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Authoiewin. Kurt

TitleDynarnic theory of personality
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McGRAW-HILL PUBLICATIONS IN PSYCHOLOGY
J. F. DASHIELL, PH.D., CONSULTING EDITOR

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

Selected Papers

McGraw-Hill Publications tn Psychology
JOHN F. DAS II I ELL

CONHULTINQ EDI'IOK

Barker, Kounin, and Wright CHILD BEHAVIOR AND DEVELOP-
MENT

/Jro?/>n -PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

Brown THE PSYCHODYNAMICS OF ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR

Col? GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY

Craftx, Schneirla, Hobinxon, and Gilbert - RECENT EXPERI-
MENTS IN PSYCHOLOGY

Davis PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING

Dunlap RELIGION: ITS FUNCTIONS IN HUMAN LIFE

Ghiselli and Brown PERSONNEL AND INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Gray PSYCHOLOGY IN HUMAN AFFAIRS

Guilford FUNDAMENTAL STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND Ki>-
uc ATIO N

Guilford Ps YC HOM ETHIC M ETI IODS

Hurlock ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT

Hurlock CHILD DEVELOPMENT

Johnson ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY

Krech and Crutchfield THEORY AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY

Lnrin A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

Lewin PRINCIPLES OF TOPOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

McNemar and Merrill (AW.) STUDIES IN PERSONALITY

Maier FRUSTRATION

Maier and frchneirla PRINCIPLES OF ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY

Moore PSYCHOLOGY FOR BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY

Morgan PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Page ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY

Pdlsbury AN ELEMENTARY PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ABNORMAL

Richards MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Seashore PSYCHOLOGY OF Music

Reward SEX AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

titagner PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONALITY

Terman and Miles SEX AND PERSONALITY

Wallin PERSONALITY MALADJUSTMENTS AND MENTAL HY-
GIENE

A DYNAMTC' THEORY
OF PERSONALITY

Selected Papers

KURT LEWIN, Pn.D.

Formerly Professor of Psychology at the University of Berlin;
Acting Professor at Cornell University

TRANSLATED BY

DONALD K. ADAMS, PH.D.

Duke University
AND

KARL E. ZENER, Pii.D.

Duke University

FIRST EDITION
NINTH IMPRESSION

McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, INC.

NEW YORK AND LONDON
1935

PREFACE

The present book is a collection of originally independent
articles which were written at different times and for quite
different occasions. Hence, the reader will find some of the
fundamental ideas recurring throughout the book. The selec-
tion has been made in order to give a picture of the fields thus
far studied, th& psychology of the person and of the environ-
ment, and at the same time to indicate their connections with
the various applied fields, especially child psychology, peda-
gogy, psychopathology, characterology, and social psychology.

Only a few years ago one could observe, at least among
German psychologists, a quite pessimistic mood. After the
initial successes of experimental psychology in its early stages,
it seemed to become clearer and clearer that it would remain
impossible for experimental method to press on beyond the
psychology of perception and memory to such vital problems
as those with which psychoanalysis was concerned. Weighty
" philosophical " and " methodological" considerations seemed
to make such an undertaking a priori impossible. The first
positive experiments in this direction seemed only to confirm
the belief that the experimental psychology of (will, emotion,
and character was condemned to rest content with surface facts
and to leave all deeper problems to schools and speculation,
incapable of experimental test.

Working in this field I felt that I had begun a task methodo-
logically and technically sound and necessary, the broader
elaboration of which could not be expected for decades. Never-
theless it soon became clear that though these problems are
difficult, they are by no means impossible to solve. One had
only to clear out a number of hoary philosophical prejudices
and to set his scientific goal high enough to arrive at explana-
tion and prediction. Today it can no longer be doubted that
the questions set, for example, by psychoanalysis are readily
accessible to experimental clarification if only appropriate
methods and concepts are employed. Indeed, it seems some-

vi PREFACE

what easier to advance to dynamic laws in the field of needs
and emotions than in the psychology of perception. My visit
to American universities during the last year has shown me
that, in spite of all the differences of historical background, the
belief in these possibilities is giving rise to many experiments.
The relations to psychopathology and to comparative psy-
chology give promise of becoming especially fruitful. Natu-
rally I know how near the beginning we stand. But the
development seems to be proceeding much more rapidly than I
had hoped. The reason for this is, above all, the historical
position of psychology, which is ripe for a "Galileian" mode of
thought.

I have been asked whether I approve of the name "topolo-
gical psychology" for this type of research. I have no objec-
tion to it so long as the following points are emphasized. I am
convinced that psychology is today in a position to grow
beyond the "schools" in the old sense of the word. To con-
tribute to this growth is a major goal of our work which uses,
so far as possible, the language of mathematics. For this
language is less equivocal than any other and at the same time
"objective" and "unspeculative," since it expresses only the
structural order of things and events. However, I do not
limit myself to concepts of topology. Furthermore, the use of
mathematical language is only an expression of a more general
"constructive" method whose chief characteristic is its greater
ability to bridge the gap between theory and particular fact.
Nevertheless, topology remains the basic mathematical disci-
pline for the presentation of dynamics in the whole field of
psychology, and I am more and more convinced that it will
become, beyond this, a solid framework for a dynamic sociology.

Doctors D. K. Adams and Karl Zener have undertaken the
great labor of translating the articles into English. Only
those who know the difficulties of this sort of translation in
scientifically new fields will appreciate the extent to which I am
indebted to them. KuRT LWIN

ITHACA, NEW YORK,
Kfarchf IQ35-

TRANSLATORS' PREFACE

Several of the terms used in this translation may be better
understood if the German terms which they are designed to
translate are indicated. The adjectives psychisch and scelisch
have both been translated "psychic" or "psychical" because it
seems to us that events, processes, and structures that are
properly called psychical do not become psychological until they
have been operated upon in some way by the science of psy
chology or by psychologists. An ambiguity is thus avoided
which could give rise to unnecessary misunderstandings and
which, in the case of physics, has done so. Thus the expression
"the physical world" is ambiguous because it may mean "the
material world of experience" or "the world of physics," two
radically different things.

The word Seelc has been translated, with much misgiving,
by "mind." We had thought to translate it by "soul," in the
belief that the time was ripe for a reintroduction of the latter
word into the technical English terminology of psychology.
It seemed impossible that there should be any confusion of the
psychological "soul/' deduced as it is from concrete behavior,
with the "soul" of theology, the properties of which cannot be
derived from or tested by concrete behavior. But a sampling
of opinion among American psychologists was against the use
of this more accurate translation. It is consequently necessary
to point out that "mind" as here used ("the totality of psychi-
cal systems") is not to be taken in any narrowly intellectualistic
sense but rather in a meaning approximating that of McDougall.
In his later papers Lewin uses the term psychologische Person
(translated by "psychological person") in what seems to be
essentially the same sense as Seele in the earlier articles.

Other translations which might require comment are ex-
plained either in the text itself or in notes.

viii TRANSLATORS' PREFACE

Acknowledgment is due Professor Murchison, Director, and
the Clark University Press for permission to reprint Chapters I
and III, which originally appeared in the Journal of General
Psychology, Volume 5, pages 141-177, and in Murchison 's
Handbook of Child Psychology, respectively.

The monograph Die psychologische Situation bei Lohn und
Strafe (Chapter IV of this book) was first published by Hirzel
of Leipzig in 1931. The "Theorie des Schwachsinns" (Chapter
VII of this book) was published in Hommage au Dr. Decroly
by Les Usines reunies Scheerders van Kerchove a St.-Nicholas-
W., Belgium in 1933. "Erziehung zur Realitat" (Chapter V
of this book) was published in Die Neue Erziehung in 1931.
We have to thank the publishing house of Julius Springer,
Berlin, for permission to translate the portion of Vorsalz,
Wille und Bedurfnis which appears in Chapter II and for the
use of most of the figures in Chapter VIII. The latter have
been redrawn after certain of those in the long series of articles
edited by Professor Lewin in the Psychologische Forschung.
We also wish to thank Mr. Charles E. Stuart for generous
assistance in preparing the drawings.

D. K. ADAMS.
K. E. ZENER.

DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA,
March, 1935.

CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFACE v

TRANSLATORS' PREFACE vii

CHAPTER I
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ARISTOTELIAN AND GALILEIAN MODES

OF THOUGHT IN CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY ... i

CHAPTER II
ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE MIND 43

CHAPTER III

ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES IN CHILD BEHAVIOR AND DEVELOP-
MENT .... . 66

CHAPTER IV

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATIONS OF REWARD AND PUNISH-
MENT . . 114

CHAPTER V
EDUCATION FOR REALITY 171

CHAPTER VI

SUBSTITUTE ACTIVITY AND SUBSTITUTE VALUE 180

CHAPTER VII
A DYNAMIC THEORY OF THE FEEBLE-MINDED 194

CHAPTER VIII
SURVEY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS 239

INDEX OF NAMES 275

INDEX OF SUBJECTS 279

A DYNAMIC THEORY
OF PERSONALITY

CHAPTER I

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ARISTOTELIAN AND

GALILEIAN MODES OF THOUGHT IN

CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY 1

In the discussion of several urgent problems of current experi-
mental and theoretical psychology I propose to review the
development of the concepts of physics, and particularly the
transition from the Aristotelian to the Galileian mode of
thought. My purpose is not historical; rather do I believe
that certain questions, of considerable importance in the recon-
struction of concepts in present-day psychology, may be clarified
and more precisely stated through such a comparison, which
provides a view beyond the difficulties of the clay.

I do not intend to infer by deduction from the history of
physics what psychology ought to do. I am not of the opinion
that there is only one empirical science, namely, physics;
and the question whether psychology, as a part of biology,
is reducible to physics or is an independent science may here
be left open.

Since we are starting from the point of view of the researcher,
we shall, in our contrast of Aristotelian and Galileian con-
cept formation, be less concerned with personal nuances of
theory in Galileo and Aristotle than with certain ponderable
differences in the modes of thought that determined the actual
research of the medieval Aristotelians and of the post-Galileian

1 Jour. Gen. PsyrhoL, 1931, 5 f 141-177, edited by Carl Murchison.

2 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

physicists. Whether some particular investigator had pre-
viously shown the later sort of thinking in respect to some
special point or whether some very modern speculations of the
relativity theory should accord in some way with Aristotle's
is irrelevant in the present connection.

In order to provide a special setting for the theoretical treat-
ment of the dynamic problems, I shall consider first the general
characteristics of Aristotelian and Galileian physics and of
modern psychology.

GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE Two MODES OF THOUGHT

In Physics

If one asks what the most characteristic difference between
"modern" post-Galileian and Aristotelian physics is, one
receives, as a rule, the following reply, which has had an impor-
tant influence upon the scientific ideals of the psychologist:
the concepts of Aristotelian physics were anthropomorphic and
inexact. Modern physics, on the contrary, is quantitatively
exact, and pure mathematical, functional relations now occupy
the place of former anthropomorphic explanations. These
have given to physics that abstract appearance in which modern
physicists are accustomed to take special pride.

This view of the development of physics is, to be sure, per-
tinent. But if one fixes one's attention less upon the style of
the concepts employed and more upon their actual functions
as instruments for understanding the world, these differences
appear to be of a secondary nature, consequences of a deep-
lying difference in the conception of the relation between the
world and the task of research.

Aristotelian Concepts.

Their Valuative Character. As in all sciences, the detachment
of physics from the universal matrix of philosophy and practice
was only gradually achieved. Aristotelian physics is full of
concepts which today are considered not only as specifically
biological, but preeminently as valuative concepts. It abounds
in specifically normative concepts taken from ethics, which

ARISTOTELIAN AND GALILEIAN MODES OF THOUGHT 3

occupy a place between valuative and nonvaluative concepts:
the highest forms of motions are circular and rectilinear, and
they occur only in heavenly movements, those of the stars; the
earthly sublunar world is endowed with motion of inferior types.
There are similar valuative differences between causes: on one
side there are the good or, so to speak, authorized forces of a
body which come from its tendency toward perfection (reXos),
and on the other side the disturbances due to chance and to the
opposing forces (jSta) of other bodies.

This kind of classification in terms of values plays an extra-
ordinarily important part in medieval physics. It classes
together many things with very slight or unimportant relation
and separates things that objectively are closely and impor-
tantly related.

It seems obvious to me that this extremely " anthropomor-
phic' 7 mode of thought plays a large role in psychology, even to
the present day. Like the distinction between earthly and
heavenly, the no less valuative distinction between "normal"
and "pathological" has for a long time sharply differentiated
two fields of psychological fact and thus separated the phe-
nomena which are fundamentally most nearly related.

No less important is the fact that value concepts completely
dominate the conceptual setting of the special problems, or
have done so until very recently. Thus, not till lately has
psychology begun to investigate the structural (Gestalt)
relations concerned in perception, thus replacing the concept of
optical illusion, a concept which, derived not from psychological
but from epistemological categories, unwarrantedly lumps
together all these " illusions" and sets them apart from the other
phenomena of psychological optics. Psychology speaks of the
"errors" of children, of "practice," of "forgetting," thus classify-
ing whole groups of processes according to the value of their
products, instead of according to the nature of the psychological
processes involved. Psychology is, to be sure, beyond classify-
ing events only on the basis of value when it speaks of disturb-
ances, of inferiority and superiority in development, or of the
quality of performance on a test. On all sides there are ten-

4 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

dencies to attack actual psychological processes. But there
can hardly be any doubt that we stand now only at the begin-
ning of this stage, that the same transitional concepts that we
have seen in the Aristotelian physics to lie between the valua-
tive and the nonvaluative are characteristic of such antitheses
as intelligence and feeble-mindedness or drive and will. The
detachment of the conceptual structure of psychology from the
utilitarian concepts of pedagogy, medicine, and ethics is only
partly achieved.

It is quite possible, indeed I hold it to be probable, that the
utility or performance concepts, such as a "true" cognition
versus an "error," may later acquire a legitimate sense. If
that is the case, however, an " illusion " will have to be char-
acterized not epistemologically but biologically.

Abstract Classification. When the Galileian and post-
Galileian physics disposed of the distinction between heavenly
and earthly and thereby extended the field of natural law
enormously, it was not due solely to the exclusion of value
concepts, but also to a changed interpretation of classification.
For Aristotelian physics the membership of an object in a
given class was of critical importance, because for Aristotle
the class defined the essence or essential nature of the object
and thus determined its behavior in both positive and negative
respects.

This classification often took the form of paired opposites,
such as cold and warm, dry and moist, and compared with
present-day classification had a rigid, absolute character.
In modern quantitative physics dichotomous classifications
have been entirely replaced by continuous gradations. Sub-
stantial concepts have been replaced by functional concepts.

Here also it is not difficult to point out the analogous stage of
development in contemporary psychology. The separation
of intelligence, memory, and impulse bears throughout the
characteristic stamp of Aristotelian classification; and in some
fields, for example, in the analysis of feelings (pleasantness and

1 E. CASSIRER, Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegrijf, Untersuchungen uber die
Grundfragcn der Erkenntniskritik, B. Cassirer, Berlin, IQIO.

ARISTOTELIAN AND GALILEIAN MODES OF THOUGHT 5

unpleasantness), or of temperaments, 1 or of drives, 2 such
dichotomous classifications as Aristotle's are even today of
great significance. Only gradually do these classifications
lose their importance and yield to a conception which seeks to
derive the same laws for all these fields, and to classify the whole
field on the basis of other, essentially functional, differences.

The Concept of Law. Aristotle's classes are abstractly
defined as the sum total of those characteristics which a group
of objects have in common. This circumstance is not merely a
characteristic of Aristotle's logic, but largely determines his
conception of lawfulness and chance, which seems to me so
important to the problems of contemporary psychology as to
require closer examination.

For Aristotle those things are lawful, conceptually intelli-
gible, which occur without exception. Also, and this he empha-
sizes particularly, those are lawful which occur frequently.
Excluded from the class of the conceptually intelligible as
mere chance are those things which occur only once, individual
events as such. Actually since the behavior of a thing is
determined by its essential nature, and this essential nature is
exactly the abstractly defined class (i.e., the sum total of the
common characteristics of a whole group of objects), it follows
that each event, as a particular event, is chance, undetermined.
For in these Aristotelian classes individual differences disappear.

The real source of this conception may lie in the fact that for
Aristotelian physics not all physical processes possess the lawful
character ascribed to them by post-Galileian physics. To the
young science of physics the universe it investigated appeared
to contain as much that was chaotic as that was lawful. The
lawfulness, the intelligibility of physical processes was still
narrowly limited. It was really present only in certain proc-
esses, for example, the courses of the stars, but by no means in
all the transitory events of the earth. Just as for other young
sciences, it was still a question for physics, whether physical

1 R. SOMMER, t)ber Personlichkeitstypen, Ber. Kong, f, cxper. PsychoL, 1925.

2 LEWIN, Die Entwicklung der experimentellen Willens psychologic und die
Psychotherapie, S. Hirzel, Leipzig, 1929

6 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

processes were subject to law and if so how far. And this
circumstance exercised its full effect on the formation of physical
concepts, even though in philosophical principle the idea of
general lawfulness already existed. In post-Galileian physics,
with the elimination of the distinction between lawful and
chance events, the necessity also disappeared of proving that the
process under consideration was lawful. For Aristotelian
physics, 1 on the contrary, it was necessary to have criteria to
decide whether or not a given event was of the lawful variety.
Indeed the regularity with which similar events occurred in
nature was used essentially as such a criterion. Only such
events, as the celestial, which the couime of history proves to
be regular, or at least frequent, are subject to law; and only
in so far as they are frequent, and hence more than individual
events, are they conceptually intelligible. In other words, the
ambition of science to understand the complex, chaotic, and
unintelligible world, its faith in the ultimate decipherability of
this world, were limited to such events as were certified by
repetition in the course of history to possess a certain per-
sistence and stability.

In this connection it must not be forgotten that Aristotle's
emphasis on frequency (as a further basis for lawfulness, besides
absolute regularity) represents, relative to his predecessors, a
tendency toward the extension and concrete application of the
principle of lawfulness. The " empiricist/' Aristotle, insists
that not only the regular but the frequent is lawful. Of course,
this only makes clearer his antithesis of individuality and law,
for the individual event as such still lies outside the pale of
the lawful and hence, in a certain sense, outside the task of
science. Lawfulness remains limited to cases in which events
recur and classes (in Aristotle's abstract sense) reveal the
essential nature of the events.

This attitude toward the problem of lawfulness in nature,
which dominated medieval physics and from which even the
opponents of Aristotelian physics, such as Bruno and Bacon,
escaped only gradually, had important consequences in several
respects.

ARISTOTELIAN AND GALILEIAN MODES OF THOUGHT 7

As will be clear from the preceding text, this concept of lawful-
ness had throughout a quasi-statistical character. Lawfulness
was considered as equivalent to the highest degree of generality,
as that which occurs very often in the same way, as the extreme
case of regularity, and hence as the perfect antithesis of the
infrequent or of the particular event. The statistical deter-
mination of the concept of lawfulness is still clearly marked
in Bacon, as when he tries to decide through his tabula praesentia
whether a given association of properties is real (essential) or
fortuitous. Thus he ascertains, for example, the numerical
frequency of the cases in which the properties warm and dry
are associated in everyday life. Less mathematically exact,
indeed, but no less clear is this statistical way of thinking in
the whole body of Aristotelian physics.

At the same time and this is one of the most important
consequences of the Aristotelian conception regularity or
particularity was understood entirely in historical terms.

The complete freedom from exceptions, the " always" which
is found also in the later conceptions of physical lawfulness,
still has here its original connections with the frequency with
which similar cases have occurred in the actual, historical
course of events in the everyday world. A crude example
will make this clearer: light objects, under the conditions
of everyday life, relatively frequently go up; heavy objects
usually go down. The flame of the fire, at any rate under the
conditions known to Aristotle, almost always goes upward.
It is these frequency rules, within the limits of the climate,
mode of life, etc., familiar to Aristotle, that determine the
nature and tendency to be ascribed to each class of objects
and lead in the present instance to the conclusion that flames
and light bodies have a tendency upward.

Aristotelian concept formation has yet another immediate
relation to the geographically-historically given, in which it
resembles, as do the valuative concepts mentioned above, the
thinking of primitive man and of children.

When primitive man uses different words for "walking,"
depending upon its direction, north or south, or upon the sex

8 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

of the walker, or upon whether the latter is going into or out
of a house, 1 he is employing a reference to the historical situation
that is quite similar to the putatively absolute descriptions
(upward or downward) of Aristotle, the real significance of
which is a sort of geographic characterization, a place definition
relative to the earth's surface. 2

The original connection of the concepts with the "actuality,"
in the special sense of the given historic-geographic circum-
stajices, is perhaps the most important feature of Aristotelian
physics. It is from this almost more even than from its tele-
ology that his physics gets its general anthropomorphic char-
acter. Even in the minute particulars of theorizing and in the
actual conduct of research it is always evident not only that
physical and normative concepts are still undifferentiated, but
that the formulation of problems and the concepts that we
would today distinguish, on the one hand, as historic 3 and, on
the other, as nonhistoric or systematic are inextricably inter-
woven. (Incidentally, an analogous confusion exists in the
early stages of other sciences, for example in economics.)

From these conceptions also the attitude of Aristotelian
physics toward lawfulness takes a new direction. So long as
lawfulness remained limited to such processes as occurred
repeatedly in the same way, it is evident not only that the young
physics still lacked the courage to extend the principle to all
physical phenomena, but also that the concept of lawfulness

1 L. L&VY-BRUHL, La Mcnlalitt primitive, Alcan, Paris, 1922, (5th ed., 1927).

2 In the following pages we shall frequently have to use the term "historic-
geographic." This is not in common usage, but it seems to me inaccurate to
contrast historic and systematic questions. The real opposition is between
"type" (of object, process, situation) and "occurrence." And for concepts that
deal with occurrence, the reference to absolute geographic space-coordinates is
just as characteristic as that to absolute time-coordinates by means of dates.

At the same time, the concept of the geographic should be understood in such
a general sense as to refer to juxtaposition, correlative to historical succession,
and as to be applicable to psychical events.

3 There is no term at present in general use to designate nonhistoric problem
formulations. I here employ the term " systematic," meaning thereby, not
" ordered," but collectively nonhistoric problems and laws such as those which
form the bulk of present-day physics (see p. 12).

ARISTOTELIAN AND GALILEI AN MODES OF THOUGHT O

still had a fundamentally historic, a temporally particular
significance. Stress was laid not upon the general validity
which modern physics understands by lawfulness, but upon the
events in the historically given world which displayed the
required stability. The highest degree of lawfulness, beyond
mere frequency, was characterized by the idea of always, eternal
(del as against eVi TO TroXu). That is, the stretch of historic
time for which constancy was assumed was extended to eternity.
General validity of law was not yet clearly distinguished from
eternity of process. Only permanence, or at least frequent
repetition, was proof of more than momentary validity. Even
here in the idea of eternity, which seems to transcend the
historical, the connection with immediate historic actuality
is still obvious, and this close connection was characteristic of
the " empiricist " Aristotle's method and concepts.

Not only in physics but in other sciences for example, in
economics and biology it can be clearly seen how in certain
early stages the tendency to empiricism, to the collection and
ordering of facts, carries with it a tendency to historical concept
formation, to excessive valuation of the historical.

Galileian Physics. *

From the point of view of this sort of empiricism the concept
formation of Galileian and post- Galileian physics must seem
curious and even paradoxical.

As remarked above, the use of mathematical tools and the
tendency to exactness, important as they are, cannot be con-
sidered the real substance of the difference between Aristotelian
and Galileian physics. It is indeed quite possible to recast in
mathematical form the essential content of, for example, the
dynamic ideas of Aristotelian physics (see page 16). It is
conceivable that the development of physics could have taken
the form of a mathematical rendition of Aristotelian concepts
such as is actually taking place in psychology today. In
reality, however, there were only traces of such a tendency,
such as Bacon's quasi-statistical methods, mentioned above.

io A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

The main development took another direction and proved to
be a change of content rather than a mere change of form.

The same considerations apply to the exactness of the new
physics. It must not be forgotten that in Galileo's time there
were no clocks of the sort we have today, that these first became
possible through the knowledge of dynamics founded upon
Galileo's work. 1 Even the methods of measurement used by
Faraday in the early investigations of electricity show how little
exactness, in the current sense of precision to such and such a
decimal place, had to do with these critical stages in the develop-
ment of physics.

The real sources of the tendency to quantification lie some-
what deeper, namely in a new conception by the physicist of
the nature of the physical world, in an extension of the demands
of physics upon itself in the task of understanding the world,
and in an increased faith in the possibility of their fulfillment.
These are radical and far-reaching changes in the fundamental
ideas of physics, and the tendency to quantification is simply
one of their expressions.

Homogenization. The outlook of a Bruno, a Kepler, or a
Galileo is determined by the idea of a comprehensive, all-
embracing unity of the physical world. The same law governs
the courses of the stars, the falling of stones, and the flight of
birds. This homogenization of the physical world with respect
to the validity of law deprives the division of physical objects
into rigid abstractly defined classes of the critical significance
it had for Aristotelian physics, in which membership in a
certain conceptual class was considered to determine the
physical nature of an object.

Closely related to this is the loss in importance of logical
dichotomies and conceptual antitheses. Their places are taken
by more and more fluid transitions, by gradations which deprive
the dichotomies of their antithetical character and represent in
logical form a transition stage between the class concept and
the series concept. 2

1 E. MACH, Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung, Leipzig, 1921.

2 E. CASSIRER, op. cit.

ARISTOTELIAN AND GALILEI AN MODES OF THOUGHT n

Genetic Concepts. This dissolution of the sharp antitheses
of rigid classes was greatly accelerated by the coeval transition
to an essentially functional way of thinking, to the use of
conditional-genetic concepts. For Aristotle the immediate
perceptible appearance, that which present-day biology terms
the phenotype, was hardly distinguished from the properties
that determine the object's dynamic relations. The fact, for
example, that light objects relatively frequently go upward
sufficed for him to ascribe to them an upward tendency. With
the differentiation of phenotype from genotype or, more gener-
ally, of descriptive from conditional-genetic 1 concepts and the
shifting of emphasis to the latter, many old class distinctions
lost their significance. The orbits of the planets, the free
falling of a stone, the movement of a body on an inclined plane,
the oscillation of a pendulum, which if classified according to
their phenotypes would fall into quite different, indeed into
antithetical classes, prove to be simply various expressions of
the same law.

Concreteness. The increased emphasis upon the quantitative
which seems to lend to modern physics a formal and abstract
character is not derived from any tendency to logical formality.
Rather, the tendency to a full description of the concrete
actuality, even that of the particular case, was influential, a
circumstance which should be especially emphasized in con-
nection with present-day psychology. The particular object
in all departments of science not only is determined in kind
and thereby qualitatively, but it possesses each of its properties
in a special intensity or to a definite degree. So long as one
regards as important and conceptually intelligible only such
properties of an object as are common to a whole group of
objects, the individual differences of degree remain without
scientific relevance, for in the abstractly defined classes these
differences more or less disappear. With the mounting aspira-
tions of research toward an understanding of actual events
and particular cases, the task of describing the differences

1 LEWIN, Gesetz und Experiment in der Psychologie, Weltkreis verlag, Berlin-
Schlachtensee, 1927.

12 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

of degree that characterized individual cases had necessarily
to increase in importance and finally required actual quanti-
tative determination.

It was the increased desire, and also the increased ability,
to comprehend concrete particular cases, and to comprehend
them fully, which, together with the idea of the homogeneity
of the physical world and that of the continuity of the properties
of its objects, constituted the main impulse to the increasing
quantification of physics.

Paradoxes of the New Empiricism. This tendency toward the
closest possible contact with actuality, which today is usually
regarded as characteristic and ascribed to an antispeculative
tendency, led to a mode of concept formation diametrically
opposed to that of Aristotle, and, surprisingly enough, involved
also the direct antithesis of his " empiricism."

The Aristotelian concepts show, as we have seen above, an
immediate reference to the historically given reality and to the
actual course of events. This immediate reference to the
historically given is lacking in modern physics. The fact, so
decisively important for Aristotelian concepts, that a certain
process occurred only once or was very frequently or invariably
repeated in the course of history, is practically irrelevant to
the most essential questions of modern physics. 1 This circum-
stance is considered fortuitous or merely historical.

The law of falling bodies, for example, does not assert that
bodies very frequently fall downward. It does not assert that
the event to which the formula s = %gt* applies, the "free
and unimpeded fall" of a body, occurs regularly or even fre-
quently in the actual history of the world. Whether the event
described by the law occurs rarely or often has nothing to
do with the law. Indeed, in a certain sense, the law refers only
to cases that are never realized, or only approximately realized,
in the actual course of events. Only in experiment, that is,
under artificially constructed conditions, do cases occur which
approximate the event with which the law is concerned. The

1 So far as it is not immediately concerned with an actual " History of the
Heavens and the Earth" or a geography.

ARISTOTELIAN AND GALILEIAN MODES OF THOUGHT 13

propositions of modern physics, which are often considered
to be antispeculative and empirical, unquestionably have in
comparison with Aristotelian empiricism a much less empirical,
a much more constructive character than the Aristotelian con-
cepts based immediately upon historical actuality.

In Psychology

Here we are confronted by questions which, as problems of
actual research and of theory, have strongly influenced the
development of psychology and which constitute the most
fundamental grounds of its present crisis.

The concepts of psychology, at least in certain decisive
respects, are thoroughly Aristotelian in their actual content,
even though in many respects their form of presentation has
been somewhat civilized, so to speak. The present struggles
and theoretical difficulties of psychology resemble in many
ways, even in their particulars, the difficulties which cul-
minated in the conquest over Aristotelian ways of thinking
in physics.

Aristotelian Concepts.

Fortuitousness of the Individual Case. The concept formation
of psychology is dominated, just as was that of Aristotelian
physics, by the question of regularity in the sense of frequency.
This is obvious in its immediate attitude toward particular
phenomena as well as in its attitude toward lawfulness. If,
for example, one show a film of a concrete incident in the
behavior of a certain child, the first question of the psychologist
usually is: "Do all children do that, or is it at least common ?"
And if one must answer this question in the negative the
behavior involved loses for that psychologist all or almost all
claim to scientific interest. To pay attention to such an
" exceptional case" seems to him a scientifically unimportant
bit of folly.

The real attitude of the investigator toward particular events
and the problem of individuality is perhaps more clearly
expressed in this actual behavior than in many theories. The

14 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

individual event seems to him fortuitous, unimportant, scien-
tifically indifferent. It may, however, be some extraordinary
event, some tremendous experience, something that has criti-
cally determined the destiny of the person involved, or the
appearance of an historically significant personality. In
such a case it is customary to emphasize the " mystical" char-
acter of all individuality and originality, comprehensible only
to " intuition," or at least not to science.

Both of these attitudes toward the particular event lead to
the same conclusion: that that which does not occur repeatedly
lies outside the realm of the comprehensible.

Lawfulness as Frequency. The esteem in which frequency is
held in present-day psychology is due to the fact that it is still
considered a question whether, and if so how far, the psychical
world is lawful, just as in Aristotelian physics this esteem was
due to a similar uncertainty about lawfulness in the physical
world. It is not necessary here to describe at length the
vicissitudes of the thesis of the lawfulness of the psychic in
philosophical discussion. It is sufficient to recall that even at
present there arc many tendencies to limit the operation of law
to certain "lower" spheres of psychical events. For us it is
more important to note that the field which is considered lawful,
not in principle, but in the actual research of psychology even
of experimental psychology has only been extended very
gradually. If psychology has only very gradually and hesi-
tantly pushed beyond the bounds of sensory psychology into
the fields of will and affect, it is certainly due not only to techni-
cal difficulties, but mainly to the fact that in this field actual
repetition, a recurrence of the same event, is not to be expected.
And this repetition remains, as it did for Aristotle, to a large
extent the basis for the assumption of the lawfulness or intelli-
gibility of an event.

As a matter of fact, any psychology that does not recognize
lawfulness as inherent in the nature of the psychical, and hence
in all psychical processes, even those occurring only once,
must have criteria to decide, like Aristotelian physics, whether
or not it has in any given case to deal with lawful phenomena.

ARISTOTELIAN AND GALILEI AX MODES OF THOUGHT 15

And, again, just as in Aristotelian physics, frequency of recur-
rence is taken as such a criterion. It is evidence of the depth
and momentum of this connection (between repetition and law-
fulness) that it is even used to define experiment, a scientific
instrument which, if it is not directly opposed to the concepts
of Aristotelian physics, has at least become significant only in
relatively modern times. 1 Even for Wundt repetition inhered
in the concept of experiment. Only in recent years has
psychology begun to give up this requirement, which withholds
a large field of the psychical from experimental investigation.

But even more important perhaps than the restriction of
experimental investigation is the fact that this extravagant
valuation of repetition (i.e., considering frequency as the
criterion and expression of lawfulness) dominates the formation
of the concepts of psychology, particularly in its younger
branches.

Just as occurs in Aristotelian physics, contemporary child
psychology regards as characteristic of a given age, and the
psychology of emotion as characteristic of a given expression,
that which a group of individual cases have in common. This
abstract Aristotelian conception of the class determines the
kind and dominates the procedure of classification.

Class and Essence. Present-day child psychology and affect
psychology also exemplify clearly the Aristotelian habit of
considering the abstractly defined classes as the essential nature
of the particular object and hence as an explanation of its
behavior. Whatever is common to children of a given age is
set up as the fundamental character of that age. The fact
that three-year-old children are quite often negative is con-
sidered evidence that negativism is inherent in the nature of
three-year-olds, and the concept of a negativistic age or stage
is then regarded as an explanation (though perhaps not a com-
plete one) for the appearance of negativism in a given particular
case!

Quite analogously, the concept of drives for example, the
hunger drive or the maternal instinct is nothing more than the

1 The Greeks, of course, knew of experiment.

1 6 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

abstract selection of the features common to a group of acts
that are of relatively frequent occurrence. This abstraction
is set up as the essential reality of the behavior and is then in
turn used to explain the frequent occurrence of the instinctive
behavior, for example, of the care of infant progeny. Most of
the explanations of expression, of character, and of temperament
are in a similar state. Here, as in a great many other funda-
mental concepts, such as that of ability, talent, and similar
concepts employed by the intelligence testers, present-day
psychology is really reduced to explanation in terms of Aristo-
telian essences, a sort of explanation which has long been
attacked as faculty psychology and as circular explanation,
but for which no other way of thinking has been substituted.

Statistics. The class! ficatory character of its concepts and
the emphasis on frequency are indicated methodologically by
the commanding significance of statistics in contemporary
psychology. The statistical procedure, at least in its com-
monest application in psychology, is the most striking expression
of this Aristotelian mode of thinking. In order to exhibit the
common features of a given group of facts, the average is calcu-
lated. This average acquires a representative value, and is
used to charactm/e (as mental age) the properties of ''the"
two-year-old child. Outwardly, there is a difference between
contemporary psychology, which works so much with numbers
and curves, and the Aristotelian physics. But this difference,
characteristically enough, is much more a difference in the
technique of execution than in the actual content of the concepts
involved. Essentially, the statistical way of thinking, which is
a necessary consequence of Aristotelian concepts, is also
evident in Aristotelian physics, as we have already seen.
The difference is that, owing to the extraordinary development
of mathematics and of general scientific method, the statistical
procedure of psychology is clearer and more articulate.

All the efforts of psychology in recent years toward exactness
and precision have been in the direction of refinement and
extension of its statistical methods. These efforts are quite
justified in so far as they indicate a determination to achieve

ARISTOTELIAN AXD GALILEI AX MODES OF THOUGHT 17

an adequate comprehension of the full reality of mental life.
But they are really founded, at least in part, on the ambition
to demonstrate the scientific status of psychology by using as
much mathematics as possible and by pushing all calculations
to the last possible decimal place.

This formal extension of the method has not changed the
underlying concepts in the slightest: they are still thoroughly
Aristotelian. Indeed, the mathematical formulation of the
method only consolidates and extends the domination of the
underlying concepts. It unquestionably makes it more
difficult to see the real character of the concepts and hence to
supplant them with others; and this is a difficulty with which
Galileian physics did not have to contend, inasmuch as the
Aristotelian mode of thought was not then so intrenched and
obscured in mathematics (see page 9).

Li mils of Knowledge. Exceptions. Lawfulness is believed to
be related to regularity and considered the antithesis of the
individual case. (In terms of the current formula, lawfulness
is conceived as a correlation approaching r = i.) So far as
the psychologist agrees at all to the validity of psychological
propositions, he regards them as only regularly valid, and his
acceptance of them takes such a form that one remains aware
of a certain distinction between mere regularity and full law-
fulness; and he ascribes to biological and, above all, to psy
chological propositions (in contrast to physical) only regularity.
Or else lawfulness is believed to be only the extreme case of
regularity, 1 in which case all differences (between lawfulness
and regularity) disappear in principle while the necessity of
determining the degree of regularity still remains.

1 As is well known, the concept of possible exceptions and the merely statistical
validity of laws has very recently been revived in physical discussion. Kven if
this view should finally be adopted, it would not in any way mean a return to
Aristotelian concepts. It suffices here to point out that, even in that event, it
would not involve setting apart within the physical world a class of events on
the basis of its degree of lawfulness, but the whole physical universe would
be subject only to a statistical lawfulness. On the relation of this statistical
view to the problem of precision of measurement, see Lewin, Gesclz und Experi-
ment in dcr Psyholotfe Weltkreisverlag, Berlin, 1927

18 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

The fact that lawfulness and individuality are considered
antitheses has two sorts of effect on actual research. It signifies
in the first place a limitation of research. It makes it appear
hopeless to try to understand the real, unique, course of an
emotion or the actual structure of a particular individual's
personality. It thus reduces one to a treatment of these
problems in terms of mere averages, as exemplified by tests
and questionnaires. Anyone to whom these methods appear
inadequate usually encounters a weary skepticism or else a
maudlin appreciation of individuality and the doctrine that
this field, from which the recurrence of similar cases in sufficient
numbers is excluded, is inaccessible to scientific comprehension
and requires instead sympathetic intuition. In both cases the
field is withdrawn from experimental investigation, for qualita
tive properties are considered as the direct opposite of lawful-
ness. The manner in which this view is continually and
repeatedly advanced in the discussion of experimental psy-
chology resembles, even to its particulars, the arguments against
which Galileian physics had to struggle. How, it was urged
at that time, can one try to embrace in a single law of motion
such qualitatively different phenomena as the movements of
the stars, the flying of leaves in the wind, the flight of birds,
and the rolling of a stone downhill. But the opposition of law
and individual corresponded so well with the Aristotelian con-
ception and with the primitive mode of thinking which con-
stituted the philosophy of everyday life that it appears often
enough in the writings of the physicists themselves, not, how-
ever, in their physics but in their philosophy. 1

The conviction that it is impossible wholly to comprehend the
individual case as such implies, in addition to this limitation, a
certain laxity of research: it is satisfied with setting forth mere
regularities. The demands of psychology upon the stringency
of its propositions go no farther than to require a validity "in

1 To avoid misunderstanding, the following should be emphasized: when we
criticize the opposition of individual and law, as is customary in psychology, it
does not mean that we are unaware of the complex problems of the concept of
individualitv.

ARISTOTELIAN AND CALILEIAN MODES OF THOUGHT 19

general," or "on the average," or "as a rule." The "com-
plexity" and "transitory nature" of life processes make it
unreasonable, it is said, to require complete, exceptionless,
validity. According to the old saw that "the exception proves
the rule," psychology does not regard exceptions as counter -
arguments so long as their frequency is not too great.

The attitude of psychology toward the concept of lawfulness
also shows clearly and strikingly the Aristotelian character of
its mode of thought. It is founded on a very meager con-
fidence in the lawfulness of psychological events and has for the
investigator the added charm of not requiring too high a stand-
ard of validity in his propositions or in his proofs of them.

Historic-geographic Concepts. For the view of the nature of
lawfulness and for the emphasis upon repetition which we have
seen to be characteristic of Aristotelian physics, in addition to
the motives which we have just mentioned, the immediate
reference to the concerned actuality in the historic-geographic
sense was fundamental. Likewise, and this is evidence of the
intimacy in which these modes of thought are related, present-
day psychology is largely dominated by the same immediate
reference to the historic-geographic datum. The historical
bent of psychological concepts is again not always immediately
obvious as such, but is bound up with nonhistoric, systematic
concepts and undifferentiated from them. This quasi-historical
set forms, in my opinion, the central point for the understanding
and criticism of this mode of concept formation.

Although we have criticized the statistical mode of thought,
the particular formulas used are not ultimately important to the
questions under discussion. It is not the fact that an arith-
metic mean is taken, that one adds and divides, that is the
object of the present critique. These operations will certainly
continue to be used extensively in the future of psychology.
The critical point is not that statistical methods are applied,
but how they are applied and, especially, what cases are
combined into groups.

In contemporary psychology the reference to the historic-
geographic datum and the dependence of the conclusions upon

20 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

frequency of actual occurrence are striking. Indeed, so far
as immediate reference to the historic datum is concerned, the
way in which the nature of the one-, two-, or three-year-old
child is arrived at through the calculation of statistical averages
corresponds exactly to Bacon's collection of the given cases of
dryness in his tabulae praesentiae. To be sure, there is a certain
very crude concession made in such averages to the require-
ments of nonhistoric concepts: patently pathological cases, and
sometimes even cases in which an unusual environment is
concerned, are usually excluded. Apart from this considera-
tion, the exclusion of the most extreme abnormalities, the deter-
mination of the cases to be placed in a statistical group is
essentially on historic-geographic grounds. For a group
defined in historic-geographic terms, perhaps the one-year-old
children of Vienna or New York in the year 1928, averages are
calculated which are doubtless of the greatest significance to
the historian or to the practical school man, but which do not
lose their dependence upon the accidents of the historic-geo-
graphic given even though one go on to an average of the
children of Germany, of Europe, or of the whole world, or of a
decade instead of a year. Such an extension of the geographic
and historic basis does not do away with the specific dependence
of this concept upon the frequency with which the individual
cases occur within historically-geographically defined fields.

Mention should have been made earlier of that refinement of
statistics which is founded upon a restriction of the historic-
geographic basis, such as a consideration of the one-year-old
children of a proletarian quarter of Berlin in the first years
after the War. Such groupings usually are based on the
qualitative individuality of the concrete cases as well as upon
historic-geographic definitions. But even such limitations
really contradict the spirit of statistics founded on frequency.
Even they signify methodologically a certain shift to the con-
crete particulars. Incidentally, one must not forget that even
in the extreme case of such refinement, perhaps in the statistical
investigation of the only child, the actual definition is in terms
of historic-geographic or at best of sociological categories;

ARISTOTELIAN AND GALILEIAN MODES OF THOUGHT 21

that is, according to criteria which combine into a single
group cases that psychologically are very different or even
antithetical. Such statistical investigations are consequently
unable as a rule to give an explanation of the dynamics of the
processes involved.

The immediate reference to the historically given actuality
which is characteristic of Aristotelian concept formation is
evident also in the discussion of experiment and nearness to
life conditions. Certainly one may justly criticize the simple
reaction experiments, the beginnings of the experimental
psychology of the will, or the experiments of reflexology on the
ground of their wide divergence from the conditions of life.
But this divergence is based in large part upon the tendency
to investigate such processes as do not present the individual
peculiarities of the particular case but which, as "simple ele-
ments" (perhaps the simplest movements), are common to all
behavior, or which occur, so to speak, in everything. In con-
trast to the foregoing, approximation to life conditions is often
demanded of, for example, the psychology of will. By this is
usually meant that it should investigate those cases, impossible
to produce experimentally, in which the most important
decisions of life are made. And here also we are confronted by
an orientation toward the historically significant. It is a
requirement which, if transferred to physics, would mean that
it would be incorrect to study hydrodynamics in the laboratory;
one must rather investigate the largest rivers in the world.
Two points then stand out: in the field of theory and law, the
high valuation of the historically important and disdain of the
ordinary; in the field of experiment, the choice of processes
which occur frequently (or are common to many events). Both
are indicative in like measure of that Aristotelian mixing of
historical and systematic questions which carries with it for
the systematic the connection with the abstract classes and the
neglect of the full reality of the concrete case.

Galileian Concept Formation.

Opposed to Aristotelian concept formation, which I have
sought briefly to characterize, there is now evident in psychology

22 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

a development which appears occasionally in radical or appar-
ently radical tendencies, more usually in little half steps, some-
times falling into error (especially when it tries most exactly to
follow the example of physics), but which on the whole seems
clearly and irresistibly to be pushing on to modifications that
may ultimately mean nothing less than a transition from Aristo-
telian to Galileian concept formation.

No Value Concepts. No Dichotomies. Unification of Fields.
The most important general circumstances which paved the
way for Galileian concepts in physics are clearly and distinctly
to be seen in present-day psychology.

The conquest over valuative, anthropomorphic classifications
of phenomena on bases other than the nature of the mental
process itself (see page 3) is not by any means complete, but
in many fields, especially in sensory psychology, at least the
chief difficulties are past.

As in physics, the grouping of events and objects into paired
opposites and similar logical dichotomies is being replaced by
groupings with the aid of serial concepts which permit of
continuous variation, partly owing simply to wider experience
and the recognition that transition stages are always present.

This has gone furthest in sensory psychology, especially in
psychological optics and acoustics, and lately also in the domain
of smell. But the tendency toward this change is also evident
in other fields, for example, in that of feeling.

Freud's doctrine especially and this is one of its greatest
services has contributed largely to the abolition of the bound-
ary between the normal and the pathological, the ordinary and
the unusual, and hereby furthered the homogenization (see
page 10) of all the fields of psychology. This process is cer-
tainly still far from complete, but it is entirely comparable to
that introduced in modern physics by which heavenly and
earthly processes were united.

Also in child and animal psychology the necessity is gradually
disappearing of choosing between two alternatives regarding
the child as a little adult and the animal as an undeveloped
inferior human, or trying to establish an unbridgeable gap

ARISTOTELIAN AND GALILEIAN MODES OF THOUGHT 23

between the child and adult, animal and man. This homo-
genization is becoming continually clearer in all fields, and
it is not a purely philosophical insistence upon some sort of
abstract fundamental unity but influences concrete research
in which differences are fully preserved.

Unconditional General Validity of Psychological Laws. The
clearest and most important expression of increasing homo-
geneity, besides the transition from class to serial concepts, is
the fact that the validity of particular psychological laws is no
longer limited to particular fields, as it was once limited to the
normal human adult on the ground that anything might be
expected of psychopathies or of geniuses, or that in such cases
the same laws do not hold. It is coming to be realized that
every psychological law must hold without exception.

In actual content, this transition to the concept of strict
exceptionless lawfulness signifies at once the same final and
all-embracing homogenization and harmonization of the whole
field that gave to Galileian physics its intoxicating feeling of
infinite breadth, because it does not, like the abstract class
concepts, level out the rich variety of the world and because
a single law embraces the whole field.

Tendencies toward a homogeneity based upon the exception-
less validity of its laws have become evident in psychology
only very recently, but they open up an extraordinarily wide
perspective. 1

1 The association psychology contains an attempt at this sort of homogeneity,
and it has really been of essential service in this direction. Similarly, in our time
reflexology and behaviorism have contributed to the homogenization of man and
animal and of bodily and mental. But the Aristotelian view of lawfulness as
regularity (without which it would have been impossible to support the law of
association) brought this attempt to nothing. Consequently, the experimental
association psychology, in its attempt at the end of the nineteenth century to
derive the whole mental life from a single law, displayed the circular and at the
same time abstract character that is typical of the speculative early stages of a
science, and of Aristotelian class concepts.

Indeed, it seems almost as if, because of the great importance of frequency
and repetition for Aristotelian methodological concepts, the law of association
was designed to make use of these as the actual content of psychological princi-
ples, inasmuch as frequent repetition is regarded as the most important cause of
mental phenomena.

24 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

The investigation of the laws of structure particularly the
experimental investigation of wholes has shown that the same
laws hold not only within different fields of psychological optics
but also in audition and in sensory psychology in general.
This in itself constitutes a large step in the progress toward
homogeneity.

Further, the laws of optical figures and of intellectual insight
have turned out to be closely related. Important and similar
laws have been discovered in the experimental investigation of
behavioral wholes, of will processes, and of psychological needs.
In the fields of memory and expression, psychological develop-
ment appears to be analogous. In short, the thesis of the
general validity of psychological laws has very recently become
so much more concrete, particular laws have shown such
capacity for fruitful application to fields that at first were
qualitatively completely separated, that the thesis of the
homogeneity of psychic life in respect to its laws gains tre-
mendously in vigor and is destroying the boundaries of the old
separated fields. 1

Mounting Ambitions. Methodologically also the thesis of the
exceptionless validity of psychological laws has a far-reaching
significance. It leads to an extraordinary increase in the
demands made upon proof. It is no longer possible to take
exceptions lightly. They do not in any way "prove the rule,"
but on the contrary are completely valid disproofs, even though
they are rare, indeed, so long as one single exception is demon-
strable. The thesis of general validity permits of no exceptions
in the entire realm of the psychic, whether of child or adult,
whether in normal or pathological psychology.

1 For this section compare especially M. Wertheimer, Untersuchungen zur
Lehre von der Gestalt, II, Psychol. Forsch., 1923, 4, 301-350, W. Ko'hler, Gestalt
Psychology, Liveright, New York, 1929. K. KotTka, The Growth of the Mind:
An Introduction to Child Psychology (trans, by R. M. Ogden), Harcourt,
Brace, New York; Kegan Paul, London, 1924, (2d ed., 1928), and Lewin,
VorsatZy Willc und Bedurfnis, mil V orbcmcrkungcn nber die psychischen Krafle
und Kncrgicn und die Struktur der Sccle, Springer, Berlin, 1926. A review of
the special researches is found in W. Kohler, Gestaltprobleme und Anfange einer
Gestalttheorie, Jahresber. d. gcs. Physiol., 1924.

ARISTOTELIAN AND GALILEI AN MODES OF THOUGHT 25

On the other hand, the thesis of exceptionless validity in
psychological laws makes available to investigation, especially
to experiment, such processes as do not frequently recur in the
same form, as, for example, certain affective processes.

From the Average to the Pure Case. A clear appreciation of
this circumstance is still by no means habitual in psychology.
Indeed, from the earlier, Aristotelian point of view the new
procedure may even seem to conceal the fundamental con-
tradiction we have mentioned above. One declares that one
wants to comprehend the full concrete reality in a higher degree
than is possible with Aristotelian concepts and yet considers
this reality in its actual historical course and its given geo-
graphical setting as really accidental. The general validity,
for example, of the law of movement on an inclined plane is
not established by taking the average of as many cases as
possible of real stones actually rolling down hills, and then
considering this average as the most probable case. 1 It is
based rather upon the frictionless rolling of an ideal sphere
down an absolutely straight and hard plane, that is, upon a
process that even the laboratory can only approximate and
which is most improbable in daily life. One declares that one
is striving for general validity and concreteness, yet uses a
method which, from the point of view of the preceding epoch,
disregards the historically given facts and depends entirely
upon individual accidents, indeed upon the most pronounced
exceptions.

How physics arrives at this procedure, which strikes the
Aristotelian views of contemporary psychology as doubly
paradoxical, begins to become intelligible when one envisages
the necessary methodological consequences of the change in
the ideas of the extent of lawfulness. When lawfulness is no
longer limited to cases which occur regularly or frequently

1 In psychology it is asserted, often with special emphasis, that one obtains,
perhaps from the construction of baby tests, a representation of the "general
human," because those processes are selected which occur most frequently in the
child's daily life. Then one may expect with sufficient probability that the
child will spontaneously display similar behavior in the test.

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

but is characteristic of every physical event, the necessity dis-
appears of demonstrating the lawfulness of an event by some
special criterion, such as its frequency of occurrence. Even
a particular case is then assumed, without more ado, to be
lawful. Historical rarity is no disproof, historical regularity
no proof of lawfulness. For the concept of lawfulness has been
quite detached from that of regularity; the concept of the
complete absence of exceptions to laws is strictly separated
from that of historical constancy (the " forever'' of Aristotle). 1
Further, the content of a law cannot then be determined by
the calculation of averages of historically given cases. For
Aristotle the nature of a thing was expressed by the character-
istics common to the historically given cases. Galileian con-
cepts, on the contrary, which regard historical frequency as
accident, must also consider it a matter of chance which
properties one arrives at by taking averages of historical cases.
If the concrete event is to be comprehended and the thesis
of lawfulness without exception is to be not merely a philosophi-
cal maxim but determinative of the mode of actual research,
there must be another possibility of penetrating the nature
of an event, some other way than that of ignoring all individual
peculiarities of concrete cases. The solution of this problem
may only be obtained by the elucidation of the paradoxical
procedures of Galileian method through a consideration of the
problems of dynamics.

1 The contrast between Aristotelian and Galileian views of lawfulness and the
difference in their methods may be briefly tabulated as follows:

For Aristotle

For Galileo

i . The regular is

lawful

The frequent is

lawful

The individual case is

chance

lawful

2. Criteria of lawfulness are

regularity

not required

frequency

3. That which is common to the historically

an expression of

an accident, only

occurring cases is

the nature of

historically

the thing

conditioned

ARISTOTELIAN AND GALILEIAN MODES OF THOUGHT 27

DYNAMICS
Changes in the Fundamental Dynamic Concepts of Physics

The dynamic problems of physics were really foreign to the
Aristotelian mode of thought. The fact that dynamic problems
had throughout such great significance for Galileian physics
permits us to regard dynamics as a characteristic consequence
of the Galileian mode of thought. 1 As always, it involved
not merely a superficial shift of interest, but a change in the
content of the theories. Even Aristotle emphasized " becom-
ing," as compared with his predecessors. It is perhaps more
correct to say that in the Aristotelian concepts statics and
dynamics are not yet differentiated. This is due especially to
certain fundamental assumptions.

Teleology and Physical Vectors.

A leading characteristic of Aristotelian dynamics is the fact
that it explained events by means of concepts which we today
perceive to be specifically biological or psychological: j%ery\
object tends, so far as not prevented by other objects, toward per-
fection, toward the realization of its own nature. This nature
is for Aristotle, as we have already seen, that which is common
to the class of the object. So it comes about that the class for
him is at the same time the concept and the goal (rcXos) of an
object.

This teleological theory of physical events does not show only
that biology and physics are not yet separated. It indicates
also that the dynamics of Aristotelian physics resembles in
essential points the animistic and artificial mode of thought of
primitive man, which views all movement as life and makes
artificial manufacture the prototype of existence. For, in the
case of manufactured things, the maker's idea of the object is,
in one sense, both the cause and the goal of the event.

Further, for Aristotelian concepts the cause of a physical
event was very closely related to psychological "drives": the
object strives toward a certain goal; so far as movement is

1 E. MACH, The Science of Mechanics (Eng. trans., 2d ed., rev.), Chicago, 1902.

28 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

concerned, it tends toward the place appropriate to its nature.
Thus heavy objects strive downward, the heavier the more
strongly, while light objects strive upward.

It is customary to dismiss these Aristotelian physical concepts
by calling them anthropomorphic. But perhaps it would be
better, when we consider that the same fundamental dynamic
ideas are today completely dominant in psychology and
biology, to examine the actual content of the Aristotelian theses
as far as possible independently of the style of their presentation.

It is customary to say that teleology assumes a direction of
events toward a goal, which causal explanation does not recog-
nize, and to see in this the most essential difference between
teleological and causal explanation. But this sort of view is
inadequate, for the causal explanation of modern physics uses
directed quantities, mathematically described vectors. Physi-
cal force, which is defined as "the cause of a physical change,"
is considered a directed, vectorial factor. In the employment of
vectorial factors as the foundation of dynamics there is thus
no difference between the modern and the Aristotelian view.

The real difference lies rather in the fact that the kind and
direction of the physical vectors in Aristotelian dynamics are
completely determined in advance by the nature of the object
concerned. In modern physics, on the contrary, the existence
of a physical vector always depends upon the mutual relations of
several physical facts, especially upon the relation of the object
to its environment. 1

Significance of the Whole Situation in Aristotelian and Galileian
Dynamics.

For Aristotelian concepts, the environment plays a part only
in so far as it may give rise to " disturbances/' forced modifica-
tions of the processes which follow from the nature of the
object concerned. The vectors which determine an object's
movements are completely determined by the object. That is,

1 Naturally this applies also to internal causes, which involve the mutual rela-
tion of the parts of a physical system.

ARISTOTELIAN AND GALILEIAN MODES OF THOUGHT 29

they do not depend upon the relation of the object to the
environment, and they belong to that object once for all,
irrespective of its surroundings at any given time. The
tendency of light bodies to go up resided in the bodies them-
selves; the downward tendency of heavy objects was seated in
those objects. In modern physics, on the contrary, not only
is the upward tendency of a lighter body derived from the
relation of this body to its environment, but the weight itself
of the body depends upon such a relation.

This decisive revolution comes to clear expression in Galileo's
classic investigations of the law of falling bodies. The mere
fact that he did not investigate the heavy body itself, but the
process of "free falling or movement on an inclined plane/'
signifies a transition to concepts which can be defined only by
reference to a certain sort of situation (namely, the presence of a
plane with a certain inclination or of an unimpeded vertical
extent of space through which to fall). The idea of investi-
gating free falling, which is too rapid for satisfactory observa-
tion, by resorting to the slower movement upon an inclined
plane presupposes that the dynamics of the event is no longer
related to the isolated object as such, but is seen to be dependent
upon the whole situation in which the event occurs.

Galileo's procedure, in fact, includes a penetrating investiga-
tion of precisely the situation factors. The slope of the inclined
plane, that is, the proportion of height to length, is defined.
The list of situations involved (free falling, movement on an
inclined plane, and horizontal movement) is exhausted and,
through the varying of the inclination, classified. The depend-
ence of the essential features of the event (for example, its
velocity) upon the essential properties of the situation (the
slope of the plane) becomes the conceptual and methodological
center of importance.

This view of dynamics does not mean that the nature of the
object becomes insignificant. The properties and structure of
the object involved remain important also for the Galileian
theory of dynamics. But the situation assumes as much
importance as the object. Only by the concrete whole which

30 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

comprises the object and the situation are the vectors which deter-
mine the dynamics of the event defined.

In carrying out this view, Galileian physics tried to char-
acterize the individuality of the total situation concerned as
concretely and accurately as possible. This is an exact reversal
of Aristotelian principles. The dependence of an event upon
the situation in which it occurs means for the Aristotelian mode
of thought, which wants to ascertain the general by seeking
out the like features of many cases, nothing more than a
disturbing force. The changing situations appear as something
fortuitous that disturbs and obscures the essential nature.
It was therefore valid and customary to exclude the influence
of the situation as far as possible, to abstract from the situation,
in order to understand the essential nature of the object and
the direction of its goal.

Getting Rid of the Historical Bent.

The actual investigation of this sort of vectors obviously
presupposes that the processes involved occur with a certain
regularity or frequency (see page 6). For otherwise an
exclusion of the differences of the situation would leave no
similarities. If one starts from the fundamental concepts of
Aristotelian dynamics, the investigation of the dynamics of a
process must be more difficult one might think here of emotion
in psychology the more it depends upon the nature of the
situation concerned. The single event becomes thereby
unlawful in principle because there is no way of investigating
its dynamics.

The Galileian method of determining the dynamics of a
process is directly opposed to this procedure. Since the
dynamics of the process depends not only upon the object but
also, primarily, upon the situation, it would be nonsensical to
try to obtain general laws of processes by excluding the influence
of the situations as far as possible. It becomes silly to bring
in as many different situations as possible and regard only
those factors as generally valid that are observed under all
circumstances, in any and every situation. It must, on the

ARISTOTELIAN AND GALILEI AN MODES OF THOUGHT 31

contrary, become important to comprehend the whole situation
involved, with all its characteristics, as precisely as possible.

The step from particular case to law, from "this" event to
"such" an event, no longer requires the confirmation by histori-
cal regularity that is characteristic of the Aristotelian mode of
thought. This step to the general is automatically and
immediately given by the principle of the exceptionless lawful-
ness of physical events. 1 What is now important to the
investigation of dynamics is not to abstract from the situation,
but to hunt out those situations in which the determinative
factors of the total dynamic structure are most clearly, dis-
tinctly, and purely to be discerned. Instead of a reference
to the abstract average of as many historically given cases as
possible, there is a reference to the full concreteness of the particular
situations.

We cannot here examine in great detail why not all situations
are equally useful for the investigation of dynamics, why certain
situations possess a methodological advantage, and why as far
as possible these are experimentally set up. Only one circum-
stance, which seems to me very seldom to be correctly viewed
and which has given rise to misunderstandings that have had
serious consequences for psychology, requires elucidation

We have seen above how Galileian concepts separated the
previously undifferentiated questions of the historical course of
events on one side and of the laws of events on the other. They
renounced in systematic problems the immediate reference to
the historic-geographic datum. That the procedure instituted
does not, as might at first appear, contradict the empirical
tendency toward the comprehension of the full reality may
already be clear from our last consideration: the Aristotelian
immediate relation to the historically regular and its average
really means giving up the attempt to understand the particular,
always situation-conditioned event. When this immediate
relation is completely abandoned, when the place of historic-
geographic constancy is taken by the position of the particular

1 It is impossible here to go more fully into the problem of induction. (Cf.
Lewin, Gesetz und Experiment in der Psychologic.}

32 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

in the whole situation, and when (as in experimental method)
it is just the same whether the situation is frequent and per-
manent or rare and transitory, only then does it become
possible to undertake the task of understanding the real,
always ultimately unique, event.

The Meaning of the Process Differential.

Methodologically there may seem to result here another
theoretical difficulty which can perhaps be better elucidated

FIG. i.

by a simple example than by general discussion. In order
that the essentials may be more easily seen, I choose an example
not from familiar physics but from problematical psychology.
If one attempt to trace the behavior of a child to psychical
field forces, among other things the justification for this
thesis is not here under discussion the following objection
might easily be raised. A child stands before two attractive
objects (say a toy T and a piece of chocolate C), which are in
different places (see Fig. i). According to this hypothesis,
then, there exist field forces in these directions (a and b}. The

ARISTOTELIAN AND GALJLETAN MODES OF THOUGHT 33

proportional strength of the forces is indifferent, and it does not
matter whether the physical law of the parallelogram of forces
is applicable to psychical field forces or not. So far, then, as a
resultant of these two forces is formed, it must take a direction
(r) which leads neither to T nor to C. The child would then,
so one might easily conclude according to this theory, reach
neither T nor C. 1

In reality such a conclusion would be too hasty, for even if the
vector should have the direction r at the moment of starting,
that does not mean that the actual process permanently retains
this direction. Instead, the whole situation changes -with the
process, thus changing also, in both strength and direction,
the vectors that at each moment determine the dynamics.
Even if one assumes the parallelogram of forces and in addition a
constant internal situation in the child, the actual process,
because of this changing in the situation, will always finally
bring the child to one or the other of the attractive objects
(Fig. 2). 2

What I would like to exhibit by this example is this: if one
tries to deduce the dynamics of a process, particularly the
vectors which direct it, from the actual event, one is compelled
to resort to process differentials. In our example, one can
regard only the process of the first moment, not the whole
course, as the immediate expression of the vector present in
the beginning of the situation.

The well-known fact that all, or at least most, physical laws
are differential laws 3 does not seem to me, as is often supposed,
to prove that physics endeavors to analyze everything into the
smallest "elements" and to consider these elements in the most
perfect possible isolation. It proceeds rather from the circum-
stance that physics since Galileo no longer regards the historic
course of a process as the immediate expression of the vectors

1 1 am neglecting here the possibility that one of the field forces entirely
disappears.

2 Even if the distances of the attractive objects and the strength of their
attractions were equal, the resulting conflict situation would lead to the same
result, owing to the lability of the equilibrium

3 H. POINCARE, La Science et Vhypothese, Paris, 1916.

34 ^ DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

determinative of its dynamics. For Aristotle, the fact that the
movement showed a certain total course was proof of the
existence of a tendency to that course, for example, toward a
perfect circular movement. Galileian concepts, on the con-
trary, even in the course of a particular process, separate the
quasi-historical from the factors determining the dynamics.
They refer to the whole situation in its full concrete individ-
uality, to the state of the situation at every moment of time.

FIG. 2.

Further, for Galileian concepts, the forces, the physical
vectors which control the situation, are proved by the resulting
process. However, it is valid to exclude the quasi-historical
in order to get the pure process, and therefore necessary to
comprehend the type of process by recourse to the process
differential, because only in the latter, and hence unmixed,
is it expressed. This recourse to the process differential thus
arises not, as is usually supposed, from a tendency to reduce all
events to their "ultimate elements," but as a not immediately
obvious complementary expression of the tendency to derive
the dynamics from the relation of the concrete particular to the
concrete whole situation and to ascertain as purely and as

ARISTOTELIAN AND GALILEI AN MODES OF THOUGHT 35

unmixed with historic factors as possible the type of event
with which this total situation is dynamically related.

Experimentally also it is important to construct such situa-
tions as will actually yield this pure event, or at least permit of
its conceptual reconstruction.

Methodological.

It remains to examine more closely the logical and methodo-
logical consequences of this mode of thought. Since law and
individual are no longer antitheses, nothing prevents relying
for proof upon historically unusual, rare, and transitory events,
such as most physical experiments are. It becomes clear
why it is very illuminating, for systematic concepts, to produce
such cases, even if not exactly for the sake of their rarity itself.

The tendency to comprehend the actual situation as fully
and concretely as possible, even in its individual peculiarities,
makes the most precise possible qualitative and quantitative
determination necessary and profitable. But it must not be
forgotten that only this task, and not numerical precision for
its own sake, gives any point or meaning to exactness.

Some of the most essential services to knowledge of the
quantitative, and in general of the mathematical, mode of
representation are (i) the possibility of using continuous
transitions instead of dichotomies in characterization, thereby
greatly refining description, and (2) the fact that with such
functional concepts it is possible to go from the particular to
the general without losing the particular in the general and
thereby making impossible the return from the general to the
particular.

Finally, reference should be made to the method of approxi-
mation in the description of objects and situations, in which the
continuous, functional mode of thought is manifest.

Fundamental Dynamic Concepts in Psychology
The dynamic concepts of psychology today are still thor-
oughly Aristotelian, 1 and indeed the same internal relations

1 The same holds, incidentally, for biology, which I cannot here especially
examine, although I regard psychology in general as a field of biology.

36 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

and motives seem to me here displayed, even to the
details.

A ristotelian Ideas: Independence of the Situation; Instinct.

In content, which is easiest to exhibit and indeed hardly
requires exposition, psychological dynamics agrees most com-
pletely with Aristotelian concepts: it is teleology in the Aristo-
telian sense. The traditional mistake of regarding causal
explanation as an explanation without the use of directed forces
has notably retarded the progress of dynamics, since psycho-
logical dynamics, like physical, cannot be understood without
the use of vector concepts. It is not the fact that directed
quantities are employed in psychological dynamics that gives
it its Aristotelian character, but the fact that the process is
ascribed to vectors connected with the object of investigation,
for example, with the particular person, and relatively inde-
pendent of the situation.

The concept of instinct in its classical form is perhaps the
most striking example of this. The instincts are the sum of
those vectors conditioned by predispositions which it is thought
must be ascribed to an individual. The instincts are deter-
mined essentially by finding out what actions occur most
frequently or regularly in the actual life of the individual
or of a group of like individuals. That which is common to
these frequent acts (e.g., food getting, fighting, mutual aid) is
regarded as the essence or essential nature of the processes.
Again, completely in the Aristotelian sense, these abstract
class concepts are set up as at once the goal and the cause of
the process. And indeed the instincts obtained in this way,
as averages of historical actuality, are regarded as the more
fundamental the more abstract the class concept is and the
more various the cases of which the average is taken. It is
thought that in this way, and only in this way, those " acci-
dents" inherent in the particular case and in the concrete situ-
ation can be overcome. For the aim that still completely
dominates the procedure of psychology in large fields is founded

ARISTOTELIAN AND GALILEIAN MODES OF THOUGHT 37

upon its effort to free itself of the connection to specific
situations.

Intrinsic Difficulties and Unlawfulness.

The whole difference between the Aristotelian and Galileian
modes of thought becomes clear as soon as one sees what
consequences, for a strict Galileian view of the concept of
law, follow from this close and fixed connection of the instinct
to the individual "in itself." In that case the instinct (e.g.,
the maternal) must operate continually without interruption;
just as the explanation of negativism by the "nature" of the
three-year-old child entails for Galileian concepts the conse-
quence that all three-year-old children must be negative the
whole day long, twenty-four hours out of the twenty-four.

The general Aristotelian set of psychology is able to dodge
these consequences. It is satisfied, even for proof of the
existence of the vectors which should explain the behavior, to
depend upon the concept of regularity. In this way it avoids
the necessity of supposing the vector to be existent in every
situation. On the basis of the strict concept of law it is possible
to disprove the hypothesis, for example, of the existence of a
certain instinct by demonstrating its nonexistence in given
concrete cases. Aristotelian concepts do not have to fear such
disproofs, inasmuch as they can answer all references to concrete
particular cases by falling back on mere statistical validity.

Of course these concepts are thereby also unable to explain
the occurrence of a particular case, and by this is meant not the
behavior of an abstractly defined "average child," but, for
example, the behavior of a certain child at a certain moment.

The Aristotelian bent of psychological dynamics thus not
only implies a limitation of explanation to such cases as occur
frequently enough to provide a basis for abstracting from the
situation, but leaves literally any possibility open in any
particular case, even of frequent events.

Attempts at Self -correction: the Average Situation.

The intrinsic difficulties for dynamics which the Aristotelian
mode of thought brings with it, namely, the danger of destroying

38 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

the explanatory value of the theory by the exclusion of the
situation, are constantly to be observed in contemporary
psychology and lead to the most singular hybrid methods and
to attempts to include the concept of the situation somehow.
This becomes especially clear in the attempts at quantitative
determination. When, for example, the question is raised and
an attempt made to decide experimentally how the strengths
of various drives in rats (perhaps hunger, thirst, sex, and
mother love) compare with each other, such a question (which
corresponds to asking in physics which is stronger, gravitation
or electromotive force) has meaning only if these vectors are
ascribed entirely to the rat and regarded as practically inde-
pendent of the concrete whole situation, independent of the
condition of the rat and its environment at the moment. Such
a fixed connection is, of course, ultimately untenable, and one
is compelled at least in part to abandon this way of thinking.
Thus the first step in this direction consists in taking account
of the momentary condition of the drive with regard to its state
of satiation: the various possible degrees of strength of the
several drives are ascertained, and their maximal strengths
are compared.

It is true, of course, that the Aristotelian attitude is really
only slightly ameliorated thereby. The curve expresses the
statistical average of a large number of cases, which is not
binding for an individual case; and, above all, this mode of
thought applies the vector independently of the structure of the
situation.

To be sure, it is not denied that the situation essentially
determines the instinctive behavior in the actual particular
case, but in these problems, as in the question of the child's
spontaneous behavior in the baby tests, it is evident that no
more is demanded of a law than a behavioral average. The
law thus applies to an average situation. It is forgotten that
there just is no such thing as an " average situation" any
more than an average child.

Practically, if not in principle, the reference to the concept of
an "optimal" situation goes somewhat further. But even here

ARISTOTELIAN AND GALILEIAN MODES OF THOUGHT 39

the concrete structure of the situation remains indeterminate:
only a maximum of results in a certain direction is required.

In none of these concepts however are the two fundamental
faults of the Aristotelian mode of thought eliminated: the
vectors determining the dynamics of the process are still
attributed to the isolated object, independently of the concrete
whole situation; and only very slight demands are made upon
the validity of psychological principles and the comprehension
of the concrete actuality of the individual single process.

This holds true even for the concepts immediately concerned
with the significance of the situation. As mentioned before,
the question at the center of the discussion of the situation is,
quite in the Aristotelian sense, how far the situation can
hinder (or facilitate). The situation is even considered as a
constant object and the question is discussed: which is more
important, heredity or environment? Thus again, on the
basis of a concept of situation gotten by abstraction, a dynamic
problem is treated in a form which has none but a statistical
historical meaning. The heredity or environment discussion
also shows, even in its particulars, how completely these
concepts separate object and situation and derive the dynamics
from the isolated object itself.

The role of the situation in all these concepts may perhaps be
best exhibited by reference to certain changes in painting.
In medieval painting at first there was, in general, no environ-
ment, but only an empty (often a golden) background. Even
when gradually an environment did appear it usually consisted
in nothing more than presenting, beside the one person, other
persons and objects. Thus the picture was at best an assem-
bling of separate persons in which each had really a separate
existence.

Only later did the space itself exist in the painting: it became
a whole situation. At the same time this situation as a
whole became dominant, and each separate part, so far
indeed as separate parts still remain, is what it is (e.g., in such
an extreme as Rembrandt) only in and through the whole
situation.

40 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

Beginnings of a Galileian Mode of Thought.

Opposed to these Aristotelian fundamental ideas of dynamics
there are now signs in psychology of the beginnings of a Galileian
mode of thought. In this respect the concepts of sensory
psychology are farthest advanced.

At first, even in sensory psychology, explanations referred to
isolated single perceptions, even to single isolated elements of
these perceptions. The developments of recent years have
brought about, at first slowly but then more radically, a revolu-
tion in the fundamental dynamic ideas by showing that the
dynamics of the processes are to be deduced, not from the
single elements of the perception, but from its whole structure.
For it is impossible by a consideration of the elements to define
what is meant by figure in the broader sense of the word.
Rather, the whole dynamics of sensory psychological processes
depends upon the ground 1 and beyond it upon the structure of
the whole surrounding field. The dynamics of perception
is not to be understood by the abstract Aristotelian method of
excluding all fortuitous situations, but this principle is
penetrating today all the fields of sensory psychology only by
the establishment of a form of definite structure in a definite sort of
environment.

Recently the same fundamental ideas of dynamics have been
extended beyond the special field of perception and applied
in the fields of higher mental processes, in the psychology of
instinct, will, emotion, and expression, and in genetic psycho-
logy. The sterility, for example, of the always circular discus-
sion of heredity or environment and the impossibility of carrying
through the division, based upon this discussion, of the char-
acteristics of the individual begin to show that there is some-
thing radically wrong with their fundamental assumptions.
A mode of thought is becoming evident, even though only
gradually, which, corresponding somewhat to the biological
concept of phenotype and genotype, tries to determine the

1 E. RUBIN, Visuclhvahrgenommene Figuren, Gyldenalske, Copenhagen, 1921.

ARISTOTELIAN AND GALILEIAN MODES OF THOUGHT 41

predisposition, not by excluding so far as possible the influence
of the environment, but by accepting in the concept of dis-
position its necessary reference to a group of concretely defined
situations.

Thus in the psychological fields most fundamental to the
whole behavior of living things the transition seems inevitable
to a Galileian view of dynamics, which derives all its vectors
not from single isolated objects, but from the mutual relations
of the factors in the concrete whole situation, that is, essentially,
from the momentary condition of the individual and the
structure of the psychological situation. The dynamics of
(he processes is always to be derived from the relation of the concrete
individual to the concrete situation, and, so far as internal forces
are concerned, from the mutual relations of the various func-
tional systems that make up the individual.

The carrying out of this principle requires, to be sure, the
completion of a task that at present is only begun: namely,
the providing of a workable representation of a concrete
psychological situation according to its individual character-
istics and its associated functional properties, and of the
concrete structure of the psychological person and its internal
dynamic facts. Perhaps the circumstance that a technique
for such a concrete representation, not simply of the physical
but of the psychological situation, cannot be accomplished
without the help of topology, the youngest branch of mathe-
matics, has contributed to keeping psychological dynamics,
in the most important fields of psychology, in the Aristotelian
mode of thought. But more important than these technical
questions may be the general substantial and philosophical
presuppositions: too meager scientific courage in the question
of the lawfulness of the psychical, too slight demands upon the
validity of psychological laws, and the tendency, which goes
hand in hand with this leaning toward mere regularity, to speci-
fically historic-geographic concepts.

The accidents of historical processes are not overcome by
excluding the changing situations from systematic considera-
tion, but only by taking the fullest account of the individual

42 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

nature of the concrete case. // depends upon keeping in mind
that general validity of the law and concreteness of the individual
case are not antitheses, and that reference to the totality of the
concrete whole situation must take the place of reference to the
largest possible historical collection of frequent repetitions. This
means methodologically that the importance of a case, and its
validity as proof, cannot be evaluated by the frequency of its
occurrence. Finally, it means for psychology, as it did for
physics, a transition from an abstract classificatory procedure
to an essentially concrete constructive method.

That psychology at present is not far from the time when the
dominance of Aristotelian concepts will be replaced by that of
the Galileian mode of thought seems to me indicated also by a
more external question of psychological investigation.

It is one of the characteristic signs of the speculative early
stage of all sciences that schools, representative of different
systems, oppose each other in a way and to an extent that is
unknown, for example, in contemporary physics. When a
difference of hypotheses occurs in contemporary physics there
still remains a common basis that is foreign to the schools of
the speculative stage. This is only an external sign of the fact
that the concepts of that field have introduced a method
that permits step-by-step approximation to understanding.
Thereby results a continuous progress of the science which is
constantly more narrowly limiting the consequences for the
whole structure of differences between various physical theories.

There seems to me much to indicate that even the develop-
ment of the schools in contemporary psychology is bringing
about a transition to a similar sort of constant development,
not only in sensory psychology but throughout the entire field.

CHAPTER II
ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE MIND 1

On the Causes of Psychical Events

The relations to which theory has heretofore looked in experi-
mental psychology, when seeking the causes of a psychical
event, belong almost exclusively to one quite specific type of
relation. This is a real connection which one may designate as
adhesion of any sort of object or collection of objects or pro-
cesses. The fact that certain single objects are connected with
each other, or that a whole event sticks together in the sense
of adhesion, is given as the cause of a psychical event.

The most pronounced case of such a type of connection is
presented by the association between two psychical objects in
the sense of the old association theory. The objects a and b
have entered into an association by reason of earlier con-
tiguity. And this association phenomenon is claimed to be the
cause of the fact that on the occurrence of experience a, exper-
ience b results.

But even when experience is not regarded as the cause of the
association and forces are assumed which do not obey the laws
of association, such as the determining tendency 2 or any sort
of natural coherence, 3 the following fundamental type is
still retained: the stimulus possesses an adhesion with certain
reactions. And this adhesion is regarded as the cause of the
course of the event.

1 An excerpt from Vorsalz, Wille und Bediirfnis, mil V orbemerkungen uber die
psychischen Krafte und Energien und die Slruktur der Seele, pp. 21-39. For
use of the word "mind" see translators' note.

2 N. ACH, Uber den Willensakt und das Temperament, Quelle u. Meyer, Leipzig,
1910.

3 G. E. MtiLLER, Komplextheorie und Geslalttheorie, Vanderhoeck u. Ruprecht,
Go'ttingen, 1923.

44 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

In psychology these couplings were conceived for the most
part as mechanically rigid connections in the sense of an
association of individual stimulations with established reactions.
In opposition to this, the idea is beginning to gain ground that
usually we have to do not with rigid connections of distinct
pieces or elements but with temporally extended wholes (of the
type, for example, of a melody), the moments or phases of which
can be explained only by the whole. Recently a deplorable
misconception of the fundamental ideas of Gestalt theories
has sometimes occurred. This misconception may be stated
as follows: The cause of the process b is not to be seen in its
rigid coupling with the preceding independent event a. Rather,
if a forms a dependent moment of a more comprehensive whole,
it carries that whole with it. Thus, indeed, no chain-like
coupling of member to member, but the connections of the
parts in the whole, is regarded as the " cause" of the event. 1

The experimental investigation of habits (association) has
shown that the couplings created by habit are never, as such, the
motor of a psychical event. 2 Such a conception is also erro-
neous when the essential fact of the process of habit formation
and of practice is taken to be, not the formation of piecemeal
associations, but the re-formation and new formation of definite
action unities. Rather, certain psychical energies, that is,
tense psychical systems which derive, as a rule, from the
pressure of will or of a need, are always the necessary condition
of the occurrence in whatever way of the psychical event.
It hardly requires special mention that this does not mean
that on the one side there are psychical Gestalten, and on the
other psychical energies without any definite psychical locus.

Sometimes the habit, for example in "compulsive habits/'
may with the waxing of the needs breed new psychical energies.
Sometimes it may bring about access to energies which have
not theretofore been available to the act involved; when in drug

1 Thus, there is still no reference to any such thing as the tensions in a dynamic
whole.

2 LEWIN, Zcitschr. f. Psythol., 1917, 77, 212-247; Psychol. Forsch , 1922, I,
191-302; 1922, 2, 65-140. SIGMAR, t)ber die Hemmung bei der Realisation
eines Willensaktes, Arch f. d. ges. Psychol., 1925, 52, 92.

OX THE STRUCTURE OF THE .}f!XD 45

addicts, for example, originally single and occasional pleasurable
experiences are " absorbed into the vital needs/' 1 and ever
broader and deeper strata of the person are drawn into this
addiction.

In the case, however, of a mere " habit of execution " 2 (that
is, the fusion, formation, or re-formation of certain actions) it is
in principle impossible to regard them as the cause (in any full
sense) of the psychical events. 3

These propositions, first valid for habit and association,
can be generalized to every kind of coupling. For connections
are never causes of events, wherever and in whatever form they
may occur. Rather, in order that the bound or coupled com-
plex move, in other words that a process occur (and this holds
also for purely machine systems), energy capable of doing work

1 E. JOEL and F. FRANKEL, Zur Pathologic der Gewohnung, II in Theraple
der Gegenwart, 1926, 67, 60. Further* Dcr Kokainismuv, Springer, Berlin, 1924.
Cf also W. McDouoALL, Social Psychology, Methuen, London, 1908.

2 LLWIN, loci cit.

3 That one must assume further factors besides associations as the causes of
psychical events has long been said. Among experimental investigations which
have advanced in this direction, should be mentioned, above all, those of Ach
(op. cit} and Poppelreuter (Uber die Ordnung des Vorstellungslaufes, Arch.f.d.
gcs P \\chol. 1913, 3, 3/0- ScU (Die Gcielze dcs gcordnctcn Denkwrlaufi,
Spemanu, Stuttgart, 1913, and /Air Psychologic dcs prodjiktivcn Dcnkcns und dc*
Irrtums, Cohen, Bonn, 1922) exhibited the significance of nonassociative forces,
the determining tendencies, chiefly in the field of particular intellectual proc-
esses. He also remarked that "even in investigations of memory the existing
determinations can by no means always be neglected" (o/>., 7., pp. 283-290).
To be sure, as late as 1920 the same author in a polemic against attacks from
the side of association psychology (Komplextheorie und Gestalttheoric, Zeitschr.
f. Psychol, 1920, 83, 215), expressly remarks, for example, that the actualization
of complexes of knowledge "can also occur without a determination directed
upon them," which together with a number of other statements seems to me
unequivocally to mean that association as one possible cause of psychological
events cannot be denied. Since Selz recently (Zur Psychologic der Gegenwart,
Zeilschr. f. Psychol., 99, 166 ff.) refers to the above and similar sentences in
raising questions of priority I should like merely to remark without going into
these questions that I should be very glad if I might interpret these references
to mean that Selz, in any event at present, regards the fundamental thesis
of my work as experimentally proven: namely, that not only must other causes
of psychical events be recognized besides association but that association presents
in principle no motor for psychical events.

46 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

must be set free. One must therefore inquire of every psychical
event whence the causal energies come.

To say that couplings are not to be regarded as sources of energy is by no
means to say that there are no couplings, or that their presence or absence is
unimportant. They are, indeed, not sources of energy for events, but the form
of the event depends in large degree upon them. Thus, for example, the re-for-
mation of certain common action unities plays a very important role. (To be
sure, if we are to advance to laws, the practice must be given up of subsuming
every case in which an earlier occurrence can be established under the concept of
"experience." Instead of this senseless conglomerate, a number of phenomena
will have to be distinguished which obey laws of very different nature: the
enriching or changing of the fund of knowledge; the learning and practicing
of tasks of different kinds; and, of essentially different nature, the process which
one may characterize as fixation of impulses or needs.)

When the concept of energy is used here and when later those
of force, of tension, of systems, and others are employed,
the question may be left quite open as to whether or not one
should ultimately go back to physical forces and energies.
In any event, these concepts are, in my opinion, general logical
fundamental concepts of all dynamics (even though their
treatment in logic is usually very much neglected). They
are in no way a special possession of physics but are seen, for
example, in economics (although up to the present less precisely
developed), without requiring the assumption that therefore
one must derive economics in some way from physics.

Quite independently, then, of the question of the ultimate
derivability of psychology from physics, the treatment of causal
dynamic problems compels psychology to employ the funda-
mental concepts of dynamics, not, as frequently in the past,
promiscuously, but in the development of a differentiated
concept-formation in dynamic fields. Physical analogies may
often be drawn without damage to clarification. On the other
hand, it is always necessary carefully to avoid certain very
easy errors, for example, in the adequate comprehension of the
psychical field forces; and it must always be kept in mind that
we have to do with forces in a psychical field and not in the
physical environment.

On the question of the psychical sources of energy, the follow-
ing should be noted briefly.

ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE MIND 47

The stimulus itself may perhaps be considered in many per-
ceptual processes as being at the same time and to a certain
degree the source of energy for the process in the sensory
sector (e.g., in the field of vision). In actual behavior and
emotions, however, as when one undertakes a journey upon the
receipt of a telegram or becomes furious at a question, the
physical intensity of the stimulus obviously plays no essential
role. Hence it has been customary to speak of a "release, " of a
process which has been represented by the analogy of the
explosion of a keg of powder by the discharging spark.

This conclusion will nevertheless have to be fundamentally
changed in two directions.

1. Since the conception of the perceptual world as a sum of
sensory elements must be given up, perception presenting us
rather with actual things and events, which have definite
meaning, the stimulus to perception (e.g., the disfigured counten-
ance of a wounded soldier) must be assessed not according to its
physical intensity but according to its psychological reality.
This sort of perceptual experience may carry with it immediately
certain purposes or create certain needs which were not before
present. To discuss whether and if so to what extent such
perceptual experiences are themselves to be regarded as sources
of energy is probably not very fruitful in the present state of
research. In any event, there may occur reorganizations
[Umschichtungen, literally " restratifications "] through which
available [arbeitsfahige] energy becomes free; in other words
tense psychical systems may arise which were not present
before, at least in this form. Nevertheless, there is much
evidence that the essential amount of energy of a psychical
process does not flow out of the momentary perceptions
themselves.

2. This is, to be sure, not equivalent to saying that we have
here to do with a "release" in the sense of the function of the
spark in the cartridge or the driving rod in the steam engine.

a. When, for example, a child wants to get to a certain
object, perhaps a piece of chocolate, the direction of the process
will change if a sharp edge or a cross dog threatens the path or if

48 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

some other barrier is present. In the simplest case the child
will make a detour and then strive toward the object in a new
direction. In brief, the totality of the forces present in the
psychical field, including the attractive object, will control
the direction of the process, according, indeed, to laws which
may be established in detail. Thus far then we have to do
only with the well-known and fundamental fact that forces
control the course of a process.

It holds no less for psychology than for physics that no
unequivocal (definite) relation obtains between the magnitude
of the forces and the amount of energy of the process. On the
contrary, relatively slight forces may, when the whole field is
appropriately formed, control relatively large amounts of
energy. Conversely, large forces and tensions may go hand
in hand with slight energies. Thus a relatively slight change
in the kind or direction of these forces may direct a process
permanently into other paths. (This plays a very large part in,
for example, the technique of social dominance.)

In every process the forces in the inner and outer environment
are changed by the process itself. This change of the forces
controlling the processes may, however, be of very different
degree in different processes, so that in many processes this
change is not essential to the course of the process itself, while
in others the course of the process itself is fundamentally
influenced thereby.

The latter case, with which psychology frequently has to deal,
is a process of the following type. Every movement starting
upon the perception of certain objects changes at the same time
the position, relative to the individual, of the field forces con-
trolling the behavior. It can thus prescribe new directions for
the process, for example, the child is driven out of his original
direction by obstacles. Thus there occurs a steering of the
process by the perceptual field. 1

1 W. KOHLER, Gestaltprobleme und Anf tinge einer Gestalttheorie, Jahrcsbericht
d. ges. Physiol.j 1922-1924, 537 ff. Compare also as a concrete example from th *
oculomotor system: K. Lewin and K. Sakuma, Die Sehrichtung monokularer und
binokularer Ohjekte bei Bewegung und das Zustandekommen des Tiefeneffektes,
Psychol. Forsch.j 1925, 6, 339.

OA 7 THE STRUCTURE OF THE MIND 49

A continuous control of the process by the forces of the outer
psychological environment occurs when the activities are not
(or are in only slight degree) autochthonous, or when the forces
inherent in the course of the process as such are small relative
to the field forces. For example, a child is faced by a disagree-
able situation in which he is threatened from different sides.
If, instead of thrusting through with a single impulse and with-
out succeeding on the other hand in inwardly insulating himself
against his impressions, he moves slowly through this field of
positive and negative valences, 1 then the steering of the process
by the field forces comes to full expression even in every little
phase of the movement.

As a rule, however, the action process is not to be regarded
as such a continuous flow. Rather, it proceeds typically in
successive action steps which themselves form largely autoch-
thonous wholes: for example, the running toward the choco-
late as far as the first obstacle, the pause for reflection, the
angry reaching with the arm, another pause, a detour around
the barrier. In such an action process with a marked whole
character (when, that is, the forces which inhere in it as an
autochthonous process are large as against the forces of the field)
no continuous control of each individual phase of the autoch-
thonous action unity by the forces of the field occurs. But
the steering by the field forces still holds in the large, especially
for the succession of the action wholes, a circumstance of
fundamental significance in, for example, the theory of detour
behavior.

Whether the control of the process by the field of force occurs
in this latter manner or in the sense of a continuous steering
depends, on the one hand, upon the integral firmness and the
forces of the action process itself and, on the other hand, upon
the strength of the forces in the field. Hence, changes in
either of these circumstances lead to essential changes in the
course of the process. At all events, the steering processes are
of fundamental significance for the whole field of impulsive
and controlled behavior.

1 For the meaning of this term, see p. 77 (with note).

50 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

(The concept of steering is, to be sure, used in a still narrower
sense: for cases in which a relatively independent steering
process changes the forces of the field continuously in such a
way that a second simultaneously occurring process is thereby
steered in its course. A physical example of this is the amplify-
ing tube.)

b. Objects which, like the chocolate in the above example,
form the goal of the process are also to be regarded primarily as
objects from which a force, steering the process, goes out in the
same way as from a sharp edge, from a breakable object, or
from the symmetrical or asymmetrical disposition of objects
on both sides of the path taken by the child. 1 But they may
in addition have been the occasion for the evocation of those
needs out of which, as a reservoir of energy, the process in this
case ultimately flows (which does not need to hold in the case
of, for example, the sharp edge). If the child had been super-
satiated with sweets, the whole process would not have occurred.
To this extent, then, the chocolate has here also a second
function.

The presence or absence of this sort of reservoir of energy,
that is, of certain needs or need-like tensions, makes itself
noticeable again and again in various forms in the whole field of
the psychology of will and impulse. It plays a part when the
interest in or effort toward a goal ceases with satiation of the
psychical need involved; when an intended act, after its com-
pletion (or the completion of a substitute act), is not repeated
upon the occurrence of a second similar occasion; when a well-
established act fails to occur even upon the occurrence of the
habitual stimulus, if certain energies do not impel the individual
to the act. Finally, this fact has basic significance for the
problems of the a/ective process. The close connection
described above (Sec. a) between the perceptual field and the
course of the process must not let us forget that the forces which

1 Cf. A. HERMANN-CZINER, Zur Entwicklungspsychologie des Umgehens mil
Gegenstanden, Zeitschr.f. angew. Psychol., 1923 22, 337, BARTELT andLAU, Beo-
bachtungen an Ziegen, Psychol. Forsch., 1924, 5, 340. DEXLER, Das Gestalt-
prinzip und die moderne Tierpsychologie, Lotos, 1921, 69, 143.

ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE MIND 51

control the course of the process remain without effect or simply
do not arise when no psychical energies are present, when there
exists no connection with tense psychical systems which keep the
process in motion.

The occasions which set need energies free may, as in the
above examples, be decisive forces for the special course of the
process. Precisely this double function is frequently realized
in psychology. It is closely related to a group of especially
marked re-formations of the field by the process of the activity
itself.

c. The attainment and eating of the chocolate are especially
significant for the change of the field forces because the coming
into possession of the chocolate and the beginning of the
satiation process imply not only a change in the position of
the field forces but at the same time a profound change of
the psychical tensions which produce the behavior.

The perception of an object or event can thus:

1. Cause the formation of a definite tense psychical system
which did not previously exist, at least in that form. Such an
experience immediately produces an intention, or awakens a
desire, which was not previously present.

2. An already existing state of tension, which may go back
to a purpose, a need, or a half-finished activity, is interested in
[spricht an] a certain object or event, which is experienced as
an attraction (or repulsion), in such a way that this particular
tense system now obtains control of the motorium. We shall
say of such objects that they possess a "valence."

3. Valences of this sort operate at the same time (as do certain
other experiences) as field forces in the sense that they steer
the psychical processes, above all the motorium.

4. Certain activities, caused in part by valences, lead to
satiation processes or to the carrying out of intentions and
hence to the reduction of the tensions in the basic system
involved to an equilibrium at a lower level of tension.

The particular processes by which the sight of the chocolate
(Sec. a) causes the behavior cannot here be discussed in detail.
It might be that the available energy already present in a

52 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

psychical system momentarily in a state of tension is simply
helped to break through to the motorium. Or it might be
that, upon the presence of the valence, a system which until
then has not been capable of work undergoes a radical trans-
position [Umlagerung] of such kind that now energy becomes
free. One might even think at times of resonance phenomena
and so on. It is nevertheless improbable that discharges in the
special sense of the pure machine-like discharge play a con-
siderable role. The fact that impulses show, as a rule, an
inner, real [sachliche] relation to the special psychical energy
sources on which they draw speaks against this assumption.

There are, naturally, all transitional degrees between val-
ences which set free available energy and the field forces
which control the remainder of the process. This does not
affect the necessity of inquiring always as to the energy sources
of the process involved.

This holds also for cases of steering in the narrower sense of the word Here
also one may not neglect the fact that the slight forces and energies necessary
for steering are not identical with the energies of the steered system and that the
effect fails to occur if the flow of energy to the primary process fails. (Analogy:
failure of the plate circuit in an amplifying tube )

We cannot here discuss the possible sources of psychical
energy as to content. At all events, the needs and the central
goals of the will are important in this connection. Nevertheless
some general questions, which are appropriate here, as to the
structure of psychical energetic systems must be considered.

Psychical Energies and the Structure of the Mind

It is customary, at present, again to emphasize somewhat
more strongly the unity of the mind. This occurs doubtless
as a protest against the atomistic dissection of the mind into
piecemeal discrete sensations, feelings, and other experiences.
The question of unity of the mind is, however, still very ambig-
uous, and in order to avoid misunderstandings we shall later
(see page 61) have to mention a number of questions which
might be raised in this connection. Suffice it here to note
that we propose to discuss not the whole problem complex

OA 7 THE STRUCTURE OF THE MIND 53

indicated by the ambiguous term " unity of the mind," but
rather a definite problem concerning the psychical energies.

First, the following general considerations should be noted:
Exactly when problems of wholeness are central, one must
beware of the tendency to make the wholes outwardly as
extensive as possible. Above all, it must be clear that concrete
research must always go beyond vague generalities to inquire
about the structure [Strukturicrtheit] of the wholes concerned
into subwholes, and about the special boundaries of the super-
ordinate systems determining the particular case.

There is an inclination, probably correct, to regard the unity
of the whole region of the psychical which makes up an indi-
vidual as relatively greater than the unity of physical nature.
But the proposition " Everything is related to everything
else," which by no means adequately portrays the conditions
in physical nature, 1 is also not wholly valid for the unity of the
mind, although in both cases it contains an element of truth.

Twenty-five years ago I awoke, happy that I did not have
to go to school that day, I flew a kite, came home late to lunch,
ate a great deal of dessert, and played in the garden; these and
all the other experiences that filled the following days and
weeks may be reproduced under certain circumstances (per-
haps in hypnosis) and are hence in that sense not dead. Doubt-
less, indeed, the whole of childhood experience may have a
decisive significance for all development and consequently
also for present behavior; moreover, certain special experiences
may still have a very acute significance for present psychical
processes. Thus each single everyday experience of the past
may somehow influence the present psychic life. But this
influence is in most cases to be evaluated in just the same way
as the influence of some specific changes in a fixed star upon
the physical processes in my study: it is not that an influence
exists but that the influence is extremely small, approximately
zero.

This lack of influence is by no means peculiar to experiences
widely separated in time. I look out the window and notice the

1 W. KOHLER, Die physischen Gestalten, Weltkreisverlag, Erlangen, 1920.

54 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

movements of a column of smoke from a chimney. To be sure,
such an experience may in a special case profoundly influence
the rest of the psychic life; but in general every psychical event
is by no means related to each of the thousands of other daily
little experiences. Behavior would not be changed or would
be changed imperceptibly if a great many of our experiences
did not occur or occurred in other ways.

The proposition "In the psychical, everything is related to
everything else" is inadequate, however, for other reasons than
that it is necessary to separate the significant from the insignifi-
cant. It does not suffice to say instead: "To be sure, not every
experience, but certainly every profound or significant one, is
related to all other psychical events." Even such a quanti-
tatively improved proposition, so to speak, remains inadequate.

The relations of psychical events to each other and the
breadth of influence of each single experience upon the other
psychical processes depend not simply upon their strength,
indeed not even upon their real importance. The individual
psychical experiences, the actions and emotions, purposes,
wishes and hopes, are rather imbedded in quite definite psychical
structures, spheres of the personality, and whole processes. One
may, for example, be interrupted in the midst of a conversa-
tion by a telephone call about some relatively indifferent
matter which is settled in a few words. In this case the total
situation may lead to a more rapid completion of the telephone
conversation. But the individual experiences, wishes, and
purposes which dominated the preceding conversation and
which dominate it again upon its resumption are as a rule practi-
cally insignificant for the telephone conversation, unless
unusually strong tensions are involved.

Whether, and if so how, two psychological events influence
each other depends to a large extent upon whether they are
imbedded in the same or in different total processes or upon the
relation which these different psychical complexes have to each
other. Thus an experience, weak in itself, may be of essential
significance to a perhaps temporally relatively distant psychical
event, while much stronger experiences which belong to another

ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE .\fIND 55

system may be practically without effect even upon temporally
nearer processes.

The context which is built up in memory is also not dependent
upon relations of intensity and time but is dominated by its
actual belongingness to the same total process. 1

This belonging to quite definite psychical systems is also in
high degree characteristic of the dynamically basic psychical
tensions and energies.

The individual psychical needs or the tensions which result
from certain processes and experiences often have, of course, a
certain connection with each other. Thus it may happen, for
example, that affective energies out of one system may go over
into another (perhaps those resulting from events in vocational
life into processes in family life) and come to expression in the
latter. Thus it may happen, also, that the satiation of a need
produces consatiation of functionally adjacent needs. The
intimacy of this communication varies greatly, however, among
different tense psychical systems. The general tendency to
communication seems also to vary in strength in certain
psychical conditions and in different individuals. Nevertheless
it must not be forgotten that each dynamic psychical system
does not have clear communication with every other, but
that the communication in many cases is extremely weak,
indeed practically nonexistent.

If there were not this sometimes astoundingly complete
segregation of different psychical systems from each other, if
there were instead a permanently real unity of the mind of such
kind that all the psychical tensions present at a given time had
to be regarded as tensions in a uniform, unitary, closed system,
no ordered action would be possible. Only the really extreme
exclusion of the majority of all the simultaneously present
psychical tensions, some of which are frequently much stronger,
and the practically exclusive connection of the motor sphere
with one special region of inner tensions make an ordered action
possible. This exclusion for the purpose of a definite action

1 W. POPPELREUTER, tlber die Ordnung des Vorstellungslaufcs, Arch.f. d ges.
Psyclwl., IQI2, 25, 208-349.

56 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

does not always occur by means of temporary elimination of
all the other tensions present in the mind; the psychical tensions
arise of themselves in definite psychical structures or regions
which have already been formed, or are then formed, by means
of certain dynamic processes which we shall not here
discuss.

Let us summarize the considerations of this section: The
mind is often considered to be the very prototype of unity.
The unity of consciousness, the unity of the person, are often
used as the basis and self-evident presupposition of far-reaching
speculations; and the integration of the individual, especially
in its psychical aspects, seems closely connected with the special
nature, the absolute uniqueness, which it is customary to
ascribe to an individual.

Upon closer examination, however, we find here a whole
range of problems of unity. The question of the unity of
consciousness is not identical with the question of the unity
of the whole region of psychical forms and processes, of tense
and not-tense psychical systems, the totality of which may be
designated as the mind. Further, it is at least questionable
whether that which may be called the ego or self, 1 the unity of
which is important for many problems, is not merely one
system or complex of systems, a functional part region within
this psychical totality (see page 61).

We are speaking here not of this problem of the unity of the
self but only of the problem of the dynamic homogeneity of the
mind.

Further, the psychical totality which is Mr. X is at least
different from that of Mr. R. and from that of the child Q.
This difference, which constitutes the individuality (Eigenart)
of the person involved, his individuality in the sense of that
which sets his nature apart from the individuality of other
individuals, is probably evident in some way as always the same
special, characteristic individuality, in each of its processes,
parts, and expressions. Questions of individuality in this
sense, that is, such questions as whether such identical charac-

1 Cf. W. JAMES, Principles of Psychology, Holt, New York, 1890.

(XV THE STRUCTURE OF THE MIND 57

teristics of all the processes in the given mind are demonstrable
and in what they consist (a basic question for individual
psychology), are also here excluded. Such individuality or
uniqueness of all that belongs to the same psychical totality
(mind) might also be present even if the latter presented no
firm unity, for example, if each of these totalities were com-
parable to a whole physical world and did not possess the
unity of a physical organism or even of a single homogeneous
closed system. We are not here discussing the question of the
identical characteristics of processes which belong to the
same psychical totality but solely the question of the causal-
dynamic homogeneity of the mind, the question of the presence
of relatively segregated energetic systems.

Finally, it should be noted that the existence of relatively
segregated psychical energetic systems has nothing to do with
the distinction of various psychical abilities such as memory,
will, or understanding. On the contrary, the repudiation of
sharp boundaries between these fields of inquiry is actually a
presupposition of the present line of thought.

The next result of these considerations is as follows. Doubt-
less there exists in certain spheres, for example, within the
motorium, a relatively high degree of unity. But however
high one may estimate the degree of unity in a psychical
totality, the recognition that within the mind there are regions
of extremely various degrees of coherence remains an exceed-
ingly important condition of more penetrating psychological
research. We have to do not with a single unitary system but
with a great number of such strong configurations (starken
Gestalteri), some of which stand in communication with others
and thus form component parts of a more inclusive weak
configuration [schwache Gestalt]. Other psychical structures,
again, may show no real connection worth mentioning. The
difference between the conception of the mind as a single whole,
uniform in all its parts, and the conception of the mind as a sum
of experiences is only formal and not in any way relevant to
research. It is necessary, however, to recognize the natural
structure of the mind, its psychical systems, strata, and spheres.

58 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

It is necessary always to determine where we have to deal with
wholes and where not.

The formation of definite psychical systems is related in part
to the ontogenctic development of the mind. It therefore also
shows, as does that development, a specifically historical
component.

The Tendency to Equilibrium: The Dynamic Firmness of
Boundaries and Relative Segregation of Psychical Systems

The following considerations lead to similar conclusions as
to the structure of the psychical in dynamic respects.

The psychical processes may often, by the use of certain
points of view, be deduced from the tendency to equilibrium
(as may biological processes in general, as well as physical,
economic, or other processes). The transition from a state of
rest to a process, as well as change in a stationary process, may
be derived from the fact that the equilibrium at certain points
has been disturbed and that then a process in the direction of a
new state of equilibrium sets in.

In carrying through this line of thought, however, one must
pay special attention to certain points.

1. The process moves in the direction of a state of equilib-
rium only for the system as a whole. Part processes may at
the same time go on in opposed directions, 1 a circumstance
which is of the greatest significance for, for example, the theory
of detour behavior. It is hence important to take the system
whole which is dominant at the moment as basis. Indeed,
the concrete task of research will often consist precisely in the
search for this determinative system, its boundaries and its
internal structure. From these the particular events may then
be directly deduced by means of the above-mentioned general
proposition.

2. A state of equilibrium in a system does not mean, further,
that the system is without tension. Systems can, on the
contrary, also come to equilibrium in a state of tension (e.g., a
spring under tension or a container with gas under pressure).

1 KOHLER, Die physischen Gestalten.

ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE IfIND 59

The occurrence of this sort of system, however, presupposes a
certain firmness of boundaries and actual segregation of the
system from its environment (both of these in a functional, not
a spatial, sense). If the different parts of the system are
insufficiently cohesive to withstand the forces working toward
displacement (i.e., if the system shows insufficient internal
firmness, if it is fluid), or if the system is not segregated from its
environment by sufficiently firm walls but is open to its neigh-
boring systems, stationary tensions cannot occur. Instead,
there occurs a process in the direction of the forces, which
encroaches upon the neighboring regions with diffusion of
energy and which goes in the direction of an equilibrium at a
lower level of tension in the total region. The presupposition
for the existence of a stationary st^te of tension is thus a certain
firmness of the system in question, whether this be its own
inner firmness or the firmness of its walls.

We are here using the concept of the firmness of a system
solely in a functional-dynamic sense without thereby making
any special assertions about the material of the system con-
cerned. Naturally, the firm walls of a system may be composed
of a surrounding system in a state of tension. In this case the
above-described presuppositions hold again for both systems as
a whole.

The occurrence of such tense systems is very characteristic
of psychical processes, at least after infancy. A tendency may
readily be observed toward immediate discharge of tension
(to a state of equilibrium at the lowest possible state of tension).
Such an equilibrium, perhaps through the fulfillment of a wish,
is, however, often not immediately possible because of the
character of the total situation. It may be that the equilibra-
tion can only gradually be established, for example, by means
of long-continued effort, or it may be that it is for the time
wholly unattainable. Then there arises, at first, a stationary
tense system which may, when a very profound disturbance
of equilibrium is involved, embrace broad psychical strata.
The child to whom an important wish is denied may throw
itself upon the ground and remain there in a state of tension,

60 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

rigid as if transfixed by despair. As a rule, however (or after
some time) , there results a special tense system. The unfulfilled
wish, for example, or the half-finished activity does not cripple
the whole motorium or charge the entire mind with tension,
but there remains a special tense system which may not appear
in experience for a long time and which may influence the course
of the other psychical processes only slightly. On appropriate
occasion, however, it may assert itself most strongly (e.g., by
the resumption of the half-finished activity).

In many such tense systems, even when a direct equilibration
of tension (e.g., by fulfillment of the wish or completion of the
activity at a later time) does not occur, a discharge may yet
eventually result. It may be that the equilibration of tension
results from a substitute completion (compensation) ; or it may
be that the segregation of the system is not so complete as to
exclude equilibration with the adjacent systems (somewhat in
the nature of diffusion). Very frequently, however, the
tensions of such special systems persist over long periods or
may be, at most, only reduced. Hence there arc systems of
very considerable functional firmness and isolation in the psychical.

In the adult, at least, there exists as a rule a great number
of relatively separate tense systems which are influenced, to be
sure, by a general discharge of the whole person but which can
only rarely be actually discharged thereby, and then usually
incompletely. They form reservoirs of energy for action, and
without their very considerable independence ordered action
would be impossible.

The experimental investigations of half-finished activities 1
also show impressively that the mind is dynamically by no
means a perfectly closed unity. If, for example, in a series of
experimental tasks several are interrupted by the experimenter
before completion, there only seldom results a general state of
tension which increases with each new unfinished task, and in
these few cases only a slight general tension occurs. Instead
of a single total state of tension, which pushes toward discharge
in any random way (e.g., by further work on already finished
1 Cf. OVSIANKINA and ZEIGARNIK, below, Chap. VIII, p. 242

OX THE STRUCTURE OF THE MIXD 6 1

tasks), there results a number of relatively independent tense
systems which demonstrate their separateness in various
directions. Only in the case of very strong tensions does the
state of tension usually extend itself far over the neighboring
regions.

The problem of whether the psychical is a single homogeneous
system in which practically everything is related to everything
else or whether relatively separate dynamic systems are present,
is, incidentally, not identical with the problem of the unity of
the self, which becomes acute in the phenomenon of split
personality, although the two problems have certain relations
to each other.

The question thereby raised is extremely difficult and far
reaching. Its concrete discussion necessarily presupposes a
much more advanced state of the experimental investigation of
psychical structure. The following remarks, which are to be
regarded merely as a groping beginning, grow out of the effort
to avoid certain easy misinterpretations and at the same time
to indicate some theoretical possibilities to the discussion of
which we are repeatedly brought by the concrete experimental
work on our problems.

It would be natural from Gestalt theoretical considerations
to understand the self in terms of the psychical totality perhaps
as its structural individuality. As a matter of fact, some such
notion is basic to the concept of character, for the adequate
conception of which .one must start, not from the presence of
certain isolated properties (traits), but from the whole of the
person. If from this beginning one comes to the problem of the
psychical dynamic systems, the attempt will in all probability
be made to identify the self with the whole of the psychical
totality.

A number of facts, however, drive one in the opposite direc-
tioji to the view that a special region, within the psychical
totality, must be defined as the self in the narrower sense. Not
every psychically existent system would belong to this central
self. Not every one to whom I say "Z)," not all the things,
men, and environmental regions which I know and which may

62 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

perhaps be very important to me, belong to my self. This self-
system would also have in functional respects this is most
important a certain unique position. Not every tense
psychical system would stand in communication with this self.
Tensions which have to do with the self would also have
functionally a special significance in the total psychical organism
(see the next section), and it is possible that within this region
differently directed tensions would tend to equilibrium con-
siderably more strongly and that relatively isolated dynamic
systems within it could much less readily occur.

One would have recourse to such a hypothesis or to similar
ones only when weighty facts of dynamics, for example, in the
field of emotion, drive him to it. It is necessary here only to
note that the distinction of relatively separate psychical systems
leaves open various possibilities for the question of the unity
and homogeneity of the self.

In summary, the following should at all events be remarked.
We have seen above that it is necessary for the investigation of
causal relations and dynamic relations to pay especial attention
to the psychical tensions and sources of energy. These psychical
tensions and energies belong to systems which are in themselves
dynamic unities and which show a greater or less degree of abscis-
sion. The structure of the dynamic system involved and the
presence (in greater or less degree) or the absence of com-
munication with various other psychical systems, as well as
every change in boundary conditions, are hence of the greatest
significance for the psychical process, for the equilibration of
psychical tensions, and for the flow of psychical energy.

In the treatment of problems of the psychical energies and
tensions one must therefore never forget that they have a
position in definite psychical systems and hence must be treated
from those points of view (Gestalt theoretical) which are valid
for such systems.

Psychical Processes as Life Processes

In the treatment of the psychical sources of energy as dynamic
systems which are in variously close communication with each

ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE MIND 63

other, one must not forget that in dealing with psychical
processes one is dealing with life processes. This circum-
stance had naturally to be left in the background of the preced-
ing discussion since in the present status of the problem of the
psychical forces and energies we must at first be concerned with
settling some general primitive questions. Hence in order to
avoid misunderstandings it should be emphasized at least
briefly.

The mere distinction of different degrees of communication
between the dynamic systems will probably not suffice for the
adequate description of the psychical structure. One will
probably have to distinguish also layers or strata [Schichtcn] of
different functional significance.

For example, the special significance which the motor process
possesses for the equilibration of psychical tensions, the way in
which the motorium may come into communication with certain
psychical systems, and the circumstances under which this
communication changes give to the motor sphere a relatively
unique functional position. Similarly one may inquire as to
the functional significance of conscious thought or of clear
imagery. (Even within the perceptual process one will prob-
ably have to go beyond the inadequate distinction between
central and peripheral processes to the distinction of special
functional strata.)

Further, changes clearly of the types of development, of
maturation, of growth, and of regulation play a great role.

This holds hardly less of the psychical energy sources also,
for example, of the psychical needs. The needs show a marked
ontogenesis. This is true not only specifically, of such needs
as the sexual, but also generally. The typical small child
enjoys throwing things down; later he pushes the things under
the carpet; as a somewhat older child, he likes to hide and to
play "hide and seek"; even certain lies of children are often
largely "hiding." Or the young child likes at first to open and
shut a certain little box; later still, sitting on the arm of his
mother, he prefers to open and shut a door; still later, when he
can walk, this door game is frequently extended indefinitely

64 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

and he likes in addition to open and close all drawers. In
these cases and in similar ones it is necessary always to follow
not only the development of ability in certain performances
but also the development of the inclinations, the needs, the
interests. 1 In following the concrete need and the individual
child it is important to note the development in the content of
the need, where an increase occurs and where a decrease,
where an originally broad need is narrowed down to a certain
small sphere of valences, and where, on the other hand, a
quite special inclination extends to neighboring regions. In
this connection one cannot depend upon the identity of the
performance as the sole criterion of belonging to the same need.
Outwardly quite different acts may belong close together in
respect to their sources of energy, while outwardly quite similar
acts, perhaps playing with dolls (or with building blocks, etc ),
may be differently based in the two-year-old child and the four-
year-old child.

Such developments frequently show a rhythm like, for
example, the biological development of the egg: they occur in
steps which are within themselves largely autonomous. The
concepts of maturation and of crisis become essential.

Superimposed upon the ontogenetic development is the
quicker rhythm of the waxing and waning of the inclinations
and needs (psychical satiation and return to an unsatiatcd
condition).

Physiology, among the fundamental problems of which the
energetic economy of the organism belongs, has been treated
up to the very recent past as a " physics of life." Energy
exchange has been studied most exactly, but it was forgotten
that these processes are here imbedded in the organism, and so
the really biological problems of energy processes were neg-
lected. With the peculiar position which energy exchange, as a
moment of the life process, acquires in biology, certain specific
problems are presented; the attempt has been made to designate
these by the term "Afittcl organischcn Geschehen"

1 K. G. LAU, Beitrage zur Psychologic dcr Jugend in der Pubertatizett, 2d ed.,
Beltz Langensalza, 1024.

OX THE STRl r CTl r RE OF THE .\flXD 65

An analogous danger and an analogous difficulty, which
become clear in carrying through the problems on concrete
material, exist for the psychological problems of energy as well.
For example, it is shown that certain systems with certain
tensions and velocities of equilibration may be deduced from
the degree of communication with adjacent regions of the system
concerned and from the relation of their tensions; and in the
treatment of these one can in principle succeed with the above-
mentioned or related basic concepts of energy processes.
But there also occur, occasionally, rather abrupt regulation
phenomena (e.g., the sort of thing usually spoken of as the
intervention of self-control or a willing), which cannot be
deduced from the principles originally taken as basis, principles
which have proved adequate up to this point. In such cases
the transition to more comprehensive regions (which, when
treated as total systems, may clear up what was at first puzzling)
is sometimes useful. It cannot here be discussed whether the
explanation may always be attained in this way, by recourse to
wholes of varying extent and varying strength, or whether the
processes of psychical growth and maturation require the use
of essentially other conceptual structures than those above
described. For here we are faced with questions which embrace
the whole field of life. 1 In any case the same concept of the
dynamic whole in the pregnant sense of the dynamic Gestalt
will play a decisive role, and a broad field is indicated to
psychological experimental research which promises to yield
important clarification toward the solutioTi of the general
problems of life.

1 Cf. K. LEWIN, Dcr BcgrijJ dcr Gencsc, Springer, Berlin, 1922.

CHAPTER III

ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES IN CHILD BEHAVIOR AND
DEVELOPMENT 1

We have here to deal only with the psychological influence
of the environment. This does not mean that the somatic
effects of environment, for example, of nutrition or climate,
do not have great psychological significance. On the contrary,
the somatic as well as the psychological influence of the environ-
ment is constantly operating on the entire child.

INTRODUCTION

It has long been recognized that the psychological influence
of environment on the behavior and development of the child
is extremely important. 2 Actually, all aspects of the child's
behavior, hence instinctive and voluntary behavior, play,
emotion, speech, expression, are codetermined by the existing
environment. Some recent theories, notably those of Watson
and Adler, assign to environment so predominant an influence
upon development that hereditary factors are usually neg-
lected. 3 Stern's theory of convergence emphasizes, on the
contrary, that a predisposition and an environmental influence

1 Reprinted from CARL MURCHISON, Handbook of Child PsycJwIogy, Clark
Univ. Press, Worcester, Mass., 2(1 ed. rev., Chap. 14, 11)33, by permission.

2 II. TAINK, DC rintclli^cme (2 vols ) Paris, 1X70 (jd ed., 1878) On Intelli-
gence (trans, by T. D. Have and rev. with additions by the author, 2 vols.),
Holt & Williams, New York, 1889.

3 J. B. W VTSON, Behaviorism, People's Instit. Publ. Co., New York, 1924-1925
(rev. ed., Norton, New York, 1930); A ADLI-R, t'bcr den nrrvosen Character.
Grundznge cincr verglcuhenden Individual psychologic und Psychotherapic, Berg-
mann, Munich and Wiesbaden, 1912 (4th ed., 1928). The Neurotic Constitu-
tion: Outlines of a Comparative Individualistic Psychology and Psychotherapy
(trans by B. Glueck and J. E. Lind), Moffat, Yard, New York, 1917.

ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES 67

must operate in the same direction in order to effect a particular
mode of behavior. 1

Average and Individual Milieu.

The fact of environmental influence has been thoroughly
established in various ways in recent years by the psychological
study of various environments. For example, the intelligence
of country children has been compared with that of city chil-
dren, 2 and the significance of size of family and position among
siblings has been investigated. 3 Research upon foster children l
and twins 5 has also played an important part. In the case of
identical twins one can be sure of equivalent hereditary capaci-
ties and dispositions. Similarities in conduct in the face of
differences in environment may thus yield important informa-
tion as to the kind and strength of the effects of environment,
on the one hand, or of heredity, on the other.

Present-day investigation of the environment uses primarily
statistical methods. The average of as many school records
as were obtainable for only children is compared, for example,
with that of eldest, middle, and youngest children in families
of three. Particular environmental factors may be excluded
to a certain degree, for example, in the investigation of the
effect of size of family or of position in the series of siblings, by

1 W. STERN, Psychologic dcr frnhcn Kindhcit, bis zum srthslcn Li'bcnijahre,
Quelle & Meyer, Lcip/.ig, 1914 (6th ed., rev., 1930). Psychology of Early
Childhood, up to iiie Sixth Year of Age (trans, from the 31! German ed. by A
Harwell), Holt, New York, Allen, London, 1924 (2(1 cd., rev., 19.30).

2 K HAUCK, Zur difTerenticllen Psychologic des Industrie- und Landkindes,
Jenacr Beitr. z. Jugend- und Erzichnngsp\ychol. t Beltz, Langcns.i1/a, 1929,
H E JONKS, II S CONRAD, and M. B. BLANCHARD, Environmental Handicap
in Mental Test Performance, Univ. Calif, Pitbl. P \ychol , 1932, 5, 63-99.

3 A. BUSJM\NN T , Die Familie als Erlebnismilieu dcs Kindes, X,\ch. j. Kinder-
forsch , 1929, 36, 17-32-

4 B. S. BURKS, The Relative Influence of Nature and Nurture upon Menial
Development: A comparative study of foster parent foster child resemblance,
2-jth Yearbook, N.S.S.E, 1928, Pt. i, 219-316; F. N. FREEMAN, el al., The
Influence on the Intelligence, School Achievement and Conduct of P'oster
Children, 27/6 Yearbook, N.S.S.E., 1928, Pt. i, pp. 103-218.

6 A. GESELL, The Developmental Psychology of Twins, in A Handbook of
Child Psychology, ed. by C. Murchison, Worcester, ist cd., 1931.

68 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

including only children of approximately the same economic
status. These investigations have brought to light a wealth of
interesting facts; for example, that in certain social levels in
(iermany the number of children optimal for school achieve-
ment is three or four, but that in proletarian families, on the
contrary, only children display, on the average, the best
records. 1

Valuable and indispensable as these facts are, they can
rarely offer more than hints toward the problem of the forces
of the environment. For, in the investigation of the funda-
mental dynamic relations between the individual and the
environment, it is essential to keep constantly in mind the actual
total situation in its concrete individuality. The statistical
method is usually compelled to define its groups on the basis
not of purely psychological characteristics but of more or less
extrinsic ones (such as the number of siblings), so that particular
cases having quite different or even opposed psychological
structure may be included in the same group. Especially to
be emphasized, however, is the following consideration: the
calculation of an average (e.g., of "the one-year-old child") is
designed to eliminate the "accidents" of the environment; the
determination of the "average situation" (e.g., of the average
effect of the situation of being an only child) is to exclude
individual variations. But the very relation that is decisive
for the investigation of dynamics namely, that of the position
of the actual individual child in the actual, concrete, total
situation is thereby abstracted. 2 An inference from the
average to the concrete particular case is hence impossible.
The concepts of the average child and of the average situation
are abstractions that have no utility whatever for the investi-
gation of dynamics. 3 The use of the average and the curve of

1 A. BUSEMANN, Op. tit.

2 L,EwiN, Conflict between Aristotelian and Galileian Modes of Thought
in Psychology, Jour. Gen. Psychol., 1931, 5, 141-177 (Chap I of this
volume).

3 Thus the environment researches become, in general, the more fruitful the
more attention is paid to a comprehension of the concrete total situation instead
of to the number of cases.

EXVIROXMEXTAL FORCES 69

distribution is unexceptionable where the object is to obtain
a numerical value to characterize the position of a given
individual in a group. For the discovery of dynamic laws,
however, it does not suffice to segregate a single property or
a phenotypically defined event, without regard to the structure
of the total situation, and then to treat statistically as many
as possible of the situations that display this characteristic.

The laws of falling bodies in physics cannot be discovered
by taking the average of actual falling movements, say of
leaves, stones, and other objects, but only by proceeding
from so-called pure cases. Likewise in psychology the forces
of the environment and the laws of their operation on child
behavior can be discovered only by proceeding from certain
total situations that are simple but well defined in their concrete
individuality. Only in this way, which usually implies experi-
ment and systematic variation of conditions, can general
propositions be made which will hold good even for the actual
individual child and the concrete particular case.

It may, of course, be questioned whether it is possible
to speak scientifically (i.e., with conceptual rigor) of dynamic
properties, especially of forces of the psychological environ-
ment. 1 Saying, for example, that bad treatment oppresses
the child, or that praise exalts it, may obviously have a merely
figurative significance.

In biology the tropism theory of Loeb attempted to establish
in a scientifically precise way dynamic relations between
environmental stimulation and the behavior of certain animals.
It has, however, been shown that the circumstance of the
animals' learning implies essential modification, 2 and, moreover,
that their behavior deoends unon their momentary "mood. 1 ' 3

1 The speculative philosophical grounds which might be urged against such an
attempt are not considered here. In America they are usually of a physical
nature, in Germany partly physical and partly geirterwhwnschaftlUH.

2 H. S. JENNINGS, Behavior of the Lower Organisms, Columbia Univ. Press,
New York, 1906.

? F Au ERDES, Ncuc Bahncn in der Lehre vom Verhalten der nicderzn Tiere,
Springer, Berlin, 1922.

yo .1 DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

The biologists at present have in part gone back to an
indeterministic or at least a nondynamic point of view according
to which it is impossible to talk of a strictly lawful operation
of environmental forces upon the individual. The influence
of the environment is reduced essentially to the principle of trial
and error. That is, the occurrence of the elementary actions
is, so far as their relations to the environment are concerned,
essentially accidental. The theory thus displays marked
Darwinistic traits: it excludes the problem of a direct dynamic
relation between environment and individual and limits the
effect of the environment to the evocation of agreeable or dis-
agreeable experiences. This theory may be regarded as an
attempt to avoid the uncomfortable concept of environmental
forces in a psychological sense and to derive an explanation
of all behavior so far as this may be possible from the organism
itself.

In child psychology also the principle of trial and error is
regarded as fundamental for the development of child behavior. 1
On the other hand, it has recently been emphasized, first, that
besides "experience" intrinsic maturation has fundamental
significance for child development 2 and, secondly, that besides
blind trial and error there is insightful behavior. 3 In the case
of insightful behavior the conduct of the individual is again
brought into immediate relation to the special structure of
the situation.

Individual, Environment, and Law.

Before we consider in detail the question of the psychological
forces of the environment, we must discuss briefly the relation
of the concepts environment, individual, and law. Environ-

1 K. BtUiLKR, Die gfhtige Entitle klung dcs Kindes, Fischer, Jena, 1918 (new
cd., 1929).

Tlic Mental Development of the Child, Harcourt, Brace, New York, Kegan
Paul, London, 1030.

2 W. STERN, Psydiologic der fruhcn Kindheit, bis zitm sechsten Lcbensjahre;
K. KOFFKA, The Growth of the MM; K. BUHLER, op. cit.

3 K. KOFFKA, op. cit.

ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES 71

ment is understood psychologically sometimes to mean the
momentary situation of the child, at other times to mean the
milieu, in the sense of the chief characteristics of the perma-
nent situation. The following considerations apply to both
concepts.

The actual behavior of the child depends in every case both
upon his individual characteristics and upon the momentary
structure of the existing situation. It is not possible, however,
as is increasingly obvious, simply to single out one part to be
attributed to the environment and another to be ascribed to
the individual. But even when the primitive question,
''Which is (in this case) more important, heredity or environ-
ment?" is given up, and the thesis is advanced that heredity
and environment must work in the same direction in order to
effect a certain mode of behavior, it is still assumed that
hereditary dispositions may be defined as tendencies toward
certain real modes of behavior without reference to a particular
environment. Actually, reference to a specific environment,
indeed, to an aggregate of specific environments, is indispensable
to the concept of predisposition: a predisposition or individual
characteristic of the person (P a ) (see page 72) cannot be
defined by one specific mode of behavior, but only by an
aggregate of modes of behavior of such kind that different
environmental situations (E\, E>i, . . . ) are correlated with
the modes of behavior (B a , B & , . . . ) they elicit. The
individual characteristics of a person as regards both pre-
disposition and momentary state are thus to be defined not
phenotypically but genotypically in dealing with dynamic
problems.

The variations in behavior (5 a , B , . . . ) with the same
individual characteristics may be extremely large. A child
that is negative in one situation may be shy in another and
at ease in a third. Thus Kramer found in 100 per cent of his
cases that bestial children lost their bestial behavior so com-
pletely w r hen brought into an appropriate environment that
they might better be characterized as dainty.

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

Sensitivity to environment varies considerably in different
individuals. In general it is greater in psychopathic than
in normal children. 1

In order for one individual characteristic 2 (P ) to be differen-
tiated from another (P b ) it must be associated with different
modes of behavior (B) in the same situations (1, E>i, E n ).

Ei-
E. 2 -
E-

Pa= '

Thus, on the whole, different individuals may often display
the same (or very similar) modes of behavior (B). Watson
and Adler emphasize this similarity, and probably the ulti-
mately possible modes of behavior of very many people might
indeed show a considerable, if not a complete, measure of
agreement. But this similarity of possible behavior does
not imply similarity of the individuals, because it requires
different situations to bring out (approximately) similar
behavior. 3 Neither similarity nor difference in behavior (B)
permits of direct unequivocal inference of similarity or differ-
ence of individual characteristics or of situation factors. Infer-
ence of an individual characteristic (P) is possible only when
the environmental situations (E) agree, inference of the situa-
tion only when the individuals agree. 4

1 A. IloMHURc.ER, Vorh'sungcn ubcr P^yihopathologie des Kindcsaltcr\, Springer,
Berlin, 1926.

2 These considerations apply equally to a single characteristic or personality
trait and to the whole personality.

3 These situations must, in general, be the more different the more different
he individuals.

4 Iwen if the Watson- Adler thesis that the overwhelming majority of mankind
is capable of most tasks were right, it would imply neither similarity of endowment
nor the decisive importance of environmental factors

EN VIROXMEXTA L FORCES 7 }

In such cases, to be sure, the inference is unequivocal.
Indeed, psychological laws really say the same thing in another
way: from a certain total constellation comprising a situation
and an individual there results a certain behavior, i.e.,
(#!, P a ) -> a , or in general: B = f(PE).

In reality, the dynamics of environmental influences can be
investigated only simultaneously with the determination of
individual differences and with general psychological laics.
The discovery of psychological laws, on the other hand, yields
important insights into the significance of environmental
factors and individual characteristics. It will be plain from
these considerations what vital importance the systematic
especially the experimental investigation of environmental
changes with the same individual 1 has for the study of the
environmental forces.

Environmental Structure and Needs.

An analysis of environmental factors must start from a
consideration of the total situation. Such an analysis hence
presupposes an adequate comprehension and presentation in
dynamic terms of the total psychological situation as its most
important task.

Loeb's theory, by and large, identifies the biological environ-
ment with the physical environment: the dynamic factors
of the environment consist of light of specific wave length
and intensity, gravity, and others of similar nature. 2 Others,
notably von Uexkiill, have shown, on the contrary, that the
biological environment is to be characterized quite differently,
namely, as a complex of foods, enemies, means of protection,
etc. The^amc physical situation must thus be described for
different species of animals as a specifically different phenomenal
and functional world [ u Merk- und Wirkwelt"].

1 Only in the same individual or in identical twins can one be sure of dealing
\\ith the same individual characteristics.

2 \V. J CROZIER, The Study of Living Organisms, Chap. II, The Foundations
of Experimental Psychology (ed. by C. Murchisonj, Clark Univ. Press, Worcester,
Mass., 1929, pp. 45~ I2 7-

74 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

In child psychology, also, the same physical environment
must be quite differently characterized according to the age,
the individual character, and the momentary condition of the
child. The life-space of the infant is extremely small and
undifferentiated. This is just as true of its perceptual as
of its effective space. 1 With the gradual extension and differ-
entiation of the child's life-space, a larger environment and
essentially different facts acquire psychological existence, and
this is true also with respect to dynamic factors. The child
learns in increasing degree to control the environment. At the
same time and no less importantit becomes psychologically
dependent upon a growing circle of environmental events.

When, for example, one breaks a doll a few feet away from
a baby, the latter is unaffected, while the same procedure
with a three-year-old usually calls forth energetic intervention.

The later extension of the child's space-time beyond the
room and the family circle also means not only an intellectual
survey of wider relations but, above all, an extension of the
environmental objects and events upon which the child is
psychologically immediately dependent.

The mere knowledge of something (e.g., of the geography of a
foreign country, of the economic and political situation, or
even of immediate family affairs) does not necessarily change
the child's life-space more than superficially. On the other
hand, psychologically critical facts of the environment, such
as the friendliness or unfriendliness of a certain adult, may
have fundamental significance for the child's life-space without
the child's having a clear intellectual appreciation of the fact.

For the investigation of dynamic problems we are forced
to start from the psychologically real environment of the
child.

1 E. LAU, Beitriige zur Psychologic der friihen Kindheit II. Zcihchr. f
Kindcrforich., 1931, 31, 481-501; C. BttiiLER, Kindheit und Jugend: Genese dcs
Bewusstseins, Psychol. Afonographicn, 3, Hirzel, Leipzig, 1928. From Birth to
.\faturity. (In preparation.) S. FAJANS, Die Bedeutung der Entfernung fur die
Starke eines AufTorderungscharakters beim Saugling und Kleinkind, Psychol.
Forsch. y 1933, 17, 213-267.

ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES 75

In the " objective" sense, the existence of a social bond is a
necessary condition of the viability of an infant not yet able
itself to satisfy its biologically important needs. This is
usually a social bond with the mother in which, functionally,
the needs of the baby have primacy.

But social facts, as essential constituents of the psycho-
biological environment, very early acquire dominant signifi-
cance. This does not mean, of course, that when the child
of three months reacts specifically to the human voice and to a
friendly smile 1 the relation to certain individuals has already
become a stable constituent of the child's psychological environ-
ment. The age at which this will occur depends essentially
upon the individual endowment and the experiences of the
child.

The fact that certain activities (e.g., playing with certain
toys) are allowed and others forbidden 2 (e.g., throwing things
or touching certain objects belonging to grown-ups) begins
very early certainly before the age of two to play an impor-
tant dynamic part in the structure of the child's environment.
With the growth of the child social facts usually acquire more
and more significance for the structure of the psychological
environment.

Social facts such as friendship with another child, dependence
upon an adult, etc., must also be regarded, from the dynamic
point of view, as no less real than physical facts. Of course,
in the description of the child's psychological environment
one may not take as a basis the immediately objective social
forces and relations as the sociologist or jurist, for example,
would list them. One must, rather, describe the social facts
as they affect the particular individual concerned. 3 For the
objective social factors have no more an unambiguous relation

1 C. BOIILER and II. HKTZKR, Das erste Verstiindnis von Ausdruck im ersten
Lebensjahr, Zcitschr. f. PsychoL, 1928, 107, 50-61; H. HKTZKR and K. WOLF,
Babytests, Zcilschr.f. PsychoL, 1928, 107, 62-104.

2 G. WEISS, Aufgabegebundcncs und aufgabefreies Verhalten von Fur-
sorgezoglingen, Zcitschr f Kinder jorsch , 1930, 36, i9.sjf.

3 LK\viN, Vectors, Cognitive Processes and Mr. Tolman's Criticism, Jous.
Gen Psyrtiol., 1933, 8, 318-345.

76 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

to the psychological individual than objective physical factors
have. Exactly the same physical object may have quite differ-
ent sorts of psychological existence for different children and
for the same child in different situations. A wooden cube may
be one time a missile, again a building block, and a third time
a locomotive. What a thing is at any time depends upon the
total situation and the momentary condition of the child
involved. Similar considerations hold also for the social
factors.

In this dependence there becomes clear a matter of funda-
mental psychological importance, namely, the direct relationship
between the momentary state of the individual and the structure
of his psychological environment. 1 That the psychological
environment, even when objectively the same, depends not only
upon the individual character and developmental stage of the
child concerned but also upon its momentary condition becomes
clear when we consider the relation between environment and
needs.

Beside the quasi-physical and quasi-social environment,
a mental task or a phantasy must sometimes be characterized
from the dynamic point of view as environment. Activities
(e.g., a game) may have the character of a region into or out
of which the child may go. In the same sense a mathematical
problem may have this character. The description of the
child's environment would be incomplete without including
the whole world of phantasy which is so important for the
child's behavior and so closely connected with its ideals and with
its ideal goals.

In the environment there are, as we have seen, many objects
and events of quasi-physical and quasi-social nature, such as
rooms, halls, tables, chairs, a bed, a cap, knife and fork, things
that fall down, turn over, can start and go of themselves;
there are dogs, friends, grown-ups, neighbors, someone who
rarely gets cross, and someone who is always strict and dis-
agreeable. There are places where one is safe from rain,

1 Ibid.; LEWIN, Vorsatz, Willc und Bcdurfnh mit Vorbemcrkungen ubcr die
psychischen Kraftc und Encrgicn und die Stntktitr der Seele.

EXVIROXMEXTAL FORCES 77

others where one is safe from adults, and still others where
one may not go under any circumstances. All these things
and events are defined for the child partly by their appearance
but above all by their functional possibilities (the Wirkwclt in
von Uexkiill's sense). The stairs are something that one can
(or cannot yet) go up and down, or something that one climbed
yesterday for the first time. Thus history, as the child has
experienced it, is also a psychologically essential constituent
of the things of the environment.

With all these, however, there remain certain critical proper-
ties of the psychobiological environment still undescribed
Objects are not neutral to the child, but have an immediate
psychological effect on its behavior. Many things attract the
child to eating, others to climbing, to grasping, to manipulation,
to sucking, to raging at them, etc. These imperative environ-
mental facts we shall call them valences 1 [AujfordcruHgs-
charaktcrc] determine the direction of the behavior. Particu-
larly from the standpoint of dynamics, the valences, their
kind (sign), strength, and distribution, must be regarded as
among the most important properties of the environment.

1 Those valences arc not to be confused with what is generally understood 1>\
''stimulus," as the term is used in speaking of a stimulus-reaction process The
effect of the valence corresponds dynamically much more nearly to a command, a
summons, or a request

A fairly precise translation of Auffordernngwharakter is the term "demand
value," which Tolman [K. C. TOLMAN, Purposive Behavior, Applcton-Century,
New York, 1932] uses for the same concept. In order to avoid unneces-
sary misunderstandings, Professor Tolman and Lew in have agreed to use the
same term and at Tolman's suggestion have chosen "valence "

[There is no good English equivalent for Aujf order unguharakter as the author
uses it. " Positive A ujfordcrungicharakterc" and " negative A ujjonlcrung\char<ik-
tere" might be accurately rendered by "attractive characters" and "repulsive
characters," were it not desirable, for various reasons, to have a neutral term.
Perhaps the most nearly accurate translation for the expression would be ''com-
pulsive character," but that is cumbrous and a shade too strong. In consulta-
tion with the author it has been decided to do a very little violence to an old use
of the word "valence" (see the New English Dictionary). It should be noted
that, in contrast to chemical valence, which is only positive, psychological
valence or a psychological valence may be either positive (attracting) or negative
(repelling), and that an object or activity loses or acquires valence (of either
kind) in accordance with the needs of the organism. Translators' note.]

78 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

The valence of an object usually derives from the fact
that the object is a means to the satisfaction of a need, or
has indirectly something to do with the satisfaction of a need.
The kind (sign) and strength of the valence of an object or
event thus depends directly upon the momentary condition
of the needs of the individual concerned; the valence of environ-
mental objects and the needs of the individual are correlative. 1
(Concerning induced valence, see page 97.) Even with objec-
tive identity of environment, the strength and the appearance
of the valences are quite other for a hungry child than for a
satisfied one, for a healthy child than for a sickly one.

The correlation between valence and environment leads
to a fundamental change in the latter with the changing needs
of increasing age. The objects bearing valences are different for
the baby, the toddler, the kindergartener, and the pubescent."

The valences change also with the momentary state of the
needs. When the need for nourishment, for playing with a
doll, or for reading history is in a hungry or unsatisfied condi-
tion, a bit of food, a doll, or the history book attracts the
child, that is, has a positive valence; whereas, when this need
is in a stage or state of satisfaction, the object is indifferent to
the child; and, in the stage of oversatiatkm of the need, it
becomes disagreeable to the child, that is, it acquires a negative
valence. 3

Since the psychological environment, especially for the
child, is not identical with the physical or social environment,
one cannot, in investigating environmental forces, proceed
from the physical forces as Loeb, for example, does in biology.
If we start primarily from the psychobiological environment

1 L,EWIN, Vorsats, Willc und Beditrfnis mil Vorbemcrkun^ nuhcrdie psychischen
Kraftc und Encrgien und die Struktur dcr Scclc.

2 LEWiN, Vectors, Cognitive Processes and Mr. Tolman's Criticism, Jour.
Gen. Psyihol., 1933, 8, 318-345.

3 A. KARSTEN, Psychische Sattigung, Psychol. Fors<.h., 1928, 10, 142-254; D
KATZ, Psychologische Probleme des Hungers und Appetits, insbesondere beim
Kinde, Zeihchr f. Kinderforsth., 1928, 34, 158-197; LE\VIN, Die Bedeutung der
"psychischen Sattigung" fiir einige Probleme der Psychotechnik, Psychotcchn.
Zcitschr., 1928, 3, 182.

ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES 79

and pay due attention to its dependence upon the actual
momentary condition of the individual involved, it is quite
possible to discover universally valid principles of the dynamic
effects of the environment. To be sure, it will always be
necessary to keep in mind the total structure of the existing
situation. 1

Psychological environmental forces [Umwltkrafte] may
be defined empirically and functionally, excluding all meta-
physical problems, by their effect upon the behavior of the
child. 2 They are equally applicable to the momentary situa-
tion and to the permanent environment of the child.

In summary: to understand or predict the psychological
behavior (B) one has to determine for every kind of psycho-
logical event (actions, emotions, expressions, etc.) the momen-
tary whole situation, that is, the momentary structure and
the state of the person (P) and of the psychological environment
(). B =f(PE}. Every fact that exists psychobiologically
must have a position in this field and only facts that have such
position have dynamic effects (are causes of events). The
environment is for all of its properties (directions, distances,
etc.) to be defined not physically but psychobiologically, that is,
according to its quasi-physical, quasi-social, and quasi-mental
structure.

It is possible to represent the dynamic structure of the
person and of the environment by means of mathematical
concepts. The coordination between the mathematical repre-
sentation and its psychodynamic meaning has to be strict and
without exception.

We shall first describe the psychological field forces and
their mode of operation, without consideration of the question
whether the object in any particular case has acquired its
valence through some previous experience or in some other way.

1 By situation is meant the psychological situation, with particular reference
to its dynamic properties.

2 The fundamental concepts of psychological dynamics are thus for the present
to be defirted purely from the point of view of psychology and biology. Whether
they agree in their formal logical structure with the fundamental dynamic con-
cepts of physics need not here be discussed.

8o A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

THE REGION OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. FORCES AND
FIELDS OF FORCE

The first presupposition for the understanding of the child is
the determination of the psychological place at which the child
concerned is and of his region of freedom of movement, that is,
of the regions that are accessible to him and of those regions
that psychologically exist for the child but are inaccessible to
him by reason of the social situation (prohibition by the adult,
limitation by other children, etc.) or because of the limitations
of his own social, physical, and intellectual abilities. Whether
his region of freedom of movement is large or small is of decisive
significance for the whole behavior of the child. 1

One can characterize these possible and not possible psycho-
dynamic locomotions (quasi-bodily, quasi-social, and quasi-
mental locomotions) at every point of the environment with
the help of the concept of topology, which is a nonquantitative
discipline about the possible kinds of connections between
"spaces" and their parts.

The basis for the coordination between mathematical and
psychodynamic concepts so far as environmental questions
are concerned is the coordination of topological path and
psychodynamic locomotion. The topological description deter-
mines which points the different paths lead to and which
regions these paths cross. The region which a child cannot
reach one can characterize by means of barriers between these
regions and their neighboring regions. The barrier corresponds
as a dynamic concept to the mathematical concept of boundary.
One must distinguish between different strengths of barriers. 2

Fundamental Properties of Field Forces.

To determine not only which locomotions (paths) are possible
but which of the possible locomotions will occur at a given
moment one has to use the concept of force.

1 F WIKHE, Die Grenzcn dcs lefts. (In preparation.) LEWIN, Die psycholo-
K/w/K 1 Situation bci Lohn und Strafe, Hirzcl, Leipzig, 1931 (Chap IV of this
volume).

2 S. FAJANS, ibid.

EXVIROXMEXTAL FORCES 8 1

A force is defined through three properties: (i) direction,
(2) strength, and (3) point of application. The first and second
properties are to be represented through the mathematical
concept vector. The point of application is indicated in
the figures (as is the custom in physics) by the point of the
arrow.

Dynamically the force is correlated with psychobiological
locomotions in a one-to-one correspondence. "The real loco-
motion must occur in every case according to the direction
and the strength of the resultant of the momentary forces'*
and u ln any case of locomotion there exists a resultant of
forces in its direction."

The direction which the valence imparts to the child's
behavior varies extremely, according to the content of the
wants and needs. Nevertheless, one may distinguish two large
groups of valences according to the sort of initial behavior
they elicit: the positive valences (+), those effecting approach;
and the negative ( ), or those producing withdrawal or
retreat.

The actions in the direction of the valence may have the
form of uncontrolled impulsive behavior or of directed voluntary
activity; they may be ''appropriate" or "inappropriate."

Those processes which make an especially goal-striving
impression are usually characterized dynamically by a refer-
ence to a positive valence. 1

One has to distinguish between driving forces, which cor-
respond to positive or negative valences, and restraining forces,
which correspond to barriers.

Direction of the Field Force. That the valence is not asso-
ciated merely with a subjective experience of direction, but that
a directed force, determinative of the behavior, must be
ascribed to it, may be seen in the fact that a change in the
position of the attractive object brings about (other things
being equal) a change in the direction of the child's movements.

An especially simple example of an action in the direction
of a positive valence is illustrated in Figs, i and 2. A six-

1 See below, p. 120.

82 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

months-old infant stretches arms, legs, and head toward a
rattle or a spoonful of porridge in accordance with the direction
of the vector (V).

The direction of the field forces plays an important part in such

intelligent behavior as has to
do with detour [Umweg] prob-
lems. The child perhaps
wants to get a piece of choco-
late on the other side of a
bench (see Fig. 3). The
difficulty of such a problem
consists primarily not in the
length of the detour (D) but
in the fact that the initial
* I<;< ** direction of the appropriate

route does not agree with that of the vector from the valence.
The detour is the more difficult, other things being equal, the
more the barrier makes it necessary for the child in making
the detour to start off in a direction opposed to the direction
of the valence (Fig. 4).

PIG. 2.

FIG. 3.-

child; Ch, chocolate; B t
bench.

The situation is similar when the child wants to take a
ring off a stick, while the stick stands so that the ring cannot
be pulled directly toward the child, but must first be moved
upward or away from himself. Similar factors are operative
when a child at a certain age may have difficulties in sitting
down on a chair or a stone. The child approaches with his

ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES

face toward the stone (5). In order to sit down he must turn
around, that is, execute a movement opposed to the direction
of the field force (Fig. s). 1

When the child finds the solution of such a detour problem,
it happens by reason of a restructuring of the field. 2 There
occurs a perception of the total situation of such a kind that
the path to the goal becomes a unitary whole. The initial
part of the route, which objectively is still a moment away
from the goal (see Fig. 4), thereby loses psychologically that
character and becomes the first phase of a general movement
toward the goal. 3

Ch -f ^.

FIG. 4. FIG. 5.

How critically important the question of direction is in
this case is indicated by the fact that one cannot force a solution
of the detour by increasing the strength of the valence. If the
attraction is much too weak, it is, to be sure, unfavorable,
because the child does not concern himself sufficiently with
the affair. 4 But if we continue to strengthen the valence, the

^EWIN, Die Auswirkung von Umweltkrilften, Proc. gth Int. Cong. Psychol.,
1929, 286-288.

*W. KOHLER, The Mentality of Apes (trans, by E. Winter), Harcourt, Brace,
New York, 1925.

* Frequently this transformation is not immediately complete, and the first
part of the route retains a sort of double character.

4 Bogen found, even among school children who were working on such tasks
voluntarily, that solutions were found more frequently if the valence of the goal
was strengthened by the addition of a piece of chocolate (see H. BOGEN and
O. LIPMANN, Naive Physik. Arbeiten aus dem Institut fUr angewandte Psychologic
in Berlin. Theoretische und experimentelle Untersuchungen tiber die Fahigkeit
zu intelligentem Handeln, Barth, Leipzig, 1923).

84 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

solution of the task ceases to be facilitated and instead becomes
more difficult. The strength of the attraction then makes
it doubly difficult for the child to start in a direction opposed
to the field force. Instead, the child will execute, with all its
energy, affective meaningless actions in the direction of the
valence (see page 96). * Above all, that relative detachment
and inward retirement from the valence which are so favorable
to perception of the whole situation and hence to the trans-
formation [Umstrukturierung] of the total field, which occurs
in the act of insight, are made much more difficult (see page 152).
For the same reason, the prospect of an especially intense reward
or punishment may impede the solution of intellectual tasks.

To older children of normal intelligence the preceding
examples of detour problems ofter no difficulty, because they
already have a sufficient survey of such situations or cor-
responding experiences. For them, it no longer requires a
special act of intelligence in order that, instead of the spatial
directions, the functional directions become decisive for the
movement.

We may at this point remark a circumstance of general
importance: direction in the psychobiological field is not
necessarily to be identified with physical direction, but must
be defined primarily in psychological terms. The difference
between psychological and physical direction appears more
prominently in older children. When the child fetches a
tool or applies to the experimenter for help, the action does
not mean, even when it involves a physical movement in a
direction opposite to the goal, a turning away from the goal
but an approach to it. Such indirect approaches are more
rare among babies. This is due to the slighter functional
differentiation of their environment and to the fact that social
structure has not yet the overwhelming significance for them
that it has for older children.

1 The impulsive struggles of Thorndike's cats may have been due in part to
such a situation (see K. L. THORNDIKE, Animal Intelligence, Macmillan, Nen r
York, 1911).

EN VI ROXtf F:\TAL FORCES 85

Fajans 1 found, for example, that in a certain situation in
which three- and four-year-old children usually applied to the
experimenter for help (indirect approach), the corresponding
turning of the baby to its mother was more a withdrawal from
failure than a seeking for help.

In the cases mentioned, the direction of the field forces
is determined by objects which, by reason of visual or auditory
distance perceptions, have a definite place in the environment.
In the case of newborn children, it is possible to speak of such
precisely directed iield forces only in so far as the psychological
environment has sufficient structure and solidity.

Directed action in response to certain forms of tactile stimula-
tion may be observed very early. Touching the child's cheek
with the nipple may elicit a turning of the head in the corre-
sponding direction.

Also among older children the (psychological) separation
of the self from the valence remains in many respects a necessary
condition for the directedness of the action upon the valence.
Fairly often the action does not proceed immediately to the
use of the object, but the field force disappears (or is at least
very much weakened) as soon as the object comes into the
"possession " of the individual involved. An example from our
films: a nine-month-old child before which two rattles are laid
does not begin to play after getting one of them, but is interested
only in the rattle that he does not have. The close relation
between directed field forces and the separation of the self
from the goal object can also be demonstrated in various ways
with older children.

Strength of the Field Forces. For the strength of the valences,
internal factors, especially the actual momentary state of the
child's needs, are of crucial significance. 2 In addition, the
strength of the field force going out from a valence depends
also upon the position of the valence relative to the individual
and upon the presence or absence of other valences.

1 S FAJANS, Erfolg, Ausdauer und Aktivitat beim Saugling und Kleinkincl,
Psychol. Forsch , 1933, 17, 268-305.

2 A. KARSTEN, op. cit.

86 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

Fajans 1 has shown that, other things being equal, the strength
of a valence increases with its apparent proximity, at least
in certain cases. This is expressed by both the duration and
the intensity of the efforts toward the goal. (In these experi-
ments actual attainment of the goal was impossible.)

In a group of babies approximately ten months old, for
example, the average total duration of approaches in the first
three minutes at distances of 9, 40, and 100 cm. was respectively
75, 39, and 27 sec. In a group of three-year-olds the average
total duration of approaches in the "near" experiment was 58
sec., in the "far" experiment 28 sec.

The activity, as well as the duration of approaches, increases
with the degree of proximity of the valence. The reason for
this is different for younger and for older children.

Again one may not, to be sure, simply assume that psycho-
logical distance corresponds to physical distance. In the
first place, a difference in apparent distance is significant
only within a rather narrowly limited range, in accordance
with the smallness of the child's life-space; and this range,
as the work of Fajans shows, is considerably smaller for the
one-year-old than for the three-year-old child. Just as visual
extent in perceptual space (e.g., with reference to the law of
apparent size) increases with age, 2 so the life-space of the
child increases and differentiates in dynamic respects. Differ-
ence in distance cannot be purely physically defined also because
the range in which the child almost gets the desired object has
qualitatively a special character. This u almost" situation
has an especially marked significance, for example, with
reference to experiences of success and failure, and cannot be
reckoned simply as a smaller distance (see page 88).

An obvious discrepancy between spatial and psychological
distance was observed in a group of four-year-old children
who experienced the situation less as an objective task than
as a social relationship with the experimenter. They were

1 S. FAJANS, Die Bedeutung der Entfernung f ur die Starke eines AufTorderungs-
charakters beim Saugling und Kleinkind, Psychol. Forsch., 1933, 17, 213-267.

2 E. LAU, op. cit.

ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES 87

simply faced by an adult who would not give them a doll.
For these children the kind and duration of approach remained
independent of the distance of the valence. Indeed, for the
social route to the valence (by way of the experimenter),
the psychological distance is the same in any case.

With older children the intellectual appreciation of the
functional and particularly the sociological relations (perhaps
of their dependence upon the might of other children and of
adults) is so far developed that physical distance usually
plays a much smaller part in such situations. 1

Weiss found in her Fraenkel experiments (see page 75) with
rather uninhibited five-year-old children that the distance
of the toys on the table was no longer important to the choice
made; the child fetches what he wants. To be sure, when
inhibitions are present, the distance again plays a considerable
role, even with older children.

With increasing age temporally distant events also acquire
increasing significance. To the psychological situation belong
not only those facts that are actually perceptible and objec-
tively present, but also a range of past and future events. A
censure or a commendation may long remain a present psycho-
logical fact for the child, and an expected event may have
psychological reality in advance of its occurrence.

As an example of the increase in the strength of the valence
with temporal proximity, it may be pointed out that, among
the inmates of homes for delinquent children, reform schools,
and similar institutions, it is not infrequently observed that
they become especially difficult just before their discharge.
We noted this paradoxical behavior, so sharply opposed to
their own interests, 2 especially in previously wdl-bchaved
individuals. The essential reason was found to be the follow-
ing: Even for the youth who is at first well behaved in the home
C#) the wish for freedom (F) is an important motive of his

1 Of course, where very strong valences are concerned or very fundamental
needs, primitive physical distance usually plays a considerable role, even with
adults.

2 It not infrequently happens that the prospective discharge is thereupon
revoked.

88 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PKRSOXAIJTY

behavior. At first this freedom is a distant half-imaginary
goal, and, most important, good conduct in the home is the way
that shall ultimately lead him there. Now that his discharge is
approaching, the longed-for, but until now uncertain, world of
freedom is just ahead (Fig. 6). The boundary of the home
thereby acquires in much greater degree the character of a
marked barrier (B) which separates the youth from his almost-
attained goal. Hence the home
acquires a pronounced negative
valence. Emotional and rebel-
lious actions are further facili-
tated by the very high state of
tension (see page 95) and by the
fact that the youth already feels
half free. 1 In a topologically
similar experimental situation
with infants an increase of
affectivity occurred in 85 per
Fir " 6 - cent of the cases when the Held

forces in the direction of the goal behind the barrier were
strengthened and the general state of tension thereby raised. 2
In many cases the impatience of children can be explained by a
similar structure of the environment.

The experiments of Fajans show that the restraining forces
corresponding to the barrier increase when the strength of the
valence behind the barrier is increased (see page 90).

( \) n stcllatio ns of Forces . Co njlict.

The ways in which different valences may interact in a
situation are naturally very numerous. I select for discussion
the case of conflict because of its special significance.

Conflict is defined psychologically as the opposition of
approximately equally strong field forces. There are three basic
cases of conflict, so far as driving forces are concerned.

1 It has happened that a prisoner sentenced to three years tried to escape
within a week of his discharge

2 S. FAJANS, Erfolg, Ausdauer und Aktivitat, beim Saugling und Kleinkind.

EXVIROXMEXTAL FORCES 8g

1. The child stands between two positive valences (Fig. 7).
He has to choose perhaps between going on a picnic (P) and
playing (PI) with his comrades. In this type of conflict situa-
tion decision is usually relatively easy. As a result of the fact
that after the choice is made the goal chosen often seems
inferior (for reasons to be described later), oscillation does
sometimes occur.

2. The child faces something that has simultaneously both
a positive and a negative valence (Fig. 8). He wants, for

example, to climb a tree (7, but is afraid. This constellation
of forces plays an important part in cases in which a reward is
offered for an activity (f.., a school task) which the child does
not want to execute. 1

Conflict situations of this type usually develop rather
quickly also in the detour experiments mentioned above, in
the experiments of Fajans, or in other situations in which the
attainment of the goal is impeded by some barrier. At first

FK, 8

the child sees a difficult barrier (B) between himself and his
goal (G)< which hinders the completion of actions in the direction
of the field forces (Fig. 9). But after the child has run against
the barrier several times and perhaps hurt himself, or had the
wounding experience of failure, the barrier itself acquires a
negative valence (Fig. 10). Beside the positive, there comes
into existence a negative vector, and we have the Type 2

1 For these and the following remarks, see Chap IV, below.

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

conflict situation. The negative vector usually increases
gradually in strength and finally becomes stronger than the
positive. Accordingly, the child goes out of the field.

This withdrawal [Aus-dem-Feldc-Gehen] either may be
physical, as when the child retreats, turns away, or possibly
leaves the room or place, or may be an inward going out
of the field, as when the child begins to play or to occupy
himself with something else.

It not infrequently occurs, for example in embarrassment,
that the child makes certain bodily movements toward the goal
but at the same time is mentally occupied with something
else. In such cases the bodily act has the character of a more or
less set gesture. 1

In such situations the withdrawal is at first almost always
merely temporary. The child turns away, only to return
after a while for another try at the barrier. 2 A final and
permanent withdrawal usually occurs only after several tempo-
rary withdrawals, the duration of which increases until finally
the child does not return.

Unusual persistence in such a situation is not necessarily
an indication of activity. On the contrary, active children
usually go out of the field earlier than passive children. It
is not the duration but the kind of approach that is significant
for activity. 3

1 LFXVIN, Kindlichcr Ausdruck, Xcitschr. f. pad. PtychoL, 1927, 28, 510-526;
S FAIANS, Krfolg, \usdauer und Aktivitat bcim Saugling und Kleinkind.

2 S F \ JAN'S, ibid.

3 Ibid

EX VIROXMEX T. 1 L FORCES

Related to this is the fact that under certain circumstances
the single actions in such a conflict situation are longer with
the infant than with the young child, 1 although in general
the duration of action unities increases with the age of the
child.-'

3. The third type of conflict situation occurs when the child
stands between two negative valences, for example, when it
is sought by threat of punishment (/*) to move a child to do a
task (7') he does not want to do (Fig. 11).

FK, n

FK. 12

There is an essential difference between this and the conflict
situation described under i. This becomes clear when one
proceeds to represent the total distribution of forces in the
field of force.

Field of Force. The field of force indicates which force
would exist at each point in the field if the individual involved
were at that point. To a positive valence there corresponds
a convergent field (Fig. 12).

As a simple example of the structure of the field of force
in a conflict situation of Type 2, a case from one of my films

1 A HOMBlRf.KR, Op. dt.

2 C Hf'HLKR, Op. dt.

92 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

may be adduced: a three-year-old boy wants to fetch a rubber
swan out of the water to the beach, but is afraid of the water.
To the swan (5) as positive valence there corresponds a con-
vergent field (Fig. 13). This field is overlaid by a second
field which corresponds to the negative valence of the waves.
It is important that here, as frequently in such cases, the

strength of the field forces which
correspond to the negative valence
diminishes much more rapidly with
increasing spatial distance than do
the field forces corresponding to the
positive valence. From the direction
and strength of the field forces at
the various points of the field it can
be deduced that the child must move
to the point P where equilibrium
occurs. (At all other points there
exists a resultant which finally leads
to P.) Corresponding to the momen-
tary oscillations of the situation,
above all to the more or less threatening aspect of the
waves, this point of equilibrium approaches and retreats
from the water. Indeed, this oscillation is reflected in the
child's approaches to and retreats from the water.

If we return now to Type 3 of the conflict situation and
compare it with Type i, the chief difference is shown in Figs.
14 and 15: in both cases two central fields overlap. But while
in Type i a stable equilibrium exists at the point P (Fig. 14)
so far as sidewise movements (on line 5) are concerned, in
Type 3 this equilibrium is labile (Fig. 15). That is, there
exists in the case of threat of punishment (Fig. n) a situation
which evokes a tendency to break out toward the side, in
accordance with the strong sidewise resultant (R) of the two
vectors (V p and V t }. Consequently the child always goes out
of the field unless other circumstances prevent it. Hence,
if the threat of punishment is to be effective, the child must
be so inclosed by a barrier (B) that escape is possible only

ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES

by way of the punishment or by way of doing the disagreeable
task. 1 That is, in addition to requiring the execution of the
task, it is necessary to limit the child's freedom of movement,

G 2

PIG 14. (From K. Lewin, Vectors, Cognitive Processes, and Mr. Taiwan's

Criticism, Jour. General PsychoL, 1933, 8, 323.)
^Driving force corresponding to goal (G).
....line of equilibrium.

y r \

\"\'T"/"/

Vj\ V 2 \ IV 2 /V 2 /V 2

~ L

FIG. 15. (From K. Lewin, Vectors, Cognitive Processes, and Mr. Tolman's
Criticism, Jour. Genetal PsychoL, IQ33, 8, 323.)
>Driving force corresponding to goal (G).
....line of equilibrium.

thus creating (by physical or social means) a more or less
constrained situation.

1 The barrier may derive its firmness psychologically from the power of the
adult, from the child's sense of honor, or from some other such factor (see Chap.
IV, below).

94 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

With the young child, the opposition of two approximately
equal field forces in the conflict situation leads typically
(so far as it is not an unstable equilibrium) to a relatively
rapid alternation of actions in the direction of each of the
two field forces in turn. It is a characteristic indication of
greater self-control when, instead of this oscillation of action,
the child displays a relatively calm type of behavior while the
conflict remains unresolved. 1

Ability to endure such unresolved conflict situations is an
important aim of the education of the will. Of course, the
occurrence of such conflict situations presupposes that the
two opposed field forces are of approximately equal strength.
If threats of punishment, pressure from the adult, or other
restrictions leave the child little enough freedom, no real
conflict situation can develop.

If a situation becomes hopeless, that is, if it becomes as a
whole inescapably disagreeable, the child, despairing, contracts,
physically and psychically, under the vectors coming from all
sides and usually attempts to build a wall between himself and
the situation. This is expressed both in the typical bodily
gestures of despair (crumpling up, covering the eyes with the
arms, 2 etc.; see Fig. 16) and by a sort of encysting (Fig. 17)
of the self: the child becomes obdurate.

State of Tension.

The opposition of the two field forces in a conflict situation
leads indirectly, as may be deduced in detail, to an increase
in the total state of tension 3 of the child, especially when
there is an outer barrier. (See the constrained situation with
threat of punishment in Fig. n.)

1 The principle that self-control is not a consequence but a condition of obedi-
ence finds a theoretical justification in these considerations: see M. MONTESSORI,
Selbsttdtige Erziehung im fruhcn Kindesalter (trans, by O. Knapp), Hoffman,
Stuttgart, 1913.

2 See Lewin: appendix to W. STERN, op. at. The experiments of Fajans also
show how in cases of great embarrassment the field forces drive the child, on the
one hand, to turn away, to forget, to go (bodily or psychically) out of the field,
or, on the other hand, to increased passivity.

3 Tension is defined as the opposition of field forces in every direction.

ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES

Especially with children, in whom the psychological delimita-
tion between self and environment is still slight (see page 106),
any increase in environmental tension is usually immediately
reflected. This sensitivity may be seen in the fact that a tear-
ful or a cheerful mood in the environment, travel preparations,
the mother's bad humor, or any other excitement usually
transfers to the child even when every effort is made to conceal
the circumstances from him.

In the simplest case, an increase in the general state of
tension is expressed by restless behavior [Unruhehandlungen].
Restless behavior is a diffuse, undirected discharge of tension
which, in conjunction with the directed forces of the particular

FIG. 16.

FIG. 17.

situation, may culminate in affective outbursts, such as fits
of rage. 1

The basic case of restless behavior is unambiguously clear
in the infant and has very similar forms in pleasant and in
unpleasant expectancy. If one holds out a rattle or nursing
bottle near the baby (the psychological situation corresponds
to that shown in Fig. 2), he stretches with arms, legs, and
mouth in the direction of the valence. He does not remain
calmly in this position, however, but begins to wave his arms
and legs about.

With somewhat older children the least intense form of
restless behavior, corresponding to an increase in the general
state of tension, is a rapid change of occupation. An example:

1 T. DEMBO, Der Arger als dynamisches Problem, Psychol. Forsch,, 1931, 15,
1-144.

96 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

a three-year-old child in a Montessori kindergarten was very
fond of drawing, but one day the director was unable to supply
the requisite paper. Thereupon there occurred a number of
varieties of substitute behavior; the child caressed the pencils,
watched the drawing of older children, etc. Finally the child
took up other occupations, but the average time he stayed with
them was only 3.5 min. as against 14.6 min. on the preceding
and 12.3 min. on the following day. The increased tension
resulting from the impassable barrier between the child and
his goal had thus produced a fourfold increase in the frequency
of his changes of occupation.

Ucko has demonstrated an analogous increase in frequency
of change with older children in an experimental investigation
of similar situations. 1 In addition, the increase in tension
made the occupation more superficial.

Although marked restless behavior is essentially a diffuse
discharge, its form depends upon the topology of the particular
situation, For example, if the restless behavior is produced
by the fact that there is a barrier between the child and the
positive valence, the restless movements occur so that so far
as possible there is no increase in the child's distance from
the positive valence. In other words, the restless movements
occur in the line of equilibrium; that is, when approach is
prevented by a barrier, they take a direction perpendicular
to that of the field vector.

In the case of the child who has difficulty in sitting down on a
stone (Fig. 5) this may lead to circling the stone. If a suffi-
ciently strong positive valence is enclosed by a circular fence
(F, Fig. 1 8), the restless behavior (R) (apart from actions in the
direction of the valence) may take the form of circling the
barrier. 2 If, on the other hand, the child is inside and the
valence outside the circular barrier, the typical behavior is a
very slight oscillation along the side toward the valence (Fig. 19) .

1 In these experiments the tension was produced by interrupting the child in
his favorite occupation.

2 K. LEWIN, Die Auswirkung von Umweltkraften, Proc. qth Int. Cong.
Psychol , iQ2g, 286-288.

ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES 97

Induced Valences

As already mentioned, the valences correspond in part
directly to the momentary needs of the child. A positive
or negative valence may, however, be induced in an object or
event by other environmental factors. This fact is of special
importance in children.

Social Fields.

It is a fundamental fact of childhood that the child's environ-
ment is not subject to his own control. The child faces a

FIG. 1 8. FIG. jo..

FIG. 1 8. (From K. Lewin, Vectors, Cognitive Processes, and Mr. Tolman's
Criticism, Jour. General Psychol., 1933, 8, 323.)
Dnving foice corresponding to goal (G).
---^Restraining force corresponding to barrier (/*).
....line ot equilibrium.

host of demands and difficulties. Difficulties arise from
physical facts of the environment and the limitations of the
child's own abilities: an object that he wants to lift proves
to be too heavy, a staircase down which he wants to crawl
too steep, or the pencil does not go over the paper as it should.
Still more important are social factors, especially the authority
or power of adults and of other children.

In the life of the neonate these social powers are first effective
as sheer physical mastery (the child is bathed, dried, made to
drink, etc.). But very soon their influence upon the child's
psychological environment acquires increasing significance.

98 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

The adult forbids or permits the handling of certain objects,
characterizes behavior as good or bad, praises and blames.

For the infant of a few weeks or months the valences depend
essentially upon his own needs and their momentary condition.
If he does not want a food he cannot be moved by psychological
means to eat it. 1 He simply spits it out. With the older
child the possibility of influencing him by psychological means
is disproportionately greater. The disagreeable act may be
imbedded in a game or in another action unity, and its meaning
(and hence its valence) thereby radically changed.

The possibility of direct influence is correlated with the
increasing psychological reality for the child of social facts,

PIG. 20 > Induced force.

especially of the powers of others. 2 Many objects in the
environment, many modes of conduct, and many goals acquire
a positive or a negative valence or the properties of a barrier,
not directly from the needs of the child himself, but through
another person. This induction may be brought about by an
expressed prohibition or command. More important, however,
is the effect of example, that is, of that which the child sees
characterized by the behavior of adults as positive or negative
for them. Even the very young child usually has a very fine
sensitivity to social evaluations and forces.

The negative valence of a forbidden object (0, Fig. 20)
which in itself attracts the child thus usually derives from an

1 Apart from simple distraction.

2 Dynamically considered, these spheres of influence constitute tields of
force for the child.

ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES 99

inducing field of force of an adult (A}. If this field of force
loses its psychological existence for the child (e.g., if the adult
goes away or loses his authority) the negative valence also
disappears.

In addition to the sphere of power of the adult, the behavior
and spheres of power of other children or of a group of children
are of critical importance for the kind and strength of induced
valences.

The strength and extent of the fields of force of other people
in the child's environment vary greatly, depending especially
upon the economic situation, the character of the parents, the
number, sex, and kind of children in the family and among
friends.

As a rule, the domain in which the child's environment
is "free" (i.e., essentially, dependent only on his own sphere of
power) is relatively small. Too strong or too extensive alien
spheres of power may lead to a real oppression of the child or
to a particularly violent revolt. This is equally true in cases of
too great strictness and of too great fondness. In either case
the child has not enough life-space in which the valences and
other dynamic properties of his psychological environment may
be determined by his own needs. Wiehe, 1 in an experimental
investigation of the effect of a strange room or a strange person,
distinguishes various degrees of strength of such a field, which
degrees can be correlated quantitatively with distinct kinds of
behavior, among others with the different kinds and degrees of
approaches to and withdrawals from a strange person. The
degree of strength of such a social field of force is, excluding the
individuality of the child and of the stranger, a function of
the spatial distance of the strange person, the duration of his
presence, and his behavior. The strongest degree of pressure
is expressed by the child's becoming motionless; a somewhat
weaker, in his crying and showing a tendency to run away,
where possible, to the neighborhood of the mother or to another
field in which he feels at home. In the other actions of the child
also a very strong pressure of strangeness [Fremdheitsdruck]

1 F. WIEHE, op. cit.

100 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

evokes inhibited, a somewhat weaker pressure overexcited or
overemphasized, behavior. Only a further reduction of the
pressure leads to a natural free behavior (see Chap. VIII, Fig.
9, page 261).

As an example of the effect of alien fields of force upon the
child, let us consider the significance of the level of the external
demands made upon him. Experiences of success and failure
have, as Adler correctly emphasizes, an extremely marked
effect upon the child's encouragement and discouragement, and
hence upon his later performance. In experiments on success
and failure with three- to four-year-old children Fajans found
the following: if one distinguishes four grades of activity (from
very active to very passive), the child's activity on the same
act may be reduced three grades by failure. 1 On the other
hand, the activity of passive children could be increased by
about the same amount. The effect upon the general self-
consciousness is also considerable.

Hoppe 2 has shown that the occurrence of success and failure
experiences depends upon the momentary " level of aspiration"
[Anspruchsniveau], and that this level of aspiration is in turn
related to the ability of the individual: with "quite too hard"
and "quite too easy" tasks no experience of success or failure
occurs. The child, for example, has no essential experience of
failure when it cannot do something that only adults or much
older children can do. Nevertheless, the level of aspiration is
by no means determined solely by the ability of the individual.
On the contrary, a level of aspiration decidedly above (or below)
the child's real ability may be produced by the demands of
adults or by the performances of comrades. For this reason
there may develop a feeling of inferiority (or of superiority)
which may be severely prejudicial to the child's general conduct
and actual achievements.

1 This holds chiefly for repetition of the same act within a certain interval of
time. Adams (D. K. ADAMS, Experimental Studies of Adaptive Behavior in
Cats, Comp. PsychoL Afonog., 1929, 6, No. 26, pp. 41, 47, 92, etc.) has
reported marked reduction in the duration of activity with failure of cats in
puzzle boxes.

2 F. HOPPE, Erfolg und Misserfolg, PsychoL Forsch., 1930, 14, 1-62.

ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES

101

Fajans found that the effects of failure could be materially
reduced by a verbal consolation of the child (Fig. 21). Here
again the significance of the social field for the consciousness
of self is evident. The offer of a substitute satisfaction [Ersatz-
befriedigung\ is even more effective than such consolation.

140

1 30

u 120

"-1 10

f _ y

pioo

: 90

'''

. __.

* 80

- !

***

| 6C

x \ ^^

**""

^80

1 70

8: eo

< 50
*o 40
C 30
| 20
I 10

\ s

123 | 2 3

Expenmen Experiment

FIG. 21. FIG. 22.

FIG. 21. Comparison of the effects of success, encouragement, substitution,
and failure upon the duration of approach [Zuwendungsdauer].

Success with concomitant encouragement. Increase in duration of

approach from first to third experiment [Vt-rtnch} 48 per cent
...Success. Increase in duration of approach == 2S per cent

. . Substitute success. Diminution in duration of approach = 6 per cent
Failure. Diminution in duration of approach = 48 per cent

FIG. 22. Effect of success ( ) and failure ( ) upon the

infant.

Even for children of from six to nine months, success or failure
changes the degree of activity and the duration of action toward
the goal. But at this age the repetition itself, after a success,
leads to a diminution in the duration of actions toward the
goal (Fig. 22).

Jucknat, 1 in an experimental investigation of some hundreds
of school children, found that success and failure in one region
may, under certain circumstances, change the level of aspiration

1 JUCKNAT, Leistung und Anspruchsniveau. (In preparation.)

102 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

in other regions: namely, when the two regions have sufficient
dynamic connection and when the child's goal level in the region
concerned is not too firmly fixed.

Means and Substitutes.

An object or event possessing special emphasis may also,
like a social field, induce an effect upon the environment.

A strongly accented goal so transforms the situation that
practically all objects acquire a reference to this goal. 1 A
building block that has just been a locomotive for the child
becomes a hammer when he desires to drive a stick into a hole.
An object that becomes a tool may thus possess a derived
valence. In the same way a bench may have the properties
of a barrier in front of one goal or of a means to another, perhaps
to climbing on the table. 2 Other environmental facts acquire
the character of either a means to the goal or a barrier from
it.

Another effect of the general directedness of the environment
upon a chief goal is the occurrence in certain cases of substitute
goals [Erastzziele].* Substitution plays a large role in children,
probably larger than in adults. A child that would like to
stroke a dog, but is afraid to, may stroke instead the child hold-
ing the dog. 4 The adult usually employs the possibility of
satisfying the child with a substitute, of diverting his wishes to
a substitute goal, in the most various ways. As a rule, such a
procedure creates less friction than a prohibition of the desired
act. A different consequence of a prohibition (by reason of
certain total structures which cannot here be discussed) is an
implicit or overt counterreaction, the so-called negative
behavior of the child, which is the more fundamental in that the

1 This is not merely an extension of an agreeable character to a larger field.
On the contrary, quite different, both positive and negative valences and other
kinds of shifts may be induced in surrounding objects by a positive valence.

2 T. DEMBO, op. a/.; W. KOIILER, The Mentality of Apes.

3 We are not here concerned with the theory of substitution which plays an
especially important part in Freudian theory, except as it touches the question of
environmental forces. See T. Dembo, op. cit.

4 L,EWiN, K., Die Entwicklung der experimentcllen Willen psychologic und die
Psychotherapie, Hirzel, Leip/ig, 1929.

ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES 103

whole psychological emphasis of the desired act is considerably
enhanced by the adult's prohibition. 1

Such processes are very often significant in pretending or
play-acting behavior. A child would like to strike another
child but contents himself with a threat; he would like to throw
a ball very high and makes an exaggerated gesture.

With certain children, those Lazar has called " gesture
children," the tendency to substitute a mere gesture for a real
performance or a serious action is so strong as to constitute an
essential character trait.

For children in general, the serious and the playful, reality
and make-believe are much more fluid, less sharply distinct
than for adults. This fact is related to a property of the
psychological environment which we must discuss briefly.

STRATA OF REALITY IN THE ENVIRONMENT

The psychological environment of the adult shows a rather
marked differentiation into strata of various degrees of reality.
The plane of reality may be characterized briefly as the plane
of " facts" to which an existence independent of the individual's
own wishes is ascribed. It is the realm of realistic behavior, of
insuperable difficulties, etc.

The more unreal planes are those of hopes and dreams, often
of ideology. A stratum of greater unreality is dynamically
characterized as a more fluid medium. 2 Limits and barriers in
such a stratum are less firm. The boundary between the self
and the environment is also more fluid. In a plane of unreality
"one can do what he pleases." 3

A complete description of the psychological environment
must always set forth the structure not only of the level of
reality but also of the levels of unreality. If conditions on the
plane of reality become too disagreeable for any reason, for
example, as a result of too high tension, there arises a strong

1 It is possible that the proposition that "action and reaction are equal"
holds also for psychological dynamics.

2 J. F. BROWN, Uber die dynamischen Eigenschaften der Realitats- und Irrea)^
tatsschichten, Psychol. Forsck., 1933, 18, 1-26.

3 T. DEMBO, op. cit.

104 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

tendency to go out of the level of reality into one of unreality
(flight into dream, into phantasy, 1 or even into illness).

These facts hold in principle equally for the adult and for the
child. Nevertheless, it is characteristic of the child's psy-
chological environment (a) that the differentiation of various
degrees of reality is much less marked and (6) that transitions
between the levels of reality and unreality occur much more
easily than in adults.

The psychological environment of the small child can be
characterized neither as a real nor as an unreal world, but the
two strata are still relatively undifferentiated. Jaensch 2 and
his students have shown for sensory psychology that the
eidetic images \Amchauungsbilder] of children have the prop-
erties still undifferentiated of both the perceptions and the
imaginings of adults. Piaget 3 has shown that the child's con-
ception of the world, especially his ideas of causation, is still
essentially " magical" and " animistic," that name and thing,
act and magic word, are not yet clearly separated. 4

These properties of the child's perceptions and intellectual
view of the world are only an expression of the general fact that
in the child's psychological environment the differentiation
between the levels of reality and unreality is still slight. This
fact is further displayed in the peculiar seriousness of the child's
play. From it derives the relative lack of distinction between
wish and reality that is expressed, for example, in the very
tenuous distinction between "falsehood" and " truth." 5 The
great " suggestibility " of children is related to the same fact.
For not only are the child's psychical processes closely depend-

1 See below, pp.

2 E. JAENSCH, Dbcr den Aufbau der W ahrnehmungswelt utid die Grundlagcn dcr
tnenschlichcn Erkcnntnis, Barth, Leipzig, 1927.

E J. PIAGET, La causal! te physique chcz V 'enfant, Paris, Alcan, 1927. The
Child's Conception of Physical Causality (trans, by M. Gabain), Harcourt,
Brace, New York, Kegan Paul, London, 1930.

4 See also D. KATZ and R. KATZ. Gcsprache mil Kinder n. Untersuchungen
znr Sozialpsychologie und Padagogik, Springer, Berlin, 1928.

5 C. STERN and W. STERN, Errinnerung, Aussage und Luge in der ersten
Kindheit. (Monog, u. d. seel Entwick. d. K hides, Vol. 2), Barth, Leipzig, 1910.

ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES 105

ent upon his present physical condition (e.g., illness), but,
which is more often overlooked, the reverse also holds. Bodily
condition may be very greatly influenced especially in
children by the psychological. Thus it is that a small child's
pain ceases when one blows on the spot and that the horse may
be "gone" when someone " throws him out the window."

The relatively slight differentiation between strata of reality
and of unreality may still be noted in puberty: sometimes
beside the real life a second life of phantasy is led for years, the
events of which have the greatest significance for the child.
Even for adolescents ideologies still in general possess much
more real forces than for adults.

It would, of course, be false to believe that a differentiation
between real and unreal strata is completely lacking in the
child. 1 This is primarily true in the field of his real needs, both
somatic and psychological. Even though the child may, under
certain circumstances, be satisfied with an imaginary sweet
instead of a real one or treat a piece of wood better than a real
doll, there are still very early indications of differentiation, at
least in many respects, between reality and unreality.

Sliosberg 2 found that such an unreal object is accepted as a
substitute only when the child is in a play situation.

Play.

The following circumstances constitute in my opinion the
foundation for a dynamic theory of play: whether a given
behavior (e.g., game X in the sand box) is to be characterized as
playful or nonplayful cannot be determined from the stand-
point of the adult but solely in terms of the child's own life-
space. The fundamental dynamic property of play is that it
has to do with events which belong in one respect to the level of
reality, namely, in so far as they are activities visible also to
other persons (e.g., as against daydreams). But at the same

1 Piaget's thesis may have to be limited even for the child's intellectual con-
cept-world (see I. HUANG, Children's Explanations of Strange Phenomena,
Psychol. Forsch.j 1930, 14, 63-182; K. BUHLER, op. ciL)

2 S. SLIOSBERG, Zur Dynamik des Ersatzes in Spiel- und Ernstsituationen.
Psychol. Forsch.j 1934, 19, 122-181.

1 00 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSON ALII Y

time play behavior is much less bound by the laws of reality
than is nonplay behavior: both the goal setting and the execu-
tion are in much greater degree subject to the pleasure of the
person. This dynamic fluidity, in respect of which the play
field approximates the dynamics of unreality, is evident, among
other ways, in the changeableness of the meaning of things and
of the child's own person (playing roles), which goes far beyond
what is possible in the level of reality. The play field is hence
a region more or less limited as regards reality which shows even
in its content a most immediate relation to the unreality of air
castles and wish ideals. 1

The various games may be differentiated according to their
dynamic fluidity. They vary rather considerably in the
degree of their dynamic fluidity, and the " rules of the game"
may be so strict that the game may, dynamically, approach the
rigidity of reality.

A strong tendency to go out of reality into unreality occurs,
especially when an overstrong pressure dominates the former.

The course of differentiation depends not only upon the
individual characteristics of the child, but also in essential ways
upon the situation and lot of the particular child. Among
proletarian children this stratification usually develops earlier. 2
An early and sharp separation of reality and unreality seems
to be unfavorable to the child's development. Important as
a sufficiently clear separation of these planes is, the kind of
relation obtaining between them remains decisive of, among
other things, all creative behavior and determines whether the
ideal goals, which belong dynamically to the level of unreality,
more or less directly condition behavior in the plane of reality.

Boundaries of the Self

Closely related to the slighter differentiation of the child's
psychological environment into real and less real or unreal
planes is a second factor : for the child, the boundary between the

1 See below, Chap. IV.

2 H. HETZER, Kindheit und Armut, Psychol. d. Fursorge, I, Hirzel, Leipzig,
1929.

ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES 107

self and the environment is less defined than for the adult.
This circumstance is of critical significance to the operation of
the environment upon the child.

The individual is dynamically a relatively closed system.
How strongly the environment operates upon the individual
will therefore be determined (apart from the structure and
forces of the situation) by the functional firmness of the bounda-
ries between individual and environment. The internal
structure of the child individual is characterized dynamically
by a relatively slight differentiation among the psychological
regions [Bereiche] and by slight functional firmness in the
boundaries of the various psychological systems. 1

In other words, the child, to a greater extent than the adult,
is a dynamic unity. 2 The infant, for example, acts first with
its whole body and only gradually acquires the ability to execute
part actions. 3 The child learns only gradually to separate
voluntarily certain parts of its environment, to concentrate.

Analogously to this relatively slight delimitation among the
various inner psychological systems, the functional firmness of
the boundary between his own person and the psychological
environment is also in general less with the child than with the
adult. This is expressed, for example, by the fact that the
"I" or self is only gradually formed, perhaps in the second or
third year. Not until then does the concept of property appear,
of the belonging of a thing to his own person. 4 The same rela-
tive indistinctness of the limits of the self is apparent in the fact
that external impressions touch the central nucleus of the
child's personality decidedly more readily than is the case with
adults. Conversely, needs or other tensions of the inner

1 This is not the place for a more comprehensive discussion of the internal
structure of the personality.

2 A "strong Gestalt" in Kohler's sense (see W. KOHLER, Gestalt Psychology.)

3 Coghill's (Anatomy and the Problem of Behavior, Macmillan, New York,
Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1929; Individuation versus Integration
in the Development of Behavior, Jour. Gen. PsychoL, 1930, 3, 431-435) import-
ant researches have shown that in embryological development even the
reflexes are formed by a gradual differentiation of reactions which originally
involved the whole organism. See also Lewin, Kindlicher Ausdruck.

4 W. STERN, op. cit.

108 .1 DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

psychological systems burst through very easily in the form of
impulsive behavior and uncontrolled affective demonstrations
(see the examples on pages 94 and 95).

The slighter firmness of the boundary between self and
environment has a direct bearing upon the slighter separation
of real from unreal strata (see page 103). For it (the former)
implies that the psychological environment of the child is
more intimately connected with and responsive to his momen-
tary needs and wishes.

The functional firmness of the limiting layer between the
child and the environment varies greatly, even in the same
child, in different situations and toward different persons.
This is equally true of the child's receptivity or inaccessibility
toward external impressions, and of the ease with which internal
states, especially tensions, come to expression.

It has been found in the course of psychopathological investi-
gations that in certain circumstances children are more readily
induced to talk openly of personal matters when they are
naked. 1 Children also are usually inclined to talk more
freely about experiences otherwise kept back when they are
going to bed in the evening. 2

The functional firmness of the wall between the self and
the environment depends not only upon the age but also upon
the individual characteristics of the person. It is especially
slight among certain psychopathic children. 3 The cause
of this may be a greater fluidity and at the same time a slight
(relative to chronological age) degree of differentiation of the

1 James has emphasized the close relation between clothing and the psycho-
logical person as a social being. It is hence (and on other grounds) understand-
able that under certain circumstances nakedness diminishes the firmness of the
psychological wall between child and environment.

2 Cf. D. KATZ and R. KATZ, op. cit. The greater frankness of children shortly
before going to sleep may be related to a beginning of the partial dissolution of
the boundary between reality and unreality that is characteristic of sleep and
dreaming. (See also G. H. GREEN, The Daydream. A study of development,
Univ. London Press, London, 1923.)

3 LEWIN, Filmaufnahmen uber Trieb- und Affektausserungen psychopathischer
Kinder (verglichen mit Normalen und Schwachsinningen), Zcitschr. /. Kinder-
forsch., 1926, 32, 414-447.

ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES log

person. This fluidity is also apparent in the dynamics of the
environment, so far as the latter is psychologically determined.
Feeble-minded children are also characterized by a relatively
slight degree of differentiation of the person (see Chap. VII,
page 194).

As distinguished from the above described psychopathic
children, certain types at least of the feeble-minded are charac-
terized by a slight fluidity of the psychical systems. Thi,^
inflexibility leads to an "either-or" behavior that is evident in a
sphere of the psychology of the will in an especially strong
fixation of certain valences and modes of behavior (stub-
borness, pedantry). The immobility of the psychological
systems and of the psychological structure of the environment
is at the same time a decisive dynamic cause for the difficulties
of these children in intellectual fields.

Even when a marked separation of the self from the environ-
ment has already occurred there may exist a particular dynamic
union between the self and other persons, for example, the
mother of some friend. This union may be expressed in various
ways, among others by the child's behaving worse with the
mother than with other people, by outspoken protest against
even a temporary absence of the mother, by turning to the
mother- "hiding behind her skirts" in any disagreeable
situation. In such cases the presence or absence of the mother
changes the total structure of the psychological environment
essentially, especially the child's feeling of security or insecurity.
As a consequence of the close psychological relationship between
the mother and the child's own person, the real abilities of the
mother, her effectiveness as against the things and persons of
the environment, have for the child the functional significance
of an extension of his own security and power against the
environment. A departure of the mother thus means to the
child a weakening of his strength against the environment. 1

The animistic character of the child's view of the world
may also be related to the fact that his psychological environ-

1 The tendency of children to take a doll or some favorite toy along to bed is
another expression of the close union of these objects with the self.

HO A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

ment generally has personal fields of force as prominent dynamic
features of its structure.

Not only other persons but other objects may have a close
psychological relation with the self of the child. To the "I"
in this sense there belong not only the child's own body but
certain toys, a particular chair, etc. Such objects are dynami-
cally somewhat like his own body in that they represent points
of special sensitivity to invasions by environmental forces.
Whether an object belongs to the self or to the outside world
depends, according to Wiehe, 1 among other things upon the
present needs and internal tension systems of the child and
changes with them. It happens, for example, that the destruc-
tion of an incomplete production of the child, in consequence
of its belonging to the self, is felt by him as a violent invasion ;
while destruction some time after completion of the task leaves
him quite unaffected. An internal discharge of tension is
usually accompanied by a loosening of the appurtenances of
the self, and this is especially marked in children.

THE INFLUENCE or ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES ON
DEVELOPMENT

The same factors that are critical for the momentary situation
are also characteristic cf the total milieu of the child over longer
periods of his life. Their effects upon the development of the
child's personality and his whole behavior are similar to
the effects of the forces described in the momentary situation
upon his momentary behavior. Particular features of the
environment are usually less important than its total character
in determining its effect upon development and, more particu-
larly, upon the rate and mode of differentiation of the child's
personality. Overly harsh or severe surroundings may lead to
the child's encapsulating or insulating himself from the environ-
ment. The child becomes stubborn and negativistic (see
pages 94 and 95). Optimal environmental conditions,
for example, optimal tension level, vary considerably with
different individuals. It is a well-known fact that infants and
1 F. WIEHE, op, cit,

ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES III

young children who grow up in an^institution generally show a
slower development in many respects than children who grow
up in a family.

It is already clear from the circumstances just discussed
what great significance a change of environment may have for
the child's development. The so-called difficulties of training
are not infrequently related to the particular requirements of
the parents, to their characters, and to the way they get along
together. These difficulties disappear as soon as the child
has been for some time in a suitable environment. To be sure,
the difficulties usually begin all over again after a return to
the old environment.

Enuresis is not infrequently treated successfully by changing
environment. 1 Of course, the improvement is often only
temporary. Grisch describes the disappearance of a voluntary
dumbness with change of environment.

Up to now we have been describing the effects of the present
situation upon development. These effects cease with a change
in the situation. Nevertheless, the operation of the environ-
ment always produces, as a consequence, a more or less marked
change in the individual himself, and thus changes his basis
of reaction to all later situations. This influence of the present
situation upon future possibilities of conduct, which is particu-
larly significant to development as a process considerably
extended in time, is due not only to the child's acquisition of
certain intellectual experiences but, above all, to the fact that
his whole person is changed in certain specific ways.

This indirect operation of present upon future situations
may be expressed in favorable as well as in unfavorable ways.
Its importance is especially great in view of a condition which
might be termed the circular causal relation [zirkulare Ruck-
koppelung] between self and environment. A feeble-minded
child, for example, is at a disadvantage among his comrades
in two ways. In the first place, he cannot do a task (e.g.,
corking a bottle, writing with a pencil) even when the con-

1 J. ZAPPERT, Kritisches liber Enuresis nocturnis, Arch. /. Kinderhk., 1926,
79, 44-69-

112 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF 1'EASONALITY

ditions are so arranged as to V actually the same for the
feeble-minded child and his normal playmate (e.g., when
both are gotten to grasp the pencil or cork and bottle in the
same way). In practically all cases in practical life, however,
there is a second difficulty: when the more intelligent child is
given a task, he knows that he must look for the mode of
manipulation that involves the least difficulties under the
conditions given. The less intelligent child has a narrower
field and sees less into the internal relations of the environment.
He does not find out, perhaps, that it is most convenient to
hold the bottle as near the mouth as possible. More generally,
he is less likely to discover the easiest way of solving the
problem.

The less intelligent child is thus not only less able, but
the actual demands made upon him by apparently the same
problem are usually really greater than those made upon the
intelligent child. The poorer solution of the weaker child
thus usually has the double character of an inferior performance
of a more difficult task.

If, now, the less gifted child experiences a failure, he will,
as we have seen, attack subsequent problems less intensely.
The increased fear of failure creates, wholly apart from the
child's inferior ability, a situation psychologically still more
unfavorable. In the new situation the already weaker child
will thus fail or give up all the more readily. He stands
usually before a (psychologically considered) harder task,
and his total situation is, owing to his earlier experiences, more
unfavorable.

Quite analogous cumulative series due to this vicious circle
may be seen in psychopathic children or in other children that
have difficulties in social groups. The overexcitable or socially
disagreeable child is not only less competent in his social
situation, and thus makes his task harder, but also the other
children reject him, drive him to a defensive attitude, etc.
The child soon gets himself into a social situation, originating
perhaps in some quite trivial conflicts, that would tax the
capacities of a child of high social endowment. Similar

ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES 113

developments of a circular causal relationship between capacity
and environment are basic, for example, to stammering. 1
Conversely, not the least advantage of the gifted child consists
in the especially favorable environmental conditions that he
usually creates for the future.

I consider it one of the fundamental tasks of pedagogy
so to constitute the situation of children in difficulties that
the severe injuries usually occasioned by the circular causal
relation may be avoided or undone. For here at least lie
genuine pedagogical possibilities which do not require changing
the child's "abilities."

1 A. HOMBURGER, Op CJt.

CHAPTER IV

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATIONS OF REWARD AND
PUNISHMENT

In the following presentation, the problem of reward and
punishment will not be discussed in its entire scope. To
raise the pedagogical question of the possibility of entirely
avoiding reward and punishment is to pass over into the
fundamental dialectical problem of authority in education.
Consequently, a positive or negative attitude toward a system
of pedagogy based on reward and punishment as essential
educational principles is less a problem of psychology than
of Weltanschauung.

In this discussion I intend to limit myself chiefly to a psycho-
logical problem, or, from the pedagogical point of view, a
technical one: namely, that of utilizing the prospect of reward
or punishment as a means of bringing about or suppressing
certain definite behavior in the child.

Reward and punishment are not to be regarded here as
sociological or juridical but as psychological categories. Hence
an identical action may be in one case a punishment, in another
a reward, according to the total situation in which the child
is placed.

The prospect of reward or punishment only arises when the
child is required to perform an action, to behave in a certain
way, other than that which at the moment he prefers. The
child must solve a problem, do a piece of work, or otherwise
engage in some activity toward which he is antagonistic,
indifferent, or too slightly interested to make the necessary
sacrifices. He must solve a problem in arithmetic but does not
like to calculate. He is to eat a certain food distasteful to him.

If the activity desired by the educator possesses in itself
a sufficient attraction for the child reward and punishment are

114

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT 115

unnecessary. The child will be prompted by his own needs to
move in the desired direction.

Reward or punishment must, therefore, lead the child either
to carry out a given command or to respect a given prohibition :
to refrain, that is, from carrying out some natural or desired
activity.

The situation involving either reward or punishment is then
to be contrasted with that in which the behavior of the child
is dominated by an original or derived interest in the thing
itself. 1

From a purely psychological point of view the question may
be raised as to which is more favorable for the performance of
a definite task: interest in the thing itself, or the prospect
of reward or punishment. At first sight natural interest might
be judged the more favorable on the ground that the need of the
child directly provides sufficient psychical energy, which might
be lacking in the other situation. It would, however, be hasty
to maintain the thesis that greater psychical energy is available
in the case of natural interest. Sufficiently strong punishment
or a longed-for reward may under certain circumstances bring
into play much greater and more persistent forces than would
interest in the thing itself.

The attempt to prove the psychological superiority of the
tk naturalness" of interest in the one situation as against its
" artificiality 77 in the other involves the use of concepts which,
to say the least, need much more precise formulation if they are

1 1 restrict myself in discussing the general situation of reward and punishment
to those cases in which the child actually experiences the reward as reward, the
punishment as punishment. I thus refrain from considering here those cases in
which punishment is for any reason desired by the child, as, for instance, where
it relieves an unendurable situation, or oilers the child the possibility of associ-
ating with a particular person, or the like. Again, under reward, I do not con-
sider cases where a child, to his surprise, is rewarded for something that he
actually wanted very much to do. The discussion is based, in part, upon our
experimental investigations. Cf. F. Hoppe, Erfolg und Misserfolg, Psychol.
Forsch., 1930, 14, 1-62; S. Fajans, Die Wirkung von Erfolg und Misserfolg auf
Ausdauer und Aktivitat beim Saugling und Kleinkind, Psychol. Forsch., 1933,
17, 213-267; T. Dembo, Der Arger als dynamisches Problem, Psychol. Forsch.,
iQ3t, 15, 1-144; and an investigation by Ucko upon the effect of prohibition
(in preparation) .

Il6 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

to be psychologically unambiguous. Even in those cases in
which the child is interested in the thing itself, the interest is
probably derived: a natural interest of the child in figures
or letters may, for instance, derive in a particular case from
an interest in various street-car lines, in house numbers, or
in store signs.

And, even though the child is of himself interested in numbers
or letters, this interest may be designated as " natural" only
with reservations. It has developed from living in a definite
metropolitan milieu and is in any case somehow mediate
and derived from more original needs. This holds for most
instances even though the interest involved is quite lively.

From the above point of view reward and punishment might
appear solely an attempt of the pedagogue to bring about
intentionally an indirect accentuation of interest when it had
not occurred in the child's past. Actually, one frequently
finds the opinion held in child and developmental psychology
(and not only in reflexology) that with small children the
important function of reward and punishment is to bring
about associatively the desired emphasis. Such a view
would obscure the deep psychological difference between an
interest pedagogy and one based on the application of reward
and punishment. This confusion, though quite convenient for
many educators, would be considered psychologically fatal by
others.

To understand the nature and scope of the processes in
question, it is necessary to achieve a penetrating insight into
the structure of the concrete psychological situation. The
behavior of a child in response to reward and punishment can
be as little derived from isolated stimuli or separate psycholog-
ical processes as can any other type of behavior- as little,
for that matter, as the psychological meaning of any environ-
mental influence. The child's behavior is not sufficiently
characterized by being ascribed to a " natural" or derived need.
Rather, an understanding of the effect of an environmental
interference or of an actual act is possible only when the
process concerned is considered in its relation to the whole

REWA RD A ND PUNISHMENT 1 1 7

present concrete situation. Indeed, conceptual derivation of
the actual occurrence is possible only through consideration of
the relations existing between a specific individual and the
particular structure of the present situation. 1

In work and play, in expression, action, emotion every-
where the actual occurrence is conditioned by the present
structure of the environment. By environment is here meant
not only the momentary situation in the narrower sense of the
word but also the inclusive psychological life-space ordinarily
referred to as milieu. The task of scientifically representing
the psychological environment is thus of fundamental signifi-
cance. It is especially so for the most important problem of
psychology, namely, the explanation of psychological dynam-
ics. Nevertheless, there has existed up to the present a great
lack of proper tools for the purpose. This discussion, aside
from its special theme, may be taken as an elementary example
of the application of a method which I regard as an essential
step in the fulfillment of this task.

In the following analysis of the situation I shall attempt
to develop a precise topological representation of its total
structure and of those factors most generally important for
dynamics. The results will be presented directly, and, trusting
in the immediate intelligibility of the terms, I shall not attempt
here to justify the designation of certain psychological char-
acteristics of the situation as " barriers," others as lt vectors"
(forces), or others as " areas."

Herein exists the proper task of research, and here lie great
difficulties of representation, however simply they may
appear in result. In such topological representation one need
not consider separate particulars of the situation in relative
isolation, as one is too tempted to do in purely verbal descrip-
tion. Rather the procedure used forces one to start out
primarily from the present total situation as a unity. For
this reason, and on account of the conceptual precision of such

1 LEWIN, The Conflict between Aristotelian and Galileian Modes of Thought
in Contemporary Psychology, Chap. I above; Zwei Grundtypen von Lebens-
prozessen, Zeitschr. f. Psychol., 1929, 113, 209 ff.

n8 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

a means of representation, one must always, in using it, consider
a whole range of implicit codetermined consequences.

On the other hand, and for the same reasons, such a repre-
sentation permits one in a peculiarly high degree to
unify a mass of apparently unrelated or contradictory
details and to clarify their mutual relationships. I
shall limit myself in the following to a discussion of
the main features of the momentary total situation.
These provide also the basis for an understanding of
the differentiated stratification of many particular
cases.

I shall first briefly discuss a few properties of the
situation determined by interest in the thing itself,

and then consider the psychological situation in reward
and punishment. There, situations involving a com-
mand will be considered first.

This is not the place to consider whether psychology is justified in
using the concepts of mathematical topology, a nonmetrical qualita-
tive science of relationships of a very general nature. I should like
PIG i ^0 emphasize, however, that the problem is not that of representing
the physical-geographical, nor yet the objective sociological situation,
but rather the structure of the psychological situation, that is, the situation
as it exists for the child. I scarcely need to remark that the vectors used in
the following representations do not stand for physical forces.

THE INTEREST SITUATION

Dynamically considered, the structure of the situation in
which a child turns toward an occupation (e.g., playing with
a doll) because of interest in the occupation or task itself is
relatively simple. The situation is dominated by an attraction,
or in our terms, by a positive valence (Fig. i). 1 The child
(C) sees a doll. Playing with the doll (/)) momentarily pos-
sesses for the child positive valence. There exists a psychical
field force, a vector, proceeding from the child in the direction of
the activity of playing with the doll. If this attraction is

1 We shall indicate a positive valence by -f-> a negative by . It is important
to note that valence may be possessed by any psychological object a concrete
physical object, a social ideal, an activity, a way of acting, a state (sleeping),
or any kind of goal.

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT

119

strong enough relative to the other psychical forces existing
in the situation, an action of the child in this direction will
occur.

How does the child behave when such action in the direction
of the attraction encounters difficulties? How does he act, for
instance, when a bench blocks his progress toward the doll, or
when an adult's prohibition or the sphere of power of another
child hinders his attainment of this goal? Psychologically
such a difficulty, be it physical or social, constitutes a barrier

FIG. 3.

(B, Fig. 2) between the child and the doll. Such a barrier
will hinder the activity of the child in the direction of the goal ;
usually it does not completely stop the child, but acts in such
a way as to force him out of the original direction. 1 The child
will, perhaps, try to go around the bench, to "get around" the
adult, or to borrow the doll from his playmates "at least for a
while."

To summarize, occurrences conditioned by interest in the
goal itself exhibit the following characteristic dynamic proper-
ties. If the child is forced out of its original direction by
difficulties (Fig. 3) , the direction of the field force also changes

1 What occurs in a concrete instance depends upon the firmness and form of
the barrier, and upon its direction relative to the direction of the field vectors.
Above all, it depends upon whether the barrier completely encloses the goal, or
leaves open possible avenues of approach.

120 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

in accordance with the changed local relations between individ-
ual and goal. Further, " the change of direction is of such a
character that a vector in the direction of the goal constantly
arises and initiates the corresponding behavior. The behavior
thus makes a pronounced goal-seeking impression. A natural
teleology reigns.

What is ordinarily designated as teleology and taken as the criterion of the
behavior of living beings is in large part nothing other than an expression of the
following fact: a positive valence controls the situation in such a way that with
changes in the position of the person the direction of the field forces changes in
the manner just described.

COMMAND WITH THREAT OF PUNISHMENT
Nature and Disposition of Valences.

In the reward or punishment situation the occupation, or
more generally, the behavior required of the child possesses, as
mentioned above, not a positive but a negative valence.
The child, for example, has no desire to fill a page
with the letter u i," or he does not wish to calculate.
Thus a vector (V r ) in the sense of a thrust away from
the task operates upon the child (Fig. 4) .

From this circumstance follow several simple but
pedagogically important facts. The child shows
a tendency, corresponding to the negative valence, to
hold himself as aloof as possible from the task. Thus
his behavior contrasts with that shown in the interest
FlG * 4< situation, in which there is a tendency for the child
to approach the task as closely as possible. Instead, as
in the latter situation, of welcoming and utilizing every
possibility of approach, the child actively seeks to prevent
approach and endeavors to postpone as long as possible the
execution of his task. When no escape is open, such tasks are
generally performed at the last moment. There exists also the
tendency to abandon the task as soon as possible.

If despite his disinclination we wish to get the child to
calculate, it is necessary to turn him from his present occupation,
perhaps some kind of play, toward the arithmetic task.

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT 1 21

Dynamically this means that by some method a field force
must be produced, oppositely directed to the previous force
(Fr), and strong enough to overcome it.

One such method is threat of punishment. It is essentially
indifferent whether the character of the punishment is apparent
to the child as such or is concealed.

One may say: If you don't do your arithmetic you will be
whipped; you will not be allowed to go on the picnic; you will
get a bad mark; you must stay after school. In these cases
one makes use of a second negative valence, a further unpleas-
antness. Further, in order to procure a field force opposed in
direction to the vector proceeding from the first negative
valence, the second negative valence must be placed behind the
child.

The fundamental situation in threat of punishment is repre-
sented topologically in Fig. 5. The child finds himself between
two negative valences, the arithmetic task (3T) and the punish-
ment (P). If the threat of punishment is to be effective, the
vector (Vp) proceeding from it must not only be strong enough
to overcome vector V T even when the child comes into imme-
diate contact with the unpleasant task, but also continue to
hold the child within the field of this task. 1

The following abstract consideration will help to clarify the
difference between the foregoing and the interest situation. If
in the latter the child is obstructed by a difficulty, the direction
of the vector immediately changes, as we saw, in such a way
that the child continues to act in the direction of the original
goal. If in the punishment situation the child is similarly
forced away by a difficulty, he will immediately tend to take a
direction opposite to that of the task to be completed.

If one is to bring about a renewed movement in the direction
of the undesired task, the second negative valence, the punish-
ment, must acquire such a position that it is again opposed to
the present direction of the vector (V T , Fig. 6). In this
situation there is thus lacking the pedagogically important

1 Once the child is in the field of the task, other factors also come into play
(see pp. 136 f.).

122

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

property of the interest situation, according to which the child
when thrust away by difficulties resumes of himself the direction
of the task (see Fig. 3), providing the difficulties are not too
unpleasant.

Even, however, without special difficulties in the performance
of the task, in the threat-of-punishment situation there exists
from the beginning and as a constant condition a dynamic

FIG. 5.

FIG. 6.

[I]

configuration in which the child is forced away from the task.
The negative valence of the task itself works dynamically
like a difficulty barrier. In many respects it hinders approach
with even greater strength. The situation is further com-
plicated by the presence of a second negative valence, creating
a conflict situation for the child.

Types of Conflict.

A conflict is to be characterized psychologically as a situation
in which oppositely directed, simultaneously acting forces of
approximately equal strength work upon the individual.

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT 123

Accordingly, three fundamental types of the conflict situation
are possible.

i. The individual stands between two positive valences of
approximately equal strength (Fig. 7). An instance of this
sort is that of Buridan's ass starving between two stacks
of hay.

In general this type of conflict situation is solved with relative
ease. It is usually a condition of labile equilibrium. Approach
to one attraction is in itself often sufficient to give it predomi-
nance. The choice between two pleasant things is generally
easier than that between two unpleasant unless questions are
involved which cut deeply into the life of the individual.

Such a conflict situation can upon occasion also lead to an oscillation between
two attractions It is of considerable importance that in these cases a decision
for one goal alters its valence in such a way as to make it weaker than that of the
renounced goal

2. The second fundamental type of conflict situation occurs
when the individual finds himself between two approximately
equal negative valences. The punishment situation just dis-
cussed (Fig. 5) is a characteristic example which we shall
examine more fully in a moment.

3. There exists finally the possibility that one of the two
oppositely directed field vectors derives from a positive, the
other from a negative valence. In this case conflict arises only
when both positive and negative valences are in the same
place. A child may wish, for instance, to stroke a dog which
it fears, or to eat a forbidden cake. In these cases there exists
the conflict situation represented in Fig. 8. We shall have
occasion later to go into such a situation in more detail.

Escape Tendencies. The Outer Barrier.

Threat of punishment creates for the child a conflict situation
of the type represented in Fig. 5. The child stands between

124

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

two negative valences and the corresponding field forces. In
response to such a pressure on both sides the child necessarily
reacts with the tendency to avoid both unpleasant things.
Thus there exists an unstable equilibrium. The situation is
such that the slightest sidewrse displacement of C must produce

Fie;. 8.

a very strong resultant (V tt ) perpendicular to the direction
punishment-task (Fig. 9). Thus the child in avoiding both
the task and the punishment will try to get out of the field (in
the direction of the dotted arrow in Fig. 9).

It may be added that the child does not always come into the threatened-
punishment situation in such a way that it stands immediately between punish-
ment and unpleasant task. Often the child may find himself at
first entirely outside the whole affair. For instance, he may be
required on pain of punishment to finish an unpleasant school task
within a fortnight. In this case punishment and task constitute a
relatively unitary, undifferentiated whole which is doubly unpleas-
ant to the child (see page 169). The child will have nothing to
do with the disagreeable affair. In this situation (Fig. go) there
exists a strong tendency to flight, often resulting more from the
threat of punishment than from the unpleasantness of the task
itself. More precisely, it may result from an increased unpleas-
antness of the total complex due to the threat of punishment.

Unpleascirrf
rask and

threat of
punishment

FIG. 9.

Fu.

The most primitive attempt to avoid simultaneously task
and punishment is a bodily going-out-of-the-field, running away,
hiding. Frequently going-out-of-the-rield takes the form of
postponing for several minutes or hours the performance of the
task. In cases of repeated, severe punishment a new threat

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT 125

may result in an actual attempt by the child to run away from
home. Fear of punishment frequently plays a role in the early
stages of childish vagabonding. 1

Another form of going-out-of-the-field consists in engaging
in some other task. Often the child seeks to conceal his going-
out-of-the-field by choosing an occupation against which as such
the adult can find no objection. Thus the child may take up
another school task more pleasing to him, execute some pre-
viously given commission, or the like.

Finally, the child occasionally escapes both punishment and
unpleasant task by deceiving the adult more or less crassly.
In cases where the adult has difficulty in checking up, the child
may claim to have carried out the task even when he has not, or
he may say (a somewhat more refined form of deceit) that a
third person relieved him of the unpleasant task or that for
some other reason its execution became unnecessary.

The conflict situation resulting from threat of punishment
thus creates a very strong tendency to go out of the field (see
Figs. 5 and 9). With the child, such a going-out-of -the- field,
varying according to the topology and field forces of the
situation, necessarily occurs unless especial measures are taken
to prevent it. If the adult wishes the child to undertake the
task despite its negative valence, mere threat of punishment is
not sufficient. The adult must see to it that the child cannot
leave the field. The adult, that is, must erect some sort of
barrier which will effectively prevent such escape. He must
so erect the barrier (B) that the child can gain freedom only
by carrying out the task or by incurring the punishment
(Fig. 10).

Actually, threats of punishment intended to get the child
to carry out some definite task are always so framed that they,
together with the field of the task and that of the punishment,
completely enclose the child. The adult is forced so to con-
struct the barriers that no "hole" remains through which the
child may slip out. Should the adult be too unskilled, or should

1 G. HOMBURGER, Psychopathologie des Kindesalters, Berlin, 1926, p. 508.

126

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

his power in this respect be insufficient, the child will slip
through if aware of the slightest hole in the barrier.

The most primitive type of such barriers is the physical-
corporeal: the child may be shut up in a
room until he has finished the task. 2

In general, however, the barriers are
sociological* The barriers surrounding
the child are the instruments of power
possessed by the adult in virtue of his so-
cial position and the inner relationship exist-
ing between him and the child. Such a
social barrier is no less real than a physical
one.

Barriers resulting from social factors may restrict
the child's freedom of movement to a narrow spatial
area. The child, for instance, is not locked in but is
forbidden to leave the room before completing the task *
i In other cases the external freedom of movement is

practically unrestricted but the adult keeps the child

under constant surveillance. He is not allowed out of sight. Since, ordi-
narily, the child cannot be followed about constantly, the adult often

1 In this and later diagrams barriers will be represented by thick lines. Thin
lines will be used to bound qualitatively definite areas, for example, the area of
the task where the boundaries do not possess psychologically very great dynamic
firmness. It is both possible and necessary to distinguish different degrees of
firmness of boundary (cf . G. Uircnbaum, Das Vergessen einer Vornahme, PsychoL
Forsch., 1930, 13, 218-284). We may, however, limit ourselves here to a sche-
matic differentiation of two degrees.

2 It should also be mentioned that with' a child definite, narrow limits must be
set for the completion of the task (see p. 128). In diagramming the situation
one is limited to the psychological present (for reasons that cannot here be dis-
cussed in detail, cf. Chap. II). The sequence of occurrences must thus be
represented diagrammatically as a succession of situations. Time restrictions
are therefore to be shown in the single representation only in so far as they are
sensed by the child in the present situation as limitations of its freedom of
movement.

3 For the most part the concepts and occurrences that constitute the psycho-
logical field are determined by social rather than by physical facts.

4 Restriction of one's freedom of movement is itself frequently used as a
punishment. Even then the confinement is often effected by nonphysical,
social, or quasi-magical means. The child, for instance, may be placed in a cor-
ner, or bound to the leg of a chair by a thread of twine. (Cf. W. von Kiigelgen,
J ugenderinnerungen eines alien Mannes, Stuttgart o. J.)

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT 127

makes use of the child's world of magic. The capacity for constant
control of the child is assigned to the policeman or to the bogey man. A God
that knows everything the child does, from whom no escape is possible, is not
infrequently used to the same effect. Secret eating of sweets may, for instance,
be controlled in this way.

Often the barners are directly constituted by life in a given social milieu, by
the customs of the family in which one lives, or by the organization of
the school.

For effectiveness it is essential that the social barrier possess a
sufficiently real firmness. If at a particular point it is not
resistant enough the child will break through. For instance,
if the child knows that a threatened punishment is only verbal
or if he can rely with some certainty upon the probability of
being able to wheedle the adult out of executing the punishment,
he will instead of completing the task trust to the possibility of
breaking through the barrier. A similar weakness of barrier
exists when a mother delegates the responsibility of watching
over the child's completion of a task to a nurse, teacher, or
elder child, who, unlike herself, does not possess sufficient
resistance to prevent the child from going out of the field.

Along with physical and social barriers there exists a third
type, closely dependent upon social facts but differing in impor-
tant respects from the last-mentioned examples. One may
appeal, for instance, to the child's pride ("Remember you are
not a street urchin!" "You're not a bad boy!") ; or to the social
standards of a group ("Remember you are a girl!" "... a
boy !") . One turns in such cases to a definite system of ideology,
to goals and values recognized by the child himself. Such an
appeal to the ideology contains a threat : danger of exclusion
from the group. At the same time, and most importantly,
this ideology constitutes an outer barrier. It defines for the
individual the boundaries of freedom of action recognized
by the ideology. Many threats of punishment are effective
only so long as the individual feels bound to these limits. If
he no longer recognizes the ideology, that is, the moral limita-
tions of the group, threats of punishment frequently become
ineffective. The individual refuses to allow his freedom of
action to be confined within these limits.

128

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

The strength of barrier necessary in a specific case depends
upon the nature of the child and upon the strength of the nega-
tive valences of task and punishment. The more intense the
negative valence, the firmer must be the barrier. For the stronger
the barrier, the stronger is the sidewise directed resultant
force. Thus the greater the pressure the adult must exert
upon the child to bring about the desired behavior, the firmer,
the less penetrable must be the barrier erected.

The Constrained Character of the Situation.

The barrier surrounding the punishment situation constitutes
not only an enclosure against the surrounding environment, but
also a more or less decided restriction of free movement on the
part of the child. This restriction not only means that the

child must carry out the speci-
fied task but constitutes at the
same time a general limitation of
freedom of movement.

This fact is perhaps most clear
in those instances in which the
child is locked in his room. Even,
however, in cases where appar-
ently only the performance of a
definite action is required and
the child is given freedom in
its other movements, the actual
barrier effects a general restriction of freedom of movement.
If this were not so, but the play area- -topologically the space
enclosed by the barrier (Fig. n) were allowed to become as
large as desired, the child would have the opportunity of engag-
ing for as long as he cared in as many occupations as he wished
before accomplishing the task. In reality the child would of
course take advantage of this possibility. Thus while remain-
ing within the field he would be able, as regards reward and
punishment, to go out of the field. Expressed in other terms,
the barrier would recede psychologically to a great distance,
becoming thereby unreal.

PIG. ii.

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT 129

The extent of freedom of movement left the child by physical
or social barriers is certainly of importance psychologically
and pedagogically; but it must be strongly emphasized that
threat of punishment always and necessarily gives rise to the
structure of a constrained situation. The constrained aspect of
the situation is prominent in proportion to the sharpness of
pressure the adult must exert in order to get the child to carry
out the task. Constraint depends not only, on the fact that in
these cases the barrier must be particularly firm and lacking in
holes, but also on the tendency of the adult to restrict the
barrier in order to avoid weak places and to reduce to a mini-
mum the play space left the child. The sharper the threatened
punishment the greater, ordinarily, is the general restriction on
the life of the child and the stronger is the tendency of the
adult to revert to primitive physical barriers. The more
the child's milieu is founded on threats of punishment and the
severer these punishments are the more the milieu as a whole
assumes the constrained character of a prison or reformatory
marked by bars, locked rooms, and constant surveillance.

The barrier surrounding the punishment situation need not
always be erected for the special instance. The area within
which the child can move, his sphere of freedom, is itself limited
corresponding to his restricted sphere of power. The sphere
of power of the single adult and above all of the organization
of adults who control the communal life is all powerful and
ordinarily completely surrounds the sphere of freedom of the
child. Only definite areas exist in the child's life within
which it can find respite from the threat of immediate adult
interference. The life of the child in a secret gang, friendship
and conversation with other children, or certain play zones
may constitute such areas. But even these afford the child
freedom and inaccessibility for only a definite time. Indeed,
the fact that the child's physiological conditions of life, its
nourishment and shelter, are controlled by the adult causes the
sphere of movement of the child to lie as a rule in the spheore of
power of the adult.

Whether a threat of punishment necessitates in addit'on
special barriers is a question of the particular instance. Very

130 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

often a slight threatened punishment makes such an increased
limitation necessary. Frequently the adult's mode of living or
the conditions and habits required by living in a house, which
previously had not been sensed as restrictions, acquire for the
child as a result of threatened punishment the meaning of a
barrier limiting his freedom of movement.

Punishment Situations without Barriers.

In certain cases despite a threat of punishment special
barriers are not demonstrable. The child, though standing
before an unpleasant task, even one of decidedly negative
valence, may yet complete it without any apparent barrier to
prevent his going out of the field. There may even appear to be
no threat of punishment. The admonition of the adult to
perform the task seems sufficient to cause the child obediently to
complete it.

We are not considering here cases in which the child performs
the task out of love of the adult. These would fall under the
problem of reward. Rather, we are concerned with situations
in which behind the admonition there stands an unexpressed
threat of punishment. Precisely in a milieu in which the child's
attitude toward the adult is foreign and hostile he may behave
as though undertaking the unpleasant task of his own free
will. The erection of particularly narrow barriers may thus be
unnecessary. Indeed in just such milieux it is not infrequently
pointed out with pride that the child is left much freedom, that
it is not narrowly restricted.

A representation of this type of situation by the topology
shown in Fig. 10 would not be exactly correct. The enclosure
of the field through a barrier expresses topologically the fact
that the psychical field is completely surrounded. But in
addition it indicates that a special region, the barrier, acts as a
bounding zone of an inner sphere, the area which it encloses.
This inner sphere within which the child is free to move may as
we mentioned before be large or small. The freedom within this
area is certainly not to be considered as equal to the freedom in a
sphere without an outer barrier. Rather, because of the barrier

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT 131

the character of the entire field and its dynamic peculiarities
are changed qualitatively in important respects. In a moment
we shall consider these in more detail. In the punishment
situations mentioned above, however, there exists a relatively
free sphere of activity, an inner sphere, which is to be distin-
guished from the barrier felt as such. Even when the child is
confined within a room he can, if recalcitrant and innerly
unbroken, do essentially what he pleases.

In the situation just sketched, however, such a particular
barrier and inner sphere are actually lacking. The power of

FlC,. 12. l

the adult and his threats of punishment have so penetrated the
whole life-sphere of the child that areas in which he can move
freely and independently are as good as nonexistent. It is
unnecessary to hinder the child's going-out-of-the-field by the
erection of an outer barrier because the function of this barrier
has spread out over the whole field. The child finds himself
in a field completely controlled at every point by the power of
the adult (Fig. 12).

1 The psychological field corresponding dynamically to the sphere of power of
the adult (A) will be schematically represented in this and later figures by con-
centric circles. Actually, of course, the field of force of the adult will not per-
vade the sphere of action of the child in such a homogeneous fashion but will be
of different density in different places. For our present purposes, however, we
need not consider this inequality.

132 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

Naturally such a condition is never completely attained.
If the child is to live at all he must retain the possibility of
a minimal independence of movement. The condition which
we have in mind does not correspond simply to the situation
in which the free sphere of action within the outer barrier is
made as small as possible. Nor can it be created simply by such
a restriction of the sphere of action. It is more apt to occur
when the adult either by particularly severe punishments or
through a definite ideology so dominates the child that he dare
not resist. The child may thus carry out unpleasant tasks
unhesitatingly because al every point within his sphere of action
Ic is internally controlled by the wishes of the adult. This
dependence may go so far that special threats of punishment are
unnecessary. In extreme cases it is scarcely necessary for the
adult even to mention his wishes.

How far such penetration of the entire field by a regime
of punishment is possible depends, of course, not only upon the
milieu but also upon the nature of the individual child. But
even in cases where there is no extreme restriction of the
child's freedom of movement it is important to keep in mind
whether the structure of the total situation corresponds to the
topology represented by Fig. 9 or to that shown in Fig. 12. 1
The latter case must be especially emphasized since it is
in precisely the most severely constrained situations that
this characteristic is particularly noticeable. Since in these
instances inner domination of the child plays a decisive role
the actual force exercised by the adult is difficult to recognize.
Yet the less apparent its action from without in, the stronger
it is. In many cases which are to be regarded throughout
as forced actions there may in a superficial and even in a rather
exacting examination appear to be exhibited exactly those
characters so typical of the dynamically opposite situation.
I refer to the apparent free will characteristic of the child when
it acts from interest in the task itself, freely following its needs
in a situation actually without barriers.

1 Naturally there exist transitional and mixed cases. One may think of Fig. 1 2
as showing an extension of the barrier throughout the entire field. This is a
possible notion since the barrier is conceived throughout as functionally denned.

REWARD AND PCXISIIMEXT 133

Consideration of the situation outlined above is complicated by the fact that
instances occur in which such a complete penetration of the child's life-sphere
and its transformation into a constraint-situation is caused by the adult's over-
weening love and constant protection. In this way as well the child may be
placed in an overpowering field of force.

Leaving the above case in which erection of a special outer
barrier is unnecessary, we shall return to a discussion of the
typical punishment situation. Even this is to be characterized
as a constrained situation, especially when, as previously
mentioned, the inner sphere is very small. That such an outer
barrier produces the characteristics of constraint becomes
clearer when a situation of this kind is compared with one in
which not threat of punishment but interest in the task itself
is the dominant factor. In such cases (see Figs, i to 3) it is
unnecessary to erect an outer barrier since the positive valence
itself continually leads the child back to the task. Neither
is it necessary to limit in any respect the freedom of movement
of the child. In contrast to that of punishment, the total
situation can remain free and unconstrained.

State of Tension.

The situation involving threat of punishment was in its
general topology characterized by the opposition of two negative
valences (the task on one hand, the punishment on the other)
and by the outer barrier hindering side wise escape. For a
general characterization of the situation it is necessary in
addition to determine the state of tension in the field.

We have seen above that a conflict is thus produced; in
consequence of two negative, oppositely placed valences, two
opposed vectors (V T and F y .) work upon the child (Fig. 10).
These vectors are not two isolated forces in an otherwise
uninfluenced field, but lead to an increase in the state of
tension within the total situation.

This means that the vectors operating on the child are not
limited to those from task and punishment. Instead there
exist opposed field forces of approximately equal strength
affecting movements in every other direction. At all positions
in the field the child is subject to an increased general pressure.

134 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

That this increased total tension in the field is a necessary
consequence of the two negative valences in the punishment
situation is readily deduced from our general principles. 1
We have already discussed the production by vectors V T and V } >
of a strong resultant (V R ) directed sidewise in the direction
of the outer barrier (Fig. 9). Otherwise expressed, the conflict
situation results in a tendency to go out of the field. If,
however, the child attempts to move in the direction of this
resultant he strikes the outer barrier. He may break through.
If he does so the topology of the total situation is changed
and the punishment becomes ineffective. This case will be
discussed later. On the other hand the barrier may hold fast.
The barrier itself then acquires a negative valence. This may
result from a variety of causes: the child has hurt himself,
perhaps bodily by running against the barrier; he has experi-
enced his own impotence; or the like. Nonphysical barriers,
furthermore, consist largely of prohibitions and act directly as
barriers in virtue of their negative valence.

Thus in so far as the punishment situation is maintained
there proceeds from the barrier a vector (V B , Fig. 13) opposed
in direction to the previous resultant (V K ). Movement in the
direction of this resultant leads to conflict; that is, two oppo-
sitely directed field forces are acting along the same line w

The same dynamic situation is created when the child seeks
to go through the barrier at any point. Opposed field forces
exist for the child at every point in the field acting in every
direction (Fig. 14); a state of tension exists in the field. 2

The degree of tension in the field depends obviously upon
the strength of the negative valences of punishment, task, and
barrier. An important influence in determining the strength
of the negative valence of the punishment is the child's previous
experience in the present or earlier instances of collision with
the barrier. For example, the negative valence of the punish-

1 The following discussion of the relation between certain field forces and
tension in the total field although based upon the punishment situation has a
general psychological significance for a whole group of similar situations.

2 As a dynamic concept, tension is defined as oppositely directed vectors.

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT

135

ment is very strong when the child has previously been severely
punished for attempting to go out of the field. The negative
valence of the barrier in its acute effect upon the individual
case is, however, largely dependent on the strengths of the
negative valences of task and punishment. In the last analysis
the minimum firmness of barrier and minimal threat of punish-
ment necessary for making such a threat effective depend upon
the strength of the negative valence of the task.

FIG. 13.

Fir,. 14."

Modes of Behavior in the Punishment Situation.

In the previous section we have discussed the general charac-
teristics of the topology and field forces existent when an
attempt is made, by threatened punishment, to force the child
to act in a certain way. We shall now briefly consider the
possibilities of actual behavior that exist for the child in such
a situation.

Execution of the Command. Through threat of punishment
the child is induced to perform the task, that is, to show the

1 The crosshatching represents the condition of tension

136

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

desired behavior. The vector (V P ) proceeding from the punish-
ment shows itself stronger than the opposed vector (V T , Fig.
15). The outer barrier remains sufficiently firm. Thus the
child enters the field of the task. Completion of the task
signifies for the child the way to freedom, escape from the
punishment.

Once the child has entered the field of the task the situation
may be fundamentally altered. The circumstance that the
task no longer stands over against the child
but is rather a field in which he finds himself
may suffice to bring about this transformation.
Sometimes the affair is not so bad as it had
appeared in advance. A small child, for
instance, may not want to eat a new food but
notices at the first bite that it does not taste
so bad as expected.

The fact that the child because of threat-
ened punishment enters a field so unpleasant
in appearance is in itself, however, not favor-
able to such a transformation toward pleas-
antness. On the contrary it may often
result in the task's remaining unpleasant.
Frequently, moreover, the child is already familiar with the
actual unpleasantness of the task.

Standing-within-the-task is in any case psychologically
quite a different situation from that of threat of punishment. 1
Acceptance of the Punishment. The situation in which the
vector proceeding from the task is stronger than the negative
valence of the punishment (Fig. 16) is in a sense the opposite
of the preceding. If in this case the outer barrier is sufficiently
strong the child will take the punishment. He goes into the
field of punishment because punishment constitutes a way to
freedom, similar to that offered by the task in the previous
case.

FIG. 15.

1 In the World War it could be clearly observed that returning to the front
constituted a much more unpleasant situation than being at the front.

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT

137

The following is an example of this type of behavior.

A father says to his three-year-old son, "If you do not gather up your things
> ou will be whipped." The child goes to his father, turns his back to receive the
blow and says, "All right!" It is clear that the child had construed his father's
remark to mean that he was presented with two possibilities of action.

It is to be noted that the youngster had never received a whipping. Some
time before a switch had been procured and had been used as a threat. The
pedagogical atmosphere in the home was, however, characteristically free and
lively and the acquisition of the switch rather an isolated event.

It is possible, moveover, that curiosity may have played a role in the decision
of the child since during the Christmas holidays a short time before there had
been a good deal of reference to the switch, as well as to Santa Claus.

Again the situation underwent transformation for the child
as he took the punishment. He noticed that the actual expe-
rience of the punishment was in reality not so
bad as the ideology of the adult had made it
appear in advance.

As punishment for too uproarious conduct, a girl of ten
years was confined in a small dark room by her teacher,
with whom she generally stood well. The child sat on a
vacuum cleaner, pounded lustily with her feet, and sang.
To the teacher's astonishment the girl, upon being released,
was pleased and answered back jokingly without noticeable
embarrassment.

The child had actually succeeded in transforming the
punishment into a playful occasion. The real unpleas-
antness was not very great once she had decided not
to take the punishment in a moral sense (see page 138).

The child in experiencing various punish-
ments builds up a certain knowledge of the
actual degree of unpleasantness of different punishments. He
views a threatened punishment no longer from without but from
within, weighing the unpleasantness of the task against that
of the punishment. He becomes callous to the punishment and
thus less sensitive to threats. An important step in this
direction occurs when the child attempts at least retrospectively
to minimize the degree of reality of the punishment and the
moral degradation which accompanies it.

FIG. i 6.

An intelligent, lively girl of six years who had been going to school for three
months tilted back on her chair. As a punishment the teacher made her kneel.

138 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

When the child returned home she did not appear in the least sad and said to her
mother, "I like to kneel."

This particular event stood in a larger context for both teacher and child. The
teacher thought it advisable to proceed against the child with stricter disciplinary
measures. The child, although at first very much delighted with school, began
to withdraw into herself, and her attitude toward the punishment was at the
same time an expression of an incipient struggle against the teacher's sphere of
power That this transformation in the school atmosphere really bore heavily
upon the child and that her indifference toward it was quite superficial manifested
itself clearly in her total behavior. She became afraid of the dark, had night-
mares, and cried at night in her sleep, "Don't always look at me so, teacher!"

More important than experiencing the degree of unpleasant-
ness of the task is the circumstance that in such cases the
execution of the punishment is apt to lead to a revolution in
the ideology of the child. His system of values may become
transformed. The adult always represents the punishment as
something bad, morally degrading. This moral disgrace is
ordinarily a major source of the negative valence of the task.

Related to the above is the fact that public punishments
are particularly shunned. That social standing is thus injured
by punishment is not only of importance to adults but is one of
the main grounds for children's fear of punishment.

A certain five-year-old boy was ill. Whenever he was naughty the little
negro puppet which hung over his bed was turned with its face to the wall. Thus
the fact of his naughtiness was apparent to everyone who came into the room.
This exposure acted as a decided sharpening of the already painful circumstance
that the beloved negro puppet must hang with its face to the wall. Incidentally,
the youngster himself never attempted to turn back the puppet although it hung
just above his bed.

Once a transformation of values occurs, however, once
punishment loses for the child its aspect of disgrace the strength
of its negative valence decreases considerably. There then
stands behind the threat only the specific unpleasantness of
the present punishment. Timidity before the entire sphere of
punishment no longer exists. No longer does the child think
anything of being punished. Eventually he may reach the
point of view that failure to perform the task is more worthy
of pride than is its completion.

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT

The following circumstance is dynamically important in the
origin of such a transformation. If the negative valence of the
task is so strong that the child prefers punishment, the latter
as the lesser evil becomes relatively positive. This shift of
relative position is made more difficult by the fact that some-
thing belonging to a morally inferior sphere must now appear
as being in some way superior to the morally unobjectionable

action desired by the adult. When this

occurs the unique moral position of the
punishment sphere is at one point and
thus, in principle, broken down.

The child who attempts to gain freedom
by going topologically through the punish-
ment generally finds himself, however,
disillusioned. Ordinarily the adult is not
content merely to inflict the punishment
but demands anew the completion of the
hated task. At the same time he often
threatens a more severe punishment (P).

Thus acceptance of the punishment docs
not actually mean for the child a way to
freedom. He finds himself afterwards
(Fig. 17) still in the same constrained situation facing the
prospect of increasing punishments, which in general finally
make him docile. This is probably significant in explanation of
the fact that punishment is relatively seldom chosen by the
child.

At times, however, punishment actually constitutes a way
to freedom. It may be that the adult cannot bring himself to
resort to more extreme measures, or perhaps the task in question
cannot be executed later on.

The following is an instance in which acceptance of the punishment really
constituted an escape from the constrained situation. W. von Kiigelgen at the
age of five years was sent to a girls' school. The femininity of the girls was so
repulsive to him that on the second day he told his mother that he would not
return to school. "Finally, amazed at such staunch resistance she played her
trump card and asked me which I would choose, a 'crop of whippings,' as she
expressed it, or returning to school. And with that she lost the battle One

Fir.. 17.

140 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

thought of the faces of the girls and their gentle ways stopped any hesitation. I
chose the 'crop.' The punishment was appropriately severe, yes, as I remember
it, beyond expectation. Yet it was not to be compared with the detestable dun-
geon of girls. I was now free. And my mother never presented to me again a
similar alternative." 1

Action against the Barrier. The third behavioral possibility
in the punishment situation, along with performance of task
and acceptance of punishment, is action in the direction of the
barrier.

In this case the vectors proceeding from task and punish-
ment are too great and the child moves in the direction of the
resultant (F). There may, then, ensue either a blind, uncon-
trolled charge against the barrier (the child locked in a room
may knock his head and legs against the walls), or a considered
attempt to break through. The exact procedure employed by
the child in specific cases depends naturally upon the nature of
the existing barrier. He may attempt to gain freedom through
flattery, defiance, or deceit.

If the barrier is very firm, there is no way out for the child.
Under these conditions and with sufficiently strong tension
in the total field, there may develop tendencies toward suicide.
Suicide then appears as the last remaining possibility of
going-out-of-the-field.

As a result of her parents' strictness, Martha, ten years of age, lived in con-
stant terror of poor grades at school. 2 "The fear of poor marks was especially
evident shortly before Easter when the question of promotion was to be decided
It was so strong that the child often cried out in her sleep, ran to her mother's
bed, and wanted to stay with her because she was afraid. Her parents treated
Martha very sternly. Once the mother threatened, 'If you are not promoted
you need not come back home!' After this utterance the child entertained
thoughts of suicide." The tendency to better her position with her parents by
particular neatness was also observable. She "helped about the house more
than was required of her, in order to make her mother happy."

Most of these attempts to break through evince not only the
escape tendency but also more or less open strife with the adult.

1 W. VON KUGELGEN, Op. Clt.

2 A. DOHME, Beitrag zur Psychologic und Psychopathologie typischer Schul-
konflikte auf den verschiedenen Altersstufen, Zeitschr.f. Kinderforsch., 1930, 36,
458-

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT

141

These aspects are related to a condition which we shall
proceed to discuss more in detail.

Struggle with the Adult. We have already mentioned that as a
rule the outer barrier is essentially social in nature and rests
upon the actual power of the adult over the life-sphere of the
child. When, then, the child turns against the outer barrier he
directs himself in the last analysis against the will and power of
the adult to whom the erection of the barrier is due.

Fit. 18.

In addition, the threatened punishment and finally the task
itself is set by the adult. All the vectors and barriers con-
trolling the situation may in the end be traced to the adult who
is responsible for maintaining them. Were only the power of
the adult to collapse, the whole situation would fall to pieces;
task, punishment, and barrier would cease to exist. All
valences determining the situation thus derive dynamically
from the circumstance that the field is controlled by the adult
(Fig. 18). The field of force corresponding to the sphere of
power of the child is not strong enough to maintain itself
against the sphere of power of the adult. The struggle of the
child is an attempt to make a stand against this superior force.

142 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

We have previously spoken (see page 131, Fig. 12) of the domination of the
total field by the adult. We were concerned there with peculiarly crass types of
constrained situation, in which threat of punishment was effective seemingly
without especial barriers. We now see that quite generally the punishment
situation is related to the situation there discussed.

Nevertheless, there exists a considerable difference between the former situ-
ation and the one here considered. It is possible that, although the outer
surrounding barrier is extraordinarily firm due to the actual power of the adult,
the child may yet possess within the enclosed area distinct freedom of movement.
Threat of punishment, here, is directed specifically toward one task. Not every
point in the total situation assumes the character of constraint, as in the examples
sketched above

The actual connection of the adult with task, punishment,
and barrier may not be intellectually quite clear to the child,
but owing to the very fine sensitivity of even small children to
social relations within their sphere of life, this connection is
clearly enough felt.

The punishment situation, therefore, tends to produce an
action of combat against the center whence issue dynamically
the negative valences and upon which the whole painful situ-
ation depends, namely, against the adult himself.

Thus the threat of punishment creates necessarily a situation
in which child and adult stand over against each other as enemies.
Herein lies one of the most important differences between this
situation and that in which the child undertakes the task
because of interest in the task itself.

The nature of the struggle, as well as the direction in which
it takes place, may vary extraordinarily and depends upon the
character of the child, of the adult, and upon the peculiarities
of the momentary situation. In essence the strife of the child
may be directed against the task, against the punishment, or
against the barrier thwarting the attempt to go out of the field.

In a direct struggle against the task, the child, as previously
mentioned, may advance difficulties which the adult must
recognize. The notebook has disappeared, the pen is broken,
other pressing assignments must be prepared, and so on.
Not infrequently the struggle is carried on by means which
Adler 1 would designate as " arrangements. 7 ' That is to say, the

1 Cf. ALFRED ADLER, Vber den nenosen Charaktcr, Bergmann, Wiesbaden, 1912.
(English trans , The Neurotic Constitution, Moffat, Yard, New York, 1917.)

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT 143

difficulty which the adult must recognize consists in the fact
that the child has developed a headache, a phenomenon that is
frequently to be observed before school examinations.

The struggle may be directed more specifically against the
punishment. Among children a favorite method of anticipating
blows at school is to put on particularly thick clothes. A
helpful illness is a good defense against punishment. Even
flattery, standing in well with the adult, may have the char-
acter of such a struggle. The exercise of every form of cheating
and deceit occurs more readily in proportion as the situation
acquires for the child the character of strife. In such a strife
the child may use without hesitation methods which it would
probably not employ in any but a hostile atmosphere.

A simple example of an attempt to evade punishment by daeption after the
deed is described by Schurz. 1 Schurz received a poor mark on his report card.
''Whether it was due to shame over my failure or to fear of my father's severity,
the fact was that on Saturday when I came home I tried to make my father
think that the chaplain had forgotten to write on my card, or something of the
sort. My uncertain behavior convinced my father at once that something was
wrong. A few questions brought me to confess the true state of affairs The
following conversation then occurred: 'You have neglected your duty and have
tried to hide the truth from me. Don't you think you deserve to be whipped?'

" 'Yes. But please let us go into the cow-shed where no one can see or hear
us.' The request was granted. I underwent my chastisement in the seclusion
of the cow-shed. It was not severe, and no one knew anything of it. My
father forgave me and treated me as before. But the bitter consciousness of
having been humiliated deservedly remained with me some time as a heavy
burden. For a long while I avoided the cow-shed, the scene of my shame,
whenever possible."

The tendency discussed above to attempt to prevent one's punishment from
becoming public is clearly shown in this illustration.

Finally, the struggle may center specifically against the outer
barrier, which hinders going-out-of-the-iield.

Whether they are directed especially against the task, the
punishment, or the barrier, all of these fighting activities
characteristically show a double aspect, conditioned by both
the structure of the situation and the dynamic source of the
field forces. They are at the same time a flight from and a

1 KARL SCHURZ, Lebenserinnerungen, cited by BATJMER and DROESCHES, Von
der Kinder seele, Leipzig, 1908, p. 236.

I 4 4 ^ DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

struggle against the adult. Actually the child can go out of
the field only by going through the barrier, task, or punishment,
and in the last analysis all these are only different embodiments
of the adult himself.

If the total milieu is such that the child must frequently
count upon threatened punishments, he may carry on the strife
against the adult beyond the specific punishment situation,
attempting in this way to shake or undermine his power. Here
belong the struggle between teacher and pupils, the so-called
problem of discipline, and the endless variety of active and
passive obstruction which children are accustomed to raise
against those parents and teachers who lay especial emphasis on
authority.

Encysting. Defiance. Going-out-of-the-ficld need not result
in breaking through the boundaries of the punishment situation.
It may also be achieved by a sort of encysting of the child within
the field. Without actually leaving the field the child attempts
to make himself unassailable, at least for a time; to erect a wall
between both task and punishment, and himself. Functionally
and in meaning, such an encysting is in many respects equiva-
lent to going-out-of-the-field.

The- encysting is usually the more marked the higher the tension and the less
the prospect of escape. The child mentioned above (page 140) who entertained
thoughts of suicide from fear of not being promoted showed this encysting.
" Martha had no chum. Aside from playing with her girl classmates on the
way home from school she remained alone Neither did she have any friends
among the children of the neighborhood. She played only occasionally with
them, preferring to associate with smaller children ' u

Closely related to encysting, indeed a special form of it, is the
defiance reaction.

The child withdraws into himself. He does not, however,
attempt to avoid the strong pressure of the environment, to
evade every unpleasant contact. Rather, encysting here con-
sists in taking up a defiant, fighting attitude toward the environ-
ment. 2 As it is displayed for instance in the case of a new
punishment threatened immediately after previous punish-

1 A. DOHME, loc. cit.

2 Cf. FAJANS, loc. cit., and WINKLER, Dcr Trotz, Munich, 1929.

REWARD AND PUNISHUfEXT 145

ment (see example on page 140), the defiance reaction is both a
convulsive summing up of one's forces and self-assertion in a
tense hostile situation. It signifies an insensitivity toward the
threat and at the same time a struggle against the field of power
of the adult. The insensitivity results chiefly from the fact
that the values and demands set up by the foreign field of force
are no longer recognized as binding for the individual con-
cerned. Along with encysting and strife, defiance involves
also a certain revolution in the child's ideology.

In children defiance frequently occurs as a first sign of independence, of
breaking through the social field that until then has been overpowering. With
suppressed, passive children the first welcome sign of activity often consists in
being impudent.

Flight into Unreality. Emotional Outburst. Among the
various types of actual behavior which may occur in the
punishment situation, there remain to be discussed certain
processes which have a direct relation to the state of
tension in the situation, namely, flight into unreality and
emotional outburst.

In the psychological life-sphere in addition to the plane of
reality there usually exist various levels of unreality. Unreality
(the plane of dreams, of so-called imagination, of gesture) is
roughly characterized by the fact that in it one can do as he
pleases. Dynamically there is a lack of firm barriers and a
large degree of mobility. 1 And the boundaries between the ego
and the environment are also fluid.

The degree of reality of psychological processes and inventions is such a funda-
mental category that it is to be used as a special third dimension for all more
exact representations of the psychical environment (see Fig. 18). A considera-
tion of this dimension in a more detailed presentation of the problems of reward
and punishment would undoubtedly be very important. It is closely related to
questions of morality and to the general ideology of the child.

If the condition of tension in the situation of threatened
punishment becomes too unpleasant without prospect of a way
out, there arises a strong tendency to go out of the field by
fleeing from the plane of reality into that of unreality. One

1 J. F. BROWN, tlber die dynamischen Kigenschaften der Realitats und
Irrealitatsschichten," Psychol. Forsch., 1933, 18, 1-26.

146 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

succeeds, of course, in going out of the unpleasant field not
bodily, but only psychologically.

The differentiation of the psychical environment into levels
of reality and unreality is at first not clear in the child. This
condition expresses itself in the magical structure of his con-
ception of the world, 1 in play, and in the lack of a firm boundary
between truth and falsehood, dream and reality, gesture and
action. Furthermore, transition from reality to unreality
occurs readily.

Fear of punishment may not only dominate dreams, but may
lead eventually to enuresis and similar phenomena. 2 It may
also result in intensive daydreams.

Within the level of unreality those things upon which the
unpleasantness of the plane of reality rests are removed. The
child is no longer in a constrained situation in the power of
the adult, but is free. The unpleasant task is finished or put
aside. The child himself is dominant, not the adult. When
definite needs and wishes are sharply blocked on the plane of
reality, a sort of substitute satisfaction 3 of just these needs
may occur in the level of unreality of play or daydream.

The following literary example, to be presented rather fully, illustrates not the
conflict situation between unpleasant task and punishment but rather the fluc-
tuating situation after the misdemeanoi, the fear of coming punishment. The
topology of the situation in the second part of the story corresponds closely to
that of the punishment situation. The child, locked in his bedroom, faces the
threatened punishment in a situation of decided constraint.

Nikolaj 4 received a failing mark in his history lesson under Teacher Lebedew,
because he had learned nothing. He feared censure and punishment from his
tutor, St. Jerome, whom his brother had at first deceived about the mark.
Furthermore, he had run out of the room for a while during the hour. This was
discovered by Mimi, his sister's governess, who would tell his grandmother
about it. Thirdly, Nikolaj had secretly opened a brief case containing letters

1 J. PIAGET, La representation du nionde chez 1 J enfant, Alcan, Paris, 1926.
(English trans., The Child's Conception of the World, Harcourt, Brace, New
York, 1929.)

2 Cf. HOMBURGER, op. cit., and Doi T \,is, loc. tit.

3 In psychoanalytic theory substitution, as is well known, plays a great role.
Concerning the dynamics and types of substitution processes, see Dembo, op
tit.

4 L. N TOLSTOY, Lebensstufen, Diederichs, Leipzig, 1903, pp. 255 ff.

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT 147

of his father and in doing it had broken the small key. He therefore anticipated
a punishment from his loved father.

11 'Mimi's complaint! The bad mark! And the key! Nothing worse could
have happened. Grandmama for Mimi's tale, St. Jerome for the zero, Papa -
for the key. . . . And all this will come down on my head not later than tonight !'

" 'What will happen to me?'

" 'A-ah! What have I gotten into?' I said to myself walking up and down
on the white rug of the work room. 'Eh,' I said to myself, taking the candy and
cigars, 'what must come, must come!' And so I ran back into the house.

"This fatalistic sentiment which I learned in my childhood from Nikola] has
exercised a soothing, momentarily quieting effect upon me in all the heavy
hours of my life. As I entered the room I was in a somewhat excited and
unnatural but completely gay frame of mind.

"After dinner the games began and I participated in them in the liveliest
manner. We were playing 'cat and the mouse.' Tn my awkwardness I bumped
the governess of the Family Kornakow who was playing with us, stepped acci
dentally upon her dress and tore it. I saw that all of the girls, especially Sonit
schka, were prepared to enjoy with the greatest pleasure the way in which the
governess with angry expression hurried into the girls' room to sew her dress,
and I made up my mind to repeat for them the pleasurable incident.

"As a result of this amiable intention, I commenced as soon as the governess
came back to our room to prance around her Persisting in this game long
enough I snatched a favorable moment to again entangle myself in her clothes
and tear them. Sonitschka and the children of the countess could scarcely keep
from laughing. My own pride was flattered to the last degree. TUit St. Jerome,
who must have seen through my game, came up, wrinkled his forehead (which I
could barely stand) and said that my playfulness did not become me, and if I
did not behave better it would end badly in spite of the celebrations of the day.

"I found myself, however, in the excited condition of one who has already lost
more in play than he has in his pocket, who fears to settle his accounts, and who
in his despair keeps playing new cards without hope of regaining them in order
to prevent himself from coming to consciousness. I laughed up at him impu-
dently and left him standing "

Dynamically the situation described is to be characterized somewhat as fol-
lows (Fig. i8df). The fields of force dominating the life-space of the child (O
are, above all, those of the father (/"), of the grandmother ((7), and of the tutor,
St Jerome (/). The child experiences the field of power of St. Jerome as hostile
Now, however, because of his own guilt the fields of his father and grandmother
possess vectors directed against him. These latter are the persons to whom the
child feels most closely bound, who have control of the house, and from whom
in the last analysis the sphere of power of the tutor, St. Jerome, derives. At
present all these fields have acquired a threatening significance for the child.
As a result of these threats from all sides the inner tension of the child is
extraordinarily great. His first reaction consists in going-out-of-the-field in
the direction of unreality. The child comforts himself in attempting a fatalistic
weakening of reality ("What is to come, will come!"). Naturally this is not
sufficient to relieve the tension, which is intensified by the gaiety of the celebra-
tion occurring on the plane of reality. Pronounced restless activity and emo-
tional outbreaks ensue.

148

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

This affectivity soon leads to a new severe clash with the tutor St. Jerome,
who meantime has discovered the bad mark and has exposed the boy in public.
The child hits the tutor and is thereupon locked in the attic

In despair and full of fear of the coming punishment the boy sits in the room.
The level of reality (LR) in his situation is to be represented approximately as
follows (Fig. 186).

Out of the whirl of the preceding scenes he is brought into an externally quiet
environment. It is, however, at the same time a situation of pronounced bodily
constraint, a physical prison. This prison is an expression of the hostility of

Fu,. i8a.

St. Jerome and simultaneously an expression of the strength of this inimical
sphere of power. In the social level of reality the child's own field of force is
wholly inferior to this hostile power St Jerome himself had locked the child in
the bedroom. The heaviness of the situation is the more oppressive since acutely
hostile actions of the highest authorities, the father and grandmother, are to be
anticipated in the near future.

In spite of the extraordinary state of tension there occur no true emotional
outbreaks, as had happened shortly before. Outwardly the child appears
rather quiet. This behavior may in part result from the fact that the child, now
alone and left to himself, possesses \v' f hin the prison a definite even though nar-
rowly limited freedom. The following considerations are probably more impor-
tant. If pressure from the environment becomes so great and so all sided that
the situation appears without possibility of escape (such conditions are typical
of despair) a certain bodily rigidity frequently results. 1

1 LEWIN, Kindlic'xe Ausdrucksbewegungen, in W. STERN, Psychologic der
fruhen Kitidheit, 6th 1., Quelle u. Meyer, Leipzig, 1930, p. 502 (English trans.,
Psychology of Early Cht'dhood, Holt, New York, 1930).

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT

149

In this prison situation in which a bodily going-out-of-the-field is impossible
the tension within the plane of reality leads to an inner gomg-out-of-the-field, to
a transition from the plane of reality into that of unreality. Lively imagining
and daydreams occur. The affective tension expresses itself within the plane of
unreality by restless thinking The special structure of the level of unreality
which thus shows itself, and the events occurring in it, are reproduced below
rather extensively because of their typical characteristics

" I did not weep but it was as though a stone lay on my breast Thoughts and
ideas flew with accelerated speed back and forth in my confused imagination.

But the memory of my misfortune constantly interrupted their strange chain,
and I fell back again in an endless labyrinth of uncertainty over my fate

"It soon came to me that there must surely be some unknown cause of the
universal lack of love, yes, even hate, shown me (I was at that moment firmly
convinced that everyone from grandmother to the coachman Philip hated me
and rejoiced in my present sorrow ) Perhaps, I said to myself, I am not, after
all, the son of my Father and Mother, Volodja's brother, but an unfortunate
waif, a foundling kept from pity And indeed this foolish thought not only pro-
vided me a certain doleful comfort but seemed fully probable It was an ecstasy
to think that the cause of my unhappiness was not my guilt but my fate from
birth, a destiny resembling that of the unfortunate Karl Iwanowitsch.

"And talking on to myself, I asked why this secret remain concealed now that
I had seen through it Tomorrow morning, I thought, I will go to papa and
say, 'Papa, in vain you hide from me the secret of my birth I know it ' He will
reply, 'What is to be done, my dear child? Sooner or later you would surely
have discovered it You are not my son I have, however, taken you as a son

150 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

and if you prove yourself worthy of my love, I shall never desert you.' And
shall answer, Tapa, although I have no right to give you this name, still I wil
use it this one time more. I have always loved you and will love you. I shal
never forget that you have been my benefactor. Yet I can remain no longer ir
this house. Here no one loves me, and St. Jerome has sworn to destroy me
Either he or I must leave your house. I cannot answer for myself. I so hat<
this man that I am capable of anything. I shall kill him. Yes, I swear it
Papa, I will kill him.' Papa reasons with me but I put out my hand and say t<
him, 'No, my friend, my benefactor, we cannot live under one roof. Let me go
I embrace him and say, I know not why in French, 'O/i, man pere, oh mon bien
faitcur, donnc-moi pour la derniere jois la benediction el que la wlonte de Dieu sot
Jaite!' And I sat on the chest in the dark room and wept, sobbing loudly at this
thought. Suddenly I thought again of the shameful punishment awaiting me
Reality came back to me in its true light and the pictures of my imaginatior
faded instantly."

The subjective oppression of the situation is not least dependent upon the facl
that it is traceable to the child's own guilt The first flight into unreality con
sists in a separation of these guilty occurrences from his own ego. As frequentl)
occurs after failure 1 one's own responsibility for the unpleasant state of affairs i<
shifted by rationalization. Fate, for whom no one can answer, is to blame
The inner alienation of the grandmother and above all of the father, so feared b>
the child, is explained by the fact that he is not a real son of his father, but a
foundling. The child (suddenly breaking into French) refuses pathetically al
consolation and draws the tragic (and thus not guilty) consequence: he leave 4
the house, he thinks, "I shall soon die." The flight from the prison is com
pletcd, even though on the plane of unreality.

Gradually there occurs a general \tnutural reorganization of the plane oj
unreality. This continues until the child possesses in this plane what he lacks in
reality, especially until his social position is radically changed and indeed com
pletcly reversed.

"Soon I saw myself free, far from our house. I was a hussar entering battle
From all sides the enemy pressed down upon me. I drew my sabre, killing
the first assailant with one stroke. Another stroke sufficed for the second, anc
another for the third. Finally exhausted from wounds and fatigue I sank tt
earth crying, 'Victory!' The general rode by, and asked, 'Where is he oui
deliverer?' All pointed to me. He fell on my neck, crying through tears ol
joy, 'Victory!' Later, convalescing, I was walking along the Twer-Boulevard
I was a general! The Czar met me and asked, 'Who is this wounded youngster?
'The famous hero, Nikolaj,' he was told. The Czar approached me, 'I thank
you. Ask of me what you will. I will grant you anything ' Bowing respect-
fully and leaning on my sabre, I replied, 'I am fortunate, mighty Czar, to havt
been able to spill my blood for my country. I would gladly have offered my life,
Since, however, you are so gracious as to grant me a request, permit me to destroy
my enemy, the foreigner, St. Jerome.' I approached St. Jerome threateningly,
'You are to blame for my unhappiness. Kneel!' Suddenly, however, the
thought came to me that the real St. Jerome might enter with a rod at any

1 HOPPE, op. cit.

REWARD AND PUNISIHfENT 151

minute. Again I saw myself not as a general saving his country, but as a most
deplorable, pitiable creature.

11 Soon the thought of God came to me and I asked why he should be punishing
me. I had not neglected to pray, morning and evening. Why then should I
suffer? I can definitely say that the first step toward the religious doubts of my
boyhood days occurred at this instant. It was not because unhappiness drove
me to grumbling and disbelief but because the thought of the injustice of Provi-
dence came to me. And in that twenty-four hours of solitude and complete
mental confusion the thought was like an evil seed that, falling after a rain in
loose earth, quickly sprouted and took root. Soon I imagined that I should
surely die, and pictured vividly St. Jerome's astonishment when he would find
my lifeless body in the attic. I remembered the tale of Natalja Sawischa, that
the soul of the expired lingers about the house for forty days. In thought [
wandered after death unseen through the rooms of my grandmother's house,
hearing Ljubotschka's whining, the complaints of grandmother, and Papa speak-
ing with August Antonowitsch. 'He was a good boy,' Papa would say with tears
in his eyes. 'Yes,' St Jerome would counter, 'but a great rogue.' 'You should
have respect for the dead' Papa censured. 'You were the cause of his death.
Vou intimidated him. He could not stand the humiliation you caused. . . . Out
of my house, miserable one!'

"St Jerome sunk to his knees, begging forgiveness. Then the forty days were
over and my soul flew to heaven. I saw there something wonderfully beautiful,
white, transparent, and felt that it was my Mother."

The situation in unreality is a complete reversal of that in reality. The child's
own field of force that had just shown itself quite weak on the plane of reality
(LR, Fig 1 86) becomes, on the plane of unreality, thanks to his heroic behavior,
the socially dominant field. At the same time the particularly painful separa-
tion from his beloved father is overcome. Whereas in reality the socially most
powerful field of force (that of the father, F) is turned against the child, in
unreality because of this reunion it stands at his disposal; the father fulfills the
punishment of St Jerome.

The previous daydream had also created on the plane of unreality a very
similar situation. There it was the Czar, the most powerful person in the world,
whose field of force was placed at the disposition of the boy. Both imaginal
situations led to the destruction of St. Jerome, whose power in reality was keep-
ing the boy prisoner in the attic. On the plane of unreality the child is not
weak and imprisoned, but powerful and free. The most powerful victorious
enemy of the actual moment, on the contrary, is impotent and defeated.

The imaginal picture stretching into unearthly power and freedom climaxes in
the reunion with the dead mother.

We shall not examine later occurrences on the plane of reality. The child
refuses to make apology to the teacher. A final attempt at actual flight from
the house is frustrated by the father.

If the opposed vectors controlling the conflict situation
are very strong, the tension may result in diffuse discharge, that
is, in an emotional outburst. This is illustrated in the above

152 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

example. The child raves, cries out, weeps. When this
happens in the punishment situation, it generally occurs when
a momentary attempt at flight is frustrated.

Even if no marked emotional expression occurs, as in the
story above, the increased state of tension may decidedly
influence the quality of work. We shall consider a case of
especial pedagogical interest, the solution of intellectual tasks.

Intellectual tasks undoubtedly require for their solution
a certain tension, a vector in the direction of completion of
the task. It is unnecessary to discuss again (see pages 120 f.)
the fact that positive valence of the task itself provides a more
favorable condition for the solution of intellectual tasks than
aversion to the task. In the former case despite the occurrence
of difficulties, that is, barriers, in the course of its solution a
child continues to work in the direction of the task.

It is to be noted further that a conflict situation, especially
when it leads to a strong total tension, is peculiarly unfavorable
to the solution of intellectual tasks. In its general psycho-
logical structure the solution of an intellectual problem consists
essentially in a transformation of the Gestalt relations within
the sphere of the problem, in a mental " clicking," so to speak. 1
A necessary condition for the occurrence of such " clicking"
is that the individual achieve a view of the field as a whole.
The decisive transformation of the structure of the field also
requires that the person be able to stand above the situation.
He must have the possibility of gaining some distance from
the task. Only thus is it possible to see the total system of
relations instead of simply several isolated facts in the field.

If the child is in a conflict situation with a strong state
of tension he feels himself to be standing under the situation,
that is, without a view from above. This obviously constitutes
an unfavorable condition for calm intellectual solution of the
problem.

We have completed our discussion of the topology of the
situation involving threat of punishment in the case of a com-

1 W. KOHLER, Intelligcnzprujfungcn an Mensclienajfen, Springer, Berlin, 1924.
(English trans., The Mentality of Apes, Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1925.)

REWARD S\D PUXISH.}fEXT 153

mand. We shall not proceed immediately to threat of punish-
ment in the case of a prohibition but shall first consider the
situation arising when there is a prospect of reward.

COMMAND WITH PROSPECT OF REWARD

Pedagogically, reward appears as the opposite of punishment.

Nevertheless, the general situations in which reward and
punishment occur are in certain respects similar. As in the
case of punishment, the prospect of reward is only offered when
the child is to be led to a type of behavior which the natural
field forces of the moment will not produce. The child is to
do something which he does not wish to do or to refrain from
doing something he desires to do. We shall first consider the
situation in which the child is to be gotten by reward to carry
out an undesired task.

Nature and Disposition of Valences and Carriers.

The child (C) is again placed opposite a task (7') of negative
valence. Whereas in threatened punishment the attempt
is made to overcome the vector proceeding from the task by
means of a second negative valence, in the present situation a
positive valence is utilized. This may be a good mark, a toy,
a piece of candy, a promotion, being praised as a good child,
or the like. Since the attraction proceeding from the positive
valence must overcome the repulsion of the task, the reward
(R) must be in the same direction as the task (7"). It must
also be placed behind the task (Fig. 19).

Thus we are again confronted with a conflict situation.
As we have seen, this means that two approximately equal
oppositely directed field forces are working on the child. In
this case the conflict situation is of the third type discussed
above (page 123).

The vector (V H ) proceeding from the reward must again
be stronger than that proceeding from the task (FV), and its
strength must vary with the unpleasantness of the task.

Such a situation would, however, by no means suffice to
get the child to complete the task. To the child, attracted by

154

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

the reward, the unpleasant task constitutes a barrier, lying
between him and the goal (G). In this respect the topology
corresponds to that of the situation in which a difficulty
prevents the child from attaining his goal (Fig. 2). As a rule
R in such a situation, where the goal is blocked, the child
-j attempts to get around the barrier. It is the situ-
ation in which the Umweg (detour) typically occurs.
Or the child may attempt to find a weak spot in the
barrier. Thus, as in the case of punishment, the child
may attempt, when the prospect of a reward is
offered, to reach the attractive goal (e.g., candy)
without fulfilling the task (Fig. 20).
Unless measures are taken to insure
that such an evasion of the task is
not possible, he will, for example,
attempt to obtain the reward from
the adult by flattery or by an effort
to conceal his failure to finish the
task.

Thus it is also necessary in the
reward situation so to erect barriers

FIG. 19. FIG. 20.

that access to the reward is pos-
sible only through carrying out the task (Fig. 21).

One may represent this situation without using particular barriers. The fact
that the reward may be reached only through the task is also represented if the
task is pictured as a zone surrounding the reward (Fig. 22). Topologically the
two representations are in many respects equivalent. In both, the zone of the
reward (R) is entirely enclosed. The representations differ in that in Fig. 22
the enclosing zone is relatively homogeneous, consisting only of the task, whereas
in Fig. 21 it consists partly of the task, partly of the special barrier (B). In most
cases Fig. 21 probably represents the situation more accurately. There are
usually special barriers, firm conduct of the adult, for example. Generally a
series of other precautions, physical and social, are also necessary to insure that
the child will attain the reward only through completing the task.

Comparison of the Total Situations Underlying Reward and
Punishment.

Important parallels appear in the comparison of the total
situations of expected reward and expected punishment. Both

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT

155

are conflict situations, and there occur in both general con-
sequences of conflict: increase in tension and tendency to
deviate from the direction of the task. In both cases there is
lacking the natural teleology characteristic of the interest
situation (see page 120).

Certain differences, however, exist. In considering them,
we shall not be primarily concerned with the moral aspects of

FIG. 21.

FIG. 22.

reward or punishment, nor with their effect upon self-conscious-
ness, nor the encouragement or discouragement incidental
to their occurrence. One major difference lies in the fact that
with threat of punishment the child is surrounded by a barrier,
whereas in the reward situation he stands outside the ring
constituted by both barrier and task. Thus a prospect of
reward does not restrict the child's freedom of movement as a
whole. Rather, within the life-sphere of the child only one
specific object, the reward, is made unattainable (until, of
course, it is reached through completion of the task).

Further, when prospect of reward is presented merely in order
to bring about completion of a task (see page 130), the situation
lacks the constraint characteristic of the punishment situation.

156 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

Behavior in the Reward Situation.

1. If the reward possesses an attraction strong enough to
counterbalance the unpleasantness and duration of the task
and if the remaining barriers surrounding the reward are strong
enough, the child will carry out the task.

Nevertheless, as with punishment, there is lacking here also,
the natural teleology characteristic of the interest situation
(where the child constantly orients himself
toward the actual goal of the task). Frequently
upon approach or actual entrance into the field of
the task, the child's movement quickly reveals a
discrepancy between the direction of the task's
goal and of the reward (Fig. 23). The child
veers in the direction of the reward during the
. 23. completion of his task. He will break off the
task as soon as possible, perhaps before completion, if only the
reward can be attained.

2. If the unpleasantness of the task is stronger than the
reward, the child will abandon the reward, analogously to taking
the punishment.

Frequently there occurs a relative shift and reevaluation of
worths (see page 138). Often the reward is given a moral tone.
And not infrequently this moral tone signifies a social elevation
of the good child above his comrades. Renunciation of the
reward usually means that the child at least in the given
instance stands outside the ideology in which the reward (a
good mark, for example) is considered morally desirable.

There exist, however, important differences between the situation just sketched
and that of punishment. In consequence of the lessened condition of constraint
in the reward situation the processes are on the whole of an easier character.
Further, the moral revaluations that occur when the child accepts punishment
as the lesser evil are in part of different type from those that occur when the
child abandons a reward or gives up an ambition to achieve a good mark.

Only rarely does reward follow a definite action of the child as
a factually necessary consequence, independent of the adult's
will. 1 Such situations are psychologically related in important

1 Punishment may also, under certain circumstances, possess the character of
a natural sanction against transgression of a command or prohibition.

REWARD AND PUNISHSfENT

157

respects to those in which behavior is determined by interest
in the thing itself.

3. With strong unpleasantness of task and strong attraction
of reward the child may attempt to break through the barrier,
to participate, for instance, in an excursion promised as reward
even though his task be unfinished.

This situation resembles in certain respects that of punish-
ment. To be sure, a break through the barrier leads in this
case to reward rather than to freedom.
But a parallel exists in that the bar-
rier here also rests essentially upon the
power of the adult. Breaking through
has thus the character of a struggle
with the adult. Corresponding to
the lack of a pronounced condition of
constraint, the strife is generally less
bitter. In addition there exists a
stronger tendency to conduct the
struggle by flattery or some other
accepted method, since the child is
striving to induce the adult to allow it
some pleasure.

Combination of Reward and Punish-
ment.

FK,. 24.

The reward situation just sketched
seldom occurs in this pure form.
Usually the adult relies upon a peda-
gogy neither of reward alone nor of
simple punishment, but rather upon a combination of the two,
" sugar and the switch. " Generally with presentation of a
reward there is at the same time a more or less hidden threat of
punishment should the reward prove ineffective.

The school system of grading is perhaps the simplest and
most characteristic example of this case. A good grade has the
character of a reward, a bad one that of punishment, and the
total situation is such that one or the other necessarily occurs.

158 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

When the child is faced with an unpleasant school task which
will be graded, the tendency to solve the problem as well as
possible derives both from the negative valence of a bad mark
and from the positive valence of a good one (Fig. 24).

This simultaneous fear of punishment and hope of reward is
characteristic of many situations of the type in question.

PROHIBITION WITH THREAT OF PUNISHMENT

So far we have discussed cases in which threat of punishment
or prospect of reward has served the purpose of getting the
child to perform a definite action, that, for instance, of com-
pleting a definite task. Let us now briefly consider the topology
of those cases in which prohibition rather than commanded
performance of a desired action is to be insured. We shall
discuss first prohibition with threat of punishment.

There occur cases of threatened punishment in which one
might as well speak of command as of prohibition. If a teacher
threatens a child with punishment should he fail to behave,
the child is faced in the first place with a prohibition of certain
unmannerly actions (laughing, acting " fresh," and so on).
In addition, he is expected to display a group of well-intentioned
positive types of action, a minimum of which may not be
evaded in fulfilling the prohibition. Thus a command also
exists. Although the following cases may not always lend
themselves to unequivocal classification in one or another
definite group, it is preferable to proceed from such definite
fundamental cases for the elucidation of psychological dynamics.

The child is faced by a desired goal, a positive valence. For
a negative valence to be effective as an opposing force it must
lie in the same direction as this goal. Thus arises a conflict
situation of the third type (see page 123), similar to that existing
when a command is presented with prospect of reward.

The most obvious representation of the situation, therefore,
would be analogous to Fig. 21 or to Fig. 22 : threat of punishment
stands as an opposing force before the desired goal (DG, Fig.
25)- 1

1 In Fig 25 the representation of the topology is analogous to that of Fig. 22.
A representation analogous to Fig 2 1 would in this case be less adequate.

REWARD AND PUNISHMF^T

The behavior of the child testifies that to a certain extent
this representation actually fits the situation. A two-year-old
child has been forbidden to pick flowers in the garden. Con-
sider his behavior as he hesitates before a flower, saying threat-
eningly to himself, "No, no." Such conduct gives the
impression that the threat of punishment really stands as a
barrier in front of the desired goal.

V DG

FIG. 25.

> k

VDG
FIG. 26.

Nevertheless punishment does not stand before the wanted
goal in the same way as the unpleasant task before the reward.
Punishment is not something that temporally precedes the
attainment of the goal. It is not a possible way to the goal, but
stands rather temporally behind it.

In attempting to represent this temporal relation it is,
nevertheless, not possible to place the punishment forthwith
behind the desired goal, as in Fig. 26. For this would represent
the goal as immediately attainable by the child, who would then
be free to move away from the punishment. Actually should
the child carry out the desired activity he would thereby incur

i6o

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

the punishment. Once he enters the field of the desired goal
he finds himself surrounded by the punishment. The situation
after entrance into the desired activity (the second phase) may
be represented topologically as in Fig. 27. The child, as it were,
stands in a cage from which he strives FlRST p HASt

to escape by all available methods.

The further fact that the child cannot escape
punishment by lingering in the field of the goal
is not represented, although such attempts are
sometimes observed. The punishment is here
not a barrier preventing transition of the child to
another activity. Generally nothing stands in the
way of such a shift. Rather, punishment comes
to the child without the necessity of his moving in
a definite direction. I '

SKCOND PIIASK

(c)

VTP

FK.. 27.

FH, 28.

A certain transformation of its topology is thus characteristic
of the prohibition situation. Before acting (first phase Fig.
28) the child sees the threat of punishment (TP) as an obstacle
between him and the desired goal. This obstacle, however,
is essentially different from the barriers we have previously
discussed. It can be passed without any present difficulty
or unpleasantness. It does not thus represent the actual,
real punishment but only reflects the barrier that acquires
full reality after entrance into the desired activity. Thus
in the first phase the barrier has more or less the unreality
of all future events, of everything whose advent is not yet
certain. 1

1 For the significance of degrees of reality in dynamics, see Hoppe, op, cit., and
Dembo, op. cit. The fact that the unreality of future events is not quite the
same as that of thought is left unconsidered here.

REWARD AND PCXISHMEXT 161

In the case of command with threat of punishment a definite
time is set within which the command must be executed. 1 This
furnishes as we have seen an element of constraint; the child is
surrounded by a barrier (Fig. 10). In the case of prohibition
with threat of punishment such a temporal limitation need not
exist. The constrained character is in general less pronounced.
The child remains free to move except in the definitely bounded
area of the forbidden action. The constrained character of the
situation, however, increases if the forbidden area is very large
or if it touches a central life-sphere (as when association
with a loved friend or indulgence in a favorite occupation is
forbidden) .

Digression on the Degree of Reality of Punishment.

The degree of reality of reward or punishment plays a large
role in determining the actual behavior of the child. This
degree of reality depends upon a whole group of factors. Above
all it is a function of the certainty with which the child antic-
ipates punishment or reward (thus indirectly of the actual
power of the adult, his sympathy, and so on). It depends
equally upon the character and upon the momentary condition
of the child (e.g., immersion in his own dreams and the degree of
reality of his conception of the world). I remember quite
exactly my childish attitude toward whips. Since I never
experienced whippings at home the cane-handled switch at
school always had for me something of the incomprehensible
and unreal, although it was not infrequently used. This
unreality was so strong that once when I was forced to face it
the situation filled me with amazement. The teacher was
astonished, as I observed with surprise and without crying the
lively pain of the separate blows.

The importance of the degree of reality of punishment is
shown above all in the fact that children who once have experi-
enced a punishment are wont to behave quite differently in

1 Or the command may be conditional. A definite action, for instance, is to
be carried out upon occurrence of certain conditions Thus, " If someone comes
you are to say, 'Good day,' nicely."

162 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

the face of a threatened repetition from whose who have never
experienced it. The reason that the burned child shuns the
fire, that one who has been severely punished generally shows
less resistance in the face of a new threat of punishment, is
not to be sought merely in an associative coupling with pain.
More essential is an increase in the degree of reality of the
punishment, the transformation of the punishment from an
imagined, possible occurrence in a level of unreality into part
of the plane of reality. We have already mentioned that such
transformation of the degree of reality does not always result
in increased fear of punishment but may lead to devaluation
of the punishment and eventually to release from the previous
ideology. Descent from levels of unreality to the plane of
reality makes things not only harder, but also more naked,
simple, and more easily surveyed in their whole extent.

A certain transformation in time of the degree of reality
is to be observed in all the reward and punishment situations
we have discussed. With increasing nearness punishment and
unpleasantness of task both become more real. Occurrences
within this interval may lead to sudden shifts in the degree of
reality of either. Punishment of another child by the adult,
even mention of some other punishment anything making the
adult seem particularly dangerous or harmless are examples of
such occurrences. Such shifts often play an essential role in
determining the time and nature of the child's decision. Should
the degree of reality of punishment and task differ too greatly
a pronounced conflict situation does not generally arise. 1

In the event of incompletion of the task in the situation
of command with threat of punishment, the punishment con-
tinues to gain in reality as it approaches. In the last discussed
instance of prohibition with threat of punishment, the punish-
ment is typically an ex post facto affair, especially when the
forbidden goal of desire (perhaps some attractive sweets) is
present and therefore possesses a very much higher degree of
reality. " Opportunity makes the thief." It is also naturally

1 We may recall that one of the necessary conditions for the origin of a true
conflict situation is the approximate equality of opposed vectors.

REWARD AND PUN I SUM EM 163

characteristic of these situations that there exists a relatively
great difference between the degrees of reality of the positive
and negative valences. Herein often lies the child's chief
difficulty in making a stand against the attraction.

Related to the fact that punishment is psychologically farther oil than satis-
faction of the desire is the circumstance that a certain intellectual maturity is a
necessary condition of the effectiveness of such threatened punishments. The
world of a little child is of small extent temporally as well as spacially. Kvents
which can be surveyed in direction of past or future and which as part of the
momentary situation determine the behavior of the child develop in the first
year of the child's life from initially very small temporal extents. Not until a
sufficiently large temporal span becomes a psychologically real present for the
child can a threat of punishment be effective by reason of such a topology. 1

A general property of threat of punishment frequently
becomes noticeable in the last-mentioned situation and is to
be related to natural differences in the degrees of reality
of punishment and desired goal. It is precisely because of
threat of punishment that an originally neutral event first
acquires positive attraction. 2 Corresponding opposed shifts
in valences may also be observed in commands. These proc-
esses are closely related to phenomena of defiance. Here lies a
realm of fundamental psychological significance. I shall go
into it only in so far as it bears upon the topology of the situa-
tion in general.

Prohibition isolates a definite area from the life-sphere
of the child in that it surrounds this area with a barrier. It
delimits the zone of free movement of the child. Thus there
occurs an interference in the sphere of power of the child.
This naturally releases an opposed action, in which the child
seeks to assert himself against the sphere of power of the adult.
The perverting effect of a command and above all of a pro-
hibition upon the valence of an object is from this point of
view to be understood as a struggle for freedom of movement
in the life-space of the child. Here lies also the explanation of
why, at just the age of two to three years, these reactions of

1 We shall discuss later (p. 169) still another possible effect of punishment.
2 1 do not here refer to cases in which the punishment as such possesses positive
valence.

1 64 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

defiance are particularly frequent. 1 An especially pronounced
stabilization of the ego of the child takes place at this time,
showing itself, for example, in the development of the concept
of property.

With respect to degree of constraint the prohibition situation
with threat of punishment is related to the command situation
with prospect of reward. On the whole the child retains
freedom of movement. Only one definite area, that of the
desired goal, is enclosed. Nevertheless when the occurrence
is viewed not by itself but as included in the total surrounding
situation, the condition of constraint in the former case is
somewhat more pronounced. The adult's domination of the
field appears more clearly in the foreground.

PROHIBITION WITH PROSPECT OF REWARD

The situation involving prospect of reward for refraining
from some action is rather special in nature. The reward
promised is always contingent upon continued avoidance of the
action within definite time limits. Either this action may
attract directly (e.g., the eating of sweets) or for some more*
indirect reason it may be difficult to avoid. Thus rewards
are often resorted to in an attempt to combat enuresis; they
may be promised to a pair of siblings for cessation from their
frequent teasing.

The situation is thus characterized by a positive valence
or an equivalent pressure toward a definite action. The reward,
a second valence introduced by the adult, is supposed to prevent
the child from acting in the direction of the first valence.
Thus there exists a conflict situation of the first type (Fig. 7).

The relations are rarely so simple. Generally there is the
prospect not only of reward for abstinence, but of punishment
for indulgence. Furthermore, as a rule the first valence

1 Charlotte Biihler speaks of "an age of defiance." The fundamental proc-
esses underlying the defiance reaction may well be of a general nature They
are not, of course, to be explained merely in terms of the age level itself Our
observations and experimental investigations of infants appear to indicate that
the defiance reaction represents an expression in the social sphere of a very
general psychological law, equivalent to the proposition "action equals reaction "

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT

165

increases in strength with the passage of time. It is often easy
to resist for a brief period but difficult to hold out over a
longer one. The following special example,
although simple, represents the topology of a
whole group of similar situations. A child
learning to swim attempts the full length of
the pool; his goal is to swim one hundred
p meters. This goal attracts him exceedingly.

At certain distances along the edge of the
pool there are ropes to which he may hold.
The child has rested on them in earlier

FIG 29.

attempts. He now faces the problem of swimming past all these
attractive resting places to the end of the pool.

In this case the topology of the psychological situation
corresponds quite well to that of the physical-geographical.

166 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

The child is attracted by the resting place immediately in front
of him (7?i, Fig. 29), and at the same time by the desired but
distant goal (to swim one hundred meters) . As the task grows
increasingly difficult and the fatigue of the child increases, the
danger that he will yield to the attraction of the nearest resting
place becomes ever greater (Fig. 30).

From a certain distance the attraction of the final goal itself generally increases
in strength as it is approached. The ultimate behavior will differ according to
the relative strengths of the vectors and the condition of the child.

In promising a reward for abstinence from an activity during
a definite period, one has also generally to reckon with the
existence of a series of attractions tempting toward a transgres-
sion of the prohibition. The child receives the reward only
when it has successfully steered past all these attractions.

REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND GENUINE TRANSFORMATION
OF INTEREST

Having completed our general discussion of the structure of
the situation underlying reward and punishment, we may now
turn to a problem closely related both psychologically and
pedagogically. We have previously indicated that utiliza-
tion of reward and punishment becomes an acute problem only
when one desires a form of behavior not prompted by natural
inclination. In such cases there exists together with these two
possibilities of bringing about the desired behavior a third,
namely awakening an interest, producing an inclination. This
possibility is one particularly stressed by modern pedagogy.
The problem arises as to how the situation involved is to be
characterized psychologically. A penetrating discussion of
this important and theoretically very interesting problem
would require much space. Here I must perforce restrict
myself to a few remarks.

Interest in an object or activity not previously interesting
may be awakened in many ways: by example, by imbedding
the task in another context (for instance, carrying out arith-
metic problems by playing salesman), and by a variety of other

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT 167

methods. Not infrequently interest in an object depends upon
the personality of a definite teacher.

The question naturally arises as to whether these situations
are essentially different from those involving prospect of
reward or punishment.

At first sight, and indeed from a psychological point of
view, it might appear that the situation in which, for instance,
the child calculates only because he likes to play at selling is
similar to that of reward. The activity of calculating possesses
a negative valence, but playing at selling, the goal behind
it, leads the child to calculate. The situation would thus
correspond to that of Fig. 21.

Such cases doubtless exist. In them, however, the
psychological essential of the third mentioned possibility,
transformation in valence of the thing itself, is not attained.
The characteristic topology of the reward situation remains
unaltered: the negative valence of calculating persists un-
changed, and there merely arises next to it a second positive
valence. Thus fundamentally there has occurred no true
transformation in the valence of calculating.

From the psychological point of view, however, one can
scarcely begin to speak of an interest pedagogy unless the
valence of the activity in question is successfully and truly
changed.

The objection is easily raised that in practice such a shift
in valence of the thing itself is rarely attained, that in any
case one must always add something to the situation in order to
bring about the transformation of interest. Without ignoring
the great practical difficulties involved, and without intending
to imply that such a transformation of valence may always be
achieved, I should still like to emphasize that the "addition"
of new moments may have effects other than those just indicated.

If an activity, undesired in itself, is related to something else
that the child likes (e.g., a primer is decorated with pretty
pictures), the pleasant and the unpleasant, though standing
next to each other, may remain unconnected. There exist,
however, imbeddings of a task or activity of such a sort that

1 68 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

the meaning, and together with it the valence, of the task
completely changes. A child that does not like a certain food
eats it without ado if the goblin on the end of the spoon is to
be buried, or if the spoon, as train, is to enter the station of
the mouth. In such cases the original action, eating, becomes
a dependent part of a more inclusive activity whole and even-
tually merely a superficial layer of the other activity. It is
a fact fundamental to the psychology of action and need as well
as to that of sensation that the psychological reality, and the
effect of such dependent parts, is primarily determined through
the whole in which they are imbedded. 1

It is because of this condition that imbedding a separate
task in another mental sphere (e.g., taking an activity from the
sphere of school tasks into the sphere of action for a practical
purpose) may radically change the valence of the activity.

Whether or not establishment of another connection actually
leads to a transformation of valence thus depends essentially
upon whether there has thereby been created a true whole, a
dynamic Gestalt, or merely a summative conglomerate.' 2
Between summative togetherness and the completely unified
whole of a strong Gestalt, in which parts completely lose their
independence, there exists a continuous transition (dynamically
weak Gestalten). Indeed this is of essential significance for
our problem of the transformation of interest. One would
expect that for a child taking no joy in learning to write the
alphabet, a change of valence would occur more quickly when he
is allowed as soon as possible to write meaningful communica-
tions in sentence form than when he is provided with a primer
with decorative drawings bordering its pages. 3 For in the first

1 For references, see K. KOFFKA, Psychologic cler optischen Wahrnehmung,
Ilandbm h dcr normal en mid pathologischen Physiologic, 1031, 12, 2 Hefte, 1215-
1271; and KoiiLKR, Gestalt Psychology, Liveright, New York, 1920 For an
especial experimental investigation of wholes in behavior and in systems of needs,
see BIRKNBAUM, Das Vcrgessen ciner Vornahme, Psydiol. Forsch., 1930, 13,
218 ff.

2 Cf. the concept of Und-Sumnic in M. WFRTHF.IMKR, P \ychol Forsch., 1921, i,
p. 47; 1923, 4 P 3or-

3 Here lies one of the chief advantages of the ''global" method of reading and
writing developed by Decroly.

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT i6g

case the letters lose their psychological separateness more
readily.

If, however, separate letters constitute too great a dilTiculty for the child, the
writing of each letter will become an independent task and the structural trans-
formation of the meaning of the total activity will be hindered

Change in valence of a task or of an activity thus becomes
possible when one imbeds the "same accomplishment" (exter-
nally regarded) in another behavior whole or in another mental
sphere. (It is thus important, e.g., that a given piece of work
be part of the preparation for a birthday celebration, that some
other work be for this or that teacher, and so on.) Pedagog-
ically applied this means that for the small child the total
atmosphere of the school is not only important but possesses
almost a constitutive significance for the dynamics of the
separate activities.

We have contrasted transformation of interest in the thing
itself with situations involving reward and punishment. To
neglect the existence of transition cases would, however,
be both false and too schematic. Both threat of punishment
and the prospect of reward may in definite instances and to a
certain degree lead to a transformation in valence of the thing
itself. Threat of punishment may make less valued the forbid-
den object. Reward may lead the child to regard the thing not
at first wanted as something to be valued for its own sake.

This spread of valence from reward and punishment to the
thing itself plays a role particularly in the young child, cor-
responding with the general weakness of functional boundaries
between his mental systems. 1 Reward and punishment, when
they are externally tacked on, may thus act as a simple strength-
ening of command or prohibition even though they possess for
the child no understandable justification. With older children,
however, transformation in valence of the thing itself occurs
only when the command or prohibition is recognized as actually
justified; when, that is, the behavior is brought into relation-
ship with some whole which attracts or repels the child as some-
thing valuable or worthless. Resort to threat of punishment or

1 See Chap. III.

I yo A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

promise of reward to support a command or prohibition is
expressive of the fact that the command or prohibition is not
factually justified or not sufficiently so. Thus in fact the threat
of punishment acts antagonistically to transformation in valence
of the thing itself. This opposed effect is clearest when the
arbitrariness, lack of factual justification of the reward or
punishment, is combined with an unjust accusation of a partic-
ular child.

CHAPTER V

EDUCATION FOR REALITY 1

On the subject Education for the Present I do not wish to
discuss the certainly very interesting questions of the position
of the aims and methods of Montessori education in the social,
economic, and political total situation of the present, nor what
education has to perform in this respect. I wish, rather, to
inquire into education for present-day life essentially in a
psychological sense.

I remember a conversation with a Montessori teacher. She
told of a student who, in her sixth semester, did not yet know
what she ought to study, and added: "In a child that had gone
through the Montessori system that would be impossible/'

Those who know the Montessori system will understand what
was meant by that. The teacher was, she thought, speaking
of a person who oscillated between various possibilities and
desires and was unable at the right moment to carry out the
right act. She fails in the face of the present because she is
unable to choose among the things the world offers and to reach
a clear-headed decision. The child in the Montessori school
learns precisely and primarily this: to decide himself, and to
choose freely between possibilities which are given him. This is
doubtless one of the most positive aspects of Montessori
education.

The American student usually has, as a result of the total
environment in which he has grown up, the ability to decide,
to stand with both feet on the ground of reality, in higher degree
than the German student; the present-day German student in
greater degree than the student before the War. Desirable as

1 From Die Neue Erziehung, 1931, No. 2, pp. 99-103. An address given in
February 1931 at a convention on problems of the Montessori method. This
does not imply that the author would defend the orthodox Montessori method.

171

172 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

this attitude is, it has, nevertheless, a danger to which attention
may again be drawn today: the present in which one lives very
easily becomes all too narrow, the mode of life [Praxis] all too
superficial, the level of aspiration all too low, the facts all too
naked.

Those familiar with the discussions of the Montessori prob-
lems will see at once a relation to the question of the atrophy of
imagination through suppression of play. I do not wish to
discuss the demand to nurture the imagination of the child
because imagination in itself is something beautiful. Even a
quite realistic consideration of the requirements for life in the
present must recognize an intrinsic problem in this demand.

Extension of Psychological Life-Space and -Time

This becomes still clearer when the question of education for
the present is subject to discussion.

If one starts out from the psychology of the small child, one
has at first to regard this task as downright paradoxical. It is,
indeed, a chief characteristic of the young child, say of the six-
months-old infant, to be essentially the present and nothing but
the present. With a variation of Hegel's dictum one might say,
" The child is essentially present." [Das Kleinkind ist wesentlich
itzt.] The world of the child is not only spatially small (the
cradle, the events of the nursery), but also temporally only
slightly extended. His units of action are small in scope and
of brief duration. Past and future play little part, and that
only for short periods, in his psychological environment. The
demand for a life in the present is hence realized to extreme degree in
the young child.

The related demand for independent decision in the present is,
in a certain sense, also realized to extreme degree in the infant.
The infant acts in accordance with his momentary needs: what
does not taste good to him he does not eat; if one attempts to
compel him he spits out the porridge.

An education for the present seems here to be in no sense
necessary. The pedagogical task seems, rather, to be precisely
the opposite, extension of the narrow horizon of the present in

EDUCATION FOR REALITY 173

spatial (including social) and temporal directions. For today
Goethe's saying is still valid "Who cannot give an account
of three thousand years remains in the darkness of inexperience,
can live only from one day to another." 1

This development in spatial-temporal extension rests, so it
might seem, essentially upon the fact that the child, through
experience, learns to survey ever larger relations. The adult
would then have the task of furthering and accelerating this
natural process. It is today common property of pedagogical
theories (although this demand is represented in variously
radical degree and the practical tasks are still extremely great)
that such a leading out from the narrowness of the child world
is not possible by the simple procedure of acquiring and retain-
ing knowledge but presupposes the autonomous activity and
productivity of the child as a natural basis.

But a pedagogy that sees in the extension of the psycholog-
ically present life-space of the child only an intellectual problem
overlooks a quite decisive consideration.

The extension of the child world beyond the momentary
present into the future consists partly, to be sure, in the fact
that the perceptual wholes in which the world is presented are
gradually extended, that the intellectual survey becomes more
embracing: the child experiences, for example, that some time
after the lightning, the thunder comes; that he is scolded when
he upsets a cup. In many respects more fundamental, however,
is the development of action wholes; the child no longer strives
solely for present things, not only has wishes that must be
realized at once, but his purposes grasp toward a tomorrow.
When he is somewhat older, not only events several months
past but also events several months in the future play a con-
siderable role in present behavior. The goals which deter-
mine the child's behavior are thrown continually further into
the future. A decisive extension of the psychologically present
life-space of the child is based upon this temporal displace-
ment of goals.

1 Wer nicht von drei Tausend Jahren sich weiss Rcchenschaft zu gcben
Bleib im Dunkcl unerfahren, mag von Tag' zu Tage leben.

174 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

This presents, however, a pedagogically important problem.
When the perceptual space of a child is extended from his
crib to the room and the street, from hours to days and months,
it is still, chiefly, a spatial (social) or temporal extension within
the same level of reality. But the action goal that reaches out
into the future is at the same time somewhat more unreal.
It is something that comes out of the realm of wishes and
dreams, as a rule an ideal goal, that does not yet possess so
full a reality as a present event. A far-ranging wish goal
brings, at the same time, an extension of the life-space in another
dimension; it signifies a reference to another, an unreal level
of the psychological environment, and this reference is usually,
indeed, more pronounced the more distant the goal. Even
in adults the bold, far-seeing plan stands close to Utopia
and fantasy, and there is danger of diversion into unreality.

Levels of Reality and Unreality

A word on the difference between levels of reality and
unreality. 1 Considered from the point of view of psychological
dynamics, unreality, the land of dreams and air castles, presents
a soft and easily movable medium. It is characterized by the
fact that in it one can do whatever he wishes. Unreality is not
limited to things of thought: 2 an action may also be unreal.
The child in the kindergarten who has been forbidden for some
reason to draw, watches the other children draw or strokes the
crayons. The mere gesture, the phrase, and in a certain sense
even the substitute (compensatory) act belong no less to the
level of unreality than do dreams.

The stratification into levels of greater and less degrees of
reality is a general property of the psychological environment
of the person. The adult flees into unreality when the level
of reality becomes too tense and disagreeable. Of the great-
est significance for his whole behavior, and a basic fact for

1 Cf. DEMBO, Der Arger als dynamisches Problem, Psychol. Forsch., 1931, 15,
1-144; HOPPE, Erfolg und Misserfolg, Psychol. Forsch., 1930, 14, i-62;LE\viN,
above, pp. 145-1 53.

8 There is also a realistic thinking.

EDUCATION FOR REALITY 175

pedagogy, is the degree of reality of the stratum in which the
center of gravity of the life of a particular individual lies.

In the child the strata of reality and unreality are still only
slightly separated. His thinking, for example, shows traces
of magic. To what extent and in what way the separation of
reality from unreality is brought about is a crucial question
for the life of the child. That this separation occur in a clear
and clean-cut way is one of the most essential pedagogical
postulates. This is not merely an overcoming of the child's
magic-animistic view of the world and certainly not an essen-
tially intellectual process. The separation derives chiefly,
rather, from the sphere of action and rests upon the experiences
of the child concerning anything that does not go as he wants
it to.

There are essentially two general conditions upon a basis
of which reality as a psychological fact for the child is formed :
(i) the will of another person; and (2) the resistance of things
against his own will.

Social Fields of Force

In the infant the forces of the psychological environment are
determined essentially by his own needs. By a process of
development (which I cannot here discuss more fully) in the
course of the first year of life a psychological environment is
formed, the attractions and fears, the possibilities and diffi-
culties of which are determined for the most part, not by the
child's own needs, but by the fact that the child lives in the
social field of force of other persons. The will of the parents
and comrades induces for the child certain goals, valuations,
friendships, and enmities. It is, above all, through these
spheres of power of other people that reality and unreality are
separated for the child.

Almost always the will of an adult is the strongest and
hardest reality in the child's life. Indeed, there exists in
the adult, thanks to the actual superiority of his sphere of power,
the natural inclination to make his wishes the decisive principle
of reality for the child. Pedagogically expressed, the child

176 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

has to obey. The more a pedagogy is based on obedience the
more this outside will becomes the supporting scaffold of the
child's reality. Even in such cases reality and unreality are
separated for the child, indeed the separation is then usually
fairly simple. Self-control in the face of reality is also learned
by the child in this way; but this discipline rests upon the fact
that the adult leads the child. A constraint situation is
established, the most striking expression of which is the harness
or halter for kindergarten children that one still sees occasion-
ally on the street. If, in such a situation, the sphere of power
of the adult, his position of authority, should for any reason
collapse, the structure of the level of reality on which the life
of the child rests psychologically must also collapse. This
occurs when the child becomes independent, usually at the
latest, with puberty. Such a collapse is usually bad for the
child especially because the constraint situation in which he
has lived is not only an inimical pressure but at the same
time the crutch of his existence.

The child lived in a present which, thanks to the immedi-
ate relation of his goals and values to those of the adult,
reached formally, to be sure, far beyond the narrow situation of
the moment, and in which he arrived at a separation of
reality from unreality. But the level of reality collapses
because it lacks a fundamental relation to his ow r n needs.
What that means becomes clear when one considers the other
conditions upon which reality and unreality may be psycho-
logically separated, namely, the resistance of things to the
execution of one's own will.

Objective Barriers

The second way to the separation of reality and unreality,
the child's experience of objective difficulties in attaining the
goal chosen by himself, is in many respects pedagogically
opposed to the first; that is, an intensive experience of a reality
independent of his own wish occurs only when the wish for
the goal is strong. The formation of a recognized stratum
of objective realities and necessities, which is certainly peda-

EDUCATION FOR REALITY 177

gogically desirable, presupposes the existence of a total situation
in which the child has the possibility to set himself goals and
to act freely according to his own needs and his own judgment.
Objectivity cannot arise in a constraint situation; it arises only
in a situation of freedom. Intensive needs of the child's own
and freedom to set goals are pedagogically not an inhibition
but a necessary condition to a happy separation of reality and
unreality.

To be sure, it is necessary that the child who has chosen his
own goal be not spared the difficulties of attaining it, neither
the difficulties conditioned by social life nor those of physical
materials. On the other hand, these difficulties should not
be so overwhelming that the child gives up entirely setting
goals of his own or flees out of the all too disagreeable reality
into unreality.

We know how precisely this consideration, free choice of
occupation on the one side, self-control on the basis of the
special structure of the materials of the occupation on the other
side, belongs to the fundamental principles of Montessori
education. That the particular difficulties due to the nature
of the material used frequently become visibly clear may permit
the child to experience the objectivity of the difficulties in an
especially fortunate way. Thus one may hope that the barriers
to the attainment of a goal, which are usually not understood
by the child and hence easily slip into the realm of the indeter-
minate, the fearful and uncanny, the unreal, may be used in a
construction of a clear level of objective reality. For the child
in the kindergarten to follow even for some hours his own
individual rhythm 1 believe to be entirely appropriate for most
children; since the rhythm of psychological needs in respect of
satiation and satisfaction varies so unpredictably from child to
child, from day to day, only if the child can actually follow
his own needs can we expect that strong tension toward the
goal, which constitutes a favorable condition for the develop-
ment of a marked level of reality.

Even later it remains important that certain intervals of
occupation according to one's own choice and own rhythm be

178 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

provided. Although, to be sure, the incorporation in the social
group becomes in many respects more dominant and the
question of the formation of an objective level of reality
within the personal relation acquires an increased importance,
the conditions become much more complicated by reason of
multiple imbedding. Thus one of the pedagogically most
difficult problems is to give a functionally proper place in the
psychological life-space of the child to that middle level between
psychological reality and unreality which is commonly called
fantasy and which is related in the most intimate way to, for
example, the gesture and artistic expression of all sorts. For
the requirement of a clear and clean-cut separation of reality
from unreality and of a life in the level of reality cannot mean
that the level of unreality is to be banished entirely from the
psychological life-space of the child or that any functional
connection between the planes of psychological reality and
unreality is to be destroyed. For the breadth of the present
life-space and the adequacy of realistic behavior depend in a
far from unimportant degree upon the kind and depth of the
relations between these levels.

Freedom and Responsibility

Education for the present cannot mean an education for
living in a momentary situation. The problem of the extension
of the psychological life-space of the child, which reaches beyond
intellectual and didactic problems, is related most intimately
to the psychological separation of the levels of reality and
unreality. The development of a level of reality which shall
provide a sound basis clear through to adulthood requires that
the free life-space of the child be not too small. The separation
of reality and unreality seems usually to occur earlier in
proletarian children; but we know that this is not always an
advantage, that an all too hard environment leads to stunting.
Analogously, an early separation of reality and unreality is
produced by the construction of an authoritative, obedience-
demanding, constraint situation; but the arbitrary and over-
done separation of these levels carries with it the danger of

EDUCATION FOR REALITY 179

concealed substitute satisfactions and a later collapse of the
whole level of reality. Only in a sufficiently free life-space
in which the child has the possibility of choosing his goals
according to his own needs and in which, at the same time, he
fully experiences the objectively conditioned difficulties in the
attainment of the goal, can a clear level of reality be formed,
only thus can the abilitv for resnonsible decision develop.

CHAPTER VI
SUBSTITUTE ACTIVITY AND SUBSTITUTE VALUE

Experimental studies of the dynamic laws of the behavior and
structure of personality have forced us to consider more and
more complicated problems. Instead of investigating the
single psychological systems which correspond to simple
needs and desires, we have to deal with the interrelationships
of these systems, with their differentiation and transformations,
and with the different kinds of larger wholes built up from them.
These interrelationships and larger wholes are very labile and
delicate. Yet one must try to get hold of them experimentally
because they are most important for understanding the under-
lying reality of behavior and personality differences. In
doing this we often find facts which Freud first brought to our
attention, thereby rendering a great service even though he has
not given a clear dynamic theory in regard to them. One
such fact is that of substitution.

Freud uses the concept of substitution extensively to explain
both normal and abnormal behavior. Moreover, sublimation,
which is closely related to substitution, is according to him an
important foundation of our whole cultural life. We find
substitution in very different forms. There is, for instance,
the man who dreams of a palace and brings a few pieces of
marble into his kitchen. There is the man who cannot buy a
piano, but who collects piano catalogs. Again we find the
delinquent boy who knows that he will not be allowed to
leave his reform school but who asks for a traveling bag as a
birthday present. And the little boy who threatens and scolds
the larger boy whom he cannot beat on the playground. These
and a hundred other examples make us realize how important
and far reaching the problem of substitution is in regard to
psychological needs as well as with reference to bodily needs

180

SUBSTITUTE ACTIVITY 181

such as hunger and sex. The greater the need, the stronger
seems to be the tendency to substitution. Even the great
field of children's play has a peculiar relationship to substitu-
tion, either of objects or of activity.

Everyone recognizes, I believe, that at present we have no
theory which really explains the dynamics of substitution.
Freud avoids giving a definition of substitution and, according
to the opinion of prominent psychoanalysts, he develops no
real theory for it.

If one asks about the necessary and adequate conditions for
the appearance of substitute action and about its effects,
one meets a paradoxical fact. Substitute actions arise often
in situations in which one cannot reach a certain goal, situations
in which a psychobiological tension exists. Let us take an
example from the work of Dembo on anger. The subject who
takes part in the experiment has been trying for a long time to
throw rings over a bottle, but without success. At last in
tears she goes to the door and slings the rings over some coat
hooks. Another example is that of the subject who cannot
reach the flower which is her goal. She suddenly grabs another
ilower which stands in a vase nearby.

The>e events, which at first appear quite understandable,
seem less simple when considered from the standpoint of the
dynamics of the situation. Obviously the substitute action
springs from the tension system which corresponds to the
original action. One would expect, therefore, that the tension
system of the original action would be discharged through
the substitute action, either completely or in part. Yet in
many cases the person only becomes more dissatisfied and
more emotional as is clearly evident in the experiments we have
made. But if the main system is not discharged through the
substitute action it is not easy to understand, from the stand-
point of dynamics, why the substitute action should arise at all.

For the investigation of this and other dynamic questions we
have carried on a series of experiments with adults, feeble-
minded children, and psychopathic children. I shall give a
few of the results of these experiments.

182 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

If one tries to define the range over which substitution may
occur, one meets with great difficulty. If, for example, in
experiments on the effect of a prohibition, one takes a doll
away from a child and the child begins to make doll clothes,
one would call this a substitute activity. But if the child
begins to play with a train, one is not sure. One person would
say that it is a substitute activity and another that it is not,
that the child would have played with the train even if the
doll had not been taken away. How similar must the original
and the subsequent action be in order that one may say surely
that the latter is a substitute action? Another example:
If the subject throw the rings, not over the bottle, but over a
block which is nearby, it is probable that this is a substitute
act. But if he playfully puts the rings first over one arm and
then over the other, or if he spins the rings on the floor, are
these substitute actions or simple restless actions?

It is impossible to escape this difficulty by limiting the con-
cept of substitution to acts which are very similar in content
to the original action; for, without doubt, there are substitute
actions which are very dissimilar in form to the original act.
We know, for example, from the work of Fajans, that a doll
may be a real substitute for a child who has been unable to
reach a piece of candy. Or the child may accept his mother's
sympathy as an equally genuine substitution. On the other
hand, we shall see that two actions can be very similar, without
one serving as a substitute for the other. In regard to
examples from psychoanalysis it is important that the simi-
larity of two facts is not sufficient evidence for the statement
that one is a substitute for the other. Whether a sub-
stitute is present or not cannot be decided from the external
appearance of the events. It is necessary in each individual
case to see whether the two facts have a certain dynamic
connection.

From the dynamic point of view one can speak of substitution
only in cases in which the substitution is connected with the
tension system corresponding to the original goal, that is,
only if the substitute action springs from this original system.

SUBSTITUTE ACTIVITY 183

According to this dynamic point of view, one finds an unex-
pected relation between substitution and the use of tools or
other means of reaching a goal. If one wishes to give informa-
tion to someone and the telephone is out of order, one sends a
telegram; if the child cannot take a direct path to his objective,
he tries to reach it by a roundabout route. In all such cases,
in which the carrying out of an intention is changed according
to environment, a new action springs from the psychological
system which corresponds to the original goal.

Experiments have shown that indeed we find a fluid transi-
tion between the use of new tools or new ways and the special
substitute action. If, for example, the subject uses a stick to
place the rings over the bottle, this use of tools changes the
meaning of the task so that we have a new task. If we use
the concept of substitution in a broad sense, we can speak of the
use of tools from the psychological point of view as a substitute
goal or substitute action. We shall return to the question of
similarity later. At first we shall speak of substitution only
when the new action arises from the original tension system and
when, at the same time, the new goal is sufficiently different
from the original goal. It is necessary to distinguish between
different kinds of substitution. But here we shall limit our-
selves to the question of whether, and if so under what con-
ditions, a substitute action brings substitute satisfaction.

We have tried experimentally to determine whether a tension
system can be discharged through a substitute action. We
know from the work of Ovsiankina that if an activity which
has been begun is interrupted there is a strong tendency to
resume it as a result of the tension system which corresponds
to the quasi-need of completing the task. In our experiments
on substitution the subject, after the interruption of the first
activity, receives a second task which seems to serve as a
substitute for the first activity. If, for example, the original
task is to make a dog out of plasticine, the second task might
be to make another animal or a ball out of plasticine. If one
interrupts the telling of a story, the subject might be asked to
draw a picture for the conclusion; or if the subject is interrupted

184 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

in the drawing of some picture, he may he asked to complete the
picture by telling a story.

We have investigated cases in which the relationship between
the original and substitute activities lies in the action on
material of the same kind and cases in which the content of the
activity is similar but the material is different. If the second
activity actually has value as a substitute, the tension system
of the original interrupted activity must be discharged wholly
or in part. Therefore, the subject will resume the original
task less often if the second task has substitute value and can
bring about a substitute satisfaction. And, on the other
hand, the subject will resume the original task more often if
the second task has no substitute value. In some cases the
experimenter does not give the second task directly, but
creates a situation which offers the possibility of spontaneous
substitution.

Lissner 1 found, in fact, that there are cases in which the
second activity has substitute value and the resumption of the
original activity occurs less often. It was soon clear that not
only was the similarity of the two tasks important for the
substitute value, but also the degree of difficulty of the sub-
stitute action. For example: if after the interruption of the
task of putting mosaic blocks together the second task of
making a mosaic pattern was easy, the resumption was 100 per
cent, that is, the substitute value was zero; but if the second
task of mosaic pattern was difficult, the resumptions dropped
to 42.- In order that a greater degree of substitution may
correspond numerically to a higher percentage, we shall give
the results in terms of nonresumption. According to this
r.otation, the above case of easy substitute action has a non-
resumption value of o per cent; and the difficult substitute
action has a value of 58 per cent. Another example: the
original task which the subject has to do is to make a little dog
out of plasticine. The second task is to make another animal.

1 K. LISSNER, Die Entspannung von Bediirfnissen durch Ersatzhandlungen,
Piychol. Forsth., 1933, 18, 218-250.
* Ibid., p. 231, Table 4.

SUBSTITUTE ACTIVITY 185

If the second animal is something easy to make, like a snake,
the substitute value is smaller (15 per cent) than if it is difficult
(70 per cent). We can say, therefore, that the substitute
value of the second task is the stronger the more difficult the
task. The difficulty of the task is very important for sub-
stitute value because it is related to the standard which the
person sets for himself. The substitute value is, therefore,
related to what we have called the level of aspiration.

Whether or not the substitute action in a particular case
is in direct dynamic contact with the original task is very
important for the substitute value. We find very little sub-
stitute value if the two activities are psychologically separated
through special circumstances of the situation. Such isolation
can sometimes be realized by having the experimenter say
at the time of interruption: "Now we shall do an entirely new
task." With the same task, the substitute value can be strong
if one develops the substitute out of the original task. In
a particular case the percentage of nonresumption in a situation
of isolation was 15; whereas in a situation of contact between
the two tasks, the percentage was 57. 1

The great significance of the kind of connection between the
two systems corresponding to the original and substitute tasks
shows up, above all, in experiments with feeble-minded children.
Kopke and Zeigarnik find with so-called Hilfsc/tuler (retarded
children of moron level) seven to eight years old the follow-
ing facts: if one gave no substitute action, the feeble-minded
in all cases resumed the interrupted activity; that is, the
nonresumption was o per cent. With normal children a year
younger nonresumption was 18 per cent. If one gave a sub-
stitute task the nonresumption in the case of feeble-minded
was 5 per cent; whereas in the case of normals it was about
70 per cent. This means that the substitute value of an
action which was very strong for the normals was negligible
for the feeble-minded. Kopke increased the similarity between
the original and the second activity to identity. For example,
if the original task was to draw an animal on red paper, the

1 Ibid., p. 240, Table 8a.

1 86 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

second task was to draw the same animal on green paper. Or,
if the original task was to build a bridge, the second task was
to build another bridge like the first. In this case, the non-
resumption by feeble-minded children was never more than
20 per cent. This very significant numerical result appears
to conflict with other experiences. One often sees that the
feeble-minded child, if he cannot reach a goal, is easily satisfied
with an achievement short of his aim. Gottschaldt has
observed the same thing in special experiments. If a feeble-
minded child wants to build a high tower of blocks and finds
difficulties, he is comparatively easily satisfied with a substitute
action, such as building a small tower or some other simple
structure. That the feeble-minded child is easily satisfied
with substitute actions can be further seen in cases like the
following. A young feeble-minded child wishes to throw a
ball very far. He docs not succeed, but he is happy because
he made such a vigorous movement. The feeble-minded child
has a tendency to be satisfied with a gesture if the real action
is impossible. Lazar has a special term for such children;
he calls them "gesture children." Thus, there are doubtless
many cases in which the feeble-minded child is much more
easily satisfied with a substitution than a normal child. On
the other hand, our experiments show that in some cases the
substitute value is much less with feeble-minded children
than with normal children. In order to clear up the contradic-
tion between these two kinds of cases, we must study the nature
of the psychological systems in feeble-minded children. Cer-
tainly, all cases of feeble-mindedness have not the same psycho-
logical nature. I shall speak only of the most common type.

At present, the general assumption is that feeble-mindedness
not only is a defect of intelligence, but also indicates a difference
in the make-up of the personality. On the whole, however,
one cannot yet define this type of personality. We have worked
on this question in recent years in different ways, and I shall
try to give a short description of the theory that has resulted.

From the dynamic point of view, the difference between
persons is based on three points. The person, dynamically,

SUBSTITUTE ACTIVITY 187

is a totality of systems. First, one can distinguish the structure
of the totality, that is, the degree of differentiation of the
systems and the kind of differentiation of systems in this
totality. The one-year-old child, for example, is dynamically
not so differentiated into separate systems as a thirty-year-old
man. In the child we do not have so many systems. The
connection between different things is closer, and we do not have
such markedly differentiated strata between the periphery
and the center. Second, with the same structure the dynamic
material of the systems may be different. The systems can
be more or less rigid, more or less fluid, and so forth. For this
kind of difference also we can use the example of the child and
the adult. It seems that the possibility of changing a given
system is easier in the child in most cases than in the
adult. The elasticity or the rigidity of the systems seems to
be a very basic and important characteristic of the whole person.
The third point is the differences of content which correspond
to the different systems. With the same structure and same
material, the content may be different. This third point seems
determined chiefly by the history of the person. For example,
the content of the systems of a four-year-old boy among
the ancient Greeks was quite different from that of a four-year-
old in New York City today.

For the most common kind of moron, according to our
experiments, it seems to be typical that the psychological
systems are comparatively rigid, not easily flexible. I shall not
enumerate all our evidence for this theory, which is based
upon experiments on satiation, will, memory, attention, and
intelligence in the feeble-minded. 1 It may be sufficient to show
that from this kind of psychological material, we can understand
even the paradoxical facts of substitution in morons. From
the dynamic point of view, this kind of child is defined as a
person who has a less differentiated structure, like that of a
younger child. But the systems are not so flexible as in the
young normal child: they are more fixed. The smaller degree

1 For a more complete statement of the theory of the person here sketched, and
of the experimental evidence upon which it is based, see below, Chap. VII.

188 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

of differentiation is the explanation of what we generally call
the infantilism of these morons. But it is clear that these
feeble-minded are not the same as the younger normal children.

If we accept the theory that the systems are more rigid, then,
in the first place, we can explain the results of the simple
interruption experiments in which no substitute task was given;
the fact, namely, that the feeble-minded resume the interrupted
task in 100 per cent of the cases. This abnormal frequency
of resumption is a consequence of the fact that a tension system,
once it is built up, stays unchanged without being diffusely
discharged. This experimental result agrees with the obser-
vations of daily life that feeble-minded children are often
extremely stubborn and that it is relatively difficult for such a
child to change his goal after he has set himself toward it.
This well-known stubbornness is a result of the rigidity of his
psychological systems.

We do not, however, find 100 per cent resumption if the child
is brought after the first task to a totally different situation.
On the contrary, the resumption then occurs much less often
than with a normal child. In such cases in our experiments,
we find again a rather extreme result, namely, 20 per cent
resumption.

The reason for the nonresumption in this case is again
the rigidity of the psychological systems. The new psycho-
logical situation is so rigid that it cannot be changed readily
enough for a connection with the old situation to be brought
about. It is typical of this kind of feeble-minded that they
cannot do two things at the same time. They are either
totally in one situation or totally in another. The theory
of rigidity of the systems enables us, therefore, to explain why
there is in some cases an abnormally high degree of resumption,
in other cases an abnormally low degree of resumption. In a
similar way, we can use this theory to explain the paradox which
we have mentioned before.

The question whether the substitute action has substitute
value presents itself in respect to the psychological, dynamic
systems as follows: One system corresponds to the original

SUBSTITUTE ACTIVITY 189

task; and one corresponds to the second task. If the com-
pleting of the second task, that is, of the substitute activity,
is to have substitute value for the first system, then the two
systems must be so connected that the discharge of the second
system at the same time discharges the first system; that is,
the two systems must be one dynamic whole. In normal
children, the systems are fluid enough so that the similarity of
the two tasks suffices to effect a special kind of connection
between the two systems. When the subject receives a second
similar task, the first system changes so that the new system
will be a dynamical part of the old. These two systems appear
to be not entirely dissolved into one, undifferentiated whole;
but we have one unitary system with a dynamic wall between
the two parts. If one part is discharged, then, according to
the strength of the inner boundary, the whole system may be
discharged.

When the feeble-minded child receives the second task,
the first system remains, as a result of its rigidity, unchanged;
and for the second task a separate system is established. So
it happens that the discharging of the second system does not
discharge the first; that is, the second task has no substitute
value.

If this theory is right, it must be possible to set up, in feeble-
minded children, a substitute satisfaction if we find a way to
develop the second task out of the original system. In fact,
this often happens when the child spontaneously proceeds
from the original activity to a substitute, as in the experiments
of Gottschaldt and in the cases about which we have spoken
before. We have only one system. Therefore, the substitute
value must be particularly great. As a result of the rigidity
of the systems we do not have in these cases the differentiation
of the whole system into two parts, slightly separated from
each other, as are those of normal children. Therefore, the
substitute action will discharge the whole system in the feeble-
minded child more completely than in the normal child. So
it happens that with normal children we can bring about rather
easily a substitute action, but the substitute value is not perfect.

190 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

With feeble-minded children either we have a complete separa-
tion of the two systems so that a second activity has no sub-
stitute value, or, if the two tasks are connected at all, the
substitute satisfaction is perfect. Such all-or-none functioning
in feeble-minded persons is important not only in substitution
but in other fields (e.g., in intelligent acts).

Besides the degree of connection and the previously men-
tioned degree of difficulty of the second task, the degree of
reality and unreality of the substitute action is important for
the substitute value. The substitute often does not occur in
the form of a real action, but in the form of an air castle or a
daydream. In many cases of substitution, speaking or gesture
takes the place of a real act. Has this kind of substitute real
substitute value? This question is also important for the
theory of dreams and for substitution in psychopathic
cases. It is not easy to make experimental investigations
upon the effect of this unreal substitution through speaking
and thinking, in place of real action. Mahler has made
experiments of this type : a piece of handwork was interrupted
and the subject had to think how he would complete the work;
or if a person could not reach a goal he was asked to tell a fairy
story in which he attained his goal. This field is very com-
plicated and I can discuss only a part of it. Mahler found
that, in general, the substitute value is stronger the more real
the substitute action is. But what degree of reality an action
has cannot be determined by the kind of substitute action alone,
but always by observation of the relationship between the
substitute action and the original action in a particular case.
Mahler found that one must distinguish between the inner goal
and the outer goal of an activity and that the degree of reality
of the second task, and with it the substitute value, is the
greater the more nearly the substitute action approaches
the inner goal of the original action. In tasks which have the
character of an intellectual problem it is generally not enough
for the discharge of the tension that the subject find the solution
in thinking; it is important that he express the solution in
reality. In this way it is shown that social factors are very

SUBSTITUTE ACTIVITY 191

important in determining the real or unreal character of an
event. Only when it is possible for the subject to inform
the experimenter of the solution of the substitute task is
an adequate discharge of the original system possible.
For only in case of social recognition is the degree of reality
sufficient.

The question of unreal substitution has a close relationship
to certain problems of play. According to the theory of Piaget,
the child's conception of the world has a mystical character.
For the child, name and thing, fantasies and reality, lies and
truth are not clearly separated. One must ask whether for
psychological needs also an unreal event can give real satis-
faction to the child. Sliosberg, who has carried out compre-
hensive experiments on this question, found that it is impossible
to make the general statement that the unreal can be sub-
stituted for the real. Whether a child is satisfied or not
when one gives him make-believe candy for real candy, paper
scissors for real scissors, depends in each case on the special
character of the situation. We must, as Koffka has said,
distinguish between the play situation and the serious situation.
The play situation is not so rigid; one may call it " loose."
Certain kinds of substitution are possible only in a play situa-
tion, in which objects have not so fixed a character as in a
serious situation. In the serious situation the child usually
refuses the play substitute. It is interesting that the opposite
is also true. The child in the play situation will often refuse
a real action as a substitute for the play action. Experiments
show that for adults also the possibility of a substitute depends
upon the looseness of the whole situation.

An important factor for the substitute value is the momentary
intensity of the need. The experiments of Sliosberg show
that the child more easily accepts the plasticine scissors, for
example, after he has played long enough with the real ones.
Generally, the stronger the need the less the substitute value of
a substitute action.

On the other hand, the tendency for substitute action, with-
out doubt, will increase as the tension of the need increases.

192 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

This was particularly clear in the experiments of Dembo, in
which the strong affective tension leads to such nonsense action
as throwing rings over the coat hooks. Dembo has shown that
such spontaneous substitution is always a result of a conflict
situation and has given a* dynamic theory of how the substitute
goal receives its positive valence. We know that if a certain
goal exists for a person, this goal works as a psychological
field which induces a derived valence in certain other objects.
For example, if one wishes to wrap up something, then, sud-
denly, paper and string assume a positive valence. Kohler
has spoken of the directed state of the situation in the use of
tools. Dembo has shown that an inducing field exists, which
gives valences as means for reaching the goal; moreover, if
the tension is strong enough, other goals are induced which have
a certain relation to the original goal.

In the beginning we saw that, as far as psychological systems
are concerned, a surprising relation exists between substitution
and the use of tools. Now we see also that from the point
of view of the psychological environment the use of tools and
substitution are closely related because both are induced by
the same inducing field. Finally, we can formulate our main
results in regard to nonspontaneous substitution: the substitute
value is the greater the more the substitute action corresponds,
not to a new goal, but to another way of reaching the original
inner goal.

SUBSTITUTE ACTIVITY
SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTS ON SUBSTITUTION

193

Figures indicate percentages of nonresumption
Original Task

Mosaic
Plasticine (dog)

Mosaic

III.

Normal children 7 to 8 years
Feeble-minded 8 years

IV.

Different tasks

Figuring on paper
Paper box

Figuring

Experiments

without
Substitution

Experiments

with
Substitution

Second task is.
Easy Difficult

10 o 58

20 15 (snake) 70 (ball)

Original and second task are.

Isolated Connected

i5 57

(New

(Second task nearly

situation)

identical with first)

Goal of the original task is
Reached Not reached
40 77

25 25

Telling

25 JOG

25 19

Thinking

With telling Without telling
17 14 o

CHAPTER VII

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF THE FEEBLE-MINDED

During the last few decades, advances in pedagogy, of which
Decroly's penetrating work constitutes not the least, have been
decidedly influenced by study of the behavior of abnormal
children. Psychopathology has continually gained in signifi-
cance for psychology, particularly for psychological theory.
Yet a true understanding of the psychopathological processes
themselves is often peculiarly difficult. The following dis-
cussion attempts to develop the fundamentals of a dynamic
theory of feeble-mindedness. We are aware that we are
presenting only the outlines of a theory. This is so of necessity
since we shall consider exclusively one relatively frequent
type among the many, dynamically perhaps quite varied, kinds
of feeble-mindedness. And the experiments upon which the
theory is based have been carried out on only one particular
degree of feeble-mindedness. Yet at present in a psychological
investigation of the varied types of personality, it seems to me
most important to attempt as strict as possible a theory of
the dynamic relation between the different behavioral mani-
festations of one type, and then to determine which of the
dynamic concepts thus evolved are applicable to the general
problem of personality differences. Such a course seems more
fruitful than to continue suggesting new classificatory divisions
for the entire range of types. Without doubt, however, a
dynamic theory of feeble-mindedness must at the same time
deal with the basic problems of a general dynamic theory of
the person.

It is common knowledge that feeble-mindedness is not merely
an " isolated disease of the intellect" but involves the total

194

ON FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS 195

personality. 1 We have, however, progressed little beyond
this first general insight. In particular we lack a positive
characterization of this peculiarity of the total personality.

As I see it, a truly penetrating experimental investigation of
the intellectual processes of the feeble-minded remains to be
achieved. Determination by test procedures of deficient
accomplishment in certain fields, important as this is in itself,
has thrown little light upon the nature of the underlying proc-
esses. Nor has it illuminated the differences between them
and the intellectual processes of the normal individual. As
in other branches of psychology here also insight into the nature
of the processes involved can only be won by pushing beyond
mere concepts of achievement. Moreover, certain perform-
ances, social behavior for instance, may upon occasion be better
achieved by the feeble-minded than by a person of normal
intelligence.

If one attempts to transcend the concepts of achievement and
to inquire into the nature of the psychological processes them-
selves, he is of course first forced to consider what distinguishes
the intellectual activity of the feeble-minded from that of the
normal person.

THE ACT OF INSIGHT IN THE FEEBLE-MINDED
In an attempt of this sort one is confronted by unexpectedly
great difficulties.

Investigations of the last twenty years have established at
least the outlines of the fundamental nature of intellectual
activity, especially of creative thinking. Dynamically the act
of insight consists in a reorganization of the field (Kohler 2 ),
closely related in many respects to the transformation of
so-called ambiguous figures. In the fields both of perception
and of thought there is a shift in the totality of internal rela-
tions. Forms that appear at first as isolated totalities become

1 Indeed Binet was keenly interested in the problem of the character of the
feeble-minded; cf. A. Binet et T. Simon, L'Intelligence des imbeciles, U Annie
psychologique, 1909, 15, i ff.

8 KOHLER, Intelligenzprufungen an Menschenajfen (The Mentality of Apes),
and Das Wesen der Intelligenz, Kind und Umwelt, Berlin, 1930.

196 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

part of a unified whole. Dependent parts become independent
or unite with originally dependent parts of other wholes to
form new wholes. Briefly, the structure of the field as regards
its grouping into wholes undergoes a transformation, usually
an abrupt one. In the causation of this transformation
definite directed forces play an essential role.

If, proceeding from this theory of intelligent activity, one
asks wherein the peculiarity of feeble-minded thinking lies,
he must first establish that acts of insight in the feeble-minded
appear throughout to have in all fundamental properties the
same nature as in the normal individual. It is certain that
the feeble-minded see wholes and that these wholes are not less
pronounced. 1 It cannot be maintained that the feeble-minded
do not engage in intelligent activity or that the process as such
is less intensive. Moreover the "Aha-experience" typical of
the act of thinking undoubtedly occurs in the feeble-minded.
Indeed, they appear often to experience it more intensively
and to rejoice in it more than do normal children. Morons
and imbecile children may experience jokes and enjoy them
keenly. Equally with the normal child and the anthropoid,
the act of insight in the feeble-minded consists in a transforma-
tion of the whole relations in the field.

There remains then this difference, quite an external one from
the dynamic point of view: the transformation of field structure
typical of the experience of wit or of intelligent activity in
general is not occasioned in the feeble-minded by the same
events which produce it in normal children of the same age. It
is caused by other events, the so-called easier tasks, or more
primitive jokes. The only qualitative distinction that seems to
have been pointed out between the process of the two groups is
that the feeble-minded think more concretely and perceptually. 2

FORMULATION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL PROBLEM
During the last three years we have attempted to gain insight
into the peculiarities of the feeble-minded, not by the direct

1 We shall see later that it may plausibly be maintained that they are even
more pronounced.

2 Cf. W. ELIASBERG, Die Veranschaulichung in der Hilfsschule, Zeitschr.f. exper.
PHd. t 1926, 27, I34-I4S.

(XV FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS 197

route of investigating intelligence, but by experimental investi-
gations in the spheres of will and needs. In many ways these
spheres are more directly related to the deeper peculiarities of
personality than are intellectual processes. If then feeble-
mindedness be an expression of a peculiarity of the total
personality it seems not unlikely that through such investi-
gations insight may finally be obtained into the causes of the
intellectual difficulties themselves.

One major difficulty in reasoning from the results of intelli-
gence testing to the problem of dynamic differences is the fact
that in testing procedures individual differences are determined
by means of activities the psychological nature and general
laws of which are not sufficiently known. 1 We have, therefore,
utilized throughout those experimental procedures in which
the underlying processes and their laws are best known to us.
For similar reasons we have first investigated relatively light
rather than pronounced degrees of feeble-mincledness. This is
apparently contrary to the general principle that investigation
should begin with differences as crass as possible. Our present
approach has been guided by the following consideration. If
one uses the same procedure with idiots as with normal children
it is very probable that the difference in psychological situations
created for normal and for idiot children will be so great that
completely different dynamic relations will exist. It may well
happen, for instance, that for the one a difficult conflict may
arise, whereas for the other none may ensue. Only when truly
psychologically comparable situations exist may one compare
differences in behavior in more than an external way or consider
such differences in the same type of activity as the effects of
dynamic differences of the person.

The experimental subjects consisted of pupils from different
schools for the defective in Berlin, ranging in age from six to
twelve years. The majority were classed as moron, a few as
imbecile. Control experiments were carried out by the same
experimenters on normal children of various ages.

1 Cf. LEWIN, Die Entwicklung der experimentellen Willens psychologic und die
Psychotherapie, Hirzel, Leipzig, 1929, pp. 28.

ic;8 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

The experiments chiefly concern: (i) the process of satiation,
(2) the expression of an unsatisfied need (resumption of an
interrupted action), and (3) the substitute value of a substitute
(compensatory) action. The selection of experiments was
naturally guided by certain working hypotheses. We shall
first present briefly the results of the experiments on satiation.

PSYCHICAL SATIATION IN FEEBLE-MINDED AND NORMAL

CHILDREN

The children were asked to draw moon faces continuously
(Fig. i; "The moon, the moon, the moon is round; it has two
eyes, a nose, and mouth"). A moon face
was copied for the child on a sheet of note-
book paper. The child then had to draw
moon faces "until he had enough of it."
He was free to stop at any time. But the
situation in itself contained, as in the experi-
ments of Karsten, 1 a weak pressure toward
continuing to draw. (The experimenter
must of course endeavor to maintain this pressure as equal as
possible with different children.) According to the general laws
of psychical satiation, of which the fundamentals are known
from the experiments of Karsten and Freund, 2 the initially
positive or neutral valence of the task gradually changes with
repetition into indifference and finally into a negative valence.
In these experiments breaking off generally did not occur
immediately upon reaching the satiation point. The child usu-
ally worked for a while after the satiation point had been
reached until the activity acquired a certain degree of negative
valence. After stopping, he was asked by the experimenter if
he would not like to continue, drawing anything he chose (free
drawing). If so, paper and pencil remained at his disposal for
as long as he wished to go on.

One is accustomed to attribute to the feeble-minded a
pronounced inclination toward repetition and at the same time

1 A. KARSTEN, Psychische Sattigung, Psychol. Forsch., 1928, 10, 142 if.
* A. FREUND, Die psychische Sattigung im Menstruum und Intermenstruum,
ibid., 1930, 13, 198 ff

ON FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS

199

small persistence in working. Since satiation, as we know, is
closely connected with the dynamics of needs, it appeared
important to determine its course with the feeble-minded.
The task presented no special difficulties to the nine- to ten-
and to the ten- to eleven-year-old feeble-minded. Only the
eight- to nine-year-olds drew decidedly fewer moons than the
normals of equal age.

The result in the main is as follows (Table I) : the total
duration of the satiation experiment (moon faces plus free
drawing) is on the average shorter with the eight- to nine-year-
old morons than with normal children of equal age (41 as
against 58 min.). Times for individual children of the normal
and feeble-minded groups, however, overlap considerably.
The average time (59 min.) of the nine- to ten-year-old morons
is the same as that of the eight- to nine-year-old normals, and
shorter, but not decidedly so, than the average of the nine- to
ten-year-old normals (75 min.). The average of the ten- to
eleven-year-old feeble-minded (77 min.) is almost identical
with that (79 min.) of the normal nine- to ten- and ten- to
eleven-year-olds.

Considering the notion of little persistence and capacity
for concentration on the part of the feeble-minded, it is sur-
prising that at least in the case of the nine- to eleven-year-olds

TABLE I PSYCHICAL SATIATION IN NORMAL (N) AND RKTARDI.D (R) CHILDREN

Satiation time, minutes

Satia-

Moons

Number per 100
minutes of

Age,

tion

years

Moons

Free
drawing

Total

point,
minutes

minute

Pauses

Other
activities

8 to 9

9 to 10

10 to ii

200 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

no essential difference in total time exists. Even when the
comparison is made between times at which satiation first
clearly appears, the averages show surprisingly good agreement.
In the three age groups of the feeble-minded this satiation point
occurs on the average at 27, 30, and 40 min. respectively; in the
groups of normal children at 35, 27, and 35 min.

The times required for total satiation in such activities by
normal and subnormal children thus appear on the whole not to
differ essentially. 1 The course of satiation, however, shows
certain typical differences. One is first struck by the fact that
with the ten- to eleven-year-old morons nearly the entire time
(75 min.) is taken up with the drawing of moon faces, and that
after satiation of this activity they refuse almost without
exception to continue with free drawing. 2 Normal children,
on the other hand, are satiated with drawing moon faces much
sooner (after 45 min.). Yet all of these children were ready
to continue with free drawing. Thus on the average the feeble-
minded of this age displayed more persistence in one and the
same activity than did the normal children. Once satiated,
however, they would have nothing more to do with any part
of the sphere. 3 They showed much more frequently, however,
small technical variations (in respect, for instance, to position
or serial order of drawings).

Together with the tendency toward variation, a typical
manifestation of satiation is the appearance of secondary
actions, that is, actions which are carried out on the side without
interruption of the major activity. In frequency of secondary

1 One may refer the quicker satiation of the eight- to nine-year-old feeble-
minded to the fact that the task was more difficult for them than for the normal
children. The feeble-minded drew on the average only four moons a minute
as against eight for normals of the same age. According to Karsten, other
things being equal, satiation is more rapid with more accentuated central tasks
and the more difficult tasks here must be so regarded.

2 This refusal may also have been influenced, on the part of the feeble-minded,
by a fear of failing in free drawing.

3 The eight- to nine-year-olds show externally the opposite : the feeble-minded
go over earlier than do the normal into the decided variations of free drawing.
The same holds with the six-year-olds. I incline to believe, however, that no
actual contradiction exists when dynamic questions are considered (see below)

ON FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS 2OI

actions there appears to be no important difference between the
normal and the feeble-minded. With the feeble-minded,
however, and in all three age groups, there occur much more
often pauses for rest and interposed actions, which definitely
interrupt the main activity. The number of pauses for rest
per 100 min. in the feeble-minded, grouped by age, is 30, 30,
and 23; in the normal, 8, 15, and 7. The corresponding values
for interposed actions are 20, 17, 21 for the feeble-minded;
8, 3, 8 for the normal children.

As a general result of the satiation experiments we find that
in ages eight to eleven there exist between normal and moron no
significant differences in rate of satiation of the total complex
(drawing moon faces plus free drawing). Typical differences
do occur, however, in the course of satiation: conflict between
the wish to continue drawing and the beginning of satiation
leads in the feeble-minded to many more pauses for rest and
interposed actions. That is, the moron child is either definitely
engaged in the task in hand or he interrupts this activity
completely by a pause or a shift to another occupation. The
course of satiation in the normal child is far more continuous.
He responds to the conflict in more elastic, yielding fashion.
He more readily finds a way, with the aid of secondary activ-
ities or by other means, to steer through the conflict
without externally giving up continuation of the task. The
behavior of the feeble-minded is much more abrupt, more
"either-or."

The cause of the more elastic behavior of the normal child
may be sought in his readier survey of the possibilities of
satisfying the demands of the experimenter, thus enabling him
really to evade the actual task. Although in point of fact
this greater insight plays a role, a purely intellectualistic
interpretation would be false. The elastic and inelastic
behavior of the two groups proceeds quite directly and without
particular deliberation. 1

1 Of greater importance, rather, is the fact that the feeble-minded much more
readily feels himself inadequate to the social situation, that he fails to stand
aoove it.

202 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

I am constrained to believe that a much more fundamental
property of the feeble-minded is here operative; namely, a
functional rigidity, an immobility of the psychic material,
which itself constitutes the true cause of the intellectual
difficulties. Before going into this theory the experiments
on resumption of interrupted actions and on substitution will
be briefly presented.

RESUMPTION OF INTERRUPTED ACTIONS. SUBSTITUTE
VALUE OF SUBSTITUTE ACTIONS

If on any pretext one interrupts the execution of a task in
which a subject has become inwardly engaged, occupies him in
another way, and then after completion of this second task
finally leaves him to himself for a short time (say half a minute),
the subject ordinarily returns spontaneously to the first task
within this period. We know from the work of Ovsiankina 1
that this resumption is very frequent in certain situations and
with certain tasks even when the subject knows that a resump-
tion is not in line with the wishes of the experimenter.

Kopke has carried out similar experiments with eight- to
nine-year-old feeble-minded' 2 and with seven- to eight-year-old
normal children (Table II). The frequency of resumption
with normal children was 79 per cent (in good agreement with
the figures of Ovsiankina) ; with the feeble-minded under the
same conditions 100 per cent. After finishing the second task,
the 31 feeble-minded children investigated returned without
exception to the interrupted one, and within 30 sec. Thus in
the feeble-minded the tension system corresponding to the
interrupted action worked itself out with an astonishing
regularity in a resumption of the task. We shall discuss the
reasons for this later.

Proceeding from the work of Lissner 3 and Mahler, 4 Kopke
used a similar technique in the investigation of substitute value.

1 OVSIANKINA, Wiederaufnahme unterbrochener Handlungen, Psychol. Forsch.,
1928, n, 302 ft.

2 Twenty-five of these children were classed as morons, six as slightly imbecile

3 K. LISSNER, Die Entspannung von Bediirfuissen durch Ersatzhand
lungen, Psychol. Forsch., 1933, 18, 218-250.

4 W. MAHLER, " Ersatzhandlungen verschiedener Realitatsgrades," Psychol.
Forsch,, 1933, 18, 27-89.

ON FEEBLE-MI NDEDNbS*

203

TABLE II. SUBSTITUTE VALUE OF SUBSTITUTE ACTIVITIES IN NORMAL (N) AND
RETARDED (R) CHILDREN

Frequency of resump-

Age,

tion in per cent

years

Without

With

Identical

Concealed

substitute

valence

7 to 8

(I)

8 to 9

IOO

(I)

(III)

(VII)

7 to 8

(ID

8 to 9

IOO

(ID

(IV)

8 to 9

(V)

(VI)

12 to 13

(IX)

n = number of subjects
( ) = procedure used

Lissner gave her subject as second activity a task similar to the
interrupted one in content or in type of material. It became
clear that the substitute value of the second activity (which we
shall name the substitute action) for the main activity varied
according to the nature, difficulty, and mode of presentation
of the second action. The greater its functional substitute
value the greater is the relief of the need for completion of the
main action and the more complete is the discharge of the
tension system corresponding to it. One can therefore test
the substitute value by determining how much less often the
subject returns to the main activity when a substitute rather
than a completely heterogeneous action is interposed.

Comparison of eight- to nine-year-old feeble-minded with
seven- to eight-year-old normal children gave the following

204 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

result. Under conditions 1 in which the substitute action had
such a high substitute value with the normal children that the
percentage of resumption sank from 79 (in experiments with-
out a substitute action) to 33, the resumption with the feeble-
minded sank only from 100 to 94. 2 With the feeble-minded the
substitute value was thus almost zero. Kopke then gradually
increased the similarity of the main and substitute activities
until they were practically identical: for the task " paint an
animal" was substituted the task " paint the same animal again
on another sheet of paper"; for " build a bridge out of stones"
was substituted "build the same bridge out of stones." In
spite of this extremely high similarity the substitute value
remained low (resumption remained at 86 to 100 per cent).
In these cases, however, resumption was not so prompt, taking
place only after 3 to 4 min.

These experimental results accord with certain observations
of daily life. Once a feeble-minded child has in mind a definite
goal he often shows a peculiarly rigid fixation on it. It is
extremely striking with what rigidity these children often
insist on carrying out a definite action in precisely one way and
exactly "now," and how difficult it is to sway them from their
preference even with conditions under which a normal child
of the same or somewhat younger age would be relatively easily
moved. Thus the will of the feeble-minded often appears
stronger, certainly more rigid than that of the normal child.

This peculiar rigidity of the will expresses itself not only
in facing momentary goals but also in so-called habits. Feeble-
minded children frequently impress one with their pronounced
stereotypy 3 and pedantry, far exceeding the commonly observed
pedantry of normal children. Thus their shoes must stand

1 Tasks were used which as far as possible were adapted in degree of difficulty
to the capacities of the children. Examples: to model an animal out of plasticine,
to assemble an automobile out of paper strips, to build an automobile out of
rods and rings.

2 In other words: whereas only 2 out of 31 feeble-minded children did not
return to the original task, 33 of the 49 normal children did not resume it.

3 Cy. L. M. TERMAN, The Measurement of Intelligence, Houghton Mifflin,
Boston, 1916, p 203.

ON FEEBLE-MI NDEDNL^ ^5

before the bed in exactly one way; the buttons on a piece of
clothing must be fastened in one definite order; the child is
extremely suspicious of new foods, and even when hungry
he may refuse at supper time a food generally eaten at
lunch.

In contrast to these experiences, which agree with the experi-
mental results on substitution in the feeble-minded, are others
which seemingly imply the opposite. The circumstance that
tricks and diversions for instance are likely to be more effective
with the feeble-minded than with the normal child is due,
perhaps, to his lesser intellectual capacities. But the feeble-
minded child is much more readily satisfied with an incomplete
solution of a task, indeed often a pure gesture appears to suffice.
If he finds it difficult to throw a ball far, he may be quite
satisfied in raising his arm as though to throw in a forceful
manner. To illustrate further, the masculine gestures of many
of these children have in high degree the function of real acts. 1
Lazar characterizes such children as Gestenkinder.' 2 Also the
experimental findings of Gottschaldt 3 show that the feeble-
minded are relatively easily satisfied with completing a simpler
task at a lower level of aspiration when the original task is too
difficult.

Experimental results and observations of daily life thus
testify with equal imprcssiveness to an apparent contradiction:
on the one hand the feeble-minded show an especial rigidity and
tendency toward fixation which makes the occurrence of sub-
stitute actions, in the functional sense, very difficult; on the
other, there is revealed a pronounced tendency toward sub-
stitute actions and a tendency to be readily satisfied with them.
Not only is this true of two different groups of children. Both
extremes are characteristic of one and the same child.

The theory to be discussed below attempts to penetrate to
the essential dynamic factors involved and seems to point to a

1 Cf. G. WEISS, Kindertypen in aufgabefreien und aufgabegebundenen Situa-
tionen, Zeitschr.f. Kinder f or sch., 1930, 36, pp. 343 ff.

2 These are by no means always feeble-minded children.

3 GOTTSCHALDT, Ber. d. V. Kong. f. Heilpdd., Munchcn, 1931, 130-143.

206 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

way of solution of this and a series of other paradoxes typical
of the feeble-minded.

GENERAL THEORY OF THE DYNAMIC DIFFERENCES
AMONG PERSONS

As previously mentioned, the problem of feeble-mindedness
is one of individual differences. If these individual differences
are regarded from a dynamic point of view the following general
considerations arise. As a dynamic system the individual is
more or less unitary and more or less self-contained (closed). 1
Differences may derive from a diversity of (i) structure of the
total system, (2) material and state of the system, or (3) its
meaningful content.

Differences in Structure of the Person.

Degree of Differentiation. One of the most fundamental
dynamic differences between small child and adult is the degree
of differentiation in their various psychical regions and systems.
The fact that various life-spheres (profession, family, friend-
ships with definite persons, and so on) as well as different needs
are much more differentiated in the adult than in the one-year-
old child scarcely demands extensive demonstration. In the
adult it is generally not difficult to distinguish more peripherally
and more centrally located regions. The young child shows far
less pronounced stratijication. Thus in this respect he is a
much more unitary system, dynamically a stronger Gestalt.
A topological representation of the functional differences of the
total personality in respect to degree of differentiation cor-
responds to the differences between Fig. 2 a (child) and Fig.
2 b (adult).

Types of Structure. Together with differences in degree
of differentiation, there certainly exist between different indi-
viduals important differences in the type of differentiation.
The total structure may for instance be relatively harmonious
or inharmonious. The dynamic connections between various

1 LEWIN, Zwei Grundtypen von Lebensprozessen, Zeitschr. f. PsychoL, 1929,
113, 220 ff.

ON FEEBLEMINDEDNESS

207

part systems of the person are by no means equally close.
Great individual differences exist with reference to the way this
delimitation of relatively closed subordinate wholes occurs:
which parts are more strongly and which parts more weakly
developed, whether the degree of demarcation among the
subordinate wholes is relatively uniform or whether separate
parts of the personality are particularly isolated. The phe-
nomenon of division of personality is an example of a very
special type of structure.

Differences in Psychical Material and in State of the Systems.

Differences in Material. Diversities in structure (in degree
of differentiation and in type of structure) do not exhaust

()

the possible differences within the personality. Thus with
identical structures, the ease with which they change may differ
decidedly. Further, the shifting may occur suddenly or
gradually. In this connection one may speak of a varying
dynamic softness, elasticity, hardness, brittleness, or fluidity
of the psychical material.

On the whole the infant must be characterized as not only
less differentiated but also as more yielding. 1 Among children
of the same age there appear to exist great differences in
material. The special properties of one's psychical material

1 Certain facts, such as the strong fixation of the small child on certain habits,
appear to speak against the hypothesis of a generally greater plasticity at this
age. I prefer, however, from general biological points of view, to maintain the
hypothesis of easier mobility of the psychical material and believe that I can
otherwise explain the opposed facts (see pp. 2286*. ).

208 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

must constitute a very deep individual peculiarity of the
person and play a decided role in heredity.

If differences in ease of structural change within the system
are indicated by variation in thickness of the boundaries
separating its various parts, the differences between small
child and adult correspond in general to those between a
and 6, Fig. 3.

States of Tension in the Systems. Along with the material
properties must also be considered properties of the state of the
systems, especially their state of tension. In the satisfaction
of a need, for instance, this state of tension may change slowly
or rapidly. It is also quite probable that together with the
diversity of momentary states there exist also enduring differ-
ences in the average tension in the systems of the total person.
(By material properties in the broad sense we mean to include

(*> (fa)

FIG. 3.

the properties discussed in the present as well as in the previous
three paragraphs.)

The material properties of the different systems within the
same individual are by no means completely uniform. The
systems of the plane of unreality possess a greater degree of
fluidity, 1 and important differences may exist between young
and old part regions of the person. In so far, therefore, as we
speak of individual differences in the material constants of
the person as a whole, it is necessary to compare homogeneous
parts within the total person.

1 C/. J. F. BROWN, Die dynamischen Eigenschaften der Realitats-und Irreal-
itatschichten, Psythol. Forsch.,

ON FEEBLh-MlKDEDNESS 2OQ

Differences in Content of Meaning of the Systems.

Even though the structure and the material properties of two
individuals are the same, the content corresponding to the
systems may be different and constitute decisive psychological
differences of the person. Even though their structure and
material properties should be approximately the same, a four-
year-old boy in the Russian steppes and one in the Chinese
quarter of San Francisco would show important personal
differences since the content of their goals and ideals, the
meaning of their different spheres of life, are different. In
higher degree than material properties and structural plan,
these diversities of content depend upon historical influences.

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF THE FEEBLE-MINDED

Theoretical Considerations

In returning from general discussion of the possible dynamic
differences among persons to the problem of the nature of the
feeble-minded (to, i.e., a relatively frequent type of the feeble-
minded) the following is to be considered.

Degree of Differentiation.

The feeble-minded child of, say, eight years is in general
less differentiated than the eight-year-old normal child brought
up under otherwise similar conditions. Not only is his level
of intelligence lower but on the whole it is to be designated as
more primitive, more infantile. In respect to structural
plan, aside from other differences of structure, the feeble-minded
is to be designated as less differentiated. In this respect he
resembles a younger normal child (Fig. 4).

The complex of phenomena ordinarily designated as infanti-
lism may be due chiefly to this small degree of differentiation.
The greater concreteness of thinking may also be related to this
primitiveness in the sense of lack of dynamic differentiation. 1

Material Properties.

Even though a feeble-minded child corresponds in degree
of differentiation to a younger normal child he is not to be

l See below, pp. 2228.

2IO

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

regarded as entirely similar. We conceive the major dynamic
difference between a feeble-minded and a normal child of the
same degree of differentiation to consist in a greater stiffness,
a smaller capacity for dynamic rearrangement, in the psychical
systems of the former (Fig. 4).

Youn ger Older

Nor

Feeble-
minc/ed

FIG. 4.1

A p plication in Outline

That on the whole the feeble-minded is to be characterized
as dynamically more rigid, less mobile, is attested by a large
number of observations.

Pedantry and Fixation of Volitional Goals.

As previously mentioned, it is striking with what inflexibility
and pedantry 2 the feeble-minded is accustomed to cling to a
fixed goal or habit.

In part this inflexibility of the feeble-minded is an expression
of his helplessness. Mishaps occur to him oftener. He
finds more frequently than the normal child that he cannot trust
the world in which he lives. It is far more difficult for him to
survey a new situation and to see through it adequately.

1 As in Fig. 3 increase in thickness of the boundary lines represents decrease
in ease of structural change within the system.

* By pedantry is meant the tendency to insist upon strict regularities and to
develop inflexible habits to an unnecessary degree and under inappropriate
circumstances.

ON FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS 2 1 1

Therefore he inclines, as does the normal child in situations of
helplessness, to try ways which are well known to him, to cling
to means which he trusts. To this extent pedantry also may
be a secondary effect of his smaller intellectual capacity, his
lesser mastery of the world.

This explanation however seems clearly insufficient. Ped-
antry in the feeble-minded is very often to be observed even
when the child certainly feels neither helpless nor overwhelmed.
Rather there seems to exist here a very deep and primary
rigidity, which manifests itself not only in well-worn habits
but also in new volitional goals. This fixation on the first
chosen goal led without exception in Kopke's experiments
to resumption of the interrupted goal.

Paradoxes of Substitute Value.

The assumption of a relatively difficult rearrangement of
psychical systems in the feeble-minded permits us to account
for the paradoxical results of the substitution experiments.

If one inquires into the dynamic assumptions that must be
fulfilled in order for a substitute activity to have substitute
value, the following is to be established with reference to the
inner psychical systems. Let the uncompleted primary task be
designated A, the substitute task, B. Satisfaction of the
primary task (dynamically, discharge of A) by the completion
of the substitute action (i.e., by discharge of B) occurs when,
and only when, the two systems A and B are so related that
the discharge of B brings with it an immediate discharge of A .
That is to say, A and B must be relatively dependent parts of
one dynamic whole (Fig. 5) and cannot therefore be mutually
isolated systems (Fig. 6). Only when the structure is as
represented in Fig. 5, where A and B are, dynamically, relatively
weakly bounded parts of one total system, can the substitute
action have substitute value. 1

1 The discharge of A by B may be, other things being equal, more complete
and thus the substitute value ot the second action higher, if the total system A
and B is bounded from other systems by a strong common outer wall. In this
case the state of tension of A-B is less dependent upon that of the neighboring
systems.

212 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

Actually Lissner 1 found that the substitute value depends
significantly upon the type of transition from the first to
the second activity. If the second activity is introduced by the
experimenter as, so to speak, an entirely new experiment
the substitute value is, other things being equal, much less
than when the second activity is developed out of the first.
The investigations of Zeigarnik 2 and Birenbaum 3 have already
shown the fundamental importance of the interconnections
of psychical systems for their tension and discharge (directly
or by the discharge of other systems). They have also indi-
cated the means by which one may experimentally produce
definite relations between whole psychical systems.

FIG. 5. Fir, 6.

In the situations utilized in the substitution experiments of
Kopke, a certain degree of similarity between the two tasks
was adequate to bring about a sufficient connection between the
two systems. When these children were presented with a
substitute task sufficiently related to the initial one, the system
which arose did not seem to be completely separated but
appeared rather to grow out of the first or at least to develop
in close connection with it. Occasionally such a close con-
nection between the two systems first arose only during the
course of the work. 4 As a rule a structure similar to that of
Fig. 5 results.

That the psychical systems be easily susceptible of re-forma-
tion is an additional requisite under the conditions given for the

1 K. LISSNER, ibid. p. 240. Table 8.

2 B. ZKIGARNIK, t)ber das Behalten von erledigten und unerledigten Hand-
lungen, Psychol. Forsch., 1927, 9, 1-85.

3 G. BIRENBAUM, Das Vergessen einer Vornahme (isolierte seelische Systeme
und dynamischc Gesamtbereiche), Psychol. Forsch., 1930, 13, 218-284.

4 See BIRENBAUM, op. a/., concerning the course and conditions underlying
the formation of such totalities.

OA r FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS 213

construction of such a totality on the basis of similarity and
thus also for the existence of substitute value. If the capacity
for transformation be small, the building of such totalities under
the previous conditions will occur with difficulty, if at all.
System 5, corresponding to the second task, will then be more
likely to appear as an independent system (corresponding to
Fig. 6). If not it will unite with A to form a dynamic unity
only with greater difficulty. The substitute value will be
small. Actually Kopke found this to be the case with
feeble-minded.

At the same time it may be predicted from our basic assump-
tion concerning the slight mobility of the psychical material
of the feeble-minded that with them, under certain circum-
stances, the substitute value must be greater than with the
normal, rather than less. For instance, if with the feeble-minded
one should succeed in bringing the second task into dynamic
connection with the first, the relative difficulty of transfor-
mation of the system must give it a particularly high degree of
unity, thus resulting in a high substitute value. This might
be attained by developing the second task out of the first.
We have already referred to the seemingly paradoxical fact
that along with instances of extreme difficulty of substitute
satisfaction there occur in the feeble-minded others in which
substitute satisfaction appears readily. In the cases mentioned
by Gottschaldt, when the first task was too difficult for the child
he spontaneously turned to easier tasks. On failing in the
construction of a high tower he contented himself with a lower
one. There is much indicating that in such spontaneous
growth of the second task out of the first the two activities
dynamically are unseparated. If, however, the tension systems
are not divided, there exists actually only one tension system.
Thus the substitute value will be high; higher, indeed than with
the normal. This inference is supported by a consequence
adduced from our fundamental assumption, a consequence
which we must consider somewhat in detail, since it is of
essential significance for the specifically intellectual problem.

214 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

Material Properties of Systems and the Formation of Wholes.

In normal individuals if there occurs spontaneous substitu-
tion, for instance of the type of substitution of resignation, 1
the new goal in general is dynamically not completely identical
with the old. The original goal is not wholly transformed
into the new one, but often maintains a certain independence,
for example an " ideal goal/' In such cases there frequently
develops in normal children a dynamic structure similar to
that of Fig. 5: one relatively unitary total system arises in
which are distinguishable two, although weakly divided,
part systems. That is, a wall exists between the two part
systems even though it is a weak one functionally. Discharge
of the one system will therefore cause a substantial though
not a complete discharge of the other (in so far as a deeper
transformation does not occur during discharge). 2

If the systems are particularly rigid in respect to their
material properties, such a differentiation of one total system
into two weakly divided parts would less easily occur. If

the forces in question are strong
enough two separate systems, A and
B (Fig. 6), are more likely to result,
or A and B will remain completely
undivided (Fig. 7). In these cases
IG ' 7 * a very high substitute value (exter-

nally viewed) must ensue because there exists a dynamically
undifferentiated system, a strong Gestalt, and because therefore
each discharge of tension must directly embrace the whole
system.

From this dynamic rigidity of systems and its effect on the
formation of differentiated total systems the paradoxes of
substitute value may be derived as necessary consequences.
Thus, in general, is to be understood the either-or behavior so
characteristic of the feeble-minded in a variety of fields. This

1 See DEMBO, op. cit.

2 It frequently does. Cf. Hoppe, Erfolg und Misserfolg, Psychol. Forsch.,
1930, 14, 1-62.

ON FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS 2 1 5

either-or characteristic rests upon the fact that in the feeble-
minded, because of their psychical material properties, we
encounter, in higher degree than with the normal, strong dynamic
Gestalten. That is, we encounter in higher degree unitary,
internally undifferentiated systems which, in so far as they
are separated, are separated completely.

There is a relative lack of weak Gestalten, those organi-
zations in which two or more part systems constitute a dynami-
cally connected unity although at the same time remaining
separated to a greater or less degree.

One of the fundamental properties of the feeble-minded is,
in my opinion, the paucity of continuously graded transitions
between absolute separation and absolute connection in more
inclusive dynamic wholes. This state of affairs makes clear
why in so many fields one finds in the behavior of the feeble-
minded extreme apparent contradictions.

Material Properties and the Psychical Environment.

In surveying the consequences of a person's dynamic material
properties for experience and behavior, one must remember
that these properties are characteristic not only of the internal
psychical systems but equally of the psychical environment
and of its changes, in so far as the latter are psychologically
conditioned. 1 Not only such facts as valences of environmental
objects and events but also the meaning and structural peculi-
arities of the perceptual field depend significantly upon psycho-
biological factors of the individual concerned and are not
completely or univocally determined by the objective stimulus
factors. Thus not only the content and momentary state of
needs and interests, but all dynamic properties of the person,
the rigidity and unchangeability of his systems, make them-
selves felt in the structure and changes of the psychical environ-
ment. Ordinarily, however, in treating particular objects or

1 The principle that within the dynamic world of a definite individual is to be
included not only his inner psychical systems and motorium but equally his
psychical environment is one that has been repeatedly emphasized but so far
insufficiently needed. Cf. W. Kohler, Gestalt Psychology, and LEWIN, Vorsatz,
Wille und Bedurfnis

2i6 A DYMANIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

situations, one refers to the degree of fixation of their valence
rather than to the transformation of tense or discharged
psychical systems.

Regarded from this conception of the psychical environment,
the behavior of the feeble-minded reveals the same either-or
structure, as effect of the general rigidity of the psychical
material. We mentioned above that the retarded pupils
returned, without exception, to the interrupted task. From
the standpoint just developed we should speak of a strong
fixation of valence on the uncompleted work. This valence,
however, will only remain effective under the conditions of
the previous experiment as long as the feeble-minded does not
leave the immediate psychological environment of the task.
Under the given conditions, 1 allowing the child to carry out
the second task (interrupting task) on another table suffices
to reduce almost to zero the frequency of returns to the first
task. The behavior of normal children contrasts decidedly
with this. The situation may be formulated thus: in higher
degree than the normal the feeble-minded is either in the one
or in the other situation. Separate situations are in much
higher degree opposed closed wholes, and the feeble-minded
acts according to the field forces of these closed situations.

From the point of view of a psychology of the will, difficulty
of transformation [Umstrukturierung], the effect of which upon
the intellectual processes we are to consider immediately,
signifies a deliverance of the person to the mercies of the momen-
tary situation. According to the circumstances, this may
have externally different effects. It may, for instance, appear
as helplessness, as incapacity to find a way out. (The fre-
quency of seductions to stealing, or within the sexual sphere,
may well be closely related to this situation.) Under other
circumstances the small changeability and relatively strong segre -
gation of the situation result in great persistence and energy in the
pursuit of a definite goal, to a particularly high concentration.
On the other hand, if even a small change in the situation is

1 Under other conditions the feeble-minded also may very well return to tasks
which are not present.

ON FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS 217

occasioned by an external influence, it will constitute a much
more profound interference. For in these persons the changed
situation must, in much higher degree, tend to appear com-
pletely closed, supplanting entirely the facts of the first situa-
tion. That is to say, the formation of two or more simultane-
ously existent stratified situations will be much more difficult
than in the normal individual. As a matter of fact the feeble-
minded are thus generally extremely sensitive to distractions.

As previously mentioned in connection with the satiation
experiments, this either-or characteristic results much more
frequently in the introduction of pauses by the feeble-minded.
Thus they completely interrupt their work more often than do
normal children.

The peculiar resoluteness and obstinacy of the feeble-minded
have already been referred to. An essential role in their
determination is played by the facts just discussed, namely,
the more difficult formation of relatively separated systems and
the occurrence of less weakly connected but relatively separated
situations. These are very intimately related with the great
difficulty encountered by the feeble-minded when he is forced
to remain in a conflict situation.

The characteristic conflict situation before decision 1 is
a state of suspension in which the situations corresponding to
various possible decisions are sufficiently present "but must at
the same time be kept sufficiently apart. On account of the
reasons mentioned, the maintenance of this state of suspension
is peculiarly difficult for the feeble-minded, and his obstinacy
may be associated with this tendency towardunivocal, dynami-
cally closed situations.

The same difficulty in maintaining stratified situations
makes it hard for the feeble-minded to dissimulate. This is
expressed in most varied ways. In play for instance it often
gives the total behavior of the feeble-minded an uncommonly
appealing appearance of moral rectilinearity.

Helplessness and fear may prevent the feeble-minded from
escaping a conflict out of which a normal, more mobile child

1 See Chaps. Ill and IV.

218 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

would find a way with relative ease. If, despite all tendencies
to the contrary, the child is forced by superior circumstances
to remain in an unresolved conflict he generally suffers very
acutely. Strong emotional reactions or suppressions result. 1

Intelligence Defects.

In these considerations we have achieved an approach to the
understanding of fecble-mincledness in its proper sense, that is,
the intellectual processes of the feeble-minded.

As we have previously mentioned, the act of insight consists
essentially in a change in the whole-relations in the field. Two
initially quite independent facts become dependent parts of an
interconnected whole; an originally unitary whole splits into
relatively independent parts; or, by far most frequently, a
re-formation of the field occurs such that parts of different
wholes simultaneously become loosened and combine with
other parts to form new wholes. Such re-formation of the
whole-relations may be favored by objective shifts in the field
(for instance, decreasing the spatial distance between banana
and stick in Kohler's experiments). It is most particularly
dependent, however, upon the general dynamic psychological
properties of the given field, or of the particular person. 2
This means then that an insufficient general mobility of the
psychical systems must hinder the occurrence of intellectual
acts, that is, the occurrence of certain transformations of the
structural unities in the field.

That the same material properties of the person hitherto
discussed are of extreme significance for ease of intellectual
activity will become even clearer upon consideration of certain

1 Dembo has shown that generally anger is connected with the presence of an
outer barrier creating a situation without escape for the person concerned.
This enables us to see the relation of anger and helplessness, which may be of
particular significance in the understanding of the feeble-minded.

2 This state of affairs, illustrated by the difficulty of achieving insight with too
great a stage of tension, is related, among other things, to the fact that forces
working toward shifting of whole-relations can effect little if the total system is
dominated by strong forces maintaining a condition of equilibrium. We will
refer later to another circumstance working in the same direction.

OA r FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS

219

rather complicated re-formations typical of intellectual acts
and their difficulties.

Rupp 1 mentions several examples of typical difficulties in
drawing by the feeble-minded, which seem to me to be particu-
larly significant in the present connection. If a feeble-minded

FIG. 8.

FIG. 9a. 2

Figures 94 and gb show clearly this isolation of the smaller wholes of the given
pattern The line a in both figures is an example of doubling a line, a condition
which results from the inability to sec the line simultaneously as part of the two
different wholes.

child is presented with a honeycomb pattern (Fig. 8) of which
the cells i, 2, and 3 are given, and asked to continue in the
sequence 4, 5, 6, 7 . . . , he
encounters great difficulties
which, can be shown not to
be manual. Frequently there
occurs a loosening up and iso-
lation of the individual cells
(Fig. go). If we inquire into
the cause of this isolation of the cells, or as we may say,
the Gestalt disintegration (see above), we find the following.
The child may have proceeded as far as cell 7, and have
drawn lines a, b, and c. What now is the situation with
regard to line d? For the child at work on cell 7 it is

1 H. RUPP, tlber Optische Analyse, Psychol. Forsch., 1923, 4, 262-300.

2 Figures 90 and 96 are from Rupp, op. cit., p. 267, Figs. 4f and 4, respec-
tively. The cross-hatching in Fig. 96 was intentionally inserted afterward
by the experimenter in order to bring out the structure of the drawing.

220

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

obvious that the cell must possess a boundary line below to
the left. This line is however also the upper right boundary
of cell 5. The line d is thus simultaneously a dependent part
of two different wholes and indeed has a quite different character
in the two. Further, in such constructive activity it is neces-
sary at the moment of actual drawing to perceive the separate
line as a relatively independent whole. Thus, fundamentally,
one must see with sufficient clearness three wholes: d as, (i)
an independent line (to be drawn, for instance, in a definite
direction from a definite point), (2) a dependent part of cell 5,
and (3) a dependent part of cell 7. The situation is closely

DD
I]

FIG. 10.

related to that of conflict with substitution previously described.
The drawing can succeed only when the different characters
of d in the two wholes are sufficiently differentiated and clearly
appreciated. If, at the time, the child is dominated only by
whole 5 or 7 and if d is sufficiently fixated as belonging to
the already completed whole 5, as constituting its upper right
boundary, then in bounding cell 7 he will be constrained to draw
a new line, its lower left boundary.

A similar situation occurs when, instead of solving the task
of dividing a square into smaller ones by drawing parallel lines
through the entire figure, the feeble-minded solves it by making
a row of smaller squares as in Fig. 10. It plays a role, together
with two other factors, when in the copying of the Binet
rhombus the figure is reproduced as a circle with added corners
(Fig. n).

O.V FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS 221

The cause of difficulties of the feeble-minded in such intel-
lectual tasks thus rests upon the fact that in the feeble-minded
there is a much greater tendency toward the formation of
strong Gestalten, that is, of unities whose subordinate parts arc
extraordinarily closely bound together and which as wholes are
relatively completely separated. Thus from the same dynamic
properties which have revealed themselves as essential founda-
tions of the processes of need and will, we may deduce the
intellectual defects of the feeble-minded. We shall recur later
to the connection between the degree of differentiation of the
person and the appearance of strong Gestalten.

Rohrschach 1 found that on presentation of ink -blot figures the feeble-minded
gave decidedly fewer whole answers. Beck 2 confirmed this finding and dis-
covered a small yet decided correlation between mental age and the tendency
to give whole answers, that is, to describe the unclear field as a whole.

From this tendency to proceed from parts rather than from wholes an objection
might be developed against our thesis of the special importance of the strong
Gestalt in the feeble-minded I shall therefore deal briefly with this question

It must first be made clear that the thesis, k< A' tends to pen eive wholes in
greater degree than 1'," is in this generali/ed form absolutely meaningless
Even though there existed persons who perceived only a "mosaic of points,"
they would be perceiving wholes. One can only meaningfully distinguish what
particular wholes will be perceived with given constellations of stimuli For
example, the whole answers of normal children with Rohrschach by no means
referred to the piece of paper with the ink blot but only to the ink blot. Yet
they are not considered as part answers.

Here we may leave it open whether type of instruction or any
other factor is responsible for the preference of these wholes in
description. Certainly one may say that it is frequently harder
for the feeble-minded, even as for the younger normal child, to
sufficiently see through extended situations. This is indeed
one of the most frequent difficulties in the solution of intellectual
tasks. Extension is here essentially to be conceived in the
sense of a property of structure; it would be completely mis-
leading to assert that the small child or the feeble-minded see
only parts and no wholes. It can no longer be doubted that
small children, primitive people, and animals depend to a

1 H. ROHRSCHACH, Psychodiagnostik, Bern, 1921

2 S J. BECK, The Rohrschach Test as Applied to a Feeble-minded Group,
Arch. Psychol , No 136, 1932.

222 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

particularly high degree upon the total character of situations.
Rather the objective temporal and spatial extension of that
which will be experienced by a young child as one connected
situation, or as one relatively closed whole within a situation,
often fails to correspond with that which would appear to the
adult as the total situation or a special whole within it. This
objective extension of the total situation is occasionally greater
with the small child, very frequently however less than with
the adult. The child's greater difficulty of surveying extended
situations derives above all from the fact that with the adult
the maximal degree of differentiation of wholes appears to be
higher. That is to say, with the adult more complexly stratified
yet clearly differentiated wholes may develop as subordinate
wholes. This means, however, that the small child by no means
sees only parts, but that with him, on the contrary, strong
Gestalten play a much more dominating role. It may scarcely
be doubted that in this respect the feeble-minded stands closer
to the younger child.

Concreteness.

Because of the slighter mobility of his psychical systems
and his greater difficulty in developing and changing Gestalten,
one is enabled to understand why the feeble-minded requires
other conditions than the normal individual in order to achieve a
reorganization of the field, an intellectual Aha-experience.
There remains the further question as to whether the specific
concreteness and primitiveness of their way of thinking is to
be understood in terms of these same considerations.

Primitiveness of thinking may perhaps be referred to the
tendency toward development of strong Gestalten. From this
one might infer that the general Gestalt characteristics play a
relatively greater role with the feeble-minded. Yet rather
than tracing this peculiarity of the feeble-minded directly to
the rigidity of his systems it is probably more correct to refer
it to his smaller degree of differentiation as a person, to which
we have already referred. Indeed the tendency to concreteness
and primitiveness appears to be a general feature of the child-

ON FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS 223

like or otherwise undifferentiated person. It may thus be the
effect of that structural property which the feeble-minded
has in common with the young child (see page 209).

One will probably have to recognize in the tendency toward
concreteness more than merely the primitiveness of the younger
child. For this difficulty concerning abstract thinking still
appears pronounced in the feeble-minded at an age at which the
normal child of equivalent mental age no longer shows this
peculiar concreteness. Our general groundwork indicates a way
in which this peculiarity of the feeble-minded may be derived.

Concreteness of thinking and action in the feeble-minded
signifies chiefly, as previously mentioned, that every object and
event derives its meaning in peculiarly high degree from the
present situation, that it is not a separable part of the situation.
Thus abstraction, by which one generally means construction of
groups according to certain factual relations of the individual
objects, is rendered more difficult. Tn addition to emphasizing
in general the dependence of the particular object on the actual
situation, the thesis of concreteness implies that certain types
of group construction are especially hindered. These are the
types of grouping which are not directly in the level of reality,
but more imaginal, conceptual, unreal. This condition may
be related to very specific properties in the structure of the
feeble-minded.

Compared with the total behavior of normal or even of
certain psychopathic types of children, that of the particular
kind of feeble-minded which we are considering strikes one by
its relative lack of imaginativeness. This does not mean
that the feeble-minded child has no ideas. Not infrequently
he possesses a good and accurate memory for concrete facts.
But his thinking and play as well reflect a poor imagination.
He lacks a certain richness and a particular kind of mobility
characteristic of imaginative play.

This lack of imagination on the part of the feeble-minded is revealed in the
above mentioned investigations of Rohrschach 1 and Beck, 2 utilizing the Rohr-

1 H. ROHRSCHACH, op. cit., pp. 94 ff.

2 S. J. BECK, op. cit., p. 72.

224 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

schach ink-blot figures. From the fact that the figures relatively seldom were
described as in motion, Beck concludes, "This finding indicates that the feeble-
minded have very little capacity for creative fantasy." Just what psychological
processes play a role here is, as Rohrschach himself emphasizes, rather unclear.

We regard the dynamic basis of the peculiarity of imaginative
behavior as consisting in the relation of these occurrences to
levels in the psychological environment and in the person,
levels we have designated by the term unreality. Differences
in degree of reality determine a dimension in the psychological
life-space 1 and in the person. The levels of unreality stand,
for example, in close relation to dreams, play, and ideal goals.
The degree of their development, their position in the whole structure
of the person, and the type of connection between these levels oj
reality and unreality appear to me to be of fundamental significance
for the total character of a person, in particular for his imagination
and creativeness.

We know from the investigation of Brown 2 that the dynamic
properties of the levels of unreality are characterized by especial
fluidity. If now relatively small mobility of psychical systems
is characteristic of feeble-mindedness it is understandable that
those psychical levels which in the normal individual are
characterized by a particularly high fluidity will suffer particu-
larly in the feeble-minded. Thus the consequence of a relative
lack of development of the levels of unreality must be a lowered
imaginativeness in total behavior, an increased concreteness of
thinking.

Whether one must speak only of a lack of development and
relative nonfluidity of the levels of unreality or whether the
function of these levels within the total person is displaced can
be determined only from a precise investigation of the particu-
larities of development of levels of unreality in the feeble-
minded. In the normal child formation of levels of different
degrees of reality is the effect of a differentiation from begin-
nings in which the planes of reality and unreality cannot
actually be separated. An investigation of the corresponding
development in the feeble-minded should yield important

1 See Chap. IV, p. 145.

2 J. F. BROWN, op. cit.

ON FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS

22$

information concerning the general problem of the development
of different parts of the total person and perhaps furnish also
an important practical instrument for the differential diagnosis
between feeble-mindedness and late development.

This suggestion leads us to the consequences for the devel-
opment of the feeble-minded which result from our basic
assumption.

Infantilism.

One of the most tangible peculiarities of the feeble-minded
is his retardation in comparison with normal children of like
age, that is, his infantilism. The slow development of the
feeble-minded child occurs by no means only in the intellectual
sphere. 1 The fact of retardation is so central that, for instance,
the difference in intelligence between normal and feeble-
minded can roughly be characterized by its degree, that is, by
mental age. It is scarcely to be doubted that the feeble-
minded behaves in many respects like a younger child, not only
with regard to intelligence but also with reference to the breadth
of his mental horizon, his store of knowledge, his attention,' 2
his emotional instability.

In a theory of infantilism one must keep in mind that
retardation is not a specific peculiarity of the feeble-minded
but also occurs frequently, for instance, in psychopathic types,
especially the sensitive and impulsive.

Dynamically retardation may be related especially to a
smaller degree of differentiation of the total systems of the
psychical person, be it in all parts or in certain important
spheres. We have, accordingly, to state as one of the most
essential facts concerning the feeble-minded that the rate of
differentiation of the total person, or of important spheres,
is smaller than with the normal individual.

1 Wallin (Clinical and Abnormal Psychology, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1927)
reports the later appearance of the first tooth and the later closing of the fonta-
nelle; Morgan (Physiological Maturity of Feeble-minded Girls, Tr. School Bull.,
1926, 27, 23, 231 ff.)> that menstruation occurs later with feeble-minded.

2 Binet, indeed, attempted to bring differences of intelligence in direct relation
to processes of attention.

226 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

Inquiry concerning the dynamic conditions upon which the
rate of differentiation of such a total system depends leads us to
the following considerations. Differentiation is certainly a
function of the conditions of the environment as well as of the
individual peculiarities of the person. At present we cannot
answer the question whether one may properly speak of an
inherited predisposition for a faster or slower rate of differentia-
tion. The question, however, as to the relation existing
between material properties and rate of differentiation of a
system may well be raised.

Two systems, A and B, may be equal in respect to their
degree of differentiation and their type of structure, yet differ
with regard to their material properties. Further, in both cases
the forces effecting differentiation may be equally strong and
similarly directed. (For our present purpose it does not matter
whether these are inner forces of the system or forces of the
environment.) In such a case one may say unequivocally
that a high functional rigidity with respect to changes must
hinder differentiation of the total system. If, then, the material
properties of the feeble-minded are to be characterized as
particularly immobile, the direct deduction may be made that
his development must, other things being equal, be slower. 1

This derivation of the rate of differentiation from material
properties agrees very well with the fact that the difference
in development (measured in years of mental age) between a
feeble-minded and normal child does not remain constant with
change in age but in general increases. Indeed, this increase is
so decided that the intelligence quotient remains constant or
actually decreases. Naturally it is very possible not only that
the slower rate of differentiation rests upon peculiarities of
material properties but that the forces effecting differentiation
are also relatively weak. 2

1 A more precise dynamic derivation would have to proceed from the relation
between the strength of the forces pressing toward re-formation and of those
necessary for the reorganization of a definite material.

2 It is quite conceivable that there are instances in which the material proper-
ties of different persons correspond in the rough and only the forces effecting
differentiation differ. In such cases also infantilism must result.

ON FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS 227

One may not, however, assert that in general differentiation
of a system occurs the more readily the more fluid the system.
We are concerned with the problem of an enduring, or in any
case a relatively stable differentiation. If the total system is
very fluid momentary differentiation may occur relatively
easily, but the slightest force will again alter the structure so
that development of a differentiated permanent structure of
the total person does not result. 1 Such dynamic relations
seem to us to be characteristic of the infantilism of certain
psychopathic types. 2

It is thus understandable why from the pedagogical point of view work with
the milder grades of feeble-minded is often more fruitful and satisfying than
work with psychopathic children Single advances in differentiation may occur
much more slowly with the feeble-minded and of course there are with them
also frequent relapses, but the construction in general seems to possess a higher
degree of stability.

Thus the favorable condition for enduring differentiation of
the total psychical systems of a person is neither a maximal
nor minimal but rather an optimal degree of material rigidity,
varying according to the strength of forces working toward
differentiation.

It must be emphasized at this point that not only too great
inflexibility but also too great fluidity of the system must
lead to feeble-minded types of behavior. It might be worth-
while to test the applicability of such a dynamic characteri-
zation to the so-called erethetic feeble-mindedness.

Degree of Differentiation, Susceptibility to Influence [Beinfluss-
barkeit], Intellectual Mobility.

The connection just discussed between material properties
and rate of development seems to me to speak quite forcibly for
the correctness of our fundamental thesis. On the other hand,
there are several kinds of facts related to degree of differentia-

1 With a completely fluid system, differentiation in the sense of an enduring
structure would be impossible (we never encounter the state of completely
stable equilibrium in a living being). Such a complete fluidity in an organism
could be as little admitted as complete rigidity.

2 Cf. LEWIN, Filmaufnahmen liber Trieb- und Affektausserungen psycho-
pathischer Kinder.

228 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

tion which are difficult to see through, dynamically. We do
not wish to neglect pointing out these difficulties.

Several Theoretical Difficulties. As mentioned, the young
normal child is to be considered as a relatively slightly differen-
tiated as well as a relatively soft, mobile system. Yet there
can be no doubt that in many respects the small child appears
to be more fixated, pedantic, yes, even more difficult to influence
than an older child or indeed the adult. Not only the feeble-
minded but also the small child demands with striking rigidity
to sit on "his" chair while eating. If for some reason or other
it does not please a one-year-old child to eat, it is generally
much harder to move him to do so than it is an older child.
Thus even though one wishes to continue holding to the thesis
of greater mobility of the child (in itself quite probable 1 ) it
becomes apparent that behavior quite closely related to the
fixation and rigidity of the feeble-minded may occur under
circumstances in which an immobile material is not to be
thought of.

One might consider reconstructing the theory so as to place
at the center lack of differentiation rather than material proper-
ties, or one might attempt to dispense altogether with the
assumption of a difference in material. The question of
whether slight mobility is to be given a primary or
secondary significance would not disturb us greatly, since in a
dynamic theory dealing always with the totality of the proper-
ties of a system such questions are no longer seen as of much
importance. Aside from special difficulties, however, a theory
that would restrict itself to differences in degree of differentia-
tion cannot be regarded as sufficient fundamentally. Accord-
ing to such a conception the feeble-minded would be conceived
of as entirely similar to a person with slower development.
Such a view is, however, undoubtedly false. Furthermore
infantilism, that is, a smaller degree of differentiation, admit-
tedly occurs with types which are not to be designated as
feeble-minded.

1 Compare the concept of plasticity, for instance, with C. BtfHLER, Kind-
heit und Jugend.

ON FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS 229

Another difficulty is connected with the problem of differ-
entiation. Failure in the face of differentiated tasks involving
comprehension, as for instance in drawing, in retention of rows
of numerals, and similar tasks, 1 is found not only with feeble-
minded but also with small children. Yet one might reason
that their relative mobility should rather facilitate the forma-
tion of differentiated perceptual fields.

Our present experimental findings and insight into the
general dynamics of the connection between psychical systems
are not sufficient to yield a complete answer to the problems
here in question. But the distinctions between degree of
differentiation, degree of communication among part systems, 2
and the degree of their changeability have shown themselves
so fruitful to us in recent years in the characterization of
individual differences in such diverse spheres and in such varied
connections that I should like to add a few considerations with
reference to the solution of the difficulties involved.

In beginning, it should be emphasized that the relatively
small differentiation of the feeble-minded follows from our
fundamental thesis. Therefore the feeble-minded must show
certain characteristics of the normal younger child, namely
those which are specific effects of lack of differentiation.

Further, general observation seems to me to speak for the
view that the degree of rigidity with the feeble-minded goes
significantly beyond the occasional fixation observable in
younger children.

Above all, however, one must inquire into the real dynamic
meaning of fixation in the normal child.

Pedantry in the Normal Child. Whatever pedantry in the
small child, for example, his wish always to sit on the same chair
at table, may signify, it is by no means characteristic of the

1 Cf. H. ROHRSCHACH, op. cit.; S. J. BECK, op. cit.; W. PETERS, Die Entwick-
lung der Wahrnehmungsleistungen beim Kinde, Zeitschr. f. Psychol., 1927, 103,
129-184.

2 Through these concepts, particularly that of the degree of communication,
the complex of facts referred to by E. R. Jaensch in the distinction between
integrated and disintegrated types can probably be comprehended in sharper
dynamic concepts.

230 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

entire young child of, say, less than one year. At this age
the child is still quite insensitive to unusual situations of certain
kinds. One can, for instance, take him on trips with fewer
difficulties than a child of three or four. The child of three
or four years already lives in a world of commands and pro-
hibitions. A very definite must is often attached to certain
things and types of behavior. This meaning is particularly
stressed and held to by the child, probably in connection
with the development of initial islands in a firm level of
reality. This connection is, however, not always easily
transparent to the adult, and often it is infected with magical
features.

It is very possible that the pedantry of the feeble-minded is
similarly based. Yet when some connection is not rationally
transparent to him the feeble-minded must incline the sooner
to magic ideas and fears. The question of material peculiarities
here can only be answered by means of a comparative investi-
gation of the degree of fixation under otherwise equal psycho-
logical conditions.

Susceptibility to Influence. In other cases in which the child
appears to be influenced with greater difficulty the younger he
is, the relations seem to be essentially different. If the hungry
infant refuses his nourishment because he does not like its taste,
there often remains only the possibility of brute force. The six-
months-old child who does not savor his porridge turns his head
away, purses his lips together, and eventually spews it out.

With the very small child the adult has fundamentally only
a few methods of psychological interference. He can attempt to
divert the child, to better his emotional state, or try to provoke
a contrary action on the part of the child by apparent with-
drawal of the object in question. The varied possibilities of
encouragement and persuasion applicable to an older child are
lacking.

Does there exist actually a greater dynamic rigidity of
the psychical systems of the small child? To me such an
interpretation appears false. The situation in question is as
a whole to be characterized as one in which there exist for the

ON FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS 231

child pronounced inclinations or disinclinations, that is, definite
dominating field forces, together with an attempt by the adult to
change the child. Under certain conditions this change is more
difficult to effect in the small than in the older child. If one
is to understand the basic dynamic factors operative it must be
emphasized that it is only under very definite conditions that
the smaller child is harder to change. The primitive method
of diversion becomes generally ineffective with somewhat older
children. One must then state that under certain conditions
the small child is harder, under other conditions easier to change
than the older child.

This paradoxical situation seems to be directly related to
the lack of differentiation of the small child. In a higher
degree than older children or adults the small child is a dynamic
whole. The different parts of the total system are still so
closely connected that in a peculiarly high degree the small
child engages with his entire person in everything that he does.
At the same time this unity means that the inner psychical
and the bodily systems of the total person are particularly
closely connected and that the dynamic boundary between
person and psychological environment is relatively weak. 1
This means, for instance, that in the small child the needs of
his person alter directly the character of his psychological
environment and also that a change in the psychological
environment affects more directly and strongly the total state
of the person.

This wholeness and the slight firmness of the wall between
person and environment have a double consequence for the
ease with which the child may be influenced. If, by one means
or another, one succeeds in altering the psychological environ-
ment of the child, then the small child is exposed with fewer
defences to the changed environment. On the other hand, the
total picture of the environment of the small child conforms
much more directly to his own momentary state and under
certain conditions it will be more difficult to bring about such

1 See Chap. III.

232 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

an alteration. 1 For instance, if the small child is angry, the
whole world is momentarily flooded with anger. If one is not
successful in evoking an occurrence strong enough to change
the character of the whole situation, the child will remain
relatively unchangeable.

The greater wholeness of the total system leads here also to
an either-or effect, similar to that which we have discussed as
resulting from the rigidity of systems. Thus in a certain
respect there exists a functional equivalent between greater material
rigidity and greater wholeness of the total system. Both material
rigidity and slight differentiation must favor the origin of
stronger Gestalten, thus leading to an either-or effect.

The feeble-minded combine both a relatively high material
rigidity and a specially small degree of differentiation of the
total person 2 (which, as we have seen, may itself be conceived as
an effect of rigidity on development), which must work in the
same way with regard to the either-or effect. Actually in
the feeble-minded one may observe in a striking manner the
above discussed paradox of susceptibility to influence: under
certain circumstances he is influenced with ease, under others
with particular difficulty. This circumstance may have
played a role in Binet's classification of the feeble-minded into
rebellious and tractable types.

Differentiation of the Person and Mobility of Comprehension.

The fact that in certain respects it is easier to gain access
to an older child is related further to the greater differentiation
of the older child's worlds of perception and experience. Under
objectively equal conditions, the degree of differentiation of
the experienced environment appears to stand in closest con-
nection with the degree of differentiation of the person con-
cerned. This connection is apparent in the early develop-
ment of the perceptual world 3 and also in the later development

1 Further, the special organization of the social field is naturally of particular
significance for susceptibility to influence.

2 Relative immobility of systems does not necessarily mean that these systems
are not in communication with each other. Reformability and degree of com-
munication are to be distinguished even though not independent of each other.

* Cf. K. KOFFKA, The Growth of the Mind.

ON FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS 233

of perceptual achievements. 1 Together with the thorough
structuring of a factual sphere, there grow generally the
differential characteristics of the features of individual facts
in the sphere and thus, at least to a certain extent, the possi-
bility of more differentiated distinction. 2

From the greater differentiation, the greater wealth of inner
levels, there must thus result for the given person a greater
richness of ways of conceiving and observing, in so far as other
forces do not work antagonistically. The result of this situation
is that a second person finds comparatively more spheres from
which he may attempt to evoke a change in the existing way of
comprehension. Even without the influence of someone else,
the more differentiated person will have more possibilities of
differently conceiving a given situation if the strength of the
field forces do not impose a definite conception. If, for any
reason, the total situation is unsatisfactory (if, for instance,
access to a goal is barred, as in the detour experiments), a
change in conception, a re-formation of the field, will occur,
other things being equal, earlier in the more differentiated
child. Whether this re-formation of the field occurs as the
most painless evasion of the difficulty or as creative insight
may depend upon the kind and degree of differentiation with
respect to the factual sphere concerned and upon other personal
peculiarities. In any case a certain degree of differentiation
of the person will facilitate the restructuring of the field neces-
sary for intellectual insights. In general it will make possible
a greater richness of differing modes of behavior.

Thus under certain conditions and to a certain extent there
exists a functional equivalence between a higher degree of

1 Cf. W. PETERS, op. cit.

2 It would lead too far afield to enter here into the problem, not wholly a
simple one, of the cause of this relation. In any case an important role is
played by the fact that the world picture of a more differentiated person is itself
more differentiated (according to the lack of dynamic separation between the
psychical person and the psychical environment). The individual perceptual
fact thus acquires a position in a completely structured whole. I incline to
believe that in addition a general relation between the maximal degree of struc-
tural detail in a perceptual picture and the degree of differentiation of the
receptor is of decided significance.

234 A- DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

differentiation of the total system and a greater mobility of the
person in the face of a given situation or task. There exists,
that is, an equivalence between a specific characteristic of
structure and a definite material property.

The same conclusion is reached as the result of the following
considerations. Let A and B represent total systems of similar
material properties and with equal (medium) degrees of
communication. Further, both systems contain part systems
a and b respectively, which in themselves are as similar as
possible. A is on the whole, however, less differentiated than
B. Under these circumstances, because of the greater diversity
of part systems in B, there will exist many more possibilities of a
change of b than of a through inner shifts in the total system.

Such re-formation through inner forces occurs in voluntary
changes of conception [Auffassung]. The tasks of voluntary
concentration and attention, tasks, that is, in which a change or
maintenance of field structure is to be brought about by inner
means, are therefore (at least within certain limits 1 ) easier
for a person of higher degree of differentiation. It requires
little demonstration to establish that possibilities of influencing
the separate part systems are significantly raised if the differ-
ence in differentiation of the total system consists not only in
the number of part systems but (as actually occurs in the
development of the child) also in qualitative differentiation
within the total system. In particular, the development
of levels of reality and unreality, of levels, that is, differ-
ing in material properties, contributes richer possibilities
dynamically.

It is quite possible that a determining role in the intellectual
weakness of the feeble-minded and in their poor capacity for
voluntary concentration, is played by precisely this smaller
differentiation of the total system in consequence of the asso-
ciated slighter secondary mobility. Indeed it may here be more
important than the direct effect of the material rigidity of the
system.

1 The danger of spontaneous changes in the part systems seems to constitute
an antagonistic factor.

ON FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS 235

If our conception of a certain equivalence between higher
degree of differentiation and external mobility be correct, then
under certain conditions, even with the feeble-minded, a greater
mobility of actual behavior should make itself noticeable with
an increase in age. Even though the actual material properties
do not change, or, indeed, though the change with age is in the
direction of greater rigidity, yet a sufficiently faster advance
of differentiation should increase the wealth of possible varieties
of behavior. I incline to believe that the development of the
slighter degrees of feeble-mindedness confirms this conclusion
throughout. In any case the absolute advance of intellectual
achievements on the part of the feeble-minded becomes fully
understandable from this point of view.

The functional equivalence between greater material rigidity
of the systems and a greater wholeness of the total system
in respect to (i) the formation of strong, relatively undifferen-
tiated Gestalten (systems), and (2) the secondary mobility of
behavior is one of the major causes of the normal child's increase
in intellectual achievement with age. 1 This occurs without
increase in fluidity of the psychical systems, but rather despite
a more probable gradual stiffening. This equivalence explains,
further, why (because of a slighter differentiation of the total
system) the feeble-minded, in spite of his greater material
rigidity, is so similar to the younger child in susceptibility to
influence, in intelligence, and in many other respects.

With these considerations the sketch of a dynamic theory
of the feeble-minded is outlined in its main features. It
scarcely need be emphasized that an abundance of detailed
questions remains to be discussed or that a theory which
attempts to proceed from the totality of dynamically possible
differences of the person as a whole must raise a host of problems
to be answered only by experiment and by comparison of very
different individual types. But before theoretical penetration
has achieved a certain degree of maturity it is often impossible

1 As additional important factors the increased store of knowledge and abili-
ties and, above all, the greater differentiation of the world picture are to be
mentioned.

236 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

even to formulate the questions which should be answered by
experiment.

Senile Dementia.

We refrain from consideration of the different kinds of mental
disease or the effects of brain injuries which sometimes are
accompanied by a kind of rigidity reminiscent of the behavior
of the feeble-minded. Certainly the cause of behavioral
rigidity may vary. Not only, as we have seen, is the degree of
differentiation of the total person of influence, but the encapsu-
lation of certain part systems remains a possible causal factor.
The work of Dembo 1 on anger has shown, furthermore, that
increase in state of tension may, under certain conditions,
lead to greater momentary unity and primitiveness of the total
behavior and may result in a certain fixation and weakness of
intelligence which appears rather feeble-minded. The question
as to whether a change is actually one of material property
(the systems' mobility) must therefore be raised each time.

It cannot be questioned that dynamic mobility of the
psychical systems is related in the closest fashion to the total
biological constitution of the person concerned. We do not
wish here to make definite assumptions concerning its relation to
any specific biochemical, endocrine, or growth processes. We
shall, however, briefly consider a general biological change in the
total person which agrees peculiarly well with our fundamental
thesis. This is the change designated as senile dementia.

The great material plasticity of the normal small child gives
way, generally at least, to greater firmness. That with
increasing age this development may lead finally to decided
rigidity, lack of mobility, and inelasticity scarcely demands
extensive demonstration. It has previously been pointed out
that this progressive stiffening of the system's material proper-
ties is cut across by an increasing differentiation of the total
person. In respect to intellectual achievements by far the most
apparent initial effects of the combined processes are the
increased structuration of the field of experience and the

1 T. DEMBO, op. cit.

OA T FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS 237

greater intellectual mobility associated with differentiation.
Should stiffening, however, proceed faster than differentiation
with increasing age intellectual mobility of behavior must
decrease and in cases of high degree of material immobility
lead to appearances of feeble-mindedness. In this respect
the effect must be particularly striking if, with age, instead of
increase in differentiation there occurs an impoverishment of
structure, a loss of part systems.

There exist, moreover, great individual differences in the
tempo, extent, and age limits of enduring differentiation as
well as in the tempo and extent of stiffening of the psychical
material. In concrete instances one must lay most weight upon
how the different part systems of the person individually
behave.

In general if a stiffening of psychical material occurs with
age and if the type of feeble-mindedness here considered is
characterized by relative rigidity, then it follows not only that
the process of differentiation must proceed more slowly, as
discussed above, but also that it must cease earlier. This
conclusion agrees very well with observation. "The mental
development of the feeble-minded is not only slower than that
of the normal individual, it also ceases earlier and begins to
decline earlier." 1

The theory here propounded thus permits a surprisingly
unified view not only of those individual differences which are
related to differences of the person in the feeble-minded, in
the normal, and to a certain extent in the psychopathic, but
also of those resting upon development in age. Further, it
permits us to deduce the fundamental similarity of one type
with other age levels of a different type and to comprehend in a
unitary fashion a great multiplicity of kinds of behavior in
very different fields, which, taken separately, are very diverse,
often apparently contradictory.

1 R. PINTNER, Feeblemindedness, in CARL MURCHISON, Handbook of Child
Psychology, ist ed., 1931, Chap. XIX, p. 611. Pintner supports this assertion
by reference to a number of investigations by various authors who used large
numbers of subjects, in some cases over periods of ten years.

238 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

Finally, I do not wish to neglect pointing out that the
theory here presented attempts to avoid methodologically those
difficulties which all classificatory divisions, however different
in detail, must contend with and because of which these divi-
sions are in certain respects so unsatisfactory. These diffi-
culties of all classifications appear by no means only in
psychology but in every science. They seem to be superable
only when in the characterization of individual differences of
the total person one passes beyond classificatory to constructive
methods. We have made such an attempt. The constructive
theory here presented does not lead to a distinction of three,
four, or five pure types and their transitions, but, proceeding
from certain basic dynamic concepts, contains from the begin-
ning a principle for the construction and deduction of an endless
variety of personal differences.

SUMMARY

Proceeding from comparative experimental investigations
on normal and feeble-minded children of psychical satiation,
resumption of interrupted actions, and substitute value of
substitute actions, a dynamic theory of a definite type of feeble-
mindedness has been developed.

The behavior of the feeble-minded is deduced from certain
dynamic material properties of the psychical systems, which
themselves imply specific structural peculiarities of the total
person with respect to its degree and rate of differentiation and
special kind of structure. The effects of these peculiarities of
the person in the fields of intelligence, attention, will, and so
on, have been discussed, and finally their relations to the
structure of the person of the normal small child and of the
senescent.

CHAPTER VIII
SURVEY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS

The following synopsis is designed to give the reader a very
brief survey of our experimental investigations. It is planned,
above all, to orient those who wish to go on to a closer acquaint-
ance with these investigations. The description is therefore
essentially from the systematic point of view. It may be
desirable, however, to introduce it with a few historical
remarks.

HISTORICAL REMARKS

The point of departure for Untersuchungcn zur Handlungs-
und AJfektpsychologie [Investigations in the Psychology of
Action and Emotion] was the investigation of the measurement
of the will and the fundamental law of association, 1 the original
aim of which was to make more precise Ach's attempts to
measure the will. This investigation showed that the funda-
mental law of association ('apart from other defects) errs in its
basic dynamic concepts in so far as it treats couplings or other
constraining forces as constituting also reservoirs of energy
or tensions. Also it became clear to me that the phenomena
occurring in these experiments were by no means so simple
as was customarily assumed, but quite complicated and
unstable. It was evident that one had to look for the simpler
and essentially stabler phenomena of will psychology in facts
which were generally considered especially complicated.

There followed a series of investigations in the field of the
psychology of perception. In one of these 2 I attempted to

1 K. LEWIN, Das Problem der Willensmessung und das Grundgesetz der
Assoziation, Psyckol. Forsch., 1922, I, 191-302; 2, 65-140.

2 K. LEWIN and K. SAKUMA, Die Sehrichtung monokularer und binokularer
Objekte bei Bewegung, und das Zustandekommen des Tiefeneffektes, Psychol.
Forsch., 1925, 6, 298-357.

239

240 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

derive the perception of depth from certain constellations of
forces in different layers of the perceptual system. The investi-
gation of the reversal of spatial position 1 treats a problem which
stands in the closest relation not only to the structure of the
perceptual field but also to the problems of the will.

Fortunately I experienced Max Wertheimer's teaching in
Berlin and collaborated for over a decade with Wolfgang
Kohler. I need not emphasize my debts to these outstanding
personalities. The fundamental ideas of Gestalt theory are the
foundation of all our investigations in the field of the will,
of affection, and of the personality. In the few articles in
which the problems of general Gestalt theory are not explicitly
discussed, this is solely because they have become the self-
evident foundation of experimental practice.

Historically the first experimental investigation of the series
on the structure and dynamics of the personality and of the
psychological environment is that of Zcigarnik. 2 All later
experimental investigations are built upon this. It was an
attempt to break a first path through a primeval forest of facts
and assumptions, using as compass concepts the practical
utility of which was still wholly untried. The coincidence on
the part of B. Zeigarnik of unusual conceptual clearness with
great psychological acuity in the judgment of particular cases
made this attempt possible.

Among the later experimental investigations a similar funda-
mental significance attaches to Dembo's investigation 3 of anger
as a dynamic problem. She shows, by means of a self-critical
investigation versatile in attack, that even rather complicated
problems (success and failure, level of aspiration, substitution
or compensation, reality and unreality, conflict, social relations,
changes in the structure of the person), problems which at
first seem to lie beyond any possibility of a dynamically strict
and yet experimentally demonstrable presentation, are capable

1 K. LKWIN, Ueber die Umkehrung der Raumlage auf dem Kopf stehender
Worte und Figuren in der Wahrnehmung, Piychol. Forsch., 1923, 4, 210-261.

2 Uber das Behalten erledigter und unerledigter Handlungen, Psychol.
Forsch., 1927, 9, 1-85.

5 Der Arger als dynamisches Problem, Psychol. Forsch., 1931, 15, 1-144.

SURVEY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS 241

of such a presentation with the aid of a constructive psychology.
Her investigation is an impressive illustration of the fact that
in a dynamic theory of psychological processes the problems
of the environment and of the person are inseparably bound
up together. It turned out that the investigation of this
emotion extended itself necessarily to an investigation of
certain environmental structures. In this research the utility
and fertility of topological concepts for the presentation of
complicated environmental structures was demonstrated for
the first time. The reader will naturally miss the quantitative
evaluation which is an essential component of Zeigarnik's
and of all the other researches of the series. But according to
my experience the thorough quantitative investigation of a
field can always be obtained with some persistence if only the
qualitative analysis is sufficiently advanced. A quantitative
elaboration of some of the questions attacked by Dembo is
already at hand, namely: the problem of success and failure and
level of aspiration by Hoppe, Fajans, Rosenfeld; the problem of
substitution (compensation) by Kopke, Lissner, Mahler;
the problem of reality and unreality by Brown, Mahler,
Sliosberg; certain social fields by Wiehe. I hope that the
last-named investigation may have a fundamental significance
for a broad field of social psychology.

SYSTEMATIC SURVEY

One may distinguish roughly two meanings of the question
"Why" in psychology:

1. Why, in a given momentary situation, that is, with a
given person (P) in a certain state and in a certain environment
(), does precisely this behavior (B] result? The problem is
thus to represent the behavior (event) as a function of the
momentary total situation (B = f(PE)).

2. The more historical question: Why, at this moment, does
the situation have precisely this structure and the person
precisely this condition or state?

It is important to separate these two questions more clearly
than is done, for example, in association psychology and in

242 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

Freud's theory. The center of gravity of our experimental
work lies, as a rule, in the first kind of why. In experimental
practice, to be sure, these two kinds of problems are often so
closely related that the creation of a sufficiently unequivocal
situation requires a certain historical structure of the experi-
mental situation.

In accordance with our general conceptual and methodo-
logical assumptions nearly all of our investigations treat not
only questions of individual differences but problems of general
lawfulness. The center of gravity lies, as a rule, in the problem
of the general laws.

As regards content, no action is referred either to the person
on the one side or to the psychological environment on the
other; or yet to a more-or-less combination of both factors.
Rather, each action is referred to the momentarily obtaining
structure of such a person in such a psychological situation.
Nearly all the investigations are therefore occupied with both
problems. The following classification thus indicates merely
the center of gravity of the problem formulations.

General Laws of the Psychological Systems
Tension Systems (Need, Purpose).

Ovsiankina, The Resumption of Interrupted Activities. 1
This article contains proof that the effect of a purpose or inten-
tion is the formation of a quasi-need, that is, dynamically, of a
tension system. This tension system drives toward discharge
and causes activities which serve the execution of the purpose.
The technique of the experiments was essentially as follows:
an activity was interrupted, and after a certain interval a situa-
tion of relative freedom for the subject was created. There
resulted a frequent resumption of the interrupted activity
(Table I).

The influence of the following factors, among others, upon
the frequency of resumption were investigated: (i) the kind of
activity; (2) the phase in which the activity was interrupted;

1 Psychol. Forsch. t 1928, u, 302-379.

SURVEY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS 243

(3) the duration of the interruption; (4) the nature of the act
of interruption; (5) the presence or absence of the uncompleted
task at the end of the interruption; (6) the attitude and char-
acter of the person.

TABLE I 1

Duration of inter-
ruption, minutes

R in

R + TR

per

in per

cent

o to 2

IOO

2 to 4

100

4 to 8

IOO

8 to 20

IOO

20 to 40

IOO

Over 40

Indeterminate

Total

IOO

i Ovsiankma, o/>. a/., Table i, p. 326.

The left half of the table under the heading Cl includes the experiments with interruptions
occurring as though by chance. The right half with the heading ])I lists the experiments
in which the first task was interrupted by asking the subject to do another (disturbing) task.
In the first column the duration of the interruption is given in minutes. The six following
columns show the number of cases of RI (refusal to be interrupted), TR (tendency to
resume), R (resumption), K? (questionable resumption), NR (ronre^mption), and R in
percentage (total percentage of resumptions), according to the duration of interruption. In
calculating the percentage of R, the instances of Rf are counted as one half.

The proof that the resumption (or as the case may be, a
repetition of the activity) fails to occur as soon as the tension
system is discharged by the attainment of the goal is important
for the character of the quasi-needs as tension systems. It is
shown that a substitute satisfaction can have the same effect
and, further, that the presentation of the half-finished work
of another person does not, as a rule, cause a tendency to
completion.

Zeigarnik, On the Retention of Completed and Uncompleted
Activities. 1 Zeigarnik attacks the same problem as Ovsiankina
but with another technique. If a purpose or intention cor-

1 Psychol. Forsch.y 1927, 9, 1-85.

244 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

responds dynamically to a tense system, it is to be expected
that the state of tension of the system should be evident not
only in the tendency to completion of the activity but also,
for example, in its better retention. Zeigarnik finds, indeed,
that memory for uncompleted activities is much better (Table
II). She proves that it is not the shock effect of the inter-
ruption that is the cause of this better retention but rather
the state of the psychical systems involved at the time when the
subject is asked to recall. The influence of the following things,
among others, was investigated in detail: (i) the structure of the
task (an activity with a definite end as against a continuous
activity); (2) interest in the task; (3) the attitude of the subject
toward the experimenter; (4) the differences among children,
adolescents, and adults.

Zeigarnik shows that the tension systems may be destroyed
by sufficiently strong variations of tension in the whole person
(affective variations produced naturally, 'Fable III, and artifi-
cially) ; and that in a fatigued state (owing to the then occurring
fluidity of the systems) no sufficiently stable systems arise.
Zeigarnik attacks the important question of the firmness of
form of nontense systems. (This question is directly investi-
gated in an unpublished work of Kaulina and plays an essential
part in that of Schwarz.) The structure of the more compre-
hensive system totalities is shown to be essential; only when
the single psychological systems are sufficiently separated are
completed activities better remembered than uncompleted.

Birenbaum, On the Forgetting of an Intention. 1 It is shown
that intentions or purposes which correspond to a main task
(or to a central need) are almost never forgotten. With the
less important purposes such, for example, as writing the name
(or the date) on the sheet of paper used for the main task, the
forgetting (nonexecution) depends essentially upon whether
and if so how the system corresponding to the purpose is
imbedded in that of the main task or main goal.

Birenbaum treats of the factors which determine whether a
newly arising system is dynamically a relatively independent

1 PsychoL Forsch., 1930, 13, 218-284.

SURVEY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS 245

TABLE II. 1 THE RATIO OF THE RETAINED UNCOMPLETED TO THE RETAINED
COMPLETED ACTIVITIES ^?

AC-
Rank Order of Subjects

Activities

Arithmetic mean by groups

Rank

Rl r

Subject

RU
RC

- R

RU
RC

Wd.

Be.

3 5

St.

3 3

in.

3 o

9. i

2 I

3 5

< M.

(EU.

6
9

2
3

3
3 o

PI.

s 2

2 5

/Paj.

<> 3

JG,n.

2 O

>Hf.

4 2

2 O

Ft.

10 s

2 O

' Ml.

8 4

2 O

10 8

3 8

I 9

(Dm.

7 4

I 75

J V.

I 75

(Git.

I 75

Dm. E.

8 S I 6

/Ml. R
Jn.

y * 6
6 4

i 5
i 5

/Rm.

l 5

| Old.

i 5

(Ml. E.
< Kur.

12
19

7
II

5
8

I 4
i j

13 3

7 8

S 5

1.4

I (lln.

1 4

(Glk.
25 5 Unk.

16
14

9
8

i 3
I 3

/Gl.
28 <{ Wit.
(Schn.

12
12
IO

6
6

6
6
5

I O
I O
I O

ir 3

5 7

I .0

rSim

I I

0.8

* 5 I 1 F

0.8

9 o

4 o

5 o

0.8

32 1 Sim. H.

o 75

Arithmetic mean

ii . i

6.8

4-25

I 9

2R = number of retained activities.

RU number of retained uncompleted activities.

RC => number of retained completed activities.

RU /RC ratio of retained uncompleted to retained completed activities.

1 Zeigarnik, op. cit., Table r, p. 9.

246

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

RU
TABLE III. 1 -->,- FOR EXCITED SUBJECTS

/vC

Subject

RU
RC

0-75

0.8

III

0.9

0.8

I.O

0-5

Mean

4-3

5-5

0.78

1 Zeigarnik, op. tit.. Table 28, p. 70.

TABLE IV 1

Task

Percent
E

i. Match task A

Before

2. Match task B

100

Critical

3. Match task C

3<i

Task

4. Match task D

5. Match task K

Mean: Tasks i to 5

3<"> ->

0.8

97.6

' I. Favorite poem

Critical

Task

II Draw a pentagon

1 1

III. Write cities

7. II or III or I

i 35

8. Ill or I or II

After

9. Guessing a name

1 6

Critical

10. Word building

Task

n. Outlining a figure

- 7 4

12. Monogram

Mean: Tasks 7 to 12

12.7

5 5

18.8

34-2

E number of subjects who executed intention.
SE number of subjects who subsequently executed intention.

F = number of subjects who forgot intention.

1 Birenbaum, op. cii., Table 2, p. 238. A series of five match tasks (different, but of the
same general character) is followed by one radically different in content (the critical task,
No. 6 above), which is then followed by a heterogeneous series.

SURVEY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS 247

whole or a dependent part of a more comprehensive regional
system. The special structure of the total system and the
degree of its wholeness [Ganzheitlichkeit] (in the sense of a
stronger or weaker dynamic Gestalt) may be to a large extent
experimentally determined by means of the temporal structure
of the event and the internal relations of its content (Table
IV). Under certain circumstances the structure of the total
system may be changed after the event. The tension of the
single systems, as well as the structure of the total system
(and hence the frequency of forgetting) is found to depend,
further, upon the general state of tension and the affective
state of the whole person.

Substitution.

The question of the discharge of the psychical systems
through substitute or compensatory activities forms the chief
problem in the investigation of the following.

Lissncr, The Discharge of Needs by Substitute Activities. 1
Lissner investigated the conditions under which a substitute
activity has dynamic substitute value for the original activity
(Table IVa). The nonresumption of interrupted activities
after the insertion of a substitute activity was used as a criterion
of substitute value (see Chap. VI, page 180). The substitute
value of a difficult performance was found to be considerably
higher than the substitute value of an easier performance
(see page 248). The substitute value increases with the
similarity between the original and the substitute task. The
degree of connection between the systems involved plays a
decisive role. 2 Kopke investigates this question comparatively
on feeble-minded and normal children.

Mahler, Substitute Activities of Different Degrees of Reality. 3
Mahler, with a similar experimental technique, studied the
question of dynamic substitute value especially for substitute

l Psychol. Forsih., 1933, 18, 218-250.
2 LISSNER, op. cit., Table 8, p. 240.
* Psychol. Forsch., 1933, 18, 27-89.

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

**,,. T3 O x C M ni H w <o <u o> *** "?

%11* 3? S * -s|S&.8?

SC 0)^

^uo-^o ^^S^r; ti 55 "> ,2 '**

H r^cl ^ll^s^l^sS;!

^^^ l^|gl|^|l 2

a S ?N l^-^

si:s B|J S

Sa.S 8.i&5.S =5

SURVEY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS 249

activities of varying degrees of reality (thinking; talking; actual
doing) in adults and children (Table V), On the whole,
substitute activities of higher degrees of reality have greater
substitute value. The relation of the substitute act to the
inner goal of the original activity nevertheless remains of
decisive importance. Substitute satisfaction occurs only when
this inner goal is in sufficient degree attained by the substitute
activity (Table VI). Mahler investigates the difference
between problem tasks and realization tasks and shows the
significance of the creation of a socially acknowledged fact
for the degree of reality and the substitute value of the sub-
stitute activity.

TABLE V 1

Tasks not
completed

Tasks completed
by substitution
(subst. = adtng)

Tasks not
completed

Tasks completed
by substitution
(subst. = talking)

24 24

18
RI

12 12

TSR SR~

TSR SR

TSR

Per cent

19 33

58 8

2/? in per
cent

RAN
RAS

2.2

1.6

SR = spontaneous resumption.
TSR * tendency to spontaneous resumption.
RI = resumed after supplementary instruction.
XR = SR -f TSR -f- RI.
RAN = resumption of acts not completed.
RAS = resumption after completion of substitute act.

n * number of cases.

The supplementary instruction (used with subjects that did not spontaneously resume, at
the very end of the experiment, when numbers of both completed and uncompleted tasks
were equally accessible) was as follows: " Now do any one of these tasks." The preference
for uncompleted tasks in response to this neutral instruction provided in these cases a
further criterion for the persistence of the tension.

In the columns TSR, SR, and RI, the figures indicate the total number of cases of resump-
tion of the different kinds, irrespective of whether the same subject showed more than one
kind. In ZR, however, only one resumption of each resumed task is counted for each
resuming subject, even though he may have resumed in more than one way. Consequently
it may happen that SR is less than TSR -f- SR -f RI.
1 Mahler, Table 4, p. 44.

250

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY
TABLE VI 1

Tasks completed

Tasks n(

by substitution:

isks not

by su

)stitution.

completed

Goal of act

completed

Goal

of act

not

attained

TSR

rs/z

I?/

TSR

Per cent

2R in per

cent

RAN

4 6

RAS

* Mahler, Table 6, p. 50.

Success and Failure; Level of Aspiration.

Related to the structure of the psychological systems and
the differences in degree of reality is the experimental work
of the following.

Hoppe, Success and Failure. 1 In spite of the great practical
significance of this problem we have hitherto known very
little about the occurrence of experiences of success and failure
and the laws of their operation. Hoppe shows that the occur-
rence of these experiences is not a simple function of the result
of the activity but depends, among other things, upon the
relation of this result to the momentary level of aspiration
(real and ideal goal) of the person and upon the ascription of
the result of the activity to the self as its own performance.
He shows that these experiences are limited to a rather narrow
zone of difficulty, which is determined essentially by the limits
of the ability of the person. In quite too hard and quite too
easy tasks experiences of success or failure do not occur (Fig.

i).

It is sometimes possible to fix upon different altitudes of
the level of aspiration and to compare them for different persons.
Thus one can investigate the effect of success and failure on the
displacement of the level of aspiration ("real goal," Fig. 2)
and the degree of reality of the ideal goal. These displacements

1 PsychoJ. Forsch., 1930, 14, 1-62.

SURVEY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS 251

of the level of aspiration, the formation of substitute goals, as
well as the tendency to spontaneous interruption after certain

Required

levd Achievemerrr

Zone of task level and level of
aspiration within which expericncies
of success $) and failure g] occur

Much too
difficult

Very difficult -w-

Difticult

Medium

Easy

Very easy

Much too
eoisy

FK,. i. (II op pc, op. cit., Fig. 25, p. 55.)

Limiting zone of
individual's capacity

Real goal

(

1 '

J-

" U

~Ln

Minutes

O Success
Failure

s cessation

I Tendency toward J Spontoneou!
I cessation I H

FIG. 2. (Hoppe. op. cit., Fig. 7, p. 16.)

successes and failures, rest upon a definite conflict situation.
Close relations were found to obtain between the level of
aspiration and the ^^//-consciousness of the individual as a

252 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

social person. Pronounced and apparently very deep-lying
individual differences were found.

Frank, The Effect of the Level of Performance in One Task
on the Level of Aspiration in Another, 1 Individual Differences
in Certain Aspects of the Level of Aspiration, 2 Some Psycho-
logical Determinants of the Level of Aspiration. 3 The level
of aspiration was studied by means of a more objective and
quantitative technique than Hoppe's. It was found that a
shift in the height of the level of performance in one task
causes a shift in the height of the level of aspiration in another
task under certain specified conditions. The relation between
the level of aspiration and the level of performance differs
widely among individuals and seems to represent a reliable and
general personality trait. The height of the level of aspiration
in a given case is a resultant of the tendencies (i) to keep the
level of aspiration as high as possible, (2) to avoid failure, and
(3) to hold the level of aspiration in close agreement with a
realistic estimate of future performance.

Jucknat, Performance and Level of Aspiration. 4 Jucknat
investigated the effect of success and failure in one field upon
the displacement of the level of aspiration in another field.
She uses an essentially improved technique for the diagnosis
of the obtaining level of aspiration. The experiments were
carried out with some hundreds of school children and showed
that success and failure in one field may importantly displace
the level of aspiration in another field, upward or downward.
This presupposes, however, definite dynamic relations between
the two fields and a not too fixed level of aspiration in the
second field,

FajanSj II, Success, Persistence and Activity in the Infant
and the Small Child. 5 Fajans investigated success and failure
in children of from one to four years and in infants of six months
to one year. She found a very considerable displacement o

1 Jour. Ex per. PsychoL, in press.

2 Amcr. J. PsychoL, 1935, 47, 119-129.

3 Amer. J. Psychol. t ig3S, 47, No. 2.

4 PsychoL Forsch., in press.

6 Psychol. Forsch., 1933, 17* 268-305.

SURVEY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS

253

the level of activity of behavior: characterologically rather
passive children can be moved by success to a rather active
kind of behavior and characterologically rather active children
can be reduced by failure to a rather passive kind of conduct.

140

120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40

* -****

x <

1 2 3
Experiment

FIG. 3.

o70

^30
"020

\ >

\
\
\

Vx >

1 2 3

Experiment

FIG. 4.

FIG 3. Comparison of the effects of success, encouragement, substitution
and failure upon the duration of approach [Zuwendungfdauer]. A positively
valent object was hung out of reach of the child: his cfTorts toward it were timed
with a stop watch and are indicated as "duration of approach" upon the ordi-
nates. (Fajans, II, Fig. 7, p. 290.)

Success with concomitant encouragement. Increase in duration of

approach from first to third experiment = 48 per cent.
Success. Increase in duration of approach =25 per cent.

Substitute success. Diminution in duration of approach = 6 per

cent.
+ -f -f + -f Failure. Diminution in duration of approach = 48 per cent.

FIG. 4. Effect of success ( ) and failure ( ) upon the

infant. (Fajans, II, Fig. 2, p. 278.)

Fajans discusses the relation of success and failure to embarrass-
ment and to going-out-of-the-field. It appears that the
attainment of a substitute goal, a consolation, or an encourage-
ment is, for the child, to a rather considerable degree the
equivalent of a genuine success (Fig. 3). The quantitative
results suggest that the attainment of a goal means psycho-
logically something essentially other in the infant (Fig. 4) than

J54 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

in the young child. This circumstance is confirmed and more
explicitly investigated by the following.

Rosen/eld, The Ontogeny of Experiences of Success and
Failure. 1 It is shown in what way the experiences of achieving
and of non-achieving differ from the experiences of success and
failure in children, and how these experiences are related to
different developmental levels. An important factor in the
development of success and failure experiences is the develop-
ment of increasingly differentiated goal structures.

Psychical Satiation.

To be distinguished from the above-described questions on
the dynamics of the tension system is the question of the condi-
tions under which a new tension system spontaneously arises
and how the new goal is related to the earlier goal. This
problem has been attacked in the investigations of the displace-
ment of the level of aspiration. A special problem in this
field is that of psychical satiation.

Karsten, Psychical Satiation. 2 Karsten investigates the
question of how the repeated execution of an act influences
the inclination to execute the act yet again. The technique
is essentially as follows: the subject must do a certain task
repeatedly; he is, however, free to stop as soon as he has enough
of it. Karsten used a group of activities as varied as possible.
By reason of the repetition, an originally positive valence of
the act changes to a negative. Finally the subject tries to
go out of the field. The progressive process of satiation is
evidenced by such typical criteria as variation, dissolution of
the whole (of both perceptual and action unities), inattention,
forgetting. Psychological satiation is shown to be different
from fatigue although fatigue is frequently a symptom of
psychical satiation. The speed of satiation depends, among
other things, upon the structure of the task, upon the state of
tension of the whole person, upon whether the task involved is
of a more peripheral or more central character (both agreeable

1 Psychol. Forsch., in preparation.
* Psychol. Forsch., 1928, 10, 142-254.

SURVEY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS 255

O M Tt- so OO r*

2 1

nj '&>

1 a

en
CJ *o vo -to -to

13
H

OO \O t^ fO ^- to

vO Ov <^ OO O t-^
t~- ON PO OO ^" OO

*o c?

C 10 O o M

2 OO l> ^f vO Tf O

C/}

O^ ^" ^o r^* O ^o

10 ^^ " M *

** en

-S

, t l m

-H 8>

g 10 O O O O O

O M CO fO IH C* CO

- t-t

"^3

C/3

4-
*-

C/3

^00 co vo O vo oo

... m

fell

1*1

M ** O t->. O>

a -

flj C/5

^a s

J3 ^0

*o w

ro "t t -i OO

d d

1 "

is*

tacsu^!

o ^ S % '

illliii

js | &i l

a .S g -

s a^^l a

8 "3

256

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

and disagreeable tasks are comparatively more rapidly satiated
than neutral ones), upon the character of the person.

The problem of the consatiation [Mitsattigung] of neighboring
regions is quantitatively investigated (Table VII) as is also the
effect of variation upon the satiation of the total region (Table
VIII). A condition of satiation is the occurrence of u genuine
repetition." Karsten discusses the conditions under which
satiation, in spite of many repetitions, fails to occur.

Karsten's results are, in addition, an impressive demonstra-
tion of the thesis that repetition by no means always brings
with it an improvement in performance such as would be
expected from the law of association.

Table VIII shows that with increase in amount of activity
necessary to satiate single part regions, the number of part
regions that have to be explicitly satiated in order to satiate
the whole region decreases.

TABLE VIII. 1 SUBJECT GROUP ON THE FIRST DAY

(l)

Rank order

Subject

Number of
explicitly satiated
part regions

Average satiation
time per
part region

3
4
5

Tr.
Ha.

So.

J-
Fa.

3 21 Min. 30 Sec.

21 o Min ^8 Sec

m. .9

Rank order

Subject

Number of
explicitly satiated
part regions

Average satiation
quantum per
part region

Tr.
Ha.

So.

Fa.

3 37 2

28 9

i Karsten, Table 3, p. 217.

SURVEY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS 257

Lange, Action Unities in the Occupations of the Kinder-
garten. 1 Lange investigates the duration of occupations in
children of various ages under the conditions of a Montessori
kindergarten and the various factors which determine the kind
of occupations and cessations of activity.

Problems of the Environment 2

The properties of the psychobiological environment ()
depend, among other things, upon the state of the person (P)
involved [E = f(P, X, Y . . .)]. The valences, especially,
are directly related to the state of the tension systems.

General Topology and Dynamics.

Of especial importance for the structure of the psychological
environment are (i) the topological relations (i.e., the mode of
connections of different regions, the presence of dynamic
barriers, etc.) ; (2) the fields of force (direction and strength
of the forces at the various points of the field) .

Fajans, I, The Significance of Distance for the Strength of
a Valence in Infants and Young Children. 3 Fajans investigates
the special problem of whether the strength of the force cor-
responding to a valence diminishes as the spatial distance
between the valence and the person increases. She used as
subjects infants and preschool children who tried to reach a
goal object from various distances. She compared the duration
of active and passive, direct and indirect, approaches (Fig. 5) .

She found, in the case of the infants, a clear diminution in
the strength of the field forces with increasing distance but no
such diminution (within the investigated distances) with the
preschool children. This difference rests in part upon the
different magnitudes of the life-space at these different ages,
in part on the greater significance of social fields for the older
children. Fajans follows up the metamorphosis of "thing"
[sachlichen] fields into social fields, the structure of the new

1 Psychol. Forsch., in preparation.

2 A somewhat more thorough survey of the results up to the present concerning
environmental forces is found in Chap. III.

* Psychol. Forsch., 1933, 17, 215-267.

258

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

environment in embarrassment, the effect of certain conflict
situations on expression, and other questions. Methodo-
logically important is the development of special criteria
which permit the discrimination of differences in the strength
of driving forces from differences in the firmness of barriers.
Fajans shows that the strength of these restraining forces is a
function of the strength of the driving forces.

"*U

4 8

u 70
c

60
o.

<"50

*6 40

c
.2 30

] 20
Q 10

*--Ai

imlx

?roi

*PP

roc*

?hes

\
s

""*-

'Acf/ve approach

its

^"~~"

9 18 40 100

Distance of the Goal Objec^cm.

FIG. 5. In these experiments with infants a positively valent object was hung
at eye level as the infant sat upon a table at the horizontal distance indicated
from his outstretched hand. The total duration of "active approaches" and
"passive approaches" (visual regard) was measured with a stop watch and is
indicated upon the ordinates. (Fajans, I, Fig. 4, /> 239.)

-ji\ approaches (active and passive).

Active approaches.

Dembo, Anger as a Dynamic Problem. 1 Dembo analyzes
the change in the topology of a situation in which a goal is
unattainable (formation of a dynamic barrier between person
and goal, formation of an outer barrier) and shows the effect
of the obtaining topology on the possible modes of behavior.
The decisive significance of the different degrees of reality,
which are to be represented by a special dimension of the
psychobiological life-space (Fig. 6), becomes clear. Besides
the topology, the field forces, their distribution and their
changes, are investigated. The structure of the fields of force
in the conflict situation is given, its effect on behavior in the

1 PsychoL Forsch., 1931, 15, 1-144.

SURVEY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS 259

level of reality (oscillation, various kinds of going-out-of-the-
field), as well as the tendency to go into the level of unreality
(fantastic solutions). Dembo uses the idea of inducing fields

FIG. 6. S = Subject. (Dembo, Fig. 13, p. 66.)

FIG. 7. The outer barrier embraces not only the field of the task but also the
field ot the struggle with the experimenter. (The task here is to throw rings over
a bottle. The experimenter intentionally provokes the subject by catching the
thrown rings, moving the bottle, etc. The subject immediately takes this up
as a game, which gives him a basis for conducting a struggle with the experi-
menter, a basis which, as mere subject, he did not have.) To this extent, then,
the field of the struggle with the experimenter corresponds to "a special region
of the field of the task." If the subject should succeed continually in getting
the upper hand in the struggle the field of the task, its vectors and its barriers,
would be annulled in so far as these rest upon the field of force of the experimenter.
(Dembo, Fig. 17, p. 82.)

Field of force of the experimenter.

Field of force of the subject.

for the presentation of social power relations and deduces the
occurrence and the forms of the struggle between experimenter
and subject from the nature of these fields (Fig. 7).
She also uses this concept in treating the difficult problems

260

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

related to the spontaneous occurrence of substitute goals
and relates the problem of the substitute goal to that of the
use of tools. Dembo follows in detail the process of destructuri-
zation [Destrukturierung] and homogenization [Homogenisierung]
of the field, which is very significant for the dynamics of anger.
The experimental findings of this investigation form the
essential basis for my analysis of the situation of reward and
punishment (see Chap. IV, page 114).
7

5 Minutes 36 Hours / Week

FlG. 8. RR real tasks retained. RU - unreal tasks retained. (Brown,

Fig- 5. P- I3-)

Reality and Unreality.

Brown, On the Dynamic Properties of the Levels of Reality
and Unreality. 1 Brown tests experimentally the assumption
that the less real levels are dynamically more fluid than the
more real, by investigating the speed of discharge of tense
systems which belong to different levels. He makes use of the
technique of Zeigarnik and compares especially the discharge
of systems which correspond to serious and nonserious tasks.

He finds that tension persists much longer (Fig. 8) in the
former, that they thus correspond to dynamically less fluid
media. A special experimental arrangement shows that
attention or intensity in the execution of the task does not
determine this effect.

The question of the differences between levels of reality and
unreality also plays a role in the already mentioned works of
Lissner and Mahler.

l Psychol. Forsch., 1933, 18, 1-26.

SURVEY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS 261

Sliosberg, On the Dynamics of Play. 1 Sliosberg investi-
gates the problem of substitution especially in the play of the
child. It is found, among other things, that the substitute
value of an object or an action depends essentially upon
whether the child is in a play or in a serious situation. The
question is discussed whether the close connection between

Acfion Toward The Stranger
100

40
30
20
10

3210

Strengths of the Field

Abscissae represent percent of cases m which fhe different kinds
of act/ on occur erf the different strengths of fhe fie/d

J- Listen to 4-<Smilmg at 7~ Express wishes 10 -Stay ing near ft- Show off
2' Look at S-Speak/ngfo 8~ Give or throw ) '/- Personal 'questions 14' Make demand
3'Turning 6 -Address to 9- Bodily contact ^-Demonstrate ability 15- Affective reaction

reality and unreality which determines the child's magical
view of the world (Piaget) is also determinative for the satis-
faction of his needs.

Social Fields.

Wiehe, The Behavior of the Child in Strange Fields. 2 Wiehe
investigates the significance of a special social field for the
behavior of children. The children, sometimes alone, some-
times in the presence of the mother, are brought into a strange

1 Psychol. Forsch., 1934, 19, 122-181.

2 In preparation.

262

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY
TABLE IX. 1 ACTION TOWARD THE STRANGER

Degree of the strengths of the social field

Behavior

N * 21

N 38

N = 59

.V = 52

N = 51

N = 22

I. Listen to

unh

100 %

IOO %

o sh

une

2. Look at

unc

oem

unh

IOO

v w

une

3. Turn bodily toward

o
o

20
o

30
40

o st

oem

unh

IOO

100

o sh

4. Smile at

unc
c

oem

s un

IOO

100

o sh

5. Speak to

oem

s un

IOO

unc

6. Address to

i
d

oem

s un

IOO

v we

7. Express wishes

unc

IOO

oem

100

IOO

o sh

8. Give or throw some-

unc

thing

oem

s un

100

IOO

o sh

unc

9. Make bodily contact

10
10

sub

oem

s un

IOO

SURVEY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS 263
TABLE IX. 1 ACTION TOWARD THE STRANGER. (Continued)

Degree of the strengths of the social field

Behavior

N - 21

N = 38

N - 59

ff - 52

N - 51

AT - 22

100%

60%

40%

20%

o sh

10. Stay nearby

unc

oem

s un

IOO

1 1 Ask personal ques-

tions

unc

s un

IOO

unc

12. Demonstrate ability

sub

oem

s un

IOO

une

1 3 Show off

unc

oem

s un

100

IOO

o sh

v we

14 Make demands

aff

oem

s un

IOO

v we

o sh

I "> Affective reactions

oem

50
o

o
o

s un

a = absent.

aff = connected with affections.
c = confident,
d = discretely,
he = hesitancy.

i = indirect,
oem = overemphasized,
o sh = overshort.

st = only starting.

1 Wiehe, in preparation.

E personal.
= substitute activity,
s un socially unhindered,
unc = uncertain,
une = unemphasized.

up = impersonal.
v we = very weak,
we = weak,
wo = doing with emphasis.

room, or a strange person appears in the child's home. Wiehe
distinguishes six different degrees of strength of this strange
field. The degree of strength is, apart from individual charac-
teristics of the child and of the strange person, a function of
the spatial distance of the strange person, of the duration of
his presence, and of his conduct. It is possible to correlate the
different degrees of the strength of the field with definite modes

264

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

of behavior of the child. Surprisingly marked quantitative
lawful relations resulted (Table IX). The strongest pressure
was expressed by the child's becoming motionless; crying and
the tendency to run away, where possible to the neighborhood
of the mother or into another field where the child feels itself
more at home, correspond to a weaker degree of pressure (Fig.
9). The other activities of the child also showed, with great
regularity, an inhibited character under high pressure of
strangeness and an overexcited or overemphasized character
under somewhat weaker pressure. Only a further reduction
of pressure led to natural free behavior.

Structure and State of the Whole Person

Nearly all the investigations described above have also
contributed somewhat to the problem of the state and structure
of the whole person. Zeigarnik showed the dependence of the
single tension upon the fatigue (Table X) and affectivity of
the whole person. Birenbaum showed their dependence upon
the state of tension (Table XI) of the whole person. In
Karsten's investigation the stratification [Geschichtetheit] of the

TABLK X

,- FOR FATKIUKI) SUBJECTS

Subject

tfC'

/tt r
RC

1.2 (5) 2

("HO

( 5 u)

0.98 (i)

o-75

0-75 (1-75)

1 1

057

05 (1.66)

o-5

o-5 (1.5)

Mean

8.7

3-0

0.74

1 Zeigarnik, Table 25, p. 66.

s The numbers in parentheses indicate the re-suits of the experiment with the same subjects
in the fresh condition six months previously.

SURVEY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS 265

whole person and the significance of the more central and more
peripheral inner psychological strata for the process of satiation
became clear. Hoppe, Fajans, and Jucknat treat of the
relation between experiences of success and failure and the
state and character of the whole person.

TABLE XI 1

7 Subjects

The same seven sub-

(naive-excited) :

jects instructed

Activity

basic experiment

for speed

i. Match task...

TOO

2. Draw a pentagon .

3. Write cities. . .

IOO

4. Guess a name. .

IOO

5. Word building

IOO

6. Poem. ...

7. Outline

8. Names of scholars with one

initial

IOO

9. Monogram

Mean ...

3- 2

i-5

2.2

6-3

O.I

0.6

90S

E = executed intention.
SE = subsequently executed intention.

F = forgotten intention.
* Birenbaum, Table 10, p. 271.

Experimental Simplification of the Structure of the Person:
Regression.

The above-mentioned investigation of Dembo on anger goes
more extensively into the problems of the whole person and of
the change in its structure. Anger, for example, can show itself
in extraordinarily different, indeed in opposed, ways. Dembo
investigates the different kinds of pure emotional expression
and emotional behavior, the criteria of emotional intensity,
and the dynamics of emotional outbursts. The functional
firmness of the boundaries of the strata between the inner
psychical systems and the environment is of decisive signifi-

266

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

cance. The paradoxical circumstance, that superficial emotions
lead more readily to emotional expression than the more serious
ones, is explained (Figs. 10 and n).

FlG. 10. Structure of the psychological environment and the person in super-
ficial emotion. (Dembo, Fig. 18, p. 109.)

Dembo follows the change in the finer structure of the person
with increasing affective tension, and the displacement of the
chief boundary between the inner psychical systems and

Pic. n. Structure of the psychological environment and the person in deeper
lying emotion. (Dembo, Fig. 19, p. no.)

the environment with special reference to the motorium. The
results on de-differentiation, that is, on the changes of the
person in the direction of a more primitive, a dynamically

SURVEY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS 267

less differentiated unity, seem to me of especial significance.
This process goes hand in hand with the simplification [Primi-
tivierung] of the structure of the environment and is of decisive
significance for emotional outburst. There result essential
common features between the world picture [Welibild] of the
affectively de-differentiated adult and that of the still relatively
un-differentiated child. The dynamic homogeneity of the
child and the difference in its whole person in emotion and
in fatigue are discussed.

Menstruum and Intermenstruum.

Freund, On Satiation in and between Menstrual Periods. 1
Freund investigated the influence of the menstrual and inter-
menstrual periods on the speed of satiation for certain tasks.
Because of the great individual differences the same subjects
were investigated in both conditions. There resulted a very
marked difference in the speed of satiation, which held indeed
without exception for every individual (Fig. 12). This differ-
ence in inclination is the more noteworthy since there occurred
no regular difference in speed or quality of performance when
the same subjects were set definitely limited tasks of the same
sort.

Psycho pathology .

Some not very systematically executed experiments on
psychopathic children seem to show that certain types of these
children are more rapidly satiated than normal children of the
same age. 2

It may be of interest, as an example of our way of work, that
these individual differences in speed of satiation, as well as the
difference in the behavior of the same person in different condi-
tions (during and between menstruation) and, finally, the
difference between peripheral and central tasks, may be deduced
in unitary fashion.

1 Psychol. Forsch., 1930, 13, 198-217.

2 Cf. Lewin, Trieb- und Affektausserungen psychopathischer Kinder (Motion
pictures of psychopathic children compared with normal and feeble-minded
children), Zeitschr. f. Kindcrforsch., 1926, 32, 414-447.

268

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

The dynamic concepts (such as degree of structuredness,
fluidity, state of tension) which resulted from investigations
of the general laws form the foundation of the experimental
study of the feeble-minded and the psychopathic child.

Feeble-mindedness .

Kopke. Kopke found essential differences between normal
and feeble-minded children in regard to the substitution value
of substitute activities (see Chap. VI, page 180).

Satiation
Time

Satiation
Quantum

1 1 3
Experiment

2 3

Experiment

019
018
0.17
016

"B 014
8 0.13
% 0.12

S-o.io

_ 009
E 008
13 0.07
0.06
005
004
0.03
0.02
001

Speed
of Work

yS-

a
3
5^

4
I

i/U?

Quality
of Work

1 2
Experiment

.br Mf seven different tasks

values for the mean of all tasks

FIG. 12. (Frtund, Fig. 6, p. 214.)

1 2 3

Experiment

Erfurthj Saathop, and Wohrmann. Erfurth, Saathop, and
Wohrmann investigated the speed of satiation in normal
and feeble-minded children. On the basis of these experiments
it is possible to determine more precisely the dynamic charac-
teristics of a certain type of feeble-mindedness (see Chap. VII,
page 194). As we noted above, one finds special determinations
on individual differences in nearly all the researches of the
series.

SURVEY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS 269

Modes of Execution, Perceptual and Cognitive Structure
of the Environment

In conclusion three works should be mentioned which do not
fit well into the selected grouping. These investigations center
about problems for which the nature of the stratum between the
inner psychical systems and the physical environment is chiefly
determinative, the stratum to which one may refer the motor
tasks [Ausfuhrungshandlung[ and the processes of perception.
Since these questions are closely related to problems of which
one usually thinks in speaking of experience in learning, a few
words on our general position toward the problem of "expe-
rience" should precede discussion of these investigations.

The results of the investigation of the fundamental law of
association 1 are sometimes misinterpreted to mean that I
hold "experience" to be unimportant. The articles on satiation,
on the effect of success and failure, on lapses in relearning,
among others, show that such a conception is far removed from
my view. It is only that the effect of experience cannot be
sufficiently characterized by means of the concept of asso-
ciation. The effect of experience always consists in the fact
that a person (P), upon the repetition of a situation, reacts
not in the same way but in another way than that in which he
reacted the preceding time. If the behavior (B) is really in
both cases the same, it means that the person has remained
unchanged. (Thus if B = B> 2 and Ei = />, P\ must equal P*
in accordance with the general law: P = f(BE)). The effect
of experience is always a change of the person or of the psycho-
logical meaning of the environment. A theory of experience
can consist only in a determination of the various possible
changes in the structure of the person, of the environment, and
of the forces dominating that environment. I am inclined
to doubt that a unitary theory of the whole field of these changes
in terms of experience is possible.

1 LEWIN, "Das Problem der Willensmessung und das Grundgesetz der
Assoziation." Psychol. Forsch., 1922, i, 191-302; 1922, 2, 65-140.

270 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

Schwarz, On Relapses in Re-learning, I and II. 1 Building
upon the negative findings of my investigation of association,
Schwarz attempted to formulate, on the newly found basis,
the conditions under which a change in a repeatedly executed
task presents difficulties and to determine what the nature of
the errors occurring under these conditions might be. Schwarz
distinguishes between errors of confusion and errors of relapsing.
He separates the question of the momentary source of the
energy for the execution of the task from the form of its expres-
sion and especially from its dependence upon constraining
forces. He finds that the two kinds of error are dynamically
of essentially different nature. Both occur only when, in the
learning process, systems of quite definite form have been
built up and have also become sufficiently rigid. He treats
in detail the question of action unities, their different forms,
their genesis, and their change; he further discusses the signifi-
cance of the valences for the execution of the task.

Forer, An Investigation of the Decroly Method of Learning
Reading. 2 Forer compares the retention of children from
five to six years old for single letters, words, and sentences.
She investigates their memory for (i) these written forms of
different extent; for (2) their significance; and for (3) the coordi-
nation of written form and significance. In general, it is shown
that a group of relatively heterogeneous written forms and
meanings is more easily learned than a homogeneous group.
The written form of a sentence and of a word are about equally
well, that of a letter a little better, retained. But the meaning
of a word and the meaning of a sentence are very much better
retained than letters; further, words referring to things are
better retained than words referring to activities or to proper-
ties. The spatial juxtaposition of the written form and the
related object constitutes an essential advantage for the
retention of children in contrast to that of adults. This differ-
ence seems to me to be related to the magical world picture of
the child in that, at this age, the written forms designate objects
and not concepts.

^Psychol, Forsch., 1923, 2, 86-158, and 1933, 18, 143-190.
*Zcitschr.ftir Kinderforsch. t 1933, 42, 11-44,

SURVEY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS 271

Voigt, Precision of Direction at a Distance. 1 Voigt treats
the problem of the steering of the execution of a task by the
perceptual field. His subjects shot with a light-pistol, without
taking aim, at targets of various kinds and at varying distances.
He found that within certain distances the angular precision
of the shooting increased with the distance of the target (Fig.
13). Voigt investigates exhaustively the dependence of these

120

.2 100

Is 80
| 60

J5 *

g> 20
<

_ V

i ~ *,

*>,

Tin

8 15 2530 60

Distance, m.
FIG. 13. (Voigt, Fig. 16, p. 91.)

100

results upon the structure of the perceptual field and upon the
motor apparatus used (shooting with the right hand, the left
hand, and with both hands). He demonstrates the signifi-
cance of the motor field [Ilandlungsfeld], which embraces in
unitary fashion the person and the goal. Voigt also goes into
the question of the learning of that sort of activity.

SURVEY OF THK EXPERIMENTALLY HANDLED PROBLEMS IN TERMS OF

TRADITIONALLY USED KEY WORDS
(The names of authors treating a given topic most exhaustively are printed in

italics.)

Schwarz (wholeness), Voigt (steering), Zeigarnik
and Ovsiankina (kinds). On dynamics see
Need, Emotion, etc.

Zeigarnik, Karsten, Ovsiankina, Hoppe, Fajans,
II, Dembo.

Karsten, Dembo, Fajans, I and II, Schwarz,
Wiehe.

Zeigarnik, Ovsiankina, Karsten, Schwarz, Freund.
Brown.

Ovsiankina, Hoppe, Dembo, Fajans, I and II,
Wiehe.

Action, activity (Handlung)

Anger ('Arger)

Attention (Aufmerksamkeit)
Attitude (Einstellung)
Character (Charakler)

1 Psychol. Forsch.j 1932, 16, 70-113.

272

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

Compensation
Conflict (Konjtikt)

Depth (Tiefe)

Development (Entwickelung)
I^mbarrassment
(Verlegenheit)
Emotion (A/ekt)

Experience (Rrjahrung)
Failure (Misserfolg)
Fantasy (Phantaiie)
Fatigue (Ermudung)
Force (Kraft)
Gestalt (Gestalt)
Gesture (Geste)
Goal (Ziel)

Habit (Gcwohnheit)

Hallucination

(II all uzi nation)
Ideal (Ideal)
Instrument (Wcrkzeug)

Individual differences

(Individ ltd Ic Untcnthirdc)
Intention (Absicht)

Lapse (Riickfall)

Learning, relearning, forget-
ting (Lcrncn, Umlernen,
Verlcrncn)

M e mo ry (Gedacht n is)

Need (Beditrfnis)

Perception (Wahrnehmung)
Persistence (A usdauer)
Person, structure of the

whole person (Person,

Struktur der Gesamt person)
Play (Spiel)
Problems of child psychology

(Kinder psychologische

Problem*)

See Substitute.

Ovsiankina, Zeigarnik, Karsten, Birenbaum,

Hoppe, Dembo, Jucknat, Fajans, I and II,

Rosenfeld, Schwarz, Wiehe.

Lewin and Sakuma, Voigt.

See Problems of child psychology.

Fajans, II, Karsten, Jucknat.

Zeigarnik, Karsten, Ovsiankina, Birenbaum,
Hoppe, Fajans, II, Dembo, Freund, Wiehe.
See Learning, Satiation, Success.
See Success.
Zeigarnik, Dembo.
Dembo, Brown, Hoppe, Mahler.
See Structure of environment, Conflict.
See Whole, unity

Fajans, II, Hoppe, Dembo. See also Unreality.
Hoppe, Dembo, Jucknat (ideal and real goal,
level of aspiration), Mahler (inner and outer goal
of action), Karsten.

Lewin (measurement of the will), Schwarz, Kar-
sten, Freund, Jucknat, Hoppe.
Dembo.

Hoppe, Jucknat, Dembo. See also Unreality.
Dembo (substitute), Voigt (steering), Hoppe
(ascription of the effect).

Kopke (feeblemindedness), Zeigarnik, Ovsian-
kina, Karsten, Fajans, II, Freund.
Voigt (significance for steering). See also Pur-
pose, Need.
See Habit.
Schwarz, Voigt, Forer, Karsten.

Lewin (measurement of the will), Zeigarnik,
Schwarz, Birenbaum, Jucknat, Brown, Forer.
Zeigarnik, Ovsiankina, Birenbaum, Hoppe, Kar-
sten, Mahler, Rosenfeld, Jucknat, Lissner,
Freund, Lewin (measurement of the will).
See Depth.

Karsten, Hoppe, Freund, Birenbaum.
Dembo, Kopke, Karsten (stratification) Freund,
Hoppe. See also Individual differences, Prob-
lems of child psychology.
Dembo, Schlossberg. See also Unreality.
Zeigarnik, Ovsiankina, Fajans, I and II, Mahler,
Wiehe, Rosenfeld, Jucknat, Forer.

SURVEY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS 273

Purpose (Vornahme)

Reading (Lesen)
Reality (Realitdt)
Restlessness (Unruhe)
Satiation

(Psychische Sdttigung)
Satisfaction (Befriedigung)
Self -consciousness

(Selbstbewusstsein)
Self-control

(Selbstbeherrschung)
Skill (Geschkklichkeit)
Social relations

(Sociale Beziehungen)
Structure of environment

( Umweltstruklur)

Struggle (Kampf)
Substitute (Ersatz)

Success (Erfolg)
Superstition (Aberglauben)
Unreality (Irrcalitat]

Valence

(A HJforderungscharakter}
Whole, unity (Ganzhcit]

Will (Witte)
World, concept of
(Weltbild)

Zeigarnik, Ovsiankina, Birenbaum, Brown,

Hoppe.

Forer.

See Unreality.

See Emotion, Conflict, Satiation.

Karsten, Freund.

See Need.

Hoppe, Fajans, II, Jucknat.

See Conflict, Emotion, Success.

Voigt, Schwarz.

Dembo, Wiehe, Hoppe, Jucknat, Fajans, I and II.

Voigt (connection with steering), Forer, Dembo
(concept of the world), Zeigarnik, Ovsiankina,
Fajans, I (environmental forces), Zeigarnik,
Hoppe, Fajans, II (topology). See also Conflict,
Social relations.
Dembo, Wiehe, Karsten.

Zeigarnik, Ovsiankina, Birenbaum, Iloppe,
Dembo, Mahler, Jucknat, Fajans, II.
Dembo, Hoppe, Fajans, I and II, Jucknat.
Dembo.

Brown, Dembo, Fajans, II, Mahler, Hoppe,
Forer, Schlossberg.

Ovsiankina, Karsten, Dembo, Fajans, I (and
distance). See also Conflict, Need
Voigt (visual wholeness and performance),
Forer (differentiation of word and meaning),
Birenbaum, Zeigarnik (wholeness, unity of ten-
sion systems), Dembo (structure of the whole
person). See also Success, Substitute.
See Purpose, Need, Conflict.
Forer, Dembo, Hoppe. See also Unreality.

INDEX OF NAMES

Ach, N., 43, 45, 239
Adams, D. K., 100
Adler, A., 66, 72, 100, 142
Alverdes, F., 69

Aristotle, i, 2, 5-9, n, 12, 14, 26, 27,
34

Bacon, F., 6, 7, 9, 20

Bartelt, 50

Baiimer, 143

Beck, S. J., 221, 223, 224, 229

Binet, A., 195, 220, 225, 232

Birenbaum, G., 126, 168, 212, 244,

246, 264, 265, 271-273
Blanchard, M. B., 67
Bogen, H , 83
Brown, J. F., 103, 145, 208, 224,

241, 260, 271-273
Bruno, G., 6, 10
Buhler, C., 74, 75, 91, 164, 228
Buhler, K., 70, 105
Burks, B. S., 67
Busemann, A., 67, 68

Cassirer, E., 4, 100
Coghill, G. E , 107
Conrad, H. S., 67
Crozier, W. J., 73

Decroly, O. J., 168, 194, 270

Dembo, T., 95, 102, 103, 115, 160,
174, 181, 192, 214, 218, 236, 240,
241, 258-260, 265, 266, 271-273

Dexler, 50

Dohme, A., 140, 144, 146

Drosches, 143

Eliasberg, W., 196
Erfurth, 268

Fajans, S., 74, 80, 85, 80, 88-90,
94, 100, 101, 115, 144, 182, 241,
252, 253, 257, 258, 2(15, 271-273

Faraday, M., 10

Forcr, S., 270, 272, 273

Frank, J , 252, 272, 273

Frankcl, F., 45

Freeman, F N , 67

Freud, S , 22, 180, 181, 242

Freund, A., 198, 267, 268

Galileo, i, 10, 26, 29, 33

Gesell, A., 67

Goethe, J W , 173

Gottschaldt, K , 186, 189, 205, 213

Green, G. H., 108

Grisch, in

Hauck, E., 67

Hegel, G. W. F., 172

Hermann-Cziner, A., 50

Hetzer, H., 75, 106

Homburger, A., 72, 91, 113, 125,

146
Hoppe, F., loo, 115, 150, 160, 174,

214, 241, 250-252, 265, 271-273
Huang, I., 105

276 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

Jaensch, E. R., 104, 229

James, W., 56, 108

Jennings, H. S., 69

Joel, E., 45

Jones, H. E., 67

Jucknat, 101, 252, 265, 272, 273

Karsten, A., 18, 85, 198, 200, 254-256,

264, 271-273
Katz, D., 78, 104, 108
Katz, R., 104, 108
Kaulina, 244
Kepler, J., 10

Koffka, K., 24, 70, 1 68, 191, 232, 268
Kdhler, W., 24, 48, 53, 58, 83, 102, 107,

152, 168, 192, 195, 215, 218, 240
Kopke, 185, 202, 204, 211-213, 241,

247, 268, 271-273
Kramer, 71
Kiigelgen, W. von, 126, 139, 140

Montessori, M., 94, 96, 171, 172,

177, 256
Morgan, 225
Miiller, G. E., 43
Murchison, Carl, 66

Ovsiankina, M., 60, 183, 202, 242,
243, 271-273

Peters, W., 229, 233

Piaget, J., 104, 105, 146, 191, 261

Pintner, R., 237

Poincar6, H., 33

Poppelreuter, W., 45, 55

Rohrschach, H., 221, 223, 224, 229
Rosenfeld, M., 241, 254, 272, 273
Rubin, E , 40
Rupp, H , 219

Lange, 256

Lau, E. G., 50, 64, 74, 86

Lazar, 103, 186, 205

L6vy-Bruhl, L., 8

Lewin, K., 5, n, 17, 24, 31, 44, 45,
48, 65, 68, 75-78, 80, Si, 83, 89,
90, 93, 94, 96, 97, 102, 104, 106-
108, 117, 148, 197, 206, 215, 227,
239, 240, 267, 269, 272

Lipmann, O., 83

Lissner, K., 184, 202, 203, 212, 241,
247, 248, 260, 272, 273

Loeb, J., 69, 73, 78

Mach, E., 10, 27

Mahler, V., 190, 202, 241, 247, 249,

250, 260, 271-273
McDougall, W., 45

Saathop, 268

Sakuma, K., 48, 239, 272, 273

Schurz, K., 143

Schwarz, G., 244, 270-273

Selz, O., 45

Simon, T., 195

Sliosberg, S, 105, 191, 241, 261,

^72, 273
Sommer, R , 5
Stern, C , 104
Stern, W., 66, 67, 70, 94, 104, 107

Taine, H., 66
Terman, L. M., 204
Thorndike, E. L., 84
Tolman, E. C., 77
Tolstoy, L. N., 146

INDEX 277

U Wertheimer, M., 24, 30, 168

Wiehe, F., 80, 99, no, 241, 261-263,
Ucko, 96, 115, 272, 273 271-273

von Uexkull, 73, 77 Winkler, 144

Wohrmann, 268
V Wolf, K., 75

w . n Wundt, W., 15

Voigt, G., 271-273 ' D

W Z

Wallin, J. E. W., 225 Zappert, J., in

Watson, J. B., 66, 72 Zeigarnik, B., 60, 185, 212, 240, 241

Weiss, G., 75, 87, 205 243-246, 260, 264, 271-273

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Achievement, inadequacy of concepts

of, iQ5
Action wholes, development of in child,

i73
Adult, authority of, 176

struggle against, 138, 141144
example of, i47f.
flattery and deceit as forms of, 143
relation to adult's field of power,

i4if.

Aff activity, 264
Age of defiance, io2f., no

dynamic explanation of, i63f.
Aha-experience in feeble-minded, 196,

222

"Almost" situation, 86f.
Ambiguous figures, 195, 221
Anger, 258, 260

relation of substitute activity to, 260
Anthropomorphism, 2, 28
" Arrangement," as evasion of barrier,

142

Artistic expression, 178
Aspiration, level of, 100, 205, 250-254
as affected by performance in

another task, 252
relation to substitute activity, 185

to success and failure, 250
satisfaction of feeble-minded with

lower level of, 205
Association, 43, 269, 270
law of, 239

not a cause of psychical events, 44f.
relation to will, 239
theory, 43ff.

Average, contrast with the concrete
situation, 68

Barrier, acquisition of negative valence

by, 89f., 134
in interest situation, 119
properties of, firmness, 127

reality of, 128, 160
in punishment situation, i23ff.
punishment situations lacking in,

130-133

representation of, 126
task, as, 122, 154
types of, physical-corporeal, 1 26
sense of honor, 127
sociological, i26f.
Behavior, as function of environment

and person, 71-73, 79
Boundaries, firmness of, s8tT.

functional weakness of, in young
child, 169

Classification, 4, 238

abstract, 4, 15

contrast with constructive method,
238

dichotomous, 4, 10

functional, 5

Command (sec Punishment; Reward)
Compensation (see Substitution)
Comprehension, relation to differentia-
tion of the person, 232-236
Concepts, 8

Aristotelian, 2ff.

classificatory, 4f., 238

conditional-genetic, 1 1

constructive, 238, 241

dynamic, 27, 35ff., 40, 46ff.

of energy, 46

Galileian, 9*!.

279

280

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

Concepts, gcnotypic, n

historic-geographic, 8, 9, 19, 30

phenotypic, n

in transition, 22

valuative, 2, 3
Conflict, definition of, 88

types of, 88-91, 123
Constraint, 161

in punishment situation, 128-133
Convergence, theory of, 66
Coupling (see Association)
Creativeness, relation to level of
unreality, 224f.

Daydreams, 190

example of, 146
Deception, 125, 140, 143

difficulty of, in feeble-minded, 217
Defiance, i44f

age of, dynamic explanation, i63f.
Despair, 94
Determination, intrinsic, 28(1., 38f.

by whole situation, 36!!., 49
Detour, 154

relation to field forces, 82f.
Devaluation, of adult's ideology, 137
Development, of the person, 209-215,

236-238

Differentiation of psychical systems,
relation of rate to material
property of mobility, 220
Direction, 81-85
Discipline, 144, 176
Distance, psychological, dependence

of valence on, 86f., 257f.
functional determination of, 86
Division of personality, 207
Domination, of child by adult, 1311!.,

142

Dreams, iO3f, 145.
Drives, 15, 38

(See also Tension system)

Ego, stabilization of, 164
Eidetic images, 104

Embarrassment, 90, 258
relation to failure, 253
Emotional outburst, 145-152, 218,

2651.

Encouragement, 253
Encysting, 94, i44f.
Energy, 46, 5of.

relation to force, 48, 239
sources of, 43-65
Enuresis, in, 146, 164
Environment, psychological, relation

to individual and law, 7ofT.
statistical investigation of, 67
structure of, 73-80, 269

dependence on momentary state of

person, 76
(See also Field)

Equilibrium, tendency toward, 58f.
Exactness, 2, 10, 16
Experimental investigations, survey

of, 239-273

Experimental techniques (see Inter-
ruptured activity, resumption of)

Failure, 150, 250-253

conditions determining, 25off.
effect of consolation, 101

on duration of action, 101
relation to difficulty of task, 251

(Sec aho Success)
Fantasy, 74, 76, 104, 178, 259
Fatigue, effect on tension in system,

264
Feeble-minded, concreteness in, 222

225

differentiation and mobility of com-
prehension, 232-236
dynamic theory of, structure of,

209-238

comparison with normal, repre-
sentation of, 210
degree of differentiation, 209
material properties, 209f.
experimental methods, selection of,

i97f.

experimental results, satiation, 198-
202

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

281

Feeble-minded, experimental results,

satiation, course of, 200
"either-or" behavior, 201, 216
secondary actions, 2oof.
technique, 198
total vs. part satiation, 199
resumption of interrupted action,

substitute value, 202-206
technique, 202
variation in similarity of sub-

stitute action, 204
formulation of experimental prob-

lem. 196-198
infantilism, 225-227

relation of rate of differentiation

to material properties, 226
intelligence defects (see Intelligent

activity)
lack of graded transitions of dy-

namic connections in, 215
material properties and psychical

environment, 215-218
material properties of systems and

formation of wholes, 2i4f.
pedantry and fixation of goals, 2iof.
relation to development of strong

Gestalts, 222f.

to lack of differentiation, 223
to level of unreality and lack of

imagination, 223
to smaller degree of differentia-

tion, 225
to undeveloped level of unreality,

223

senile dementia, earlier cessation of
differentiation in feeble-minded,

237

substitute value, paradoxes of, 21 iff.
dependence of, on dynamic con-

nections of task, 215
susceptibility to influence, 227-232
dependence on field conditions,

test approach, its inadequacy, 195

theory of, in application, 185-238

whole personality involved, i94f.

Field, psychological, difference from

objective situati9n, 75!.

Field, functional determination of,

direction in, 84
problems of, 257-264
reorganization (transformation) of,
in feeble-minded, 219-222

in intellectual tasks, 152

insight as, i95f.

on plane of unreality, 150

in prohibition situation, 160

relation to differentiation of the
person, 232-236

role of directed forces in, 196

topological representation of, 1 1 7f.
Field of force, 80-103, 257!!.
convergent field, 9 if.
definition of, 91 f.
illustration of, 92f.
influence on development, 66-113
social, 97, 102, i75f., 261-264
Flattery, 140, 143, 154, 157
Forces, 48

constraining, 81, 239, 258
dependence on valences, 88
driving, 81, 239, 258
environmental (field), 77-113

definition of, 79
fundamental properties of, 80-88

direction, 81-85

strength of, 85-88
relation to energy, 48

to needs, 5of.
Freedom of movement, dependence

on sphere of power, 99
restriction of, 93, 126, i28f., 155

in prohibition, 163

relation to constraint, 1 28ff.

Genotype, n
Gestalt, 240

contrast with summative conglomer-
ate, 1 68
strong, 206, 215, 247

relation of, to degree of differen-
tiation of person, 221
theory, 240

282

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

Gesture, 103, 145, 174, 178, 190
in feeble-minded, 205
"gesture children," iH6
"Global" method of reading and

writing, 168

Goal, distinction between inner and
outer, between "real" and
"ideal," 2501.

in relation to substitute activity, 190
striving toward, 81

(See also Valence)
Going-out-of-the-field, 190
in anger, 259
encysting as, 144
prevention of, by barrier, 125
in punishment situation, i24f.
relation to failure, 253^
suicide as, 140
types of, 90

Habit, 44fT.

Heredity and environment, 71

Homogeni/ation, 10, 22, 24

Ideology, 103, 105, 127, 132

relation to level of unreality, 145
transformation of, i37f., 145, 156,
162

Imagination, 145

lack of, in feeble-minded, 223^
relation to level of unreality, 223^

Imbedding, 54, 178, 244

transformation of interest by, 166-
169

Impudence, 145

Independence, 145
of decision, 17 if.

Individual differences, relation of, to
dynamic theory of the person, 194
to general law, 73, 241

Inducing fields, 192, 259

Induction, 97-100
of child's goals by adult, 175!.
of valence, 192

Infantilism, 188, 225-227

of psychopathic types, 227
Inferiority, feeling of, 100
Ink-blot figures, 221
Insight, definition of, 196

difference in, between feeble-minded
and normal, 196, 2i8ff.

nature of, as reorganization, 1951.
Intellectual tasks, solution of, 150
Intelligence quotient, dynamic theory

of constancy of, 226f.
Intelligence testing, limitations of,

i95, iQ7
Intelligent activity, defects of, in

feeble-minded, 218-222
similarity of, in normal and feeble-
minded, 196
theory of, 196

Intention, forgetting of, 244-247
Interest, genuine transformation of,

166-170

interest situation, 118-120
natural vs. artificial, nsf.
Interrupted activities, resumption of,

Law, concept of, 5

general validity of, 9, 23, 31
relation to individual differences,

70-73
to individual and environment,

Lawfulness, 5, 375.

criteria of, 6, 7, 14, 15, 26
exceptions, 17, 19, 24
frequency, 7, 14

of individual event, 5, 11-13, l &

statistical character of, 7
Level of aspiration (see Aspiration)
Life-space, 14

dependence upon temporal displace

ment of goals, 1 73
structure of, in levels of varying
reality, 178

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

283

Life-time, extension of, in child, 172-

174
Locomotion, psychological, 61

Magical features of child's world, 127,

146, 175, 230, 261, 270
Means, 102

Memory (see Retention)
Milieu, 67, 68, 71

Mobility of psychical systems, 2i8ff.
Montesson system, i7iff., 177
Moral disgrace, 138
Morality, 145
Motor actions,

Need, 50, 73, 74

environmental structure and, 73-80

(See also Tension system)
Negativism, iO2f., no, i63f.

Obedience, i 76

Obstinacy, in feeble-minded, 2 1 7

Pedantry, 109
definition of, 210
in feeble-minded, 204, 2iof.
in normal child, 22gf.
Perception, 239^, 269

role in guidance of action, 5 if.
Persistence, in feeble-minded and

normal, 200
and rigidity of will in feeble-minded,

204
Person, conditions determining tension

in, 264f.
dependence upon historical factors,

209
development of structure of, 1075.

2095., 2362.
differences, in content of meaning

of the systems, 209
in structure, 2o6f.

Person, dynamic theory of, 180-187,

206-209
material differences (ease of change

of structure), 207
representation of, 208
relation to problem of individual

differences, 194, 206
simplification of structure of, 265^
states of tension, 208

conditions determining tensions

in, 208
difference of, in different regions

of, 208

stratification of, 265^
structure of, in child, 107!!.
Play, 103, losf.

distinction between play and serious

situations, 191
dynamics of, 261
relation to substitution, 181, 191
Power, sphere of, of child, interference

in by prohibition, 163
control of child by adult's, in situa-
tions without barriers, i3off.
Pressure, 133

resulting in bodily rigidity, 148
social, 9gf., 264
Process differential, 32(1.
Prohibition (sec Punishment; Reward)
Property, development of concept of,

107

Psychical material (see Person, dy-
namic theory of)
Psychical systems, 5$f.

interconnections of, 57f., 211-215
rate of differentiation of, 226f.
relation of motorium to, 63f.
segregation of, s8f.

Psychological environment (see Field)
Psychological law, 79

relation to individual differences, 73
Psychological present, 163
danger of too narrow a, 1 7 2
extension of, 1 73

Psychological situation, constancy of,
a necessity for comparative ex-
perimentation, 197
relation of behavior to, n6f.

284

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PERSONALITY

Psychological situation, representation

of, 1 17!.

total, concrete importance of, 69
Psychopathic child, 108

comparison with normal and feeble-
minded children, 257^
sensitivity to environment, 72
Punishment, psychological situation
in, characteristics of, constraint,

I28f.

command with threat of, 120-153
comparison with transformation of

interest, 166-170
degree of reality of, 161-164

function of certainty of anticipa-
tion, 161

of intellectual maturity, 163
transformation of, 162
devaluation of, 162
kinds of behavior in, acceptance of

punishment, 126-140
action against barrier, 140
encysting, 144
escape tendencies, 123-128
execution of command, i35f.
flight into unreality (emotional

outburst), T45~ I 53
struggle with adult, 141-144
nature and disposition of valences,

120-122

prohibition with threat of, 158-164
topological representation, i59f.
state of tension, 133^

(See also Reward)
types of conflict situation in, 122-

123
Purpose, intention, 51

(See also Tension system)

Rationalization, 150

Reading, Decroly method of learning,

270
Reality, basis of, resistance of objective

barriers, 176-178
will of other persons, i5sf.
degrees of, in anger, 258

Reality, dependence of, upon situation

freedom, 177
dynamic properties of level of,

1035., 260

education for, 171-179
(See also Unreality)
Regression, 265^
Reorganization (see Field)
Representation, topological, 41, ii7f.
Responsibility, relation to freedom,

178
Restless behavior, 95f.

dependence of form of, on topology

of situation, 96

Retention, of completed and uncom-
pleted activities, 243^
Reward, psychological situation in

(see Punishment)

combination of punishment with,
and similarity of situation with
that of punishment, 153
command with prospect of, 153-158
comparison with punishment situa-
tion, i54f.
with transformation of interest,

166-170

disposition of valences, 153
prohibition with prospect of, 164-

166
types of behavior in, isbf.

Satiation, 254-257, 264^

consatiation, 55, 256

in menstruum and intermenstruum,
267

in normal and feeble-minded, 268
(Sec also Feeble-minded, satiation

in)
School, atmosphere, 169

marks, i57f.
Self, 6if.

boundaries of, 106-110
Self-consciousness, 101

relation to level of aspiration, 251
Self-control, 94
Senile dementia, 236-238

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Situation, total concrete, 243

Social fields (see Fields, social)

Social pressure, ggf., 264

Social standing, 138

Sphere of power (see Field of power)

State of tension, 88, 94-97

definition of, 134

factor in a dynamic theory of the
person, 208

in punishment situation, 133-135

relation to forgetting of an intention,

247
Statistics, 16, 20

limitations of, 68
Steering process, 49f., 271
Stereotypy, in feeble-minded, 204
Stimulus, as source of energy, 47f.
Strangeness, in social field, 99f., 26 iff.
Structure, environmental, 93

mental, 52*!.
Struggle (see Adult)
Sublimation, 180
Substitute activity, value, attainment

of inner goal, IQO, 250
conditions of, 180-193, 2 47> 2 5
degree of reality of substitute

activity, 249

difference between normal and re-
tarded children, 185!!., 193, 247
difficulty of substitute task, 184
dynamic connection of substitute

and original task, 182, 185
intensity of- need, 191
level of aspiration, 185

in feeble-minded children, 186
relation of content and material of
substitute task to original, 184
similarity of substitute task, 182,

i5
Substitution, dynamic theory of, 181,

i88ff.

experiments on, 182-193
explanation of paradoxes of, in

feeble-minded, 211-213
relation to discharge of tension, 243,

to play, 191
to tools, 183

Substitution, summary of experimental

results, 193
Success, relation to persistence of

activity in infant, 25 2f.
difference from achievement in

children, 254
(See also Failure)
Suicide, 140
Survey of experiments, 230-273

Teleology, natural, 120, i55f.
Tension, state of (sec State of tension;

Tension system)

Tension system, conditions determin-
ing nature of discharge, 242-243
discharge of, 58ff.

(Sec also Person)
Terminology, 2 7 iff.
Tools, 102, 192

relation to substitute activity, 183
Topology, 117, 241, 257ff.
Transformation, of interest, 166-170
differences from reward situation,

i67f.

by imbedding, i66ff.
of psychical systems, 2i2f.
of values, 138, 156
(See also Field)

Unity of the mind, $2ff.
Unreality, level (plane) of, i45ff.

action of gesture, 1 74

characterized by fluidity of medium,

i?4
development of separation from

reality in the child, 175, 177,

i94f.
as dimension of psychical field, 145-

174

example of, 146-151
of future events, 160, 174
stratification of, 1 74
(See also Reality)

286 A DYNAMIC THEORY OP PERSONALITY

V Valence, shifts in, 163

transformation of, by imbedding,
Vagabonding, 125 167(1.

Valence, 51, 81 Vector, definition of, 81
definition of, 175
dependence on distance, 86f., 166

on need, 78 Wholeness, degree of, 247

examples of, 118 Will, measurement of, 239
induction of, 175 rigidity of, in feeble-minded, 204

magnitude as function of distance, Withdrawal (see Going-out-of-the-
166 field)