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DUPLEIX  AND  GLIVE 


DUPLEIX  AND  GLIVE 

THE  BEGINNING  OF 
EMPIRE 


BY 

HENRY    DODWELL 

M.A.(OXON.),  F.R.HIST.S. 

CURATOR  OF    THE    MADRAS    RECORD  OFFICE 


C'KST  SE  FAIRE  UHE  CONCEPTION  PAUSSE  OS  NOTRB 
NATURE  QUE  DS  LA  CROIRE  CAPABLE  DE  VOIR 
filBN   LOIN   ET   DE   VOULOIR   SANS   D^PAILLANCE  .   .   . 

PROS?ER  CULTRU 


METHUEN   &   CO.    LTD   ^ 
36    ESSEX    STREET    W.C. 
LONDON 


First  Published  in  ig20 


PREFACE 

THE  following  pages  are  based  principally  upon  the  East 
India  Company's  records  preserved  under  my  own  care 
at  Madras,  the  Bengal  Records  preserved  at  the  India 
Office,  and  the  Orme  MSS.,  also  preserved  at  the  India  Office. 
I  have  further  consulted  the  Admiralty  and  War  Office  papers 
at  the  Public  Record  Office,  various  MS.  collections  at  the  British 
Museum,  with  the  Miscellaneous  Letters  Received  and  the  Home- 
Miscellaneous  series  at  the  India  Office,  and  papers  lodged  in 
the  archives  of  the  French  Ministry  of  the  Colonies  and  at  Pondi- 
ch6ry.     I  must  acknowledge  with  great  gratitude  the  unvarying 
courtesy  and  ready  help  I  received  from  the  various  custodians 
of  these  papers.    Perhaps  M.  Martineau,  late  Governor  of  the 
French  Establishments  in  India,  and  Mr.  W.  Foster,  C.I.E.,  of 
the  India  Office,  will  allow  me  thus  publicly  to  announce  my 
special  debt  to  their  wide  knowledge  and  experience.    I  am  also 
under  great  obligations  to  Mr.  S.  C.  Hill,  not  only  for  numerous 
suggestions,  indications,  and  references  in  the  course   of  my 
research,  but  also  as  the  editor  of  Bengal  iT 56-57,  a  collection 
of  documents  which  I  have  found  it  impossible  to  supplement. 
Above  all,  I  am  obhged  to  Mr.  Mark  Hunter,  of  the  Indian 
Educational  Service,  who  was  to  have  been  the  author  of  the 
present  work.    When  he  found  his  other  engagements  too  pressing, 
he  not  only  suggested  my  undertaking  it,  but  also  gave  me  with 
the  greatest  generosity  his  MS.  collections,  of  which  I  have  made 
extensive  use.    My  indebtedness  to  printed  works  is  too  extensive 
to  be  here  particularised,  but  is,  I  hope,  fully  indicated  in  my 
footnotes  and  the  appended  Bibhography. 


CONTENTS 


Preface 

Bibliography 

Introduction 


PACE 

vii 


XI 
XV 


PART  I 
THE  FRENCH  EFFORT 

CilAP. 

I.  The  War  of  the  Austrian  Succession 
II.  The  Successes  of  Dupleix 

III.  The  Failure  of  Dupleix    . 

IV.  BUSSY  IN  THE   DECCAN 

V.  The  Policy  of  Dupleix 


3 

3' 

54 

84 

103 


PART   II 

THE  ENGLISH   ACHIEVEMENT 

I.  The  Overthrow  of  Siraj-ud-daula 
II.  Clive's  First  Government  . 

III.  The  Supremacy  of  the  Carnatic 

IV.  The  Policy  of  Non-intervention 
V.  The  Downfall  of  Mir  Kasim 

VI.  Clive's  Political  Settlement 
VII.  Clive's  Administrative  Settlement 
Conclusion      .... 


117 
138 
158 
190 

213 
238 
252 
270 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

UNPUBLISHED  MS.  COLLECTIONS 

The  Orme  MSS.  (India  Office  Library). 

The  Madras  Records  (Madras  Record  Office). 

The  Bengal  Records  (India  Office  Library). 

The  Admiralty  Records  (Public  Record  Office). 

The  War  Office  Records  {ibid.). 

The  Archives  de  PondichAry. 

The  Archives  du  MiNisxfcRE  colonial,  Paris. 

PRINTED  DOCUMENTS 

The  Records  of  Fort  St.  George  (folio,  Madras) : 

Country  Correspondence,  1740,  1748-49.  ITS'.  1753-58  (1908-15)- 

Military  Consultations,  1752-56  (5  vols.     1910-13). 

French  Correspondence,  1750-52  (3  vols.     1914-16). 

The  Siege  Diary,  1758-59,  Public  Sundry  No.  13  (l  vol.     I9I5)- 

Publications  of  the  Socifixf  de  l'histoire  de  l'Inde  Fran^aise  : 
Pondich^ry  en  1746  (191 1). 

Deliberations  du  Conseil  Superieur,  1701-39  (3  vols.     191 1-14). 
Lettres  et  Conventions,  1666-1793  (i  vol.     1914). 

Correspondance  du  conseil  supdrieur  de  Pondichery  avec  le  conseil  de 
Chandernagore,  1728-57  (3  vols.     191 5-18). 

Hill,  S.  C— Catalogue  of  the  Orme  MSS.    Oxford,  8vo,  1916. 

Nazelle,  le  Marquis  de.— Dupleix  et  la  defense  de  Pondichdry.    Paris, 
8vo,  1908. 

Ananda  Ranga  Pillai — Diary  (Madras,  8vo) : 

Vols.  i.-iii.,  1736-1747  (ed.  Sir  FREDERIC  PRICE). 
Vols,  iv.-vi.,  1747-1750  (ed.  H.  Dodwell). 
{In  progress.) 


xii  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

Love,  Colonel  H.  D.— Vestiges  of  Old  Madras.    (Indian  Record  Series.) 
3  vols.    8vo,  1918. 

DODWELL,  H. — Calendar  of  the  Madras  Records,  1740-44.     Madras,  8vo,  1917. 

D'ACH^. — Despatches,  ap.  La  vie  priv^e  de  Louis  XV,  par  Moufle  d'Angerville. 
Paris,  8vo,  1781. 

La  Farelle. — Mdmoires  et  Correspondance.     Paris,  8vo,  1896. 

Lettres  edifiantes  et  curieuses  (ed.  Aim£-Martin),  vol.  ii.    Paris,  8vo,  1839. 

Parliamentary  Reports  of  the  Secret  and  Select  Committees.    Folio,  1772-73. 

Long,  J. — Selections  from  the  Unpublished  Records  of  Government,  1748-67. 
Calcutta,  Svo,  1869. 

Hill,  S.  C. — Abstract  of  the  Early  Records  of  the  Foreign  Department 
Calcutta,  folio,  1901. 

Bengal  in  1756-57.    (Indian  Record  Series.)    3  vols.    Svo,  1905. 

Calendar  of  Persian  Correspondence,  1759-67.    Calcutta,  Svo,  191 1. 

Law,  J. — Mdmoires  sur  quelques  affaires  de  I'empire  mogul  (ed.  A.  Martineau). 
Paris,  Svo,  1913. 


CONTEMPORARY  CONTROVERSY 

{a)   FRENCH 

Memoire  pour  La  Bourdonnais  [and  supplement].     Paris,  4to,  1750-51. 

M^moire  pour  La  Gatinais.    Paris,  4to,  1750. 

Memoire  pour  la  famille  de  Dupleix.    Paris,  410,  1751. 

Histoire  de  la  demi^re  revolution  des  Indes  Orientales,  par  M.  L.  L.  M.    Paris, 
i2mo,  1757. 

Relation  du  sifege  de  Pondich^ry,  ap.  Collection  historique  .  .  .  pour  servir 
k  I'histoire  de  la  guerre  terminde  [en  1748].     London,  i2mo,  1758. 

Mdmoire  pour  Dupleix  contre  la  Compagnie  des  Indes.    Paris,  410,  1759. 

Lettre  de  Godeheu  k  Dupleix.    Paris,  410,  1760. 

Memoire  pour  la  Compagnie  des  Indes  contre  Dupleix.    Paris,  4to,  1763. 

Plainte  du  Chevalier  Law.    Paris,  4to,  1763. 

Rdponse  de  Dupleix  k  la  lettre  de  Godeheu.     Paris,  4to,  1763. 

Refutation  des  faits  imputes  k  Godeheu.    Paris,  4to,  1764. 

Mdmoire  pour  Bussy  expositif  de  ses  cr^ances  sur  la  Compagnie  des  Indes. 
Paris,  4to,  1764. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  xiii 

M^moire  pour  Bussy  au  sujet  du  mdmoire  que  Lally  vient  de  r^pandre  dans  le 
public.     Paris,  4to,  1 766. 

M^moire  pour  Bussy  centre  la  Compagnie.    Paris,  410,  1767. 

M6moire  pour  Lally  contre  le  Procureur-gfo^rale.    3  parts.    Paris,  410,  1766. 

Lettres  de  d'Ach6  k  Lally.    Paris,  4to,  1766. 

Lettres  de  Leyrit  k  Lally.    Paris,  4to,  1766. 

M^moire  pour  d'Ach^.    Paris,  4to,  1 766. 

(6)  MADRAS 

[MoNSON,  William]. — A  Letter  to  a  Proprietor  of  the  East  India  Company. 
8vo,  n.d.,  123  pp.  (I.O.  Tracts). 

Narrative  of  the  Transactions  of  the  British  Squadrons  in  the  East  Indies  .  .  . 
by  an  Officer  who  served  in  those  Squadrons.    8vo,  1751. 

Journal  ...  of  the  Boscaweris  Voyage  to  Bombay  ...  by  Philalethes.  8vo, 
1750- 

{c)  BENGAL 

[Watts,  William].— Memoirs  of  the  Revolution  in  Bengal  in  the  Year  1757. 
Svo,  1760. 

An  Authentic  Account  of  the  Proceedings  of  .  .  .  the  States  of  Holland  and 
West  Friesland  on  the  Complaints  laid  before  them  by  Sir  Joseph  Yorke. 
[With  appendix  of  original  letters.]    4to,  1762. 

A  Defence  of  the  United  Merchants  of  England  .  .  .  against  the  Complaints 
of  the  Dutch  East  India  Company  .  .  .    4to,  1762. 

''[Caillaud,  John]. — Narrative  of  what  happened  in  Bengal  in  the  Year  1760. 
Svo,  n.d. 

HOLWELL,  J.  Z.— India  Tracts.    4to,  1764  (2nd  ed.). 

Vansittart,  H.— Narrative.    3  vols.    Svo,  1766. 

Address  from  .  .  .  Holwell  .  .  .  to  .  .  .  Scrafton  in  reply  to  his  .  .  .  Observa- 
tions on  Mr.  Vansittart's  Narrative.    Svo,  1767. 

Strachey,  H. — Narrative  of  the  Mutiny  of  the  Officers  in  Bengal.    Svo,  1773. 

Proceedings  of  the  Court-Martial  on  Sir  Robert  Fletcher.    Svo,  n.d. 

Bolts,  W.— Considerations  on  Indian  Affairs.    3  vols.    4to,  1772-75. 

Caraccioli,  C— Life  of  Robert,  Lord  Clive.    4  vols.    Svo  [1777]. 


xiv  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

OTHER  WORKS 

Cambridgk,  R.  O. — Account  of  the  War  in  India.    4to,  1761. 

Orme,  R. — History  of  the  Military  Transactions  of  the  British   Nation  in 
Indostan.    3  vols.    410,  1803  (4th  ed.). 

Malcolm,  Sir  J. — Life  of  Lord  Clive.    3  vols.    8vo,  1836. 

Forrest,  Sir  G.— Life  of  Lord  Clive.    2  vols.    8vo,  1918. 

Grant,  J. — Sketch  of  the  History  of  the  East  India  Company.    8vo,  1813. 

Waddington.— La  Guerre  des  Sept  Ans.    4  vols.    Paris,  8vo,  1899. 

CORBETT,  J.— England  in  the  Seven  Years'  War.    2  vols.    8vo,  1907. 

WiLKS,  M. — Historical  Sketches  of  the  South  of  India.    2  vols.    Madras, 
8vo,  1869. 

Gentil. — Mdmoires  sur  Hindustan.    Paris,  8vo,  1822. 

Hamont,  T. — Dupleix  d'apr&s  sa  correspondance  inddite.    Paris,  8vo,  1881. 

Cultru,  p. — Dupleix,  ses  idees,  sa  politique  et  sa  chute.     Paris,  8vo,  1901. 

Hamont,  T.— Lally-ToUendal.     Paris,  8vo,  1887. 

Grant,  C. — History  of  Mauritius.    4to,  1801. 

Lacour-Gayet,    G. — La  marine  militaire  de  la  France  sous  le  r^gne  de 
Louis  XV.    Paris,  8vo,  1910. 

Du  Teil,  J.  Baron.— Une  famille  militaire  au  i8«  sifede.    Paris,  8vo,  1896. 

Ives,  E.— Voyage  to  India.    8vo,  1773. 

Broome,  A.— Rise  and  Progress  of  the  Bengal  Army.    Calcutta,  8vo,  1850. 

Hyde,  H.  B.— The  Parochial  Annals  of  Bengal.    Calcutta,  8vo,  1901. 

Klerk  de  Reuss. — De  expeditie  naar  Bengale  en  1759  {ap.  Indische  Gids, 
1889,  vol.  ii.,  p.  2093  ;  and  1894,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  27  and  247). 

Hill,  S.  C— Three  Frenchmen  in  Bengal.    8vo,  1903. 


INTRODUCTION 

IT  is  not  my  purpose  in  the  following  pages  to  attempt 
writing    the    personal    history   of    the    two  great   though 

essentially  different  men  whose  names  I  have  placed  upon 
my  title-page,  but  rather  to  sketch  the  history  of  the  ideas  and 
conditions  which  under  their  impulse  resulted  in  the  establish- 
ment of  the  English  Company  as  the  principal  power  in  India, 
and  to  trace  out  the  obUgations  of  the  EngUsh  to  the  French. 
Those  obhgations  have  conamonly  been  minimised  by  the 
historians  of  the  first,  and  exaggerated  by  the  historians  of  the 
second  nation.  And  the  last  considerable  English  writer  on 
this  subject.  Colonel  Malleson,  abounds  in  gross  mistakes  and 
crude  generalisations.  He  repeats  the  old  traditional  and  in- 
acciurate  views  that  the  battle  of  the  Adiyar  first  revealed  the 
military  superiority  of  the  European,  that  Dupleix  was  less  well 
supported  by  the  Company  at  Paris  than  was  Savmders  by  the 
Company  at  London,  that  Lally's  poUcy  in  recalling  Bussy  from 
the  Deccan  was  ruinous  to  the  French  cause.  These  ideas 
when  brought  to  a  comparison  with  facts  prove  to  be  erroneous. 

Our  subject  falls  evidently  into  two  well-defined  and  yet 
closely  connected  parts.  The  first  is  concerned  with  the  projects 
of  Dupleix,  arising  out  of  the  struggle  of  the  War  of  the  Austrian 
Succession.  The  vicissitudes  of  that  struggle  led  Dupleix  into 
conflicts  with  the  Nawab  of  the  Carnatic  and  left  him  with 
augmented  military  power  at  the  very  moment  when  a  freak 
of  fortune  thrust  into  his  anps  as  an  ally  the  Nawab 's  rival  and 


xvi  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

competitor,  Chanda  Sahib.  The  Nawab  was  slain  in  battle ; 
Chanda  Sahib  was  formally  seated  on  the  masnad  of  Arcot ;  he 
lavished  grants  of  territory  upon  his  allies ;  and  the  English, 
after  a  momentary  indecision,  drew  the  sword  on  behalf  of  the 
late  Nawab's  son,  Muhammad  Ah,  in  fear  lest  their  settlements 
should  be  encircled  by  French  grants  and  their  commerce  strangled 
by  French  imposts.  A  bitter  struggle  ensued  in  which  the 
French  at  first  carried  off  all  the  advantages.  Nazir  Jang,  the 
Subahdar  of  the  Deccan,  and  as  such  overlord  of  the  Camatic, 
came  to  pull  down  the  French  Nawab,  but  was  himself  slain  by 
treachery  ;  and  his  expedition  ended  in  the  establishment  of 
a  French  Subahdar  of  the  Deccan  as  well  as  a  French  Nawab  of 
Arcot. 

But  this  very  success  contributed  to  the  ruin  of  Dupleix. 
He  had  flung  his  nets  too  wide  ;  he  had  dissipated  his  forces  ; 
he  had  sent  Bussy,  his  only  officer  of  real  merit,  away  to  Auran- 
gabad  when  he  was  needed  urgently  at  Trichinopoly.  Dupleix 
never  recovered  from  the  consequences  of  this  error.  Bussy 
and  his  forces  would  have  tiuned  the  scale  against  the  EngUsh 
in  the  south.  But  instead  of  this,  Lawrence  and  Clive  won  such 
conspicuous  successes  that  the  French  Company  recalled  Dupleix 
in  weariness  of  an  unending  war  the  motives  and  purposes  of 
which  had  never  been  explained  to  them.  In  the  course  of  this 
struggle  Dupleix  had  developed  a  whole  system  of  policy.  He 
had  begun  by  selUng  mercenaries  to  a  pretender.  He  ended  by 
claiming  the  authority  of  government  over  all  the  country 
that  Ues  south  of  the  river  Kistna.  This  again  was  a  mistake 
almost  as  essential  as  the  dispersion  of  his  force.  How  was  it 
to  be  expected  that  the  English  would  ever  consent  to  recognise 
such  powers  in  French  hands  so  long  as  they  retained  the  barest 
hold  on  the  Coromandel  Coast  ?  Thus  Dupleix  was  beaten, 
partly  because  he  did  not  foresee  wlaither  his  poHcy  would  lead 


y/ 


INTRODUCTION  xvii 


him,  partly  because  he  grasped  at  so  much  ostensible  power  that 
the  EngUsh  coiild  not  possibly  avoid  seeing  the  danger  that 
threatened  them.  Meanwhile  Bussy  in  the  Deccan  had  main- 
tained his  position  of  predominance  and  accumulated  an  immense 
fortime.  The  two  men  had  thus  shown  both  what  could  be  done 
and  what  should  be  avoided  in  intercourse  with  the  native 
powers. 

The  French  experience  contained  another  warning  also.  The 
officers  employed  in  the  Deccan,  the  officers  and  civihans  em- 
ployed in  the  Camatic,  had  such  opportunities  of  acquiring 
fortunes  as  had  never  before  been  afforded  to  Europeans  in 
India.  Leaders  and  subordinates  alike  took  or  strove  to  take 
full  advantage  of  these  extraordinary  conditions.  The  result 
was  a  disorganisation  of  the  old  system,  a  sudden  growth  of 
insubordination,  civil  and  miUtary,  which  rendered  government 
almost  impossible  and  went  far  to  weaken,  distract,  and  nullify 
the  later  efforts  of  the  French  in  the  Seven  Years  War. 

In  all  this  CUve  had  been  either  a  deeply  interested  spectator 
or  a  prominent  actor.  He  was  near  thirty  years  younger  than 
Dupleix,  who  was  fifty  when  he  embarked  on  his  great  specula- 

Kon.  Clive  had  come  out  a  writer  to  Madras  in  1744,  on  the 
i^e  of  war.  Two  years  later  the  capture  of  Madras  had  deprived 
im  of  employment  and  driven  him  into  the  profession  of  arms. 
He  took  part  in  all  the  fighting  which  ensued  on  Dupleix's  efforts 
to  capture  Fort  St.  David,  and  was  employed  in  Boscawen's 
siege  of  Pondich^ry.  On  the  conclusion  of  peace,  he  reverted  to 
civil  employment ;  but  on  the  renewal  of  hostilities  he  found 
quasi-military  occupation  in  charge  of  the  Commissariat,  which 
in  about  three  years  yielded  him  a  fortune  of  £40,000.  All  the 
last  part  of  this  period,  however,  he  was  in  active  miUtary  service, 
having  received  rank  as  Captain.  He  maintained  his  famous 
defence  of  Arcot,  assisted  Lawrence  in  the  operations  which  led 


xviii  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

to  the  surrender  of  the  French  army  before  Trichinopoly,  and 
drove  the  French  out  of  the  Arcot  country. 

After  these  services,  in  1753,  he  went  home  to  enjoy  his  fortune. 
But  his  generosity  and  extravagance  speedily  outran  his  means. 
In  1755  he  returned  to  India  as  second  on  the  Coromandel  Coast 
with  right  of  succession  to  the  Presidency  of  Fort  St.  George. 
After  co-operating  in  the  reduction  of  the  pirate  stronghold  of 
Gheriah  on  the  Malabar  Coast,  he  proceeded  to  Madras. 

At  this  very  moment  troubles  broke  out  with  the  Subahdar 
of  Bengal,  Siraj-ud-daula.  Calcutta  was  captured  by  him ; 
123  of  his  prisoners  yrere  suffocated  in  the  Black  Hole  in  which 
they  were  confined ;  the  important  investment  which  the  Com- 
pany drew  from  Bengal  was  abruptly  stopped.  This  discovered 
the  scene  on  which  CUve  was  to  put  into  practice  the  lessons  of 
war  and  politics  which  he  had  learnt  in  the  South.  Thus  the 
second  part  of  the  story  opens — distinct  from  the  first  because 
its  scene  was  remote  from  the  Camatic,  yet  resulting  from  the 
first,  flowing  in  natural  sequence  out  of  it,  because  the  actors 
were  the  troops  and  officers  who  had  previously  been  concentrated 
at  Madras,  because  their  ideas,  poHcy,  and  purpose  were  the 
fruits  of  their  experience  in  the  Camatic,  and  because  the  success 
which  Clive  won  in  Bengal  reacted  powerfully  on  the  later  phases 
of  the  Camatic  struggle.  The  connection  may  therefore  be  briefly 
stated  as  follows  :  English  predominance  could  be  estabhshed 
in  Bengal,  thanks  to  the  accumulation  of  troops  necessitated  by 
the  wars  of  Dupleix ;  the  Madras  army  was  kept  together  and 
enabled  to  overthrow  LaUy  and  captrure  Pondichery  by  the 
supplies  of  money  which  predominance  in  Bengal  placed  at  their 
disposal. 

Lastly,  we  shall  have  to  trace  the  gradual  progress  of  the 
English  position  in  Bengal  itself.  It  begins  with  a  predominant 
influence  exactly  similar  to  that  of  Dupleix  over  Chanda  Sahib 


INTRODUCTION  xix 

or  that  of  Bussy  over  Salabat  Jang.  This  is  the  result  of  Chve's 
first  visit  to  Bengal,  1756-60.  But  the  maintenance  of  this 
position  demanded  constant  watchfulness  and  dexterity.  Clive's 
successors  failed  altogether  to  maintain  it.  They  suffered  the 
Nawab  to  get  out  of  hand  ;  worse  still,  they  suffered  their  own 
subordinates,  civil  and  military,  to  get  out  of  hand  as  well. 
Private  interests  were  adopted  as  the  principal  motives  of  govern- 
ment. The  orders  of  Council,  the  orders  of  the  Company, 
were  canvassed  and  adopted  or  set  aside ;  and  the  authorities 
of  Calcutta  were  as  helpless  in  1764  as  the  authorities  of  Pondi- 
chdry  in  1758.  In  both  cases  the  desire  of  wealth  and  the  oppor- 
tunities of  attaining  it,  opened  out  by  participation  in  Indian 
politics,  had  disorganised  the  Company's  government.  At 
Pondich^ry  an  attempt  at  reformation  was  made  by  LaUy 
(1758-61) ;  it  failed  because  such  a  reform  could  not  be  carried 
out  in  the  midst  of  war.  At  Calcutta  CUve  was  charged  in  his 
second  government  (1765-67)  with  a  similar  reform  which  he 
effected  at  the  same  time  that  he  found  a  basis  for  the  future 
development  of  English  rule.  This  last  marks  an  important 
advance  on  the  ideas  and  policy  of  Dupleix,  and  constitutes 
Clive's  individual  contribution  towards  solving  the  problem  of 
European  administration  in  the  East.  Such  is  the  dual  story, 
with  its  parallel  developments,  the  main  outlines  of  which  I 
hope  to  disengage  in  the  following  pages. 


PART    I 

THE   FRENCH   EFFORT 


CHAPTER   I 

THE  WAR  OF  THE  AUSTRIAN  SUCCESSION 

AT  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  relations 
between  Madras  and  Pondichery  had  been  very  friendly. 
The  French  settlement  was  in  its  infancy.  The  popula- 
tion was  small,  and  its  fortifications  even  for  India  feeble,  when 
England  and  Holland  were  in  arms  against  France  in  the  War 
of  the  Spanish  Succession.  Its  founder  and  governor,  Fran9ois 
Martin,  had  reason  to  fear  that  his  work  would  again  be  ruined, 
as  it  had  aheady  been  by  the  Dutch  in  1696.  He  therefore 
induced  Pitt,  Governor  of  Madras,  to  enter  into  a  treaty  of 
neutrality  under  which  the  men  and  ships  of  the  two  settlements 
were  not  to  attack  each  other.  When  Martin  believed  that  the 
Dutch  were  preparing  to  besiege  Pondichery,  French  goods 
were  sent  to  the  EngHsh  settlement  for  safety.  When  a  French 
squadron  appeared  in  Indian  waters  and  began  to  seize  EngUsh 
shipping,  the  Pondich6ry  Council  did  its  best  to  limit  its  captures, 
and  to  secure  good  terms  of  ransom  for  English  prizes,  while 
the  English  were  so  obliging  as  to  remit  the  proceeds  of  the 
French  prizes  to  Bengal  for  the  French  investment. ^ 

But  the  growth  of  Pondichery  and  the  development  of  its 
trade  during  the  twenty  years  1720  to  1740  put  a  different 
aspect  on  affairs.  So  early  as  1721  the  French  believed  that 
EngUsh  merchants  were  jealous  of  their  trade  to  Manila.  ^  In 
1725  the  rival  settlements  of  Mahe  and  Tellicherry  were  almost 
involved  in  open  war  on  the  coast  of  Malabar.  In  1736  the 
French  had  become  "  our  most  dangerous  rivals  "  ;  ^  and  at  the 
close  of  the  following  year  the  EngHsh  directors  wrote  :  "  The 
most  particular  intelligence  procurable  concerning  those  powerful 
competitors,  the  French,  and  their  commerce,  must  annually 
be  communicated  to  us."  *  In  1744  the  Enghsh  called  in  the 
assistance  of  the  native  authorities  to  prevent  weavers  employed 

'  See  Deliberations  du  Conseil  Supfrieur,  vol.  i.  pp.  6-8,  T5,  34,  36,  39,  106. 
»  Ibid.,  vol.  i.  pp.  290-291.         »  Wheeler,  Madras  in  the  Olden  Time,  p.  549. 
•  Pub.  Des.  from  England,  December  30,  1737. 

3 


\ 


/ 


4  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

by  them  from  being  seduced  into  making  cloth  for  the  French.* 
When  therefore  it  became  hkely  that  France  would  take  part 
in  the  war  already  raging  between  Spain  and  England,  the 
problem  of  Anglo-French  relations  in  the  East  Indies  became 
acute.  In  both  countries  those  interested  in  the  India  trade 
were  divided  into  two  camps.  On  the  one  hand,  it  was  urged 
that  war  would  give  the  long-needed  opportunity  of  destroying 
the  commerce  of  troublesome  rivals  ;  on  the  other  hand,  many 
held  that  trading  companies  stood  to  lose  more  than  to  gain  by 
participating  in  the  struggle,  that  their  fortresses  and  troops 
were  only  intended  to  check  the  encroachments  of  Indian  princes, 
and  that  neutrality  in  the  national  struggle  afforded  the  most 
advantageous  course. 

The  latter  view  well  illustrates  the  ambiguous  position  that 
the  Companies  occupied.  In  Europe  they  were  mere  private 
corporations ;  in  India  they  were  political  entities.  Being 
directed  from  Europe,  it  was  natural  that  their  political  functions 
should  always  be  subordinated  to  their  commercial  interests, 
for  they  were  designed  to  enrich  the  nations  they  represented, 
rather  than  to  develop  or  extend  their  overseas  influence  and 
territory.  Even  the  advocates  of  war  hardly  could  claim  a 
clear-sighted  conception  of  what  they  were  about.  The  real 
question  at  issue  was  whether  or  no  to  embark  on  a  struggle 
wTiich  would  determine  the  possession  of  India  ;  but  no  one 
perceived  this. 

La  Boui'donnais,  the  Governor  of  the  French  Islands,  urged 
activity  on  the  French  Ministry  in  1740-41,  because  he  hoped  to 
make  handsome  profits  out  of  captured  prizes.  The  English 
directorate  sought  a  squadron  from  the  Admiralty  in  1744  because 
they  wished  to  see  rival  trade  destroyed  and  rival  ships  swept 
from  the  Indian  Seas.  Many  in  England  and  most  in  France 
desired  a  neutraUty  because  they  hoped  thus  to  avoid  disturb- 
ances of  commerce  and  reductions  of  dividends  ;  while  the 
Companies'  servants  in  the  East  were  too  deeply  involved  in 
private  trade  not  to  deprecate  anything  which  would  threaten 
their  private  fortunes.  The  net  result  was  that  neither  Company 
desired  to  take  an  active  part  in  the  war  ;  but  the  English 
Company  longed  to  see  its  rival's  commerce  injured  by  a  royal 
squadron.     A  similar  resolve  had  almost  prevailed  in  France. 

In  1741  La  Bourdonnais'  vigorous  representative  so  far 
impressed  the  French  Ministry  that  he  was  sent  out  to  the  Isle 
•  Madras  Pub.  Cons.,  May  2  and  28,  1744. 


THE  WAR  OF  THE  AUSTRIAN  SUCCESSION         5 

of  France  with  a  squadron  and  orders  to  attack  the  English 
trade  as  soon  as  he  should  hear  of  the  dedaration  of  war.  But 
the  weight  of  French  opinion  inclined  the  other  way.  From 
the  time  of  its  reconstruction  in  1721,  the  Company  had  suffered 
from  a  lack  of  capital ;  and  it  had  only  succeeded  in  sending 
out  its  yearly  cargoes  by  a  system  of  annual  loans,  which  had  to 
be  paid  off  out  of  the  proceeds  of  each  year's  sales.  The  conse- 
quence was  that  the  failure  of  a  single  year's  shipping  would 
involve  the  non-payment  of  the  loans  falling  due,  the  impossibility 
of  raising  new  loans,  and  the  total  stoppage  of  trade.  This  was 
a  powerful  argument  in  favour  of  neutrahty — so  powerful  that 
La  Bourdonnais'  squadron  was  recalled. 

However,  the  French  Company  had  small  reason  to  believe 
that  a  general  neutrality  could  be  arranged.  In  1742  Henry 
Lowther,  an  old  servant  of  the  Company  then  residing  in  France, 
took  upon  himself  to  approach  the  French  Company  regarding 
this  question,  although  he  was  not  authorised  to  do  so  by  the 
Enghsh  directorate.  He  succeeded  in  framing  with  the  French 
directors,  Le  Noir  and  Dumas,  a  proposal  in  three  articles,  pro- 
viding for  a  neutrality  by  the  two  Companies  ;  and  this  was  seen 
and  approved  by  Cardinals  Fleury  and  Tencin.  When,  however, 
Lowther  communicated  it  to  Henry  Gough,  then  chairman  of 
the  English  Company,  Gough  replied  :  "  We  think  such  a  thing 
can  be  of  no  service  farther  than  as  it  may  be  agreed  on,  as  in 
the  last  war,  betwixt  the  settlements,  as  was  done  betwixt 
Madras  and  Pondichery.  It  would  be  in  our  interest  in  all  events 
to  get  men-of-war  there  ...  as  the  French  ships  are  now  loaden 
richly.  ..."  * 

Accordingly,  on  the  outbreak  of  war  in  1744,  the  French 
Company  ordered  Dupleix  to  enter  if  possible  into  such  local  ^ 
agreements  as  the  English  reply  had  indicated.  It  was  a  policy 
vpf  which  he  heartily  approved,  and  which  he  had  already  re- 
commended to  the  French  Company.*  He  was  led  to  this  by 
the  exigencies  of  his  situation,  as  Governor  of  Pondichery.  Tliat 
settlement  had  no  harbour,  and  lacked  all  facilities  for  fitting 
out  or  manning  privateers.  Consequently,  in  time  of  war,  its 
trading  vessels  ran  the  risk  of  capture,  while  their  owners  could 
not  recoup  their  losses  by  equipping  vessels  to  prey  upon  their 
enemies.     They  stood  to  lose  all  and  gain  nothing.^    The  French 

»  Brit.  Mus..  Add.  MSS.,  359C36,  fi.  178,  etc.;   Journal  of  the    Voyage  of  the 
Boscawen.  p.  73  ;  Monson's  Letter,  pp.  83,  etc.  '  Cultrii,  Dupleix.  p.  189. 

*  Pondichdry  to  the  Company,  February  11,  1745  (P.K.,  No.  0). 


6  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

Islands,  it  should  be  noticed,  were  in  a  very  different  position. 
They  had  a  good  harbour,  where  ships  could  be  built  or  refitted. 
Crews  could  be  made  up  from  the  Creole  population  and  the 
"  Coffree  "  slaves  whom  they  obtained  from  Madagascar — a 
type  very  different  from  the  lascars  who  alone  were  available 
for  manning  vessels  on  the  Coromandel  Coast.  Thus  war  did 
not  possess  the  same  terrors  for  the  Islands  as  for  Pondich6ry  ; 
and  here  doubtless  is  the  reason  why  Dupleix  advocated  neutral- 

I  ity,  while  La  Bourdonnais  regarded  that  poUcy  with  nothing  but 
contempt. 

News  of  the  declaration  of  war  reached  Madras  on  September 
i6,  1744,  and  was  communicated  without  delay  to  Pondichery 
by  a  Roman  Catholic  priest  .■^  Although  Dupleix  did  not  receive 
any  instructions  till  November  28,  he  at  once  proceeded  to  sound 
the  EngUsh  by  directing  the  Council  of  Mahe  to  seek  the  Telli- 
cherry  Council's  consent  to  the  maintenance  of  an  old  agreement 
of  1728.''  The  proposal  was  warmly  welcomed  ;  and  the  EngUsh 
chief  even  suggested  an  extension  of  the  original  treaty.  On 
hearing  this,  Dupleix  at  once  addressed  the  English  at  Madras. 
They  of  necessity  returned  a  temporising  answer,  for  it  was  a 
matter  in  which  they  had  no  authority.*  But  when  instructions 
at  last  arrived  from  Paris,  and  Dupleix  formally  proposed  a 
neutrahty  on  the  part  of  the  English  settlements  and  their 
shipping,  all  the  Presidencies  replied  that  they  were  not  authorised 
to  enter  into  such  an  agreement.*  This  answer  must  have  some- 
what disconcerted  Dupleix,  who  had  made  sure  of  the  EngUsh 
consent.  On  the  very  day  that  he  made  the  second  proposal 
to  Madras,  the  Pondichery  Council  assured  the  Company  that 
the  gentlemen  at  Madras  desired  nothing  better  ;  •  and  Dupleix 
wrote  in  the  same  strain  to  La  Bourdonnais  at  Mauritius.*     But 

LDupleix  was  incurably  sanguine  by  nature,  and  easily  persuaded 
himself  of  what  he  wished  to  believe. 

However,  in  the  present  case  he  had  a  plausible  reason  for 

'  Madras  Pub.  Cons.,  September  5,  1744  ;  Madras  Lfrs.  Sent,  1744,  No.  115  ; 
Pondichery  to  Mahfe,  September  22,  1744  (P-R-.  No.  60,  f.  625). 
'  Pondichery  to  Mah6,  September  32,  1744  (P.R.,  No.  60.  f.  625). 

•  Tellicherry  was  subordinate  to  Bombay. 
♦Madras  Pub.  Cons.,  November  13  and  26,  17^4. 

•  Ponchich^ry  to  the  Company,  December  2,  1744  (P.R.,  No.  7). 

•  Mem.  pour  La  Bourdonnais,  p.  37-  I  suppose  these  letters  gave  rise  to  the 
curious  statement,  repeated  even  by  recent  writers  (Weber,  La  Compagnie  des 
Indes  Orientates,  p.  349),  that  the  English  agreed  to  a  neutrality.  See  Letters 
Edifiantes  et  Curieuses,  vol.  ii.  p.  781. 


THE  WAR  OF  THE  AUSTRIAN  SUCCESSION        7 

expecting  the  accession  of  the  English  to  his  proposals.  The 
condition  of  the  Madras  defences  was  deplorable.  Trading 
companies  were  naturally  incUned  to  economise  on  miUtary 
expenditure,  and  in  so  doing  they  were  but  copying  more  illus- 
trious examples.  Economy  had  been  urged  on  the  various 
Governors  of  the  East  India  Company's  settlements  with  pecuUar 
energy  for  near  ten  years  before  the  outbreak  of  war.  A  Governor 
of  Bombay  had  been  dismissed  for  venturing  to  fortify  his  city  ; 
a  leading  director  is  alleged  to  have  said  of  him  that  he  was  a 
very  honest  man,  but  too  expensive  a  Governor.  ^  So  Madras 
remained  with  its  defences  practically  unchanged  since  the 
time  of  Thomas  Pitt  thirty  years  before.  Every  one  competent 
to  judge  agreed  that  the  place  was  untenable  against  a  serious 
attack.  Commodore  Barnett  wrote  to  Anson  in  1745  :  "  Such 
is  the  naked  defenceless  condition  of  the  settlements  on  this 
the  Coromandel  Coast  that  a  small  reinforcement  of  the  garrison 
of  Pondich^ry  would  put  the  enemy  in  condition  to  take  this 
and  St.  David's  in  a  few  hours,  if  there  was  no  ship  of  war  to 
protect  them.  They  are  now  adding  to  the  fortifications  here, 
and  by  the  time  the  peace  is  signed  the  place  will  be  in  tolerable 
order.  True  old  English  management  !  The  Directors  copy  the 
Court  and  never  guard  against  a  war  till  it  is  declared,  and  of 
course  too  late  to  be  properly  provided."  *  And  again  to  the 
Secret  Committee  of  Directors,  Barnett  says :  "  The  works 
seem  rather  built  by  chance  than  design  ;  the  bastions  are 
placed  contrary  to  all  rules  ;  ...  if  I  was  Governor,  I  should 
never  sleep  sound  in  a  French  war  if  there  were  500  Europeans 
in  Pondich^ry."  * 

Such  a  state  of  things  would  have  mattered  less,  had  it  been 
unknown  to  the  French.  But  Dupleix  was  well  acquainted'' 
with  the  Madras  defences.  He  was  furnished  with  regular 
reports  by  the  priest  Noronha  (a  relative  of  Madame  Dupleix), 
who  held  the  cure  of  a  small  church,  still  standing,  on  the  out- 
skirts of  the  city.*  Moreover,  the  principal  French  engineer, 
Paradis,  had  visited  Madras,  and  drawn  out  a  plan  of  attack.* 
In  February  1746  Dupleix  wrote  to  La  Bourdonnais  that  the 
garrison,  defences,  and  Governor  of  Madras  were  alike  pitiable.* 

'  Monson's  Letter,  p.  ii. 

»  Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  I59S5.  f.  1 13.  »  Monson's  Letter,  p.  44. 

*  The  Luz  Church.  •  Cultru,  Dupleix,  p.  199. 

•  Dupleix  to  La  Bourdonnais,  February  26,  1746  (Mim.  pour  la  Jamille  de 
Dupleix,  Piices,  No.  2). 


8  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

In  view  of  this  knowledge,  he  had  confidently  anticipated  that 
the  English  would  accept  a  neutrality  as  they  could  not  resist 
an  attack. 

But  in  making  this  calculation,  he  had  failed  to  divine  the 
English  Company's  intention  of  making  good  their  lack  of 
defences  by  means  of  a  royal  squadron.  In  this  they  seem  to 
have  been  guided  by  their  experience  in  the  War  of  the  Spanish 
Succession,  when  not  only  a  French  squadron  but  French 
privateers  also  had  been  fitted  out  to  prey  on  English  shipping 
in  the  Indian  Seas.  Even  while  war  was  still  confined  to  Spain, 
the  Company  reminded  Government  of  their  former  losses  and 
sought  powers  by  which  to  protect  themselves  ;  and  in  conse- 
quence the  East  India  ships  were  provided  with  letters  of  marque 
and  reprisal.^ 

When  France  was  on  the  point  of  declaring  war  in  1744, 
it  was  resolved  that  notice  was  to  be  given  immediately  to  the 
East  India  Company  and  consideration  had  for  the  security  of 
the  English  and  the  capture  of  the  French  East  Indiamen.^ 
Three  weeks  later  the  squadron  that  was  to  operate  in  the  East 
Indies  was  placed  under  orders  of  equipment  ;  ^  and  on  May  i 
it  set  sail  under  the  command  of  Commodore  Curtis  Barnett,  an 
able  and  energetic  officer,  already  distinguished  for  his  gallantry 
in  action. 

Once  arrived  in  Indian  waters,  he  speedily  swept  them  of 
French  shipping.  Besides  three  Company's  ships  taken  with 
rich  cargoes  from  China,  Barnett  also  captured  the  French 
Manila  ship  with  400,000  dollars  aboard,  and  other  vessels 
returning  from  Surat,  Basra,  and  Mokha.*  These  latter  were 
country  ships,  as  vessels  were  called  that  traded  from  port  to 
port  in  the  East  Indies ;   they  were  usually  freighted  by  a  body 

"Townshend  MSS.  (H.M.C.),  p.  149;  P.R.O.,  Admiralty,  3912.  Mole  to 
Corbett,  January  14  and  October  24,  1744. 

'  Minute  of  Privy  Council,  March  22,  1744.  Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  33004 
f.  78. 

•  Orders  to  Captains  of  April  17,  1744,  P.R.O.,  Admiralty,  2,  61  f.,  195.  It 
is  perhaps  worth  noting  that  the  ships  were  to  be  provided  with  beer  for  one 
month  only  and  with  "  English  Malt  spirits  "  for  seven  months  (Admiralty 
Orders  of  April  7  and  11,  1744,  Admiralty,  2,  6i  ff.,  162,  and  175).  In  this  con- 
nection Barnett  wrote  to  the  Admiralty  on  October  9,  1744:  "The  brandy, 
issued  agreeable  to  their  Lordships'  directions,  has  agreed  vei-y  well  with  the 
men,  and  though  they  were  at  first  almost  in  a  mutiny  on  account  of  its  being 
mixed  with  water,  are  now  quite  reconciled  and  pleased  with  it,  and  I  think  it 
a  very  wholesome  drink." 

•Barnett  to  the  Admiralty,  January  28,  February  32,  1745,  and  January  9, 
1746,  P.R.O.,  Admiralty  i,  160. 


^ 


THE  WAR  OF  THE  AUSTRIAN  SUCCESSION         9 

of  merchants  on  the  joint-stock  method  for  a  single  voyage, 
after  which  the  stock  was  divided  up  among  the  persons  con- 
cerned, and  the  vessel  sold  to  the  next  society  which  might 
or  might  not  be  composed  of  the  same  individuals  as  its  pre- 
decessor. In  these  societies  the  Governor  and  Council  usually 
held  the  largest  share  ;  and  thus  the  capture  of  these  vessels  I 
involved  Dupleix  and  his  Council  in  considerable  losses.  In 
fact,  it  swept  away  a  very  large  part  of  the  private  fortune  which 
Dupleix  had  built  up  in  twenty  years  of  trade,  and  put  an 
immediate  stop  to  all  French  commerce  on  the  Coromandel  ^ 
Coast.  Although  this  was  brought  about  by  a  royal  squadron 
the  operations  of  which  would  not  have  been  covered  by  the 
treaty  which  Dupleix  had  proposed,  and  into  which  the  English 
had  refused  to  enter,  the  French  Governor  promptly  demanded 
the  return  of  the  prizes. ^  On  what  grounds  he  justified  this 
even  in  his  own  mind,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  ;  but  under 
the  stress  of  personal  loss  men  care  little  for  consistency  ;  and 
Dupleix  seems  to  have  persuaded  himself  that  he  had  been 
treated  with  the  blackest  treachery.  He  wrote  at  once  to  La 
Bourdonnais  to  come  to  his  assistance  with  a  squadron,  and 
meanwhile  set  to  work  to  give  the  English  as  much  trouble  as 
possible  with  the  country  Government. 

The  results  of  the  latter  were  quickly  seen.  In  March  1745 
the  English  received  a  letter  from  Anwar-ud-din,  the  Nawab 
of  Arcot,  directing  the  two  nations  to  live  at  peace,  and  for- 
bidding their  squadrons  to  engage  off  the  Indian  Coast,  "  for 
the  end  of  these  things  will  not  be  good."  *  Three  weeks  later 
came  a  much  more  embarrassing  letter,  saying  that  the  Nawab 
had  granted  Moghul  colours  and  passes  to  native  subjects  and 
strangers,^  and  that  ships  possessed  of  these  were  not  to  be 
molested.*  The  admission  of  this  claim  would  have  allowed 
French  ships  to  trade  as  freely  as  before  the  arrival  of  the 
English  squadron  ;  Barnett  and  his  officers  were  unlikely  to 
forgo  good  prize-money  on  so  flimsy  a  pretext.  The  English 
sent  an  agent  to  explain  their  position  and  the  European  customs 
in  such  cases  ;  and  after  long  discussion  they  carried  their  point 
— at  last,  they  wrote,  the  Nawab  "  understood  that  French 
presents  would  not  outweigh  the  losses  of  a  breach  with  the 
English."  ^     Foiled  here,  Dupleix'  success  was  limited  to  obtain- 

'  Madras  Pub.  Cons.,  January  4,  1745.       'Madras  Cons.,  March  4,  1745. 
'  i.e.,  to  the  French.  *  Madras  Cons.,  March  35,  1745. 

'  Pub.  Dcs.  to  England,  September  24,  1745. 


10  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

mg  an  order  forbidding  the  English  to  attack  Pondichdry,  to 
which  the  Governor  of  Madras  replied,  "  I  shall  not  be  the  first 
to  disobey  your  commands  in  this  respect,  provided  there  is 
the  same  deference  paid  to  them  by  the  French."  »  But  this 
did  not  prevent  the  EngUsh  squadron  from  blockading  Pondi- 
ch6ry  when  Dupleix  threatened  the  neighbouring  Enghsh 
settlement  of  Fort  St.  David. 

Meanwhile,  La  Bourdonnais  had  been  busy  at  the  Islands 
equipping  a  squadron  that  might  encounter  the  English  on  equal 
terms.  The  task  demanded  great  energy,  but  was  scarcely  so 
Herculean  as  has  been  pretended.  In  the  long  run  he  was 
able  to  assemble  eight  Company's  ships  and  one  country  vessel 
which  he  had  built  at  the  Islands.  Now  the  ships  employed 
by  the  French  Company  were  mostly  large  vessels  of  800  or  900 
tons,  cut  with  portholes  for  40  or  50  guns.  The  principal 
difficulty  in  equipping  these  vessels  for  war  consisted  in  finding 
guns  with  which  to  arm  them,  and  this  difficulty  not  even  La 
Bourdonnais  could  completely  overcome.  Of  the  290  guns 
which  were  mounted  on  his  squadron,  only  74  were  i8-pounders. 
That  placed  the  French  ships  at  a  marked  disadvantage  as 
\  compared  with  the  English  men-of-war,  which  carried  i8-pounders 
as  their  ordinary  armament.  Moreover,  the  latter  sailed  and 
manoeuvred  better  than  the  ships  designed  to  carry  cargo. 
La  Bourdonnais  sought  to  compensate  these  two  defects  as  far 
as  possible  by  the  strength  of  his  crews.  Here  the  English  were 
,-  weak.  Their  full  complement  numbered  1600  men,  but  the 
tropical  climate  and  scurvy  had  greatly  weakened  them  ;  and 
they  could  not  oppose  more  than  1300  or  1400  men — including 
lascars — to  the  300ooddwho  manned  the  ships  of  La  Bourdonnais.* 
After  various  delays  and  misadventures  the  French  ships  were 
sighted  off  the  Coast  on  June  25 /July  6.  Their  coming  was  not 
unexpected.  In  the  previous  February  the  Enghsh  had  received 
news  of  vessels  fitting  at  the  Islands.'  But  since  then  Curtis 
Barnett  had  died  of  a  fever  at  St.  David's  ;  and  the  command 
had  devolved  on  his  senior  captain,  Edward  Peyton,  an  un- 
reliable subordinate  and  unenterprising  commander.*     He  was 

'  Madras  Pub.  Cons.,  July  15,  1745. 

'  1  have  found  no  return  about  June  or  July,  1746,  but  cf.  that  of  November  28, 
1746  (P.R.O.,  Admiralty,  1-2288) ;  also  Narr.  of  the  Trans,  of  the  British  Squadrons, 
pp.  46-48. 

•  Pub.  Cons.,  February  7,  1746. 

♦GrifSn  to  Anson,  February  7,  1746-47  (Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  15955, 
f.  288. 


I 


THE  WAR  OF  THE  AUSTRIAN  SUCCESSION       11 

on  his  way  to  Trincomalee  to  repair  certain  of  his  vessels,  when 
at  daybreak  he  sighted  the  French  off  Negapatam.  The  winds 
were  Ught,  and  the  two  squadrons  did  not  join  action  till  half- 
past  four  in  the  afternoon.  An  indecisive  engagement  ensued 
till  night  fell ;  next  morning  Peyton  reformed  hne  and  made 
sail  for  the  enemy ;  but  they  stood  to  the  northward.  That 
evening  a  Council  of  War  decided  to  make  for  Trincomalee  and 
repair  the  damages  sustained  in  the  action.*  The  French,  how- 
ever, had  had  much  the  worst  of  it.  The  Enghsh  had  lost  but 
14  killed  and  46  wounded  ;  *  whereas  La  Bourdonnais'  losses 
had  been  72  killed  and  150  woimded.  His  ships  too  had  been 
much  damaged  by  shot  and  even  more  by  fire.'  A  keener  or  a 
more  skilful  commander  than  Peyton  might,  it  seems,  have 
infUcted  severe  loss  upon  the  French  before  they  could  have 
found  shelter  under  the  guns  of  Pondich^ry. 

As  it  was,  La  Bourdonnais  reached  the  French  settlement  and 
lay  there  almost  a  month,  unlading  the  treasure  he  had  brought, 
refitting  his  vessels,  and  discussing  plans.  Almost  at  once  the 
ancient  dishke  which  he  and  Dupleix  had  cherished  for  each 
other  flamed  up  into  activity.  La  Bourdonnais  was  welcomed 
by  a  salute  of  only  15  guns  ;  Dupleix  received  him  at  the 
Gouvernement  instead  of  going  to  meet  him  at  the  beach  ;  the 
drummers  beat  the  tambour  instead  of  the  aux-champs  at  his 
approach.  These  seemed  to  him  claims  by  Dupleix  to  a  superior 
rank  which  he,  with  commission  as  a  naval  officer,  would  never 
concede  to  a  mere  servant  of  the  Company.  Within  the  week 
Dupleix  too  was  abusing  La  Bourdonnais  to  all  who  would  listen 
to  him.* 

The  plans  which  these  men  had  to  concert  were  twofold — 
involving  the  destruction  of  the  English  squadron  and  the  capture 
of  Madras.  The  latter  was  an  old  ambition  of  La  Bourdonnais'  ; 
but  it  was  plain  that  the  Enghsh  squadron  had  first  to  be  dealt 
with.  In  order  to  make  his  armament  less  unequal  to  that  of 
the  Enghsh,  La  Bourdonnais  asked  for  a  number  of  i8-pounders. 
Dupleix  would  only  give  him  two-thirds  of  what  he  wanted,, 
making  up  the  deficiency  with  lighter  pieces  which,  had  the  \ 
English  commander  known  his  business,  would  have  been  entirely 

>  Peyton  to  Corbctt,  November  28,  1746  (P.R.O.,  Admiralty,  1-2288). 
'  Hervey,  Naval  History,  vol.  iv.  p.  314. 

•  PondicWry  to  Mah6,  July  13,  1746  (P.R.,  No.  61,  f.  233);  Pondichiry 
to  the  Company,  January  31,  1747  (P.R.,  No.  7). 

*  Diary  of  Ananda  Ranga  Pillai,  vol.  ii.  pp.  1 14,  I3i,  and  128. 


]^^m     [o  ine  K^o 
^^k  *  Dia, 


la  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

useless.^  With  these  and  a  reinforcement  of  men  La  Bourdonnais 
sailed  to  find  and  destroy  the  English  squadron.  He  met  it 
sailing  north  off  Negapatam.  Two  days  were  spent  in  closing 
on  each  other.  At  last,  on  August  8/19.  Peyton  with  the 
weather-gage  bore  down  to  attack.  But  as  he  approached,  he 
noticed  that  several  of  the  French  ships  now  showed  a  new  tier 
of  guns.  He  therefore  suddenly  refused  action.  After  cruising 
for  some  days  to  the  southward  in  the  hope  of  faUing  in  with 
reinforcements,  he  sail.d  for  the  coast,  and  made  Pulicat 
on  August  22/September  2.  He  there  received  news  that 
Madras  was  threatened  by  the  French,  but  fortified  himself 
for  repeated  flight  by  another  council  of  war,  and  sailed  for 
Bengal.  2 

Neither  the  French  nor  the  English  on  the  coast  had  any  idea 
of  his  whereabouts.  For  the  latter,  Peyton  had  arranged  a  bitter 
disappointment.  He  had  not  even  taken  the  trouble  to  write  to 
Madras  when  he  touched  at  Pulicat,  but  he  had  convoyed  an 
EngUsh  country  ship  bound  to  Madras  from  Batavia.  This 
vessel  reached  Madras  a  couple  of  days  after  Peyton  reached 
Pulicat,  and  announced  the  approach  of  the  squadron.  The 
English  Council  at  once  sent  a  sloop  in  search  of  the  commodore 
with  an  urgent  appeal  for  assistance  ;  but  Peyton  escaped  this 
by  the  haste  of  his  departure.' 

La  Bourdonnais,  judging  him  more  intelligent  than  he  really 
was,  supposed  that  he  had  withdrawn  only  in  order  to  fall  upon 
the  French  when,  with  half  their  people  ashore,  they  were  be- 
sieging Madras.  Indeed,  his  presence  on  the  coast  would  have 
made  the  siege  of  Madras  an  exceedingly  rash  undertaking  ;  and 
La  Bourdonnais  returned  to  Pondichery  on  August  12/23  after 
Peyton's  refusal  of  action  entirely  uncertain  what  coiu-se  to  take. 
He  longed  to  attack  Madras  ;  but  shrank  from  accepting  the 
responsibility  of  possible  failure.  He  tried  therefore  to  throw 
that  responsibility  on  to  Dupleix  and  his  Council  by  demanding 
a  resolution  that  the  attempt  was  required  by  the  Company's 
interests.*  But  Dupleix  was  no  more  willing  to  shoulder  this 
burden  than  La  Bourdonnais  himself,  and  called  upon  him  either 

'  La  Bourdonnais  to  Dupleix,  July  17  (Mim.  pour  La  Bourdonnais,  Piices, 
No.  14);  Dupleix  to  La  Bourdonnais.  July  20,  1746  (Mem.  pour  la  familte  dt 
Dupleix,  Piices.  No.  6). 

*  Peyton  to  Corbett,  November  28,  1746  (ut  supra). 
»  Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  23825,  fi.  158,  etc. 

•  La  Bourdonnais  to  Dupleix,  August  36,  1746  (Mim.  pour  La  Bourdonnais, 
Piices,  No.  27). 


THE  WAR  OF  THE  AUSTRIAN  SUCCESSION        13 

to  pursue  the  squadron  or  attack  the  town.^  To  test  matters, 
the  latter  sent  his  fleet  to  make  a  demonstration  before  Madras, 
in  the  hope  of  drawing  the  Enghsh  squadron  should  it  be  within 
reach.'  As  if  to  point  the  Enghsh  commodore's  incompetence, 
this  took  place  two  days  before  he  put  in  to  Pulicat ;  and  the 
French  ships  returned  to  Pondich^ry  without  his  having  made  a 
sign. 

This  inaction  determined  La  Bourdonnais  to  lay  siege  to 
Madras.  He  sailed  up  the  coast,  disembarked,  and,  on  Septem- 
ber 7/18,  opened  fire  from  a  battery  of  mortars  hidden  among 
the  palmyra  groves  to  the  southward  of  the  Fort.  The  same 
evening  he  opened  another  mortar-battery  from  behind  the 
Governor's  garden-house  to  the  west.^ 

The  English  had  made  no  attempt  to  interrupt  these  opera- 
tions except  by  a  random  and  quite  ineffective  fire  from  the 
fort  walls.  Indeed  their  garrison  consisted  of  but  300  men, 
of  whom  only  half  were  Europeans,  the  rest  Portuguese  half- 
castes.  The  men  were  ill-disciplined,  and  commanded  by  officers 
who  knew  nothing  of  active  service.  They  formed  less  than 
a  third  of  the  forces  that  La  Bourdonnais  had  landed.  The 
Council's  hopes  lay  entirely  in  the  arrival  of  external  help — from 
the  squadron  or  from  the  Nawab. 

Peyton,  as  we  have  seen,  had  easily  convinced  himself  that 
he  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  defence  of  Madras,  and  was 
actually  flying  for  the  friendly  shelter  of  the  Ganges.  But 
the  Nawab  had  already  espoused  the  English  cause.*  Thrice 
before  La  Bourdonnais  formed  the  siege,  Nawab  Anwar- 
ud-din  had  forbidden  the  French  in  the  most  unmistakable 
terms  to  attack  the  place,  threatening  if  they  did  so  to  expel 
them  from  Pondich^ry.  On  September  8/19  Dupleix  received  -^ 
by  a  camel-messenger  most  urgent  orders  to  desist  from  the''^ 
enterprise.* 

He  returned  an  answer  promising  to  put  the  Nawab  in  posses- 

'  Sommation  faite  par  le  Conseil,  August  27,  1746  {ibid.,  No.  29). 

*  La  Bourdonnais  to  Dupleix,  August  27,  1746  {ibid.,  No.  30). 

•La  Bourdonnais  to  Dupleix,  September  15,  1746  (ibid.,  No.  37)  ;  London 
Magaiine,  1747,  pp.  227,  etc.  ;   Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS..  23825,  f.  152. 

♦  The  current  story,  sanctioned  even  by  the  authority  of  Orme,  is  that  the 
Englisih  failed  to  send  a  large  enough  present  with  their  appeal  for  help.  This 
seems  to  have  had  its  origin  in  the  indignant  surmises  of  the  Fort  St.  David 
Council  after  the  loss  of  Madras.  It  appears  to  be  directly  contrary  to  the 
facts,  for  Anwar-ud-din,  the  Nawab,  displayed  no  backwardness  to  help  the 
English. 

•  Diary  of  Ananda  RangalPillai,*vo\.  ii.  pp.  285,  291,  and  311. 


14  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

sion  of  Madras  when  it  should  be  taken.*  This  has  been  praised 
as  a  splendid  stroke  of  policy ;  it  was  really  nothing  of  the 
sort.  It  was  a  hasty  expedient,  intended  to  deceive  La  Bour- 
donnais  rather  than  to  win  over  the  Nawab.  It  had  not  the 
least  effect  upon  the  latter  ;  but  it  enabled  Dupleix  to  allege  that 
the  subsequent  war  with  the  Moors  was  due  to  his  rival's  keeping 
Madras  in  his  own  hands.  The  one  point  in  which  Dupleix 
judged  aright,  was  that  Madras  might  be  captured  before  the 
Nawab's  troops  could  come  to  its  reHef . 

Meanwhile,  the  Englisii  had  lain  exposed  to  the  French  bom- 
bardment. That  was  not  particularly  effective.  Although  the 
only  bomb-proof  place  was  the  Portuguese  Church,  in  which  the 
women  were  lodged,  only  six  persons  were  killed  in  the  siege — 
two  English  and  four  Portuguese.'  But  chance  shells  had  broken 
open  the  doors  of  the  arrack  godowns  ;  and  the  troops  became 
drunk  and  mutinous.  After  two  days'  fire  the  Enghsh  sent  out 
deputies  to  La  Bourdonnais,  who  promised  favourable  terms 
should  the  garrison  surrender,  but  threatened  blood  and  fire 
should  it  stand  a  storm.*  This  overture  was  exceedingly 
welcome  to  him.  He  had  just  received  news  from  Dupleix 
of  the  appearance  of  four  ships,*  which  both  feared  might 
be  the  English  reinforcements,  with  the  help  of  which  Peyton 
would  attack  the  half-manned  squadron.  The  next  day,  there- 
fore, he  agreed  to  accept  the  surrender  of  Madras  on  condition 
of  a  ransom  to  be  determined  later.  On  the  afternoon  of 
September  21,  he  entered  the  Fort  by  the  Water  Gate  and  took 
possession.* 

This  event  released  all  that  pent-up  ill-feeUng  with  which  the 
two  French  chiefs  regarded  each  other.  Each  was  resolved  to 
dispose  of  the  captured  place.  We  have  already  seen  how 
Dupleix  sought  to  tie  his  rival's  hands  by  promising  to  deliver 
Madras  to  the  Nawab.  And  before  he  had  heard  of  this.  La 
Bourdonnais  had  already  put  in  his  claim  to  independence.  In 
the  letter  announcing  his  entry  into  the  place,  he  mentions,  as 
it  were  casually,  that  he  was  now  called  "  Commandant  by  land 

•  Dupleix  to  La  Bourdonnais,  September  ai,  1746  (Mim.  pour  La  Bourdon' 
nais,  Piices.  No.  55). 

*  Love's  Vestiges,  vol.  ii.  p.  425. 

*  La  Bourdonnais  to  Morse  and  to  Dupleix,  September  20,  1746  {Mint,  pour 
La  Bourdonnais,  Piices,  Nos.  43  and  44). 

♦  Dupleix  to  La  Bourdonnais,  September  ij,  1746  {ibid..  No.  39).    The  news 
was  false. 

•  La  Bourdonnais  to  Dupleix,  September  21,  1746  {ibid.,  No.  49). 


€ 


THE  WAR  OF  THE  AUSTRIAN  SUCCESSION       15 

and  sea  on  the  North  of  the  Coast."  ^  This  tacitly  excluded  the 
authority  of  Pondichery.  Dupleix  at  once  took  up  the  challenge. 
He  and  his  Council  claimed  fuU  powers  over  every  place  where 
the  French  flag  flew  in  India,  and  proceeded  to  nominate  a 
Council  to  take  charge  of  Madras  affairs.*  La  Bourdonnais 
refused  to  receive  these  councillors.  When  on  instructions  from 
Dupleix  they  attempted  to  seize  control  of  the  place,  he  sent  the 
Pondich6ry  troops,  who  might  have  helped  them,  aboard  ship. 

The  details  of  this  dispute  are  not  worth  discussion.  As 
usual,  both  parties  alleged  any  and  every  reason  except  that 
which  really  animated  them.  The  question  was.  Who  should 
profit  ?  La  Bourdonnais  expected  private  advantage  from  the 
liberal  terms  which  he  skilfully  dangled  before  the  EngUsh  eyes  ; 
while  if  only  Dupleix  could  jockey  La  Bourdonnais  out  of  the 
management  of  affairs,  he  expected  handsome  sums  for  permits 
to  carry  goods  out  of  Madras.*  La  Bourdonnais,  however,  had 
all  the  advantages  of  position  ;  Dupleix  could  only  rage  at  a 
distance.  The  former  coolly  proceeded  with  his  negotiations  for 
a  ransom,  which  was  at  last  fixed  at  ii  lakhs  of  pagodas  for 
the  French  Company  and  a  private  present  of  one  lakh  for 
himself.  Of  the  latter  sum  credible  witnesses  declared  that 
88,000  pagodas  were  actually  deUvered  to  him  in  gold  and 
iamonds.* 

There  is  no  reason  for  supposing  that  their  evidence  was 
alse.  Such  transactions  were  by  no  means  inconsistent  with 
the  manners  of  the  eighteenth  century ;  nor  was  the  poUcy  of 
ransom  nearly  so  indefensible  as  has  commonly  been  repre- 
sented. The  affair  must  not  be  judged  in  the  light  of  subsequent 
events.  Neither  French  nor  English  at  this  moment  dreamed} 
of  acquiring  territorial  possessions  in  India.  Neither  nation' 
even  thought  of  claiming  a  monopoly  of  trade  on  the  Coromandel 
Coast.  Trading  settlements  on  the  Indian  or  the  African  coasts 
might  be  attacked  in  time  of  war,  but  it  was  not  the  policy  of 
that  age  to  demand  from  a  beaten  enemy  the  total  resignation 
of  great  branches  of  overseas  commerce.  This  is  shown  by  the 
treaties  alike  of  1748,  of  1761,  of  1783.  It  was  antecedently 
probable  to  every  observer  of  1746  that  peace  would  restore 
Madras  to  the  possession  of  the  Enghsh.    llie  real  problem  was 

^  Loc.  cit. 

*  Council  to  La  Bourdonnais,  September  35,  1746  {ibid.,  No.  65). 

*  Diary  of  Ananda  Ranga  Pillai,  vol.  ii.  pp.  301-302. 

*  I.O.,  Law  Case,  No.  31. 


16  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

how  to  do  the  English  Company  as  much  harm  as  possible  ;  and 
with  that  object  it  might  be  ransomed  or  it  might  be  destroyed 
La  Bourdonnais  decided  for  the  first  ;  Dupleix  pretended  to 
decide  for  the  second  ;  and  both  decisions  promised  private  gain 
to  those  who  formed  them.  The  affair  indeed  brings  out  with 
exceeding  clearness  one  of  the  characteristics  of  the  age — the 
way  in  which  men  sought  to  combine  public  and  private  in- 
Iterests.  We  should  be  deeply  in  error  if  we  supposed  either 
iDupleix  or  La  Bourdonnais  to  have  been  unpatriotic.  They 
Were  patriots  ;   and  few  in  that  age  thought  or  felt  differently. 

The  negotiations  of  this  arrangement  and  the  dispute  with 
Dupleix  had  delayed  La  Bourdonnais  until  the  time  was  drawing 
near  for  the  breaking  of  the  October  monsoon,  when  heavy 
storms  sweep  down  upon  the  harbourless  Coromandel  Coast. 
Both  sides  now  began  to  feel  anxious  about  the  issue  of  their 
contests.  La  Bourdonnais  knew  that  the  co-operation  of 
Dupleix  was  necessary  for  the  complete  execution  of  his  treaty  ; 
and  Dupleix  was  fearful  lest  La  Bourdonnais  should  hand  back 
Madras  to  the  English  and  sail  away.  Both  sides  therefore 
became  more  conciliatory.  La  Bourdonnais  proposed  that  a 
French  garrison  should  be  left  in  Madras  till  February  ;  ^  Dupleix 
affected  readiness  to  accept  the  treaty  on  that  condition. ^  Five 
additional  articles  were  therefore  added  to  the  original  agree- 
ment ;  an  unwilling  consent  was  extorted  from  the  English 
Council ;  then  suddenly,  two  days  before  the  usual  time,  the 
monsoon  broke  in  a  tempest  which  swallowed  up  four  and  dis- 
masted four  more  of  the  vessels  lying  in  the  Madras  roads. 
A  few  days  later,  having  reassembled  what  remained  of  his 
shattered  fleet,  the  French  leader  sailed  for  Pondichery,  leaving 
behind  him  as  an  involuntary  accession  to  the  forces  of  his 
rival  some  1200  of  the  men  whom  he  had  brought  from 
the  French  Islands,  ^  and  abandoning  Madras  to  the  mercy  of 
Dupleix. 

But  even  this  did  not  close  the  quarrel  between  them,  for 
the  disposal  of  the  shipping  was  still  to  be  determined.  From 
the  first  Dupleix  had  desired  a  greater  voice  in  their  destination 
than  La  Bourdonnais  had  been  wiUing  to  concede  ;  *  the  matter 

>  D'Esprfem^nil  to  I,a  Bourdonnais,  October  9,  1746  {Mftn.  pour  La  Bour- 
donnais, Piices,  No.  124). 

»  Dupleix  to  La  Bourdonnais,  October  7.  8,  11,  and  12,  1746  (ibid..  N0.1.  I22, 

131,  138,  and  148). 

»  La  Bourdonnais  to  the  Council,  October  20,  1746  (ibid.,  No.  173). 
*  Correspondance  de  PondicMry  avec  Bengale,  vol.  ii.  p.  419. 


THE  WAR  OF  THE  AUSTRIAN  SUCCESSION       IT 

was  now  complicated  by  the  arrival  of  three  fresh  ships  from 
Europe  ^  which  the  Company  had  placed  at  the  disposal  of 
Dupleix  while  the  Minister  had  entrusted  them  to  La  Bour- 
donnais.2  On  this  matter  Dupleix  felt  and  wrote  with  extreme 
bitterness.  More  than  two  years  later  he  wrote  to  his  brother 
that  La  Bourdonnais  had  apparently  been  empowered  to  sell, 
bum,  wreck,  or  surrender  his  squadron,  while  he  himself  was 
only  a  cipher  in  India. ^  In  the  extremity  of  his  annoyance  he 
descended  to  conduct  which  can  only  be  regarded  with  amaze- 
ment.* La  Bourdonnais  was  informed  that  the  newly  arrived 
ships  would  be  sent  to  wirier  at  Mergui ;  two  days  later  they 
were  given  sailing  orders  for  Achin.  They,  however,  had  received 
an  urgent  summons  from  La  Bourdonnais  to  join  him  at  once.* 
They  did  so,  and  the  united  squadron  anchored  before  Pondichery 
on  October  15/26.  There  La  Bourdonnais  meekly  accepted  the 
Council's  proposals,  and  sailed  for  Achin,  intending  to  return 
to  the  coast  in  the  following  January.  But  three  of  his  ships, 
having  been  sorely  tried  in  the  recent  tempest,  proved  incapable 
of  making  Achin  against  head-winds.  With  these  he  put  about 
for  the  French  Islands,  and,  leaving  the  rest  to  continue  their 
voyage,  quitted  Indian  waters  for  ever. 

The  importance  of  the  disputes  in  which  he  had  been  engaged 
has  been  greatly  exaggerated.  They  were  rather  illustrative  of 
the  faulty  organisation  of  the  French  than  productive  of  im- 
portant consequences.  Had  the  two  leaders  agreed  to  reconcile 
their  interests.  La  Bourdonnais  might  have  escaped  the  tempest, 
might  have  returned  to  the  Coast  in  January,  might  have  fought 
another  indecisive  action  with  the  reinforced  English  squadron, 
now  under  an  abler  commander.  But  that  would  not  have 
modified  the  Treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle.  India  was  but  a  minor 
theatre  of  war,  where  the  combatants  aimed  at  injuring  trade, 
not  at  making  conquests,  though  in  fact  the  conflict  was  to 
generate  conditions  which  rendered  conquests  at  once  possible 
and  desirable.    The  real  importance  of  La  Bourdonnais'  expedi- 

'  They  reached  Pondichery  on  September  27/October  8. 

'  Malleson  writes  as  though  the  Company  had  placed  La  Bourdonnais  himself 
under  Dupleix'  orders — -a  very  gross  mistake.  The  Minister  of  course  had 
issued  his  orders  supposing  La  Bourdonnais  to  be  at  Mauritius. 

'  Letter  of  January  36,  1749  (Nazelle,  Dupleijt  el  la  difense  de  Pondichiry, 
P-  253)- 

*  Mim.  pour  La  Bourdonnais,  Piices,  Nos.  189  and  194.  The  facts  were 
not  disputed  by  Dupleix. 

•  Ibid.,  No.  195. 


18  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

tion  lies  in  its  having  by  accident  increased  the  Pondich&y 
garrison  by  1200  men  and  brought  the  French  into  conflict  with 
the  Nawab. 

Dupleix  now  had  his  opportunity  of  bringing  his  policy 
towards  Madras  to  the  test  of  experience.  He  declared  the 
Ransom  Treaty  null.  He  expelled  the  English  not  only  from 
Madras,  but  also  from  those  neighbouring  places  where  they 
had  found  refuge.  He  appointed  his  brother-in-law  Commandant, 
and  attempted  to  transfer  all  the  trade  from  Madras  to  Pondich^ry 
by  the  simple  expedient  of  removing  thither  all  the  native 
merchants  and  their  property.  But  these  merchants  obstinately 
refused  to  be  thus  transplanted.  The  Armenians  indeed  pre- 
tended a  readiness  to  acquiesce  ;  but  this  was  Uttle  more  than 
a  cover  under  which  to  remove  their  property  elsewhere.^ 
Against  the  Indian  merchants  Dupleix  threatened  in  vain.  In 
March  1747  he  ordered  all  the  goods  of  native  merchants  to  be 
carried  into  the  Fort  for  shipment  to  Pondichery,  whither  the 
merchants  themselves  were  to  proceed  within  a  week.*  But 
towards  the  close  of  the  same  year  the  Pondichdry  Council  had 
to  report  as  follows  :  "All  the  methods  we  have  employed — 
proinises,  threats,  and  confiscation — to  induce  the  native 
merchants  to  come  and  dwell  here  have  been  fruitless.  Most 
favourable  conditions  were  annexed  to  their  removal — the 
possession  of  all  their  property,  and  the  most  formal  assurances 
of  never  being  molested  either  in  their  trade  or  reUgion.  .  .  . 
But  not  one  has  come,  save  a  few  wretches  neither  rich  nor 
respectable.  .  .  .  This  obstinacy  is  in  fact  very  humiliating  to 
us."  '  A  few  days  later  the  order  of  confiscation  was  repeated,* 
but  this  was  no  more  effective  than  the  previous  order,  although 
in  the  interval  half  the  Black  Town  had  been  demolished. 

The  result  of  these  attempts  was  merely  the  enrichment  of 
the  French  officials  at  Madras.  A  good  deal  of  plundering  had 
doubtless  gone  on  while  the  city  remained  under  La  Bourdonnais.* 
But  later  on,  when  some  kind  of  order  had  been  established, 

'  Diary  of  Ananda  Ranga  Pillai,  vol.  iii.  p.  109  ;  Pondich6ry  to  the  Company, 
February  6,  1747  (P.R.,  No.  7).     See  also  below. 

'  Diary  of  Ananda  Ranga  Pillai,  vol.  iii.  pp.  403,  405. 

•  Pondich6ry  to  the  Company,  November  30,  1747  (P.R.,  No.  7). 

*  Arrets  Civils,  December  12,  1747  (P.R.). 

'  Cf.  Diary  of  Ananda  Ranga  Pillai,  vol.  iii.  p.  135.  Probably  it  was  at  this 
time  that  a  wealthy  Armenian,  Coja  Petrus  Uscan,  lost  the  shroud  which  he 
had  brought  from  Jerusalem  to  be  buried  in — a  loss  whicli  he  lamented  in  his  will 
(Madras  Will  Books,  1756). 


THE  WAR  OF  THE  AUSTRIAN  SUCCESSION       19 

another  harvest  had  ripened.  Under  pressure  of  the  decrees 
of  confiscation,  every  merchant  who  had  goods  in  Madras 
hastened  to  get  them  removed,  and  paid  for  the  privilege. 
Dupleix  himself  complains  of  the  number  of  Company's  servants 
who  "  forgot  themselves  " — the  phrase  seems  oddly  inappropriate 
— at  Madras.*  A  suit  that  came  before  the  Mayor's  Court  at 
Madras  in  1758  reveals  precise  details.  ^  An  Armenian  bestowed 
piece-goods  and  a  gold-headed  cane  for  the  services  of  the  officer 
who  was  quartered  on  his  house  ;  a  Company's  servant  was 
given  a  diamond  ring  to  prevent  goods  from  being  sent  away  to 
Pondich^ry  ;  another  officer  was  given  400  rupees  for  passing 
goods  through  the  Fort  and  out  to  Pulicat,  while  100  rupees 
was  paid  to  the  soldiers  who  carried  them.  The  "  Malabar  "  or 
Tamil  merchants  got  their  goods  valued  at  half-rates,  and  paid 
20  per  cent,  on  this  valuation  for  leave  to  carry  them  away.  The 
affair  was  thus  reduced  to  a  regular  system.  How  far  the 
principal  people,  such  as  d'Espr^menil,  were  concerned  does  not 
appear  ;  but  they  were  universally  credited  with  taking  as  much 
as  they  could  get.  To  judge  by  the  event,  Dupleix'  policy  at 
Madras  hardly  merits  the  praise  that  has  been  bestowed  upon 
it.  It  did  not  benefit  the  Company  ;  it  is  not  clear  that  it 
benefited  even  his  relatives.  J 

And  meanwhile  Dupleix  had  had  to  fight  for  the  prize  he  had 
wrested  from  La  Bourdonnais.  We  have  seen  that  Anwar-ud- 
din,  the  Nawab  of  Arcot,  was  indisposed  to  allow  his  orders  pro- 
hibiting hostilities  ashore  to  be  disobeyed  with  impunity.  After 
the  usual  delays,  his  eldest  son,  Mahfuz  Khan,  was  sent  to  drive 
the  French  from  Madras.  He  appeared  before  that  place  shortly 
after  La  Bourdonnais'  departure. ^  Next  day  followed  a  skirmish, 
in  which  the  Moghul  troops  fled  before  the  fire  of  the  French 
field-guns,  probably  short  4-pounders  loaded  with  grape.  But 
that  did  not  break  the  blockade  which  had  been  established. 
Dupleix  at  once  dispatched  a  body  of  450  Europeans  with  some 
sepoys  under  the  command  of  Paradis,  his  engineer,  and  the 
ablest  commander  he  had.  On  their  approaching  Madras  they 
found  Mahfuz  Khan  blocking  their  way  on  the  northern  bank 
of  the  wide  but  shallow  Adiyar.*    There  followed  an  action  in 

'  See  Dupleix'  Report  on  the  Company's  Servants  submitted  in  175 1  {Archive* 
des  Colonies,  C.  215). 

*  Aviat  Nazar  v.  Aratoon  Badramy  (Mayor's  Court  Pleadings,  1758). 
»On  October  17/28. 

♦  Called  in  those  days  the  St.  Thom6  River. 


20  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

which  the  French  behaved  with  great  gallantry.  They  forded 
the  river,  and  opened  a  well-sustained  fire  which  the  Moghul 
troops  were  unable  to  bear.  They  gave  way  and  got  en- 
tangled in  the  streets  of  St.  Thoni^  in  their  rear,  where  they 
lost  many  men  ;  having  at  last  extricated  themselves,  they 
withdrew  beyond  the  reach  of  the  French,  and  abandoned  their 
blockade.  1 

Apart  from  its  immediate  consequences,  the  action  was  im- 
portant ;  but  I  believe  its  historians  have  commonly  laid  the 
emphasis  in  the  wrong  place.  Orme  observes  that  it  broke  the 
charm  of  Moghul  superiority  and  was  the  first  considerable  success 
obtained  by  Europeans  over  the  Country  troops  for  over  a  century. 
But  it  cannot  be  supposed  that  the  Europeans  had  ever  ad- 
mitted the  individual  equality  of  Country  troops.  Roe  at  the 
Moghul's  Court  had  seen  many  horsemen  but  few  soldiers  ;  Bemier 
claimed  that  a  regiment  of  Turenne's  army  would  scatter  the 
whole  Moghul  forces  ;  in  1711  the  English  at  Fort  St.  David  had 
met  and  overthrown  a  superior  force  of  Moors ;  and  Paradis 
himself  had  routed  a  Tanjorean  army  before  Karikal.  Individual 
superiority  was  not  in  question.  But  the  action  on  the  Adiyar 
, :  announced  emphatically  the  value  of  that  development  of  arms 
\'  and  tactics  which  had  been  introduced  in  the  preceding  eighty 
years.  An  illustration  will  readily  show  how  great  was  the 
change.  In  1687-88  the  EngUsh  had  sent  to  Bengal  a  larger 
number  of  Europeans  than  Clive  had  with  him  at  Plassey  ;  and 
they  had  failed  in  the  seventeenth  almost  as  conspicuously  as 
they  were  to  succeed  in  the  eighteenth  century.  In  1687  a 
third  of  the  men  were  armed  with  pikes  ;  since  then  every  man 
had  been  armed  with  musket  and  bayonet.  By  that  change 
alone  infantry  had  become  more  effective  by  over  a  third.  But 
besides  that,  in  1687  artillery  consisted  at  the  lightest  of 
clumsy  pieces  which  fired  perhaps  fifteen  rounds  to  the  hour  ; 
they  had  been  replaced  by  field-pieces  which  could  fire  nearly 

•  The  fantasy  of  historians  has  transformed  the  action  into  something  of  a 
myth.  To  read  Malleson  {Decisive  Battles,  p.  14),  one  would  suppose  that 
Paradis  and  his  men  plunged  into  a  deep  and  rapid  stream  in  the  face  of  a 
large  army,  under  a  brisk  and  well-nourished  fire  of  small-arms  and  artillery  ; 
climbed  a  steep  bank  ;  delivered  their  fire  ;  and  then  charged  with  the  bayonet. 
The  number  of  Mahfuz  Khan's  troops  is  unknown  ;  it  was  of  course  considerable 
compared  with  Paradis'  numbers — probably  10  to  i.  But  the  match-lock  men 
were  worthless  ;  and  the  Moghuls  had  but  four  guns,  which  did  no  execution, 
while  the  small-arm  fire  only  wounded  two  of  Paradis'  people.  Nothing  more 
than  ordinary  steadiness  was  needed  to  advance  upon  so  ineffective  an  enemy. 
It  is  not  clear  that  the  French  ever  came  hand  to  hand  with  the  enemy. 


THE  WAR  OF  THE  AUSTRIAN  SUCCESSION       21 

as  many  charges  to  the  minute.*  Consequently  the  minimum 
unit  which  could  act  with  success  against  large  bodies  of  horse 
had  been  enormously  reduced.  In  the  period  we  are  now 
about  to  consider,  the  Moghul  horse  could  never  charge  home 
against  steady  infantry.  By  1746  the  troops  which  the  English 
and  French  Companies  could  maintain  had  become  capable  1 
of  taking  the  offensive,  without  danger  of  being  overwhelmed | 
by  numbers.  This  was  the  truth  demonstrated  by  La  Tour's 
skirmish  before  Madras  and  by  Paradis'  victory  at  the  Adiyar. 

Paradis'  victory  had  frightened  the  Nawab's  troops  from 
the  neighbourhood  of  Madras  ;  so  Dupleix  resolved  to  pro- 
ceed to  the  capture  of  Fort  St.  David,  which  promised  no  more 
stubborn  defence  than  the  Presidency  town  had  made.  It  was, 
indeed,  in  a  miserable  condition.  A  few  of  the  Madras  garrison 
and  most  of  the  officers  had  come  in,"  but  there  were  not  more  than 
200  European  soldiers  to  defend  the  place,  and  money  was  running 
short. 3  However,  the  English  were  assisted  by  the  Nawab's 
resentment  at  Dupleix'  breach  of  his  orders.  While  his  elder 
son,  Mahfuz  Khan,  had  been  sent  against  Madras,  the  younger, 
Muhammad  Ali,  had  been  dispatched  with  2500  horse  to  ravage 
the  Pondichery  bounds  and  assist  St.  David's.* 

Dupleix  had  intended  to  entrust  this  expedition  to  Paradis, 
whom  he  had  recalled  from  Madras  for  that  purpose  ;  but 
Paradis  was  an  engineer,  who  only  held  the  mihtary  rank  of 
capitaine  reforme.  The  French  officers  refused  therefore  to 
serve  under  him.  This  has  been  magnified  into  a  gross  act  of 
insubordination,  but  it  was  hardly  inconsistent  with  mihtary 
usage.  On  this  refusal,  he  resolved  to  take  command  of  the 
siege  himself,  so  as  to  be  able  to  employ  Paradis  as  he  pleased. 
Meanwhile  he  sent  900  Europeans,  450  sepoys,  and  6  guns  to 
drive  Muhammad  Ali  away  and  to  seize  the  almost  unprotected 
town  of  Cuddalore.     It  lay  a  mile  south  of  the  Enghsh  fort, 

'  The  English  short  field-guns  when  well  served  fired  ten  or  twelve  shots  a 
minute.  French  contemporaries  claim  a  rate  of  twenty  shots  a  minute  for  their 
gnns,  but  IboUeve  that  to  be  exaggerated. 

'  With  some  of  the  Covenanted  servants,  including  Clive,  who  conceived 
that  the  annulment  of  the  Ransom  Treaty  released  them  from  their  paroles. 

»  Clive,  ap.  Orme  MSS.,  India,  i.  io8,  and  Fort  St.  David  Cons.,  September  13, 
1746. 

'Fort  St.  David  Cons.,  December  3,  1746.  The  number  of  the  Moghul 
forces  both  here  and  in  Paradis'  affair  has  been  greatly  exaggerated.  Even  after 
Mahfuz  Khan  had  arrived,  there  were  only  6000  horse  (Fort  St.  David  Cons., 
December  29,  1746),  whereas  the  French  and  even  Clive  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  i.  109) 
talk  of  much  larger  numbers,  ten  or  fifteen  thousand. 


22  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

from  which  it  was  separated  by  a  broad  though  shallow 
river.* 

The  French  troops  marched  from  Pondich^ry,  December  9/18, 
and  on  the  afternoon  of  the  following  day  neared  the  Enghsh 
bounds.  The  English  sent  out  a  large  body  of  native  infantry, 
with  orders  to  engage  the  enemy  and  harass  them  at  night  as 
much  as  possible.  ^  These,  however,  could  not  stop  the  French 
advance  next  morning,  and  about  seven  o'clock  the  enemy  reached 
the  Garden  House,  two  miles  distant  from  the  Fort.  As 
Muhammad  Ali  refused  to  attack  unless  he  was  supported  by  a 
body  of  Europeans,  about  half  the  scanty  garrison  was  sent  out, 
with  orders  to  act  with  extreme  caution.  After  about  an  hour's 
action  the  French,  having  expended,  or  fearing  to  expend,  their 
ammunition,  and  alarmed  by  movements  which  signified  an  in- 
tention of  cutting  off  their  retreat,  abandoned  their  baggage, 
which  had  been  deposited  at  the  Garden  House,  and  withdrew.* 

Dupleix  seems  to  have  concluded  from  this  affair  that  the 
Moghul  troops  supported  by  the  EngUsh  were  too  much  for  him, 
and  proceeded  to  seek  a  peace  with  the  Nawab.  This  was 
always  a  lengthy  process,  and  the  terms  were  not  settled  until 
March  2,  1747.  Dupleix  atoned  for  his  disobedience  by  presents 
amounting  to  over  80,000  rupees,  and  by  allowing  the  Moghul 
flag  to  fly  over  Madras  for  a  week.'' 

Now  at  last  the  way  seemed  open  to  St.  David's  ;  but  almost 
at  once  it  closed  again.  On  March  9  news  reached  Pondich^ry 
that  the  English  squadron  was  on  its  way  to  the  Coast."  A 
couple  of  days  later  a  body  of  troops  marched  under  Paradis, 
whom  Dupleix  had  shamed  the  French  officers  into  accepting  as 
their  leader.  But  for  a  whole  day  the  EngUsh  defended  the  line 
of  the  Pennar  ;  and  though  that  evening  they  were  forced  to  fall 
back,  the  next  morning  brought  the  welcome  sight  of  British  men- 
of-war.  Again  the  French  had  to  retire  with  haste  on  Pondi- 
chdry.* 

*  Pondichfiry  to  the  Company,  February  6,  1747  (P.R.,  No.  7). 

'  One  thousand  six  hundred  were  sent  out  under  "  Vencataschilum  and 
Mulrauze,  the  commanding  officers  of  our  black  Military."  Fort  St.  David  Cons., 
December  8,  1746. 

•  Fort  St.  David  Cons.,  December  20,  1746  ;  cf.  M^m.  pour  La  Bourdonnais, 
Piices,  No.  230. 

*  Pondich6ry  to  the  Company,  October  11,  1747  (P.R.,  No.  7),  and  the 
Diary  of  Ananda  lianga  Pillai.  vol.  iii.  pp.  394-395.  The  latter  condition  does 
not  seem  to  have  been  reported  to  Europe. 

'  Diary  of  Ananda  lianga  Pillai,  vol.  iii.  p.  410. 

•  Fort  St.  David  Cons.,  March  i  and  2,  1747. 


THE  WAR  OF  THE  AUSTRIAN  SUCCESSION       23 

The  squadron  arrived  under  a  new  commander,  Commodore 
Griffin,  1  who  had  sailed  to  reinforce  the  Enghsh  with  the  Pearl 
and  the  Princess  Mary  in  1746,  and  having  made  too  long  a 
passage  to  gain  the  Coast  that  year,  had  wintered  at  Achin  and 
reached  Bengal  in  December.*  There  he  was  again  delayed  by 
the  repairs  needed  by  the  Medway,  and  could  not  sail  till  March  i.^ 
His  arrival  brought  matters  to  a  pause.  He  was  exceedingly 
short-manned,*  and  any  attack  on  Pondich^ry  was  out  of  the 
question.  The  utmost  he  could  do  was  to  blockade  the  French 
settlement  and  keep  Dupleix  inactive.  The  leading  events  of  the 
next  months  are  the  destruction  of  the  French  ship  Neptune  lying 
in  the  Madras  roads,  and  the  burning  of  a  number  of  grain-vessels 
that  had  come  to  victual  Pondichery.  All  through  the  monsoon 
of  1747,  however,  he  kept  watch  over  St.  David's,  thereby  not 
only  earning  the  enthusiastic  approval  of  the  English  Council, 
but  also  forcing  from  Dupleix  a  recognition  of  the  superior  con- 
stancy of  English  sailors  * — a  tribute  the  more  heartfelt  inas- 
much as  Griffin  had  compelled  him  personally  to  retire  to  Pondi- 
chery when  marching  in  January  1748  to  attack  the  English  fort.* 

This  lull,  however,  came  to  an  end  in  the  middle  of  1748.  Both 
French  and  English  were  sending  out  considerable  reinforcements. 
In  February  Griffin  was  joined  by  three  men-of-war,  and  news 
came  that  a  large  expedition  was  preparing.'  At  the  same  time 
the  Company  sent  out  Stringer  Lawrence,  a  retired  captain  of  the 
King's  Service,  to  take  command  as  major  of  the  St.  David's 
garrison.  His  arrival,  and  the  disciphne  which  he  at  once  pro- 
ceeded to  enforce,  mark  the  time  from  which  the  Company's 
troops  became  an  effective  mihtary  force. 

The  French  succours  were  less  fortunate.  A  fleet  which 
sailed  under  St.  George  was  first  driven  back  by  a  storm,  and 
then  when  it  sailed  later,  under  the  escort  of  La  Jonquiere,  escort 
and  convoy  were  caught  or  destroyed  by  Anson  off  Cape  Finisterre. 
Three  ships,  however,  had  disappeared  in  the  storm  ;  and  these 

'  He  was  promoted  Rear- Admiral  of  the  Red  in  1747. 

•Griffin's  Journal  (P.R.O.,  Admiralty,  Admirals'  Journals,  No.  25). 

'  Narr.  of  the  Trans,  of  the  British  Squadrons,  p.  58. 

♦  Griffin  to  .\nson,  February  7,  1747  (Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  15955,  f.  288). 

'  Pub.  Des.  to  England,  February  13,  1748  ;  Dupleix  to  Montaron,  January 
30,  1749  (Nazelle,  p.  396). 

•Fort  St.  David  Cons.,  January  7,  1748  ;  Diary  of  Anamla  Ranga  Pillai, 
vol.  iv.  p.  321. 

'  The  new  vessels  were  the  Exeter,  York,  and  Eltham.  Griffin  to  .\nson, 
February  12,  1748  (Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  15955,  f.  291). 


24  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

reached  the  French  Islands  in  October  1747.  Other  vessels 
were  lying  there  more  or  less  ready  for  service.  With  these  a 
squadron  of  seven  sail  was  formed,  under  the  command  of 
Bouvet,  to  carry  much-needed  suppHes  of  money  to  Pondichery.^ 
His  instructions  expressly  stated  that  this  was  the  principal 
object  of  his  mission.* 

When,  therefore,  he  made  the  Coast  his  first  concern  was  to 
reconnoitre  the  Enghsh  squadron.  On  June  21  he  sent  a  fast- 
sailing  boat  ahead,  which  reported  that  ten  men-of-war  and  several 
merchantmen  were  l3^ng  in  the  St.  David's  roads.  He  himself 
approached  within  about  a  league  to  survey  the  enemy,  but, 
after  consulting  his  senior  captain,  resolved  to  sail  for  Madras, 
and  there  land  the  treasure  and  men  he  was  bringing,  instead  of 
running  the  risk  of  an  action.^  This  he  accomplished  on  the 
22nd,  and  then  hastily  quitted  the  Coast.*  Dupleix  complained 
of  this  abrupt  departure.  Had  Bouvet  only  put  into  Karikal, 
he  declared,  he  would  have  learnt  that  Griffin  only  had  four 
ships  ready  to  sail ;  and  by  attacking  could  have  made  an  end 
of  the  English  squadron.* 

But  whatever  Dupleix  thought  about  it,  Bouvet  would  un- 
doubtedly have  been  bringing  his  mission  into  the  most  serious 
peril  had  he  ventured  on  attacking  Grifhn,  who  was  not  so  un- 
prepared as  Dupleix  stated.  It  is  true  that  the  Pearl  and  Eltham 
were  at  the  moment  useless,  for  their  rudders  were  ashore  for 
repairs  ;  but  apart  from  these,  the  English  squadron  comprised 
six  line-of-battle  ships  with  a  frigate  and  two  of  the  Company's 
ships.  Nor  were  the  English  taken  by  surprise.  About  nine 
o'clock  on  the  evening  of  the  20th  an  English  scout  came  in 
with  the  news  that  she  had  sighted  a  French  squadron,  and 
Bouvet  did  not  appear  until  2  p.m.,  on  the  following  day.' 
Griffin  was  ashore  when  the  scout  arrived,  but  he  got  aboard  at 
4  a.m.  the  next  morning,'  and  if  he  had  sailed  at  once,  with  the 
land  breeze,  he  could  probably  have    brought  the  French  to 

'  See  Lacour-Gaillet,  La  Marine  Militaire  sous  Louis  XV.,  p.  215.  The  ships 
lying  at  the  Islands  consisted  of  the  ships  that  had  sailed  from  Pondichfery 
under  Dordelin,  and  two  French  privateers.  The  squadron  mounted  328  guns 
and  carried  21 10  men. 

•  David  to  Bouvet,  April  24,  1748  (Nazelle,  p.  296,  etc.).         *  /6jd.,pp.  139,  etc. 

•  He  landed  60,000  marcs  (  =  472,250  ounces)  of  silver  and  about  400  men.  In  a 
Reponse  en  aposiille  of  January  10,  1749,  the  Council  says  these  consisted  of  274 
soldiers,  40  sailors  and  volunteers,  and  85  Cofirees. 

•  Dupleix  to  the  Company,  January  15,  1749  (Nazelle,  p.  289). 

•  Fort  St.  David  Cons.,  June  9  and  lo,  1748. 

'  Griffin's  Court  Martial  (P.R.O.,  Admiralty,  1-3294). 


THE  WAR  OF  THE  AUSTRIAN  SUCCESSION       25 

action  that  day.  Instead  of  doing  that,  however,  he  remained 
quietly  at  anchor  until  the  enemy  was  in  sight  from  the  masthead, 
at  2  p.m.,  and  the  sea  breeze  had  set  in  from  the  south.  Then 
he  called  a  council  of  war,  which  decided  nothing  except  that 
the  EUham's  crew  was  to  be  distributed  among  the  rest  of  the 
fleet.*  Later  in  the  afternoon,  as  the  French  drew  near,  he  con- 
templated putting  out  to  sea,  and  again  consulted  his  captains. 
Finally,  he  waited  until  the  wind  had  moderated  and  only  got 
to  sea  at  i  a.m.  on  June  22. ^  The  result  of  all  this  hesitation 
and  delay  was,  as  we  have  seen,  that  Bouvet  got  safely  off  to 
Madras  while  Griffin  was  cruising  vainly  off  Pondichery,  and 
was  clear  of  the  Coast  when  at  last  the  English  sailed  north  in 
search  of  him.  Griffin  himself  felt  that  his  conduct  was  liable 
to  strictures,  for  he  wrote  to  Anson  :  "I  acquaint  your  Lordship 
more  fully  with  this  lest  the  impertinence  of  some  people  should 
raise  clamour,  as  it  has  been  the  custom  to  condemn  all  who  see 
French  ships  and  does  [sic)  not  take  them."  *  His  anticipations 
were  justified.  On  return  to  England  he  was  court-martialed 
and  found  guilty  of  an  error  of  judgment  in  not  sailing  early  in 
the  morning  of  the  21st  * — a  fjiding  which  appears  to  be  com- 
pletely just. 

Griffin's  fruitless  chase  after  Bouvet  had  meanwhile  left 
St.  David's  uncovered.  Even  now  that  reinforcements  had  been 
received  from  Bengal  and  Bombay,*  and  that  recruits  had 
arrived  from  Europe,  the  garrison  was  still  very  weak  compared 
with  that  of  Pondichery.  It  consisted  of  473  Europeans  and 
371  Topasses,'  equally  distributed  among  five  companies,  to- 
gether with  about  1000  native  infantry,  not  too  reliable  in  action. 
With  these,  Lawrence  had  to  defend  not  only  the  fort  and  its 
outworks,  but  also  the  town  of  Cuddalore,  lying  a  mile  away, 
with  ruinous  walls  over  two  miles  long.^ 

•Griffin's  Journal,  June  ll,  1748  (P.R.O.,  Admiralty.  Admirals'  Journals, 
No.  25). 

•  Loc.  cit. 

•Griffin  to  Anson,  August  15,  1748  (Brit.  Mus.,  .\dd.  MSS.,  15955,  f.  306). 
'Court  Martial,  Decc-mber  3-7,  1752,  and  the  Report  on  Griffin's  petition, 

January  9,  1752(3)  (P.R.O.,  Admiralty,  1-5294  and  7-480). 

•  One  hundred  Europeans  were  received  from  Bengal  on  Griffin's  squadron 
in  March  1747  (Clive,  ap.  Orme  MSS.,  India,  i.  f.  108),  and  in  the  following  May 
68  Europeans,  200  Topasses,  and  115  sepoys  arrived  from  Bombay  (Bombay 
Cons.,  April  24,  1747.  Communicated  by  the  courtesy  of  Mr.  Bulwant  Mahadev, 
Record-keeper  at  Bombay). 

i^m      'Fort  St.  David  Cons.,  June  24,  1748. 


26  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

On  the  evening  of  June  27  a  considerable  body  of  troops 
marched  out  of  Pondichery,  under  the  command  of  Mainville,  a 
captain  in  the  Company's  service. ^  Instead  of  moving  directly 
on  the  Fort,  they  kept  inland,  and  on  the  evening  of  the  28th 
were  close  to  the  southern  part  of  the  EngUsh  bounds.  Their 
design  was  now  evident  ;  so  Lawrence  reinforced  the  garrison  of 
Cuddalore  by  a  party  of  Sepoys  and  went  thither  in  person. ^ 
About  eight  o'clock  the  French  attempted  an  escalade,  on  the 
southern  side  of  the  town,  where  the  wall  was  low  and  easily 
climbed  ;  but  as  the  garrison  was  on  the  alert,  the  French  were 
beaten  off  with  some  loss.^  This  was  Dupleix'  last  attempt 
against  St.  David's,  and  accident  rendered  it  peculiarly  exasperat- 
ing. The  morning  after  the  attack,  Madame  Dupleix  received 
a  report  that  it  had  been  successful,  then  came  news  of  failure, 
but  Mainville  was  believed  to  be  about  to  renew  his  attempt  ; 
an  anxious  watcher  was  said  to  have  seen  clouds  of  smoke 
hanging  over  Cuddalore.  Only  after  violent  alternations  of 
hope  and  fear  were  the  r'eal  facts  known,  whereon  Madame 
burst  into  a  passion,  while  Dupleix  himself  withdrew  to  conceal 
his  emotion.* 

Indeed,  his  last  chance  of  rivalling  the  achievements  of  La 
Bourdonnais  had  been  lost,  for  Boscawen  was  at  hand  with  forces 
which  at  once  reduced  the  French  to  the  defensive.  When 
the  news  of  the  capture  of  Madras  and  the  flight  of  Peyton's 
squadron  reached  England,  the  Company  hastened  to  request 
more  effective  succour  from  the  Government.*  As  a  result,  six 
ships  of  the  line,  with  store  ships,  etc.,  were  ordered  to  fit  ;  • 
at  the  same  time  it  was  resolved  to  raise  twelve  independent  com- 

'  Mimoire  by  Mainville,  October  4,  1754  (Dupleix,  Riponse  d  la  lettre  du  Sietir 
Godeheu,  p.  24 1 ). 

'  Fort  St.  David  Cons.,  June  17,  1748. 

•  Orme  has  a  story  (derived  from  Clivo,  Orme  MSS.,  India,  i.  140)  that  Lawrence 
induced  the  French  to  attack  by  removing  the  guns  and  men  in  Cuddalore  ; 
and  Malleson  follows  this  with  strictures  on  Lawrence's  conduct.  But  not  a 
gun  or  man  was  withdrawn.  "  We  had  given  out  that  we  intended  to  abandon 
it,"  say  the  Council  (Pub.  Des.  to  England,  September  2,  1748).  It  is  likely  that 
had  the  Fort  been  attacked  in  force  the  Cuddalore  garrison  would  have  been 
withdrawn.  Ensign  Hyde  Parker  asserts  that  some  days  before  the  ammunition 
had  been  ordered  to  be  sent  to  the  Fort  (Parker  to  Mole,  January  17,  1749, 
I.O.,  Misc.  Ltrs.  Reed..  1749-50,  No.  7). 

•  Diary  of  Ananda  Ranga  Pillai,  vol.  v.  pp.  78,  etc. 

'  Petition  of  the  Secret  Committee  to  Newcastle,  April  24,  1747  (P.R.O., 
Colonial,  77-78). 

•  Orders  of  July  15,  1747  (P.R.O.,  Admiralty,  2-70).  Like  Bamctt's  squadron, 
these  ships  also  were  provided  with  "  English  malt  spirits." 


THE  WAR  OF  THE  AUSTRIAN  SUCCESSION       27 

panics  ;  ^  half  by  drafts  from  the  regiments  stationed  in  Ireland, 
half  by  recruitment  in  Scotland,  by  gentlemen  commissioned  as 
captains  on  condition  of  raising  companies. ^  The  recruitment 
in  Scotland  did  not  prove  very  successful,  and  the  companies 
had  to  be  completed  with  rebels,  deserters,  and  highwaymen 
pardoned  on  condition  of  enlistment.' 

Boscawen  was  entrusted  with  the  supreme  command  of  this 
expedition.  He  was  junior  in  the  service  to  Griflin,  but  the 
latter  was  ordered  to  leave  four  men-of-war  with  him,  and  with 
the  remainder  to  escort  the  East  India  shipping  home.*  The  new 
Admiral  was  provided  with  a  plan  of  operations  drawn  up  by 
the  Company,  proposing  the  reduction  of  Mauritius,  Pondichery, 
Chandernagore,  or  any  other  French  settlement,  and  recommending 
that  any  place  captured  should  be  dismantled  and  demolished 
at  once.*  Boscawen  got  under  sail  with  H.M.'s  ships  and  eleven 
of  the  Company's  on  November  22,  1747.' 

He  reached  the  Cape  on  February  7,  after  an  unusually 
healthy  and  prosperous  voyage.''  Here  he  remained  four  months, 
busied  with  drilling  his  raw  troops,*  and  finally  sailed  in  May  for 
Mauritius,  accompanied  by  six  Dutch  Indiamen  with  600  Dutch 
troops.  • 

Boscawen  made  Mauritius  on  July  4,  and  anchored  that  night 
in  Turtle  Bay.  A  couple  of  days  were  spent  in  seeking  a  place 
suitable  for  the  disembarkation  ;  but  as  none  was  found,  and 
nothing  was  known  of  the  strength  or  dispositions  of  the  French, 
it  was  resolved  to  sail  with  all  speed  for  the  Coromandel  Coast, 

•  i.e.  companies  not  formed  into  a  battalion. 

•  Fox  to  Corbet t,  June  3,  1747,  to  Major-Gcneral  Churchill,  July  6,  1747,  and 
to  Captain  James  Stuart.  July  17,  1747  (P.R.O.,  War  Office,  4-43). 

•  Fox  to  the  Duke  of  Argyle,  August  4,  to  the  Keeper  of  Chelmsford  Gaol, 
September  17,  to  Calcraft.  September  21,  and  to  Newcastle,  October  6,  1747 
(P.R.O.,  War  Office,  4-43  and  44). 

•  Instructions  to  Griffin,  October  14,  1747  (P.R.O.,  Admiralty,  2-70). 

•  Plan  of  operations,  dated  October  7,  1747  (P.R.O.,  Admiralty,  2-70). 

•  Boscawen  to  Corbett,  November  12,  1747  (P.R.O.,  Admiralty,  1-160). 

'  Boscawen  attributed  this  chiefly  to  his  having  touched  at  the  Islands  for 
refreshments,  but  believed  also  that  something  was  due  to  the  ventilation- 
pipes  with  which  the  vessels  were  fitted.  Letter  to  Corbett.  April  4,  1748 
(P.R.O.,  Admiralty,  1-160). 

'  Loc.  cit. 

•The  Dutch  entered  the  war  in  1747.  Malleson  writes  conspicuous  nonsense 
about  the  Dutch  Indiamen  that  accompanied  Boscawen  against  Mauritius, 
speaking  of  their  waging  war  under  the  guise  of  peaceful  traders.  Was  he 
really  ignorant  that  Dutch,  French,  and  English  Companies  alike  armed  their 
vessels  and  used  them  for  warlike  purposes  ?  Had  he  never  heard  of  the  action 
in  the  Hugli  between  Dutch  and  English  Indiamen  in  1759  ? 


28  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

to  the  great  joy  of  the  enemy,  who  were  ill-prepared  to  defend  the 
island.^  The  Dutch  ships  now  sailed  for  Batavia,  according 
to  previous  arrangennsnts,  so  that  Boscawen  reached  the  Coro- 
mandel  Coast  with  six  ships  less  than  had  appeared  off  Mauritius. 
On  this  foundation,  Dupleix  built  up  a  legend,  which  he  sought 
to  spread  far  and  wide,  of  a  severe  British  defeat  at  the  French 
Islands.* 

Boscawen  at  last  arrived  off  St.  David's  on  August  8,  1748.' 
Both  sides  had  long  known  of  his  coming  ;  but  although  the 
English  claimed  to  have  made  all  possible  preparations  to  attack 
Pondichery,  the  event  proved  those  of  the  French  to  have  been 
the  more  effective.  Griffin  feared  that  Boscawen  would  not 
find  the  place  so  easy  a  conquest  as  many  imagined,  for  the 
French  had  been  throwing  up  works  ever  since  the  previous 
December.*  Lawrence,  however,  thought  otherwise.  He  did  not 
doubt  of  carrying  the  place  in  thirty  days  open  trenches,  and 
contemplated  breaking  ground  as  near  the  walls  as  possible.* 
However,  the  procedure  followed  was  the  extreme  opposite  of 
what  he  recommended. 

The  army  under  Boscawen  marched  out  of  the  St.  David's 
bounds  on  August  8/19.  It  comprised  1200  of  the  independent 
Companies,  800  marines,  750  of  the  Company's  foot,  1000  sea- 
men who  had  been  taught  the  manual  exercise,  and  120  of  our 
Dutch  allies  from  Negapatam.  Besides  these  there  were  150 
artillerymen — 4000  Europeans  in  all,  with  about  2000  native 
foot.  The  Pondichery  garrison  consisted  of  1800  Europeans 
and  Topasses,  and  3000  sepoys.  With  such  a  superiority  of 
force,  the  EngUsh  could  have  picked  their  position,  opened  their 
trenches,  and  quickly  overcome  the  fire  of  the  enemy.  But 
never  was  a  siege  less  skilfully  conducted.  "  If  there  be  any 
officers  or  soldiers  in  India,"  wrote  Clive  to  Orme,  "  remaining  of 
those  who  were  at  the  siege  of  Pondichery  twelve  or  thirteen 
years  ago,  experience  must  have  convinced  them  how  very 
ignorant  we  were  of  the  art  of  war  in  those  days.  Some  of  the 
engineers  were  masters  of  the  theory  without  the  practice,  and 

'Boscawen  to  Corbctt,  October  17.  1748  (Admiralty,  1-160) ;  cf.  Grant's 
Mauritius,  p.  299. 

'  Dupleix  to  David,  August  20,  1748  (Nazellc,  p.  323). 

•Boscawen  to  Corbett,  August  24,  1748  (P.R.O.,  Admiralty,  1-160).  The 
Fort  St.  David  Cons,  give  the  date  as  July  26-27 /August  6-7. 

*  Griffin  to  Corbett,  August  15,  1748  (P.R.O.,  Admiralty,  i-l6o). 

*  Lawrence  to  the  Secret  Committee,  April  24,  1748  (I.O.,  Fac.  Rec.  Fort  St. 
David,  vol.  x.  £.  131). 


THE  WAR  OF  THE  AUSTRIAN  SUCCESSION       29 

those  seemed  wanting  in  resolution.  Others  there  were  who 
understood  neither,  and  yet  were  possessed  of  courage  sufficient 
to  have  gone  on  with  the  undertaking  if  they  had  known  how 
to  go  about  it.  There  was  scarce  an  officer  who  knew  whether 
the  engineers  were  acting  right  or  wrong,  till  it  was  too  late  in 
the  season  and  we  had  lost  too  many  men  to  begin  an  approach 
again."  * 

Eleven  days  were  spent  in  capturing  a  small  fort  south  of 
Pondichery  on  the  Ariyankuppam  River,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
there  was  no  particular  need  to  capture  it  at  all.  This  fruitless 
success  was  obtained  at  the  cost  of  many  men  and  of  Major 
Goodere  killed  and  Major  Lawrence  taken.  These  were  the  only 
two  officers  who  seem  to  have  known  what  they  were  about.  So 
sluggishly  were  matters  conducted  that  Boscawen  wasted  five 
more  days  in  putting  this  fort  in  a  state  of  defence.  He  does 
not  seem  to  have  been  sure  whether  he  was  besieging  or  block- 
ading Pondichery.  At  last  he  moved  and  took  post  on  the 
high  ground  north-west  of  the  town.  Here  a  dozen  years  later 
Coote  estabUshed  his  headquarters  ;  but  Coote  aimed  at  block- 
ading the  place,  and  established  his  headquarters  in  the  centre  of 
his  army.  No  place  could  have  been  worse  chosen  as  the  point 
of  departure  for  an  attack  in  form.  It  was  a  long  way  from  the 
sea,  and  all  stores  had  to  be  protected  by  strong  convoys  ;  worse 
than  that,  marshes  prevented  the  works  being  carried  near 
enough  to  batter  in  breach.  "  God  alone,"  said  the  Tamil 
diarist  of  the  day,  "  could  have  made  the  English  choose  such 
a  position."  To  make  matters  worse,  the  engineers  did  not  get 
the  heavy  batteries  completed  till  September  25/October  6,  nine 
days  before  the  monsoon  was  due  to  burst.  Finding  matters 
grew  desperate,  Boscawen  ordered  the  fleet  to  warp  in  and 
bombard  Pondichery  from  the  sea  while  he  did  the  same  from 
his  batteries.  But  the  men-of-war  could  not  get  nearer  than 
1000  yards  ;  and  the  result  was  a  prodigious  noise,  some  alarm, 
but  little  damage.  On  October  6/17  accordingly  Boscawen 
raised  the  siege.*  He  had  suffered  heavy  losses,  especially  from 
sickness.  In  his  infantry — the  marines,  independents,  and  the 
Company's  foot — there  had  been  816  casualties  out  of  a  total 
of  2750  ;  of  these  nearly  seven-eighths  by  sickness  ;  the  ar- 
tillery had  lost  a  third  of  its  effectives,  half  by  sickness  ;  the 
seamen  had  lost  25  per  cent. — 62  killed  and  wounded,  198  died 

'  Clive,  ap.  Orme  MSS.,  India,  i.  in. 
^  »  Boscawen  to  Corbctt,  October  17,  1748  (P.R.O.,  Admiralty,  1-160). 


30  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

and  sick.'  The  French  losses  were  trivial.  About  a  hundred  men 
had  been  killed  or  wounded  by  an  explosion  caused  by  the 
English  fire  at  Ariyankuppam  ;  Paradis  was  killed  in  a  sortie 
made  against  the  EngHsh  trenches,  and  perhaps  another  hundred 
were  killed  or  wounded  in  the  course  of  the  siege. 

A  couple  of  months  later  news  arrived  that  the  peace  pre- 
liminaries had  been  signed  in  Europe  ;  and  in  the  following 
May  a  Danish  ship  brought  out  the  news  of  a  general  peace. 
So  far  as  India  was  concerned,  this  involved  two  things — the 
restoration  of  Madras  to  the  English,  and  the  removal  of  all 
danger  of  further  English  attacks  on  Pondichdry. 

'The  returns  arc  in  Admiralty,  1-160. 


CHAPTER   II 
THE  SUCCESSES  OF  DUPLEIX 

THE  news  of  peace  arrived  just  as  another  series  of  events 
came  to  a  head.     The  Carnatic  was  in  theory  dependent 
on  the  Deccan  ;    and  the  Nawabs  of  the  Carnatic  were 
supposed  to  be  appointed  by  the  Viceroy  of  the  Deccan.     But> 
the  latter,  the  famous  Nizam-ul-Mulk,  had  long  been  too  busy 
establishing    and    maintaining   his    own    independence    of    the 
Emperor  to  pay  much  attention  to  the  Carnatic.     There  also 
a  similar  process  went  forward.     Three  successive  Nawabs  had 
belonged   to   the   same   family ;     and   the   Nawabship   seemed 
likely  to  become  hereditary,  when  suddenly  the  third,  Safdar 
Ali  Khan,  was  murdered  by  a  relative  and  rival,  Murtaza  Ali 
Khan,  who,  however,  failed  to  estabUsh  himself.     This  led  to 
confusion,  to  Nizam-ul-Mulk's  personal  intervention,  and  the 
appointment  of  a  new  Nawab,  Anwar-ud-din,  who  was  entirely 
unconnected  with  the  late  ruling  family.     This  took  place  in 
1743.     But  from  the  day  of  Anwar-ud-din's  appointment,  his 
position  had  never  been  as  secure  as  that  of  his  predecessors.     It 
had  been  shortly  followed  by  the  murder  of  the  young  son  of 
the  last  Nawab.     Anwar-ud-din  and  Murtaza  Ali  Khan  were 
suspected  of  having  had  a  hand  in  this  ;   and  every  bazaar  had 
been  filled  with  a  thousand  uncertain  rumours  and  prognostica- 
tions.     It  was  whispered  that  Anwar-ud-din  would  shortly  be 
removed,  and  that  Nizam-ul-Mulk  would  extend  to  the  Carnatic 
that  baneful  practice  of  leasing  the  revenues  to  the  highest 
bidder,  which  he  had  already  established  in  the  Deccan.     Even 
to  European  eyes  the  disjointed,  enervated  condition  of  the 
Empire  was  becoming  obvious  ;    while  Ananda  Ranga  Pillai 
predicted  that  the  Nizam's  death  would  mvolve  in  anarchy  the 
whole  of  Southern  India.  * 

The  truth  of  his  prophecy  was  soon  to  be  proved.    Even  as  he 
wrote  the  words,  Nizam-ul-Mulk  was  lying  dead  near  Burhanpur, 

'  Pub.  Des.  to  England,  January  31,  1746  ;    Diary  of  Ananda  Ranga  Pillai, 
vol.  V.  p.  41. 

3« 


32  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

and  his  second  son,  Nasir  Jang,  had  already  seized  the  govern- 
ment.! xhe  news  quickened  into  sudden  activity  all  the 
smouldering  plot  and  intrigue  which  for  the  last  four  years  had 
surrounded  the  new  Nawab.  At  once  he  ordered  additional 
horse  to  be  raised,  and  entered  into  negotiations  with  his  nearest 
and  most  dangerous  enemy,  Murtaza  Ali  Khan,  who  had  escaped 
all  punishment  for  the  murder  of  two  Nawabs,  and  who  was 
believed  to  be  awaiting  a  propitious  moment  to  renew  his 
attempts  upon  the  government  of  Arcot.  Farther  south,  the 
surviving  Hindu  princes  were  planning  the  restoration  of  Hindu 
rule  at  Trichinopoly.^  At  the  same  moment  news  came  that 
Chanda  Sahib  had  reached  the  river  Kistna  with  an  army  of 
Mahrattas.3 

This  was  a  man  who  had  played  a  great  part  in  the  previous 
history  of  the  Carnatic.  AlUed  to  the  late  ruling  house  aUke 
by  blood  and  marriage,  he  had  served  the  previous  Nawabs  both 
as  Diwan  and  General.  He  was  brave,  warlike,  and  ambitious. 
He  had  aimed  at  founding  a  Government  for  himself  by  con- 
quering, ostensibly  for  the  Nawab,  the  ancient  Sindu  kingdoms 
of  Trichinopoly,  Tanjore,  and  Madura  ;  but  his  conquests  had 
provoked  the  great  Hindu  power  of  the  Marathas,  and  his  am- 
bition had  made  an  enemy  of  the  Nawab's  son  and  successor. 
Accordingly,  in  1740-41,  the  Marathas  invaded  the  Carnatic, 
slew  the  Nawab  in  battle,  and  then,  having  made  terms  with 
his  son  Safdar  AU,  they  proceeded  to  besiege  Chanda  Sahib  in 
Trichinopoly.  He  was  at  last  forced  to  surrender,  and  was  carried 
off  prisoner  to  Satara,  where  he  remained  for  some  eight  years, 
constantly  intriguing  for  his  release  and  estabUshment  as  Nawab 
of  Arcot. 

The  method  and  time  of  his  release  have  been  variously 
stated.  At  a  later  period  Dupleix  claimed  the  whole  credit, 
and  this  story  has  been  endlessly  repeated  by  writers  who  did 
not  choose  to  go  deeper  for  their  sources.  M.  Cultru,  on  the 
contrary,  holds  that  he  was  released  in  1745,  without  French 
intervention  of  any  sort.*     Both  views,  I  beUeve,  are  inaccurate. 

>  Nizam-ul-Mulk  died  June  2,  1748  ;  Diary  of  Ananda  Ranga  Pillai.  vol.  v.  p.  53. 
'  Trichinopoly  had   been   conquered   by  Chanda   Sahib   (brother-in-law  of 
Nawab  Dhost  Ali  Khan)  in  1736. 

•  Diary  of  Ananda  Ranga  Pillai,  vol.  v.  pp.  75,  96,  103,  and  176  ;  Country 
Correspondence,  1748,  p.  65. 

*  Cultru.  Dupleix,  p.  230.  I  must  take  this  occasion  to  acknowledge  my 
great  obligations  to  this  most  valuable  author.  I  only  venture  to  contravert  a 
statement  of  his  with  the  greatest  diffidence. 


THE  SUCCESSES  OF  DUPLEIX  38 

As  Grant  Duff  observes/  Chanda  Sahib's  captivity  was  not 
very  rigorous.  It  probably  amounted  to  no  more  than  confine- 
ment within  the  limits  of  the  fort  with  an  attendant  guard. 
Certainly  it  was  not  long  before  he  began  to  scheme  for  his 
return  to  the  south.  So  early  as  October  1744,  we  hear  of 
invitations  addressed  to  the  Marathas  by  the  family  which 
Anwar-ud-din  had  supplanted.  Many  of  them  held  jagirs  and 
forts  in  the  Carnatic,  and  feared  they  would  be  dispossessed  if 
he  succeeded  in  establishing  his  power.  ^  In  the  next  year, 
Chanda  Sahib  himself  wrote  to  Dupleix.'  He  related  that  as 
Raghoji  and  other  lords  of  the  Marathas  had  promised  "  to  put 
him  in  possession  of  his  rights,  he  had  resolved  to  give  them 
what  they  asked,"  but,  he  himself  having  no  funds,  Balaji  Rao's 
nephew  had  paid  several  lakhs  to  Raghoji  for  him,  and  promised 
to  provide  what  would  be  needed  either  for  presents  to  the 
Nizam  or  for  other  expenses.  Raghoji  Rao,  he  adds,  having 
given  him  leave  of  departure,  he  intends  to  visit  Balaji  Rao,  and 
to  send  his  son  to  the  Nizam,  "  who  seeing  me  so  strongly  sup- 
ported, will  not  fail  to  restore  me  to  my  rights." 

However,  in  spite  of  this  plain  statement  of  his  release  by  the 
Marathas,  something  appears  to  have  gone  wrong  with  the 
negotiation,  for  he  remained  in  captivity.  In  1747  the  Pondi- 
chery  Council  wrote  of  him  that  he  was  still  a  prisoner  though 
allowed  a  good  deal  of  liberty.*  In  November  1746,  Ranga 
Pillai  recorded  negotiations  for  his  release.  Early  next  year  a 
messenger  came  from  Poona,  "  where  Chanda  Sahib  is  detained." 
In  July  he  wrote  to  Pondichery  from  Satara.  His  family  only 
heard  of  his  release  in  1748,  at  the  same  moment  that  his  brother 
reported  it  to  the  Enghsh.*  In  the  face  of  all  this,  it  must  be 
admitted  that  Chanda  Sahib  was  not  free  to  go  where  he  pleased 
in  1745.  Perhaps  he  was  so  sanguine  as  to  write  of  promises 
as  accomplished  facts  ;  and  probably  the  whole  affair  depended 
on  Nizam-ul-Mulk's  attitude.  It  is  not  likely  that  Balaji  Rao's 
nephew  advanced  several  lakhs  for   nothing  ;    and    in    effect 

'  Hiit.  of  the  Mahrattas.  vol.  ii.  p.  S  and  n.  (ed.  1912). 

'  Dupleix  to  the  Company,  October  2,  1744  {Mem.  pour  la  Comp.  corttre 
Dupleix,  Piices,  No.  2). 

'  Cultru,  op  cit.,  pp.  228-229. 

*  Pondichfery  to  the  Company,  January  31,  1747  (P.R.,  No.  7).  M.  Cultru 
comments  that  the  Council  was  misinformed  ;  but  the  other  evidence  renders 
that  view  difficult  to  hold. 

'  Diary  of  Ananda  Ranga  Pillai,  vol.  iii.  pp.  118,  140,  274  ;  vol.  iv.  p.  J24  ; 
vol.  V.  p.  97  ;  Country  Correspondence,  1748,  p.  54. 

3 


34  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

Chanda  Sahib  would  seem  only  to  have  exchanged  Raghoji 
Bhonsla  for  Balaji  Rao  as  jailer. 

In  any  case,  we  know  that  Maratha  generosity  was  not  so 
great  as  to  reheve  Chanda  Sahib  from  the  necessity  of  finding 
other  financial  help.  On  May  4,  1745,  the  Pondichery  Council 
agreed  to  lend  him  a  lakh  of  rupees  as  soon  as  funds  were  re- 
ceived from  France.^  This  was,  however,  a  mere  Platonic  reso- 
lution. The  presence  of  the  British  squadron  prevented  the 
arrival  of  any  funds  at  Pondichery  ;  French  credit  vanished  ; 
and  Dupleix  was  more  in  need  of  help  than  capable  of  affording 
any.  But  the  events  of  1746 — the  coining  of  La  Bourdonnais, 
the  capture  of  Madras,  and  Paradis'  victory  at  the  Adiyar — 
changed  the  situation.  The  alliance  of  the  French  became  more 
valuable.  At  the  close  of  the  year,  Dupleix  and  Chanda  Sahib's 
relatives  at  Pondichery  were  concerting  measures  for  his  Hbera- 
tion.  Dupleix  refused  to  guarantee  the  payment  of  his  ransom, 
but  offered  to  act  as  the  Marathas'  agent  in  its  collection  ;  and 
a  few  days  later  advised  Raza  Sahib  ^  to  assemble  all  the 
forces  of  his  family  and  fall  upon  Anwar-ud-din,  who  was  then 
lying  sick  at  Arcot.  He  promised  to  pay  the  lakh  offered 
in  the  previous  year  as  soon  as  Chanda  Sahib  reached  the 
Carnatic* 

Meanwhile  a  new  plan  emerged.  The  Nizam  had  expressed 
such  disgust  at  the  defeat  of  the  Nawab's  forces  by  the  French  that 
Chanda  Sahi^  resolved  to  send  his  elder  son  to  treat  with  him 
for  the  Camatic ;  and  he  informed  Dupleix  that  Balaji  Rao 
had  promised,  in  the  event  of  the  Nizam's  refusal,  the  assistance 
of  30,000  men.*  This  message  seems  to  have  accompanied  the 
letters  of  congratulation  on  the  capture  of  Madras  addressed 
to  Dupleix  by  Chanda  Sahib  and  Raghoji.  The  latter  announced 
that  he  was  coming  to  re-establish  Hindu  riile  in  the  territories 
seized  in  recent  years  by  the  Moghuls.*  It  looks,  therefore,  as 
though  the  restoration  of  Trichinopoly  to  Hindu  rule  were  one 
of  the  conditions  of  Chanda  Sahib's  release  at  this  time.  If  so, 
it  would  completely  explain  Nizam-ul-Mulk's  opposition.  About 
this  time  a  noble  of  his  court  informed  Dupleix  that  Nasir  Jang 

»  Pondich6ry  to  the  Company,  January  11,  1746  (P.R.,  No.  7).  Unfortun- 
ately the  proceedings  of  the  Council  are  missing  for  the  whole  period  of  Dupleix' 
administration. 

^  Chanda's  second  son  ;  the  elder,  Abid  Sahib,  was  with  his  father. 

»  Diary  of  Avanda  lianga  Pillai,  vol.  iii.  pp.  140  and  1 57. 

«  Ibid.,  vol.  iii.  p.  274- 

<■  Letter  printed  in  Nazelle,  p.  269. 


THE  SUCCESSES  OF  DUPLEIX  35 

had  been  ordered  to  £orsue  and  punish  any  Marathas  moving 
towards  the  CafnatTc* 

Dupleix  having  conferred  with  the  vakils  from  Poona,  raised 
his  offer  to  3  lakhs  of  rupees — one  when  Chanda  Sahib  set 
out  from  Satara  ;  another  when  he  reached  Cuddapah  ;  and 
the  third  when  he  reakhed  Arcot.^  It  is  not  explicitly  stated 
whether  this  offer  was  accompanied  by  a  promise  of  armed 
assistance  ;  but  as  such  an  offer  had  previously  been  made,'  it 
is  not  unlikely.  However,  Chanda  Sahib  was  expected  to  be 
accompanied  with  an  overwhelming  force  ;  and  financial  appeared 
more  urgent  than  military  help.  When  the  offer  reached  Chanda 
Sahib,  he  seems  to  have  assembled  troops,  and  was  only  hindered 
from  marching  by  the  fact  that  Nizam-ul-Mulk  and  Nasir  Jang 
were  encamped  in  a  position  commanding  his  route.  In  June 
1747  he  was  only  awaiting  their  withdrawal  to  begin  his  march.* 

But  this  scheme  was  destined  to  fall  through,  equally  with 
that  of  1745.  It  is  possible  that  this  was  brought  about  by 
Dupleix'  failure  to  furnish  the  necessary  sums,  which  was  cer- 
tainly beyond  his  power  at  any  moment  between  June  1747 
and  June  1748.  But  a  mere  matter  of  3  lakhs  would  not 
have  withheld  the  Marathas,  had  their  minds  been  set  on  the 
affair.  It  is  likely  that  they  were  diverted  from  it  either  by  the 
threats  of  Nizam-ul-Mulk  or  by  that  internal  disunion  to  which 
they  were  constantly  subject.  In  any  case,  Chanda  Sahib  did 
not  escape  from  their  guardianship  for  another  year. 

This  succession  of  futile  plans  wearied  Dupleix,  who  began 
to  regard  Chanda  Sahib's  coming  as  improbable.  So  far  did 
this  feeling  lead  him  that  he  did  not  hesitate  to  coerce  and 
threaten  a  family  hitherto  treated  with  great  deference  and 
generosity.  In  May  1748,  when  he  was  at  his  wits'  end  for 
money,  a  proposal  was  made  to  borrow  a  lakh  of  rupees  from 
the  Killedar  of  Wandiwash,  one  of  Chanda  Sahib's  relatives. 
The  Killedar's  son  seems  to  have  promised  to  supply  the  money, 
and  on  failing  to  do  so.  he  was  imprisoned  in  Fort  Louis  ;  *  as 
for  Chanda  Sahib's  wife  and  son,  long  resident  at  Pondichdry,  they 
could  go  and  welcome  as  soon  as  they  had  paid  what  they  owed.* 

Just  when  Dupleix  was  behaving  as  though  he  had  ceased 
to  care  what  Chanda  Sahib  did  or  thought,  the  latter  was  actually 

*  Letter  printed  in  Nazelle,  p.  268. 

'  Diary  of  Ananda  Ranga  Pillai,  vol.  iv.  p.  124.     •  Ibid.,  vol.  iii.  p.  157. 

*  Op.  cit.,  vol.  iv.  p.  124.  'The  citadel  of  Pondichficy. 

*  Diary  oj  Ananda  Ranga  Pillai,  vol.  iv.  p.  45 5,  and  vol.  v.  pp.  30,  etc. 


36  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

released  by  the  Marathas.  News  reached  his  family  on  July  2, 
1748  (and  was  then  about  six  weeks  old),  that  the  ransom  had 
been  fixed  at  210,000  rupees  payable  in  forty  days,  that  the  ques- 
tion of  Trichinopoly  had  been  settled,  and  that  Chanda  Sahib 
had  already  set  out  on  his  march. -^  There  is  much  here  that  is 
obscure.  Whence  came  the  funds  for  the  payment  of  the 
ransom  ?  Apparently  not  from  the  French,  who  were  actually 
quarrelling  with  the  Navaits  ^  over  a  loan  for  their  own  use. 
Ranga  Pillai  mentions  diamonds  being  sent  to  Chanda  Sahib 
from  Pondichery,  presumably  by  his  wife,  but  they  are  spoken 
of  as  though  not  completing  the  full  sum.  Again,  how  was  the 
Trichinopoly  question  settled  ?  As  we  have  seen,  Chanda  Sahib 
had  already  agreed  to  its  retrocession,  thus  incurring  the  Nizam's 
hostility.  We  do  not  know  why  the  matter  had  been  reopened 
or  how  it  was  determined.  A  letter  from  Chanda  Sahib,  re- 
ceived nearly  two  months  later  but  which  seems  to  refer  to  this 
period,  says  that  his  affairs  have  been  settled  thanks  to  Dupleix' 
message  by  Jayaram  Pandit,  Raghoji's  vakil  ;  *  but  whether 
this  refers  to  the  three-lakh  agreement  made  with  Jayaram 
Pandit  in  1747,  or  whether  the  latter  had  made  a  later  unre- 
corded journey  to  Pondichery,  does  not  appear.  News  received 
at  the  same  time  as  this  letter  reported  Chanda  Sahib  south  of 
the  Kistna  with  12,000  horse.*  Dupleix  perhaps  hoped  that  he 
would  move  south  and  drive  Boscawen  from  before  Pondichery, 
and  he  even  asked  Raza  Sahib  to  write  to  his  father  about  it  ; 
but  the  matter  made  so  little  impression  on  him  that  within 
twenty-four  hours  he  cancelled  the  leave  of  departure  he  had 
given  to  Chanda  Sahib's  son,  and  offered  to  his  wife  the  public 
insult  of  stopping  her  and  her  retinue  on  the  public  highway. 
"  Men  say  to-day's  action  obliterates  all  the  kindness  shown 
them  since  1740,"  observes  the  Tamil  diarist.*  However,  this 
was  only  a  temporary  aberration.  Soon  Dupleix  was  writing 
to  Chanda  Sahib  to  explain  away  the  detention  of  his  son,'  and 
announcing  to  one  of  his  subordinates  that  he  would  place  the 
French  on  a  footing  such  as  they  had  never  yet  enjoyed  in  India.' 
But  Chanda   Sahib  was  not  to  enter  the  Camatic  for  yet 

>  Diary  of  A  nanda  Ranga  Pillai,  vol.  v.  p.  97. 

»  The  tribe  (so  to  speak)  to  which  Chanda  Sahib's  family  belonged. 

»  Diary  of  A  nanda  Ranga  Pillai,  vol.  v.  p.  254. 

^Op.  cit.,  vol.  v.  p.  245. 

»  Op.  cit.,  vol.  V.  pp.  279  and  285. 

•  Diary  of  A  nanda  Ranga  Pillai,  vol.  vi. 

'  Nazelle,  op.  oil.,  p.  359.  I 


I 


THE  SUCCESSES  OF  DUPLEIX        87 

another  year.  His  movements  during  that  period  are  uncertain. 
Orme  relates  ^  that  on  reaching  the  Kistna  he  engaged  in  a 
local  dispute,  was  made  prisoner  and  released,  engaged  again 
in  a  war  with  the  king  of  Bednur,  and  succeeded  in  obtaining 
a  following  of  6000  horse,  with  whom  he  then  joined  Muzaffar 
Jang,  Nawab  of  Adoni  and  grandson  of  Nizam-ul-Mulk.  Wilks 
narrates  a  very  different  story,  ^  according  to  which  he  immedi- 
ately joined  in  the  war  against  Bednur,  was  taken  prisoner  on 
the  very  day  of  Nizam-ul-Mulk's  death,  and  was  then  released 
by  the  body  of  Muhammadan  horse  who  had  captured  him  and 
who  enlisted  under  his  banner. 

Neither  of  these  romantic  stories  can  be  entirely  accepted. 
Neither  Dupleix  nor  Chanda  Sahib's  family  appear  to  have  heard 
of  any  participation  in  local  disputes  down  to  October  1748  ; 
and  the  first  contemporary  mention  of  the  Bednur  affair  appears 
to  be  in  a  letter  received  at  Fort  St.  David  in  March  1749.* 
Moreover,  it  should  be  remembered  that  Muzaffar  Jang,  with 
whom  Chanda  Sahib  was  presently  to  enter  the  Carnatic,  had 
been,  and  I  believe  still  was,  Nawab  not  only  of  Adoni  but  also 
of  the  whole  country  of  Bijapur,  on  the  government  of  which 
the  Raja  of  Bednur  was  nominally  a  dependent.     I  conjecture, 

default  of  precise  information,*  that  Chanda  Sahib  joined 
uzaffar  Jang  very  shortly  after  his  release,  and  that  the  next 
few  months  were  spent  in  persuading  him  to  embark  on  the 
great  adventure  of  seizing  first  the  Carnatic  and  then  the  Deccan. 
We  know  that  early  in  1749  the  final  negotiations  were  carried 
through  in  which  French  help  was  finally  pledged  against  Anwar- 
ud-din.  At  the  same  time,  it  may  be  conjectured,  Chanda 
Sahib  was  employed  in  raising  money  for  Muzaffar  Jang  in  the 
Subah  of  Bijapur,  out  of  which  arose  the  Bednur  affair/  probably 
a  very  insignificant  business  such  as  was  incidental  to  raising 
revenue  in  the  Moghul  country  in  the  eighteenth  century. 

Chanda  Sahib  had  engaged  to  reimburse  to  the  French  Com- 

•  Orme,  History,  vol.  i.  pp.  1 18,  etc.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  Orme  MSS.  in- 
clude scarcely  anything  of  note  relating  to  this  period  of  Chanda  Sahib's  career, 
nor  were  Orme's  informants  people  likely  to  know  more  than  the  current  rumours 
of  the  time. 

'Historical  Sketches  of  Southern  India,  vol.  i.  pp.  159-160.  His  information 
purports  to  come  from  Chanda  Sahib  himself,  but  its  authority  depends  on  the 
accurate  recollection  of  words  heard  near  fifty  years  before. 

•  Country  Correspondence,  1 749,  p.  7. 

•  Probably  available  among  the  French  archives. 

•  His  son,  Abid  Sahib,  seems  to  have  been  killed  there. 


^^ 


38  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

pany  the  pay  of  their  sepoys — 1800  or  2000  men — from  March 
1749  ;  but  he  did  not  claim  their  assistance  until  the  following 
July.  On  the  15th  Raza  Sahib  marched  with  them  to  join  his 
father,  accompanied  further  by  a  body  of  Europeans  and 
Coffrees,  500  strong,  under  the  command  of  d'Auteuil.  On 
July  28  they  joined  Chanda's  army.  On  August  3,  they  com- 
pletely defeated  Anwar-ud-din  at  Ambur,  after  a  stubborn  con- 
test in  which  the  French  troops  bore  the  brunt  of  the  fighting. 
Anwar-ud-din  was  slain  ;  ^  his  brother  and  elder  son  were  made 
prisoners  ;  his  second  son  escaped  and  fled  to  Trichinopoly. 

So  resolute  a  resistance  was  a  surprise  to  the  confederates. 
The  French  detachment  had  marched,  not  in  order  to  fight 
battles,  but  to  protect  Chanda  Sahib  from  his  ally,  Muzaffar 
Jang.  2  Indeed,  at  the  moment  the  latter  was  regarded  with  great 
mistrust.  Dupleix  advised  Chanda  Sahib  to  keep  the  French 
detachment  with  him  until  he  had  got  rid  of  "  this  leech  that  will 
prove  difficult  to  satisfy."  »  But  the  important  business  that 
demanded  immediate  settlement  consisted  of  presents,  rewards, 
finance.  On  receiving  the  news  of  victory,  Dupleix'  first  thought 
was  to  claim  a  proper  share  of  the  booty  for  the  French  troops 
and  himself.  He  urged  the  attack  of  forts  supposed  to  shelter 
great  treasures.  D'Auteuil  was  not  to  give  up  his  prisoners  till 
assured  of  a  share  of  their  ransom.*  But  the  victors'  military 
chest  was  ill-furnished.  All  that  could  be  got  was  a  donation 
of  50,000  rupees  for  the  French  troops  *  and  a  promise  of  140,000 
rupees  for  the  officers.  Dupleix,  his  wife,  and  her  relatives  were 
rewarded  for  the  moment  with  a  village  apiece,  as  Dumas  had 
been  after  the  great  Maratha  raid. 

The  victors  entered  Arcot  on  August  7  and  remained  there 
five  weeks,  enjoying  their  newly  assumed  dignities  and  seeking 
the  means  of  supporting  them.  The  French  contingent  accom- 
panied them,  but  found  Arcot  so  unhealthy — I  suppose  owing  to 
excessive  indulgence  in  the  liquor  and  women  of  the  country — 
that  they  were  recalled  to  the  Pondichery  limits.  On  September 
14,  Chanda  Sahib  and  Muzaffar  Jang  left  the  capital  and  pro- 

'  He  is  said  to  have  been  killed  by  Shaikh  Hasan,  Jemadar  o£  the  French 
sepoys  in  Chanda's  service. 

*  Pondich6ry  to  the  Company,  August  i,  1749,  ap.  Cultru,  op.  cit.,  p.  237. 

'  Dupleix  to  d'Auteuil,  August  5  and  6,  1749,  ap.  Cultru,  op.  cit.,  pp.  239,  etc. 

•  Ibid. 

'M.  Cultru  says  that  on  the  orders  of  Dupleix  d'Auteuil  paid  the  men 
6  rupees  each  and  kept  the  balance  (which  would  be  about  47,000  rupees)  for 
himself. 


THE  SUCCESSES  OF  DUPLEIX  89 

ceeded  by  easy  stages  to  the  French  settlement,  which  the  former 
entered  on  the  27th,  the  latter  on  the  29th,  with  all  the  pomp 
of  Oriental  processions,  elephants,  flags,  and  dancing-girls,  and 
in  their  train  came  the  European  troops  without  whom  the 
position  of  Ambur  would  never  have  been  carried.* 

This  visit  was  marked  by  a  serious  political  blunder.  One  of 
the  conditions  of  French  help  had  been  the  grant  of  the  neighbour- 
ing districts  of  ViUiyanallur  and  Valudavur  ;  but  Muzaffar  Jang 
was  anxious  to  show  his  gratitude  ;  with  all  the  faciUty  usually 
shown  in  parcelhng  out  an  enemy's  territory,  he  added  the  seaport 
of  Masulipatam  and  the  district  of  Bahur.^  But  this  last  included 
the  villages  immediately  surrounding  the  Fort  St.  David  Umits. 
To  Dupleix  this  may  have  seemed  no  more  than  a  convenient 
rounding  off  of  French  territory  ;  ^  but  to  the  EngUsh  it  bore  the 
menacing  aspect  of  a  scheme  to  cut  off  all  trade  and  communica- 
tion with  the  interior  of  the  country.  Their  fear  was  confirmed 
by  certain  sinister  occurrences  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Madras  ; 
and  thus  the  English  Council  were  compelled  to  embark  on  a 
policy  of  opposition,  which  was  to  renew  and  carry  to  a  victorious 
conclusion  the  contest  they  themselves  had  provoked  in  1744. 

The  English  Governor,  at  the  time  when  this  momentous  re- 
solution was  taken,  was  Charles  Floyer,  who  had  unexpectedly 
succeeded  to  the  Chair.  He  was  not  a  man  of  parts  or  appUca- 
tion.  He  had  not  even  troubled  to  make  adequate  preparations 
for  the  siege  of  Pondichery  ;  he  had  squandered  a  considerable 
sum  of  money  on  a  useless  embassy  to  Nasir  Jang  ;  he  was  fond 
of  pleasure  and  preferred  the  card-table  to  the  Council  room.* 
The  only  man  of  note  in  his  Council  was  Stringer  Lawrence.  But 
he  had  only  arrived  on  the  Coast  in  1748  and  had  little  experi- 
ence of  India.  An  excellent  soldier,  he  was  too  short-tempered, 
had  too  little  imagination,  and  possessed  too  fallible  a  judgment, 
to  make  a  political  leader  or  open  out  new  political  paths.  Always 
ready  to  have  a  knock  at  Jack  Frenchman,  he  doubtless  supported 
any  proposal  to  resist  French  plans  ;  but  his  conduct  in  1750, 
when  chance  placed  him  for  a  short  time  in  control  of  the  English 
poUcy,  shows  plainly  that  his  political  judgment  was  timid  and 
irresolute.     If   under  such   leaders   the   EngUsh   decided   upon 

'  Leltres  idifianles  et  curieuses,  vol.  ii.  pp.  719,  etc.  (ed.  Aime-Martin). 

*  Dupleix  to  the  Compajiy,  October  15,  1749,  ap.  Mem.  pour  le  Sieur  Dupleix, 

P-  47- 

*  So  at  least  he  represented  it. 

*  In   1750  he  was  dismissed  by  the  Company  for  gambling.     Ranga  Pillai 
alleges  that  he  was  afflicted  with  syphilis. 


40  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

resistance,  the  necessity  of  so  doing  must  have  seemed  beyond 
dispute. 

Floyer,  however,  had  already  given  signs  of  leaning  towards  a 
poUcy  of  adventure.     Towards  the  end  of  1748,  Shahji,  who  had 
been  driven  from  the  throne  of  Tanjore  in  1739,  applied  to  the 
English  for  help  to  recover  the  kingdom,  asserting  that  he  would 
find  plenty  of  support  once  he  entered  Tanjore  with  an  English 
force.     He  had  already  made  one  or  two  attempts  to  engage  the 
French  in  his  favour,  1  but  at  that  time  Dupleix  had  both  the 
English  war  and  Chanda  Sahib's  intrigue  on  his  hands  ;  he  there- 
fore refused.    The  EngUsh,  however,  were,  free  from  engagements. 
They  had  just  received  news  that  peace  was  being  made  in  Europe. 
They  decided  therefore  to  help  Shahji  with  a  body  of  men  on 
condition  of  a  grant  of  Devikottai,  a  small  fort  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Coleroon,  and  the  reinibursement  of  their  expenses.^     In  prin- 
ciple the  agreement  cannot  be  distinguished  from  that  made  by 
Dupleix  with  Chanda  Sahib.     Each  was  designed  to  estabHsh  a 
pretender  and  expel  a  prince  who  was  in  quiet  possession  of  his 
territory,  with  the  help  of  foreign  mercenaries  ;   and  each  looked 
to  favours  which  might  be  expected  from  the  newly  estabhshed 
prince  by  his  benefactors.     Dupleix  aimed  at  the  pohtical  control 
of  the  Carnatic  no  more  than  the  English  at  that  of  Tanjore.     The 
real  difference  consisted  in  the  possibihty  of  the  pretender's  being 
useful  when  established  ;    and  the  English  should  have  foreseen 
that  a  new  Raja  of  Tanjore  could  never  render  them  any  service 
of  an  essential  nature.     Moreover,  as  far  as  could  be  seen  in  1749, 
Devikottai  was  useless.     It  was   not    a    place    of    trade ;    and 
although  later  on  it  opened  a  secure  route  of  commimication  with 
Trichinopoly,  the  need  for  that  was  still  hidden  in  the  future. 
Floyer's  bargain  was  identical  with  that  of  Dupleix  in  all  but  the 
advantages  which  could  be  derived  therefrom. 

However,  the  affair  was  decided  on  by  Floyer  and  one  other 
Councillor,  3  in  consultation  with  Boscawen.  It  was  only  an- 
nounced in  Council  when  the  troops  had  actually  marched  ;  and 
was  only  confirmed  by  Council  to  avoid  the  ignominy  of  recalUng 
them. 

Of  the  expedition  itself  little  need  be  said.  It  was  nearly 
overwhelmed  by  a  cyclone  before  it  reached  the  Coleroon  ;   not 

*  Leriche  to  Dupleix,  April  26  and  October  29,  1747  (P.R.,  No.  83)  ;    Diary 
of  Ananda  Ranga  Pillai,  vol.  iv.  pp.  350  and  387,  etc. 

•  Country  Correspondence,  174S,  p.  83  ;  Fort  St.  David  Cons.,  April  10,  1749. 
'  Richard  Prince. 


THE  SUCCESSES  OF  DUPLEIX  41 

a  soul  in  Tanjore  was  prepared  to  support  Shahji ;  after  an  in- 
glorious appearance  before  Devikottai  and  a  still  more  inglorious 
retreat,  a  second  expedition  was  dispatched  by  sea.  This  was 
commanded  by  Lawrence.  He  took  Devikottai  easily  enough  ; 
and  when  Pratab  Singh,  the  actual  Raja  of  Tanjore,  offered  terms, 
they  were  accepted,  and  Shahji  was  pensioned  off  into  an 
obscurity  from  which  he  should  never  have  emerged.^ 

This  business  was  finished  by  the  month  of  June,  so  that  the 
English  had  full  leisure  to  observe  the  revolution  brought  about 
by  Dupleix.  They  watched  its  progress  with  apprehension, 
decided  to  keep  up  the  troop  of  European  horse  that  had  been 
formed  during  the  late  war,  and  maintained  their  sepoys  at  fuU 
strength.  2  But  their  European  force  was  still  inconsiderable. 
The  1200  Independents  brought  out  by  Boscawen  had  been 
thinned  by  war  and  sickness.  Even  when  500  of  these  had 
entered  the  Company's  service,  the  Council  had  not  800  Europeans 
under  its  orders.  ^ 

However,  Boscawen  was  still  on  the  Coast  with  his  squadron, 
and  with  his  help  the  EngUsh  could  certainly  have  assembled  a 
body  of  men  quite  large  enough  to  counteract  all  French  designs. 
Orme  even  says  that  Boscawen  offered  to  remain,  and  blames  the 
jCouncil  for  not  acceding  to  his  offer.* 

In  his  dispatch,  however,  describing  the  situation  on  the 
Coast  and  the  peril  of  French  aggression,  Boscawen  does  not  drop 
a  word  about  remaining  in  the  Indies  ;  *  while  if  the  Coimcil, 
having,  as  we  shall  see,  already  decided  on  opposing  the  French, 
were  unwilling  to  incur  the  slight  additional  responsibility  of 
inviting  Boscawen  to  remain,  they  far  exceeded  even  the  measure 
of  ordinary  human  stupidity.  It  seems  more  Ukely  that  Orme 
was  misinformed.* 

At  first,  while  standing  on  their  guard,  the  English  resolved  to 
offer  no  cause  of  rupture  to  the  new  Nawab.  Chanda  Sahib  wrote 
informing  Floyer  of  his  success  ;   Floyer  immediately  responded 

•  Fort  St.  David  Cons.,  April  26,  May  32,  and  June,  1749  ;  Orme  MSS.,  India, 
i.  ff.  221,  etc. 

•  Fort  St.  David  Cons.,  July  29,  1749. 

•  Floyer  to  the  Company.  October  30,  1749  (I.O.,  Fac.  Rec,  Fort  St.  David, 
vol.  X.  fi.  525,  etc.). 

•  History,  vol.  i.  g.  133. 

'Boscawen  to  Bedford.  May  29,  1750  (P.R.O.,  Col.,  77-18). 

•  It  is  conceivable  that  they  refrained  from  personal  motives,  but  I  can  trace 
no  signs  of  ill-feeling  between  Boscawen  and  the  Council.  After  his  return  to 
England  he  sent  out  a  chaise  to  Floyer,  which  does  not  suggest  difficult  personal 
relations. 


42  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

with  a  letter  of  congratulation,  and  followed  this  a  few  days  after 
with  a  similar  letter  to  Muzaffar  Jang.i  A  Httle  later  Raza  Sahib 
wrote,  offering  to  procure  for  the  English  Governor  a  mansab  and 
a  jagir,  and  promising  to  bestow  greater  favours  on  the  English 
than  on  the  French. ^  These  letters  merit  consideration.  Possibly 
they  were  intended  only  to  keep  the  English  quiet  until  Chanda 
Sahib  had  firmly  established  his  power  ;  but  probably  they  meant 
more.  Probably  Chanda  Sahib  hopejd  to  be  able  to  hold  the 
balance  between  the  English  and  the  French.  He  certainly 
made  two  proposals  for  an  interview  with  Floyer.^  Perhaps 
fear  of  friendship  between  the  English  and  his  Nawab  forced 
Dupleix  into  actions  which  could  not  but  provoke  English 
hostility. 

We  have  already  seen  that  in  September  1749  Dupleix  re- 
ceived from  Muzaffar  Jang  a  grant  of  the  villages  skirting  the 
bounds  of  Fort  St.  David,  thus  cutting  them  off  from  the  inland 
weaving  settlements  on  which  the  trade  of  the  place  depended. 
Just  before  this,  another  scheme  had  taken  air,  intended  to  nullify 
the  rendition  of  Madras.  On  the  outskirts  of  that  city  stood, 
and  still  stands,  a  little  Portuguese  church,  a  reUc  of  the  Portu- 
guese settlement  at  St.  Thome,  and  dedicated  to  Nossa  Senhora 
da  Luz.  This  church  was  served  by  a  Portuguese  CordeUer,  by 
name  Antonio  Noronha,  a  relative  of  Madame  Dupleix.*  He  had 
already  made  himself  useful  by  sending  information  about  Madras 
to  Pondichery  ;  and  as  soon  as  Dupleix  knew  that  he  would  be 
obliged  to  restore  that  place  to  the  English,  he  got  from  the 
Viceroy  of  Goa  a  commission  appointing  this  man  Procurator 
of  the  Portuguese  at  St.  Thome.  As  soon  as  Anwar-ud-din  had 
been  disposed  of,  he  strengthened  Noronha's  position  by  getting 
Chanda  Sahib  to  appoint  him  Amildar  of  the  district.  He  thus 
established  a  creature  of  his  in  a  post  of  authority  within  three 
miles  of  Fort  St.  George.* 

The  existence  of  French  designs  on  St.  Thome  were  reported 
by  Boscawen  to  the  Council  on  September  13  ;  three  weeks  later 
he  advised  that  the  English  should  secure  themselves  by  taking 
possession  of  the  town,  as  Noronha  had  already  signalised  his 

'  Country  Correspondence,  1749,  pp.  25-27. 

'  Ibid.,  pp.  27-28.  '  Ibid.,  pp.  29  and  35. 

*  He  reappears  later  on  as  the  Bishop  of  Halicaniassus. 

'These  statements  rest,  not  on  assertions  of  the  EngUsh  seeking  excuses  for 
opposmg  the  French,  but  on  statements  of  the  Viceroy  and  Dupleix.  D'Alomo 
to  Fort  St.  David,  February  5,  1750  (ap.  Love's  Vestiges,  vol.  ii.  p.  400) ;  Dupleix 
to  Saunders,  February  18,  1752  (French  Correspondence,  1752). 


I 


THE  SUCCESSES  OF  DUPLEIX  48 

attitude  by  stopping  provisions  going  into  Madras.  Accordingly, 
the  English  applied  to  Muhammad  Ali  for  a  grant.  On  October 
22,  Boscawen  occupied  it,  hoisted  the  English  flag,  and  arrested 
Noronha,  whose  papers  are  said  to  have  proved  him  "  a  secret 
enemy  and  a  stimulator  of  the  animosities  between  the  French 
and  us."  *  Chanda  Sahib  at  once  demanded  Noronha's  rdease  ; 
but  though  Floyer  abstained  from  returning  a  direct  refusal,^ 
the  occupation  of  St.  Thome  was  in  fact  and  should  have  been 
regarded  as  a  formal  defiance  of  the  French  and  a  proclamation 
of  the  English  resolve  to  support  Muhammad  Ali. 

That  resolution  was  definitely  taken  on  October  13,  1749. 
Even  when  congratulating  Chanda  Sahib,  Floyer  had  written  to 
condole  with  Muhammad  Ali  on  his  father's  death.  In  August 
fourguns  and  a  few  artillerymen  were  sent  to  him  at  Trichinopoly. 
In  September,  when  he  was  urgently  demanding  more  consider- 
able assistance,  Floyer  answered  that  Nasir  Jang's  intervention 
would  probably  prevent  any  attack  upon  Trichinopoly,  but  that, 
were  any  made,  he  would  send  all  possible  help.'  On  October  13 
this  conespondence  was  laid  before  the  Council.  It  resolved,  under 
the  pretext  of  dismissal,  to  send  some  of  the  best  sepoys  in  service 
to  Trichinopoly,  together  with  a  small  body  of  Europeans,  partly 
out  of  gratitude  for  Muhammad  All's  help  in  1746,  partly  out  of 
the  conviction  that  Nasir  Jang's  arrival  would  speedily  suppress 
Chanda  Sahib's  rebellion.*  In  November,  for  fear  lest  the  French 
should  carry  all  before  them  while  Nasir  Jang  was  still  at  a  dis- 
tance, they  sent  in  addition  a  company  of  Europeans  under 
Captain  Cope.^  This  party  never  came  into  conflict  with  the 
French,  but  it  heartened  up  the  English  protege,  and  induced  him 
to  grant  the  Enghsh  country  round  Fort  St.  David  *  which  had 
already  been  granted  to  the  French  by  Muzaffar  Jang.  Thus  the 
ring  Dupleix  had  formed  around  the  English  in  the  south  was 
broken  through,  just  as  the  similar  design  at  Madras  had  been 
frustrated  by  the  seizure  of  St.  Thomd. 

While  the  English  were  thus  considering  and  defining  their 
position,  Chanda  Sahib  and  Dupleix  were  maturing  their  plans 

'  Fort  St.  David  Cons.,  September  2  and  25  and  October  16,  1749  ;  Pub.  Dcs. 
to  England,  October  :8,  1749.  Boscawen  carried  Noronha  a  prisoner  to  Eng- 
land, where  he  was  released  on  the  application  of  the  Portuguese  minister. 

*  Country  Correspondence,  1749,  pp.  44-46.  The  dates  of  the  letters  are 
confused,  but  their  sequence  is  reasonably  clear. 

'  Country  Correspondence,  1749,  pp.  27-28,  32,  and  34. 

*  Fort  St.  David  Cons.,  October  2,  1749. 

Jbid.,  November  t6,  1749.  •  Ibid.,  February  26,  1750. 


44  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

for  future  operations  and  waiting  for  the  end  of  the  autumnal 
rains.  The  main  business  before  them  was  the  reduction  of 
Muhammad  Ali  at  Trichinopoly.  The  French  contingent  was 
increased  to  800  Europeans,  with  300  Coffrees  and  Topasses,  and 
a  train  of  field  artillery.  But,  the  difficulty  was  finance— the 
payment  of  that  useless  swarm  of  cavalry  without  which  no 
Indian  prince  could  move.^  Dupleix  managed  to  borrow  from 
private  persons  2  lakhs  of  rupees,  and  himself  provided  another, 
secured  on  the  revenues  of  certain  districts.^  Such  security  was 
good  enough  in  time  of  peace  when  backed  by  undisputed  author- 
ity. But  in  times  of  war  districts  might  be  plundered ;  and 
when  two  men  laid  claim  to  the  same  province,  the  mortgages 
and  grants  of  the  successful  competitor  alone  were  honoured. 
This  defect  lay  at  the  bottom  of  all  the  financial  difficulties  which 
the  French  were  to  undergo. 

Even  with  the  assistance  which  Dupleix  was  able  to  procure 
for  his  proteges,  they  did  not  proceed  upon  their  main  enterprise, 
but  turned  aside  to  collect  revenue,  according  to  the  time-honoured 
custom  of  Moghul  India,  with  the  armed  hand.  As  soon  as  the 
monsoon  rains  were  over,  they  marched  from  Pondichery,  but 
Chanda  Sahib  lingered  on  the  way  to  surround  the  jungles  of  a 
considerable  Pohgar  and  extort  from  him  3  lakhs  of  rupees. 
This  affair  occupied  the  best  part  of  a  month. »  Meanwhile 
Muzaffar  Jang  had  moved  on  with  a  slowness  proportioned  to 
his  dignity.  Their  united  forces  did  not  pass  the  Coleroon  until 
December  13,*  and  then  it  was  only  to  repeat  the  operation  of 
collecting  revenue  in  Tanjore.  The  army  encamped  before  the 
capital  of  that  kingdom.  Two  vigorous  actions,  in  which  the 
French  took  the  lead,  produced  in  the  Raja  a  speedy  desire  for 
an  accommodation ;  and  he  agreed  to  pay  70  lakhs  of  rupees. 
But  he  never  intended  to  pay  all  this  if  he  could  possibly  help  it ; 
he  still  hoped  that  some  fortunate  event  would  relieve  him  from 
the  necessity  of  making  good  his  promise.  In  this  view  he  was 
encouraged  by  Muzaffar  Jang,  who  was  jealous  of  the  independ- 
ence Chanda  Sahib  had  displayed  in  making  the  treaty.*    The 

'  Indian  armies  were  habitually  kept  in  arrears  of  pay  in  peace  time  ;  but 
expected  different  treatment  on  the  field  ;  of.  Law's  Mimoire,  pp.  39,  etc.  (ed. 
Martineau). 

^  Dupleix  to  the  Company,  October  15,  1749  (Mim.  pour  le  Sieur  Dupleix, 
p.  48). 

'  Pub.  Des.  to  England,  February  12,  1750. 

'  Le  Riche  to  Dupleix,  December  16,  1749  (P.R.,  No.  84,  i.  188). 

'  Cultru,  op.  cit.,  pp.  245,  2.16. 


THE  SUCCESSES  OF  DUPLEIX  45 

terms  had  been  settled  on  December  31  ;  but  a  month  later  only 
a  small  part  had  actually  been  paid.  The  attack  was  therefore 
resumed.  But  by  this  time  the  French  army  had  grown  thor- 
oughly weary  of  so  dilatory  and  ineffective  a  manner  of  making 
war.  The  men  complained  they  had  not  received  a  fanam  since 
taking  the  field  ;  five  sergeants  had  to  be  punished  for  mutinous 
behaviour  ;  the  ofticers'  sense  of  honour  had  to  be  quickened  by 
donations,^  which  absorbed  most  of  the  money  that  Chanda 
Sahib  received  from  the  Raja. 

It  might  have  been  supposed  that  the  French  officer  in 
command  would  have  had  a  decisive  voice  in  determining  what 
was  to  be  done.  The  French  troops  formed  the  effective  part 
of  Chanda  Sahib's  army.  They  had  borne  the  brunt  of  the 
fighting  at  Ambur  ;  they  had  stormed  the  redoubts  outside 
Tan j  ore  ;  by  a  sudden  assault  they  had  seized  one  of  the  gates 
of  the  city  ;  and  all  this  while  the  native  troops  had  done  little 
to  justify  their  bearing  arms.  But  in  spite  of  this,  neither 
Duquesne,  nor  Goupil,  nor  Bussy  seems  to  have  been  consulted 
by  Chanda  Sahib.  In  December  Duquesne  beUeved  that  terms 
had  already  been  made  with  Muhammad  Ali ;  his  advice  was 
never  asked  about  Tanjore  ;  on  February  19  Chanda  Sahib 
forbade  an  attack  on  the  city  in  spite  of  Goupil's  desire  to  make 
it.^  In  other  words,  the  French  were  as  yet  neither  masters, 
nor  even  partners,  but  auxiUary  troops  serving  for  hire.  Chanda 
Sahib  was  at  liberty  to  frame  his  plans  without  reference 
to  Dupleix  ;  Dupleix  could  offer  advice,  but  he  had  not  yet 
attained  the  position  from  which  advice  is  equivalent  to  a 
command. 

Towards  the  close  of  February  1750,  while  the  French  and 
their  wayward  allies  were  still  lying  aimlessly  before  Tanjore, 
long-current  rumours  of  Nasir  Jang's  coming  were  confirmed  by 
the  approach  of  a  numerous  body  of  Maratha  horse.  Dupleix 
advised  the  seizure  of  Tanjore,  where  he  thought  they  might 
have  maintained  themselves  until  famine  compelled  the  hosts  of 
Nasir  Jang  to  withdraw.  With  singular  timidity  his  advice  was 
rejected.  Then  he  urged  them  to  move  northward  and  seize 
Gingee  as  their  headquarters  ;   but  this  also  seemed  too  daring 

I      to  be  ventured  on.    The  siege  of  Tanjore  was  raised.     The  army 

t 

!  •  Le  Riche  to  Dupleix,  February  i,  6,  and  i6,  1750  {P.R.,  No.  84.  ff.  198,  200, 

1  and  202). 

I  *  Le  Riche  to  Dupleix,  n.d.  and  December  12,  1749,  and  February  24,  1750 

'  (P.R.,  No.  84,  ff.  187,  188,  and  205). 


46  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

moved  hurriedly  towards  Pondichdry,  harassed  by  the  Marathas 
and  only  saved  from  dispersion  by  the  steadiness  of  the  French 
troops  and  the  rapid  fire  of  their  artillery.  The  terrified  crowd 
and  its  panic-stricken  leaders  were  only  prevented  from  seeking 
shelter  under  the  walls  of  Pondichery  by  a  threat  that  the  French 
would  open  fire  on  them  if  they  dared  to  enter  the  bounds. 
Reluctantly  they  encamped  at  Villiyanallur.  Their  condition 
was  miserable.  All  the  money  that  Dupleix  had  provided  and 
all  that  they  had  managed  to  raise  had  been  expended  in  dona- 
tions to  the  French  officers  and  in  part-payment  of  the  arrears 
due  to  the  troops  who  were  still  dissatisfied  and  clamouring  for 
more.  Dupleix  succeeded  in  raising  another  3  lakhs.  1  The 
operations  of  the  last  four  months  had  thus  cost  the  French  6 
lakhs,  but  had  been  utterly  fruitless  save  for  the  grant  of  a  few 
villages  bordering  on  Karikal. 

When  the  news  of  the  battle  of  Ambur  reached  Nasir  Jang, 
he  was  on  his  way  to  Delhi  to  co-operate  in  repelling  Afghan 
invaders  who  were  threatening  the  north. ^  He  at  once  halted, 
ordered  all  the  forces  of  the  south  to  join  him  ;  negotiated  with 
Raghoji  Bhonsla  for  the  services  of  a  Maratha  contingent,^  and 
made  arrangements  for  marching  south  instead  of  north.  These 
were  completed  in  the  fulness  of  time,  and  at  last  he  entered 
the  Camatic  in  March  1750.*  He  had  appointed  Gingee  as  his 
rendezvous,  and  thence  moved  to  Tiruviti,  about  25  miles  west 
of  St.  David's,  whence  he  summoned  the  English  to  his  assist- 
ance. The  number  sent  probably  disappointed  his  expectations, 
for  they  do  not  seem  to  have  exceeded  300  men.* 

Meanwhile  Chanda  Sahib  and  the  French  contingent  under 
d'Auteuil  had  advanced  towards  the  new  enemy.     On  April  3 

'  Dupleix  to  the  Company,  October  3,  1750  {Archives  des  Colonies). 

*  Wilks,  op.  cit.,  vol.  J.  p.  163. 
»  Grant  Dufi,  vol.  ii.  p.  30. 

♦  Dupleix  attempted  to  prove  that  the  English  brought  Nasir  Jang  into  the 
Camatic.  This  ludicrous  exaggeration  of  their  role  is  sufficiently  disproved  by 
the  Country  Correspondence  of  1749.  News  of  Nasir  Jang's  being  on  his  way  was 
received  from  Muhammad  Ali  on  August  3/14,  but  is  obviously  an  invention  of 
tlie  latter's  to  encourage  the  English  to  assist  him.  Floycr's  first  letter  to  Nasir 
Jang  in  this  connection  is  dated  October  20/31  ;  a  few  days  later  came  a  letter 
from  Shah  Nawaz  Khan,  dated  September  29/October  lo.  announcing  the  coming 
of  the  army. 

»  Orme  says  {History,  vol.  i.  p.  138)  that  Lawrence  joined  the  camp  on  March  22 
(April  2  N.S.)  with  600  Europeans!  But  the  facts  are  that  Cope  marched  with  his 
party  of  about  100  from  Trichinopoly ;  Lawrence  with  100  men  was  sent  from 
St.  David's  on  March  19/30  ;  and  100  more  were  sent  on  March  24/April  4 
(Fort  St.  David  Cons.,  March  19  and  26,  1750). 


THE  SUCCESSES  OF  DUPLEIX  47 

the  French  commandant  addressed  to  Cope  a  letter  which  well 
illustrates  the  political  complexity  of  the  situation  and  the 
manner  in  which  Dupleix  tried  to  scare  the  English  out  of  the 
conflict  by  poUtical  fictions.  D'Auteuil  claimed  that  the  French 
had  abstained  from  intervention  in  the  Devikottai  affair  solely 
on  account  of  the  peace  between  the  two  crowns,  and  required 
the  English  not  to  interfere  in  this  war  of  the  French  against 
the  family  of  Anwar-ud-din.  Cope  merely  replied  that  he  had 
forwarded  the  letter  to  Fort  St.  David.  * 

Lawrence  at  this  juncture  advised  Nasir  Jang  to  move  on 
Pondichery,  so  as  to  compel  the  enemy  to  attack.  Instead  of 
this,  he  moved  directly  against  them  and  spent  April  4  in  a 
distant  cannonade. ^  That  night  the  French  retired  hastily 
with  Chanda  Sahib  ;  *  next  day  Nasir  Jang  set  out  in  pursuit 
of  them  and  received  the  submission  of  his  nephew  Muzaffar 
Jang. 

To  Nasir  Jang  this  was  a  victory  due  to  the  greatness  of 
his  name  ;  in  fact  it  was  brought  about  by  a  piece  of  insub- 
ordination which  can  only  be  paralleled  by  the  mutiny  of  the 
Bengal  officers  in  1766.  On  the  return  from  Tanjore,  several 
officers  had  asked  to  be  relieved  on  the  plea  of  ill-health  ;  and 
d  bfeen  replaced  by  others  from  the  garrison  of  Pondichery. 

ese  at  once  began  to  grumble  that  the  others  had  got  all  the 
pay  while  they  would  have  to  bear  all  the  blows.  One  knows 
not  which  party  to  blame  the  more — those  who  wrung  donations 
from  Chanda  Sahib  before  Tanjore,  or  those  who  refused  to 
serve  against  Nasir  Jang  and  the  English  without  reward.  When 
the  English  joined  Nasir  Jang,  the  complaints  became  louder 
and  more  exigent.  Bury,  the  senior  officer  at  Pondichery,  was 
sent  out  to  bring  the  officers  to  a  sense  of  their  duty,  but  without 
success.  He  was  told  that  imless  their  demands  *  were  conceded 
within  twenty-four  hours  they  would  abandon  the  camp.  The 
next  day  was  occupied  by  Nasir  Jang's  cannonade.  That  evening 
thirteen  subaltern  officers  withdrew  to  Pondichery.  D'Auteuil, 
unable  to  control  his  men  without  officers,  retreated  in  the  night. 

'  French  Correspondence,  1750,  pp.  6-7.  Lawrence  {ap.  Cambridge,  p.  6) 
claims  d'Auteuil's  letter  as  addressed  to  himself.  If  so,  why  did  Cope  answer 
it  in  his  own  name  ? 

•  Both  English  and  French  claimed  tliat  the  other  side  began  the  firing. 
French  Correspondence,  1750,  pp.  8-11. 

•  They  abandoned  10  guns  and  30  artillerymen  who  were  made  prisoners, 
transferred  to  the  English,  and  by  them  sent  into  Pondichery. 

•  A  donation  equal  to  that  received  before  Tanjore. 


om 


48  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

This  desertion  was  rendered  still  more  disgraceful  by  the  mal- 
contents having  insisted  on  receiving  in  advance  the  monthly 
allowances  made  by  Chanda  Sahib.^ 

This  ugly  affair  set  Dupleix  to  work  to  gain  time  by  intrigu- 
ing in  Nasir  Jang's  court.  On  his  first  approach  the  French 
Governor  had  sought  to  enter  into  relations  with  his  Diwan, 
but  had  met  with  a  rebuff.^  Nasir  Jang  had  abruptly  demanded 
the  withdrawal  of  the  French  troops.  A  little  later  the  Diwan 
sent  two  messengers  to  Dupleix  with  proposals  which  he  had 
been  prepared  to  accept,  until  he  heard  that  the  Enghsh  forces 
had  joined  his  enemies,  on  which  he  broke  off  negotiations. 
Now  the  mutinous  conduct  of  the  officers  obhged  him  to  try 
to  make  terms.  Accordingly,  he  wrote  again  to  Nasir  Jang.^ 
Next  day  occurred  the  cannonade,  the  mutiny,  and  the  retreat. 
On  April  6,  with  front  of  brass,  Dupleix  wrote  to  Nasir  Jang, 
stating  that  he  had  withdrawn  his  troops  to  facilitate  peace 
negotiations,  and  hoping  that  Nasir  Jang  would  remove  his 
evil  counsellors.*  The  French  now  seem  to  have  met  with 
support  from  the  party  at  Nasir  Jang's  court  who  favoured  the 
restoration  of  Muzaffar  Jang  to  his  former  rank  ;  *  and  with 
their  help  it  was  arranged  that  Nasir  Jang  should  receive  a 
French  embassy.  This  consisted  of  two  Company's  servants, 
one  of  whom  spoke  Persian  with  tolerable  fluency.'  It  seems 
that  at  this  moment  Dupleix  was  willing  to  abandon  either  or 
both  of  his  allies  if  only  Nasir  Jang  would  withdraw.  In  their 
original  instructions,  the  ambassadors  were  ordered  to  demand 
Adoni  for  Muzaffar  Jang,  while  Arcot  might  be  given  to  Chanda 
Sahib  or  "  the  young  Prince."  ^  On  April  21,  Dupleix  wrote 
that  Arcot  was  to  go  to  Muzaffar  Jang.  Next  day  Muzaffar 
Jang  might  be  kept  in  prison,  provided  Adoni  was  given  to  his 

'  Dupleix  to  the  Company,  October  3,  1750  {Archives  des  Colonics).  Dupleix 
hastened  to  bring  the  ofienders  to  trial  ;  but  they  had  sympathisers  among  the 
Company's  servants  (the  case  here  also  recalls  the  Bengal  mutiny)  ;  so  tlie  trial 
was  dropped  and  the  deserters  broken  by  resolution  of  the  Council.  The  chief 
offender  was  Schonamille,  son-in-law  of  Madame  Dupleix. 

*  Dupleix  to  the  Company,  ut  supra. 

»  In  his  Mtmoire,  pp.  53-54,  Dupleix  gives  a  letter  to  Nasir  Jang  which  he 
suggests  was  written  at  this  moment.  I  believe,  however,  that  it  was  one  of  those 
written  earlier. 

*  Letires  idifiantes  et  curieuses,  vol.  ii.  p.  735. 

'  Dupleix  speaks  of  them  as  "  les  anciens  serviteurs  de  Nizam." 

*  Henri  de  Larchc.  The  other  was  du  Bausset,  chosen  because  he  had  gone  on 
the  embassy  to  Nizam-ul-Mulk  at  Trichinopoly  in  1743. 

'  i.e.  the  younger  son  of  Safdar  Ali,  residing  at  Wandiwash  with  his  relatives, 
who  held  the  Kille  and  Jagirs  there. 


THE  SUCCESSES  OF  DUPLEIX  49 

family.'  M.  Cultru  concludes  with  reason  that  Dupleix  still 
had  no  policy  except  that  of  hiring  his  troops  to  the  highest 
bidder. 

With  such  ill-defined  aims  the  ambassadors  could  accom- 
plish little  beyond  getting  a  general  idea  of  the  parties  into 
which  the  Court  was  divided.  They  also  seem  to  have  sought 
relations  with  the  Pathan  Nawabs  of  Cuddapah,  Kurnool,  and 
Savanur,^  who  were  already  discontented  at  their  prolonged 
detention  in  the  south.  After  a  few  days  they  returned  to 
Pondichery. 

Meanwhile,  Dupleix  had  succeeded  in  restoring  order  among 
his  troops,  and  had  sent  them  out  of  the  bounds  to  encamp 
near  Valudaviu",  where  their  presence  probably  contributed  to 
Nasir  Jang's  willingness  to  receive  the  ambassadors.  After 
these  had  returned,  d'Auteuil  sent  out  a  detachment  under 
La  Touche  to  beat  up  the  Moghul  camp  by  night,  probably 
with  a  view  to  restoring  the  self-confidence  of  his  men.  The 
enterprise  succeeded,  as  such  enterprises  usually  did,*  and  Nasir 
Jang's  army  was  thrown  into  great  confusion.*  This  alarm, 
coupled  with  a  growing  shortage  of  food  and  fodder,  led  to 
Nasir  Jang's  withdrawing  to  pass  the  hot  months  at  Arcot, 
leaving  all  the  questions  in  dispute  imsettled,  and  Chanda  Sahib 
still  strong  in  French  support. 

The  EngUsh  had  hoped  that  the  advent  of  the  Subahdar 
would  quickly  bring  about  such  a  settlement  as  they  desired 
to  see.  Their  disappointment  in  this  respect  was  deepened  by 
the  failure  of  their  own  political  views.  On  Nasir  Jang's 
approach,  they  had  appointed  Major  Lawrence  and  a  Company's 
servant,  Foss  Westcott,*  ambassadors  to  Nasir  Jang  with  in- 
structions to  procure  confirmation  of  Muhammad  All's  grant 
at  St.  David's  and  Madras,  and  a  grant  of  the  Poonamallee 
country  lying  round  Madras,  to  meet  the  cost  of  maintaining 
troops  enough  to  counterbalance  the  French,  and,  as  Dupleix 

,'     •  Cultni/op.  cic,  p.  388. 

'  Du  Bausset  to  Estoupan  de  Laval,  February,! $,  175 1,  cited  ap.  Mdmoire  pour 
Godeheu,  p.  28. 

»  Sec  Orme,  History,  vol.  i.  p.  145. 

♦  Cf.  Clive's  night  attack  on  Siraj-ud-daula's  camp  and  [its  consequences. 
In  both  the  cases  the  effects  were  moral  rather  than  material.  The  English 
with  Nasir  Jang  appear  to  have  done  nothing.  Probably  La  Touche  attacked 
at  a  point  where  they  could  not  intervene. 

'  Dalton  w£is  joined  with  them  to  succeed  in  case  of  mortality.  Orme  MSS., 
India,  ix.  i.  2175. 

4 


50  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

had  the  title  of  Saf ar  Jang  Bahadur,  the  grant  of  the  same  or 
a  higher  one  to  Floyer,  together  with  villages  yielding  revenue 
enough  to  support  the  dignity.  ^  To  assist  in  procuring  these 
concessions,  they  were  entrusted  with  the  delivery  of  a  handsome 
present. 2  This  was  done  on  April  7,  and  the  ambassadors  were 
delighted  with  their  reception,  reporting  that  Nasir  Jang  had 
written  a  letter  to  the  King  of  England  ^  with  one  of  the  fountain 
pens  which  formed  part  of  the  present.  On  April  10,  they 
complacently  relate  that  he  would  not  open  a  letter  from  the 
French  except  in  their  presence.*  But  three  days  later  they 
write  to  Floyer :  "  Patience  we  find  is  very  requisite  in  trans- 
acting business  with  the  Moors  ;  our  affairs  go  on  but  very 
slowly,  and  we  have  great  reason  to  suspect  the  French  are 
tampering  with  some  of  the  people  about  Court.  .  .  ."  *  In- 
deed, their  services  had  not  been  such  as  to  merit  any  consider- 
able reward.  They  had  proffered  unwelcome  military  advice  ; 
they  had  refused  to  pursue  the  French  in  their  flight  ;  they 
had  informed  Nasir  Jang  that  they  could  not  enter  the  French 
bounds.*  Moreover,  they  were  accompanied  by  a  native  agent, 
who,  though  long  employed  by  the  English,  made  no  scruple 
about  betraying  their  plans  and  letters  to  the  French.'  On 
April  20  they  refused  to  co-operate  in  an  attack  on  Wandiwash 
unless  their  demands  were  granted.*  Again,  they  refused  to 
join  Nasir  Jang  in  an  expedition  to  raise  tribute  in  Tanjore.* 
On  May  i,  although  Nasir  Jang  had  agreed  to  their  requests, 
"  this  day  his  whole  army  has  marched  six  miles  from  us  towards 
Arcot."  So  the  ambassadors  and  their  troops  marched  back 
to  Fort  St.  David.i" 

The  hot  weather  which  followed  these  events  was  marked 
by  great  French  successes.  Nasir  Jang  had  given  orders  for 
the  seizure  of  the  two  French  factories  to  the  northward — at 

•  Proceedings  of  the  Embassy,  Ormc  MSS.,  India,  ix.  ff.  2175,  etc.  The 
instructions  include  several  other  items — possession  of  Divy  Island,  the  removal 
of  oppressions  in  the  Northern  Circars,  etc. 

^  It  cost  17,894  pagodas  ;  say,  something  over  ;^7000.  Fort  St.  David  Cons., 
March  3,  1750. 

'  The  "  Letter  "  is  merely  a  boasting  statement  that  Nasir  Jang  will  shortly 
have  the  four  comers  of  earth  in  his  possession. 

*  Orme  MSS.,  India,  ix.  f.  2189.         '  Ibid.,  ix.  f.  2195.        •  Ibid.,  ix.  f.  2184. 
'  Haji  Hadi. 

'  Fort  St.  David  Cons.,  April  9,  1750.  »  Ibid.,  April  16. 

10  Orme  MSS.,  India,  ix.  f.  2205.  Both  sides  accused  the  diwan.  Shah  Nawaz 
Khan,  of  helping  the  other.  Fort  St.  David  Cons.,  April  24,  i^^o,  asid  Mimoire  pour 
la  Sieur  Dttpleix,  p.  55. 


THE  SUCCESSES  OF  DUPLEIX  51 

Masulipatam  and  Yanam.  This  was  accordingly  done,  and 
the  two  French  factors  at  the  former  place  were  made  prisoners  ; 
Yanam  was  abandoned  before  it  was  attacked.  With  the  help 
of  thirty  men  sent  up  from  Pondichery,  the  Yanam  factoiy  was 
presently  recovered  by  force,  only  to  be  abandoned  again  when 
a  larger  Moghul  force  was  assembled  against  it.  Some  time 
after  this,  as  all  seemed  quiet  in  the  Carnatic,  Dupleix  ventured 
to  send  La  Tour  with  200  Europeans  and  as  many  sepoys  by 
ship  to  Masulipatam,  which  town  they  seized  without  striking 
a  blow.^ 

Still  more  marked  successes  were  gained  in  the  south.  As 
soon  as  Nasir  Jang  had  withdrawn  to  Arcot,  Dupleix  hastened 
to  reoccupy  Valudavur  and  Bahur.  A  little  later  he  sent  his 
troops  farther  afield  and  occupied  Chidambaram  and  Tiruviti. 
In  June  Muhammad  Ali  moved  south  with  a  body  of  horse  to 
oppose  them,  and  by  promising  to  pay  all  the  English  expenses 
procured  the  assistance  of  600  men  with  a  train  of  artillery  under 
Cope.  The  French  troops  consisted  of  500  Europeans  under  La 
Touche,  their  best  officer.  Some  trivial  operations  followed. 
On  August  I,  under  orders  from  Lawrence,  Cope  tried  to  bring 
the  French  to  action.  He  found  them  well  entrenched  in  a  grove 
of  trees,  and  after  a  prolonged  cannonade,  withdrew.  ^  At  the 
end  of  the  month  he  was  recalled  to  St.  David's,  "  as  the  French 
would  not,  and  we  could  not  attack."  *  Immediately  Dupleix 
sent  out  reinforcements  under  d'Auteuil  with  orders  to  attack 
Muhammad  Ali.  On  September  i  he  was  completely  routed  with 
the  loss  of  all  his  guns.  His  troops  attempted  to  reassemble 
under  the  walls  of  Gingee.  Bussy  was  at  once  sent  forward  with 
a  detachment  ;  and  d'Auteuil  followed.  They  arrived  before 
Gingee  on  September  11.  Bussy  repulsed  an  attack  made  on 
his  troops  by  Muhammad  Ah's  fugitives,  and,  on  d'Auteuil's 
coming  up,  the  fortress  was  carried  by  escalade.  It  was  reputed 
the  strongest  in  Southern  India.* 

'  Fort  St.  David  Ltrs.  Recti.,  1750,  Nos.  46,  47,  60,  66,  68,  and  81  ;  Le  Riche 
to  Dupleix,  n.d.  (P.R.,  No.  84,  f.  220)  ;  Pondich6ry  to  the  Company,  Septem- 
ber 20,  1750  (Archives  des  Colonies).  The  French  repeatedly  declared  that  the 
English  from  the  neighbouring  factory  of  Ingeram  had  helped  the  Moghuls  to 
take  Yanam.  Even  M.  Cultru  makes  the  same  a,ssertion  (op.  cit.,  pp.  292  and 
294).  However,  the  English  Correspondence  cited  above  shows  that  they  had 
no  hand  in  it . 

'  Narrative  of  Joseph  Smith,  ap.  Orme  MSS.,  India,  ii.  f.  ,311. 

'  Pub.  Des.  to  England,  October  24,  1750. 

•  Lettrcs  idifiantes  et  curieuses,  vol.  ii.  p.  742  ;  Dupleix  to  the  Company, 
October  3,  1750  (Archives  des  Colonies). 


52  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

Meanwhile  an  active  intrigue  had  been  going  on  between 
Nasir  Jang's  court  and  Pondichery.  On  the  surface  the  negotia- 
tions with  Nasir  Jang  still  proceeded  on  their  leisurely  way  ;  but 
closer  relations  were  being  secretly  knit  up  between  the  French 
and  his  discontented  officers.  The  capture  of  Gingee  induced 
Nasir  Jang  to  move  south  again.  But  the  autumn  rains  that 
year  were  unusually  early  and  severe  ;  ^  they  caught  Nasir 
Jang  on  the  march,  and  prevented  him  from  advancing  or  re- 
tiring. Just  before  this,  the  plot  against  him  had  been  com- 
pleted. The  leaders  of  it  were  the  three  Pathan  Nawabs,  to 
whose  messenger  Dupleix  gave  a  white  flag  so  that  their  troops 
should  not  be  fired  upon  by  the  French. ^  Meanwhile  the  dis- 
comforts of  Nasir  Jang's  position,  under  canvas  amidst  swollen 
rivers  and  beneath  pouring  skies,  induced  him  to  renew  his 
negotiations  with  Dupleix.  It  had  been  arranged  with  the  con- 
spirators that  they  should  give  d'Auteuil  the  signal  for  attack. 
Apparently  this  was  delayed  by  the  heaviness  of  the  weather. 
The  signal  was  at  last  given  at  the  very  moment  when  Dupleix 
had  assented  to  Nasir  Jang's  proposals.  A  letter  was  written 
to  inform  d'Auteuil  that  an  agreement  had  been  reached  and 
that  he  was  not  to  attack  the  Moghuls.  But  already  La  Touche 
had  marched  against  Nasir  Jang's  camp.  In  the  early  dawn  of 
December  i6  the  French  broke  into  it ;  the  troops  of  the  con- 
federates held  aloof  ;  one  of  the  rebel  leaders  shot  Nasir  J^g  as 
he  was  about  to  take  up  his  position  to  command  the  army  ;  and 
at  once  his  nephew,  Muzaffar  Jang,  was  acknowledged  as  Subahdar 
of  the  Deccan.' 

The  news  reached  Pondich6ry  the  same  day.  In  defiance 
of  all  etiquette,  Chanda  Sahib  ran  through  the  streets  to  find 
Dupleix  and  almost  stifled  him  with  his  embraces.*  On  Decem- 
ber 26  Muzaffar  Jang  made  his  triumphal  entry  into  the  French 
settlement.  On  the  31st  he  held  his  first  durbar  and  received  the 
homage  of  Dupleix  and  the  Moghul  nobles.     Nor  was  this  an 

>  Pub.  Des.  to  England,  February  7,  1751. 

'Cultru,  op.  cit.,  p.  251. 

»  Most  writers  have  followed  Dupleix  in  describing  Nasir  Jang  as  an  indolent 
and  cowardly  sensualist.  But  c£.  Grant  Duff's  Hist,  of  the  Mahrattas,  vol.  ii. 
pp.  45-46  ;  and  Wilks,  Historical  Sketches  0/  Southern  India,  vol.  i.  p.  166  n. 
The  murder  of  Nasir  Jang  is  generally  ascribed  to  Abdul  Nabi  Khan,  Nawab  of 
Cuddapah.  Dupleix  is  alleged  to  have  erected  a  monument  and  founded  a  town 
here  —  Dupleixfatehabad.  But  the  monument  was  never  erected  and  the 
"  town  "  consisted  of  a  small  village  and  a  choultry  {Military  Cons.,  lysz,  p.  6). 

*  Onne  MSS.,  India,  ii.  fi.  25 1,  etc. 


THE  SUCCESSES  OF  DUPLEIX  58 

empty,  unremunerative  triumph.  Nizam-ul-Miilk  in  his  long 
rule  had  accumulated  a  great  treasure,  after  the  approved  fashion 
of  Moghul  officials/  This  had  been  seized  by  Nasir  Jang  on  his 
father's  death  ;  and  in  his  expedition  to  the  south  he  had  carried 
with  him  a  large  amount.  Eighteen  chests  of  jewels  and  a  crore 
of  rupees  in  specie,  besides  bullion,  are  said  to  have  been  carried 
into  Pondichery.^  The  whole  town  overflowed  with  money. 
Soldiers  and  officers,  councillors  and  junior  servants,  all  had  their 
share.  The  amount  Dupleix  received  is  unknown,  but  there  is  no 
reason  to  suppose  that  he  was  any  more  backward  than  CUve  was 
in  similar  circumstances.  A  few  days  later,  Muzaffar  Jang  set 
out  to  take  possession  of  the  Deccan,  having  appointed  Dupleix 
his  deputy  south  of  the  Kistna,  and  granted  the  French  terri- 
tories which  with  fond  optimism  they  expected  to  produce  an 
annual  net  revenue  of  3^  lakhs  of  rupees. 

•  Law  to  the  Company,  November  15,  1752  (Mimoire  pour  la  Comp.,  PUces. 
No.  4).  Though  Law  was  liostile  to  Dupleix,  there  seems  no  reason  for  dis- 
trusting this  statement,  which  is  corroborated  by  others.  Cf.  Cultni,  op.  cit., 
p.  258). 


CHAPTER  III 
THE  FAILURE  OF  DUPLEIX 

THE  English  had  looked  on  at  these  affairs  without  inter- 
vening. In  the  middle  of  the  year  a  dispatch  had  been 
received  from  England  dismissing  the  President,  Charles 
Floyer,  ostensibly  for  gaming,  really  for  the  extravagance  of  his 
administration  and  the  little  care  which  he  bestowed  on  the 
investment.  He  was  succeeded  by  Thomas  Saunders,  who 
arrived  at  St.  David's  on  September  30.1  He  was  a  man  of  far 
more  than  common  capacity,  yet  singularly  lacking  in  the 
gift  of  self-expression.  No  portrait  of  him  is  known  to  exist  ; 
none  of  his  private  letters  have  survived ;  even  the  mansion 
which  he  built  for  himself  after  his  return  to  England  has  long 
been  demolished  ;  his  very  family  has  died  out.  At  Madras 
no  vestige  remains  of  him  except  the  official  papers  which  he 
composed  or  approved  ;  at  Vizagapatam,  where  he  once  was 
chief,  his  successors  have  ignorantly  commemorated  him  by 
inscribing  his  family  motto — Mors  janua  vitae — over  the  gateway 
of  their  cemetery. 

The  eulogies  which  Orme  and  Wilks  alike  passed  on  him 
need  not  be  here  repeated.  Far  more  illuminating  is  a  chance 
phrase  of  the  former  in  one  of  his  letters.  "  Had  I  anything 
on  earth  to  expect,"  he  says,  "  or  anything  to  fear,  he  is  the 
man  on  earth  I  should  dread  as  an  enemy."  ^  Cold,  silent,  and 
unresponsive  in  bearing,  he  was  gifted  with  quick  insight,  with 
superlative  common  sense,  with  a  tenacity  not  to  be  shaken  off 
by  all  the  ingenuity  of  plot  or  fertihty  of  intrigue  of  Dupleix 
himself.  His  name  can  never  be  omitted  from  the  list  of  those 
who  have  contributed  greatly  to  the  foundation  of  British 
India. 

Shortly  after  this  change  in  the  government.  Stringer  Law- 
rence, the  only  experienced  military  officer  in  the  EngUsh  service, 

'Pub.  Des.  to  England,  September  26,  1750. 

'Orme  to.  Payne,  March  11.   1758  (Love's   Vestiges  of  Old  Madras,  vol.  ii. 
p.  489). 

54 


THE  FAILURE  OF  DUPLEIX  66 

returned  to  England.  His  departure  was  not  due,  as  Orme 
states,  to  the  obstinately  pacific  policy  of  the  Council,^  for  a 
negotiation  was  going  forward  at  the  very  time  of  his  sailing 
with  a  view  to  join  Nasir  Jang  with  a  body  of  men.^  It  was  due 
to  a  lamentably  petty  cause  which  Orme  did  not  choose  to 
mention.  Lawrence,  on  his  arrival  in  1748,  said  he  had  agreed 
with  the  Company  for  a  larger  salary  than  they  indicated  in  their 
dispatches.  The  Council  accorded  him  more  liberal  tenns ; 
and  the  Company  at  first  acquiesced.  However,  when  Floyer 
was  removed,  Lawrence's  pay  was  cut  down  to  what  the  Company 
declared  it  had  originally  stipulated  ;  on  which  Lawrence  at 
once  threw  up  his  commission. 

On  the  death  of  Nasir  Jang,  Muhammad  AU  had  fled  once 
more  to  Trichinopoly  ;  and  opened  negotiations  with  tho  French. 
But  as  he  applied  at  the  same  time  to  the  English  for  assistance, 
this  was  but  in  accordance  with  the  wise  saying,  "  Why  should  we 
begin  a  fray  to-day  which  may  be  done  as  well  to-morrow  ?  " 
Besides  it  was  the  harvest  season,  the  chief  time  of  collecting 
the  revenue  ;  and  the  longer  he  could  persuade  the  French  to 
remain  at  Pondichery,  the  better  it  would  be  for  his  finances. 
He  accordingly  amused  Dupleix  and  Chanda  Sahib  for  four 
months  with  discussions  which  he  regularly  communicated  to 
the  EngUsh.  They  too  took  their  part  with  decision.  Although 
he  informed  them  that  he  no  longer  had  resources  with  which 
to  carry  on  the  war,  they  determined  not  to  acquiesce  in  French 
supremacy,  but  to  support  Muhammad  Ali  by  every  means  in 
their  power.  ^  They  accordingly  dispatched  a  force  to  Trichino- 
poly under  the  command  of  Captain  Cope. 

In  March  1751,  Chanda  Sahib  and  the  French  moved  from 
Pondichery,  reduced  one  or  two  forts  in  the  Carnatic;  and,  pro- 
ceeding to  Arcot,  there  received  the  homage  and  tribute  of  the 
Killedars  and  others  in  authority  in  that  province.  This  occupied 
the  best  part  of  three  months,  and  Chanda  Sahib  was  not  ready 
to  move  southward  until  the  end  of  May  or  later.  Meanwhile 
an  English  force  under  Captain  de  Gingens  had  taken  the  field 
in  order  to  bar  the  way  to  Trichinopoly  ;  *    and  the  two  forces 

'  History,  vol.  i.  p.  167. 

^  Pub.  Des.  to  England,  October  24,  1750;  Country  Correspondence,  1751, 
P-  3- 

*  Country  Correspondence,  175 1,  p.  4  ;  Extraordinary  Occurrences,  January  17, 
1751. 

*  Extraordinary  Occurrences,  March  18  and  May  6,  1751.  He  had  about 
600  Europeans. 


56  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

came  in  contact,  near  a  fort  called  Valikondapuram,*  in  July. 
Each  side  endeavoured  to  win  the  Killedar  over.  He,  however, 
very  much  preferred  to  admit  neither  side  into  his  fort.  After 
a  fortnight's  negotiations,  Gingens  lost  patience,  and,  posting 
himself  between  Chanda  Sahib  and  the  town,  opened  fire  on  the 
latter,  and  carried  it  by  assault,  but  could  not  effect  an  entrance 
into  the  citadel.  Next  day  the  French  advanced.  The  English 
officers  could  not  decide  whether  to  attack  or  retreat  ;  their 
poor  spirit  infected  the  men  ;  and  after  having  won  an  initial 
advantage,  Gingens  retired  towards  Trichinopoly,  with  the  loss 
of  much  baggage."  He  fell  back  on  a  strong  defensive  position, 
but  abandoned  this  also,  after  a  couple  of  skirmishes,  and  with- 
drew first  to  the  north  bank  of  the  Coleroon,  then  across  the  river 
into  the  island  of  Srirangam,  and  finally  across  the  Cauvery 
under  the  walls  of  Trichinopoly.  This  singularly  inglorious 
campaign  marks  with  the  greatest  plainness  the  signal  incapacity 
of  the  English  commander,  who  was  also  hindered  by  quarrels 
and  cabals  among  his  subordinate  officers.'  The  only  excuse 
that  can  be  found  is  that  offered  by  Captain  Dalton  :  "To  say 
the  truth,  we  were  all  young  soldiers,  at  that  time  little  experienced 
in  the  country  method  of  making  war."  *  If  the  Enghsh  had 
shown  no  greater  vigour  and  intelligence  than  they  had  hitherto 
displayed  against  the  French,  in  spite  of  all  the  advantages  of 
the  command  of  the  sea,  they  could  never  have  won  India. 

But  the  moment  had  come  for  them  to  show  their  better 
qualities.  For  some  time  Muhammad  Ali  had  been  proposing 
a  diversion  in  the  direction  of  Arcot."  At  first  Saunders  and 
the  Council  thought  this  might  be  effected  by  Gingens  leaving 
a  sufficient  garrison  in  Trichinopoly  and  himself  marching  with 
the  remainder  into  the  Arcot  country.  But  Gingens  was  too 
sluggish,  and  denied  the  possibility  of  such  a  course.  At  that 
moment  Captain  Clive  returned  from  conducting  a  convoy  to 
Trichinopoly.'     Probably  Muhammad  Ali  had  urged  the  Arcot 

'  The  "  Volcondah  "  of  Orme. 

*  Extraordinary  Occurrences,  June  17  and  26,  175 1  ;  Country  Correspondence, 
175 1,  p.  41 :  "  We  lost  an  ensign  and  five  or  six  men  in  the  action,  and  may  say 
all  our  courage."     Orme  MSS.,  India,  v.  f.  1062. 

'  They  were  also  conducting  an  ajiimated  dispute  with  the  Council  aboat 
the  rate  of  their  batta,  or  allowances  in  the  field.  > 

«  Orme  MSS.,  India,  iii.  f.  521. 
'  Country  Correspondence,  1751,  pp.  42  and  48. 

•  CHvc  came  out  a  Writer  to  Madras  in  1744  ;  after  the  capture  of  the  place 
he  escaped  to  St.  David's  and  accepted  a  commission  as  ensign.     He  served 


THE  FAILURE  OF  DUPLEIX  67 

plan  on  him,  and  he  was  one  of  those  men  "  who  see  things  and 
their  consequences  in  an  instant."  On  his  return  he  persuaded 
Saunders  to  send  him  into  the  Arcot  country  with  any  troops 
that  could  be  spared.  A  party  of  130  was  made  up  at  St.  David's 
and  sent  by  sea  to  Madras  under  his  command.  There  he  was 
joined  by  80  more.  With  these  and  a  few  sepoys  he  marched  on 
Arcot  and,  beyond  expectation,  occupied  it,  a  body  of  3000 
native  troops  retiring  before  him.^ 

His  object  was,  if  possible, to  raise  contributions  for  Muhammad 
AU,  and  at  all  events  to  interfere  with  the  collection  of  revenue 
for  Chanda  Sahib.  In  his  first  object  he  failed  altogether.  He 
marched  against  two  or  three  Killedars  near  Arcot,  but  could 
nowhere  halt  long  enough  to  produce  any  effect. 

Meanwhile  he  had  to  look  to  his  own  security  ;  and  although 
Chanda  Sahib's  people  whom  he  had  driven  from  Arcot  did  not 
dare  to  attack  him,  their  flying  parties  of  horse  hindered  getting 
in  provisions. 2  In  spite  of  this,  however,  adequate  supplies 
seem  to  have  been  collected,  and  CUve  resolved  to  hold  the  fort 
in  spite  of  its  large  circuit  and  ruinous  defences. 

The  news  of  this  violation  of  his  capital  caused  great  annoy- 
ance to  Chanda  Sahib.  He  wrote  an  indignant  letter  of  protest 
to  the  English,  which  they  ignored  ;  *  and  dispatched  troops  to 
expel  the  intruders.  He  had,  indeed,  no  alternative.  To  leave 
Clive  undisturbed  at  Arcot  would  have  involved  a  loss  of  revenue 
which  he  could  ill  afford.  As  was  usually  the  case  in  Indian 
warfare,  strategy  was  at  the  mercy  of  finance.  But  to  avoid 
weakening  the  forces  at  Trichinopoly  more  than  need  be,  the 
main  part  of  the  attacking  troops  were  drawn  from  Pondich^ry. 

until  news  of  peace  arrived  in  1749,  and  then  reverted  to  Civil  employment. 
He  was  named  "  Steward."  The  occupant  of  this  post  supplied  what  provisions 
were  needed  either  for  the  Governor's  table  or  for  the  garrison.  When  the  troops 
took  the  field,  the  duty  of  provisioning  them  was  naturally  assigned  to  Clive. 
As  their  numbers  swelled,  the  employment  became  unexpectedly  advantageous, 
and  Clive  thus  founded  his  fortune. 

'Sep.  Des.  to  England,  September  30,  175 1  ;  Extraordinary  Occurrences 
and  Fort  St.  David  Cons.,  August  19,  1751  ;  Country  Correspondence,  1755, 
p.  26. 

*  Extraordinary  Occurrences,  September  :2,  175 1.  It  is  to  be  feared  that  the 
story  of  Clive's  sepoys  contenting  themselves  with  rice-water  must  be  given 
up  as  a  myth,  in  spite  of  Sir  George  Forrest's  acceptance  of  the  story.  Clive 
reports  three  months'  provisions  in  his  magazines  in  October  (Extraordinary 
Occurrences,  October  7,  175 1 ).  The  only  contemporary  reference  which  lends  the 
least  colour  to  the  story  is  a  reference  to  the  besiegers  "  upbraiding  "  the  besieged 
with  their  want  of  provisions  "  (French  Correspondence,  T752,  p.  lit). 

*  Extraordinary  Occurrences,  October  7,  175 1. 


58  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

According  to  his  usual  practice,  Dupleix,  in  default  of  soldiers, 
sent  out  200  sailors — "  tarpaulin  rascalls,"  as  Saunders  calls 
them  » — with  some  sepoys  ;  and  these  were  strengthened  by  a 
body  of  Chanda  Sahib's  horse.  The  French  detachment  was 
commanded  by  the  Chevaher  Mouhy  ;  ^  and  the  troops  were 
accompanied  by  Raza  Sahib,  Chanda's  son. 

These  troops  appeared  before  Arcot  on  October  4,  and  in- 
vested the  fort.  Saunders  at  once  endeavoured  to  reheve  the 
place  by  ordering  Gingens  to  leave  behind  enough  troops  to 
defend  Trichinopoly  and  to  march  north  with  the  rest.  But 
this  was  agreeable  neither  to  the  Nawab  nor  to  Gingens  ;  and 
Saunders'  orders  were  left  unexecuted.*  Another  attempt  at 
rehef  was  made  from  Madras,  whence  a  party  without  guns 
marched  for  Arcot.  But  this  was  encountered  by  a  body  of 
the  enemy,  who  forced  the  relievers  with  some  loss  to  take  refuge 
in  the  fort  of  Poonamallee  ;  this  party  was  subsequently 
strengthened,  but  only  reached  Arcot  when  the  siege  had  been 
raised  by  other  means.* 

Meanwhile  Clive  had  been  more  vigorously  beleaguered  than 
had  been  expected — "  We  apprehended  nothing  further  from  them 
than  a  blockade,"  wrote  a  sergeant  who  was  present  in  Arcot.* 
But  the  enemy  kept  up  a  regular  fire  which  was  extremely  harass- 
ing, and  the  houses  of  the  town  were  so  close  to  the  fort  walls  that 
Clive  had  several  people  hurt  by  stones  thrown  in.*  Moreover, 
the  extent  of  the  fort  rendered  the  duty  of  the  guards  so  exhaust- 
ing that  he  feared  his  men  would  drop  with  fatigue.'  However, 
as  his  tottering  walls  crumbled  before  the  enemy's  fire,  he  counter- 
worked the  breaches  when  repair  was  no  longer  possible.  Raza 
Sahib,  surprised  at  the  obstinacy  of  the  defence,  offered  good  terms 
and  a  considerable  present  to  Clive.  The  offer  was  rejected.  Then 
news  arrived  of  the  approach  of  some  Marathas  and  of  the  re- 
newed advance  of  the  English  relieving  party.     On  November  25 

•  Saunders  to  Clive,  August  25,  175 1  (Orme  MSS.,  Various,  287,  f.  129). 

'  Castonnet  dcsVosfics,  Dupleix,  ses  derniires  luties,  p.  8.  But  cf.  Orme  MSS., 
Various,  XV.  f.  163,  where  Goupil  is  said  to  have  been  in  command  on  November 
19/30. 

^  Orme  MSS.,  India,  ii.  f.  493  and  v.  f.  1066;  Extraordinary  Occurrences, 
October  30,  175 1. 

*  The  first  party  consisted  of  130  Europeans  under  Lieutenant  Innes,  the 
second  was  commanded  by  James  Killpatrick  {Extraordinary  Occurrences,  October 
21  and  31,  1751;  Saunders  to  Qive,  October  18,  1751  (Onne  MSS.,  Various, 
287,  f.  169). 

'  Orme  MSS.,  Various,  15,  ff.  153,  etc.  •  Loc.  cit. 

'  Extraordinary  Occurrences,  October  21,  175 1. 


THE  FAILURE  OF  DUPLEIX  59 

the  enemy  attempted  to  storm  the  breaches.  The  attempt  was 
made  by  their  sepoys  only,  for  the  French  troops  took  no 
part  in  the  assault.  By  this  time,  Chve  had  only  240  men 
effective,*  nevertheless  he  made  good  the  defence.  After  an  hour 
the  enemy  desisted.  That  night  they  withdrew  from  Arcot. 
It  was  the  first  conspicuous  success  the  English  had  obtained 
since  they  had  entered  the  lists  against  the  French. 

The  main  body  of  the  Marathas  under  Morari  Rao  moved  on 
to  join  Muhammad  AH  at  Trichinopoly  ;  but  they  left  a  body  of 
1000  horse  to  co-operate  with  Give  against  Raza  Sahib.  The 
small  forts  near  Arcot,  which  on  Clive's  first  appearance  had 
defied  him,  now  submitted  without  delay  ;  but  the  Marathas 
proved  intractable  aUies,  and  scattered  to  plunder  the  country, 
until  some  of  them  were  attacked  and  killed  by  Raza  Sahib's 
people.  Then  they  joined  Clive,  who  on  December  6  marched 
from  Arcot.-  On  the  14th  he  came  up  with  the  French  near 
Ami.  Here  again  the  French  troops  failed  to  distinguish  them- 
selves.^ After  an  action  lasting  from  noon  to  five  o'clock,  they 
retreated  ;  and  Clive,  moving  at  once  on  Conjeeveram,  occupied 
it  on  the  flight  of  the  garrison.  The  province  of  Arcot  was  for 
the  moment  clear  of  the  enemy.* 

However,  they  returned  as  soon  as  the  English  troops  had  gone 
into  garrison.  They  marched  along  the  Coast,  plundered  Poona- 
mallee  and  the  Mount,*  and  reoccupied  Conjeeveram.  Clive  was 
resting  from  his  labours  at  St.  David's  ;  but  was  hastily  sent 
up  to  Madras,  where  luckily  a  reinforcement  of  100  men  had 
arrived  from  Bengal.  With  these,  the  sepoys  he  had  recently 
raised,  and  drafts  from  the  garrisons  of  Arcot  and  Madras,  he 
took  the  field,  with  forces  somewhat  inferior  in  infantry  to  those 
of  the  enemy,  and  with  nothing  to  oppose  to  the  2500  horse  who 
marched  with  the  latter.  They  had  entrenched  themselves  at 
Vendalore,  25  miles  from  Madras,  but  on  Clive's  approach 
hiu-riedly  marched  away  towards  Arcot  in  the  hope  of  surprising 
it.  Clive  hastened  after  them,  first  towards  Conjeeveram, 
whither  he  supposed  them  to  have  gone,  and  then  towards  Arcot. 
He  came  upon  them  suddenly  at  Coverypauk  as  dusk  was  falling, 
and  his  first  warning  of  their  presence  was  their  artillery  opening 

'  Orme  MSS.,  Various,  15,  f.  159,  etc. 

'Extraordinary  Occurrences,  November  22  and  25  and  December  2,  1751. 

*  Clive  said  their  sepoys  behaved  better  (Ormo  MSS.,  India,  ii.  f.  297). 

*  Extraordinary  Occurrences,  Decemt>er  6,  l8,  and  23,  1751. 
'  Where  the  English  had  country  villas. 


60  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

fire  at  250  yards  on  his  advanced  guard.  Clive  ordered  his  troops 
into  a  deep  watercourse  on  the  left  of  the  road,  whence  by  the 
hght  of  the  moon  the  action  was  continued.  Finding  by  the 
report  of  a  sergeant  whom  he  sent  to  reconnoitre,  that  the  enemy's 
rear  was  unguarded,  he  detached  half  his  force  to  attack  them, 
and  himself  accompanied  the  detachment  part  of  the  way.  On 
returning  to  the  men  he  had  left  behind,  he  found  them  quitting 
the  watercourse,  and  could  scarcely  drive  them  back  to  the 
position  they  had  deserted.  After  a  tedious  interval  of  an  hour, 
the  sound  of  musketry  in  the  rear  was  heard.  The  detachment 
had  reached  unobserved  a  position  only  50  yards  in  rear  of  the 
French,  whence  they  had  poured  in  a  general  volley,  which 
did  great  execution  and  struck  the  enemy  with  panic.  They 
fled,  abandoning  everything.  ^ 

This  uninterrupted  course  of  success  won  Clive  great  reputa- 
tion. His  victories  were  indeed  the  only  successes  which  the 
English  had  obtained  ;  and  while  his  brother-officers  felt  some 
jealousy  of  his  sudden  promotion  and  the  contrast  between  his 
achievements  and  theirs,  the  soldiers,  Europeans  and  Indians 
alike,  looked  to  him  as  an  infallible  leader.  "  I  am  informed," 
wrote  Saunders  to  him  shortly  after  the  siege  of  Arcot,  "  the 
Mullahs  are  writing  a  history  of  the  wars  of  Arcot  wherein  you 
will  be  dehvered  down  to  future  ages."  ^  Indeed,  he  had  acquired 
that  reputation  for  good  fortune  which  in  later  years  was  to  give 
him  so  remarkable  an  ascendancy  over  the  Indian  mind.  About 
this  time,  Muhammad  Ah  wrote  to  him  :  "  By  God  Almighty's 
grace  you  are  very  lucky  in  all  engagements  ;  as  you  have  met 
with  an  incomparable  success  in  all  your  expeditions,  I  am  well 
assured  that  fortune  is  bent  in  your  favour.  .  .  ."  ^ 

All  this  time  affairs  at  Trichinopoly  had  been  dragging  on 
with  great  lack  of  enterprise  on  both  sides.  Gingens,  although 
superior  to  the  French  in  Europeans,^  had,  as  we  have  seen, 
crossed  the  Cauvery  and  taken  refuge  under  the  walls  of  Trichino- 

»  Clive's  narrative,  ap.  Orme  MSS.,  India,  ii.  ff.  298,  etc.  Cf.  also  the  letter 
from  the  French  surgeon  at  Karikal,  September  10,  1752  {French  Correspond- 
ence, 1752).  The  latter  says  Very  <ie  Saint-Romain  was  in  command  of  the 
French  in  the  absence  of  Brenier. 

'  Orme  MSS.,  Various.  287,  f.  177. 

'  Chatham  MSS.,  i.  99.  The  copy  in  this  collection  is  undated,  and  I  am  not 
clear  whether  the  letter  was  written  before  or  after  the  crowning  victory  at 
Srirangam. 

♦Sep.  Des.  to  England,  August  15,  175 1,  where  the  Fort  St.  David  Council 
state  tliat  they  have  900  regular  troops  in  the  field  against  600  of  the  French. 


THE  FAILURE  OF  DUPLEIX  61 

poly.  On  this  Chanda  Sahib  and  the  French  crossed  the  Cole- 
roon  and  occupied  the  island  of  Srirangam,  which  hes  opposite 
to  the  city,  but  d'Auteuil,  who  commanded  the  French,  contented 
himself  with  firing  on  the  town  with  his  larger  guns.  D'Auteuil 
was  then  recalled,  and  a  younger  officer,  Law,  was  sent  in  his 
place,  with  orders  to  bring  the  affair  to  a  rapid  conclusion.  He 
crossed  the  Cauvery  without  opposition,^  but  then  found  he  had 
not  men  enough  to  invest  the  city,  and  contented  himself  with 
establishing  posts  at  a  respectful  distance  from  the  place.  ■^ 
Gingens,  without  a  thought  of  molesting  the  enemy,  wore  his  men 
out  by  making  them  sleep  on  their  arms,  and  thought  wistfully 
of  the  protection  he  might  obtain  by  retiring  behind  the  city 
walls.'  Towards  the  close  of  the  year  the  Marathas  arrived,  and 
a  little  later  a  considerable  body  of  Mysore  troops,  whom  Muham- 
mad Ali  had  obtained  by  making  great  promises.  This  gave  the 
English  a  superiority  of  native  troops  ;  and  they  were  still  about 
equal  to  the  French  in  Europeans,  in  spite  of  the  reinforcements 
sent  by  Dupleix.     But  Gingens  refused  to  attack. 

The  Council  at  last  grew  weary  of  this  method  of  war,  which 
exhausted  their  funds  by  keeping  men  in  the  field  *  without 
obtaining  any  of  the  advantages  that  had  been  hoped  for.  Imme- 
diately after  Clive  had  destroyed  the  French  force  in  the  pro- 
vince of  Arcot,  they  summoned  him  to  St.  David's  with  all  his 
forces  ;  a  detachment  of  200  men  had  arrived  from  Bengal ;  and 
it  was  resolved  to  send  all  these  to  Trichinopoly  and  overwhelm 
the  French  before  they  could  receive  reinforcements  from 
Europe.  Clive  was  about  to  march  with  these  troops  when  there 
arrived  the  Durrington,  with  Stringer  Lawrence  aboard.  He 
had  interviewed  the  Directors,  induced  them  to  restore  the  pay 
they  had  deprived  him  of,  and  so  returned  once  more  to  the 
command  of  their  troops.  Within  forty-eight  hours  of  his 
arrival,^  he  had  marched  to  the  southward  on  his  way  to 
Trichinopoly. 

'  An  active  oliicer  would  surely  have  endeavoured  to  defend  the  line  of 
the  river,  especially  as  it  was  full  and  deep. 

'  I-aw  complained  that  50CX)  men  were  sent  away  to  Arcot,  and  that  left 
him  with  only  6800.  This  of  course  includes  all  the  native  troops  of  Chanda 
Sahib. 

'Extraordinary  Occurrences,  October  7,  1751. 

*  Tlie  expense  of  an  army  in  the  field  was  about  twice  as  much  in  mere  pay  as 
when  it  was  in  garrison. 

•  The  Durrington  arrived  March  14/25,  and  the  troops  set  out  from  St.  David's 
F  March  16/27. 


^B  March  16/3 


62  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

His  arrival  was  extremely  fortunate.  Had  Clive  commanded 
the  expedition,  there  would  certainly  have  been  bitter  disputes 
about  his  rank  at  Trichinopoly,  where  none  of  the  older  captains 
would  have  served  under  him/  and  where  even  the  lieutenants 
would  have  grumbled  about  having  to  obey  a  man  who  had  been 
thrust  over  their  heads  by  the  Council's  partiality.  Clive  could 
have  ill  tolerated  the  languor  and  indecision  of  his  brother- 
captains  ;  while  his  lack  of  military  experience  might  have  been 
urged  as  a  strong  reason  for  not  entrusting  him  with  the  com- 
mand. But  Lawrence's  arrival  solved  all  these  difficulties,  and 
his  authority  suppressed  any  outward  manifestations  of  the 
jealousy  which  certain  of  the  captains  undoubtedly  felt  for 
Clive.  2 

On  April  7,  Lawrence  arrived  lo  miles  from  Trichinopoly.  He 
had  with  him  about  400  Europeans  and  a  body  of  sepoys  whom 
Clive  had  raised  and  trained  in  his  campaigns  round  Arcot.  On 
the  news  of  this  advance,  Law  fell  into  a  state  of  great  indecision. 
He  seems  to  have  leaned  to  an  immediate  retreat  into  the 
island  of  Srirangam  ;  Dupleix,  who  may  have  under-estimated 
Lawrence's  force,  urged  an  advance  to  crush  the  approaching 
convoy  ;  ^  and  it  is  evident  that  by  awaiting  action  near  Trichino- 
poly, Law  was  facilitating  the  English  task  of  bringing  both  parts 
of  their  force  against  him  at  the  same  moment.  It  is  probable 
that  in  no  case  would  he  have  crushed  Lawrence,  who,  if  need 
were,  could  have  declined  battle.  But  he  would  have  had  a 
much  better  chance  of  doing  so  had  he  marched  towards  him 
with  his  whole  force  while  the  convoy  was  yet  at  a  distance, 
for  he  might  have  been  sure  that  Gingens  would  not 
have  followed  close  at  his  heels.  Instead,  he  remained  on 
Trichinopoly  plain,  sending  out  a  small  detachment  which  could 
neither  check  nor  divert  Lawrence's  march.  On  the  9th,  Lawrence 
was  joined  by  a  strong  detachment  sent  out  by  Gingens  ;  the 
French  after  a  considerable  cannonade  were  unable  to  prevent 
his  march  into  Trichinopoly,  and  could  claim  only  the  empty 
honour  of  remaining  on  the  battle-field. 

»  Even  Dalton,  an  intimate  friend  of  Clive's,  and  moreover  under  heavy 
pecuniary  obligations  to  him,  would  only  serve  under  him  as  a  volunteer.  Almost 
the  whole  of  Clive's  military  service  at  this  period  was  passed  on  detachment, 
where  the  question  of  his  rank  could  not  be  raised  by  the  other  captains.  The 
situation  closely  resembled  that  raised  by  Dupleix  trying  to  give  supreme 
command  to  Paradis  in  1746. 

'  Notably  Gingens  and  Scrimsour. 

*See  the  correspondence  printed  by  Hamont  (Dupleix,  pp.  186-188). 


THE  FAILURE  OF  DUPLEIX  63 

They  were  not  to  wait  long  for  the  results  of  this  junction. 
Two  days  after  Lawrence's  arrival,  a  party  was  sent  out  by  night 
to  beat  up  Chanda  Sahib's  camp.  The  attempt  failed,  owing 
to  a  mistake  of  the  guide.  But  it  increased  Law's  nervousness. 
Like  many  other  bad  officers,  he  lacked,  not  physical,  but  moral 
courage.  He  was  confronted  by  a  superior  force  and  was  un- 
speakably afraid  of  being  beaten.  He  insisted  then  on  retreating 
into  the  island  of  Srirangam,  so  as  to  put  the  Cauvery  between 
him  and  the  enemy.  This  movement  was  approved  by  a  council 
of  war  ;  so  was  Peyton's  flight  from  the  Coromandel  Coast  in 
1746  ;  so  was  to  be  Clive's  hasty  proposal  not  to  advance  on 
Plassey  in  1757. 

Law's  timidity  encouraged  the  Enghsh  to  a  plan  which  against 
an  active  foe  might  have  led  to  their  undoing.  They  resolved  to 
separate  their  forces,  keep  part  south  of  the  Cauvery  under 
Lawrence,  and  send  the  rest  under  Clive  to  take  post  north  of  the 
Coleroon,  so  as  to  besiege  Law  in  his  island.  The  proposal  came 
from  the  bold  spirit  of  Clive,  and  there  were  not  wanting  officers 
who  exaggerated  Law's  capacity  and  predicted  nothing  but 
failure  from  the  scheme.^  The  decision  was  taken  on  April  15, 
and  that  night  ^  CUve  set  out  with  400  Europeans,  1200  sepoys, 
and  3000  horse, ^  and  established  himself  at  Samiaveram. 

The  French  had  two  posts  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Coleroon, 
in  the  country  forts  of  Lalgudi  and  Pitchanda.  In  the  former 
was  a  large  store  of  grain,  which  was  guarded  only  by  a  party  of 
sepoys.  This  Clive  carried  against  a  mere  show  of  resistance; 
and  as  Law  had  found  but  little  grain  in  Srirangam,  the  loss  of 
the  magazine  at  Lalgudi  was  a  serious  blow.*  But  more  serious 
business  was  at  hand.  A  convoy  was  approaching  from  Pondi- 
chery,  under  d'Auteuil,  whom  Dupleix  sent  once  more  to  take 
command.  He  had  with  him  only  40  Europeans,  but  was  joined 
by  a  party  whom  Law  had  sent  out  to  escort  him  safely  into 
Srirangam.*  Chve  had  therefore  to  keep  a  sharp  watch  in  both 
directions — on  Law  in  his  island  and  on  d'Auteuil  to  the  north- 

'  On  May  4/15  Daltoii  wrote  to  Clive,  "  I  give  you  joy,  my  dear  friend,  on 
the  success  of  your  scheme,  which  I  think  must  be  utter  ruin  to  the  enemy's 
army.  As  everybody  almost  disapproved  of  it,  you  have  all  the  honour  " 
(Orme  MSS.,  India,  iii.  f.  664). 

'  Orme  MSS.,  India,  ii.  f.  301,  and  v.  f.  1072. 

*  Ibid.,  ii.  f.  476.  *  Ibid.,  Various,  287,  f.  29. 

•  Orme  {History,  vol.  i.  p.  222)  seems  in  error  when  he  says  d'Auteuil  brought 
120  Europeans  from  Pondichfery.  Cf.  Dupleix'  letter  to  Law  of  April  24  ap. 
Hamont,  op.  cit.,  pp.  194-195. 


64  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

ward  ;  he  seems  to  have  asked  Lawrence  to  send  an  additional 
force  across  the  river  ;  but  Lawrence  refused/  and  Clive  had 
therefore  to  be  particularly  active  and  vigilant. 

On  receiving  news  that  the  convoy  had  with  it  seven  lakhs 
of  rupees  and  was  at  Utatur,  Clive  made  a  sudden  march  that  way 
by  night  ;  but  as  the  French  had  heard  of  his  coming,  they  with- 
drew and  he  returned  hot-foot  to  Samiaveram  lest  the  enemy 
should  occupy  it  in  his  absence.  Law  did  indeed  make  the 
attempt,  but  with  too  sinall  a  party.  He  sent  about  80  Europeans, 
half  of  whom  were  English  deserters.  They  reached  Samiaveram 
after  Clive 's  return,  but  deceived  the  sentinels  by  pretending 
to  be  a  reinforcement  sent  from  Lawrence.  A  confused  conflict 
followed,  in  which  Clive  escaped  death  by  a  hairsbreadth  ;  but 
the  French  were  overpowered,  and  their  whole  party  killed  or 
taken.  ^ 

This  affair  led  to  a  renewed  apphcation  from  Clive  to  Lawrence 
for  assistance,  this  time  urging  him  to  move  his  troops  into 
Srirangam,  so  as  to  be  able  to  come  at  once  to  his  assistance 
should  Law  cross  the  Coleroon  ;  but  Lawrence  pointed  out 
that,  should  he  do  so,  he  would  have  to  leave  unguarded  the  way 
southward  to  Karikal  and  thus  expose  the  whole  scheme  to 
failure.*  However^  he  soon  after  detached  a  party  under 
Dalton  to  attack  d'Auteuil,  who  had  returned  to  Utatur.*  This 
new  detachment  encountered  the  French  near  that  place,  and 
drove  them  into  it  with  such  vigour  that  in  the  following  night 
d'Auteuil  withdrew  to  a  more  respectful  distance.*  Lawrence 
then  recalled  Dalton,  but  the  Coleroon  was  too  high  to  be  crossed, 
and  Dalton  put  his  troops  under  Clive 's  command  *  for  the  siege 
of  Pitchanda,  the  only  post  Law  then  had  on  the  north  bank  of  the 

»  Lawrence  to  Clive,  April  13,  1752.     Onne  MSS.,  India,  ii.  f.  458. 

*  This  occurred  on  the  night  of  April  26-27.  The  French  oificer  in  command 
was  named  Zilvaiguer  :  he  had  with  him  one  Kelsey,  an  English  deserter,  to 
whom  Dupleix  had  given  a  commission.  He  was  hung  by  Lawrence's  orders  out 
of  hand.  See  Dupleix  to  Saunders,  May  18,  1752  {French  Correspondence,  1752) ; 
Lawrence  to  Clive,  April  16,  1752  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  ii.  f.  461).] 

^  Clive  to  Lawrence,  Orme  MSS.,  India,  iii.  f.  662,  and  Lawrence's  answer  of 
April  20  {ibid.,  ii.  f.  463).  Mr.  S.  C.  Hill  points  out  that  Orme  misdates  Clive's 
letter  May,  and  that  it  must  be  earlier. 

»  The  date  of  this  is  uncertain.  Orme  {History ,  i.  p.  226);givcs  May  9/20  ;  but 
although  this  date  is  supported  by  Dalton's  Narrative,  the  Orme  MSS.  (India, 
ii.  f.  478  and  iii.  f.  663)  contains  letters  from  Dalton  of  May  3,  4,  and  5.  Orme's 
date  is  probably  New,  not  Old  Style. 

»  Loc.  cit. 

'  Dalton  himself  served  as  a  volunteer.  This  was  the  only  way  in  which 
Uc  could  participate  while  leaving  the  command  with  his  junior,  Clive. 


THE  FAILURE  OF  DUPLEIX  65 

Coleroon.  This  was  taken  after  a  brief  cannonade  on  May  20.^ 
Lawrence  meanwhile  had  taken  the  French  post  at  Coiladi.  Law 
was  thus  completely  shut  in.  It  is  curious  that  he  made  no 
attempt  to  escape.  He  had  800  Europeans,  while  Lawrence 
at  this  moment  had  but  400,  and  the  Coleroon  was  too  high  for 
Clive  and  Dalton  to  come  to  his  help  in  case  of  action. *  He  had 
therefore  a  reasonable  prospect  of  being  able  to  cut  his  way  out 
to  the  southward.  He  probably  distrusted  Chanda  Sahib's 
troops/  but  he  seems  also  to  have  lost  all  energy  and  will,  and  to 
have  made  up  his  mind  that  the  only  possible  escape  lay  in  coming 
to  terms  with  Muhammad  Ah.*  He  therefore  lay  without  move- 
ment in  the  pagodas  he  had  occupied. 

It  was  the  worst  possible  course  he  could  have  adopted.  The 
capture  of  Pitchanda  enabled  Clive  to  open  fire  with  his  guns 
on  Chanda  Sahib's  camp.  This  harassment,  combined  with 
lack  of  pay  and  food,  determined  most  of  the  latter's  forces  to 
leave  him,  and,  when  the  English  promised  them  a  safe-conduct, 
.   they  did  so  gladly.     Many  joined  Clive. 

To  complete  Law's  encirclement  the  capture  or  destruction  of 
d'Auteuil's  force  was  still  necessary.  Clive  therefore  marched 
against  him.  He  hoped  to  catch  the  French  in  the  open,  moving 
towards  Srirangam,  but  d'Auteuil  after  beginning  to  move  forward 
fell  back  towards  Valikondapuram.  The  Governor  had  been 
won  over  to  the  English  side  ;  and  when  d'Auteuil  was  driven 
within  the  walls,  he  was  refused  admission  into  the  citadel,  and 
obliged  to  surrender.* 

This  news  produced  an  offer  from  Law  to  leave  half  his  heavy 
guns  behind  and  march  away  to  Pondich^ry.  But  the  English 
had  not  beleaguered  him  so  long  in  Srirangam  only  to  give  up  all 
the  fruits  of  their  success.  Muhammad  Ali  replied  that  he  must 
surrender  at  discretion.     Meanwhile  the  leader  of  the  Tanjore 

'  See  declaration  of  the  French  officers  appended  to  Dupleix'  letter  of  May  31 
{French  Correspondence,  1752).  Orme  dates  the  capture  May  16,  which  is  wrong, 
whether  new  or  old  style.  For  this  service  Muhammad  Ali  bestowed  on  Clive 
the  title  of  Sabat  Jang  Bahadur  (Chatham  MSS.,  i.  99). 

•  Dalton's  Narrative,  Orme  MSS.,  India,  iii.  f.  545. 

•  Dupleix  to  Law,  May  13,  1752  (Plainte  du  Sieur  Law,  p.  38). 

•  Op.  cit.,  p.  32.  Cf.  also  Dupleix  to  d'Auteuil,  May  21,  1752  (ap.  Ilamont, 
op.  cit.,  p.  195),  in  which  he  discusses  a  possible  treaty  between  Chanda  Sahib 
and  Muhammad  Ali. 

'  This  was  June  9.  The  treasure  was  mostly  plundered  ;  and  a  captain's 
share  of  the  prize-money  only  amounted  to  3000  rupees  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  iii. 
f.  548).  At  the  time  of  his  surrender  d'Auteuil  only  had  70  Europeans,  400 
sepoys,  and  300  horse  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  u.  f.  477). 

5 


66  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

troops  with  the  Nawab  offered  to  assist  Chanda  Sahib  to  escape 
to  Karikal.  Chanda  Sahib  sought  Law's  advice,  and  on  June  ii 
a  messenger  came  with  pressing  letters  to  both  of  them.  That 
evening  Law  met  the  Tanjorean  within  the  enemy's  hnes,  and 
demanded  a  hostage  for  Chanda  Sahib's  security.  The  other 
answered  "  that  if  he  had  a  mind  to  break  his  word,  the  hostage 
would  signify  nothing,"  and  objected  that  a  hostage  would 
expose  the  plan  to  discovery.  However,  he  took  the  most  solemn 
oaths  not  to  betray  Chanda.  Law  at  last  gave  way,  and  Chanda 
Sahib  was  conducted  into  the  enemy's  camp.^  Why  Chanda 
should  have  hoped  to  find  mercy  from  a  Tanjorean  is  hard  to 
discover.  He  had  been  the  bitterest  enemy  of  the  little  kingdom. 
Time  and  time  again  he  had  laid  it  waste,  and  at  least  twice 
besieged  its  capital.  He  had  been  tne  prime  enemy  of  the  Hindu 
principaUties  of  the  south.  To  suppose  that  a  man  who  had  so 
much  reason  to  hate  him  would  let  him  go,  was  to  beheve  him 
either  inconceivably  poor-spirited  or  magnanimous  beyond  what 
was  usual  in  the  East. 

But  the  Tanjorean  had  never  intended  to  let  him  go.  A 
thousand  horse  patrolled  the  outskirts  of  the  French  encamp- 
ment to  catch  him  in  case  he  preferred  flight  to  the  Tanjorean 
offers.*  On  arriving  in  his  enemy's  camp,  he  was  detained. 
Next  day  a  conference  was  held,  at  which  each  of  the  allies 
demanded  the  custody  of  the  prisoner.^  Two  days  later  Chanda 
SaJiib  was  beheaded,  in  the  very  choultry,  it  was  said,  where  he 
had  taken  that  false  oath  by  which,  sixteen  years  earUer,  he  had 
secured  possession  of  the  town.* 

On  the  same  day  that  the  seizure  of  the  French  protege  was 
known,  Law  was  again  summoned  to  surrender  at  discretion. 
On  June  13  he  obtained  an  interview  with  Lawrence,  in  which  the 

•  These  details  are  given  in  a  declaration  made  by  Law  and  forwarded  by 
Dupleix  to  the  English  with  his  letter  of  July  7  {French  Correspondence,  1752). 
I  can  see  no  reason  for  suspecting  this  version  of  events,  which  agrees  well 
enough  with  what  we  know  from  other  sources. 

•  Dalton's  Narrative,  Orme  MSS.,  India,  iii.  S.  549-550. 

'  In  a  statement  appended  to  Saunders'  letter  to  Dupleix  of  August  22 
(French  Correspondence,  1752)  Lawrence  seems  to  deny  that  any  conference 
was  held.  But  I  do  not  think  much  weight  attaches  to  this.  He  expressly 
says  the  opposite  in  his  narrative  (Cambridge,  p.  28). 

•  Wilks,  op.  cil.,  vol.  i.  pp.  176,  etc.  The  assertion  that  Monaji  sacrificed  a 
large  reward  by  not  facilitating  Chanda's  escape  is  absurd.  Chanda's  resources 
were  exhausted,  and  he  probably  carried  all  the  wealth  he  possessed  on  his 
person  ;  while  the  French  were  for  the  moment  discredited.  He  was  beheaded 
June  14  (Cambridge,  loc.  cil.). 


THE  FAILURE  OF  DUPLEIX  67 

latter  reminded  him  that  the  pagodas  were  not  tenable  against 
heavy  artillery,  and  offered  as  his  only  concession  to  release  the 
officers  with  their  arms  and  baggage  on  parole.  With  these 
terms  Law  was  forced  to  comply.  Early  next  day  an  EngUsh 
detachment  marched  into  the  pagoda  which  the  French  had 
occupied,  and  as  they  drew  up  with  bayonets  fixed  and  colours 
flying,  the  French  "  threw  down  their  arms  in  a  confused  heap 
before  us  and  were  secured  under  a  guard."  ^ 

This  surrender  was  of  great  importance.  It  left  Pondich^ry 
practically  undefended  except  by  a  few  recruits.  But  for  the 
peace  between  the  French  and  EngUsh  Crowns,  Dupleix  could  not 
have  held  his  chief  settlement  for  a  week.  The  effect  of  the  news, 
when  it  reached  France,  was  to  bring  about  the  recall  of  Dupleix. 

The  French  Governor  himself  was  fully  alive  to  the  disastrous 
nature  of  the  blow  that  had  been  dealt  to  his  schemes.  On  June  13, 
before  he  had  heard  of  Chanda  Sahib's  death  or  Law's  surrender," 
he  wrote  to  Saunders  stating  that  he  had  been  authorised  by  the 
Subahdar  of  the  Deccan  to  settle  the  affairs  of  the  Camatic  by 
granting  possession  of  Trichinopoly  to  Muhammad  Ali.^  The 
EngUsh  waited  to  see  how  matters  went  at  Trichinopoly  before 
replying.  On  June  23,  Saunders  answered  that  he  was  very 
ready  to  promote  peace — "  Indeed,  as  Chanda  Sahib  is  dead,  I 
can  see  no  reason  why  it  may  not  be  easily  accompUshed."  * 
But  Dupleix  demanded  the  release  of  all  prisoners  as  a  preUminary 
to  discussing  terms.*  In  other  words,  he  invited  the  EngUsh 
to  deprive  themselves  of  their  principal  advantage  over  him,  and 
to  restore  him  to  his  former  military  strength,  before  he  had  bound 
himself  to  any  terms.  Saunders  decUned  to  negotiate  on  such 
conditions.  The  war  therefore  continued.  No  doubt  the 
diplomacy  of  Dupleix  was  stiffened  by  the  knowledge  that  he  was 
on  the  eve  of  receiving  considerable  reinforcements.  On  July  28 
two  ships  reached  Pondich^ry  with  500  soldiers  aboard.* 

The  EngUsh  had  meanwhile  been  greatly  embarrassed  by  a 
breach  between  Muhammad  Ali  and  the  King  of  Mysore.  It 
suddenly  appeared  that  the  Nawab  had  only  secured  Mysorean 
help  by  promising  to  cede  Trichinopoly.  He  now  evaded  per- 
formance of  his  promise  under  various  pretexts.    The  EngUsh 

•  Law's  declaration  ut  supra,  and  Dalton's  Narrative  (Orme  MSS.,  India, 
iii.  £.  552). 

'  He  might  have  heard  of  d'Auteuil's  capture  on  June  9. 

•  French  Correspondence,  1752.  *  Letter  of  June  12,  ibid. 

'  Letter  of  July  7,  ibid.  •  Hamont,  op.  cit.,  p.  216. 


68  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

had  not  been  consulted  in  the  negotiations,  and  were  not  con- 
cerned from  a  moral  standpoint  to  secure  the  performance  of 
the  agreement.  But  the  quarrel  was  inconvenient  poUtically. 
It  involved  leaving  a  good  garrison  in  Trichinopoly.  With 
less  reason  it  was  thought  that  the  absence  of  the  Mysorean 
troops  involved  a  diminution  of  military  strength.  But,  neither 
against  the  French  before  Trichinopoly,  nor  afterwards  against 
the  English,  when  Mysore  had  definitely  changed  sides,  does  it 
appear  that  these  troops  were  capable  of  any  other  service  than 
terrifying  unprotected  convoys  or  plundering  unguarded  countries. 

After  delaying  for  about  a  fortnight  in  the  hope  that  the 
dispute  might  be  composed,  Lawrence  left  Trichinopoly  under 
the  command  of  Captain  Dalton,  and  himself  marched  with  the 
rest  of  his  army  to  Tiruviti,  whence  a  watch  could  be  kept  on 
the  French  movements  at  Pondich6ry. 

About  this  time  there  had  arrived  at  Madras,  Major  Kinneer, 
an  oificer  who  had  served  in  the  Royal  army,  and  who  was  to 
comrnand  next  under  Lawrence.  He  was  naturally  burning  to 
emulate  the  feats  of  Clive  and  his  chief  ;  and  unluckily  for  him 
Saunders  had  resolved  to  adopt  a  proposal  of  Muhammad  Ali 
and  besiege  Gingee.^  In  spite  of  Lawrence's  urgent  protests, 
Kinneer  was  sent  with  a  couple  of  hundred  Europeans  and  some 
sepoys — with  a  much  smaller  force,  that  is,  than  had  been  engaged 
when  the  French  escaladed  the  place  two  years  before.  Kinneer 
found  an  attack  out  of  the  question,  and  in  his  withdrawal  he 
encountered  a  body  of  French  whom  he  engaged  without  duly 
reconnoitring  their  position.  He  suffered  severe  loss  in  his 
attack,  himself  being  wounded,  and  retreated  in  haste.  Soon 
after  he  died  of  fever  heightened  by  disappointment. ^ 

Lawrence  quickly  redeemed  this  misfortune.  He  proceeded 
from  Madras,  whither  he  had  gone  to  protest  against  the  futile 
attempt  on  Gingee,  and  took  command  of  the  troops  at  Tiruviti. 
He  then  moved  towards  the  French  on  August  28,  but  they 
fell  back  towards  Pondichdry,  and  contented  themselves  with 
preventing  any  attempt  on  their  forts  of  Valudavur  and  Gingee, 
although  the  English  ravaged  the  country  forming  the  new 
French  acquisitions.     Finding  he  could  not  bring  the  French 

'  This  seems  to  be  the  only  case  in  whicli  Sauntlers'  good  sense  deserted  him. 

^  Shortly  before  this  the  English  troops  had  been  exceedingly  discontented, 
almost  to  the  point  of  mutiny  (Matlras  Ltrs.  Reed.,  1752.  No.  135)  ;  but  it  does 
not  appear  that  this  affected  Kinneer's  expedition — at  least  I  can  find  no  allusion 
to  its  having  been  supposed  to  have  done  so. 


THE  FAILURE  OF  DUPLEIX  69 

commander,  Kerjean,  to  action,  Lawrence  then  fell  back  on 
Bahur.  Kerjean  moved  after  him,  presumably  in  order  to  cover 
the  French  territories  from  further  ravage  ;  but  moved  too  far 
and  too  close  to  the  English,  who,  in  the  early  morning  of  Septem- 
ber 6,  fell  upon  their  camp,  slew  many,  took  the  commander 
and  15  officers  with  100  men  prisoners,  and  captured  all  their 
guns  and  baggage.  This  victory  at  Bahur  reduced  the  French 
to  miUtary  inactivity  for  the  next  six  months,  *  while  the  Enghsh 
hold  on  the  Carnatic  was  strengthened  by  Clive's  capture  of 
French  posts  at  Covelong  and  Chingleput. 

But  though  incapable  for  the  moment  of  military  effort, 
Dupleix  displayed  great  diplomatic  activity.  He  busily  widened 
the  breach  between  the  Mysoreans  and  Muhammad  Ali,  and  set  to 
work  to  detach  the  Marathas  under  Morari  Rao  from  his  enemies. 
Both  attempts  succeeded  to  his  desire.  The  latter  was  merely 
a  question  of  money  or  credit.  In  December  the  Maratha  chief, 
who  had  hesitated  for  a  time  after  the  French  defeat  at  Bahur, 
joined  the  French  on  condition  of  receiving  a  lakh  and  a  quarter 
of  rupees  a  month.  In  the  following  February  an  agreement 
was  made  with  the  Mysoreans  which  was  a  real  diplomatic 
victory.  On  condition  of  Dupleix  furnishing  troops  and  muni- 
tions for  the  siege  of  Trichinopoly,  Nandi  Rajah,  the  principal 
minister  and  real  director  of  the  State,  agreed  to  pay  down  four 
lakhs  of  rupees,  to  pay  eleven  lakhs  more  on  the  capture  of  the 
place,  to  meet  the  expenses  of  the  troops  engaged  there,  and  to  find 
three  lakhs  annually  for  the  French  Company.^  These  astound- 
ing terms  were  obtained  by  the  pressure  Dupleix  was  able  to 
exercise  through  the  presence  of  French  troops  in  the  Deccan, 
and  the  control  exercised  by  Bussy  over  the  policy  of  the  Subah- 
dar,  Salabat  Jang.  Unless  Mysore  agreed  to  the  French  terms, 
Salabat  Jang  was  to  have  enforced  his  claim  to  tribute  by  an 
invasion. 

A  third  diplomatic  operation  which  Dupleix  carried  out  at 

'  Historians  have  diUcreil  about  the  responsibility  for  this  action,  some 
saying  Dupleix  orilercd  Kerjean  to  come  to  action,  others  that  Kerjean  was 
burning  to  distinguish  himself  before  his  expected  supersession  by  the  arrival 
of  his  senior,  Ija.  Touche.  I  beUeve  neither  version  to  be  correct.  Dupleix 
distrusted  the  steadiness  of  his  recruits  too  much  to  be  willing  to  risk  an  action 
(see  his  letter  of  August  7,  ap.  Hamont,  op.  cit.,  pp.  218-219),  and  Kerjean 
was  so  far  from  eager  to  achieve  military  renown  at  this  moment  that  he  was 
demanding  his  recall  from  Dupleix  with  much  urgency  (sec  Dupleix'  letter  to 
him  of  August  30,  French  Correspondence,  1752).  I  conclude  that  the  action 
resulted  from  his  inadvertently  putting  himself  within  Lawrence's  reach. 

•  Cultru,  op.  cit.,  pp.  316,  etc. 


70  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

this  time  was  less  successful.  On  the  death  of  Chanda  Sahib, 
Dupleix  seems  for  a  moment  to  have  contemplated  standing 
forth  himself  as  Nawab  of  the  Carnatic.^  But  his  need  of  money, 
if  nothing  else,  rendered  this  inadvisable.  Chanda  Sahib's  son, 
Raza  Saliib,  also  lacked  resources  to  help  the  French  in  their 
struggle  with  the  English.  Dupleix  therefore  turned  to  an  old 
candidate  for  the  Nawabship  of  Arcot — Murtaza  Ali  Khan  the 
Killedar  of  Vellore,  he  who  had  murdered  Nawab  Safdar  Ali 
Khan  and  was  beUeved  to  have  murdered  Safdar  All's  son.  He 
was  reputed  rich,  and  Dupleix  reckoned  that  his  ambition  would 
induce  him  to  pay  lavishly  for  French  support,  while  his  fortress 
of  Vellore  would  form  a  base  of  operations  from  which  to  attack 
and  weaken  the  EngUsh  hold  on  the  province  of  Arcot.  Murtaza 
Ali  fell  in  with  these  plans  so  far  as  to  accept  the  title,  to  visit 
Pondich6ry  early  in  1753,  and  to  contribute  five  lakhs  to  the 
French  exchequer.  But  his  suspicious  and  tortuous  mind  was 
too  acute  not  to  see  the  danger  he  ran  of  becoming  a  puppet  in 
the  hands  of  the  French  Governor.  He  departed,  convinced,  as 
Orme  says,^  that  he  had  met  a  more  cunning  man  than  himself. 
He  declined  to  receive  a  French  garrison  into  his  fortress,'  and 
did  no  more  than  plunder  territory  round  Arcot.  A  year  later 
he  made  his  peace  with  the  EngUsh. 

Meanwhile,  military  affairs  had  been  very  much  at  a  standstill. 
Dupleix  still  had  a  body  of  some  500  Europeans  at  his  disposal, 
but  their  quality  was  not  such  as  to  warrant  an  engagement  on 
anything  like  equal  terms  with  the  English,  in  spite  ^of  their 
being  supported  by  Morari  Rao's  horsemen,  who  were  far  more 
than  a  match  for  the  wretched  cavalry  with  which  Muhammad 
Ali  suppUed  the  EngUsh .  In  Januciry  the  French  marched  from 
Valudavur  and  took  up  a  position  near  Tiruviti,  where  they 
protected  their  camp  with  a  ditch  and  rampart,  a  glacis,  and 
raveUns  to  cover  the  re-entering  angles.*  Lawrence  lay  near 
them.  Various  skirmishes  followed  with  the  Maratha  horse, 
who  harrassed  every  convoy  that  brought  money  from  Fort 
St.  David.  But  the  French  withdrew  on  the  only  occasion  when 
the  two  armies  came  in  sight  of  each  other ;  *  and  the  French 

'  He  had  received  a  grant  as  such  from  Salabat  Jang  in  175 1.  It  is  printed 
in  Lettres  et  Conventions,  p.  256.  Sec  also  the  extract  of  a  letter  from  Bussy 
dated  July  13,  1752,  ap.  Mimoire  pour  le  Sieur  Godeheu,  p.  58. 

*  History,  vol.  i.  pp.  275-276. 

»  "  A  renunciation  of  the  Koran  would  sooner  have  been  agreed  to  by  him  " 
(Orme  to  Holdemcsse,  March  i,  1756)  (Orme  MSS.,  Various,  17,  f.  296). 

♦  Mil.  Cons.,  1753.  p.  56.  » Ibid.,  p.  53. 


THE  FAILURE  OF  DUPLEIX  71 

camp  was  too  strong  to  be  stormed  by  five  times  as  many  men 
as  Lawrence  had.* 

Meanwhile,  Trichinopoly  had  been  besieged  by  the  Mysoreans, 
without  any  outstanding  incident  since  the  English  commandant, 
Captain  Dalton,  had  lost  a  number  of  his  small  garrison  in  an 
attempt  to  harass  the  enemy  on  the  island  of  Srirangam.^  On 
this  a  part  of  the  Mysoreans  had  encamped  on  the  south  side  of 
the  river,  on  Trichinopoly  plain,  in  order  to  hinder  convoys  of 
grain  from  reaching  the  city.  In  this  their  cavalry  patrols  were 
very  active,  and  spread  terror  among  the  country  people  by 
cutting  off  the  noses  of  those  caught  bringing  in  provisions, 
according  to  the  ancient  Mysorean  practice. ^ 

This  blockade  quickly  illustrated  the  disadvantages  of  the 
divided  command  under  which  the  city  was.  Dalton  was  com- 
mandant of  the  garrison,  but  the  Nawab's  brother-in-law  was 
Killedar  and  had  charge  of  all  administrative  matters.  In 
January  and  February  Saunders  wrote  to  Dalton  to  urge  the 
Killedar  in  the  strongest  terms  to  miss  no  opportunity  of  storing 
the  fort  with  provisions.  The  Killedar  neglected  to  do  so, 
although  in  February  considerable  quantities  of  grain  came  into 
the  town  and  were  sold  in  the  bazaars.*  When  the  blockade 
became  more  effective,  he  wrote  to  the  Nawab  reporting  that 
the  magazines  had  begun  to  fail,  but  at  the  same  time  would 
only  hint  his  uneasiness  to  Dalton  and  would  inform  him  of 
neither  the  quantity  in  store  nor  the  number  of  those  who  had 
to  be  subsisted  on  it.*  On  April  12  he  suddenly  announced  that 
he  had  provisions  only  for  fifteen  or  twenty  days.* 

The  news  reached  Lawrence  on  April  20  ;  on  April  22  he 
marched  to  relieve  Trichinopoly,  leaving  a  small  garrison  to  hold 
Tiruviti.  This  was  at  the  beginning  of  the  hot  weather.  The 
burning  land  winds  had  already  set  in,  and  his  march  was  delayed 
by  men  dropping  on  the  way  with  heat  and  exhaustion.'  He 
reached  Trichinopoly  on  May  7,  and  found  that  on  the  news  of 
his  approach   the  Mysoreans  had  already  withdrawn  onto  the 

'  Mil.  Cons.,  1753,  p.  57. 

•This  was  on  January  5,  1753  (ibid.,  p.  15).     Orme  {History,  vol.  i.  p.  268), 
in  describing  this  affair,  still  uses  the  Old  Style  and  dates  it  December  25. 
»  Mil.  Cons.,  1753,  pp.  46  and  54. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  22  and  27.  »  Ibid.,  pp.  57-58. 

•  Ibid.,  pp.  64-65.  The  Madras  Council  severely  blamed  Dalton  for  not 
insisting  on  the  storing  of  provisions  ;  but  the  incident  is  a  commentary  on  the 
evils  of  dual  government. 

'  On  his  arrival  at  Trichinopoly,  100  men  were  sent  straight  into  hospital. 


72  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

island.  They  had  been  joined  the  day  before  Lawrence's  arrival 
by  a  small  body  of  French  troops  ;  and  on  the  loth  Lawrence 
crossed  the  Cauvery  in  order  if  possible  to  bring  them  to  action. 
Not  succeeding  in  this,  he  re-passed  the  river,  and  busied  himself 
with  victualling  Trichinopoly.  There  followed  three  obstinate 
actions.  In  June  and  again  in  August  ^  the  English,  though 
inferior  in  number,  had  the  advantage.  In  the  third,  in  Septem- 
ber, Lawrence  obtained  a  considerable  success,  taking  ii  guns 
and  100  prisoners,  with  the  French  cornmander  and  lo  other 
officers.  This  greatly  relieved  the  situation,  and  a  stock  of  six 
months'  provisions  was  laid  in  at  Trichinopoly. 

Dupleix,  who  had  been  persistently  feeding  the  French  corps 
with  all  the  recruits  he  could  get  together,  resolved  on  yet 
another  effort.  Lawrence  had  withdrawn  to  pass  the  rainy 
season  in  cantonments  on  the  borders  of  Tanjore.  Dupleix 
therefore  changed  his  commander,  ^  sent  new  reinforcements, 
and  ordered  the  town  to  be  attempted  by  a  night  escalade. 
The  attempt  was  made  and  came  perilously  near  success.  It 
is  alleged  that  two  officers,  detailed  to  distract  the  attention  of 
the  garrison  by  false  alarms,  failed  to  carry  out  their  orders.' 
As  it  was,  the  situation  was  at  one  moment  very  alarming — 
"  600  men,  all  whites,  within  the  first  wall,  beating  the  Grenadiers' 
March  with  four  drums,  a  12-pounder  with  round  and  grape, 
and  them  600  kept  a  constant  firing  upon  me,  the  ladders  set 
up  against  the  inner  wall,  and  the  people  a-mounting."  * 
But  by  good  fortune  the  ladders  were  broken  by  grape-shot, 
and  most  of  the  French  were  caught  in  the  interval  between 
the  two  walls,  unable  to  attack  or  escape.  The  attempt 
cost  Dupleix,  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners,  over  400 
men. 

These  successive  faiku-es  led  to  a  show  of  conciliation  on  the 
part  of  the  French.  Negotiations  were  opened,  and  deputies 
met  to  discuss  terms,  at  the  Dutch  factory  of  Sadras,  midway 
between  Madras  and  Pondichery,  in  January  1754.  The 
French  offered  to  recognise  the  grant  of  Poonamallee  to  the 

*  This  action  was  fought  as  Lawrence  was  returning  from  Tanjore  with  a  large 
convoy.  On  arrival,  it  was  found  to  consist  of  only  ten  days'  supply  of  grain, 
the  rest  of  the  bullocks  being  laden  with  the  Nawab's  "  frippery." 

'  Astrnc  had  been  captured  in  September  ;  in  November  Dupleix  superseded 
Maissin  by  Mainvillc. 

'  Dupleix,  Riponse  i  la  lettre  du  Sieur  Godeheu,  p.  147. 

^Letter  from  Lieutenant  T.  Harrison,  December  13,  1753  (Orme  MSS., 
India,  iii.  f.  661). 


THE  FAILURE  OF  DUPLEIX  78 

English  and  to  make  provision  for  Muhammad  AH,  in  return 
for  the  English  recognition  of  the  Subahdar  of  the  Deccan  and 
the  release  of  all  French  prisoners.  The  Enghsh,  on  the  other 
hand,  demanded  that  Muhammad  Ali  should  be  recognised  as 
Nawab  of  Arcot. 

The  significance  of  the  French  terms  was  displayed  by  the 
sanads  which  their  deputies  produced,  appointing  Dupleix 
Governor  of  the  country  south  of  the  Kistna,  and  confirming 
Murtaza  Ali  as  his  deputy  at  Arcot.  The  Enghsh  at  once 
attacked,  and  with  apparent  reason,  the  authenticity  of  these 
papers.  But  in  truth  their  genuineness  mattered  little  either 
way  ;  for  if  genuine,  they  were  the  orders  of  an  authority  which 
had  vanished.  On  a  narrow,  technical  view,  Dupleix  no  doubt 
had  the  better  position.  He  had  the  support,  he  argued,  of 
the  Subahdar  of  the  Deccan,  on  whom  the  Carnatic  depended. 
The  Enghsh  could  not  deny  this.  But  they  could  and  did  answer, 
that  the  authority  to  which  he  appealed  had  been  created  by 
himself,  and  that  the  constitution  of  the  Moghul  Empire,  which 
he  adduced  to  justify  his  claims  to  govern  the  Carnatic,  had 
been  violently  overthrown  by  his  own  actions.  The  man  whose 
troops  had  slain  a  lawful  Nawab  of  the  Carnatic,  and  whose 
confederates  had  murdered  a  lawful  Subahdar  of  the  Deccan, 
could  not  consistently  demand  that  others  should  hold  them- 
selves bound  by  the  former  customs  of  the  Empire. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  Dupleix  hardly  expected  the  Enghsh 
to  acquiesce  in  his  claims.  His  main  object  at  the  conference 
of  Sadras  was,  as  Saunders  perceived,  to  furnish  himself  with 
materials  for  a  plausible  remonstrance  to  Europe.^  In  spite 
of  his  repeated  reverses,  he  was  not  at  bottom  inchned  for  peace 
with  the  Enghsh.  If  he  had  been,  he  could  never  have  put 
forward  his  claim  to  the  government  of  Southern  India.  His 
real  views  are  plainly  stated  in  a  letter  written  to  Bussy  on  the 
eve  of  the  conference.*  He  has  proposed,  he  says,  to  leave 
the  settlement  of  affairs  to  Salabat  Jang  the  Subahdar  ;  but 
he  does  not  expect  Saunders  to  agree  to  this,  and  this  refusal 
will  put  the  Enghsh  in  the  wrong.  Nor  is  peace  really  desirable. 
"  You  think,"  he  continues,  "  it  would  be  a  good  thing  to  settle 
with  them  ;  I  don't.  So  long  as  they  are  kept  busy  here,  they 
can't  attend  to  affairs  in  the  north,  where  we  should  estabhsh 
ourselves  quietly  with  as  few  difficulties  as  possible.     Unless 

•  Mil.  Cons.,  1754,  p.  37. 
Dupleix  to  Bussy,  December  31,  1753,  ap.  Hamont,  of>.  cit.,  p.  270. 


^K        '  Duple 


74  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

they  were  kept  busy  here,  they  would  make  all  sorts  of  trouble 
for  you." 

The  conference  at  Sadras  was  not  intended  to  result  in 
peace.  Dupleix  meant  to  continue  the  war  in  the  Camatic 
as  a  shield  for  the  French  operations  in  the  Deccan.  Saunders' 
proposal,  that  the  two  nations  should  hold  equal  concessions 
in  the  Camatic,  was  therefore  rejected,  and  the  war  continued.^ 

The  only  incident  of  note  was  a  sharp  check  inflicted  on  the 
EngUsh  near  Trichinopoly  in  February,  when  a  large  convoy, 
escorted  by  more  than  a  quarter  of  the  Europeans  under 
Lawrence's  command,  was  surprised  and  destroyed  ;  ^  and  this 
loss  was  only  just  made  good  by  the  recruits  of  the  season, 
inclusive  of  those  destined  for  Bengal,  and  a  detachment  sent 
from  Bombay.^  In  spite  of  this  success,  however,  little  more 
was  done.  The  French  continued  to  blockade  Trichinopoly 
and  ravaged  part  of  Tan j  ore  ;  but  the  Mysore  finances  began 
to  give  out.  Morari  Rao  grew  discontented ;  and  accepted 
three  lakhs  of  rupees  as  the  price  of  his  abandoning  the  French 
alhance  and  quitting  the  country.  Such  was  the  situation 
when  on  August  i  two  French  vessels  anchored  in  the  roads 
of  Pondich6ry,  bearing  the  orders  for  Dupleix'  recall. 

That  event  has  been  the  occasion  of  much  vague  and  unin- 
formed eloquence,  chiefly  inspired  by  wisdom  after  the  event. 
But  we  must  not  ignore  the  contemporary  opinion  of  the  use 
and  value  of  tropical  settlements.  They  were  regarded  above 
all  as  places  for  trade  ;  and  a  pohcy  was  judged  according  as 
it  promoted  trade  or  not,  alike  at  London  and  at  Paris.  The 
French  had  no  monopoly  of  this  opinion.  The  East  India 
Company  and  the  Compagnie  des  Indes  Orientales  were,  and 
were  resolved  to  remain,  essentially  trading  corporations. 

When,  therefore,  in  1749  Dupleix  reported  Chanda  Sahib's 
success  in  overthrowing  Anwar-ud-din,  the  news  was  accepted 
joyfully  enough,  for  it  seemed  to  mean  the  accession  of  a  new 
Nawab  who  would  accord  new  privileges  to  French  commerce. 
In  the  following  year  came  the  news  of  Nasir  Jang's  expedition  ; 
but  confidence  in  the  prudence  of  Dupleix'  policy  remained 
unabated.     He  promised  a  speedy  peace,  and,  though  he  did 

'  The  proceedings  at  Sadras  arc  printed  as  App.  ii.  of  Cambridge's  History  of 
the  War. 

'  Lawrence  had  855  Europeans  under  his  command  on  February  i  ;  of  these, 
238  were  lost  in  the  convoy  affair  (I.O.,  French  in  India,  iii.  f.  50). 

•Mil.  Cons.,  1754,  p.  149- 


THE  FAILURE  OF  DUPLEIX  75 

not  conceal,  he  minimised  the  assistance  the  English  were  pre- 
pared to  give  Nasir  Jang,  while  ascribing  the  whole  affair  to 
their  malevolent  diplomacy.  Next  year  he  announced  the 
death  of  Nasir  Jang  and  the  estabhshment  of  a  new  Subahdar 
of  the  Deccan  supported  by  French  troops  ;  and  he  repeated 
his  promises  of  an  early  peace,  which  seemed  to  depend  solely 
on  reducing  the  helpless  Muhammad  AU  to  a  sense  of  reason. 
But  then  the  following  year  there  was  the  grievous  failure  of 
Law  at  Trichinopoly,  the  active,  vigorous,  and  successful  inter- 
vention of  the  English.  The  stern  facts  of  Chanda  Sahib's 
death  and  the  surrender  of  600  Frenchmen  ruined  Dupleix  in 
the  opinion  of  the  Company  and  th*  Minister.  He  paid  dearly 
for  the  pleasure  of  depreciating  his  EngUsh  enemies  in  his  pubUc 
and  private  letters  from  1749  to  175 1. 

Indeed  their  intervention  had  not  been  expected  by  him 
when  he  was  merely  planning  the  estabhshment  of  Chanda 
Sahib  at  Arcot.  And  he  failed  to  take  them  into  consideration 
as  his  schemes  expanded.  He  even  so  far  lost  touch  with 
reaUty  as  to  hope  to  keep  them  from  interfering  by  the  worn- 
out  fiction  of  Moghul  authority.  But  the  French  Company 
was  not  prepared  to  stake  its  trade  upon  the  issue  of  a  serious 
armed  conflict  with  its  rival.  It  knew  too  well  the  precarious 
state  of  its  finances.  ^  On  the  receipt  of  the  news  of  Law's 
surrender,  it  sent  deputies  privately  to  London  to  arrange  for 
peace,  when  Dupleix  was  loudly  demanding  men  and  money. 

The  deputies  sent  were  the  director,  Duvelaer,  and  his  brother 
the  Count  du  Lude.  Duvelaer  had  served  indeed  in  the  East, 
but  principally  at  Canton,  and,  like  the  rest  of  the  directors, 
regarded  trade  as  the  principal  consideration.  He  had  various 
meetings  with  the  Secret  Committee  of  the  Company  in  London 
in  May  1753,  and  the  question  was  also  discussed  between  the 
French  ambassador,  de  Mirepoix,  and  the  English  Ministry. 
AH  parties  were  agreed  on  the  necessity  of  re-establishing  peace. 
To  secure  this,  the  French  Company  were  willing  to  give  up  such 
of  their  new  acquisitions  as  might  reasonably  be  considered  to 
threaten  English  interests.*  They  were  even  wilhng  to  recognise 
Muhammad  Ali  as  Nawab  of  Arcot,  provided  he  did  not  trouble 
them  in  the  possession  of  Gingee,  and  also  to  give  up  Dupleix' 

'  "  L'on  parle  d'une  banqueroute  pour  la  compagnie  des  Indes,"  d'Argenson, 
March  1752  {Mimoires,  vol.  vii.  p.  138),  who  goes  on  to  speak  of  the  difficulty 
of  selling  shares  in  the  Company. 

•  French  Committee  to  Duvelaer,  June  5,  1753  (P.R.O.,  Col-,  77-19). 


76  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

claim  to  the  dominion  of  the  countries  from  the  Kistna  to  Cape 
Comorin.i  But  they  dechned  absolutely  to  give  up  the  ciicars 
of  Masulipatam  and  Condavir,  granted  in  1751,  while  the  English 
were  resolved  not  to  acknowledge  them  as  a  territorial  power 
of  such  magnitudje.  On  this  point  no  agreement  could  be  reached. 
But  meanwhile  the  French  were  known  to  be  fitting  out  a 
considerable  squadron  for  the  Indies.  On  being  questioned, 
Mirepoix  assured  Newcastle  that  only  the  usual  reinforce- 
ments would  be  sent.*  But  the  preparations  were  known  to 
be  on  a  larger  scale  than  this  indicated.  =*  In  September  the 
Cabinet  decided  that  orders  should  "  be  immediately  given  for 
the  sheathing  a  proper  number  of  ships,  to  be  in  a  condition 
to  be  sent  to  the  East  Indies  in  case  the  force  that  shall  be  sent 
thither  by  France  should  make  it  necessary."  *  On  January  3, 
1754,  orders  were  issued  to  equip  four  fourth-raters  for  service  in 
the  East  Indies  ;  ^  and  they  sailed  at  the  end  of  March  with 
900  of  H.M.'s  troops  aboard. 

The  reasons  for  this  failure  of  the  negotiations,*  consisting 
as  they  did  in  territorial  questions,  mark  the  beginning  of  a 
new  order  of  ideas  as  regards  Indian  policy.  Pohtical  and 
commercial  motives  had  now  become  interwoven.  Up  to  this 
time  the  French  and  EngUsh  Companies  had  looked  to  the 
extension  of  their  trade  by  commercial  methods.  Thanks  to 
Dupleix  they  had  become  aware  of  the  possibility  of  employing 
political  methods  as  well.  The  enjoyment  of  revenues  and  the 
administration  of  territories  would  give  decided  commercial 
and  financial  advantages.  But  still  the  commercial  aspect  of 
affairs  dominated  every  other.  The  idea  of  political  responsi- 
bility was  still  wholly  lacking,  not  only  as  regards  the  subject 
territories,  but  also  as  regards  the  State  to  which  the  Companies 
were  subject.  This  is  shown  by  the  curious  fact  that  these 
negotiations  included  the  revival  of  the  idea  of  a  neutraUty 
between  the  Companies  in  the  event  of  war.     It  was  proposed 

'  "  Lettre  ostensible  "  received  from  Mirepoix,  September  13,  1753  (P.R.O., 
Col.,  77-19)- 

'  Minute  of  a  Conversation  at  Newcastle  House,  June  27,  1753  (ibid.). 

'  Godeheu  carried  with  him  2000  French  and  German  troops. 

'Minute,  Newcastle  House,  September  29,  1753  (P.R.O.,  Col.,  77-19). 

'  Holdernesse  to  the  Admiralty,  January  3,  1754  (P.R.O.,  Admiralty,  r-4119). 

"  It  should  be  noted  that  although  the  dispatch  of  the  English  squadron 
was  originally  designed  as  a  reply  to  the  dispatch  of  Godeheu,  the  English 
Admiral  only  sailed  when  the  French  had  formally  declined  to  give  up  the  con- 
cessions in  the  Deccan  and  when  a  settlement  appeared  exceedingly  unlikely  ;. 
the  negotiations  went  on  for  some  time  after  and  were  never  formally  broken  off. 


THE  FAILURE  OF  DUPLEIX  77 

by  the  French,  that  east  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  all  shipping, 
whether  King's  or  Company's,  should  be  neutral ;  that  even  in 
home  waters,  Indiamen  should  be  exempt  from  capture,  and 
that  all  Company's  settlements  "  should  enjoy  the  completest 
neutrahty."  '  The  English  Company  was. willing  to  adopt  this 
almost  as  it  stood  ;  but  as  was  to  be  expected,  the  Ministry  were 
unwilling  to  accede  to  a  proposal  so  evidently  calculated  to 
benefit  the  weaker  naval  power.*  A  couple  of  months  later  the 
Company  again  urged  it  upon  the  Ministry,  and  assured  Duvelaer 
of  their  hearty  concurrence. •''  In  September  the  French  made 
renewed  proposals,  offering  to  include  the  Dutch  East  India 
Company  in  the  treaty  ;  and  the  English  directors  practically 
persuaded  Newcastle  of  its  desirabiUty  ;  *  but  the  Cabinet  wisely 
refused  to  change  its  opinion.*  In  this  respect  the  Company 
was  forced  against  its  will  into  participating  in  the  poUtical 
action  of  the  State. 

The  French  Company  had  in  these  discussions  endeavoured 
to  secure  what  it  considered  the  advantages  of  Dupleix'  conduct 
in  India  while  evading  its  inconveniences.  It  had  refused  to 
give  up  concessions  yielding  revenues  which  would  minister  to 
its  finances,  but  it  had  striven  to  remove  the  danger  of  English 
hostility,  not  only  at  the  moment  but  also  in  the  event  of  a  future 
national  war.  Had  the  English  accepted  its  proposals,  their 
hands  would  have  been  most  effectively  tied  against  interference 
with  further  French  projects  in  the  Deccan.  The  Company's 
policy  was  therefore  less  unintelligent  than  modern  writers  have 
commonly  represented.  Above  all,  it  was  not  guilty  of  what 
has  usually  been  alleged  as  its  chief  crime,  the  recall  of  Dupleix. 
That  was  a  decision  of  the  French  Ministry,  which  was  not  even 
communicated  to  the  directors  of  the  Company.* 

There  were,  however,  reasons  which  appeared  to  Machault, 

'  Articles  du  projet  de  neutralit6  delivered  to  Holdernesse  by  the  Company, 
May  23,  1753  (I.O.,  Home  Misc.,  No.  93). 

'  Minutes,  dated  Newcastle  House,  May  24  and  30,  1753  (P.R.O.,  Col.,  77-19). 

•Company  to  Holdernesse,  July  18,  1753  (I.O.,  Home  Misc.,  No.  93),  and 
Proceedings  of  Committee  of  Secrecy,  July  20,  1753  (P.R.O.,  Col.,  77-19). 

♦Newcastle  to  Joseph  Yorke,  September  14,  1753  {ibid.). 

'  Minute,  dated  Newcastle  House,  September  27,  1753  {he.  cit.). 

•  Cultru,  op.  cit.,  p.  363.  The  legend  (borrowed  from  Dupleix)  that  the  Eng- 
lish offereil  to  recall  Saunders  as  the  condition  of  his  recall  has  been  repeated 
often,  but  appears  baseless.  M.  Cultru  found  nothing  in  the  French  archives 
to  justify  it  ;  I  have  found  nothing  in  the  English  papers.  Saunders'  recall 
seems  never  to  have  been  propo-sed.  It  should  be  added  that  Orme  and  M. 
Cultru  are  both  in  error  in  stating  that  the  English  Ministry  did  not  apply  for 
the  recall  of  Duplci.x.     As  will  be  seen,  they  did  so. 


78  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

the  Minister  responsible,  and  may  appear  even  to  posterity, 
adequate  to  justify  that  measure.  First  and  foremost,  Dupleix 
had  proved  most  conclusively  that  he  could  not  conduct  his 
schemes  without  exciting  English  opposition.  His  farman  for 
the  government  of  Southern  India  gave  evidence  of  ambitions 
too  plain  to  be  denied  and  too  threatening  to  be  admitted.  No 
one  could  expect  the  English  to  see  the  regions  from  which  their 
investment  was  drawn  pass  under  the  control  of  their  chief 
commercial  rival.  Saunders  and  the  Madras  Council  had  urged 
in  the  strongest  terms  the  danger  of  French  designs  ;  but  Dupleix 
himself  supplied  the  basis  for  English  representations  against 
him.  In  February  1752  he  had  composed  a  long  letter  to  Saunders, 
intended  by  him  to  prove  the  iniquity  of  the  English  opposition. * 
He  addressed  copies  of  this  to  the  French  Company,  with  the 
suggestion  that  one  should  be  forwarded  to  the  directors  in 
London.  This  was  done,  but  the  event  disappointed  his  expecta- 
tions. The  directors  immediately  forwarded  it  to  Holdemesse, 
Secretary  of  State  for  the  Southern  Division,  with  the  following 
comments  :  "  Your  Lordship  will  see  the  pretensions  and  claims 
which  Mr.  Du  Pleix  makes  in  the  name  of  the  French  nation  ;  .  .  . 
the  troubles  in  those  p^rts  cannot  subside  so  long  as  Mr.  Du  Pleix 
is  suffered  to  continue  there,  and  ...  if  the  French  Court  do 
support  Mr.  Du  Pleix's  measures,  or  even  if  they  do  not  disavow 
them,  we  apprehend  it  will  be  impossible  for  the  East  India 
Company  to  carry  on  their  trade  or  even  keep  a  footing  upon  the 
Coast  of  Coromandel  where  their  principal  settlement  now  is."  * 
This  was  communicated  to  Lord  Albemarle,  our  ambassador  at 
Paris,  who  reported  that  in  conversation  with  St.  Contest :  "I 
went  so  far  as  to  ask  him  whether  M.  Dupleix's  proceedings  were 
approved  of  by  His  Most  Christian  Majesty.  M.  St.  Contest 
told  me  that,  so  far  from  it,  he  (M.  Dupleix)  had  received  orders 
to  comport  himself  as  a  man  at  the  head  of  a  trading  Company, 
and  not  in  the  unaccountable  manner  he  had  lately  done."  ' 
This  disavowal  of  Dupleix'  plans  was  not ,  however,  j  udged  adequate. 
In  the  conversations  with  Duvelaer,  the  English  Company  seems 
to  have  demanded  his  recall,  although  nothing  was  committed 
to  writing,  for  in  his  conversation  with  Newcastle  of  June  27, 
already  alluded  to,  Mirepoix  said,  "  Between  ourselves  I  will  give 
you  all  assurances  regarding  M.  Dupleix.    The  Duke  of  Newcastle 

•  See  letter  of  February  18,  1752,  in  French  Correspondence,  1752. 

»  Company  to  Holdemesse,  January  10,  1753  (I.O.,  French  in  India,  vol.  iii.). 

■  Albemarle^to  Holdemesse,  March  14,  1753  {P.R.O.,  For,,  France,  No.  246). 


THE  FAILURE  OF  DUPLEIX  79 

may  tell  the  English  Company  that  it  may  drop  the  article  relat- 
ing to  Dupleix."  *  I  conclude  that  political  motives  entered  into 
Machault's  decision  to  recall  the  French  Governor,  but  that  he 
desired  to  avoid  the  appearance  of  doing  so  at  English  dictation. 

However,  poUtical  motives  were  not  the  only  reasons  for  this 
resolve.  There  had  arisen  at  Pondich^ry  a  situation  extremely 
similar  to  that  which  was  later  to  arise  in  Bengal.  Chanda 
Sahib,  Muzaffar  Jang,  and  Salabat  Jang  had  all  shown  their 
gratitude  by  presents  to  the  French  ;  but,  not  having  the  re- 
soxu^ces  enjoyed  by  the  Nawab  of  Bengal,  their  presents  took  the 
form  of  grants  of  land  and  assignments  of  revenue.  But  such 
presents  had  been  long  prohibited  by  French  law,  and  to 
remove  all  doubt  on  the  subject  new  decrees  were  issued  in 
1750  and  1751.''  On  this  subject  Dupleix  had  addressed  the 
Company  in  a  tone  of  undisgxaised  indignation,  which  had  greatly 
injured  him  in  the  eyes  of  both  the  Minister  and  the  Company. 
It  confirmed  the  views  which  the  enemies  of  Dupleix  already 
held,  and  made  his  defence  exceedingly  difficult  for  his  friends. 
It  became  generally  believed  that  the  Company's  orders  were 
constantly  outweighed  by  the  Nawab's  presents  ;  that  all  was 
sold  ;  that  the  Company  no  longer  had  either  Governor,  or  Council, 
or  troops  at  its  disposal.  Hence  in  part  the  recall  of  Dupleix  ; 
hence  the  orders  of  reformation  with  which  Lally  was  subse- 
quently to  be  charged. 

We  will  now  return  to  the  Coast  of  Coromandel.  Godeheu, 
the  Commissary  dispatched  by  Machault  to  supersede  Dupleix, 
reached  Pondich^ry  in  August  1754.  The  Enghsh  squadron, 
with  the  King's  troops  aboard,  had  not  yet  arrived  ;  and  for  the 
moment  the  French  were  in  a  position  of  great  numericalsuperiority . 
However,  Godeheu's  orders  were  to  come  if  possible  to  an  amicable 
arrangement ;  and  he  at  once  released  a  company  of  Swiss 
troops  whom  Dupleix  had  captured  as  they  passed  in  masula- 
boats  through  the  Pondich6ry  roads.*    The  English  Company 

•  "  De  vous  k  moi,  je  vous  donnerai  toutes  Ics  assurances  pour  ce  qui  regarde 
M.  Dupleix.  Le  Due  de  Newcastle  pourra  dire  i  la  Compagnie  angloise  do  passer 
cet  article  de  Dupleix  "  (Minute  of  June  27,  1753,  P.R.O.,  Col.,  77-19)- 

'Arrets  du  Cons,  d'etat,  June  6,  1750,  and  December  30,  1751  (P.R., 
No.  84,  f.  345)- 

'  It  is  not  apparent  why  hostilities  at  sea  should  have  been  regarded  as  an 
infraction  of  the  peace,  while  hostibties  ashore  outside  the  Companies'  ancient 
bounds  were  not  ;  it  was  possibly  felt  that  at  sea  the  pretence  of  acting  on  behalf 
of  native  allies  was  too  hollow  to  be  upheld  and  would  pass  too  easily  into  general 
hostilities. 


80  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

also  had  sent  out  orders  for  the  conclusion  of  a  provisional  peace, 
on  the  understanding  that  no  territory  was  to  be  evacuated 
under  its  terms  until  they  had  been  approved  in  Europe.^  The 
arrival  of  the  English  squadron  in  September,  while  it  did  not 
give  an  equality  of  actual  numbers,  was  considered  to  place  the 
two  nations  on  much  the  same  footing,  and  contributed  to  render 
the  negotiations  less  costive.  On  his  first  arrival  Godeheu  had 
suggested  a  suspension  of  arms  ;  but,  whether  swayed  by  the 
advice  he  received  at  Pondich^ry  or  whether  merely  in  con- 
sideration of  the  superiority  of  force  which  he  perceived  himself 
to  possess,  at  the  end  of  August  he  rejected  the  idea.^  But  on 
September  i  part  of  the  English  expedition  reached  St.  David's  ; 
by  September  23  all  the  troops  had  arrived  ;  ^  and  by  the  middle 
of  the  month  Godeheu  had  reverted  to  his  original  idea  and  made 
formal  proposals  for  a  three  months'  truce.  After  some  delibera- 
tion, these  were  accepted  by  the  English  and  proclaimed  on 
October  11.* 

This  suspension  of  arms  was  intended  to  give  time  for  the 
negotiation  of  the  provisional  treaty.^  At  first  it  looked  as  though 
no  peace  could  be  made.  Godeheu  demanded  the  retention  of 
all  the  grants  in  the  Deccan  ;  on  which  the  English  Council 
resolved  that  conferences  were  useless  unless  "  these  unbounded 
pretensions  are  previously  reduced  within  the  limits  of  equahty."  * 
When  Godeheu  was  asked  to  specify  what  districts  he  claimed  for 
the  French  Company,  he  replied  that  he  claimed  the  possession 
of  all  those  which  the  English  could  not  prove  to  affect  their 
interests.'  This  matter  was  to  be  submitted  to  a  conference. 
But  j  ust  when  the  conference  was  due  to  open,  Godeheu  suddenly 
withdrew  on  the  ground  that  nothing  definite  could  be  decided 
in  India,  and  that  it  would  be  best  to  wait  for  further  orders 
from  Europe.*  The  English,  however,  were  indisposed  to  pro- 
long the  suspension  of  arms  unless  an  agreement  could  be  reached 
as  to  the  French  claims.'    After  some  delay  two  English  deputies 

'  Pub.  Des.  from  England,  April  3,  1754. 

'  Mil.  Cons.,  September  4,  1754,  p.  197. 

'  Pub.  Cons.,  September  5  and  26,  1754. 

♦Mil.  Cons.,  September  16,  26,  and  28,  1754,  pp.  206,  214,  224.  etc. 

'  It  seems  that  the  orders  for  the  treaty  to  be  provisional  only  were  limited 
to  England.  Godeheu  had  been  authorised  to  conclude  a  definite  peace  in 
India. 

•Mil.  Cons.,  October  21,  175.1^,  p.  247. 

'  Godeheu  to  Saunders,  October  27,  1754  (Letlre  du  Sieur  Godeheu,  Pi/'ces). 

'  Godeheu  to  Saunders,  November  7,  1754  (Madras  Orig.  Series). 

»  Mil.  Cons.,  November  15,  1754,  p.  356. 


i 


THE  FAILURE  OF  DUPLEIX  81 

visited  Pondichery,  ostensibly  on  a  mission  to  St.  David's,  with 
orders  to  summon  Godeheu  to  a  final  decision.  He  agreed  to 
accept  the  terms  proposed  by  the  Enghsh,  and  at  the  end  of 
December  a  provisional  treaty  was  signed,  together  with  a  truce 
to  be  observed  pending  its  confirmation  or  rejection. 

The  articles  of  the  provisional  treaty  laid  down  the  principle 
of  equal  possessions,  not  only  in  the  Carnatic  but  also  in  those 
circars  to  the  northward  where  the  French  had  the  most  ex- 
tensive claims.^  On  the  face  of  things,  this  amounted  to  a 
surrender  of  what  the  French  Company  had  firmly  refused  to 
give  up.  Those  historians  who  have  inspired  themselves  from 
the  various  memoirs  of  Dupleix  have  dwelt  at  length  upon  this 
as  a  scandalous  abandonment  of  French  interests,  as  an  insult  to 
the  sovereign  powers  of  the  Subahdar  of  the  Deccan,  and  the 
ruin  of  the  vast  schemes  of  Dupleix  for  French  aggrandise- 
ment. But  such  criticisms  ignore  the  provisional  nature  of  the 
treaty.  Had  these  terms  come  into  force  on  the  day  of  their 
signature,  had  Moracin  been  required  at  once  to  evacuate 
Masulipatam  and  Rajahmundry,  EUore  and  Chicacole,  that 
would  doubtless  have  proclaimed  the  defeat  of  the  French  by 
English  arms  and  diplomacy.  But  that  was  not  the  case.  Not 
a  French  garrison  was  withdrawn.  Bussy  remained  with  Salabat 
Jang  on  the  same  terms  as  before.  Everything  that  Dupleix 
had  contrived  to  secure  was  retained  ;  and  the  French  continued 
to  enjoy  territories  alleged  to  produce  a  revenue  of  sixty-eight 
lakhs  of  rupees.  In  addition  to  this,  they  were  relieved  of 
the  burden  which  the  war  with  the  English  had  imposed  upon 
them.  Godeheu  thus  obtained  all  the  material  advantage  which 
Dupleix  had  won,  and  escaped  from  the  great  disadvantage  which 
had  been  involved  by  Dupleix'  policy.  He  placed  the  French 
Company  in  a  position  where  it  could  decide  whether  to  give  up 
its  acquisitions,  or  send  such  a  force  as  would  effectively  break 
English  resistance.  The  day  before  Godeheu  signed  the  treaty, 
he  wrote  to  Bussy :  "  You  need  not  be  anxious  about  anything 
you  see  in  it,  for  it  is  only  intended  to  gain  time  and  place  the 
Company  in  a  position  to  adopt  the  wisest  course  when  it  is  in- 
formed of  the  actual  state  of  its  affairs  ;  so  far  from  surrendering 
anything,  we  must  put  ourselves  in  a  position  not  to  lose  an 
inch  of  territory."  ^  Godeheu's  diplomacy  was  not  candid,  but 
it  accorded  very  precisely  with  French  interests.     On  the  out- 

•  For  the  treaty,  see  Cambridge,  p.  73,  or  Mil.  Cons.,  1754,  p.  286. 
I,'  Godeheu  to  Bussy,  December  25,  1754  {M£m.  pour  Bussy,  1764,  p.  83). 
6 


82  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

break  of  war,  in  1756,  the  French  enjoyed  the  same  territory  they 
had  held  on  the  day  Dupleix  deUvered  up  his  government. 

It  appears  then  that  not  Godeheu  but  the  English  Council 
need  justification  for  a  treaty  which  gave  everything  in  words 
but  nothing  in  fact.  In  the  first  place,  they  were  bound  by  the 
orders  of  the  Company :  "  We  would  have  you  use  your  utmost 
endeavours  to  conclude  a  provisional  treaty  with  the  French 
Company's  agents  in  India,  in  order  to  put  an  end  to  hostihties, 
under  condition  that  neither  side  do  proceed  to  the  cessions, 
retrocessions,  and  evacuations  that  may  be  agreed  on  till  after 
the  entire  consummation  of  the  definitive  treaty  .  .  .  under  the 
approbation  of  the  two  Crowns."  1  In  the  second  place,  there 
appeared  no  prospect  of  being  able  completely  to  defeat  the 
enemy.  The  French,  as  Saunders  bitterly  observed  to  Lawrence, 
usually  sent  out  twice  as  many  recruits  as  did  the  English 
Company.  ^ 

As  it  has  been  alleged  that  Dupleix'  failure  was  due  to  the 
lack  of  military  support  which  he  received  from  France,  this 
point  deserves  to  be  somewhat  elaborated. 

In  the  course  of  the  four  years,  1750-53,  the  French  Company 
sent  out  to  Dupleix  no  less  than  2645  recruits,  of  whom  2500 
reached  India.  =>  In  the  same  period  the  English  Company  sent 
to  Madras  only  1258.*  To  these  must  be  added  some  600  Bengal 
recruits  who  were  detained  at  Madras,*  and  the  occasional  rein- 
forcements received  from  Bengal  and  Bombay — not  300  Europeans. 
Dupleix  therefore  received  nearly  400  recruits  more  than  the 
EngUsh  did.  He  started  with  a  garrison  of  1200  Europeans  ;  at 
that  time  the  EngUsh  had  but  800.  The  conclusion  must  be 
that  he  was  appreciably  better  supplied  with  soldiers  than  the 
English  were. 

It  has,  however,  been  alleged  that  the  English  recruits  were 
much  better  than  the  French  ;  and  the  several  engagements  that 
took  place  before  Trichinopoly,  in  almost  every  one  of  which  the 
French  were  worsted  by  equal  or  inferior  numbers,  lends  colour 
to  this  assertion.  The  French  recruits  were  undoubtedly  poor 
in  quality — rascals  or  children,  the  lowest  dregs  of  the  people, 
Dupleix  calls  them.  The  French,  indeed,  employed  an  agent 
who  found  the  prisons  the  best  recruiting-groimd  ;   vagabonds, 

'  Pub.  Des.  from  England,  April  3,  1754. 

•Mil.  Cons.,  July  3,  1754.  P-  i49-  »  Cultru,  op.  cil..  p.  200. 

*  Lists  of  recruits  in  the  Pub.  Dcs.  from  England. 

•Bengal  to  Madras.  May  25,  1756  (Madras  Ltrs.  Reed.,  1756,  No.  95). 


THE  FAILURE  OF  DUPLEIX  88 

deserters,  and  murderers  were  sent  out  to  fill  the  gaps  in  the 
ranks  of  the  Company's  troops.* 

As  against  this  system,  the  English,  we  are  told,  raised 
Swiss  troops  or  chose  experienced  warriors  out  of  the  regular 
battalions  ;  ^  another  writer  converts  Lawrence's  Grenadiers 
into  Swiss,  and  gives  them  all  the  credit  of  the  fighting  round 
Trichinopoly.  ^  This  is  to  do  the  Company's  forces  something 
less  than  justice.  Of  the  1800  recruits  landed  at  Madras,  only 
500  were  Swiss,*  who  surely  did  not  rout  five  times  their  number 
of  Frenchmen.  The  English  recruits  were,  in  fact,  raised  in 
just  the  same  way  as  the  French  ;  the  English  Company's 
recruiting  agent,  one  Sosby,  was  notorious  for  his  bad  character  ;  * 
and  the  principal  advantage  which  the  English  soldier  had  over 
the  French  probably  consisted  in  the  severe  discipline  which 
Lawrence  imposed  both  upon  his  men  and  upon  his  subordinate 
officers.  The  English  of  all  ranks  seem  to  have  been  only  not 
better  led  but  also  more  obedient. 

The  facts  thus  indicate  that  Dupleix  was  not  the  victim  of 
neglect,  that  Godeheu  was  not  the  betrayer  of  French  interests  in 
India,  but  rather  that  both  Companies  were  exhausted  by  the 
struggle  in  which  they  had  been  engaged,  and  both  urgently  felt 
the  need  of  a  breathing-space  in  which  to  recover  themselves. 
It  is  noteworthy  that  when  the  war  in  the  Carnatic  was  renewed, 
it  was  renewed  with  all  the  advantage  to  the  English  of  superior 
sea-power  which  in  the  period  we  have  been  considering  had  been 
inoperative,  and  then  was  conducted  mainly  by  Royal  troops 
and  Royal  officers — in  part  because  the  Companies  were  unable 
to  continue  such  a  struggle  unaided,  in  part  because  its  objects 
had  become  evidently  of  national  importance. 

We  will  now  consider  the  position  which  meanwhile  Bussy 
had  secured  in  the  Deccan,  and  then  endeavour  to  estimate  the 
value  and  define  the  nature  of  the  ideas  and  policy  which  had 
inspired  Dupleix  and  his  yet  abler  lieutenant. 

'  Cultru,  op.  cit.,  pp.  301,  etc.  '  Hamont,  op.  cit.,  p.  355. 

•Cultru,  op.  cit.,  p.  314.  ♦  Wilson,  A/of/cas  Army,  vol.  i.  p.  63. 

•  I.O.,  Misc.  Ltrs.  Reed.,  1758-59,  Nos.  141  and  142. 


CHAPTER  IV 
BUSSY  IN  THE  DECCAN 

IT  has  been  a  commonplace  of  historians  that  in  conquering 
India  the  Enghsh  but  adopted  the  methods  of  the  French, 
applying  them  in  more  fortunate  circurhstances.  There  is 
much  truth  in  this — so  much  that  Bussy's  career  in  the  Deccan 
offers  numerous  parallels  with  Chve's  career  in  Bengal.  Ahke  in 
the  advantage  which  these  two  men  enjoyed,  in  the  difficulties 
which  they  had  to  encounter,  and  in  the  policy  which  they 
adopted,  we  find  a  marked  similarity  which  arose  naturally 
enough  out  of  situations  at  bottom  identical,  and  characters  with 
much  in  common  in  spite  of  superficial  differences. 

It  will  be  enough  for  our  present  purpose  if  we  sketch  Bussy's 
career  in  the  Deccan  in  the  broadest,  most  general  terms.  The 
death  of  Nasir  Jang  in  December  1750  was  accompanied  by  the 
seizure  of  his  treasury,  the  capture  of  his  brothers,  and  the 
disbandment  of  his  army.  His  nephew  and  rival,  Muzaffar  Jang, 
was  by  the  same  event  released  from  prison,  and  established  as 
Subahdar  of  the  Deccan  by  his  victorious  allies  the  French.  His 
only  dangerous  competitor  was  Nizam-ul-Mulk's  eldest  son, 
Ghazi-ud-din,  but  he  was  in  far-off  Delhi.  Dupleix  was  urgent 
therefore  to  induce  Muzaffar  Jang  to  march  without  delay  and 
occupy  Hyderabad  and  Aurangabad,  and  proposed  to  send 
with  him  a  French  contingent  to  overbear  all  possible  resistance. 
The  proposal  was  accepted  ;  Bussy  was  chosen  to  command  the 
detachment  ;  his  objections  were  overcome  by  a  present  of  four 
lakhs  of  rupees,*  and  each  man  of  his  party  received  three  months' 
pay  in  advance,  besides  considerable  presents,  in  proportion  to 
his  rank.*  The  expedition  was  expected  to  be  profitable  to 
those  who  took  part  in  it,  as  was  shown  by  the  significant  fact  that 

>  Cultru,  op.  cit.,  p.  261. 

'  The  rates  of  pay  fixed  were  only  to  hold  good  as  far  as  Hyderabad,  where 
new  terms  were  to  be  made.  On  leaving  Pondichery,  Bussy  was  to  receive  1200 
rupees  a  month,  Kerjean  (second  in  command)  1000  rupees,  lieutenants  500 
rupees,  ensigns  300  rupees,  privates  30  rupees.    The  rates  of  pay  they  would  have 

84 


BUSSY  IN  THE  DECCAN  85 

two  relatives  of  Dupleix,  Kerjean  his  nephew,  and  Vincens,  his 
wife's  son,  went  as  second  and  third  in  command.  Under  these 
leaders  marched  300  Europeans  and  1800  sepoys,  with  10  lield 
pieces.  Bussy's  orders  were  limited  to  accompanying  Muzaffar 
Jang  as  far  as  Hyderabad,  whence  it  was  expected  that  he 
would  return  to  Masulipatam,  bearing  with  him  the  golden  rewards 
of  Ills  assistance. 

The  need  of  this  French  contingent  quickly  became  evident. 
The  same  chieftains  whose  conspiracy  had  brought  about  the 
death  of  Nasir  Jang,  conspired  anew  against  his  nephew  and 
supplanter  ;  nor  did  they  hesitate  to  attack  him  as  soon  as  they 
had  entered  the  territory  of  the  Nawab  of  Cuddapah.*  In  the 
conflict  Muzaffar  Jang  was  kiUed,  although  French  arms  decided 
the  fortune  of  the  day. 

This  news  was  received  with  joy  by  Muhammad  Ali  and  the 
English  ;  *  but  their  exultation  was  premature.  The  leaders  of 
the  army  at  once  proposed  to  Bussy  that  Salabat  Jang,  brother 
of  Nasir  Jang,  should  be  made  Subahdar.  Bussy  concurred  ; 
and  the  only  result  of  the  Pathans'  conspiracy  was  the  substitu- 
tion of  one  Moghul  prince  for  another.  The  new  Nawab  was  as 
eager  for  the  support  of  French  artillery  and  muskets  as  the  old 
one  had  been.  He  was  desired  to  give  proof  of  his  gratitude  both 
to  the  French  in  general  and  to  the  individuals  most  prominently 
concerned.  He  confirmed  the  grants  made  of  Masulipatam  and 
Divy  Island,  and  granted  also  more  villages  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  the  former  ;  he  bestowed  a  donation  upon  his  army,  and 
especially  extended  his  liberality  to  the  French  contingent.' 
The  army  then  resumed  its  march,  and  crossed  the  Kistna.  There 
they  found  a  considerable  body  of  Marathas,  whose  hostility  was 
bought  off  by  Salabat  Jang  for  two  lakhs  of  rupees.*  After  this 
they  entered  Hyderabad.  Here  was  a  considerable  treasure  left 
by  Nasir  Jang.     His  successor  took  possession  of  it,  paid  his 

received  in  the  Company's  service  were  :  Captains,  90  livres  (about  36  rupees)  a 
month  ;  lieutenants.  60  livres  ;  and  ensigns,  45  livres,  with  certain  additional 
allowances.     Common  soldiers  were  paid  2  pagodas  (about  7  rupees)  a  month. 

'  At  Rayachoti,  in  the  taluq  of  that  name  in  the  Cuddapah  District. 

^  "  God  send  you  and  all  my  well-wishers  joy  on  this  account  "  (Muhammad 
Ali  to  Saunders,  Madras  Country  Correspondence,  1 75 1 ,  p.  11). 

•Dupleix  to  the  Minister,  June  10,  175 1  (Archives  des  Colonies).  I  do  not 
find  the  amount  of  the  donation  to  the  French  stated.  Dupleix  himself  expected 
a  handsome  present  (Cultru,  op.  cit.,  pp.  262,  etc.). 

*  Memoir  for  Dupleix  (1759),  p.  70.  In  his  letter  to  the  Minister  above  cited, 
Dupleix  gives  a  characteristically  pompous  account  of  this  affair,  reducing  the 
two  lakhs  to  the  exchange  of  presents.     The  motive  is  evident. 


86  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

army,  and  again  bestowed  "  de  grandes  largesses  "  on  the  French 
officers  and  troops.^ 

These  last  seem  to  have  been  the  prepayment  for  future 
services.  According  to  the  agreement  Dupleix  had  made  with 
Muzaffar  Jang,  the  French  were  to  go  only  as  far  as  Hyderabad  ; 
but  Salabat  Jang  shrank  from  being  abandoned  to  the  treacheries 
of  his  Court,  the  hostility  of  the  Marathas,  and  the  rivalry  of  his 
brother  Ghazi-ud-din.  Accordingly,  he  conciliated  Bussy  and  his 
officers  with  his  bounty,'^  while  he  wrote  pressingly  to  Dupleix 
to  allow  them  to  accompany  him  to  Aurangabad,  a  hundred 
leagues  farther  on.  Dupleix  consented,  and  dispatched  a  hundred 
Europeans  to  make  good  the  gaps  in  the  French  ranks.^  In 
return  for  this  condescension  Salabat  Jang  made  further  grants 
to  the  French. 

In  the  middle  of  June  Aurangabad  was  reached,  and  the 
comedy  of  threatened  French  departure,  already  so  profitable, 
was  played  over  again.  This  Bussy  turned  to  amazing  account. 
When  Muzaffar  Jang  made  Dupleix  Governor  of  the  country 
south  of  the  Kistna,  his  powers  had  been  left  vague,  undefined,  and 
unreal.*  After  some  discussion,  Dupleix  proposed  that  he  should 
be  allowed  a  lakh  of  rupees  a  month,  in  consideration  of  which  he 
would  keep  in  pay  2000  European  troops,  remitting  the  balance 
of  the  collections  to  the  treasury  at  Aurangabad  ;  he  himself 
would  assume  the  title  of  Nawab,  and  appoint  deputies — naibs — 
to  carry  out  his  orders  and  attend  to  details.®  But  the  messengers 
bearing  his  letter  northwards  must  have  passed  on  their  way 
others  with  news  from  Bussy  that  the  provinces  of  Arcot,  Trichino- 
poly,  and  Madura  had  already  been  granted  by  the  Subahdar  to 
Dupleix  and  after  him  to  the  French  nation,  free  of  all  tribute, 
on  condition  of  alliance  and  support.*  Thus  the  whole  surplus 
revenues  of  the  Carnatic,  or  at  all  events  what  could  be  recovered 
from  Chanda  Sahib,  were  at  the  sole  disposal  of  the  French.  In 
forwarding  extracts  from  Bussy's  letters  Dupleix  adds  the  follow- 
ing comment :  "  You  will  find  in  them  an  event  which  I  had  not 

•  Dupleix  to  the  Minister,  ut  supra. 

•  Bussy  received  38o,CKX)  rupees  from  Salabat  Jang  at  about  this  time  (Cultru, 
op.  cit..  p.  347). 

•  Dupleix  to  the  Minister,  ut  supra.  Bussy  set  out  with  300  Europeans ;  he 
had  the  same  number  in  October  1751  (Cultru,  op.  cit.,  p.  272,  n.  i). 

•  Salabat  Jang's  confirmation  of  this  grant,  March  8,  1751,  is  printed  in  the 
Lettres  et  Conventions,  p.  256. 

»  Dupleix  to  Bussy,  October  28,  175 1  (Cultru,  op.  cit.,  pp.  268-269). 

•  Cultru,  op.  cit.,  ut  supra. 


BUSSY  IN  THE  DECCAN  87 

anticipated,  and  which  is  altogether  the  work  of  M.  de  Bussy. 
It  is  a  question  of  securing  the  Arcot  Government  for  the  Nation, 
with  power  of  regulating  the  annual  payment  to  the  Royal 
treasury.  This  affair,  of  the  highest  importance  to  the  Nation, 
deserves  the  closest  attention,  for  it  will  dispense  with  the  need 
of  sending  funds  to  India  for  your  investment."  * 

This  brilliant  success  was  followed  by  more  serious  business. 
The  Marathas  under  Balaii  Rao  invaded  the  Deccan,  and  a  short 
campaign  followed,  in  which  Bussy's  artillery  was  so  effective 
that  the  enemy  soon  agreed  to  make  peace  for  the  trifling  sum  of 
a  lakh  of  rupees.  This,  however,  was  but  a  prehminary  canter. 
Though  peace  was  made  early  in  1752,  Balaji  Rao  was  soon  back 
again  in  Salabat  Jang's  dominions.  This  was  wholly  contrary 
to  the  hopes  of  the  French,  who  had  dreamed  of  an  alliance 
between  Salabat  and  Balaji,  whereby  Dupleix  would  have  been 
enabled  to  control  with  some  hope  of  permanence  the  quick- 
changing  politics  of  Western  India.  ^  But  Balaji  Rao  considered 
it  was  his  interest  to  support  Ghazi-ud-din,  Salabat  Jang's 
brother  and  rival. 

At  the  same  time  Balaji  Rao  sought  the  support  of  the  Eng- 
lish, and  sent  his  vakils  both  to  Madras  and  to  Bombay.  Th(- 
former  were  well  aware  of  the  importance  of  the  occasion,  but 
could  not  send  troops,  for  Bussy  and  Salabat  Jang  lay  in  between 
them  and  the  Marathas. ^  The  Bombay  Council  displayed  an 
extraordinary  lack  of  political  good  sense,  allowing  what  they 
conceived  to  be  their  local  interests  to  outweigh  what  was  de- 
manded by  the  great  Anglo-French  struggle.  English  inter- 
vention at  this  time  in  the  Deccan,  if  vigorous  and  well  directed, 
might  have  produced  considerable  results  ;  but  Bombay  was 
too  closely  wedded  to  peace  and  trade  to  seize  the  opportunity, 
and  by  the  time  the  President  had  written  to  Madras  and  received 
an  answer,  the  opportunity  had  gone. 

For  the  moment  an  enormous  force  was  gathered  together 
against  Salabat  Jang,  for  Ghazi-ud-din  was  supported  by  the  two 
principal  Maratha  leaders,  Balaji  Rao  and  Raghoji  Bhonsla. 
Bussy's  anxiety  was  extreme.  He  wrote  to  Dupleix  a  letter 
which  contemplated  the  possible  necessity  of  retiring  with 
Salabat  Jang  to  Masulipatam  or  even  to  Pondichery.     In  reply, 

*  Dupleix  to  the  Company,  February  19,  1752  {Archives  ties  Colonies).     Clive 
used  almost  exactly  the  same  words  regarding  the  acquisitions  in  Bengal. 

'  See  Dupleix  to  Bussy,  quoted  in  Hamont,  op.  cit.,  pp.  210-211. 

•  Sep.  Des.  from  Madras  to  England  of  September  1752. 


88  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

Dupleix  announced  the  dispatch  of  reinforcements  amounting- to 
300  Europeans,  urged  the  possibihty  of  negotiations  which  would 
leave  Salabat  Jang  at  least  the  position  of  Ghazi-ud-din's  deputy, 
and  finally  directed  that,  if  anything  should  happen  to  Salabat 
Jang,  Bussy  should  offer  French  support  to  his  rival  on  condition 
of  the  renewal  of  all  grants  to  the  French.^  A  httle  later  Bussy 
regarded  his  situation  as  all  but  desperate,  and  his  dispatches 
draw  forth  the  following  answer  from  Dupleix  :  "  I  tremble  at 
your  news,  and  if  you  had  let  me  know  sooner  of  your  extremity, 
I  would  have  ordered  your  return."  * 

This  threatening  situation  was  relieved  after  the  true  Oriental 
manner.  The  mother  of  Salabat  Jang  poisoned  Ghazi-ud-din  in 
October  at  Aurangabad.  That  left  only  the  Marathas.  At  the 
moment,  the  French  and  Salabat  Jang  were  near  Beder,  north- 
west of  Hyderabad.  Their  camp  was  practically  besieged  by 
Balaji  Rao's  horsemen,^  and  although  all  the  direct  attacks  of  the 
Marathas  failed,  Bussy  at  one  time  thought  of  throwing  himself 
with  Salabat  Jang  into  the  fortress  of  Beder  and  defending  it 
until  he  could  get  reasonable  terms.  Balaji  Rao,  however,  did  not 
think  it  worth  while  to  press  matters  to  a  desperate  conclusion. 
Negotiations  were  set  on  foot.  The  Marathas  sent  vakils ; 
Bussy  sent  a  French  officer  ;  on  November  22,  after  overcoming 
the  reluctance  of  theMoghul  nobles  to  a  peace  made  by  the  French, 
Bussy  interviewed  Balaji  Rao,  and  peace  was  made  on  the  con- 
ditions that  the  latter  should  receive  all  that  had  been  promised 
him  by  Ghazi-ud-din  except  sixty  lakhs  of  rupees,  which  Salabat 
Jang  could  not  possibly  pay.  This  conclusion,  like  the  con- 
clusion of  Bussy's  other  struggles  with  the  Marathas,  hardly 
warrants  the  belief  which  historians  have  expressed  in  Bussy's 
victories  ;  but  Bussy's  troops,  though  strong  enough  to  check  the 
enemy,  were  not  numerous  enough  ever  to  give  them  a  decisive 
overthrow.*  Shortly  after  this,  the  other  Maratha  leader, 
Raghoji  Bhonsla,  after  various  actions  made  peace  on  condition 
of  receiving  a  grant  of  jagirs  in  Berar. 

This  last  was  followed  by  another  cession,  that  of  Condavir, 
to  the  French.     Although  these  latter,  to  judge  by  the  resultant 

1  This  letter  is  printed  in  Hamont,  op.  cit.,  pp.  227,  etc. 

"  Duplcix  to  Bussy,  September  16,  1752  (Hamont,  op.  cit.,  p.  229).  See  also 
Mimoire  pour  Bussy  (1764),  pp.  18-19. 

•  Cf.  Balaji  Rao's  account  in  the  Madras  Country  Correspondence,  1753,  p.  i. 

*  See  Bussy  to  Dupleix,  November  28,  iy$2^{Mimoire  pour  Bussy,  1764, 
pp.  122,  etc.).  The  treaty  (I  suppose  wrongly  dated  August  5,  1752)  is  printed  in 
the  Lettres  et  Conventions,  pp.  262-263. 


BUSSY  IN  THE  DECCAN  89 

terms  of  peace,  had  not  won  the  decisive  victories  which  were 
subsequently  claimed  for  them,  they  had  undoubtedly  main- 
tained Salabat  Jang  in  his  position  as  Subahdar  of  the  Deccan  at 
an  incomparably  smaller  price  than  he  would  have  had  to  pay 
without  their  assistance.  Accordingly  Condavir  was  granted  to 
Bussy,  and  he  at  once  made  it  over  to  the  Company.  It  was 
reputed  a  wealthy  district  ;  it  bordered  on  the  territory  which 
the  French  already  held  round  Masulipatam  ;  and  it  was  im- 
portant as  supplying  many  varieties  of  that  cotton  cloth  which 
formed  the  main  portion  of  the  exports  to  Europe.  Its  acquisi- 
tion was  therefore  peculiarly  welcome.  On  receipt  of  the  news, 
Dupleix  considered  that  the  Company  had  then  as  much  territory 
as  it  needed.  "  We  should  hmit  ourselves  to  what  we  now 
possess  in  the  north,"  he  wrote. ^ 

Bussy,  however,  was  far  from  being  able  to  rest  upon  his 
laurels.  Salabat  Jang's  army  was  desperately  in  arrears  ;  the 
money-lenders  refused  further  credit ;  the  soldiers  swore  an  oath 
of  union  and  were  on  the  point  of  mutiny.  Nor  was  finance  the 
sole  cause  of  distress.  There  was  also  bitter  complaint  that  the 
French  had  stolen  all  the  accumulated  treasures  of  the  Deccan.^ 
Bussy  was  on  the  verge  of  despair.  "  It  is  impossible  to  main- 
tain Salabat  Jang  longer,"  he  wrote  ;  "  in  the  present  state  of 
feeling,  any  new  pretender  would  be  supported  by  all.  .  .  ." 
So  he  proposed  to  abandon  Salabat  Jang,  and  to  march  with  his 
whole  force  to  Masulipatam.^  "  There  is  no  hope  of  his  ever 
re-establishing  his  finances,  they  are  too  badly  administered.  .  .  . 
It  is  a  kind  of  brigandage.  The  renters  pay  only  half  of  what  is 
due.  ...  I  do  not  see  how  he  can  ever  form  a  treasure  such  as 
that  left  by  Nizam-ul-Mulk."  *  Bussy  had  already  asked  for, 
but  failed  to  secure, the  circars  of  Rajahmundry,  Ellore,  Chicacole, 
and  Guntoor  ;  this  project  having  been  defeated  by  the  intrigues 
of  the  Court  against  the  French.*  It  was  in  these  circumstances 
that  Bussy  formed  a  plan  which  failed  of  realisation  but  which 
illustrates  the  policy  pursued  by  himself  and  Dupleix.  Salabat 
Jang  had  long  been  anxious  to  place  his  brothers  in  safe  custody. 
At  this  time  he  contemplated  the  fortress  of  Beder  for  the  pur- 
pose.    Bussy  pointed  out   that   their  guardians  would  almost 

'  Mimoire  pour  le  Sicur  de  Bussy  (1764),  pp.  20-21. 

*  See  report  of  Muhammad  All's  vakil,  Country  Correspondence,  1753,  p.  8. 
'  Bussy  to  Dupleix,  ap.  Hamont,  op.  cit.,  p.  239. 

•  Bussy  to  Dupleix,  November  28,  1752  (Mtmoire  pour  Bussy,  1764,  p.  136). 
'  Mimoire  pour  Bussy  (1764),  p.  27. 


90  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

certainly  be  bribed  to  suffer  their  escape.  "  While  rendering  him 
suspicious  of  all,"  he  wrote,  "  I  have  suggested  that  he  might 
send  them  to  Pondichery.  .  .  .  With  such  hostages,  we  should 
always  keep  a  tight  rein  over  the  Nawab."  ^ 

Dupleix  was  highly  indignant  at  this  faint-heartedness  after 
the  great  good  fortune  of  Ghazi-ud-din's  death  and  the  peace  with 
the  Marathas.  The  abandonment  of  the  Nawab,  he  wrote  in 
January  1753,^  could  be  justified  only  by  the  decision  of  a  council 
of  war.  He  urged  that  the  discontented  nobles,  especially  Saiyid 
Laslikar  Khan,  should  be  pacified,  and  that,  after  having  carried 
matters  so  far,  after  establishing  and  maintaining  the  Nawab  in 
spite  of  so  many  difficulties,  Bussy  was  obliged  by  every  call  of 
reason  and  honour  to  carry  the  affair  to  a  victorious  end.  If 
need  be,  why  should  not  Saiyid  Lashkar  Khan  lose  his  head  ? 
Such  an  act  of  justice  would  go  far  to  secure  the  safety  alike 
of  the  Nawab  and  of  the  French. 

Meanwhile  Bussy,  worn  out  by  anxiety  and  sickness,  had 
withdrawn  first  to  Hfyderabad,  and  then  on  his  surgeon's  advice 
to  Masulipatam,^  leaving  Goupil  in  command  of  the  French  con- 
tingent. He  was  in  fact  anxious  to  retire.  He  had  made  a 
very  handsome  fortune,  which  naturally  enough  he  desired  to 
enjoy  at  his  ease  in  his  native  country.  But  Dupleix  declared 
that  he  could  find  no  one  else  to  command  the  army  in  the 
Deccan.  The  officers  too  wrote  to  Bussy  urging  the  necessity  of 
his  return.  Reluctantly  he  gave  way,  and  in  June  1753  went 
back  to  Hyderabad. 

His  presence  there  was  a  matter  of  the  utmost  urgency.  All 
the  enemies  of  the  French  had  been  emboldened  by  his  departure  ; 
and  Goupil,  who  had  been  left  in  charge,  though  a  gallant  officer, 
was  a  poor  politician.  Balaji  Rao  was  occupied  in  an  expedition 
into  Mysore  and  the  neighbouring  districts  in  order  to  exact 
tribute.*  Saijnd  Lashkar  Khan  conceived  that  the  moment  was 
propitious  for  an  attack  upon  Balaji's  territories,  and  persuaded 
Salabat  Jang  against  the  latter's  desires  to  move  to  Aurangabad. 
Goupil  objected,  urging  that  Aurangabad  was  unhealthy  for 
liuropeans,  who  had  died  there  in  1752  in  considerable  numbers. 
It  was  accordingly  decided  that  Salabat  Jang  should  be  accom- 

'  Bussy  to  Duplt'ix,  November  28,  1752  (Mimoire  pour  Bussy,  iyC>^,  p.  138). 

'The  letter  is  printed  by  Hamont,  p.  241.  He  dates  it  January  14,  1754, 
but  it  is  an  answer  to  Bussy's  letter  of  November  1752. 

'  MSmoire  pour  Bussy  (17C4),  pp.  27-28  ;  Ormc  MSS.,  Various,  55,  ff.  15-16. 

'  Sec  the  reports  of  the  English  vakil  sent  to  Balaji  Rao,  in  Country  Corre- 
spondence, 1753,  pp.  54  and  62. 


BUSSY  IN  THE  DECCAN  91 

panied  by  a  bodyguard  of  loo  Frenchmen  and  a  battalion  of 
French  sepoys.  The  rest,  800  Europeans  and  four  battaUons  of 
sepoys,  went  into  quarters  at  Hyderabad.^ 

Once  at  Aurangabad,  Salabat  Jang  was  persuaded  to  im- 
prison his  brothers  in  the  fortress  of  Daulatabad  ;  and  stories  were 
industriously  propagated  of  plots  between  them  and  French 
officers,  though  the  whole  course  of  events  suggests  that  the  latter 
had  no  more  wit  than  to  look  stupidly  on  at  the  affairs  then  being 
transacted.  The  rest  of  the  army  at  Hyderabad  was  left  un- 
paid and  so  became  irregular  and  disobedient.  "  All  the  letters 
I  receive,"  Dupleix  wrote  to  Bussy  about  this  time,  "  make  my 
hair  stand  on  end.  Debauchery  of  all  kinds  is  carried  to  excess, 
and  the  nation  has  fallen  into  a  degree  of  contempt  from  which 
you  alone  can  save  it."  ^ 

The  real  difficulty  was  finance.  The  French  contingent  cost 
nearly  2^  lakhs  of  rupees  a  month — 29  lakhs  a  year.^  The 
resources  of  the  Deccan  had  been  thought  inexhaustible.  But, 
as  we  have  seen,  Bussy  had  already  revised  his  ideas  on  that  head 
before  the  end  of  1752.  Moreover,  the  payment  of  such  large 
sums  from  the  public  treasury  was  widely  unpopular.  All  the 
nobles  of  the  Court,  all  the  troopers  of  the  Subahdar's  cavalry, 
regarded  the  pay  of  the  French  contingent  as  so  much  taken 
directly  from  themselves.  Nor  could  the  pay  be  found.  In  June 
1753  the  French  troops  were  between  three  and  four  months 
in  arrears.  On  his  arrival  at  Hyderabad  in  July,  Bussy  only 
succeeded  in  borrowing  enough  from  the  native  bankers  and 
Muhammadan  friends  to  discharge  a  part  of  this.* 

The  only  method  of  securing  regular  payments  was  to  obtain 
a  grant  of  revenues  which  the  French  could  collect  for  them- 
selves. Bussy  accordingly  reverted  to  his  old  plan  of  getting 
the  four  circars  of  Chicacolc,  Ellore,  Rajahmundry,  and  Guntoor. 
These  with  the  territories  already  granted  would  give  the  French 
absolute  control  of  a  long  strip  of  the  coast  and  the  fertile  delta 
lands  of  the  Godavari  and  Kistna.  Their  revenues  were  esti- 
mated as  high  as  thirty-one  lakhs  of  rupees — with  the  old  conces- 
sions, they  were  supposed  to  make  a  total  of  forty-two  lakhs  a 
year. 

'  The  English  had  a  spy  Brahmin  in  Salabat  Jang's  camp,  from  whom  they 
received  full  and  apparently  accurate  reports.  See  the  letters  from  Vasudeva 
Pandit  received  April-June,  in  the  Country  Correspondence  of  1753. 

'  An  extract  from  this  letter  is  printed  by  Hamont,  op.  cit.,  p.  249. 

•  Mimoire  pimr  Hussy  (17^14),  p.  31.  *  Ibid.,  pp.  40-41. 


92  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

In  November  1753,  after  having  restored  order  among  the 
troops  at  Hyderabad,  Bussy  set  out  for  Aiirangabad,  where  on  his 
arrival  his  enemies  bent  before  him,  and  the  circars  formerly 
refused  were  granted  without  delay.  The  reasons  for  this  sudden 
change  are  not  too  apparent,  save  in  so  far  as  it  was  due  to  the 
compliance  which  in  eighteenth-century  India  was  almost  always 
accorded  to  cool,  clear-sighted  resolution.  Moreover,  the  Subah- 
dar  and  his  ministers  knew  that  they  needed  the  protection  of 
the  French  against  the  Marathas.  But  both  these  causes  should 
have  operated  on  the  previous  occasion  in  the  same  direction. 
Be  that  as  it  may,  the  circars  were  granted  to.  Bussy  personally  * 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  French  troops. 

In  spite  of  reforms  which  Bussy  introduced,  bringing  down 
the  cost  of  the  army  to  ij  lakhs  a  month,  ^  the  position  remained 
exceedingly  difficult.  The  cession  of  the  new  territories  brought 
in  no  ready-money  ;  nor  was  Salabat  Jang's  authority  sufficient 
to  secure  obedience  to  his  parawana.  At  the  same  time  war  broke 
out  again  between  him  and  Raghoji  Bonsla.  The  campaign 
lasted  until  April  1754,  when,  Salabat  Jang  and  Bussy  having 
reached  Nagpur,  Raghoji's  capital,  peace  was  made,  and  the 
French  returned  to  Hyderabad  in  May.  Bussy's  financial  straits 
were  only  relieved  by  the  loans  which  he  succeeded  in  procuring 
from  Bukanji,  the  great  banker  of  Southern  India.  ^ 

Meanwhile,  considerable  difficulties  had  arisen  in  establishing 
French  authority  in  the  circars.  The  former  deputy  was  Jafar 
Ali  Khan  ;  and  he  immediately  prepared  for  resistance.  In 
this  he  was  naturally  encouraged  by  the  English.  His  family 
was  sent  to  their  settlement  at  Vizagapatam  for  safety,  and  he 
requested  them  to  garrison  the  fort  of  Rajahmundry.  Westcott, 
the  English  agent  in  those  parts,  took  upon  himself  to  detain  a 
small  detachment  of  troops  on  their  way  to  a  short-lived  settle- 
ment off  the  Burmese  coast,  with  a  view  to  affording,  Jafar  Ali 
Khan  material  assistance.  But  the  English  forces  available  to 
the  northward  were  too  scanty  to  be  able  to  oppose  Bussy  with 
any  hope  of  success  ;  so  the  Madras  Council  ordered  Westcott 's 
project  to  be  abandoned.* 

Nor  did  Jafar  Ali  receive  much  more  effective  help  from 
local  chieftains.  In  December  1753,  on  first  receipt  of  news 
of  the  grant  to  the  French,  the  Zemindars  did  indeed  promise 

'  Mimoire  pour  Bussy  (1767),  pp.  79,  etc.  '  Ibid.  (1764).  P-  44- 

'  Country  Correspondence,  1754,  pp.  96  and  120. 
*  Pub.  Cons.,  February  14,  1754. 


BUSSY  IN  THE  DECCAN  98 

him  their  assistance.  But  in  February  Moracin,  the  French 
chief  at  Masulipatam,  succeeded  in  detaching  the  principal  one 
of  them,  the  Raja  of  Vizianagram,  by  offering  him  the  appoint- 
ment of  Naib  in  the  two  most  northerly  circars.^  Raghoji 
Bonsla,  however,  sent  15,000  horse  under  his  son  to  help  in 
opposing  the  French.  These  swept  through  the  provinces  on 
their  usual  errand  of  plunder,  and  although  their  incursion  had 
no  permanent  effect  upon  the  French  occupation,  it  materially 
affected  the  collection  of  the  revenues  for  this  year  and  so  added 
appreciably  to  Bussy's  difficulties.  They  quitted  the  provinces 
some  time  in  May  1754. 

Meanwhile,  Moracin  had  been  busy  in  arranging  the  terms 
on  which  the  circars  should  be  rented  out  ;  and  he  seems  to  have 
let  Rajahmundry  and  Chicacole  to  the  Raja  of  Vizianagram 
for  the  sum  of  sixteen  lakhs.  ^  But  as  was  usual  in  the  revenue 
settlements  of  those  days,  nothing  Uke  this  sum  was  reahsed. 
Bussy  says  that  the  first  year  produced  less  than  ii|  lakhs.'  In 
May  1754  he  was  writing  that  his  troops  were  reduced  to  beggary, 
that  he  had  had  to  sell  his  jewels,  that  money  must  be  sent  from 
Masulipatam,  even  though  it  should  be  drawn  from  the  revenues 
of  the  old  concessions.*  In  July  he  himself  marched  with  the 
bulk  of  his  troops  to  attend  personally  to  the  estabhshment  of 
the  French  government  in  the  circars.  There  he  found  much 
disorder.  The  Zemindars  who  held  between  them  almost  the 
whole  of  those  districts  required  the  most  tactful  management. 
He  succeeded  in  making  agreements  with  the  various  renters, 
under  which  nearly  18^  lakhs  of  revenue  would  be  paid  in  the 
year  1754-55  ;  *  and  this,  if  realised  in  full,  would  have  just  met 
the  expenses  of  the  Deccan  army.  This  important  matter  settled, 
Bussy  returned  to  the  Deccan  at  the  close  of  the  year  1754. 

The  recall  of  Dupleix  in  August  1754,  and  the  subsequent 

'  Country  Correspondence,  1754,  pp.  5  and  54. 

*  Mtmoire  pour  Bussy  (1767),  pp.  60-102.  »  Ibid.  (1764),  p.  44,  n.  2. 

•  Ibid.,  pp.  47-49. 

'  One  version  of  the  settlement  which  ho  made  is  detailed  in  his  letter  to 
Dupleix  of  October  5,  1754  {Riponse  du  Sr.  Dupleix  d  la  lettre  du  Sr.  Godeheu. 
pp.  282,  etc.).  The  Raja  of  Vizianagram  retained  only  the  Rajahmundry  circar 
at  a  rent  of  13  lakhs  ;  Chicacole  was  given  to  Ibrahim  Khan  for  9  lakhs  ;  and  the 
other  two  circars  were  let  for  sums  aggregating  9  lakhs  ;  so  that  the  four  countries 
were  expected  to  produce  31  laklis  in  the  year  1754-55,  with  an  expected  surplus, 
after  defraying  the  costs  of  government  and  of  the  Deccan  army,  of  5J  lakhs  a 
year.  The  version  adopted  in  the  text  from  Bussy's  Mimoire  (1764),  pp.  60-62. 
seems  much  more  probable.  Of  course  it  must  be  remembered  that  Bussy 
was  as  much  interested  in  reducing,  as  Dupleix  was  in  exaggerating,  the  figures. 


94  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

truce  wliich  Godeheu  arranged  with  Saunders  later  in  the  year, 
hardly  affected  Bussy  at  all.  Godeheu  was  by  no  means  dis- 
posed to  give  up  the  French  acquisitions  in  the  Deccan,  if  only 
the  finances  of  the  French  Company  would  permit  the  mainten- 
ance of  the  struggle.  The  truce  did  not  extend  to  the  Deccan, 
and  so  did  not  hinder  Bussy 's  operations.  The  provisional 
treaty  which  was  signed  at  the  end  of  1754  contemplated  indeed 
the  retrocession  of  the  French  territories  to  the  northward  ;  but 
pending  the  Company's  confirmation,  it  maintained  all  parties 
in  their  existing  possessions.  The  treaty,  therefore,  secured  the 
present  enjoyment  of  all  gains  freed  from  the  burden  of  the 
English  war  ;  and  the  relinquishment  of  those  gains  depended 
on  the  approval  of  the  Company.  In  short,  Godeheu  obtained 
all  the  advantages  of  immediate  peace  at  the  slender  cost  of  a 
provisional  promise.  He  returned  to  France  in  February  1755, 
and  his  successor,  de  Leyrit,  arrived  at  Pondichery  from  Bengal 
in  the  following  month.  He  too  continued  the  support  which 
Bussy  had  received  from  his  predecessors.  The  chief  result  of 
the  change  was  that  Bussy  no  longer  enjoyed  the  advantage,  or 
disadvantage,  of  control  by  a  mind  so  fertile  of  expedient  but  so 
excitable  and  impervious  to  large  simple  facts  as  that  of  Dupleix. 

Immediately  after  his  return  to  Salabat  Jang,  Bussy  accom- 
panied him  on  an  expedition  to  collect  tribute,  or  rather  to 
exact  contributions,  from  the  King  of  Mysore,  who  in  1753  and 
1754  had  been  the  unwilling  host  of  Balaji  Rao  and  a  large  army 
of  Marathas.  The  Mysoreans  at  first  resolved  upon  resistance  ; 
but  news  of  another  advance  of  the  Marathas  decided  them  to 
accept  the  mediation  which  Bussy  offered,  and  they  compounded 
with  Salabat  Jang  for  a  sum  of  fifty-two  lahks — twenty-seven 
in  cash  and  the  remainder  in  bills.  ^ 

It  was  shortly  after  this  that  a  dazzling  scheme  filled  Bussy's 
mind.  Both  he  and  Dupleix  had  long  dallied  with  the  idea  of 
a  march  to  Delhi.  On  the  last  day  of  1755  he  addressed  to 
d'Argenson,  the  French  Minister  of  War,  a  letter  which  fell  into 
English  hands  on  its  way  to  Europe.^  In  this,  after  dwelling 
upon  the  peace  which  for  a  brief  while  was  then  reigning  in  the 
Deccan,  he  adverts  to  the  projected  alliance  with  the  Emperor, 
who  "  with  his  Vizier  are  very  desirous  we  should  join  with  them 

'  Mil.  Cons.,  1755,  p.  92  ;  Orme  MSS.,  Various,  55,  pp.  18-19  ;  Mimoire  pour 
Bussy  (176^),  y.  54- 

•  Mil.  Des.  from  England  of  February  i,  1757,  and  enclosure.  See  also  the 
English  vakil's  report  of  February  i,  1756  (Country  Correspondence,  1756,  p.  26). 


BUSSY  IN  THE  DECCAN  95 

to  accomplish  the  work  of  humbling  the  Marathas."  The  alliance 
with  Delhi,  he  urges,  must  always  be  advantageous  ;  and  the 
terms  on  which  he  considers  it  should  be  undertaken  are  the 
immediate  payment  of  a  sum  of  money,  the  imperial  confirmation 
of  all  the  French  possessions,  the  settlement  of  Arcot  in  due 
subordination  to  the  Deccan,  and  the  pay  of  the  troops  that 
would  be  employed.  The  scheme  is  plainly  chimerical.  Apart 
from  the  otiose  confirmation  of  the  French  grants,  which  in  fact 
they  had  secured  and  could  hold  only  by  the  sword,  the  only 
advantages  proposed  consisted  in  money  payments  which  the 
Moghul  was  in  no  position  to  make.  Like  Dupleix  and  indeed 
all  other  Europeans  of  that  time,  Bussy  exaggerated  both  the 
importance  and  resources  of  that  splendid  phantom. ^ 

At  the  very  time  when  he  was  cherishing  this  idle  dream, 
events  were  preparing  which  were  to  shake  his  position  to  its 
foundations.  One  of  the  Pathan  Nawabs  of  the  south-eastern 
Deccan  had  never  duly  submitted  himself  to  Salabat  Jang. 
The  Maratha  freebooter,  Morari  Rao,  was  established  not  far  from 
the  Pathan  and  was  defying  Balaji  Rao.  The  latter  and  Salabat 
joined  forces  to  subdue  these  rebels  ;  and  camped  before  the 
Pathan's  chief  town,  called  Bankapuram,^  early  in  1756.  Morari 
Rao  had  considerable  claims  upon  the  French  in  connection 
with  the  operations  in  the  Carnatic  of  1752-54.  Bussy  seized 
the  opportunity  to  intervene,  and  arranged  terms  of  peace 
between  the  rebels  and  their  masters,  securing  for  the  French 
a  full  release  of  Morari  Rao's  claims.^  This  happened  towards 
the  end  of  April.  On  May  12,  Bussy  had  been  dismissed  from 
Salabat  Jang's  service  and  was  already  on  the  march.* 

This  was  the  outcome  of  intrigues  which  had  long  been  hatch- 
ing. Shortly  after  Bussy's  recovery  of  power  in  1754,  he  had 
procured  the  removal  of  Saiyid  Lashkar  Khan  from  his  post  as 
diwan  and  the  reappointment  of  Shah  Nawaz  Khan.  But  the 
latter  was  as  much  the  enemy  of  the  French  as  his  predecessor 
had  been.  He  had  quietly  allowed  Bussy  to  arrange  the  peace 
before  Bankapuram  ;  but  the  moment  that  was  accomplished, 
he  represented  that  much  better  terms  could  have  been  ob- 
tained if  Bussy  had  not  sacrificed  the  Subahdar's  interests  to  those 
of  the  French,  and  that  the  Subahdar  had  received  nothing  from 
the  Carnatic  where  the  French  had  retained  all  the  surplus 

'  Similar  projects  were  later  on  cherished,  with  less  justification,  at  Calcutta, 
vide  infra. 

•OrSavanur.     'P.R.,  No.  15,  £.  516.        *  Country  Correspondence,  17$^,  p.  6y. 


96  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

revenues  ;  at  the  same  time  Jafar  Ali  Khan,  who  had  attempted 
to  oppose  the  French  occupation  of  the  circars  and  who  had 
later  made  his  peace  with  Salabat  Jang,  declared  that  the  English 
would  at  once  send  the  Subahdar  as  many  troops  as  he  wanted. 
The  whole  court  was  united  against  the  French  ;  and  Balaji 
Rao  acquiesced  because  he  hoped  that  if  Bussy  were  dismissed 
he  would  take  service  with  the  Marathas.  In  these  circumstances 
Bussy  could  only  accept  his  dismissal  quietly,  thankful  that  he 
was  permitted  to  march  away  unmolested  ;  and  this  was  only 
because  Balaji 's  secret  motives  for  acquiescence  prevented  him 
from  desiring  the  destruction  of  his  proposed  auxiliary. 

Bussy  reached  Hyderabad  on  June  14,  1756,  and,  having 
but  a  slender  prospect  of  being  able  to  effect  a  safe  retreat  to 
Masulipatam,  quickly  chose  a  defensible  position  on  the  north- 
west of  the  city  in  the  pleasure-garden  called  the  Char-Mahal. 
Here  he  was  feebly  besieged,  but  maintained  himself  with  ease, 
in  spite  of  a  considerable  desertion  of  his  sepoys,  until  Law 
arrived  on  August  16  with  a  reinforcement  drawn  from  Pondi- 
chery  and  MasuUpatam.  Four  days  later  the  Muhammadans 
agreed  to  a  peace,  by  which  on  the  one  side  the  circar  of  Condavir, 
which  had  been  granted  for  Bussy 's  hfe,  was  granted  in  per- 
petuity, while  on  the  other  Bussj'  agreed  not  to  interfere  with 
internal  affairs. ^  This  exploit  has  been  the  occasion  of  much 
enthusiastic  writing.  It  abundantly  displays  the  judgment  and 
good  conduct  of  Bussy  ;  but  there  was  httle  hard  fighting  either 
in  the  defence  or  on  Law's  march  up.  Salabat  Jang's  army  was 
honeycombed  with  treachery.  Bussy  had  won  over  a  number 
of  Salabat's  officers  ;  and  when  he  ordered  Law  to  march  with 
all  speed  to  Hyderabad,  he  informed  him  which  of  the  chiefs 
sent  to  oppose  his  march  would  offer  no  serious  resistance.*  The 
exploit  then  rather  resembles  CUve's  success  at  Plassey  than 
any  more  stubbornly  contested  victory. 

This  affair  coincided  with  the  culmination  of  events  which 
nearly  sent  Clive  to  conquer  the  Deccan  instead  of  Bengal.  In 
the  year  1754,  when  negotiations  for  peace  were  in  progress 
between  the  two  Companies  in  Europe,  but  when  the  French  were 
showing  themselves  little  amenable  to  argument  regarding  their 
possessions  to  the  northward,  a  plan  was  formed  for  an  attack 

'  Bussy  to  Lcyrit,  August  28,  1756  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  vi.  ff.  1330,  etc.) ;  also 
letter  from  an  officer  of  Law's  detachment,  n.d.  {ibid.,  S.  1339,  etc.),  and  Country 
Correspondence,  1756,  p.  133. 

'  This  rests  on  Bussy's  own  authority  (Orme  MSS.,  Various,  No.  55,  pp.  1-2). 


BUSSY  IN  THE  DECCAN  97 

upon  Bussy  in  alliance  with  Balaji  Rao,  to  be  undertaken  either 
from  Bombay  or  from  the  eastern  coast,  or  simultaneously  from 
both  sides,  according  as  circumstances  might  dictate.  CUve  at 
that  time  was  on  the  point  of  returning  to  India  as  Deputy 
Governor  of  Fort  St. David,  with  succession  to  the  chair  atMadras. 
Court  patronage  compelled  the  Company  to  name  Colonel 
Caroline  Scott,  recently  sent  out  as  Engineer  General,  to  the 
command  of  the  proposed  expedition  ;  but,  failing  him,  CUve 
was  to  command.  Chve  reached  Bombay  in  1755  with  three 
companies  of  Royal  Artillery  and  three  or  four  hundred  Royal 
foot.i 

The  dispatches  announcing  these  plans  reached  Bombay  in 
September  1755  ;  but  the  Doddington  which  carried  the  corre- 
sponding letters  to  Madras  was  wrecked  on  her  way  out.-  The 
first  direct  information  received  at  the  latter  place  was  a  letter 
from  Bourchier,  President  of  Bombay,  dated  September  25, 1755  ; 
however,  Pigot  had  already  received  an  earlier  letter  from  the 
Secret  Committee,  from  which  he  guessed  the  real  nature  of  the 
plan.  Bourchier  wrote  that  he  supposed  the  truce  made  with 
Godeheu  would  preclude  any  hostilities  against  the  French,  and 
that  he  had  therefore  taken  no  steps  to  form  an  alliance  with 
Balaji  Rao.  Pigot  and  his  councillors  took  a  directly  contrary 
view.  The  truce  certainly  precluded  all  attacks  in  the  Carnatic, 
but  the  Deccan  was  nowhere  mentioned  ;  indeed,  Godeheu 
sub.sequently  admitted  that  it  was  not  comprehended  in  the 
truce.  They  strongly  urged  that  an  immediate  alliance  should 
be  concluded  with  the  Marathas,  that  an  English  contingent 
should  join  the  latter,  and  that  in  the  probable  event  of  war 
between  Salabat  Jang  and  Balaji  Rao,  there  could  be  no  objection 
to  the  Enghsh  supporting  the  latter  if  the  French  supported  the 
former.*  This  may  be  regarded  as  a  somewhat  oversubtle  inter- 
pretation of  international  obligations  ;  but  it  rested  on  sound 
and  practical  considerations.  The  French  were  far  from  being 
sufficiently  defeated  to  give  up  acquisitions  which  enabled  them 
to  keep  on  foot  forces  that  were  a  constant  threat  to  English 

'  Secret  Committee  to  Pitt,  January  12,  1757  (Chatham  MSS.,  I.  99) ;  Mil.  Des. 
to  Madras,  March  26,  1755,  with  enclasures  ;  Mil.  Des.  to  Bombay  of  same  date  ; 
Mil.  Des.  to  Bombay,  April  25,  1755  ;  CUve's  evidence  (First  Report  Select  Com- 
mittee, p.  14). 

'  Duplicates  only  reached  Madras  on  May  9,  1756. 

"  Bourchier  to  Pigot,  September  25,  1755,  and  Pigot's  answer  of  November  30, 
with  the  discussion  of  the  Madras  Sel.  Com.,  in  Madra-s  Private  Committees 
(Military  Sundry  Book  No.  9). 

7 


98  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

security.  The  contest  had  to  be  fought  to  a  finish  ;  and  the 
Madras  councillors  were  wholly  right  to  recognise  and  make 
preparations  for  this.  It  was  apparently  Robert  Orme  who  took 
the  lead  in  this  matter  and  carried  it  against  some  reluctance.* 
Bussy's  operations  in  Mysore,  and  the  correspondence  which 
passed  on  this  subject  between  Pigot  and  de  Leyrit  confirmed 
the  Madras  view  and  led  to  further  representations  to  Bombay.  ^ 

But  the  "  Bombay  gentlemen  "  were  obdurate.  They  had 
received,  as  we  have  seen,  considerable  reinforcements  of  troops  ; 
they  had  close  at  hand  a  pirate  enemy  who  had  long  preyed  upon 
the  country  shipping  that  plied  along  the  Western  Coast ;  and 
with  an  amazing  sense  of  disproportion,  they  resolved  to  attack 
Gheriah  instead  of  Bussy.  Watson  and  Clive  were  accordingly 
dispatched  against  the  pirates,  whose  stronghold  was  speedily 
taken  ;  and  the  matter  was  managed  with  so  little  regard  for 
the  general  interests  that  their  Maratha  allies  were  given  a  griev- 
ance by  being  refused  a  share  in  the  plunder.  Such  were  the 
effects  of  local  interests  and  local  jealousy.  As  Orme  wrote  : 
"  In  an  expedition  against  Salabat  Jang  the  Governor  of  Bombay 
will  only  be  looked  upon  by  the  Old  Gentlemen  of  Leadenhall 
Street  as  having  given  assistance  to  the  Presidency  of  Madras."  * 

Even  then,  however,  it  did  not  seem  too  late  to  drive  Bussy 
from  the  Deccan.  Early  in  1756  war  was  plainly  impending 
with  France  ;  and  all  question  of  truce  and  treaty  were  practi- 
cally at  an  end.  On  March  15,  1756,  proposals  were  received 
from  Balaji  Rao  for  an  English  contingent  ;  the  Madras  Com- 
mittee resolved  to  send  him  200  Europeans  and  1000  sepoys 
with  a  train  of  artillery  ;  and  it  was  thought  that  the  cession  of 
Gheriah  might  induce  him  to  enter  into  a  firm  alliance  with  us.* 
While  this  was  still  under  discussion  with  Bombay,  there  came 
the  surprising  change  of  scene  in  the  Deccan  which  led  to  Bussy's 
dismissal.  On  June  15  a  letter  was  received  from  Salabat  Jang 
desiring  a  detachment  of  Englishmen.  It  was  at  once  resolved 
to  send  a  body  of  men — 400  Europeans  with  a  party  of  artillery- 
men.* But  some  time  was  spent  in  discussion  and  preparation. 
While  the  expedition  was  still  incomplete,  there  came  on  July  13 
news  of  the  seizure  of  Kasimbazaar,  on  August  3  alarming  repre- 

>  Orme  to  Holdemessc,  March  i,  1756  (Orme  MSS., Various,  No.  17,  ff.  287,  etc.). 
"  Madras  Private  Committees,  March  5,  1756. 
'  Orme  to  Holdernesse,  ut  supra. 

•  Madras  Private  Committees,  March  1 5  and  May  18,  1756. 
^  Ibid.,  June  15,  1756;  Military  Cons.,  July  27  and  30,  August  2  and  6.  1756 
(pp.  242,  246,  248,  250). 


BUSSY  IN  THE  DECCAN  99 

sentations  of  the  Nawab's  conduct  in  Bengal,  and  on  August  13 
tidings  of  the  capture  of  Calcutta.  This,  in  spite  of  opposition 
which,  Orme  says  in  his  private  correspondence,  was  due  to 
private  interests,^  determined  the  abandonment  of  the  English 
schemes  in  the  Deccan. 

The  net  result  of  all  this  was  to  enable  Bussy  to  maintain 
himself  there,  but  to  enable  the  English  to  estabhsh  themselves 
in  Bengal.  Had  we  been  finally  committed  to  the  Deccan 
expedition  when  Calcutta  was  lost,  Clive  could  not  have  sailed 
for  its  recovery  and  the  course  of  events  in  Bengal  might  have 
been  widely  different.  It  was  therefore  fortunate  that  in  1756 
Bombay  preferred  its  local  interests  in  attacking  Gheriah  to  the 
general  interests  of  the  nation  in  attacking  Bussy.  But  it  was 
the  fortuitous  concourse  of  events  that  converted  a  stupid 
blunder  into  a  lucky  abstention.  The  Deccan  could  never  have 
afforded  the  resources  which,  derived  from  Bengal,  permitted 
the  capture  of  Pondich^ry  in  1761.  But  in  the  beginning  of  1756 
not  the  most  prudent  or  the  acutest  politician  could  have  guessed 
the  events  which  were  to  place  in  our  hands  the  richest  province 
of  India.  The  Bombay  policy  was  wrong  in  spite  of  its  issue  ; 
the  Madras  policy  was  wise  in  spite  of  the  difficulties  in  which 
its  adoption  might  have  involved  us.  It  was  a  case  in  which 
selfish  stupidity  earned  an  unmerited  reward. 

After  the  happy  termination  of  his  defence  of  the  Char-Mahal, 
Bussy  proceeded  in  November  1756  to  the  circars,  to  reduce  to 
obedience  the  renters  and  zemindars  who,  with  the  exception  of 
Viziaram  Razu,  Raja  of  Vizianagram,  had  thrown  off  their 
allegiance  to  the  French  and  refused  to  pay  the  instalments  of 
the  revenue  as  they  fell  due,  in  consequence  of  Bussy's  troubles 
at  Hyderabad  and  the  absence  in  the  circars  of  all  powers  of 
coercion.  The  principal  of  these,  after  Viziaram  Razu,  was 
Ranga  Rao,  Raja  of  Bobbili ;  and  on  the  former's  advice  Bussy 
at  once  proceeded  to  his  subjugation.  The  attack  upon  his 
fortress  on  January  24,  1757,  the  desperate  defence,  the  massacre 
which  succeeded,  and  the  murder  of  Viziaram  Razu  by  two  sur- 
vivors, are  tragic  incidents  of  which  Orme  has  left  us  a  vivid  and 
moving  narrative.  Bussy  then  attempted  to  reduce  the  Raja 
of  Gumsur,  where  he  wasted  several  weeks  endeavouring  to  force 
his  way  through  impenetrable  jungle  ;  finally  he  accepted  the 
Raja's  offers,  and  moved  to  drive  the  English  out  of  their 
settlements  in  the  circars,  news  having  arrived  of  the  declaration 

>  Orme  to  Payne,  November  3,  1756  (Orme  MSS.,  Various,  28,  ff.  58,  etc.). 


100  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

of  war.  Only  one  post,  Vizagapatam,  had  even  the  name  of  a 
fortification  ;  and  that  was  inferior  even  to  the  ordinary  kind  of 
colonial  fortress.  Bussy  appeared  before  it  on  June  24.  The 
next  day  the  place  sm-rendered,  the  inhabitants  retaining  all 
their  private  property — a  condition  which  Bussy  observed  with 
the  utmost  generosity.  The  remainder  of  the  year  was  occupied 
with  expeditions  to  compel  the  tributaries  to  pay  their  dues.  It 
is  noteworthy  that  in  this  year  he  carried  his  annual  settlement 
for  the  revenue  to  the  sum  of  forty-one  lakhs  of  rupees — a  third 
more  than  had  been  agreed  upon  in  1756.* 

Meanwhile,  a  Court  revolution  had  been  in  active  progress. 
Salabat  Jang  had  two  brothers,  Nizam  Ah  and  Basalut  Jang, 
who  formed  natural  centres  for  intrigue  against  the  French. 
Bussy,  as  we  have  seen,  was  at  one  time  anxious  to  have  kept 
them  safe  in  French  hands  at  Pondich^ry ;  that  plan  had  fallen 
through  ;  but  he  had  succeeded  in  keeping  them  at  a  distance 
from  all  participation  in  the  management  of  affairs.  At  the 
time  of  the  siege  of  the  Char-Mahal,  his  enemies  brought  the 
brothers  forth  from  their  obscurity  ;  and  Nizam  Ali  had  been 
given  the  government  of  Berar  while  Basalut  Jang  received  that 
of  Adoni.  In  the  early  months  of  1757,  the  Diwan,  Shah  Nawaz 
Khan,  dihgently  brought  Nizam  AU  torward  in  the  pubhc  eye, 
and  finally  induced  Salabat  Jang  to  entrust  him  with  the  great 
seal  of  the  Subah.  This  was  the  situation  which  Bussy  found 
on  his  return  to  the  Deccan  early  in  1758.  He  at  once  set  about 
restoring  the  authority  of  Salabat  Jang.  The  return  of  the  seal 
was  demanded  of  Nizam  Ali  both  by  Bussy  and  by  Salabat  Jang  ; 
but  to  both  it  was  refused.  This  defiance  was  followed  by  a 
commotion  about  a  supposed  attempt  to  murder  Basalut  Jang  ; 
after  which  the  seal  was  returned  with  insults. 

The  anti-French  party  was  thus  headed  by  the  two  brothers 
and  Shah  Nawaz  Khan.  Their  strength  depended  on  the  mihtary 
forces  of  the  former  and  the  wealth  secured  in  the  fortress  of 
Daulatabad  by  the  latter.  In  order  to  break  the  combination, 
Bussy  seized  the  fortress  with  the  connivance  of  the  Governor, 
and  at  the  same  moment  arrested  the  person  of  Shah  Nawaz 
Khan,  and  kept  him  under  guard.  This  event,  coupled  with 
Balaji  Rao's  refusal  of  assistance,  decided  Nizam  Ali  to  make 
an  apparent  submission  ;  but  this  was  immediately  followed  by 
other  counsels.  Bussy 's  Diwan  was  murdered  on  a  visit  to 
Nizam  AU  in  the  latter's  tent,  and  almost  in  his  presence.     On 

1  Mimoire  pour  Bussy  (1764),  pp.  92-93. 


BUSSY  IN  THE  DECCAN  101 

hearing  of  this,  Bussy  expected  an  immediate  attack,  and  sent 
to  fetch  Shah  Nawaz  Khan  to  the  French  camp.  Resistance 
was  offered  ;  in  the  conflict  Shah  Nawaz  Khan  was  slain  ;  and 
Nizam  Ah,  shrinking  from  the  judgment  of  the  sword,  fled  with 
a  party  of  horse.  Bussy,  having  conciliated  Basalut  Jang  with 
the  offer  of  the  government  of  Hyderabad,  thus  succeeded  in 
re-establishing  the  authority  of  Salabat  Jang.  At  this  time  his 
career  in  the  Deccan  was  suddenly  cut  short  by  the  orders  of 
Lally,  who  summoned  him  south  with  all  the  troops  that  could 
be  spared  from  the  defence  of  Masulipatam. 

It  is  foreign  to  the  present  purpose  to  pursue  the  story  further. 
It  is  enough  to  remind  the  reader  that  in  this  same  year  Clive 
dispatched  an  expedition  from  Calcutta  under  Colonel  Forde, 
who  defeated  the  French  in  the  field,  captured  Masulipatam,  held 
it  under  great  difficulties,  and  obtained  from  the  deserted  Salabat 
Jang,  without  any  obhgation  of  service  in  return,  the  cession  of 
the  provinces  which  the  French  formerly  had  held. 

The  remarkable  episode  we  have  been  considering  bears  in 
two  ways  at  least  upon  the  subject  of  this  book.  No  one  can 
deny  the  brilhance  of  Bussy's  character,  or  his  skilful  conduct 
aUke  of  military  and  political  affairs  ;  and  yet  the  French  suc- 
cesses in  the  Deccan  were  completely  fruitless,  except  in  so  far  as 
they  provided  Dupleix  with  a  shadow  of  legitimate  authority. 
French  control  of  the  Subahdar  of  the  Deccan,  on  whom  the 
government  of  the  Camatic  was  traditionally  dependent,  enabled 
Dupleix  to  put  forth  a  very  plausible  case,  which  the  English 
found  it  difficult  to  controvert,  but  which  was  utterly  at  variance 
with  the  facts.  As  the  English  did  not  care  to  accept  Dupleix' 
theories,  their  plausibiUty  mattered  little  ;  and  the  French  paid 
heavily  for  being  able  to  declare  that  Dupleix  had  been  appointed 
Nawab  of  the  South  by  competent  Moghul  authority. 

It  has  been  usual  to  consider  that  in  recaUing  Bussy  in  1758 
Lally  was  stupidly  giving  up  the  fruits  of  Dupleix'  poUcy.  But 
let  us  consider  what  those  fruits  were.  In  the  first  place,  the 
Deccan  expedition  withdrew  from  the  critical  field  of  operations — 
the  Camatic — a  relatively  considerable  body  of  troops  and  in- 
comparably the  ablest  French  officer  ;  but  for  this  it  is  very 
possible  that  the  long  and  indecisive  struggle  with  the  English 
might  have  been  considerably  modified,  the  French  Company 
might  not  have  been  disgusted  with  grandiloquent  accounts  of 
victories  which  produced  nothing  but  renewed  war,  Dupleix 
might  have  remained  at  Pondich^ry,  and  the  course  of  subsequent 


102  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

affairs  been  changed.  In  the  second  place,  while  the  expedition 
secured  great  territorial  concessions,  it  was  never  more  than  just 
self-supporting,  save  in  so  far  as  in  the  early  days  Bussy  and 
his  companions  remitted  to  Pondichery  the  proceeds  of  Salabat 
Jang's  munificence.  Once  the  treasuries  of  Hyderabad  and 
Aurangabad  had  been  emptied,  Bussy  was  continually  in  straits 
for  money.  When  he  left  the  Deccan  he  claimed  as  due  to  him 
from  the  Company  considerable  sums  which  he  had  had  to  advance 
for  the  maintenance  of  his  troops.  It  appears  then  that  the 
advantages  derived  from  Bussy's  exploits  were  showy  rather  than 
substantial,  and  that  the  policy  which  sought  them  was  funda- 
mentally unsound.     The  Deccan  was  not  worth  conquering. 

Yet  this  expedition  merits  the  closest  attention,  for  it  showed 
how  a  body  of  Europeans  might  dominate  an  Oriental  court,  the 
dangei's  to  which  they  would  be  exposed,  the  advantages  which 
they  could  hope  for.  Clive's  relations  with  Jafar  Ali  were  just 
the  same  as  Bussy's  with  Salabat  Jang.  In  both  cases  the  prince 
was  weak,  untrustworthy,  solely  dependent  in  fact  upon  the 
Europeans  who  had  given  him  his  throne.  In  both  cases  this 
European  predominance  roused  the  bitter  jealousy  of  the  Muham- 
madan  nobles  who  intrigued  for  the  support  of  other  European 
nations  in  overthrowing  that  predominance.  In  both  cases  the 
financial  administration  was  so  weak  that  the  prince  was  always 
in  difficulties  for  money  and  constantly  threatened  by  an  unpaid 
army.  In  both  cases  financial  difficulties  compelled  the  cession 
of  territory  which  still  was  not  adequate  to  the  public  necessities. 
In  both  cases  the  European  leaders  secured  amazing  rewards 
for  their  services.  In  both  cases  they  avoided  all  appearance  of 
independent  authority  and  aimed  at  directing  affairs  from  behind 
the  screen  of  the  native  government. 

It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  Bussy's  example  was  con- 
stantly before  the  eyes  of  Clive  in  those  uncertain,  exciting  years 
which  followed  the  capture  of  Calcutta  by  Siraj-ud-daula.  Less 
smooth  and  debonnaire,  his  forceful  character  and  more  secure 
position  enabled  him  to  obtain  an  even  greater  ascendancy  than 
Bussy  had  been  able  to  establish  ;  the  superior  wealth  of  Bengal 
permitted  greater  scope  than  the  sun-scorched,  rocky  plains  of 
the  south  ;  but  apart  from  these  differences  in  character  and 
position,  Clive  had  to  encounter  the  same  problems  as  Bussy,  and 
commonly  adopted  the  solutions  which  the  latter  had  devised. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  POLICY  OF  DUPLEIX 

BEFORE  the  exploits  of  Dupleix  and  Bussy  had  produced 
their  natural  consequences,  the  position  of  Europeans 
in  India  had  varied  much.  In  the  north  they  were  at  the 
uncertain  mercy  of  the  local  Governors.  At  Calcutta,  for  ex- 
ample, the  Council  feared  to  condemn  a  Muhammadan  to  death  ; 
and  neither  French  nor  English  were  allowed  to  strengthen  or 
enlarge  their  fortificatioqs.  But  the  government  of  Bengal  under 
Ahvirdi  Khan  was  comparatively  vigorous,  and  subordinate 
officials  were  closely  watched.  The  governments  dependent  on 
the  Subahdar  of  the  Deccan,  however,  were  much  less  strictly 
supervised  during  the  later  years  of  Nizam-ul-Mulk.  He  had 
adopted  the  custom  of  letting  out  the  various  offices  for  short 
terms  to  the  highest  bidder  ;  and  the  local  Nawabs  were  at 
liberty  to  recoup  themselves  as  best  they  could.  The  European 
factories  which  lay  within  their  power  felt  their  severity.  Those 
at  Masulipatam,  formerly  a  great  mart,  languished  or  were  with- 
drawn on  account  of  the  heavy  duties  that  had  been  imposed. 
The  French  factory  at  Yanam,  the  Dutch  at  Narsapur,  the  English 
at  Ingeram  and  Madapollam,  were  harassed  by  demands  for 
presents,  or  requisitions  to  buy  timber,  under  pain  of  the  stoppage 
of  trade.  On  more  than  one  occasion  the  total  abandonment  of 
these  factories  was  contemplated. 

In  the  south  the  position  was  very  different.  There  the~ 
Europeans  held  fortified  and  garrisoned  cities.  Madras  was  a 
place  of  considerable  wealth,  a  centre  of  trade  and  banking,  not 
Ughtly  to  be  meddled  with,  and  there  the  English  privileges  were 
jealously  upheld.  When  in  1744  a  shroff,  instead  of  applying 
to  the  English  courts,  dared  to  seek  the  aid  of  the  amildar  of 
St.  Thom6  to  procure  payment  from  an  English  debtor,  he  was 
promptly  fined  300  pagodas,  and  such  representations  were  made 
to  the  offending  amildar  that  he  promptly  offered  apologies, 
explaining  that  he  had  but  recently  come  from  a  remote  part 


104  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

of  India  and  knew  nothing  of  English  privileges.*  Neither 
Madras  nor  Pondich^ry  were  in  the  least  accustomed  to  Uve  in 
dread  of  the  Nawab's  displeasure.  They  avoided  causes  of 
dispute — that  was  natural  in  a  purely  trading  society — ^but 
Dupleix  had  found  the  Europeans  in  this  position  when  he 
assumed  the  government  in  1742,  and  had  enjoyed  its  benefits 
for  several  years  before  his  mind  turned  from  commercial  to 
pohtical  meditations.  The  independent  position  of  Europeans 
in  the  Carnatic  was  the  starting-point  from  which  his  poUcy 
developed. 

His  motives  in  supporting  Chanda  Sahib  in  his  attempt  on 
Arcot  were  simply  to  strengthen  that  position.  He  expected 
two  things.  One  was  that  the  new  Nawab  would  favour  French 
trade,  that  the  subordinate  officials  would  be  less  disposed  than 
ever  to  interfere  with  goods  destined  for  the  French  settlement. 
The  second  was  the  enlargement  of  French  territory  round 
Pondichery,  involving  an  increase  in  the  Company's  permanent 
revenues,  and  also  the  estabUshment  of  a  considerable  weaving- 
centre  under  its  ovm  jurisdiction.  But  in  all  this  there  was 
nothing  new.  The  EngUsh  had  sent  an  embassy  to  the  great 
Moghul  thirty  years  before  to  procure  the  grant  of  villages  which 
they  desired  for  exactly  the  same  reasons.  How  little  Dupleix 
foresaw  the  development  of  his  political  ideas  is  shown  by  his 
attitude  towards  Muzaffar  Jang  after  the  victory  of  Ambur.  He 
is  "  a  leech  to  be  got  rid  of  as  soon  as  possible."  The  principal 
purpose  of  the  French  contingent  is  to  guard  Chanda  Sahib  against 
him.  There  is  no  trace  of  any  idea  of  poUtical  predominance. 
Chanda  Sahib  is  still  his  own  master.  It  is  he  who  elects  to 
attack  Tanjore  instead  of  Trichinopoly  in  1749.  He  flies  to 
Pondichery,  dragging  the  French  army  after  him,  on  the  approach 
of  Nasir  Jang  in  1750. 

This  absence  of  real  poUtical  motive  explains  why  Dupleix 
felt  such  surprise  and  indignation  at  the  English  support  afforded 
to  Muhammad  Ah.  He  had  not  interfered  when  they  attacked 
Tanjore  ;  why  should  they  act  differently  ?  * 

His  correspondence  with  Floyer,  the  Governor  of  Fort  St. 
David,  abounds  with  protests  of  this  nature.'    When  the  English 

•  Pub.  Cons.,  March  8,  1744. 

'  "  II  pouvait  croire  a  rimmobilite  des  Anglais  et  qu'ils  imiteraient  sa  correc- 
tion dans  des  conjonctures  toutes  pareilles "  (Cultru,  op.  cit.,  p.  290).  The 
remark  looks  strange  in  the  light  of  subsequent  events,  but  is  true  enough  of  1750. 

•  See  French  Correspondence,  1750. 


THE  POLICY  OF  DUPLEIX  105 

occupy  Tiruvendipuram,  he  does  not  question  their  right  to  do 
so,  but  complains  that  they  ought  to  have  given  him  notice 
instead  of  pulling  down  the  French  flags.  On  their  sending  help 
to  Muhammad  Ali,  he  observes  that  in  the  past  Europeans  have 
never  intervened  in  disputes  between  a  European  and  a  country 
power,  and  that  this  is  the  only  policy  possible  for  them  in  India. 
He  was  unaware  that  he  had  inaugurated  a  policy  which  was  to 
revolutionise  the  situation  and  render  the  traditional  acquiescence 
impossible. 

In  that  respect  his  English  opponents  saw  the  actual  bearing 
of  his  policy  more  clearly  than  he  did  himself,  as  is  evinced  by 
their  preparations  for  resistance  in  the  autumn  of  1749.  Even 
then,  however,  and  for  long  after,  their  attitude  was  determined 
by  trade  rather  than  poUtical  considerations.  They  were  de- 
fending the  commercial  privileges  of  the  Company,  not  fighting 
for  predominance  in  Southern  India.  The  treaty  to  which  they 
agreed  at  the  close  of  1754  shows  how  far  they  still  were  from 
having  imbibed  the  political  ideas  which  Dupleix  had  in  the 
interval  developed. 

That  development  may  be  said  to  date  from  the  death  of 
Nasir  Jang  in  December  1750.  Up  till  then  Dupleix  would  have 
been  perfectly  content  with  Nasir  Jang  as  Subahdar.  He  had 
just  concluded  an  amicable  arrangement  with  him.  But  his 
death  and  the  accession  of  Muzaffar  Jang  necessarily  modified 
his  aims  and  ambitions.  Muzaffar  Jang,  Hke  Chanda  Sahib, 
owed  his  position  solely  to  the  French.  So  uncertain  was  he  of 
support  that  he  insisted  on  Dupleix  giving  him  a  French  body- 
guard. His  death  proved  the  need  of  such  assistance.  His 
successor,  Salabat  Jang,  enjoyed  the  same  precarious  position, 
and  needed  the  same  adventitious  help.  But  by  the  theory  of 
outworn  Moghul  institutions,  the  Subahdar  of  the  Deccan  was 
the  lord  of  the  south.  The  Nawab  of  Arcot  was  his  nominee  ; 
the  kings  of  Mysore  and  Tanjore  were  his  tributaries. 

The  change  of  position  is  indicated  at  once  by  the  grants 
that  were  made.  At  Pondich6ry  Muzaffar  Jang  bestowed  on 
the  French  Masulipatam  and  recognised  Dupleix  as  his  Deputy 
south  of  the  river  Kistna.  ,  But  as  yet  Dupleix  was  not  prepared 
to  take  full  advantage  of  these  grants.  He  at  once  named 
Chanda  Sahib  as  the  Nawab  of  Arcot,  which  meant  in  fact  the 
establishment  of  numerous  obstacles  in  the  way  of  his  exercising 
political  power.  On  the  death  of  Muzaffar  Jang,  his  successor 
confirmed  all  his  grants  to  the  French  ;  and  presently  we  begin 


106  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

to  hear  of  new  dcuiands.  To  the  town  and  district  of  Masuli- 
patani  was  added  the  adjoining  district  of  G>nda\'ir.  Then,  as 
the  ascendancy  which  Bussy  established  over  Salabat  Jang 
became  more  evident,  and  as  Chanda  Sahib  grew  rcsti\'e  under 
the  growing  restraint  imposed  on  him.  there  appear  wider  ideas 
of  the  advantage  which  mi^t  be  taken  of  the  sitiiatioo.  It 
oocurs  to  Dupleix  that  the  Deput\-ship  might  be  made  use  of, 
and  a  curious  intrigue  oneiges  with  that  object  in  view. 

That  causes  of  dissatisfaction  would  arise  against  Chanda 
Sahib  was  as  obtain  as  that  day  follows  night.  He  was  indebted 
to  Dupleix  and  the  Company,  and  probably  to  half  Pondich^ 
besides  ;  Orimtal  state-debtws  have  ev«r  been  bad  paymasters. 
His  collections  in  the  rc\'enue  year  1750-51  cannot  have  amounted 
to  much,  and  had  possibly  beoi  expected  to  amount  to  more. 
Financial  difterences  thus  almost  certainly  arose  iaetween  the 
allies.  Then  again  thon^  was  the  conduct  of  the  war.  At 
Ambur.  in  Tanjore.  and  against  Nasir  Jang,  Chanda  Sahib  had 
displayed  no  military  talent ;  he  had  rath^  given  grounds  for 
doubting  his  posonal  bravery.  In  the  camp>aign  against 
Muhanunad  Ali  at  Tridunopoly.  the  French  therefore  took  a 
mote  decided  part  and  gave  commands  rather  than  offered  advice. 
Chanda  Sahib  took  this  hardly — as  was  inevitable  ;  he  is  alleged 
with  great  probability  to  luive  written  to  Delhi  comi^aining  that 
Salabat  Jang  was  dehvering  the  whole  country  into  the  hands 
of  the  Christians,  and  that  the  True  Faith  would  be  trodden 
down  unless  he  reodved  a  forman  for  Aroot  from  the  Emperor 
himsdf.* 

We  have  afaeady  sem  how  this  scheme  was  counter-worked 
by  anotho-,  intmded  to  establish  Dupldx'  authoity.*  In 
writing  to  the  Company,  Dupldx  ascribes  this  to  Bussy  ;  *  but 
it  b  in  the  last  degree  unlikely  that  Bossy  should  hav^e  taken 
actkm  affecting  so  profoundly  the  relations  of  Dupldx  and 
Chanda  Sahib  without  full  instructfon  from  his  superior.  In 
disclaiming  the  authorship  of  the  schone.  Dupldx  was  probably 
only  evading  the  responsibility  for  what  he  foared  would  give 
his  oondoct  too  aggressive  an  appearance  ;  and  he  commoided 
it  to  the  Cooqnny  witii  the  irresistible  aigument  that  this  grant 
would  relieve  the  Company  from  the  need  of  sliding  funds  for 

>B«sqrU>Diq>leix.Stptcinber  1. 1751  {JUmt.  ptmr  (Mtkm.  p.  6m}. 
•St»p.»6.sm^rm. 

*  IXqieiz  to  tk#  CoHipaay.  Febraaiy  tg^  I75<:  **  Vohs y  trawvcrt*  m  iiitM 
Most  aaqMljeaea'attswlois  pas.    CastlaiiKr<»vncedelLd»BBSf.*' 


THE  POLICY  OF  DUPLEIX  107 

its  investment,  and  with  assurances  that  the  grant  only  tended 
to  the  complete  tranquillity  of  the  French  in  the  Camatic* 

The  real  motive,  however,  seems  to  have  been  the  dispossessicm 
of  Chanda  Sahib.  "  On  receiving  the  parawana,"  writes  Bussy, 
"  I  think  you  should  sununon  Chanda  Sahib  and  his  son,  tell 
them  they  may  sit  quiet,  as  you  are  Nawab  of  the  Camatic, 
and  take  all  the  troops  on  your  account."  *  Dupleix,  however, 
preferred  to  wait  until  he  had  received  from  Delhi  the  confirma- 
tion of  Salabat  Jang's  parawana ;  and  great  pains  were  taken 
to  keep  the  matter  unknown  to  Chanda  Sahib.  In  March  1752 
it  is  said  that  a  confirmative  parawana  was  sent  him  to  lull  his 
suspicions,'  and  a  letter  is  quoted  which,  however  siispect  by 
origin,  bears  within  it  all  the  marks  of  probability :  "  I  am 
assured,"  Bussy  is  said  to  have  written,  "  that  Chanda  Sahib 
has  sent  proposals  to  Muhammad  Ali  Khan,  telling  him  he  felt 
he  should  never  be  anything  but  a  slave  of  the  Governor's  and 
only  be  Nawab  in  appearance — Ne  serait  Nabob  qu'en  peinture  ; 
and  therefore  proposed  to  leave  him  in  peace  at  Trichinopoly, 
and  himself  to  withdraw  to  Arcot."  They  were,  Bussy  continues, 
to  help  each  other  against  all  enemies,  even  against  the  French.* 
The  question  of  Chanda  Sahib  was  determined  by  his  death. 
But  Dupleix'  parawana  was  used,  as  we  have  seen,  to  justify 
his  claims  against  the  English  ;  and  when  Murtaza  Ali  became 
Nawab,  he  was  only  Dupleix'  deputy.* 

Thus  Dupleix  attempted  to  solve  the  problem  of  governing 
the  Camatic.     The  difficulty  of  controlling  Chanda  Sahib  had 
rendered  a  revolution  necessary.     But  when  Dupleix  decided 
on  becoming  Nawab,  he  had  no  intention  of  undertaking  the 
administration  in  person.     "  I  shall  immediately  name  a  Nawab  ) 
\i.e.  a  naib  or  deputy]  who  will  be  charged  with  all  the  detail  of  S. 
the  province  .  .  .  and  it  will  be  he  who  will  render  me  accoxmt    j 
of  the  revenues.  .  .  ."  •  y 

In  actual  fact  Dupleix  did  not  find  this  scheme  practicable, 
for  Law's  surrender  emd  the  other  French  reverses  of  1752  and 
1753  left  only  a  small  part  of  the  Camatic  at  his  disposal.     Nor, 

•  Loc.  cit 

•  Bussy  to  Dnpleix,  October  13,  175 1,  ap.  Hamont.  op.  cit..  p.  166. 
•Godeheu,  Mimoire.  p.  65  ;    cf.  also  Bossy  to  Dupleix,  April  17.  1752,  »p. 

Mtm.  pour  la  Compagnie  contre  Dupleix.  Piices  No.  6. 

•  Bussy  to  Dupleix,  March  7,  1752.  ap.  Godeheu,  Mimoire,  pp.  65-66. 

•  See  the  parawana  dated  10  Jamadi-us-sani,  a.b.  i  166,  ap.  Dupleix'  Riponse 
i  la  lettre  de  Godeheu.  pp.  322-323. 

•  Dupleix  to  Bussy,  October  28,  1751,  ap.  Coltm,  op.  cit.,  pp.  268-269. 


108  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

when  he  appointed  Murtaza  Ali  Naib  of  Arcot,  was  he  so  imprudent 
as  to  entrust  him  with  the  general  collection  of  revenues.  That 
was  confided  to  Papaiya  Pillai,  a  creature  of  Madame  Dupleix  ; 
and  the  malversations  and  oppressions  of  this  man  are  credibly 
asserted  ^  to  have  equalled  anything  done  that  way  by  Indian 
revenue-collectors . 
f  y  The  system  thus  established  so  far  as  French  power  extended 
in  the  Carnatic  was  rather  the  result  of  circumstances  than  the 
fruit  of  political  meditation.  It  followed  the  course  which 
would  have  been  adopted  by  any  administrator  of  the  eighteenth 

^century.  Nor  was  Dupleix  even  the  first  to  adopt  the  system. 
The  Dutch  had  encountered  similar  problems  as  their  power  had 
extended  over  the  island  of  Java.  They  too  had  shrunk  from 
interference  in  the  complicated  administration  of  a  large  subject- 
population.  They  also  had  found  themselves  ignorant  of  native 
law  and  custom  ;  their  functionaries  were  skilled  rather  in  valuing 
spices  and  measuring  cloth  than  in  deaUng  with  political  or 
judicial  problems  ;  ''they  suffered  native  institutions  to  stand, 

r  and  contented  themselves  with  the  control  of  the  native  princes, 
because  they  had  no  idea  how  to  replace  them. 

Such  too  was  the  position  of  Dupleix  in  the  Carnatic.  Even 
had  he  wished  to  do  so,  he  could  not  possibly  have  estabhshed 
a  European  administration.  He  lacked  the  knowledge  that 
would  have  been  required.  His  subordinates  at  Pondichery 
were  ignorant  alike  of  the  language  and  the  customs  of  the 

,^  people.  He  could  not  do  other  than  preserve  all  the  forms  and 
all  the  abuses  of  the  native  government.  The  only  administrative 
function  in  which  he  was  interested  was  the  collection  of  revenue  ; 
and  the  sole  change  that  he  introduced  there  was  that  the  proceeds 
were  paid  at  Pondichery  instead  of  at  Arcot.  Bussy  in  the 
Deccan,  as  we  have  seen,  showed  the  way  to  control  and  manage 
a  native  Court  ;  Dupleix  in  the  Carnatic  carried  the  process  a 
stage  farther.     Bussy's  career  offers  a  fair  parallel  with  the  first 

V~govemment  of    Chve  ;    Dupleix'   ideas  of   government  in  the 

i  south  correspond  with  those  which  the  EngUsh  followed  in  Bengal 
from  Clive's  first  departure  till  the  Company  resolved  to  stand 
forth  as  Diwan. 

This  is  not  the  only  respect  in  which  French  examples  offered 
a  model  and  a  warning  to  the  English.  There  was  also  the 
acceptance  of  private  presents.  On  hearing  of  the  terms  of 
Godeheu's  provisional  treaty,  Bussy  at  once  marked  what  seemed 

'  By  M.  Cultru. 


THE  POLICY  OF  DUPLEIX  109 

to  him  a  fatal  obstacle  to  its  observance.  On  the  stipulation  that 
neither  side  should  in  future  take  part  in  the  quarrels  of  native 
princes,  he  remaiks  :  "  It  is  little  hkely  that  either  side  will  keep 
this  promise  ;  all  know  how  easily  an  ascendancy  may  be  estab- 
lished over  Asiatics.  .  .  .  The  soUd  advantages  that  one  has 
found  in  doing  so  are  powerful  motives."  ^  Private  advantages 
were  inextricably  interwoven  with  the  policy  of  Dupleix.  How 
far  such  motives  weighed  with  him  or  Bussy  would  be  hard  to  say. 
It  is  unUkely  that  they  weighed  much  in  the  later  stages  of  their 
careers,  for  then  ambition  had  been  aroused  in  them  ;  whatever 
they  had  been  before,  they  became  men  pla5dng  great  parts 
on  a  great  stage,  and,  engrossed  in  the  development  of  their 
plans,  they  could  not  in  the  intoxication  of  action  have  been  moved 
overmuch  by  thought  of  resultant  opulence.  Dupleix  at  all 
events  staked  the  wealth  which  his  policy  brought  him  upon 
the  success  of  that  poUcy.  Had  he  won,  there  would  have  been 
no  questions  of  his  accounts  or  any  debt  due  from  the  Company  ; 
he  would  have  had  ample  opportunities  of  settling  that.  But 
with  this  adventure  of  the  French,  just  as  later  on  with  the  Enghsh 
in  Bengal,  we  find  the  same  mixture  of  public  and  private  motives, 
of  public  and  private  advantages,  even  among  the  foremost, 
while  the  rank  and  file  of  both  nations  are  too  apt  not  even  to 
mix  their  motives.  As  in  policy,  so  too  here  the  French  showed 
us  the  way. 

We  need  not  dwell  upon  the  advantages  which  the  leaders 
found.  Bussy 's  fortune  was  of  unknown  amount,  but  it  enabled 
him  to  buy  an  estate  and  marry  the  daughter  of  the  Due  de 
Rohan.  When  Dupleix  was  recalled,  he  was  actually  negotiat- 
ing for  the  purchase  of  an  estate.  D'Argenson's  comment  on  his 
return  recalls  Walpole's  description  of  CUve,  "  All  over  estates 
and  diamonds."  "  Nor  were  their  subordinates  forgotten.  We 
have  already  mentioned  the  donation  which  the  French  officers 
demanded  and  received  before  Tanjore,and  the  subsequent  mutiny 
of  thirteen  who  had  not  been  thus  inspired  for  war.  But  the  great 
field  for  such  harvests  was  the  Deccan.  A  French  surgeon  writes 
from  Pondich6ry  in  1752  :  "  All  who  go  make  immense  fortunes, 
none  returns  without  a  considerable  sum  ;   M.  Vincens,  Madame 

'  Bussy  to  Godeheu,  October  23.  1754  (Dupleix,  Riponse  d  Godeheu,  pp.  295, 
etc.). 

•  Dupleix  received  the  district  of  Valudavur  as  a  jagir  (another  similarity 
with  Clive),  and  the  French  Company  allowed  him  to  enjoy  its  proceeds  so  long 
as  it  remained  in  their  possession.  He  was  reduced  to  poverty  by  the  English 
success  rather  than  byjthe  Corapany'sjiniquity. 


no  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

Dupleix'  son,  has  just  brought  back  40,000  gold  rupees,  each 
worth  16  silver  ones, — to  say  nothing  of  pagodas,  silver  rupees, 
and  jewels,  with  which  they  are  overwhelmed  in  that  country. 
.  .  .  M.  Kerjean,  M.  Dupleix'  nephew,  has  just  arrived  with  at 
least  as  much  ; — to  go  to  Golconda  is  every  one's  ambition,  but 
that  is  a  privilege  reserved  for  the  favourites  of  the  Court.  .  .  ."  ^ 

At  first  Dupleix  reported  all  this  freely  enough,  observing  that 
it  would  facilitate  the  recruitment  of  the  Company's  officers.  The 
Company,  however,  saw  matters  in  a  somewhat  different  light. 
From  the  very  first  the  private  receipt  of  presents  had  been 
forbidden.^  When  in  1740  Nawab  Safdar  Ali  gave  three  villages 
to  Dumas  in  jagir  as  a  reward  for  the  shelter  which  his  wife 
and  mother  had  found  at  Pondichery,  Dumas  had  had  to  obtain 
the  Company's  leave  before  he  could  enjoy  them.  The  Company 
now  sought  and  obtained  from  the  Ministers  a  decree  of  the 
Council  of  State,  prohibiting  again  the  receipt  of  presents  by  any 
servant,  civil  or  military,  of  the  Company.'  Dupleix'  answer  to 
this  is  remarkable.  It  is  clear,  he  says,  from  the  precautions 
taken  by  the  Company,  that  its  only  purpose  is  to  appropriate  to 
itself  the  rewards  of  valour  and  good  service,  without  troubling 
about  the  justice  of  the  proceeding.* 

The  only  result  of  the  Company's  action  was  to  convert  the 
presents  received  from  the  country  powers  from  a  public  and 
avowed  into  a  private  and  concealed  matter.  Dupleix  was 
permitted  to  enjoy  the  jagir  granted  him  by  Muzafiar  Jang. 
The  rest  hid  what  they  could  not  openly  defend.  But  the  example 
of  these  swift  and  easy  fortunes  affected,  as  such  examples 
always  must,  every  servant  and  officer  in  the  service.  Nor  were 
they  well  prepared  to  resist  the  contagion  of  such  examples.  The 
practice  of  paying  officials  by  means  of  fees  received  from  the 
public  had  of  course  been  imported  from  Europe  in  the  early  days 
of  the  Company  ;  and  in  India  the  practice  had  attained  a  develop- 
ment in  accord  with  the  character  of  the  country,  where  presents 
formed  the  normal,  legitimate,  respectable  reward  for  doing 
one's  duty.  Dupleix'  administration  was  honeycombed  with 
what  to-day  we  should  call  flagrant  corruption.  Presents  for 
giving  a  favourable  award  in  an  inheritance  suit,  for  restoring 

'  French  Correspondence,  1752. 

'  Reglement  of  January  31.  1685,  quoted  in  the  Mimoire  of  the  Company 
against  Dupleix.  p.  9,  n. 

'  Decree  dated  Juno  6,  1750  (copy  in  P.R.,  No.  84,  f.  345).  Also  a  later 
decree  to  the  same  purpose,  dated  December  30,  175 1.  \ 

♦  Cultru,  op.  cit.,  p.  349. 


THE  POLICY  OF  DUPLEIX  111 

a  dismissed  official  to  his  post,  for  attending  a  native  wedding  for 
paying  marks  of  respect  to  people  of  rank  * — such  was  the  every- 
day practice,  the  undeviating  example. 

It  was  natural  then  that  his  subordinates  should  have  been 
deeply  affected  by  the  sight  of  the  sudden  fortunes  which  men 
acquired  in  the  service  of  the  country  powers.  It  was  bound 
to  demoralise  them,  and  it  did.  All  possible  means  of  making 
money  were  eagerly  sought  after  and  grasped  at.  The  instnic- 
tions  to  Godeheu  of  1753,  the  instructions  to  Lally  of  1757,  show 
how  alarmed  were  people  in  France  at  the  reports  they  had 
received.^ 

Even  in  1750  Dupleix  complains  of  the  Company's  servants 
whom  interest  turns  aside  from  duty.  ^  Leyrit  describes  his  officers 
as  spoilt  by  the  independent  commands  they  have  enjoyed,  and 
unwilling  to  march  unless  they  are  to  be  well  paid  for  it.''  The 
unfortunate  Lally  finds  peculation  running  through  every  branch 
of  the  service.  The  charge  for  feeding  artillery  bullocks  is  re- 
duced from  21  to  12  rupees  a  month  on  the  express  condition  that 
nothing  need  be  paid  to  the  commanding  officer."  The  lands 
of  the  Company  are  always  let  below  their  value  to  renters  who  can 
be  changed  at  pleasure  and  so  have  to  pay  for  their  position. 
Lally  mentions  a  coconut  garden  the  rent  of  which  was  raised 
from  450  to  9000  livres.'  As  Orme  observed,  "  Wars  in  India 
always  make  immense  private  fortunes  "  ; '  and  how  familiar 
sounds  this  short  passage  from  Lally 's  instructions  :  "As  the 
troubles  in  India  raised  a  great  number  of  new  and  sudden  private 
estates,  the  same  system  still  reigns  at  Pondich^ry,  where  those 
who  have  not  yet  made  a  fortune  hope  to  make  one  by  the  same 
means, and  those  who  have  dissipated  one  hope  to  make  another."* 

This  tendency  under  Dupleix'  government,  although  it  may 
not  have  been  so  vigorously  developed  as  it  was  under  Leyrit, 
was  well  known  in  France,  and  must  be  included  among  the 
causes  which  discredited  his  management.  But  his  main  failure 
lay  in  finance,  giving  colour  to  the  reports  of  mismanagement  or 

'  See  Diary  of  Ananda  Ranga  Pillai,  vol.  i.  p.  346 ;  vol.  ii.  pp.  6,  14,  35,  53,  339, 
341-342.  It  should  be  observed  that  the  diarist  records  these  incidents  as 
matters  of  course. 

'  Lally  was  even  warned  not  to  send  the  Company's  troops  alone  upon  any 
expedition. 

'  Dupleix  to  the  Company,  October  3,  1750  (Archives  des  Colonies). 

*  Godeheu,  Mimoire,  p.  21,  n.        '  Lally's  Mimoire,  p.  14.        "  Ibid.,  p.  12. 

'  Letter  to  Holdcrnesse.  n.d.  (Orme  MSS..  India,  ii.  f.  448). 

"  Lally's  Mimoire,  p.  21. 


112  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

roguery.  It  has  been  strenuously  argued  that  Dupleix  made  his 
wars  pay  for  themselves  ;  but  never  was  such  a  delusion.  His 
collections  in  the  Carnatic  are  unknown — he  sedulously  con- 
cealed them  ;  so  is  the  expenditure  which  was  involved  by  his 
wars — for  a  similar  reason.  But  in  spite  of  these  defects  in  our 
knowledge,  we  have  ample  evidence  to  show  that  his  policy 
involved  a  heavy  expenditure  out  of  the  funds  provided  for  other 
purposes  by  the  French  Company.  The  figures  on  which  this 
conclusion  depends  are  controversial — but  if  incorrect,  they  may 
be  presumed  to  err  in  his  favour,  for  they  are  furnished  by  him- 
self. From  his  statement  of  receipts  and  expenditure  it  appears 
that  between  June  30,  1748,  and  April  25,  1754,  he  detained  63 
lakhs  of  rupees  at  Pondich6ry  in  bullion,  while  he  received  from 
Europe  and  the  other  factories  a  net  amount  of  41^  lakhs  in 
merchandise.  As  he  returned  to  Europe  during  this  period 
cargoes  amounting  to  only  62  J  lakhs,  he  therefore  expended  at 
Pondich^ry  out  of  the  Company's  funds  more  than  42  lakhs. 
Out  of  this  he  paid  off  more  than  7  lakhs  of  debt  contracted 
duiing  the  previous  war,  leaving  expenditure  on  current  affairs 
amounting  to  34 J  lakhs. ^  Now  the  normal  and  permitted  ex- 
penditure at  Pondich^ry  and  Karikal  amounted  to  2J  lakhs  a 
year.^  Let  us  assume  that  between  Jime  30,  1748,  and  April  25, 
1749,  Dupleix  spent  twice  as  much — a  liberal  allowance,  to 
cover  the  cost  of  the  siege  and  the  repairs  involved.  Then  in  five 
years  Dupleix  spent  30  lakhs  of  the  Company's  money,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  old  revenues.  These  amounted  to  over  5  lakhs 
in  that  period.^  That  gives  out  of  the  Company's  money  and  old 
revenues  an  average  annual  expenditure  of  7  lakhs — more  than 
three  times  the  normal.  In  other  words,  the  Company's  funds 
had  to  provide  an  annual  sum  of  4I  lakhs  for  the  war,  without 
which  Dupleix  could  have  increased  the  Company's  investment  by 
near  50  per  cent.  The  Company  thus  had  to  pay  what  was, 
relatively  to  its  annual  imports,  a  great  sum  towards  Dupleix' 
war,  at  a  time  when  he  was  assuring  it  that  the  war  was  costing 
nothing. 

So  much  appears  certain.  And  while  this  contribution  from 
the  Company's  funds  was  large  when  compared  with  the 
amount  of  the  investment,  and  enormous  when  compared  with 

•  Figures  taken  from  the  statement  (Piices,  Q)  in  Dupleix'  Riponse  d  la  lettre 
du  Sieur  Godeheu. 

•  fitat  General  des  D6pcnses,  dated  February  17,  1747  (Archives  des  Colonies). 
'  Mimoirc  pour  la  Compagnie,  Piices  14  C  and  D. 


THE  POLICY  OF  DUPLEIX  113 

the  usual  annual  expenditure,  it  was  no  small  part  of  the 
total  expenditure  involved  by  the  war.  The  English  expendi- 
ture during  the  three  years  in  which  they  took  an  active  part 
amounted  to  ii  or  12  laklis  a  year.  It  seems  likely  then  that  the 
French  expenditure  was  met  to  the  extent  of  at  least  a  quarter  out 
of  the  Company's  funds.  Considering  that  Dupleix  and  Chanda 
Sahib  enjoyed  the  Carnatic  revenue  undisturbed  for  less  than  a 
year,  we  may  well  doubt  whether  the  country  furnished  more  than 
another  quarter  towards  the  war  expenditure.  The  balance  was 
furnished,  partly  by  the  contributions  of  Mysore  and  Murtaza 
Ali,  partly  by  the  treasure  of  Nasir  Jang,  much  of  which  Dupleix 
was  obliged  to  expend  on  the  war,  borrowing  it  either  out  of  his 
own  private  purse  or  out  of  those  of  the  other  sharers. 

It  appears  then  that  a  considerable  proportion  of  the  French 
Company's  funds  were  absorbed  by  Dupleix  ;  and  that  he  suc- 
ceeded no  better  than  did  the  English  then  or  later  in  making 
war  in  the  Carnatic  pay  for  itself.  Like  the  Deccan,  it  was  too 
poor.  It  was  ruinous  to  dispute  it  against  another  European 
power.  Dupleix'  schemes  and  policy  demanded  a  wealthier 
province  than  either  the  Carnatic  or  the  Deccan  for  their 
realisation. 


\ 


/ 


PART    II 
THE   ENGLISH   ACHIEVEMENT 


ns 


CHAPTER  I 
THE  OVERTHROW  OF  SIRAJ-UD-DAULA 

THE  events  which  followed  the  conclusion  of  Godeheu's 
treaty  showed  how  impossible  it  was  for  French  and 
EngHsh  at  that  moment  to  live  side  by  side  without 
disputes.  By  the  treaty  it  was  arranged  that  each  should 
remain  in  possession  of  the  districts  which  it  actually  held. 
Even  that  gave  birth  to  difficulties.  Both  parties  claimed  certain 
districts.  When  commissaries  were  appointed  to  determine 
these  diiferences,  they  too  fell  to  wrangling.  Two  months  after 
their  nomination,  they  were  recalled,  to  let  their  tempers  cool ; 
four  months  later  they  were  set  to  work  again,  but  to  no  better 
purpose.  Quarrels  and  protests  nearly  led  to  blows.  Each 
party  accused  the  other  of  encroachments  ;  and  the  discussions 
had  no  result  except  to  exasperate  both  sides.* 

Nor  were  these  difficulties  confined  to  the  districts  lying 
between  the  undisputed  possessions  of  French  and  English. 
The  French  entered  territories  near  Trichinopoly  which  were 
alleged  always  to  have  obeyed  Muhammad  Ali.  The  English 
sent  an  expedition  to  raise  revenue  in  Madura  and  Tinnevelly,^ 
and  threatened  Murtaza  Ali  at  Vellore.  These  incidents  almost 
led  to  breaking  off  the  truce.  Duval  de  Leyrit,  who  in  March 
1755  had  come  down  from  Bengal  as  Governor  of  Pondich^ry, 
demanded  sharply  how  the  English  dared  to  make  conquests 
in  Madnra  and  Tinnevelly,  which  belonged  to  his  ally,  the 
King  of  Mysore.'  Pigot  replied  with  perfect  truth  that  neither 
the  French  nor  the  Mysoreans  had  had  a  foot  in  those  districts 
all  the  war.*  As  for  Vellore,  Leyrit  threatened  to  march  to  its 
assistance  if  it  was  attacked.*     AH  this  led  to  a  revival  of  the 

'  The  Commissaries'  Proceedings,  1755-56,  from  Sundry  Books  of  the  Military 
Department  of  the  Madras  Records. 

•  Heron's  expedition,  on  wliich  Orme  dilates  at  greater  length  than  it  deserves. 
'  Leyrit  to  Pigot,  August  16,  1755  (French  Correspondence). 

•  Pigot  to  Leyrit,  August  27,  1755  (ibid.). 

•  Leyrit  to  Pigot,  January  7,  1756  (ihid.). 

117 


118  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

dispute  as  to  who  was  the  legitimate  Nawab.  Leyrit  argued 
that  all  rents  and  revenues  were  due  to  Salabat  Jang  ;  Pigot 
bluntly  answered  that  the  latter  could  never  be  recognised 
"  while  his  only  support  seems  to  be  a  large  body  of  French 
troops."  ^  It  is  on  the  whole  surprising  that  war  did  not  break 
out  again  in  the  Carnatic  before  it  was  declared  in  Europe.* 
The  reason  is  probably  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  in  the  first 
half  of  1756  both  nations  were  concerned  with  events  in  the 
Deccan  rather  than  in  the  Carnatic.  Leyrit  was  sending  re- 
inforcements to  support  Bussy  in  his  difficulties  ;  Pigot  was 
preparing  an  expedition  to  take  advantage  of  them.  And  then 
in  the  middle  of  the  year  came  the  sudden  news  of  Calcutta 
seized  by  Siraj-ud-daula. 

To  what  extent  this  misfortune  was  due  to  what  had 
happened  in  the  south  is  uncertain.  HolweU  relates  that  on 
his  death-bed  Alivirdi  Khan  solemnly  warned  his  young  suc- 
cessor, Siraj-ud-daula,  against  the  ambitions  of  the  Europeans. 
This  has  been  denied  by  Company's  servants  better  informed 
and  on  the  whole  more  truthful  than  Holwell.*  But  while  the 
death-bed  may  easily  enough  have  been  but  a  picturesque 
addition,  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  the  death  of  Anwar-ud- 
din  Khan,  the  death  of  Nasir  Jang,  the  position  which  Bussy 
established  at  the  court  of  Salabat  Jang,  were  regarded  vnth 
that  apathy  which  Holwell's  enemies  would  have  us  believe. 
We  know  at  all  events  that  Alivirdi  Khan  was  so  shocked  at 
Nasir  Jang's  death  that  he  threatened  the  French  in  Bengal 
with  the  seizure  of  their  property.*  Incurious  and  apathetic 
as  Indians  may  have  been,  the  slaughter  of  two  Muhammadan 
princes  and  the  tutelage  of  a  third  by  the  infidel  were  not  e  vents 
to  be  passed  over  without  comment  at  a  Muhammadan  Court. 
It  matters  little  whether  Alivirdi  Khan  solemnly  warned  his 
grandson  or  not  ;  none  can  doubt  that  these  things  were  well 
calculated  to  raise  suspicion  and  distrust  in  the  mind  of  the 
young  Nawab. 

*  Letters  of  February  5  and  9,  1756  {French  Correspondence). 

'  Similar  unauthorised  war  and  similar  fruitless  conferences  had  been  pro- 
ceeding in  North  America.  Sharp  complaints  came  from  the  West  African 
settlements.  French  and  English  could  not  avoid  quarrelling  wherever  they 
met. 

'  Watts  in  the  Memoirs  of  the  Revolution ;  cf .  also  Watts  to  the  Company, 
January  30,  1757.  Papers  cited  regarding  Bengal,  1756-57,  without  further 
authority,  will  be  found  in  Mr.  S.  C.  Hill's  admirable  collection. 

*  Cultru,  op.  cit.,  p.  353. 


THE  OVERTHROW  OF  SIRAJ-UD-DAULA        119 

All  the  other  causes  asserted  to  have  produced  the  terrible 
outbreak  were  evidently  urged  and  pressed  mainly  in  order 
to  discredit  the  Governor  of  Calcutta,  Roger  Drake.  He  and 
his  Council  are  alleged  to  have  protected  a  runaway  whose 
wealth  the  Nawab  wished  to  seize,  but  which  they  wished  to 
share  ;  they  are  alleged  to  have  insulted  the  messenger  whom 
the  Nawab  sent  to  demand  his  surrender  ;  and  while  these 
accusations  may  well  enough  be  true,  their  truth  hardly  merits 
the  trouble  of  discussion.  Such  motives  would  scarcely  have 
turned  back  the  Nawab  in  the  verj'  act  of  marching  against 
his  only  dangerous  rival.  The  EngUsh  were  believed  to  have 
been  strengthening  their  fortifications  ;  the  Nawab  sent  them 
an  order  to  reduce  their  works  to  their  former  condition  ;  and 
to  this  demand  the  EngUsh  repUed  that  they  must  be  prepared 
to  defend  themselves  against  a  French  fleet.  Surely  it  was 
this  reply,  reacting  upon  suspicions  and  fears  already  formed, 
which  brought  the  Nawab  and  his  army  to  a  sudden  halt  at 
Rajmahal  on  their  way  to  Purnea.  He  surely  feared  that  the 
Europeans  were  preparing  to  repeat  in  Bengal  what  they  had 
perpetrated  in  the  Carnatic.  Why  otherwise  should  he  have 
sent  threatening  messages  at  the  same  moment  to  the  French 
and  Dutch  ?  Nor  is  this  view  inconsistent  with  his  subsequent 
treatment  of  them.  After  the  easy  capture  of  Calcutta,  he  was 
persuaded  that  for  him  at  least  Europeans  had  no  terrors. 
He  could  govern  them,  he  said,  with  a  pair  of  slippers.  He 
did  not,  therefore,  attack  Chandemagore  and  Cliinsura  after 
he  had  taken  Fort  William,  because  he  had  ceased  to  fear 
them. 

On  May  17,  Siraj-ud-daula  received  'the  English  answer 
regarding  their  defences,  and  at  once  marched  back  to  Murshida- 
bad,  which  he  reached  on  June  i.  On  the  outskirts  of  that  city 
at  Kasimbazaar  was  an  English  factory,  important  both  on 
account  of  the  silk  which  it  provided  for  the  Company  and  the 
intercourse  with  the  Nawab's  durbar  which  its  situation  made 
possible.  The  factory  was  fortified,  but  its  garrison  consisted 
of  only  fifty  men,  and  its  guns  were  small  and  honeycombed 
with  rust.  It  was  blockaded  on  May  31.  On  June  3  the  Nawab 
demanded  the  chief's  presence.  This  was  William  Watts,  a 
man  of  some  service,  and  possessing  a  talent  for  diplomacy 
which  was  later  on  to  be  fully  displayed.  By  threats  he  was 
forced  to  sign  a  paper  promising  to  raze  the  new  works  at 
Calcutta,  to  cease  passing  the  goods  of  natives  as  English,  and 


120  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

to  afford  no  shelter  to  the  Nawab's  subjects  at  Calcutta.     Next 
day  the  factory  was  surrendered.* 

At  this  time  Fort  WilUam  was  in  as  wretched  a  state  as 
was  Madras  in  1746.  It  had  long  been  so.  In  1742,  after  the 
Marathas  had  begun  their  devastations  in  Bengal,  and  when 
Indian  politics  were  manifestly  growing  precarious,  the  Italian 
engineer  Forresti  and  the  English  officer,  Major  Knipe,  con- 
demned it  as  untenable.  But  Knipe  went  on  to  Madras,  and 
Forresti  was  dismissed  as  an  extravagant  schemer.  In  1747  Com- 
modore Griffin  declared  the  place  to  be  indefensible.  Captain 
Fenwick  in  vain  attempted  to  induce  the  President  to  erect 
works  which  would  include  the  fatal  church  that  commanded 
the  gorges  of  all  four  bastions.  The  captain  of  artillery  informed 
the  Council  that  there  was  not  an  embrasure  fit  to  hold  a  gun 
or  a  carriage  fit  to  mount  one  ;  the  Council  only  resolved  that 
his  letter  was  irregular.  So  in  1756,  in  spite  of  numerous  plans 
and  calculations.  Fort  WiUiam  still  stood  with  great  windows 
cut  in  its  curtains,  with  out-buildings  masking  the  fire  of  the 
bastions,  with  ruinous  walls  unfit  to  bear  a  gun,  and  looking 
more  like  a  deserted  Moorish  fort  than  a  European  stronghold.  ^ 

Nor  was  the  place  better  off  for  a  garrison.  The  necessity 
of  resisting  the  French  had  compelled  the  Council  at  Madras 
to  detain  there  batch  after  batch  of  recruits  destined  for  Bengal  ; 
between  1750  and  1754,  600  men  had  been  thus  detained.  Be- 
sides this,  Bengal  had  sent  down  at  least  two  detachments,  few 
of  whom  ever  returned.  The  garrison,  therefore,  was  excep- 
tionally weak.  It  amounted  to  only  190  men,  most  of  whom 
were  the  half-castes  known  at  Madras  as  Topasses.  The  Militia 
was  embodied,  but,  when  sailors  had  been  drafted  off  to  the 
shipping,  there  remained  in  all  only  250  fighting  men,  together 
with  a  useless  body  of  untrained  Armenians  and  others.*  Nor 
was  the  commandant  a  man  to  make  good  by  skill  his  lack  of 
numbers.  He  is  said  to  have  been  on  the  point  of  being  broke 
before  the  attack ;  and  for  his  military  capacity,  he  kept  that 
to  himself.* 

'  Holwell  (letter  to  the  Company,  November  30,  1756)  complains  of  this  ; 
a  defence  for  twenty-four  hours,  he  says,  might  have  delayed  the  advance  on 
Calcutta  for  many  days.  As  against  this  Watts  rejoins  that  the  short  defence 
made  at  Calcutta  proves  that  tlie  Kasimbazaar  factory  was  untenable  (Watts 
to  the  Company,  January  30,  1757). 

'  See  Wilson's  Old  Fort  William,  vol.  ii. 

*  Holwelljto  Madras,  July  17,  1756,  and  to  the  Company,  November  30,  1756. 

*  Holwell  to  the  Company,  November  30,  1756. 


THE  OVERTHROW  OF  SIRAJ-UD-DAULA        121 

The  defence  of  Calcutta  would  in  any  case  have  been  a 
matter  of  great  difficulty  ;  but  the  plan  actually  adopted,  of 
trying  to  defend  the  streets  of  the  town,  was  probably  the  worst 
that  could  have  been  chosen.  It  meant  that  the  enemy  would 
have  cover  to  get  up  within  close  range  ;  that  they  would  be 
able  to  threaten  the  rear  of  every  post,  since  all  the  avenues 
could  not  be  adequately  guarded  ;  that  all  the  advantages  of 
European  discipline  and  fire-control  were  abandoned.  An 
enterprising  leader  would  have  led  his  men  out  into  the  open, 
and  sought  an  opportunity  to  bring  the  enemy  under  the  rapid 
fire  of  his  field-pieces  ;  a  prudent  commander  would  have  blown 
up  the  houses  and  the  church  that  overlooked  the  fort,  thrown 
up  earth  behind  the  windows  in  the  curtains,  and  destroyed  the 
outhouses  that  prevented  the  cross-fire  of  the  southern  bastions. 
But  spirit  was  lacking  for  the  first  of  these  operations  ;  and 
private  interest  was  too  strong  for  the  second.* 

In  spite  of  the  encouragement  he  had  received  from  the 
surrender  of  Kasimbazaar,  Siraj-ud-daula  still  hesitated  about 
attacking  Calcutta  with  nothing  but  his  own  resources.  He 
demanded  help  from  the  French  and  Dutch,  and  even  offered 
to  bestow  Calcutta  on  the  former  in  return  for  their  assistance.^ 
This  could  not  be  given.  Even  in  the  Carnatic,  the  English  had 
steadily  refused  to  co-operate  in  any  attack  on  the  ancient 
possessions  of  the  French ;  a  similar  reason  compelled  the 
French  refusal  in  Bengal,  nor  is  there  any  evidence  that  they 
wished  to  do  so. 

In  spite  of  this  refusal,  however,  the  Nawab  proceeded  to  the 
attack.  On  June  i6  an  advanced  party  of  his  troops  was 
repulsed  in  a  skirmish,  but  it  was  the  only  success  that  was  on 
this  occasion  to  attend  British  arms.  On  the  17th  the  native 
infantry  that  had  been  taken  into  pay  deserted  in  a  body,  and 
the  northern  part  of  the  town  was  plundered.  On  the  i8th  the 
English  were  driven  from  their  posts  in  the  town  and  forced  to 
take  refuge  in  the  fort. 

Then  began  a  series  of  desertions  almost  unparalleled  for 
their  cowardice  and  only  redeemed  by  the  equally  extraordinary 
fortitude  and  suffering  of  others.  It  was  resolved  to  send  the 
women  and  children  aboard  ship  ;   two  councillors  nobly  volun- 

'  It  was  said  that  there  was  not  enough  powder  ;  but  even  had  there  been, 
it  is  in  the  last  degree  iinUkcly  that  the  Oilcutta  Council  would  have  sacrificed 
their  houses. 

'  Hill,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i.  p.  15. 


122  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

teered  to  accompany  them  ;  and  without  orders  allowed  the  ship 
to  drop  down  the  river  out  of  danger,  i  The  example  was  con- 
tagious. On  the  next  day,  June  19,  the  Governor  and  the 
Commandant  also  fled  ;  and  Holwell,  rising  in  this  exigency  to  a 
point  of  heroism,  took  command  and  continued  the  defence  for 
yet  another  day,  after  which,  his  men  being  drunk  and  mutinous, 
and  the  ships  obstinately  refusing  to  approach  the  fort  and  rescue 
the  garrison,  he  reluctantly  surrendered. 

The  fate  which  awaited  him  and  his  companions  in  captivity 
has  been  narrated  so  poignantly  by  his  own  pen  that  there  is  no 
need  to  describe  again  the  imprisonment  of  146  people  all  one 
night  in  a  room  not  20  feet  square,  whence  only  23  emerged  alive. 
No  one  has  ascribed  this  event  to  the  personal  orders  of  Siraj-ud- 
daula  ;  but  the  many  circumstances  narrated  of  him  by  native 
historians — pregnant  women  ripped  open  to  gratify  his  curiosity  ; 
boatloads  of  people  upset  in  the  Ganges  for  him  to  watch  the 
agonies  of  the  drowning — would  go  near  to  justify  the  reflection 
that,  when  the  news  was  brought  to  him,  his  first  feeling  must 
have  been  regret  to  have  been  asleep  when  so  gratifying  a  tragedy 
was  in  action.^ 

The  English  refugees  found  shelter  down  the  river,  at  Fultah, 
where  the  chief  people  spent  the  next  six  months  in  accusing  each 
other  of  having  been  the  authors  of  their  common  misfortune. 
The  news  reached  Madras,  as  we  have  seen,  when  that  Presidency 
was  on  the  eve  of  dispatching  an  expedition  to  the  Deccan.  On 
hearing  of  the  capture  of  Kasimbazaar,  Major  Killpatrick  was  at 
once  dispatched  with  200  men  to  the  assistance  of  Fort  William.* 
But  when  he  reached  the  Hugh,  he  found  he  could  do  nothing 

'  "  These  gentlemen,"  writes  Holwell  with  just  indignation,  "  lay  with  30 
sail  of  vessels,  the  19th  and  20tli,  within  sight  of  our  flag  flying  ;  and  heard  us 
incessantly  engaged  with  the  enemy,  without  once  attempting  to  return  with 
either  ships  or  boats  to  our  succour  or  favour  our  retreat  "  (Holwell's  reply  to 
Manningham's  Humble  Address)  (London,  8vo,  1758). 

'  Recent  attempts  have  been  made  to  show  that  Holwell's  narrative  is  false 
and  that  no  Black  Hole  incident  took  place  (see  Bengal  Past  and  Present,  July 
1915,  pp.  75-104,  and  January  1916,  pp.  136-171).  But  the  arguments  employed 
cheerfully  ignore  the  first  principles  of  evidence.  That  Holwell  touched  up 
his  narrative  with  an  eye  to  picturesque  effect  is  possible  enough  ;  but  that  ^ 
large  number  of  people  were  suffocated  in  the  Black  Hole  is  established  by  the 
evidence  of  too  many  survivors  and  acquaintances  of  survivors  to  be  shaken.  Of 
Holwell's  general  veracity  the  present  writer  has  as  poor  an  opinion  as  anyone  ; 
but  even  he  at  times  approximated  to  the  truth  ;  we  cannot  deny  an  assertion 
merely  because  he  made  it  ;  and  he  had  too  many  enemies  for  his  assertions  to 
pass  witliout  close  scrutiny. 

'  The  news  arrived  on  July  14  ;  the  detachment  sailed  July  20. 


I 


THE  OVERTHROW  OF  SIRAJ -UD-DAULA         123 

except  await  the  reinforcements  which  the  later  and  alarming 
news  was  Ukely  to  summon  up.  News  of  the  loss  of  Calcutta 
was  received  at  Madras  on  August  i6.^  The  advice  of  Clive  and 
Admiral  Watson  was  at  once  sought. 

There  were  three  possible  courses  which  could  have  been 
taken.  The  first  was  to  continue  the  Deccan  expedition  and 
leave  Bengal  to  its  fate  ;  the  second,  to  send  a  small  expedition 
to  reinforce  Killpatrick  ;  the  third,  to  assemble  and  dispatch 
the  largest  force  that  could  possibly  be  spared.  Of  these,  the 
first  was  not  publicly  avowed,  for  it  represented  the  selfish  desires 
of  those  who  were  to  have  acted  as  deputies  with  the  expedition 
to  Salabat  Jang.*  The  second  represented  the  views  of  those 
who  believed  (rightly)  that  news  would  very  shortly  be  received 
of  a  declaration  of  war  against  the  French.  Their  narrow 
particularism  naturally  met  with  strong  support ;  but  the  wiser, 
more  statesmanlike  poUcy — of  sending  all  the  men  who  could  be 
spared — fortunately  was  adopted,  mainly  owing  to  the  firm, 
wise,  and  unanswerable  arguments  of  Robert  Orme.*  He  pointed 
out  the  supreme  need  of  recovering  Calcutta,  and  urged  the  un- 
deniable fact  upon  the  Council  that  a  small  expedition  could 
only  weaken  Madras  without  vindicating  the  position  of  the 
English  in  Bengal. 

His  victory  was  not  won  without  a  struggle.  The  difficulty 
was  brought  forward  that  the  President  and  Council  of  Fort 
WiUiam  had  retained  their  functions,  and  could  not  be  trusted 
either  to  recover  Calcutta  or  return  the  troops  should  Madras  be 
attacked.  This  specious  argument  was  met  at  first  by  the  pro- 
posal that  the  expedition  should  be  independent  of  the  Bengal 
Council  and  should  be  accompanied  by  two  deputies  from  Madras. 
Just  when  this  had  at  last  been  arranged,  there  arrived  a  member 
of  the  peccant  Council,  who  protested  so  loudly  at  this  super- 
session of  the  Bengal  Civil  servants  that  it  was  decided  not  to 
send  deputies  after  all.  Clive  and  Orme  entered  dissents  from 
this  resolution  ;  and,  as  it  was  held  impossible  to  place  a  con- 
siderable body  of  men  under  the  orders  of  the  Bengal  Council, 
because  then  they  could  not  be  recalled  should  that  become 

•  It  is  odd  to  find  Orme  using  the  Old  Style  so  long  after  1752.  He  dates^it 
August  5  (History,  ii.  84). 

"  Palk  and  Vansittart.  See  Orme  to  Payne,  November  3,  1756.  Orme  MSS., 
Various,  28,  flf.  58,  etc. 

»  Orme  had  his  faults  ;  he  intrigued  none  too  delicately  for  the  Government 
of  Madras  ;  he  is  accused  of  having  demanded  presents  from  the  Nawab  ;  but 
at  this  crisis  he  behaved  so  as  to  deserve  the  admiring  gratitude  of  his  successors. 


124  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

necessary,  it  was  finally  settled  that  the  leader  of  the  expedition 
should  be  responsible  for  his  military  conduct  to  the  Madras 
Council  who  sent  him,  not  to  the  Bengal  Council  whom  he  went 
to  save.  In  view  of  the  leader  chosen,  the  decision  was  the  best 
that  could  have  been  taken. ^ 

The  choice  of  a  leader  had  been  nearly  as  difficult  a  matter  as 
the  definition  of  the  powers  with  which  he  was  to  be  invested. 
The  first  candidate  was  the  Governor  himself,  Pigot,  who  con- 
sidered that  if  he  were  in  command  the  Council  of  Bengal  would 
probably  offer  less  opposition  to  the  independent  powers  which 
the  leader  was  to  have.  But  he  altogether  lacked  miUtary  ex- 
perience and  does  not  seem  to  have  pressed  his  claims.  The 
obvious  commander  by  official  position  was  Lawrence,  now 
commander-in-chief  of  all  the  Company's  forces  in  India  ;  but 
ill-health  precluded  him  from  going.  The  man  who  most  urged 
his  claims  to  command  the  expedition  was  Colonel  Adlercron, 
commander  of  the  King's  regiment  that  had  come  out  with 
Watson's  squadron.  He  was  offered  and  accepted  the  command, 
but  then  difficulties  arose,  first  about  the  return  of  the  troops  to 
the  Coast  in  case  of  need,  and  second  about  the  reservation  of  a 
share  of  the  plunder  for  the  Company.  He  refused  to  give  the 
desired  assurances  on  either  of  these  heads  ;  and  so  the  Council 
decided  at  last  to  entrust  the  forces  to  Clive.  Probably  they  had 
never  been  enthusiastic  about  Adlercron's  going.  Their  relations 
with  him  had  been  exceedingly  difficult ;  he  had  had  no  experience 
of  warfare  in  India  ;  and  he  was  such  an  intolerably  pompous 
and  empty-minded  person  that  none  could  have  the  least  opinion 
of  his  talent.  It  was  another  link  in  that  chain  of  fortunate  events 
that  this  incompetent  soldier  was  not  finally  chosen  for  the 
command. 2 

The  change,  however,  involved  a  delay  of  some  three  weeks, 
for  the  Royal  Artillery  had  to  be  landed,  as  Adlercron  resolutely 
refused  to  allow  it  to  sail  without  him,  and  a  body  of  the  Com- 

'  It  not  only  angered  the  Bengal  Council,  as  was  to  be  expected,  but  called 
down  the  wrath  of  the  Directors,  who  were  outraged  at  this  setting  of  the  military 
above  the  civil  branch  and  the  thought  of  4  lakhs  being  consigned  to  a  single 
person.  "  Had  wc  not  the  highest  opinion  of  Colonel  Clive's  prudence  and  modera- 
tion, there  would  be  no  end  to  the  disagreeable  reflections  we  might  make  on  so 
extraordinary  a  precedent  "  (Pub.  Des.  from  England,  August  3,  1757). 

'  Adlercron  wrote  home  that  he  had  never  really  been  intended  to  go,  and 
that  the  offer  of  the  command  was  intended  to  get  tlie  Royal  Artillery  embarked, 
after  which  it  was  thought  that  he  would  agree  to  let  it  go  without  him.  Adler- 
cron to  Fox,  November  21,  1756  (I.O.,  Home  Misc.,  No.  94,  f.  210). 


THE  OVERTHROW  OF  SIRAJ-UD-DAULA        125 

pany's  Artillery  with  their  guns  had  to  be  assembled  and  em- 
barked. All  these  transactions  took  up  much  time,  so  that  it  was 
not  until  October  i6  that  the  expedition  sailed  from  the  Madras 
roads,  two  months  after  the  news  of  the  loss  of  Calcutta  had 
been  received.  The  delay  had  been  considerable,  "  Yet,"  as  the 
Directors  wrote,  "  we  observe  many  marks  of  care  and  good 
conduct  which  deserve  our  approbation."  ^  Indeed,  the  final 
resolve  of  the  Madras  Council  was  characterised  by  such  a 
broadness  of  view,  such  a  recognition  of  general  interests  trans- 
cending the  local  interests  of  Madras,  as  are  at  all  times  excep- 
tional and  precious. 

The  expedition,  apart  from  the  four  ships  of  the  line  and  the 
frigate  which  formed  Watson's  squadron,  was  composed  of  800 
European  troops  and  1000  sepoys.  Two  hundred  of  the  Euro- 
peans were  furnished  by  a  detachment  of  Adlercron's  regiment  ; 
the  remainder  consisted  of  103  artillerymen  and  four  companies 
of  the  Coast  infantry.  ^  They  had  a  prolonged  and  stormy 
voyage  ;  and  only  reached  the  Hugh  a  few  days  before  Christmas.' 
One  of  the  squadron,  however,  was  driven  into  Vizagapatam  and 
put  back  to  Madras.  She  had  250  soldiers  aboard,  and  so  Clive 
had  hardly  more  than  his  original  numbers  when  he  landed  and 
was  joined  by  Killpatrick  with  what  troops  there  were  at  Fultah.* 

He  announced  his  coming  in  a  letter  to  Siraj-ud-daula  which 
he  sent  to  the  Nawab's  Killedar  at  Calcutta  (or  Alinagur,  as  it 
had  been  renamed)  to  be  forwarded.  But  the  letter  was  not 
phrased  in  the  usual  forms.  The  Killedar  refused  to  forward  it, 
and  sent  to  Clive  an  amended  copy,  addressing  the  Nawab 
as  "  Sacred  and  Godlike  Prince."  This  might  have  been  used, 
Clive  said,  before  the  taking  of  Calcutta,  but  not  now.  Instead, 
he  informed  the  Nawab  that  he  was  come  at  the  head  of  such  a 
force  as  had  never  before  been  seen  in  Bengal ;  that  he  hoped 
the  Nawab  would  take  heed  to  his  own  and  his  people's  prosperity 
by  making  satisfaction  to  the  Company  for  its  wrongs  ;  and  that, 
if  the  Prince  was  a  great  warrior,  he,  CUve,  also  has  been  fighting 
any  time  the  last  ten  years  with  undeviating  success.     Adding 

'  Pub.  Des.  from  England,  November  ii,  1757. 

•  "  Return  of  the  Forces,"  October  5,  1756.  Only  a  quarter  of  the  Coast 
Europeans  remained  alive  a  year  after  their  landing  in  Bengal.  Long's  Selections, 
p.  114. 

•  The  Marlborough  with  all  the  field  artillery  aboard  only  arrived  on  Jan- 
uary 20.  '• 

«A  Return  of  February  32,  1757,  shows  705  European  efiectives  and  144 
sick. 


k 


126  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

deeds  to  words,  the  English  easily  overthrew  a  body  of  troops 
that  tried  to  oppose  their  march  to  Calcutta,  occupied  the  fort 
at  Baj-baj,  recovered  Fort  Wilham  on  January  2,  and  plundered 
Hugh  on  January  10. 

This  vigorous  action  alarmed  the  Nawab,  whose  servants 
proposed  that  the  French  should  mediate.  This  was  natural 
enough  in  view  of  the  assistance  English  refugees  had  received  at 
the  French  factories  ;  but  news  had  by  now  arrived  of  the 
declaration  of  war,  and  no  proposal  could  have  been  less  accept- 
able. After  some  correspondence,  the  Nawab  arrived  before 
Calcutta  for  the  second  time  in  the  beginning  of  February.  On 
the  4th  two  deputies  ^  were  sent  to  him  to  ascertain  the  terms  he 
was  willing  to  concede.  But  he  treated  them  with  haughtiness, 
declined  to  withdraw  from  Calcutta,  and  terminated  a  threatening 
audience  by  referring  them  to  his  Diwan. 

The  English  were  much  embarrassed,  for  the  Nawab 's  ap-* 
proach  had  led  to  a  general  desertion  of  coolies  and  bazaar- 
people.  In  this  situation  Clive  resolved  to  try  an  expedient 
which  the  French  had  twice  adopted  with  great  success  against 
Nasir  Jang.  He  beat  up  the  Nawab's  camp  in  the  early  morning. 
The  enterprise  does  not  seem  to  have  been  particularly  well 
concerted.  The  English  lost  their  way  in  the  mist,  and  met 
with  opposition  which  cost  them  67  Europeans  and  100  sepoys. 
But  it  had  the  same  effect  on  Siraj-ud-daula  as  the  French 
attacks  had  had  upon  the  Subahdar  of  the  Deccan.  He  at  once 
drew  off  to  a  safer  distance,  and  sent  a  messenger  with  offers 
to  treat.  The  negotiations  were  shorn  of  those  long  delays  and 
tedious  references  usual  in  Oriental  diplomacy.  Within  two  days 
everything  had  been  concluded  and  the  Nawab  had  begun  his 
march  from  that  dangerous  neighbourhood  ;  within  five  da)^ 
he  had  signed  the  completed  treaty. 

This  confirmed  all  the  English  privileges,  stipulated  for  the 
restitution  of  all  the  plunder  which  had  come  into  the  Nawab's 
possession,  and  granted  the  liberties  of  fortifjdng  Calcutta  as 
the  English  pleased  and  of  coining  rupees  which  were  to  pass 
current  throughout  the  province.  This  treaty  has  been  char- 
acterised as  neither  honourable  nor  secure, ^  because  it  did  not 
provide  reparation  for  the  Black  Hole  or  any  guarantee  for  the 
Nawab's  fidelity  to  his  promises.  To  this  it  might  be  answered 
that  honour  had  been  avenged  by  driving  the  Nawab  from 

•  Watts  and  Scrafton. 
^  ^  '  Elphinstone,  The  liise  of  British  Power  in  India,  p.  290. 


THE  OVERTHROW  OF  SIRAJ-UD-DAULA        127 

before  Calcutta,  and  that,  if  the  Nawab  wished,  to  break  his 
word,  no  securities  could  be  adequate  save  superior  military 
force.  The  second  part  of  the  defence  is  more  convincing  than 
the  first.  The  English  success  had  been  in  no  way  decisive. 
It  had  alarmed  and  humiliated  the  Nawab,  but  it  certainly  had 
broken  neither  his  power  nor  his  will.  The  fact  is  that  the  peace 
was  convenient  rather  than  glorious.  There  was  the  danger 
that  the  French  might  join  the  Nawab  now  that  war  had  been 
declared  between  the  two  nations  ;  and  it  was  so  manifestly 
their  interest  to  do  so,  that  Clive  was  anxious  to  put  it  out  of  their 
power. 

The  simultaneous  arrival  of  Clive's  forces  and  the  news  of 
war  created  a  situation  of  great  difficulty  for  the  French  at 
Chandernagore,  for  it  was  at  once  apparent  that  should  the 
English  beat  the  Nawab,  the  ancient  neutrality  of  the  Ganges, 
which  depended  solely  on  the  Nawab's  power  to  enforce  it,  would 
have  lost  its  sanction,  and  there  would  be  nothing  to  hinder 
an  attack  on  the  French  factories.  Law,  the  French  chief  at 
Kasimbazaar,  wrote  to  the  Directeur,  Renault  de  St.  Germain, 
advising  him  either  to  enter  into  a  neutrality  with  the  EngHsh 
at  once  or  to  join  the  Nawab  before  he  made  peace  with  them. 
"  If  he  makes  peace,"  Law  added,  "  without  having  received 
any  help  from  you,  you  cannot  expect  help  from  him  if  you 
should  be  attacked." 

The  French,  however,  lacked  forces.  Leyrit  claimed  to  have 
received  orders  from  Europe  which  prevented  him  from  taking 
an  active  part  in  Bengal.  He  also  alleged  with  greater  cogency 
that  he  had  sent  all  his  available  men  to  Bussy  in  the  Deccan, 
and  that,  even  had  he  had  men,  he  lacked  ships  to  send  them 
on.^  It  was  not  the  first  time  that  the  Deccan  expedition, 
fruitful  in  illustration  and  suggestion  of  political  method,  had 
proved  fatal  to  the  achievement  of  French  schemes.  It  ob- 
structed them  in  Bengal  no  less  than  it  had  at  Trichinopoly. 

On  CUve's  arrival  in  Bengal,  the  French  had  followed  Law's 
advice  so  far  as  to  propose  a  treaty  of  neutrality.  The  EngUsh 
had  rephed  that  they  were  willing  to  agree  if  the  French  would 
join  them  against  the  Nawab.*  This  the  French  shrank  from 
accepting  ;  but  when  the  Nawab  was  marching  on  Calcutta, 
the  English  offered  to  relax  this  stipulation.     "  As  yet  we  have 

*  Leyrit  to  Lally,  October  8,  1758  (Leyrit's  Memoir,  p.  191). 

•  Law's  Memoir  (ed.  Martineau),  pp.  94,  etc.  ;  cl.  also  Clive  to  the  Secret 
Committee,  February  i,  1757. 


MS  DUPLEIX  AM)  CLIVE 


had  BO  aasma  from  tbem,"  writes  Chve  oo  February  i,  "  but  I 
tUdc  Ae  pnopootion  too  advantageous  for  them  to  decline, 
ankw,  indeed,  the  gentlemen  <rf  Chamagofe  should  not  be  vested 
vrith  powen  to  enter  into  '•"gftp*""'"*'*  of  such  a  nature,  which  I 
somewhat  taspect."  ^  This  ofier  was  suffered  to  be  unanswered 
by  the  French  nntfl  February  21,  when  they  renewed  their  pro- 
posals for  a  neutrality  within  the  Ganges.*  The  cause  cA  this 
loqg  dday  is  not  eaqdained.  Renault  pfcsomafciy  was  debating 
thepossibilityof  driving  theEn^fehout  of  Bengal  with  the  Nawab's 
bel^.  A  treaty  was  drawn  up  and  the  Bengal  Connnittee  agreed 
to  iBcommnrid  it  to  Watson.  It  would  have  been  better  if  the 
Admiral  had  been  consulted  at  an  eailier  stage ;  for  he  now 
drcHned  to  have  anytime  to  do  with  it  unless  it  came  into 
iminrdiatf  eflect,  idddi  was  beyond  the  powers  of  the  Chander- 
nagore  ConnciL  "  I  declined  entering  any  farther  into  a 
n^otiatioa  of  that  nature,"  Watson  reported  to  the  Admiralty. 
"  with  peofde  idio  had  no  authority  to  do  it."  *  The  treaty 
was  therefore  declined.  So  sudden  a  change  of  front  naturally 
mggntfed  to  the  Frendi  that  the  n^otiations  had  been  proposed 
and  prolonged  mody  to  gain  time,  and  that  Watson's  typosition 
was  merely  odinstve.  But  the  documents  lend  no  support  to 
tliii  view.    Give  seons  to  have  been  giemnnely  surprised  and 


As  we  have  seen,  after  the  original  proposals  the  French  had 
not  manifested  any  disposition  to  accede  to  a  treaty  until 
February  21 ;  they  then  reopened  negotiatknis  whidi  were 
broken  off  by  the  English  on  March  3  or  4.  Meanwhile,  the 
Nawab's  Court  had  been,  the  seme  of  a  diplomatic  duel  between 
Law  on  bdialf  of  the  Frendi  and  Watts  on  behalf  of  the  English. 
The  durbar  does  not  seem  to  have  inclined  particularly  either 
way,  for  Law  complains  of  the  weight  of  English  influence,  while 
Watts  dwells  on  the  need  <rf  counteracting  French  bribes.  The 
Seths,  though  aheady  contemplating  measures  for  getting  rid  of 
Siraj-ud-daula,*  woe  iodiqxMed  to  interest  themselves  on  either 
aide  until  it  was  clear  which  would  prevail  and  be  at  liberty  to 
assist  the  scheme  they  bad  really  at  heart.*  At  first  the  balance 
swayed  in  the  French  direction,  for  Siraj-ud-daula  had  long 

■  CKve  to  Secret  Committee,  loc.  cit. 

*  Cihre  to  Seoet  Committee,  Febraaxy  33,  1757. 

*  Wataon  to  Clevdaad,  March  31,  1757. 

*  Cfive  to  Sdect  Committee,  March  4.  1757. 

*  Lsw,  op.  cit..  pp.  1 16,  etc 

*  I.OC.  ciL  and  [Watta*]  Memoirs  of  Ike  Revolution,  pp.  27,  etc 


THE  OVERTHROW  OF  SHLU-UD-DAtXA   1» 


to  break  tiie  taaty  at  tte  lot  appartaaity.  b 
witb  Lav  some  time  befare  tte  Ea^feii  attacJjed 
he  shoved  "  that  the  pevoe  he  h^  Made  vith 
ttem  vas  anylhii^  bat  smcere.  ffis  c^^  blaaed  ^cb  he  spelK 
of  tfaem.  I  sav  plainly  that  be  sj^aed  for  a  s%aal  veBgeaaoe.** ' 
Reaaoit  aBst  indeed  have  iiiinitid  afius  3  mt  to  have  beea 
able  to  profit  by  sach  a  favamable  dbpuMliun.  As  it  vas»  tte 
Navab  praoiised  all  that  Lav  could  desire  in  case  CUve  attached 
Chandeni^QR.  When  the  latter  adtanced.  on  tiie  stvencth 
of  a  letter  from  the  Navab  desirins  him  to  prefvent  Bossy  from 
entering  the  province,  be  qaidi^  leoeived  a  perenytory  letter 
teladdii^  mbj  attach  w  the  French.  Bat  a  little  later  tite 
sitaatkai  vas  mfrwlifiwl  1^  reports  that  the  A^ghuis  vho  had 
invaded  Northem  India  intended  to  continoe  their  excmsaoBS 
as  far  as  BoigaL  Of  the  tvo  European  natinas,  there  vas  no 
doubt  as  to  which  coald  give  the  more  rBrclual  h^>.  On  the 
day  oa  which  the  An^o-Frendi  negotiatioas  terminated.  Sira j- 
od-danla  ofiered  the  En^ish  a  lakha  month  for  their  assistance.* 
He  doubtless  hqped  that  they  voold  thos  be  led  to  veakoi 
themselves  for  the  stmgj^  with  the  French.  But  dive,  though 
anxious  to  accq>t  the  Nawab's  <^er,  did  not  intend  to  leave 
Chandemagore  bdund  him  if  he  could  help  it.*  It  vas  in  these 
drcnmstances  that  the  Navab  vas  brought  to  give  an  exceedingly 
amfaignoos  permission  to  attack  the  Frencli — "  He  explained 
his  sense  of  the  matter  sufficient  to  be  understood  he  would 
not  interfere  or  know  of  anj^thing  done  between  us  and 
them."  « 

Give  had  already  moved  towards  the  French  settloneiit. 
On  March  13  he  summoned  the  place.  The  next  day  he  drove 
the  enemy  from  their  outworks  into  the  fort.  At  last  on  the 
23rd  the  ships  arri%'ed  that  were  to  co-operate  in  the  attack. 
and  after  a  hot  fire  for  three  hours  the  French  siirrendered. 

This  was  a  decisive  event.  It  deprived  the  Nawab  of  allies 
who  would  have  been  ver>-  ready  to  assist  him  against  the  English. 
It  also  deprived  the  French  Islands  of  their  habitual  suppKes 
of  grain,  so  that  they  were  in  the  grreatest  difficulty  to  feed  or 
provision  the  squadrons  sent  out  by  the  French  in  1757  and  1758. 
Give  ironically  sent  his  congratulations  on  the  success  that 

>L«w,  op.  eil..  p.  113. 

■  Nawab  to  CUve.  March  4.  17S7. 

*  CUve  to  Pigot,  March  1 1.  1757. 

*  Wataon  to  Clevdand.  Maich  31.  1757. 


180  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

had  thus  been  won  under  His  Excellency's  auspices  ;  the  Nawab 
could  not  conceal  his  chagrin  at  this  letter. 

Moreover,  the  apparent  danger  from  the  Afghans  subsided,  and 
the  sacrifice  which  had  been  made  thus  proved  vain.  Now  that 
the  French  had  been  removed,  Siraj-ud-daula  seems  really  to  have 
sought  their  help.  He  wrote  to  Bussy  to  come  to  his  deliver- 
ance ;  and  contributed  to  the  maintenance  of  Law  and  the 
fugitives  who  joined  him  from  Chandernagore.  This  was  at  once 
made  the  subject  of  remonstrances.  If  these  hostile  acts  had 
rested  entirely  upon  English  evidence,  one  might  have  supposed 
that  it  had  been  fabricated  by  them  in  order  to  justify  their 
subsequent  conduct  ;  but  the  English  allegations  are  corroborated 
by  the  testimony  of  Law.  Before  the  Enghsh  had  given  the 
Nawab  a  reasonable  cause  of  resentment  by  capturing  Chander- 
nagore, against  his  will  though  not  against  his  orders,  he  had 
already  determined  to  take  vengeance  on  them  ;  after  Chander- 
nagore had  fallen,  he  was  still  resolved  on  the  same  course,  at  once 
more  bitterly  exasperated  and  more  outwardly  compliant.  But  he 
could  be  nothing  consistently  for  long.  He  ordered  Law  to  quit 
the  province  of  Bengal,  but  supplied  him  with  money  and  provided 
hjm  with  a  shelter  in  Behar.  He  promised  Watts  to  hasten  the 
execution  of  the  treaty,  and  at  the  same  time  wrote  more-  press- 
ingly  than  ever  for  Bussy  to  come  to  his  assistance.  So  fearful 
was  he  of  some  sudden  onslaught  of  the  English  that  he  would 
not  suffer  a  boat  to  come  up  to  Kasimbazaar  without  being 
searched.'  One  day  he  would  overwhelm  Watts  with  assurances  of 
friendship,  and  the  next  turn  the  English  vakil  out  of  the  durbar. 
For  a  moment  Clive  thought  that  such  an  act  of  vigour  as 
the  overthrow  of  the  French  would  show  the  Nawab  the  necessity 
of  keeping  his  promises.^  But  the  Nawab's  conduct  convinced 
him  in  the  course  of  April  that  it  was  hopeless  to  expect  any- 
thing but  bad  faith.  All  would  doubtless  be  well  so  long  as 
he  and  the  Madras  troops  remained  in  Bengal ;  but  he  had  to 
consider  also  the  situation  of  Madras.  At  any  time  he  might 
receive  an  urgent  summons  to  return  to  the  assistance  of  that 
Presidency,  and  then  he  would  have  to  choose  between  leaving 
'  Calcutta  to  the  mercy  of  Siraj-ud-daula  or  Madras  to  the  mercy 
of  the  French.  About  the  same  time  a  scheme  emerged  which 
promised  rehef  from  so  embarrassing  a  dilemma,  by  getting  rid 
altogether  of  the  Nawab. 

'  Watts'  Memoirs  of  the  Revolution,  pp.  62,  etc. 
•  Clive  to  Madras,  March  30,  1757. 


THE  OVERTHROW  OF  SIRAJ-UD-DAULA        181 

Such  a  design  was  neither  novel  nor  surprising.  Dupleix 
had  already  shown  how  easily  so  popular  and  capable  a  prince 
as  Nasir  Jang  could  be  removed  ;  and  before  CUve's  arrival  the 
Bengal  Select  Committee  had  engaged  with  the  Seths  in  a  secret 
correspondence  having  a  similar  object  in  view.^  It  is  not  im- 
possible that  Clive  on  setting  out  for  Bengal  regarded  this  as  a 
possible  outcome  of  his  expedition  ;  but  it  had  been  the  policy 
at  Madras  to  support  existing  rather  than  to  establish  new 
princes,  and  it  is  more  likely  that  CUve  expected  only  to  resettle 
the  Company's  affairs  upon  a  safer  basis. 

But  whatever  his  attitude  may  have  been  when  he  set  out, 
by  the  month  of  April  1757  he  had  found  that  no  reliance  could 
be  placed  on  Siraj-ud-daula,  and  that  a  strong  body  of  persons, 
altogether  apart  from  the  English,  desired  a  revolution.  The 
principal  of  these  were  the  Seths,  the  great  Hindu  bankers  of 
Bengal,  who  had  already  approached  the  English.  Indeed,  the 
Nawab's  conduct  had  been  such  that  none  of  the  principal  people 
at  his  Court  felt  safe,  and  therefore  none  were  contented.  The 
Seths  had  been  threatened  with  circumcision  ;  Rai  Durlab,  who 
had  been  the  chief  Minister,  was  placed  under  the  orders  of  a  mean 
favourite,  Mohan  Lai ;  guns  had  been  planted  against  the  palace 
of  Mir  Jafar,  the  chief  Military  Commander.  All  the  old 
Ministers  of  Ahvirdi  Khan,  the  Nawab's  grandfather  and  pre- 
decessor, had  been  alarmed,  disgusted,  or  removed. 

A  revolution  had  therefore  long  been  meditated  at  Murshida- 
bad  ;  and  it  is  alleged  with  great  probability  that  Siraj-ud-daula's 
delays  in  complying  with  the  terms  of  the  treaty  were  due  in  part 
to  treacherous  advice  designed  to  force  the  English  into  the  plot 
against  him.''  The  latter,  however,  seem  to  have  held  aloof  vmtil 
a  suitable  candidate  was  proposed.  The  Seths  had  proposed 
one  Yar  Latif  Khan,  whom  they  had  brought  to  Murshidabad 
to  guard  them  against  possible  violence  from  the  Nawab.  This 
man  was  pressed  eagerly  upon  the  English  ;  '  but  the  latter 
took  no  decided  part  until  Mir  Jafar  was  substituted  in  the  leading 
role.  He  had  married  Alivirdi  Khan's  sister ;  alike  under 
the  previous  and  the  reigning  Nawabs  he  had  held  high -rank 
from  which  he  had  recently  been  removed  with  circumstances  of 
great  insult.* 

*  Gleig,  Memoirs  of  Warren  Hastings,  vol.  i.  pp.  41,  etc. 

'  Law,  op.  cit.,  p.  1 59. 

»  Clive  to  Watson,  April  26,  1757. 

'  Law,  op.  cit.,  pp.  165-166. 


182  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

On  May  i,  Clive  and  the  Select  Committee  debated  this  new 
proposal,  and  resolved  to  accept  it.  Matters  were  still  delayed 
because  Watts  could  communicate  with  Mir  Jafar  only  with  the 
greatest  caution  ;  but  on  May  14  he  sent  to  Clive  a  draft  of  the 
terms  which  Mir  Jafar  would  certainly  accept.^  On  May  19 
the  proposed  treaty  was  drawn  out  in  cipher,  signed,  sealed,  and 
returned  for  execution. ^ 

This  affair,  however,  was  complicated  by  the  claims  which  had 
been  set  up  by  Omichand,  a  considerable  native  merchant,  who 
had  formerly  been  extensively  employed  in  the  provision  of  the 
Company's  investment  and  had  been  gravely  suspected  of  play- 
ing the  English  false  when  Siraj-ud-daula  attacked  Calcutta  in 
1756.^  In  spite  of  this,  he  had  been  employed  in  the  earliest 
negotiations  with  the  Seths,  and  reappears  in  connection  with  the 
candidature  of  Yar  Latif  Khan.  Unsuccessful  efforts  were  made 
to  keep  him  out  of  the  intrigue  when  Mir  Jafar  came  into  it ; 
and  when  terms  came  to  be  discussed,  Omichand  demanded  5  per 
cent,  of  "all  that  might  be  found  in  Siraj-ud-daula 's  treasury  and 
a  quarter  of  his  jewels.  In  the  draft  treaty  as  sent  down  by 
Watts,  he  was  to  receive  no  less  than  30  lakhs  in  compensa- 
tion for  his  losses  at  the  taking  of  Calcutta.  But  at  the  same 
meeting  at  which  this  treaty  was  considered,  was  also  read  a 
letter  from  Watts,  stating  that  he  had  certain  proof  of  Omichand's 
having  behaved  with  great  treachery.*  It  was  in  these  circum- 
stances that  the  expe  dient  of  the  two  treaties — one  fictitious  and 
one  genuine — was  resolved  on,  in  order  to  deceive  Omichand  into 
believing  that  his  demands  had  been  compiled  with.  The  view 
taken  by  Clive  and  the  Committee  was  that  this  was  the  only 
way  of  saving  the  lives  of  Mir  Jafar  and  of  the  Englishmen  at 
Murshidabad,  and  at  the  same  time  of  not  rewarding  a  man  who 
so  richly  merited  punishment.  It  was  a  regrettable  expedient  ; 
nor  is  it  clear  why  the  English  should  ever  have  thought  of  em- 
ploying a  man  they  had  reason  to  distrust.*  Meanwhile,  Omichand 
had  provided  against  the  possibility  of  the  EngUsh  scheme  mis- 
carrjdng.  On  May  16  he  visited  the  Nawab,  and  succeeded  in 
getting  an  order  for  four  lakhs  of  rupees  and  the  restitution  of  all 

>  Watts  to  Clive,  May  14,  1757. 

»  Select  Committee  to  Secret  Committee,  July  14,  1757. 

•  On  January  30,  1757.  Council  ordered  his  property  to  be  sequestrated,  but 
the  order  does  not  seem  to  have  been  carried  into  effect.     Long's  Selections,  p.  92. 

*  Select  Committee,  May  17,  1757. 

'  I  omit  reference  to  the  question  o£  Watson's  signature.  It  is  immaterial 
one  way  or  the  other. 


THE  OVERTHROW  OF  SIRAJ-UD-DAULA        133 

the  money  and  goods  he  had  lost  at  Calcutta.^  His  exclusion 
from  the  treaty  therefore  disappointed  his  avarice,  but  did  not 
ruin  his  fortune  ;  and  however  the  means  employed  may  be 
condemned,  it  is  impossible  to  sympathise  with  one  who  sought  so 
persistently  to  run  with  the  hare  and  hunt  with  the  hounds. 

Even  when  the  treaty  had  been  returned  to  Watts,  the  matter 
was  not  complete,  for  Mir  Jafar's  formal  assent  was  still  required  ; 
and  this  was  delayed  by  his  absence  at  the  entrenched  camp 
which  the  Nawab  had  formed  at  Plassey.  But  he  returned  to 
the  city  on  May  30  ;  on  June  4  he  received  a  secret  visit  from 
Watts  and  swore  on  the  Koran  to  observe  the  treaty  ;'  on  June  11 
the  Select  Committee  received  it.^  It  confirmed  all  EngUsh 
privileges,  provided  ample  compensation  for  past  EngUsh  losses, 
and  granted  them  the  territory  later  known  as  the  24  Paraganas. 
It  was  agreed  that  no  forts  should  be  built  within  20  miles  of 
the  Hugh  along  its  whole  course  below  Calcutta.  Moreover,  the 
future  Nawab  promised  to  treat  all  English  enemies  as  enemies 
of  himself  and  to  pay  for  their  military  aid  whenever  he  required 
it.  A  separate  agreement  provided  a  donation  for  the  forces 
by  which  his  power  was  to  be  established. 

This  treaty  was  delivered  to  the  Select  Committee  on  June  11  ; 
on  June  12  Watts  and  his  companions  escaped  from  Murshidabad  ; 
on  June  13  CUve  began  his  march.  Watts  had  carried  matters 
through  with  great  success,  displaying  much  coolness  of  nerve 
in  a  trying  and  indeed  a  dangerous  situation.  More  than  once 
had  reports  reached  Calcutta  that  his  head  had  been  carried 
in  procession  through  the  streets  of  the  capital.  Such  an  event 
would  have  been  deeply  gratifying  to  Siraj-ud-daula ;  but,  with 
all  his  malevolence  of  heart,  he  was  also  a  coward  who  shrank  from 
decisive  action.  Mir  Jafar's  fate  had  long  hung  upon  a  razor- 
edge.  But  on  the  news  of  Watts'  flight,  at  the  moment  when  Mir 
Jafar's  death  or  seizure  would  have  flung  the  English  plans  into 
confusion,  the  Nawab  thought  fit  to  enter  into  a  solemn  recon- 
ciliation with  his  rival.' 

Clive's  forces  consisted  of  800  Europeans  and  2200  sepoys. 
He  marched  rapidly,  and  on  June  18  was  at  Kutwa.  His  main 
preoccupation  was  with  Mir  Jafar,  whose  letters  had  been  vague, 
ambiguous,  unsatisfactory.  Clive  hesitated  ;  Siraj-ud-daula  had 
50,000  horse  at  Plassey  ;   and  if  Mir  Jafar  did  not  stand  to  his 

'  Watts'  Memoirs  of  the  Revolution,  pp.  94,  etc. 

'  Select  Committee  to  Secret  Committee,  July  14,  1757. 

•  Mir  Jafar  to  Mir  Anwar  Beg  (?  received  by  Clive),  June  19,  1757. 


184  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

engagements,  the  English  force  might  be  overwhelmed.^  He 
applied  to  the  Select  Committee  for  directions  ;  it  repUed  that  he 
should  force  a  decisive  engagement  if  there  was  any  prospect  of 
success 


2 


But  before  this  Delphic  reply  (as  Malcolm  calls  it)  could  be 
received,  Clive  had  already  determined  on  his  course.  On 
June  21  he  held  a  council  of  war,  presumably  by  reason  of  a 
report  he  had  received  that  day  that  Mir  Jafar  would  "  stand 
neuter."  The  Council  by  a  majority  recommended  that  the 
army  should  remain  where  it  was,  in  agreement  with  Chve's  own 
opinion.  But  within  an  hour  Clive  had  thought  better  of  this 
resolve.  Next  morning  he  wrote  to  Mir  Jafar  that  he  had  decided 
to  put  all  to  the  risk  and  would  be  across  the  river  that  evening. 
A  little  after  midday  he  received  a  more  encouraging  letter  from 
his  faint-hearted  confederate.  He  then  set  his  men  in  motion, 
crossed  the  river,  and  at  midnight  camped  in  Plassey  grove.* 

Clive  is  related  to  have  passed  that  night  in  great  agitation.* 
If  so,  it  is  no  wonder.  He  knew  that  the  next  day  would  bring 
forth  an  action  which  would  either  bestow  on  the  English  in 
Bengal  the  position  that  Bussy  enjoyed  in  the  Deccan,  or  send 
them  in  harassed  and  difficult  retreat  back  to  Calcutta,  with  all 
the  work  of  the  previous  six  months  undone.  None  who  knew 
the  magnitude  of  the  issue  could  regard  unmoved  its  approaching 
decision. 

The  next  day  was  June  23.  The  enemy  moved  their  cum- 
brous artillery  forward  to  the  attack  ;  but  the  severity  of  the 
EngUsh  fire  kept  them  at  a  distance.  Presently,  after  a  shower 
of  rain,  they  withdrew  to  their  camp.  The  English  advanced, 
assaulted  and  carried  an  angle  of  the  enemy's  defences  together 
with  an  eminence  near  it.  Hitherto  their  aUies  had  made  no 
more  sign  of  life  than  had  the  forces  of  the  Pathan  Nawabs  when 

•  At  this  crisis  Clive^wrote  on  June  20  to  the  Rajah  of  Beerbhoom  for  help; 
on  June  26  a  reply  full  of  promises  was  received  ;  on  July  2  a  later  letter  came, 
written  after  the  news  of  Plassey  had  spread  abroad,  saying  the  Rajah  had  been 
on  the  march  when  he  heard  of  the  victory  ! 

•  Select  Committee,  June  23,  1757. 

*  Coote's  journal  places  the  passage  of  the  river  at  6  a.m.,  and  adds  that  the 
troops  then  camped  ;  but  Scrafton,  Clive's  letter  to  the  Secret  Committee,  Clive's 
evidence,  and  the  Military  Journal  all  agree  that  the  river  was  crossed  in  the 
afternoon,  i.e.  after  the  receipt  of  Mir  Jafar's  letter,  and  twenty-four  hours  after 
the  Council  of  War.  Perhaps  this  explains  why  Scrafton  (and  Clive  in  his 
evidence)  says  he  only  resolved  to  continue  his  march  twenty-four  hours  after  the 
Council.  He  seems  to  have  made  up  his  mind  earlier,  but  only  took  the  decisive 
step  later. 

♦  Orme's  first  draft  (Orme  MSS.,  Various,  164A,  f .  1 1 1 ). 


THE  OVERTHROW  OF  SIRAJ-UD-DAULA        186 

La  Touche  attacked  the  camp  of  Nasir  Jang.  Now,  however,  they 
acted.  Rai  Durlab  urged  the  timorous  Nawab  to  fly.  His  advice 
was  accepted.  The  Nawab  fled.  His  army  disbanded.  The 
success  was  as  complete  as  that  which  had  brought  Muzaffar 
Jang  back  in  triumph  to  Pondichery.^ 

There  was,  however,  this  difference.  The  treasures  of  Nasir 
Jang  had  lain  within  the  royal  enclosure  of  his  camp  ;  those  of 
Siraj-ud-daula  were  in  the  treasury  of  Murshidabad,  whither  the 
Nawab  had  fled.  On  the  next  morning  Clive's  first  concern  was 
to  hasten  Mir  Jafar  to  the  city.  The  Nawab  had  reached  it  at 
midnight  after  the  battle,  and  next  day  attempted  by  a  distribu- 
tion of  money  to  induce  the  troops,  who  now  thronged  into  the 
city,  to  stand  by  him.  This  they  accepted,  but  he  quickly  found 
he  could  place  no  reliance  upon  them. 

Mir  Jafar  reached  the  city  while  his  rival  still  Ungered  there. 
But  instead  of  seizing  him,  the  former  proceeded  quietly  to  his 
own  mansion,  and  only  seized  the  palace  and  treasury  after 
receiving  word  that  Siraj-ud-daula  had  departed.  Had  the 
latter  succeeded  in  reaching  Law  with  his  Frenchmen  in  Behar, 
the  English  might  have  had  considerable  trouble  to  establish  Mir 
Jafar  in  complete  security.  But  Siraj-ud-daula  was  pursued  not 
only  by  Mir  Jafar's  messengers  but  also  by  his  own  cruelty.  A 
mendicant,  whose  ears  he  had  caused  to  be  cut  off,  recognised 
and  delivered  him  up.  Mir  Jafar's  son,  Miran,  who  had  set  out 
in  his  pursuit,  received  him,  carried  him  back  to  Murshidabad, 
and  that  same  day  put  him  to  death. 

A  yet  more  interesting  operation  remained  to  be  completed. 
As  has  already  been  stated,  a  separate  agreement  had  been  made 
by  Mir  Jafar  to  bestow  40  lakhs  on  the  Army  and  Navy,  and  12 
lakhs  on  the  Select  Committee, ^  besides  the  considerable  sums 
which  had  been  assigned  by  the  treaty  as  compensation  for  the 
losses  of  the  Company  and  private  persons.  Watts  and  Walsh  ^ 
were  accordingly  sent  forward  to  inquire  into  the  state  of  the 
treasury,  and  on  June  29  Clive  followed  them.  The  amount 
found  was  considerably  below  general  expectation.*     Rai  Durlab 

'  The  similarity  of  the  two  actions  is  heightened  by  Clive's  plan,  which  was 
to  have  lain  quiet  all  day,  and  fallen  upon  the  Nawab's  camp  that  night  (Watts' 
Memoirs  of  the  Revolution,  p.  109  ;  of.  also  Mir  Jafar  to  Clive,  received  5  p.m., 
June  23,  1757). 

'  Clive  to  Watts,  May  19,  1757. 

•  Clive's  secretary. 

*  The  Seir-ul-Mutakherim  sa5rs  that  there  was  an  inner  treasury  the  existence 
of  which  was  not  disclosed  to  the  English. 


136  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

received  5  per  cent,  for  his  co-operation ;  ^  and  a  part  of  what 
remained  was  bestowed  in  considerable  gifts  on  the  leaders  of 
the  expedition, — Clive,  Watts,  Killpatrick,  Walsh,  and  Scrafton 
were  thus  distinguished,— and  the  residue  was  unequal  to  dis- 
charge the  obhgations  into  which  the  new  Nawab  had  entered. 
Part  was  therefore  paid  in  jewels,  and  part  left  to  be  settled 
as  the  revenues  came  in.  In  spite  of  this,  a  crore  of  rupees  was 
sent  down  in  boats  from  Murshidabad  to  Calcutta. 

It  has  been  the  habit  of  historians  to  enter  into  lengthy  dia- 
tribes upon  this  subject.  It  is  indeed  perfectly  undeniable  that 
officers  should  not  accept  gifts  from  others  than  their  employers. 
It  opens  the  way  to  gross  abuse,  to  disobedience  of  orders,  to 
neglect  of  public  interests.  But  the  moralists  who  assail  Clive 
forget  many  things  which  ought  to  be  remembered.  So  far  as  I 
can  recollect,  they  do  not  include  Dupleix  and  Bussy  in  their 
reproaches,  although  these  merit  castigation  just  as  much  as 
CUve.  They  ignore  the  fact  that  Watson,  the  gallant  sailor, 
quarrelled  angrily  with  the  Select  Committee  because  they  re- 
fused him  a  share  in  the  donation  specially  assigned  to  them. 
Yet  the  fact  is  too  significant  properly  to  be  overlooked.  It  proves 
that  a  King's  officer  was  no  less  willing  than  the  Company's  ser- 
vants to  share  in  the  sums  stipulated  with  Mir  Jafar  for  payment ; 
that  His  Majesty's  service  regarded  such  presents  as  perfectly 
legitimate  ;  and  that  a  man,  himself  the  soul  of  honour,  believed 
his  reputation  no  ways  endangered  by  participation.  It  has  not 
been  usual  in  judging  Chve  to  give  these  facts  their  due  weight. 
It  was  the  practice  of  the  eighteenth  century  to  accept  advan- 
tages which  were  consecrated  by  custom,  or  which  did  not 
threaten  the  interests  of  the  State,  provided  they  could  be  re- 
conciled with  the  private  conscience  ;  and  the  pubhc  view  of  the 
acceptance  of  these  advantages  was  principally  coloured  by 
political  feeling.  The  same  action  might  be  condoned  in  one  man 
and  condemned  in  another.  The  outcry  that  was  subsequently 
raised  against  Clive's  presents  did  not  indicate  that  the  moral 
feeling  of  the  age  was  shocked,  but  that  in  affairs  of  this  sort 
misrepresentation  was  easy  ;  and,  where  a  matter  rested  with  the 
private  conscience,  enemies  were  sure  to  think  a  man  had  done 
wrong.  In  CHve's  case,  so  confident  was  he  of  his  integrity  that 
he  announced  his  good  fortune  to  the  Court  of  Directors,  and  so 
little  did  this  shock  their  sense  of  propriety  that  he  received  the 
congratulations  of  the  chairman.     It  is  hard  that  CUve  should 

>  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  July  6,  1757. 


THE  OVERTHROW  OF  SIRAJ-UD-DAULA        137 

have  been  accused  of  misconduct  for  accepting  what  few  men 
of  his  age  would  have  declined.  It  was  his  misfortune  that  he 
was  succeeded  by  men  possessing  but  a  scanty  sense  of  public 
duty,  who  sheltered  themselves  behind  his  example  while  trans- 
gressing limits  which  he  had  never  passed  ;  so  that  an  ignorant 
public  confounded  his  case  with  theirs,  and  involved  all  in  a 
common  condemnation. 


CHAPTER   II 
CLIVE'S  FIRST  GOVERNMENT 

THE  English  now  held  in  Bengal  a  position  indistinguish- 
able from  that  of  the  French  in  the  Deccan.  The  Subah- 
dar  was  of  their  making  ;  their  troops  formed  the  only 
effective  military  force  in  the  province  ;  in  so  far  as  it  might  be 
expedient,  their  will  was  the  determining  voice  in  his  counsels. 
The  French  had  found  this  position  liable  to  many  inconveniences, 
the  principal  one  of  which  was  the  jealousy  which  their  predomin- 
ance caused  among  the  principal  Muhammadans  of  the  Deccan. 
But  one  difference  between  Bengal  and  the  Deccan  was  that, 
whereas  Nizam-ul-Mulk  had  chiefly  employed  Muhammadans 
in  the  higher  posts  of  his  administration,  his  contemporary  in 
Bengal,  Alivirdi  Khan,  had  employed  Hindus.  These  had  to 
some  extent  survived  Siraj-ud-daula's  reign,  and  in  1757  Rai 
Durlab  was  still  Diwan,  Ramnarayan  was  still  the  Nawab's 
deputy  in  Behar. 

Siraj-ud-daula's  misconduct  had  in  general  alienated  both 
classes.  He  had  found  no  supporters  among  the  Muhammadans  ; 
and  leading  Hindus,  such  as  the  Seths  and  Rai  Durlab,  had  been 
ranged  actively  against  him.  Indeed,  as  Mr.  Hill  has  pointed 
out,  it  was  not  surprising  to  find  English  and  Hindus  united  in 
the  same  political  action,  for  their  joint  interests  in  the  commerce 
of  the  country  made  them  natural  allies. 

Mir  Jaf  ar  had  expected  that  his  unstipulated  generosity  to  the 
English  leaders  would  lead  to  a  relaxation  of  their  demands 
on  account  of  the  Company.  Instead,  he  was  sternly  required  to 
pay  the  sums  he  had  promised.  This  was  not  at  all  to  his  liking. 
Scrafton,  acting  as  Resident  at  the  Durbar,  complains  of  the 
passionate  and  haughty  way  in  which  the  Nawab  treated  him.^ 
Even  Clive  came  to  the  conclusion  that  "  the  less  occasion 
he  has  for  us,  the  more  unwilling  he  will  be  to  comply  with  any 
of  our  requests."  ^     He  even  pointed  out  to  the  Select  Committee 

'  See  Malcolm,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i.  p.  324. 

•  Clive  to  Select  Committee,  November  4,  1757  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  x.  i.  2462). 

138 


CLIVE'S  FIRST  GOVERNMENT  189 

that  if  the  Nawab  persisted  in  refusing  to  make  over  the  lands  he 
had  ceded  by  the  treaty,  it  might  be  necessary  to  occupy  them  by 
force.  ^ 

At  the  same  time  as  he  was  quarrelhng  with  the  Enghsh,  the 
Nawab  resolved  to  strengthen  his  government  by  getting  rid 
of  the  principal  Hindu  officials  ;  and  this  policy  led  to  a  pro- 
longed duel  between  him  and  Clive  for  their  removal  or  retention. 

At  the  commencement  it  is  likely  that  Mir  Jafar,  and  certain  that 
Clive,  did  not  know  whither  circumstances  were  leading  them. 
In  September  the  Nawab  summoned  to  Murshidabad  Ramram 
Singh,  the  Raja  of  Midnapore,  from  whom  considerable  arrears 
of  revenue  were  due.  He  sent  two  of  his  relatives  to  explain 
matters  ;  and  these  were  at  once  imprisoned.  On  this  the  Raja 
prepared  to  resist,  and  about  the  same  time  a  rebellion  broke  out 
in  the  Pumea  country,  also  headed  by  a  Hindu.*  These  troubles 
were  ascribed  by  the  Nawab  to  the  secret  intrigues  of  Rai  Durlab, 
who  had  received  repeated  promises  of  being  continued  as 
Diwan,  and  who  (Clive  wrote  in  the  following  December)  had  a 
powerful  following  and  probably  was  trying  to  increase  it.  Siraj- 
ud-daula's  brother,  "  a  lad  and  almost  an  idiot,"  was  hastily 
executed  on  the  pretext  that  Rai  Durlab  intended  to  make  him 
Nawab,  and  but  for  English  interposition  Rai  Durlab  himself 
would  probably  have  been  attacked.^  Watts,  however,  inter- 
fered, and  effected  an  outward  reconciliation.*  The  Nawab 
then  ordered  his  army  to  march,  and  after  some  difficulties  due 
to  unsettled  arrears,  he  was  at  last  able  to  take  the  field  in  order 
to  quell  the  disturbances  and  estabUsh  his  government  in  Behar. 

The  threatened  difficulties  in  the  latter  province,  where  it 
was  supposed  that  the  Deputy,  Ramnarayan,  was  in  league  with 
the  Nawab  of  Oudh,  compelled  Mir  Jafar  to  seek  English  help, 
and  CUve  marched  from  the  neighbourhood  of  Calcutta  in  the 
middle  of  November.^      Some  days  before   this,  the   Raja  of 

'  Select  Committee,  November  8  and  12,  1757. 

'  Not  on  his  own  account,  but  on  behalf  of  a  Muhammadan  whom  Mir  Jafar 
wished  to  dispossess.  There  was  also  a  Muhammadan  movement  at  Dacca 
which  was  quite  unconnected  with  the  two  risings  mentioned  in  the  text,  but  like 
them  came  to  nothing. 

'CUve  to  the  Secret  Committee,  December  23,  1757,  ap.  Malcolm,  Life  of 
Clive,  vol.  i.,  p.  329  (Malcolm  incorrectly  addresses  the  letter  to  the  Select  Com- 
mittee). ■ 

♦  Clive  to  Nawab.  October  17,  1757  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  xi.  f.  2852). 

•  The  Select  Committee  were  opposed  to  the  Behar  expedition,  fearing  a 
French  attack  by  sea  ;  but  Clive  overruled  them  (Bengal  Sel.  Com..  December 
19,  1757,  and  January  11,  1758). 


140  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

Midnapore  had  made  his  submission  on  the  promise  of  EngUsh 
protection  ;  and  on  CHve's  approach  the  Purnea  rebels  sub- 
mitted or  fled.^ 

In  spite  of  their  apparent  reconciliation,  however,  the  affair 
of  Rai  Durlab  still  demanded  settlement  before  the  Nawab  could 
proceed  to  Behar.  When  he  had  marched  from  his  capital, 
Rai  Durlab  had  stayed  behind,  alleging  sickness  as  his  reason,- 
but  also  fearing  to  trust  himself  in  the  Nawab's  camp.  When 
Clive  passed  through  Murshidabad  on  his  way  to  join  the 
Nawab,  he  assured  the  Minister  of  his  protection,  although  he 
was  by  no  means  certain  that  Rai  Durlab  was  not  concerned 
in  the  delay  in  paying  the  English  debt.  At  Murshidabad  he 
received  repeated  promises  of  settlement,  but  when  he  had 
moved  on  and  joined  the  Nawab,  nothing  was  done.  He 
therefore  resolved  not  to  move  farther  till  these  matters  were 
cleared  up,  and  ordered  Scrafton  to  tell  Rai  Durlab  that  he  was 
risking  the  loss  of  English  protection.^  The  warning  seems  to 
have  been  effectwal.  The  Diwan  at  last  left  Murshidabad,  and 
on  December  24  visited  CUve  ;  on  the  26th  Watts  presented 
him  to  the  Nawab  ;  *  on  the  30th  a  conference  was  held  between 
the  Nawab,  Rai  Durlab,  and  Omar  Beg,  on  the  one  side, 
and  Clive  and  Watts  on  the  other.  It  was  agreed  that  the 
English  dues  should  be  discharged  by  orders  on  the  revenue- 
managers  of  various  districts,^  and  that  the  grant  for  the 
territory  promised  to  the  Company  should  issue  without 
delay. 

Matters  were  now  cleared  up  for  the  advance  into  Behar. 
At  first  the  sentiments  of  CUve  had  been  decidedly  adverse  to 
Ramnarayan,  the  deputy,  who  was  believed  to  have  cherished 
deeper  sentiments  of  loyalty  towards  Siraj-ud-daula  than  his 
other  ministers  had  done.  Soon  after  the  battle  of  Plassey  • 
Coote  had  been  dispatched  with  a  detachment  to  pursue  and 
capture  Law  and  his  party  of  Frenchmen.    The  latter  on  July  i 

•  Clive  to  the  Secret  Committee,  December  23,  1757  {loc.  cit.). 

"  In  December  he  was  attended  by  the  English  surgeon,  Forth,  and  his  sickness 
seems  to  have  been  genuine  enough  (letters  of  Rai  Durlab  and  Clive  of  December  5 
and  13,  1757.  dive's  Country  Correspondence). 

•  Clive  to  Scrafton,  December  14,  1757  (Orme  MSS.,  Tndia,  x.  f.  2485)  ;  Clive 
to  Select  Committee,  December  23,  1757. 

•  Chve  to  Secret  Committee,  February  18,  1758  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  x.  f.  2540). 
'  A  very  usual  manner  of  discharging  debt. 

•  On  July  6.  Orme  gives  a  singularly  detailed  account  oi  this  expedition,  drawn 
from  Coote's  diary  and  correspondence. 


CLIVE'S  FIRST  GOVERNMENT  141 

was  near  Rajmahal,  whence,  on  hearing  of  the  defeat  and  capture 
of  Siraj-ud-daula,  he  had  rapidly  retired  towards  Patna,  which 
Coote  did  not  reach  till  July  26,  when  Law  had  already  retired 
into  Oudh.  Coote's  reception  was  not  very  cordial.  He  com- 
plained that  his  people  bringing  in  bullocks  for  slaughter  had 
been  attacked  by  peons  in  the  open  street.^  He  was  informed 
that  Ramnarayan  could  easily  have  stopped  Law,  that  he  was 
aiming  at  independence,  and  had  entered  into  correspondence 
with  Shuja-ud-daula,  the  Nawab  of  Oudh.^  At  the  same  time 
Mir  Jafar's  vakil  in  Oudh  reported  that  every  one  there  was 
eager  to  plunder  the  riches  of  Murshidabad.  ' '  They  all  cry 
out  they  are  no  soldiers  in  Bengal  and  there  are  great  riches."  * 
The  result  of  all  this  was  that  Ramnarayan  was  looked  on  as  a 
secret  enemy,  and  Coote  boldly  requested  orders  to  seize  him.* 
The  orders  were  actually  issued.  "  The  resolution  here  is," 
CUve  writes,  "  that  if  it  can  be  effectually  done,  he  is  to  be 
demolished."  '  However,  Mir  Jafar's  friends  at  Patna  dissuaded 
Coote  from  the  attack  which  he  proposed,*  and  at  the  same 
time  the  Nawab  resolved  that  nothing  should  be  done,  perhaps 
because  he  distrusted  his  relatives  at  Patna,  perhaps  because 
he  distrusted  the  English.'  So  Coote  superintended  a  solemn 
oath  of  fidelity  taken  by  Ramnarayan,  and  strong  protestations 
of  perpetual  friendship  between  him  and  his  future  executioner, 
Mir  Kasim.*  Clive  was  annoyed  at  this  sudden  change. 
"  Unless  you  chastise  some  of  these  treacherous  and  turbulent 
dispositions,"  he  wrote,  "  every  petty  rajah  will  dare  dis- 
obedience."* 

AH  this,  it  will  be  observed,  took  place  before  Clive  had  had 
experience  of  the  capacity  for  mismanagement  which  Mir  Jafar 
was  about  to  display.  In  the  interval  between  this  affair  and 
the  expedition  to  Patna,  Clive  had  witnessed  the  troubles  which 
had  arisen  with  the  Raja  of  Midnapore  and  the  Diwan,  Rai 

•  Coote  to  Clive,  July  28.  1757  (Orme  MSS..  India,  vii.  f.  1614).  * 

*  Ibid.,  i.  161s. 

'  Nawab's  vakil  to  Nawab,  received  August  26,  1757  (Clive' s  Country  Corre- 
spondence). 

*  Coote  to  Clive,  August  4,  1757  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  vii.  f.  1617). 
»  Clive  to  Coote,  August  i,  1757  (loc.  cit.,  f.  1646). 

»*  Coote  to  Clive,  August  13,  1757  (/oc.  cii.,  f.  1624). 
'  The  first  reason  is  given  byKillpatrick,  who  was  at  Murshidabad  ( Killpatrick  to 
Coote,  August  9,  1757,  loc.  cit.,  i.  1647).     Orme  says  the  motive  of  this  sudden 
change  is  obscure. 

»  Coote  to  Killpatrick,  August  22,  1757  (loc.  cit.,  f.  1630). 

•  Clive  to  Nawab,  August  12,  1757  (Clive's  Country  Correspondence). 


142  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

Durlab.  He  had  been  able  to  form  his  own  opinion  of  the  Nawab's 
character  and  the  reliance  it  was  possible  to  place  upon  his 
promises.  The  impression  produced  by  his  behaviour  before 
the  battle  of  Plassey  was  deepened  and  confirmed  by  his  early 
conduct  as  Nawab.  By  the  end  of  the  year,  Clive  was  aware 
that  he  was  engaged  to  support  a  man  of  much  the  same  type 
as  Bussy  was  upholding — weak,  inconsistent,  and  insincere. 
It  is  from  the  latter  part  of  this  period  that  we  must  date  the 
commencement  of  that  policy  which  marks  his  later  relations 
with  Mir  Jafar.  The  protection  which  circumstances  had  at 
first  led  him  to  accord  to  Ram  Raja  and  Rai  Durlab  now  be- 
came a  settled  principle  of  supporting  Hindu  ministers  against 
oppression  on  condition  that  they  performed  their  duties.  This 
was  his  first  step  in  advance  of  what  Dupleix  and  Bussy  had 
already  taught  him. 

Accordingly,  in  the  Patna  expedition,  we  find  a  change  of 
r61es.  Clive  no  longer  urges  the  punishment  of  Ramnarayan  ; 
on  the  contrary,  he  stands  forward  as  his  protector  and  the 
negotiator  of  a  reconciliation  between  the  Nawab  and  his  deputy. 
This  change  of  attitude  was  first  manifested  by  Chve  in  December, 
on  the  receipt  of  assurances  from  Ramnarayan  of  his  fidelity  to 
the  Nawab. ^  On  January  i  he  wrote  promising  his  protection 
(with  the  Nawab's  authority  for  doing  so),  as  the  deputy  had 
refused  to  trust  his  person  in  the  Nawab's  power  without  a 
guarantee  from  the  English.*  On  receipt  of  this,  Ramnarayan 
at  once  took  boat  to  meet  Clive  and  Mir  Jafar.  The  latter 
received  him  graciously  enough,  but  made  him  march  in  the 
rear,  so  that  the  whole  of  the  Nawab's  forces  were  interposed 
between  him  and  Clive.  The  suspicions  of  the  latter  were  at 
once  awakened.  He  wrote  anxiously  to  ascertain  the  cause 
of  this  arrangement,  and  was  only  reassured  by  letters  from  Rai 
Durlab  and  Ramnarayan  himself.^  On  reaching  Patna  other 
causes  of  suspicion  arose.  The  Nawab  sent  troops  in  advance 
to  prevent  any  from  entering  the  city  ;  Chve  insisted  on  enter- 
ing, and  marched  through  to  the  English  factory,  where  he 
encamped.  The  next  day  he  moved  out  to  Bankipur,  but  when 
the  Nawab  desired  him  to  move  yet  farther  off,  he  dechned, 

'  Clive  to  Select  Committee,  December  12,  1759  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  x.  f.  2466), 
and  Ramnarayan  to  Clive  of  November  20  and  25  {loc.  cit.,  xi.  ft.  2874-2875). 

'  Clive  to  Select  Committee,  January  4,  1758  (loc.  cit.,  f.  2489). 

'  Clive  to  Amir  Beg,  February  3 ;  Rai  Durlab  and  Ramnarayan  to  Clive, 
received  February  4,  1758  (dive's  Country  Correspondence). 


CLIVE'S  FIRST  GOVERNMENT  148 

and  camped  on  an  island  in  the  Ganges  where  he  was  secure 
from  any  sudden  attack — such  precautions  were  necessary,  he 
observed,  at  so  great  a  distance  from  Calcutta  ;  ^  and  he  now 
urged  the  Nawab  to  redeem  his  engagements  and  confirm 
Ramnarayan  in  his  government. 

Whatever  may  have  been  Mir  Jafar's  intentions  towards 
the  EngUsh,  he  certainly  had  no  good  will  towards  Ramnarayan, 
and  hoped  to  replace  him  by  his  brother-in-law,  Mir  Kasim." 
Clive  at  last  visited  him  to  force  him  to  a  declaration  of  his 
intentions.  "  He  asked  me,"  Clive  wrote  next  day  to  Ramna- 
rayan, "if  it  was  absolutely  my  desire  that  he  should  give  you 
the  kilaut.^  I  told  him  I  had  given  my  word  ...  on  which 
the  Nabob  said,  I  will  give  him  the  kilaut  the  first  lucky  day."  * 
This  determination  was  strengthened  by  rumours  (which,  how- 
ever, came  to  nothing)  of  an  impending  attack  on  Bengal  by  the 
Marathas  and  the  Nawab  of  Oudh.  It  was,  therefore,  settled 
that  Ramnarayan  should  pay  at  once  a  peshkash  of  9  lakhs 
and  be  appointed  deputy  in  Behar." 

This  appointment  was  made  very  much  against  the  Nawab's 
inchnations,  and  he  still  cherished  hopes  of  being  able  to  induce 
CUve  to  depart,  leaving  him  and  his  troops  in  Patna,  so  that  he 
might  then  have  the  new-made  deputy  at  his  disposal.  But 
Clive  with  his  usual  insight  detected  each  scheme  as  it  arose 
in  the  Nawab's  mind,  and  declined  to  budge  until  the  Nawab's 
forces  were  withdrawn.  He  now  felt  no  danger  of  treachery, 
and  sent  away  the  bulk  of  the  English  troops  on  April  i ;  but 
he  himself  waited  at  Patna  almost  another  month,  until  he  had 
convinced  the  Nawab  that  further  attempts  were  useless.  On 
April  30,  Ramnarayan  took  his  leave  of  Mir  Jafar  aboard  Clive 's 
budgerow  about  40  miles  below  Patna  ;  and  then  CUve  proceeded 
with  Rai  Durlab  to  Murshidabad.® 

During  Mir  Jafar's  expedition,  that  city  had  been  left  under 
the  charge  of  Miran,  the  Nawab's  son,  whose  character  may  be 
shortly  and   accurately   described   as   in   cowardice,  folly,  and 

'  Clive  to  Select  Committee,  February  7,  1758  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  x.  f.  2495). 
Clive  possibly  had  in  mind  the  affair  of  the  Char-Mahal. 
«  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  February  18,  1758. 

*  The  dress  of  honour  presented  at  the  time  of  conferring  or  confirming  an 
official  in  a  post. 

*  Clive  to  Ramnarayan,  February  15,  1758  {Clive's  Country  Correspondence). 

•  The  Nawab's  son  was  formally  appointed  Deputy  and  Ramnarayan  was 
appointed  to  act  for  him. 

•  Clive  to  Drake,  May  3,  1758  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  x.  £.  2501). 


144  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

cruelty  an  exact  replica  of  Siraj-ud-daula's.  As  soon  as  his 
father  had  quitted  Murshidabad  the  son  exemplified  his  character 
by  promptly  murdering  a  possible  claimant  to  the  masnad  of 
Bengal.  What  he  expected  as  a  result  of  the  Behar  expedition 
we  cannot  tell ;  but  the  city  continued  in  a  state  of  great  unrest 
and  excitement  ;  ^  and  when  news  came  that  Clive  and  Rai 
Durlab  were  returning  from  Patna,  Miran  hurriedly  quitted 
Murshidabad  for  the  palace  of  Motijhil  and  thither  summoned 
all  his  troops.  Had  CUve  been  a  man  of  less  practical  wisdom 
and  coolness,  Mir  Jafar's  tenure  of  the  provinces  might  then 
have  been  suddenly  cut  short  ;  but  instead  of  taking  miUtary 
measures  against  this  hostile  demonstration,  he  contented 
himself  with  sharply  reproaching  Mir  Jafar  for  his  son's 
behaviour  ;  ^  having  received  Miran's  apologies  and  cantoned 
his  troops  at  Kasimbazaar,  he  proceeded  calmly  to  Calcutta, 
where  he  arrived  on  May  28.' 

Not  even  Bussy's  career  offers  a  more  remarkable  illustration 
of  wise  and  vigorous  political  conduct  than  Clive's  achievement 
in  this  expedition  to  Patna.  Without  ever  breaking  with  the 
Nawab,  or  lowering  his  dignity  by  threats,  he  succeeded  most 
completely  in  imposing  his  will  upon  him.  He  had  with  the 
Nawab's  concurrence  declared  that  if  Ramnarayan  made  his 
submission,  he  should  be  confirmed  in  his  post  ;  and  the  Nawab 
was  obliged  to  keep  his  word.  Rai  Durlab,  whose  support  had 
been  secured  by  the  promise  of  retaining  the  office  of  Diwan, 
was  equally  maintained.  And  the  Nawab  was  also  forced  to 
fulfil  his  engagements  with  the  English.  In  fact  the  English 
and  Hindus  who  had  made  Mir  Jafar  Nawab  combined  against 
him  to  make  him  keep  his  promises,  with  the  result  that  the 
country  enjoyed  political  tranquillity  instead  of  being  distracted 
by  a  thousand  intrigues  against  the  new  ruler.  As  Chve  justly 
claimed  :  "  The  Nawab  seems  so  well  fixed  in  his  government  as 
to  be  able,  with  a  small  degree  of  prudence,  to  maintain  himself 
quietly  in  it.  For  ourselves,  we  have  been  so  fortunate  in  these 
transactions  as  to  attach  to  us  the  most  considerable  persons 
in  the  kingdom  ;  and  by  the  constancy  with  which  we  success- 
ively supported  Rajah  Ram,  Roy  DuUub,  and  Ram  Narrain, 

'  In  February  it  was  reported  that  the  Nawab  had  attempted  and  failed  to 
murder  Ramnarayan  and  that  Rai  Durlab's  troops  had  fallen  upon  and  slain  the 
Nawab  (Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  February  i8.  1758). 

•  Clive  to  Nawab,  May  18,  1758  {Clive's  Country  Correspondence). 

»  Clive  to  Scrafton,  May  29,  1758  {Orme  MSS.,  India,  x.  I.  2502). 


CLIVE'S  FIRST  GOVERNMENT  146 

to  acquire  the  general  confidence,  and  make  our  friendship  be 
sollicited  on  all  sides."  ^ 

Even  after  the  expedition,  however,  such  was  Mir  Jafar's 
unstable  nature  that  no  vigilance  could  be  relaxed.  Mir  Kasim, 
for  instance,  still  remained  at  Patna,  threatening  and  alarming 
Ramnarayan.  "  By  showing  his  apprehension  of  the  Nabob," 
Clive  wrote  to  Amyatt  at  Patna,  "  his  authority  will  be  always 
encroached  upon  ;  so  by  a  contrary  conduct,  the  other  [Mir 
Kasim]  will  not  attempt  to  lessen  his  authority.  .  .  .  You  may 
assure  him  I  will  support  and  stand  by  him  in  everything  but 
the  casting  off  his  allegiance."  -  Even  at  the  end  of  the  year,  he 
still  needed  assurances  of  CUve's  support ;  ^  and  without  the 
confidence  he  felt  in  this,  Ramnarayan  would  most  certainly 
have  been  numbered  with  the  Nawab's  enemies. 

It  was  about  this  time  that  the  anomalous  position  hitherto 
occupied  by  Clive  was  regularised,  in  defiance  of  an  extraordinary 
scheme  formulated  by  the  Court  of  Directors.  On  June  20  the 
Company's  ship  Hardwicke  came  into  the  river,  and  on  the 
following  day  her  dispatches  reached  Calcutta.  They  contained 
orders  establishing  a  Council  of  ten  to  be  presided  over  by  four 
of  its  members  each  holding  the  government  for  a  month  at  a 
time — as  a  pamphleteer  remarked,  dancing  the  hay  in  the  govern- 
ment like  Mr.  Bayes'  sun,  moon,  and  earth.*  This  was  the  first 
of  Holwell's  intrigues.  le  had  gone  home  in  1757,  and  in- 
dustriously sought  to  procure  appointment  as  President  of  Fort 
William.  Failing  in  this,  he  had  succeeded  in  persuading  a 
majority  of  the  Directors  to  accept  this  "  Rotation  Government," 
as  it  was  called,  in  which  he  was  included  as  one  of  the  four 
alternate  Governors.^  However,  the  Bengal  Council  had  good 
sense  enough  to  refuse  to  put  this  mad  scheme  into  execution. 
The  three  nominated  Governors  (Holwell  had  not  yet  arrived) 
refused  to  act  ;  and  it  was  agreed  that  Clive  should  occupy  the 
chair  until  affairs  had  been  regulated  from  home.     When  the 

•  Clive  to  Company,  February  i8.  1758  (Malcolm,  op.  cit.  vol.  i.  pp.  336-339). 
•Clive  to  Amyatt,  June  5,   1758  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  x.  f.  2503).     See  also 

Ramnarayan  to  Clive  (received  J  une  7  ?)  and  Clive  to  Mir  Jafar  of  June  7,  1758 
(dive's  Country  Correspondence). 

•  Clive  to  Amyatt,  December  29,  1 7  58  {loc.  cit.,  i.  2599). 

*  Address  to  the  Proprietors  regarding  the  Motion  to  be  discussed  at  the  South 
Sea  House  (1764). 

*  For  further  details,  the  reader  may  be  referred  to  Malcolm,  op.  cit.,  ii.  pp. 
112,  etc.  Holwell's  Vindication,  pp.  7,  etc.  There  is  a  curious  account  of  it  in 
the  Newcastle  Papers  (Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  33031,  f.  204). 

10 


146  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

news  of  the  Revolution  reached  England,  Clive  was  at  once  ap- 
pointed Governor  by  the  Company.* 

It  was  fortunate  that  the  absurdity  of  the  Company  was 
corrected  by  the  good  sense  of  the  Company's  servants,  for  it 
was  no  time  for  divided  or  varying  counsels.  The  news  of  Lally's 
arrival  on  the  Coromandel  Coast  with  large  forces  was  still 
recent ;  and  it  was  known  that  the  French  and  English  squadrons 
had  fought  a  severe  but  indecisive  action.  The  Nawab  beUeved 
that  the  time  of  his  dehverance  from  English  demands  was  at 
hand,  and  was  with  great  probability  suspected  of  seeking  to 
open  a  correspondence  with  the  French.^ 

In  the  first  place,  Clive  urged  a  policy  of  moderation  on  the 
Council.  There  were  numerous  complaints  of  encroachments 
by  the  English  on  the  rights  of  Government.  English  flags  had 
been  set  up  outside  the  Company's  territory  ;  and  Clive  insisted 
on  their  removal.  "  The  reputation  we  have  established,"  he 
wrote  at  this  juncture,  "  by  the  force  of  our  arms  makes  it  neces- 
sary for  the  Company's  advantages,  as  well  as  for  the  benefit 
of  the  trade  in  general,  that  we  establish  the  like  reputation  for 
equity  and  moderation."  ^ 

To  strengthen  his  hold  on  the  Nawab,  and  not  impossibly  to 
have  him  in  his  power  in  case  news  came  of  Lally's  advancing  on 
Madras  after  his  success  at  St.  David's,  Clive  invited  the  Nawab 
to  Calcutta.*  The  invitation  was  accepted ;  and  luckily,  in- 
stead of  bad  news,  reports  arrived  of  Pocock's  second,  more 
successful  action  against  d'Ach^  and  of  Lally's  expedition  to 
Tanjore.  The  visit  therefore  passed  off  with  great  festivities, 
of  which  Scrafton  gives  a  lively  description :  "  Indeed,  we  have 
been  so  much  taken  up  in  balls,  musick,  and  visits  to  do  honour 
to  the  Nabob,  and  poor  me  the  eternall  interpreter,  that  aU 
publick  affairs  has  been  totally  neglected."  *  And  again  :  "  Thank 
God,  His  Excellency  is  at  last  gone.     He  has  led  me  a  hell  of  a 

'  Clive  to  W^atts,  June  22,  1758  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  x.  fi.  2504  ;  Clive  to  Forde 
{loc.  cit.,  f.  2555  ;  Bengal  Pub.  Cons.,  June  26,  1758).  Clive  was  appointed 
Governor  by  dispatch  dated  April  11,  1758.  On  Clive's  accepting  the  chair,  he 
ceased  to  submit  his  correspondence  with  the  Nawab,  etc.,  to  the  Madras  Com- 
mittee. 

"  In  fact,  he  behaved  much  like  Salabat  Jang.  "  Mustapha,"  the  translator 
of  the  Siyar-ul-Mutaquerin,  was  supposed  to  be  concerned  in  these  intrigues. 

*  Clive  to  Drake  and  to  Sumner  of  June  4,  1758  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  x.  ff. 
2502-2503). 

•  "  I  need  not  hint  to  you  how  many  good  purposes  the  Nabob's  presence  will 
answer."     Clive  to  Watts,  August  4,  1758  (loc.  cit.,  i.  2567). 

'  Scrafton  to  Hastings,  August  22,  1758  (Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  29132,  f.  4). 


CLIVE'S  FIRST  GOVERNMENT  147 

life  here  by  the  constant  attendance  I  have  been  obliged  to  pay 
to  him  and  his  wenches,  for  he  never  went  20  yards  from  his  house 
but  they  were  with  him.  I.  believe  he  is  gone  away  well  satisfied."  ^ 
With  that  irony,  however,  with  which  our  present  subject 
abounds,  these  festivities  were  accompanied  by  a  new  series  of 
intrigues  *  developed  at  Murshidabad  with  the  object  of  seizing 
the  reputed  treasures  of  Rai  Durlab  and  ruining  him  in  the  eyes 
of  the  English.  In  July  one  Rajabalabh  had  been  appointed 
Miran's  Diwan,  and  Rai  Durlab  had  been  ordered  to  deUver  over 
to  him  certain  accounts.  He  complied  with  the  request,  but, 
certain  that  it  foreshadowed  accusations  of  mismanagement, 
he  demanded  leave  to  withdraw  to  Calcutta.  This  the  Nawab 
granted,  but  Miran  frustrated  this  by  causing  his  house  to  be 
beleaguered  by  troops  clamorous  for  pay.  Scrafton  and  Watts 
narrowly  succeeded  in  rescuing  him,*  and  he  accompanied  the 
Nawab  to  Calcutta. 

The  matter  was  exceedingly  delicate.  It  was  essential  to 
Clive's  poUcy  that  a  man  like  Rai  Durlab  should  not  be  abandoned 
to  spoliation  by  the  Nawab  ;  it  was  also  required  by  the  needs 
of  the  moment  that  no  rupture  should  take  place  between  the 
Nawab  and  the  English.  Clive's  resources  of  men  were  far  too 
scanty  to  permit  of  his  sending  help  to  Madras  and  at  the  same 
time  entering  on  a  campaign  against  Mir  Jafar.  "  The  expedi- 
tion now  on  foot,"*  he  wrote,  "makes  it  necessary  we  should  carry 
everything  at  the  Durbar  with  smoothness  and  complacency  ; 
as  little  disgust  as  possible  should  be  given.  .  .  ."  * 

Hastings,  who  was  for  the  moment  in  charge  of  affairs  at 
Murshidabad,  was  confronted  with  a  task  of  great  difficulty  in 
carrying  out  these  orders.     Some  time  after  the  Nawab's  return 

'  Loc.  oil.,  i.  12 ;  in  Long's  Selections,  pp.  191-194,  is  a  curious  account  of  the 
expenses  involved.  The  Nawab's  presents  included  waxworks — "  twelve  stand- 
ing Venusses  to  pull  off  behind ;  one  Ijfing  ditto."  There  was  an  entertainment 
at  the  Theatre  and  a  ball  at  the  Courthouse.  Also  a  considerable  bill  for  "  sound- 
ing "  the  trump)ets,  horns,  and  kettledrums  at  the  entertainments. 

•  This  affair  was  shared  by  Nuncomar,  who  desired  to  supplant  Rai  Durlab. 

•  Scrafton  received  for  this  service  a  present  of  10,000  rupees  (Scrafton  to  Hast- 
ings, August  27,  1758  ;  Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  29132,  f.  12).  The  case  affords  an 
illustration  of  a  present  which,  accordingly  to  the  ideas  of  the  age,  was  perfectly 
legitimate.  It  was  not  stipulated  beforehand,  and  was  a  return  for  a  clear  per- 
sonal service  performed  in  carrying  out  the  orders  of  Scrafton's  superiors.  It  is 
noteworthy  that  Rai  Durlab  was  replaced  in  his  office  of  Diwan  by  a  Muham- 
madan,  Omar  Beg. 

•  Forde's  expedition  to  the  circars.     See  below. 

•  Clive  to  Hastings,  September  9,  1758  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  x.  f.  2573);  of.  also 
CUvc'scarlierletter  to  Watts  of  August  I3  (loc.cil.,  i.  2568). 


148  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

from  Calcutta,  he  showed  Hastings  a  letter  ^  which  he  declared 
to  be  written  by  Rai  Durlab,  and  which,  if  genuine,  incriminated 
the  writer  in  a  conspiracy  against  Mir  Jafar.  Hastings  was 
inclined  to  believe  the  letter  to  be  genuine.  Clive  did  not.  He 
pointed  out  that  in  the  conspiracy  against  Siraj-ud-daula  Rai 
Durlab  would  commit  nothing  to  writing,  and  could  hardly  be 
induced  even  to  send  messages  ;  that  he  would  never  dare  to 
intrigue  when  actually  living  at  Calcutta,  and  when  discovery 
would  lead  at  once  to  his  surrender  to  the  Nawab's  mercy  ;  and 
that  the  Nawab  had  made  large  offers  to  Nuncomar  in  case  the 
business  of  the  letter  were  brought  to  a  good  conclusion.^  Clive 
was  almost  certainly  right  ;  and  the  probabilities  are  greatly  in 
favour  of  Rai  Durlab's  innocence.  The  essential  point,  however, 
was  that  Clive  maintained  his  policy  without  any  breach  with 
Mir  Jafar.  ^  The  whole  situation  is  summed  up  with  great 
clearness  by  Clive  in  a  letter  which  he  addressed  about  this  time 
to  Pitt.  Mir  Jafar,  he  there  says,  "  still,  'tis  true,  retains  his 
attachment  to  us,  and  probably  while  he  has  no  other  support 
will  continue  to  do  so  ;  but  Mussalmen  are  so  little  influenced  by 
gratitude,*  that  should  he  ever  think  it  his  interest  to  break  with 
us,  the  obligations  he  owes  us  would  prove  no  restraint  ;  and 
this  is  very  evident  from  his  having  lately  removed  his  Prime 
Minister  and  cut  off  two  or  three  principal  oihcers,  all  attached 
to  our  interest  and  who  had  a  share  in  his  elevation.  Moreover, 
he  is  advanced  in  years,  and  his  son  so  worthless  and  cruel  a 
young  fellow,  and  so  apparently  an  enemy  to  the  English,  that 
it  will  be  almost  unsafe  trusting  him  with  the  succession.  ..."  * 
However  much  the  support  which  the  English  accorded  to 
prominent  Hindu  oihcials  in  1758  may  have  alienated  the  Nawab, 
the  events  of  1759  were  speedily  to  prove  even  to  him  that  this 
protection  did  not  signify  hostility  to  his  interests,  for  when  his 
position  was  threatened  by  an  invader,  Clive  stood  forward  at 
once  as  his  champion.  Some  time  in  1758  the  son  of  the  Moghul, 
later  on  known  to  history  as  Shah  Alam,  fled  from  Dellii,  and 
after  various  wanderings  took  refuge  with  Shuja-ud-daula,  the 

»  Forwarded  with  Hastings'  letter  to  Clive  of  October  2,  1758  {loc.  cit.,  i.  2581). 
'  Clive  to  Hastings,  October  6  and  November  28,  1758  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  x. 
fi.  2581  and  2594). 

*  "The  Nabob  has  been  very  sanguine  for  our  delivering  up  Roy  duUub;  but 
we  are  too  much  bound  in  honour  to  protect  him,  to  abandon  him  upon  mere 
suspicion."     Clive  to  Amyatt,  December  7,  1758  (loc.  cit.,  i.  2597). 

♦  A  very  current  sentiment  at  this  time,  frequently  in  the  mouth  of  Dupleix. 
'  Chatham  Correspondence,  vol.  i.  p.  387. 


I 


CLIVE'S  FIRST  GOVERNMENT  149 

Nawab  of  Oudh.  He  had  a  following  of  about  8000  horse,  and 
formed  the  plan  of  strengthening  himself  by  the  occupation  of 
Behar  and  Bengal.  Early  in  1759  there  were  frequent  rumours 
of  his  approach  ;  but  for  some  time  it  did  not  seem  as  though 
serious  danger  threatened.*  In  February  Clive  received  flowery 
letters  from  the  Shah  Zada,^  which  he  ordered  Hastings  to 
answer,  in  consultation  with  the  Nawab,  "  in  such  a  style  as 
may  convince  them  that  it  will  not  be  prudent  in  them  to  venture 
into  these  provinces."  ^  Clive  indeed  had  every  reason  to  wish 
to  scare  the  invader  off,  for  neither  the  English  nor  the  Nawab 
were  prepared  for  such  an  event.  Clive,  emulating  the  generous 
patriotism  with  which  Madras  had  sent  him  to  Bengal  in  1756, 
had  dispatched  half  his  forces  under  Colonel  Forde  to  attack 
the  French  in  the  Northern  Circars  and  thus  relieve  the  pressure 
which  the  European  enemy  were  putting  upon  Madras.*  More- 
over, the  Nawab's  troops  were  even  more  discontented  than  usual, 
and  had  requested  CUve's  interference  on  their  behalf.  He 
naturally  could  not  enter  into  engagements  with  them,  but  pro- 
mised to  do  his  best  to  settle  matters.^ 

To  add  to  these  difficulties,  and  in  spite  of  the  promises  of 
vigorous  English  support,®  Mir  Jafar  thought  the  moment  oppor- 
tune for  an  intrigue  with  the  Marathas,  to  the  great  anger  of 
Clive,  who  wrote  sternly  warning  him  that  such  conduct  would 
bring  on  his  head  the  wrath  of  God  and  the  curses  of  his  subjects. 
It  was,  moreover,  plausibly  suspected  that  he  meant  the  Marathas 
to  be  a  counterpoise  to  the  English,  in  which  case,  wrote  Scrafton, 
"  I  know  not  which  to  admire  most,  his  folly  or  his  treachery."  ' 

In  spite  of  Clive's  attempts  to  keep  the  Shah  Zada  at  a 

"  See,  for  instance,  Clive  to  Amyatt,  January  28,  1759  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  x. 
f.  2602). 

•  I.e.  the  King's  son,  the  name  by  which  the  Prince  is  usually  mentioned  in  the 
writings  and  records  of  the  period. 

*  Clive  to  Hastings,  February  19,  1759  (Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  29131,  f.  63). 

*  For  this  expedition  see  Chap.  Ill,  infra. 

'  CUve  to  Hastings,  March  4,  1759  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  x.  f.  2606). 

•  CUve  to  Hastings,  February  10,  1759  (Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  29131,  f.  55). 
'Scrafton  to  Hastings,  April  21,  1759  (Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  29132,  f.  90). 

In  order  to  sound  the  Nawab's  purposes  in  this  matter,  Hastings  feigned  a  sus- 
picion of  Rai  Durlab.  CUve  seized  the  occasion  to  read  him  a  lesson  on  the  posi- 
tion of  the  English  in  India.  "  I  do  not  think  it  right,"  he  said,  "  that  such 
artifices  should  be  put  in  practice  by  us.  I  would  leave  all  trickery  to  the 
Hindoos  and  Mussalmen  to  whom  it  is  natural,  being  convinced  that  the  reputa- 
tion we  have  in  this  country  is  owing,  among  other  causes,  to  the  ingenuity  and 
plain  dealing  for  which  we  are  distinguished"  (CUve  to  Hastings,  May  15,  1759, 
loc.  cit.,  291 3 1,  f.  70). 


150  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

distance  by  big  words,  at  the  end  of  February  1759  he  had  to 
take  the  field  in  person/  with  all  the  European  troops  he  had, 
leaving-,  Calcutta  to  be  guarded  by  volunteers  and  the  militia. 
The  conduct  of  Ramnarayan,  according  to  the  reports  which 
were  received,  gave  cause  for  uneasiness.  When  the  invader 
crossed  the  Karamnassa,  which  forms  the  boundary  between 
Behar  and  Oudh,  he  was  quickly  joined  by  a  number  of  zemindars 
who  were  either  obedient  to  the  greatness  of  his  rank  or  moved 
by  hostility  against  Mir  Jafar  ;  and  the  Shah  Zada  moved  on 
Patna  at  the  head  of  40,000  men.  Everything  for  the  moment 
turned  on  Ramnarayan,  whom  Clive  exhorted  to  behave  with  a 
becoming  spirit  until  assistance  could  reach  him.^  The  Nawab 
and  Miran  were  so  alarmed  that  they  begged  Clive  to  offer  the 
deputy  every  possible  assurance  in  their  names.  ^  It  was  also 
resolved  that  Clive  and  Miran  should  march  to  the  relief  of  Patna 
with  all  speed. 

Meanwhile  Ramnarayan  had  displayed  the  wisdom  of  the 
serpent.  When  the  Shah  Zada  had  crossed  the  Karamnassa,  he 
visited  the  invader's  camp,  and  made  a  nominal  submission,  in 
return  for  which  he  was  invested  with  the  government  of  Behar. 
But  submission  and  investiture  alike  were  of  much  the  same 
degree  of  sincerity.  Ramnarayan,  having  delayed  matters  some 
days  by  his  visit,  presently  withdrew  to  Patna.  He  gave  out 
that  he  was  going  to  prepare  for  the  Shah  Zada's  reception  ;  he 
actually  prepared  to  defend  the  place.  All  this  as  reported 
to  Clive  had  the  appearance  of  absolute  desertion  ;  *  but  better 
news  soon  arrived.  On  March  27,  Clive  heard  of  the  repulse  of 
an  attack  on  the  walls  of  the  city,  and  sent  on  a  battalion  of  sepoys, 
with  orders  to  march  towards  Patna  as  fast  as  possible,  and  use 
every  endeavour  to  effect  an  entrance  into  the  city.^  On  the  news 
of  their  approach  the  Shah  Zada,  whose  attacks  had  all  failed, 
hastily  drew  off  his  troops  ;  and  all  the  persuasion  of  Law,  who 
had  just  joined  him,  failed  to  induce  him  to  make  another 
attempt.*     As   Shuja-ud-daula  was   disinchned   to   support    a 

•  Hill,  Abstract  of  the  Records  of  the  Foreign  Department,  p.  50,  n.  i. 
'  Clive  to  Amyatt,  March  5,  1759  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  x.  f.  2607). 

•  Same  to  same,  March  10,  1759  {he.  cit.,  f.  2609). 

•  Clive  to  Manningham,  March  23,  1759  (loc.  cit.,  f.  2616). 

'Clive  to  Manningham,  and  Camac  to  Mathews,  of  March  27,  1759  (Orme 
MSS.,  India,  x.  ff.  2619-2620). 

•  Clive  to  Manningham,  April  4,  1759  {loc.  cit.,  f.  2623).  Also  Law's  Memoir, 
pp.  389,  etc.  Law  had  intended  to  march  into  Behar  with  the  Shah  Zada,  but 
the  latter  at  first  ordered  him  to  remain  behind. 


CLIVE'S  FIRST  GOVERNMENT  151 

failing  cause,  the  Shah  Zada  now  made  a  bid  for  English  pro- 
tection. But  this  was  refused,  and  Clive  dismissed  the  Prince 
with  an  alms  of  500  mohurs.*  Having  punished  the  rebellious 
zemindars,  he  placed  a  garrison  in  Patna,^  and  early  in  July 
returned  to  Calcutta. 

This  successful  defence  of  the  Nawab's  territory,  coupled 
with  Chve's  complete  frankness  in  dealing  with  the  Shah  Zada's 
proposals,  revived  all  the  old  feelings  of  gratitude  with  which 
Mir  Jafar  had  formerly  regarded  the  English.  This  was  speedily 
shown  by  the  grant  of  a  jagir  to  Clive,  consisting  of  the  quit- 
rent  which  the  Nawab  had  reserved  when  he  granted  the  24 
Parganas  to  the  Company,  and  which  henceforward  the  Company 
was  to  pay  to  its  great  servant  instead  of  into  the  Nawab's 
treasury.^  This  was  an  indubitable  proof  of  reconciliation,  and 
such  improvement  of  feeling  between  the  Nawab  and  his  pro- 
tectors was  fortunate  in  view  of  the  events  which  were  about 
to  follow — the  attempt  to  replace  the  English  by  a  Dutch 
ascendancy  in  Bengal. 

From  the  first  the  Dutch  had  been  exceedingly  displeased  at 
the  predominance  secured  by  the  English  in  establishing  their 
nominee  as  Nawab.  They  had  even  been  so  unwise  as  to  mani- 
fest their  displeasure  by  refraining  from  offering  Mir  Jafar  the 
customary  present  on  his  accession.^  The  new  Nawab  retaUated 
by  stopping  their  trade  and  seizing  their  vakil ;  and  the  same 
thing  happened  again  in  the  following  year.*  Other  causes  of 
irritation  also  followed.  When  Pocock  left  the  Hugh  with  the 
English  squadron  in  order  to  proceed  to  Madras,  there  were  fears 
lest  the  French  should  seek  to  recover  their  position  in  Bengal. 
In  order  to  place  the  greatest  possible  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
their  sailing  up  the  river,  the  English  sent  proposals  to  the  Dutch 
that  joint  measures  should  be  taken  to  close  the  Hugh  against 
the  French.    The  Dutch  declined  any  such  proposal ;    and, 

'  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  May  4  and  30,  1759. 

'  About  70  Europeans  and  a  battalion  of  sepoys  under  the  command  of 
Captain  John  Dyer  (Clive  to  Select  Committee,  June  4,  1759,  and  Clive  to 
Dyer,  June  5,  1759,  Orme  MSS.,  India,  x.  f.  2646). 

•  See  the  evidence  of  Clive  and  Sykes  before  the  House  of  Commons  in  1772. 
Sykcs's  evidence  completely  proves  the  voluntary  nature  of  the  grant. 

*  Klerk  de  Reuss,  De  Expeditie  naar  Bengal,  p.  6.  They  seem  to  have  de- 
manded, as  the  condition  of  their  recognising  Mir  Jafar,  the  restoration  of  the 
four  lakhs  which  Siraj-ud-daula  had  exacted  from  them  in  1 75O.  Clive  to  Bisdom, 
July  7,  1757  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  x.  f.  2436). 

'Clive  to  Amyatt,  September  25,  and  to  Bisdom,  October  2,  1758  {loc.  cil., 

e.  2578-2579). 


152  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

accordingly,  the  English  insisted  that  the  Dutch  pilot-sloops 
should  be  recalled  from  Balasore,  so  that  French  vessels  could  not 
be  piloted  up  by  the  Dutch. ^ 

Such  measures  caused  much  exasperation,  and  it  may  be 
doubted  whether  they  were  advisable.  But  the  Dutch  began  to 
feel  the  English  supremacy  in  other  ways  as  well.  One  of  the 
important  products  of  Behar  was  saltpetre.  The  Government 
had  always  farmed  this  out  as  a  monopoly,  and  the  Dutch  had 
attempted  to  secure  it  for  themselves.^  In  February  1758, 
Clive  obtained  this  for  the  English  Company,  with  the  political 
motive  of  preventing  this  essential  ingredient  of  gunpowder 
from  reaching  the  French.'  The  Dutch  protested,  and  Clive  at 
once  retorted  on  them  their  own  application  to  Siraj-ud-Ud,ala 
for  the  very  privilege  they  now  objected  to.*  To  this  no  effective 
answer  was  possible  ;  but,  as  the  English  later  in  the  year 
declared  that  the  produce  would  barely  answer  their  own  demands, 
the  Dutch  had  to  procure  their  suppHes  from  less  advantageous 
sources.^  Other  complaints  were  that  the  export  duty  on  opium 
had  been  raised,  thus  affecting  the  extensive  Dutch  trade  in 
opium  to  the  Archipelago,®  and  that  weavers  were  hindered 
from  working  for  the  Dutch,  thus  obstructing  their  cloth-invest- 
ment for  Europe.' 

Except  in  the  case  of  the  saltpetre,  where  there  was  a  political 
motive  at  work,  there  would  seem  to  have  been  no  real  attempt 
to  obstruct  Dutch  commerce.  But  it  would  have  been  difficult 
to  have  persuaded  the  Dutch  of  this,  and  their  indignation  was 
great.  They  were,  in  fact,  in  exactly  the  same  position  which  the 
English  *  would  have  occupied  on  the  Coromandel  Coast,  had 
they  allowed  the  French  quietly  to  estabhsh  Chanda  Sahib  as 
Nawab  of  Arcot.  The  motives  of  Saunders  in  opposing  Dupleix 
were  identical  with  the  motives  of  the  Dutch  leaders,  Bisdom  and 

•  Bengal  Sel.  Cora.,  March  2,  1758.  In  the  following  September  a  Dutch  ship 
was  found  carrying  letters  to  the  French  about  the  projected  expedition  under 
Forde  {loc.  cit.,  September  18). 

'  Klerk  de  Reuss,  op.  cit.,  p.  9. 

'  Coote  to  Qive,  August  8,  1757  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  vii.  f.  1622). 

*  Clive  to  La  Tour,  March  5,  1758  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  x.  f.  2496). 

'CUve  to  Bisdom,  August  11,  1758  (loc.  cit.,  I.  2568).  The  Dutch  obtained  a 
firman  from  Shuja-ud-daula  for  all  the  saltpetre  produced  in  Oudh. 

'  This  was  the  more  felt  because,  contrary  to  the  Dutch  Company's  regula- 
tions, this  trade  was  conducted  by  the  principal  servants  at  Chinsura  and  Batavia, 
and  thus  private  interests  were  involved. 

'  Klerk  de  Reuss,  op.  cit.,  pp.  7-8. 

'  And  of  course  the  Dutch. 


CLIVE'S  FIRST  GOVERNMENT  158 

Vernet,  in  now  opposing  Clive.  However,  events  were  to  prove 
that  the  latter  opposition  was  based  on  a  mistaken  estimate  of 
their  material  force.  The  Dutch  Diredeur,  Bisdom,  was  indeed 
ill  adapted  to  political  action.  He  was  irresolute,  slow,  and 
timid  in  matters  where  he  was  so  little  accustomed  to  weigh 
chances  and  calculate  probabilities.  His  second,  Vernet,  was  a 
stronger  man  ;  but  he  was  either  Uke  his  chief  unable  to  perceive 
the  value  of  swift  action,  or  else  unable  to  move  the  Council. 
And  these  men  were  opposed  to  one  who  could  in  an  instant 
judge  a  situation  and  decide  what  action  it  demanded. 

Even  before  the  Revolution,  the  Dutch  had  resolved  to 
strengthen  themselves  in  Bengal.  In  1757  an  Engineer  officer 
was  sent  tliither  to  report  on  the  fortifications  of  the  Dutch 
settlement  at  Chinsura.  He  found  it  like  every  other  European 
fort  in  India,  irregular,  decayed,  and  overlooked  by  the  neigh- 
bouring houses  ;  and  recommended  that  it  should  be  rebuilt  on 
the  site  formerly  occupied  by  the  Ostend  Company — a  proposal 
which  was  approved  by  the  Chinsura  Council.*  In  the  following 
year  emerged  the  latent  hostility  between  the  Nawab,  and 
especially  his  son  Miran,  and  their  EngUsh  supporters.  Vernet, 
who  was  chief  of  the  Dutch  factory  at  Kasimbazaar,  took  ad- 
vantage of  the  dissensions  that  arose  over  Ramnarayan  and  Rai 
Durlab,  and  entered  into  negotiations  with  Miran  for  the  intro- 
duction of  a  Dutch  force  into  Bengal,  and  this  was  followed  in 
January  1759  by  interviews  with  Mir  Jafar  in  which  he  expressed 
hatred  of  the  Enghsh  and  eagerness  to  escape  from  their  yoke.^ 

Apparently  before  this  news  had  been  transmitted  to  Batavia, 
their  High  Mightinesses,  the  Government  of  the  Dutch  East 
Indies,  had  already  decided  to  strengthen  their  garrisons  in 
Ceylon,  on  the  Coast,  and  in  Bengal.  On  the  motion  of  the 
Governor-General,  Mossel,  it  was  resolved  to  send  2000  Europeans 
with  six  or  eight  vessels,  to  be  employed  as  the  local  govern- 
ments thought  best.  But  before  this  plan  could  be  put  in 
execution,  news  came  from  Chinsura  of    the    negotiation  with 

'  Klerk  de  Reuss,  op.  cit.,  pp.  9-10. 

•  The  exact  detail  of  this  Dutch  intrigue  is  unknown.  Klerk  de  Reuss  says 
that  no  documents  expressly  relating  to  it  have  survived  ;  but  there  are  numerous 
references  to  it  in  the  Dutch  archives  which  he  quotes.  At  first  it  appears  that 
Miran,  in  disgust  with  his  father's  compliance  with  the  English,  was  prepared  to 
dethrone  him  and  attack  the  English  with  Dutch  help.  Later  on  Mir  Jafar 
himself  takes  a  part.  Klerk  de  Reuss  supposes  the  proposals  of  Miran  to  have 
been  merely  a  blind  ;  but  the  view  expressed  above  seems  to  me  more  probable. 
See  op.  cit.,  pp.  15,  etc. 


154  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

Miran,  and  secret  orders  were  at  once  sent  to  Bisdom  to  call  up 
the  troops  that  would  be  sent  to  Coromandel  and  support  Miran's 
party  with  men,  money,  and  ammunition. ^  In  June  1759,  300 
European  troops  and  600  Malays  were  dispatched  in  six  vessels, 
with  orders  to  proceed  to  Negapatam  and  there  obey  the  orders 
they  would  receive  from  the  Governor  of  that  settlement.* 

The  mishaps  of  the  expedition  began  immediately.  A 
fortnight  out  of  Batavia  one  vessel  of  the  squadron  broke  com- 
pany and  sailed  direct  for  Bengal,  so  that  her  captain  might  sell 
his  goods  in  an  empty  market.  He  thus  succeeded  in  placing 
the  English  on  their  guard  a  month  before  the  expedition  arrived 
in  Bengal  waters. 

The  rest  of  the  expedition  reached  Negapatam  on  August  7 
and  lay  there  for  a  month  ;  what  was  the  motive  of  this  long 
delay  does  not  appear.  Presumably  the  Councils  of  Negapatam 
and  Chinsura,  insufficiently  warned  of  the  plans  of  the  Supreme 
Government,  had  not  concerted  measures.  At  last  the  Dutch 
squadron  sailed,  and  reached  Fultah  in  the  Hugh  on  October  12, 
and  another  month's  delay  intervened  before  further  action 
was  taken.  How  could  an  expedition  succeed  when  at  every 
stage  it  gave  the  enemy  all  the  leisure  he  needed  to  complete  his 
plans  of  defence  ? 

The  earliest  news  received  of  the  Dutch  expedition  at  Calcutta 
seems  to  have  been  the  advices  sent  by  Herbert,  the  English 
Resident  at  Batavia,'  and  forwarded  from  Madras.  This  was 
received  about  July  22 ;  but  met  with  Uttle  credit.  Clive 
directed  Hastings  to  warn  the  Nawab,  and  with  that  the  matter 
dropped,  pending  the  receipt  of  further  information.*  However, 
there  were  several  indications  of  Dutch  activity.  On  August  3 
Hastings  reported  alleged  Dutch  intrigues  in  Oudh.  One  of  the 
Calcutta  Councillors  heard  the  Dutch  boasting  their  intention 

'  Klerk  de  Reuss,  0/).  c»7.,  pp.  12-15.  On  the  receipt  of  later  news  the  Batavia 
Council  ordered  that  no  alliance  was  to  be  formed  with  Mir  Jafar,  but  he  was  to 
be  incited  against  the  English  (loc.  cit.,  p.  16). 

•  The  leaders  were  empowered  to  take  200  recruits  out  of  the  Europe  squadron 
should  they  fall  in  with  it  (loc.  cit.,  pp.  13,  etc.). 

•  Klerk  de  Reuss  (op.  cit.,  p.  32)  describes  him  as  "  the  known  English  spy." 
This  is  scarcely  fair,  although  the  Dutch  expedition  certainly  proved  the  desira- 
bility of  keeping  a  spy  at  Batavia.  Herbert  was  the  avowed  Resident,  whose 
principal  business  was  to  buy  the  arrack  consumed  by  the  Company's  troops 
at  Madras  and  elsewhere,  and  the  timber  which  was  also  imported  from  Java. 
It  was  a  natural,  and  not  dishonourable,  part  of  his  duties  to  report  such  an 
expedition  as  the  Dutch  had  equipped  and  which  was  notoriously  intended  for 
Bengal. 

•  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  July  22,  1759. 


CLIVE'S  FIRST  GOVERNMENT  155 

of  righting  themselves.  On  August  21  the  single  Dutch  ship  * 
arrived  in  the  river  with  native  and  European  troops  aboard. 
On  October  2,  Bisdom  received  news  of  the  rest  of  the  ships  having 
reached  Pippli. 

It  was  now  to  be  seen  whether  the  Nawab  would  abide  by 
his  promise  to  treat  the  English  enemies  as  his  enemies,  or  keep 
his  more  recent  engagements  with  the  Dutch.  Before  he  had 
heard  of  the  arrival  of  the  Dutch  vessels,  he  had  set  out  on  a 
visit  to  Calcutta,  where  he  remained  until  October  19.  On  the 
English  demand,  he  forbade  the  Dutch  ships  to  come  up  the 
river ;  and  under  cover  of  his  orders  the  English  fortified  the 
banks  of  the  Hugli,  and  insisted  on  searching  every  boat  that 
came  up  from  the  fleet. ^ 

The  Dutch  wasted  time  in  trying  to  get  the  Nawab  formally 
to  withdraw  his  orders,*  and  in  this  betrayed  a  serious  misappre- 
hension of  the  situation.  They  should  have  guessed  that  the 
Nawab  would  never  commit  himself  openly  against  the  English 
until  the  Dutch  had  proved  themselves  able  to  protect  him  from 
their  vengeance.  Had  they  hastened  to  force  the  passage  of 
the  Hugli  in  defiance  of  orders  manifestly  dictated  by  the  English, 
the  Nawab  might  possibly  have  joined  them.  But  it  seems  that 
they  embarked  on  this  adventure  with  the  vaguest  ideas  of  what 
it  involved.  Even  so  late  as  October  19,  Vemet  submitted 
three  plans  of  action  to  the  Chinsura  Council ;  to  his  despair 
they  could  not  make  up  their  minds  to  select  one.*  All  this 
while  the  English  had  been  busily  completing  their  arrange- 
ments for  preventing  the  entrance  of  the  Dutch  troops.  Three 
Company's  ships,  the  Calcutta,  Duke  of  Dorset,  and  Hardwicke, 
were  ordered  into  the  river  ;  detachments  were  posted  at  the 
batteries  commanding  the  passage  up  ;  and  the  Calcutta  Militia 
was  embodied  under  the  command  of  Holwell,  at  this  moment 
Second  of  Council. 

On  November  7  the  Dutch  sent  "  an  immense  remonstrance  " 

»  The  Visvliet. 

•  In  one  boat,  which  the  Dutch  said  contained  only  women,  were  found  eighteen 
.Malay  soldiers  (the  English  Defence,  p.  12).     This  was  on  September  29. 

»  Their  letters  are  printed  in  the  English  Defence,  pp.  54-55. 

♦  Klerk  de  Reuss,  op.  cit.,  pp.  35,  etc.  This  writer  lays  great  stress  on  the 
eftects  of  the  Nawab's  visit  to  Calcutta  in  October,  and  writes  as  though,  if  that 
could  have  been  prevented,  the  Nawab  might  have  been  won  over  to  the  Dutch. 
The  assumption  seems  to  me  very  dubious.  If  the  Dutch  wanted  to  win  over 
the  Nawab,  they  should  have  ignored  his  orders.  Success  would  have  excused 
everything. 


156  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

recounting  their  grievances  and  demanding  free  -passage  for  their 
ships.  The  EngUsh  answered  that  everything  had  been  done 
under  the  orders  of  the  Subahdar.^  At  last,  encouraged  by  the 
gracious  reception  the  Nawab  had  given  them  after  his  visit 
to  Calcutta,  the  Dutch  made  up  their  slow  minds  to  action. 
They  ordered  reprisals  on  English  vessels  and  sent  Vernet  down 
to  Fultah  where  the  Dutch  were  lying.  There  various  small 
EngUsh  craft  were  seized  ^ — another  mistake,  for  it  gave  the 
EngUsh  grounds  to  accuse  the  Dutch  of  beginning  hostilities. 

The  former  now  ordered  their  three  vessels  to  pass  the  Dutch 
and  post  themselves  between  the  latter  and  Calcutta.  In  spite 
of  the  Dutch  threats  that  they  would  fire  on  them  if  they  did 
so,  the  order  was  carried  out.  On  the  night  of  November  21-22 
the  Dutch  forces  were  landed  ;  and  immediately  on  this  the 
EngUsh  ships  were  ordered  to  demand  the  restitution  of  the 
vessels  seized,  and  if  that  was  refused,  to  attack.  Restitution 
was  refused.  The  three  Company's  ships  attacked  ;  and  within 
two  hours  every  Dutch  vessel  had  struck  her  colours.* 

The  Dutch  were  not  much  luckier  ashore  than  afloat.  The 
Dutch  ships  were  taken  on  November  24.  The  same  day  Colonel 
Forde  encountered  and  routed  a  party  of  400  men  marching 
from  Chinsura  to  join  the  troops  marching  up  the  river.  The 
next  day  he  encountered  the  latter  body,  and  dealt  with  them 
so  vigorously  that  out  of  over  800  men,  only  14  reached  Chinsura. 

Faced  with  these  repeated  disasters,  the  Dutch  at  once  made 
their  submission.  They  acknowledged  they  had  begun  hostiUties, 
agreed  that  their  forces  should  be  limited,  and  promised  to  pay 
10  lakhs  damages.  It  was  the  most  prudent  thing  they  could 
do,  for  Miran,  now  the  issue  had  been  decided,  appeared  at  the 
head  of  his  forces,  breathing  fire  and  slaughter  against  his  former 
friends,  whom  he  now  called  "  those  Chinsura  cowards."  * 

This  was  the  last  important  incident  of  Clive's  first  govem- 

•  Klerk  de  Reuss  says  they  did  not  trouble  to  answer  {op.  cit.,  p.  41). 

•  Besides  the  usual  narratives,  I  may  mention  a  letter  from  Captain  Price  to 
Pocock,  December  25,  1759,  at  the  P.R.O.  (Admiralty,  1-161). 

•  Klerk  de  Reuss  {op.  cit.,  p.  14)  for  some  unknown  reason  calls  the  English 
ships  men-of-war.  They  were  no  more  so  than  the  Dutch  vessels,  though  they 
were  probably  larger.  The  Dutch  vessels  numbered  seven,  of  which  two  were 
small  and  one  ran  away. 

•  Miran  to  CUve,  November  23,  1759  {English  Defence,  p.  70).  In  this  account 
I  have  been  guided  principally  by  Klerk  de  Reuss  and  the  account  printed  by 
Malcolm  in  vol.  ii.  The  English  and  Dutch  official  pamphlets  have  also  been 
examined.  The  matter  led  to  lengthy  diplomatic  discussions  in  Europe,  which 
died  away  without  result. 


CLIVE'S  FIRST  GOVERNMENT  157 

ment.  Major  Caillaud,  whom  Clive  had  pointed  out  as  the  fittest 
officer  to  take  command  of  the  Bengal  troops,  had  arrived 
from  Madras  with  a  body  of  Europeans,  not  in  time  to  take 
part  against  the  Dutch,  but  soon  enough  to  reheve  Clive  of 
apprehensions  as  to  the  future  safety  of  Bengal.  Moreover 
CUve's  health  was  very  indifferent  ;  and  a  dispatch  had  lately 
been  received  from  the  Court  of  Directors  which  had  angered 
him  exceedingly.  Accordingly  he  quitted  his  government, 
and  took  ship  for  England  on  February  25,  1760. 

He  had  destroyed  one  Nawab  and  made  another.  He  had 
not  only  made  but  also  maintained  the  latter  in  his  place,  pre- 
vented the  effects  of  his  ill-will,  and  with  nothing  like  an  open 
quarrel  defeated  the  Dutch  effort  though  made  with  the  Nawab's 
connivance.  He  had  by  his  constant  and  undeviating  support 
secured  the  friendship  of  influential  Hindus  who  saw  in  him  their 
defence  against  Mir  Jafar's  designs.  In  short,  he  had  displayed 
in  Bengal  as  a  statesman  the  same  high  qualities  as  he  had  dis- 
played in  the  Carnatic  as  a  soldier,  and  in  a  higher  degree,  for, 
whereas  he  had  never  encountered  in  the  field  any  but  mediocre 
opponents,  in  Bengal  he  had  had  to  deal  with  men,  astute  and 
treacherous  though  weak  in  character,  and  in  his  deaUngs  with 
them  he  had  rarely  been  betrayed  into  a  mistake.  He  had  indeed 
enjoyed  the  advantage  of  learning  from  the  examples  of  Bussy 
and  Dupleix  what  dangers  to  look  for  and  avoid.  Hence  no 
doubt  the  patience  with  which  he  regarded  the  vacillations  of 
Mir  Jafar  and  the  promptitude  with  which  he  beat  down  his 
French  and  Dutch  enemies.  But  his  debt  to  the  French  leaders 
of  the  south  in  no  way  detracts  from  his  essential  greatness. 
Servile  imitation  is  impossible  in  poUtics,  which  always  demand 
much  more  than  the  mechanical  apphcation  of  a  formula.  The 
lamentable  history  of  his  successors  was  to  prove  how  easily 
deranged  was  the  poise  of  the  political  machine  established  in 
Bengal.  To  have  maintained  it  so  successfully  proves  to  the 
fuU  Clive's  value  as  a  practical  statesman. 


CHAPTE|R  III 

THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  CARNATIC 

WHILE  Clive had  been  establishing  English  influence  in 
Bengal,  English  and  French  had  renewed  the  struggle 
for  the  control  of  the  Carnatic.  Nor  was  this  without 
a  clear  bearing  on  the  affairs  of  Bengal.  Just  as  Dupleix'  war  at 
Trichinopoly  had  secured  Bussy  from  molestation  at  Aurangabad, 
so  now  the  lighting  which  swayed  between  Madras  and  Pondi- 
chery  secured  Bengal  from  a  French  invasion.  Clive  recognised 
this  by  sending  Forde  to  attack  the  French  in  the  Northern 
Circars.  The  Madras  Council  expressed  their  consciousness  of 
the  fact  with  great  clearness.  They  judged  the  safety  of  all  the 
Company's  possessions  "  to  depend  on  the  fate  of  Madras,  which 
is  the  barrier  the  enemy  must  first  force."  ^  And  again  :  "  It  is 
to  be  considered,"  they  write  to  Coote,  "  that  not  only  the 
possessions  on  this  Coast  depend  on  our  maintaining  ourselves 
here  against  all  the  efforts  of  the  war,  but  also  that  ...  if 
we  can  only  keep  the  enemy  at  bay  here  and  seciure 
by  that  means  the  commerce  of  Bengal,  the  advantage  is 
evidently  on  our  side."  ^  The  truth  of  this  is  evinced  by 
the  effects  which  ill  news  from  the  Carnatic  at  once  produced 
on  the  attitude  of  Mir  Jafar.^ 

Even  after  Godeheu's  treaty,  warlike  inclinations  had 
flourished  at  Madras  and  Pondichery ;  but  Leyrit  had  been  forced 
to  send  reinforcements  to  Bussy  in  May  1756,  and  Pigot 
had  sent  Clive's  expedition  to  Bengal.  When  news  of  war 
arrived,*  therefore,  neither  nation  was  capable  of  any  large 
offensive  action  in  the  Carnatic.  For  the  moment  neither 
Madras  nor  Pondichery  was  much  better  garrisoned  than  it 
had  been  in  the  old  days  before  the  beginning  of  the  troubles. 
The  Madras  Council,  ignorant  of  the  higher  game  at  which  he 

'  Mil.  Des.  to  England,  June  28,  1759. 
•Mil.  Cons.,  January  13,  1760. 
•  See  above,  p.  1 46. 

'Mil.  Cons.,  November  13,  1756.  , 

is8 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  CARNATIC  159 

was  then  flying,  complained  bitterly  of  Clive's  not  returning  to 
the  Coast  after  he  had  taken  Chandernagore.^  At  the  end  of 
April,  Forde  was  sent  to  attack  Nellore,  where  the  Renter  had 
thrown  off  his  allegiance  to  Muhammad  Ali ;  but  he  failed  com- 
pletely in  an  attempt  to  storm  the  town.*  In  May,  Adlercron 
took  the  field  in  person,  but  achieved  nothing.  ^  It  was  indeed 
fortunate  that  he  did  not  encounter  an  enemy,  for  "  during  the 
late  march  of  the  army  none  of  the  regulations  or  precautions 
absolutely  necessary  to  be  observed  by  a  commanding  officer  were 
taken.  By  this  reason  all  the  inhabitants  left  their  villages  and 
the  troops  were  exposed  to  inconveniences  never  before  experi- 
enced." *  The  Council  were  in  a  fever  to  induce  Adlercron  to 
quit  the  command  and  leave  it  to  Forde  or  Lawrence ;  and  as 
he  obstinately  refused,  Lawrence  was  persuaded  to  serve  as  a 
volunteer  under  him.  Meanwhile,  the  efforts  of  the  French  had 
been  limited  to  the  capture  of  a  small  fort  to  the  westward  of  the 
French  territories,*  and  an  attempt  to  surprise  Trichinopoly. 
In  May,  the  commandant,  Caillaud,'  was  absent  to  the  south- 
ward, with  a  large  part  of  the  garrison,  engaged  in  one  of  those 
fruitless  attempts  to  estabhsh  order  among  the  poligars  which 
Orme  details  with  merciless  exactitude.  After  taking  Elevanasur, 
d'Auteuil  moved  rapidly  south  and  appeared  before  Trichinopoly 
while  Caillaud  was  still  at  Madura.  The  city  had  been  left  under 
the  command  of  Captain  Joseph  Smith.'  As  his  dispositions 
prevented  any  attempt  to  surprise  the  place,  d'Auteuil  turned 
his  attention  to  cutting  off  Caillaud,  who  was  marching  without 
tents,  baggage,  or  artillery  to  reheve  Trichinopoly.     On  June  4  * 

'  Mil.  Cons.,  April  28,  1757. 

•  Ibid.,  May  9,  1757,  and  Richard  Smith's  Narrative  (Orme  MSS.,  Various, 
25,  fi.  23-25. 

•Mil.  Cons.,  June  17,  1757. 

*  Ibid.,  July  30,  1757.  The  only  incident  of  note  in  this  fruitless  campaign 
was  the  outbreak  of  an  epidemic  in  camp  near  Wandiwash,  on  which  most  ol 
the  coolies  deserted,  being  assured  by  a  Brahman  emissary  from  the  French 
that  it  was  a  divine  visitation  for  the  sin  of  following  the  EngUsh  camp  {ibid., 
July  7,  1757). 

*  This  was  Elevanasur,  which  had  been  occupied  by  an  adventurer  called 
Mir  Sahib  ;  he  seems  to  have  been  an  ex-commandant  of  French  sepoys,  well 
known  under  the  name  of  Shaikh  Abdur-Rahman. 

•  Nothing  seems  known  of  Caillaud's  career  before  he  arrived  at  Madras  as 
captain  in  the  Company's  service  in  1753.  He  was  a  man  of  undeniable  military 
talent  and  considerable  culture,  and  in  1759  was  sent  up  to  Bengal  to  command 
the  Company's  troops  there. 

'  The  future  opponent  of  Hyder  Ali. 
"  Orme's  dates  appear  to  be  Old  Style. 


160  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

he  reached  a  village  12  miles  off.  That  night,  by  marching 
through  rice-swamps  which  the  French  had  not  thought  of 
guarding,  he  succeeded  in  carrying  his  men,  though  fatigued  to 
death,  safe  into  Trichinopoly.^  Such  a  termination  was  a  triumph 
of  spirit  and  endurance. ^ 

This  uneventful  situation  was  modified  by  the  arrival  of  a 
French  squadron  at  Pondichery  on  September  8.  It  had  on  board 
the  first  detachment  of  a  considerable  expedition  which  the 
French  had  decided  to  send  to  India  to  establish  their  supremacy. 
The  force  now  arrived  consisted  of  about  1000  men  of  the  Regi- 
ment de  Lorraine,  under  the  command  of  Soupire.  The  squadron 
on  which  these  arrived  comprised  10  vessels  under  the  command 
of  Bouvet.*  Although  the  EngUsh  squadron  was  still  lying  in  the 
Hugh,  Bouvet  displayed  that  extreme  degree  of  caution  which 
even  friends  call  lack  of  enterprise,  and  refused  to  remain  on  the 
Coast.*  Soupire  himself,  though  not  wanting  in  courage,  also 
shrank  from  accepting  responsibiUty,  and,  to  the  astonishment 
of  the  English,  took  no  further  advantage  of  his  decided  military 
superiority  than  to  capture  the  fort  of  Chettepat.  So  matters 
continued  with  little  change  until,  in  April  1758,  Tally  and  d'Ach^ 
reached  the  Coast  with  the  remainder  of  the  expedition.  This 
consisted  of  the  Regiment  de  Tally,  about  1000  strong,  with  a 
detachment  of  the  Royal  Artillery.  At  this  time  the  French 
Company's  troops  formed  a  body  of  about  1000  men. 

Tally,  who  had  been  named  S5mdic  of  the  Company,  Com- 
missary for  the  King,  and  Commandant-General  of  all  the  French 
establishments  in  India,  had  never  before  enjoyed  an  independ- 
ent command.  He  had  distinguished  himself  at  the  battle  of 
Fontenoy,  had  taken  an  active  part  in  the  intrigues  on  behalf  of 
the  Pretender,  and  was  well  known  for  the  bitter  hatred  with 
which  he  regarded  the  English.  He  had,  moreover,  taken  part 
in  the  controversy  aroused  by  the  administration  of  Dupleix, 
and  had  produced  a  memoir  so  powerfully  expressing  and  de- 
fending the  views  of  the  Company  that  the  Directors  persisted 
in  desiring  his  appointment  until  at  last  the  Ministry  gave  way.* 
D'Argenson's  remonstrance  is  well  known.     Tally,  he  said,  hides 

'  Mil.  Cons.,  June  i,  1757  ;  Smith's  Narrative  (Orme  MSS.,  Various,  25, 
ff.  31,  etc.)  ;   Caillaud  to  Orme,  June  5,  1759  {he.  cit.,  52,  f.  81). 

«  For  the  last  two  miles  Caillaud  had  to  be  supported  on  men's  shoulders, 
so  exhausted  was  he. 

•  The  commander  who  had  evaded  action  with  Griffin  in  1748.  . 

*  Soupire's  Mimoire,  pp.  7,  etc.  f 
*For  this  memoir  see  Hamont's  Lally-Tollendal,  p.  61. 


I 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  CARNATIC  161 

nothing  of  what  he  feels,  and  expresses  himself  in  words  that 
people  do  not  forgive  ;  his  operations  will  be  obstructed  for  the 
sake  of  private  vengeance.  This  estimate  was  too  true.  But  it 
was  not  complete.  Not  only  did  Lally  make  a  host  of  private 
enemies  by  the  freedom  with  which  he  condemned  the  conduct  of 
the  Company's  servants  in  India,  but  also  he  neglected  to  reduce 
them  to  a  position  in  which  they  would  be  powerless  for  evil. 
He  poured  fierce  condemnation  and  savage  sarcasm  on  the  cor- 
ruption and  misconduct  which  he  found  in  India  ;  but  he  left 
the  peculators  not  only  in  enjoyment  of  their  gains  but  also  in 
possession  of  their  posts.  He  seems  to  have  supposed  that  he 
could  absolve  himself  for  the  mismanagement  of  French  affairs 
which  went  on  under  him  by  abusing  without  punishing  the 
guilty  ;  and  proved  hiniSelf  so  incapable  of  independent  command 
as  to  be  unable  to  maintain  his  authority. 

Even  had  he  been  a  man  of  much  greater  pohtical  talent,  he 
would  have  found  the  Company's  directions  impossible  to  carry 
out  in  a  time  of  war.  lie  was  ordered  to  suppress  the  malversa- 
tion and  abuses  which  had  sprung  up  under  Dupleix  and  flourished 
under  the  lax  administration  of  de  Leyrit.  In  fact  he  was 
assigned  a  task  wholly  similar  to  that  which  was  to  be  confided 
to  Clive  when  he  was  a  second  time  sent  out  to  Bengal.  Chve 
achieved  his  task,  at  the  cost  of  a  persecution  which  was  carried 
even  beyond  the  grave. ^  But  even  Clive  could  not  have  re- 
formed the  administration  of  Bengal  if  he  had  also  been  engaged 
in  warfare  with  a  European  power.  Yet  Lally  was  asked  to  drive 
out  the  Enghsh  and  reform  Pondichery  in  the  same  breath. 
Thus  an  impossible  task  had  been  confided  to  a  man  possessed  of 
energy  and  talent,  but  lacking  all  sense  of  statesmanship.^  This 
unfortunate  leader  reached  Pondichery  on  April  28,  1758. 

His  companion  d'Ach6,  the  commander  of  the  squadron,  was 
as  ill  a  choice  as  himself.  He  was  jealous  of  the  least  inter- 
ference with  his  command,  eternally  dissatisfied  with  the  sup- 
port he  received,  and  regarded  the  safety  of  his  ships  as  more 
important  than  that  of  the  settlement  he  was  sent  to  defend.  He 
had  with  him  nine  ships  of  the  line  (of  which  four  were  King's 
vessels)  and  two  frigates.    On  the  day  after  he  sighted  'ondich^ry, 

'  Caraccioli's  worthless  and^contemptible  Life  is  a  piece  of  hack-work  manifestly 
inspired  and  paid  for  by  Clive's  enemies. 

'  Less  tlian  three  weeks  after  his  arrival,  Lally  had  the  imprudence  to  inform 
de  Leyrit  of  the  way  in  which  the  Directors   had  spoken  of  the  latter.     Lally  to 
Leyrit,  May  15,  i758J(Leyrit's  Minioire,,pp.  9,  etc. ;  cf.  Waddington,  La  Guerre 
des  Sept  Ans.  vol.  iii.  p.  380). 
II 


162  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

he  encountered  the  English  squadron,  under  Pocock/  who  had 
left  the  Hugh  in  February,  and  assembled  his  whole  squadron  of 
seven  ships  of  the  line  at  Madras  in  March.  He  had  sailed  down 
the  Coast  as  far  as  Negapatam,  but  the  fleets  had  passed  without 
sighting  each  other.  On  his  return  up  the  Coast,  Pocock  sighted 
the  French  squadron  off  St.  David's.  D'Ache  sailed  to  the  north- 
ward, in  order  to  be  joined  by  two  of  his  vessels  that  were  at  a 
distance  in  the  oliiing  ;  and  the  action  did  not  begin  until  close 
on  3  o'clock.  It  continued  till  near  five,  when  d'Ach6  broke  the 
line  and  bore  away  with  his  whole  squadron.  In  the  following 
night,  one  French  ship,  the  Bien-Aime,  went  ashore.  The  English 
suffered  chiefly  in  the  masts  and  rigging,  the  French  in  the  hulls 
of  their  vessels  ;  and  in  consequence  of  the  difference  of  aim,  the 
French  losses  amounted  to  over  400  killed  and  wounded,  while 
the  EngUsh  only  lost  118.  Indecisive  as  was  the  action,  a 
substantial  advantage  lay  with  the  English.*  Both  sides  had 
reason  to  complain  of  the  behaviour  of  certain  captains,  who 
seemed  too  disposed  to  avoid  coming  to  close  action  with  the 
enemy. 

Immediately  on  his  landing,  Lally  had  resolved  to  form  the 
siege  of  Fort  St.  David.  The  place  enjoyed,  not  altogether  justly, 
a  reputation  for  great  strength.'  It  was  of  small  extent,  yet  had 
been  provided  with  numerous  outworks  requiring  a  large  garri- 
son ;  *  it  lacked  bomb-proof  shelters  ;  and  although  it  had  been 
recently  remodelled,  parts  were  so  ill-constructed  as  not  to  admit 
the  firing  of  their  guns. 

Lally,  however,  found  considerable  difficulty  in  forming  his 
siege,  and  complained  that  no  preparations  had  been  made  for 
an  operation  that  should  have  been  accomplished  eight  months 
before  his  arrival.  In  this  he  seems  to  have  displayed  his  custom- 
ary exaggeration.     Some  preparation  had  been  made,  although 

'  Watson  had  died  in  Bengal  in  August  1757. 

'  There  are  numerous  accounts  of  the  action  :  Pocock  to  the  Madras  Council, 
April  30,  1758  (Mil.  Cons..  May  2,  1758)  ;  Pocock  to  Clevland,  July  22,  1758 
(P.R.O.,  Admiralty,  1-161) ;  Minutes  o£  the  Engagement  (Orme  MSS.,  India, 
xi.  ff.  2992,  etc.)  ;  Monteil  to  Lally,  April  29,  1758  (d'Ache's  Lettres,  p.  3)  ; 
d'Achfe's  dispatch  to  the  Minister,  October  30,  1758,  is  printed  in  La  Vie  privie 
de  Louis  XV.,  vol.  iv.  App.  p.  34)- 

'  The  French  Company  calls  it  "  le  plus  considerable  et  le  mieux  fortifife  de 
tous  [les  forts]  que  les  nations  europ6ennes  aient  construits  sur  le  cote  de  Coro- 
mandel  "  (Company  to  Lally,  March  20,  1759,  Lally's  Piices,  p.  24). 

*  The  covered  way  was  980  yards  round  and  was  300  yards  from  the  nearest 
defence  (Poller's  Report,  ap.  Mil.  Cons.,  December  12,  1757).  C)n  April  i, 
1758,  the  garrison  consisted  of  286  Europeans,  93  Topasses,  1300  sepoys,  83 
invalids,  and  234  lascars  {ibid..  May  2,  1758). 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  CARNATIC  163 

draft -bullocks  and  porters  had  to  be  collected  ;  *  and  Leyrit's 
comment — "  Is  it  my  fault  if  M.  de  Lally  rushes  his  operations 
and  attacks  works  before  he  has  furnished  himself  with  what 
he  needs  to  take  them  ?  "  ^ — is  more  justifiable  than  most  of  his 
observations  on  Lally's  conduct,  for  the  latter  should  cer- 
tainly have  satisfied  himself  that  the  stores  were  ready  before 
hastening  off  to  lay  siege  to  the  English  fortress.  Although 
he  appeared  before  it  on  May  i,  he  did  not  break  ground  until 
the  17th. 

The  English  settlement  was  composed  of  two  parts  perfectly 
distinct  the  one  from  the  other.  One  was  Fort  St.  David  proper, 
lying  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Gadilam  close  to  the  sea,  with 
the  villas  of  the  Company's  servants  lying  round  it.  The  second 
was  the  large  native  town  of  Cuddalore,  about  a  mile  south  of 
the  fort,  with  walls  indeed,  but  decayed  and  worthless.  It  had 
never  been  intended  to  defend  this  town,  as  its  extent  would  have 
demanded  a  much  larger  garrison  than  could  have  been  spared. 
It  was  therefore  surrendered  as  sooir  as  summoned,  on  May  3, 
and  at  the  same  time  Lally  agreed  that  the  French  prisoners  in 
the  fort  should  be  sent  elsewhere  to  await  the  result  of  the 
siege.' 

After  this  came  a  fortnight's  delay  in  which  Lally  was  gradu- 
ally procuring  piecemeal  from  Pondichery  the  stores  and  artillery 
he  needed.     On  May  17  he  carried  the  outworks  by  storm,  the 
English  sepoys  not  awaiting  the  attack,  but  deserting  into  the 
country,  and  soon  after  the  garrison  reported  that  almost  all  their 
sepoys  and  Indian  artificers  had  fled.*     On  the  26th,  Lally,  who 
had  till  then  only  thrown  shell  into  the  fort  from  a  mortar  battery, 
with  a  few  random  shots  from  Cuddalore,  opened  a  breaching 
battery,  which  was  soon  followed  by  the  opening  of  three  more, 
and  on  June  2  the  garrison  capitulated.     Several  days  previously, 
Wynch,  the  Governor,  had  reported  that  most  of  his  embrasures 
had  been  ruined  by  his  own  and  the  enemy's   fire,  that  they 
could  not  be  repaired  for  lack  of  artificers,  and  that  his  effectives 
had  been  reduced  to  120  Europeans,  70  Topasses,  20  marines,  and 
200  sepoys ;  ^    the  commandant,   Polier  de    Bottens,   a    Swiss 
officer,  distrusted  his  men  and  was  thought  not  to  have  made 
as  protracted  a  defence  as  he  might  have  done  ;    and  Pocock's 
'  Leyrit  to  Lally,  October  8,  1758  (Leyrit's  Mimoire,  p.  187). 
»  Op.  cit.,  p.  15. 
»  Mil.  Cons.,  May  9,  1758. 
*  Ibid.,  May  25,  1758. 
'  Ibid.,  May  27,  1758. 


164  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

failure  to  beat  up  to  St.  David's  against  the  wind  certainly 
dispirited  the  defenders.  The  fall  of  the  place  produced  a  great 
effect  upon  the  opinion  of  the  country  powers  and  upon  the 
English,  who  now  prepared  for  the  inevitable  siege  of  Madras, 
while  Lally  made  a  triumphal  entry  into  Pondichery,  which  his 
enemies  were  subsequently  to  convert  into  a  subject  of  mockery 
and  accusation.^ 

Could  Lally  have  followed  up  his  success  as  he  himself  wished 
to  do,  most  probably  he  would  have  captured  Madras  as  well. 
But  there  were  two  principal  difficulties  in  his  way.  The  first 
was  finance.  He  had  brought  out  with  him  2,000,000  hvres — 
say,  2 1  lakhs  of  pagodas  ;  but  this  sum  seems  to  have  been 
swallowed  up  by  the  debts  of  Pondichery,  and  almost  immediately 
after  his  arrival  the  French  fell  into  difficulties  for  money.  The 
second  trouble  was  the  fleet.  It  was  small  use  endeavouring  to 
take  Madras  while  Pocock's  squadron  lay  unbeaten  between  that 
place  and  Pondichery.  But  here  d'Ache  came  in.  In  May  he 
had  been  encouraging  enough.  "  Pluck  up  courage,  my  dear 
General,"  he  had  written  ;  "all  will  turn  out  well ;  you  will  take 
St.  David's  and  then  we  will  concert  measures  to  secure  the 
control  of  the  sea."  ^  But  when  Fort  St.  David  had  fallen, 
he  refused  absolutely  to  attack  Pocock,  alleging  a  lack  of 
victuals.  The  fact  seems  to  have  been  that  he  wished  to 
cruise  to  the  southward  after  some  English  Indiamen  said  to  be 
expected.^ 

This  refusal  of  co-operation  rendered  any  attempt  on  Madras 
futile  until  the  approach  of  the  north-east  monsoon  in  the 
following  October  had  compelled  Pocock  to  leave  the  Coast. 
Lally  had  thus  four  months  to  fill  in  before  he  could  begin  his 
main  enterprise.  Two  courses  lay  open  to  him.  He  might 
lead  his  troops  northward,  drive  the  English  out  of  all  the  posts 
they  occupied  in  the  Arcot  country,  and  confine  them  to  Madras  ; 
or  he  might  carry  his  arms  to  the  southward  and  attempt  con- 
quests in  a  region  which  could  not  affect  the  final  issue.  Un- 
fortunately for  him,  he  allowed  his  financial  difficulties  and  the 

'  The  details  of  the  procession,  etc.,  were  suggested  by  the  Jesuit,  PSre 
Lavaur  (Lavaur  to  Lally,  and  Lally's  answer  of  June  5,  1758,  Lally's  Pieces, 
pp.  51  and  55). 

"  D'Achfe  to  Lally,  May  18,  1758  (Lally's  Pidces,  p.  35). 

•  Lally  to  Leyrit,  June  25,  1758  {op.  cit.,  p.  66).  D'Ache  in  his  second  memoir 
alleges  that  he  was  quite  ready  to  co-operate  against  Madras  ;  but  this  seems  to 
me  difficult  of  belief.  He  had  spent  the  remains  of  his  wife's  fortune  on  his 
equipment  (d' Ache's  Mimoire,  p.  2). 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  CARNATIC  165 

strenuous  advice  of  PSre  Lavaur  to  lead  him  into  the  latter  course 
of  action.^ 

Pere  Lavaur  was  a  Jesuit  priest  of  Pondichdry.  He  had  been 
a  confidant,  and  acted  as  an  agent,  of  Dupleix.  He  still  remained 
an  intimate  of  Bussy.  Orme  judged  him  as  sensible  a  man  as 
any  in  India  ;  and  there  is  not  the  slightest  reason  to  suppose  that 
the  advice  which  he  tendered  at  this  time  to  Lally  was  in  the 
least  insincere.  It  offered  many  advantages,  even  though  they 
were  not  decided  advantages  ;  and  it  proved  fatal  partly  because 
of  Lally's  errors  in  carrying  it  into  execution,  partly  because 
other  circumstances  intervened  to  exaggerate  its  fundamental 
defect. 2 

This  advice  was  to  march  south  and  compel  the  King  of 
Tanjore  to  pay  the  bond  for  70  lakhs  which  he  had  given  to 
Chanda  Sahib  in  1749.  While  Lally  was  still  besieging  Fort 
St.  David,  the  priest  had  set  to  work,  sending  emissaries  to 
Tanjore.*  A  little  later,  on  June  7,  he  suggests  it  would  be  well 
if  Lally  sent  for  him,  and  urges  the  need  of  secrecy.*  On  June  27, 
he  proposes  that  on  his  way  to  Tanjore  Lally  might  as  well 
depose  the  Poligar  of  Udayarpalayam  and  establish  his  nephews, 
who  offered  4  lakhs  of  rupees.  "  I  think,"  he  adds,  "  you 
could  do  nothing  more  advantageous  than  effect  half  a  dozen 
at  least  of  such  changes,  as  occasion  offers,  without  any  loss  of 
time  or  money."  *  In  July  he  reappears  once  more,  persuading 
Shahji  to  join  Lally  before  Tanjore.*  All  this  was  the  pohcy  of 
Dupleix  in  its  lowest  form,  as  it  appeared  to  vulgar  and  ignoble 
minds. 

So  Lally  marched  south,  with  the  same  lack  of  preparation 
that  he  had  displayed  in  his  attack  on  Fort  St.  David.  He  seems 
to  have  regarded  detail  as  entirely  beneath  his  dignity.  He 
expected  everything  to  proceed  with  entire  regularity  of  its  own 

'  Hamont  says  that  a  memoir  advocating  an  expedition  into  Tanjore  was 
among  the  papers  received  by  Lally  at  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  (op.  cit.,  p.  75). 
He  adds  that  I.ally  read  it  eagerly.  I  am  unaware  of  any  evidence  to  this 
effect. 

'  Leyrit  declared  that  Lally  consulted  no  one,  and  that  the  expedition  was 
his  own  idea.  This  is  an  example  of  the  suppressio  veri.  I  believe  neither 
Leyrit  nor  his  Councillors  were  consulted  ;  but  Lavaur  certainly  was,  and  it  is 
impossible  but  that  leyrit  knew  it  (Leyrit's  Mimoire,  pp.  55,  60-61). 

»  Lavaur  to  Lally,  May  15,  1758  (Lally's  Pi^ce.9,  p.  53).  In  this  letter  he  reminds 
Lally  to  secure  the  person  of  Shahji,  whom  the  English  had  detained  there. 

♦  Op.  cit.,  pp.  52  and  54. 
»  Op.  cit.,  p.  62. 

•  Leyrit  to  Lally,  July  14,  1758  (Leyrit's  Mimoire,  p.  109).  ■  ' 


166  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

accord  ;  when  matters  went  wrong,  when  the  army  ran  short  of 
food  or  arrack,  he  blamed  everybody  but  himself,  and  never 
thought  of  reorganising  his  commissariat.  The  Tanjorc  cam- 
paign was  ruined  by  this  neglect.  His  men  were  starving  when 
they  reached  Devikottai.*  There  they  found  a  magazine  of 
paddy,  but  lacked  the  pestles  with  which  to  beat  it  into  rice.^ 
From  Karikal  Tally  writes  that  the  troops  have  to  lie  in  the 
open  for  want  of  tents,'  and  he  had  to  delay  there,  waiting  for 
coolies  to  be  collected  and  sent  to  him.*  On  July  5,  he  discovers 
that  he  has  only  12  milliers  of  gunpowder  ^ — a  defect  that  was 
only  repaired  in  part  by  the  suppUes  which  he  obtained  from  the 
Dutch  at  Negapatam  and  the  Danes  at  Tranquebar. 

Meanwhile  he  had  occupied  Nagur,  a  Tanjorean  seaport,  the 
plunder  of  which  he  sold  to  his  Colonel  of  Hussars  for  2  lakhs 
of  rupees,*  and  advanced  to  Tiruvalur,  where  was  a  temple  of 
great  sanctity  which  he  ransacked  in  a  fruitless  search  for  treasure. 
It  was  here,  too,  that  he  blew  from  his  guns  six  Brahmans,  on 
the  suspicion  of  their  being  spies.  This  was  one  of  those  actions 
which  by  their  excess  produce  the  exact  opposite  of  their  intended 
results.  Tally  desired  to  terrify  the  Tanjoreans  by  this  act  of 
severity  ;  in  fact  he  convinced  them  that  their  sole  hope  of  safety 
lay  in  flight  or  resistance.' 

On  July  12  he  marched  towards  Tanjore  through  a  deserted 
country,*  and  arrived  before  the  city  on  the  i8th.  The  slowness 
of  the  march  was  due  to  lack  of  transport,  the  army  never  having 
had  more  than  a  quarter  of  the  bullocks  needed  for  the  artillery 
and  ammunition.  Even  when  they  had  thus  reached  their 
objective,  they  could  not  begin  the  siege  for  lack  of  powder  and 
cannon-balls,  and  the  infantry  had  but  fifteen  rounds  a  man.* 
Negotiations  were  begun.     The  king  had  no  objection  to  see  the 

'  The  English  had  not  defended  the  place,  but  abandoned  it  on  the  approach 
of  a  French  detachment  immediately  after  the  fall  of  Fort  St.  David,  the  garrison 
retreating  to  Trichinopoly. 

'  Lally  to  Leyrit,  June  22,  1758  (Leyrit's  Mimoirc,  p.  67). 

»  Same  to  same,  June  26,  1758  (op.  cit.,  p.  75). 

*  Same  to  same,  June  26,  1758  {op.  cit.,  p.  8:). 

•  Op.  cit.,  p.  100.     A  millier  is  looo  livres'  weight. 

•Lally  to  Leyrit,  Julys,  1758  (Leyrit's  A/dmo»>c,  p.  100).  Leyrit  approved  the 
transaction  {ibid.,  p.  106). 

'  Lawrence  had  similarly  executed  a  Brahman,  Poniyappa,  before  Trichinopoly  ; 
but  that  was  for  the  definite  and  heinous  crime  of  treachery,  and  produced  results 
differing  in  proportion  with  tlie  circumstances.  No  doubt  his  action  shocked 
Hindu  feeling,  but  it  did  not  appear  a  motiveless  act  of  ferocity. 

*  Lally's  Mimoirs,  p.  67. 

•  Lally  to  Leyrit,  July  21,  1758  (Leyrit's  Mimoirc,  p.  1 14)- 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  CARNATIC  167 

enemy  lying  outside  his  walls,  consuming  their  scanty  and  hard- 
got  supplies.  He  offered  3  lakhs  ;  Lally  demanded  10  and 
assistance  against  the  EngUsh  at  Trichinopoly.  When  at  last 
battering  guns  had  been  brought  up  from  the  Coast,  the  Tan j ore 
offer  was  raised  to  5  lakhs,  with  the  service  of  300  horse,  1000 
coolies,  and  a  supply  of  provisions.  These  terms  Lally  decided 
to  accept,  but  after  various  delays  and  misunderstandings 
threatened  the  king  with  being  carried  away  prisoner  to  the 
French  Islands.  This  indignity  alarmed  the  king  beyond  measure, 
and  decided  him  to  resist  to  the  last.  On  the  other  side,  Lally 
held  a  council  of  war  which  resolved  that  the  only  course  open 
was  to  attack  and  capture  the  city.^ 

Batteries  were  improvised  in  haste,  protected  only  by 
fascines  instead  of  earthworks  ;  and  cannon-ball  was  so  scarce 
that  it  was  forbidden  to  fire  a  shot  in  reply  to  the  batteries  of 
the  city.^  Just  as  the  breach  was  almost  practicable,  on 
August  8,  Lally  heard  that  Pocock  had  beaten  d'Ach6  off  Karikal 
and  that  the  EngHsh  had  taken  the  field  and  were  threatening 
Pondichery.  On  the  receipt  of  this  news  he  summoned  another 
council  of  war,  reported  the  information  he  had  received,  and 
added  he  had  but  three  milHers  of  gunpowder  left,  and  20  rounds 
of  cartridges  per  man.*  As  an  attack  would  completely  use  up 
all  the  remaining  ammunition  and  leave  the  army  defenceless, 
it  was  resolved  to  raise  the  siege.  V'ith  great  loss  of  reputation 
Lally  withdrew  to  the  Coast,  after  repulsing  a  sally  made  on  the 
morning  of  his  retreat,  "  without  victuals,  money,  or  munitions, 
barefoot  and  half-naked,  worn  out  with  fatigue  and  in  despair 
at  having  been  engaged  in  so  wild  an  adventure  " — so  Lally  de- 
scribed the  situation  of  his  army  after  the  expedition  to  Tanjore.* 

He  reached  Karikal  on  August  18  ^  to  find  that  part  of  the 
news  which  had  alarmed  him  so  had  been  considerably  exag- 
gerated. The  English  had  only  taken  the  field  after  he  himself 
had  begun  his  retreat.'    D'Ache's  reverse,  however,  had  been 

'  Lall/s  Mcmoire,  pp.  69,  etc.,  and  Piices,  p.  71. 

'See  an  interesting  letter  dated  August  20,  1758,  ap.  Duteil,  Une  Famille 
militaire,  pp.  131,  etc.  Tliis  also  states  that  for  the  last  few  days  of  the  siege 
the  writer  had  nothing  to  eat  but  a  little  biscuit  soaked  in  arrack,  and  the  soldiers 
only  cocoanuts.     But  that  is  an  exaggeration. 

*  Lally's  Memoire,  pp.  72,  etc. 

*  Lally  to  Leyrit,  August  20,  1758  (Leyrit's  Mimoire,  p.  155). 

*  Lally's  Mimoire,  p.  78. 

•Mil.  Cons.,  August  13  and  19,  1758.  On  Lally's  return,  they  withdrew 
to  their  former  quarters  (ibid.,  August  26,  1758). 


168  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

serious.  After  the  action  of  April  29  he  had  with  difficulty 
been  induced  to  refrain  from  sailing  back  to  the  French  islands.* 
Early  in  June  he  sailed  down  the  Coast  as  far  as  Karikal,  and, 
as  we  have  seen,  was  urgent  to  proceed  farther  to  the  southward. 
In  July  Lally  was  still  afraid  that  the  admiral  would  abruptly 
quit  the  Coast. ^  However,  he  lay  at  Pondich^ry  until  July  27, 
when,  on  the  news  of  Pocock's  approach,  he  put  out  to  sea  again,' 
but  kept  well  to  windward  of  the  EngUsh.*  At  last,  on  August  i, 
the  fleets  approached  each  other.  Twice  d'Ach6  refused  action 
because  the  wind  was  so  strong  as  to  render  his  lowest  tier  of 
guns  useless.  After  two  days'  manoeuvring,  he  decided  to  try 
and  cross  just  in  rear  of  Pocock's  last  vessel,  so  that  it  and 
perhaps  otlfers  would  be  crushed  by  the  successive  fire  of  his 
whole  squadron.  Accordingly,  on  August  3,  off  Negapatam,  he 
edged  down  on  the  English  line,  and,  according  to  his  account 
of  the  action,  just  as  he  was  on  the  point  of  accomplishing  his 
purpose,  the  sea-breeze  set  in,  and  he  was  obliged  to  form  his 
hne  on  that  of  the  English.  The  action  opened  at  1.20  p.m., 
when  the  leading  vessels  were  within  musket -shot  of  each  other. 
So  hot  was  the  Enghsh  fire  that  within  10  minutes  d'Ach6  set 
more  sail  in  order  to  increase  his  distance.  A  running  fight 
followed  for  half  an  hour,  and  then  the  whole  French  squadron 
put  before  the  wind.  Pocock  was  able  to  keep  within  gun-shot 
for  about  an  hour,  but  the  French  drew  steadily  ahead  owing 
to  the  effects  which  their  mitraille — broken  pieces  of  brass, 
iron,  and  copper — had  had  upon  the  EngUsh  yards  and  rigging. 
Though  again  indecisive  in  the  sense  that  d' Ache's  fleet  remained 
in  existence,  the  action  none  the  less  was  an  Enghsh  victory.* 
D' Ache's  losses  had  been  heavy.  His  own  ship,  the  Zoiiaque, 
had  more  killed  and  wounded  than  the  whole  British  squadron. 

1  See  the  resolution  of  the  "  Mixed  Council,"  May  28,  1758,  in  d'Ach6's 
first  Mi-moire  (Piiccs,  p-  15). 

'  Lally  to  Leyrit,  July  5,  1758  (Leyrit's  Mimoire,  p.  100). 

»  D' Ache's  dispatch  of  October  30.  1758,  ut  supra.     After  his  fruitless  efiort 
to  reach  St.  David's  before  it  fell,  Pocock  returned  to  Madras  on  June  15  ;   ten  ^ 
days  were  spent  in  watering  and  refitting,  and  then,  owing  to  a  timorous  resolu-     W 
tion  of  Council  (from  which  Lawrence  and  Palk  dissented),  he  cruised  to  the 
north  of  Pondichfery,  merely  watching  the  French  squadron. 

*  Pocock  to  Madras,  July  29  {ap.  Mil.  Cons.,  July  31,  1758). 

'  D'Ach6  attributed  his  defeat  in  great  part  to  the  "  artifices  "  which  the 
English  used  to  set  his  ships  on  fire  ;  and  the  French,  officers  were  so  indignant 
at  "  this  ungenerous  method  of  warfare  "  that  they  refused  to  sit  at  table  with 
the  English  officers,  prisoners  at  Pondich6ry  (Leyrit  to  Lally,  August  9,  1758, 
Leyrit's  Mimoire,  p.  135).  However,  they  at  once  set  to  work  contriving 
"artifices"  themselves  (Lally's  PUces,  p.  95).     History  repeats  itself. 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  CARNATIC  169 

In  all,  the  French  losses  were  close  upon  500,  the  English  below 
200.^  In  fact  d'Ache  was  beaten  ;  he  feared  to  meet  the  English 
again.  He  described  his  squadron  as  incapable  of  another 
engagement — his  ships  were  too  much  knocked  about  and  his 
sailors  were  killed,  wounded,  or  sick  with  dysentery.^  Only 
with  difficulty  was  he  persuaded  to  wait  for  Lally's  return.^ 
On  August  31  a  council  of  war  was  held,  consisting  of  the 
principal  naval  and  military  officers.  It  resolved  that  the 
squadron  ought  to  remain  at  Pondichery  another  fortnight 
or  three  weeks.*  But  d'Ach^  feared  he  might  be  forced  by  fire- 
ships  to  leave  the  shelter  of  the  Pondichery  guns.  He  immediately 
held  another  council,  consisting  of  his  captains  only,  who  voted 
for  immediate  departure.*  Having  landed  500  sailors,  who  were 
formed  into  a  battaUon  under  the  Chevalier  du  Poete,  he  sailed 
from  Pondichery  on  September  3,  to  renew  his  discussions, 
difficulties,  and  complaints  at  the  Isle  of  France,*  where,  as  he 
knew  when  he  sailed  thither,  his  people  could  not  be  fed  nor 
his  squadron  equipped.' 

Lally  now  took  up  again  his  scheme  for  capturing  Madras. 
But  though  Pocock  left  the  Coast  in  October,  success  would 
evidently  be  much  more  difficult  than  it  would  have  been  in 
the  previous  June  could  d'Ache  have  held  the  sea.  The  English 
had  been  diligently  preparing  to  defend  themselves,  laying  in 
supplies  of  provisions  and  gunpowder,  and  improving  their 
works.*  Moreover,  they  had  been  strengthened  by  the  arrival 
of  Draper  with  a  couple  of  hundred  men  of  H.M.'s  64th,  the 
whole  of  which  was  on  its  way  out,»  and  a  detachment  of  marines 

'  The  following  are  the  chief  accounts  of  the  action  :  Pocock  to  Madras, 
August  5  (Mil.  Cons.,  August  lo,  1758) ;  to  Clive,  August  12  (Orme  MSS.,  Various, 
290,  f.  21)  ;  to  Clevland,  August  22,  1758  (P.R.O.,  Admiralty,  i-i6i)  ;  Minutes 
(Orme  MSS.,  India,  xi.  f.  2994) ;  d'Achfe's  first  Mimoire,  pp.  35,  etc.  ;  d'Ache 
to  Lally,  August  6,  1758  (d'Achfi's  Lettres,  p.  20) ;  d'Achfi's  dispatch  of  October  30, 
1758  (ut  supra). 

•D'Ache  to  the  Pondichery  Council,  August  18.  1758  (d'Ach6's  Memoir. 
Piices,  p.  34). 

*  Leyrit  to  Lally.  August  21,  1758  (Leyrit's  Mimoire.  p.  160). 

*  D'Achfe's  first  Memoir,  Pieces,  pp.  36,  etc. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  51,  etc. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  41,  etc. 

'  .Magon'.s  letter  of  August  i,  1758  (ibid.,  p.  29).  This  was  sent  by  the  Rubis, 
which  had  reached  Negapatam  some  time  before  (ibid.,  pp.  36-37). 

'The  engineer  at  Madras  was  John  (subsequently  Sir  John)  Call,  a  man  of 
talent.  Itcs  bears  witness  to  the  keenness  with  which  Pigot  superintended 
the  completion  of  the  works. 

*  Pub.  Dis.  from  England,  December  23,  1757. 


170  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

landed  by  Pocock  before  his  departure.  In  all,  the  garrison 
amounted  to  1700  Europeans  and  Topasses,  2200  sepojre/  with 
Lawrence,  Draper,  and  Brereton  at  their  head.  Moreover,  it 
had  been  ordered  by  the  Company  that  if  Madras  was  attacked 
the  Council  was  to  be  suspended  and  the  government  assumed 
by  Pigot  and  four  military  officers.^  It  had  been  resolved  to 
withdraw  all  the  out-garrisons  save  that  at  Chingleput,  whence 
it  was  intended  to  attack  Lally's  communications. 

When,  therefore,  in  October,  Lally  advanced  northwards, 
he  encountered  no  resistance,  and  occupied  the  principal  places. 
Then  came  a  pause,  necessitated  by  the  approach  of  the  mon- 
soon. In  mid-November  he  was  preparing  to  renew  his  advance, 
having  made  up  his  mind  to  leave  Chingleput  behind  him. 
The  problem  which  this  place  offered  was  difficult  enough. 
He  could  not  spare  men  to  mask  it  ;  he  could  not  spare  time  to 
besiege  it  ;  ^  and  it  was  too  strong  to  be  carried  by  escalade. 
So  he  comforted  himself  with  reflecting  that  by  the  rules  of  war 
the  English  ought  to  evacuate  it,*  and  that  its  position  did  not 
directly  threaten  the  French  convoys.*  His  principal  difficulties 
were  lack  of  time,  lack  of  money,  and  the  discontent  of  unpaid 
soldiery.*  But  he  hoped  that  Raza  Sahib,  whom  he  took  with 
him,  would  be  able  to  raise  considerable  contributions  from  the 
poligars,  and  resolved,  as  he  said,  to  stake  Pondichery  against 
Madras.' 

He  accordingly  advanced  to  the  Mount,  and,  as  Lawrence 
fell  back  before  him,  to  the  plain,  in  those  days  thinly  scattered 
with  garden-houses,  which  lay  to  the  westward  of  the  city. 
On  the  morning  of  December  14  he  entered  the  Black  Town 
still  unopposed.  The  English  had  withdrawn  before  him,  but 
were  not  unwatchful  to  seize  any  opportunity  that  might  offer. 
They  learnt  that  the  French  had  scattered  in  search  of  plunder 
and  had  found  the  arrack  godowns.     They  decided  therefore 

•  Wilson's  Madras  Army,  vol.  i.  p.  103.  Cf.  also  the  Siege  Diary,  pp.  3  aiid 
109. 

'  Pub.  Dis.  from  England.  May  12,  1758. 

'  He  could  not  reckon  on  the  absence  of  the  EngUsh  squadron  beyond  the 
middle  of  January. 

*  I_.ally  to  Leyrit,  November  14,  1758  (Leyrit's  M^moire,  p.  211). 
'  Same  to  same,  December  4,  1758  (ibid.,  p.  242). 

•Same  to  same,  November  14,  1758  (ul  supra).  Thirty-three  men  deserted 
into  Fort  St.  George  in  the  first  week  of  the  siege,  but  after  Leyrit  had  sent  sup- 
pUes  of  money  tlie  number  dwindled  away.  In  the  next  three  weeks  it  fell  to  1 7, 
and  thereafter  did  not  merit  returns  (Siege  Diary,  pp.  143  and  194). 

'  Same  to  same,  December  8,  1758  (loc.  cit.,  p.  249). 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  CARNATIC  171 

on  a  sally.  It  consisted  of  600  men  under  Draper  and  Brereton, 
and  led  to  some  confused  street-fighting  in  which  the  English 
lost  200  men  and  their  two  guns,  but  made  good  their  retreat.^ 

This  incident  is  chiefly  remarkable  for  the  controversy  to 
which  it  gave  rise  concerning  the  conduct  of  Bussy,  whom  Lally 
had  recalled  from  the  Deccan  in  the  preceding  June.  The 
relations  of  these  men  were  never  cordial.  Lally  was  so  pre- 
judiced against  Company's  officers  that  he  never  did  justice 
to  Bussy's  undoubted  talent  ;  and  Bussy  never  forgave  Lally 
for  his  recall.  Moreover,  shortly  after  reaching  the  Carnatic, 
Bussy  produced  letters  stating  that  he  had  been  named  second- 
in-command.  This  would  have  involved  the  supersession  of 
all  the  king's  officers  whom  Lally  had  brought  out  with 
him  ;  and  although  the  senior  officers  are  said  to  have  signed 
a  letter  recommending  Lally  to  appoint  Bussy  the  senior 
Brigadier,  Lally  had,  not  improperly,  dechned  to  do  so.  Bussy's 
rank  when  he  accompanied  Lally  to  the  siege  of  Madras  was 
therefore  that  of  youngest  Brigadier  without  a  command.^ 
Lally  declared  that  in  the  course  of  the  action  Bussy  refused 
to  permit  Crillon,  a  lieutenant-colonel,  to  occupy  with  Lally's 
regiment  a  bridge  which  Draper  would  have  to  pass  in  his  retreat, 
and  this  is  said  to  have  been  confirmed  by  Crillon  in  his  evidence 
at  Lally's  trial.'  As  against  this,  Bussy  asserted  be  had  given 
Crillon  no  orders,  and  merely  advised  him  to  take  field-pieces 
with  him.  He  also  pointed  out  that  the  same  evening  Lally 
ha(f  appointed  him  to  the  brigade  rendered  vacant  by  the 
capture  of  d'Estaing.*  However,  he  himself  says  that  this 
appointment  was  paid  for  by  a  humiliating  scene,*  and  we  know 
it  was  Lally's  habit  to  abuse  people  for  misconduct  and  yet 
not  to  punish  them  ;  and  the  very  next  day  he  wrote  to 
d'Estaing  that  the  English  would  have  been  cut  off  if  Bussy 
had    let    Crillon    advance.     The    probabilities   are   that    Bussy 

'  Siege  Diary,  p.  3.  The  sally  took  place  at  10  a.m.,  but  Haraont  {op.  cit., 
p.  148)  invests  it  with  the  darkness  of  night  broken  only  by  the  flames  of  the 
burning  city.  Malleson  {French  in  India,  p.  537)  misdates  the  French  occupa- 
tion of  the  Black  Town.  The  French  losses  amounted  to  130  killed  and 
wounded  (Lally  to  Leyrit,  December  15,  1758,  Leyrit's  Mtmoire,  p.  255); 
d'Estaing,  one  of  Lally's  best  officers,  was  made  prisoner. 

•  See  Hamont,  np.  cit.,  p.  135. 

•  Lally's  Mfmoire,  pp,  103,  etc. 

•  Bu.ssy's  M (moire  of  1766,  pp.  17-18.  He  also  mentions  as  proof  of  his  good 
conduct  a  letter  of  congratulation  written  him  by  Leyrit  {ibid.,  p.  30).  But, 
in  the  circumstances,  such  congratulations  meant  little. 

»  Frcvillc,  "  Lally  ct  Bussy  aux  Indes  "  {Rev.  dcs  Quest,  hist.,  January  1907). 


172  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

did  do  what  he  afterwards  denied  doing.  The  odd  thing  is  that 
he  did  not  adduce  in  his  defence  the  fact  that  had  Crillon  advanced 
to  the  bridge  he  would  have  been  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  Fort 
and  doubtless  suffered  considerable  loss  without  being  able  to 
cut  off  Draper's  retreat.^  A  soldier  figures  oddly  when  he  denies 
doing  what  in  any  case  he  ought  to  have  done. 

This  was  almost  the  only  sensational  incident  of  the  siege, 
for  the  English  attempted  no  more  sorties  of  importance.  For 
nearly  three  weeks  after  Draper's  attempt,  the  French  were 
silent,  for  lack  of  artillery  and  ammunition.^  They  opened 
fire  on  January  2,  and,  though  their  guns  were  at  first  silenced, 
they  soon  reopened  and  maintained  a  steady  attack  on  the 
selected  works,  and  at  the  same  time  their  mortar  batteries 
threw  shell  constantly  into  the  place."  Later  on  a  mine  was 
sprung,  but  the  gap  it  made  was  completely  commanded  by  one 
of  the  bastions.*  At  last,  after  a  month's  bombardment,  a  breach 
appeared  in  the  defences  ;  but  it  was  so  exposed  to  the  un- 
weakened  fire  of  the  garrison  that  the  French  artillery  officers 
considered  it  impracticable,^  and  it  was  never  attempted.  In 
short,  the  defence  within  the  place  was  eminently  successful. 

Nor  was  Lally  able  to  give  it  his  undistracted  attention.  He 
had  decided  that  on  the  whole  it  was  wisest  to  leave  Chingleput 
untouched,  and  had  ordered  the  troops  he  had  left  at  Pondichery 
to  prevent  the  garrison  there  from  being  joined  by  any  rein- 
forcements from  the  south.*  The  EngUsh,  on  the  other  hand, 
had  directed  Captain  Achilles  Preston,  who  commanded  the 
Chingleput  troops,  to  exert  himself  in  cutting  off  the  enemy's 
supplies  until  he  should  have  been  joined  by  Caillaud  and  Yusuf 
Khan  '  from  Trichinopoly,  when  it  was  expected  that  it  would  be 
possible  entirely  to  block  the  road  from  Pondichery  to  Madras.* 
In  the  latter  part  of  December  Yusuf  Khan  moved  north  with  a 

'     'See  "  W.  D."  (Sir  William  Draper)  to  the  Public  Advertiser,  October  24, 
1766. 

'  Lally  to  Leyrit,  December  15  and  24,  1758  (Leyrit's  Memoire,  pp.  256  and 
265). 

*  Their  mortars  were  better  served  than  their  heavy  guns.  Siege  Diary, 
p.  25  ;   Call's  Journal  (ap.  Cambridge,  p.  167). 

*  Siege  Diary,  p.  81. 

'Lally's  Mi  moire  (Pieces,  p.  96). 

•Lally  to  Leyrit,  December  27,  1758  (Leyrit's  Mi  moire,  p.  273). 

'  The  principal  sepoy  officer  in  the  Engish  service,  holding  a  commission  as 
commandant  of  all  the  English  sepoys.  He  had  been  employed  in  reducing 
the  Madura  and  Tinnevelly  poligars.  He  was  the  only  sepoy  officer  in  the 
Madras  army  to  be  entrusted  with  independent  commands  of  any  consequence. 

*  Pigot  to  Preston,  December  i8,  1758  (Siege  Diary,  p.  137). 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  CARNATIC  173 

body  of  native  horse  and  foot,  ravaged  the  country  round  Pondi- 
ch^ry,  and  joined  Preston  at  Chingleput  on  Christmas  Day.i 

On  receipt  of  this  news,  it  was  resolved  that  they  should 
advance  and  attack  the  enemy's  posts  to  the  southward  of 
Madras,  an  attempt  in  which  the  garrison  was  to  co-operate.^ 
Accordingly  Preston  advanced  to  the  Mount.  Lally  sent  a 
detachment  against  him,  which  was  beaten  back  with  the  loss 
of  two  guns  ;  ^  but  in  spite  of  this  success,  Yusuf  Khan  declined 
to  make  the  projected  attack,  alleging  that  his  people  were 
dissatisfied  for  lack  of  provisions  ;  *  and  although  the  French 
were  again  driven  back  after  a  renewed  attack,  the  native 
troops  fled  to  Chingleput,  whither  Preston  had  to  follow  them.* 
As,  however,  the  French  were  now  bringing  up  their  stores  by 
sea,  the  Coast  road  mattered  little  ;  Preston  was  therefore 
ordered  to  return  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Madras  and  take 
post  there,  for  the  purpose  of  attempting  once  more  to  break 
through  the  French  cordon.*  But  the  attempt  was  again  delayed, 
in  spite  of  the  urgency  of  the  Madras  commands  ;  '  apparently 
Yusuf  Khan  would  not  venture  to  lead  his  troops  against  the 
French.  He  could  write  with  great  confidence  of  attacking 
Lally  in  his  camp  ;  but  when  it  came  to  the  point  some  excuse 
for  delaying  action  was  never  wanting.  When  at  last  Caillaud 
joined  the  force  on  February  7,  he  observed  that  sepoys  could 
hardly  attack  a  regular  force  well  posted,  and  that  "  the  man 
who  is  the  soul  of  all  these  black  people  thinks  badly  of  the 
scheme."  ^ 

But  although  the  plan  for  a  joint  attack  upon  the  besieging 
forces  was  not  to  be  attempted,  the  presence  of  an  Enghsh  force 
at  the  moment  was  very  distracting  to  the  besiegers.  On 
February  2  they  had  sent  out  a  considerable  body  against 
Preston  ;  but  as  the  French  drew  up  behind  some  paddy-fields 
which  were  under  water,  the  result  was  only  a  cannonade,  from 

'  Yusuf  Khan  to  Kgot,  December  21  and  22  ;  Preston  to  Pigot,  December  25, 
1758  (Siege  Diary,  pp.  161  and  163). 
'  Ihil.,  December  27,  1758  (p.  17). 

•  Preston  to  Pigot,  December  30,  1758  {ibid.,  p.  171). 

♦Preston  to  Pigot  and  Yusuf  Khan  to  Pigot,  December  31,  1758  {ibid.,  p. 
175).     Cf.  Siege  Diary,  January  i,  1759  (p.  24). 

'  Preston  to  Pigot,  January  2  and  6,  1759  {ibid.,  pp.  182  and  184). 

•  Pigot  to  Preston,  January  14,  16,  and  27,  1759  {ibid.,  pp.  200  and  206). 

'  Pigot  to  Preston,  January  28  and  February  2  and  5  ;  Preston  to  Pigot, 
January  30  and  February  i  ;  Yusuf  Khan  to  Pigot,  February  4,  1759  {ibid., 
pp.  227,  239,  241,  243,  246-247). 

"  Caillaud  to  Pigot,  February  8,  1759  {ibid.,  p.  259). 


174  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

which  the  French  presently  withdrew.*  A  week  later  they  made 
a  more  serious  effort  to  dislodge  the  English  from  the  Mount. 
This  led  to  an  action  continuing  over  twelve  hours,  the  French  in 
vain  trying  to  carry  the  garden-walls  behind  which  Caillaud's 
men  were  posted.  Although  abandoned  by  his  native  horse 
and  two-thirds  of  his  sepoys,  Caillaud  held  his  ground  till  evening, 
when  the  French  retreated,  and  then  he  too  fell  back,  for  lack 
of  ammunition.- 

Under  these  frequent  alarms  and  the  resolute  defence  of  the 
Fort,  Lally's  hopes  of  success  had  steadily  been  sinking.  In 
mid- January  he  had  received  news  of  English  ships  being  sighted 
on  their  way  south  from  Bombay  ;  ^  and  he  knew  therefore  that 
he  had  not  more  than  a  month  at  farthest  in  which  to  complete 
his  enterprise.  "  You  would  not  believe  me,  sir,"  he  wrote  to 
Leyrit,  on  February  ii,  "  when  I  told  you,  more  than  a  month 
ago,  that  I  expected  little  from  the  expedition.  I  now  regard  it 
as  a  failure."  *  He  proceeds  to  complain  that  officers  and  men 
alike  had  been  much  more  interested  in  the  plunder  of  the  Black 
Town  than  in  the  siege  of  the  Fort.  Three  days  later  he  writes 
in  a  despairing  tone,  that  on  their  return  to  Pondichery,  he  and 
his  men  had  better  seek  some  other  trade  than  that  of  war.* 
On  the  15th,  half  his  officers  have  gone,  weary  of  war,  and  the 
other  half  he  cannot  trust.'  The  next  afternoon  the  long- 
expected  reinforcements  from  Bombay  hove  in  sight  ;  that  night 
the  French  evacuated  their  trenches,  and  next  morning  were 
seen  in  full  retreat.' 

The  English  losses  in  killed  and  wounded  amounted  to  468  ; 
and  their  defence  is  conspicuous  not  only  for  its  success  but  also 
for  its  gallantry.  "  The  constancy  and  perseverance  of  our 
people,"  writes  Draper  in  a  letter  dated  "  from  the  shattered 
remains  of  Madras,"  "  deserves  the  greatest  encomiums,  as  we 
had  no  places  of  security  from  the  enemy's  shells  when  off  duty, 
so  that  many  were  killed  in  their  sleep.  .  .  .  The  brave  old 
Colonel  Lawrence,  the  Governor,  Mr.  Pigot,  Brereton,  and  myself 

'  Preston  to  Pigot,  February  3,  1759  {Siege  Diary,  p.  244). 

'Caillaud  to  Pigot,  February  10  and  11,  1759  {ibid.,  pp.  262,  264). 

'  Leyrit  to  Lally,  January  iz,  1759  (Leyrit's  Mimoire,  p.  281). 

*  Ibid.,  p.  290. 

'  Lally  to  Leyrit,  February  14,  1759  (Siege  Diary,  p.  279).  This  letter  was 
intercepted  at  Chingleput. 

•Lally  to  Leyrit,  February  15,  1759  (Leyrit's  Mirrioire,  p.  295).  Bussy  was 
among  those  who  had  retired  to  Pondichery  (Bussy's  Mimoire,  of  1766,  p.  34,  n.). 

'  Siege  Diary,  February  16  and  17,  1759  (pp.  101-102). 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  CARNATIC  175 

determined  from  the  commencement  of  the  siege  not  to  listen 
to  any  terms  of  capitulation,  for  the  loss  of  this  place  would 
have  drawn  after  it  the  entire  loss  of  the  country.  .  .  ."  ^  That 
is  doubtless  an  exaggeration  ;  but  it  remains  true  that  the  loss 
of  Madras  in  1759  might  have  jeopardised  Clive's  work  in  Bengal. 

Of  this  Clive  was  very  sensible  ;  and  although  he  did  not 
believe  that  Lally's  superiority  in  numbers  could  make  good 
the  French  defect  of  sea-power  on  the  Coast,*  he  did  not  regard 
that  as  a  reason  for  failing  to  reciprocate  the  action  by  which 
Bengal  had  been  secured  for  the  English.  In  spite  of  his  diffi- 
culties with  the  Nawab,  he  resolved  to  send  away  half  the  forces 
he  had  under  his  command,'  to  hasten  the  final  victory  which 
he  foresaw  over  the  French. 

His  project  was  a  revival  of  that  scheme  for  the  expulsion 
of  the  French  from  the  Decc?n  which  had  almost  been  attempted 
in  1756,*  with  the  important  Zemindar  of  Vizianagram  for  the 
EngUsh  ally  instead  of  the  Marathas.  This  raja,  Ananda  Razu 
by  name,  had  some  time  before  sent  offers  of  help  against  the 
French,*  and  now  repeated  them  on  the  news  of  Bussy's  recall, 
which  had  encouraged  him  to  rebel  and  seize  Vizagapatam. 
About  the  same  time  came  news  of  d'Ach^'s  defeat  of  August  3 
and  Lally's  expedition  to  Tanjore.  The  Bengal  Council  were 
induced  reluctantly  to  concur  ;  *  and  at  the  end  of  September 
Forde  sailed  for  Vizagapatam  with  500  Europeans  and  2000  sepoys. 
His  immediate  mihtary  object  was  to  prevent  Lally's  army 
receiving  reinforcements  from  the  Circars ;  their  acquisition 
for  the  English  was  a  consummation  desired  rather  than  expected, 
for  it  was  not  known  in  what  strength  the  French  were  holding 
those  provinces. 

Early  in  November  Forde  was  able  to  take  the  field,  having 
come  to  an  agreement  with  Ananda  Razu  that  he  was  to  pay 
the  army  their  batta,'  but  not  to  make  any  payments  on  this 

I  Draper  to  Peirson,  February  i8,  1759  (Hardwick  Papers,  Brit.  Mus..  Add. 
MSS.,  25893,  f.  206).  « 

•Clive  to  Pigot,  August  14,  1758  {ap.  Malcolm,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i.  p.  369). 

•  This  weakening  of  his  military  power  much  increased  the  difficulties  of 
dealing  with  Mir  Jafar,  and  gave  to  his  poUcy  for  the  moment  an  appearance  of 
weakness  much  criticised  by  Scrafton  in  his  letters  to  Hastings. 

*  See  p.  96  above. 

'Ananda  Razu  to  Pigot,  received  February  4,  1758  {Country  Correspondence, 
1758,  No.  37). 

'See  Clive's  minute  of  September  12  and  Becher's  of  September  18  {ap. 
Bengal  Sel.  Com.  Pro..  1758). 

'  I.e.  the  extra  allowances  due  to  troops  in  the  field  beyond  their  ordinary  pay- 


176  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

account  until  in  possession  of  Rajahmundry,  the  old  headquarters 
of  government  of  the  southern  part  of  the  French  territories  ;  he 
was  also  to  receive  as  his  share  the  lands  of  all  zemindars  who 
should  assist  the  French,  while  the  Company  was  to  have  all 
the  coastal  towns.* 

The  Fren«h  were  at  this  time  under  the  command  of  the 
Marquis  de  Conflans,  who  had  about  the  same  number  of  Europeans 
as  Forde,  but  many  more  sepoys.-  In  spite  of  this  advantage, 
the  French  were  inferior  in  the  quality  ahke  of  troops  and  leader. 
The  two  armies  met  some  little  way  north  of  Rajahmundry. 
On  December  7,  an  action  ensued  near  a  village  called  Condore. 
After  a  40-minute  cannonade,  the  French  battalion  moved  to 
attack  the  battalion  of  sepoys  which  formed  the  left  of  the  English 
army,  and  which  was  mistaken,  from  the  colour  of  its  uniform, 
for  European  troops.  This  battalion  lacked  resolution  to  await 
the  French  assault  and  gave  way  ;  but  Forde  rapidly  re-formed 
his  Europeans  so  as  to  catch  the  French  in  flank  as  they  advanced. 
Grape-shot  and  a  volley  at  close  quarters  threw  them  into  con- 
fusion ;  and  if  the  Raja's  horse  had  only  possessed  courage  to 
pursue  a  flying  enemy,  few  could  have  escaped.  As  it  was,  they 
could  carry  off  only  four  field-pieces.  All  the  rest  of  their  artillery 
and  all  their  baggage,  save  two  camels  laden  with  money  and 
papers,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  English.*  This  led  immediately 
to  the  occupation  of  Rajahmundry,  which  the  French  did  not 
attempt  to  defend. 

The  conditions  on  which  Ananda  Razu  was  to  pay  the  army's 
batta  were  now  fulfilled  ;  but  he  delayed  payment  until  the 
middle  of  January,  when  he  was  placed  in  possession  of  the  fort. 
In  February,  Forde  was  able  to  renew  his  march,  and  moved  towards 
Masulipatam,  where  he  appeared  on  March  6.  Meanwhile  the 
French  had  divided  their  forces.  Between  400  and  500  Europeans 
under  Conflans  lay  before  Masulipatam,  while  150  with  a  body 
of  sepoys  formed  "  an  army  of  observation,"  intended  to  disturb 
the  English  should  they  undertake  the  siege  of  that  place.  That 
duty,  however,  they  wholly  failed  to  perform,  and  in  fact  the  only 
service  they  rendered  was  to  reoccupy  Rajahmundry  when  it 
was  left  to  the  protection  of  the  Raja's  troops. 

'  Cambridge,  op.  cit.,  p.  203  ;  Orme,  vol.  ii.  p.  376. 

•  Exclusive  of  Ananda  Razu's  troops,  who  counted  for  little.  But  Conflans' 
sepoys  were  not  much  better. 

•Forde  to  Andrews,  December  7,  1758  (Siege  Diary,  p.  199);  Cambridge, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  204,  etc.  ;  Orrae,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii.  pp.  376,  etc.  Orme  misdates  the 
action. 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  CARNATIC  177 

Nor  was  Conflans'  behaviour  much  better.  On  Forde's 
appearance,  he  held  a  strong  position  in  the  native  town  which 
had  sprung  up  on  the  outskirts  of  the  swamp  surrounding  the 
site  of  the  old  city  and  its  fortifications  ;  but  he  abandoned  this 
at  once  and  withdrew  behind  the  walls  of  the  latter.  For  a 
fortnight  the  English  lay  inactive,  waiting  for  their  heavy  guns 
to  come  down  by  sea  from  Vizagapatam.  This  delay  placed 
Forde  in  a  very  awkward  position.  The  French  reoccupation 
of  Rajahmundry  had  interrupted  a  convoy  of  money  coming 
overland  from  Vizagapatam,  and  the  troops  were  considerably 
in  arrears.  On  March  i8,  the  Europeans  mutinied,  demanded 
the  immediate  payment  of  the  prize-money  due  to  them,  and 
insisted  that  when  Masulipatam  was  taken  the  whole  booty 
should  be  divided  among  the  troops  instead  of  half  being  reserved, 
according  to  orders,  for  the  Company.  However,  Forde  succeeded 
in  pacifying  them,*  and  when  his  guns  were  landed  at  once 
pressed  the  siege.  He  had  two  motives  for  haste.  One  was 
that  he  feared  disturbance  from  "  the  army  of  observation  "  ; 
the  other  was  that  he  had  received  news  of  the  approach  of 
Salabat  Jang.  By  April  6  his  fire  had  much  damaged  two  of 
the  enemy's  bastions,  but  his  supplies  of  gunpowder  were 
running  low,  and  he  resolved  to  attempt  the  place  by  escalade. 
This  was  carried  out  on  the  night  of  April  7/8.  The  attention 
of  the  garrison  was  successfully  diverted  by  false  attacks  made 
by  the  Raja's  troops  and  some  of  the  sepoys,  while  the  Euro- 
peans and  the  ist  Bengal  Sepoys  carried  the  breached  bastions, 
and  after  a  sharp  conflict  drove  the  French  altogether  from 
their  defences.  This  achievement  was  performed  by  313  Euro- 
peans against  400  regular  troops  with  100  officers  and  civiHans.^ 
The  blow  was  severe.  It  cost  private  persons  8  or  9  lakhs, 
apart  from  the  losses  of  the  French  Company  '  and  the  de- 
struction of  their  prestige  in  the  Deccan. 

The  news  caused  extreme  surprise  at  Pondichery,  where 
Forde's  numbers  had  been  underestimated.*  Moreover,  Lally 
had  already  dispatched  Moracin  with  300  men  as  a  reinforce- 
ment. These  appeared  a  week  too  late.  Moracin  found  the 
place  already  occupied  and  then,  instead  of  landing  and  joining 
Salabat  Jang,  which  was  his  only  chance  of  counteracting  the 

'  Forde  to  Madras,  March  19,  1759  {ap.  Mil.  Cons.,  March  28,  1759). 

•  Forde  to  Madras,  April  10,  1759  {ap.  Mil.  Cons.,  April  20,  1759). 
»  Leyrit  to  Lally,  May  7,  1759  (Leyrit's  Memoire,  p.  353). 

*  Bussy  to  Lally,  April  24,  1759  (Bussy's  Mimoire  ol  1766,  pp.  61-62). 

12 


178  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

English  success,  he  sailed  north  and  landed  at  Ganjara,  where  he 
could  accomphsh  nothing.* 

In  fact,  Moracin's  action  greatly  assisted  Forde  in  his  negotia- 
tions with  Salabat  Jang,  to  whom  he  had  sent  a  Bengal  civiUan, 
Johnstone,  who  had  accompanied  him.  At  first,  the  latter  found 
great  difficulties  in  his  way.  Salabat  Jang  was,  in  fact,  hoping 
for  the  return  of  Bussy,  in  order  that  he  might  march  with  him 
against  his  brother  and  rival,  Nizam  Ah.*  At  last,  on  May  14, 
six  weeks  after  Johnstone  had  joined  the  camp,  the  Subahdar 
agreed  to  a  treaty  by  which  he  was  to  expel  the  French,  and 
grant  the  country  surrounding  MasuUpatam  to  the  EngUsh,  in 
return  for  their  undertaking  not  to  assist  his  brother.'  This  event 
terminated  the  active  part  of  the  expedition,  but  Forde  remained 
at  MasuUpatam  until  October  15,  when,  in  disgust  at  his 
appointment  of  commander  in  Bengal  not  being  confirmed, 
he  returned  to  Calcutta,*  just  in  time  to  complete  his  miUtary 
achievements  by  the  defeat  of  the  Dutch. 

The  great  success  attending  this  expedition  has  usually  been 
held  to  demonstrate  the  unwisdom  of  Lally's  recalUng  Bussy  and 
Moracin  from  the  Deccan.  But  the  matter  cannot  be  quite  so 
lightly  dismissed.  Lally's  mistake  lay  rather  in  not  securing  the 
full  execution  of  his  orders  than  in  the  orders  themselves.  These 
I  believe  to  have  been  perfectly  sound.  On  his  arrival  in  India, 
he  found  Bussy  in  the  Deccan  vnth  considerable  forces  at  his 
disposal ;  he  found  that  the  only  part  Bussy  had  taken  in  the 
struggle  against  the  EngUsh  was  the  capture  of  the  so-called  fort 
of  Vizagapatam  ;  he  found  that  the  only  reason  which  could  be 
assigned  for  this  lack  of  co-operation  was  the  alleged  necessity 
of  attending  on  Salabat  Jang,  and  that  the  Circars,  the  possession 
of  which  had  been  vaunted  as  so  great  an  achievement,  had 
never  been  able  to  remit  a  single  pagoda  to  Pondichdry.  In  the 
Carnatic,  Lally  was  confronted  by  a  European  enemy  ;   the  same 

'  He  returned  to  Pondichfery  with  the  remnants  of  his  expedition  in  November. 
He  had  at  first  been  joined  by  a  considerable  zemindar,  Narayan  Deo,  but  came 
to  blows  with  him  as  soon  as  he  began  to  need  money  (Forde  to  Madras,  May  28, 
and  Heath  to  Madras,  July  19,  1759,  a{>.  Mil.  Cons.,  June  11  and  August  6, 

1759)- 

*  Bussy  to  Lally,  April  30,  1759  (Bussy's  Mlmoire,  1766,  p.  65). 

*  Forde  to  Madras,  May  28,  1759  (ap.  Mil.  Cons.,  June  11,  1759).  The  treaty 
is  printed  by  Cambridge,  op.  cit.,  p.  213. 

*  Andrews  to  Madras,  October  21  (ap.  Mil.  Cons.,  October  30,  1759).  In 
July  he  had  had  to  suppress  a  mutiny  among  his  sepoys  by  seizing  two  ring- 
leaders and  immediately  blowing  them  from  his  guns.  Forde  to  Madras,  July  3 
(/o«.  eit.,  July  10.  1759)- 


I 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  CARNATIC  179 

enemy  was  supreme  in  Bengal.  He  resolved,  therefore,  on  a 
concentration  of  his  forces,  in  order  to  crush  first  Madras,  and 
then  Calcutta  ;  and  in  consequence  signified  to  Bussy  his  desire 
that  the  latter  should  join  him  in  the  Carnatic  with  his  forces.' 
Bussy  replied  with  a  most  doleful  account  of  his  situation — all  his 
plans  for  co-operation  frustrated,  all  his  resources  of  money  used 
up,  certain  destruction  awaiting  him  if  he  breathed  a  hint  of 
the  departure  from  Aurangabad.^  In  reply  to  this  Lally  issued 
definite  orders  to  both  Bussyand  Moracin  to  join  him  with  all  their 
Europeans  and  as  many  sepoys  as  possible.  "  It  matters  Uttle," 
he  wrote  with  profound  truth,  "  whether  the  elder  or  the  younger 
brother  governs  the  Deccan,  if  I  remain  master  of  the  Coast  ;  it 
matters  httle  if  your  zemindars  and  avaldars  refuse  tribute, 
if  I  have  an  army  with  nothing  else  to  do  than  to  reduce 
them  to  obedience."  '  "I  should  like  you  to/  prove  to  me," 
he  writes  to  Leyrit  about  the  same  time,  "  that  the  opera- 
tions of  these  gentlemen  *  concern  the  Company's  interests 
more  nearly  than  a  revolution  in  Cochin-China  which  we  may 
read  about  in  the  Gazette."  *  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the 
opposition  to  Lally's  poUcy  was  due  to  private  interests  ;  that 
Bussy 's  army,  in  attendance  on  the  Nizam,  swallowed  up  all 
the  revenues  of  the  French  concessions  in  the  Deccan  ;  that 
Bussy's  arguments,  based  on  the  validity  of  Salabat  Jang's 
power,*  were  as  empty  as  the  orders  which  Dupleix  had  issued 
to  Saunders  in  the  same  prince's  name  to  abandon  the  cause  of 
Muhammad  Ali. 

Lally  was  so  completely  in  the  right  that  it  is  singular  that 
anyone  should  ever  have  been  found  seriously  to  defend  Bussy's 
arguments.  Lally's  mistake  was  now  to  follow — he  did  not 
make  himself  obeyed.  Bussy  wiote  letter  after  letter  full  of 
protestations  of  obedience  ; '  he  received  Lally's  orders  on  or 
before  July  15  ;   he  and  Moracin  did  not  join  I-ally  until  more 

'  His  letter  was  dated  April  20,  1758.  Neither  he  nor  Bussy  found  it  worth 
printing. 

»  Bussy  to  Lally,  May  17,  1758  (Lally's  Mtmoire,  Piices,  p.  66). 

'  Lally  to  Moracin,  June  11,  1758  {ibid.,  Pieces,  p.  86).  Lally's  letter  to  Bussy 
is  dated  June  13  (Bussy's  Mimoire  of  1766,  pp.  2,  etc.). 

•  He  refers  to  Bussy  and  Law. 

•  Lally  to  Leyrit,  June  28,  1758  (Lally's  Mimoire,  Pieces,  p.  70). 

•  He  says,  for  instance,  that  Salabat  Jang's  parawana  for  Arcot  was  enough 
to  procure  the  payment  of  the  Poligars'  tribute  (Bussy's  Mimoire  of  1766,  p.  161, 
n.).  He  cannot  seriously  liave  believed  that  the  Poligars  paid  anyone  unless  he 
came  sword  in  hand. 

'  They  are  printed  in  Bussy's  Mimoire  of  1764. 


180  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

than  two  months  later,  and  then  they  were  not  accompanied 
by  a  single  man.  Lally  now  departed  from  his  original  inten- 
tions. He  was  over-persuaded  to  leave  the  European  troops  in 
the  Circars,  and  that,  as  we  have  seen,  involved  sending  reinforce- 
ments when  they  were  attacked.  Nearly  900  European  troops 
were  thus  lost  to  no  purpose  whatever  in  a  region  where  success 
or  failure  mattered  nothing.  This  evidently  accentuated  the 
grave  disadvantage  to  which  Lally  was  put  by  Pocock's  superi- 
ority at  sea. 

After  the  siege  of  Madras  had  been  raised,  the  English  resolved 
to  take  the  field,  although  they  could  bring  only  1000  Europeans 
against  Lally's  2000.*  Lawrence's  health,  however,  did  not 
permit  him  to  bear  the  fatigues  of  a  campaign,  and  the  command 
was  entrusted  to  Major  Cholmondeley  Brereton  of  Draper's.  The 
French,  however,  declined  action,  and  all  that  was  possible  was 
to  storm  Conjeeveram  in  April.*  In  May,  to  save  expense,  the 
English  went  into  cantonments  in  the  neighbourhood  of  that 
place.^  There  they  remained  till  August,  when,  recruits  having 
arrived,  it  was  decided  again  to  take  the  field,  but  not  to  risk 
any  hazardous  operation  until  the  arrival  of  Coote's  regiment, 
shortly  expected.*  In  spite  of  this,  Brereton  attacked  Wandi- 
wash,  where,  after  a  hard-fought  action,  he  was  beaten  off  with 
the  loss  of  200  killed  and  wounded.*  It  was  fortunate  for  the 
English  that  the  command  was  about  to  fall  into  more  experi- 
enced hands.  "  Brereton 's  zeal  and  activity  on  service  is  very 
great,"  wrote  Call  with  much  truth,  "  but  he  is  warm,  and  has 
no  idea  of  obstacles,  which  possibly  arises  from  his  never  having 
been  on  subaltern's  duty." 

The  French  inaction  all  this  while  was  due  in  part  to  the 
continual  disputes  which  Lally  had  with  the  Pondich^ry  Council, 
in  part  to  the  great  and  increasing  lack  of  money.  One  of  the 
reasons  why  the  English  entered  on  a  campaign  which  was  not 
likely  to  produce  military  fruits  was  Lally's  financial  distress — 

'Mil.  Cons.,  February  i8  and  20,  1759.  They  were  soon  strengthened  by 
the  arrival  of  the  rest  of  Draper's  regiment  from  Bengal  {he.  cit.,  February  38, 

J759)- 

•Brereton  to  Pigot,  April  13  and  16,  1759  (ap.  Mil.  Cons.,  April  16  and  J9, 

J759)- 

•Mil.  Cons.,  May  24,  1759. 

*  Mil.  Cons.,  August  27  and  31,  and  September  37,  1759. 

•  Brereton  to  Pigot,  September  30  {ap.  Mil.  Cons.,  October  2,  1759).  Interest- 
ing accounts  of  the  action  will  be  found  in  Cheshyre  to  Barrington,  February  12, 
1760  (P.R.O.,  War  Office,  40-1),  and  in  Call  to  Speke,  October  30,  1759  (Brit. 
Mus.,  Add.  MSB.,  35917,  fi-  40,  etc.). 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  CARNATIC  181 

a  fact,  as  Lawrence  said,  well  and  publicly  known. ^  In  October 
this  military  discontent  came  to  a  head  in  the  mutiny  of  the 
whole  body  of  Europeans,  who  quitted  their  camp  and  officers, 
and  marched  off  some  distance  with  their  artillery.  They  were 
ten  months'  pay  in  arrears,  and  were  with  difficulty  induced  to 
return  to  duty  by  the  delivery  of  six  months'  pay  and  the  promise 
of  the  speedy  discharge  of  the  remainder.^ 

It  was  not  unreasonable  for  the  troops  to  suppose  that  funds 
had  arrived  for  their  pay,  as  the  French  squadron  had  in  Sep- 
tember reached  Pondich^ry  and  again  sailed  away.  When  in  the 
previous  year  d'Ach6  had  reached  the  French  Islands  he  found 
that  vessels  had  arrived  from  France  with  supplies  of  money, 
but  that  the  victualling  of  his  fleet  offered  the  greatest  difficulties. 
The  Islands  scarcely  produced  enough  to  feed  their  own  popula- 
tion, and  had  been  accustomed  to  rely  on  receiving  annual 
supplies  of  wheat  and  rice  from  Bengal.  The  capture  of  Chander- 
nagore  in  1757  had  put  a  stop  to  these,  so  that  the  presence  of 
a  large  squadron  such  as  d'Ach^'s  caused  great  embarrassment. 
It  was  decided  to  send  vessels  to  buy  provisions  at  the  Cape  of 
Good  Hope  ;  half  the  funds  sent  out  for  the  service  of  Pondich6ry 
were  thus  employed  ;  ^  but,  d'Ach6  says,  the  private  trade  ex- 
ceeded the  cargoes.*  The  squadron's  victualling  had  to  be 
completed  by  purchases  from  private  persons,  who  insisted  on 
receiving  high  prices."  All  this  caused  great  delay,  and  the 
squadron  did  not  sail  until  July  17,  1759. 

Pocock  was  on  the  watch  for  its  coming.  He  had  with  him 
9  ships  of  the  line,  and  sighted  d'Ach6  with  11  on  September  2. 
The  winds  were  too  light  for  the  fleets  to  come  within  reach  of 
each  other.  Next  day  the  French  manoeuvred  for  position, 
keeping  out  to  sea,  and  that  night  were  lost  sight  of.  Pocock 
at  once  sailed  for  Pondich(5ry,  and  on  the  8th  again  sighted  the 
enemy.  At  last,  on  the  loth,  action  was  engaged,  in  a  situation 
disadvantageous  to  the  English,  for,  their  rear  being  widely 
spread  out,  the  last  two  ships  could  take  little  part.*     Practically, 

'  Mil.  Cons.,  March  26,  1759. 

'  Folenay's  Report  (Lally's  Mlmoire,  Piices,  p.  106) ;  Allen  to  Bussy,  October 
18,  1759  (Buss/s  Memoire  of  1766,  p.  124)  ;  the  Officers  to  Lally  [October  18, 
1759J  (Lally's  ^cjMOjre,  p.  137)  ;  Lally  to  Fumcl,  October  I7and  19,  1759  (Leyrit's 
Mimoire,  pp.  411  and  413)  ;  La  Flotte.  Essais  historiques,  p.  53. 

'  One  out  of  two  millions  of  livros. 

*  D' Ache's  first  Mimoire,  p.  46. 

*  Ibid. 

*  Only  one,  the  Sunderland,  seems  to  have  been  able  to  get  up  and  engage. 


182  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

the  English  fought  7  ships  against  11.  The  battle  was  more 
stubborn  than  either  of  the  two  which  had  preceded  it.  For  two 
hours  the  squadrons  continued  within  musket-shot,  exchanging 
a  furious  cannonade.  Of  the  English  vessels,  the  Tyger  and 
the  Newcastle  suffered  severely,  with  all  their  sail  shot  away  so 
as  to  be  under  no  control  of  the  helm.  But.  at  last  the  French 
rear  gave  way.  D'Ach^  fell  wounded  at  the  moment  when  his 
pilot  ordered  his  ship  to  be  put  about  ;  and  the  rest  of  the 
Frenchmen  followed  him.  They  had  lost  886  killed  and  wounded,^ 
against  569  in  the  English  fleet.^ 

The  latter  was,  as  usual,  too  crippled  in  masts  and  rigging  to 
pursue,  and,  while  it  was  painfully  engaged  in  refitting,  d'Ach6 
put  into  Pondichery,  where  he  landed  the  remains  of  the  money 
that  had  been  sent  out  from  France,^  and  announced  his  intention 
of  returning  at  once  to  the  Islands.  This  was  followed  by  the 
usual  assemblage  of  Councils  and  delivery  of  protests  which 
characterise  the  relations  of  the  Pondichery  government  with 
all  the  commanders  of  French  squadrons  at  this  period.  D'Ache 
lay  at  Pondichery  a  fortnight,  and  on  October  i  sailed,  never  to 
return.*  At  the  Islands  he  met  the  same  difficulties  and  was 
occupied  with  the  same  interminable  disputes  as  before.  His 
last  letter  to  Tally  declared  that  he  would  never  abandon  Pondi- 
chery ;  ^  but  early  in  1760  he  received  news  from  France  of  a 
projected  attack  upon  Mauritius,*  and  made  that  an  excuse  for 
not  returning  to  the  Coast.' 

Hitherto  Tally  had  relied  upon  his  troops  and  d'Ach6's 
squadron  for  defeating  the  enemy.     Neither  had  answered  his 

'  Waddington,  La  Guerre  des  sept  ans,  vol.  iii.  p.  412. 

*  Pocock  to  the  Admiralty,  October  12,  1759  (P.R.O.,  Admiralty,  1-161); 
Pocock  to  Madras,  September  12,  1759  (Mil.  Cons.,  September  15,  1759)  ;  Coote's 
Journal  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  viii.  ff.  1900,  etc.)  ;  Minute  of  tW  engagement 
(loc.  cit.,  xi.  fi.  3001-3002)  ;   d'Ache's  first  Mimoire,  pp.  49,  etc. 

*  One  million  livres  in  silver  had  been  sent  earlier  by  a  frigate.  What  d'Ach6 
now  landed  included  diamonds  which  had  been  captured  on  the  homeward- 
bound  Indiaman  Grantham  (on  which  Orme  was  a  passenger).  Apparently  the 
diamonds  were  sent  in  part  of  the  funds  from  France.  They  were  resold  to 
the  English — a  fact  which  throws  a  curious  light  on  trade  relations  during  war 
in  the  eighteenth  century. 

*  D'Ache  to  Lally,  September  15  and  17,  1759  (d'Ache's  Z.f«f«s,  pp.  27  and  29)  ; 
Representations  of  the  Council,  September  16,  1759  (d'Achfe's  Mimoire,  Pifces, 
p.  72)  ;  Conseil  de  Marine,  September  16,  1759  [ibid.,  p.  76)  ;  Conseil  Superieur 
to  d'Ache,  September  26,  1759  (P.R.,  No.  15,  f.  555). 

'  D'Ache  to  Lally,  October  i,  1759  (d'AchS's  Lettres,  p.  32). 

*  D'Ache's  first  Mimoire,  p.  63. 

'  D'Ach6  resigned  his  command  and  went  home  in  December  1760. 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  CARNATIC  183 

expectations,  and  he  now  turned  in  despair  to  seek  help  from 
the  Country  powers.  Of  these,  one  had  in  September  1759 
a  vakil  at  Pondichery  proposing  alliance.  This  was  Basalat 
Jang,  a  son  of  Nizam-ul-Mulk,  who  was  seeking  an  independent 
position  for  himself  in  the  South.  Bussy  advocated  his  being 
recognised  as  Nawab  of  Arcot  on  condition  of  sharing  the  revenues 
with  the  French  and  affording  them  assistance  against  the 
Enghsh.^  Two  days  after  d' Ache's  departure,  Lally  decided  to 
send  Bussy  to  bring  this  prince  into  the  Camatic.''  Bussy 
accordingly  set  out  for  the  Cuddapah  country,  where  Basalat  Jang 
was  then  encamped  ;  but  he  was  delayed  first  by  heavy  rains 
and  then  by  news  of  the  mutiny,  so  that  he  did  not  reach  his 
destination  until  November  10.  He  found  the  prince  already 
resolved  not  to  move  south,  and  explains  this  by  the  exaggerated 
accounts  that  had  been  brought  of  the  French  mutiny.  But  it 
is  likely  that  this  produced  its  chief  effect  on  Basalat  Jang's 
mind  by  proving  how  ill-supplied  were  his  proposed  allies  with 
money.  He  himself  owed  great  sums  to  his  troops  and  had 
demanded  an  advance  of  4  lakhs  to  be  repaid  out  of  the  future 
revenues  of  the  Camatic.  Bussy  had  aheady  refused  this  ;  and 
his  refusal,  coupled  with  the  proof  that  the  French  could  not 
pay  their  own  people,  showed  too  plainly  that  the  alliance  was 
not  worth  cultivating  by  a  needy  prince.  Bussy  therefore 
returned  in  December,  having  achieved  nothing,^  and  bringing 
with  him  some  Country  horse  and  the  remnants  of  the  army  of 
observation  which  Conflans  had  detached  from  Masulipatam. 

Meanwhile  the  Enghsh  had  received  an  important  reinforce- 
ment. In  April,  Coote's  battalion  had  embarked  for  the  East 
Indies.  It  was  intended  for  service  in  Bengal,  but  on  reaching 
the  Coast  in  October  was  ordered  ashore  for  service  against  the 
French.*    Coote  took  the  field  at  the  head  of  the  united  forces 

'  Bussy  to  Lally.  September  7,  1759  (Bussy's  Memoire  of  1766,  p.  87). 

'  Lally  to  Bussy,  October  3,  1759  {ibid.,  p.  94). 

'  Correspondence  relating  to  this  was  printed  by  Bussy  in  his  Memoire  of 
1766,  pp.  132,  etc.  It  may  be  noted,  as  a  curious  echo  of  the  theories  of  Dupleix, 
that  Bussy  considered  the  advent  of  Basalat  Jang  would  relieve  the  French 
of  the  expenses  of  their  native  troops,  who  would  be  paid  out  of  the  Camatic 
revenues.  He  seems  to  have  supposed  that  the  mere  name  of  this  adventurer 
would  extract  revenues  where  the  French  could  not.  To  a  great  extent  this 
was  an  illusion.  So  far  as  it  was  well  founded,  it  was  the  justification  of  the 
dual  system  of  government  from  the  internal  point  of  view. 

♦Coote's  Journal  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  viii.  ff.  1898,  etc.).  At  the  same  time 
a  body  of  Company's  troops  was  sent  to  Bengal  under  Caillaud.  It  is  said  that 
the  principal  reason  for  this  was  Clive's  dislike  of  Coote. 


184  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

on  November  19,  and  took  the  forts  of  Wandiwash  and  Carangoly. '' 
The  capture  of  the  former  affords  an  illustration  of  the  attitude 
of  the  army  towards  its  rights  of  plunder.  The  fort  had  been 
breached,  and  the  Killedar  had  sent  out  people  offering  to  sieze 
and  deliver  up  the  French  in  garrison.  Before  any  answer  had 
come  to  Coote's  reply,  the  French  troops  crowded  onto  the  walls 
of  the  fort  and  shouted  that  they  would  surrender.  One  company 
of  English  sepoys  therefore  was  sent  to  take  possession  of  the 
gate  and  another  to  occupy  the  breach,  so  that  the  place  was  in 
fact  occupied  without  any  capitulation.^  Coote  had  been  in- 
structed to  endeavour  to  recover  the  arrears  of  tiibute  owing  by 
the  Killedar  to  the  Nawab  ;  and  accordingly,  in  his  reply  to  the 
Killedar's  offer,  had  included  a  demand  for  5  lakhs  of  rupees. 
The  army  now  claimed  half  of  this  sum  for  not  having  plundered 
the  tort  on  its  occupation.^  At  a  council  of  war  held  on  Decem- 
ber 2,  Coote  was  unable  to  transact  any  business  ;  it  was  whispered 
that  he  had  made  a  private  arrangement  with  the  Killedar  to  the 
exclusion  of  the  army,  and  he  was  obliged  to  contradict  this 
in  the  solemnest  way  in  general  orders,  announcing  that  a  present 
of  20,000  rupees  offered  by  the  Killedar  would,  if  received,  be 
distributed  among  the  troops.* 

In  order  to  oppose  the  English,  Lally  now  recalled  a  detach- 
ment which  he  had  sent  to  Srirangam,  and  on  January  11,  1760, 
he  was  joined  by  a  body  of  Maratha  horse  sent  by  Morari  Rao,' 
to  whom  Lally  had  turned  for  help  when  he  could  get  none  from 
Basalat  Jang.*  With  these  reinforcements  he  succeeded  in 
plundering  an  English  magazine  at  Conjeeveram,  and  then  re- 
solved to  retake  Wandiwash  and  Carangoly.  This  was  exactly 
what  Coote  wished  him  to  do.  On  January  14  he  was  expecting 
with  great  impatience  the  siege  of  Wandiwash  to  be  formed. 
Five  days  later,  he  writes  :  "  I  have  an  army  ready  to  engage  the 
enemy  whenever  I  think  the  defence  of  that  garrison  precarious, 

'  Coote's  Journal  (Orme  MSS.,  viii.  fi.  1903,  etc.));  Coote  to  Madras,  November 
30,  1759  (Mil.  Cons.,  December  3,  1759). 

'  The  Army  supposed,  or  professed  to  suppose,  that  the  5  lakhs  had  been 
demanded  as  ransom  for  the  Killedar's  person  and  effects. 

•Coote's  Journal,  December  2,  1759  {ibid.,  viii.  ff.  1906,  etc.);  Mil.  Cons., 
December  6  and  10,  1759. 

*  This  affair  had  been  negotiatied  by  that  curious  person,  Antonio  Noronha, 
now  Bishop  of  Halicarnassus,  whom  I  have  already  mentioned  in  connection 
with  Dupleix'  intrigues  at  St.  Thome.  He  was  carried  to  Europe  by  Boscawen, 
released,  and  then  spent  some  time  in  Paris,  where  his  conduct  was  exceedingly 
unecclesiastical.  Dupleix'  family  procured  for  him  the  appointment  of  a  Bishop 
in  partibus  in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  the  Papal  Nuncio  at  Paris. 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  CARNATIC  185 

.  .  .  and  am  of  opinion  Lally  is  in  the  same  scrape  he  laid  for  me, 
as  he  expected  I  should  attack  Arcot  upon  his  leaving  it  open."  ^ 
On  January  21,  he  learnt  that  Lally  had  effected  a  breach  in  the 
fort,  so  he  advanced,  and  next  day  was  fought  the  battle  of 
Wandiwash.  In  the  action  the  English  were  slightly  outnum- 
bered in  Europeans,^  and  greatly  outnumbered  in  native  horse. 
But  the  latter  did  nothing,  the  French  infantry  were  fairly  out- 
fought, and  the  issue  was  a  complete  victory  for  the  English.* 

This  led  immediately  to  the  reduction  of  the  places  which  the 
French  still  held  in  the  province  of  Arcot  ;  *  and  in  March  the 
French  were  reduced  to  Pondichery,  Gingee,  and  Karikal,  with 
the  districts  immediately  around  those  places.  On  April  5, 
Karikal  surrendered  to  a  joint  military  and  naval  force,  after 
which  the  military  commander,  Monson,  moved  northward, 
clearing  the  small  posts  which  the  French  still  held  in  that  region  ; 
so  that  Pondichery  was  now  within  measurable  distance  of  being 
closely  besieged  by  land  and  sea.  On  April  17,  Valudavur  was 
surrendered,  without  Lally's  having  attempted  to  relieve  it  ; 
but  after  this  came  a  lull  in  the  operations,  for  Coote  judged 
his  forces  insufficient  to  form  a  regular  siege. 

At  this  juncture,  having  been  abandoned  by  Morari  Rao's 
Marathas  as  soon  as  they  discovered  the  poverty  of  the  French 
exchequer,  Lally  made  his  last  effort  at  following  the  methods  of 
Dupleix.  This  time  he  turned  his  attentions  to  Mysore,  where 
the  great  adventurer,  Hyder  Ali,  was  on  the  point  of  estab- 
lishing himself  in  power.  By  means  of  the  Bishop  of  Halicar- 
nassus,  a  treaty  was  arranged  with  this  chieftain,  who  agreed  to 
help  the  French  with  2000  horse  and  3000  infantry  in  return  for  a 
present  of  twelve  pieces  of  artillery,  the  cession  of  the  forts  of 
Thiagar  and  Elevanasur,  which  the  French  still  occupied,  2  lakhs 
to  be  paid  two  months  after  the  troops  joined  the  French,  and 
assistance  in  conquering  Madura  and  Tinnevelly  as  soon  as  the 
English  war  was  ended.* 

•  Coote  to  Madras,  January  14  and  19,  1760  {ap.  Mil.  Cons.,  January  17  and 
21,  1760). 

•  Coote  had  1700  against  about  2000.     Lally  (Mimoire.  p.  161)  alleges  he  had 
^K  only  1200  European  foot,  but  this  cannot  be  accepted.     A  year  later  we  took 
^B  1400  in  Pondichfcry,  and  he  had  received  no  reinforcements  in  the  interval. 
^H         '  Coote  to  Madras,  January  22,  1760  (Mil.  Cons.,  January  24,  1760)  ;   Coote's 
^H  Journal  (loc.  cit.,  fi.  1914,  etc.).     Bus,sy  was  taken  prisoner. 

^H         *Chettepat   was  taken   January    28,    Arcot    February    10,    Tiruvanamalai 

^B  i^ebruary  25,  and  Perumukkal  March  5. 

^H         *  Diliberation  du  Conseil  Supirieur,  June  28,  i76o(Leyrit's  A/^wjojk',  pp.  463, 

^^etc). 


186  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

In  consequence  of  this  treaty,  in  the  middle  of  July  a  body  of 
Mysoreans  reached  Pondich^iy  in  spite  of  Coote's  efforts  to  inter- 
cept them.  In  Pondichery  every  one  believed  that  Coote  woiUd 
now  be  forced  to  abandon  the  blockade  which  he  had  maintained 
for  three  months,  and  a  ball  was  given  in  honour  of  Hyder  All's 
defeat  of  the  detachment  sent  to  intercept  him.  But  the  joy  was 
short-Uved.  Hyder  Ali  brought  no  stores  of  provisions  to  re- 
plenish the  magazines  ;  on  the  contrary,  the  French  had  to 
supply  his  troops  with  rice.  No  measures  for  the  destruction  of 
Coote  could  be  concerted  ;  and,  within  a  month  of  his  arrival, 
Hyder  AH  departed  as  he  had  come,  restoring  the  forts  which 
had  been  ceded  to  him.^  A  revolution  in  Mysore  seemed  to  him 
to  offer  a  fairer  prospect  than  further  participation  in  the  troubled 
aifairs  of  Pondichery. 

Even  while  he  had  remained  with  Lally,  Coote  had  succeeded 
in  capturing  the  fort  of  ViUiyanallur,^  and  preparations  for  a  siege 
were  commenced.  The  first  step,  Coote  thought,  was  the  capture 
of  Ariyankuppam,  but  he  feared  to  move  his  army  for  that  pur- 
pose lest  the  garrison  of  Gingee  should  seize  the  occasion  to  slip 
provisions  into  Pondichery.  He  therefore  desired  Steevens,  who 
had  succeeded  Pocock  in  the  command  of  the  squadron,  to  land  a 
body  of  marines.  After  a  Council,  in  which  Pigot  participated, 
the  Admiral  agreed  to  do  so  for  a  few  days  ;  but  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Monson,  second-in-command,  objecting  to  this  operation, 
it  was  deferred.  Lally,  however,  conscious  of  the  English  in- 
tentions to  restrict  him  within  a  narrower  circle,  hazarded  a 
general  attack  on  the  English  positions,  but  was  beaten  off  with 
severe  losses.^ 

At  this  moment  the  command  of  the  siege  changed  hands. 
Coote,  as  we  have  seen,  had  been  intended  to  command  in  Bengal, 
and  his  commission  as  lieutenant -colonel  was  older  than  that  of 
Monson — a  circumstance  not  unnatural,  as  Coote  was  an  officer 
of  nineteen  years'  service  and  had  been  wounded  in  action  before 
Monson  was  old  enough  to  have  entered  the  army.*  However, 
Monson  was  a  man  of  family  and  influence,  and  the  War  Office 
decided  to  give  him  rank  as  full  colonel  in  the  East  Indies,  thus 

'  Dorez  to  [Dumont],  August  20,  1750  (Madras  Records). 

•  The  commandant  was  degraded  for  misconduct  (Dorez,  ui  supra)  ;  Coote  to 
Madras,  July  21,  1760  {ap.  Mil.  Cons.,  July  23,  1760). 

'  He  attributed  his  failure  to  the  mistake  by  which  the  India  battalion 
was  absent  from  its  appointed  position.  See  Lally's  Jl/^»io«re,  Pieces,  pp.  128, 
and  9  (second  pagination). 

*  Coote  to  Barrington,  October  15,  1760  (P.R.O.,  War  Office,  1-39). 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  CARNATIC  187 

superseding  Coote.*  On  the  Company's  application,  Coote 
received  similar  promotion,  but  of  later  date.^  On  this  the 
Company  made  representations  to  Pitt,  and,  as  he  would  not 
interfere,  to  the  War  Office,  but  were  xmable  to  obtain  more  than 
orders  that  Monson  was  not  to  use  his  commission  if  Coote  was 
serving  at  Madras,  but  in  the  latter  case  Coote  was  to  proceed  as 
soon  as  possible  to  Bengal.^  These  orders  were  received  by  Coote 
on  September  4,  and  produced  in  him  all  the  annoyance  that  the 
Directors  had  anticipated.  Monson  was  eager  to  take  the 
command,  in  order  to  have  the  glory  of  taking  Pondich^ry. 
Every  moment's  delay  in  Coote 's  departure  seemed  an  injustice 
to  him.*  However,  when  Coote  ordered  his  regiment  to  be  in 
readiness  to  march,  it  was  clear  that  the  command  was  less 
desirable  than  it  had  at  first  appeared.  Monson  therefore 
offered  to  withdraw  from  the  army  till  Pondich^ry  was  taken. 
Not  to  be  outdone  in  generosity,  Coote  then  agreed  to  leave  his 
regiment  behind.* 

The  affair  appeared  to  be  settled  on  that  basis  ;  so  Monson 
on  the  loth  led  an  attack  on  the  French  posts  in  the  Bound 
Hedge  which  marked  the  ancient  limits  of  Pondichery.  The 
attack  succeeded  ;  the  enemy  were  driven  from  their  posts,  and 
evacuated  the  fort  of  Ariyankuppam  ;  but  in  the  action  Monson 
was  severely  wounded.*  This  reopened  the  question  of  Coote's 
departure.  Monson  urged  that  he  should  return  to  the  command, 
and  engaged  not  to  rejoin  the  army  before  the  fall  of  Pondichery, 
should  his  wound  permit  his  doing  so  ;  '  and  Coote  reluctantly 
agreed  to  fulfil  the  earnest  request  of  the  Council  that  he  should 
resume  the  command  of  the  siege.* 

Pondichery  had  now  been  blockaded  for  several  months,  and 
the  conditions  within  the  town  were  miserable.  Tally  became, 
if  it  were  possible,  more  and  more  hated,  as  the  consequences  of 

•  Barrington  to  Monson,  March  24,  1760  (I.O.,  Misc.  Ltrs.  Reed.,  1760, 
No.  51)- 

•  Tyrwhitt  to  James,  March  24,  1760  [loc.  cit.,  No.  50). 

•Wood  to  Godfrey,  April  8  ;  Barrington  to  James,  April  12  ;  Barrington 
to  Coote,  April  17,  and  to  Monson,  April  :8,  1760  (I.O.,  Misc.  Ltrs.  Reed.,  1760, 
Nos.  65,  60,  64,  and  66). 

•*  Coote's  Journal  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  viii.  f.  1963) ;  Coote  to  Madras,  Septem- 
ber 5,  1760  {ap.  Mil.  Cons.,  September  7,  1760). 

»  Monson  to  Madras,  September  5,  and  Coote's  remarks  in  Council,  September 
8  (Mil.  Cons.,  September  7  and  8,  1760). 
^K         •Monson  to  Madras,  September  10  (Mil.  Cons.,  September  10,   1760),  and 
^^B  Gordon  to  Madras  {loc.  cit.,  September  15,  1760). 

I^H         'Monson  to  Madras,  September  14  (Mil.  Cons.,  September  22,  1760). 
^^K        ^  Mil.  Cons.,  September  15  and  18,  1760. 

m 


188  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

the  French  defeats  became  more  and  more  painful.  Abandoned 
by  the  fleet,  beaten  back  steadily  by  Coote's  unrelaxing  pressure 
towards  the  walls  of  the  city,  disappointed  of  the  help  they  had 
looked  for  from  Hyder  Ali,  the  unfortunate  inhabitants  and 
soldiers  could  hope  for  nothing  better  than  to  prolong  their 
sufferings  to  the  furthest  possible  day.  And  even  in  that  sad 
necessity  they  were  rent  by  the  inextinguishable  hatred  they 
felt  for  their  unfortunate  leader,  a  hatred  which  he  returned  with 
an  equal  measure  of  contempt.  Not  even  the  terror  of  the 
situation  could  bridge  the  gulf  which  separated  Lally  from  the 
Pondichery  Council,  or  produce  the  faintest  real  approach  to 
co-operation.  Neither  his  demands  for  money  nor  his  con- 
demnation of  the  individuals  who  had  made  profit  out  of  the 
public  necessity,  nor  even  his  plans  to  provide  food  for  his  starv- 
ing soldiers,  met  with  the  approval  of  the  Council.  He  demanded 
30,000  rupees  from  certain  individuals  believed  to  have  profited 
by  the  war  ;  the  Council  defended  their  conduct,  and  Moracin 
induced  Lally  to  forgo  this  demand  by  undertaking  the  collection 
of  a  loan  which  he  never  realised.^  Lally  repeatedly  demanded 
the  expulsion  of  the  greater  part  of  the  native  inhabitants,  but, 
as  he  bitterly  declared,  the  Councillors  preferred  to  keep  their 
slaves  rather  than  that  his  officers'  scanty  ration  should  be 
increased.^ 

Coote  once  more  took  command  of  the  siege  on  September  20. 
His  principal  difficulty  consisted  in  inducing  Steevens  to  permit 
the  marines  he  had  landed  to  remain  ashore.  "  I  beg  leave  to 
observe  to  you,"  the  latter  wrote  to  Pigot,  "  that  the  army 
should  not  attempt  or  presume  to  undertake  any  designs  against 
the  enemy  to  the  hazard  of  distressing  themselves,  and  with  that 
the  squadron  sent  for  your  protection,  under  whose  success  and 
support  the  fate  of  all  your  factories  and  settlements  in  India 
depends.  ..."  *  But  he  yielded  when  he  saw  that  their  with- 
drawal would  involve  raising  the  siege  ;  *  and  after  asserting  the 
independent  nature  of  his  command,  which  the  Madras  Council 
had  never  impugned,  he  even  agreed  to  leave  part  of  his  squadron 
in  the  Pondichery  roads  during  the  monsoon.*  In  December 
Coote  was  able  to  open  fire  on  the  defences  of  Pondichery  itself. 

'  Leyrit's  Mlmoire,  pp.  482  and  507  ;    Dorez  to  Iiis  mother  and  to  Dumont, 
August  20,  1760  (Madras  Records). 

*  Lally's  Memoirs,  Piices,  pp.  132,  etc. 

*  Steevens  to  Pigot,  October  2,  1760  (Mil.  Cons.,  October  11,  1760). 

*  Coote  to  Pigot,  October  24,  1760  (ibid.,  October  26,  1760). 
•Steevens  to  Pigot,  October  15,  1760  (ibid.,  October  23.  1760). 


1 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  CARNATIC  189 

Early  in  January  a  tempest  scattered  the  English  squadron, 
and  Lally  thought  he  saw  a  ray  of  hope  ;  but  within  a  few  days 
the  ships  were  back  again  on  their  old  cruising  ground,  and  by 
now  the  store  of  food  was  practically  exhausted.  Dogs,  cats,  and 
all  other  animals  had  been  devoured,  and  not  even  a  crow  was 
left.*  On  January  15,  1761,  Pondichery  surrendered  at  discre- 
tion, and  next  morning  Coote's  grenadiers  took  possession  of  the 
Villiyanallur  gate. 

Lally  had  brought  out  instructions  to  destroy  every  British 
settlement  which  he  should  capture,  and  he  had  carried  out 
these  orders  at  Fort  St.  David.  The  Enghsh  had  determined 
to  retahate  with  a  Uke  treatment.  Coote  and  Steevens,  however, 
considered  that  the  place  had  been  taken  by  H.M.'s  forces  and 
that  its  disposal  should  be  referred  to  H.M.'s  pleasiure.  To  this 
Pigot,  the  Governor  of  Madras,  answered  that  under  letters 
patent  of  1758  the  Company  had  the  disposal  of  all  places  captured 
in  the  East  Indies,  and  declared  that,  unless  Pondichery  were 
delivered  to  him,  he  would  provide  no  more  money  for  the  Royal 
troops  or  squadron.  This  unanswerable  argument  carried  the 
day.  Pondichery  was  delivered  to  the  Company's  servants, 
and  the  thoroughness  with  which  the  demolition  was  at  once 
begun  shows  with  what  long-continued  fear  the  Council  at 
Madras  had  regarded  their  ancient  enemy.  The  dazzling  white 
palace  of  Dupleix,  like  the  dreams  of  its  builder,  sank  in  the  dust 
and  ruin  of  unsuccessful  war,  at  last  brought  to  a  decisive  end. 
Madras  no  longer  had  a  serious  rival  in  the  control  of  the  Nawab- 
ship  of  Arcot. 

»  Orme  MSS.,  Various,  27,  f.  47. 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  POLICY  OF  NON-INTERVENTION 

THE  defeat  of  Lally  in  the  South  and  Clive's  goverament 
in  Bengal  had  now  established  the  English  in  a  position 
of  ascendancy  in  two  great  provinces  of  India.  The 
problem  now  was,  to  provide  that  ascendancy  with  some  more 
durable  basis  than  mihtary  force  or  the  good-will  of  the  Durbar. 
In  both  provinces  small  cessions  of  territory  had  been  made  to 
the  English  ;  but  in  neither  were  these  at  all  equal  to  meeting 
the  cost  of  the  troops  required  for  protecting  them  from  external 
enemies.  In  both,  therefore,  the  Nawab's  co-operation  was 
essential ;  in  both  his  misconduct  or  ill-will  might  produce  the 
worst  consequences  at  a  critical  moment.  Hitherto  in  Bengal 
the  English  had  been  able  to  rely  on  the  practical  genius  of 
CUve  ;  in  Madras  the  threatening  power  of  the  French  had  kept 
Muhammad  Ali  faithful  to  his  alliance.  But  Chve  left  Bengal 
in  the  beginning  of  1760,  and  Eondich6ry  was  taken  just  a  year 
later. 

On  Clive's  departure,  a  new  campaign  against  the  Shah  Zada 
was  in  progress.  That  prince  had  again  invaded  Behar,  and 
Caillaud  had  marched  with  Miran  to  repulse  him.  The  English 
troops  amounted  only  to  400  Europeans  and  a  battaUon  of 
sepoys  ;  Miran's,  to  15,000  horse  and  foot.*  They  were  delayed 
on  their  march  by  the  necessity  of  bringing  to  reason  the  faujdar 
of  Purnea,  who  had  threatened  to  join  the  Shah  Zada  ;  but,  after 
a  conference  with  CaiUaud,  this  affair  was  for  the  moment 
accommodated.^     The  army  then  moved  on  towards  Patna. 

Meanwhile  Ramnarayan  had  acted  with  much  more  decision 
than  he  had  shown  in  the  previous  year,  although  the  province 
of  Behar  was  generally  disaffected  to  Mir  Jafar,*  and  this  feeling 

'  Narrative  of  1 760. 

•  Caillaud's  Journal,  February  2  to  6,  1760  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  vi.  f.  1374). 
"  He  .  .  .  consents  to  everything  which  the  Nabob  requires,  since  he  is  assured 
of  our  protection  for  his  life  and  what  may  remain  of  his  fortune  after  having 
settled  his  accounts."     Caillaud  to  Am yatt,  February  6,  1760  (/oc.  ct<.,  xii.  f.  3067). 

'  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  1759. 

190 


THE  POLICY  OF  NON-INTERVENTION  191 

was  reflected  in  the  chiefs  of  the  Deputy's  army.  "  By  your 
account  of  the  chief  men  about  Ramnarayan,"  wrote  Caillaud 
to  Amyatt,  "  I  think  them  so  httle  to  be  trusted  that  I  could 
wish  he  may  not  venture  a  general  engagement  before  we  come 
up."  *  In  spite  of  this  advice,  however,  he  accepted  battle  with 
the  Shah  Zada,  was  himself  wounded  in  the  action,  and  was 
defeated,  chiefly  owing  to  the  desertion  of  his  left  wing  to  the 
enemy.2  However,  he  managed  to  retreat  to  Patna,  with  the 
help  of  a  battaUon  of  sepoys  that  had  been  left  with  him  in  1759. 
On  learning  this,  Caillaud  at  once  moved  forward  by  forced 
marches,  so  that  the  enemy  were  obliged  to  abandon  Patna, 
which  they  had  aheady  attacked.^  On  February  22,  an  action 
ensued  at  Sirpur.  The  enemy  sedulously  avoided  attacking  the 
EngUsh,  but  fell  upon  Miran's  troops,  who,  contrary  to  plan,  had 
been  drawn  up  in  a  confused  mass  on  Caillaud's  right.  These 
were  driven  back,  but  were  saved  by  Caillaud's  leading  his  sepoys 
onto  the  inner  flank  of  the  attacking  column,  which  was  thrown 
into  such  disorder  by  their  fire  that  Miran's  people  recovered 
themselves  and  put  their  opponents  to  the  rout.  However,  the 
pursuit  was  not  pressed  as  it  should  have  been,  as  Miran  had 
received  "  two  scratches  which  he  was  then  pleased  to  think 
were  very  dreadful  wounds."  *  Caillaud  was  justly  indignant 
at  this  slackness.  "  I  believe,"  he  wrote,  "  he  doth  not  wish  an 
enemy  entirely  crushed,  whom  he  is  certain  always  of  beating 
with  our  assistance,  and  while  they  remain  in  or  near  the  province 
will  always  be  an  excuse  for  his  keeping  up  a  large  body  of  forces."' 

Miran  withdrew  to  Patna  to  cure  his  "  scratches,"  and 
wasted  a  week  there,  during  which  time  Caillaud  had  to  remain 
where  he  was  for  lack  of  cavalry.     The  Shah  Zada  thus  had 

e  in  which  to  collect  himself  and  his  forces  and  decide  upon 
his  future  movements.  The  result  was  a  raid  into  Bengal, 
which,  if  Caillaud  had  followed  less  hard  at  his  heels,  might  have 
proved  very  damaging  to  the  revenue  collections.  However, 
he  was  so  closely  pursued  that  he  retraced  his  steps  into  Behar, 
and  the  chief  result  of  the  raid  was  to  expose  the  foolishness  or 
treachery  of  the  Nawab  and  his  son.  The  latter  more  than  once 
refused  Caillaud  the  cavalry  he  needed  to  bring  the  enemy  to 

.^_         '  Letter  of  January  23,  1760  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  xii.  f.  3060). 

\^^k        *  Caillaud  to  Council,  February  12,  1760  (ibi-l.,  xii.  f.  3075). 

'^*        *  Caillaud's  Journal,  February  1 1  to  21,  1760  (loc.  cit.,  vi.  f.  1375). 

•Caillaud's  Journal,  February  22  and  23,  1760  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  vi.  £.  1378); 
L^_  Caillaud  toCoote,  ap.  Coote's  Journal  [loc.  cit.,  viii.  f.  1843). 
I^k       '  Caillaud  to  Council,  February  23,  1760  (loc.  cit.,  xii.  i.  3079). 

■ 


^^wnei 
|Hfetime 


192  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

action  ;  the  former  entered  into  correspondence  with  the  Shah 
Zada,  eliciting  from  Caillaud  the  scornful  comment,  "  We  are 
always  sure  of  finding  a  party  which,  with  our  force  thrown 
into  the  scale,  is  sufficient  to  overset  any  scheme  against 
us."  1 

On  leaving  Bengal,  the  Shah  Zada  again  attempted  to  take 
Patna.  Aided  by  Law,  he  closely  besieged  the  city ;  its  waUs 
were  easily  breached,  but  twice  the  enemy  attacked,  and  were 
beaten  with  the  help  of  the  English  sepoys.  The  day  after  the 
second  assault,  there  arrived  a  detachment  of  200  Europeans 
and  a  battalion  of  sepoys  sent  by  Caillaud  to  the  relief  of  the 
city  ;  and  after  a  successful  sortie,  made  when  the  besiegers 
were  enjoying  their  midday  sleep,  the  Shah  Zada  gave  up  the 
attempt  and  once  more  withdrew  from  Behar.- 

Caillaud  and  Miran  then  set  out  to  chastise  the  rebellious 
zemindars  who  had  afforded  him  countenance  and  help — 
especially  the  faujdar  of  Purnea,  who  had,  it  appears,  only 
deceived  Caillaud  by  a  pretended  submission.  Some  time  was 
spent  in  chasing  him,  fruitlessly  because  Miran  again  refused 
the  service  of  his  cavalry,*  when  suddenly  the  campaign  was 
brought  to  a  close  by  the  young  Nawab's  death.  On  the 
night  of  July  3,  as  he  lay  in  his  tent,  he  was  killed  by  hghtning — 
in  fulfilment  of  a  curse,  a  native  historian  observes,  laid  upon 
him  by  two  victims  of  his  cruelty.* 

From  the  military  point  of  view,  Caillaud  had  on  the  whole 
fulfilled  all  that  had  been  expected  from  his  appointment  ;  but 
the  political  conduct  of  affairs  had  been  less  fortunate.  In 
consequence  of  a  singularly  ferocious  letter  from  the  Court  01 
Directors,  received  in  the  latter  part  of  1759,  no  less  than  six 
members  of  Council  had  resigned  on  January  i,  1760,  leaving 

•  Caillaud  to  Select  Committee,  May  i,  1760  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  xii.  f.  31 13). 

•  In  May  he  received  news  of  the  death  of  his  father  and  assumed  the  title  of 
Shah  Alam,  appointing  the  Nawab  of  Oudh  as  his  Wazir. 

'  Caillaud's  Journal,  June  25,  1760  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  vi.  f.  1406). 

•  J ami-ut-tawarikh  (Elliott  and  Dowson,  vol.  viii.  p.  429).  The  date  is  given 
as  the  2nd  by  Ironside  (Narrative,  Asiatic  Annual  Register,  1800)  ;  but  Hastings 
(Narrative,  Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  29209,  f.  112)  and  Caillaud  (Journal,  loc.  cit., 
f.  1409)  both  say  the  3rd.  Soon  after  Caillaud's  enemies  accused  him  of  having 
caused  or  permitted  Miran  to  be  murdered,  and  Law  (op.  cit.,  pp.  452-453)  gives 
some  countenance  to  this  allegation,  which  Burke  revived  nearly  thirty  years 
later.  But  if  that  was  the  case,  Caillaud  was  singularly  fortunate  in  being  able  to 
suppress  all  the  evidence.  Strong  testimony  of  his  innocence  is  to  be  found  in 
I.O.  Home  Misc.,  456  D.  Caillaud  ascribed  this  story  to  Fullerton,  the  surgeon 
who  escaped  the  Patna  massacre  ;  see  an  undated  and  incomplete  paper  in 
War  Ofifice,  1-319,  vindicating  Caillaud's  behaviour. 


THE  POLICY  OF  NON-INTERVENTION  193 

Holwell,  the  defender  of  Calcutta  in  1756,  as  Clive's  successor  by 
seniority.  Clive  had  but  a  poor  opinion  of  Holwell,  who,  as  the 
phrase  of  the  day  went,  united  many  virtues  of  the  head  with 
many  faults  of  the  heart  ;  but,  as  he  had  warmly  recommended 
Henry  Vansittart,  a  Madras  servant,  to  be  brought  up  to  take 
his  place,  he  did  not  consider  it  necessary  further  to  injure  his 
health  by  a  continued  residence  in  India  merely  to  prevent 
Holwell's  succession. 

Holwell  therefore  became  President,  knowing  that  his  term 
of  office  would  be  short  ;  *  neither  did  he  inherit  the  authority 
of  his  office  unimpaired.  Caillaud  advised  him,  in  a  letter  of 
congratulation  on  his  accession  to  the  chair,  to  prove  by  his 
conduct  that  he  merited  what  fortune  had  given  him.^  This 
patronising  attitude  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  indicates  what 
a  change  had  taken  place  among  the  English.  A  corresponding 
change  necessarily  took  place  in  the  mind  of  Mir  Jafar.  Before 
his  departure,  Clive  had  visited  the  Nawab  and  endeavoured  to 
impress  him  with  the  need  of  economy  and  the  necessity  of  trust- 
ing the  English  Government.  With  an  optimism  which  his  strong 
common  sense  seldom  permitted,  he  seems  to  have  supposed  that 
he  had  succeeded.^  Other  observers,  however,  were  less  hopeful 
of  the  future.  So  early  as  1758,  Scrafton  had  written  :  "  When 
the  Colonel  leaves  India,  .  .  .  my  life  on  it,  if  we  have  anything 
of  a  force,  we  shall  not  be  long  without  a  second  rupture  with 
the  Government."  *  Since  then  the  air  had  been  cleared  by  the 
defeat  of  the  Shah  Zada  and  the  overthrow  of  the  Dutch  plans  ; 
but  a  year  later  Hastings  believed  that  English  influence  at  the 
Durbar  depended  wholly  upon  CUve.  "  As  there  is  nobody  to 
succeed  you  with  the  same  influence,"  he  wrote,  "  nothing  but 
a  large  military  force  will  secure  our  privileges  from  being  en- 
croached upon."  ^  A  writer  who,  almost  alone  in  the  eighteenth 
century,  dealt  in  a  spirit  of  dispassionate  inquiry  with  the  events 
we  are  about  to  consider,  points  out  how  Clive,  by  a  rare  mixture 
of  sagacity,  resource,  and  firmness,  had  exercised  a  control  that 
was  equally  gentle  and  effective,  whereas  Holwell's  position, 
"  as  a  mere  interregent,"  would  never  have  allowed  him  to 

'  Holwell  to  Payne,  January  4,  1760  (Orme  MSS.,  Various,  21). 

*  Caillaud  to  Amyatt,  February  6,  and  to  Holwell,  February  23,  1760  (Orme 
|MSS.,  India,  xji.  ft.  3068  and  3077). 

*  Clive  toCouncil,  January  23,  ap.  Consultations  of  January  24,  1760. 
•Scrafton  to  Hastings,  September  2,   1758  (Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  29132, 

18). 

'  Hastings  toClive,  August  18,  1759  {he.  cit.,  29096,  f.  167). 
'3 


194  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

secure  that  deference  to  his  advice  which  the  Nawab  had 
yielded  to  CUve's  commanding  talents  and  paramount  authority  ; 
"  this  natural  change  of  feeling  .  .  .  Mr.  HolweU  perceived  and 
appears  to  have  resented."  * 

The  Nawab,  in  fact,  was  less  manageable  after  CUve's 
departure  than  before  it,  and  his  conduct  was  judged  more 
hastily  than  Chve  would  have  judged  it.  At  the  same  time,  he 
gave  ample  cause  for  discontent.  Caillaud  strove  to  induce 
him  to  pay  off  part  of  his  mutinous  troops,  "  though,  to  tell  you 
the  truth,  I  fear  it  will  be  to  little  purpose,  as  the  Colonel,^ 
whose  interest  was  so  superior  to  mine,  could  never  persuade  him 
to  this  salutary  step."  ^  In  almost  the  very  words  which  Bussy 
had  used,  he  writes  :  "  The  more  I  see  of  the  Nabob  the  more  I 
am  convinced  he  must  be  ruined,  in  spite  of  all  our  endeavours, 
if  he  doth  not  alter  his  present  measures  ;  he  is  neither  loved 
nor  feared  by  his  troops  or  his  people  ;  he  neglects  securing  the 
one  by  the  badness  of  his  payments,  and  he  wants  spirit  and 
steadiness  to  command  the  other."  *  Elsewhere,  he  expresses 
himseK  with  still  greater  vigour  :  "I  am  sorry  we  are  obliged  to 
support  two  such  fellows  [as  Mir  Jafar  and  Miran],  who,  without 
any  one  virtue,  have  all  the  vices  and  imperfections  of  human 
nature  "  ;  *  and  again :  "  The  present  system  ...  is  rotten  to 
the  core."  ' 

In  the  course  of  the  six  months  which  followed  CUve's  de- 
parture, the  financial  situation  went  from  bad  to  worse.  In 
the  first  burst  of  enthusiasm,  the  authorities  at  Calcutta  had 
assured  the  Company,  just  as  Dupleix  had  done,  that  financial 
difficulties  were  at  an  end,  and  that  no  suppUes  of  money  need 
be  sent  for  the  next  three  years  ;  and,  in  spite  of  Holwell's  warn- 
ing, the  Company  had  resolved  to  act  upon  these  reports.'  No 
funds,  therefore,  arrived  from  Europe  ;  the  Nawab's  pa5mients 

•  Grant's  Sketch  of  the  History  oj  the  East  India  Company,  pp.  171  and  182. 
It  is  most  refreshing  to  come  on  this  work,  with  its  sane  judgment  and  common 
sense,  amid  the  waste  of  controversial  pamphlets  in  which  not  a  single  state- 
ment can  be  accepted  without  corroboration.  I  may  cite  one  instance  as  an 
example  of  their  dishonesty.  We  have  seen  that  Scraiton  in  1758  regarded  a 
revolution  as  inevitable  on  dive's  departure.  His  pamphlets  against  HolweU 
and  Vansittart  allege  a  perfect  friendship  to  have  subsisted  between  Mir  Jafar 
and  the  English, 

'  I.e.,  Clive. 

»  Caillaud  to  Hastings,  February  10,  1760  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  xii.  f.  3073). 

*  Caillaud  to  HolweU,  February  27,  1760  (loc.  cit.,  i.  3080). 

•  Caillaud  to  Amyatt,  April  19,  1760  (loc.  cit.,  f.  3104). 

*  Caillaud  to  the  Council,  February  27,  1 760  (loc.  cit.,  i.  3083 ). 

'  HolweU  to  Payne,  December  30,  1759  (HolweU's  Vindication,  p.  74). 


THE  POLICY  OF  NON-INTERVENTION  195 

for  the  maintenance  of  the  English  troops  fell  into  arrears  ;  the 
disturbances  caused  by  the  Shah  Zada's  irruption  into  Bengal 
hindered  the  payment  of  the  revenues  on  which  the  English 
held  mortgages  ;  and  they  were  reduced  to  seek  in  vain  a  large 
loan  from  the  Seths.^  This  situation,  coupled  with  Mir  Jafar's 
and  Miran's  failure  to  support  Caillaud  in  his  campaign  against 
the  Shah  Zada,  necessarily  produced  the  gravest  discontent 
with  the  Nawab's  conduct,  possibly  heightened  and  exaggerated 
by  personal  motives.^ 

Nor  was  there  lacking  a  man  to  seek  his  personal  gain  out  of 
this  troubled  situation.  The  Nawab  had  a  son-in-law,  Mir  Kasim, 
wealthy,  prudent,  and  unscrupulous,  who  watched  and  encour- 
aged the  growing  dissensions  between  the  Nawab  and  his  pro- 
tectors. At  first  his  ostensible  motive  was  to  secure  for  himself 
the  post  still  held  by  Kamnarayan,  and  which,  as  we  have  seen,  he 
had  formerly  sought.^  He  now  promised,  if  this  were  conferred 
on  him,  to  be  a  much  more  effective  counterpoise  to  the  Nawab 
than  Ramnarayan  ;  he  represented  the  Nawab  and  his  ministers 
as  "  united  to  a  man  in  the  design  of  lowering  the  English  power," 
and  urged  a  line  of  conduct  well  calculated  to  embroil  Caillaud 
with  Miran.*  The  project  of  replacing  Ramnarayan  by  this 
intriguer  was  adopted  by  both  Caillaud  and  Holwell,  and  had 
even  been  approved  by  Clive  with  the  reservation  that  the  change 
should  only  be  made  with  Ramnarayan 's  own  consent.*  Before 
this  scheme,  however,  could  be  put  in  execution,  the  death  of 
Miran  opened  a  wider  range  of  ambition  ;  and  he  asked  and 
received  HolweU's  support  in  his  candidature  for  the  Diwanship, 
in  which  post  he  would  have  in  fact  exercised  all  the  powers  of 
the  Nawab.* 

Amid  these  circumstances,  the  origin  of  the  revolution  of 
1760  is  to  be  found  ;  and,  until  it  was  deflected  by  that  "  con- 

'  Caillaud  to  Vansittart,  August  15,  1760  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  xii.  i.  3165). 

*  Caillaud  roundly  accuses  Holwell  of  having  plotted  Mir  Jafar's  overthrow 
because  the  latter  had  not  gratified  him  with  a  substantial  present  (Caillaud  to 
an  intimate  friend,  ap.  Orme  MSS.,  India,  xii.  fi.  3239,  etc.).  It  would  be  fairer 
to  say  that  Mir  Jafar  might  possibly  have  bought  HolweU's  support  ;  in  default 
of  Clive's  supreme  power  of  control,  the  policy  which  Holwell  at  first  advocated 
showed  much  more  foresight  than  the  opinions  of  those  who  opposed  it. 

*  See  p.  143  supra. 

*  Hastings  to  Caillaud,  January  18,  1760  [misdated  1759]  (Brit.  Mus.,  Add. 
MSS.,  29096,  f.  200) ;  cf.  Caillaud  to  Clive,  January  24,  1760  (Orme  MSS.,  India, 
xii.  f.  3063). 

•Caillaud  to  Amyatt,  April  28,  1760  {loc.  cit.,  i.  3109) ;  Holwell  to  Caillaud, 
May  5,  1760  (India  Tracts,  p.  37). 

*  Caillaud  to  Vansittart,  August  2,  1760  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  xii.  f.  3153). 


196  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

sumniate  politician,"  *  Mir  Kasim,  Holwell's  policy  was  scarcely 
more  than  an  anticipation  of  what  was  to  prove  inevitable  in 
1765.  We  must,  indeed,  distinguish  between  his  original  plan 
and  that  which  was  carried  out  with  his  assistance  under  the 
presidency  of  Vansittart. 

Early  in  his  government,  Holwell  had  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  a  change  of  system  was  necessary  ;  and,  as  we  have  seen, 
this  opinion  was  shared  by  Caillaud.  The  Shah  Zada's  invasion 
added  a  circumstance  which  brought  matters  to  a  head.  While 
Caillaud  was  engaged  in  chasing  him  out  of  Bengal,  Mir  Jafar 
thought  the  time  opportune  to  open  a  correspondence  with  him 
unknown  to  the  English.^  Nor  did  this  fact  stand  alone.  It 
was  accompanied  by  a  marked  reluctance  on  the  part  of  the 
Nawab  to  bring  the  Shah  Zada  to  action.  To  Holwell,  who 
had  been  informed  that  Mir  Jafar  was  seeking  peace  by  throwing 
all  the  blame  of  his  opposition  upon  the  Enghsh,^  this  appeared 
most  suspicious.  "  The  carrying  on  this  concealed  correspond- 
ence with  the  Prince,"  he  wrote  to  Caillaud,  "  I  cannot  look  on 
in  any  other  light  than  as  the  highest  infringement  of  that  respect 
and  deference  due  to  your  station  and  the  treaty  subsisting 
between  us."  *  He  himself  entered  into  correspondence  with  the 
Prince  ;  in  May  he  received  what  purported  to  be  Mir  Jafar's 
original  petition  to  the  latter,  and  decided  that  the  Nawab's 
government  must  be  brought  to  an  end. 

The  decision  to  depose  Mir  Jafar  has  usually  been  reprobated 
as  a  breach  of  faith.  That  opinion  is  untenable.  The  Nawab 
had  been  guilty  of  conspiring  against  the  English  with  the 
Dutch ;  he  was  not  unreasonably  suspected  of  conspiring 
against  them  with  the  Shah  Zada.  The  English  had  a  full 
release  of  all  their  treaty  obligations  to  Mir  Jafar.  CUve  himself, 
who,  with  his  friends,  adopted  this  as  one  of  the  grounds  from 
which  to  attack  the  revolution,  had  himself  contemplated  the 
possibiUty  of  removing  the  Nawab  at  a  much  earUer  date.  In 
his  letter  to  Pitt  of  January  7,  1759,  he  observes  that  he  had 
received  from  Delhi  an  offer  of  the  Diwanni,  "  but  this  high 
oflftce  I  have  been  obliged  to  decline  as  I  am  unwilling  to  occasion 
any  jealousy  on  the  part  of  the  Subah,  especially  as  I  see  no 

'  Rumboki  to  R.  Smith,  February  3,  1764  (Orme  MSS.,  Various.  21.  f.  182). 

•  Mir  Jafar  admitted  the  correspondence  both  to  Hastings  and  to  Caillaud. 
Holwell  to  Caillaud,  April  7  ;  Caillaud  to  Holwell,  April  15,  1760  (both  letters  are 
printed  in  the  Itidia  Tracts,  and  occur  in  the  Orme  MSS.,  India,  xii.). 

'  Holwell  to  Caillaud,  April  7,  ut  supra. 

♦  Holwell  to  Caillaud,  April  22,  1760  {India  Tracts,  p.  33). 


I 


THE  POLICY  OF  NON-INTERVENTION  197 

likelihood  of  the  Company's  providing  us  with  a  sufficient  force 
to  support  properly  so  considerable  an  employ,  and  which  would 
open  a  way  for  securing  the  Subahship  to  ourselves."  ^ 

To  Holwell's  letter  announcing  his  resolve,^  Caillaud  replied 
with  great  truth  that  the  estabhshment  of  a  new  Nawab  would 
be  certain  to  involve  new  troubles  and  easily  might  mean  only 
the  setting  up  of  one  much  more  dangerous  than  Mir  Jafar.' 
But  in  pressing  this  argument  he  misapprehended  Holwell's 
purpose.  The  latter  replied  agreeing  entirely  with  the  un- 
wisdom of  pulling  down  the  present  Nawab  only  to  estabUsh 
another  in  his  place.  "  But  my  views  for  the  Company  went 
much  higher.  That  the  country  will  never  be  in  a  settled,  peace- 
ful state  whilst  this  family  is  at  the  head  of  it,  is  a  position  I 
lay  down  as  incontestable,  and  that,  until  the  country  enjoys 
that  state  the  Company's  affairs  must  in  consequence  be  daily 
approaching  to  certain  ruin.  I  therefore  judge  we  could  never 
be  possessed  of  a  more  just  or  favourable  opportunity  to  carry 
into  execution  what  must  be  done,  I  plainly  see,  one  time  or 
other,  if  the  Company  have  ever  a  secure  footing  in  the  provinces, 
to  wit,  take  this  country  into  our  own  hands.  .  .  .  The  situation 
of  the  Prince  at  present  is  such  that  I  am  sure  he  would  .  .  . 
without  hesitation  grant  a  phirmaund  appointing  the  Company 
perpetual  subas  of  the  Province."  *  Had  only  this  plan  been 
carried  into  execution,  the  war  with  Mir  Kasim  would  have  been 
avoided.  Caillaud  and  Amyatt  both  disapproved  of  it,  how- 
ever, and  the  matter  was  left  for  Vansittart's  consideration 
when  he  should  arrive. 

Henry  Vansittart  was  a  Madras  servant  of  fourteen  years' 
standing,  who  had,  as  secretary  to  the  Select  Committee,  gained 
the  hearty  approval  of  all  his  superiors.  He  had  retained  his 
reputation,  when  he  went  into  Council,  as  an  honest,  amiable, 
and  capable  man  ;  and  Clive  had  recommended  him  to  the 
Company  as  the  fittest  person  to  succeed  himself  as  Governor 
of  Fort  William,  supposing  his  experience  in  managing  Muhammad 
All  would  enable  him  to  manage  Mir  Jafar.  "  The  merit  of 
Vansittart  shines  with  so  pecuhar  and  bright  a  lustre,"  wrote 

'  Chatham  Correspondence,  vol.  i.  p.  387. 

»  Holwell  to  Caillaud,  May  24,  1760  (India  Tracts,  p.  45). 

'Caillaud  to  Holwell,  MaJ-  29,  1760  (ibid.,  p.  47).  Hastings  argues  in  the 
me  sense;  Hastings  to  Caillaud,  June  4.  1760  (Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  29096, 
f.  249). 

*  Holwell  to  Caillaud,  June  14,  1760  (India  Tracts,  p.  51);  cf.  Holwell  to 
Amyatt,  May  30,  1760  (ibid.,  p.  55). 


198  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

Give,  "  as  must  make  his  services  coveted  by  every  well-wisher 
to  the  Company."  ^  "  Both  from  talents  and  disposition," 
wrote  Caillaud,  "  he  is  formed,  I  think,  to  make  his  government 
flourishing  and  the  people  under  his  command  happy."  ^  But, 
in  spite  of  all  these  favourable  judgments,  in  spite  of  his  amiability 
and  honesty,  Vansittart  was  to  prove  hirnself  lamentably  de- 
ficient in  the  art  of  government.  He  could  neither  judge  men, 
nor  manage  them,  nor  read  the  future.  He  started,  of  course, 
at  a  disadvantage.  Few  Bengal  servants  could  forgive  his  coming 
from  Madras  ;  but  that  might  have  been  forgotten  in  time, 
had  he  not  committed  at  the  very  outset  of  his  government  that 
appalUng  blunder  which  is  inseparably  connected  with  his  name. 
He  brought  with  him  ready  made  the  policy  of  non-inter- 
vention, which  had  been  definitely  adopted  by  the  Madras 
Council  just  before  his  departure  northwards.  Two  conditions 
broadly  differentiated  the  relations  between  the  Nawab  and 
Council  in  Madras  and  in  Bengal.  While  financial  considera- 
tions entered  largely  into  both  series,  in  Madras  the  Nawab's 
indebtedness  was  due  to  advances  made  in  his  support  by  the 
English  ;  in  Bengal  it  was  due  to  promises  made  in  support  of 
the  English.  So  far,  Muhammad  Ah  was  more  closely  dependent 
on  the  EngHsh  than  was  Mir  Jafar.  The  effects  of  this  were 
furthermore  accentuated  by  the  fact  that  Muhammad  Ah  had 
been  established  as  Nawab  after  two  obstinately  contested  wars, 
lasting  four  and  five  years  respectively,  against  an  equal  and 
often  a  superior  enemy  ;  in  Bengal  the  French  and  Dutch  had 
been  beaten  swiftly  and  decisively,  while  the  Shah  Zada  had 
not  dared  to  measure  arms  with  Clive.  Consequently,  the 
Nawab  of  Arcot  had  been  compelled  to  rely  on  English  support 
far  more  constantly  and  completely  than  had  his  companion 
of  Murshidabad.  The  cumulative  effects  of  these  two  causes 
were  hardly  at  all  modified  by  the  fact  that  Muhammad  Ali 
claimed  to  succeed  as  the  son  of  the  late  Nawab,  while  Mir  Jafar 
was  wholly  the  creature  of  a  revolution.  Hereditary  succession 
to  the  ofiice  of  Nawab  was  an  innovation.  It  represented  an 
idea  influential  in  the  Enghsh  mind  but  alien  to  the  Moghul, 
and  only  tolerated  where  the  Muslim  conqueror  had  been  forced 
by  circumstances  to  adopt  the  earlier  Hindu  system.^ 

'  Clive  to  Sulivan,  December  30,  1758  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  x.  f.  2554). 
"  Caillaud  to  Hastings,  July  16,  1760  {loc.  cit.,  xii.  f.  3152). 
'  As,  for  instance,  in  the  hill  regions  of  the  northern  circars  or  in  the  extreme 
south,  where  the  Muhammadans  never  fully  established  themselves. 


THE  POLICY  OF  NON-INTERVENTION  199 

One  might  have  expected  this  necessary  dependence  of 
Arcot  upon  Madras  to  result  in  a  greater  degree  of  interference 
in  the  administration  of  the  country,  or  such  parts  of  it  as  were 
under  the  Nawab's  control.  It  was  indeed  proposed.  Lawrence 
wrote  in  1754 :  "  The  immediate  inconvenience  we  labour  under 
is  our  expence  ;  to  ease  which  there  is  but  one  method  left, 
in  our  opinion — to  take,  by  the  Nabob's  leave,  the  management 
of  the  Arcot  province  in  our  own  hands,  collect  its  revenues, 
and  pay  Mahfuz  Khan's  troops,  a  proper  allowance  to  be  made 
to  the  Nabob,  and  his  family  to  be  taken  care  of  in  the  settle- 
ments." ^  But  the  Council  did  not  accept  the  proposal,  and 
only  asked  for  the  mortgage  of  certain  territory.  ^  As  Caillaud 
observed,  the  English  regarded  themselves  as  only  "  second 
causes  "  to  "  set  the  first  in  motion."  *  In  the  following  year, 
however,  as  the  mortgaged  countries  did  not  produce  enough 
even  to  pay  the  interest  on  the  Nawab's  debt  and  the  garrisons 
maintained  on  his  behalf,  it  was  decided  to  propose  taking 
over  the  whole  Arcot  country  till  the  debt  had  been  paid  off.* 
But  Muhammad  Ali  protested  that  this  would  ruin  his  position 
in  the  eyes  of  the  people,  and  was  let  off  with  promises  to  dismiss 
most  of  his  troops,  who  were  so  useless  that  he  would  not  even 
confide  to  them  the  guard  of  his  person,  to  increase  the  assign- 
ment of  lands,  and  to  furnish  larger  contributions  from  the 
revenues  of  the  remainder.* 

These  were  sufficient  for  the  moment,  but  the  outbreak  of 
war  occasioned  new  demands,  more  urgent  in  themselves,  and 
more  insistently  pressed.  The  Nawab  had  established  his  elder 
brpther,  Mahfuz  Khan,  as  Deputy  in  Madura  and  Tinnevelly  ; 
he  had  thrown  off  his  allegiance.  Another  relative  had  been 
established  at  Nellore,  and  had  done  the  same.  Branches  of 
the  old  family  of  Nawabs  survived  at  Vellore,  Chettepat,  and 
Wandiwash,  and  upheld  their  dignity  by  refusing  tribute.  "  The 
Committee  see  no  remedy  for  this  growing  evil  but  the  Nabob's 
remaining  and  sending  for  all  his  family  to  Madras,  retrenching 
all  his  useless  expenses,  and  delivering  over  all  his  districts  and 
the  forts  ...  to  the  Company.  .  .  .  The  President  is  desired 
to  propose  these  measures  to  the  Nabob."  *     But  Muhammad 


•  Lawrence  and  Starke  to  Saunders,  June  24,  1754  (Mil.  Cons.  1754,  p.  145). 

•  Ibid.,  p.  153. 

'  Caillaud  to  Orme,  n.d.  (Orme  MSS.,  Various,  293,  f.  59). 

•  Mil.  Cons.,  1755,  p.  142. 

•  Ibid.,  pp.  146,  148. 

•  fbid.,  August  29,  17S7. 


200  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

Ali,  like  many  other  princes,  was  little  able  to  learn  wisdom 
from  circumstances.  As  Orme  wrote  at  the  time,  he  wanted 
to  spend  profusely  at  a  moment  when  he  should  have  practised 
the  hard  task  of  economy.  "  These  avulsions  from  his  state, 
tear  his  pride  to  pieces."  *  He  refused  absolutely  to  accept  the 
English  propositions,  declaring  that  he  would  be  regarded  as  no 
better  than  the  French  nominee,  Raza  Sahib,  and  that  nobody 
would  obey  him.  Instead,  he  asked  for  a  loan  to  raise  a  new 
body  of  horse,  and  proposed  to  leave  Madras  for  Arcot.  The 
Council  observed  that  as  things  were  he  could  furnish  neither 
men  nor  money,  urged  him  to  remain  at  Madras  as  they  did  not 
mean  to  garrison  Arcot  strongly,  and  refused  him  the  loan  he 
asked  for.^  Perforce  he  remained  at  Madras.  In  1758  the 
revenues  of  Madura  and  Tinnevelly  were  let  out  in  the  Nawab's 
name  but  by  the  Council's  act.  The  Commandant  of  Trichino- 
poly  was  ordered  to  secure  out  of  the  revenues  of  that  place 
enough  to  pay  the  garrison  their  batta  and  to  keep  the  walls 
in  repair.'* 

These  and  similar  acts  of  apparently  necessary  control 
angered  the  Nawab  to  an  unreasonable,  but  not  to  a  s\n-prising, 
degree,  and  he  at  once  began  that  series  of  intrigues  with  the 
King's  officers  which  was  later  on  to  occasion  so  much  em- 
barrassment to  the  Madras  Council.  In  May  1760,  he  visited 
Coote,  at  the  head  of  the  army  before  Pondichery,  and  at  a 
private  interview  gave  so  ludicrously  perverse  an  account  of 
his  earher  relations  with  the  Enghsh  that  either  his  memory 
or  his  veracity  must  have  completely  failed  him.  Prefacing 
his  remarks  by  the  statement  that  he  found  he  had  no  friends 
among  the  Councillors  at  Madras,  he  said  that  "  at  the  beginning 
of  the  troubles  the  English  and  French  were  both  indifferent 
to  him,  that  both  sides  had  petitioned  him  hard  to  assist  them, 
that  he  joined  with  the  Enghsh,  and  that  he  had  in  his  treasury 
at  that  time  60  lack.  Soon  after  his  declaring  for  us,  he  fought 
a  battle  and  gained  a  victory  without  having  any  of  our  troops 
with  him."  With  this  vague  reference  to  the  assistance  he 
gave  to  Fort  St.  David  in  1746,  he  passes  over  all  the  rest,  and 
never  thinks  of  mentioning  to  Coote  the  utter  defeat  of  his  father 
and  the  straits  to  which  he  himself  was  reduced  by  Chanda 
Sahib.     Instead  of  alluding  to  these  trifles,  he  proceeds  at  once 

'  Orme  to  Payne,  November  17,  1757  (Orme  MSS.,  Various,  28,  f.  219). 
*  Mil.  Cons.,  September  i,  5,  and  17,  I757- 
»  Ibid.,  November  2,  1758. 


THE  POLICY  OF  NON-INTERVENTION  201 

to  his  recent  grievances — the  letting  out  of  his  districts  by  the 
English  (he  says  at  half-rates  for  corrupt  purposes)  ;  the  swelling 
of  his  account  with  the  Company  (again  he  suggests  improperly) . 
The  only  appearance  of  power  he  had  left  had  been  taken  from 
him,  and  while  "  he  was  willing  all  his  revenues  should  be  paid 
into  the  Company's  treasury,"  he  "thought  it  a  cruel  thing  he  had 
not  the  management  of  his  own  country  to  the  best  advantage."  ^ 

How  far  these  accusations  were  warranted  by  the  facts  is 
hard  to  say.  What  seems  certain  is  that  the  Nawab's  adminis- 
tration was  exceedingly  inefficient  ;  and  it  is  probable  that  the 
efforts  of  the  Madras  Council  were  equally  so.  The  fortunes 
with  which  Pigot  and  the  Councillors  of  this  time  retired  do  not 
suggest  that  they  followed  the  practices  of  which  the  Nawab 
accused  them  with  either  vigour  or  success.  It  is  on  the  whole 
more  likely  that  handsome  presents  from  Muhammad  Ali  coin- 
cided with  the  Council's  resolution  a  month  later  to  restore  the 
country  to  his  management.  He  promised  to  pay  the  Company 
30  lakhs  a  year  until  his  debt  was  paid  off,  as  well  as  3  lakhs 
for  the  Trichinopoly  garrison,  on  condition  that  in  future  he 
should  have  the  renting  of  the  country  and  that  his  flag  should 
fly  over  the  forts  which  the  English  defended  for  him.  The 
reasons  which  the  Council  gave  for  this  decision  ^  were  that  the 
English  lacked  time  and  knowledge  to  govern  the  country,  that 
the  Nawab's  influence  and  authority  were  needed  to  collect  the 
revenues,  and  that  he  must  either  be  left  with  substantial  power 
or  be  pensioned  off.^  The  Carnatic  was  to  pay  for  this  resolution 
with  forty,  years  of  misgovernment,  while  the  Council  looked 
on  helplessly  at  evils  they  had  not  assumed  authority  to  check, 
or  gave  a  venal  assent  to  measures  which  they  knew  to  be  mis- 
taken or  unjust. 

We  have  already  seen  the  plan  which  Holwell  had  formed 
before  Miran's  death — the  assumption  of  the  Subahdari  of 
Bengal  by  the  Company.  We  have  also  seen  how  Mir  Kasim 
had  intrigued  against  the  Nawab  and  Miran,  in  the  hope  of 
obtaining  the  deputyship  of  Behar,  and  had  obtained  the 
support  of  both  Holwell  and  Caillaud  for  the  proposal.  On  the 
death  of  Miran,  he  raised  his  ambitions,  and  sought  to  be  named 

I"  Chota  Nabob  " — that  is,  to  enjoy  the  power  and  rank  lately 
ijoyed  by  the  Nawab's  son.     With  great  astuteness  he  seized 
»  Coote's  Diary,  May  9,  1760  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  viii.  fit.  1941,  etc.). 
'  Three  members  dissented. 
...........  -  ^ 


202  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

the  occasion  of  a  mutiny  of  the  Nawab's  troops  at  Murshidabad 
to  earn  the  gratitude  of  the  EngUsh  by  appeasing  it  with  an 
immediate  payment  of  3  lakhs  and  a  guarantee  of  the  re- 
mainder. *  Holwell  had  already  made  up  his  mind  to  support  his 
pretensions,  =  and  ceased  wholly  to  advocate  his  old  scheme. 
Vansittart  reached  Calcutta  on  July  27.  On  August  4,  Holwell 
laid  before  him  a  minute  on  the  state  of  the  province,  concluding 
with  the  observation,  "  The  sudden  death  of  the  young  Nabob 
(if  made  a  proper  use  of)  seems  to  point  out  a  middle  way,  if 
things  are  not  gone  too  far  already  to  admit  of  any  other  than 
the  divesting  this  family  of  the  government  altogether."  '  In 
this  obscure  fashion  he  indicates  his  new  scheme  of  giving  to  Mir 
Kasim  control  of  all  the  affairs  of  the  Subah  by  appointing  him 
Mir  Jafar's  Diwan.  He  had,  in  fact,  fallen  into  Mir  Kasim 's 
snare.  Proposing  to  follow  a  middle  way,  and  leave  Mir  Jafar 
Subahdar  of  the  province,  he  had  given  Mir  Kasim  the  opening 
he  desired,  which  would  enable  him  to  force  what  purported  to  be 
no  more  than  a  change  of  Ministers  into  the  substitution  of  one 
Nawab  for  another — a  course  the  evils  of  which  Caillaud  and 
Holwell  alike  had  fully  and  emphatically  predicted.  In  Holwell's 
case  it  is  too  probable  that  private  motives  *  contributed  to  his 
being  thus  outmanoeuvred.  He  was  too  clever  not  to  have 
divined  Mir  Kasim's  ulterior  object. 

Caillaud  advocated  another  plan.  He  proposed  that  Mir 
Kasim  should  become  Deputy  of  Behar,  in  which  office  he  could 
be  kept  to  his  duty  by  the  Patna  garrison  ;  that  Ramnarayan 
should  be  compensated  by  appointment  to  another  considerable 
office  ;  and  that  Rajabalabh,  a  late  servant  of  Miran's,  should  be 
made  Diwan.  The  last,  he  urged,  would  as  Diwan  be  dependent 
on  the  English,  whereas,  if  Mir  Kasim  were  appointed,  he  would 
be  Nawab  for  all  practical  purposes.  He  further  supported  his 
plan  by  Clive's  precept  and  example,  of  trusting  Muhammadans 
as  little  as  possible,  because  they  would  certainly  endeavour  to 
make  themselves  independent.* 

Caillaud's  advocacy  of  Rajabalabh,  however,  was  counter- 
acted by  the  ill-report   which   Hastings  gave  of  that   Hindu, 

'  Hastings  to  the  Select  Committee,  July  i8,  1760  (Vansittart's  Narrative, 
vol.  i.  pp.  71,  etc.). 

•  Nawab  to  Holwell,  received  July  10,  1760  (op.  cit.,  vol.  i.  p.  75). 
'  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  August  4,  1760. 

*  See  below,  p.  205. 

'  Caillaud  to  Vansittart,  July  23  and  August  2,  1760  (Orme  MSB.,  India,  xiL 
fi.  3146  and  3153). 


THE  POLICY  OF  NON-INTERVENTION  203 

asserting  that  he  had  encouraged  Miran  in  his  misconduct,  while 
at  the  same  time  he  heaped  praises  on  Mir  Kasim.'  Unfortu- 
nately these,  together  with  Holwell's  representations,  carried  the 
day.  On  September  2  Vansittart  wrote  to  Mir  Kasim  desiring 
to  see  him  as  soon  as  possible.^  On  September  11  the  Select 
Committee  resolved  against  seeking  any  independent  powers  from 
the  Shah  Zada.  "  Our  views,"  they  declared,  "  in  adopting 
this  system  should  be  directed  rather  to  strengthen  than  weaken 
or  overthrow  the  present  Nabob.  AU  we  desire  is  to  see  the 
power  removed  out  of  the  hands  of  that  sort  of  men  who  now  rule 
and  direct  his  affairs."  '  Four  days  later,  Mir  Kasim  having 
reached  Calcutta,  Vansittart  was  desired  to  sound  him  with  a  view 
to  his  co-operation  in  this  object.*  The  same  day  Vansittart 
interviewed  Mir  Kasim,  who  declared  himself  entirely  ready  to 
assist  in  procuring  for  the  English  the  grants  of  territory  needed 
to  support  the  army  without  being  dependent  on  the  Nabob's 
uncertain  payments,  provided  he  were  invested  with  power  and 
supported  by  an  adequate  force.*  On  this,  Holwell  was  deputed 
to  arrange  terms.  Mir  Kasim  coolly  proposed  that  the  Nawab 
should  be  made  away  with  ;  but  was  brought  to  agree  to  accept 
the^iwanni  of  the  province  with  a  guarantee  of  succession  to  Mir 
Jafar,  on  condition  that  there  should  be  ceded  to  the  English 
the  districts  of  Burdwan,  Midnapur,  and  Chittagong.  A  treaty 
to  this  effect  was  signed  on  September  27,  and  next  day  Mir 
Kasim  returned  to  Murshidabad.* 

Vansittart  and  Caillaud  were  deputed  to  persuade  or  compel 
Mir  Jafar  to  consent  to  these  arrangements.  They  were  to  be 
escorted  by  two  companies  of  Europeans,  a  company  of  artillery, 
and  a  battalion  of  sepoys  in  case  of  resistance,  and  were  given  full 
discretion  to  act  as  circumstances  might  require.'  They  set 
out  from  Calcutta  on  October  2,  and,  proceeding  slowly  to  allow 
time  for  the  escort  to  reach  Murshidabad  before  them,  they  arrived 
at  Kasimbazaar  on  October  14.  The  Nawab  paid  them  a  visit 
of  ceremony  the  morning  after  their  arrival ;   this  was  returned 

'  Hastings  to  Vansittart,  n.d.  (Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  29132,  ff.  103,  etc.). 

'  Col.  Pers.  Corr.,  vol.  i.  p.  25.  It  may  be  noted  that,  probably  by  a  confusion 
of  Persian  titles,  Caillaud  is  usually  mentioned  in  the  early  part  of  this  work  by 
the  name  of  Coote. 

i'  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  September  11,  1760. 
*  Ibid.,  September  15,  1760.  '' 

•  Ibid.,  September  16,  1760. 
•  Holwell's  India  Tracts,  p.  59  ;  Bengal  Sol.  Com.,  September  27,  1760. 
'  Ibid.,  September  24,  1760. 


204  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

next  day ;  and  on  the  i8th  a  formal  conference  was  held  at  the 
palace  called  Muradbagh.  At  this  Vansittart  presented  three 
letters  to  the  Nawab,  enumerating  the  causes  of  complaint  and 
urging  the  need  of  appointing  some  capable  person  in  the  room 
of  the  deceased  Miran.  A  long  conversation  followed,  in  which 
Vansittart  strove  to  induce  the  Nawab  spontaneously  to  name 
Mir  Kasim.  At  last  he  did  so,  and  the  deputies  at  once  insisted 
on  his  being  sent  for.  After  much  opposition  Mir  Jafar  agreed  ; 
but  it  was  then  so  late,  and  the  old  Nawab  so  exhausted,  that  the 
conference  could  not  be  further  protracted.  The  Nawab  was 
allowed  to  withdraw  some  time  before  Mir  Kasim  arrived  at 
Muradbagh.  Such  jealousy  of  the  latter  had  been  displayed  by 
the  Nawab,  that  Caillaud  and  Vansittart  agreed  to  employ  force 
as  the  only  method  of  overcoming  his  reluctance.  On  the  night 
of  the  following  day  Caillaud  prepared  to  seize  the  Nawab  in  his 
palace  of  Motijhil.  At  dawn  on  the  20th  he  occupied  the  outer 
gates,  and  sent  in  a  letter  written  by  Vansittart,  saying  that 
troops  had  been  sent  to  expel  his  evil  councillors.  For  two  hours 
Mir  Jafar  hesitated  between  resistance  and  submission  as  irre- 
solutely as  he  had  hesitated  before  the  battle  ot  Plassey.  At 
last  he  gave  way  and  sent  out  a  message  offering  to  resign  his 
office  altogether  if  the  English  would  guarantee  his  life  and  honour. 
Vansittart  was  sent  for.  On  his  arrival  Mir  Kasim  was  solemnly 
seated  on  the  masnad.  Two  days  later  the  ex-Nawab  set  out 
to  take  up  his  residence  at  Calcutta.^ 

This  termination  was  generally  unexpected.  Mir  Kasim 
certainly  and  Holwell  probably  had  guessed  how  the  matter 
would  end ;  but  Vansittart  and  his  Committee  seem  to  have 
supposed  they  were  only  going  to  substitute  Mir  Kasim  for  the 
Nawab's  former  advisers.  The  sudden  developments  which 
their  proceedings  had  brought  about  surprised  them,  and  exposed 
them  to  accusations  of  bad  faith,  which  the  hastiness  of  Vansittart's 
conduct  at  Murshidabad  made  it  difficult  to  rebut.  This  diffi- 
culty was  increased  by  the  inevitable  donation  which,  though 
delayed,  followed,  and  which  every  one  knew  would  follow.  All 
who  were  jealous  of  Vansittart's  promotion,  almost  every  one 
except  those  members  of  the  Select  Committee  who  had  effected 
this  change,  accused  the  Governor  of  hiding  his  real  purpose  and 
of  effecting  the  revolution  for  the  sake  of  gain.  "  The  whole," 
wrote  one  of  these  gentlemen,  "  appears  to  me  to  be  very  low 

'  Caillaud  and  Vansittart  to  the  Select  Committee,  October  18  and  ai,  1760 
(Vansittart's  Narrative,  vol.  i.  pp.  iiS,  etc.). 


THE  POLICY  OF  NON-INTERVENTION  205 

and  surfeiting,  and  no  more  than  what  the  custom  of  the  country 
allows  of.  .  .  .  In  my  opinion  it  will  turn  out  one  of  the  worst 
affairs  that  ever  befell  the  English  in  these  parts."  * 

These  critics  of  the  revolution  were  right  ;  but  they  mostly 
assigned  inadequate  reasons  for  their  condemnation  ;  and  the 
transaction  has  generally  been  discussed  with  reference  to  its 
more  insignificant  aspects.  It  has  been  usually  attacked  and 
defended  on  the  questions  of  the  alleged  breach  of  faith  and  of 
the  donation.  The  first  is  unfounded.  It  is  true  that  the  charges 
against  the  Nawab  did  not  at  the  time  amount  to  more  than 
strong  suspicion  ;  but  in  practice  politicians  cannot  wait  until 
their  suspicions  ^re  capable  of  judicial  proof,  and  action  based 
on  well-founded  beliefs  is  not  usually  severely  judged.  The 
second  is  more  specious ;  nor  is  it  any  defence  to  assert,  as  Van- 
sittart  and  Sumner  did,  that  the  present  was  not  delivered  until 
some  months  afterwards.  They  were  not  ignorant  that  Mir 
Kasim  would  show  his  gratitude  by  way  of  a  donation,  even  though 
they  dechned  receiving  any  obligation  from  him  on  the  day  the 
treaty  was  executed.  Their  real  defence  on  this  score  is  that 
offered  in  their  behalf  by  Grant :  "  The  principal  persons  in  the 
Bengal  Government  were  possessed  of  many  easier  avenues  to 
irregular  emolument  than  the  troublesome,  hazardous,  and,  it 
may  be  added,  public,  road  of  a  general  revolution.  .  .  .  Nor 
after  all  that  has  been  said  of  the  venality  or  rapacity  of  the 
early  Anglo-Indians,  can  there  be  any  doubt  that  most,  if  not 
all  of  them,  declined  many  more  presents  than  they  accepted."  ^ 
It  cannot  seriously  be  argued  that  Vansittart  made  the  revolu- 
tion for  private  motives. 

Holwell.  however,  can  less  easily  be  exculpated.  His  career 
in  India  was  at  an  end,  and  he  knew  it.  He  resigned  the  Com- 
pany's service  only  a  few  days  after  he  had  accomplished  the 
treaty  with  Mir  Kasim.  He  returned  to  Europe  in  February 
1761  ;  and  before  that  time  he  had  received  not  only  an  obliga- 
tion from  Mir  Kasim  for  2  lakhs,  but  also  some  50,000  rupees 
on  account — some  months  before  the  other  Select-Committee 
men  had  received  anything.  ^  Thus  both  in  position  and  treat- 
ment he  differed  from  his  companions,  nor  was  his  character  such 
as  to  render  suspicion   of   his   motives   unreasonable.     Clive's 

'  Letter  to  Drake,  January  15,  1761  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  iv.  f.  1031). 
'  Grant's  SAeicA,  pp.  187-189. 

*  Sumner's  evidence  before  the  Select  Committee  of  the  House  of  Commons 
{First  Reports,  p.  36) ;  and  Holwell  to  Wollaston,  April  13,  1763  (ibid.,  app.  12). 


206  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

judgment  of  him  is  hardly  too  severe — "  Unfit  to  preside  where 
integrity  as  well  as  capacity  is  equally  essential."  ' 

But  while  the  revolution  cannot  be  fairly  criticised  either  as 
a  breach  of  public  faith  or  (with  a  possible  exception)  as  the  fruit 
of  private  greed,  it  was,  nevertheless,  the  greatest  political 
blunder  that  the  English  have  yet  comrnitted  in  India.  The 
blood-stained  history  of  the  Camatic  durbar  might  have  warned 
Vansittart  how  little  Mir  Jafar  would  relish  being  delivered  into 
the  keeping  of  a  man  to  whom  every  day  that  passed  before  the 
Nawab's  death  would  seem  insufferably  tedious.  None  could 
have  been  proposed  as  Diwan  so  unwelcome  to  Mir  Jafar's  person 
or  so  dangerous  to  his  life.  Had  the  latter  acgppted  Mir  Kasim 
according  to  Vansittart 's  proposal,  it  is  long  odds  the  Nawab 
would  have  died  within  the  month.  The  English  scheme  was 
impracticable  ;  and  led  its  authors  on  to  most  dangerous  ground. 

And  not  only  was  it  impracticable,  but  also  it  was  based 
on  a  conception  of  English  policy  diametrically  opposed  to  all 
their  interests.  A  revolution  was  essential ;  but  this  was  a 
counter-revolution.  As  matters  had  stood,  the  Nawab  was  able 
easily  to  impede  English  operations  ;  now  a  Nawab  was  set  up 
who  could  resist  them.  Vansittart  declared  that  his  aim  had 
been  to  strengthen  the  Nawab  ;  he  should  have  endeavoured 
to  strengthen  the  English.  The  only  remedy  for  the  evils  which 
he  found  lay  in  a  change  of  system,  not  a  change  of  persons  ;  and 
the  cession  of  three  districts  with  a  sum  of  ready-money  was 
dearly  bought  with  the  establishment  of  a  man  whom  Vansittart 
had  provided  with  the  gravest  reasons  for  wishing  to  render 
himself  independent  of  all  English  control.  Every  reason  which 
Vansittart  could  assign  for  selecting  Mir  Kasim  as  Diwan  was, 
in  fact,  a  reason  for  never  investing  him  with  independent  power 
as  Nawab.  There  was  only  one  method  by  which  the  English 
could  maintain  their  position — by  taking  more  and  more  of  the 
Government  under  their  management — not  by  deposing  one 
Nawab  to  estabUsh  another  with  equal  political  power  and 
greater  personal  capacity. 

•  Clive  to  Sulivan,  December  30,  1758  (OrraeMSS.,  India,  x.  f.  2554).  I  cannot 
refrain  from  quoting  a  sentence  or  two  of  CaUlaud's  on  Holwell  :  "  Still  to  have 
a  cloak,  he  wrapped  himself  up  in  the  external  practice  of  religious  duties.  The 
Sundays  he  used  to  pass  with  his  family,  and  a  few  select  friends  in  acts  of  devo- 
tion, singing  spiritual  hymns  and  reading  treatises  of  devotion.  ...  At  the 
same  time,  for  their  further  example  and  edification,  he  lived  in  the  closest  union 
(and  doubtless  in  the  strictest  practice  of  virtue,  divine  love,  and  friendship) 
with  another  man's  wife."     See  he.  cit.,  xii.  fi.  335 1-3253. 


THE  POLICY  OF  NON-INTERVENTION  207 

At  the  same  time  as  the  Committee  were  accomplishing  this 
change,  they  had  also  to  consider  the  terms  of  peace  with  the 
Shah  Zada,  who  still  remained  in  the  province  of  Behar,  collecting 
revenues  almost  up  to  the  gates  of  Patna.  Mir  Kasim,  when  at 
Calcutta,  was  consulted  and  approved  the  proposal  to  make 
peace  and  assist  the  Shah  Zada  to  march  to  Delhi  and  establish 
himself  as  Emperor  in  the  place  of  his  father  who  had  been 
murdered  several  months  previously.  ^  This  proposal  shows  as 
plainly  as  the  revolution  itself  how  little  Vansittart  understood 
the  position  and  interests  of  the  Enghsh  in  India.  It  mattered 
nothing  to  the  English  who  was  Emperor,  so  long  as  the  EngUsh 
were  strong  enough  to  be  feared.  Schemes  centring  on  Delhi 
at  this  time  would  have  produced  such  a  dispersion  of  the  English 
effort  as  to  have  rendered  it  ineffective.'^ 

Caillaud  had  at  first  been  intended  to  negotiate  this  affair  in 
concert  with  Amyatt,  chief  of  Patna  ;  but  about  this  time  Camac 
arrived  as  Major  of  the  Company's  troops  in  Bengal  and  Caillaud 
was  recalled  to  Madras.  Camac  took  command  at  Patna  on 
December  3i,and,although  theNawab's  troops  were  still  mutinous 
in  spite  of  the  considerable  sums  which  Mir  Kasim  had  sent  up 
for  their  payment,^  he  took  the  field  with  the  Enghsh  troops 
alone,*  encountered  the  Shah  Zada  three  days'  march  from 
Patna,  and  in  January  15  inflicted  on  him  a  severe  defeat,  in 
which  Law  and  most  of  his  Frenchmen  were  captured.  Carnac 
followed  up  this  success  with  great  vigour,  with  the  result  that 
the  fugitive  offered  terms,  met  Carnac  near  Gya  on  February  6,* 
and  accompanied  him  to  Patna.' 

Although  Mir  Kasim  before  the  revolution  had  agreed  to  the 
scheme  for  making  the  Shah  Zada  Emperor,  he  now  displayed 
the  greatest  jealousy  of  the  English  negotiations,  and  could  only 
be  induced  to  meet  the  Shah  Zada  in  the  English  factory.     He 

'  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  September  29,  1760. 

'  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Rai  Durlab,  who  was  consulted,  advised  the 
English  to  obtain  the  Subahdari  for  the  Company,  and  then  confirm  Mir  Jafar  iJ 
they  pleased  (Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  September  16,  1760).  Vansittart  was  perhaps 
influenced  to  reject  this  scheme  by  the  failure  of  Dupleix  ;  but  he  should  have 
reflected  on  the  difference  between  the  situations  of  the  Camatic  in  175 1  and 
Bengal  in  1760. 

•Camac's  Narrative,  ap.  Coote's  Journal,  April  12,  1761  (Orme  MSS.,  India, 
viii.  f.  2006). 

•  Five  hundred  and  twenty-eight  Europeans  and  1923  sepoys  (Camac's 
Journal,  January  15,  1761  (loc.  cit.,  vi.  f.  1416). 

•  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  February  17,  1761. 

•  Camac's  Narrative,  ul  supra  (f.  2009). 


208  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

seems  to  have  been  obsessed  vnth  the  idea  that  the  English 
would  obtain  a  grant  of  the  subahdari  for  themselves.^  Long  and 
inconclusive  discussions  followed.  Mir  Kasim  feared  nothing 
so  much  as  a  friendship  between  the  English  and  the  Shah  Zada. 
He  refused  to  proclaim  him  as  Emperor  till  after  his  departure. 
At  last  in  June  the  unwelcome  guest  was  got  rid  of  ;  and  marched 
away  into  Oudh  without  the  assistance  which  the  English  had 
been  ready  to  afford  him.  It  was  a  fortunate  conclusion  for 
them  ;  none  the  less,  it  marked  a  victory  for  Mir  Kasim,  who 
was  bent  on  reducing  their  importance. 

In  this  object  he  was  assisted  by  the  English  themselves. 
Vansittart  wrote  to  Mir  Kasim  that  Camac  was  placed  under 
his  orders.^  This  was  a  marked  retrocession  from  the  position 
the  English  had  always  adopted,  and  gave  opening  for  numberless 
disputes.  The  Nawab,  without  consulting  Camac,  recalled  his 
forces  from  the  south  of  Behar,  where  they  were  co-operating 
with  an  English  detachment  ;  Camac  at  once  recalled  his  people 
too,  on  the  ground  that  they  should  not  be  left  unsupported  in  a 
country  of  which  they  knew  nothing.  This  was  magnified  by 
the  Nawab  into  an  insult,  and  Camac  resented  his  behaviour 
with  military  promptitude.'  Indeed,  Mir  Kasim  gave  the 
impression  of  considering  the  English  troops  to  be  mere  mercen- 
aries in  his  service :  "  We  were  bound  to  assist  him  with  all  our 
troops  whenever  and  for  whatever  purpose  he  chose  to  demand 
them."  *  Carnac,  on  the  other  side,  declared  he  would  assist 
the  Nawab  only  so  far  as  was  consistent  with  the  good  of  the 
service  and  his  own  honour,  and  desired  his  recall  if  the  army 
was  to  be  dispersed  in  detachments  at  the  Nawab's  pleasure.* 

In  April,  Carnac  was  superseded  by  Coote,  who  had  come  up 
from  Madras  after  the  fall  of  Pondich^ry.  He  set  out  for  Patna 
on  April  23rd,  "  to  take  upon  me  the  management  of  the  intricate 
and  confused  state  of  the  country  affairs,  which  at  this  time  in 
particular,  from  the  different  interests  of  parties  clashing  to- 
gether, I  imagine  will  be  attended  with  almost  unsurmountable 
difficulties."  '     He,  too,  received   orders  to  obey  the  Nawab.' 

'  Both  that  and  the  Diwanni  seem  to  have  been  offered  them. 
'  Col.  Pers.  Corr.,  vol.  i.  pp.  54  and  80. 

•Camac  to  Select  Committee,  March  6,  1761  (Vansittart's  Narrative,  vol.  i. 
p.  185) ;  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  March  15,  1761. 

*  See  Camac's  Narrative  (ut  supra,  i.  2010). 

*  Camac  to  Select  Committee,  March  25  (Bengal  Sel.  Cora.,  April  9,  i"6t ). 

*  Coote's  Journal,  April  23,  1761  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  viii.  f.  2006). 
'  Cal.  Pers.  Corr.,  vol.  i.  pp.  87-88. 


I 


THE  POLICY  OF  NON-INTERVENTION  209 

Even  before  his  arrival  Mir  Kasim  objected  that  he  had  appointed 
Nuncomar  his  Diwan  ;  *  and  on  his  arrival  at  once  sent  a  message 
inquiring  whether  the  EngUsh  would  continue  to  support  him 
or  were  about  to  appoint  another.^  He  also  urged  Coote  to 
visit  him  before  he  visited  the  Shah  Zada.  This  Coote  refused  to 
do  ;  and  indeed  it  would  have  been  a  singular  slight  to  put  upon 
a  man  whom  at  that  time  the  English  still  proposed  to  accom- 
pany to  Delhi.  When  Coote  did  visit  Mir  Kasim,  the  Nawab 
"  seemed  to  be  under  great  anxiety,  which  I  endeavoured  to 
remove  by  every  assurance  I  had  power  to  make  him."  *  It  is 
difficult  to  believe  that  this  anxiety  was  sincere,  for  it  continued 
after  the  Shah  Zada  had  marched  away  under  Camac's  escort 
and  the  English  plan  had  been  dropped.  On  June  15  Mir  Kasim 
refused  to  enter  the  city  to  proclaim  the  Shah  Zada  as  Emperor 
unless  the  English  sentries  and  guards  were  withdrawn.  Coote 
requested  an  interview;  insteadofgrantingit,  Mir  Kasim  assembled 
his  officers  and  spent  the  next  day  in  council  with  them.  He 
was  reported  to  have  doubled  his  guards,  issued  ball  cartridges, 
and  drawn  out  his  artillery.*  These  reports,  to  which  the  Nawab 's 
previous  conduct  lent  all  the  appearance  of  truth,  naturally 
alarmed  Coote  for  his  own  safety,  the  more  so  as  Carnac  had 
taken  with  him  the  bulk  of  the  Enghsh  army.  Next  morning, 
therefore,  he  rode  over  to  the  Nawab's  camp  to  seek  an  ex- 
planation. According  to  the  Nawab's  account  he  entered 
the  reception  tent  armed  to  the  teeth,  with  God-damn-me's 
pouring  from  his  mouth.  Be  that  as  it  may,  Mir  Kasim  refused 
to  see  him.'  On  the  appointed  day  the  Shah  Zada  was  only 
proclaimed  Emperor  under  the  threat  that  if  the  Nawab's  people 
did  not,  Coote  would  do  so  himself.* 

The  blame  for  these  disputes  cannot  be  laid  wholly  upon  the 
head  of  a  single  person.  Carnac  and  Coote  behaved  as  though 
they  had  powers  independent  of  the  Council  at  Calcutta — it  was 
a  common  failing,  as  we  shall  see  later  ;  and  they  distrusted  both 
the  Nawab  and  the  Committee  which  had  made  him.  Mir  Kasim, 
finding  these  officers  not  the  slaves  of  his  will,  undoubtedly  did 


i 
I 


•  Col.  Pers.  Corr.,  vol.  i.  p.  94. 
Coote's  Diary,  May  21,  1761  {loc.  cit.,  B.  2013,  etc.).     Coote  had  not  con- 
Jed  his  disapproval  of  the  revolution  ;   but  such  a  greeting  was  ill-calculated 
convert  him. 

•  Coote's  Diary,  May  25,  1761  {loc.  cit..  f.  2014). 
'Ibid.,  June  15-16,  1761  {he.  cit.). 

•  Coote's  Journal,  June  17,  1761  {he.  cit.). 
'  Ibid.,  June  18,  1761  {he.  cit.). 

14 


210  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

his  best  to  raise  dissensions  between  them  and  the  Council.  His 
fears  of  a  new  revolution  were  almost  certainly  intended  to 
provoke  them  into  imprudent  actions  which  might  give  him 
legitimate  cause  of  complaint.  And  lastly,  both  the  Nawab 
and  the  EngUsh  commanders  had  evil  councillors,  filling  their 
ears  with  such  exaggerated  reports  as  might  be  agreeable  to 
their  predilections. 

Mir  Kasim  had  two  principal  motives  in  his  struggle  with 
Carnac  and  Coote.  One  was  to  get  rid  of  the  Shah  Zada,  or 
rather  the  Emperor  Shah  Alam  as  he  should  now  be  called, 
before  the  opponents  of  the  revolution  could  gain  ground 
sufficient  to  overturn  it  by  entering  into  engagements  with  him 
over  the  Nawab's  head.  The  second  was  by  the  removal  of 
Ramnarayan  to  gain  complete  control  over  the  province  of 
Behar.  He  had  succeeded  in  the  first  ;  we  have  now  to  trace 
his  progress  in  the  second,  success  in  which  would  imply  almost 
complete  enfranchisement  from  EngUsh  control. 

For  the  last  four  years  Mir  Kasim  had  been  endeavouring 
to  supplant  Ramnarayan  ;  when  he  became  Nawab  he  resolved 
to  remove  him.  The  English  had  as  consistently  protected  him. 
At  first  Vansittart  intended  to  continue  that  pohcy.  At  the  end 
of  January  and  again  in  March  he  wrote  assuring  the  Deputy 
of  English  support.^  In  April,  Carnac  reported  that  Mir  Kasim 
showed  great  ill-will  towards  the  Deputy,  refused  to  submit  his 
accounts  to  the  Council's  arbitration,  and  asserted  the  necessity  of 
removing  him.  On  this  the  Select  Committee,  in  drawing  up 
Coote's  instructions,  declared  that  Ramnarayan  was  to  be  pro- 
tected from  injustice  and  preserved  in  his  government.^  At 
the  same  time,  in  answer  to  the  Nawab's  complaints,  Vansittart 
wrote  that  Ramnarayan  was  a  friend  of  Clive's  and  desired  Mir 
Kasim  to  settle  affairs  amicably.'  In  May,  probably  moved  by 
the  Nawab's  ceaseless  complaints,  the  Committee  receded  some- 
what from  the  unconditional  support  they  had  hitherto  promised 
to  Ramnarayan  ;  and  Vansittart  wrote  that,  if  he  did  not  come 
into  the  presence  with  a  sincere  heart,  the  Nawab  should  act 
as  the  interests  of  the  Circar  might  demand.  However,  he  still 
urged  moderation  and  a  friendly  settlement  on  Mir  Kasim.*    In 

»  Cat.  Pers.  Corr.,  vol.  i.  pp.  54  and  70. 
»  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  April  21,  1761. 

'  Vansittart  to  Mir  Kasim,  April  22,  1761  {Cal.  Pers.  Corr.,  vol.  1.  p.  88). 
*  Letter  to  Coote  and  M'Gwire,  May  17, 1761  (OrraeMSS.,  India,  viii.  f.  .joiS); 
and  Cal.  Pers.  Corr.,  vol.  i.  pp.  9^-97- 


THE  POLICY  OF  NON-INTERVENTION  211 

June  the  Committee  went  still  further  and  agreed  to  Ramnarayan's 
being  suspended  from  his  office.^  This  letter  was  carried  only  by 
Vansittart's  casting  vote,  for  two  members  dissented,  on  the 
ground  that  the  Nawab  hated  Ramnarayan  because  he  was  a 
friend  of  the  EngUsh.^  Coote  received  this  letter  on  the  27th, 
and  immediately  resolved  to  quit  Patna,  "  being  heartily  tired 
of  being  employed  on  a  service  where  there  is  so  much  corruption 
and  villainy."  ^  He  set  out  on  July  5,  leaving  the  troops  at 
Patna  under  the  command  of  Carnac. 

Meanwhile,  he  had  received  orders  from  the  Select  Committee 
recalling  both  himself  and  Carnac  from  Patna.  This  recall 
loudly  proclaimed  the  decision  of  the  Committee  to  abandon 
Ramnarayan  and  allow  Mir  Kasim  to  act  as  he  pleased.  In 
vain  did  the  Deputy  visit  Carnac  and  beg  to  be  permitted  to 
leave  the  country  instead  of  being  delivered  over  to  his  enemies.* 
On  August  6  Vansittart  approved  the  appointment  of  Rajabalabh 
as  Deputy  of  Behar.*  In  September  he  ordered  Ramnarayan  to 
be  delivered  into  Mir  Kasim's  hands.*  When  the  latter  had 
extracted  from  him  all  the  money  he  could,  he  had  him  put 
to  death,  as  a  signal  proof  of  how  little  English  protection 
availed  against  his  hostility. 

This  complaisance  marks  the  culminating  point  of  Vansittart's 
revolution.  He  had  been  jockeyed  into  naming  Mir  Kasim 
Nawab  ;  into  dismissing  the  Emperor  without  taking  advantage 
of  his  situation  ;  and  now  into  tacitly  surrendering  the  right  of 
interference  which  the  English  had  exercised.  From  this  time 
onwards  till  Mir  Kasim  had  been  driven  a  fugitive  out  of  the 
province,  military  force  was  the  sole  prop  of  the  English  position. 
The  checks  which  Clive  had  established  upon  the  Nawab 's 
power  had  been  removed  ;  and  it  was  now  certain  that,  unless 
the  EngUsh  would  be  content  to  relapse  into  the  position  they 
had  held  before  1756,  they  would  have  to  fight  for  it,  so  much 
had  they  lost  by  Holwell's  venal  policy  and  Vansittart's  blunder- 

'  Letter  to  Coote,  June  i8,  1761  {loc.  cit.,  f.  2020).  It  is  noteworthy  that 
according  to  the  Cal.  Pers.  Corr.,  vol.  i.  p.  108,  Vansittart  on  the  same  day  wrote 
to  Mir  Kasim  that  he  might  do  as  he  pleased  about  Ramnarayan. 

•  Dissent  of  Ellis  and  Amyatt,  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  June  18,  1761. 

»  Coote's  Journal,  June  27,  1761  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  viii.  f.  2017).     He  an- 
ounced  his  intentions  in  the  letter  to  the  Select  Committee  of  July  4  (Bengal 
\.  Cora.,  July  12,  1761). 

•  Carnac  to  Select  Committee,  July  7,  1761. 
'  Cal.  Pers.  Corr.,  vol.  i.  p.  117. 

•  Jbid.,  p.  122. 


212  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

ing  optimism.  He  had  set  out  to  strengthen  the  Nawab  ;  he 
had  done  so  with  a  vengeance.  To  the  outside  world  it 
appeared  that  he  must  either  have  been  moved  by  the 
Nawab's  wealth  or  be  a  man  of  astonishing  stupidity  and 
incredible  weakness 


-/ 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  DOWNFALL  OF  MIR  KASIM 

THE  remainder  of  Vansittart's  government  was,  and 
deserved  to  be,  a  government  of  troubles.  The  first 
sign  of  them  was  the  sudden  disappearance  of  three  of 
his  supporters.  One  of  the  last  acts  of  Clive's  government 
had  been  the  composition  of  a  letter  to  the  Court  of  Directors 
complaining  of  the  unmerited  asperity  of  recent  dispatches  and 
the  readiness  with  which  the  home  authorities  listened  to  the 
interested  slander  of  designing  persons.  ^  The  Company's  re- 
partee was  rather  vigorous  than  subtle.  It  dismissed  from  its 
service  every  person  who  had  signed  the  letter  of  complaint.  ^ 
Seven  of  the  ten  victims  had  gone  home  before  the  order  of 
dismissal  was  received  in  India.  The  disappearance  of  the 
three  who  remained  in  August  1761,  together  with  the  resigna- 
^^tion  of  another  member  soon  after,  destroyed  Vansittart's 
^bnajority. 

^B  The  leader  of  the  opposition  in  Council  was  Ellis,  a  Company's 
^■servant  but  recently  sent  to  Bengal.-''  He  was  a  man  of  strong 
^R>rejudices  and  unbending  temper.  Having  arrived  just  after 
^^he  revolution  had  been  effected,  he  had  quickly  ranged  himself 
among  the  number  of  its  critics,  and  had  been  an  indignant 
though  helpless  spectator  of  the  abandonment  of  Ramnarayan. 
The  Council  now  determined  to  send  him  as  Chief  to  Patna  in- 
stead of  the  dismissed  M'Gwire.  A  stormy  debate  arose  on  the 
subject  of  his  instructions.  Vansittart,  adopting  the  principle  of 
non-interference  in  all  its  severity,  proposed  that  he  should  be 
forbidden  to  protect  any  of  the  Nawab's  Ministers,  and  directed 
to  afford  any  military  assistance  the  Nawab  applied  for,  without 
a  discretionary  power  of  considering  the  purpose  of  the  ser- 

'  Bengal  to  the  Company,  December  29,  1759. 

*  Company  to  Bengal,  January  2 1,  1761. 

*  He  arrived  while  Vansittart  was  at  Murshidabad  in  October  1760  (Van- 
sittart's Narrative,  vol.  i.  p.  142). 

«I3 


214  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

vice  demanded.  These  instructious  were  carried  only  by  the 
Governor's  casting  vote.* 

It  was  about  this  time,  also,  that  a  subject,  which  became 
later  on  exceedingly  prominent,  first  rose  into  public  notice.  From 
the  time  when  the  Company  had  found  it  expedient  to  recognise 
the  private  trade  of  its  servants,  it  had  allowed  them  the  enjoy- 
ment of  those  commercial  privileges  which  had  been  granted 
to  itself.  In  Bengal,  therefore,  all  Enghsh  trade  was  exempt  from 
the  payment  of  those  numerous  transit  dues  which  were  levied  on 
entry  into  every  district,  and  clogged  the  exchange  of  every 
article  of  consumption.  To  protect  themselves  from  these  ex- 
actions, English  traders  or  their  agents  carried  with  them  a 
pass  (called  a  dastak)  with  the  Company's  seal,  declaring  the  goods 
to  be  English-owned. 

The  practice  had  occasioned  difficulties  from  time  to  time. 
Company's  servants  could  not  be  prevented  from  obtaining  passes 
and  selling  them  to  native  merchants.  Moreover,  there  was 
another  source  of  dispute  with  the  local  government.  The  para- 
wanas  and  farmans  defining  English  privileges  did  not  Umit  them 
to  any  special  variety  of  trade.  Thus  the  parawana  granted  to 
Littleton  says :  "  Let  their  goods  and  gomastahs  pass  by  land 
or  by  water  without  any  examination  or  demand  of  custom, 
that  they  may  trade  with  all  people."  ^  Again,  the  farraan  of 
Farrukh-siyar,  which  was  supposed  to  regulate  the  English  trade 
in  Bengal  up  to  the  year  1757,  merely  says :  "  We  .  .  .  have 
granted  you  our  Royal  Phirmaunds  for  the  currency  of  a  free 
trade  throughout  the  whole  empire."  *  So  far  as  words  went,  the 
English  therefore  were  granted  the  privilege  of  exemption  from 
duties,  ahke  in  articles  of  export  or  import,  and  in  those 
such  as  salt,  tobacco,  and  betel-nut,  which  formed  the  chief 
branches  of  the  internal  trade. 

However,  it  was  one  thing  to  obtain  an  Imperial  grant,  and 
quite  another  to  secure  its  observance.  The  same  emperor, 
Farrukh-siyar,  also  granted  permission  to  purchase  a  number  of 
villages  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Calcutta  and  the  privilege  of 
freely  using  the  royal  mint  at  Murshidabad.  But  when  Murshid 
Quli  Khan,  the  Subahdar,  was  desired  to  put  the  English  in  posses- 
sion of  their  rights,  he  exphcitly  and  publicly  refused.     What- 

'  The  instructions,  etc.,  are  printed  by  Vansittart  (Narrative,  vol.  i.  pp. 
292,  etc.). 

'  Wilkes'  Treaties,  No.  70  (I.O.,  Treaties,  vol.  i.). 
'  Loc.  cit.,  No  74. 


THE  DOWNFALL  OF  MIR  KASIM  215 

ever  the  farmans  may  grant,  he  said,  you  shall  neither  use  the 
mint  nor  purchase  the  villages.^  So  also  was  it  with  English  trade. 
The  same  Nawab  insisted  that  this  should  be  confined  to  articles 
of  export  and  import.^  Immediately  after  his  death,  the  English 
made  another  attempt  by  sending  salt  up  to  Patna  ;  but  this 
evoked  such  complaints  from  those  who  held  the  salt  monopoly  * 
that  the  Fort  William  Council  forbade  their  subordinates  to  trade 
in  salt.*  It  would  seem  that  this  order  was  not  implicitly  obeyed, 
for  four  years  later  the  English  chief  at  Kasimbazaar  was  required 
to  sign  a  document  agreeing  not  to  trade  in  salt,  etc.,  in  future. 
The  Council  protested  against  this  act  as  unauthorised.  "  We 
are  of  opinion  that  Mr.  Stackhouse  has  acted  very  unwarrantably 
in  giving  an  obligation  by  which  the  king's  Phirmaund  and 
Husbulhookum  are  annulled."  *  Mowever,  the  Company  was 
indisposed  to  defend  a  branch  of  trade  in  which  it  did  not  partici- 
pate. In  1748  it  wrote  :  "  Every  person  dealing  in  Bengal  salt 
or  any  other  reserved  or  prohibited  commodity,  contrary  to  the 
known  established  laws  of  the  country,  shall  be  dealt  with  as  if 
he  or  they  had  committed  a  fraud  in  the  dusticks."  *  Thus  before 
the  battle  of  Plassey,  English  trade  in  Bengal  was  limited,  not  by 
the  Imperial  grants,  but  by  the  Subahdar's  power.  The  Com- 
pany, not  being  interested,  acquiesced  in  this  limitation.  In 
spite  of  this,  the  Company's  servants  from  time  to  time  engaged 
in  it. 

Mir  Jafar's  sanad  of  1757  was  even  more  widely  worded  than 
any  of  its  predecessors.  "  Whatever  goods  the  Company's 
gumastahs  may  bring  or  carry  to  or  from  their  factories  .  .  . 
You  shall  neither  ask  for  nor  receive  any  sum  however  trifling 
on  the  same.  .  .  .  Whoever  acts  contrary  to  these  orders,  the 
English  have  power  to  punish  them."  '  There  are  reasons  for 
believing  that  this  wording  was  intentional.  "  The  President," 
we  read,  "  remembering  something  of  a  machulka  '  exacted  from 
Mr.  Stackhouse  when  Chief  of  Cossimbazar,  not  to  trade  for 
salt  or  goods  and  grain  not  designed  for  exportation,  ...  we 

'  Wilson's  English  in  Bengal,  vol.  ii.  p.  275. 

•  Stewart's  History  of  Bengal,  p.  402. 

•  Salt,  betel,  tobacco,  etc.,  formed  Government  monopolies  which  were 
farmed  out  to  renters. 

*  Bengal  Pub.  Cons.,  September  18  and  October  9,  1737. 
'  Ibid.,  November  22,  1731. 

*  Company  to  Bengal,  June  17,  1748. 
'  Sanad  dated  July  15,  1757. 

'  Obligation. 


216  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

have  desired  the  gentlemen  at  Muxadavad  to  have  the  above- 
mentioned  machulka  .  .  .  made  null  and  void,  as  we  are  not 
restrained  in  these  particulars  by  the  Phirmaund."  *  Clive  re- 
plied, "...  We  are  searching  after  the  muchilka  exacted 
from  Mr.  Stackhouse,  and,  when  obtained,  shall  render  it  invalid 
by  an  article  in  the  treaty."  ^  It  appears  therefore  that  in  1757 
the  old  Umitation  of  English  trade  by  the  Nawab's  power  was 
remembered  and  resented  ;  and  that  the  Nawab's  sanad  was 
so  drafted  as  to  authorise  the  English  to  carry  on  trade  of 
any  sort,  but  without  any  express  authorisation  of  the  inland 
trade. 

The  actual  conduct  of  the  trade  during  Clive's  first  govern- 
ment was  the  subject  of  lively  controversy,  Scratton  denying, 
Vansittart  asserting,  that  Clive  had  permitted  it.  What  is 
certain  is  that  it  was  practised  by  the  EngUsh  and  complained 
of  by  Mir  Jafar.  Except  in  the  letter  quoted  above,  Clive  seems 
to  have  set  his  face  against  it.  "  It  is  equally  our  duty,"  he 
wrote  in  July  1757,  "  to  avoid  all  deviations  or  encroachments 
contrary  to  the  real  intent  and  meaning  of  the  privileges  enjoyed 
by  the  English  "  ;  ^  and  again  :  "  The  Phousdar  of  Hugh  has  also 
represented  to  the  Colonel  that  boats  frequently  pass  under 
English  colours  with  a  Bengal  writing  but  no  dustick."  *  Clive's 
view  seems  to  have  been  that  the  Enghsh  had  obtained  no  new 
commercial  privileges  by  the  establishment  of  Mir  Jafar  ;  and  he 
is  said  to  have  obtained  a  special  parawana  from  the  Nawab  for 
special  individuals  as  a  favour.  But  while  he  was  no  doubt  right 
in  holding  that  the  English  had  acquired  no  new  privileges,  he 
seems  to  have  avoided  expressing  a  clear  opinion  on  the  matter. 
It  was,  moreover,  open  to  argument  whether  the  English  were  not 
now  in  a  position  to  enjoy  those  privileges  which,  though  long 
acquired,  they  had  been  hitherto  restrained  from  enjoying.  This 
argument  was  plausible  enough  for  the  Company's  servants  to 
believe  they  had  every  right  to  pursue  the  inland  trade  untaxed. 
In  short,  self-interest  led  them  into  a  position  which  from  a 
narrow  point  of  view  seems  to  have  been  justified,  but  which  was 
politically  inexpedient. 

The  matter  seems  at  no  time  to  have  been  formally  discussed 
while  Clive  occupied  the  chair  ;    but  Holwell's  accession  was 

•  Bengal  to  the  Company,  August  20,  1757. 

'  Clive,  etc.,  toCouncil,  August  19,  1757  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  x.  i.  2454). 

•  Clive,  etc.,  toCouncil,  July  31,  1757  (loc.  cit.,  x.  f.  2450). 

•  Same  to  same,  September  13,  1757  (loc.  cit.,  i.  2460). 


THE  DOWNFALL  OF  MIR  KASIM  217 

taken  by  the  Nawab  as  a  suitable  occasion  to  state  his  objection 
to  the  English  sharing  untaxed  in  the  internal  trade  of  Bengal. 
This  he  did  in  a  parawana  addressed  to  the  Council,  not  as  usual 
to  the  Governor.  Holwell  refused  to  reply  to  this  irregular 
communication,  but  inquired  through  Hastings  "  on  what 
pretence  we  are  prohibited  trading  in  the  two  articles  of  salt  and 
betel-nut."  *  Hastings'  reply  explains  clearly  the  situation  at 
the  moment.  "  The  perwannah  to  the  Council  upon  the  subject 
of  the  Salt  and  Betel  trade  were  wrote  at  the  desire  of  the  Colonel,^ 
who  referred  him  to  the  Board  for  a  positive  answer,  not  chusing 
(I  believe)  to  give  him  a  direct  denial  or  perhaps  not  having 
sufficiently  considered  the  nature  of  the  Nabob's  claim.  .  .  . 
With  regard  to  the  Nabob's  demands  for  excluding  the  Company 
from  the  Salt  and  Betel  trade,  I  took  the  Uberty  to  remonstrate 
strongly  [about]  them  to  the  Colonel,  when  the  Nabob  first  broke 
the  subject  to  him.  The  reasons  alleged  in  favour  of  his  claim 
were  that  these  articles  were  farmed  and  that  the  English  were 
prohibited  from  trading  in  these  articles  before  the  Revolution. 
But  the  same  rules  will  lay  the  Company  under  the  same  re- 
strictions in  regard  to  grain,  sugar,  and  almost  every  branch  of 
their  trade,  which  either  in  the  first  or  last  manufactory  always 
paid  a  duty  to  the  Government  contrary  to  the  express  tenor  of 
the  Phirmaund,  which  by  continual  encroachments  became  almost 
of  no  validity  ;  and  I  think  we  have  been  at  the  expense  of  so 
much  blood  and  treasure  to  little  purpose  if  we  are  to  be  bound 
by  precedents  drawn  from  the  abject  state  in  which  we  remained 
before  the  battle  of  Plassey. 

"  I  believe  we  have  for  a  long  time  past  indirectly  given  up 
our  rights  to  the  Salt  trade  (though  I  am  not  clear  that  any 
concession  of  that  kind  was  actually  made  by  the  Colonel)  by 
sending  that  up  the  country  with  the  Buxbunder's  rowanas,' 
which  method  had  constantly  been  practised  by  such  of  the 
Company's  servants  as  have  had  any  concern  in  the  trade.  .  .  . 
But  the  Company's  servants  (particularly  the  gentlemen  at 
Dacca)  have  traded  in  betel-nut  (though  with  interruption  from 
the  Shahbunder  and  other  officers)  ever  since  the  Revolution. 
.  .  .  Whether  the  Company's  title  to  a  free  trade  in  salt  ought 
to  be  insisted  upon,  as  it  has  been  long  discussed,  and  as  it  will 

'Holwell  to  Hastings,  February  ii,   1760  (Vansittart's  Narrative,  vol.  i. 
P-  31)- 

*  Clive,  who  had  gone  to  Murshidabad  to  pay  a  farewell  visit  to  Mir  Jafar. 

*  I.e.,  the  Customs-Collector's  permits. 


218  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

cause  so  great  a  loss  to  the  Buxbunder's  revenues,  I  will  not 
presume  to  determine."  ^ 

It  was  determined,  though  not  apparently  by  any  formal 
resolution,  that  the  English  had  a  full  right  to  participate  in  the 
inland  trade  on  the  same  terms  as  they  imported  and  exported 
goods  from  the  province.  And  this  doubtless  furnished  another 
cause  of  ill-feeling  between  Mir  Jafar  and  Council,  although,  so 
far  as  I  know,  it  is  not  again  alluded  to.  This  trade  quickly 
took  on  a  considerable  extension,  for  native  merchants  bought 
the  privilege  of  trading  under  the  names  of  Company's  servants, 
so  that  more  than  one  young  writer  was  enabled  without  exer- 
tion and  without  capital  to  drive  his  curricle  on  the  course, 
clothe  himself  in  fine  raiment,  and  fare  sumptuously  every  day.'' 
This  system  was  already  in  operation  when  Vansittart  reached 
Calcutta.  He  adopted  it  and  employed  therein  the  private 
fortune  which  he  brought  up  with  him  from  Madras. 

Whatever  may  have  been  Mir  Jafar's  expectations  when  he 
became  Nawab  in  1757,  Mir  Kasim  was  perfectly  well  acquainted 
with  the  English  interpretation  of  their  privileges  when  he 
replaced  his  father-in-law  in  1760  ;  and  his  conduct  in  regard 
to  the  inland  trade  plainly  manifests  the  development  of  his 
project  of  emancipation  from  English  control.  In  other  words, 
the  Enghsh  inland  trade  was  not  a  cause  of  the  ultimate  breach 
between  them  and  the  Nawab,  but  an  admirable  pretext  which 
he  found  ready  to  hand  for  distressing  them.  They,  on  the 
other  hand,  would  have  been  well  advised  not  to  have  afforded 
him  so  good  an  excuse. 

At  first  Mir  Kasim,  so  far  from  resenting  the  Enghsh  trade, 
was  actually  stirred  on  to  a  more  vigorous  discharge  of  his  duties 
by  Vansittart,  who  desired  him  to  order  his  customs-people  to 
maintain  a  sharper  watch  for  those  who  improperly  used  the 
English  flag  to  cover  their  goods.  ^  The  series  of  complaints 
does  not  begin  until  December  1761,  when  the  Emperor  and  Ram- 
narayan  had  been  got  rid  of  and  the  Governor  was  at  acute 
variance  with  the  greater  part  of  his  Council.  We  hear  of  new 
customs-posts  being  established,  of  Enghsh  boats  being  stopped 
in  spite  of  their  having  the  Company's  dastaks.*     A  couple  of 

>  Hastings  to  Holwell,  February  19,  1760  (Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  29096,  fi.  223 
verso,  etc.). 

'  Verelst,  p.  8. 

»  Vansittart  to  Mir  Kasim,  July  i6,  1761  (Cal.  Pers.  Corr.,  vol.  i.  p.  1 13)- 

*  Cal.  Prrs.  Corr.,  vol.  i.  137. 


THE  DOWNFALL  OF  MIR  KASIM  219 

months  later  Vansittart  demands  that  all  customs-people  shall 
be  required  to  recognise  the  English  passes.^  In  May  1762 
comes  Mir  Kasim's  earliest  recorded  complaint  of  the  misconduct 
of  the  native  agents  of  the  English. ^  Vansittart,  firmly  clinging 
to  his  optimistic  belief  in  the  Nawab's  unalterable  gratitude, 
considered  that  Mir  Kasim  was  only  making  himself  uneasy 
about  small  matters,  and  that  any  disquiet  could  be  removed 
by  a  personal  interview.^  But  from  this  time  forward  com- 
plaints doubled  and  redoubled.  The  Nawab's  people  obstructed 
English  trade  ;  the  EngUsh  righted  themselves  by  force  ;  the 
Nawab  claimed  the  right  to  administer  justice  himself. 

This  was  a  definite  mark  of  his  emancipation.  "  The  doing 
ourselves  justice,"  says  Scrafton,  "  in  matters  of  Phirmaund 
privilege  was  a  power  we  always  exercised  ;  I  remember  a  multi- 
tude of  instances  in  former  times,  and  often  practised  it  after 
Mir  Jafhr's  accession  without  any  complaint  from  him  or  any 
superiors."  *  In  this  case  even  the  heat  of  controversy  did  not 
hurry  Scrafton  beyond  the  truth.  It  was  a  privilege  expressly 
sanctioned,  as  we  have  seen,  by  the  sanad  of  Mir  Jafar  ;  and  a 
letter  of  Hastings  shows  what  was  done  while  Clive  was  still 
Governor  of  Bengal.  "  All  the  satisfaction  I  can  give  you  in 
this  affair,"  he  writes,  "  is  to  advise  you  in  future  to  oppose 
every  insult  offered  you  or  your  people  with  force,  but  be  very 
careful  that  your  banyans,  etc.,  do  not  abuse  your  name  and 
the  Enghsh  protection  in  oppressing  or  injuring  any  persons. 
...  To  be  perpetually  complaining  to  the  Nabob  renders  us 
too  little  and  mean  in  his  eyes.  ...  If  you  have  not  a  force 
capable  of  protecting  you  and  your  servants  from  insults,  you 
should  apply  for  it."  ^ 

Mir  Kasim  had  not  revoked  the  sanction  which  his  prede- 
cessor had  plainly  accorded  to  this  practice  ;  but  he  now  behaved 
as  though  it  were  a  sudden  and  grievous  innovation,  jnade  by 
personal  enemies  resolved  upon  his  overthrow.  But  indeed 
the  whole  spirit  of  the  administration  had  changed.  The  new 
deputyat  Patna  refused  to  visit  Ellis  without  the  Nawab's  orders.* 
There  were  mutual  complaints  of   misbehaviour   by  both   the 

'  Cal.  Pers.  Corr.,  vol.  i.  p.  149. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  i5i. 

•  Vansittart  to  Hastings,  June  11,  1762  (Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  29132,  f.  209). 

*  Scrafton's  Observations  on  Mr.  Vansittart's  Narrative,  p.  34. 

'  Hastings  to  Hugh  Watts,  August  29,  1759  (Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  29096, 
f.  \y^ verso). 

•  Vansittart  toMir  Kasim,  December  19,  1761  (Cal.  Pers.  Corr.,  vol.  i.  p.  138). 


220  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

Nawab's  and  English  servants  in  Purnea.  An  Armenian  in  Mir 
Kasim's  service  infringed  the  EngUsh  monopoly  of  saltpetre  ;  Ellis 
sent  him  down  to  Calcutta  in  irons  ;  and  when  later  he  desired 
the  Nawab  to  prohibit  his  servants  from  interfering  with  English 
goods,  Mir  Kasim  answered,  "  Since  my  servants  are  subjected 
to  such  insults,  my  writing  can  be  of  no  use.  .  .  .  How  much 
my  government  and  authority  are  weakened  by  these  proceed- 
ings I  cannot  describe." 

Immediately  after  this  came  the  affair  of  the  deserters.  It 
was  reported  to  Ellis  that  two  European  deserters  had  found 
refuge  in  the  fort  of  Monghyr.  Thereon  he  desired  Rajabalabh 
to  write  to  the  Killedar,  and  sent  a  sergeant  with  a  company 
of  sepoys  to  bring  the  men  back.  The  sergeant,  however,  was 
not  admitted  into  the  fort,  whereon  Elhs  directed  the  party 
to  remain  before  Monghyr.  This  the  Nawab  represented  as 
sending  sepoys  to  attack  the  place,  and  demanded  ElUs's  punish- 
ment for  lessening  his  character.^ 

About  this  time  too  it  began  to  be  rumoured  that  the  Nawab 
had  entered  into  an  alliance  with  the  Nawab  of  Oudh  against 
the  English.  "  The  Nabob,"  wrote  Shitab  Rai  to  Coote,  "  is 
such  an  enemy  to  your  gentlemen  that  he  has  prevailed  on  the 
Nabob  Vizier  '^  to  put  a  stop  to  all  correspondence  with  the 
English  ;  ...  he  is  endeavoiu-ing  to  root  out  the  English,  and 
his  intentions  are  very  bad  ;  it  is  unnecessary  for  me  to  write 
this,  for  you  will  have  heard  it  from  many  others."  '  Hastings 
and  Vansittart  both  believed  in  the  innocence  of  the  Nawab's 
intentions  ;  *  but  that  view  is  scarcely  borne  out  by  subsequent 
events.  Mir  Kasim  was  bent  on  estabUshing  his  independence — 
an  object  neither  surprising  nor  reprehensible,  but  certain  sooner 
or  later  to  bring  him  into  armed  conflict  with  the  EngUsh.  Van- 
sittart and  Hastings  were  grievously  to  blame  for  missing  this 
cardinal  fact  in  the  situation  ;  their  opponents,  Ellis  and  his 
friends,  were  equally  blameworthy,  for,  though  right  in  their 
main  contention  of  the  Nawab's  latent  hostility,  their  hasty 
conduct  and  selfish  purposes  obscured  the  essentially  inevitable 
nature  of  the  subsequent  war,  for  which  Mir  Kasim  had  long 
been  preparing.     So  early  as  May  1761,  Vansittart  had  remon- 

'  Cal.  Pers.  Corr.,  vol.  i.  pp.  149,  152,  153,  155.  Rajabalabh  subsequently 
denied  sending  any  letter,  but  it  is  definitely  asserted  that  he  had  promised  to 
do  so. 

•  I.e.,  the  Nawab  of  Oudh,  whom  Shah  Alam  had  named  Wazir. 

•  Shitab  Rai  to  Coote,  received  March  12,  1762  (OrmeMSS.,  India,  v.  £.  1322). 

•  See  Hastings'  letters  printed  in  Gleig's  Memoir,  vol.  i.  pp.  1 1  i-i  14. 


THE  DOWNFALL  OF  MIR  KASIM  221 

strated  with  the  Nawab  about  his  military  estabhshment,  re- 
minding him  of  a  former  declaration  that  he  would  not  maintain 
more  than  five  or  six  thousand  horse. ^  But  he  passed  over  without 
comment  Mir  Kasim's  subsequent  reorganisation  of  his  army, 
the  purpose  of  which  was  evidently  to  free  himself  from  de- 
pendence on  English  forces.  This  is  characteristic  of  the 
weakness  of  Vansittart's  policy.  He  aimed  at  strengthening 
the  Nawab,  and  this  could  only  be  done  at  the  expense  of  the 
English. 

Meanwhile,  Hastings  was  sent  up  to  the  Nawab  to  endeavour 
to  reconcile  matters.^  But  the  only  result  of  his  mission  was  to 
persuade  the  Nawab  to  revoke  the  orders  he  had  at  first  given, 
forbidding  the  new  Deputy  of  Behar  to  pay  Ellis  the  usual  com- 
plimentary visit.  He  also  convinced  himself  that  the  method 
he  had  formerly  recommended,  of  the  English  themselves  punish- 
ing those  who  stopped  their  boats,  had  become  impracticable. 

There  were  two  reasons  why  a  practice,  unwise  in  itself, 
should  have  become  obviously  impossible.  One  was  the  known 
ill-feeling  between  the  Nawab  and  a  large  party  of  the  English, 
which  prompted  native  officials  to  obstruct  their  trade  ;  the 
other  was  the  misconduct  of  the  native  agents  of  the  English, 
who  gave  every  excuse  for  interference.  This  latter,  Vansittart 
made  efforts  to  correct,  but  wholly  without  success.  As  a  last 
resort  he  himself  paid  a  visit  to  the  Nawab  at  the  close  of  the  year. 
There  he  agreed  to  a  new  arrangement,  to  regularise  the  duties 
which  the  EngUsh  had  as  a  rule  actually  paid  on  their  inland 
trade,  and  to  settle  a  method  of  deciding  the  disputes  which 
constantly  arose  between  the  Nawab's  officers  and  the  English 
agents.  The  first  was  fixed  at  9  per  cent.,  whereas  an  ordinary 
native  merchant  carrying  salt  to  Patna  would  have  to  pay  30  to 

'  Cal.  Pers.  Corr.,  vol.  i.  p.  loi. 

•  His  dispatch  was  the  occasion  of  a  curious  incident  which  shows  how  high 
feeling  ran  at  that  time.  Amyatt  unkindly  proposed  that  Hastings  should  be 
instructed  to  ask  Mir  Kasim  to  pay  to  the  Company  the  20  lakhs  he  had  promised 
the  Select  Committee  in  1760.  In  reply,  Vansittart  recorded  a  long  minute 
(printed  in  his  Narrative,  vol.  ii.  pp.  29,  etc.)  narrating  his  various  refusals  of 
money  and  enumerating  the  payments  already  made  by  Mir  Kasim  to  the  Com- 
pany, but  wholly  neglecting  the  fact  (known  of  course  to  Amyatt  and  his  friends) 
that  large  sums  had  already  been  paid  by  Mir  Kasim  to  the  Select  Committee. 
It  does  not  appear  definitely  stated  that  Vansittart  had  received  any  present  at 
this  time,  but  when  the  Nawab  was  giving  away  lakhs  to  Holwell,  Sumner,  and 
the  rest,  it  is  odd  if  the  President  did  not  participate  in  his  generosity.  Van- 
sittart altogether  lacked  Clive's  courage.  Clive  beyond  a  doubt  would  have 
retorted.  Why  ask  the  Nawab  to  pay  money  twice  over  ?  Vansittart  shrank 
from  doing  so. 


222  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

40  per  cent.  In  case  of  disputes  arising,  the  faujdars,  or  native 
officers  of  justice,  were  to  decide  them  and  report  their  pro- 
ceedings to  the  Nawab.i  Vansittart  imprudently  celebrated  this 
agreement  by  accepting  7  lakhs  of  rupees  from  Mir  Kasim. 
Part  of  this  seems  to  have  been  a  refund  for  certain  advances 
which  he  had  made  ;  ^  but  the  greater  part  of  the  amount  con- 
sisted of  a  present  from  the  Nawab  to  the  Governor. 

It  had  been  understood  that  this  agreement  should  only  be 
published  and  enforced  after  Vansittart  had  returned  to  Cal- 
cutta and  submitted  it  to  the  Council.  Instead  of  doing  so,  Mir 
Kasim  at  once  notified  his  officers.  He  also  directed  them  to 
show  special  favour  to  Vansittart 's  agents.*  This  combined  with 
the  present  gave  the  opposition  party  an  excuse  for  charging  the 
Governor  with  corrupt  motives  in  agreeing  to  allow  the  Nawab's 
officers  jurisdiction  over  EngUsh  concerns.  The  charge  was 
unfoimded  ;  but  the  subordination  of  the  English  to  the  native 
government  was  a  poUtical  retrocession  comparable  in  its  effects 
with  the  withdrawal  of  protection  from  Ramnarayan,  and  in 
fact  formed  the  culminating  point  of  Mir  Kasim's  success  in 
attempting  to  establish  political  independence.  The  first  made 
every  official  of  the  Circar  dependent  upon  his  pleasure  ;  the 
second  placed  English  trade  altogether  under  his  control.  The 
use  he  intended  to  make  of  his  power  may  be  gathered  from  the 
demand  he  shortly  made  on  Vansittart,  that  the  English  should 
cease  from  trading  with  old-established  merchants.* 

The  news  of  the  agreement  was  received  by  the  Council  with 
indignation.  It  was  voted  that  Vansittart  had  exceeded  his 
powers  in  making  it,  and  that  all  absent  members,  except  the 
chiefs  of  Patna  and  Chittagong  owing  to  the  remoteness  of  those 
places,  should  be  summoned  to  consider  the  situation  thus 
created.*  It  was  resolved  that  the  English  should  trade  duty- 
free except  for  a  tax  of  a^per  cent,  on  salt,  and  that  English  agents 
should  be  liable  to  English  control  only.  As  the  Nawab  would 
not  agree,  it  was  decided  to  send  Amyatt  and  Hay  to  Monghyr 
to  represent  to  him  the  Enghsh  claims." 

It  has  been  usual  to  condemn  this  resolution  in  the  most 
emphatic  terms.     The  Councillors  are  represented  as  having  been 

'  Vansittart  and  Hastings  to  Council,  December  15,  1762. 

'  Sel.  Com.  Rep.  I  (2),  App.  80-81. 

'  Mir  Kasim  to  the  Naib  of  Dacca,  n.d.  (loc.  cit.,  App.  34). 

*  Mir  Kasim  to  Vansittart,  February  22,  1763  (loc.  cit.,  App.  39). 

*  Bengal  Pub.  Cons.,  January  1 7,  1 763. 

*  Sec  their  instructions,  March  28,  1763  (Sel.  Com.  Rep.  i  (2),  App.  40). 


THE  DOWNFALL  OF  MIR  KASIM  223 

inspired  solely  by  their  private  interests  to  adopt  a  course  utterly 
at  variance  with  the  public  welfare.  There  are,  however,  reasons 
for  modifying  this  sweeping  judgment.  In  the  first  place,  the 
Councillors  were  claiming  a  right  which  they  beUeved  with  some 
show  of  reason  to  have  been  long  granted  and  unjustly  withheld. 
Secondly.the  system  of  differential  advantageswhich  they  claimed 
for  themselves  had  not  in  India  that  extraordinary  appearance 
which  it  possessed  even  in  eighteenth-century  Europe.  It  was 
of  the  very  nature  of  the  Muslim  government  to  make  such 
differentiations,  to  exempt  the  true  believer  and  levy  duties  from 
the  infidel.  The  English  were  claiming  from  the  Muhammadans 
treatment  such  as  the  latter  had  accorded  to  themselves.  Thirdly, 
it  was  not  so  much  exemption  from  fixed  and  regular  duties  that 
was  claimed,  but  exemption  from  the  wholly  indeterminate 
demands  of  the  revenue  officials.  The  Sayar  revenues,  as  these 
internal  transit  dues  were  called,  were  farmed  out  along  with  the 
other  branches  of  revenue  ;  and  the  farmers  collected  as  much  as 
they  could.  Such  considerations  must  be  borne  in  mind  in 
judging  the  English  demand  of  exemption  from  the  internal 
duties  of  Bengal.  It  did  not  shock  the  commercial  ideas  of 
India  as  it  did  those  of  Europe  ;  and  part  of  the  condemnation 
it  has  received  was  due  to  viewing  the  matter  from  a  false  stand- 
point. Another  point  also  must  be  remembered.  These  internal 
duties  formed  but  a  small  part  of  the  total  circar  collections  ; 
and  the  liberty  claimed  by  the  English  did  not  embarrass  the 
Nawab's  finances  nearly  so  much  as  has  been  pretended.  Lastly, 
it  has  been  said  that  this  privilege  involved  making  over  to  the 
English  the  whole  internal  trade  of  the  province.  That  is 
evidently  absurd.  The  Enghsh  did  not  possess  capital  enough 
to  monopohse  the  trade. 

In  short,  sordid,  paltry,  and  indefensible  as  this  policy  seems 
in  modern  eyes,  it  was  not  so  inexcusable  in  India  in  1763,  when 
moreover  it  had,  in  the  eyes  of  its  advocates,  the  added  merit 
of  opposing  that  plan  of  strengthening  the  Nawab  which  Van- 
sittart  had  inaugurated  in  1760.  Ellis  and  Amyatt  had  long  been 
firmly  convinced  that  Mir  Kasini  was  not  the  sincere  friend  that 
Vansittart  and  Hastings  believed  him  to  be.  He  had  removed 
his  usual  residence  from  Murshidabad  to  the  remote  city  of 
Monghyr  ;  he  had  assiduously  formed  and  trained  an  army  of  his 
own  instead  of  relying  on  his  Enghsh  allies  ;  he  had  removed  every 
friend  of  the  Enghsh  from  his  administration  ;  he  had  entered 
into  obscure  and  threatening  relations  with  the  Nawab  of  Oudh  ; 


224  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

his  officers  no  longer  displayed  that  respect  for  the  English  which 
had  been  customary  under  the  government  of  CUve.  When  to 
all  these  he  added  what  appeared  to  thera  an  invincible  hostihty 
to  English  commerce,  they  believed  firmly  that  either  the  Nawab 
must  be  overthrown  or  the  English  must  quit  Bengal.  Iheir 
demands  were  intended  to  determine  whether  Mir  Kasim  would 
recede  from  his  position  or  whether  the  question  must  be  decided 
by  the  event  of  war.  Such  was  the  object  of  Amyatt's  mission 
to  Monghyr. 

The  Nawab  understood  it  very  differently.  He  remembered 
the  mission  of  Vansittart  and  Caillaud  to  Murshidabad  in  1760, 
and  demanded  that  Amyatt's  escort  should  be  sent  back  ;  ^  he 
remembered  the  plot  of  1757,  and  seized  the  Seths,  whose  fate 
was  sealed  by  Vansittart's  intercession  on  their  behalf.^  On 
May  15,  Amyatt  presented  the  Council's  demands  to  the  Nawab.* 
On  May  26  he  returned  an  answer  which  rejected  every  one  of 
them.  On  the  previous  day  six  boats  with  muskets  for  the  Patna 
garrison  had  been  stopped  at  Mongh)^-  by  the  Nawab's  orders.* 
Although  the  English  envoys  still  lingered  at  Monghjn:  exposed 
to  almost  daily  insults/  this  was  in  fact  the  Nawab's  declaration 
of  war.  At  last,  on  June  22  or  23,  Amyatt  with  his  suite  was 
allowed  to  set  out,  leaving  Hay  behind  as  a  hostage  for  the 
Nawab's  people  in  Calcutta.  But  then  the  war  was  on  the  very 
point  of  beginning. 

Indeed  the  Nawab  had  considered  himself  at  war  with  the 
English  ever  since  Vansittart's  agreement  had  been  rejected  by 
the  Council.*  Some  time  before  he  had  caused  the  gate  at 
Patna,  close  to  the  English  factory  lying  just  outside  the  walls, 
to  be  closed  and  stockaded.  In  March  he  began  collecting 
troops  at  that  city.**  In  June  he  set  emissaries  upon  seducing 
Ellis's  sepoys  and  Europeans  to  desert.''  On  June  21  he  dis- 
patched from  Monghyr  a  fresh  body  of  troops  for  Patna  under 

'  Cal.  Pers.  Corr.,  vol.  i.  pp.  209-210. 
»  Op.  cit.,  vol.  i.  p.  211  ;  cf.  p.  215. 

•  Op.  cit.,  vol.  i.  p.  218  ;   Amyatt,  etc.,  to  Council,  May  18,  1763  (Sel.  Com. 
Rep.,  I  (2),  App.  44). 

•  Cal.  Pers.  Corr.,  vol.  i.  p.  220  ;  Amyatt,  etc.,  to  Council,  May  26,  1763  (Sel. 
Com.  Rep.,  i  (2),  App.  45). 

'  Letter  from  Amyatt,  etc.,  of  June  14,  ap.  Bengal  Cons.,  June  23,  1763  (Sel. 
Com.  Rep.,  1  (2),  App.  52). 

•  Amyatt,  etc.,  to  Council,  May  18,  1763  {he.  cit.,  App.  44). 
'  Ellis,  etc.,  to  Council,  April  5,  1763  {he.  cit.,  App.  41). 

'  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  June  17,  1763  {he.  cit.,  App.  50) ;  cf.  Mir  Kasim's  letters 
to  the  Naib  of  Patna  (Orroe  MSS.,  Various,  21,  fi.  213,  etc.). 


THE  DOWNFALL  OF  MIR  KASIM  225 

an  Armenian,  Khwaja  Markar.^    The  news  of  this  would  have 
reached  Patna  on  June  24. 

Some  time  previously  the  English  Council  had  debated  what 
should  be  done  at  Patna  in  the  event  of  a  rupture  with  Mir 
Kasim.  The  English  factory  there  was  untenable  if  attacked 
from  the  city  ;  and,  moreover,  the  hospital  with  their  sick  and 
surgeons  lay  within  the  walls.  The  forces  there  could  not  be 
assisted  from  Calcutta  without  a  long  delay  ;  and  it  was  agreed, 
in  the  event  of  war,  that  their  only  course  of  safety  was  to  seize 
the  city  itself  and  defend  it  against  Mir  Kasim.  By  what  means, 
however,  was  Elhs  to  be  informed  of  the  outbreak  of  war  ? 
Major  Adams,  an  officer  of  Coote's,  at  that  time  in  command, 
considered  that  Ellis  should  seize  the  city  if  the  Nawab  moved 
towards  it  without  apparent  reason  ;  Council,  however,  decided 
that  ElUs,  unless  attacked,  should  attempt  nothing  until  he  had 
received  news  of  war  from  Calcutta.  In  reply,  ElUs  pointed  out 
that  news  took  twelve  days  to  reach  Patna  from  Calcutta,  that 
he  could  neither  defend  the  factory  nor  meet  the  Nawab's  troops 
in  the  open,  and  that  "  our  safety  lies  in  mastering  the  city  by 
a  coup  de  main  before  the  Nabob  gets  into  it."  ^  On  the  news 
of  Markar's  advance,  Ellis  therefore  seized  the  city.  This  was 
on  the  morning  of  June  25.  But  the  troops  dispersed  to  plunder. 
Markar,  meeting  with  the  dispossessed  Killedar  and  his  flying 
troops,  induced  them  to  return  I.0  the  attack ;  and  the  English 
were  expelled  from  the  city  as  easily  as  they  had  conquered  it. 
That  evening  170  Europeans  and  1200  sepoys  mustered  in  the 
EngUsh  factory.  It  was  resolved  to  retreat  into  Oudh.  But 
they  were  pursued,  surrounded,  and  forced  to  surrender.'  They 
evidently  had  not  been  kept  under  as  good  discipline  as  they 
should  have  been.  The  affair  was  ill  managed ;  but  had  not 
Ellis  attacked,  he  would  have  been  attacked  on  the  following 
day.  Meanwhile,  Amyatt  and  his  party  had  been  intercepted 
at  Murshidabad ;  they  attempted  a  vain  resistance  ;  on  July  3 
Amyatt  and  the  commander  of  his  escort  were  killed  ;  and 
Amyatt's  head  was  sent  to  the  Nawab  at  Monghyr.* 

'  Bengal  Cons.,  July  5,  1763  (loc.  cit.,  App.  55)  ;  cf.  Gentil,  Mimoires,  pp. 
211,  etc. 

•Bengal  Cons.,  April  14,  1763  ;  Ellis,  etc.,  to  Council,  April  24,  1763  (Sel. 
Com.  Rep.,  i  (2),  App.  42-43). 

'See  FuUerton's  Narrative  (Orme  MSS.,  Various,  21,  ff.  113,  etc.);  Grant's 
Journal  {loc.  cit.,  4,  fi.  23,  etc.);  and  the  anonymous  Narrative  {loc. cit.,  84,  S.  7, etc.). 

*  Orme  MSS.,  Various,  21,  fi.  139,  etc.,  and  84,  f.  51.  Mir  Kasim  disclaimed 
the  issue  of  orders  for  his  murder. 

15 


226  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

This  news  reached  Calcutta  on  July  4,  and  at  once  composed 
the  dissensions  which  had  led  even  to  violence  at  the  Council 
table. ^  On  July  8  the  restoration  of  Mir  Jafar  was  proclaimed, 
and  war  was  declared  against  Mir  Kasim.  Vansittart's  experi- 
ment of  non-intervention  had  at  last  broken  down. 

In  all,  after  the  reverse  at  Patna,  the  English  disposed  of 
some  1 100  European  troops,  4000  sepojrs,  and  a  small  body  of 
horse. ^  These  were  to  encounter  15,000  to  20,000  men,  of  whom 
the  cavalry  were  picked,  horsemen  and  the  infantry  had  been 
sedulously  trained  after  the  European  manner.^  On  June  10 
Adams  took  command  of  the  EngUsh  army,  and  next  day  began 
his  march  on  Murshidabad,  though  hampered  by  a  shortage 
of  baggage-cattle.*  The  first  of  a  long  series  of  successes  took 
place  near  Kutwa  on  the  19th,  when  the  enemy,  estimated  from 
7000  to  12,000  strong,  after  a  general  engagement  "  flew  before 
us,"  the  EngUsh  pursuing  them  for  three  hours.*  On  the 
24th  the  enemy  abandoned  with  Uttle  resistance  the  entrench- 
ments they  had  made  to  cover  Murshidabad,  and  a  second  time 
that  capital  beheld  a  Nawab's  army  flying  from  British  troops.* 
On  August  2  Adams  came  up  with  a  larger  body  than  he  had 
hitherto  engaged.  This  action  was  very  stubbornly  contested. 
Early  in  the  day  the  English  lost  five  guns,  which  they  only 
recovered  when  the  enemy  abandoned  their  position  about 
midday,  after  a  fight  that  had  lasted  four  hours,  leaving  twenty- 
three  guns  behind  them.'  Continuing  his  advance,  Adams  on 
August  II  arrived  before  the  extensive  works  which  had  been 
constructed  at  UdanaUa,  where  marshes  narrowed  still  further 
the  gorge  between  the  Ganges  and  the  hills  of  Rajmahal.  Here 
regular  approaches  had  to  be  made  and  batteries  raised.     The 

'  Batson  had  alluded  to  Vanslttart  and  Hastings  as  the  Nawab's  retained 
solicitors,  and  in  the  altercation  which  followed  struck  Hastings  (Bengal  Cons., 
June  10,  1763). 

'  Rumbold  to  R.  Smith,  February  3,  1764  (OrmeMSS.,  Various,  21,  f.  191). 

'  Mir  Kasim  had  been  "  allowed  to  discipline  it  in  the  European  manner  under 
our  eye  and  even  assisted  with  arms  from  ourselves  at  a  time  when  there  was  no 
prospect  of  the  tranquillity  of  the  country  being  disturbed  "  (Rumbold  to  R. 
Smith,  loc.  cit.,  f.  182). 

■•  Grant's  Journal  (Orme  MSS.,  Various,  4,  f.  10,  etc.). 

'  Grant's  Journal  {he.  cit.,  f.  15)  and  Adams'  Journal  (Orme  MSS..  India,  vii. 
f.  1744).  Broome  (p.  372)  follows  the  Siyar-ul-Mutaquerin  in  describing  it  as  a 
desperate  action  only  decided  by  the  death  of  Mir  Kasim's  general.  The  Journals 
above  cited  suggest  nothing  of  the  kind. 

•  Journals  ut  supra  (Onne  MSS.,  Various,  4,  f.  17,  and  India,  vii.  f.  1747). 
Broome  dates  the  23rd. 

'  Adams'  Journal  {loc.  cit.,  i.  1749). 


THE  DOWNFALL  OF  MIR  KASIM  227 

position  was  at  last  stormed  on  September  5,^  and  nothing  now 
remained  to  bar  an  advance  upon  Monghyr. 

Mir  Kasim  had  not  ventured  to  take  the  field  in  person  ; 
and  he  now  began  to  believe  that  his  leaders  were  betraying 
him.  He  withdrew  therefore  from  Monghyr  to  Patna,  full  of 
schemes  of  vengeance.  On  the  march  he  caused  his  Armenian 
commander-in-chief,  Gurjin  Khan,  to  be  assassinated. ^  His 
next  victims  were  the  Seths.  They  sent  the  Nawab  a  petition 
offering  4  lakhs  for  their  release.  According  to  Gentil,  who 
was  present,  the  Nawab  remarked,  "  If  my  chiefs  heard  that, 
they  would  release  them  and  deliver  me  into  their  hands,"  and 
he  straightway  sent  Somroo,  a  European  in  his  service,  to  dispatch 
them.'  He  was  probably  justified  at  this  time  in  distrusting 
his  army.  It  had  lost  all  confidence  in  itself.  Monghyr  sur- 
rendered a  week  after  the  EngHsh  appeared  before  the  walls,'' 
and  Adams  prepared  to  continue  his  march  towards  Patna. 

Just  after  Udanalla  had  been  stormed,  Mir  Kasim  had 
written  to  Adams,  threatening  to  slay  all  his  Enghsh  prisoners 
if  he  advanced  farther.^  While  the  siege  of  Monghyr  was  still 
in  progress,  the  Nawab  carried  out  his  threat.  On  the  evening 
of  October  5  *  he  discussed  the  matter  with  Gentil,  who  en- 
deavoured to  dissuade  him  from  the  crime,'  but  in  vain,  for 
he  at  once  sent  for  Somroo  and  ordered  the  slaughter  of  forty-nine 
who  were  imprisoned  together.  Somroo  with  two  companies  of 
sepoys  went  straightway  to  their  prison  and  summoned  ElUs, 
Hay,  and  Lushington.  They  went  out  to  meet  him  into  a  small 
outer  court,  accompanied  by  six  others  ;  and  there  they  were 
massacred.  The  rest  were  then  shot  down,  and  those  who  showed 
any  sign  of  life  cut  to  pieces.  The  seven  prisoners  who  were 
confined  elsewhere  were  slaughtered  on  October  11.'  Such 
was  the  vengeance  which  Mir  Kasim  took  upon  the  English 

'  Grant's  and  Adams'  Journals  {loc.  cit.). 
'  Gentil's  Mimoires,  pp.  218,  etc. 

•  Op.  cit..  p.  226. 

*  Adams'  Journal,  October  3  to  10,  1763  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  vii.  f.  1762). 

•  Cat.  Pars.  Corr.,  vol.  i.  pp.  239-240. 

*  Adams  and  Grant  give  the  date  as  6th  ;  FuUerton  and  Anderson  (Narrative, 
ap.  Orme  MSS.,  Various,  84)  say  5th. 

'  Gentil,  Mimoires,  p.  228.  Gentil  had  already  procured  the  escape  of  one 
Englishman,  Dallas,  by  representing  him  to  be  French. 

"  Adams  to  Council,  October  18,  1763  (Long's  Selections,  p.  334)  ;  Narrative 
(of  Dr.  Anderson),  ap.  Orme  MSS.,  Various,  84 ;  Grant's  Journal  (loc.  cit.,  4,  f.  32)  ; 
FuUerton's  Narrative  (loc.  cit.,  21,  f.  123).  The  inscription  in  memory  of  Henry 
Lushington  in  Eastbourne  Parish  Church  is  printed  in  Bengal  Past  and  Present, 

vol.  i.  p.  211. 


228  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

when  unable  to  meet  them  in  the  field ;  such  the  fruit  of  that 
disappointed  ambition  which  Vansittart  had  so  blindly  encour- 
aged and  fed. 

On  October  27  Adams  and  his  army  appeared  before  Patna. 
Mir  Kasim  had  already  left  the  place,  hoping  to  be  able  to 
interrupt  the  siege.  In  this  he  failed.  The  walls  were  breached, 
and  on  November  6  the  city  was  carried  by  storm.  On  this 
news,  Mir  Kasim  with  his  treasure  escaped  into  Oudh.  Adams 
pursued  him  to  the  banks  of  the  Karamnassa,  and  there  halted 
to  await  the  further  orders  of  Council. 

On  the  outbreak  of  war,  it  had  been  immediately  resolved 
to  restore  Mir  Jafar  ;  but  it  still  was  not  recognised  that  the 
only  remedy  for  the  difficulties  which  had  brought  about  the 
revolution  of  1760  and  that  of  1763  was  for  the  EngUsh  to  take 
a  share  in  the  administration.  They  still  shrank  from  that, 
and  still  sought  to  estabUsh  a  balance  of  power  which  would 
relieve  them  both  of  the  troubles  of  administration  and  the 
dangers  of  the  Nawab's  hostility.  To  this  end,  on  Camac's 
advice,^  it  was  resolved  to  limit  the  forces  which  the  Nawab 
might  keep,  and  to  maintain  a  resident  at  the  Durbar.  The 
districts  which  Mir  Kasim  had  made  over  to  the  EngUsh  were 
to  be  confirmed  to  them.  The  liberty  of  inland  trade  was  to 
be  explicitly  recognised,  and  the  only  duty  which  the  English 
should  pay  was  fixed  at  2^  per  cent,  on  salt.  Moreover,  the 
damages  which  the  Company  and  private  persons  had  suffered 
were  to  be  made  good.  These  conditions  were  embodied  in  a 
treaty  which  was  executed  on  July  10.^ 

The  Nawab,  however,  retained  full  liberty  to  choose  his 
ministers.  The  Council  desired  to  see  Rai  Durlab  restored  to 
the  posts  which  he  had  held  in  1757  ;  but  Mir  Jafar  insisted 
on  having  Nuncomar  as  Diwan,'  and  this  dubious  personage, 
in  spite  of  repeated  protests,  remained  the  chief  minister  until 
the  Nawab's  death  in  1765  ;  and  as  the  expulsion  of  Mir  Kasim 
from  Bengal  and  Behar  progressed,  as  the  sphere  of  Mir  Jafar's 
government  accordingly  expanded,  so  also  did  the  English 
discontent  with  his  management  and  policy.  After  all  these 
experiments  and  failures,  the  English  in  Bengal  began  at  last 

'  Camac's  Minute  of  July  4,  1763  (Sel.  Com.  Rep.,  i  (2),  App.  66). 

» The  treaty  is  printed  by  Verelst,  App.,  p.  i6o.  A  separate  agree- 
ment secured  donations  of  25  lakhs  to  the  Army  and  12J  lakhs  to  the  Naval 
forces. 

•Vansittart  to  Mir  Jafar,  July  10,  1763  {Col.  Pers.  Corr.,  vol.  i.  p.  228); 
Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  July  7,  1763  (Sel.  Com.  Rep.,  i  {2),  App.  57). 


THE  DOWNFALL  OF  MIR  KASIM  229 

dimly  to  perceive  that  the  dual  system  demanded  the  talents 
of  a  Bussy  or  a  Clive  unless  it  was  to  break  down  whenever  the 
slightest  strain  was  imposed  upon  it. 

Such  was  the  case  during  the  earlier  portion  of  the  war  with 
Oudh  which  followed  on  the  expulsion  of  Mir  Kasim  from  Behar. 
This  new  war  came  as  something  of  a  surprise,  for  it  was  not 
customary  in  the  princes  of  Indostan  to  espouse  ruined  causes  ; 
and  it  seems  to  have  been  thought  that  Shuja-ud-daula,  the 
Nawab-Wazir  of  Oudh,  was  indisposed  to  intervene,  as  he  had 
not  done  so  earUer  in  the  struggle.  Perhaps  he  would  not 
have  taken  part,  could  Adams  have  intercepted  the  treasure 
which  Mir  Kasim  succeeded  in  carrying  with  him  into 
Oudh. 

While  matters  were  still  undetermined,  Adams  was  obUged 
by  ill-health  to  retire  to  Calcutta,  where  he  died  shortly  after, 
having  achieved  as  brilliantly  successful  a  campaign  as  the 
EngUsh  ever  fought  in  India.  The  officer  to  whom  he  delivered 
the  command  was  also  obliged  to  retire,  so  that  the  command 
devolved  for  the  moment  upon  Jennings,  the  senior  Captain. 
About  the  same  time  Mir  Kasim  sent  emissaries  to  debauch 
the  army  he  had  failed  to  conquer.  These  promised  promotion 
and  high  pay,  and  dwelt  upon  the  fact  that  Mir  Jafar's  donation 
which  had  been  promised  six  months  earlier  was  still  unpaid. 
Moreover,  there  was  among  the  Company's  Europeans  a  number 
of  French  troops  who  had  either  deserted  Lally  or  had  been 
induced  to  join  the  English  after  the  fall  of  Pondich^ry.  The 
fideUty  of  these  men  was  naturally  uncertain,  and  many  were 
ready  enough  to  quit  a  service  they  had  entered  rather  from 
necessity  than  inclination.  A  further  cause  of  discontent  was 
the  scarcity  and  dearness  of  provisions. 

On  January  30,  1764,  occurred  the  first  manifestation  of  the 
resulting  discontent.  The  European  battaUon  on  parade  refused 
to  obey  the  word  of  command,  on  which  Jennings  issued  an  army 
order,  expressing  the  hope  that  the  men  would  not  sully  their 
former  good  conduct  by  any  rash  behaviour.  In  respect  to  the 
prize-money,*  he  added :  "  he  gives  his  word  and  honour  the 
payment  shall  be  made  as  soon  as  it  arrives,  and  in  case  any  other 
complaints  happen,  if  they  are  made  in  a  proper  manner  as  be- 
comes a  soldier,  he  will  endeavour  to  give  them  all  the  satisfac- 
tion that  lies  in  his  power."  ■^    The  Grenadier  companies,  which 

'  /.«.,  the  Nawab's  donation. 

»  Brit.  Mus..  Add.  MSS.,  6049,  f.  43. 


230  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

had  been  most  prominent  in  the  demonstration,  were  shortly 
afterwards  detached  to  the  Karamnassa.  These  measures, 
however,  proved  insufficient.  On  February  ii  the  Europeans 
stood  to  arms,  seized  six  guns,  and  marched  off  to  join  the 
Grenadiers.  The  Nawab,  who  was  in  camp,  offered  them  an 
immediate  instalment ;  but  they  would  not  listen  until  they 
reached  the  Karamnassa,  when  Jennings  got  them  to  halt  while 
a  dram  and  biscuit  were  served  out ;  and  they  were  persuaded 
to  return,  except  a  body  of  French  who  would  listen  to  nothing 
and  crossed  the  river  into  Oudh.^  Next  day  a  distribution  was 
made,  the  Europeans  receiving  half  the  promised  donation,  or 
40  rupees  per  man  ;  while  the  sepoys  received  six  only.^  This 
led  to  another  mutiny  on  the  part  of  the  sepoys,  who  claimed  that 
they  should  receive  a  like  proportion  with  the  Europeans.  This 
was  paid  them,'  and  tor  the  moment  they  seemed  contented 
and  in  good  order. 

However,  when  on  March  6,  Carnac,  who  had  been  appointed 
to  the  command,  reached  the  army,  he  found  it  still  in  an  emi- 
nently unsatisfactory  condition.''  Jennings  reported  that  he  could 
answer  for  the  conduct  of  neither  Europeans  nor  sepoys,  that  he 
thought  other  motives  were  at  work  besides  the  question  of  the 
donation,  and  that  he  believed  none  but  mild  measures  would 
bring  the  men  back  to  a  sense  of  duty.*  Carnac  reported  this  to 
Council,  adding  that  he  had  had  already  to  put  a  havildar  of 
sepoys  in  irons  and  send  him  down  to  Calcutta.*  When  Champion, 
who  had  accompanied  Carnac,  had  the  Europeans  out  to  exercise, 
he  found  they  had  only  been  drilled  twice  since  the  previous 
November.'  On  March  13  the  army  moved  towards  Buxar 
with  a  view  to  counteract  the  enemy's  reported  preparations  to 
invade  Behar,  and  about  the  same  time  another  distribution 

»  Jennings  to  Vansittart,  February  12,  1764,  ap.  Bengal  Sal.  Com.,  February 
23,  1764. 

'  Orderly  Book  (Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS..  6049,  f.  45  verso). 

»  Jennings  to  Vansittart,  February  15,  1764  (Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  February  27, 
1764).  This  sepoy  mutiny  was  the  occasion  of  an  episode,  described  by  Broome 
(pp.  420,  etc.),  in  which  Jennings'  presence  of  mind  only  just  averted  an  armed 
conflict  between  Europeans  and  sepoys.  Jennings  does  not  seem  to  have  re- 
ported it  to  Council. 

*  The  account  of  Carnac's  campaign  in  1764,  given  by  Broome  (pp.  423,  etc.), 
is  based  mainly  on  the  work  of  Caraccioli,  and  therefore  minimises  his  difficulties. 
The  anti-Clive  party,  bom  of  his  reforms  in  1765-66,  could  allow  no  merit  to 
one  so  closely  connected  with  him  as  Carnac. 

'  Champion's  Journal,  March  6,  1764  (I.O.,  Home  Misc.,  No.  198). 

'  Carnac  to  Vansittart,  etc.,  March  7,  1764  (Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  March  19,  1764). 

'  Champion's  Journal,  March  10,  1764  (loc.  cit.). 


THE  DOWNFALL  OF  MIR  KASIM  281 

of  the  donation  money  was  made,  bringing  the  amount  received 
by  the  Europeans  to  60  rupees  and  by  the  sepoys  to  30  rupees  per 
man.  Carnac  now  announced  that  this  would  be  taken  to  com- 
plete all  that  the  latter  were  to  receive  ;  and  that  the  officers  had 
agreed  not  to  receive  their  proportions  until  the  soldiers  had 
received  entire  payment.^  On  March  26,  a  subahdar  of  sepoys 
was  foimd  encouraging  his  men  to  desert.  He  was  at  once  tried 
by  sepoy  court-martial  and  blown  from  a  gun.^  It  does  not 
appear  that  Camac's  decision  to  Umit  the  sepoys'  share  in  the 
donation  to  30  rupees  per  man  was,  if  judged  by  the  custom  of 
that  day,  improper  ;  the  fault  lay  rather  in  the  neglect  to  an- 
nounce in  the  first  instance  what  the  various  shares  were  to  be. 
It  was  alleged  that  Adams  had  promised  the  sepoys  that  their 
cartouche-boxes  should  be  filled  with  rupees. 

Besides  the  difficulty  of  this  military  unrest,  there  was  the 
difficulty  of  supplies.  Jennings  had  complained  of  this  before 
Carnac's  arrival  with  the  army.*  On  March  18  the  latter  wrote 
that  he  would  have  marched  into  Oudh  to  meet  the  enemy  "  but 
that  he  fears  the  distress  they  are  in  for  provisions,  being  only 
suppUed  from  day  to  day,  will  not  permit  his  doing  so."  ''  On 
March  21  a  council  of  war  resolved  that  if  the  army  quitted  the 
line  of  the  Ganges  its  supplies  would  be  cut  off.^ 

A  third  obstruction  was  provided  by  the  Nawab,  who  still 
continued  with  the  army.  He  was  hoping  at  this  time  to  make 
a  treaty  with,  or  by  means  of,  Bulwant  Singh,  the  Zemindar 
of  Benares,  and  opposed  any  invasion  of  Shuja-ud-daula's 
country  so  as  to  avoid  all  appearance  of  himself  commencing 
hostihties.' 

The  Nawab  of  Oudh  was  thus  left  to  complete  his  preparations 
in  peace,  while  Carnac  lay  near  Buxar.  On  April  3  it  was  con- 
sidered necessary  to  fall  back  towards  Patna  for  fear  that  a  party 
of  the  Oudh  troops  should  cut  off  communications  with  that 
city.  This  was  unfortunate.  It  involved  fighting  on  Mir  Jafar's 
territory,  and  the  disturbance  of  his  instead  of  Shuja-ud-daula's 

•  Camac  to  Vansittart,  etc.,  March  15,  1764  (Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  March  26, 
1764). 

»  Carnac  to  Vansittart,  etc.,  March  26,  1764  {ibid.,  April  9,  1764). 

»  Jennings  to  Vansittart,  February  28,  1764  {ibid.,  March  12,  1764). 

'  Uengal  Sel.  Com.,  March  29,  1764.  Champion's  Journal  confirms  this. 
"  Our  provisions  seem  to  come  in  from  hand  to  mouth,  having  no  more  than 
two  days'  provisions,  nor  can  we  gain  ground  "  (Journal,  March  20,  1764,  loc.  cit.). 

'Champion's  Journal,  March  21,  1764  (loc.  cit.). 

•  Carnac  to  Vansittart,  etc.,  March  22,  1764  (Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  April  3,  1764). 


282  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

finances.     However,  there  does  not  appear  to  have  been  any 
criticism  of  Carnac's  decision.^ 

By  this  time  Council  and  Camac  were  agreed  that  it  was  most 
desirable  to  get  rid  of  Nuncomar.  Already  the  Nawab  had 
caused  great  imeasiness  by  insisting  on  an  effort  to  obtain  sanads 
for  Bengal,  though  the  English  pointed  out  that  this  would  only 
be  providing  the  Nawab-Wazir  with  additional  funds  for  the  attack 
which  he  certainly  contemplated.''  This  was  probably  the  work  of 
Nuncomar.^  The  difficulty  of  procuring  grain  for  the  army  was 
attributed  to  the  same  person,  who,  it  was  thought,  aimed  at 
preventing  the  invasion  of  Oudh  while  he  conducted  independent 
and  secret  intrigues  with  the  Wazir,  Shah  Alam,  and  Mir  Kasim. 
In  April  direct  proof  of  this  was  still  wanting,  but  his  influence 
was  deemed  so  undesirable  that  Carnac  was  instructed  to  procure 
his  dismissal  if  possible.*  Carnac  had  come  independently  to  the 
same  conclusion  ;  and  there  was  at  least  no  doubt  that  under  his 
management  the  conduct  of  the  campaign  had  been  gravely 
embarrassed.  But  the  Nawab  clung  to  him  with  all  the  weak 
obstinacy  of  his  nature.  Carnac  reported  that  he  could  only 
be  removed  by  force.*  He  was  therefore  suffered  to  remain,  the 
more  so  as  his  treachery  could  not  be  satisfactorily  proved.  But 
that  such  a  situation  could  arise  is  in  itself  a  crushing  comment 
on  the  political  system  of  Bengal. 

In  April,  their  preparations  being  complete,  the  enemy  in- 
vaded Behar  ;  and  on  the  23rd  Camac  withdrew  to  Patna.  This 
was  brought  about,  not  only  by  the  news  that  a  body  of  the 
enemy's  horse  had  cut  in  between  his  army  and  the  city,  but  also 
by  the  fear  of  treachery  in  the  Nawab's  camp  itself.*  Van- 
sittart  and  his  Council  were  uneasy  at  this  news.  They  pointed 
out  to  the  general  "  that  all  our  successes  against  the  powers  of 
this  Empire  have  been  owing  to  acting  offensively  and  always 

'Champion's  Journal,  April  3,  1764  (loc.  cU.).  Carnac  to  Vansittart,  etc., 
April  4,  1764  (Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  April  16,  1764).  Champion  criticised  Camac 
Ireely  enough  later  on,  but  not  at  this  moment. 

'  Council  to  Camac,  February  2,  1764  (ibid.). 

•  In  December  the  Wazir  conferred  on  him  the  title  of  Maharajah.  Wazir  to 
Adams,  December  7,  1763  (Cal.  Pers.  Corrs.,  vol.  i.  p.  256  ;  cf.  also  p.  261). 

*  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  April  3,  1764. 

^  Ibid.,  April  26  and  May  7,  1764.  It  should  be  remembered  that  Nuncomar 
had  been  suspected  of  correspondence  with  the  French  in  1760-61.  He  was  con- 
sistently hostile  to  Mir  Kasim,  who  accused  him  of  prejudicing  Coote.  There 
was  not  therefore  antecedent  hostility  between  him  and  Camac,  though  there 
doubtless  was  between  him  and  Vansittart. 

•Carnac  to  Vansittart,  etc.,  April  25  and  30,  1764  (Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  May  7 
and  10,  1764). 


THE  DOWNFALL  OF  MIR  KASIM  233 

pushing  to  the  attack. "  At  the  same  time  they  declared  that  they 
had  every  confidence  in  Camac's  judgment.^ 

On  May  3  the  enemy  attacked  the  Enghsh  position  both  in 
front  and  rear  ;  but  after  an  action  which  lasted  from  ten  in  the 
morning  to  five  in  the  afternoon,  they  were  completely  beaten  off. 
They  were  not  pursued,  however,  in  their  retreat.  Carnac  ex- 
plained this  by  saying  his  men  were  exhausted,  having  been  awake 
most  of  the  previous  night  in  expectation  of  attack.^ 

This  battle  was  followed  by  a  pause  of  near  a  month,  during 
which  Carnac  was  amused  by  pretended  negotiations,  which 
were  evidently  not  meant  seriously  ;  and  presently  Shuja-ud- 
daula  withdrew  to  his  own  country,  which  was  being  ravaged  by  a 
detachment  that  Carnac  had  sent  for  that  purpose.  But  the  main 
EngUsh  forces  continued  in  their  former  position.  This  delay 
was  most  unwelcome  to  the  Council,  who  urged  Carnac  to  bring 
the  enemy  to  action.  This  led  to  a  correspondence  exceedingly 
characteristic  of  the  relations  frequently  existing  between  the 
Enghsh  governments  and  their  military  officers,  and  of  that 
esprit  de  corps  which  made  the  civil  and  military  servants  of  the 
Company  into  distinct  and  generally  hostile  bodies.  In  the 
present  case  it  was  also  embittered  by  the  disputes  which  had 
arisen  three  years  before  about  the  treatment  of  Ramnarayan. 
On  May  29  it  was  decided  to  write  to  Carnac  "  that  we  have  re- 
peatedly given  him  our  opinion  for  attacking  the  enemy,  but  if  he 
really  thinks  this  measure  impracticable,  we  desire  he  will  acquaint 
us  fully  with  his  reasons  and  what  plan  he  would  propose  for 
bringing  the  war  to  an  issue."  At  the  same  time  it  was  resolved 
to  transfer  the  management  of  the  negotiations  to  a  civilian.^ 
On  June  7  Carnac  was  reproached  with  not  having  written  to 
government  from  May  19  to  29,  after  having  been  desired  to  write 
daily.*  On  the  nth,  Vansittart,  etc.,  wrote  that  the  war  must  be 
prosecuted,  and  that  the  approaching  rains  would  rather  facihtate 
than  hinder  a  campaign,  for  they  would  make  it  possible  to  move 
supplies  by  the  rivers.     On  the  14th  they  declared  :  "  We  think  it 

•  Vansittart,  etc.,  to  Carnac,  May  9,  1764  (Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  May  10,  1764). 

>  Carnac  to  Vansittart,  etc..  May  4,  1764  (ibid.,  May  14,  1764).  Champion 
(Journal,  May  3)  admits  the  men  seemed  incapable  of  a  pursuit,  but  adds: 
"  I  cannot  help  thinking  it  was  an  opportunity  such  as  might  be  wished  for 
by  many  people,  and  would  most  certainly  have  made  complete  victory."  It 
should  be  added  that  Champion  was  at  this  moment  annoyed  at  Camac's  having 
recently  preferred  Swinton's  advice  to  his. 

'  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  May  29,  1764. 

'  Ibid.,  June  7,  1764. 


234  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

absolutely  necessary  to  proceed  against  Shuja-ud-daula  without 
loss  of  time,  nor  stop  until  we  have  convinced  him  that  we  are 
capable  of  acting  offensively  as  well  as  defensively  .  .  .  "  ^ 
They  directed  these  orders  to  be  laid  before  the  principal  officers 
for  their  opinion. 

To  the  first  letter,  Carnac  pointed  out  that  his  men  would 
scarcely  endure  the  fatigues  of  another  wet  campaign.  "  Indeed," 
he  said,  "the  order  you  have  thought  proper  to  give  seems  big  with 
mischief.  However,  it  is  so  absolute  as  to  leave  no  room  for 
deviating  therefrom."  ^  To  the  second  he  replied:  "  I  am  rejoiced 
for  the  sake  of  the  public  that  you  have  been  pleased  to  submit 
your  perfemptory  order  of  the  4th  June  to  the  determination  of 
the  principal  officers  here.  .  .  .  You'll  herewith  receive  their 
sentiments,  all  concurring  in  the  necessity  of  cantoning  the 
troops.  ..."  * 

When  Carnac's  letter  of  June  23  reached  Calcutta,  there  was 
great  indignation.  It  was  voted  to  contain  arguments  incon- 
sistent with  his  duty  as  an  officer  and  expressions  unbecoming  in 
him  and  disrespectful  to  the  Board.  The  latter  had  from  the 
very  first,  it  was  declared,  recommended  taking  the  offensive, 
whereas  Carnac  had  tamely  retreated  before  Shuja-ud-daula  to 
Patna.''  The  Council  were  therefore  greatly  rejoiced  when 
orders  arrived  from  home  dismissing  Carnac  for  the  part  he  had 
taken  in  1761. 

These  disputes  raise  a  question  which  is  very  difficult  to 
decide.  It  is  evident  that  Carnac's  conduct  appears  to  display 
a  marked  contrast  with  that  of  Adams  in  the  previous  year.  But 
it  is  not  so  clear  whether  Carnac  was  justified  in  the  mistrust 
which  he  felt  for  his  sepoy  forces.  They  had  undoubtedly  mani- 
fested jealousy  of  the  European  troops  ;  and  the  officers  under 
Carnac  seem  to  have  held  the  same  opinion  as  himself.*  But  that 
leaves  it  undecided  whether  a  more  vigorous  policy  might  not 
have  produced  better  results.  However  no  action  was  after- 
wards attempted  until  a  drastic  remedy  had  been  applied. 

At  the  end  of  July,  Carnac  left  the  army  and  withdrew  to 
Calcutta."     About  a  fortnight  later,  he  was  replaced  by  Major 

'  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  June  loand  14,  1764. 
'  Carnac  to  Vansittart,  etc.,  June  23,  1764  {ibid.,  July  2,  1764). 
'  Carnac  to  Vansittart,  etc.,  July  i,  17O4  (loc.  cit.,  July  12,  1764). 
■"  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  July  5,  1764. 

'Champion  and  Stibbert  to  Carnac,  ap.  Champion's  Journal,  July  30,  1764  ; 
Pemble  to  Carnac,  June  27,  1764  (Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  July  12,  1764). 

•  Champion's  Journal,  July  23-28,  1764.     Broome  misdates  this  by  a  month. 


THE  DOWNFALL  OF  MIR  KASIM  285 

Hector  Munro,  of  the  89th,  who  had  proceeded  from  Bombay  to 
Bengal  on  the  news  of  the  death  of  Adams  and  the  invasion  of 
Behar.  Munro  was  desired  before  attempting  any  action  to 
bring  the  army  into  a  state  of  discipUne.^  This  he  immediately 
proceeded  to  do.  On  August  14  he  issued  an  order  calling 
attention  to  the  points  of  discipline  which  had  been  relaxed  ; 
and  next  day  he  advised  young  officers  to  study  the  Duke  of 
Cumberland's  Standing  Orders,  which  stated  the  authorised 
practice  of  the  British  Army.^  Just  before  his  arrival  there  had 
been  trouble  with  the  sepoy  battahons  at  Monghyr,  in  which  the 
matter  of  the  donation  was  again  revived  ;  but  the  chief  com- 
plaint seems  to  have  been  their  reduction  from  full  to  half-batta 
on  being  placed  in  cantonments  ;  and  there  were  also  demands  for 
an  increase  of  pay.''  On  August  24  Munro  issued  an  army  order 
deahng  specially  with  the  sepoys.  He  declared  that  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  donation  money  could  not  be  altered,  that  the 
sepoys  should  receive  full  or  half-batta  according  to  the  pay- 
ments made  to  the  European  troops,  and  that  if  aggrieved  they 
should  apply  to  their  officers  in  a  decent  and  obedient  manner.* 
Several  small  disturbances  occurred  after  this,  and  at  last  on 
September  8  the  9th  battalion  mutinied.  The  mutineers  were 
overpowered  and  seized.  Twenty-five  men  were  picked  out, 
tried  by  court-martial,  and  sentenced  to  be  blown  from  the  guns. 
Eight  men  were  at  once  thus  executed  on  the  parade  ;  the  rest 
were  sent  to  the  other  sepoy  cantonments  to  be  similarly  punished. 
The  battalion  was  broken  with  all  possible  ignominy  ;  and  the 
men  distributed  among  the  five  youngest  battahons.  Munro 
addressed  a  vigorous  allocution  to  them,  in  which  he  told  them 
that  if  they  did  not  choose  to  serve  on  these  terms  they  might 
go  to  Shuja-ud-daula  or  the  devil,  "  on  which  they  seemed  very 
penitent  indeed,  and  declared  that  ever  more  they  would  serve 
the  Company  very  faithfully."  *  This  vigorous  action  did  in  fact 
stamp  out  the  trouble  which  had  for  nine  months  paralysed  the 

'  Bengal  Scl.  Com.,  July  12,  1764. 

'Orderly  Book,  August  14  and  15,  1764  (Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  6049,  fi.  80 
and  82). 

•  See  Long's  Selections,  p.  395  ;  also  Champion's  Journal,  August  3  and  6, 
1764;  Stibbert  to  Champion,  August  10,  1764  (Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  August  20, 
1764). 

'  Orderly  Book,  August  24,  1764  (Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  6049,  I.  84). 

'See  Munro's  reports  in  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  September  24,  1764.  Broome 
(PP-  457.  etc.)  gives  a  romantic  story,  based  on  Munro's  evidence,  of  his  blowing 
away  twenty  men  in  batches  of  fours  on  the  parade  at  Chuprah,  having  overawed 
the  mutineers  with  guns  loaded  with  grape.     This  is  evidently  an  exaggeration. 


236  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

British  arms.  In  fairness  to  Carnac  it  must  be  remembered  that 
this  was  done  after  the  withdrawal  of  Shuja-ud-daiila  into  Oudh. 
It  would  not  have  been  feasible  in  face  of  the  enemy. 

It  had  been  originally  intended  to  move  into  Oudh  in  the 
middle  of  September.  ^  This  was  necessarily  delayed  by  the 
events  mentioned  above  ;  and  it  was  not  till  October  8  and  9  that 
Champion  moved  forward  to  cover  the  passage  of  the  main  army 
across  the  Soan,  which  was  completed  with  success  on  October  10.* 
On  the  22nd  Munro  came  in  sight  of  the  enemy's  camp  at  Buxar. 
He  had  with  him  less  than  900  Europeans,  5000  sepoys,  and  900 
native  cavalry.^  On  the  following  day  a  stubborn  battle  was 
fought,  in  which  the  enemy  were  completely  routed,  abandoning 
their  camp  and  most  of  their  baggage  ;  and  they  were  only 
saved  from  complete  destruction  by  the  breaking  down  of  a 
bridge  over  a  nullah,  which  checked  the  pursuit.* 

This  victory  had  great  consequences.  The  first  was  that 
Shah  Alam  at  once  came  over  to  the  English.  He  had  been 
treated  by  his  Wazir  with  a  lack  of  respect  proportioned  to  his 
want  of  power.  Immediately  after  the  battle  he  sent  his  con- 
gratulations to  Munro,  and  shortly  after  requested  the  English 
alliance.  This  was  very  agreeable  to  the  Council,  who  had 
already  instructed  Munro  that,  if  the  Wazir  would  not  surrender 
Mir  Kasim,  Oudh  might  be  offered  to  the  Emperor.^ 

The  second  result  was  that  Shuja-ud-daula  did  not  dare 
again  to  meet  the  English  in  the  field.  He  also  made  proposals 
for  a  peace,  but,  as  he  refused  to  surrender  Mir  Kasim,  the  offers 
came  to  nothing. 

Early  in  January  Munro  quitted  the  army,  leaving  the  com- 
mand to  Major  Robert  Fletcher,  a  Company's  officer,  who  had 
arrived  the  day  after  the  battle  of  Buxar.  Carnac,  however, 
had  already  been  reinstated,  in  accordance  with  the  bewildering 
custom  of  the  Company  to  change  its  officers  with  every  change 
in  the  cliques  which  controlled  the  Direction  ;  and  Fletcher  made 
haste  to  take  all  advantage  of  his  temporary  command  before 
he  should  be  superseded  by  Carnac's  arrival.  On  February  8; 
1765,  he  received  the  surrender  of  Allahabad  ;  on  the  same  day  the 
fort  of  Chunargarh,  which  had   resisted  the  attack  of  Munro, 

'  Champion's  Journal,  August  13,  1764  {loc.  cit.). 
"  Champion's  Journal,  October  8-10,  1764. 
'  Munro's  evidence  (Sel.  Com.  Rep.,  i.  p.  41). 

*  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  November  6,  1764. 

•  Ibid.,  November  6,  1764.  j 


THE  DOWNFALL  OF  MIR  KASIM  237 

surrendered  to  a  detachment  which  Fletcher  had  sent  back  to 
capture  it ;  '  while  Shuja-ud-daula  fled  first  to  Lucknow  and 
then  into  the  Rohilla  country,  Somroo  took  service  with  the  Jats, 
and  Mir  Kasim  escaped  into  obscure  poverty,  stripped  of  his 
treasure  and  deserted  by  his  followers. 

•  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  February  19,  1765. 


/ 


CHAPTER    VI 
CLIVE'S  POLITICAL  SETTLEMENT 

WE  have  now  traced  to  their  condusion  the  difficulties 
in  which  Clive's  successors  were  involved  bytheir  defects 
of  character  and  the  operation  of  a  system  essentially 
unstable.  Clive,  as  Governor,  had  assumed  it  to  be  part  of  his 
duty  to  exercise  a  constant  supervision  over  the  Nawab's  govern- 
ment, to  protect  if  necessary  the  Nawab's  ministers,  and  to  guard 
against  the  development  at  the  Durbar  of  any  interest  antagonistic 
to  the  English.  Under  Holwell  the  system  had  fallen  into  con- 
fusion. Vansittart,  thinking  a  change  of  persons  would  remedy 
evils  inherent  in  the  system  itself,  had  established  Mir  Kasim 
and  adopted  the  principle  of  not  interfering  with  the  government 
except  on  those  points  which  directly  concerned  the  EngUsh 
trade.  The  result,  as  we  have  seen,  was  the  unchecked  develop- 
ment of  a  hostile  power,  and  a  bloody  war  to  re-establish  the 
person  who  had  been  deposed  by  Vansittart  in  1760.  It  now 
remains  to  consider  the  steps  leading  to  the  settlement  that  was 
to  form  the  basis  of  permanent  and  ordered  British  rule  in 
Bengal. 

It  is  necessary,  however,  first  to  explain  why  a  system  that 
broke  down  in  three  years  in  that  province  should  have  lasted 
forty  at  Madras.  It  must  in  the  first  place  be  remembered  that, 
although  the  dual  system  lasted  at  Madras  more  than  a  genera- 
tion, this  was  not  due  to  its  efficiency.  It  was  from  the  first 
imsatisfactory  alike  to  the  English,  to  the  Nawab,  and  to  his 
unfortunate  subjects.  It  would  be  difficult  to  name  a  Governor 
who  was  neither  bribed  nor  hated  by  Nawab  Muhammad  Ali. 
But  these  inconveniences,  and  at  times  they  were  very  great, 
arose  after  all  in  what  had  become  an  area  of  secondary  interest. 
The  destruction  of  Pondichery  had  destroyed  the  importance 
of  Fort  St.  George.  The  lordship  of  India  was  never  again 
contested  on  the  plains  of  the  Camatic,  which  lost  the  importance 
they  had  acquired  as  the  theatre  of  the  struggle  with  the  French. 
Henceforth  the  pohtical  centre  shifted  of  necessity  to  the  wealthier 

»38 


CLIVE'S  POLITICAL  SETTLEMENT  239 

provinces  and  more  warlike  peoples  of  the  north.  Thus  the 
difficulties  arising  out  of  the  dual  system,  although  they  caused 
at  least  two  wars  and  pcq)etual  misgovernment,  did  not  vitally 
affect  the  position  of  the  English.  Had  they  never  conquered 
Bengal,  and  had  all  their  resources  been  drawn  from  the  south, 
it  cannot  be  supposed  that  Muhammad  AJi's  government  would 
have  exceeded  the  three  years'  limit  of  a  Bengal  Nawabship ; 
for  then  his  mismanagement  would  have  been  fatal.  As  things 
stood,  it  was  immaterial.  In  short,  the  dual  system  could  be 
tolerated  at  Madras  ;  in  Bengal  it  could  not. 

The  victory  of  Buxar  terminated  for  the  moment  the  struggle 
with  Mir  Kasim  and  his  ally  of  Oudh.  It  left,  however,  three 
matters  to  be  settled :  the  disposal  of  Oudh,  the  attitude  to  be 
adopted  towards  the  Emperor  Shah  Alam,  and  the  nature  of 
the  relations  to  be  maintained  with  the  Nawab.  In  each  of 
these  tentative,  and  in  several  respects  unsatisfactory,  solutions 
were  reached  by  Vansittart  and  Spencer,  who  succeeded  him  as 
Governor  in  November  1764. 

On  receiving  the  news  of  the  victory  at  Buxar,  the  Council 
resolved  that  if  Shuja-ud-daula  would  cede  Benares  and  deliver 
up  Mir  Kasim  and  Somroo,  he  should  be  left  in  possession  of  his 
dominions  ;  but  that  otherwise  Shah  Alam  should  be  offered  the 
country  of  Oudh.^  The  tentative  offers  which  came  from  the 
Nawab-Wazir  proved  unsatisfactory,  and  Shah  Alam  appeared 
anxious  to  embrace  the  English  proposals.  "  Put  me  in  posses- 
sion of  it  (Oudh),"  he  wrote,  "  and  leave  a  small  detachment 
of  the  troops  with  me  to  show  that  I  am  protected  by  the  English, 
and  they  shall  be  at  my  expense  ;  if  any  enemy  come  any  time 
against  me,  I  wiU  make  such  connections  in  the  country  that, 
with  my  own  troops  and  the  above-mentioned  small  detachment, 
[I  may]  defend  the  country  without  any  further  assistance  from 
the  English.  And  I  will  pay  them  of  the  revenues  of  the  country 
what  sum  they  shall  demand  yearly."  ^ 

These  proposals  were  accepted.  Munro  was  ordered  to  obtain 
a  royal  grant  for  Benares.  "  With  regard  to  the  other  parts  of 
Shuja-ud-daula's  country,"  the  Committee  wrote,  "  as  the  King 
has  been  declared  supreme,  he  will  of  course  take  possession 
and  exercise  (?)  the  revenues  thereof  ;  but  as  his  authority 
becomes  established,  we  think  it  proper  to  demand  such  propor- 
tion of  them  as  his  necessities  permit  should  be  applied  to  assist 

'  Vansittart,  etc.,  to  Munro,  November  6,  1764  (Bengal  Sel.  Com.). 
•  Proposals  from  the  King  {ibid.,  December  6,  1764). 


240  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

in  defraying  the  expenses  of  the  war,  and  when  he  is  in  full  posses- 
sion we  shall  expect  to  have  the  whole  reimbursed  us.  .  .  .  To 
avoid  giving  any  umbrage  or  jealousy  of  our  power  to  the  King 
or  the  nobles  of  the  empire,  we  would  have  everything  done 
under  the  sanction  of  his  authority  and  that  we  may  appear  as 
holding  our  acquisitions  from  him."  ^  The  projected  settlement 
of  Oudh  thus  consisted  in  making  it  over  to  the  powerless  Shah 
Alam,  saving  the  grant  of  Benares  to  the  Company. 

The  settlement  with  the  Nawab  was  a  longer  business.  As 
regards  one  subject  of  dispute,  his  choice  of  ministers,  no  change 
was  made,  in  spite  of  all  the  Council's  efforts.  Nor  was  the  case 
much  better  in  regard  to  the  other  main  source  of  difficulty — 
the  English  private  trade.  After  the  expulsion  of  Mir  Kasim 
from  Behar,  the  Nawab  had  promised  to  visit  Calcutta  and 
regulate  all  outstanding  questions.  But  the  war  with  Oudh 
furnished  him  with  an  excuse  for  evading  this  until  September 
1764.  Then  prolonged  discussions  arose.  The  English  demands 
were  principally  financial.  There  was  urgent  need  of  money  for 
the  payment  of  the  troops.  The  Nawab  was  expending  great 
sums  on  the  maintenance  of  forces  that  served  no  purpose  except 
the  satisfaction  of  his  pride.  It  was  therefore  proposed  that 
the  Nawab  should  reduce  them  in  order  to  be  able  to  provide 
funds  for  the  English  army,  without  which  he  could  not  possibly 
support  himself.^  At  last  he  agreed  to  provide  5  lakhs  a  month  ;  ^ 
but  at  the  same  time  he  put  forward  a  long  series  of  complaints 
— ^his  revenues  were  injured  by  the  establishment  of  stores  of 
grain  by  English  officers  ;  his  authority  was  impaired  by  garrisons 
being  maintained  at  Patna  and  Monghyr,  and  by  the  EngUsh 
agents  holding  farms  and  protecting  his  dependents  ;  the  EngUsh 
trade  in  grain  prevented  his  people  from  supplying  the  army 
with  that  commodity,  and  their  trade  in  salt,  betel-nut,  and 
tobacco  deprived  the  poor,  who  used  to  deal  in  these,  of  their 
daily  bread.* 

Some  of  these  complaints  were  admitted  as  just.  It  was 
resolved  that  in  future  the  bazaars  of  the  troops  at  Patna  should 

'  Spencer,  etc.,  to  Munro,  December  6,  1764  (Bengal  Sel.  Com.). 

•  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  September  4,  1764.  It  will  be  observed  that  this  was  a 
proposal  which  Pigot  at  Madras  had  made  to  Muhammad  AH.  It  was  only 
the  possibiUty  of  obtaining  funds  from  Bengal  that  relieved  Pigot  from  the 
necessity  of  enforcing  his  demands. 

*  Ibid.,  September  15,  1764. 

■•  Ibid.,  September  17,  1764.  The  paper  containing  these  complaints  was 
put  in  on  the  14th. 


CLIVE'S  POLITICAL  SETTLEMENT  241 

be  supplied  out  of  the  Nawab's  stores.  English  trade  in  rice  was 
prohibited  except  for  importation  to  Calcutta  and  Chittagong. 
It  was  agreed  that  the  Nawab's  servants  should  not  receive 
English  protection  except  where  they  had  special  claims  to 
Enghsh  countenance.  But  no  cases  could  be  found  in  which 
English  agents  held  farms  or  villages  ;  and  the  Nawab  was  re- 
minded that  the  English  garrisons  at  Patna  and  Monghyr  were 
employed  only  in  his  service. 

As  regards  the  inland  trade,  however,  the  Committee  made 
considerable  concessions.  It  was  resolved  to  limit  this  to  the 
cities  and  factories  of  Patna,  Kasimbazaar  and  Miurshidabad, 
and  Dacca.  This  would  in  fact  have  removed  the  principal 
cause  of  the  disputes  which  had  arisen  in  the  past — the  mis- 
conduct of  the  English  agents  in  smaller  places,  their  forced 
sales  and  defiance  of  authority.  ^  But  this  reform  was  fated  not 
to  be  put  in  operation.  A  few  days  later  there  came  news  that 
CUve  had  been  appointed  a  second  time  Governor  of  Bengal, 
and  the  whole  question  was  remitted  to  his  consideration.^  The 
Nawab  hngered  on  at  Calcutta  until  December,  chiefly  on  account 
of  the  demands  made  for  instalments  of  the  donation  promised 
to  make  good  the  losses  of  private  persons  through  the  war 
with  Mir  Kasim.'  At  last  he  departed,  and  about  the  same 
time  Samuel  Middleton  was  appointed  Resident  at  the  Durbar, 
to  guard  all  Enghsh  interests  and  also  to  check  the  intrigues 
which  were  being  directed  against  Muhammad  Riza  Khan  who 
was  at  this  time  Deputy  at  Dacca.  ^ 

The  questions  of  principle  were  thus  left  altogether  imsettled. 
But  a  further  occasion  for  intervention  speedily  arose.  The 
Nawab  Mir  Jafar  died  on  February  5,  1765.  On  January  31, 
when  news  came  that  he  was  dangerously  sick  and  Middleton 
reported  that  his  death  was  likely  to  be  followed  by  disturbances 
among  his  sepoys,  it  had  been  decided  to  send  400  Enghsh  troops 
to  the  capital  to  ensure  the  maintenance  of  order.^  Thus  the 
Enghsh  had  full  control  of  the  situation  ;    and  Spencer  rightly 

'  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  September  17,  1764. 

•  Ibid.,  November  i,  1764.  The  same  thing  was  clone  in  January  (Pub. 
Cons.,  January  25,  1765)  on  the  reception  of  the  Company's  letter  of  June  j, 
1764,  condemning  the  1763  treaty  with  Mir  Jafar. 

•Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  November  10  and  21,  and  December  6,  1764.  The 
amount  claimed  at  first  had  been  estimated  at  10  lakhs  ;  but  the  Committee 
appointed  to  examine  claims  had  passed  them  to  the  extent  of  near  50  lakhs. 

■*  Ibid.,  December  13,  1764. 

'Ibid.,  January  31,  1765. 
16 


242  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

decided  not  to  lose  this  opportunity  of  defining  the  Nawab's 
relations  with  his  English  protectors. ' 

Middleton  had  allowed  the  Nawab's  son,  Najm-ud-daula, 
to  be  seated  on  the  masnad  and  proclaimed  throughout  the 
city  on  the  day  of  his  father's  death.  But  this  action  was  wholly 
unauthorised  and  treated  as  null.  Orders  were  issued  from  Cal- 
cutta that  the  late  Nawab's  officers  were  to  carry  on  the  govern- 
ment until  a  decision  had  been  reached,  and  then  a  deputation 
would  be  sent  to  instal  the  Nawab  "  in  a  proper  and  public 
manner,  that  he  as  well  as  the  whole  country  may  see  that  he 
receives  his  government  from  the  Company."  ^  The  inconsist- 
ency of  this  declaration  with  the  policy  lately  adopted  regarding 
the  Emperor  either  was  unperceived  or  was  allowed  to  pass 
without  comment. 

It  was  speedily  decided  that  Najm-ud-daula  should  be  ap- 
pointed in  his  father's  room,  although  one  Councillor  advocated 
the  expediency  of  appointing  the  son  of  the  late  Miran.^  Najm- 
ud-daula's  unfitness  to  govern,  which  was  afterwards  made  a 
subject  of  accusation  against  the  Council,*  was  not  discussed  for 
the  very  proper  reason  that  it  was  never  intended  that  he  should 
govern.  On  February  20  the  Committee  signed  the  treaty 
under  which  the  new  Nawab  was  to  be  appointed.  It  contains 
three  important  conditions.  The  Nawab  was  henceforward  to 
maintain  troops  only  lor  the  support  of  his  dignity,  the  main- 
tenance of  internal  peace,  and  the  collection  of  the  revenues. 
Secondly,  the  English  were  to  control  the  appointment  of  the 
principal  officials.  Thirdly,  the  Nawab  was  to  apply  to  the 
Emperor  for  sanads  only  through  the   President.*     These  in- 

'  Clive  after  his  arrival  reproached  the  Council  with  precipitation  in  not 
awaiting  his  arrival  ;  and  indeed  it  appears  that  their  conduct  as  regards  the 
Nawab  was  singularly  inconsistent  with  their  previous  behaviour  about  the 
inland  trade,  except  that  private  interest  affected  their  policy  in  both  cases. 
Nevertheless  it  remains  true  that  the  moment  was  exceedingly  opportune  for  a 
definition  of  the  English  position,  and  that  delay  in  recognising  a  new  Nawab, 
or  his  installation  with  unchanged  rights,  would  have  offered  obvious  incon- 
veniences. We  conclude  that  the  action  was  justifiable  enough,  though  the 
motives  were  to  a  great  extent  utterly  indefensible. 

'  Bengal  Scl.  Com.,  February  8,  1765. 

'  Ibid.,  February  12,  1765. 

*  Clive  to  the  Company,  September  30,  1765.  He  describes  the  Nawab  as 
"  the  issue  of  a  prostitute,  who  has  little  abilities  and  less  education  to  supply 
the  want  of  them."  This  of  course  supplied  a  minor  argument  for  the  policy 
which  in  any  case  Clive  would  have  followed. 

'  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  February  20,  1765.  The  provisions  regarding  inland 
trade  repeat  those  made  with  Mir  Jaiar  ia  1763. 


CLIVE'S  POLITICAL  SETTLEMENT  243 

volved  a  complete  revolution  in  his  position.  A  mere  outward 
show  of  independence  was  left  to  him.  Without  mihtary  strength, 
without  the  power  of  changing  ministers  at  his  pleasure,  how 
could  he  oppose  the  will  of  the  Calcutta  government  ?  Even 
the  sanads  which  would  confer  on  him  a  legal  position  could 
only  be  obtained  by  their  good  offices.  Clive  had  in  vain  urged 
Mir  Jafar  to  dismiss  his  useless  troops.  CUve  had  protected 
Mir  Jafar's  ministers  against  their  master's  displeasure,  but  at 
a  risk  which  could  only  be  justified  by  urgent  political  necessity. 
Both  these  points  were  now  secured.  What  the  treaty  failed 
to  provide,  however,  was  a  basis  for  the  English  position.  That 
still  remained  entirely  unconnected  with  the  fabric  of  the  native 
government,  and  in  fact  was  so  to  remain  until  Clive  obtained 
the  grant  of  the  Diwanni. 

The  main  difficulty  that  arose  consisted  in  effecting  the  pro- 
jected change  in  the  Nawab's  ministers.  The  treaty  provided 
that  Muhammad  Riza  Khan  should  be  appointed  the  Nawab's 
deputy,  while  it  was  proposed  that  the  collection  of  the  revenues 
should  be  divided  between  Rai  Durlab  and  Nuncomar.  Two 
Councillors,  together  with  the  chief  of  Kasimbazaar  and  the 
Resident  with  the  Nawab,  were  named  the  deputation  to  carry 
this  treaty  into  effect.'  They  found  that  Najm-ud-daula  was  filled 
with  apprehensions  of  Muhammad  Riza  Khan,  whom  he  had 
been  assured  by  Nuncomar  the  English  intended  to  make  Nawab. 
The  deputation,  however,  reassured  him  as  to  the  English  designs, 
and  he  agreed  to  accept  the  treaty.^  On  March  3,  when  the  new 
deputy  had  reached  Murshidabad,  Najm-ud-daula  was  formally 
proclaimed  Nawab.  It  was  then  discovered  that  Nuncomar 
had  applied  for  the  Emperor's  confirmation  of  Najm-ud-daula 
immediately  after  Mir  Jafar's  death.' 

Further  causes  of  dissatisfaction  soon  appeared.  Nuncomar 
did  his  utmost  to  prevent  the  English  from  acquiring  any  know- 
ledge of  the  revenue  system  of  the  late  government,  and  con- 
tinued to  act  as  though  he  were  still  chief  minister,  transacting 
business  which  properly  belonged  to  the  Nawab's  deputy.  He 
was,  therefore,  pubhcly  warned  of  the  limited  nature  of  his 
present   powers.'*     Moreover,   at  this  moment  there  seemed  a 

'  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  February  14,  1765. 

•  Deputation  to  Spencer,  etc.,  February  25  (Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  February  28, 
1765). 

»  Ibid. 

*  Deputation  to  Spencer,  etc.,  March  7  (Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  March  16,  1765). 


244  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

likelihood  of  further  evidence  appearing  as  regards  his  alleged 
treachery  in  1763.'  Spencer  therefore  decided,  again  rightly, 
to  order  him  down  to  Calcutta.  At  first  the  Nawab  would  not 
hear  of  this,  and  declared  that  he  would  never  part  from  Nun- 
comar.-  At  last,  after  repeated  letters  and  when  the  deputation 
had  been  authorised  to  seize  Nuncomar  if  necessary,  the  Nawab 
agreed  to  his  dismissal.* 

The  total  removal  of  Nuncomar  had  in  fact  been  essential 
to  the  success  of  the  English  plan  from  the  first  ;  and  it  was  a 
blunder  of  Spencer's  not  to  have  resolved  upon  it  at  once.  It 
should  have  been  apparent  that  so  long  as  Nuncomar  continued 
in  service,  he  would  employ  all  the  current  methods  of  intrigue, 
and  possibly  of  treachery,  to  upset  the  English  plan  and  recover 
power  for  himself.  He  would  never  have  allowed  his  successful 
rival,  Muhammad  Riza  Khan,  quietly  to  enjoy  the  great  olfice 
to  which  the  English  had  raised  him  ;  and  the  Durbar  would 
have  been  the  theatre  of  continual  dissension  so  long  as  the  two 
men  remained  together  in  office.  His  removal  completed  the 
estabhshment  of  EngHsh  influence. 

While  this  revolution  was  in  progress,  events  were  demon- 
strating the  weakness  of  the  projected  Enghsh  settlement  in 
Oudh.  Shuja-ud-daula  was  by  no  means  disposed  to  acquiesce 
in  the  loss  of  his  government.  He  had  still  much  treasure.  He 
was  therefore  able  to  seek  and  obtain  as  allies  the  Rohilla  Afghans 
and  the  Marathas.  Nor  could  the  English  determine  on  whom 
to  confer  the  vacant  subahdari.  All  candidates  seemed  equally 
suspect ;  and  Shah  Alam  had  no  resources,  either  material  or 
personal. 

In  April,  therefore,  the  success  of  Shuja-ud-daula's  negotia- 
tions forced  Carnac  to  concentrate  his  army,  which  had  been 
scattered  over  a  great  part  of  Oudh  in  detachments  for  the  collec- 
tion of  revenue.*  A  little  later  news  came  that  the  Marathas 
had  entered  the  district  of  Korah.  Carnac  moved  against  them 
by  forced  marches,  and  on  May  3  brought  them  to  action  and 
defeated  them.  By  another  action  on  May  22  Fletcher  forced 
them  to  withdraw.     But  they  had  already  been  deserted  by 

•  Deputation  to  Spencer,  etc.,  March  10,  1764  (Bengal  Sel.  Com.). 
•Deputation  to  Spencer,  etc.,  March  21,   1765  {ibid.,  March  25,  1765), 

'  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  March  25  and  April  i,  1765.  On  arrival  at  Calcutta, 
Nuncomar  was  confined  to  liis  own  house  witli  hircarrahs  to  watch  him.  After 
dive's  arrival  he  was  released.  Indeed,  after  the  firm  establishment  of  Muhammad 
Riza,  the  essential  purpose  of  his  detention  had  been  served. 

*  Letter  from  Caraac  of  April  10  {ibid.,  April  29,  1765).  _j 


CLIVE'S  POLITICAL  SETTLEMENT  245 

their  ally.  Immediately  after  the  action  of  May  3,  Shuja-ud- 
daula  had  withdrawn  from  them  into  the  Rohilla  country.  A 
fortnight  later  he  made  propositions  of  peace  to  Camac.  Before 
the  month  was  out,  he  had  placed  himself  in  the  hands  of  the 
English. 

Such  was  the  political  situation  which  Clive  found  on  his 
arrival  at  Calcutta  on  May  3,  1765.  His  advent  was  hailed 
with  an  outburst  of  Oriental  rhetoric.  "  The  ilower  of  our  wishes 
is  blossomed  in  the  garden  of  hope,"  wrote  one  ;  to  another  his 
coming  was  "  as  rain  upon  the  parched  earth."  And  these  expres- 
sions of  joy  represented  something  more  than  mere  compliment. 
Save  those  who  feared  punishment  for  their  misdeeds,  there  was 
not  a  man,  of  any  race  or  creed,  in  Calcutta,  but  felt  the  safer 
for  Clive's  coming.  The  vigorous  directness  of  his  character, 
coupled  with  his  marvellous  power  of  immediately  perceiving 
the  essential  features  of  a  situation,  brought  it  to  pass  that  he 
was  trusted  and  feared  with  singular  unanimity.  Few  dared 
to  cross  his  path  ;  those  who  ventured  to  do  so  had  bitter  reason 
to  regret  their  rashness.  Behind  his  back  men  might  mock  his 
ugliness  or  his  pride  ;  they  might  bitterly  condemn  his  measures 
when  these  threatened  their  private  interests  ;  but  their  mahce 
or  resentment  quailed  before  his  presence,  and  what  resistance 
they  made  was  offered  with  a  shrinking  heart.  When  the  news 
of  war  with  Mir  Kasim  had  reached  England,  it  had  been  the 
thought  of  all  save  his  personal  enemies  that  the  man  who  had 
established  the  British  power  in  Bengal  must  now  be  sent  to 
restore  it. 

His  mission  had  a  double  purpose.  He  was  to  establish  with 
the  country  powers  such  relations  as  should  not  in  themselves 
offer  occasion  for  ceaseless  revolutions  ;  he  was  further  to  put 
an  end  to  that  insubordination  which  had  recently  pervaded  all 
branches  of  the  Company's  government,  refusing  obedience  to 
orders  from  home,  or  resolutions  of  the  Council,  whenever  these 
seemed  to  threaten  pecuniary  loss,  and  almost  establishing 
private  interests  as  the  criterion  of  public  policy.  In  both 
respects  Chve  was  called  upon  to  complete  the  work  of  his  former 
government.  He  had  left  the  English  position  dependent  on 
the  sincerity  of  the  Nawab's  friendship  ;  and  he  had  acted  as 
though  he  supposed  a  system  established  while  the  Company  had 
none  but  trading  interests  could  serve  equally  well  when  it  had 
become  a  pohtical  power.  But  the  balance  which  he  had  be- 
queathed to  his  successors  overtaxed  their  skill  or  their  honesty 


246  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

to  maintain  ;  and  the  old  system  of  government  had  speedily 
displayed  its  inadequacy.  Both  these  aspects  were  now  to  be 
vigorously  dealt  with,  but  it  will  be  more  convenient  to  describe 
first  the  alterations  which  Clive  made  in  Vansittart's  and  Spencer's 
settlement  with  the  country  powers,  and  then  to  deal  with  the 
administrative  reforms  which  he  established  in  the  Calcutta 
government. 

His  arrival  in  fact  counted  for  much  in  Shuja-ud-daula's 
resolve  to  trust  himself  to  the  English.  At  first  Clive  was  too 
busy  in  Calcutta  to  deal  with  Oudh,  but  in  the  meantime  Camac 
conducted  negotiations  with  the  Nawab-Wazir,  who  declared 
his  readiness  to  proceed  to  Calcutta  if  Chve  desired.  The  main 
outline  of  the  settlement  was  thus  arranged  before  Clive  set  out 
to  visit  Shah  Alam  and  Shuja-ud-daula.^  This  meeting  was  at 
last  held  at  Allahabad  in  August.^  There  it  was  definitely 
agreed  that  Shuja-ud-daula  was  to  be  restored  to  Oudh,  but  he 
was  to  resign  the  districts  of  Korah  and  Allahabad  as  a  sort  of 
demesne  to  the  Emperor  and  pay  50  lakhs  to  the  English  Com- 
pany by  instalments.  All  English  forces  were  to  be  withdrawn 
except  from  the  Emperor's  districts  ;  and  the  Nawab  entered 
into  a  defensive  alliance  with  the  Company.  The  English  were 
also  to  enjoy  the  privilege  of  a  free  trade  in  Oudh.^ 

This  retrocession  was  undoubtedly  wise.  The  English  had 
not  yet  learnt  the  alphabet  of  Indian  administration  ;  and  as  they 
were  to  find,  Bengal  was  more  than  they  could  manage.  It  was 
not  the  time  to  extend  their  conquests.  In  Bengal  and  Behar 
the  English  held  enough.  "  To  go  farther,"  Chve  wrote,  "  is  in 
my  opinion  a  scheme  so  extravagently  ambitious  and  absurd 
that  no  Governor  and  Council  in  their  senses  can  adopt  it,  unless 
the  whole  system  of  the  Company's  interest  be  first  entirely 
new-modelled."  * 

While  this  pohcy  reUeved  the  Company's  Government  of  a 
burden  it  could  not  have  borne,  it  also  made  a  firm  friend  of  the 
Nawab  of  Oudh.  He  paid  off  his  instalments  with  punctuaUty. 
When  in  the  following  year  he  again  met  Clive,  he  did  not  conceal 
his  gratitude  for  having  been  restored  to  dominions  which  he  could 
not  have  recovered  by  the  sword.     And  he  was  bound  to  the 

•  Camac's  letter  of  July  3,  ap.  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  August  lo,  1765. 

*  Clive  met  Shuja-ud-daula  at  Benares  and  they  proceeded  together  to 
Allahabad.     See  Malcolm's  Clive,  vol.  iii.  pp.  121,  etc. 

'  The  treaty,  dated  August  16,  1765,  is  printed  by  Verelst  (App.,  p.  171). 
The  last  stipulation  was  speedily  withdrawn  on  Shuja-ud-daula's  request. 
■•Clive  to  the  Company,  September  30.  1765. 


CLIVE'S  POLITICAL  SETTLEMENT  247 

Company  not  only  by  gratitude  but  by  the  powerful  tie  of 
interest.  The  English  were  his  only  neighbours  who  did  not 
threaten  him.' 

The  share  allotted  to  Shah  Alam  in  these  transactions  has 
encountered  a  greater  degree  of  criticism.  He  received,  as  we 
have  seen,  the  districts  of  Korah  and  Allahabad,  and  was  guaran- 
teed 26  lakhs  a  year  from  the  revenues  of  Bengal.  Why,  asks 
Elphinstone,  pay  tribute  to  a  shadow  ?  Why  give  him  Allaha- 
bad ?  Why  acknowledge  his  power  of  appointing  the  Diwan 
while  usurping  his  power  of  appointing  the  Nawab  ?  ^  On  the 
other  hand,  enemies  like  Sulivan  complained  that  Clive  had  robbed 
the  poor  Moghul  by  breaking  the  treaty  under  which  he  was  to 
have  enjoyed  full  power  over  Oudh.^  But  if  fairly  considered, 
CUve's  policy  merits  the  objections  of  neither  historian  nor  con- 
temporary. The  essential  facts  of  the  situation  were  that  the 
English  were  under  engagements  to  make  provision  for  Shah 
Alam,  but  that  he  could  not  maintain  himself  in  Oudh  with- 
out continual  assistance.  Clive  chose  a  middle  way.  Without 
abandoning  the  poor  Moghul  to  his  fate,  he  refused  to  accept  the 
heavy  obligations  which  Spencer  had  light-heartedly  undertaken. 
He  made  the  best  of  a  stupid  situation.  Moreover,  futile  as  were 
the  Emperor's  pretensions  to  the  rule  of  India,  his  recognition 
and  sanction  were  not  wholly  valueless.  The  prestige  of  his  name 
still  carried  a  certain  weight  with  Indian  princes,  and  his  con- 
firmation was  usually  desired  though  no  one  thought  of  paying  the 
least  obedience  to  his  commands.  Besides,  the  English  were  not 
the  only  European  nation  settled  in  Bengal ;  the  French  were  re- 
estabUshed  at  Chandernagore  ;  the  Dutch  were  still  at  Chinsura  ; 
and  the  Imperial  sanction  was  of  value  in  case  of  protests 
from  those  nations  against  the  power  which  the  English  had 
acquired.  Pompous  absurdity  as  it  v/as,  the  validity  of  Shah 
Alam's  farman  could  not  easily  be  disputed  at  Paris  or  The 
Hague. 

In  fact,  CUve's  policy  recognised  the  Emperor's  position, 
made  a  handsome  provision  for  his  maintenance,  but  avoided  the 
danger  of  schemes  for  his  effective  re-establishment.  His  settle- 
ment marks  the  end  of  the  dreams  which  had  long  floated  before 

'  Letter  from  Clive  and  Camac,  of  July  14,  ap.  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  August  12, 
1766  ;  Sel.  Com.  to  the  Company,  September  8,  1766. 

'  Elphinstone,  Rise  of  the  British  Power,  p.  440. 

•  Mr.  Sulivan's  Sentiments  .  .  .  submitted  ...  to  the  Earl  of  Shelbume, 
August  26,  1766  (Lansdowne  House  MSS.,  No.  90,  f.  79.) 


248  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

the  eyes  of  both  French  and  English.  We  have  already  seen  how 
consistently  the  thoughts  of  Dupleix  and  Bussy  had  centred  upon 
Delhi,  drawn  by  the  seductive  lure  of  re-establishing  Imperial 
greatness  and  reaping  the  rich  harvest  of  Imperial  gratitude. 
Caillaud  had  wondered  in  1759  whether  Clive  should  not  remain 
another  year  in  India  and  make  a  Great  Moghul  as  well  as  a 
Nawab  of  Bengal.  CHve  himself  had  pondered  the  consequences 
of  such  action,  if  only  the  uncertain  support  of  the  Company  could 
be  exchanged  for  the  military  resources  of  the  Crown.  Holwell 
and  Vansittart,  Carnac,  Coote,  and  Munro  had  all  meditated  the 
possibility  of  a  triumphant  march  to  Delhi.  But  Clive  now  wisely 
abandoned  such  ambitions,  and,  as  with  Oudh,  marked  out  the 
course  which  his  successors  were  to  follow.  Attractive  as  it 
seemed,  the  policy  of  establishing  the  Imperial  power  would  have 
involved  the  English  in  innumerable  difficulties.  It  would  have 
made  every  power  in  India  hostile  to  them,  and  might  have 
achieved  the  miracle  of  uniting  them  in  common  action.  As 
matters  stood,  the  English  were  dangerous  only  to  those  who 
wished  to  attack  them  ;  had  they  appeared  beside  the  Emperor 
at  Delhi  and  asserted  the  Imperial  claims,  every  prince  must 
at  once  have  become  their  enemy,  in  support  of  his  own 
independence. 

In  fact,  Clive 's  treatment  of  Oudh  and  the  Emperor  evinced  a 
foresight  which  he  himself  could  not  always  command  and  which 
his  opponents  wholly  lacked.  His  settlement  in  Bengal  deserves 
great  if  not  equal  praise.  Spencer  had,  as  we  have  seen,  secured  for 
the  English  a  right  to  nominate  the  chief  officials  of  the  Durbar. 
But  that  right  was  based  solely  upon  military  force.  Muhammad 
Riza  Khan  had  been  substituted  for  Nuncomar  in  just  the  same 
way  as  Shah  Nawaz  Khan  had  been  substituted  for  Saiyid  Lashkar 
Khan  by  Bussy  at  Aurangabad.  In  Indian  eyes  the  change 
possessed  no  validity  ;  the  agreement  with  the  Nawab  would 
at  best  endure  only  for  the  period  of  his  continuance.  The 
unavowed  position  which  the  English  had  assumed  invited  by  its 
very  nature  projects  for  its  destruction.  One  necessary  change 
was  to  define  this  position  and  invest  it  with  an  appearance  of 
stability  in  Indian  eyes. 

But  that  was  not  all.  Two  other  aspects  demanded  con- 
sideration. It  was  essential  to  avoid  giving  the  French  and  Dutch 
an  opportunity  to  raise  difficulties  in  Europe.  From  the  Indian 
point  of  view  the  Company's  position  required  to  be  regularised  ; 
but  from  the  European  point  of  view  there  was  danger  in  assum- 


CLIVE'S  POLITICAL  SETTLEMENT  249 

ing  too  ostensibly  the  government  of  Bengal.  Any  sudden  or 
extensive  assumption  of  public  power  might  and  probably  would 
have  occasioned  trouble  in  English  international  relations.  Again, 
the  Company  was  not  the  State.  Already  its  acquisitions  were 
looked  on  with  jealousy  in  England,  and  the  great  fortunes  which 
had  gone  home  from  Bengal  had  accentuated  that  feeling  among 
those  who  could  effectively  express  their  sentiments.  It  was 
necessary  not  only  to  guard  against  the  jealousy  of  French  and 
Dutch,  but  also  to  avoid  giving  the  English  Parliament  room  to 
intervene  ;  and  this  too  required  the  political  power  of  the  Com- 
pany to  be  masked  as  much  as  possible.  The  problem  was  there- 
fore how  to  secure  effective  and  legitimate  power  in  Bengal  with- 
out alarming  the  Company's  possible  enemies,  foreign  and 
domestic.  Clive's  settlement  was  designed  to  that  end,  not  to 
the  improvement  of  the  administration  of  the  country,  which 
was  a  question  necessarily  subsequent  to  the  establishment  of 
power  itself. 

With  these  objects  Clive  resolved  to  obtain  from  Shah  Alam 
powers  which  had  formerly  been  jealously  separated  from  those 
exercised  by  the  Nawab,  but  which  in  the  confusion  of  the  empire 
since  the  death  of  Aurangzib  the  Nawab  had  found  no  difficulty 
in  appropriating  to  himself.  These  were  the  powers  of  the 
Imperial  Diwan.  In  theory  the  Nawab  was  responsible  for  the 
administration  of  his  province  ;  the  Diwan  for  the  collection  of 
the  revenues.  By  controlling  the  latter,  the  English  ostensibly 
would  still  remain  without  political  power  ;  they  would  not 
acquire  that  territorial  jurisdiction  which  would  make  the  chiefs 
of  Chandemagore  or  Chinsura  politically  dependent  on  them,  or 
which  would  afford  enemies  in  the  House  of  Commons  or  House  of 
Lords  an  opportunity  of  attacking  the  Company  as  the  sovereign 
power  of  Bengal.  At  the  same  time  the  Nawab  would  become 
their  pensioner  and  the  Durbar  completely  dependent  upon  them. 
As  a  temporary  poUtical  expedient,  the  plan  was  admirable. 
It  closed  for  ever  that  system  by  which  the  English  had  been  at 
once  the  humble  servants  and  the  political  directors  of  the  Nawab 
— a  system  which  in  practice  had  involved  triennial  revolutions. 
It  provided  a  transitional  stage  between  the  acquisition  of  power 
and  the  assumption  of  administration.  It  did  not,  it  was  not 
intended  to,  affect  the  administrative  system  of  the  province ; 
and  those  who  decry  the  policy  which  Clive  adopted  forget  that 
the  administrative  question  was  one  that  could  scarcely  be  taken 
up  while  the  relations  between  the  Company  and  the  English 


250  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

Crown  were   still   undefined,  and   consequently  one   thai  was 
excluded  from  Clive's  purview  in  1765. 

Simultaneously  with  his  settlement  of  the  Oudh  question, 
Clive  put  into  execution  his  project  for  the  settlement  of  power  in 
Bengal.  On  his  way  up  country  to  meet.  Shuja-ud-daula  and 
Shah  Alam,  he  had  visited  Najm-ud-daula  at  Murshidabad, 
associated  with  Muhammad  Riza  Khan  his  old  friend  Rai  Durlab 
and  the  Seths  in  the  administration  of  the  province,  and  agreed 
with  the  Nawab  that  he  should  receive  an  allowance  of  53  lakhs 
of  rupees  a  year.^  He  then  proceeded  to  Allahabad,  where  he 
received  from  Shah  Alam  a  formal  grant  of  the  Diwanni  of 
Bengal,  Behar,  and  Orissa,  thus  completing  the  process  of  es- 
tabUshing  the  British  power  begun  by  Siraj-ud-daula's  insensate 
conduct  nine  years  before. 

In  few  great  revolutions  have  circumstances  more  completely 
overruled  and  directed  the  wills  of  the  actors.  Neither  Chve 
nor  a  single  man  who  sailed  with  him  from  Madras  in  1756 
dreamed  of  the  destiny  to  which  fortune  was  impelling  them. 
The  acquisition  of  private  fortunes,  the  re-estabhshment  of  the 
Company's  privileges,  the  vindication  of  national  pride — such 
were  the  expectations  of  their  hearts.  When  Chve  lingered  on 
in  Bengal  after  the  capture  of  the  French  settlements,  the 
Presidency  of  Fort  St.  George  could  not  imagine  the  projects 
which  were  detaining  him.  The  ablest  head  in  the  Madras 
Council  deemed  that  the  Company  had  already  acquired  by  the 
treaty  with  Siraj-ud-daula  "  as  much  as  they  will  ever  be  able, 
or  ever  need  to  wish,  to  maintain."  ^  Even  the  event  of 
Plassey  did  not  withdraw  the  veil  of  destiny.  Men  thought 
that  the  EngUsh  had  only  been  restored  to  their  former  rights  ;  ' 
they  still  designed  to  convert  Fort  WilUam  into  a  great  place 
of  arms  capable  of  defying  the  Nawab.  Only  in  1766  was  it 
decided  not  to  complete  the  fort  on  its  original  plan,  since  if 
ever  the  English  were  cooped  up  within  its  walls  their  affairs 
might  be  regarded  as  irretrievably  ruined.''  This  change  of 
poUcy  is  deeply  significant.  It  marks  emphatically  the  point 
to  which  the  force  of  circumstances  had  driven  the  Enghsh,  and 

•  Bengal  to  the  Company,  September  30,  1765.  See  also  Malcolm,  op.  cit., 
vol.  iii.  pp.  121,  etc.  Nuncoraar  seems  to  have  been  already  intriguing  for  the 
restoration  of  his  power,  and  Clive  sent  down  to  Calcutta  a  man  believed  to  have 
acted  as  his  agent  (Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  August  lo,  1765). 

«  Orme  to  Payne,  July  6,  1757  (Orme  MSS.,  Various,  28,  f.  182). 
'  Scrafton's  Observations  on  Vansittarl's  Narrative,  p.  2. 

*  Bengal  Sel.  Com.  to  the  Secret  Committee,  January  31,  1766. 


CLIVE'S  POLITICAL  SETTLEMENT  251 

to  which  all  had  ignorantly  contributed — Clive  by  his  military 
success,  Vansittart  by  his  policy  of  re-establishing  the  Nawab's 
power,  thus  hastening  the  denouement  of  the  piece,  the  Company's 
servants  by  their  trade  and  the  disputes  occasioned  thereby, 
until  Clive  returned  to  reap  the  harvest  in  whose  sowing  he  had 
played  so  considerable  a  part. 


,  CHAPTER  VII 

CLIVE'S  ADMINISTRATIVE  SETTLEMENT 

AS  we  have  seen,  in  the  poUtical  settlement  Clive  care- 
fully avoided  accepting  responsibility  for  the  administra- 
tion of  the  provinces  over  which  British  power  was  now 
estabUshed.  That  was  to  remain  in  native  hands  and  follow 
the  traditional  methods.  It  was  not  expected  that  this  would 
give  ideal  results  ;  but  it  was  beheved  that  great  offenders  could 
be  detected  and  punished,  and,  as  Clive  wrote,  the  English  would 
have  the  satisfaction  of  knowing  that  they  themselves  did  not 
participate  in  the  corrupt  practices  which  were  regarded  as 
inevitable.* 

At  first  sight  this  may  appear  an  evasion  of  a  responsibility 
which  should  have  been  accepted.  But  in  fact  this  abnegation 
was  a  wise  prudence.  Clive  had  not  the  personnel  at  his  disposal 
to  permit  his  adopting  a  bolder  policy.  The  English  were 
already  responsible  for  the  management  of  the  24-Paraganas,- 
Midnapur,  Burdwan,  and  Chittagong  ;  '  these  districts,  in  them- 
selves extensive,  were  ample  for  a  school  of  administration  ; 
and  much  had  to  be  learnt  before  the  greater  task  could  be 
attempted  with  the  least  hope  of  success.  And  not  only  had 
much  to  be  learnt,  but  also  a  reformation  of  the  Company's 
system  was  needed  before  its  Civil  servants  could  be  set  to 
administrative  instead  of  commercial  employment. 

The  essential  weakness  of  that  system  in  the  new  circum- 
stances was  the  practice  of  allowing  them  to  supplement  their  pay 
by  private  trade.  In  former  days  when  the  Company  was  not 
a  political  power  this  practice  had  been  tolerable  enough.  For 
the  most  part  the  Company's  and  its  servants'  interests  had  not 
diverged  to  a  serious  degree  Both,  for  example,  were  in- 
volved in  the  maintenance  of  peace  with  the  country  powers, 
because  wars  and  disturbances  were  as  injurious  to  the  provision 

'  Clive  to  the  Company,  September  30,  1765.  " 

•  Granted  in  1757. 

*  Granted  in  1763. 


CLIVE'S  ADMINISTRATIVE  SETTLEMENT        253 

of  goods  for  other  parts  of  India  as  to  the  provision  of  goods  for 
Europe  ;  and  the  universal  method  by  which  the  servants' 
private  trade  was  conducted — that  of  temporary  joint -stocks 
— coupled  with  the  relative  smallness  of  their  capital,  made 
them  the  partners  and  alUes,  rather  than  the  rivals  and  com- 
petitors, of  the  native  traders.  But  the  battle  of  Plassey  had 
modified  this  situation  in  Bengal.  It  had,  as  we  have  seen, 
opened  the  inland  trade  to  the  English,  and  enabled  them  to 
enjoy  what  they  had  till  then  only  claimed  as  a  right  ;  and  the 
profits  obtainable  by  trading  in  grain,  or  salt,  or  tobacco  without 
paying  duties  were  much  greater  than  those  offered  by  any 
branch  of  sea-borne  trade  from  Bengal,  especially  since  the 
.trade  to  Persia  had  been  ruined  by  the  internal  commotions 
of  that  country.  But  the  participation  of  the  Company's 
servants  in  the  inland  trade  developed  a  marked  opposition 
between  their  and  their  Honourable  Masters'  interests.  They 
employed  agents  whom  they  could  not  properly  control.  Under 
their  name,  if  not  with  their  knowledge,  these  agents  forced 
their  goods  upon  up-country  villages,  assumed  powers  belonging 
to  the  officials  of  the  Nawab's  Government,  and  thereby  bred 
innumerable  disputes  between  Calcutta  and  Murshidabad,  and 
the  less  scrupulous  the  Company's  servants  were,  the  more 
speedily  tliey  advanced  to  wealth.  This  situation  afforded 
matter  for  a  reform  with  which  Clive  was  specially  charged. 

There  was  another  still  more  unpleasant  business  for  him 
to  deal  with — the  question  of  presents.  The  acceptance  of 
gifts  from  Nawabs  for  political  services  had  been  the  universal 
custom  from  the  time  when  Dupleix  proclaimed  Chanda  Sahib 
Nawab  of  the  Camatic  and  Muzaffar  Jang  Subahdar  of  the 
Deccan.  Pondichery  had  overflowed  with  the  gold  and  silver 
of  Nasir  Jang's  treasure  scattered  by  the  grateful  hands  of  his 
nephew  ;  Bussy  and  his  officers  in  the  Deccan  had  repeatedly 
enjoyed  the  bounty  of  Salabat  Jang  ;  and  the  French  Company 
witnessed  with  surprise  the  return  of  officers  and  officials  with 
sudden  fortunes  from  the  East.  The  same  thing  happened  with 
the  English,  and  to  a  much  greater  degree,  not  because  they 
were  more  corrupt  than  the  French,  but  because  their  oppor- 
tunities were  greater  and  more  prolonged.  Calcutta  had  not 
hesitated  to  follow  the  example  of  Pondichery  and  Madras. 
Chve  and  the  Select  Committee  of  1757  led  the  way.  Holwell 
and  Vansittart  had  profited  by  the  revolution  of  1760.  Van- 
sittart  and  his  friends  had  not  indeed  ventured  to  accept  presents 


254  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

for  the  restoration  of  Mir  Jafar  in  1763,  but  they  compensated 
themselves  for  this  moderation  by  their  great  claims  for  losses 
in  their  private  trade  by  the  war  with  Mir  Kasim.  When  Mir 
Jafar  died  and  Council  determined  to  establish  Najm-ud-daula 
in  his  room,  Spencer  and  his  fellows  accepted  donations  not  only 
from  the  new  Nawab  for  his  elevation  but  also  from  Muhammad 
Riza  Khan  and  others.  It  was  subsequently  alleged  that  these 
gifts  were  extorted  from  unwilling  donors  ;  *  but  their  real 
peculiarity  was  that  they  were  accepted  after  the  arrival  of 
orders  from  the  Company  that  all  their  servants,  civil  and 
military,  should  execute  covenants  binding  themselves  not  to 
receive  presents.-  Thus  the  Company's  service  demanded 
reform  not  only  in  regard  to  the  method  of  remuneration  but 
also  in  regard  to  the  establishment  of  a  spirit  of  subordination. 
These  two,  however,  were  intimately  connected  ;  and  no  per- 
manent improvement  could  be  hoped  for  until  the  Company 
became  the  sole  master  from  whom  remuneration  could  be 
expected.  Clive  made  a  wise  attempt  to  remedy  these  evils  ; 
and  his  policy  would  have  achieved  a  great  measure  of  success 
had  the  Company  been  wise  enough  to  support  it. 

When  the  negotiations  regarding  Clive's  appointment  had 
been  in  progress,  he  had  demanded  the  power  of  acting  apart 
from  his  Council  if  need  should  arise.  ^  This  was  refused  him, 
but  a  Select  Committee  was  appointed  with  powers  similar  to 
those  exercised  by  the  Select  Committee  under  Vansittart. 
The  new  body,  however,  was  empowered  only  to  establish  peace 
and  tranquiUity,  after  which  its  authority  was  to  devolve  to  the 
Council.*  Clive,  however,  employed  this  Committee  as  the 
instrument  of  his  reforms,  and  continued  it,  long  after  peace 
had  been  established,  as  the  principal  administrative  body.  In 
this  he  was  undoubtedly  travelling  beyond  the  letter  of  the 
Company's   orders ;    but   he   was    justified   by  the  conditions 

>  Clive  held  a  lengthy  inquiry  into  the  matter,  but  the  evidence  adduced 
against  the  recipients  was  all  suspect,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  the 
least  complaint  would  have  been  made  had  there  been  no  change  of  government, 
or  had  not  Clive's  known  disapproval  of  the  conduct  of  Spencer,  etc.,  encouraged 
the  complainants.  The  proceedings  of  Clive  and  the  Select  Committee  are 
printed  in  the  First  Rep.  Sel.  Com.,  App.  84. 

»  These  orders  arrived  on  January  24,  1765,  and  were  absolutely  ignored. 

*  Clive  to  the  Directors,  April  27,  1764,  ap.  Malcolm,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii.  pp.  314. 
etc.  He  quotes  as  precedents  the  powers  with  which  the  French  had  invested 
Godeheu  in  1754  and  those  conferred  on  himself  by  the  Madras  Council  in  1756. 

'Company  to  Bengal,  June  i,  1764.  The  Committee  consisted  of  Clive, 
Sumner,  Carnac,  Verelst,  and  Sykes. 


CLIVE'S  ADMINISTRATIVE  SETTLEMENT       255 

which  he  found  upon  his  arrival.  "  We  saw  plainly,"  he  wrote, 
"  that  most  of  the  gentlemen  in  Council  had  been  too  deeply 
concerned  themselves  in  the  measures  which  required  amend- 
ment, for  us  to  expect  any  assistance  from  them."  '  The 
establishment  of  the  Committee  was  not  allowed  to  pass  without 
some  faint  show  of  resistance.  One  member  of  Council  attempted 
to  discuss  the  extent  of  the  Committee's  powers  ;  another  pro- 
posed to  send  to  the  subordinate  factories  extracts  from  the 
Company's  orders  which  seemed  to  limit  those  powers.  But 
both  malcontents  gave  way  before  CUve's  stern  severity, 
and  sat  "  with  very  long,  pale  countenances  "  for  the  rest  of 
the  proceedings.  2  As  CUve  declared  later,  "  Upon  my  arrival 
in  Bengal,  I  found  the  powers  given  so  loosely  and  Jesuitically 
worded  that  they  were  immediately  contested  by  the  Council. 
I  was  determined,  however,  to  put  the  most  extensive  con- 
struction upon  them,  because  I  was  determined  to  do  my  duty 
to  my  country."  '  In  fact  by  this  means  Clive  secured  complete 
control  of  the  Company's  government.  "  Clive  is  really  our 
king,"  wrote  a  civihan,  fearful  how  far  his  interests  would  suffer  ; 
"  his  word  is  law,  and,  as  in  your  time,  he  laughs  at  contra- 
dictions." * 

The  first  use  of  this  power  was  to  enforce  the  Company's 
orders  regarding  presents.  The  new  covenants  were  signed  by 
the  Councillors  on  May  g,  "  after  many  idle  and  evasive  argu- 
ments." *  Indeed,  Chve's  vigorous  support  of  these  orders  came 
as  a  cruel  surprise  to  the  Council.  It  seems  to  have  been  gener- 
ally believed  that,  as  they  arose  out  of  the  disputes  regarding 
Clive's  jagir,  he  would  certainly  procure  their  reversal  before 
he  left  England,  aUke  in  his  own  interests  and  in  those  of  the 
people  who  accompanied  him.*  No  one  seems  to  have  sup- 
posed that  he  would  act  otherwise ;  and,  indeed,  a  man 
with  less  strength  of  character  would  not  have  dared  so  com- 
pletely to  turn  his  back  on  his  own  past.  As  it  was,  this 
matter  formed  the  basis  of  endless  accusations  against  him,  and 

'  Clive  to  the  Company,  September  30,  1765. 

*  Clive  to  Carnac,  May  6,  1765. 
'  Clive's  Speech,  p.  5. 

*  Barwell  to  Beaumont,  September  1 5,  1765  {Bengal  Past  and  Present,  vol.  viii. 
p.  185). 

*  Clive  to  Palk,  May  11,  1765  (Malcolm,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii.  pp.  324-325). 

•See  Barwell  to  his  father,  September  15,  1765  {Bengal  Past  and  Present, 
vol.  viii.  p.  195) ;  of.  Leycester  and  Gray  to  the  Company,  September  29 
1765. 


256  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

secured  for  him  the  lasting  dislike  of  the  Bengal  civilians  of  his 
time.' 

Another  measure  secured  for  him  an  almost  equal  amount  of 
odium.  In  the  course  of  1765  various  vacancies  occurred  in  the 
Council.  One  member  committed  suicide,  another  was  suspended, 
two  more  resigned.  In  July,  when  Clive  was  absent,  and  only 
one  member  of  the  Select  Committee  was  at  Calcutta,  the  Council 
decided  to  call  up  to  the  Board  two  covenanted  servants  next  in 
seniority,  in  spite  of  the  warning  they  received  that  their  action 
would  not  be  approved.'  CUve  had,  indeed,  other  schemes  in 
view.  He  regarded  the  next  senior  members  of  the  service  as  too 
tainted  with  the  vices  of  the  late  administration  to  be  promoted  ; 
while  the  rest  were  too  young  and  inexperienced.  In  these 
circumstances  he  resolved  to  call  up  four  members  of  the  Madras 
service,  in  order  to  remind  offending  servants  of  the  penalties  of 
misconduct  and  because  the  conduct  at  Madras  had  been  "  in 
general  so  unexceptionable  that  to  present  Bengal  with  such 
examples  of  regularity,  discretion, and  moderation,  would,  I  think, 
be  a  means  of  restoring  it  to  good  order  and  government."  ^ 
Early  in  January  this  transaction  became  known  in  Calcutta  ; 
on  February  7,  1766,  the  four  Madras  servants  arrived.* 

As  in  the  case  of  presents,  so  here  also,  Clive's  enemies  accused 
him  of  inconsistency,  for  he  had  condemned  Spencer's  appoint- 
ment from  Bombay  as  President  of  Fort  William,  as  provocative 
of  jealousy  and  disputes.  Moreover,  the  covenants  had  been 
signed  by  the  express  order  of  the  Company,  whereas  the  Madras 
civilians  had  been  appointed  by  the  sole  order  of  Clive  and  the 
Select  Committee.  Lastly,  this  supersession  of  the  Bengal 
servants  came  on  the  top  of  the  prohibition  of  presents,  and 
gathered  together  the  discontent  created  by  both,  for  which 
besides  it  offered  a  more  decent  excuse.  As  soon  as  the  appoint- 
ments became  known,  a  meeting  was  held  attended  by  most 
of  the  Company's  servants  in  Calcutta,  and  a  memorial  to  the 
Directors  was  drawn  up  and  signed.     In  itself  the  memorial  was 

'  A  passage  in  Champion's  diary  (August  6,  1765,  I.O.,  Home  Misc.,  No.  198) 
throws  a  curious  light  on  the  spirit  in  which  the  covenants  were  signed.  Champion 
remarks  that  he  signed  "  with  cheerfulness,  as  they  appear  to  be  but  matter 
of  form." 

»  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  September  14,  1765. 

•  Clive  to  the  Company,  September  30,  1765.  Russell,  Akiersey,  Kelsall,  and 
Floyer  were  applied  for  by  resolution  of  the  Select  Committee  (Sumner  dissenting) 
of  November  11,  1765. 

'Champion's  Journal,  January  8  and  February  7,  1766. 


CLIVE'S  ADMINISTRATIVE  SETTLEMENT       257 

unobjectionable — "  though  puerile  it  is  modest,  and  though 
plaintive,  it  is  not  clamorous."  ^  But  besides  this,  it  was  resolved 
to  cut  Clive  and  all  the  members  of  the  Select  Committee  (except 
the  one  who  had  dissented  from  the  appointment)  and  the  new 
Councillors  from  Madras.  Clive  was  not  the  man  quietly  to 
accept  this  opposition  to  his  authority.  The  secretary,  who  was 
believed  to  have  taken  a  principal  part  in  this  matter,  was  dis- 
missed from  his  post  and  suspended  from  the  Company's  service, 
and  other  leaders  were  refused  dastaks  and  thus  prevented  from 
trading."  Other  removes  were  also  made  affecting  the  pockets 
of  the  leading  malcontents — "  in  short,  every  servant  that  had 
ventured  to  express  detestation  of  the  administration  was  marked 
and  immediately  stripped  of  all  to  their  bare  pay."  *  This  broke 
up  the  association,  and  "  lo  !  the  spirited  Bengallers  appeared 
in  a  body  one  morning  at  the  table  of  their  lord  and  master."  * 
The  incident  shows  how  completely  the  Bengal  civilians  mis- 
understood their  position  and  the  character  of  their  Governor  ; 
Chve's  resolute  front  quickly  recalled  them  to  a  sense  of 
reaUties. 

He  had  already  taken  steps  to  remedy  one  great  evil — ^that 
of  their  salaries.  He  brought  out  with  him  orders  that  the  inland 
trade  was  to  be  placed  on  a  more  equitable  footing  ;  *  and  while 
he  was  completing  the  settlement  with  Oudh  and  the  Emperor, 
Sumner  prepared  a  scheme  on  the  basis  of  emplo5dng  part  of  the 
revenues  formerly  derived  by  the  Government  from  salt,  betel- 
nut,  and  tobacco  for  the  pajmient  of  additional  allowances  to  the 
senior  civil  and  miUtary  servants.  Salt  had  formerly  been  a 
government  monopoly,  farmed  out  periodically  to  the  highest 
bidder  or  the  greatest  favourite  ;  while  the  other  articles  had 
been  subject  to  transit  dues  at  numerous  points  along  the  water- 
ways and  roads  of  the  province.  It  was  now  decided  to  deHver 
these  articles  over  to  an  exclusive  company,  comprising  aU 
senior  servants,  both  civil  and  mihtary,  on  whose  account  the 
total  produce  and  import  was  to  be  deUvered  at  a  reasonable 
price  and  by  them  sold  to  native  merchants  at  specified  places. 

'  Clive's  Minute,  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  January  20,  1766. 

'Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  January  20,  1766.  Perquisites  of  the  Secretary  were 
reckoned  at  8000  Rs.  a  year,  in  1758  (Scrafton  to  Hastings,  September  4,  1758. 
Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  29132,  f.  16). 

'  Barwell  to  Leycester,  September  15,  1766  {Bengal  Past  and  Present,  vol.  ix, 
P-  93)- 

*  Loc.  cit. 

'  Company  to  Bengal,  June  i,  1764  (Fourth  Rep.  Com.  of  Sec,  App.  24). 

17 


258  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

The  Company  was  to  receive  a  duty  of  35  per  cent,  on  salt,  25  per 
cent,  on  tobacco,  and  10  per  cent,  on  betel-nut,^  which,  it  was 
estimated,  would  produce  them  10  lakhs  a  year.  The  remainder 
was  to  be  divided  in  shares  apportioned  to  their  rank,  from  the 
Governor  and  Commander-in-Chief  down  to  the  Chaplain,  the 
Major,  and  the  head-surgeons.^  This  scheme  in  practical  fact 
amounted  merely  to  the  allocation  of  special  allowances  upon 
a  particular  branch  of  the  revenue  ;  and  while  in  form  the 
administration  was  confided  to  the  members  of  the  Company, 
they  were  in  reality  but  put  in  the  place  of  the  old  farmers  of  the 
revenues. 

The  society  was  established  for  one  year  from  September  1765, 
and  when  the  matter  came  up  again  for  consideration  in  1766, 
orders  had  been  received  from  the  Company,  based  upon  the 
complaints  of  Mir  Jafar  in  1764,  totally  prohibiting  the  trade.* 
Clive  refused  to  put  these  orders  into  execution.  They  had 
been  issued  in  ignorance  of  his  assumption  of  the  Diwanni  for  the 
Company,  whereby  the  inland-trade  duties  had  passed  out  of  the 
Nawab's  control.  His  point  of  view  was  entirely  reasonable  ; 
but  it  unhappily  exposed  Clive  to  the  specious  accusation  of 
disobeying  the  Company's  orders  in  the  same  manner  as  Spencer 
had  done  in  the  matter  of  the  presents,  although  Clive's 
conduct  was  inspired  by  public,  and  Spencer's  by  private 
interest. 

Clive,  therefore,  resolved  to  continue  the  society  for  another 
year  ;  however,  he  took  the  opportunity  to  amend  it  in  certain 
directions.  In  order  to  give  the  natives  a  larger  share  in  the 
trade,  it  was  ordered  that  all  salt  should  be  sold  at  Calcutta  or  at 
the  place  of  production  at  a  fixed  price  to  native  merchants,  who 
were  also  subjected  to  maximum  prices  fixed  for  each  town. 
At  the  same  time  the  Company's  duty  was  raised  to  50  per 
cent.^ 

Unfortunately  the  real  nature  of  the  arrangement  was  mis- 

1  In  practice  the  Society  traded  only  in  salt  (Verelst,  p.  ii6). 

'  B«^al  Sel.  Com.,  August  lo  and  September  i8,  1765  ;  Bengal  to  the  Com- 
pany, September  30,  1765.  There  were  fifty-six  shares,  of  which  the  Governor 
took  five,  the  Second  and  Commander-in-Chief  three  each,  the  rest  of  the 
Council  and  the  Colonels  two  each,  the  Chaplain,  fourteen  junior  merchants,  and 
three  lieutenant-colonels  two- thirds  each  ;  twenty-seven  others  one-third  each. 

'  Company  to  Bengal,  February  19,  1766. 

*  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  September  3,  176G.  Shortly  after  the  committee  of 
management  was  warned  not  to  allow  its  agents  to  assume  authority.  Ibid., 
September  30,  1766. 


CLIVE'S  ADMINISTRATIVE  SETTLEMENT        259 

apprehended  by  the  Company,  who  seemed  to  think  that  they 
were  desired  to  protect  and  recognise  a  system  similar  to  that 
which  had  bred  such  troubles  with  Mir  Kasim.  They  there- 
fore ordered  its  abolition  and  the  re-establishment  of  the  old 
system.^  In  this  they  were  much  influenced  by  the  form  which 
Clive  had  adopted,  and  which  did  appear  to  continue  the  former 
practice.  Had  Clive  placed  the  management  under  government, 
the  real  efiect  of  his  proposals  would  have  been  more  apparent  ; 
but  he  probably  feared  that  then  the  Company  would  complain 
of  his  conduct  in  thus  disposing  of  its  revenues. 

The  society  seems  to  have  worked  fairly  enough  during  its 
short  existence.  In  the  first  year,  indeed,  the  managers  succeeded 
in  taking  more  than  the  5  per  cent,  profit  which  Clive  had 
allotted  to  them  ;  hence  the  modifications  which  were  made  in 
1766.  Nor  did  the  establishment  of  the  society  raise  the  price, 
except  at  Calcutta,  where  it  had  hitherto  been  imported  duty 
free  or  Uable  only  to  the  Company's  5  per  cent,  sea-customs.  The 
selling  rates  were  fixed  at  12  or  15  per  cent,  below  the  average 
of  the  previous  twenty  years  ;  and  at  Patna,  where  the  price  had 
varied  from  3^  to  7  rupees  the  maund  between  1760  and  1765,  it 
did  not  exceed  4  rupees  under  the  society's  management. - 

But  although  the  Company  did  not  adopt  Clive's  scheme,  his 
arguments  regarding  the  pay  of  the  Company's  servants  were 
found  imanswerable.  He  had  pointed  out  the  need  of  some 
length  of  service  for  the  acquisition  of  that  political  knowledge 
which  had  become  essential  for  the  proper  discharge  of  the 
higher  offices  in  the  Company's  service,  as  well  as  the  need  that 
the  Company's  servants  should  be  assured  of  something  more 
than  a  bare  living.^  Councillors  and  field-officers  "  have  a  right 
to  expect  such  advantages  in  your  service  as  may  enable  them 
to  return  in  a  few  years  with  independence  to  their  native 
country."  "  These  arguments  were  recognised  by  a  grant  of 
2|  per  cent,  on  the  Company's  net  revenues  to  be  distributed 
among  the  principal  civil  and  military  servants.*    So  a  beginning 

'  Dispatches  to  the  Select  Committee  and  to  Clive  of  May  17,  176G. 

'  See  Verelst,  p.  1 16.  Both  Mill  and  Thornton  take  a  very  prejudiced  view 
of  Clive's  conduct  in  this  respect,  but  they  do  not  seem  to  have  understood 
either  the  scheme  itself  or  the  revenue  system  which  it  replaced. 

*  Clive  to  the  Company,  September  30,  1765. 

*  Bengal  Sel.  Com.  to  the  Company,  September  30,  1765. 

'  This  mofle  of  payment  had  been  adopted  by  the  French  Company,  who 
had  granted  the  chief  and  Council  at  Masulipatam  a  percentage  on  the  revenues 
of  the  Northern  Circars. 


260  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

at  least  was  made  in  the  direction  of  creating  a  professional 
service  which  should  not  depend  upon  external  emoluments. 

Clive  was  less  successful  in  seeking  the  aboUtion  of  private 
trade,  although  he  confined  his  attempt  to  the  head  of  the  adminis- 
tration. In  one  of  his  minutes,  he  remarked  that  the  President 
was  entrusted  with  the  management  of  enormous  revenues,  the 
superintendence  of  the  Company's  finance,  trade,  and  poUcy,  and 
the  conduct  of  the  proceedings  of  both  the  Council  and  the  Select 
Committee.  In  these  multifarious  occupations  he  had  ample 
employment,  and  should  not  be  embarrassed  with  the  manage- 
ment of  private  trade  as  well.  He  proposed  therefore  to  execute 
a  bond  to  abstain  wholly  from  private  trade, ^  for  which  he  was 
to  receive  a  commission  of  ij  per  cent. on  the  Company's  Diwanni 
re  venues. - 

This  proposal,  which  was  unanimously  accepted  in  Calcutta, 
looks  at  first  as  though  Clive  desired  to  augment  the  £6000  a  year 
which  the  Company  had  granted  him  as  salary.^  But  he  had 
already  resolved  to  go  home  after  Christmas,  and  the  proposal  was 
designed  to  affect  future  Governors  rather  than  himself.  Van- 
sittart,  who  had  been  granted  2J  per  cent,  on  the  revenues  be- 
stowed by  Mir  Kasim,  was  reckoned  to  have  received  near  £20,000 
per  annum  as  Governor,  without  being  restrained  in  regard  to 
either  trade  or  presents.  The  latter  had  now  been  prohibited 
by  the  Company  ;  and  CUve  proposed  to  abolish  the  former.  But 
this  wise  reform  was  too  far-sighted  to  please  the  Company,  who 
allowed  the  Governor  a  share  of  the  2^  per  cent,  without  any 
stipulation  regarding  his  private  trade.* 

Such  was  Clive's  poUcy  in  regard  to  the  Civil  service  of  the 
Company.  The  history  of  his  relations  with  the  Military  service 
is  not  dissimilar.  He  had  to  enforce  reforms  which  his  pre- 
decessors had  shrunk  from  executing  in  the  one  as  much  as  in  the 
other  ;  in  regard  to  both  he  had  to  suppress  a  spirit  of  insubordina- 
tion which  was  as  old  as  the  Company  itself,  but  which  had 
recently  assumed  alarming  proportions  in  Bengal.  In  the  case  of 
the  military,  this  spirit  was  intensified  by  the  jealousy  long  sub- 
sisting between  the  officers  on  the  one  hand  and  the  Civil  servants 
and  Councils  on  the  other.     In  its  earlier  days  the  Company 

'  This  was  just  after  Clive  had  refused  a  share  in  the  Salt  Society  of  1766. 
»  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  September  19,  1766. 
•Company  to  Bengal,  June  i,  1764. 

*  Company   to  Bengal,   November   20,    1767.     The   Governor  was  allowed 
31  per  cent,  of  the  2 J  per  cent.,  or  roughly  f  per  cent,  of  the  net  revenues. 


CLIVE'S  ADMINISTRATIVE  SETTLEMENT       261 

had  obstinately  refused  to  allow  a  higher  commissioned  rank 
than  that  of  lieutenant.^  At  that  time  officers  were  closely 
assimilated  to  the  civiUans.  Like  the  latter,  they  supplemented 
their  scanty  pay  by  the  profits  of  private  trade  and  by  various 
practices,  condemned  as  irregular  but  tacitly  permitted  in  most 
armies  of  the  period.  With  the  growth  of  the  Company's  forces 
necessitated  by  the  wars  with  the  French,  the  increased  number 
of  the  officers,  and  the  entertainment  of  a  number  who  had  served 
in  the  King's  army,  quickly  developed  a  more  professional  spirit, 
which  affected  deeply  the  relations  between  the  civil  and  mihtary. 

On  one  occasion  the  whole  body  of  officers  on  the  Coast 
endeavoured  to  coerce  Government  into  allowing  them  greater 
advantages  than  the  Council  was  prepared  to  concede.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  war  with  Chanda  Sahib,  the  Enghsh  troops  in  the 
field  had  received  an  extra  allowance  called  batta  from  Muhammad 
AH  Khan.  But  when  in  1751  grants  were  made  of  revenues 
intended  to  enable  the  Company  to  meet  the  cost  of  supporting 
their  candidate,  Muhammad  Ah  naturally  objected  to  continue 
paying  batta  ;  it  was  henceforward  paid  by  the  Company,  but 
at  a  lower  rate  than  had  been  given  before.  This  caused  immense 
dissatisfaction  amongst  the  officers,  who  presented  a  protest,  on 
Council's  refusing  to  accede  to  their  requests,  couched  in  such 
terms  that  the  leading  signatories  would  have  been  brought 
before  a  court-martial  had  there  been  enough  captains  who  had 
not  signed  it  to  constitute  a  court.  As  it  was,  the  three  leaders 
in  the  movement  were  ordered  down  to  Madras,  and  it  was 
decided  to  send  them  home  ;  but  one  died,  another  deserted, 
and  the  third  made  his  submission. 

Later  on,  similar  trouble  arose  again.  The  Company  was 
constantly  urging  upon  its  agents  in  India  the  need  of  reducing 
military  expenditure.  In  this  it  was  not  wholly  unreasonable  ; 
its  service  was,  and  long  remained,  the  best -paid  military  service 
in  the  world.  Among  the  retrenchments  in  the  Madras  army 
was  the  steady  reduction  of  the  garrisons  at  which  half-batta  was 
allowed,  in  proportion  as  communications  became  more  regular 
and  the  cost  of  European  articles  lower.  In  time  this  was  extended 
to  the  remoter  garrisons,  and  in  1759  half-batta  was  abolished  at 
Trichinopoly.  This  was  much  resented.  At  last  in  1762,  after 
repeated  appUcations  from  the  officers.  Council  resolved  that  the 
half-batta  could  not  be  restored  but  that  the  officers  who  desired 

'  So  late  as  1748,  companies  were  commanded  by  lieutenants  styled  Captain 
by  courtesy. 


262  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

it  should  be  removed  elsewhere.  Shortly  after  this  twenty-eight 
officers  collectively  demanded  batta  or  relief.  Government  there- 
on resolved  to  punish  the  officer  beUeved  to  be  chiefly  responsible 
for  this  combination,  and  to  refuse  the  demand  ;  but  they  did 
not,  or  could  not,  maintain  their  position,  and  the  struggle  con- 
cluded with  the  re-estabUshment  of  half-batta  at  Trichinopoly.' 

Such  incidents  recall  in  a  modified  way  the  shameful  mutiny 
of  the  French  officers  under  d'Auteuil  in  1750.  This  also  had  its 
origin,  the  reader  may  recollect,  in  the  allowances  and  donations 
made  to  the  French  troops  by  Chanda  Sahib. 

Another  cause  of  difficulty  was  the  ancient  jealousy  between 
men  of  the  sword  and  those  of  the  pen.  This  emerged  as  soon 
as  the  former  existed  in  numbers  sufficient  for  the  development 
among  themselves  of  an  esprit  de  corps.  The  feeUng  was 
strengthened  by  the  consciousness  of  professional  knowledge 
which  the  civUians  lacked  and  opportunities  of  gain  inferior  to 
those  which  the  civiUans  enjoyed.-  Hence  a  tendency  to  dis- 
regard (when  possible  and  convenient)  the  orders  of  a  civilian 
government.  Innumerable  disputes  arose  between  Lawrence, 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  Saunders,  the  President,  over  the 
conduct  of  military  operations  and  the  promotion  of  officers  ; 
whenever  the  Council  differed  from  Lawrence  in  opinion,  he 
threatened  them  with  resignation  ;  he  was  perpetually  finding 
slights  in  the  best-intentioned  letters.  After  Saunders  went 
home,  he  complained  of  the  system  under  which  the  Majors  sat 
in  Council  on  civil  and  miUtary  affairs  alike,  as  producing  a 
lack  of  harmony.  "  Of  what  service,"  he  asked,  "  can  their 
presence  be  in  debating  that  which  they  are  totally  ignorant 
of  ?  "  » 

Still  more  was  this  the  case  with  King's  officers  in  India. 
In  1754  a  royal  regiment  was  sent  out  to  Madras  ;  and  its  Colonel, 
Adlercron,  straightway  plunged  into  disputes  with  the  Council, 
regarding  both  the  amount  of  his  allowances  and  the  extent  of  his 
powers.  Adlercron  remained  three  years  in  the  Carnatic  ;  he 
claimed  the  whole  military  authority  upon  the  coast,  apparently 
to  the  entire  exclusion  of  the  Council ;  ^  he  was  reprimanded  for 

'  Wilson  (The  Madras  Army,  vol.  i.  pp.  32  and  165)  gives  an  account  of  these 
two  aflairs. 

*  Mainly  in  the  article  of  private  trade,  for  which  the  civilians  were  necessarily 
in  a  more  advantageous  position. 

*  I.O.,  Misc.  Ltrs.  Reed.,  1754-55,  No.  180. 

*  "  There  is  now  no  other  military  authority  on  this  coast,  but  what  is  lodged 
ia  my  hands"  (Adlercron  to  Council,  September  24,  1754.  Mil.  Cons.,  1754,  p.  218). 


CLIVE'S  ADMINISTRATIVE  SETTLEMENT       263 

his  conduct,  and  then,  as  that  proved  ineffectual,  he  was  recalled.^ 
He  was  a  dull,  unintelligent,  and  quarrelsome  person  ;  but  similar 
troubles  arose  with  the  officers  who  succeeded  him.  "  We, 
however, begin  to  think,"  wrote  the  Madras  Committee,"  that  it  is 
impossible  for  the  best-disposed  man  in  the  world  to  govern 
himself  properly  in  that  state  of  independent  authority  the 
King's  officers  are,  or  imagine  they  are,  vested  with  in  this 
country.  ...  By  way  of  illustration  we  enclose  herewith  the 
copy  of  a  letter  we  received  lately  from  Major  Monson  and  of  our 
answer.  .  .  .  Major  Monson  is  allowed  by  all  that  know  him  to  be 
a  man  of  great  politeness  and  of  a  moderate  even  temper."  ^ 
With  Coote  relations  were  still  worse.  He  resigned,  or  threatened 
resignation,  a  dozen  times  in  a  twelve-month,  and  seems  only  to 
have  thoroughly  agreed  with  the  Government  in  their  praises  of 
his  services.^ 

But  if  the  relations  between  civil  and  military  had  been  bad 
at  Madras,  they  had  been  worse  in  Bengal,  chiefly,  one  may 
suppose,  because  the  prizes  at  stake  were  more  considerable,  but 
also  because  the  conduct  of  the  Bengal  Council  was  far  more 
open  to  question  than  that  of  the  Madras  Government.  As  we 
have  seen,  bitter  disputes  arose  over  Vansittart's  policy  in  1761 ; 
and  both  Camac  and  Coote  were  recalled.  Later  on,  Camac's 
management  of  the  campaign  of  1764  was  regarded  by  Council 
as  slack  and  inefficient,  while  he  described  the  orders  sent  to  him 
as  big  with  mischief.*  A  Uttle  later  he  claimed  that  officers 
commanding  detachments  should  not  be  subjected  to  the  com- 
mands of  the  local  chief.  The  civilian,  he  observed,  could  at 
worst  only  lose  his  post ;  the  officer  might  lose  life  and  honour  as 
well.* 

CUve  himself,  in  all  the  flush  of  his  victory  at  Plassey,  en- 
countered difficulties  in  the  management  of  his  subordinate 
officers.  All  the  captains  in  a  body  waited  on  him  to  protest 
against  a  rumoured  promotion  which  they  disapproved  ;  *  and  in 
the  next  year  eleven  captains  protested  against  the  admission  of 
a  Bombay  captain  on  the  Bengal  establishment,  and  six  resigned 

'  Pub.  Des.  from  England,  December  19,  1755  and  February  i,  1757. 

»  Mil.  Des.  to  England.  July  28,  1759.  The  dispute  alluded  to  concerned  the 
conduct  of  the  Company's  renters.     Mil.  Cons.,  July  2,  1759. 

'  His  journal  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  viii.)  is  full  of  reflections  on  the  conduct  of 
Pigot,  etc. — reflections  for  the  most  part  unmerited. 

*  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  July  5,  1764. 

*  Ibid.,  December  31,  1764. 

•Clive  to  Drake,  December  19,  1757  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  x.  f.  2486). 


264  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

in  consequence  of  his  transfer.^  Vansittart,  as  was  to  be  ex- 
pected, met  with  more  cavalier  treatment.  An  intended  appoint- 
ment "  raised  such  a  commotion  among  the  of&cers  that  all  the 
subalterns  to  a  man  gave  in  a  remonstrance,  declaring  they 
would  all  lay  down  if  this  was  put  in  execution."  ^  It  is  difficult 
in  all  these  affairs  exactly  to  apportion  the  fair  share  of  blame 
which  should  be  laid  on  the  two  opposing  bodies.  The  facts  are 
cited  rather  to  illustrate  the  relations  which  subsisted  at  Madras 
and  Calcutta  between  the  officers  and  the  government  than  to 
convict  either  singly  of  a  misconduct  which  seems  to  have  been 
shared  by  both.  It  is  clear  that  when  Clive  assumed  the  govern- 
ment of  Bengal  for  the  second  time,  these  relations  were  notably 
bad. 

Besides  this,  the  same  question  had  arisen  as  had  caused 
so  much  trouble  at  Madras.  Up  to  the  time  of  Mir  Kasim's 
grants  for  the  maintenance  of  the  troops,  the  Nawab  had  paid 
their  batta  when  on  field  service  at  a  rate  somewhat  less  liberal 
than  had  been  accorded  by  Muhammad  Ali  in  the  south. ^  This 
rate  was  continued  by  Vansittart  and  his  Council  when  the 
charges  were  transferred  to  the  Company ;  and  when  they 
proposed  a  few  months  later  to  reduce  it,  the  officers  represented 
the  matter  so  vigorously  that  the  question  was  remitted  to  the 
Covui  of  Directors.  The  latter  could  not  in  the  least  see  why 
the  Bengal  officers  should  draw  twice  as  much  batta  as  those  of 
Madras,  where  living  was  notoriously  dearer  ;  *  but  this  dispatch 
arrived  on  the  eve  of  the  war  with  Mir  Kasim — a  time  unpro- 
pitious  for  a  measure  certain  to  evoke  military  discontent. 
Nothing  was  done,  therefore,  and  when  in  the  following  year 
the  Company  sent  out  renewed  orders  for  the  reduction  of  this 
double-batta,^  Spencer  and  Council  treated  this  just  as  they 
had  treated  the  other  disagreeable  orders  about  presents,  and 
did  nothing.  8 

•  Bengal  Cons.,  August  29  and  31,  1758. 

'  Letter  to  Drake,  January  15,  1761  (Orme  MSS.,  India,  iv.  f.  1030). 

•  Muhammad  Ali  had  allowed  to  captains  1 5  Rs.  a  day  ;  Mir  Jafar  gave  them 
12  Rs.  The  batta  allowed  by  the  Company  in  175 1  at  Madras  was  5  Rs.  ; 
raised  in  1755  to  6  Rs.  Captains'  pay  was  los.  a  day,  but  besides  this  they 
enjoyed  various  indefinite  advantages,  such  as  clothing  their  companies. 

*  Company  to  Bengal,  March  9,  1763. 
*Ibid.,  June  i,  1764. 

*  Clive's  strictures  upon  his  predecessor's  government  may  have  been  over- 
charged ;  but  it  is  plain  that  Spencer  used  Clive's  appointment  as  a  pretext  for 
delajring  the  enforcement  of  unpleasant  orders,  while  he  eagerly  seized  all  occa- 
sions for  action  which  might  lead  to  profit. 


CLIVE'S  ADMINISTRATIVE  SETTLEMENT       265 

Thus  Clive  was  compelled  to  assume  the  unpopular  role  of 
reformer  of  the  Military  as  well  as  of  the  Civil  service.  Among 
other  measures  which  CUve  had  carried  with  the  Court  of  Directors 
was  the  reorganisation  of  the  Bengal  army.  The  Europeans 
were  divided  into  three  battalions  ;  and  three  brigades  were 
formed,  comprising  a  battalion  of  Europeans,  a  company  of 
artillery,  six  battalions  of  sepoys,  and  a  troop  of  native  horse. 
These  brigades  were  placed  under  the  command  of  Sir  Robert 
Barker,  Richard  Smith,  and  Sir  Robert  Fletcher.  The  first 
two  were  able  and  experienced  officers,  who  had  seen  much 
arduous  service  against  the  French  in  the  Camatic.  The  fruit 
of  their  appointment  was  quickly  seen  in  the  discovery  and 
reform  of  abuses  which  had  sprung  up  in  the  payment  of  the 
troops.*  But  the  third.  Sir  Robert  Fletcher,  was  an  officer  of 
whose  character  it  is  difficult  to  speak  with  moderation.  Seldom 
has  the  spirit  of  intrigue  been  more  completely  incarnated. 
Like  the  others,  he  had  served  in  the  Camatic,  where  he  had  been 
dismissed  for  insolence.  He  had  procured  his  reinstatement  by 
an  apology  which  shows  that  he  knew  how  to  grovel  as  well  as 
to  bully.  ^  He  had  subsequently  returned  to  England,  whence 
he  was  sent  back  to  India  as  Major  by  SuUvan,  Clive's  principal 
opponent  in  the  Court  of  Directors.^  He  was  later  appointed 
Colonel  and  Brigadier,  but  complained  of  what  he  called  his 
supersession  by  Richard  Smith,  though  the  latter  was  an  older 
officer  by  five  years.*  Eager  to  supersede  his  elders,  he  could 
not  bear  to  see  them  take  their  due  rank  above  him.^  He  was, 
moreover,  as  greedy  of  money  as  he  was  of  rank.  He  had  joined 
the  Bengal  army  just  after  the  battle  of  Buxar,  and,  in  his  eager- 
ness to  share  in  the  spoils  of  Benares,  he  almost  persuaded  Munro 
to  send  him  ahead  with  a  detachment  to  prevent  valuables 
being  removed  from  the  city.  Though  disappointed  in  this,  he 
claimed  to  share  in  the  prize-money  all  the  same  ;  Munro 
and  his  officers  refused  ;  on  which  Fletcher  persuaded  Spencer 
to   intervene,   but  without    result.  •      It    was    Clive's    misfor- 

•  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  September  7  and  October  25,  1765. 

'  Madras  Mil.  Cons.,  January  14  and  28  and  February  13  and  28,  1760. 

'  I.O.,  Misc.,  Ltrs.  Reed.,  1763,  No.  322,  is  a  characteristicletter  from  Fletcher, 
requesting  that  his  commission  should  be  dated  earlier  than  that  of  Major  Donald 
Campbell,  a  much  older  and  a  much  better  officer. 

'  Ibid.,  1766,  No.  9. 

•  At  a  later  date  in  Madras  he  caused  endless  trouble  ;  and  his  last  achieve- 
ment was  the  conduct  of  the  intrigue  which  ended  in  the  imprisonment  and  death 
of  Lord  Pigot. 

•  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  December  7,  1764,  and  January  17,  1765. 


266  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

tune  to  have  this  double-dealer  in  command  of  one  of  his 
brigades. 

On  his  arrival  Clive  foimd  that  the  officers  were  accumulating 
fortunes  out  of  presents  and  their  double-batta  nearly  as  fast  as 
civilians  were  doing  out  of  presents  and  the  inland  trade — in 
both  cases  with  undue  rapidity.  The  ideal  which  he  kept  in 
view  in  framing  the  regulations  of  the  Salt  Society  was  that 
the  latter  should  be  enabled  to  retire  with  a  comfortable  fortune 
after  a  few  years'  service  in  Council,  and  the  former  after  a  few 
years'  service  as  field  officers.  Having,  as  he  hoped,  secured 
this  object,  he  then  proceeded  to  deal  with  the  batta  question. 
He  drew  up  new  regulations,  to  come  into  force  from  January  i, 
1766,  based  on  the  Madras  rates.  Officers  in  cantonments  at 
Patna  and  Monghyr  were  to  draw  half-batta,  as  was  done  at 
Trichinopoly  ;  if  they  took  the  field,  they  would  draw  batta  so 
long  as  they  remained  within  the  hmits  of  Bengal  and  Behar ; 
but  as  soon  as  they  passed  the  Karamnassa  into  Oudh,  they  would 
be  allowed  double-batta.'  Officers  commanding  brigades  were 
allowed  40  rupees  a  day  for  their  tables — which  was  the  full 
double-batta  rate  for  Lieutenant-Colonels.  On  the  publication 
of  these  orders,  the  officers  of  each  brigade  submitted  a  memorial, 
to  which  Clive  answered  that  the  Company's  orders  were  per- 
emptory. Fletcher  remonstrated  on  his  own  account  against 
the  insufficiency  of  the  allowance  made  to  the  Brigadiers.-  For 
some  time  after  this  there  was  no  appearance  of  discontent. 
Suddenly  at  the  end  of  April  CUve  heard  that  the  officers  had 
agreed  on  a  general  resignation  of  their  commissions. 

That  Fletcher  was  concerned  in  this  is  certain.  As  a  friend 
of  CUve's  enemies,  he  was  naturally  disposed  to  injure  liim. 
Moreover,  to  a  recent  appUcation  about  his  losses  of  baggage  on 
campaign,  Chve  had  bluntly  answered  that  this  demand  had 
no  foundation  in  reason  and  would  not  be  admitted  in  any 
service  in  the  world.  ^  His  representation  about  the  brigadiers' 
table-money  had  been  similarly  dealt  with.  These  seem  to  have 
furnished  motives  for  conduct  which  even  on  his  own  showing 
was  pecuUarly  disgraceful.  Several  officers  afterwards  bore 
evidence  that  Fletcher  had  advised  them  to  resign  in  a  body  in 

*  I.e.,  for  a  Captain  three,  six,  and  twelve  rupees  a  day.     For  a  full  list  oi  the 
rates  see  Strachey's  Narrative,  p.  135,  and  Bengal  Sel.  Com..  October  25,  1765. 

*  Bengal  Sel.  Com.,  November  22,  1765. 

'Fletcher  to  Clive,  October  10,  and  Clive  to  Fletcher,  October  :6,  1765 
(Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  29132,  i.  280). 


CLIVE'S  ADMINISTRATIVE  SETTLEMENT       267 

order  to  enforce  the  restoration  of  double-batta.^  Fletcher  himself 
admitted  having  given  such  advice  in  the  expectation  (he  ex- 
plained) of  being  able  to  secure  their  confidence  and  thus  frustrate 
their  schemes.^  Thus  he  either  betrayed  the  Government  whose 
commission  he  bore,  or  betrayed  his  brother-officers,  or,  which 
is  equally  probable,  betrayed  both.^  What  remains  certain  is 
that  the  officers  received  from  him  encouragement,  sincere  or 
feigned,  to  coerce  Government  by  simultaneously  resigning  their 
commissions. 

Nor  was  this  the  only  encouragement  that  the  officers  received. 
The  batta  regulations  came  into  force  only  a  week  before  Clive's 
decision  of  summoning  Councillors  from  Madras  became  known 
in  Calcutta  ;  and  it  was  impossible  but  that  many  civiUans  should 
side  with  the  officers  against  their  common  reformer.  It  is 
probable  that  their  sympathy  did  not  go  far  beyond  platonic 
expressions  of  good  will ;  but  there  was  some  talk  of  a  subscrip- 
tion to  assist  officers  who  should  suffer  in  pocket  by  resignation  ; 
and  beyond  doubt  the  indignation  felt  by  the  two  bodies  of  men 
mutually  exasperated  each  other.'* 

But  though  Civil  servants  and  officers  alike  might  be  all  on 
fire  against  him,  Clive  never  hesitated  for  a  moment.  "  I  must. 
see  the  soldiers'  bayonets  levelled  at  my  throat,"  he  said,  "  before 
I  can  be  induced  to  give  way."  *  He  immediately  directed  the 
Council  to  apply  to  Madras  for  every  officer  who  could  be  spared,* 
and  ordered  the  Brigadiers  to  send  down  to  Calcutta  every  officer 
who  displayed  the  smallest  intention  to  mutiny.  He  himself 
set  out  from  Murshidabad  for  Mongh}^,  where  Fletcher's  brigade 
was  stationed,  and  where  forty-two  officers  had  resigned  their  com- 

'  Evidence  of  Bagot,  Goddard,  Roper,  Watts,  Francis,  ap.  Strachey's  Narrative 
and  Fletcher's  Court-Martial. 

*  Fletcher's  defence,  loc.  cit. 

*  In  April  he  professed  to  dissuade  members  of  his  staff  from  resigning,  ^t 
is  a  signal  instance  of  the  height  to  which  party  feeling  ran  that  both  Lawrence 
and  Caillaud  should  have  approved  his  conduct,  and  that  there  should  have 
been  directors  at  the  India  House  willing  at  a  later  date  to  send  him  to  continue 
his  tortuous  intrigues  as  Commander-in-Chief  at  Madras. 

•*  Strachey's  Narrative,  pp.  19  and  55.  It  appears  certain  that  a  subscription 
was  set  on  foot.  "  Two  of  the  Civil  servants  at  this  settlement  were  written 
to  from  Calcutta  to  set  their  hands  to  a  subscription  which  they  refused  ;  this 
comes  from  themselves,  although  their  honour,  as  they  call  it,  will  not  allow 
them  to  make  further  discoveries."  Clive  to  Verelst,  Chupra,  June  9,  1766, 
(I.O.,  Home  Misc.,  No.  739)  ;  cf.  also  Clive  and  Camac  to  Council,  May  29,  1766 
(Strachey,  op.  cit..  p.  188). 

•Clive  to  Barker,  May  8,  1766  (Strachey's  Narrative,  p.  167). 

*  Forty-two  officers  were  actually  sent  up  from  Madras. 


268  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

missions  but  professed  a  willingness  to  serve  as  volunteers  until 
May  15.  However,  even  before  that  term  had  expired,  they  be- 
came so  troublesome  that  they  were  ordered  down  to  Calcutta  in  a 
body,  and  the  European  battalion  nearly  broke  into  open  mutiny. 
They  were,  however,  appeased  by  a  donation  and  overawed  by 
the  sepoys  who  stood  firm.^  The  next  day  Clive  himself  arrived, 
addressed  the  men,  and  ordered  double  pay  to  the  sepoys  for 
May  and  June. 

After  a  brief  halt,  he  proceeded  to  the  brigade  stationed  at 
Patna  under  Sir  Robert  Barker,  whom  he  joined  on  May  20. 
Here  many  officers  had  resigned,  as  at  Monghjn-,  but  the  troops 
had  remained  quiet.  Four  of  the  most  active  malcontents  had 
been  sent  down  to  Calcutta  ;  and  CMve  offered  reinstatement 
to  those  who  had  resigned  but  continued  to  do  duty.  His  offer 
was  accepted. 

The  third  brigade.  Smith's,  lay  part  at  Allahabad,  part  at 
Serajepur.  Here  the  situation  was  in  many  ways  worse  than 
elsewhere.  The  Marathas  were  known  to  be  advancing  along  the 
south  bank  of  the  Jumna,  and  resignation  was  barely  distin- 
guishable from  desertion  in  the  face  of  the  enemy.  Nevertheless, 
on  May  6  six  of  the  officers  at  Serajepur  resigned,  and  all  but  two 
of  the  rest  expressed  their  intention  to  resign  on  June  i.  Within 
two  days  thirteen  were  sent  down  to  Calcutta.  Much  the  samehad 
happened  at  Allahabad  ;  and  in  reply  to  Smith's  representations 
of  the  unwisdom  of  their  conduct,  the  officers  there  declared  their 
resolution  to  quit  the  station  on  May  20.  But  instead  of  re- 
ceiving the  expected  news  of  the  capitulation  of  the  Government, 
the  officers  only  heard  of  CUve's  inflexible  resolve  and  his  success 
at  Monghyr  and  Patna.  Resignations  which  would  be  accepted 
at  whatever  cost  appeared  very  different  from  resignations  which 
would  be  followed  by  reinstatement  and  the  restoration  of  double- 
batta.  The  officers  wavered  ;  Smith  was  authorised  to  reinstate 
those  whom  he  considered  least  guilty  ;  and  the  conspiracy 
collapsed.  Fletcher  was  deservedly  cashiered — if  he  had  not 
been  guilty  of  mutiny,  he  had  been  guilty  of  conduct  imbecoming 
an  officer  and  a  gentleman.  Six  others  were  broke.  The  re- 
mainderwere  required  tosign  a  three-years'  agreement  which  under 
the  East  India  Mutiny  Act  would  expose  to  the  penalty  of  death 
any  who  so  conducted  themselves  in  future. 

'  Fletcher's  three  letters  to  Clive  of  May  14,  1766  (Strachey's  Narrative, 
pp.  180-181);  cf.  Champion's  Journal  of  May  14  (I.O.,  Home  Misc.,  No.  198). 
Champion  was  hostile  to  Fletcher,  having  been  superseded  by  him. 


CLIVE'S  ADMINISTRATIVE  SETTLEMENT        269 

While  this  conspiracy  had  been  hatching,  Clive  had  decided 
on  a  measure  to  remove  the  principal  disadvantage  under  which 
the  miUtary  service  of  the  Company  had  suffered.  Hitherto 
there  had  been  no  provision  for  those  whom  exposure  in  the 
field  or  wounds  in  action  had  rendered  incapable  of  further 
service  before  they  had  saved  enough  to  live  upon.  The  Company 
had  already  made  inquiries  whether  a  fund  for  the  reUef  of  such 
cases  could  not  be  raised  by  stoppages  from  the  pay  of  the 
officers  themselves.  That  plan  had  been  considered  wholly 
impracticable.  But  one  of  the  last  acts  of  Mir  Jafar  had  been  to 
desire  that  a  sum  of  5  lakhs  should  be  given  in  his  name  to  the 
man  who  had  constantly  thwarted  his  wiU  but  invariably  com- 
manded his  respect.  This  was  not  a  present  but  a  legacy.  It 
was  not  covered  by  the  Company's  covenant  against  presents. 
There  was  nothing  to  hinder  CUve  from  accepting  it  for  himself 
except  his  own  decision  not  to  enrich  himself  by  his  second  term  of 
government.  He  resolved  to  accept  it  and  to  vest  it  in  trustees 
for  the  relief  of  invahd  officers  and  widows.  This  act  completed 
his  reform  of  the  Company's  miUtary  service  in  Bengal. 


CONCLUSION 

CLIVE'S  work  in  India  was  now  completed  ;  his  health, 
never  vigorous,  was  seriously  impaired  ;  he  sailed  the 
last  time  from  India  at  the  end  of  January  1767.  I  do 
not  propose  to  follow  him  further,  or  to  discuss  those  events  which 
led  to  the  Parhamentary  inquiry  of  1772,  at  which  the  Baron  of 
Plassey  ^  was  questioned  like  a  sheep-stealer.  That  first  blunder- 
ing attempt  to  regulate  the  British  administration  in  India  belongs 
rather  to  the  history  of  another  illustrious  statesman,  Warren 
Hastings.  It  only  remains  to  attempt  to  estimate  the  value  of 
CUve's  services.  In  the  first  place,  his  defence  of  Arcot  and  his 
vigorous  co-opeiation  with  Lawrence  in  the  campaign  of  1752 
brought  about  the  downfall  of  Dupleix.  He  then  showed  that 
penetration  and  vigour  which  were  afterwards  to  give  extra- 
ordinary success  to  his  political  action.  But  he  was  not  alone  in 
that.  The  English  success  in  the  Camatic  against  Dupleix  must  be 
ascribed  to  Lawi'ence  and  Saunders  as  well  as  to  CUve.  He  was, 
in  fact,  at  school.  Lawrence  was  an  eminently  capable  soldier, 
Saunders  an  eminently  capable  poUtician.  Without  them  there 
could  have  been  no  defence  of  Arcot  or  surrender  of  Srirangam. 
Nor  could  Clive  observe,  without  learning  from,  the  ambitious 
schemes  of  Dupleix.  There  he  saw  plainly  marked  the  hmita- 
tions  within  which  Company's  servants  were  confined,  the  need  of 
eliminating  or  avoiding  European  opposition,  the  facility  with 
which  a  durbar  might  for  a  time  at  least  be  controlled.  The 
lessons  thus  learnt  were  of  incalculable  value  to  him  in  the  later 
part  of  his  career. 

When  he  returned  from  England  and  was  sent  to  Bengal  in 
1756,  he  was  well  prepared  for  the  situation  he  there  encountered. 
We  have  seen  with  what  success  he  estabhshed  EngUsh  influence 
at  Murshidabad  and  avoided  the  errors  of  Dupleix.  But  the 
system  which  he  established  in  the  course  of  his  first  government 
was  evidently  of  the  most  makeshift  nature.  It  was  a  sj^tem  of 
influence  based  in  part  on  personal  values,  in  part  on  the  divided 

'  To  justify  his  second  title  he  had  renamed  one  of  his  Irish  estates.     Clive 
to  Newcastle,  October  13,  1761  (Brit.  Mus.,  Add.  MSS.,  32685,  £.  66). 

•7° 


CONCLUSION  271 

allegiance  of  the  chief  servants  of  the  Durbar.  Could  we  suppose 
that  CUve  regarded  this  as  anything  more  than  a  temporary 
expedient,  we  should  have  the  gravest  reason  to  deny  his  poUtical 
acumen.  But  in  fact  he  was  infinitely  hampered  by  the  foolish- 
ness of  the  Company  at  home.  He  recognised  the  difficulties 
and  dangers  of  the  situation  ;  the  fact  is  proved  by  his  letter  to 
Pitt  proposing  that  the  territorial  and  pohtical  interests  of  the 
Company  should  be  taken  over  by  the  Crown  ;  and  he  left  India 
in  1760  with  the  intention  of  capturing  the  Direction  and  im- 
posing on  it  a  more  vigorous  and  inteUigent  policy.  But  mean- 
while Holwell's  misconduct  and  Vansittart's  imbeciUty  brought 
matters  to  such  a  pass  that  Bengal  had  to  be  reconquered.  By 
then  Chve  had  secured  considerable  influence  at  home.  He 
came  out  to  his  second  government  with  the  full  intention  of 
reorganising  the  English  system ;  and  if  his  first  administration 
exhibits  all  the  dexterity  of  the  politician,  the  second  exhibits 
qualities  of  statesmanship  on  which  his  fame  mainly  rests. 

His  work  was  undeniably  imperfect ;  but  those  who  accuse 
Clive  of  not  having  anticipated  the  reforms  of  Hastings,  of  Corn- 
walUs,  and  of  Wellesley  must  have  a  strange  conception  of  the 
practical  possibiMties  of  statecraft.  He  is  mainly  accused  of 
establishing  a  system  under  which  power  was  separated  from 
responsibiUty.  By  accepting  for  the  Company  the  powers  of  the 
Imperial  diwan  alone, he  did  undoubtedly  dechne  responsibilty  for 
the  administration  of  the  greater  part  of  Bengal  ^  and  for  the  whole 
of  Behar.  But  could  he  have  done  otherwise  ?  Were  the  Com- 
pany's servants  who  would  have  had  to  conduct  any  system  of 
EngUsh  administration  suited  for  such  employment  either  by 
their  knowledge  of  the  country  or  the  traditions  of  the  service  ? 
It  is  evident  that  they  were  not.  Great  progress  was  first  needed 
in  their  knowledge  of  the  languages  and  customs  of  the  people ; 
above  all, a  tradition  had  to  be  estabUshed  of  disinterested  service. 
If  CUve  left  behind  him  the  basis  from  which  a  system  of  ad- 
ministration could  be  developed,  that  was  as  much  as  was  possible 
for  him  to  do. 

In  fact  he  left  such  a  basis  which  his  successors  adopted  and 
developed.  His  poUtical  settlement  lasted  for  near  a  century. 
For  three  generations  men  continued  to  bow  as  CUve  had  done 

'  The  districts  granted  by  Mir  Jafar  and  Mir  Kasim  were  and  remained  under 
direct  British  management,  forming  an  experimental  school  in  which  the  earliest 
British  administrators  received  llieir  training.  People  often  ignore  this  fact,  and 
write  as  though  Clivt  might  have  done  as  much  as  Warren  Hastings. 


272  DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 

before  the  shadowy  powers  of  the  Emperor  ;  the  buffer-state 
of  Oudh  which  he  estabUshed  on  the  north-west  frontier  sur- 
vived until  the  time  of  Dalhousie  ;  in  Bengal  there  were  no  more 
revolutions  or  donations.  His  administrative  settlement  was 
equally  successful.  Gradually  the  EngUsh  Government  assumed 
power  after  power,  and  entered  deeper  and  deeper  into  the  detail 
of  administration.  CUve  had  rendered  this  possible  by  his  reform_ 
of  the  civil  and  mihtary  services,  by  the  principles  which  he  laid 
down  that  all  servants  of  the  Company  should  look  to  the  Com- 
pany alone  for  their  reward,  by  the  beginnings  which  he  made 
towards  estabUshing  reasonable  rates  of  pay.  Never  again 
did  the  services  fall  into  the  condition  from  which  he  rescued 
them.  He  laid  the  foundation  of  the  future  system,  and  pre- 
pared the  instruments  with  which  it  was  to  be  built  up.  The 
wonder  is,  not  that  his  system  was  so  incomplete,  but  that  he 
accompUshed  so  much  that  needed  neither  to  be  undone  nor  to 
be  repeated. 

His  second  government  may  indeed  be  claimed  as  a  miracle 
of  insight,  vigour,  prudence,  and  honesty.  Who  else  of  his 
generation  could  have  done  as  much  in  something  over  eighteen 
months  ?  How  many  of  those  who  at  Westminster  daily 
prostituted  pubMc  interests  would  have  thought  his  salutary 
reforms  possible  or  desirable  at  the  certain  cost  of  opprobrious 
clamour  ?  If  in  his  earlier  career  CUve  often  enough  acted  Uke 
the  majority  of  his  contemporaries,  in  his  second  government  he 
rose  far  above  the  poUtical  and  moral  standards  of  his  age.  Of 
those  who  have  encountered  similar  extremes  of  praise  and  blame, 
few  have  better  merited  the  first  and  less  deserved  the  second, 
few  have  rendered  more  enduring  and  meritorious  service  to  their 
country. 


-C 


INDEX 


Abdal-Nabi  Khan,  49,  52  n.  3,  85 

Abid  Sahib,  34,  37  n.  5 

d'Achi,  Anne  Antoine,  Comte,  146,  160- 

164,  167-169,  175,  181-183 
Achin,  17,  22 
Adams,  Major  Thomas,  225-229,  23 1 ,  234, 

235 
Adiyar,  the,  19,  20,  21,  34 
Adlercron,  Col.  John,  124,  159,  262,  263 
Adoni,  37,  48,  100  N 

Albemarle,  Lord,  78 
Aldersey,  William,  256  n.  3 
Alinagur.     See  Calcutta 
Alivirdi  Khan,  103,  118,  131,  138 
Allahabad,  236,  246,  247,  250,  268 
Ambur,  38,  39,  45,  46,  104,  106 
Amyatt,   Peter,    145,   191,   197,  207,  221 

n.  2,  222-225 
Ananda  Ranga  Pillai,  31,  33,  36 
Ananda  Razu.     See  Virianagram,  Raja  of 
Anson,  Lord,  7,  23,  25 
Anwar-uddin  Khan,  9,  13,  14,  19,  22,  31, 

33.  34.  37,  38,  42.  47.74.  "8 
Aratoon  Badramy,  19  ».  2 
Arcot,  34,   35,  38,  48-51,  55-62,  70,  73, 

75.  86,  95,  104,  106-108,  185  and  «.  4, 

200,  270 
d'Argenson,  Comte,  94,  109,  160 
Ariyankuppam,  29,  30,  i86,  187 
Arni,  59 

Astruc,  [        ],  72  «.  2 
Aurangabad,  84,  86,  88,  90-92,  102,  158, 

179,  248 
Aurangzib,  249 
d'Auteuil,  Louis  Combault,  38,  46-49,  51, 

52,  6l,  63-65,  67  ».  2,  159,  262 
Aviat  Nazar,  19  ».  2 

Bahur,  39,  61,  69 

Baj-baj,  126 

Balaji  Rao,  33,  34,  87,  88,  90,  94-98,  too 

Balasore,  152 

Bankapuram.     See  Savanur 

Bankipur,  142 

Barker,  Sir  Robert,  265,  268 

Barnelt,  Capt.  Curtis,  7,  8,  10,  26  ».  6 

Basalut  Jang,  100,  loi,  183,  184 

Batavia,  12,  28,  153,  154 

Batson,  Stanlake,  226  «.  I 

Beder,  88,  89 

Bednur,  37 

Beerbhoom,  Raja  of,  134  n,  I 

18 


Behar,  130,  135,  138-157,  190-212 

Benares,  231,  239,  240,  265 

Bengal,  25,  59,  61,  74,   79,   82,   94,   99, 

102,  109,  1 17-157,  190-269 
Berar,  88,  100 
Bernier,  Franjois,  20 
Bijapur,  37 

Bisdom,  Adriaan,  152-155 
Black  Hole,  122  and  «.  2,  126 
Black  Town,  the,  170,  174 
Bobbin,  Ranga  Rao,  Raja  of,  99 
Bombay,  25,  74,  82,  87,  97,  98,  99,  174, 

235 

Boscawen,  Adm.  Edward,  26-29,  36,  40-43 

Bourchier,  Richard,  97 

Bouvet  de  Lozier,  24,  25,  160 

Brenier,  [         ],  60  «.  I 

Brereton,  Major  Cholmondeley,  170,  171, 
174,  180 

Bukanji,  92 

Bulwant  Singh,  231 

Burdwan,  203,  252 

Burhanpur,  31 

Bury,  [         ],  47 

Bussy,  Charles  Joseph  Patissier,  Marquis 
de,  45,  51,  69,  73,  81,  83,  84-102,  103, 
106-109,  118,  127,  129,  130,  134,  136, 
142,  144.  158.  165,  171,  172,  175.  178, 
179,  183,  185  n.  3,  194,  229,  248,  253 

Buxar,  230,  231,  236,  239,  265 

Caillaud,  Major  John,  157,  159,  172-174, 

183  «.  4,  190-199,  201-204,  207,  224, 

248,  267  «.  3 
Calcutta,  99,  loi,  103,  118-157,  190-269 
Call,  Sir  John,  169  «.  8,  180 
Campbell,  Major  Donald,  265  «.  3 
Canton,  75 

Cape  of  Good  Hope,  181 
Caraccioli,  Charles,  161  «.  I 
Carangoly,  184 
Carnac,  Major  John,  207-211,  228,  230- 

234,  236,  244-246,  248,  263 
Cauvery,  the,  56,  60,  61,  63,  72 
Champion,  Col.  Alexander,  230,  233  n.  2, 

236,  256  n.  I 
Chanda  Sahib,    32-83,  86,    104-107,   113, 

152,  165,  200,  253,  261,  262 
Chandemagore,     27,    tig,    127-130,     159, 

181,  247,  249 
Char-Mahal,  96,  99,  100 
Chamagore.     See  Chandemagore 


274 


DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 


Chettepat,  160,  185  n.  4,  igg 

Chicacole,  81,  89,  gi,  93 

Chidambaram,  51 

Chingleput,  69,  170,  172,  173 

Chinsura,  119,  153,  156,  247,  249 

Chittagong,  203,  222,  241,  252 

Chunargarh,  236 

Chuprah,  235  «.  5 

Clive,  Robert,  Lord  (Sabat  Jang),  21,  26 
K.  3,  28,  49  «.  4,  53,  56-65,  68,  69,  84, 
87  «.  I,  96-99,  loi,  102,  108,  109, 
123-159,  161,  175,  190,  193,  :94-i98, 
202,  205,  210,  211,  213,  216,  217,  2ig, 
224,  22g,  238-272 

Coiladi,  64  \ 

Coleroon,  the,  40,  44,  56,  61,  63-65 

Compagnie  des  Indes  Orientales,  74,  82, 
94,  loi,  log,  no,  112,  253,  25gK.  5 

Condavir,  76,  88,  8g,  g6,  :o6 

Condore,  176 

Conflans,  Marquis  de,  176,  177,  1S3 

Conjeeveram,  5g,  180,  184 

Coote,  Col.  Eyre,  2g,  140,  141,  158,  180, 
l83-i8g,  200,  208-211,  220,  248,  263 

Cope,  Capt.  James,  43,  46,  47,  51,  55 

Covelong,  69 

Coverypauk,  59 

Crillon,  Lt.-Col.,  171,  172 

Cuddalore,  21,  25,  26,  163 

Cuddapah,  35,  183 

Cultru,  M.  Prosper,  32,  33,  49,  51  n.  1, 
77«.  6 

Dacca,  139  n.  2,  217,  241 

Dal  ton,  Capt.  John,  49,   56,  62  k.  I,  64, 

65,  68,  71 
Daulatabad,  gi,  100 
Delhi,  46,  84,  94,  g5,  106,  107,  148,  207, 

2og,  248 
Devikottai,  40,  41,  47,  166 
Dhost  All  Khan,  32  «.  2 
Divy  Island,  50  «.  i,  85 
Dordelin,  [        ],  24  ».  I 
Drake,  Roger,  119 

Draper,  Lt.-Col.  William,  169-172,  174 
Du  Bausset,  [        ],  48  «.  6 
Duff,  Grant,  33 
Du  Lude,  Comte,  75 
Dumas,  Benoit,  5,  38,  no 
Dupleix,  Joseph,  Marquis  de  (Safar  Jang), 

6,  9,  11-28,  32-55,  58,  61-95,  101-113, 

131.  136,  142,  152,  'S8,  161,  165,  179, 

248.  253 
Dupleix,  Mme.,  36,  38,  42,  48 «.  i,  108, 

109 
Dupleixfatehabad,  52  «.  3 
Du  Poete,  Chevalier,  169 
Duquesne,  [       ],  45 

Dutch  East  India  Company,  77,  151,  153 
Duvelaer,  Pierre,  75,  77,  78 
Dyer,  Capt.  John,  151 

East  India  Company,  26,  74,  82,  108,  125, 


145,  157,  187,  213,  248,  249,  252,  253, 

258,  259,  271 
Elevanasur,  159,  185 

Ellis,  William,  213,  219-221,  224,  225,  227 
EUore,  81,  89,  g  I 
Elphinstone,  Mountstuart,  247 
d'Espr^menil,  Duval,  16  k.  1,  19 
d'Estaing,  Brigadier,  171 

Farrukh-siyar,  214 

Fenwick,  Capt.,  120 

Fletcher,  Col.  Robert,  236,  237,  244,  265- 

268 
Fleury,  Cardinal,  5 

Floyer,  Charles,  39-43,  46,  5°.  54.  55.  '04 
Floyer,  Charles  (Junior),  256  n.  3 
Forde,  Col.  Francis,    101,   149,   156,   158, 

159.  175-178 
Forresti,  [        ],  120 
Forth  (surgeon),  1407/.  2 
Fort  Louis  (Pondichery),  35 
Fort  St.  David,  7,  13  k.  4,  20-26,  28,  37, 

39,  42,  43.  46.  47.  49-51,  54.  57.  59.  61. 

70,  80,  81,  97,  146,  162-165,  200 
Fort  St.  George.     See  Madras 
Fort  William.     See  Calcutta 
French    Company.     See    Compagnie    des 

Indes  Orientales 
French  Islands,  the,   16,    17,   24,   27,  28, 

167-169,  181,  182 
Fultah,  122,  125,  154,  156 

Gadilam,  the,  163 

Ganjam,  178 

Gentil,  Chevalier  de,  227 

Ghazi-ud-din  Khan,  84,  86-88,  90 

Gheriah,  98,  gg 

Gingee,  45,  46,  51,  52,  68,  75,  185,  186 

Gingens,   Capt.   Rudolph  de,  55,  56,  58, 

60-62 
Godavery,  the,  91 
Godeheu,  Charles  Robert,  76  «.  3  and  6, 

79-83.  94.  97.  108,  III,  117,  158 
Golconda,  no 
Goodere,  Major,  29 
Gough,  Henry,  5 
Goupil,  [       ],  45,  58,  90 
Grant,  J.,  205 

Griffin,  Adm.  Thomas,  23-25,  27,  28,  120 
Gumsur,  Raja  of,  gg 
Guntoor,  89,  91 
Gurjin  Khan,  227 
Gya,  207 

Haji  Hadi,  50 ».  7 

Hamont,  M.  Tibulle,  171  «.  1 

Harrison,  Lieut.  T. ,  72  n.  4 

Hastings,  Warren,  147-149,  154,  193,202, 

217,  2ig-22i,  223,  226  «.  1,  270 
Hay,  William,  222,  224,  227 
Herbert,  John,  154 
Heron,  Lt.-Col.  Alexander,  117  «.  2 
Hill,  Mr.  S.  C,  64«.  3,  Ii8«.  3,  138 
Holdernesse,  Lord,  78 


INDEX 


275 


Holwell,  J.  Z.,   ii8,  122,  145,  155,  193- 

197,  201-20S,  211,  216,  217,  238,  248, 

253.  271 
Hugli,  the,  27«.  9,  122,   125,   133.    15'. 

154.  ISS.  160 
Hugli  (town),  126,  216 
Hyderabad,  84-86,  88,  90-92,  96,  99,  lOl, 

102 
Hyder  Ali  Khan,  185,  186,  188 

Ibrahim  Khan,  93  n.  3 

Ingeram,  51 «.  i,  103 

Innes,  Lieut.  John,  58  ».  4 

Isle  of  France.     See  French  Islands 

Ives,  Edward,  169 ».  8 

Jafar  Ali  Khan,  92,  96.     See  Mir  Jafar 

Java,  108 

Jayaram  Pandit,  36 

Jennings,  Capt.,  229-231 

Johnstone,  James,  178 

Karamnassa,  the,  1 50,  228,  230,  266 
Karikal,  20,  24,  46,  64,  66,  112,  166-168, 

18s 
Kasimbazaar,  98,  119,  120 ».  i,  121,  122, 
127,    130,    144,    153,    203,    215,    241, 

443 

Kelsall,  Thomas,  256  «.  3 

Kelsey,  [        ],  64  k.  2 

Kerjean,  Jacques  Desnos  de,  69,  84  k.  2, 

85,  no 
Khwaja  Markar,  225 
Killpatrick,  Major  James,  58;/.  4,  122-125, 

136,  141  «■  7 
Kinnecr,  Major  William,  68 
Kistna,  the,  32,  36,  37,  53,  73,  85,  91 
Knipe,  Major,  120 
Korah,  244,  246,  247 
Kurnool,  Nawab  of,  49 
Kutwa,  133,  226 

La  Bourdonnais,  Bernard  Fran9ois  Mahe 

de,  4,  9,  11-19,  26,  34 
Iji  Jonquiere,  23 
Lalgudi,  63 
I.ally,  Comte  de,  79,  loi,  iii,  146,  160- 

189,  229 
de  Larche,  Henri,  48  n.  6 
La  Touche,  le  Provost  de,  49,  51,  52,  69 

«.  I,  13s 
La  Tour,  Jacques  de,  21,  51 
Lavaur,  Pere,  164  n.  i,  165 
Law,  Jacques,  53  «.  i,  61-67,  75,  96,  107 
Law,  Jean,  127-130,  135,  140,  141,  150, 

192,  207 
Lawrence,  Stringer,  23,  25,  26,  28,  29,  39, 

41,46,  47,  49,  51,  54,  55,  61-66,  68-72, 

74,  82,  83,  124,  159,  166  K.  7,  168  K.  3, 

170,   174,   180,   181,  199,  262,  267  ?i.  3, 

270. 
Le  Noir,  Pierre  Chrislophe,  5 
L«yrit,  Duval  de,  94,  98,  in,  n7,  118, 

127,  158,  161 


Littleton,  214 
Lowther,  Henry,  5 
Lucknow,  237 
Lushington,  Henry,  227 

Machault  d'Amouville,  77,  79 

MadapoUam,  103 

Madras,  7,  12-26,  30,  34,  39,  42,  43,  49, 

54,  57-59,  68,  87,  97,  98,  103,  104,  120, 

122,  12s,  130,  146,  147,  149,  151,  157, 

158-189 
Madura,  32,  86,  117,  159,  185,  199,  200 
Mahfur  Khan,  19,  20«.  i,  21,  199 
Mainville,  [        ],  26,  72  «.  2 
Maissin,  [        ],  72  «.  2 
Malleson,  Col.,  17  «.  2,  20  n,  i,  26  n.  3, 

27  «.  9,  171  ».  I 
Malrazu,  22 
Martin,  Franfois,  3 
Masulipatam,  39,  51,  76,  81,  8;,  87,  89, 

90,  93,  96,  loi,  103,  IDS,  106,  176-178, 

183 
Mauritius.     See  French  Islands 
Mergui,  17 

M'Gwire,  William,  213 
Middleton,  Samuel,  241,  242 
Midnapore,  Ramram  Singh,  Raja  of,  139- 

142,  144 
Midnapore  (country),  203,  252 
Miran,    135,     143,    144,     147,     150,     153, 

154,  156.   190-192,   194,   19s.  201-204, 

242 
Mirepoix,  Marquis  de,  75,  76,  78 
Mir  Jafar,   102,   131-136,   138-158,  175  k. 

3,  193-198,  202-206,  215-219,  226,  228, 

229,  231,  232,  240,  241,  243,  254,  258, 

269 
Mir  Kasim,  141,  143,   145,   195-197,  201- 

2n,  218-229,  232,  236-241,  245,  254, 

259,  260,  264 
Mohan  Lai,  131 
Monaji,  66  and  n,  4 
Monghyr,    221-225,   227,    235,   240,   241, 

266-268 
Monson,  Col.  George,  185-187,  263 
Moracin,  Leon,  81,  93,  177-179,  188 
Morari  Rao,  59,  69,  70,  74,  95,  184,  185 
Mossel,  Jacob,  153 
Motijhil,  144,  204 
Mouhy,  Chevalier,  58 
Mount,  the.     See  St.  Thomas's  Mount 
Muhammad  Ali  Khan,  21,  22,  43-46,  49, 

51.  55-  56,  57,  59-61,  65,  67-70,  73,  75, 

85,   104-107,   117,   179,   190,    197-199. 

201,  238,  239,  261,  264 
Muhammad   Riza   Khan,  241,   243,    244, 

248,  250,  254 
Mulrauze.     See  Malrazu 
Munro,  Major  Hector,  235,  236,  239,  248, 

265 
Muradbagh,  204 
Murshidabad,     119,     131-133,     135,     136, 

139-141,  143,   144,  147,  202,  203,   204, 

214,  216,  223-226,  241,  243,  250,  267 


276 


DUPLEIX  AND  CLIVE 


Murshid  Quli  Khan,  214,  215 

Murtaza   Ali   Khan,   31,  32,  70,  73,  107, 

108,  113,  117 
Mustapha,  146  n.  2 
Muxadavad.     See  Murshidabad 
Muzaffar  Jang,  37-39.  42-44.  47.  48,  52, 

S3.  79.  84-86,  104,  105,  no,  135,  253 
Mysore,  67-69,  74,  90,  94,  98,  113,   117, 

18s,  186 

Nagpur,  92 

Nagur,  166 

Najm-ud-daula,  242,  243,  250,  254 

Nandi  Raja,  69 

Narayan  Deo,  178  n.  I 

Narsapur,  103 

Nasir  Jang,  32,  34,  35,  39,  43,  45-53,  55. 

74.  75.  84.  8s,  104-106,   113,  1 18,  126, 

131,  135,  253 
Negapatam,  12,  28,  154,  162,  166,  168 
Nellore,  159,  199 
Newcastle,  Duke  of,  76-78 
Nizam  Ali,  100,  loi,  178 
Nizam-ul-Mulk,   31,   32  «.  i,  33-37,  48  «. 

6,  S3,  84,  89,  103,  138 
Noronha,    Antonio    (ah.     ^Vntoine    de    la 

Purification,  Bishop  of  Halicarnassus),  7, 

42,  43.  184  «•  4.  i8S 
Nunconiar,    147,  148,  209,    228,   232,   243, 

244,  248,  250  II.  I 

Omar  Beg,  140,  147  «.  3 

Omichand,  132 

Orme,  Robert,  13  «.  4,  20,  26  h.  3,  28,  37, 
41.  54.  55.  63  n.  S,  64  «.  3  and  4,  65  n. 
1,  70,  71  «.  2,  77  V.  6,  98,  99,  III,  123 
and  «.  I  and  3,  165,  182  «.  3,  200 

Ostend  Company,  the,  153 

Oudh,  150,  154,  208,  225,  228-232,  236, 
239,  240,  244,  246-248,  250,  266,  272 

Oudh,  Shuja-ud-daula,  Nawab  of,  139, 
141,  143,  148,  150,  192  ;/.  2,  220,  223, 
229,  231-237,  239,  244-246,  250,  257 

Palk,  Robert,  123,  168  «.  3 

Papaiya  Fillai,  108 

Paradis,  Louis,  7,  19-22,  30,  34,  62  n.  i 

Parker,  Hyde,  26  «.  3 

Patna,   141-14S,    150-151,    190-192,  207, 

208,  211,  215,  219,  222,  224-228,  231- 

234,  240,  241,  259,  266,  268 
Pennar,  22 
Persia,  253 
Perumukkal,  185  «.  4 
Petrus  Uscan,  18  «.  5 
Peyton,  Capt.  Edward,  10-14,  26,  63 
Pigot,  George,  97,  98,  117,  118,  124,  15S, 

169  «.  8,  170,  174,   186,  188,   189,  201, 

26s  «.  5 
Pippli,  iss 
Pitchanda,  63-65 
Pitt,  Thomas,  3,  7 
Pitt,  William,  148,  187,  196,  271 


Plassey,  20,  63,  96,  133,  134,  140,  142, 
204,  215,  217,  250,  253,  263,  270  «.  I 

Pocock,  Adm.  George,  146,  151,  162-164, 
167-170,  180,  181,  186 

Polier  de  Bottens,  Major,  163 

Pondichery,  3,  12-19,  21-30,  33,  36,  38, 
39.  42,  44.  46.  47.  49.  Si-57.  63.  65,  67, 
68,  70,  74.  79-81,  87,  90,  94,  96.  99- 
102,  104,  105,  108,  110-112,  117,  I3S, 
158-189 

Poniyappa,  166  «.  7 

Poona,  33,  35 

Poonamallee,  49,  58,  59,  72 

Pratab  Singh,  41 

Pretson,  Capt.  Achilles,  172,  173 

Prince,  Richard,  40  «.  3 

Pulicat,  12,  13,  19 

Purnea,  119,  139,  140,  190,  192,  220 

Raghoji  Bonsla,  33,  34,  36,  46,  87,  88,  92, 

93 
Rai  Durlab,    131,    135,    138-140,   142-144, 

147.  148,  153.  207  n.  2,  228,  243,  250 
Rajabalabh,  147,  202,  211,  220 
Rajahmundry,  81,  89,  91-93,  176,  177 
Rajmahal,  119,   141 
Ramnarayan,  138-145,  150,  135,1190,  191 

195,  202,  2IO,  211,  213,  218,  222,  233 
Ram  Raja,  ah.  Ramram  Singh.     See  Mid- 

napore.  Raja  of 
Rayachoti,  85  tt.  1 
Raza  Sahib,    34,   36,  38,   42,   58,  59,  70, 

170,  200 
Renault  de  St.  Germain,  127-129 
Roe,  Sir  Thomas,  20 
Rohan,  Due  de,  109 
Russell,  Claud,  256  ».  3 

Sadras,  72-74 

Safar  Jang  Bahadur.     See  Dupleix 

Safdar  Ali  Khan,  31,  32,  48  //.  7,  70,  no 

St.  Contest,  M.  de,  78 

St.  David's.     See  Fort  St.  David 

St.  George,  23 

St.  Thomas's  Mount,  59,  170,  1 73 

St.  Thome,  20,  42,  43,  103 

St.  Thome  (the  river).     Sfe  Adiyar 

Saiyid  Lashkar  Khan,  90,  95,  248 

Salabat   Jang,  69,  70  k.  I,  73,  79,  81,  Sj- 

102,  105-107,  118,  123,  177-179.  253 
Samiaveram,  63,  64 
Satara,  32,  33,  35 
Saunders,  Thomas,  54,  56-58,  60,  67,  68, 

71.  73.  74.  77.  78.  82,  94,  152,  179,  26a, 

270 
Savanur,  95 
Savanur,  Nawab  of,  49 
Schonamille,  [         ],  48  «.  i 
Scott,  Col.  Caroline,  97 
Scrafton,   Luke,  136,    138,    140,    146,  147, 

149.  17s  "■  3.  193.  216,  219 
Scrimsour,  Capt.,  62  ».  2 
Serajepur,  268 


INDEX 


2T7 


Seths,  the,  128,  131,  132,  138,  195,  224, 

227,  250 
Shah  Alam,   148-151,  190-196,   198,  203, 

207-210,  218,  232,  236,  239,  240,  244, 

246,  247,  249,  250 
Shahji,  40,  41,  165 
Shah  Nawaz  Khan,  46,  50  ».  lo,  95,  :oo, 

loi,  248 
Shah  Zada.     See  Shah  Alam 
Shaikh  Abdur-Rahman,  159  «.  5 
Shaikh  Hasan,  38  «.  I 
Shitab  Rai,  220 

Shuja-ud-daula.     See  Oudh,  Nawab  of 
Siraj-ud-daula,    49   n.    4,    102,    118,   119, 

121,   122,   125-135,   138-I41,   144,   148, 

152,  250 
Sirpur,  191 

Smith,  Capt.  Joseph,  159 
Smith,  Col.  Richard,  265,  268 
Scan,  the,  236 
Somroo,  227,  237,  239 
Sosby,  [         ],  83 
Soupire,  [         ],  160 
Spencer,   John,   239,    241,   244,  246-248, 

254,  256,  258,  264,  265 
Srirangam,  56,  61-65,  7'>  '84,  270 
Stackhouse,  John,  215,  216 
Steevens,  Adm.,  186,  188,  189 
Sulivan,  Laurence,  247,  265 
Sumner,  William,  254  n.  4,  256  n.  3,  257 
Swinton,  Capt.,  233  n.  2 


Tanjorc,   32,  40,  41,  44,  45,  47,  50,  65, 
72,  74,    104,    106,    109,   146,    165-167, 

175 
Tencin,  Cardinal,  5 
Thiagar,  185 

Tinnevelly,  117,  185,  199,  200 
Tiruvalur,  166 
Tiruvananialai,  185  «.  4 
Tiruvendipuram,  105 
Tiruviti,  46,  51,  68,  70,  71 
Tranquebar,  166 
Trichinopoly,  32,  34,  36,   38,  40,  43,  44, 

46,  48,  55-62,  67  69,  71,  72.  74.  75.  83, 


86,   104,  106,    107,   117,   127,   158-160, 
167,  172,  200,  201,  261,  262,  266 
Turtle  Bay,  27 

Udanalla,  226 

Udayarpalayam,  Poligar  of,  165 
Utatur,  64 

Valikondapuram,  56,  65 

Valudavur,  39,  49,  51,  68,  70,  109,  185 

Vansittart,  Henry,  123  n.  2,  193,  196-198, 

202-208,   210-214,   216,   218-224,   226, 

228,   232-233,  238,  239,   246,  248,  251, 

253.  254,  260,  263,  264,  271 
Vasudeva  Pandit,  91  n.  i 
Vellore,  70,  117,  199 
Vendalore,  59 
Venkatachelam,  22 
Vernet,  153,  155,  156 
Very  de  St. -Remain,  60  «.  i 
Villiyanallur,  39,  46,  186 
Vincens,  85,  109 
Vizagapatam.   54,  92,   100,   125,  175,  177, 

178 
Vizianagrara,  Ananda  Razu,  Raja  of,  175, 

176 
Viiianagram,  Viziaram  Razu,  Raja  of,  93, 

99 

Walpole,  Horace,  109 
Walsh,  John,  135,  136 
Wandiwash,   48 «.  7,  50,   180,  184,   185, 

199 
Watson,  Adm.  Charles,  98,  123-125,  128, 

132  n.  5,  136,  162  «.  I 
Watts,   William,    119,   128,   130,  132,  133, 

«3S.  136.  139.  140,  147 
Westcott,  Foss,  49,  92 
Wilks,  Mark,  37,  54 
Wynch,  Alexander,  163 

Vanam,  51,  103 

Var  Latif  Khan,  131,  132 

Yusuf  Khan,  172,  173 

Zihaiguev,  64  n.  2 


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