demand immediately com-
plied with, but one of the editors felt obliged to resign.

5. LOSS OF RIGA9

The meeting of the Petrograd Soviet of September 3 opened
with the reading of telegrams from the commissars of the Northern
Front [Riga]. At the request of Chkheidze, all present stood up in
honor of those who gave their lives for the revolution and the free-
dom of Russia.

* "Riech/' No. 226, October 8, 1917.
*Ibid., No. 230, October 13, 1917, Editorial
*Ibid.f No. 196, September 4, 1917.

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 585

Following this, the Soviet listened to Bogdanov's report on the
telegrams read

"These telegrams," said B. O. Bogdanov, "show clearly the seri-
ous dangers which are added to the numerous other difficulties which
beset the Russian revolution. I need not tell you how difficult it is for
us, who are unable either to fight or to make peace.

"I am sure there is no one here who can remain unmoved while
reading these telegrams. The enemies of the revolution will not miss
a chance to utilize the misfortune at the front, for political purposes.
We should, therefore, do all that we can to spoil their game. From
the telegrams it is clear that the revolutionary army, with its army
committees at the head, are doing everything that they can to save
revolutionary Russia. In the evening papers it is said that regiments
have of their own free will abandoned their positions. Even if this
were true even in part, it should be remembered that this also hap-
pened in the days of the Tsar. . . .

"The defeat on the Northern Front threatens to bring forth many
new complications. A panic may begin tomorrow, if the population
decides to run from Petrograd. Such a move may call forth an up-
rising against the revolution. . . «,

"Rumors are circulating today that on the streets of Petrograd
are pasted posters that 'The Fourth Duma can save the situation.'
On investigation it was found that no such posters exist. But the
fact that such reports are heard, shows that those who shout that
the country is in clanger are trying to utilize the misfortunes of the
revolution in the interest of reaction." . . .

LOSS OF RIGA 10

According to official reports Russia has to live through a new
national misfortune — the loss of Riga. One cannot say, however,
that it has taken us unprepared. On the contrary, everything that is
happening at the front should prepare us for the worst. The Supreme
Commander, General Kornilov, in his speech at Moscow, predicted
it. ...

One of the leading questions at Moscow was the means to be em-
ployed to reestablish the national defense. The question came to the
front of itself, by the force of necessity, against the wish of those
who put "the salvation of the revolution" before "the salvation of
the country." It is around this question that the two camps were so
sharply divided. It was particularly noticeable when some represent-
*"Riech," No. 196, September 4, 1917, Editorial.

586 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

atives of the Army remained seated as the Supreme Commander was
given an ovation. Those who are united on this question, so important
for Russia, are sneeringly referred to by the Left as "counter-
revolutionists." ...

The Government has no choice. ... It must finally and definitely
cut loose from the Soviets and accept the proposition of General
Kornilov. It was not in vain that the Supreme Commander said that
if his recommendation was not accepted then, it would have to be put
into force later— after the fall of Riga. . . .

6. EVACUATION OF PETROGRAD »

Petrograd, October 19

Petrograd is again passing through alarming days. The news^of
German operations in the Baltic and the appearance of zeppelins
have given rise to many rumors of the danger threatening Petrograd
and have created a panicky atmosphere. Thet news that the Govern-
ment is taking definite measures to evacuate State institutions in the
near future and is considering whether it should move the central
organs of government and even the pre-parliament to Moscow have
added strength to these alarming rumors.11 „ . .

THE BOLSHEVIKS AND EVACUATION u

The leaders of the Bolsheviks find that the removal of the Gov-
ernment to Moscow will produce a situation in Petrograd similar
to the one in Paris in 1871, when "the enemy was at the gates and
there was no government." At that time, there will grow up a desire
among the masses, so say the Bolsheviks, to form a commune. The
Bolshevik leaders say that they are opposed to a commune at the
present, but if it should appear, the Bolsheviks would participate
in it.12

RESOLUTION* OF PETROGRAD SOVIET ON EVACUATION l*

[October Jp]

The Soldiers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies vehemently protests against the idea of moving
the Government from Petrograd to Moscow. Such an act would leave
the revolutionary capital unprotected.

n "Riech," No. 235, October 19, 1917, Editorial.

*JKd.

** "Izvestiia," No. 191, October 20, 1917,

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 587

If the Provisional Government cannot defend Petrograd, it
should either make peace or step down to make room for another
government.

To move to Moscow means desertion from a responsible post.

PETROGRAD GARRISON REFUSES TO OBEY ORDERS14

On October 22 there was a meeting of the soldiers of the Finland
Guard Regiment. They were called together to deliberate on the
order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in regard to the reor-
ganization of parts of the Petrograd garrison. . . . The meeting
passed a sharp resolution, in true Bolshevik spirit, against the Pro-
visional Government and in particular against Kerenski, and de-
manded that all power be handed over to the Soviets, and recom-
mended the calling of a meeting of representatives of regimental
committees to work out practical measures for the defense of
Petrograd.

7. WAR-REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AND DEFENSE
OF PETROGRAD 18

Yesterday [October 22] there was a meeting of the executive
committee of the Petrograd Soviet The question of the protection of
the cai>ital and the need of taking part of the garrison out of the
city to defend its approach called forth a warm debate. Though ad-
mitting the strategic value of such a move, the Bolsheviks claimed
that they had no confidence in the Government and its military lead-
ers, and therefore proposed the organization of a revolutionary
staff of their own* „ . . They introduced a resolution in which they
said that the Soviet could assume no responsibility for the strategy
of the Provisional Government and that the only way to save Petro-
grad was to hand over the government to the Soviets, to declare
an armistice immediately, etc. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revo-
lutionists jxrinted out that to form a military staff alongside the
Government's meant dual authority and a serious menace to the
defense of the city* . . . The following resolution was adopted :

x. To appeal to the garrison to strengthen its war activity . . .
to make energetic preparations, in case it should be necessary, to
call out a part of the garrison from the capital to defend its approach.

2, To form a college of representatives of the Petrograd Soviet,

** **Rtedh»" No. 238, October 23,

» "lavestiia," No* 193, October 23, 1917.

588 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Central Committee, and "Tsentroflot" {revolutionary naval organi-
zation] to function alongside the commander of troops of the Petro-
grad Military Zone. No part of the garrison is to be moved without
first notifying this college.

3. To take steps to reorganize the militia.

4. To take extra measures to clean out the commanding
personnel.

5. In addition, the Petrograd Soviet authorizes the Executive
Committee, together with the presidium of the soldiers' section [of
Soviet] and representatives of the Petrograd garrison to organize a
committee of revolutionary defense. This body is to make a study
of the question of the defense of Petrograd and its approach and
work out a plan for the protection of the city with the active support
of the laboring class.

ORGANIZATION OF A WAR-REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE10

There was a closed session yesterday [October 25-26] of the
Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet to discuss the question
of organizing a war-revolutionary committee. After some debate a
scheme for the organization of a temporary revolutionary commit-
tee and a garrison council was accepted. , . . This committee is
organized in connection with the Petrograd Soviet and is its organ.
This body is to be made up oi members of the presidium and the
soldiers' section of the Soviet, representatives of the Tscntroflot,
of the Finland regional committee, railway men's union, post and
telegraph union, Soviets of factory and mills committees, soviet of
labor unions, representatives of party military organizations, Union of
Socialists in the national army, representatives of the military section
of the Petrograd Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, military section of the
Central Executive Committee, workmen's militia, and such others as
may be needed.

Among the more immediate tasks of the war-revolutionary com-
mittee are : To determine the minimum of troops and resources neces-
sary to protect Petrograd and which can not be removed ; to keep
up contact with the commissars, with the commatxler-m-chief of
the Northern front, with the Baltic fleet, garrison of Finland, and
staff of the commander-in-chief of the war area; to keep an accurate
account of every one in the garrison of Petrograd and neighborhood,
and of the war materials and food supplies ; to work out a plan for the
defense of Petrograd; to take measures to protect Petrograd from
** "Izvestiia," No. 197, October 27, 1917,

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 589

pogroms and desertions ; to uphold discipline among the masses and
soldiers of Petrograd.

The war-revolutionary committee is divided in sections : ( I ) de-
fense, (2) supplies, (3) contact, (4) information bureau, (5) work-
men's militia, (6) denunciation, and (7) buildings, etc.

The military section and the provisional revolutionary committee
are to organize garrison conferences. . . . The immediate task of the
garrison conference is to get information on the condition of the
garrison and an account of all the resources necessary to raise its
fighting efficiency. Members of the Menshevik Party in the Executive
Committee asked to be placed on record as voting against this motion.

WAR-REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE17

Meeting of the Petrograd Sozict under the Chairmanship of
Kamcnw, October 29, 1917.

Rroido, speaking in the name of the Mensheviks, announced that
the question under discussion was bound up with the defense of the
capital. None of us, he said, "question that the taking of Petrograd by
the Germans is a death blow to the revolution. But we should do
nothing which would interfere with unity of effort directed toward
the defense of Petrograd. This is a task for the military authorities
of the Petrograd War Area. The revolutionary committee is a Bol-
shevik idea, but the Bolsheviks have not the men capable of taking
charge of the defense of the city. Comrades, we are passing through
an unusually serious time. Petrograd is threatened not only from
the outside, but from the inside. Agitation is being carried on, inciting
the masses to come out in the streets under the slogan, "All Power
to the Soviets/' Under these circumstances, the revolutionary
committee may become something else, something dangerous and
threatening.

"Until now the Bolsheviks have failed to answer the question put
to them by Dan : Whether they are going to take part in the uprising
and whether they regard such a movement as beneficial, whether they
are calling on the masses to come on the street to seize power,

"Your refusal to answer may be explained in one of two ways.
Either you are cowardly afraid or uncertain of your strength. If
the latter* then I bless you for your doubts. . . . Such an uprising,
we are convinced, would ting the death knell of the revolution. Your
scheme for a revolutionary committee is nothing else than an organiza-

*"Izvestiia;* No. 199, October 30, 1917*

590 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

tion of a revolutionary staff to seize power. We are against it and
will not join it ... We have information showing that the masses
are not in favor of an uprising. . . ."

Trotski followed Broido : "In answering the question of Comrade
Broido, whether the Bolsheviks are preparing an armed uprising,
I should like to know in whose name he is asking it. Is it in the name
of Kerenski, the intelligence service, secret police, or other such
institutions ? . . ." In concluding his speech, Trotski insisted that it
was necessary to take the power out of the hands of the irresponsible
leaders by a unanimous demonstration of the power of the democ-
racy, and demanded an expression against the removal of the troops
from Petrograd. . . .

EVACUATION OF PETROGRAD18

On the night of October 25 there was a meeting of the Com-
mission of Defense of the Provisional Council of the Republic, and
after a lively debate, the following resolution was adopted :

Having heard the statement of the Provisional Government on
the military situation on the Northern Front in relation to the
evacuation of the capital, the Commission declares:

1. That the Provisional Government has announced its purpose
to defend Petrograd to the last;

2. That, under the present condition of the country, the Provi-
sional Government thinks it necessary to remain in Petrograd until
there is immediate danger;

3. That not only will the Provisional Government remain in
Petrograd, but the Constituent Assembly will also be asked to
meet there. . . .

ORDER OF THE COMMANDER OF THE PETROGRAD telLrrARY DISTRICT ig

Preparations are being made for another armed demonstration on
the streets of Petrograd. Such an act will bring with it anarchyt and
useless sacrifices, and will put the country on the brink of ruin. He
who at the present hour calls the masses to civil war is either mad,
blind, or works in the interests of Emperor William.

I call on all officers and soldiers under me not to listen to this
call to come out. Soldiers and officers, think of the great responsibility
that Iks on you, before the democracy and free Russia.

COLONEL POLKOVNIKOV
""Izvestna," No. 196, October 36, 1917.
*d.f No. 199, October 30, 1917.

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 591

SESSION OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE20

[October 27, 1917]

Meeting opened at 9 :oo P. M., under the chairmanship of Gotz.
The questions of the day were as follows : (l ) Defense of Petrograd ;
(2) The All- Russian Congress of Soviets.

A number of representatives from the front addressed the meeting.
All, without exception, declared that to continue the war, under
conditions as they now exist, is impossible. The front is thinking only
of peace. Some of the units demand peace, any kind of peace, even a
separate peace. As one of the orators put it: "If it is an indecent
peace, let's have that."

The soldier masses are so bent on peace that their own army
committees and regimental organizations will not be able to do
anything with them, for the soldiers have announced most emphatically
that they will not remain at the front when cold weather comes.

DECLARATION OP GOT2 21

"The representatives from the front have painted a very gloomy
picture. We understand the difficult position of the soldiers at the
front, and we are doing everything that we can to bring about an
early peace. But it is not possible to conclude a shameful peace which
will ruin the revolution. I cannot believe that there are units in the
Russian revolutionary army that would agree to a shameful, separate
jxsace, and I am convinced that in case of need, this army will do
its duty before the country and the revolution.*'

DAN'S SPEECH**

Dan made a report on the question of the defense of Petrograd.
, , „ Petrograd is the center of the Russian revolution . . . and its
defense is the duty of every revolutionist. ... In this time of danger
the reactionaries are raising their heads. Russian monarchism is the
true ally of German imperialism. Under the protection of the
counter-revolutionists there is growing up a restless movement among
the masses, which manifests itself in pogroms against the Jews and
against the bourgeoisie.

It would seem as if at such a time all quarrels and misunderstand-
ings among the revolutionary democracy would be forgotten; that

*"I*vestHa,H No, 199. October 30,
* Aft, No. 198, October 28, 1917.

592 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

every shade of democracy would realize the threatening danger and
defend revolutionary Petrograd, would try to produce the necessary
materials for the defense which are lacking.

Instead of that, the Bolsheviks are carrying on agitation which
arouses the masses of workers and soldiers. We should straightfor-
wardly ask our comrades what is their object in all this. ("Peace
and land," shouted Riazanov.)

Peace and land (continued Dan), but we think that demonstra-
tion on the streets and the failure to fill war orders will not give
peace and land, but will destroy the revolution.

Do the Bolsheviks realize the effect of their agitation on the
workers and soldiers? Do they assume the responsibility for the
consequences of their agitation? The Bolsheviks should on this
platform answer whether the revolutionary proletariat understands
their point of view or not. Are the Bolsheviks calling on the proletariat
to rise, or are they not? We believe that such an uprising, should it
take place, would kill the revolution and would lead to pogroms and
counter-revolution.

I demand that the Bolshevik Party answer this question with
an honest and straightforward "Yes" or "No." No other kind of
answer is possible.

We should at the same time appeal to the workers and soldiers
of Petrograd and say to them that at this dangerous time they should
give up the idea of demonstration. . . *

RIAZANOV'S SPEECH 2*

"The question of the defense [Petrograd] ... we discussed in
the Petrograd [Soviet] Executive Committee, and it was decided to
organize a War Revolutionary Committee. We were led to this
action by the deepest conviction that as long as the defense was in
the hands of the coalition government . , * it would be no better
than it is now. . . ."

THE PETROGRAD SOVIET AND THE STAFF OF THE PETROGRAD
MILITARY DISTRICT *4

The organization of the War-Revolutionary Committee by the
Petrograd Soviet to control the action of the Staff of the Petrograd
Military District has brought on a serious conflict between the Petro-
grad Soviet and the Staff.

* "Izvestiia," No. 198, October 28, 1917.
**Ibid.t No. 205, November 6,

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 593

As it stands today, alongside the Staff there exists a special
council made up of members of the war section of the Central Execu-
tive Committee and the soldiers' section of the Petrograd Soviet. The
Petrograd Soviet proposed the organization of a War-Revolutionary
Committee with the right to control, and even to change, orders of
the Staff, On November 3 the Petrograd Soviet recognized the War-
Revolutionary Committee as the real commander of the troops of the
capital. On the night of November 4, members of this Committee
presented themselves at the Staff and demanded the right to partici-
pate, with a deciding voice, in the command. Col. Polkovnikov, the
commander of the troops, emphatically refused to admit their claim.
The Petrograd Soviet then called together at Smolny representatives
of the regiments, who telephoned to all the units that the Staff refused
to recognize the War-Revolutionary Committee and by so doing
broke with the revolutionary garrison and the Petrograd Soviet and
became a tool of the counter-revolution.

"Soldiers of Petrograd," the telephone message goes on to say,
"the safeguarding of the revolutionary order from counter-
revolutionary attacks falls on you, under the direction of the
War-Revolutionary Committee. Orders not countersigned by the
Committee are void. All the orders of the Petrograd Soviet for today,
the day of the Petrograd Soviet, remain in force. Every soldier of
the garrison should be on the watch, and keep in strict discipline. The
revolution is in danger. Long live the revolutionary garrison/'

The Commander of the Petrograd Military District called a meet-
ing which included representatives of the Central Committee and the
Commissar attached to his Staff. Members of the Petrograd garrison
at Smolny were also asked to come. They came headed by Sergeant
Dashkevich. He announced that he was authorized by the garrison
to inform the Staff of the District that from now on all orders issued
by the Staff must be countersigned by the War-Revolutionary
Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. He ended there by declaring that
he was not authorized to say anything more, and then departed with
his delegation.

This conflict brought General Cheremisov, the Commander of
the Northern Front, to Petrograd yesterday. He talked over with
the Prime Minister both the situation at the front and the local
conflict*

Without commenting on the conflict, General Cheremisov insisted
that all measures should be taken to have the garrison ready to meet
the enemy that is preparing to strike on the Northern Front. . . .

594 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

He supported the resolutions of his troops that the Petrograd garrison
should relieve some of the regiments at the front. "If," said the
General, "the War-Revolutionary Committee should take the stand
that the garrison troops should not be moved, then he would cate-
gorically protest in the name of the armies/'

Kerenski had conferences with some members of the Central
Executive Committee, who told him that in this conflict the members
of the Central Executive Committee were whole-heartedly with him,
but asked him to withhold action temporarily, for they hoped to
settle the trouble in a peaceful manner by discussions between the
Central Executive Committee and the Petrograd Soviet.

It is reported that the Commissars attached to the Petrograd gar-
rison and elected by the Petrograd Soviet intercept every telephone
message that is sent from the Staff to the units of the Petrograd
garrison, . . *

8. MEETING OF PETROGRAD SOVIET **

[October 22}

Comrade Karakhan made a report on the Regional Congress.
The idea of such a congress belongs to the workmen and sailors
of Finland. The Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet has
decided to take part and to send thirty delegates, of whom fifteen
are Bolsheviks, ten Socialist-Revolutionists, and five Mensheviks.
... In the program of the Congress there was to be at first just
one question— government, but later it was decided by the Executive
Committee that the question of government should be bound up with
the question of the defense of the northern region.

WORD FROM THE THIRTY-THIRD ARMV CORPS

One of the delegates greeted the Soviet on behalf of the Thirty-
third Corps, which he called the advance guard of the revolutionary
democracy, and said that his delegation, composed of thirty-six men,
demands that the Petrograd Soviet should take energetic measures
to start peace negotiations at once; to take over all power by the
Soviets, and to do away with capital punishment

The next question was the relation with the pre~parliainent
Comrade Trotski had this to say on the subject, . * . The Bolsheviks
* "Izvestiia," No, 193, October 23, 1917-

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 595

left because the pre-parliament could not accomplish the object
which the clefensists had in mind at the time of the Democratic
Conference. He pointed out that while it was the main purpose
of the Democratic Conference to limit the personal power of Kerenski,
the pre-parliamcnt actually legalized this irresponsible government.
For that reason the pre-parliament is of no use. It serves merely
as a cover to conceal the actual handing over of the power to the
imperialists.

In criticizing the pre-parliament Trotski declared that the Bol-
sheviks could not remain in such a body, where representatives of
the bourgeoisie are present and possibly getting ready to hand over
to the Germans the citadel of the revolution — Petrograd.

"We left the pre-parliament/* continued Trotski, "to make it
clear that only a government of the Soviets can raise the slogan of
peace, and to announce it to the democracies of other countries over
the heads of the imperialists.

"Long live the direct and open struggle for a revolutionary
government in Russia, Long live peace for all nations.11

LIEBER'S SPEECH

Lieber, Social-Democrat, took the floor. "I am sure that from the
tone assumed by Trotski one could hardly believe that the Bolsheviks'
departure from the pre-parliament was determined by an insignificant
majority.

"The situation is not quite as simple as some try to make believe.
We should remember what is going on in the country. We are told
here that the revolutionary spirit is on a high plane, but when you
leave this building and see the endless lines [bread, etc.], when you
hear of the troubles in the factories about wages, and the way the
whole country is becoming demoralized, there is some doubt as
to the ability of this revolutionary spirit to allay discontent.

**It 5s proposed that the democracy should take all power. Remem-
ber how recently it was that you cheered Kerenski, Let us suppose
for a minute that Trotski, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Lenin are in
power. It is one thing to seize power and quite another to hold it,
Our conscience and our responsibility before the country did not
allow tts to take power. We were never demagogues ; we realized
that every promise should be carried out. And when we convinced
ourselves that in the bourgeois countries it was impossible to bring
about socialistic governments, we made up our tninds to let the people

596 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

have at least something of that for which they strived. It is only
with this idea in mind that we take part in the Provisional Council
of the Republic. . . .

"Trotski said that he did not wish to take part in the Council
because the bourgeoisie was there. I should like to ask him whether
he will take part in the Constituent Assembly. . , .'*

KOLLONTAI'S SPEECH

A. M. Kollontai (-Bolshevik) was the next speaker: "Comrades!
Citizen Lieber said that the question of leaving the pre-parliament
was passed by an insignificant majority. That's not true. The Bolshe-
vik faction was, as a whole, in favor of leaving, but there was some
difference of opinion as to how and when. Some were of the opinion
that we should not leave until after we had expressed ourselves on
political questions, others said not to wait for that, for the proletariat
and the soldiers were already sufficiently enlightened as to the way
they should go." . . . After her speech she read a resolution . . „ and
ended with : "Down with the Bonapartists, down with the counter-
feit pre-parliament ! Long live the struggle against the usurpers for
the transfer of power to the Soviets."

MARTOV'S SPEECH

"The explanations of the Bolsheviks did not explain to me why it
was necessary for them to leave the pre-parliament. If it is really
true, as they say, that the pre-parliament strengthens irresponsible
government and bourgeois domination, then the thing to do is to
disperse it and not merely leave it But I do not agree with the
opinion of the Bolsheviks.

"We, Menshevik-Internationalists, did not leave and do not intend
to do so. We shall continue to fight, even if unsuccessful, to the end.
The future alone can say who is in the right. . . /'

KAMENEV'S SPEECH **

Kamenev read the following leaflet which was being passed around
in the factories:

"Citizens, the cowardly and dastardly traitorous ministers have
betrayed the Russian people. They have rained the arniy, filled the
fleet with German agents, and now they are the first to fly for safety
from Petrograd. With them goes the pre-parliament, a gang of

* "Izvestiia," No. 193, October 23,

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 597

impostors planning to crowd out the Constituent Assembly, which
they do not intend to call.

"Citizens, you are threatened with hunger, cold, and German
slavery. Let the guilty ones share it with you, don't let them go.
Arm yourselves and stand at the stations, to prevent by force the
escape of the ministers, pre-parliament, and the hired German
murderers who are meeting at Smolny."

Kamenev denounced this leaflet as provocation and asked the
workers to catch the people who scattered them.

The next question was the removal of the troops from the
capital , . . The Bolshevik, Pavlunovski, said that the army cannot
obey the orders of the Government, in which it has no confidence,
. . . [Two resolutions were introduced, one by the majority of the
Executive Committee and one by the Bolsheviks* The latter was
adopted. The meeting ended almost in a fight.]

CHAPTER XLIII

CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF THE NORTHERN
REGION *

At the initiative of the Regional Committee of the Army, Navy,
and Workers of Finland, there has been organized, by representa-
tives of this committee, a congress of Soviets and army organizations
of the Northern Region.

This congress is called to meet at Helsingfors on October 21.
Invitations have been sent to Archangel, Petrozavodsk, TikhvJn, Nov-
gorod, Dorpat, Luga, Chudovo, Schlusselburg, Sestroret.sk, Kronstadt,
Peterhof, Krasnoe Selo, Tsarskoe Selo, Pavlovsk, Pskov, Reval,
Narva, Pernau, Walk, Weimar, Wenden, Hapsal, Gatchina, Oranien-
baum, Wiborg, Abo, Helsingsfors, and Tammerfors. There will be
one deputy for every 15,000 persons. . . „

Beginning with October 19, all matters relating to the Congress
should be addressed to Comrade Baranov . . . Smolny Institute,
Petrograd.1

Last evening [October 23] at Smolny there was a preliminary
conference of the delegates of the regional congress of Soviets, Those
present debated the problem of organization, and it was decided to
take up the questions in the following order:

(i) Local reports, (2) current questions, (3) land, (4) war-
politkal situation, (5) All-Russian Congress of Soviets, (6)
Constituent Assembly, (7) organization. ... It was agreed to open
the congress today at 3 : oo P. M. . . „*

THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE COMES OUT AGAINST
NORTHERN REGION CONGRESS*

[October 24]

The Bureau of the Central Executive Committee, having heard
the report of the Outside City Section on the Northern Region
Congress, called by the Helsingfors Soviet to meet at Petrograd,
found that:

* "Izvesth'a," No. 191, October 20, 1917.
*/&*&, No. 194, October 24, 1917.
rfv No. 195, October 25, 1917.

593

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 599

(i) A regional congress can be made up only of the Soviets of
said region, the area of which was determined by the First All-
Russian Congress of Soviets.

(2") Notwithstanding the instruction of the Central Executive
Committee that it be notified of all congresses called by regional com-
mittees, no notice was received of the Congress of the Northern
Region.

(3) From the information at hand, it is evident that while some
places in the Northern Region did not receive any invitation, others,
outside (Moscow), did.

Taking all these facts into consideration, the Bureau of the Execu-
tive Committee resolves that the above-called assembly of delegates
is not a fully authorized regional congress of the Northern Region,
but an informal conference of separate Soviets.

OPENING OF THE CONGRESS OF TIIE NORTHERN REGION *

On October 24 the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region
was opened. There were 103 delegates, among them a delegate from
Moscow* * . . Lieutenant Krylenko (Comrade Abram), recently
freed from prison [political reasons] was unanimously elected
chairman.*. , .

The meeting, set for 3 :oo P. M., was very late in getting started.
Comrade Antonov made a report, pointing out that the idea of the
congress originated with the Regional Committee of Finland, that
it had been planned to have it meet at Hebingfors on October 21,
but the military situation made it necessary to transfer it to the
capital The Petrograd Soviet had taken active part in the organization
of the congress and had sent thirty delegates. . . „

The congress elected Krylenko (Bolshevik) as chairman, . - .

Trotski greeted the assembly in the name of the Petrograd Soviet,
"You know/' he said, uthat lately the Petrograd Soviet has changed
its composition and its politics. The defensists' policy has been changed
to a merciless struggle against class enemies and against the Pro-
visional Government, which is betraying the revolution*

"At the present, only the Petrograd Soviet has the right to speak
in the name of the Petrograd proletariat and garrison. . . . Just now
there is no institution, other than the All-Russian Soviet of Workers*
and Soldiers' Deputies, that can stand at the head of the country.
Only the transfer of power to the Soviets can save the revolution/'

4 "Riech," No, 340, October &5*

6oo DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

[Trotski was 'followed by a number of other delegates, who spoke
along the same line, after which] Krylenko read the following
resolution: . . .

All who spoke here, with the exception of those from Novgorod,
are in full agreement. The keynote of all the speeches, the funda-
mental slogan is : All Power to the Soviets, Down with the Existing
Provisional Government. This is the unanimous opinion of the
country at the present time. We should justify the hope of the country
and fight energetically for power.0

THE REGIONAL CONGRESS 7

[October 25]
Declaration by Bogdanov (Menshevik)

"Comrades, the present congress was called by the Helsingfors
Soviet and cannot, therefore, be called the regional congress of
northern Soviets, It is our opinion that the right to call a regional,
or an All-Russian, congress of Soviets belongs to the Central Execu-
tive Committee. By calling this meeting, the Helsingfors Soviet, or
the Regional Committee of Finland, has encroached upon the rights
of the Central Executive Committee. Many cities were not invited.
It would seem that this is a hand-picked body — only those Soviets
were asked where the Bolsheviks were in the majority. The Central
Executive Committee was not even officially notified of this assembly.
At its yesterday's meeting the Central Executive Committee declared
this congress an informal conference.

"In view of this state of affairs, the Mensheviks declare that : . . .

(1) This meeting cannot be called a Congress of Soviets of the
Northern Region, but an informal conference, and

(2) If our declaration is not acceptable, then the Mensheviks
decline to take part in the work of the meeting, but will attend for
the purpose of getting information* * . ."

[Trotski denied the charges of picking the assembly.] "We con-
sider this assembly as the Congress of the Northern Region, As
regards the charge that the Central Executive Committee has not
been officially notified, it should be recalled that on October 20, at
the meeting of the Petrograd Executive Committee, in which the
Mensheviks participated, it was unanimously voted to take part in
the Congress of the Northern Region. * , ." [He went on to say]

* "Izvestiia," No. 195, October 25, 1917.
*Ibid.t No, 196, October 26, 1917,

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 601

that at the present time, notwithstanding all the obstacles, the people
are sufficiently ripe to take the Government in their own hands. This,
according to Trotski, is the only way to save the country and the
revolution. . . , Our congress ought to show that we have the
material forces on which we can rely. He asked for a unanimous vote
on the resolution which declares that the politics of the Provisional
Government disorganize the army, that the way to save the country
is to take over all power by the Soviets, that the soviet government
would immediately propose an armistice on all fronts, with an honest
democratic peace, that 5t would hand over immediately, without com-
pensation, the land of the landholders to the peasants, would requisi-
tion all concealed supplies, and unmercifully tax the propertied
classes. The Provisional Government should quit. The Soviets have
lx>th right and might on their side. Time for talking is past. Only
a determined and whole-hearted coming out of the Soviets can save
the country and the revolution.

This resolution was almost unanimously adopted; three refrained
from voting.

The next question for discussion was the war-political situation,
I*ashevich (Bolshevik) announced that there existed in the capital a
special soldier revolutionary committee which had all kinds of weapons
and would lx* able, in the near future, to command the soldiers. . , .

RADIO-TELEGRAM OF THE CONGRESS OF THE NORTHERN REGION *

[October 29]

To all, to all. . . * All regimental and divisional committees of
Soviets of Workers*, Soldiers*, and Peasants* Deputies. All sailors,
workers, and peasants,

November 2 is the day for the All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
The purpose is to propose immediately an armistice on all fronts, to
transfer the land to all peasants, and to provide for the calling of
the Constituent Assembly on the time set. All the bourgeoisie, the
Provisional Government and all subject to them are doing everything
that they can to break up the Congress- They try to frighten people
by saying that the Congress will kill the Constituent Assembly. It
is a He! The Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region, made up
of the most powerful organizations — the Soviets ol Petrograd,
Moscow, Finland, the Baltic Fleet, Kronstadt, Reval, and others-
declare that the killing of the Constituent Assembly is being done
*<*I«irestiia#w Na soi» November

602 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

by the counter-revolutionists, who prolong the war, and crush the
peasant revolt.

The Congress of Soviets will provide for the calling of the Con-
stituent Assembly and will immediately propose peace. Those who
stand in the way of the Congress ruin the army and the revolution.
Individual organizations which have come out against the Congress
have violated the resolutions of the Ail-Russian Congress, have
exceeded their powers, and new elections should be held at once.
Soldiers, sailors, peasants, workers, your duty is to overcome all
obstacles through your regimental, divisional, and corps committees
and to send your representatives to the Congress on November 2.
We suggest that you bring this notice to the immediate attention of
all who are connected with your organization.

CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF SOLDIERS',
PEASANTS', AND WORKERS' OF THE
NORTHERN REGION.

REPLY OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE9

. . . The Congress of Soviets has to be called by the Bureau of
the Central Executive Committee. It is being prepared by a special
commission, made up of representatives of all factions that have dele-
gates in the Central Executive Committee. Its first meeting is set
for November 7, and on the 5th and 6th there will take place the
preliminary conferences of the factions. No other committee is
authorized or has the right to take upon itself the calling of a congress,
Least of all has the Congress of the Northern Region such a right.
This body is called together in violation of all regulations for assem-
bling regional congresses and is made tip of representatives of
specially selected Soviets. . * .

BUREAXJ OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
9 "Izvestiia," No. 201, November i, 1917.

CHAPTER XLIV

SECOND ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF
WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS* DEPUTIES *

i. CALL FOR THE CONGRESS

On October 6, there was a meeting of the Central Executive
Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies with
the participation of the representatives of the provincial Soviets who
took part in the Democratic Conference.

The question for discussion was the calling of an Ail-Russian
Congress of Soviets of Workers* and Soldiers* Deputies. . . .

After a long debate the date for the Congress was set for
November 2.

ARMY UNITS AGAtNST CALLING AN ALL-RUSSIAN
CONGRESS OF SOVIETS2

The Committee finds that at the time of the elections for the
Constituent Assembly, which is not far off, the calling of a Congress
ami the work connected with the election and representation will use
up a great deal of energy and will thereby weaken, if not make
altogether impossible, the campaign preceding the election to the Con-
stituent Assembly; therefore, the Committee is strongly against
calling such a Congress.

CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED ARMY AND
REAR ORGANIZATIONS OF THE NORTHERN FRONT
* * * *

The Executive Committee of the Southwest Front is of th$
opinion that the calling of a Congress of Soviet Deputies on Novem-
l>er a is both untimely and harmful, and therefore appeals to all
democratic army organizations to insist that the Congress be post-
poned for a time, [at least] until after the end of the elections of the
Constituent Assembly.

CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

OF THE SOUTHWESTERN FRONT
* * * * #

*9*7«

'"Izvettiia," No, i8a October 7,
- /&*<*., Ho. 192, October a*, 19x7*

603

604 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

The calling of the Congress before the Constituent Assembly has
for its object the seizure by the former of powers that belong to
the latter. . , . The Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies of the Twelfth
Army regards the calling of the Congress on November 2 as untimely
and exceedingly dangerous, and for that reason and in fulfilment of
its duty to all the people, protests against a Congress at such a
time. . . ,3

SOVIET OF SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES OF THE TWELFTH ARMY

AGAINST THE ALL-RUSSIAN SOVIET *

Having learned of the calling for November 22 of an All-Russian
Congress of Soviets, which is to demand that all power go to the
Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, the Executive
Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies feels
that it should categorically declare that such a step at the present
time might have very sad consequences for the country and the
revolution, might bring on civil war, which would be very advan-
tageous to the foreign foe. . . .

2, SECOND CONGRESS OF SOVIETS *

In view of the impossibility of assembling a Second All-Russian
Congress of Soviets of Workers* and Soldiers* Deputies on Novem-
ber 2, also in view of the hostile attitude of the committees of the
army and the front toward such a Congress, the Bureau of the
Central Executive Committee has decided to take all measures to
notify afl army and local organizations of the necessity of taking
part in the Congress, and that the opening of the Congress is to be
postponed to November 7, and the meetings of the factions to
November 5 and 6.

Realizing that it is not possible to interrupt for any considerable
length of time the labor of the local party workers in connection with
the election campaign for the Constituent Assembly, the Bureau of
the Central Executive Committee finds it necessary that the Congress
shall not be prolonged beyond three days* The three following topics
will come up for consideration;

* "Izvestiia," No. 192, October 21, 19x7.
*Ibid.t No. 197, October 37, 1917.

* r*"v , No. 200, October 31, 1917.

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 605

1) Current questions ;

2) Preparation for the Constituent Assembly;

3) Election for the Central Executive Committee.

3. SCHISM*

EDITORIAL IN

[October j/]

One can no longer close his eyes to the fact that the Bolshevik
party has brought about a deep schism in our democratic organization.
From the moment that the Bolsheviks got a controlling voice in the
Petrograd Soviet, they have turned it into a party organization and
made use of it to get control of all the Soviet organizations through-
out Russia.

No one can object to having the Bolsheviks spread their ideas
in all the organizations of which they are members. It is a right
that belongs to every party. But if this is clone in a violent manner,
it inevitably leads to a split and a breaking up of the organization.
No matter how numerous the Bolsheviks may be in Petrograd, they
are by no means the only party of the laboring masses ; they cannot
compel every one in Russia, not even every one in Petrograd, to
become a Bolshevik, Such an idea is Utopian and, like all such ideas,
will end in failure. Unfortunately, however, this failure will affect not
only our enthusiastic comrades, but the whole organization of the
Soviets of workers' and soldiers' deputies.

There were always different parties in the Petrograd Soviet and
its executive committee ; there were always differences and quarrels
among them, but there was also friendly cooperation. Fundamental
differences at the beginning of the revolution never, or hardly ever,
led to violent attacks on one party by another. But now this has
become the usual thing, and cooperation is no longer possible.

In addition to this, the Petrograd Executive Committee, dis-
pleased with the policy of the Central Executive Committee, has
carried on a bitter campaign against it- The Bolsheviks are trying
to force out the Central Executive Committee and put in their own
men. This, too, they have a right to do, and the present members
of this body are not going to fight against holding a new election.
Quite the contrary. They will gladly hand over their heavy burdens
No, aoo, October 31, 1917*

606 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

to their comrades who desire to take them on. Such a change, if
necessary, should be carried out in a legal manner, with an eye to the
interests o£ all army and provincial organizations, and not by means
of lawless grabbing and struggling, which would undermine all faith
in Soviet organizations. The Bolshevik Petrograd paper refers to
the Central Executive Committee in an extremely vicious and hateful
manner. The invitation by the Bolshevik Congress of the Northern
Region to regimental and divisional committees to the Congress of
Soviets is a violation of the regulations of the All-Russian Congress
of Soviets. This was done after the Central Executive Committee
and a majority of the army organizations came out (in view of the
elections for the Constituent Assembly) against such a congress.

The Central Executive Committee has as yet taken no stand in
regard to the time of the Congress and does not undertake to do so ;
but the Bolsheviks have already taken a hand in the matter, without
consulting or even notifying the Central Executive Committee, , . .

The Bolsheviks are trying to overthrow the Provisional Govern-
ment, the Central Executive Committee, and the Council of the
Republic, which has just begun to function; to anticipate the Con-
stituent Assembly with the congress of Soviets (this too means to
overthrow, but In a concealed form) ; and to overthrow the Congress
of Soviets itself by calling it illegally. This is a bit too much over-
throwing, and may it not end in their own overthrow ?

CHAPTER XLV
PREPARATION FOR THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION

i. LENIN TO SMILGA1

Wiborg [Finland, October 10, ip/7]
To Comrade [Smilga]

I make use of a good opportunity to take up a few questions in
more detail

The general political situation is troubling me a great deal. The
Petrograd Soviet and Bolsheviks have declared war on the Govern-
ment. But the Government has the army and is systematically pre-
paring. (Kerenski is at the General Headquarters. It is obvious that
he is considering with the Kornilov men [reactionaries] practical
measures for crushing the Bolsheviks by the army.)

What are we doing? Are we passing resolutions and nothing
more? We lose time, we set "dates" (Congress of Soviet, Nov. 2 —
is it not ridiculous to delay in this manner? Is it not ridiculous to
depend on this?) The Bolsheviks are not carrying on systematic work
to prepare THEIR military forces to overthrow Kerenski.

Events have fully justified the stand I took at the time of the
Democratic Conference, that the party must work toward an armed
uprising* Events force this on us. The question of arms is now the
fundamental political question. I fear that the Bolsheviks forget this.
They are carried away by "the topics of the day/* by details, and by
the "hopf that **a wave will carry away Kerenski," Such a hope
is quite naive* It is working "at random/' Such an attitude on the
part of a revolutionary proletariat party may prove to be criminal.

My opinion is that we should carry on agitation in the party to
consider seriously an armed uprising, and therefore this letter should
be written on a machine and sent [to our party men} in Petrograd
and Moscow.

Now as to your role* It seems to me that the only thing which we
can completely have in our hands and whkh is of military

* "Lcnfauki SbomiV IV, 335*9*

607

6o8 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

is the army in Finland and the Baltic fleet. It seems to me that yoi>x
should make use of your high position to throw off on your assistants
and secretaries all the petty details and routine work, not waste any
time on "resolutions," but give all your attention to preparing the
army in Finland and the fleet for the overthrow of Kerenski. Form
a secret committee of MOST DEPENDABLE military men; examine
with them the question from all rides; collect (and you personally
verify) accurate information about the composition and disposition
of the troops near and in Petrograd, about the possibility of bring-
ing the army in Finland to Petrograd, and regarding the movements
of the fleet, etc.

Beautifully worded resolutions and Soviets without power make
us ridiculous losers. I think that you are in a position to bring
together reliable and able military men. Go to Ino [fortress] and
other important points ; make a really careful and serious study of
the situation; do not be carried away by the boastful phrases which
we are too much in tJie habit of making.

It is quite clear that we must UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES permit
the removal of the troops from Finland. It is better to risk EVERY-
THING on an uprising, the seizure of power — to be handed over to
the Congress of Soviets. I read in today's paper that in two weeks
all danger of a [German] landing will be over. It means that you
have very little time to get ready.

Furthermore, it is necessary to make use of [your] "authority*
in Finland to carry on a systematic propaganda among the Cossacks
who are now in Finland. Some of these Kerenski and Company pur-
posely removed from Wiborg, for fear they would become tainted
with "Bolshevism," and stationed at Usikirko and Perkiarvi, which
are between Wiborg and Terioki, where they would be safely isolated
from the Bolsheviks, It is necessary to get full information about
these Cossacks and to send among them some of our best soldier
and sailor agitators that can be found in Finland* This is most urgent.
The same is true in regard to printed matter*

Furthermore, soldiers and sailors are given leave of absence.
Organize those who have leave, to go to the country into propaganda
units for systematic agitation. Let them visit villages and counties
to agitate in general and for the Constituent Assembly. You are in

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAMK INTO POWER 609

an exceptionally good position. You can 'begin at once to form a bloc
with the Socialist-Revolutionists of the left wing. Only this move
can put real power in our hands in Russia and secure for us a
majority in the Constituent Assembly. In the meantime, form such
a bloc where you are ; make arrangements about publishing leaflets ;
(let me know what technical problems you may have in printing
them and getting them into Russia). And then it is necessary that
in each group of village propagandists there should be at least two
men: one Bolshevik and one Left Socialist-Revolutionist. At the
present moment the "firm" of Socialist-Revolutionists is doing a
thriving business, and you should take advantage of your good luck
(for you have Left Socialist-Revolutionists) to form in the village
in the NAME OF THIS firm a bloc of Bolsheviks and LEFT Socialist-
Revolutionists, peasants with workmen, but not with the capitalists.
In my opinion, in order to prepare people's minds properly, there
should be circulated at once this slogan : The power should immedi-
ately be placed in the hands of the Petrograd Soviet, which should
hand it owr to the Congress of Soviets. Why endure three more
weeks of war and the "Kornilov preparations" of Kerenski? The
spreading of such a slogan by the Bolsheviks and Left Socialist-
Revolutionists in Finland can bring nothing but good results.
* * * *

Now that you are at the head of the "government" in Finland,
there falls to you one very important, though simple problem. To
work out a plan for bringing printed material illegally into Russia
FROM Sweden. Without it, all this talk of "International" is just
words, It can be done in the following manner:

I, Have your own soldier organization on the frontier. 2. If that
is not possible, send regularly at least ONE trustworthy man to one
place, where I began to arrange about transport with the help of
that person in whose home / spent one day before going to Helsing-
fors* (Rovio knows him.) It is possible that it may take a little money.
Be sure to do that I

I think that we should meet to talk over these matters* You could
come and thereby lose less than one day. But if you can come only
to see me, request Rovio to telephone to Khutunen [Finnish Social-
ist] whether it is possible for Rovio's "wife's sister" ("wife's sister"
=5 you) to see Khutunen's "sister** ("sister" s= I), for [otherwise]

6io DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

it is possible that I may go away unexpectedly. Be sure to reply to
this letter (burn it) by the same comrade who hands it to Rovio and

WHO RETURNS SOON,

In case I should remain here for some time, we must arrange
about getting mail. YOU CAN HELP in this by handing the railway
men envelopes addressed to the Wiborg SOVIET (and inside of
these envelopes have others for Khutunen).

Send me by the same comrade an identification paper (the more
formal the better, on the stationery of the Regional Committee,
signed by the chairman, with the seal ; have it typed on the machine
or written in a very clear hand) made out to Konstantine Petrovich
Ivanov. Have the certificate read that the chairman of the Regional
Committee vouches for this comrade and asks all Swtets, WIBOKG
Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, as well as others, to have fttlt confidence
in him and help him in every possible way. I need it in case
ANYTHING should happen, a "conflict" or "meeting."

Do you happen to have the book, published in Moscow, "Re&cam-
ination of the Programs" ? Make a search for it in HeLsinjff ore, and
send it to me by the same comrade.

10.

Please keep in mind that Rovio is a first-rate man but LAZY.
One has to keep after him, to K&MIND him twice a day, otherwise
he does not do anything,

Greetings !

K[ONSTANTINE] IVA[NOV]

CHAPTER XLVI

THE BOLSHEVIK UPRISING1
i. RUMORS

In Government circles no attention is paid to the rumors of a
I»nlshcvik uprising on November 2. In any case, the Government
is prepared to keep order.

2. THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
AND THE UPRISING2

In view of the fact that some of the Ministers have gone to
Moscow* there was no formal meeting on October 27. In the morning,
however, a number of the Ministers met in the office of the Prime
Minister to take tip current questions* Much of the discussion was
over the rumors of the coming uprising of the Bolsheviks- It would
seem that there really is foundation for these reports. Recently
certain individuals, claiming to be representatives of Bolshevik organ-
izations, have visited factories, mills, and barracks, calling on the
workers and soldiers to come out with the slogan "All Power to
the Soviets of Workers* and Soldiers' Deputies." Until now it has
not been possible to ascertain definitely whether these persons are
really authorised to act in the name of the Bolshevik organizations.
On the contrary, in Government circles it is taken for granted that
the very radical agitation is carried on vigorously by dark forces,
among them the former agents of the old regime, and a few with
criminal records.

In any case, the Provisional Government has decided to take
most energetic steps to prevent uprisings or excesses.

3, ANNOUNCEMENT BY MAYOR OF PETROGRAD
ON THE FOOD SITUATION *

Citizens: Having been elected by you, I would be false to my
and unworthy of your confidence if I were to conceal the

1 "Riech," No. 240, October 25, 1917.
* /Ml, No. 243, October 38, 1917.
'"IxvestUa," No. ig& October 30, 1

611

612 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

truth from you. I feel in duty bound to tell you of the food situation
in the capital.

The city duma, the city administration, and the special food com-
missions are doing everything in their power to supply the needs of
the population. Unfortunately the regions that produce food refuse,
for one reason or another, to sell it to Petrograd. Even the little
that is with difficulty secured cannot easily be brought here, owing
to the disorganization of the railway service and the fact that it is
held up en route and stolen. That portion which finally reaches Petro-
grad can only with difficulty be unloaded, due to lack of hands and
teams.

At the present time hardly any flour comes to the city. We get
nothing but grain. Our mills are forced to the limit to grind sufficient
flour for the needs of the capital. Part of the flour we must give
up for the use of the Petrograd garrison.

Citizens, our condition is such that if a freight train should be
late, if unloading should be delayed, if the mills should stop working
for a few hours, then the food situation of the capital would l>e
critical.

Citizens, this situation will become terrible if, in addition, there
should be disorders in the city. Disorders will inevitably delay and
even stop the work of supplying the inhabitants with food. The least
stoppage of this work, in view of the lack of food reserves, will
throw us, your wives, and children into a state of famine. He who
brings about such a serious condition commits a terrible crime.

4. ARMING FOR THE UPRISING

. . . The Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers'
and Soldiers' Deputies brings to the attention of factory committees
and other organizations that, in accordance with the resolution of the
commission of the Central Executive Committee to fight counter-
revolution, no arms, ammunition, or explosives should be given
out to any organization without the authorization of the Provisional
Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. . . *

4 "Izvestiia," No, 200, October 31,

TfOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 613

5, MEETING OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET *
[October 51]

Meeting opened at 7 P. M., with Trotski in the chair. At the
I ginning there were reports by representatives from the front. A
majority of them said that the front desired just one thing and that
is an end of the war at all costs. The next question was the Congress
[of Soviets]. Karakhan reported that ... it was postponed until
November 7* * - - In connection with the rumors of a Bolshevik
uprising, Trotski said:

Comrades, during the last days the press has been full of rumors
and articles on the supposed uprising, which is credited sometimes
to the Bolsheviks and sometimes to the Petrograd Soviet, I should
like to make a statement on the subject, in the name of the Petrograd
Soviet.

The decisions of the Petrograd Soviet are published for the
information of all. The Soviet is an elective body; each deputy is
resi>onsib!e to his constituency. This revolutionary parliament cannot
take a decision without its being known to all workmen and soldiers.
And those of the bourgeoisie who think they have a right to
question us about our political plans we refer to our political decisions,
which are known to all. If the Petrograd Soviet should find it neces-
sary to set a date for an uprising, it would do so. But I do not know
when and where such an uprising was decided upon. The bourgois
press says it was set for November 4. This is "Petrograd Soviet
Day/' which was set aside by the Executive Committee for the
purpose of propaganda and money collection-
It was also pointed out that I, as chairman of the Soviet, have
signed an order for 5,000 rifles. In accordance with the decision of
the committee to fight counter-revolution, at the time of Kornilov, to
organize and equip a workers* militia, I, in fulfilment of this resolu-
tion gave orders for 5,000 rifles. . . .

In regard to the other question — the calling of the Congress.
At this time there is a desire to separate Petrograd from the garri-
son. This is very clear, for it is understood that the Congress will
certainly pass a resolution that the power should be handed over to
the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and for an immediate armistice
on all fronts, and the transfer of all land to the peasants. The bour-
geoisie knows all this and therefore desires to arm against us all
those who are subject to them* . . .
'"IzvestJ!*,'1 No. jaoi, November x,

614 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

6. MAD ADVENTURE*

Apparently all pleadings are in vain, and the Bolshevik uprising",
which we have warned against as a terrible trial for the country,
Is being organized and started. It is only three weeks to the Con-
stituent Assembly, only a few days to the Congress of Soviets^ and
yet the Bolsheviks have decided to bring about a new coup d'etat
They are making use of the wide discontent and the great ignorance
that exists among the masses of soldiers and workers. They have
taken upon themselves the boldness to promise the people bread,
peace, and land. We have no doubt whatsoever that they are unable
to keep a single one of their promises, even if they succeed in
their attempt.

They can not provide the city population with bread because
little of it is or can be brought in, due to the breakdown of the
railways. If anarchy increases, still less will be brought in. One
of the first consequences of the Bolshevik attempt will be to lower
the food supplies of the city and army. If the Bolsheviks should
really seize power, a state of famine would be reached. A Bolshevik
government would never be recognized in the far southern steppes,
and the grain which comes from there for the whole of Russia
would be held back. The question of food is bound up with the
question of organization, and who can doubt that organization suffers
in time of civil war and that it will break down completely if the
power falls into hands which have never had any practical experience
in State affairs, who have not even a conception of the problems?
They can confiscate the supplies in warehouses and stores and with
this they can feed the population of the capital for a day or two, hut
no more. After that there will be famine, riots and pogroms. This is
the only solution to the food problem that the Bolsheviks have, and
they cannot do anything more, no matter how hard they try.

As regards the land question. The land can be transferred to the
toilers in one of two ways. By passing the necessary legislation and
proper organization of land distribution, or by the simple method
of grabbing by peasants. The first method means not only working out
the necessary legislation, but the forming of local land committees,
working according to a definite plan, on the basis o£ population and
the amount of land. How can the Bolsheviks carry on such a work,
when they never had a village organization, when they never had,
'"Izvestiia," No. 206, November 7, 1917, Editorial*

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 615

and do not now have, a majority either in the zemstvos or volosts?
The best they can jxxssibly do is to issue an order in two words : grab
land! Such an order would lead to agrarian disorders, destruction,
which they, to save their face, call agrarian revolts, but under no cir-
cumstances can it be called handing over the land to the toilers. Under
this system the land goes not to the man who needs it, but to the
one who desires it.

Destruction of estates does not mean a division of the land. To
a very large extent the landless peasants will be as landless as before.
In any case, the very people, that is to say the soldiers, who have
the most right to expect a distribution of the land, will be left out
in the cold. After the general land grabbing, the soldiers may be
obliged to make use of their guns to get some land for themselves,
cither in their own or neighboring village, or in some distant place.
Land grabbing is not the kind of agrarian legislation that a revolu-
tionary army, above all, has a right to expect. It is a barbarous
system which impoverishes, at least at first, the country as a whole.

In regard to the question of peace, it is no better* By disorganized
fraternization the firing may cease on certain points along the front.
One can abandon these points and make it possible for the enemy to
surround those who remain at their posts, to kill them or take them
prisoners. One can open the front and give the foe a chance to occupy
new territory. In this way, however, peace is not to be had. Only
a State can conclude peace* In order to have a peace with some degree
of success, it is necessary that the State should be united and strong,
should have the respect of allies and enemies. No one will make peace
with a country in the throes of civil war, for there is no sense in
concluding a treaty with a State that is not recognized. Under such
circumstances it is advantageous for the enemy, even if he desires
peace, to go on with the war, in order to improve his situation still
more and put himself in a still more advantageous position* The
experience of this summer shows that with each military success of
the Germans the reactionary patty in Germany became stronger and
the position of William improved, and thereby the chances of a demo-
cratic peace decreased* The Bolsheviks promise an immediate peace,
but all that they can do is to hand Russia over immediately to
William, even though they may not wish to do that, even though
they may fight against it with all their might* The logic of events,
which is stronger than man's, will lead to that

But worst of all is the fact that the Bolshevik uprising, if suc-
cessful, will bring on a series of civil wars between different regions

616 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

of the country, as well as in the interior of each region. We would
have a regime of fist-right. In one place there would be a white
terror and in another a red terror. All constructive work for any
length of time would be impossible. One of the outcomes of the
anarchy would be that the first adventurer that came along would
seize power, and the ignorant masses (of whom our country has so
many) would turn to Nicholas II to save them from the revolution,
which was not able to give the people what it had promised.

The Bolshevik uprising can lead only to that Is it possible that
people do not understand that dictatorship and terror are not the way
to organize a country? Is it not clear that the dictatorship of one
party, no matter how radical, will be as hateful to the great majority
of the people as the autocracy? Is it not clear that an attempted
uprising, at the time of the preparation for the election to the Con-
stituent Assembly, can be regarded as a non-criminal act only
because it is a mad act ?

7. MEETING OF PETROGRAD SOVIET T

[November 7]

The meeting was opened at 7 P. M. by Trotski, who said ; We
learned in the course of the night that the Provisional Government has
called for a battalion of picked men from Tsarskoe Selo, the officers'
school from Oranienbaurn, and artillery from Pavlovsk, ^ Early
in the morning we received information that two papers, "Soldat*'
and "Rabochi Put/1 have been closed.

But the War-Revolutionary Committee was not a passive onlooker,
and, as a result, all the troops called out by the Government, with
the exception of a small group of cadets, have refused to obey orders.
In addition to this, the War-Revolutionary Committee proposed
to the Litovski regiment to take upon itself the protection of our
papers, which was done immediately, and the printing presses are
working regularly. No attention was paid to the order of the Pro-
visional Government to the cruiser Aurora to weigh anchor and
leave Petrograd* The cruiser is just where she was yesterday, which
is in accordance with the instructions of the War-Revolutionary Com-
mittee. . , .

We were asked whether we planned to have an uprising, I
replied that the Petrograd Soviet stood for a transfer of power into
the hands of the Soviets, and at the present time, today or tomorrow,
f "Izvestiia/* No. 206, November 7, 1917.

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 617

when the All-Russian Congress of Soviets opens, this slogan will be
put into force. Whether this will lead to an uprising depends not on us
but on those who oppose us.

We regard the Provisional Government as nothing more than a
pitiful, helpless half -government, which waits the motion of a his-
torical broom to sweep it off, to make room for a real, popular
government. The present government has lost everything — support,
authority* right, and morale.

I Hit a conflict in the form of an uprising is not in our plan for
today or tomorrow, when the All-Rtissian Congress of Soviets is
about to meet. We believe that the Congress will carry through our
slogan with considerable force and authority. But if the Government
wishes to make use of the hours — 24, 48 or 72 — which it still has to
live, and conies out against us, then we will meet it with a counter-
attack, blow for blow, §teel for iron. . . .

THE END OP THE KERENSK1 REGIME 8

[Nozvmbcr 7]

KerenskJ remained at the office of the Staff from 2 until 7 A. M,
. . . At 7 he set out for the front. . . . He is expected back any
minute. . * * At 8:30 P. M., the Provisional Government at the
Winter Palace received an ultimatum signed by the Petrograd Soviet.
Members of the government were given 20 minutes in which to
surrender, and in case of refusal they were threatened with having
the guns of the Peter and Paul Fortress and the cruiser Aurora turned
on the Winter Palace. The Government refused to discuss matters and
to accept the ultimatum. . „ .

News reached us at 2 A, M, that the Winter Palace was taken,
that the members of the Government were arrested . . . and locked
up at the Peter and Paul Fortress.

MEETING OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET *

The meeting opened at 2 135 P. M* with Trotski in the chair. He
said : "In the name of the War- Revolutionary Committee, I announce
that the Provisional Government no longer exists. (Applause.) Some
of the Ministers are already under arrest. (Bravo.) Others soon will
be. (Applause.) The revolutionary garrison, under the control of the
War-Revolutionary Committee, has dismissed the Assembly of the
Pre-Pariiament [Council of the Republic], (Loud applause. "Long
* "lives till," No. 807, November 8, 1917.

618 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

live the War-Revolutionary Committee") . . . The railway stations,
post and telegraph offices, the Petrograd Telegraph Agency, and State
Bank are occupied/'. . .

Trotski continued by saying: uln our midst is Vladimir Ilich
Lenin, who, by force of circumstances, had not been able to be with
us all this time. . . . Hail the return of Lenin!" The audience
gave him a noisy ovation. . . .

Lenin's Speech™

Comrades, the workmen's and peasants' revolution, the need of
which the Bolsheviks have emphasized many times, has come to pass.

What is the significance of this revolution? Its significance is, in
the first place, that we shall have a soviet government, without the
participation of bourgeoisie of any kind. The oppressed masses will
of themselves form a government. The old 'state machinery will he
smashed into bits and in its place will be created a new machinery
of government by the soviet organizations. From now on there is a
new page in the history of Russia, and the present, third Russian
revolution shall in its final result lead to the victory of Socialism.

One of our immediate tasks is to put an end to the war at once.
But in order to end the war, which is closely bound up with the
present capitalistic system, it is necessary to overthrow capitalism
itself. In this work we shall have the aid of the world labor movement,
which has already begun to develop in Italy, England, and Germany,

A just and immediate offer of peace by us to the international
democracy will find everywhere a warm response among the interna-
tional proletariat masses. In order to secure the confidence of the
proletariat, it is necessary to publish at once all secret treaties*

In the interior of Russia a very large part of the peasantry has
said: Enough playing with the capitalists; we will go with the
workers. We shall secure the confidence of the peasants by one
decree, which will wipe out the private property of the landowners.
The peasants will understand that their only salvation is in union
with the workers.

We will establish a real labor control on production.

We have now learned to work together in a friendly manner, as
is evident from this revolution. We have the force of mass or-
ganization which has conquered all and which will lead the proletariat
to world revolution.

*> "Izvestiia," No. 207, November 8>

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 619

We should now occupy ourselves in Russia in building up a
proletarian socialist state.

Long live the world-wide socialistic revolution.

8. BOLSHEVIKS IN POWER11

Yesterday we said that the Bolshevik uprising is a mad adventure
and today, when their attempt is crowned with success, we are of the
same mind. We repeat: that which is before us is not a transfer of
ix>wer to the Soviets, but a seizure of power by one party — the
Bolsheviks. Yesterday we said that a successful attempt meant the
breaking up of the greatest conquest of the revolution — the Con-
stituent Assembly. Today we add that it means, also, the breaking up
of the Congress of Soviets, and perhaps the whole soviet organization.
These are the facts: The Socialist-Revolutionists and the Social-
Democrat Mensheviks (the defensists and the internationalists) have
found it impossible under present circumstances to take part in the
congress. This is also the point of view of the men from the front.
With the departure of these groups from the Congress, there are
left ... the Bolsheviks. They can call themselves what they please;
the fact remains that the Bolsheviks alone took part in the uprising.
All the other socialistic and democratic parties protest against it.

How the situation may develop we do not know, but little good
is to t>e expected. We are quite confident that the Bolsheviks can not
organize a state government As yesterday, so today, we repeat that
what is happening will react worst of all on the question of peace.
, * . Today the Council of the Republic was to vote a special resolu-
tion on the question of peace. But the Mariinski Palace was occupied
by the Revolutionary Committee, and the Council did not meet . . .

9, FORMATION OP THE GOVERNMENT OF
PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS12

At the meeting [of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets] on
November 8, Kamenev read the following decree:

The All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and
Peasants* Deputies resolves to form a provisional workers* and

No. 307, November 8, 1917* Editorial. This wad the last
number of the "Izyestiia" published by the Central Executive Committee. On
the day following it was already in the hands of the Bolsheviks,
I*; 4<S6chkienii*;t III, Part

620

DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

peasants' government, to be known as the Soviet of People's Com-
missars, to govern the country until the meeting of the Constituent
Assembly. The control over the acts of the People's Commissars and
the right to change them belongs to the All-Russian Congress of
Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies and its
Central Executive Committee.

For the present the Soviet of People's Commissars is made up
of the following persons :

President of the Soviet:
Commissar of the Interior:
Commissar of Agriculture:
Commissar of Labor:

VLADIMIR UUANOV (Lenin)
A. L RYKOV

V. P. MlLXUTIN

A. G. SHLIAPNIKOV

Commissar of War and Navy: Committee made up o£

V. A. QVSKENKO (Antonov)
N, V. KRYLENKO and

Commissars of

Commerce and Industry:
Commissar of Education:
Commissar of Finance:
Commissar of Foreign Affairs:
Commissar of Justice:
Commissar of Food:
Commissar of Post and

Telegraph:

Chairman for Nationalities:
Commissar of Railways:

DYBENKO
V. P. NOGIN

A. V. LUNACHARSKI

I. I. SKVOKTSOV
L. D. BRONSTKIN (Trotski)
G. I. OPPOKOV tLomov)
L A. TEODOROVICH

Kf. P- AviLov^Glebov)

L V. D2HUGASHVILX (Stalin)

Not named for the time being.

10. DECREE OF PEACE PASSED UNANIMOUSLY BY

THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF

WORKERS', SOLDIERS', AND PEASANTS'

DEPUTIES ON NOVEMBER 8, 1917 »

The Workers' and Peasants* Government, created by the revolu-
tion of November 6-7, and drawing its strength from the Soviets of
Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, proposes to all warring
people and their governments that* negotiations leading to a just
peace begin at once.

The just and democratic peace for which the great majority of
war-exhausted, tormented toilers and laboring classes of all bd-

** "Izvestiia," No. 2o8» November 9,

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 621

ligerent countries are thirsting; the peace for which the Russian
workers and {>easants are so insistently and loudly clamoring since
the overthrow of the tsarist regime is, in the opinion of the Govern-
ment, an immediate peace without annexation (i. e.f without tlie
seizure of foreign lands and the forcible taking over of other
nationalities) and without indemnity.

The Russian Government proposes that this kind of peace be
concluded immediately between all the warring nations. It offers to
take decisive steps at once, without the least delay, without
waiting for a final confirmation of all the terms of such a peace by
conferences of popular representatives of all countries and all nations.

The Government interprets the term annexation or seizure of
foreign lands, in the light in which it is understood by the democracy
in general, and the working classes in particular, that is to say, every
annexation by a large and strong state of a small and weak nationality,
without a clear and voluntary expression of agreement to that act
by the said nationality; regardless of the time when such forcible
annexation took place; regardless of the cultural development or
backwardness of the nation forcibly annexed or forcibly detained
within the frontiers of a certain state; regardless, finally, of the fact
whether said nation is in Europe or far away across the ocean.

If any nation whatsoever is detained by force within the boun-
daries of another state; if it is detained against its will — whether
expressed in the press, national assemblies, party decisions, or rest-
lessness and uprising against national oppression — and is not able
to vote freely, owing to the presence of troops of the annexing or
stronger nation, and to determine, without the least pressure, its
form of state life; then such an acquisition is annexation, that is to
say, seizure by force*

To prolong this war txscause the rich and strong nations cannot
agree how to divide the small and weak nationalities which they have
seized is, in the opinion of the Government, a most criminal act
against humanity, and it [government] solemnly announces its
decision to sign at once terms of peace bringing this war to an end
on the indicated conditions, which are equally just to all nationalities
without exception.

Moreover, the Government declares that it does not regard the
above mentioned terms of peace in the light of an ultimatum. It will
agree to examine all other terms. It will insist only that whatever
belligerent nation has anything to propose, it should do so quickly,
in the clearest terms, leaving out all double meanings and all secrets

622 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

in making the proposal. The Government does away with all secret
diplomacy and is determined to carry on all negotiations quite openly
in the view of all people. It will proceed at once to publish all
secret treaties, ratified or concluded by the government of landowners
and capitalists, from March until November 7, 1917.

The Government annuls, immediately and unconditionally, the
secret treaties, in so far as they have for their object, which was
true in a majority of cases, to give benefits and privileges to the
Russian landowners and capitalists, to maintain or to increase an-
nexation by the Great Russians.

In proposing to the Governments and peoples of all countries
to begin open peace negotiations at once, the Government, on its
part, expresses its readiness to carry on these negotiations in writing,
by telegraph, by discussions between representatives of different
countries, or at a conference of such representatives. To facilitate
these negotiations, the Government appoints its authorized agents in
neutral countries.

The Government proposes to all governments and peoples of all
belligerent countries to conclude at once an armistice of no less than
three months, i e., for a period long enough not only to negotiate
peace with the participation of representatives of all nations or
nationalities, without exception, that were drawn into the war or
forced to take part in it, but also to permit the calling together in
all countries of assemblies of national representatives for the final
ratification of the peace terms. In making these peace proposals to
the governments and peoples of all warring countries, the Pro-
visional Government of Workers and Peasants of Russia appeals in
particular to the intelligent workers of the three foremost nations of
mankind, and the leading participators in this war, England, France,
and Germany. The toilers of these countries have rendered the
greatest service to the cause of progress and Socialism by their great
examples, such as the Chartist movement in England, the series of
revolutions of historical and world importance brought on by the
French proletariat, and, finally, the heroic struggle against the
Exemption Laws in Germany, and the example for the workers of
all the world given by the German toilers in their stubborn, pro-
longed, and disciplined efforts to organize the proletarian mattes, AH
these examples of proletarian heroism and historical development lead
us to believe that the workers of the named countries will understand
the task before them to free humanity from the horrors of war and
its consequences. By decisive, energetic, and self-sacrificing efforts in

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER 623

various directions, these workers will help us not only to bring the
|H?acc negotiations to a successful end, but to free the toiling and
exploited masses from all forms of slavery and all exploitation.

n. THE LAND DECREE"

The final settlement of the land question belongs to the national
Constituent Assembly.

The most equitable settlement is as follows:

1. The right of private ownership of land is abolished forever.
I -and cannot be sold, bought, leased, mortgaged, or alienated in any
manner whatsoever. All lands — state, appanage, cabinet, monastery,
church, entail, private, communal, peasant, and any other lands —
pass to the nation without indemnification and are turned over for
the use of those who till them.

Persons who have suffered from the loss of property will be
entitled to public aid only during the time necessary for their read-
justment to the changed conditions of existence.

2. All the underground resources, such as ores, petroleum, coal,
Kilt, etc., as well as forests and waters which have national impor-
tance, are transferred for the exclusive use of the State. All small
streams, lakes, forests, etc., are transferred for the use of the land
communities, on condition that they be administered by the organs
of local self-government.

3. Holdings under intensive agriculture — orchards, gardens,
plantations, nurseries, etc,, are not to be divided, but turned into
model farms and handed over to the State or the community, depend-
ing upon size and importance.

Small private estates, city and village land in fruit or truck
gardens, are to be left in possession of their present owners, but
the size of these holdings and the amount of tax to be paid on them
shall be determined by law,

4. Stud farms, State and private farms for breeding thorough-
bred stock, poultry, etc,, shall be confiscated, nationalized, and
turned over either for the exclusive use of the State, or the land
community, depending upon their size and importance. The question
of indemnification .is to be settled by the Constituent Assembly.

5. The entire livestock, tools, etc., of confiscated lands shall be

** "Imstiia," No* aog, November 10, 1917, This Land Decree is practically
the same as the Land Mandate of the Peasants, which was published it* the
"Isvesttia Vserosmiskogo Soviet* Krestiimddldt Deputatov," No. 88* September

624 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

turned over for the exclusive use of the State or land community,
depending upon size and importance, without indemnification, but this
does not apply to the small landholding peasants.

6. All Russian citizens (male and female) who are willing to
till the land, either by themselves or with the assistance of their
families or in collective groups, are entitled to the use of the land,
as long as they are able to cultivate it. Hired labor is not permitted.
In case a member of a rural community is incapacitated for a period
of two years, it becomes the duty of the community to help him
until he recovers, by collectively tilling his land. Farmers who are
too old or physically unable to till the soil, lose the right to it, but
receive instead a State pension.

7. The land is to be divided equally among the toilers, according
to needs or labor capacity, depending on local conditions. Each
community is to decide for itself how its land is to be apportioned,
whether it is to be held collectively or as homesteads or artels.

8. All the alienated land goes into one national fund. Its distri-
bution among the toilers is carried out by local and central self-gov-
erning bodies, beginning with the democratic organization in villages
and cities and ending with the central regional institutions. This
fund is subject to periodical redistribution, based on the rise in
population, the increase in production, and the methods of cultivation.

In changing the boundaries of land allotments, the original nuclei
of the allotments [made after the emancipation of the serfs] shall not
be disturbed.

The land of members passing out of the community reverts to
the land fund, but the preferential right to it goes to the nearest
relatives and persons designated by those who held it last.

At the time that the land reverts to the fund, there shall be com-
pensation for the fertilization and improvements (fundamental
improvements) made on it to the amount that these ameliorations
had not yet yielded returns.

Should the supply of land in certain localities be inadequate for
the needs of the inhabitants, the surplus population shall be settled
elsewhere at the expense of the State, which shall organize the
undertaking and provide the settlers with the necessary equipment
The settlers shall be taken in the following order: landless peasants
willing to go, undesirable citizens, army deserters #t of, and lastly*
those drawn by lot or who voluntarily offer to go.

All that has been stated in this mandate is an expression of the
strong wish of an overwhelming majority of politically conscious

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWKR 625

jK»asants and is proclaimed as a provisional law to be put into force
before the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. Some portions of
it are to ,t»o into effect as soon as possible, and other portions gradually,
as may seem best to the Uiezd Soviets of Peasants7 Deputies.

The lands of peasants and Cossacks of average means shall not
he confiscated.

President of the Council of Peoples' Commissars

VLADIMIR ULIANOV LENIN
, 1917.

APPENDICES

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The appendices contain a few imi>ortant documents and some
valuable information not easily found elsewhere.

MANIFESTO TO IMPROVE THE STATE ORDER1

October 17 [30] 1905

The rioting and agitation in the capitals and in many localities
i»f OUR Empire fills OUR heart with great and deep grief. The
welfare of the Russian Emperor is bound up with the welfare of
the people, and its sorrows are HIS sorrows. The turbulence which
hits broken out may confound the people and threaten the integrity
untl unity of OUR Empire,

The great vow of service by the Tsar obligates US to endeavor,
with all OUR strength, wisdom, and power, to put an end as quickly
as possible to the disturbance so dangerous to the Empire. In com-
manding the responsible authorities to take measures to stop dis-
orders, lawlessness, and violence, and to protect peaceful citizens in
the quiet performance of their duties, WE have found it necessary
to unite the activities of the Supreme Government, so as to insure
the successful carrying out of the general measures laid down by
US for the peaceful life of the state.

We lay upon the Government the execution of OUR unchange-
able will :

X. To grant to the population the inviolable right of free citizen-
ship, based on the principles of the freedom of person, conscience,
speech, assembly, and union*

2, Without postponing the intended .elections for the State Duma
and in so far as possible, in view of the short time that remains
before the assembling of that body, to include in the partidpation of
the work of the Duma those classes of the population that have
been until now entirely deprived of the right to vote, and to extend
*<<Foteoe Sobwiie Zakonov Rpssiiskoi Imperil,*' XXV, 190$, 754-

627 , i '•'[.'. \. .. ; 1 1 , • , '

628 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

in the future, by the newly created legislative way, the principles
of the general right of election.

3. To establish as an unbreakable rule that no law shall go into
force without its confirmation by the State Duma and that the {Ar-
sons elected by the people shall have the opportunity for actual par-
ticipation in supervising the legality of the acts of authorities ap-
pointed by US.

We call on all the true sons of Russia to remember their duties
toward their country, to assist in combating these unheard-of dis-
turbances, and to join US with all their might in reestablishing
quiet and peace in the country.

Given in Peterhof, on the seventeenth [thirtieth) day of Octo-
ber in the year of our Lord 1905, and the eleventh year of OUR

reign.

NICHOLAS

MANIFESTO TO BETTER CONDITIONS AND IMPROVE

THE WELL-BEING OF THE PEASANT

POPULATION *

November^ [16] 1905

WE declare to all OUR loyal subjects:

The troubles that have broken out in villages of certain meads,
where the peasants have resorted to violence on large estates, fills
OUR heart with deep sorrow. Taking the law into one's hands ami
acting in a high-handed manner can not be tolerated, and OUR
military and civil authorities have been instructed to use every
means to prevent and put an end to disorder and to punish the
guilty.

The needs of the peasant are close to OUR heart and are not
ignored. Violence and crime do not, however, help the peasant and
may bring much sorrow and nusery to the country. The only way
to bettor permanently the welfare of the peasant is by peaceful and
legal means; and to improve his condition has always bean one of
•'OUR first cares. We have lately given order* to wlleet and place
before US information relating to the measures that might be taken
immediately for the benefit of the peasants. Having considered it,
'^tevt: decided:,. . , , •., •

: i. To reduce by half, from January i, 1906, and to discontinue
s "Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperil/' XXV, 1905,

APPENDICES 629

altogether after January i, 1907, payments due [to the State] from
jKMsants for land which before emancipation belonged to large land-
owners, State, and Crown.

2. To make it easier for the Peasant Land Bank, by increas-
ing its resources, and by offering better terms for loans, to help the
peasant with little land to buy more.

WE have given special orders to bring these measures te pass.
\VK are convinced that by uniting OUR efforts with those of the
best men elected in Russia, who should be freely elected by OUR
loyal subjects, including the peasants, WE shall succeed in satisfy-
ing the other needs of the peasants without causing any harm to
other landowners.

WE trust that the peasant population so dear to OUR heart,
will give heed to the Christian teaching of love and good, and will
listen to OUR Tsar call, to preserve peace and order, and not to
violate the laws and rights of others.

Given at Tsarskoe Selo, on the third [sixteenth] day of Novem-
ber in the year of Our Lord 1905, and the twelfth of OUR reign,

NICHOLAS

TSARIST MINISTERS: 1914-1917

PRIME MINISTERS

Goremykin, Ivan Loginovich, February 12, 1914-February 2,

Stunner, Boris Vladimirovich, February 2, I9j6-November 23,

Trtpov, Alexander Fedorovich, November 23, I9i6-January 9,

Prince Golitsytt, Nikolai Dmitrievich, January 10,

OF THE INTERIOR

Maklakov, Nikolai Aleteeevich, I9t3~june 18,
Frwce Shcherimtov, Nikolai Borisovich, June 18,

9* *9*5*

Khvostov, AWkset NJkolaevich, October 9, 1915-Msirth 16, 1916,

Sturmer, Boris VladimirovicK March tf>» I9i6-Juiy 22, 1916.
Khvostov, AleKaader Atekseevtch, July 22, I9i6-September 29,

i j , ' ., : ; ; '' : ; ! • , " • • ' : ! , : . . , , ,:.'•.! : •
Alesc^wier Dmitrievlc^ September 29,

'' ' '

630 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY _

MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Sazonov, Sergei Dmitrievich, igio-July 20, 1916.
Stunner, Boris Vladimirovich, July 29, I9i6-November 23, 1016.
Pokrovski, Nikolai Nikolaevich, December 13, iQid-March 12,
1917,

MINISTERS OF WAR

Sukhomlinov, Vladimir Alexandrovich, March 24, igop-Junc

26, 1915.

Polivanov, Aleksei Andrecvich, June 26, igis-March 28, 1916.
Shuvaev, Dmitri Savelievich, March 28, I9i6-January 16, 1917.
Beliaev, Mikhail Alekseevich, January 16, i9i7~March 12, 1917.

MINISTER OF MARINE

Grigorovich, Ivan Konstantinovich, April ign-March 12, 1917,

MINISTER OF FINANCE

Bark, Peter Lvovich, February 12, ign-March 12, 1917*

MINISTERS OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY

Timashev, Sergei Ivanovich, igcxj-March 2, 1915*
Prince Shakhovskoi, Vsevolod Nikolaevich, March 3, 1915-
March 12, 1917.

MINISTERS OF TRANSPORTATION

Rukhlov, Sergei Vasilievich, i909~N0vernber 9, 1915,
Trepov, Alexander Fedorovkh, November I2t igis-january 9,
1917.

Vomovski-Kriger, E. B., January 10, 1917-March 13, 1917,

i STATE COMFTROLLJEfcS

Peter Aldkseevich^ I907*-Febniary 7, 1916.
f^ JSfifcolai Nikolaevich, February 7, I9i6-Decetnber 13^

.: , _ _ _ . • • : " • , . •

iw, Sergti Grigwevfcfa, Bepcapqfljer 15^

' ' ,-, : -i !'; (': .

Krivp;s!ieiri, A!eKa«ider

APPENDICES 631

Count Bobrinski, Aleksei Alexandrovich, August 3,
vember 27, 1916.

Rittikh, Alexander Alexandrovich, November 27,
u, 1917.

MINISTERS OF JUSTICE

Scheglovitov, Ivan Grigorievich, I9o6-July 19, 1915.
Khvostov, Alexander Alekseevich, July 19, igiS-July 22, 1916.
Makarov, Alexander Alexandrovich, July 22, I9i6-January 2,
1917.

Dobrovolski, Nikolai Alexandrovich, January 2, 1917-March

OBERPROCURATORS OF THE HOLY SYNOD

Sabler, Vladimir Karlovich, May 15, ipn-July 17, 1915.
Samarin* Alexander Dmitrievich, July 17, igis-October 9, 1915.
* Vokhint Alexander NikolaevJch, October 13, igiS-August 20,
1916,

Raev, Nikolai Pavlovich, September 12, I9i6-March 12, 1917.

MINISTERS OF EDUCATION

Kas&o, Lev Aristidovich, I9io-December 9, 1914.

Count Ignatiev, Pavel Nikolaevich, January 22, igis-January 9,
1917,

Kulchitski, Nikolai Konstantinovich* January 9^ 1917-March 13,
19*7-

MINISTER OF IMPERIAL COURT AND APPANAGE

Count Fredericks, Vladimir Borisovich, i897-March 13, 1917,

MINISTER OF HEALTH

[This ministry was created on October 5, 1916.]
Rein, Georgi Ermolaevich, October 6> I9i6-March 12,

MINISTERS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
Manih 15, I9t7-November 8^ 'i

Kemiski, 'AleKa)Ar; 'IMotdTidb,1 Jt&

• ' - - -

632 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY _

ASSISTANT PRIME MINISTERS

Nekrasov, Nikolai Vissarionovich, July 20, igiT-September 13,
1917.

Tereschenko, Mikhail Ivanovich, September 17, 1917-Octoher
8, 1917.

Konovalov, Alexander Ivanovich, October 8, 1917-November 7,
1917.

MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Miliukov, Paul Nikolaevich, March 15, I9i7-May 15, 1917.
Tereschenko, Mikhail Ivanovich, May 18, J9i7-November 7,
1917.

MINISTERS OF INTERIOR

Prince Lvov, Georgi Evgenievich, March 15, 1917-July 20, 1917,

Tseretelli, Irakli Georgievich, July 23, 191 7- August 6, 1917.

Avksentiev, Nikolai Drnitrievich, August 7, 1917-September 18,
1917.

Nikitin, Aleksei 'Maksimovich, September 21, X9i7~November 7,
1917.

MINISTERS OF WAR

Guchkov, Alexander Ivanovich, March 15, !9i7~May 18, 1917.
Kerenski, Alexander Fedorovich, May x8, Z9i7-Septeaiber u«

Col. Verkhovski, A. I, September I2f 1917-November 6, 1917.
Gen. Manikovski, A. A. (acting minister of war), November 6,
1917-November 7, 1917.

MINISTERS OF MARINE

Guchkov, Alexander Ivanovich, March 15, igiT-May 18, 1917*
Kerenski, Alexander Fedorovich, May 18, I9t7-September u»

1917.

Rear Admiral Verderevski, Dmitri V», September I a, ip^-No-

vember 7, 1917.

MINISTERS OF JUSTICE

Kerenski, Alexander Fedorovich, March i$, igij-M&y 18, 1917,
Pereverzev, Paul Nikotovich, May 18, igi7~~]uly 19, 19
Efremov, Ivan Nikolaevich, July 23, 1917-Augitst 6,
Zarttdni, Alexander Sergeevkh, August 6, X9t7~September
1917,

Mali^itovich, fatal Nikolaevich, October 8, X9*7~N0vembet %

_ _ APPENDICES _ 633

MINISTERS OF TRANSPORTATION

Nekrasov, Nikolai Vissarionovich, March 15, I9i7-July 17, 1917.

Takhtarnyshev, Georgi Stefanovich (acting minister), July 24,
1917-August 7, 1917.

lurencv. Peter Petrovich, August 7, 1917-September 13, 1917.

Liverovski, Alexander V* (acting minister), September n, 1917-
Xovember 7, 1917.

MINISTERS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

Konovalov, Alexander Ivanovkh, March 15, I9i7~june 2, 1917.

Stepanov, Vasili Alexandrovich (acting minister), June 3, 1917-
July 17, 1917.

Prokopovich, Sergei Nikolaevich, August 7, 1917-September 29,
1917,

Konovalov, Alexander Ivanovkh, October 8, 1917-November 7,
1917.

MINISTERS OF EDUCATION

Manuilov, Alexander Apollonovich, March 15, igiT-July 17,
1917.

Oldenburg, Sergei Fedorovich, August 7, 1917-September 13,
1917.

Salazkin^ Sergei Scrgeevich, September 17, ip^-November 7,
19x7-

MINISTERS OF AGRICULTURE

Shingarev, Andrei Ivanovich, March 15, ipiT-May 18, 1917.
Chernov, Victor Mikhailovich, May 18, 1917-September 10, 1917.
Maslov, Semen L^ontievich, October 16, i9t7~Novemb^r 7,

MINISTERS OF FINANCE

Tereschenko, Mikhail Ivanovich, March 15, I9i7-May 18, 1917-
Shingarev, Andrei Ivanovich, May 18, 1917-July 17, 1917.
Nekrasov, Nikolai Vissarionovich, August 7, I9i7-September 13,

Bernatski, Mikhail Vladimirovich, September 15, 1917-Novem-
% 1917,

STATE COHFTROLtEES

Gadntv* Ivan Va$ilievi<ih, March 15, 1917-Augmt 7, 1917.
Kokoshkin, Fedor Falorovich, August , 7, I0t7-$e$l^j» 13,

' , ' ' - , •' ' ' :' ' •• -i ;•: '

-» October

634 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY _

OBERPROCUKATORS OF THE HOLY SYNOD

Lvov, Vladimir Nikolaevich, March 15, igiT-August 7, 1917.
Kartashev, Anton V., August 7, 1917-August 18, 1917,

MINISTERS OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

Kartashev, Anton V., August 18, i9i7~November 7, 1917,

MINISTERS OF FOOD

(Ministry created May 18, 1917.)

Peshekhonov, Aleksei Vasilievich, May 18, i9i7~September 13,
1917.

Frokopovich, Sergei Nikolaevich, September 29, 1917-November

7, 1917-

MINISTERS OF LABOR

(Ministry created May 18, 1917.)

Skobelev, Matvei Ivanovich, May 18, i9i7~September 15, 1917,
Gvozdev, Kozma Antonovich, October 8» I9t7-November 7,
1917.

MINISTERS OF POST AND TELEGRAPH

(Ministry created May 18, 1917.)

Tseretelli, Irakli Georgievich, May 18, xgi7-*Augttst 7» 1917* -
Nikitin, Aleksei Maksimovich, August 7, 1917-November 7, 1917.

MINISTERS OF SOCIAL WELFARE

(Ministry created May 8, 1917.)

Prince Shakhovskoi, Dmitri Ivanovich, May 18, ig^-july 17,
1917.

Baryshnikov, Alexander Alexandrovich (acting minister) , July
13, I9i7-August 7, 1917.

Efremov, Ivan Nikolaevich, August 7» t9i7-0ctober 7, 1917*

Kishkin, Nikolai Mikhailovich, Ottober 8, 1917-November 7,
1917.

ARMY LEADERS 1914^1917

SUPREME

Grand Duke Nicholas Nichokevich, August 2, 1914-September

Tsar I^idMis 1 1; ; Sep^eixiber 5, ig^s-Maitfe ^ 1917.

APPENDICES 637

did not spend much time listening to reports. During the day I took
a walk along the highway towards Orsha. The weather was sunny.
After dinner I decided to go quickly to Tsarskoe Selo, and at i
o'clock in the morning [March 13] boarded the train.

March 13, Tuesday

I went to bed at 3: 15 as I had a long talk with [General] N. I.
Ivanov, whom I am despatching to Petrograd with troops to restore
order. We left Mogilev at five in the morning, I slept till 10 o'clock.
The weather was cold and sunny. During the day we passed through
Viazma, Rzhev, and Likhoslavl at 9 o'clock.

March 14, Wednesday

During the night we turned back from Malaia Vishera, as Liuban
and Tosno seemed to be occupied by the rebels. We went to Valdai,
Dno, and Pskov, where I stopped for the day. Saw Ruzski.* He,
with Danilov and Savich, dined, Gatchina and Luga, too, reported
to be in possession [of the rebels]. Shame and disgrace* Failed to
reach Tsarskoe, [Selo] but my thoughts and feelings are always
there. How hard it must be for poor Alix [Empress] to go through
all these events alone. Lord help us.

March 15, Thursday

In the morning Ruzski came and read his very long direct-wire
talk with Rodzianko, According to this, the situation in Petrogracl
is such that a 'Ministry of the Duma would now be powerless to do
anything, for it has to contend with the Social-Democratic Party, rep-
resented by the workers* committee. My abdication is required.
Ruzski transmitted this talk to Headquarters, and Alexeev sent it on
to all the commander$-in~chieL By 2 o'clock replies were received
from them* The gist of them is that in order to save Russia and
keep the army at the front quiet, such a step must be taken, I have
agreed. Prom Headquarters has been sent a draft of a manifesto.
In the evening Guchkov and Shulgin arrived from Petrograd, witB
whom I discussed the matter, and I handed them the signed and
altered manifesto. At i o'clock in the morning [i6th} I left P$kov,
with a heavy hea?t kotuse of the things gwfe through. All around
me there b toeadfceiy> cowardice, 'and jfaxfa,, > '! : " _ ;" ^ ; , ' ' ' ' • ,

' '/.' ,\ ;; ,' \ '"';;• • ' ' i;1 •' ",'', ; j^<fi^

tod *<fwflL' Awke fat beycmd 'Dvk$i., 'The :'day, m& •

^ wltfa ' thofe i^r *nei ;aJxMt; yepterd^' Head,
flie ' ' ' ' '

638 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

a great deal about Julius Caesar. Arrived at 8 : 20 at Mogilev, All
ranks of the Staff were on the platform. Received Alexeev in the
car. At 9 : 30 I went over to the house. Alexeev came with the latest
news from Rodzianko. It transpires that Misha [Grand Duke
Michael] has abdicated. His, manifesto ends with a four-tail form-
ula5 for the election of a constituent assembly within 6 months.8
God knows who put it into his head to sign such stuff. In Petrograd,
the disturbances have ceased — if it would only remain that way,

March 17, Saturday

Slept well. At 10 o'clock came the good Aleck.0 Then I went to
listen to the reports. At 1-2 I drove to the platform, to meet dear
Mother, who has arrived from Kiev. I took her to my own place and
lunched with her and our own family. We sat and talked a long time.
Today, at last, I received two telegrams from dear Alix, I 'took a
walk. The weather was very bad — cold, with a snowstorm* After
tea I received Alexeev and Fredericks, Toward 8 o'clock I drove
to dine with Mother and remained with her till n.

March 18, Sunday

It blew hard during the night. The day was clear and frosty. At
10 I drove to mass. Mother arrived later. She lunched with me and
stayed until 3: 15. I walked about the little garden. After tea I re-
ceived N. I. Ivanov, who has returned from his mission. He was at
Tsarskoe Selo and saw Alix. I took leave of poor Count Fredericks
and Voeikov, whose presence, for some reason, has been irritating
everybody. They have gone to his estate in Penza province. At 8
o'clock I went to dine with Mother*

March 19, Monday

Last day at Mogilev. At 10: 15 I signed the farewell order to
the armies. At 10:30 I went into the guard-house to say good-bye
to all ranks of the Staff and bureau. At my own house I bade fare-
well to the officers and Cossacks, of my guard, cavalry and infantry,
It nearly broke my heart. At 12 o'clock I went to Mother** and
lunched with her and her suite. At 4:30 I left her, Sandro/ Sergei/
Boris/ and Aleck, Poor Nilov was not jxsrmtttedl to go with me.
At 4:45 I left Mogilev; a crowd that was greatly moved came to

* Uwversal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage, Tfctre was HO definite time
att for the Constituent Assembly.

* Prince A, P. Oldenburg*

pukes Alexander and Sergei MiWWtovfch, and Cttadi Duke 8ori«

APPENDICES 639

sec me off. Four members of the Duma accompanied me. Went by
way of Orsha and Vitebsk. The weather is cold and windy. It is
hard, painful, and sad.

March 22, Thursday

Arrived quickly and safely at Tsarskoe Selo at 11:30. But,
God, what a difference! On the street, around the palace, inside the
park, wherever you turn there are sentries. Went upstairs and saw
dear Alix and the precious children. She looked cheerful and well.
The children were lying in a darkened room, but were in good spirits
except Maria, who recently came down with the measles. We
lunched and dined in the playroom with Alexei. I saw good Bencken-
dorff * Walked with Valia Dolg 8 . . » and worked with him in the
little garden, as we cannot go beyond. . . . After tea I played a
game of Solitaire, In the evening we visited all the occupants of the
other wing and found them in their places.

March 23, Friday

We slept well. In spite of the present circumstances, the thought
that we are all together cheers and consoles. In the morning I re-
ceived Benckenclorff. Later I looked through, arranged, and burned
papers. Sat with the children till 2 : 30. Walked, with Valia Dolg . . .
accompanied by the same guard, who were today more agreeable.
Had some good exercise working in the snow* Sunny weather. We
spent the evening together,

March 24, Satwrd&y

In the morning I received Benckendorff, Learned through him
that we must remain here for some time. This is a pleasant thought.
Continued burning letters and paper*. Anastasia has earache just as
the others had* From 3 till 4: 30 I valked with Valia Dolg ... and
worked in the garden* The weather was unpleasant, windy, with 2
degrees of frost At 6:45, we went to evening service at the field
chapel, Alexei took his first bath, Called ott Atua,* Lilly D., and the
others.

4prtt 5, ThMsfay

After 2 o'clock it deared and thawed. Walked for a short time
in the morning. Sorted my belongings and books, and sorted the
thmgs I want to take with me in case I go to England, After luncheon
I took a walk with Olga and Tatiana, and worked in the garden.
Spent the evening as usual

•AnmVyrubovaandLiliDdm.

640 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

April 9, Monday

We began to prepare for holy communion, but it has not started
well. After mass Kerenski arrived and requested that we confine
our meetings to mealtimes, and that we sit apart from the children.
This, he claimed, was necessary in order to placate the Soviet of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. I had to submit so as to avoid
the possibility of violence. Took a walk with Tatiana, Olga has again
taken to bed with a sore throat. The others feel well. At 9: 45 I wont"
down to my rooms. Tatiana sat with me till 10: 30. Afterwards 1 did
some reading, drank tea, and went to bed. . . .

April 12, Thursday

During the day a strong wind scattered the clouds* At 10 we went
to mass, where many of our people took communion. Walked for a
short time with Tatiana. Today was the funeral of the "victims of
the revolution" in our park, opposite &e central }>art of Alexandrov-
ski Palace, not far from the Chinese Palace. We could hcnr the* strains
of the Funeral March and the Marseillaise. It was over by 5: 30* At
6 o'clock we went to the service of the Twelve Apostles; Father
Bieliaiev, all alone, bravely read all of them. The evening I spent like

all recent ones.

April 20, Friday

The weather has improved and it has grown wanner. Was out
of doors a long time this fine morning. During the day I was occu-
pied with Tatiana and Alexei, The appearance of the soldiers, and
their slovenly bearing have made a disgusting impression on all of
us. Read a great deal. From 10: 15 on I was in my own rooms,
downstairs.

April 21, Saturday

Celebrated the 23d anniversary of our engagement quietly*
Weather was springlike and warm. In the morning spent a long time
with Alexei. Found out why yesterday's guard was so disagreeable ;
it was made up from among the Soldiers* Deputies, Today Jt has
been a good guard, from the reservq battalion of the Fourth Rifles.
Worked at the latiding stage, on account of the mob, and we en-
joyed the warm sunshine. Spent the evening as usual.

May it Tuesday

This is the first of May abroad, therefore our blockheads have
decided to celebrate the day by parading in the streets with l>amte
of music and red flags* They had evidently come inttf otir park to

APPENDICES 641

place wreaths on the grave, but the weather turned bad. Dense, wet
snow fell* At 3 : 15, when everything was finished, I came out for a
walk and the sun peeped out. Worked an hour and a half with
Tatiana. In the evening I began to read aloud to the children.

May 14, Monday

Wonderful, warm day. In the morning I had a nice walk. From
12 o'clock I gave Alexei a geography lesson. During the day I worked
again in our vegetable garden. The sun was scorching hot, but the
work is progressing. Read till dinner, and in the evening, aloud,
Yesterday we learned that General Kornilov has given up his post
of Cominander-in-Chief of the Petrograd Military District, and this
evening that Guchkov has resigned. Both of them give the same
reason : the irresponsible interference of the Soviet of Workers' Dep-
uties, and certain other organizations that are far more radical,
with military authorities. What is Providence holding in store for
poor Russia? God's will be done.

Ji&n0 16, Saturday

After breakfast Kerenski arrived unexpectedly from the city by
motor. He did not remain with me long. He asked me to send to
the Investigation Commission any papers or letters that have any
bearing on internal politics. After my walk and until luncheon I
helped Korovichenko *° to sort these papers. The rest of the day he
had the assistance of Kobylinskl11 I finished sawing the trees on the
first spot. At this time the incident of Alexei's rifle occurred. He had
been playing with it on the little island and the soldiers, who walked
in the garden, saw it and requested the officer to be allowed to take
it away, and carried it off to the guard-house. Later, it transpired
that the rifle, for some reason or other, was sent over to the common
hall. Fine officers these, who dare not deny the requests of tibeir
soldiers I Attended the evening service. Spent the evening as usual.

June 22, Friday

Exactly three months since I came from Mogilev and here we
are confined like prisoners. It is hard to be without news of dear
Mother, but as for other matters, I am indifferent Today the
weaiher Is still better—so degrees in the shade, atid 36 in the sun.
There vW$ the smell of fire in the air. After my walk, I took Alexei
into my study, whem it is cooler, went over his liistbry lesson and

** Korovichenko, Commandant of the

Hm betwan the zotfe

643 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

accomplished something, Alix did not go outside. Until dinner, the
five of us were together. The weather was comparatively cool The
day passed as usual. Just before dinner came the good news of the
launching of an offensive on the southwest front. In the direction of
Zolochev our troops, after two days of artillery action, broke
through the enemy's positions and captured about 170 officers and
10,000 men, 6 cannon and 24 machine guns. The Lord he praised!
God grant that this may be an auspicious hour. I felt altogether dif-
ferent after this cheering news.

July 9> Afonday

It was a glorious day* Our good commandant, Colonel, Kobylinski,
has asked me not to shake hands with the officers in the presence of
outsiders, and not to greet the soldiers. There have already been
several occasions when they refused to answer. Worked with Alexei
in geography, We sawed up an enormous pine not far from the
green-houses. The soldiers, themselves, volunteered their help. The

evening ended with reading.

July iSt Wednesday

It rained all morning; by 2 o'clock the weather improved; and
toward evening it grew cooler. Spent the day as usual. In Petrograd
there are disorders these days, accompanied by shooting. Many sol-
diers and sailors arrived there yesterday from Kronstadt to oppose
the Provisional Government. Absolute chaos* Where are those people
who could take this movement in hand and put a stop to strife and
bloodshed? The seed of all this evil is in Petrograd and not every-
where in Russia* ^

July 19, Thursday

Fortunately, the overwhelming majority of troops at Petrograd
remained loyal to their duty and order is again restored in the streets,
The weather has been wonderful. Took a nice walk with Tatiana and
Valia. During the day we worked successfully in the forest grave
chopping down and sawing up four trees. In the evening I began * * .

July 21 r Saturday

A fine* hot day. Walked all around the park with Tatiana and
Maria. During the day we worked in the same places. Yesterday
and today the guards from the Fourth and First Rifles acted prop-
erly in the discharge of their duties, and did not shadow us daring
our walk* There have been changes in the composition of the Govern*
meat Prince Lvov has gone. KerenskI is to be Prime Minister, re*

APPENDICES 643

maining Minister of War and Navy at the same time, and also
directing the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. This man is cer-
tainly in the right place at the present moment : the more power he
lias the better.

July 24, Tuesday

In the morning I took a walk with Alexei, and when I returned
learned that Kerenski had arrived. In our conversation he referred
to the probability of our going south, in view of the proximity of
Tsarskoe Selo to the turbulent capital. As it was Olga's name day,
we attended church. After luncheon we chopped down two more
trees in the same place, making altogether almost seventy trees that
have been sawed up. Finished reading the third part of Merezhkov-
ski's trilogy, PETER. It is well written, but makes a painful im-
pression.

July 26, Thursday

The last few days bad news has been coming in from the south-
west front. Following our offensive at Galich, many units, thoroughly
infected by the contemptible defeatist propaganda, not only refused
to advance, but in some sectors even left their position though they
were not pressed by the enemy. Taking advantage of this favorable
opportunity, the Germans and Au^trians, with small forces, broke
our lines in southern Galicia, which may compel the entire southwest
front to retreat in an easterly direction. This is dishonorable and
heartbreaking. Today, at last, there has been a proclamation from
the Provisional Government that the death penalty is in force in the
theater of military operations for persons found guilty of treason.
I trust that this measure may not be too late* The day was muggy and
warm. We worked at the same pla/ce, along the edges of the clearing.
We chopped down three trees and sawed up two. Am beginning grad-
ually to collect my things and books*

[TOBOLSK]

November 2, Friday

Warm day* About 4 o'clock it rained a little. Now all our peo-
ple who wish to take a walk are forced to pass through the city

escorted by the soldiers*

November 3, Saturday

From our window we saw the funeral of a soldier frot$ the
Fourth Rifl$$* At the head of tibe procession marched a band made
tip Of high school students which played very poorly. At n mass

644 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HIST( )RY

was said at our house. Sat till tea time with Kostritski. At 9 o'clock,
there was a vesper service and then we made confession to Father

Alexei." Went to bed early.

November 17, Saturday

In the morning I was made happy by a letter from Xenia. Much
snow had fallen ; I cleared a place for walking, and during the day
we carried wood to the barn. It is already two days since any agency
telegrams have been received. During the last two clays there has
been no telegraphic news, which may be due to unfortunate events

in the big cities.

November 23, Friday

Another warm day — it went to zero. During the day 1 suwvl
wood. Finished the first volume of "i793*" In the evening 1 rt'sul
Turgenev's "Memoirs of a Hunter" aloud.

November 24, Saturday

Much snow has fallen. No newspapers or telegrams have come
from Petrograd for a long time. At such a grave time this is serious.
The girls were occupied with the swings, jumping from them into
a pile of snow. At 9 o'clock there was a vesper service.

November 27, Tmsday

Birthday of dear Mother and 23d anniversary of our wedding,
At 12, there was a religious service. The choir got things mixed up
and sang out of tune, probably because it had not been rehearsing.
The weather was sunny and warm, with gusty winds. After after-
noon tea, I re-read my earlier diaries — pleasant occupation,

November 30, Friday

The same disagreeable weather, with a penetrating wind. Heart-
breaking to learn from the papers descriptions of what happened
two weeks ago at Petrograd and Moscow. It is much worse and
more dishonorable than before.

Dtcembw i, Saturday

There has come to attention a most incredible report that three
delegates of our Fifth Army went to the Germans before Dvinuk
and signed the preliminary conditions of an armistice. Such a night-
mare I never expected. How cowld these Bolshevik scoundrels stoop
So low as to carry into effect their cherished dream of proposing
peace without asking tfee opinion of the people, and at a time when
the $nemy Is occupying large tracts of our country?

APPENDICES 645

December 3, Monday

The frost increased and the day was clear. There was disaffection
among the soliders because they had not received their pay from
Petrograd for three months. This was quickly settled by a temporary
loan of the necessary sum from the bank. During the day I busied
myself with the firewood. At 9, there was a vesper service.

December 4, Tuesday

This day of the Feast of the Presentation we had to go without
church service because Pankratov 22 did not deign to permit it. The
weather was warm. Everybody worked in the yard.

December 9, Sunday

At 8 o'clock we went to mass. This is a holiday in honor of those
decorated with the St. George Cross. The city gave a dinner and
otlwr entertainments in the Community House in honor of them.
Among the members of our guard were several knights whom their
comrades, not members of the Order, would not relieve even on a
day like this. Freedom. . , . Walked long and much; weather
moderate.

December 14-1 S> Friday-Saturday

Both days passed exactly alike. There has been a biting frost
with sunshine. After our daily walk, we gather every day at ...
for rehearsal At 9, there were vespers.

December 16, Sunday

Alix and Alexei did not go with us to mass, on account of the
cold — it was 16 degrees. All morning we rehearsed our parts in the
drawing-room, where, with the aid of numerous screens and all
manner of furniture, we set up something like a stage. In the eve-
ning it was all put back in place. We walked as long as there was
daylight* While bezlqnt is being played, I am now reading aloud
Turgenev's "On the Eve."

December ig, Wednesday

My name day was passed quietly, and not as in former years.
At noon there was a religious service. The men of the Fourth Rifles,
on guard duty in the garden, congratulated me, and I them, on the
occasion of their regimental holiday. I received three Saint's Day
pies and sent one 0f tiiem to the guard* la the evening, JVIaria,
Alexei, and , * . carried off ow parts m tbe pipy very tiicdy*
and there was much laughter. . i ' : < , i , < • ; ' • , . , ' , , ' . . , , '
. a V. S. Pankratov was a Commissar sent from the Capital. '. ,' ' ':>; <

646 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

January to, Thursday

Wonderful, sunny, warm day, with 2 degrees of frost. Remained
long in the open air, both morning and evening. Learned with indig-
nation that our good Father Alexei is being examined by the authori-
ties and held under arrest in his house. This happened because at the
Christmas service in the church the deacon referred to us by our title
in the presence of the soldiers of the Second Rifles. Pankratov and his
crowd probably had a hand in this, as they always do.

January 13, Sunday
Not a cold day, with a gusty wind. Toward evening Alexei got

up. He was able to put on his boot. After tea we separated, till the

arrival of the New Year.
Lord, save Russia.

PEACE TERMS"

The Central Executive Committee has accepted the following out-
line of instructions, which is to guide its delegate on his mission
[Interallied Confererxre at Paris].

The new agreement should come out clearly and openly on war
aims. It should be based on the principle "peace without annexation,
without indemnity, and on the basis of the right of national self-
determination/*

TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS

1. As an unfailing condition to peace, the Germans must evacu-
ate Russian territory occupied by them. Russia offers full Self-
determination to Poland, Lithuania, and I at via.

2. Turkish Armenia to receive full autonomy atid later, when
it has a local government and international guarantees, the right of
self-determination.

3. The Alsace-Lorraine question should be settled by the in-
habitants of that country, under conditions that would give them
full freedom of voting. The election should be organised by the local
self-government after the troops of both belligerents have been
removed

4. Belgium to have her old frontiers and compensation for
damages, to be made from an international fttirid.

5. Serbia and Montenegro to be restored and to have ma-
""ImttUa/' No* *$>*, October J

____ APPENDICES 647

terial aid from the international assistance fund. Serbia should have
access to the Adriatic, Bosnia and Herzegovina to be autonomous.

6. Disputed areas in the Balkans to have temporary autonomy
to be followed by plebiscites,

7. Rumania to have back her old frontiers, with the obligation
to give Dobrudja temporary autonomy at once and the right of self-
determination later, Rumania to bind herself to put into force im-
mediately the clauses in the Berlin Treaty about the Jews and to
give them equal rights with citizens of Rumania.

8. To have autonomy in the Italian parts of Austria, to be fol-
lowed by plebiscites to determine to what State they should belong*

9. To give back to Germany her colonies.
10* To reestablish Greece and Persia.

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

To neutralize all straits which give access to inland seas ; also the
Suez and Panama Canals, Merchant marine to be free. Privateering
to be prohibited. Torpedoing merchant ships to be prohibited.

INDEMNITIES

AH belligerents to renounce war indemnities, either in open or
hidden form (such as for taking care of prisoners). All levied con-
tributions during the period of the war to be paid back.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Commercial treaties not to be made a part of peace conditions.
Each country to be free to follow out its own commercial policy,
and the peace treaty is not to dictate to any State whether it should
or should not conclude this or that treaty. All States to bind them-
selves not to carry on economic blockades after the war, not to make
separate tariff unions, and to grant the most favored nation terms
to all States without distinction.

GUARANTEES OF PEACE

Peace is to be made at the peace congress by the plenipotentiaries
selected by the organs of popular representation. The terms of peace
are to be confirmed by the parliaments* Secret diplomacy is to be
done away with. All States to obligate themselves not to make secret
treaties. Such treaties are to be declared as against the law of nations
W& void. Without legality, also, are all treaties not ratified by
parliaments.

648 DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Gradual disarmament on land and sea, and the going over to a
system of [citizen] militia.

The proposition of Wilson's "League of Nations" could become
a precious conquest for international law only under the following
conditions; i. That all States participate on an equal footing; 2. that
foreign affairs be democratized as indicated above.

THE WAY TO PEACE

No matter how concretely the war aims may be formulated, the
Allies should make it clear and publish in the agrccmefit, that they
are ready to begin peace negotiations just as soon as their opponents
will agree to it on the basis of all parties renouncing all (terri-
torial] seizures by force.

The Allies bind themselves not to begin secret peace negotiations
and to conclude peace only at a congress and with the participation
of all neutral countries.

In addition to the above, the delegate is given, also, the follow-
ing instructions:

All obstacles placed in the way of the Stockholm Conference to
be removed and, in particular, passports to be given to delegates of
all parlies and factions who agree to take part.

PARTIAL LIST OF NEWSPAPERS, PERIODICALS, AND
BOOKS CONSULTED IN THE PREPARATION

OF THIS HOOK
Newspapers :

"Izvestiia," "Novoe Vremia," "Riech," "Pravitelstvenny Viest-
nik/* "Vestnik Vrcmennago Pravitelstva."

Periodicals and Books :

Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii. Berlin, 1921.

Buchanan, Sir George; My Mission to Russia, 2, vols. London,

1923.
Camming, C K., and Pettit, W. W.; Russian- American Rela-

tions. New York, 1920.
Dohn, Lili ; The Real Tsaritsa. London, 1922.
Denikin, A. L ; The Russian Turmoil. New York,
Fleer, WL G. ; Rabochee Dvizhenie v. Gody Voiny. Moscow, 1925,
Iakovlev? la. A,; Petrogradskii Soviet Rabochikh i Soldatskikh

Deputatov. Protokoly Zasedanii Ispolnitelnogo Komiteta i

BJuro I. K* Moscow, 1925,
Izvestiia Glavnago Komiteta Po Snabzheniiu Armii, Moscow,

Izvestiia Vserosiiskago Soiuza Gorodov. Moscow,

Kanienevt L. B.; Lemnski Sbornik. Moscow, 1925.

Krasnaia Nov. Moscow, 1921.

Krasny Arkhiv. Moscow, 1922.

I-cmkomsky, A,; Memoirs of the Russian Revolution* London,

2922.

Memoirs of the Crown Prince of Germany. London, 1922.
Miliukov, P, N.; Istoriia Vtoroi Russkoi Revoliutsii. i volume in

2 jjarts, Sofia, 1921, 1922,
Nefclttdoff, A» i Sotivenirs Diplomatiques : Eia Su&ie Pendant La

Gtierre Mondkle. Paris, 1926.
Official Bulletin* (Publiahed <kily under order of the President

by the Committee ot* Public Information, George

Qmirman.) Washington, D. C.
Paclenie Tsarskogo Rezhima. Moscow, 1925.
Princess PSaley; Memories of Russia, 1916-1919, Loadotu
' ' ' '

6so DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Petrunkevitch, Alexander; Harper, Samuel N.; Colder, Frank

A.; The Russian Revolution. Cambridge (Harvard University

Press), 1918.
Piontkovski, S. A. ; Khrestomatiia po Istorii Oktiabrskoi Revo-

liutsiu Moscow, 1924.
Pisma Imperatritsy Aleksandry Fedorovny k Imperatoru Niko-

laiu II. 2 vols. Berlin, 1922,
Pokrovski, M. N.; Perepiska Nikolaia i Aleksandry Romanovykh.

Moscow, 1923.

Pokrovski, M. N.; Tsarskaia Rossiia i Voina. Moscow, 14)24.
Pokrovski, M. N., and lakovlev, la. A.; Razlozhenie Armii v 1917

Godtu Moscow, 1925.

Polivanov, A. A.; Memuary. Moscow, 1924.
Purishkevich, V.; Comment J'ai Tue Rasputino. Paris, 1924.
Root, Elihu; The United States and the War, the Mission to Rus-
sia, Political Addresses. Collected and edited by Robert

Bacon and James Brown Scott. Harvard University Press,

Cambridge, 1918.
Sack, A. J. ; The Birth of the Russian Democracy. New York,

1918.
Scott, James Brown; President Wilson's Foreign Policy. New

York, 1918.
Semennikov, V. P. ; Politika Romanovykh Nakanunc Revoliutsii.

Moscow, 1926.
Semennikov, V. P. ; Dne iik B. Velikogo Kniazia Andreia Vladi-

mirovkha. Leningrad, 1925.

Semennikov, V. P.; Nikolai II Velikie Kniazia, Leningrad, 1925.
Semennikov, V. P.; Za, Kulisami Tsariznia, Arkhiv Tibctskogo

Vracha Badmaeva. Leningrad, 1925,
Shulgin, V. ; Dni. Leningrad, 1925.
Stenographic Records of the Duma* Leningrad, 1914.
Trotski, L*; Sochineniia. Volume III, Part I. Moscow, 1917,
Valentinov, N. ; Snosheniia's Soiuznikami po Voennym Voprosam

vo Vremia Voiny 1914-1918* Part 1. Moscow, 1920.
Vkdimirova, Vera; RevoIiutsJia 1917 Goda. Moscow.

INDEX

Alu% 400, 598,

Adjemov, 164,

Afghanistan, to.

Agriculture (sec also Peasants and
I .and Problems), 14, 15, 87, 179,
i«o, 182, 195, 224 332, 351, 372-
383, 4*3, 4#9, 470, 474, 484, 499,
502, SS<>» 5<*>, 623, 624.

Aladift, 521.

Albania, 8, 9, 57, 58, 366.

Alexander I, 64, 66.

Alexander II, 71, 180,

Alexander III, 5, 16, 25,

Alexander Miktyailovich, 234, 248,
SS*» 638.

Alexandra, Empress, Ministers and,
04 96, 97* IQ4, 105, 108, in, 117,
U9, 157, 189, JW7-237, *42, ^44,
246; Personality, 81, in, 226, 338,
241, 243; Rasputin and, 28, 81, 97,
98, XOI, 104, X05, 108, H2, 114.

ns» XS7» X7<5, *88, 189, 198, ^99,
a04 206, six, 213-3*9, 228, 333,
»35» »37» *44 «46; Separate peace
and, 40-4& 69, 70, 104 1*7, "9»
xao; Supreme Command and,
93, 188, 189, 197, 199, 203-306, an,
312, 339, 242; Other references,
8& x0x, xoa, xxxf xis, xi7, 166, 181,
192, 194, 213-320, 226, 368, 637* 639,

643, 645-
Alexeenko, 260.
Alexcev, 94, 109, 112, 207, 212, 213,

«0, 30*» 403.

$37, 538, S4ft SSi^ €37, 638,
AfexeJ, T»arevidir 181, 2x8, 237, 246,

63®, 643, 64$,
Akxmski, 494.
Allies, 3-*& 3»

61*78, xoo, 10

»* 40-53* S5» S7i
09, xio» ti2, ia>»
167, *6&

170, 172, 173, 201, 202, 226,
257, 271, 285, 297, 312, 320, 323,

328, 330, 332, 334 336, 337, 340,
342, 34S> 34<5» 354 356, 359, 36i,
371, 395, 397, 3$8, 408, 409, 425,
428, 458, 468, 472, 484 551, 557,
559, 5<59, 646, 648.

Alsace-Lorraine, 57, 69, 328, 646.

America, 5, 7, 10, 46, 55, 56, 65,
99, 202, 322, 333, 343, 347, 357,
512.

Amnesty, 34 39, *34 X3S, 153, *•&.

305, 309, 3io.

Anarchy (see also Lawlessness), 361,
45<5, 457, 459, 4<$6, 4^7, 473, 474,
49<>, 497, 508, 544, 553, 556, 558, 562,
569, 57^, 614 616.

Andrei Vladimirovich, 87, 92, 95,
in, 194, 197, 199, 201, 334 239,
240, 241.

Andronnikov, Prince, 97, 157, 174
227, 229, 231.

Anisimov, 572, 578.

Annexations and Indemnities, 57,
58, 76, 77, 321, 322, 325-327, 329-
332, 334 336, 343, 346, 354, 3^5-
367, 369, 371, 398, 406, 425, 474,
574 621, 622, 646, 647-

Antonov, 599, 620,

Arabia, 62,

Archangel, 100, 112, 136, 171, 59&

Argentina, 86.

Armenia, 13, 76, 328, 646.

Army, Casualties, see War Invalids;
also Red Cross; Discipline and
Morale, 108, 142, 166, 167, 184,
200, 202, 209, 220-226, 233, 248,
268, 274 282, 287, 288, 296, 305,

306, 309, 3*4* 315, 317, 323, 332,
339, 342, 351, 362, 369, 371, 378,
384 386, 388, 390, 394, 396, 4>XT
403, 404, 406, 408, 409, 4»3, 425»
436, 428, 435» 453, 457. 4$8, 472,
474 485, 40& 5P2, 503, 506, 5X3>
518, 525, 527, S3i, 532, 539> 544,

651

652

INDEX

551, 556, 560, 580, 581, 585, $86,

591, 593, 594, 597, 601, 613, <5l6,
640, 641, 643, 645; Preparedness,
munitions and general supply, 10,
II, 20, 29, 78, 79, 84, 89, 9*,
94, 99, 101, 102, 109, H4, *20, 122,
126, 130, 131, 135, 146, 150, 152,
154, 188-196, 199, 200, 213, 215,
223, 225, 226, 233, ^34, 292, 293,
312, 330, 380, 381, 384, 397, 400,
402, 408, 428, 499, 503, Si6, 518,

592, 614; Revolutionary propa-
ganda in the, 21, 189, 220, 222, 223,
225; Supreme Command, 51-54,
81, 93-95, 197-212, 218, 222, 228,
239, 243, 269, 300, 302, 403, 406,
427, 506, 510, 513, 515, S22, 528,
530, 532, 537, 544, 56o, 581, 582,
586; Other references, 65, 76, 79>
81, 93-95, 108, in, 112, 116, 117*
119, 142, 143, 148-151, *66, 167,
170, 180, 184, 213-219, 234,
235, 247, 260, 2<58, 270, 282, 284,
285, 294, 297, 305, 3^2, 333, 342,
354, 364, 386, 387, 393, 394, 396,
412, 415, 426, 428, 434, 436, 438,
440, 442, 449, 454, 4$7» 468, 474
478, 479, 484, 491, 498, 509, 5H»
5*9, 521, 5^2, 534, 537, 542, 54$,
547, 549, 551, 553, 564, 568, 57C\ 573,
580, 582, 583, 588, 596, 598, 601,
604, 606, 608, 614 615, 6l& 624,
637, 638, 642.

Art, #20.

Artemiev, 131.

Astrov, 150, 473*

"Aurora," 616, 617.

Austria-Hungary, 5, 8, 9> *5» 24, «Sr
27, 29-30, 38, 43, 45* 47, 51, $7, 6(V
68, 73, 76, 77, 103, 158, *6t, l80>
325, 337, 329, 338, 341, 342, 397,
398, 426, 427, 435, 514 531*
647*

Avilov, 600.

Avksentiev, 350* 479, 489, &$8» 540*
542, 548, 554 555, 563, $64

344-

Bakhmeteff, B. A., 347.

Balkans, 5, 7-9, 13, 28, 61, 6af 71, 73r
328, 329. 647-

Banks, see Finances.

Baranov, 598,

Baranovichi, 213,

Bark, 66, 76, 183, 202, an, 231.

Barkov, 292.

Belenin, see Shliapnikov.

Belgium, 34, 38-39, 47, 5*, 56, S7»
69, 76, 327i 646.

Beliacv, 76, 77, 120,

Benckendorff, 56, 67, 639.

Bernatski, 479> 558.

Bernstorff, 55.

Bessarabia, 72,

BethmannhfloUweg, 76, 104.

Binasik, 335.

Bobrinski, A,, 114, 170,

Bobrinski, V,, 136, 203,

Bogdanov, B, I., 487-

Bogdanov, K O., 585.

Bogdanov, V. <X *>i, foo.

Bohemia, sec Czechoslovakia.

Bolsheviks, i-*7, 1*9, ^66, 337» 39\
357, 359-361, 363. 364 367» 3<^,
37«» 373, 384» 396, 4^4 444 445*
448, 45*» 456, 461, 463, 4&& 477.
480, 481, 485* 488* 490, 49*, &*h
522, 526, S»8, 53*. 536* 540, 547,
550, 554 555, $63. S7& 577, 57«,
584 586, $87, 589, 590^ &M» 594
$97, 599, 60*, 605, 609, <*n, 6f3»
616, 618, 619, 644*

Boris Vladimirovich, 2O2, 247, 638.

Borisov, 392.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, 8, 57, 60,
647-

Bosphorus, see Dardanelles*

Bourgeoisie, 257, 303, 304 3*7, 3*8,
327, 3*fc 337, 357. m 3^4 &&>
372, 400, 401, 406, 410, 415, 444,
448, 449, 453, 456, 458, 463, 4%
474, 480, 484 49*>, 493* 5<>S. 5^9*
512, 532. $33, 537, 538, 540, S4*»
54S 547, 549, 55*, 553, 556, $64,
7» 570, 577, 5&», S&l* 591, 595,

Bacon,
Badaev, 137.
Badenko, 292,

Bramson, L, U.r 292,
Bt»tiaiio> 71, 72*

Brcshko-Breshkovskaia, 490^ 566,
Brtand, 75*
Broidoy 5»9» SP^
Bronstcin, see TroUld

INDEX

653

Brusilov, n6, 214, 225, 247, 405, 406,
490.

Bublikov, 300, 506.

Buchanan, Sir George, 50, 56, 58,
39, 70, 73, 74, too, 118, 162, 163,
1 66, 246, 323.

Kutaaria, 9, 28, 57, 61, 62, 71, 73, 74,
;d, 77, ^7, 3*9*

Bum! (Jewish Socialist organiza-
tion), 291, 361.

Bunting, von, 172,

Bu rials, 237,

Burtsev, 38-39.

Ituryshkin, 549. 555-

Cadet Party, 21, 35, 90, 132, 136,

269, 334, 373, 435, 440, 445, 454,

458, 4$S, 465, 47-*, 475, 479, 4&,

4B6» 49*» 509, 5X0, 525, 533, 535,

537, 538, 540, 543> 545, 548, 550,
556, 558, 565, 5<)7* 577-

Canada, 357*

Carlotti, Marquis, 69.

Carpathians, 43, 47-48, 84, 214, 217,
219,

Caucasus, xo, 136, 207, 208, 212, 222,

239, 241, 243, 244, 394, 299, 403,
507, 525.

Censorship (see also Press), 79>

x68, 170, 17*1 182, 183, 223,

393*

Chaikovski, 292.

Chelnokov, g6< 131, *SO, 153, 24

Chercrmsov, 593, 594»

Chernigov, t?&

Chernov, 353, 372, 375, 379, 434,
456, 464, 474, 479, 536> 578.

China* 6, 171, 338.

Chkheidzc, 133, 164, 165, 256, 270,
272, 274, 376, 280, *8x, 291, 294,
299, 303, $06, 311, 3*4, 3^5, 334
348, 350, 390, 421, 425, 446, 452,
477, 48dv 489, 49*» 493, 495, 49$,
50&, 540, 542, 543, 555, 55^ 564,
578> 579* 584*

Church and Cfergy, 97» 98, *04* xo&
W, 174, 177, *4<>> 38t, 383, 484,
505, 5*2, 623, 646-

Ktef of Greece^ wa,
52,

334*

Constituent Assembly, 90, 96, 140,
261, 285, 288, 296, 298, 303, 306,
309, 3io, 3x2, 314, 317, 323> 325,
354, 355, 3^3, 3<57, 369, 372, 379,
391, 410, 413, 4H-416, 435, 442,
455, 459, 463, 467, 474, 485, 486,
495, 502, 510, 522, 525, 534, 552,
554, 556, 559, 56i, 563, 566, 575,
583, 590, 59<5, 598, 601, 606, 6o8t
609, 614, 616, 619, 620, 623, 625,
638.

Constitutional Democrats, see Cadet
Party.

Contact Commission, 304, 310.

Cooperatives, 127, 131, 136, 45& 482,
484, 492, 499, 501, S«i 542, 547,
560, 561, 563.

Cossacks, 136, 142, 260, 264, 378, 381,
411, 424, 448, 492, 495, 507, 5io, 522,
526, 564, 566, 608, 625, 638.

Council of Elders, see Duma.

Council of the Empire, see State
Council.

Council of Ministers, 67, 85, 86, 89,
94, 95, 98, 102, 103, 108, xi2, 114,
122, 124, 129, 132, 133, 136, 137-
145, 164, 166, 167, 174, 178, 179,

l8l, 184, 197, 200, 206, 210, 220r

239, 249, 250, 267, 278, 279.

Council of the Republic, see Provi-
sional Council of the Republic.
Cyril Vladimirovich, 238, 246, 272.
Czechoslovakia, 57, 60, 68, 180, 224.

Dalmatia, 57.

Dan, 534, 537, 564, 5^5, 578, 579, 589,

591, 592.

Danilov, G. N*, 92, 201, 637.
Danilov, N. A., 83, 84, 142,
Dardanelles, 8, 13, 25, 27, 40, 42, 43,

4S» 52, 58, 6r, 158, 160, 161, x8&

328, 334-
Dashkevich, 593-
Dehn, Lali, 28* 639.
Delcftsse*, 56, 58*
Democratic Conference, 540-549* S55-

557, 567, 583, 595, 603, 607,
Democratic Council, dw Provisional

Council of the Republic.
Denikin, 526.
Dettmark, 57. 69, 329.
Darentmrg, 55,

654

INDEX

Diakov, 279.

Directory, 525, 533-539* 5S5-

Disabled Soldiers, see War Invalids.

Dmitri Pavlovich, 177.

Dmitrievski, 292.

Dmitriukov, 88, 136, 280, 281*

Dolgoruki, V., 639.

Dolgorukov, 492

Donetz Basin, 423, 424.

d'Oubril, 66.

Dragoumis, 59.

Drunkenness, 136, 290, 381, 382, 417,
418, 448.

Drutskoi-Sokolinski, 279.

Duma, After the revolution, 255,
295, 298, 300, 303, 305, 306, 308,
3U, 315, 353, 384, 386, 387, 4<>3,
407-413, 417, 448, 4&k 470, 475,
478, 480, 482, 484, 489, 490, 492,
493, 514, 520, 531, 525, 5*7, 530,
533, 534 535, 553, 557, 5^5; Domes-
tic affairs, 20, So, 85, 91, 96, 100,
101, 104, 109, 113, 1x4, H7, 120,

121, 134, 145, 150, 175, 183* 185,

220, 221, 224, 228, 229, 231, 249,

407; Foreign affairs, 24-29, 100,
106, 109, 154-175 ; National defense,
29, 37, 79, 80, 85, 87, 89, 90, 93,
94, 99, ioo, 102, 107, 109, H4, n6,

122, 123, 125, 134, 135, 137, 138,
148, 149, 151, 152, 154-175, 220,
231, 407; Other references, 53, 74,
75, 83, 88, 91, too, 106, 107, no,
112, 113, 115, 120, 126, 154-175.
178, 196, 208, 246, 250, 252, 3n,
318, 404, 405, 627, 628, 637, $39-

Duritskl, 401.
Durnovo, 3, 569, 572.
Dvinsk, 213, 225, 637, 644.
Dybenko, 6#a
Dzhugashvilli, see Stalin,
Dzhunkovski, 203, 240*

Education, 178, 35«» 437, 43«, 459,

549-

Edward VII, xoa
Ef remov, 136, 260, 430, 47& 479-
Ekatennoslav, ira, 179, 273* 380.
Elena Vladimirovna, in,
EI»at>eth Fedorovna, 1:03, 1% 240,
En^efhfcrdt, »6o, 386.

England, 3, 9* i* *3t *5, *7, ift •",
'<*?, 34, 3B, 48, 51, 5A 55, <>3, fa,
70, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78, 99, KHI, iu.
158, 160, 162, 173, 253, 284, 3(xn
301, 304, 3^, 3-n, 3-7, 3-^* 3,^.
357, 365, 368, 385, 3«0, 408, 434*
618, 6~>~», 639.

Erdeli, 526.

Erlich, 2c>z

Esthonia, 14, 570.

Kulenburg, 40, 50.

Evdokimov, 82, 83.

Evert, £25.

Far East, 6, 7, xo«

Fe<I«rov, G« Ir.» 292,

Fcodosiev, 76*

Filipovski, 292, 311, 335,

FilonenkOt 494* 519.

Finances, 89, 99, too, 351, 330, &
35«t 354. 3&*» 3fH), 400, 437. 4
486, 489, 400, 496, 5M* 50 A 5«
549* 55-2. 553, #«> &&

Finland, 10, 20, 135, 365, 367, 4

435> 444* 5S^» 570, 5^8. S*M* S«
601, 607, 600,

Food supply* 98, io2» zoo, mt 1
115, n6t uo, 121, iati u$.
131, 163, 169, 170, 3fKi» x^», *
194, X95. &3> »^5, as6, a^, j
258, 278, 279, 287, 292, a*)&
332, 351, 354, 3&* 3fa> 37**
38o» 381, 385, 397, 400, 40^ 4<>S.
4<K>, 423, 4*8, 458, 4#7* 4fa* 4*4*
406, 490, 502, $i& 5*8, 549* 5$l
50S» 6n» 614.

France, 5, «» 9» *7> 19. «3» s*» 34* 3»*
39* 4#> 45. 47-49. 5*» S», 57* 5^.
6l, 63, 69, 7&» 72» 74. 76, 78, IO&
no, 155, *58» 160, i6af i/a, 173,
264 W 3^t, 337* 33A 338* 34**
364, 3<$B» 395» 397, 6*&

Frands Joseph, 72, 104,

Fredericks, 40, 50, 106, 346, 298, 638.

Friedman, 36,

Frolov, 127*

, 68,

328, 430, 643*

INDEX

655

Gallipoli, 201.

Gcorgi Mikhailovich, 201, 247.

Germany, Bolsheviks and, 366, 568,
571, 587, 595, 601, 618; Influence
in Russia, 16, 18, 68, 88, 92, 109,
no, 113, 117, 119, 156, 159, 161,
163, 168, 170, 174, 189, 209, 221,
222, 224, 226, 228, 234, 247, 266,
384, 3*<5, 444» 457; Russian liberals
and, 45, 35, 3#, 80, 154-166, 284;
Russian reactionaries and, 3-29,
Bo, 158, 159, 166-175, 226; Russian
Socialists and, 34, 38, 39, 314, 325,
3,7, 329, 342, 357, 361, 362, 397,
398, 589* 615, 646, 647; Separate
peace, 40-54, 56, 69, 70, 80, 103,
105, U7, 120, 156, 158, 161, 163,
167, 168, 222, 224, 226, 333, 338,
34i» 354, 356, 361, 362, 370, 371.
307V 399* 401, 402, 409, 4*5» 427,
457. 5^4, 531, 53*, 55*» $9*, &5,
644; Other references, 55, 58, 6o»
65* 68, 73, 76, 77, n6, 179, 180,
18-8, 185, 241, 243, 249, 262, 274,
3X7, 325, 345, 367, 3<>8, 41*, 428,
433* 434, 4<>7» 507* 5*3, 5*4, 522,
544, 567» 586, 591, 596, 597> 608,
6M 643, 644*

Germonius, 99.

Gesberg, 112, 113.

Giers, Admiral, 99,

Gimmer (Sukhanov), 292, 311.

Glebov, 279* 7

G0bt*chiat 429.

Godnev, 308, 353, 44*> 476.

Goldman, see Lieber.

Golitsyn, Prince A, M., 103.

Golitsyn, Prince N, D.» 121, 278.

Golitsyn, Priace N. V., 75-

Colavin, 490, 494-

Golovin, General, 65.

Golubev, 118*

Gorchakov, 66,

Goremykin, 49i 8s» 86, 89, 04, 98* 100,
105, Ida, 133* ^36, L|XV 143* 144,
»*!• *(>& ^83, 184* Wi ^n, asx,

554, 555,

58, S9» &*, ^ 7

647*

Grcwcnitz, von, I7».
Gnjy, Sit Edward, 6of 62;
Gribunin, 300,

Grigorovich, 100, 107, 114, 137.

Grimm, 280, 495.

Grinevich, 292.

Guchkov, 89, 108, 126, 127, 129, 211,
228, 230, 231, 236, 244, 247, 274,
276, 280, 294, 308, 348, 349, 351,
396, 404, 490, 495, 507, 637, 641.

Gurko, V. I., 10, 219, 225.

Gvozdev, 291, 558.

Hakebusch, 174.

Hanover, 57.

Harper, S. N., 225.

Helsingfors, 400, 598, 600, 609, 610,

Hcrmonius, sec Gernionius.

Hesse, Grand Duke of, 40, 47-48,

104.
High cost of living, 98, 101, 102,

127, 131, 132, 179, 181, 224, 381,

385.

Hindenburg, 168, 458.
Holland, 69.
House, Colonel, 55, 56.

lanushkevich, 92, 94, 188, 193, 200,
202, 220.

lasaitis, 432, 433-

Ignatiev, n8, 178, 2n.

Imperial Council, see State Council.

Imperial Duma, see Duma*

India, 4, 5-

Industry, n, 14* *6» 17, 87, 80, 90,
99, 101, 102, 122, 124, 126, 128,
130, 132, 137, 172, 179, 279, 354,
380, 417, 448, 458, 4^8, 474, 484,
486, 490, 4P3» 496, 499, 50O, 506,
Si8, 537, 543, 546, 549, 550, 552,
553, 555, 55<$, 56o, 564, 568.

Intelligentsia, 19, ai, 142, 257, 4Q9,
481, 484, 490, 493, 543, 564.

Internationalists, 320, 338, 34*, 342,
350, 357, 359, 36o, 488, 575, 584,
596, 619*

Ireland, 4*

Irmatiov, 201,

Italy, 9, 24, 46, 52, & 68, 70, 74,
76, 163, 327, 329, 338, 6x8, 647,

Itimashev, 280,

lurenev, 479* 537-

lust, 381-

656

INDEX

lusupov, see Yusupov.

Ivanov, General, 212, 213, 219, 243,

637, 638.

Ivanovo-Voznesensk, 184.
lavfstiia, 277, 292, 321, 365, 409, 412,

413, 445, 504, 523, 577, S8-2, 584,

605, 619.
Izvolski, 3, 64, 65, 326,

Jagow, von, 45, 47-

Japan, 5, 8, 10, n, 14, 23, 26, 43,

43, 58, 65, 69, 76, 100, 253, 362.
Jews, 12, 36, 66, 68, 135, 181, 185,

231, 251, 591, 647.
Jusserand, 56.
Justice, Administration of, 236, 306,

307, 3io, 31% 380, 438, 473» 549»

553, 582.

Kaledin, 493, 495* $05, 5&7, 5*7,

Kalinin, 115, 300.

Kalmykov, 424,

Kamenev, 350, 460, 462, 545, 548, 564*
572, 575, 578, 584, 589, 595, 597,
619,

Kamenski, P. V., 151.

Kamkov, 564,

Kanin, Admiral, 66.

Kapelinski, 291,

Kapnist, 260.

Karakhan, 594, 613.

Karatilov, 264, 280, 281, 285, 297.

Kartashev, 479, 558.

Keller, General, 217.

Kerenski, In the Duma, 33, 35, 90,
133, 256, afia, 265, 269, 271, 273,
274, 280, 281, 285, 294; In the
Provisional Government, 303, 304,
306, 308, 310, 348> 349, 35*, 353,
359» 362, 366, 374, 379, 384, 385*
394, 400, 416, 422, 42$, 43*7, 430,
433, 436* 439, 445, 447r 453* 4$4*
471, 473, 475, 480, 4&*> 483, 489, 40&
5<>5, SP7, 5o8» 5^3, 5*6, 5*8, $»f,
&& 5% 5*7, $4*» 544 545» 553,
555, 5S6* 5H& 5^3, Ste> 569, 570,
581, £* 587^ 590, 594* S95r 607,
609, 6*7, 640, 6143.

; 139, 14% *44 *4& W&

Kharkov. 380*

Khaustov, 35,

Kherson, 179, 180, 380.

Khomiakov, 47* 49<>.

Khrushchov, 131,

Khutuncn, 609, 610.

Khvostov, 94, loj, 105, no, i*u W&
139, 244, 157, ^14, uiv JJ7, JM
235.

Kicdorlen-Wacchtcr, 71*

Kienthal» 329*

Kiev, in, 243, 435, 43^ 44f», 44 A
638.

Kifihkin, 473, 546, 555, 558,

Kitchener, 70.

Kicmhovski, 405, S-K), SJii, 53^.

Klirnchinski, 292,

Klopov, 106,

Knox, Sir Alfred, loo*

Kc»hyJinski, 641* 64^

Kokoshkint 479, 532.

Kokovtscv, 65, 237.

Kolltrtitai, 575, sg6,

Komsin, 280.

Konovalov, 127, u8, i%w» ^B0» rft,
308, 353, 549* 555. $5&

Kornilov, 385, 4<K>» 4*%, 4^ 401,
493, 494, 5ivV$J*4, 5^534. 5** 537.
53& 544. 545. S4^» 55** 5^ *W»
569» 570, 580, $8t, 583* S«5» 5*^
607, 6ofc 6ij» 641.
Korovichcrrfco, 641,
Kastritski, 644,
Kovalevski, N* N.t 131,
Kovno, 185.
Kozlovski, 392.
Krasikov, 201.
Kremlin* 142, 490,
Krivosheitt, $8, 59^ «s» W I4»t *43»

155* 183, i83r ^oo* an.
Krokhmal, 566*

Kttm»ttdt» 4»J» S»o, ^ tot, 64*
Krapotkin, 490,
Krotovski, aoa.
Krylenko, S99* to
Kryinov, 116, $«8,

Pfctoee, 445, 44^ 451,
Kudnavtsev, 202.
Kukot-Iasnopolski, 381.
Kulomzin, ioit n8, 134,
Kunst & Albers, 172.

Kurak, 380.

INDEX

657

uij 506.
Kuzmin, 237,

Labor, 20, 21, 34, 85, 96, 98, 101, 102,
ui, 124, 126, 129, 131, 132, 135, 137,
138, HO, 142, 152, 153, 172, 179,
184, 187, 225, 256, 257, 260, 265,
279, 284, 287, 289, 292, 304, 306,
309, 3X0, 3*7, 329> 332, 338, 344,
354, 357* 359, 3<$3» 3<$4, 366, 369,
370, 374» 377, 378, 380, 381, 397,
398, 400, 401, 417, 424, 428, 445,
449, 453, 456, 459, 461, 464, 469,
474, 480, 482, 484, 485, 4*7, 489,
490, 49*» 497, 499, 5oo, 501, 504,
509* 5*0> $n, 532, 534, 535, 542,
$43, 54S, 547, 549, 553, 5&>, 5*1,
S«4» $67, 5^8, 570, 573, 575, 580,
582, 583, 588, 589, 592, 595, 598,
6oi» 602, 605, 609, 6n, 613, 614,
618, 620, 622, 624.

Labor Group (political party), 33,
90, 350* 36x.

Land problems (see also Peasants
«»df Agriculture), 21, 220, 270, 273,
303* 3*5, 351, 354» 363, 369, 373-
383» 4*4, 433, 436, 439, 440, 448,
452, 457> 4&t, 467, 469, 471, 486,
503, 50ft S«i 535, 545, 549, $5*»
$$*, 564, 568, 57*, 575, 592, 598,
6o*» $;& fas, 618, 623-625, 628, 629,

Lappo-Danilevski, 75.

Laptev, 280.

Lashevich, 449, 601.

Laaovart, Dr.f 177.

iMvki 14* 646.

Lawkssness, (see also Anarchy), 380,
383, 39*> 39SK 402, 40$, 417, 4x8,
432, 424, 4261 4$6» 469, 496, 518,

«fc.

League of Nations, 648.
Lcbedev, 161.

v* Cokmd, 527-
f V. L, 4^9, 519,

?, 93» 203, 205, 233.
359» 363. 3^7, 409, 444, 451,
ft 460, 462, 481, 568, 56& 575,

Latvia.
LJeber, 292, 33$, »5i 596.
Uman ,to4 Sanders, 27.

Linde, 292.

Lindley, 70, 74-

Lists of 'Ministers and Army Lead-
ers, 629-636.

Lithuania, 14, 646.

Little Russians, sea Ukraine.

Litvinov-Falinski, 87, 89, no.

Liverovski, 558.

Lobanov-Rostovski, 42.

Lodz, 83.

Lomoy, 620.

Lopatin, 490.

Lopukhin, 131.

Loukomsky, 51, 53, in, 405, 514, 524,
526, 527-

Lukomski, see Loukomsky.

Lunacharski, 450, 535, 575, 620.

Lvov (city), see Lemberg,

Lvov, Prince G, R, 90, 102, 131, 146,
151, 300, 302, 308, 309, 3i3, 3i6,
331, 348, 349, 353, 396, 404, 439,
441, 446, 460, 463, 464, 470, 471,
549, 642.

Lvov, N. N., 74, 76, 77-

Lvov, V., 136, 260, 280, 281, 308, 353,
441, 476, 520, 521, 523, 524, 528, 531-

Macedonia, 57.

Majoresco, 71.

Makarov, 230.

Maklakov, N. A., 85, 93, 154.

Maldakov, V. A., 90, 495.

Maliantovich, 558.

Manasevich-Manuilov, no, 156, 157,

163, I7f

Manchuria, 6, 7, 43.
Mandelberg, 564.
Manuilov (Minister), 308, 309, 352,

353, 441, 445.
Manus, 108.
Mardari, 174.
Margulies, 128*
Maria Fedorovna, 64, 82, 83, 239, 241,

245, 638, 644-
Maria Pavlovna, 103, na> 117^ «3Si

247.
Mariinski Palace, 3x9, 335, 445, 566,

619-

Mario, 280.

Markov, 3> 24, 107, 113. *5
Martov, 535^ 596.
Marxists, 127, 304 367*

658

INDEX

Maslov, S. L., 558.

Maslov, S, N,, 151.

Masson, 50.

Meller-Zakomelski, 280.

Mennonites, 179, 180.

Mensheviks, 127, 129, 390, 292, 350,
359, 36o, 368, 4*0, 449, 451, 456,
459» 4^6, 486, 487, Sio, 511, $34,
535, 538, 552, 564, 565, 567, 577,
584, 587, S8& 594, 596, 600, 619.

Merezhkovski,* 643.

Mesopotamia, 328.

Metelev, 451,

Miasoedov, 92, 234, 326.

Michael Alexandrovich, 81, 106, 117,
118, 120, 269, 294, 299, 303, 316,

323. 520, 638,

Michael Mikhailovich, 99.

Militia, see Police and Red Guard.

Miliukov, In the Duma, 24, 25, 35,
90, 114, 121, 136, 154, *66, 185,
186, 246, 256, 260, 269, 274, 280,
283, 285, 294, 303; In the Provi-
sional Government, 295, 296, 308,
309, 320, 3% 333, 335, 338, 348,
349, 353, 4<>8» 569> Other refer-
ences, 476, 481* 485, 492, 495, Sn,

Miliutin, 620,

Miloradovich, 104.

Ministers of the old regime (w also
Council of Ministers), 79, 80, 81,
85, 94, 96, 104, 106, n8, HI, 127,
*3^ 133, XS% *54» 155, ifo ^5» *6?t
170, 173, 174, 185, 188, 192, 194, 196^
197, 199, 205, 206, 210, 026, 237, 244,
245, 248, 252, 255, 256, 25fy 3#* 36x»
266, 267, 273, 319, 4o8w

Minor, 564.

Mogilev (Mohilev), 231, 300, 527,
528, 637, 638, 641,

Molostov, 381.

Molotov, 292.

Monarchist^ Monarchy, 19, 45, 133,
138, 177. 178, 182, 24& 251, *& »6xf
268, 269, 274, 276, 294, »97, 30<V 30&
39*, 482, 5x4, $9*.

Mongolia, 7, t$*

Montenegro, & 25, 5ft *» ^ '- x A
24X, fl43i 94^ fi<&

Moscow, 8% 90, 93, 06, ^ *6^ n6,
131, 133, X40, 14^ 144 xs*» I53f tA
IS9, 182, 164, xS& 241,
408, 4xx, 4x4, 4^, 45«» 480,
$*7> 530, 55*> 555* 556, 56tk»' $7%

583, 585, 587, SW. ^)i, 607, 610, 6uv

644.
Moscow State Conference, 4^7» 4&>*

5". 5^7* 52$, 530, 534, 539, 545, $$&,

585.

Motono, 69.
Muranov, 137.
Muravicv, Admiral, 76.
Muroratsev, 490.

Natokov, V., 21, 47J» 494,
Nagacv, 5«7, $<&*
Nagin, 491, 555.
Narodniks, 227, 129.
Nationalist Party, 90, 136.
Nationalities in Russia, 33, 30, 131*

134, 147, 148, *5*, 308, 3«^, W» *U

3X0, 3^9, 338, 365, 378, 391, 394* 4.15.

438, 440, 4&>> 484, 4»S, 504i 543» 547,

552, 561, 562, 564, 566.
Naumov, 74* 76, 77, «&
Navy (jrei? «to Army), 29, 76, <>,$,

100, 114, !2J-ia^ l88» 131, 3*M, d7A
3^, 387» 39&> 4«0, 4^» 4^ 4**6. 4?**
484, sxx, 5^8, SI0, 5^>, SJ8* S^>. 5»M.
S&>, 588, 596, S98» 601, 608, 616, ««;.

Nazimov, 314.

Nechaeva, 422,

Ncidhardt, 2^8.

Nekrasov, N, V., 131, 380, 36t,

334> 353, 434. 446, 475,

Nemert»tlovT 104.

Nesselrode, 66,

Nicholas II, Abdication, 53, 81, ir6,

93. 0*

107,

sooality, 86, 8f» 88,

; Ptr*

The revolution ami, 80, Si, ioaf
n4 x% x«^ tax, X4i, 185, 18^ i4&
245, »5i, 356, 26r» 268. ^ 474* ^7^
ap7t *>i» «a^ «^; Hit War and,
3f 59-3^4^54, 78» 80, 87, 89, ^4,
ioo? 108, in, si*, taa, 134, i$t, ip,

244, 297» ft^ 644: Oilier refer-
ences, Mft tj^ t^ i5fc t^ |74

INDEX

659

175, 227-237, 245, 247, 248, 252, 317,

326, 338, 385, 386, 398, 404, 520, 616,

629.
Nicholas Nicholaevich, 37, 38, 40, 46,

67, 68, 82, 88, 93, 94, 104, 133, 188,

189, 197, 199, 201, 212, 216, 219, 221,

235, 238, 242, 246, 269, 294, 295, 299,

301, 302, 403.

Nicholas, Prince, of Greece, in, 112.
Niemen, 57.

Nikitin, 479, 484, 486, 538, 558.
Nikolai Mikhailovich, 63-77, 179, x8x,

242, 246. *

Nilov, Admiral, 638.
Nizhni-Novgorod, 107, 380.
Nobility, 96, 98, 173, 177, 253, 314,

318, 379, 481, 546, 553-
Nogin, 620,
Norway, 329.
Novgorod, 570, 598, 600.
Novoe Vremia, 157, 231, 243, 447,

526, 572-

O'Beirne, 70.

Obolenski, 127,

Obolensky, Prince A. N., 246.

Octobrist Party, 20, 90, 136, 173.

Odessa, 217.

Officers, see Army.

Oldenburg, Minister, 479.

Oldenburg, Prince of, 83, 84, 240,

63&

Oldenburg (State Councillor), 280.
Olsufiev, Countess, 104.
Qppokov, see Lomov.
Order No. I, 274, 288,, 305, 384, 386,

388, 380, jo6.
Orlov, Prince Alexei, 66.
Orlov, Prince, V. N», 240.
Ovseenko, $** Antonov.

Paderin, 292.

Palchinski, 540.

Pateotogue, 49, W 56, 58, 70,

Palitsyn, 199.

Panama Canal, 647.

Panin, 105.

Paul Alexandrovich, 49, 520.

Pavlovsk, in, 525, 598, 616.

Pavlunovski, 597.

Peasants (see also Agriculture and
Land problems), 20, 21, 34, 8i, 107,
135, 179, 180, 195, 310, 337, 361,
364, 366, 370, 372-383, 397, 398, 400,
401, 428, 436, 452, 456, 460, 465,
466, 469, 470, 473, 475, 477, 482,
484, 489, 492, 499, 502, 509, 5"t
522, 535, 536, 542, 543, 545, 547,
549, 552, 563, 564, 566, 568, 571,
573, 575, 582, 583, 588, 601, 602,
604, 609, 613, 615, 618, 619, 621,
625, 628, 629,

People's Commissars, 619, 620.

Pereverzev, 353, 572.

Persia, 5, 7, 10, 13, 25, 62, 76, 202,
338, 366, 647-

Peshekhonov, 353, 476, 479, 566.

Peter and Paul (Petropavlovskaia)
Fortress, 271, 301, 319, 408, 445,
617.

Petrograd City Duma, 284, 291, 564,
577, 6n, 612.

Petrograd garrison, 260, 262, 268,
270, 271, 273, 274, 278, 279, 282,
283, 285, 287, 289, 292, 296, 305,
306, 308, 309, 314, 315, 335, 384,
386-389, 444, 452, 454, 456, 460,
461, 465, 470, 492, 513, 527, 567,
570, 573, 587, 590, 592, 594, 597,
599, 601, 608, 611, 613, 617, 636,
642.

Petrov, N. R, 154*

Petrovski, 137.

Petrunkevich, 225*

Piontkovski, 337, 363, 450, 45*, 455,
456, 509, 549*

Pltirim, 104, 157, 163, 244.

Plekhanov, 361. *

Podolia, 381. *

Pokrovski, M, N., 55, 56, 58> 60, 223,

22& ;

Pokrovski, N. N^ 66.

Poland, 10, la, 14 37, 3$» 45, 52, 57,

66, 79, 76, 83, 135, 180, 200, 243,
328, 330, 336; 405, 435, 646.

Police, 101, 102, 1X2, n& H9, 131,

126^ 128, 140, 14$ *S3» 157. 16*,

168, X7», 184, 220, %3*> 249, afo,

264 265, 27*, sSft 291, 306, 309,

313, 3*4» 335, 367, 417» W 423,

66o

INDEX

Political and civil liberty, 132, 134,
135, XSO, 15*. *6o, *45» 305, 309,
310, 312, 313, 391, 393, 627-

Political prisoners, 134, 135, 3<>5, 3W>
309, 553, 572.

Polivanov, 6$, 92, 9S> *ox, 107, 109,
in, n8, 136, 138, X39, *4*» *44»
*54> 155, 183, *9*, ao6, **o» 230,
231, 234, 235, 40S.

Polkovnikov* 590, 593-

Polovtsev, 260.

Poltava, 380.

Popular Freedom, Party of> sc*
Cadet Party.

Posen, 57, 69,

Pourtales, 157.

Pozzo di Borgo, 66.

Pravda, 453, 461, 576.

Pre-Parliament, see Provisional
Council of the Republic,

Press, 24, 39, 64, 68, 79, 97, 108, no,
1X2, 121, 132, 135, 157, *59> *6i,
168, 170, 173* 174, 182, 185, *2i,
231, 243, 277, 296, 305, 309, 3*7»
3i8, 3«7. 339» 4<>9, 434, 447, 448,
453* 457, 461, 490, 509, 52*> S26»
543* 568, 572, 576, $&t, 606, 613,
616, 621, 644.

Profiteering (see also High Cost of
Living), 101, 171, 195, 38r, 38$,
498, 499*

Progressive Bloc, 107, 113, 134, 145,
*5*> IS& 164, 260,

Prokfcpovich, 479* 48& 5S&

Protppopov, 81, S&t no, 117, xao, 155,
160, 162, 163, ito i#3f *74 a»6»
227, 236, 237, 3$*» «SS* 3#$» 39&

Provisional Council of the Republic,
54*, 54% 562, 367, 5!^ S&3,
590, 594» ! S9& S97. 60^ 617,

Prfcemysl, 43, 203, ae&

Pskov, 276, 294, 298^ 333, s^i 5W
598* 6537.

Purishkeviqh, 26^ 3^ *7& s^ 24^
269^ 409* 4** 4S>^

Putilov, 8?, 8ft 99» ^ 140^ t74

, - •' , - , ' R '' ' ' _
Radfcal-Detnocratic Party, 558,
Railways, we Transportarioii.
RamishvilHT 290*
Rasputin, & 28, 81, $?, p^ I<WE, 104,

175,

2x1, 213-219, a^t 233, jjis»

237, 240, 244, 246, 269, 271, 3*6,

398.

Rataiev, 161.
Razumov^ki, 66.
Red Cn»ss {^t* a/w War Invalids),

79, 82, 83» 84, i^«, 130,
Red Guard, 288, a8& 4»9

S5^» 569» S8o, 613.
Refugees, 98, 130, 135* *53» 180, i8i»

182, 185, 188,
Religious freedom, 131, 135, 305* jc^i,

309^310, 393-
Republic, 270, 296, 297, 3«>6f ,p8t 310,

3X4* 3I5» 3»5> 364, 3^5i 374* 4<^4.

467, 470> 508, 5^0, 534* 535, S^l.

545, SS6, S$8, 560, 57S, 582,
Rcval, n, 322, 432, 598, «ewu
Revolution, Fears and warnings o{,

19, 21, 22, 49, 80, &> 85, 90, M 94»

96, X03t 116, 118, iaot ui» ra9. UJ.

134 137, 138, 140, *44t *5& ifto*

164* X70. »8i, *8& 195. ao^ AJIJ,

223, 226, 240, «43, ^45. «47» 348,

S&lf 585,

173.
137,

Rtabushinski, 150.
Riazanov, 452, 592.
Richter^ 534-
Ri$ch> 221, 543, 57J
Riga, 217, 2*5, 5*

586.
Rivkin, 378,

Rodichev, 156, 157, *&* I7
Rodztanko, 31, 32, 82, 13^
nt aai, 346, *47»
1, 363, 367, 375, »78t

403, 409* 4*3. 478, 483,
530,

274,

Romanovski, 530.

Roosevelt, 55.

Root Mission id Russia, 3a2t 344, 3

Rosenberg, 432.

Rubinstein, D, Lf 108, 214, ^31.

Rukhlov, 98.

Rumania, ft 5$, ^ «i, «% «Bt 7%

Rusin, 66, 76.

188, 18$ 19$,

* StA
i79> aaj, 373. ITS, 637.

INDEX

661

Rykcw,

Rzhcvski, 260, 280,

Sahler, 89, 92, 97, 154.

Sack, A. J., 323.

Sadovski, 292.

Sakharov, 508,

Salaxkm, 506, 558.

Samara, 380.

Samartn, 74, 76, 77, 97, 98, 103, n8,

*55» *n, 230, 240.
Samoslov, 137.
Saratov, 380.
Savkh, 88, 637.
Savinkov, 429, 479, 49*, 494, 5*5, 5*9,

5*3, 5*4, 5$?, 5«9» 531-
Savitski, 27$.
Saxonov, 3, 24, 50, 56, 6r, 64, 67, 103,

*07» n8, 133> J37, MX, 143, 144,

*55, 158, 160, 161, 201, 202, an,

Schliissclburg, 580, 598.

Scott, James Brown, 343,

Secret treaties* 55, 6062, 371, 273,

336» 338, 35$, 359, 425, 45*, 55*,
fk8> 622, 647,

Self -determination of peoples. 307,
&«» 323, 330, 331, 333, 334, 336,
341, 343, 354, 369, 371, 374, 435,
438, 474* 55*1 S&» 574, <$2X, 646,
647,

Seiivanov, 236.

Semaanlkov, 4^ 4*, 43. 44, *57» aw7*

310,

Senate, 278,

Senior Council, see Dumau

SerWa, 9. **» *& $* 57, 59, *>,

6fc 7t» 73, Ttf, 3*9, ^46, 647*
Sergei Mikhailovich, 87, 9*, *88,
638.

Shakhovakoi, Prince D. I., 353, 44^,

445.
Shakhdfdcol, V* H^ **4» »* 120,

138, 184* 211*

Shchepktn, 131.

Shcherbatov, 95, 97, A "8, 127, 129,

184, an, 220, 239, m 240.

Shcbeko, 67, 75.

Shekhter, j^ Grinevich.

Sheremetev, D., 207.

Shidlovski, 116, 136, 260, 271, 280,

281,
Shingarev, 113, 116, 154, 258, 260,

^69, 308, 35^, 353, 434, 441, 445,

492.

Shliapnikov, 292, 620.
Shmurlo, 279.
Shulgin, 74, 76, 77, 256, 258, 280, 281,

294, 407, 409, 410, 495, 637.
Shumakher, 279.
Shumilov, 236.

Shtivaev, 86, 87, 113, 114, 225.
Shuvalov, Peter, 66.
Siberia, 98, 109, 113, n6, 136, 171,

220, 225, 236, 237, 244, 307*
Sikorski, 191.
Silesia, 57, 69.
Simbirsk, 380.
Skalov, 335.
Skarzhinski, 507, 508.
Skobeiev, 291, 299, 3", 335, 353,

479, 486, 536, 538, 546, 578.
Skoropadski, 41.
Skriabin, see Molotov.
Skvortsov, 620.
Sleswig-Holstcin, 57, 69.
Smilga, 607.
Smiroov, 555, 558.
Sinotoy Instittttc, 528, 538, 548, 553,

576, 593* 597, 598.
Social-Democrats, see dso Metishev

viks, 127, 290, 29% 353, 361, 368,

373, 390» 4*0, 459, 475, 488, 558,
5*6> 574, 575, 595, 619, 637.

Socialist - Revolutionists, 127, 290,

291, 309, 3*o, 350, 353, 359, 3<>o»

368, 373, 4X0, 44& 45^>, 45*, 455,

456, 466, 475, 487, 5W, 5«, 534,

535, 538, 55*, 558, 564, 566, 5^7,

577, 584, 587, 594, 609, $19.
Socialists, Id general, 19-22, 3ft, 34,

255, a#6, 287, 289, 303, 304, 307,

330, 3^ 3*9, ?39, 34** 34*, 350,

359, 36x, 36& W, 368, 370, 37*,

374, 375, 3«8> 4^8, 4«7, ^5, 4^»
440, 441, 444, 45*, 457, 4% 4<S4,
470, 47*, 476^ 477, 480,

5Ht 5H 533, 537, 543,
568, 57^ 573, 58^ 6t
Socialists, National, 350, 353,

475, 5«&

662

INDEX

Sokolnikov, 534.

Sokolov, N. D.» 292, 432, 433.

Sokolovski, 292, 506.

Soviet, at Petrograd, Organization

and first steps, 266, 268, -270, 285,

288, 291, 293, 295.
Spain, 69, 70.
Special Councils (wartime), 79, 89,

90, 9*» 93, S& 99, xoj, 102, 109, 114,

Il6, 1 2O, 122,, X25.

Spring-Rice* 56.

Staal, A. F., 520.

Stakheev, 280.

Stakhovich, 280,

Stalin, 292, 448, 620.

Stankevich, 292.

State Council, 3, 30, 32, 74, 95, 99*
xox, 106, 116, 118, 122, 123, 124,
12$, 134, 144, 175, 228, *37> «44»
250, 277, 279, 410, 4**» 4*3* 470,
553*

State Duma, see Duma.

Steklov, 291, 31**

Stepanov, 441.

Stishinski, 172.

Stockholm, 48, no, 162, 163, *73» 340,
648.

Stolypin, n.

Straits, see Dardanelles,

Strikes* see Labor.

Stuchka, 291,

Students m the revolution* 259, 265,

*9*, 383*
Stunner, 51, 70, 105, *o8, no, 112,

114, 150; 159, i6x, 163, 165, 166,

173, 195, 236, 232, 335, s*3<5» $4&>

248, 326, 408,
Suez Canal, 647*
Sukhanov, see Gimmer,
SukhomHiwv, 83, 85, 88, 90, 9^ *$4>

167.

SverdBov, 451,
Sviatitski, 292.

Sweden, iot ixat x$8T 329, 609.
Switasetton^ i6lt ?62, 32^ 367.
Synod, see Church ana Obrgy.

7**

Taurida, 179-

Taurida l^Iace, 175,
319, 409, 41 *» 44S» 44^*
454, 456, 46i» 477» 57^-

Tcreshchenkt*, iio» no, 131,

355, 435» 439, 440. 475.

45*.
35J*

lew,

Thcodorovich,
Thomas, 109,
Tibet, 7, 237-
Timashev, 109.
Tobolsk, 97, «
Tolstoi, a$o.

Trade Unions, jrrr Labor.
Transportation, n» 98, 101

n6, 123, XJ$, iji* i8j» 188.

X95, 225* ^ ^78, ^70, 3J(o,

35«» 354* 399, W* 4^3. 474i

499, 500, 5«^ 5«8, S«2»» 54J.

564, 588, 6x2. 614, 618.
Transylvania, S7« W, 74, 180.
Trcbteoiul <Tra|>cxund), Jtu.
Trepov, A. F.» 98, 114, l«(^ i7Jf* 193*
Trctiakov. 549. 5S5» SJ*
Triple Alliance, £4* 7**-
Triple Entente. & 43. ^4. 5*. 5>.
Trotski, 357» 4^>» 4^a» 554* 5N*

$69, 575, 5&*, SW 5<M* S«A

601, 6i3» 616, &M,
Trul>ct?;koi, -So.

Truh«t»koif Gitgory, 75* 7<i 77.
TmcJoviki^ ^rr tabcir
T$eretellit a^» 350,
400, 4^5* 434»
466, 47<i 4»I»

495* SOi* $**« 5J5> 137* 54^ |$4t

5S5, 557, SS4» #5» 57%
Twrgenev, 644* &4S*
Turkestan, 10, 171^ 144,
Turkey,

Tver*

Tatbhchev, ilo,

SIS-

435-443, 55*
Ulianov, see Leniit
Union of Cttiet, 79, 112, nj,

I30y I}|t 13^ 140, t^f 144

1 4&I*

INDEX

663

Vainstein, 280.

Vakulenko, 292.

Varnava, 97, 101, 174, 230.

Vasilchikov, Boris, 244.

Vasilchikova, Maria, 40-48, 103, 104,

161.

Vasiliev, 280.
Velikhov, 4I7»
Venizelos, 59, 112.
Verbo, 432, 433-
Vederevski, 538, 558.
Verkhovski, 538, S5&
Vernadski, 280.
Vernander, 235.
Vershinin, 300.
Viazemski, Prince, 274, 275.
Vilenkin, 401.
Villasinda, Marquis, 69.
Vilna, 213.
Vinogradov, 38-39-
Vishnevski, 159.
Viviani, 109.

Vladimir, Metropolitan, 104.
Voeikov, 241, 638.
Voitinski, 35O, 440*, 5^3-
Volia Rossii, no, 173.
Volkonski, Prince V., 95, 4**-
Volkov, General, 83, 84.
Volodarski, 449-
Volzhin, 174-
Von Dehn, 222.
Vorontsov-Dashkov, 207,
Vyrttbov, V. V., 83.
Vyrubova, 28, 101, 105, 163, 198, 199,

204, 218, 227, 232, 235, 236, 246,

639.
Vyshnegradski, 88, 89.

Wages, &e Labor.

War aims, 22, 316, 320-347. 355,
370, 371, 373, 374, 395, 3$,
463, 464, 468, 472, 498, 509,/55*»
559, 574, 618, 621, 646* 648.

War-Industry Committee* 9, 121,

124, 130, 132, 160, 243, „ 284.
War invalids (see also >£&]. Cross),

82, 84, 130, 135, 142, /46,< I53» 180,

102, 503. /

War prisoners, 46, 48; 171, 180, 212,

220, 224, 357, 377, 647-
War-Revolutionary Committee, 570,

580, 587, 590, 593, 594, 616, 618.
Warburg, 163, 173.
Warsaw, 83, 84, 405.
Weinstein, 486, 487, 534-
Wiborg, 400, 598, 607, 608, 610.
William II, 44, 48, 50, 104, 168, 338,

357, 397, 398, 454, 544, 590, 615.
Wilson, President, 55, 56, 224, 322,

343, 345, 347, 4*5, 5*2, 648.
Winter Palace, 30, 31, 475, 477, 479,

483, 5x6, 535, 538, 555, 557, 617.
Witte, 3.
Wounded soldiers, see War invalids.

Xenia Alexandrovna, 64, 77, 240,
245, %•

Yusugpv, 9*> 94, 176.

ZaljjtsH 292.

Z^jpyslovsld, 159, 170.
J idny, 416, 479, 538, 539-
hchina, 243.

stvo, 79, 83, 85, 87, 94, 96, 99,
X02, 1X2, 113, 125, 130, 136, 140,
142, 146-149* 150, 151, 153, *50\
160, 243, 251, 284, 313, 314, 369,
375, 376, 415, 483, 484, 489* 506,
543, 547, 503, 6*5-

Zemstvo-Octobrists, 113, 136.

Zenzinov, 292.

Zimmerwald, 329, 352*

Zinoviev, 350, 450, 452, 460, 462, 575,
576, 595-

Zubashov,

130901

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