The duplicate letters, the fisheries and the Mississippi. Documents relating to transactions at the negotiation of Ghent

THE

THE

FISHERIES AND THE MISSISSIPPI,

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO TRANSACTIONS

AT

THE NEGOTIATION OF GHENT.

Collected and Published

BY JOHN QUINCY ADAMS,

ONE OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE UNITED STATES
AT THAT NEGOTIATION-

WASHINGTON.

PRINTED BY DAVIS AND FORCE, frRANKLIN's HEAD.)
PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE.

1822.

To facilitate the comparison between the Original and Duph*
cate of Mr. RusseWs Letter of nth February, ||-|| to Mr.
Monroe, they are in this Collection printed in corresponding
pages, with the variations between them numbered and printed
in a brevier type. The passages in the Ghent Documents, par
ticularly referred to in the subsequent discussion, are enclosed
in brackets.

INTRODUCTION.

During the progress, and after the conclusion, of the negotiation
at Ghent, despatches were at three several periods received by the
executive government of the United States, from their plenipoten
tiaries at that place. The documents relating to the negotiation,
transmitted by the first and second of these occasions, were commu
nicated by messages from the President of the United States to Con
gress, and thereby became generally known to the public. They
are to be found in the 9th volume of Wait's State Papers, and in the
7th volume of Niles' Register, and they contain the correspondence
of the American mission, as well with their own government as
with the British plenipotentiaries, from the commencement of the
negotiation till the 31st of October, 1814. The third messenger
brought the treaty of peace itself. The correspondence subsequent
to the 31st of October, was of course communicated to the Senate
with the treaty, when it was submitted to that body for their advice
and consent to its ratification. But it was not communicated to
Congress or made public, nor was there at that time manifested
any desire to see it either by the House of Representatives or by
the nation.

In the course of the last summer, (of 1821,) I was apprised by a
friend, that rumours very unfavourable to my reputation, even for
integrity, were industriously circulated in the Western Country.
That it was said I had made a proposition at Ghent to grant to the
British the right to navigate the Mississippi in return for the New
foundland fisheries, and that this was represented as, at least, a high
misdemeanor. I observed that a proposition to confirm both these
rights as they had stood before the war, and as stipulated by the
treaty of 1783, had been offered to the British plenipotentiaries,
not by me, but by the whole American mission, every one of

235163

whom had subscribed to it. That the proposal to make this of
fer had been made to the mission not by me, but by a citizen of
the Western Country : that it was warranted, and as I believed, ab
solutely required by the instructions to the mission at the time
when the proposal was made to the British commissioners, and that
if I had felt and shown great solicitude at Ghent for the fisheries,
I did not expect it was to be imputed to me as an offence, ei
ther in my character of a servant of the Union, or in that of a na
tive citizen of Massachusetts. He said the proposal was at all
events to be so represented, that it was charged exclusively upon
me, and that I should hear afore about it ere long.

On the 16th of January last, Mr. Floyd, a member of the House
of Representatives of the United States, submitted to the House a
resolution in the following words :

11 Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to cause to
be laid before this House, all the correspondence which led to the treaty of
Ghent, which has not yet been made public, and which, in his opinion, it may
not be improper to disclose."

The said resolution was read, and ordered to lie on the table
one day.

The proceedings of the House upon it the next day, are thus re
ported in the National Intelligencer of the 18th of January.

Thursday, January 17th, 1822.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

On motion of Mr. Floyd, the House proceeded to the considera
tion of the resolution offered by him yesterday, requesting of the
President of the United States " all the correspondence which led
to the treaty of Ghent, which has not yet been made public, and
which, in his opinion, it may not be improper to disclose."

Mr. Floyd remarked that, as peace was now restored, there was
no reason why the whole of the correspondence which led to the
treaty of peace, should not be made public. He therefore modi
fied his motion by striking out the excepting clause, in italic, and
inserting after the word "Ghent," the words, "-together with the
protocol" He would also observe, that the bill which he had this
day reported to the House, contemplated a very considerable
change in our intercourse with the Indian tribes in the West, and
it appeared, by the report of the Secretary of War, made yester
day, that a great influence wasJexercised over those tribes by our
European neighbours in that quarter. The correspondence be
tween the commissioners at Ghent embraced this subject, among
others, and he thought it was desirable that the House should be
in possession of the whole of it.

Mr. Lowndes presumed the House would have no objectioa to
obtaining the information alluded to, if it were proper to make it
public ; but he thought it would be proper to leave the President,
in the form of the request, the option of communicating such of
the correspondence only as he might deem it not improper to dis
close. This was the usual form adopted by the House, and, al
though peace had taken place, there might be some parts of the
correspondence which it would be improper to publish. An un
limited call for all the information in the possession of the govern
ment on the subject, might create some embarrassment, and he
hoped the mover of the resolution would restore it to its original
shape.

Mr. Floyd was unwilling, by any act of his, to embarrass the
executive ; but presumed there was nothing asked for in this reso
lution which would have that effect, and feeling anxious to obtain
all the information on his subject which could be furnished, he pre
ferred the motion in its present form. If the motion would reach
any state secret — admitting there ought to be any state secrets in
this government — he wished not to be instrumental in disturbing
it ; but he anticipated no such consequence.

Mr. Lowndes rejoined, in substance, that although five or six
years had elapsed since the restoration of peace, it did not follow
that all that passed in the negotiations was proper for publication.
Some parts of the correspondence it might be incompatible with
the public interest to disclose to the world ; at any rate it was pro
per to except such as the President might deem the public good
required him to withhold. Mr. L. therefore moved to amend the
resolution by restoring the words, " and which, in his opinion, it
>tiay not be improper to disclose."

Mr. Floyd thought there was, in reality, no difference between
himself and the gentleman from South Carolina. If the gentleman
was apprised of any thing which it was improper to communicate
to the House, to be sure that would be a different matter ; but if
nis remarks were general, and had reference to no particular facts
j.n the correspondence, there was no reason for the amendment.

The question being taken, the amendment was agreed to ; and

Thus amended, the resolution was adopted, and a committee of
two appointed to carry it to the President.

On this debate it was observable that the mover of the resolu
tion had struck out the usual exception, which had been in his
draft of it presented the day before, of such papers as in the Pre
sident's opinion, it might be improper to disclose ; and had added
the words " together with the protocol ," which had not been in the
original resolution. The words of exception were restored, after
debate upon the motion of Mr. Lowndes. The inferences natu
rally drawn from these circumstances were, that in the day's inter-

val between the offering of the resolution, and the debate upon it,
suggestions had been made to the mover, that there might be mo
tives operating upon the executive, for withholding precisely the
information that was desired, unless the whole should be demand
ed ; and that a request for the correspondence would be liable to
fail in drawing forth the momentous disclosure, unless the protocol
should also be required. This special reference to the protocol,
would more readily occur to a person who had been concerned in
the negotiation, than to others, and the debate indicated at once
some eagerness to obtain very complete information, some appre
hensions that pains would be taken to suppress it, and some im
pression, that the evidence of the material fact to be elicited was
lodged in the protocol.*

It was in the protocol of the conference of 1st December, 1814,
that the proposal made to the British plenipotentiaries relating to
the Mississippi and the fisheries was contained. But all the Ame
rican plenipotentiaries had been present at that conference, and on
the face of the protocol it appeared that the proposal had been
made by them as a jojnt act of all. There was a subsequent letter
from them of 14th December, 1814, to the British plenipotentia
ries, signed by all, and referring to it as an article to which they had
no objection, considering it as merely declaratory. There was nothing
in the documents showing at whose instance in the American mis
sion, the proposal had been offered ; but in the joint letter of the
mission to the*' Secretary of State of 25th December, 1814, it was
stated that a majority of the mission had determined to offer it, and
in a separate letter of the same date, Mr. Russell noticing this pas
sage of the joint letter, acknowledged, in candour, that/ie had been
on that occasion in the minority ; and reserved to himself there
after, the power of assigning his reasons to vindicate his motives.
It will be seen in the course of the following papers, that the indi
cation in the joint letter, that the offer had been made, upon a de
termination of a majority, had, by an alteration of the original draft
been inserted, through the agency of Mr. Russell, not (as he stated)
at his own desire, but at that of Mr. Clay. But neither Mr. Clay,
nor any other member of the mission, save Mr. Russell, had
thought it necessary at the time to inform the government how he

* See in the Appendix, Mr. Floyd's Letter, published in the Richmond En-
er of 27tli August, 1822, and the remarks upon it.

had voted on the question, or to vindicate his motives for his vote.

When the documents called for by the resolution of the House
of 17th January, 1822, were on the 23d of February communicated
by the message from the President, they did indeed show that this
portentous proposal had been made ; but that it was by the concur
rent act of all the American plenipotentiaries. They also showed
that upon the expediency of making the proposal, there had pre
viously been taken a vote, on which occasion Mr. Russell had been
in the minority. The documents were, by order of the House,
laid upon the table, and there reposed for the space of nearly two
months till the 18th of April.

In the mean time the correspondence from Washington, and the
newspapers indoctrinated by it, had not been equally inactive.
Through these channels, the public were assured that the proposal
ef offering the navigation of the Mississippi for the fisheries, had
been made by me ; that Mr. Clay had uniformly declared that he
would not sign the treaty, wilh such an article in it ; and that" the
proposal had been finally set aside, by Mr. Bayard's having chang
ed his mind,. and come over to the opinion of the minority. Not one
of these three statements was true, though Mr. Russell has since
positively asserted the second, and gone still further than the
third, by alleging that the proposal was actually made by a minori
ty of the mission, against the will of Mr. Bayard, and without giv
ing him notice after he had changed his mind.

None of these allegations could derive any countenance from the
documents communicated to the House, under their resolution ot"
the 17th of January. But Mr. Russell's letter from Paris was in
reserve. The following papers will show how it was finally brought
before the House, together with a new edition of it in the form of
a duplicate ; and how a third exemplar, varying from both, was
presented to the public, in the National Gazette at Philadelphia.
The duplicate was the first of these papers seen by me, and from
the moment of my perusing it, I could be no longer at a loss, for the
origin of the storm, which a friendly voice had warned me was to
burst upon me from the West. The letter was a tale wrought up
with the ingenuity of a novelist, representing the proposition made
to the British plenipotentiaries on the 1st of December, 1814, as
a deliberate and wanton sacrifice of the peace and security of the
whole Western and Southern section of the Union, for the doubtful

accommodation of a tew Eastern fishermen, annually decreasing u
number, entirely exempt from the danger, and unsupported by any
claim of right. To take away all excuse from this procedure, it
was represented as having been pursued by the majority, in wilful
and express violation of the instructions to the mission, as under
stood by themselves, and in defiance of the remonstrances of the mi*
norily; Mr. Russell represented himself as having inflexibly opposed
it to the last, and the whole purport of the letter tended to the im
pression that he had, in the deliberations of the mission at Ghent
opposed the measure by urging against it all the reasons which
were set forth in the letter itself. There was withal, a profession
of unfeigned respect for the integrity, talents, and judgment of the
majority, thus represented as having grossly violated their own sense
of their duties, and been prepared to lay open to British smugglers
and emissaries, and to all the horrors of Indian warfare, the unof
fending citizens of the largest portion of the Union.

No one member of the majority was specially named in Mr,
Russell's letter, as peculiarly responsible for the obnoxious propo
sal, but the joint letter of the mission to the Secretary of State, of
25th December, 1814, had been drawn up by me. Mr. Russell^
who had signed it without discussion, and without proposing any
alteration to it, excepting those noticed in these papers, had, as ap
peared by this duplicate, taken it as the text for an adverse com
mentary. The joint letter, written the day after the signature of
the treaty, to be despatched with it, had given to the Secretary of
State, a concise and summary narrative of the proceedings of the
mission since the 31st of October, 1814, the date of their last pre
ceding despatch. In this narrative were mentioned the circum
stances under which the proposal to the British plenipotentiaries
of 1st December, 1814, had been made ; the reasoning by which
it had been discussed with them, the counter-proposition which they
had offered as a substitute for it, and their final acceptance, in its
stead, of the alternative which we had offered with it, of omitting
altogether the article by which they would have abandoned their
claim to the boundary line to the Mississippi. It was to the rea
soning interwoven with this narrative, reasoning which had been
used by the American mission in debate with the British plenipo
tentiaries, and as adversaries in argument to them, that I found Mi
Russell's duplicate was a deeply -studied, counter-argument. He had

undertaken, after the conclusion of the treaty, to do that for tlxe
enemy which they had not done for themselves ; but the glaring
fallacy of his letter was, that it represented that which had been
urged on our part is discussion with them, as if it had been a sub
ject of debate among ourselves. It undertook to prove, that the
principles which we had asserted, and the arguments we had urged
to the British commissioners, in support of bur fishing liberties,
contested by them, were entirely without foundation ; that we had
no right to the fishing liberties, and no right even to advance a claim
to them ; and that these had been among his reasons for refusing
his consent to the proposal of a stipulation for securing them. The
duplicate,

11 Tarn ficti, pravique tenax, quam nuncia veri,"

blended with these misrepresentations, the objections which Mr.
Clay had made, not only against the proposal which was offered,
but against an article which never had been offered, and alleged as
capping the climax of all Mr. Russell's reasons against the propo
sals, that it was in express violation of instructions which had been
cancelled before, the proposal was made.

Heterogeneous ^and incongruous as were these materials, they
had obviously been mixed up with the design of exciting the re
sentment and indignation of the Western and Southern sections of
the Union against the offer made to the British plenipotentiaries,
and against those by whom it had been proposed. When the ori
ginal letter from Paris was found, a comparison of it with the du
plicate disclosed this design in still broader light. All the new pa
ragraphs had a direct tendency either to aggravate the criminality
and injustice of the majority, or to make special claims for the
writer to Western favour and gratitude, or to deprecate by flattering
compliments the resentments of the Eastern fishing interest. To
any person unacquainted with the real transactions at the negotia
tion of Ghent, the composition was mingled with so much address
and plausibility, that it was eminently calculated to produce its ef
fect. It was difficult to suppose that the Ghent documents, and this
letter in particular, had been called forth from their slumbers of
seven years for any other purpose.

There were circumstances of a peculiar nature, imposing upon
me the obligation of meeting this accusation at once, and in the
most explicit manner. The documents called for by the House in

10

their first resolution of 1 7th January, were to be furnished from the
Department of State ; and some mistrust had been discovered, thai
there would be a disposition there to withhold some of them. The
second call, was for a paper known not to be forth-coming from
thence, until it should be furnished by Mr. Russell himself; for
which he had taken care to be prepared. Mr. Russell, too, by ob
serving, when he delivered it at the Department, that he was in
different whether it should be communicated or not, but if not, that
he wished it might be returned to him, evidently disclosed a suppo
sition on his part, that I should feel reluctant at the communication
of it to the House — that I should shrink from the exhibition of its
contents to the world. My official duty was to report it to the Pre
sident for communication to the House, and if precluded from the
privilege of remarking upon it, 1 should have been reduced to the
singular predicament of being made the silent reporter of my own
condemnation. A deceased, and an absent colleague, were impli
cated in the charges of the letter, apparently as much as myself.
Could I in justice to myself, I could not in duty to them, be the
bearer of these imputations to the Legislative Assembly of the na
tion, without declaring them to be unfounded. I did, therefore, in
reporting the paper to the President, request that in the communi-
Ca ion of it to the House, it might be accompanied by my Remarks.
The following pages will show the sequel.

In the collection of these papers, however, the defence and jus
tification of myself and my colleagues of the majority, forms but a
secondary purpose. Its primary intention is to prove —

1. That the principle assumed by the American mission at
Ghent, at the proposal of Mr. Clay, and in a paragraph drawn
up by him that the rights and liberties of the people of the
United States in the North American fisheries, were not abro
gated by the war of 1812, was a just and sound principle, en
tirely conformable to the law of nations.

2. That the article first offered by Mr. Gallatin, which was not
proposed to the British plenipotentiaries, and the amendment
to the 8th article of the project, also offered by Mr. Gallatin,
which was actually proposed to the British plenipotentiaries,
and by them rejected, was only a declaratory recognition of
that same principle, applied to the British right of navigating
the Mississippi, as well as to our fishery rights and liberties

11

3. That, considered even on the narrow ground of conflicting
sectional interests, this article and amendment proposed to
place the East and the West in the same state as before the
war ; without gain to one or loss to the other.

4. That the objection, by the minority, against the article and
amendment, insisted, in principle, upon the sacrifice of an
Eastern for the benefit of a Western interest.

5. That the Eastern interest to be sacrificed, was of very great
importance to the Union, and of vital magnitude to the State
of Massachusetts ; while the Western interest, for which it
was to be immolated, was altogether speculative and imagina
ry. It was most truly denominated, by the member of the
mission now no more, bragging a million against a cent.

If, therefore, the letter of Mr. Russell, of llth February, 1815,
from Paris, had been the real exposition of the motives of the mi
nority, for objecting to the proposed article and amendment of Mr.
Gallatin, its whole foundation, both of law and of fact, failing, would
have left the minority without any justification for their votes what
soever. With regard to the comparative value of the two interests
in question, it was impossible for the minority with more sincere
and deep conviction to believe the views of the majority to be er
roneous, than the majority thought those of the minority to be so.
But it never entered into my head, and never could have entered
into my heart, to treasure up these errors of opinion for after-use
against a colleague of the mission ; to " set in a note-book, con, and
learn by rote," opinions expressed in the mutual confidence of as
sociates in a great national trust, in order to bring them forth, after
many years, as engines to ruin a rival reputation.

But the letter from Paris was no exposition of the opinions which
had been manifested by the minority at Ghent. The principle,
that the fishing liberties had not been abrogated by the war, had
been asserted by the mission at Ghent, on the proposal of Mr. Clay.
The refutation of it is the most heavily laboured part of the letter
from Paris. If individual opinions upon the expediency of particu
lar measures adopted by the mission, are to be made the test of
merit or demerit for individual members of the mission, it is not a
little whimsical that Mr. Russell, for the minority, should now dis
claim the principle adopted at the motion of one of them, and which
has been completely successful in maintaining the interest in de-

12

fence ol which it was advanced, and pin all their claims ot" superior
service upon their ineffectual opposition to a proposal which they
did actually concur in making, and which failed, not in consequence
of their objections, but because the enemy disdained to accept it.
If by the sturdiness of their adherence to their opinions, they had
prevented the proposal from being made, there might have been
some semblance of a claim to credit from those who tremble at the
sight of an Englishman afloat upon the Mississippi. If the enemy
had eagerly snatched at the offer, and British emissaries, British
smugglers, and Indian wars, had swarmed upon us, in consequence,
the minority might have had some apology, for disengaging their re
sponsibility to the act, and casting upon their colleagues of the ma
jority all its evil report. * But so far as the proposal could possibly
have operated mischief, they are answerable for it by their con
currence. So far as the immediate rejection of the proposal by a
clear-sighted enemy, can test its possible consequences, the event
affords as little cause for the minority to glory in their foresight, as
their assent to what they thought so pernicious, gives them reason
to be proud of their firmness. A loud call upon the nation to dis
criminate between the profound wisdom and comprehensive pa
triotism of the minority, and the dulness, absurdity, and contracted
spirit, or treachery, of the majority, could scarcely rest on weaker
grounds, than upon the aversion of the minority to principles which
they nevertheless did sanction ; and upon their arguments against
measures to which they did subscribe their names. The majority
have asked for no discrimination. As one of them, I have as little
desire to conceal, as to proclaim, my separate agency in the transac
tions of the mission, or my vote upon any measure discussed by
them. I ask, only, not to be misrepresented.

-JOHN QUINCY ADAM?;.

21st September, 1822,

CORRESPONDENCE WHICH LED TO THE TREATY OF

GHENT.

.Ext fact from the Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States,
JANUARY 16, 1822.

Mr. Floyd submitted the following resolution, viz :

Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to cause to
be laid before this House, all the correspondence which led to the Treaty of
Ghent, which has not yet been made public, and which, in his opinion, it may
«ot be improper to disclose.

The said resolution was read and ordered to lie on the table one day.

JANUARY 17, 1822.

On motion of Mr. Floyd,

The House proceeded to consider the resolution submitted by him yesterday^
and the same being again read, and modified to read as follows :

Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to cause to
be laid before this House, all the correspondence which led to the Treaty of
Ghent, together with the Protocol, which has not yet been made public.

Mr. Lowmles moved to amend the same, by subjoining the following, viz :
'* And which, in his opinion, it may not be improper to disclose.''

And the question being taken thereon, it passed in the affirmative.

The said resolution, modified and amended as aforesaid, was then agreed to
by the House; and Mi. Floyd and Mr. Walworth were appointed a committee
to present the same to the President of the United States.

To the House of Representatives of the United States :

I transmit to the House of Representatives, a Report frfyn the
Secretary of State, with the Documents accompanying it, in pur
suance of a resolution of the House of the 17th of January last.

JAMES MONROE,

Washington, 21st February, 1822.

Department of State,

Washington, 21st Feb. 1822.

The Secretary of State, to whom has been referred the resolu
tion of the House of Representatives of the 17th January, request
ing the President of the United States to cause to be laid before the
House all the correspondence which led to the Treaty of Ghent,
together with the Protocol, which has not been made public, and
which, in his opinion, it may not be improper to disclose, has the
honour to submit to the President the papers embraced by that
resolution.

JOHN Q.UINCY ADAMS.

The President of the United States.
2

14

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

American Note No. 6. in answer to British Note No. 6.

Ghent, November 10, 1814.

The undersigned have the honour to acknowledge the receipt
of the note addressed to them by His Britannic Majesty's Plenipo
tentiaries, on the 31st ultimo.

The undersigned had considered an interchange of the project
of a trteaty as the course best calculated to exclude useless and de
sultory discussion, to confine the attention of both parties to the
precise object to be adjusted between the two nations, and to has
ten the conclusion of the peace so desirable to both. Finding, in
the note of the British plenipotentiaries of the [21st] ultimo, a mere
reference to the points proposed by them in the first conference,
with the offer of assuming the basis ofuli possidetis, on which the
undersigned had in substance already declined to treat ; they did
not consider it as the project of a treaty presented in compliance
with their request, They proposed, in their note of the 24th ulti
mo, that the exchange of the two projects should be made at the
same time. And it is not without some surprise, that the under
signed observe, in the note to which they now have the honour of
replying, that the British plenipotentiaries consider their note as
containing the project of a treaty, to which the undersigned are
supposed to be pledged to return a counter-project.

Believing that where both parties arc sincerely desirous of bring
ing a negotiation to a happy termination, the advantage of giving
or of receiving the first draft is not of a magnitude to be made a
subject of controversy, and convinced that their government is too
sincerely desirous of that auspicious result to approve o*' its being
delayed for a moment upon any question of etiquette, the under
signed have the honour to enclose herewith the project of a treaty,,
accompanied with some observations upon several of the articles,
which may more fully elucidate their object in proposing them.

The British plenipotentiaries stated, in their last note, that
they had no other propositions to offer, nor other demands to make,
than those contained in their note of the 21st ultimo, which, with
the reference to their former declaration respecting the fisheries,
contains only two propositions, viz : that of fixing the boundary
from the Lake of the Woods to the Mississippi ; and that of adopt
ing, with respect to the other boundaries, the basis of uti possidetis.

*[In answer to the declaration made by the British plenipoten
tiaries respecting the fisheries, the undersigned, referring to what
passed in the conference of the 9th August, can only state that they
are not authorized to bring into discussion any of the rights or li
berties which the United States have heretofore enjoyed in relation

* Paragraph drawn by Mr. Clay, and inserted at bis proposal-

thereto. From their nature, and from the peculiar character of
the treaty of 1783, by which they were recognised, no further
stipulation has been deemed necessary by the government of the
United States, to entitle them to the full enjoyment of all of them.]

The undersigned have aready, in their last note, explicitly de
clined treating on the basis of uti possidetis. They cannot agree
to any other principle than that of mutual restoration of territory,
and have accordingly prepared an article founded orf that basis.
They are willing even to extend the same principle to the other
objects in dispute between the two nations ; and in proposing all
the other articles included in this project, they wish to be distinctly
understood, that they are ready to sign a treaty, placing the two
countries, in respect to all the subjects of difference between them,
in the same state they were in at the commencement of the present
urar ; reserving to each party all its rights, and leaving whatever
may remain of controversy between them, for future and pacific
negotiation.

The British plenipotentiaries having, in their note of the 4th ol
September, communicated the disposition of their government to
receive tavourably a proposition which should acknowledge the
boundary from the Lake of the Woods to the Mississippi, or to dii-
cuss any other line of boundary which might be submitted for con
sideration, the undersigned answered, that as soon as the proposi
tion of Indian boundary should be disposed of, they would have no
objection, with the explanation given by the British plenipotentia
ries, to discuss the subject.

The government of the United States had, prior to the acquisi
tion of Louisiana, been disposed to agree to the boundary, from the
Lake of the Woods to the Mississippi, from a wish not only to ar
range that subject, but also to settle, in a definitive manner, the
differences respecting the boundary and islands in the Bay of Pas-
samaquoddy : and its assent to the proposed stipulation of that
boundary was refused on account of the acquisition of Louisiana,
the boundaries of which might have been affected by it. The un
dersigned cannot agree to fix the boundaries in that quarter, unless
that of Louisiana be also provided for in the arrangement. They
accordingly submit for consideration the article on that subject
which appears to have been agreed on between the British and
American commissioners in the project of convention of the year
1807.

In respect to the intended review of the other boundaries be
tween the British and American territories, with the view to pre
vent future uncertainty and dispute, the undersigned propose the
reference of the whole subject to commissioners : and they pre
sent accordingly five articles, drawn on the principles formerly
adopted by the two powers for settling the question respecting the
river St. Croix.

The article already agreed on, respecting the Indian pacification,
is included in the project of the undersigned. In conformity with

16

their former suggestion, they offer another, intended to restrain the
hostilities, and to prevent the employment, of the savages in war,
and one reciprocally granting a general amnesty.

The only other subjects which have been presented by the un
dersigned as suitable for discussion, were those respecting seamen,
blockade, and indemnities.

Keeping in view the declaration made by lord Castlercagh, in
his note ofthe^Qth of August, 1812, to Mr- Russell, and in his let
ter of the 4th November, 1813, to Mr. Monroe, the undersigned
propose only a temporary article, intended, without affecting the
rights or pretensions of either country, to attempt to accomplish,
by means less liable to vexation, the object for which impressment
has hitherto been thought necessary by Great Britain. The pro
posed agreement being purely conditional, and limited in duration,
each party will be bound only so far, and so long, as the other shall
fulfil its conditions ; and at the end of the term fixed for the dura
tion of the article, or whenever either party may fail to perform
his engagement, the rights of both will be as valid and entire as
they were before the agreement.

The article respecting blockades is believed to he in perfect con
formity with the principles of the law of nations, as acknowledged
by both nations. The definition is borrowed from the treaty of
1801, between Great Britain and Russia, and the residue of the
article from the unratified treaty of 1806, between Great Britain
and the United States.

That relating to indemnities, consists of two parts : the first for
irregular seizures, captures, and condemnations of American pro
perty, contrary to the established laws and usages of nations, pre
vious to the commencement of the war ; and the second for similar
irregularities committed during the war. and contrary to the known
and established usages of war, between civilized nations. The
cases of the first apply exclusively to claims of the citizens of the
United States, because, the causes of such claims were then con
fined, by the relative situation of the parties, to one side. It is pre
sumed, that the British government will itself be sensible of the
justice of making indemnity for injuries committed by its officers,
in violation of principles avowed and recognised by itself; particu
larly in the letter from lord Hawkesbury to Mr. King, of llth
April, 1801, and in that from Mr. Merry to Mr. Madison, of 12th
April, 1804 ; and that the same justice will be admitted, in cases
where the territorial jurisdiction of the United States was violated,
and where the injury was occasioned by the retrospective effects
of the British Orders in Council, of June, 1803, as to the return
from the contraband voyages, and of the Orders in Council of Ja
nuary 7, 1807.

With regard to the Orders in Council, of November, 1807, and
of April, 1809, the undersigned will observe, that these having
been issued solely on the ground of retaliation against France, and
their object having altogether ceased, it is just to indemnify the

17

citizens of the United States for losses experienced by the effect o»
measures intended to operate against the enemy of Great Britain,
and which fell almost exclusively on a country, which was no party
to the war. The United States have never ceased, and at this time,
continue to demand, from France, indemnity for the losses they
have experienced by the effect of the decrees of her government,
in violation of the law of nations.

The cases of the second part of this article apply equally to
both the belligerent parties. They have been, during the war,
subjects of crimination on both sides. The American government
can give no stronger and more signal proof of its disapprobation of
every departure, under colour of its authority, from the established
usages of legitimate warfare between civilized nations, than by the
offt* of mutual reparation.

The article fixing a limitation for captures at sea, does not seem
to require any comment.

The undersigned present their entire project in this specific
form, with the full expectation of receiving from the British pleni
potentiaries their explicit answer respecting all the articles embra
ced in it, and a project also reduced to specific propositions, and
embracing all the objects which they intend to bring forward.

The undersigned renew to the British plenipotentiaries the as
surance of their high consideration.

JOHN QU1NCY ADAMS,
J. A. BAYARD,
HENRY CLAY,
JONATHAN RUSSELL,
ALBERT GALLATI> .-."

To the Plenipotentiaries of His Britannic

Majesty, &c. &c. Aic. Ghent.

Copy of a project of a treaty of peace submitted by the American to the
British Plenipotentiaries at Ghent, on the 10th day of Nov. 1814.

Treaty of Peace and Amity between his Britannic Majesty and the
United States of America.

His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America desirous
of terminating the war which has unhappily subsisted between the
two countries, and of restoring, upon principles of perfect recipro
city, peace, friendship, and good understanding, between them, have
for that purpose, appointed their respective plenipotentiaries, that
is to say : His Britannic Majesty on his part has appointed the right
honourable James Lord Gambier, admiral of the White Squadron
of his Majesty's fleet, Henry Goulburn, Esquire, a member of the
Imperial Parliament and under Secretary of State, and William
Adam?. Esq. Doctor of Civil Laws ; and the President of the Unit-

IB

ed States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof,
has appointed John Quincy Adams, James A. Bayard, Henry Clay,,
Jonathan Russell, and Albert Gallatin, citizens of the United States.
who, after a reciprocal communication of their respective full
powers, have agreed upon the following articles :

ARTICLE I. There shall be a firm and universal ponce between
his Britannic Majesty and the United States, and between their
respective countries, territories, cities, towns, and people of every
degree, without exception of persons or places. AH hostilities
both by sea and land shall immediately cease. All prisoners on both
sides shall be set at liberty. All territory, places, and possessions,
without exception, taken by either party from the other during the
war, or which may be taken after the signing of this treaty, shall
be restored without delay, and without causing any destruction^ or
carrying away any artillery or other public property, or any slaves
or other private property ; and all archives, records, deeds, and
papers, either of a public nature or belonging to private persons,
which, in the course of the war, may have fallen into the hands of
the officers- of either party, shall be forthwith restored and deliver
ed to the proper authorities and persons, to whom they respective
ly belong.

ARTICLE II. Immediately after the respective ratifications of
this treaty, orders shall be sent to the armies, squadrons, officers,
subjects, and citizens of the two powers, to cease from all hos
tilities. And to prevent all causes of complaint which might
arise on account of the prizes which may be taken at sea after the
signing of this treaty, it is reciprocally agreed that the vessels and
enVtlft which may be taken in the Channel and in the North Seas af
ter the space of from that of the signature hereof, shall be

restored on each side : that the term shall be from the Chan
nel and the North Seas to the Canary Islands, inclusively, whether

in the ocean or the Mediterranean : of from the said Canary

Islands to the equinoctial line or equator, and of in all other

parts of the world, without exception.

ARTICLE III. Whereas that portion of the boundary between the
dominions of his Britannic Majesty in North America, and those of
the United States, from the mouth of the river St. Croix, (as the
said mouth was ascertained by the commissioners appointed for
that purpose,) to the bay of Fundy, has not yet been regulated and
determined ; and, whereas, the respective rights and claims of his
Britannic Majesty and of the United States, to the several islands in
the bay of Passamaquoddy, and to the island of Grand Menan, have
never been finally adjusted and determined, the said islands being
claimed on the part of the United States as lying within twenty
leagues of their shores, and south of aline drawn due east from the
mouth of the river St. Croix ; and on the part of his Britannic Ma-
}esty, as having been, at or before the former treaty of peace, be
tween the two boundaries within the limits of the province of Nova
Scotia : In order, therefore, finally to decide these several ques-

19

S'ons, it is agreed that they shall be referred to three commissioners,
to be appointed in the following manner, viz : one commissioner
shall be appointed by his Britannic Majesty, and one by the Presi
dent of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate thereof, and the said two commissioners, shall have
power to choose a third ; and if they cannot agree, they shall each
propose one person, and of the two names so proposed, one shall
be drawn by lot, in the presence of the two original commissioners,
and the three commissioners so appointed, shall be sworn impar
tially to examine and decide the said questions according to fuch
evidence as shall respectively be laid before them, on the part of
the British government and the United States. The said commis-

missioners shall meet at and shall have power to adjourn to

such other place or places as they shall think tit. The said com
missioners, or a majority of them, shall, by a declaration under
their hands and seals, determine the boundary aforesaid, from the
mouth of the river St. Croix to the bay of Fundy ; and decide to
which of the two contracting parties the several islands aforesaid
do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the
former treaty of peace. And both parties agree to consider such
decision as final and conclusive.

ARTICLE IV. Whereas neither that point of the high-lands lying
due north from the source of the river St. Croix, and designated in
the former treaty of peace between the two powsrs, as the north
west angle of Nova Scotia, nor the northwesternmost head of Con
necticut river, has yet been ascertained : And whereas that part of
the boundary line between the dominions of the two powers, which
extends from the source of the river fit. Croix, directly north, to
the above mentioned northwest angle of Nova Scotia : thence, along
the said high lands, which divide those rivers, that empty them
selves into the river St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the
Atlantic ocean, to the northwestern<;icst head of Connecticut river ;
thence, down, along the middle of that river, to the forty-fifth de
gree of north lattitude ; thence, by a line due west, on said latitude,
until it strikes the river Iroquois, or Cataraguy, has not yet been,
surveyed; It is agreed, that, for these several purposes, three
commissioners shall be appointed, sworn, (mutatis mutandis) and
authorized to act exactly in the manner directed with respect to
those mentioned in the next preceding article ; the said commis
sioners shall meet at — , and shall have power to adjourn to

such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said com
missioners, or a majority of them, shall have power to ascertain and
determine the points above mentioned, in conformity with the provi
sions of the said treaty of peace, and shall cause the'boundary afore
said, from the source of the river St. Croix to the river Iroquois,
or Cataraguy, to be surveyed and marked according to the said
provisions. The said commissioners, or a majority of them, shall
make a map of the said boundary, and annex to it a declaration, un
der their hands and seals, certifying it to be the true map of the

20

said boundary, and particularizing the latitude and longitude ot' the
northwest angle of Nova Scotia ; of the northwesternmost head of
Connecticut river, and of such other points of the said boundary as
they may deem proper ; and both parties agree to consider such
map and declaration as finally and conclusively fixing the said boun
dary.

ARTICLE V. Whereas, by the former treaty of peace, that por
tion of the boundary of the United States from the point where the
forty-fifth degree of north latitude strikes the river Iroquois, or
Cataraguy, to the lake Superior, was declared to be along the mid
dle of said river, into lake Ontario, through the middle of said lake,
until it strikes the communication by water between that lake and
lake Erie ; thence, along the middle of said communication, into
lake Erie ; through the middle of said lake until it arrives at the
water communication into the lake Huron ; thence, through the
middle of said lake, to the water communication between that lake
and lake Superior : And whereas doubts have arisen what was the
middle of the said river, lakes, and water communications, and whe
ther certain islands lying in the same were within the dominions of
his Britannic Majesty or of the United States : In order, therefore,
finally to decide these questions, they shall be referred to three
commissioners, to be appointed, sworn, (mutatis mutandis) and au
thorized to act exactly in the manner directed with respect to those
mentioned in the next preceding articte. The said commissioners,

shall meet, in the first instance, at , and shall have power to

adjourn to such other place, or places, as they shall think fit. The
said commissioners, or a majority of them, shall, by a declaration
under their hands and seals, designate the boundary through the
said river, lakes, and water communications, and decide to which of
the two contracting parties the several islands lying within the said
rivers, lakes, and water communications, do respectively belong, in
conformity with the* true intent of the former treaty of peace.
And both parties agree to consider such decision as final and con
clusive.

ARTICLE VI. It is further agreed, that the said last-mentioned
commissioners, after they shall have executed the duties assigned
to them in the preceding article, shall be, and they, or a majority of
them, are hereby, authorized, upon their oaths, impartially to fix
and determine, according to the true intent of the said former trea
ty of peace, that part of the boundary between the dominions of the
two powers which extends from the water communication between
lake Huron and lake Superior, to the most northwestern point of
the Lake of the Woods ; to decide to which of the two parties the
several islands lying in the lakes, water communications, and rivers,
forming the said boundary, do respectively belong, in conformity
with the true intent of the said former treaty of peace, and to cause
such parts of the said boundary as require it to be surveyed and
marked. The said commissioners, or a majority of them, shall, by
-a declaration, under their hands and seals, designate the boundary

SI

aforesaid, state their decision on the questions thus referred t<n
them, and particularize the latitude and longitude of the most north
western point of the Lake of the Woods, and of such other points
of the said boundary as they may deem proper. And both parties
agree to consider such decision as final and conclusive.

ARTICLE VII. The several boards of commissioners mentioned in
the four preceding articles shall, respectively, have power to ap
point a secretary, and to employ such surveyors, or other persons,
as they shall judge necessary. Duplicates of their respective de-
claratrons and decisions, of the statement of their accounts, and ot
the journal of their proceedings, shall be delivered by them to the
agents of his Britannic Majesty, and to the agents of the United
States, who may be respectively appointed, and authorized to man
age the business in behalf of their respective governments. The
said commissioners shall be respectively paid in such manner as shall
be agreed between the two parties ; such agreement being to be
settled at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty.
And all other expenses attending the said commissions shall be de
frayed, jointly, by the two parties, the same being previously as
certained and allowed by a majority of the commissioners. And in
the case of death, sickness, resignation, or necessary absence, the
place of every such commissioner, respectively, shall be supplied
in the same manner as such commissioner was first appointed, and
the new commissioner shall take the same oath or affirmation, and
do the same duties.

It is further agreed between the two parties, that, in case any of
the islands mentioned in any of the preceding articles, which were
in the possession of one of the parties prior to the commencement
of the present war between the two countries, should, by the de
cision of any ot the boards of commissioners aforesaid, fall within
the dominions of the other party, all grants of lands made previous
to that time, by the party having had such possession, shall be as
valid as if such island or islands had, by such decision or decisions,
been adjudged to be within the dominions of the party having had
such possession.

ARTICLE VIII. It is agreed that a line, drawn due north or
south, (as the case may be) from the most northwestern point of
the Lake of the Woods, until it shall intersect the forty-ninth par
allel of north latitude, and from the point of such intersection, due
west, along and with the said parallel, shall be the dividing line
between his majesty's territories and those of the United States to
the westward of the said lake, as far as their said respective ter
ritories extend in that quarter ; and that the said line shall, to that
extent, form the southern boundary of his majesty's said territo
ries, and the northern boundary of the said territories of the
United States : Provided, that nothing in the present article shall
be construed to extend to the northwest coast of America, or to
the territories belonging to, or claimed by, either party, on the
continent of America, to the westward of the Stony Mountain*

22

ARTICLE IX. The United States of America engage to put aw
end, immediately after the ratification of the present treaty, to
hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom they
may be at war at the time of such ratification, and forthwith to
restore to such tribes or nations, respectively, all the possessions,
rights, and privileges, which they may have enjoyed or been en
titled to in 1811, previous to such hostilities.

Provided always, that such tribes or nations shall agree to de
sist from all hostilities against the United States of America^ their
citizens and subjects, upon the ratification of the present treaty
being notified to such tribes or nations, and shall so desist accord
ingly.

And his Britannic majesty engages on his part, to put an end,
immediately after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostili
ties with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom he may be
at war at the time of such ratification, and forthwith to restore to
such tribes, or nations, respectively, all the possessions, rights, and
privileges, which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in
1811, previous to such hostilities.

Provided always, that such tribes or nations shall agree to desist
from all hostilities against his Britannic majesty and his subjects,
upon the ratification of the present treaty being notified to such
tribes or nations, and shall so desist accordingly.

ARTICLE X. His Britannic majesty and the United States shall,
by all the means in their power, restrain the Indians living within
their respective dominions from committing hostilities against the
territory, citizens, or subjects, of the other party : and both powers
also agree and mutually pledge themselves, if at any time war
should unhappily break out between them, not to employ any In
dians, nor to admit of their aid and co-operatiori in the prosecu
tion of the war against the other party.

ARTICLE XI. Each party shall effectually exclude from its naval
and commercial service all seamen, seafaring, or other persons,
subjects or citizens of the other party, not naturalized by the re
spective governments of the two parties, before the day of

. seamen or other persons, subjects of either party, who

shall desert from public or private ships or vessels, shall, when
found within the jurisdiction of the other party, be surrendered,

provided they be demanded within from the time of their

desertion.

No person whatever shall, upon the high seas, and without the
jurisdiction of either party, be demanded or taken out of any ship
or vessel, belonging to subjects or citizens of any of the parties,
by the public or private armed ships or vessels belonging to, or in
the service of, the other, unless such person be, at the time, in
the actual employment of an enemy of such other party. This

article shall continue in force for the term of years, Nothing

in this article contained shall be construed thereafter to affect or
impair the rights of either party.

23

ARTICLE XII. If either of the contracting parties shall hereafter be
engaged in war against any third power, to which war the other of
the parties shall remain neutral, it is agreed that every vessel of the
neutral party, sailing for a port or place belonging to the enemy
of the belligerent, without knowing that the same is besieged,
blockaded, or invested, may be turned away from such port or
place, but shall not be detained, nor her cargo, if not contraband,
be confiscated, unless, after such notice, she shall again attempt to
tenter : but she shall be permitted to go to any other port or place
she may think proper ; nor shall any vessel or goods of either
party, that may have entered into such port or place before the
same was besieged, blockaded, or invested by the other, and be
found therein after the reduction or surrender of such pince, be
liable to confiscation, but shall be returned to the proprietors
thereof: and, in order to determine what characterizes a blockaded
port, that denomination is given only to a port where there is, by
the disposition of the power which attacks it with ships, stationary,
or sufficiently near, an evident danger in entering.

ARTICLE XIII. It is agreed that indemnity shall be made by his
Britannic majesty to the citizens of the United States, for all losses
and damages sustained by them during the late war between Great
Britain and France, and prior to the commencement of the present
war, by reason of irregular or illegal captures, seizures, or con
demnations of vessels and other property, under colour of autho-
rity$ contrary to the known and established rules of the law of
nations. And it is also agreed, that indemnity shall be m:?de by
each of the contracting parties, to the subjects or citizens of the
othej; party, for all losses and damages sustained subsequent to the
commencement of the present war, by reason of the seizure or
condemnation of the vessels or cargoes, belonging to the subjects
or citizens of the one party, which, in the ordinary course of com.'
merce, happened at the commencement of hostilities to be in the
ports of the other party ; and by reason of the destruction of un
fortified towns, and the pillage or destruction of private property,
and the enticement and carrying away of negroes, contrary to the
known and established rules and usages of war between civilized
nations.

. It is agreed, that, for the purpose of determining the indemnities
due by each contracting party, in conformity with the provisions
of this article, commissioners shall be appointed in the following
manner, viz : one commissioner shall be named by his Britannic
majesty, and one by the President of the United States, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof; and the said
two commissioners shall agree in the choice of a third ; or, if they
cannot agree, they shall each propose one person, and of the two
names so proposed, one shall be taken by lot, in the presence of
the two original commissioners, and the three commissioners thus
appointed, shall' be sworn, and authorized and empowered, im
partially, to examine into all such claims and complaints, and to
determine the indemnities which may be justly due for the same*

24

The said commissioners shall meet at and shall have

power to adjourn to such other place, or places, as they shall
think ik ; they shall also have power to appoint a secretary, swear
and examine witnesses, and have all assistance and facilities neces
sary to effect the object of their appointment.

The award of the said commissioners, or a majority of them,
shall in all cases be final and conclusive, both as to the justice of
the claim, and as to the amount of the sum to be paid to the claim
ant and claimants. And his Britannic majesty and the United States
agree and undertake to cause the sums so awarded to be due by
them, respectively, to be paid in specie, to such claimant and
claimants without deduction, and at such place or places, time or
times, as shall be awarded by the commissioners.

ARTICLE XIV. It is also agreed, that no person or persons, re
siding within the dominions of one of the parties, who may have
taken part with the other party, in the war between Great Britain
and the United States, shall, on that account, be prosecuted, mo-
Jested, or annoyed, either in his person or property ; and that all
such persons disposed to remove into the dominions of the other

party, shall be allowed the term of months, freely to sell

their property, of every nature and description whatsoever, and
to remove accordingly.

ARTICLE XV. This treaty, when the same shall have been rati
fied on both sides, and the respective ratifications mutually ex
changed, shall be binding on both parties, and the ratification shall

be exchanged at in the space of months from this day.,

or sooner, if possible.

In faith whereof, we, the respective plenipotentiaries, have
signed this treaty, and have thereunto affixed our seals,

Done at Ghent, the day of one thousand eight hun
dred and fourteen.

British Note, No. 7.

The undersigned have had the honour to receive the note and
project of a treaty of peace presented by the American plenipo
tentiaries on the 10th instant.

The undersigned are of opinion that the most convenient course
for them to adopt will be to return this project with their marginal
alterations and suggestions on the several articles of which it is
composed. The existing differences between the two governments
will thus be brought more immediately in view, and it is hoped
that, by confining the discussions to one project, the negotiations
may sooner be brought to a favourable conclusion. The first part
of the 10th article appears to be unnecessary, and the stipulation
contained in the whole of it altogether inadmissible. Though his
majesty's government sincerely hopes that a renewal of the war
between his majesty and the United States may be far distant, yet
the undersigned cannot consent to enter into any engagement as to
what shall be the conduct of their government, if such a war should
nnfortunately occur.

With respect to the 1 1th and 12th articles, his majesty's govern
ment has strongly manifested its sincere disposition to the speedy
restoration of peace, by agreeing, under all the present circum
stances, to conclude the treaty without any stipulation on the points
ta which these articles relate. No advantage can arise from en
tering into discussions, upon a successful result of which the Ame
rican plenipotentiaries, have stated, more than once, that they will
not make the conclusion of the peace at all to depend.

With respect to the 13th article, the indemniiications proposed
by it, as applied to the actual circumstances of the war, are so
unprecedented and objectionable, that any further perseverance of
the American plenipotentiaries in requiring them, is not anticipated
by the undersigned : if, however, contrary to expectation, indem
nifications of this kind should be required, all hope of bringing the
negotiations to a favourable issue must prove abortive. The un
dersigned are instructed explicitly to declare, that as their go
vernment makes no claim on account of losses sustained by British
subjects arising out of a war declared by the United States, so
neither can their government agree to make compensation for losses,
sustained in such a war by the American people.

The undersigned are, however, willing to agree to a stipulation
by which it shall be provided, that the courts of justice in each
country sh'all be open to the just demands of the respective peo
ple, and that no obstruction be thrown in the way of their recover)
of the rights, claims, or debts, of any kind respectively due or be
longing to them.

With respect to the 14th article, the undersigned do not concur
In the necessity for any such stipulation as is there proposed.

The undersigned think proper to add, that, with respect to par
ticular alterations suggested by them in various articles of the
project, they are ready to enter into such explanations as may be
required of them, with the sincere desire of endeavouring to re
concile the pretensions brought forward on the part of their re
spective governments.

The undersigned have forborne to insist upon the basis of uti
possidetis, to the advantage of which they consider their county
fully entitled. But should this negotiation terminate in a way
contrary to their hopes and just expectations, they must protest
against any claim or demand being urged by the American govern
ment in any future negotiation, in consequence of the facilities
which his majesty's government have now shown themselves wil
ling to afford to the speedy restoration of peace.

The undersigned avail themselves of the present opportunity to
renejv to the plenipotentiaries of the United States the assurances
of their high consideration.

GAMBIER,

HENRY GOULDBURN,

WILLIAM ADAMS.

Ghent, November 26th,

26

Project of a Treaty, as returned by the British to the American Plem*.
potentiaries, 26th November ^ 1814.

Treaty of Peace and Amity, between his Britannic Majesty, and
the United States of America.

The following marginal remarks
and alterations were made and
proposed by the British pleni
potentiaries.
Note. It is proposed to omit

altogether the words that are

nnderlined.

ARTICLE 1.

(1) places or

(2) after the exchange of the ra
tifications as herein after men
tioned.

* It is thought more advisable

His Britannic majesty and the
United States of America, desi
rous of terminatingthe war which
has unhappily subsisted between
the two countries, and of restor
ing, upon principles of perfect re
ciprocity, peace, friendship, and
^ood understanding, between
them, have, for that purpose, ap
pointed their respective plenipo
tentiaries, that is to say, his Bri
tannic majesty on his part has
appointed the right honourable
James lord Gambier, admiral
of the White Squadron, of his
majesty's fleet, Henry Goulburn,
esq. a member of the Imperial
Parliament, and under Secretary
of State, and William Adams,
esq. Doctor of Civil Laws ; and
the President of the United States,
by and with advice and consent of
the Senate thereof, has appointed
John Quincy Adams, James A.
Bayard, Henry Clay, Jonathan
Russell, and Albert Gallatin, citi
zens of the United States, who,
after a reciprocal communication
of their respective full powers,
have agreed upon the following
articles.

ARTICLE I. There shall be a
firm and universal peace between
his Britannic majesty and the
United States and between their
respective countries, territories,
cities, towns, and people, of eve
ry degree, without exception of
(1) persons or places. All hos
tilities, both by sea and land,
shall immediately cease. (2) Ml
prisoners on both sides shall be set
at liberty.* All territory, places,
and possessions, without excep-

that the provision respecting pri
soners of war, should be the sub
ject ot* a separate article ; the
draft of an article on this subject
is subjoined.

(1) belonging to

(2) and taken by

(3) of the

(4) originally captured in the said
forts or places, and which shall
remain therein upon the ex
change of the ratifications, of this
treaty.

(5) as far as may be practicable.

ARTICLE II.
:*6) shall have been exchanged,

7) exchange of the ratiiications

H") the period of the exchange
of the ratifications,

i'f>) the same term of for

ail parts of the Mediterranean.

tion, taken by (1) either party
from (2) the other during the
war, or which may be taken
after the signing of this treaty,
shall be restored without delay,
and without causing any destruc
tion, or carrying away any (3)
artillery or other public proper
ty, or any slaves or other pri
vate property, (4) and all ar
chives,, records, deeds, and pa
pers, either of a public nature
or belonging to private persons,
which, in the course of the war,
may have fallen into the hands of
the officers of either party, shall
be (5) forthwith restored, and de
livered to the proper authorities
and persons -to whom they re
spectively belong.

ARTICLE II. Immediately af
ter the respective ratifications of
this treaty, (6) orders shall be
sent to the armies, squadrons,
officers, subjects, and citizens,
of the two powers, to cease
from all hostilities : and to pre
vent all causes of complaint,
which might arise on account of
the prizes which may be taken
at sea, after the (7) signing ot
this treaty, it is reciprocally
agreed, that the vessels and ef
fects which may be taken in the
Channel, and in the North Seas,

after the space of from

(8) that of the signature hereof,
shall be restored on each side ;

that the term shall be

from the Channel and the North
Seas to the Canary islands inclu
sively, (9) whether in the ocean

or the Mediterranean : of

from the said Canary Islands to
the equinoctial line or equator,

and of in all other

parts of the world without ex
ception.

28

ARTICLE TIL Whereas it wa3
stipulated by the second article
in the treaty of peace of 1783,
between his Britannic majesty
and the United States of Ameri
ca, that the boundary of the
United States should compre
hend " all islands within twenty
leagues of any part of the shores
of the United States, and lying
between lines to be drawn due
east from the points where the
aforesaid boundaries between
Nova Scotia on the one part, and
East Florida on the other, shall,
respectively, touch the Bay of
Fundy, and the Atlantic ocean,
excepting such islands as now
are, or heretofore .have been,
within the limits of Nova Sco
tia :" And whereas claims have
been made by the government
of the United States to certain
islands in the Bay of Fundy,
which said islands are claimed
as belonging to his Britannic
majesty, as having been at the
time of, and previous to, the
aforesaid treaty of 1783, within
the limits of the province of No
va Scotia : In order, therefore,
finally to decide upon these
claims, it is agreed that they
shall be referred to two com
missioners, to be appointed in
the following manner, viz. one
commissioner shall be appointed
by his Britannic majesty, and
one by the President of the
United States, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate
thereof, and the said two com
missioners, so appointed, shall
be sworn impartially to examine
and decide upon the said claims,
according to such evidence as
shall be laid before them on the
part of his Britannic majesty and
of the United States reppective-

ARTICLE III. Whereas, that
portion of the boundary between
the dominions of his Britannic
majesty in North America, and
those of the United States, from
the mouth of the river St. Croix
(as the said mouth was ascertain*
ed by the commissioners appoint™
edfor that purpose) to the Bay of
Fundy, has not yet been regulated
and determined : And whereas ,
the respective rights and claims
of his Britannic Majesty and of
the United States, to the several
islands in the Bay of Passama-
quoddy, and to the island of
Grand Menan, have never been
finally adjusted and determined,
the said islands being claimed on
the part of the United States as
lying within twenty leagues of
their shores, and south of a line
drawn due east from the mouth of
the river St. Croix, and on the
part of his Britannic majesty, as
having been, at or before the for
mer treaty of peace, between the
two countries, within the limits
of the province of Nova Scotia :
In order, therefore, finally to de
cide these several questions, it is
agreed that they shall be referred
to three commissioners, to be ap
pointed in the following manner ,
•viz. one commissioner shall be ap
pointed by his Britannic majesty,
and one by the President of the
United States, by and with the ad
vice and consent of the Senate
thereof, and the said two commis
sioners shall have power to choose
a third, and if they cannot agree
they shall each propose one person,
and of the two names, so proposed,
one shall be drawn by lot, in the
presence of the two original com
missioners, and the three commis
sioners, so appointed, shall be.
sworn impartially to examine

29

all

The said
meet at

commissioners
, and

shall have power to adjourn to
euch other place, or places, as
they shall think fit. The said
commissioners shall, by a decla
ration or report, under their
hands and seals, decide to which
of the two contracting parties
the several islands aforesaid do
respectively belong, in conform
ity with the true intent of the
said treaty of peace of 1783:
and if the said commissioners
shall agree in their decision,
both parties shall consider such
decision as final and conclusive.
It is further agreed, that, in
the event of the two commis
sioners differing upon all, or any,
of the matters so referred to
them, or in the event of both, or
cither of the said commissioners
refusing, or declining, or wilful
ly omitting, to act as such, they
shall make, jointly or separate
ly, a report, or reports, as well
to the government of his Britan
nic majesty as to that of the
United States, stating, in detail,
the points on which they differ,
and the grounds upon which
their respective opinions have
been formed ; or the grounds
upon which they, or either of
them, have so refused, declined,
or omitted to act. And his Bri
tannic majesty, and the govern
ment of the United States, here
by agree to refer the report, or
reports of the said commission
ers, to some friendly sovereign
or state, to be then named for
that purpose, and who shall be
requested to decide on the dif
ferences which may be stated in
the said report, or reports, or
upon the report of one com
missioner, together with the

decide the said questions, accord
ing to such evidence as shall re
spectively be laid before them on
the part of the British govern
ment, and of the United States.
The said commissioners shall meet
at 9 and shall have pow
er to adjourn to such other place,
or places, as they shall think Jit.
The said commissioners, or a ma
jority of them, shall, by a decla
ration under their hands and
seals, determine the boundary
aforesaid from the mouth of the
river St. Croix to the Bay of Fun-
dy, and decide to "which of the
two contracting parties the several
islands aforesaid do respectively
belong, in conformity with the
true intent of the former treaty
of peace. And both parties agree
to consider such decision as final
and conclusive

grounds upon which the other
commissioner shall have so re
fused, declined, or omitted to
act, as the case may be. And if
the commissioner so refusing,
declining, or omitting to act,
shall also wilfully omit to state
the grounds upon which he has
so done in such manner that the
said statement may be referred
to such friendly sovereign or
state, together with the report
of such other commissioner,
then such sovereign, or state,
shall decide, ex parte, upon the
said report alone. And bis Bri
tannic majesty, and the govern
ment of the United States, en
gage to consider the decision of
such friendly sovereign or state,
to be final and conclusive on- all
the matters so referred.
ARTICLE IV.

ARTICLE IV. Whereas, nei
ther that point of the Highlands
lying due north from the source
of the river St. Croix, and de
signated in the former treaty of
peace between the two powers
as the northwest angle of Nova
Scotia, nor the northwestern-
most head of Connecticut river,
has yet been ascertained ; and
whereas that part of the bound
ary line between the dominions
of the two powers, which ex
tends from the source of the ri
ver St. Croix directly north to
the above mentioned northwest
angle of Nova Scotia ; thence,
along the said Highlands, which
divide those rivers thac empty
themselves into the river St.
Lawrence, from those which
fall into the Atlantic ocean, to
the northwesternmost head of
Connecticut river ; thence, down
along the middle of that river to
the forty-fifth degree of north
latitude ; thence, by a line due

31

(1) two

(2) unless otherwise specified
in the present article,

(3) of 17

(4) And, in the event of the
said two commissioners differing,
or both or either of them refus
ing, declining, or wilfully omit
ting to act, such reports, decla
rations, or statements, shall be
made by them, or either of them;
and such reference to a friendly
sovereign or state shall be made,
in all respects, as in the latter
part of the third article is con
tained, and in as full a manner as
if the same was herein repeated.

ARTICLE V .

west, on said latitude, until it
strikes the river Iroquois, or
Cataraguy, has not yet been sur
veyed. It is agreed that, for
these several purposes three (1)
commissioners shall be appoint
ed, sworn, (mutatis mutandis^)
and authorized to act exactly in
the manner directed with re
spect to those mentioned in the
next preceding article.(2) The
said commissioners shall meet
at , and shall have pow
er to adjourn to such other place
or places as they shall think fit.
The said commissioners, or a
majority of them, shall have
power to ascertain and deter
mine the points abovementioned,
in conformity with the provi
sions of the said treaty of peace,
(3) and shall cause the boundary
aforesaid, from the source of the
river St. Croix to the river Iro-
quois, or Cataraguy, to be sur
veyed and marked according to
the said provisions.

The said commissioners, or a
majority of them, shall make a
map of the said boundary, and
annex to it a declaration, under
their hands and seals, certifying
it to be the true map of the said
boundary, and particularizing
the latitude and longitude of the
northwest angle of Nova Scotia,
of the northwesternmost head
of Connecticut river, and ofsuch
other points of the said boundary
as they may deem prpper ; and
both parties agree to consider
such map and declaration as
finally and conclusively fixing
the said boundary. (4)

ARTICLE V. Whereas, by the
former treaty of peace, that por
tion of the boundary of the
United States, from the point
where the forty-fifth degree of

32

(1) doubts

(2) two.

(3) unless otherwise specified
in this present article.

(4) report or

north latitude strikes the river
Iroquois, or Cataraguy, to the
Lake Superior, was declared to
be along the middle of said river
into Lake Ontario, through the
middle of said lake until it strikes
the communication by water be
tween that lake and Lake Erie ;
thence, along the middle of said
communication, into Lake Erie,
through the middle of said lake
until it arrives at the water com
munication into the Lake Huron;
thence, through the middle of
said lake, to the water communi
cation between that lake and
lake Superior : And whereas
doubts have arisen what was the
middle of the said river, lakes,
and water communications, and
whether certain islands, lying
in the same, were within the do
minions of his Britannic majes
ty, or of the United States : In
order, therefore, finally to de
cide these questions ^(\) they shall
be referred to (2) three commis
sioners, to be appointed, sworn,
(mutatis mutandis'} and authoriz
ed to act exactly in the manner
directed with respect to those
mentioned in the next preceding
article. (3) The said commis
sioners shall meet, in the first

instance, at — , and shall

have power to adjourn to such
other place or places as they
shall think fit. The said com
missioners, or a majority of them,
shall, by a (4) declaration, under
their hands and seals, designate
the boundary through the said
river, lakes, and water commu
nications, and decide to which of
the two contracting parties the
several islands lying within the
said rivers, lakes, and water
communications, do respectively
belong, in conformity with the

33

(1) said treaty of 1783.

(2) designation and

(3) And in the event of the
said two commissioners differing,
or both or either of them refus
ing, declining, or wilfully omit-
ing to act, such reports, declara
tions, or statements, shall be
made by them, or either of
them ; and such reference to a
friendly sovereign or state shall
be made, in all respects, as in
the latter. part of the third arti
cle is contained, and in as full a
manner as if the same was herein
repeated.

ARTICLE VI.

(4) two.

(5) of 1783,

(6) of 1783,

(7) report or.

true intent of the (1) former
treaty of peace ; and both par
ties agree to consider such (2)
decision as final and conclu
sive. (3)

ARTICLE VI. It is further
agreed, that the said (4) last
mentioned commissioners, after
they shall have executed the du
ties assigned to them in the pre
ceding article, shall be, and they,
or a majority of them, are hereby
authorized, upon their oaths,
impartially to fix and determine,
according to the true intent of
the said former treaty of peace,
(5) that part of the boundary be
tween the dominions of the two
powers which extends from the
water communication between
Lake Huron and Lake Superior,
to the most northwestern point of
the Lake of the Woods ; to de
cide to which of the two parties
the several islands lying in the
lakes, water communications,
and rivers, forming the said
boundary, do respectively be
long, in conformity with the true
intent of the said former treaty
of peace, (6) and to cause such
parts of the said boundary, as re
quire it,to be surveyed and mark
ed. The said commissioners,
or a majority of them, shall, by a
(^declaration, under their hands

34

(I) point*.

(2) pads oi

(3) designation and.

(4) And in the event of the
said two commissioners differing,
or both or either of them refus
ing, declining, or wilfully omit
ting to act, such, reports, decla
rations, or statement?, shall he
made by them, or either of
them ; and such reference to a
friendly sovereign or state shall
be made in all respects as in the
latter part of the third article is
contained, and in as full a man
ner as if the same was herein
repeated.

ARTICLE VII.

(5) two.

(6) all. (?) reports.

(8) statements.

(9) and.

and seals, designate the bounci
ary aforesaid, state their deci
sion on the (1) questions thus re
ferred to them, and particularize
the latitude and longitude of the
most northwestern point of the
Lake of the Woods, and of such
other (2) points an the said
boundary, as they may deem
proper ; and both parties agree
to consider such (3) decision as
final and conclusive.(4)

(10) contracting.

ARTICLE VII. The several
boards of (5) commissioners men
tioned in the four preceding ar
ticles, shall respectively have
power to appoint a secretary,
and to employ such surveyors,
or other persons, as they shall
judge necessary. Duplicates of
(6) their respective (7) declara
tions (8) and decisions of the
statement (9) of their accounts,
and of the journal of their pro
ceedings, shall be delivered by
them to the agents of his Britan
nic majesty, and to the agents of
the United States, who may be
respectively appointed and au
thorized to manage the business
in behalf of their respective go
vernments. The said commis
sioners shall be respectively
paid in such manner as shall be
agreed between the two (10) par
ties, such agreement being to Ue

35

(1) equally.

(2) contracting.

(3) or of the sovereign or state
so referred to, as in ninny of the
preceding articles contained.

ARTICLE VIII. It is agreed
that a line, drawn due west, from
the Lake of the Woods, along
the 49th parallel of north lati
tude, shall be the line of demar
cation between his Britannic
majesty's territories and those
of the United States, to the west
ward of the said Lake, so far as
the territories of the United
States extend in that quarter;

settled at the time of the ex-
change of the ratifications of this
treaty ; and all other expenses
attending the said commissions,
shall be defrayed (I) jointly by
the two parties, the same being
previously ascertained and allow
ed by the majority of the commis
sioners. And in the case of
death, sickness, resignation, or
necessary absence, the place of
every such commissioner, re
spectively, shall be supplied in
the same manner as such com
missioner was first appointed ;
and the new commissioner shall
take the same oath, or affirma
tion, and do the same duties.

It is further agreed between
the two (2) parties, that, in case
any of the islands mentioned in
any of the preceding articles,
which were in the possession of
one of the parties, prior to the
commencement of the present
war between the two countries,
should, by the decision of any
of the boards of commissioners
aforesaid, (4) fall within the do
minions of the other party, all
grants of lands made previous to
that time, by the party having
had such possession, shall be as
valid, as if such island or islands
had, by such decision or deci
sions, been adjudged to be within
the dominions of the party hav
ing had such possession.

ARTICI.K VIII. It is agreed
that a line, drawn due north or
south, (as the case may be) from
the most northwestern point of the
Lake of the Woods, until it shall
intersect the forty-ninth parallel
of north latitude, and from the
point of such intersection due
west, along and with, the said
parallel, shall be the dividing
line between his majesty* * ter-

36

and the said line shall, to that ex
tent, form the southern boundary
ef his Britannic Majesty's terri
tories, and the northern bounda-
ry of the territories of the United
States, It being always distinctly
understood, that nothing in the
present article shall be construed
to extend to the Northwest
Coast of America; or to territo
ries belonging to, or claimed by,
either party, on the continent of
America, westward of the Stony
Mountain?. [And it is further
agreed, the subjects of his Bri
tannic majesty shall, at all times,
have access from his Britennic
majesty's territories, by land or
inland navigation, into the afore
said territories of the United
States to the river Mississippi,
with their goods, -effects, and
merchandise, and that his Britan
nic majesty's subjects shall have
and enjoy the free navigation of
the said river.]

ARTICLE IX.

Approved.

ritories and those of the United
States, to the westward of the said
Lake, as far as their said respec
tive territories extend in that
quarter; and that the said line
shall, to that extent, form the
• southern boundary of his Britan
nic majesty's said territories, and
the northern boundary of the said
territories of the United States :
Provided, that nothing in the pre
sent article shall be construed to
extend to the Northwest Coast of
America, or to the territories be
longing to, or claimed by, either
party, on the continent of America*
to the westward of the Stony
Mountains.

ARTICLE IX. The United
States of America engage to put
an end, immediately after the
ratification of the present treaty,
to hostilities with all the tribes
or nations of Indians with whom
they may be at war, at the time
of such ratification, and forth
with to restore to such tribes or
nations, respectively, all the
possessions, rights, and privi
lege5?, which they may have en
joyed, or been entitled to, in
1811, previous to such hostili*
ties : Provided always, that such
tribes or nations shall agree to
desist from all hostilities against
the United States of America,
their citizens, and subjects, upon
the ratification of the present
treaty being notified to such
tribes or nations, and shall so
desist accordingly. And his Bri

37

ARTICLE X.
Inadmissible.

ARTICLE XI.
Inadmissible,

tannic majesty engages, on hi*
part, to put an end, immediately
after the ratification of the pre
sent treaty, to hostilities with all
the tribes or nations of Indians
with whom he may be at war, at
the time of such ratification, and
forthwith to restore to such
tribes or nations, respectively,
all the possessions, rights, and
privileges, which they may have
enjoyed or been entitled to in
1811, previous to such hostili
ties : Provided always, that such
tribes or nations shall agree to
desist from all hostilities against
his Britannic majesty and his
subjects, upon the ratification of
the present treaty being notified
to such tribes or nations, and
shall so desist accordingly,

ARTICLE X. His Britannic
majesty and the United States
shall, by all the means in their
power, restrain the Indians living
within their respective domin
ions from committing hostili
ties against the territory, citi
zens, or subjects, of the other
party. And both powers also
agree and mutually pledge them
selves, if at any time war should
unhappily break out between
them, not to employ any Indians,
nor to admit of their aid and co
operation in the prosecution of
the war against the other party.

ARTICLE XI. Each party shall
effectually exclude from its na
val and commercial service, all
seamen, seafaring, or other per
sons, subjects or citizens of the
other party, not naturalized by
the respective governments of

the two parties before the

day of .

Seamen, or other persons,
subjects of either party, who shall
desert from public or private

38

ships or vessels, shall, when
found within the jurisdiction of
the other party, be surrendered,
provided they be demanded with
in from the time of their

desertion.

No person whatever shall,
upon the high seas, and without
the jurisdiction of either party,
be demanded, or taken out of any
ship or vessel belonging to sub*
jects or citizens of any of the
parties, by the public or private
armed ships or vessels belonging
to, or in the service of, the other,
unless such person be, at the
time, in the actual employment
of an enemy of such other party.
This article shall continue in

force for the term of years.

Nothing in this article contained
shall be construed thereafter to
affect or impair the rights of ei
ther party.

ARTICLE XH, ARTICLE XII. If either of the

Inadmissible. contracting parties shall hereaf

ter be engaged in a war against
any third power, to which war
the other of the parties shall re
main neutral, it is agreed that
every vessel of the neutral par
ty sailing for a port or place be
longing to the enemy of the
belligerent, withoutknowing that
the same is besieged, blockaded,
or invested, may be turned away
from such port or place, but
shall not be detained, nor her
cargo, if not contraband, be con
fiscated, unless, after such no
tice, she shall again attempt te
enter ; but she shall be permitted
to go to any other port or place
she may think proper. Nor
shall any vessel or goods of either
party, that may have entered
into such port or place before
the same was besieged, block
aded, or invested;, by the other.

39

and be found therein after the
reduction or surrender of such
place, be liable to confiscation,
but shall be restored to the pro
prietors thereof : and, in order
to determine what characterizes
a blockaded port, that denomina
tion is given only to a port where
there is, by the disposition of the
power which attacks it with
ships stationary or sufficiently
near, an evident danger in en*

that

indemnity shall be made by his
Britannic majesty to the citizens
of the United States, for all losses
and damages sustained by them.
during the late war between
Great Britain and France, and pri
or to the commencement of the
present war, by reason of irregu
lar or illegal captures, seizures,
or condemnations of vessels and
other property, under colour of
.authority, contrary to the known
and established rules of the law
of nations. And it is also agreed,
that indemnity shall be made, by
each of the contracting parties,
to the subjects or citizens of the
other party, for all losses and
damage sustained subsequent to
the commencement of the pre
sent war, by reason of the sei
zure or condemnation of the
vessels or cargoes, belonging to
the subjects or citizens of the
other party, which, in the ordi
nary course of commerce, hap
pened, at the commencement of
hostilities, to be in the ports of
the other party ; and by reason
of the destruction of unfortified
towns, and the pillage or destruc
tion of private property, and the
enticement and carrying away of
negroes, contrary to the known
and established rules and usages

40

of war, between civilized ira
tions.

It is agreed that, for the pur
pose of determining the indem
nities due by each contracting
party, in conformity with the
provisions of this article, com
missioners shall be appointed,
in the following manner, viz :
one commissioner shall be named
by his Britannic majesty, and one
by the President of the United
States, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate there
of; and the said two commission
ers shall agree in the choice of
a third ; or, if they cannot agree,
they shall each propose one
person, and of the two names so
proposed, one shall be taken by
lot, in the presence of the two
original commissioners, and the
three commissioners, thus ap
pointed, shall be sworn and au
thorized and empowered, impar
tially, to examine into all such
claims and complaints, and to
determine the indemnities which
may be justly due for the same.
The said commissioners shall
meet at , and shall have pow
er to adjourn to such other place
or places as they shall think fit ;
they shall also have power to ap
point a secretary, swear and ex-
amine witnesses, and have all as
sistance and facilities necessary
to effect the object of their ap.
pointment.

The award of the said com
missioners, or amajorityofthem,
shall, in all cases, be final and
conclusive, both as to the justice
of the claim and as to the amount
of the sum to be paid to the
claimant and claimants ; and his
Britannic majesty and the Unit
ed States agree and undertake
to cause the sums so awarded to

ARTICLE XIV
Inadmissible.

be due by them, respectively, to
be paid in specie, to such claim
ant and claimants, without de
duction, and at such place or
places, time or times, as shall be
awarded by the commissioners.
ARTICLE XIV. It is also agreed,
that no person or persons, re
siding within the dominions of
one of the parties, who may have
taken part with the other party
in the war between Great Britain
and the United States, shall, on
that account, be prosecuted, mo
lested, or annoyed, either in his
person or property ; and that all
such persons disposed to remove
into the dominions of the other
party, shall be allowed the term

of months, freely to sell

their property, of every nature
and description whatsoever, ami
to remove accordingly.

ARTICLE XV. This treaty,
when the same shall have been
ratified on both sides, and the
respective ratifications mutually
exchanged, shall be binding on
both parties, and the ratifica
tions shall be exchanged at (1)

in the space of months

from this day, or sooner if pos
sible. (2)

In faith whereof, we, the re*
spective plenipotentiaries, have
signed this treaty, and have
thereunto affixed our seals.

Done at Ghent, the day

of one thousand eight hun
dred and fourteen.

True copy of the project submitted by the American to the Bri
tish ministers, and also of the marginal changes, propositions, and
remarks, made by the latter on returning their answer to the Ame
rican ministers' note, communicating said project of a treaty.

C. HUGHES, Jr.
Secretary American Mission extraordinary.

ARTICLE XV.

(1) Washington, with all practi
cable despatch.

(2) practicable

42

Draft of article to be inserted immediately after article %d of the
American project*

All prisoners of war taken on either side, as well by land as by
sen, shall be restored as soon as practicable, alter the ratifications
of this treaty shall have been exchanged, on their paying the debts
which they may have contracted during their captivity. The two
contracting parties respectively engage to discharge, in specie, the
advances which may have been made by the other, for the sqste*
toance and maintenance of such prisoners.

American A"o. 7, in reply to British No. 7.

GHENT, 3oth Nov. 1814.

The undersigned have had the honour to receive the note of
the British plenipotentiaries of the 26th instant, together with their
marginal alterations and suggestions, on the several articles of the
project of a treaty of peace, proposed by the undersigned

The undersigned consent that the day of the exchange of ratifi
cations be substituted to that of the signature of the treaty, as the
time for the cessation of hostilities, and for regulating the periods
after which prizes at sea shall be restored : it being understood
that measures shall be adopted for a speedy exchange of ratifica
tions, and that the periods in the second article shall be fixed in a
manner corresponding with this alteration.

The undersigned will also agree to the new article respecting
prisoners, and to the mode of reference proposed by the British
plenipotentiaries in the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh arti
cles, instead of that which had been proposed by the undersigned.
But, in order to prevent delay, they will suggest that a time be
fixed, within which the commissioners shall make their decisions
and reports.

The undersigned will decline insisting upon the 10th, 12th, and
14th articles, and upon so much of the 13th article as relates to
indemnities for losses and damages sustained subsequent to the
commencement of the present war. They wish to discuss the cases
of vessels and property, in port when war was declared or known ;
and have the honour to enclose a copy of the provision made in
th.it respect by the United States. They will also waive the resi
due of that (the 13th) article, and the llth article, it being under
stood that the rights of both powers on the subject of seamen, and
tke claims of the citizens and subjects of the two contracting par
ties, to indemnities for losses and damages sustained prior to the
commencement of the war, shall not be affected, or impaired, by
the omission in the treaty of any specific provision with respect to
those two subjects.

: Proposed by the British ministers.

43

In forbearing to insist upon the discussion of subjects 3eep]jr
involving interests important to their country, and upon which the
undersigned view the proposals offered by them for consideration
as founded on principles the most moderate and conciliatory, they
give the strongest evidence of the anxious wish of their government
that the negotiation should be brought to a happy issue.

Sincerely participating in the desire expressed by the British
plenipotentiaries, of endeavouring to reconcile.the pretensions oi"
both governments on the few subjects remaining for discussion, the
undersigned have also assented to most of the alterations, proposed
by the British plenipotentiaries, to those parts of the project which
they have not entirely rejected. 0^7* [To some of these alterations
the undersigned are compelled by their duty to object. They have
already stated, and now repeat, that, whilst requiring of Great
Britain no sacrifice whatever, the government of the United States
has not authorized the undersigned to agree to any stipulation in
volving any cession of the territory, or the dereliction of any of the
essential rights of the people of the United States.

The objections of the undersigned are to one of the alterations
suggested by the British plenipotentiaries in the first article ; to
some parts of the preamble of the third article ; and to the eighth
article ;] and they have also some other verbal alterations to sug
gest. They request a conference, at such time and place as may
suit the British plenipotentiaries, for the purpose of discussing
those points, and of agreeing on the places and times left in bla,nk
in several of the articles.

The undersigned renew to the British plenipotentiaries the as
surance of their high eonsideration.

JOHN QU1NCY ADAMS,
J. A. BAYARD,
HENRY CLAY,
JONATHAN RUSSELL,
ALBERT GALLAT1N.
To the Plenipotentiaries of his Britannic

majesty, &LC. &c. &c.

Extract of a law of the United Slates passed July 6/A, 1812.

** Sec. 6. And be it further enacted, That the President of the
United States be, and he is hereby, authorized, to give, at any
time, within six months after the passage of this act, passports for
the safe transportation of any ship or other property belonging to
British subjects, and which is now within the limits of the United
>States."

British Note No. 8.

The undersigned have the honour to acknowledge the receipt
of the note addressed to them by the American plenipotentiaries,

44

and in compliance with their request for a conference, shall be
happy to receive them at the Chartreux to-morrow at 12 o'clock.

The undersigned request the American plenipotentiaries to ac
cept the assurance of their high consideration.

GAMB1ER,

HENRY GOULBURN,
WILLIAM ADAMS.
, ]\Toy. 3oih, 1814.

Protocol of a conference,, held the 1st December, 1814, at Ghent.

At a conference held this day, the American plenipotentiaries
proposed the following alterations in their project, as amended by
the British plenipotentiaries.

1. In article 1st, strike out the alteration consisting of the words
" belonging to, and taken by," and preserve the original reading,
viz. " taken by either party from the other."

This alteration was objected to by the British plenipotentiaries,
and after some discussion, reserved by them for the consideration
of their government.

2. Transpose alteration consisting of the words " originally cap
tured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain therein
upon the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty," after the
words " public property."

Agreed to by the British plenipotentiaries.

3. Article 2d. The term to be fifteen days in the Channel, in
the North Seas, in all parts of the Atlantic ocean to the equinoctial
line or equator, and in all parts of the Mediterranean. Two months
in the Atlantic ocean, to the latitude of the Cape of Good Hope,
and three months in all other parts of the world.

In lieu of this alteration, the British plenipotentiaries proposed
(he following, viz. " That all vessels and effects which may be taken
after the space of twelve days from the period of the exchange of
the said ratifications, upon all parts of the coasts of North America,
from the latitude of 23 deg. north, to the latitude of 47 deg. north
and as far eastward in the Atlantic ocean as the 65 deg. of west
longitude from the meridian of Greenwich, shall be restored on
each side. That the term shall be thirty days in all other parts of
the Atlantic ocean, as far eastward as the entrance of the British
Channel, and southward as far as the equinoctial line or equator,
and the same time for the Gulf of Mexico and all parts of the West
Indies. Forty days for the British Channel and the North Seas.
The same time for all parts of the Mediterranean, and one hun
dred and fifty days for all other parts of the world, without excep
tion." Which was reserved by the American plenipotentiaries
for consideration.

4. Article 3d. After the words " all islands within twenty leagues

43

of," insert " any part of" and substitute " points" for " point," af
ter the words "to be drawn due east from the."
Agreed to by the British plenipotenitaries.

5. Article 3d. Strike out the words " whereas claims have been
made by the government of the United States to certain islands in
the Bay of Fundy," and insert, " whereas the severals islands in
the Bay of Passamaquoddy, which is part of the Bay of Fundy,
and the island of Grand Menan, in the said Bay of Fundy, are
claimed by the United States, as being comprehended within the
aforesaid boundaries."

Agreed to by the British plenipotentiaries.

6. Article 7th. In the alteration, consisting of the words "or of
the sovereign or state so referred to as in many of the preceding
articles contained," substitute " any" to u many."

Not insisted on ; the British plenipotentiaries consenting to sub
stitute the words " the foar next" for the marginal words " many
ofthe." f

7. Articles 3, 4, 5, and 6. Provide that the decisions of the
commissioners shall be made within a limited time.

Objected to by the British plenipotentiaries.

8. Article 8th. Substitute, after the words " to the westward of
the said lake so far as," the words " their said respective territo
ries," instead ofthe words " the territories ofthe United States."

Agreed to by the British plenipotentiaries.

Ctirp. Article 8th. Strike out from the words " and it is fur
ther agreed," to the end.

Reserved by the British plenipotentiaries for the consideration
>f their government.

10. The American plenipotentiaries also proposed the following
amendment to Article 8th, viz. "The inhabitants of the United
States shall continue to enjoy the liberty to take, dry, and cure
fish, in places within the exclusive jurisdiction of Great Britain, as
secured by the former treaty of peace ; and the navigation of the
river Mississippi, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States, shall remain free and open to the subjects of Great Britain,
in the manner secured by the said treaty ; and it is further agreed,
that the subjects of his Britannic majesty shall at all times have
access, from such place as may be selected for that purpose, in his
Britannic majesty's aforesaid territories, west, and within three
hundred miles of the Lake of the Woods, in the aforesaid territo
ries ofthe United States, to the river Mississippi, in order to enjoy
the benefit ofthe navigation of that river, with their goods, effect*,
and merchandise, whose importation into the said States shall not
be entirely prohibited, on the payment ofthe same duties as would
be payable on the importation of the same into the Atlantic ports
ofthe said States, and on conforming with the usual custom-house
regulations/'

This amendment was left with the British plenipotentiaries for
consideration.

46

The American plenipotentiaries also intimated their willingness
to omit Article 8th altogether, if that course should appear more
advisable to the British plenipotentiaries.]

The American plenipotentiaries further proposed, in conformity
with their note of November 30th, indemnifications for ships de
tained in British ports on the breaking out of the war, and after
wards condemned ; which was resisted by the British plenipoten
tiaries.

After much discussion on this point, the conference was ad
journed.

Protocol of Conference on December 10th, 1 8 1 4.— Ghent,

The Protocol of the preceding conference, held on the Isi.
instant, was settled.

The British plenipotentiaries stated that their government could
not consent to omit the words in article 1st, " belonging to either
party and taken by the other," unless some modification should be
introduced, either by excepting from mutual restitution all thosd
territories which are made by any articles of the treaty the subject
of reference to commissioners, or by excepting the Passamaquoddy
Islands alone.

Received by the American plenipotentiaries for consideration.

03= [The British plenipotentiaries then stated, that with respect
to the 8th article, their government offered, in lieu of the American
proposals, to retain the amended article as far as the words " Stony
Mountains," and to insert the following stipulation :

** His Britannic majesty agrees to enter into negotiation with the
United States of America respecting the terms, conditions, and re
gulations, under which the inhabitants of the said United States
shall have the liberty of taking fish on certain parts of the coast of
Newfoundland, and other his Britannic majesty's dominions in North
America, and of drying and curing fish in the unsettled bays, har
bours, and creeks, of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labrador,
as stipulated in the latter part of the 3d article of the treaty of 1783,
in consideration of a fair equivalent, to be agreed upon between his
majesty and the said United States, and granted by the said United
States for such liberty aforesaid.

" The United States of America agree to enter into negotiation
with his Britannic majesty respecting the terms, conditions, and re
gulations, under which the navigation of the river Mississippi, from
its source to the ocean, as stipulated in the 8th article of the treaty
of 1783, shall remain free and open to the subjects of Great Bri
tain, in consideration of a fair equivalent, to be agreed upon be
tween his majesty and the United States, and granted by his ma
jesty."]

Received by the American plenipoliaries for consideration.

In the 7th article the British plenipotentiaries proposed, after
the words " all grants of land made previous to," to omit the words

47

" to that time," and insert " previous to the commencement of the
war ;" so that the line would read " all grants of land made pre
vious to the commencement of the war."

Agreed to.

The British plenipotentiaries proposed the insertion of the fol
lowing article relative to the slave trade.

" Whereas the traffic in slaves is irreconcileable with the prin
ciples of humanity and justice, and whereas both his majesty and
the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote
its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed that both the contracting
parties shall exert every means in their power to accomplish so
desirable an object."

Received for consideration.

The British plenipotentiaries proposed the following provision :

" That the citizens or subjects of each of the contracting parties
may reciprocally sue in the courts of the other, and shall meet
with no impediment to the recovery of all such estates, rights, pro
perties, or securities, as may be due to them by the laws of the
country in whose courts they shall sue."

Received for consideration.

The British plenipotentiaries proposed in the preamble to the
project of the treaty to omit the words " Admiral of the White
Squadron," and insert ** late Admiral of the White, now Admiral
of the Red," in lieu of them.

Agreed to.

The American plenipotentiaries stated that possibly doubts
might arise as to the geographical accuracy of the words at the be
ginning of the 8th article — " a line drawn due west from the Lake
of the Woods along the 49th parallel of north latitude."

It was agreed that an alteration should be made to guard against
such possible inaccuracy.

The American plenipotentiaries proposed the following altera
tion in the draft delivered to them by the British plenipotentiaries,
relative to the manner of filling up the blanks in article 2d : " Ex
tend the term of 12 days to 50 degrees north latitude, and to the
oGth west longitude ; include the British and Irish channels in the
term of 30 days ; include the Baltic in the term of 40 days ; instead
of term of 150 days, insert 60 days for the Atlantic, as far as the lati
tude of the Cape of Good Hope ; 90 days for every other part of the
world south of the equator; 120 days for all other parts oi the world."

The conference then ended.

Protocol of Conference on December 1 2th, 1814.

The Protocol of the preceding conference, held on the 10th in
stant, was settled.

(^[After much discussion relative to the 1st and 8th articles, the
conference ended by the American plenipotentiaries undertaking
to return an answer, in writing, to the propositions brought forward
by the British plenipotentiaries, at the last conference.]

48

American iVbte, No. 8, written after the Conference of \1th of De
cember, 1814.

Ghent, December 14th, 1814.

The undersigned, having considered the propositions offered, iu
the conference of the 10th instant, by the British plenipotentiaries,
on the few subjects which remain to be adjusted, now have the ho
nour of making the communication which they promised.

The first of them relates to the mutual restoration of the territo
ry taken by either party from the other, during the war. In ad
mitting this principle, which the undersigned had repeatedly de
clared to be the only one upon which they were authorized to treat,
the British plenipotentiaries had, at first, proposed an alteration in,
the article offered by the undersigned, limiting the stipulation of re
storing territory taken during the war, to territory belonging to the
party from which it was taken. The objection of the undersigned
to this alteration was, that a part of the territory thus taken being
claimed by both parties, and made a subject of conference by the
treaty, the alteration would leave it in the power of one party to
judge whether any portion of territory taken by him during the war,
did or did not belong to the other party, laying thereby, in the very
instrument of pacification, the foundation of an immediate misun
derstanding, the moment that instrument should be carried into ex
ecution.

The British plenipotentiaries have now proposed to omit the
words originally offered by them, provided, that the Passamnquod-
dy Islands should alone be excepted from the mutual restitutioirof
territory.

The consent of the undersigned to this solitary exception, if
founded on the alleged right of Great Britain to those islands, might
be construed as an implied admission of a better title on her part,
than on that of the United States, and would necessarily affect their
claim. The only ground for the exception consists in the allega
tion of the British plenipotentiaries that Great Britain had, during
some period subsequent to the treaty of peace of 1783, exercised
jurisdiction over those islands, and that the United States had sub
sequently occupied them, contrary to the remonstrances of the
British government, and before the question of title had been ad
justed.

Under these considerations, the undersigned, unwilling to pre
vent the conclusion of the treaty of peace, will take upon them
selves the responsibility of agreeing to the exception proposed,
with a provision, that the claim of the United States shall not,
thereby, be in any manner affected. The undersigned have ac
cordingly prepared a clause to that effect, and which provides, also,
that the temporary possession may not be converted into perma
nent occupancy. They had agreed to the alteration proposed by
the British plenipotentiaries in the mode of reference of the several
boundaries and territory in dispute, under the expectation that th-e

49

proposed exception to a general restoration would not be insisted
on, and they will add, that the objection to the temporary posses
sion by Great Britain of the Passamaquoddy Islands, would be con
siderably lessened by adopting a mode of reference which would
insure a speedy and certain decision.

[To the stipulation now proposed by the British plenipotentia
ries as a substitute for the last paragraph of the 8th article, the un-
dersigned cannot accede.

The proposition made, respecting the navigation of the Missis
sippi, in the alteration first proposed by the British plenipotentia
ries to that article, was unexpected. In their note of the 31st of
October, they had stated, that they had brought forward in their
note of the 21st of the same month, all the propositions which they
had to offer ; and that subject was not mentioned either in this last
mentioned note, or in the first conference to which it referred. In
order to obviate any difficulty arising from a presumed connectiou
between that subject and that of the boundary proposed by the 8th
article, the undersigned expressed their willingness to omit the ar
ticle altogether. For the purpose of meeting what they believed
to be the wishes of the British government, they proposed the in
sertion of an article which should recognise the right of Great Bri
tain to the navigation of that river, and that of the United States to
a liberty in certain fisheries, which the British government consi
dered as abrogated byjthe war. To such an article, which they
viewed as merely declaratory, the undersigned had no objection,
und have offered to accede. They do not, however, want any
new article on either of those subjects : they have offered to be
silent with regard to both. To the stipulation now proposed, or to
uny other, abandoning, or implying the abandonment of, any right
in the fisheries claimed by the United States, they cannot subscribe.
As a stipulation merely, that the parties will hereafter negotiate
concerning the subjects in question, it appears also unnecessary.
Yet, to an engagement couched in general terms, so as to embrace
all the subjects of difference not yet adjusted, or so expressed as to
•mply in no manner whatever an abandonment of any right claimed
by the United States, the undersigned are ready to agree.]

Since neither of the two additional articles proposed by the Bri
tish plenipotentiaries was included amongst, or is connected with,
fhe subjects previously brought forward by them, it is presumed
they are offered only for consideration, as embracing objects of
common and equal interest to both parties. The undersigned will
accede to the substance of the article to promote the abolition of
the slave trade. They cannot admit the other article, which to
them, appears unnecessary. The courts of the United States will,
without it, be equally open to the claims of British subjects ; and
they rely that, without it, the British courts will be equally open to
tjie dainiF of the citizens of the United States.

50

The undersigned renew to the British plenipotentiaries the as
surance of their high consideration.

JOHN qUINCY ADAMS,
JAMES A. BAYARD,
HENRY CLAY,
JONATHAN RUSSELL,
ALBERT GALLATIN.

To the Plenipotentiaries of his Britannic

majesty, &c. &c. &c.

Such of the islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy as are claimed
by both parties, shall remain in the possession of the party in whose
occupation they may be at the time of the exchange of the ratifica
tions of this treaty, until the decision respecting the title to the said
islands shall have been made* in conformity with the 4th article of
this treaty. But if such decision shall not have taken place within

years after the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty,

such islands shall be restored to, and until such decision may take
place, shall be retained by, the party who had possession of the
same at the commencement of the war. No disposition made by
this treaty of the intermediate possession of the islands and territo
ries, claimed by both parties, shall, in any manner whatever, be
construed to affect the right of either.

British Note jVo. 10, in answer to American JVo. 8.

The undersigned have had the honour to receive the note of the
American plenipotentiaries, dated on the 14th instant, stating their
consent to except the Passamaquoddy Islands from the mutual re
stitution of territory captured during the war, provided the claim of
the United States shall not be in any manner affected thereby. To
the article proposed by the American plenipotentiaries, so far as it
is adapted to this object, the undersigned are willing to agree ; but
they object, as before intimated by them, to that part of the pro
posed article which would make it imperative on the commission
ers to decide the question within any fixed time, trusting that on
this head the American plenipotentiaries will be satisfied with their
declaration, that it is the intention of his majesty's government to do
ail that belongs to them to obtain a decision without loss of time.
The project of the article subjoined, will be found to omit the clause
intended to enforce a decision within some limited time, and to con
tain a slight alteration in the third clause, by substituting in the
place of the words " intermediate possession," the words, " as to
such possession."

0^=[So far as regards the substitution proposed by the undersign
ed, for the last clause of the 8th article, as it was offered solely with
the hope of attaining the object of the amendment tendered by the
American plenipotentiaries at the conference of the 1st instant, no

51

difficulty will be made in withdrawing it. The undersigned, re
ferring to the declaration made by them at the conference of the
8th of August, that the privileges of fishing within the limits of tl?e
British sovereignty, and of using the British territories for purposes
connected with the fisheries, were what Great Britain did not in
tend to grant without equivalent, are not desirous of introducing
any article upon the subject. With the view of removing what
they consider as the only objection to the immediate conclusion of
the treaty, the undersigned agree to adopt the proposal made by
the American plenipotentiaries, made at the conference of the 1st
instant, and repeated in their last note, of omitting the 8th article
altogether.]

The undersigned avail themselves of this opportunity to renew
to the plenipotentiaries of the United States, the assurance of their
hHi consideration.

GAMBIER,

HENRY GOULDBURN,
WILLIAM ADAMS.
Ghent, December 22, 1814.

Accompanying British Note A"o. 1 0.

Such of the islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy as are claimed
bv both parties, shall remain in the possession of the party in whose
occupation they maybe at the time of the exchange of the ratifica
tions of this treaty, until the decision respecting the title to the

said islands shall have been made in conformity with the •

article of this treaty.

No disposition made by this treaty, as to such possession of the
islands and territories claimed by both parties, shall, in any manner
whatever, be construed to affect the right of either.

Protocol of Conference.

Ghent, 23d December, 18l4.

At a conference held this day, the protocol of the preceding con
ference was settled.

The American plenipotentiaries intimated their readiness to ac
cede to the propositions contained in the note of the British pleni
potentiaries, of the 22d instant.

The following alterations were then agreed to :

In the first article, after the word " cease," omit the words "af
ter the exchange of the ratifications," and insert " as soon as thr*
treaty shall have been ratified by both parties." Substitute the
word " whatsoever" for the words v' without exception." Restore
the words *' taken by either party from the other," in the room ot"
the words " belonging to either party and taken by." After the
words " signing of this treaty," insert the words " excepting onl\
(he island? hereinafter mentioned." After the words " reppeftivelv

.52

belong,'* insert, verbatim, the words of the amendment inclosed in
the note of the British plenipotentiaries of the 22d instant, filling up
the blank with the word " fourth. **

2d article. The second article was altered so as to read as fol
lows :

ARTICLE II. Immediately after the ratification of this treaty by
both parties, as hereinafter mentioned, orders shall be sent to the
armies, squadrons, officers, subjects, and citizens, of the two pow
ers, to cease from all hostilities; and to prevent all causes of com
plaint, which might arise on account of the prizes which may be
laken at sea after the said ratifications of this treaty, it is recipro
cally agreed, that all vessels and effects which may be taken after
the space of twelve days from the said ratifications, upon all parts
of the coast of North America, from the latitude of twenty-three
degrees north to the latitude of fifty degrees north, and as far east
ward in the Atlantic ocean as the thirty-sixth degree of west longi
tude from the meridian of Greenwich, shall be restored on each
side ; that the time shall be thirty days in all other parts of the
Atlantic ocean north of the equinoctial line or equator ; and the
same time for the British and Irish Channels, for the Gulf of Mexico,
and all parts of the West Indies ; forty days for the North Seas,
for the Baltic, and for all other parts of the Mediterranean ; sixty
days for the Atlantic ocean, south of the equator, as far as the
latitude of the Cape of Good Hope ; ninety days for every other
part of the world south of the equator, and one hundred and twenty
days for all other parts of the world without exception.

It was agreed that the article respecting prisoners of war should
be the third article, and that the words " as hereinafter mention
ed," should be substituted for the words, " shall have been ex»
changed."

The articles numbered in the original project 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, to be
respectively numbered 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.

In the 4th article, it was agreed that the blank should be filled
up with the words " St. Andrews, in the province of New-Bruns
wick."

In the 5th article, it was agreed that the blank should be filled
up with the words " St. Andrews, in the province of New-Bruns
wick."

Near the end of the 5th article, substitute the word " fourth"
for » third."

In the 6th article, it was agreed to fill up the blank with the
words " Albany, in the State of New- York," and to substitute the
word " fourth" for " third," in the concluding paragraph.

In the 7th article, substitute the word " fourth" for " third," in
the last paragraph.

It was agreed that the article respecting the African slave trade
should be the I Oth article, and that the words " use their best en
deavours," should be substituted for the words '* exert every
means in their power."

53

The 15th article of the project to be numbered 1 1 ; it was
agreed to insert in it, after the words " on both sides," the words
*' without alteration by either of" the contracting parties."

Omit the words " with all practicable despatch." Fill up the
blank with the word " four." Insert after the word " done," the
words "• in triplicate." The British plenipotentiaries urged the
article formerly proposed by them, as to suits of law to be prose
cuted by the citizens or subjects of one nation in the courts of
justice of the* other. Resisted by the American plenipotentia
ries.

The conference was adjourned to the 24th inst. for the purpose
of signing the treaty.

The American Plenipotentiaries to the Secretary of State.

GHENT, 25th December, 1814.

SIR : We have the honour of transmitting herewith, one of the
three copies of the treaty of peace between Great Britain and the
United States, signed last evening by the plenipotentiaries of his
Britannic majesty and by us.

The papers, of which copies are likewise now forwarded, will
exhibit to you so fully the progress of the negotiation since the
departure of the Chauncey, that few additional remarks from us
will be nee<53sary. It may be proper for us, however, to state,
that in the interval between the time when our first project of a
treaty Was sent to the British plenipotentiaries, and that when they
communicated to us the answer to it, the despatches which we
had sent by Mr. Dallas, and the instructions to us, which had been
published in the United States, were republished in England.

In declining to insist on the articles respecting impressment and
indemnities, we made a formal declaration, that the rights of both
parties, on the subject of seamen and the claims to indemnities for
losses and damages sustained prior to the commencement of the
war, should not be affected or impaired by the omission, in the
treaty, of a specific provision on these two subjects.

From the time when the project of the treaty, presented by us,
was returned, with the proposed alterations, it was apparent, that
unless new pretension- on the part of Great Britain should be ad
vanced, the only important diilerences remaining to be discussed,
were those relating to the mutual restoration of territory, taken
during the war ; to the navigation of the Mississippi by British
subjects, and to the right of the people of the United States to the
fisheries within the British jurisdiction. Instead of a general res
titution of captured territory, which we had proposed, the British
government, at first, wished to confine it to the territory taken by
either party belonging to the other. On our objecting, that this
would make each party the judge, whether territory taken did or
did not belong to the other, and thereby occasion new disputes,

54

acknowledged it to be their object, that each party should,
until a decision had taken place with respect to the title, retail
possession of all the territory claimed by both parties, which might
have been taken by such party during the war. They proposed,
however, to limit the exception from mutual restitution, to the is
lands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy. As it had been, on both sides,
admitted, that the title to these islands was disputed, and as the
method of settling amicably those disputes was provided for in the
treaty, we had not expected that the British government would ad
here to the demand of retaining the temporary possession of those
islands. We insisted, therefore, on their being included in the
general restoration, until we had reason to believe that our further
perseverance would have hazarded the conclusion of the peace
itself; we finally consented, as an alternative preferable to the
continuance of the war, to this exception, upon condition that it
should not be understood as impairing, in any manner, the right of
the United States to these islands. We also urged for a stipulation,
requiring an ultimate decision upon the title within a limited time ?
but to this we also found opposed an insuperable objection, and w«
were finally induced to accept, in its stead, a declaration of the
British plenipotentiaries that no unnecessary delay of the decision
should be interposed on the part of Great Britain.

At the first conference on the 8th of August, the British pleni
potentiaries had notified to us, that the British government did not
intend, henceforth, to allow to the people of the United States,
without an equivalent, the liberties to fish, and to dry and cure
fish, within the exclusive British jurisdiction, stipulated in their
favour, by the latter part of the third article of the treaty of peace
of 1783. And, in their note of the 19th of August, the British
plenipotentiaries had demanded a new stipulation to secure to
British subjects the right of navigating the Mississippi : a demand,
which, unless warranted by another article of that same treaty of
1783, we could not perceive that Great Britain had any colourable
pretence for making. Our instructions had forbidden us to suffer
our right to the fisheries to be brought into discussion, and had not
authorized us to make any distinction in' the several provisions of
the third article of the treaty of 1783, or between that article and
any other of the same treaty. We had no equivalent to offer for a
new recognition of our right to any part of the fisheries, and we
had no power to grant any equivalent which might be asked for it
by the British government. We contended that the whole treaty
of 1783, must be considered as one entire and permanent compact,
not liable, like ordinary treaties, to be abrogated by a subsequent
war between the parties to it ; as an instrument recognising the
rights and liberties enjoyed by the people of the United States as
an independent nation, and containing the terms and conditions ou
which the two parts of one empire had mutually agreed thence
forth to constitute two distinct and separate nations. In consent-*
ing, by that treaty, that a part of the North American continent

55

s-hould remain subject to the British jurisdiction, the people of the
United States had reserved to themselves the liberty, which they
had ever before enjoyed, of fishing upon that part of the coasts,
and of drying and curing fish upon the shores ; and this reserva
tion had been agreed to by the other contracting party. We saw
not why this liberty, then no new grant, but a mere recognition of
a prior right, always enjoyed, should be forfeited by a war, any
more than any other of the rights of our national independence,
or why we should need a new stipulation for its enjoyment more
Jhan we needed a new article to declare that the king of Great
Britain treated with us as free, sovereign, and independent states.
We stated this principle, in general terms, to the British plenipo
tentiaries, in the note which we sent to them with our project of
Ihe treaty ; and we alleged it as the ground upon which no new
stipulation was deemed by our government necessary to secure to
the people of the United States all the rights and liberties, stipu
lated in their favour, by the treaty of 1783. No reply to that part
of our note was given by the British plenipotentiaries ; but, in re
turning our project of a treaty, they added a clause to one of the
articles, stipulating a right for British subjects to navigate the Mis
sissippi. Without ad verting to the ground of prior and immemorial
usage, if the principle were just that the treaty of 1783, from its
peculiar character, remained in force in all its parts, notwithstand
ing the war, no new stipulation was necessary to secure to the sub
jects of Great Britain the right of navigating the Mississippi, as far
as t that right was secured by the treaty of 1783 ; as, on the other
hand, no stipulation was necessary to secure to the people of the
United States the liberty to fish, and to dry and cure fish, within the
exclusive jurisdiction of Great Britain. If they asked the naviga
tion of the Mississippi as a new claim, they could not expect we
should grant it without an equivalent : if they asked it because it
had been granted in 1783, they must recognise the claim of the
people of the United States to the liberty to fish and to dry and cure
fish, in question. To place both points beyond all future contro
versy, a majority of us determined to ofler to admit an article con
firming both rights : or, we offered at the same time, to be silent
in the treaty upon both, and to leave out altogether the article de
fining the boundary from the Lake of the Woods westward. They
finally agreed to this last proposal, but not until they had proposed
an article stipulating for a future negotiation for an equivalent to be
given by Great Britain for the navigation of the Mississippi, and by
the United States for the liberty as to the fisheries within the Bri
tish jurisdiction. This article was unnecessary, with respect to
its professed object, since both governments had it in their power,
without it, to negotiate upon these subjects if they pleased. We
rejected it, although its adoption would have secured the boun
dary of the 49th degree of latitude west of the Lake of the Woods,
it would have been a formal abandonment, on our part, of

our claim to the liberty as to the fisheries, recognised by the trea
ty of 1783.

You will perceive by the correspondence that the 9th article
was offered us as a sine qua non and an ultimatum. We accepted
it, not without much hesitation, as the only alternative to a rup
ture of the negotiation, and with a perfect understanding that our
government was free to reject it, as we were not authorized to sub
scribe to it.

To guard against any accident which might happen in the trans
mission of a single copy of the treaty to the United States, the Bri
tish plenipotentiaries have consented to execute it in triplicate :
and as the treaty with the British ratification may be exposed to the
same danger, the times for the cessation of hostilities, the restora
tion of captures at sea, and the release of prisoners, have been fixed,
not from the exchange of ratifications, but from the ratification on
both sides, without alteration by either of the contracting parties.
We consented to the introduction of this latter provision, at the
desire of the British plenipotentiaries, who were willing to take a
full, but were unwilling to incur the risk of a partial ratification, as
the period from which the peace should be considered as concluded.
We are informed by them that Mr. Baker, their secretary, is to
go out to America with the British ratification.

We have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your most
humble and obedient servants,

JOHN QJJINCY ADAMS,
J. A. BAYARD,
HENRY CLAY,
JONATHAN RUSSELL,
ALBERT GALLAT1N.

Extract of a letter from Jonathan Russell, esq. to the Secretary of
State, dated Ghent, (25th December, 1814.

" My necessary occupation, at this moment, in aiding my col
leagues to prepare our joint despatches, puts it out of my power to
furnish you with any details or observations exclusively my own.

" As, however, you will perceive by our despatch to you of this
date, that a majority only of the mission was in favour of offorino-
to the British plenipotentiaries, an article confirming the British
right to the navigation of the Mississippi, and ours to the liberty as
to the fisheries, it becomes me, in candour, to acknowledge, that I
was in the minority on that question. I must reserve to myself
the power of communicating to you, hereafter, the reasons which
influenced me to differ from a majority of my colleagues on that
occasion ; and if they be insufficient to support my opinion, I per
suade myself they will, at least, vindicate my motives."

57

Mr. Gallatin to the Secretary of State.

Ghent, 25th December, 1&14.

SIR : The treaty which we signed yesterday, with the British
ministers, is, in my opinion, as favourable as could be expected,
Under existing circumstances, so far as they were known to us. —
The attitude taken by the State of Massachusetts, and the appear
ances in some of the neighbouring States, had a most unfavourable
effect. Of the probable result of the Congress at Vienna, we had
no correct information. The views of all the European powers
were precisely known, from day to day, to the British ministry.
From neither of them did we, in any shape, receive any intimation
of their intentions, of the general prospect of Europe, or of the
interest they took in our contest with Great Britain. I have some
reason to believe that all of them were desirous that it might conti
nue. They did not intend to assist us ; they appeared indifferent
about our difficulties, but they rejoiced at any thing which might
occupy, and eventually weaken our enemy. The manner in which
the campaign has terminated ; the evidence afforded, by its events,
of our ability to resist, alone, the now very formidable military
power of England ; and our having been able, without any foreign
assistance, and after she had made such an effort, to obtain peace
on equal terms, will raise our character and consequence in Eu
rope. This, joined with the naval victories, and the belief that
we alone can fight the English on their element, will make us to be.
courted as much as we have been neglected by foreign govern
ments. As to the people of Europe, public opinion was already
most decidedly in our favour. I anticipate a settlement with Spain
on our own terms, and the immediate chastisement of the Alge-
rines. Permit me to suggest the propriety of despatching a squad-
rou for that purpose, without losing a single moment.

I have little to add to our public despatch on the subject of the
terms of the treaty. I really think, that there i? nothing but nomi
nal in the Indian article, as adopted. With respect to precedent^
you will find two, though neither is altogether in point, viz. the

— article of the treaty of Utrecht, and the latter part of the

article of our treaty with Spain. You know, that there was

no alternative between breaking off the negotiations, and accepting
the article ; and that we accepted it, only as provisional, and sub
ject to your approbation or rejection.

The exception of Moose Island, from the general restoration of
territory, is the only point on which it is possible that we might
have obtained an alteration, if we had adhered to our opposition
to it. The British government had long fluctuated on the question
of peace : a favourable account from Vienna, the report of some
success in the Gulf of Mexico, or any other incident, might pro
duce a change in their disposition ; they had, already, after the
question had been referred to them, declared that they could not
consent to a relinquishment of that point. We thought it too ha-

58

zurdous to risk the peace on the question of the temporary posses
sion of that small island, since the question of title was fully re
served ; and it was, therefore, no cession of territory.

On the subject of the fisheries, within the jurisdiction of Great
Britain, we have certainly done all that could be done. If, accord
ing to the construction of the treaty of 1783, which we assumed,
the right was not abrogated by the war, it remains entire, since we
most explicitly refused to renounce it, either directly or indirectly.
In that case, it is only an unsettled subject of difference between
the two countries. If the right must be considered as abrogated by
the war, we cannot regain it without an equivalent. We had none
to give but the recognition of their right to navigate the Mississippi,
and we offered it. On this last supposition, this right is also lost
to them ; and, in a general point of view, we have certainly lost
nothing. But we have done all that was practicable in support of
the right to those fisheries — 1st, by the ground we assumed, re
specting the construction of the treaty of 1783 — 2d, by the offer to
recognise the British right to the navigation of the Mississippi —
3dly, by refusing to accept from Great Britain both her implied re
nunciation of the right of that navigation, and the convenient bound
ary of 49 degrees, for the whole extent of our and her territories,
west of the Lake of the Woods, rather than to make an implied
renunciation, on our part, to the right of America to those particu
lar fisheries.

I believe that Great Britain is very desirous of obtaining the
northern part of Maine, say from about 47 degrees north latitude,
to the northern extremity of that district, as claimed by us. They
hope that the river, which empties into the Bay des Chaleurs, in
the Gulf of St. Lawrence, has its source so far west as to intervene
between the head waters of the river St. John's, and those of the
streams emptying into the river St. Lawrence ; so that the line north
from the source of the river St. Croix will first strike the heights
of land which divide the waters emptying into the Atlantic Ocean
(river St. John's) from those emptying into the Gulf of St. Law
rence, (river des Chaleurs,) and afterwards the heights of land
which divide the waters emptying into the Gulf of St. Lawrence,
(river des Chaleurs,) from those emptying into the river St. Law
rence ; but, that the said line never can, in the words of the treaty,
strike any spot of land actually dividing the waters emptying into
the Atlantic ocean, from those which fa'll into the river St. Law
rence. Such will be the foundation of their disputing our claim
to the northern part of that territory ; but, feeling that it is not
very solid, I am apt to think that they will be disposed to offer the
whole of Fassamaquoddy bay, and the disputed fisheries, as an,
equivalent for the portion of northern territory, which they want,
in order to connect New-Brunswick and Quebec. This may ac
count for their tenacity with respect to the temporary possession
of Moose Island, and for their refusing to accept the recognition of
their right to the navigation of the Mississippi, provided they re
cognise ours to the fisheries.

59

That northern territory is of no importance to us, and belongs to
the United States, and not to Massachusetts, which has not the sha
dow of a claim to any land north of 4o degrees, to the eastward of
the Penobscot river, as you may easily convince yourself of, by re
curring to her charters.

I have the honour to be, with respect, &c.

ALBERT GALLATIN.

The Hon. the Secretary of State

of the United States, Washington.

Extract from the Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States,

APRIL 18, 1822.

Mr. Floyd submitted the following resolution, viz :

Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to cause to
be communicated to this House, if not injurious to the public good, any letter
or communication which may have been received from Jonathan Russell, Es
quire, one of the Ministers of the United States who concluded the Treaty of
Ghent, after the signature of that Treaty, and which was written in conform
ity to the indications contained in said Minister's letter, dated at Ghent, 25th
December, 1814.

The said resolution was read and ordered to lie on the table one day.

APRIL 19, 1822.

The resolution submitted by Mr. Floyd, on yesterday, was taken up, read,
and agreed to by the House.

MESSAGE from the President of the United States, to the House,
of Representatives, of 4th May, 1822,^Tyrummr tv tJieir-Resoh^-
tion of IQth April, 1822.

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives,
of the 19th of April, requesting the President "to cause to be
communicated to the House, if not injurious to the public interest,
any letter which may have been received from Jonathan Rusself,
one of the Ministers who concluded the treaty of Ghent, in conform
ity with the indications contained in his letter of 25th of December,
1814," I have to state, that, having referred the resolution to the
Secretary of State, and it appearing, by a report from him, that no
such document had been deposited among the archives of the De
partment, I examined and found among my private papers a letter
of that description, marked "private" by himself. I transmit a
copy of the report of the Secretary of State, by which it appears
that Mr. Russell, on being apprized that the document referred to
by the resolution had not been deposited in the Department of State,

I

60

delivered there " a paper purporting to be the duplicate of a letter
written by him from Paris, on the llth of February, 1815, to the
then Secretary of State, to be communicated to the House, as the
letter called tor by the resolution."

On the perusal of the document called for, I find that it commu
nicates a difference of opinion between Mr. Russell and a majority
of his colleagues, in certain transactions which occurred in the ne
gotiations at Ghent, touching interests which have been since satis
factorily adjusted by treaty between the United States and Great
Britain. The view which Mr. Russell presents of his own con
duct, and that of his colleagues, in those transactions, will, it is
presumed, call from the two surviving members of that mission,
who differed from him, a reply, containing their view of those
transactions, and of the conduct of the parties in them, and who,
should his letter be communicated to the House of Representatives,
will also claim that their reply should be communicated in like man
ner by the Executive — a claim which, on the principle of equal
justice, could not be resisted. The Secretary of State, one of the
Ministers referred to, has already expressed a desire that Mr. Rus
sell's letter should be communicated, and that 1 would transmit, at
the same time, a communication from him respecting it.

On full consideration of the subject, I have thought it would be
improper for the Executive to communicate the letter called for,
unless the House, on a knowledge of these circumstances^ should
desire it ; in which case the document called for shall be commu
nicated, accompanied by a report from the Secretary of State, as
above suggested. 1 have directed a copy to be delivered to Mr.
Russell, to be disposed of as he may think proper, and have caused
the original to be deposited in the Department of State, with in
struction to deliver a copy to any person* v^ho nuy be interested.

JAMES MONROE,

Washington, May 4th, 1822.

Department of State,

Washington, May 3, 1822.

The Secretary of State, to whom was referred the resolution ot
the House of Representatives of the 19th ultimo, requesting the
President " to cause to be communicated to the House, if not inju
rious to the public good, any letter or communication which may
have been received from Jonathan Russell, Esquire, one of the
Ministers of the United States who concluded the treaty of Ghent,
after the signature of that treaty, and which was written in con
formity to the indications contained in s tid Minister's letter, dated
at Ghent, 25th of December, 1814," has the honour of reporting
to the President, that, until after the adoption of the said resolution
by the House, there was upon the iiles of the Department of State,
no letter from Mr. Russell, of the description mentioned therein ;.

Gl

but that Mr. Russell himself has since delivered at the Depart
ment, a communication purporting to be the duplicate of a letter
written by him from Paris, on the llth of February, 1815, to the
then Secretary of State, to be communicated to the House, as the
letter called for by their resolution.

A copy of this paper is herewith submitted to the President.

JOHN QU1NCY ADAMS.

Extract from, the Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States,
MAY 6th, 1822.

Mr. Fuller submitted the following resolution, to wit :

Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to commu
nicate to this House the letter of Jonathan Russell, esquire, referred to in his
message of the 4-th of May, instant; together with such communications as he
may have received relative thereto, from any of the other ministers of the
United States who negotiated the treaty of Ghent.

The said resolution was received by unanimous consent of the House, read,
and ordered to lie on the table one day.

MAY 7th, 1822.

The House took up and proceeded to consider the resolution submitted by
Mr. Fuller, yesterday, arid the same being read,

Mr. McCarty moved that it lie on the table ; which, being disagreed to.
The question was taken on agreeing to the resolution,
And passed in the affirmative.

Extract from the National Intelligencer of 13/ft June, 1822.

CONGRESSIONAL.

[It is one of the most vexatious incidents that has ever occurred to us, of
lesser importance, that we mislaid our notes of the proceedings which took
place in the House of Representatives on the 7th May last, on Mr. Fuller's
motion, respecting Mr. Russell's letter, and on the bill authorizing the change
of the site of the canal in this city, both of which debates we hoped to have
published. We have the more reason to regret the circumstance, because a
curiosity has been expressed to see what was said on Mi. Fuller's motion. A
friend, who attended to wliat passed, has furnished us, from memory, with the
following sketch of the proceedings on that occasion. It is brief, but is believed
to be substantially correct.]

HOUSE OF REPRESE1VTATIVKS — 7th May, 1822.

Mr. Fuller's resolution, whicty was submitted yesterday, request
ing the President to communicate the letter of Jonathan Russell,
esq. relating to the treaty of Ghent, together with such communi
cations as had been received from the other plenipotentiaries, or
either of them, in explanation of the letter of Mr. R. was called
up, and, on the question of its adoption—
Mr. Floyd said, he had moved the original resolution for the
Ghent correspondence, with an expectation that it might throw
some light on the importance of the Columbia river, and the bill
before the House proposing an establishment there. As the Pre
sident, however, had not thought proper to communicate the letter
in question, when specially called for, he (Mr. F.) had moved to

8

62

hate the message committed to a committee of which lie was a
member, but the motion had not prevailed. He had, however,
hoped, since he had desisted from again requesting the letter, that
no other gentleman would have proposed it. It was manifest that
it had been withheld to prevent the excitement and ill blood which
the contents might produce. He hoped the resolution would not
be adopted.

Mr. Fuller said, he was happy to hear from the gentleman from
Virginia^ that he had been induced to abstain from a further, call
for Mr. R's letter to prevent the excitement of" ill blood," and he
would by no means be behind him, (Mr. Floyd,) in such a laud
able intent ; but, in his opinion, the communication of the letter,
and of the explanation of the other commissioners, to Congress
and to the public, would have a far greater tendency to allay the
ill blood, if any existed, than the suppression of the explanation^
while the letter was in effect made public. The President's mes
sage informed us, Mr. Fuller said, that he had transmitted the letter
to the Department of State, and directed copies of it to be delivered
to persons who should apply ; consequently, it would soon reach
the newspapers, while the comments or explanations which ought
to accompany it would be effectually suppressed. Nothing, in his
opinion, could be more unfair than thus to stifle all reply. It re
minded him, he said, of what he had of late frequently witnessed
in this House, when some bill was pending, and, before it was un
derstood, one of its opposers would make a speech against it, and
conclude with a motion to lay it on the table, which precluded all
debate, and, consequently, all explanation. The indignation pro
duced by such a course every gentleman must have observed and
sometimes have felt. There was nothing so safe and honourable
as a full disclosure of the statements of both sides. He regretted,
he said, that his colleague, the writer of the letter, was not in his
seat, as be was sure he could not object to the call, more especially
as it appeared from the message, that the gentleman himself had
furnished to the Department a duplicate or copy of that letter to
be communicated to Congress before the original had been found.
As to the suggestion that the Ghent correspondence or the letter
in question could throw a single ray of light on the subject of the
occupation of Columbia river, it wa»too improbable, Mr. Fuller said,
to have ever entered his mind ; but if the gentleman from Virginin
(Mr. Floyd) had expected it at first, he could see no reason for
his giving over the pursuit. He hoped the House would see the
obvious justice of adopting the resolution.

Mr. Cocke said, he could see no reason for calling for the letter:
the President had declined communicating it, and, therefore, he
thought it not proper in the House to persist in the call.

Mr. Sergeant said, he rose to correct the error into which the
gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Cocke) had fallen, in supposing
the President had " declined" communicating Mr. Russell's letter.
It appeared, on recurring to the message, (a part of which Mr. S.

63

read,) that he merely declined sending the letter, without also
sending such answer or explanation as the majority of the commis
sioners who negotiated the treaty, or any of them, should request-
On the other hand, the President signifies his willingness to com
municate both together ; and Mr. S. said, he could see no objec
tion whatever to the resolution, which seemed, under existing
circumstances, to ask no more than was due to the survivers of the
commissioners, whose conduct was implicated, and who had aright
to be heard.

Mr. Cocke, after hearing the message read, the terms of which,
he said, he had not before so particularly attended to, withdrew
his opposition.

Mr. Hardin said, he was glad the letter was called for, and he
should vote for the resolution, as it would show the western peo
ple in what manner their interests were disregarded or sacrificed ;
that the commissioners offered to give up the navigation of the Mis
sissippi to secure the fisheries of the east.

The resolution was then adopted with only one or two voices in
the negative.

MESSAGE from the President of the United States, transmitting (pursuant to
a resolution of the House of Representatives, of 1th May,) a Letter of Jona
than Russell, late one of the Plenipotentiaries of the United States, at the
negotiation of Ghent, with Remarks thereon, by the Secretary oj State.

To the House of Representatives:

In compliance with the resolution of the House of Represented
lives of the 7th of May, requesting the President of the United
States " to communicate to that House the letter of Jonathan Rus
sell, esq. referred to in his message of the 4th instant, together
with such communications as he may have received relative there
to, from any of the other ministers of the United States who ne
gotiated the treaty of Ghent,1' I herewith transmit a report from
the Secretary of State, with the documents called for by that reso
lution. JAMES MONROE,

Washington, May 7, 1822.

Department of State,

Washington, 7th May, 1822.

The Secretary of State has the honour of transmitting to the
President of the United States his remarks upon the paper depo
sited at the Department of State on the 22d of last month, by
Jonathan Russell, late one of the plenipotentiaries of the United
States, at the negotiation of Ghent, to be communicated to the
House of Representatives, as the letter called tor by their resolu
tion of the 19th of that month ; and the Secretary of State respect
fully requests that the President would transmit to the House of
Representatives these Remarks, together with the above mentioned
communication of Mr. Russell, on the renewal of the call therefor
ty the House. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

64

Mr. Russell to the Secretary of State.
(PRIVATE.)

Paris, llth February, 1815.

SIR : In conformity with the intimation contained in my letter of
the (1) 25th of December, I (2) now have the honour to state to you the
reasons which induced me to differ from a majority of my col
leagues on the expedienc}' of offering an article confirming the
British right to the navigation of the Mississippi, and the right of the
American people to take and cure fish in certain places within the
British jurisdiction.

The (3) prppnRififui ^f c»lch an articleappeared to be inconsistent
with our reasoning to prove its absoIuTe"lnutIIitY. According to
thiajreasomng, no new stipulation was any more necessary ^on the
^ubiecToT such an article, than anew slipUlTTttoTrfoFTlie recognition
of the sovereignty and independence oitne Umied States.

The article proposed appeared also to be inconsistent with onr
instructions, as (4) interpreted by us, which forbid us to suffer (5j our
tight to the fisheries to be brought into discussion ; for, it could not be
believed that we were left free to (6) stipulate on a subject which
we were restrained from (7) discussing, and that an (&) argument,
and not an (9) agreement, was to be^avoided. If our construction
was indeed correct, it might not, perhaps, be difficult to show that
we have not, in fact, completely refrained from the interdicted dis
cussion.

At any rate, the proposal of the article in question was objection
able, inasmuch as it was incompatible with the principles asserted
by a majority of the mission, and with the construction which
(10) this majority had adopted on that part of our instructions which
related to the fisheries. If the majority were correct in these
principles, and in this construction, it became us to act accordingly ;
if they were (11) not correct, still it was unnecessary to add inconsist
ency to error.

I freely confess, however, that I did not accord with the majori
ty, pithpr in thpir VJPW nfihp treaty of 1783. whence they derived
their prin^ii^psT-Qf~o£^uiLJu^trjictions ; jmd that my great objection
to proposing the article did not arise from an anxiety to reconcile
our conduct with our reasoning and declaration?.

* [DUPLICATE.]

Paris, llih February, 1822.t

SIR : In conformity with the intimation contained in my letter of
(he (1) 25th December, I (2) have now the honour to state to you the
reasons which induced me to differ from a majority of my col
leagues on the expediency of offering an article confirming the
British right to the navigation of the Mississippi, and the right of
the American people to take and cure fish in certain places withia
the British jurisdiction.

The (3) proposal of such an article appeared to be inconsistent
with our reasoning to prove its absolute inutility.

According to this reasoning, no new stipulation was any more
necessary, on the subject of such an article, than a new stipulation
for the recognition of the sovereignty and independence of the
United States.

The article proposed appeared, also, to be inconsistent with our
instructions, as (4) interpreted by w, which forbid us to suffer (5) our
right to thejisheries, to be brought into discussion ; for, it could not
be believed that we were left free to (6) stipulate on a subject
which we were restrained from (?) discussing, and that an (8) argu
ment^ and not an (9) agreement, was to be avoided. If our con
struction was, indeed, correct, it might not, perhaps, be difficult to
show that we have not, in fact, completely refrained from the in
terdicted discussion.

At any rate, the proposal of the article in question was objec
tionable, inasmuch as it was incompatible with the principles as
serted by a majority of the mission, and with the construction which
(10) that majority had adopted on that part of our instructions
which related to the fisheries. If the majority were correct in
these principles, and in this construction, it became us to act ac
cordingly. If they were (H) incorrect, gtill it was unnecessary to
add inconsistency to error.

I freely confess, however, that I did not aecord with the majori
ty, either in their views of the treaty of 1783, whence they derived
their principles, nor of our instructions ; and that my great objec
tion to proposing the article did not arise from an anxiety to re
concile our conduct with our reasoning and declarations.

'* The word (Copy) had here been written by Mr. Russell, and erased. The
traces of it are visible on the paper.

t JVb/e on the date of the Duplicate. This was the date of the paper as deli
vered by Mv. Russell on the 22d of April, 1822, at the Department of State. It
was afterwards altered to 1815, with his approbation, and before it was com
municated to the House, as will be sern in the sequel.

66 [PRIVATE.]

I could not believe that the independence of the United States
was derived from the treaty of 1783 5 that the recognition of that
independence, by Great Britain, gave to this treaty any peculiar
character, or that such character, supposing it existed, would ne
cessarily render this treaty absolutely inseparable in its provisions,
and make it one entire and indivisible whole, equally imperishable
in all its parts, by any change which might occur in the relations
between the contracting parties.

The independence of the United States rests upon those funda
mental principles set forth and acted on by the American Congress,
in the declaration of July, 1776, and not on any British (12) grant
in the treaty of 1783, and its era is dated accordingly.

The treaty of 1783 was merely a~(13) treaty of peace? and there
fore subject to the same rules of construction as all other compacts
of this nature. The recognition of the independence of the United
States could not (14) well have given to it a peculiar character, and
excepted it from the operation of these rules. Such a recognition,
expressed or implied, is always indispensable on the part of every
nation with whom we form any treaty (15) whatsoever. France, in
the treaty of alliance, long before the year 1T83, not only expressly
recognised, but engaged (1C) effectually to maintain, this independ
ence ; and yet this treaty, so far from being considered as possess
ing any mysterious peculiarity, by which its existence was perpe
tuated, has, even without war, and although a part of it contained
words of (17) perpetuity, and was (18; unexecuted, long (19) since en
tirely terminated.

Had the recognition of our independence by Great Britain given
to the treaty of 1783 any peculiar character, which it did not, (20)
still that character could have properly extended to those provi
sions only (21) which affected that independence. All those general
rights, tor instance, of jurisdiction, which appertained to the Unit
ed States, in their quality as a nation, might, so far as that treaty
was declaratory of them, have been embraced by (22) such pecu
liarity, without (23) necessarily extending its influence to mere
(24) special commercial liberties and (25) privileges, or to provisions
(26) long since executed, not indispensably connected with national
sovereignty, (27) or necessarily resulting from it

The liberty to take and cure fish, within the exclusive (28) juris
diction of (29) Great Britain, was certainly not necessary to perfect
the (30) jurisdiction of the (31) United States; and there is no reason
to believe that such a liberty was intended to be raised to an equa
lity with the general right of fishing within the common jurisdic
tion of all nations, which accrued to us as a member of the great
national family. On the contrary, the distinction between the spe
cial liberty and the general right appears to have been well under
stood by the American ministers who negotiated the treaty of 1783,
and to have been clearly marked by the very import of the terms
which they employed. It would evidently have been unwise in
them, however ingenious it may be in us, to exalt such a privilege

[DUPLICATE.] 67

I could not believe that the independence of the United States
was derived from the treaty of 1783 ; that the recognition of that
independence, by Great Britain, gave to this treaty any peculiar
character, or that such character, supposing it existed, would ne
cessarily render this treaty absolutely inseparable in its provisions,
and make it one entire and indivisible whole, equally imperishable
in all its parts, by any change which might occur in the relations
between the contracting parties.

The independence of the United States rests upon those funda
mental principles set forth and acted on by the American Congress,
in the declaration of July, 1776, and not on any British (12) grant
in the treaty of 1783 ; and its a?ra is dated accordingly.

The treaty of 1783 was merely a (13) treaty of peace, and there-
Tore subject to the same rules of construction as all other compacts
ot this nature. The recognition of the independence of the United
States could not (14) have well given to it a peculiar character, and
p.xcepted it from the operation of these rules. Such a recognition,
expressed or implied, is always indispensable on the part of every
nation with whom we form any treaty (15) whatever. France, in
the treaty of alliance, long before the year 1783, not only express
ly recognised, but engaged (IS) effectually to maintain this indepen
dence; and yet this treaty, so far from being considered as possess
ing any mysterious peculiarity by which its existence was perpe
tuated, has, even without war, and although a part of it contained
words of (H) perpetuity and was (18) unexecuted long (19) since termi-
ziated.

Had the recognition of our independence by Great Britain given
to the treaty of 1783 any peculiar character, which it did not,
(2o) yet that character could have properly extended to those pro
visions only (21) which affected that independence. All those gene
ral rights, for instance, of jurisdiction, which appertained to the
United States in their quality as a nation, might, so far as that treaty
was declaratory of them, have been embraced by (22) that peculi
arity without (23) necessarily extending its influence to mere (24)
special liberties and (23) privileges, or to provisions (26) long since er-
ecuted,) not indispensably connected with national sovereignty,
(2?) nor necessarily resulting from it.

The liberty to take and cure fish within the exclusive (28)y«m-
diclion of (29) Great Britain, was certainly not necessary to perfect
the (30) jurisdiction of the (3l) United States. And there is no reason
to^ believe that such a liberty was intended to be raised to an equa
lity with the general right of fishing within the common jurisdiction
of all nations, which accrued to us as a member of the great na
tional family. On the contrary, the distinction between the special
liberty and the general right, appears to have been well under
stood by the American ministers who negotiated the treaty of 1783,
and to have been clearly marked by the very import of the terms
which they employed. It would evidently have been unwise iu
them, however ingenious it may be in. us. to exalt such a privilege

68 [PRIVATE.]

to the rank of a sovereign right, and thereby to have assumed the
unnecessary and inconvenient obligation of considering such a liber
ty to be an indispensable condition of our national existence, and
thus rendering that existence as precarious as the liberty itself.
They could not have considered a privilege, which they expressly
made to depend, to a very considerable extent, for its continuance,
(32) on events and private interests, as partaking of the character
and entitled to the duration of the inherent properties of sove
reignty. The settlement of the shores might, at any time, have
been effected by the policy of the British government, and would
have made the assent of British subjects, under the influence of
that policy, necessary to the continuance of a very considerable
portion of that (33) liberty. They could not have meant thus to
place, within the control of a foreign (34) government and its sub
jects, an (35) integral part, as we now affect to consider this privi
lege, of our national rights.

It is from this view of the subject that I have been constrained
to believe that there was nothing in the treaty of 1783, which
could, essentially, distinguish it from ordinary treaties, or rescue it,
on account of any peculiarity of character, from the jura belli, or
from the operation of those events on which the (36) continuation
or termination of such treaties depends. I was, in like manner,
compelled to believe, if any such peculiarity belonged to those
provisions, in that treaty, which had an immediate connexion with
our independence, that it did not necessarily affect the nature of
the whole treaty, (37) or attach to a privilege which had no analo
gy to such provisions, or any relation to that independence.

I know not, indeed, any treaty, or any article of a treaty, what
ever may have been the subject to which it related, or the terms in
which it was expressed, that has survived a war between the par
ties, without being specially renewed, by reference or recital> in
the succeeding treaty of peace. I cannot, indeed, (38) conceive of the
possibility of such a treaty or such an article ; for, however clear
and strong the stipulations for perpetuity might be, these stipula
tions themselves would follow the fate of ordinary unexecuted en
gagements, and require, after a war, the declared assent of the par
ties for their revival.

We appear, in fact, not to have had an unqualified confidence in
our construction of the treaty of 1783, or to have been willing to
rest exclusively on its peculiar character our title to any of the
rights mentioned in it, and much less our title to the fishing (39)liberty
in question. If hostilities could not affect that treaty, (40) or abro
gate its provisions, why did we permit the boundaries assigned by
it to be brought into discussion, or stipulate for a (41) restitution of all
places taken from us during the present war ? If such (42) restitution
was secured by the mere operation of the treaty of 1783, why did
we discover any solicitude for the status ante helium, and not resist
the principle of uti possidetis on that ground ?

[DUPLICATE.] 69

to the rank of a sovereign right, and thereby to have assumed the
unnecessary and inconvenient obligation of considering such a lib
erty to be an indispensable condition of our national existence, and
thus rendering that existence as precarious as the liberty itself.
They could not have considered a privilege which they ex
pressly made to depend, to a very considerable extent, for its con
tinuance, (32) on mere events and private interests, as partaking of
the character, and entitled to the duration, of the inherent proper
ties of sovereignty. The settlement of the shores might, at any
time, have been effected by the policy of the British government,
and would have made the assent of British subjects under the influ
ence of that policy, necessary to the continuance of a very consi
derable portion of that (33) privilege. They could not have meant
thus to place within the control of a foreign (34) power and its
subjects, an (3S) integral part, as we now affect to consider this pri
vilege, of our national rights.

It is from this view of the subject that I have been constrained
to believe that there was nothing in the treaty of 1733, which could
essentially distinguish it from ordinary treaties, or rescue it, on
account of any peculiarity of character, from the jura belli, or from
the operation of those events on which the (36) continuance or ter
mination of such treaties depends.

I was, in like manner, compelled to believe, if any such peculi
arity belonged to those provisions in that treaty, which had an im
mediate connection with our independence, that it did not necessa
rily affect the nature of the whole treaty, (37) nor attach to a privi
lege which had no analogy to such provisions, nor any relation to
that independence.

1 know not, indeed, any treaty, nor any article of a treaty, what
ever m;\y have been the subject to which it related, or the terms
in which it was expressed, that has survived a war between the
parties, without being specially renewed, by reference or recital,
in the succeeding treaty of peace. I cannot, indeed, (3&) conceive the
possibility of such a treaty, or of such an article ; for, however
clear and strong the stipulations for perpetuity might be, these
stipulations themselves would follow the fate of ordinary unexecut
ed engagements, and require, after a war, the declared assent of
the parties for their revival.

We appear, in fact, not to have an unqualified confidence in our
construction of the treaty of 1783, or to have been willing to rest
exclusively on its peculiar character our title to any of the rights
mentioned in it ; and much less our title to the fishing (39) privilege
in question.

If hostilities could not affect that treaty, (40) nor abrogate its pro
visions, why did we permit the boundaries assigned by it, to be
brought into discussion, or stipulate for a (41) restoration of all places
taken from us during the present war ? If such (42) a restitution was
secured by the mere operation of the treaty of 1783, why did we
discover any solicitude for the status ante bdlvm, and not resist t'he
principle of vti possidetis on that ground.

70 [PRIVATE."]"

With regard to the fishing privilege, we distinctly stated to you,
in our letter of the (43) 2 1st of December, that, (44) "at the time of
the treaty of 1783, it was (45) no new grant, we having always before
that time enjoyed it," and thus endeavoured to derive our title to
it from (46) prescription. A title, derived from immemorial usage,
antecedent to 1783, could not well owe its origin or its validity
(47) to a compact concluded at that time, and we (48) could, therefore,
in this view of the subject, correctly say that this privilege (49)Was no
new grant ; that is, that our right to the exercise of it was totally
independent of such compact. If we were well-founded, however,
in the assertion of our prescriptive title, it was quite (50) unneces-^
sary to attempt to give a kind of charmed existence to the treaty oi
1783, and to extend its (51) undefinable influence to every article of
which it was composed, merely to preserve that title, which we
declared to be in no way derived from it, and which had existed,
and, of course, could exist, without it.

It was rather unfortunate, too, for our argument against a seve
rance of the provisions of that treaty, that we should have disco
vered, ourselves, (52) a radical difference between them, making the
fishing (5s) privilege depend on immemorial usage, and, of course, dis
tinct in its nature (54) and origin from the rights resulting from our
independence.

We, indeed, throw some obscurity over this subject when we de
clare to you that this privilege was always enjoyed by us before the
treaty of 1783, thence inferring that it was not granted by that trea
ty, and in the same sentence and from the same fact, appear also to
infer, that it was not to be forfeited by war any more than (55) any
other of the rights of our independence, making it thus one of (56) these
rights, and of course, according to our doctrine, dependant on that
treaty.

There might have been nothing incomprehensible in this mode
of reasoning, had the treaty recognised this privilege to be derived
from prescription, and confirmed it on that ground. The treaty
has, however, not the slightest allusion to the past, in reference to
this privilege, but regards it only with a view to the future. The
treaty, (57) therefore, cannot be construed as supporting a pre-exist
ing title, but as containing a grant entirely new. If we claim, there
fore, under the treaty, we must renounce prescription, and if we
claim from prescription, we can derive no aid from the treaty. If
tlie treaty be imperishable in all its parts, the fishing privilege re
mains unimpaired without a recurrence to immemorial usage ; and
if our title to it be well-founded on immemorial usage, the treaty
may perish without affecting it. To have endeavoured to support
it on both grounds, implies that we had not entire confidence in
either, and to have proposed a new article, indicates a distrust oi*
both.

It is not, as I conceive, difficult to show that we (58) cannot, in
deed, derive (59) a better title to this fishing privilege, from pre
scription, than from any indestructible quality of the treaty of 1783

{DUPLICATE.} 71

Wiih regard to the fishing privilege, we distinctly stated to you,
in our letter of the (43) 25th of December last, that (44) at the time of
the treaty of 1783, it was (45) nonew grant, we having always before
that time enjoyed it, and thus endeavoured to derive our title to it
from (46) prescription ; a title derived from immemorial usage, ante
cedent to 1783, could not well owe its origin, or its validity, (47) to
any compact, concluded at that time ; and we (4*8) might, therefore,
in this view of the subject, correctly say that this privilege (49) was
then no new grant ; that is, that our right to the exercise of it was
totally independent of such compact. If we were well founded,
however, in the assertion of our prescriptive title, it was quite
(50) unnecessary for us to attempt to give a kind of charmed existence
to the treaty of 1783, and to extend its (51) indefinable influence to
every article of which it was composed, merely to preserve that
title which we declared to be in no way derived from it, and which
had existed, and, of course, could exist without it.

It was rather unfortunate, too, for our argument against the se
verance of the provisions? of that treaty, that we should have dis
covered, ourselves, (52) such a radical difference between them,
making the fishing (53) privilege to depend on the immemorial usage,
and, of course, distinct, in its nature (54) and in its origin, from the
rights resulting from our independence.

We indeed throw some obscurity over this subject, when we de
clare to you that this privilege was always enjoyed by us before
the treaty of 1783 ; thence inferring that it was not granted by that
treaty, and, in the same sentence, and from the same fact, appear
also to infer that it was not to be forfeited by war, any more than
(55) any other of the rights of independence; making it thus one of (56)
those rights, and, of course, according to our doctrine, dependant on
that treaty. There might have been nothing incomprehensible in
this mode of reasoning, had the treaty recognised this privilege to
be derived from prescription, and confirmed it on that ground.
The treaty, however, has not the slightest allusion to the past, in
reference to this privilege, but regards it only with a view to the
future. The treaty (57) cannot, therefore, be construed as support
ing a pre-existing title, but as containing a grant entirely new. If
we claim, therefore, under the treaty, we must renounce prescrip
tion ; and if we claim from prescription, we can derive no aid from
the treaty. If the treaty be imperishable in all its parts, the fish
ing privilege remains unimpaired, without a recurrence to imme
morial usage ; and if our title to it be well founded on immemorial
usage, the treaty may perish without affecting it. To have endea
voured to support it on both grounds, implies that we had not entire
confidence in either, and to have proposed a new article indicates
a distrust of both.

It is not, as I conceive, difficult to show that we (58) can, indeed,
derive (59) no better title to this fishing privilege from prescription
than from any indestructible quality of the treaty of 1783.

72 [PRIVATE. J

Prescription (60) appears to me to be inapplicable to the (61) parties
and to the (62) subject, and to be defective both in (63) fact and effect-
As to the parties : — the immemorial enjoyment of a privilege
within British jurisdiction, by British subjects, the inhabitants of
British colonies, could not well be considered as evidence of a title
to that privilege claimed (64) by the citizens of an independent repub
lic, residing within the exclusive jurisdiction of that republic. The
people of the United States, as such, could have claimed no special
privilege within the dominions of any foreign power from immemo
rial usage, in 1783, when the longest duration of their own existence
in that quality was little more, at the utmost, than the brief period
of seven years, which is surely not beyond the memory of man,
(ultra memoriam hominis.) The people of the United States had
never, in fact, during that period, enjoyed the fishing privilege a
moment ; being effectually prevented therefrom by the existing
state of hostilities. Nor could the inhabitants of the colonies, ori
ginally constituting the United States, even in their colonial condi
tion, acquire against their sovereign any right from long usage
(65) or mere lapse of time, (66) (nullum tempus regi occuvrit.) The Bri
tish sovereign was always competent to regulate (67) and restrain his
colonies in their commerce and intercourse with each other, when
ever and however he might think proner, and had he forbid his
Subjects in the province of (68) Massachusetts, to fish (C9) and dry and
cure fish in the bays, harbours, and creeks of Labrador, which, by
the way, had (70) not immcmorially belonged to him, it is not to be ima
gined that they would have conceived themselves discharged from
the obligation of submitting, on account of any pretended right from
immemorial usage. The fishing privilege, therefore, enjoyed by
British subjects within British jurisdiction, could give no perma
nent and independent right to those subjects themselves and,
(71) a fortiori, no such right to the citizens of the United States,
claiming under a (72) different estate and in a different capacity.
Great Britain might, indeed, as well prescribe for the prerogatives
of her sovereignty over us, as we for any of the privileges which
we enjoyed as her subjects.

I do not think it necessary to inquire how far the practice of the
people of iAlassachusetts was the practice of (73) the whole original
thirteen United States, or of the United States now, including Lou
isiana ; or how far the immemorial usage of the people of Boston
can establish a prescriptive right in the people of New-Orleans.
1 trust 1 have said enough to show that prescription is (74) inapplica
ble to the parties. It is also, I conceive, inapplicable to the subject.

Had the United States, as an independent nation, enjoyed, from
time immemorial, the fishing privilege in question, still, from the
nature of this privilege, no prescriptive right (75) could have thence
been established. A right to fish, or to trade, or to do (76) any other
actor thing within the exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign state, is a
(77) simple power, a right (78) of mere ability, (jus merce facultatis,) de-

(DUPLICATE.] 73

Prescription (60) appears to be inapplicable to the (61) parties, and
to the (62) subject, and to be defective both in (63) fact and effect.

As to the parties : — the immemorial enjoyment of a privilege,
within British jurisdiction, by British subjects, the inhabitants of
British colonies, could not well be considered as evidence of a title
to that privilege, (64) claimed by citizens of an independent repub
lic, residing within the exclusive jurisdiction of that republic. The
people of the United States, as such, could have claimed no special
privilege within the dominions of any foreign power, from imme
morial usage, in 1783, when the longest duration of their own ex
istence in that quality was little more, at the utmost, than the brief
period of seven years, which is surely not beyond the memory of
man, (ultra memonam hominis.) The people of the United States
had never, in fact, during that period, enjoyed the fishing privilege
a moment, being effectually prevented therefrom by the existing
state of hostilities. Nor could the inhabitants of the colonies, origin-
ally constituting the United States, even in their colonial condition,
acquire against their sovereign any right from long usage, (65) or th»
mere lapse of time, (66) (nullum tempusregi occurrit.) The British SO-
vereign was always competent to regulate (67) or to restrain them in
their commerce and intercourse with each other, whenever and
however he might think proper. And had he forbid his subjects,
in the province of (68) Massachusetts Bay, to fish, (69) and to dry and
cure fish, in the bays, harbours, and creeks, of Labrador, which,
by the way, had (70) not immemorially belonged to him, it is not to be
imagined that they would have conceived themselves discharged
from the obligation of submitting, on account of any pretended right
from immemorial usage.

The fishing privilege, therefore, enjoyed by British subjects,
within British jurisdiction, could give no permanent and independ
ent right to those subjects themselves, and, (7l; afortiori, no such
right to the citizens of the United States, claiming, under a i72)rf«y~
ferent estate, and in a different capacity. Great Britain might, indeed,
as well prescribe for the prerogatives of her sovereignty over us,
as we for any of the privileges which we enjoyed as her subjects.

I do not think it necessary to inquire how far the practice of the
people of Massachusetts was the practice of (73) the people of the
whole original thirteen United States, or of the United States now,
including Louisiana ; or how far the immemorial usage of the people
of Boston can establish a prescriptive right in the people of New-
Orleans. I trust 1 have said enough to show that prescription is
(74) inapplicable to the parties.

It is, also, I conceive, inapplicable to the subject. Had the
United States, as an independent nation, enjoyed, from time imme
morial, the fishing privilege in question, still, from the nature of
this privilege, no prescriptive right (75) would have thence been
established. A right to fish, or to trade, or to do (76) any other
thing, within the exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign state, is a (77)
parrcr, a right (?8; of mere ability, jus merse facultatis, depend-

74 [PRIVATE^

pending on the will Of such State, (?9) and is consequently imprescripti-
pie. Aa independent (80*) title can be derived only from treaty.

I conceive, therefore, that (80) our claim to the fishing privilege,
.from immemorial usage, is not only unsupported by the (81) fact,
but cannot, in (82) effect, result from such usage.

I have, (83) from this view of the subject, been led to conclude,
that the treaty of 1783, in relation to the fishing liberty, is abrogat
ed by the war ; that this liberty is totally destitute of support from
prescription ; (84) and that we are, consequently, left without any title
to it whatsoever. For, I cannot prevail upon myself to seek for
such a title in the relative situation of the parties, at the time of ne
gotiating the treaty of 1783, and contend, according to the insinua
tion contained! in our letter to you of the (85) 21st of December, that
the jurisdiction of Great Britain over the colonies, assigned to her
in America, was a grant (86) from the United States, and that the
United States, in making this grant, (87) reserved to themselves the
privilege in question. Such a pretension, however lofty, is so in
consistent with (88) the circumstances of the case, and with any sober
construction which can be given to that treaty, that I shall, I trust,
be excused from seriously examining its validity.

Having thus gtated some of the reasons which induced me to differ
in opinion from a majority of my colleagues, relative to the cha
racter of the treaty of 1783, as well as with regard to every other
foundation on which they were (89) disposed to rest our title to the
fishing privilege, I shall now proceed to explain the (90) causes
which influenced me to dissent from them in the interpretation of
«UT (91) instructions.

These instructions forbid us to permit our (92) rights to the trade
beyond the (93) Cape of Good Hope, to the fisheries, and to Louisiana} to
be brought into discussion. I conceived that this prohibition ex*
tended to the general rights only, which affected our sovereignty,
and resulted from it, and not (94) to mere special liberties and privi
leges which had no relation to that sovereignty, either as to its na
ture or extent.

The right (95) relating to the trade beyond the Cape of Good
Hope, was the right which belonged to us as an independent (96) na
tion, in common with all other independent nations, and not the permission of
trading to those parts of the East Indies which were within the ex
clusive jurisdiction of Great Britain. In like manner, the right to
the fisheries, contemplated by our instructions, was, (97) 1 conceived,
the right, common to all nations, to use the open sea for fishing as well
as for navigation, and (98) not to the liberty to fish (99) and cure fish
within the territorial limits of any foreign state. The right to
Louisiana, (100) which was not to be brought into discussion, was the
right to the empire and domain of that region, and (101) not to the
right of excluding Great Britain from (102) the navigation of the Mis
sissippi.

How far we conformed to this instruction, with regard to the ge
neral right to Louisiana, it is not necessary for me here to inquire ;

[DUPLICATED 75

ing on the will of such state, (79) and conseqcuUy imprescriptible. An
independent (80*) right can be derived only from treaty.

I conceive, therefore, that (8O) a claim"to the fishing privilege,
from immemorial usage, is not only unsupported by the (81) fact,
but cannot, in (S2) effect, result from ?uch usage.

I have, (K3) in this view of the subject, been led to conclude that
the treaty of 1783, in relation to the fishing liberty, is abrogated by
the war, and that this liberty is totally destitute of support from
prescription (84) and, consequently, that we are left without any title
to it whatsoever. F-or, I cannot prevail upon myself to seek for
such a title in the relative situation of the parties at the time of
negotiating the treaty of 1783, and contend, according to the insinua
tion contained in our letter to you, of the (85$ 25th of December
last, that the jurisdiction of Great Britain over the colonies assign
ed to her, in America, was a grant (86) of the United States, and
that the United States, in making this grant, (87) reserved to themselves
the privilege in question. Such a pretension, however lofty, is so
inconsistent with (88) the real circumstances of the case, and with any
sober construction which can be given to that treaty, that I shal^
I trust, be excused from seriously examining its validity.

Having thus stated some of the reasons which induced me to dif
fer in opinion from a majority of my colleagues, relative to the
character of the treaty of 1783, as well as with regard to every
other foundation on which they were (89) disposed, inconsistent1^, to rest
our title to the fishing privilege, I shall now proceed to explain the
(90) reasons which influenced me to dissent from them in the inter
pretation of our (91) instructions relative to that privilege.

These instructions forbid us to permit our (92) rights to th«
trade beyond the (93) Cape of Good Hope, to the fisheries, and to Louisiana?
to be brought into discussion. I conceived that this prohibition ex
tended to the general rights only, which affected our sovereignty
and resulted from it, and not (94) the special liberties and privileges
which had no relation to that sovereignty, either as to its nature or
extent.

The right, (95) relative to the trade beyond the Cape of Good
Hope, was the right which belonged to us as an independent
(96) nation, and not to the permission of trading to those parts of the
East Indies which were within the exclusive jurisdiction of Great
Britain. In like manner, the right to the fisheries, contemplated
t>y our instructions, w&s, (97) I conceive, the right to use the open sea
for fishing as well as for navigation, and (98) not the liberty to figh,
(99) and to cure fish, within the territorial limits of any foreign state.
The right to Louisiana, (100) which, by those instructions, were not to be
brought into discussion, was the right to the empire and domain of
that region, and (lol) not the right of excluding Great Britain from
(102) the free navigation of the Mississippi.

How far we conformed to this instruction, with regard to the ge
neral right to Louisiana, it is not necessary for roe here to inquire ;

76 [PRIVATE.]

but certainly the majority believed (103) themselves permitted to offer
a very explicit proposition with regard to the navigation of its prin
cipal (104) river. I believed, with them, that we were so permitted, and that
we were likewise permitted to offer a proposition relative to the fishing liberty,
and had the occasion required it, to make proposals concerning the trade to the
British East Indies. I was persuaded, that treating relative to these privileges,
or discussing the obligation or expediency of granting or witholding them, re
spectively, violated in no way our instructions, or affected the general right?
which we were forbidden to bring into discussion.

Considering, theretore, the Ashing liberty to be entirely at an
end, without a new stipulation for its revival, and believing that we
were entirely free to discuss the terms and conditions of such a
stipulation, I did not object to the article proposed by us because
any article on the subject was unnecessary, or contrary to our in
structions, but I objected specially to that article, because, by con
ceding (105)init the free navigation of the Mississippi, (106) we offered,
in my estimation, for the fishing privilege, a price much above its value.

In no view of the subject could I discover any (107) analogy between
the two objects, and the only reason for connecting them and mak
ing them mutual equivalents for each other, appeared to be because
they were both found in the treaty of 1783.

If that treaty was abrogated by the war, as I consider it to have
been, any connexion between its parts must have ceased, and the
liberty of navigating the Mississippi by British subjects must, at
least, be completely at an end ; for it will not, I trust, be attempted
to continue it by a (108; prescriptive title, or to consider it as a
(109) reservation, made by the United States, from any grant of sove
reignty which, at the treaty of peace, they accorded to Great Bri
tain. If, indeed, it was such a reservation, it must have been in
tended for (HO) our benefit, and, of (111) course, could be no equivalent
for the fishing (112) privilege. If it is considered as a reservation
made by Great Britain, it will reverse (113) the facts assumed by us
in relation to that privilege.

The (H4) third article of the treaty of 1783, respecting the fish
eries, and the (115) eighth article of that treaty, respecting the Missis
sippi, had not the slightest reference to each other, and were placed
as remote, the one from the other, as the limits of that treaty could
well admit. Whatever, therefore, (116) was the cause of inserting
the fishing liberty, whether it was a voluntary and gratuitous grant
on the part of Great Britain, or extorted from her as a condition
on which the peace depended, it could have had no relation (117) to
the free navigation of the Mississippi. Besides, the article relative

DUPLICATE.] 77

but, certainly, the majority believed 0°3) themselves ta be permitted,
their own construction to the contrary notwithstanding, to offer a Very expli
cit proposition, with regard to the navigation of its principal

(104) river ; now, this offer I considered, for the reasons just suggested, not to
he a violation of the instructions in question, but I considered it to be against
both the letter and the spirit of our instructions of the l5th of April, 1813. By
these instructions we were explicitly and implicitly directed "to avoid any
stipulation which might restrain the United States from excluding the British
traders from the navigation of the lakes and rivers, exclusively within our own
jurisdiction." This instruction applied with the greater force to the Mississippi,
because, as it is believed, it was the only river to which it could apply.

While I believed, therefore, that we were permitted to offer a proposition, re
lative to the fishing liberty ; and that, in treating concerning this liberty, or in
discussing our claim to it, we in no way violated our instructions, nor affected
the "enoral rights which we were forbidden to bring into discussion; I did be
lieve, and do still believe, that we were expressly and unequivocally forbidden
to offer or to renew a stipulation tor me free navigation, by the British, of the
Mississippi, a river within our exclusive jurisdiction.

Considering, therefore, the felling liberty to be entirely at an.
end, without a new stipulation for its revival ; and believing that
we were entirely free to discuss the terms and conditions of such a
stipulation, I did not object to the article proposed by us, because
any article on the subject was unnecessary, or contrary to our in
structions, but 1 objected specially to that article, because, by con
ceding (105) in it, to Great Britain, the free navigation of the Mississippi,
(106) we not only directly violated our instructions, but we offered, in my esti
mation, a price mut-.h above its value, and which could not justly be given.

In no view of the subject, could I discover any (107) analogy 01
relation beetweeu the two objects ; and the only reason for connecting
them, and making them mutual equivalents for each other, appeared
to be, because they were both found in the treaty of 1783. If that
treaty was abrogated by the war, as I consider it to have been, any
connection between its parts must have ceased, and the liberty of
navigating the Mississippi, by British subjects, must, at least, be
completely at an end; for it will not, I trust, be attempted to con
tinue it by a UQ& prescriptive title, or to consider in as a (108) reserva
tion made by the United States from any grant of sovereignty, which,
at the treaty of peace, they accorded to Great Britain. If, indeed,
it were such a reservation, it must have been intended for (110) our
benefit, and of (111) course, no equivalent for the fishing (112, privilege,
likewise for our benefit. If it is considered as a reservation made by
Great Britain, it will reverse (113) all the facts assumed by us ia re
lation to that privilege.

The -114) third article of the treaty of 1783, respecting the fish-
eries, and the (-H5> eighth of that treaty, respecting the Mississippi,
had not the slightest reference to each other, and were placed as
remote, the one from the other, as the limits of that treaty could
well admit ; whatever, therefore, (116- might have been the cause of
inserting the fishing liberty, whether it was a voluntary and gratui
tous grant on the part of Great Britain, or extorted from her as a
condition, on which the peace depended, it could have had no re
lation ''H7) with the free navigation of the Mississippi. Besides,, the

10

7# [PRIVATE.]

$o fchis river must, from the evident views of the parties at the
time, from (118) their supposed relations to each other, and from their
fcnown relations to a third (119) power, as to this river, have been con
sidered of mutual and equal advantage, and furnished no subject
for compensation or adjustment in any other provision of that treaty,
Both parties believed that this river touched the territories of
both, and that, of course, both had a right to its navigation. As
Spain possessed both banks of this river, to a considerable distance
from its mouth, and one of its banks nearly throughout its whole
extent, both parties had an interest in uniting to prevent that power
from obstructing its navigation. Had not the article been intended
to engage the parties in relation to Spain, they (120) would, probably,
have limited it to the navigation of the river (121) as far as their own
territories extended on it, and not have stipulated for this naviga
tion to the ocean, which necessarily carried it through the exclusive
territories of Spain.

If the circumstances had been, in fact, such as the parties at the
time believed them to be, and with a view to which they acted ; or
had these circumstances subsequently experienced no radical
ohange ; Great Britain would have gained now no more than she
would have granted by the (122) revival of the article in relation to
(123) the Mississippi, and would not, any more than in 1783, have ac
knowledged any equivalent to be conferred by it for our liberty
relative to the fisheries. The circumstances, however, assumed
by the parties, at the time, in relation to Great Britain, and from
which her rights were deduced, have not only, in part, been disco
vered not to have existed, but those which did exist have been en
tirely changed by subsequent events. It has (124) been ascertained
that the territories assigned to Great Britain, no where, in fact,
reached the Mississippi ; and the acquisition of Louisiana by the
United States (125) has forever removed the Spanish jurisdiction
that river.

The whole consideration, therefore, on the part of Great Britain,
whether derived from her territorial rights, or from her part of the
reciprocal obligations relative to Spain, having entirely failed, our
engagements, entered into 011 account of that consideration, may be
fairly construed to have terminated with it.

In this view of the subject, Great Britain could have had no title
to tfce navigation of the Mississippi, even if a war had not taken
place between the parties. To renew, therefore, the claims of
Great Britain, under that article, subject to this construction, would
be granting her nothing ; and to renew that article, independent of
this construction, and without any reference to the circumstances
that attended its origin, in 1783, or to the events which have since
occurred in relation to it, would be granting her advantages not
only entirely (126)uni-lateral, as it relates to the article itself, butf
(127) as I believe, of much greater importance than any which we
could derive from the liberty relative to the fisheries

79

article relative to this river, must, from the evident views of the
parties at the time, from (H8) their relations to each other, and from
their known relations to a third (119) power, have been considered of
mutual and equal advantage, and furnished no subject for compen
sation or adjustment in any other provision of that treaty.

Both parties believed that this river touched the territories of
both, and that of course both had a right to its navigation. As Spain
possessed both banks of this river to a considerable distance from
its mouth, and one of its banks nearly throughout its whole extent,
both parties had an interest in uniting to prevent that power from
obstructing its navigation. Had not the article been intended to en
gage the parties in relation to Spain, they (120) probably would have
limited it to the navigation of the|river, (121) so far as their own terri
tories extended on it, and not have stipulated for its navigation to
the ocean, which necessarily carried it through the exclusive ter
ritories of Spain. If the circumstances had been, in fact, such as
the parties at the time believed them to be, and with a view to
which they acted, or had these circumstances subsequently expe
rienced no radical change, Great Britain would have gained now,
no more than she would have granted by the (122) renewal of the
article in relation to (123) the navigation of the Mississippi, and would
not, any more than in 1785, have acknowledged any equivalent to
be conferred by it, for our liberty relative to the fisheries. The
circumstances, however, assumed by the parties at the time, in re
lation to Great Britain, and from which her rights were deduced.,
have not only, in part, been since discovered not to have existed,
but those which did exist have been entirely changed by subse
quent events.

It has (124) been clearly ascertained, that the territories, assigned to
Great Britain, no where, in fact, reached the Mississippi ; and, the ac
quisition of Louisiana, by the United States, (125) had forever removed
the Spanish jurisdiction from that river. The whole consideration,
therefore, on the part of Great Britain, whether derived from her
territorial rights, or from her part of the reciprocal obligations, re~
iative to Spain, having entirely failed, our engagements, entered
into, on account of that consideration, may be fairly construed to
have terminated with it.

In this view of the subject, Great Britain could have had no title
to the navigation of the Mississippi, even if a war had not taken
place between the parties. To renew, therefore the claims of
Great Britain, under that article, subject to this construction, would
be granting her nothing ; and, to renew that article, independent of
this construction, and without any reference to the circumstances
that attended its origin in 1783, or to the events which have since
occurred in relation to it, would be granting her advantages not
only entirely (126) unilateral, as it relates to the article itself, but,
(127) as I believed, of much greater importance than any which we
could derive from the liberty relative to the fisheries.

80 [PRIVATE.]

If the article which we (128) offered merely intended to rescue the
third and eighth articles of the treaty of 1783, from the operation
of the present war, and to continue them precisely as they were
immediately prior 10 this war, the third article being then in full
force, and the eighth article being no longer (129) obligatory, we
should have attempted to exchange, like General Drumrnond, the
dead for the living.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the British government,
should, in suspecting such an intention, (130) have rejected our pro
position. I was opposed, however, to making the proposition, not
only because 1 was convinced that it was (131) offered with no such
intention, but because I believed it would give to Great Britain
the free navigation of the Mississippi, under circumstances, and
evidently for an object, which would place it on very distinct
grounds from those on which it was placed by the treaty of 1783.

The whole of the Mississippi being now exclusively within the
acknowledged jurisdiction of the United States, a simple renewal
of the British right to navigate it would place that right beyond
the reach of the war, and of every other previous circumstance
which might have impaired or terminated it; and the (132) power
to grant, on our part, being now complete, the right to enjoy,
(133) on hers, under our grant, must be complete also.

It would be absurd to suppose that any thing impossible was in
tended, and that Great Britain was to be allowed to navigate the
Mississippi (134) precisely as she (135) could have navigated it imme
diately after the treaty of 1783 ; as if her territories extended to
it, and as if Spain was (136) in entire possession of one of its banks
and of a considerable portion of the other. The (13?) revival of the
British right to navigate the Mississippi would be, (138) under exist
ing circumstances, a new and complete grant to her, measured by
these circumstances, and thence embracing not only the entire free
dom of the whole extent of (139) that river, but the unrestrained access

to it across our territories. If we did not intend (14o) this, we intended
nothing which Great Britain could accept ; and, whatever else
(14*1) might have been intended, if not at once rejected by her, would hereafter
have been the subject of new and endless controversy. When, how
ever, we connected the revival of the navigation of the Mississippi
with the revival of the (142) liberty of taking and curing fish within
the British jurisdiction, two things, which never before had any re
lation to each other, we evidently meant, if we acted (143) in good
faith, not only to concede, as well as to obtain something, but also
to be understood as conceding an equivalent for what we obtained.

In thus offering the navigation of the Mississippi, and the access
to it through our territories, as an equivalent for the fishing liberty,
we not only placed both on ground entirely different from that
(144) in which they respectively stood in the treaty of 1783, and
acted somewhat inconsistently with our own reasoning relative tc

DUPLICATE.

[

If the article which we (128) offered was merely intended to rescue
the third and eighth articles of the treaty of 1783, from the opera
tion of the present war, and to continue them precisely as they
were immediately prior, to this war, the third article being then in
full force, and the eighth article being no longer (129) operative, we
.should have attempted to exchange, like General Drurnrnond, the
dead for the living. It is not surprising, therefore, that the British
government, in suspecting such an intention, (130) should have re
jected our proposition.

1 was opposed, however, to making the proposition, not only be
cause I was convinced that it \v;ts (131) made with no such inten
tion, but because I believed it would give to Great Britain the free
navigation of the Mississippi, under circumstances, and evidently
for an object, which would place it on very distinct grounds from
those on which it was placed by the treaty of 1783.

The whole of the Mississippi being now exclusively within the
acknowledged jurisdiction of the United States, a simple renewal
of the British right to navigate it would place that right beyond the
reach of the war ; and every other previous circumstance which
might have impaired or terminated it, and the (132) right to grant,
on our part, being now complete, the right to enjoy, (133) on the part
of Great Britain, must be complete also. It would be absurd to sup-
pose that any thing impossible was intended, and that Great Britain
was to be allowed to navigate the Mississippi (134)fcnly as she
(135) would have navigated it immediately after the treaty of 1783,
as if her territories extended to it, and as if Spain was (136) in the
entire possession of one of its banks, and of a considerable portion
of the other. The (137) recognition of the British right to navigate
the Mississippi, would be,(l3&) under existing circumstances, a new and
complete grant to her, measured by these circumstances, and,
thence, embracing not only the entire freedom of the whole extent

of (139) the river and its tributary waters, hut unrestrained access to it
across our territories. If we did not intend (1^0) to offer this, we in
tended to offer nothing which Great Britain could accept ; and what
ever else (1^1) we might have intended to offer, if not at once rejected by her,
would at least have been, hereafter, the subject of new and endless con
troversy.

When, however, we connected the revival of the navigation of
the Mississippi with the revival of the (142) privilege of taking and
curing fish within the British jurisdiction, two things which never
before had any relation to-each other, we evidently meant, if we
acted (143) with good faith, not only to concede, as well as to ob
tain something, but also to be understood as conceding an equiva
lent for what we obtained.

In thus offering the navigation of the Mississippi, and the access
to it through our territories, as an equivalent for the fishing liberty,
we not only placed both on ground entirely different from that
(144) on which they respectively stood in the treaty of 1783, and
acted somewhat inconsistently with our own reasoning, relative to

82 [PRIVATE.]

the origin and immortality of the latter, but we offered to concede
(145) much more than we could hope to gain (146) by the arrangement,
with whatever view its comparative effects might be estimated.

From the year 1783, to the commencement of the present \var,
the actual advantages derived from the fishing privilege by the peo
ple of the United States, were, according to the* best information
that (147) I can obtain on the subject, very inconsiderable, and an
nually experiencing a voluntary diminution. ,

It was discovered that the obscurity and humidity of the atmos
phere, owing to almost incessant fogs, in the high northern latitudes,
where this privilege was chiefly located, prevented the effectual
curing of fish in those regions, and, consequently, lessened very
much the value of the (148) liberty of taking them there. By far
the greatest part of the fish taken by our fishermen before the pre
sent war. was (1*9) caught in the open sea or (150) upon our own
coasts, and cured on (151) our own shores. This branch of the fish
eries has been found to be inexhaustible, and has been pursued
with so much more certainty and despatch than the privileged por
tion (152) within the British jurisdiction, that it has not only been ge
nerally preferred by our fishermen, but would probably, on longer
experience, have been almost universally used by them. It was
to be believed, therefore, that a discontinuance of the privilege of
taking and curing fish, within the British jurisdiction, would not,
at all, diminish the aggregate quantity taken by the people of the
United States, or (1J3) very materially vary the details of the business.
That part of the fisheries which would (154) still have belonged to us
as a nation, being exhaustless, would afford an ample field for all
the capital and industry hitherto employed in the general business
of fishing, or merchandise of fish, and on that field might the few
fishermen, who had hitherto used the liberty of taking and curing
fish within the jurisdiction of Great Britain, exert their skill and
labour without any serious inconvenience. (155) This liberty, lia
ble (156) in a very considerable degree by the terms in which it was
granted, to be curtailed by the government and subjects of a foreign
state ; already growing into voluntary disuse by our own citizens, on
account of the difficulties inseparable from it, and absolutely inca
pable of extension ; was totally unnecessary to us for subsistence
or occupation, and afforded, (157) in no way, any commercial facility
or political advantage. This privilege, too, while it was thus o£
little (158) or no utility to us, cost Great Britain literally (159) nothing.

The free navigation of the Mississippi, with the necessary access
to it, is a grant of a very different character. If it was not hereto
fore used by Great Britain, it was, perhaps, because she did not
consider herself entitled to it, or because the circumstances of the
moment suspended its practical utility. The treaty of 1783 stipu
lated for her the navigation of this river, under the presumption
that her territories extended to it, and, of course, could not intend
to give her an access to it through our territories. The British
possessions to the westward of Lake Erie, being almost entirely

[DUPLICATE.] 83

the origin and immortality of the latter, but we offered to concede
(145) much more than we could hope to gain (l'*G) by the arrangement.

From the year 1783, to the commencement of the present war,
the actual advantages derived from the fishing privilege hy the
people of the United States, were, according to the hest informa
tion that U*7) we could obtain on the subject, very inconsiderable
and annually experiencing a voluntary diminution.

It was discovered that the obscurity and humidity of the atmos
phere, owing to almost incessant fogs in the high northern latitudes,
where this privilege was chiefly located, prevented the effectual
curing of tish in those regions, and, consequently, lessened very
much the value of the (148) privilege of taking them there. By far
the greatest part of the fish taken by our fishermen before the
present war, was (l 49) taken in the open sea, or (15o)on our own
roasts, and curqd on (151) our shores. This branch of the fisheries
has been found to be inexhaustible, and has been pursued with so
much more certainty and despatch than the privileged portion
(152) within British jurisdiction, that it has not only been generally
preferred by our fishermen, but would, probably, on longer expe
rience, have been almost universally used by them. It was to be
believed, therefore, that a discontinuance of the privilege of taking,
and curing fish within the British jurisdiction, would not, at all,
diminish the aggregate quantity taken by the people of the United
States, or (153) vary materially the details ot'the business. That puit
of the fisheries which would (154) still belong to us as a nation, being
exhaustless, would afford an ample field for all the capital and in
dustry hitherto employed in the general business of fishing, or mer
chandise offish ; and on that field might the few fishermen who had,
hitherto, used the liberty of taking and curing fish within the ju
risdiction of Great Britain, exert their skill and labour without any
serious inconvenience. O55) That liberty, liable, (156) to a very
considerable degree, by the terms in which it was granted, to be
curtailed by the government and subjects of a foreign state, already
growing into voluntary disuse by eur own citizens, on account of
the difficulties inseparable from it, and absolutely incapable of ex
tension, was totally unnecessary to us for subsistence or occupa
tion, and afforded, (157) in no honest way, either commercial facility.
or political advantage. This privilege, too, while it was thus oif
little (158) and precarious utility to us, cost Great Britain literally
(159) miking.

The free navigation of the Mississippi, with the necessary access
to it, is a grant of a very different character. If it was not, here
tofore, used by Great Britain, it was, perhaps, because she did not
consider herself entitled to it; or because the circumstances of the
moment suspended its practical utility. The treaty of 1783 stipu
lated, for her, the navigation of this river, under the presumption
that her territories extended to it, and of course, could not intend
fo give her access to it through our territories. The l-riti«h pos-
?ps«ions to the westward of Lake Erie being almost entirely ians«t-

iJ4 [PRIVATE.!

^unsettled, rendered, perhaps, the free navigation of the Mississippi,
for the moment, of little advantage to her, particularly as her right
to reach it was at least equivocal ; and as, by another treaty, she
could carry on trade with our Indians.

This navigation might, indeed, for a long time to come, be of lit
tle use to her for all the (160) legitimate purposes of transit and in
tercourse ; but every change that could take place in this respect
must increase its importance to her; while every change in the
fishing liberty (161) would be to the disadvantage of the United
States.

The freedom (162) of the Mississippi, however, is not to be esti
mated by the mere legitimate uses that would be maJe of it. The
unrestrained and undefined access which would have been inferred
from the article which we proposed, (103) would have placed in the
hands of Great Britain and her subjects all the facilities of commu
nication with our own citizens, and with the Indians inhabiting the
immense regions of our western territory. It is not in the nature
of things that these facilities should not have been abused for un
righteous purposes. A vast field for contraband (Iti^) and intrigue
would have been laid open, and our western territories would have
swarmed with British smugglers and British emissaries. The re
venue would have been defrauded by the illicit introduction of
English merchandise, and the lives of our citizens, and the security
of a valuable portion of our (165) country exposed to Indian hostilities,.
excited by an uncontrolled British influence. (166) if our in
structions to guard against such an influence forbid us to renew the British li
berty to trade with our Indians, we certainly violated the sp;;if of those instruc
tions in offering the means of exercising that influence witi still greater facility
and effect than could result from that liberty.

What was there in the fishing liberty, either of gain to us, or IGSJ-
to Great Britain, to warrant, in consideration of it, a grant to her of
puch mean-; of fraud arid annoyance ? What justice or equality was
there in exposing to all the horrors ot savage warfare the unoffend
ing citizens of an immense tract of territory, (167) not at all benefited
by the fishing privilege, merely to provide for the doubtful accom
modation of a (168) few fishermen, in a remote quarter, entirely ex
empt from the danger ?

Such have been the reasons which induced me to differ from a
majority of my colleagues with regard to the article in question,
and which I trust Will be (169) thought sufficient, at least, to vindicate
my motives.

The unfeigned respect which I feel for the integrity, talents, and
judgment of those gentlemen, would restrain me from opposing
them on slight grounds, an,d a deference for their opinions makes
me almost fear that I have erred in dissenting from them on the
present occasion. I can but rejoice, however, that the article, as

[DUPLICATE,] 35

tied, rendered; perhaps, the free navigation of the Mississippi, for
the moment, of little advantage to her ; particularly, as her right
to reach it was, at least, equivocal ; and, as by another treaty, she
could carry on trade with our Indians.

This navigation might, indeed, for a long time to come, be of
little use to her for all the (160) legitimate purposes of transit and
intercourse ; but every change that could take place in this respect
must increase its importance to her, while every change in the
fishing liberty (161) must be to the disadvantage of the United
States.

The freedom (162) of navigating the Mississippi, however, is not
to be estimated by the mere legitimate uses that would be made of
it. The unrestrained and undefined access, which would have
been inferred from the article which we proposed, (163) must have
placed in the hands of Great Britain and her subjects, all the facili
ties of communication with our own citizens, and with the Indians
inhabiting the immense regions of our western territory. It is not
in the nature of things that these facilities should not have been
abused for unrighteous purposes. A vast field for contraband (164)
and for intrigue would have been laid open, and our western territo
ries would have swarmed with British smugglers and British em
issaries. The revenue would have been defrauded by the illicit
introduction of English merchandise, and the lives of our citizens,
and the security of a valuable portion of our (165) country, would
have been exposed to Indian hostility, excited by an uncontrolled Bri
tish influence. (166) If our instructions of the 15th of April, 1813, already
cited, forbid us, in order to guard against such an influence, to renew the treaty
of 1794, " allowing the North West Company and British traders to carry on
trade, with the Indian tribes within our limits, a privilege, the pernicious effects
of which have been most sensibly felt in the present war," we certainly violated
the spirit of those instructions in offering the means of exercising that influence
with still greater facility and effect than could result from that privilege.

What was there in the fishing liberty, either of gain to us or loss
to Great Britain, to warrant, in consideration of it, a grant to her
of such means of fraud and annoyance ? What justice or equality
was there, in exposing to all the horrors of savage warfare, the
unoffending citizens of an immense tract of territory, (167) not at all,
or but faintly, benefited by the fishing privilege, merely to provide
for the doubtful accommodation of a (168) few fishermen, annually de
creasing in number, in a remote quarter, and entirely exempt from
the danger.

Such have been the reasons which induced me to differ from a
majority of my colleagues with regard to the article in question,
and which, 1 trust, will be (169) deemed sufficient, at least, to vindi
cate my motives.

'I1 he unfeigned respect which I feel for the integrity, talents,
and judgment, of those gentlemen, would restrain me from oppos
ing them on slight grounds, and a deference for their opinions makes
me almost fear that I have erred in dissenting from them on the
present occasion. I can but rejoice, however, that the article, as

n

#6

proposed bj us, was rejected by Great Britain ; whatever were
her reasons for rejecting it ; whether, as above suggested. (170) she
suspected some tacit reservation, or want of faith on our part, or sup
posed, from the price we at once bid for the fishing privilege, that
we overrated its value, and might concede for it even more than
(171) the navigation of the Mississippi, with all its accessary advan
tages.

(172) We are still at liberty to negotiate for that privilege in a treaty of com
merce, should it be found expedient, and to offer for it an equivalent, fair in its
comparative value, and just in its relative effects. In any other way, I trust,
we shall not consent to purchase its renewal.

I have the honour to be, with profound respect,

Sir, your faithful and obedient servant,

JON A. RUSSELL.

My argument to demonstrate the abrogation of the treaty of 1783, by the pre
sent war, and the consequent discontinuance of the fishing privilege, will, I trust,
not be ascribed to any hostility to those who were interested in that privilege. I
have been always ready, and am still ready, to make every sacrifice for the pre
servation of that privilege which its nature and utility can justify; but I have
conscientiously believed that the free navigation of the Mississippi was pregnant
with too much mischief to be offered indirectly under our construction of the
treaty, or directly, as a new equivalent for the liberty of taking and curing fish
within the British jurisdiction.

We had three other ways of proceeding :

First. To contend for the indestructibility of the treaty of 1783, thence infer-
ing the continuance of the fishing privilege, without saying any thing about the
navigation of the Mississippi, which would have reserved our right of contesting
this navigation on the grounds I have mentioned, specially applicable to it.

Secondly. To have considered the treaty at an end, and offered a reasonable
equivalent, wherever it might be found, for the fishing privilege.

Thirdly. To have made this liberty a sine qua mm of peace, as embraced by
the principle of status ante bellum.

To either of these propositions I would have assented, bull could not consent
to grant to revive the British right to the navigation of the Mississippi, in or.de/
• o procure or preserre the fishina; liberty.

[DUPLICATE.]

87

proposed by us, was rejected by Great Britain, whatever were her
reasons for rejecting it ; whether, as above suggested, (170) she might
have suspected some tacit reservation, or want of faith, on our part ;
or supposed, from the price we at once bid for the fishing privi
lege, th.it we overrated its value, and might concede for it even
more than (171) the free navigation of the Mississippi, with all its ac
cessary advantages.

(172) Let me not, in any thing which I have said, be misunderstood. In
judging on the interests of the great whole, I am not disposed to undervalue the
interests on any of the constituent parts. No one can more highly appreciate
than I do, a branch of industry which not only adds to national wealth, but
<eems to create it. .Nor can any one more warmly admire the usefulness and
patriotism of those citizens who are engaged in it, and who have never ceased
to deserve well of the republic. In times of peace they bring home, amidst con
flicting elements, the treasures of the deep to enrich their country ; and in times
of war they contribute, by their skill and intrepidity, to- her defence and glory.
Hut, in our country, where all are equal, the essential security and prosperity of
the many must be preferred to the convenience and minor interests of the few.
In giving this preference, I will fiankly confess I had to silence early prepos-
sions and local predilections, and to listen to the councils of a more enlarged
patriotism; and io this patriotism I dare appeal for my vindication, not only
with those to whom I am officially responsible, but with those with whom I am
more immediately connected in society, and whose interests may be considered
to have been unfavourably affected by the views which I have deemed it to be
my duty to adopt. I have always been willing to make any sacrifice for the
fishing privilege, which its nature, or comparative importance could justify, but
I conscientiously believe that the free navigation of the Mississippi, and th»
access to it which we expressly offered, were pregnant with too much mischief
to be offered, indirectly, under our construction of the treaty ; or, directly, as
they were in fact offered, as a new equivalent for the liberty of taking and dry
ing fish within the British jurisdiction.

frankl a

Great Britain, calculating on the
h aTsent •<
the"mist'ressot EToi

To aHaTrdrm he

aters ; and that_she did notr in this event

ofiquesT'under the terms"ofthe treaty of Ghent.
sters ha"d, Ulinosl fium tne" 'commencement of the negotiation, not

iute

Her

only affected to consider our acquisition of Louisiana as evidence of a spirit of
agrandizement, but insinuated a defect in our title to it. Expecting, therefore,
to obtain the free navigation of the Mississippi for nothing, she would not con
sent to part even with the fishing liberty as an equivalent. If she be disap-
poi nted in her views nn Louisiana, »"'» I tr-ist in God and the valour "ok trie"
wesfthat she will be, I shall not be surprised if, here?^tprt *^p Srant us the.
fi £ hifig privilege, wlncn Costs her absolutely nothing w'thfuit Tmj-T"rclrnvTJMii'>~

AnuijTrateT^ve are still at liberty to negotiate for that privilege in a treaty
of commerce, and to offer foi it an equivalent, fair in its comparative value,
and just in its relative effects ; and to negotiate for it in this w;iy is evidently
more wise than to demand it as a condition of peace, or to offer for it a price
beyond its worth, and which, however excessive, runs the hazard of being re
fused, merely by the operation of those unaccommodating passions which are
inevitably engendered by a state of war.

I have the honour to be, with the most profound respect, sir, your faithful
and obedient servant, JOJVA. RUSSELL.

To the Hou'ble JAMES MONROE,

Sec'yoJ State of the United States, &c. kc, &c.

A true copy of a paper left by Jonathan Russell, esq. at the De
partment of State, 22d April, 1822, to be communicated to the
House of Representatives of the United States.

J. Q. ADAMS, Secretary of State .

REMARKS

On a Paper delivered by Mr. Jonathan Russell, at the Department of State, on
the 22<f of April, 1822, to be communicated to the House of Representatives,
as the duplicate of a Letter written by him at Paris, the llth of February t
1815, to the then Secretary of State, and as the Letter called for by the Resolu*
tion of the House, of 19th April, 1822.

The first remark that presents itself upon this duplicate, is, that
it is not a copy of the letter really written by Mr. Russell, at Paris,
on the llth of February, 1815, to the Secretary of State, and re
ceived by him. The latter was marked "private," and, as such,
was not upon the files of the Department of State ; and, although
of the same general purport and tenor with the so-called duplicate,
differed from it in several highly significant passages, of which the
following parallel, extracted from the two papers, presents one
example :

ORIGINAL.

" How far we conformed to
this instruction, with regard to
the general right to Louisiana, it
is not necessary for me here to
inquire ; but certainly the majo
rity believed (1^3) themselves per
mitted to offer a very explicit pro
position with regard to the navi
gation of its principal (104) river.
/ believed, with them, that we were so
permitted, and tnat we were, likewise,
permitted to offer a proposition relative
to the fishing liberty, and, had the oc
casion required it, to make proposals
concerning the trade to the British
East Indies. I was persuaded, that
treating relative to these privileges, or
discussing the obligation or expediency
of granting or withholding them, re
spectively, violated, in no way, our
instructions, or affected the general
rights which we were forbidden to
bring into discussion,''

DUPLICATE.

" How far we conformed to
this instruction, with regard to
the general right to Louisiana, it
is not necessary for me here to
inquire ; but certainly the majo
rity believed (103) themselves to be
permitted, their own construction to the
contrary notwithstanding, to offer a

very explicit proposition with
regard to the navigation of its
principal (104) river; now, this of
fer, I considered, for the reasons just
suggested, not to be a violation of the
instructions in question, but I consi
dered it to be against both the letter
and the spirit of our other instructions
of the 15th of April, 1813. By these
instructions, we were explicitly and
implicitly directed * to avoid any sti
pulation which might restrain the Unit
ed States from excluding the British
traders from the navigation of the lakes
and rivers exclusively within our own
jurisdiction^ This instruction applied
with the greater force to the .Missis
sippi, because, as it is believed, it was
the only river to which it could apply.
" While I believed, therefore, that
we were permitted to offer a proposi
tion relative to the fishing liberty, and
that in treating concerning this liberty,
or in discussing our claim to it, we in
no way violated our instructions, nor
affected the general rights which we
were forbidden to bring into discussion,
3 did believe, und do still believe, that

89

DRIGINAI, DUPLICATE.

we were expressly and unequivocally
forbidden to offer, or to renew, a stipu
lation for the free navigation, by tb«
British, of the Mississippi, a river
within our exclusive jurisdiction.'*

It is here seen that, while in the original letter Mr. Russell did,
with the majority of his colleagues, believe that we were permitted
by our instructions to make the proposition with regard to the na
vigation of the Mississippi, as well as a proposition relative to the
fishing liberty, he had, when writing the duplicate, brought himself
to the belief, not only that we were not so permitted, but that he
had, even at Ghent, considered it as a direct violation both of the
letter and spirit of our explicit and implicit instructions of 15th
April, 1813. The solution of this difference in the mind of Mr.
Russell, between the writing of the original and the duplicate of
his letter, may be found in this circumstance. The proposition re
lating to the navigation of the Mississippi, and the fishery, was made
to the British plenipotentiaries on the 1st of December, 1814. It
had been discussed at the meetings of the American mission, on the
preceding 28th and 29th of November. On the 24th of that month,
the American plenipotentiaries had received a letter of instructions
from the Secretary of State, dated 19th October, 1814, and con
taining the following passages :

•* It has been judged proper to communicate to Congress so
" much of the instructions' given to you by this Department, as
44 would show the terms on which you were authorized to make
44 peace. These, as well as your communications, have been print-
" ed, and several copies are now forwarded to you, as it is believed
" they may be usefully disposed of in Europe. Should any circum
stance have unexpectedly prolonged the negotiation, and you find
*' the British commissioners disposed to agree to the status ante bel-
'* Zwm, you will understand that you are authorized to make it the
"basis of a treaty."

Now, the status ante bellum, upon which we were thus expressly
and unequivocally permitted to conclude a treaty, included not only
the recognition of the entire treaty of peace of 1783, but the re
vival of the first ten articles of the treaty of 1794 ; not only the
freedom to the British to navigate the Mississippi, but free ingress
into our territories, and free trade with our Indians. And so en
tirely was that part of the instructions of 15th April, 1813, novr
cited by Mr. Russell, considered by the President as cancelled,
that it was omitted from that copy, which had been communicated
to Congress, of " so much of the instructions as would show the
terms on which we were authorized to make peace, "and of which
several printed copies were thus forwarded to us. (Sec WaiCs
State Papers, vol. IX, p. 339-358.)

It was scarcely possible that, within the compass of one week,
Mr. Russell should have forgotten the receipt of the instruction of

19th October, 1814, fresh from Washington ; nor at all possible
that he should have considered us as then bound by the instruction
of 15th April, 1813, to which, in his duplicate, he now so emphati
cally refers. The llth of February, 1815, was yet so recent to
the date of the conclusion of the treaty, that, in writing the original
of his letter, the recollection of the new instructions of October,
1814, had doubtless not escaped him. But when the duplicate was
written, other views had arisen ; and their aspects are discovered
in the aggravation of charges against the memory of a dead, and the
character of living colleagues.

But whether the real sentiments of iVlr. Russell, at Paris, on the
llth of February, 1815, with regard to the transactions to which
this passage relates, are to be taken as indicated in the original, or
in the duplicate, certain it is that the vehement objections to the
proposed article, which, in the duplicate, appear to have made so
deep an impression on his mind, had as little been made known to
his colleagues at the time of the discussions at Ghept, as they ap
pear to have been to himself, when writing the original of the same
letter.

The proposal, to which the whole of Mr. Russell's letter, in both
Us various readings, relates, was made to the British plenipotentia
ries, not by a majority, but by the whole of the American mission,
including Mr. Russell, as may be seen by the protocol of the confer
ence of the 1st December, 1814, and by the letter from the Ameri
can to the British plenipotentiaries, of 14th December, 1814. In
that letter, already communicated to the House, the American ple
nipotentiaries, referring to the article in question, expressly say :
*' To such an article, which they viewed as merely declaratory, the
undersigned had no objection, and have offered to accede :" and to
that letter the name of Mr. Russell is subscribed.

At the time when the letter from Paris was written, or within a
few days thereafter, all the colleagues, whose conduct it so severe
ly censures, in relation to measures, to which Mr. Russell's sanction
and signature stood equally pledged with their own, were at Paris,
and in habits of almost daily intercourse with him. They little sus
pected the colouring which he was privately giving, without com
munication of it to them, of their conduct and opinions, to the head*
of the government, by whom he and they had been jointly employ
ed in a public trust of transcendent importance ; or the uses to
which this denunciation of them was afterwards to be turned.

Had the existence of this letter from Paris been, at the time when
it was written, known to the majority of the mission, at whose pro
posal this offer had been made ; to that majority, who believed that
the article was perfectly compatible with their instructions, con
sistent with the argument maintained by the mission, important for
securing a very essential portion of the righttothe fisheries, and in
nowise affecting unfavourably the interest of any section of the
Union, they would doubtless have felt that its contents called much
more forcibly upon them, to justify to their own government them-

91

selves and their motives for making that proposal, than Mr. Rus
sell could be called upon to justify himself for merely having been
in the minority upon the question whether an article should be pro
posed, which he did actually concur in proposing, and which the
adverse party had not thought worth accepting.

The writer of these remarks is not authorized to speak for his
colleagues of th» majority ; one of whom is now alike beyond the
reach of censure and panegyrick ; and the other, well able, when
he shall meet this disclosure, to defend himself. But he believes
of them what he affirms of himself, that had they entertained of the
projected article, and of the argument maintained by the mission,
ihe sentiments avowed in either of the variations of Mr. Russell's
letter from Paris, no consideration would have induced them to con
cur in proposing it, or to subscribe their names to a paper declar
ing that they had no objection to it.

Still less, if possible, would they have thought it reconcileable
with their duty to their country, had they entertained those senti
ments, to have subscribed, on the 25th of December, 1814, the
joint letter of the mission to the Secretary of State, already com
municated to Congress, and on the same day to have written the
separate and secret letter, fore-announcing that of llth of Februa
ry, 1815, from Paris.

Besides the memorable variation between the original and du
plicate of the letter of llth February, 1815, which has been exhi
bited in parallel passages extracted from them, there are others not
less remarkable. In the course of the duplicate, the total and un
qualified abandonment of the rights of the poor fishermen, is com
pensated by an eloquent panegyric upon their usefulness to the
country, their hardy industry, their magnanimous enterprise, and
their patriotic self-devotion. Little of this appears in the original ;
and that little, in the after-thought of a postscript. Towards the
close of the duplicate, the spirit of prophecy takes possession of the
writer. By his '* trust in God, and in the ralour of the West," he
foresees the victory of General Jackson at New-Orleans. He fore
sees the convention between the United States and Great Britain,
of October, 1818. In the original there is no prophecy — no " trust
in God, and in the valour of the West."

With all these varieties the two copies of the letter form an ela
borate and deeply meditated dissertation to prove :

1. That the treaty between the United States and Great Britain,
of 1783, the treaty which upon its face is a treaty of independ
ence, a treaty of boundaries, a treaty of partition, as well as a
treaty of peace — was, in his estimation, all his signatures at
Ghent to the contrary notwithstanding, a mere treaty of peace,
totally abrogatevi by the war of 1812.

2. That the same treaty, was a treaty sui generis, consisting of
two parts ; one, of rights appertaining to sovereignty and in
dependence ; and the other, of special grants and privileges ;
of which the former were permanent, and the latter abrogated
by tke war.

92

3. That the principles assumed, and the argument maintained,
by the majority of the Ghent Mission, and to which he had
subscribed his name in all the joint communications of the
Mission, as well to the British plenipotentiaries as to his own
government, were a mass of errors, inconsistencies, and absur
dities.

4. That the offer to the British plenipotentiaries of a right to the
British to navigate the Mississippi, was, in the opinion of the
majority, and also in his own opinion, permitted by our in
structions, and in no ways violated them.

5. That the same offer was directly contrary to the construction
given by the majority to their instructions, and, as he had
always thought, and still thought, contrary to explicit and
implicit, express arid unqualified prohibitions, in those instruc
tions.

6. That the offer of the right to navigate the Mississippi, as an
equivalent for the fisheries, was the offer of an excessive price,
for a privilege worth little or nothing.

7. That, extravagant as that offer (to which he signed a letter
declaring that he had no objection) was, it was rejected by
the adverse party ; because they thought it an offer of the
dead for the living ; or because, they hoped to get still more
for the worthless privilege ; or, because, they expected to
take and keep Louisiana, and thus get the navigation of the
Mississippi for nothing; or, because, they were blinded by the
unhappy passions incident to war ; but that he foresaw, that
they would'nEREAFTER grant all the valuable part of the same
worthless privilege far nothing.

8. That there was no sort of relation whatsoever between a
privilege for the British to navigate in waters within our ju
risdiction, and a privilege for us to fish in waters within Bri
tish jurisdiction ; because one of these privileges had been
stipulated in the third, and the other in the eighth article, of
the treaty of 1783 ; and therefore, that it was absurd to offer
one as an equivalent for the other.

3. Lastly, that the offer to the British of the right to navigate
the Mississippi, was pregnant with mischief to the western
country — to '* the unoffending citizens of an immense tract of
" territory, not at all, or but faintly benefited by the fishing
" privilege, merely to provide for the doubtful accommodation
" of a few fishermen, annually decreasing in number, in a re-
" mote quarter, and entirely exempt from the danger."
Upon most of these points, so far as argument is concerned, it
might, upon the mere statement of Mr. Russell's positions, be left
to his ingenuity to refute itself. His first and second points, with
regard to the character of the treaty of 1783, considered as doc
trines, are evidently inconsistent with each other. The variation
between the original and duplicate of his letter upon the fourth and
fifth points, is something more than inconsistency ; something more

93

even than self-contradiction. The whole letter is a laborious tis
sue of misrepresentation of every part of its subject ; of the con
duct and sentiments of his colleagues who constituted the majority
of the mission ; and of his own conduct and sentiments in opposi
tion to them. It substantially charges them with deliberate and
wanton violation, in the face of his solemn warning, of the positive
and unequivocal instructions of their government, for the sake of
sacrificing tiie interest, the peace, the comfortable existence of the
whole western country, to the doubtful accommodation of a few
eastern fishermen, and in support of a claim to which they had not
the shadow of a right.

1 say it is a tissue of misrepresentations — of the subject, of the
conduct and sentiments of his colleagues, and of his own conduct
in opposition to them.

1. Of the subject. Mr. Russell represents the offer of an article,
granting to the British the right of navigating the Mississippi, as an
equivalent for the grant of a fishing privilege in British jurisdic
tion, as if it had been a separate and insulated proposal of new
grants, in a distinct article, without reference to the state of the ne
gotiation at the time when it was made, to the occasion upon which
it was made, and to the considerations by which it was induced.

Mr. Russell represents the article as if offered under circum
stances, when it was, by both parties, acknowledged that the British
had no claim to territory, to the Mississippi. This is a direct and
positive perversion of the whole statement of the subject.

Mr. Russell represents the offer of a right to navigate the Mis
sissippi, and of access to it from the British territories as general
and unqualified ; as giving access to British traders and British em
issaries to every part of the western country, and to intercourse
with all our Indians. The proposal was, of a limited access from
a single spot of the British territory, to the river, for the purpose
of navigating the river with merchandise, upon which the duties
of import should have been first paid.

In consequence of these misrepresentations, Mr. Russell brings in
British smugglers, British emissaries, and all the horrors of Indian
warfare, upon the western country, as necessary inferences from a
proposal, not that which was made, but that into which it is dis
torted by his misrepresentations.

2. Of the conduct and sentiments of his colleagues.

Mr. Russell represents his colleagues as having deliberately,
and against his declared opinion, violated both the letter and the
spirit of their most explicit and implicit, express and unequivocal,
instructions from their own government. He charges them, also,
with having violated their own construction of their instructions.

It is true that, in another reading of the same letter, purporting
to have been written on the same day, he acquits them entirely of
all violation of their instructions, and declares he had always beea
of that opinion.

12

94

Mr. Russell ascribes to his colleagues opinions which they never
entertained, arguments which they never advanced, and doctrines
which they not only would disclaim with indignation, but diametri
cally opposite to those which they did maintain. He imputes to
them the opinion that the Independence of the United Stares was
derived only from the treaty of peace of 1783, and that all the
rights stipulated by it, in favour of the people of the United States,
were mere grants from the crown of England. This was the
British doctrine, whirh Mr. Russell well knew his colleagues re
jected with disdain, but which he himself countenances by main
taining the British side of (he argument, that the fishing liberty,
stipulated in the treaty of 1783, was abrogated ipso facto by the
war of 1812.

He imputes to them, as an inconsistency with their other imput
ed opinion, that they rested their claim to the fishing privilege,
upon prescription; and this notwithstanding all the light of learn
ing with which he had irradiated them, from the lucid sources of
"jus mer&facuUatis ;" of" ultra memoriam hominis ;" of " nullum
tempus occur ril rcgi ;" and of the imprescriptible character of fish
eries. Of all this not one word was said at Ghent. The majori
ty never asserted the right of the fishing privilege, as resting upon
the right of prescription ; nor had they ever the benefit of Mr.
Russell's learned labours to prove that it was not applicable to the
subject.

3. Of his own conduct and sentiments, in opposition to those of
the majority of his colleagues.

The parallel passages from the original and duplicate of his let
ter remove all necessity for further proof of this. But that is not
all. Throughout the letter, Mr. Russell holds himself forth as
having been the intrepid and inflexible asserter and supporter of
the rights of the West, against the majority of his colleagues ; as
having, by a painful struggle, obtained a conquest over his early
prejudices and local partialities, and enlarged his intellectual facul
ties and patriotism, to become the champion and vindicator of the
interests of the West. Of all this, nothing was made known to his
colleagues of the majority at Ghent. The article to which his
letter conjures up such formidable objections was drawn up and
proposed 10 the mission by a distinguished citizen of the western
country. It was opposed by another citizen from the same section,
of the Union Of the five members of the mission Mr. Russell
was the person who took the least part in the discussion. He nei
ther objected that it was contrary to our instructions, nor depre
ciated the value of the fisheries ; nor painted the dangers of British
smugglers and emissaries, or the horrors of Indian warfare, as im
pending over the unoffending inhabitants of the western country
from the measure. He gave, it may be, a silent vote against pro
posing the article ; and, when it was determined by the majority
to propose it, concurred in proposing it ; was present at the con
ferences with the British plenipotentiaries when it was proposed

95

Cft and discussed with them, and heard from thorn the reasons which
induced them to reject it, which reasons did not embrace one of"
those which he has so severely tasked his sagacity to devise for
them ; hut, plainly and simply, because they said it was clogged
with conditions which made it of no value to them, or, at least, not
of value to induce them to concede that our fishing liberties, within
British jurisdiction, should continue, in return : and he afterwards
signed a letter to the British plenipotentiaries, together with all the
other members of the mission, declaring that they had no objection
to the article, considering it as merely declaratory.

If Mr. Russell had entertained at Ghent the sentiments relating
to this measure, disclosed in the duplicate, or even those avowed
in the original of his letter, he is to account for it to his conscience
and his country, that he ever assented to it at all. He was not
under the slightest obligation to assent to it. As an act of the ma
jority, it would have been equally valid without his concurrence
or signature as with it. More than one member of the mission,
and on more than one occasion, signified his determination to de
cline signing the treaty, if particular measures, proposed by the
British plenipotentiaries, should be acceded to by the majority. A
refusal by any one member to concur in any measure upon which
a majority were agreed, would at least have induced the majority
to re-consider their vote, and in all probability to have cancelled it.
la a case of such transcendent importance as this, of high interests,
generous policy, humane and tender sympathies, wantonly to be
sacrificed, in defiance of the most express and unqualified instruc
tions, to the paltry purpose of accommodating a few fishermen, des
titute of all claim of right, how could Mr. Russell sit patiently in
conference with the British plenipotentiaries, and join in the offer
of it to them ? How could he subscribe his name to a letter declar
ing he had no objection to it ? Had Mr. Russell dissented from this
measure of the majority, and they had still persisted in it, he would
doubtless have reported to his own government the reasons of his
dissent ; his colleagues of the majority would in like manner have
reported theirs ; and the responsibility of each party would have
rested, as it ought, upon their respective acts. To concur individu
ally in the measure ; to sign all the papers approving it; and then
secretly to write to the government a letter of censure, reproach,
and misrepresentation, against it and those who proposed it — was,
indeed, a shorter and easier process.

Mr. Russell, therefore, did not entertain or express at Ghent,
the opinions disclosed in hi* letter from Paris, and has been as un
fortunate in the representation of his own conduct and sentiments,
as in that of the subject of his letter, and in that of the sentiments
and conduct of his colleagues.

But there is a point of view more important than any regard to
his conduct and sentiments, in which his letter is yet to be consi°
dered. If there were any force in his argument against the mca-

96

Sures, or any correctness in his statements against his colleagues*
it is proper they should be sifted and examined.

Let, us, therefore, examine the proposed article in both its
parts : — first, as relates to the fishing liberty for us ; and secondly,
to the navigation of the Mississippi by the British And, in order
to ascertain the propriety of the principles assumed, and of the
measures adopted by the American commissioners, as now in
question, let us premise the state of things as they existed, and the
circumstances under which this proposal was offered.

By the third article of the treaty of 1783, it was agreed, that the
people of the United States should continue to enjoy the fisheries
of Newfoundland and the Bay of St. Lawrence, and at all other
places in the sea, where the inhabitants of both countries used at
any time theretofore to fish ; and, also, that they should have certain
fishing liberties, on all the fishing coast within the British jurisdic
tion of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labrador. The title
by which the United States held those fishing rights and liberties
was the same. It was the possessory use of the right, or, in Mr.
Russell's more learned phrase, of the " jus meroz facultatis " at
any time theretofore as British subjects, and the acknowledgment
by Great Britain of its continuance in the people of the United
States after the treaty of separation. It was a national right ; and,
therefore, as much a right, though not so immediate an interest, to
the people of Ohio and Kentucky, aye and to the people of Loui
siana, after they became a part of the people of the United States,
as it was to the people of Massachusetts and Maine. The latter
had always used it, since they had been British colonists, and the
coasts had been in British dominions. But, as the settlement of the
colonies themselves had not been of time immemorial, it was not,
and never was pretended to be, a title by prescription.

Such was the title of the United States to the fisheries — prior
possession, and acknowledgment by the treaty of 1783.

The commissioners at Ghent had received from the Secretary of
State a letter of instruction, dated 25th of June, 1814, containing
the following passage :

" Information has been received from a quarter deserving of at-
" tention, that the late events in France have produced such an
" effect on the British government, as to make it probable that a
" demand will be made at Gothenburg, to surrender our right to the
" fisheries, to abandon all trade beyond the Cape of Good Hope,
" and to cede Louisiana to Spain. We cannot believe that such a
" demand will be made ; should it be, you will of course, treat it
" as it deserves. These rights must not be brought into discussion.
" If insisted on, your negotiations will cease."

Now, it is very true that a majority of the commissioners did
construe these instructions to mean, that the right to the fisheries
was not to be surrendered. They did not subtilize, and refine, and
inquire, whether they could not surrender a part, and yet not bring
the right into discussion, whether we might not give up a liberty.

97

and yet retain a right ; or whether it was an argument, or an agree
ment, that was forbidden. They understood, that the fisheries were
not to be surrendered.

The demand made by the British government was first advanced
in an artful and ensnaring form. It was by assuming the principle
4hat the right had been forfeited hy the war, and by notifying the
American commissioners, as they did at the first conference, " that
the British government did not intend to grant to the United
States, gratuitously, the privileges formerly granted hy treaty to
them, of fishing within the limits of the British sovereignty, and
of using the shores of the British territories for purposes con
nected with the fisheries." Now to obtain the surrender of thus
much of the fisheries, all that the British plenipotentiaries could
possibly desire, was, that the American commissioners should ac
quiesce in the principle, that the treaty of 1783 was abrogated by
the war. Assent to this principle would have been surrender of
the right. Mr. Kussell, if we can make any thing of his argument,
would have assented, and surrendered, and comforted himself with
the reflection, that, as the right had not been brought into discus
sion, the instructions would not have been violated.

But, however clearly he expresses this opinion in his letter, and
however painfully he endeavours to fortify it by argument, he ne
ver did disclose it to the same extent at Ghent. The only way in
which it was possible to meet the notification of the British pleni
potentiaries, without surrendering the rights which it jeopardized,
was by denying the principle upon which it was founded. This
was done by asserting the principle, that the treaty of Independ
ence of 1783 was of that class of treaties, and the right in question
of the character, which are not abrogated by a subsequent war ;
that the notification of the intention of the British government not
to renew the grant, could not affect the right of the United States,
which had not been forfeited by the war ; and that, considering it
as still in force, the United States needed no new grant from Great
Britain to revive, nor any new article to confirm it.

This principle I willingly admit was assumed and advanced by
the American commissioners at my suggestion. I believed it not
only indispensably necessary to meet the insidious form in which
the British demand of surrender had been put forth ; but sound in
itself, and maintainable on the most enlarged, humane, and gener
ous principles of international law. It was asserted and maintained
by the American plenipotentiaries at Ghent ; and if, in the judg
ment of Mr. Russell, it suffered the fishing liberty to be brought
into discussion, at least it did not surrender the right.

It was not acceded to by the British plenipotentiaries. Each
party adhered to its asserted principle ; and the treaty was conclud
ed without settling the interest involved in it. Since that time,
and after the original of Mr. Russell's letter of the 1 1th February,
"1815, was written, the principle asserted by the American pleni
potentiaries at Ghent, has been still asserted and maintained through
two long and arduous negotiations with Great Britain, and has passed

•93

the ordeal of minds of no inferior ability. It lias terminated in a
new and satisfactory arrangement of the great interest connected
with it, and in a substantial admission of the principle asserted by
the American plenipotentiaries at Ghent; by that convention of
20th October, 1818, which, according to the duplicate of Mr. Rus
sell's letter, he foresaw in February, 1815, even while writing his
learned dissertation against the right which he had been instructed
not to surrender, and the only principle by which it could be de
fended.

At this time, and after all the controversy through which the
American principle was destined to pass, and has passed, I, with
out hesitation, reassert, in the face of my country, the principle,
which, in defence of the fishing liberties of this nation, wasf at my
suggestion, asserted by the American plenipotentiaries at Ghent.

1 deem this reassertion of it the more important, because, by the
publication at this time of Mr. Russell's letter, that plenipotentiary
has not only disclaimed all his share in the first assertion of it, but
has brought to bear all the faculties of his mind against it, while the
American side of the argument, and the reasons by which it has
been supported against arguments coinciding much with those of
his letter, but advanced by British reasoners, are not before the
public. The principle is yet important to great interests, and to
the future welfare of this country.

When first suggested, it obtained the unanimous assent of the
American mission. In their note of 10th November, 1814. to the
British plenipotentiaries, which accompanied their first projet of a
treaty, they said, " in answer to the declaration made by the Bri
tish plenipotentiaries respecting the fisheries,. the undersigned,
" referring to what passed in the conference of the 9th August, can
" only state, that they are not authorized to bring into discussion
" any of the rights or liberties which the United States have here-
** tofore enjoyed in relation thereto. From their nature, and from
" the peculiar character of the treaty of 1783, by which they were
<c recognised, no further stipulation has been deemed necessary by
" the government of the United States, te entitle them to the full
<; enjoyment of all of them." This paragraph was drawn up, and
proposed to the mission by the member with whom Mr. Russell
concurred in objecting to the proposal of an article confirmative of
the fishing liberties and navigation of the Mississippi, and as a sub
stitute for it. The mission unanimously accepted it : and the fish
ing liberties being thus secured from surrender, no article relating
to them or to the Mississippi was inserted in the projet sent to the
British mission.

But one of the objects of the negotiation was to settle the bound
ary befcveen the United States and the British dominions, from the
northwest corner of the Lake of the Woods westward. That
boundary, by the treaty of 1783, had been stipulated to be, " from
*' the most northwestern point of the Lake of the Woods on a due
" west course to the river Mississippi j and thence, down the mid-

99

die of the Mississippi, to the thirty-first degree of north latitude ;"
while, by the eighth article of the same treaty, it had been stipulat
ed, that " the navigation of the river Mississippi, from its source to
** the ocean, should forever remain free and open to the subjects oi'
*' Great Britain and the citizens of the United States."

The right of Great Britain and of the United States, at the time
of the treaty of 1783, to make this stipulation with regard to the
navigation of the Mississippi, might be, and afterwards was, ques
tioned by Spain, then a possessor also of territories upon the same
river, and indeed of both its banks, trom its mouth to a hiyher la
titude than that thus stipulated as the boundary of the United
States. But, as, between Great Britain and the United States,
there could, at the time of the conclusion of the treaty of 1783, be
no possible question of the right of both to make the stipulation,
the boundary line itself being in substance a concession of territory
to the river, and down its middle to latitude 31, which Great Britain
was undoubtedly competent to make, and the United States to re
ceive. Now, the United States having received the cession and the
boundary, with the right to navigate the river, with the express
condition that the navigation of the river should forever remain
free and open to British subjects, and having expressly assented
to that condition, without considering it as infringing upon any right
of Spain ; they could not, consistently with good faith, by acquiring
afterwards the right of Spain, allege that this acquisition absolved
them from the obligation of the prior engagement with Great Bri
tain. There is, indeed^ in Mr Russell's letter, a hesitating argu
ment to that effect ; the odious character of which is but flimsily
veiled by its subtlety. The United States had always insisted upon
their right of navigating the Mississippi, by force\of the article of
the treaty of 1783, and had obtained the acknowledgment of that
right from Spain herself, many years before they acquired her ter
ritorial right by the purchase of Louisiana. With what front, then,
could an American negotiator have said, after the latter period, to
a British minister : — You have no right to the navigation of the
Mississippi ; for although, on receiving from you a part of the river,
we expressly stipulated that you should forever enjoy a right to its
navigation, yet that engagement was a fraud upon the rights of
Spain ; and although, long before we had acquired these rights of
Spain, she had acknowledged our right to navigate the rive., found
ed upon this very stipulation of which you now claim the benefit,
yet I will now not acknowledge your right founded on the s«ine
stipulation. Spain, no party to the compact between you and i.-u;,
after controverting it as infringing upon her rights, anally acceded
to its beneficial application to us, as compatible with thojs rlgiits.
But we, who made the compact with you, having now acquired i'bie
adverse rights of Spain, will not allow you the bei .%nc ':»i u • of our
own compact. We first swindled and then bullied Sp;;m AC, of .ur
rights, by this eighth article of the treaty of 1 *&':> ; i^ j now, hav
ing acquired ourselves those rights, ive plead them for holding our
engagement with you for a dead letter.

100

This, and nothing more or less than this, is the substance of Mr
Russell's argument to show, that perhaps the United States were,
by the acquisition of Louisiana, absolved from the obligation of the
eighth article of the treaty of 1783, even before the war of 1812.

But, says Mr. Russell, the treaty of 1783 was made, under a be
lief of both parties, that it would leave Great Britain with a portion
of territory upon the Mississippi, and therefore entitled to claim the
right of navigating the river. But the boundary line of the treaty
of 1783, was a line from the northwesternmost point of the Lake of
the Woods, due west to the Mississippi. And after the treaty of
1783, but before the war of 1812, it had been found that a line due
west, from the northwest corner of the Lake of the Woods, did not
strike the Mississippi. Therefore, continues Mr. Russell, Great
Britain could claim no territorial right to the navigation of the ri
ver ; and therefore had no longer any claim to the benefit of the
eighth article of the treaty of 1783.

To this it may be replied : First, that the British claim of right
to navigate the Mississippi, was not founded solely on the territory
which it was believed they would retain upon that river, by the
boundary west from the Lake of the Woods. The eighth article
of the treaty of 1783, was a separate and distinct article, stipulat
ing the right of both nations to navigate the river, without any re
ference to boundary or to territory. But the boundary, the ter
ritory, and the right to navigate the river, were all, in that treaty,
cessions from Great Britain to the United States. And, had it even
been the intention of both parties, that Britain should cede thewhole
of her territories on the Mississippi, it was yet competent to her to
reserve the right of navigating the river for her subjects, in common
with the people of the United States, and competent for the United
States to accept the cession, subject to that reservation. They did
so, by the eighth article of the treaty. And in this point of view,
the British right of navigating the river, within the Americnn ter
ritory, was precisely similar to the American liberty of fishing
within the British territorial jurisdiction, reserved by the third ar
ticle of the same treaty.

But, secondly, the discovery that a line due west, from the north-
westernmost corner of the Lake of the Woods, would not strike
the Mississippi, had not deprived Great Britain of all claim to terri
tory upon that river, at the time of the negotiation at Ghent. The
line described in the treaty was, from the northwesternmost point
of the Lake of the Woods, " on a due west course to the river Mis
sissippi." When it was found that the line due west did not touch
the Mississippi, this boundary was annulled by the fact. It re
mained an unsettled boundary, to be adjusted bv a new agreement.
For this adjustment, the moral obligation of the parties was to adopt
such aline as should approximate as near as possible to the inten
tions of both parties in agreeing upon the line for which it was to
be substituted. For ascertaining this line, if the United States
were entitled to the benefit of the words " on a due west course.'-

101

'Britain was equally entitled to the benefit of the Words " to the ri
ver Mississippi." Both the demands stood on the same grounds.
Before the war of 1812, three abortive attempts had been made by
the parties to adjust this boundary. The first was by the treaty of
1794, when it was already conjectured, but not ascertained, that
the line due west from the lake would not intersect the Mississippi.
By the fourth article of the treaty of 1794, it was agreed that a joint
survey should be made to ascertain the fact ; and that, if, on the
result of that survey, it should appear, that the west line would not
intersect the river, the parties would proceed, " by amicable nego-
" tiation, to regulate the boundary line in that quarter, according to
"justice and mutual convenience, and in conformity to the intent
*' of the treaty of 1783." This survey was never made. The
second attempt to adjust the line, was by the convention signed on
the 12th of May, 1803, by Mr. King and lord Hawkesbury ; the
fifth article of which, after reciting the same uncertainty, whether
a line drawn due west from the Lake of the Woods would intersect
the Mississippi, provided that, instead of the said line, the bounda
ry of the United States, in that quarter, should, and was declared
to be, the shortest line "xhich could be drawn between tJie northwest
point of the Lake of the Woods, and ihe nearest source of the river Mis
sissippi. This convention uot having been ratified, the third at
tempt at adjustment had been made in the negotiation of Mr. Monroe
and Mr. Pinkney, of 180G and 1G07 ; at which an article had been,
proposed and agreed to, that the line should be from the most
northwestern point of.tho. Lake of the Woods, to the 49th parallel
of latitude, and from that point, due west, along and with the said
parallel, as far as the respective territories extend in that quarter.
And with that article was coupled another, as follows :

*' It is agreed by the United States that his majesty's subjects
•' shall have, at all times, free access from his majesty's aforesaid
" territories, by land or inland navigation, into the aforesaid terri-
*' tories of the United States, to the river Mississippi, with the
ct goods and effects of his majesty's said subjects, in order to enjoy
" the benefit of the navigation of that river, as it-cured to them by
" the treaty of peace, between his majesty and the United States,
•" and also by the third article of the treaty of amity, commerce,
*' and navigation, of 1794. And it is further agreed that his ma-
" jcsty's subjects shall, in like manner, and at all times, have free
" access to all the waters and rivers falling into the western side of
*"• the river Mississippi, and to the navigation of the said river."

This negotiation was suspended, by a change of the British mi
nistry, and was not afterwards resumed. But Ihe following obser
vations upon the two articles, contained in a letter from Mr. Madi
son to Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, of 30th July, 1807, show how
far Mr. Jefferson, then President of the United States, had author
ized those commissioners to accede to them.

" Access by land or inland navigation from the British territo-
" ries, through the territory of the United States to the river Mis-

13

102

^ feFssippi, is rtot lo be allowed to British subjects, with theif goods
'* or effects, unless such articles shall have paid all the duties, and
" be within all the custom-house regulations, applicable to goods
e< and effects of citizens of the United States. An access through
" the territory of the United States to the waters running into the
" western side of the Mississippi, is under no modification whatev-
" er to be stipulated to British subjects."

Such then was the state of things in relation to this interest in
question, at the time when the war of 1812 broke out ; and at the
negotiation of Ghent, the same question of boundary again occurred
for adjustment. The right of the British to a line from the Lake
of the Woods to the Mississippi, had never been renounced : and,
at the last negotiation between the parties, four years after the
United States had acquired Louisiana, and with it all the Spanish
fights upon the Mississippi, the British government, in assenting
fo take the 49th parallel of latitude, as a substitute for the line lo
the Mississippi, had expressly re-stipulated for the free navigation
of the river, and free access to it from our territories ; to both of
which Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney had been explicitly authorized
lo accede.

Under this state of things, it had never been admitted by the Bri
tish, nor could we maintain against them by argument, even that
the Mississippi river was within our exclusive jurisdiction : for so
long as they had a right by treaty to a line of boundary to that ri
ver, and consequently to territory upon it, they also had jurisdic
tion upon it ; nor, consequently, could the instructions of 15th
April, 1813, had they even been still in full force, have restricted
the American commissioners from making or receiving a proposi
tion, for continuing to the British the right of navigating the river,
which they had enjoyed, without ever using it, from the time oi*
fhe treaty of 1783, when the United States had received, by cession
from them, the right of enjoying it jointly with them.

Bearing in mind this state of things, we are also to remember,
that, in the conference of 19th August, 1814, and in the letter of
that date, from thP British to the American plenipotentiaries, (Sc&
Waifs State Papers, vol. IX. pp. 334 and 338,) they had claimed a
new northwestern boundary line from Lake Superior to the Missis
sippi, and the free navigation of that river. To this the American
commissioners had answered on the 24th of August, 1814: The
undersigned perceive that the British government " propose, with-
" out purpose specifically alleged, to draw the boundary line west-
'* ward, not from the Lake of the Woods, as it now is, but from
" Lake Superior:" and they objected to it, as demanding a cession
of territory.

The British plenipotentiaries, on the 4th September, 1814, re
plied :

" As the necessity for fixing some boundary for the northwestern
'* frontier has been mutually acknowledged, a proposal for a discus-
" sion on that subject cannot be considered as a demand for a ce."-

103

*•* sion of territory, unless the United States are prepared to assert
f ' that there is no limit to their territories in that direction, and that,
" availing themselves of the geographical error upon which that
M part of the treaty of 1783 was founded, they will acknowledge
" no boundary whatever, then, unquestionably, any proposition to
" fix one, be it what it may, must be considered as demanding a
;s large cession of territory from the United States.

" Is the American government prepared to assert such an unli-
ik mited right, so contrary to the evident intention of the treaty it-
;* self? Or, is his majesty's government to understand that the
%< American plenipotentiaries are willing to acknowledge the bound-
** ury from the Lake of the Woods to the Mississippi, (the arrange-
44 ment made by a convention in 1803, but not ratified,) as that by
" which their government is ready to abide ?

" The British plenipotentiaries are instructed to accept favour-
v< ably such a proposition, or to discuss any other line of boundary
u which may be submitted for consideration."

I stop here for a moment, to observe how instinctively, if the
expression may be allowed, both the parties in this correspondence
recur to the treaty of 1783, with a consciousness that it was yet in
full force, as an appeal for either in support of its claims. The ex
pression in the above American note, applied to the boundary, " as
it now is;" the reference of the British note to the geographical
error in the treaty of 1783, and their willingness to discuss the ar
rangement of 1803, (the shortest line from the Lake of the Woods
to the Mississippi,) both acknowledge the treaty of 1783 as the basis
of all proposition and all argument, and as being }et in force for
every thing which should not be otherwise provided for in the new
treaty.

In their note of 21st October, 1814, the British commissioners
said :

" On the subject of the fisheries, the undersigned expressed with
•; so much frankness, at the conference already referred to, th«
u views of their government, that they consider any further observ-
*' ations on that topic as unnecessary at the present time.

" On the question of the boundary between the dominions of his
kC majesty and those of the United States, the undersigned are led
t; to expect, from the discussion which this subject has already un-
" dergone, that the northwestern boundary, from the Lake of the
" Woods to the Mississippi, (the intended arrangement of 1803,)
" will be admitted without objection."

Thus stood the parties and the subject, when, on the 10th of
November, 1814, the American plenipotentiaries sent the first pro-
jet of a treaty to. the British commissioners, it contained no arti
cle relating either to the fisheries or to the Mississippi ; but, in the
note which accompanied it, to meet the notification twice giveu o;j
the part of the British government, t,hat they did not intend IQ
grant, without equivalent, the liberty of fishing within the British
jurisdiction, the counter-notification, already noticed, was intro.rluc-

104

eel, informing them that the American government did not consider
the fishing liberties as forfeited by the war, and that they would re
main in full force without needing any new grant to confirm them.
At this stage of the negotiation, therefore, the American plenipo
tentiaries did actually pursue the first of those three other ways of
proceeding, which Mr. Russell, in the postscript to the original of
his letter of llth February, 1815, says they might have taken, and
to which he adds that he would have asserted, namely, to contend
for the continuance of the fishing privilege, notwithstanding the
war, without saying any thing about the navigation of the Missis
sippi. It cannot but be surprising to find Mr. Russell, within three
months after these events, writing privately to the Secretary of
State, stating this as a course other than that which we had pur
sued, and that he would have assented to it if we had ; when it was
the very course that we did pursue, and he had assented to it. We
did contend, not for the indestructibility, as Mr. Russell terms it, of
the treaty of 1783, but that, from its peculiar character, it was not,
abrogated by the mere occurrence of war. We never maintained
that the treaty of 1783 was indestructible, or imperishable, but that
the rights, liberties, and boundaries, acknowledged by it as belong
ing to us, were not abrogated by mere war. We never doubted,
for example, that we might be compelled to stipulate a new bound
ary ; but that would have been, not as a consequence of mere war,
but the effect of conquest, resulting from war. The difference be
tween our principle and that of the British was, that they, consider
ing the rights acknowledged as belonging to us by the treaty, as
mere grants, held them as annulled by war alone ; while we, view
ing them as rights existing before the treaty, and only acknowledg
ed by it, could not admit them to be forfeited without our own as
sent. Britain might have recovered them by conquest ; but that
could not be consummated without our acquiescence, tacit or ex
pressed. Mr. Russell, who assented to our principle, and asserted
it with us, now says he always thought the British principle was the
true one. If the American mission, at that trying time, had acted
upon it, he never would have prophesied the convention of October,
1813.

The eighth article of the projet of a treaty, sent by the Ameri
can commissioners on the 10th of November, offered the bounda
ry which had been proposed in 1807, a line north or south to lati
tude 49, and westward, on that parallel, as far as the territories of
the two countries extended ; and said nothing about the Mississip
pi. But when, on the 26th of November, the British plenipoten
tiaries returned the projet, with their proposed amendments, they
accepted the 49th parallel, westward, from the Lake of the Woods,
for the boundary, but with the following addition to the article :
" And it is further agreed, the subjects of his Britannic majesty
*' shall at all times have access, from his Britannic majesty's terri-
*' tories, by land or inland navigation, into the aforesaid territories
" of the United States to the river Mississippi, with their goods,

105

" effects, and merchandise, and that his Britannic majesty's subjeelt
*' shall have and enjoy the free navigation of the said river."

It was to meet this demand that, at the conference of 1st Decem>
ber, (he American plenipotentiaries proposed to strike out all those
words, and to substitute the amendment contained in the protocol of
that conference, already communicated to Congress. It was thus
that the relation which Mr. Russell, within three months after
wards, so singularly professes not to perceive between the fishing
liberties and the Mississippi navigation, not only naturally arose,
but forced itself upon the American plenipotentiaries. They had
saved the fishing liberties from surrender, as they had been spe
cially instructed to do, by asserting that the treaty of 1783 had not
been abrogated ipso facto by the war. Two days before receiving
this counter projet, they had received from Washington a fresh in
struction, expressly authorizing them to conclude a treaty on the.
basis of the status ante bellum, including, of course, the fishing lir
berty on one side, and the navigation of the Mississippi on the other.
They could not, therefore, consistently with those instructions,
either reject thjs British demand, or abandon to surrender the fish
eries. They offered, therefore, the amendment containing the re
newed acknowledgment of both ; and they said to the British ple
nipotentiaries : We have told you that we consider all the rights,
secured to us by the treaty of 1783, as still in force. What we
demand, if you assent to it, we must yield in return. If, as we say,
the treaty of 1783 is yet in force, you have the right of navigating
the Mississippi, and we have the fishing rights and liberties unim
paired. If, as you say, the treaty is abrogated, how can you claim
the right of navigating the Mississippi ? You must admit the one,
or not demand the other. We offer you the alternative of a new
stipulated admission of both, or a total omission of both. We offer
you in application the choice of our principle or of your own.

The British commissioners took the proposal for reference to
their government, by whom it was immediately rejected. But, to
show how anxious they were to obtain from us the surrender of our
fishing liberties, and how cheaply they valued the right of navigat
ing the Mississippi, as one of the last expedients of negotiation, they
offered us an article agreeing that, after the peace, the parties
would further negotiate " respecting the terms, conditions, and re-
" gulations, under which the inhabitants of the United States"
should again enjoy the fishing liberties, "in consideration of a fair
" equivalent^ to be agreed upon between his majesty and the said
" United States, and granted by the said United States for such li-
" berty aforesaid ;" and a reciprocal stipulation with regard to the
British right of navigating the Mississippi. As the parties after the
peace would have been just as competent further to negotiate on
these points, if so disposed, without this article as with it, its only
effect would have been a mutual surrender, on the American side,
of the fishing liberties, and on the British side, of the right to navi
gate the Mississippi ; with this difference, thnt we should havesur-

106

rendered, in direct violation of our instructions, a real, existing,
practical liberty, which, even in the war of our Independence, had
been deemed of the highest importance, and at its close had been,
with infinite difficulty, secured ; a liberty, of which that portion of
the Union, whom it immediately concerns, had been, from the time
of the treaty of 1783, in the constant, real, and useful possession ;
while the British would have surrendered absolutely nothing — a
l*ight which, by inference from their own principle, was abrogated
by the war ; a right which, under the treaty of 1783, they had en
joyed for thirty years, without ever using it, and which, in all human
probability, never would have been of more beneficial use to the
British nation, than would be to the people of the United States the
right of navigating the Bridgewater canal, or the Danube.

There was certainly an inconsistency on the part of the British
government, in claiming a right to navigate the Mississippi, while
asserting that the treaty of 1788 was abrogated by the war : and
when pressed by us to say on what principle they claimed it without
offering for it an equivalent, they said the equivalent was, their ac
ceptance of the 49th parallel of latitude for the northwestern boun
dary, instead of the line, to which they were entitled by the treaty
of 1783, to the Mississippi. As they gave up the line to the river,
they said they had a right to reserve its navigation, and access to
it for that purpose. They had said the same thing to Messrs. Mon
roe and Pinkney in 1807 ; and the principle had been assented
to by them, with the subsequent sanction of President Jefferson.
Still the whole argument leaned upon the continuing validity of the
treaty of 1783 ; for the boundary line, as well as the Mississippi na
vigation, was null and void, if that treaty was abrogated. We re
plied to them, that, although we were willing to agree to the 49th
parallel of latitude for the boundary, and thought it of mutual in
terest that the line should be fixed, we were yet not tenacious of
it ; we could not agree to their article of mutual surrender, with a
pledge of future negotiation ; but we would consent to omit the
boundary article itself, and leave the whole subject for future ad
justment. And to this they finally agreed.

The advantage of this to us was, that we came out of the war,
without having surrendered the fishing liberties, as they had been
enjoyed before, and stipulated at the treaty of 1783. We were
still free to maintain, and we did, after the conclusion of the peace,
effectively maintain, the existence of the right, notwithstanding the
intervening vvar. The British government still insisted that the
treaty of 1783 was abrogated by the war ; but when called upon to
show, why then they treated the United States as an independent
nation, and why in the treaty of Ghent they had agreed to four
several commissions to ascertain the boundaries, "according to the
true intent and meaning of that same treaty of J783," they finally
answered, that they considered our Independence, and the boun
daries, as existing facts, like those of other nations, without refer
ence to their origin. This left nothing but a dispute about words j

107

tor we applied the same principle to the fishing liberties of the
third article, which they conceded with regard to the acknowledge
ment of Independence and to the boundaries. They considered
the whole treaty of 1783 as a British grant. We considered it as
a British acknowledgement. They never drew the nice distinction,
attempted by Mr. Russell, between a perishable and imperishable
part of the treaty, or admitted that it consisted of rights which they
could not, and of privileges which they could resume without our
consent. By their principle, they might have resumed the whole :
and when they notified to us at Ghent, that they did not intend to
".••runt us again the fishing liberties within their exclusive jurisdic
tion, but that they meant to leave us the right of fishing in the
epen sea, they gave us distinctly enough to understand that they
were treating us with magnanimity, in not resuming the whole.
There was in truth no difference in the principle. And Mr. Rus
sell, in consulting his Vattel, to find that fishing rights were jura
wercc facultatis, and therefore imprescriptible, ought to have seen
iv hat that writer very explicitly says, not that they were rights
which could not be acquired by long usage, but rights which could
not be lost by non user. lie ought also to have seen, what Vattel
no less clearly lays down, that although a nation may appropriate
to itself a fishery upon its own coasts and within its own jurisdic
tion, yet, "if it has once acknowledged the common right of other
•• nations to come and fish there, it can no longer exclude them
** from it ; it has left that fishery in its primitive freedom, at
tv least with respect to those who have been in possession of it.'*
And he cites the herring fishery on the coast of England, as being
common to them with other nations, because they had not appro
priated it to themselves, from the beginning.

In perusing the letter of Mr. Russell, whether original or da-
plicate, I cannot but reflect with gratitude to Providence upon the
slender thread by which the rights of this nation to the fisheries
were in fact suspended at the negotiation of Ghent. Positive and
precise as our instructions were, not to surrender them, if Mr.
Russell had disclosed at Ghent the opinions avowed in either ver
sion of his letter, if he had so broadly asserted and so pertinacious
ly maintained his conviction of the utter worthiesaness of the fish
eries, in comparison with the exclusion of the British from a mere
phantom of right to navigate the Mississippi, which they had al
ways enjoyed without use ; without benefit to themselves or injury
to us ; if he had so learnedly disserted to prove that the treaty of
1783 was totally and absolutely abrogated by the war ; if he had
so thoroughly inverted the real state of the question, and painted
it in such glowing colours as a sacrifice of deep, real interests of
the West to a shallow, imaginary interest ot the East ; if, with
that perseverance which is the test of sincerity, ne had refused to
sign the proposal determined upon by the majority of his colleagues,
and •: /en them notice that he should transmit to his government
fhe vindication of himself and hi« motives for differing from thejn ;

JOS

and, above all, it' another mind could have been found in the mis
sion, capable of concurring with him in those views, it would at
least have required of the majority an inflexibility of fortitude,
beyond that of any trial by which they were visited, to have per
severed in their proposal. Had they concurred with him in his
opinion of the total abrogation of the treaty of 1783, by the mere
fact of the war, the fisheries in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, on the
coast of Labrador, and to an indefinite extent from the Island of
Newfoundland, were lost to the United States forever, or at least
till the indignant energy of the nation should have recovered, by
conquest, the rights thus surrendered to usurpation. In notifying
to us that the British government intended not to renew the grant
of the fisheries within British jurisdiction, they had not said what
extent they meant to give to these terms. They had said they did
not mean to extend it to the right of the fisheries, generally, or in
the open seas, enjoyed by all other nations. (See Letter of the Ame
rican Commissioners to the Secretary of Stale of 12th August, 1814.
Waifs State Papers, vol. 9, p. 321.) But there was not wanting his
torical exposition of what Great Britain undeistood by her exclu
sive jurisdiction as applied to these fisheries. In the 12th article
of the treaty of Utrecht, by which Nova Scotia or Acadia had been
ceded by France to Great Britain, the cession had been made " in
"• such ample manner and form, that the subjects of the most
" Christian King shall hereafter be excluded from all kind of fish-
" ing in the said seas, bays, and other places on the coasts of Nova
lk Scotia ; that is to say, on those which lie towards the east, within
*' THIRTY LEAGUES, beginning from the island commonly called
41 Sable, inclusively, and thence along towards the southwest."

By the thirteenth article of the same treaty, French subjects
were excluded from fishing on any other part of the coast of the
Island of Newfoundland, then from Cape Bonavista northward, and
then westward to Point Riche. By the fifteenth article of the treaty
of Utrecht, between Great Britain and Spain,' certain rights of fish-
tng at the Island of Newfoundland, had been reserved to the Gui-
puscoans, and other subjects of Spain ; but in the eighteenth article
of the treaty of peace between Great Britain and Spain, of 1763,
his Catholic majesty had desisted, "as well for himself as lor his
successors, from nil pretension which he might have formed in fa
vour of the Guipuscoans and oilier his subjects, to the right of
fishing IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD of the Island of Newfoundland.'*
In these several cases, it is apparent that Great Britain had assert
ed and maintained an exclusive and proprietary jurisdiction over
the whole fishing grounds of the Grand Bank, as well as on the
coast of North America, and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Nor
are we without subsequent indications of what she would have
considered as her exclusive jurisdiction, if a majority of the Ame
rican commission at Ghent had been as ready as Mr. Russell de
clares himself to have been, to subscribe to her doctrine, that all
aur fishing liberties had lost, by the war, every vestige of right.

109

For, in the summer of 1815, the year after the conclusion of the
peace, her armed vessels on the American coast warned all Ame
rican fishing vessels not to approach within SIXTY MILES of the
shores.

It was this incident which led to the negotiations which termi
nated in the convention of 20th October, 1818. la that instru
ment the United States have renounced forever, that part of the
fishing liberties which they had enjoyed or claimed in certain parts
of the exclusive jurisdiction of the British provinces, and within
three marine miles of the shores. This privilege, without being of
much use to our fishermen, had been found very inconvenient to the
British : and, in return, we have acquired an enlarged liberty, both
of h'shing and drying fish, within the other parts of the British ju
risdiction, forever The first article of this convention affords a
signal testimonial of the correctness of the principle assumed by
the American plenipotentiaries at Ghent ; for, by accepting the
express renunciation of the United States, of a small portion of the
privilege in question, and by confirming and enlarging all the re
mainder of the privilege/orerer, the British government have im
plicitly acknowledged that the liberties of the third article of the
treaty of 1783 had not been abrogated by the war, and have given
the final stroke to the opposite doctrine of Mr Russell. That worda
of perpetuity in a treaty cannot give that character to the en
gagements it contains, is not indeed a new discovery in diplomatic
history ; but that truism has as little concern with this question,
as the annulment of our treaty of 1778 with France, so aptly ap
plied to it in his letter. It is not, therefore, the word forever, in
this convention, which will secure to our fishermen, for all time,
the liberties stipulated and recognised in it ; but it was introduced
by our negotiators, and admitted by those of Great Britain as a
warning that we shall never consider the liberties secured to us by
it, as abrogated by mere war. They may, if they please, in case
of a war, consider the convention as abrogated, but the privileges
as existing, without reference to their origin. But they and we, I
trust, are forever admonished against the stratagem of demanding a
surrender, in the form of notify ing a forfeiture. They and we are
aware, forever, that nothing but our own renunciation can deprive
us of the right.

The second article of this same convention affords a demonstra
tion equally decisive, how utterly insignificant and worthless, in the
estimation of the British government, was this direfully dreaded
navigation of the Mississippi. The article gives us the 49th pa
rallel of latitude for the boundary, and neither the navigation of the
river, nor access to it, was even asked in return.

These are conclusive facts — facts appealing not to the prejudices
or the jealousies, but to the sound sense and sober judgment of
men. Without yielding at all to Mr. Russell, in my " trust in God
and the valour of the West," 1 have an equal trust in the same di
vine being, as connected with the justice of the \Ve«t. I have the

110

perfect and undoubtingreliance, that to the clear-sighted intelligence
of the western county, the gorgons, and hydras, and chimeras dire,
of Mr. Russell's imagination, raised by incantation from the waters
of the Mississippi, will sink as they rose, and be seen no more.
Without professing to sacrifice any of those ties of duty and alle
giance, which bind me to the interests of my native State, I cannot
allow Mr. Russell's claim to a special ardour for the welfare of the
West, to be superior to my own, or to that of the deceased, or of
the living colleague, with whom I concurred, without mental re
servation, in the measure subscribed to. and denounced by, Mr.
Russell. We were all the ministers of the whole Union ; and
sure I am, that every member of the majority would have spurned
with equal disdain the idea of sacrificing the interest of any one
part of the Union to that of any other, and the uncandid purpose
of awakening suspicions at the source of their common authori
ty here, against the patriotism and integrity of any one of his col
leagues.

I shall conclude with a passing notice of the three alternatives,
which in the postscript to the original of his letter of 1 1th Februa
ry, 1815, he says, we might have taken, instead of that which, as
he alleges, we, against his will, did do. We had, says he, three
other ways of proceeding :

" First. To contend for the indestructibility of the treaty of 1783,
•c thence inferring the continuance of the fishing privilege, without
" saying any thing about the navigation of the Mississippi, which
"would have reserved our right of contesting this navigation, on
" the grounds I have mentioned, specially applicable to it. Se-
" condly, To have considered the treaty at an end, and offered a
" reasonable equivalent, wherever it might be found, for the fishing
" privilege." Thirdly, To have made this liberty a sine qua non
" of peace, as embraced by the principle of status ante bellum.

" To either of these propositions" (he adds,) " I would have as-
" sented. But I could not consent to grant or revive the British
"right to the navigation of the Mississippi."

He could not consent ! He did consent : see his name subscribed
to the letter from the American to the British plenipotentiaries of
12th December, 1814 — p. 44 of the message of 25th February
last.

It is, indeed, painful to remark here, and throughout this letter
of Mr. Russell, how little solicitude there is discoverable, to pre
serve even the appearance of any coincidence between his real
sentiments and his professions : half his letter is an argument in
form to prove, that the treaty o*' 1783 was abrogated by the war ;
yet, he says, he would have assented to contend for its indestruc
tibility, so long as it applied only to the defence of the fisheries,
reserving his special grounds of objection to its being applied to-
the navigation of the Mississippi. 1 have shown, that the inde
structibility of the treaty of 1783 never was asserted by any of the
American commissioners ; but, that the principle that it bad not

in

been abrogated by the war, and that none of the rights stipulated
and recognised in it, as belonging to the people of the United
States, could be abrogated, but by their own renunciation, was at
first assumed in defence of the fisheries only, and without saying
any thing of the Mississippi. When, therefore, the demand for
the navigation of the Mississippi came from the British plenipo
tentiaries, Mr. Russell's special objections to the application of our
principle, in favour of our demand, might have been urged. But
what were these special objections ? 1 have shown, that they were
our own wrong — fraud and extortion upon Spain, to justify perfidy
to. Great Britain. Mr. Russell never did allege these objections
at Ghent, and, if he had, a majority of the American mission would,
assuredly, have been ashamed to allege them to the British govern
ment.

The second way of proceeding, to which Mr. Russell says he
would have assented was to consider the treaty of 1783 at an end,
and offer for the fishing privilege, a reasonable equivalent, wherever
it might be found — and where would he have found it ? He will
not affirm that we had authority to offer any equivalent whatever —
we had been specially instructed not to surrender them. He says
he would have surrendered, and purchased them at a reasonable
price again.

The third substitute, to which he says he would have assented,
is the strangest of all. He says he would have made it a sine quu
non of peace, as embraced by the principle of status ante bellnm.

A sine qua non for the status ante bellum ! And yet he could not
consent to grant or revive the British right to the navigation of the
of the Mississippi in order to procure or preserve the fishing lib
erty ; when the status ante bellum would have given them not only
the whole treaty of 1783, but the permanent articles of the treaty
of 1794 ; not only the navigation of the Mississippi, but unre
strained access to our territories and intercourse with our Indians.

I have shown that the most aggravated portion of Mr. Russell's
charge against his colleagues of the majority, that of wilful viola
tion of positive and unequivocal instructions, by a senseless offer
to the British plenipotentiaries, sacrificing an important Western
to a trifling Eastern interest, is not only utterly destitute of founda
tion, but that it was not even made, nay, more, that it was distinctly
contradicted by the letter really written by Mr. Russell at Paris,
on the 1 1th of February, 1815. Into Mr. Russell's motives for in
troducing it into the duplicate of that letter, delivered by himself
at the Department of State, to be communicated to the House as
the letter called for by their resolution, I shall not attempt to
penetrate ; having, as 1 trust, equally shown that the charges im
plied in the real letter are as groundless as their aggravations in
the duplicate. The professions of unfeigned respect for the integ
rity, talents, and judgment, of those colleagues whose conduct is,
in the same letter, represented as *o weak, absurd, and treacherous,
| can, for my own part, neither accept nor reciprocate. To havn

112

been compelled to speak as in these remarks I have done, of a per
son distinguished by the favour of his country, and with whom I
had been associated in a service of high interest to this Union, has
been among the most painful incidents of my life. In the defence
of myself and my colleagues, against imputations so groundless in
themselves, at first so secretly set forth and now so wantonly pro
mulgated before the legislative assembly of the nation, it has been
impossible entirely to separate the language of self-vindication from
that of reproach. With Mr. Russell 1 can al^o rejoice that the
proposal offered on the 1st of December, 1814, was rejected by
the British government, not because I believe it now, more than I
did then, liable to any of the dangers and mischiefs so glaring in
the vaticinations of Mr. Russell, but because both the interests to
which it relates have since been adjusted in a manner still more
satisfactory to the United States. 1 rejoice, too, that this adjust
ment has taken place before the publication of Mr. Russell's letter
could have any possible influence in defeating or retarding it. The
convention of 20th October, 1318, is the refutation of all the doc
trines of Mr. Russell's letter, to which there can be no reply. It
has adjusted the fishing interest upon the principle asserted by the
American mission at Ghent, but disclaimed by Mr. Russell. It has
given us the boundary of latitude 49, from the Lake of the Woods
westward, and it has proved the total indifference of the British
government to the right of navigating the Mississippi, by their
abandonment of their last claim to it, without asking an equivalent
for its renunciation.

With regard to the magnitude of the fishing interest which was at
stake during the negotiation at Ghent, I believe the views disclosed
in Mr. Russell's letter as incorrect as the principles upon which he
would have surrendered it. The notification of exclusion was from
all fisheries within exclusive British jurisdiction I have shown
that, historically, Great Britain had asserted and maintained exclu
sive proprietary jurisdiction over the whole. Had we tamely ac
quiesced in her principle of forfeiture, without renunciation, we
should soon have found that her principle of exclusion embraced
the. whole. That a citizen of Massachusetts, acquainted with its
colonial history, with the share that his countrymen had had in the
conquest of a great part of these fisheries, with the deep and
anxious interest in them taken by France, by Spain, by Great Bri
tain, for centuries before the American revolution ; acquainted
with the negotiations of which they had been the knot, and the wars
of which they had been the prize, betvyeenthe three most powerful
maritime nations of modern Europe ; acquainted with the profound
sensibilit}' of the whole American Union, during the revolutionary
war, to this interest, and with the inflexible energies by which it
had been secured at its close ; acquainted with the indissoluble
links of attachment between it and the navigation, the navy, the ma
ritime defence, the national spirit and hardy enterprise of this great
republic ; that such a citizen, stimulated to the discharge of duty by

113

a fresh instruction from his government, given at the most trying
period of the war upon the very tirst rumour of an intention, on
the part of Great Britain, to demand its surrender, not to surrender
it, sooner to break off the negotiation than surrender it ; that such
a citizen, with the dying words of Lawrence, " Don't give up the
"ship," still vibrating on his ear, should describe this interest "as
" totally unnecessary for us for subsistence or occupation," and
affording, " in no honest way, either commercial facility or political
'* advantage," as t; the doubtful accommodation of a few fishermen
" annually decreasing in number," is as strange and unaccountable
to me as that he should deliberately sit down, two months after the
treaty was concluded, and write to his government a cold-blooded
dissertation to prove that there was nothing, absolutely nothing, in
the principle upon which he and his colleagues had rested its future
defence, and that he considered the fishing liberty " to be entirely
" at an end, without a new stipulation for its revival."

Such were not the sentiments of a majority of the American com
missioners at Ghent ; such were, particularly, not the sentiments
of the writer of these remarks. He reflects, with extreme satis
faction, upon that deep and earnest regard for this interest mani
fested at that time, by the executive government of the United
States, in the positive and unqualified instruction of 25th June, 1814,
to the commissioners, on no consideration whatever to surrender
the fisheries. He rejoices that this instruction was implicitly obey
ed ; that the nation issued from the war with all its rights and liber
ties unimpaired, preserved as well from the artifices of diplomacy,
as from the force of preponderating power upon their element, the
seas ; and he trusts that the history of this transaction, in all its de
tails, from the instruction not to surrender the fisheries, to the con
clusion of the convention of 20th October, 1818, will give solemn
warning to the statesmen of this Union, in their conflicts with fo
reign powers, through all future time, never to consider any of the
liberties of this nation as abrogated by a war, or capable of being
extinguished by any other agency than our own express renun
ciation.

JOHN qUINCY ADAMS.

May 3, 1822.

114

THE TRIPLICATE.

In the National Gazette, of 10th May, 1822, printed at Philadel
phia, there was published, headed "For the National Gazette," a,
" Letter of Jonathan Russell, Esq. to the Hon. the Secretary of
State, in relation to the negotiations at Ghent." It was dated Paris,
1 Hh February, 1815, not marked "private," and in the same pa
per was accompanied by the following article, under the editorial
head :

NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT.

The call made in Congress for a particular letter of Jonathan
Russell, Esq. on the subject of the negotiations at Ghent, the sup
posed object of that call, and the extraordinary tenour of the Pre
sident's reply to it, have excited a general curiosity respecting the
contents of the document, about which an air of mystery and preg
nant importance was thus thrown. The President stated in his
message, as our readers will recollect, that lie had found the letter
among his private papers, marked ''private," by the writer, whose
view of his own conduct and that of his colleagues was such as
would demand from the two surviving members of the Ghent mis
sion, a reply containing their view of the transactions in question ;
which reply, upon the principles of equal justice, ought to be com
municated at the same time to Congress. The President stated,
also, that he had deposited the original of the letter in the Depart
ment of State, with instructions to deliver a copy to any person who
might be interested. O^rfA copy has come into our hands, for the
exactness of which we can vouch, and which we publish entire,
this afternoon ;] and ss the House of Representatives has repeated
the call for the document, in terms that have empowered the Pre
sident to submit with it whatever he pleased of a relevant purport,
we may expect to be soon able to lay before our readers, the com
munication, in the nature of an answer, which the Secretary of
State had expressed a desire to be permitted to oiler.

Most persons will, we apprehend, find that the ide.is respecting
the character of the letter, which they had been led from what has
passed, to form, are in a degree erroneous. Mr. Russell has not
arraigned the conduct or questioned the motives of his colleagues,
who composed the majority on the point discussed — on the contra
ry, he has, we observe, emphatically borne testimony, towards the
end of the letter, to their integrity, (alents, and judgment ; and his
purpose seems to have been, not to prove that they erred, so much
as to furnish a satisfactory apology for his having differed with them
in opinion. If he marked the letter " private," it is not thence to
be inferred that he meant it to remain secret for them, or absolute
ly ; but merely that it should not be considered as a part of the
public and official record of the negotiations, or otherwise than hi*

115

separate and personal explanation of his dissent in a particular and
important transaction of the case. We would remark that such ex
planations are by no menqs rare in the annals of diplomacy. —
$$=• [We learn, from good authority, that the first call in the House
of Representatives, for ihe correspondence which led to the Treaty
of Ghent, was not made at the instigation of Mr. Russell, nor in
consequence of communications with him ; and that in like manner,
he had no share in the call for the private letter.] The attention
of Mr. Floyd was attracted to it, we presume, by the following
passage of a short extract of a letter from Mr. Russell to the Secre
tary of State, contained in the correspondence which the Presi
dent submitted to Congress on the 25th of February.

"As you will perceive by our despatch to you, of this date, that a majority
only of the mission was in favour of offering to the British plenipotentiaries, aa
article confirming the British right to the navigation of the Mississippi, and ours
to the liberty as to the fisheries, it becomes me in candour to acknowledge, that
I was in the minority on that question. I must reserve to myself the powei of
communicating to you, hereafter, the reasons which influenced me to differ from
a majority of my colleagues on that occasion ; and if they be insufficient to sup
port my opinion, I persuade myself they will at least vindicate my motives."

That his letter may be the better understood, we shall proceed
to quote that part of the official despatch to which he refers, which
relates to the article mentioned. The despatch is dated Ghent*
25th December, 1814 ; and is among the papers communicated to
Congress.

" At the first conference on the 8th of August, the British plenipotentiaries
had notified to us, that the British government did not intend, henceforth, to al
low to the people of the United States, without an equivalent, the liberties to
fish, and to dry and cure fish, within the exclusive British jurisdiction, stipulat
ed, in their favour, by the latter part of the third article of the treaty of peace
of 1783. And, in their note of the 19th August, the British plenipotentiaries
had demanded a new stipulation to secure to British subjects the right of navi
gating the Mississippi ; a demand, which, unless warranted by anather article
of that same treaty of 1783, we could not perceive that Great Britain had any
colourable pretence for making. Our instructions had forbidden us to suffer our
right to the fisheries to be brought into discussion, and had not authorized us to
make any distinction in the several provisions of the third article of the treaty
of 1783, or between that article and any other of the same treaty. We had no
equivalent to offer for a new recognition of our right to any part of the fisheries,
and we had no power to grant any equivalent which might be asked for it by
the Biitish government. We contended that the whole treaty of 1783, must be
considered as one entire and permanent compact, not liable, like ordinary trea
ties, to be ab -ogated by a subsequent war between the parties to it ; as an in
strument, recognising the rights and liberties enjoyed by the people of the United
States, as an independent nation, and containing the terms and conditions on
which the two parts of one empire had mutually agreed, thenceforth to consti
tute two, distinct and separate nations. In consenting by that treaty, that a
part of the North American continent should remain subject to the British juris
diction, the people of the United States had reserved to themselves the liberty,
which they had ever before enjoyed, of fishing upon that part of the coasts, and
of drying and curing fish upon the shores ; and this reservation had been agreed
to by the other contracting party. We saw not why this liberty, then n ) new
grant, but a mere recognition of a prior right, always enjoyed, should be forfeited
fe-v * n-ar. any more than any other of the rights of oar national independence,

116

0r why we should need a new stipulation for its enjoyment, more than we need
ed a new article to declare that the king of Great Britain treated with us a.s
free, sovereign, and independent States. We stated this principle, in general
terms, to the British plenipotentiaries, in the note which we sent to tnevn, with
our projet of the treaty ; and we alleged it as the ground upon which no new
stipulation was deemed by our government necessary to secure to the people of
the United States, all the rights and liberties stipulated in their favour by the
treaty of 1783. No reply to that part of our note was given by the British
plenipotentiaries ; but, in returning our projet of a treaty, they added a clause
to one of the articles, stipulating a right for British subjects to navigate the
Mississippi. Without adverting to the ground of prior and immemorial usage,
if the principle were just, that the treaty of 1783, from its peculiar character,
remained in force in all its parts, notwithstanding the war, no new stipulation
was necessary to secure to the subjects of Great. Britain, the right of navigating
the Mississippi, as far as that right was secured by the treaty of 1783 ; as, on
the other hand, no stipulation was necessary to secure to the people of the Unit
ed States the liberty to fish, and to dry and cure fish within the exclusive juris
diction of Great Britain.

"If they asked the navigation of the Mississippi, as a new claim, they could
not expect we should grant it without an equivalent ; if they asked it because
it had been granted in 1783, they must recognise the claim of the people of the
United States, to the liberty to fish, and to dry and cure fish, in question. To
place both points beyond all further controversy, a majority of us determined
to offer to admit an article confirming both rights; or, we offered at the same
time, to be silent in the treaty upon both, and to leave out altogether the article
defining the boundary from the Lake of the Woods westward. They finally
agreed to this last proposal, but not until they had proposed an article stipulat
ing for a future negotiation for an equivalent to be given by Great Britain, for
the navigation of the Missisippi, and by the United States, for the liberty as to
the fisheries within British jurisdiction. This article was unnecessary, with re
spect to its professed object, since both governments had it in their power, with
out it, to negotiate upon these subjects if they pleased. We rejected it, al
though its adoption would have secured the boundary of the 49th degree of lati
tude, west of the Lake of the Woods, because it would have been a formal aban
donment, on our part, of our claim, to the liberty as to the fisheries, recognised
by the treaty of 1783."

For the more complete comprehension of the foregoing extract,
and Mr. Russell's letter, we copy the article, and two extracts from
the instructions of the American commissioners.

Article offered by the American to the British Plenipotentiaries at Ghent, on the
1st of December, 1814.

*e The inhabitants of the United States shall continue to enjoy the liberty to
take, dry, and cure fish in places within the exclusive jurisdiction of Great Bri
tain, as secured by the former treaty of peace; and the navigation of the river
Mississippi, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, shall remain
free and open to the suhjerts of Great Britain, in the manner secured by that
treaty ; and it is further agreed that the subjects of his Britannic majesty shall
at all times have access, from such place as mat/ be selected for that purpose, in
his Britannic majesty^ aforesaid territories, westward and within three hundred
miles of the Lake of the Woods, in the aforciaid territories of the United States,
tn the. river Mississippi, in order to enjoy the benefit of tlte navigation of that
river, with their goods, effects, and merchandise, whose importation into the said
States, shall not be entirely prohibited, on the payment of the same duties o.s-
would be payable on the importation of t/ie same into the Atlantic ports of th*i
mi.d States, and on conforming with the usual custom-house regulations."

117

j£7*[Extract of a letter from Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State, to the American
Commissioners.

Department of State, April 15, 1813.

" The article in the treaty of 1794, which allows British traders from Ca
nada and the North West Company, to carry on trade with the Indian tribes,
within the limits of the United States, must not be renewed. The pernicious
effects of this privilege have been most sensibly felt in the present war, by the
influence whicfi it gave to the traders over the Indians, whose whole force has
been wielded by meant thereof against the inhabitants of our Westtrn States
and territories. You will avoid also any stipulatiou which might restrain the
United States from increasing their naval force to any extent they may think
proper, on the lakes held in common ; or excluding the British traders from the
navigation of the lakes and rivers, exclusively within our own jurisdiction."]

Extract of a letter from the same to the same, 25th June, 1814.
" Information has been received from a quarter deserving attention, that the
late events in France have produced such an effect on the British government,
as to make it probable that a demand will be made at Gottenburg, to surrender
our right to the fisheries —to abandon all trade beyond the Cape of Good Hope,
and to cede Louisiana to Spain. We cannot conceive that such a demand will
be made. Should it be, you will, of course, treat it as it deserves. These
rights must not be brought into discussion. If insisted on, your negotiations

" We must confess that we consider the general views of Mr.
Russell, which are only exhibited, as for the most part sound, and
believe with him both that the treaty of 1783 was abrogated by the
war, and that much mischief might have resulted from allowing
the British access to the Mississippi from the interior, which was
offered and rejected. But we must wait to see in what lights the
subject has been placed in the communication of Mr. Adams. It
has been supposed, and indeed asserted with some exultation, that
the disclosure of this affair would affect the good repute of that
gentleman with the country, as a staunch and enlightened patriot.
It may be confidently believed, however, that those who have
predicted or desired this result, will be disappointed. If he com
mitted even an error of judgment, it was in common with Mr. Gal-
latin and Mr. Bayard, men whose diffusive and deep love of
country, and whose pervading sagacity and powers of just reflec
tion are so far acknowledged OH one side or the other by the poli
tical parties of the Union, that they may be declared to be fully
admitted. And when the case shall be studied in all its circum
stances and details of reasoning, it will probably be universally ac
knowledged, by candid minds, to be one as to which the course
pursued by the majority of the commissioners should not be deemed
inconsistent with the best dispositions that could distinguish Ame
rican negotiators. We hold the rejection by the British commis
sioners of the article offered to them, to be a fortunate incident,
but at the same time, we think it entitled to no small weight in the
question of the judgment which ought, at this distance of time, to
be pronounced on the proposal."

In this article, the voucher for the exactness of the copy — the
assertion from good autlmrity, that Mr. Russell had had no share

15

M8

Jtl either of the calls of the House of Representatives of 17 Jan^
F822, for the Ghent documents, or of 19 April, 1822, for his own
letter, and above all, the extract from the instructions of 15 April,
1813, which had never before been published, but of which Mr.
Russell had recently obtained, from the records of the Depart
ment of State, two copies, were undoubted indications that the
publication came from Mr. Russell. The editor of the Gazette
has indeed since stated, that the editorial article was written by
himself; but it was evidently written upon representations directly
or indirectly from Mr. Russell. The opinions expressed in the
editorial article were his own, but the facts for which he vouched,
and the extract from the cancelled instructions, could have been
furnished him only by, or at the instance of, Mr. Russell.

The copy of the letter was not exact, as will be seen by the fol
lowing extracts from a subsequent editorial article in the National
Gazette of 25 May, 1822.

" We insert, to-day, the reply of the hon. John Q. Adams, Se
cretary of State, to Mr. Russell's communications to the govern
ment respecting the negotiations at Ghent."

" Upon the merits of the main argument, we do not intend, and
indeed have not room, to express an opinion to-day ; but we may
remark at once, that so far as regards the proposal to allow the
British the free navigation of the Mississippi, Mr. Adams has plac
ed his conduct and views beyond the reach of calumny and misap
prehension for the future. It will be seen that Mr. Jefferson, in
1807, then President of the United States, expressly authorized
Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, who were negotiating in London, to
accede to a stipulation proposed by the British government for the
navigation of that river, and access to it from our territories, on
submitting to the duties and custom-house regulations applicable
to goods and effects of citizens of the United States.

" The pamphlet of documents printed for (Congress embraces
not only the original letter of Mr. Russell, as received by Mr. Mon
roe, but the paper which Mr. Russell on the 22d April last, left at
the Department of State, as the duplicate of that letter, and which
contains passages not to be found in the original. In publishing the
letter of Mr. Russell, we undertook to vouch for its exactness as a
copy, circumstances having led tis fully to believe this to be the
case. On comparing it, however, with the printed original, we
found the following variations in the text

" (Quotation from our publication : * From the year 1783 to the

* commencement of the present war, the actual advantages derived

* from the fishing privilege by the people of the United States,
s were, according to the best information that we could obtain on
c the subject,' &c. The text of the original is — / can obtain on the
subject. Again, our printed text is, - because by conceding in it

* (the proposed article) to Great Britain the navigation of the Mis-

* sissippi, we directly violated our instructions, and we offered,*
&c. The phrase, we directly violated our instructions, is not in the

119

tfnginal. In the postscript of the letter in our text, it is said, ' we
had three ways of proceeding ;' the text laid before Congress is,
1 we had three other ways of proceeding.'

" With respect to the variations between the text of the letter
which we published and that of the original, we would remark that
they are likewise in the duplicate, deposited in the Department of
State.'*

The most remarkable circumstances attending this publication of
the letter in the National Gazette, were the time selected for the
purpose, and the interpolations still retained, while nearly all those
of the duplicate were dismissed. The letter in the Gazette was,
with the exception of about two lines, the original letter entirely
restored; but one of those lines was " we directly violated our
instructions" and its retention was necessarily connected with the
citation of the cancelled paragraph, published fcs part of the accom
panying editorial article. For those were the instructions alleged
to have been violated ; yet this was after I had shown to Mr. Rus
sell, and he had read at the Department of State, the despatch from
the Secretary of State, which had revoked those instructions. It
was apparent also that Mr. Russell had, before he left Washington,
prepared himself for this publication at Philadelphia, and at a time
when, from the President's message in answer to the call from the
House of the 19th of April, it was probable the letter would not
be communicated to the House at all.

From the Boston Statesman of 27 June, 1&22,
MR. RUSSELL'S REPLY TO MR. ADAMS.

Is was not until the 30th ult. that I received a copy of the com
munication which had been made, by the President, to the House
of Representatives, on the 7th of that month. This communication
consists of a letter which I had written from Paris on the 15th of
February, 1815, and addressed to the then Secretary of State, of
a paper left by me at the Department of State, on the 22d of April
last, and of the remarks of Mr. Adams on both. 1 say on both —
for, notwithstanding that the report of Mr. Adams to the President,
speaks only of his remarks on the paper deposited by me at the
Department, as just mentioned, yet a considerable portion of those
remarks apply to the letter received at that Department in 1815.
The message of the President of the 4th ult. indeed, evidently
considers the contemplated report of Mr. Adams to be confined to
that letter only. It is apparent, from the whole tenor of that message,
that the letter which Mr. Monroe received from Paris, was alone
the document called for, and to be communicated to the House. I
was surprised, therefore, on receiving the printed documents, to
find that either more had been called for on the 6th, or, without
being embraced by such call, had been communicated on the 7th
of May, than had been signified by that message.

120

I had left Washington on the 5th, io the belief that, at so late a
moment of the session, no call, in reference to that message, would
be made, or, if made, that it would produce the letter only receiv
ed from Paris, with the corresponding report of the Secretary of
State. My surprise was not diminished when, on reading the re
marks of Mr. Adams, 1 discovered that they mainly owed their ex
istence and character to a paper, which had been considered not to
be the paper called for, and which had been obtruded on the
House, after my departure, at the special instance of Mr. Adams
himself, and to afford him an opportunity of giving another speci
men of his taste and temper to the public.

Mr. Adams, on the 6th of May, the very next day after my de
parture from Washington, went to the House of Representatives,
and there, in person, sought for a member who would consent to
make the call whic^i was necessary for the official publication of
his personal remarks. To one member from Massachusetts, at
least, he had applied in vain, before he finally succeeded in his ob
ject. It would seem that the evidence furnished by these facts
oughr to have been sufficient, at least, to deter him from accusing
others of " a wanton promulgation before the legislative assembly
of the nation."

For the previous calls, whatever might have been the motive
for making them, I am not responsible. With the gentleman who
made the call on the 17th of January, for the correspondence
which led to the treaty of Ghent, not already made publ^, I had
not the least personal acquaintance at the time, nor hadBpbefore
that call was actually made, the slightest intimation, direcuy or in
directly, of any intention of making it.

In an interview with Mr. Adams, at his house, a short time af
terwards, he said, in reference to that call, that a letter had been
found from me, in the archives of State, which might be considered
to be embraced by it. He desired to know if I was willing to have
it communicated. I replied that I had no distinct recollection of
the letter to which he alluded, and that I wished to see it before I
gave my consent to its publication. He acquiesced, and I repaired
accordingly to the Department of State. I found the letter to
which Mr. Adams had referred, to be that which I had written at
Ghent, on the 25th of December, 1815, and which announced the
fact of my having been in the minority on the proposition relative
to the navigation of the Mississippi and the tishing privilege, and
intimated my intention of communicating the reasons which had in
fluenced my conduct on that occasion. I could perceive no good
cause why I should object to the communication of such a letter,
and I consented that the part which related to the subject just
mentioned, should, with the approbation of Mr. Adams, be commu
nicated. Mr. Adams at that time expressed no dissatisfaction that
I had written such a letter, nor made any comment on its contents.
This is all the participation which I had, directly or indirectly,
with the call of the 17th of January.

121

The member who had made that call, made also the call of the
19th of April, 'i his. second call was obviously occasioned by the
extract of rny letter of the 25th of December, 1814,* above men
tioned, which the first call had brought forth. To that member I
had never communicated, by transcript or otherwise, the contents
of my letter written at Paris, for which he called. I had refused to
others any account or copy of that letter, for which they had applied
to me, as I believed, for publication. As a reason for thus refusing,
I uniformly assigned the necessity, in my op:nion, of the previous
consent and approbation ot the constituted authorities for the regu
lar publication of a letter written by me while in the public ser
vice, to one of those authorities, and in relation to that service.

All the participation which I had in this call was, to leave at the
Department of State, in consequence of an application from thai
Department, the paper which has since been published as a dupli
cate. The simple facts are these: on the morning of the 20th of
April, a gentleman employed in the Department of State called on
me at my lodgings and inquired if 1 could furnish a duplicate of
the letter which had been called for. I intimated a reluctance to
communicating any thing as a duplicate. He observed, that it need
not be presented as such to the House, but wished to have it so
presented to the Department. This is, in substance, what was said
on that occasion.

On the 22d, I called at the Department of State— Mr. Adams
was not there — and 1 left the paper with the gentleman who had
apj/lie^pto me for it. The word " duplicate" had indeed been
written on it, in consequence of his suggestion as above stated ; but
I gave no further intimation, much less any assurance, that it was
so. He made no inquiry, and I made no comment. I observed
merely, that I left it for the examination of Mr. Adams ; and that I
was indifferent whether it was communicated, under the call of the
House, or not, as the letter called for ; but if not so communicated ^
I expressed the expectation that it would be returned to me. He
received it accordingly.

A few days afterwards I again visited the Department of State,

* Tlie following is the extract alluded to :

Extract of a letter from Jonathan Russell, esq. to the Secretary of State, dated
at Ghent, 25//t of December, 1814, and communicated to the House of Repre
sentatives^ by the President, on the 21 at of February, 1822.

" My necessary occupation, at this moment, in aiding my colleagues to prepare
our jo/nt despatches, puts it out oj my power to jurnish you with any details or
observations exclusively my own.

" As, however, you 'will perceive by our despatch to you of this date, that a majo
rity only of the mission icas in favour of offering to the British plenipotentiaries)
an article confirming the British right to tfic navigation of the Mississippi, am;
ours to the liberty as to the fisheries, it becomes me, in candour, to acknowledge that
I was in the minority on that question. I must reserve the power of column ni-
rating to you, hereajtcr, the reasons which influenced me to differ from a majo-
oity of my colleagues on that occasion, and if they be insufficient to support nv,-
opinion, I per svadt mi/self they will, at hast., vindicate my moticfa^

122

and was again so unfortunate as not to find Mr. Adams there. I
saw, however, the gentleman with whom I had left the paper, and
learnt from him, that as it had been dated, as he supposed, by mis
take in 1822, he had taken the liberty to correct it, by inserting
1816. I made no objection, but repeated my expectation, that if
it should not be deemed proper to use it for the purpose for which
it had been delivered, it would be returned to me.

1 made a third visit to the Department of State, on the 2d of May,
if I remember correctly. Mr. Adams was then in his office, and
in passing thither, I learned from the gentleman who had received
the paper delivered by me on the 22d, that it had undergone ano
ther alteration in its date, and that 1816 had been made to give
place to 1815. This last alteration was, it seems, found necessary
to make the paper agree in date with the letter received from Pa
ris, which had at last been found ; and thus to be able to use that
paper, with a better grace, as a duplicate, and to abuse it with the
more confidence for its variation from that letter. The corrective
poivcr, assumed, appears to have been limited acccordingly.

Mr. Adams soon spoke of the paper which 1 had left, on the 22d,
and had not proceeded far without complaining of its difference
from the original which had been found. This circumstance he
affected to consider particularly offensive. In vain I represented
that the difference between the two was not material ; that neither
was personal or accusatory ; that both were merely defensive ;
and that I was willing that either or neither should be communicat
ed, as he might judge proper. I soon perceived that itjfcas too
late to offer explanation with a prospect of success. He was not in
a humour to listen to me, even with civility ; the manner in which
he treated the business, destroyed, in me, even a wish to conciliate
or appease him.

1 have stated these facts principally to show, that the paper was
left at the Department of State, not on my own proper motion, but
that it was left there on the application, and marked duplicate at
the suggestion of a person belonging to that Department, and pos
sessing the confidence of VIr. Adams. Such an application was
altogether unexpected by me, and was made without any previous
intimation, suggestion, or encouragement on my part ; and had it
not been made, that paper would never have been left at the De
partment of State, nor in any other manner presented to the pub
lic. Having twice failed in my attempts to see Mr. Adams, 1 had
no opportunity of offering those explanations which the case ap-*
peared to require, until it was too late to offer them.

I considered it an act of frankness to place the paper, when thus
applied for, whatever might be its merits or defects, in the power
of the person who might consider himself the most liable to be af
fected by its publication. In this act there was certainly neither
secrecy nor concealment to offend him. He had the sole power to
publish it or not, as he might judge proper, and to consult his own
feelings and interests, in forming his decision. When a private let-

123

ier, written solely for the vindication of my own conduct, to those
to whom I war- immediate!}7 responsible, was asked of me, by a per
son known to be under the orders of the Secretary of State, for the
purpose of presenting it lo the public, a tribun-d for which it had
never been intended, and to which it ought not to have been pre
sented without my consent. I certainly did believe, that I was
permitted to make those corrections of the copy in possession,
which appeared to me to be proper to exhibit my case most advan
tageously before that tribunal. I the more confidently entertained
this opinion, as the paper was not to be there exhibited without the
previous examination and consent of the adverse party. Such were
the views with which it was unreservedly confided to Mr. Adams.
But he communicated my private letter, as the paper called for,
and, with it, he disingenuously communicated the paper, entrusted
to him, not as the paper called for, but as a convenient vehicle for
passionate invective and intemperate personal abuse against .ae.
If justice, or even decency towards me, presented no obst;i -le,
still, I should have believed, that a respect for the Representatives
of the people of the United States, would have at least been suffi
cient to have deterred him from so rude and irregular a course of
proceeding.

His tirst remark on what he ostentatiously presents as a duplicate
is, that the letter written at Paris, ''although of the same general
purport and tenor, with the so-called duplicate, differs from it ia
several highly significant passages." He presents, as an example,
a parallel extracted from the two papers. He deduces from this
parallel, the contradiction that I did believe, in the one paper, and
that I did not believe, in the other paper, that we were permitted,
by our instructions, at Ghent, to offer a stipulation for the naviga
tion, by the British, of the Mississippi. So far however, from the
parallel passages exhibiting such a contradiction, they contain
within themselves the evidence of their consistency with each
olher.

The original letter refers exclusively to the instructions of the
25th of June, 1814, (a) on which the majority, in the despatch of
the 25th of December, of the same year, solely relied, when they
j-aid, " our instructions had forbidden us to sutler our right to the
fisheries to be brought into discussion, and had not authorized us to
make any distinction in the several provisions of the 3d article of
the treaty of 1783."

(o) Extract of a letter of insl nations, rec tired from the Secretary by the Com
missioners at GJtent, dated '25/A of June, 1814.

" /// formation has been rfceirrd, from a quarter deserving attention, that the
Idle events in France huce produced such an effect on the British government, as
lornake it probable that a demand will be made at Gothenburgh tosurrtn'ier our
right to thejisherics, to abandon all trade bfyvnd the Cape of Good Hope, and tit
cede Louisiana to Spain. 7* e cannot believe that s'ucli a demand ui/t be r. tide.;
xhould it be, if-Guutlf, of course, treat it as it deserves. These rights mu^not be
'irctight into discussion. If insisted on, your negotiations v. ill cease."

124

The duplicate also refers to the same instructions, and perfectly
agrees, so far as it does refer to them, with the interpretation of
them in the original letter.

The original letter says, The duplicate says,

"The majority believed them- ''The majority believed them
selves to be permitted to offer a selves to be permitted, their own
very explicit proposition, with construction to the contrary not-
regard to the navigation of its withstanding, to offer a very ex-
principal river. I believed with plicit proposition with regard to
them that we rtere so permitted, the navigation of its principal ri-
and that we were likewise per- ver ; now this offer I considered,
mitted to offer a proposition re- for the reasons just suggested,
lative to the fishing liberty," &c. not to be a violation of the instruc-

tionSy in question," &,c.

Instead of any contradiction or inconsistency, there is here a
perfect accordance in the sense of the two papers, in relation to
the instruction of the 25th of June.

I will here observe that my letter, written at Paris, in 1815, was
as may be readily ascertained, confined to a discussion of the
grounds which the majority assigned or suggested, in the despatch
of the 25th of December, for the offer of the navigation of the
Mississippi for the fishing privilege. To justify my own conduct
to my government, in opposing that offer, 1 believed that it would
be sufficient, at the time, to show why the reasons of the majority
had not satisfied me. In preparing the paper which I left at the
Department of State, 1 believed it to be proper, for the causes
already suggested, to assign, for my justification, an additional reason
which had influenced me in the course which I pursued, at the
time. The paper therefore, says, in speaking of the offer, " but
I considered it to be against the letter and the spirit of our instruc
tion of the.J5th of April, 1813." (b.)

Mr. Adams, in his remarks, admits, at least by implication, that
" the letter and the spirit" of this instruction was, indeed, against
that offer, when he resorts for a release irom the obligation of ob
serving it, to other instructions, of the 19th of October, 1814,
which, he says, were received on the 24th of the following Nov.
authorizing the status ante helium, as a basis of negotiation. He

(6) Extract of a letter of instructions from the Secretary of State, to the Ameri
can Commissioners, dated 15th April, 18 13.

" The article in the Treaty of 1794-, which allows British traders from Cana
da, and the North West Company, to carry on trade with the Indian tribes, with
in the limits of the United States, must not be renewed. The pernicious effects of
this privilege have been most sensibly felt in the present war, by the influence
which it gave to the traders over the Indians, whose whole force has been
wielded, by means thereof, against the inhabitants of. our western States and
territories. You will avoid also any stipulation, that might restrain the United
States from increasing their naval force, to any extent they may thinkproper, on
the Lakes, held in common; or excluding the British traders from the naviga
tion of the lakes and rivers exclusively \vithin our own jurisdiction.'*

123

evidently means to insinuate if not to assert that, in consequence oi'
the basis, thus -authorized, the American mission discussed the
proposition, relating to the navigation of the Mississippi and the
iishing privilege, on the 28th and 29th of November, and, as a re
sult of that discussion, offered it on the first of December to the
British ministers.

This statement is incorrect. The ?ense of the mission was not
distinctly taken on the 28th and 29th of November, in relation to
this proposition, nor did any majority, at that time, agree to offer it.

The following is the real history of the transaction : —

On the 24th of October, we addressed a note to the British mi
nisters and repeated a request already made to them, that they
would communicate all the other specific propositions, (the preli
minary article proposed by the British government having already
been accepted by us) offering a simultaneous exchange of projects
by both parties. The British ministers, by their note of the 31st
of that month, declined complying with this request, saying that
they had already by their note of the 21st of that month, communi
cated to us all the points upon which they were instructed to insist.
After the receipt of this note, we met together every day, I be
lieve, in order, tirst, to decide if we should present, on our part, a
complete project to the British ministers without insisting on a si
multaneous one, on theirs, and then, after having decided to do so,
to prepare and digest this project, until the 10th of November,
when it was presented. During this period the proposition in
qaestion, after having been repeatedly and thoroughly discussed,
was carried, as a part of the project, in the affirmative, by a bare
majority, Mr. Clay and myself having uniformly opposed it.

After the majority had thus decided on making the proposition
just mentioned an article of the contemplated project, the dissatis
faction of the minority at this decision, especially of Mr. Clay, who
declared that he would sign no treaty of which such an article
should make a part, induced the majority, particularly the gentle
man who is now no more, to relax in their adherence to it, and to
consent to present our project without such an article. Instead of
such an article in the project, or, as Mr. Adams himself avows, as
a substitute for it, the paragraph, justly ascribed by him to Mr.
Clay, was inserted in the note of the 10th of November.

That this .proposition had been decided on, before the 10th of
November, is not only to be inferred from the avowal of Mr.
Adams, just mentioned, that a substitute for it had been inserted in
cur note of that day, but is expressly proved by the following ex
tracts of two letters which 1 addressed, at the time, to the Ameri
can minister at Paris.

The tirst is dated at Ghent, the 4th of November, 1814, and
says,

" If we adhere to the understanding which we now have, we
shall make the status <////(• bellwn a sine qua non. The questioa

16

126

which most perplexes us is the fisheries, and we hata not yet de
cided on the mode of proceeding, in relation to it. They have told
us that the liberty of taking, drying, and curing fish within the ex
clusive jurisdiction of Great Britain, will not be continued to us
without an equivalent ; we cannot relinquish this liberty, and we
cannot offer territory as an equivalent. Shall we then offer the
free navigation of the Mississippi, which they apparently suggested
with this view. I think this will be carried in the affirmative, al
though I have very serious objections to the measure."

The other letter was dated the 20th of November, 1814, and says
as follows : —

" Without having been deceived relative to the disposition of the
majority, on the subject of the free navigation of the Mississippi, I
am happy to inform you that this disposition was not inflexible, and
we finally transmitted our project without the article that had at
first been carried." This article was as follows : —

" The right and liberty of the people and inhabitants of the Unit
ed States to take, dry, and cure fish in places within the exclusive
jurisdiction of Great Britain as recognised (arid secured) by the
former treaty of peace; and the privilege of the navigation of the
Mississippi, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,
(as secured to the subjects of Great Britain by the same treaty) are
hereby recognised and confirmed."

" Besides the objection to such an article which had occurred to
you, and which had not escaped us, the blending of the two points
together and making them mutually dependent on each other, which
was not done in the treaty of 1783, made this article the mope ob
jectionable."

From these facts it is manifest that the solution afforded by Mr.
Adams for " the difference in my mind between the writing of the
original and the duplicate" is not correct. A despatch, received
on the 24th of November, could not well have had any influence on
my reasons for opposing a measure, previous to the 10th of that
month.

I have accused no one of acting against instructions, but surely
I ought not to offend if I discovered a disposition to act, as far at
least as might be expedient, in conformity to my own construction
of them.

Mr. Adams, when I last saw him at the Department of State,
showed me on record, an instruction to the American ministers at
Ghent, dated the fourth of October, 1814, apparently with a view
to freshen my memory in relation to our dispensation from the obli
gation of observing the instructions, which I had alleged as a cause
for opposing the proposition, with respect to the Mississippi. I
had not proceeded far, however, in its perusal, before Mr. Adams
interrupted me by saying that he believed it had not been received
at the time, adding, after a momentary pause, that he did not know
if it hod ever been received. The instructions of the 4th of Octo
ber, which had never been received, had just as much influence on

127

the discussions of the mission previous to the 10th of November, as
a letter of the 19th of October which was not received until more
than fourteen days after those discussions had taken place.

It may not be improper to remark here that an instruction re
ceived on the 24th of November, authorizing the status antebellum.,
although highly satisfactory as it regarded the past, could not well^
considering what had already been done, have had much practical
effect on the future negotiations. On the 10th of that month we
had, in substance if not in name, already proposed that basis in op
position to that of the uti possidetis, urged by our adversaries. la
our note to them of that date, xve offered with a sufficient precision
the status ante bcllum, when we said that the undersigned " cannot
agree to any other principle than that of a mutual restoration of
territory, and have accordingly prepared an article founded on that
basis. They are willing even to extend the same principle to the
other objects in dispute between the two nations ; and in proposing
till the other articles included in this project, they wish to be dis
tinctly understood that they are ready to sign a treaty placing the
two countries, in respect to all the subjects of difference between
them in the same state they -were in at the commencement of the pre
sent war, reserving to each party all its rights, and leaving what
ever may remain of controversy between them, for future and pa
cific negotiation."

Besides, the proposition to which I objected before the 10th of
November, and which was substantially that first offered on the 1st
of December, was not, in my opinion, authorized by the status ante
bellum. 1 distinctly stated, in my letter, that the revival of the
British tight to navigate the Mississippi would be under existing
circumstances, a new and complete grant to her, &c. And in ano
ther place, " in thus offering the navigation of the Mississippi and
the access to it through our territories, as an equivalent for the
fishing liberty, we not only placed both on ground entirely different
from that on which they respectively stood in the treaty of 1783,"
&c.

The meetings of the American mission on the 28th and 29th of
November, were not in consequence of the despatch received on
the 24th of that month. They were convened for the purpose of
discussing "the alterations and suggestions" of the British minis
ters on our project which they had returned to us on the 27th,
with an explanatory note of the 26th. Whatever might have been
said at these meetings in relation to the Mississippi, on account of
the alteration, respecting it, made in the 8th article of our project,
by the British plenipotentiaries, no new resolution was there taken
by the American mission to offer the navigation of that river for the
fishing privilege. This offer was made on the 1st of December.,
in virtue of the vote taken before the 10th of November, and
which, although suspended, had not been reconsidered or cancelled,
I am the more confident in this statement, as 1 distinctly remember
that when that offer was actually made, it was unexpected by a ma*

128

jority of the mission. Mr. Bayard, in returning home from the
house of the British ministers, where the conference of the 1st of
December had been holden, very explicitly declared to Mr. Clay
and to me, his dissatisfaction that this offer had been made without
his having been recently consulted in relation to it. I dare, in regard
to these facts, to appeal to the recollection of Mr. Clay in confirm
ation of my own.

The explanation which I have given, will, I trust, be sufficient to
show that there could have been no impropriety in stating, at any
time, the instructions of the 15th of April, 1813, as furnishing an
objection, at least during the first days of Nov. to a proposition
to revive or continue to Great Britain aright to the free navigation
of the Mississippi — a river within our exclusive jurisdiction. As
this was the only topic, in the paper left at the Department of
State, which was not in the letter received from Paris, which could
by the most sickly imagination, be strained into anattack upon others,
I shall take but little notice of the remarks of Mr. Adams in relation
to the remainder of that paper.

The opinion which I there suggested, concerning the cause of
the rejection of our proposition by the British ministers, was an
opinion formed soon after that event, and 1 mentioned it to several
persons, particularly to the American minister at Paris, at or about
the time my letter was written at that place. A " trust in God and
the valour of the West," for the disappointment of our enemies,
was naturally suggested, at the time, by a pious and patriotic con
fidence in those who were able and might be willing to defend us,
and certainly had nothing in it of prophecy. It was evidently more
wise to place a trust there than instinctively in the fish of the East,
which were swimming in British waters. Nor was there any sem
blance of prediction of the treaty of 1818, in a belief that the fishing
privilege might thereafter be obtained, by negotiation, "without
any extravagant equivalent, whatever," as that belief was not only
suggested by the nature of the case, but authorized by the explicit
offer made by the British ministers, on the 10th of December,
1814, thus to negotiate and to grant that privilege in consideration
of a fair equivalent. By the measure of Mr. Adams, no extrava~
gant equivalent is precisely equal to no equivalent at all.

As to the sentiment which 1 expressed in favour of the fishermen
immediately interested in that privilege, it is a sentiment always
and every where felt by me, and could not be expressed out of
time or place.

Thus much for the important differences, between the private
letter received from Paris and the paper left at the Department of
State, which have afforded such an ample field to Mr. Adams for
the display of the enviable attributes of his head and heart.

I shall now make a few brief observations on the principal charges
which he exhibits against me, of inconsistency and misrepresent
ation.

The principle, that the treaty of 1783 was not, on account of if?

129

peculiar character, abrogated by tbe war, Mr. Adams not only *v,
asserts, but alleges to have obtained, when first suggested by him at
Ghent, the unanimous assent of the American mission. The prooi'
of this allegation appears to be inferred from the signature, by alt
that mission, of a note, to the British ministers, of the 10th of No
vember, in which that principle was partially adopted. It has al
ready been seen, even from the avowal of Mr. Adams himself, that
the paragraph, offered by Mr. Clay, admitting that doctrine, was a
substitute to a proposition which the minority had opposed. To
adopt, partially, in the spirit of compromise, a doctrine, as a pretext,
to preserve the fishing privilege and to get rid of a proposition con
firmative of the British right to the navigation of the Mississippi,
cannot fairly be considered a? an unanimous acknowledgment by the
American mission, of the orthodoxy of that doctrine. The consti
tution of the United States was, avowedly, the result of compro
mise, and thence some, at least of those who signed that instrument,
must necessarily have subscribed to provisions which they did not
desire, and to opinions which they did not approve. The infer
ence of Mr. Adams is, therefore, not correct. I do not recollect,
indeed, that any member of the mission, excepting Mr. Adams him
self, appeared to be a very zealous believer in that doctrine. Even
Mr. Gallatin, in his separate letter of the 25th of December, 1814,
(c) speaks only of this doctrine as one that had been assumed. Sure
it is that the minority consented to admit that doctrine as an expe
dient only to prevent the proposition, already decided on by the
majority, from constituting an article of our project. So far and no
farther were the minority willing to go in adopting that doctrine*
but whenever it was proposed to sanction the British right to navi
gate the Mississippi, they uniformly resisted it.

Mr. Adams also asserts that the proposal confirming the British
right to the navigation of the Mississippi and ours to the fishing
privilege, was made not by a majority, but by the whole of the Ame
rican mission, and refers to the protocol of the conference of the
1st of December, at which that proposal was, at length, made, and
to our note of the 14th of that month, signed by all the American
mission, which said that '" to such an article, which they viewed as
merely declaratory, the undersigned had no objection, and have of
fered to accede."

(c) Extract of a letter from Albert Gallatin, Esq. to the Secretary of State,

dated 25(h December, 1814.

" On the subject of the fisheries, within the jurisdiction of Great Britain,
we hare certainly done all that could be done. If according to the construction
of the treaty of 1783, which we assumed, the right was not abrogated by the
•war, it remains entire, since we most explicitly refused to renounce it, eillier di
rectly or indirectly. In that case it is only an unsettled subject of difference be*
tween the two countries. If the right must be considered as abrogated by the
war, we cannot regain it without an equivalent. We had none to give but the
recognition of their right to na\igate the Mississippi, and we offtred it. On this
last supposition this right is also lost to them ; and, in a general point of view,
we certainly hav« lost nothing.'"

130

if he had referred, at the same time, to the'clespatch of the 25th
December, 1814, (/I) he would there have seen that, in fact, ama-

(d) Extractfrom a despatch from the American Plenipotentiaries to the Secrela<
ry of Stale, dated at Ghent, ttth of December,

At fhc first conference, on the Slh of August, f he British plenipotentiaries had
notified us, t/tat Ike British government did not intend, henceforth, to allow to the
people of the United States, without an equivalent, the liberties to Jish, and to
dry and cure Jish within the exclusive British jurisdiction, stipulated in their
favour by the tatter part of the third article of the treaty of peace of 1783. And
in the note of the l9//t of *'h/-gusf, the British plenipotentiaries had demanded a
new stipulation to secure to British subjects the right of navigating the Missis
sippi, a demand, which, unless warranted by another article of the same treaty
of 1 783, we could not perceive that Great Britain had any colourable pretext for
Waking. Our instructions had forbidden us to suffer our right to the fisheries
to be brought into discussion, and had not authorized us to make any distinction
in the several provisions of the third article of the treaty of 1 783, or between that
article and any other of the same treaty. We had no equivalent to offer for a
new recognition of our right to any part of the fisheries, and we had no power
to grant any equivalent, which might be asked for it by the British government.
Wt contended that the whole treaty of 1783 must be considered as one entire and
permanent compact, not liable, like ordinary treaties, to be abrogated by a sub
sequent war between the parties to it, as an instrument recognising the rights and
liberties enjoyed by the people of the United States as an independent nation, and
containing the terms and conditions on which the two parts of one empire had
mutually agreed, thenceforth, to constitute two distinct and separate nations. In
consenting, by that treaty, that a part of the North American continent should
remain subject to the British jurisdiction, the people of the United States had
reserved to themselves the liberty, which they had ever before enjoyed, ofjishw1^
on that part of the coast, and of drying and curing Jish upon the shores — and
this reservation had been agreed to by the other contracting party. We saw nut
why this liberty, then no new grant, but a mere recognition of a prior right,
should be forfeited by war, any more than any other of the rights of our national
independence — or why we should need a new stipulation for Us enjoyment more
than we needed a new article to declare that the king of Great Biitain treated
with us as free, sovereign, and independent States. We staled this principle, in
general terms, to the British plenipotentiaries, in the note which we sent to them,
with our project of the treaty — and we alleged it as the ground upon which no
new stipulation was deemed by our government necessary to secure to the people
of the United Slates all the rights and liberties, stipulated in their favour by the
treaty of 1783. JVb reply to that part of our note was given by the British
plenipotentiaries ; but, in returning our project of a treaty, they added a clause
to one of the articles stipulating for a right for British subjects to navigate the
Mississippi,* without adverting to the ground of prior, and immemorial usage,
if the principle were just, that the treaty of 1783, from its peculiar character,
remained in force in all its parts, notwithstanding the war, no new stipulation
ic as necessary to secure to t/ie subjects of Great Britain the right of navigating
the Mississippi as far as that right was secured by the treaty of 1783 ; as on the
other hand, no new stipulation was necessary to secure to the people of the United
States the liberty to Jish and to dry and cure Jish, within the exclusive jurisdic
tion of Great Britain. If they asked (lie navigation of the Mississippi, as a
new claim, tliey could not expect we sJiould grant it without an equivalent ; if
they asked it because it had been granted in 1783, they must recognise the claim
vf the people of the United States to the liberty to Jish and to dry and cure Jish
tn question.

To place both points beyond all future controversy, A MAJORITY OP us de°
tormined to offer to admit an article confirming both rights.

* This passage is here incorrectly quoted by erroneous punctuation ; exhibiting a sense dif-«
fer«nt from that of the original — for which see p. c>5; but it is here, as published in the Bostaa
Statesman of 27 Jure. A»

131

jonfy only, and not the whole of the mission, decided to make that
proposal. The words of the despatch, in reference to that pro
posal, are, " to place both points beyond all future controversy, a
majority of us determined to offer an article confirming both rights."
Mr. Adams signed that despatch, anil thus, at that time, attested a
fact which he now positively denies.

The protocol was a mere record of the facts which had occurred
p.t the conference, and in no way furnished proof that a proposition,
there made had or had not been previously decided on una
nimously by the mission making it. The protocol of the 1st of
December stated that the proposal in question had been offered bj
the American mission, and the note of the 14th of that month sim
ply recognised that fact. Neither that protocol or that note inti
mated that this proposal had been unanimously offered by the
American mission. The majority who were competent before the
JOth of November, to determine on making that proposal, were
equally competent to make it on the 1st of December, and to say,
on the 14th of that month, that they had made it, and that " to it
they had no objection, and had offered to accede." The minority,
in net expressing their dissent at that conference, or by not refus
ing to sign that note, cannot be fairly adjudged to have inconsist
ently given their assent. They had opposed that proposal when
and where only their opposition could have had a beneficial effect,
and produced no evil. To have disturbed a conference with the
British ministers by protesting against an act of the majority, or to
have refused to sign a note from an objection to that act, could
have produced evil only. It would have discovered to the adverse
party dissention in our councils, and thence might have had a disas
trous effect on the whole negotiation. In relation to the proposal
itself, such a discovery to that party of our opposition to a particu
lar proposal, was calculated to enhance the value of that proposal,
in their estimation, and to induce them to accept it ; thus consum
mating the very evil which we deprecated. The act of the majo
rity was, in respect to the other party, the act of the whole ; and
Mr. Adams himself acknowledges that " it would have been equally
valid without my concurrence or signature as with it." In his
opinion, therefore, it would have been useless, and in mine, for the
reasons just stated, it would have been highly mischievous, to have
notoriously refused my acquiescence in the will of the majority.
For what is called assent, concurrence, and joining in the offer, was
merely an acquiescence in that will. For such an acquiescence I
have long since accounted to my conscience, and now cheerfully
account to my country. By the principles of our institutions the
minority, though free to disapprove the acts of the majority, are
bound to submit to them. If Mr. Adams dues not agree with me
in this view of the rights and duties of a minority, ho will only
present another in«tanr.p in whiH* w«* difi««r from each other ID
•pinion.

132

in my letter ;" and, if I did not disclose them " to the same extent,"
I did state them with sufficient precision and perspicuity to entitle
them to all the consideration which they might deserve.

Mr. Adams charges me with ascribing to my colleagues opinions
which they never entertained, arguments which they never ad
vanced, and doctrines which they not only would disclaim with in
dignation, but diametrically opposed to those which they did main
tain. Let it be remembered here that my letter received from
Paris was confined, in justification of my conduct, to combating the
opinions, arguments, and doctrines of the majority, which, in the
despatch of the 25th of December, 1814 (d) were stated by them,
or at least by Mr. Adams, for that despatch was drawn up by hirn.
Mr. Gallatin, indeed, in his separate letter of the same date, (c)
does not go to the same extent. He merely states the assumption
of the peculiarity of the treaty of 1783.

To support this charge, Mr. Adams says I impute to my col
leagues an opinion that the Independence of the United States was
derived from the treaty of 1783.

In what part of my letter he finds such an imputation I am at a
loss to discover. In contending against any peculiarity of that treaty,
I simply said " I could not believe that the Independence of the
United States was derived from the treaty of 1783." Without admit
ting such a derivation of our Independence, I could not perceive,
indeed, any ground for the peculiarity ascribed to that treaty ; for a
mere recognition of a prior right furnished none ; no other treaty
containing such recognition having been considered as possessing it.
In denying such a derivation, although fairly inferrable from the
doctrine of Mr. Adams, I charged no one with believing in it, but
I removed the only foundation, as I conceived, on which the doc
trine of Mr. Adams could be supported ; and now, in disclaiming
that foundation, unless he can show a better, he virtually renounces
that doctrine.

He says, also, that I impute to my colleagues " that they rested
their claim to the fishing privilege on prescription ;" but he adds
that," as the settlement of the colonies themselves had not been
of time immemorial, it was not, and never was pretended to be a
title by prescription." This appears to have been a recent dis
covery. In the letter of the 25th of December, above mentioned,
it is said, " this liberty, then," (1783) " no new grant, but a mere
recognition of a prior right always enjoyed." And again, in the
same letter, " without adverting to the ground of prior and imme
morial usage," &c. If I erroneously inferred from these passages
that a title was claimed from prescription, my error, I trust, will
be considered a venial one. Mr. Adams can undoubtedly explain
what he meant by ** a prior right, always enjoyed," and by " the
ground of prior and immemorial usage." He did not mean, it

133

&eem?, any thing like prescription. Is he quite sure that, in dis
cussing this privilege, while in England, in 1815 or 1816, he
never set up a prescriptive title, or a title from immemorial usage ?

Mr. Adams likewise asserts that I represent ** the offer of an ar
ticle, granting to the British the right of navigating the Mississippi,
as an equivalent for the fishing privilege in British jurisdiction."
I certainly believed that it might have been so interpreted, even in
its original form ; and that, if so interpreted, it could be made to
mean more than would be meant by a simple continuance of that
right, and of that privilege, as they stood, independently of each
other, in the treaty of 1783. That the navigation of the Missis
sippi was, at last, offered, not under the principle of Mr. Adams,
or the status ante helium, which thus far were the same, but as an
equivalent, sufficiently appears from the documents, notwithstand
ing the subsequent intimation that " we considered that offer as
merely declaratory" Besides, Mr. Gallatin, in his separate letter
of the 25th of December, says, " if the right must be considered
as abrogated by the war, we cannot regain it without an equivalent.
We had none to offer but the recognition of the right to navigate
the Mississippi, and we offered it."

I have now, I trust, satisfactorily explained the inconsistencies
and tissue of misrepresentations with which Mr. Adams has, with
so much dignity and propriety, charged me. To whom inconsis
tency and misrepresentation can be justly imputed an impartial
public is left to decide.

With regard to what is considered so serious an offence, my not
having shown my letter, written at Paris, to my colleagues, at the
time, I will merely observe that the majority had already, in the
despatch of the 25th of December, (d) given their reasons for the
affirmative, without taking any notice of the reasons on which the
minority supported the negative. I believed it just, therefore, to
account for rny conduct, by stating my objections to the reasons as
signed by the majority, and to these objections my letter was con
fined. I imputed to the majority nothing which they had not
alleged for themselves. Their case was before the government on
their own showing, and I did not believe that there was any obli
gation to consult them on the case of the minority. To the only
member of the mission who had a direct interest in that case, I did
show, at the time, the letter written at Paris. I certainly was not
aware of the proprienty or etiquette of communicating a private
or separate letter to my colleagues, particularly as their private or
separate letters had not been communicated to me. That they
did occasionally write such letters is not only probable, but the let
ter of Mr. Gallatin, of the 25th of December, furnishes proof in
point. That letter of Mr. Gallatin was never shown to me, and I
certainly never felt myself aggrieved because it was not, although
he stated in it the grounds in which he had acted as one of the ma
jority.

J here most solemnly protest, as Mr. Adams appears to believe

17

a protest to be neeesary to prove sincerity, that nothing whieli I
have written was directly or remotely intended to impute either
weakness, absurdity, or treachery, to the majority, and to infer
such an imputation from my letter would seem to require a mind
distorted by passion and a " jealousy that discolours every thing.'*

There was a difference, and I believe, an honest difference of
opinion between me and some of my colleagues, on certain points,
and if I felt it to be my duty to act according to my own, I certainly
had the right to state the grounds of my opinion to those to whom
I was immediately accountable for my conduct. In doing this, I
accused no one — and if in endeavouring to prove that my opinion
was correct, I implied that the opinion of those who differed from
me was incorrect, I did no more towards them, than what, from the
very nature of the case, was indispensable, or than what they, in
defending their opinion,, must necessarily have done towards me.
Mr. Adams, indeed, goes much further. He appears to believr
that self-vindication cannot be separated from reproach. In a con
scientious difference of opinion between fallible men, who reason
but to err, there can be no just cause for reproach ;, but a pretend
ed difference of opinion between infallible men must necessarily
imply wilful error somewhere. 1 do not pretend to infallibility,
and sincerely pity those who do. It may be less difficult to some
minds to abuvse the man, than to refute the argument. " Censure,
reproach, and rmsrepresentatiou is, indeed, a shorter and easier
process "

I still differ with Mr. Adams on his doctrine that the treaty of
1783, by reason of its peculiarity, could not be abrogated by war.

I still differ with him concerning the relative value of the navi
gation of the Mississippi and the fishing privilege.

I still differ with him, in respect to the consistency of his prin
ciple with the proposal which was first decided on, and after a pe
riod of three weeks, actually offered by a majority.

I shall probably continue to differ with him on these points, un
less he can produce other and better reasons for my conversion-
than those contained in his remarks.

For his doctrine, be appeals to a class of treaties which are not
known to exist, and to the ordeal of minds with which he has not
made us acquainted. He relies on instinct when he says " I stop
here for a moment to observe how instinctively both parties recur
to the treaty of 1783, with a consciousness that it was yet in full
force" when- at the very 'first conference the British ministers gave
us notice that the fishing privilege, granted by that treaty, would
not be renewed, without an equivalent, thus considering thattreatv
to be at an end.

Express renunciation or conquest, that is, consent on our part
or force on the part of Great Britain, might, according to Mr.
Adams himself, abrogate our rights under the treaty of 1783; and
these are precisely the means only by which we can be deprived
<>f our rights under any treat/. The peculiarity ^ therefore* for

135

which Mr. Adams contends, is left on a very equivocal foundation.
Mr. Adams insinuates that the convention of 1818 confirms his
doctrine, and gives a tinal stroke to mine. That convention does
not contain the slightest allusion to the doctrine of Mr. Adams, nor
even to the treaty of 1783, but settles the differences which had
arisen on the subject by a grant entirely new.

By the way, if an express renunciation was necessary, on our
part, to surrender the fishing privilege, the implicit renunciation
which Mr. Adams says was made by the British, cannot be suffi
cient to surrender their right to navigate the Mississippi — accord
ing to Mr. Adams, therefore, that right is unimpaired.

I certainly was not willing to renounce or to surrender the fishing
privilege to force or conquest, but I was willing to adopt a doctrine
which 1 believed, and still believe, to be the true one ; and which,
if it deprived us of the benefit of the fishing privilege, released us
at the same time from the evils of the British right to navigate
the Mississippi, because I believed those evils outweighed that be-
ziefit. I have seen no cause since to change this opinion.

All that Mr. Adams says, in his remarks concerning the fishing
privilege, is " that we had renounced certain parts, which without
being of much use to ourselves, had been found very inconvenient
to the British ; and that my views with regard to the magnitude of
the fishing interest, he believes to be as incorrect as my principles
on which 1 would have surrendered it. If I erred in my estimate
of the fishing privilege, there is nothing in these remarks of Mr.
Adams to demonstrate my error. I acted on the best information
which I had at the time. And, if I erred, my error could not de
serve reproach. I believe, however, that the views, disclosed in
rny letter, did notjunderrate or depreciate that privilege. The most
authentic information which I have until now been able to obtain
on the subject, justifies the opinion which I then entertained in re
lation to it. I am informed by respectable citizens well acquainted
with the business, that few or no fish are now dried or cured within
the British jurisdiction, and that most, if not all that are taken
there, are taken by the few fishermen who have not sufficient capi
tal to procure vessels of adequate size and strength to fish on the
grand banks or in the open sea ; and that even those few fishermen
are annually decreasing in number.

With regard to the British right to navigate the Mississippi, MrT
Adams says that it was a mere phantom — that they had enjoyed it for
30 years without using \i — thatin all human probability it never would
have been of more beneficial use to the British nation than would
be to the people of the United States the right of navigating the
Bridgewater Canal or the Danube ; and that, in surrendering it,
the British would have surrendered absolutely nothing. Although
all this was not said at Ghent to the same extent, yet Mr. Adams cer
tainly did express there his great contempt of the British right to
reach and navigate thai river. 1 have good reason to believe, how*
qver. that there was not another member of the mission who en-.

136

tcrtained the same opinion. Each member estimated differently
the importance of that right according to his own information and
impressions. Some believed it to be of more importance — some
of less importance, and some of about the same importance, as the
fishing privilege, but not one, excepting Mr. Adams, considered it
a mere phantom, worth absolutely nothing. Mr. Gallatin appears
to have thought it equal, at least, to the fishing privilege. In his
separate letter, already mentioned, (c) he says " if the right" (the
fishing privilege) " must be considered as abrogated by the war,
we cannot regain it without an equivalent. We had none to offer
but the recognition of their right to navigate the Mississippi, and
we offered it. On this last supposition," (the abrogation of the
treaty of 1783, by war) " this right is also lost to them, and in a
general point of view we have certainly lost nothing." The neces
sary construction of this clause is, that, by abrogating the Missis
sippi right, we gained as much as we lost by abrogating the fishing
privilege — and thus, in a general point of view we have lost nothing
by abrogating both; thus making the two of equal value.

I certainly differed very much from Mr. Adams in his estimate
of this right under his doctrine, united with his construction, or
under his proposal. I did not appreciate it by the mere beneficial
or legitimate uses that might be made of it. Its importance I con
sidered to be derived from its evils — from the abuse of it, and from
the pernicious facility which it would afford to British smugglers
and British emissaries — to defraud the revenue and to excite the
Indians. If our instructions, of the 15th of April, 1813, had been
no longer imperative, they furnished, at least, evidence in point,
which was entitled to attention. The privilege of British traders
from Canada, and the Northwest Company, were not to be renewed,
because " the pernicious effects of this privilege had been most sensi
bly felt in the present war, by the influence which it gave over our
Indians, whose whole force has been wielded by means thereof against
the inhabitants of our western States and Territories.

We ourselves had borne testimony, during the negotiation, to
the magnitude of the evil resulting from allowing to British traders
and agents access to our Indians. In our note to the British minis
ters of the 21st of September, 1814, we say, " The undersigned
very sincerely regret to be obliged to say that an irresistible mas*
of evidence, consisting principally of the correspondence of British
officers and agents, part only of which has already been published
in America, establishes, beyond all rational doubt, the fact that a
constant system of excitement to these hostilities was pursued by
British Traders and Agents, who had access to our Indians, not only
without being discountenanced, but with frequent encouragement
by the British authorities. And if they had ever dissuaded the
Indians from commencing hostilities, it was only by advising them,
as in prudence, to suspend their attacks until Great Britain could
recognise them in the war."

Here was surely evidence to prove the danger of giving to Brr-

137

tish Traders and Agents access to our Indians. If this access,
owing to existing circumstances, had not hitherto, to any great ex
tent, been practically derived from the right' to approach and to
navigate the Mississippi, yet this tight, having become the only
means of access, would undoubtedly have been made the thorough
fare of this nefarious intercouse. If 1 erred in this opinion, still
I should hope to find charity for my motives. As a citizen of Mas*
sachusetts, i believed that justice and sound policy required that
we should treat fairly and liberally every other section of the
Union, and to do as we would be done by. As a minister of the
United States, it was my duty to act impartially towards the great
whole.

The inconsistency of Mr. Adams' doctrine with his conduct, in
relation to the fishing liberty, needs no illustration. If that liberty
was, as he alleged, inseparable from the general right, why sepa
rate them, by offering a specific proposition for the one, and leav
ing the other to rest on the treaty of 1783 ? If this liberty was, by
our instructions, included in the right, why discuss it, as those in
structions forbid us to bring that right into discussion ? If {his
liberty was an attribute of our Independence, why rely for its
continuance on the peculiarity of a treaty, and at the same time
offer to make it an article of another treaty, where there could be
no such peculiarity to perpetuate it ? If that liberty was indeed
an attribute of our Independence, 1 say that it depended on no
treaty, but on those eternal principles on which it had been de
clared previous to any treaty — and on that high spirit and resistless
energy which dictated and accomplished that declaration. When-
ever that Independence, or any of the essential attributes of the
sovereignty, which necessarily results from it, shall be denied or
questioned, I trust in God and the valour, not of the West only,
but of all, that we shall not resort to the dreams of a visionary, or
to the dead letter of a treaty, to assert our rights and rank among
the nations of the world.

I shall now close this defence against an unprovoked and unprin
cipled attack, trusting it, for my vindication, with the justice and
liberality of my fellow citizens. If I had been previously entrust
ed with the remarks of Mr. Adams, as he frankly was with the
paper which has mainly been the subject of them, I should have
had an opportunity of simultaneously offering these explanations,
and been spared the unpleasant necessity of thus appealing to the
public. If I have not retorted the virulence and acrimony of Mr.
Adams, it is because I have not felt them sufficiently to forget the
respect which I owe to myself and to the public. I regret, equally
with Mr. Adams, the necessity which he has supposed to exist for
the virulent character of his remarks, but I shall have abundant
reason to rejoice, if, in directing the infirmities of his temper against
me, they shall have been diverted from a course in which they
might have been disastrous to the country.

JONATHAN RUSSELL.

138

.£/ o/;i (fie National Intdli.gencc.r of July 17, 1825.
MR. ADAMS' REJOINDER TO MR. RUSSELL.

Mr. Jonathan Russell having thought proper to transfer the scene
of his attack upon the character and conduct of his colleagues, the
majority of the late mission to Ghent, and especially upon mine,
from the House of Representatives of the United States, where he
first volunteered to bring it forward, to the newspapers, it becomes
necessary for my defence, and that of my colleagues, against this
assault, to apply to his new statements and representations a few of
those " correctives" which, at the call of the House of Represent
atives, I did apply to the original and duplicate of his letter of
llth February, 1815.

The paper published by Mr. Russell in the Boston Statesman, of
the 27th of June last, bears the same relation to truth that his ori
ginal letters bear to their duplicates, and his sentiments to hu>
signatures.

Nearly two columns of the paper published in the Boston States
man, are occupied with a narrative of circumstances which preced
ed, attended, and followed, the delivery, by Mr. Russell, at the
Department of State, on the 22d of April last, of the paper pur
porting to be a duplicate of his letter of 1 1 th February, 1815, from
Paris, to the then Secretary of State. In the course of this narra
tive, Mr. Russell makes the following admission ; how reluctantly,
the very structure of the sentence in which it is contained, will
show ; and it is proper that it should be exhibited in his own words :

*' I certainly did believe that I was permitted to make those cor-
" rections of the copy in possession, which appeared to me to be
" proper to exhibit my case most advantageously before thuttribu-
" nal" — [the tribunal of the public.]

The reasons of iVIr. Russell for believing that he was permitted,
m 1822, to make corrections which happened to suit his own pur
poses, in a paper furnished by himself to be communicated to the
House of Representatives of the United States, as a specific letter
written by him in Paris, in the year 1815, are as singular and sur
prising as the belief itself. They consist of insinuations and infer
ences that he had furnished the paper at my solicitation ; that the
word "duplicate," written upon it, with his own hand, gave no
further intimation or assurance that it was so ; that 1 had the sole
power to publish it or not, as 1 might judge proper, and to consult
my own feelings and interests in forming my decision ; and that the
paper was not to be exhibited to the public without the previous
examination and consent of the ADVERSE PARTY. And with these
ingenious principles, he has interwoven a statement of facts, with
which he has believed himself permitted to take the same liberty
that he had taken with his own letter ; making in them those cor
rections which appeared to him necessary to exhibit his case moe*
advantageously before the tribunal of the public.

139

Frail and tottering as is this scaffolding (o support the cause oi'
>Tr. Russell's candour. I am concerned to say, that by a mere state
ment of the real facts, it must be taken entirely from under him.

The real facts are these :

On the 17th of January last, the House of Representatives of the
United States adopted the following resolution :

" Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to cause tu
s< be laid before this House, all the correspondence which led to the Treaty of"
•' Ghent, together with the Protocol, which has not been made public, and
•' which, in his opinion, it may not be improper to disclose."

In the ordinary course of business, this resolution was by t,h£
President referred to the Department of State, to report the papers
to be communicated to the House, in compliance with the call.

In examining among the archives of the Department for those
papers, I found among them a short letter from Mr. Russell to the
Secretary of State, dated the 25th of December, 1814, the day after
the signature of the treaty. It was not marked private, but it re
lated principally to Mr. Russell's own affairs ; and, referring to the
joint letter of the mission, of the same 25th of December, 1814, in
which it had been stated that a majority of it had determined to offer
to the British an article confirming the navigation of the Mississip
pi to the British, and the fisheries to us, as stipulated in the treaty
<yf 1783, it acknowledged, IN CANDOUR, that he, (Mr. Russell,) was
in the minority on that occasion, and reserved to himself the power
of communicating thereafter his reasons for being in the minority.

With Mr. Russell's candour in the transaction, at the time, I shall
not now trouble the public. It was in the examination of the files
for the purpose of answering the call of the House, that I first dis
covered the existence of this letter ; and a question occurred tome
whether it should be communicated with the other documents to
the House or not. It was not strictly within the letter of the call,
for it was not a part of the correspondence which led to the treaty
— having been written the day after the treaty was signed. It had
no bearing upon the information which had been assigned to the
House as the motive for the call ; and the only fact relating to the
negotiation which it communicated, was, that upon one vote which
had been taken in the joint mission during the negotiation, and that
vote upon a question whether an offer should be made, which,
when made, had been rejected, Mr. Russell had been in the mi
nority, and reserved to himself the power of assigning his reason*,
thereafter, for the purpose of vindicating his motives. It was doubt
ful whether it would be proper to disclose this difference of opinion,
and Mr. Russell's solicitude to vindicate his motives for voting
against a rejected offer, which had terminated in nothing. But, out
the other hand, this might be, of all the documents relating to the
negotiation, the* most desirable one to the purposes for which the
call had been made. The call might have been made with the
special intention of eliciting this letter, or the disclosure of the fact
which it attested. To have withheld the letter might have give*

140

rise to surmises of special motives for veiling from the eye of Con
gress, and of the nation, the discovery of that fact. As Mr. Rus
sell was upon the spot, and a member of the House, I determined
to mention the letter to him, and place it at his option whether it
should be communicated to the House or not. I did so, at my
house, as he has stated ; and it was on the 26th of January But
Mr. Russell did not say that he had no distinct recollection of the
letter, to which 1 alluded, and that he wished to see it before he
gave his consent to its publication. I had not asked his consent to
its publication. I had told him there was such a letter ; and left
it at his option whether it should be communicated in the answer
to the call of the House of Representatives, or not. His tirst re
ply was, that he thought it was a private letter, which it would be
improper to communicate to the House ; but, after a pause, as if
recollecting himself, he said he wished to see the letter, before giv
ing a definitive answer. To this I immediately assented. Mr.
Russell accordingly repaired to the office, and saw his letter ; not
in my presence, or in the room occupied by me, but in that of Mr.
Bailey, the clerk who has charge of the diplomatic documents.
Mr. Russell then desired to examine the whole of the correspond
ence relating to the Ghent negotiation, and afterwards twice in suc
cession requested to be furnished with copies of one paragraph of
the instructions to the commissioners, of 15th April, 1813. That
paragraph is the one which, in the duplicate, is cited so emphatic
ally, and with so many cumulative epithets, in support of the charge
against the majority of the mission, of having violated both the let
ter and the spirit of their explicit and implicit instructions. After'
all these examinations, and after a request to be furnished with a
eopy of this most pregnant paragraph, in all of which he was in
dulged to the extent of his wishes, he told me that he saw no ob
jection to the communication to the House of his separate letter
of 25th December, 1814 ; with the exception of a part of it, not
relating to the negotiation. He was informed that the part only in
dicated by himself would be communicated ; and accordingly that
part only was communicated. Mr. Russell then added, that there
was another letter, written at Paris, conformably to the indication
in that of 25th December, 1814, and containing his reasons therein
alluded to ; and which he wished might also be communicated with
the rest of the documents, to the House. This was the first intima
tion I had ever received of the existence of the letter of 1 1th Fe
bruary, 1815; arid I told Mr. Russell that, if it could be found up
on the files of the Department, it should be communicated with
the rest. I directed, accordingly, that search should be made, and
afterwards that it should be repeated, among all the files of the
Department, for this letter. It was nut to be found. After a delay
of several days, for repeating these ineffectual searches, I deemed
it necessary to report, in answer to the call of the House ; and the
documents were all sent, including that portion of his letter of 25th
December., 1814, which he himself had marked for communication*.

Ill

It was not alone to me that Mr. Russell had expressed the wish
that his letter of 1 1th February, 1815, might be communicated
with the other documents to the House. He had, as appears by
the statement of Mr. Bailey, repeatedly manifested the same wish
to him. He had even gone so far as to inform him, that he had a
copy of it at Mendon, and to inquire of him whether a copy of it
from himself would be received at the Department, for communi
cation to the House. He did not, indeed, make the same inquiry of
me, nor was I then informed that he had made it to Mr. Bailey. If
I had been, I should have immediately answered that it would be
received and communicated. I knew not what were the contents
of the letter : but I knew that, whatever they might be, I could
have no objection to their being communicated, at the desire of Mr.
Russell himself; and far from suspecting him capable of believing
himself permitted to make any alterations in the copy, to suit pre
sent purposes, I should have thought the bare suspicion an outrage
upon his honour.

But 1 had no desire of my own that the letter should be commu
nicated. I regretted even that Mr. Russell had chosen that the
part of his letter of 25th December, 1814, which announced his
disagreement with the majority of the mission, should be commu
nicated. I regretted that he had ever thought proper to inform
the Secretary of State what had been his vote upon that occasion ;
and I was perfectly assured, that there never had existed a moment
when there could have been any necessity for him to vindicate his
motives for that vote. I was assured that neither the government
nor the nation would ever have inquired of him how he had voted,
if he had not been so over-earnest in his solicitude to tell them.
And I was equally convinced, that after he had told them, it would
not ultimately redound to his credit. I had no feelings of enu.ity
towards Mr. Russell. Our private intercourse had been, for more
than ten years, that of friendship, which, in no instance whatever,
had been, in word, deed, or thought, violated by me. As an asso
ciate in a trust of great importance, the general result of which had
been satisfactory to the country, he had always had claims, sacred
to me, to my peculiar regard With the high and honourable du
ties of that great trust, I had mingled no little expedients of self-
aggrandizement by the debasement of any of my colleagues. I
had sown no seed of future accusation against a brother commis
sioner, in the shell of a pretended vindication of myself. I had laid
up no root of rancorous excitement, to be planted, after the lapse
of years, in the soil of sectional prejudice, or party prepossession.
I lamented to discover that Mr. Russell had not so dealt with his
colleagues of the majority ; and I was mortified to see the earnest
ness with which he appeared determined to blazon forth this dis
agreement of opinion, and the part that he had taken in it, to the
world. I felt that it neither became me to object to the commu
nication of either of his letters to the House, if desired by him,
nor officiously to offer him facilities for the communication, which

18

142

ije had not suggested to rne himself. I, therefore, did not ask him
to furnish, himself, a copy of his letter from Paris, to be communi
cated to the House ; but, on the 21st of February, reported to the
President, for communication to the House, all the other docu
ments, embraced by their call of the 17th January preceding.

The message from the President to the House, communicating
the documents, was delivered on the 23d of February, and was or
dered to be laid on the table.

On the 19th of April, the following resolution was adopted by the
House, having been first moved the day before : .

" Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to cause te
be communicated to this House, if not injurious to the public good, any letter,
or communication, which may have been received from Jonathan Russell, Esq.
one of the Ministers of the United States who concluded the Treaty of Ghent,
after the signature of that Treaty, and which was written in conformity to the
indications contained in said Minister's letter, dated at Ghent, 25th December,
1814."

It will be observed, that nearly two months had intervened be
tween the report of the Ghent treaty documents to the House, and
this second call, which Mr. Russell has admitted was made at his
suggestion.

On Saturday, the 20th of April, the day after the adoption of the
resolution of the House, and even before it had been officially re
ferred to the Department for an answer, Mr. Daniel Brent, the
chief clerk of the Department, without consulting me, but knowing
the anxious desire that I should feel, of being enabled to report
the paper called for by the House, knowing also that it was not
upon the files of the Department, called upon Mr. Russell, 'at his
lodgings, and inquired of frjm whether he could furnish the letter
desired ; and was told by Mr. Russell that he could, and would de
liver it to the President. Mr. Brent, it seems, suggested that it
would be better that it should be delivered as a duplicate than as
a copy, to which Mr. Russell assented. This distinction, which has
reference chiefly to the forms of office, would not have occurred to
me. Between a copy, marked as such by the writer, signed by him,
and all in his own hand-writing, and a duplicate, furnished as such
also by the writer, I can perceive no difference of substance,
though, as evidence in a court of justice, or as a document in the
public archives, one might bear the character of an original paper.,
and the other only of a copy. Mr. Brent had too much respect for
Mr. Russell, to imagine it possible, whether he gave the paper a?
a copy or as a duplicate, that he should give it other than as the let
ter originally written, and called for by the resolution of the
House.

Mr. Russell, however, did assent to the suggestion of Mr. Brent?
and, with his own hand, wrote the word " duplicate" on the paper,
which he had already prepared to deliver, to be reported in answer
to the call of the House. He did more : he erased with a scraper
the word " cop}V which he had previously written in its stead,
aiid the traces of which are still discernible on the paper.

143

What, then, does Mr. Russell mean, when, in the Boston States*
man of 27th June last, he says, that when he delivered the paper
at the Department, to Mr. Brent, on the 22d of April, " the word
** [duplicate] had indeed been written on it, in consequence of his
"suggestion, as above stated: but 1 gave no further intimation)
<l muck less .any assurance that it was so." These are Mr. Rus
sell's own words ; and what can they mean ? They have been, at
least by some portion of the public, understood to mean, that the
paper had been styled a duplicate, not by Mr. Russell, but by rne.
O no ! the word was written with Mr Russell's own hand ; ond
when I received the paper I knew not that there ever had passed
a word between Mr. Brent and him whether it should be delivered
as a duplicate or a copy. The Boston Statesman, of the same day
in which his reply is published, says " Mr. Russell, without much
reflection, consented" (to give it as a duplicate.) 1 should think he
had time enough for reflection, while at work with the scraper, to
efface the word 4C copy," for which it was substituted. Mr. Rus-
seiFs meaning is, therefore, that, although he wrote the word du
plicate with his own hand, yet he did not intend it should be re
ceived as an intimation, much less as an assurance, " THAT IT

\VAS SO."

Mr. Russell had been explicitly told by Mr. Brent, that his call
to inquire whether he could furnish the paper called for by the re
solution of the House, had not been at my desire, or with my know
ledge, but of his own motion. But it seems Mr. Russell did not be
lieve him ; and instead of delivering the letter, as he had said he
would, to the President, he brought it to the Department, and de
livered it to Mr. Brent himself ; observing that he was indifferent
whether it was communicated to the House or not ; but, if it should
not be, he wished it might be returned to him.

The singularity of this observation is not among the least extra*
ordinary incidents of this transaction. Mr. Russell, who, while the
first resolution of the 17th of January, calling for the Ghent treaty
documents, was to be reported upon by the Department of State,
had expressed to me, and repeatedly to Mr. Bailey, the wish that his
letter from Paris should be communicated — Mr. Russell, at whose
suggestion the specific call from the House of the 19th of April,
for that letter, had been moved — Mr. Russell, who in the interval
had written to Mendon for the original draft of his letter, had re
ceived it from Mendon, and on the morning after the resolution of
the House calling for it, was already prepared with a " copy" of it
to deliver to the President, a copy consisting of seven folio sheets
of paper — transforms this copy, at the suggestion of Mr. Brent,
into a duplicate, and after having again on Saturday declared to Mr.
Brent his wish that it might be communicated to the House, brings
it on Monday morning to the Department, and in delivering it to
Mr. Brent, says he is indifferent whether it should be communicat
ed to the House or not : but, if not, wishes it may be returned to
fcim.

144

What was the meaning of this tardy hesitation and new-born in
difference, whether ii should be communicated or not ? Why does
he say that the application from the Department of State for his
letter was made without any previous intimation, suggestion, or
encouragement on his part ; and that, had it not been made, that
paper would never have been left at the Department of State, nor
in any other manner presented to the public ? Why did he bring it
to the Department ? He had told Mr. Brent that he would deliver
it to the President ; and of this disposal of it, Mr. Brent had ap
proved. Why does he represent it as a demand upon him from the
Department of State of a private letter, never intended for the pub
lic ? Neither I nor any person at the Department of State, knew
that the letter was private. Mr. Russell knew it, although he had
prepared his copy or his duplicate, without marking it as such. He
had told me, when I mentioned to him that his short letter of De
cember 25, 1814, was among the documents of the negotiation at
the Department, and asked him whether he chose it should be
communicated to the House ; he had then at first told me that he
thought that was a private letter, which it would be improper to
communicate ; but when, after having examined it, he decided that
part of it should be communicated, he had told me there was ano
ther letter written from Paris, which he wished might also be com
municated. He had not spoken of it as a private letter, nor did he
deliver the duplicate as such to the Department. He omitted from
it the word private, which had been written by himself upon the
original. This omission was doubtless one of those corrections,
which appeared to him proper to exhibit his case most advantageously
before the tribunal of the public. Its tendency certainly was to
excite a suspicion in the public mind, that the original letter was or
had been upon the files of the Department, and that in the answer
to the prior call of the House of 17th January, it had been sup
pressed.

Mr. Russell's delivery of his duplicate at the Department of State
was entirely spontaneous. It had not even been asked of him by
Mr. Brent ; and the inquiry which Mr. Brent had made of him,
whether he could furnish a duplicate of the letter called for by the
resolution of the House, if application should be made to him for it,
had been without my knowledge ; and Mr. Brent had told him so,
Mr. Russell delivered his duplicate at the Department as a public
letter, and as if the original itself had been also public. What then
does Mr. Russell mean, when he says that he left it for my exami
nation ? What does he mean, by saying that I had the sole power to
publish it or not, as I might judge proper, and to consult my own
feelings and interests, in forming my decision ? There was " a reso
lution of the House of Representatives," calling^upon the President
to cause to be communicated to them a letter specifically designat
ed. The writer of that letter, after repeated expressions more
than two months before to me and to Mr. Bailey, that he wished
that letter might be communicated to the House, now brought to the

145

Department a duplicate of it, and says I was at liberty to publish it
or not, as it might suit my feelings and interests. Mr. Russell is
not so ignorant of the duties of a Secretary of State as not to know
that, in the usual course of business, the resolution of the House
was referred by the President to the Department of State for a
report, and that when once his letter had been delivered by himself
at the Department, it was my indispensable duty to report a copy
of it to the President for communication to the House. Had it di
rectly charged me with treason to my country, as it indirectly did
little less, my only and inflexible duty as Secretary of State was, to
report it to the President for communication to the House. By the
terms of the resolution of the House, the President indeed might
have withheld it from the House, if in his judgment the communi
cation would be injurious to the public interest : but of that, the
President, and not I, was the judge. Suppose even that the Presi
dent, in forming his judgment, had thought proper to consult my
opinion upon it, with what face could I advise that it should be
withheld ? If the letter was not a tissue of misrepresentations, the
Secretary of State, and the Minister of the United States in France,
were men unfit to hold any station whatever in the service of their
country ; and that was the impression evidently intended to be pro
duced by the letter, at least throughout the largest and most grow
ing section of the Union. Upon what pretence could / have advis
ed the President to withhold the communication as injurious to the
public interest ? If there was truth in the letter, its contents could
not be too soon known to Congress and to the nation. It was fitting
that the conspirators against the peaceful and unoffending inhabit
ants of the Western Country, should be unmasked before the pub
lic, and that the world of the West should be apprized of the whole
extent of their obligations to the great contider in their valour and
in God.

On receiving the paper, therefore, my only duty was to report a
copy of it to the President, for communication to the House, in an
swer to their call. On perusal of it, I found that it was marked
duplicate, but not private, and that it bore date " Paris, 11 Febru
ary, 1822."

My first impression certainly was, that the error of this date was
in the time, and not in the place. I supposed it an inadvertency,
such as not unfrequently happens in copying papers of date other
than the current year, which in the hurry of writing is substituted
unconsciously for the date of the original. I did not then perceive
that the word copy had been written close at the side of the word
duplicate, and scraped out. The erasure had been made with a
cautious and delicate hand ; its attenuation of the texture of the pa
per, was not perceptible to an unsuspecting eye ; and in the fresh
ness of the ink when performed, must have appeared to be com
plete. In the progress of blackening, incidental to ink after it has
been some days written upon paper, the traces of the word soon
became perceptible, and are now apparent upon its face. Both the

146

words, the date, and the whole letter, are in the hand-writing oi
Mr. Russell.

On reading the letter through, I found it had been composed
with a view to be received and understood as if all written at Paris,
in February, 1815. Yet I was confident it had not all been so
written. I was particularly struck with the following passages.
" I will frankly avow, however, that my impressions were, and still,
" are, that Great Britain, calculating on the success of the power-
" ful expedition which she HAS SENT against New-Orleans, confi-
" dently expected that she would have become the mistress
*' Louisiana, and all its waters ; and that she did not, in this event,
" intend to abandon her conquest under the terms of the treaty of
" Ghent."

" If she be disappointed in her views on Louisiana, and I trust
rt in God and the valour of the West thats/te will be, I shall not be
" surprised, if, hereafter, she grants us the fishing privilege, which
" costs her absolutely nothing, without any extravagant equivalent
" whatever."

" At any rate, we are still at liberty to negotiate for that privilege,
" and to offer for it an equivalent, fair in its comparative value, and
" just in its relative effects."

" I trust in GOD she WILL BE" — in a letter dated Paris, 1 1 Febru
ary, 1822 — signed Jonathan Russell — addressed to the lion. James
Monroe, Secretary of State — and delivered by Mr. Russell to be
communicated to the House of Representatives, in answer to a call
suggested by himself for a letter written by him in 1815! And
Mr. Russell charges me with disingenuousness, for communicating
this paper to the House ! And Mr. Russell talks of respect for the
Representatives of the people of the United States I I am in the
judgment of my country, upon this state of facts. But as for Mr.
Russell, when he wrote that — " I trust in God, she will be" — and
came to the name of GOD — did not the pen drop from his hand ?

I took the letter to the President, and expressing to him my sus
picion, that the above passage particularly had never been written
at Paris, requested him to cause search to be made among his pri
vate papers for the original letter, if there ever had been one.
The search was accordingly made, and the letter was found. On
comparing them together, 1 immediately perceived that the original
was marked private ; which the duplicate was not. I turned im
mediately to the prophesies of the duplicate : in the original they
were not. I looked to the passage in the duplicate, which repre^
sentsthe fishing privilege, notonly as utterly insignificant, and trifling
in value, but as having been proved to be so by the best informa
tion " we (the plenipotentiaries at Ghent) could obtain on the sub
ject." There was a whole system of misrepresentation in these
words we could obtain : for they represented the incorrect estimate
of the value of the fishing privilege which they introduced, as the
result of information obtained by the whole mission at Ghent, as
having been there discussed, and as aggravating the wrong of the

147

majority, in offering so extravagant an equivalent, for what they
knew, upon their own inquiries, to be of so little value. Knowing,
as I did, that the information was all misinformation ; that no in
formation concerning the value of the privilege had been, or could
have been, obtained by the joint mission ; and that, excepting some
doubts as to its value, expressed, not by Mr. Russell, it had never
been even a subject of conversation in the mission — I turned to
the real letter from Paris, to see how the writer had expressed
himself there, and found he had written, " according to the best
information that I can obtain on the subject." I saw immediately
Ui.it all that tale about the obscurity and humidity of the atmos
phere, in the high northern latidudes, to degrade the value of the
Labrador fishery, was not in the original even pretended (o have
been information sought or obtained by the joint mission ; that the
discovery which it discloses was not pretended to have been ever
made known to the mission ; that the fogs, so pernicious to the
curing of the fish, were in the original letter, if not merely the
vapours of Mr. Russell's imagination, at least no more than the re
sult of the best information that he could obtain. And 1 instantly
saw, too, the motives for the substitution of the wortls we could in
in the duplicate, for the words / can, in the original. As the ori
ginal had been written the bill of indictment which it virtually con
tained against the majority of the mission, left them at liberty to
say, in their defence, that if they had overrated the value of the^fish-
ing liberty, it had been at least an honest error. It left them at
liberty to inquire, why Mr. Russell, in their discussions upon the
fishery question, had not revealed to them this great discovery of
obscurity and humidity and incessant fogs, which lessened so much
the value of the fishing liberty. The tre could of the duplicate
took from them all such means of defence. It represented them
as having wilfully sinned against their better knowledge ; as hav
ing sought information of the value of the fishing liberty — as hav
ing obtained proof of its worthlessness— and yet as having persisted
in offering for it an equivalent which was to let in British smugglers,
British emmissaries. and all the horrors of Indian warfare, upon
the unoffending inhabitants of the West. Was this one of those
corrections which Mr. Russell believed himself permitted to make,
which appeared to him proper, to exhibit his case most advantage
ously before the tribunal of the public ?

Proceeding in the comparison between the two papers, when I
came to that sublime panegyric upon the fishermen to atone for the
absolute surrender and eager sacrifice of their liberties ; to that
cheering cup of consolation doled out to them as a peace-offering
for the extinguishment, as far as Mr. Russell's labours could avail,
of their means of subsistence, " that the essential security and pros
perity of the many, must be preferred to the convenience and mi
nor interests of the few ;" to that swelling peai of t elf applause,
for early prepossessions silenced, and local predilections subdued ;
nil substituted in the duplicate, for a mere postscripted trust, in the

148

Original, that his argument to demonstrate the abrogation of the
treaty of 1783, by the war, and the consequent discontinuance of the
fishing privilege, would not be ascribed to any hostility to those in
terested in it — the mingled emotions at the bottom of the soul of
the writer, betrayed by these self-accusing and self-extolling varia
tions from his letter as it had been originally written, excited in
my mind a sentiment too much cheered with merriment, and too much
mitigated by compassion, for anger to have in it any part. But when,
in place of a paragraph in the original letter, expressly declaring
that he had believed with the majority that the propositions relat
ing to the navigation of the Mississippi and to the fisheries '* violated
in no way our instructions," I found foisted into the duplicate a pa
ragraph, accusing the majority not only of the violation of their
instructions, but of a wilful and wanton violation of them, as un
derstood by themselves ; and to support this interpolated charge, a
cancelled paragraph of instructions solemnly cited, of which he
had, within two months, obtained from the archives of the Depart
ment two successive copies — let me candidly confess that the senti
ment uppermost in my mind was indignation. Mr. Russell com
ments upon the infirmities of my temper, and says, that when
afterwards 1 pointed out to him, face to face, these palterings of
his own hand-writing, and gave hirn proof, from the records of the
Department, that the instructions cited by him in support of his
charge against his colleagues, had been cancelled at the time to
which the charge applied, I was not in a humour to listen to him
even with civility. This I deny. I did listen to him with civility.
The reason that he assigned to me for the variance between his ori
ginal and his duplicate was, that the whole of the original draft,
for which he had sent to Mendon, had not been found, and that he
had been obliged to make up the two last leaves from memory.
He said, too, that there was no material variation of facts, as re
presented in the two papers. He said, as he says in the Boston
Statesman, that he had felt himself at liberty to alter the paper to
make his case better for the public eye. He said he had never
written against me anonymously in the newspapers, and intimated
that, in the year 1816, when I was in Europe, there had appeared
in thQ Boston Centinel a paragraph, charging him with having
been willing, at Ghent, to give up the fisheries — a thing of which I
had never before heard. He assured me that, in bringing his letter
before the public, his motive had not been to combine with my
enemies to ruin my reputation. To all this I did listen with per
fect civility and composure ; and the last words with which 1 parted
from him, however painful to him and myself, were not wanting in
civility. They are clearly impressed upon my memory, and I
trust they are upon his. He is at liberty to publiph them if he
thinks fit, as they were spoken. I should not have alluded to them
here but for his charge of incivility, which is as groundless as all
the other charges of which he has been the willing bearer against

149

But Mr. Russell did not say, that he had understood the applica
tion from Mr. Brent to him, to know whether he could furnish the
duplicate of the letter called for by the House, had been made
with my privity, or by my authority. He did not say that it had not
been his intention to deliver it as a duplicate. He did not say that
he had purposely dated it "Paris, llth February, 1822," to give
notice that it was not the letter written by him in 1815, called for
by the resolution of the House. He did not say that it was at my
option whether to communicate it to the House or not, nor did he
insinuate that the alteration at the Department of the date from.
1822, tirst to 1816, and then to 1815, had been made without his
approbation or consent. To all this he knew the refutation was
too near at hand to admit of its being said at that time and place.
As to his giving explanations to me, what explanation could he
give ? What explanation has he given to the public ? The call of
the House was for a specitical paper written by him — he had fur
nished a paper as a duplicate of it, in his own hand-writing. It
had been detected as a paper, so much the same, and yet so differ
ent, that it was susceptible of no explanation consistent with fair
dealing : and the expedients to which ;Vlr. Russell is reduced, in
attempting to account for it now, afford the most unanswerable
proof, that he has for it no honest explanation to give. He despe
rately seeks an apology for it, by imputing to me a design to entrap
him, by the alteration of the date of his duplicate, from 1822 to
1816, and then to 1815, made at the Department. These alterations
were made like the application of Mr. Brent to Mr. Russell, for
the duplicate without my knowledge, and happened thus.

After comparing the two papers together, I gave the duplicate
to Mr. Bailey, for a copy of it to be made, to be reported to the
President, for communication to the House. Mr. Bailey gave it to
be copied to Mr. Thomas Thruston, a Clerk in the Department,
a young man of a fair and honourable mind. Perceiving the date
of the letter to be "Paris, 11 February, 1822," and knowing that
Mr. Russell had been through the whole of that month attending
Congress in this city ; not suspecting for a moment that this date
had been designedly assumed by Mr. Russell, he consulted Mr.
Brent, who, concluding with him that the date of the year was an
inadvertency, authorized him to rectify it in the copy. Mr. Thrug-
ton thought that he might extend that kindness to Mr. Russell fur
ther, by making the same change in the paper itself. He passed
his pen therefore through the figures 1822, and wrote over them
1816, thinking that was the year in which the letter was written.
This change was not only made without my knowledge ; but when,
made known to me was disapproved by me. Mr. Brent supposed
that all would be set right by making known the alteration to Mr.
Russell himself, and obtaining his consent to the rectification of the
date of the year. He did so ; and Mr. Russell not only approved
of the change, but brought his original draft to the Department,
and showed the date of it to Mr. Brent, to confirm the second cor
rection. I only askjhow intense must be the pressure of that con-

19

150

Su'cmsrress, which attempts to palliate the variations in Mr. Rus
sell's two papers, by representing incidents like these, as crafty
wiles of mine to ensnare his innocence ?

Mr. Russell complains that, after the original of his letter had
been found, the duplicate should have been communicated to the
Blouse at all. He complains that I should have presumed to make
remarks upon both of them. He complains that I went to the
House of Representatives on the 6th of May, and there in person
sought for a member who would consent to make the call which
was necessary for the official publication of my personal remark?.
As usual, part of these statements is true, and part is riot — my call
at the House of Representatives on the 6th of May, was accidental ;
being on my return from witnessing the experiment of Commodore
Rodgers's noble invention at the Navy-Yard. I did not there seek
for a member who would consent to make the call. I never asked
any member to make the call ; though I told several members who
spoke to me on the subject there, and elsewhere, that it was my
wish the documents should be communicated to the House. The
President's message to the House of the 4th of May, which Mr.
Russell had seen before he left the city, had informed the House
of my desire that the letter should be communicated, together with
a communication from me respecting it.

The truth is, that my desire for the communication of Mr. Rus
sell's letter to the House had commenced on the same day that his
own had ceased. Mr. Russell, from the 26th of January to the
22d of April, had been indefatigable in bis exertions to bring this
letter before Congress and the public. He had procured the ori
ginal draught of it from Mendon ; he had procured the call for it
from the House ; he had endured the toil of re -writing, with his
own hand, at least once, a letter of seven folio sheets of paper -t
he had brought, and delivered it with his own hand, at the Depart
ment. At the moment of fruition his appetite fails him. Doubts
of consequences to himself, as well as to others, seem to flash across
his mind. He leaves the paper— For what? For communication
to the House, in answer to their call ? No ! " To put it in the
power of the person tvho might consider liimself the most liable to be
affected by its publication1' — for the " previous examination and
consent of the ADVERSE PARTY." He seems to invite objection to
its being communicated. He is quite indifferent whether it be
communicated or not, and, it not communicated, he desires that it
may be returned to him. But to make its terrors irresistible, he
has double and treble charged it with crimination of violated in
structions ; and to vouch his charges, has twice armed himself
with official copies from the Department, of the cancelled part of
the instructions of 15th April, 1813.

I had never wished for the communication to the House or to the
public of the letter, until I had seen it. The effect of its perusal
upon my mind was certainly different from what Mr. Russell ap
pears to htwe anticipated. I saw at once what it was and what if

151

tuearit. I also saw, in a great measure, what its writer was, which
I had never seen before, and the discovery of the original letter,
two days after, disclosed him to me in all his glory. In the private
relations between us, I remembered what he had been to me, and
what 1 had been to him, for more than twelve years before, until,
and including that very morning. I saw that he was now to be, in
substance and in intent, my accuser, and that of the colleagues with
whom I had acted, before the House, of which he was a member,
and before the nation. In the original he had been a secret ac
cuser, under the mask of self-vindication. In the duplicate he had
laid aside the mask, though not the professions of unfeigned re
spect ; and to all the secret discoJourings of the conduct and opi
nions of his colleagues, had added the new and direct charge of a
wanton and wilful violation of their instructions, as understood by
themselves. To have shrunk from these charges would, in my es
timation, have been equivalent to an admission of their truth. To
have suppressed them, after the prying curiosity, which had long
been stimulated, to see this mysterious and fearful letter, would
have been impossible. No honourable course was left me but thai;
of meeting the ADVERSE PARTY on the scene which he himself had
selected for his operations ; and I knew that little more would be
necessary for my own vindication, and that of my colleagues, in the
minds of all impartial men, than from the materials furnished by
Mr. Russell himself, to expose to the House at once the character
of the accusation and of the accuser. I did, therefore, desire that
both the letters of Mr. Russell, and my remarks upon them, should
be communicated to the House ; but even then, if Mr. Russell, in
stead of affectiog indifference, had fairly acknowledged his error,
and requested that the papers might not be communicated, I would
have joined him in that request to the President.

Both the letters were communicated to the House ; both were
strictly within the call of their resolutiou, which was for " any
letter which may have been received from Jonathan Russell, in con
formity with the indications contained in his letter of the 25th De
cember, 1814." 1 remarked upon both; and if that has proved
a mortification to Mr. Russell, he should recollect that he brought
it upon himself. It was his fault there was any difference between
them to remark upon. He should also remember, that if the ori
ginal alone had been communicated, he would have been deprived
of the benefit of " those corrections of the copy in possession, which
appeared to him proper to exhibit his case most advantageously be»
fore the tribunal of the public."

Mr. Russell is mistaken in supposing that I attach any importance
to his protest, as adding authentication to his professions, or prov
ing his sincerity. What difference can there be between the word
of a man, with or without protest, who, after writing the word du
plicate upon a letter written and signed by himself, to be communi
cated as a public document to a legislative body, tells the public
that he gave no further intimation, much less an assurance, thai it

152

was so, and avows that it was not so ? If the name of God, under
Mr. Russell's pen, could not deter him from converting the past
into the future, that he might enjoy the honours of prophecy, and
couple with his trust in the Deity, his confidence in the valour of
the West, what excuse could I have for considering the declaration
of Mr. Russell as either more or less sincere for being backed by
his protest ?

** To add a perfume to the violet

** Is wasteful and ridiculous excess."

But if Mr. Russell, after delivering on the 22d of April his du
plicate at the Department of State, and especially after he knew
that the orignal had been found, was no longer solicitous that either
of them should be communicated to the House, he had neither
given up the inclination, nor the intention of appearing before the
public, as the accuser of his colleagues of the majority at Ghent.

He left the City of Washington on the 5th of May, the day after
the House of Representatives had received the President's answer
to the call of the 19th of April — with that answer the President
communicated to the House my report to him, which had been
accompanied by a copy of the duplicate left by Mr. Russell at the
Department for communication. But the President did not com
municate the copy of the duplicate itself. He informed the House
that the original had also been found — that it had been marked as
SL private letter, by the writer himself — that it disclosed differences
of opinion which would naturally call for answers from those im
plicated by it ; and that 1, as one of them, had already requested
that it might be communicated, together with my remarks upon it.
Under those circumstances the President declined communicating
the letter called for, unless the House, upon a knowledge of them,
should desire it — in which case he informed them that it would be
communicated, together with rny report upon it.

Ail this was known to Mr. Russell when he left the city ; and it
is presumed that he also knew that the call for the letter would not
be renewed by the mover of the resolution of the 19th of April ;
yet Mr. Russell went to Philadelphia, and there caused to be print
ed in the National Gazette of the 10th of May. another variety of
his letter of llth February, 1815, from Paris, to Mr. Monroe —
still differing from the original — differing also from the duplicate,
which he had delivered at the Department, but satisfactorily prov
ing with what ingenuity he had told me that the two last leaves of
his original draft had not been found at Mendon. and that he had
been obliged to supply their contents in the duplicate from memo
ry — the triplicate of the National Gazette was accompanied by an
editorial article, vouching for its authenticity as a copy— vouching
from good authority that Mr. Russell had had no share in the call
(of the House of the 19th of April) for the private letter — and
commenting in a style, the apologetical character of which indicates
its origin, upon the privacy, which it urged was not secrecy, of the
letter ; upon the professions of Mr. Russell's respect for his col-

153

leagues in the letter, and upon the frequency of such personal and
separate explanations in the annals of diplomacy — all this, upon the
face of it, came directly or indirectly from Mr. Russell himself.
The letter, as published in the National Gazette, was not marked
private, as the original had been, which was now known from the
President's message. It had discarded the panegyric upon the dis
franchised fishermen — the self-eulogium for enlarged patriotism
and subdued predilections and prepossessions — the prophetic in
spirations, and the trust in God and in the valour of the West,
which were in the duplicate and not in the original. It had stripped
off all the cumulative epithets added in the duplicate to the charge
of a wilful violation of instructions — it had even dismissed the
charge of having violated their instructions relating to the Missis
sippi, as construed by tJiemselvcs, and the emphatic citation of tht*
explicit and implicit CANCELLED instructions of 15th April, 1813.
But it had retained the interpolation of " we directly violated our
instructions" and the substitution of " we could" for " I can," in
that luminous exposition of atmospheric humidities and incessant
fogs which had been discovered to have so nearly annulled the
value of the Labrador fishery ; and although the cancelled instruc
tions were no longer cited in the text of the letter, yet to support
the remnant of interpolated charge, that they had been violated,
they were expressly subjoined as an appendage to the publication,
with an abundance of italicised words to point out the heinousness
of this violation ; and this was after the interview in which I had
shown to Mr. Russell at the Department, the record, not only of
the letter of 4th October, 1814, to the Commissioners, which had
not, but that of the letter of the 1 9th October, 1814, which had been
received before the proposal, upon which the charge of violation
rested, had been made to the British plenipotentiaries. The tri
plicate of the National Gazette had restored the postscript of the
original, which had been dismissed from the duplicate, containing
the three hopeful OTHER ways of proceeding devised by Mr. Rus
sell's resources of negotiation, two months after the negotiation was
over, instead of the course which we did pursue, the word other
only being omitted. The triplicate of the National Gazette, in
short, proved that the original draft from Mendon had been com
plete ; and that all its own interpolations, as well as those of the
duplicate, and its omissions, had been owing, not to deficiencies of
memory, but to superfluities of invention.

Such is the true history of the tactics of Mr. Russell, in bringing
before the House of Representatives and the nation, his impeach
ment of his colleagues, the majority of the Ghent mission — that it
was such of me, is fully admitted by himself in the Boston States
man, by styling me the adverse party, and in that publication he
sufficiently indicates his disposition in the progress of his operations
to concentrate his charges against me alone. Be it so. In my re
marks upon the original and duplicate of his accusatory letter, I
styled it a laborious tissue of mitrep retaliation*. He complains of

154

this as of virulence and acrimony., which he boasts of not having re
turned. If virulence and acrimony had no other vehicle than harsh
language, if they could be disguised under professions of unfeigned
respect, however cautiously Mr. Russell had abstained from them
in his original letter from Paris, he had been much less observant of
that decorum in the duplicate, prepared with new relishes of crimi
nation to suit the appetite of political hatred ; and the publication in
the Boston Statesman is by no means sparing either of virulence or
acrimony against me. The whole tenour of his argument in the
original letter, against his colleagues, was sneering and sarcastic.
In the Boston Statesman, besides direct charges against me, of disin-
genuousness, of having made an unprincipled and unprovoked attack
upon him, of disrespect to the House of Representatives, of infirm
ities of temper and taste, and of being a dreaming visionary, he tries
even the temper of his wit to assail me, and by a heavy joke upon
an expression used in my remarks, indulges his own inftinct of mis
quoting my words to make them appear ridiculous. If this be Mr,
Russell's mildness and moderation, it looks very much like the viru
lence and acrimony of others. In the transactions of human socie
ty, there are deeds of which no adequate idea can be conveyed in
the terms of courtesy and urbanity ; yet I admit the obligation of a
public man to meet with coolness and self-command the vilest arti
fices, even of fraud and malignity, to rob him of the most precious
of human possessions, his good name — -"thrice happy they who
master so their blood." If in my former remarks upon Mr. Rus
sell's Janus-faced letter, or in this refutation of his new and direct
personal attack upon my reputation, I have, even in word, trans
gressed the rule of decency, which, under every provocation, it is
still the duty of nay station and of my character to observe, though,
unconscious, myself, of the offence, I submit to the impartial judg
ment of others, and throw myself upon the candour of my country
for its forgiveness. This paper has been confined to a demonstra
tion of the frailty or the pliability of Mr. Russell's memory, in rela
tion to facts altogether recent. As, upon an issue of facts, I do not
even now ask that my word alone should pass for conclusive, state
ments of Mr. Brent and Mr. Bailey, relative to the production of
Mr. RusselPs letter before the House of Representatives, and to
the incidents from which Mr. Russell has attempted to extort a
charge of disingenuousness against me, are subjoined. My only
wish is, that they should be attentively compared with Mr. Rus
sell's narrative.

In another paper I shall prove that Mr. Russell's reminiscences
of the proceedings at Ghent, bear the same character of imagina
tion substituted for memory ; and that what he calls " the real his
tory of the transaction," [the fishery and Mississippi navigation pro
posal,] contradictory to the statement which I had made in my re
marks, is utterly destitute of foundation.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS,

Washington, 13th July, 1$22.

Mr. BrenCs Statement.

On the 20th of April of the present year, I called upon Mr. Russell at hi$
i.> Icings in this city, without the knowledge or direction of any other person
whatever, to inquire of him, as I did, whether he could and would furnish the
Department of State with a copy of his letter from Paris to the Secretary of
State, which was referred to in a resolution that I supposed to be then on its
passage (but which had actually passed the day before,) through the House of
Representatives, upon the motion of Doctor Floyd, in case the said resolution
:-hould be adopted by the House, and a regular application were made to him
fur it ; observing to him distinctly and particularly, however, that I had no au
thority to make such an application myself, and that my entire object was to
ascertain the facts just stated. In answer to this inquiry, Mr. Russell informed
mo that his daughter had recently transmitted to him the draft of the letter hi
question ; that he had it thereby in his power to give a transcript of it, and would
sot about making one immediately, which, when finished, he would deliver to
the President. Upon which I remarked, that this seemed to be the proper
rourso, the original having been addressed to him, the President, when Secreta
ry of State. I then observed to Mr. Russell, that he had better deliver it as a
duplicate than as a copy ; that he knew the original was not to be found upon the
filt-s of the Department of State, and that this was'he common form with regard
to all such communications. Pie seemed pleased with the suggestion, and said
that he would conform to it, without giving me the slightest intimation that he
would prefer giving a copy, as such, or that he v/ould furnish any other than a
duplicate of the identical letter spoken of and referred to, which had been
transmitted by him from Paris to the then Secretary of State. I was prompted
by a double motive to this inquiry — first, by an habitual wish that the Depart
ment to which I belonged should always be prepared to furnish what might be
required of it by the House of Representatives ; and, secondly, by an appre
hension that, if it were not so prepared in this particular case, unjust imputa
tions might be made against the Head of that Department, which I was desir
ous of obviating. In this interview, Mr. Russell told me that it was at his in
stance Doctor Floyd had submitted his last resolution to the House of Repre
sentatives ; that he was influenced, himself, by the wish that his letter should be
communicated to Congress, tor his justification as to the part he had taken in
the negotiation of the treaty of Ghent, with regard to the fisheries ; but that the
same gentleman's first motion upon the same subject, was made without his
knowledge or advice. On the 22d of the same month, Mr. Russell handed to
we, in my rrom at the Department of State, in the absence of the Secretary,
with a request that I would deliver it over to him, an open letter, marked "Du
plicate," a copy of which was communicated by the President to the House of
Representatives, on the ?th of May last ; observing, when he did so, that he felt
no particular solicitude about it, and requesting that it might be returned to
him, if not used by the Department. A day or two afterwards this paper was
put into the hands of Mr. Thomas Thruston, one of the clerks of the office,
to be copied. Perceiving that it bore date at Paris, on the llth of February,
1822, when Mr. Russell was known to be attending the session of Congress in
this city, as a member of the House of Representatives, this young gentleman
asked my advice whether he should insert that date in the copy or not ; and I
told him, without hesitation, to insert 1816 instead of 18^2, as Mr. Russell had
evidently, from inadvertence, made a mistake in the date. Mr. Thruston gave
it that date accordingly, and made a correspondent alteration in the paper it
self, which Jie was transcribing, under the impression that he was likewise au
thorized to do so, and that it would never produce criticism of any sort. When
Mr. Adams came to be apprized of these circumstances, particularly of the al
teration in the date of the " duplicate" paper, he manifested and expressed
much surprise and displeasure upon the occasion. But Mr. Russell, whom I
s i\v immediately after they happened, and to whom I communicated what ha«

156

been done, expressed his full and entire approbation of it; and the next day he
brought to the office the draught from which he stated the " duplicate" was pre
pared by him, bearing date Paris, llth February, 1815, which he particularly
showed to me, as a corroborative justification to the Department of State for
the alteration that had been made in the date of his paper. It was then, I
think, that I informed him of the substitution which had been made in the office
copy of the year 1815 for that of 1816, to correct our own mistake ; and he au
thorized and requested me to have a like alteration made in his " duplicate,"
which was accordingly done. Mr. Russell, upon this occasion, again expressed
his indifference as to the determination of the Executive with regard to this
u duplicate,'' and repeated his request that it should be returned to him if not
used.

In one of our conversations I asked him why he had delivered that paper to
me, and not to the President, to whom he had said he would deliver it ? His
reply was, that he had done so because he deemed that course most respectful
to the Department of State, being under the impression, notwithstanding my de
claration to the contrary, that I had sounded him upon the subject of the paper
in question by authority, (meaning, I presumed, by direction of the Secretary
of State,) and that it was actually required at the Department of State.

In a conversation between Mr. Russell and myself, on the 1st May, in Mr.
Bailey's room, at the Department of State, in the presence and hearing of that
gentleman, he fully and expressly admitted and confirmed the correctness of the
statement given in this paper of the conversation between us of the 20th of
April, at his lodgings, with regard to the facts that the call of Doctor Floyd for
his letter had been made at his suggestion, and that I mentioned to him I had
no authority to make an application to him for a copy of that letter, and that I
made none.

DANIEL BRENT,

Washington, IQth July, 1822.

Mr. Bailees Statement.

Several days after the passage of the resolution of the House of Represent
atives of the United States, of 17th January, 1822, moved by Mr. Floyd, and
calling on the President for copies of certain papers relative to the negotiations
at Ghent, but before the copies had been communicated to the House, Mr. Rus
sell, of the House, called at my room in the Department of State, and expressed
a wish to see aletter addressed by himself, separately, at Ghent, to the then Se
cretary of State. He stated that the present Secretary of State had mentioned the
letter to him, and had desired to know whether it was his (Mr. Russell's) wish
that this letter should be communicated to the House with other papers embraced
fay the above call, or not. This letter, (a short one, dated "Ghent, 25th De
cember, 1814.,") was accordingly shown to Mr. Russell by me, in a volume con
taining the original communications from our Plenipotentiaries at Ghent, which
had been bound and lettered in the Department several years before. Mr. Rus
sell, on reading the letter, suid that he saw no objection to the communication
of it, and asked me if I saw any. The reply was, that none was seen. He
said that the concluding paragraph, as it related to his return to Sweden, and
not at all to the negotiations at Ghent, did not require to be communicated to
the House. I requested him to mark such part as he wished communicated.
This he did ; and, conformably to this, the copy was made, by subsequent di
rection of the Secretary of State, and thus it appears in the printed copy, p. 50,

At the same time, or very soon after, (I do not remember which,") Mr. Rus
sell expressed a wish that the letter might be found and communicated, which,
in his letter of 25th December, 1814, he intimated his intention of writing.
The wish was repeated at subsequent times, both at my room and elsewhere;
and much desire was manifested by him on the subject. Mr. Russell and my
self together, as well as myself separately, examined at different times the

157

bound volume above-named, and also other files, on which, if mislaid, the let
ter would most probably have been placed ; but no trace of it was found. Afc
his suggestion I made inquiry of the Secretary and of the Chief Clerk ; but
they had no knowledge of such letter. The Secretary informed me that his first
knowledge that such a letter had been written, was from Mr. Russell's declar
ation to him since the call of 17th January ; and that the existence even of Mr.
Russell's letter of 25th December, 1814, was unknown to him previous to his
examination of the files in consequence of said call.

Mr. Russell, while making the above inquiries for his letter of the Hth Feb
ruary, 1815, remarked to me, that he had not a copy of it here, but had at
home, (in Massachusetts,) and that he could get a copy by writing to his
daughter, there ; but supposed that would be too late for a compliance with the
(first) call. He asked me if I supposed a copy, so made out, would be received
and communicated to the House with the other papers. I replied that I did
not know sufficiently what was usual on such occasions. After he had delivered
the " duplicate" at the Department, he told me that he had written to his
daughter for the copy, and that she had sent it.

While Mr. Russell, at his first visit, was examining various records of the.
office, he noticed a paragraph in the instructions to the Commissioners of peace
of loth April, 1813, respecting British traders within our limits ; a paragraph,
which was omitted in the copy sent to Congress by Mr. Madison with his mes
sage of 13th October, 1814, (see Wait's State Papers, vol. 9, p. 357,) and
which, it is believed, was never published till it appeared in the National Ga
zette of lOth May, 1822. Of this Mr. Russell requested of me a copy. On
direction of the Secretary, I made and sent to him the copy : and, several
weeks after, (I think early in April,) on his remarking to me that that copy was
mislaid or not found, and asking another copy, a second was made and sent to
him.

Soon after the call of 19th April, Mr. Russell was at my room, and said
(wholly spontaneously) that Mr. Floyd had made his motion for that call «TZ*
fire.li/ without his knowledge, or without consulting .with him, or words to that
effect. He also said he did not know Mr. Floyd's motive for making his firs^
motion (for the call of 17th January.)

On receiving the duplicate, the Secretary of State gave it to me to be copied |
for which purpose it was handed to Mr. Thiuston. The date having been al
tered from 1822 to 1816, as stated by Mr. Brent, the Secretary, OB seeing the.
alteration, expressed distinctly his displeasure at the circumstance. When Mr.
J&ussell next came to the Department, Mr. Brent, in my presence, mentioned to
him the incident of the alteration from 1822 to 1816 ; and (such is strongly my
impression, scarcely leaving a doubt, though Mr. Brent is uncertain whether
this intimation happened at this or the next visit of Mr. Russell,) intimated
that 1816 was put by mistake for 1815, and that 1815 would be the reading of
the copy for the House, if such was Mr. Russell's pleasure. Mr. Russell not
only assented to the alteration, (to 1815,) but requested that it might be read
thus, in a manner more emphatic and formal than an ordinary request ; pur
porting, that he wished this declaration of his to be taken as authority for the
alteration. And, at his next call, he brought with him the draught from which
he made the duplicate, and, after exhibiting its date to Mr. Brent, in his room,
brought it to me, to show that " 1822" was a mistake in copying. The draught
was plainly " l3l5."

When the copy was made for the House, the Secretary was anxious that it
should conform with scrupulous exactness to the paper deposited by Mr. Rus-
se], with the sole exception of the date, which he wished modified according to
Mr. Russell's special request.

On the 1st of May, Mr. Russell and Mr. Brent were in my roonvand Mr.
Brent recapitulated the conversation between himself and Mr. Russell, on the
20fh April, when Mr. Brent made certain inquiries respecting Mr. Russell's
'f-tter. The recapitulation in substance stated, that Mr. Brent informed Mr.

20

158

Russell, that his Inquiries were wholly without the authority of any other per-
son ; that his object was to know whether Mr. Russell could and would furnish
the letter, if it should be wanted, and if he should be applied to for it ; and
that Mr. Russell told Mr. Brent that he could and would furnish it to the Pre
sident ; 'and that he further told Mr. Brent, (on Mr. Brent's inquiry,) that Mr,
Floyd had made his (second) motion on his (Mr. Russell's) suggestion. Mr.
Russell assented to the correctness of this recapitulation, explaining the last ob
servation by saying, that Mr. Floyd, before he moved the second call, asked
him if he could give him (Mr. Floyd) a copy of the letter, and that he (Mr,
Russell) declined, and told Mr. Floyd that if he wished a copy he must move a

Callf0rit' JOHN BAILEY.

Washington, 10 th July, 1822.

From the National Intelligencer of August 7, 1822.
TO THE EDITORS.

In the reply printed in the National Intelligencer of the 17th
ultimo, to a publication by Mr. Jonathan Russell in the Boston
Statesman, of the 27th of June preceding, it was stated that the
subject would be resumed in another paper. That paper, with
others elucidating all the topics of general interest discussed in Mr,
Russell's letter, has been prepared, but will be presented to the
public in another form. Mr. Russell's letter from Paris, of llth
February, 1815, was ostensibly a vindication of himself and his mo
tives against an accusation instituted by himself— self-defence
against "self-impeachment ! The substance was, a secret impeach
ment of the majority of his colleagues before their common supe
rior authority. That accusation he saw fit, during the late session
of Congress, to bring before the Legislative Assembly of which he
was a member, and shortly afterwards to produce before the pub
lic, in newspapers, at Philadelphia and at Boston. If, in meeting
this accusation wherever it has appeared visible and tangible, 1 have
been compelled to present myself more than once to the public at
tention, it has been under circumstances deeply mortifying to me,
and assuredly not of my own choosing. I have been called to re
pel a succession of charges, supported by the name of a man high
in the confidence of the country ; an associate in the trust which,
he substantially accuses me of having betrayed, and implicating the
character, conduct, and memory of other citizens employed on the
same service. It has, indeed, recently been suggested that this is
a mere personal controversy between Mr. Russell and me, with
which the public have no concern. And why was it brought before
the public ? So long as the purport of Mr. Russell's letter was
merely propagated in whispers— just hinted in anonymous para
graphs of newspapers, and hoped not to be true in charitable letter*
from Washington, however infamous the imputations with which it
was occasionally oound up and circulated, a man conscious of his
innocence, and secure in the uprightness of his intentions, might

159

overlook and despise it. But, when made the ohject of two sue*
cessive legislative culls for obsolete and forgotten documents, trum
peted beforehand throughout the Union, as fraught with disclo
sures which were to blast a reputation worthless in the estimation
of its possessor, if not unsullied ; when pertinaciously obtruded
upon Congress and upon the nation, by a colleague in the transac
tion denounced, by a participator in the act reprobated by himself,
principles and duties of a higher order than those of mere personal
delicacy commanded me to solicit the attention, first, of the House
of Representatives, and, secondly, of the nation, to my defence and
that of my colleagues, arraigned before them. That defence has
been, and will be, strictly confined to the same limits as the attack
to which it is opposed ; and if, in the course of it, the attack itself
has necessarily been made to recoil upon the accuser, it was because
nothing could more forcibly tend to show the futility of the charges
than an exposition of the conduct of him who produced them. Let
me then be permitted to say, that this is not a mere personal con
troversy between Mr. Russell and me, with which the public have
no concern. It did not so begin, nor can it so end. The negotia
tion at Ghent was an event of great importance in the history of
this Union. It was conducted by five Commissioners, citizens of
different sections of the country. One of the great objections to
the entrusting of critical negotiations to Commissions is, their in
herent tendency to internal dissentions, injurious to the common
cause. Of these dissentions 1 believe there were as few at Ghent
as in any negotiation, by Commissioners of equal number, upon his
torical record. Until the last winter, I had flattered myself that
none of those differences of opinion had been of a character which
it would have been ever necessary to disclose to the world. In
making the draught of the joint letter of 25th December, 1314, to
the Secretary of State, I had, in speaking of the proposition made to
the British plenipotentiaries on the first of that month, said, '• To
place both points beyond controversy, we offered to admit an article
confirming both rights," (to the Mississippi navigation and the fish
eries.) The draught having been passed round to all the members of
the mission for revisal, was brought back to me by Mr. Russell,
with an alteration, which he said was desired, not by him, but by
Mr. Clay, to say, instead of "we offered" "a majority of us de
termined to offer." Now, although the expressions first used had
been strictly correct, and the offer had been actually made by the
whole mission, I readily assented to the alteration, not imagining
that Mr. Russell's purpose was to lay it as a corner-stone for future
iabrics, either of self-accusation and defence, or of social discord
and reproach. Me now alleges it as a self-contradiction of mine,
that I say the proposition was made by the whole mission, although
in the joint letter of 25th December, it was said, a majority deter
mined to offer it. But the contradiction is of his''own imagination,
The determination was taken by the majority. The offer was made
!>y the whole. Mr. Russell proposed another amendment, for which

160

he neither mentioned, nor did I then suspect his motive. The let
ter says, " We contended that the whole treaty of 1783 must he
considered as one entire and permanent compact, not liable, like
ordinary treaties, to be abrogated by a subsequent war between the
parties to it." Mr. Russell's proposal was to change the word
must for might — to read " we contended that the whole treaty
might be considered," &c. But to this alteration I objected that it
would not state the facts as they were — that we had actually con
tended that it must, and not that it might be so considered ; and Mr.
Russell immediately yielded to this objection, which he could not
dispute. He assented to this passage of the letter, as it was first
written, and as it now stands. The use which he even then pro
posed to make of the alteration, if it had been admitted, I now per
ceive, but had then too sincere a regard for Mr. Russell to surmise.
There were, in the course of the negotiation, many differences
of opinion, and many votes taken ; but, excepting this solitary case,
no one member of the mission thought it necessary to record the
fact, or to make it known even to the American government. As
all the members of the mission had finally concurred in the pro
position upon which the vote was taken, and had signed their names
lo it in the communications to the British plenipotentiaries ; and as
there was then no allegation by any one that it was not fully war
ranted by our instructions, 1 certainly thought there was as little
necessity for announcing to our government that a vote had been
taken upon this proposition, as upon any other question which had
occurred — yet, when it was desired by any membej of the mission,
that the proposition to which ail had pledged their names and sig
natures to the adverse party and the world, should be recorded, as
having been previously determined by a majority only, I could
have no objection to its being so stated. Mr. Clay did not think it
necessary either to accuse or to defend himself for having been in
the minority. The course pursued by Mr. Russell was neither
candid towards his colleagues, nor friendly to the liberties of his
country. Under the guise of accusing himself, he became the se
cret delator of his colleagues. But his letter from Paris was not
Confined to its professed object of vindicating himself for his vote
tipon the Mississippi proposition. He travelled out of the record,
and racked his ingenuity and his learning to refute the principle
assumed at the proposal of Mr. Clay himself — the principle upon
which no vote had been taken in the mission ; but which had been
adopted and inserted in the note of 10th November, 1814, by una
nimous consent ; the principle that, from the nature of the fishing
liberties, and the peculiar character of the treaty of 1783, they
were not abrogated by the war. And now, seven years afterwards,
when, by the maintenance of that very principle, we had, in a sub^
sequent negotiatipn with Great Britain, secured in a new compro
mise, without abandoning the principle, the whole essential interest
r n the iishmg liberties ; when, by the same negotiation, we had ob-
•aiced the abandonment by Great Britain c-f her own ground ot

161

•«,Iaim to the navigation of the Mississippi, and when that negotiation
had been conducted under instructions entirely drawn up by me ;
a call from the House of Representatives comes for the residue of
tjie Ghent documents. Mr. Russell, having it placed at his own op
tion whether his old denunciation of himself, and his disagreement
with the majority, shall or shall not be communicated to the House,
deliberately decides that it shall — and gives himself and others no
repose, till he has brought before Congress and the nation, his bill
of attainder against his colleagues, new vamped to suit the political
passions of the day ; it is HOW too late to say that this is a mere
personal controversy between Mr. Russell and me with which the
public have no concern.

The principle asserted in the letter from Paris, that tt-e were left
without any title to the fishing liberty -whatsoever, was in the highest
degree pernicious to one of the most important interests of this
Union. The pretension that our only title to them had been a
temporary grant of the British king, revokable at hjs pleasure,
was equally unfounded in law and in fact. The reason assigned
for the averment of its extinction — that war abrogates all treaties,
and all articles of every treaty — is not warranted by the law of na
tions ; and if it were, would not warrant the conclusion drawn
from it. The character and value of the proposition relating to
the Mississippi, are in the letter from Paris totally misrepresented
and perverted by exaggeration. The value of the fishing liberty
is equally misrepresented and perverted by disparagement. The
possession of this liberty has twice been the turning hinge upon
which wars with Great Britain have been concluded. If upon ei
ther of those occasions the principles asserted in Mr. RusselT
letter had prevailed with the American negotiators, our rights m
the Newfoundland, Gulf of St. Lawrence, and Labrador fishery,
would have been lost. The same question may very probably arise
again. I undertake to prove that the argument, as Mr. Russell
calls it, of his letter, is in all its parts as untenable as it was unpro-
pitious to the cause of his country,

I have no intention, however, of pursuing this controversy fur
ther in the newspapers. I propose to publish in one collection,
the Ghent documents called for by the resolution of the House of
Representatives ; the message of the President to the House, with
Mr. Russell's letters and my remarks ; his publication of 27th June,
in the Boston Statesman, and mine in answer thereto in the Na
tional Intelligencer, with other papers, rectifying other represen
tations of Mr. Russell : and discussing the effect of war upon
treaties and treaty stipulations ; the value of the Mississippi navi
gation to the British, and of the fishing liberty to us and the rights
by which we have held and still hold them. That there ever w;is
any difference of opinion between the American plenipotentiaries
at Ghent upon measures in which they all finally concurred, would
never have been made known to the public by me. Satisfied with
an equal share of responsibility, for all which they had done, con-

162

tented and grateful for the satisfaction of our common country with
the general result of our services, I had no private interests or
feelings to indulge, at the expense of others, and my earnest desire
would have been, to have seen in every member of the mission,
for the rest of my days, no other than a friend and a brother. Disap*-
pointed in this wish, rny next hope is, that even the discords of Ghent
may be turned to the promotion of future harmony in the Union.
From the nature of our federative constitution, it is probable that
hereafter, as heretofore, the most important negotiations with for
eign powers will be committed to joint missions of several mem
bers. To every such mission and to all its rnombers the Ghent
negotiation will afford instructive lessons, as well by its union as
by its divisions. The conduct of Mr. Russell will afford a negative
instruction of deep import. It will teach them to beware of leaguing
invidious and imaginary sectional or party feelings with the pur
poses of the enemy, against our rights — of assuming the argument
of the enemy against ourselves — of proclaiming, without necessity,
differences 'of opinion upon rejected propositions — of secret de
nunciations in the shape of self-vindication — of crude and shallow
dissertations against essential interests and just claims, and of in
terpolating public papers to adapt them to the purposes of the mo
ment. It will teach them to have a higher sense of the rights and
liberties of this nation, than to believe them to be held at the will
of a British king; and it will warn them to turn their talents
to better uses than that of sacrificing the essential interests of their
country. These are public concerns of great moment, and a just
understanding of them in every part of the Union is indi?solubly
connected with a just estimate of the conduct of the majority of
the Ghent mission, held forth to public censure by one of their col
leagues. For a view of the whole ground it will be indispensable
to compare the documents of the negotiation with the references of
both parties to them in the discussion, and to that end it will be ne
cessary that they should all be included in one publication. J ask
of the candour of my countrymen to be assured, that this publica
tion will be addressed to no temporary purposes, to no party feel
ing, to no sectional passions, but to the whole nation and to pos
terity, upon objects which, although implicating immediately onlv
the conduct of the negotiators at Ghent, are of deep and perma
nent interest to themselves.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

August 5, 1822.

163
FURTHER STRICTURES

ON MR. RUSSELL'S REPRESENTATIONS AND ESTIMATES.

/. Navigation of the Mississippi — Worthless to the British.

In the joint despatch of the 25th of December, 1814, to the Se
cretaryof State, signed by all the members of the American mis
sion at Ghent, a narrative was given of the circumstances, undei
which the proposal had been made to the British plenipotentiaries
and rejected by them, of a stipulation, confirming the provisions of
the treaty of 1783, in regard to the fishing rights and liberties of
the people of the United States, and to the right of the British to
navigate the Mississippi. It was there stated, that after the Ame
rican mission, in answer to the notification from the British, that
their government did not intend to grant anew the fishing liberties,
had asserted the principle, that from the peculiar character of the
treaty of 1783, and the nature of those rights and liberties, no fur
ther stipulation had been deemed necessary by the government of
the United States, to entitle them to the full enjoyment of all of
them ; after they had sent to the British plenipotentiaries, on the
10th of November, 1814, a project of a treaty, containing no arti
cle or stipulation on the subject ; after the British plenipotentiaries
had, on the 2G£/i of November, returned that project with alterations
proposed by them, one of which was a stipulation that British sub
jects should, at all times, have access to the river Mississippi and
the free navigation of the river — to meet this demand, and to place
both points beyond all future controversy, a majority of the mission
determined to offer to admit an article confirming both rights.

Nothing can be more clear and explicit than this statement that
the determination of the majority was taken after the 26th of No
vember, 1814. Yet directly in the face of it, Mr. Russell, in the
Boston Statesman of 27 June, affirms that at the mission meetings
of the 28th and 29th of November, " whatever might have been
'• said in relation to the Mississippi, on account of the alteration,
^J respecting it, made in the B(h article of our project, by the Bri-
" tish plenipotentiaries, no new resolution was there taken by the
ir American mission to offer the navigation of that river for the fishing
•c privilege. This offer was made on the 1st of December, in vir-
" tue of the vote taken before the 10th of November, and which,
<J although suspended, had not been reconsidered or cancelled."
And he adds, " I am the more confident in this statement, as I dis-
-' tinctly remember that when that offer was actually made, it was
"' unexpected by A MAJORITY OF THE MISSION. Mr. Bayard, in re-
" turning home from the house of the British ministers, where the
" conference of the 1st of December had been holden, very expli-
<{ citly declared to Mr. Clay and to me, his dissatisfaction that this
:' offer had been made without his having been recently consulted in
•' relation to it. I dare, in regard to these facts, to appeal to the
•'• recollection of Mr. Clay, in confirmation of my own,"'

164

Marvellous indeed ! So then this wonder-working and tefriblc
proposal, this portentous sacrifice of the peace, comfort, and safety
of the western world, was actually made in full conference with
the British plenipotentiaries, not by a majority, but by a MINORITY,
of the American mission. And Mr. Bayard, who had changed his
mind, stood by, and saw the proposal made, heard it discussed,
saw it entered on the protocol as the proposal of the American
plenipotentiaries, and afterwards signed a letter declaring he had
no objection to it ; while all the time he was not for, but against it.
And Mr. Clay and Mr. Russell, who from before the 10th of No
vember had known the change of Mr. Bayard's mind, they too,
witnessed this insolent usurpation, by the minority, of the name
and rights of the whole mission, without dariny; to avow an objec
tion to it either in the presence of, or in correspondence with, the
British plenipotentiaries, or in the meetings of the mission itself.
Mr. Bayard contents himself with whispering his dissatisfaction to
Mr. Clay and Mr. Russell ; and they, instead of vindicating the in
sulted rights of the majority, reserve it as a secret, which Mr. Rus
sell, seven years after the death of Mr. Bayard, divulges to the
world.

The anecdote is an outrage on the memory of Mr. Bayard. Mr.
Clay will not respond affirmatively to the appeal of Mr. Russell.
J have no occasion for appealing in this case to the recollection of
any one. I speak not only from the express and positive testimony
of the joint despatch of 25 December, 1814, but from the record
of a private diary, kept by me at the time, in which are minuted
from day to day, with all the accuracy and detail in my power, the
proceedings as well of the mission, as of both missions in their con
ferences : and 1 now affirm, that on the 28th of November, 1814,
after a discussion of more than five hours, in which every member
of the mission, except Mr. Russell, took part, a vote was taken
npon the proposal of Mr. Gallatin, to accept the proposed altera
tion of the 8th article of the project, presented by the British
plenipotentiaries, relating to the navigation of the Mississippi, ad
ding to it a counter stipulation for securing the fishing liberties
within exclusive British jurisdiction ; that a majority of the mis
sion voted for this proposal, and that Mr. Gallatin should prepare
for consideration the next day, an amendment to the 8th article con
formably ; — that on the 29th of November Mr. Gallatin did pro
duce this amendment, which, after another long discussion, was
agreed to, and was the same offered to the British plenipotentiaries,
as appears by the protocol of the 1st of December, 1814. It was
to this vote of the majority, and to this alone, that the joint des
patch of 25 December, 1814, referred ; and it was to this vote,
ihus stated upon the face of the despatch, that Mr. Russell referred
in his separate letter of the same date, when he said that he had
been on that occasion in the minority. Yet it was not without rea
son that in my former remarks upon his letters I said, he gave, it
may be, a silgnt vote against the proposal : for, from the minutes

165

in my diary, although I know that a vote was taken, and that there
was a majority in favour of the proposal, yet it <loes not appeal-
that Mr. Russell voted against it ; and from an observation made
at the time by Mr. Gallatin, to which Mr. Russell expressed no dis
sent, I should now rather conclude that he did not on that day vote
at all. It was not unusual when a vote was taken, as soon as a ma
jority was ascertained, to ornit calling for the vote of the fifth
member ; and Mr. Russell was not unwilling to avail himself of
these opportunities to avoid voting at all. However that fact may
he, I repeat that he took no part in the discussion, and that after
the vote was taken, it was Mr. Gallatin's impression, which he ex
pressed in Mr. Russell's presence without being contradicted by
him, that he was then in favour of the proposal.

The proposition to which Mr. Russell says he objected, [he should
have said, against which he voted,] before the 10th of November,
was not substantially that first offered on the 1st of December ;
nor was the latter offered in virtue of the vote taken before the
10th of November. The joint despatch of 25th December, says
not one word of the vote taken before the 10th of November : nor
had Mr. Russell's separate letter of 25th December, any reference
to it whatever. His subsequent letters have indeed attempted to
confound them together, for the purpose of urging against the pro
position which was made, the arguments, some of which had been
used by Mr. Clay, against that which was not made. But these are
all corrections made to suit present purposes. By comparing toge
ther the article upon which the vote was taken before the 10th of
November, (I shall soon say when) as Mr. Russell has published
it in the Boston Statesman, and the proposal actually made as ap
pears in the protocol of 1st December, it will immediately be per
ceived, that they are essentially different ; and that the latter could
not have been offered as the act of the American mission, by vir
tue of the vote taken upon the former.

The history of the vote taken before the 10th of November is
as follows :

On the 29th of October, 1814, it was agreed at a meeting of the
mission, that a draught of a project of a treaty should be made, to
be discussed by the mission, and, as might be after such discussion
settled by them, presented to the British plenipotentiaries. The
task of making this draught was assigned to Mr Gallatin and me.
Mr. Gallatin engaged to draw up the articles respecting the boun
daries and Indians, and I undertook to prepare those respecting
impressment, blockade, and indemnities.

At a meeting of the mission the next day, the draughts of the arti
cles were produced ; and among those offered by Mr. Gallatin was
the article cited by Vlr. Russell in the Boston Statesman of 27th June
last. As it was finally set aside, I have no copy of it ; but have no
reason to doubt that it was in the words cited by Mr. Russell. At
this meeting, Mr. Clay objected to it. Mr. Russell was not pre-
gent.

21

166

The article was discussed further, chiefly between Mr, Gallatm
and Mr. Clay, at meetings of the mission on the 31st of October*
and on the 1st, 2d, and 3d of November.

I had till then taken no part in the discussion. The following
are extracts from my diary of subsequent dates, when, at meetings
pf the mission, all the articles of the draught were discussed.

4 November, 1814. " The great difficulty was with regard to,
f the fisheries. Mr. Gallatin's draught proposed the renewal of the
c< right of fishing and drying fish withiii the British jurisdiction, to?
" gether with the right of the British to navigate the Mississippi,
" both taken from the peace of 1783. I was in favour of this. Mr.
" Clay has an insuperable objection to the renewal of the right to
" the British of navigating the Mississippi. I then declared myself
5* prepared either to propose Mr. Gallatin's article, or to take the
" ground, that the whole right to the fisheries was recognised as a
6< part of our national independence ; that it could not be abrogated
" by the war, and needed no stipulation for its renewal. Mr. Clay
c4 was averse to either of the courses proposed, and said that after
*« all if the British plenipotentaries should insist upon this point, we
" should all finally sign the treaty without the provision respect-
" ing the fishery. Mr Russell expressed some doubt whether he
" would sign without it ; and I explicitly declared that I would not,
c( without further instructions — J could not say that I would, with
" them."

5 November, 1814. " The article concerning the fisheries and
" the navigation of the Mississippi as drawn by Mr. Gallatm was
" further debated, and the vote taken upon it. Mr. Clay and Mr.
" Russell voted against it — Mr. Bayard, Mr. Gallatin, and myself
c< for proposing it. After the vote was taken, Mr. Clay said that
*' he should not sign the communication by which the proposal
" would be made."

7 November, 1814. "Mr. Clay proposed a paragraph for the
" note to be sent to the British plenipotentiaries, as a substitute in-
" stead of the article respecting the fisheries and the navigation of
" the Mississippi, which had passed by vote on Saturday. Mr.
<{ Clay said, that in declaring at that time that he should not sign
(l the note accompanying the project, if it included Mr. Gallatin's
£' article, he had not intended that it should in any manner affect
'« the rainds of any of us. If the article should be proposed and
" accepted, and a treaty otherwise not exceptionable should be
" obtainable he might perhaps ultimately accede to it ; but the
" object was in his view so important, that he could not reconcile
** it to himself to agree in making the proposal. His proposed pa-
" ragraph took the ground which I had originally suggested that all
*'• the fishery rights formed a part of the recognition of our Inde-
** pendence, and as such, were by our instructions excluded from
" discussion. I said I should have preferred the proposal of Mr.
11 Gallatin's article, as placing the subject out of controversy ; but
: ' that as we could not be unanimous for that, \ was willing to take

167

" Mr. Clay's paragraph, by which we should reserve all our rights,
" and at the same time execute our instructions. Mr. Bayard said,
" that rather than differ among ourselves, he would agree to sub-
" stitute Mr. Clay's paragraph, instead of the proposed article, and
" this was ultimately assented to by us all."

Mr. Russell has taken infinite pains to fasten exclusively upon
me, the imputation of being the only asserter of this doctrine, that
from the peculiar character of the treaty of 1783, and from the
nature of the fishing rights and liberties, they had none of them
been abrogated by the war, and needed no new stipulation to pre
serve them. And it is this doctrine, which in the calmness of his
urbanity he styles the dream of a visionary.

I certainly never should have claimed the credit of having been
alone in the assertion of this principle. I should have been wil
ling that all rny colleagues, who united with me in asserting it in
the note of 10th November, 1814, at Ghent, signed by them all,
should have gone through life with the credit, and have left to pos
terity the reputation, of having had each an equal share in this
assertion. But Mr. Russell has effectually disclaimed all his portion
of it, and its consequences. He has represented it as, on the part
of the minority, a PRETEXT to preserve the Jishing privilege, and to
get rid of a proposition confirmative of the British right to the na
vigation of the Mississippi. He says he does not recollect that any
member of the mission, except myself, appeared to be a very zeal
ous believer in that doctrine. I thank Mr. Russell for that concession.
If there was moral virtue or has been successful result in the asser
tion of that principle to preserve the fishing liberties, I ask no more
than an equal share in the esteem of my country, for having assert
ed it, with those of my colleagues who are yet willing to bear the
imputation, not as a pretext, but with sincerity of heart, and as very
zealous believers in it. But were every other living member of
the mission to say, and were the spirit of Bayard from the tomb to
join with them and declare, that they assumed this principle only
in the spirit of compromise, and as a pretext, but that they con
sidered it only as the dream of a visionary, I would answer — the
dream of the visionary was an honest dream. He believed what he
affirmed and subscribed. And, I might confidently add, it has saved
your fisheries. Nor should I need other pi oof, than the negotia
tions with Great Britain since the peace, and the convention of
1818.

I would further observe, thai; if the principle was assumed by
the minority in the spirit of compromise, that spirit was much more
strongly manifested by the majority, and particularly by me, in ac
cepting this substitute, instead of the article proposed by Mr. Gal-
latin. I shall assuredly never deny, that from the time when the
British plenipotentiaries notified to us, that their government did
not intend to grant the fishing liberties without an equivalent, I
felt an inexpressible solicitude for their preservation. I have al
ready remarked that this notification was made interms so indefinite,

168

that its object apparently was to exclude us from the whole of the
Newfoundland, Gulf of St. Lawrence, and Labrador fisheries. Mr.
Russell has not ventured to contest this position ; nor could he
have contested it with success. The notification, as entered upon
the protocol of conference of 8th August, 1814, made up jointly
by both parties, was as follows :

" The British commissioners requested information, whether
u the American commissioners were instructed to enter into nego-
" tiation on the above points ? But before they desired any answer,
"they felt it right to communicate the intentions of their govern-
" ment as to the North American fisheries, viz. That the British
"• government did not intend to grant to the United States, gratu-
" itously. the privileges formerly granted by treaty to them, of
"fishing within the limits of the British sovereignty, and of using
** the shores of the British territories for purposes connected with
" the fisheries." Wait's State Papers, vol. 9, p. 330.

The remark upon it, made by the American mission, in their
letter to the Secretary of State of 12th August, 1814, was this :

" The extent of what was considered by them as waters pecu-
'•* liarly British, was not stated. From the manner in which they
"• brought this subject into view, they seemed to wish us to under-
** stand, that they were not anxious that it should be discussed, and
" that they only intended to give us notice, that these privileges
** had ceased to exist, and would not be again granted without an
*' equivalent, nor unless we thought proper to provide expressly in
*' the treaty of peace for their renewal." Ibid, p. 321.

And what were the limits of British sovereignty, as to the North
American fisheries ? Ask the Abbe Raynal.

" According to natural right, the fishery upon the great bank
" ought to have been common to all mankind ; notwithstanding
" which, the two powers that had formed colonies in North Ame-
t( rica, have made very little difficulty of appropriating it to them-
tl selves. Spain, who alone could have any claim to it, and who,
" from the number of her monks, might have pleaded the necessi-
" ty of asserting it, entirely gave up the matter at the last peace,
" since which time the English and French are the only nations
" that frequent these latitudes." Raynal1 s Historyt book 17.

Ask the commentator on the marine ordinance of Louis XIV,
Vafin. After assigning soundings, as the extent of sovereign juris
diction, upon the sea, in regard to fisheries, he says :

" As to the right of fishing upon the Bank of Newfoundland, a?
" that island, which is as it were, the seat of this fishery, then be-
" longed to France, it was so held by the French, that other nations
c< could naturally fish there only by virtue of the treaties. This
" has since changed, by means of the cession of the Island of New-
** foundland, made to the English, by the treaty of Utrecht; but
'' Loins XIV, at the time of that cession, made an express reserva-

169

•< tion of the right of fishing upon the Bank of Newfoundland, ia
;t favour of the French, as before." Valin, vol. 2, p. 693.

And Jr. Jefferson, in his Report on the Fisheries, of 1st Febru
ary, 1791, had said :

" Spain had formerly relinquished her pretensions to a partici-
* pation in these fisheries, at the close of the preceding war : and
1 at the end of this, the adjacent continent and islands being divided
' between the United States, the English, and French, (for the last
' retained two small islands merely for this object,) the right of fish-
' ing was appropriated to them also."

I did not entertain a doubt that the object of the British govern
ment then was, to exclude us from the whole of this fishery, unless
upon our own coast ; nor do 1 now, that if we had then acquiesced
in their principle, they would have excluded us from it after the
peace entirely.

I did, therefore, feel a deep and earnest solicitude for them.
Nor was that solicitude allayed by the discovery that there was in
the heart of the mission itself, a disposition and an influence operat
ing against them almost as inflexibly, and, in my estimation, far
more dangerously, than the British adversary himself.

There were but two possible ways, after the British notification,
of preserving these rights and liberties from total extinction. The
one was, by obtaining a new recognition of them in the treaty, which
could not be done without offering an equivalent ; and the other
was, by asserting that they had not been forfeited by the war, and
would remain in full vigour, although the treaty should be conclud
ed without such an article.

In preparing the draught of the treaty, Mr. Gallatinhad drawn an
article, stipulating anew the recognition, and offering, as the equiva
lent, the recognition of the British right to navigate the Mississippi,
contained in the same treaty of 1783, and of which the British ple
nipotentiaries had demanded the renewal.

Mr. Gallatin was a citizen of the Western Country, and as inca
pable as any other member of the mission, of sacrificing an essen
tial interest of one quarter of the Union, to a minor interest of ano
ther. I was, therefore, profoundly mortified to see his article ob
jected to on a principle of conflicting sectional interest, and still
more so, to hear Mr. Russell observe, after his opinion had been
disclosed by his vote, that the fisheries were an interest of a disaf
fected part of the country. I was as far as Mr. Russell from ap
proving the policy or the measures then predominating in New-
England : but to cast away and surrender to the enemy the birth
right of my country, an interest as lasting as the ocean and the shores
of my native land, for a merely momentary aberration, rather of its
legislature than its people, was so far from meeting my concur
rence, that it sickened my soul to hear it hinted from one of her
own sons.

Considered merely and exclusively with reference to sectional
interests, Mr. Gallatin's proposed article was fair and just. It pro-

no

posed that both interests should be placed on the sdtne looting on
which they had stood before the war. The first and paramount
duty of the government was to bring the nation out of the war,
with all its great interests preserved. It was not to gain an advan
tage for one section, by the loss of an advantage to another. The
principle of Mr. Gallatin's article was, that neither section should
gain or lose by the issue of the war. The principle of the objec
tion to it was, that the West should gain, by the sacrifice of the in
terest of the East : and the main motive assigned for it was, that
the East was a disaffected part of the country.

Much, too, was. said of the comparative value of the two liber
ties ; not by Mr. Russell, who had not then made, or at least did
not disclose, his notable discovery of incessant fogs, and their dele
terious effects upon the fisheries. But doubts were expressed, on
one side, whether the fisheries were of much value : and opinions
were very confidently expressed, on the other, th-it the navigation
of the Mississippi would be to the British of no value. Neither
evidence nor argument was adduced to show the small value of the
fisheries. But that the navigation of the Mississippi would be to
the British of no value, and of no injury to us, was proved, first,
by the experience of thirty years, from the peace of 1783 to the
war of 1812, during which they had possessed it without inconve
nience to us or benefit to themselves ; secondly, by the apparent
fact, that after abandoning their claim to a boundary line to the
Mississippi, and consequently the power of ever forming any settle
ment upon its banks, there was neither present nor prospective
interest, which could make the mere right of navigating it down
wards to the ocean, of any value to them. It was absolutely noth
ing more than a right of travelling upon a highway ; and all rational
foresight, as well as all past experience, led to the conclusion, that
the privilege would remain as it had been, merely nominal. The
objections against this reasoning were all speculation against fact ;
all surmises of what might be in future, against the uniform tenour
of what had been before. When, afterwards, the proposition of the
first of December was actually made to the British plenipotentia
ries, the immediate rejection of it by their government, and the
reasons which they assigned for rejecting it, demonstrated that they
considered it at least no equivalent for the part of the fisheries, of
which they intended to deprive us : and their final abandonment,
without any equivalent, of all claim to it, in negotiating the conven
tion of 181 8, completed the proof that they had always considered
it as a mere name, the only use they ever could make of which was
to obtain, if they could, something for renouncing it.*

* I take this opportunity to rectify an inaccuracy in the statement of my re
marks upon Mr. Russell's letter, that at the negotiation of that Convention, the
navigation of the Mississippi was not even asked by the British. On recurring
to the documents of that negotiation, I find that it was asked, but easily aban
doned. Our Negotiators were instructed not to accede to .it.

171

Mr. Russell says, that 1 expressed at Ghent my great contempt of
;he British right to reach and navigate the Mississippi : and Mr.
Russell's motive for using this expression is as apparent as it is invi-
iious. 1 never, at Ghent or elsewhere, expressed contempt of this
right, otherwise than by maintaining, that in the nature of things it
must and would he, as it had been, a naked right without use ; of no
value to them, and of no damage to us. For this opinion my rea
sons are now before the public ; and if a solid answer to them can
oe given, I shall be ready to acknowledge that I have been mistaken
in entertaining it. But I shall not take for such answer, any thing
[hat was said at (jhent ; and much less any thing; since alleged by
Mr. Russell. I shall not take for an answer, the immense import
ance TO us of the Mississippi and its navigation. No man has a
deeper sense of it than I have ; but it has no bearing on the ques
tion. The navigation of the Rhine is of immense importance to the
people of Germany and of France. There are treaties, by which
the right to this navigation, both ascending and descending, is stipu
lated for all mankind.* The people of the United States enjoy it
as much as the people of France or of Germany. Is it of any va
lue to us ? Is it of any injury to them ? I shall not take for an
answer Mr Russell's perpetual mis-statements of the question ;
his perpetual confounding of the article first proposed by Mr. Gal-
latin, which was never proposed to the British, with the amend
ment to the 8th article, which was proposed to them and rejected ;
hi* -/erpetual confounding of both with the 3d article of the treaty
of 1794. Mr. Russell says he has good reason to oelieve, that not
another member of the mission agreed with me in this opinion.
The best possible proof that Mr. Russell himself entertained it, is
found in the straits to which he is reduced to muster arguments
against it. His ingenuity cannot devise a plausible objection to the
proposal as it was made : so he substitutes in its stead, at one time
the article first proposed by Mr. Gallatin, and never offered ; at
another, the third article of the treaty of 1794 ; at a third, his con
jectural inferences of abuses which might be made of the privi
lege, as if the United States would have had no power to control
them. His argument is never against the proposal as it "was made.
It is always against the substitute of his own imagination. Mark
his words:

" It would be absurd to suppose that any thing impossible was
" intended, and that Great Britain was to be allowed to navigate

* " The navigation of the Rhine, from the point where it becomes navigable
" unto the sea, and vice versa, shall be free, so that it can be interdicted to no
11 one : and at the future Congress, attention shall be paid to the establishment
** of the principles, according to which the duties to be raised by the states bor-
" dering on the Rhine, may be regulated, in the mode the most impartial, and
" the most favourable to the commerce of all nations.'* [Definitive Treaty be
tween France and Great Britain, of 30 May, 1814.]

The same stipulation is contained in the Vienna Congress Treaties, and ex~
tended to the Necker, the Mayne, the Mosellej the IVJeuse, and the Scheldt,

172

" the Mississippi precisely as she could have navigated it
" diately after the treaty of 1783; as if her territories extended
" to it, and as if Spain was in entire possession of one of its banks,
" and of a considerable portion of the other. The revival of the
" British right to navigate the Mississippi, would be, under exist-
*' ing circumstances, a new and complete grant to her, measured by
" these circumstances, and thence embracing not only the entire
" freedom of the whole extent of the river, but the unrestrained
" access to it across our territories. If we did not intend this, we
ic intended nothing which Great Britain could accept."

Now observe the amendment to the 8th article of the projected
treaty, as it was proposed on the 1st of December, 1814, and re
jected :

" The inhabitants of the United States shall continue to enjoy the
ct liberty to take, dry, and cure fish, in places within the exclusive
"jurisdiction of Great Britain, as secured by the former treaty of
" peace ; and the navigation of the river Mississippi, within the
" exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, shall remain free and
*' open to the subjects of Great Britain, in the manner secured by the
" said treaty ; and it is further agreed that the subjects of his Bri-
" tannic majesty shall at all times have access, from such place as
ct may be selected for that purpose, in his Britannic majesty's afore-
'* said territories, west, and within 300 miles of the Lake of the
" Woods, in the aforesaid territories of the United States, to the
" river Mississippi, in order to enjoy the benefit of the navigation
" of that river, with their goods, effects, and merchandise, whose
" importation into the said States shall not be entirely prohibited,
" on the payment of the same duties as would be payable on the
"" importation of the same into the Atlantic ports of the said States,
" and on conforming with the usual custom-house regulations."

After reading this, if you inquire how it was possible for Mr. Rus
sell to say, in the passage of his letter immediately preceding it, that
we offered the navigation of the Mississippi to the British otherwise
than as it had beeri secured to them by the treaty of 1783, and that
we offered them unrestrained access to it across our territories ;
the only possible answer to the question will be, that it was neces
sary for his argument to say so ; for the very proposition which he
says was nothing which Great Britain could accept, was the identi
cal proposition which we did make, and which she did not accept.
We did offer, in express terms, and in no others, the navigation, in
the manner secured by the treaty of 1783. We offered the access
to it, restrained to a single point of departure, 300 miles west of
the Lake of the Woods ; restrained to the admission only of goods
not prohibited, to the payment of duties on merchandise admitted,
and to compliance with all the custom-house regulations. Mr. Rus
sell says that it embraced the entire freedom of the whole extent
of the river. And so it did at the peace of 1783 : for it was then
secured to Great Britain, not only by the treaty with the United

173

States, but by her trenties with Spain ; secured indeed in
far more unrestrained than in our proposal ; for by the treaties
with Spain, she was entitled to the passage both in and out of the
mouth of the river, and that none of her vessels should be stopped,
visited, or subjected to the payment of any duty whatsoever. The
right, therefore, which she would have held under the proposal of
1st December, 1814, would have been, so far as our original territo
ry extended, precisely the same as by her treaty with us of 1783 ;
and so far ns related to the territory which had belonged to Spain,
in 1783, infinitely more restricted than it had been under her trea
ties with Spain. Yet under all the advantages of the right as se
cured to her by her treaties with Spain, it never had been of any
•jse to her ; for the simple reason that she had no settlement on the
river. Now, her boundary, as with us, remained, at the negotia
tion of Ghent, precisely the same as it had been agreed upon at the
peace of 1783. She had formed no settlement on the river; but
tehe was entitled by that treaty to a line from the Lake of the Woods
to it. We proposed to her a new line, which would cut her off
from it ; which she offered to accept, with the reservation of the
right to navigate the river. All the change, therefore, between
the right which Great Britain had enjoyed under the treaties of
1783, and that which she would have enjoyed under our proposal
of 1814, was to (he disadvantage of Great Britain, and went to the
annulment of the value to her, even contingent and eventual, of the
right.

The worthlessness to the British of this right of navigating the
Mississippi, had been very distinctly perceived, and clearly pointed
out in the debates, in the British Parliament, on the preliminary
articles of peace of November, 1782. On that occasion, the Earl
of Carlisle said, in the House of Lords :

*' But we keep the navigation of the Mississippi ! and so we might
" say that we keep that of the Rhone or the Rhine. We are not
" possessed, for 3000 miles, of a single acre of its shores : and
*' West Florida, where the Mississippi meets the sea, is by the
" treaty in the hands of the Spaniards. To what sort of under-
" standings is this fallacy addressed, or for what description of ra-
*' tional beings is this delusion calculated V

Lord Walsingham : — " Nothing could be, so absurd as to stipulate
c< for the navigation of the Mississippi, and yet cut off all communi-
w cation with it. What was meant by the navigation of the Missis-
44 sippi, as agreed on in the treaty, he professed he could not tell."

Viscount Stormont — " exposed in glaring colours the folly of
ic stipulating for the navigation of the Mississippi, when every thing
« that could make the Mississippi valuable, was gone. We had no
" coast; there was no junction even with the Lakes ; no commu-
" nication by which we could transport our furs to any market, Iu
*' short, the article for the navigation of the Mississippi was an in-
" suit on our understandings, added to all the injuries done, tn om
" property by the present peace."

174

Viscount Sackville :—" All the forts were on the American side 5
*' the immense district of country which supplied us with masts was
" gone ; the Indian nations were abandoned ; and we were insult-
" ed with the navigation of the Mississippi, when all its benefits
" were taken away."

To all this, the only reply of the minister, the Earl of Shel-
burne, was :

" The navigation of the Mississippi has been reprobated as an
" useless acquisition. Could men seriously assert this ? Was a
" navigation of so many hundred miles up a country where there
" is a call for our manufactures, an useless tiling ? Surely not."

[Hansard's Parliamentary History, vol. 23.

In the House of Commons, lord North said :

** There seems to he a peculiar mockery in the article which
" grants us an eternal and free navigation of the Mississippi, from
" its source to the ocean, in participation with the United States.
" Such is the freedom of the navigation, that where we were not
*' locally excluded, we have effected it by treaty We were ex-
" eluded by the northern boundary. The east is possessed by the
u Americans. The west had been ceded by the peace of Paris to
" the French, who had since granted it to the Spaniards ; and each
" shore, at its mouth, is ceded by the present treaty to Spain. —
<c Where is then this navigation, so free and open, to be commenced 1
" All the possession, I believe, that we shall ever have, will be its
" nomination in this treaty. We must be content with the grant,
" without the possession." p. 451.

Mr. Fox : — " By the boundaries which have been so carelessly
c< prescribed, we have excluded ourselves from the Mississippi ;
" so that we only retain the name, without being able to enjoy its
" possession." p 535,

To these objections, no reply was made in the House of Com
mons. They were all grounded on the very obvious principle that
the mere right of navigating a river from its source to the ocean>
can be of no use to a nation, Caving no settlement on the river ;
yet, at that time, as Great Britain retained a boundary line to the
river, she might have subsequently formed a settlement upon it
which would have given value to the right. At the time of the
treaty of Ghent, thirty years of experience had proved the cor
rectness of those views by which the right of navigating the Mis
sissippi, reserved to the British by the treaties of 1783, had been
represented as merely nominal and worthless ; and by the propos
ed 8th article of the treaty, Great Britain was to abandon her claim
even of ever coming in territorial contact with the river.

Until a better answer, therefore, than this can be given to the
opinion that the proposal offered to the British would have been,
if accepted, of no value to them, and of no injury to us, I shall take
*he liberty to consider it as demonstrated. Nor will it be sufficient

175

for Mr. Russell to say, that he still differs in opinion with me, and
will probably continue to differ in opinion with me, on this point :
for 1 have proved from his o\vn words that his opinion did not
differ from mine, as to the proposal actually made ; and if he does
differ with me now, it is only in as much as he differs with himself.

As to the value, the comparative value of the fisheries to us, with
this admission of a mere naked right in foreigners to travel on one
of our high-ways, constitutionally declared to be forever free to all
the citizens of every State in the Union, I cannot agnin withhold
my surprize that it should be denied, by a citizen of Massachusetts.
If a citizen of Georgia should publish a laborious argument to
prove that the right of cultivating cotton, or a citizen of Louisiana
should maintain that the right of raising sugar, was of no value to
the people of the United States, is it to the derision or to the indig
nation of his country, that his dissertation would prove the most
effectual passport.? And if such an argument should be written,
not as an idle amusement to show with how much ingenuity the
wildest absurdities might be maintained, but as a grave state-paper,
addressed to the supreme authority of the Union, striking directly,
not at the mere theoretical right, but at the actual exercise of it by
the citizens of Georgia or of Louisiana, and directly tending, in con
currence with a foreign power contesting it, to deprive them of it
forever — what would the people of Georgia and Louisiana, what
would the people of the United States, say to such a citizen ? —
Should it further appear, that this very citizen, at the very time of
his composing the work, was a member of a commission specially
charged and instructed to defend and maintain, against the most
formidable of national enemies, the same right, which he was thus
exercising every faculty of his mind irredeemably to destroy ; that
after subscribing his name to a principle containing the last and only
defence of this right, While the contest was yet pending, and he
himself was yet charged with its support, he should contradict his
own signature, exhaust his ingenuity to prove the principle totally
destitute of foundation, and style it the dream of a visionary, to
ridicule one of his colleagues for believing it ; such a rare combi
nation of incidents would doubtless present a moral and political
character to the contemplation of the States most immediately inte
rested in his conduct, and to the Union, which would not soon be
obliterated from their memory.

That which a native citizen of Georgia or of Louisiana would
have done, under the circumstances here supposed, if the right of
cultivating cotton or sugar had been at stake, Mr. Russell, a native
of Massachusetts, has done, in the hour of danger to her fishery.
The Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Gulf of St. Lawrence, and La
brador fisheries, are in nature, and in the consideration both of
jfcheir value and of the right to share in them, one fishery'. To be
cut off from the enjoyment of that right, would be to the people of
Massachusetts, a calamity similar in kind, and comparable in de
gree, with an interdict to the people of Georgia or Louisiana to

176

cultivate cotton or sugar. To be cut off even from that portion of
it which was within the exclusive British jurisdiction in the strict
est sense, within the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and on the coast of La
brador, would have been like an interdict upon the people of
Georgia or Louisiana to cultivate with cotton or sugar three-fourths
of the lands of those respective States. The fisheries of Massa
chusetts are her cotton plants and her sugar canes. She is not blest
with the genial skies, nor gifted with the prolific soil, of southern
climes ; but that which nature has denied to her shores, she has
bestowed upon her neighbouring seas, and to them she is indebted
for copious sources of nourishment and subsistence, if not of opu
lence and splendour, to thousands of her sons.

Of the value of these fisheries, none but general information was
possessed by the American negotiators at Ghent. Their instruc
tions *-ere, not to inquire into their value, but nut to surrender any
part of ihem. After the peace was made, while Mr. Russell was
intent upon his discovery that they were worthless by reason of
incessant fogs and humidities of atmosphere, and straining his dia
lectic powers and his diplomatic erudition, to prove that the right
to them was irretrievably lost, I was impelled by my sense of
duty to seek more particular information of the value both of that
fishery, generally, and of that portion of it, which, by the most re
stricted construction of the notification which we had received,
would be denied us if that notification should be carried into effect.
I obtained it from various sources ; but principally from one of the
most distinguished merchants and statesmen of this Union : and as
it concerns an object of great national interest, I shall publish it,
with some additional observations of my own. It will have the ef
fect of sunshine upon all Mr. Russell's fogs.

Immensely valuable as it will prove these fisheries to be, yet if the
question involved in the article first proposed by Mr. Gallatin had
been such, that ./bile securing to the people of New England the
continued enjoyment of them, it would in any the slightest degree
have unpaired the enjoyment, by the people of the Western
Country, of their right to navigate the Mississippi, the objection to
it would have been serious and great. Could it have affected ma
terially their enjoyment of that right, the objection would have
been insuperable, and Mr. Gallatin never would have thought of
making the proposal. But no such consequence could flow from it.
The people of the West are left by it in the full enjoyment of all
their rights. Nothing was taken from them. But British subjects
from Canada would have been entitled to travel by land or water t»
the river, and to descend in boats to its mouth. They now enjoy
the right as much'as they would have enjoyed it if the article had
been proposed and accepted. The only difference is, that they now
enjoy it, as not prohibited by law, while by the proposed article it
would have been secured to them by treaty.

The objection to Mr. Gallatin's proposed article, therefore, was
&n objection to securing to New England the continued enjoyment

177

of the fisheries, because the price of its purchase would be to per
mit British subjects to travel a highway in the Western Country.
It was impossible to make of it any thing more ; and deeply con
cerned as I felt for the fate of the fisheries, 1 greatly regretted
that the objection was made to it. Not that I expected it would be
accepted by the British plenipotentiaries. 1 too well knew the
value which they set upon the fisheries, and the worthlessness at
which they must estimate the naked right to them of navigating the
Mississippi, to consider it as probable that they would accept the
proposal. But our duty as ministers of the Union, charged with
the defence of all its rights and liberties staked upon the conflict,
and specially instructed not to surrender the fisheries, was to use
even/ fair exertion to preserve them. And Mr. Gallatin's proposal
vvas'one of the only two possible modes of effecting it.

Nevertheless, as a strong and earnest opposition to proposing the
article was made, avowedly founded upon a supposed interest
merely sectional ; after a discussion continued through six succes
sive days, at the last of which only I had taken part, and before the
vote was taken, I did, on the 4th of November, declare myself pre
pared either to propose Mr. Gallatin's article, or to take the ground
that all the rights and liberties in the fisheries were recognised as
a part of our national independence, that they could not be abro
gated by the war, and needed no stipulation for their renewal — to
assert this principle in the note to be sent to the British plenipo
tentiaries, with the project of the treaty 3 and to omit the article
altogether.

Mr. Russell, in the acuteness of his perceptions, discovers an in
consistency between these two opinions, in his letter from Paris,
he charged it as an inconsistency upon the majority of the mission.
In the Boston Statesman he returns to it as an inconsistency of mine.
According to his doctrine, the assertion of a right or liberty, is incon -
Distent with the oiler of a stipulation for its recognition. The first
article of the preliminaries, of November, 1782, was, according to
this doctrine, inconsistent with the Declaration of Independence.
Why stipulate for a right, which you hold by virtue of your own
declaration ? I cannot waste words in refuting such positions as
these. So of the pretended inconsistency of stipulating for the li
berty, leaving the right to the fisheries to rest upon the recognition
in the treaty of 1783. The stipulation offered was co-extensive
with the portion of right contested by the adverse party. There
was no motive tor asking a stipulation for that which they did not
question. If the British plenipotentiaries had not notified to us
that they considered our privileges of fishing within the limits cf
British sovereignty, as forfeited by the war, I never should have
thought of asking a n«w stipulation to secure them. If their doc
trine and Mr. Russell's was right, that the whole treaty of 1783 wyfc
abrogated by the war, and that our only title to the fishing liber
ties was a grant of his Britannic majesty's, in that treaty, which,
i>y the mere existence of war, was totally extinguished, they

J78

under no necessity whatever to give us that notification. They
might have concluded the treaty without saying a word about the
fisheries, and then have told us that they had been forfeited by the
war. But they knew better. They knew that not only war, but
conquest, was necessary to wrest from us any right or liberty recog
nised by them as belonging to us by the treaty of 1783. To accom
plish this conquest, despairing to obtain from us an express renun
ciation by treaty, as they had obtained it from Spain in 1763, they
tried to obtain it by means of our acquiescence in this notification ;
and they made it in indefinite terms, seeming to strike only at the
portion of the fisheries within their most restricted territorial ju
risdiction, but susceptible, if once acquiesced in by us, of a con
struction sanctioned by the whole history and public law relative
to those fisheries, which would deprive us of them all, including
those of the Grand Bank.

The article proposed by Mr. Gallatm covered the whole ground
disputed by the adversary ; and the advantage of it to us, if pro
posed and accepted, would have been, that we should have issued
from the war, with all the fishing rights and liberties, as enjoyed
before it, uncontested. When, therefore, during the discussion,
and before the vote had been taken, I offered to abandon this ad
vantage, and to rest the future defence of the fishing rights and
liberties upon the distinct assertion that they had not been forfeited
or abrogated by the war, by thus resting it, I knew that it would
be necessary to defend them, after the conclusion of the peace —
to defend them against the power, and the policy, and the intel
lect of Great Britain. It was placing them all at the hazard of
future negotiation and another war : and 1 thought I offered a
signal concession, of deference to the mere sectional feelings of
one western member of the mission, by offering to accept the al
ternative. But I felt the most entire confidence in the soundness
of the principle which I asserted. I knew that it was sufficient to
preserve the fishing rights and liberties from surretider. I was
content with it as a fulfilment of our express instructions ; and I
relied upon the determined spirit and active energy of my country
to maintain it after the peace. I had no doubt of the ultimate re
sult, so long as our assent to the British doctrine and notification,
was neither expressed nor implied.

My proposal was not however accepted, until, upon taking the
vote on the question whether the article proposed by Mr. (iallatin
should be offered to the British plenipotentiaries, it appeared there
was a majority of the mission in favour of it. This vote was taken
as has been stated, on the 5th of November ; and on the 7th the
substitute, being the proposition which 1 had suggested on the 4th,
was offered by Mr. Clay, and unanimously accepted. The article
was not proposed to the British plenipotentiaries, nor was the con
sideration of it ever after resumed.

This transaction, therefore, was totally distinct from that of the
and 29th of November : and as it terminated in no act of the

179

mission, was not even mentioned, nor was the remotest allusion to
it made in the joint letter of the mission to the Secretary of State,
of 25th December. It is true, that on the 5th of November, when
the vote upon Mr. Gallatin's offered article was taken, the instruc
tions of 19th October preceding, cancelling the paragraph of the in
structions of 15th April, 1813, cited by Mr. Russell in his duplicate,
although written and on their passage, had not been received ; but
it is equally true, that through the whole discussion preceding the
vote of 5th November, although every objection which an ardent,
profound, and vigorous mind could suggest against the article was
adduced, yet no mention was made of this paragraph of the instruc
tions of 15th April, 18 13. It never was alleged that the article would
violate those instructions ; and if it had been alleged the answer
would have been obvious, that so long as Great Britain retained
a claim to the boundary line to the Mississippi, we could not as-
smme for granted that that river was within our exclusive jurisdic
tion, nor consequently that the instructions of 15th April, 1813, for
bad us from agreeing to a stipulation reserving the right of British
subjects to its navigation. Mr. Russell says, that in my remarks I
admit, at least by implication, that the letter and spirit of the in.
struction of 15th April, 1813, were against the offer. 1 admit
no such thing; but think 1 have proved the contrary. I say that
never, either in the discussions preceding the vote of 5th Novem
ber, 1814, or in those of 28th and 29th November, were the instruc
tions of 15th April, 1813, alleged against the offer : nor did I show
to Mr. Russell at the Department of State, the record of the in
structions of 4th and 19th October, to show that we were released
from the obligation of observing the instructions of 15th April, 1813,
I showed them to him to prove, that in the variations of his dupli
cate, fabricated at Washington in 1822, from his real letter written
at Paris in 1815, he had not only introduced a new charge of ag
gravated crimination against his colleagues, contradicted by the
express words of his real letter, but that he had cited, in proof of
this charge, an instruction, which at the time when the question
was taken, against which he now, speaking as if in 1815, averred,
in contradiction to what he had really said in 1815, that he had
voted, because he thought it violated that instruction, he knew
had been cancelled. I showed them to him to prove, that what he
now alleged as his main motive for voting against the proposition,
had not been and could not have been his real motive : that it was
an invention of 1822, held forth as a narrrtive of facts in 1814.

I trust I have now shown, beyond the reach of reply, that the
same character belongs to what he calls the real history of th"
offer made to the. British plenipotentiaries on the 1st of December,
1814, in contradiction to the summary statement of it which I had
given in my remarks on his letters.

But at the close of Mr. Russell's publication in the Boston
Statesman of 27th June, there is an insinuation, upon which I have.
a word to say, and with which I shall take leave of this part of hi»

180

reply. He says he shall have abundant reason to rejoice, if in di
recting the infirmities of my temper against him, they shall have
been diverted from a course in which they might have been disastrous
to the country. If in the history of my life, or in that of the coun
try, Mr. Russell could allege a single incident, in which the infir
mities of my temper ever have taken a course disastrous to the
country, I should have felt this Parthian shaft to be as deeply tinged
with venom to me, as with bitterness from the heart whence it sped.
But it has fallen short of its mark ; equally harmless to me and
useless to the professed patriotic self-devotion of the archer.

And how stands the account of Mr. Russell ? At the negotiation
of Ghent, he had, as a member of the mission, been instructed, in
terms the most positive and unqualified, not to surrender the fish
eries. In that instruction, no sophistical distinction between a
right in the fisheries held by virtue of our Independence, and a
liberty in the fisheries held by grant from Great Britain, was war
ranted or allowed. No part of them was to be surrendered. And
the instruction was pointed and precise, to break off the negotiation
sooner than surrender them. The British plenipotentiaries had
presented the demard of surrender in such form, that there were
only two possible modes of saving them ; one, to agree to a new-
stipulation recognising them ; the other, to maintain that they had
not been abrogated by the war. A stipulation for a new recogni
tion is offered. Mr. Russell votes against it, because, as he alleges,
it would deprive the western country of an advantage, which they
would otherwise derive from the war. He prefers that the East
should /ose, so that the West may gain, by the result of the war.
lie rejects the proposal which would place both interests on the
fame footing as before the war. The East is his native section of
the Union. But it is a disaffected part of the country : and then —

" Westward the star of empire takes its course."

Well — the other alternative is presented ; to maintain that the
liberties in question were not abrogated by the war. Mr. Russell
subscribes to this : but he now says it was " in the spirit of com
promise, as a PRETEXT to preserve the fishing privilege, and to get
rid of" the other proposition. Subsequently, Mr. Russell assents
to the other proposition itself, and subscribes his name to a letter
declaring that he had no objection to it. But this 100 he now says
was only in deference to the majority, and for fear that if he did
not subscribe, the enemy would accept it. The enemy, however,
despise this equivalent, so extravagant in the eyes of Mr. Russell :
and no sooner is it offered to them than they reject it. The peace
is concluded. The Mississippi navigation is not conceded to the
British ; and the preservation of the fishing liberties to this nation,
depends exclusively upon their maintaining the principle, that
they had not been abrogated by the war. Six weeks after signing
this treaty, Mr. Russell, still commissioned as a member of the
to negotiate a treaty of commerce with Great Britain, lia-

181

ble every hour to be called to a share in that negotiation, and to
the duty of maintaining against British negotiators our fishing liber
ties, deliberately sits down and writes to his government a long
and learned diplomatic discourse to prove, that the fishing liberties
were irretrievably lost ; that there was not a shadow of right to
them remaining ; that the principle upon which he and his col
leagues had staked them at Ghent, was the dream of a visionary ;
that our only title to them was a grant, in the treaty of 1783 ; that
the treaty of 1783 was a dead letter, and that the only possible ex
pedient for us to recover them, was by offering for them an equi
valent, "fair in its comparative value, and just in its relative ef
fects ;" and, as the profoundest of all his discoveries, reveals to
them that this equivalent must be taken " wherever it might be
found."

This letter, Mr. Russell writes, not in cypher ; commits it to
the ocean, before hostilities have ceased ; and exposes it in various
ways to be intercepted by the enemy. It reaches, however, its
destination, after the ratification of the peace, and just about the
time when British cruisers, stationed on the fishing grounds, warn
all American fishing vessels not to approach within SIXTY miles of
the shores. Such is the practical exposition given by the British
government of their meaning in the indefinite notification that they
intended to exclude us from fishing within the limits of British so
vereignty : and that exposition was supported by all the historical
public law applicable to the case, and by the most eminent writers
upon the law of nations. The complaints of the American fisher
men, thus interrupted in their honest industry, and interdicted
from the exercise of it, and the argument of Mr. Russell to de
monstrate the abrogation of the treaty of 1783 by war, and the
consequent discontinuance of the fishing privilege, (as he terms it)
must have been received about the same time, by the Secretary of
State. If the argument had been as successful, as it had been la
boriously wrought, what a happy answer it would have supplied
for Mr. Monroe to the complaints of the fishermen ! What a theme
for the instructions to be given to the American minister at Lon
don, upon this emergency !

But the President of the United States and the Secretary of
State of that day, were no converts to the doctrine of Mr. Russell ;
nor believers in the worthlessness of the fishing liberties The
minister at London was instructed to remonstrate against the inter
ruption of the fishermen, and to maintain the rights of the nation.
A correspondence with the British government ensued, in which
the question as to the abrogation of the treaty of 1783 was tho
roughly discussed. The orders to the British cruisers were partly
disavowed, and partly countermanded. The negotiation was con
tinued until that of the convention of 1818 commenced, and merg
ed in it The British government never formally renounced their
and Mr. Russell's doctrine, that the war of 1812 had abrogated the
treaty of 1783. As little did the government of the United States

23

182

renounce the doctrine, that all their rights and liberties, recognised
by the treaty of 1783, were in full force as if the war of 1812 had
never occurred. The conflict of opinion was adjusted by a new
article, as little liable to be abrogated by a future war, as the treaty
of Independence. By this article, we have expressly renounced
a small portion of the liberties within the exclusive and limited
territorial jurisdiction of part of the British provinces, and have
received in equivalent an enlargement of those liberties on the
coast and shores of Newfoundland. The substance of the contest
has been conceded to us ; and each party has adhered to its doc
trine. Now, if Mr. Russell had been charged with this negotiation
on the part of the United States, as, at the time when he wrote
his letter of 1 1th February, 1815, there was a probability that he
might be, what would have been his situation, and how would this
great interest of his country have stood, if when first ordered to
remonstrate against the interruption of the American fishermen by
British cruisers in 1815, the British government had answered
him by a copy of his own letter, written but six months before at
Paris? To his own situation, perhaps, his memory may furnish
him a parallel, from the feelings with which on the 29th of April
last, he learnt that the original of his letter had been found. But
lor the interest of his country , what had his letter left him the power
to say to the British government, in the case supposed ? For the
maintenance of the liberties of his country, he had disabled his own
pen, and sealed his own lips. He had come forth as the champion
of the cause of their adversary. The fisheries on the banks of
Newfoundland, in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and on the coast of
Labrador, would have been lost to this Union ; lost, by the pre
varications (to use no harsher term) of a NATIVE OF MASSACHU
SETTS. Is this, the man who charges me with infirmities of
temper, which might have taken a course disastrous to my country?

II. Right of the People of the United States to the Fishing Liberties — -
Effect of War upon Treaties, and Treaty Stipulations — Peculiar
character of the Treaty of 1783.

When at the negotiations of Ghent, under an express instruction
from the government of the United States, sooner to break off the
negotiation than to surrender the fisheries ; after a notification from
the British plenipotentiaries that their government " did not intend
" to grant to the United States, gratuitously, the privileges formerly
"granted to them by treaty, of fishing within the limits of the Bri-
^ tish sovereignty, and of using the shores of the British territories,
f( for purposes connected with the fisheries" — I suggested to my
colleagues, as an answer to be given to that notification, that all the
'ights and liberties, in the fisheries, having been recognised by

183

Great Britain in the treaty of 1783, as belonging to the people oi
the United States, none of them had been forfeited or abrogated by
the war; that we needed no new stipulation for their security, and
that we should consider ourselves as much entitled to them after
the peace, without an article concerning them as witii one; and
when my colleagues unanimously, so far as their signatures could
pledge their sentiments, united with me in asserting that principle;
it certainly did not enter into my dreams, that seven years after
wards one of those same colleagues would traduce that doctrine
before the legislative assembly of my country, as equivalent to a
crime of state, and denounce me in the face of the nation, as a
visionary dreamer for believing it.

I first suggested it as an alternative, for an article proposed by
another member of the mission, to be offered for a new stipulation,
recognising again those liberties, fo. an equivalent recognition, of
a similar liberty claimed by the other party, and deducible from
the same principle— I had no objection to that article, because it
offered nothing but what J considered as necessarily flowing from
the principle itself, and because, if accepted, it would not only have
secured the interest, and the liberties in question, but have pre
cluded all future controversy with the adverse party concerning
them. But as one member of the mission had raised very earnest
objections against the article, and as I was anxiously desirous of
conciliating the feelings as well as of protecting the interests of
every part of the Union, I was willing to accept the assertion of
the principle, as a substitute for the stipulation of the article, and
to rest the defence of the interest upon the future firmness and in
telligence of my country.

In the soundness of the principle itself I firmly believed and
still believe : — I had proposed the assertion of it before the vote
upon the question whether Mr. Gallatin's projected article should
be offered to the British plenipotentiaries had been taken. — It was
not then accepted, but after the vote had been taken, and a majo
rity of the mission had resolved to propose the article, my princi
ple was reproduced by Mr. Clay, and by unanimous consent
was substituted for the article which it had been determined to
offer.

The paragraph as it appears in the note of 10th November,
1814, from the American to the British plenipotentiaries, signed
by all the members of the American mission, is as follows :

" In answer to the declaration made by the British plenipoten-
* tiaries respecting the fisheries, the undersigned, referring to what
' passed in the conference of the 9th of x\ugust, can only state
' that they are not authorized to bring into discussion any of the
' rights or liberties which the United States have heretofore en-
'joyed in relation thereto. From their nature, and from the pe-
' culiar character of the treaty of 1783, by which they were re-
'" cognised, no further stipulation has been deemed necessary by

" the government of the United States, to entitle them to the full
"enjoyment of all of them."

As the treaty of Ghent was concluded without any article relat
ing to the fisheries, the only grounds upon which our rights and
liberties in them could be maintained against Great Britain after
the peace, were contained in the principle asserted by this para
graph. They rested, therefore, upon the nature of the rights and
liberties of the people of this Union, in and to those fisheries, and
upon the peculiar character of the treaty recognising them. What
was the nature of those rights and liberties ? And what was the
peculiar character of that treaty ?

The nature of the rights and liberties, consisted in the free par
ticipation in a fishery. That fishery covering the bottom of the
banks which surround the island of Newfoundland, the coasts
of New-England, Nova Scotia, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and
Labrador, furnishes the richest treasure and the most benefi
cent tribute that ocean pays to earth on this terraqueous globe-
By the pleasure of the Creator of earth and seas, it had been con
stituted in its physical nature owe fishery, extending in the open seas
around that island, to little less than five degrees of latitude from
the coast, spreading along the whole northern coast of this conti
nent, and insinuating itself into all the bays, creeks, and harbours
to the very borders of the shores. For the full enjoyment of an
equal share in this fishery, it was necessary to have a nearly ge
neral access to every part of it. The habits of the game which it
pursues being so far migratory that they were found at different
periods most abundant in different places, sometimes populating
the banks and at others swarming close upon the shores. The
latter portion of the fishery had, however, always been considered
as the most valuable, inasmuch as it afforded the means of drying
and curing the fish immediately after they were caught, which
could not be effected upon the banks.

By the law of nature this fishery belonged to the inhabitants of
the regions in the neighbourhood of which it was situated. By the
conventional law of Europe, it belonged to the European nations
which had formed settlements in those regions. France, as the
first principal settler in them, had long claimed the exclusive right
to it. Great Britain, moved in no small degree by the value of the
fishery itself, had made the conquest of all those regions upon
France, and had limited by treaty, within a narrow compass, the,
right of France to any share in the fishery. Spain, upon some
claim of prior discovery had for some time enjoyed a share of the
fishery on the banks ; but at the last treaty of peace, prior to the
American revolution, had expressly renounced it.

At the commencement of the American revolution, therefore,
this fishery belonged exclusively to the British nation, subject to a
certain limited participation in it reserved by treaty stipulations
to France,

185

By an act of parliament, passed in the reign of Edward the sixth,
(1547) the Newfoundland fisher)7 had been declared an unlicensed
fishery, free to all the inhabitants of the realm, and in all the char
ters of the New-England colonies, the rights of fishings, had been
granted, with special reservations of the right of sharing in these
fisheries to all British subjects. The right " to use and exercise
" the trade of fishing upon the coast? of New-England, in any of
" the seas thereunto adjoining, or any arms, of the said seas, or
" salt water rivers, where they have been wont to fish," together
with the power to use the shores, for purposes connected with the
fisheries, was expressly granted much at large, in the last charter
of Massachusetts Bay, as it had been in those that preceded it.
There was a gross mistake, therefore, in the assertion that the
king of Great Britain might have interdicted the enjoyment of these
fisheries to the people of the province of Massachusetts Bay. It
was their birth-right, as British subjects ; it was their special right
as secured to them by charter ; and the British parliament it
self could deprive them of it, as they did, only by one of those
acts which provoked and justified the Declaration of Independence.
In March 1775, the British parliament, passed " an act to restrain
" the trade and commerce of tiie provinces of Massachusetts Bay
" and New Hampshire, and colonies of Connecticut and Rhode-
c Island, and Providence Plantation, in North America, to Great
: Britain, Ireland, and the British islands in the West Indies ; and
" to prohibit such provinces and colonies from carrying on any
"fishery on the Banks of Newfoundland, and other places therein
"mentioned, under certain conditions and limitations."

In moving for leave to bring in this bill, lord North " supported
" his motion by declaring, that as the Americans had refused to
' trade with this kingdom, it was but just that we should not suffer
' them to trade with any other nation. In particular, he said that
' the fishery on tne Banks of Newfoundland, and the other banks,
' and all the others in America, was the undoubted right of Great
' Britain, therefore we might dispose of them as we pleased. That
« although the two houses had not declared all Massachusetts Bay
" in rebellion, they had declared, that there is a rebellion in that
"province. It was just, therefore, to deprive that province of its
"fisheries." Hansard's Parliamentary History, vol. 18, p. 299.

In the debates upon this bill, all the abilities and all the elo
quence of both parties in the British parliament were called forth.
On this bill Mr. Charles Fox said, " that this bill must have been
" calculated to put an end to all that remained of the legislative
" authority of Great Britain over America. That it must be in-
" tended to show to the colonies that there was no one branch of
*' supreme authority which parliament might not abuse in such a
" manner, as to render it reasonable to deny, and necessary to re-
" sist it." Then after enumerating all their previous acts of oppres
sion, he added, " but the British legislature is now to convince the
1 Americans that this power thus used, may be made by fax the

186

" most oppressive, and worse than any of those they had hitherto
" denied. He was quite satisfied, that the bill was meant for no-
" thing else hut to exasperate the colonies into open and direct
" rebellion."

Mr. Burke, pursuing the same idea, and enlarging upon it, applied
to the ministry, who brought forward the bill, the passage from
Macbeth :

" I am in blood

" Stept in so far, that should I wade no more,
" Returning were as tedious as go o'er."

He said " that the scheme was new, and unheard of in any civil-
" ized nation ; to preserve your authority by destroying your domi-
" nions. It was rather the idea of hostility between independent
*• states, where one not being able to conquer another, thinks to re-
** duce its strength gradually, by destroying its trade and cutting oft"
'* its resources."

On the passage of the bill through the house of lords, there
was a protest against it, signed by sixteen peers, among whom are
the names of Rockingham, Camden, and Fitzwiliiam. Among the
reasons of this protest are the following :

" Because the people of New England, besides the natural claim
" of mankind to the gifts of Providence on their own coast, are
" specially entitled to the fishery by their charters, which have
" never been declared forfeited" —

*' Because we conceive that the attempt which has been made to
" bribe the nation into an acquiescence in this arbitrary act, by
" holding out to them (by evidence at the bar,) the spoils of the
" New England fishery, worth upwards of three hundred thousand
" pounds sterling a year, to be a scheme full of weakness and in-
" decency ; of indecency, because it may be suspected that thede-
" sire of the confiscation has created the guilt ; weak, because it
" supposes that whatever is taken from the colonies is of course to
" be transferred to ourselves. We may trample on the rules of
"justice, but we cannot alter the nature of things. We cannot
" convey to Great Britain the advantages of situation which New
" England possesses for the fishery."

But reason and eloquence were vain : the bill, styled by Mr.
Burke " the grand penal bill, which passed sentence on the trade
"and sustenance of America," was sanctioned by the then usual
majorities of both houses of parliament ; and it is thus specially
mentioned among the charges against George the third, in the De"-
claration of Independence : " He has combined with others to sub-
" ject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknow~
" ledged by our laws ; giving his assent to their acts of pretended

" legislation -for cutting off" our trade with all parts of the

" world."

Had Mr. Russell been a member of the Congress of 1776, with
what admiration would that illustrious body have listened to hisdoq \

187

fine that the British sovereign had an absolute unlimited control
>ver the commerce and fisheries of the colonies, and that he needed
nothing more than his maxim of nullum tempus occurrit regi, to cut
ihem off from them, whenever and however he might think proper.

Had Mr. Russell been prime minister of Great Britain in 1775,
with how much easier and speedier a process than by an act of
parliament, would he have cut off the commerce and the fisheries
of the colonies. His doctrine of the royal prerogative, and his
maxim of nullum tempus occurrit regi, would have sufficed, with
a. mere order in council to accomplish the work.

This act of parliament continued in force during the whole war
of the American Revolution ; and as the Declaration of Independ
ence was subsequent to and partly founded upon its enactment,
when the parties came to negotiate the treaty of peace, or rather
the preliminary articles of November, 1782, to which the whole
argument applies, their situations and relative interests, claims, and
principles, were certainly very peculiar. The whole fishery,
(with the exception of the reserved and limited right of France,)
was the exclusive property of the British empire. The right to a
full participation in that property, belonged by the law of nature to
the people of New England, from their locality. Their national
right to it as British subjects, had, as the United States maintained,
been tyrannically violated, but not extinguished ; and, as the other
party to the negotiation asserted, forfeited by their rebellion, and
lawfully taken from them by act of Parliament, the supreme su
perintending authority of the whole empire. It was one of the
questions upon which the war itself had hinged, and in the interval
between the. Declaration of Independence, and the negotiation for
peace, it had been among the subjects of the deepest and most
anxious deliberations of Congress, how this great interest should be
adjusted at the peace. In the second volume of the Secret Jour
nals of the Confederation Congress, recently published, it will be
found, that from the 17th of February to the 14th of August, 1779,
the various questions connected with this interest, formed the sub
ject of the most earnest and continual debates, and the numerous
propositions upon which the yeas and nays were taken, manifestly
show the determination with which they resolved, in no event
whatever, to abandon the right to share in this fishery ; and the
perplexities under which they laboured in deciding, as well whether
it should or should not be made a sine qua non for peace, as how
they should secure the continuance of that portion of the fishery
which, with the boundary line which they ultimately concluded to
accept, would fall within the immediate territorial jurisdiction of
the provinces to remain in British possession.

By the third article of the preliminaries of November, 1782, and
also by the corresponding article of the definitive treaty of 1783J
the whole of the fishing rights and liberties were secured, and re
cognised, as rights and liberties, pre-existing, and not as temporary
grants — the variation of the terms in the article, securing the right

183

to fish on the banks of Newfoundland, in the Gulf of St. Lawrence,
and at all other places in the sea, and the liberty to fish on the coasts
of Newfoundland and the other British provinces, arose only from
the circumstance, that by the same act which recognised these li
berties, (the treaty of peace,) the territorial jurisdiction of those
provinces, which had until then been the same with that of the other
British colonies, became to the United States n foreign jurisdiction.
The continuance of the fishing liberty was the great object of the
article ; and the language of the article was accommodated to the
severance of the jurisdictions, which was consummated by the
same instrument. It was co-instantaneous with the severance of the
jurisdiction itself; and was no more a grant from Great Britain,
than the right acknowledged in the other part of the article ; or than
the Independence of the United States, acknowledged in the first
article. It was a continuance of possessions enjoyed before ; and
at the same moment, and by the same act, under which the United
States acknowledged those coasts and shores as being under a fo
reign jurisdiction. Great Britain recognised the liberty of the peo
ple of the United States to use them for purposes connected with
the fisheries.

This also was the peculiar character of the treaty of 1783, in
which our title was recognised to the rights and liberties in the
fisheries. They had all the qualities mentioned by the authors on
the laws of nations, as appropriate to permanent and irrevocable
acknowledgments :

« Who can doubt," says Vattel, " that the pearl fishery of Bah-
" rem and Ceylon, may not lawfully be enjoyed as property ? And
" though a fishery for food appears more inexhaustible, if a nation
" has a fishery on its coasts that is particularly advantageous, and
" of which it may become master, shall it not be permitted to ap-
" propriate this natural advantage to itself, as a dependence on the
" country it possesses ; and if there are a sufficient number of fish
" to furnish the neighbouring nations, of reserving to itself the great
" advantage it may receive from them by commerce ? But if, so
" far from taking possession of it, it has once acknowledged the com-
" mon right of other nations to come and fish there, it can no longer
" exclude them from it ; it has left that fishery in its primitive free-
" dom, at least with respect to those 'who have been in possession of it.
" The English not having taken the advantage /rom the beginning,
" of the herring fishery on their coast, it is become common to them
"with other nations." Vattel, b. 1, ch. 23, §287.

In the third article of the treaty of 1783, the liberties of the peo
ple of the United States in the fisheries within the British North
American colonial jurisdiction were, in the most rigorous sense of
the words, acknowledged/rom the beginning — for it was by the very
same act, which constituted it, as to the United States, a foreign
jurisdiction.

189

That this was the understanding of the article, by the British go-
vernmont as well as by the American negotiators, is apparent to
demonstration, by the debates in Parliament upon the preliminary
article?. It was made in both Houses one of the great objections
to the treaty. In the House of Commons, lord North, the man who
as minister in 1775, had brought in and carried through the act for
depriving us of the fishery, but who had now become a leader of the
opposition, said : " By the third article, we have, in our spirit of
" reciprocity, given the Americans an unlimited right to take fish
€t of every kind on the Great Bank, and on all the other Banks of
14 Newfoundland. But this was not sufficient We have also given
44 them the right of fishing in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and at all
44 other places in the sea where they have heretofone enjoyed,
44 through us, the privilege of fishing, They have likewise the
44 power of even partaking of the fishery which we still retain.
44 We have not been content with resigning what we possessed, but
" even share what we have left. The United States have liberty
l' to fish on that part of the coast of Newfoundland which British
" fishermen shall use. All the reserve is, that they are not to dry
-' or cure the same on the island, By this grant they are at liberty
4i to take our property, for which we have so long kept possession
44 of the island. This is certainly a striking instance of that liberal
41 equity which we find is the basis of the provisional treaty ! But
44 where shall I find an instance of that reciprocity which is also set
" forth in the preamble ? We have given the Americans the unli-
" mited privilege of fishing on all the coasts, bays, and creeks, of
•4 our American dominions. But where have they, under this
44 principle of reciprocity, given us the privilege of fishing on any
*' of their coasts, bays, or creeks 1 I could wish such an article
" could be found, were it only to give a colour to this boasted reci-
" procity. The advantage we should derive from such an article,
44 cannot be a consideration ; for every real and positive advantage
" to Great Britain seems to have been entirely foreign to the intent
44 and meaning of this peace, in every particular; otherwise I
" should have thought it would have been the care of administra-
" tion not to have given without the least equivalent, that permis-
ci sion which they could never demand as British subjects. I am
(i at a loss to consider how we could grant, or they could claim it,
*; as -i right, when they assumed an independency which has sepa-
44 rated them from our sovereignty."

In this speech, the whole article is considered as an improvident
concession of British property ; nor is there suggested the slight
est distinction in the nature of the grant between the right of fishing
©n the banks, and the liberty of the fishery on the coasts.

Still more explicit are the words of lord Loughborough, in the
House of Peers : " The fishery," says he, 44 on the shores retained
** by Britain, is in the next article, not ceded, but recognised as a
il right inherent in the Americans, which though no longer British
*' subjects, they are to continue, to enjoy unmolesttdt no right on the

190

** other hand being reserved to British subjects to approach their
" shores, for the purpose of fishing, in this reciprocal treaty."

In the replies of the ministerial members to these objections,
there is not a word attempting to contradict them, or hinting at a
distinction in the tenure of the title between the right and the li
berty.

Such was the nature of the rights and liberties of the people of
the United States in the fisheries, and such the peculiar character
of the treaty of 1783, by which they had been recognised. The
principle asserted by the American plenipotentiaries at Ghent ; dis
avowed and combated by Mr. Russell, in his letter of llth Febru
ary, 1815, and now treated by him as the dream of a visionary,
was, that tftese right? and liberties, thus recognised, could not be
forfeited by a war, and that no new stipulation was necessary to
secure them. The whole fishery, as well without as within the
special territorial jurisdiction, had been the common property of
the British empire : so had been the whole territory to which it
had been incidental. By the treaty of separation, the territory
was divided, and two separate sovereign jurisdictions arose. The
fishery bordered upon both. The jurisdictions were marked out
by the boundary line agreed upon by the second article of the
treaty. The fishery was disposed of in the third article. As com
mon property, it was still to be held in common. As a possession,
it was to be held by the people of the United States, as it had beea
field before. It was not like the lands partitioned out by the same
treaty, a corporeal possession, but in the technical language of the
English law, an incorporeal hereditament, and in that of the civil
Jaw, a right of mere faculty, consisting in the power and liberty of
exercising a trade, the places in which it is exercised being occu
pied only for the purposes of the trade. Now the right or liberty
to enjoy this possession, or to exercise this trade, could no more be
affected or impaired by a declaration of war, than the right to the
territory of the nation. The interruption to the exercise of it dur
ing the war, could no more affect the right or liberty, than the oc
cupation by the enemy of territory could affect the right to that.
The right to territory could be lost only by abandonment or renun
ciation in the treaty of peace ; by agreement to a new boundary
line, or by acquiescence in the occupation* of the territory by the
enemy. The fishery liberties could be lost, only by express re
nunciatioa of them in the treaty, or by acquiescence in the princi
ple that they were forfeited^ which would have been a tacit renun
ciation.

I hope it will not be deemed an assertion of infallibility, when I
say, that I present this argument to my country, both as to the na
ture of our rights and liberties in the fisheries, and' as to the pecu
liar character of the treaty by which they were recognised, with a
perfect conviction that it cannot be answered. But if I am mistaken
in that, sure I am, that it never has been answered, either by the
British government or by Mr. Russell,

191

If admitted, it leaves the question, whether the treaty of 1783
was or was not abrogated by the late war ? a mere question of use
less speculation, or of national pride. That British statesmen and
jurists should manifest some impatience, and seize upon any pretext
to cause that treaty to disappear from the archives of their national
muniments, is not at all surprising. That an American statesman
should partake of the same anxiety, is not so natural, though it
may be traced to the same system of public law, by which the com
merce and fisheries of the colonies, before the Revolution, were
supposed to be held at the mere pleasure of the British crown.
It is not necessary to deny that the treaty of 1783 was, as a national
compact, abrogated by the late war, so long as with the assertion
of its being so abrogated, is not coupled the assertion that any one
right or liberty, acknowledged in it as belonging to the people of
the United States, was abrogated with it. But when the British
government or Mr. Russell assert that all the other rights and li
berties acknowledged and secured to the United States by that
treaty, survived its abrogation, except one portion of the properly
in the fisheries, stipulated in one half of one article, I say there i*
nothing either in the nature of the liberty contested, or in the arti
cle by which it is recognised, that will warrant their distinction ;
that the whole treaty was one compact of irrevocable ackno*'iedg-
ments, consummated by the ratification ; and that the thin* article
ia particular, adjusted the rights and liberties of the partis in and
to one common property, of which neither party could ever after
wards divest the other without his consent.

When, therefore, the British government and Mr- ftussell assert,
that war abrogates all treaties, and every article of every treaty,
they have yet proved nothing for their argument 5 they must pro
ceed to affirm, that with the abrogation of th<> treaty by war, all the
rights and liberties recognised in the treatf as belonging to either
party, are likewise abrogated. And he^»n lies the fallacy of their
argument. We ask them, was the acknowledgment of the Inde
pendence of the United States, in tie first article of the treaty of
1783, abrogated by the war of 18^ ? Yes, says Mr. Russell, but
the Independence of the United States rested upon their own de
claration, and not upon the acknowledgment of Great Britain. With
regard to all other nation^, undoubtedly our Independence rests
upon our own Declaration, for they never contested it. But Great
Britain had waged a war of seven years against it, and it was by vir
tue of that article of the treaty alone, that she was bound to acknow
ledge our Independence. And this constituted one of the peculiar
ities of the treaty of 1723. Our treaty with France, of 1 778, con
tained no article stipulating the acknowledgment of our Independ
ence. No such article was necessary with any nation which never
had contested it. But with Great Britain, it was the whole object
of that treaty. All the other articles were merely arrangements ot
detail and adjustments of consequences flowing from the recognition
«f the first article. If the acknowledgment of our Independence,,

192

in the first article of the treaty of 1783, was abrogated by the WAV
of 1812, from the first hour of its declaration by Congress, Great
Britain might have treated us as rebels t as she had done through the
whole war of the Revolution.

Was the boundary line of the treat}?- of 1783 abrogated by the
war of 1812 ? The American plenipotentiaries certainly did not
so consider it, when they spoke of it in one of their notes, as the
line " as it now is." Nor did the British plenipotentiaries so consi
der it, when they demanded the express stipulation of another line,
by the treaty then to be concluded. They claimed it, not because
the boundary of the treaty of 1783 was abrogated, but by the right
of conquest, as a cession of our territory ; and the demand was
resisted on that ground. The articles in the treaty of Ghent,
which refer to the boundary line, do not renew or confirm the arti
cles of the treaty of 1783, which they recite. They refer to
them, as reference is always made to treaties in full force, and
merely add new stipulations for ascertaining the line described by
them, according to the true intent and meaning of that treaty.

If, then, none of the rights, liberties, or possessions, recognised
b> the first and second articles of the treaty of 1783, as belonging
to tte United States, were abrogated by the war of 1812, by what
right, and upon what principle, could Mr. Russell consider the
fishing '^berty, recognised as belonging to them by the third article,
to be entirely at an end, -without a new stipulation for its revival,
The wholt. of the third article, concerning the fisheries, was as
much a recognition of pre-existing rights, liberties, and posses
sions, as the fii^t and second articles. With regard to that identi
cal portion of th% article, which Mr. Russell considers entirely at
an end, the words of ior(j Loughborough, which I have cited, prove
that it was universal! j considered, at the time when the treaty of
1783 was made, as a recognition of existing rights, as much as all
the rest. Mr. Russell say: that the fishing liberty, within exclusive
British jurisdiction, was unnecessary to perfect the jurisdiction of
the United States. What thei.? It was not a perfection of juris
dictions, but a division of common property. The whole fishery
had been the joint property of boti. parties! When the separation
was to be consummated, it was agrted that that property should
still be held in common ; that the people of the United States
should continue to enjoy the right of exercising the faculty upon
the banks and open seas, and should have the liberty of exercising
it in the unsettled bays, creeks, and harbours, where thev had be^
fore exercised it as British subjects, but which were thenceforth to
be within a foreign jurisdiction. There is nothing in the import of
the term liberty, nothing in the limitations expressed in the articlej
nothing in the principles of English law, or of the laws of nations
applicable to fisheries, which can warrant the pretension that this,
more than the rest of the article, or than any other article in the
treaty, was a grant of privilege, revocable at the pleasure of Great
Britain, or forfeitable by war. Mr0 Russell, in his letter, frequent

193

ly -substitutes the term privilege., for that of liberty , which is th«
word used in the article, and the substitution is itself an indication
of weakness in his argument. An eminent English writer mark*
the distinction between the meaning of these words, in the follow
ing manner :

" Liberty, in the general sense, is an unaliennble right, which

" belongs to man as a rational and responsible agent : it is not a

u claim, for it is set above all question and all condition ; nor is :'

" a privilege, for it cannot be exclusively granted to one being, noi

' unconditionally be taken away from another."

Crabb's English Synonymcs — word RIGHT.

Such is the purport of the word liberty, in its general sense j
and by the application of it in the third article of the treaty to the
power which the Americans were to enjoy within the British juris
diction, to carry on the fishery, it is not to be presumed that the
negotiators of the treaty mistook the word, or that they used it as
in any manner synonymous with a privilege.

Were it then true, as Mr. Russell asserts, that war dissolves all
treaties, without exception, and that the treaty of 1783 was totally
dissolved by the war of 1812, it would not follow that the fishing
liberty within British jurisdiction, stipulated by the third article of
the treaty, was abrogated with it. As a liberty existing before the
war, the right to it could not be forfeited by war. The suspension
of its exercise during the war, could no more affect the right, than,
the occupation of territory by the enemy could affect the right to
that.

But the doctrine itself, that war dissolves all treaties, and every
article of ever}r treaty, without exception, is not correct. It has
been very solemnly disclaimed by the United States, in the following
terms of the IMth article of their first treaty with Prussia :

" And it is declared, that neither THE PRETENCE that war dis-
*' solves all treaties, nor any other, whatever, shall be considered
" as annulling or suspending this and the next preceding article ;
" but on the contrary, that the state of war, is precisely that for
•' which they are provided ; and during which they are to be as
** sacredly observed as the most acknowledged articles in the law
" of nature or nations."

Of this treaty, Dr. Franklin and Mr. Jefferson were two of the
negotiators on the part of the United States, and Frederick the se
cond was the sovereign with whom it was negotiated. It not only
contradicts the doctrine that war dissolves all treaties, without ex
ception, but fixes a stigma upon it as a pretence usually resorted to
for the purpose of disguising or of palliating a violation of good
faith.

The pretence that war dissolves all treaties, is itself a remnant of
that doctrine of the barbarous ages, that faith is not to be kept with
enemies, and that no compact made in war is obligatory. The mo~
.dern writers upon the laws of nations, have exploded this opinion.

10 1

and expressly laid it down, that all articles of a treaty made during
war, or having in contemplation the state of war, as that in which
they are to take effect, remain in full force, and are not abrogated
by war. This, therefore, constitutes a large class of articles of
treaties which are not abrogated by war. Another class of arti
cles, equally privileged from such abrogation, are all executed stipu
lations — Cessions of territory, demarcations of boundary, acknow
ledgments of pre-existing rightsand liberties, belong to this class —
and in it are included the first, second, and third articles of the
treaty of 1783.

All articles which have been executed, may indeed be said to be
abrogated by the execution itself. The transaction between the
parties is consummated. In the case of a cession of territory, when
the possession of it has been delivered, the article of the treaty ia
no longer a compact between the parties, nor can a subsequent war
between them operate in any manner upon it.

So of all articles the purport of which is the acknowledgment by
one party of a pre-existing right belonging to another. The en
gagement of the acknowledging party is consummated by the ratifi
cation of the treaty. It is no longer an executory contract ; but a
perfect right united with a vested possession, is thenceforth in one
party, and the acknowledgment of the other is in its own nature irre
vocable. As a bargain, the article is extinct ; but the right of thi»
party in whose favour it was made, is complete, and cannot be af
fected by a subsequent war.

A grant of a facultative right, or incorporeal hereditament, and
specifically of a right of fishery, from one sovereign to another, is
an article of the same description. It is analogous to a cession of
territory, and is in fact a partial and qualified cession. The right
is consummated by the ratification of the treaty. The possession
is vested by the exercise of the faculty. Mere war between the
parties, can neither impair the right of one party nor effect the re-
Tocation of the grant by the other.

So that whether the third article of the treaty of 1783 be consi
dered as an acknowledgment of pre-existing liberties, or as a grant
of them, to be exercised within British jurisdiction, it was in its
nature permanent and irrevocable, liable, under, no circumstances
whatever, to be annulled by the wifl of Great Britain, and capable
of being lost to the United States in no other manner than by their
own express renunciation or tacit abandonment.

I have already cited a passage from Vattel, to show, that when a
nation has once acknowledged the right of other nations to share in
a fishery within its territorial jurisdiction, it can never afterwards
exclude them from it without their consent. What says he of grants
by treaty ?

" Treaties, which do not relate to objects of reiterated occur-
<{ rence, but to transitory, single acts, immediately consummated,
" conventions, compacts, which are accomplished once for all, and
" not, by successive acts, as soon as they have received their exe-

195

** cution, are things consummated and finished. If they are valid,
** they have in their nature an effect perpetual and irrevocable. —
" In like manner, as soon as a right is transferred by a lawful con-
<; vention, it no longer belongs to the state which has ceded it : the
" affair is finished and concluded." Vattel,b. 2, -c/j. 12, § 192.

" But we must not here confound treaties or alliances, which,
" bearing the obligation of reciprocal engagement?, can subsist only
" by the continued existence of the contracting powers, with those"
" contracts which give an acquired and consummate right in.lepend-
i{ ent of all mutual engagement. If, for example, a nation had
"ceded in perpetuity to a neighbouring prince, the right of fishery
" in a river, or that of keeping a garrison in a fortress, Ibis prince,
*'• would not lose his rights, even if the nation from which he re-
" ceived them, should afterwards be conquered or pass in any other
%t manner under a foreign dominion His rights depend not on the
*4 continued existence of that nation : they had been alienated
" by it, and the conqueror could take only that which belonged to
" itself." Felice — Commentary on Burlamaqui, Part 4, ch. 9, § 161.
I trust I have now sufficiently shown, either that the treaty of
1783 was of that class of treaties which are not abrogated by a
subsequent war, between the parties to it, or that if it was so ab
rogated, not one particle of the rights or liberties, stipulated or re
cognised in it, as belonging to the United States, was or could be
abrogated with it, and consequently — that the conclusion of Mr,
Russell's elaborate argument, that the fishing liberty secured to
the United States, by the third article, was entirely at an end, with'
out a new stipulation for its revival, was as unwarranted by any
principle of the laws of nations, as it was pernicious to the liber
ties of his country. Equally groundless and untenable, is the opi
nion that by offering the stipulation in another treaty, the peculia
rity of its character would be lost. The peculiarity consisted as
well in the nature of the liberty, as in the character of the treaty
by which it was secured, as was expressly asserted by the Ameri
can plenipotentiaries ; and the same principles would have applied
to a new stipulation then, and do apply to the new stipulation since
made, as did apply to the third article of the treaty of 1783.
When Mr. Russell says that I appeal to a class of treaties which
are not known to exist, he only proves that it would be well for
him to revise his studies of diplomatic and international law.

The doctrine that all treaties and all rights, acknowledged by
articles of treaties, are dissolved by war, has not always been held
to be sound even by the British government. In the debates in
parliament on the peace of Amiens, lord Auckland said —

" He had looked into the works of all the first publicists on these
•''subjects, and had corrected himself in a mistake, still prevalent
" in the minds of many, who state, in an unqualified sense, that all
*' treaties between nations are annulled by war, and must be spe-
" '•tally renewed if meant to be in force on the return of peace. It

J.96

f< is true, that treaties in the nature of compacts or concession1?,
" the enjoyment of which has been interrupted by the war, and
" has not been renewed at the pacification, are rendered null by
" the war. But compacts not interrupted by the course and effect
" of hostilities, such as the regulated exercise of a fishery on the re-
«« spective coasts of the belligerent powers, the stipulated right of cut-
c< ting wood in a particular district, or possessing rights of territorij
" heretofore ceded by treaty, are certainly not destroyed or injured by

And again : " It is not true that our non-renewal of the Dutch
4t treaties will liberate the ships and vessels of that republic from
** the ancient practice of striking their flag to British ships of war,
^ in the British seas. That practice did not depend on the treaty

'of 1784, nor even on the treaty of Breda, in 1667. Those trea-
*' tics were only recognitions of an existing right. And the treaty ot
•' 1667 expressly stated that the Dutch flag shall be struck in such
l' manner as the same hath been formerly observed in any time
"whatsoever. The same remark would be found applicable to the
"sixth article of the treaty of 1784, by which the States General

k promised not to obstruct the navigation of the British subjects in
*' the eastern seas. That article was no compact or grant ; it was
f' only an acknowledgment of a pre-existing and undoubted right ;
"' and was merely meant as a notice to our merchants that they
" would not be disturbed in the exercise of that right."

Lastly: " He had already stated the incontrovertible principle,
*•' that treaties or compacts, the exercise of which is not interrupt-
" ed by the course of the war. remain in full effect on the return
" of peace. Our privileges in the Buy of Honduras had been given
" in lieu of ancient and acknowledged rights in the Bay of Cam-
•; peachy. Those privileges having been enjoyed without disturb-

' ance during the war, are confirmed and established.

The earl of Carnarvon — a member of the opposition, said in the
same debate :

" It has been nearly admitted by ministers, that former treaties,
" by the omission of renewal, are abrogated : my noble relation
"(lord Grenville) does not go that length, but he thinks we have
" lost our title deeds in most cases, and has affirmed, that we have
"thereby totally lost the gum trade. I am far from thinking any
" of these consequences follow simply from the tacit omission of
" the renewals. War does not abrogate any right, or interfere
" with the right, though it does with the exercise, but such as it
" professes to litigate by war. All the writers on the law of nations
" distinctly affirm, that peace has only relation to the war which it
" terminates, leaving all the former relative situations of the two
** countries as before the war; and that former treaties, though not
" expressly renewed, remain in full effect, if not expressly abro-
" gated in the treaty of peace, or by private consent and acknow
ledgment."

197

* The lord chancellor (Eldon) said that if by the omission of the
« mention of former treaties they were all to be considered as ab-
" rogated, and if the public law of Europe was thus altered, he
" had no difficulty in saying that an address should be voted to his
"majesty praying that he would dismiss his present ministers from
" his councils forever. But he trusted that the fact was far other-
" wise, and that the conduct of ministers deserved no such cen-
" sure."

And afterwards with regard to the right of cutting logwood in
the Bay of Honduras :

" Let it be held in mind, that Honduras became the rightful pro-
" perty of Great Britain by conquest, and was never ceded to
•* Spain, without an acknowledgment , on the part of the court of
" Madrid, of our undoubted right to cut logwood. In proportion.
" as the right of conquest was paramount to the effect of treaties,
" in which that right was not specifically abandoned and resigned,
ts our right to cut logwood in the Bay of Honduras remained more
" secure and free from challenge than it could have done if it had
" been mentioned in the definitive treaty."

And in the debate in the House of Commons, speaking of this
same right of cutting logwood in the Bay of Honduras, lord Hawkes-
bury (the present earl of Liverpool) said,

" The fact is, that right was ceded to us by the Spaniards in
" 1787, in return for some lands that we gave them on the Mus-
" quito Shore ; therefore it is a settlement which we possess of
" right, and to which the Spaniards were as much bound to refer
" in the treaty as we were ; it was, in truth, on our part no ornis-
" sion." Hansard's Parliamentary History, vol. 36, A. D. 1802.

The doctrine of the non-abrogation even of commercial treaties, by
war, has been maintained by British statesmen and lawyers on
many occasions. They have sometimes carried it further than
those of other nations have been ready to admit. Thus in the de
bate of the House of Commons on the definitive treaty of peace of
1783, between France, Spain, and Great Britain, Mr. Fox, al
luding to the renewal in that treaty of the treaty of Utrecht ; and
to the period of two years from the 1st of January, 1784, fixed for
the negotiation of a treaty of commerce, said : " Pending the nego-
" tiation, it was reasonable to suppose the three nations would, in
"commercial transactions, be bound by the treaty of Utrecht : and
" this he imagined was the sense of the British ministers. But sup
posing the two years should expire before the new commercial
" arrangements should take place, a question would naturally arise,
" what would, in this case, become of the treaty of Utrecht ? For
" his part, he was of opinion that the treaty of Utrecht would, in such
" a case, still remain in full force ; but he knew, on the other hand,
" that this had not been the opinion of the courts of Madrid and
" Versailles, the ministers of which contended, that if the negotia-
" tions should end without producing any new commercial arrange-

198

"'fluents, the treaty of Utrecht would, in that case, be compietel}'
" annulled." Hansard's Parliamentary History, vol. 23, p. 1147.

In the year 1686, a treaty was concluded between Louis the 14th
and James the second, regulating the commercial intercourse be
tween the respective subjects and possessions of France and Great
Britain in America. It was known by the denomination of the
Treaty of Neutrality. Two years after its conclusion, occurred the
revolution by which James was expelled from the British throne,
and a war between the two nations, which terminated in 1695, by
the peace of Ryswick. At the commencement of the next cen
tury, broke out the war of the Spanish succession, which, after
raging twelve years, closed in 1714, by the treaty of Utrecht. The
treaty of neutrality had not been specifically renewed or named ,
either by the treaty of Ryswick or by that of Utrecht : yet on the
3d of June, 1728, the attorney and solicitor general, Yorke and
Talbot, gave their official opinion that the treaty of neutrality was
Still in force, and instructions, founded upon its validity, were given
to the governors of the British colonies in America.

In 1741, commenced the war of the Pragmatic Sanction, or for the
Austrian succession, which finished in 1748, by the peace of Aix
la Chapelle — five years after which, the attorney and solicitor gen
eral, sir Dudley Ryder, and Murray, afterwards lord Mansfield/
gave it as their official opinion that the treaty of neutrality of 1686y
was then yet in force.

The same question occurred in 1765, after the close of the se
ven years' war, when the attorney and solicitor general, Norton and
De Grey, gave it as their opinion that the treaty of neutrality was
not then in force ; but the advocate general, sir James Marriott,,
gave it as his opinion that it was, and supported his opinion by an
elaborate, ingenious, and forcible argument.

These opinions are all to be found in the second volume of Chal
mers's Collection of Opinions of Eminent Lawyers, pp. 339 — 355;
and as the result of the whole, Chitty, in his Treatise on the Laws
of Commerce and Manufactures, a work published in 1820, says ;
" It has been considered that a general commercial treaty, not lim-
" ited by its terms to a particular time, is only suspended by a war,
" and, that upon the return of peace, it will tacitly revive, by
"implication, unless there be an express declaration to the con-
"trary." Chitty, p. 45.*

By the concurrent testimony, therefore of the writers upon the
laws of nations, and of the most eminent British statesmen and
lawyers of the present age, the general position that war abrogates
all treaties, and the particular inference from it, that by the abro
gation of treaties, the rights or liberties stipulated in them are con •

* For the references to these British authorities, relative to the effect of war,
upon treaties, and treaty stipulations, I have to acknowledge rny obligation
to a learned and ingenious friend, a member of the Senate of the Unite ;
States,

199

-equently discontinued, are both utterly destitute of foundation. 1
have been the more anxiously earnest in the developement of this
demonstration, because the error of Mr. Russell, both as to the
principle and its consequence, is by no means confined to him. In
the above extracts it will appear, that it was entertained by lord
Auckland himself, until called upon in the deliberations upon the
peace of Amiens, to examine thoroughly the doctrines of the wri
ters on the laws of nations relating to the subject. Be the opinion
of Mr. Russell what it may, the portion of the fisheries to which
we are entitled, even within the British territorial jurisdiction, is
of great importance to this Uniofi. To New-England it is among
the most valuable of earthly possessions. But the whole fishery
of the Banks, and in the adjoining seas, is at stake, upon the prin
ciples of Mr. Russell : by his doctrine we now hold it at the breath
of Great Britain ; for, by a declaration of war, she can extinguish
it forever. The foundations of the Union itself are shaken by
this opinion. If the fisheries of New-England are held at the
pleasure of Great Britain, one of the main purposes of the Union
to the people of New-England is taken away. So long as Great
Britain holds a preponderating power upon the ocean, whenever
a war between her and the United States may occur, this greafc
interest of New-England will be the first to suffer, and in the most
distressing manner. If, besides the endurance of this peculiar hard
ship which is unavoidable, New-England is to be told that her liber
ties in the fisheries themselves, are nothing but voluntary donations
of Great Britain, which she has a right to resume, on the first firing
of a gun, the^vital interests of New-England are not on the same foot
ing of protection, by the Union, as those of its other portions. In the
relative proportions of power and influence between the different
sections of the country, New-England will behold, without envy
and without regret, her sisters of the South and of the West, rising
to pre-eminence in wealth, population, and 'resources over herself.
But never again let her be told, and least of all by one of her own
sons, that her riglits, tier liberties, or her possessions, are of trifling
or insignificant value to the nation, and that at the first sound of a
hostile trumpet they will be abandoned to the mercy of the com
mon enemy ; or surrendered to the desperate chance of a repur
chase for an equivalent wherever it may be found.

In my remarks on Mr. Russell's letter, 1 expressed the hope,
that from the whole history of this transaction, the statesmen of this
Union would take warning through all future time, in their conflicts
with foreign powers never to consider any of the liberties of this
nation as abrogated by a war, or capable of being extinguished by
any other agency than our own express renunciation. Mr. Russell
takes alarm at this lest the implicit renunciation by the British of
the right to navigate the Mississippi should not be sufficient — and
he says, that according to me, that right is unimpaired. Mr. Rus
sell's conclusion, as usual, is broader than his premises. He might
have seen that the object of my remark was to give warning to the

200

statesmen oi' this Union, never to permit or abet the extinguish
ment of any of our liberties, by abandonment or surrender, which
would be tacit renunciation. It was no purpose of mine to s*y that
our liberties could not be so extinguished. On the contrary, it was
precisely because after the notification of the British plenipoten
tiaries on the 9th of August, 1814, our fishing liberties would have
been tacitly renounced, had we quietly acquiesced in it, that I deem
ed the counter notification in the note of 10th November, or a new
stipulation in the treaty indispensable to save those liberties from
extinction. It was precisely because Mr. Russell had not only
been prepared to surrender them, but so eager to prove them al
ready extinct, that I thought it necessary to give this warning to the
statesmen of my country, never hereafter to follow his example.
It was that counter notification, which saved our liberties (and our
rights too) in the fisheries. Had the negotiation with Great Bri
tain since the peace, been for the repurchase of liberties acknow
ledged by ourselves to be extinct, a very different equivalent must
have been given for them, from the naked right of navigating the Mis
sissippi. The liberties of this Union will never be capable of being
extinguished otherwise than by express renunciation, so long as the
public servants to whom the defence and protection of them may
be committed, are duly determined never to surrender them by im
plication. The incapacity of surrender is not in the liberty itself,
but in the soul of its defenders.

As to the right of the British to the navigation of the Mississippi,
they have not only renounced it, by their concurrence with Mr.
Russell that the treaty of 1783 was abrogated by the war, but by
stipulating anew boundary line, which cuts them off from all claim
to territory upon the river, without reserving the right to its navi
gation. They have abandoned both the grounds of their claim to
it — territorial contiguity and treaty stipulation ; and an effectual
guard against it, more effectual indeed than any renunciation, is that
while they have no territory upon its borders, they never can have
any interest in reviving it. Their very advancing any claim to it
at Ghent, was an inconsistency with their doctrine that the treaty of
1783 was abrogated by the war, and as they really had no interest
worth a straw in the claim, they finally abandoned it, to redeem
their consistency. They, like Mr. Russell, were willing enough to
adopt one principle tor operation upon their own claims and its op
posite principle, to affect the claims of their adversary ; but as the
object of their claim was of no real value, they finally preferred to
abandon their claim, rather than formally to renounce their doc
trine.

But there is one object which to Mr. Russell, as a member of
Congress, seems to present matter for very serious consideration.
If the navigation downwards of the Mississippi, by British subjects,
with merchandise on which the duties have been paid, and subject
to all the custom-house regulations, is a power of such tremendous
consequence to the Union, and especially to the unoffending inha-

201

\

bitants of the Western Country ; if it surrenders them all to British
smugglers, British emissaries, and the tomahawk of the Indian sa
vage, why has it never been prohibited by law ? How has the arm
ef the Union been palsied? Why has the guardian and protecting
power of the national government so long slumbered ? There was
nothing proposed to be stipulated by the offer made to the British
plenipotentiaries on the first of December, 1814, which British sub
jects do not at this hour possess, and have never ceased to enjoy,
without any stipulation whatsoever. By the act of Congress admitting
the State of Louisiana into the Union, it is provided " that it shall be
*' taken as a condition upon which the said State is incorporated in
" the Union, that the river Mississippi, and the navigable rivers and
" waters leading into the same, and into the Gulf of Mexico, shall be
" common highways, and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of
" said State as to the inhabitants of other States, and the territories
*' of the United States, without any tax, duty, impost, or toll, there-
*' for, imposed by the said State." That which is a common high
way, free to all the citizens of the United States, by this act, and by
the constitution of the State of Louisiana, is in point of fact equally
free to all foreigners at peace with the United States, and conse
quently to British subjects. It can be prohibited only by law, and
no such law is in existence.

It will be observed that the right of navigation offered by Mr,
Gallatin's proposal, was only that of descending the river, from its
source to the ocean. It did not bind us to admit them to a right of
ascending the river, from the sea, or to allow their vessels to pass
above the first port of entry in the river.

It remains only to be shown, that the estimates of Mr. Russell,
with regard to the value of the fishing liberties, are as erroneous, as
his opinions with regard to our title to them are incorrect.

202

HL Fishing Liberties — their Valut.

OF all the errors in Mr. Russell's letter of 1 1th February, 181 £,
to the Secretary of State, there is none more extraordinary in its
character, or more pernicious in its tendency, than the disparaging
estimate which he holds forth of the -value of the liberties in the
fisheries, secured by the treaty of 1733, and, as he would maintain,
extinguished, by the war of 1812. Not satisfied with maintaining
in the face of his own signatures at Ghent, the doctrine that all right
to them had been irredeemably extinguished by the war ; not con
tented with the devotion of all his learning and all his ingenuity, to
take from his country the last and only support of right upon which,
this great interest had, by himself and his colleagues, been left at
ihe conclusion of the peace to depend ; not ashamed of urging the
total abandonment of a claim, at that very time in litigation, and of
•which he was himself one of the official defenders, he has exhausted
his powers, active and meditative, in the effort to depreciate the
value of those possessions, which, while committed to his charge,
he was so surprisingly intent upon relinquishing forever.

His first attempt in this patriotic career, is to represent this in
terest as a merely sectional and very trifling concern, brought in
conflict at Ghent with another but a much greater and deeper inte
rest of a different section of the Union.

His next endeavour is to represent it as an exclusive interest of a
few individuals, the mere accommodation of a few fishermen, annu
ally decreasing in number.

And, finally, he degrades the value of the object itself, by affirm
ing that the fogs in the high northern latitudes prevented the effectual
curing of the fish, and that this liberty was totally unnecessary to us
for subsistence or occupation, and afforded in no way, (in the du
plicate he says in nohonest way,) any commercial facility or political
advantage.

It is scarcely possible to render a greater disservice to the peo
ple of this Union, than in their controversies with foreign powers*
to array the interests of one section of the Union against those of
another. On no occasion can this be so dangerous as when the
power, with whom the negotiation is held, has the purpose of wrest
ing from us the enjoyment of such a possession, the immediate in
terest of which is confined to one section ; and 1 confidently affirm,
that never since the existence of the United States as an independ
ent nation, has there been an emergency upon which there was less
reason for flinging into the discussion this torch of dissension, thnn
at the negotiation of Ghent. The aim of tbe enemy was at the fish
eries. His object was to deprive us of them. The American ple
nipotentiaries were instructed not to surrender them. What more
could the enemy desire, than to excite within the American mission
itself, a sectional interest adverse to that of the fisheries ? He did
so ; and so far as Mr. Russell dared to indulge his disposition, mo?*

203

successfully. Had Mr, Russell been in (lie mission of Great Bri
tain instead of that of the United States, he could not have perform
ed a more zealous and acceptable service, than by maintaining the
doctrines of his letter of llth February, 1815. As to the object
at issue, it was their argument that he urged. As to the spirit he
excited, it was their interest he was promoting. Excellent indeed
would have been the account to which they would have turned
their right of navigating the Mississippi, if, at the very moment while
they disclaimed it, they could have obtained for its renunciation,
that of these United States to their fishing liberties. Besides the
immense disproportion of what they would have gained by the ex
change, they would have planted in the heart of the Union, a root
of bitterness which never could have been plucked up but with
its blood. Had the fisheries been surrendered — when the people
of New-England came to inquire where were their liberties m
them, and how they had been lost ? what would their feelings have
been to be told — they were lost, that we might gain the right offer-
bidding British subjects from descending the Mississippi river in
boats ? With what human endurance would they have heard it said,
We have lost nothing, upon the whole. You, indeed, have lost
your fisheries — but we have acquired the right of interdicting all
Englishmen from travelling a highway in the Western Country.—
It was not in the power of man to devise an expedient better suited
to detach the affections of the people of New-England from the
Union, or to fill their bosoms with heart-burning and jealousy
against the people of the West.

I have already shown that the importance which Mr. Russell
strains to the utmost ail his faculties to give to this British right of
navigating the Mississippi, is all founded upon a mis-statement of
what it was. He begins by saying that it would be absurd to sup
pose that the article meant no more than what it expressly purport-
ed to mean ; and then he infers that it would have been understood
to mean the same thing as the third article of the treaty of 1794 ;
and as the free access, both of intercourse and of trade with the In
dians within our territories, which that had given to the British, had
caused inconveniences to us, which had been mentioned in the in
structions of 15th April, 1813, he infers that all the same evils
would have flowed from the continuance of their right to navigate
the Mississippi. No such inference could have been drawn from
the article. The article was precisely what it purported to be, and
no more ; and if, under colour of it, British subjects had ever at
tempted to give it a greater extension, it would always have been
entirely in the power of the American government to control them.

It is the first common-place of false and sophistical reason
ing, to mis-stale the question in discussion ; and Mr. Russell, after
making this, without reason or necessity, a question of one sectional
interest against another, changes the nature of the question itself,
for the double purpose of magnifying the Wostorn, and of diminish

204

ing the Eastern interest, which he has brought in conflict with each
other.

I have shown that the proposal actually made to the British ple
nipotentiaries, was, hy the admission of Mr. Russell himself, so
worthless, that it was nothing that they could accept ; as in fact it
was not accepted by them. Let us now see what was the value of
this fishery ; this *« doubtful accommodation of a few fishermen,
annually decreasing in number."

From the tables in Dr. Seybert's Statistical Annals, it will be
seen that in the year 1807, there were upwards of seventy thou>
sand tons of shipping employed in the cod fishery alone ; and that
in that and the four preceding years, the exports from the United
States of the proceeds of the fisheries, averaged three millions of
dollars a year. There was indeed a great diminution during the
years subsequent to 1807, till the close of the war — certainly not
voluntary, but occasioned by the state of our mnritime relations
with Europe, by our own restrictive system, and finally by the
war. But no sooner was that terminated, than the fisheries reviv
ed, and in the year 18 1G, the year after Mr. Russell's letter was
written, there were again upwards of sixty-eight thousand tons,
employed in the cod fishery alone. From Dr. Seybert's state
ments, it appears further, that in this occupation the average of sea
men employed is of about one man to every seven tons of shipping,
so that these vessels were navigated by ten thousand, of the har
diest, most skilful, soberest, and best mariners in the world. —
•c Every person (says Dr. Seybert,) on board our fishing vessels,
" has an interest in common with his associates ; their reward de-
;t pends upon their industry and enterprise. Much caution is ob-
" served in the selection of the crews of our fishing vessels : it often
" happens that every individual is connected by blood, and the
'* strongest ties of friendship. Our fishermen are remarkable for
" their sobriety and good conduct, and they rank with the most
c; skilful navigators."

Of these ten thousand men, and of their wives and children, the
cod fisheries, if I may be allowed the expression, were the daily
bread — their property — their subsistence. To how many thou
sands more were the labours and the dangers of their lives subser
vient ? Their game was not only food and raiment to themselves,
but to millions of other human beings.

There is something in the very occupation of fishermen, not
only beneficent in itself but noble and exalted in the qualities of
which it requires the habitual exercise. In common with the cul
tivators of the soil, their labours contribute to the subsistence of
mankind, and they have the merit of continual exposure to danger,
superadded to that of unceasing toil. Industry, frugality, patience,
perseverance, fortitude, intrepidity, souls inured to perpetual con
flict with the elements, arid bodies steeled with unremitting action,
ever grappling with danger, and familiar with death : these are
the properties to which the fisherman of the ocean is formed by

205

the daily labours of his life. These are the properties for whid
he who knew what was in man, the Saviour of mankind, sought,
his first, and found his most faithful, ardent, and undaunted disci
ples among the fishermen of his country. In the deadliest rancours
of national wars, the examples of latter ages have been frequent
of exempting, by the common consent of the most exasperated ene
mies fishermen from the operation of hostilities. In our treaties
with Prussia, they are expressly included among the classes of men
"whose occupations are for the common subsistence and benefit of
mankind;''' with a stipulation, that in the event of war between
the parties, they shall be allowed to continue their employment
without molestation. Nor is their devotion to their country less
Conspicuous than their usefulness to their kind. While the hunts
man of the ocean, far from his native land, from his family, and
his fire-side, pursues at the constant hazard of life, his game upon
the bosom of the deep, the desire of his heart, is by the nature of
his situation ever intently turned towards his home, his children,
and his country. To be lost to them gives their keenest edge to his
fears ; to return with the fruits of his labours to them is the object of
all his hopes. By no men upon earth have these qualities and disposi
tions been more constantly exemplified than by the fishermen of
New-England. From the proceeds of their >; perilous and hardy
industry," the value of three millions of dollars a year, for five
years preceding 1808, was added to the exports of the United
States. This was so much of national wealth created by the fish
ery. With what branch of the whole body of our commerce was
this interest unconnected ? Into what artery or vein of our politi
cal body did it not circulate wholesome blood ? To what sinew of
our national arm did it not impart firmness and energy ? We are
told they were " annually decreasing in number :" Yes ! they had
lost their occupation by the war ; and where were they during the
war ? They were upon the ocean and upon the lakes, fighting the
battles of their country. Turn back to the records of your revo
lution — ask Samuel Tucker, himself one of the number ; a living
example of the character common to them all, what were the fish
ermen of New-England, in the tug of war for Independence ? Ap
peal to the heroes of all our naval wars — ask the vanquishers of
Algiers and Tripoli — ask the redeemers of your citizens from the
chains of servitude, and of your nation from the humiliation of
annual tribute to the barbarians of Africa — call on the champions
of our last struggles with Britain— ask Hull, and Bainbridge, ask
Stewart, Porter, andMacdonough, what proportion of New-England,
fishermen were the companions of their victories, and sealed the
proudest of our triumphs with their blood ; and then listen if you
can, to be told, that the unoffending citizens of the West were not
at all benefited by the fishing privilege, and that the few fisher
men in a remote quarter, were entirely exempt from the danger.

But we are told also that " by far the greatest part of the fish
f«ken by our fishermen before the present war, was caught in tho

206

open sea, or upon our own coasts, and cured on our own shores."
This assertion is, like the rest, erroneous.

The shore fishery is carried on in vessels ofless than twenty tons
burthen, the proportion of which, as appears by Seyhert's Statisti
cal Annals, is about one seventh of the whole. With regard to
the comparative value of the Bank, and Labrador fisheries, I sub
join hereto, information collected from several persons, acquainted
with them, as their statements themselves will show in their mi
nutest details.

At an early period of the negotiation, I had been satisfied, that
the British plenipotentiaries would not accept the renewal of the
8th article of the treaty of 1783, (the Mississippi navigation) as an
equivalent for the renewal of the third, (the fisheries.) In the
correspondence which followed their notification at the first con
ference, that their government did not intend to grant the former
fishing liberties without an equivalent, they had even dropped
their claim for an article renewing their right of navigating the
Mississippi, until we met their pretension that the fisheries had
been forfeited by the war, which we first did in our note of the 10th
of November, 1814. The principle upon which I had always re
lied, was, that the rights and liberties recognised in the 3d article
of the treaty of 1783, had not been abrogated by the war, and
would remain in full force after the peace, unless we should re
nounce them expressly by an article in the treaty, or tacitly by
acquiescing in the principle asserted by the British plenipotentia
ries. There was a period during the negotiations, when it was
probable they might be suspended, until the American commis
sioners could receive new instructions from their government,
After the peace was signed I was aware that the question relating
to the fisheries, must become a subject of discussion with the Bri
tish government; and I had been previously informed by the Se
cretary of State, that if the negotiation should result in the con
clusion of peace, it was the President's intention to nominate me
for the subsequent mission to Great Britain. I felt it, therefore,
to be peculiarly my duty to seek the best information that I could
obtain, in relation both to the rights and liberties in the fisheries,
as recognised in the treaty of 1783, and to their value. The fol
lowing are extracts of two letters written by me from Ghent, to one
of the negotiators of the treaty of 1783. By attending to the dates
it will be seen, that the first of them was written three days before
the first proposal by Mr. Gallaiin, of the article relating to the
Mississippi and the fisheries, and the second, two days after the
signature of the peace.

Ghent, 27th October, 1814.

" My dear sir : The situation in which I am placed, often brings
to my mind that in which you were situated in the year 1782, and
1 will not describe the feelings with which the comparison, or 1
might rather say, the contrast affects me, 1 am called to support

207

the same interests, and in many respects the same identical points
and questions. The causes in which the present war originated,
and for which it was on our part waged, will scarcely form the most,
insignificant item in the negotiation tor peace. It is not impress
ment and unalienable allegiance, blockades and orders in council,

colonial trade and maritime rights, or belligerent and neutral colli
sions of any kind that form the subjects of our discussion. It is the
boundary, the fisheries, and the Indian savages.

" It is nothing extraordinary but a strong evidence of the real
character of the contest in which we are engaged, that the most
offensive and inadmissible of the British demands are pointed
against the State of Massachusetts. It is a part of her territory
of which they require the cession, and it is the fisheries of her
citizens which they declare themselves determined no longer to
allow. It is not the general right to the fisheries which they con
test, but the liberty of fishing and of drying fish within their juris
diction, stipulated in the 3d article of the peace of 1783. For my
own part, I consider the whole article as containing parts of the
general acknowledgment of our Independence, and therefore, as
needing no renewal by any future treaty. But as the subject will
certainly come under the consideration of the government of the
United States, they will have time to give instructions founded upon
their view of it, before any peace can be concluded. There is no
doubt, whenever the negotiation is resumed, that this point will be
come again a subject for discussion. If there is among your papers
relating to the negotiations of peace in 1782 and 1783, any infor
mation tending to elucidate the third article of those treaties which
you can communicate to me, it may perhaps serve a valuable pur
pose to the public. And as this letter contains more than I should
at this moment think myself warranted to communicate even to
you, but for the particular motive which occasions it, I must re
quest of you to consider it as entirely confidential.

" Ghent, 26th December, 1814.

** My dear sir : I transmited by Mr. Hughes a duplicate of my last
letter to you, dated 27th October, which 1 siill entreat you to an
swer, if lam destined to a longer continuance in Europe, and upon
which I ask all the advice and information which it may be in your
power to bestow. It relates principally to the subject of the great'
est difficulty we have had in the negotiation, and that, which of all
others, is left in the state the most unsatisfactory to us and particu
larly to me. It has been now for a full month ascertained, that
unless new pretensions on the part of Great Britain were advanced,
a treaty of peace would be signed ; but it was not until last Thurs
day that I ceased to doubt whether it would receive my signature.
The British plenipotentiaries had declared to us at the outset of
the negotiation, that it was not the intention of the British govern
ment to grant to the people of the United States in future the li
berties of fishing, and drying, and curing fish within the exclusivr

British jurisdiction without an equivalent. There is, as you
remember, in the third article of the treaty of 1783, a diversity of
expression by which the general fisheries on the Banks are ac
knowledged as our right, but these fishing privileges within the
British jurisdiction, are termed liberties. The British govern
ment consider the latter as franchises forfeited ipao facto by the
war, and declared they would not grant them anew without an equi
valent. Aware that by this principle they, too, had forfeited their
right to navigate the Mississippi, recognised in the same treaty of
1 783, they now demanded a new provision to secure it to them again*

" We were instructed not to suffer our right to the fisheries to be
brought into discussion ; we had no authority to admit any discri
mination between the first and the last parts of the third article of
the treaty of 1783. No power to offer or agree to an equivalent
either for the rights or the liberties. I considered both as stand
ing on the same footing : both as the continuance of franchises al
ways enjoyed, and the difference in the expressions only as arising
from the operation of our change from the condition of British
subjects to that of a sovereign people, upon an object in one part of
general, and in the other of special, jurisdiction. The special ju
risdiction had been that of our own sovereign : by the revolution
and the treaty of peace, it became a foreign, but still remained a
special, jurisdiction. By the very same instrument in whi<;h we
thus acknowledged it as a foreign* jurisdiction, we reserved to our
selves with the full assent of its sovereign, and without any limitation,
of time or of events, the franchise which we had ahvays enjoyed
while the jurisdiction had been our own.

" It was termed & liberty because it was a freedom to be enjoyed
within a special jurisdiction ; the fisheries on the Banks were
termed rights because they were to be enjoyed on the ocean, the
common jurisdiction of all nations ; but there was nothing in the
terms themselves and nothing in the article or in the treaty imply
ing an intention or expectation of either of the contracting parties,
that one, more than the other, should be liable to forfeiture by a
subsequent war. On the maturest deliberation I still hoid this ar
gument to be sound, and it is to my mind the only one by which
our claim to the fisheries within British jurisdiction can be main
tained. But after the declaration made by the British government,
it was not to be expected that they would be converted to this
opinion without much discussion, which was forbidden to us, and
the result of this must have been very doubtful upon minds at all
times inclined, and at this time most peculiarly prone, rather to
lean upon power than to listen to reason. We stated the genera1;
principle in one of our notes to the British plenipotentiaries, as
the ground upon which our government deemed no new stipulation
necessary to secure the enjoyment of all our rights and liberties
in the fisheries. They did not answer that part of our note; but
they came to ask a stipulation for the right of British subjects

209

to navigate the Mississippi, we objected, that by our construction
of the treaty of 1783, it was unnecessary. If we admitted tbeii1
construction of that treaty, so as to give them a new right to the
navigation, they must give us an equivalent for it. We offered
an article recognising the continuance of the rights on both sides ;
this offer met, however, with very great opposition among our
selves — for there were two of us against making it, and who thought
the navigation of the Mississippi incomparably more valuable than
the contested part of the fisheries. Not so did the British govern
ment think ; for they, instead of accepting it, offered us an article
stipulating to negotiate hereafter for an equivalent to be given by
Great Britain for the right of navigating the Mississippi, and by the
United States for the liberties of the fisheries within British juris
diction. This was merely to obtain from us the formal admission
that both the rights were abrogated by the war. To that admission
I was determined not to subscribe. The article was withdrawn
ta*t Thursday by the British plenipotentiaries, who accepted our
proposal to say nothing in the treaty about either, and to omit the
•jrliele by which they had agreed that our boundary west from the
Lake of the Woods should be the 49th parallel of north latitude*
They at the same time referred again to their original declaration,
that the fisheries within British jurisdiction would not hereafter be
granted without an equivalent. It is evident that it must be the
subject of a future negotiation. The only thing possible to be done
now, was to preserve our whole claim unimpaired, and with that I

consented to sign the treaty.

•" As a citizen of Massachusetts, I felt it to be most peculiarly HIV
duty not to abandon any one of her rights, and I would have refused
to sign the treaty had any one of them been abandoned : but it was
impossible to force a stipulation in favour of the fisheries ; and for
a temporary possession of Moose Island, merely until it shall be as
certained whether it belongs to her or not, we could not think of

continuing the war.

" My colleagues propose to leave Europe about the first of
April, in the Neptune, which is waiting for them at Brest. I have
great satisfaction in saying, that our harmony has been as great and
constant, as perhaps ever existed between five persons employed
together upon se important a trust. Upon almost all the important
questions, we have been unanimous. J. Q. A.'5

The information requested in these letters was collected, and
transmitted to me, and received at Londen in the summer of 1815,
The material parts of it are contained in the following papers, th«
first of which is from a letter of James Lloyd, Esq. to my corres
pondent, and is now published with Mr. Lloyd's permission. It
was written in consequence of the communication to him of the
above letter from me, and, as will be seen by its date, within four
weeks after tUat of Mr. Russell's letter to Mr. Monroe from Paris.

210

" Boston, 8th March, 1815,

64 Sir : In a former note, returning the letter with which you
had so obligingly favoured me, I had the honour to offer you my
congratulations on the termination of* the war, without waiting to
know what were the grounds of the treaty which concluded it ;
because, from the tenor of the previous correspondence, and my
personal knowledge of nearly all the commissioners, 1 felt a reli
ance that the arrangement would not be a dishonourable, although
I acknowledge my rejoicing was mingled with fear least it should
be, at least in some points, a disadvantageous, one ; and this expres
sion of feeling I volunteered with the more readiness, as the intelli
gence was received at a moment when the national character had
been splendidly illustrated by the recent achievement at New-
Orleans.

" But I greeted the occurrence with smiles, principally not be
cause I expected it would bring or restore to us all the benefits we
possessed under former treaties, but because I saw no chance, but
from this source, of happier prospects for the future. It was not,
however, the storm that howled along the lakes, or upon the sea
board, that created the apprehension of an instant for the fate of the
contest, but it was the hidden fire that was rumbling within our own
bosoms, and which, under the continuance of the war, would, I be
lieve, have made our country the theatre of domestic convulsions,
as well as of foreign warfare, and perhaps from its effects have of
fered up some parts of it as no very difficult prey to the mercy of
the enemy.

" On this head, I know, sir, you had better hopes, and thought
differently from me ; and I have now only to say, I am glad the ex
periment has never come to issue.

'* As the price of the purchase of an escape from evils portentous
as these, I considered it as probable that the English government
might claim from us the contested eastern islands, and interdict all
trade between us and her colonial possessions ; and possibly still
further, that she would endeavour to extort from us the coast fishe
ries around her own shores ; for, on the magnanimity or friendship
of Great Britain, or of any other nation, in matters of interest, I
confess I never had the ability to lash my imagination into any sort
of dependence ; but I did also cherish the belief that none of our
essential or important rights or liberties would be diminished or sur
rendered. Of the latter, the one of the greatest consequence in
reference to its intrinsic value, and as derived from discovery and
possession, and confirmed by a formal treaty stipulation, is unques
tionably that to which you have referred — the coast fisheries on the
Shores of the British possessions in North America.

*' These fisheries, as most advantageously secured to the United
States by the treaty of 1783, and made at the time, as 1 have always
understood, a sine qua non of that treaty, offer an invaluable fund
of \vealth and power to our country ; one which has never been
duly attended to, nor justly appreciated, but which, if continued

;md improved, was destined to grow with our growth and strengthen
with our strength.

" The prosecution of these coast and bay fisheries, although it
had already become extremely advantageous, had undoubtedly
reached, in a very small degree, the extension and importance it
was capable of attaining. The unsettled state of the commercial
world for the past twenty years, and the more alluring objects of
mercantile enterprise which such a state of things evolved, seemed,
in point of immediate consideration and attention, to throw these
fisheries into the back ground ; but still, until first checked by the
system of embargoes and restrictions, and finally stopped by a de
claration of war, the} were silently, but rapidly, progressing, and
reaching an importance which, though generally unknown to iur
country and its statesmen, had become highly alarming to the go
vernments and more wealthy merchants of the provinces, and was
beginning to attract the attention and jealousy of the cabinet of
Great Britain towards them.

'* The shores, ihe creeks, the inlets of the Bay of Fundy, the Bay
of Chaleurs, and the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the Straits of Bellisle,
and the Coast of Labrador, appear to* have been designed by the
God of Nature as the great ovarium offish ; — the inexhaustible re»
pository of this species of food, not only for the supply of the Ame
rican, but of the European continent. At the proper season, to
catch them in endless abundance, little more of effort is needed than
to bait the hook and pull the line, and occasionally even this is not
necessary. In clear weather, near the shores, myriads are visible
and the strand is at times almost literally paved with them.

" All this was gradually making itself known to the enterprise
and vigilance of the New-England fishermen, and for a few seasons
prior to the year 1808, the resort to this employment had become
an object of attention, from the Thames, at New-London, to the
Schoodic ; and boats and vessels of a small as well as a larger size,
were flocking to it from all the intermediate parts of the United
States. In the fishing season, at the best places for catching the
cod, the New-England fishermen, I am told, on a Sunday, swarmed
like flies upon the shores, and that in some of these years, it pro
bably would not make an over estimate to rate the Lumber of vessels
employed in this fishery, belonging to the United States, at from
1500 to 2000 sail, reckoning a vessel for each trip or voyage, and
including the larger boat fishery ; and the number, if the fisheries
were continued > would shortly be still further and very greatly ex»
tended.

** The nursery for seamen, the consequent increase of power,
the mine of wealth, the accumulation of capital, (for it has been
jus(Jy observed, that he who draws a cod fish from the sea, gives a
piece of silver to his country,) the effect upon the trade and cus
tom of Great Britain, and the corresponding advantages to the
United States, of which the enlargement of such an intercourse
wa? susceptible, (for the stock of fish appears inexhaustible,) you

212

are much better able to conceive than I am to describe ; but I with
pleasure point them anew for your consideration, as on many ac
counts presenting one of the most interesting public objects to which
it can be directed.

Lucrative, however, and imposing in its individual and national
bearings, as this fishery was and was to become, it was little known
to the leading men of our country, and little spoken of by others,
even in Massachusetts, or among those who were actually engaged
in it, and a knowledge of its existence in any thing like its real
extent, or future capability, was perhaps confined to not more than
half a dozen heads, (if so many,) in the whols of the Southern and
Western, and even Middle divisions of the Union.

" The causes of its value and importance not being a matter of
great notoriety here, are obvious ; it was an employment not only
in the fishery, but in many instances undoubtedly in trode, with
the British inhabitants ; those who were engaged in it made no un
necessary promulgations of their employment, while the poorer in
habitants of the provinces, tasting equally its sweets and advan
tages, were alike disposed to keep silence with regard to it ; but not
so situated were the provincfal governments, and the more wealthy
of the merchants of the sea-port towns. They had become highly
alarmed at the expansion of this fishery and trade ; jealous of its
progress and clamorous at its endurance; they, therefore, of late
years, have repeatedly memorialized the government in England,
respecting the fisheries carried on by the Americans, while the
whole body of Scottish adventurers, whose trade both in imports
and exports, and control over the inhabitants it curtailed, have
turned out in full cry and joined the chorus of the colonial govern-
ments'in a crusade against the encroachments of the infidels, the
disbelievers in the divine authority of kings, or the rights of the
provinces, and have pursued their objects so assiduously that at
their own expense, as I am informed from a respectable source, in
the year 1807 or 8, they stationed a watchman in some favourable
position near the Straits of Canso, to count the number of American
vessels which passed those straits on this employment ; who re
turned nine hundred and thirty eight as the number actually ascer -
tained by him to have passed, and doubtless many others, during
the night or in stormy or thick weather, escaped his observation ;
and some of these addressers have distinctly looked forward with
gratification to a state of war, as a desirable occurrence, which
would, by its existence, annul existing treaty stipulations, so inju
rious, as they contend, to their interests and those of the nation.
With what degree of correctness this expectation has been enter
tained, the future must determine ; but unfortunately these mur-
niurs and complaints reached England, and were industriously cir
culated about the time that our restrictive measures awakened an
unusual and critical attention to the commercial connection between
the two countries, and probably the value and importance of this
branch of it is now at least as fully understood and appreciated ou
the eastern as xm the western side of the Atlantic,

213

'* Carried away by first impressions, a large part of mankind be
come not unfrequently the dupes of misconception, and adhere to
their opinions with a pertinacity proportioned to the time they have
entertained them. From a source something like this, it has been,
and is generally, I might almost say, universally, believed, by the
mass of our countrymen, that the right of fishing on the Banks of
Newfoundland, or as it is properly called, the Grand Bank, was the
great boon acquired, as it respected the fisheries, by the treaty of
1783, while unquestionably the fisheries on the Banks of New
foundland no more belonged exclusively in possession or the right
of control either to Great Britain or the United States, than the air
of Heaven is the patent property of both or either of them, with
power to dole out its use to such other nations as agree to conform
to the stipulations they may please to prescribe for its enjoyment.
If any thin" was gained or secured on this head, it undoubtedly was
the Coast Fisheries, on the shores of the British provinces. This
is the fishery which will now come under discussion, at least, if not
into contest, between the two countries. It is highly important that
correct ideas of its value and extent should be entertained, and per
haps these could not be more perspicuously traced than by taking
a relative view of it, compared with the importance of the Bank
Fishery. This I will now briefly attempt ; confident, (hat if in do
ing it I should be reiterating to you the communication of facts of
a knowledge of which you are already acquainted, the motive will
bring along with it its own sufficient apology.

" The Batik Fishery is carried on in vessels generally from 70 to
00 tons burthen, and manned with eight or ten men each. They
commence their voyages early in March^ and continue in this em
ployment until the last of October, in which time they make two,
and sometimes three, fares to the United States, bringing their fish
home to be cured. The produce of these trips, if successful, after
paying the shoresmen the expense of making or curing, generally
furnishes a sufficient quantity of dried fish to load the vessel for
Europe. These vessels employed in fishing require cables of
from 160 to 180 fathoms in length. They must always keep their
sails bent to the yards, so as to be ready, in case of accident to the
cable, or any of those adverse occurrences to which tempests or the
casualties incident to anchoring nearly in mid-ocean, must expose
them. They purchase salted clams for bait, which they procure at
considerable expense, and take with them from the United States.
They fish night and day, when the fish bite well, which is not always
the case, and haul their cod in a depth of water from 45 to 55 fa
thoms. After catching, they head and open the fish, and place
them in the hold, in an uncured, and consequently, in some degree,
in a partially perishing state ; and after having obtained a fare, or
freight, return with it to the United States, to be cured or dried and
prepared for exportation ; but before this is done, or they can be
landed, the fish is always more or less deteriorated, becomes soft
jpr, and part of'it makes an inferior quality of fish, called Jamaica

2H

fish, and the proportion of this Jamaica fish is much greater than it
would have been had the fish been dried and cured shortly after
having been taken, as is the case with the Coast and Bay Fishery ;
in addition to which, these vessels employed in the Bank Fishery
are unavoidably obliged to prosecute this business with a great
comparative expense, as to the wear and tear of their vessels, and
loss of time, and with an increased degree of hazard, both as to
safety and success.

" The Coast and Labrador Fisheries are prosecuted in vessels of
from 40 to 120 tons burthen, carrying a number of men, according
to their respective sizes, in about the same proportion as the ves
sels on the Bank Fishery. They commence their voyages in May,
and get on the fishing ground about the 1st of June, before which
time bait cannot be" obtained. This bait is furnished by a small
species of fish called capling, which strike in shore at that time,
and are followed by immense shoals of cod fish, which feed upon
them. Each vessel selects its own fishing ground, along the coasts
of the Bay of Chaleurs, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the Straits of
Bellisle, the Coast of Labrador, even as far as Cumberland Island,
and the entrance of Hudson's Bay, thus improving a fishing ground
reaching in extent from the 45th to the 68th degree of north latitude,

" In choosing their situation, the fishermen generally seek some
sheltered and safe harbour, or cove, where tliey anchor in about
six or seven fathoms water, unbend their sails, stow them below, and
literally making themselves at home, dismantle and convert their ves
sels into habitations at least as durable as those of the ancient Scy
thian?. They then cast a net over the stern of the vessel, in which
a sufficient number of capling are soon caught to supply them with
bait from day to day. Each vessel is furnished with four or five
light boats, according to their size and number ot men, each boat
requiring two men. They leave the vessel early in the morning,
and seek the best or sufficiently good spot for fishing, which is fre
quently found within a few rods of their vessels, and very rarely
more than one or two miles distant from them, where they haul the
fish as fast as they can pull their lines, and sometimes it is said that
the fish have ]3een so abundant, as to be gaft or scooped into the
boats, without even a hook or line ; and the fishermen also say that
the cod fish have been known to pursue the capling in such quan
tities, and with such voracity, as to run in large numbers quite out
of water on to the shores. The boats return to the vessels about
nine o'clock in the morning, at breakfast, put their fish on board,
salt and split them ; and after having fished several days, by which
time the salt has been sufficiently struck in the fish first caught, they
carry them on shore and spread and dry them on the rocks or tem
porary flakes. This routine is followed every day, with the addi
tion of attending to such as have been spread, and carrying on board
and stowing away those that have become sufficiently cured, until
the vessel is filled with dried fish, fit for an immediate market,
which is generally the case by the middle or last of August^ am'.

with which she then proceeds immediately to Europe, or returns
to the United States ; and this fish, thus caught and cured, is es
teemed the best that is brought to market, and ibr several years pre
vious to that of 1808, was computed to furnish three fourth parts of
all the dried fish exported trom the United States. This fishery
was also about that time taking a new form, which would have had
a double advantage, both in point of profit and extension ; for some
of our merchants were beginning to send their large vessels to the
Labrador Coast, and its vicinity, to receive there, from small fishing
boats they employed or purchased from, cured fish, to load their
vessels with immediately for Europe, thus saving so great an ex
pense in getting the fish to market abroad, as would in a short tiirn*
have given our merchants a command of the European markets,
and would have also afforded an encouragement to a small but very
numerous boat fishery, which, from receiving the pay for their la?-
hour on the spot, could not fail to have been greatly excited and in
creased, and enabling the persons concerned in the exportation
from the coast, to receive at home the proceeds of their adventures
from abroad, about as early as the bank fish could have been put
into a state fit to he exported from the United States ; in addition to
which, we were prosecuting a very productive salmon and inacka-
rel fishery, in the same vicinity, as most of the pickled fish we had
received for some years prior to the war were caught on those
shores.

" This Coast Fishery, then, most highly important and invaluable
as I think it must be admitted to be, even from the foregoing hasty and
imperfect sketch of it, merits every possible degree of attention and
effort for its preservation on the part of the government of the
United States. The refusal of the British commissioners to re
new or recognise the stipulation of the treaty of 1783, respecting
it, and the notification, I hope not formally given, that it would not
hereafter be permitted without an equivalent, are alarming indica
tions in reference to the future peaceable prosecution of this fish
ery, and of the dispositions of the British government with regard
to it.

" The difference of expression used in the third article of the
treaty of peace of 1783, as to the right of fishing on the Banks of
Newfoundland, and the liberty of fishing on the coasts of the Bri
tish provinces in North America, however it might have originated,
affords a diversity of expression which, in the present instance,
will be seized, and be made to give the partizans of Great Britain
and of the provinces a popular colour of justice in support of their
arguments, when they contend, as I think they probably will do,
that in so important a compact the variance of language could not
have been a matter of accident ; that if precision in the use of
terms in their most literal sense is any where to be expected, it is
rertainly to be looked for in an instrument which is to form the
paramount law between two nations, whose clashing interests have
brought them into collision ^ and which is generally framed by men

216

of the most distinguished talents of each party, the acutetiess of
whose conceptions is always kept in full play by the contending
pretensions they have respectively to consult and sustain ; and that
therefore a distinction was made, and was intended to be made, at
the time of the negotiation between a right derived from the God
of nature, and to be exercised on the common field of his bounty, the
great high- way of nations; and the liberty, permission, or indulgence,,
as they will term it, to continue the exercise of an employment on
the coast at the very doors, and within the peculiar and especial
jurisdiction, ot another nation : the one according to this doctrine
being a right inherent and not to be drawn in question, the other
a sufferance open to modification or denial altogether subsequently
to a war, according to the will or the interests of the party origin
ally acceding to it.

" The liberty, for the expression of the treaty in the discussion
between the two nations must be admitted, whether it operate ad
versely or favourably to us, rests for its own continuance either as
we assert on the ground of right as an anterior possession and a
perpetual franchise, or as the British will contend on the existence
of the treaty of 1783. The first ground to be supported on the
view taken of it in your own letter and in that which you had the
goodness to communicate to me, and even on the second, admitting
pro forma that a declaration of war does ipso facto abrogate all
previous treaty stipulations brought into contest by it, unless tacitly
or expressly renewed by a new treaty to be an acknowledged prin
ciple of international law, still the right in question could, 1 be
lieve, rest untouched and unaffected, although I know not with
what degree of decision or determination the negation of a future
use of the coast fisheries was brought forward in the negotiations
at Ghent by the British commissioners. But while on the one
hand the coupling the offer to treat for a renewal of the liberty of
the coast fisheries for an equivalent with a proposition to treat for
a renewal of the right of the free navigation of the Mississippi,
also for an equivalent, unless, as has been suspected, they were
made with the insidious purpose of obtaining an admission that both
had already ceased to exist, shows the confidence they would wish
to appear to entertain in the soundness of their position, that the
war had extinguished both the right and the liberty ; forthe former,
the free navigation of the Mississippi, if force of language and repe
tition are to have any weight, could not well have been placed on a
stronger basis, it being very expressly and explicitly contracted for
in the treaty of 1783, recognised in that of 1794, and again men
tioned in a provisional article in 1796, still on the other hand, the
omission in the new treaty to state that the treaty of 1783 had ex
pired or been annulled, and a reference having been made to it ii>
several instances, is a yet stronger evidence that they did consider
that treaty as remaining in existence and of consequence, entitled
to respect and observance in all such of its provisions as had not
been specially contravened in the new treaty-

217

" A liberty was recognised by the treaty of 1783, for the inha-1
bitants of the United States to prosecute the fisheries on the coasts
of British Nortli America, with the exception of the island of
Newfoundland, not only where the parties had been accustomed to
use them, but where British fishermen not only did but might
thereafter (that is subsequently to the date of the treaty) prose
cute them, and this right, for it had now become a right of liberty
or use, demanded by the one party and admitted and acknowledged
by the other, was wholly without limits as to its duration, and
could then only cease or the limitation take effect on the happening
of one of three events, that is, the surrender of the party possess
ing the right and the annulment of the treaty which confirmed it,
or by an usurped and unjustifiable exercise of power on the one
part in defiance of the rights of the other, and in violation of those
common principles of good faith which can alone regulate the in
tercourse between nations ; but the surrender of the right has not
been made by the United States, and the treaty of 1783 has not
been annihilated by the existence of the war, because the parties
have not only not agreed to abrogate it, but have expressly refer
red to it, and in the treaty of Ghent made a provision to carry the
stipulations as to boundaries of the treaty of 1783, more fully and
completely into effect : now it being an uncontroverted principle
of the law of evidence, that the whole must be admitted if a part
is received, unless some reciprocal and mutual agreement exists td
the contrary, and as no such stipulation does exist in the present
case, the treaty of 1783, is, as I should contend, even by the show
ing of the British commissioners themselves, still in existence,
with all the rights and liberties incident to it, with the full and free
use to the inhabitants of the United States of the fisheries, as for
merly recognised and secured to the United States by that treaty,

"This is the construction, whether to be supported on this
ground or any other, which I hope the government of our country
will maintain. It is a right most highly important to the eastern
section, and, indeed, to the present and future naval and commercial
power of the United States ; and should the British ministry or the
colonial authorities attempt to interdict this fishery, as I think they
now will, to the inhabitants of the United States, the government
ought, and I trust will, take the most prompt and effectual measures
to obtain and enforce a renewal or recognition of this right as it has
heretofore existed. It is a gem which should never be surrendered,
nor can it ever be abandoned by any statesman, alive to the inter
ests ot his country : compared in its consequences with a free right;
of navigating the Mississippi, it is even a much more unequal stake
than would be " six French rapiers imponed against six Barbary
horses."

" The right of navigating the Mississippi, since the acquisition
of Louisiana and the possession of both sides of the river by the
United States, and when the difficulties of the ascending naviga
tion are considered, and the jealousy and inconvenience which the

218

subjects of Great Britain must experience from attempting to avail
of it, can be of little value to her, except as in its higher branches
and on the Missouri, it may facilitate the prosecution of the fur
trade. This trade, however, although it employs a large number
of persons, never has been very important to the nation, and must
from the operation of unavoidable causes, gradually lessen, and in
the course of a few years probably recede altogether from the
great rivers. She has, therefore, notwithstanding the opinion of
two of the American commissioners and her own probable preten
sions of fairness given up nothing in point of value compared with
the fisheries, which, upon the same ground, she is undoubtedly de
sirous of fortifying herself in withholding.

" In compliance with the intimation you had given me, 1 have
commented on this subject at much greater length even than I had
contemplated at the outset, perhaps, too minutely when I recollect
that a part of it at least must be much better understood at Qiiincy
than by myself, but the account of the recent state of these fish
eries and the mode in which they were prosecuted, I thought might
not be unacceptable to you. My information with regard to them,
has in general been derived from respectable sources upon which
I can rely, never having had any direct interest or concern in
the fisheries myself. I have not attempted to apply the principles
of public law to the question respecting them, because the few
books of this description which I possess, are still at Washington ;
and since the rising of the council, I have not had time to make any
research elsewhere, and because I presume this part of the busi
ness will be placed under the hands of those who will have both
the means and the ability to do it ample justice.

" I had intended also in reference to the treaty of 1314, to have
made some few remarks upon the interdiction it may occasion, of a
trade between the United States and the British ports in India, and
on its operation upon the contested boundary on our North Eastern
frontier, so far as regards the right of possession to the Islands of
Dudley, Moose, and Frederick, in the Bay of Passamaquoddy. I
have, however, already so unduly trespassed on your patience, that
f will only not omit them altogether. Both these objects attach
to them some importance, but compared in point of value with the
possession of the fisheries, perhaps in a ratio not much greater
than the bullion in the mint at Philadelphia would be to the ore in
the mines of Peru.

*' Feeling persuaded that in avowing the hope that all these ob
jects may be disposed of in such a manner as best to confirm the
rights and secure the interests of the United States, I shall unite
fully in sentiment with yourself.

" I have the honour to remain, sir, with great consideration, your
very respectful and obedient servant,

" JAMES LLOYD."

219

The following letter from a very respectable merchant, con-
crncd himself in the fisheries, contains further interesting de
tails—

Boston, May 20th, 1815.

" Dear sir : Argeeably to your request to me, 1 have endeavour
ed to obtain every information in my power relative to our fisheries
in this and the neighbouring States, with their tonnage, number of
men employed, quantity of fish caught, quantity of salt used,
and the probable price they averaged at foreign markets. As I
was not acquainted with this business before our revolutionary war,
( shall endeavour to give you a statement from the year 1790 to
1810 ; to some my account may appear large or much exaggerated;
but I have conversed with several gentlemen who have been large
ly concerned in the business, and two of them took much pains
1o ascertain the number, etc. some time since ; and I find they go
far beyond me ; but 1 shall endeavour to give you as correct a state
ment as I can, and wish it may prove satisfactory to you.

" Your humble servant."

"My calculation is, that there were employed in the Bank, La-
brador, and Bay fisheries, the years above mentioned, 1232 vessels
yearly, viz. 584 to the Banks, and 648 to the Bay and Labrador. I
think the 584 Bankers may be put down 36, 540 tons, navigated by
4,627 men and boys, (each vessel carrying one boy,) they take and
cure, annually, 510,700 quintals offish ; they average about three
fares a year, consume, annually, 81,170 hhds. salt, the average cost
of these vessels is about $ 2,000 each ; the average price of these
fish at foreign markets is $ 6 per quintal ; these vessels also make
from their fish, annually, 17,520 barrels of oil, which commands
about $ 10 per barrel, their equipments cost about $ 900, annually,
exclusive of salt.

" The 648 vessels that fish at the Labrador and Bay, I put down
48,600 tons, navigated by 5,832 men and boys ; they take and cure,
annually, 648,000 quintals of fish ; they go but one fare a year ;
consume, annually, 97,200 hhds. of salt. The average cost of these
vessels is about g 1600 ; the cost of their equipments, provisions,
etc. is 1050 dollars : those descriptions of vessels are not so valu
able as the bankers, more particularly those that go from the Dis
trict of Maine, Connecticut, and Rhode-Island, as they are mostly
sloops of no very great value ; most of these vessels cure a part
of their fish where they catch them, on the beach, rocks, etc. and
the rest after they return home ; several cargoes of dry fish are
shipped yearly from the Labrador direct for Europe. The usual
markets for those fish are in the Mediterranean, say Alicant, Leg
horn, Naples, Marseilles, etc. as those markets prefer small fish/
and the greatest part of the fish caught up the bay and Labrador
are very small. The average price of these fish at the market
'hey are disposed of i«= $5 : th<??e ves^ds also rr>3ke from thr-ir fish

220

about 20,000 bbls. of oil, which always meets a ready sale arid at
handsome prices, say from $ 8 to $ 12 per barrel, the most of it is
consumed in the United States.

<l 1232 vessels employed in the Bank, Bay, and Labrador fisheries,
measuring Tons, 85,140

Number of men they a^e navigated by, 10,459
Number of hhds. salt th"y consume, 178.370 hhds.
Quantity of fish they take and cure, 1,1 5ft, 700 quintals.
Barrels of oil they make, 37,520 barrels.

" There are also a description of vessels called jiggers or small
schooners of about from 30 to 45 tons that fish in the South Chan
nel, on the Shoals and Cape Sables, their number 300, they carry
about 4 or 5 hands, say 1200 men, and take about 75,000 qtls. of
fish, annually ; consume 12,000 hhds. of salt, and make about 4,000
barrels of oil ; their fish is generally sold for the West Indies and
home consumption.

" There are another description of fishing vessels commonly cal
led Chebacco Boats or Pink Sterns ; their number 600 ; they are
from 10 to 28 tons, and carry two men and one boy each, say 1,800
hands ; they consume 15,000 hhds. of salt, and take and cure
120,000 quintals of fish, annually. These fish also are wholly
used for home and West India market, except the very first they
take early in the spring, which are very nice indeed, and are sent
to the Bilbao market, in Spain, where they always bring a great
price ; they make 9,000 barrels of oil ; these vessels measure abom.
10,800 tons.

" There are also about 200 schooners employed in the mackerel
fishery, measuring 8,000 tons, they carry l,tiOO men and boys, they
take 50,000 barrels, annually, and consume 6,000 hhds salt.

" The alewive, shad, salmon, and herring fishery is also immense,
and consumes a great quantity of salt.

f% Whole number of fishing vessels of all descriptions 2,332
Measuring Tons, 115,940

Number of men navigated by, 15,059

Salt they consume, 265,370 hhds.

Quantity of fish they take and cure, 1,353,700 quintals.
Number of barrels of oil, 50,520 barrels.

Number of barrels of mackerel, 50,000 barrels,

" There are many gentlemen assert, and roundly too, that one
year there were at the Labrador and Bay, over 1,700 sail beside
the bankers ; but I feel very confident they are much mistaken, it
is impossible it can be correct."

These papers will suffice to show what reliance is to be placed
on that information concerning the value of the fishing liberties, as
they had been enjoyed by the people of the United States from
the peace of 1783, to the war of 1812, which Mr. Russell in his
letter from Paris, of llth February, 1815, says is the best infor
mation he can obtain ; but which, in the duplicate of 1822, he di-

221

lates into the best information which he and his colleagues at Ghent
could obtain, and thus represents as the information upon which
they as well as he had acted. It may be proper to refer also to
documents, showing, 1. The extent of the interest in the fisheries
of which the British government intended at the negotiation of
Ghent, to obtain from the United States the tacit or implied surren
der. 2. The value of this interest as estimated, by British autho
rities.

The instructions from the Secretary of State to the American
commissioners at Ghent, commanding them in no event to surren
der the fisheries, but if such surrender should be insisted on to break
off the negotiation, were dated the 24th of June, 1814. By a singular
and fortunate coincidence of events they were received on the
evening of the 8th of August, the very day upon which the British
plenipotentiaries had notified to us the intentions of their govern
ment not to grant the liberties in the North American fisheries,
which, as they stated, had been granted by the treaty of 1783.

In the 6th volume of Nile's Register, p. 239, under date of the
llth of June, 1814, there is a memorial of the merchants and prin
cipal resident inhabitants interested in the trade and fisheries of
Newfoundland, to admiral Keats, who had been some time governor
of that island, and was then about returning to England. It was
dated 8th November, 1813, and in the Register was preceded by
the following remarks, which serve to indicate the popular feeling
of the time.

From Niles's Register of llth June, 1814. — The Fisheries.

" The following memorial has excited considerable interest, par
ticularly in the eastern States, so far as we have heard of its pro
mulgation, I cannot doubt, from the high ground assumed by Great
Britain since her victories on the continent, but that she will at
tempt to exclude us from the fisheries as the grand nursery of her
seamen, etc. This opinion is strengthened by hosts of " Extracts
of Letters from England" Let those who have calculated on the
" magnanimity" of Great Britain look to it ; those who have ex
pected nothing of her justice " are blessed for they shall not be
disappointed."

" The Boston Centinel says this memorial is alarmingly interest
ing. It was borne to England by admiral Keats^ the late governor
of Newfoundland, who has promised to give it his support."

" JVo peace without the fisheries" has begun to be the cry. If pa
triotism has failed, we are pleased to see that interest is about to
unite the people ; and I am very much mistaken in the character
of the ' middle' and ' south' if their representatives shall for a mo
ment abandon the one iota of the rights of the ' eastern' population,
however perverse it naay have been to the views of an immen^
majority of our citizens. If we * pull together'' all will be well.

28

222

Extracts from the Memorial of the Newfoundland Merchants to Admiral Kea!??
8th Nov. 1813.

" Conceiving that our existence as a great and independent nation
must chiefly depend upon our preserving the sovereignty of the
seas, the policy of excluding France and America from the advan
tages those nations have heretofore enjoyed in the times of peace,
in this fishery, must be evident to every man of observation en
gaged in this branch of commerce.

** By former treaties with France and the United States of Ame-
rica* these powers were allowed certain privileges on those shores,
banks, coast of Labrador, and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, in the
opinion of your excellency's memorialists highly impolitic, and
which the wisdom of the British government never would concede
except under very peculiar circumstances.

" Fifteen hundred American vessels have been known to be
prosecuting the fishery at one time on the Labrador coast, bringing
with them coffee, teas, spirits and other articles of contraband.

" The intercourse of our fishermen with these secret enemies
of Britain, has an effect not less fatal to their moral character than
to our fishery. The small planters and catchers of fish which
make the great body of the people on the coast of Labrador under
the influence of notions imbibed by their daily intercourse with
men whose interests are at war with ours, become dissatisfied with
their supplying merchants who are unable to meet their foreign
competitors upon equal ground. The next step, as experience
shows, is the neglect of the only means in their power to discharge
their debts, disobedience and insubordination follow, and finally,
their minds become alienated from their own government, and they
emigrate to another, to the great loss of their country.

" In times of peace, besides, the citizens of the United State*
resort, in great numbers, to the Banks, where they anchor in vio
lation of express stipulations to the great annoyance of this valua
ble branch of the Newfoundland trade. Nor is it possible that the
strictest vigilance is often able to detect them in the breach of such
stipulations.

" The evils growing out of impolitic concessions to insidious
friends, are more exteusive than your excellency's memorialists
have yet stated ; they accompany our commerce into the markets
of Europe and the West-Indies.

" In the United States, men, provisions, and every other article
of outfit are procured upon much better terms than the nature of
things will admit with the British. These combined advantages en
able them to undersell the British merchant in the foreign market.
Hence heavy losses have often by him been sustained, and must
always be sustained under similar circumstances. —

'* The increased advantages since the commencement of hosti
lities with America, derived to both our import and export trade,
having now no competitors in the foreign market^ and what is of

223

the last and highest importance, the increase of our means to make
mariners, while those of our enemies must, in the same propor
tion, be crippled, show the wisdom of preserving the * vantage
ground' we now stand upon. And your excellency's memorialists
feel the more urgent in their present representation, as the pros
pects which happily have recently opened in Europe, may afford
a well-grounded hope that the time is not very remote when
negotiations may be opened for the return of permanent peace.

" From the protection afforded to the trade of this island by
your excellency, as well as by his excellency, sir John B. War
ren, a great number of fishing vessels have gone to Labrador from
Nova-Scotia, the number of them employed on the Labrador shores
this season has been double, and the absence of their former intru
ders has enabled them to fish unmolested. Your excellency's me
morialists beg to press upon your serious consideration, of which
they cannot too often urge, the important policy, should fortunately
the circumstances of Europe ultimately encourage such a hope, of
wholly excluding foreigners from sharing again in the advantages
of fishing, from which a large proportion of our best national de
fence will be derived."

The following extracts from Colquhoun's Treatise on the Wealth,
Power, and Resources of the British empire, further illustrate the
views of the British government in relation to the contested fish
eries at the negotiation of Ghent, and the value of these fisheries.
The first edition of Colquhoun's work was published on the 20th
of July, 1814 ; the second edition, from which these extracts were
made, on the 18th of April, 1815. In the interval between these
two periods, the negotiation at Ghent commenced and terminated,
and Mr. Russell's letter from Paris was written.

Extracts from Colquhoun's Treatise on the Wealth, Power, and Resources 01
the British empire — 2d edit. 1&15.

" The value of these fisheries (of the British colonies in North
""• America,) to the parent state, will be more obvious after the
•' lapse of 20 or 30 years, than at present. Certain it is, however,
*' that their value is beyond all calculation : and their preservation
*£ as a part of the British empire, is of the most vital importance."
— p. 16, note. See also p. 424.

The value of these fisheries, in the table No. 8, p. 36. is esti
mated at £ 7,550,000 sterling.

" New-Brunswick and Nova-Scotia, from being both watered by
" the Bay of Fundy, enjoy advantages over Canada, which more
-' than compensate a greater sterility of soil. These are to be
*' traced to the valuable and extensive fisheries in the Bay of Fun-
"' dy, which, in point of abundance and variety of the finest fish,
" exceed all calculation, and may be considered as a mine of gold —

224

•'* a treasure which cannot be estimated too high, since with little
** labour, comparatively speaking, enough could be obtained to feed
•< all Europe." pp. 312-313.

" Since the trade with the United States has been so greatly ob-
*' structed, the produce of the fisheries in the British-colonies, thus
»' encouraged by the removal of all competition, has been greatly
" augmented ; and nothing but a more extended population is re-
" quired to carry this valuable branch of trade almost to any given
*' extent.

" It will be seen by a reference to the notes in the table annex-
" ed to this chapter, that the inhabitants of the United States derive
*' incalculable advantages, and employ a vast number of men and
" vessels in the fishery in the river St. Lawrence, and on the coast
" of Nova Scotia, which exclusively belong to Great Britain. The
" dense population of the Northern States, and their local situation
" in the vicinity of the most prolific fishing stations, have enabled
" them to acquire vast wealth by the indulgence of this country.'*
p. 313.

" It ought ever to be kept in view, that (with the exception of the
" small islands of St. Pierre and Miguelon, restored to France by.
" the treaty of Paris, in May, 1814,) the whole of the most valua-
" ble fisheries in North America exclusively belong at this present
<l time to the British crown, which gives to this country a monopoly
" in all the markets in Europe and the West Indies, or a right to a
" certain valuable consideration from all foreign nations, to whom
" the British government may concede the privilege of carrying on
" a fishery in these seas." p. 314.

"{ Private fisheries are a source of great profit to the individuals,
" in this and other countries, who have acquired a right to such
t4 fisheries. Why, therefore, should not the united kingdom de-
" rive a similar advantage from the fisheries it possesses within the
" range of its extessive territories in North America, (perhaps the
l< richest and most prolific in the world,) by declaring every ship
44 and vessel liable to confiscation which should presume to fish in
" those seas without previously paying a tonnage duty, and receiv-
*' ing a license limited to a certain period when fish may be caught,
" with the privilege of curing such fish in the British/territories ?
*' All nations to have an equal claim to such licenses, limited to cer-
** tain stations, but to permit none to supply the British West-In-
•: dies, except his majesty's subjects, whether resident in the colo-
" nies or in the parent state." p. 315.

(E.) St. John's or Prince Edward's Island.

" Fisheries. This island is of the highest importance to the

" united kingdom. Whether the possession of it be considered with
" relation to the Americans, or as an acquisition of a great maritime
•' power, it is worthy of the most particular attention of govern-
fc* ment. Mr. Stewart has justly remarked, in his account of thaf

island, (page 296,) that 'the fishery carried on, from the Ame

225

" rican States, in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, for some years past, is
" very extensive, and is known to be one of the greatest resources
<e of the wealth of the Eastern States, from which about 2000
" schooners, of from 70 to 100 tons, are annually sent into the Gulf ;
" of these, about 1400 make their fish in the Straits of Bellisle, and
" on the Labrador shore, from whence what is intended for the
" European market is shipped off, without being sent to their own
" ports. About six hundred American schooners make their fares
" on the north side of the island, and often make two trips in a sea-
" son, returning with full cargoes to their own ports, where the fish
" are dried. The number of men employed in this fishery is esti-
" mated at between fifteen and twenty thousand, and the profits on
" it are known to be very great. To see such a source of wealth
•* and naval power on our own coasts, and in our very harbours,
" abandoned to the Americans, is much to be regretted; and would
" be distressing, were it not that the means of re-occupying the
" whole, with such advantages as must soon preclude all competi-
" tion, is afforded in the cultivation and settlement of Prince Ed-
" ward's Island." pp. 318, 319.

It remains only to notice the painful and invidious industry with
which Mr. Russell inculcates the doctrine, that because the direct
and immediate interest in these fisheries was confined to the State
of Massachusetts, they were therefore, of no value, either as
right, or possession, to the rest of the Union. If any thing could
add to the incorrect moral character of this doctrine, it would be
the claim of merit for enlarged patriotism and more than disinter
ested virtue in maintaining it. When imputing to the majority of
the Ghent mission, the phantom of his own fancy, by assuming that
they had rested a right to the fisheries upon prescription, among his
battering rams against this wind-mill, is the argument that the
United States, including their new acquisition of Louisiana, could
not claim by prescription, a right which had been exercised only by
the people of Massachusetts. The essence of this enlarged patriot
ic sentiment is, that a possession or liberty, the enjoyment or exer
cise of which is, from local causes, confined to one State, is not,
and cannot be, a possession or liberty of the whole Union. For
suppose prescription had been our only title to this liberty ; Mr.
Russell's argument is, that it could not be the liberty of the whole
Union, because, if it were, it would have been abrogated by the
acquisition of Louisiana ; and the point where this profound inves
tigation lands him, is, to use his own words, that for the fishing li
berty " WE ARE CONSEQUENTLY LEFT WITHOUT ANY TITLE TO IT

*' WHATSOEVER." This was the last result of his enlarged patriot
ism : for, as to the insinuation in the joint letter of 25th Decem
ber, 1814, which he had signed, that the fishing liberty was a sti
pulated participation of territorial jurisdiction, for necessary pur-
pOses of the fishery, reserved by the United States in the treaty
of separation between the two nations ; this pretension, he says,

226

however lofty, is so inconsistent with the circumstances of the case,
and with any sober construction which can be given to that treaty,
that he desires to be excused from seriously examining its validity.
From this contemptuous reference to a position to which he had
subscribed without hinting an objection, and which he cannot an
swer, would not one imagine that the treaty of 1783 was a capitula
tion of vanquished subjects at the feet of a victorious and magnani
mous master ? Mr. Russell's spirit of independence, like his
patriotism, is bold and intrepid in generalities, pliant and submissive
in particulars. He gravely tells you, that until the Revolution, the
fishing liberties of the colonies were held at the bare pleasure of
the crown. He is so anxious for the repurchase of our forfeited
fishing liberties, that he is willing to give for them an equivalent
•wherever it maybe found ; provided always, that it shall not be the
continuance of a harmless right to travel upon a Western highway.
He disclaims all pretension to a liberty of his country stipulated in
a treaty, unless as a gracious temporary donation from the bounty of
his Britannic majesty, which, at the first blast of war, the monarch
had rightfully resumed ; and although he has signed his name with
his colleagues to numerous papers claiming it as a permanent stipu
lated right, unalienable but by our own renunciation, and in no wise
held at the will of the British king, he will not be thought so simple
as to have believed a word of what he has concurred in saying, or
to have imagined that at the treaty of 1783, the situation of the par
ties was such that the United States could bargain for the fishing
liberties, or receive them otherwise than as precarious and tempo
rary grants, resumable at the will of the grantor, so as to leave us
" without any title to them whatsoever" Was Mr. Russell ignorant,
that through a large portion of the Revolutionary war, it was a de
liberate and determined purpose of Congress that the United States
should include the northern British provinces ? That express pro
vision for the admission of Canada into the Union, was made, in the
Confederation of 1781 ? That, finally, when Congress prescribed
the boundary line, which, for the sake of peace, they would ac
cept, and which was that stipulated in the treaty, they passed va
rious resolutions, declaring the rights of the United States in the
fisheries, and the necessity of stipulating for them, if possible, by
the treaty ; but that under no circumstances, whatever, were they
to be given up ? That in all the deliberations of Congress the ne
cessity of this reservation was avowedly connected with the aban
donment of the pretension to include all the northern provinces in
the Confederation ? That the terms of the treaty of 1783, or ra
ther of the preliminaries of 1782, which were word for word the
same, were almost entirely dictated by the United States ? That
this very third article, securing the fisheries, and that very portion
of it stipulating for the liberty within British jurisdiction, was made
a sine qua non, by the American commissioners, two of whom ex
pressly declared that they would not sign the treaty without it ? and
1.o solve Mr. Russell's scruples, whether an interest of the State of

227

Massachusetts is an interest of the whole Union — that one of those
two commissioners was a citizen of South-Carolina ? If Mr. Rus
sell is ignorant of all this, it only shows his jncompetency to give
any opinion the subject. If he is not, with what colour of justice
can he pretend, from the relative situation of the parties to the
treaty of 1783, that the pretension of having reserved the fishing
liberty as a permanent participation of jurisdiction, while abandon
ing the claim to the territory itself, was a vain-glorious boast, too
ridiculous to deserve an answer ?

Mr. Russell does not leave us, however, to indirect inferences,
for the conclusion, that in his estimates, a great interest of Massa»
chusetts was of none to the rest of the Union ; for he expressly
says, in his original letter of llth February, 1815, and in his se
cond revision of it, published in the National Gazette of loth May,
that the people of the whole Western Country, the " unoffending
" citizens of an immense tract of territory," were " NOT AT ALL
*' benefited by the fishing privilege."

In the revision of the duplicatey for the eye of the House of Re
presentatives, and of the nation, made in 1822, this passage is one
of those which appears to have smitten the conscience of the writ
er ; for in that version, he qualified the words not at all, by adding
to them, ** or but faintly ," so that it reads, " the unoffending citi-
*? zens of an immense tract of territory, not at all, OR BUT FAINTLY,
*: benefited by the fishing privilege," but then again, as if grudging
even this concession to the fishermen, he takes care in the same
sentence to reduce it in degree as much as he enlarges it in ex
tent, by adding to his " doubtful accommodation of a few fisher-
" men," the words " annually decreasing in number."

It was not so that the patriots and sages of our Revolution were
wont to reason or to feel. On the 19th of June, 1779, a resolution
was moved in Congress, by Mr. Gerry — *' That it is essential to
" the welfare of these United States, that the inhabitants thereof,
" at the expiration of the war, should continue to enjoy the free
" and undisturbed exercise of their common right to fish on the
;' Banks of Newfoundland, and the other fishing banks and seas of
" North America, preserving inviolate the treaties between France
" and the said States."

In the debate upon this resolution, a motion was made by Mr.
John Dickinson, to insert the word ALL, before " these United
States," and the word was inserted by a vote of ten States out of
twelve. And so, on the 24th of June, the resolution passed — that
it was essential to the welfare of all these United States, that they
should continue to enjoy the fisheries after the war.

It is, indeed, only upon the principle that an interest important to
one section of the Union, is and ought to be considered and sup
ported as the interest of the whole, that a right of excluding British
subjects from the navigation of the Mississippi, could be claimed or
contended for, as the interest of the whole Union. It is an interest,
whether great or small, essentially local, am! admitting to the fullest

228

extent, that it is, nevertheless, an interest of the whole Union, !
only claim that other interests, alike local in their exercise, should
be entitled to the same benefit. If the gain by the war, of a right
to interdict British subjects from descending the Mississippi river,
had been to the people of the West an object of profit as great afe
the privation of the fishing liberties by the same war would have
been to the people of the East an object of /oss, the interests, as
concerned the whole, would have been equally balanced ; but in
asmuch as the duty of preserving possessions already and before
enjoyed, is paramount to that of making new acquisitions, the prin
ciple of equity, as well as the spirit of union, would have dictated
as the true policy, that of maintaining both interests in the state in
which they had been before the war, rather than that of sacrificing
one part of the Union for the profit of another.

If the comparative value of the two interests had been as dis
proportionate as they have been represented by Mr. Russell, and
the balance of value had been on the side to which he assigns it,
still the question of right, remaining the same, the small interest of
the East could not with justice have been sacrificed to the greater
interest of the West, without compensation. For although the
whole Union may possess the power of preferring the interests of
the many to those of the few, they have no power of arbitrary dis
posal over the liberties of the smallest portion of the communitjs,
if, by a solemn article of the Constitution, it is provided that the
private property of the humblest individual shall not be taken for
public use, without just compensation, how much more imperious
is the prohibition of taking away the scanty and hard-earned live
lihood of a few fishermen, even were they annually decreasing in
number, to bestow new and exclusive benefits upon a distant portion
of population, without compensation to the indigent, without conso
lation to the bereaved sufferer.

229

CONCLUSION.

THE interests of the West are the interests of the whole Union —
rand so are the interests of the East; — and let the statesmen who
are the servants of the whole, beware of setting them in conflict
with each other. A review of these papers will show that the in
terest really at stake in the negotiation of Ghent, a deep and import
ant stake, was an interest of the East ; that there was wo Western
interest affected by the article first proposed by Mr. Gallatin. or by
the amendment finally offered to the British plenipotentiaries at his
proposal, and rejected ; that the only plausible objection to it, rest
ed upon a gratuitous assumption, contrary to all reason and expe
rience, that it would have given a right of access to, and of inter
course with, our Indians, to the British. This, the British had
possessed by another article of another treaty, acknowledged to be
extinguished by the war — but it would no more have been granted
to them, by a right to navigate the Mississippi, than by a right to
enter the harbour of New- York. The whole argument rested upon
a fallacy; a mis-statement of the question. Happy would it have
been for Mr. Russell, if, after assenting and pledging his signatures
to the decision of the majority, he had as cautiously withheld from
his government, and his country, the allegation of his reasons for
having voted against it, as he did at the time of the discussion, from
his colleagues. But, in the vehemence of his zeal to vindicate his
motives for one unfortunate vote at Ghent, which but for himself
would probably never have been known to the world, he has been
necessitated to assert principles of international and municipal law,
and to put forth statements as of fact, more unsubstantial than the
pageant of a vision. He has been reduced to the melancholy office
of misrepresenting the subject of which he treats, the conduct and
sentiments of his colleagues in a great national trust and his own.
He has been compelled to disavow his own signatures, to contradict
his own assertions, and to charge himself with his own interpola
tions. He has been forced to enter the lists as the champion of his
country's enemy, upon a cause which he had been specially entrust
ed to defend and maintain — to allege the forfeiture of liberties which
he had been specially instructed not to surrender — to magnify by
boundless exaggerations, an ideal, and to depreciate in equal pro
portion, a real, interest of his country — to profess profound re
spect for the integrity and talents of men, while-secretly denouncing
their conduct as treacherous and absurd — and, finally, to traduce
before the Representative Assembly of the nation, the character of
the absent, and the memory of the dead.

It has been my duty, not only in justice to my own character and
to that of the colleagues with whom I acted, but in respectful defe
rence to the opinion of that nation of which we were, and two of
•is still are. the servants, to justifv the .conduct thus denounced in

230

tiit, lace of the country— and to prove that the letter which contain
ed that denunciation was a tissue of misrepresentations. The at
tack of Mr. Russell was at first secret — addressed to the Execu
tive officer of the administration, at the head of the department, un
der whose instructions the mission at Ghent had acted. It was
made under the veil of concealment, and in the form of a private
letter. In that respect it had failed of its object. It had neither
made the Executive a convert to its doctrines, nor impaired his
confidence in the members of the majority at Ghent. Defeated in
this purpose, after a lapse of seven years, Mr. Russell is persuaded
to believe that he can turn his letter to account, especially with the
aid of such corrections of the copy in possession as the supposed loss
of the original would enable him to make without detection, by bring
ing it before the Legislative Assembly of the Union. Foiled in
this assault, by the discovery of the original, he steals a march upon
refutation and exposure, by publishing a second variety of his let
ter, in a newspaper ; and when the day of retribution comes, dis
closing every step of his march on this winding stair, he turns upon
me, with the charge of having, by the use of disingenuous artifices, led
him unawares into the disclosure of a private letter, never intended
for the public, and seduced him to present as a duplicate, what he had
not intended to exhibit as such. To this new separate and person
al charge, I have replied, by proving the paper which contains it
to be, like the letter from Paris, a tissue of misrepresentations. —
Cor the justification of myself, and of my colleagues at Ghent,
nothing further was necessary. But the letter of Mr. Russell from
Paris, contains doctrines with reference to law, and statements
with reference to facts, involving the rights, the harmony, and the
peace, of this Union.

*' Dangerous conceits are in their nature poisons.™

If the doctrines of Mr. Russell are true, the liberties of the peo~
pie of the United States in the Newfoundland, Gulf of St. Law
rence, and Labrador fisheries, are at this day held by no better
tenure than the pleasure of the king of Great Britain, and will be
abrogated by the first act of hostility between the two nations.

If his statements are true, those liberties are the mere accommo
dation of a few fishermen, annually decreasing in number, too
worthless to be accounted to the rest of the nation of any benefit
at all.

If his statements are true, the propositions made by the Ameri
can to the British plenipotentiaries, on the 1st of December, 1814,
gave unrestrained and undefined access for the British to the Indians
within our territories — laid our country bare to swarms of British
smugglers, and British emissaries — and exposed the unoffending
citizens of an immense territory to all the horrors of savage warfare.

I now submit to the deliberate judgment of the nation, whether
1 have not proved that these doctrines and statements are equally
and utterly without foundation — That the rights and liberties in the

231

fisheries, are held at the will, not of the king of Great TVitain, l"i
of the people of the United States themselves, founded upon na
tional right, unhroken possession, and irrevocable acknowledgment
— That their value, both immediate and remote, direct and conse
quential, is immensely important, not, only to the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, but to the whole Union — That the proposition made
to the British plenipotentiaries, on the 1st of December, 13 M,
would, if accepted, have given to the British, instead of an unre
strained and undefined access to our Indians, no access to them
whatever — That it would have given them access, even to the
Mississippi river, only from a single spot in the British territories ;
and a right to descend the river only with merchandise upon which
the duties should have been paid, and subject to all the custom
house regulations.

The question in relation to the Mississippi, can never be revived.
That spectre is forever laid. Great Britain has not only disavowed
the claim to it which we would have admitted as valid, she has
abandoned that upon which she herself exclusively rested it. Of
its value, in confirmation of the opinions which I have expressed,
1 have given extracts from the debates in parliament, on the peace
of 1782, which show how it was estimated by her greatest states
men at that time. Those estimates had been confirmed by an ex
perience of thirty years. The slumbers of the unoffending citizens
of the Western Country, can, therefore, never more be, if they
ever were, disquieted by the visits of this apparition to the
glimpses of the moon. But the day may come, though I trust it is
far remote, when the title to our fishing liberties may again be in
peril as imminent as it was at the negotiation of Ghent. And if, in
that day, the American statesmen who may be charged with the de
fence and support of the rights, liberties, and interests of their
country, should deem it among the qualifications for their office to
possess some knowledge of the laws of nations, some acquaintance
with the history of their country, and some patriotism more com
prehensive than party spirit or sectional prejudice ever gave or
ever can give, I trust in God that their proficiency will have led
them to the discovery, that all treaties, and all articles of treaties,
and all liberties recognised in treaties, are not abrogated by war ;
that our fishing liberties were neither before nor since the Revolu
tionary war, held at the mere pleasure of the British crown ; and
that the lawful interests and possessions of one section of the Union
are not to be sacrified for the imaginary profit of another, either by
disparaging th;nr value, or by casting them away as the interests of
••d part of the country.

APPENDIX.

1. Western Commentaries.

In the remarks upon Mr. Russell's letter and duplicate, which
tvere submitted to the House of Representatives, I expressed the
most unqualified confidence in the justice of the West, and my en
tire conviction that however justly the inhabitants of that portion
of the Union might have been incensed against the majority of the
Ghent mission, upon the statements and representations of those
letters, yet that when the plain unvarnished tale of real fact should
be laid before them, they would not only acquit the majority of any
intended sacrifice of their interests, but would find in the measure
itself, distinctly disclosed to them in its own nature, nothing to dis
approve. In every part of this Union, when the whole truth can
once be exhibited to the people, there is a rectitude of public opi
nion which neither individual enmity, local prejudices, nor party
rancour can withstand or control. Upon this public virtue of my
country I have ever relied, nor has it now, nor ever disappointed me.
I have the satisfaction of knowing from various sources of informa
tion, public and private, that the general sentiment of the Western
Country, wherever the Remarks as well as the Letters have been
read, has done justice to the intentions of the majority, as well as
to the motives of Mr. Russell.

Yet, since the communication of his Letters to the House of Re
presentatives, the uses for which it was supposed the production
of them was intended, and to which they were adapted, have
not been altogether abandoned in some parts of the Western
Country. The St. Louis Enquirer has pursued this purpose, in
the simplest form, by publishing the message of the President of
the United States to the House of Representatives of 7th May ;
and Mr. Russell's Private letter, and by suppressing the Duplicate
and the Remarks.

In the Kentucky Reporter, published in Lexington, and in the
Argus of Western America, published at Frankfort, various publi
cations have appeared, exhibiting similar views of the subject, re
presenting the proposition made to the British plenipotentiaries,
on the 1st of December. 1314, as a very grievous offence, and
ascribing it exclusively to me. The subject has, however, been

233

presented in a manner more impartial, in the Louisville Public Ad
vertiser, where, among other things, it has been inquired how, if the
proposal was so very exceptionable it could, under any circum
stances have received the sanction or signature of Mr. Clay ?

The following editorial article in the Frankfort Argus, of 18th
July, seems intended to answer that question, and although con
taining some severe strictures upon " the Secretary," mingles with
them some candid admissions, in a spirit upon which I would with
equal candour animadvert.

From the Argus of Western America, Frankfort, Kentucky, 18th July, 1822.

THE GHENT MISSION.

" Mr. Penn does not understand the circumstances attending the
Ghent negotiation, or he wilfully conceals the truth.

''• The first instructions given to our commissioners were, that
they should noi agree to any stipulation by which the pre-existing
right of British subjects to trade with the Indians living within our
territories, should be revived. The object of this instruction was
to cut off the means of British influence among the Indians, which
we had felt so fatally in that war.

" While acting under these instructions, it was proposed by Mr.
Gallatin to offer the British the free navigation of the Mississippi,
with access to it through our territories, on condition that the liber
ty to take and cure fish on the coast within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the British colonies, should be continued to the citizens of the
United States. This proposition was strenuously opposed by Mr.
Clay, on the ground that it would give the British those very means
of influence over the Indians of which it was the object of the go
vernment to deprive them, as evinced by their instructions. At
first Gallatin, Adams, and Bayard, were favourable to the proposi
tion, and Clay and Russell against it. In the end, however, Bayard
changed sides, and it was rejected. Of course, no such proposition
was made at that time.

" Subsequently, however, the overthrow of Napoleon having
left us to contend single-handed with the undivided power of Great
Britain, our government thought proper to change the^ terms ofler-
ed to the British government, and accordingly sent additional in
structions to Ghent, directing our commissioners to make a peace
if practicable, upon the simple condition, that each party should
be placed in the same situation in which the war found them.

" At the commencement of the war, the British had a right by-
treaty, not only to navigate the Mississippi, but to trade with all
our western Indians. Of course our commissioners were instructed
to consent to the continuance of this right, if no better terms could
be procured. Under these instructions a proposition relative to
the Mississippi and the fisheries, similar to that which had been
rejected, was again presented, adopted, and sent to the British
commissioners, But it did not restore the right to navigate the

234

Mississippi in as lull a manner as the British government <iesirecf,
and on that account, we presume, was rejected.

a Now we believe the truth to be, that Mr. Clay still opposed
this proposition, believing that it never ought to be made by our
government, arid perhaps was not necessary to the conclusion of
the peace. But as the government had authorized a treaty to be
made on the status ante bellum, and as the proposition amounted to
nothing more, he did not refuse to sign his name to the letter
which contained not only that, but all the other propositions made
in the treaty.

"The Secretary, in his strictures, confounds together the dis
cussions which took place before and after the reception of the
additional instructions, by which means more discriminating heads
than Penn's have been deceived.

44 The commissioners at Ghent assumed the principle, that the
right to the fisheries in British waters, on our side, and the right to
navigate the [Mississippi, on their side, secured by the treaty of '83,
were not abrogated by the war, but continued in full force without
any new stipulation at 'the peace. The Secretary calls this the
American side of the argument, and exults, with many thanks to
God, that it has been sustained through subsequent negotiations,
and particularly in forming the convention with Great Britain in
1818. Surely this exultation is not only without cause, but con
trary to reason. If the principle so strenuously asserted by him
be correct, what have we gained hy it ? At the close of the war
our right to the fisheries and the British right to navigate the Mis-
stssippi, existed to the full extent at which they were secured by
the treaty of '83, and would have continued so to exist without any
additional stipulation until this moment. But the convention of
1818, restricts our fishing liberties, and says not a word about the
navigation of the Mississippi. Hence, if the Secretary's position
be sound, we have lost by it a part of our fishing liberties, and
the British retain the right to navigate the Mississippi in its fullest
extent ! How can the Secretary consistently say, that they abandon
ed this right in the convention of 1818, when not a word is said
about it in that compact ? If he were President and the British
were to claim the right to navigate the Mississippi to-morrow, he
would be obliged to grant their claim valid or contradict his own,
favourite principle ! !'7

Remarks on the A'oove Editorial Artkle,

This article admits that Mr. Clay did not refuse to sign his name
to the proposition made to the British plenipotentiaries on the 1st
of December, 1814, of confirming to the British the right of navi
gating the Mississippi. It admits that the proposition was fully
warranted by the instructions of 19th October, 1814, and formally
assigns them, as his motive for not refusing his assent to the pro
posul. Jt does, indeed, say that he believed the proposition

235

r ought to be made by our government, and perhaps was not
necessary to the conclusion of the peace. The perhaps it was not,
of course implies that perhaps it was necessary to the conclu
sion of the peace, and in candid reasoning is of itself sufficient to
justify the majority in the determination to make the proposal,
which they did believe to be necessary.

In transferring the blame, whatever it might be, of making the
proposition, from the majority of the mission, who only executed,
to the government which issued the instructions, under which Mr.
Clay did not refuse his signature, a new field of argument is opened,
not very reconcilcable with any portion of Mr. Russell's papers
on this subject. Mr. Russell's duplicate alleges that the proposi
tion was in positive and wilful violation of instructions, explicit and
implicit. Mr. Russell in the Boston Statesman of 27th June last,
affirms that the instructions of 19th October, 1814, had no effect
whatever on the proposition to the British. plenipotentiaries of 1st
December ; that no vote in the mission was taken after the in
structions of 19th October were received — and he appeals to Mr,
Clay to confirm this statement.

It is, to be sure, a matter of opinion, whether the government
ought to have given the instructions of 19th October, 1814, or not,
upon which every member of the Ghent mission, individually,
had the right of entertaining his own opinion. There may be ex
treme cases in which a public minister would be justified in refus
ing his signature to a proposition warranted or even required by
die instructions of his government: a member of a commission may
indulge himself in this regpect with a much greater latitude than a
single plenipotentiary, for the obvious reason that the instructions
may be executed without his assent. Mr. Clay, therefore, might
have withheld his signature from the proposition which was made
on the 1st of December, 1814, as he had said he should withhold it
from that which had been voted on the 5th of November. The
reason assigned in the editorial article of the Argus, for his having
taken a different course, namely, the receipt in the interval be
tween the two periods of the new instructions from the government,
is amply sufficient to justify him for yielding his assent at last, but
in candid reasoning, if it justified him in pledging his signature to
a measure which he disapproved, it surely more than justified th^
majority, in determining to offer a proposition, which they approv
ed, and for which they had been prepared even before those in
structions had been received.

The editorial article in the Argus, admits, in amplest form, that
at the commencement of the war, the British had the right to na
vigate the Mississippi, and that the commissioners were instructed
to consent to the continuance of this right, if no better tern^
could be procured. But it intimates the belief of Mr. Clay, that
the government ought never to have issued such instructions. Yet
the reason stated in the editorial article itself, as the inducing mo
live of the government to thi? measure, is weighty, and whoever

236

will duly consider the situation and circumstances of this nation aoJ
its government, in October, 1814, will, I believe, not be very ready
to join in a censure upon the government for offering a peace on the
basis of the state before the war. There was then a heavy re
sponsibility, both upon the government and upon the mission at
Ghent, that the war should be concluded. This nation would have
ill-brooked a rupture of the negotiation upon light or trivial causes,
and if it had been broken off upon a refusal to continue to the Bri
tish a mere nominal nght to navigate the Mississippi, possessed by
them and harmless to us until the war had begun, the government
and the mission would nave had a very different task. to justify
themselves to this country, from that which they now have. If,
instead of writing his letter of 1 1th February, 1815, from Paris.
Mr. Russell had brought the substance of it home in his pocket,
with the war still raging, and he had said, We have not concluded
the peace — we have broken off the negotiation — but here are our
reasons — producing his letter of seven sheets against the Mississip
pi navigation, and the fisheries — What would the nation and the
world have said of the American government and the American
mission at Ghent ? After the responsibility has been removed,
and the peace concluded, it is very easy to " enjoy the good and
cavil the conditions" — but in this case, measure still harder is dealt,
out to the government and the majority of the mission : after the
good is secured, the cavil is against conditions not annexed to it,
but merely once proposed — not against an actual stipulation, but
against a rejected offer — against a possibility extinct.

It is sufficient for the justification of the majority of the mission
that it was authorized, and that they believed it to be required by
their instructions. But I cannot pass over this censure upon the
government for issuing the instructions themselves, without notice.
Far from deeming them blameable, I believe them to have been
wise and meritorious. The instructions not to surrender the fish
eries, even at the hazard of breaking off the negotiation, mani
fested a sensibility congenial to the true and essential interests of
the country. I have in these papers furnished proof that the in
terest in the fisheries at stake in the negotiation, was great and im
portant. The disquisitions in the Western newspapers on this
subject, dwell largely upon the state of politics then prevailing in
the Eastern section of the Union. This is an invidious topic, and I
wish to dismiss it, with this observation, that the administration of
Mr. Madison could not have honoured itself more than by maintain
ing with inflexible energy against the enemy, the special interest of
that portion of the Union which had been most opposed to the war.
But had that illustrious statesman and patriot suffered himself on
that occasion to be influenced by narrower considerations, it could
not escape him, that however exceptionable the political course of
the State of Massachusetts might be, the portion of the people, most
particularly interested in these fisheries, neither countenanced nor
supported it. They had been the first, and were among the great-

237

est sufferers by the war, and by the restrictive measures that pre
ceded — and they were among the most effective supporters of the
war, and of the honour of the nation in the conduct of it. To have
sacrificed their liberties in the fishery, would have been a stain upon
the gratitude, no less than upon the justice, of the American go
vernment. The instruction to accept a peace upon the basis of the
state before the war, was equally well considered. There was no
time at Ghent when the British plenipotentiaries would have ac
cepted it. The British government, at that time, had evidently
taken a bias, from which nothing could divert them, and which was
to appear to the world as if they had gained something by the war.
The state before the war, upon all the points of difference* was ac
tually offered to them, and they rejected it. After commencing
Ihe negotiation with the loftiest pretensions of conquest, they finally
settled down into the determination merely to keep Moose Island,
and the fisheries, to themselves. This was the object of their
deepest solicitude. Their efforts to obtain our acquiescence in
their pretension that the fishing liberties had been forfeited by the
war, were unwearied. They presented it to us in every form that
ingenuity could devise. It was the first stumbling block, and the
last obstacle to the conclusion of the treaty. Their pretension was
announced as a preliminary, at the beginning of the first conference,
and their article proposing a future negotiation to treat for a revival
of the liberty, was the last point from which they receded. But
the wisdom and the importance of the instruction to the American
mission, to agree to a peace on the basis of the state before the
war, was this : it enabled them to avoid a rupture of the negotia
tion upon points of minor importance, and upon which the spirit of
the country might not have been prepared to support the govern
ment. If upon any of the articles of the project in discussion, the
parties had come to an absolute splitting point, as upon many arti
cles they actually did, the American mission always had the general
state before the war, to offer as an alternative, which would save
them and the country from the danger of breaking off the negotia
tion upon any particular article, or any point of less than universal
interest. With an enemy whose policy might be really to continue
the war, but to throw the blame of it upon us, there was a hazard
in adhering inflexibly to any OHC point of difference. By the pow
er of offering the general state before the war, if the negotiation
was to be broken off, it would not be in the power of the enemy
to put us in the wrong for the rupture ; and with that general prin
ciple, always in reserve, we were enabled to insist more persever-
ingly upon every particular article in discussion.

The editorial article in the Argus charges " the Secretary" with
confounding, in his strictures (on the duplicate letters,) the discus
sions which took place before, and after, the reception of the addi
tional instructions, by which means, it says, more discriminating
heads than Penn's [the editor of the Louisville Public Advertiser,]
have been deceived.

30

23$

It is not the Secretary, but Mr. Russell, who confounds
preceding and subsequent discussions. The joint despatch of 25th
December, 1814, and Mr. Russell's separate letter of the same
date, say not a word of the discussions prior to the receipt of the
new instructions. They refer exclusively to the vote taken on the
29th of November, and to the proposition actually made on the 1st
of December. Mr, Russell's letter from Paris, confounds together
the preceding and subsequent discussions. His duplicate brings in
the cancelled instructions, as violated by the proposal actually made,
on the first of December, and his publication in the Boston States
man of 27th June, affirms, that no vote was taken after the receipt
of the new instructions ; and calls upon Mr. Clay to confirm the
assertion. It is hoped that the discriminating heads will find that
in these pages, the Secretary has been sufficiently explicit in dis
tinguishing between the first and second votes, and between the
discussions upon both of them.

The editorial paper states that the article first proposed by Mr.
Gallatin, and voted by the majority, was finally rejected, because
Mr. Bayard changed sides. This is not altogether exact. If there
was any change of sides, it was by Mr. Clay. He brought forward
on the 7th of November, as a substitute for Mr. Gallatin's article,
which had been voted on the 5th, the very same proposition which
I had offered to take instead of Mr. Gallatin's article, before the
vote upon it had been taken, but which Mr. Clay had not then been
prepared to accept. Upon this new proposal of Mr. Clay, Mr.
Bayard agreed, for the sake of unanimity, to take it instead of Mr.
Gallatin's article ; and so did I, and so did Mr. Gallatin himself.
Mr. Bayard, of course, afterwards voted, on the 29th of Novem=
ber, for the proposition which was actually made on the 1st of De
cember.

The editorial article of the Argus, after stating that the commis
sioners at Ghent assumed the principle, that the right to the fish
eries in British waters, on our side, and the right to navigate the
Mississippi, on their side, secured by the treaty of '83, were not
abrogated by the war, but continued in full force, without any new
stipulation at the peace, observes, that " the Secretary" calls this
** the American side of the argument" and exults, with many thank?
to God, that it has been sustained through subsequent negotiations,
and particularly in forming the convention with Great Britain in
1818. The writer in the Argus appears to be chagrined at this ex
ultation of the Secretary, and exceedingly anxious to deprive him
of his satisfaction. But in the first place, this statement of the
principle assumed by the commissioners at Ghent is again not alto
gether exact* The principle assumed by them, was in these
words, drawn up by Mr. Clay :

" In answer to the declaration made by the British plenipoten-
" tiaries, respecting the fisheries, the undersigned, referring to what
" passed in the conference of the 9th August, can only state, that
'* they are not authorized to bring into discussion any of the righU

239

** or liberties which the United States have heretofore enjoyed m
*6 relation thereto. From their nature, and from the peculiar cha-
" racter of the treaty of 1783, by which they were recognised, no
** further stipulation has been deemed necessary by the govern-
** ment of the United States to entitle them to the full enjoyment of
" all of them."

This principle, thus assumed, the Secretary does call the •Ameri
can side of the argument, and with his thanks to God, that it was as
sumed, and has since been maintained, against the 'British tide of the
argument, announced in the conference of 8th August, 1814, and
to which this paragraph was the formal answer, the Secretary would
not less heartily add his thanks to Mr. Clay, for having made this
principle his own, by proposing it to the mission, by signing the
note in which it was contained, and by maintaining it against the
British plenipotentiaries, as long as it was necessary for the great
interest at stake upon it, that he should maintain it. The Secre
tary would readily call it Mr. Clay's side of the argument, if he had
reason to suppose it as unequivocally that gentleman's individual,
as he had made it his official, opinion. The Secretary himself,
not only pledged to it his official signature, but firmly believed, and
still firmly believes it sound — warranted by the laws of nations,
and sanctioned by the most eminent writers on international juris
prudence, as well as by many of the most eminent lawyers and
statesmen of Great Britain. The inaccuracy of the statement in
the editorial article of the Argus, is in representing the commis
sioners as having assumed the principle, in its application to the
British right of navigating the Mississippi, as well as in relation to
the fisheries, and on this inaccuracy is founded the censure of the
Secretary for calling it the American side of the argument.

The commissioners assumed the principle, only as it was pre
sented by Mr. Clay, and only in relation to the fisheries. It was
emphatically the American side of the argument, and still continued
so, when afterwards the British plenipotentiaries demanded a stipu
lation in the treaty, that British subjects should enjoy the right of
navigating the Mississippi, and access to it for that purpose through
our territories. The American commissioners then said to them :
If you admit our principle, you need no new stipulation to secure
to you this right ; we are willing, however, to recognise it by a new
article, declaratory of both rights,. If you reject it, you have no
foundation to claim a right of navigating the Mississippi, and, there
fore, no pretence for asking it by n new stipulation. The British
plenipotentiaries could not extricate themselves from this dilemma.
They said they claimed the right of navigation, as an equivalent for
abandoning their line of boundary to the Mississippi, and agreeing
to the 49th parallel of latitude. We offered them to leave the
boundary as it was — which they finally accepted. Throughout
the whole discussion, the principle assumed by the American com
missioners, was the American side of the argument.

It was still so in the negotiations after the peace which terminated

240

in the convention of 1818, and remains the American side of the
argument to this day. When, in the summer of 1815, British arm
ed cruisers warned all American fishing vessels on the coast of No
va-Scotia to a distance of sixty miles from the shores, they very
significantly proved what the British government had meant by their
side of the argument, and in entering upon the negotiation, imme
diately afterwards and in consequence of that event, the Secretary
may be allowed to speak with confidence when he says, that had it
not been for the principle assumed by the commissioners at Ghent,
he could not have taken the first step in it — he could not have al
leged a cause of complaint — sixty miles was largely within the ex
tent of exclusive British jurisdiction, as to those fisheries, if our li
berties in them had been abrogated by the war ; and the American
minister in England would have had no more right to complain of
this warning, or of any exclusion by British cruisers of American
fishing vessels from any part of the Newfoundland fisheries, than of
the seizure of an American vessel in the port of Liverpool for a
manifest violation of the British revenue laws.

It was upon the rights and liberties, in these fisheries, as recog
nised in the treaty of 1783, as unimpaired by the war of 1812, and
as unabrogated, although no stipulation to confirm them had been
inserted in the treaty of Ghent, that the American minister in Lon
don did complain of this warning and interdiction of the American
fishermen. He recurred immediately to the principle asserted by
the American commissioners at Ghent, at the proposal of Mr. Clay,
and consigned in their note of 10th November, 1814. On that he
rested the continued claim of the United States to all the rights and
liberties in the fisheries, recognised in the treaty of 1783, and en
tered upon a full discussion of the question with the British go
vernment. The result of that discussion, which was continued in
the negotiation of the convention of 1818, appears in the first arti
cle of that convention. The editorial article in the Argus, says that
this convention restricts our fishing liberties, and says not a word
about the navigation of the Mississippi. The convention restricts
the liberties in some small degree ; but it enlarges them probably
in a degree not less useful. It has secured the whole coast fishery
of every part of the British dominions, except within three marine
miles of the shores, with the liberty of using all the harbours,
for shelter, for repairing damages, and for obtaining wood and wa
ter. It has secured the full participation in the Labrador fishery ;
the most important part of the whole, and that of which it was at
Ghent peculiarly the intention of the British government at all
events to deprive us. This fishery cannot be prosecuted without
the use of the neighbouring shores, for drying and curing the fish :
it is chiefly carried on in boats, close into the shores, and the loss
of it, even if the rest had been left unaffected by the same princi
ple, would have been a loss of more than half of the whole interest.
The convention has also secured to us the right of drying and
curing fish on a part of the island of Newfoundland, which had not

241

been enjoyed under the treaty of 1783 : it has narrowed down the
pretensions of exclusive territorial jurisdiction with reference to
these fisheries, to three marine miles from the shores. Upon the
whole, I consider this interest as secured by the convention of
1818, in a manner as advantageous as it had been by the treaty of
1783 ; we have gained by it, even of fishing liberties, perhaps as
much as we have lost ; but if not, we have gained practically the
benefit of the principle, that our liberties in the fisheries recognised
by the treaty of 1783, were not abrogated by the war of 1812. If
they had been, we never should have obtained, without a new war,
any portion of them again. The error of the editorial article ia
the Argus, is in putting out of sight the difference between a con
tested and an uncontested right. After the conclusion of the peace
of Ghent, according to the American side of the argument, and by
virtue of the principle, assumed at the proposal of Mr. Clay, the
rights and liberties of the people of the United States in these
fisheries, remained in full force, as they had been recognised by
the treaty of 1783. According to the British side of the argument,
and to the doctrine of Mr. Russell's Letter from Paris, they were
totally abrogated by the war. The letter says, in express terms,
that the liberty was " entirely at an end ;" and, that we were left
*' without any title to it whatsoever." If this was the real doctrine of
the minority of the American mission at Ghent, has not the Secre
tary reason to exult, and to give many thanks to God, that instead
of avowing it, they professed directly the contrary ? That Mr.
Clay himself proposed to the mission, and the mission at his pro
posal adopted the opposite principle, the American side of the ar
gument. After the peace of Ghent, the right of the people of the
United States to the fishing liberties was perfect, but it was contest
ed. There was a British side of the argument, and what we have
gained by the convention of 1818, has been an adjustment of that
contest, preserving essentially the whole interest that was in dis
pute. The first article of the convention is upon its face the ad
justment of a contested question. The documents of the negotia
tion prove how it was adjusted, and show that we obtained the ad
justment by maintaining our principle. On the principle of the let
ter from Paris, there was no liberty to maintain, no right to assert.,
no contest to adjust : the liberty was gone, irretrievably lost.

The editorial article says, that " if the British were to claim the
right to navigate the Mississippi to-morrow, the Secretary would
be obliged to grant their claim valid or contradict his own favourite
principle ! !" The double notes of admiration annexed to this
closing period of the editorial article, indicate a long cherished and
intense desire to fasten upon the Secretary, in spite of all that he
can say, the deep crimination of the dreadful consequences to
which his, favourite principle might yet lead. Mr. Russell, too, has
resorted to this forlorn hope of charge against the Secretary. My
reply to it is this —

242

. That the principle alluded to in its application to our fishing li
berties, is my favourite principle, I admit, knowing as I do, that it
has been the means of saving them from total extinction. That it
is my own principle, I have perhaps not more the right to say than
that it was Mr. Clay's own principle : for it was at his proposal
that it was assumed by the American mission at Ghent, and the pa
ragraph by which it was assumed, was drawn up by him. For all
possible consequences in relation to the British right of navigating
the Mississippi, which may flow from the assumption of this prin
ciple, Mr. Clay so far as official acts and signatures can pledge, is
as responsible as I am.

But the truth is, that the principle can no longer be. applied to
the British right of navigating the Mississippi, because they them*
selves have disclaimed it, and thereby renounced the right to the
claim. The right once disclaimed, cannot again be resumed. It
could not be resumed even after a tacit renunciation — a disclaimer
is still more. It was precisely because acquiescence on our part
in the principle asserted by the British plenipotentiaries, in their
notification of 8th August, would have been a surrender and tacit
renunciation of the fishing liberties, that I deemed the counter no
tification on our part, or a new article indispensable. But in assert
ing a principle just and sound in itseif, in defence of our own liber
ties, we are in nowise bound to force it upon Great Britain, in support
of any right of hers ; and as she has chosen to consider her right
to navigate the Mississippi by virtue of the 8th article of the treaty
of 1783, as abrogated by the war, we are neither bound to obtrude
upon her that which she disclaims, nor to admit the claim, should
she hereafter be disposed to retract the principle.

But this is not all ; the editorial article asks " how can the Se
cretary consistently say that the British abandoned this right in the
convention of 1818, when not a word is said about it in that com
pact?" It is precisely because not a word is said in the compact about
it, that the British have abandoned the right. By the second arti
cle of the convention a new boundary line is stipulated, along the
49th parallel of latitude, which of course cuts them off from the
line to which they were before entitled to the Mississippi. Dis
claiming the right secured to them by the 8th article of the treaty
of 1783, the only ground upon which they still claimed the right,
was by virtue of the line which brought them in contact with the
river. At the negotiations of 1807, and at Ghent, they declined
agreeing to the new line, unless wilh a reservation of the right to
navigate the river, and of access to it, through our territories.
They demanded the same thing at the negotiation of the convention
of 1818, and presented an article to that effect. But they finally
agreed to the new boundary line, without the reservation, and
thereby abandoned their last claim to the right of navigating the
river.

The editorial article in the Argus, is sufficient to justify Mr.
Clay for his assent to, and concurrence with, all the measures

243

agreed upon by the majority of the Ghent mission. His services
to the nation are sufficiently distinguished to enable him to dispense
with the assistance of unjust aspersions upon others.

77. Mr. Floyd's Letter.

From the Richmond Enquirer of 27th August, 1822.
To the Editors of the Enquirer :

XEW-BERNE, VIRGINIA, AUGUST 14, 1822,

Gentlemen : I am induced to write to you, impelled by the nu
merous editorial remarks which have issued from different parts of
the Union, relating to the controversy between Messrs. Russell and
Adams, involving me in a greater or less degree ; but more parti
cularly from the unwarrantable assertions of Mr. Adams through
out his rejoinder.

On entering into public life, I formed a plan from which I de
termined never to depart, unless for the strongest reasons ; and
I assure you, it is with pain arid regret, I now deviate from that
plan. When any thing occurs in my public conduct, if it concerns
myself alone, I have been content to rest my claims to justice upon
the decision of those with whom I act, entirely regardless whether
the newspapers, or reporters to newspapers, either misunderstand
me, misrepresent me, or do not hear me.

In the commencement of this affair, I was not a little surprised
to see the editorial remarks of the Weekly Register in concluding
the publication of the President's message with the letters of Mr.
Russell and Mr. Adams, subjecting mo. to imputations of " elec
tioneering views" and the " getting up" this business : my surprise
was not lessened to find any thing in my course, liable to such im
putations, as I have always felt the most perfect confidence in the
correctness of my course : though 1 have too high an opinion of
the correctness and integrity of the Weekly Register to believe
these remarks were intended for any other purpose, than to give
an honest opinion of the transaction as it appeared to him.

With these feelings, as soon as I recovered from a severe illness,
under which I was labouring when the Register was received, I
wrote a statement of the whole matter, to the editor of that paper,
whose independent republican course has impressed me with the
most favourable sentiments of his rectitude and ability ; but, think
ing there would be an end to the affair very soon, and that the op
portunities might offer elsewhere, of doing myself justice, I yield
ed to the suggestion of a friend in withholding it : nor, do I think
the necessity would now exist, had the whole of the debate been
published, which took place in the House of Representatives upon
*hc adoption of Mr, Fuller* resolution, making the final rail upon

244

the President for the papers ; which now appears to have been
done at the instance of Mr. Adams himself.

There is certainly something very singular in this affair, that
Mr. Adams, who has laboured with so much zeal and perseverance,
to impress the nation with the belief that Mr. Russell is not correct
in his statements, should, nevertheless, as zealously adhere to de
clarations equally injurious, and unfounded as it regards myself 5
to the end, it is presumed, to justify his own conduct in procuring
Mr. Fuller to make the call which I had desisted from, and which
it seems was so desirable to him as a mean of getting into the news
papers, — this, too. after Mr. Russell had said he knew nothing of
my intention of Making the request I did make.

Mr. Adams, I had believed, was too well acquainted with eti
quette, to leave his lawful game, to send a shaft at me, however he
might/ee/ towards me ; but, since he has thought proper to do so,
I must defend myself.

Whatever a Secretary shall say of me, I think it but right, to
hold him responsible ; nor will I consent that he shall ransack hi§
department to find a clerk to prop his desires by a certificate. So
far as it regards myself, I must protest against the certificates of
clerks, who depend for their daily bread, upon the capricious
smiles of a Secretary of a Department. I do not wish to be un
derstood as making any remark upon Mr. Adams's certifying clerks.
It is possible they may be respectable, I know nothing of them;
nor, can I, consistent with my own self-approbation, know any body
but Mr. Adams, who 1 presume, having reliance, and regardless of
feelings or opinions, boldly and confidently, reiterates in his re
joinder, that Mr. Russell procured me, to subserve his purposes,
and make the call in the House which I did make ; which assertion,
I unequivocally pronounce to be utterly destitute of that verity
which ought always to characterize assertions made to the public.

The story is briefly this :

Last winter was a year, at my lodgings, in conversation with
some of my friends, we were discussing the advantages of the oc
cupation of the Oregon, or Columbia river, the value of the- fur
trade of our western rivers, the wealth to be derived from that
trade in the Canton market, and the practicability of supplying the
valley of the Mississippi with the manufactures of China by that
route ; when one gentleman observed, that the Mississippi had
been discussed at Ghent, arid from the character of the gentlemen
engaged in it, there was a strong probability, that, if I had that cor
respondence, I would obtain something, which might be useful to
me. I had then presented to the House, my report upon the occu
pation of that river, and would have to make an exposition of the
bill when it came up for discussion. 1 instantly determined to make
the call, as the proper mode of getting the papers : but, I soon
found my bill for its occupation, could not, from the place it held
in the orders of the day, be acted upon that session : I then deter
mined to postpone the call until the next session. Accordingly, on

245

the 17th of January last, I requested all the papers ; and on the
23d of February, the President answered that request, taking more
than a month to prepare a copy.

Mr. Adams says, after commenting upon this, that, " it will be
observed, that nearly two months had intervened, between the
report of the Ghent treaty documents to the House, and this se*
cond call, which Mr. Russell has admitted was made as his sugges
tion."

Mr. Adams knew very well, the papers were sent to the House
on the 23d of February, and not only ordered to lie on the table,
as he states, but likewise ordered to be printed: I had not an op
portunity of examining them until they were printed, which would
of course require some days. But in that time, I had received
intelligence of the afflictions of my family, and Mr. Adams does
know, I obtained leave of absence for the remainder of the ses
sion, believing it not possible for me to return.

I left this city, I believe, about the 13th of March, but my fami
ly being restored to health, I returned to Washington, and arrived,
on Sunday, the 14th of April. I went into the House on the 15th,
and on the 18th submitted the second resolution, calling specifically
for !Ylr. Russell's letter ; that resolution was adopted on the 19th.

The reason of this second call was, that, on examining the pa
pers, I could not find any thing I wanted, though I did perceive
from Mr. Russell's letter, dated the 25th of December, from Ghent,
that he intended to write fully, and naturally concluded he had
done so, as he was a public man, and in the discharge, as I thought,
€f his duty ; and too, expected what I wanted was contained in
that letter, to wit, touching the value of the Mississippi river.

I will take no part in the controversy between Mr. Russell and
Mr. Adams, nor would I now have written, had not Mr. Adams
gone out of his way, in endeavouring to place me in an attitude,
which he must know, nothing but his injustice could have exhibited
me in.

I am almost as much surprised at the memory of the friend of
the National Intelligencer, as at all the rest of this affair : he has
certainly reported to that paper as far as he went " substantially"
what happened in that debate ; but the surprize is, that his me
mory fails at the precise point where my justification begins. I
recollect what was said, and made these remarks, and nearly in
these words : That I had made the previous calls, and had not re
newed it, as the letter wanted had been specifically desired, and
the President already knew .the wishes of the House> and might
send it if he thought proper, as he was the judge of the propriety
of doing so ; I did not think another resolution to the same effect
would be consulting the dignity of the House ; and if the papers
would produce misunderstanding and ill blood, between men high
in office and public esteem, which the President, who had the pa-
pers seemed to insinuate, I would not be the means of producing
*haf evil. What I wanted was the information, which I supposed the

511

246

papers to contain relative to the value of the Mississippi, which
Would, according to my view of the occupation of the Columbia
river, show the value of the trade to flow in that channel, which
was to connect those two great rivers ; and that there could not
be any thing difficult to comprehend in that. That if the President
would tell the House such consequences would flow from the com
munication, and at the same time state, that copies of the papers
would be furnished to any gentleman at the Department of State,
who might desire them, was a thing left for him to justify and to re
concile : I wished myself to be correct, and said this for my own
justification, and to show my own consistency, and not the Presi
dent's.

I will close these observations by observing to you, that I have
seen in your paper a few days ago, the remarks contained in a
Charleston journal. I cannot divine how the writer knew I had
made a motion to refer the President's communication to my com
mittee, before it was read. I conclude, though, it is much after
the disinterestedness of the times, and that a diplomatic mission to
some of the new republics, may be the hoped reward of the hon
est exertions of the writer. How was that fact ascertained ? there
is no record showing whether the motion was made before the pa
pers were read or not — this minute fact is known to the writer so
distant from Washington, who does not even know the part of the
country I live in, as he states me to be a member from the west —
it may be honest ignorance — I believe, though I did make the mo
tion to refer the papers, as soon as it was ascertained what the
papers related to*. This is every day's practice, and I have now
papers referred to my committee which the House never saw,
which contained information I had sought through the medium of
the House, as I had done that, which was to be used when my bill
was called up. I will say more, that if 1, by any proper act,
could have prevented this affair, that I would have done so ; nor
will I, either in public or in private, refrain from commenting upoa
the public conduct and opinions of any public man, who may be
thought, or may think himself entitled to office. My opposition
has always been political, and directed by the ideas I entertain of
the power which gentlemen may think themselves entitled to ex
ercise, under the constitution of the United States. I look upon that
constitution as containing expressed grants of power, and cannot ap
prove any opposite opinion.

I, a& a public man, am willing to be judged by this test, and when
I, or others, cannot defend their opinion, injustice to the country,
they ought to retire. In iny public capacity I called upon the ex
ecutive branch of the government for papers expressly relating to
a national transaction, and for public use^ and if evil has resulted,
<ur private letters been divulged, it cannot attach to me.

I am, sirs, with great respect, your obedient servant,

JOHN FLOYD,

247

///. Mr. Fullers Letter.
From the Boston Patriot of 4th September, 1822.

BOSTON, 3d SEPTEMBER, 1825,
I o the Editors of the Boston Patriot :

Gentlemen : Having seen in the Richmond Enquirer of the 27th
of August, a letter from Mr. Floyd, of Virginia, in which he speaks
of the conduct of Mr. Adams *' in procuring Mr. Fuller to make
the call" for Mr. Russell's letter and Mr. A.'s remarks in relation
to the Ghent treaty, I am induced, with great reluctance, to ad
dress you a line on that subject, for publication. My great aversion
to appear, without evident necessity, in the newspapers, alone
withheld me from this course, on observing that Mr. Russell, in his
letter re-published in the National Intelligeqcer on the 3d of July,
says Mr. Adams " sought for a member who would consent to make
the call." — " To one member from Massachusetts, at least, he had
applied in vain, before he finally succeeded in his object."

It was perfectly obvious, on being informed by the President's
rnessage of the 4th of May, that Mr. Russell's private letter on the
Ghe*it negotiation was to be seen by gentlemen who might call at
the Department of State, that it would be immediately published in
the newspapers, The message also stated the wish of the Secre
tary of State, to have the letter communicated to Congress, toge
ther with his remarks, explanatory of its contents. This course
appeared to me perfectly fair ; and in supporting the motion, which
I had submitted for the purpose, I assigned, among other reasons,
the palpable unfairness of making the letter public, while the an
swer was suppressed. Several members, with whom 1 conversed,
concurred with me entirely in the propriety of having both commu
nicated together. It seems to me, therefore, very singular, that
any censure could be attached to Mr. Adams, even had he, as al
leged, requested or " procured" the call. I do, however, explicitly
declare, that neither Mr. Adams, nor any other person, either re
quested or "procured" me to move the call, or to do any thing in re
lation to it.

I regretted the absence of Mr. Russell, and did not know of his
intention to depart from Washington, until he was actually gone ;
had he been present, however, it did not occur to me, that he could
have any objectio.n to the resolution, and it would not have pre
vented the support I gave it.

Mr. Floyd's remarks, in opposition to the resolution, appear to
me more accurately stated in his letter, than as reported in the In
telligencer ; but the addition which he has supplied, seems not ma
terial, in my view, for his " justification."

Permit me to add, that while 1 regret extremely the unfortunate
occasion, I nevertheless rejoice in perceiving that it has produced
a full development of the import and bearings of several important
points, which required only to be understood, to allay the jealousies
so natural, but I trust so unfounded, between the different sections
of our country, Your's respectfully,

T. FULLER

248

fr. From the National Intelligencer of 31^ August t 1822.

To the Editors of the National Intelligencer.

In the Richmond Enquirer of the 27th August, 1822, there is
published a letter from Mr. Floyd to the editors of that paper, in
which he says, that in my Rejoinder to Mr. Russell, I boldly and
confidently reiterate, that Mr. Russell procured HIM, to subserve
his purposes, and make the call in the House, which he did make ;
which assertion he unequivocally pronounces to be utterly desti
tute of that verity which ought always to characterize assertions
made to the public.

Whoever has read the Rejoinder, thus referred to, must have
seen that the name of Mr. Floyd is not so much as mentioned in it.
I have invariably spoken in it of the call of the House of Represent
atives, and have mentioned the mover of the Resolution, only to
gay, that when Mr. Russell left the City, on the fifth of May, I pre
sumed he knew that the call for the letter would not be renewed
by him. I have said that the call of the House of the 19th of
April, was made at Mr. Russell's instance or suggestion, and that it
was procured by him. My vouchers for this assertion, are the
declarations of Mr. Russell himself to Mr. Brent and Mr. Bailey,
as attested in their statements — from the latter of which it appears
how the call for Mr. Russell's letter was procured by him, namely,
that Mr Floyd, before offering the resolution, asked him for a copy
of the letter, which Mr. Russell declined giving, telling Mr. Floyd
that if he wished a copy, he must move a call for it. Mr. Floyd
has not denied this to be fact. If he did deny it, the question would
be upon the verity of Mr. Russell's assertion, and not of mine.
With the verity which ought always to characterize assertions
made to the public, I am as deeply impressed as I could be by the
precept of Mr. Floyd, or by his example.

JOHN QiJINCY ADAMS,

Washington, 30th August, 1822.

V. Further Remarks upon Mr. Floyd's Letter to the Editors of the
Richmond Enquirer.

The impartial editors of the Richmond Enquirer, in republish-
ing |his letter of mine to the editors of the National Intelligencer,
repelling the charge of Mr. Floyd, annexed to it a note of their
own, styling the distinction pointed out in my letter between the
motion of Mr. Floyd, and the call of the House of Representatives
which resulted from it, a nice distinction.

The distinction was this : Mr. Floyd had accused me of having,
" regardless of feelings or opinions, boldly and confidently reiterat-
" ed, in my Rejoinder, that Mr. Russell had procured him, (Mr,
<f Floyd,) to subserve his, (Mr. Russell's,) purposes, and make the
' call in the House which he did make." And upon this accusa-

249

tion, Mr. Floyd had taken ground to charge me with injustice to
him, and with having asserted of him that which was not true.

If 1 had asserted, personally, of Mr. Floyd, that which he im
puted to me, he would have had reason to take offence at the as-
s< • ion, and to deny its truth : but the assertion that the call of the
House, adopted upon his motion, was procured by Mr. Russell,
neither implied that Mr. Floyd had made himself subservient to
Mr. Russell's purposes, nor any thing at which Mr. Floyd could
justly take offence. The fact which I did assert, namely, that the
call for Mr. Russell's letter had been made at his own suggestion,
is not denied by Mr. Floyd, and is true. It was only by imputing
ro me an assertion that I had not made, that Mr. Floyd could make
himself ground to stand upon, in charging injustice to him, and un
truth upon my assertion.

My assertion was no more saying that Mr. Russell procured Mr.
Floyd to subserve his purposes, than that he procured the House
of Representatives to subserve his purposes.

In stating the simple fact, that the call of 19th April, 1822, was
moved for at the suggestion of Mr. Russell, I neither meant, nor
thought, that Mr. Floyd acted in subserviency to the purposes of Mr.
Russell. I knew he had purposes of his own. That so far as they
were applicable to me, those purposes concurred well with those
of Mr. Russell, I did believe ; but to Mr. Floyd, all that I meant to
impute, was, the wish to obtain the letter, and that the mode of ob
taining it had been suggested to him by Mr. Russell.

Mr. Floyd, sensitive as he is to the idea of a bare intimation that
a call of the House, moved for by him, had been procured by Mr.
Russell, has, nevertheless, not scrupled to say, in direct terms, that
I procured Mr. Fuller to make the call from which he, Mr. Floyd,
had desisted. I do not suppose that by this assertion Mr. Floyd
intended any thing offensive to Mr. Fuller ; and if he did not, still
less reason could he have for taking offence at my asserting, in
terms not even personal to himself, nor using his name, that a call
moved for by him had been procured by Mr. Russell. He had less
cause to use the term, as applicable to Mr. Fuller, than I had, as
applicable to him. His call of 19th April, had been directly sug
gested to him by Mr. Russell. After the President's message to
the House, of 4th May, declining the communication of the papers,
unless they should renew their call, it was unknown to me for two
days, whether Mr. Floyd would move a renewal of the call, or not.
The public curiosity was very highly excited, and many of the
members of both Houses of Congress, whom I casually saw in the
interval, spoke to me on the subject. I did not conceal from any
one of them, my wish that the papers should be communicated to
the House ; but I did not ask any one of them to renew the call.
I gave them all to understand that if Mr. Floyd should renew the
call, I hoped it would by no one be resisted, on any consideration
of regurd for me. Every one of them must have known, that if
Mr, Floyd did not renew t(he call, I should be glad if it were re-

newed by any other member : but I neither a^fced Mr. Fuller MM,
any other member to renew it. I did not, therefore, procure Mr,
Fuller, to renew the call and if I can be said to have procured thr
call, moved for by him, it was only by the expression of a general
wish to him, as to many others, that the papers should be commu
nicated to the House ; a wish which had already been made known
to the House by the message of the President.

Nothing offensive to Mr. Floyd was intended by me in my Re
joinder, nor, if he had been governed by his own maxim, could he
have seen any thing offensive to him in it. But there is one thing,
at least, in which there is, between Mr. Russell and Mr. Floyd, a
community of purpose : that of assuming an attitude of defence, for
the purpose of making an attack upon me.

Mr. Floyd, in the publication here alluded to, has indulged him
self in m$ny reflections and insinuations against me, which, having
no relation to the subject of this controversy, I deem it most respect
ful to the public to pass over in silence. I bear no enmity to Mr.
Floyd. Having no personal acquaintance with him, I can have no
feelings towards him, other than those excited by his conduct as a
public man, which is open to my observation as mine is open to

There had been a time when, upon a critical occasion, in which
my public conduct was not a little involved, Mr. Floyd, still more
pnknown to me than at present, had in the House of Represent
atives taken a part which had given him claims to my esteem — per
haps to rny gratitude. His copduct and opinions then, were doubt
less actuated exclusivejy by public motives, and without reference
at all to me — yet I was grateful to him for his support of a cause
which it had also been my duty to defend : the cause of a hero,
upon whose public services was invoked the public censure of his
country.*

Whatever were his motives for moving the first call for the
Ghent papers, or the second, for Mr. Russell's letter, as he thereby
only exercised his right as a representative of the people, 1 could
take no exception to it. There were no ties of private friendship
between Mr. Floyd and me, which made his case different from
that of Mr. Russell ; and if he had received his impression of the
transactions at Ghent from representations such as those of Mr,
Russell's letter, he might, without impropriety, move a call for the
papers, for the purpose of bringing the whole subject before Con
gress, and the nation, and of exposing what he might deem to be my
misconduct in the transaction, even though it should have no bear
ing upon his bill for the occupation of Columbia river.

By his publication in the Richmond Enquirer, he seems desirous
of being understood to disclaim any other purpose in moving the

* See the Debate in the House of Representatives, on the Seminole War,
February, 1819, Mr. Floyd's Speech.

251

calls, than to obtain information for the support anil elucidation of
that bill — yet his disclaimer is not explicit.

At the preceding session of Congress, as Chairman of a Commit
tee of the House Of Representatives, he had made a report recom
mending the establishment of a territory at the mouth of Columbia
river. He now states, that at that time, in conversation at his
lodgings with some of his friends, upon the subject of that report,
and upon the value of the fur trade of our western waters, the
wealth to be derived from that trade in the Canton market, and
the practicability of supplying the valley of the Mississippi with the
manufactures of that route, one gentleman observed, that the Mis
sissippi had been discussed at Ghent, and from the characters of the
gentlemen engaged in it, there was a strong probability that if Mn
Floyd had that correspondence, he would obtain something which
might be useful to him. Upon which he immediately determined to
make the call, as a proper mode of getting the papers, but after
wards determined to postpone the call until the next session.

Mr. Floyd has not informed the public, who it was that made the
suggestion to him, upon which he determined to call for the Ghent
correspondence ; but it was a person who knew that the Mississip
pi had been discussed at Ghent, and who, by suggesting this idea to
Mr. Floyd, sufficiently manifested the disposition that the corres
pondence containing the discussion of the Mississippi at Ghent,
should be brought before the public.

Mr. Floyd's projected bill might be an occasion to obtain this ob
ject, but where so much was known about the discussion of the Mis
sissippi at Ghent, other purposes, besides the occupation of Co
lumbia river, the fur trade, or the Canton market, were doubtless
contemplated in stimulating the call for the correspondence. I do
not mean to complain of such motives, if they were partaken by
Mr. Floyd : but while influenced by them, he cannot claim the
privilege of impartiality, with reference to this inquiry, nor should
he have appealed to the public, as if he had been injured by me,
for merely stating the fact, that the call of the House for Mr. Rus
sell's letter, had been moved for at the suggestion of Mr. Russel!
himself. By Mr. Floyd's own showing, his first call for the Ghent-
papers, had been suggested to him. He does not deny that the call
for Mr. Russell's letter was suggested to him, and he might have
added, even, that his coming forward in the Richmond Enquirer,
in aid of Mr. Russell, had been suggested to him by the editors of
that paper.*

The motives now alleged by Mr. Floyd for his call of 17th Ja
nuary, 1822, could not lead him to the suspicion, that there would
be any reluctance in the Executive to furnish all the documents
that could be useful to him for his Columbia river bill ; nor does it
indeed appear, that on the 16th of January, 1822, when he moved
the resolution, he suspected, or had reason to suspect, there would
be any difficulty in obtaining all the papers upon the call.

* ?ee the Richmond Enquirer of 2d August, 1822,

252

The case seems to have been different on the next day. Mr.
Floyd then proposed to strike out from his resolution, the exception
of papers, which, in the opinion of the President, it might be im
proper to disclose ; and to the demand for the correspondence, had
added that for the protocol.

The following observations of Mr. Floyd in this day's debate,
[17th January, 1822,] explaining his reasons for wishing for the
whole correspondence, without excepting even such parts of it as in
the President's opinion it might be improper to disclose, are par
ticularly remarkable. He observed " that the bill which he had
"this day reported to the House, contemplated a considerable
" change in the intercourse with the Indian tribes, in the West ; and
'* it appeared by the report of the Secretary of War, made yester-
" day, that a great influence was exercised over those tribes by our
" European neighbours in that quarter. The correspondence be-
" tween the commissioners at Ghent, embraced this subject among
" others, and he thought it was desirable that the House should be
" in possession of the whole of it."

Mr. Floyd, in his recent publication, says that when the papers
were communicated to the House, in answer to this call, on exam
ining them, he could not find any thing he wanted ; but that he ex
pected to find it in the letter of Mr. Russell, promised in his sepa
rate despatch of 25th December, 1814. He disclaims any inten
tion, however, of calling for a private letter, and says, that if by
any proper act he could have prevented tiiis affair, he would have
done so. Whether he found, in Mr. Russell's letter, when it was
communicated, any thing that he wanted, he has not said. There
was much touching the value of the Mississippi river, and much
about the influence exercised over those Indian tribes, by our Eu
ropean neighbours in that quarter : the bearing of it, or of any part
of it, upon Mr. Floyd's bill for the occupation of Columbia river, is
not so perceptible as its bearing upon the object which he now
seems to disclaim. If he means to be understood to say, that he had
no other motive in calling for that letter than those that he has as
signed in his recent publication, I should only regret that this paper,,
when obtained, was so little suited to answer his expectations, or to
give him the information of which he was in pursuit.

That he had other objects in view, it was certainly very natural
to believe, upon observing the earnestness with which he pressed for
the "whole Ghent correspondence, without excepting such part as
the President might think it improper to disclose ; and upon com
paring his observations in the debate of 17th January, with the
contents of Mr. Russell's letter,

His resolution of 19th April, called on the President (if not in
jurious to the public good) for any letter or communication, which
may have been received, from Jonathan Russell, after the signature
of the treaty of Ghent, and written in conformity to the indications
contained in his letter of 25th December, 1814. Although in this
call, there is neither qualification of the character of the kttcror

253

communication, whether public or private, of the time when, nor of
the person by whom, it might have been received, and by iis word
ing it seemed adapted to obtain precisely such a paper as Mr. Rus
sell did produce, yet, after what has been said by Mr. Floyd, I
must infer, that in making this call of 19th April, he did not know
that Mr. Russell's letter from Paris was a private letter. But Mr.
Russell himself did know it, and had, nevertheless, repeatedly ex
pressed the wish, that it might be communicated to the House un
der the first call of 17th January. In the interval between the
first and second call, he had sent for his own original of it to Men-
don — had received it, and was immediately afterwards prepared
with his duplicate, not marked private, but delivered by himself at
the Department of State as a public letter.

Of Mr. Floyd's anxious wish first, that the whole correspond
ence, and secondly, that this letter of Mr. Russell should come
before Congress, there can assuredly be no question. With re
gard to the correspondence, my wish to gratify him was the more
earnest, from the hope, that whatever might be his motive for
the call, he would be convinced there was none in the executive
for concealment. As to Mr. Russell's letter, before I knew its
contents, I wished it might be communicated, for the gratification
both of Mr. Russell and Mr. Floyd; and after I knew them, for my
own vindication and that of my colleagues of the majority at Ghent,
against them.

Mr. Floyd, when he says that I procured Mr. Fuller to make
the call (of 7th May,) which he, Mr. Floyd, had desisted from,
adds, that it seems this was so desirable to me as a mean of getting
into the newspapers

A biographer of Mr. Fox, charged the physicians who attended
him in his last illness, with having hastened his death by adminis
tering foxglove The physicians answered by declaring that they
had administered no foxglove to him ; upon which the biographer
turned upon them with a charge of having caused the patient's
death by omitting to administer foxglove, a remedy known to be
suited for his disease. Thus Mr. Floyd, after moving a call for
the Ghent papers, without excepting even such as the President
might think it improper to disclose ; after moving a second call for
any letter or communication, unless injurious to the public good,
which may have been received from Mr. Russell, on the subject,
after manifesting the utmost impatience for the papers, and not
sparing the excitement of suspicions that they would be garbled
or suppressed ; now turns upon me for concurring with him in the
wish, that they might all be produced, and imputes it all to a desire
on my part of getting into the newspapers.

It was not into the newspapers, but before the House of Repre
sentatives, that the motion of Mr. Fuller was adapted to bring me ;
and it was at the call of Mr. Floyd, with thp concurring will and

,32

agency of Mr. Russell, that I had been summoned there. Under
their auspices, I should have been introduced like a convict of the
inquisition, with my sentence upon my breast. My own wish was
lo appear with the accusation against me, and my defence for the
House to judge upon both. If Mr. Floyd had then reason to de
sist from his call, I had the more reason for wishing it renewed.

It was Mr. Russell, too, who chose to go into the newspapers,
first by publishing his triplicate in Philadelphia, and then his reply,
in the Boston Statesman. It was with extreme reluctance that I
followed him into that field, and I took the earliest opportunity of
withdrawing from it, until called there again by Mr. Floyd^

If Mr. Jefferson himself, the patriarch of the revolution, the
immortal author of the Declaration of Independence, in the re
tirement of private life, in the last stage of his illustrious career,
surrounded by the gratitude and veneration of his country, justly
thought it not unworthy of himself, to meet twice in the newspa
pers, the accusations of a nameless " Native of Virginia," because
they struck at his honour, I hope it will be imputed to no thirst for
newspaper contention, if I, who in comparison with him am but of
yesterday, but holding a public trust, for which dishonour is dis
qualification, have met in the publk journals, the concurring and
persevering, though variously pretexted and modified, attacks of a
native of Massachusetts and a native of Virginia, both supported by
their names, both acts of men, honoured themselves with public
confidence, and both tending, if not intended, to rob me of that
good name* without which to me public trust would be a reproach
and existence itself but a burthen.

The perusal of Mr. Russell's duplicate disclosed to me the mys
tery of ruin which had been brewing against me, from the very day
after the signature of the treaty of Ghent. It was by representa
tions like those of that letter, that the minds of my fellow citizens in
the West, had for a succession of years been abused and ulcerated
against me. That letter, indeed, inculpated the whole majority of
the mission at Ghent, but subsidiary slander had performed its part
of pointing all the guilt, and fastening all the responsibility of the
crime upon me. It was I who had made the proposal, and Mr.
Bayard, after assenting to it, had repented. Such were the tales
which had been for years in circulation, and which ceased not to
be told, until after the publication of Mr. Russell's letters and my
remarks. Imputations of motives of the deepest infamy, were
connected with these aspersions, conveyed in dark insinuations,
and vouched for upon pretended ambiguous givings out of the
dead.* Several of the public journals from the first call of Mr-
Floyd for the Ghent papers, had caught enough of the oracular and
prophetic spirit, to foresee that it would result in my irredeemable
disgrace. The House of Representatives had called for Mr. Rus-

* See the Aurora, daily, for the last \vcck in May, and the Richmond En
quirer of 4th June, 1822,

255

sell's letter : Mr. Russell himself had furnished it, to be reported
in answer to the call. Curiosity had been potioned into eager
ness for a sight of it, and of that eagerness Mr. Floyd had ex
hibited no unintelligible share. If his only object was to obtain
information useful to him, with reference to the Columbia River Bill,,
the indexes to his mind, in the debate of the 17th of January,
1822, had mistaken their direction. If he had another object, it
would have been candid to avow it then, and not to disavow it now.

Mr. Floyd says he will take no part in the controversy between
Mr. Russell and me. I should have had more reason to thank Mr.
Floyd for this profession of impartiality, if it comported better
either with the general tenor, or the particular import, of the pub
lication in which it is contained. Mr. Floyd must not be allowed
at once to claim the rights of neutrality and to practise acts of en
mity. The whole of his publication is full of hostility to me, as
inveterate as it was unprovoked : a neutral flag imd a raking broad
side are but indifferent vouchers for each other. Mr. Floyd now
comes forward in this controversy substantially as an auxiliary to
Mr. Russell, and as a pretext for it , he charges me with an asser
tion which I never made, that he may take it as personally offen
sive to himself, and attack me under a colour of self-defence. I
never gave cause of offence to Mr. Floyd, and if in the Ghent
papers for his profound researches touching the value of the Mis
sissippi river, or the discussion of the Mississippi at Ghent, he
could not find any thing he wanted, the fault was not mine. It is
usual to look for information to places where it is likely to he found.
If an astronomer should point his telescope to the moon in search
of spots on the face of the sun, it would not be surprising if he
could not find any thing that he wanted.

Mr. Floyd declares that he will not either in public or in private
refrain from commenting upon the public conduct and opinions of
any public man, who may be thought or may think himself entitled
to office. He adds that his opposition has always been political
and directed by the ideas he entertains of the power which gentle
men may think themselves entitled to exercise, under the constitution
of the United States. If, by these general expressions, Mr. Floyd
means any special reference to me, 1 have not the slightest objec
tion to his commenting upon my public conduct and opinions, whe
ther in public or private, while he will confine himself to that ex
act verity, of which he has so sound a theoretic conception. 1 am
perfectly willing even that he should take his Columbia River Bill
as the text for a comment upon the discussion of the Mississippi at
Ghent. But if he comments upon the power which / may think
myself entitled to exercise under the constitution of the United
States 4 from the ideas which he entertains of it, I shall only ask
the hearers to examine well the coincidence between my thoughts
and his ideas on the same subject. He says he looks upon the
constitution of the United States as containing expressed grants of
power, ai^d cannot approve any opposite opinion. I hold no oppo-

256

site opinion, and it' in his comments, public or private, Mr. Floyd
should impute to me that I do, I can only hope that his hearers will
juuge of my opinions as they are, and not according to the ideas of
them entertained by Mr. Floyd.

Mr. Floyd intimates that he shall hold me responsible not only
for every thing that I say of him, but for every thing that may be
said of him by persons in official stations under me. To the tirst
part of this determination I have no objection ; but he will excuse
me from holding myself responsible to him for what I do not say of
him, or for what may be said of him by any other man. The offi
cial dependence of the subordinate officers of government, neither
in law, justice, or equity disqualifies them for the exercise of the
rights, nor absolves them from the responsibility of giving testimo
ny ; and the credit due to that testimony, depends not upon official
station, but upon individual character. I called upon Mr. Brent
and Mr. Bailey for statements of facts, material in the controversy
between Mr. Russell and me, and known only to them. They have
long held in the Department, offices of great trust and confidence, of
fices for which no other than men of perfect integrity and unsullied
reputation could be qualified. They are not personally known to
Mr. Floyd ; and I do him the justice to believe, that if they had
been, he would have spared some of his reflections. But they are
extensively known to others, and wherever known, are respected,

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS,

DAVIS & FORCE, PRINT.

CONTENTS.

Page.

INTRODUCTION. 3
Debate in House of Representatives of the U. S. 17th January, 1822.

From the National Intelligencer,....* 4

CORRESPONDENCE WHICH LED TO THE TREATY OF GHENT.

Extracts from the Journal of the House of Representatives of the Unit
ed States, of the 16th and 17th January, 1822, 13

Mr. Floyd's Resolutions calling for the Ghent Correspondence, 13

Message from the President of the United States to the House, transmit
ting the Correspondence....... 21 Feby. 1822, 13

Report of the Correspondence to the President of the United States by

the Secretary of State, 13

American Note No. 6, in answer to British Note No. 6,.. 10 Nov. 1814, 14

Project of a Treaty sent with the above Note, 17

British Note, No. 7, 26 Nov'r 1814, 24

Project of a Treaty as returned with this Note, 26

American Note No. 7, in reply to British Note, No. 7,... 30 Nov'r 1814, 42

Extract of a Law of the United States, passed July 6, 1812, 43

.British Note, No. 8, 30 Nov'r 1814, 43

Protocol of Conference...... 1 Dec'r 1814, 44

Protocol of Conference, lODec'r 1814, 46

Protocol of Conference, 12 Dec'r 1814, 47

American Note, No. 8, 14 Dec'r 1814, 4fc

British Note, No. 10, in answer to American Note, No. 8, 22 Dec'r 1814, 50

Protocol of Conference, 23 Dec'r 1814, 51

American Plenipotentiaries to the Secretary of State of the

United States, 25 Dec'r 1814, 53

Mr. Russell to the Secretary of State— Extract, 25 Dec'r 1814, 56

Mr. Gallatin to the Secretary of State, 25^ Dec'r 1814, 5?

THE DUPLICATE LETTERS AND THE REMAKS.

Extracts from the Journal of the House of Representatives of the Unit
ed States, 18 and 19 April, 1822, 59

Mr. Floyd's Resolution calling for Mr. Russell's Letter, 59

Message from the President of the U. States to the House, 4 May, 1822, 59
Report of the Duplicate to the President of the United

States by the Secretary of State, 3 May, 1822, 60

Extracts from the Journal of the House of Representatives

of the United States, 6 and 7 May, 1822, 61

Mr. Fuller's Resolution.

Iracl fr.'inthe National Intelligencer of 13th June. 1822. 6l

CONTENTS.

Page.

DebateonMr. Fuller's Resolution, »...t 61

Message from the President of the United States to the House, transmit
ting the Duplicate Letters and the Remarks of the Secretary of

State, ? May, 1822, 63

Report to the President of the United States of the Secretary of State's

Remarks, 63

Mr. Russell's Private Letter to the Scc'y of State. Paris, ll Feb'y 1815, 64

Duplicate, left 22 April, 1822, by Mr. Russell at the Department of State, C5

Remarks thereon, by John Quincy Adams 3 May, 1822, 8?>

THE TRIPLICATE.

Extracts from the National Gazette. Philadelphia, 10 and 25 May,
1822,.. 114, 118

Mr. Russell's Reply to Mr. Adams. From the Boston Statesman, 27
June 1822, „ 119

Mr. Adams's Rejoinder. From the National Intelligencer of 17th July
and 7th August, 1822, 138, 158

Mr. Brent's Statement, 155

Mr, Bailey's Statement,.... 156

FURTHER STRICTURES ON MR. RUSSELL'S REPRESENTATIONS AND
STATEMENTS!.

I. Navigation of the Mississippi — worthless to the British,...* .«. 163

Tl. Right to the Fishing Liberties — Effect of War upon Treaties — Pecu
liar character of the Treaty of 1783, 182

'•211. Fishing Liberties — Their Value, 202

Mr. Lloyd's Letter, 210

Newfoundland Memorial. From Niles's Register, of 11 June, 1814, 22 1
Extracts from Colquhoun's Treatise on the Wealth, Power, and

Resources of the British Empire, 223

Conclusion, 229

APPENDIX.

I. Western Commentaries,. 232

Extract from the Argus of Western America, Frankfort, Kentucky,

18 July, 1822, 233

Remarks on the above Extract, '234

il. Mr. Floyd's Letter—Richmond Enquirer of 2? August, 1822, 243

HI. Mr. Fuller's Letter — Boston Patriot of 4- September, 1822, 247

IV. Mr. Adams's Answer to Mr. Floyd's Letter — National Intelligencer

of 31 August, 1822, 248

V. Furthei Remarks upon Mr. Floyd's Letter,.,.... 248

ERRATA.

I'agc 15, line 5, for " are ad y," read "already."

18, last line but one, for "boundaries,'' read " countries.**

20, line 24, for " article," read " article."

24-, 25, for " ratification," read "ratifications.''

25, 15, for ** negotiations," read "negotiations."

•!•(>, 3, from the bottom, for "plenipotiaries," read "plerii*

pntentiaries."

71, 20, towards the end, strike out "the."
71, 29, for "dependant," read "dependent."

'77, 6, between " our1' and " Instructions/' insert "other,"'

77, 39, for " were," read " was."

78, 32, at the beginning of the lino, add "from.''
86, last line but one, for " grant to," read "grant or.'*
o7, line 37, before "negotiation," add " of the."

10P>, 31, for "then," read "than."

117, 24, for "only," read "ably."

121, 3 from the bottom, for "rating," read "eating."

121, 2 from the bottom, for " oily," read " rity."

130, 5, for "conference, read " conference."

133, 10 from the bottom, for " proprienty," road M propriety .9

147, 21, at the beginning, strike out "in.'*

152, 12, for "oiignal," read "original."

161, 1C, for "them," read "it."

200, 6, for "9th," read " bth."

221, 12, for <l 24th," read "25th."

2^7, 4, after "opinion," !n?f-t «« upon.'1''

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