The Eastern question; an historical study in European diplomacy

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THE

EASTERN QUESTION

AN HISTORICAL STUDY

IN

EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

BY

J. A. R. MARRIOTT

TEILOW OF WORCESTER COLLEGEj OXFORD ; M.P. FOR THE CITV OF OXFORD"

OXFORD

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1917

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW NEW YORK

TORONTO MELBOURNE CAPE TOWN BOMBAY

HUMPHREY MILFORD

PUBLISHER TO THE UNTVEESITY

PREFACE

* The Eastern Question has by degrees assumed such large
proportions that no one can be surprised at the space it
occupies in all public discussions whether of the tongue or of
the pen.' So Lord Stratford de RedclifFe wrote to Tlie Times
on September 9, 1876. His words testified to a notorious
fact. The fact has not become less notorious during the
forty years since the words were written nor have the
proportions assumed by the Eastern Question become less
ample. In view of these facts it is the more surprising that
English Historical Literature should still lack any systematic
and continuous account of the origin and development of the
Eastern Question.

Monographs exist in plenty on special aspects of the
problem, and many general Histories of Europe contain
useful chapters on the subject, but I do not know of any
book in English which attempts the task which in the
present work I have set before myself.

The main lines of this book were laid down many years
ago ; the subject has formed part of my academic teach-
ing ; for this purpose my material has been under constant
revision, and some of it has been utilized for articles
recently contributed to the Edinburgh Review, the Fort-
nightly Revieiv, and the Nineteenth Century and After. To
the proprietors and editors of these Revieivs I am indebted
for permission to reproduce portions of my articles, but none
of them are reprinted in extenso. Elsewhere, in the course of
my protracted journey, I have come across traces of my
OMii footsteps, indicating the route of previous historical
excursions. In such cases I have not been careful to avoid
them, and here and there I have incorporated whole para-

a 2

/i^Kj^i. i i O

iv PREFACE

gi'aphs fi'om earlier works, for I was long ago impressed by
the warning that a man may say a thing once as he would
have it said, but he cannot say it twice.

To each chapter I have suffixed a list of authorities which
will I trust be found useful by students, by teachers, and by
the 'general reader' who may desire further information
on special topics which in a work like the present must
needs be somewhat summarily dismissed. To stimulate such
curiosity and to encourage more detailed research are among
the main objects which I have had in view. But my primary
purpose has been to provide for those who are in any degree
charged with the responsibility for the solution of a most
complex political problem an adequate basis of historical
knowledge. A knowledge of the past is not in itself sufficient
to solve the problems of the present ; but no solution is likely
to be effective or enduring which is not based upon such
knowledge. Least of all in the case of a problem which,
like that of the Near East, includes numerous factors which
are intelligible only in the light of past events, many of
them remote, and most of them obscure.

Especially obscure are the facts of the political geography
of the Balkans. My numerous maps are intended to elucidate
them, and if they are found to fulfil their purpose at all
adequately it is mainly owing to the kind help of my friend
and colleague Mr. C. Grant Robertson, M.A., C.V.O., of
All Souls College, and to the extraordinary patience and care
bestowed upon their preparation by the Assistant Secretary
to the Delegates of the Press. But every student of historical
geogi-aphy will acknowledge the difficulty of the task. Among
the maps will be fomid one on Balkan Ethnography which no
one should consult without taking heed to Sir Charles Eliot's
warning : ' every Ethnogi-aphic map of the Balkan Peninsula
gives a different view of the arrangement of the populations.'
In truth precision is unattainable, and the map must be
accepted only as a rough indication of the distribution
of races.

PREFACE V

In the accomplishment of my task I have incurred many
obligations to friends which it is a duty and a pleasure
to acknowledge. Sir Arthur Evans kindly allowed me to
consult him on one or two geographical points ; Dr. Holland
Rose of Cambridge and Professor Alison Phillips of Dublin
were good enough to reply in some detail to questions
addressed to them, while to Dr. R. W. Macan, Master of
University College, and to Mr. Grant Robertson I owe a debt
which I find it difficult to acknowledge in terms which shall
be at once adequate to my own sense of gratitude and not
repugnant to them. Both these distinguished scholars have
subjected my proof sheets to the most careful revision,
and from both I have received invaluable suggestions. My
obligations to writers who have covered parts of the same
ground are, it is needless to add, exceedingly numerous, but
I trust that they have been acknowledged in the foot-notes
and bibliographies. For any unacknowledged or unwitting
appropriation I crave pardon. To the modern school of
French historians my debt is particularly heavy, and I desire
to pay my respectful homage to the skill with which they
combine massive erudition with a brilliance of exposition
which none may hope to rival. Neither in French, however,
nor in any other language have I come across any book which
is identical in scope and purpose with my own, and though
no one can be more conscious than myself both of the
inadequacy of my equipment and the imperfection of my
execution, yet I have no misgivings as to the importance or
the timeliness of the task I have essayed. The author may
liave dared too much ; but the book itself was overdue.

J. A. R. MARRIOTT.
Oxford,
Easter Eve {April 7), 1917.

CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE

I. Introductory. The Problem of the Near East 1

II. Physics and Politics ....

III. The Advent of the Ottomans. Conquests in

Europe .......

IV. The Ottoman Empire : its Zenith, 1453-1566

Suleiman the Magnificent

V. The Decadence of the Ottoman Empire
Contest with Venice and the Habsburgs .

VI. The Eastern Question in the Eighteenth
Century. Russia and Turkey, 1689-1792

1. From the Treaty of Carlo witz to the Treaty

of Belgi-ade, 1699-1739

2. From the Treaty of Belgrade to the Treaty of

Kutschuk-Kainardji, 1739-1774 .

3. Austro-Russian Alliance, 1775-1792

VII. Napoleon and the Near Eastern Problem

1. W-est and East, 1797-1807 .

2. The Ottoman Empire and the Resurrection of

Serbia ......

3. Napoleon and Alexander

VIII. Th^ Struggle for Hellenic Independence

IX. The Powers and the Eastern Question, 1830
1841. Mehemet Ali of Egypt .

X. The Crimean War

XL The Making of Roumania

18
37
66
95

116

128
138

148

159
164

173

201
222
253

XII. The Balkan Insurrections. The Southern
Slavs. The Russo-Turkish War. The Powers
and the Eastern Question, 1856-1878 . . 274

Vlll

CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE

XIII. The Balkan States, 1878-1898. The Making

of Bulgaria. Modern Greece (1832-1898). The

Cretan Problem 307

XIV. A New Factor in the Problem. German

Policy in the Near East, 1888-1908 . . 341

XV. The Macedonian Problem. Habsburg Policy

in the Balkans. The Young Turk Revolution 361

XVI. The Balkan League and the Balkan Wars 386

XVII. Epilogue, 1914-1916 428

Appendix A : List of Ottoman Rulers . . . 445

Appendix B : Genealogies 446

Appendix C : Shrinkage of the Ottoman Empire in

Europe, 1817-1914 449

Index 450

LIST OF MAPS

The Balkans : Physical Features .

The Balkans : Roman Empire ....

Balkan Railways, 1914

The Ottoman Empire, except the Arabian and African
Provinces .......

The Balkan Peninsula: Ethnological .

Mediaeval Bulgaria, a.d. 900-1019 . . v

Mediaeval Kingdom of Serbia. Stephen Dushan

Frontiers of States in 1912 ; Aspirations of
RouMANiA, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece

Balkan States, 1878-1914, showing acquisitions of
Montenegro, Roumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and
Greece, 1913, and the territory ceded to Bulgaria
and retroceded to Turkey, 1913

23

28
29

36

40
48
50

387

425

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

The Problem of the Near East

' That shifting, intractable, and interwoven tangle of conflicting interests,
rival peoples, and antagonistic faiths that is veiled under the easy name of
the Eastern Question.' — John Morley.

From time immemorial Europe has been confronted with The
an ' Eastern Question '. In its essence the problem is un- ?^2^^^i^^
changing. It has arisen from the clash in the lands of South-
Eastern Europe between the habits, ideas, and preconceptions
of the West and those of the East. But although one in
essence, the problem has assumed different aspects at different
periods. In the daAvn of authentic history it is represented
by the contest between the Greeks and the Persians, the
heroic struggle enshrined in the memory of Marathon,
Thermopylae, and Salamis. To the Roman the 'Eastern
Question ' centred in his duel with the great Hellenistic
monarchies. In the early Middle Ages the problem was repre-
sented by the struggle between the forces of Islam and those
of Christianity. That struggle reached its climax, for the
time being, in the great battle of Tours (732). The chivalry
of Western Europe rencM^ed the contest, some centuries later,
in the Crusades. The motives which inspired that movement
were curiously mixed, but essentially they afforded a further
manifestation of the secular rivalry between Cross and
Crescent ; a contest between Crusaders and Infidels for pos-
session of the lands halloAved to every Christian by their
association with the life of Christ on earth.

With none of these earlier manifestations of an immemorial
antithesis is this book concerned. Its main purpose is to
sketch the historical evolution of a problem which has
baffled the ingenuity of European diplomatists, in a general
sense, for more than five hundred years, more specifically

1984 3

2 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

and insistently for about a century. In the vocabulary of
English diplomacy the Eastern Question was not included
until the period of the Greek War of Independence (1821-9),
though the phrase is said to be traceable at least as far back as
the battle of Lepanto (1571). A definition of the * Question ',
at once authoritative and satisfactory, is hard to come by.
Lord Morley, obviously appreciating the difficulty, once
spoke of it, with characteristic felicity, as 'that shifting,
intractable, and interwoven tangle of conflicting interests,
rival peoples, and antagonistic faiths that is veiled under the
easy name of the Eastern Question'. A brilliant French writer,
M. Edouard Driault, has defined it as Le prohleme de la
mine de la pinssance x>olitique de V Islam. But this defini-
tion seems unnecessarily broad. Dr. Miller, with more
precision, has explained it thus : * The Near Eastern Question
may be defined as the problem of filling up the vacuum
created by the gradual disappearance of the Turkish Empire
from Europe.' But though this definition is unexceptionable
as far as it goes, our purpose seems to demand something at
once more explicit and more explanatory. Putting aside the
many difficult problems connected with the position of
Ottoman power in Asia and Africa, the 'Eastern Question'
may be taken, for the purpose of the present survey, to
include :

First and primarily : The part played by the Ottoman
Turks in the history of Europe since they first crossed the
Hellespont in the middle of the fourteenth century ;

Secondly : The position of the loosely designated Balkan
States, which, like Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Roumania,
have gradually re-emerged as the waters of the Ottoman
flood have subsided ; or, like Montenegi'o, were never
really submerged ; or, like Bosnia, the Herzegovina, Ti-an-
sylvania, and the Bukovina, have been annexed by the
Habsburgs ;

Thirdly : The problem of the Black Sea ; egi-ess therefrom,
ingress thereto ; the command of the Bosphorus and the
Dardanelles, and, above all, the capital problem as to the
possession of Constantinople ;

Fourthly : The position of Russia in Europe ; her natural

I INTRODUCTORY 3

impulse towards the jNIediterranean ; her repeated attempts
to secure permaneut access to that sea by the narrow straits ;
her relation to her co-religionists under the sway of the
Sultan, more particularly to those of her own Slavonic
nationality ;

Fifthly : The position of the Habsburg Empire, and in
particular its anxiety for access to the Aegean, and its
relations, on the one hand, with the Southern Slavs in the
annexed provinces of Dalmatia, Bosnia, and the Herzegovina,
as well as in the adjacent kingdoms of Serbia and Monte-
negro ; and, on the other hand, with the Roumans of Tran-
sylvania and the Bukovina ; and

Finally : The attitude of the European Powers in general,
and of England in particular, towards all or any of the ques-
tions enumerated above.

The primary and most essential factor in the problem is, The
then, the presence, embedded in the living flesh of Europe, t^^!]^'^^^
of an alien substance. That substance is the Ottoman Turk.
Akin to the European family neither in creed, in race, in
language, in social customs, nor in political aptitudes and
traditions, the Ottomans have for more than five hundred
years presented to the other European Powers a problem, now
tragic, now comic, now bordering almost on burlesque,
but always bafiling and paradoxical. The following pages,
after sketching the settlement of this nomad people in
Anatolia, will describe their momentous passage from the
southern to the northern shore of the Hellespont ; their
encampment on European soil ; their gradual conquest of
the Balkan peninsula ; their overthrow of the great Serbian
Empire ; their reduction of the kingdom of Bulgaria ; and
finally, by a successful assault upon Constantinople, their
annihilation of the last feeble remnant of the Roman Empire
of the East.

From Constantinople we shall see the Ottomans advancing Conquests
to the conquest of the whole of the Eastern basin of the ^"^ Europe
Mediterranean : the Aegean islands, Syria, Egypt, and the
northern coast of Africa. The zenith of their power was
attained with remarkable rapidity. Before the end of the

b2

dence.

4 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

sixteenth century it was already passed. The seeds of decay
were indeed sown, even if they Mere not yet discernible,
during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-66),
a period generally accounted the noontide of Ottoman gi-eat-
ness and prosperity. Within five years of Suleiman's death
the great naval disaster at Lepanto (1571) had revealed to
an astonished world the obvious weakening of Ottoman
morale and the waning of their power at sea.
Deca- Political decay Avas temporarily arrested during the follow-

ing century. But for any success achieved by the Turks the
Sultans were no longer personally responsible. Not one of
the Sultans of the seventeenth century, nor for that matter
of the eighteenth, left any impress upon the page of Ottoman
history. The revival of Turkish prestige in the seventeenth
century Avas due to a remarkable Albanian family, the
Kiuprilis ; but that revival rested upon no substantial founda-
tions, and its evanescent character was clearly manifested
before the century had drawn to a close. The failure of
the Moslems to take advantage of the distractions of their
Christian enemies during the Thirty Years' War (1618-48)
was in itself symptomatic of a loss of energy and initiative.
Still more significant were the reverses sustained by Turkish
arms. At the great battle of St. Gothard (1664) Montecuculi
proved that the Ottomans were no longer invincible on land,
as Don John had demonstrated at Lepanto that they were
no longer invincible by sea.

Twenty years later the Vizier, Kara Mustapha, did indeed
carry the victorious arms of Turkey to the gates of Vienna,
But the Polish King, John Sobieski, snatched from him the
supreme prize ; saved the Austrian capital ; and relieved
Europe from the nightmare by which it had long been
oppressed.

From that moment (1683) the Turks ceased to be a menace
to Christendom. The Habsburgs inflicted a series of crush-
ing defeats upon them in the north ; the Venetians con-
quered the Morea ; while France was so deeply involved in
Western Europe that she could do little to help the Power
with whom she had so long been allied in the East. The
Treaty of Carlo witz, concluded in 1699 between the Habsburgs

I INTRODUCTORY 5

and the Turks, supplemented by that of Azov, dictated by
Russia in 1702, afforded conclusive evidence that the tide had
turned. For two and a half centuries the Ottomans had been
the scourge of Christendom and had seriously threatened the
security of the European polity. The menace was now
dissipated for ever. John Sobieski's brilliant exploit was in
this sense decisive. The advance of the Moslem was finally
arrested, and the first phase of the Eastern Question had
closed.

Only, however, to give place to another less alarming but Change in
more perplexing. Ever since the early years of the eighteenth ^f ^jj^
century Europe has been haunted by the apprehension of pioblem.
the consequences likely to ensue upon the demise of the
sick man, and the subsequent disposition of his heritage.
For nearly two hundred years it was assumed that the in-
heritance would devolve upon one or more of the Great
Powers. That the submerged nationalities of the Balkan
peninsula would ever again be in a position to exercise any
decisive influence upon the destinies of the lands they still
peopled was an idea too remote fi-om actualities to engage
even the passing attention of diplomacy. From the days of
Alberoni ingenious diplomatists in long succession have
amused themselves by devising schemes for the partition
of the Ottoman Empire, but none of these schemes paid any
heed to the claims of the indigenous inhabitants. It would,
indeed, have been remarkable if they had ; for from the
fifteenth century to the nineteenth nothing was heard and little
was known of Bulgar, Slav, Rouman, or Greek. The problem
of the Near East concerned not the peoples of the Balkans,
but the Powers of Europe, and among the Powers primarily
Russia.

In its second phase (1702-1820) the Eastern Question might Relations
indeed be defined as the Relations of Russia and Turkey, .^^^^i ''^
The Habsburgs were frequently on the stage, but rarely in Tuikey.
the leading role, and the part they played became more
and more definitely subsidiary as the eighteenth century
advanced. From the days of Peter the Great to those of
Alexander I Europe, not indeed without spasmodic protests
from France, acquiesced in the assumption that Russia might

6 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

fairly claim a preponderant interest in the settlement of the
Eastern Question. This acquiescence seems to a later genera-
tion the more remarkable in view of the fact that Russia
herself had so lately made her entrance upon the stage of
European politics. Perhaps, however, this fact in itself
explains the acquiescence. Russia was already pushing towards
the Black Sea before Western Europe recognized her
existence. By 1774 her grip upon the inland sea was firmly
established, and she was already looking to the possibilities of
egress into the Mediterranean. The Treaty of Kainardji,
concluded in that year, not only provided ample excuse for
subsequent interference in the Balkans, but gave Russia the
right of establishing a permanent embassy at Constantinople.
The Treaties of Jassy (1792) and Bucharest (1812) carried
her two stages further towards her ultimate goal. But by
this time new factors in the problem were beginning to^
operate.
France France had never been unmindful of her interests in the

j^-gar Eastern Mediterranean. By the capitulations of 1535 Francis I
East. had obtained from Suleiman the Magnificent considerable
trading privileges in Egj^pt. D'Argenson, in 1738, published
an elaborate plan for the construction of a canal through the
Isthmus of Suez and for restoring, by the enterprise of French
traders and the efforts of French administrators, political
order and commercial prosperity in Egypt. In the negotia-
tions between Catherine II and the Emperor Joseph for the
partition of the Ottoman dominions the interests of France
Avere recognized by the assignment of Egypt and Syria to the
French monarch.

But it was Napoleon >vho first concentrated the attention of
the French people to the high significance of the problem of the
Near East. The acquisition of the Ionian Isles ; the expedi-
tion to Egj'pt and Syria ; the gi-andiose schemes for an attack
on British India ; the agreement with the Tsar Alexander for
a partition of the Ottoman Empire — all combined to stir the
imagination alike of traders and diplomatists in France.
English And not in France only. If Napoleon was a great educator
^ ^^^' of the French, still more was he an educator of the English.
For some two hundred years English merchants had been.

I INTRODUCTORY 7

keenly alive to the commercial value of the Levant. The
politicians, however, were curiously but characteristically tardy
in awakening to the fact that the development of events in
the Ottoman Empire possessed any political significance for
England. The statesmen of the eighteenth century observed
with equal unconcern the decrepitude of the Turks and the
advance of the Russians. The younger Pitt was the first
and only one among them to display any interest in what,
to his successors in Downing Street, became known as the
Eastern Question. With a prescience peculiar to himself he
perceived that England was supremely concerned in the
ultimate solution of that problem. His earliest diplomatic
achievement, the Triple Alliance of 1788, was designed largely,
though not exclusively, to circumscribe Russian ambitions in
the Near East. But his apprehensions were not shared by
his contemporaries. Few English statesmen have commanded
the confidence and the ear of the House of Commons as Pitt
commanded them. Yet even Pitt failed to arouse attention
to this subject, and when in 1790 he proposed a naval demon-
stration against Russia he suffered one of the few checks in
his triumphant parliamentary career. The enemies of Eng-
land were less slow to perceive where her vital interests lay.
' Really to conquer England,' said Napoleon, * we must make
ourselves masters of Egypt.'

Hence the importance attached by General Bonaparte, at
the very outset of his political career, to the acquisition of the
Ionian Isles. Corfu, Zante, and Cephalonia were, he declared
in 1797, more important for France than the whole of Italy.
They were the stepping-stones to Egypt ; Egypt was a stage
on the high road to India. Hardly a generation had elapsed
since Clive, strenuously seconded by the elder Pitt, had
turned the French out of India. To Egypt, therefore, the
thoughts of Frenchmen naturally turned, not only as afford-
ing a guarantee for the maintenance of French commercial
interests in the Near East, but as a means of threatening the
position so recently acquired by England in the Further East.
These ideas constantly recur in the reports of French ambas-
sadors at the Porte, and Talleyrand, on taking office, found,
as he tells us, his official portfolio bulging with schemes for

8 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

the conquest of Egypt. ^ Napoleon, therefore, in this as in
other things, was merely the heir and executor of the ti-adi-
tions of the Ancien regime. He brought, however, to the
execution of these schemes a vigour which, of late years, the
old monarchy had conspicuously lacked. But even Napoleon
was only partially successful in arousing the attention of the
English people to the importance of the Eastern Mediter-
ranean. The decrepitude of the Turk, the advance of Russia,
the ambitions of France were all regarded as the accentuation
of a problem that was local rather than European.
The Not until the events which followed upon the insurrection

]^volu- ^^ ^^® Greeks in 1821 did the English Foreign Office, still less
tion. did the English public, begin to take a sustained interest in
the development of events in South-Eastern Europe.

The Greek Revolution was indeed sufficiently startling to
arouse the attention even of the careless. For more than
four hundred years the Greeks, like the Bulgarians and the
Serbians, had been all but completely submerged under the
Ottoman flood. To the outside world they had given no sign
whatever that they retained the consciousness of national
identity, still less that they cherished the idea of ever again
achieving national unity. There had indeed been a rising in
Serbia in 1804, and by the Treaty of Bucharest the Serbians
had obtained from the Porte a small measure of internal
autonomy, but all the strong places were garrisoned by Turks,
and the step towards independence was of insignificant pro-
portions. Besides, Europe was preoccupied with more
important mattei-s ; Balkan affairs were of merely local
interest.

The Greek rising was in a wholly different category. When
Prince Alexander Hypsilanti unfurled the flag of Greek
independence in Moldavia, still more when the insurrection
spread to the Morea and the islands of the Aegean archi-
pelago, even the dullards began to realize that a new force
was manifesting itself in European politics, and that an old
problem was entering upon a new phase. The Greek rising
meant an appeal to the sentiment of nationality : Pan-
hellenism — the achievement of Hellenic unity and the
1 C. de Freycinet, La Question d'igypte, p. 2.

I INTRODUCTORY 9

realization of Hellenic identity — was the motto inscribed
upon their banner. Plainly, a new factor had entered into
the complex problem of the Near East. But the nationality
factor was not the only one disclosed to Europe by the Greek
insurrection. Hitherto, the Eastern Question had meant the
growth or the decline of Ottoman power ; a struggle between
the Turks on the one hand and Austrians and Venetians on
the other. More lately it had centred in the rivalry between
the Sultan and the Tsar. Henceforward it was recognized,
primarily through the action of Russia and the newly aroused
sympathies of England, as an international question. The
more cautious and more disinterested of European statesmen
have persistently sought to ' isolate ' the politics of the Near
East. They have almost consistently failed. The Greek
insurrection struck a new note. It refused to be isolated.
The Tsar Alexander, though deaf to Hypsilanti's appeal, had
his own quarrel with Sultan Mahmud. There was, therefore,
an obvious probability that two quarrels, distinct in their
origin, would be confused, and that the Tsar would take
advantage of the Greek insurrection to settle his own
account with the Sultan.

To avoid this confusion of issues was the primary object of England
English diplomacy. Castlereagh and Canning were fully alive Q^-eek
to the significance of the Hellenic movement, alike in its Kevolu-
primary aspect and in its secondary reaction upon the
general diplomatic situation. And behind the statesmen
there was for the first time in England a strong iniblic
opinion in favour of determined action in the Near East.
The sentiment to which Byron and other Philhellenist en-
thusiasts appealed with such efiect was a curious compound of
classicism, liberalism, and nationalism. A people who claimed
affinity with the citizens of the States of ancient Hellas ;
a people who were struggling for political fi-eedom ; who relied
upon the inspiring though elusive sentiment of nationality,
made an irresistible appeal to the educated classes in Eng-
land. Canning was in complete accord with the feehngs of
his countrymen. But he perceived, as few of them could, that
the situation, unless dexterously handled, might lead to new
and dangerous developments. Consequently, he spared no

10 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

efforts to induce the Sultan to come to terms with the insur-
gent Greeks lest a worse thing should befall him at the hands
of Russia.

The Porte was, as usual, deaf to good advice, and Canning
then endeavoured, not without success, to secure an under-
standing with Russia, and to co-operate cordially with her
and with France in a settlement of the affairs of South-Eastem
Europe. That co-operation, in itself a phenomenon of high
diplomatic significance, was in a fair way of achieving its
object when Canning's premature death (1827) deprived the
new and promising machinery of its mainspring. Owing to
untimely scruples of the Duke of Wellington England lost all
the fruits of the astute and far-seeing diplomacy of Canning ;
the effectiveness of the Concert of Europe was destroyed,
and Russia was left free to deal as she would with the
Porte and to dictate the terms of a Treaty, which, by the Duke's
own admission, 'sounded the death-knell of the Ottoman
Empire in Europe '. But, although the Treaty of Adrianople
represented a brilliant success for Russian policy at Con-
stantinople, Great Britain was able to exercise a decisive
influence on the settlement of the Hellenic question. By
the Treaty of London (1832) Greece was established as an
independent kingdom, under the protection of Great Britain,
Russia, and France.
Mehemet The tale of the Sultan's embarrassments was not completed
by the Treaties of Adrianople and London. The independence
of Greece had not only made a serious inroad upon the
integrity of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, but had pre-
cipitated a disastrous conflict with Russia. Worse still, the
effort to avert the disruption of his Empire had induced the
Sultan to seek the assistance of an over-mighty vassal. If there
is anything in politics more dangerous than to confer a favour
it is to accept one. Mehemet Ali, the brilliant Albanian
adventurer, who had made himself Pasha of Egypt, would,
but for the intervention of the Powers, have restored Greece
to the Sultan. The island of Crete seemed to the vassal an
inadequate reward for the service rendered to his Suzerain.
Nor was the revelation of Ottoman weakness and incom-
petence lost upon him. He began to aspire to an independent

Ali.

I INTRODUCTORY 11

rule in Egypt ; to the pashalik of Syria ; perhaps to the lord-
ship of Constantinople itself. The attempt to realize these
ambitions kept Europe in a state of almost continuous ap-
prehension and unrest for ten yeai-s (1831-41), and opened
another chapter in the history of the Eastern Question.

To save himself from Mehemet Ali the Sultan appealed to
the Powers. Russia alone responded to the appeal, and as
a reward for her services imposed upon the Porte the
humiliating Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (1833). By the terms
of that Treaty Russia became virtually mistress of the
Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The Tsar bound himself
to render unlimited assistance to the Porte by land and sea,
and in return the Sultan undertook to close the Straits to
the ships of war of all nations, while permitting free egress
to the Russian fleet. To all intents and purposes the Sultan
had liecome the vassal of the Tsar.

Thus far England, as a whole, had betrayed little or England
no jealousy of the Russian advance towards the Mediter- ^^*^Lj,
ranean. Canning, though not unfriendly to Russia, had
indeed repudiated, and with success, her claim to an ex-
clusive or even a preponderant influence over Turkey. But
by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi that claim was virtually
admitted. Russia had established a military protectorship
over the European dominions of the Sultan.

The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi inaugurates yet another
phase in the evolution of the Eastern Question. From that
time down to the Treaty of Berlin (1878) the primary factor
in the problem is found in the increasing mistrust and
antagonism between Great Britain and Russia. Lord
Palmerston, inheriting the diplomatic traditions of Pitt and
Canning, deeply resented the establishment of a Russian
protectorate over Turkey, and determined that, at the first
opportunity, the Treaty in which it was embodied should
be torn up. Torn up it was by the Treaties of Loudon
(1840 and 1841), under which the collective protectorate of
the Western Powers was substituted for the exclusive pro-
tectorate of Russia. After 1841 the Russian claim was
never successfully reasserted.

That Great Britain had a vital interest in the development

12 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

England of events in Soiith-Eastern Europe was frankly acknowledged
J?ear^^ by Russia, and the Tsar Nicholas I made two distinct efforts
East. to come to teiins with Great Britain. The first was made in
the course of the Tsar's visit to the Court of St. James's in
1844 ; the second occurred on the eve of the Crimean War,
when the Tsar made specific though informal proposals to
Sir Hamilton Seymour, then British Ambassador at St. Peters-
burg. Neither attempt bore fruit. The overtures were
based upon the assumption that the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire was imminent, and that it was the duty,
as well as the obvious interest, of the Powers most closely
concerned to come to an understanding as to the disposition
of the estate. British statesmen refused to admit the
accuracy of the Tsar's diagnosis, and questioned the pro-
priety of the treatment prescribed. The 'sick man' had
still, in their opinion, a fair chance of recovery, and to
arrange, before his demise, for a partition of his inheritance,
seemed to them beyond the bounds of diplomatic decency.
Lord Palmerston, in particular, was at once profoundly mis-
trustful of the designs of Russia, and singularly hopeful as
to the possibilities of redemption for the Ottoman Empire.
The advances of the Tsar were, therefore, rather curtly
declined.
The However distasteful the Tsar's proposals may have been to

War ami the moral sense or the political prejudices of English states-
after, men, it cannot be denied that they were of high intrinsic signifi-
cance. Had they found general acceptance — an extravagant
assumption — the Crimean War would never have been fought ;
Russia would have become virtually supreme in the Balkans
and over the Straits, while England would have established
herself in Egypt and Crete. The refusal of the Aberdeen
Cabinet even to consider such suggestions formed one of the
proximate causes of the Crimean War.

That war, for good or evil, registered a definite set-back to
the policy of Russia in the Near East. It has, indeed, become
fashionable to assume that, at any rate as regards the British
Empire, the war was a blunder if not a crime. How far that
assumption is correct is a question which will demand and
receive attention later on. For the moment it is sufficient to

I INTRODUCTORY 13

observe that the Crimean War did at any rate give the
Sultan an opportunity to put his house in order, had he
desired to do so. For twenty years he was relieved of all
anxiety on the side of Russia. The event proved that the
Sultan's zeal for reform was in direct ratio to his anxiety for
self-preservation. To relieve him from the one was to remove
the only incentive to the other. Consequently, his achieve-
ments in the direction of internal reform fell far short of his
professions.

Little or nothing was done to ameliorate the lot of the Unrest
subject populations, and in the third quarter of the nineteenth g^^l^^ns
century those populations began to take matters into their
own hands. Crete, the 'Great Greek Island', had been
in a state of perpetual revolt ever since it had been re-
placed, in 1840, under the direct government of the Sultan.
In 1875 the unrest spread to the peninsula. It was first
manifested among the mountaineers of the Herzegovina ;
thence it spread to their kinsmen in Bosnia, Serbia, and
Montenegro. The insurrection among the Southern Slavs
in the west found an echo among the Bulgars in the east.
The Sultan then let loose his Bashi-Bazouks among the
Bulgarian peasantry, and all Europe was made to ring with
the tale of the atrocities which ensued. The Powers could
not stand aside and let the Turk work his will upon his
Christian subjects, but mutual jealousy prevented joint
action, and in 1877 Russia was compelled to act alone.

An arduous but decisive campaign brought her within Treaties
striking distance of Constantinople, and enabled her to stephauo
dictate to the Porte the Treaty of San Stephano. The terms and
of that famous Treaty were highly displeasing, not only to
Austria and Great Britain, but to the Greeks and Serbians,
whose ambitions in Macedonia were frustrated by the creation
of a Greater Bulgaria. Great Britain, therefore, demanded
that the Treaty should be submitted to a European Congress.
Russia, after considerable demur, assented. Bismarck under-
took to act as the ' honest broker ' between the parties, and
terms were ultimately arranged under his presidency at
Berlin. The Treaty of Berlin (1878) ushers in a fresh phase
in the evolution of the Eastern Question.

14 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

The It had already become clear that the ultimate solution of

^\^?^' an historic problem would not be reached in disregard of the

principle, aspirations and claims of the indigenous inhabitants of the

Balkan peninsula. The Slavs and Bulgars were indeed only

in one degree more indigenous than the Turks themselves.

Roumans, Albanians, and Greeks might claim by a more

ancient title. But all alike had at any rate been established

in the lands they still continue to inhabit many years before

the advent of the alien Asiatic power. For centuries, however,

all, save the hillsmen of Albania and the Black IVIountain,

had been more or less completely submerged under the

Ottoman flood. AVhen the tide turned and the flood gave

signs of receding, the ancient nationalities again emerged.

' The rebirth of Greece, Roumania, Serbia, and Bulgaria

represents in itself one of the most remarkable and one of

the most characteristic movements in the political history

of the nineteenth century. Incidentally it introduced an

entirely new factor, and one of the highest significance, into

the already complex problem of the Near East. The principle

of nationality is itself confessedly elusive. But whatever may

be its essential ingredients we must admit that the principle

has asserted itself with peculiar force in the Balkan peninsula.

Nor have the peoples of Western Europe been slow to manifest

their sympathy with this new and interesting development.

The official attitude of Great Britain during the critical years

1875-8 might seem to have committed the English people

to the cause of reaction and Turkish misgovern ment.

Whatever may have been the motives which inspired the

policy of Lord Beaconsfield it is far fi-om certain that, in

effect, it did actually obstruct the development of the Balkan

nationalities. Two of them, at any rate, have reason to

cherish the memory of the statesman who tore up the Treaty

of San Stephano. Had that Treaty been allowed to stand,

both Greece and Serbia would have had to renounce their

ambitions in Macedonia, while the enonnous accessions of

territory which it secured for Bulgaria might ultimately have

proved, even to her, a doubtful political advantage.

Since 1878 the progress of the Balkan nations has been
rapid, and with that progress the concluding portion of this

I INTRODUCTORY 15

book will be mainly concerned. It will also have to chronicle
the appearance of yet another factor in the problem. At no
time could the Habsburgs regard with unconcern the develop-
ment of events in South-Eastern Europe, but between 1848
and 1878 they had much to engage their attention elsewhere.
They played a shrewd and calculating game between 1853
and 1856, and not without success ; but their conduct during
the Crimean crisis was hotly resented in Great Britain, and
it may perhaps account for the lack of sympathy with which
the English people regarded the misfortunes of the Austrian
Empire during the next ten years. Prussia, too, was busy
elsewhere, and as long as Bismarck remained in power Prussia
disclaimed any interest in the problem of the Near East.

Nothing differentiates more clearly the policy of the Germany
Emperor William II fi-om that of Bismarck than the in- g^*][i.*j|{j^g
creasing activity of German diplomacy in the Balkans. The
growing intimacy of the relations between Berlin and Vienna,
still more between Berlin and Buda-Pesth, must in any case
have led to this result. The virtual annexation of Bosnia
and the Herzegovina to the Austrian Empire was Bismarck's
acknowledgement of the obligations which in 1870 he had
incurred to Habsburg neutrality. But the gift bestowed
upon Austria caused the first serious breach in the good
relations between Berlin and St. Petersburg. The Avire be-
tween those capitals was never actually cut so long as Bismarck
controlled the German Foreign Ofiice ; but his successor found
himself compelled to choose between the friendship of Austria
and that of Russia, and he deliberately preferred the former.

That choice inevitably involved a change in the attitude of
Germany towards the Near Eastern Question. Austria made
no secret of her ambition to secure access to the Aegean.
Germany not only identified herself with this ambition, but
she developed similar ambitions of her own. If Salonica was
the obvious goal for Austrian activities, those of her all}' might
naturally be directed towards Constantinople, and from
Constantinople onwards to Bagdad and Basra. From such
grandiose designs Bismarck instinctively recoiled ; but to the
very differently constituted mind of William II their appeal
was irresistible. Consequently, in the Near East as elsewhere.

16 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

German diplomacy has followed since 1890 a perfectly con-
sistent and undeviating path. In every conceivable way
the Turk Avas to be caressed. Not even the massacre of
the Armenian Christians was allowed to interrupt the grow-
ing intimacy between Berlin and Constantinople. The
moment when the rest of the Powers shrank in horror from
the perpetrator of those massacres was selected by the Kaiser
to demonstrate his unalterable friendship for his new ally.
From 1904 onwards the Triple Alliance was enlarged to
include the Ottoman Turk. Not, indeed, without embarrass-
ment to one of the original partners. Berlin was continually
engaged in the delicate task of preventing a rupture between
Rome and Vienna on questions connected with the Near
East, and for the time her diplomacy succeeded. The
Alliance was still further strained by the Turco-Italian War in
1911 ; but for three more years it remained nominally intact.
Not until 1914 was it finally broken.

German policy in the Near East had in the meantime
sustained more than one check. Depending, as it did, largely
on a personal equation ; the deposition of Abdul Hamid and
the triumph of the ' Young Turks ' threatened it with ruin.
But the danger passed ; the Young Turks proved no less
amenable than Abdul Hamid to the influence of Berlin ;
Germany was again supreme at Constantinople. Even more
serious was the formation, in 1912, of the Balkan League
and its astonishing success in the field. All the arts known
to German diplomacy were needed to avert disaster ; but
they did not fail. With consummate adroitness Serbia was
pushed away from the Adriatic and compelled to turn south-
wards ; the most extravagant demands of Greece were
encouraged in Macedonia ; Bulgaria was eflfectively estranged
from its allies ; a remnant of the Ottoman Power in Europe
was salved ; a German vassal still reigned at Constantinople.

One danger remained. Between Central Europe and its
Drang nacli Siidosten there intervened Serbia ; no longer
the Serbia of 1878 ; no longer the client of Austria-Hungary ;
but a Serbia in which was reborn the ancient spirit of the
Jugo-Slav race ; a Serbia which believed itself destined to
be the nucleus of a great Serbo-Croatian Empire ; which

I INTRODUCTORY 17

should embrace all the lands in which their race was domi-
nant : Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia and the Herzegovina, Serbia,
Montenegro, Dalmatia, with parts of Carniola, Carinthia,
Istria, and Styria. The foundation of such an empire would
mean not only the dismemberment of the Dual Monarchy, but
the death-blow to the ambitions of Central Europe in the
Near East. At all hazards, even at the hazard of a world-
war, such a danger must be averted.

The Great War of 1914 was the outcome of this conviction.
Once more had the Near East reacted upon the West ;
indeed upon the whole world. In order that Austria-Hungary
might keep a road open to the Aegean ; in order to pre-
vent a change of gauge between Berlin and Basra, the
world must be flung into the crucible : Belgium, peaceful
and unoflfending, must be ruthlessly devastated ; given over
to arson, pillage, and abomination of every description ;
Poland must pay the last of many penalties ; some of the
fairest fields and most prosperous cities of France must be
laid waste ; the vast resources of the British Empire must
be strained to the uttermost ; Canadians must pay the toll
in Flandere ; Australians and New Zealanders must make
the last heroic sacrifice in Gallipoli ; Englishmen must perish
in the swamps of the Euphrates ; Indians must line the
trenches in France ; women and babes must perish on land
and sea ; from London to Melbourne, from Cairo to the Cape,
from Liverpool to Vancouver the whole Empire must fight
for its life ; the whole world must groan in pity and suffering.

If it be true that in its dealings M'ith the Near East Western
Europe has in the past exhibited a brutal and callous selfish-
ness, the Near East is indeed avenged.

The end no man can see. But one thing is certain. The
future will not be as the past, nor as the present. Yet in
order to face the future fearlessly and to shape it aright
nothing is more indispensable than a knowledge of the past.
Nor can that knowledge safely be confined to the few who
govern ; it must be diffused among the many who control. To
diffiise that knowledge is the purpose of the pages that
follow.

CHAPTEK II

PHYSICS AND POLITICS

Physical
condi-
tions.

' No other site in the world enjoys equal advantages nor perhaps ever
will enjoy them.' — D. G. Hogarth (of Constantinople).

' It is the Empire of the world.' — Napoleon (on Constantinople).

'When the Turks threw themselves across the ancient paths in the
fifteenth century a.d., a great necessity arose in Christendom for searching
out new lines of approach to India. From that quest the history of modern
commerce dates.' — Sir W. W. Hunter.

' By whichever way we approach the problems before us we are brought
back to the unique importance of the position occupied by Belgrade. It
is in several ways the most commanding of any European city. . . .
Belgrade lies at the only available gateway on the road to Salonica and
the Piraeus as well as to Constantinople.' — Sir Arthur Evans.

This book will be concerned, as the introductory pages
should have made clear, primarily with Politics ; with the
history of the Near East as the home of man ; as the cock-
pit of nations, and as the arena of international rivalries.
But there is no region in the world where physical conditions
have played a more dominating part in shaping the destinies
of individual men or of those political aggregations which
we know as Nations and States. This is demonstrably true
whether we have regard to the region as a whole, or to that
segment of it with which this book is more particularly con-
cerned, the lands which the geographers of the last generation
described as Turkey in Ewojm, but for which political
changes have compelled us to seek a new name. The name
generally given to that segment is The Balkan Peninsula, or
simply The Balkans. In strictness the description applies
only to the lands to the south of the great Divide formed
by the Shar mountains and the Balkan range. It excludes,
therefore, a great part of Serbia and the Southern Slav
provinces, and the whole of Roumania. In the following
pages The Balkans will, however, be used as synonymous
with the Turkey in Europe of our forefathers.

I

PHYSICS AND POLITICS 19

Only a few words can be spared for the geographical The
significance of the general region of the Near East. Nor, j^^g^?
indeed, is it necessary to labour a commonplace. A glance
at a map of the world — more particularly of the known
world of A.D. 1450 — can hardly fail to carry conviction even
to those who are not wont to cultivate the historical or geo-
graphical imagination. The lands which fringe the Eastern
Mediterranean — roughly the region bounded on the west by
the Adriatic and the island of Crete, to the north by the
Danube, to the east by Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, and to
the south by Syria and Egypt^ — have possessed a significance
in world-history incomparably greater than any other. If it
be objected that the definition excludes all the lands domi-
nated by the Anglo-Saxon race it is sufficient to reply, first,
that this statement refers to the past, not to the future ; and,
secondly, that indications are not wanting that, in the future,
the region may play a part in determining the fate of world-
empires hardly less important than that which it has played
in the past.

Until the establishment of the Ottoman Empire the The old
region thus defined formed the nerve-centre of the world's ^J^tes"
commerce. From time immemorial the trade bet\veen the
East and the West has followed well-defined routes. The
most ancient is the caravan route which, from the da^vn of
history down to the sixteenth century, was commanded by
the Semites. From the Far East goods found their way to
the head of the Persian Gulf, thence by caravan they ulti-
mately reached the Syrian sea-board, and from Tyre and
Sidon were distributed by the Phoenicians to the peoples of
the West. Basra, Bagdad, and Jerusalem were the domi-
nating stations on this trunk-line. The Mongol invasions of
the thirteenth century gravely impaired the security of the
Mesopotamia -Syria route, and proportionately increased
the importance of the northern and southern routes. The
former reached Europe by the Oxus, the Caspian, and the
Black Sea, its outer gate being commanded, of course, by
Constantinople ; the latter came by way of the Indian Ocean,
the Red Sea, and the valley of the Nile, debouching from
332 B. c. onwards at Alexandria.

c2

20 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

Every one of these Mediterranean outlets, Constantinople,
Alexandria, and the Syrian coast, passed into the hands of the
Ottoman Turks between 1453 and 1516. One after another
the great trade-routes Mere blocked by a Power, inimical to
commerce, and still more inimical to those Christian nations
for whose benefit intercourse between East and West was
mainly carried on. It will, therefore, be readily understood
that the Ottoman conquest of the Near East constitutes one
of the decisive events in world-history. After that conquest
the Western world found itself confronted by three alterna-
tives : to forgo the profits and conveniences of its trade with
the East ; or to expel the Ottomans from the * nodal-points ',
or to discover a new route to the East Avith the continuity of
which the Ottomans could not interfere. Europe preferred
the last. Hence the abnormal activity displayed at Cadiz,
Bristol, and above all at Lisbon, in the latter half of the
fifteenth century. Portugal, thanks to Prince Henry the
Navigator, had indeed long been a centre of maritime activity
and scientific research. It was fitting, therefore, that the
first prize in the quest for a new route to the East should
fall to the Portuguese explorers.
The new The rounding of the Cape of Good Hope by Vasco
routes. ^^ Gama in 1498 opened a sea-route to India which was
successively dominated by the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the
English. Columbus setting forth on a similar quest a few
years earlier had stumbled upon the West Indies, and had
thus opened to his Sjianish patrons a path to Empire in South
America. The Cabots, sailing from Bristol, under the Eng-
lish flag, discovered and explored the coast of North America
Plainly, then, the geographical renaissance of the later fifteenth
century was due primarily, though not exclusively, to the
advent of the Ottomans in South-Eastern Europe and the
consequent blocking of the old established trade-routes.
Results to The opening of the new route to the East Indies, together
^ope- with the discovery of America and the West Indies, had
a profound and far-reaching influence upon the European
polity. The centre of gi'avity, commercial, political, and
intellectual, rapidly shifted from the south-east of Europe to
the north-west ; from the cities on the Mediterranean littoral

II PHYSICS AND POLITICS 21

to those on the Atlantic. Constantinople, Alexandria, Venice,
Genoa, and ^Marseilles were deprived, almost at one fell swoop,
of the economic and political pre-eminence which had for
centuries belonged to them. Four of the five cities have
regained a large measure of importance, and at least one of
them may be destined to pre-eminence in the near future ; but
for four centuries the Mediterranean, which had been the
greatest of commercial highways, was reduced almost to the
position of a backwater. Commercial supremacy passed to the
Atlantic. The Thalassic Age, to adopt the terminology ren-
dered classical by Sir John Seeley, was superseded by the
Oceanic. To Western Europe, as a whole, and to England in
particular, these changes were of the highest possible signifi-
cance ; but it is neither necessary, nor in this connexion
pertinent, to elaborate a commonplace of historical generali-
zation.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century the great The Suez
enterprise of ]M. de Lesseps, the cutting of the Isthmus of Suez
by a canal, restored in large measure the commercial signifi-
cance of the Mediterranean. Hardly less important has been
the influence excited in the same direction by the political
reorganization and the economic development of Egypt under
Lord Cromer. Genoa and ^Marseilles have responded superbly
to the new demands made upon them, Alexandria has regained
much of its importance.

The twentieth century has Avitnessed the initiation of an The
enterprise which, if it be carried through to a successful issue, j^^^.^^
may possibly have consequences, political and economic,
hardly inferior to those which have accrued from the cutting
of the Suez Canal. Just as at the close of the fifteenth
century the Western Powers were intent upon securing for
the eastern trade a route beyond the control of the Ottomans,
so at the present day Mittcleuropa is straining every nerve
to obtain conmiand of a great trunk-line which, by the
dominant sea-power of Great Britain, shall carry the com-
merce and the influence of the Teutonic Empires from the
shores of the North Sea to the Persian Gulf undisturbed. The
Bagdad railway is not yet completed, nor is it by any means
certain that if and when it is completed the control will be

22

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

The

Balkans :
physical
features.

The
mountain

system.

vested in Berlin or Hamburg. But the mere initiation of the
enterprise affords one more indication of the commanding
geographical situation of the lands which still form part of
the Ottoman Empire, and in particular the incomparable
significance of Constantinople. The convergence of all the
great trade-routes of the ancient and the mediaeval worlds
upon the Eastern Mediterranean, the importance attached in
the modern world to Eg}'pt, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Constan-
tinople, are conclusive proof of the propositions advanced in
the opening paragraphs of this chapter. England would not
be in Egypt to-day, the German Emperor would not have
courted the Sultan Abdul Hamid and Enver Pasha, had not
the Near East retained all the significance which in all
previous ages of world-history has been conferred upon it by
a geographical situation pre-eminently and perhaps uniquely
advantageous.

Not less obvious is the influence which physics have
exercised upon the history of the Balkan lands. Before this
proposition can be accepted it is necessary to discriminate
with some nicety the outstanding geographical features of
this region. For the first impression is one of almost hopeless
confusion.

The orographical relief is, indeed, singularly complex. At
first sight the peninsula seems, with small exceptions, to be
covered by a series of mountain ranges, subject to no law
save that of caprice, starting from nowhere in particular,
ending nowhere in particular, now running north and south,
now east and west, with no obvious purpose or well-defined
trend. Closer scrutiny corrects the first impression, though
not fundamentally. Still, where all had seemed chaotic,
certain features emerge : the lower Danube basin, the two
valleys of the Maritza, the plain of Thessaly, and the lower
Yardar valley. These are the most obvious exceptions to
the mountain ranges and the high uplands. Still closer
observation reveals a gap between the southern end of the
Dinaric Alps and the northern terminus of the mountains of
Albania. This * Albanian Gap ', created by the Drin river
and extending on the Adriatic coast from Scutari to Alessio
or S. Juan di Medua, has already played a considerable

II

PHYSICS AND POLITICS

23

political role, and may be destined to play a much larger one.
It is, indeed, hardly too much to say that the whole political
future of Serbia depends upon the economic potentialities of
this break in the coastal mountains. Another feature, of
hardly less significance to Serbia, is the passage-way between
the western coastal mountain chains and the central upland,
a passage which opens at the northern end into the gi-eat

Hungarian plain, and at the southern into the lower Vardar
valley, connecting, in fact, Belgrade and Salonica. ' Within
this belt is concentrated', as a recent writer has admirably
said, 'most of the drama and most of the tragedy of the
peninsula.' ^
A third feature which disentangles itself from the confused

1 Newbiggin, Geographical Aspects of Balkan Problems, p. 9.

24 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

mountainous mass is the Rhodope upland, a fairly defined
central earth-block of triangular shape, based upon Salonica
and Constantinople, and stretching in a north-westerly
direction towards an apex at Belgrade. Along the sides of
this triangular upland run the main lines of communication,
with their junction at Nish (see maps, pp. 28, 29).
The west- The most pronounced features of the mountain system still
BQoun- remain to be summarily noted. The first is the prolongation
tains. of the Alpine chain which, starting between Nice and Genoa,
forms the northern boundary of the great Lombard plain,
then sweeping round the head of the Adriatic begins to run
down its eastern shore, first as the Julian and then as the
Dinaric Alps. There is a fairly wide gap north-east of Fiume,
and a well-marked one, already referred to, where the Drin
has forced its way to the sea. Otherwise the coastal range
runs almost continuously parallel with the shore, and, what
is more important, generally close to it. These geographical
facts are not without significance in relation to the claim put
forward by Italy to the eastern shore of the Adriatic. The
Venetian character of the Dalmatian cities is as indisputable
as is the Slavonic blood of the vast majority of the inhabi-
tants, and if it be true that a mountain range affords a more
scientific frontier than a river bank or even a sea-coast line,
geographical symmetry might seem to argue in favour of
Italy's claim to the ancient Illyria and modern Dalmatia.
But here, as elsewhere in the Balkans, ethnography conflicts
sharply with geography, agreeing with it only so far as to
assert that whoever ' the rightful claimant may be it is not
the present occupant '. Once past the Bocche di Cattaro the
coastal mountains recede from the sea-coast until they reach
Valona. From Valona they have a south-westerly trend
until, in the Pindus range, they form the spinal cord of
Greece.
The From the west-coastal mountains there runs almost to the

watex^^ Black Sea an horizontal range. It starts with the Shar moun-
shed. tains just south of the Albanian Gap ; and broken once or
twice, notably by the Belgrade-Salonica gangway, it continues
as the Balkan range almost due east, stopping short of Varna
on the Black Sea coast. This forms the great central water-

II PHYSICS AND POLITICS 25

shed of the peninsula. North of it all the rivers, such as the
northern or white Drin, the Morava, the Isker, and the Vid,
empty into the Danube ; south of it the Vardar, the Struma,
and the gi-eat Maritza system all flow into the Aegean.

Finally, we have to note the position of the Carpathians. The Car-
They belong, in a sense, rather to the Central European than Pa^^^ans.
to the Balkan system. But the Balkan range itself may
almost as well be regarded as a continuation of the Car-
pathian folds as of the central watershed, and apart from this
the Carpathians have a paradoxical significance of their own
Avhich cannot be ignored. In one sense they form an
obvious and formidable barrier between the Hungarian plain
and the basin of the lower Danube, which in its turn marks,
from the Iron Gates almost to the Black Sea, the southern
frontier of Roumania. But the physiographic fi-ontier, in the
case of the Danubian principalities, conflicts curiously with
the ethnogi-aphic. If there are some nine million Roumanians
dwelling to the east of the Carpathians, there are four million
people of the same race to be found on the western side of
the mountains. In this fact lies the core of the political
problem of Roumania, a problem deliberately created, it
would seem, by a capricious but obstinate geography.

Caprice is, indeed, the obtrusive characteristic of Balkan The river
physiography. If anything could be more confusingly *^^ ^^'
capricious than the orographical relief, it is the river system
of the peninsula. Why does the Danube, after a prolonged,
regular, orthodox, west to east course from Belgrade to
beyond Silistria, take a sudden tilt due north as far as Galatz
before it is content to empty itself into the Black Sea ? Its
only purpose seems to be the purely malicious one of involv-
ing Roumania and Bulgaria in disputes over the unattractive
mai*shes of the Dobrudja. If the Danube had only persevered
a little longer in its eastward course and reached the sea
— as the railway line from Bucharest does — at the port of
Constanza, there would be practically nothing to prevent
unbroken amity between the Roumanians and their Bulgarian
neighbours. But that again would be so contrary to every
Balkanic principle and tradition that perhaps, after all, the
Danube, under an outer cloak of perversity, is only attempt-

26 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

ing to preserve spiritual conformity with the circumstances
of its political environment.

Further south, the Maritza plays us an almost identical
trick Avith political results hardly less embarrassing. This
great river drains the valley which intervenes between the
Balkans and the Rhodope block of central uplands ; it main-
tains a south-easterly course from Philippopolis to Adrianople,
and then, instead of continuing its orthodox course to the
Black Sea, or even to the Sea of Marmora, it takes a sudden
turn to the south and finally, by a course decidedly south-
westerly, reaches the Aegean at Enos. The curious deflection
of this great river system is due to the geological process
known as ' river capture '. The sinking of land below what
is now the surface of the Aegean Sea — a process the incom-
pleteness of which is manifested by the existence of the
Aegean archipelago — has increased the velocity and therefore
the erosive power of the streams flowing southward to such
a degree that the watershed has been thrust northward, and
the Aegean streams have ' captured ' the head- waters of
systems which did not originally belong to them. Geologically
the Aegean has thus excited a very powerful attractive force.
The Maritza, the iNIista, the Struma, to say nothing of the
Vardar and the Vistritza, all flow into the Aegean. Politics
have followed the lead of Physics. oNIen, like streams, have
been attracted towards the Aegean littoral, and thus Mace-
donia has become the 'key to the history of the whole
peninsula '.^ Nowhere in the Balkans has physiogi'aphy
more obviously dictated the course of history than in this
difficult and debatable region. Macedonia consists of a
string of basins more or less connected by the threads of the
Yardar and the Vistritza. But here, as in Roumelia, geography
has made it much easier for the northern peoples to come
south than for the southern peoples to go north. ^ Therein
lies, perhaps, the primary cause of the outbreak of the Second
Balkan War in 1913, though the monitions of nature were in
that case powerfully assisted by the promptings of diplomacy.

1 Newbiggin, op. at., p. 10. On the whole subject of ' river capture '
cf. chap. V in the same ilhiminating work.

2 Hogarth, Nearer East, pp. 170-1.

II PHYSICS AND POLITICS 27

Apart, however, from this particular instance history shows
the continuous attraction of the Aegean littoral for the several
peoples of the peninsula.

Closely connected with the geological process to which
reference has been made is the uncertainty of the watershed
between the upper waters of the Vardar and those of the
Morava. That physical phenomenon finds its political re-
flection in the position of the Southern Slavs. By which
route will they ultimately obtain access to the sea ? By the
Vardar valley to the Aegean or by the Albanian Gap to the
Adriatic ? But for the malicious interposition of the Central
European Powers the Serbians would, without question, be
on the Adriatic to-day. ^Vhether that or the Aegean is their
' natural ' destiny is a point upon which natm-e has not very
decisively pronounced. It is, however, worthy of note that
there is no such 'pull' to the Adriatic as there is to the
Aegean. To Italy the strategical value of the Dalmatian
and Albanian coast is unquestionable. It has still to be
demonstrated that it is for the Southern Slavs a 'natural'
outlet either in a commercial or in a political sense. If the
dictates of ethnography are to be accepted as final the award
cannot be in doubt. The claim of the Southern Slavs is
indisputable. But race is not the only factor of which
account must be taken.

A conspectus of the physical features of the peninsula
seems, indeed, to suggest the conclusion that the main
structural lines are not horizontal but vertical. The general
trend is north to south, not east to west nor west to east*
It would be unwise to lay exaggerated emphasis upon this
physiographic tendency. To do so might supply a physical
justification for the Drang nach Sildosten of the Central
European Empires. But it may not, on this account, be
ignored. The conclusions suggested by the main lines of
communication are indeed irresistible.

In a country such as has been described above it would be Roads ami
ridiculous to look for elaborate means of communication. In R^il^^ays.
the Balkans, at any rate, they will be looked for in vain.

^ Cf. Evans, The Adriatic Slavs.

t2r~~-7^ *'

^

THE BALKANS

(ROMAN EMPIRE)

Roman Roads 3'ho^n thus

//. S UnZtxri ,

BALKAN RAILWAYS
1914

XSjTm

30 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

Neither by road nor rail is communication easy. The difficulties
interposed by nature may be gauged by a comparison, extra-
ordinarily suggestive, between the Roman road map and
a modern railway map of the peninsula. A glance at the
maps on pp. 28 and 29 will show that only in one respect is
there any conspicuous divergence between the two. The
primary purpose of the Roman roadmaker was to secure
a direct line of communication between the old Rome on the
Tiber and the new Rome on the Bosphorus. This purpose
w^as achieved by the construction of the famous Via Egnatia,
which, starting from Durazzo on the Adriatic, ran by way of
Lake Ochrida to Monastir and thence to Salouica. From
Salonica it ran parallel to, but at some little distance from,
the Aegean littoral to Kavala, and thence do^Mi to the shore
at Dedeagatch, from which point it made straight for Con-
stantinople. A second trunk-road from Belgrade to Constan-
tinople via Nish, Sofia, Philippopolis, and Adrianople — the
precise route of the line now traversed by the Berlin to
Constantinople express. A third, starting from Metkovitch,
followed the stream of the Narenta, and thence ran up to
Serajevo, and linked Serajevo with Salonica by way of Novi
Bazar, the plain of Kossovo, and Uskub. Subsidiary roads
connected Scutari with the Danube via Nish, and Monastir
with the Danube via Sofia.

The modern lines of communication are, with one excep-
tion, far less systematic. Bucharest now is connected by
different lines with the Roumanian port of Constanza, the
Bulgarian port of Varna, with Sofia, and, via Philippopolis,
with Constantinople. Otherwise, the advantage lay with the
Roman roads. Besides the trunk-line already mentioned
between Belgrade and Constantinople, a second connects
Belgrade with Nish, Uskub, and Salonica, and a branch line
runs from Salonica to Constantinople. But, with the excep-
tion of a line from Ragusa to Serajevo, there is not a single
railway running westward from or eastward to the Adriatic.
There is nothing to connect either Durazzo or Valona with
Monastir and Salonica ; nor Serajevo with anything to the
south of it. The outbreak of the European War interrupted
various projects for supplying the more obvious of these

II PHYSICS AND POLITICS 31

deficiencies, but many repairs will have to be effected before
any large schemes of construction are likely to be resumed.
Meanwhile, the main lines of communication remain much as
the Romans left them. Now, as then, they are dictated by
the triangular central upland which, based upon Constanti-
nople and Salon ica, reaches its apex at Belgrade. Now, as
then, these three cities hold the keys of the peninsula.

The foregoing survey of the geographical features of the I'olitical
Balkans, summary as it has been, is sufficient to indicate the Jj^nst
exceptional degree of influence which in this interesting impossi-
region Physics has exercised upon Politics. In such a country ^.^nJaJiza-
it would be vain to expect the establishment of a strong tion.
centralized State, such as was possible in England, and still
more obviously in France. Nor, in fact, has there ever been
such a State in the Balkans. The Greek city States represent
the antithesis of centralization, and neither ISIacedon nor
Rome was foolish enough to attempt the impossible. The
Ottoman Empire, though in a sense despotic, has never been
a centralized despotism. Subsequent chapters will make it
clear that in practice a very considerable amount of local
autonomy was permitted to the conquered peoples even
throughout the most oppressive periods of Ottoman dominion.
Centralization is indeed prohibited by nature.

Even a closely knit federal State would seem to be outside Klein-
the realm of possibilities for the Balkans. Nature points '^ '^'^ ^^^^'
imperiously to a congeries of relatively small States, and the
geographical presuppositions are re-enforced by the principle
of ethnography. The present distribution of States and races
is, on the whole, tolerably scientific. As usual, however,
nature has done her political work in a slovenly fashion, and
has left a number of very ragged edges. Or perhaps it would
be more modest and more true to say that man has been too
stupid to interpret with precision the monitions of nature.
But wherever the blame lies, the fact remains that there are
in the Balkans a good many intermediate or debatable
districts, the political destiny of which cannot easily be deter-
mined. As we have already seen nature has not made it quite
clear whether she means Serbia to expand towards the
Adriatic or towards the Aegean. Politically, the former

32 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

alternative would be the less inconvenient, for it might untie
one of the many knots in which the Macedonian problem
is involved.
Inter- Of all the debatable areas Macedonia is the most con-

rivahy spicuous. If the Moslems are to evacuate it, upon whom
is the inheritance to devolve? Upon Greece, Serbia, or
Bulgaria ? If upon all three, how will the lines of a satis-
factory frontier be drawn ? That Bulgaria cannot be per-
manently content with the present arrangement is frankly
admitted by the most prescient of Greek statesmen. But if
Greece makes room for Bulgaria at Kavala, ought Serbia to
keep Monastir ? Does not the road system of the Romans,
however, suggest a connexion between Monastir and Durazzo?
Again, is not Salonica the obvious port of Belgrade? Or
possibly, horresco referens, of Buda-Pesth, or even of Berlin ?
It is much easier to ask these questions than to answer them.
And they are far from being exhaustive. They may serve as
samples of the problems propounded by Physics to Politics
in the Balkans.

Two conclusions would seem, however, to emerge with toler-
able clearness, and there is some danger of our being compelled
to accept a third. It will always be difficult to maintain in
the Balkans a single centralized State ; unless, therefore, the
ingenuity of man can triumphantly overcome the dispositions
of nature there will always be a congeries of relatively small
States. Must we also conclude that these States will remain
to all time in a condition of rivalry ; is an armed peace the
best that is to be hoped for in the Balkans ? This question
cannot in any case be disposed of summarily, and an attempt
at a considered answer may conveniently be deferred to
a later chapter. But this much may be said at once. It
would be hazardous to draw conclusions either from the
'miracle' of 1912 or from the grotesquely disappointing sequel
of 1913. Grossly exaggerated were the hopes founded upon
the formation of the Balkan League ; perversely pessimistic
were the opposite conclusions derived from its melodramatic
dissolution.
Con- Two inferences seem to be justified by recent events.

First, that the utmost degree of centralization which may be

II PHYSICS AND POLITICS 33

reasonably looked for in the Balkans is a somewhat loose con- v. Federal-
federation of the Christian States. Unification is prohibited '^°^-
alike by geography and by ethnography. Even federalism
presupposes the existence of unifying forces which have not
as yet manifested themselves in this region. Things being as
they are, a Staatenbund would therefoi'e be preferable to
a Bundesstaat : Switzerland is a model more appropriate to
the Balkans than Germany or the Australian Commonwealth ;
and the Switzerland ante 1848 rather than that of to-day.
Secondly, even this measure of union is unattainable without
a thorough territorial readjustment. No confederation, how-
ever loose in structure, could be expected to endure for six
months, unless a fairly satisfactory settlement of outstanding
difficulties can be previously effected. And that settlement
must come from within. The Treaties of London and
Bucharest (May and August, 1913) are a sufficient warning
against the futility of European intervention in Balkan affairs.
Even assuming complete disinterestedness and goodwill, the
event is only too likely to defeat benevolent intentions ;
where, as at Bucharest, such an assumption is forbidden by
notorious facts, intervention can issue only in disaster.

The above reflections suggest irresistibly a further conclu- Europe
sion. Physiography, as we have seen, denies to the Balkan ^ *
lands any pre-eminent importance from the productive point East.
of view. In this respect the Danubian principalities are the
most favourably circumstanced among the States of the
peninsula. The external commerce of Roumania is approxi-
mately equal to that of the rest of the States put together,
and Roumanian oil and cereals have undoubtedly a great
future in the European markets. But only on one condition —
that the egress of Roumanian merchandise through the narrow
straits is unimpeded. The future of Constantinople is there-
fore of vital consequence to Roumania. Bulgaria, with an
Aegean sea-board, is obviously less interested, but only in
one degi'ee. Bulgaria, like Roumania, is giving evidence of
improvement in the methods of cultivation by the exporta-
tion of cereals. Nor are the exports of Greece and Serbia
insignificant, though Greece ministers chiefly to luxuries.

It is not, however, in its productive capacity that the

1M4 D

34 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

economic importance of the Near East consists. That is to
be sought in its general geogi'aphical situation regarded from
the point of view of Weltpolitih and Weltokonomie. Through-
out the ages this region has possessed an incomparable
importance in relation to the commercial lines of communica-
tion. Temporarily diverted by the discovery of America and
of the Cape route to India, commerce, always conservative in
its instincts, has lately regained the accustomed paths. The
Balkans, Egj^pt, Mesopotamia, are again to-day, what from
the dawn of history they have been, objects of jealous desire to
all economically minded peoples. Less from the point of view
of occupation than of control ; less for their intrinsic impor-
tance than as a means of access to other lands. Hence the
concentration of international rivalries upon the lands which
fringe the Eastern ISIediterranean. That rivalry has not
exhausted itself during the last twenty centuries ; on the
contrary, it seems possible that we may be about to witness
its manifestation on a scale without precedent in the history
of the world. Nor can there be any doubt that the lands
which form part, or until recently did form part, of the Ottoman
Empire will provide the arena. Enough has been already
said on the importance of Egypt, S}Tia, and Constantinople
as guarding the lines of commimication, but we must not
fail to notice that the geographical formation of the peninsula
itself has rendered it exceptionally open to incursions. Unlike
the Iberian peninsula, that of the Balkans is widest where it
joins the European continent. Neither to the north-east nor
to the north-west is there any natural line of separation, still
less is there any substantial obstacle to the advance of a hostile
incursion.^ Over and over again has Roumania oiFered a con-
venient high road for the passage of invading hosts : Goths,
Huns, Lombards, Avars, and Slavs traversed it in turn,
though only the last tarried in Roumania itself. Between
Bucharest and Constantinople there is no serious impediment,
still less between Belgrade on the one hand and either the
Aegean or the Bosphorus on the other.

Relatively small and weak as the States of the Balkans

1 Cf. Newbiggin, op. cit., p. 15.

II PHYSICS AND POLITICS 35

are, and must necessarily be, what hope is there of their being
able to ofler any effective resistance to similar incursions in
the future? There would seem to be none except in the
adoption of safeguards similar to those which for more than
a century have maintained inviolate the neutrality and inde-
pendence of the Swiss Confederation: constitutional readjust-
ment, neutralization under an international guarantee, and
a confederate citizen army, well trained and well equipped,
and prepared, if need be, to extort the respect of powerful
neighbours. Before these conditions can be attained there
will have to be a good deal of give and take among the
Balkan States ; irreconcilable claims in Macedonia and else-
where will have to be compromised. This Avill be no easy task,
but it may perhaps be accomplished if once the contending
parties can be convinced that there are only two other alterna-
tives. Either the peninsula will, in the future as in the past,
be the prey of any sufficiently powerful invader, or it will find
protection by common subordination to an alien empire,
drawing upon resources external to the peninsula, and
imposing its will by irresistible military strength. These
alternatives to a domestic accommodation are not attractive,
but they are exliaustive. Physiography excludes a third.

For fm-ther reference : D. G. Hogarth, The Near East ; Miss Xewbiggin,
Geographical Aspects of the Balkan Problem ; Sir W. W. Hunter, History
of British India, vol. i ; E. Himly, La formation territoriale ; E. A.
Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe ; Sir Arthur Evans, The
Adriatic Slavs and the Overland Route to Constantinople.

1) 2

I

I

CHAPTER III

THE ADVENT OF THE OTTOMANS

Conquests in Europe

' Modern history begins under the stress of the Ottoman Conquest.' —
Lord Acton.

' II n'y a point de nation turque, mais seulement des conquerants campes
au milieu de populations hostiles ; les Turcs ne forment point un Etat,
mais une armi^e qui ne vaut que pour la conquete et tend a se dissoudre
des qu'elle est contrainte de s'arreter.' — Albert Sorel.

The origins of the Turkish tribe, subsequently known as The
tlie Osraanlis, Othmans or Ottomans, are slu-ouded in baffling Ottomans
obscurity. The highly coloured pictures drawn by their o^vn
liistorians are, by common consent, entirely untrustworthy.
But if little can be learnt authoritatively, perhaps it is
because there is little to learn. It is still more probable that
we have a good deal to unlearn. We are bidden, for example,
to discard the commonly accepted tradition of a westward
migration on an imposing scale ; of a great struggle between
the Ottoman and Seljukian Turks ; of the dramatic overthrow
of the Seljuk Empire ; of the establishment of a powerful
Ottoman Empire in Asia Minor and the advance of the
conquerors upon South-Eastern Europe. This book is not,
however, a history of the Ottomans, and the critical discussion
of these and similar questions must not therefore be per-
mitted to detain us. Let it suffice to say that the Ottomans
emerge into the realm of authentic history in the thirteenth
century. We first see them as one of innumerable bands of
nomads, warriors, and herdsmen, flying from the highlands
of Central Asia before the fierce onset of the Moguls.
A picturesque but exceedingly doubtful legend tells how
Ertogrul, chief of a tribe of some four hundred families,
found himself in a position to perform a signal service to
Alaeddin, Sultan of the Seljukian Turks. The Seljuks had

38 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

established a powerful empire in Asia Minor in the course of
the eleventh and twelfth centuries, but by the thirteenth
their power was manifestly in decay. To the Seljuk Empire
there was no immediate successor. The story of its overthrow
by the Ottomans cannot be accepted. All that we know is
that Ertogrul and his small band of folloAvers established
themselves, towards the middle of the thirteenth century, in
the north-western corner of Asia Minor, in the plain between
Brusa and Xicaea, with a ' capital ' at Yenishehr.
Osman To Ertogrul there succeeded in 1288 Ms sou Osman or

13^6^ Othman, from whom the tribe, destined to fame as the
conquerors of Constantinople and inheritors of the Byzantine
Empire, took their name.^ Osman extended his modest
heritage partly at the expense of other Turkish Emirs but
mainly at the expense of the Greek Empire in Asia Minor, and,
upon the extinction of the Seljuk Empire, he assumed the
title of Sultan [circ. 1300). In 1301 he won his first notable
victory over tlie Greeks at Baphaeon, in the neighbourhood
of Nicomedia, and during the next few years he pushed on
towards the Black Sea, and thus hemmed in the strong Greek
cities of Nicomedia, Brusa, and Nicaea. On his death-bed
(1326) he learnt that Brusa had fallen to his son Orkhan,
and though the great prize of Nicaea was denied to him,
Osman died ' virtual lord of the Asiatic Greeks '.^
Orklian His son and successor Orkhan not only rounded offOsman's
i8^.m~ ^vork in Asia Minor, but obtained a firm foothold upon the
European shores of the Hellespont. Nicomedia, the ancient
capital of the Emperor Diocletian, fell to him in the first
year of his reign, and was renamed Ismid. A few years later
he crowned his victories over the Byzantine Empire in Asia
Minor by the capture of Nicaea, the second city of the
Empire. By this time the Eastern Empire M'as, as we shall
see later, tottering to its fall, not only in Asia INIinor but in
Europe. Towards the middle of the fourteenth century the
pitiful remnant of it was distracted by civil war between the

1 Only to Europeans are the Ottomans knoM n as ' Turks ' — a name,
among- themselves, of contempt, see H. A. Gibbons, Ottoman Empire,
p. 29 ; Hogarth, Balkans, p. 310, &c.

- Hogarth, op. cit., p. 325.

1359).

Ill THE ADVENT OF THE OTTOINIANS 39

Palaeologi and John Cantacuzenos, who in 1341 had crowned
himself Emperor at Demotika. Both parties appealed to
Sultan Orkhan for help. Orkhan Avent to the assistance of
Cantacuzenos in 1345, and was rewarded by the hand of
Theodora, daughter of Cantacuzenos and granddaughter
of the Bulgarian Tsar. This marriage may be regarded as
the first step towards the establishment of an Ottoman-
Byzantine Empire in Europe. In 1349 Orkhan's assistance
was again invoked by his father-in-law, to help in repelling
the attacks of the Serbians, now at the zenith of their power,
upon Macedonia. Orkhan's response was suspiciously
prompt, and again a large body of Ottoman warriors feasted
their eyes with a vision of the promised land.

Hitherto the Ottoman horsemen, once their mission was ac- Per-
complished, had duly withdrawn to their home on the Asiatic gg^i^.
shore. But we are now on the eve of one of the cardinal events ment in
in world-history. That event was in one sense only the natural ^353)^
sequel to those which immediately preceded it ; nevertheless it
definitely stands out as marking the opening of a new chapter.
In 1353 Cantacuzenos once more appealed for the help of the
Ottoman Sultan against the Serbians : accordingly, Orkhan
sent over his son Suleiman Pasha, by whose aid the Serbians
were defeated at Demotika and the Greeks recaptured the
Thracian capital Adrianople. In acknowledgement of these
signal services Suleiman Pasha received the fortress of
Tzympe, and there the Ottomans effected their first lodg-
ment on European soil. Much to the chagrin of the rival
emperors Gallipoli fell before the Ottoman assault in the
following year (1354), and a few years later Demotika also was
taken. By this time the breach between Orkhan and his
father-in-law was complete, and henceforward the Osmanli
horsemen fought in Europe no longer as auxiliaries but
as principals. Suleiman Pasha was killed by a fall from
his horse in 1358, and a year later his father followed
him to the grave. But the grip which they had got upon
the European shore of the Dardanelles was never after-
wards relaxed.

Before proceeding to describe the wonderful achievements Condition
of Ottoman arms during the next hundred years it seems Ejjgt°"4

Ill THE ADVENT OF THE OTTOMANS 41

desirable to get some clear idea of the political conditions Europe

which prevailed in South-Eastern Europe. four-^

Tlie Empire of the East, kno^\^l indifferently as the Greek teenth

or Byzantine Empire, had by this time reached the last stage ce^*"iT-

of emasculate decay. The life of the Roman Empire had Qi-ggk

been prolonged for more than a thousand years by the epoch- Empire.

making resolution of the Emperor Constantine. But it was

now ebbing fast. For three hundred years after Constantine's

removal of the capital to Byzantium (330 a.d.) the Empire

continued to be essentially Roman. With the reign of

Heraclius (610-41) it became as definitely Greek. Under

Leo in (the Isaurian, 716-41) Greek became the official

language of the Empire , though its subjects still continued,

until the advent of the Ottomans and beyond it, to style

themselves Romaioi. Many hard things have been said of the

Eastern Empire, but this at least should be remembered to

its credit. For nearly a thousand years it held the gates of

Europe against a series of assaults from the East, until in turn

it was itself partly overwhelmed and partly absorbed by the

Ottomans. Not that the Ottomans were the earliest of the

Turkish tribes to threaten the Greek Empire. Towards the

end of the eleventh century the Seljuks overran Asia Minor,

drove the Emperor out of his Asiatic capital, Nicaea, and

assumed the title of Sultans of Roum. The Emperors of the

House of Comnenos pushed back the Seljuks from Nicaea to

Iconium (Konia), but in the latter part of the twelfth century

the Eastern Empire again showed symptoms of decrepitude,

and at the opening of the thirteenth century it suffered an

irreparable blow.

The fourth crusade (1200-4) has generallv been accounted The Latin

. . Empire at

one of the blackest crimes in modern history.^ The immediate coi^tanti-

result of it was to establish a Latin or Frankish Empire, under nople

Baldwin, Count of Flanders, in Constantinople ; more re- ^ "

motely it may be held responsible for the Ottoman conquest

of South-Eastern Europe. It lasted little more than half

a century (1204-61) ; but during those years the work of

1 See e. g. Sir Richard Jebb, Modern Greece, p. 30 ; Sir Edwin Pears,
Conquest of Constantinople', the famous chapters in Gibbon's Decline
and Fall ; and Milman's Latin Ghriatianity .

42 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

disintegration proceeded apace in the Balkan lands. The
Slavonic kingdoms firmly established themselves in the
northern parts. Boniface of Montferrat proclaimed himself
King of Salonica. Greece proper was divided np into various
Frankish principalities, while the Aegean islands passed, for
the most part, under the flag of the maritime Republic
of Venice. Meanwhile, the Greek Empire, dethroned at
Constantinople, maintained itself, in somewhat precarious
existence, at Nicaea. Not less precarious was the hold of the
Latin Empire upon Constantinople. The latter was purely
a military adventure. It never struck any roots into the
soil, and in 1261 Michael Palaeologus, Emperor of Nicaea,
had little difficulty in reconquering Constantinople from the
Latins. The restored Byzantine Empire survived for nearly
two centuries, but its prestige had been fatally damaged, its
vitality had been sapped, and it awaited certain dissolution
at the hands of a more virile race. There can indeed be
little doubt that only the advent of the Ottomans prevented
Constantinople itself from falling into the hands of the
Southern Slavs. The condition of the Byzantine Empire
during this last period of its existence presents a curious
analogy to that of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth.
' It is ', writes a penetrating critic, ' the story of an uninter-
rupted succession of bitter internal quarrels, of attacks by
former vassals upon the immediate frontiers of its shrunken
territory, of subtle undermining by hostile colonies of
foreigners whose one thought was commercial gain, and of
intermittent, and in almost all cases selfishly inspired, eiForts
of Western Europe to put oflp the fatal day.' ^

Territorially, the Greek Empire had shrunk to the narrowest
limits, little wider, in fact, than those to which the Ottoman
Empire in Europe is reduced to-day. The Empire of Trebi-
zond represented the remnant of its possessions in Asia, while
in Europe, apart from Constantinople and Thrace, it held
only the Macedonian coast with the city of Salonica and the
Eastern Peloponnesus. Hungary, Transylvania, Wallachia,
Croatia, and Bosnia oAvned the sway of Lewis the Great ; the

^ H. A. Gibbons, op. cit., p. 36*

Ill THE AD^TENT OF THE OTTOMANS 43

Serbian Empire stretched from Belgrade to the Gulf of
Corinth, from the Adriatic to the Aegean ; Bulgaria held what
we know as Bulgaria proper and Eastern Roumelia ; Dalmatia,
Corfu, Crete, and Euboea were in the hands of Venice ; the
Knights of St. John were in possession of Rhodes, while the
Franks still held the kingdom of Cyprus, the principality of
Achaia, the Duchies of Athens, Naxos, and Cephalonia, not
to speak of many of the Aegean islands. Little, therefore,
was left to the successors of the Caesars in Constantinople.

When the Romans first made themselves masters of South- lHyiians
Eastern Europe they found three gi'eat races in possession : ^j^j^
the lUyrians, the Thracians, and the Hellenes. The Illyrians,
who had established the kingdom of Epirus in the fourth
century B.C., were represented in the thirteenth century, as
they are still, by the mountaineers of Albania. The Thracians,
dominant during the ^lacedonian supremacy, mingled with
Trajan's colonists in Dacia to form the people represented by
the modern Roumanians. But neither of these aboriginal
races would, perhaps, have preserved, through the ages, their
identity but for the existence of the third race, the Greeks.
It was the Greeks, who, by their superiority to their Roman
conquerors in all the elements of civilization, prevented the
absorption of the other races by the Romans, and so con-
tributed to that survival of separate nationalities which, from
that day to this, has constituted one of the special peculiarities
of Balkan politics. Of the Illyrians in Albania little need, in
this place, be said, except that they have successfully resisted
absorption by the Turks as they had previously resisted
similar efforts on the part of Romans, Byzantines, and
Slavs.

The Albanians have never contributed an important factor
to the Balkan problem. Like the Slavs, but in even greater
degree, ' they were devoid of cohesion and political sentiment,
and have at no time been more than an aggregate of tribes,
mostly occupied with internal quarrels,' ^ though, as we shall
see, they have more than once produced a man of virile and
commanding personality.

J Eliot, op. cit., p. 44.

44 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

Moldavia Far different has been the history of the Thracians in the
kchia ^ Danubian principalities. That history is largely the outcome
of geography. Their geographical situation, as was explained
in the preceding chapter, though suggesting a highway to
westward-bound invaders rendered them immune from con-
quest, and, as a fact, they have never actually submitted to
a conqueror. Least of all to the Ottomans, who, as we shall
see later, never made any serious or sustained attempt to
absorb them into their Empire,

The modern Roumanians are commonly supposed to be
descendants of the Roman colonists settled {circ. a.d. 101) by
the Emperor Trajan in the province of Dacia for the pro-
tection of the Roman Empire against the northern barbarians.
This account of their origin was disputed, however, by
Dr. Freeman, who held that they represented * not specially
Dacians or Roman colonists in Dacia, but the great Thracian
race generally, of which the Dacians were only a part '. ^ The
question is not one which can be permitted to detain us. It
must suffice for our present purpose to say that just as the
Hungarians represent a great Magyar wedge thrust in between
the Northern and the Southern Slavs, so do the Roumanians
represent a Latin wedge, distinct and aloof from all their
immediate neighbours, though not devoid, especially in
language, of many traces of Slav influences. Towards the
close of the third century {circ. a.d. 271) the Emperor
Aurelian was compelled by barbarian inroads to abandon
his distant colony, and to withdraw the Roman legions, but
the colonists themselves retired into the fastnesses of the
Carpathians, only to emerge again many centuries later,
when the barbarian flood had at last subsided.

For nearly a thousand years, reckoning to the Tartar
invasion of 1241, Dacia was nothing but a highway for suc-
cessive tides of barbarian invaders, Goths, Huns, Lombards,
Avars, and Slavs. But, except the last, none of the invaders
left any permanent impress upon the land. Still, the suc-
cessive tides followed each other so quickly that the Daco-
Romans themselves were completely submerged, and for a
thousand years history loses sight of them.

' E. A. Freeman, Ottoman Poioer in Europe, p. 51.

Ill THE ADVENT OF THE OTTOMANS 45

But though submerged they were not dissipated. 'The
possession of the regions on the Lower Danube', writes
Traugott Tamm, 'passed from one nation to another, but
none endangered the Roumanian nation as a national
entity. " The water passes, the stones remain " ; the
hordes of the migration period, detached from their native
soil, disappeared as mist before the sun. But the Roman
element bent their heads while the storm passed over them,
clinging to the old places until the advent of happier days,
when they were able to stand up and stretch their limbs.' ^
The southern portion of what is now Roumania emerged,
towards the close of the thirteenth century, as the principality
of Wallachia (or Muntenia, i. e. mountain-land) ; the northern,
a century later, came to be known as the Principality of
Moldavia. Both principalities were founded by immigrant
Rouman nobles from Transylvania, and, as a consequence,
Roumania has always been distinguished from the other
Balkan provinces by the survival of a powerful native aristo-
cracy. In Serbia the nobles were exterminated ; in Bosnia
they saved their property by the surrender of their faith ; in
Roumania alone did they retain both.

Such was the position of the Danubian principalities when
the Ottomans began their career of conquest in South-Eastern
Europe. The principalities had never been in a position, like
their neighbours to the south and west of them, to aspire to
a dominant place in Balkan politics. Nor were they, like those
neighbours, exposed to the first and full fury of the Ottoman
attack. Still, under its famous Voivode Mircaea the Great,
Wallachia took part against the Ottomans in the great
Slavonic combinations, which were dissolved by the Turkish
victories at Kossovo (1389) and Nicopolis (1396).

Early in the fifteenth century the Ottomans crossed the
Danube, and in 1412 Wallachia was reduced to a state of
vassaldom. But it was never wholly absorbed like Serbia,
Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, and Thrace into the Ottoman
Empire. Nor was Moldavia, which, for obvious geographical
reasons, managed to maintain its independence for a hundred

^ Quoted by D. Mitrany, The Balkans, p. 256.

46 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

years longer than Wallachia. In 1475 Stephen the Great,
Voivode of Moldavia, won a resounding victory over the
Turkish army at Racova. In 1512, however, his son Bogdan,
weakened by the attacks of Poland and Hungary, made a
voluntary submission to the Ottomans. He agreed to pay
tribute to the Sultan and to assist him in time of war, but
Moldavia was to continue to elect its own prince, and no
Turk was to be permitted to settle in the principality. These
terms were confirmed, in 1536, by Suleiman the Magnificent,
and formed the basis of the relations Avhich subsisted be-
tween Constantinople and the two Danubian principalities
down to the eighteenth century.
Bulgaria. South of the Danube and between that river and the
Aegean lay the district known as Bulgaria. The Thraco-
Illyrian race by which it was originally inhabited was
conquered by the Slavs who, from the beginning of the sixth
century onwards, inundated the peninsula. By the middle of
the seventh century the Slav penetration of the Balkans was
complete ; from the Danube to the Maritza, from the Adriatic
to the Black Sea the Slavs formed a solid mass, broken
only by Albania and Southern Thrace ; Greeks held the
Aegean coast and most of the towns — Athens, Corinth, Patras,
Larissa, and Salonica : but even in the interior of the Morea
there was a considerable infusion of Slavs. Upon the heels
of the Slavs came the Bulgars. The latter belong to a
Turanian race, akin to the Avars, Huns, Magyars, and
Finns. Coming like other Mongol races from Eastern Asia,
they settled on the Volga, where the Greater or White
Bulgaria continued to exist down to the sixteenth century.
Thence they made various predatory inroads into the Balkan
peninsula, in the latter part of the sixth and first half of the
seventh century, and eventually in 679 subjugated the Slavs
of Moesia and effected a definite and permanent settle-
ment in the land between the Danube and the Balkan
mountains. After their settlement, however, they were
completely assimilated in language and in civilization to the
conquered Slavs, and to-day they are commonly accounted
a Slavonic people. Yet despite identity of speech, and
despite a very large infusion of Slav blood, the Bulgar has

Ill THE ADVENT OF THE OTTOMANS 47

developed a distinct national self-consciousness which has
constantly come into conflict with that of the Southern
Slavs.

The antagonism between these near neighbours has been
accentuated in recent years by the establishment of a\i
independent Bulgarian Exarchate, That exceedingly im-
portant step was taken in 1870, precisely one thousand years
after the fateful decision by which the Bulgarian Church was
placed under the Patriarch of Constantinople. Prince Boris
of Bulgaria had been converted to Christianity in 865, but
for the first few years it was uncertain whether the infant
Bulgarian Church would adhere to Constantinople or to
Rome. In 870, during the reign of the Emperor Basil I, the
victory, pregnant with consequences for Bulgaria, was assured
to Constantinople.

It was under Simeon the Great (893-927), the son of Boris, First
that Bulgaria attained to the position of a great Power. Emph-e*^"
Simeon himself adopted the style of ' Tsar and Autocrat of (893-972).
all Bulgars and Greeks', and the territorial expansion of
his kingdom, the widest as yet achieved by Bulgaria,
went far to sustain his titular pretensions. The Byzantine
emperors could command the allegiance only of Constanti-
nople, Adrianople, Salonica, and the territory immediately
adjacent thereto, and were compelled to pay tribute to
the Bulgarian Tsar. Simeon's empire stretched at one
time from the Black Sea almost to the Adriatic, and
included Serbia and all the inland parts of Macedonia,
Epirus, and Albania.

But the first Bulgarian Empire was shortlived. The Serbs
reasserted their independence in 931 ; domestic feuds led to
the partition of Bulgaria itself into Eastern and Western
Bulgaria in 963 ; ecclesiastical schism, due to the spread of
the curious Bogomil heresy, accentuated civil strife ; while
the Emperor Nikephoros Phokas (963-9) renounced in 966
the tribute paid to the Bulgarian Tsar, and, shortsightedly
invoking the assistance of the Russians, inflicted a crushing
defeat upon Bulgaria, It was, indeed, easier to introduce

1 See map, p. 48.

Ill THE ADVENT OF THE OTTOMANS 49

the Russians into the Balkans than to get rid of them. But
the latter feat was at length accomplished by the Emperor
John Tzimisces — a brilliant Armenian adventurer — and
Eastern Bulgaria was merged, for the time, into the Byzantine
Empire (972).

Western Bulgaria, with its capital at Okhrida, and including
at one time Thessaly, Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, Herze-
govina, and parts of Serbia and Bulgaria proper, survived
for another thirty years. But it in turn fell before the long-
sustained attack of the Emperor Basil II (976-1025), known
to fame as Bulgaroktonos, * slayer of the Bulgarians.'
A succession of victories culminated in 1016 in the capture
of Okhrida, and the Western Bulgaria, like the Eastern,
ceased to exist. Once more the authority of the Byzantine
emperor was reasserted throughout the peninsula.

For more than a century and a half the history of Bulgaria The
is a blank. Its revival dates from a successful revolt headed By*j^arian
in 1186 by John Asen — a Vlach shepherd — against the tyranny Empire,
of the Emperor Isaac Angel us. The capital of this second 1257)
or Vlacho-Bulgarian Empire was at Tirnovo where, in
1187, John Asen was crowned. It included, at one time,
besides Bulgaria proper, most of Serbia, with parts of
Thrace, IMacedonia, Thessaly, and Epirus, but the murder
of John Asen II in 1257 brought the Vlach dynasty and the
Vlacho-Bulgarian Empire to an end. Most of its provinces
had already been lost to it, and the remnant was held in
vassaldom to Serbia. For the Serbs had by this time become
the dominant power in the peninsula, and it was, as we have
seen, to combat the insistent menace of this people that
Catacuzenos, in the middle of the fourteenth century, invoked
the aid of the Ottomans. The place of the Southern Slavs
in the Balkan polity of the fourteenth century must, there-
fore, be our next concern.

Of the coming of the Slavs into the Balkan Peninsula Serbia
something has been already said. By the middle of the Southern
seventh century the peninsula had become predominantly Slavs.
Slavonic, and the lines of the chief Slav States had already
been roughly defined. Of Bulgaria no more need be said.
The other three were inhabited by Serbs, Croatians, and

1984 E

I \ TARTAR

C \empire

\MOLDAVIA\

KINGDOM OF HUNGARY \

MEDIEVAL KINGDOM
OF

SERBIA

(STEPHEN DUSHAN)

£f.S JlaCart,,

Ill THE ADVENT OF THE OTTOMANS 51

Slovenes respectively. The last occupied what we know as
Carniola and Southern Carinthia ; the Croats held Croatia
with parts of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia ; the Serbs
held the remaining portions of the three last-named provinces
together with Montenegro and practically everything which
was assigned to Serbia by the Treaty of Bucharest (1013),
i. e. Serbia proper, old Serbia, and the northern part of
Macedonia. The Southern Slavs have always been more
devoted to independence than to discipline, more conspicuous
for valour than for organizing capacity. From the first they
were, in a political sense, loosely knit, lacking in coherence
or in the power of continuous combination. They were bound
to the soil, not by serfdom, but by the afifectionate ties of
cultivating proprietors. Such governmental machinery as
they devised was local rather than central ; they organized
themselves in agricultural village-communities, and showed
a marked aversion, in strong contrast with the Greeks, to
city life. Originally they had neither kings, nor priests, nor
even slaves, but settled down in free communities of peasant
owners and organized their social and economic life on
*a system of family communism'.^ Freedom-loving and
brave, they had the defects of their qualities. Their lack
of discipline, subordination, and political coherence, not less
than the physical characteristics of their country, made it
difficult to weld them into a powerful State, while their
jealous devotion to the soil disposed them to local feuds of
a peculiarly ferocious character.

Torn by internal dissensions the Serbs have always lacked,
except towards the north, natural and definable frontiers.
Still more unfortunate has been their lack of coast-line.
They have never reached the Aegean, and only for a short
period were they established on the Adriatic. The Greeks
headed them oft' from the former ; the Venetians and Hun-
garians, after the fall of Rome, generally kept a jealous hold
upon the latter.

The Serbs embraced Christianity towards the end of the
ninth century, but in ecclesiastical as in political afluirs the

^ Eliot, op. cit., p. 25.
E 2

52

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

The

Serbian
Empire.

Stephen
Urosh
(1196-
1223).

Southern Slavs found it difficult to agree ; for while the Serbs
adhered to Constantinople the Croats acknowledged the
authority of Rome. Temporal allegiance tended to follow
the same direction. From the ninth century to the twelfth
the Serbs were for the most part under the suzerainty of
the Bulgarian or the Byzantine Empires ; the Croats were
subject to Hungary or Venice.

The great period in the mediaeval history of Serbia extends
from the middle of the twelfth to the close of the fourteenth
century. Under the Nemanya dynasty (1168-1371) Serbia
managed to compose, in some degree, her internal quarrels,
and so gave herself, for the first time, a chance of attaining to
a dominant position in Balkan politics. Stephen Nemanya,
the first of the new line, succeeded in uniting most of the
Serbian countries — Serbia proper, Montenegro, and Herze-
govina, and though forced to make submission to the
Emperor Manuel I Comnenus, he renewed his career of
conquest on the latter's death, 1180, and when, in 1196, he
resolved to abdicate, he handed over to his second son,
Stephen Urosh (1196-1223), a kingdom tolerably homo-
geneous, and, in extent, indubitably imposing.

The new ruler was, on his accession, confronted by diffi-
culties which have recurred with ominous regularity in every
period of Serbian history. These difficulties arose from three
main causes : dynastic disunion ; the jealousy of Bulgaria; and
the unremitting hostility of the Magyars of Hungary. The
chagrin of an elder brother, passed over in the succession, was
mollified by the tact of a younger brother, a monk, the famous
St. Sava. The same tactful intermediation secured for the
Serbian Church internal autonomy and independence of the
Patriarchate of Constantinople. Against the jealousy of Bul-
garia St. Sava was less successful, for the Bulgarians, seizing
the opportunity of Serbian disunion, made themselves ijiasters
of a large part of Eastern Serbia, including the important towns
of Belgrade, Nish, and Prizren. The hostility of Andrew II
of Hungary had, for the time being, little definite result, but
its existence supplies one of those constant factors which give
something of unity and consistency to the confused annals
of the Southern Slavs. If at any time there has been

Ill THE AD\T:NT of the OTTOMANS 53

any special manifestation of national self-consciousness
on the part of the Southern Slavs, Buda-Pesth has im-
mediately responded by a marked exhibition of its un-
ceasing vigilance and its ineradicable jealousy. Xor is it
possible to deny that the antagonism between the two
peoples is due to a direct conflict of interest. The Magyars
have always striven to obstruct the progress of the Southern
Slavs towards the Adriatic ; the Serbians still block the
access of the ^Nlagj'ars to the Aegean. Notwithstanding
these initial diflficulties the reign of Stephen Urosh was
exceptionally prosperous. He himself was the first of
Serbia's kings to receive the consecration of a solemn corona-
tion, and so skilful was his diplomacy in playing off Rome
against Constantinople, and Nicaea against both, that he
secured the recognition of Serbian independence, both civil
and ecclesiastical, not only from the Pope but fi-om the
Latin and Greek emperors.^

We must pass over with scant notice the century which
elapsed between the death of Stephen Urosh (1223) and the
accession of the most renowned of all Serbian rulers, Stephen
Dushan (1331). Serbian annals have little else to record
during this period but a monotonous tale of domestic quarrels
and military expeditions, conducted with varying success,
against immediate neighbours. A crushing defeat inflicted
upon a combination of Greeks and Bulgars by Stephen YH ^
(1321-31) is perhaps worthy of record, since it prepared
the way for the brilliant success achieved by his son. It
should be noted also that by this time the Serbians had
already come into contact with the Turks.

The reign of Stephen VHI, ' Dushan,' ^ demands more Steijlien
detailed consideration, for it marks the meridian of Serbian (1331-
history. Cut off at the early age of forty-six, perhaps by ^5).
poison, he yet lived long enough to establish his fame both
as lawgiver and conqueror. His code of laws published in

1 The Latin Empire was established at Constantinople in 1204, see supra,
p. 41.

~ It should be noted that the numeration of kings and the chronology
of their reigns are alike uncert<^in.

^ Dushan — the strayigler, and according to one, but not the only, version
Stephen VIII strangled his father.

54 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

1349, not less than his encouragement of literature and his
protection of the Church, has given to Dushan a place in the
history of his own land analogous to that of King Alfred in
our own. It is, however, as a mighty conqueror that his
memory lives most vividly in Balkan history.
Conquests His first military success Avas achieved against the Emperor
DiShan.''" Andronicus III. He invaded Thessaly, defeated the forces of
the emperor, and by a treaty dictated in 1340 Serbia was
recognized as the dominant power in the peninsula. Bulgaria,
the sister of whose king Dushan married, formally recognized
his supremacy, and in 1345 Stephen was crowned at Uskub,
which he made his capital, Tsar of the Serbs, Bulgars, and
Greeks. So formidable was Dushan's position in South-Eastern
Europe that in 1353 the Pope, Innocent VI, deemed it prudent
in the interests of Western Christendom to incite Lewis,
King of Hungary, to an attack upon the Serbian Tsar. The
Magyars, as we have seen, were never backward in such
enterprises ; but, in this case, their intervention recoiled
upon their own heads. The city of Belgrade, and the
provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina rewarded the victorious
arms of Dushan. The extent of his empire was now enormous.
It extended from the Save and Danube in the north almost
to the Aegean in the south ; from the Adriatic in the west
almost to the Lower Maritza in the east. It thus comprised
Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Southern Dalmatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Northern Macedonia, and a great part of
Greece.

The South Slavonic lands of Croatia, Slavonia, and Northern
Dalmatia were still outside the Serbian Empire, nor did it
even include Salonica, still less the imperial city itself. Not
that Constantinople was beyond the range of Dushan's am-
bition. The distracted condition of the Eastern Empire seemed
indeed to invite an attack upon it. In the domestic dissen-
sions which so grievously weakened the B} zantine emperors
in their incipient duel with the Ottomans, Dushan espoused
the side of the Empress Anna against Cantacuzenos, and with
marked success. In 1351 Dushan organized a great crusade

1 See snjyra, chap. iii.

Ill THE ADVENT OF THE OTTOMANS 55

against the decadent Empire of Constantinople with the hope
of re-establishing the imperial city as a barrier against the
advancing power of the Ottomans.

Cantacuzenos, as we have seen, had not hesitated, again
and again, to invoke the aid of Sultan Orkhan against the
redoubtable Dushan. In 1353 the Serbians were defeated
by the Ottomans at Demotika and Adrianople, and Thrace
and parts of Macedonia were thus recovered for the Byzantine
Empire. Dushan was great enough both as statesman and
strategist to see that, if South-Eastern Europe was to be
saved from the Asian menace, Constantinople itself must be
held by a national Power, more virile than that of the decadent
Byzantines. Under the circumstances that Power could be
none other than Serbia. Advancing in 1355 to the accom-
plishment of this great enterprise, Stephen Dushan was
suddenly and prematurely cut off. That poison should have
been suspected was inevitable, and the suspicion may be
justified.

The death of the Tsar Dushan may fitly close our prolonged
parenthesis.

The object of that parenthesis has been to enable the
reader to grasp the main features of the general political
situation in the Balkans at the moment when a new Power
intervened in European affairs. The close of it tempts to
speculation. Is it idle to conjecture what might have hap-
pened had the Ottomans declined the invitation of Cantacu-
zenos and elected to remain an Asiatic Power ? What, under
those circumstances, would have been the fate of South-
Eastern Europe ? The Greek Empire, undeniably damaged
in prestige by the Latin episode, had itself fallen into a state
of decrepitude which forbad any possible hope of redemp-
tion. Could a suitable successor have been found among the
other Balkan 'States'? The autochthonous Illyrians, now
settled in Albania, might perhaps have kept a hold on their
mountain fastnesses, but they could never have hoped to do
more. The Daco-Roumans, representing the other indigenous
race, were geographically too remote from any one of the three
keys of the Balkans — Belgrade, Salonica, and Constantinople
— to assume at this stage a leading role. The Greeks were

56 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

politically successful only so long as they remained within sight
and smell of the sea. The subjection of a hinterland has always
seemed to be beyond their powers. By a process of exclusion
we reach the Bulgarians and the Serbs, and judging from the
experience of the recent past the future seemed to belong to
one or other of these peoples, or stiU more certainly, if they
could compose the differences which divided them, to both.
Twice had the former attained to clear pre-eminence, if not to
domination. But the empires of Simeon and Asen were
matched if not surpassed by that of Stephen Dushan. And
to Serbia came the ' psychological ' chance. Her supremacy
m Balkan politics coincided with one of the great moments
in human history. Tremendous issues hung in the balance
when Stephen Dushan was suddenly smitten with mortal
illness, as he was advancing on Constantinople ; when, from
the Danube almost to the Aegean, from the Black Sea to
the Adriatic, Serbian suzerainty was virtually unchallenged ;
when the Ottomans were effecting their first lodgment on
European soil.

The history of the Southern Slavs had already revealed
congenital weaknesses ; it would be idle to pretend that more
recent experience has proved that during the dark days of
adversity and oblivion they have been entirely overcome.
But whatever the explanation the fact remains that, in the
middle of the fourteenth century, the Balkan Slavs had a
chance such as comes to few peoples ; and they missed it.
As a result the history of South-Eastern Europe belongs for
the next five hundred years not to the Slavs, nor to the
Greeks, but to their Ottoman masters.
Ottoman To the story of the Ottomans we must, therefore, after
in^irope. ^ long but necessary diversion, return. It was against the
Serbs, not against the Greeks, that the Ottoman arms in
Europe were first directed — a point on which a recent
historian has laid considerable emphasis. The result was
to involve the Ottoman invaders ' in a tangle of Balkan
affairs from which they only extricated themselves after forty
years of incessant fighting '.^ Nevertheless it was upon the

1 Hogarth, The Balkans, p. 327.

in THE ADVENT OF THE OTTOMANS 57

Thracian Chersonese that the invaders first fastened. Canta-
cuzenos was not slow to perceive the blunder he had made.
An appeal to Orkhan to quit liis hold was met by a courteous
but firm refusal. Whereupon the wretched emperor so far
humiliated himself as to beg for the assistance of the Bulgars
and Serbs. On their refusal his position in Constantinople
became desperate. His subjects recalled John Palaeologus,
and Cantacuzenos abdicated his uneasy throne and withdrew
into a monastery (1354).

Four years later Sultan Orkhan, his son-in-law, died. The IMurad I
reign of his son, Murad I, was one of the most splendid in the ^^^ ~
annals of the Ottomans. It opened auspiciously with a long
and successful campaign in Thrace (1360-1) which finally
assured the foothold of his people on the soil of Europe.
One after another the important strategic points in Thrace
fell into their hands, until at last, by the capture of Adrianople
and Philippopolis, they confined the Greek Empire to Constan-
tinople. The Emperor, John V, bowed to the inevitable,
recognized the Ottoman conquest of Thrace as definitive, and
agreed to become the vassal of the Sultan (1363).

By this time the Christian States were awakening to the
gravity of the situation, and in 1363 Lewis the Great of
Hungary led a crusading expedition of Hungarians, Serbians,
Bosnians, and Wallachians against the successful infidel.
Very little, however, was achieved by the enterprise, which
came to a disastrous, if not a disgraceful, end in a crushing
defeat on the banks of the ]Maritza.

In 1366 Sultan Murad took a step of high significance ; he Conquest
established his capital at Adrianople, and, turning his back Balkan
upon the imperial city, devoted himself for the remainder of Peninsula.
his life and reign — twenty-three years — to the conquest of the
Balkan Peninsula. Sisman of Bulgaria was, in 1379, reduced
to vassaldom ; the Serbs were decisively defeated at Taenarus,
and the Nemanya dynasty came to an end. With the extinction
of the dynasty to which Dushan had given distinction Serbia's
brief day was over. Little hope now remained to the Byzan-
tine emperor. Frantic appeals were once more addressed
to the Christian prhices ; the emperor himself undertook
a special pilgrimage to Rome, but no help was forthcoming

58 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

from a distracted and divided Christendom, and in 1373
John V definitely accepted the suzerainty- of the Ottoman
conqueror ; undertook to render him military service ; and
entrusted to his custody his son Manuel as a hostage for the
punctual performance of his promises.

Meanwhile Murad made i-apid progi*ess in the subjugation
of the peninsula : Eastern Macedonia, up to the Vardar river,
M'as conquered in 1372 ; the rest of Macedonia was occupied
in 1380 ; the Ottomans established themselves in Prilep and
Monastir, and, a few years later, in Okhrida. Murad then
turned to complete the subjection of Bulgaria and Serbia.
Sofia was taken in 1385, and a year later Nish also
fell.
Battle of One last and desperate effort was now made by the Slavs
June 15 ' ^^ avert their impending doom. A great combination was
1389. formed between the Southern Slavs of Serbia and Bosnia,
the Bulgars, the Vlachs, and the Albanians. On June 15,
1389, one of the most fateful battles in the history of
the Near East was fought on the historic plain of Kossovo.
The arms of the Ottoman were completely victorious, and
the Slav confederacy was annihilated. The assassination of
the Sultan Murad by a pretending Serbian traitor, Milosh
Obilic, adds a touch of tragedy to sufficiently impres-
sive history. But the tragedy did not aflect the issue
of the dsij. Murad's son, Bajazet, rallied his troops and
pressed the victory home. Lazar, the last Serbian Tsar,
was captured and executed, and his daughter, Despina,
became the wife of the victorious Sultan. The memory of
the battle of Kossovo Polye — the Field of Blackbirds — has
been preserved in the ballad literature of a freedom-loving
peasantry. Not until 1912 did the memory cease to rankle ;
not until then was the defeat avenged, and the bitterness it
had engendered even partially assuaged.

For five hundred years after Kossovo the Serbs never
really rallied. Many of them took refuge in the mountains
of Montenegro, and there maintained throughout the ages
a brave fight for freedom ; many more migrated to Bosnia,
and even to Hungary. But as an independent State Serbia
was blotted out.

Ill THE ADVENT OF THE OTTOMANS 59

Four years after the overthrow of the Southern Slavs at Conquest
Kossovo Bulgarian independence suffered a similar fate. „aria.
The Turks had already taken Nikopolis in 1388, and in 1393
they destroyed the Bulgarian capital, Tirnovo. The Bulgarian
Patriarch was sent into exile ; the Bulgarian Church was, for
just five hundred years, reduced to dependence on the Greek
Patriarchate at Byzantium ; the Bulgarian dynasty was ex-
tinguished, and the Bulgarian State was absorbed into the
Empire of the Ottomans.

From the conquest of Bulgaria Bajazet turned to Hungary. Battle of
He had already, in 1390, carried out a series of successful Q39gj|^ ^
raids into that country ; he now aspired to more permanent
conquest. Sigismund, who had succeeded to the throne of
Hungary in 1387, was fully conscious of the impending peril.
He made a strong appeal to the other Christian princes of
Europe, and in 1394 Pope Boniface IX proclaimed a crusade.
One hundred thousand Paladins, the flower of the chivalry of
France and Germany, nobles not a few from England, Scot-
land, Flanders, and Lombardy, and a large body of the
Knights of St. John responded to the papal call, and enlisted
under the banner of Sigismund. In the battle of Nikopolis
(1396) the forces of Christendom were overthrown by the
Ottomans. The larger part of Sigismund's followers were
slain or driven into the Danube to be drowned ; no fewer
than four French Princes of the Blood and twenty sons of
the highest nobility in France were among Bajazet's prisoners ;
of the Knights of Rhodes only the Grand Master survived,
while Sigismund himself escaped with difficulty down the river,
and thence by sea returned to Hungary. After the battle
a force of Turks invaded Hungary, destroyed the fortresses,
and carried off" sixteen thousand Styrians into captivity. The
triumph of the Ottomans was complete.

The effort of Christendom was unfortunately premature.
Could they have waited another six years, and then have
struck hard when Bajazet was himself a prisoner in the
hands of Tamerlane, the whole future course of European
history might have been profoundly affected. When the
chance did come in the first years of the fifteenth cen-
tury, Christian Europe was too hopelessly distracted by

60 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

the Great Schism and other quarrels to take advantage
of it.

Conquest After his victory at Nikopolis Bajazet turned southwards.
■ Hitherto Greece proper had been spared ; but between 1397
and 1399 Bajazet conquered Thessaly, Phocis, Doris, Locris,
part of Epirus, and Southern Albania. Thus the conquest of
the Balkan Peninsula was all but complete. Athens and
Salonica remained in Christian hands/ but the emperor him-
self retained nothing but the extreme south of the Morea
and Constantinople.

Could even this remnant be saved ? At the end of the
fourteenth century it seemed more than doubtful ; at the
beginning of the fifteenth it appeared at least to be possible ;
for the whole situation was temporarily transformed by the
bursting over Western Asia of a storm which for some years
had been gathering in the East.

Tamer- Born in Bokhara in 1336, Timour 'the Tartar' had in the

latter half of the fourteenth century made himself master of
a vast-stretching territory between the Indus and Asia Minor.
From Samarkand to Khorassan, from Khorassan to the
Caspian ; northwards from the Volga to the Don and the
Dnieper ; southwards to Persia, Mesopotamia, Armenia, and
Georgia — all acknowledged him as lord. In 1398 he invaded
India, and was proclaimed Emperor of Hindustan ; then,
westwards again, he made himself master of Bagdad, Aleppo,
and Syria. Finally, in 1 402, he challenged the Ottoman Sultan
in Anatolia. With the Ottoman Empire in Asia this book is
not primarily concerned ; but it is essential to remember that,
coincidently with their ceaseless activity in Europe, the Otto-
mans had gradually built up, partly at the expense of the
Greek emperors, partly at that of the Seljukian Turks,
partly at that of smaller Turkish emirs, an imposing empire
in Asia Minor.

At the beginning of the fifteenth century the whole of
their hardly-won empire was threatened by the advent of the
mighty conqueror Tamerlane. In 1402 Tamerlane inflicted

^ Gibbons, op. cit., p. 231, seems to have estabh'shed his point that
Salonica was not taken until 1430, and that Athens sui'vived the capture
of Constantinople ; but it is not certain.

Ill THE ADVENT OF THE OTTOMANS 61

a crushing defeat upon the Ottomans at Angora, and took
the Sultan Bajazet prisoner. Later on he captured Brusa and
Smyrna, and overran the greater part of Asia Minor. But
then, instead of advancing into Europe, he again turned
eastwards, and in 1405 he died. The cloud dispersed almost
as quickly as it had gathered.

Sultan Bajazet died in captivity in 1403. The battle of
Angora is memorable for the fact that it resulted not only in
a crushing military defeat but in the capture of an Ottoman
Sultan. Never had this happened before ; never has it happened
since. But apart from this, the defeat of Bajazet at Angora
had curiously little significance. The remnant of the Byzantine
Empire did, indeed, get a temporary respite ; the imperial city
was saved to it for half a century ; and there ensued among the
Ottomans a decade of confusion, civil war, and interregnum.

Yet during this period of confusion no attempt was made
either by the Greek emperor or by the Slav peoples in the
peninsula, or by interested competitors such as the Venetians
or Genoese, or by Sigismund of Hungary, or by the Pope as
representing Christendom, to repair the damage wrought in
the last half century by the infidel. What is the explanation
of this astounding neglect of a unique opportunity ? Chris-
tendom had, it is true, plenty on its hands. The Great
Schism rendered nugatory any action on the part of a Pope.
Sigismund, too, was preoccupied. But the essential reasons
must be sought elsewhere. It is clear, in the first place, that
the Greek Empire was sunk beyond hope of redemption ;
secondly, that the Balkan ' peoples ' were unready to take its
place ; and finally, that the Ottoman Emperors, Orkhan,
Murad, and Bajazet, had builded better than they knew. It
is, indeed, a remarkable testimony to their statesmanship that
the infant empire should have passed through the crisis after
Angora practically unscathed. The ten years' anarchy was
ended in 1413 by the recognition of Mohammed I (1413-21)
as sole Sultan, but his brief reign did little to repair the
havoc. That task he bequeathed to his son.

For thirty years Murad II devoted his great energy and Murad II
ability to its accomplishment. His first effort was directed ^ "'^ ''.
against Constantinople ; but the great prize was snatched

62 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

from his grasp, as all men then believed, by the miraculous
apparition of the Virgin on the walls of the l^eleaguered city,
or possibly by an urgent call from Asia jMinor. To Asia
Minor, at any rate, he went, and having effectually restored
his authority there, he returned to Europe in 1424. The
attack upon Constantinople was not resumed, but in 1430
Salonica was for the first time taken by the Ottomans, and
Murad's victorious army advanced into Albania.
John But the main work of Murad lay elsewhere. In 1440 he

Corvinus ^.^^ confronted by a great confederacy in the north. Tlie
Turkish victory at Nikopolis owed not a little to the help
of Serbia, who, as a reward, was reinvested with Belgi'ade.
In 1427, however, the lordship of the Serbians passed to
George Brankovic, whereupon Murad immediately declared
war, and Brankovic was compelled to surrender Nish to the
Turks and Belgrade to the ^Magyars. But he built, lower
down the Danube, the great fortress of Semendria, which
remained, until the nineteenth century, the Serbian capital.
Shortly afterwards the Ottomans were threatened by the
rise of a great leader among the Magyars. Of all the foes
whom the Turks encountered in their conquest of the Balkans,
the most brilliant, perhaps, was John Corvinus Hunyadi,
Voivode of Transylvania, and celebrated by Commines as * le
chevalier blanc des Valaques '. Under his banner Magyars,
Czechs, Vlachs, and Serbians united in an attempt to stem
the Ottoman tide. The first encounter between Hunj-adi
and the Turks was in 1442 at Hermannstadt in Transylvania,
when he inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Ottoman
general. An attempt to avenge this defeat ended in an even
more decisive victory for the arms of Hunyadi. In the
summer of 1443 Hunyadi again led an imposing host against
the Ottomans. Crossing the Danube near Semendria, he
marched up the valley of the Morava, and on November 3
defeated the Turks at Nish. He then took Sofia, forced
the passage of the Balkans, and having won another gi-eat
victory in the valley of the Maritza, found himself within
striking distance of Constantinople.
Treaty of Sultan Murad, beaten to his knees, begged for peace, which
d^^^^' ^^'^^ solemnly concluded at Szegeddin (July 12, 1444). There

Ill THE ADVENT OF THE OTTOMANS G3

was to be a truce for ten years; Serbia and Herzegovina Mere
to be restored to George Brankovic in complete independence,
and Wallachia was to pass under the suzerainty of Hungary.
Ladislas, King of Hungary, swore upon the Gospels, the
Sultan swore upon the Koran, that the terms should be
faithfully observed.

Hardly was the ink dry upon the treaty when Ladislas, on
yielding to the combined and perfidious persuasion of the
Papal Legate, Cardinal John Cesarini, and the Greek Emperor,
determined to break it. Hunyadi, bribed by a promise of the
throne of Bulgaria, reluctantly consented, and on September 1
the Hungarian army marched into Wallachia, and in less than
two months found themselves in front of Varna. The sur-
render of Varna, however, put a term to the triumph of the
Hungarians.

Secure in the oath of a Christian, Sultan IMurad had gone Battle of
into retirement after the Treaty of Szegeddin, and had sent >;^)^ j'q
his army into Asia Minor. The news of the Hungarian 1^44.
advance recalled both the Sultan and his army. Transported
from Asia by a heavily bribed Genoese fleet, the Turks reached
Varna, and there on November 10, 1444, inflicted a crushing
and merited defeat upon their foes. The King of Hungary,
the Papal Legate, and two bishops paid for their perfidy
with their lives upon the field of battle.

Hunyadi, however, escaped, and four years later he again
led a great army across the Danube. The Turks met him on
the historic field of Kossovo (October 17, 1448), and there,
after three days battle, aided by the defection of George
Brankovic, they won, for the second time, a decisive victory.

Thus was the infant empire of the Ottomans saved at last
from one of the greatest dangers that ever threatened it. In
the same year the Emperor John VIH died, and the rival
claimants appealed to Sultan Murad, who designated Con-
stantine as his successor. In 1451 Murad himself died, and
was succeeded by his son, Mohammed II.

Mohammed, a young prince of one and twenty, lost no time ^roham-
in plunging into the task with the accomplishment of which . ^jjg q^j^.
his name will always be associated. Having hastily renewed queror '
all his father's engagements with Hungary, Serbia, Wallachia, ^ "^ >

64 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

the republics of Ragusa, Venice, and Genoa, he promptly

declared war upon the Greek emperor and advanced to the

siege of the imperial city. On May 29, 1453, Constantinople

was carried by assault, and the last Greek emperor died

fighting in the breach.

Fall of The last Greek emperor died, but his empire survived.

nople ■ the ^^ ^^^ been recently argued that modern critics have

Byzantine attached to the conquest of Constantinople an importance

Eraph-e^ of which contemporaries were ignorant. The contention is

partly true. Contemporaries, however, are not the best

judges of the historical perspective of the events they witness.

To the people of that day the capture of Constantinople was

merely the inevitable climax of a long series of Ottoman

victories on European soil. The Sultan was already sovereign

of the Greek Empire ; the emperor was his vassal ; the taking

of the imperial city was merely a question of time.

Nevertheless, the fall of Constantinople is in the true histori-
cal sense ' epoch marking '. Of its significance in an economic
and commercial sense, and its relation to the geographical
Renaissance, mention has been already made. Hardly
less direct was its relation to the Humanistic Renaissance,
Learning fled from the shores of the Bosphorus to the banks
of the Arno. From Florence and Bologna and other Italian
cities the light of the new learning spread to Paris and to
Oxford. The Oxford lectures of John Colet, the Novum
Instrumentum of Desiderius Erasmus, perhaps even Luther's
historic protest at Wittenberg, may be ascribed, in no fanciful
sense, to the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople. But most
important of all its consequences, fi-om our present stand-
point, was the foundation of a new empire. That empire was
not exclusively Turkish ; still less was it purely Byzantine.
It was a fusion and combination of the two. The Ottomans
were in truth not merely the conquerors of the Balkans but
the heirs of the Graeco-Roman Empire of the East.

For further reference : H. A Gibbons, The Foundations of the Ottornan
Empire (with an elaborate bibliography for the period prior to 1403) ; E. A.
Freeman, The Ottoman Power in Europe (London, 1877) ; S. Lane Poole,
Turkey (1250-1880), (London, 1888); D. S. lAs^vgoWonih, Mohammed and
the Rise of Islam (London, 1905) ; Sir W. Muir, The Caliphate, its Rise,

Ill THE ADVENT OF THE OTTOMANS 65

Decline, and Fall (liOiidon, ll^l'l)'; A. Wirth, Geschichte der Tilrkeu;
H. F. Tozcr, The Church and the Eastern Ennnre (1888) ; L. von Ranke,
History of Servia (Eng. trans. 1858) ; Lavisse et Rambaud, Histoire
Gmerale, vol. iii (with excellent bibliograpliy for this period) ; Sir W. M*
Karnsay, Historical Geograxohy of Asia Minor (1890); W. Miller, The
Balkans (189G), The Latins in the Levant : a History of Prankish
Greece (1908) ; V*^ A. de la Jonquiere, Histoire de V Empire Ottoman,
2 vols, (new ed. 1914) ; E. Creasy, History of the Ottoman Turks ; J. von
Hammer, Gesch. des Osmanischeyi Eeichs, 10 vols. ; E. Gibbon, Decline
and Fall of the Boman Empire ; J. H. New-man, The Ottomaii Turks ;
J, W. Zinkeisen, Gesch. des Osmanischen Beichs in Europa, 7 vols,
(vol. i) ; Sir E. Pears, Destruction of the Greek Emjnre (1903) ; C. Oman,
Byzantine Em2}ire ; W. H. Hutton, Constantinople.

CHAPTER IV

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE : ITS ZENITH

1453-1566

Suleiman the Magnificent

' The peculiarity of the Turks is at once apparent when we observe that
their history is ahnost exclusively a catalogue of names and battles.' —
Odysseiis (Sir Charles Eliot).

' The failure of the Turks is due to Byzantinism. . . . The decadence ot
the Turk dates from the day wlien Constantinople was taken and not
destroyed.' — ' Diplomatist,' Nationalism and War in the Near East.

The events recorded in the preceding chapter demon-
strated conclusively one fact of supreme significance : a new
nation had definitely planted itself on European soil ; the
Osmanlis had come to stay.

Down to the capture of Constantinople some doubts upon
this point might have lingered ; after it there could be
none. The Osmanlis were now plainly something more than
brilliantly successful adventurers. The taking of Constanti-
nople fundamentally altered their position. It is true that
in its declining years the Byzantine Empire enjoyed, as it
deserved, little prestige ; yet the mere possession of the
imperial city did confer upon its conquerors, altogether
apart from questions of strategic or commercial advantage,
a quasi-constitutional authority such as they could not other-
wise have obtained.

And the Sultan Mohammed clearly recognized the signi-
ficance of the change. Hitherto his followers had been
merely an army of occupation in a conquered land. They
have always been that and, according to one reading of their
history, they have never been anything more. How far that
reading is accurate the following pages will show ; a point
of more immediate significance is that after 1453 Sultan
Mohammed initiated the attempt to devise a polity for the
new nation.

THE OTTOMAN ElMPIRE : ITS ZENITH 67

To what extent could he rely upon the essential charac- Charac-
teristics of his people? Many contradictory attributes have ^^^j^^
been predicated of the Ottoman Turks. They have been Ottoman
delineated by friends and by foes respectively as among the "^P"®-
most amiable, and unquestionably the most detestable of
mankind ; but on one point all observers are agreed. The
Turk never changes. What he was when he first effected
a lodgement upon European soil, that he remains to-day.
Essentially the Ottoman Turk has been from first to last
a fighting man, a herdsman, and a nomad.

'In the perpetual struggle', writes one, 'between the
herdsman and the tiller of the soil, which has been waged
from remote ages on the continents of Europe and Asia,
the advance of the Ottomans was a decisive victory for the
children of the steppes. This feature of their conquest is
of no less fundamental importance than its victory for Islam.' ^

' The Turks ', writes another, ' never outgi-ew their ancestral
character of predacious nomads ; they take much and give
little.' 2

Thus, to close observers, the Turks have always given
the impression of transitoriness ; of being strangers and
sojourners in a land that is not their own. 'Here', they
have seemed to saj", ' we have no abiding city.' ' A band
of nomadic warriors, we are here to-day ; we shall be gone
to-morrow.'

But the sense of temporary occupation was not inconsistent Heirs of
with a rigid conservatism as long as the occupation might tines.^ ^^'
last. And in nothing have the Ottomans shoA\Ti themselves
more conservative than in fulfilment of the obligations which
they inherited from their predecessors. No sooner were
they masters of the imperial city than they made it plain
to the world that they regarded themselves as the legitimate
heirs of the Byzantine Empire. No Greek could have
exhibited more zeal than Sultan Mohammed in resisting
the encroachments, whether territorial or ecclesiastical, of
the Latins. Venetians, Genoese, and Franks Avere alike
made to realize that the Turk was at least as Greek as his

^ J. B. Bury ap. C. M. H. 2 Eliot, Turkey in Europe.

f2

68 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

predecessor in title. Most clearly Mas this manifested in
his dealings with the Orthodox Church.
The Some of the more fanatical adherents of that Church had

Church, actually favoured the revolution by which a Turkish Sultan
had replaced a Greek Basileus who was known to approve
of reunion with Rome. They had their reward. At the
moment when Constantinople was taken the patriarchal
throne happened to be vacant. Within three days Sultan
Mohammed had given orders that a new Patriarch should
be elected and consecrated with all the accustomed rites.
After his election the Patriarch Avas treated with the deepest
personal respect, and received from the Sultan a solemn
guarantee for all the rights and immunities of his Church ;
in particular, there was to be complete freedom of worship
for the Greek Christians. In every way the Orthodox
Church was encouraged to look to the Sultan as its protector
against the pretensions of the rival Rome. Thus the Patriarch
became in effect the Pope of the Eastern Church. He was
invested, indeed, v.ith extraordinary privileges. After the
conquest, as before, he was permitted to summon periodical
synods, to hold ecclesiastical courts, and to enforce the
sentences of the courts with spiritual penalties. ^
The rha- Nor was the favour shown to the Greeks confined to
ecclesiastics. On the contrary the Sultans developed among
the Greek laymen a sort of administrative aristocracy.
Known as Phanariotes from the Phanar, the particular
quarter which they inhabited in Constantinople, these shrewd
and serviceable Greeks were utilized by the Turks for the
performance of duties for which the conquerors had neither
liking nor aptitude. The Turk is curiously devoid of that
sense which the ancient Greeks described as jjolitical. He
desires neither to govern nor to be governed. He , is a
polemical not a 'political animal'. To conquer and to enjoy
in ease the fruits of conquest has always been his ideal of
life. With the dull details of administration he has never
cared to concern himself That was the work of 'slaves',
and as a fact, though none but a Moslem could in theory

1 Hutton, Constantinople, p. 156.

nariotes.

IV THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: ITS ZENITH 69

aspire to the highest administrative posts, the actual work
of administration was confided to the Phanariotes. Whether
this practice, in the long run, contributed either to the well-
being of Christianity in the dominions of the Porte, or to
the better government of the Greek population, is a moot
point to which we may recur. For the moment it must
suffice to say that while the Higher Clergy of the Orthodox
Church became almost wholly dependent upon the State,
the parish priests laboured witli extraordinary devotion to
keep alive among their flocks the flame of nationality even
more perhaps than the tenets of Orthodoxy. To their effbrts,
maintained with remarkable perseverance throughout a
period of four and a half centuries, the success of the Greek
revival, in the early nineteenth century, was largely due.

The attitude of the Ottomans towards the Greek Christians Tolerance
was inspired by a mixture of motives. It was due partly to fn^jyjgnce
an innate tendency towards toleration, and still more perhaps
to invincible indolence. In view of the hideous massacres
perpetrated by Abdul Hamid it is not easy to insist that
religious toleration is one of the cardinal virtues of the
Turk.^ Yet the fact is incontestable. Although the Ottoman
State was essentially theocratic in theory and in structure,
although the sole basis of political classification was eccle-
siastical,- the Turk was one of the least intolerant of
rulers. He was also one of the most indolent. So long as
his material necessities were supplied by his subjects the
precise methods of local government and administration
were matters of indifference to him. This had its good and
its bad side. It often left the conquered peoples at the
mercy of petty tyrants, but where the local circumstances
were unfavourable to tyrannies it left the people very
much to themselves. Hence that considerable measure of
local autonomy which has frequently been noted as one
of the many contradictory features of Ottoman government

^ Cf. a recent writer : ' The Osmanlis were the first nation in modern
history to lay down the principle of religions freedom as the corner-stone
in the building up of their nation.' Gibbons, op. cit, and cf. an interesting
note on the Armenian massacres, p. 74.

- The Ottoman government took no account of 'nationalities'. If a
Tnrkif>h subject was not a IMoslcm, he was a 'Greek'.

70

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

No assimi-
lation
between
con-
querors
and con-
quered.

in Europe, and which largely contributed, when the time
came, to the resuscitation of national self-consciousness
among the conquered peoples.

The traits already delineated may perhaps account for
another marked characteristic of Ottoman history. Whether
it be due to pride or to indolence, to spiritual exclusiveness
or to political indifference, the fact remains that the Turks
have neither absorbed nor been absorbed by the conquered
peoples ; still less have they permitted any assimilation
among the conquered peoples. Mr. Freeman put this point,
with characteristic emphasis, many years ago :

'The Turks, though they have been in some parts of
Turkey for five hundred years, have still never become the
people of the land, nor have they in any way become one
with the people of the land. They still remain as they were
when they first came in, a people of strangers bearing rule
over the people of the land, but in every way distinct from
them.'

The original Ottoman invaders were relatively few in
numbers, and throughout the centuries they have continued
to be ' numerically inferior to the aggregate of their subjects '.
But for two considerations it is almost certain that like the
Teuton invaders of Gaul they would have been absorbed by
the peoples whom they conquered. The Teuton conquerors of
Gaul were pagans, the Turks, on the contrary, brought with
them a highly developed creed which virtually forbade
assimilation. Under the strict injunctions of the Koran
the infidel must either embrace Islamism ; or suffer death ;
or purchase, by the payment of a tribute, a right to the
enjoyment of life and property. Only in Albania Avas there
any general acceptance of the Moslem creed among the
masses of the population. In Bosnia, and to a less degree
in Bulgaria, the larger landowners purchased immunity by
conversion ; but, generally speaking, the third of the alterna-
tives enjoined by the Koran was the one actually adopted.
Christianity consequently survived in most parts of the
Turkish Empire. And the Turk, as we have seen, shrewdly
turned its survival to his own advantage. The second
pertinent consideration is that the conquered peoples were

IV THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: ITS ZENITH 71

hopelessly divided amongst themselves. Before the coming of
the Turk, the Bulgarians, as we have seen, had been constantly
at the throats of the Serbians, and both at those of the
Greeks. This antagonism the Turk set himself sedulously
to cultivate, and with conspicuous success. As a close and
discriminating observer has justly said : * they have always
done and still do all in their power to prevent the oblitera-
tion of racial, linguistic, and religious differences ', with the
result that 'they have perpetuated and preserved, as in
a museum, the strange medley which existed in South-
Eastern Europe during the last years of the Byzantine
Empire '.^

If the Turk was not, in the Aristotelian sense, a ' political Neglect
animal ', still less was he an ' economic man '. He adhered merce.
ftiithfully to his primitive nomadic instincts. There is a
proverbial saying in the East : where the Turk plants his
foot the grass never grotcs again. To a nomad it is a
matter of indifference whether it does. He is a herds-
man, not a tiller of the soil. Agriculture and commerce
are alike beneath his notice, except, of course, as a source
of revenue. Here, as in the lower ranks of the administra-
tive hierarchy, the Greek could be pre-eminently useful
to his new sovereign. Consequently the Greek traders
in Constantinople, for example, and Salonica and Athens,
were protected by a substantial tariff against foreign
competition. In the sixteenth century the expulsion of
the Moors from Grenada led to a considerable influx of
Moors and Spanish Jews into Salonica, where they still
predominate, and even into Constantinople. In them and
also in the Armenians the Greeks found powerful com-
petitors, both in finance and in commerce. For the
governing Turks these matters had no interest except in
so far as they affected the contributions to the imperial

1 Eliot, op. cit., p. 16. Cf. M. Rambaud, ap. Hut. G&nirale, iv, 751 :
* L'assimilation, I'absorption de I'un des deux elements par I'autre etait
impossible grace a Topposition du Koran a I'Evangile, du croissant a la
croix. Plus d'une fois les Osmanlis ayant conscience de leur inferiorite
numerique s'inquieterent de cette situation grosse de perils pour I'avenir
de leur puissance.'

72

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Progress
of Otto-
man con-
quests.

Extinc-
tion of
Southern
Slav inde-
pendence.

Monte-
negro.

Albania.

treasury. So long as that was full it mattered nothing to
the Turks who were the contributors, or whence their wealth
was derived.

Such were some of the outstanding characteristics of the
people who in the fifteenth century established themselves
permanently in South-Eastern Europe. But though they
were permanently established by 1453, they had by no means
reached the final limits of political ascendancy or of territorial
conquest and expansion.

Mohammed's first anxiety after the taking of Con-
stantinople was to complete the subjugation of the Southern
Slavs. But so long as Hunyadi lived the latter did not lack
an effbctive champion, Appealed to by George Brankovic of
Serbia, Hunyadi, in 1454, came to the relief of Semendria, and
then burnt Widdin to the ground. But in 1455 Mohammed
captured Novoberda, and in the following year laid siege to
Belgrade. Once more the Pope, Calixtus HI, attempted
to rouse Christendom against the Moslems. A considerable
measure of enthusiasm was excited by the preaching of
a Minorite brother, John of Capistrano, and in 1456 Hunyadi
marched at the head of a great army to the relief of Belgrade.
The frontier fortress was saved, and the Turks Avere routed
with a loss of 50,000 men and 300 guns. But this was the
last exploit of John Corvinus Hunyadi, who died in this same
year (1456). Brankovic of Serbia died almost simultaneously.

The death of these two men shattered the last fragment of
independence enjoyed by the Southern Slavs. Serbia was
converted into a Turkish Pashalik, and was finally annexed to
the Ottoman Empire in 1459 ; Bosnia shared its fate in 1463,
and Herzegovina in 1465. For more than three centuries and
a half the Southern Slavs disappear from the page of history.

Only in the region of the Black Mountain did a remnant
of the race maintain their independence ; but until the nine-
teenth century the gallant resistance of Montenegro was
devoid of political significance.

Almost the same is true of Albania, though in the middle
of the fifteenth century the sombre story of the Alb.anian
mountaineers was illuminated by the brief but brilliant
episode of a famous adventurer known as Scanderbeg or

IV THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: ITS ZENITH 73

Iskendar Bey. George Castriotis, ' the dragon of Albania ',
Mas brought up as a Moslem at the court of Murad II and
served in the Ottoman army, but at the age of forty he was
converted to Christianity, abjured his allegiance to the
Sultan, and initiated, in his native mountains, a guerrilla war-
fare against the Turks. This war was maintained with
extraordinary success during the remaining years of Scan-
derbeg's life (1443-67) ; one Turkish army after another
was thrown into Albania only to be repelled by the indomit-
able courage of Scanderbeg and his compatriots, seconded
by the inaccessible nature of their fastnesses. In 1461
Mohammed II came to terms with Scanderbeg, acknowledging
the independence of Albania and the lordship of Castriotis
over Albania and Epirus. A few years later, however, the
struggle was renewed, but with no better success for the
Turks. Castriotis died still unconquered in 1467, and after
his death many of his followers migrated to Italy. Of the
rest a large number embraced Mohammedanism ; not a few
entered the service of the Porte ; and some, notably the
Kiuprilis, rose to eminence in that service. But the country
itself has never really been subdued by the foreigner, and
only at rare intervals has it been united in submission to one
of its own native chieftains. Geography has indeed prohibited
both union and subjection ; both commercial and political
development. Bands of brigands, with little or no mutual
cohesion, have, throughout the centuries, maintained a pre-
carious existence by preying on each other or on their
neighbours. That the race has virility is proved by the men
it has spasmodically thrown up — a Castriotis, a Kiuprili, an
Ali Pasha of Janina, and, most notable of all, the famous
soldier and statesman who played in the nineteenth century
so great a part in the history of Egypt and indeed of Europe,
Mehemet Ali. But apart from individuals such as these,
and the episodes connected with one or two of them, Albania
from the end of the fifteenth century until the end of the
nineteenth played no appreciable part in Balkan politics. In
recent years European dijilomacy has, for its om'u purposes,
discovered an ' Albanian Question ', but it is not cynical to
suggest that the discovery is due to the existence of two

74 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

harbours on the Albanian coast, Durazzo and Valona.
The significance of the discovery must engage attention at
a hiter stage of our inquiry. For at least four centuries
after the death of Scanderbeg, as a factor in the problem
of the Near East, Albania may be ignored.
Conquest The Morea and Greece proper were, as we saw, distributed,
of Greece ^^ ^j^^ ^j^^^^ ^f ^^^ Ottoman invasion, among a number of
principalities, Byzantine, Frankish, and Venetian. After the
conquest of Constantinople these were gradually reduced to
submission. The Florentine dynasty in Athens was finally
expelled in 1456 ; Corinth capitulated in 1458 ; the two
Palaeologi, whose rule in the Morea had long been a public
scandal, were dethroned in 1459, and the Morea itself was
finally annexed to the Ottoman Empire.
War with Aegina and some half-dozen coast towns, not to mention
Venice ^j^^ great majority of the Aegean islands, still remained in
Genoa. the hands of the Venetians. Between the Turks and the
Venetian Republic there was intermittent war for nearly
twenty years. In 1463 Venice attempted to rouse Western
Europe to a sense of the gravity of the Ottoman peril.
But only with partial success. A league was formed between
the Republic, the Pope, the Duke of Burgundy, and the
King of Hungary, but though a considerable force assembled
at Ancona it lacked organization, and Venice was left to
fight the battle of Christendom alone. She fought bravely but
without success. Argos was taken by the Turks in 1463, and
in 1467 Euboea was attacked in force by land and sea. Its
conquest, in the following year, was the death-blow to the
Venetian Empire in the Near East. Joined by Pope Sixtus IV,
by Naples, and by the Knights of St. John, Venice then
attempted a diversion in Asia Minor. Their combined fleets
attacked and captured Smyrna, and an attempt was made to
incite Karamania to revolt against the Turks. But little was
actually accomplished. Nearer home Scutari was held by
the Venetians against repeated sieges, but in 1478 the Turks
took Kroia, the Albanian fortresses, and thence advanced
again upon Scutari. Deserted by her allies Venice then
determined to treat, and in 1479 the Treaty of Constantinople
was concluded. The Doge surrendered to the Turks Lemnos,

IV THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: ITS ZENITH 75

Euboea, and Scutari, and agreed to pay an indemnity of
100,000 ducats and an annual tribute of 110,000. In return
Venice was to have the privilege of a consular establishment
in Constantinople, and to enjoy freedom of trade throughout
the Ottoman dominions.

Meanwhile the Turks had been making rapid progress on Supre-
both shores of the Black Sea. In 1461 Amastris, in the north ^^^'^ ^"
of Anatolia, was taken from the Genoese ; in the same year Euxine.
Sinope and Paphlagonia were captured from one of the
Turkish emirs ; and — greatest prize of all — Trebizond, the
last refuge of the Greek emperors, fell into the hands of
Mohammed. A few years afterwards the Emperor, David
Comnenus, and all his kinsmen were strangled. Thus
perished the last of the Roman emperors of the East. The
Seljukian Empire survived that of Byzantium only a few
years. In 1471 Karamania, the last Seljukian principality,
was annexed by INIohammed, and two years later a terrific
contest between Mohammed and Ouzoun Hassan, the Turco-
man ruler of Persia and part of Armenia, ended in the
decisive defeat of the latter. Thenceforward the Turks were
undisputed masters of Anatolia. Finally, in 1475 Azov and
the Crimea were taken from the Genoese, and the Tartars
accepted the suzerainty of the Sultan, This completed
Turkish supremacy on both shores of the Black Sea. Not
until the latter part of the eighteenth century was it ever
again questioned.

The career of Sultan Mohammed, now nearing its close, had Death of
been one of almost uninterrupted success. One last ambition ^jg^i^^j^e
which he cherished was destined to remain unfulfilled. He Con-
had already conquered most of the Aegean islands, Lemnos, ^"®^'°^" •
Imbros, Thasos, and Samothrace ; but the island of Rhodes
was still held by the Knights Hospitallers. A great armament
was accordingly dispatched from Constantinople in 1480 to
eiFect its conquest, but after besieging it for two months the
Turks were beaten off" with heavy loss. Mohammed, nettled by
this reverse, determined to take command of the next expedi-
tion in person, but just as it was starting the Sultan suddenly
passed away (May 3, 1481). He well deserves the name by
which in Turkish history he is distinguished ; among a long

76 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

line of brilliant soldiers he was pre-eminently ' the Conqueror '.
A few outlying portions of the Byzantine Empire, each im-
portant in a strategic sense, were nevertheless denied to
him : Belgi-ade in the north ; Crete, Cyprus, and Rhodes in
the south ; but apart from these hardly an ambition of his
life was unfulfilled, and to his successor he bequeathed an
empire which extended from the Danube to the Euphrates.
Baye- That successor was destined to a more chequered fortune.

a481- ^"® distinguished critic has held that the seeds of the decay
1512). of the Ottoman Empire began to be sown as early as the reign
of Bayezid II. Be that as it may, his career was certainly
less consistently successful than that of his predecessor. To
begin with, the succession was not undisputed. His half-
brother Djem proposed partition : that Bayezid should keep
the European dominions, while Djem should rule Asiatic
Turkey Avith Brusa as his capital. Bayezid declined the offer,
and in one decisive battle, atYenisher, disposed of his brother's
pretensions. Supported by the Mameluke Sultan, with Avhom
he took refuge in Cairo, Djem had the temerity to repeat the
proposal, only to meet with an equally decided rebuff.
Djem then fled for refuge to the Knights of St. John, by
whom he was sent on to France, whence, six years later, he
passed to his final captivity at the Vatican. So long as he
lived (until 1495) he was a source of some disquietude to
Sultan Bayezid, and a pawn of some potential value in the
hands of the Christians, but the effective use they made of
him was not great.
War-svith Of Bayezid's numerous wars the most important was that
(SS ^^^^^ ^^^ Venetian Republic. The progress made by the Vene-
1502). tians in the Aegean, more particularly the taking of Cyprus,
had seriously alarmed the Sultan. Further stimulated, perhaps,
by the Italian rivals of the Republic, he declared Avar upon it
in 1498. The Turkish fleet Avon a great victory at Lepanto,
but in the Morea, Avhere most of the land fighting Avas con-
centrated, the fortunes of Avar Avere very uncertain. Hungary,
the Papacy, and other Western PoAvers sent some assistance
to the Republic, and their combined fleet inflicted a severe
defeat upon the Turkish navy, raided the coast of Asia
Minor, and seized the island of Santa Maura. Bayezid,

IV THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: ITS ZENITH 77

therefore, concluded peace with Venice in 1502 and M'ith
Hungary a year later. The Sultan recovered Santa Maura,
and retained all his con(|uests in the INIorea, while Cephalonia
was retained by the Republic.

The next twenty years (1503-20) formed a period, as far as
Europe was concerned, of unusual tranquillity. The Turkish
Sultan Avas busy elsewhere. The rise of the Safarid dynasty
in Persia led to a struggle between Persia and the Ottomans ;
there was a war also, not too successful, with the Mamelukes ;
and, worst of all, Bayezid had serious trouble with his own
house. So serious, indeed, did it become that in 1512 Sultan
Bayezid was compelled by Selim, the youngest of his three
sons, to abdicate, and shortly after his abdication he died,
probably by poison.

Entirely devoid of pity or scruples the new Sultan began Selim I,
his reign by the murder of his two brothers and eight nephews, ggxlble'
Still his reign, though brief, was brilliant. Perpetually at war (1512-20).
he never crossed swords with a Christian. But his wars and
conquests in the East were on such an imj)osing scale that in
less than eight years he nearly doubled the size of the Ottoman
Empire.

A three years' war with the Shah Ismail of Persia resulted Conquest
in the acquisition of Northern Mesopotamia ; Egypt, Syria, ^^n Meso-
and Arabia were successively conquered, and, to crown all, potamia,
the Khalifate was transferred to the Ottoman Sultan, who syj^ja, 'and
became henceforward the protector of the holy places and the Arabia.
spiritual head of Mohammedanism throughout the world.
The conquest of Egypt rendered the continued occupation
of Rhodes by the Knights Hospitallers increasingly galling to
the masters of Cairo and Constantinople. But to Selim, as
to his grandfather, this prize was denied. Like Mohammed
he was preparing for an expedition against the Knights when
he was overtaken by death.

Few reigns in Ottoman history have been shorter ; none
has been more crowded with notable events. Of these by
far the most significant, apart from the territorial expansion
of the empire, Avas the assumption of the Khalifate — signifi-
cant but sinister. For, as an acute critic has said, 'it
marked the supersession of the Byzantine or European ideal

78 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

by the Asiatic in Osmanli policy, and introduced a phase of
Ottoman history which has endured to our own time.' ^
Sulei- The Khalifate and the Sultanate passed without dispute,

™?*^ li thanks to the sanffuinarv precautions of Sultan Selim, to his

' the Mag- , " t^

nificent' only son Suleiman, known to European contemporaries as
(1520-66). i ^jjg Magnificent ', to his own people as the ' lawgiver '.

In the reign and person of Suleiman the history of his
nation reaches its climax ; as warrior, as organizer, as legis-
lator, as man he has had no superior, perhaps no equal, among
the Ottoman Turks. Physically, morally, and intellectually
Suleiman was richly endowed : a man of great strength and
stature ; capable of enduring immense fatigue ; frank, generous,
amiable in character ; indefatigably industrious ; a capable
administrator, and no mean scholar. But despite his
brilliant gifts, sedulously cultivated, the reign of Suleiman is,
by general consent, taken to mark not only the zenith of
Ottoman greatness, but the beginnings, though at first hardly
discernible, of decline.
Conquest The opening of the reign Avas extraordinarily auspicious,
^r^e and ^^^ predecessor bequeathed to Suleiman a vast empire ; but
Rhodes, in that empire there were two points of conspicuous weak-
ness. In the north, the Turkish frontier was insecure
so long as the great fortress of Belgrade remained in the
hands of Hungary ; in the south, the presence of the Knights
Hospitallers in Rhodes constituted a perpetual menace to the
safety and continuity of communication between Cairo and
Constantinople. Within two years of Suleiman's accession
both these sources of weakness had been removed. Belgrade
and Sabacz were conquered from Hungary in 1521 ; Rhodes
at least fell before the Ottoman assault in 1522. The Knights
found a temporary refuge in Crete, and in 1530 settled per-
manently in Malta. Belgrade remained continuously in the
hands of the Ottomans until the end of the seventeenth
century.
Conquest The acquisition of this great frontier fortress opened the
gary. ^^'^y ^^^' ^he most conspicuous military achievement of the
reign. With Belgrade in his hands Suleiman could safely

^ Hogarth, op. cif., p. 338.

IV THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: ITS ZENITH 79

embark upon a more ambitious enterprise, the conquest of
Hungary itself.

That enterprise initiates a new phase in the history of The
the Ottoman Empire in Europe. The Turks had now been ?*rkTand
' encamped ' upon European soil for nearly two centuries ; the Euro-
but though in Europe they were not of it. They were J^^^^„
pariahs, Avith whom no respectable prince, except sur-
reptitiously, would hold converse. The reign of Suleiman
marks, in this respect, a notable change, a change mainly due
to the new political conditions which were beginning to prevail
in Western Europe. The States-system of modern Europe
only came into being in the sixteenth century, and the first
manifestation of the new system was the prolonged and
embittered rivalry between the kingdom of France and
the Habsburg Empire. The contest between Charles V and
Francis I for the imperial crown (1519) brought that rivalry
to a head. The success of Charles V opened a chapter
which did not close until, at the beginning of the eighteenth
century, Louis XIV put his grandson on the throne of
Spain. The first bout of this prolonged contest ended with
the utter defeat of Francis I in the battle of Pavia (1525).
Pavia was a great day not only for the Habsburgs but for the
Turks. Francis I had begun his reign with a fervent reaffir-
mation of the traditional policy of his house. Fresh from the
glory achieved at Marignano he would lead a great crusade
of all the powers of the West against the intruding Ottoman.
That crusade was a main plank of his platform in the contest
for the empire. He promised that if elected he would,
within three years, either be in Constantinople or in his
coffin. His failure to obtain the imperial crown somewhat
tempered his crusading zeal, and after his humiliating defeat
at Pavia, Francis, while yet a prisoner in the hands of his
rivals, made overtures to the Ottoman Sultan. The alliance
that ensued between Turkey and France was destined to
supply one of the most important and one of the most con-
tinuous threads in the fabric of European diplomacy for more
than three hundred years to come.

The overtures of a French king, even in captivity, could Battle of
not fail to cause gratification at Constantinople, and the (1526^

80

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Third ex
pedition
into
Hungary

(1529).

Siege of

Vienna

(1529).

response was prompt. In April, 1526, the Sultan started
from Constantinople at the head of a magnificent army of
100,000 men. Crossing the Danube he took Peterwardein in
July, and on August 28, 1526, he met and defeated on the
plain of Mohacz the flower of the Hungarian nobility. Lewis,
the last Jagellon King of Hungary and Bohemia, the brother-
in-law of Ferdinand of Austria, was drowned in his flight from
the field. Nothing could now arrest the advance of Suleiman
upon Buda, the Hungarian capital, which he occupied on
September 10. But after a fortnight's stay he was recalled
to Constantinople, leaving the fate of Hungary undecided.
For the next two years Suleiman's energies were fully
occupied with the affkirs of his empire in Asia Minor.

Meanwhile, there was acute dissension in the two kingdoms
where the Jagellons had ruled. To Bohemia, Ferdinand of
Austria made good his claim, but iu Hungary he encountered
a serious rival in John Zapolya, the Voyvode of Transylvania.
Favoured by Suleiman the latter was crowned king in 1526,
but in 1527 he was driven back by Ferdinand into Transyl-
vania. Both parties then appealed for help to the Ottoman
Sultan. Accordingly, Suleiman again set out for Hungary in
1529, and in August of that year again found himself on the
plain of Mohacz. There he was joined by Zapolya, and
together they advanced on Buda. Buda offered little re-
sistance, and Suleiman then determined to attack Vienna
itself.

Exclusive of the Hungarian followers of Zapolya the
Turkish army numbered 250,000 men, and had 300 guns.
The garrison consisted of only 16,000 men, but they de-
fended the city with splendid gallantry. In view of the
menace to Christendom Lutherans and Catholics closed their
ranks, and large reinforcements were soon on their way to
the capital. After a fruitless siege of twenty-four days
Suleiman, therefore, decided to retire (October 14).

The failure of the greatest of the Sultans to take Vienna,
and his withdrawal in the autumn of 1529, mark an epoch in
the history of the Eastern Question. A definite and, as it
proved, a final term was put to the advance of the Ottomans
towards Central Europe. The brave garrison of Vienna had

IV THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: ITS ZENITH 81

rendered an incomparable service to Germany and to Christen-
dom. Here at last was a barrier which even Suleiman could
not pass.

Three times more at least did Suleiman lead expeditions
into Hungary : in 1532, in 1541, and finally in the very last
year of his reign and life, 1506. But never did he renew the
attempt upon Vienna. The failure of 1529 was accepted as
final.

It would be tedious to folloM' in detail the fortunes of
Suleiman's Hungarian enterprises ; nor is it pertinent to the
purpose of this book. The expedition of 1532 was on a very
imposing scale. Suleiman left Constantinople at the head of
a force of 200,000 men, and was joined at Belgrade by 100,000
Bosnians and 15,000 Tartars. But the Turkish host suffered
a serious check at the little town of Giins, and after taking
it Suleiman, instead of advancing on Vienna, contented him-
self with laying waste a great part of Styria and Lower
Austria. Nothing of importance had been effected, and in
June, 1533, a treaty — memorable as the first between the
House of Austria and Turkey — was concluded.

The expedition of 1541 had more permanent results. Tncor-
Zapolya had died in July, 1540, and though Suleiman of Hun"
espoused the cause of his widow and infant son, the interests gary and
of the Zapolya family were virtually set aside. What the y^niTin'
Sultan now conquered he conquered for himself. Buda Ottoman
again fell into his hands in 1541, not to be surrendered for /i™|7^f
nearly a century and a half Another expedition in 1543
confirmed the Turkish possession of Hungary and Transyl-
vania which, except for a strip retained by Ferdinand, was
definitely incorporated as the pashalik of Buda in the Ottoman
Empire. The country was divided into twelve sanjahs, in each
of which a regular administrative and financial system was
established. Negotiations between the Habsburgs and the
Turks continued for several years, but at last, in 1547, the
former accepted the inevitable and a five years' armistice
was concluded. Ferdinand then agreed to pay to the Porte
an annual tribute of 80,000 ducats for the strip of Hungary
which he Mas permitted to retain. The truce was imperfectly
observed on both sides and in 1551 the war was resumed.

82

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Persian
Wars:
acquisi-
tions in
Asia.

Ottoman
sea-
power.

With short intervals of inactivity it continued, without
essentially modifying the situation on either side, until 1562,
when a treaty was concluded between the veteran antagonists.
Ferdinand died two years afterwards (1564), but in 1566
war was renewed between his successor, the Emperor
Maximilian II, and the Ottomans. It was in the course of
this campaign, which he led in person, that the great Sultan
Suleiman passed away.

The wars against the Habsburgs, extending M'ith brief
intervals from the first year of Suleiman's reign to the last,
constitute the most important as well as the most continuous
preoccupation of that monarch's career. But these wars did
not stand alone, nor were the Sultan's activities confined to the
Hungarian expeditions. Six campaigns at least did he under-
take in person against the rival INIohammedan Power of Persia
with the result that large portions of Armenia and JNIesopo-
tamia, including the city of Bagdad, were added to the
Asiatic dominions of the Ottomans. Suleiman went indeed
even further afield. Thanks to his omnipotence at sea he
was able to effect a permanent occupation of Aden, Avhich
was strongly fortified, and to make himself master of much
of the coast of Arabia, Persia, and even North- Western India.

Even more conspicuous was the superiority of Ottoman
sea-power in the INIediterranean. Great as was the terror
inspired in Europe by the military prowess of Suleiman, that
inspired by the exploits of the Turkish navy was hardly less.
For this reputation Suleiman was largely indebted to the
genius of one of the most remarkable seamen of the six-
teenth century. In that age of buccaneers Khaireddin Bar-
barossa fills a conspicuous place. He did not, like Frobisher
or Drake, add to knowledge, but his seamanship was unques-
tioned, and to the Spaniards his name was hardly less terrible
than that of Drake. Born in Mitylene after the conquest of
that island by the Turks he was by birth an Ottoman subject.
About the year 1516 he and his brother established them-
selves in Algiers, whence they carried on a perpetual and
harassing contest with the naval forces of Spain. Recognized
by Suleiman as Beyler Bey of Algiers, Barbarossa placed his
services at the disposal of his suzerain, and in the year 1533

IV THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: ITS ZENITH 83

was appointed admiral in chief of the Ottoman navy, then at
the zenith of its reputation.

About the same time he undertook a series of voyages, Barba-
seven in all, from Algiers to the Andalusian coast, in the [J!^^Y'^"y
course of which he transported 70,000 Moors from Spain to
Algiers. By this remarkable feat he not only consolidated
his own corsair kingdom on the African coast, but rescued
a large number of persecuted Moslems from the tender
mercies of the Inquisition. In 1533 he was employed by the
Sultan to drive off Andrea Doria, the famous Genoese sailor
who commanded the imperial fleet in the Mediterranean.
Doria had lately seized. Coron, Patras, and other fortified
coast-toMiis belonging to the Ottomans, and Barbarossa's
intervention was as opportune, therefore, as it was effective.
In 1534, at the head of a powerful and well-equipped fleet,
Barbarossa attacked and plundered the coasts of Italy, and
later in the year conquered Tunis and added it to his
Algerian principality. But his triumph in Tunis was short-
lived. INluley Hassan, the representative of the Arabian
family who had ruled for centuries in Tunis, appealed to
the Emperor Charles V. The latter, seriously alarmed by
Barbarossa's activity in the Western INIediterranean, collected
a large army and a powerful fleet, and in 1535 sailed from
Barcelona for the Tunisian coast. He reconquered the
principality, and having put the capital to the sack with
a barbarity which no Turk could rival, he drove out
Barbarossa and reinstated Muley Hassan.

In the same year, 1535, the war between the Habsburg Franco-
Emperor and Francis I was renewed, and the latter turned Ottoman
,. . 1,1 ri 1 . alliance

tor assistance to the Sultan Sulemian. (1535).

The treaty then concluded between the French monarch
and the Ottoman Sultan is of the highest possible significance.
It is indicative of the position to which the Turks had by
now attained that even a French writer should describe the
convention as ' less a treaty than a concession '.^ The Sultan
now extended throughout the Ottoman Empire the privileges
accorded, in 1528, to the French in Egypt. Frenchmen were

^ Albin, Les Grands Traite's poliiiques, p. 128.
g2

84 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

to enjoy complete freedom of trade and navigation in all
Turkish ports, subject to a uniform duty of 5 per cent. ; no
foreign vessel might sail in Turkish waters except under the
French flag ; French traders were to be under the exclusive
jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, of their OAvn consuls, and
the Turkish officials guaranteed the execution of all judge-
ments in the consular courts ; French settlers in the Ottoman
Empire were to enjoy peculiar privileges in respect of the
transmission of property by will and even of intestate estates ;
they were to have not only complete religious liberty for them-
selves, but also the custody of the Holy Places, and thus to
exercise a species of protectorate over the Christian subjects
of the Porte. The King of France, alone among the European
sovereigns, was regarded and treated as an equal by the
Sultan, being henceforward described in official documents
as Padishah, instead of Bey.

The privileges thus accorded, in the Ottoman Empire, to
France were not only extraordinarily valuable in themselves ;
they established, on firm foundations, a diplomatic friend-
ship which operated powerfully, in the sixteenth century,
against the dominance of the Habsburgs, and for more than
three hundred years continued to be an essential factor in
French diplomacy.^

Its immediate significance was far from negligible. France
was at war with the Habsburgs, with very brief intervals,
from 1535 to 1559, and not until 1598 was peace finally
concluded. Throughout the whole of that period, and indeed
much beyond it, France could count upon the loyal co-opera-
tion of the Turks. It must, indeed, be confessed that the
loyalty of the Turks to the alliance was a good deal more
constant and continuous than that of the French. The latter
were glad enough to take advantage of it Avhenever and for
so long as it suited their purpose ; but they did not hesitate
to come to terms with the adversaries of the Turk when
their own interests dictated the step. Nevertheless, the
alliance confirmed in 1535 forms a guiding thread in a
tangled diplomatic skein.

^ Cf. infra, chap. vi.

IV THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: ITS ZENITH 85

In that year war was resumed between Francis I and the Naval war
emperor. Barbarossa, far from discouraged by the loss of ^^^^^^"^
Tunis, was ready to embarrass Charles V in the Mediter- and
ranean. Secure in the possession of Algiers he was still in X^-o'^^ax
a position to attack with effect, and in the space of a few
months he jilundered the island of Minorca, sacked the
coasts of Apulia and Calabria, and recovered Coron. In 1537
Suleiman, in response to an appeal from France, declared
war upon the Venetians, who were staunch in their alliance
Avith the emperor. Sailing from Valona he laid siege to
the island of Corfu, while Barbarossa seized the oppor-
tunity to conquer for his master most of the Aegean islands
Avhich still flew the flag of the Republic. In 1538 the
Pope and King Ferdinand joined with the emperor and
Venice in a Holy League against the Turks, and in the same
year Francis I concluded with Charles V the Truce of Nice.
The Venetians, however, found themselves ill-supported in
their contest with the Turks by their Holy allies ; the latter
sufiered a tremendous reverse at the hands of Barbarossa
off Prevesa in September, 1538, and in 1539 negotiations were
opened between the Republic and the Porte. A three
months' truce was arranged, and in 1540 a definite peace was
concluded. The Republic agreed to pay to the Sultan an
indenmity of 300,000 ducats, and to surrender various points
on the Dalmatian coast, and all claims to the recover}' of the
Aegean islands which had been captured by Barbarossa. The
triumph of the Ottoman Sultan was complete.

Neither the conclusion of the Truce of Nice between the Continued
French king and the Habsburgs nor the definitive treaty ^^^ ^'^*^
between the Republic and the Porte was permitted to inter- emperor,
rupt the contest between the Sultan Suleiman and the
Emperor Charles V. Barbarossa's continued possession of
Algiers was a perpetual menace to the Spanish and Italian
dominions of the emperor. In 1541, therefore, Charles V fitted
out another expedition with the object of finally expelling
Barbarossa from his corsair kingdom. The expedition was
a complete fiasco. Francis I renewed his contest with
Charles V in 1542, and in the following year a French fleet,
commanded by the Due d'Enghien, combined with that of

86 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

Barbarossa to effect a capture of tlie town of Nice which
was sacked and burnt by the Ottomans. The accord between
Barbarossa and the French was far from perfect, but the
latter gave proof of their friendship by handing over the
harbour of Toulon to their allies. But in 1544 Francis and
Charles again made peace at Crespy, and again the Turks
and the Habsburgs were left confronting each other both in
the Mediterranean and on the Hungarian plain.
Death of In 1546 Suleiman suffered a great loss by the death of his
nSsa^ brilliant admiral, Barbarossa. The genius of the corsair had
(1546). not merely added materially to the Empire of the Ottomans,
but had secured for their navy in the Mediterranean, in
the Red Sea, and in the Indian Ocean an ascendancy which it
never again enjoyed. The death of Barbarossa, following
closely upon the desertion of France, inclined Suleiman to
peace with the emperor, and in 1547, as we have seen,* a five
years' truce was concluded at Constantinople.
Henry II The death of Francis I in the same year was of much less con-
^^ . sequence than that of Barbarossa, for the alliance between him
and Suleiman was cemented and perhaps more consistently
maintained by his son. In 1556, however, the Emperor
Charles V, in view of his impending abdication, concluded with
France the Truce of Vaucelles, and at the same time recom-
mended his brother Ferdinand to come to terms w ith the Turks.
The French king was at pains to explain to his Ottoman ally that
the truce concluded with the emperor involved no weakening
of his hereditary friendship, and Suleiman graciously accepted
the assurance. The truce did not endure ; in 1557 the French
suffered a severe defeat at St. Quentin, and Henry II was
more than ever anxious for the assistance of the Sultan ; and
that in more than one form. He begged Suleiman to attack
the Habsburgs in Hungary, to send an expedition to Naples,
to maintain their fleet on a war footing, even throughout
the M'inter months, in the Mediterranean, and, finally, to
accommodate him with a considerable loan. As to the last,
the Sultan replied, not without dignity, that * the Ottomans
were wont to succour their friends with their persons and

1 Cf. supra, p. 81.

IV THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: ITS ZENITH 87

not Mith their purses, since their religion forbade money
loans to the enemies of their faith '. Naval assistance in the
Mediterranean was, however, readily promised. As a fact,
there had been no cessation of naval hostilities throughout
all these years. Even the conclusion of the Peace of Prague*
between the Sultan and the Habsburgs did not interrupt
them, for Spain was not included in the peace. Soon after
his accession (1556) Philip II of Spain had endeavoured to
rid himself of the perpetual embarrassment of the naval war ;
but his effort Mas fruitless, and the contest in the Mediter-
ranean dragged its wearisome length along. On both sides
it was largely irregular and almost piratical in character ;
sustained on the one hand by Thorgond, the successor of
Barbarossa in Algiers, and on the other by the Knights
of St. John.

The Knights, driven by Suleiman from Rhodes, had estab- Ottoman
lished themselves in Malta. The possession of that island is, ^^^^ ^^
and always has been, deemed essential to naval supremacy
in the Mediterranean. Apart from the shelter it afforded
the buccaneering Knights it offered tempting advantages to
the Turks in their contest with the Sovereign of Spain. In
1565 Suleiman determined to make a strenuous effort to
capture the island In the spring of that year, therefore, he
dispatched from Constantinople a magnificent fleet, number-
ing not less than one hundred and ninety ships, with an army,
on board, of 80,000 men, under the command of Mustapha
Pasha. The fort of St. Elmo was taken but with very
heavy loss to the Turks, and the Castles of St. Angelo and
St. Michel resisted all their eflbrts. Again and again the
assault was renewed, but after four months of fruitless fight-
ing Mustapha, having lost two-thirds of his army, decided to
abandon the attempt. What the Turks could not do in the
sixteenth century no one else ventured to attempt, and the
Knights were left undisturbed until the Napoleonic wars.

The great Sultan's course was now nearly run. It had Death of
been attended, in the main, with extraordinary success, yet fi^l*^,'.^?^^
the failure to take Malta was not the only shadow which fell
over his declining years.

^ Cf. supra, p. 82.

88 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

Koxalana, Like other men who present to the Morld an adamantine
front Suleiman was not proof against the cajolery of a fasci-
nating woman. A Russian slave, named Khoureem, better
known as Roxalana/ had in his early years acquired an
extraordinary influence over her lord, M'ho was persuaded
to enfranchise her and to make her his wife. All the Sultana's
efforts Avere then directed to securing the succession for her
son, Prince Selim. An elder son, Prince Mustapha, born to
the Sultan by another wife, had already shown extraordinary
promise, and had won, among his father's subjects, a fatal
measure of popularity. The intrigues of Roxalana turned
that popularity to his destruction, and the prince was mur-
dered in his father's i^resence. After Roxalana's death, which
preceded that of the Sultan by eight years, her second son,
Prince Bayezid, with his children, was murdered, at his
father's instance, by the Persians. The purpose of all these
sordid tragedies was to clear the succession for Roxalana's
elder and favourite son Selim, ' the Sot '.

It seems at first sight paradoxical that these revolting
murders should have been instigated by a sovereign famed,
and justly famed, for magnanimity, generosity, kindliness,
and courtesy. Yet the contradiction is not peculiar to great
rulers, or even to great men. Suleiman, perhaps the most
brilliant of the Ottoman Sultans, certainly one of the greatest
among contemporary sovereigns, Avas as wax in the hands of
the woman to whom he gave his heart. Whether that complai-
sance afl'ected in any degree his policy or capacity as a ruler
is open to question ; but two things are certain : on the
one hand that the Ottoman Empire attained, in the days of
Suleiman, the zenith of splendour and the extreme limits of
its territorial expansion; and, on the other, that the seeds
of decay were already sown and were beginning, though as
yet imperceptibly, to germinate.
Extent of Estimates of population are notoriously untrustworthy, but
man's ^^ seems probable that at a time when Henry VIII ruled over
empire, about 4,000,000 people the subjects of the Sultan Suleiman
numbered 50,000,000. These included not less than tAventy

^ A corruption or emendation of La Kossa, the Russian woman.

IV THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: ITS ZENITH 89

distinct races : Ottomans, Slavs, Greeks, Magyars, Rounians,
Armenians, Arabs, Copts, and Jews, to mention only a few.
The empire extended from Buda to Basra ; from the Caspian
to the Western ^Mediterranean ; and embraced many lands
in Europe, Asia, and Africa. To the north the walls of Azov
guarded the frontiers of the Turkish Empire against Russia ;
to the south ' the rock of Aden secured their authority over
the southern coast of Arabia, invested them with power in
the Indian Ocean, and gave them the complete command of
the Red Sea. ... It was no vain boast of the Ottoman Sultan
that he was the master of many kingdoms, the ruler of three
continents, and the lord of two seas '.^

This vast-stretching empire was organized by Suleiman in
twenty-one governments, which were subdivided into two
hundred and fifty sanjaks, each under its own Bey. Land
tenure and local government were alike assimilated to the
feudalism of the West ; but it was feudalism devoid of its
disintegrating tendencies, for all power was ultimately con-
centrated in the Sultan, who was at once Basikns and Khalif,
Emperor, and Pope.

The scope of this work does not permit of the discussion of
the details of domestic administration. It is concerned with
the Ottoman Empire only as a factor, though a very im-
portant factor, in the problem of the Near East, as marking
a stage in the evolution of the Eastern Question. Yet there
is one domestic institution to which a passing reference must
be made.

Many things contributed to the astonishing success of the The Jauii
early Ottomans and the rapid extension of their empire : the ^^^^ics.
hopeless decrepitude of the Greek Empire ; the proverbial
lack of cohesion among the Slav peoples ; the jealousies and
antagonisms of the Western Powers ; the Babylonish captivity
at Avignon and the subsequent schism in the Papacy ; the
military proAvess and shrewd statesmanship of many of the
earlier Sultans. But, after all, the main instrument in
the hands of the Sultan was his army, and in that army
a unique feature was the corps (Telite, the Janissaries.

* Finlay, History of Greece, v, p. (5.

90 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

As to the origin of this famous corps there has been much
controversy. It is, liowever, generally agreed^ that the
beginnings of the institution must be ascribed to Alaeddin,
brother of Orkhan, and first vizier of the Ottomans, and
dated about the year 1326. But if Orkhan initiated, Murad I
perfected, the organization. Every four years - the agents of
the Sultan took toll of his Christian subjects ; one in five of
all the young boys, and always, of course, those who gave
most promise of physical and mental superiority, were taken
from their parents and homes, compelled to accept the Moslem
faith, and educated, under the strictest discipline, as the
soldier-slaves of the Sultan. Cut off" from all human inter-
course save that of the camp, without parents, wives, or
children, the Janissaries ^ formed a sort of military brother-
hood: half soldiers, half monks. Owing implicit obedience
to their master, inured to every form of toil and hardship
from earliest youth, well paid, well tended, they soon became
one of the most potent instruments in the hands of the
Sultan.

Originally one thousand strong the force increased rapidly,
and may have numbered 10,000 to 12,000 under Mohammed
the Conqueror, and anything between 12,000 and 20,000 in
Suleiman's day. It was recruited from all parts of the Otto-
man Empire in Europe, but mainly from Bosnia, Bulgaria,
and Albania. The child-tribute has been commonly regarded
as a peculiarly repulsive illustration of the cruelty and in-
genuity which characterized the rule of the Ottoman Turks.
It is far from certain that it was so regarded by the Christians
of the Empire. The privileges of the corps w ere so great,
and their prestige so high, that the honour may well have
outweighed the ignominy in many minds. There seems, at
any rate, to have been little need of compulsion, and one

^ The latest authority on the early history of the Ottomans, Mr. Gibbons
{op. cit, p. 118), dissents on this, as on many other points, from the
hithei'to accepted view, and here as elsewhere gives reasons for his
dissent.

2 Or, as some say, every five. There is infinite variety, among
authorities, in regard to this and other details.

3 The name is generally derived from Yeni-Tscheri = new or young
troops.

IV THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: ITS ZENITH 91

distinguished authority has gone so far as to assert that the
Greek clergy ' tacitly acquiesced in the levy of tribute-
children '. Be this as it may, there can be no question as to
the importance of the part played by this corps in the building
up of the Ottoman Empire.

The institution of the Janissaries fulfilled a dual purpose.
On the one hand, it provided the Sultan with a body of picked
troops on whose loyalty and discipline he could implicitly
rely. On the other, it represented a perpetual drain upon
the young manhood of the peoples who obstinately refused
to accept the creed of their conquerors. It may be that the
extent of the debt which the earlier Sultans owed to the
Janissaries has been exaggerated, no less than the resent-
ment of those upon whom the tribute was levied. This,
however, is certain, that the advance of the Ottomans
synchronized with the period during which the corps was
maintained in its pristine simplicity, and that the change in
the position of the Janissaries coincided with the beginnings
of the political decadence of the empire.

Early in his reign (15'2G) Suleiman was faced by a mutiny
of the Janissaries. The mutiny was stamped out with
salutary severity, but the hint was not lost upon the shrewd
Sultan. He perceived that constant employment on war-
service was absolutely essential to discipline ; nor did he fail
to provide it. But the loyalty of the army was given
not to a political institution but to a personal chief. Con-
sequently, as the Sultan tended to withdraw from active
service in the field and to yield to the seductions of the
harem, the Janissaries manifested similar inclinations'

The whole position of the corps Avas revolutionized when, Changes
in 1566, its members were permitted to marry. The nextj"*.^?
step, an obvious one, was to admit their children to a body of the
which thus in time became to a large extent hereditary. J'^^^'s-
The hereditary principle soon led to exclusiveness. The (1566-
Janissaries began to regard with jealousy the admission of ^^^^^
the tribute-children, and after 1676 the tribute ceased to
be levied. A step, not less fatal to the original conception
of a military order, Mas taken when members of the corps
were allowed to engage in trade, and even to pay substitutes

92 THE EASTERN QUESTION char

for the performance of their niilitar}' duties. Throughout
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this praetorian
guard became more and more highly privileged ; more and
more insolent in the exercise of power ; more and more the
masters instead of the servants of the nominal sovereigns,
who reigned on suiferance. At last, but not until the
nineteenth century, there came to the throne a Sultan who
was strong enough to deal with what had long since become
the most flagrant scandal and the most corroding weakness
in a government which was rapidly dissolving into anarchy.
In 1826 Sultan Mahmud exterminated the whole caste of
the Janissaries and razed to the ground the quarter of
Constantinople which they had appropriated. The treat-
ment was drastic ; but no one could doubt that it was an
indispensable preliminary to political reform.
Symp- But we anticipate events. The change in the position of the

decav^ Janissaries was in part the cause, in part the consequence, of
the general decrepitude in Ottoman administration. The
general causes are not difficult to discern. The most important
was the deterioration in personnel. In an autocracy every-
thing depends on the efficiency of the autocrat. After
Suleiman the Magnificent the Sultans exhibited symptoms
of astonishingly rapid deterioration. Between the death of
Suleiman (1566) and the accession of Mahmud II (1808)
there was not a single man of mark among them. Few of
them enjoyed any considerable length of days : there are
twelve accessions in the seventeenth century as against six
in the sixteenth. The deficiency of character among the
seventeenth-century Sultans was to some extent supplied
by the emergence of a remarkable Albanian family, the
Kiuprilis, Avho provided the Porte with a succession of
brilliant viziers ; but a great vizier is not the same thing
in Turkey as a great Sultan, and even this resource was
lacking in the eighteenth century.

The inefficiency of the dynasty v. as reflected in that of the
armed forces of the Crown. The soldiers and sailors of
the Crescent continued to fight, but they no longer conquered.
The only permanent conquests effected by the Porte after
the death of Suleiman were those of Cyprus and Crete.

IV THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: ITS ZENITH 93

Ceasing to advance the Turkish poMcr rapidly receded.
Victory in the field was as the breath of life to the Otto-
mans ; success in arms was essential to the vigour of domestic
administration.

So long as the Turks were a conquering race their govern-
ment was not merely tolerable but positively good. There
was no kingdom in Europe better administered in the
sixteenth century than that of Suleiman. That great Sultan
was, as we have seen, known to his own people as ' the legis-
lator ' ; and his legislation was of the most enlightened
character. Entirely based upon the Koran Turkish law is
not susceptible of expansion or reform ; but there, as else-
where, everything depends on interpretation and adminis-
tration, and, under Suleiman, these left little to be desired.
Nor did he fail of the appropriate reward. Taxation was
light, but the revenue was prodigious, amounting, it is
reckoned, to between 7,000,000 and 8,000,000 ducats, more
than half of it being derived from Crown lands. Under
Suleiman's successor corruption set in, and spread with fatal
rapidity from the heart to the members. The taxes were
farmed out to the Jews and Phanariote Greeks ; with the
inevitable consequences : the grinding oppression of the
taxpayer and an habitually impoverished treasury.

For one source of increasing weakness Suleiman himself
may be held indirectly responsible. No autocracy could be
expected permanently to sustain the burden of an empire
so extended as his. The more distant conquests meant
a drain upon resources without any corresponding accession
of strength. Even the incorporation of Hungary has not
escaped criticism. It has been argued, and with some show
of reason, that in a military sense the Porte would have
been better without it. Economically, the Hungarian plain
must always have been valuable, but strategically Belgrade
is a better frontier fortress than Buda.

Still, when all criticisms have been weighed and all
deductions effected, Suleiman was a great ruler, and his
reign was incomparably the most brilliant epoch in the
history of the Ottoman Empire. If, after his death, decay
supervened Avith suggestive rapidity, we must not hastily

94 THE EASTERN QUESTION

assume that it could not have been arrested had competent
successors been forthcoming. Subsequent chapters will show
how little that condition was fulfilled.

For further i-eference see bibliogi'aphy to chapter iii, and Appendix.
General Works. Cf. also L. von Kanke, The Ottommi and Spanish
Emjnres in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Eng. trans. 1854) ;
J. de la Graviere, Doria et Barherousse ; J. B. Zeller, La Diplomatic
fran^aise vers le milieu du xyi* siecle.

CHAPTER Y

THE DECADEXCE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

1566-1699

Contest avith Venice and the Habsburgs

' My last judgment is that this Empire may stand, but never rise again.' —
Sib Thomas Koe (1628).

Thus far the main factor in the problem of the Near East Change
has been the advent and progress of the Ottoman Turk. To J-acter of
an analysis of that factor the two preceding chapters have problem,
been devoted. We now enter upon a new period, which will
disclose a considerable modification in the conditions of the
problem. AVhen the Sultan Suleiman passed away in 1566
the Ottoman Empire had already reached and passed its
meridian. In the seventeenth century the symptoms of decay
are manifest. Sultan succeeds Sultan, and, as one brief reign
gives place to another, the decadence of the ruling race
becomes more and more obvious. Anarchy reigns in the
capital, and corruption spreads from Constantinople to the
remotest corners of the empire. Lepanto has already
announced that the Turks are no longer invincible at sea ;
Montecuculi's great victory at St. Gothard, the failure to
capture Vienna in 1683, Prince Eugene's victory at Zenta
in 1697, combine to prove that the army is going the wa}^
of the navy. The Treaties of Carlowitz, Azov, and Passa-
rowitz afford conclusive evidence that the Eastern Question
has entered upon a new phase ; that the problem presented
to Christendom will no longer be how to arrest the advance
of the Ottomans, but how to provide for the succession to
his inheritance.

The main interest of the period under review in the Contest
present chapter concentrates upon the prolonged duel Y^e,jj^>g
between the Turks and the Habsburgs for supremacy in and the
the valleys of the Danube and the Save. By the end of^^l^^"

96 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

the period the issue of that duel is no longer in doubt.
Hardly secondary is the interest attaching to the contest
with the Venetian Republic. In the latter, fortune inclines
now to this side now to that ; nor is this remarkable, for it is
a struggle between combatants both of whom have passed
their prime.
The snc- The most palpable symptom of Ottoman decadence is
cessois afforded by the deterioration in the personal character of
man. the Sultans. Mustapha, the idiot son of Mohammed III, was
declared incapable of reigning when in 1617 he succeeded
to the throne. Excluding Mustapha no less than thirteen
sovereigns occupied the throne between 1566 and 1718. Of
these only two, Murad IV (1623-40) and Mustapha II
(1695-1703) showed any anxiety to effect reform and to
arrest the decrepitude of the empire. One out of the
thirteen was murdered, three others Avere dethroned. Not
one led an army to victory ; most of them devoted all the
time they could spare from the neglect of their duties to
the pleasures of the harem. The son, for whom Roxalana
had intrigued and Suleiman had murdered, was known
as Selim, 'the Sot' (1566-74). His son and successor,
Murad III (1674-95), spent the twenty-one years of his
reign in his harem. He began it by strangling his five
brothers, and was otherwise remarkable only for the number
of his children. Of the 103 who were born to him 47 sur-
vived him. As twenty of these were males, his successor,
Mohammed III (1595-1603), had to better his father's
example by the simultaneous slaughter of no less than
nineteen brothers. The next Sultan, Achmet I (1603-17),
was a lad of fourteen when he succeeded, and died at the
age of eight-and-twentj^ His brother INIustapha was declared
incapable of reigning owing to mental deficiency, and the
throne accordingly passed to another minor, Othman II,
whose brief reign of four years (1618-22) was only less
disturbed than that of his successor, Mustapha I (1622-3),
whose reign of fifteen months M^as the shortest and perhaps
the worst in Ottoman history. His son, Murad IV (1623-40),
was unspeakably cruel, but by no means devoid of ability,
and he made a real effbrt to carry out much needed

V DECADENCE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 97

reform. But all the ground gained under Murad was lost
under Ibrahim I, whose reign of eight years (1640-8)
was brought to a close by a revolution in the capital and
the violent death of the Sultan. His son, Mohammed IV
(1648-87), was a child of six at the time of his father's
murder. The anarchy which prevailed during the first
years of the reign was unspeakable, but it was dissipated
at last by the emergence (1656) of the Kiuprili 'dynasty',
who throughout the rest of the century provided the dis-
tracted empire with a succession of remarkable grand
viziers.

The Kiuprilis might provide rulers, but they could not
secure a succession of even tolerably efficient Sultans, and
in the absence of the latter no permanent reform of Ottoman
administration could be effected. Mohammed IV was de-
throned in 1687, and was succeeded by two brothers,
Suleiman I (1687-91), who at the age of forty-six emerged
from his mother's harem to assume an unwelcome crown ;
and Achmet II (1691-5), who was a poet and a musician,
and would have liked to be a monk. In 1695 the throne
fell to INIohammed's son, Mustapha II, who in his reign
of eight years (1695-1703) made a real effort to recall
the virtues of the earlier Sultans, but was dethroned in
1703. The same fate befell his successor, Achmet III, in
1730.

This tedious and catalogic enumeration wiU suffice to show
that the student of the Eastern Question need not concern
himself overmuch with the Ottoman Sultans of the seven-
teenth century. Until the accession of the Kiuprilis the
internal history of the empire presents one monotonous
vista of anarchy and decay. To follow it in detail would
mean the repetition of features which become tiresomely
familiar as one incompetent Sultan succeeds another. For-
tunately, there is no reason for inflicting this tedium upon
the reader.

The interest of the period, as already stated, centres in
the contests between the Ottomans on the one hand, and, on
the other, the Venetian Republic and the Habsburg Empire.

From the moment when the Ottoman Turks obtained

98 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

Venice command of the great trade-routes^ the ultimate fate of
Turks. Venice as a commercial power was sealed. She had
already lost to the Turks many of her possessions on the
mainland of the Peloponnese and in the Aegean archipelago,
but the Republic still carried her head proudly, and still
held a position which was in many ways threatening to the
Ottoman Empire. Planted in Dalmatia she headed off from
the Adriatic the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herze-
govina ; mistress of the Ionian isles she threatened the
security of the coasts of the Morea ; while the continued
possession of Crete and Cyprus not only rendered precarious
the Ottoman hold on the Levant, but offered a convenient
naval base to the Knights of St. John and the other Christian
pirates who infested the Mediterranean.

One of the first exploits of the Sultan Suleiman was, as
we have seen, the conquest of Rhodes ; one of the last was
the capture of Chios (1566). A year later Naxos fell to his
son Selim, who then proceeded to demand from Venice the
cession of Cyprus.

The moment seemed favourable for the enterprise. The
destruction by fire of her naval arsenal had just maimed
the right hand of Venice (September, 1569), while the
Sultan had freed his hands by concluding a truce with
the Emperor Maximilian (1569) and completing (1570) the
conquest of Yemen. The grand vizier, Mohammed Sokoli,
had lately conceived the idea of cutting a canal through
the Isthmus of Suez and thus strengthening the strategical
position of the empire. The outbreak of a revolt in Arabia
deferred the execution of this interesting project and led to
the conquest of Yemen. This accomplished, the Turks were
free to turn their attention to Venice.
The Holy The Republic, gravely perturbed by the insolent demand
(l57oT fo^ t^i^ cession of Cyprus, appealed to the Pope. Pius V
promised to pay for the equipment of twelve galleys,
sanctioned the levy of a tithe on the Venetian clergy, and
appealed for help not only to the Christian princes but to
the Persian Shah. The emperor's hands were tied by his

^ See supra, chap. ii.

V DECADENCE OF THE OTTOMAN EiMPIRE 99

recently concluded truce, but Philip II of Spain, Cosmo de
Medici, Duke of Tuscany, and the States of Parma, Mantua,
Lucca, Ferrara, and Genoa joined Venice and the Papacy
in a Holy League against the Ottomans. The command of
the combined armada was entrusted to a brilliant young
sailor, Don John of Austria, a natural son of the Emperor
Charles V.

The two fleets, each with a large and well-equipped army Battle of
on board, met near the entrance of the Gulf of Patras, and q^^^"*°'
there, on the 7th of October, 1571, Don John fought and won 1571. '
the great battle of Lepanto. The battle was stubbornly
contested, and the losses on both sides were enormous.'
The victory of the Holy Allies resounded throughout the
world ; Te Deums were sung in every Christian capital ;
the Pope preached on the text, ' There was a man sent from
God whose name was John ', but the actual fruits of a gigantic
enterprise were negligible. The Turks, though hopelessly
defeated in battle, retained command of the sea ; a new and
splendid fleet was rapidly built and equipped ; the conquest
of Cyprus was completed, and in May, 1573, Venice concluded
peace with the Ottoman Empire. The terms of that peace
reflected the issue of the campaign, not that of Don John's
brilliant sea-fight. The Republic agTced to the cession of
Cyprus ; to the payment of a war indemnity of 300,000
ducats ; to increase her tribute for the possession of Zante
from 500 to 1,500 ducats, and to re-establish the status quo
ante on the Dalmatian and Albanian coasts.

The terms were sufficiently humiliating to the victors at
Lepanto. Yet the victory itself was by no means devoid of
significance. Coming, as it did, so soon after the great days
of Suleiman and Barbarossa, it was interpreted as a sign
that the Turks were no longer invincible, and that their
political decadence had set in. Nor was the interpretation
wholly at fault.

The truce concluded in 1569 between the Emperor Maxi- TheHabs-
milian and the Turks lasted, mirahilc dictu, for nearly ^"'gf and
a quarter of a century. But the truce between the rulers

1 Among the wounded was Cervantes.
h2

100 THE EASTERN QUESTIOJ^ chap.

did not deprive the local chieftains on either side the
artificial frontier from perpetual indulgence in the pastime
of irregular Avar. Nominally, however, the truce was not
broken till 1593. The breach of it was followed by thirteen
years of Avar ; the Turks achieved one brilliant victory, but
much of the fighting was of a desultory character, and the
vassal rulers of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania allied
themselves with the enemy of their suzerain ; the Avar went,
on the whole, decidedly in favour of the Habsburgs ; it
became clear that the Turks had reached the limits of expan-
sion beyond the Danube. Peace was accordingly concluded,
in 1606, at Sitvatorok. The Sultan renounced his suzerainty
over Transylvania, and in exchange for a lump sum sur-
rendered the annual tribute of 30,000 ducats which ever since
1547 the emperor had paid in respect of that portion of
Hungary Avhich he had then been permitted to retain. Thence-
forward there was no question, on either side, of superiority.
Sultan and emperor Avere on a footing of formal equality.
The Fortunately for the Habsburgs, and indeed for Western

Years^ Christendom, the half century AA'hich folloAved upon the Peace
War of Sitvatorok Avas, as Ave have seen, a period of anarchy and

(1618-48). corruption in the Ottoman Empire. Were other proof lacking,
sufficient evidence of the degeneracy of the Sultans Avould be
found in their neglect to take advantage of the embarrassments
of their chief opponent. From 1618 until 1648 the empire
was in the throes of the Thirty Years' War ; the Habsburg
dynasty did not finally emerge from the contest until 1659.
In one sense, indeed, the fight did not cease until Louis XIV
had * erased ' the Pyrenees and put a Bourbon on the throne
of Spain. The preoccupation of the Habsburgs ought to
have been the opportunity of the Turk. Had the latter
advanced from Buda to Vienna Avhen the Habsburgs Avere
engaged with the recalcitrant Calvinists of Germany ; Avith
Denmark, SAveden, or France, the Austrian capital could
hardly have failed to fall to them. But the Turk let all the
chances slip, and Avhen, in 1648, the Treaties of Westphalia
Avere concluded, the conditions of the secular contest were
essentially altered.
The Thirty Years' War fatally Aveakened the Holy Roman

V DECADENCE OF THE OTTOMAN E:\IPmE 101

Empire, but out of the welter the House of Austria emerged
as a first-rate European Pom er. The Treaty of Westphalia,
even more definitely than that of Prague (186G), marks the real
beginning of the new orientation of Habsburg policy : the
gravitation towards Buda-Pesth had begun. The Holy Roman
Empire belonged essentially to the Western States-system ;
the interests of Austria-Hungary have drawn her irresistibly
towards the East. This gravitation has necessarily accen-
tuated the antagonism between the Habsburgs and the
Ottomans, and the second half of the seventeenth century is
largely occupied by a contest between them for supremacy
in the Danube and the Save valleys.

Before we pass to the details of that contest it will conduce Turkey
to lucidity if we dismiss briefly the subsidiary, but at times y ^^ .
interdependent, war between the Turks and the Venetian (1645-
Republic. So long as the latter retained Crete Ottoman ^'^^^)-
supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean lacked completeness.
In 1645 the Sultan Ibrahim roused himself to the task of
putting the coping stone upon the edifice. A pretext was
soon found. In 1638 the Venetians, in pursuit of some
Barbary pirates, had bombarded Valona on the Albanian
coast. In 1644 a buccaneering raid was made by some
galleys upon a valuable Turkish merchant fleet in the
Levant. The successful assailants came, indeed, from IMalta,
but it sufficed that they found a refuge in a Cretan harbour.
The disastrous failure, in 1565, of the last Turkish attack
upon the Knights Hospitallers in Malta, had made the Sultan
shy of renewing the attempt. The Venetian Republic seemed
to be a less redoubtable enemy and Crete a more important
prize. Against Crete, accordingly, the attack was delivered
in 1645, and Candia was besieged. The town held out for just
a quarter of a century, in the course of which the Venetian
sailors managed to inflict more than one humiliation upon
the Turks. The Ottoman fleet suffered an important reverse
in the Aegean in 1649, and in 1656 Mocenigo, an intrepid
Venetian admiral, won a great victory in the Dardanelles,
captured Lemnos and Tenedos, and threatened Constantinople.

The brilliant success of the Venetian fleet, combined with The
the degeneracy of the Sultans and the complete corruption ^^"P^'^^^^-

102 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

of Ottoman administration, seemed to threaten the imminent
dissolution of the Turkish Empire. The nadir of its fortunes
was reached, however, in 1656, and in the same year there
was initiated a remarkable revival. The revival was due to
the stupendous energy and splendid ability of one man,
Mohammed Kiuprili. To him the mother of the young
Sultan turned, in the hour of the empire's deepest need.
Belonging to an Albanian family which had long been resi-
dent in Constantinople, Mohammed Kiuprili was, in 1656,
an old man of seventy, but he agreed to attempt the task
demanded of him, on one condition. He stipulated that he
should be invested with absolute authority. The condition
was accepted, Kiuprili became grand vizier, and entered
forthwith upon his work.

The strong hand upon the reins Avas felt at once, and the
high-mettled steed immediately responded to it. The Janis-
saries were taught their place by the only method they
could now appreciate — the simultaneous execution of 4,000
of their number ; the administration was purged of the
corrupting and enervating influences to which it had long
been a prey ; chaos gave way to order in the finances, and
discipline was promptly restored in the army and navy.

In no sphere were the effects of the new regime more
quickly manifested than in the prosecution of the war. Within
twelve months the Venetian fleet was chased from the Dar-
danelles ; the guardian islands, Lemnos and Tenedos, were
recovered by the Turks ; the operations against Crete were con-
ducted with new vigour; and in 1658 the gi-and vizier under-
took in pei*son, despite his years, a punitive expedition against
George Rakoczy II, the Yoyvode of Transylvania. Rakoczy
himself was deposed, and two years later was killed ; Tran-
sylvania had to pay a large war indemnity and an increased
tribute to the Porte.
Achmet Mohammed Kiuprili died in 1<361, but was immediately
nfifn-7m succeeded by his son Achmet, a man of a vigour and ability
not inferior to his own. After an expedition into Hungary,
to which reference will be made presently, Achmet, in 1666,
assumed personal control of the operations against Venice.
In 1669 Louis XIV, in order to avenge an insult offered to

(1661-76).

V DECADENCE OF THE OTTOMAN EI^IPIRE 108

the French ambassador in Constantinople, sent a force to the
help of the Republic, but at last, after a siege which had
dragged on, with intervals, for twenty-five years, Candia
capitulated in 1669, and the whole island of Crete — except
the three ports of Suda, Carabusa, and Spina-Lurga — passed
into the hands of the Turks. The conquest of the great
Greek island was doubly signifi^cant : it was the last notable
conquest made in Europe by the Ottomans, and marked the
final term of their advance ; it marked also the complete
absorption of the last important remnant of the Greek Empire.
Not until 1913 did the Hellenes formally recover an island
by which they have always set exceptional store.

The capitulation of Candia was immediately followed by Renewal
the conclusion of peace between the Porte and the Republic, '^y^^^^
But, after the disaster to Turkish arms before Vienna in 1683, Venice
the Venetians again determined to try their fortunes against '^^"^'*)-
their old enemies. A Holy League, under the patronage of
the Pope, was in 1684 formed against the infidel. Austria,
Venice, Poland, and the Knights of JNIalta were the original
confederates, and in 1686 they were joined by Russia. The
Venetians invaded Bosnia and Albania, and a little later,
under Francesco Morosini, they descended upon the Morea.
Brilliant success attended the expedition ; Athens itself was
taken in September, 1687, and though it was restored by the
Treaty of Carlowitz (1699), the whole of the Morea, except
Corinth, together with the islands of Aegina and Santa Maura
and a strip of the Dalmatian coast, were retained by the
Republic.

Venetian rule in the Morea was not popular. The Vene-
tians did something to improve education, and much of the
lost trade between the Levant and Western Europe was, during
the period of their occupation, recovered. But their domina-
tion was almost as alien as that of the Turks, and the Greeks
gained little by the change of masters. When therefore the
Turks, in 1714, declared war against the Venetians, they were
able in some sort to pose as the liberators of the ]Morea. Li
places they were indubitably welcomed as such, and the
progress of their arms was consequently rapid. But in 1716
Austria intervened in the war, and in 1718 the Porte was

104 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

glad enough to conclude a peace by Avhich she regained the
Morea, though Venice retained her conquests in Dalmatia,
Albania, and Herzegovina. If the Ottoman Empire was
decadent, the Republic too had fallen from its high estate.
Hungary For the sake of lucidity we have anticipated the progress
^ylvania^ of events ; we must now retrace our steps and follow the
course of the struggle on the northern frontiers of the
empire. For more than a century the Sultan had been
direct sovereign of the greater part of Hungary, and had
claimed a suzerainty, not always conceded, over Transyl-
vania. By the middle of the seventeenth century it seemed
possible that the latter principality, after many vicissitudes,
might become hereditary in the house of Rakoczy. That
possibility was dissipated, as we have seen, by the vigorous
action of Mohammed Kiuprili. On the death of George
Rakoczy II (1660), the Transj^lvanian nationalists elected
John Kaminyi as Voyvode, while the Turks nominated a
candidate of their own, Apafy. Kaminyi appealed to the
Emperor Leopold, who sent a force under Montecuculi to his
assistance. The succour did not, however, prove effective,
and in 1662 Kaminyi was killed. Apafy, mistrustful of the
disinterestedness of his patrons, sought, in his turn, help
from the emperor. Meanwhile, Achmet Kiuprili collected
a force of 200,000 men, and in 1663 crossed the Danube at
their head. He captured the strong fortress of Neuhausel,
ravaged Moravia, and threatened Vienna. Smarting under
the diplomatic insult to which reference has been made,
Louis XIV dispatched a force to the assistance of the emperor,
and at St. Gothard, on the Raab, Montecuculi, commanding
the imperial forces, inflicted, with the aid of the French,
a decisive defeat upon Kiuprili.
Treaty of St. Gothard was the most notable victory won by the arms
acfiiT ^^ Christendom against those of Islam for three hundred
years. But the emperor, instead of following it up, suddenly
concluded a truce for twenty years with the Turks. The
terms obtained by the latter, and embodied in the Treaty of
Vasvar, were unexpectedly favourable. The emperor agreed
to pay an indemnity of 200,000 florms ; the Turks retained
Grosswardein and Neuhausel, and thus actually strengthened

DECADENCE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE lOo

their position in Hungary, while their suzerainty over Tran-
sylvania was confirmed. The concession of such terms after
such a victory as that of St. Gothard evoked resentment in
some quarters, and astonishment in all. The explanation of
the paradox must be sought in the repercussion of Western
politics upon those of the East, and in the dynastic preoccupa-
tion of the Habsburg emperor. Philip IV of Simin was on his
death-bed ; the succession to the widely distributed dominions
of the Spanish crown was a matter of gi-eat uncertainty ; French
help in Hungary, though acceptable at the moment, might
well prove to have been too dearly purchased ; and it was
intelligible that the emperor should desire to have his hands
free from embarrassments in the East, in view of contingencies
likely to arise in the West.

For the time being, however, his enemies were even more Turkish
deeply involved than he was. The Venetian War was not Poiand
ended until 1669, and three years later the Turks plunged (1672-6).
into war with Poland.

The lawlessness of the border tribes to the north of the
Euxine had already threatened to bring the Ottoman Empire
into collision with the Russian Tsars. Towards the end of
Ibrahim's reign (1640-8) the Tartars of the Crimea had
pursued their Cossack enemies into Southern Russia and had
brought away 3,000 prisoners. The Russians in turn advanced
against Azov but were badly beaten, with the result that
the Tartars sent 800 Muscovite heads as a trophy to
Constantinople.

There were similar troubles on the side of Poland. In
1672 the Cossacks of the Ukraine, stirred to revolt by
the insolence of the Polish nobles and the extortions of
their Jewish agents, oflPered to place themselves under the
suzerainty of the Sultan in return for assistance against
their local oppressors. Achmet Kiuprili, nothing loth,
declared war upon Poland, and, accompanied by the Sultan,
Mohammed IV, led a strong force to an assault upon
Kaminiec, the great fortress on the Dniester, which strategi-
cally commanded Podolia. Kaminiec, though hitherto deemed
impregnable, quickly yielded to the Turks, and the Polish
King jVIichael hastily concluded with the Sultan a treaty.

106 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

which involved the payment of an annual tribute and the
surrender of Podolia and the Ukraine. The Polish Diet,
however, refused to ratify the treaty, and entrusting the
command of their forces to John Sobieski, they waged for
four years an heroic struggle against the Ottomans. Thanks
to the commanding character and the military genius of
Sobieski, the Poles not only rallied their forces, but inflicted
a crushing defeat upon the Turks at Khoczim (November,
1673). In 1674 the victorious general was elected to the
Polish throne, and in the following year he again defeated
the Turks at Lemberg. But despite this defeat the Turks
steadily persisted and maintained their hold upon Podolia,
and in 1676 both sides were glad to conclude the Peace of
Zurawno. Under the terms of this treaty the Turks retained
Kaminiec and the greater part of Podolia, together with
a portion of the Ukraine, but agreed to forgo the tribute
promised by King Michael.

The Peace of Zurawno may be regarded as a further triumph
for Achmet Kiuprili, but it was his last. In the same year he
died, having substantially advanced the borders of the empire
at the expense of Austria-Hungary, of Poland, and of Venice.
He was succeeded, as grand vizier, by his brother-in-law, Kara
Mustapha, who almost immediately found himself involved in
war with Russia.
Russo- The war brought little credit to the new vizier, and

;^^kish i^otjjjjjg ^jy^^ disaster to his country. Kara Mustapha led
(1677-81). a large army into the Ukraine, but he was driven back
across the Danube by the Russians, and in 1681 the Porte
Avas glad to conclude a peace by which the district of the
Ukraine, obtained from Poland in 1676, was ceded to Russia,
and the two Powers mutually agreed that no fortifications
should be raised between the Dniester and the Bug.
East and Kara Mustapha had more important work on hand. Lack-
ing both character and ability he was nevertheless devoured
by ambition. He determined to associate his name with
the conquest of Vienna and the extension of the Ottoman
Empire to the Rhine. The moment was not unfavourable to
such a design. The attention of Western Europe was con-
centrated upon Louis XIV, who had now reached the zenith

V DECADENCE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 107

of his power. War had succeeded war and treaty had followed
treaty, and from all France had extracted the maximum of
advantage. By the Treaty of Westphalia, supplemented by
that of the Pyrenees (1659), Louis XIV had gone some way
towards realizing the dream of all patriotic Frenchmen, the
attainment of les Umites naturelles : the Rhine, the Alps,
the Pyrenees, and the Ocean. France pushed her frontier to
the Pyrenees and got a firm gi-ip upon the middle Rhine ;
Pinerolo guarded her frontier towards Savoy, and, on the
north-east, a large part of Artois passed into her hands. Louis's
marriage with Marie Louise, eldest daughter of Philip IV of
Spain, opened out a still larger ambition. The War of Devolu-
tion gave him an impregnable frontier on the north-east, and
ten years later, by the Treaty of Ximeguen (1678), he obtained
the * Free County ' of Burgundy, and made the Jura, for the
first time, the eastern frontier of France. His next annexa-
tion was the great fortress of Strasburg (1681), and in 1683
he threatened Luxemburg.

The emperor could not remain indifferent to these assaults The

upon the western frontiers of the empire : but as Archduke Habs-

^ '■ ' burgs and

of Austria and King of Hungary he had troubles nearer home. Hungary.

The Turks were still, it must be remembered, in possession
of by far the larger part of Hungary — the pashalik of Buda.
In Austria-Hungary, moreover, there had long been much
discontent with Habsburg rule. The Emperor Leopold, like
his predecessors, was much under the influence of his Jesuit
confessors, and his hand was heavy on the Hungarian Pro-
testants, who looked with envy upon the lot of their brethren
living under the tolerant rule of the Ottoman Turks.

Nor was religious persecution their only ground of com-
plaint against the Habsburgs. The proud Magyar aristocracy
denounced the Treaty of Vasvar as a craven betrayal of
Hungarian interests on the part of a ruler by whom Hun-
gary was regarded as a mere appendage to Austria. Their
nationalist instincts were further ofiended by the attempt of
the Emperor Leopold to administer his Hungarian kingdom
through German officials responsible solely to Vienna. So
bitter was the feeling that in 1666 a Avidespread conspiracy
was formed under the nominal leadership of Francis Rakoczy,

108 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

a son of the late Prince of Transylvania. The plot was
betrayed to the Viennese Government. Louis XIV had
lately concluded a secret agreement with the Emperor
Leopold in regard to the Spanish succession, and hence
Mas not, at the moment, disposed to help the Hungarian
malcontents ; above all, the Turks were busy in Crete. The
movement, therefore, collapsed ; Rakoczy was treated with
contemptuous lenity, but the rest of the leaders were punished
with pitiless severity, and the yoke of the Habsburgs was
imposed with tenfold rigour upon what w^as now regarded as
a conquered province. The office of Palatine was abolished ;
the administration was entrusted exclusively to Gemian
officials ; the Hungarian aristocracy were exposed to every
species of humiliation and crushed under a load of taxation ;
the Protestant pastors were sent to the g-alleys or driven
into exile.
Hun- The reign of terror issued, in 1674, in a renewed revolt

fevdt under the patriotic and devoted leadership of a Magyar
under aristocrat, Emmerich Tokoli. The moment was propitious.
The emperor was now at war with Louis XIV, who, in 1672,
had launched his attack upon the United Provinces. Louis
was, it is true, too much engaged on his own account to send
help to the Hungarian nationalists, but he used his influence
at Warsaw and Constantinople on their behalf. Not that
either Poles or Turks engaged in fighting each other (1672-6)
could at the moment do much for the Magyars. Kara
Mustapha, however, promised that he would send help imme-
diately his hands were free of the Polish War. But, as we
have seen, that war was no sooner ended than the Turks were
involved in war with Russia. The latter war ended, in its
turn, in 1681, and at last Kara Mustapha was in a position
to embark upon the larger designs which from the first he
had entertained.

Promptly, the emperor attempted to conciliate the Hun-
garian nationalists. The administrative system was remodelled
in accordance with their wishes ; the governor-generalship
was abolished ; the German officials were withdrawn ; the
more oppressive taxes were repealed ; the rights of citizen-
ship were restored to the Protestants, both Calvinists and

Tokoli
(1674)

V DECADENCE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 109

Lutherans, who Mcre to enjoy liberty of conscience and of
worship ; the chief administrative offices were confided to
natives ; and the dignity of Palatine was revived in favour of
Paul Esterhazy.

Concession could hardly have gone further, but the
emperor's change of front was suspiciously coincident with
the modification of the external situation. Emmerich Tokoli
refused to be beguiled into the acceptance of conditions so
obviously inspired by prudential considerations. On the
contrary, he entered into closer i-elations with the enemies
of the emperor. He married the widow of Francis Rakoczy,
and so strengthened his position on the side of Transylvania,
and at the same time proclaimed himself Prince of Hun-
gary under the suzerainty of the Sultan.

In 1682 Mohammed IV advanced to the support of his Austro-
vassal. He led from Adrianople a magnificent army of 200,000, ^y^j.
amply supplied ^vith guns and siege trains. At Belgrade he (1683).
surrendered the command to the gi*and vizier, who, having
effected a junction with Tokoli, advanced in 1683 towards
Vienna.

The Emperor Leojjold, isolated by the diplomacy of John
Louis XIV in Western Europe, and even in the empire
itself, turned for help to Poland, and, thanks to the king, not
in vain. Sobieski undertook, notwithstanding an appeal from
Louis XIV, to come with a force of 40,000 men to the rescue
of the emperor and of Christendom.

Meanwhile Kara Mustapha was marching with leisurely
confidence upon Vienna. The emperor and his court retired
in haste to Passau, and Charles IV, Duke of Lorraine, the
commander of the imperialist forces, having entrusted the
defence of the capital to Count Stahremberg, withdrew
to await the arrival of Sobieski and the Poles. Stahrem-
berg proved equal to one of the heaviest responsibilities
ever imposed upon an Austrian general. He burned the
suburbs to the ground, and did his utmost to put the city
itself into a posture of defence. The fortifications w^ere in
a most neglected condition ; the walls were in no state to
resist an assault ; the garrison consisted of no more than
10,000 men ; while the defence was hampered by crowds of

Vienna.

110 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

peasants who liad fled for refuge to the city before the advance
of the Ottomans.
Siege of Stahremberg, however, kept a stout heart, and inspired
the garrison with his own grim determination. On July 14
the Ottoman host encamped before the walls, and proceeded
to invest the city. The siege lasted for 60 days, and the
beleaguered garrison was reduced to the last extremity. On
September 5 Sobieski had joined the Duke of Lorraine, and
had assumed command of their combined forces ; on the 9th
a message reached him from Stahremberg that unless succour
arrived immediately it would be too late ; on the 11th the
relieving army took up its position on the Kahlenberg, the
hill which overlooks the capital ; on the 12th it advanced
to the attack upon the besiegers.

At the first charge of the Poles the Turks were seized with
panic, and, before they could recover, Sobieski flung his
whole force upon them. The great host was routed ; Vienna
was saved'; 10,000 Turks were left dead upon the field ; 300
guns and an enormous amount of equipment and booty fell
into the hands of the victors. Two days later the emperor
returned to his capital to greet the saviour of Christendom.

Sobieski, however, started ofi" at once in pursuit of the
Turks, defeated them near Parkan in October, at Szecsen
in November, and drove them out of Hungary. Kara
Mustapha fled to Belgrade, and there on Christmas Day
paid with his life the penalty of his failure.

The significance of that failure can hardly be exaggerated.
Had Kara Mustapha's ability been equal to his ambition
and superior to his gi-eed, Vienna must have fallen to an
assault. Had Vienna fallen, the Ottoman Empire might
well have been extended to the Rhine. In view of the
decadence of the Sultans and the corruption which had
already eaten into the vitals of their empire, it is more
than doubtful whether the advance could have been main-
tained ; there is, indeed, ground for the belief that even the
absorption of Hungary was a task beyond their strength, and
that the Danube formed their * natural limit ' towards the
north. But even the temporary occupation of Vienna, still
more the annexation, however transitory, of lands wholly

V DECADENCE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 111

Teutonic in race and essentially ' western ' in their political
connexions, could not have failed to administer a severe
moral shock to Christendom. That shock was averted by
the valour and intrepidity of Sobieski, the Pole. The 'most
Christian King ', Louis XIV of France, so far from stirring
a finger to save Christendom, regarded the advance of the
Turks as a welcome military diversion ; he exhausted all
the unrivalled resources of French diplomacy to assure the
success of their enterprise, and annihilate the only Power
in Europe which seemed, at the moment, capable of circum-
scribing the ambition of the Bourbons.^ It Avas five years
later that the English Revolution gave to the Dutch stad-
holder the chance, which he did not neglect, of saving
Europe from the domination of France.

Meanwhile, the war between the Habsburgs and the Turks Recon-
continued for fifteen years after the raising of the siege of ^®^* °^
Vienna. Sobieski, having successfully accomplished the task &c. '
which has won him imperishable fame, soon retired from the
war. The French party reasserted itself at Warsaw ; domestic
difficulties, ever recurrent in Poland, demanded the personal
intervention of the king, and in 1684 he surrendered the com-
mand of the imperialist forces to Charles of Lorraine. The
formation of the Holy League, in that same year, gave to
the war against the Turks something of the nature of a
crusade, and volunteers flocked to the standard of the
emperor from many countries besides those which actually
joined the League. -

Led by Charles of Lorraine, by the Margrave Lewis of
Baden, by the Elector of Bavaria, by Prince Eugene of
Savoy, and other famous captains, the imperialists won
a succession of significant victories against the Turks. They
stormed the strong fortress of Neuhausel, and drove Tokoli
and the Hungarian nationalists back into Transylvania in

^ Voltaire suggests (ie Siecle de Lotas XI F, cha^. xiv) that the French
king was only waiting for the fell of Vienna to go to the assistance of the
empire, and then, having posed as the saviour of Europe, to get the
Dauphin elected king of the Romans. The idea may well have been
present to Louis's mind.

2 See supra, p. 103.

112

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Second
battle of
Moliacz

(1687).

Fall of
Belgrade

(1688).

1685, and in the following year they retook Buda, which for
145 years had formed the capital of Turkish Hungary. The
Habsburg emperor, now master of the whole of Hungary,
proceeded to deal with his rebellious subjects. A reign of ter-
ror ensued, and the embers of the insurrection were quenched
in blood. Important modifications were introduced into the
constitution. The Hungarian Crown, hitherto nominally
elective, became hereditary in the House of Habsburg, and
in 1687 the Austrian Archduke Joseph was crowned king.

In that same year the imperialist forces met the Turks on
the historic field of Mohacz, and by a brilliant victory wiped
out the memory of the defeat sustained at the hands of
Suleiman the Magnificent 161 years before. The second
battle of Mohacz was followed by the reduction and recovery
of Croatia and Slavonia. This prolonged series of defeats
in Hungary led to the outbreak of disaifection in Constanti-
nople. The Janissaries demanded a victim, and in 1687, as we
have seen, Sultan Mohammed IV was deposed. But the
change of Sultans did not afiect the fortunes of war. In
1688 the imperialists invaded Transylvania, and the ruling
Prince Apafy exchanged the suzerainty of the Ottomans for
that of the Habsburgs. Henceforward Transylvania became
a vassal state under the croA^Ti of Hungary.

But a much more important triumph awaited Austrian
arms. In September, 1688, the great fortress of Belgrade
was stormed by the imperialists, and for just half a century
was lost to the Turks. From Belgrade the conquering
Teutons advanced into Serbia and captured Widdin and
Nish.

Once more, however, the repercussion of Western politics
was felt in the East, and, in 1688, the outbreak of the war
of the League of Augsburg and the French invasion of the
Palatinate, relieved the pressure upon the Turks. But this
advantage was cancelled by the appearance of a new antago-
nist. In 1689 Peter the Great of Russia invaded the Crimea,
and in 1696 captured the important fortress of Azov.^ INIean-
while, for the Turks the situation Mas temporarily redeemed

1 See, for further details, infra, p. 119.

V DECADENCE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 113

by the appointment as grand vizier of a third member of
the famous Albanian family which had already done such
splendid service for the State. Mustapha Kiuprili (III) was
the brother of Achmet ; he was in office only two years
(1689-91), but the effect of a strong hand at the helm was
immediately manifested : the finances were put in order ; the
administration was purified, and new vigour was imparted to
the conduct of the war.

The death of Apafy, Prince of Transylvania (April, 1690),
gave Mustapha a chance of which he was quick to avail
himself Master of Hungary, the Emperor Leopold was
most anxious to absorb Transylvania as well, and to this
end endeavoured to secure his own election as successor to
Apafy. The separatist sentiment was, however, exceedingly
persistent among the Roumans of Transylvania, and, with
a view to encouraging it, the vizier nominated as voyvode
Emmerich Tokoli. With the aid of Turkish troo})s Tokoli
temporarily established himself in the principality, though
his position was threatened by the advance of an imperialist
army under Lewis, INIargrave of Baden.

Meanwhile, Kiuprili himself marched into Serbia, retook
Widdin and Nish, and advanced on Belgrade. That great
fortress fell, partly as the result of an accidental explosion,
into the hands of the Turks, who, in 1691, advanced into
Hungary. Recalled from Transylvania to meet this greater
danger, Lewis of Baden threw himself upon the advancing
Turks at Salan Kemen, and inflicted upon them a crushing
defeat (August 19, 1691). 28,000 Turks were left dead upon
the field, and 150 guns fell into the hands of the victors.
The grand vizier himself was among the killed. With him
perished the last hope of regeneration for the Ottoman
Empire.

After the defeat and death of Kiuprili III, Tokoli could Conquest
no longer maintain his position in Transylvania, and the gylvania
Diet came to terms with the emperor (December, 1691).
Local privileges were to be respected, but the emperor was
to become voyvode and to receive an annual tribute of
50,000 ducats. Transylvania thus virtually took its place
as a province of the Habsburg Empire.

K84 I

114 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

For the next few years the war languished. England and
Holland tried to bring about peace in Eastern Europe, while
Louis XIV, for reasons equally obvious, did his utmost to
encourage the prolongation of the war. But in 1697
Louis XIV himself came to terms with his enemies in the
Treaty of Ryswick, and thus the emperor was once more
free to concentrate his attention upon the struggle in the
Near East.
Battle of In iQg'j Prince Eugene of Savoy assumed command of
Sept. 11, the imperialist forces, and in the autumn inflicted upon
1697. the Turks at Zenta on the Theiss the most crushing defeat
their arms had sustained since their advent into Europe.
The grand vizier and the flower of the Ottoman army,
20,000 in all, were left dead upon the field ; 10,000 men
were wounded, and many trophies fell into the hands of the
victors. Carlyle's comment on this famous victory is charac-
teristic : * Eugene's crowning feat ; breaking of the Grand
Turk's back in this world ; who has staggered about less
and less of a terror and outrage, more and more of a
nuisance, growing unbearable, ever since that day.'
Treaty of A fourth Kiuprili, who succeeded as grand vizier, made
Jan. 26 ^ gallant effort to redeem the situation ; he raised a fresh
1699. army and drove the Austrians back over the Save ; but the
battle of Zenta was decisive, it could not be reversed, and
in January, 1699, peace was concluded at Carlowitz.

The terms were sufficiently humiliating for the Porte.
The advantages secured by the Venetian Republic have
already been enumerated. To the emperor the Turks were
obliged to cede Transylvania, the whole of Hungary except
the Banat of Temesvar, and the greater part of Slavonia and
Croatia. Poland retained the Ukraine and Podolia, including
the great fortress of Kaminiec. The peace with Russia was
not actually signed until 1702, when she secured the fortress
and district of Azov.

No such peace had ever before been concluded by the
Turk. The tide had unmistakably begun to ebb. The
principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia remained subject
to the Sultan for a century and a half to come, but otherwise
the boundary of the Ottoman Empire was fixed by the

V DECADENCE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 115

Drave, the Save, and the Danube. Never again was Europe
threatened by the Power which for three centuries had been
a perpetual menace to its security. Henceforward the nature
of the problem was changed. The shrinkage of the Ottoman
Empire created a vacuum in the Near East, and diplomacy
abhors a vacuum. How was it to be filled ?

The succeeding chapters of this book will be largely con-
cerned with the attempts of Europe to find an answer to that
question.

For further reference cf. chapter iii ; General "Works (Appendix) ;
and also L. Leger, V Autriche-Hotigrie ; Rambaud, History of Russia
(Eng. trans.) ; Hinily, La formation territoriale ; Freeman, Historical
Geography.

i2

CHAPTER yi

THE EASTERN QUESTION IN THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY

Russia and Turkey, 1689-1792

* Pour la Eussie toute la fameuse question d'Orient se resume dans ces
mots: de quelle antorite dependent les detroits du Bosphore et des
Dardanelles ? Qui en est le detentenr ? ' — Serge Goriatnow.

' Tout contribue a developper entre ces deux pays 1 'antagonism e et la
liaine. Les Russes ont regn leur foi de Byzance, e'est leur metropole, et
les Turcs la souillent de leur presence. Les Turcs oppriment les co-
religionnaires des Eusses, et chaqne Eu^se considere comme une ceuvre
de foi la delivrance de sps freres. liCS passions populaires s'accordent ici
avec les conseils de la politique : c'est vers la mer Noire, vers le Danube,
vers Constantinople que les souverains russes sont naturellement portes
a s'etendre : delivrer et conquerir deviennent pour eux synonymes. Les
tsars ont cette rare fortune que I'instinct national soutient leurs calculs
d'ambition, et qu'ils peuvent retoumer contre I'empire Ottoman ce
fanatisme reiigieux qui a precipite les Turcs sur I'Europe et rendait
naguere leurs invasions si formidables.' — Albert Sorel.

' L'introduction de la Eussie sur la scene europeenne derangerait aussi
le systeme politique du Nord et de I'Orient tel que I'avait compose la
• prudence de nos rois et de nos ministres.' — Vandal.

§ 1. From the Treaty of Carlotvitz to the
Treaty of Belgrade, 1699-1739

The new THROUGHOUT the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it

in the was, as we have seen, the Habsburo; emperors who, with

problem, the fitful aid of the Venetian Republic, bore the brunt of

the struggle against the Turks. The prize for which they

contended was domination in the Save and the Middle

Danube valleys.

With the opening of the eighteenth century, just, indeed,
before the close of the seventeenth, a new factor makes its
appearance in the problem of the Near East. Russia comes
more and more prominently forward as the protagonist.
She challenges Turkish supremacy in the Black Sea, and

THE EASTERN QUESTION 117

begins to interest herself in the fate of her co-religionists
in the Ottoman Empire. Connected with many of them by
ties not merely of religion but of race, she stands forth as
the champion of the Slav nationality no less than as the
protector of the Greek Church. To her Constantinople is
Tsargrad. She poses as the legitimate heir to the pretensions
of the Byzantine emperors. But Constantinople is more
than the imperial cit}. It is the sentinel and custodian
of the straits. In alien hands it blocks the access of
Russia to European waters. Without the command of the
straits Russia can never become, in the full sense, a member
of the European polity. Persistently, therefore, she looks
towards the Bosphorus. Her ulterior object is to obtain
unrestricted egress from the Black Sea into the Mediter-
ranean. But a prior necessity is to get access to the shores
of the Black Sea.

When Peter the Great, in 1689, took up the reins of Peter the
government Russia had little claim to be regarded as a /jggg*.
European Power. She had no access either to the Baltic 1725).
or to the Black Sea. The former was a Swedish lake ; the
latter was entirely surrounded by Turkish territory. With
the opening of the 'window to the west' this narrative is
not concerned, though it is noteworthy that the prospect
from St. Petersburg, like that from Azov, is a singularly
contracted one, unless the tenant has the key of the outer
door in his own pocket.

Since 1453 there had been no attempt to force the door Russia
of the Euxine from either side. But the rapid rise of the xluks*^
Russian Empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
rendered it certain that the attempt would not be indefinitely
postponed. The first contact between the two Powers,
Avhich were destined to such acute rivalry in the Near East,
dates from the year 1492, when the Tsar, Ivan III, protested
against the treatment to which certain Russian merchants
had been subjected by the Turks. The result of the
protest Avas the opening of diplomatic relations between
Moscow and Constantinople. The same Ivan, on his marriage
with Sophia, niece of the Emperor Constantine XIII and
the last princess of the Byzantine House, assumed the

118 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

cognizance of the two-headed eagle, the symbol of the
Eastern Empire. Already, it Avonld seem, the ambitions of
the Muscovite were directed towards the city and empire of
Constantine. The reign of Ivan the Terrible (1533-84) is
memorable for the first armed conflict between the Russians
and the Turks. Sokoli, the grand vizier of Selim the Sot,
had conceived the idea of strengthening the strategical
position of the Ottoman Empire in regard to that of Persia
by cutting a canal to unite the Don with the Volga.
A necessary preliminary was the occupation of Astrakhan.
Not only was the attempt to seize that city successfully
resisted by the Russian garrison, but a serious defeat was
inflicted by the Muscovite forces upon another Turkish army
near Azov (1575). Thus the Russians had drawn first blood,
and Sokoli's enteiprise was abandoned.

Not for a century did the two Powers again come into
direct conflict. In the meantime, however, they were fi'e-
quently in indirect antagonism in connexion with the
perpetual border warfare carried on by the Cossacks and
the Tartars on the northern shores of the Black Sea. A raid
of the Tartars into southern Muscovy would be followed by
a Cossack attack upon Azov. The Sultan would disavow
the action of his Tartar vassals ; the Tsar w ould protest that
he could not be held responsible for the lawlessness of the
Cossacks, * a horde of malefactors who had withdrawn as far
as possible from the reach of their sovereign's power, in order
to escape the punishment due to their crimes '. The protesta-
tions Avere on neither side wholly sincere ; but if they had
been it would have made little difference to the conduct of
the fierce tribesmen on the frontiers.

In 1677, as we have seen,^ the relations between the Poles
and the Cossacks of the Ukraine involved the outbreak of
formal war between Russia and Turkey. A peace was
patched up in 1681, but Russia joined the Holy League in
1686, and from that time until the conclusion of the Treaty
of Carlowitz (1699) the two Powers were intermittently
at war.

1 Supra, p. 106.

VI IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 119

From the outset of his reign Peter the Great was firmly Peter's
resolved to obtain access to the Black Sea. With that ^f'JJ^Qy*
object he organized a great expedition against Azov in 1695.
He himself led an army of 60,000 men against the fortress.
Thrice did he attempt to storm it, and thrice was he repelled,
but failures only stimulated him to further efforts. During
the winter of 1695-6 25,000 labourers, headed by the Tsar
himself, worked night and day on the building of a vast flotilla
of vessels of light draught. In 1696 the attempt was renewed
with fresh forces and with the assistance of this newly-built
fleet, and on July '28 Azov surrendered. No sooner had
the fortress passed into his hands than Peter proceeded
to improve the fortifications, to enlarge the harbour, and to
make all preparations for converting the conquered town into
a great naval base. Two years later a Russian Tsar and
an Ottoman Sultan were for the first time admitted to a
European congress. By the treaty arranged at Carlowitz
the Porte agreed to cede Azov and the district — about
eighty miles in extent — which the Russians had conquered
to the north of the Sea of Azov.

But ten years later the Turks turned the tables upon the Charles
Tsar. In 1 709 the greatness of Sweden as a European power was ^^J^^"
destroyed at a single blow by the rash policy of Charles XII.
Perhaps persuaded by the subtle diplomacy of Marlborough
to turn his arms against the Tsar ; certainly lured by
Mazeppa, the Cossack chieftain, to embroil himself in his
quarrels, Charles XII led the army of Sweden to its destruc-
tion on the fateful field of Pultawa (July, 1709). After the
annihilation of his army at Pultawa the Swedish king, accom-
panied by Mazeppa, took refuge in Turkey, and the Tsar's
demand for their surrender was firmly refused by the Sultan.
Urged to a renewal of the war with Russia by Charles XII,
and still more persistently by his vassal, the Khan of the
Crimean Tartars, Sultan Achmet, rather reluctantly consented,
and in November, 1710, war was declared.

The Russian conquest of Azov, and the resounding victory The capi-

over the Swedes at Pultawa, had created no small measure ^"latiou

' and

of unrest among the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Treaty

Empire. The Slavs in the west, the Greeks in the south, p .^^^

(ini).

120

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Renewal

oi war

against

Venice

and

Austria.

and even the Latins in the north-east of the peninsula, began
to look to the Tsar as a possible liberator, and the excite-
ment among them was great when, in the summer of 1711,
the Russian army crossed the Pruth. Peter, however,
repeating the blunder which had led to the overthrow of
the Swedish king at Pultawa, pushed on too far and too
fast, found himself surrounded by a vastly superior force of
Turks, and was compelled to sue ignominiously for peace.
Despite the remonstrances of the Swedes and Tartars the
Turkish vizier consented to treat, and on July "21, 1711,
the terms of the capitulation were arranged. By this Treaty
of the Pruth Azov and the adjacent territory were to be
restored to the Ottomans ; the Tsar undertook to raze to
the ground the fortress of Taganrog lately built on the
Sea of Azov ; to destroy other fortifications and castles in
the neighbourhood ; to surrender the guns and stores ; to
withdraw his troops from the Cossack, and not to interfere
in the alFairs of Poland or the Ukraine. The Russians were
no longer to have an ambassador at Constantinople ; they
were to give up all Moslem prisoners in their custody ; to
afford Charles XII, the guest of the Ottoman Empire, free
and safe passage to his own kingdom, and not to keep a fleet
in the Black Sea. No surrender could have been more
complete, but it is generally agreed that the vizier, either
from weakness or something worse, made a fatal blunder in
accepting it. Such an opportunity for annihilating the
power of the Muscovite Tsar might never recur. Such was
emphatically the opinion of contemporaries. The indigna-
tion of Charles XII knew no bounds, and he refused to leave
the Ottoman dominions ; the vizier was deposed, and his
two subordinate officers were executed, but thanks mainly
to the mediation of English and Dutch envoys, a definitive
peace, on terms corresponding to those of the capitulation,
was finally concluded in 1713. Not for a quarter of a
century did war break out again between Russia and Turkey.
The Turks, however, were at war again with the Venetian
Republic in 1715. They had never acquiesced in the loss
of the Morea, where Venetian rule, though favourable to
commerce and education, did not prove popular among the

VI IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 121

mass of the people. In 1715, therefore, the Turks fell upon the
Morea, with overwhelming forces, both by land and sea, and
in the course of a few months the Venetians were expelled
from the Morea and from all the islands of the Archipelago.
The victors then prepared to follow up their success in the
Adriatic ; but in 1716 Austria intervened, accused the Porte
of a gross violation of the Treaty of Carlowitz, and concluded
an alliance with the Republic. Prince Eugene won a great
victory over the Turks at Peterwardeiu (August 13, 1716),
and in November the city of Temesvar, the last fortress left
to the Turks in Hungary, was compelled to surrender.

Prince Eugene's campaign against the Turks possessed Capture of
political as well as military significance. Since the over- ^^ ^^* ^"
throw of the Slavs on the fatal field of Kossovo,^ Serbia, as
a political entity, had virtually been obliterated, but at the
opening of this campaign Eugene appealed to the Serbians
to seize the opportunity of throwing off the yoke of the
Turks, and more than a thousand of them enlisted under
his banners. Could they have looked into the future they
might have shown less eagerness to help the Austrians to the
possession of Belgrade.

The capture of that great fortress was the object and
culmination of the campaign of 1717. The city was held by
a garrison of 30,000 men, who for two months (June-August)
resisted all the eff'orts of Eugene's besieging force. Early in
August an army of 150,000 Turks marched to the relief of
the beleaguered fortress, and Eugene was in turn besieged.
On August 16, however, he attacked, and, with gi-eatly
inferior numbers, routed the relieving force. Two days later
Belgrade surrendered.

The Porte now invoked the mediation of Great Britain Treaty of
and Holland. The emperor, anxious to have his hands free ^.j^^^^'
for dealing with a complicated situation in the West, con- (1718).
sented to treat, and peace was signed at Passarowitz (July 21,
1718). The Sultan accepted terms from the emperor, but
dictated them to Venice. The Republic had to acquiesce in
the loss of the INIorea and the Archipelago, and henceforward
retained only the Ionian isles and a strip of the Albanian

' Supra, p. 58.

122 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

coast. Her sun Avas setting fast. For the Habsburgs, on
the other hand, the Treaty of Passarowitz marks the zenith
of territorial expansion in the Near East. By the acquisition
of the Banat of Temesvar they completed the recovery of
Hungary ; by the cession of Little Wallachia they made
a serious inroad upon the Danubian principalities ; while
by that of Belgrade, Semendria, a portion of Bosnia, and
the greater part of Serbia they advanced towards both the
Adriatic and the Aegean. It will not escape notice that
the populations thus transferred from the Sultan to the
emperor were not Ottomans, but, on the one hand, Rouma-
nians, and on the other, Soutliern Slavs. The significance
of that distinction was not, however, perceived at the time ;
it has, indeed, only recently been revealed.
The A change of more immediate consequence to the Rouma-

T^.^I!^!^ ^^" nians had been effected a few years before the Treatv of
palities. Passarowitz. Down to the year 1711 the Danubian princi-
palities had, in accordance with an arrangement concluded
with Suleiman the Magnificent,^ been permitted to remain
under the rule of native hospodars. The progi'ess of Russia
to the north of the Euxine, and the dubious attitude of one
or more of these hospodars during the recent wars betAveen
Russia and Turkey, seemed to render desirable a strengthen-
ing of the tie between the principalities and the bureaucracy
of Constantinople. The hospodarships were, therefore, put
up to auction, and for 110 years were invariably knocked
down to Phanariote Greeks. The tenure of each Phanariote
was brief, for the more rapid the succession the greater the
profit accruing to the Porte. Consequently each Phanariote
had to make his hay while the sun shone, and it Mas made at
the expense of the Roumanians.^
Russia Tlie capitulation of the Pruth was a humiliating, and for

Turkey ^^^ time being a disastrous, set back to the advance of
(1711-36). Russia. But its significance was merely episodical. Russia,
notwithstanding the signature of a treaty of * perpetual '
peace with the Porte in 1720, never regarded it as anything

1 In 1536.

2 Between 1711 and 1821 there were 33 hospodars in Moldavia and 37 in
Wallachia.

VI m THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 123

more than the temporary adjustment of an embarrassing
situation. Least of all did she forgo for an instant her
ambitions in regard to the Black Sea in general and Azov in
particular. Nor were any of the outstanding difficulties
between Russia and Turkey really settled. The Tartars of
the Crimea, encouraged by the retrocession of Azov, were
more persistent than ever in their incursions into South
Russia ; the quarrels between them and the Cossacks were
unceasing and embittered ; occasional co-operation between
Russians and Turks against the Empire of Pei-sia did nothing
to adjust the differences between them in the Kuban district
in Kabardia, and in the other disputed territories which lay
between the Black Sea and the Caspian. Most insistent of
all, however, was the problem of the Black Sea. It still
remained a Turkish lake, and into this Turkish lake poured
all the waters of the great Russian rivers, the Kuban, the
Don, the Dnieper, the Bug, and the Dniester. These were
and are the natural highways of Russia ; so long as the
Black Sea was a Turkish lake they were practically useless for
purposes of trade. From the moment that Russia achieved
something of political unity, from the moment she realized
her economic potentialities, the question of access to the
Black Sea, of free navigation on its waters, and free egress
from them into the Mediterranean became not merely impor-
tant but paramount To have accepted as final the terms
extorted in 1711 would have meant for Russia economic
strangulation and political effacement. Without access to
the Black Sea she could never become more than a second-
class Power ; without command of the narrow straits which
stand sentinel over the outer door she can never fulfil her
destiny as one of the leaders of world-civilization.

How far did the general diplomatic situation lend itself to The diplo-

the realization of Russian ambitions ? Upon whom could ™f *'^.

^ situation.

she count as a steadfast ally ? With whose enmity must she
reckon ?

For 200 years the permanent pivot of continental politics Bourbon-
had been the antagonism between France and the House ^jvairv ^
of Habsburg. In order to secure her own diplomatic
interests France had cultivated close relations with Stock-

124 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

holm, with Warsaw, and, above all, with Constantinople.
Nor Avere the ambitions of France exclusively political. Her
commercial prosperity was derived mainly from the trade
with the Levant, which was one of the by-products of the
Franco-Turkish alliance.

The wars of Louis XIV, however flattering to French prestige,
had imposed a terrible strain upon the economic resources
of the country, and under Louis XV France was compelled to
trust rather to diplomacy than to war for the maintenance
of her pre-eminent position in Europe.^ It was more than
ever important for her to maintain her ascendancy at Con-
stantinople. Originally an outcome of her rivalry with the
Habsburgs, that ascendancy now involved her in prolonged
antagonism to the ambitions of Russia. It was to France,
then, that Turkey naturally looked for guidance and support,
as did Poland and Sweden.

Between England and Russia there had as yet arisen no
occasion of conflict, but England, if a friend, Avas a distant
one. Prussia had hardly as yet attained the position of
a second-class Power, though she was on the eve of attaining
something more ; Austria, therefore, was the only great
Power upon whose friendship Russia, in pursuit of her Near
Eastern policy, could at all confidently rely. The Habsburgs
had been fighting the Turks for two centuries ; the centre of
gravity of their political system was still in Vienna ; the ideas
of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism were yet unborn ; the con-
flict between them was still in the distant future. To Austria,
therefore, Russia now turned, and, in 1726, concluded with
her a close alliance which, with occasional and brief inter-
ruptions, endured for more than a century, and proved of
incomparable advantage to Russia.
Russo- Ten years later the long period of patient preparation,

lurkish iniiitary and diplomatic, came to an end, and Russia plunged
(1736-9). into war Avith Turkey. The trouble began, as it so often did,
in Poland. In 1732 France offered her friendship to Russia
on condition that the latter would support the candidature

1 Not that France refrained from war. Far otherwise. But (i) the
energies of France were largely diverted to India and North America;
and (ii) her arms were by no means so potent as under Louis XIV.

VI IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 125

of Stanislaus Leczynski, the father-in-law of Louis XV.
Osterman, the brilliant minister of the Tsarina Anne, declined
the offer, and agreed to support the Saxon candidate, who
afterwards became king as Augustus III. France then
turned to Turkey, and reminded the Porte that it was by
treaty bound to safeguard the independence of Poland, now
menaced by the interference of Russia and Austria. The so-
called War of the Polish Succession broke out in 1733. Two
years later Russia declared war upon the Porte, and, in 1736,
Azov was recaptured ; the whole of the Crimea was overrun
by Russian troops, and Bagchaserai, the capital of the Tartar
khan of the Crimea, was destroyed. The Russian triumph
was complete, but it was purchased at enormous cost.
Austria then offered her mediation, and Russia agreed to
accept it — on terms. She demanded, as the price of peace,
the whole of the territory encircling the Black Sea between
the Caucasus and the Danube ; she required the Porte to
acknowledge the independence of the frontier provinces of
Moldavia and Wallachia under the suzerainty and protection
of Russia ; and she insisted that Russian ships should be
free to navigate the Black Sea and to pass into and from
the Mediterranean through the narrow straits. Austria's
disinterested friendship was to be rewarded by the acquisition
of Novi-Bazar and a further slice of Wallachia.

The Porte naturally refused these exorbitant demands,
and Austria consequently marched an army into Serbia and
captured Nish. Encouraged by the Marquis de Villeneuve,
the French ambassador at Constantinople, the Turks then
took the offensive, marched down the Morava valley, captured
Orsova, and besieged Belgrade. Outside Belgrade Villeneuve
himself joined them, promptly opened direct negotiations
Avith the Austrian general, Neipperg, and on September 1,
1739, the Treaty of Belgrade was signed.

Austria agreed to abandon all the acquisitions which had The
been secured to her in the last war by the brilliant strategy gg^f^rad?-^
of Prince Eugene of Savoy. She restored Belgrade and (1739).
Orsova and Sabacz to the Porte, and evacuated Serbia and
Little Wallachia.

The news of the signature of this astonishing treaty came

126 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

as a bitter surprise to Marshal Miinnich, the commander of the
Russian forces. The Russian part in the campaign had been
as successful as that of Austria had been the reverse. The
Russians had captured the great fortress of Oczakov in 1738,
that of Choczim, on the Dniester, in 1739, and ten days after
Austria had signed a separate peace at Belgrade they crossed
the Pruth and entered the Moldavian capital. But, deserted
by their ally, they had no option but to conclude a peace on
the best terms they could. They recovered Azov, but only on
condition that the fortifications were destroyed, and that the
district immediately surrounding it should be cleared of all
works ; they were to be allowed to trade on the Sea of Azov
and the Black Sea, provided, however, that all their goods
were carried in Turkish vessels.

The Treaties of Belgrade were a grievous disappoint-
ment to the Russians, a humiliation for Austria, a notable
success for the Turks, but, above all, a brilliant triumph for
the diplomacy of France. French historians may well exalt
the skill of the Marquis de Villeneuve. It cannot be denied.
They may well derive legitimate satisfaction from the testi-
mony afibrded by these treaties to the prestige of France,
and to her controlling influence upon the politics of the Near
East. But these things are insufficient, by themselves, to
account for the astonishing surrender of Austria. The
explanation is to be found in the consuming anxiety of the
Emperor Charles VI, now nearing his end, to secure for his
daughter, ]\Iaria Theresia, the succession to the hereditary
dominions of his house, and for her husband the crown of
the Holy Roman Empire. But whatever the explanation
may be, the fact remains that the intervention of France had
obtained for the Ottoman Empire a respite on the side of
Russia, and a signal revenge upon Austria.
France Cardinal Alberoni might mitigate the tedium of political

Xear exile by drafting schemes for the partition of the Ottoman
East. Empire. But INIontesquieu diagnosed the situation with
a shrewder eye : ' L'Empire des Turcs est k present k peu
pres dans le meme degr6 de foiblesse ou ^toit autrement
celui des Grecs ; mais il subsistera longtemps. Car si quel-
que prince que ce fiit mettoit cet empire en peril en pour-

VI IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 127

suivant ses coiiquetes leg trois puissances commer^antes de
I'Eiirope connoissent trop leur affaires pour n'en pas prendre
la defense sur-le-champ.' ^ As regards England, Montesquieu,
writing in 1734, was considerably ahead of his time ; but his
words made an obvious impression upon the younger Pitt,
who referred to them in the House of Commons, when, in
1791, he vainly attempted to excite alarm on the subject of
Russia's progress in South-Eastern Europe. There was no
need to excite it among French statesmen. Jealousy of
Russia's influence in the Near East had long since become
one of the fixed motives of French diplomacy. France was
definitely committed to the defence of the integrity and
independence of the Ottoman Empire many years before that
famous phrase had ever been heard in England.

Nor are the reasons far to seek. Apart from the secular
rivalry between France and the Habsburgs ; apart from all
questions of balance of pnwer, France was vitally interested,
from commercial considerations, in the Near East. French
trade with the Levant was, for those times, on a most imposing
scale. 'En mati^re de commerce,' as a French historian
has put it, ' rOrient nous rendait tons les services dune
vaste et florissante colonic.' ^ The Capitulations originally
conceded to France by Suleiman in 1535 ^ had been renewed
in 1581, 1597, and 1604.

It was natural after the signal service rendered by Vil- The
leneuve to the Ottoman Empire that the Capitulations [-Qnlf" f
should have been re-enacted with special formality and par- 1740.
ticularity, and should have been extended in several important
directions. Extraordinary and exclusive privileges were,
in 1740, conferred upon French traders in the Ottoman
dominions, and special rights were granted to Latin monks
in the Holy Land, to French pilgrims, and in general to
Roman Catholics throughout the Turkish Empire.* It was
to these Capitulations that Napoleon III appealed when, on

1 Grandeur et Decadence des Eomains, chap. 23.

2 M. VaUflal, ap. Histoire Generate, vii. 145.

3 See supra, p. 83.

4 The text will be found in Allan, Les Grands Traites politiques,
pp. 128 sqq.

128 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

the eve of the Crimean War, he attempted to reinstate Latin
monks in the guardianship of the Holy places in Palestine.

§ 2. From the Treaty of Belgrade to the Treaty
OF Kutschuk-Kainardji, 1739-74

Interlude To France, then, the Ottoman Empire owed the new lease

^ " ^'' of life which it obtained in 1739. The actual duration of the

lease was about thirty years, and it was the action of France

which at the close of that period determined it.

European During the interval the Porte was relieved of all pressure

(l'HO-63). ^^ *^® ^^^® either of Russia or of Austria-Hungary. Like

the rest of the Great Powers they were preoccupied with

other matters. Between 1740 and 1763 two great questions

were in the balance : first, whether Austria or Prussia was

to be the dominant power in Germany ; secondly, whether

France or England was to be supreme in India and North

America.

The death of Frederick William I of Prussia in May, 1740,
followed in October by that of the Emperor Charles VI,
opened a new chapter in German history — a chapter that
was not finally closed until, in 1866, on the fateful field of
Koniggratz (Sadowa), the question of German hegemony was
set at rest for ever. Almost simultaneously there opened
in India and in America, between England and France,
or rather, between England and the French and Spanish
Bourbons, the war which was destined to determine the
future of a great part of the world. Hardly was Frederick
the Great seated on the Prussian throne when he snatched
the Silesinn duchies out of tie hands of Maria Theresia.
Great Britain supported Maria Theresia ; France was on the
side of Frederick. The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) left
Frederick in possession of Silesia, while France and England
restored the conquests they had respectively made in India
and North America.

Between the conclusion of the so-called War of the Austrian
Succession in 1748 and the renewal of war in 1756 there was
a curious reversal of alliances. The rivalry of Austria and
Prussia on the one hand, and of France and England on the

VI IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 129

other, remained unchanged and unabated. But Frederick
rehictantly joined England on the question of the neutraliza-
tion of Hanover, and thus France was compelled to accept
the proffered friendship of Austria. The detachment of
France from Prussia was a conspicuous triumph for the
diplomacy of the Austrian minister, Kaunitz ; the wisdom
of the change from the French point of view is much more
questionable. It might have been argued that, on a long
view, it could not be to the interest of France to contribute
towards the aggrandizement of the Hohenzollern. But such
an argument would, in 1756, have implied unusual prescience.
The point which impressed itself upon contemporaries was
that France surrendered in an instant the influence which for
two hundred years she had exercised in Poland and at Con-
stantinople. For fi'iendship with Austria involved alliance
with Russia.

The significance of this fact, obvious enough during the The
Seven Years' War, became much more startlingly apparent, ^^^^^^ ^
when, after 1763, the attention of the Eastern Powers was
concentrated upon Poland. In 1762 one of the ablest rulers
that ever sat upon a European throne succeeded to that of
Russia. Catherine II did not lose a moment in picking up
the threads of the ambitious foreign policy initiated by
Peter the Great.

Marshal ^Miinnich, the hero of the last Turkish War, used Policy of
all his influence with the young Tsarina to induce her^j*^®^®
promptly to espouse the cause of the Greeks and Slavs in the
Ottoman Empire. In the war of 1736 Miinnich had assured
the Tsarina Anne that Greeks, Slavs, and Roumanians alike
looked to her not only as their protectress but as their
legitimate sovereign ; he had begged to be alloAved to
take advantage of their enthusiasm for the Russian cause,
and to caiTy the war to the gates of Constantinople. The
signature of the Treaty of Belgrade had for the moment
interrupted his plans, but he now urged the same policy upon
Catherine II.

No scheme of foreign policy was too gi*andiose to command
the assent of the Tsarina, but she thought it prudent to
secure at least one trustworthy ally. France had been

198i K

330 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

compelled, by her alliance with Austria, to siirrender her
interests at Warsaw and Constantinople. But the divergence
from the traditional path of French policy M'as only temporary ;
France, therefore, had to be reckoned as an opponent.
Great Britain, though friendly enough to Russia, had already
acquired the reputation of fickleness in diplomacy, and
Catherine preferred a power whose interests were more
definitely compatible, if not identical, with her own. That
could not be said of Austria, and Catherine, therefore, turned
to Frederick of Prussia.

The accession of the Tsar Peter III in 1762 had saved
Frederick II at the most critical moment of the Seven Years'
War, and, indeed, of his whole career. Catherine II was not
at all unwilling to trade upon the good will acquired by her
unfortunate husband. Prussia had no interests Avhich could
by any possibility conflict with her own in the Balkan penin-
sula, and their interests in Poland were, up to a point,
identical.
Eusso- Augustus III, the Saxon King of Poland, died on October 5,

intrigues 1763, and it became immediately necessary to look out for
in Poland. ^ successor. A group of Polish patriots, led by the Czar-
toryskis, were anxious to seize the opportunity of effecting
a radical reform of 'the most miserable constitution that
ever enfeebled and demoralized a nation '. In particular
they desired to make the crown hereditary, and to abolish
the ridiculous privilege — the liherwn veto — which permitted
any single noble to veto legislation and obstruct reform. But
the last thing desired either by Frederick or by Catherine
was a reform of the Polish Constitution. They accordingly
intervened to perpetuate the prevailing anarchy, and in April,
1764, agreed to procure the election to the Polish throne
of Stanislas Poniatowski, a Polish nobleman of blemished
reputation and irresolute character, and one of the discarded
lovers of the Russian Empress. Stanislas was duly seated on
the throne, and in 1768 a Diet, elected under the influence
of a Russian army of occupation, declared the liberimi veto
and other intolerable abuses to be integral, essential, and
irrevocable parts of the Polish Constitution, and placed that
Constitution under the sfuarantee of Russia.

VI IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 131

The Polish patriots made one more effort to escape from
the toils of their ambitious neighbours, and formed the
Confederation of Bar. The object of the Confederation was
to put an end to Russian domination and to restore the
supremacy of Roman Catholicism, Austria and France
cordially supported the patriots. France, indeed, would
gladly have done more, but crippled, both in a military and
in a financial sense, by the prolonged and unsuccessful war
with England, she was compelled to rely entirely upon diplo-
matic methods.

Choiseul had returned to power in 1766 eager for revenge Turkey
upon England. As a preliminary to that revenge France ^^.^^^
must, however, recover her position upon the Continent, and
for that purpose Choiseul tried to cement the recent alliance
with Austria, and to renew the ancient ties of France with
Sweden, Poland, and, above all, with the Ottoman Empire.
To Vergennes, the French ambassador at Constantinople, he
wrote : * We must at all costs break the chain fastened upon
the world by Russia. . . . The Ottoman Empire is the best
instrument for doing it, and most interested in the success
of the operation. True, the Turks are hopelessly degenerate,
and the attempt Avill probably be fatal to them, but that does
not concern us so long as Ave attain our objects.'

The immediate objects of French diplomacy were to rescue
Poland from the grip of Catherine II and Frederick II, and
to arrest the progress of Russian propaganda in the Balkans.

Catherine's pact with the King of Prussia (1764) had pro- Russia
vided for common action at Constantinople with a view to ^^.jjgy
averting Turkish intervention in Poland. The simplest way
to effect this end was to keep the Turks busy at home.
Accordingly, throughout the years 1765-7, Russian agents
were constantly at work in Greece, Crete, Bosnia, and Monte-
negro. Both Greeks and Slavs were led to believe that the day
of their deliverance was at hand ; that the ancient prophecy
that 'the Turkish Empire would one day be destroyed
by a fair-haired people' was at last about to be fulfilled.
Vergennes, on his part, lost no opportunity of emphasizing
the significance of the ferment among the subject peoples, and
of urging upon the Porte the necessity of a counter-attack.

k2

132 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

Turkey A pretext was found in the violation of Turkish territory

declares ^y Russian troops who had pursued some fugitive Poles into

war on "^ * ^

Russia Tartary. Accordingly, in 1768, the Porte demanded that the

(1768). Russian troops should immediately evacuate Poland. Russia
hesitated to comply ; the Porte declared war (October 6),
and, on the advice of Vergennes, issued a manifesto to the
Powers. The Sultan, so it ran, had been compelled to take
up arms against Russia in defence of the liberties of Poland,
gi'ievously compromised by the recent action of the Empress
Catherine : ' she had forced upon the Poles a king who was
neither of royal blood nor the elect of the people ; she had
put to the sword all who had opposed her will and had
pillaged and laid waste their possessions.' Turkey, in fact,
stood forth as the guardian of international morality and the
champion of small nationalities.

' War ', wrote Vergennes, ' is declared. I have done my
master's bidding. I return the three millions furnished to
me for my work. There was no need of the money.' ^ Thus,
as Sorel pithily puts it : 'La France essaya de soutenir les
confed^res catholiques avec les amies des JNIusulmans.'
Catherine The methods employed by France did not save Poland,
F^ T*^" k ^^^^ ^^^^^ brought destruction upon Turkey. The Turkish
II. attack upon Russia served only to precipitate the partition

of Poland. Catherine would much have preferred the main-
tenance of the status quo in Poland. Attacked on the flank
by Turkey she was the more disposed to listen to the voice
of the Prussian tempter. Frederick was profoundly impressed
by the rapid development of Russia, and he dreaded in
particular a renewal of that alliance between Russia, Austria,
and France, which had so nearly proved fatal to Prussia
in the Seven Years' War. How was he to retain the fi-iend-
ship of Russia ; to remove from Austria the temptation to
fling herself into the arms of either Russia or of France, and
at the same time avert the threatened annihilation of the
Ottoman Empire ? Of these objects the last was not the
least important in Frederick's eyes. It was, in his view,
entirely opposed to the interests of Prussia that Turkey

1 Sorel, La Question d'Orient au dioc-huitieme Siccle, chap. ii.

VI IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 133

should be wiped out of the map of Europe, for circumstances
might well render her a valuable counterpoise against the
designs either of Russia or of Austria.^ The problem was by
no means simple, but the solution of it was found, for the
time being, in the partition of Poland.

Early in 1769 that partition was informally suggested by
Frederick to his ally at St. Petersburg. Almost simultaneously,
Austria, alarmed by the outbreak of Avar between Russia and
Turkey on her immediate frontier, deemed it prudent to
reoccupy the county of Zips which had been mortgaged by
Hungary to Poland in 1412. Maria Theresia was probably
perfectly sincere when, two years later, she protested un-
alterable friendship for Poland, and repudiated the idea of
partition. Nevertheless, the seizure of Zips had its place in
the coil which was winding itself round the devoted kingdom.
In 1772 the first partition was accomplished, and Maria
Theresa accepted her share of the spoil.

Meanwhile, things were going badly for the Turks. In Russo-
1769 a Turkish army was surprised on the Dniester, and fled -^y^^ ^
in panic before the Russians, who then occupied Jassy and (1769-74)
Bucharest.

In 1770, Catherine II, relying upon the reports of discon- Eussia
tent among the subject populations in the Balkans, and ^^lan^
particularly among the Greeks, made a determined effort to
rouse them to insurrection against the Sultan. A Russian
fleet, under the command of Admiral Elphiustone, formerly
in the English service, issued from the Baltic and made its
way round to the Mediterranean. Choiseul wished to arrest
its progress, and in no other way could France have rendered
so signal a service to her Turkish allies. But England firmly
intimated to both France and Spain that any attempt to
arrest the progress of the Russian fleet would be regarded as
a casus belli, and it was permitted, therefore, to go on its
way unmolested.

In the Mediterranean, Alexis Orloft', one of the murderers
of Peter III, assumed the supreme command, and made a
descent upon the coasts of the Morea. Great excitement was

^ Frederick II Mimoires, vi, p. 25, ap. Sorel, o^y. cit., p. 49.

134

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Naval
victory of
Bussia.

Russian
victories
on land.

Austrian
interven-
tion.

aroused among the Greeks in the Morea, and it extended
to the Serbs and even to the Roumanians. The hour of
their deliverance appeared to be at hand. But tlie Russian
scheme miscarried. Orloff, with a small force, attacked
Tripolitza, but was badly supported by the Greeks, and
fell back before the Turks. The latter exacted a terrible
vengeance from the unhappy Greeks, both in the Morea and
in the islands of the Archipelago, and the Greeks, disillusioned
and disappointed, cursed the fickle allies who had first roused
them to rebellion and had then abandoned them to their
fate.

Meanwhile Orloff", aided by some luck and still more by the
English officers under his command, won a notable success at
sea. He attacked the Turkish fleet near Chios, inflicted
heavy losses upon them, and compelled them to take refuge
in the harbour of Tchesme. Elphinstone then suggested
a brilliant manoeuvre. The whole Turkish fleet, cooped up
in harbour, was destroyed by a fireship, almost without
another shot. Elphinstone was anxious to follow up the
victory by an immediate attack upon Constantinople ; but
Orloff" delayed, and though the English admiral took a few
ships with him to the Dardanelles, no decisive operations
could be attempted. Constantinople was quickly put in
a posture of defence, and Orloff" contented himself with the
seizure of some of the islands in the Levant. But although
the greater prize was denied to the English admiral, the
appearance of a Russian ffeet in the Mediterranean and tlie
damage inflicted upon the Turkish navy created an immense
sensation not merely in the Ottoman Empire but throughout
the world. It seemed to presage the final overthrow of the
power of the Turks.

Nor were the disasters at sea redeemed by success on land.
The Crimea was conquered by Russia ; the Turkish fortresses
on the Dniester and the Danube fell one after another before
the Russian assault ; and before the end of 1771 Catherine
was in undisputed occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia.

Meanwhile Austria, seriously alarmed by the rapid success
of Russia, had, on July 6, 1771, signed a secret treaty with
Turkey. If the Russians crossed the Danube Austria under-

VI IX THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 135

took to march an army to the assistance of the Sultan. An
intimation to this effect was sent to St. Petersburg and
Berlin. Frederick was gravely perturbed by the news. In
two interviews with Joseph II in 1769 and 1770 at Neisse
and Neustadt respectively he had brought the emperor over
to his views on the Polish question. The whole scheme
would be ruined if war Avere now to break out between
Russia and Austria. But the partition itself, if promptly
effected, seemed to offer a way out of the Balkan difficulty.
Negotiations were hastily resumed, and in 1772 the partition
was finally agreed upon. Catherine consented to surrender
her conquests on the Pruth and the Danube in return for
a large slice of Poland ; Turkey was saved from disruption,
and war between Russia and Austria Avas averted.

The Russo-Turkish War still dragged on, but although
Catherine continued to win victories in the field, she was
disposed towards peace by the outbreak of a formidable
insurrection among the Cossacks of the Don, and in July,
177-4, the Treaty of Kutschuk-Kainardji was signed.^

Of the many treaties concluded during the last two cen- Treaty of
turies between Russia and Turkey this is the most funda- J^jjjj^.
mental and the most far-reaching. A distinguished jurist Kainardji,
has indeed asserted that all the great treaties executed pl^^ ^^'
by the two Powers during the next half century were but
commentaries upon this text. Its provisions, therefore,
demand close investigation. Apart from those of secondary
or temporary importance three questions of pre-eminent
significance are involved.

Russia restored to the Porte most of the territories she («)/^eFri.
had recently occupied : Bessarabia, Moldavia, Wallachia, and justments
the islands of the Archipelago ; but only, as we shall see, on and the
condition of better treatment. For herself Russia was to^^^^^^®*"
retain Azov, Jenikale, and Kertsch, with the districts adjacent
thereto ; also Kinburn at the mouth of the Dnieper, and,
provided the assent of the Khan of Tartary could be obtained,
the two Kabardas. By these acquisitions Russia obtained

' An admirable commentary upon this most important treaty, together
Avith the full text, will be found in Holland's Treaty Relations heticeen
Russia and Turkey.

136 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

for the first time a firm gi'ip upon the northern shore of the
Black Sea ; she controlled the straits between the Sea of
Azov and the Black Sea ; Avhile the possession of the two
Kabardas gave her a footing on the eastern shore. The
Tartars to the east of the Bug were at the same time de-
clared independent of the Porte, except in ecclesiastical
matters — a further blow to the position of the Turks on the
Euxine. Thus Turkish territory, instead of encircling the
Black Sea, was henceforward to be bounded on the north-
east by the river Bug. To develop her trade, Russia
was to be allowed to establish consuls and vice-consuls
wherever she might think fit ; she was to have the right
of free commercial navigation in the Black Sea ; and the
subjects of the Tsarina were to be allowed to trade in the
Ottoman dominions ' by land as well as by water and upon
the Danube in their ships . . . with all the same privileges
and advantages as are enjoyed by the most friendly nations
whom the Sublime Porte favours most in trade, such as the
French and English. Reciprocal advantages were granted
to Ottoman subjects in Russia '. (Art. xi.)
(b) Russia Not less significant was the diplomatic footing which
Orthodox I^^^^i^ obtained in Constantinople. Henceforward Russia
Church was to be represented at the Porte by a permanent Embassy ;
Ottoman ^^® ^^^^ ^^ have the right to erect, in addition to her
Empire, minister's private chapel, ' a public church of the Greek
ritual ', which was to be under the protection of the Russian
minister. The Porte further agreed to permit Russian
subjects, ' as well lajTiien as ecclesiastics', to make pilgrimages
to Jerusalem and other Holy places, and the Sultan under-
took ' to protect constantly the Christian religion and its
churches '. The Porte also allowed ' the ministers of the
imperial court of Russia to make, upon all occasions, repre-
sentations as well in favour of the ncAv church at Constantinople
as on behalf of its ofiiciating ministers, promising to take such
representations into due consideration as being made by
a confidential functionary of a neighbouring and sincerely
friendly power '.

The clauses (Articles xii and xiv) in which these terms were
embodied deserve the closest scrutiny, for upon them were

VI IX THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 137

founded the claims to a formal protectorate over the Greek
Christians put forward by Russia on the eve of the Crimean
War.^ Lord Clarendon then declared that the interpreta-
tion which Russia sought to place upon these clauses was
inadmissible. But however ambiguous, perhaps studiously
ambiguous, they may have been, it cannot be denied that
the provisions which defined the relations of Russia to the
Greeks- in Turkey registered a signal triumph for Russian
diplomacy. Thugut, who was then Austrian minister at
Constantinople, truly described the whole treaty as *un
module d'habilete de la part des diplomates russes, et un rare
exemple d'imbecillit^ de la part des negociateurs turcs '.^

In regard to the territories lately occupied by Russia and (c) The
now restored to the Ottoman Empire the stipulations were prin^i-
even more specific. The Danubian principalities, the islands palities,
of the Archipelago, and the provinces of Georgia and Min-
grelia were restored only on condition of better government
in general, and of particular privileges in regard to ' monetary
taxes ', to diplomatic representation, and above all to religion.
The Porte (Arts, xvi, xvii, and xxiii) definitely promised * to
obstruct in no manner whatsoever the free exercise of the
Christian religion, and to interpose no obstacle to the erection
of new Churches and to the repairing of old ones '.

From these stipulations Russian publicists have deduced,
and not unnaturally, a general right of interference in the
domestic concerns of the Ottoman Empire. *De Ik,' as
M. Sorel says, ' pour la Russie V obligation de s'immiscer dans
les afiaires interieures de la Turquie, chaque fois que les
interets des chr^tiens I'exige.' ^

Such was the famous Treaty of Kutschuk-Kainardji : not
the term but the real starting-point of Russian x^i'ogress in
the Near East.

The next step toward the dismemberment of the Ottoman The
Empire was taken, however, not by Russia but by Austria. ^ °"^^

1 Infra, chap. x.

- It must not be forgotten that the temi Greek at that time included all
non-Mussulmans in Turkey. Creed not race was the differentia.
a Sorel, op. cit., p. 263.
4 Op. cit, p. 262.

138 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

The Turks, declared Kaunitz, thoroughly deserved their
misfortunes, as much by their feebleness in war as by their
' lack of confidence in those Powers which, like Austria, were
disposed to help them out of their difficulties'. Austria's
method of doing this was characteristic. She was far from
satisfied with her share, though in point of population and
extent of territory it was the giant's share, in the partition of
Poland. Accordingly, directly after the conclusion of the
Treaty of Kainardji, she helped herself to the Bukovina ;
and the Turks were constrained to acquiesce. The formal
treaty of cession was signed on May 7, 1775. Thus by
a simple act of brigandage Austria obtained, in territory, far
more than Russia had acquired by a prolonged and strenuous
war. Nor did she gain only in territory. The acquisition
of the Bukovina forged a fresh link in the chain of friend-
ship between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

§ 3. AusTRO-RussiAN Alliance, 1775-92

Catherine That friendship became even more intimate after the
Joseph IT. tleath, in 1780, of Maria Theresia. The Emperor Joseph II
succumbed entirely to the seductive and dominating person-
ality of the Tsarina Catherine, and cordially supported her
ambitious policy in the Near East.

Catherine was, in respect of that policy, in direct apostoli-
cal succession to Peter the Great. It is a suspicious fact
that the Political Testament of Peter the Great was first
published in Paris at the moment when Napoleon, in prepara-
tion for his expedition to Moscow, was anxious to alienate
sympathy from and excite alarm against the ' colossus
of the north '. That famous document was probably an
apocryphal forgery, but there can be no question that it
accurately represented the trend and tradition of Russian
policy in the eighteenth century. Constantinople was clearly
indicated as the goal of Russian ambition. The Turks were
to be driven out of Europe by the help of Austria ; a good
understanding was to be maintained with England ; and every
effort was to be made to accelerate the dissolution of Persia
and to secure the Indian trade. Whether inherited or

VI IX THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 139

original these were the principles which for nearly forty
years inspired the policy of Peter the Great's most brilliant
successor on the Russian throne.

To the realization of Catherine's dreams one thing was Russo-
indispensable — the cordial support of the Habsburg emperor, j^ijiancc"
One or two personal interviews sufficed to secure it, and in
June, 1781, an agreement between the two sovereigns was
embodied in private correspondence. A technical question
of precedence alone prevented a more formal engagement.
Catherine and Joseph were thus mutually pledged to support
each other in the Near East.

In September, 1782, the Tsarina laid before her ally a Catlie-
specific plan for the complete reconstruction of the map of g"^g^g
the Balkan peninsula, and the lands, seas, and islands adjacent
thereto.

The governing presupposition of the whole scheme was the
expulsion of the Ottoman Turks from all their European terri-
tories. Once the Turks were expelled, partition would not be
difficult. The direct acquisitions of Russia were conceived
on a moderate scale : she Avas to get only Oczakov and the
territory, known as Lesser Tartary, which lay between the
Bug and the Dniester, with the addition of a couple of the
Aegean islands to be utilized as naval bases. Moldavia,
including Bessarabia, and Wallachia v.ere to be erected into
the independent kingdom of Dacia, and a crown was in this
way to be provided for Catherine's favourite and minister,
Potemkin. Austria's share of the spoil was to consist of
Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia, while Venice was
to be compensated for the loss of Dalmatia by the acquisition
of the ^Nlorea, Cyprus, and Crete. Catherine did not apparently
apprehend any opposition except from France, and that was to
be averted by a timely offer of Egypt and Syria. The crown-
ing feature of this wonderfully comprehensive scheme remains
to be disclosed. The Greek Empire, with Constantinojjle
itself, Thrace, ^Macedonia, Bulgaria, northern Greece, and
Albania was to be reserved for Catherine's second gi*and-
son. The boy, Avith sagacious prescience, had been christened
Constantine ; he was always dressed in the Greek mode, sur-
rounded by Greek nui"ses, and instructed in the tongue of his

140 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

future subjects. That no detail might be lacking which fore-
sight could devise, a medal had already been struck, on one
side of which was a representation of the young prince's head,
and on the other an allegorical device indicating the coming
triumph of the Cross over the Crescent. Against the possible
union of the Greek and Russian Empires the Tsarina was
prepared to offer ample guarantees.

Catherine's proposals were not entirely to Joseph's liking.
To a modern critic the most curious and significant feature of
the scheme is the total lack of any recognition of the nationality
principle ; the complete absence of any consideration for the
likes and dislikes, the affinities and repulsions, of the peoples
immediately concerned. That was, however, the way of the
eighteenth century, and no criticism on that score was to be
expected from the Habsburg emperor. Joseph's objection
was of another kind. His o>^ti share was insufficient. He
wanted not only Dalmatia but Istria, not only Serbia but
Little WaUachia ; nor did it please him that the rest of the
Danubian principalities should be torn from the Ottoman
Empire only to pass into the control of Russia. But these
were, relatively, details, and were not sufficient to cause a
breach of the friendship existing between the august allies.
Annexa- The grandiose scheme of 1782 was not destined to realiza-
Crimea i^on. But in the following year Catherine resolved to put an
end immediately to an embarrassing situation in the Crimea.
By the Treaty of Kainardji the Porte had been deprived of
its suzerainty over the Tartars in political affairs, though
the Khalifal authority of the Sultan remained inviolate.
Difficulties naturally arose from this contradictory arrange-
ment, and in 1779 a Convention explicative defined the
Turkish supremacy over the Tartars as purely spiritual.
This virtually meant that political supremacy was transferred
to Russia, and in 1783 Catherine resolved any remaining
ambiguity by annexing the khanate of the Crimea. The
administration of the new Russian province w^as confided to
Potemkin, and, thanks to his energj, was rapidly transformed
by Russian engineers and cultivators ; it began to bristle
with fortresses and arsenals, and to yield a rich harvest of
agricultural produce.

VI IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 141

In 1787 the Tsarina, accompanied by the Emperor Joseph, Cathe-
made a magnificent progress through her new dominions, p^-o^ress
She sailed doMn the Dnieper to Kherson, where she passed in the
under a triumphal arch bearing the inscription, ' The Way ^^" '
to Byzantium ' ; she had the more solid satisfaction of
witnessing, in company with her ally and the ambassadors
of the Great Powers, the launch of three battleships from the
newly constructed dockyard ; and then from Kherson she
passed on to the Crimea, where she inspected Potemkin's
crowning achievement, the new naval arsenal of Sevastopol.
There was a touch of the theatrical, not to say the melo-
dramatic, in the whole proceedings, but they did not lack
real substance and significance.

It was not to be expected that the Porte would view with Attitude
unconcern the rapid strides which Russia was making towards Porte.
supremacy in the Black Sea : the annexation of the Tartars ;
the fortification of the Crimea ; the economic development
of the southern provinces ; above all, the striking progress
of Russian sea-power. Sebastopol was within two days'
sail of Constantinople ; Varna, where Catherine had insisted
upon establishing a consulate, Avas within 120 miles of
it. Moreover, Russian agents had been busy of late in
stirring up discontent among the Greeks, Slavs, and Rou-
manians ; they had even extended their intrigues to Egypt.
Sultan Abdul Hamid had, therefore, ample ground for
disquietude.

Disquietude gave place to indignation when Catherine
formulated her immediate demands. The Sultan was re-
quired to renounce his sovereignty over Georgia, to surrender
Bessarabia to Russia, and to permit the establishment of
hereditary governors in Moldavia and Wallachia. The cup of
Abdul Hamid's anger was now full. He had already issued
a manly manifesto to the true believers, calling attention
to the treacherous advance of Russia, and in particular to the
seizure of the Crimea in time of peace. He now demanded
its immediate restoration, and followed up the demand by
a declaration of war against Russia (August, 1787).

As to the wisdom of this move there are diversities of Turkey
opinion among modern critics. Professor Lodge attributes Ruggia.

142

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Intei'ven-
tion of
Austiia.

The
Powers
and the
Eastern
Question,

the action of the Sultan to 'passion rather than policy'.^
Dr. Holland Rose sees in it a * skilful move \^ in view of the
reasonable probability that Prussia and Sweden Avould come
to the assistance of the Porte. Catherine herself was deeply
chagrined, and attributed the bold action of the Sultan to the
perfidious encouragement of Pitt. For this suspicion there
was not, as we shall see, a scintilla of justification.

Faithful to his alliance Joseph H declared war against the
Sultan in February, 1788, but the Austrians contributed little
to the success of the campaign. Not that the Turks were
making much of it. In October, 1788, Suvaroff, the Russian
veteran, beat off with great loss a Turkish attack on Kinburn,
the fortress which confronted Oczakov and commanded the
estuary of the Dnieper and the Bug. Catherine, however,
was on her side compelled to withdraw a considerable portion
of her forces in order to repel the advance of Gustavus III of
Sweden upon St. Petersburg. The Swedish attack, like that
of the Turks, was set down by Catherine to English diplomacy.
*As Mr. Pitt', said the Tsarina, 'wishes to chase me from
St. Petersburg, I hope he will allow me to take refuge at
Constantinople.' There is no more ground for the one
insinuation than for the other. Nevertheless, it cannot be
denied that from the Turkish point of view the intervention
of Gustavus was exceedingly opportune. It probably saved
the Ottoman Empire from immediate annihilation.

Gustavus could not, however, secure the Turks from all
damage. Before the close of the year 1788 Potemkin had
made himself master of the great fortress of Oczakov and the
surrounding district, and in 1789 the Austrians, after taking
Belgrade and Semendria, made an incursion into Bosnia.

The days were, however, drawing to a close when a war
between the Ottoman Empire and its immediate neighbours
could be regarded as a matter of concern only to the belli-
gerents. It had never been so regarded by France, and the
ablest ministers of the last period of the Ancien Regime,
Choiseul, for example, and Vergennes, were entirely faithful
to the traditions of French diplomacy in the Near East.

1 Ap. Camhridge Modern History, viii. 310.

2 Pitt and the Natiotial Revival, p. 488.

VI IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 143

Brandenburg-Prussia cannot be said to have had a diplo-
matic system before the eighteenth century, while England
had so far been curiously unconcerned as to the develop-
ment of events in Eastern Europe. But the period of
acquiescence was nearly at an end. A new phase of the
Eastern Question was clearly opening.

The Triple Alliance concluded, in 1788, between Great I'he
Britain, Prussia, and the United Provinces was not concerned ^ance
primarily with the affairs of the Near East. But among its
objects was that of holding in check the ambitious designs
of Russia and Austria in that direction. Prussia, in particular,
was anxious to use the machinery of the alliance for sustain-
ing the resistance of the Turks to the aggressions of their
neighbours. Not that Prussia's policy in the matter was
fi-ee from ambiguity and vacillation. In May, 1789, the
Prussian minister, Herzberg, propounded an ambitious project
by which Prussia was to secure her heart's desire, Danzig
and Thorn. Poland was to be compensated by the recovery
of Galicia from Austria, while the latter w'as to be permitted
to add Moldavia and Wallachia to Transylvania and the
Bukovina.

Pitt, however, had not fonned the Triple Alliance to further England
the ambitions of Prussia, but to save Belgium from France, ^^A*^.®
and above all to preserve the peace of Europe. He frowned, Question,
therefore, upon proposals Avhich were likely to provoke
a general European war. He willingly combined with
Prussia in bringing effective pressure to bear upon Denmark,
when the latter, at the bidding of the Tsarina Catherine,
attacked Gustavus III of Sweden. But only very gradually
and reluctantly was he driven to the conviction that it was
incumbent upon Great Britain to offer more direct resistance
to the advance of Russia in South-Eastern Europe.

Hitherto England had not manifested any jealousy towards England
the remarkable progress of Russia. On the contrary, she had j^gj^
welcomed Russia's advent into the European polity : politically,
as a possible counterpoise to the dangerous pre-eminence of
France ; commercially, as an exporter of the raw materials
required for naval construction, and as a considerable importer
of English goods, and of 'colonial produce' carried to her

144

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Pitt and
the

Eastern
Question.

Close of
the war.

England

and

Kussia.

ports in English bottoms. The elder Pitt was a strong
advocate of a Russian alliance. ' I am quite a Russ,' he
wrote to Sherburne in 1773 ; 'I trust the Ottoman will pull
down the House of Bourbon in his fall' In regard to
Russia Fox inherited the views of Chatham. He was in
office when Catherine annexed the Crimea and cordially
approved of it, and, like Chatham, he would gladly have
formed a close alliance with Russia and the northern powers.

The younger Pitt was the first English statesman to
appreciate the real and intimate concern of Great Britain
in the affairs of the Near East, and to perceive that those
interests might be jeopardized by the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire, and the access of Russia to Constantinople.
And the truth, as we have seen, dawned only gradually
upon him. So late as 1790 he warned Herzberg that the
armed mediation Avhich Prussia proposed in the interests
of the Porte was outside the scope of the Triple Alliance.^
He did, however, go so far as to press Austria to come to
terms with the Porte and so avoid the threatened rupture
with Prussia.

Meanwhile, a combination of events disposed the belli-
gerents to peace. In April, 1789, Abdul Hamid I died, and
was succeeded by Selim III, a ruler who was as feeble and
reactionary as Abdul Hamid had been vigorous and en-
lightened. The death of the Emperor Joseph (February 28,
1790) and the accession of his sagacious brother, Leopold,
gave a new turn to Austrian policy. Above all, the develop-
ment of the revolutionary movement in France was com-
pelling the strained attention of every monarch and every
government in Europe. In face of this new source of dis-
turbance the emperor and the King of Prussia accommodated
their differences, and in June, 1790, concluded the Convention
of Reichenbach. Prussia surrendered, for the moment, the
hope of acquiring Danzig and Thorn. Leopold agreed to
make peace with the Turks on the basis of the statits quo
ante.

Pitt now assumed a firmer tone towards Catherine II. In
November, 1790, he demanded that she should surrender
1 Kose, 02?. cit., p. 521.

VI IX THE EIGHTEEXTH CENTURY 145

Oczakov, and in the follo\\ing March the Cabinet agreed
that an ultimatum should be dispatched to Russia in that
sense. But subsequent debates, both in the House of Lords
and in the Commons, showed that public opinion, as repre-
sented there, was not yet prepared for a reversal of the
traditional policy which had hitherto governed the relations
of Russia and England. On March 28 the king sent a
message to both Houses recommending 'some further
augmentation of his naval force' in view of the failure of
his ministers to ' effect a pacification between Russia and the
Porte'. The ministers carried their reply in the Lords by
!)7 to 34, and in the Commons by 228 to 135. But although
the ministerial majorities were substantial, the votes did not
reflect either the temper of Parliament or the tone of the
debate. Hardly a voice was raised in either House in favour
of Pitt's proposed demonstration. Lord Fitzwilliam opposed
it on the gi-ound that * no ill consequence was likely to arise
from Russia's keeping in her hands Oczakov and Akerman '.
Burke vehemently protested against a demonstration of
friendship or support for ' a cruel and wasteful Empire ' and
a nation of ' destructive savages '. Fox insisted that Russia
was our ' natural ally ', that we had always looked to her to
counterbalance the Bourbons, that we had encouraged her
'plans for raising her aggrandisement upon the ruins of
the Turkish Empire', that to oppose her progress in the
Black Sea would be sheer madness, and that it would not
hurt us if she emerged into the JNIediterranean. Pitt urged
that 'the interest which this country had in not suffering
the Russians to make conquests on the coasts of the Black
Sea were of the utmost importance ', but his reply as a whole
was singularly unconvincing and even perfunctory.^ In
regard to the proposed armament Pitt wisely deferred to an
unmistakable expression of public opinion, and promptly

1 Hansard, Parliamentary History (vol. xxix), for the debates which
are supremely interesting in view of the subsequent policy of England. It is
noteworthy that Pitt's speech on this occasion is not included in Hathaway's
edition of his speeches, and from the critical point of view Hathaway was
right. It is less remarkable that it should have been omitted from
Mr. Coupland's recent edition of the War Speeches.

1984 L

146 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap

effected a somewhat humiliating but exceedingly prudent
retreat. Catherine II had her way about Oczakov, without
molestation from the English fleet. But it is pertinent to
remark that though Oczakov is now merely an historical
memory, Odessa is not.
Treaties jn August, 1791, Austria concluded peace with the Porte
and Jassy. ^^ Sistova. Serbia was handed back to Turkey, and the
status quo ante was restored. On January 9, 1792, a 'treaty
of perpetual peace' was signed by Russia and Turkey at
Jassy. The Treaty of Kainardji, the Convention Explicative
of 1779, and the Commercial Treaty of 1783 were confirmed ;
the Porte recovered Moldavia, but again on condition that
the stipulations contained in the preceding treaties were
fulfilled ; the Russian frontier was advanced to the Dniester
(Oczakov being thus transferred), and the Porte agreed to
recognize the annexation of the Crimea.
The close rjy^Q Treaty of Jassy brings to a close one of the most
chapter, important phases in the history of the Eastern Question,
and one of the lengthiest chapters in this book. When it
opened Russia had hardly begun to play a part as a European
Power ; the Black Sea was a Turkish lake. As it closes,
Russia is firmly entrenched upon the shores of the Euxine, and
is already looking beyond them. Kherson and Sebastopol have
been transformed into great naval arsenals ; Kinburn and Oc-
zakov, not to mention Taganrog, Azov, and the Kabardas, are
secure in Russian keeping. To the north of the Euxine Turkish
territory ends at the Dniester, and the border provinces
between the Dniester and the Danube are retained only
on sufferance. Upon the lands to the south of the Euxine the
Turkish hold is already loosening. ' I came to Russia ', said
Catherine, ' a poor girl ; Russia has dowered me richly, but
I have paid her back with Azov, the Crimea, and the Ukraine.'
Proudly spoken, it was less than the truth.

For further reference see chapter iii and Appendix B; also Serge
Goriainow, Le Bosjihore et les Dardanelles (a valuable study in diplomacy
with close reference to the documents) ; Cardinal Alberoni, Scheme for
reducing the Ttirkish Emjnre (Eng. trans. 1736) ; A. Sorel,"i« Question
d'Orient an xviii^ sihle ; T. E. Holland, Treaty Relations of Russia and
Turkey (with texts of important treaties) ; W. E. H. Lecky, History of

VI IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 147

England in the Eighteenth Century ; J. Hollaiifl Kose, Pitt and the
National Revival; Paganel, Histoire de Joseph II; J. F. Bright,
Joseph II; Vandal, Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie, Une amhassade
franqaise en Orierit, La mission de Villeneuve: R. Waliszewski, Le
roman d'une impdratrice {Catherine II); A. Eatnbaud, History of
Russia.

l2

CHAPTER VII
NAPOLEON AND THE NEAR EASTERN PROBLEM

'Really to ruin England we must make ourselves masters of Egypt.'—
Napoleon to the Directory, Aug. 16, 1797.

'Egypt is the keystone of English ascendancy in the Indian Ocean.' —
Paul Rohebach (1912).

'Le personnage de Napoleon, en Orient comme ailleurs, doraine les
premieres annees du xix^ siecle . . . certes il serait excessif d'afiflrmer
que la question d'Orient fut le noeud de sa politique . . . mais c'est
precisement par I'Orient qu'il pensa atteindre son inabordable ennemie,
et, par suite, il ne le quitta jamais des yeux ; il y edifia ses combinaisons
politiques les plus aventureuses sans doute, mais aussi les plus geniales.
II y porta ses vues des ses premieres victoires en Italie ; il y poursuivit les
Anglais a travers I'ancien continent; il y brisa sa fortune. C'est en ce
sens qu'il put concevoir un moment I'idee de la domination universelle ;
c'est bien a Constantinople qu'il placa le centre du monde.' — Edouaed
Dbiault, Question d'Orient.

§ 1. West and East, 1797-1807

The The Treaty of Jassy closed one important chapter in the

advent of history of the Eastern Question. The next opens with

* the advent of Napoleon. By the year 1797 he had begun

to arrive not only in a military but in a political sense.

During the five years which elapsed between the Treaty

of Jassy (1792) and that of Campo Formio the Eastern

Question, as in this work we understand the term, was

permitted to rest. This brief interval of repose was due

to several causes, but chiefly to the fact that the year which

saw the conclusion of the war between Russia and Turkey

witnessed the opening of the struggle between the German

Powers and the French Revolution.

The Catherine's ambition in regard to Poland had been whetted

French rather than sated by the partition of 1772. But between

tion and 1772 and 1792 she was, as we have seen, busy elsewhere.

the Par- Poland seized the opportunity to put what remained of its

Poland, house in order — the last thing desired by Catherine. But

in 1792 her chance came. She had been 'cudgelling her

NAPOLEON AND NEAR EASTERN PROBLEM 149

brains to urge the Courts of Vienna and Berlin to busy
themselves with the aflfairs of France' so that she might
liave Mier own elbows free'. The German Courts played
her game for her, and by the summer of 1792 her elbows
were free. In 1793 the second partition of Poland was
carried out. Prussia and Russia divided the spoil ;
Austria got nothing. But in the third and final partition
of 1795 Austria was admitted to a share. In the same year
Prussia concluded peace with France at the expense of the
empire ; two years later Austria followed suit.

Prussia had made her peace with the Directory. With
Austria the peace was negotiated directly by the young
general who had commanded the French army in the great
campaign of 1796-7. And General Bonaparte had already
begun to comport himself as an independent conqueror.
'Do you suppose', said he to Miot de M^lito, 'that
I have been winning victories in Italy to enhance the glory
of the lawyers of the Directory — Barras and Carnot? Do
you suppose that I mean to establish the Republic more
securely? . . . The nation wants a chief, a supreme head
covered with glory.' In Bonaparte's view they had not
very far to look for him. Nor was the chief in any doubt
as to his real antagonist. From the outset his eyes were
fixed upon England, and upon England not merely or mainly
as a unit in the European polity, but as a world-power, and
above all as an Oriental poMer.

Before the Treaty of Campo Formio was actually signed The
Bonaparte had written to the Directors (August 16, 1797) : igies.
' Corfu, Zante, and Cephalonia are of more interest to us than
all Italy.' ' Corfu and Zante ', he said to Talleyrand, ' make us
masters both of the Adriatic and of the Levant. It is useless
to try to maintain the Turkish Empire ; we shall see its
downfall in our lifetime. The occupation of the Ionian Isles
will put us in a position to support it or to secure a share of
it for ourselves.' Amid the much more resounding advantages
secured to France in 1797 — Belgium, the Rhine frontier, and
so on — little significance was attached to the acquisition of
these islands. But Bonaparte was looking ahead. To him
they were all important. Might they not serve as stepping-

150 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

stones to Egypt.' To Choiseiil Egypt had seemed the obvious
compensation for the loss of the French Empire in India.
Napoleon regarded the occupation of the first as a necessary
preliminary to the recovery of the second. Volney, whose
book, Les Ruines, had a powerful influence upon him,
had written in 1788, 'Par I'Egypte nous toucherons k I'lnde ;
nous retablirons I'ancienne circulation par Suez, et nous
ferons deserter la route du cap de Bonne-Esp^rance.'

Nor was Napoleon without warrant from his nominal
masters. On October 23, 1797, the Directors had indited
an elaborate dispatch commending to his consideration the
position of Turkey, the interests of French commerce in
the Levant, and indicating the importance they attached to the
Ionian Isles and Malta.^ The views of the Directors coincided
with his own. It is safe to assume that if they had not done so
they would not have found an agent in General Bonaparte.
But alike to the Republicans and to the future emperor they
came as a heritage from the Ancien Regime. French policy
in the Near East has been, as we have repeatedly seen,
singularly consistent. So far as Napoleon initiated a new
departure, it was only in the boldness and originality with
which he applied traditional principles to a new situation.
Egypt. In the summer of 1797 Napoleon had already made over-

tures to the Mainotes, the Greeks, and the Pashas of Janina,
Scutari, and Bosnia. In regard to the Greeks of the Morea
he was particularly solicitous. ' Be careful ', he wrote to
General Gentili, whom he sent to occupy the Ionian Isles,
' in issuing your proclamations to make plenty of reference
to the Greeks, to Athens, and Sparta.' He himself addressed
the Mainotes as ' worthy descendants of the Spartans who
alone among the ancient Greeks know the secret of preserving
political liberty '. But it was on Egypt that his attention was
really concentrated, and on Egypt mainly as a means to the
overthrow of the Empire of England. Talleyrand represented
his views to the Directory : ' Our war with this Power (Eng-
land) represents the most favourable opportunity for the
invasion of Egypt. Threatened by an imminent landing on

^ Sorel, VEiirope et la Eirolution, v. 253.

VII NAPOLEON AND NEAR EASTERN PROBLEM 151

her shores she will not desert her coasts to prevent our
enterprise (in Egypt). This further offers us a possible
chance of driving the English out of India by sending thither
15,000 troops from Cairo via Suez.' '

It was, however, to the command of the Army of England The
that Bonaparte was gazetted in November, 1797. He England.
accepted it not without an arriere-jyensee. 'This little Europe',
he said to Bourrienne, ' offers too contracted a field. One
must go to the East to gain power and greatness. Europe is
a mere mole-hill ; it is only in the East, where there are
600,000,000 of human beings, that there have ever been vast
empires and mighty revolutions. I am willing to inspect
the northern coast to see what can be done. But if, as I fear,
the success of a landing in England should appear doubtful,
1 shall make my Army of England the Army of the East and
go to Egypt.' -

A visit to the northern coast confirmed his view that the The
blow against England should be struck in Egypt. The French S^^t^f '^
navy was not in a condition to attempt direct invasion, tion
Besides, he had his own career to consider. He must 'keep (l"^^)-
his glory warm', and that was not to be in Europe. He
persuaded the Directors to his views, and in April, 1798, he
was nominated to the command of the army of the East.
His instructions, drafted by himself, ordered him to take
Malta and Egypt, cut a channel through the Isthmus of Suez,
and make France mistress of the Red Sea, maintaining as far
as possible good relations with the Turks and their Sultan.
But the supreme object of the expedition was never to be
lost sight of. ' You ', he said to his troops as they embarked
at Toulon, ' are a wing of the Army of England.'

The preparations for the expedition were made with a
thoroughness which we have been too apt of late to associate
with the Teutonic rather than the Latin genius. On Napoleon's
staff were at least a dozen generals who subsequently attained
renown ; but not generals only. Egypt was to be trans-
formed under French rule ; the desert was to be made to

1 Jonquiere, VExpMition d'£gypte, i. 161 (cited by Foiirnier).

2 I combine two separate conversations, both with Bourrienne, but, of
course, without altering the sense and merely for the sake of brevity.

152 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

blossom as the rose. To this end Napoleon took with him
Berthollet, the great chemist, Monge, the mathematician,
engineers, architects, archaeologists, and historians.

The expedition sailed from Toulon on May 19, 1798. Nelson
had been closely watching the port, though quite ignorant of
Napoleon's destination. But he was driven out to sea by
a storm, and before he could get back the bird had flown.
Meanwhile, Napoleon occupied JVIalta without resistance from
the Knights of St. John (June 13) ; the French troops landed
in Egypt on July 1 ; took Alexandria on the 2nd, fought and
won the battle of the Pyramids on the 21st, and on the next
day occupied Cairo. Three weeks had sufficed for the conquest
of Lower Egypt. But Nelson and the English fleet, though
successfully eluded during the voyage, were on Napoleon's
track, and on the 1st of August they came up with the
French fleet lying in Aboukir Bay, and, by a manoeuvre
conceived with great skill and executed Avith superb courage,
they succeeded in completely annihilating it. Nelson's victory
of the Nile rendered Napoleon's position in P^gypt exceedingly
precarious. Cut off" from his base, deprived of the means of
transport and supply, a lesser man would have deemed it
desperate. Napoleon was only stimulated to fresh efforts.
Expedi- The attack upon Egypt was, as we have seen, directed
Syria primarily against England. But the lord of Egypt was the
(1799), Sultan, and to him the French conquest was both insulting
and damaging. Encouraged by Nelson's success Sultan Selim
plucked up courage to declare war upon France on Septem-
ber 1, and prepared to reconquer his lost province. Napoleon
thereupon determined to take the offensive in Syria. He
took by assault El Arisch, Gaza, and Jaffa, laid siege to Acre
(March, 1799), and on April 16 inflicted a crushing defeat
upon the Turks at Mount Tabor.

Acre, thanks to the support of the English fleet under
Sir Sydney Smith, sustained its reputation for impregnability ;
the sufferings of Napoleon's army were intense ; their general,
reluctantly resigning his dream of an advance through Asia
Minor upon Constantinople, was compelled to withdraw to
Egypt. Instead of conquermg Constantinople, and from
Constantinople taking his European enemies in the rear, he

VII NAPOLEON AND NEAR EASTERN PROBLEM 153

found himself obliged to defend his newly conquered province
against the assault of its legitimate sovereign.

Convoyed by the English fleet a Turkish expedition reached
Egypt in July, but Napoleon flung himself upon them and
drove them headlong into the sea (July 25). This second
battle of Aboukir firmly established Napoleon's supremacy
in Egypt. But the victory, though militarily complete, was
politically barren. News from France convinced Napoleon
that the pear was at last ripe, and that it must be picked
in Paris. Precisely a month after his victory over the Turks
at Aboukir he embarked with great secrecy at Alexandria,
leaving his army under the command of Kleber. The
Mediterranean was carefully patrolled by the English fleet,
but Napoleon managed to elude it, landed at Frejus on
October 9, and precisely a month later (18th Brumaire)
effected the coup d'4tat which made him, at a single blow,
master of France.

During Napoleon's absence in Egypt events had moved The war
rapidly in Europe. Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Naples, Second
Portugal, and Turkey had united in a second coalition against Coalition
France. So long as Napoleon was away the war went in the isoi).
main against France, but his return was signalized by the
victories of ^Marengo (June) and Hohenlinden (December,
1800), and early in 1801 Austria was obliged to make i)eace.

Napoleon had already, without much difficulty, detached Napoleon
the Tsar of Russia ^ from the coalition. Alienated from Eng- ^^g^^, ®
land by the rigidity with which she interpreted the rules of Paul I.
International Law at sea, Paul I gladly came to terms with
the First Consul, for whom he had suddenly conceived a fervent
admiration. The bait dangled before the half-crazy brain of
the Russian Tsar was a Franco-Russian expedition against
British India, ^ A large force of Cossacks and Russian
regulars were to march by way of Turkestan, Khiva, and Bok-
hara to the Upper Indus valley, while 35,000 French troops,
under Mass^na, were to descend the Daimbe, and, going by
way of the Black Sea and the Caspian, were to make

1 He succeeded Catherine in 179G.

2 A French historian speaks of this scheme as ' une ^clatante lumiere
jetee sur I'avenir ', Driault, op. cit., p. 78.

154 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

an attack on Persia, take Herat and Candahar, and then
unite with the Russians on the Indus. The details of the
scheme were worked out to an hour and a man ; twenty days
were to suffice for reaching the Black Sea ; fifty-five more
were to see them in Persia, and another forty-five in India.
Towards the end of June, 1801, the joint attack would be
delivered upon India. Towards the end of February, 1801,
a large force of Cossacks did actually cross the Volga ; but
on March 24 the assassination of the Tsar Paul put an end
to the scheme.
Treaty of The projected expedition into Central Asia was not without
Q802^^ its influence upon subsequent schemes entertained by Napo-
leon, but it did nothing to relieve the immediate situation in
Egypt. Great Britain, by the taking of Malta (September,
1800), had made herself undisputed mistress of the Mediter-
ranean, and she had also thrown a large army, including
10,000 Sepoys, into Egypt. Sir Ralph Abercromby won a
great victory at Alexandria in March (1801) ; Cairo capitulated
in June, and in September the French agreed to evacuate
Egypt, which was forthwith restored to the Sultan. There
was no longer any obstacle to the conclusion of peace,
and in March, 1802, the definitive treaty was signed
at Amiens. England undertook to restore Malta to the
Knights, and the Ionian Isles were erected into a sort of
federal republic under the joint protection of Turkey and
Russia.
The The truce secured to the two chief combatants by the

Mission. Treaty of Amiens proved to be of short duration. Napoleon
was angered, not unnaturally, by the refusal of England to
evacuate Malta. England was ready to restore the island
to its legitimate owners, but only when they could guarantee
its security from Napoleon, against whom she had her own
grievances. Among many others were the continued intrigues
of Napoleon in Egypt and the Levant. In the autumn of
1802 he sent a Colonel Sebastiani on a commercial mission to
the Near East. Sebastiani, who hardly disguised the political
and military purpose of his journey, Avas, according to the
French authorities, received with boundless enthusiasm in
Tripoli, Alexandria, Cairo, and not less when he passed on to

VII NAPOLEON AND NEAR EASTERN PROBLEM 155

Acre, Smyrna, and the Ionian Tsles.^ On his return to France
he presented a Report, which was published in the Moniteur
Officicl for January 30, 1803. The publication gave deep
oflfence in England, and Avell it might, for it discussed with
complete frankness the military situation in the Near East ;
it declared that, in view of the hostility between the Turks
and the Mamelukes and the latter's sympathy with France,
6,000 French troops would suffice for the reconquest of Egypt,
and it affirmed that the Ionian Isles only awaited a favourable
moment to declare for France.

Sebastiani's Report had, before publication, been largely
retouched, if not fundamentally altered, by Napoleon, and
was published with the express purpose of goading England
into a declaration of war. It succeeded, and in May, 1803,
war was declared. Russia also, alarmed by the Sebastiani
Report, strengthened her garrison in Corfu. Austria, more-
over, discovered that Napoleon was again intriguing in the
Morea, with the Senate of the little Republic of Ragusa, and
with the Bishop of Montenegro, who had consented to hand
over the Gulf of Cattaro to France.

The young Tsar Alexander, Avho, on the assassination of Ri^sia
his father, had succeeded to the throne in 1801, was disposed Balkans,
to resort to the policy of the Empress Catherine in regard to
Turkey. According to the Memories of Prince Adam Czar-
toryski, now Foreign Minister of Russia, ' the European ter-
ritories of Turkey were to be divided into small States united
among themselves into a federation, over which the Tsar
would exercise a commanding influence. Should Austria's
assent be necessary she was to be appeased by the acquisition
of Turkish Croatia, part of Bosnia, and Wallachia, Belgrade,
and Ragusa. Russia would have Moldavia, Cattaro, Corfu,
and above all Constantinople and the Dardanelles.' ^

Russia and Austria both joined the fresh coalition formed The Third
by Pitt in 1805, but their combined armies suffered a terrible Coahtion.

1 e.g. Driault, op. cit., p. 82, but contra, see Fournier (Najwl^ou, i. 316),
who declares, on the authority of Sebastiani himself, that the French
mission no far from being welcomed in Egypt had been obUged to seek
shelter from the mob in Cairo.

* Cited by Fournier, op. cit., i. 347.

156 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap-

reverse at Napoleon's hands at Austerlitz (December 2, 1805),
and before the close of the year Austria was compelled to
conclude peace at Pressburg. The terms of the treaty were
disastrous both to her pride and her territorial position.
Napoleon took his reward in the Adriatic : Venetia, Istria
(except the town of Trieste) , and Dalmatia being annexed to
the new kingdom of Italy. Talleyrand shreAvdly advised the
emperor to compensate Austria with the Danubian princi-
palities and northern Bulgaria, and so interpose a stout
barrier between Russia and Constantinople, and by that
means turn the ambitions of Russia towards Asia, where she
must needs come into collision with Great Britain. This
suggestion anticipated by nearly a century the policy of
Bismarck, but it is far from certain that Austria would have
accepted the ofi'er, even could Napoleon have been induced
to make it.^
Auster- Austerlitz put Austria out of play for four years. But
and "^' Frederick William III of Prussia chose this singularly unpro-
Trafalgar. pitious moment for breaking the neutrality which for ten
shameful years Prussia had maintained. Prussia, therefore,
was crushed at Jena and Auerstadt, and Napoleon occupied
Berlin. Russia, however, still kept the field, while England
had strengthened her command of the sea by the great victory
ofi" Cape Trafalgar.
The Con- Nelson's victory compelled Napoleon to play his last card —
Blockade. *^® continental blockade. England was still the enemy ; she
could not be reached by an army from Boulogne ; she had
proved herself irresistible at sea. What remained? She
must be brought to her knees by the destruction of her
commerce. To this end every nation on the European Con-
tinent must be combined into his 'system', and the whole
of the coast from Archangel to the Crimea must be her-
metically sealed against English shipping and English trade.
Such was the meaning of the decree issued in November,
1806, by Napoleon from Berlin.
Napoleon A month later the intrigues of Napoleon at Constantinople
Turks.

1 Lefebvre, Hist, des Cabinets de V Europe, ii. 23o, and Vandal
Napoldon et Alexaoidre, i, p. 9.

VII NAPOLEON AND NEAR EASTERN PROBLEM 157

issued (December, 1800) in a declaration of war by the
Porte upon England and Russia.

After the conclusion of the Treaty of Pressburg the place
of the Ottoman Empire in the general scheme of Nai)oleonic
policy becomes increasingly apparent. The annexations in
the Adriatic were an essential part of a deliberate plan.
* The object of my policy ', he wrote in May, 1806, * is a triple
alliance between myself, the Porte, and Persia, indirectly
aimed at Russia. The constant study of my ambassador
should be to fling defiance at Russia. We must close tlie
Bosphorus to the Russians.' ^

The closing of the straits was, indeed, of high consequence
to Napoleon's ambitions in the Adriatic, for Russia had taken
advantage of her alliance with Turkey to send large Russian
reinforcements to the Ionian Isles. She had also, to the in-
dignation of the Turk and the chagrin of Napoleon, utilized
the adjacent mainland of Albania as a recruiting ground for
her garrison in the islands.

In the summer of 1806 Sebastiani was sent by Napoleon as Russia
ambassador extraordinary to Constantinople, charged with the ^^,- *^^
special task of effecting a breach between Turkey on the one palities.
hand and Russia and Great Britain on the other. A hint of
Russian intrigues in the principalities sufficed to persuade
Sultan Selim, in direct violation of his treaty engagements
with the Tsar, to depose the hospodars of Moldavia and
Wallachia, Prince Moronzi and Prince Hypsilanti. To this
insult the Tsar promptly responded by sending 35,000 men
across the Pruth, and before the end of the year the Russian
army was in undisputed occupation of the principalities.
The Sultan thereui^on declared war on Russia. An English
fleet under Admiral Duckworth then forced the Dardanelles,
destroyed a Turkish squadron in the Sea of Marmora, and
threatened Constantinople. The defences of the city were in
a ruinous condition, and had an attack been delivered forth-
with Constantinople would almost certainly have fallen.
But Duckworth wasted precious months in negotiation ;
Constantinople was rapidly put into a state of defence by

1 To Eugene Beauliarnais, ap. Sorel, o^j. cit., vii. 53-4.

158 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

French engineers ; the Enghsh fleet was compelled to with-
draw from the Sea of jNIarmora, and, after sustaining con-
siderable losses, repassed the Dardanelles on March 3, 1807.
Nfjpoleon To Napoleon Constantinople was not the term but the
' starting-point of adventure. He looked beyond Constantinople
to Persia, and beyond Persia to the ultimate goal of India.
The destruction of British Power in the Far East was fast
becoming an obsession with the emperor.

A few weeks later Admiral Eraser landed a force in Egypt
and took Alexandria. But Egypt was now in the capable
hands of Mehemet Ali, the Albanian adventurer, destined
to play so prominent a part in later developments of the
Eastern Question. The Sultan Selim had sent Mehemet
Ali at the head of a force of Albanians to Egypt in order to
bring back the Mamelukes to their allegiance. The latter
consequently inclined towards the English invaders, but
INIehemet Ali had the situation well in hand, and nothuig
came of Fraser's intervention.

Meanwhile, Napoleon was revolving larger schemes upon
a more extended field. To him an alliance with Turkey
was only a step towards Asiatic conquest. The call of
the Far East was to a man of Napoleon's temperament
irresistible. India, as he subsequently confessed, was now
occupying more and more of his thoughts. England, as an
insular State, might be impregnable, but her dominion in
the Far East was continental. On the Continent there was
nothing Avhich a French army could not reach, and anything
which a French army could reach it could conquer. But
between Europe and India lay Persia. To Persia, therefore,
he first turned his attention.
Treaty of Ever since the Tsarina Catherine had conquered the
stein Caucasus there had been intermittent war between Russia
■^pril, and Persia. The Shah was, therefore, only too ready to
receive the advances of Napoleon. During the year 1806
no less than three French agents were sent to Teheran.
'Persia ', wrote the emperor to Sebastiani, 'must be roused, and
her forces directed against Georgia. Induce the Porte to
order the Pasha of Erzeroum to march against this province
with all his troops.' In April, 1807, a Persian envoy met the

VII NAPOLEON AND NEAR EASTERN PROBLEM 159

emperor in Poland, and the Treaty of Finkenstein was con-
cluded. Napoleon promised to supply guns and gunners to
the Shah, and to compel Russia to evacuate Georgia. The
Shah on his part was to adhere to the continental system,
to break off his relations with Great Britain, confiscate all
British goods, exclude British shipping from his ports, stir
up the Afghans against British India, afford free passage to
a French army through Persia, and himself join in the attack
against British Power in Asia.^

§ 2. The Ottoman Empire and the Resurrection
OF Serbia

For all these adventures, however, Constantinople was the Condition
starting-point. For the moment, therefore, the stability of q^^^^^j^
the Ottoman Empire was a matter of considerable concern Empire,
to Napoleon. How far could he depend upon it ?

The Sultan, Selim III (1789-1807), who, as we have seen,
had come to the throne in the midst of the war with Russia
and Austria, had made a real effort to carry out much needed
reforms in his distracted empire. His success had not been
equal to his zeal, and the situation had now become so grave
that the Sultan could give little effective aid to his exacting
ally. In Egypt the Mamelukes virtually repudiated the
authority of their nominal sovereign, and were held in check
only by the dangerous device of setting a poacher to watch
the game. In Syria, Djizzar Pasha exercised his tyranny in
virtual independence of the Sultan. The Wahabites had
conquered the Holy cities of Mecca and Medina in 1802 and
were now masters of the whole of Arabia. Nearer home,
the Suliotes and other tribes in northern Greece and Epirus
were bound by the loosest of ties to Constantinople ; Ali,
Pasha of Janina, had carved out for himself an independent
chieftainship in Albania ; the Montenegrins had wTung from
the Sultan an acknowledgement of the independence which
they had always in practice enjoyed ; wiiile on the Danube,
PassAvan Oglon, one of the many Bosnian nobles who had

1 Foumier, op. cit, 1. 449 ; Driault, La Politique orientate cle
NapoUon (passim).

160 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

accepted Mohammedanism, was already master of Widdin,
Sofia, Nikopolis, and Plevna, and was dreaming of a revival
of the Bulgarian Tsardom with Constantinople itself as his^
capital.
Serbia. Most threatening of all was the position of aiFairs in Serbia.

There, as in other provinces of the empire, the central
government of Constantinople had ceased long since to
exercise any real control over its nominal subordinates.
The government of Serbia was in the hands of the Janissaries
of Belgrade, who maintained their authority alike over the
Moslem Spahis, or feudal landowners, and over the native
peasantry by methods of revolting cruelty and tyranny.

Among the peasantry, however, the traditions of past
greatness and independence, nurtured on popular ballads
and encouraged by the Orthodox clergy, had somehow
managed to survive through the long centuries of Ottoman
oppression. The frequent change of masters, resulting from
the wars of the eighteenth century, had tended to revive
a spirit of hopefulness among the native Slavs. Whatever
change war might bring to them could hardly be for the
worse. At one time they looked with some expectation to
Vienna. They were now turning, less unwarrantably, to their
brothers in blood and creed, who were the subjects of the
Russian Tsar.

Yet, in truthj the Serbians could count upon little effective
assistance from any external Power. Fortunately, perhaps,
they were compelled, by their geographical situation, to rely
entirely upon themselves. Cut off, first by Venice and
afterwards by Austria, from access to the Adriatic, they could
obtain no help from the maritime Powers. Between them-
selves and their potential allies in Russia there interposed
the Danubian principalities. Nor had they, like the Bosnians
and Roumanians, any indigenous nobility to which they could
look for leadership. Salvation, therefore, must come, if at
all, from the peasantry. In the wars of the eighteenth
century that peasantry had learnt to fight ; and when, in 1791,
Serbia was restored to the Porte, the agents of the Sultan
were quick to note the change in their demeanour. * Neigh-
bours, what have you made of our rayahs ? ' asked a Turkish

VII NAPOLEON AND NEAR EASTERN PROBLEM 161

Pasha of an Austrian official, when a regiment of native Serbs
paraded before him. On the restoration of Turkish authority
the Serbian troops were disbanded, but the lessons which the
peasants had learned were not forgotten.^

The fact was proved in 1804. The Serbian rising of that Serbian
year marks an epoch of incomparable significance in the ^^^^
history of the Eastern Question. For four hundred years (1804-17).
the spirit of Slav nationality had been completely crushed
under the heel of the Ottomans. That it had not been
eradicated events were soon to prove. But its continued
existence was little suspected. Still it was something that the
Serbian peasants had learnt to fight. Napoleon had taught the
same invaluable lesson to his Italian subjects. But the Serbians
had not yet learnt to fight for an idea. The seed of the new
idea came from the Revolution in France. It fell into the
fertile soil of the Balkans : it fructified in the insurrection of
1804.

It is one of the paradoxes of which the recent history of
the Near East is compact that this insurrection should have
been directed in the first instance not against the Turkish
Government, but against its rebellious servants the Janis-
saries of Belgrade. The tyranny of the latter was as intoler-
able to the Serbians as was their disloyalty to the Sultan
and his officials. Selim accordingly determined to dislodge
them.

Expelled from Belgrade the rebels joined forces with Pass-
wan Oglou, and together they invaded Serbia. Responding to
the appeal of the Turkish Pasha of Belgrade, the Serbians
rose in defence of their country and repelled the invasion.
Thereupon the Janissaries of Constantinople and the Moslem
hierarchy compelled Sultan Selim to restore the Janissaries
at Belgi'ade, and Serbia was virtually reoccupied by official
Mohammedanism and given over to a reign of terror. The
Sultan vainly endeavouring to restrain his agents only added
fuel to the flames of vengeance by an obscure hint that unless
they mended their ways ' soldiers should come among them of
other nations and of another creed '. The Janissaries deter-
mined that the alien soldiers should not be Slavs.
1 Banke, Serbia, p. 84.

1»«4 M

162 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

Kara To avert literal extermination the Serbs organized what

ncoige. ^y^g jj^ truth the first national rising in the modern history

of the Balkans, and elected as their Commander-in-Chief

a peasant pig-merchant, George Petrovitch, or Kara (Black)

George.

Kara George had served in the Serbian Volunteer Corps
in the Austrian war of 1788-91, and now led the national
insurrection with conspicuous courage and skill. So great
was the success of the peasant army that in a very brief
space of time the Janissaries were confined to Belgrade, and
a few other fortresses. Unofficial Mohammedanism went to
the assistance of the Janissaries, but the Pasha of Bosnia,
acting upon instructions from Constantinople, put himself at
the head of the Serbian nationalists. The strange com-
bination of official Turk and Serb peasant again proved
irresistible, and in the event the power of the Janissaries was
annihilated.

Official Turkey had now to deal with its formidable allies.
The latter refused to be disarmed, and in August, 1804, applied
for help to Russia. The Tsar was sympathetic, but advised
the Serbians to apply for redress, in the first instance, to
their own sovereign. In 1805, accordingly, a mission was
sent by the Serbians to Constantinople to demand that, in
view of their recent exertions and sufferings, all arrears of
tribute and taxes should be remitted, and that all the strong
places in their land should be garrisoned by native troops.

Almost simultaneously the Sultan was confronted by
a demand from Russia, now on the eve of war with France,
that the Porte should enter uito a strict offensive and defen-
sive alliance with Russia, and that all its subjects professing
the Orthodox faith should be placed under the formal pro-
tection of the Tsar.

Threatened on one side by the insurgent Janissaries, on
a second by the Serbian rayahs, on a third by Russia,
Sultan Selim found himself involved in the most serious
crisis of a troublesome reign. He dealt with it in character-
istic fashion by temporizing with the Russian envo}^ while
he attempted to crush the Serbians.

The Serbian nationalists, magnificently led by Kara George,

VII NAPOLEON AND NEAR EASTERN PROBLEM 163

defended themselves with energy against the Sultan's troops,
and in the brilliant campaign of 1806 practically achieved
their independence, without any external assistance what-
soever. At the end of the same year Turkey, as we have
seen, was forced by Napoleon into war with Russia, and the
Serbian forces united with those of Russia on the Danube ;
in May, 1807, Sultan Selim was deposed by a palace revolu-
tion, and in July, 1808, both he and his successor, Mustapha IV,
were killed, and there succeeded to the throne the only sur-
viving male descendant of Othman, and one of the greatest
of his successors, the Sultan known to history as Mahmud IL

The sequel of the Serbian insurrection may be briefly told.
Fighting came to an end after the conclusion of the Treaty of
Tilsit, and as soon as they ceased fighting the Turks, the Serbs
began to fight each other. The Turks offered to Serbia an
administration similar to that of the Danubian principalities.

The sudden death of Milan Obrenovitch, the leader of the
Russophils, gave an occasion for the usual insinuations of foul
play against Kara George, who led the Nationalists. This
insinuation naturally intensified the bitterness between the two
parties. Nor was this feeling diminished when the Pro-Rus-
sians procured the rejection of the Sultan's terms under
which Serbia would have been placed on the same footing as
the Danubian principalities. The terms procured at Bucharest
(1812) were, as we shall see, decidedly less favourable.'

Nor were they observed. In 1813 the Turks relieved from Milosli
all fears of foreign intervention reconquered the country, yitch"^"
and administered it with such brutality that in 1815 a fresh
insurrection broke out. Its leader, Milosh Obrenovitch,
the half-brother of Milan, conducted it with a mixture of
courage and craft to a successful issue. In 1817, however,
Kara George, who had been interned in Hungary whither he
had fled after the reconquest of his country, returned to
Serbia. His presence was as unwelcome to Obrenovitch as
it was to the Turks. They combined to procure his assas-
sination (July 26, 1817), and his head was sent by Obrenovitch
as a trophy to Constantinople. Such was the real beginning

1 Infra, p. 169.
M 2

164 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

of the bitter blood-feud between the two dynasties, which
have divided the allegiance of the Serbian people fi-oni that
day until the consummation of the tragedy of 1903.

In November, 1817, a National Assembly was held at
Belgrade, and, with the sulky assent of the Turks, Obreno-
vitch was elected hereditary prince of Serbia. A limited
amount of local government Avas at the same time conceded
to the province, though the sovereignty of the Sultan
remained nominally unimpaired.
Treaty of The Greek war of independence led to a further concession.
(182fi) ^y ^^^^ convention of Akerman, concluded between Russia
and the Porte in 1826, the latter recognized a Russian
protectorate over Serbia, and at the same time conceded
to the Serbians almost complete autonomy.
Treaty of The terms agreed upon in 1826 were confirmed by the
nopVe^ Treaty of Adrianople, and by 1830 Serbia's autonomy was
(1829). definitely achieved. Milosh Obrenovitch was recognized by
the Porte as hereditary prince of a district (now the northern
part of the modern kingdom) bounded by the rivers Dvina,
Save, Danube, and Timok. No Turk was to be permitted to
live in the principality, except in one or other of eight forti-
fied towns which were still to be garrisoned by the Turks.
The Serbs were to enjoy complete local autonomy, though
remaining under the suzerainty of the Sultan to whom they
were to continue to pay tribute. They Mere to be allowed
to erect churches and schools, to trade freely, and to print
books in the vernacular. In a word, but for the Turkish
garrisons, they were to be free to work out their own salvation
in their own way.

§ 3. Napoleon and Alexander

The After this prolonged parenthesis it is time to resume the

TilsU.^ main thread of the story with which this chapter is concerned.

We left Napoleon in Poland conducting the war against

Russia and Prussia, but finding time, in the midst of an

arduous campaign, for the negotiation of a treaty which had

as its ultimate object the annihilation of British power in

India (April, 1807). The Treaty of Finkenstein was, indeed,

no sooner signed than Napoleon dispatched to Teheran

VII NAPOLEON AND NEAR EASTERN PROBLEM 165

General Gardane to devise a detailed scheme for the invasion
of India. But though primarily directed against Great Britain
the Franco-Persian alliance would serve if required against
Russia as well.

From that point of view it proved to be otiose. On June 14
Napoleon brought the campaign in East Prussia to an end
by a decisive victory over the Russians at Friedland (June 14,
1807). After that battle the Tsar applied for an armistice,
M'hich was readily granted, for Napoleon had already decided
upon a volte-face. The real enemy was not Russia nor
even Prussia. Prussia must incidentally be annihilated,
but if Alexander was prepared to abandon his alliance with
England, and to join forces with France, the two emperors
might divide the world between them.

The Tsar was not indisposed to listen to the tempter ; but
before the conspirators met at Tilsit to arrange terms, the
Prussian minister Hardenberg laid before the two emperors
a scheme by which the attention of Napoleon might be
diverted from the annihilation of his enemy Prussia to the
spoliation of his ally, the Ottoman Sultan.

According to Hardenberg's scheme Russia was to get Wal-
lachia, Moldavia, Bulgaria, and Roumelia, together with the
city of Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles ;
France was to have Greece and the islands of the Archipelago ;
Austria to acquire Bosnia and Serbia ; a reconstituted Poland
might go to the King of Saxony, who should in turn cede his
own kingdom to Prussia. The idea was highly creditable alike
to the courage and to the ingenuity of the Prussian statesman,
and his plan had the merit of completeness- But Napoleon
was in no mood to negotiate, on this or any other basis, with
a defeated and despised foe. If Prussia were permitted to
survive at all it must be on terms dictated by the conqueror.

In order to ensure complete secrecy the two emperoi-s
met in a floating pavilion which was moored in mid-stream in
the Niemen. With most of the detailed questions discussed
between them this narrative is not concerned ; enough to
note that the emperors decreed that Prussia should be dis-
membered— but for the scruples of the Tsar it would have
been completely wiped out; the British Empire must be

166 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

annihilated. The latter consummation was to be attained in
two ways : by the ruin of English commerce through the en-
forcement of the continental blockade, and by an attack upon
India. Napoleon had come to the conclusion that on the
whole it was easier for him to transport an army from Paris
to Delhi than from Boulogne to Folkestone. Never, in our
whole history, has the significance of irresistible sea-power been
more amply vindicated or more brilliantly illustrated. But
the latter part of the scheme was still locked in the breast of
Napoleon. Enough for the moment that an avaricious nation
of shopkeepers should be compelled to concede the ' freedom
of the seas ', and to share their commercial gains with equally
deserving but less favoured peoples. For the annihilation
of her two allies, Russia was to find her compensation in
the acquisition of Finland and the partition of the Ottoman
Empire.
Tilsit and According to the secret articles of the Treaty of Tilsit
East ^'^* France was to have the Bocche di Cattaro, and it was further
stipulated that, failing the conclusion of a peace between
Russia and the Porte within three months, Napoleon would
join the Tsar in expelling the Turks from the whole of their
European dominions except the city of Constantinople and
the province of Roumelia.^ How the provinces of European
Turkey were to be apportioned was not specified, though it
was taken for granted that Russia would retain Moldavia and
Wallachia. But the Danubian principalities, even if their
cession were procured by Napoleon — a large assumption — were
an inadequate recompense for the desertion of allies ; and
the Tsar intimated to Napoleon that he would not ulti-
mately be satisfied with anything short of the possession
of Constantinople. For Constantinople, as Alexander urged
with unanswerable logic, was the 'key of his house'. The
suggestion is said to have provoked from Napoleon an angry
retort : ' Constantinople ! never ; that would mean the empire
of the world.' The truth of the matter is that at Tilsit, as
elsewhere. Napoleon had only one object in view : to engage

^ See A. Yandal, Napoleon et Alexandre J*"'", where the ftill text of
the Treaty of Tilsit will be found in the Appendix to vol. i.

VII NAPOLEON AND NEAR EASTERN PROBLEM 167

Europe at large in his contest a outrance against Great
Britain.

As for the Near East Napoleon's policy was palpably
opportunist. The gradual publication of memoirs and docu-
ments has made it abundantly clear that Napoleon was merely
amusing Alexander with hopes of rich spoils in South-Eastern
Europe. For himself he had by no means made up his mind
whether he Avould plump for the integrity of the Ottoman
Empire or for its annihilation. His own preference was in
favour of the former policy, a policy which, as we have seen,
accorded with the unbroken tmditions of monarchical France.^
The latter accorded more precisely with the views of his
ally, and Alexander was an important asset in his diplomatic
balance-sheet. For the English Foreign Office had lately passed
into the vigorous hands of Canning, and English policy showed
signs of unwonted promptitude and energy. Hardly was the
ink dry on the Tilsit Treaty when the whole conspiracy was
countermined by Great Britain's seizure of the Danish fleet and
her prompt succour to Portugal and Spain. More than ever
Napoleon was in need of his Russian ally. Grandiose schemes
of policy in the East must therefore be dangled before the
eyes of the Tsar. There was talk of a joint attack, French,
Austrian, and Russian, upon Constantinople, which was to be
the base of an expedition to India. The Tsar was prudent
enough to wish to make sure of Constantinople before going
further : the Ottoman Empire must first be disposed of :
France might have Bosnia, Albania, and Greece ; Austria's
share was to be Serbia and Roumelia, with possession of
Salonica as a strategical and commercial base on the Aegean ;
Russia was to have the Danubian principalities, Bulgaria, and
Constantinople, with command of the Straits.

Coulaincourt, who succeeded Savary as French ambas- Napoleon
sador at St. Petersburg in December, 1807, Avas entrusted by ^"^g^. ^^"
Napoleon with these delicate and protracted negotiations.
He insisted that if Russia took Constantinople France must
have the Dardanelles, but Alexander justly observed that
Constantinople was important to Russia, only so far as it

1 Cf. Sorel, VEurope et la Revolution fran^aise, vol. i, passim, and
Bourgeois, Manuel de la Politique 6trangere, vol. i.

168 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

would give access to the Mediterranean. France was welcome
to Egypt and Syria, but the key to the Straits must be in
Russia's keeping.^

The whole of the negotiations between the Tilsit con-
spirators are of singular interest, both in themselves and in
relation to the offer subsequently made by the Tsar Nicholas
to Great Britain.^ They are, moreover, strongly confirmatory
of the conclusion which M. Serge Goriainow, one of the most
eminent of Russian publicists, has deliberately reached : ' Pour
la Russie toute la fameuse question d'Orient se resume dans
ces mots : de quelle autorit^ dependent les d^troits du
Bosphore et des Dardanelles ; qui en est le d^tenteur.' ^

But while the eyes of Russia were fixed upon the Near
East Napoleon preferred to avoid inconvenient details by
pointing to the rich prize which awaited bold enterprise in
the further East : Constantinople was the goal of the Tsar ;
Napoleon's supreme object was the humiliation of England.

The Meanwhile, little came of the grandiloquent phrases and

Isles'" far-reaching schemes with which the two emperors had
amused each other at Tilsit. Russia remained in occupation
of the principalities ; Napoleon resumed military control
over the Ionian Isles, where the joint rule of Russia and
Turkey had proved exceedingly unpopular. To the occupa-
tion of Corfu in particular Napoleon attached immense
importance : ' The greatest misfortune that could happen to
me', he said, 'would be the loss of Corfu.' Corfu he did
manage to retain until his abdication in 1814, but all the
rest of the islands were captured between 1809 and 1814 by
the British fleet. During those years Great Britain also
occupied most of the islands oif the Dalmatian coast, and
Lissa proved very valuable to her as a naval base.

Negotia- The two emperors met again at Erfurt in October, 1808.

Erfurt. Napoleon's reception of his ally lacked nothing of pomp and
magnificence ; but the relations between the august allies were
perceptibly cooler. The stern realities of the Peninsular cam-
paign were already imparting more sober hues to Napoleon's

1 Vandal, op. cit., Appendix to vol. i.

2 Infra, chap. x.

^ Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, p. 1.

VII NAPOLEON AND NEAR EASTERN PROBLEM 169

oriental dreams— all the larger schemes of partition were
consequently put aside. The Danubian principalities were,
however, guaranteed to the Tsar, who refused to evacuate
them at the request of the Sultan. Accordingly, war was
resumed between Russia and Turkey in 1809, and Russia,
though by no means uniformly successful, took Silistria and
other important fortresses from the Turks.

Relations between the Tsar and the Emperor of the French
M'ere, however, for reasons into which it is unnecessary to enter
here,^ growing more strained every day. Turkey, therefore,
became an increasingly important pawn in the diplomatic
game. Russia made repeated eflforts in 1811 to conclude
peace with Turkey on the basis of the cession of the princi-
palities. But in vain. The accession of Sultan Mahmud II
had infused a new vigour and decision into the counsels of the
Porte. Napoleon then made a desperate eflfort to secure the
alliance of the Sultan. If Turkey would join France and
protect Napoleon's right flank in the projected advance
against Russia, not only should the Danubian principalities
be definitely and finally secured to her, but she should
recover the Crimea, Tartary, and all the losses of the last
half century. It is not wonderful that the Sultan, besieged
by suitors for his favour, should have been able to perceive
the cynical efirontery of these overtures, and should have
firmly rejected them. The more firmly, perhaps, because
England had threatened to force the Dardanelles and burn
Constantinople if they were accepted. As a fact, however,
Napoleon was too late. Sultan Mahmud had already come
to terms with Alexander, and on May 28, 1812, the definitive
treaty of peace was signed at Bucharest.

Previous treaties were specifically confirmed, but Russia Treaty of
obtained Bessarabia ; her boundary was ' henceforward to be rggt.
the Pruth, to its entrance into the Danube, and, from that
point, the left bank of the Danube down to its entrance into the
Black Sea by the Kilia mouth '. The great islands were to
be left vacant. The Treaties of Kainardji and Jassy, in refer-
ence to the better government of the principalities, were to be

1 They will be found briefly summarized in the present writer's Modern
Europe, chap. x.

170

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Serbia.

The Con-
gress of
Vienna
and the
settle-
ment of
18]5.

Austria
and the
Adriatic.

duly observed, and for the first time the liberties of Serbia
were made the subject of treaty obligations between Russia
and Turkey.

Article VIII of the Treaty of Bucharest begins with the
naive recital that although ' it was impossible to doubt that
the Porte, in accordance with its principles, will show gentle-
ness and magnanimity towards the Serbians, as a people long
subject and tributary to it', yet it seemed just 'in considera-
tion of the share which the Serbians have taken in the war,
to make a solemn agreement for their safety '. The Porte
accordingly undertook, while continuing to garrison the for-
tresses, to allow the Serbians ' such liberties as are enjoyed
by the islands of the Archipelago ; and, as a token of its
generosity, will leave to them the administration of their
internal affairs'.^ The Serbians, it maybe added, considered
these terms as vague and unsatisfactory, and resented what
they regarded as a base desertion at the hands of their
powerful protector, the Tsar.''

In the stirring and pregnant events of the next three
years the problem of the Near East had no place. The
disastrous expedition to Moscow, the war of German Libera-
tion, the Hundred Days — none of these was concerned with
the Orient. Yet the settlement effected at Vienna had
an important influence upon the future evolution of the
Eastern Question.

The many schemes and violent perturbations of the Napo-
leonic period left the Ottoman Empire, in a territorial sense,
almost unscathed. Bessarabia had, indeed, been alienated
to Russia, but this represented a loss not so much to the
Turkey of the present as to the Roumania of the future.
For the rest, it was at the expense of Italy, or rather of
Venice, that the neighbours of the Turk were enriched.

Austria recovered Trieste, Gradisca, and Gorizia, together
with Istria, Carniola, and Carinthia, which took their place
in the composite empire of the Habsburgs as the kingdom of
Illyria. She acquired also Venetian Dalmatia and the ancient

1 Holland, op. cit., pp. 16, 17.

2 Cf. Cnnibert, Essai historiqtie sur les Revolutions et V Indipendance
de la Serbie, cited by Creasy, op. cit., p. 491.

VII NAPOLEOX AND NEAR EASTERN PROBLEM 171

Slav republic of Ragiisa, the islands appurtenant thereto, and
the Bocche di Cattaro. The Ionian Isles were formed into 'The
United States of the Ionian Islands, under the protectorate
of Great Britain '. Had Great Britain known the things
which belong unto her peace, she would never voluntarily have
relaxed her hold upon islands, the strategical value of which
was so clearly recognized by Napoleon. She also retained
Malta, which greatly strengthened her naval hold upon the
Mediterranean, and brought her, all unconscious, a step
nearer to Egypt.

The net results of the wars, treaties, and negotiations of
a quarter of a century appear disproportionately small. But
it would be a fatal error to regard them as negligible.

The whole future of Austria, more particularly in relation
to the Near East, was profoundly affected thereby. Crushed
in the field again and again, Austria, nevertheless, emerged
triumphant at the Peace. Her emperor had cleverly got rid
of the troublesome appanage of the Netherlands, and in
return had secured two compact and invaluable kingdoms in
the south. King of Lombardo-Venetia, Lord of Trieste, King
of Illyria, master of the ports of Venice, Trieste, Pola, and
Fiume, not to mention the Dalmatian littoral, Ragusa, the
Gulf of Cattaro, and the Adriatic archipelago, he found him-
self in a most commanding position as regards the Eastern
Mediterranean and the Balkan Peninsula. On the other
hand, his rival the Tsar was, save for the acquisition of
Bessai'abia, no nearer to Constantinople than he had been
in 1792. The long war with Persia had, indeed, left the
Tsar in possession of Georgia, Tiflis, and the coast of the
Caspian up to the Araxes, and had greatly increased his
influence at Teheran, but as regards the solution of the
problem with which this work is concerned the advance of
Russia was inconsiderable.

Infinitely the most important result of the period imme- The spirit
diately under review was, however, one far too intangible to ^i^uf^ ^°'^'
be registered in treaties or documents. Subsequent events
make it abundantly clear that, whether, as a direct con-
sequence of the novel ideas disseminated by the French Revo-
lution, whether in response to the principle of nationality

172 THE EASTERN QUESTION

so powerfully, if unconsciously, evoked by Napoleon, whether
as a result of the general unrest, or from other causes too
subtle for analysis, a new spirit had been awakened among
the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula, so long inert and dumb
beneath the yoke of the Ottoman Turk, It was stirring
among the Latins of the Danubian principalities ; it was
clearly manifested in the insurrection of Serbia ; above all,
it was operating powerfully, though as yet silently, among
the people destined, a few years later, to carve out of the
European dominions of the Ottoman Sultan an independent
commonwealth, and to add to the European polity a new
sovereign State — the kingdom of the Hellenes.

With the making of the new State the next chapter will
be concerned.

For further reference : Jonquiere, V Expedition cfT^gypte ; A. Sorel,
Bonaparte et Hoche en 1797; Driault, La Question d' Orient, U Europe
et la Revolution frangaise ; Vandal, Napoleon et Alexandre P'' ; Fonrnier,
Life of Napoleon; Martens, Becueil des traites de la Riissie avec les
Puissances etrangeres ; E. Diiault, La politique orientale de NapoUon ;
Tatistchef, Alexandre P'' et Napoleon. For Serbia see infra.

CHAPTER VIII

THE STRUGGLE FOR HELLENIC INDEPENDENCE

'Did I possess their (the Athenians) command of language and their
force of persuasion I sliould feel the highest satisfaction in employing
them to incite our armies and our fleets to deliver Greece, the parent of
eloquence, from the despotism of the Ottomans. But we ought besides to
attempt what is I think of the greatest moment, to inflame the present
Greeks with an ardent desire to emulate the virtue, the industry, the
patience of their ancient progenitors.' — Milton.

'It offers in detail a chequered picture of patriotism and corruption,
desperate valour and weak irr'^solution, honour and treachery, resistance
to the Turk and feud one with another. Its records are stained with
many acts of cruelty. And yet who can doubt that it was on the whole
a noble stroke, struck for freedom and for justice, by a people who, feeble
in numbers and resources, were casting off' the vile slough of servitude,
who derived their strength from right, and whose worst acts were really
in the main due to the masters, who had saddled them not only with a
cruel, but with a most demoralizing, yoke ? ' — W. E. Gladstone, on the
Greek War of Independence.

' As long as the literature and taste of the ancient Greeks continue to
nurture scholars and inspire artists modern Greece must be an object of
interest to cultivated minds.' — Finlay.

'. . . England . . . sees that her true interests are inseparably connected
with the independence of those nations who have shown themselves worthy
of emancipation, and such is the case of Greece.' — Loed Byron.

The Emperor Napoleon was at once the heir of the French The Na-
Revolution, and the product and agent of a powerful pi^ncipie,
reaction against the principles which the Revolution had
proclaimed. Of * Liberty ' he understood nothing ; at 'Frater-
nity ' he scoffed ; * Equality ' he interpreted as ' equality of
opportunity ', the carrlh'e ouverte aux talents. A chance
was given not only to his subjects, but to two countries
which he conquered, and to some which he did not.

The ferment of ideas caused by the outbreak of the
Revolution, the political unrest which followed on the con-
quests of Napoleon, and on the perpetual rearrangements of
the map of Europe, produced important consequences in the

174 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

Near East. It is to the Balkan Peninsula that the political
philosopher of to-day most frequently and most naturally
turns for an illustration of the fashionable doctrine of
nationality. Before 1789 the principle was unrecognized in
those regions or elsewhere. In the great settlement of 1815
it was contemned or ignored. But in less than a decade after
the Congress of Vienna it had inspired one of the most
romantic episodes in the annals of the nineteenth century,
and had presided over the birth of a new sovereign State.
The The principle of nationality has defied definition and even

revival, analysis. Generally compounded of community of race, of
language, of creed, of local contiguity, and historical tradition,
it has not infrequently manifested itself in the absence or
even the negation of many of these ingredients. But in
the Hellenic revival, which by common consent constitutes
one of the most conspicuous illustrations of the operation of
the nationality principle, most of these elements may un-
questionably be discerned.

In March, 1821, a bolt from the blue fell upon the diplo-
matic world. Many of the most illustrious members of that
world happened, at the moment, to be in conference at
Laibach, summoned thither by the Austrian minister. Prince
Metternich, to discuss the best means of combating the spirit
of revolution which had lately manifested itself in Spain, in
Portugal, and in the Bourbon kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
Air-^-^ In November, 1820, a formal protocol had been issued by
the leading members of the Holy Alliance : Russia, Austria,
and Prussia. The terms of this document are significant :
' States which have undergone a change of government due
to revolution, the results of which threaten other States, ipso
facto cease to be members of the European Alliance, and
remain excluded from it until their situation gives guarantees
for legal order and stability. ... If, owing to such altera-
tions, immediate danger threatens other States the Powers
bind themselves to bring back the guilty State into the
bosom of the great alliance.' To this protocol, Louis XVIII
of France, in general terms, assented, but Lord Castlereagh
warmly insisted that the principle on which the allies proposed
to act was ' in direct repugnance to the fundamental laws of

VIII STRUGGLE FOR HELLENIC INDEPENDENCE 175

the United Kingdom '. Still stronger was his protest when
the allies commissioned Austria to restore, by force of arms,
Bourbon absolutism in Naples. ' We could neither share in
nor approve, though we might not be called upon to resist
the intervention of one ally to put down internal disturbances
in the dominions of another.' Castlereagh's protest, though
consolatory to English liberalism, was quite ineffective as
a restraint upon the Holy Allies.

Most disquieting, however, was the news which in the Rising in
spring of 1821 reached the sovereigns and ministers in con- ^^*^^'^
ference at Laibach. They learnt with alarm, that Prince
Alexander Hypsilanti, the son of a Phanariote Greek, Hos-
podar successively of Moldavia and Wallachia, had placed
himself at the head of an insurrectionary movement in Mol-
davia, and had unfurled the flag of Greek independence.

The local for the initial rising was singularly ill chosen,
yet not without intelligible reasons. The malcontent Greeks
had, as we have seen, received frequent encouragement from
St. Petersburg in the latter part of the eighteenth century.
The Tsar Alexander was known to be a man of enlightened
views, a firm believer in the principle of nationality, and
pledged, in his own words, ' to restore to each nation the full
and entire enjoyment of its rights and of its institutions '.
So long ago as 1804 he had foreseen that the weakness of the
Ottoman Empire, ' the anarchy of its regime and the growing
discontent of its Christian subjects ', must open a new phase
in the history of the Eastern Question.^ The Tsar's foreign
minister, Count Giovanni Antonio Capo d'Istria, was by birth
a Greek and a member of the Philike Hetaireia. Hypsilanti,
the chosen leader of the insurrection, was his aide-de-camp.
What more natural than that the Greeks should have looked
for assistance to Russia, or that in order to obtain it the
more effectually the initial rising should have been planned
to take place in Moldavia ?

Nevertheless, the decision was a blunder. The Roumanians
detested the Phanariote Greeks, whom they regarded as
intrusive aliens and oppressors, and they neither felt nor

1 Ct. Alexander's instructions to Novosiltsov (1804), ap. Phillips,
Confederation of Europe, p. 35.

176 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

displayed any enthusiasm for the Hellenic cause. Nor did
it secure the anticipated assistance of the Tsar Alexander.
Hypsilanti, after crossing the Pruth on March 6, issued
a proclamation calling upon the people to rise against Otto-
man tyranny, and declaring that his adventure was sanctioned
and supported by ' a Great Power '.
Alex- The statement was entirely unwarranted. The Tsar, from

Hypsi^^ the first, frowned sternly upon Hypsilanti's enterprise. His
lanti. political confessor was now Prince Metternich ; under Met-
ternich's influence Alexander, rapidly discarding the slough
of liberalism, was easily persuaded that the rising of the
Phanariote Greeks supplied only one more manifestation of
the dangerous spirit which had already shown itself at
Madrid, Lisbon, and Naples — the spirit which the Holy Allies
were pledged to suppress.

Any doubts which might have existed as to the attitude of
the Tsar were promptly dissipated. He issued a proclamation
which disavowed all sympathy with Hypsilanti, ordered him
and his companions to repair to Russia immediately, and
bade the rebels return at once to their allegiance to their
legitimate ruler, the Sultan, as the only means of escaping the
punishment which the Tsar would inflict upon all who per-
sisted in aiding the revolt.
Collapse The firm attitude of Russia was fatal to the success of the
nortlfern ^^^"^S ^^ the Principalities. Hypsilanti himself betrayed a
insuriec- mixture of vanity, brutality, and incompetence ; the Turks
tion. occupied Bucharest in force, and on June 19, 1821, inflicted

a decisive defeat upon his forces at Dragashan, in Wallachia.
Hypsilanti escaped into Hungary, where until 1827 he was, by
Metternich's orders, imprisoned. He died a year later. Four
days after the battle of Dragashan the Turks entered Jassy,
and shortly afterwards the remnant of Hypsilanti's force was
overwhelmed after a brief but heroic resistance at Skaleui.

The Moldavian rising was a mere flash in the pan : an
enterprise unwisely conceived and unskilfully executed. Far
otherwise was the movement in the Greek islands and in the
Morea.

The outbreak has been described as a ' bolt from the blue '.
So it appeared to the Holy Allies. In reality the motive

VIII STRUGGLE FOR HELLENIC INDEPENDENCE 177

forces which were behind it had been operating for a long ^i^"^®^
time, and if any one had given serious heed to the Greeks Greek
a national revival among them might have been foreseen. insunec-

But the racial movement was obscured beneath an eccle-
siastical designation. To the Turks the social and political
diflferentia has always been not race but religion. Every one
who was not a ^Moslem, unless he were an Armenian or a Jew,
was a Greek. ' After the Ottoman conquest ', as Sir Charles
Eliot has justly observed, ' the Greeks were not a local
population, but a superior class of Christians forming a
counterpart to the Turks. South-Eastern Europe was ruled
by the Turks ; but until this century its religion, education,
commerce, and finance were in the hands of Greeks.' ^ Con-
sequently, although the Greek Empire was annihilated, and
the Greek nation was submerged, the Greek population
survived, and a large number of individual Greeks rose to
positions of gi-eat influence under the Ottoman Empire.

The truth is, and too much emphasis can hardly be laid upon
it, that the Turk is a great fighter, but not a great adminis-
trator : the dull details of routine government he has always
preferred to leave in the hands of the ' inferior ' races. This
fact must not be ignored when Ave seek the causes of the
national revival among the Greeks and other Balkan peoples
in the nineteenth century.

Largely as a result of this indifierence the Greeks were Survival
permitted to enjoy, in practice if not in theory, a considerable autonomy.
amount of local autonomy. The unit of administration has,
ever since classical days, been small ; and in the village com-
munities of the interior and the commercial towns on the
sea-board the Greeks, throughout the long centuries of Otto-
man rule, preserved the memory, and, to some extent retained
the practice, of self-government. More particularly was this
the case in the Greek islands of the Adriatic and the Aegean.
These islands, inhabited by a race of shrewd traders and
skilful mariners, had long been virtually independent, save
for the payment of an annual tribute to Constantinople, and
in them the national movement found its most devoted and
most capable adherents.

1 Op. cit., p. 273.

1984 N

178 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

Marinei-s The Turkish navy had always been manned to a large
chantT^" ^^^^"^^ ^y Greeks, and most of the commerce of the empire
was in the same hands. Among the Greeks the joint- stock
principle had developed with great rapidity in the eighteenth
century, and a large number of trading companies had been
formed. To this development a powerful stimulus was given
by the victories of the Empress Catherine II, and the com-
mercial advantages consequently conceded to Russia by the
Porte. The provisions of the Treaty of Kainardji were sup-
plemented in 1783 by a commercial convention under which
the Greeks obtained the specific privilege of trading under
the Russian flag. When, later on, the continental blockade
and the British Orders in Council drove all shipping, save
that of Turkey, from the sea, the Greeks were glad enough
to resume the Turkish flag ; and under the one flag or the
other they not only amassed great fortunes, but practised
the art of seamanship and cultivated the spirit of adventure.
Armatoli Among the Greeks of the mainland the fighting spirit was
Klepbts. maintained partly by the Armatoli and partly by the Klephts.
The former were members of a local Christian gendai'merie
officially recognized by the Turkish Pashas, and permitted to
bear arms for the purpose of keeping in order their more
unruly neighbours, and in particular the Klephts, from whose
ranks, however, they were not infrequently recruited. The
Klephts may fairly be described as brigands dignified by a
tinge of political ambition. At their worst they were mere
bands of robbers who periodically issued from their mountain
fastnesses and preyed upon the more peaceable inhabitants.
At their best they were outlaws of the Robin Hood type. In
either case they habituated the people to the use of arms and
maintained a spirit of rough independence among the Greek
subjects of the Sultan.
The From the opposite pole the Phanariote Greeks contributed

riote to the same end. These Phanariotes have, as Sir Charles Eliot
Greeks, truly observes, 'fared ill at the hands of historians. They
are detested by all wiiose sympathies lie with Slavs or
Roumanians, and not overmuch loved by Philhellenes.' ^

1 Op. ciL, p. 283.

VIII STRUGGLE FOR HELLENIC INDEPENDENCE 179

Yet modern Greece owes to them a debt heavier than is
generally acknowledged. Indolent in everything that does
not pertain to war, the Turks, as Ave have previously noted, ^
soon found it to their advantage to delegate the work of
government to the Greeks of the capital, who were well-
educated, supple, and shrewd. Employed, at first, mostly
on humbler tasks, as clerks, interpreters, and so forth, the
Greeks who generally inhabited that quarter of Constanti-
nople assigned to the Patriarch and his satellites, known as
the Phanar, rose rapidly to positions of great responsibility,
and gradually came to fulfil the functions of a highly organized
bureaucracy.

During the revival initiated by the Kiuprilis in the middle The
of the seventeenth century a new office, the Dragoman of the j^^an of
Porte, was created in favour of a distinguished Phanariote, the Porte
a Chiot named Panayoti ; he was succeeded by a still more i)rago-

distinguished Greek, Alexander Mavrocordatos, with the result man of

the Fleet
that the office which these men successively adorned became

virtually a Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Henceforward, the

foreign relations of the Ottoman Empire were mainly conducted

by Greeks. Later on, a Dragoman of the Fleet or Secretary

of the Admiralty was similarly appointed to assist the Capitan

Pasha, a great official Avho was at once Lord High Admiral

and Governor of the Archipelago. This second Dragoman,

generally a Phanariote, was thus brought into close official

relations with the intensely Greek communities in the Aegean

islands.

Early in the eighteenth century the hospodarships of the The

Danubian principalities were, as we have already seen, also ^lars.

entrusted to Greeks. Not infrequently the grand vizier

himself was a Phanariote. These high officials naturally

secured the appointment of compatriots to the subordinate

posts, and in this way the Greeks began to dominate the

whole official hierarchy. That this hierarchy was inspired

by any feelings of national self-consciousness it would be an

afffectation to suggest ; still more that they maintained any

close connexion, except as tax-gatherers, with their kinsmen

1 Passim and supra, chap. iv.

n2

180

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAPe

The

Orthodox

Church.

Literaiy
renais-
sance.

in the JNIorea and the Archipelago. But although Gordon
speaks of them derisively as ' a fictitious and servile noblesse V
yet the large share of the Greeks in the actual administration
was not without its influence upon the Hellenic revival.

Even more important was the position of the Orthodox
Church. Nothing contributed more directly to the revival
than the privileged relations between the Patriarch and the
Sultan ; and, in another sphere, the singular devotion dis-
played, alike in a pastoral and a political capacity, by the
lower clergy.

Reference has already been made to the policy adopted by
the conqueror Mohammed II, and his successors, towards the
Byzantine Church ; the result being that the Greek Patriarch
of Constantinople was not only respected as the representative
of the Orthodox Church, but was utilized by the Ottoman
Sultans as the official channel of communication between them
and the conquered Greeks. So much was this the case that
Finlay describes the Patriarch as ' a kind of under-secretary to
the grand vizier for the affairs of the orthodox Christians '.^
From the point of view of Greek nationalism the peculiar
position thus occupied by the Greek Patriarch may have had
its drawbacks as well as its advantages. The continuous exer-
tions of the parish priests were, on the other hand, wholly to
the good. It was mainly owing to their devotion that through
the long night of darkness there was maintained a flicker of
the national spirit among the Greeks of the islands and the
Morea. ' The parish priests ', writes Finlay, ' had an influence
on the fate of Greece quite incommensurate with their social
rank. The reverence of the peasantry for their Church was
increased by the feeling that their own misfortunes were
shared by the secular clergy.'

To the causes of revival enumerated above, many of them of
long standing, must be added two more which began to operate
only towards the end of the eighteenth century. The first
was a literary revival of the Greek language, and the second
was the outbreak of the revolution in France. Spoken Greek
began to diverge perceptibly from the literary language of

History oj the Greek Revolution.
Greek Revolution, i. 21.

VIII STRUGGLE FOR HELLENIC INDEPENDENCE 181

classical days, in the fourth century, but until the eighth
classical Greek was generally undei-stood. After the Slavonic
inroads a large infusion of Slav words took place, and from
the twelfth century onwards a literature sprang up in the
vernacular. This vernacular Avas afterwards largely overlaid
with Slav, Turkish, Albanian, and Italian words.^

The Venetian occupation (1684-1718) did nothing for the
language, but a good deal for education, in the Morea, and
may to some extent have contributed to the marked literary
revival in the latter years of the eighteenth century. That
revival was partly the product, and still more the cause, of
the rising sense of national self-consciousness.

Two writers of the period call, in this connexion, for specific
mention : Rhegas (1753-98) and Adamantios Koraes (1748-
1833). The former, a Ylach, had studied in Paris, but
his national songs sounded the first trumpet-note of the
coming revolution. He was, however, more than a singer of
songs. He was the founder of one of the secret societies
out of which the Hctaireia subsequently developed, and
lie opened negotiations with other revolutionary spirits in
various parts of the Balkans. Betrayed, when living in
Hungary, to the Austrian police, he was handed over
to the Turkish Government, and executed as a rebel at
Belgrade in 1798. By the people, whose cause he served,
he is commonly regarded as the proto-martyr of Greek
independence. The gi-eat contribution made by Koraes to
that cause consisted less in the political works of which he
was the author than in his translation of the Greek classics
into a purified and refined vernacular. By this means he
performed a great service to the movement for linguistic
reform which, at the close of the eighteenth century, suc-
ceeded in purging the spoken language of the Greeks from
many of the impurities with which it had been infected. The
work of Koraes did more. ' It gave an impetus to the wave
of Philhellenism which did so much to solve the practical
question of the liberation of Greece from Ottoman mis-
government ; and it supplied to the infant State, born after

1 Modern Greece, by E. C. Jebb, p. 46.

182 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap,

so much travail, a language and a tradition which linked it
consciously with an inspiring past.' ^
The Not less inspiring to the Greeks was the example of

^etcd- revolutionary France. Under that example were founded
reia. a number of secret societies, the most famous of which was
the Philile Hetaireia. This ' Association of Friends ' was
founded at Odessa by four Greek merchants. The precise
degree of significance to be attached to the influence of the
Hetaireia has been very variously estimated,^ but it certainly
secured the adhesion of most of the leading Greeks, both at
home and abroad, and is said by 1S20 to have enrolled
200,000 members. Its object was the expulsion of the Turks
from Europe and the re-establishment of the Greek Empire ;
and, however questionable its methods, it indisputably gave
coherence and unity of aim to a movement which, though
powerful, was dispersed and hopelessly lacking in these
qualities.
Ali Pasha The immediate opportunity for the outbreak of the Greek
of Janina. insurrection was afibrded by the extraordinary success attained
by Ali Pasha of Janina, one of the many ambitious and discon-
tented viceroys of the Sultan. Ali Pasha had taken advantage
of the general unrest caused by the Napoleonic wars, and of the
frequent changes in the hegemony of the Adriatic, to carve
out for himself a principality, imposing in extent, and virtually
independent of Constantinople, upon the Albanian sea-board.
The hill tribes of Albania and northern Greece were gradually
reduced to subjection, and in 1817 the position of Ali was so
far recognized by the protectress of the Ionian Isles that
Great Britain handed over to him the excellent harbour and
town of Parga. The conduct of Lord Castlereagh in this, as
in other matters, has been hotly canvassed, but the choice
he had to make was not an easy one. The Pargiotes had
voluntarily surrendered their to^^-n to us, and had sought
British protection against a ruffianly adventurer. But the
adventurer had rendered a considerable service to us in the
Napoleonic wars, and the retention of a to^^'n, little valued

1 Ah'son Phillips, ap. C.M.H., x. 174-5.

2 e. g. t)y Finlay and Gordon respectively.

VIII STRUGGLE FOR HELLENIC INDEPENDENCE 183

for its own sake, might have led to embarrassments. So the
* Lion of Janina ' went from triumph to triumph.

Not until 1820 did Sultan Mahmud take action against his
audacious viceroy. But, at last, a large force under Kurshid
Pasha was dispatched from Constantinople, and after two years
of successful evasion and resistance the * Lion ' was trapped
in Janina ; he was assassinated in the midst of a parley, and
his head was sent as a trophy to the Sultan (Feb. 1822).

Meanwhile, encouraged by the preoccupation of the Porte, Rising
the Hetairists had initiated the disastrous insurrection in i" ^''^
Moldavia, and, before the northern rising collapsed, had April,'
lighted in the Morea and the islands a torch which was not ^^^^•
to be extinguished until a new nation had taken its place in
the European polity.

The enthusiasm of Lord Byron, the knight errantry of
Lord Cochrane, General Church, and other Philhellenist
volunteers, cast over the ensuing Avar a glamour only par-
tially deserved. Never, surely, did any movement display
a more confused and perplexing medley of brutality and
nobility, of conspicuous heroism and consummate cowardice,
of pure-minded patriotism and sordid individualism, of self-
sacrificing loyalty and time-serving treachery.

The initial uprising in the Morea was marked by terrible
ferocity. It was avowedly a Avar of extermination. ' The
Turk ', sang the Moreotes, ' shall live no longer, neither in the
Morea, nor in the Avhole earth.' In the Morea the threat
was almost literally fulfilled. In April, 1821, a general mas-
sacre of ^loslems began. Out of 25,000 Ottomans hardly one
was suflfered to remain outside the Availed toAvns into Avhich
all Avho escaped the massacre had hastily fled for refuge.
Within a month the Turkish domination of the Morea Avas at
an end.

MeauAvhile the massacre of Turks in the Morea was Turkish
promptly folloAved by reprisals Avherever Christians could be i^pnsals.
taken at a disadvantage. In Constantinople itself Sultan
Mahmud Avrought a deed, the ncAvs of Avhich startled and
horrified Christendom. On the daAvn of Easter Day
(April 22, 1821) the Venerable Patriarch Gregorius was
seized as he emerged from the celebration of mass, and, still

184 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

clothed in his sacred vestments, he was hanged, and with him
the Archbishops of Adrianople, Salonica, and Tirnovo. For
three days the bodies hung outside the episcopal palace,
and were then cut down and flung into the Bosphorus.
The body of the Patriarch was picked up by a Greek trading
ship and carried to Odessa, where it was interred with all
the honour due to a martyr for the faith.

The murders in Constantinople gave the signal for a whole-
sale massacre of Christians. In Thessaly, Macedonia, and
Asia Minor, Christian Churches were pillaged, the men were
put to the sword, and the women sold into slavery.
Attitude The Powers could not look on at these things unmoved,
of Russia. Least of all Russia. Metternich regarded the Greek in-
surrection Avith unfeigned alarm. To him it was merely one
more manifestation of the revolutionary temper which was
infecting a great part of Southern Europe. He would have
left the Greeks to their fate, and did his utmost to restrain
his august ally. But Alexander was not only the head of the
Holy Alliance ; he was the protector of the Orthodox Church
and the hereditary enemy of the Sultan. His subjects, more-
over, were deeply moved by the insult to their faith and the
unhappy plight of their co-religionists.

Apart from the question of Greek independence, and the
outrages upon the highest ecclesiastics of the Greek Church,
the Tsar had his own grievances against the Porte. The Turks
had insulted Russian ships in the Bosphorus, and had continued
to administer the principalities, not perhaps unwarrantably
but in defiance of Treaty obligations, by martial law. Accord-
ingly, though Alexander no less than Metternich ' discerned
the revolutionary march in the troubles of the Peloponnese ',
the Russian ambassador at Constantinople was instructed, in
July, 1821, to present the following demands and to require
an answer within eight days :

(i) that the Greek Churches, destroyed or plundered,
should be immediately restored and rendered fit for the cele-
bration of Divine worship ; (ii) that the Christian Religion
should be restored to its prerogatives by granting it the
same protection it formerly enjoyed, and by guaranteeing its
inviolability for the future, to console Europe in some

VIII STRUGGLE FOR HELLENIC INDEPENDENCE 185

degree for the murder of the Patriarch ; (iii) that an equitable
distinction should be made between the innocent and the
guilty, and a prospect of peace held out to those Greeks who
should hereafter submit within a given time ; and lastly (iv)
that the Turkish Government should enable Russia, by virtue
of existing treaties, to contribute to the pacification of the
principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia.

The Porte was, at the same time, informed that immediate
assent to these demands was ' the only means by which it
would be able to avoid utter ruin'. The answer was not
forthcoming within the specified time ; the Russian ambas-
sador demanded his passports, quitted Constantinople on
July 27, and a Russo-Turkish war seemed imminent.

The rest of the Powers were, however, in no mood for the ^*^*"^®
i-enewal of war. The restored Bourbons in France were pre- Powers.
occupied with the congenial task of restoring legitimism and
autocracy in Spain. ]\Ietternich was supremely anxious to
avert the reopening of the Eastern Question in its larger
aspects. Berlin echoed the voice of Vienna.

Lord Castlereagh was not indifferent to the fate of the
Greeks, but, like Metternich, was primarily concerned to
avoid a European conflagration. To that end he joined
Metternich in putting pressure upon the Sultan to induce
him to agree quickly with his powerful adversary. Capo
d'lstria would have been glad to serve the cause of his
people by engaging his master in a war with the Turks,
but Alexander did not wish to push matters to extremities.
Pacific counsels therefore prevailed. The Sultan was in-
duced to yield a point and evacuate the principalities, and
Metternich could congratulate himself upon having, for the
time, averted war. In September, 1822, he met his allies at
Verona in comparatively cheerful mood.

Meanwhile the Near East remained in a state of profound Cainpaign
perturbation. The unrest was not appeased by the events of
1822. In February of that year the Albanian revolt was, as we
have seen, extinguished, and thus the border provinces Avere
preserved from Hetairist infection and secured to the Porte.
Kurshid Pasha, fresh from his triumph over the Lion of
Janina, then delivered his attack in force upon the insurgents

186 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap,

of central Greece and the Morea. On July 16a serious defeat
was, owing partly to treachery and partly to mismanagement,
inflicted upon a Greek force, and Mavrocordatos withdrew to
the shelter of ISIissolonghi. Missolonghi stood a siege for two
months and then beat off its assailants ; and before the end of the
year the Greeks had recovered Athens, Nauplia, and Corinth.
The The Greeks were equally successful at sea, but their mastery

islands. ^,r^g jjq^ established before the Turks had perpetrated terrible
atrocities in Chios. On April 22, 1822, precisely a year after
the murder of the Greek Patriarch, the Turks landed a force
of 15,000 men in Chios, and put to the sword the whole
population — priests and peasants, women and children, save
some thousands of young girls who were carried off into
slavery. Including the latter the Turks claimed, in Chios
alone, some 30,000 victims.

But their savage triumph was short-lived. The Greek fleet
which, but for divided counsels, ought to have prevented the
Turkish landing in Chios, presently appeared upon the scene
and exacted a terrible though tardy vengeance. Employing
a device familiar to the Greeks, Constantine Kanaris,
their admiral, inflicted a crushing blow upon the Turks.
On the night of June 18 he rammed, with a fireship, the
Turkish admiral's flagship ; and it was blown up with
the admiral and a thousand men on board. This bold
and skilful stroke cleared the Levant. The rest of the
Turkish navy fled in terror and took shelter in the Dar-
danelles. On sea as on land the Greek cause seemed destined
to a victory, speedy and complete.
A Greek Meanwhile the Greeks had taken a step of considerable poli ti-
Constitu- ^oi significance. On January 1, 1822, a national assembly met
in a wood near Epidaurus, solemnly proclaimed the indepen-
dence of Greece, and promulgated a constitution. There was
to be an executive council of five members under the presi-
dency of Alexander Mavrocordatos, and a legislative assembly
of fifty-nine members elected on a popular franchise and
presided over by Demetrius, the brother of Alexander
Hypsilanti. The formation of a new State, under a regularly
constituted government, was thus officially announced to the
world.

VIII STRUGGLE FOR HELLENIC INDEPENDENCE 187

For some time the Powers made no response. But to Great Recogni-
Britain and other maritime Powers the situation was highly ^i*'" *^
inconvenient, and, as the Greek navy asserted its supremacy belllger-
in the Levant, became intolerable. The Greeks were still ^"*^y i'^

Great

technically privateers. No redress for the outrages they Britain.
committed could be obtained from Constantinople, nor under
existing conditions could redress be sought from the pro-
visional government in the IVIorea.

In August, 1822, the death of Lord Londonderry (Castle- Canning,
reagh) had opened the Foreign Office to George Canning.
In regard to the Near East Canning accepted in principle
the policy of his predecessor, but circumstances soon forced
him to a much more active intervention than Castlereagh
would have approved. In the first place, the injuries inflicted
upon English commerce compelled him, on March 25, 1823,
to recognize the Greeks as belligerents.

The rising tide of Philhellenism pushed him still further in Philhel-
the same direction. The enthusiasm aroused in England, p"^^,"^ \"
as among other progressive peoples, for the cause of the
Greek insurgents was extraordinary. It was due partly
to reverence for the past, partly to hope for the future.
The mere name of Hellenes, heard once more upon the lips
of men after centuries of complete oblivion, thrilled the hearts
of those who owed to Greek philosophy, Greek art, and
Greek literature a debt larger than they could acknowledge
or repay. But Philhellenist sentiment did not derive its
sustenance solely from the memories of the past. In England
the long reign of the Tory party was drawing to a close.
The peace of 1815 had been followed not by plenty but by
a period of profound depression in agriculture, finance, and
trade. Distress led to an epidemic of disorder ; disorder
necessitated repression ; repression stimulated the demand
for reform. Liberalism not less than nationalism looked
exultingly to Greece.

Of both sentiments Byron was the most impassioned repre- Byron and
sentative, and in July, 1823, he started from Italy for Greece. *^^''®^^®-
He tarried in Cephalonia during the autumn, and in January,
1824, landed at Missolonghi.

During the last twelve months the outlook for the Greek

188 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

nationalists had darkened. Distracted by internal feuds,
gravely hampered, despite a generous loan from English
sympathizers, by lack of money, the Greeks had nevertheless
managed until 1824 to hold their own against the Turks.
Interven- In January, 1824, however, Sultan jNIahmud took a bold
IbraWm ^"* desperate step. He summoned to his aid his powerful
Pasha. vassal Mehemet Ali of Egypt, the ' exterminator of infidels '.
The reward of his assistance was to be the Pashalik of Crete,
while his stepson Ibrahim was to govern, in the Sultan's
name, the reconquered ]Morea.
Conquest In the early spring of 1824 a great expedition was fitted
out at Alexandria, and in April Ibrahim landed in Crete.
The fortresses were captured and, by methods soon'l'to be
repeated on a larger scale in the Morea, the island was
reduced to submission. Ibrahim next exterminated the
population of Kasos, while his Turkish allies dealt in similar
fashion with Psara. Had there been anything approaching
to unity in the counsels of the Greeks, had there been any
co-ordination between the 'government', the soldiers and
the sailors, Ibrahim might never have accomplished the
short voyage between Crete and the Morea. But thanks
to the negligence of the Greek navy Ibrahim landed a large
force at Modon in February, 1825, and secured Navarino as
Conquest a naval base. Bravely as they fought, the Greek irregulars
vastation Were no match for disciplined forces led by a skilled soldier.
of the From Navarino Ibrahim advanced through the JNIorea
' harrying, devastating, and slaughtering in all directions '.

It seemed in 1825 as if no assistance, short of the official
intervention of one or more great Powers, could avail to
save the Greek cause. While the Egyptians attacked from
the south-west, the Turks delivered their assault on the
north-west. The two forces converged on Missolonghi where,
on April 19, 1824, Byron had given the last proof of his devotion
to the cause of Hellas.
FalUf In April, 1825, the Turks, under Reschid Pasha, invested

longhi. tb® town by land and sea. Again and again the assault was
delivered ; again and again it Avas repelled. Reschid himself
Avas in danger of being cut off by the Greek fleet ; but in
November the Turkish forces were reinforced bv Ibrahim.

VIII STRUGGLE FOR HELLENIC INDEPENDENCE 189

The eflforts of the Egyptians were as vain as those of the
Turks ; the besiegei*s still repelled every assault. At last,
after more than six months of siege, the assault was aban-
doned, and the combined force of the besiegers sat down to
a blockade. The heroic defenders were starved out ; and in
April, 1826, after a close investment of exactly a year, the
whole population determined to make a sortie. On April 22
every man, woman, and child — not physically disabled — assem-
bled at the gates prepared for the last desperate sally ; only
the infirm were left behind. The vanguard cut their way
through, and the gallant attempt seemed on the point of
complete success, when, owing to a mistaken order, the force
divided, part advanced, part retired ; some of the advancing
party got through ; but the besiegers closed in upon the rest ;
hardly a man of them escaped ; most of them died sword
in hand ; the small remnant set fire to the magazines and
perished in the flames. Some three thousand women and
children, the sole survivors of the siege, were carried off" into
slavery.

From Missolonghi the victors marched on Athens ; Athens Fall of
in its turn was besieged, and on June 2, 1827, despite the Athens.
eflbrts of the Greeks themselves, and despite the assistance
of Lord Cochrane, General Church, and others, was compelled
to surrender. The Greek cause seemed desperate. Unless
help were forthcoming from outside the whole movement
must collapse. In despair the Greeks formally placed them-
selves under British protection, and begged that Great
Britain would send them a king. It was, of course, im-
possible to accede to the request, and Canning, though he
received the Greek deputies with cordiality, made it clear to
them that England could not depart from her attitude of
strict, though benevolent, neutrality. This negotiation took
place at the close of 1825. Just about the same time an
event happened which profoundly modified the whole Euro-
pean situation.

In December, 1825, the Tsar Alexander died suddenly Alex-
in the Crimea, and after a short interval of uncertainty j^J'^j*^'' ^
and confusion his brother Nicholas succeeded. Nicholas Nicholas
was a man entirely opposed in taste and temper to his •

190 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

predecessor. Alexander was a curious mixture of shrewd-
ness and sentiment ; Nicholas had none of his Western
veneer, and cherished none of his illusions ; he was brother's
Russian to the core. For the Greeks he cared little ; but he
was indisposed to allow the Porte to play fast and loose with
Russia. The questions at issue between the two Courts were
no nearer a satisfactory settlement than when, four years
earlier, Russia had broken off diplomatic relations with
Constantinople. The British ambassador to the Porte had
done all in his power to bring about a settlement of the
dispute ; but he had no sooner, with infinite labour,
secured an adjustment on one point than another had been
raised.
England Qn the accession of the new Tsar, Canning induced the
Bussia. Duke of Wellington to undertake a special mission to
St. Petersburg. His object was twofold : to adjust, if
possible, the outstanding difficulties between Russia and
the Porte, and thus to avert the war, which at any moment
in the last four years might have been regarded as imminent ;
and to arrive at a common understanding with Russia on
the Greek Question.
The For it was hardly possible that the great Powers could

and ^^^ much longer hold aloof. Metternich, indeed, never wavered
Crieece. for an instant from the attitude which he had from the first
assumed : the Greeks were rebels against legitimate authority,
and must be left to their fate. Prussia still adhered to the
policy of Austria. In France, however, the Philhellenist
sentiment was not powerless ; and in England and Russia
it might at any moment get beyond the control of the
respective governments. More particularly was this the
case after Ibrahim's devastating conquest in the Morea.
Ibrahim has been described as a ' savage ' ; and if he was
not that, it must, at least, be admitted that his methods
of warfare Mere exceedingly repugnant to Western ideas.
Moreover, an ugly rumour had got abroad that Ibrahim
had formed a plan to carry off into slavery all the Greeks
whom he did not exterminate, and having made of the
Morea a desert to repeople it with submissive fellaheen.
The Porte found it necessary to repudiate the report. But

VIII STRUGGLE FOR HELLENIC INDEPEXDENCE 191

the report was more impressive than the repudiation.
Nothing did so much to excite the sympathies of the Phil-
hellenes in Western Europe, or to hasten the halting paces
of diplomacy. Canning, indeed, regarded the rumour, first
communicated to him by Prince Lieven, as incredible. But
towards the end of 1825 he had appointed to the Embassy
at Constantinople his cousin. Stratford Canning ; a man
destined to fame as Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. The first
Reports sent home by the new ambassador were a cautious
confirmation of Prince Lieven's account. * If the statements
which had reached Mr. S. Canning were true, Ibrahim then
acted on a system little short of extermination . . . and
there was room to apprehend that many of his prisoners had
been sent into Egypt as slaves, the children, it was asserted,
being made to embrace the Mahommedan Faith.'

Stratford Canning was instructed to satisfy himself as to Camiing's
the facts, and, if they should correspond with the rumour, ^'^^^y-
'to declare in the most distinct terms to the Porte that
Great Britain would not permit the execution of a system
of depopulation '. More than that, a naval officer was to be
dispatched from the INIediterranean fleet direct to Ibrahim,
and to give ' the Pasha distinctly to understand that unless
he should in a written document distinctly disavow or
formally renounce . . . the intention of converting the Morea
into a Barbary State, by transporting the population to Asia
or Africa and replacing them by the population of those
countries, effectual means would be taken to impede by the
intervention of his Majesty's naval forces the accomplishment
of so unwarrantable a project '.

Meanwhile the Duke of Wellington had, with some diffi- England
culty, brought the Tsar Nicholas into line with Canning's ii^^^^
policy on the Greek Question ; had secured his promise to
' co-operate with Great Britain to prevent the execution of
the designs imputed to Ibrahim Pasha ' ; and on April 4,
1826, had concluded with him the Protocol of St. Peters-
burg.

By this treaty the two Powers, renouncing any ' augmenta- Protocol
tion of territory, any exclusive influence', or any superior g^Pg^rs-
commercial advantages for themselves, agi*eed to ofi*er their burg,

192

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

April,
1826.

Eussia

and

Turkey.

Mahmud
II and the
extinction
of the
Janis-
saries.

mediation to the Porte. Greece, though continuing to pay
tribute to the Porte, was to become a virtually independent
State, to be governed by authorities chosen by itself, and
to enjoy 'entire liberty of conscience and commerce'. To
prevent collisions in the future the Turks Avere to evacuate
Greece, and the Greeks were to 'purchase the property of
the Turks ... on the Grecian continent or islands '.

This protocol must be regarded as a conspicuous personal
triumph for Canning. And it went a long way to settle
the Greek Question. But as to the outstanding questions^
between Turkey and Russia it did nothing : and on these
the mind of the Tsar Nicholas was bent. Though profess-
ing his readiness to treat of the matter with Wellington, the
Tsar had already (March 17, 1826) dispatched an ultimatum
to the Porte. The ultimatum demanded the immediate
evacuation of the principalities ; the abandonment of the
appointment of the ' Beshlis ' or police ; and the instant
dispatch of plenipotentiaries to the Russian frontier.

These demands the Porte was not in a position to refuse.
A critical moment in the domestic history of the Ottoman
Empire had indeed arrived. The marvellous expansion of
that empire in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had
been largely due to the Corps of Janissaries. The decay
of the empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
had been coincident with their deterioration. Of late years
the whilom defenders of the empire had degenerated int»
oppressive and obstructive tyrants. Without their con-
currence no real reforms could be effected, and that concur-
rence was invariably withheld.

To Mahmud II, the greatest of the Sultans since Suleiman
the Magnificent, it seemed that the time had come to make
a final choice ; either he must be content to see the authority
of the Sultan crumble and the empire perish, or he must by
one bold stroke destroy the jealous military oligarchy which
had become as ineffective in the field as it was obscurantist
and tyrannical in domestic affairs. He had himself crushed
the Wahabites ; his vassal Mehemet Ali had exterminated
the Mamelukes of Egypt ; why should Mahmud hesitate to
strike down the Janissaries? They were not, it seemed.

VIII STRUGGLE FOR HELLENIC INDEPENDENCE 193

equal even to the task of subduing the infidel insurgents
in Greece. That INIoslems could still fight when armed and
disciplined on a European model Ibrahim had clearly demon-
strated in the Morea. Small wonder that the contrast
between his own troops and those of his vassal was too
gaUing to Mahmud's pride to be endured, or that he resolved
to remove the principal obstruction in the path of reform.

A great Council of State decreed that, in order to subdue
the infidels, the military system of the empire must be
completely reorganized. The Janissaries were ordered to
submit to a new discipline. They refused ; and broke out
into rebellion.

Their mutiny had been foreseen, and every preparation
had been made to quell it. A force of 14,000 artillerymen,
splendidly equipped with guns, with a corresponding force
of infantry drawn from Asiatic Turkey, had been assembled
in the neighbourhood of the capital. The command of the
artillery was entrusted to Ibrahim, a general of known
devotion to the person of the Sultan, and of unquenchable
resolution. Ibrahim, or Kara Djehennin ('Black Hell') as
he came, after the great day, to be called, had made all
necessary dispositions for street fighting of a severe cha-
racter. As the Janissaries advanced on the palace they were
mown down by the gunners : they then fled to their own
barracks, which were battered with shell-fire until the whole
body of the Janissaries of Constantinople had perished in
the blazing ruins of the Etmeidan.

The blow struck in Constantinople was repeated in every
city of the empire where there existed a body of Janissaries.
Thus Avas the Sultan at last master in his own house and free
to carry out the reforms indispensable to its preservation.

A comprehensive scheme of military reorganization was Moltke'e
promptly initiated, and a great military critic has put on record ^Jf ™Xd^s
his opinion that 'if Turkey had enjoyed ten years of peace after reforms.
the destruction of the Janissaries, Sultan Mahmud's military
reforms might in that time have gained some strength ; and,
supported by an army on which he could depend, the Sultan
might have carried out the needful reforms in the adminis-
tration of his country, have infused new life into the dead

194 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

branches of the Ottoman Empire, and made himself formidable
to his neighbours '.^
The ' Ten j^ears of peace.' The war with Greece still continued ;

Aker- ^^^' although Ibrahim's intervention had relieved the pressure
man, Oct. on one side, it stimulated activity on the other. The new
7, 1826. rpgg^j. ^yQ^ji(j brook no delay. The last day permitted for a
reply to his ultimatum was October 7, and on that day the
Convention of Akerman was signed. By that Convention the
Sultan made, as we have already seen, large concessions in
regard to Serbia and the principalities, and in all things
submitted to the will of the Tsar.
Turkey As regards Greece, on the other hand, the Porte, in the
Greece ^"^^ *^^® ^^ successful barbarity, showed no signs of accept-
ing mediation unless backed by force. Greece had already
formally applied for it. Accordingly, in September, 1826,
Canning proposed to the Tsar common action to enforce
mediation upon the Sultan. The two Powers agreed to
intimate to the Sultan, if he remained obdurate, that ' they
would look to Greece with an eye of favour, and with
a disposition to seize the first occasion of recognizing as an
independent State such portion of her territory as should
have freed itself from Turkish dominion '.

Every effort was made to bring the other Powers into line ;

Metternich, however, left no stone unturned to frustrate

Canning's policy, even to the extent of using backstairs

influence to create mistrust between the Court and the

Cabinet. Prussia followed Metternich's lead, but France

concluded with Russia and Great Britain the Treaty of

London (July, 1827).

The The public articles of the treaty were substantially

Lond*Jn^^ identical with the terms of the Protocol of St. Petersburg,

(1827). in accordance with which an 'immediate armistice' was to

be offered to the belligerents. A secret article provided

that the Porte should be plainly informed that the Powers

intend to take 'immediate measures for an approximation

with the Greeks ' ; and that if within one month ' the Porte

do not accept the armistice ... or if the Greeks refuse to

execute it' the High Contracting Powers should intimate

1 Moltke, p. 456, quoted by Creasy, op. cit., p. 508,

VIII STRUGGLE FOR HELLENIC INDEPENDENCE 195

io one or both parties that 'they intend to exert all the
means which circumstances may suggest to their prudence
to obtain the immediate effect of the armistice ... by
preventing all collision between the contending parties . . .
without, however, taking any part in the hostilities between
them '. It was further provided that ' instructions conform-
able to the provisions above set forth' should be sent *to
the admirals commanding their squadrons in the seas of the
Levant '.

This treaty may be regarded as the cro^vn of Canning's Caiimng's
policy in regard to the Eastern Question. Tlie principles of
that policy are clear ; the Powers could not ignore the
struggle of Greece for independence : * a contest so ferocious
(as Canning wrote to Lieven), leading to excesses of piracy
■and plunder, so intolerable to civilized Europe, justifies extra-
ordinary intervention, and renders lawful any expedients
«hort of positive hostility.' On the other hand, they could
not consistently interfere by force ; nor must the Russian
Tsar be permitted to utilize the Greek struggle, for which he
cared little, to attain objects for which he cared much. This
policy is clearly reflected in the terms of the Treaty of
London ; but its practical application was not free from
difficulty and ambiguity. The Porte was notorious for sullen
obstinacy. How were the ' high contracting parties ', in the
all too probable event of a refusal of an armistice by the
Porte, to ' prevent all collision between the contending parties
without taking any part in the hostilities ' ? Either the
matter had not been clearly thought out, or there was a
deliberate intention to leave the Gordian knot to be cut by
the Executive Officers of the Powers, i. e. * the admirals
conmianding their squadrons in the seas of the Levant'.
Canning was obliged to move warily ; but that he himself
contemplated the employment of force is clear from the
Duke of Wellington's condemnation of the Treaty of London
on the ground that ' it specified means of compulsion which
were neither more nor less than measures of war '.

In August, 1827, the mediation of the three Powei-s was
offered to the 'contending parties', was accepted by the
Greeks, and refused by the Porte.

o2

196 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

The game now passed from the hands of diplomatists into
those of sailors. The British fleet in the Levant was under
the command of Sir Edward Codrington. Codrington received
his instructions on August 7 ; but, not being a diplomatist,
he found them difficult of interpretation. How was he 'to
intercept all ships freighted with men and arms destined ta
act against the Greeks, whether coming from Turkey or the
coast of Afi'ica ', and, at the same time, prevent his measures
from ' degenerating into hostilities ' ? In a word, was he, or
was he not, to use force 2 Such was the blunt question which
he addressed to our ambassador at Constantinople. Stratford
Canning's answer was unequivocal : 'the prevention of supplies
is ultimately to be enforced, if necessary, and when all other
means are exhausted, by cannon shot.'
Battle of Meanwhile large reinforcements from Egypt had reached
Navarino. Jbrahim who was still in the Morea ; and a squadron of
Turkish and Egyptian ships was lying in Navarino Bay.
Ibrahim was informed that not a single ship would be allowed
to leave the harbour, and on making one or two attempts ta
sail he found that the admirals were determined to enforce
their commands. Foiled in his attempt at naval operations^
and instructed by the Porte to prosecute the war on land with
all possible energy, Ibrahim proceeded to execute his orders
with merciless severity. All who were found in arms were
put to the sword, while the miserable survivors were to be
starved into submission by the total destruction of every
means of subsistence. ' It is supposed ', wrote one eye-
witness, Captain Hamilton, ' that if Ibrahim remained in the
Morea, more than a third of its inhabitants would die of
absolute starvation.' Of these atrocities the allied admirals
were all but eyewitnesses. ' Continual clouds of fire and
smoke rising all round the Gulf of Coron bore frightful
testimony to the devastation that was going on.' The
admirals thereupon determined to ' put a stop to atrocities
which exceed all that has hitherto taken place', and for
this purpose to sail into Navarino Bay, and there renew
their remonstrances with Ibrahim. No hostilities were
intended 'unless the Turks should begin'. The Turks,
however, fired on a boat from the Dartmouth; the Dart-

VIII STRUGGLE FOR HELLENIC INDEPENDENCE 197

mouth and the French flagship replied ; the battle became
general ; and before the sun went do>\ni on October 20 the
Turco-Egyptian ships ' had disappeared, the Bay of Navarino
was covered with their wrecks '.

The news of the battle of Navarino was received with Revereal
amazement throughout Europe, but by the English Govern- '^^^^'
ment with something like consternation. Tlie sailors had Policy.
indeed cut the Gordian knot tied by the diplomatists, but
they got no thanks in England for doing it. Canning had
died two months before the battle of Navarino (August 8),
and Wellington, who, after five months' interval, succeeded
to his place, made no secret of his dislike of Canning's policy.
The Turk, with consummate impudence, described Navarino
as a ' revolting outrage ', and demanded compensation and
apologies. Even Wellington was not prepared to go this
length, but the king was made (January 29, 1828) to 'lament
deeply' that 'this conflict should have occurred with the
naval forces of an ancient ally ', and to express ' a confident
hope that this untoward event will not be followed by further
hostilities '.

The one anxiety of the new Government was to preserve Welling-
the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. No policy.
language could have been more nicely calculated to defeat
this object. Turkey was, of course, encouraged to pei-sist in
her attitude towards Greece, and to renew her quarrel with
Russia. Russia was permitted, and even compelled, to engage
single-handed in war with the Turks. Thus all the fruits of
3'ears of diplomacy on Canning's part were carelessly dissipated
in a few months by his successors.

Sultan jNIahmud had meanwhile denounced the Convention Russo-
of Akerman, and had declared a Holy War against the ^y^^^. ^
infidel (December 20, 1827). Russia, though with ample
professions to the Powers of complete disinterestedness,
accepted the challenge, and on April 26, 1828, the Tsar
Nicholas formally declared war. In May, 1828, the Tsar him-
self took the field, crossed the Pruth at the head of an amiy
of 150,000 men, and again occupied the principalities. About
the same time the Russian fleet entered the Dardanelles.

Neither France nor England was quite happy about the

198

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

The
Powers
and
Greece.

Kussia

and

Turkey.

action of the Tsar, nor disposed to confide the settlement of
Near Eastern affairs to his hands exclusively. Consequently,,
in July, 1828, while the Turks, to the amazement of Europe,
were holding the Russians in the Balkans, the two Western.
Powers concluded a protocol, providing for immediate action
against Ibrahim in the Morea. England, less jealous of
France than France was of her, confided the execution of
the protocol to France. Accordingly, at the end of August,
a French force of 14,000 men under the command of General
Maison reached the Gulf of Corinth. The English consul
offered some objection to their landing, on the ground that
Sir Pulteney Malcolm, the English admiral, was, at that
moment in Egypt, negotiating with Mehemet Ali for the
withdrawal of the Egyptian forces from the Morea. Malcolm's
mission was successful, and a convention was signed in Alex-
andria to that effect on August 6.

Meanwhile 14,000 French troops landed at Petalidi in the
Gulf of Coron and arranged with Ibrahim for an immediate
evacuation of the Morea. The good accord thus established
between the French and the Egyptian Pasha was not, perhaps,
w ithout its influence on later events.^ Ibrahim had, however,
surrendered the fortresses, not to the French, but to the
Turks. The latter quitted them on the summons of the
French general ; Navarino, Coron, Patras, Tripolitza, and
Modon were occupied by the French, virtually without
resistance, and in a few days the Morea was entirely free
of both Egyptian and Turkish forces.

A protocol concluded in London (November 16, 1828)
placed the Morea and the islands under the j)rotection of the
Powers, and a further protocol (March 22, 1829) provided
that Greece was to be an autonomous but tributary State,
governed by a prince selected by the Powers, and that its
frontier should run from the mouth of the river Aspro, on
the west coast, to the Gulf of Yolo on the east.

Russia, meanwhile, was finding in the Porte a tougher
antagonist than she had looked for. In the Caucasus, indeed,,
the Russians carried everything before them, but in Europe

1 See chap, ix.

VIII STRUGGLE FOR HELLENIC INDEPENDENCE 199

their progi-ess in 1828 was very sIoav. Varna held them up
for three months and Choumla for three more.

In 1829 Diebitsch was entrusted with the supreme com-
mand, and for the first time Russian troops crossed the
Balkans. Leaning on his fleet, Diebitsch advanced with little
resistance, by way of Burgas, upon Adrianople. Adrianople
surrendered without firing a shot on August 14, and a month
later the Treaty of Adrianople Avas signed.

In the long history of the Eastern Question the Treaty of Treaty of
Adrianople is inferior only in importance to those of Kainardji ■'^^^'
and Berlin. Russia restored her conquests, except the * Great Sept. 14,
Islands ' of the Danube ; but her title to Georgia and the ^^^^•
other provinces of the Caucasus was acknowledged ; all
neutral vessels were to have free navigation in the Black Sea
and on the Danube ; practical autonomy was granted to the
principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia under Russian pro-
tection ; Russian traders in Turkey were to be under the
exclusive jurisdiction of their own consuls, and, in regard to
Greece, the Porte accepted the Treaty of London — thus
virtually acknowledging Greek independence.

The actual settlement of the affairs of Greece was relegated T^he
to a conference in London, and by the Protocol of London ^.f ^gg
(February 3, 1830) Greece was declared to be an indepen- Hellenes.
dent and monarchical State under the guarantee of the three
Powers. This arrangement was confirmed and enlarged by
the subsequent Convention of London (May 7, 1832), by
which the Powers further undertook jointly to guarantee
a loan of 60,000,000 francs to the Greek kingdom.^

It was comparatively easy for the protecting Powers to
declare that Greece should be a monarchical State ; it was
more difficult to find a suitable monarch, and most difficult
of all to educate the Greek people in that purely exotic and
highly exacting form of government known as ' constitutional
monarchy '. The CroAvn having been successively declined by
Prince John of Saxony and, after a temporary acceptance,
by Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg (afterwards King of the
Belgians), was ultimately accepted by Prince Otto of Bavaria.

1 The texts of these impoi-tant documents will be found in Hertslet,
Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. ii, pp. 841 and 893 sq.

200 THE EASTERN QUESTION

Capo d'Istria, M'ho, in March, 1827, had been recalled from
voluntary exile in Switzerland, and had been elected President
by a National Assembly in Greece, was assassinated in 1881,
and the way was clear for the Bavarian princeling, who,
at the age of seventeen, ascended the Greek throne on
January 25, 1833.

The Treaties of Adrianople and London, and the accession
of King Otto, mark the final achievement of Greek indepen-
dence, and bring to a close one of the most significant chapters
in the history of the Eastern Question. For the first time
the principle of nationality had asserted itself in a fashion at
once completely successful and striking to the historical
imagination. For the first time the future of the Ottoman
Empire was recognized as a matter of profound concern not
merely to the Porte itself, to Russia and to Austria, but to
Europe as a whole, and not least to Great Britain. For the
first time an Ottoman Sultan of exceptional vigour and
disposed to reform had been compelled to call to his aid an
ambitious vassal, and despite that assistance to consent to
terms of peace dictated by the Powers and involving the
partial dismemberment of his European dominions. Plainly,
Europe was face to face with all the perplexities, paradoxes,
and contradictions which contribute to the tangle of the
Eastern Question.

For fiu'ther reference : T. Gordon, History of the Greek Bevohition,
2 vols, (London, 1832) ; A. von Prokesch-Osten, Geschichte des Ahfalls
der Griechen vom tiirkischen Reiche im Jahre 1821, 6 vols. (Vienna,
1867) ; G. Finlay, History of Greece, 7 vols. (ed. Tozer) (Oxford, 1877) ; The
History of the Greek Bevolution (Edinburgh, 1861) ; G. Isarabert, L'Ind4-
pendance yrecque et VEurope (Paris, 1900) ; W. A. Phillips, The Greek
War of Independence (Lonlon, 1897) ; W. E. Gladstone, The Hellenic
Factor in the Eastern Problem {Gleanings from Past Years, Series iv,
London, 1879); W. Miller, The Ottoman Etnpire (Cambridge, 1913);
E. M, Church, Sir Richard Church in Greece and Italy (Edinburgh,
1895); L. Sargeant, Greece in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1897):
Murray, Handbook to Greece.

CHAPTER IX

THE POWERS AND THE EASTERN QUESTION,

1830-41

Mehemet Ali of Egypt

*L']6gypte vaut moins par elle-meme que par sa sitnation. . . . Qui
touche a I'lSgypte touche a la Turquie. Qui souleve la question d'figypte
souleve la question d'Orient, dans toute son ampleur et avec toutes ses
consequences.' — C. de Fretcinet, La Question cV^gypte.

It is proverbially dangerous in public affairs to confer
a favour ; it is even more dangerous to accept one. Never
has there been a more apt illustration of this truth than that
afforded by the curious phase of the Eastern Question which
it is the purpose of this chapter to disclose.

Had it not been for the intervention of the Powers, Mahmud
Mehemet Ali of Egypt and Ibrahim Pasha would indubitably j^iehemet
have rescued the Ottoman Empire from imminent dismember- Ali.
ment. Such a service it was difficult for the recipient to
requite, and still more difficult to forgive. Mehemet Ali,
on his part, was not disposed to underrate the obligations
under Avhich he had placed his suzerain, and the cession
of Crete seemed to him a wholly inadequate reward. In
the disgust thus engendered we have one of the clues to the
intricacies of the period which intervened between the Treaty
of Adrianople and the Treaty of London of 1841.

Recent events had, moreover, revealed the weakness,
military, naval, and political, of the Ottoman Empire. If
Greece, an integi'al part of his European dominions, could
so easily be detached from the sceptre of the Sultan, why
not other parts of the empire, connected with Constantinople
by a looser tie ? Algiers, which still acknowledged the titular
sovereignty of the Sultan, had been seized in 1830 by the
French, who had proclaimed their purpose to deliver that

202 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

promising land from the yoke of the Ottoman Sultan. If
Algiers, why not other parts of Africa or of Asia ?

Career of The extraordinary success already achieved by Mehemet All

^hemet jjjjgjj^ ^ygj] inspire that brilliant barbarian — half an illiterate
savage, half a consummate statesman, wholly a genius — with
ambitions even more far reaching.

Born in 1769 at Kavala, a small seaport in eastern
Macedonia, Mehemet Ali Avas, like Ali Pasha of Janina, by
race an Albanian. The son of a peasant cultivator he was
himself a small trader, but Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in
1798 gave him his chance of carving out a career for himself.
It was not neglected. As second-in-command of a regiment
of Albanian irregulars, he took part in the Turkish expedition
to Egypt, which began and ended so disastrously with the
battle of Aboukir. Driven into the sea with his comrades he
was picked up by the gig of the English admiral. Sir Sydney
Smith, and two years later (1801) he returned to Egj^pt in
command of his regiment.

Mehemet Ali was greatly impressed by the military
superiority of troops trained on European models, and still
more impressed of the career open, in such times, to a man
of genius like Napoleon or himself. After the successive
evacuations of the French and English Egypt was in a terrible
condition of anarchy. The Mameluke Beys were as inde-
pendent of their suzerain the Sultan as they were impotent
to rule the Egyptians.

Pasha of In the prevailing confusion Mehemet Ali saw his chance ;

Egypt. \^Q determined to stay in Egypt, and in 1805 was requested
by the Sheiks of Cairo to become their Pasha. A little
later the choice of the Sheiks was confirmed by the Sultan
(July 9, 1805).

Nor was Mehemet Ali long in justifying it. The Sultan, in
1806, was forced by Napoleon to declare war upon the Third
Coalition, and in 1807 England made the disastrous descent
upon Egypt already described.^ The moment was not ill
chosen. The Pasha was preoccupied with domestic difficulties,
but on receiving news that the English had taken Alexandria,

^ Supra, chap. vii.

IX AND THE POWERS, 1830-41 203

and were advancing upon Rosetta, Meheraet Ali did not lose
an hour. He hastily collected his forces, inarched northwards,
and flung back the English, who were besieging Rosetta, with
terrible loss upon Alexandria. The attempt to take Rosetta
was repeated with equally disastrous results, and in September
the English force was withdrawn. All traces of this humilia-
ting episode are now erased ; is the memory of it also
eradicated ?

'Few who nowadays drive by the Ezbekich garden are
aware ', writes Sir Auckland Colvin, * that the space which it
covers was hideous less than a century ago with the heads of
British soldiers.' ^

Having repulsed the English attack, the new Pasha con-
centrated all his energies upon the accomplishment of his
life-work in Egypt. That work owed much to French ideas
and to French agents. Napoleon, when he went to Egypt in
1798, was accompanied not only by great soldiers but by
a brilliant staff of scientific experts, administrators, engineers,
and financiers. Their work was less evanescent than that of
their chief. And no one knew better how to appreciate the
skill of subordinates than the ' illiterate savage ' who, betMcen
1805 and 1849, was the real ruler of Egypt. Still, though
Mehemet Ali utilized the technical skill of French soldiers,
sailors, engineers, financiers, jurists, and agriculturists, the
work accomplished was his own, and bears in every detail
the mark of a vigorous mind and a dominating personality.

There was no obscurity as to the objects which he meant Objects of
to attain. The first was to make himself master of Egypt : Mehemet
to annihilate ruthlessly every competing force or authority
in the land ; to concentrate in a single hand all the economic
resources of the country, and to make of the army and navy
an instrument perfectly fashioned for the accomplishment of
the task to which it was destined.

The task was threefold : to make Egypt supreme over the
adjacent lands, the Soudan and Arabia ; to render it virtually
independent of the Sultan ; and to use it as a stepping-stone
to the conquest of Syria, perhaps of Asia Minor, and possibly

1 Modern Egypt, p. 4.

204 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

of the Ottoman Empire as a whole. Was not the vigour
of the Osmanlis exhausted ; had not the time come to
replace the house of Ottoman by a dynasty drawn from the
virile races of Albania ? But the question as to the future of
Constantinople was not immediate. Mehemet Ali was enough
of a diplomatist to realize the international advantages which
for the time being he enjoyed as a vassal of the Sultan.
Slight as was the connexion which bound him to his suzerain,
it sufficed to ward off many inconveniences which might other-
wise have arisen from the mutual jealousies of the Powers.
His successors in the government of Egypt have sometimes
made use of the same fiction to their advantage.
Military His first business, then, was to reorganize the army and
reoro^ani-^ navy. A brilliant French officer. Colonel S^ves, better known
zation. as Suleiman Pasha, entirely reconstructed the Egyptian
army : he introduced a new method of recruiting by which
the army establishment was raised from 20,000 to 100,000
men ; he set up special schools of military instruction ;
applied to Egyptian troops European discipline, and supplied
them with arms and equipments of the most approved French
pattern. The navy was similarly rebuilt by M. de C^risy,
a naval constructor imported fi-om Toulon, while the armament
was supplied and the sailors trained under the direction of
a French engineer, M. Besson, of Rochefort. One fleet was
stationed in the INIediterranean and another in the Red Sea,
and at Alexandria a magnificent dockyard and arsenal were
constructed.
Economic Mehemet Ali applied himself not less vigorously and
refoiTQs. systematically to the work of economic reconstruction.

By an act of sheer confiscation the land was ' nationalized ',
the proprietors were expropriated, and Mehemet Ali himself
became the sole owner of the soil of Egypt. JMost of the
principal products of the countiy were, in similar fashion,
converted into State monopolies. New industries were estab-
lished : under the scientific direction of M. Jumel cotton
growing was developed in the Delta, and vast tracts of land
yielded abundant crops of sugar, olives, and mulberries. Nor
did raw products monopolize his attention. Factories were
built, though with less remunerative results, and Egyptian

IX AND THE POWERS, 1830-41 205

youths were sent to western lands to extract from them the
secrets of commercial and industrial success. The Malmiudiya
Canal was constructed by the forced labour of the fellaheen
to connect Alexandria Avith the Nile. During the accomplish-
ment of this useful but laborious task 20,000 workmen are
said to have perished of dysentery, but of human life
Mehemet Ali was prodigal. Not that he neglected sanitary
science. It was part of the equipment of a modernized State,
and must, therefore, find its place in his scheme of reform.
Thus Alexandria was rebuilt and provided with a new water
supply. Similarly in regard to education. Mehemet Ali is
said not to have been able to read or write, ^ but the modern
State demanded education ; Egypt, therefore, must have it.
These things, as modern States have learnt to their cost,
cannot be done without money, and the taxation imposed by
Mehemet Ali was crushing. Combined with the system of
State monopolies heavy taxation had the effect of raising
prices to an almost incredible extent,^ and the sufierings of
the fellaheen were consequently intense. Tt is, indeed, true
of many of Mehemet All's economic reforms that they were
more productive of immediate advantages to the ruler than
conducive to the ultimate prosperity of his people ; but not
of all. Many works of permanent utility were carried out,
and not until the British occupation did Egypt again enjoy
an administration equally enterprising and enlightened.

Mehemet All's enterprise was, however, that of a savage Massacre
despot. His dealing with the Mamelukes affords an illustra- ^^ *'^^
tion of his ruthless temper. The Mamelukes had raised him lukes.
to power, but they were now in his way and must be destroyed.
With every circumstance of treachery and cruelty the deed
was accomplished in 1811 ; the Mamelukes were wiped out
in a general massacre, and thus the last possible competitors
for political ascendancy were removed from the adventurer's
path.

In the same year Mehemet Ali launched his expedition Conquest
against the Wahabites of Arabia. At the request of his !jj|^^j.'jj^^*

1 Other ai.thorities state that in middle life he taught himself to read.
' Colonel (^ampbell, who was sent to Egypt as Consul-General in 1833,
put the increase as high as six to tenfold.

206 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

suzerain he dispatched Ibrahim in 1811 to bring these
troublesome schismatics to submission. Several years were
devoted to the arduous task, but by 1818 it was accom-
plished : the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina were recovered
for the Sultan, and the remnant of the Wahabites were driven
into the Nubian desert.

In 1821 his son Ismail penetrated to the confluence of the
Niles and conquered the Soudan, Kordofan was annexed
in 1822, and in 1823 were laid the foundations of Khartoum.
From 1824 to 1829, as was explained in the last chapter, the
military energies of Mehemet Ali were concentrated upon
Europe.

For the services then rendered to Sultan Mahmud, and for
the still greater service, which, but for the Powers, the
Egyptian Pasha was prepared to render to his suzerain, the
island of Crete was a recompense pour rire. To fulfil his
promise in regard to the Morea was not within the Sultan's
power ; in regard to Syria it was. And Syria, at least,
Mehemet Ali was determined to have.
expedi-^^ ^ ^ pretext for invasion was found in the refusal of Abdullah
tion into Pasha of Acre to surrender the Egyptian * rebels ' who had
n^"l-2) ^o^o''^* refiige with him. In November, 1831, a force variously
estimated at 10,000 to35,000 men was sent into Palestine under
the command of the redoubtable Ibrahim. The great fortress
of St. Jean d'Acre offered, as usual, an obstinate resistance,
and, leaving a force to besiege it, Ibrahim occupied Jaffa,
Gaza, and Jerusalem. On May 27, 1832, however. Acre was
taken by storm, and on June 1 5 Damascus also was captured.
E"-vptian Ibrahim's progress naturally caused great alarm at Con-
War stantinople, but in reply to the remonstrances of the Sultan,
(1832-3). Mehemet Ali protested his unbroken loyalty, and declared
that the sole object of the expedition was to chastise the
presumption of Abdullah Pasha Avho had ' insulted his beard
whitened in the service of his sovereign'.* No one was
deceived by these assurances, but there were those about
Sultan Mahmud, and not his least sagacious counsellors, who
urged him to come to terms with his formidable vassal, and
turn their combined arms against the infidel. Hatred of
^ Hall, England and the Orleans Monarchy, p. 150.

IX AND THE POWERS, 1830-41 207

Mehemet Ali was, however, the master passion of Mahmiid's
declining years, and he decided, though not without hesitation,
to send an army against him. In May, 1832, sentence of
outlawry was pronounced against both Mehemet Ali and
Ibrahim, and Hussein Pasha, the destroyer of the Janissaries,
was appointed to command the Turkish troops.

On July 9 Ibrahim routed the advanced guard of the
Turks in the valley of the Orontes, entered Aleppo, which
had closed its gates upon Hussein Pasha on July 16, and on
the 29th inflicted a decisive defeat upon Hussein himself in
the Beilan Pass. The Turks were thrown back in complete
confusion into the Taurus Mountains, and Asia Minor was
open to Ibrahim.

A second arni}"^ was then dispatched from Constantinople
under Rescind Pasha ; it encountered Ibrahim at Konieh on
December 21, and suffered at his hands a crushing reverse.
Ibrahim advanced to Kutaya, and thence wrote to the Sultan
asking permission to take up a still more threatening position
at Brusa.

At this moment it looked as though Constantinople itself ^'^^
would soon be at his mercy. But now, as so often, Turkey and the
found in its military weakness diplomatic strength. In the Powers.
summer of 1832 the Sultan had appealed to the Powers.
Only the Tsar Nicholas was prompt in the offer of assistance ;
but to accept assistance from Russia alone was too risky
a policy even in the hour of Turkey's extreme need. Yet
where else was it to come from ? England and Austria were
unreservedly anxious to maintain the integrity of the Otto-
man Empire, and Prussia followed humbly in the wake of
Metternich. England, however, was at the moment (1832) in
the throes of a domestic revolution, and was still preoccupied
with the affairs of Belgium. France had a traditional interest
in Egypt, and in addition to this there had sprung up a curious
but undeniable cult for Mehemet Ali, particularly among the
Bonapartists, who regarded him as the disciple of Napoleon,
almost as his apostolic successor in Egypt. Of all the
Powers, therefore, Russia alone was at once anxious and able
to go to the assistance of the Sultan in 1832. And not the
jnost obtuse could be doubtful as to her motives.

208

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Turkey

and

England.

Russia

and

Turkey.

Eussia
and Me-
hemet Ali

The Sultan, accordingly, made a desperate attempt to secure
the assistance of England. Stratford Canning, in Constanti-
nople, strongly urged the English ministry to accede to the
Sultan's request for a naval expedition to the Syrian coast.
Lord Palmerston, however, was in an unusually cautious
mood, and, though generally in complete sympathy with the
views of Stratford Canning was not, at the moment, willing
to risk the breach with Russia and France, likely to arise
from isolated action in the Levant.

Russia, meanwhile, reiterated, with added empressement,
her oflFers of assistance. In December, 1832, there arrived
in Constantinople, simultaneously with the news of the
disaster at Konieh, General Mouravieif on a special mission
from the Tsar Nicholas. Mouravieff was charged to repre-
sent to the Sultan the fatal consequences likely to accrue
to his empire from the phenomenal success of his Egyptian
vassal, and to offer him a naval squadron for the protection
of the capital. The Sultan still hesitated, however, to accept
the offer, and Mouravieff, therefore, started off to Alexandria
to attempt the intimidation of Mehemet Ali. The reasons for
the Tsar's disquietude are not obscure.^ Not Turkey alone
was threatened by the advance of Ibrahim. The rights secured
to Russia by a succession of treaties were also directly
jeopardized. The substitution of a virile Albanian dynasty
at Constantinople in place of the effete Osmanlis was the
last thing desired by the Power which wished, naturally-
enough, to command the gate into the Mediterranean.

The most that Mouravieff could get out of Mehemet Ali
was that Ibrahim should not, for the moment, advance beyond
Kutaya.'^ The Sultan had, meanwhile, come to the con-
clusion that nothing but Russian aid could avert the ruin of
his empire ; he begged that not only a naval squadron might
be sent to the Bosphorus, but that it might be followed by
an army of 30,000 men.

1 They are fully set out in the instructions given to Mouravieff, which
■will be found in Serge Goriainow's valuable monograph, Le Bosphore et
les Dardanelles, pp. '^S- 9.

* 150 miles beyond Konieh, but 80 miles short of Brusa, Hall, op. cit.,.
p. 158.

IX AND THE POWERS, 1830-41 209

Accordingly, on February 20, 1833, a powerful Russian Russian
squadron sailed into the Bosphorus and anchored before ^jj^ j^^^
Constantinople. Its appearance seriously alarmed both France phorus.
and Great Britain, who brought pressure upon the Sultan to
procure its withdrawal. The Tsar, however, refused to with-
draw until Ibrahim and his army had recrossed the Taurus
Mountains.

Until his demands were conceded Mehemet Ali would issue
no such orders to Ibrahim. Those demands included the
cession of the whole of Syria, part of Mesopotamia, and
the very important port and district of Adana. In March
the Sultan agreed to the cession of Syria, Aleppo, and
Damascus, but the Pasha stood out for his pound of flesh.

The arrival of a second Russian squadron in the Bosphorus Conven-
and the landing of a Russian force at Scutari caused still ^^"tj^i^
further alarm to the Western Powers, and did not perhaps
diminish that of the Sultan. A prolongation of the crisis
seemed likely to result in the permanent establishment of
Russia at Constantinople. France and England, therefore,
applied further pressure both to Mehemet Ali and his
suzerain. At last the latter yielded, and on April 8, 1833,
there was concluded the Convention of Kutaya, by which
Mehemet All's terms were conceded in full.

But the drama was not yet played out. Mehemet Ali had Treaty of
been bought ofl"; the debt to Russia remained to be discharged, g^gi^^j
So Russia took further security. On April 22 a third con- July 8, '
tingent of Russian troops arrived at Constantinople, and ^'^"^^"
Russian engineers proceeded to strengthen the defences of
the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Against what enemy ?
On the heels of the third Russian contingent came Count
Alexis Orloff" to take up his appointment as ' Ambassador-
Extraordinary to the Porte, and Commander-in-Chief of the
Russian troops in the Ottoman Empire '.'^ At the end of
April Count Orloff" made a State entry into his new kingdom,

1 The instructions given to OrlofF are of supreme interest. They are
now printed, hi, extenso, in Goriainow, op. cit., p. 33 seq. Orloflf was to
(i) induce the Porte to confide absolutely in the support of Russia ;
(ii) combat French influence at Constantinople ; viii) conciliate the support
of Austria and neutralize the perpetual ill will of England by making it

1984 P

210 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

and after two months of tiresome negotiations he received
the title-deeds under the form of the Treaty of Unkiar-
Skelessi (July 8, 1833).

This famous treaty marked the zenith of Russian in-
fluence at Constantinople. In effect, it placed the Ottoman
Empire under the military protectorship of Russia. The
six public articles simply reaffirmed, in platonic terms, the
relations of peace and friendship between the two empires,
though the Tsar of Russia pledged himself, should circum-
stances compel the Sultan to claim his help, to provide
such military and naval assistance as the contracting parties
should deem necessary. Reciprocal assistance was promised
by the Sultan. The real significance of the treaty was
contained in a secret article, which released the Sultan
from any obligation to render assistance to Russia, save by
closing the Dardanelles against the ships of war of any other
Power. The precise meaning to be attributed to this stipula-
tion was disputed at the time, and has been the subject of
controversy ever since. But Count Nesselrode was clearly
not guilty of an empty boast when he declared that the treaty
'legalized the armed intervention of Russia'. It did more.
It guaranteed to Russia a free passage for her warships
through the straits, and it closed the door into the Black
Sea to every other Power. The day after the treaty was
signed the Russian troops re-embarked, and the Russian navy
sailed back to Sebastopol.
The The conclusion of this treaty excited the liveliest appre-

andTthe hensions in England and France. In Lord Palmerston's view
Treaty, its terms were inconsistent with the Anglo-Turkish Treaty
of 1809, by which 'the passage of ships of war through the
straits is declared not allowable'.-^ The English fleet in the
Levant, under the command of Sir Pulteney Malcolm, was
reinforced and sent up, with a French squadron, to Besika

clear that the sole object of Russian intervention was to preserve the
Ottoman Empire ; (iv) reserve to Russia complete independence of action,
iind resist any proposal for collective intervention ; (v) keep the Russian
forces at Constantinople until the conclusion of a definitive peace between
Turkey and Mehemet Ali, and, above all, convince Mahmud that in the
support of Russia lay his one hope of salvation.

J Palmerston to Temple, Oct. 8, ap. Bulwer, Life, ii. 171.

TX AND THE POWERS, 1830-41 211

Bay. England and France presented identical notes at
St. Petersburg and Constantinople protesting against the
proposed violation of the neutrality of the straits, and things
looked like war between the maritimes and Russia.

None of the Powers, however, desired war. Metternich
interposed his good offices, and the Tsar was induced to give
a verbal assurance that he had no intention of enforcing the
rights conferred upon him by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi.
For the moment the assurance was accepted, but Palmerston
made up his mind that at the first convenient opportunity
the treaty itself should be torn up.

In September a conference was held between the Tsar, Conven-
the Austrian Emperor, and the Crown Prince of Prussia :\iunchen-
at Miinchengratz. Its outcome was a formal Convention gratz.
(September 18, 183.S) between Russia and Austria, by which
the two Powers mutually undertook to oppose any extension
of the authority of the Egyptian Pasha over the European
provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and agreed that, should
their efforts fail to maintain the integrity of that empire,
they would act in the closest concert in regard to future
dispositions. The second provision, as Goriainow^ points
out, was studiously vague : the first was precise. Sultan
Mahmud nearly provoked a renewal of the troubles by
shuffling about the cession of Adana, but eventually gave
way, and by the beginning of 1834 the first phase of the
Egyptian crisis was at an end.

The diplomatic fires were only smouldering. Sultan Troubled
Mahmud was eager to be revenged upon his detested (i834_8j.
rival in Egypt, and in particular to recover Syria ; between
England and France there was increasing suspicion and
tension ; while the Tsar Nicholas made no secret of his dislike
for the Orleanist Monarchy in France, and his contempt for
the policy pursued by its ministers. By 1838 events seemed
hastening towards a renewed war in the Near East. The
Sultan had invoked the help of Prussia in the reorganization
of his army, and Prussia had lent him the services of a young
officer, destined to fame as the conqueror of Austria and

1 Op. cH., p. 52.
p2

212

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP,

Turco-
Egyptian
War
(1839-41)

Death of

Sultan

Mahmud.

Collective
Note of
July 27.

France, Helmuth von Moltke. By the conclusion (August 19^
1838) of a commercial treaty with England, the Sultan not
only drew closer the ties between that country and himself,
but at the same time, with consummate adroitness, deprived
Mehemet Ali of much of the advantage derived fi'om his
commercial monopolies, and still further widened the breach
between Egypt and England.

Mehemet Ali was, on his side, chafing under the re-
strictions imposed upon him by the Convention of Kutaya,
and was restrained from declaring his formal independence
only by the pressure of the Powers. In Syria, however,
his rule proved to be as unpopular as it was tyrannical,
a fact which encouraged the Sultan in his resolution to
delay his revenge no longer. The Powers did their utmost
to dissuade him ; Moltke warned him that the army was
not ready ; but Mahmud would listen to no counsels
of prudence, and in the spring of 1839 the war for the
reconquest of Syria began. The issue was disastrous. In
April, 1839, a large Turkish force crossed the Euphrates,,
and on June 24 it was routed by Ibrahim near Nessib, on
the Syrian fi-ontier. Nearly 15,000 prisoners were taken,
and almost the Mhole of the Turkish artillery and stores
fell into his hands. His victory was complete and conclu-
sive.

Before the news could reach Constantinople the old Sultan
died (June 30), with rage in his heart and curses on his lips.
He was succeeded by his son, Abdul Medjid, a youth of sixteen.
Nothing could have been darker than the prospects of the
new reign. Close upon the news of the disaster at Nessib
came tidings of treachery in the fleet. The admiral, Ahmed
Pasha, had carried off" the Turkish fleet to Alexandria, and had
surrendered it to Mehemet Ali.

The yomig Sultan promptly opened direct negotiations
with the Egyptian Pasha. The latter demanded that the
hereditary government of both Egypt and Syria should be
secured to him, and the Sultan seemed disposed to acquiesce,
Avhen the Powers intervened.

On July 27, 1839, the Powers presented a collective note
to the Porte, demanding the suspension of direct negotia-

IX AND THE POWERS, 1830-41 213

tioiis between the Sultan and the Pasha. To this the Sultan
joyfully assented.

His assent only served to sow the seeds of discord be- Dissen-
tween the members of the Concert. The soil was congenial. iJniongthe
The government of Louis-Philippe was lavish in encourage- Powers.
ments to Mehemet Ali. Firm alliance with the Egyptian
adventurer seemed to open the prospect of a restoration of
French prestige throughout the Near East. Strong in posses-
sion of Algeria, cordially united with Spain, France might
even hope to convert the Mediterranean into a French lake ;
and, by cutting a canal through the isthmus of Suez, might
neutralize the advantages secured to England by the posses-
sion of Cape Colony.

England, however, had in 1839 taken the precaution to
occupy Aden, and, with the rest of the Powers, w^as not
minded to permit the break-up of the Ottoman Empire and
the substitution of the rule of Mehemet Ali for that of a feeble
youth at Constantinople. Hitherto England and France had
acted in cordial co-operation in regard to the Near Eastern
Question, and had to some extent succeeded in resisting the
ambitions of Russia. The Tsar Nicholas now saw an oppor-
tunity of turning the tables upon the Western Powers, and
in September, 1839, sent Baron Brunnow to London to
make certain specific proposals to Lord Palmerston. The
Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi should be allowed to lapse ; the
straits be closed to all ships of war ; Mehemet Ali should
be restricted to the hereditary government of Egypt ; and
Russia should go hand in hand with England towards a final
solution of the Near Eastern problem.

Lord Palmerston Avas naturally attracted by the prospect, England,
if only as a means of checking the ambitions of France. He and
was no more disposed to allow France to erect an exclusive France,
protectorate over Egypt than he had been to see Russia
supreme at Constantinople. Of Louis-Philippe he was at
once contemptuous and mistrustful. His colleagues and his
sovereign, on the other hand, were strongly averse to a rupture
with France. Palmerston did not desire it ; neither did he
fear it. 'It is evident', he writes to Bulwer, 'the French
•Government will not willingly take the slightest step of coercion

214 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap,

against Mehemet Ali . . . anxious as we are to continue to go oit
M ith them, we are not at all prepared to stand still with them.
They must therefore take this choice between three courses :
either to go forward ^vith us and honestly redeem the pledges
they have given to us and to Europe ; or to stand aloof and
shrink from a fulfilment of their own spontaneous declara-
tion ; or lastl}', to go right about and league themselves with
Mehemet Ali, and employ force to prevent us, and those
other Powers who may join us, from doing that which France
herself is bound by every principle of honour and every
enlightened consideration of her real interests, to assist us in
doing, instead of preventing from being done.' ^

As to the future of Turkey, Palmerston was far from
pessimistic. ' All that we hear about the decay of the Turkish
Empire, and its being a dead body or a sapless trunk, and so
forth, is pure and unadulterated nonsense.' Given ten years
of peace under European protection, coupled with internal
reform, there seemed to him no reason why ' it should not
become again a respectable Power'. For the moment two-
things were essential : Mehemet must be compelled * to with-
draw into his original shell of Egypt', and the protection
afforded to Turkey must be European, not exclusively
Russian. These were the key-notes of Palmerston's policy
in the Near East. Negotiations between the Powers were
protracted, but Palmerston had the satisfaction of seeing his
views prevail.

France, however, was excluded from the settlement. In
February, 1840, Thiers had come into power in France.
Thiers had always asserted the claims of France to supreme
influence in the Near East with peculiar vehemence, and
Palmerston soon convinced himself and the rest of the Powers
that Thiers was playing exclusively for his own hand. The
policy adopted by Russia in 1833, and so recently repudiated,
was to be precisely repeated on the part of France.

In order to avert a European war a sharp lesson had to
be administered to Thiers. If he were allowed to persist in
his course in regard to Egypt, Russia would resume her

1 Sept. 1839.

IX AND THE POWERS, 1830-41 215

claims over Constantinople. The ultimate result would,
therefore, be ' the practical division of the Ottoman Empire
into two separate and independent States, whereof one
would be a dependency of France and the other a satellite
of Russia '. Only by a threat of resignation did Palmerston
bring his colleagues into agreement with himself, and on
July 15, the four Powers — Russia, Prussia, Austria, and
Great Britain — concluded with the Porte a 'convention for
the pacification of the Levant '.

Under this Convention the Sultan agreed to confer upon Conven-
Mehemet the hereditary Pashalik of Egypt, and, for his life, JJoJJ^JjJn
the administration of southern Syria, including the fortress July 15,
of St. Jean d'Acre, with the title of Pasha of Acre. Failing ^^^^'
Mehemet's acceptance within ten days, the latter part of the
offer was to be withdrawn ; failing acceptaiKie within twenty
days, the whole offer. The rest of the contracting Powers,
Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, agreed to force
then- terms upon Mehemet ; to prevent sea-communication
between Egypt and Syria, to defend Constantinople, and
guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.^

It was, at the same time, expressly provided (Art. 4) that
the naval protection of the straits against INIehemet Ali
should be regarded as an exceptional measure, * adopted at
the express demand of the Sultan ', and it was agi'eed ' that
such measure should not derogate in any degree from the
ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it
has in all times been prohibited for ships of war of foreign
Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the
Bosphorus '.

The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi was torn into shreds. Two
questions remained : would IMehemet Ali accept the terms to
be offered to him by the Sultan ? if not, could he count upon
the help of France in defying the will of Europe ?

1 The full text of the Convention in French is printed in an appendix to
Buhver's Lye of Palmerston, ii. 420-7; also (in English) in Holland's
Eu,rox>ean Concert in the Eastern Question, pp. 90-7. The whole course
of the preceding negotiations is described, with full references to the
documents in Goriainow, ojy. cit., chapter x — of course, from the Russian
point of view.

216

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

England

and

France.

Mehemet
Ali and
the
Powers.

The Quadruple Treaty aroused profound indignation in
France. For the best of reasons Palmerston had kept that
country in the dark as to its impending conclusion. Had
France known of it Mehemet Ali would undoubtedly have
been encouraged to thwart the Avill of Europe, and a general
war would have ensued.'

But Thiers was incensed no less at the substance of the
Convention than at the methods employed to secure it. The
Citizen King and his subjects had undeniably been bowed out
of the European Concert by Lord Palmerston. The will of
Europe was imposed explicitly upon Mehemet Ali ; implicitly
upon France. Thiers was all for defying the allied Powers.
Warlike preparations were pushed on apace ; the army and
fleet were strengthened, the fortification of Paris was begun, and
for a moment it seemed probable that a great European con-
flagi-ation would break out. Palmerston was quite unmoved.
He knew his man. He did not believe that Louis-Philippe
was ' the man to run amuck, especially without any adequate
motive'.'^ Bulwer, therefore, was instructed to tell Thiers
' in the most ft-iendly and inoflfensive manner that if France
throws down the gauntlet Ave shall not refuse to pick it up'.^
Palmerston's confidence in his own judgement Avas not mis-
placed. His diagnosis of the situation was accurate. Louis-
Philippe knew that a European war would complicate the
domestic situation in France, and might imperil his dynasty.
The fiery Thiers was permitted to resign in October and was
replaced by Guizot, who was at once friendly to England and
anxious to preserve peace in Europe.

The task was not an easy one. In the Levant things had
been moving fast since the signature of the Quadrilateral
treaty. As a precautionary measure the British Mediterranean
squadron had been ordered to cut ofl* all communication by
sea between Egypt and Syria, and a portion of it, with some
Austrian frigates, appeared off" Bey rout on August 11, 1840.
Ibrahim was now in a dangerous position, and jSIehemet Ali,

1 Palmerston's reasons are conclusively and exhaustively explained in
A letter to Hobhouse printed in the English Historical Review for January,
1903.

2 To Bulwer, July 21, 1840.

3 To Bulwer, Sept. 20, 1840.

IX AND THE POWERS, 1830-41 217

having virtually refused the tenns required in the Convention
of London, applied for protection to France. In September,
therefore, the Sultan, with the approval of the four Powers,
declared him to be deposed from all his governorships, and
at the same time Sir Charles Napier bombarded and captured
Beyrout, under the eyes of Ibrahim and the Egyptian army.
Sidon was taken before the middle of October, and on Novem-
ber 3 the great fortress of St. Jean d'Acre, hitherto deemed
impregnable, surrendered to Sir Charles Napier. Ibrahim
himself had already been defeated by a force of British and
Austrian marines, and Mehemet Ali at last realized that his
hold upon Syria was gone for ever.

The British fleet then proceeded to Alexandria, and Mehemet
Ali was compelled to yield to the will of the Powers. In
return for the hereditary Pashalik of Egypt he agreed to
surrender the Turkish fleet, Avhich, since 1839, had been in
his hands ; to evacuate Syria, Arabia, and Crete ; and to com-
ply with the terms set forth in the Convention of London.
The Porte, now relieved of all anxiety, hesitated to fulfil its
part of the bargain. Palmerston was consequently obliged
to apply pressure at Constantinople, and on June 1, 1841,^
the Sultan issued a Firman by which, after an acknowledge-
ment of the * zeal and sagacity of Mehemet Ali ', and a
reference to the ' experience and knowledge which he had
acquired in the afiairs of Egypt ', the government of Egypt,
together with Nubia, Kordofan, Darfur, and Sennaar, was
solemnly conferred upon him ' with the additional privilege
of hereditary succession'.'*

The Egyptian question was now settled. The European
crisis was also successfully surmounted, thanks partly to
the pacific disposition of Guizot and his bourgeois King,
thanks even more to the incomparable self-confidence and
undeviating firmness with which Lord Palmerston had con-
ducted a series of difficult negotiations.

1 To the terras of the original Firman of Feb. 13 the Pasha had
successfully objected.

" The full text of a remarkable and historic document will be found in
Holland, op. cit., pp. 110 sqq.

218 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

The France was invited to re-enter the European Concert, and

Treaty cf ^^^ j^j^, jg^ 1841, a second Treaty of London was concluded

July 13' between England, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France. The

1841. Porte recovered Syria, Crete, and Arabia ; Mehemet was

confirmed in the hereditary Pashalik of Egypt under the

suzerainty of the Sultan ; and the Powers agreed that the

Dardanelles and the Bosphorus should be closed to all foreign

ships of war so long as the Turkish Empire was at peace.

Palmerston's triumph was complete. The claim of Russia to

a protectorate over Turkey, that of France to a protectorate

over Egypt was firmly repudiated ; the Treaty of Unkiar-

Skelessi was set aside ; Turkey was rescued both from the

hostility of Mehemet Ali and from the friendship of Russia ;

the will of Great Britain was made to prevail ; the peace of

Europe was secured.

With the conclusion of the Treaty of London Mehemet Ali
disappears from the political stage on which for five-and-thirty
years he had played so conspicuous a part. He lived until
1849, but some years before his death his mind gave way,
and the actual government of Egypt was vested in Ibrahim.
Ibrahim, however, died before his father, in 1848, and on his
death the Pashalik passed to his son Abbas I.
Position The country which Mehemet liad recreated became, subject
01 Egypt, ^Q ^Yie payment of an annual tribute to the Porte, completely
autonomous in an administrative and economic sense. The
Pasha was at liberty to conclude commercial, financial, and
administrative conventions with foreign Powers ; he could,
by consent, vary the terms of the ' capitulations ', raise loans,
and set up any domestic institutions which seemed good to
him. Yet the international position of Egypt was peculiar.
Subject to an obligation to render military assistance when
required to the suzerain, the Pasha was master of his
•own military establishment. With his African neighbours
he could fight to his heart's content. He was prohibited
from making war, without the Sultan's consent, upon any
European Power ; but, obviously, no European Power could
exact reparation, for any injury inflicted, from the Pasha,
without a violation of international law, and oftering a casus
belli to the suzerain Power. The difficulties and contradic-

IX AND THE POWERS, 1830-41 219

tions involved in this situation were clearly revealed in the
last decades of the nineteenth century, when Egypt again
became the pivot of international politics.

A word seems to be required, before this chapter closes, Russia
as to the relations of the two Powei-s which, apart from the ^^|^, ,
Ottoman Empire itself, were most intimately concerned in
the events recorded in the preceding pages.

It was not until the outbreak of the Greek insurrection
that Russia and Great Britain had come into contact in Near .
Eastern affairs. Canning laid down the principle that Russia
must not be pennitted to regard those affairs as her oami
exclusive concern. He, like his master Pitt, grasped the
truth that Great Britain was not less interested than
Russia, and much more interested than any other Great
Power, in the fate of the Ottoman Empire. The Duke of
Wellington, shocked by the * untoward incident ' of Navarino,
deserted Canning's principles and dissipated the hard-won
fruits of his diplomacy. The Tsar profited by Wellington's
blunder in 1829, and was tempted to an even bolder experi-
ment in 1833.

But Canning's mantle had fallen, in even ampler folds,
upon the shoulders of Palmerston. It was Palmerston, more
definitely than Canning, who established the tradition that
the actions of Russia in the Near East must be watched
with ceaseless vigilance, not to say continuous jealousy. The
lesson of Unkiar-Skelessi was always before his eyes. It
revealed, as he thought, the true mind of Russia. Her
real policy was not the annihilation of the Ottoman Empire,
but its preservation in tutelage to herself. As a fact,
Russian policy has throughout the nineteenth century halted
between these two opinions.

As far back as 1802 Count Victor placed the two alterna-
tives clearly before his master, Alexander I : on the one
baud, the policy of partition ; on the other, the mainten-
ance of a feeble power at Constantinople under a Russian
protectorate.

This latter policy, as we have seen, attained the zenith of
its success in the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. But for the
jealous vigilance of Palmerston the position then acquired

220 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

by Russia might have been permanently consolidated. But
if the lesson of 1833 sank deep into Palmerston's mind, so
did that of 1840-1 make a profound impression upon the
mind of the Tsar Nicholas.
Nicholas I The intellect of Nicholas may have been narrow, but it
Britain. ^^^^ singularly acute. He frankly recognized that England
>vas hardly less interested than Russia in finding a satisfactory
solution of the Near Eastern problem, and he endeavoured
honestly, according to his lights, to assist her in the quest.

In the summer of 1844 the Tsar paid a visit to the English
Court, and upon all with whom he came in contact his
personality produced a pleasing impression. On public
affairs, particularly those relating to the Eastern Question,
he opened his mind freely to Lord Aberdeen, who was
Foreign Secretary at the time, and to other statesmen in
England, including the Prince Consort. The views expressed
in conversation he was at pains to amplify and embody in
a written memorandum. According to the account of it
given by the Duke of Argyll, this singularly instructive
document contained the following leading propositions :
'That the maintenance of Turkey in its existing territory
and degree of independence is a great object of European
policy. That in order to preserve that maintenance the
Powers of Europe should abstain from making on the Porte
demands conceived in a selfish interest, or from assuming
towards it an attitude of exclusive dictation. That, in the
event of the Porte giving to any one of the Powers just
cause of complaint, that Power should be aided by the rest
in its endeavours to have that cause removed. That all the
Powers should urge on the Porte the duty of conciliating its
Christian subjects, and should use all their influence, on the
other hand, to keep those subjects to their allegiance. That,
in the event of any unforeseen calamity befalling the Turkish
Empire, Russia and England should agree together as to the
course that should be pursued.' ^

' Nothing ', as the Duke justly says, * could be more reason-

^ Autobiography of the eighth Duke of Argyll, i. 443. The Duke gives
a vivid description of the Tsar. Cf. also Queen Victorias Letters, ii. 13-23,
for the impression produced on the Conr^,

IX AND THE POWERS, 1830-41 221

able, nothing more friendly and even confidential towards us
than this declaration of views and intentions of the Emperor
of Russia.' The memorandum, so he tells us, remained in
the Foreign Office, and ' was handed on by each minister to
his successor', and he adds an expression of his own strong
conviction that ' if the Emperor Nicholas had abided by the
assurances of this memorandum, the Crimean War would
never have arisen'.^ Be that as it may there can be no
doubt that the pereonal relations established by the Tsar
in 1844 with English statesmen, and particularly with
Lord Aberdeen, who in 1852 became Prime Minister, did
predispose them to anticipate with a confidence, which was
perhaps excessive, a peaceful issue to the difficulties which
then arose. On the other hand, the Tsar had drawn from
his conversations in London an inference, even more fatally
en'oneous : that under no circumstances, so long as Lord
Aberdeen controlled its destinies, would Great Britain draw
the sword. In these mutual misunderstandings we have,
perhaps, a warning against ' amateur ' diplomacy. That
they were, in part, responsible for a most unhappy war
cannot be denied.

With the antecedents and course of that war the next
chapter will be concerned.

' Autobiography of the eighth Duke of Argyll, i. 444.

For reference: C. de Freycinet, La Question d'lSgypte (Paris, 1904)
(presents the French point of view with admirable lucidity and ample
reference to documents) ; Major John Hall, England and the Orleans
Monarchy (Smith, Elder & Co., 1912 : a valuable monograph ; hien docu-
mentee) ; Serge Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles (written from
the Kussian documents by the Director of the Imperial Archives at
St. Petersburg, and invaluable as presenting the Russian point of view) ;
Dalling and Ashley, Life of Lord Palmerston (Bentley, 1870 ; vol. ii consists
almost entirely of original letters and documents of firstrate importance) ;
T, E. Holland, European Concert in the Eastern Question (Clarendon
Press, 1885) (invaluable for texts); Hertslet, as before.

CHAPTER X

THE CRIMEAN WAR

The Near

East

(1841-52).

Eefomis
in Tur-
key.

The

Hatti-

scherif

of Gu'l-

hane

(1^39).

'Had it not been for the Crimean "War and the policy subsequently
adopted by Lord Beaconsfield's Government, the independence of the
Balkan States would never have been achieved, and the Russians would
now be in possession of Constantinople.'— Lord Cromer.

' A war to give a few wretched monks the key of a Gi'otto.' — Thiers.

' The only perfectly useless modern war that has been waged.' —
Sir Robert Morier.

' The Turkish Empire is a thing to be tolerated but not to be recon-
structed : in such a cause ... I Avill not allow a pistol to be fired.' — TsAR
Nicholas.

After twenty years of continuous storms (1822-41) Eastern
Europe was permitted to enjoy a spell of unusual calm. It
proved to be no more than an interlude between two periods
of upheaval, but it lasted long enough (1841-52) to give the
young Sultan, Abdul Medjid, an opportunity of putting his
house in order.

The leader of the reform party was Reschid Pasha, who
had been Turkish ambassador at the Court of St. James's,
and had imbibed, during his residence in London, many ideas
as to the nature of political progress in the West. His efforts
to apply to his own country the lessons learnt in England
were warmly encouraged by Sultan Mahmud and by his
successor Abdul Medjid.

In 1839 all the grandees of the Ottoman Empire, viziers,
ulemas, dignitaries secular and ecclesiastical, with the
diplomatic corps were summoned to the palace of Giilhan^ ;
prayer was offered up ; the omens were consulted ; a salute
of a hundred and one guns was fired, and then the young
Sultan proclaimed, Avith all possible solemnity, the issue of
a Hatti-scherif, an organic Charter of Liberties, sometimes
known in history as the Taiizimat The Sultan declared his
fixed resolve to secure for the Ottoman Empire the benefits

THE CRIMEAN WAR 223

of a reformed administration : security of life, honour, and
property was to be guaranteed to every subject ; taxes were
to be imposed and collected according to a fixed method ;
military service was to be regulated ; the administration of
justice was to be reformed, and something in the nature
of a representative, though not an elected, council to be
instituted.

The announcement of this comprehensive programme marks Ai-my
an epoch of no little significance in the history of the Otto- reform.
man Empire. Nor was its execution delayed. A large
scheme of military reform was initiated in 1 843. The army,
recruited in European fashion, was henceforth to be divided
into two parts : the Nizam, or active army, in which men
were to serve for five years ; and the Redif, or reserve, in
which they were to serve for a further seven years.

Later on local government was reorganized, and a deter- Local
mined attempt was made to put a stop to the farming of the j^^g^^™'
taxes and the gross abuses connected with that antiquated and Edu-
fiscal system. The market for negro-slaves was abolished, ^''^*'o"-
and the large profits accruing to the State therefrom were
surrendered. Nor was education neglected. The ecclesiastical
monopoly of education was restricted ; a medical school and
a military academy were established, and a great impulse was
given to technical training by the institution of schools of
commerce, science, and art.

Finally, the Sultan declared that there should be no dis-
crimination between the several creeds : Moslems, Jews, and
Christians were all to regard themselves as equally under the
protection of the sovereign, children of the same father.

Sentiments so enlightened, especially when translated, how-
ever tentatively, into action, could not fail to excite alarm
and provoke opposition among the obscurantist elements of
the Sultan's Empire. Nor did the reactionaries lack either
numbers or influence. The ulemas denounced Reschid as
a giaour ; declared that the Almighty woidd not fail to visit
with his wrath such a blasphemous violation of the Koran ;
that the Hatti-scherif was contrary to the fundamental law
of the Ottoman Empire, and that the attempt to put Moslem
and Christian on an equality, so far fi'om allaying discontent.

224 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

would promote unrest among the subject populations and
encourage perpetual agitation.

The latter prediction seemed, indeed, likely to be justified.
Concession served to whet the appetite for reform. The war
of creeds blazed out more fiercely than ever, and each sect
in turn applied to its external protector : the Orthodox to
the Tsar ; the Catholics to France ; the few Protestants to
England. The quarrels of the Greeks and Latins were, as we
shall see, not the least important among the many contribu-
tory causes which issued in the great European conflagration
known to history as the Crimean War.
Origins What Aristotle said of revolutions is true also of wars,

of the rpi^g occasions may be trivial, the causes are always important.
•V7ar. Emphatically was this the case with the Crimean War. It
may be that the faggots were laid by the squabbles of the
Greek and Latin monks in the Holy Land. Louis Napoleon
may have applied the match to highly inflammable materials.
The personalities of the Tsar Nicholas, of his ambassador
]VIenschikolf, of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, even, in another
sense, of Lord Aberdeen, may have contributed to the out-
break. But to regard such things as the essential causes of
the war implies a singularly superficial apprehension of the
majestic and deliberate operation of historic forces. King-
lake wanted a villain for the central figure of his brilliant
romance, and found him in the Emperor Napoleon. Much
may be forgiven to a supreme artist, and something, as was
hinted, to the disappointed suitor.^ But scientific history is
compelled to look further and deeper.
NaDoleon That Louis Napoleon was the immediate firebrand is in-
III. disputable. In 1850 he took up with great zeal the cause of

the Roman Catholics in the Near East. In 1852 M. de Lava-
lette, the French ambassador at Constantinople, was instructed
to insist upon the claims of the Latin monks to the guardian-
ship of the Holy Places in Palestine. ' Stated in bare terms \
writes Kinglake, ' the question was whether for the purpose
of passing through the building into their Grotto, the Latin
monks should have the key of the chief door of the Church

1 Kingluke is said to liave been a suitor for the favours of Miss Howard,
Napoleon's mistress : F. A. Simpson, Rise of Louis Napoleon, p. 162.

X THE CRIMEAN WAR 225

of Bethlehem, and also one of the keys of each of the two
doors of the sacred manger, and whether they should be at
liberty to place in the sanctuary of the Nativity a silver star
adorned with the arms of France.'* So stated, the question
at issue seems puerile to the verge of criminal levity. But
behind a question superficially trivial was the tradition of
three hundred years of French diplomacy in the Levant. The
privileged position bestowed upon France and its clients by
Suleiman the Magnificent had, as we have seen, been specifi-
cally renewed and guaranteed by the more formal Capitu-
lations of May 28, 1740.^ Since 1740 the Latin monks had
neglected their duties as custodians of the Holy Places, the
Greeks had stepped into their shoes, with the tacit assent of
France who had lost interest in the matter.

Louis Napoleon saw his chance. He was now on the brink
of achieving his lifelong ambition. After two humiliating,
but not futile, fiascoes ^ the ' man of destiny ' had come
forward, at the precise psychological moment in 1848, and,
declaring his name to be ' the symbol of order, nationality,
and glory ', had announced his candidature for the Presidency
of the Second Republic established on the collapse of the
July Monarchy. In the contest which ensued Lamartine,
the hero of February, received less than 18,000 votes ;
Cavaignac, who in the terrible * days of June ' had saved
the State, received less than a million and a half ; the un-
known man, who bore the name of Napoleon, received
5,434,226. But Louis Napoleon had still to make good. He
obtained a confirmation and prolongation of his Presidency
by the coup detat of December, 1851, and after a second
coup (Vetat in December, 1852, he transformed the Presidency
into an hereditary empire. He relied for support funda-
mentally upon the peasants of France, but more immediately
on the two highly organized forces in France, the Church and
the Army. The Bourgeois Monarchy had failed to touch the
imagination of France. ' La France s'ennuie ', as Lamartine

1 Invasion of the CrimPM, i. 46.

2 Arts. 33-6 and 82 deal specifically with Les Lieux saints.

3 At Strasburg (1836), at Boulogne (1840), the second followed by six
years' imprisonment.

lS?i Q

226

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

liad sagaciously observed. Her prestige abroad had suffered
severely from the conduct of foreign affairs under Louis-
Philippe, particularly in that quarter as to which France
was most sensitive — the Levant. Lord Palmerston had
elbowed France out of the Concert in 1840, and had admitted
her on sufferance in 184L

rrance. Such a position was wholly inconsistent with the Napoleonic
interpretation of *la gloire'. That interpretation the new
emperor was determined to revive. The traditions of French
diplomacy dictated the direction. Nor was a personal motive
lacking. With studied contempt Nicholas had refused to
accord the successful conspirator the courtesy which pre-
vailed between crowned heads : he had addressed him not
as * frere ' but as ' bon ami '. The Greek monks at Bethlehem
and Jerusalem were to pay for the affront put by the Tsar
upon the protector of the Latins.

Russia. But if the prestige of France had suffered at the hands of

Lord Palmerston, not less had that of Russia. Ever since the
days of Peter the Great, Russia had set before herself two
supreme objects : a virtual protectorate over the Christian
subjects of the Sultan ; and the domination of the Bos-
phorus and the Dardanelles. These objects had been
practically attained when the Sultan, in 1833, signed the
Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. That treaty Lord Palmerston
had torn up.

England. For Great Britain, though tardy in realizing the significance
of the Near Eastern Question to herself, was now deeply
impressed with a sense of the danger to be apprehended
whether from a French protectorate over Egypt or from a
Russian protectorate over Turkey. To repudiate the exclusive
pretensions of both Russia and France was, therefore, the
key-note of English foreign policy throughout three-quarters
of the nineteenth century.

Not that England asserted any exclusive claims on her own
behalf. On the contrary, the principle to which she firmly
adhered was that the problem of the Near East could be
solved only by the Powers in Concert. That concert she
has honestly endeavoured to maintain, and in maintaining
it she has, to a large extent unconsciously, given room and

X THE CRDIEAN WAR 227

opportunity for the growth of a new and vitalizing principle,
the principle of nationality.

In this diagnosis of the situation the modern reader will J^xei-many
detect, or imagine that he has detected, a palpable omission.
"\Miat, he will ask, was the attitude of the German Powers,
Austria and Prussia, and of Italy ? Austria was deeply
interested, but preoccupied. The Habsburg dominions,
German, ]Mag3'ar, Bohemian, and Italian, had barely emerged
from the crisis of 1848-9 : the crisis which had displaced
Metternich, and threatened with disruption the emi)ire which
he had so long governed. Only the intervention of the Tsar
Nicholas had preserved Hungary to the Habsburgs, and
though gratitude, as events were soon to prove, is not the most
conspicuous attribute of the Austrian House, the policy of the
young emperor was at the moment in complete accord with
that of his preserver.^ Prussia had played no independent
part in Eastern affairs since Metternich's accession to power.
Italy had not yet come into being. But, as we shall see, the
man destined to create it was no sooner in power than he
firmly asserted that the Italy of the future had a vital interest
in the solution of the Xear Eastern Problem. For the moment,
however, the game was in the hands of the Tsar Nicholas,
Napoleon, and Great Britain.

The demands made, on behalf of the Latin monks, by The Holy
Napoleon were supported by the other Roman Catholic ^^^^'
powers : Austria, Spain, Sardinia, Portugal, Belgium, and
Naples ; and after some delay they Avere, in substance, con-
ceded by the Sultan. The concession roused bitter resentment
in the mind of the Tsar Nicholas, who demanded, from the
Porte, its immediate rescission. Thus the Porte found
itself, not for the first time, between the upper and the nether
millstone ; and, in order to escape from that embarrassing
situation, the Sultan played an old diplomatic trick. His
decision on the points at issue was embodied in a letter to
the French charge d'affaires, and in a Firman addressed to
the Greek patriarch at JerusalenL The language of the two
documents was not identical : the letter laid stress upon

^ ' When I speak of Russia I speak of Austria as well ' : Tsar Nicholas
to Sir G. H. Seymour. Eastern Papers, Part V, 1854.

Q 2

228

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP,

Menschi-

koff's

miseioD.

The atti-
tude of
England.

the substantial concessions to France ; the Firman dwelt
upon the claims denied. In the upshot France was satisfied,
Russia was not.

Accordingly, in INIarch, 1853, the Tsar dispatched to
Constantinople Prince jNIenschikoiF, a rough and overbearing
soldier, who was charged not only to obtain full satisfaction
in regard to the Holy Places, but to demand from the Sultan
a virtual acknowledgement, embodied in a formal treaty, of
the Tsar's protectorate over all the Orthodox subjects of the
Porte. On the question of the Holy Places the Tsar had
a strong case ; his claim to a protectorate over the Greek
Church in Turkey was, on the contrary, an extravagant
extension of the vague and indefinite engagements contained
in the Treaty of Kainardji, and in subsequent convention*
concluded between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.

This demand appeared to the British Government to be
wholly inadmissible.

'No sovereign,' wrote Lord Clarendon, 'having a proper
regard for his own dignity and independence, could admit
proposals so undefined as those of Prince jMenschikoff", and
by treaty confer upon another and more powerful sovereign
a right of protection over a large portion of his own subjects.
However well disguised it may be, yet the fact is that under
the vagiie language of the proposed Sened a perpetual right
to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey would be con-
ferred upon Russia, for governed as the Greek subjects of
the Porte are bv their ecclesiastical authorities, and lookine:
as these latter would in all things do for protection to Russia,
it follows that 14,000,000 of Greeks would henceforth regard
the emperor as their supreme protector, and their allegiance
to the Sultan would be little more than nominal, while his
own independence would dwindle into vassalage.' ^

Inadmissible in substance, the Russian demand was urged
upon the Sultan by Prince Menschikoff" with insulferable
insolence. But by this time Menschikoff* himself had to
reckon with an antagonist in wliose skilful hands the bluster-
ing Russian was a mere child. On April 5 Lord Stratford
de Redcliffe returned to Constantinople, and the whole
* Lord Clarendon to Lord Stratford, May 31, 1853.

X THE CRIMEAN WAR 229

diplomatic situation quickly underwent a complete trans-
formation.^

The Tsar Nicholas had always, as we have seen, been England
anxious to maintain a cordial understanding with England 'JJJJ^^jg^
in regard to the Eastern Question, and early in the spring
of 1853 he had a series of interviews with Sir Hamilton
Seymour, then British ambassador at St. Petersburg.
During these interviews he discussed, in the most friendly
manner, the relations of their respective countries in the
Near East. Recalling his personal friendship with the head
of the new ministry, Lord Aberdeen, he insisted that the
interests of England and Russia were ' upon almost all
questions the same ', and expressed his confidence that the
two countries would continue to be on ' temis of close amity '.
* Turkey ', he continued, ' is in a critical state . . . the country
itself seems to be falling to pieces . . . we have on our hands
a sick man — a very sick man : it will be, I tell you frankly,
a great misfortune if, one of these days, he should slip away
fi-om us before all necessary arrangements were made.' In the
Tsar's view it was therefore 'very important that England
and Russia should come to a perfectly good understanding on
these affairs, and that neither should take any decisive step
of which the other is not apprised '. The Tsar further asserted
that he had entirely abandoned 'the plans and dreams'
of the Empress Catherine, but frankly admitted that he had
obligations in regard to the Christian subjects of the Porte
which treaties and national sentiment alike compelled him
to fulfil- In his view, however, the governing fact of the
situation was that the Turk was in a state of hopeless
decrepitude. ' He may suddenly die upon our hands : we
cannot resuscitate what is dead ; if the Turkish Empire falls,
it falls to rise no more ; and I put it to you, therefore,
whether it is not better to provide beforehand for a con-
tingency than to incur the chaos, confusion, and certainty of
a European war, all of Avhich must attend the catastrophe,

1 For the relations between the home Government and the ambassador
in Constantinople during these critical months see Maxwell's Life of Lord
■Clarendon, vol. ii, chap. xiii.

2 Eastern Papers, Part V (122 of 1854).

230 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

if it should occur uuexpectedly and before some ulterior
system has been sketched.' England and Russia nuist settle
the matter. But neither England nor any other Great Power
must have Constantinople. Nor would Russia take it per-
manently ; temporarily she might have to occupy it {en
ilej)ositalre) but not en proprietaire. For the rest, the
principalities might continue to be an independent State
under Russian protection ; Serbia and Bulgaria might receive
a similar form of government. To counterbalance these
indirect advantages to Russia, England might annex Egypt
and Crete. On one further point the Tsar was particularly
insistent : ' I never will permit ', he said, ' an attempt at the
reconstruction of a Byzantine Empire, or such an extension
of Greece as would render her a powerful State : still less
will I permit the breaking up of Turkey into little Republican
asylums for the Kossuths and JVIazzinis and other revolu-
tionists of Europe ; rather than submit to any of these
arrangements I would go to war, and as long as I have a man
or a musket left would carry it on.'

The English ministers, who had been captivated by the
personality of the Tsar in 1844, were aghast at the coolness
and candour of the specific proposals which were submitted
to them in 1853 through the ordinary diplomatic channels.
They refused to admit that the dissolution of the sick man
Avas imminent ; they repudiated with some heat the idea of
a possible partition of his inheritance ; they pointed out,
with unanswerable force, that ' an agreement in such a case
tends very surely to hasten the contingency for which it is
intended to provide ; they urged the Tsar to act with for-
bearance towards the Porte ; they objected to an agi*eement
concluded behind the back of Austria and France ; and,
finally, they declined, courteously but very firmly, to entertain
the proposals of the Tsar'.^

Those proposals were in form almost brutally candid, but
there is no reason to doubt that they were put forward with
a genuine desire to find a solution for a hitherto insoluble
problem. Nor was the Tsar's diagnosis of the case substantially

1 The correspondence briefly summarized above may be read in extenso
in Eastern Palters, Part V (122 of 1854).

X THE CRIMEAN WAR 231

inaccurate. It is tempting to speculate as to what would have
happened had the Tsar's advances been accepted by the English
Covernment ; but the temptation must be resisted. That they
were refused was due largely to the mistrust inspired among
ministers by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, mucli more to
the popular detestation of Russia aroused by her treatment
of the Poles, and most of all to the part played by the Tsar in
the suppression of the Hungarian insurrection in 1849. Con-
versely, the Sultan Avas high in popular favour owing to the
asylum he had chivalrously afforded to Louis Kossuth and
other Hungarian refugees.

Still, none of these reasons, though potent in their appeal
to popular passions, can in the dry light of historical retro-
spect be regarded as an adequate justification of a great
European war.

Into that war, however, the Powers were now rapidly
' drifting '. The expression was Lord Aberdeen's, and to him
and to several of his colleagues it was undeniably appropriate.
To one Englishman it was not. Lord Stratford at Constanti-
nople knew precisely where he Avas going, and where he
intended to go. He was persuaded that there could be no
real settlement in the Near East until the pretensions of
Russia had been publicly repudiated and until the Tsar had
sustained an unmistakable defeat either in diplomacy or
in war. If without war so nmch the better, but by Avar if
necessary.

Lord Stratford's first task Avas to persuade JVIenschikoff to Lord
separate the question of the Holy Places from that of a ^*'rI^.
general Russian protectorate over the Greek Christians, clift'e.
This important object Avas attained Avith consummate adroit-
ness, and Stratford then induced the Porte to give satisfac-
tion to Russia on the former point. Before the end of April
the dispute as to the Holy Places Avas settled. But the con-
cession made by the Porte effected no improvement in the
diplomatic situation. On the contrary, as the Porte became
more conciliatory, Menschikoff became more menacing. But
he AA'as noAv on Aveaker ground, on to Avhich he had been
lured by Lord Stratford's astuteness. The latter advised the
Porte to refuse the protectorate claimed by Russia, and on

232 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

May 22, 1853, MenschikofF and the staff of the Russian
Embassy quitted Constantinople. A week later the Porte
addressed to the Powers a Note announcing that 'the
question of the Holy Places had terminated in a manner
satisfactory to all parties ; that nevertheless the Prince
MenschikofF, not satisfied with that, had demanded from the
Porte a treaty to guarantee the rights and privileges of all
kinds accorded by the Sultan to his Greek subjects '. ' How-
ever great ', it continued, ' may be the desire of the Porte to
preserve the most amicable relations with Russia, she can
never engage herself by such a guarantee towards a foreign
Government, either concluding with it a treaty or signing
a simple official Note, without compromising gravely her
independence and the most fundamental rights of the Sultan
over his own subjects.' Despite all this the Porte, though
bound to take measures of self-defence, did not abandon
hopes of peace.
Palmer- The hopes became fainter day by day. A large Russian
policy. army under Prince Gortschakoff had been mobilized in
Bessarabia during the spring ; on July 21 it crossed the
Pruth and occupied the principalities. Russia thereupon
announced to the Powers that the occupation was not
intended as an act of war, but as a ' material guarantee ' for
the concession of her just demands. But while condescend-
ing to offer this explanation, the Tsar was not greatly
concerned as to the attitude of the Western Powers. He
was confident that, if war really threatened, Austria and
Prussia would send an army to the Rhine and keep France
quiet. His confidence was misplaced. Austria, forgetful
of the debt she had recently incurred to the Tsar, was more
jealous of Russia than of France, and more ready, therefore,
to mobilize upon the Danube than upon the Rhine. More-
over, on the news of the impending occupation of the
principalities the combined fleets of England and France
had been sent into Besika Bay, and Palmerston believed
that the only chance of now convincing Russia that we were
in earnest and thus averting war would be to order them up
to the Bosphorus and, if necessary, into the Black Sea.
But Aberdeen still hung back, and the Sultan was advised.

X THE CRIMEAN WAR 233

* in order to exhaust all the resources of patience ', not to
resist the Russian invasion by force.

]VIean while, Austria, though unwilling to fight, was anxious The
to avert the all but inevitable war. Accordingly, the repre- ^JJ^^ '
sentatives of England, France, Austria, and Prussia met at July 31.
Vienna in July and agreed upon a ' Note ' which it was hoped
might satisfy both Russia and Turkey. The Note simply
reaffirmed the adherence of the Porte to 'the letter and
spirit of the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople relative
to the protection of the Christian religion '. The Note was
accepted by Russia, though not, as subsequently appeared,
in the sense intended by the mediators. Turkey, like Russia,
perceiving its ambiguities, insisted on amending it. For the
words above quoted the Porte proposed to read: 'To the
stipulations of the Treaty of Kainardji, confinned by that
of Adrianople, relative to the protection hy the Sublime Porte
of the Christian religion.' To a superficial view the amend-
ment may appear a strangely inadequate reason for provoking
a European war. But the addition of the words 'by the
Sublime Porte ' had revealed, in succinct epitome, the whole
question at issue between Russia and Turkey. Did the Treaty
of Kainardji give to Russia a general protectorate over the
Orthodox subjects of the Sultan ? Since Russia claimed that
it did, the Vienna Note was sufficient for her purpose. The
diplomatists at Vienna were simple enough to imagine that
they had discovered a formula which might, by studied
ambiguity, postpone or even avert war. Lord Stratford,
however, was quick to perceive the ambiguity, and by the
addition of four words, seemingly unimportant, brought
Russia out into the open. These words implicitly repudiated
the Russian claim to a general protectorate over the Greek
Christians. The latter were to be protected not by the Tsar
but by the Sultan. Russia promptly refused to accept the
amendment ; Lord Stratford encouraged the Sultan to insist
upon it. 'No man', wrote the editor of the EcUuhnnjh
Review, * ever took upon himself a larger amount of responsi-
bility than Lord Stratford when he virtually overruled the
decision of the four Powers, including his own Government,
and acquiesced in — not to say caused — the rejection of the

234

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Outbreak

of war

between

Russia

and

Turkey.

The

massacre
of Sinope.

Vienna Note by the Porte after it had been accepted bj^
Russia. The interpretation afterwards put upon that Note
hj Count Nesseh-ode showed that he was right ; but, neverthe-
less, that was the point on which the question of peace and
war turned , . . Russia had formed the design to extort from
Turkey, in one form or another, a right of protection over
the Christians. She never abandoned that design. She
thought she could enforce it. The Western Powers inter-
posed, and the strife began.' ^

On October 5 the Porte demanded from Russia the
evacuation of the principalities within fifteen days, and
on October 28 Turkey declared war. The British fleet
had already been ordered up to the Bosphorus — an order
of which Russia had some cause to complain as an infraction
of the Treaty of 1841.- Nevertheless, Russia and the
Western Powers still remained at peace, and the Tsar
declared that, despite the Turkish declaration of war, he
would not take the offensive in the principalities. The
Turks, however, attacked vigorously on the Danube, and
on November 30 the Russian Black Sea fleet retaliated by
the entire destruction of a Turkish squadron in the Bay
of Sinope.

The ' massacre of Sinope ' aroused immense indignation
in England and France, and must be regarded as the imme-
diate prelude to the European War. ' I have been ', wrote
Sir James Graham, 'one of the most strenuous advocates
of peace with Russia until the last moment ; but the Sinope
attack and recent events have changed entirely the aspect
of affairs. I am afraid that a rupture with Russia is
inevitable.' ■

The Cabinet decided that in consequence of the ' massacre '

' Edinlmrgh Reviev, April, 1803, p. 331. Special impoi-tance attaches
to this article. Written primarily as a i-eview of the two first volumes of
Kinglake by the then editor, Henry Reeve, it was carefully revised by
Lord Clarendon himself, and may be taken as an authoritative apologiafor
the policy pui'sued by the Aberdeen Cabinet.

- The Russian point of view on this important question is put with gi'eat
elaboration and detailed reference to the documents in Goriainow, o/?. cit.,
pp. 94 sqq.

3 Parker, Life of Graham, ii. 226.

X THE CRIMEAN WAR 235

of Siuope the allied fleets must enter the Black Sea. On The allicl
January 4, 1854, this momentous order was executed, and fi^'^^p]'^ i-
it was announced that the English and French admirals had Sea,
instructions to * invite ' all Russian ships in the Black Sea to '^^?"''^iT»
withdraw into harbour. Even yet the Western Powers were
not at war, and on February 22 Austria, always anxious
about the presence of Russian troops in the principalities,
but not too straightforward in her diplomacy, intimated that
if the Western Powers would present an ultimatum, demand-
ing the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia before a given
date, she would support them. England and France promptly
acted on this suggestion, and on February 27 Lord Claren-
don informed Count Xesselrode that Great Britain, having
exhausted all the efforts of negotiation, was compelled to
call upon Russia ' to restrict within purely diplomatic limits
the discussion in which she has for some time been engaged
with the Sublime Porte ', and by return messenger to * agree
to the complete evacuation of the Provinces of Moldavia and
Wallachia by the 30th of April '.

Russia refused this ultimatum on March 19, and on the
27th and 28th the Western Powers declared war. It was
then made manifest that Austria's promised support was
only diplomatic ; Prussia — to the great indignation of Queen
Victoria — followed Austria's lead ; ^ the concert on which so
much depended was broken, and England and France were
left alone to sustain an exceptionally arduous struggle.

Can the Crimean War be justified before the tribunal of Was the
impartial history ? Retrospective criticism has tended to ^y-^r'^^'^
the view that the war, if not a crime, was at least a blunder, justified ?
and that it ought to have been and might have been avoided.
Sir Robert Morier, writing in 1870, perhaps expressed the
current opinion when he described it as 'the only perfectly
useless modern war that has been waged '.- Lord Salisbury,
some twenty years later, enshrined in classical phrase the
opinion that * England put her money on the wrong horse '.

^ See the remarkable letters of Queen Victoria to the King of Prussia in
March and June, 1854, Q.V.L. iii. 21, 39.

' Memoirs and Letters of Sir Robert Morier, by his daughter,
Mrs. Wemyss, ii. 215.

236 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

The Duke of Argyll, on the contrary, writing at the close of the
century, confessed himself though one of the Cabinet respon-
sible for the war 'to this day wholly unrepentant'.^ More
recently Lord Cromer has reaffii'med his conviction that * had
it not been for the Crimean War and the policy subsequently
pursued by Lord Beaconsfield the independence of the
Balkan States would never have been achieved, and the
Russians would now be in possession of Constantinople'.^
Kinglake has popularized the idea that England was an
innocent tool in the hands of an unscrupulous adventurer,
anxious to establish a throne unrighteously attained, by
a brilliant war causelessly provoked. But to suggest that
either Stratford or Aberdeen was the dupe of Napoleon's
ambition is grotesquely inaccurate.

Popular passions had, as we have seen, been aroused by
recent events against the Russian Tsar. ]More reflective
opinion inclined to the view that the time had come for a
sustained effort to repel the secular ambition of his people.
The bias of Russian policy during the last century and a half
was unmistakable. From the Treaty of Azov to that of
Unkiar-Skelessi the advance had been stealthy but con-
tinuous. Was the dissolution of the sick man to be hastened
now to satisfy the impatient avarice of the heir presumptive ?
Was the Tsar to be allowed to convert the Black Sea into
a Russian lake, and to establish an exclusive and dangerous
domination in the eastern waters of the ]Mediterranean ?
Was Europe in general, and England in particular, prepared
to permit Russia to force upon the Porte a 'diplomatic
engagement which would have made her the sole protector
of the Christian subjects of the Porte, and therefore the sole
arbiter of the fate of Turkey '.-^ Rightly or wrongly England
came, slowly but steadily, to the conviction that the matter
was one of vital concern to Europe at large and to herself in
particular ; that the Tsar was determined to assert his claims
by force, and that only by force could they be repelled. Of

^ Our Besponsibiliiies for Turkey (1896); p. 10.

^ Essays, p. 275.

' Argyll, op. cit.. p. 10.

X THE CRIMEAN WAR 237

this conviction the Crimean War was the logical and inevit-
able result.

To tlie conduct of that war we must now turn. Early in The War
1854 a British fleet was sent to tlie Baltic, under the command (l^-^'i-^)-
of Sir Charles Xapier, but though it captured Bomarsund
the results of the expedition were disappointingly meagre,
and contributed little to the ultimate issue of the war.
On April 5 a British force under Lord Raglan, who had
served both in the field and at the Horse Guards under
the Duke of Wellington, landed at Gallipoli. It was pre-
ceded by a French army under Marshal Saint-Arnaud, the
fellow conspirator of Xapoleon HI in the first coup d'etat.

Tlie Russians had already crossed the Danube (^Nlarch 23)
and had besieged Silistria. The prolonged defence of this
weakly fortified town was due largely to two English
volunteers, Captain Butler and Lieutenant IS'asmyth, and
in order to support it the allied army moved up from
Gallipoli to Varna. There on May 19 a conference was
held between Raglan, Saint-Arnaud, and Omar Pasha. On
June 23, however, the Russians raised the- siege of Silistria,
and in July they commenced the evacuation of the principali-
ties. Their withdrawal was due partly to the arrival of the
allies on the Black Sea littoral ; partly, perhaps, to the hope
of luring them on to a second ^Moscow expedition ; but most
of all to the pressure of Austria, who, with the support of
Prussia, had called upon the Tsar to evacuate the principali-
ties. As soon as that had been effected the principalities
were occupied, under an arrangement with the Porte, by an
Austrian army. That occupation, though perhaps dictated
in the first instance by jealousy of Russia, proved in the
long run of incomparable advantage to her.

By the end of the first week in August there was no longer
a Russian soldier to the west of the Pruth ; the ostensible
and immediate object of the European intervention might
seem, therefore, to have been attained. But the allies had
already reached the momentous decision (June) to ' strike at
the very heart of Russian power in the East — and that heart
is at Sebastopol '.^ On July 22 Lord Clarendon stated
1 The Times, June 24, 1854.

238 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

explicitly that they would no longer be satisfied by the
restoration of the Status quo ante helium. They must at
least secure guarantees on four points :

1. Russia must be deprived of the Treaty Rights in virtue

of which she had occupied the principalities ;

2. Turkey must be guarded against attack from the

Russian navy in the Black Sea ;

3. The navigation of the Danube must, in the interests of

European commerce, be secured against the obstruc-
tion caused by Russia's * uncontrolled possession of the
principal mouth of the Danube ' ; and

4. The stipulations of the Treaty of Kainardji relative to

the protection of the Christians must be amended,
since that treaty ' has become by a wrongful interpreta-
tion the principal cause of the present struggle'.^

Lord Clarendon's dispatch is of importance as defining at
once the causes and the objects of the Crimean War.
The War On September 14, 1854, the allied army, more than 50,000
Crimea strong, disembarked in the Bay of Eupatoria to the north of
Sebastopol. On the 19th the march towards Sebastopol
began. On the 20th Menschikofi", in command of 40,000
Battle of troops, tried to stop the advance of the allies on the Alma —
a stream about fifteen miles north of Sebastopol. After
three hours of severe fighting the Russians were routed.
The allies, though victorious, sufiered heavily. But Raglan,
despite the lack of transport and the ravages of cholera,
wanted to make an immediate assault upon Sebastopol.
Had his advice been taken Sebastopol would almost infallibly
have fallen. But Saint- Arnaud, in the grip of a mortal disease,
vetoed the suggestion, and it was decided to march round
the head of the harbour and approach Sebastopol from the
south. This difficult operation was effected without resistance
from Menschikofi^ who had withdrawn his main army into
the interior, leaving the fortress under-garrisoned, and on
the 26th Raglan occupied the harbour of Balaclava. Again
Raglan Avanted to assault, this time from the south, and was

^ Lord Clarendon to Lord Westmorland, Ambassador at Vienna, July 22,
1854, — Eastern Papers.

the Alma.

X THE CRIMEAN WAR 239

strongly seconded by Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, who was
commanding the fleet. Saint-Arnaud was now dying on board
ship,' and the command of the French force devolved upon
General Canrobert, a man of great personal bravery, but
devoid of the moral courage essential for high command.
Canrobert was not less strongly opposed than Saint-Arnaud to
the idea of assault, and the allied forces, therefore, encamped
to the south of the fortress, and made slow preparations for
a regular siege.

The hesitation of the allies gave the defenders of Sebastopol
a chance which they seized with consummate adroitness and
skill. They cleared the Russian ships of guns and men : sank
some of the largest ships at the entrance to the harbour —
thus rendering the allied fleets comparatively useless — and
mounted the guns on shore ; Colonel von Todleben, the
great engineer, and Admiral Koniiloff" worked with such
energy and enthusiasm that the town was rapidly placed in
a posture of defence. On October 17 the bombardment
began. The experience of the first day was sufficient to
prove the inadequacy of the preparations for a siege. In
order to arm three batteries the English Commander had to
dismantle ships and employ seamen.

But no perceptible effect was produced upon the fortress. Battles of
and on October 25 the allies were unpleasantly reminded ^^'^^'^^J,*

" (Uct. 25)

of the dangers to which their position Mas exposed by and In-
Menschikoff^s strategy. Reinforced from home Menschikofl', J^^J"^)^
at the head of 30,000 men, re-entered Sebastopol, while
a large detachment under General Liprandi delivered from
outside an attack on the position of the allies, he ping to
catch them between two fires and drive them out of
Balaclava.

The familiar story of the battle of Balaclava may not be
retold ; enough to say that the enemy, though repulsed in
their attack upon Balaclava, retained their position on the
heights above, and the besiegers were now, in fact, besieged,
and ten days later were made to realize the fact.

For a regular investment of Sebastopol the allied forces

^ He died on September 29.

240

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

The great
gale of
Novem-
ber 14.

Siege of
Sebasto-
pol.

Peace

negotia-
tions at
Vienna.

were hopelessly insufficient : for a bombardment the navy
had been rendered useless by INIenschikoif's ingenious device,
and the army by itself could make little impression on
a fortress which six weeks before might have been taken by
assault, but was rendered every day more proof against
a siege by the greatest engineer of his day. All that the
allies could do was to await the arrival of reinforcements,
and meanwhile hold their position on the bay of Balaclava
and the ridges above it. From that position ISIenschikofF
was determined to dislodge them. The attempt, known as
the battle of Inkerman, was made on November 5, with
the result that the Russians were compelled to retire with
the loss of 10,000 men. Now, if ever, was the moment to
storm the fortress. Raglan was in favour of it ; Canrobert,
however, again refused to concur ; and the opportunity of
dealing a really effective blow at Menschikoff's army was lost.

On November 14 a terrible disaster befell the allies.
A fierce hurricane, accompanied with storms of rain and
snow, sprang up, swept down the tents on shore, and destroyed
much of the shipping in the roads. The Prince, a new
steamer of 2,700 tons, was driven on the rocks and thirty
other ships foundered in the gale. Stores to the value of
£2,000,000 were lost, and the men were deprived of all that
might have rendered tolerable the cruel Crimean winter.

The gale was the real beginning of the sufferings which
have made the 'Crimean Winter' a byword in the history
of military administration. For many weary months the
condition of the British force before Sebastopol was deplor-
able. After the great fight of Inkerman (November 5) there
were no operations on a large scale in the field until the
middle of February. Nevertheless, the intermission of fight-
ing brought no cessation of toil or suffering to the unhappy
soldiers.

While the soldiers were thus toiling and suffering in the
trenches, the diplomatists were busy at Vienna. Austria,
whose policy during this phase of the Eastern Question was
consistently subtle, had set negotiations on foot towards
the end of 1854, and on December 28 the allied Powers,
in conjunction with Austria, presented to the Russian Pleni-

X THE CRIMEAN WAR 241

potentiary a Memorandum embodying the 'Four Points'.
They were as follows :

1. The exclusive protectorate exercised by Russia over

Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia was to cease, and
the privileges accorded by the Sultan to the princi-
palities were henceforward to be guaranteed collec-
tively by the five Powers ;

2. The navigation of the Danube was to be free ;

3. The preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea was to

be terminated ; and

4. Russia was to renounce all pretensions to a protectorate

over the Christian subjects of the Porte ; and the five
Powers were to co-operate in obtaining from the Sultan
the confirmation and observance of the religious privi-
leges of all the various Christian communities without
infringing his dignity or the independence of his
Crown.

The Conference formally opened on March 15, 1855, but
before that date arrived two events had occurred, each, in
its way, of profound significance. The first was the interven-
tion of Sardinia ; the second the death of the Tsar Nicholas.

On January 26, 1855, Count Cavour appended his signature Interven-
to a Convention with Great Britain and France, promising ganUnia
the adherence of Sardinia to the alliance. Of good omen for January,

-I QIC

the Western Powers, this step was incomparably the most
momentous in the diplomatic history of modern Italy. On
the face of it the resolution to take part in the war was at
once cynical and foolhardy. What part or lot had the little
sub-Alpine kingdom in the quarrel between Russia and the
Western Powers ? To Cavour the mere question seemed to
imply ' a surrender of our hopes of the future '. Accordingly,
despite bitter opposition at home, 18,000 Italians were by
the end of April on their way to the Crimea, under the
command of General Alfonso La Marmora. 'You have
the future of the country in your haversacks.' Such was
Cavour's parting injunction to the troops. The response
came from a soldier in the trenches, ' Out of this mud Italy
will be made '. It was.

1984 J(

242

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Death of
the Tsav
Nicholas,
IVIarch 2,
1855.

Confer-
ence of
Vienna.

l^rogress
of the war

The adhesion of Sardinia came as a timely encouragement
to the allies. To all those who were longing and working for
peace the death of the Tsar Nicholas seemed of still happier
augury. Nicholas was unquestionably the prime author of
the war ; he had sustained it with unflagging energy, and he
was bitterly disappointed at his failure to bring it to a rapid
and brilliant termination. What Russian arms failed to accom-
plish at the Alma, at Balaclava, and at Inkerman, ' Generals
January and February' might be trusted to achieve. But,
as Punch felicitously pointed out, ' General February turned
traitor '. The Tsar was attacked by influenza, to which on
March 2, 1855, he succumbed. The news of his death evoked
profound emotion throughout Europe, more particularly at
Vienna, Avhere the Conference was in progress.

The accession of the new Tsar, Alexander II, did not, how-
ever, render the Russian Plenipotentiaries more pliable. The
real crux lay in the proposed limitation of Russian naval
preponderance in the Black Sea. To that point Palmerston
in particular attached the greatest importance, and on it the
negotiations, at the end of April, broke down.^

Notwithstanding the failure of the diplomatists at Vienna
the war was nearing its end. Still, there was a great deal of
hard fighting round Sebastopol during the spring and summer
of 1855. On February 17 a Russian force, 40,000 strong, made
a determined effort to take Eupatoria by storm, but was
gallantly repulsed by the Turks under Omar Pasha, supported
by a French detachment and by five men-of-war in the road-
stead. After four hours' continuous fighting the Russians
retired with considerable loss. In March the Russians
advanced the defensive works of Sebastopol into the allied
lines by the seizure and fortification of a knoll known as the
Mamelon Vert, and by the construction of a number of rifle
pits. Desperate efforts were made by the allies to dislodge
them from these advanced points, but without avail.

Towards the end of May, however, the allies planned and
executed a diversion at the south-eastern extremity of the
Crimea. A combined fleet, under Sir Edmund Lyons and

1 The history of these negotiations may be followed in minute detail in
Goriainow, op, cit., chap. xi.

X THE CRIMEAN WAR 243

Admiral Briiat, with a considerable force of English, French,
and Turkish troops left Sebastopol on May 22, and three
days later captured Kertch and made themselves complete
masters of the Straits of Yenikale, which lead from the Black
Sea into the Sea of Azov. This expedition, brilliantly suc-
cessful both in conception and execution, contributed in no
slight degree to the general purpose of the campaign. The
stores destroyed at Kertch were computed to amount to
nearly four months' rations for 100,000 men — a very serious
loss for the Russian army in the Crimea.

On May 16 Canrobert asked to be relieved of his command,
and was succeeded by General Pelissier, who was not only
a great soldier, but was possessed of the moral courage
which Canrobert lacked. He soon infused fresh vigour into
the operations before Sebastopol. On June 18 a tremendous
assault was delivered by the allies upon the Russian position ;
the French directed their attack upon the Malakoff, the
English upon the Redan, two formidable outworks on the east
of the fortress. Both attacks were repulsed by the Russians
with heavy loss. The failure of the attack upon the Redan
was a bitter disappointment to Lord Raglan, who, enervated Death of
by anxiety and worn out by ceaseless toil, was carried j^jj^j
oif by cholera on June 28. A braver soldier and a more
gallant gentleman never breathed. The continuance of the
French alliance was the best tribute to the extraordinary
tact with which for two years he had eased the friction
incidental to a difficult situation ; the fall of the great fortress
was the posthumous reward of his persistency and courage.
General James Simpson succeeded to the command, and
reaped where Raglan had sown.

Slowly but surely the allied armies pushed forward their The Fall
lines towards the Russian fortifications. Once more the ^^^^ ^^
covering army, under the command of Prince Michael
Gortschakoff, made a desperate and gallant effort to raise
the siege. On the night of August 15-16 the Russians
descended from the Mackenzie Heights upon the Tchemaya
river, Avhere the Sardinian contingent, under General La
Marmora, got their first real chance. Nor did they miss it.
Fighting with the utmost gallantry they contributed in no

B 2

244 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap,

small degree to the decisive repulse of the Russian army.
Thus were Cavour's calculations precisely fulfilled. In the
waters of the Tchernaya the stain of Novara was wiped out
for ever ; out of the mud of the Crimean trenches was modern
Italy built up. Henceforward Cavour could speak with his
enemies in the gate. The victory of the allies at the Tchernaya
shattered the last hopes of the besieged from the army in the
field. For three weeks the allies kept up a continuous and
terribly destructive fire upon the devoted fortress, and on
September 8 the attack which had been foiled in June was
renewed. The British, with a force miserably inadequate,
again attacked the Redan and were again with great loss
repulsed, but the Malakofi" — the real key of the position — was
already in the hands of their allies.

The storming of the Malakofi" cost the French 7,500 in
killed and wounded, including fifteen generals, but it pre-
luded the fall of Sebastopol. Within a few hours the Russians
blew up the magazines, withdrew across the harbour to the
north, and on September 9, after a siege of 349 days, the
allies occupied the burning ruins of the fortress that had
been. The Russian garrison was unwisely permitted to make
good its retreat, and thus the fall of Sebastopol did not bring
the war to an immediate conclusion.
Fall of On November 28 General Fenwick Williams was com-

Kars. pelled to surrender the fortress of Kars. He had been sent
to reorganize the Turkish forces in Armenia, and with a small
Turkish garrison had been holding Kars for nearly six months
against overwhelming odds. It was an heroic defence and it
won for Fenwick Williams undying fame. A Turkish force
had been dispatched too tardily to the relief of Kars, and
before it arrived the little garrison was starved out. General
Mouravieff's success at Kars was a slight set-ofi" against the
surrender of Sebastopol, and predisposed the mind of the Tsar
Alexander to peace.
Treaty The Emperor Napoleon was even more anxious for it.

Ma^ch 30 ^® ^^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^® could out of the war ; the French army
1856, ' had gained fresh lustre from its concluding passages ; the
English army had not. Napoleon's restless mind was already
busy with the future disposition of Europe. He was looking

X THE CRIMEAN WAR 245

towards Russia and towards Italy ; for England he had no
further use. Cavour too had got all he wanted. The
main obstacle to peace was Lord Palmerston. He was
gravely mistrustful of France, and still more so of Austria.
And he had reason. The part played by Austria was
crafty, selfish, and even treacherous. Her interest was
concentrated upon the Principalities. She had induced
England and France to pick the chestnuts out of the fire
for her there. Russia having been induced to withdraw from
the Principalities, not by the threats of Austria, but by the
action of England and France, Austria had promptly occupied
them, and had thus enabled Russia to concentrate her efibrts
upon the Crimea. Finally, as soon as there was a chance of
peace, Austria spared no effort to detach Napoleon from the
English alliance. In this she nearly succeeded ; but on January
16, 1856, the Tsar (at the instance of his brother-in-law
the King of Prussia) accepted as a basis of negotiation the
^Four Points V including a stipulation for the neutraliza-
tion of the Black Sea ; on February 1 a protocol embody-
ing these terms was concluded by the representatives of the
five Powers at Vienna, and the definitive Peace was signed at
Paris on March 30, 1856. The main terms were as follows :
1. The Sublime Porte was formally admitted, on the
invitation of the six Powers (including the King
of Sardinia), to 'participate in the public law and
concert of Europe ', and the Powers engaged severally
to respect, and collectively to guarantee 'the inde-
pendence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman
Empire '.
^. The Sultan, ' in his constant solicitude for the welfare of
his subjects ', announced to the Powers his intention
to ameliorate their condition ' without distinction of
creed or race ' ; but the Powers, while recognizing
' the high value of this communication ', expressly
repudiated the ' right to interfere, either collectively
or separately ', in the internal affairs of Turkey.
S. The Black Sea was neutralized, its waters and ports
were to be open to the mercantile marine of every

' Cf. supra, p. 241.

246

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Conven-
tions.

Treaty
of Paris,
April 15,
1856.

nation, but permanently 'interdicted to the flag of
war ' ; and there were to be no arsenals, either Russian
or Turkish, on its coasts.

4. Kars was to be restored to the Turks, and the Crimea to

Russia.

5. The navigation of the Danube was to be open on equal

terms to the ships of all nations, under the control of
an international conmiission.

6. Southern Bessarabia was to be ceded by Russia ta

Moldavia. The Principalities of Moldavia and Wal-
lachia were to remain under the suzerainty of the
Porte ; Russia renounced her exclusive protectorate
over them, and the contracting Powers collectively
guaranteed their privileges. They were to enjoy 'an
independent and national administration with full
liberty of worship, legislation, and commerce, and were
to have ' a national armed force '. In each province
a national Convention was to be held ' to decide the
definitive organization of the Principalities '.

7. The liberties of Serbia were to be similarly guaranteed.
To the main Treaty of Paris there were annexed three

Conventions of the same date. With one between England,
France, and Russia respecting the Aland Islands we are not
here concerned. A second, concluded between the six Powers
on the one part and the Sultan on the other part, reaffirmed
in the most specific manner the ancient rule of the Ottoman
Empire according to which the Straits of the Dardanelles
and of the Bosphorus are closed to foreign ships of war, so
long as the Porte is at peace. A third, concluded between
the Tsar and the Sultan, defined the force and number of
light vessels of war which under Art. xiv of the main treaty
they were authorized to maintain in the Black Sea, not-
withstanding the neutralization of its waters and its ports,
for the service of their coasts.

Under a separate treaty, concluded on April 15, Great
Britain, Austria, and France agreed to guarantee, jointly
and severally, the independence and the integrity of the
Ottoman Empire ; they pledged themselves to regard any
infraction as a cams belli, and undertook to come to an

X THE CRIMEAN WAR 247

understanding with the Sultan and with each other as to the
measures necessary for rendering their guarantee effectual.

By an Addendum to the Treaty, known as the Declaration of Declaia-
Paris, it was agreed to abolish privateering, and to proclaim p^jjj^
as permanently accepted principles of maritime war the con-
cessions in favour of neutrals made during the recent war by
England and France : (1) a neutral flag was to cover an enemy's
goods, except contraband of war ; (2) neutral merchandise,
except contraband, was not to be seized under an enemy's flag ;
and (3) a blockade must be ' effective ', i. e. maintained by an
adequate naval force. Such were the terms of the treaty
which crowned the conclusion of the Crimean War.

What had the war achieved ? In reference to one of the Results of
most difficult and most interesting of the questions which * ^® ^^'''*^-
the war had forced to the front, the future of the Principalities,
nothing need now be said, as the subject w411 be considered in
detail in the next chapter. So acute was the controversy on
this point during the negotiations at Vienna and Paris that
it was ultimately agreed that only the general principles of
the settlement should be laid down in the formal treaty, and
that their application should be left to be determined in
a subsequent convention.

Of the other results of the war the most obvious was the Tho
new lease of life secured to the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan Emph-e"
was to have his chance, free from all interference, friendly or
otherwise, from his powerful neighbour, to put his house in
order. He could enter upon his task with renewed self-respect,
tor was he not at last admitted to the most polite society of
Europe ? And his subjects should realize the spontaneity of
his beneficence ; if he chose to persecute, it was his affkir :
the Powers had expressly repudiated the right of interference ;
equally, if he chose to extend civil or religious liberty, the
extension was the outcome of his own loving-kindness towards
his people. Such was the formal position secured to the
Ottoman Empire by the Treaty of Paris. Yet the Sultan,
if he were wise, could not fail to observe that the guarantee
of independence and integrity vouchsafed to him by the
Powers imposed upon them a corresponding obligation.
Morally, if not legally, they were bound to see to it that

248 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

the Porte behaved in accordance with the unwritten rules of
polite society. In repudiating the exclusive protectorship
of Russia they assumed a responsibility for the good goveni-
ment of the Christian subjects of the Porte which the Sultan
could ignore only at his peril. On this point much will,
unfortunately, have to be said later on.
Kussia. To Russia the Treaty of Paris involved, for the time being,

a bitter disappointment, if not a profound humiliation. For
a century and a half she had pursued with singular con-
sistency three main objects : to establish her naval and com-
mercial supremacy on the waters and coasts of the Black
Sea ; to secure a free outlet to the Mediterranean ; and to
obtain from the Porte an acknowledgement of her position as
champion of the liberties, political and ecclesiastical, of the
Christian subjects of the Sultan. At times there had floated
before the eyes of Russian rulers, notably those of the Tsarina
Catherine, dreams even more ambitious. The Treaty of Paris
not only dissipated completely all ideas of partition, but
involved a disastrous set back to those more sober and prosaic
aims which had inspired Russian policy from the days of
Peter the Great to those of Alexander II.

'J^"he The neutralization of the Black Sea was of special concern

Black Sea

Question. ^^ England, as the leading Naval Power of the world. To the

growth of the naval power of Russia, England, as we have
seen, had become, in recent years, increasingly sensitive. The
prolonged siege of Sebastopol had naturally made a profound
impression upon the public mind. To allow Russia, in the
complete security afforded by the closing of the straits, to
build up a great naval force, and to convert the shores of the
Black Sea into a great arsenal, seemed sheer madness to the
Power which had large interests in the Near East and was
paramount in the Far East.

Regarded from the Russian point of view the neutralization
of the Black Sea Avas an insolent and intolerable interference
in the domestic concerns of the Russian Empire, an attempt,
inspired by petty jealousy, to arrest her natural and inevit-
able development. It Mas, therefore, absolutely certain that
Russia would seize the first favourable opportunity to get rid
of the shackles imposed upon her by the Treaty of Paris.

X THE CRIMEAN WAR 249

The opportunity came with the outbreak, in 1870, of the Bismarck
Franco-German War. Bismarck owed Russia a very heavy t?^ •
debt ; the time had come to discharge it. Not that the
obligations were all on one side. In the Crimean War the
neutrality of Prussia was, as we have seen, more than
benevolent towards Russia. During the Polish insurrection
of 1863 Bismarck performed a signal service to the Tsar.
For he not only kept a strict guard upon the western frontier
of Russian Poland, but warded off the possible interference
of Austria and the Western Powers. Bismarck's assistance,
however, was never given without precise calculation. Each
move in the great diplomatic game which he played during
the next eight years was already in his mind, and in the
course of that game Russia would be able to repay very
amply any obligations incurred in 1863. Nor was Bismarck
disappointed in the issue. The success of his policy in regard
to the Danish Duchies in 1864, in regard to Austria and the
Germanic Confederation in 1866, not least in regard to France
in 1870, depended very largely upon the diplomatic goodwill
of the Tsar, Alexander I. In 1864 Russia not only allowed
the Treaty of London to be broken by Prussia, but declared
herself ready to forgo her own claims upon Holstein and
Oldenburg. In 1866 she avowedly regarded Prussia as ' the
avenging instrument of Russian wrath ' upon an ungrateful
Austria. In 1870 it was Russia who kept Austria quiet while
Bismarck w^orked his Avill upon France.

Such services demanded substantial requital. The means Russia
were ready to hand. In October, 1870, Prince Gortschakoff g^*^ *^| ^
addressed to the Powers a circular denouncing on behalf of
Russia the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris (1856),
and declaring that the Tsar proposed to resume his ' sovereign
rights' in the Black Sea. The step, if not actually sug-
gested, was certainly approved beforehand by Bismarck.
In justification of the action of Russia Gortschakoff cynically
referred to the ' infringements to which most European trans-
actions have been latterly exposed, and in the face of which
it would be difficult to maintain that the written law . . .
retains the moral validity which it may have possessed at
other times'. In plain English the Tsar saw no reason

250 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

why he should observe treaties when other people broke
them.

The Russian circular evoked strong opposition both in
England and in Austria. Lord Granville expressed the ' deep
regret' of his Government at 'an arbitrary repudiation of
a solemn engagement', and declared that England 'could
not possibly give her sanction '. Count Beust, the Austrian
minister, expressed himself as 'painfully affected' by the
behaviour of the Tsar, and found it ' impossible to conceal
his extreme astonishment thereat '.

But Gortschakoff went on his way unheeding. Bismarck
was behind him, and Bismarck was confident that though
England might bark she would not bite.

He had reason for his confidence. Plainly there were but
two courses open to Great Britain : either to acquiesce in the
bold and cynical action of the Tsar, or, without allies, to fight
him. To declare war upon Russia, at this juncture, would
be to provoke the Armageddon which England was using all
her endeavours to avert. Was the game worth the candle ?
Lord Derby declared that ' he would fight for the neutrality
of Egypt, but not for the neutrality of the Black Sea '.^ And
he expressed the general opinion on the subject. In face of
that opinion Lord Granville had no option but to extricate
his country from a disagreeable situation with as little loss of
prestige as possible. Accordingly, Bismarck was induced to
invite the Great Powers to a conference to discuss the ques-
tions raised by Prince GortschakofF's circular. Great Britain
assented on condition that the conference met not at St.
Petersburg but in London, and that it should not assume
' any portion of the Treaty to have been abrogated by the
discretion of a single Power '. This assumption may be re-
garded as solemn farce ; the conclusion was foregone ; but
Lord Granville was wisely attempting to put the best face
upon an episode, somewhat discreditable to all parties. The
conference met in London in December, 1870, and Lord Gran-
ville got all the satisfaction he could out of a solemn protocol,
declaring it to be ' an essential principle of the law of nations

* Odo Russell to Grranville, ap. Fitzmaurice, ii. 72.

X THE CRIMEAN WAR 251

that no Power can liberate itself fi-om the engagements of
a Treaty . . . unless with the consent of the contracting Powers
by means of an amicable arrangement '. For the rest Russia
got what she Avanted.^

By the Treaty of London the Black Sea clauses (Arts, xi, Treaty of
xiii, and xiv) of the Treaty of Paris were abrogated ; but the jviarch 13
Black Sea was to remain open to the mercantile marine of all 1871.
nations as heretofore ; at the same time the closing of the
straits was confirmed with the additional proviso that the
Sultan was empowered to open them in time of peace to the
warships of friendly and allied Powers, if necessary, in order
to secure the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of
Paris.

That English prestige suffered severely from the emascula-
tion of that treaty can hardly be denied. To the Black Sea
clauses she had attached great importance ; from a selfish
point of view she had little else to show for a heavy expendi-
ture in men and money.

France had not much more. But though France gained France
little by the Crimean War, Napoleon gained much. In 1853 |"r(jinia.
his position in Europe was far from assured ; the Crimean
War established it ; and until the advent of Bismarck his
influence upon the Continent was almost overwhelming. The
war gained him, paradoxically, the fi-iendship of Russia : the
peace lost him the confidence of England.

The greatest gainer by the war, excepting the Porte, was
Italy. Cavour's prudent calculations were precisely fulfilled.
He took his place, despite the angry protest of Austria, at
the Council Board in Paris, as the representative not merely
of Sardinia but of Italy. In the name of Italy he denounced
the misgovernment of the two Sicilies ; for Italy he conciliated
the sympathy of Great Britain and the active assistance
of Napoleon. The intervention of Sardinia in the Crimean
War gave to her a place in the Concert of Europe, and gave
to her the I'ight as well as the opportunity to champion the
cause of Italian liberation. At the Congress of Paris Cavour
and the Emperor Napoleon came to an understanding ; it was

1 Cf. Holland, European Concert in the Eastern Question (with texts
in full), p. 272. *

252 THE EASTERN QUESTION

sealed two years later by the pact of Plombieres ; it bore
fruit in the war of 1859.

The Crimean War was, then, supremely significant in
relation to the fortunes of more than one of the nations of
modern Europe. A keen student of affairs has expressed
his conviction that if the war had not been fought ' the two
subsequent decades of the century would not have seen the
formation of a United Italy and a United Germany, and all its
consequences '.^ But it is as an epoch in the evolution of the
Eastern Question that it must in these pages be considered.
Some of its consequences, in that connexion, were palpable
even to contemporaries. To these attention has already been
drawn. Other consequences neither were, nor could have
been, perceived by the men of that day. And these were the
more enduring. Subsequent chapters will disclose them.

^ Lord Fitzmaurice, Life of the Second Earl Granville, i. 99.

Works for further reference. For documents : Uasterti Papers, presented
to Parliament, 1854-6. For texts : T. E. Holland, European Concert in
the Eastern Question. Serge Goriainow (as befoi'e) ; Kambaud, History
of Russia (trans.) ; Sir Herbert Maxwell, Life and Letters of the Fourth
Earl of Clarendon ; Duke of Argyll, Autobiography ; Ashley, Life of
Lord Palnierston ; Martin, Life of Prince Consort ; Letters of Queen
Victoria (ed. Lord Esher and A. C. Benson) ; IMorley, Life of Gladstone ;
Parker, Life of Sir James Graham ; Lane Poole, Life of Lord Stratford
de Bedcliffe; P. de la Gorce, Histoire du Second Emjnre; '^. Ollivier,
V Empire Liberal; Debidour, JEfis^oire diplomatique', Kinglake, Invasion
of the Crimea ; Sir E. B. Hamley, The War in the Crimea ; Sir E. Wood,
The Crimea in 1S54 and 1894- For the Sardinian intervention : Thayer,
Life of Cavour, and Bolton King, History of Italian Unity.

CHAPTER XI
THE MAKING OF ROUMANIA

'Un ilot latin au milieu de rocean slave et finnois qui Tenvironne.' —
Barok Jean de Witte.

' La Roumanie est latine d'origine et d'aspirations : elle a constamment
mis son orgiieil a le dire et a le repeter. . . . Nous ne sommes ni Slaves, ni
Germains, ni Turcs ; nous sommes Roumains.' — Alexandek Stuedza.

• La Dacie devint comme une Italie nouvelle. Ces Italiens du Danube
et des Carpathes ont conserve dans I'histoire le nom des Remains qui leur
donnerent leur sang, leur laugue, leur civilisation; ils s'appellent les
Roumains et leur pays la Roumanie.' — G. Lacour-Gayet.

The Crimean War was fought ostensibly to maintain tlie The
independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. That ^™ean
principle received its consecration in the Treaty of Paris. theBalkan
The supreme purpose which inspired the Western Powers in J\atJonaW-
their joint enterprise was to repudiate the claims of Russia
to an exclusive protectorate over the Christian subjects of
the Porte, and to arrest her progi-ess in the Black Sea and
the narrow straits. That purpose was apparently achieved
in 1856.

But contemporaries were as usual slow to apprehend the
things which really belonged unto their peace. Beneath the
surface of Balkan politics there Avere fires smouldering, forces
silently at work, which, in the middle of the nineteenth
century, few people could have perceived. Meanwhile the
soldiers and diplomatists were working better than they
knew. They set out to repel Russia and to save Turkey.
AVhat they really saved was not the effete rule of the Ottoman
Sultan, but the future of nations which were not yet reborn.

Of these the first to come to the birth was that which we Rouraa-
know as the Kingdom of Roumania, but which figures in the ^^^'
Treaty of Paris as the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia.
The diplomatists at Paris were, however, content to lay
down certain broad principles embodied in Articles xx to
xxvii of the treaty, leaving it to a Special Commission at

254

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Sketch
of the
history
of the
princi-
pahties.

Michael
the Brave
(1595-
1601).

Bucharest to ' investigate the present state of the principali-
ties and to propose bases for their future organization '. A
Divan ad hoc was also to be convoked in each of the two
provinces to express the wishes of the people in regard to
the definitive organization of the principalities. The results
of this somewhat startling recognition of the right of a people
to a voice in its own political destiny will be in due course
recounted. It seems, in the meantime, desirable to preface
the story of the making of the modern State of Roumania by
a rapid sketch of the previous history of the principalities.

The Roumanians occupy, in more ways than one, a unique
place among the Balkan peoples. A Latin people, surrounded
by Slavs and Magyars, they were never really absorbed, like
the Serbs, Bulgars, and Greeks, into the Ottoman Empire.
About the year a.d. 101 Trajan, as we have seen, organized
the province of Dacia, and a province of the Roman Empire
it remained until the close of the third century. About the
year 271 the Roman legions were withdrawn, and the colonists,
in order to avoid the barbarian inroads, fled into the Car-
pathians. For the next thousand years Dacia was merely
a highway for successive hosts of barbarian invaders. But
they came and went, and none of them, except the Slavs,
left any permanent impress upon land or people. As the
barbarian flood subsided the Daco-Roumans emerged from
their mountain fastnesses, and towards the close of the
thirteenth century established the Principality of Wallachia,
and a century later that of Moldavia. The former was
reduced to vassaldom by the Turks in 1412, the latter in
1512 ; but neither principality ever wholly lost the sense or
the symbols of independence. Both paid tribute to the
Sultan, but down to the eighteenth century they continued
to elect their own rulers.

Towards the close of the sixteenth century there occuri-ed
a brilliant interlude in the somewhat sombre history of the
principalities. In the year 1593 Michael the Brave became
Voyvode of Wallachia, and inaugurated his brief but brilliant
reign by flinging down a challenge to the Ottomans, then
hardly past the meridian of their fame. Engaged in their
prolonged contest with the Habsburg Emperors the Turks

XI THE MAKING OF ROUMANIA 255

quickly realized the importance of Michael's defection, and
turned aside from the Hungarian campaign to inflict upon their
revolted vassal the punishment due for so daring a defiance
of their suzerainty. But INIichael's forces, though hopelessly
outnumbered, won at Kalougareni a decisive victory over
the Ottoman army under Sinan Pasha (August 13, 1595).
Strengthened by reinforcements from Transylvania and
Moldavia, the victor pursued his advantage with such efffect
as to drive the Turks in headlong rout across the Danube.
At a single stroke the independence of AVallachia was tem-
porarily achieved.

Victorious over the Turks Michael then turned to the Union

higher task of reuniting under one crown the whole 2f*^®

mi . 1 1 1 . 1 • 1 • , Roumans.

Roumanian people. This also he achieved with singular

success. Sigismund Bathory, Voyvode of Transylvania,

suddenly resigned his crown to the Emperor Rudolph, and

transferred to the latter such rights as he supposed himself

to possess over Wallachia. Michael nominally accepted the

suzerainty of the emperor, but the turn of events then gave

him the opportunity of conquering Transylvania for himself.

He eagerly embraced it, inflicted a crushing defeat upon

a rival claimant at Schellenburg (October 28, 1599), and

established himself as Voyvode of Transylvania. He then

turned his attention to Moldavia. That also was reduced to

submission, and thus for a brief space the whole Roumanian

people were united under Michael ' the Brave '. It would

be affectation to suggest that this achievement was regarded,

at the time, as a triumph of the nationality principle. That

principle had not yet emerged as a political force, and the

sentiments of the Roumanians in Transylvania and Moldavia

were entirely opposed to the rule of Michael. The significance

of his achievement was wholly proleptic. Michael's reputation

as a ' Latin hero ' really results from the revival of national

self-consciousness in the nineteenth century. The Roumans

of Transylvania and Moldavia regarded him, in his own day,

as a meddlesome usurper. The Roumanians of to-day look

to him as the national hero, who, for a brief space, realized

the unity of the Roumanian people. What Roumania was

under Michael the Brave, the Greater Roumania may be

256 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

again. Michael's, therefore, is the name with which to conjure
among the Roumanian irredentists. The temporary union of
the various Rouman provinces was, however, dissolved by
the assassination of Michael in 1601, and with him died all
hopes of unity or even of independence for more than two
centuries.
Theeigh- The fortunes of the principalities touched the nadir in
century, ^^e eighteenth century. Suleiman the Magnificent had, in
1536, concluded an arrangement, by which the election of
the ruling princes was left to the principalities themselves.
But in 1711 even this remnant of independence was extin-
guished. The hospodarships of the two principalities were
put up by the Porte to auction and were invariably knocked
down to Phanariote Greeks. For one hundred and ten
years, therefore (1711-1821), Moldavia and Wallachia were
ruled by a rapid succession of Greek bureaucrats. The more
rapid the succession the better for the Turks. Consequently,
each hospodar, knowing that his tenure would be brief,* had
perforce to make hay while the sun shone, and the system
was, as M. X^nopol has said, neither more nor less than
* organized brigandage '.
Habsburg Meanwhile, paradoxical as it may appear, the prospects of
me^nte^ ' Roumania sufiered from the weakening of Ottoman power
and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. By the Treaty
of Carlowitz the Turks were compelled, as we saw, to cede to
the Habsburgs the whole of Hungary, except the Banat of
Temesvar, together with the Roumanian Duchy of Transyl-
vania. By the Treaty of Passarowitz (1718) the recovery of
Hungary was completed by the cession of the Banat of
Temesvar, while at the same time the Habsburgs acquired
the whole of the territory known as Little Wallachia, that is
the portion of the principality bounded by the river Aluta.
The latter acquisition proved to be only temporary, for the
Turks recovered it by the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739. In
1775, however, the Habsburgs claimed and obtained from
the Turks the Bukovina. The Moldavian boyards energeti-

^ In 110 years there were thirty-seven hospodars in Wallachia and
thirty-thi-ee in Moldavia. Cf. SeigTioho», Political History of Europe ^
ii. 640.

XI THE MAKING OF ROUMANIA 257

cally protested to the Porte against the cession of a district
which was not merely an integral part of the principality but
contained their ancient capital, the mausoleum of their kings,
and other historical monuments and associations. The Porte,
despite a strong hint that the Moldavians might find it to
their interest to seek protection elsewhere, declined to recon-
sider its bargain with the emperor.

Had the Moldavians carried out their threat they would Russia
not have had to go far to find their new protector. Russia pi!-^*i.^
had begun, from the days of Peter the Great, to interest palities.
herself in the affairs of the Danubian principalities. That
interest was not ethnographical, but partly geographical and
partly ecclesiastical. The appearance of Russia as a Black
Sea Power raised an entirely new problem for the Roumanian
peoples, while the geographical situation of the principalities
suggested to the Russian strategists questions of the highest
significance. Russia had temporarily occupied Moldavia
during her war with the Turks, 1736-9, and both principali-
ties were occupied during the war which was ended by the
Treaty of Kainardji in 1774.

By that treaty, as we saw, Russia restored the principali-
ties to the Porte, but only on condition of better government ;
and she formally reserved to herself the right of remonstrance
if that condition was not observed. Five years later a
Convention exjylicative (1779) stipulated that the tribute
payable by the principalities to the Porte should be ' imposed
with moderation and humanity' ; a Russian consulate was,
against the wishes of the Sultan, established at Bucharest,
while the Prussian consul at Jassy complained of the activity
of the Russian agents in Moldavia.^ Clearly the policy of
peaceful penetration had begun.

The principalities occupied a noticeable place in the Catherine
agreement concluded between the Tsarina Catherine H and pj-jn^!}.
the Emperor Joseph H in 1781. The two sovereigns then palities.
decided that the time had arrived for the complete annihila-
tion of Ottoman power in Europe, and for the partition of
the dominions of the Sultan. Wallachia and Moldavia,

1 Miller, Ottoman Empire, p. 8.

1984 S

258 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

including Bessarabia, were to be erected into a new kingdom
of Dacia, and the crown Avas to be conferred upon Catherine's
favourite and minister, Count Potemkin. The grandiose
scheme, of which this was only one, though by no means the
least interesting feature, was not destined to materialize.
Six years later, however, Catherine and Joseph II were again
at war with the Porte, and when, in 1792, peace was concluded
at Jassy, the Russian frontier was advanced to the Dniester,
the Tsarina acquired the great fortress of Oczakov with the
surrounding districts, while Moldavia was restored to the
Sultan, but only on condition that the Porte fulfilled the
stipulations of the Treaty of Kutschuk-Kainardji and the Con-
vention ex2)licative.
Napoleon During the Napoleonic wars the principalities were re-
princi- garded merely as a pawn in the game of diplomacy and of war.
palities. Thus in the war of the Second Coalition the Porte found itself
in temporary alliance with Russia against France. Russia
improved the occasion to obtain for her clients an important
concession, and for herself a still stronger position as pro-
tectress. The Sultan agreed, in 1802, that henceforward the
hospodars should hold office for a fixed term of seven years
instead of at the good pleasure of the Porte, and that they
should not be deposed without the assent of the Tsar. "When,
in 1806, Napoleon compelled the Sultan to declare war upon
Russia, the latter retorted by an immediate invasion of the
principalities. Before twelve months Avere over Napoleon
had decided upon a new move in the diplomatic game,
and agreed at Tilsit to divide the world with the Tsar
Alexander. The Tsar's share was to include the Danubian
principalities. But the Tilsit concessions were never carried
out, and in 1812 the Tsar, anxious to secure his left flank,
agreed to evacuate the principalities, and to accept from the
Porte in full settlement of all immediate claims the province
of Bessarabia. This arrangement, reached through the media-
tion of England, was embodied in the Treaty of Bucharest.
Treaty of The Treaty of Bucharest was, for the Turks, a colossal
(1812). blunder ; to the Moldavians it involved a painful sacrifice.
Nor did it tend to assuage the bitter memory which the period
of Russian occupation had implanted in the minds of the

XI THE MAKING OF ROUMANIA 259

Roumanians. Though the Russians had come as ' liberators '
there is no period in the history of their country to which
the Roumanians look back with greater bitterness. More
particularly do they resent the fact that by the dismember-
ment of Moldavia a population which now numbers two
million Roumanians exchanged autonomy under the Sultan
for absorption in the Empire of the Tsar.

At the general settlement in 1815 the Porte made desperate
efforts to recover Bessarabia ; but Alexander was not likely
to forgo the only, and as he might reasonably think the
wholly inadequate, fruits of Russian diplomacy in the Near
East, and Bessarabia remained in his hands.

The next scene in the drama of Roumanian history opens The Pha-
on the Greek revolution of 1821. The selection of the J^^VJjJ^^^f
principalities for the initial rising, though intelligible, was, 1821.
as we saw, singularly unfortunate. The Roumanian nationalists
detested the Phanariote Greeks, and neither felt nor displayed
any enthusiasm for the Hellenic cause. Still, Hypsilanti's
insurrection had one important result. It led immediately
to the extinction of Phanariote rule in the principalities.
Greek hospodars were no longer acceptable to the Porte,
and from 1822 onwards the hospodars of both principalities
were selected from the native nobility.

To the Roumanians, however, the change brought little The pi-in-
advantage. It signified only a transference from one alien ^822-54).
master to another. From 1822, until the outbreak of the
Crimean War, the Russians enjoyed a virtual protectorate over
the principalities. The Convention of Akerman guaranteed
to them all their privileges ' under the guardianship of the
Cabinet of St. Petersburg '. The hospodars >vere to be
elected for a term of seven years by the native boyards, and
were not to be deposed by the Sultan without previous notice
to Russia. The Treaty of Adrianople (1829) provided for the
complete evacuation of the principalities by the Turks and
conferred upon them practical autonomy. They were to pay
tribute, at a slightly enhanced rate, to the Porte, but were to
be free from all requisitions for corn, corv^es, and the like.
No Moslems were henceforward to reside there, and those
who owned real property were to sell it within eighteen

s2

260 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

months. The hospodars were to hold office for life. Finally,
the Turks undertook not to retain any fortresses on the left
bank of the Danube, and to sanction the administrative regula-
tions made during the Russian occupation. These regulations
were embodied in a Reglement organique (1831) which the
Russians bequeathed as a parting gift to the inhabitants
when, in 1834, their occupation determined.
The In- In some respects the Russian administration of the prin-

^"^^o f^'^^^ cipalities had been excellent, but the material benefits which
of 1848. . p , . ro .

it conferred upon them were insufficient to counterbalance

the loss of independence. Nor did Russian interference
end with their formal evacuation. So bitter was the anti-
Russian feeling that in 1848 the people of the principalities
appealed to their nominal suzerain, the Sultan, to deliver
them from their 'liberators', and raised the standard of
a national insurrection.

For Europe at large the year 1848 was essentially the
' year of revolution ' ; and nowhere did the fire burn more
fiercely than in the heterogeneous empire which owned
the Habsburgs as lords. Germans, Czechs, Magyars, Italians
were all in revolt. But, while the Magyars of Hungary were
in revolt against Vienna, they had themselves to confront
a separatist movement within the borders which they
regarded as their own. The feeling of Magyar against
German was not more intense than the feeling of the
Roumans of Transylvania against the Magyar. The nationalist
fever had got into the blood of Europe, and, while the
Transylvanian Roumans rose against Buda-Pesth, the Cis-
Carpathian Roumans attempted once for all to throw off"
the yoke of St. Petersburg. Neither movement achieved
any large measure of success. The Tsar Nicholas, as we
have seen in another connexion, went to the assistance of
the young Emperor Francis Joseph and crushed the insurrec-
tions in Hungary and Transylvania, and, at the same time,
in collusion with the Sultan, suppressed, without difficulty,
the rising in the principalities. Ostensibly, the only result
of the movement was the Convention of Balta Liman.
Conven- Under that Convention, concluded between the Sultan and
Bait ^^^^ "^^diV in May, 1849, the principalities were deprived of

XI THE MAKING OF ROUxMANIA 261

many of the privileges which they had previously enjoyed. Liman,
The tenure of the hospodars was again limited to seven years ; ^^ ^'
the representative assemblies were abolished, and they were
replaced by Divans, nominated by the princes.

Here, as in Italy and elsewhere, the ' year of revolution '
had come and gone, and to all outward seeming had left
things worse than before. Not so, in reality. Good seed
had been planted ; the attempt to reap prematurely had
failed ; Avithin a decade it was to ft-uctify, and before the
century closed was to yield an abundant harvest.

The growth was native, but the culture was French. French
Ineffective as the movement of ] 848 was, its inspiration was ^"A'^^^ce
due to self-conscious nationalism. The nationalist spirit was mania.
fostered in part by the spread of education at home, not
less by the historical and juristic studies pursued then, as
now, by the young nobles in Paris.

For to the French the Roumans have persistently looked
as the nearest of their blood relations ; their natural allies in
the secular struggle against Islamism on the one side and
Pan-Slavism on the other. Nor can the modern history of
Roumania be rightly apprehended unless this fact and all its
many implications be kept steadily in view.

Modern Roumania is 'un ilot latin au milieu de I'oc^an
slave et finnois qui I'environne'.^ Roumanian historians love
to recall the Roman origin of their race.- But the primary
debt, intellectual and political, acknowledged and emphasized
by the modern Roumanian, is not to Italy but to France.
'Nous sommes Roumains,' writes M. Alexander Sturdza,
the honoured bearer of an honoured Roumanian name,
* c'est-^-dire Latins ; et parlant ethniquement apparent^s
k la France. La Roumanie moderne poursuit la realisation
d'une oeuvre ^minemment nationale, mais elle aime sa soeui*
ain^e, sa bienfai trice, la France.'

The debt warmly acknowledged in Roumania is proudly
claimed in France : ' C'est sous notre influence que la nation

1 De Witte, op. cit., p. 2.

- Cf. for example the speech of the Roumanian historian, V. A. Urechia,
in Rome : ' Nous sommes ici pour dire a tout le monde que Rome est notre
mere ' (cited by Mavrodin).

262

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP,

The prin-
cipalities
in the
Crimean
War.

The
Treaty
of Paris.

roumaine s'est form^e et a grandi ; ce sont les travaux de
nos ^crivains, de iios historiens, qui out r^v^le sa veritable
origine alors ignor^e en Europe.' ^

From France, then, came the spark which fired the in-
surrection of 1848. The flame, for the moment, flickered
out, but the fire was smouldering. It broke into flame again
after the Crimean War. That war marks an epoch of gi-eat
significance in the history of modern Roumania. On the
first hint of trouble with Turkey the Tsar, as we have seen,
sent a force, as usual, to occupy the principalities. But
after their failure to take Silistria (June, 1854) the Russians
retired across the Pruth, and Austria occupied the principali-
ties ; the Emperor Francis Joseph having pledged himself to
protect them, during the war, and to restore them to the
Sultan on the conclusion of peace.

When the terms of that Peace came to be considered at
Vienna, and afterwards in Paris, the future position of
Moldavia and Wallachia proved to be a subject of acute
controversy between the Powers. The question of frontiers
was the least of the difficulties, and was settled by the
restoration of the southern portion of Bessarabia to Moldavia.
Three other points were quickly decided : the Russian pro-
tectorate was to be abolished ; the suzerainty of the Sultan
to be maintained ; the principalities themselves were to be
virtually independent. The Emperor Napoleon had, indeed,
originally suggested that they should be handed over to
Austria, in return for the cession of Lombardy and Venetia
to Sardinia. This characteristic but over-ingenious scheme
found no favour in any quarter ; Austria had no mind for
the bargain ; Russia naturally opposed the idea ; while the
provinces themselves saw no advantage in getting rid of
the Russians and the Turks in order to fall into the hands

1 de Witte, Quinze ans d'histoire, p. 8. Cf. also M. Georges Lacour-Gayet's
words : 'La France est certainement le pays, en dehors de la Eoumanie, oCi
les questions roumaines provoquent le plus de sympathie, o^ les interets
roumains sont le niieiix sentis et le mieux compris ' — ap. C. D. Mavi-odin,
La Rouvianie contemporaine (p. x) ; and cf. also the elaborate studies
of M. P. Eliade, VInfluence fran^aise sur Vesprit public en Roumanie
(Paris, 1898) ; and Histoire de Vesprit public en Roumanie au XIX' siecle
(Paris, 1905).

XI THE MAKING OF ROUMANIA 263

of the Habsburgs. They ardently hoped to achieve not
merely independence but union.

The former was virtually conceded in the Treaty of Paris,
by which the Porte engaged to preserve to the principalities
*an independent and national administration as well as full
liberty of worship, of legislation, of commerce, and of naviga-
tion'.^ The question as to the form of government was
postponed, and in order to ascertain the wishes of the
inhabitants the Sultan undertook 'to convoke immediately,
in each of the two provinces, a Divan ad hoc, composed in
such a manner as to represent most closely the interests of
all classes of society '.^

As to the wishes of the inhabitants there could be little
doubt, and, in Napoleon, the champion of nationality, the
Roumanians found a cordial supporter. Napoleon brought
Russia round to his views. Austria, on the other hand,
obstinate in her adherence to the policy Divide et hnj^era,
and justly fearful of the operation of the nationality principle
among her own subjects— particularly among the Roumans
of Transylvania and the Bukovina — offered a strenuous
opposition. The Porte was naturally on the side of Austria,
while the English Government, though not without consider-
able hesitation, eventually threw the weight of its influence
into the same scale, on the ground that having fought to
maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, it could
not logically support a project for its dismemberment.
Persigny, the French ambassador in London, thought the
entente with England much more important than the future
of the principalities, and made no secret of his opinions.^
Thouvenel, who represented France at Constantinople, was
no less solicitous as to the maintenance of French influence
over the Sultan, but behaved with greater discretion than
his colleague in London.'*

Under these circumstances much would obviously turn

1 Art. xxiii.

2 Art. xxiv.

3 Ollivier, VEmpire Lihiral, iii. 411.

* Cf. Louis Thouvenel, Trots Ans de la Question cTOrient (1856-9),
containing a number of important documents.

264

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

The

Fi'ench
Emperor
and Em-
press at
Osborne.

upon the views expressed b}^ the Divans ad hoc. The
elections were so manipulated by the provisional governors
appointed by the Porte as to obtain the result desired by
the Sultan. The scandal was so glaring that Thouvenel,
supported by the ambassadors of Russia, Prussia, and
Sardinia, entered an immediate protest, and, under the threat
of a diplomatic rupture, compelled the Porte to cancel the
results and hold the elections afi-esh.

Against this interference on the part of France and Russia
the English Government hotly protested. Lord Palmerston
and Lord Clarendon were now deeply committed to the
formula of ' the integrity of the Ottoman Empire ' ; still
more deeply was Lord Stratford de RedclifFe concerned to
maintain it. All three were profoundly suspicious of the
good faith of Napoleon III, and gravely disquieted by his
obvious rajyprocliement with Russia.

In August, 1857, however, the French Emperor, accom-
panied by the Empress and by his Foreign Minister, Count
AValewski, paid a visit to the English Court at Osborne.
The question of the principalities was exhaustively discussed,
and Napoleon urged very strongly that their 'union, by
rendering those countries contented, and particularly if well
governed by a European prince, would form an eflfectual
barrier against Russia, whilst the present disjointed and
unsatisfactory condition of those countries would make
them always turn towards Russia. The union was, there-
fore, in the interest of Turkey'.^ As to the last point
there may be a difference of opinion, but few people will
now be found to deny that in his main contention the
Emperor Napoleon was right, and the English statesmen
wrong. Among the latter there were, however, one or two
notable exceptions. The most notable was Mr. Gladstone,
who, for once in his life, found himself in cordial agxeement
with Napoleon III, being dra^\ii to the emperor's views by
his warm sympathy with the nationality principle. He was
not in office during the height of the crisis, but in ]\Iay, 1858,

* A record of this most important conversation, from the pen of the
]'rince Consort himself, ■will be found in Martin's Life of the Prince
Consort, vol. iv, pp. 99 sq.

XI THE MAKING OF ROUMANIA 265

he urged with characteristic vehemence that England ought
to support the declared M'ish of the people of Wallachia and
]\Ioldavia. 'Surely the best resistance to be offered to
Russia', he said, 'is by the strength and freedom of those
countries that will have to resist her. You want to place
a living barrier between Russia and Turkey. There is no
barrier like the breast of freemen.' ' Mr. Gladstone carried
with him into the division lobby not only Lord John Russell,
but Lord Robert Cecil. They were unable, however, to
prevail against the official view.

Meanwhile the diplomatic situation had become so grave
as to threaten a renewal of war in the Near East. Napo-
leon III stoutly maintained his o^vn views, and was supported
by Russia, Prussia, and Sardinia. If war did not actually
break out it was due partly to the sincere desire of the emperor
to avoid any breach in the good relations between the English
Court and his own ; partly to the natural reluctance of Russia
and England again to draw the swords so lately sheathed ;
partly to English pre-occupation with the Sepoy mutiny in
India ; but, above all, to the adroitness and tenacity of the
principalities themselves.

Fresh elections having been held, the Divans ad hoc
met in Jassy and Bucharest respectively (October, 1857).
The Moldavian Assembly, by 80 votes to 2, the Wallachian
Assembly, without a dissentient voice, declared in favour of
the 'union of the Principalities in a single neutral and
autonomous State, subject to the suzerainty of the Sultan,
and under the hereditary and constitutional government of
a foreign prince '.

What were the Powers to do? Again they met in con-
ference (May- August, 1858), and after nearly six months'
deliberation resolved that the two principalities must remain
politically separate : that each should have its own parliament
and its own prince, to be elected by itself, but that affairs
common to both should be entrusted to a joint commission
of sixteen members, consisting of deputies fi'om each parlia-
ment.

1 Morley's Gladstone, ii. 4.

266

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Election
of Coiiza.

Union
com-
pleted.

Rule of
Couza

(1861-6).

Educa-
tion.

This arrangement was both intrinsically clumsy and grossly
insulting to the national sentiment of the Roumanians, who,
with courage and ingenuity, resolved to cut the Gordian knot
for themselves.

The National Assemblies duly met in the two capitals, and
both unanimously elected as their prince the same man, a
native noble, Colonel Alexander Couza (January and
February, 1859).

This flagrant defiance of the will of Europe caused con-
siderable commotion in the Chancelleries ; but the Powers
eventually had the good sense to accept the accomplished fact ;
and on December 23, 1861, the union of the principalities was
formally proclaimed. The new-born State was christened
Roumania ; and an agreement was reached, not without
heart-burnings at Jassy, that the capital should be Bucharest.

The united principalities did not provide a bed of roses for
the prince of their choice ; his brief reign sufficed to demon-
strate the wisdom of the Roumanian leaders, who had, from
the first, expressed a strong preference for a foreign hereditary
dynasty. * The accession to the throne of princes chosen from
amongst us has ', they declared, ' been a constant pretext for
foreign interference, and the throne has been the cause of
unending feud among the great families of this country.'
Their misgivings were justified by the event.

Couza, though not conspicuous for domestic virtues, was
a man of enlightened views, and anxiously desired to improve
the social and economic condition of his people. Between
1862 and 1865 he carried through, despite much oppo-
sition from the * feudal ' party, a series of far-reaching
reforms, mainly concerned with education and the agra-
rian problem.

The condition of education in Roumania was, indeed,
deplorable, but Couza made a serious effort to improve it.
He founded two universities, one at Jassy and one at
Bucharest ; he established a number of secondary and techni-
cal schools, all of them free, and elementary education was
made not only gratuitous but nominally compulsory.^ Despite

* Since 1893, thanks to M. Take Jonescu, compulsion has been more than
nominal.

XI THE MAKING OF ROUMANIA 267

this fact the percentage of illiterates in Roumania is still
very large. ^ Couza then tackled the land question.

His first step was the secularization of monastic property. Agrarian
Not less than one-fifth of the land of the country had passed '"^f'^'^-
into the hands of the monks, who, to ensure themselves
against spoliation, had affiliated their houses to the monas-
teries of Roumelia, Mount Athos, and Mount Sinai, and to
the Patriarchies of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. The
device did not avail against the reforming zeal of Couza, who
set aside over 27 million francs for the compensation of the
patrons, but dissolved the monasteries, turned the abbots and
monks adrift, seized their property for national purposes, and
converted the houses themselves into hospitals and jails
(1863).

The problem which confronted Couza was similar to that
which, in the first years of the century. Stein and Hardenberg
had faced and solved in Prussia. Roumanian feudalism Avas,
in some respects, siii generis, but there, as elsewhere, the
essential difficulty in modernizing a feudal land system was
how, while respecting the vested interests of the ' lord ' and
the peasant owner respectively, to get rid of the legal and
economic incubus of dual ownership,

Couza solved the problem, mutatis mutandis, much as it
had been solved in Prussia. He abolished all dues, both in
labour and kind, in return for an indemnity advanced to
the lords by the State, to be repaid, in instalments, to the
latter by the peasants ; and he handed over one-third of
the land in unshackled proprietorship to the peasants,
leaving two-thirds in possession of the lords. That the
compromise did not satisfy the peasants is proved by the
fact that although some readjustment of the terms waseffected
in 1881, and again in 1889, the last thirty years have wit-
nessed no less than five insurrections among the Roumanian
peasantry.

The path of the reformer is never easy, and in order to Cm^p
overcome the opposition of the feudal and military parties, ]\iay2°
Couza was compelled, in May, 1864, to carry out a coup dJetat. 1864.

^ Some authorities say sixty per cent, of people over seven.

268 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

The army was employed to evict the deputies, and the prince
demanded a plebiscite from his people for or against the
policy which he propounded. The sole initiative in legisla-
tion was to belong to the prince ; a Senate, nominated by him,
was to be superadded to the Chamber, and the latter was to
be elected by universal suffrage. The plebiscite gave the
prince 682, 621 votes against 1,307. Couza's action, com-
pounded of Cromwellianism and Bonapartism, subsequently
received the sanction of the Powers.

Couza was now supreme, and the coiq) cVetat was followed,
appropriately enough, by the application of the Napoleonic
codes — civil, criminal, and commercial — with slight modifica-
tions, to Roumania. That the coup d'etat and its immediate
results were generally approved by the people there can be
no doubt, but the prince was assailed from many quarters :
by the ' reds ' who represented him as a pro-Russian dangerous
to the peace of Europe ; by the ' whites ' who disliked his
reforming activities ; by the constitutionalists who denounced
him as a bastard Bonaparte. Discontent reached a climax
in August, 1865, when, during the prince's absence at Ems,
a counter coup d'etat was attempted at Bucharest. The
Vienna Fremdenhlatt (August 5, 1865) detected in this
coup d'itat the first signs of a revolutionary movement which
would presently engulf not Roumania only, but Bosnia,
Bulgaria, and Serbia as well.^ Couza hurried back to
Roumania, but the movement against him rapidly gathered
force ; an association, comprising influential men from all
parties, was formed with the object of substituting for him
a foreign prince, and M. Jean Bratiano was sent abroad to
find a suitable candidate. In Paris Couza was denounced as
a Russian agent ; in St. Petersburg as the tool of Napoleon III.

Meanwhile, in February, 1866, the revolution had been
quietly effected at Bucharest. Couza was deposed and
deported, and a provisional government proclaimed as his
successor Prince Philip of Flanders.^ This prince was promptly
elected by the chambers, and their choice was ratified by
plebiscite. Hardly a voice was raised for Couza ; not a drop

' Dame, La Roumanie contemporaine, p. 146.
« Father of Kina: Albert of Belgium.

XI THE MAKING OF ROUMANIA 269

of blood was shed on liis behalf ; he passed silently out of
the land for which he had dared much, and seven years later
he died in exile.

Prince Philip of Flanders promptly declined the proffered
cro\Mi, which was thereupon offered to Prince Carol, the
second son of the Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, the
elder and Catholic branch of the family ruling at Berlin.

A cousin of the King of Prussia, Prince Carol was, Prince
through his grandmother, connected with the Bonapartes.^ Hohen°
The Emperor Napoleon was sounded as to his candidature zoUern-
through his intimate friend, Madame Hortense Cornu, and^^j^^'
approved it. King William of Prussia, dutifully consulted
by his kinsman, Avas more doubtful ; but Bismarck, who was
just about to plunge into war with Austria, perceived the
advantage of having a Hohenzollern at Bucharest, and urged
the prince to accept the offer, ' if only for the sake of a
piquant adventure '. The prince himself, if rumour be true,
had never heard of Roumania when the offer reached him,
but he took down an atlas, and, finding that a straight line
drawn from London to Bombay passed through Roumania,
exclaimed : ' That is a country with a future ', and promptly
decided to accept the crown. -

The provisional offer was conveyed to him by John Bratiano
on March 30 ; a plebiscite taken in April confirmed it ; and on
May 22 the prince, having travelled in disguise to the frontier,
made his formal entry into Bucharest.

A congress of the Powers at Paris had pronounced by four
votes to three against the candidature of the Prince, but,
like the Sultan himself, they ultimately accepted the accom-
plished fact, and a Hohenzollern prince, a Prussian dragoon,
reigned over the principalities.

The outstanding features of his long, and, on the whole. Rule of
prosperous, reign can here be indicated only in summary. Carol^

His first act was to summon a constituent assembly which (1866-
drafted, on the Belgian model, a very liberal Constitution. ^^^*^*

1 His maternal grandmother was Stephanie de Beauhaniais, adopted
daughter of Napoleon I, and his paternal grandmother was a !Murat.

2 Carmen Sylva, wife of King Carol, tells the story (De Witte, oj).
cit., p. 7).

270

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Anew
Constitu-
tion.

The
Church.

Accepted in 1866, and considerably amended in 1879 and 1884,
that Constitution is still in force. Like its prototype, it is
exceedingly meticulous, consisting of no less than 133 clauses.
Alone among the Balkan States may Roumania be said to
possess a monarchy which is genuinely ' constitutional ' in
the narrow English sense. The person of the king is, by
article 92, inviolable ; his ministers are responsible, no act
of the crown being valid unless signed by a responsible
minister. Subject to this responsibility the crown enjoys
the rights, and has to perform the duties, usually vested in
the executive of a Constitutional State. i The cabinet consists
of nine members, Avho are responsible to the legislature.
The latter is bicameral in form, but both chambers are
elective. In each case, however, the election is indirect, the
elections being made through electoral colleges, composed
of the taxpayers. Mho are divided into three colleges, accord-
ing to the amount of taxes paid. The franchise is, however,
higher in the case of the senatorial electors than in that
of electors to the popular chamber. The senate consists of
120 members, who must be at least forty years of age and
possess an income of £376 a year, and their term of office is
for eight years. It enjoys a position not only of dignity but
real power. The Chamber of Deputies consists of 183 mem-
bers, who are elected for four years and must be at least 13 ve-
and-twenty years of age.-

The Church has not played a part in the national evolution of
Roumania at all comparable to that which it played in Greece.
And for a simple reason. Greek in its allegiance, the Church
finds itself an alien institution among a Latin people. The
people have always associated it, therefore, with foreign
influences : with the Phanariote domination of the eighteenth
century ; with the Church of their Russian * protectors ' in the
first half of the nineteenth. Nevertheless, it was at once
a symptom and a result of reviving national self-consciousness

1 The reality of the constitutional limitations upon the personal will of
the sovereign was strikingly manifested, to the great advantage of the
Entente, on the outbreak of the present war (1914).

* The full text of the Constitution will be found in Dame, La Roumanie
contemporaine, Appendice, pp. 425 sq.

XI THE MAKING OF ROUMANIA 271

that the Roumanian Church should, in 1865, have declared
its independence of the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople.
Since that time the Church has been virtually autocephalous,
though its independence was not officially recognized by the
Greek Patriarch until 1885.

From a social and economic standpoint the reign of Social and
Prince Carol in Roumania has synchronized Avitli the trans- prooress.
formation of a mediaeval into a modern State. One or two
illustrations must suffice. In 1866 there did not exist a single
railway in the State ; in 1912 there were 3,690 kilometres of
railways. The export of cereals, which, in 1866, was less than
half a million tons, amounted, in 1918, to 1,320,235. Of petrol,
the production at the earlier date was 5,915 tons ; at the later
about two million. A budget of 56 million francs sufficed for
the country in 1866 ; it now exceeds 500 millions. In the war
of 1877-8 the army numbered 40,000, and Roumania possessed
not a single man-of-war ; the army now numbers more than
a million, and there is an embryo fleet of thirty-one ships.
Unlike most of the Balkan States Roumania possesses a
powerful native aristocracy, but out of a population of seven
and a half millions over one million are proprietors, and
most of the peasants own the land they cultivate. Industry
develops apace, but agriculture is still the main occupation
of the people, only twenty per cent, of whom dwell in toAras.
The natality is said to be, next to that of Russia, the highest
in Europe. The external trade of the country — consist-
ing mainly in the export of oil and cereals — is now about
fifty millions, and exceeds that of all the other Balkan
States together ; but most of it is with the Central Empires.
The imports from the United Kingdom are less than two
millions ; from Germany and Austria-Hungary they are over
thirteen.

The last figures indicate, eloquently enough, the new Foreign
orientation of Roumanian policy. More and more since the ^^° ^^^'
accession of Prince Carol was this Latin State drawn into
the orbit of the Central-European Empires. Not unnaturally.
' Bien que je sois aujourd'hui prince de Roumanie,' so ran
a telegram from Prince Carol to King William of Prussia in
1869, 'je suis et je reste toujours un Hohenzollern.' The

272 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

prince's marriage, in the same year, with the Princess
Elizabeth of Wied, known to the world as the gifted
Carmen Sylva, did nothing to diminish the force of his
Teutonic sympathies.
The The Franco-German War revealed a serious cleavage of

German opinion between the prince and his subjects. AVhen the war
War. broke out the prince wrote to King William to express his
disappointment at not being able to 'follow his beloved
Sovereign on to the field of battle, and at being compelled
to the most rigorous reserve among a people whose sympathies
were on the side of France '. The prince was not mistaken.
It is true that since 1866 French influence at Bucharest had
been waning, but from the hearts of the Roumanian people
nothing could eradicate the sentiment of kinship with the
people of France.
Position The position of a German prince at Bucharest, particularly
of Prince ^yjjgj^ ^jj^t prince's brother had been made the stalking-horse
for the enmity between Germany and France, could not,
during the war of 1870, have been otherwise than difficult.
In August, 1870, a serious emente broke out at Ploiesti,
a town about 60 kilometres north of Bucharest ; the ' Prussian
prince' was denounced, and a republic proclaimed. The
army remained loyal, and the insurrection was suppressed
without difficulty, but it served to strengthen the disposition
of the prince to abandon a thankless task. ' A German
prince', so his father wrote to him on September 29, 'is
made of stuff" too precious to be wasted on such a useless
job.' Financial complications, bitter discussions in parlia-
ment, insulting innuendos against the personal integrity of
the prince, all tended to disgust Prince Carol with his
position ; and in December, 1870, he appealed to the Powers
to take into their consideration a revision of the Treaty of
1856.

The appeal came to nothing, and after the decisive victory
of the Germans the excitement in Roumania tended to
subside.

Only to be aroused, before long, and more acutely, over
affairs nearer home. Already might be heard the distant
rumblings of the storm, which, in 1875, was to burst over the

XI THE MAKING OF ROUMANIA 273

Balkans. From IMontenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
and Serbia came news which presaged the advent of a critical
time for all the States and peoples actually or nominally
subject to the Ottoman Sultan. Plainly it was not a moment
to think of abdication, least of all for the prince who regarded
himself as ' the extreme advance guard of civilization, the
sentinel posted on the frontier of the East ', ^

The part played by Roumania in the great drama of 1875-8 ;
the achievement of its independence (1878) ; its accession to
the rank of a kingdom (1881) ; and its increasing inclination
towards the Central European system, must receive notice
in subsequent chapters.

By the close of the first decade of Prince Carol's reign the
modern State of Roumania was fairly established. During
the next few years the attention of the world was rivetted
upon other parts of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. On the
eve of the great events of 1875 it may be well, therefore, to
pause and examine the condition of the other peoples of the
Balkans.

^ Prince Carol to Bismarck in 1871 .

For further reference: A. D. Xenopol, Histoire des Boumains, and
other works (translated into French from the Koumanian) (Paris, 1896) ;
P. Eliade, Histoire de Pesprit j)uhlic en Roiunanie au x/x« siecle (Paris,
1905), and Ulnfiuence frangaise sur Vesi^rit ]iublic en Boumanie
(Paris, 1898) ; F. Dame, Histoire de la Eoumanie contemporaine, 1822-
1900 (Paris, 1900) ; Bo". Jehan de Witte, Quinze ans d' histoire, 1866-81
(Paris, 1905) ; C. D. Mavrodin, La Boumanie contemporaine (Paris,
1915) ; G. G. Giurgea, Donnees i^olitiques et economiques sur la Boumanie
nioderne (Bucharest, 1913) ; K. W. Seton Watson, Boumania and the
Great War (Constable & Co., 1915) ; D. Mitrany, Boumania, in The
Balkans (Clarendon Press, 1915) ; Ency. Brit. (11th edition), art. Bou-
mania.

CHAPTER XII

THE BALKAN INSURRECTIONS

The Southern Slavs. The Russo-Turkish War.
The Powers and the Eastern Question, 1856-78

'The Christian East has had enough of Turkish misrule. . . , High
diplomacy will never solve the Eastern Question ; it can be solved only
in the East, in the theatre of war, with the co-operation of the peoples
directly concerned.' — Peince Caeol of Roumania.

' That Turkey is weak, fanatical, and misgoverned no one can honestly
deny. . . . The chief Powers of Christendom have all more or less an
interest in the fortunes of an Empire which from being systematically
aggressive has become a tottering and untoward neighbour.' — Loed
Steatfoed de Redcliffe (1875).

Position Paradox is the eternal commonplace of the Eastern

after^the"^ Question. But even in the Near East paradox was never

Crimean more triumphant than in the settlement which concluded the

^^' Crimean War. The Powers, as we have seen, expressly

repudiated the right of interference, individual or collective,

in the internal concerns of the Ottoman Empire. Yet the

Treaty of Paris marks indisputably the point at which

Turkey finally passed into a state of tutelage to the European

Concert.

A fortnight after the signature of the general Treaty
(March 30) a separate Treaty Avas, it will be remembered,
concluded between Great Britain, France, and Austria
guaranteeing 'jointly and severally the independence and
the integrity' of the Ottoman Empire (April 15, 1856).
That guarantee imposed upon the Powers concerned a moral
if not a legal responsibility of the gravest kind.

But this Treaty did not stand alone. At the moment
when the Powers were negotiating their Treaties in Paris
a conference was taking place in the British Embassy at
Constantinople between the Turkish ministers and the repre-
sentatives of the Powers. The outcome of that conference

THE BALKAN IXSURRECTIOXS 275

was a charter of liberties which, as Lord Stratford de Redcliffe
said, ' was made part of the general pacification nnder an
agreement that its insertion in the Treat}' should not be
made a pretext for the interference of any foreign Power in
the internal afiairs of Turkey'.^ The Finnan of the Sultan
was expressly described as 'emanating spontaneously from
his sovereign will ' ; it was, however, ' communicated ' to
the contracting parties, and by them was 'annexed' to the
Treaty of Paris. Still, Turkey was to be entrusted with
the fulfilment of her own promises.

Such was the paradoxical yet not unintelligible position in
which matters were left by the Crimean War. The object of
that war was, in the Prince Consort's words, ' the cancelling
of all previous Russian treaties and the substitution of
a European protectorate of the Christians, or rather of
European protection for a Russian Protectorate'.^ That
object was achieved. Plainly, however, there was a corollary.
' The Cabinet of Loi'd Aberdeen, while actively defending the
independence of Turkey, felt that in objecting to the separate
interference of Russia they Mere bound to obtain some
guarantee for the security of the subjects of the Porte
professing the Christian faith.' ^ Thus, at a later date.
Lord Russell. How far did the Turks fulfil their own
promises? How far did the 'guarantee' obtained by the
Powers prove efiective for its purpose? It is the main
purpose of this chapter to answer these questions.

AMiile the Powers were concluding Peace in Paris, the The
Sultan Abdul Medjid issued in February, 1856, a second ^jj^y^^^ ^j
edition of the Tanzimat of Gulhaneh. Except in regard to Feb, 18,
military reform the famous Tanzimat had remained a dead
letter. The Christians, so far from obtaining the promised
equality before the law, found themselves still treated as
a despised and conquered people. Their word was not
accepted in the courts ; they were exposed to the extor-
tions of every Moslem official, high or low ; life, honour,

* The Eastern Question, p. 14.

2 Martin, Life, iii. 92.

3 Turkey, xvii, 1877, No. 148, p. 115, quoted by Duke of Ai'gyll, Eastern
Question, i, p. 34.

t2

276 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

fortune was still at the mercy of the dominant race. But all
this was now to be reformed. The Hatti-Humayoun of 1856
guaranteed to every subject of the Porte, without distinction
of creed or class, personal liberty ; equality before the law ;
complete religious freedom ; eligibility for office civil and
military ; equality of taxation ; equal representation in the
communal and provincial councils and in the supreme Council
of Justice ; and complete security of property.^ On paper
nothing could have been more satisfactory. But practically
nothing came of it.
Sultan In 1861 Sultan Abdul Medjid at last drank himself to

^^iz" death, and was succeeded by Abdul Aziz. At this fateful
(1861-76). moment in its history, when the Western Powers had secured
to it — on conditions — a reprieve, when its life depended
upon a radical reform not merely of law but of administra-
tion, the Ottoman Empire was entrusted to the care of an
amiable and well-intentioned but half-insane ruler. Abdul
Aziz was sincerely minded to follow the prudent monitions
of the Powers ; he did something to modernize and secularize
the administration of the State ; to initiate useful public
works ; to improve means of communication ; to exploit the
natural resources of his empire ; and to found a system of
education, primary and secondary, free from ecclesiastical
control and open to pupils of every creed. He set up
a High Court of Justice, composed in equal numbers of
Christians and Moslems, and in 1868 he crowned the
administrative edifice by establishing a Council of State.
The council was to have legislative as well as administrative
functions ; it was to consist of Christians as well as Moslems,
and, best of all, was to have as its first president Midhat
Pasha, a statesman of enlightened views and strong character.
It was all to no purpose. The Ottoman Empire was and
always had been a theocracy. It is impossible to secularize
a theocracy : to reform law which rests upon an unchangeable
religious sanction ; or to secure good and equal government
for men whose life, honour, and property were at the mercy
of local officials, when those officials were in a few cases only

^ The full text is printed in Holland, European Concert, pp. 329 sq.

XII THE BALKAN INSURRECTIONS 277

at once honest and capable, in most cases were neither, and
in all cases were beyond the reach or control of the energetic
and well-intentioned reformers at Stamboul.

Here lay the root of the difficulty. To overcome it there
was needed a man of exceptional strength of character, who
was free to act without reference to the advice of more or
less interested monitors ; above all, a man who could rule,
wdth a stern hand, his own political household.

Abdul Aziz had no such qualifications, and as his reign
went on he plunged deeper and deeper into the grossest
forms of personal extravagance. His incessant demands for
money and more money afforded an excuse for the rapacity
of subordinates, and even the best of the provincial Pashas
were compelled to tighten the financial screw upon the
peoples committed to their charge.

Nor were those peoples in a mood to submit to the exactions Political
of the Turkish Pashas. A new spirit was beginning to stir the gaSce^in
' dry bones ' in the Balkan valleys. It was excited partly by the Bal-
the movement in the principalities ; partly by the reforming ^^^'
movement at Constantinople ; partly by the deliberate Pan-
Slavist propaganda of Russian agents, and not least by the
memory of the Napoleonic rule in the 'Illyrian provinces'.
Among the makei^s of United Germany and United Italy the
first Napoleon already occupies a conspicuous place. It may
be that he is destined to a place not less conspicuous among
the makers of the future Jugo-Slav Empire. This at least is
certain, that the Jugo-Slavs of to-day look back to the time,
1809-14, when, under the name of 'The Illyrian Provinces',
Dalmatia, Istria, Trieste, Gorizia, Carinthia, Carniola, and
part of Croatia were united under Napoleon's auspices, as the
happiest and most fruitful period in the modern history of their
race. The mere fact of union, though transitory and achieved
under an alien ruler, was in itself an inspiration for the future,
after the oppression and disunion of centuries ; and the rule
though alien was enlightened. In particular, the modern
Jugo-Slavs recall Avith gratitude the fact that Napoleon
reintroduced their native tongue both as the medium of
education and as the official language of the Illyrian State.
Between 1830 and 1840 there was a renaissance of this

278 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

'Illyrian' spirit, which was, however, sternly repressed by
the Austrian administrators.
Serbia. Of the Southern-Slav movement Serbia Avas, throughout

the nineteenth century, the most conspicuous and powerful
champion. After a quarter of a century of struggle and
vicissitude Serbia had, as we saM^, become by 1829 an
autonomous principality under the suzerainty of the Sultan,
though the Turks continued to garrison the eight principal
fortresses.

But only the first steps had been taken along the path of
national regeneration. An immense task still awaited the
Serbian people. They had, in the first place, to remake
Serbia, in a territorial sense. What Serbia had been in the
days of her greatness we have already seen. What she had
been in the past she aspired again to be. The Serbia of 1830
included a very small portion of her ancient territory. The
Turks were still in possession not only of Bosnia and the
Herzegovina, but of the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar and the district
of northern Macedonia known as Old Serbia. To reunite
with herself these territories was, and is, the minimum of
Serbian aspirations.

In the second place, she had to work out her own con-
stitutional salvation ; to compose, if possible, the dynastic
antagonisms which seemed so curiously at variance with the
genius of a Peasant-State ; to devise an appropriate form of
government, and to get rid of the last traces of Turkish
sovereignty.

She had, lastly, and above all, to prepare herself by social,
educational, and economic reform for the great part which
she believed herself to be destined to play as the liberator
of the Southern Slavs, who were still under the heel of Habs-
burg and Turk, and as the centre and pivot of that Greater
Serbia, the Jugo-Slav Empire, which is still in the future.
Serbia The period between 1830 and 1875 was largely occupied

( 0-75). ijy dynastic alternations between the Obrenovics and the
Karageorgevics which it would serve no useful purpose to
follow in detail. The quarrel between the two families was
not indeed really composed until the extinction of the former
dynasty by the brutal though not undeserved assassination of

XII THE BALKAN INSURRECTIONS 279

King Alexander and his ill-omened consort Draga in 1903.
Nothing could have been more disastrous for the infant State :
not only was internal development seriously hampered, but,
to an outside world ignorant of Serbia's great past, the
impression was inevitably conveyed that the Serbia of the
present consisted of half-civilized swineherds ; and that it
was perhaps unfortunate that these swineherds should have
escaped from the control of the Ottoman Empire which had
alone understood the best way of dealing with unruly savages.
How false that impression was it has required a political
martyrdom to prove to the world.

Apart from almost perpetual squabbles between the
turbulent peasantry and their elected rulers, and between the
rival chiefs, there are only two events, in the period between
the attainment of autonomy (1829) and the outbreak of the
Balkan insurrections (1875), which call for special mention.

The first is the achievement, in 1831, of ecclesiastical
independence ; the second is the evacuation of the Serbian
fortresses by the Turks in 1867.

As in Greece, so also in Serbia, the Orthodox Church has The
been throughout the ages the nursing mother of national inde- (^^yrch.
pendence. Founded and organized by St. Sava, the son of
King Nemanja, the Serbian Church has been at once Orthodox
and national. ' If the father (King Nemanja) endowed the
Serbian State with a body, the son (St. Sava) gave it', as
Father Nicholas Yelimirovic has eloquently and truly said,
a ' soul. And later on, when the body of the Serbian State
was destroyed by the Turkish invasion, the soul lived on
through the centuries, and suifered, and nothing remained
unconquered in this soul but her faith, and the tradition of
the freedom of the past. The monasteries were centres of
trust and hope. The priests were the guides of the people,
upholding and comforting them. The Patriarchs of Ipek
were in truth patriarchs of the people, and, like the
patriarchs of old, true representatives of the people and
their protectors.' ^

The first act of the great Stephen Dushan had been, as we

^ Beligion and Nationality in Serbia, p. 7.

280

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Eccle-
siastical
indepen-
dence

(1831).

Turkish
evacua-
tion of the
fortresses.

saw, to summon an Ecclesiastical Council and to proclaim the
Serbian Church a Patriarchate with its ecclesiastical capital at
Ipek in Montenegro (1345). After the Ottoman conquest the
Patriarchate of Ipek was abolished ; the Serbian Church lost
its independence ; was subordinated to the Greco-Bulgar
Archbishopric of Ochrida, and, for some two centuries, fell
completely under the control of the Greeks. But in 1557
the Patriarchate of Ipek was revived. * The revival of this
centre of national life was momentous ; through its agency
the Serbian monasteries were restored, ecclesiastical books
printed, and, more fortunate than the Bulgarian national
Church, which remained under Greek management, it was
able to focus the national enthusiasms and aspirations and
keep alive with hope the flame of nationality among those
Serbs who had not emigrated.' ^

Serbia sufiered terribly at the hands of both Turks and
Austrians during the wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, and in 1766 the Patriarchate of Ipek was finally
abolished and the Serbian Church acknowledged the supre-
macy of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople.

With the revival of national self-consciousness in the nine-
teenth century came a renewed desire for ecclesiastical
independence, and in 1831 Prince Milos finally broke the
chain which still bound the Serbian Church to the Patri-
archate of Constantinople. Thus, at last, after many vicissi-
tudes, Serbia obtained a national Church with a Metropolitan
at Belgrade.

The year 1867 witnessed the completion of another stage
on the long and toilsome journey towards national indepen-
dence. The position of Serbia during the second quarter of
the nineteenth century was more than usually paradoxical.
Still subject to the sovereignty of the Sultan, she was really
under the protectorship of Russia. But the Sultan possessed
a tangible symbol of authority in the continued military
occupation of the fortresses. Nor were the garrisons Avith-
drawn even after the Crimean War. In that war Serbia took
no part. The people inclined towards the Russian side, but

^ Forbes, Serbia, in TJie Balkans, p. 104.

XII THE BALKAN IXSURRECTIONS 281

the prince (Alexander Karageorgevi6) was under considerable
obligations both to Turkey and to Austria. Nor could the
prince forget the encouragement which Serbia had obtained
from Lord Palmerston, who, for the first time, had sent
a British consul to Belgrade in 1837, nor the support given
to himself in 1843 by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. By the
Treaty of Paris Serbia, like the principalities, was tacitly
excepted from the protectorate of Russia ; she Avas to
continue to enjoy an * independent and national administra-
tion, as Avell as full liberty of worship, of legislation, of
commerce and navigation', and her rights and inmiunities
were 'placed thenceforth under the collective guarantee of
the contracting powers'. An emeute at Belgi*ade in 1862 led
to the withdrawal of the civilian Turkish population, and in
1867 Prince iSIichael Obrenovic III had the satisfaction of
bringing about the final evacuation of the fortresses. Michael
persuaded the Sultan that a grateful Serbia Avould be a far
more efifective barrier against an Austrian attack than a few
isolated Turkish garrisons on the Danube and the Save ; he
persuaded Austria that a Serbian Belgrade would prove
more neighbourly than a Turkish outpost ; France, Russia,
and Great Britain supported him ; the Porte gave way ; in
May, 1867, the Turks finally evacuated Serbia, and Belgrade
became, for the first time for many centuries, not merely the
Serbian capital, but a Serbian city.

Independence was now virtually achieved, but the nominal
suzerainty of the Sultan was not actually extinguished until
the Turkish Empire had been broken by the Balkan in-
surrection of 1875 and the Russian War. To these events we
must now turn.

But for the foolish and brutal murder of Prince Michael
in 1868 the great national uprisings of 1875 would have
started more obviously under the leadership of Serbia. That
brilliant ruler had worked out an elaborate combination not
only with the Southern Slavs of ^Montenegro, Bosnia, and
the Herzegovina, but with the nationalist leadei*s in Croatia,
with a Bulgarian patriotic society, and even with Greece.
The Serbians have paid dearly for the dastardly crime, not
the first nor the last of its kind, perpetrated in 1868. Had

282 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

that crime not taken place the events of 1912-13 might possibly
have been antedated by a whole generation ; Serbia might
have placed herself at the head of a gi-eat Southern-Slav
Empire, while Austria was still reeling under the shock of
Sadowa, when the German Empire had not yet come to the
birth, when Bosnia and Herzegovina were still 'Turkish',
and when Bulgarian aspirations were not yet fomiulated in
opposition to those of the Southern Slavs. The crime of
1868 robbed Serbia of a chance which, in its original form,
can never recur.
Bosnia It was not Serbia then, but the Slav inhabitants of one

gd the remote village in the Herzegovina who, in the summer of
Vina. 1875, gave the signal for the outbreak of an insurrection
which quickly involved the whole of the Slav States in the
Ottoman Empire ; which, before it was quelled, led to another
war between Russia and Turkey, and all but eventuated in
a great European conflagration.

The primary causes of the original rising in Bosnia and
the Herzegovina Avere not so much political as social and
economic ; they acquired strength less from the spirit of
nationality than from the unbearable nature of the fiscal
burdens imposed upon the peasantry by Turkish ofiicials and
native landowners.
Renegade Bosnia and the Herzegovina presented in several respects
Nobles, r^ striking contrast to Serbia. It was against the powerful
Empire of Serbia that the attack of the Ottoman Turks Mas
first directed after their advent into Europe. Bosnia, more
remote and more obscure, managed to retain until 1463
independence. The Herzegovina until 1482. But when
once conquered they were more completely absorbed into
the Ottoman system than ever Serbia was. For another
reason these provinces became more 'Turkish' than any
other part of the Balkan peninsula except perhaps Bulgaria
and the provinces immediately adjacent to Constantinople.
Bosnia was a land of large landowners who, to save their
property, abandoned their faith and "embraced ISIoham-
medanism, not only with discretion, but with zeal.
Christian Nor was the Slav peasantry ecclesiastically homogeneous.
Peasan- fjj^g majority adhered to the Orthodox Church, but mingled

XII THE BALKAN INSURRECTIONS 283

with them was a very strong body of Roman Catholics,
who leaned upon the Roman Catholic Slavs of Croatia
just as naturally as the Orthodox Bosnians looked to the
Serbs. The aristocracy, who were exceptionally powerful
in Bosnia, were Moslems to a man, and acknowledged in
the Sultan not merely their political but their spiritual
lord : sovereign and caliph in one. The Bosnian Moslems
were indeed in every way 'more Turkish than the Turks',
and in no quarter did the reforming party in Constantinople
encounter more bitter or more sustained opposition than
from the feudal renegades in Bosnia. The suppression of
the Janissaries and the other reforms attempted by Sultan
Mahmud led to open revolt, and the policy embodied in the
Tanzimat and the Hatti-Humayoun of 1856 was viewed with
the utmost disfavour.

It is not difficult, therefore, to understand why the con-
dition of the Christian peasantry in these provinces should
have been even less tolerable than elsewhere. Exposed on
the one hand to the unregulated rapacity of the Ottoman
tax-farmer ; ground down on the other by the labour services
and burdensome dues demanded by their native feudal lords ;
the wretched peasants found themselves between the hammer
and the anvil.

But there were other ingredients in the restlessness of the Pan-
Balkan Slavs which are less easy to discriminate. Ever ^'*^'^'^-
since the Crimean War missionaries of the new gospel of
Pan-Slavism — mostly Russians — had been engaged in an
unceasing propaganda among the peoples of their oAvn faith
and their own blood. In 1867 a great Pan-Slavist congress
was held, under the thin disguise of a scientific meeting, at
Moscow. It issued in the formation of a central Pan-Slavist
committee with its head-quarters at Moscow, and a sub-
committee sitting at Bucharest ; books and pamphlets were
circulated in the Balkans ; young Slavs flocked to Russian
universities, just as the Roumanian youths flocked to Paris ;
Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Bulgaria were honeycombed
with secret societies.

Nor did the movement lack oflicial support. Behind the
popular propaganda were the forces of high diplomacy.

Eeports.

284 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

Every Russian consul in the peninsula was a Pan-Slavist,
and General Ignatieff, an enthusiast in the same cause,
was appointed ambassador at Constantinople.

How far, at the precise moment of the outbreak, the
incitement came from outside, how far it was a spontaneous
explosion against political wrongs and fiscal oppression
which had become intolerable, it is impossible to say. That
both ingredients were present is beyond dispute ; their pro-
portions cannot, with accuracy, be determined.
The rising In July, 1875, the peasants of the Herzegovina suddenly
Duchy, refused to pay their taxes or to perform their accustomed
labour services, and, when confronted by a Turkish force,
inflicted upon it a decisive defeat (July 24). Sympathizers
flocked to their assistance from Serbia, Montenegi'o, and
Dalmatia, and things began to look ugly when the consuls
of the Powers intervened Avith an attempt to mediate between
the Ottoman Government and its discontented subjects.
Consnlar For years past the British Government had been made
aware by the reports of its consuls of the appalling condition
of the Turkish provinces. As early as 1860 Mr. Holmes, the
British consul in Bosnia, had warned the Foreign Office that
' the conduct of the Turkish authorities in these provinces had
been sufficient, in conjunction with foreign agitation, to bring
Bosnia to the very verge of rebellion, whilst the Herzegovina
was in a state of war'.^ From ISIonastir, Janina, and other
parts came stories of almost inconceivable misgovernment,
obscurantism, and tyranny : another batch of reports, con-
taining further evidence, was laid before Parliament in 1867.^
In 1871 Mr. Holmes referred to 'the open bribery and
corruption, the invariable and unjust favour shown to
Mussulmans in aU cases between Turks and Christians'
which was characteristic ' of what is called justice ' throughout
the Ottoman Empire. ' I do not hesitate to say ', he wrote in
April, that * of all cases of justice, whether between Mussul-
mans alone, or Turks and Christians, ninety out of a hundred
are settled by bribery alone.' These reports testify not only

' Reports on Condition of Christians in Turkey, 1860, presented to
Parliament, 1861, p. 73 and passim.
- Reports, 1867.

XII THE BALKAN INSURRECTIOXS 285

to the abuses of Turkish misgovernment, but to foreign
interference. Thus in 1873 Mr. Hohnes reported that
Austrian and Russian agents were ' equally working to
create difficulties '. ^

Xor had the British Government neglected to warn the
Porte of the inevitable outcome of the policy it was pursuing.
Thus in 1861 Lord Russell, referring to the recent massacres
in Syria, solemnly warned the Sultan that while Great Britain
would resist 'a wanton violation of the rights or an un-
provoked invasion of the territory of the Porte by any
European sovereign', yet 'the public opinion of Europe
would not approve of a protection accorded to the Porte in
order to prevent the signal punishment of a Government'
which should permit such atrocities to continue.^ Similarly,
in 1870, Lord Granville instructed Sir Henry Elliot to impress
upon Turkey ' that her real safety Avill depend upon the spirit
and feelings of the populations over which she rules'.

It is, however, unnecessary to multiply quotations. Writ
large over the Papers presented at intervals to Parliament
will be found overwhelming testimony, on the one hand, to
Turkish misgovernment ; on the other to the Pan-Slavist
agitation ; and, above all, to the reiterated but unheeded
warnings addressed to the Ottoman Government.

In September, 1875, the insurgents themselves laid before Demands
the European consuls in Bosnia a statement of their case ^ * ^j^'^"
and an appeal for sympathy if not for help. They demanded
freedom for their religion ; the right to give evidence in the
courts ; the formation of a local Christian militia, and reforms
in the imposition and collection of taxation ; they declared
that they would die rather than continue to suffer such
slavery ; they begged that the Powers would at least not
obstruct their enterprise or assist their oppressoi-s ; and they
concluded by suggesting alternative remedies: either (1) 'a
corner of land ' hi some Christian state to which they might
emigrate en masse ; or (2) the formation of Bosnia and
the Herzegovina into an autonomous state ' tributary to the
Sultan with some Christian prince from somewhere, but

^ Turkey, xvi, 1877, No. 21. « Turkey, xvii, 1877, No. 73.

286 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

never from here ' ; or (3), as a minimum, a temporary foreign
occupation.

In an Irad^ published on October 2 the Porte promised
prompt and general reform ; but nevertheless the insurrection
deepened and spread. In a Firman issued on December 12
the Sultan offered the immediate establishment of local
elective councils, in which the Christians were to take
part ; and a local gendarmerie. The reply of the insurgents
took the form of further defeats inflicted on the Turkish
troops.
The The Powers could no longer refrain from interference, and

their action was hastened by financial considerations.

It is one of the salutary paradoxes incidental to misgovern-
ment that it is as ruinous to the sovereign as it is hurtful to
the subject. The inherent extravagance of a bad system
had combined with the peculation of officials to bring
disaster upon Turkey, and on October 7, 1875, the Sultan
w^as compelled to inform his creditors that he could not pay
the full interest on the debt. Partial repudiation compli-
cated an international situation already sufficiently em-
barrassing. Accordingly, the Sovereigns of Germany, Russia,
and Austria took counsel together, and on December 30,
1875, the Austrian Chancellor, Count Andrassy, issued fi'om
Buda-Pesth the Note which bears his name.
The The Andrassy Note professed the anxiety of the Powers to

Note^^^ curtail the area of the insurrection and to maintain the peace
of Europe ; it drew attention to the failure of the Porte to
carry out reforms long overdue, and it insisted that pressure
must be put upon the Sultan effectually to redeem his
promises. In particular he must be pressed to grant com-
plete religious liberty ; to abolish tax-farming ; to apply the
direct taxes, locally levied in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to the
local needs of those provinces ; to improve the condition of
the rural population by multiplying peasant owners ; and,
above all, to appoint a special commission, composed in equal
numbers of Mussulmans and Christians, to control the execu-
tion not only of the reforms now proposed by the Powers,
but also of those spontaneously promised by the Sultan in
the Irade of October 2 and the Firman of December 12.

XII THE BALKAN IXSURRECTIOXS 287

Finally, the three emperors required that the Sultan should,
by a signed Convention, pledge himself to a prompt and
effectual execution of the reforms ; in default of which the
Powers could not undertake to continue their efforts to
restrain and pacify the insurgents.^ To this Note the British
Government gave a general adhesion, though they pointed
out that the Sultan had during the last few months promised
to carry out the more important of the reforms indicated
therein.

The Note was presented to the Porte at the end of
January, 1876 ; and the Sultan, with almost suspicious
promptitude, accepted four out of the five points ; the excep-
tion being the application of the direct taxes to local objects.

The friendly efforts of the diplomatists were foiled, how-
ever, by the attitude of the insurgents. The latter refused,
not unnaturally, to be satisfied with mere assurances, or to
lay down their arms without substantial guarantees. The
Sultan on his side insisted, again not without reason, that
it was impossible to initiate a scheme of reform while the
provinces were actually in armed rebellion. ^leanwhile the
mischief was spreading. Bosnia threw in its lot with the
Herzegovina ; Serbia, ^lontenegro, and Bulgaria were pre-
paring to do the same when, at the beginning of May,
a fanatical jMohammedan outbreak at Salonica led to the
murder of the French and German consuls. Drastic
measures were obviously necessary if a great European
conflagration was to be avoided.

On May 1 1 the Austrian and Russian Chancellors were The Ber-

in conference with Prince Bismarck at Berlin, and deter- ^^^ ^lemo-

' raudum.

mined to make further and more peremptory demands upon

the Sultan. There was to be an immediate armistice of two
months' duration, during which certain measures of pacifica-
tion and repatriation were to be executed under the super-
intendence of the delegates of the Powers. A mixed Com-
mission, composed of natives faithfully representing the two
creeds of the country and presided over by a native Christian,
was to be appointed in Bosnia and the Herzegovina ; and the

^ The full text of the Andrassy Note will be found in Hertslet, il/o/? of
Europe by Treaty, vol. iv, pp. 2418-29.

288

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Attitude
of the
English
Govern-
ment.

Spread of
the insur-
rection.

insurgents were to be permitted to remain under arms until
the reforms promised by the Sultan in October and December,
1875, had been carried into effect. If by the expiry of the
armistice the object of the Powers had not been attained,
diplomatic action would have to be reinforced.

France and Italy assented to the Note, but the British
Government regarded the terms as unduly peremptory ;
they resented, very naturally, the independent action of the
three imperial Powers ; they declined on May 19 to be
a party to the Memorandum ; and on the 24th ordered the
fleet to anchor in Besika Bay. Accordingly, the proposed
intervention was abandoned. The Moslem patriots replied
in characteristic fashion to Christian menaces. On May 29
they deposed the Sultan Abdul Aziz as too feeble for their
purposes, and on June 4 he was suicide ; his insane successor,
Murad V, reigned only three months, being in turn (August 31)
deposed to make room for his brother, Abdul Hamid, the
cleverest Sultan Islam had known since the sixteenth century.

Mr. Disraeli's refusal to assent to the Berlin Memorandum
created profound perturbation abroad, and evoked a storm
of criticism at home. There can be no question that the
European Concert, whatever it was worth, was broken by
the action of Great Britain. If the latter had joined the
other Powers, irresistible pressure would have been put
upon the Porte, and some terrible atrocities might have
been averted. On the other hand, it is indisputable that the
Imperial Chancellors were guilty, to say the least, of grave
discourtesy towards Great Britain ; nor can it be denied that,
assuming a sincere desire for the preservation of peace, they
committed an inexcusable blunder in not inviting the co-
operation of England before they formulated the demands
contained in the Berlin Memorandum.

Events were in the meantime moving rapidly in the
Balkans. On June 30, 1876, Serbia formally declared war
upon the Porte ; Prince Milan being stimulated to action partly
by irresistible pressure from his own people, and partly by
fear of Peter Karageorgevid, the representative of the rival
dynasty. One day later Prince Nicholas of Montenegro
followed his example.

XII THE BALKAN INSURRECTIONS 289

The tiny principality which thus came into the forefront Monte-
of Balkan politics has not hitherto claimed much space in this "®&^°-
narrative. Serbs of the purest blood and subjects of the great
Serbian Empire, the inhabitants of the Black Mountain had, on
the dissolution of Dushan's Empire, proclaimed their auto-
nomy. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the
Black Mountain was technically included in the Turkish pro-
vince of Scutari, but the inhabitants, secure in fastnesses almost
inaccessible, continued to be ruled by their Prince-Bishops,
and never acknowledged the authority of the Ottoman Sultan.

In the eighteenth century they came forward as the
champions of the Slav nationality ; they received cordial
encouragement from Russia, and played some part in the
Turkish wars of the Empress Catherine. When, by the
Treaty of Pressburg, Napoleon seized Dalmatia, the Monte-
negrins, with the support of the Tsar Alexander, occupied the
splendid harbour known as the Bocche di Cattaro, and refused
to evacuate it. The Bocche di Cattaro had belonged to them
until the Treaty of Carlowitz (^1699). That treaty had assigned
the harbour to Venice, from whom in 1797 it was transferred to
Austria. At Tilsit, however. Napoleon claimed it ft'om Alex-
ander, who deserted the MontenegTiu cause. Half a century
later the championship of that cause was assumed by Austria.
Bishops of the Orthodox Church being celibate, the succession
in Montenegro had always been collateral. But in 1851, on
the death of the Prince-Bishop Peter II, his nephew and
successor, Danilo, proposed to marry and to secularize the
principality. With the approval of the Tsar and the assist-
ance of Austria this change, though not AAithout a war with
the Turks, was effected in 1852. Nowhere in the Balkans
did the flame of Slav nationality, fi-equently revived by
contests with the Turks, burn more pure, and the interven-
tion of the little principality in 1876 was therefore according
to expectation.

Nor was the unrest confined to Slavs of the purest blood. Bulgaria.
It spread even to Bulgaria, which of all the Balkan provinces
had been most completely absorbed into the Ottoman system.
For that reason we have heard nothing of Bulgaria since
the last vestiges of its independence were crushed out bj"

1984 XJ ..-

290 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

the Ottoman victories in the closing years of the fourteenth
century.^

During the great days of the Ottoman Empire the lot
of the Bulgarians, as of other conquered peoples in the
peninsula, was far from intolerable. As in Bosnia, many
of the nobles embraced Mohammedanism, but the mass of
the people adhered to their oAvn creed, and, provided the
tribute of children and money was punctually forthcoming,
the Turks did not interfere with the exercise of Orthodox
rites, nor with the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Orthodox
priests. Some of the towns were permitted to retain their
municipal privileges ; a considerable measure of autonomy
was conceded to the province at large ; and the natives were
allowed the free use of their own language.

Here, as elsewhere, the condition of the subject people
deteriorated as the rule of the Ottoman Government became
enfeebled. The Bulgarians suffered much from the passage
of the Ottoman armies' as they marched north against the
Austrians, and later from that of the Russians when they began
to threaten or to defend Constantinople. To Russia, however,
Bulgaria began to look towards the end of the eighteenth
century for protection. The stipulations for the better
government of the principalities and the islands contained
in the Treaty of Kainardji ; the presence of a Russian
ambassador at Constantinople ; the privileges conceded, on
Russia's demand, to the Christians, all tended in the same
direction.
The Bui- In Bulgaria, as in Serbia, the Ottoman Sultan was not the
Church ^^^y ^^^ perhaps the most formidable foe to the spirit of
independence and the sense of nationality. By the Sultan's
side in Constantinople was the Greek Patriarch. Politically,
Bulgaria was conquered and absorbed by the Turks ; socially
and ecclesiastically, it was permeated by the Phanariote
Greeks. The methods employed by the latter were parallel
to, but even more thorough than, those which, as we have seen,
were employed in Serbia : the independent Patriarchate of
Tirnovo was in 1777 suppressed ; all the higher ecclesiastical
offices were monopolized by Phanariotes ; the parish clergy,
* Sujn'a, chap. iii.

XII THE BALKAN INSURRECTIONS 291

even the schoolmasters, were Greek, and Greek ^became not
only the language of 'society' but the sole medium of
instruction in the schools of the people.^ The first step
towards a revival of Bulgarian nationality was therefore
a restoration of ecclesiastical independence. The Porte
promised to make certain concessions — the appointment of
native bishops and the use of the native tongue in schools and
churches — in 1856. But nothing was done, and in 1860 the
Bulgarians refused any longer to recognize the Patriarch of
Constantinople. Not for ten years did the Porte give way,
but in 1870 it figreed to the establishment of a separate
Bulgarian Exarchate at Constantinople, with jurisdiction not
only over Bulgarians in Bulgaria proper, but over those of
Macedonia, and indeed over any community {millet) of
Bulgarians in any part of the empire.

The demand for a Bulgarian Exarchate was symptomatic.
The spirit which was moving the purer Slavs of Serbia,
Montenegro, Bosnia, and the Herzegovina was not leaving the
Bulgar-Slavs untouched. Nor were they less moved by
the Pan-Slavist impulse from without. The Bulgarians, more
even than the Serbs, were roused to a remembrance of their
ancient greatness by the tramp of foreign soldiers in the
peninsula. The march of the Russians upon Adrianople in 1 828
naturally caused considerable excitement even among the
phlegmatic peasants of Bulgaria ; the presence of the allied
armies at Varna in 1854 evoked emotions of a different but
hardly less exciting character. At least these were signs of
impending changes. Clearly, things were not going to be
in the Balkans as for five hundred years they had been.

Nevertheless, it was not until IVIay, 1876, that the name
Bulgarian first became familiar on the lips of men. On the
first day of the month, some of the Bulgarian Christians,
imitating the peasants of Herzegovina, defied the orders
of the Turkish officials, and put one hundred of them to
death. The Herzegovina was relatively remote, but now

1 ' Even forty years ago ', wrote Sir Charles Eliot in 1896, ' the name
Bulgarian was almost unknown, and every educated person coming from
that country called liimself a Greek as a matter of course ' {op. cit.,
p. 314).

u2

292 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

the spirit of insubordination seemed to be infecting the heart
of the empire. The Porte, already engaged in war with Serbia
and Montenegi'o, was terrified at the idea of an attack upon
the right flank of its army, and detennined upon a prompt and
terrible suppression of the Bulgarian revolt. A force of 18,000
regulars was marched into Bulgaria, and hordes of irregulars,
Bashi-Bazouks, and Circassians were let loose to wreak the
vengeance of the Sultan upon a peasantry unprepared for
resistance and mostly unarmed. Whole villages were wiped
out, and in the town of Batak only 2,000 out of 7,000 in-
habitants escaped massacre.
Bulgarian On June 23 a London newspaper published the first ac-
atrocities. ^.q^^^ ^f ^j^g horrors alleged to have been perpetrated by the
Turks in Bulgaria. How much of exaggeration there was
in the tale of atrocities with which England and the world
soon rang it was and is impossible to say. But something-
much less than the ascertained facts would be sufficient to
account for the profound emotion which moved the whole
Christian world. In July Mr. Walter Baring was sent by the
British Government to Adrianople to ascertain, if possible,
the truth. After careful investigation he came to the con-
clusion that in the initial outbreak 136 Moslems had been
murdered, while, in the subsequent massacres, 'not fewer
than 12,000 Christians' perished.^ His final report was not
issued until September, but preliminary reports so far sub-
stantiated the accounts which had been published in the
English Press as to move the conscience of England to its
depths. In a dispatch - to Sir Henry Elliot, British Ambas-
sador to the Porte, Lord Derby gave expression, in language
not the less strong by reason of its restraint, to the feelings
of indignation aroused in England by the accounts of the
Bulgarian atrocities, and instructed him to demand from
the Sultan prompt and effective reparation for the victims.
Mr. Glad- But a voice more powerful than that of Lord Derby was
pamphlet, already making articulate the feelings of his countrymen.
To Mr. Gladstone the tale of atrocities made an irresistible

^ M. Driault (0^5. cit., p. 214) puts the number much higher: 25,000-
- 30.000.

2 Sept. 21, 1876.

XII THE BALKAN INSURRECTIONS 293

appeal. A pamphlet, published on September 6, was cir-
culated by tens of thousands.^ With voice and pen he
vehemently demanded that the Turks should be cleared out
* bag and baggage . . . from the province they have desolated
and profaned '.

Meanwhile another complication had arisen. At the end Turco-
of June Serbia and Montenegro, as we have seen, had ^^^^^ ^^•
declared war upon the Porte. How far would that conflict
extend? Could it be confined Avithin the original limits?
These were the serious questions with which diplomacy
was now confronted. The Serbian army consisted largely
of Russian volunteers and was commanded by a Russian
general. How long would it be before the Russian Govern-
ment became a party to the quarrel? The Serbian army,
even reinforced by the volunteers, could ofier but a feeble
resistance to the Turk, and in August Prince Milan, acting
on a hint from England, asked for the mediation of the
Powers.- England, thereupon, urged the Sultan to come
to terms with Serbia and Montenegro, lest a Avorse thing
should befall him. The Sultan declined an armistice, but
formulated his terms, and intimated that if the Powers
approved them he would grant an immediate suspension
of hostilities. But to Lord Derby's chagrin Serbia would
accept nothing less than an armistice, and, after six
weeks' suspension, hostilities recommenced- Nevertheless,
the English Government was untiring in its efforts to
promote a pacification, and suggested to the Powers some
heads of proposals (September 21) : the status quo in
Serbia and Montenegro ; local or administrative autonomy
for Bosnia and Herzegovina ; guarantees against malad-
ministration in Bulgaria, and a comprehensive scheme of
reform, all to be embodied in a protocol concluded be-
tween the Porte and the Powers. Russia then proposed
(September 26) that, in the event of a refusal fi'om Turkey,
the allied fleets should enter the Bosphorus, that Bosnia
should be temporarily occupied by Austria, and Bulgaria
by Russia. Turkey, thereupon, renewed her dilatory tactics,

1 The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East.
^ Turkerj, 1877 (No. 1), p. 380.

294 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

but Russia's patience was almost exhausted ; General Ignatieff
arrived at Constantinople, on a special mission from the Tsar,
on October 1 5, and on the 30th presented his ultimatum. If an
armistice were not concluded with Serbia Avithin forty-eight
hours, the Russian Embassy was to be immediately withdrawn.
On November 2 the Porte gave way ; Serbia was saved ; a
breathing space was permitted to the operations of diplomacy.
Confer- The interval was utilized by the meeting of a Conference

Constanti- of the Powers at Constantinople (December 23). The Powers
nople, agreed to the terms suggested by Lord Derby in September,
1876. ' ^^^^ ^^^® Porte was obdurate. Profuse in professions and
promises of reform, the Porte, with delicious irony, selected
this moment for the promulgation of a brand new and
full-blown parliamentary constitution, but it stubbornly
refused to allow Europe to superintend the execution of
the reforms. There was to be a Legislative Body of two
Houses : a nominated Senate and an elected Chamber of
Deputies ; a responsible Executive ; freedom of meeting
and of the press ; an irremovable judiciary and compulsory
education.^ But though the Sultan was prodigal in the
concession of reforms, on paper, no one but himself should
have a hand in executing them. On this point he was
inexorable. Thereupon General Ignatieff, refusing to take
further part in a solemn farce, withdrew from the Con-
ference. The Tsar had already (November 10) announced
his intention to proceed single-handed if the Porte refused
the demands of the Powers, his army was already mobilized
on the Pruth, and war appeared imminent.

The diplomatists, however, made one more effort to avert
it. Their demands were reduced to a minimum : putting
aside an extension of territory for Serbia or Montenegro, they
insisted upon the concession of autonomy to Bosnia, to the
Herzegovina, and to Bulgaria, under the control of an inter-
national commission. On January 20 the Sultan categorically
refused, and on the 21st the Conference broke up. Great
Britain, nevertheless, persisted in her efforts to preserve
peace, and on March 31, 1877, the Powers signed in London

1 The first Turkish Parliament ^vas opened with clue ceremony on March
19, 1877.

XII THE BALKAN INSURRECTIONS 295

a protocol proposed by Count SchouvalofF. Taking cognizance
of the Turkish promises of reform, tlie Powers declared
their intention of watching carefully ' the manner in which
the promises of the Ottoman Government are carried into
effect '. If, however, the condition of the Christian subjects
of the Porte should again lead to a ' return of the complica-
tions which periodically disturb the peace of the East, they
think it right to declare that such a state of things would be
incompatible with their interests and those of Europe in
general '. The Turk, in high dudgeon, rejected the London
Protocol (April 10), and on April 24 the Tsar, having
secured the friendly neutrality of Austria,^ declared war.

Russia had behaved, in face of prolonged provocation,
with commendable patience and restraint, and had shown
a genuine desire to maintain the European Concert. The
Turk had exhibited throughout his usual mixture of
shrewdness and obstinacy. It is difficult to believe that
he would have maintained his obstinate fi-ont but for
expectations based upon the supposed goodwill of the British
Government. The language of the Prime Minister- and
the Foreign Secretary had unquestionably given him some
encouragement. So much so that before the break up of
the Conference Lord Salisbury telegraphed " to Lord Derby
from Constantinople : ' The Grand Vizier believes that he
can count upon the assistance of Lord Derby and Lord
Beaconsfield.' The Turk, it is true, is an adept at diplomatic
'bluff', and 'assistance' went beyond the facts. But this
much is certain. If the English Cabinet had, even in
January, 1877, frankly and unambiguously gone hand in hand
with Russia there would have been no war.

The armistice arranged in November between Turkey and Russo-
Serbia had been further prolonged on December 28, and on ^"^'^ ^
February 27 peace was concluded at Constantinople. But
on June 12, Montenegro, encouraged by the action of Russia,

1 By the Agi-eement of Reichstadt (July 8, 1876), confirmed by definite
treaty January 15, 1877. The terms of the Austro-Russian agreement
have never been authoritatively revealed : cf. Rose, Development of
Enroj)ean Nations, p. 180.

^ e.g. at the Guildhall on November 9. 3 Jan. 8, 1877.

296

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Siege ot
Plevna.

Re-entry
of Serbia
into the

Treaty of
San Ste-
fano,
Mai-cb,

1878.

recommenced hostilities, and on June 22 the Russian army
effected the passage of the Danube.

No other way towards Constantinople was open to them,
for the Russian navy had not yet had time since 1871 to
regain the position in the Black Sea denied to it in 1856.
The co-operation of Roumania was, therefore, indispensable,
and this had been secured by a convention concluded on
April 16, by which, in return for a free passage for his troops
through the principalities, the Tsar engaged to ' maintain and
defend the actual integrity of Roumania '. The Roumanian
army held the right flank for Russia, but an offer of more
active co-operation was declined >vith some hauteur by the
Tsar. From the Danube the Russians pushed on slowly but
successfully until their advanced guard suffered a serious
check before Plevna on July 30. On the following day
Osman Pasha, strongly entrenched at Plevna, inflicted a very
serious reverse upon them.

Instead of carrying Plevna by storm they were compelled
to besiege it, and the task proved to be a tough one. In
chastened mood the Tsar accepted, in August, the contemned
offer of Prince Carol, who was appointed to the supreme
command of the Russo-Roumanian army. For five months
Osman held 120,000 Russians and Roumanians at bay, inflict-
ing meantime very heavy losses upon them, but at last his
resistance was worn down, and on December 10 the remnant
of the gallant garrison — some 40,000 half-starved men — were
compelled to surrender.

Four days later Serbia, for the second time, declared war
upon the Porte, and recaptured Prisrend, the ancient capital
of the kingdom. The Russians, meanwhile, were pushing the
Turks back towards Constantinople ; they occupied Sofia
on January 5, and Adriauople on the 20th. In the Caucasus
their success was not less complete ; the great fortress of
Kars had fallen on November 18 ; the Turkish Empire seemed
to lie at their mercy, and in March Russia dictated to the
Porte the Treaty of San Stefano.

A basis of agreement had already been reached at
Adrianople (January 31) ; the terms were now embodied in
a treaty signed, on March 3, at a village not far from

XII THE BALKAN INSURRECTIONS 297

Constantinople. Montenegro, enlarged by the acquisition
of some strips of Bosnia and the Adriatic port of Antivari,
was to be recognized definitely as independent of the Porte ;
so also was Serbia, which was to acquire the districts of Nish
and Mitrovitza ; the reforms recommended to the Porte at
the Conference of Constantinople were to be immediately
introduced into Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and to be
executed under the joint control of Russia and Austria ;
the fortresses on the Danube were to be razed ; reforms were
to be granted to the Armenians ; Russia was to acquire, in
lieu of the greater part of the money indemnity which she
claimed, Batoum, Kars, and other territory in Asia, and part
of the Dobrudja, which was to be exchanged with Roumania
(whose independence was recognized by the Porte) for the
strip of Bessarabia retroceded in 1856. The most striking
feature of the treaty was the creation of a greater Bul-
garia, which was to be constituted an autonomous tribu-
tary principality with a Christian government and a national
militia, and was to extend from the Danube to the Aegean,
nearly as far south as Midia (on the Black Sea) and
Adrianople, and to include, on the west, the district round
Monastir but not Salonica.^ The Ottoman Empire in Europe
was practically annihilated. The proposed aggi-andizement of
Bulgaria aroused grave concern in the other Balkan States.
How was this treaty regarded by Europe in geneml and in
particular by Great Britain ?

Lord Beaconsfield had come into power in 1874. with the Great
deliberate purpose of giving to English foreign policy the ^^j^J^^^^
new orientation imperatively demanded by the new conditions Eastern
of the world. Q"^^*^°^-

' You have ', he said, ' a new world, new influences at work,
new and unknown objects and dangers with which to cope.
. . . The relations of England to Europe are not the same
as they were in the days of Lord Chatham or Frederick the
Great. The Queen of England has become the Sovereign of
the most powerful of Oriental States. On the other side
of the globe there are now establishments belonging to her,

1 See Turkey Papers, No. 22, 1878; Holland, European Concert,
pp. 335 sq.

298 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

teeming with wealth and population. . . . These are vast and
novel elements in the distribution of power. . . . What our
duty is at this critical moment is to maintain the Empire
of England.'
Suez The first indication given to the world of the 'new

slmres. Imperialism' was the purchase of the Khedive's shares in
the Suez Canal. On the 25th of November, 1875, the world
was startled by the news that the British Government had
purchased from the Khedive for the sum of four million
sterling his 176,000 shares in the Suez Canal. ^ The success
of this transaction, as a financial speculation, has long since
been brilliantly demonstrated. As a political move, it marks
a new departure of the highest significance. England, as
preceding pages have shown, had been curiously blind to
her interests in the Eastern Mediterranean ; Disraeli, by
a brilliant coup, opened her eyes. But to him the purchase
of the Canal shares was no isolated speculation, but only the
first move in a coherent and preconcerted plan.
The His next move had a twofold object. During the winter

Tittes ^^ 1875-6 the Prince of Wales had undertaken an extended
Bill. tour in India. The visit, M'hich was without precedent in

the history of the empire, proved an eminent success, and
prepared the way for a still more important departure. ' You
can only act upon the opinion of Eastern nations through
their imagination.' So Disraeli had spoken at the time of
the Mutiny, and in Opposition. As first INIinister of the
Crown he gave effect to his convictions ; and touched the
imagination not only of India but of the world by making
his sovereign Empress of India. A magnificent Durbar was
held at Delhi in the closing days of the year 1876, and on
Januar}" 1, 1877, a series of celebrations culminated in the
proclamation of Queen Victoria as Empress of India in the
presence of sixty-three ruling Chiefs, and amid the acclama-
tions of the most brilliant assemblage ever brought together
in British India.

1 The total shares were 400,000. The idea of the purchase was said to
have been suggested by Mr. Frederick Greenwood, a distinguished London
journalist. See The Times, Dec. 27, 1905, and Jan. 13, 1906. But there
are now other claimants to the distinction.

XII THE BALKAN IXSURRECTIOXS 299

The purchase of the Canal shares, the assumption of the Reopen-
Imperial Crown of India, were parts of a coherent whole. ^fg^Ji^ ^
Disraeli's attitude towards the complex problems, roused Question.
into fresh life by events in the Near East, was determined by
precisely the same considerations. lie never forgot that the
queen was the ruler of Mohammedans as well as Christians,
of Asiatics, Africans, Australians, and Americans as well as
Europeans. It was therefore with the eyes of an oriental, no
less than of an occidental, statesman that he watched the
development of events in the Near East. Those events
caused, as we have seen, grave disquietude in Great Britain.
Before the Russian armies had crossed the Danube the Tsar
undertook to respect English interests in Egypt and in the
Canal, and not to occupy Constantinople or the Straits
(June 8, 1877), but the Russian victories in the closing
months of 1877 excited in England some alarm as to the
precise fullBlment of his promises. Accordingly, in January,
1878, Lord Derby, then Foreign Secretary, deemed it at
once friendly and prudent to remind the Tsar of his promise,
and to warn him that any treaty concluded between Russia
and Turkey which might affect the engagements of 1856 and
1871 'would not be valid without the assent of the Powers
who were parties to those Treaties'. (January 14.)

In order to emphasize the gravity of the warning the Tlie
Fleet, which had been at Besika Bay, was ordered to pass the yJelt^og-
Dardanelles (January 23), and the Government asked Parlia- Constanti-
ment for a vote of credit of £6,000,000. ''''^^^■

In moving the vote on January 28, the Chancellor of
the Exchequer (Sir S. Northcote) made public the terms
demanded by Russia, which, in addition to the points sub-
sequently embodied in the Treaty of San Stefano, included
' an ulterior understanding for safeguarding the rights and in-
terests of Russia in the Straits '. This was the point in regard
to which Russia had already been warned by Lord Derby,
and the situation became critical in the extreme. In the
preliminary terms concluded between the combatants on
January 31, this stipulation disappeared ; but, in consequence
of excited telegrams from Mr. Layard, the British ambas-
sador in Constantinople, the Cabinet decided (February 7)

300 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

to send a detachment of the Fleet into the Sea of Marmora
for the protection of British subjects in Constantinople.
Russia retorted that if British ships sailed up the Straits
Russian troops would enter Constantinople for the purpose
of similarly protecting the lives of Christians of every race.
But the Sultan, equally afraid of friends and foes, begged
the English fleet to retire, and it returned accordingly to
Besika Bay.

The extreme tension was thus for the moment relaxed.
The Austrian Government was already moving in the matter
of a European Congi'ess, and on March 4 Lord Derby informed
Count Beust that Great Britain agreed to the suggestion,
provided it were clearly understood that ' all questions dealt
with in the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey
should be considered as subjects to be discussed in the
Congress '. This had been throughout ' the keynote of our
policy ', ' the diapason of our diplomacy '. ^ With regard to
the Treaty of San Stefano the language of Lord Beaconsfield
was emphatic : ' it abolishes the dominion of the Ottoman
Empire in Europe ; it creates a large State which, under the
name of Bulgaria, is inhabited by many races not Bulgarian
... all the European dominions of the Ottoman Porte are
. . . put under the administration of Russia . . . the effect
of all the stipulations combined will be to make the Black
Sea as much a Russian lake as the Caspian.' " Whether this
description was exaggerated or no, there can be no question
that, in every clause, the treaty was a ' deviation ' from those
of 1856 and 1871, and as such required the assent of the
signatory Powers.

To the demand that the treaty in its entirety should be
submitted to a congress Russia demurred. Great Britain
insisted. Again peace hung in the balance. Apart from
the dispute between England and Russia there was a great
deal of inflammable material about, to which a spark would
set light. Greece, Serbia, and, above all, Roumania, who
with incredible tactlessness and base ingratitude had been

^ Lord Beaconsfield in the House of Lords, April 8, 1878, Speeches,
ii. 163.
2 Ibid., p. 170.

XII THE BALKAN INSURRECTIONS 301

excluded from the peace negotiations, were all gravely
dissatisfied with the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano.
Greece had indeed actually invaded Thessaly at the begin-
ning of February, and only consented to abstain from further
hostilities upon the assurance of the Powei-s that her claims
should have favourable consideration in the definitive Treaty
of Peace.

Lord Beaconsfield, however, was ready with his next move, Indian
and, at this supremely critical moment he made it. On de^red^to^"
April 17 it was announced that he had ordered 7,000 Indian Malta,
troops to embark for Malta. The coup was denounced as
'sensational', un-English, unconstitutional,^ even illegal.- That
it was dramatic none can gainsay ; but it was consonant with
the whole trend of Lord Beaconsfield's policy : if it alarmed
England it impressed Europe, and there can be no question
that it made for peace.

The operation of other forces was tending in the same Russia,
direction. The terms of settlement proposed by Russia a^^'^^'^^*
were not less distasteful to Austria than to England. An Austria.
Austrian army was mobilized on the Russian flank in the
Carpathians, and on February 4 the Emperor Francis Joseph
demanded that the terms of peace should be referred to
a Congress at Vienna. Austria might well take a firm line,
for behind Austria was Germany.

Bismarck had made up his mind. He would fain have Bis-
preserved in its integrity the Dreikaiserhund of 1872 ; he "i^yc'^'s
was under deep obligations to Russia, and Avas only too glad
to assist and even to stimulate her ambitions so long as they
conflicted only with those of Great Britain or France. But
when it came to a possible conflict between Russia and
Germany matters were diflerent. It was true that Russia
had protected Prussia's right flank in 1864, and her left
flank in 1866, and — highest service of all — had 'contained'
Austria in 1870. The Tsar thought, not unnaturally, that in
the spring of 1878 the time had arrived for a repayment
of the debt, and requested Bismarck to contain Austria.
Bismarck was still anxious to ' keep open the wire between

■J e. g", by Mr. Gladstone. ^ e. g. by Lord Selborne.

302 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

Berlin and St. Petersburg', provided it was not at the
expense of that between Berlin and Vienna. He replied,
therefore, to the Tsar that Germany must keep watch on the
Rhine, and could not spare troops to contain Austria as
well. The excuse was transparent. Bismarck had, in fact,
decided to give Austria a free hand in the Balkans, and even
to push her along the road towards Salonica. His attitude
was regarded in Russia as a great betrayal, a dishonourable
repudiation of an acknowledged debt. It is not, however,
too much to say that it averted a European conflagration.
The Tsar decided not to fight Austria and England, but,
instead, to accept the invitation to a Congress at Berlin.
T^® „ On May 30 Lord Salisbury and Count Schouvalofi* came
Berlin. to an agreement upon the mam pomts at issue, and on
June 13 the Congress opened at Berlin. Prince Bismarck
presided, and filled his chosen role of Hhe honest broker',
but it was Lord Beaconsfield whose personality dominated
the Congress. ' Der alte Jude, das ist der Mann ' was
Bismarck's shrewd summary of the situation.

Little time was spent in discussion ; the treaty was signed
on July 13. Russia's sole acquisition in Europe was the
strip of Bessarabia which had been retroceded to Roumania
in 1856 and was now, by an act of grave impolicy and base
ingratitude, snatched away from her by the Tsar. In Asia
she retained Batoum, Ardahan, and Kars. Bosnia and the
Herzegovina were handed over for an undefined term to
Austria, who was also to be allowed to occupy for military,
but not administrative, purposes the Sanjak of Novi Bazar.
England, under a separate Convention concluded with Turkey
on June 4, was to occupy and administer the island of Cyprus,
so long as Russia retained Kars and Batoum. Turkey was
to receive the surplus revenues of the island, to carry out
reforms in her Asiatic dominions, and to be protected in the
possession of them by Great Britain. France sought for
authority to occupy Tunis in the future ; Italy hinted at
claims upon Albania and Tripoli. Germany asked for
nothing, but was more than compensated for her modesty
by securing the gi'atitude and friendship of the Sultan.
Never did Bismarck make a better investment.

XII THE BALKAN INSURRECTIONS 303

Greece, >vith no false modesty, claimed the cession of
Crete, Thessaly, Epirus, and a part of Macedonia, but for
the moment got nothing. Roumania was ill compensated
for the loss of southern Bessarabia by the acquisition of
part of the Dobrudja, but secured complete independence
from the Porte, as did Serbia and Montenegro, who received
most of the districts promised to them at San Stefano.

Bulgaria did not. And herein lay the essential difference
between the Treaty of Berlin and that of San Stefano.

' Bulgaria ', as defined at Berlin, was not more than a third
of the Bulgaria mapped out at San Stefano. It was to
consist of a relatively narrow strip between the Danube and
the Balkans, and to be an independent State under Turkish
suzerainty. South of it there was to be a province. Eastern
Rouraelia, which was to be restored to tlie Sultan, who
agreed to place it under a Christian governor approved by
the Powers. By this change the Sultan recovered 2,500,000
of population and 30,000 square miles of territory ; Bulgaria
was cut oflf from the Aegean ; Macedonia remained intact.

Such were the main provisions of the famous Treaty of
Berlin. They were criticized at the time, and from several
points of view, with great acerbity. Lord Beaconsfield's
claim that he had brought back to England 'Peace with
Honour ', though conceded by the mass of his fellow country-
men, evoked some derision among them. His statement that
he had 'consolidated' the Ottoman Empire was received
with polite scepticism both at home and abroad, a scepticism
to some extent justified by the Cyprus Convention, to say
nothing of the cession of Bosnia and the Herzegovina.
With some inconsistency, however, he was simultaneously
assailed for having replaced under the withering tyranny of
the Sultan a Christian population which Russia had emanci-
pated. The charge is, on the face of it, difficult to rebut.
But it does not lie in the mouths of the Philhellenists and
Philo-Serbs to make it. Had the Treaty of San Stefano
been permitted to stand the ambitions both of Serbia and
Greece would have been seriously circumscribed. It was
not, indeed, of Serbia, or Greece, still less of Roumania, that
Lord Beaconsfield was thinking at Berlin. The motive of

304 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

his policy was that which had inspired Lord Palmerston and
Mr. Canning. He definitely repudiated the claim of Russia
to dictate by her sole voice and in her own interests the
solution of a secular problem. It is only fair to Russia to
say, that if at the time of the Berlin Memorandum Lord
Beaconsfield had been at more pains to preserve the Concert
of the Powers, the claim might never have been preferred.
Once preferred it could not be admitted.

For a final judgement on the events recorded in this
chapter the time has not yet arrived. During the generation
which has followed the Congress of Berlin opinion has swung
backwards and forwards, and the pendulum is not, even
now, at rest. This much, however, may with confidence be
afiirmed : the diplomatists at Berlin were working better
than they knew. The settlement outlined at San Stefano
was both hasty and premature. That it should be submitted
to the collective judgement of the Powers was only reason-
able. Lord Beaconsfield must at least have the credit of
having secured for it that further scrutiny.
Eouina- Two of the Balkan States owe little gratitude to his
memory. At San Stefano Roumania had been treated by
Russia with discourtesy and ingratitude. At Berlin it was
treated no better. Both Germany and England, to say
nothing of France, might have been expected to extend
towards the principality something more than sympathy.
But Bismarck, indifferent to the dynastic ties which united
Prussia and Roumania, was not sorry to see Russia neglect-
ing a golden opportunity for binding Roumania in grati-
tude to herself. A Roumania alienated from Russia would
be the less likely to quarrel with the Dual Monarchy and
to press her claims to the inclusion of the unredeemed
Roumanians in Transylvania and the Bukovina. Lord
Beaconsfield professed much Platonic sympathy for the
disappointment of their wishes in regard to Bessarabia, but
frankly confessed that he could not turn aside from the
pursuit of the larger issues to befriend a State in whose
fortunes Great Britain was not directly interested. It was
a gross blunder, the consequences of which are not yet
exhausted. The Roumanian envoys left Berlin not only

ma

XII THE BALKAN INSURRECTIONS 305

empty-handed, but deeply impressed by the cynicism of
higli diplomacy, and bitterly chagrined by the ingratitude
of Russia and the indifference of Europe.

The sentiments of Bulgaria were not dissimilar. Against Bulgaria.
Russia she had no cause of complaint ; but in her view
Germany and Great Britain had conspired to dash from her
lips the cup proffered her by the Tsar. San Stefano had gone
beyond the equities of the case, and had imperilled other
interests not less important than those of Bulgaria. Berlin
fell short of them. The barrier interposed between the
Bulgarians of the new principality and those of Eastern
Roumelia was not merely inequitable but manifestly absurd.
Nor did it endure. The making of modern Bulgaria demands,
however, and will receive, more detailed attention.

So also with the position of the Southern Slavs, to whom The
the settlement of 1878 was profoundly disquieting. Serbia Southern
gained some territory, but it was really at the expense of
Bulgaria ; the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, garrisoned by Austria,
but still governed by the Turks, severed the Serbs of Serbia
from their brethren in Montenegro, while the Austrian
occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina brought the
Habsburgs into the heart of Balkan affairs and made a
tremendous breach in the solidarity of the Jugo-Slav race.

The Treaty of Berlin is generally regarded as a great land-
mark in the history of the Eastern Question. In some
respects it is ; but its most important features were not
those with which its authors were best pleased, or most
concerned. They were preoccupied by the relations between
the Sultan and the Tsar, and by the interest of Europe in
defining those relations. The enduring significance of the
treaty is to be found elsewhere : not in the remnant of the
Ottoman Empire snatched from the brink of destruction by
Lord Beaconsfield, but in the new nations which were arising
upon the ruins of that empire — nations which may look back
to the 13th of July, 1878, if not as their birthday, at least
as the date on which their charters of emancipation were
signed and sealed.

For fiu-ther reference : the Papers laid before Parliament in 1861, 1867,
1877, and 1878, and referred to in the footnotes, are of great importance

1984 X

306 THE EASTERN QUESTION

They are usefully summarized by the Duke of Argyll in The Eastern
Question (2 vols.). Lord Stratford de Redcliflfe's Eastern Question, con-
taining his letters to the Times in 1876-8, and other papers has great
contemporary interest. Holland and Hertslet are, as before, invaluable
for the texts of treaties.

For relations of Russia and Germany : T. Klaczko, The Two Chancellors
(Gortschakoff and Bismarck) ; Busch, Our Chancellor ; and Bismarck's
Iie'minisce7ices.

On the Balkan movement: Marquis of Bath, Observations on Bulgarian
Affairs, 1880 ; Duke of Argyll, as above ; The Balkans (Clarendon Press,
1915) ; A. J. Evans, Through Bosnia and Herzegovina on Foot (1876) ;
W. E. Gladstone, Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East
(London, 1876) ; lovanovitz, Les Serbes et la Mission de la Serbie dans
^Europe d'Orient (Paris, 1876) ; A. Gallenga, Two Years of the Eastern
Question, 2 vols. (London, 1877) ; Hanotaux, Contemporary France.

For English policy : Lord Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Granville ; Lord
Newton, Life of Lord Lyons ; Morley, Gladstone ; Holland, Duke of Devon-
shire ; Marriott, England since Waterloo ; Paul, Modern England. The
concluding volume of Monypenny and Buckle's Disraeli ought in this
connexion to be of supreme interest.

Generally : Debidour, Histoire di2)lomatique ; Driault, La Question
d'' Orient.

CHAPTER XIII

THE BALKAN STATES, 1878-98

The Making of Bulgaria. Modern Greece (1832-98).
The Cretan Problem

' These newly emancipated races want to breathe free air and not through
Russian nostrils.'— SiE William White (1885).

'A Bulgaria, friendly to the Porte, and jealous of foreign influence,
would be a far surer bulwark against foreign aggression than two
Bulgarias, severed in administration, but united in considering the Porte
as the only obstacle to their national development.' — Lord Salisbury
(Dec. 23, 1885).

' It is next to impossible that the Powers of Christendom can permit the
Turk, however triumphant, to cast his yoke again over the necks of any
emancipated Provincials. . . . There is much reason to think that a chain
of autonomous States, though still, perhaps, tributary to the Sultan, might
be extended from the Black Sea to the Adriatic with advantage to that
potentate himself. But, at all events, the very idea of reinstating any
amount of Turkish misgovemment in places once cleared of it is simply
revolting.' — Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

' Greece wants something more than the rules of political procedure that
are embodied in written constitutions in order to infuse better moral prin-
ciples among her people whose social system has been corrupted by long
ages of national servitude . . . until the people undergo a moral change
as well as the government, national progress must be slow, and the surest
pledges for the enjoyment of true liberty will be wanting.' — Dr. George
Finlay.

' Crete is an unexplored paradise in ruins, a political volcano in chronic
activity, a theatre on the boards of which rapine, arson, murder, and all
manner of diabolical crimes are daily rehearsed for the peace, if not the
delectation, of the Great Powers of peace-loving Christendom. Truly this
is far and away the most grotesque political spectacle of the nineteenth
century.' — E. J. Dillon.

To pass from the Congress of Berlin to the early struggles The Bal-
of the reborn Balkan States means more than a change of |^°^^^*^^'
temperature and environment. It involves an abrupt transi- of Beriin.
tion from drab prose to highly coloured romance ; from a
problem play to transpontine melodrama ; from the tradi-
tional methods of nineteenth century diplomacy to those

x2

308 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

of primitive political society. Transported to the Balkans
we are in the midst of boideversements and vicissitudes,
political and personal ; sudden elevations ; sudden falls ;
democratic constitutions and autocratic cot(2JS d'etat ; plot-
ting and counterplotting ; the hero of yesterday, the villain
of to-day, and again the hero of to-morrow ; abductions,
abdications, and assassinations ; the formation and dissolution
of parties ; a strange medley of chivalry and baseness ; of
tragedy and comedy ; of obscurantism and progress,
Greece, The Treaty of Berlin meant the end of ' Turkey in Europe '
Southern ^^ ^^® term had been understood by geographers for the last
Slavs, and four hundred years. The place of the provinces of the
jjijj " Ottoman Empire is now taken by independent, or virtually
independent. States : Greece, Roumania, Serbia, Montenegro,
and Bulgaria. But although the Ottoman Empire is broken
and crippled the new States are by no means fully fashioned.
The garment woven at Berlin had many ragged edges. Greece
got nothing at the moment, and had to wait three years
before even a portion of her claims upon Thessaly and
Epirus were conceded ; Crete remained in Turkish hands
for another generation. Serbia was profoundly dissatisfied
and with reason : the arrangement proposed at San Stefano
would have divided the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar between her-
self and the sister State of Montenegro, thus bringing the two
Slav States into immediate contact, and giving Serbia indirect
access, through Montenegro, to the Adriatic. The crafty restora-
tion of the Sanjak to Turkey ; the retention of the great
harbour of the Bocche di Cattaro by Austria, and the Austrian
occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina inflicted a series
of terrible blows upon the aspirations of the Southern Slavs,
and kept open sores which might have been healed. The
Habsburgs were, however, far too clever to allow their hopes
of access to the Aegean to be frustrated by the interposition
of a compact Jugo-Slav State, whether that State >vas
unitary or fedei-al. The disappointment of Serbia was the
immediate disappointment of Montenegro, and ultimately the
disappointment of Bosnia and the Herzegovina.
The Of the cruel blow to the legitimate hopes of Roumania

donian enough, for the moment, was said in the last chapter. But
Problem.

XIII THE BALKAN STATES, 1878-98 309

the fatal character of the bhmder then committed by
Russia, Avjthout protest, be it added, from any of the Powers,
cannot be too strongly emphasized. Most significant of
all, however, was the partition of the proposed Bulgaria.
That partition not only served to keep the Balkans in
ferment for the next thirty years but introduced into
European diplomacy, or at least into its vocabulary, a new
problem, that of ' Macedonia '. Whether Serbia and Greece
would or could have acquiesced in the San Stefano settle-
ment is a question which must be reserved for subsequent
discussion ; but it is obvious that if Lord Beaconsfield had
not torn that treaty into shreds the Macedonian problem
would never have emerged in the shape with which the
present generation is familiar. The Greater Bulgaria might
ultimately have raised as many problems as it solved; but
those problems would have been approached from a different
angle and might have been solved with less friction and more
satisfactory results.

As things were, it was upon the fortunes of Bulgaria that Bulgaria.
the attention not merely of the Balkans but of Europe at
large was concentrated during the twenty years succeeding
the CongTess of Berlin. To the affairs of Bulgaria a large
section of this chapter must, therefore, be devoted.

In 1878 the Russian army was in occupation of the The Con-
principality which Russian diplomacy proposed to create. s*^*"i*'o°-
The plans of the future edifice had been, it is true, pro-
foundly modified at Berlin, but the task of executing them
was committed to Russia.

The first business Avas to provide the new principality
with a constitution. Accordhig to the Treaty of Berlin the
' Organic Law of the Principality ' was to be drawn up
'before the election of the Prince' by an assembly of
notables of Bulgaria convoked at Tirnovo ; particular
regard was to be paid to the rights and interests of the
Turkish, Roumanian, Greek, or other populations, where these
were intermixed with Bulgarians, and there was to be
absolute equality between difierent religious creeds and
confessions.

Until the completion of the Organic Law the principality

310 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

was provisionally administered by a Russian Commissary,
assisted by a Turkish Commissary and Consuls delegated
ad hoc by the Powers. The Constituent Assembly, elected in
December 1878, met on February 26, 1879, and duly drafted
an Organic Law which was adopted on April 28. Mainly the
work of the fii'st ruler of the independent Bulgaria, Petko
Karaveloff,' this Law was amended in 1893 and again in 1911,
but neither in its original nor amended form has it worked
satisfactorily. It was said of modern Itah , perhaps with truth,
that she was made too quickly. The saying is certainly true
of Bulgaria. Her young men and old men were alike in a hurry.
Without any training whatever in the most difficult of all
political arts, that of self-government, Bulgaria adopted a form
of constitution which presupposed a long political apprentice-
ship. Karaveloff was a sincere patriot, but he belonged to the
worst type of academic radicals. The constitution reflected,
in every clause, the work of the doctrinaire.

The Legislature was to consist of a Single Chamber, the
Sobranje or National Assembly ; any man over thirty years
of age who could read and write, unless he were a clergy-
man, a soldier on active service, or had been deprived of
civil rights, was eligible for election to it ; all members were
to be paid ; the Assembly Avas to be elected on the basis of
universal manhood suffrage, and each electoral district was
to consist of 20,000 votei-s who were to return one member ;
unless dissolved by the prince (now the king) the Assembly
was to sit for four years. Questions concerning the
acquisition or cession of territory, a vacancy of the crown,
regencies and constitutional revision were to be reserved
from the competence of the ordinary Sobranje and to be
referred to a Grand Sobranje, elected in the same manner
by the same people but in double strength. The Executive
was entrusted to a Council of eight ministers, to be nominated
by the prince (king), but responsible to the Assembly. -

Had this constitution been the outcome of a slow political
evolution there would have been little to be said against it.

1 For an admirable portrait see Laveleye, The Balkan Peninsula^
pp. 259 sq.
' For convenience the subsequent amendments are incorporated.

XIII THE BALKAN STATES, 1878-98 311

Imposed upon a people totally inexperienced, it proved, as the
sequel will show, unworkable.

Having drafted the Organic Law the Assembly proceeded ] he
to the election of a prince. The Treaty of Berlin had pro- ^'"^^e.
vided that he was to be 'freely elected by the population,
and confirmed by the Porte with the assent of the Powers,
but no member of the reigning dynasty of a Great Power was
to be eligible. The Tsar recommended and the Assembly
elected (April 29, 1879) Prince Alexander of Battenberg,
a scion, by a morganatic marriage, of the House of Darmstadt,
a nephew by marriage of the Tsar, and an officer in the
Prussian army.

Born in 1857 Prince Alexander was at this time a young Prince
man of twenty-two, of fine presence, and with plenty of g^^^g^ ^f
character and brains. A close observer described him as Batten-
*a wise statesman, a brave soldier, a remarkable man in every ^^^"
respect'.^ The description was perhaps partial, but the
choice was unquestionably a good one, and if Prince Alexander
had had a fair chance he would probably have done a great
work for his adopted country. He was, however, hampered
from the outset on the one hand by the jealousy and
arrogance of the Russian officials by whom he was at first
surrounded, and on the other by the opposition of the
Sobranje, which was elected under the ridiculous provisions
of the Organic Law.

Out of 170 members elected to the first Sobranje in 1879 The
not more than thirty were supporters of the ministers ap- ^ ^^^i^-
pointed by the prince, and after a session which lasted only
ten days it was dissolved. A second Sobranje, elected in
1880, was even less favourable to the prince and his
ministers. The appointment of a new ministry, under the
Russophil radicals Zankoff" and Karavelofl", temporarily
eased the situation, but in May, 1881, the prince suspended
the Organic LaAV, and in July a new Assembly ratified his cou}?
d'etat and conferred upon him extraordinary powers for a
period of seven years. In September, 1883, however, the prince
w as compelled by pressure from St. Petersburg to re-establish

1 Majoi" A. von Huhn, The Struggle of the Bulgarians for Indepen-
dence (1886), p. 6.

312 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

the abrogated constitution. The new Tsar, Alexander HI/
was much less friendly than his father to the Prince of
Bulgaria, and from this time onwards there was more or less
avowed hostility between St. Petersburg and Sofia.
Union of That hostility accounts in part for the attitude of Russia
the two towards the union of the two Bulgarias, so soon to be
garias. accomplished. Of all the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin
the one which was most obviously artificial was the severance
of the Bulgarians to the south of the Balkans from their
brethren to the north of them. Of the two provinces the
southern was the purer Bulgarian. In the northern was
a large sprinkling of Moslems, Greeks, and Wallachs. The
southern was far more homogeneous in race. Ethno-
graphically, therefore, the partition was absurd. Yet the
policy of Russia under Alexander III Avent, as the sequel
shows, some way to justify the suspicions of Lord Beacons-
field.
Eastern No less than ten articles of the Treaty of Berlin were
Koumelia. ^jgyQ^ed to the future organization of Eastern Roumelia, but
these provisions proved to be so purely temporary that they
need not detain us. Hardly was the ink on the treaty dry
before the Russian agents, in both provinces, began to
encourage the popular demand for reunion. More par-
ticularly among the Bulgarians of ' Eastern Roumelia '. By
the formation of 'athletic societies', the encouragement
of national sports, and other methods conmion to the
stimulation of nationalist movements, the youth of Eastern
Roumelia were accustomed to the idea of association and
discipline. By the year 1885, 40,000 of them were trained
in the use of arms. When Sultan Hamid protested against
these proceedings he was reminded that the Turkish indemnity
to Russia was not yet paid.

Meanwhile, in the northern province, the unionist move-
ment was making rapid progress, under the powerful leader-
ship of Karaveloflf, who was now Prime Minister, and of
Stephen Stambulofi", who, in 1884, had become President of
the Sobranje.

^ Succeeded in 1881 on the assassination of Tsar Alexander 11.

XIII THE BALKAN STATES, 1878-98 313

Among the makers of modern Bulgaria this remarkable Stambu-
man holds, beyond dispute, the highest place. The son of ° •
an innkeeper, Stephen Stambuloflf was bom at Tirnovo in
1854. Educated at Odessa, he was powerfully attracted
towards the views of the nihilist party, but the consuming
passion of his life was not Russian nihilism but Bulgarian
nationalism. On his return from Odessa he plunged into
the turbid waters of Bulgarian politics, and, on his election
to the Sobranje, was almost immediately appointed President
of the Assembly. He ardently supported the movement for
the union of the Bulgarias, and from the abdication of
Prince Alexander to the days of his own dismissal by Prince
Ferdinand he exercised an authority which was virtually
dictatorial.^

On September 18,1885, Gavril Pasha, the Turkish Governor- Tnion of
General at Philippopolis, was informed that his services were g^|_
no longer required, and he was conducted, with some con- gaiias.
tumely, out of the province. Resistance there could be none,
for the Bulgarians were unanimous. Not so the Powers.
What was their attitude ? An answer to this question lands
us once more in the realm of political paradox. To say that
Russia frowned upon the enterprise thus launched at Philip-
popolis Avould be a ludicrous understatement. The attitude of
Russia demands, however, and will repay, closer consideration.
To the union of the two Bulgarias the Tsar was not, and
could not be, in principle, opposed. Seven short years had
passed since the Treaty of San Stefano was di-afted. But the
circumstances were radically different. In the spring of
1878 a victorious Russian army had just pierced the Balkans,
and could, at any moment, thunder at the gates of Constanti-
nople. Russia was virtually in occupation of all the country
between the Danube and the Bosphorus. She could dictate
the destinies of the Bulgarians.

It was otherwise in 1885. The Bulgarians had found
themselves. They had not learnt the art of parliamentary
government, but what was more important they knew the
meaning of ' nationality '. The arrogance of Russian officials

* For Stambuloflf's career cf. A. H. Beaman, M. Stamhuloff (London,
1895).

314 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

towards the Bulgarian peasants had, in the course of seven
years, gone far to obliterate from their minds the remem-
brance of the mighty services rendered by their liberators in
1877. Neither 'the Battenberg', as Prince Alexander was
contemptuously known at St. Petersburg, nor the quondam
nihilist, Stambuloff, was inclined to be the pliant instrument
of Russian influence in the principality.

The Tsar was not ill-disposed towards the union, provided
it was effected on his own terms, on terms which would
have brought the Bulgarians to heel. And the first indis-
pensable condition was that Prince Alexander should yield
his place to a Russian nominee. ' You remember ', were the
orders issued by the Foreign Office to the Russian Consul-
General at Rustchuk, ' that the union [of the two Bulgarias]
must not take place until after the abdication of Prince
Alexander.' ^ In other words, Russia was willing to see
a Greater Bulgaria come into existence, but it must be as
a Russian protectorate, not as a State, independent alike of
the Sultan and the Tsar.
Attitude Did not the contention of the Tsar afford some posthumous
Lnd^^ justification for the misgivings of Lord Beaconsfield in 1878 ?
Plainly, there are two alternative answers to this question.
It may be urged, on the one hand, that Lord Beaconsfield
would have done well to exhibit a more robust faith in
Bulgarian nationality ; on the other, that in 1878 the
ambition of Russia was much more obvious than the in-
dependence of Bulgaria. Those Englishmen, who in 1878
favoured the creation of the Greater Bulgaria, were actuated
much more by detestation of the Turk whom they did know,
than love for the Bulgarian whom they did not know. They
felt, with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, that ' the very idea of
reinstating any amount of Turkish misgovernment in places
once cleared of it is simply revolting '.

The policy of England in 1885 was inspired by a different
motive. * If you can help to build up these peoples into
a bulwark of independent States and thus screen the " sick
man " from the fury of the northern blast, for God's sake do

1 Quoted by Kose {op. cit., p. 262), whose masterly analysis of the
evidence should be consulted.

XIII THE BALKAN STATES, 1878-98 315

it' Thus wrote Sir Robert Morier from St. Petersburg to
Sir William White in Constantinople at the height of the
Bulgarian crisis in December, 1885. Bulgaria, it will be
observed, was to come into being not as the catspaw of
Russia, but as a barrier against her advance towards Con-
stantinople. Could any one have foreseen such a possibility
in 1878 ? It was too much to expect. But Lord Beacons-
field's colleague at Berlin was now a complete convert to the
views of our ablest representatives abroad. *A Bulgaria,
friendly to the Porte', said Lord Salisbury in December,
1885, 'and jealous of foreign influence, would be a far surer
bulwark against foreign aggi*ession than two Bulgarias,
severed in administration, but united in considering the
Porte as the only obstacle to their national development.' *

Prince Alexander, without reference to the Powers, had Serbo-
already taken the plunge. He showed a moment's hesitation Waf xoT,
when the patriots of Philippopolis came to offer him the 1885,
crown, but Stambuloff" told him bluntly that there were only
two paths open to him : ' the one to Philippopolis and as far
beyond as God may lead ; the other to Darmstadt.' The
prince's choice was soon made, and on September 20 he
announced his acceptance of the throne of united Bulgaria.

Before his action could be ratified or repudiated by his
suzei-ain or the Powers, Bulgaria was threatened with a new
danger. If Russia began to see in a united Bulgaria a barrier
in her advance towards the straits, Austria had no mind to
see the multiplication of barriers between Buda-Pesth and
Salonica.

On November 14 King Milan of Serbia, who, in 1882, had
followed the example of Prince Carol of Roumania and
assumed a royal crown, suddenly seized an obviously frivolous
pretext to declare war upon Bulgaria.

Whether Austria actually instigated the attack it is at
present impossible to say. Apart from Habsburg intrigues
King Milan had his own reasons. Despite the new crown
his owTi position was none too secure. An attempt upon
his life in Belgrade indicated the fact that his enemies were

1 ap Rose, o;>. cit., p. 273.

316 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

alert : a marriage between Prince Peter Karageorgevic and
a daughter of Prince Nicliolas had lately strengthened the
rival dynasty ; there were unsettled boundary questions and
tariff questions between Serbia and Bulgaria ; above all,
the idea of a Balkan ' Balance of Power ' was germi-
nating. If Bulgaria was to be doubled in size, and more
than doubled, Greece and Serbia, to say nothing of Roumania,
would look for compensations. Serbia was the first actively
to intervene. King Milan left his capital for the front
amid enthusiastic cheers for 'the King of Serbia and
Macedonia'. On November 14 the march towards Sofia
began.

The chance to stab a friend and rival in the back was too
tempting for a Balkan kinglet to refuse. The question of
the union of the two Bulgarias, though answered with
emphasis by the Bulgarian people, still hung in the diplo-
matic balance ; the Bulgarian army, thanks to the action of
the Tsar in the withdrawal of his Russian ofiicers, was left
at a critical moment Avithout instructors ; such officers as
remained to it were raw and inexperienced ; the prince's
own position was exceedingly precarious.

But his peasant subjects rallied superbly to his support ;
Bulgarians from Macedonia flocked to the assistance of their
kinsmen, and in a three days' battle at Slivnitza (November
17-19) they inflicted a decisive defeat upon the Serbians.
The young Bulgarian army, emerging triumphant from its
' baptism of fire ' at Slivnitza, promptly took the offensive and
marched on Pirot, which was captured on November 27. The
Serbian army seemed, to a close and competent observer,^ to
lie at their mercy ; but the short though significant war was
over.
Interven- On November 28 Count Khevenhiiller, the Austrian
Austria minister at Belgrade, arrived at Pirot, and imposed a truce
upon Prince Alexander. The Bulgarians, flushed with victory,
already dreaming of the absorption of Serbia into a Greater
Bulgaria, were bluntly informed that if they advanced from

1 Major A. von Hubn, whose work, The Struggle of the Bulgarians for
National Independence, translated from tlie Gei'man (Murray, 1886), con-
tains much the best account known to me of these events.

XIII THE BALKAN STATES, 1878-98 317

Pirot they would find themselves ' face to face no longer with
Serbian but with Austrian troops '.

Serbia was saved : but so also was the union of the Bui- Attitude
garias. The Battle of Slivnitza had decided that question. po^^j,g
A peace signed at Bucharest (March 3, 1886) restored the
status quo ante as between Bulgaria and Serbia ; but the
larger question had been settled at Constantinople. A con-
ference of the Powers had met on November 5, and Great
Britain had taken the lead in urging the Sultan to acquiesce
in the alienation of Eastern Roumelia.

To the diplomatic reasons, already detailed, for the atti- Queen
tude of Great Britain was now added a dynastic one. On ^^^*^"^-
July 23, 1885, Princess Beatrice, the youngest daughter and
constant companion of Queen Victoria,. had become the wife
of Prince Henry of Battenberg, the youngest brother of the
Prince of Bulgaria. Queen Victoria's interest in the Batten-
berg family was not confined to her own son-in-law. His
eldest brother, Prince Louis, a distinguished officer in the
English navy, had, in 1884, married the queen's grand-
daughter. Princess Victoria of Hesse, the eldest daughter
of the Princess Alice, and in 1888 the queen interested
herself keenly in a proposed marriage between another
granddaughter. Princess Victoria of Prussia, and Prince
Alexander. Before this time, however, much had happened
to the prince and his people.

At Constantinople the Mill of Great Britain prevailed, and Recogni-
early in 1886 Sultan Abdul Hamid formally recognized the un"on^/^®
union of the two Bulgarias, and appointed Prince Alexander
to be ' Governor-General of Eastern Roumelia '.

He was not destined to enjoy his new honour long. On his Russian
return from Pirot to Sofia he received an enthusiastic ^^^ ^*
welcome from his subjects. Their enthusiasm intensified the August,
chagrin of Russia, and in August, 1886, the Tsar carried out l^^^-
his counterstroke. Implacable in enmity against his cousin
he determined to dethrone him by force. On the night of
August 21 a band of Russian officers burst into the palace at
Sofia, compelled the prince to sign an abdication, and carried
him ofi" a prisoner to Reni, near Galatz, in Russian territory.
Thence he was dispatched under escort to Lemberg. But

318 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

the Russian party in Bulgaria gained little by this melo-
dramatic coup.

A provisional government was hastily set up at Sofia
under StambuloflP, and their first act was to recall their
kidnapped prince (August 29). On September 3 Prince
Alexander re-entered his capital amid the enthusiastic
plaudits of his people. But by his own act he had already
rendered his position untenable.

On his arrival at Rustchuk he had been welcomed by the
Consul-Geneml for Russia, and in gratitude for this friendly
act he was foolish enough, perhaps under the stress of the
conflicting emotions produced by recent experiences, to send
to the Tsar a telegram, which concluded wvih. these words :
' Russia having given me my Crown I am ready to give it
back into the hands of its Sovereign.' The Tsar promptly
took advantage of this amazing indiscretion, and refused
curtly to approve his restoration. The prince, in despair of
overcoming the antipathy of his cousin, and genuinely anxious
to do the best he could for his distracted country, at once
announced his abdication, and on September 7 he left
Bulgaria for ever.^

Prince Alexander had presided with dignity and some
measure of success over the birth-throes of a nation ; he
left it, as he believed, for its good ; primarily, in order not
to obstruct a rapprochement between Bulgaria and its
' natural ' protector.

Before leaving Prince Alexander appointed a regency,
consisting of Stambuloffj Karaveloff", and Nikeforoff", to whom
the Tsar sent as ' adviser ' General Kaulbars. Having done
his best to raise the country against the regents, and failed
ignominiously, Kaulbars was, however, recalled. The Govern-
ment and the people alike refused to be browbeaten by the
Russian agent. A Sobranje containing no less than 470 sup-
porters of the regency against thirty Russophils was returned ;
it conferred a virtual dictatorship upon Stambulofi', and
elected Prince Waldemar of Denmark. The latter, acting

^ He retired into private life, and, after the failure of Queen Victoria to
obtain for him the hand of Princess Victoria, married an opera singer, and
died in 1893.

XIII THE BALKAN STATES, 1878-98 319

under family pressure exerted by the Tsar, declined the
offer, and again Bulgaria had to look for a ruler. For the
time being Stambuloif more than filled the place, but in July,
1887, after Bulgarian delegates had searched the European
Courts for a candidate, the Sobranje, refusing the Tsar's
nominee, the Prince of Mingrelia, elected Prince Ferdinand
of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, a son of Princess Clementine of
Orleans, and a grandson, therefore, of King Louis Philippe.
Prince Ferdinand, who was a young ^ and ambitious man,
accepted the offer, and ascended the throne on August 14,
1887. Russia refused to recognize him, but strong in the
support of Bismarck and the Emperor Francis Joseph, in
whose army he had served, the yoimg prince defied the
opposition of the Tsar and reaped his reward.

For the next seven years Bulgaria was ruled by Stephen Stambn-
Stambuloff. Prince Ferdinand wisely took time to feel his po-^^er
way, and thus escaped much of the odium which no statesman (1887-94).
worthy of the name could, during those difficult years, have
avoided.

A double task awaited Stambuloff : on the one hand to
emancipate his country from foreign tutelage ; on the other
to introduce internal order and discipline, and lay the founda-
tions, as yet non-existent, of a modern civilized State. In
both directions he succeeded beyond expectation, but not
by ' rose water ' ^ methods. The situation demanded strength
rather than finesse, and it cannot be denied that Stambuloff
was compelled to have recourse to weapons which excited
just resentment and even indignation.^ x\ll through he had
to fight for his political life, and more than once escaped
actual assassination by a hair's-breadth, but he carried things
through with a strong hand, to the infinite advantage of his
country and his prince. He has been called the Bismarck
of the Balkans ; but he lacked the finesse which that supreme
diplomatist concealed under an aftectation of bluntness ; in

1 Bom in 1861.

2 The phrase, of course, is Carlyle's, and used by him in reference to
Cromwell's work in Ireland.

3 A notable example was the liigh-handed execution of a Major Panitza
in 1890.

320 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

some respects he was Cromwelliaii rather than Bismarckian ;
but essentially he was himself: a rough, coarse-grained
peasant, of indomitable will, strong passions, and burning^
patriotism. Involved in domestic trouble in May, 1894, he
sent in his resignation, little suspecting that it would be
accepted. To his intense chagrin it was. Prince Ferdinand
himself succeeded to the vacant place.

StambuloflP bitterly resented his dismissal, and took na
pains to hide the fact ; it was, therefore, something of a
relief to all parties when, in July, 1895, the fallen statesman
was finally removed from the scene by assassination.

The people he had served so truly were stricken with grief

at the news of the dastardly crime ; but Prince Ferdinand

was at last master in his own house.

Bap- The first use he made of his freedom was to effect a recon-

^^g^^^ ^itlj ciliation with Russia. The death of Alexander III in 1894

Eussia. rendered the task easier. Ferdinand himself had married,

in 1893, Princess Marie of the house of Bourbon-Parma, and

when, in 1896, an heir was born to them, the young crown

prince was baptized according to the rites of the Orthodox

Church, and the Tsar Nicholas II acted as godfather. Two

years later the reconciliation was sealed by a State visit paid

by the Prince and Princess of Bulgaria to Peterhof.

Meanwhile, Ferdinand's international position was regu-
larized when, in March, 1896, he was recognized by the Sultan
as Prince of Bulgaria and Governor-General of Eastern Rou-
melia. His mother, the Princess Clementine, who was at once
exceedingly clever and exceedingly wealthy, devoted herself
untiringly to the task of improving the dynastic and political
position of her son. And not in vain. The development
of Bulgaria, alike in European prestige, in political stability,
and in all the economic and industrial appurtenances of a
modernized society, was astonishingly rapid. Leaving it in
this promising position we must turn our attention to
other parts of the peninsula, or rather of the Ottoman
dominions.
Armenian From 1894 to 1897 interest in the Eastern Question was
massa- ^^ainly concentrated upon the unhappy relations between
the Sultan Abdul Hamid and the Armenian Christians. But

XIII THE BALKAN STATES, 1878-98 321

this painful subject can be dealt with more conveniently in

another connexion.^

Early in the year 1897 the outbreak of an insurrection in The

Crete— the 'Great Greek Island' as the Greeks loved to "'^p"^*'

factor.

call it — and the excitement caused thereby among the
Greeks of the mainland once more brought into prominence
the Hellenic factor in the Near Eastern problem.

In order to pick up the threads of the Hellenic question,
it will be necessary to cast a brief retrospective glance upon
Greek affairs since the formal achievement of independence
in 1832.^

The protecting Powers, it will be remembered, had pro-
vided the new kingdom with a king in the person of a young
German princeling. Otto of Bavaria.

The task committed to him would have tried the skill of The

the most accomplished and experienced statesman ; Otto l|avarmn

l\e""Gncy.
was a lad of seventeen, of indifferent natural capacity, devoid

of any special aptitude for government, and entirely ignorant

of the country and people whose fortunes were committed to

his charge.

Manifold difficulties confronted him at the outset of his
reign, and most of them dogged his footsteps until its
inglorious ending. His tender years necessitated a Regency,
which was committed, perhaps, inevitably to Bavarians, and
by Bavarians he was surrounded for the first ten years of
his reign. An ex-minister of Bavaria, Count von Armans-
perg ; General von Heideck, a typical German soldier ;
Dr. Maurer, a distinguished jurist — this was the incongruous
triumvirate who were to rule the young kingdom in the
young king's name. Less distinguished men might have
bungled things less badly ; they could hardly have bungled
them worse.

A second difficulty arose from the niggardly and stupid Epinis
fashion in Avhich the northern frontiers were defined t>y !'.!!' ^.... , ,
the Treaty of London (1832). The lino was then drawn
from the Gulf of Arta on the west to the Gulf of Volo on the
east. Beyond that line, in Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia,

1 Infra, p. 349. 2 Supra, p. l'J9.

322 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

were a large number of Greeks who, ardently desiring
reunion with their brethren in the kingdom, still remained
subject to the rule of the Sultan. For half a century nothing
whatever was done by the Powers to remedy the sense of
wrong which poisoned the minds of patriotic Greeks on both
sides of the purely artificial frontier.

On the outbreak of the Crimean War the Greeks were
anxious, not unnaturally, to take advantage of the pre-
occupation of the Turks and to acquire the long-coveted pro-
vinces of Epirus and Thessaly. Early in 1854 a large though
ill-disciplined force of Greeks burst into the provinces ;
but the invasion was repelled by the Turks ; the Western
allies occupied the Piraeus from May, 1854, until February,
1857 ; and King Otto was coerced into a highly distasteful
neutrality. The only results of the ill-advised and inoppor-
tune invasion of Turkish territory were, therefore, the
alienation of the best friends of Greece ; an increase of her
financial embarrassments ; and, worst of all, a damaging blow
to her prestige and self-respect. At the Peace of Paris
Greece got nothing.

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8 was, in a territorial
sense, more productive. Though not immediately. In the
war itself Greece had taken no part. There was a strong
party in Greece which believed that the moment had come
for taking by force of arms the great prize — Thessaly and
Epirus — denied to her by diplomacy in 1856. But Trikoupis,
who was Foreign Minister, unwisely preferred to trust to
diplomacy and, in particular, to the goodwill of Great
Britain, who, as in 1854, strongly opposed the intervention
of Greece. Popular insurrections broke out in Thessaly and
Epirus as well as in Crete, but the peace between Greece
and Turkey remained technically unbroken until February 2,
1878, when, at the acutest moment of the European crisis,
Greece declared war upon the Porte. This most inopportune
and not very courageous demonstration was at once sup-
pressed by the Powers, and Greece acquiesced. Consequently
Greece went to the Congress of Berlin as an outside sup-
pliant, and, as might have been expected, came away empty-
handed. Lord Beaconsfield, jealous for the integrity of the

XIII THE BxVLKAN STATES, 1878-9S 323

Ottoman dominions, supjgestcrl that Greece M'as ' a country
with a future, who could afford to wait '. ]\Ir. Gladstone, an
ardent Philhellene, scathingly contrasted the fate of Greece
with that of the Balkan States which, relying upon Russia, had
made war upon the Turk and had reaped their appropriate
reward. Greece, who had kept her sword in the scabbard and
had relied upon English benevolence, got nothing more than
a passing sneer from Lord l^eaconsfield. The Congress of
Berlin did indeed invite the Sultan to grant to Greece such
a rectification of frontiers as would include Janina and
Larissa in Greek territory, but the Sultan, not unnaturally,
ignored the invitation.

Two years later (1880), when Mr. Gladstone himself had
come into office, the Powers suggested to the Porte the
cession of Thessaly and Epirus, and at last, in 1881, the tact
and firnmess of Mr. Goschen wrung from the unwilling
Sultan one-third of the latter province and the greater part of
the former. Macedonia Avas still left, fortunately for Greece,
under the heel of the Sultan. Lord Beaconsfield did not
exhibit much positive benevolence towards Greece, but
negatively she, like Serbia, owes him a considerable debt.
If he had not torn up the Treaty of San Stefano Bulgaria
Avould have obtained a commanding position in JNIacedonia,
Serbia would never have got Uskub and JNIonastir, Greece
would still be sighing for Kavala and perhaps for Salonica.

Nearly twenty years earlier the Hellenic kingdom had
been enriched by a gift even more romantic and hardly less
prized than that of Thessaly and Epirus.

Ever since the Greek War of Independence the inhabitants The
of the seven islands of the Ionian archipelago — Corfu, Zante, j^}^^
Paxo, Ithaca, Cephalonia, Santa Maura, and Cerigo — rhad
been restless under the British protectorate. To that pro-
tectorate they had, as we have seen, been confided after
many vicissitudes by the Congress of Vienna (1815). But
the arrangement did not work smoothly, and in 1858 Bulwer
Lytton, then at the Colonial Office, persuaded Mr. Gladstone
to undertake a special mission and to investigate the
grievances of the islanders. The system of administration
was such that, as Gladstone himself said, * not Cherubim and

y2

324 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

Seraphim could work it'. The High Commissioner Extra-
ordinary had a mixed reception in the islands, but every-
where he found one sentiment prevailing among the in-
habitants, an ardent wish for immediate union with the
Greek kingdom. To this step he was himself at the outset
strongly opposed, believing that the surrender of the protec-
torate by England 'would be nothing less than a crime
against the safety of Europe as connected with the state
and course of the Eastern Question'. As a substitute he
offered the islands constitutional reform, which they did not
want. Within four years Mr. Gladstone had changed his
mind ; Lord Palmerston came round to the same opinion,
and in the Queen's Speech of February, 1863, the offer of the
islands to Greece was publicly announced. The National
Assembly of the Hellenes gratefully accepted the gift on
IVIarch 20, and the protocol concluded at London on June 5
contained a provision for the cession of the islands to Greece.
The cession of the Ionian Isles was in the nature of a
christening present for the young Danish prince whom
the Powers simultaneously presented to the Greeks. For
by this time the rule of King Otto had reached its term.
The reign To follow in detail the course of events which culminated
?lo9o*'^o^ "^ liis enforced abdication would be both tedious and, in the
present connexion, impertment. One or two outstandmg
causes must, however, be noted. The tactlessness of the
Bavarian advisers of the king ; the intrigues of innumer-
able parties which rapidly evolved during and after the
War of Independence ; discontent among the disbanded
irregulars who had fought in the war ; unrest among
a people who found themselves under a highly centralized
German bureaucracy deprived of that communal autonomy
which they had enjoyed under the Turks, all contributed
to the unpopularity of the unfortunate king. His creed
was another stumbling-block. The attempt of a Roman
Catholic to rule a people who owed their political emancipa-
tion in large measure to Orthodox priests must, in any case,
have led to some friction. It led to much more when the
domestic relations between Crown and Church were com-
plicated by the withdrawal of the Greek Church of the

XIII THE BALKAN STATES, 1878-98 325

kingdom from the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constanti-
nople.
We have ah'eady noted the significance of the movements Eccle-

to wards ecclesiastical independence in Serbia and Bulgaria, f'^ft'^'''^^
,.., ,. mdepen-

In those cases ecclesiastical preceded the achievement ofdence.

political independence. In Greece political emancipation
came first. Consequently, the delicate task of adjusting
relations with the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople fell
to a German and a Roman Catholic. The Orthodox Church
in Greece renounced obedience in 1833, and the renunciation
was accompanied by a measure of domestic reorganization,
by a reduction in the numbers of the episcopate, and by the
dissolution of all the smaller monasteries. These measures
excited considerable opposition in Greece, and not until 1850
did the Church of the kingdom obtain formal recognition of
its independence from the Patriarch.

In 1837 King Otto came of age, and immediately assumed The In-
the reins of power. For a brief moment the hope was ^"isiy^"
entertained that he might prove to his people that the
blunders which had thus far characterized his reign were those
of his Bavarian ministers, not his own. They Avere ; but
unfortunately his own were worse. Otto, as Finlay pithily
remarked, was neither * respected, obeyed, feared, nor loved '.*
The evils of the regency were if anything accentuated :
a centralized administration of foreign type proved powerless
to perform the elementary functions of government ; brigand-
age, * an ineradicable institution ' ■ in Greece, grew steadily
more and more intolerable ; extravagant expenditure with-
out appreciably beneficent results, but involving oppres-
sive taxation, led ultimately to financial repudiation ; the
press was gagged ; the promised constitution was unaccount-
ably withheld ; worst of all, from the Greek point of view,
the destruction of local self-government denied to the
people those opportunities for discussion and debate so
warmly cherished by every typical Greek and regarded as
the only tolerable alternative to the other national sport —
guerrilla warfare. Denied the former, the Greeks resumed

1 Finlay, vii. 1G8. ~ Lewis Sergeant, New Greece, ij. 104,

326 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

the latter ; and early in 1843 armed insurrection in epidemic
form broiie out in many parts of the country. But though
armed the insurrection of 1843 was bloodless. King Otto
yielded at once to the demands of the insurgents, dismissed
his Bavarian ministers, and agreed to accept a democratic
constitution, with a bi-cameral legislature and a responsible
executive.^
The con- The concession was popular ; but it soon became evident
^^it^tion i\^r^i constitutional reform would not provide a permanent
solution of the difficulties by which King Otto was con-
fronted. The politicians amused themselves with a bur-
lesque of parliamentary government ; parties innumerable
were formed, but the ' English ', the ' French ', and the
* Russian' parties were the only ones which had any cor-
respondence with the realities of political affairs ; debates
interminable took place in * Senate ' and ' Chamber ' ;
ministries, in rapid succession, were called to office and
dismissed ; the forms of a representative democracy were
all carefully reproduced. There was no reality behind them.
Unless indeed he were aiming at a reductio ad ahsurdum
King Otto had begun at the wrong end. His people had
asked for a ' constitution ' based upon the rights of man, and
other purely exotic ideas. What they wanted was a develop-
ment of indigenous local democracies. But this was precisely
what they did not get. Otto was by no means entirely to
blame. The Powers — England and France in particular —
must bear a very large share of responsibility. It was the
era of doctrinaire liberalism in the West. The same
principles must be exported to the Near East. The Greeks
were essentially democrats ; but in the Swiss sense, not the
French, still less the English.

If Otto had had the sense to build up a constitution from
below instead of imposing it, in German method, from above
he might have led his people — as difficult a people as ever
a man had to lead — along the first halting steps on the
path towards real self-government. It was in truth not to be

1 The text of this constitution, together Avith a detailed acconnt of the
revohition, will be found iu British and Foreign State Fajjers, 1843-4,
vol. xxxii, pp. 938 sq.

XIII THE BALKAN STATES, 1878-98 327

expected of the king. But it was, in a constitutional sense,
the only possible chance for his infant kingdom.

Otto's constitutional experiment lasted for nearly twenty
years, but there is nothing to be gained from a detailed
account of its vicissitudes. All that need here be said is that
Otto, in his domestic policy, lamentably failed to achieve the
impossible.

In the domain of foreign relations the one really important The*Dom
episode of the reign was the raid into Epirus and Thessaly at jQgijg^t*
the opening of the Crimean War. To this episode reference
has already been made. Another incident, which at the
time caused even more friction with England, Avas that
associated with the name of Dom Pacifico. Two British
subjects. Dr. George Finlay, the eminent historian, and
Dom Pacifico, a Portuguese Jew born in Gibraltar, had
suffered unquestionable wrong at the hands of the Greek
Government. Dr. Finlay had tried in vain to recover damages
for the loss of land illegally taken from him ; Dom Pacifico
for the value of property destroyed by a mob with the con-
nivance of the police. Dom Pacifico's own record was none
of the best, but equally with Dr. Finlay he was a British
subject, and for Lord Palmerston, who was then at the
Foreign Office, that was enough. Redress was insolently denied
not merely to the sufferers, but to the British minister.
Lord Palmerston, therefore, instructed the British Admiral ' to
take Athens on his Avay back from the Dardanelles '. Russia
resented the pressure thus put upon King Otto, the en-
fant gate de Vahsolutisme ; the French President sulked,
oflfended by the refusal of his offer of mediation, and with-
drew his ambassador, Drouyn de Lhuys, from London. But
Palmerston went on his way unheeding, and quickly achieved
the desired end. The point at issue was trivial ; the whole
incident was intrinsically unimportant except as illustrative
of the stupidity displayed by King Otto and his ministers in
their relations with other countries no less than with the
Oreek people.

By the year 1862 the patience of the Greeks, never their
most conspicuous characteristic, Avas Avorn out, and they
determined to get rid of their Bavarian king. The question

328 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

of the succession to the throne brought matters to a crisis.
The king and queen Avere childless, and no collateral member
of the Bavarian House had qualified for the succession,
according to the tenns of the constitution, by embracing
the Orthodox faith. Queen Amalia, an Oldenburg princess,
Avas suspected of ambitious designs on her own account. The
Greeks preferred to look elsewhere.

Kevolii- Itt Februar}, 1862, a military revolt broke out at Nauplia ;

iftfi9^^ the insurrection spread rapidly ; the king and queen found
themselves excluded from their own capital ; in October, 1862,
they embarked on an English gunboat, and from the Bay of
Salamis the king issued a proclamation announcing that * he
had quitted Greece for a time in order to avoid plunging the
country in civil war '.

They never returned. King Otto died in Germany in 1867 ;
meanwhile the Greek people had proceeded to the election by
plebiscite of a successor.

The protecting Powers acknowledged the right of the
Greeks to decide the matter for themselves, but reiterated
their resolution not to permit a scion of the reigning
house of any of the great European Powers to accept the
throne.

Search for The Greeks, hoAvever, were perversely determined, and

kiu"^ elected Prince Alfred, the second son of Queen Victoria.
On a plebiscite, Prince Alfred obtained 230,016 votes ; the
next candidate, the Duke of Leuchtenberg, got 2,400, Prince
William George of Denmark was at the bottom of a long list
with 6.

Prince Alfred, despite the warning of the Powers that both
he and the Duke of Leuchtenberg were disqualified, was
accordingl}'^ proclaimed king by the National Assembly
(February 3, 1863).

The Powers, however, adhered to their resolution,* and
England was entrusted with the invidious task of providing
the Greeks with a ' constitutional ' king. For some months
the crown was hawked round the minor Courts of Europe.
It was first offered to and refused by a Coburg prince,

1 Cf. Joint Note of December 15, 1862 (State Papers, vol. Iviii, p. 1107),
and translation ap. Hertslet, vol. iii, p, 2073.

XIII THE BALKAN STATES, 1878-98 3-29

Ferdinand, the Ex-King-Consort of Portugal, and then, in
succession, by two other Coburg princes.

The Greeks, in the meantime, being foiled in their attempt Kin?^
to obtain the services of an English prince, tried to get an (Greece
English statesman as their king. The offer of the crown was (186;3-
actually made to and declined by Lord Stanley, and Mr. Glad- ^*
stone's name was also mentioned, much to his own amusement
in the same connexion.^ Ultimately, however. Great Britain
secured for the Greeks the services of Prince William George
of Denmark, who, in 1863, ascended the throne as King
George L

The disappointment of the Greeks was, as Ave have seen,
mitigated by the cession of the Ionian Isles, a transaction
which Avas tactfully included in the same protocol (London,
June 5, 1863), which provided for the nomination of the
Danish prince to the crown.

The definitive treaty was concluded between Great Britain,
France, and Russia of the one part, and Denmark of the other
part, on July 13, and its terms deserve attention. Article III
runs as follows : ' Greece, under the Sovereignty of Prince
William of Denmark and the guarantee of the three courts,
forms a Monarchical, Independent and Constitutional State.'

The precise connotation of the last epithet, ' Constitu-
tional ', Avas, and is, a matter of dispute. If the epithet implied
anything more than a promise that the constitution should
be embodied in a Avritten document (Statiito), its impli-
cations must have varied considerably in the minds of the
three protecting PoAvers — Great Britain, Imperial France,
and Autocratic Russia.

King George, like his predecessor, Avas at the time of his Revision
accession a youth of seventeen, and promptly proceeded to ^Q^tltu-
fulfil the promise of his sponsors. A National Assembly AA'as tloa.
summoned, and the king urged upon it the importance of
completing Avithout delay the revision of the constitution.

1 ' Though I do love the country and never laughed at anything else in
connexion with it before, yet the seeing my own name, -which was never
meant to carry a title of any kind, placed in juxtaposition with that
particular idea made me give way.' Mr. Gladstone to a fiiend, ap. Morley,
Life, i. 620.

330 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

By the end of October, 1864, the ■work was accomplished ;
on November 28 the king took the oath to the constitution,
and the Constituent Assembly was dissolved.

Constitu- The constitution thus inaugurated was frankly democratic.

tion of rpijg Senate, established in 1843, was abolished, and legislative
power was vested in a single chamber with an absolute veto
reserved to the crown. The Boule, as it is called, was to
consist of not less than 150 deputies apportioned to the
several provinces according to population. The deputies
were to be elected for four years by direct and universal
suffrage, and to receive payment for their services. Half
the members, plus one, were required to form a quorum. A
special procedure was ordained for constitutional revision.
Ministers were to be responsible to the Chamber, but the
means of asserting their responsibility were not defined until
1876. There was to be a Cabinet of seven nominated by the
king, not necessarily from among members of the Boule.
All ministers might speak in the Boule, but could not vote
unless they were members of it.^

Such were the main features of the constitution which
continued practically unchanged down to 1911. In the
latter year, the Council of State, a probouleutic body, was
revived ; soldiers were declared ineligible for seats in the
Boule ; the quorum of the Boule was reduced to one-third ;
and elementary education was made both compulsory and
gratuitous. If parliamentary government has not hitherto
proved a conspicuous success in Greece, it has not been for
lack of meticulous constitutional definition. But the truth
is that this particular form of polity postulates conditions
which are not found in combination nearly so often as most
Englishmen and some foreigners imagine. It demands, in
the first place, a long and laborious apprenticeship in the art
of self-government among the people ; it demands in the
elected representatives, as Cromwell perceived, substantial
unanimity as regards the 'fundamentals' of government ; it de-
mands in the sovereign (if the polity be of the constitutional-

1 For details cf. Demombynes, Les Constitutions Europeennes, vol. i,
pp. 801 sq. The full text of the constitution of 186i is printed in
Appendix V to Fiulay, op. cit., vol. vii.

XIII THE BALKAN STATES, 1878-98 331

monarchical type) consummate tact and considerable politi-
cal experience and education. It must frankly be admitted
that these prerequisites have not invariably been forthcoming
in the modern Hellenic State, and that the parliamentary
constitution has been subjected, at not infrequent intervals,
to a strain to which it is manifestly unequal.

With the establishment of the constitution of 1864 we may The
leave, for a time, the domestic politics of Greece and turn to Pf'^!*'+"
the most pressing of its external problems.

Among these none appealed with such force to the mass of
the Greek people as the condition of their brethren, still
under Turkish rule, in the * Great Greek Island '. Crete,
more definitely even than the Peloponnesus, presents the
quintessence of Hellenism. The Cretans, as a Greek writer
has said, 'are as pure Greeks as exist to day V a^iid many of
the foremost statesmen of the kingdom, including M. Veni-
zelos himself, were born and bred in the island, and in the
island served their political apprenticeship.

Crete was actually the last of the territorial acquisitions
of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. Not until 1669 was it
surrendered by the Republic of Venice to the Sultan.
From the day of that surrender down to its virtual union
with the Greek kingdom in October, 1912, Crete was the
scene of perpetual revolts against Turkish tyranny. It was
handed over by the Sultan to ]\Iehemet Ali in 1830 as a
reward for his services to his suzerain in the War of Inde-
pendence, and for the next ten years it formed part of the
Pashalik of Egypt. Under Mehemet Ali it enjoyed a species
of local autonomy, but in 1840 it was restored by the Treaty
of London to the Porte.

The biograi)her of M. Venizelos has counted no less than
fourteen insurrections in the island since the year 1830.^
To follow them in detail would be tedious ; they were mostly
of one pattern ; and all were promoted with the same ultimate
object, that of securing reunion with the Greeks of the
mainland.

The domestic grievances of the Cretans were practically

1 D. J. Cassavetti, Hellas and the Balkan Wars (1914), p. 4.

2 Keiofilas, Eleftherios Venizelos, p. 47.

332 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

the same as those with wliich we have become familiar
among other subject peoples in the Ottoman Empire :
extortionate and irregular taxation ; unequal treatment of
Christians and Moslems ; denial of justice in the courts ; the
refusal to carry out the promises contained in the Tanzimat
and the Hatti-Humayoun, and so forth. In 1866 the islanders
broke into open revolt, convoked a General Assembly at
Sphakia, declared their independence of the Ottoman Empire,
and proclaimed their union with the Hellenic kingdom
(September 2). This declaration represented the Cretan
reply to an oflfer made to them by the Sultan of reunion with
the Pashalik of Egypt. The offer was indignantly repudiated,
and from 1866 to 1868 the island was in a state of continuous
revolt. The Turks were seriously embarrassed, and suppressed
the revolt after three years' fighting with considerable diffi-
culty, and only by the assistance of Egyptian troops.
The In order to appease his troublesome subjects, whom he

Organic ^yould gladly have handed over to the Khedive Ismail of

Statute T-i T T •

of 1808. Egypt, and to avoid, if possible, the expense and vexation
of perpetual reconquests, the Sultan, in 1868, conceded
a series of reforms which were embodied in the Organic
Statute.

The Governor-General was henceforward to be assisted by
two assessors, of Avhom one was to be a Christian ; similarly,
the governor of each of the ten provinces into which the
island was now divided was, if a INIoslem, to have a Christian
assessor, or if a Christian, a Moslem assessor ; there was to
be a central administrative council to advise the governor,
and a similar local council in each province ; the island as
a whole was to have an elective general assembly ; mixed
tribunals were to be set up, and precautions were to be
taken against religious persecution and oppressive taxation.

The new constitution proved entirely unworkable ; it
satisfied neither the privileged ]\Ioslem minority nor the
Christian majority, and in 1876 large modifications were
demanded by the islanders. The outbreak of the Russo-
Turkish War in 1877 caused great excitement in Crete as
in other Greek provinces still subject to the Sultan ; a com-
mittee was formed to promote the complete autonomy of

XIII THE BALKAN STATES, 1878-98 333

Crete, and, on the refusal of the Porte to gi-ant their demands,
an appeal was made to the Powers. From the Congress of
Berlin the Cretans got nothing, except a promise that the
Organic Law should be strictly enforced and even enlarged ;
but they had had enough of promises, and in despair they
asked to be placed under the protectorate of Great Britain.

This privilege was denied to them, but by the good offices The Tact
of the British Consul, jNIr. Sandwith, a considerable amend- J'jp^ jy'^^'
ment of the Organic Statute was secured from the Porte and 1878.
was embodied in a pact which took its name from the suburb
of Canea in which the consuls resided. The Judiciary was
made nominally independent of the Executive ; there was to
be a General Assembly, consisting of forty-nine Christians
and thirty-one Moslems ; natives were to have the preference
for official appointments, and the official language, both in the
assembly and in the courts, was to be Greek ; the revenue was
to be reorganized so as to provide a surplus for the promo-
tion of much-needed public works ; the issue of paper money
was prohibited, and the press was to be free. For the
moment the Cretans were satisfied, or rather were content
to await a more favourable time for the achievement of
their ultimate ambition.

The success of the Philippopolis revolution ^ aroused among The Crisis
the Greeks, as among the Southern Slavs, much heartburning *^^ 1^^6-9.
and excitement. Serbia the naval Powers have never been
able either to coerce or to assist. Greece is more — or less —
fortunately situated. In 1882 there had come into power
Charilaos Trikoupis, one of the two great statesmen whom
modern Greece has produced. With brief intervals Trikoupis
remained at the head of affairs until 1895.^ Trikoupis had
served a long apprenticeship to diplomacy in England, and
had naturally seen much of English public life Avhen, in an
administrative sense, that life was perhaps at its best. No
man was better qualified to introduce into the politics of his
own country the qualities so sadly lacking : financial honesty
and economy, with a high sense of public duty. In the yeai*s
between 1882 and 1894 he did much to improve the financial

1 Supra, p. 313.

2 He was at the Greek Legation in London, 1852-63.

334 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

and social condition of Greece ; order was introduced into
the public service, and foreign capital, desperately needed
for the development of the material resources of the country,
was slowly but steadily attracted.

The crisis of 1885-6 unfortunately coincided, however,
with one of the brief intervals of power enjoyed by his rival
Theodore Delyannis, Delyannis, oblivious of the paramount
necessity of husbanding the resources of Greece, came in on
the cry of a spirited foreign policy. Bulgaria had acquired
Eastern Roumelia ; Serbia was making a bid — though an
unsuccessful one — for an equivalent ; Greece could not afford
to be left behind. The army and fleet were mobilized, and
several collisions occurred between Turkish and Greek forces
on the frontier.
Intervcn- But the Powers, strongly adverse to a reopening of the
Powers. '^ Eastern Question on a large scale, called upon Greece to
disarm. When Greece declined the Powers, despite the
refusal of France to co-operate, established a blockade. The
excitement on the mainland spread to Crete, Avhere the
Christians proclaimed their union with the kingdom. Thanks,
however, to the presence of the European fleets things went
no further. Delyannis was forced to resign ; Trikoupis
came back to power, and did his best to restore order at
home and confidence abroad. In 1889, at the instance of
the Porte, he persuaded the Cretans to acquiesce in the
Turkish occupation of certain fortified places in the island,
an act of complaisance characteristically rewarded by an
abrogation of the Pact of Hal^pa. This gross breach of
faith on the part of the Sultan not only evoked the liveliest
indignation in the island, but fatally undermined the position
of Trikoupis in the kingdom. In October, 1890, Delyannis
came back to power, only, however, to give way again in 1892
to Trikoupis, who was recalled by the king, in the hope of
averting national bankruptcy. Even he proved unequal to
the task without recourse to a scaling down of interest on
the debt, and when he ultimately resigned in 1895 Greece
appeared to be plunging headlong towards financial ruin.^
A crisis of another kind was, however, rapidly maturing.
1 Trikoupis died in 189G.

XIII THE BALKAN STATES, 1878-98 335

Temporarily gratified, in 1894, by the appointment of a
Christian governor, the Cretans were greatly incensed by his
recall in 1895. The bad faith of the Porte in financial
and other matters intensified the excitement, which was
further stimulated by the rapid growth of the nationalist
movement both in the island and in the kingdom.

Of this movement there were many manifestations. Not The
the least significant was the foundation, in 1894, of a secret jietai-
society known as the Ethnild Hetaireia (National Society), reia.
Its objects were to stiffen the back of the Government in
regard to the nationalist movement, both on the mainland
and in the islands ; to repudiate international intervention
which in 1854, in 1878, and in 1886 had, as the young
patriots imagined, denied to Greece its reasonable share in
the spoils of the Ottoman Empire ; to improve the military
organization of the kingdom ; to stimulate the ' Greek ' move-
ment in Macedonia, and thus avert absorption by Bulgaria ;
and, not least, to promote reunion between the Greeks
of the island and the kingdom.

In the spring of 1896 the islanders were again in arms. Cretan in-
Civil war broke out between Moslems and Christians in QgyQ^y?"
Canea, and the Powers, to prevent the spread of disturbances,
put pressure upon the Sultan to make concessions. The latter
accordingly agreed to renew the Pact of Haldpa, to grant an
amnesty, to summon a National Assembly, and to appoint
a Christian governor. On September 4 George Berovic,
who had been ' Prince of Samos ', was appointed to the post.
But neither INIoslems nor Christians took the Sultan's
promises seriously, and in February, 1897, war again broke
out at Canea, and the Christians again proclaimed union
with Greece.

No power on earth could now have prevented the Greek
patriots from going to the assistance of the islanders.
Prince George, the king's second son, was accordingly sent
(February 10) with a torpedo-boat flotilla to intercept
Turkish reinforcements, and three days later an army was
landed under Colonel Vassos. The admirals of the Powere
then occupied Canea with an international landing party,
and compelled the insurgents to desist from further fighting.

336 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

Meanwhile diplomacy got to work, and, on March 2, pre-
sented identical notes at Athens and Constantinople. Greece
was to withdraw her army and navy ; the Turks were not to
be allowed to send reinforcements to the island ; Crete was
(1) not at the moment to be annexed to Greece ; (2) 'in no
circumstances to revert to the rule of the Sultan ' ; and (3) to
enjoy autonomy under the suzerainty of the Porte. To the
ears of the Greeks these proposals had a painfully familiar
sound. The Greek Government refused to abandon the
Christian Cretans to their Moslem enemies, or to withdraw
their forces until the islanders had been allowed to decide
for themselves, by plebiscite, the future of their own land.
The insurgents themselves declined to lay down their arms.
The admirals accordingly established a blockade of the island
(March 20) and bombarded the Christian insurgents at
Malaxa,^ occupied the ports, and issued a formal declara-
tion to the effect that henceforward the island was under
European protection, and that its autonomy was assured.
The Interest then shifted to the mainland. The young patriots

Days'*^ leagued in the Ethnile Hetaireia believed that the moment
War,' for decisive action had come. King George yielded, in
May '^0 ^^°^"^^' ^^ t-^® warlike sentiment of his people, believing, it
1897. ' was said, that the Powers w^ould intervene, as they had inter-
vened in 1854, in 1878, and in 1886, to prevent war.^ But if
the Greek hot-heads wanted war, the Sultan was prepared for
it, and his august ally at Berlin urged him to put to the test
the new weapon which Germany had forged for him, and,
once for all, teach the insolent Greeks their place.

' Greek ' irregulars were already pouring over the frontiers
of Thessaly, and accordingly, on April 17, the Sultan declared
war. The 'Thirty Days' War' ensued. It was all over
before the end of May. Greece was quite isolated. Russia
had warned her friends in the Balkans that there must be
no intervention. The European admirals policed the Levant.
The Greeks made no use of their superior sea-power, and on
land they were quickly pushed back over their own frontiers.

1 For details cf . Dr. E. J. Dillon s article ' Crete and the Cretans ' in the
Fortnightly lievieio for June, 1897.
- Miller, Ottoman Empire, p. 435.

XIII THE BALKAN STATES, 1878-98 337

The Turkish army under Edhem Pasha occupied Larissa,
and won two decisive victories at Pharsalos and Domokos.
So disorganized were the Greek forces that Athens became
alarmed for its own safety, and turned savagely upon the king.
The Powers, however, having no mind to embark, for the
third time, upon the tedious task of providing the Greeks
with a king, imposed an armistice upon the combatants
(May 20). The definitive peace was signed in December.

The war was nothing less than disastrous to Greece : it
discredited the dynasty ; it involved the retrocession of
a strip of Thessaly ; and it imposed upon a State, already
on the verge of bankruptcy, the burden of a considerable
war indemnity. Nor was Greece spared the further humilia-
tion of International Control, exercised by means of a mixed
Commission, over her external finance. On the other hand,
Crete obtained final, though not formal, emancipation.

With the Cretan imbroglio the Powers had still to deal. The
They dealt with it not the less effectually because they had aMCrete
ceased to be unanimous. For reasons which the next chapter
>vill disclose Germany and Austria-Hungary retired from the
Concert, and withdrew their ships from the naval blockade.
Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy went forward and
completed the task. There were many factors in a difficult
problem : the antagonism of Christian and Moslem in the
island itself; the wider rivalry of which Crete was the
microcosm between Hellenes and Ottomans ; the mutual
suspicions of the Great Powers. At the very moment when
the English and French admirals were co-operating cordially
in Crete the two nations were brought to the brink of war
by the Fashoda incident.^ But all the difficulties were by
patience overcome. Each of the four Powers occupied a
coast-town ; the English holding Candia, and Canea being
held by a joint force. In these towns the Moslems were
concentrated, while the open country was left to the
Christians. Colonel Vassos and the Greek troops had
already withdi'awn, and a characteristic incident presently

^ Kitchener won his victory at Omdnrman on September 2, 1898, and
occupied Khartoum on the 4th. Major Marchand planted the French flag
at Fashoda on the Upper Nile on Jvly 12 of the same year.

198« 2

338 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

led to a demand for the recall of the Turks. On Sep-
tember 18 the Moslems in Candia, having burnt the British
vice-consul in his own house, proceeded to massacre all the
Christians they could reach. The Porte was thereupon
required to recall all its troops and all its civil officials, and
by the end of November the last of the Turks had left
the island. The admirals were now in sole and supreme
control. But on November 26 the four Powers invited
Prince George of Greece to act as their High Commissioner
in Crete for a period originally of three years, but subse-
quently prolonged to eight. This ingenious arrangement
was accepted by Greece, and on December 21, 1898, the
prince landed at Suda Bay. Before the end of the year
the naval squadrons withdrew, though the troops remained
to police the island.
Auto- In April, 1899, a Constituent Assembly was summoned, and

°*\":^ , approved a new constitution on liberal lines. That constitu-
achieved. ^ ^

tion had been drafted by a young Cretan lawyer, destmed to
fill a conspicuous place not merely in Greek but in European
politics, M. Eleftherios Venizelos. Thanks mainly to him
Crete for the first time enjoyed real self-government. Owing
to the international occupation, which was prolonged only
long enough to restore order in the island, the experiment
started under the happiest auspices. Unfortunately, however,
friction soon developed between the prince and M. Venizelos.
The latter retired from the Council, and when in 1905 a
revolution broke out the leadership of the movement was by
general consent confided to him.

The sole object of the rising w^as to hasten the day of
reunion with the kingdom. By the Greeks of the island
the appointment of Prince George as High Commissioner
had been interpreted, not unnaturally, as a sign that the
Powers had made up their minds to union, and only desired
that it should be brought about with the least possible
offence to the Sultan, and without raising difficult questions
elsewhere. The High Commissionership of a royal prince
was in fact accepted as a step to union.

But years passed, nothing was done ; the term of the
prince's appointment was prolonged, and at last in August,

XIII THE BALKAN STATES, 1878-98 339

1904, the prince was formally requested to ' inform the Great
Powers of the firm resolution of Crete, and urging them not
to postpone its union with Greece '. No action followed, and
in 1905 the islanders, led by M. Venizelos, attempted to take
the matter into their own hands, and proclaimed the union of
Crete with the Hellenic kingdom. The Powers, thereupon,
again intervened ; Prince George resigned ; the king, by
permission of the Powers, nominated M. Zaimis to succeed
him, and for the next three years the island was policed by
an international military force. The exciting events of 1908:
the proclamation of Bulgarian independence ; the ' Young
Turks' ' revolution at Constantinople ; above all, the an-
nexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina by Austria, pro-
duced an uncontrollable outburst of feeling in Crete, and
again the islanders demanded annexation to Greece. A
provisional government was set up with M. Venizelos as
Minister of Justice and Foreign Affairs. The Powers, while
refusing formally to recognize the provisional government,
entered into administrative relations with it. If, at this
crisis, Greece had acted with courage and promptitude, the
Cretan problem would probably have been solved there and
then ; but in fear of the Turk on the one hand, and on the
other of the Powers, the Greeks allowed the favourable
opportunity to slip. Not until the whilom rebel M. Venizelos
had become Prime Minister of the kingdom was the union
actually achieved. The recital of the events which led to
that long and ardently desired consummation must, however,
be deferred. In the meantime there had entered into the
problem of the Near East a new factor which must be
subjected to close analysis. That analysis will occupy the
next chapter.

The best authorities are the Papers presented to Parliament under the
head of ' Bulgaria ' and ' Turkey '.

For further reference : Dr. J. Holland Kose's masterly essay on The
Making of Bulgaria {The Development of the European Nations,
chap, x) ; E, Dicey, The Peasant State; A. H. Beaman, Life of Stamhuloff,
; J. Samnelson, Bulgaria Past and Present (1888) ; Major A. von
Huhn, Tlie Struggle of the B^dg avians for National Independence (Eng.
trans., 1886), The Kidnapping of Prince Alexander (1887) ; Marquis of
Bath, Observations on Bulgarian Affairs (1880j ; A. G. Drandar, Cinq

z2

340 THE EASTERN QUESTION

Ans de Eigne de Prince Alexandre de Battenherg en Bulgarie (Paris,
1884); E. de Laveleye, The Balkan Peninsula; Encyclopedia Britan-
nica (11th edition); V. Berard, Les Affaires de Crete; Kolmar Fr. von
der Goltz, Der Thessalische Krieg und die Turkische Armee (Berlin,
1898) ; D. J. Cassavetti, Hellas and the Balkan Wars (1914) ; Dr.
C. Kerofilas, Eleftherios Venizelos (1915) ; Victor Berard, La Turquie
et VHelUnisme contem2wrain (1904) ; G. Isambert, Ulndependance
grecque et VEurope (Paris, 1900).

CHAPTEE XIV

A NEW FACTOR IN THE PROBLEM

German Policy in the Near East, 1888-1908

'The attempt to dominate the East forms the keystone of German
Weltpolitik.' — G. W. Protheko.

'Ce qui modifie revolution de la question d'Orient, ce qui bouleverse
completement les donnees du probleme et par consequent sa solution
possible, c'est la position nouvelle prise par I'Allemagne dans I'Enipire
ottoman. . . . Hier, I'influence de I'empereur allemand a Constantinople
n'etait rien, aujom'd'hui elle est tout; silencieusemeut ou avec ^clat,
elle joue un role preponderant dans tout ce qui se fait en Turquie.' —
Andre Chekadame (1903).

' I never take the trouble even to open the mail bag from Constantinople.'
' The whole of the Balkans is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian
grenadier.' — Prince Bismarck.

' The 300,000,000 Mohammedans who, dwelling dispersed throughout the
East, reverence in H.M. the Sultan Abdul Hamid their Khahf, may rest
assured that at all times the German Emperor will be their friend.' —
Speech of the German Emperor at Damascus in 1898.

' "We have carefully cultivated good relations >vith Turkey. . . . These
relations are not of a sentimental nature. . . . For many a year Turkey was
a useful and important Unk in the chain of our political relations.' — Prixce
Bernhard von Bulow.

' La politique utiUtaire de I'Allemagne, si odieuse soit-elle au sentiment
europeen, est au moins une politique ; elle gagne a I'empereur Guillaume
les sympathies du monde musulman, ouvre les voies au commerce et impose
un certain respect. . . . L'Orient ne respecte que la force.' — Gaulis.

On November 1, 1889, the German imperial yacht, the Emperor
Hohenzollem, steamed through the Dardanelles with the ^J '^^"^
Emperor William II and his Empress on board. The}^ were stanti-
on their way to pay their first ceremonial visit to a European "op'®-
capital and a European sovereign.* The capital selected for
this distinguished honour was Constantinople ; the ruler was
the Sultan Abdul Hamid.

' The emperor and empress had recently attended the marriage at
Athens of the present King and Queen of Greece.

342 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

It was precisely seven hundred years, as the German colony
in Constantinople reminded their sovereign, since a German
emperor had first set foot in the imperial city. But
Frederick Barbarossa had come sword in hand ; the Emperor
William came as the apostle of peace ; as the harbinger of
economic penetration ; almost, as was observed at the time,
in the guise of a commercial traveller. The reception
accorded to him in Constantinople was in every way worthy
of a unique occasion ; he and his empress were the reci-
pients not only of the grossest flattery but of superb and
costly gifts. But such attentions were not bestowed without
the hope of reward. Sultan Abdul Hamid was one of the
shrewdest diplomatists that ever ruled the Ottoman Empire.
He was well aware that the State visit of the emperor and
empress to Constantinople meant the introduction of a new
factor into an immemorial problem. ' The East is waiting for
a man.' So spake the Emperor William ten years later. His
advent was foreshadowed in 1889. Rarely has a ceremonial
visit been productive of consequences more important.
Hohen- The ostentatious advances thus made by the Emperor
l>olioy in William to Abdul Hamid marked an entirely new departure
the Near in Hohenzollern policy. Until the conclusion of the alliance
with Holland and Great Britain in 1788 the Eastern Question
had never come into the orbit of Prussian diplomacy. Nor
can it be pretended that solicitude for the fortunes of the
Ottoman Turks had much weight in bringing Frederick
William II into the triple alliance. Just before the meeting
of the emperors at Tilsit, Hardenberg, the Prussian minister,
did, as we have seen, amuse himself by adding one more to
the many schemes for the partition of the Ottoman Empire.
But Hardenberg was clutching at straws to avert disaster
nearer home. From the Congress of Vienna down to the
advent of Bismarck Berlin took its orders as to foreign
policy from Vienna.^ No Prussian diplomatist was at all
a match for Metternich or Schwarzenberg.

* If the Zollverein is deemed to belong to foreign policy one exception
to this rule would have to be admitted ; but the Zollverein was primarily
a domestic measure.

XIV A NEW FACTOR IN THE PROBLEM 343

During the first ten years of his official career Bismarck was Bismarck
far too much occupied in fighting Denmark, Austria, tlie Ger- j;" g^grn
manic Confederation, and France to pay much heed to the Question.
Eastern Question, even had the question been acute. But, as
a fact, the years between 1861 and 1871 coincided with one of
the rare periods of its comparative quiescence. Yet Bismarck
lost no opportunity of turning the Near East to account as a
convenient arena in which to reward the services of friends or
to assuage the disappointment of temporary opponents with-
out expense to Prussian pockets or detriment to Prussian
interests.

Two illustrations of this policy will suffice. In 1866
Bismarck not only turned Austria out of Germany but, in
order to secure the assistance of Victor Emmanuel, he
deprived the Habsburgs of the last remnant of their heritage
in Italy. He had, however, no desire to see Austria un-
necessarily humiliated, still less permanently disabled. Pro-
vided it were clearly understood that henceforward she had
no part or lot in German affairs, Austria might regard him
as a friend and ally.

Two results ensued. The new frontier of Italy was drawn The
with a most niggardly hand. The assistance rendered by the „^(,/i
Italian forces on land and sea during the Seven Weeks' War Osten of
had not indeed been such as to entitle her to an ounce more \^yy^^]
than the promised pound of flesh. And Bismarck, though
true to the letter of his bond, took good care that the weight
was not exceeded. On the contrary, 'Venetia' was in-
terpreted in the narrowest possible sense. The northern
frontier of Italy was defined in such a way as to deprive
Italy of a compact mass of 370,000 Italians ; to exclude
the industrial products of these Italian people from their
natural market in north Italy, and to thrust into the heart
of an Italian province the military outpost of an unfriendly
neighbour. From the boundary definition of 1866 has arisen
the Trentino problem of to-day.

But that was not the only, nor, from our present stand-
point, the most important, feature of the readjustment
of 1866.

Italian though the Trentini are in race, in language, and

344 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

I'he in sympathies, the Trentino had never formed part of the

problem, kingdom of Italy, except for five years (1809-14), when it was
annexed to his Italian kingdom by Napoleon. Nor was
it ever politically united to Venetia except during the
periods 1797-1805 and 1815-66, when Venice itself was
under Habsburg rule. The same is true of Trieste. But it
was otherwise with the Venetian provinces to the east of
the Adriatic, Istria and Dalmatia, which Austria also retained
in 1866. For four centuries at least the Venetian common-
wealth had been dominant on the eastern coast of the
Adriatic, and ardent Italians to-day base their claims
upon an even earlier title. But be that as it may, a great
opportunity was lost by Italy in 1866. Had Venice been
wrung from Austria by Italy's strong right arm, instead of
being accepted from Bismarck as the price of a diplomatic
bargain, and in spite of a dubious success on land and
a disastrous defeat at sea, there might be no 'Adriatic
Problem ' to-day.

To Trieste and Fiume Italy cannot advance any historical
claim, and however strong her strategic or political claims
may be they do not concern our present theme. What is
important in this connexion is the problem of the Dalmatian
coast. To its possession there are two claimants who can
advance strong arguments, historical, racial, strategical, and
commercial, in support of their respective claims : Italy and
the Southern Slavs. If Bismarck had really been animated
in 1866 by friendly feelings towards Italy, he would un-
questionably have insisted, without any nice regard for
ethnography, upon the transference to the Italian kingdom
of the M'hole of the Venetian inheritance, including Istria
and Dalmatia.

Bismarck, however, was concerned much less with the
future of Italy than with the future of Austria-Hungary, and
he deliberately encouraged the Drang nach Osten, which,
from 1866 onwards, became a marked feature of Habsburg
policy. Istria and Dalmatia, therefore, were retained by
Austria. Thus did Bismarck conciliate a temporary enemy
and a potential ally.
Four years later he took the opportunity of rewarding

XIV A NEW FACTOR IN THE PROBLEM 345

the services of a most constant friend. The Black Sea Bismarck
clauses of the Treaty of Paris were, as we have seen, torn ^^g^jg^
up in favour of Russia. That transaction was not, of course,
inspired entirely by benevolence towards Russia. Bismarck's
supreme object was to keep Russia at arm's length from
France, and, what was at the moment more important,
from England. Nothing was more likely to conduce to this
end than to encourage the pretensions of Russia in the
Near East, and, indeed, in the Further East. The Black Sea
served his purpose in 1870 ; the ' Penjdeh incident ' was
similarly utilized in 1885.

Another critical situation arose in 1877. Since 1872 the The
Dreikaiserbund had formed the pivot of Bismarck's foreign ^"|if_o^
policy. But the interests of two out of the three emperors
were now in sharp conflict in the Balkans. It is true that in
July, 1876, the Emperors of Russia and Austria had met at
Reichstadt, and that the Emperor Francis Joseph had agreed
to give the Tsar a free hand in the Balkans on condition that
Bosnia and the Herzegovina were guaranteed to Austria. But
by 1878 Russia was in occupation of Bulgaria and Roumelia,
and in less complaisant mood than in 1876 ; an immense im-
pulse had been given to the idea of Pan-Slavism by recent
events ; the Southern Slavs were beginning to dream of the
possibility of a Jugo-Slav empire in the west of the peninsula.
Bosnia and the Herzegovina might easily slip, under the new
circumstances, from Austria's gi'ip ; the Drang nach Osten
might receive a serious set-back ; the road to the Aegean
might be finally barred ; even access to the Adriatic might
be endangered. Thus Bismarck had virtually to choose be-
tween his two friends. At the Berlin Congress he played,
as we saw, the role of the 'honest broker'. For aught he
cared Russia might go to Constantinople, a move which
would have the advantage of embroiling her with England ;
but Austria must have Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Austria
got them, and the road to Salonica was kept open.

Apart from any sinister design on the part of a Mittel- Austrian
europa party in Germany or Austria-Hungary there was tum of
a great deal to be said for the arrangement. Not least from Bosnia
the English point of view. To the England of 1878 Russia ^'^^^

govina.

346 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

was the enemy, Pan-Slavism the bugbear. An Austrian
wedge thrust into the heart of the incipient States under
Russian protection was, as Lord Beacon sfield thought, dis-
tinctly advantageous to equilibrium in the Near East. To
the fate of the Balkan peoples, as has been shown above, Lord
Beaconsfield was indifferent. Even from a selfish point of
view it is now possible to view the matter in a clearer light.
We can perceive that ' the occupation of Bosnia and Herze-
govina . . . M'as the prelude to the attempted strangulation of
Serbian nationality ' ; ^ and we can see also that the strangula-
tion of that nationality was an essential preliminary to the
realization of Central European ambitions in the Balkan
Peninsula.

In the future of the Christian subjects of the Ottoman
Empire Bismarck took as little interest as Lord Beaconsfield.
It is said that on the morrow of the signature of the Treaty
of Berlin Bismarck sent for the Turkish representatives and
said : * Well, gentlemen, you ought to be very much pleased ;
we have secured you a respite of twenty years ; you have got
that period of grace in which to put your house in order.
It is probably the last chance the Ottoman Empire will get,
and of one thing I'm pretty sure — you won't take it.' The
story may be apocryphal, but it accords well enough with
Bismarck's sardonic humour.
The Prince Gortchakoff" never forgave his pupil for the rupture

Alliance, of the Dreikaiserbund. Russia and Germany drifted further
apart ; and in 1882 Bismarck formed a fresh diplomatic com-
bination. Italy joined Germany and Austria in the Triple
Alliance ; and, a year later, the Hohenzollern King of
Roumania was introduced into the firai as *a sleeping
partner '. The ' Battenberger ' was no favourite at Berlin, but
the election of a 'Coburger' to the Bulgarian throne in 1887
decidedly strengthened Teutonic influence in the Balkans.

Bismarck, however, to the end of his career, regarded
Balkan politics as outside the immediate sphere of Berlin.
Ten years he devoted to the task of creating a united
Germany under the hegemony of Prussia. The next twenty

1 Professor Ch. Andler, Pan-Germanism — a brilliant summary.

XIV A NEW FACTOR IN THE PROBLEM 347

were given to the consolidation of the position he had
acquired. But Bismarck's course was nearly run.

In 1888 the direction of German policy passed into other
hands. Like his great-great-uncle, George III, the young
Emperor William mounted a throne quite determined * to be
king '. In the English executive there was no room for both
George III and the elder Pitt ; Pitt had to go. In the higher
command of German politics there was no room for William II
and Bismarck ; the pilot was soon dropped.

The young emperor was by no means alone in his anxiety
to initiate a new departure in the Near East. The visit to
Constantinople in 1889 was the first overt intimation to the
diplomatic world of the breach between the young emperor
and his veteran Chancellor. The mission of Bismarck was,
in the eyes of the younger generation, already accomplished.
The past belonged to him, the future to the emperor. * Bis-
marck ', wrote one of the younger school, ' merely led us to
the threshold of German regeneration.' ^

The man who more than any one else persuaded the Kaiser A vacancy
to the new enterprise, and in particular to the effusive g^^^ti-
demonstration of 1889, was Count Hatzfeld, who had been nople.
German ambassador to the Sublime Porte in the early
eighties. Count Hatzfeld was quick to perceive, during his
residence in Turkey, that there was a vacancy at Constanti-
nople. From the days of Suleiman the Magnificent down to
the first Napoleonic Empire, France, as we have seen, occupied
a unique position at Constantinople. From the beginning of
the nineteenth century that position was threatened by
England, and from the days of Canning to those of Beacons-
field England was a fairly constant and successful suitor for
the heaux yeux of the Sultan.

England's popularity at Constantinople did not long
survive the conclusion of the Cyprus Convention (1878).
It was further impaired by Mr. Gladstone's return to power
in 1880.

Mr. Gladstone was the recognized friend not of the Turks
but of the ' subject peoples ' ; and his accession to office was

1 r. Lange, Eeines Deutschium, p. 210 (quoted by Andler, op. cii.,
p. 23).

348 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

signalized by the rectification of the Greek frontier at the
expense of the Porte in 1881. The occupation of Egypt
(1882) was the final blow to a traditional friendship.

The vacancy thus created at Constantinople the young
German Emperor determined to fill. The way had been
prepared for his advent in characteristic Prussian fashion.
Von Moltke had been sent on a mission to Constantinople
as far back as 1841, and had formed and expressed very
clear views on the situation he found there. Forty years
later a military mission was dispatched from Berlin to avert,
if possible, the disruption which Moltke had prophesied.
The head of the mission was the great soldier-scholar, who,
in 1916, laid down his life in the Caucasus. Baron von
der Goltz devoted twelve years to the task of reorganizing
the Turkish army, and the results of his teaching were
brilliantly demonstrated in the brief but decisive war with
Greece in 1897. In the wake of Prussian soldiers went
German traders and German financiers. A branch of the
Deutsche Bank of Berlin was established in Constantinople,
while German commercial travellers penetrated into every
corner of the Ottoman Empire. The contemporary situation
was thus diagnosed by a brilliant French journalist : ' Dans
ce combat commercial 1' Allemagne poursuit I'offensive, I'Angle-
terre reste sur la defensive et la France commence k capi-
tuler.' Monsieur Gaulis further suggests reasons for the
phenomenal success of the German traders : even ambassadors
do not deem it beneath their dignity to assist by diplomatic
influence the humblest as well as the greatest commercial
enterprises ; consular agents abroad keep the manufacturers
at home constantly and precisely informed as to demands of
customers, and above all the German manufacturer is adaptable
and teachable. Instead of attempting to force upon the con-
sumer something which he does not want — ' I'article d^mod^ '
— he supplies him with the exact article which he does want
And what the Eastern generally does want to-day is some-
thing cheap and nasty. The result may be learnt from a
conversation with a typical Turk recorded by M. Gaulis :

* Mon grand-pere a achet^ sa sacoche k un Fran9ais ; il
I'a pay^e deux livres ; elle ^tait en cuir. Mon p^re I'a achet^e

XIV A NEW FACTOR IN THE PROBLEM 349

h un Anglais ; il I'a pay(5e une livre ; elle ^tait en toile cirde.
Moi, je I'ai achet^e k un Allemand ; je I'ai pay^e deux medji-
di^s (huit francs) ; elle est en carton vernL' ^

If German diplomatists have not disdained to act as com-
mercial agents they have only followed a still more exalted
example. The commercial aspect of the question did not
escape the shrewd eyes of the emperor in 1889.

The second visit paid by the emperor to the Sultan, in The em-
1898, was even more productive in this respect. But the P?,^or'a

• #• 1 • 1 . /. /-N pilgriin-

promotion of the commercial mterests of Germany was not age to the

its primary object. The moment was chosen with incompar- ^^i"* ^^

able felicity. No crowned head ever stood more desperately

in need of a friend of unimpeachable respectability than did

Abdul Hamid in the year 1898.

For the last four years Christendom had been resounding The

with the heartrending cries of the Armenian Christians, Armenian
1. t ' ^ 1 OI1J1T1 massacres

butchered m their thousands to make a Sultans holiday. (1894-8).

The story of the Armenian massacres has been told by many
competent pens. Pamphlets, articles in contemporary re-
views, political speeches, and substantial volumes go to make
up a vast literature on the subject.^ Not the least impressive
account is that which is to be found in the papers presented
to Parliament in 1895 and 1896.^ Stripped of all exag-
geration and rhetoric the story is one of the most horrible,
and, for the Christian nations, the most humiliating in the
long history of the Eastern Question. The present narrative
is, however, concerned with it only so far as it reacted upon
the diplomatic situation in the Near East, and the relations
of the European Powers to the Sultan and to each other.

Some parts of the story are still obviously incomplete ;
much of it is obscure ; the whole of it is difficult and con- '^'^K
fusing. But the points essential to our present purpose
emerge with terrible distinctness.

The Armenian Church claims to be the oldest of all the Armenia
national churches, having been founded by St. Gregory the Arme-^

mans.

1 Gaulis, La JRuine d'un Empire, p. 143.

2 See bibliographical note at the eud of this chapter.
^ Under the head of Turkey.

350 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

Illuminator in the third century. It is not in communion
with the Orthodox Greek Church, and its appeals, therefore,
have always left the Russians cold ; and only since the
abandonment of the monophysite heresy in the fifteenth
century has a portion of the Armenian Church been accepted
as ' Catholic '. Armenia itself is an ill-defined geographical
area lying between the Caspian, the Black Sea, the Caucasus,
and Kurdistan, partitioned between the Empires of Russia,
Turkey, and Persia. But while 'Armenia' has no official
geographical existence in the gazetteer of the Ottoman Empire,
the Armenians have been for centuries among the most im-
portant sections of Turkish society. ' To the Albanians the
sword ; to the Armenians belongs the pen.' The familiar
proverb indicates with sufficient accuracy their characteristic
place and function. These ' Christian Jews ', as they have
been called, are apt, above all other subjects of the Sultan,
in all that pertains to money and finance. Bankers, financiers,
and merchants in the higher grades of society ; money-
changers and hucksters in the lower, they have performed
a useful function in the Ottoman Empire, and many of them
have amassed large fortunes. Wealth acquired by finance
has, it would seem, in Turkey as elsewhere, a peculiarly
exasperating effect upon those who do not share it, and the
Armenian Christians have always excited a considerable
amount of odium even in the cosmopolitan society of Con-
stantinople. Still, it is only within the last quarter of a
century that their lot has been rendered unbearable.

Three reasons must be held mainly responsible for the
peculiar ferocity with which the Armenians were assailed by
Abdul Hamid : the unrest among hitherto docile subjects
caused by the nationalist movements in Bosnia, Serbia, and
Bulgaria ; the intervention of the European Powers ; and, not
least, the palpable jealousies and dissensions among those
Powers.

The primary motive which animated Abdul Hamid was
beyond all question not fanaticism but fear. Greeks,
Roumanians, Serbians, and Bulgarians ; one after another
they had asserted their independence, and the Ottoman
Empire was reduced to a mere shadow of its former self.

XIV A NEW FACTOR IN THE PROBLEM 351

That these events had caused unrest among the Armenians,
even though Armenia was not, like Roumania or Bulgaria,
a geographical entity, it would be idle to deny. Abdul Hamid
was terrified.

He was also irritated. The Powers had interested them-
selves in the lot of the Armenians. Article LXI of the
Treaty of Berlin ran as follows :

'The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without
further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded
by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the
Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the
Circassians and Kurds.

' It will periodically make known the steps taken to this
effect to the Powers, who will superintend their application.'

But if the Powers in general were disposed to interfere, Great
Britain, in particular, had imposed a special obhgation upon
the Sultan, and had herself assumed a peculiar responsibihty.
The first Article of the Cyprus Convention contained, it will be
remembered, a promise, a condition, and a territorial deposit.

'If, it ran, 'Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them shall
be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at
any future time by Russia to take possession of any further
territories of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia, as
fixed by the Definitive Treaty of Peace, England engages to
join his Imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by
force of arms.

' In return, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan promises to
England to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon
later between the two Powers, into the government, and for
the protection, of the Christian and other subjects of the
Porte in these territories ; and in order to enal3le England
to make necessary provision for executing her engagement.
His Imperial Majesty the Sultan further consents to assign the
Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England.'

From 1878 onwards the Sultan lived, therefore, under the
perpetual apprehension of intervention while his Armenian
subjects could repose in the comfortable assurance that they
were under the special protection of their fellow Christians
throughout the world.

Gradually, however, it dawned upon the shrewd Sultan
that the apprehension was groundless, while the miserable

852 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

Armenians were soon to discover that the assurance was not
worth the paper upon which it was written.

If the Sultan was frightened, so also was the Tsar,
Alexander III. The nihilist spectre was always before his
eyes. His father, the emancipator of the serfs, had fallen a
victim to a nihilist conspiracy in 1881. Nihilism had shown
itself among the Turkish Armenians, and had led to an
outbreak, easily suppressed, in 1885. Bulgaria, too, had
proved a terrible disappointment to Russia. After being
called into being by the Tsar it was manifesting its inde-
pendence in most disquieting fashion. Instead of opening
the way to Constantinople, Bulgaria, with unaccountable
forgetfulness of past favours, was actually closing it. *We
don't want an Armenian Bulgaria,' said the Russian Chan-
cellor, Prince Lobanoff. If the road to Constantinople is
closed, all the more reason for keeping open the roads to
Bagdad and Teheran. Nothing could be more inconvenient
to the Tsar than a ' nationality ' movement in Armenia. The
Tsar's disposition was well known at Constantinople, and the
Sultan soon drew the inference that, if he chose to work his
will upon the Armenians, he had little to fear from St. Peters-
burg. He had much less to fear from Berlin ; while Paris
and London were kept apart by Egypt.
The Here, then, was an opportunity ; and from 1894 to 1896

(iS^Sr °^* ^ moment was wasted. The Powers should be taught
the imprudence of intervening between an Ottoman Sultan
and his rightful subjects ; the Armenians should learn
— or the remnant of them who escaped extermination —
that they had better trust to the tender mercies of their own
sovereign than confide in the assurances of the European
Concert.

His crafty calculations were precisely fulfilled. In the
year 1898 there seems to have been some recrudescence,
among the Armenians, of the revolutionary propaganda
which had been suppressed in 1885. The Kurds, half-
publicans, half-police, wholly irregulars, were encouraged
to extort more and more taxes from the Armenian high-
landers. The Armenians forcibly, and in some cases
effectually, resisted their demands. Supported by Turkish

XIV A NEW FACTOR IN THE PROBLEM 353

regulars the Kurds were then bidden to stamp out the
insurrection in blood.

They soon got to work, and the massacre of August, 1894, The
was the result. Several villages in the Sassoun district were massacre
pillaged and burnt, and about 900 people were killed.^ The (ISM).
news of these massacres, the extent of which was at first
grossly exaggerated, sent a thrill of horror throughout
Christendom, and as a result the Sultan was obliged to
consent to a Commission of Inquiry, consisting of English,
French, and Russian consuls, together with certain Turkish
officials. The Commission inquired, but the massacres went
on. In the spring of 1895 a scheme of reform was presented
to the Sultan, and after alternate pressure and delay was
accepted by him in the autumn. The Sultan had, how-
ever, some reason to hope that before the reforms could be
executed the Armenians would be exterminated. All through
the year 1895 the massacres went on, and by December the
victims probably numbered at least 50,000,^ not to mention
the thousands who perished from the ravages of disease and
from exposure. The massacres were accompanied by deeds
of 'the foulest outrage and the most devilish cruelty'.^
Great Britain laboured assiduously to induce the Concert
to intervene, but Russia, for reasons already suggested,
resolutely refused, and Great Britain hesitated to act alone.
Our responsibility was heavy ; that of Russia was still
heavier, for she could act directly in Armenia ; we could act
only at Constantinople, and there only in conjunction with
unwilling allies.

Still the massacres went on ; whole villages were wiped
out ; the cry of the victims rose to heaven ; the Powers
looked on in impotence ; the ' red Sultan ' was gleeful, but
his appetite for blood was even yet unsated.

In August, 1896, the interest of the scene shifted from
Armenia to Constantinople. On the 26th the Armenians of

^ The original reports put the numbers at 7,000-8,000 ; oflBcial inquiries
reduced them to 900 : see Eliot, oj). cit., p. 406.

2 An American estimate put it at 75,000.

3 The phrase is the Duke of Argyll's, Our Responsibilities for Turkey,
p. 87.

1984 A a

354 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

the capital, frenzied by the appeals of their brethren in
Armenia, and despairing of help from the Powers, rose in
rebellion, and attacked and captured the Ottoman Bank in
Galata. Something desperate must be done to make the
world listen. But the recoil upon their own heads was
immediate and terrible. Within the next twenty-four hours
6,000 Armenians were bludgeoned to death in the streets of
the capital. But though the aggregate was appalling the
Sultan was precise and discriminating in his methods. Only
Gregorian Armenians were butchered ; hardly a Catholic
was touched.^ In Constantinople the Armenians were the
aggressors ; the Turks were plainly within their rights in
suppressing armed insurrection ; the Powers could only, as
before, look on ; all the cards were in the Sultan's hands ;
the rubber was his.

Still, his hand was bloodstained. No respectable sovereign
could grasp it without loss of self-respect. That considera-
tion did not deter the German Emperor. The more socially
isolated the Sultan the greater his gratitude for a mark of
disinterested friendship.
The In the midst of the massacres it was forthcoming. On

SirSie ^^® Sultan's birthday, in 1896, there arrived a present from
Sultan. Berlin. It was carefully selected to demonstrate the intimacy
of the relations which subsisted between the two Courts,
almost, one might say, the two families ; its intrinsic value
was small, but the moral consolation which it brought to the
recipient must have been inestimable : it consisted of a signed
photograph of the emperor and empress surrounded by
their sons. That was in 1896. In 1897 came the Turco-
Greek War. The success of von der Goltz's pupils in Thessaly
afforded a natural excuse for a congratulatory visit on the
part of von der Goltz's master to Constantinople.

In 1898 the visit was paid ; but it was not confined to the
Bosphorus. From Constantinople the German Emperor,
accompanied by the Empress, went on to the Holy Land.

The pilgrimage, w^hich was personally conducted by
Messrs. Thos. Cook & Co.,^ extended from Jaffa to Jeru-

1 Eliot, op. cit., p. 411.

^ 'Des caisses, des malles, des sacs portant rinscription "Voyage de

XIV A NEW FACTOR IN THE PROBLEM 355

salem, and from Jerusalem back to Damascus. The avowed
purpose of the emperor's visit to the Holy Land was the
inauguration of a Protestant Church at Jerusalem. Down
to 1886 the Protestant bishop in Palestine was appointed in
turn by England and by Prussia, though the bishop was under
the jurisdiction of the See of Canterbury. The German
Protestants have, however, shown remarkable activity in
mission work in Palestine, and the emperor's visit was
intended primarily to set the seal of imperial approval upon
these activities and to mark the emancipation of the German
mission from Anglican control. But the German Emperor
is lord not only of Protestants but of Catholics. To the
Catholics, therefore, in the Holy Land he also gave proof
of his special favour. Xor must the Moslems be ignored.
True, he could not count Moslems among his own subjects
as yet. But who knows what the future may have in store ?
At Jerusalem Protestants and Catholics had claimed atten-
tion. But the emperor, as M. Gauhs wittily observed,
varied his parts as quickly as he changed his uniforms. At
Damascus he was an under-study for the Caliph, and the
Mohammedans got their turn. Of all the emperor's speeches
that which he delivered at Damascus, just before quitting
the Holy Land, on November 8, 1898, was perhaps the most
sensational and the most impudent. It contained these words :
' His Majesty the Sultan Abdul Hamid, and the three hun-
dred million Mohammedans who reverence him as Caliph,
may rest assured that at all times the German Emperor will
be their friend.' Well might those who listened to this
audacious utterance hold their breath. W^as it intoxication
or cool calculation ?

' Ceux qui ont vu, comme moi ', writes M. Gaulis, ' le p^lerin
et son cortege dans leurs trois avatars successifs : protestant,
catholique et musulman, restent un peu abasourdis sur le
rivage. Quel est le sens de cette grande habilet^ qui,
voulant faire k chacun sa part, jette un d^fi aux passions

S.M. I'empereur d'Alleniagne a Jerusalem; Thos. Cook & Co." Deux
royautes clans uue phrase. Celle de Cook est incontestee en Palestine.'
Gaulis, in whose work, La Ruine (Tun Empire, pp. 156-242, will be
found an entertaining and illuminating account by an eyewitness of the
Kaiser's pilgrimage.

Aa2

356

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

religieuses de I'Orient? L'Allemagne, nous le savons bien,
est venue tard dans la politique orientale. Comme toutes
les places y ^taient prises elle a jug6 qu'elles ^taient toutes
bonnes k prendre. Elle s'est mise alors h jouer le role
d'essayiste, tatant le terrain de tons les c6t6s, guettant
toutes les proies et ouvrant la succession des vivants avec
une audace souvent heureuse. Mais ce n'est plus de I'audace,
c'est de la candeur, tant le jeu en est transparent, lorsqu'elle
offre dans la m6me quinzaine un hommage h J^sus-Christ et
un autre k Saladin, un sanctuaire k I'Eglise ^vangelique et
un autre au pape.'

But if Frenchmen marvelled at the audacity of the per-
formance, other reflections occurred to the applauding
Germans. Among those who were present at the banquet
at Damascus was Pastor Friedrich Naumann, the author of
a work which has to-day made his name famous throughout
the world.^ Side by side with the impressions of the French
publicist it is instructive to read those of the German
philosopher. Pastor Naumann discerned in the emperor's
speech a secret calculation of ' grave and remote possibilities '.

(1) 'It is possible that the Caliph of Constantinople may
fall into the hands of the Russians. Then there would
perhaps be an Arab Caliph, at Damascus or elsewhere, and
it would be advantageous to be known not only as the friend
of the Sultan but as the friend of all Mohammedans. The
title might give the German Emperor a measure of political
power, which might be used to counteract a Russophil
Ottoman policy.

(2) ' It is possible that the world war will break out before
the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Then the Caliph
of Constantinople would once more uplift the Standard of
a Holy War. The Sick Man would raise himself for the last
time to shout to Egypt, the Soudan, East Africa, Persia,
Afghanistan, and India "War against England". ... It is
not unimportant to know who will support him on his bed
when he rises to utter this cry.' ^

German But the Kaiser had not undertaken a personal mission to
develo^- *^^ Near East merely to patronize the disciples of various
ment creeds in the Holy Land ; nor even to congratulate his friend

' Mitteleuropa, by Friedricli Naumann (Berlin, 1915; Eng. trans.,
London, 1916).

2 Asia (1899) quoted by Andler, ojy. cit., p. 57.

XIV A NEW FACTOR IN THE PROBLEM 357

Abdul Hamid upon a partial extermination of the Armenians.
His sojourn at Constantinople coincided with the concession
of the port of Haidar-Pasha to the * German Company of
Anatolian Railwaj'S '.

That concession was supremely significant. German diplo-
macy in the Near East has been from first to last largely
'railway-diplomacy', and not its least important field has been
Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. The idea of directing German
capital and German emigration towards these regions was of
long standing. The distinguished economist, Roscher, sug-
gested as far back as 1848 that Asia Minor would be the
natural share of Germany in any partition of the Ottoman
Empire. After 1870 the idea became more prevalent and
more precisely defined. In 1880 a commercial society was
founded in Berlin, with a capital of fifty million marks, to
promote the ' penetration ' of Asia Minor. Kiepert, the
prince of cartographers, was employed systematically to survey
the country. About 1886 Dr. A. Sprenger, the orientalist, and
other savants called attention to the favourable opening for
German colonization in these regions.

' The East is the only territory in the world which has not
passed under the control of one of the ambitious nations of
the globe. Yet it offers the most magnificent field for coloni-
zation, and if Germany does not allow this opportunity to
escape her, if she seizes this domain before the Cossacks lay
hands upon it, she will have secured the best share in the
partition of the earth. The German Emperor would have the
destinies of Nearer Asia in his power if some hundreds of
thousands of armed colonists were cultivating these splendid
plains ; he might and would be the guardian of peace for all
Asia.'i

Ten years later the Pan-German League published a
brochure with the suggestive title, Germany s Claim to the
Turkish Inheritance, and in the editorial manifesto wi'ote as
follows :

* As soon as events shall have brought about the dissolution
of Turkey, no power will make any serious objections if the

1 A. Sprenger, Babylonien das reichste Land in der Vorzeit und
das lohnendste Kolonisationsfeld fur die Gegenwart (1886). Quoted by
Andler, op. cit., p. 40.

358

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Euglish
schemes
in Meso-
potamia.

The

Bagdad-

hahn.

German Empire claims her share of it. This is her right as
a World-Power, and she needs such a share far more than the
other Great Powers because of the hundreds of thousands of
her subjects who emigrate, and whose nationality and economic
subsistence she must preserve.' *

The field in Asia Minor was open to them alike for com-
mercial penetration and for railway construction. But it was
not for lack of warning on the part of clear-sighted English-
men. The question of establishing a steam route to the
Persian Gulf and India by way of Mesopotamia had been
again and again raised in this country. In the early forties
the fashionable idea was the establishment of steam naviga-
tion up the Euphrates ; in 1856 a private company did
actually obtain a concession from the Porte for the con-
struction of a line of railway from the mouth of the Syrian
Orontes to Koweit, but the scheme was insufficiently sup-
ported and never materialized ; a committee of the House of
Commons reported favourably upon a similar scheme in 1872,
but the report was coldly received in parliament ; finally, an
abortive Euphrates Valley Associatioti was formed in 1879
under the presidency of the Duke of Sutherland. But after
1880 attention in this country was concentrated upon Egypt
and the Canal route ; not unnaturally, but in so far as it ex-
cluded consideration of the alternative possibilities of Asia
Minor and Mesopotamia, with very questionable wisdom.^

England's indifference was Germany's opportunity. In 1880
an Anglo-Greek syndicate had obtained from the Porte certain
rights for railway construction in Asia Minor ; in 1888 all
these rights were transferred on much more favourable terms
to the Deutsche Batik of Berlin and the Wiirttembergische
Vereinsbank of Stuttgart, and in 1889 the Ottoman Company
of Anatolian Railways was promoted under the same
auspices. Further concessions were obtained between that
time and 1902, and in the latter year the convention for the
construction of a railway from Constantinople to Bagdad was

^ Quoted by Andler, op. cit., p. 38. See also Cheradame, La Question
d'Orient, pp. 5-7.

2 Cf. a most informing article by Mr. D. G. Hogarth, National Beview,
vol. xxxix, pp. 462-73.

XIV A NEW FACTOR IN THE PROBLEM 359

finally concluded. This railway it need hardly be said was
only one link in a much longer chain stretching from Ham-
burg to Vienna, and thence by way of Buda-Pesth, Belgrade,
and Nish to Constantinople, with an ultimate extension from
Bagdad to Basra. Thus would Berlin be connected by vir-
tually continuous rail with the Persian Gulf.

It was, and it remains, a great conception worthy of a
scientific and systematic people. Should it materialize it will
turn the flank of the great Sea-Empire, just as, in the fifteenth
century, Portugal, by the discovery of the Cape route to India,
turned the flank of the Ottoman Turks.

That a line should be constructed from the Bosphorus to
the Persian Gulf is in the political and social interests of one
of the richest regions of the world ; it is in the economic
interests of mankind. But there are alternative routes from
Western Europe to Constantinople.^ Not all these routes are
controlled from Berlin or even from Vienna. Which of them
will ultimately be selected ? The answer to this question is
one of the many which depend upon the issue of the present
war.'^

For the first twenty years of his reign all went well with Checks to
the policy of the Kaiser in the Near East. But everything ^ ^jj^^"
depended upon the personal friendship of the Sultan Abdul
Hamid, and upon the stability of his throne. In 1908 his
throne was threatened ; in 1909 it was overturned. The
triumph of the Young Turk revolution imposed a serious
check upon German policy ; but, to the amazement of
European diplomacy, the check proved to be only temporary.
Enver Pasha quickly succeeded to the place in the circle of
imperial friendship vacated by his deposed master. Bosnia
and the Herzegovina were definitely annexed by Austria.
Bulgaria finally declared her independence. Russia was
successfully defied by Germany. Once again the Kaiser
was supreme at Constantinople.

It now seemed as if one thing, and one thing only, could
interpose a final and effective barrier between Mitteleuropa

^ Cf ., for instance, Sir Arthur Evans's exceedingly interesting suggestion
of a route via Milan and the Save valley to Constantinople.
•■^ Written in 1916.

360 THE EASTERN QUESTION

and its ambitions in the Near East — a real union between
the Balkan States. In 1912 that miracle was achieved.
Again the Kaiser's schemes appeared to be finally frustrated.
Again the check was only temporary. The brilliant success of
the Balkan League in 1912 was followed, in 1913, by the dis-
ruption of the League and by fratricidal war. Once more had
German diplomacy triumphed. But the crowded events of
these fateful years must be reserved for treatment in the
next chapter.

For further refei'ence : Paul Dehn, Deutschland unci der Orient (1884),
and Deutschland nach Osten (1888) ; Karl Kaeger, Klein-Asien ein
deutsches Kolonisationsf eld (1892) ; F.Jjunge, Beines Deutschtum (1904);
Paul Rohrbach, Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt : die Bagdadbahn ;
Albrecht "Wirth, Tiirkei, Oesterreich, Deutschland (1912) ; Count von
Reventlow, Die ausioilrtige Politik Deutschlands, 1888-1913 (Berlin);
J. L. de Lanessan, L' Empire Qermanique sous Bismarck et Guillaume II;
Bismarck, Beflectlons and Beminiscences ; G. W. Prothero, German
Policy before the War (1916); Klaczko, Two Chancellors; Andre
Cheradame, La Question d'Orient (1903), and Le Plan Bangermaniste
demasqu6 (1916).

For Armenia : Lord Bryce, Transcaucasia (1896) ; E. M. Bliss, Turkey
and the Armenian Atrocities (1896); W. E. Gladstone, The Armenian
Question (1905) ; H. F. B. Ijyxich., Armenia : Travels and Studies,2 vols.
(1901) ; Saint^]\Iartin, Me'moire historique et geographique sur FArminie
(Paris, 1818).

CHAPTER XV

THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM

Habsburg Policy in the Balkans. The Young
Turk Revolution

' The history of the last fifty years in Soixth-Eastem Europe is to a great
extent the history of the disentanglement of the Slavonic races from Greeks
and Turks, and to this is now succeeding the disentanglement of the Slavonic
races from one another.' — Sir Chakles Eliot.

' La Macedoine est vraiment le fondement de I'Hellade unie et grande, la
Macedoine est le boulevard de la liberte grecque, le gage de son avenir.' —
Kallostypi (in 1886).

' Macedonia has for two thousand years been the " dumping ground " of
different peoples and forms, indeed a perfect ethnographic museum.' —

LUIGI ViLLAEI.

'Voila un siecle que Ton travaille a resoudre la question d'Orient, Le
jour ou Ton croira I'avoir resolue I'Europe verra se poser inevitablement
la question d'Autriche.' — Albekt Sokel.

Macedonia is the microcosm of the Balkan problem. In The
Macedonia we can see simultaneously, and in compact and ^^^^^^
concentrated form, all the different elements which, on a problem.
larger scale and in successive phases, have combined to make
up the Eastern Question.

There we see in the forefront the Turk ; heavy-handed The
in extortion ; in all other matters careless and indifferent ;
impotent to absorb the various races and creeds ; but deter-
mined to prevent their fusion. There we see exemplified not
only his attitude towards his own subjects, Moslem and
Christian, but his relations to the concerted Powers of
Europe : there, as elsewhere, we see him ever prodigal of
promises but tardy in fulfilment.

The presence of the Turk is, however, the least perplexing
of the problems which confront us in Macedonia. The
country with its ill-defined boundaries and its kaleidoscopic
medley of races is in itself a problem. And the problem has

362 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

been intensified by the demarcation of the Balkan nations in
the last half-century. For Macedonia is a 'no man's land ' ;
or rather it is an all men's land. It is the residuum of the
Balkans. Moslems, Jews, Albanians, Bulgars, Serbs, Kutzo-
Vlachs, Greeks — all are to be found here cheek by jowl ;
only the roughest territorial discrimination is possible.

The The Greeks have always desired to see Macedonia * Hel-

lenized', and an Hellenized Macedonia is plainly an in-
dispensable preliminary to the realization of the dream
of a revived Hellenic Empire with Constantinople as its
capital. Yet to Macedonia itself the Greeks have, on
ethnographic grounds, no overpowering claim. Greeks are
numerous on the coast and in most of the towns ; they form
a preponderant element in the south-western part of the
vilayet of Monastir and in the south of that of Salonica, but they
are outnumbered by the Spanish Jews in the city of Salonica,
and in the aggregate they are far inferior to the Slavs.

The Greek claim to a Hellenized Macedonia rests partly
upon a Byzantine past, and partly upon the possibility of
a Byzantine future ; but in the present it is mainly eccle-
siastical. ' Hellenism ', writes a close observer, ' claims these
(Macedonian) peoples, because they were civilized by the

"Greek Orthodox" Church To the Greek Bishops all

Macedonians are Greeks because they are by right the
tributaries of the Patriarch. True, they are at present in
schism, but schism is an ofience against the order of the
Universe.'^ This purely ecclesiastical claim is buttressed by
a ' spiritual ' claim. Macedonia may not be Hellenic in
speech or in race, but its spiritual (or, as the Germans would
say, kultural) affinities are, so the Greeks urge, incontestable.
Macedonia being Hellenic in spirit must eventually, there-
fore, form part of the Greater Greece.

The But the Greek is not without competitors. The most

T)..l t

garians. serious of these are the Bulgarians. The Bulgars are the
more detested by the Greeks since their rivalry is of recent
date. DoAvn to 1870 all the Bulgarians in Macedonia, as
elsewhere, were, according to the official nomenclature of the
Ottoman Empire, Greeks. Creed being the only differentia
^ H. N. Brailsford, Macedonia, pp. 195, 196.

XV THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM 363

acknowledged by the Turk, all members of the Orthodox
Church were in the same category. The establishment of an
independent Bulgarian exarchate ^ was the first blow to the
Greek monopoly in Macedonia. But although Bulgaria came
into existence as an ecclesiastical entity in 1870, it was not
until 1878 that its existence was acknowledged in a political
sense.

The conclusion of the Treaty of San Stefano appeared
to deal a death-blow to Hellenic ambitions in Macedonia.
Lord Beaconsfield's intervention was a godsend to the Greeks.
But the success of the Philippopolis revolution in 1875 and
the subsequent union of Eastern Roumelia and Bulgaria again
rendered acute the Macedonian situation. The events of
1885 seemed once more to bring within the sphere of practical
politics the realization of the dream of the Greater Bulgaria
actually defined at San Stefano. For some years after 1885
the Bulgarians entertained the hope that it might be realized.
Geologically and geographically ^ Bulgaria is drawn towards
the Aegean. So long as Constantinople and the Straits are
in hands potentially hostile, a good commercial harbour on
the Aegean is essential to the full economic development of
Bulgaria.

Ethnographically also her claims are strong. It is per-
haps rather too much to say, with a distinguished American
authority, that ' the great bulk of the population of Mace-
donia is Bulgarian ',^ but it is undeniable that Macedonia has,
'by the educational efforts of the Bulgar people, been to
a very large extent Bulgarized in its sympathies' in recent
years. The people have * for a quarter of a century been
educated as Bui gars; have fought as Bulgars in 1895, 1903,
and 1912 ; w^ere annexed to Bulgaria by the Russians in 1878,
and by the Serbs in 1912 ; were assigned to the Bulgar
Church by the Turks in 1872 and 1897 ; and are to-day,
many of them, perhaps most of them, protesting against being
treated other than as Bulgars.' *

1 Supra, p. 291. 2 See chap, ii, supra.

3 H. A, Gibbons, New Map of Europe, p. 167.

4 Nationalism and War in the Near East, by A Diplomatist (Clarendon
Press, 1915).

364

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Bulgarian The policy of Bulgaria in regard to Macedonia has passed
Mac2 ^^ through two phases and into a third during the last thirty
donia. years. For some years, as was said, it aimed at the realiza-
tion of the Greater Bulgaria, mapped out at San Stefano.
Gradually abandoning this idea as outside the domain of
practical politics the Bulgarians devoted their energies
to the emancipation of Macedonia. Their avowed hope
was that, as an autonomous principality under a Christian
governor, Macedonia, possibly enlarged by the addition of
the vilayet of Adrianople, might become a powerful inde-
pendent State and the nucleus of a Balkan Federation.^

Always practical, however, Bulgaria, while surrendering the
dream of political annexation, has pursued a policy of peace-
ful penetration ; perhaps with a view to the ultimate partition
which would now seem to be the least unhopeful of the many
schemes which have been propounded for the pacification of
Macedonia.

Meanwhile, the Bulgarians have incurred the bitter hostility
not only of the Turks but of the other Christian races in
Macedonia. The Turks here, as elsewhere, have proceeded on
the formula : Divide et impera. In the south of Macedonia,
as Dr. Tatarchefi* (not without a strong Bulgarian bias)
writes : ' The Turks support the Greek propaganda ; in the
north they encourage the Serbian propaganda ; and every-
where they persecute the Bulgarian Church, schools, and
nationality.'^ In the latter task they have undoubtedly
derived much assistance from the Greeks, and some perhaps
from the Serbians.

The latter have their own claims to substantiate. Ethno-
graphically those claims are incontestable in northern Mace-
donia ; historically they extend much further. It was
from Serbians, not from Greeks or Bulgars, that the
greater part of Macedonia was originally conquered by the
Ottoman Turks. The historical self-consciousness of the Serbs
is not less intense than that of the Greeks. If, therefore,
the hold of the Turks upon Macedonia be relaxed, it is to

The
Serbians.

' Cf, Tatarcheflf, ap. Villari, Balkan Question, chap. vi.
2 Op. cit., p. 171.

XV THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM 365

those who represent the empire of Stephan Dushan that, in
the Serbian view, the country should revert. But present
politics are more potent in Macedonia than past history,
and Serbian pressure towards the south is due rather to
the denial of access to the Adriatic than to the hope of
reviving Dushan's empire. To this point, however, we shall
have, in another connexion, to return.

Two other races claim a share in the Macedonian heritage, liiyrians
and though numerically inferior to the rest, are incom- ^.^
parably superior in antiquity. They are the Illyrians, cians.
represented by the modern Albanians, who are numerous
in the extreme west, and the Thracians, who, as Kutzo-
Vlachs or Roumanians, are to be found in scattered ' pockets '
throughout Macedonia, but are nowhere concentrated in any
compact mass. The Roumanians claim that their countrymen
in this ' all men's land ' number half a million ; less sym-
pathetic analysts give them a fifth of that sum. In any case,
Roumania cannot, for obvious geographical reasons, advance
any territorial claims in Macedonia, though the unquestionable
existence of a Roumanian element in the population might
possibly help Roumania, when the time arrives for a final
partition of the Balkans, towards a favourable deal with
Bulgaria in the Dobrudja.

The rough outline sketch presented above would sufficiently The
demonstrate the complexity of the Macedonian problem even .^^("^{^(.g.
if it did not contain other factors. But Macedonia is not donia.
only the residuum of Balkan races ; it is not only the cockpit
of competing Balkan nationalities ; it has been for years the
favourite arena for the international rivalries of the gi-eat
European Powers.

We have seen that international jealousies were largely
responsible for the immunity enjoyed by Abdul Hamid in the
perpetration of the Armenian massacres, and for the mishand-
ling of Crete ; the same cause operated to prolong the agony of
Macedonia. Two Powers in particular — Russia and Austria-
Hungary — have looked with a jealous eye upon Macedonia ;
and the other Powers have, in a sense, tacitly admitted the
validity of their superior claims. If Russia had been per-

366 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

mitted to carry out her plans in 1878 the Macedonian
question would have been settled in favour of Bulgaria. At
that time Europe was quite unconscious of the existence of
a Macedonian problem. Indeed, in the sense in which we
have understood it in this chapter, that problem did not exist.
The growing self-consciousness of the Balkan nations, and the
demarcation of their respective frontiers served, if not to
create, at least to accentuate and define it. So soon as the
problem was defined there would seem to have been only three
possible solutions : an autonomous Macedonia under European
protection ; Turkish reform under European control ; or par-
tition between Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Albania. The
jealousy of the Powers was effectual to prevent the adoption
of either of the first two, and has practically wrecked the third.

jNIeanwhile, the condition of the Macedonian peoples, to
whatever race they might belong, was nothing short of
deplorable. For five hundred years the Ottomans had been
undisputed lords of Macedonia. They began to plant colonies
in Macedonia, even before they attempted the conquest of
the Balkan Peninsula. They have been systematically
colonizing it afresh since the shrinkage of their empire in
Europe. But at no time have Turkish Moslems formed a
majority of the population in Macedonia. There, as else-
where, many of the upper classes apostatized to Moham-
medanism, and were rewarded in the usual fashion. Those
who refused to do so shared the common lot of the subject
Christian populations in other parts of the peninsula.

With the nature of their grievances we have become, in the
course of this narrative, only too familiar. There is, indeed,
a painful monotony in the tale of Turkish misgovern ment.
Here, as elsewhere, the toiling peasantry were subject to
a cross-fire of exactions, and extortions, and persecutions.
They suffered at the hands of the Moslems because they were
Christians ; they were exposed to the lawless depredations
of the brigands, frequently of Albanian race, by whom the
country was infested ; they had to meet the demands, both
regular and irregular, of Moslem bej^s and official tax-farmers ;
they could obtain no redress in the courts of law ; life, pro-
perty, honour were all at the mercy of the ruling creed.

XV THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM 367

For some years after the conclusion of the Treaty of Berlin Insurrec-
these things were patiently endured in the hope that the ^'^jqno^^^
Powers would fulfil the promises of reforms contained in that
document. But from 1893 to 1903 there were sporadic
insurrections in various parts of Macedonia, organized by the
secret revolutionary committees which quickly came into
existence as the hope of reform faded. In 1895 Bulgaria
stood forth as the avowed champion of the oppressed
peasantry of Macedonia. In that year the ' supreme Macedo-
Adrianopolitan Committee ' was formed at Sofia, and armed
bands poured over the Bulgarian frontiers. Bulgarian inter-
vention effected little good, though it served to stimulate
a movement in Macedonia itself which had for its object
the creation of an autonomous province under Turkish
suzerainty.

The outbreak of the ' Three Weeks' War ' between Turkey
and Greece in 1897 naturally aroused considerable enthusiasm
in Macedonia. But the hopes it raised were destined to dis-
appointment, for, in 1898, Austria and Russia concluded an
agreement to maintain the status quo. In 1899, however,
the Macedonian Committee, which was attempting from Sofia
to organize a reform movement, addressed a memorial to the
Powers in favour of an 'autonomous Macedonia', with its
capital at Salonica, to be placed under a governor-general
belonging to the ' predominant nationality '. Nothing came
of it, and from 1900 to 1903 Macedonia was in a state of
chronic insurrection, which culminated in the autumn of
1903 in general risings in the Monastir district and in Thrace.

Meanwhile, in 1901, a band of brigands, acting, there is no
doubt, under the orders of the Sofia Committee, captured
Miss Stone, an American missionary, and held her to ransom.
The object of the capture was twofold : money and publicity.
In order to obtain Miss Stone's release a very large sum —
£16,000 — had to be paid to her captors ; while the excite-
ment caused by the outrage made Europe for the first time
generally aware that there was a * ]\lacedonian question '.
Having at last realized the existence of a ' problem ', the
Powers confided to Austria and Russia the task of solving
it. By this time the Porte was becoming seriously alarmed,

368

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Mace-
donian
insurrec-
tion of
1903.

The

Miirzteg
Pro-
granune.

and in the autumn of 1902 Abdul Hamid himself produced
an elaborate scheme of reform, and appointed Hilmi Pasha
as inspector-general to supervise its execution. Austria and
Russia, which for some years had acted in close concert in
Macedonia, were not to be burked in their benevolent inten-
tions, and early in 1903 they presented to the Porte an
independent reform programme.

For the moment, however, both schemes were perforce set
aside by the outbreak of a serious and elaborately organized
insurrection. The money obtained from Miss Stone's ransom
had been expended on the purchase of arms and dynamite,
and in the spring and summer of 1903 the results were made
manifest to the world. The Ottoman Bank at Salonica was
blo^vn up ; bombs were placed upon trading vessels, and
there was much destruction of both life and property.
These outrages alienated European sympathy, and the Sultan
got his opportunity. He did not neglect it. Troops, regular
and irregular, were let loose upon the hapless peasantry ;
more than a hundred villages were totally destroyed by fire,
and tens of thousands of the inhabitants were rendered
homeless and destitute.

Meanwhile the Tsar Nicholas and the Emperor Francis
Joseph met at the castle of Miirzteg, near Vienna, and the
two sovereigns sanctioned the immediate initiation of a
scheme of reform known as the Miirzteg Programme.

Acting as the ' mandatories ' of Europe they recommended
that Hilmi Pasha, the inspector-general of reforms, should
be assisted in the work of pacifying jNIacedonia by two civil
assessors, one a Russian and the other an Austrian, and
that the gendarmerie should be reorganized and put under
the command of a foreign general and a staff of foreign
officers. Germany stood ostentatiously aloof, but the other
five Powers each took a district and attempted to maintain
order within it. Under their well-meant but misdirected
efforts Macedonia sank deeper and deeper into the slough of
anarchy. The Powers might put pressure upon the Sultan,
but 'bands' of Greeks and Bulgarians made life intolerable
for the mass of the population. The civil assessors had no
administrative powers, and it soon became plain that much

XV THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM 369

more drastic measures would have to be taken if any good
were to be effected.

But long before Europe had made up its mind to effective
action a rapid series of dramatic events had revolutionized
the whole situation in the Near East.

In 1905 Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany com-
bined to secure the appointment of an international commis-
sion to control Macedonian finance. This touched the Turk
on his tenderest spot, and the Sultan showed every disposi-
tion to prevent the action of the Powers. But the latter
presented a firm front ; their combined squadrons occupied
Mytilene and sailed through the Dardanelles, and, in December,
1905, the Sultan, at last realizing that they meant business,
gave way. The commission did useful work within a limited
sphere, but the essential difficulties of the Macedonian situa-
tion were untouched. Nor did the Miirzteg Programme
solve them more effectually.

Early in 1908 the two parties to that agreement fell out.
In January Baron von Aerenthal announced that Austria-
Hungary had applied for permission to survey the gi'ound
for a line of railway to connect the terminus of the Bosnian
railway with the line running from Mitrovitza to Salonica.
The implication was obvious, and the announcement created
a great sensation. Russia, in particular, regarded it, and
naturally, as a denunciation of the condominium, which, with
Austria-Hungary, she had been commissioned by the Powers
to exercise over Macedonia.

Baron von Aerenthal did not question the correctness of
the inference. On the contrary, he declared that the ' special
task of Austria and Russia [in Macedonia] was at an end '.
Plainly, the Dual Monarchy had made up its mind to play
its own hand. Momentous events compelled it to play with-
out delay.

In the long history of the Eastern Question there is no The year
period more pregnant with startling developments than the ^^^^•
last six months of the year 1908.

On July 24 the 'Committee of Union and Progress' —
better known as the ' Young Turks ' — effected a blood-
less revolution in Constantinople ; on October 5 Prince

1984 B b

370 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

Ferdinand proclaimed the independence of Bulgaria ;
on the 7th the Emperor Francis Joseph announced the
formal annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina to the
Habsburg Empire ; on the 12th the Cretan Assembly voted
the union of the island with the kingdom of Greece. At
least two of these developments will demand detailed treat-
ment. The last, as the least complicated, may be disposed
of forthwith.
Crete: M. Zaimis, who was appointed High Commissioner of

w^th" Crete in 1907, had speedily reduced the island to order. The
Greece, protecting Powers, anxious to lay down their invidious task
at the earliest moment compatible with its fulfilment, in-
formed M. Zaimis that as soon as an effective native gen-
darmerie had been organized and the High Commissioner
could guarantee the maintenance of order, and more par-
ticularly the security of the Moslem population, they would
evacuate the island.

In March, 1908, M. Zaimis formally drew the attention of
the Powers to the fact that their conditions had been ful-
filled. In July the evacuation began. But the news from
Bosnia and Bulgaria created intense excitement in Crete,
and on October 12, just a week after the Tsar Ferdinand's
proclamation at Tirnovo, the Assembly at Canea once more
voted the union of the island with the Hellenic kingdom.
M. Zaimis happened to be absent on a holiday, and the
Assembly therefore appointed a Provisional Government
of six members to govern the island in the name of the
King of the Hellenes.

The Moslems, in great alarm, thereupon invoked the pro-
tection of the British Government ; but the latter, while
promising protection to the Moslems, declined either to
recognize or to repudiate the union. The Young Turk
Government at Constantinople contented itself with a formal
protest against the dismemberment of the inheritance upon
which it had so lately entered. In July, 1909, the protecting
Powers finally withdrew their forces from the island, while
at the same time they announced that four ships of war
Mould be stationed off Crete in order to guarantee the
safety of the Moslem population and to 'safeguard' the

XV THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM 371

rights of the Ottoman Empire. Those rights were, however,
ah-eady virtually extinguished, and the Balkan War of 1912
brought the solemn farce to an end.

The circumstances attending the completion of Bulgarian Bulgarian
independence demand only brief attention. Prince Ferdinand's Jj^np^""
move, like that of the Cretan Assembly, was directly attribu-
table to the astonishing success of the Young Turks.

It had long been Ferdinand's ambition to sever the last
ties which bound the principality to its suzerain and to
assume the ancient title of Tsar of Bulgaria. So long, how-
ever, as the Ottoman Empire was manifestly in a condition
of decadence there was no immediate necessity for a step
likely to arouse the susceptibilities of the Powers which
had signed the Treaty of Berlin. The revolution at Con-
stantinople put another aspect on the matter. Ferdinand
could no longer afford to postpone the contemplated step.
If the Young Turks succeeded in effecting a real reform at
Constantinople the opportunity for the declaration of Bul-
garian independence might never recur. A slight offered to
the Bulgarian representative at Constantinople in September
afforded a pretext for his recall, and on October 5 the
independence of Bulgaria was proclaimed. The principality
was converted into a kingdom, and the king, by a solemn
act performed in the Church of the Forty Martyrs in the
ancient capital of Tirnovo, assumed the title of Tsar. Two
reasons were assigned for the violation of the Berlin Treaty :
first that the Bulgarian nation, though practically inde-
pendent, was ' impeded in its normal and peaceful develop-
ment by ties the breaking of which vnW remove the tension
which has arisen between Bulgaria and Turkey ' ; and,
secondly, that 'Turkey and Bulgaria, free and entirely
independent of each other, may exist under conditions
which will allow them to strengthen their friendly relations
and to devote themselves to peaceful internal development '.

This hypocritical explanation did not tend to mitigate
the Sultan's wrath, but the real significance of Ferdinand's
action was to the Porte financial rather than political. The
new government at Constantinople demanded compensation
for the loss of the tribute which Bulgaria had been accustomed

Bb2

372 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap,

to pay. Tsar Ferdinand bluntly refused to provide it ;

Turkey and Bulgaria were brought to the brink of war, but

Russia stepped in to facilitate a financial composition, and

on April 19, 1909, the Turkish Parliament formally recognized

the independence of Bulgaria.

Austria- Much more serious alike in its immediate and its remoter

and the consequences was the action taken by Austria-Hungary in

Balkans, regard to Bosnia and the Herzegovina. So serious, indeed,

that this would seem to be the appropriate occasion for

a summary analysis of Austro-Hungarian policy in the Near

East.

Of all the great European Powers Austria-Hungary is
most closely, if not most vitally, concerned in the solution
of that problem. England's interest is vital, but remote,
and may be deemed to have been secured by the annexation
of Egypt and Cyprus, and by her financial control over the
Canal. Russia's interest also is vital. On no account must
any Power, potentially hostile, be in a position to close the
straits against her. But the interests of Austria-Hungary
while not less vital are even more immediate and direct.
For England it is mainly a question of external policy,
except in so far as the fate of the European Moslems
reacts upon the hopes and fears of British subjects in Egypt
and India. For Russia too, apart from the waning idea of
Pan-Slavism and from the position of the Orthodox Church,
the question is mainly though less exclusively an external
one.

For Austria-Hungary the external question is hardly if
at all less vital than it is to Russia, and more vital than
it is to England, while internally the whole position of the
Dual Monarchy may be said, without exaggeration, to depend
upon the form in which the Balkan problem is ultimately
solved. M. Albert Sorel writing as far back as 1889,
exhibited the prescience of a great publicist no less than
the acumen of a brilliant historian when he predicted, in
words which have lately become familiar, that the moment
the Eastern Question was solved Europe would find itself
confronted with an Austrian question. As a fact, the
Habsburgs have deemed it imprudent to await the final

XV THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM 373

solution of that question before flinging the Austrian apple
of discord into the diplomatic arena. It becomes necessary,
therefore, at this point to define with some precision the
nature and extent of Austro-Hungarian interests in the
problem under consideration.

No words are needed to emphasize the vital importance External
to Russia of a free passage through the Bosphorus and the "^*®^®st8.
Dardanelles. Her dominant interest in the future of the
straits is now generally recognized. It is less commonly
realized that the external problem for Austria-Hungary is
almost precisely parallel to that of Russia. Deprive the
Habsburgs of Trieste, Pola, Fiume, and Dalmatia — and her
enemies would do it, if they could, to-morroAV — and the
position of Austria-Hungary would be identical with that
of Russia, or worse. The Danube alone would then give
them access to the sea, and with Constantinople in hostile
hands the advantages even of that access would be
cancelled.

Trieste is the Liverpool of the Dual Monarchy ; Pola its The
Portsmouth. If Trieste be adjudged to Italy, and Istria and Adriatic.
Fiume either to Italy or to the new Jugo-Slavia, the naval
and commercial position of Austria-Hungary would indeed
be desperate. But even assuming that there is no dismember-
ment of the existing Habsburg Empire her position on the
Adriatic will still be exceedingly precarious. Secure in the
possession of Brindisi and Valona, Italy would find little
diflficulty in barring the access of Austria-Hungary to the
Mediterranean. The Straits of Otranto are only forty-one
miles broad ; small wonder, then, that Albania is regarded
with jealous eyes by the statesmen of the Ballplatz.

Italy, however, is not the only potential rival of Austria-
Hungary in the Adriatic. Montenegro has already gained
access to its waters, though her coast-line is less than thirty
miles in extent. If the dreams of a Jugo-Slav Empire are
realized even partially, the Greater Serbia, possessed of
Dalmatia and absorbing Bosnia — to say nothing of Croatia
and part of Istria — would at once neutralize, in considerable
degree, the importance of Trieste, Fiume, and Pola.

These considerations enable us to appreciate the significance

374 THE EASTERN QUESTION char

of the Habsburg monarchy's Drang nach Sud-Osten. If
egress from the Black Sea and the Adriatic were denied
to her, or even rendered precarious, Salonica w ould become
not merely valuable but indispensable to her existence.
Hence the persistent and increasing hostility manifested by
Austria towards the development of Serbia and the consolida-
tion of the Southern Slavs.
The new The Habsburgs have, in Bismarck's phrase, been gravitating
in Habs-^ towards Buda-Pesth ever since the virtual destruction of the
burg Holy Roman Empire in the Thirty Years' War (1618-48).
poicy. ^g ^ £^^^^ gravitation was for many years equally per-
ceptible towards the Adriatic and the Lombard plain. But
the new departure in Habsburg policy really dates, as I have
attempted to sIioav in another connexion, not from the Treaty
of Westphalia but from the Treaty of Prague (1866). When
Bismarck turned Austria simultaneously out of Germany and
out of Italy he gave her a violent propulsion towards the
south-east. The calculated gift of Bosnia and the Herzegovina,
supplemented by the military occupation of the Sanjak of
Novi-Bazar, increased the momentum. Novi-Bazar not only
formed a wedge between the Slavs of Serbia and those of Mon-
tenegro but seemed to invite the Habsburgs towards the
Vardar valley and so on to Salonica.
Position For twenty-five years Serbia appeared to be acquiescent.
Had Serbia been in a position at the Congress of Berlin to
claim Bosnia, or even Novi-Bazar, Balkan politics would
have worn a very different aspect to-day. But Serbia had
not yet found her soul, nor even her feet. Her geographical
position as defined in 1878 was, as we have seen, a hopeless
one. Nor did she lack other troubles. Prince Milan assumed
a royal crown in 1882, but his policy was less spirited than
his pretensions ; he took his orders from Vienna, a fact which
widened the breach between himself and the Queen Natalie,
who, being a Russian, had strong Pan-Slavist sympathies.
But Queen Natalie had grievances against Milan as a husband
no less than as a king, and court scandals at Belgrade did
not tend to enhance the reputation of Serbia in European
society.

The disastrous war with Bulgaria (1885) still further lowered

of Serbia.

XV THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM 375

her in public estimation. The grant of a more liberal consti-
tution in 1888 did little to improve the situation of a country
not yet qualified for self-government, and in 1889 King Milan
abdicated.

His son, King Alexander, was a child of thirteen at his
accession, and though not devoid of will he could not give
Serbia what she needed, a strong ruler. In 1893 he sud-
denly declared himself of age, arrested the regents and minis-
ters, and abrogated the prematurely liberal constitution of
1888. This act, not in itself unwise, threw the country into
worse confusion, which was still further increased when in
1900 the headstrong young man married his mother's lady-
in-waiting, a beautiful woman but a divorcee, and known
to be incapable of child-birth. The squalid story reached
a tragic conclusion in 1903, when the king, Queen Draga,
and the queen's male relations were all murdered at Belgrade
with every circumstance of calculated brutality.

This ghastly crime sent a thrill of horror through the
courts and countries of Europe.^ Politically, however, it
did not lack justification. Serbia gained immeasurably by
the extinction of the decadent Obrenovic dynasty, and the
reinstatement of the more virile descendants of Kara-
georgevic ; the pro-Austrian bias of her policy has been
corrected ; and under King Peter she has regained self-
respect and has resumed the work of national regeneration.

That work was watched with jealous eyes at Vienna, and Austria-
still more at Buda-Pesth, and not without reason. The develop- anTfhe
ment of national self-consciousness among the Southern Slavs Southern
seriously menaced the whole structure of the Dual Monarchy.
Expelled from Germany in 1866, the Emperor Francis Joseph
came to terms with his Magyar subjects in the Aiisgleich of
1867. Henceforward the domestic administration of Austria
and her dependencies was to be entirely separate from that
of Hungary ; even the two monarchies were to be distinct,
but certain matters common to the Austrian Empire and the
Hungarian kingdom — foreign policy, army administration,

1 There is more than a suspicion that it -was plotted in Vienna and
carried out with Austrian connivance ; for Alexander was less in tutelage
to Vienna than Milan,

376 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

and finance — were committed to a joint body known as
the 'Delegations'. But the essential basis of the formal
reconciliation thus eflfected between Germans and ]\Iagyars
was a common hostility to the third racial element in the
Dual Monarchy, the element which outnumbers both Magyars
and Gennans, that of the Slavs.

Out of the 51,000,000 subjects of the Emperor Francis
Joseph about 10,000,000 are Magyars — these form a compact
mass in Hungary ; about 11,000,000 are German ; about
26,000,000 are Slavs. Of the latter, about 7,000,000 belong
to the Serbo-Croatian or Southern Slav branch of the great
Slav family.

Since 1867 it has been the fixed policy of the leading
statesmen, of both Vienna and Buda-Pesth, to keep the Slav
majority in strict subordination to the German-Magyar
minority. The inclusion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with
a compact population of nearly 2,000,000 Slavs, has rendered
this policy at once more difl&cult, and, at least in the eyes of
the timorous minority, more absolutely imperative. In pro-
portion, however, as Habsburg methods have become more
drastic, the annexed provinces have tended to look with
more and more approbation upon the Jugo-Slav propaganda
emanating from Belgrade. To meet this danger the Austrian
Government has promoted schemes for the systematic German
colonization of Bosnia in much the same way as Prussia has
encouraged colonization in Poland. But neither the steady
progress of colonization nor the material benefits unques-
tionably conferred upon Bosnia by German administration
have availed to \\in the hearts of the Bosnian Serbs, nor to
repress the growing intimacy between Serajevo and Belgrade.
Trialism This fact, too obtrusive to be ignored, has led some of the
Dualism ^lore thoughtful statesmen of the Ballplatz to advocate
a new departure in Habsburg policy. To maintain, in per-
petuity, the German-Magyar ascendancy over the Slavs
seemed to them an impossibility. But was there any alter-
native, consistent, of course, with the continued existence
of the Habsburg Empire ? Only, it seemed to them, one :
to substitute a triple for the dual foundation upon Avhich for
half a century the Habsburg Empire had rested ; to bring

XV THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM 377

in the Slav as a third partner in the existing German-
Magyar firm.

On one detail of their programme the * trialists ' were not
unanimous. Some who favoured 'trialism' in principle
wished to include only the Slavs who were already subject
to the "Dual Monarchy ; others, with a firmer grip upon the
nationality idea, advocated a bolder and more comprehensive
policy. To them it seemed possible to solve by one stroke the
most troublesome of the domestic difficulties of the Habsburg
Empire, and the most dangerous of their external problems.
The Jugo-Slav agitation had not, at that time, attained the
significance which since 1912 has attached to it. Serbo-Croat
unity was then a distant dream. While the nationality senti-
ment was still comparatively weak, the religious barriers
between Orthodox Serbs and Roman Catholic Croats were pro-
portionately formidable. Whether even then the Slavs could
have been tempted by generous terms to come in as a third
partner in the Habsburg Empire it is impossible to say ;
but from the Habsburg point of view the experiment was
obviously worth making, and its success would have been
rightly regarded as a superb political achievement. With
Serbia and Montenegro added to Bosnia, and the Herzegovhia
to Dalmatia and Croatia-Slavonia, the Habsburgs would not
only have been dominant in the Adriatic ; the valley of the
Morava would have been open to them, and Salonica would
have been theirs whenever they chose to stretch out their
hands and take it. Greece would certainly have protested,
and might have fought, but at that time there would have
been Crete and Epirus, and even western Macedonia to bar-
gain with. Bulgaria might easily have been conciliated by
the cession of western Macedonia, including, of course,
Kavala, and perhaps the vilayet of Adrianople. The Mace-
donian problem would thus have been solved with complete
satisfaction to two out of the three principal claimants, and to
the incomparable advantage of the Habsburg Empire.

If it be true that the heir to the throne, the late Arch- The Arch-
duke Franz Ferdinand, had identified himself Avith this large J^,^^^
scheme of policy, it would go far to stamp him as a great Ferdi-
statesman ; it would also go far to explain the relentless "'^^-

378 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

hostility with Avhich he was pursued by the party of Gemian-
INIagyar ascendancy.
1903. Things seemed to be shaping, in the first years of the

present century, in that direction. Serbia, distracted by
domestic broils, was in the slough of despond ; a generous
offer fi'om the Habsburgs might well have seemed to
patriotic Serbs the happiest solution of an inextricable
tangle. Austria, on the other hand, had reached at that
moment the zenith of her position in the Balkans. The
year which witnessed the palace revolution at Belgrade
witnessed also the brilliant culmination of Habsburg diplo-
macy in the conclusion of the Mlirzteg agreement. Russia
was on the brink of the Japanese AVar. Great Britain had
just emerged with seriously damaged prestige from the war
in South Africa. The brilliant diplomacy of King Edward VII
had not yet succeeded in bringing England and France
together, still less in laying the foundations for the Triple
Entente between the Western Powers and Russia.

The moment was exceptionally favourable for a bold coup
on the part of the Habsburgs in the Balkans. The Mlirzteg
agreement seemed almost to imply an international invi-
tation to attempt it. But the opportunity was lost. What
were the forces which were operating against the Trialists ?
At many of them we can, as yet, only guess. But there are
some indications which are as sinister as they are obscure.
In 1909 a corner of the curtain was lifted by a cause celbbre.
In December of that year the leaders of the Serbo-Croat
Coalition brought an action for libel against a well-knoMTi
Austrian historian. Dr. Friedjung of Vienna. Dr. Friedjung
had accused the Croatian leaders of being the hirelings of
the Serbian Government, but the trial revealed the amazing
fact that a false accusation had been based upon forged
documents supplied to a distinguished publicist by the
Foreign Office. Dr. Friedjung was perhaps the innocent
victim of his own nefarious government ; the real culprit
was Count Forgach, the Austrian minister at Belgrade,
a diplomatist whose ingenuity was rewarded by an important
post at the Ballplatz. Incidents of this kind showed to the
world the direction of the prevailing wind. The archduke

XV THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM 379

was already beaten. Baron von Aerenthal was in the
saddle.

During six critical years the direction of the extemal Baron von
policy of the Habsburg Empire lay in the hands of this (1906-I2).
masterful diplomatist. The extinction of the Obrenovic
dynasty in Serbia was a considerable though not a fatal blow
to Habsburg pretensions. The tragedy itself was one of
several indicative of the gi'owth of an anti-Austrian party.
The bad feeling between the two States was further accen-
tuated by the economic exclusiveness of the Habsburg
Government, which threatened to strangle the incipient trade
of Serbia, and in particular to impede the export of swine
upon which its commercial prosperity mainly depended- The
fi-iction thus generated culminated in the so-called ' Pig- war '
of 1905-6, which convinced even the most doubting of
Serbian politicians that no free economic development was
possible for the inland State until she had acquired a coast-
line either on the Adriatic or on the Aegean. The latter was
hardly in sight ; only two alternatives were really open to
Serbia. The Albanian coast is with reference to the hinter-
land of little economic value. Besides, the Albanians are
not Serbs ; nor have they ever proved amenable to con-
quest. Unless, therefore, Serbia were content to resign all
hope of attaining the rank even of a third-rate European
State, one of two things was essential, if not both. Either
she must have some of the harbours of Dalmatia, pre-
eminently a Slav country, or she must obtain access to the
Adriatic by union with Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

All hope of the latter solution was extinguished by Aeren- Annexa-
thal's abrupt annexation of these Slav provinces in 1908. g^g^k
Austria-Hungary had been in undisputed occupation since and the
1878, and no reasonable person ever supposed that she would o-oyjua
voluntarily relax her hold. But so long as the Treaty of Berlin
remained intact, so long as the Habsburg occupation was
technically provisional, a glimmer of hope remained to the
Pan-Serbians. Aerenthal's action was a declaration of war.
In the following year he did indeed throw a sop directly to
the Turks, indirectly to the Serbs, by the evacuation of Novi-
Bazar. He took to himself great credit for this generosity

380 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

and the step was hailed with delight in Serbia. We now
knoAv that it was dictated by no consideration for either
Turkish or Serbian susceptibilities ; it was taken partly to
conciliate Italy, the third and most restless member of the
Triple Alliance ; but mainly because the Austrian general
staff had come to the conclusion that the Morava valley oflFered
a more convenient route than the Sanjak to Salonica.
Feeling ill Could Serbia hope to shut and lock both these doors
against the intruding Habsburgs? That was the question
which agitated every Chancellery in Europe at the opening
of the year 1909. In Belgrade the action of Austria-Hungary
excited the most profound indignation, and the Avhole Serbian
people, headed by the Crown Prince, clamoured for war. Feel-
ing in Montenegro was hardly less unanimous. The Serbian
Government made a formal protest on October 7, and appealed
to the Powers for 'justice and protection against this new and
flagrant violation, which has been eflfected unilaterally hy force
majeure to satisfy selfish interests and without regard to the
grievous blows thus dealt to the feelings, interests, and rights
of the Serbian people '. Finally, in default of the restoration
of the status quo, they demanded that compensation should
be given to Serbia in the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar.

The Powers were not unsympathetic, but urged Serbia to
be patient. Upon the most acute of English diplomatists
the high-handed action of Austria had made a profound
impression. No man in Europe had laboured more assiduously
or more skilfully for peace than King Edward VII. Lord
Redesdale has recorded the effect produced upon him by the
news from the Balkans.

' It was the 8th of Oct. that the King received the news at
Balmoral, and no one who was there can forget how terribly
he was upset. Never did I see him so moved. . . . The King
was indignant. . . . His forecast of the danger which he
communicated at the time to me showed him to be possessed
of the prevision which marks the statesman. Every word
that he uttered that day has come true.' ^

The peace of Europe depended upon the attitude of Russia.
Her Balkan partnership with Austria-Hungary had been

^ Lord Redesdale, Memories, i. 178-9.

XV THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM 381

dissolved, and in 1907 she had concluded an agreement
respecting outstanding difficulties with Great Britain. That
agreement virtually completed the Triple Entente, the crown
of the diplomacy of King Edward VII. In June, 1908,
King Edward and the Tsar Nicholas met at R^val, and
a further programme for the pacification of Macedonia was
draMii up. Whether the R^val programme would have suc-
ceeded in its object any better than the Miirzteg agi'eement,
which it replaced, the Young Turks did not permit Europe to
leam. But at least it afforded conclusive evidence that a new
era in the relations of Russia and Great Britain had dawned.

In the Balkan question Russia was, of course, profoundly
interested. To her the Serbians naturally looked not merely
for sympathy but for assistance. Russia, however, was not
ready for war. She had not regained her breath after the
contest with Japan. And the fact was, of course, well known
at Potsdam. All through the autumn and M'inter (1908-9)
Serbia and Montenegro had been feverishly pushing on
preparations for the war in which they believed that they
would be supported by Russia and Great Britain. Austria,
too, was steadily arming. With Turkey she was prepared
to come to financial terms : towards Serbia she presented
an adamantine front. Towards the end of February, 1909,
war seemed inevitable. It was averted not by the British
proposal for a conference but by the ' mailed fist ' of Germany.
In melodramatic phrase the German Emperor announced that
if his august ally were compelled to draw the sword, a
knight 'in shining armour' would be found by his side.
At the end of March Russia was plainly informed that if she
went to the assistance of Serbia she would have to fight not
Austria-Hungary only but Germany as well. Russia, conscious
of her unpreparedness, immediately gave way. With that
surrender the war of 1914 became inevitable. Germany was
intoxicated by her success ; Russia was bitterly resentfid.
The Serbs were compelled not merely to acquiesce but to
promise to shake hands with Austria. The Powers tore up
the twenty-fifth Article of the Treaty of Berlin. Turkey
accepted £2,200,000 from Austria-Hungary as compensation
for the loss of the Serbian provinces, and in April, 1909,

382 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

formally assented to their alienation. Bulgaria compounded

for her tribute by the payment of £5,000,000.^ Thus were

the 'cracks papered over', and Europe emerged from the

most serious international crisis since 1878.

The We must now return, after this prolonged parenthesis, to

Turkish ^^iq fons et origo of the whole commotion. It was, as we saw,

tion. the sudden move of the Macedonian 'Committee of Union

and Progress ' which set a light to the conflagration, the slow

burning down of which we have just witnessed. The fire

was not burnt out. The ashes smouldered, to blaze out

again more fiercely in 1914.

Few single events in the whole history of the Near Eastern
Question have caused a gi-eater sensation or evoked more
general or generous enthusiasm than the Turkish revolution
of 1908. The Committee which organized it with such com-
plete and amazing success had been in existence for several
years, and was itself the descendant of a party which was first
formed in Constantinople after the disastrous conclusion of
the Greek War of Independence (1830). It was in that year
that the High Admiral, Khalil Pasha, said : ' I am convinced
that unless we speedily reform ourselves on European lines
we must resign ourselves to the necessity of going back to
Asia.' - Those words indicate the genesis of the Young Turk
party, and might have been taken as its motto. To trans-
form the Ottoman Empire for the first time into a modern
European State ; to give to Turkey a genuine parliamentary
constitution ; to proclaim the principle of religious and in-
tellectual liberty ; to emancipate the press ; to promote
intercourse with the progressive nations of the world ; to
encourage education ; to promote trade ; to eradicate the
last relics of mediaevalism — such was the programme with
w^hich the Young Turks astonished and deluded Europe in
the summer of 1908.

Composed mainly of young men who had acquired a veneer
of Western — particularly Gallic — ideas the Committee was
originally formed at Geneva in 1891. Thence it transferred
its operations to Paris, and, in 1906, established its head-

1 Of which Russia provided£l,720,000.

2 Driault, p. 135.

XV THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM 383

quarters at Salonica, Its first object was to secure the
army, more particularly the third army corps then stationed
in Macedonia. The sporadic outbreaks in the early part
of July in Macedonia, the assassination of officers known to
be well affected towards the Hamidian regime indicated the
measure of its success. On July 23 the Committee proclaimed
at Salonica the Turkish constitution of 1876, and the third
army corps prepared to march on Constantinople.

Abdul Hamid, however, rendered the application of force
superfluous. He protested that the Committee had merely
anticipated the wish dearest to his heart ; he promptly
proclaimed the constitution in Constantinople (July 24) ;
summoned a parliament ; he guaranteed personal liberty and
equality of rights to all his subjects irrespective of race,
creed, or origin ; he abolished the censorship of the press ;
and dismissed his army of 40,000 spies.

The Turkish revolution was Melcomed with cordiality in Counter-
all the liberal States of Europe and with peculiar efi"usive- [fj^ at
ness in Great Britain. The foreign officers of the Macedonian Constanti-
gendarmerie were recalled ; the International Commission ""^P'^-
of Finance Avas discharged. But the brightness of a too
brilliant dawn soon faded. The new grand vizier, Kiamil
Pasha, was compelled to resign in February. His successor,
Hilmi Pasha, the late inspector-general in Macedonia, was
replaced in April by Tewfik Pasha. The army, meanwhile,
gave signs of grave dissatisfaction. There was unrest, too,
in Arabia and Anatolia. The Young Turks soon learnt that
the introduction of a European system into an empire
essentially Asiatic is less easily accomplished than they had
supposed. The Sultan, Abdul Hamid, was even more acutely
conscious of this truth, and on April 13 he felt himself strong
enough to effect, with the aid of the army, a counter-
revolution.

But his triumph was short-lived. The Young Turkish Deposi-
troops, commanded by Mahmud Shevket, marched from j^i,^^\
Salonica, and on April 24 entered and occupied Constant!- Hamid.
nople. On the 27th Abdul Hamid was formally deposed by
a unanimous vote of the Turkish National Assembly, and his
younger brother was proclaimed Sultan in his room, under

384 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

the title of Mohammed V. On the 28th the ex-Sultan was
deported to Salonica, and interned there. Hilmi Pasha was
reappointed grand vizier ; the new Sultan expressed his
conviction that *the safety and happiness of the country
depend on the constant and serious application of the
constitutional regime which is in conformity with the sacred
law as with the principles of civilization '.
Turkifica- A new era appeared to have dawned for the Ottoman
Empire. It soon became clear, however, that the Young
Turks, so far from turning their backs upon the traditions of
their race, were Osmanlis first and reformers afterwards.
Abdul Hamid's brief triumph had been marked character-
istically by fresh massacres of Armenians at Adana and in
other parts of Anatolia. His deposition, so far from stay-
ing the hands of the assassins, tended rather to strengthen
them. An eyewitness of the massacres has declared that
in the last fortnight of April, 1909, 30,000 Christians perished
in Asia Minor, and that the murderers went unpunished
under the new regime. ^

In Macedonia, as in Asia Minor, the lot of the Christians, so
far from being ameliorated by the reformers, became steadily
worse. There, as elsewhere, the keynote of Young Turk
policy was unrelenting * Turkification '. The same principle
inspired their ecclesiastical policy. At the name of Allah
every knee was to bow. The obeisance was to be enforced
by every form of outrage and persecution. * They treat us ',
said the Greek Patriarch, 'like dogs. Never under Abdul
Hamid or any Sultan have my people suffered as they are
sufiering now. But we are too strong for them. We refuse
to be exterminated.' ^ But the power of the Young Turks
was unequal to their ambition ; their deeds, though as brutal
as might be wherever they were strong, were less potent than
their words. Their denunciation of tyranny was all sound
and fury ; in effect it signified nothing. Their promises of
reform were empty.

Still, one possibility remained. Enver Pasha and his crew
were bent on making Turkey a nation of Turks. One virtue

^ Gibbons, op. cit., pp. 178 sq. 2 Idem, p. 189.

XV THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM 385

at least the Turk was supposed to possess. He was believed
to be a born fighter. True, most of his battles had been won
by the Mosleniized Christians. But they had fought in the
Ottoman name. If the Young Turks could effect but one
reform, a real reorganization of the army, their regime might
still justify itself.

It was not long before the army was brought to the test.
On September 29, 1911, Italy declared war upon the Ottoman
Empire. That war opened the latest chapter in the history
of the Eastern Question.

For further reference: the Annual Register, 1907-10; The Round
Table, 1911 onwards ; Nationalism and War in the Near East, by a
Diplomatist (Oxford, 1915) ; Sir C. Eliot (as before) ; C. R. Buxton, Turkey
in Revolution, 1 vol. (London, 1909) ; Sir "W. E. Ramsay, Revolution in
Turkey and Constantinople (London, 1909) ; H. A. Gibbons, New Map
of Europe (London, 1915) ; Victor Berard, La Revolution Turque (Paris,
1909), La Turquie et rHelldnisrne contemporain (6th ed., Paris, 1911)
La Macidoine (Paris, 1900), Pro Macedonia (Paris, li»04) ; H. N. Brails-
ford, Macedonia, its Races and tht-.ir Future (London, 190G) ; L. Villari
(ed. and others). The Balkan Question (London, 1904) ; E. F. Knight, The
Awakening of Turkey (London, 1909) ; Rene Pinon, V Europe et la Jeune
Turquie (1911) ; Virginio Gayda, Modern Austria (Eng. trans., I^ondon,
1915) ; Louis Leger, rAutriche-Hongrie (Paris, 1879) ; B. Auerbach, Les
Races et les Nationalitis en Autriche-Hongrie (Paris) ; R. Cliarmatz,
Oesterreichs innere Geschichte, I848 1909. 2 vols. (Teubner) ; A. Ch('''-a-
flanie, V Allemagne, la France, et la question d'Autriche (Paris), UEurope
et la question d'Autiiche au seuil du JTX''^^ siecle (Paris) ; G. Drage,
Austria-Hungary ; D. A. Fournier, Wie wir zu Bosnien kamen (Vienna,
1909): 'Scotus Viator' (E. W. Seton-Watson), The Future of Austria-
Hungary (London, 1907), Racial Problems in Hungary (1908) ; R. W.
Seton-Watson, The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy
(1911) ; H. W. Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy (London, 1913).

C C

CHAPTER XVI
THE BALKAN LEAGUE AND THE BALKAN WARS

' The problem now is not how to keep the Turkish Empire permanently
in being . . . but how to minimize the shock of its fall, and what to substitute
for it.' — Viscount Bryce.

' The war of the Coalition can claim to have been both progressive and
epoch-making. The succeeding War of Partition was rather predatory
and ended no epoch, though possibly it may have begun one : it is
interesting not as a settlement but as a symptom.'—' Diplomatist ',
Nationalism and War in the Near East.

'The Turks, who have always been strangers in Europe, have shown
conspicuous inability to comply with the elementary requirements of
European civilization, and have at last failed to maintain that military
efficiency which has, from the days when they crossed the Bosphorus,
been the sole mainstay of their power and position.' — Lord Cromer.

The In October, 1909, the diplomatic world was startled to learn

• nd^th^ that the Tsar Nicholas was about to pay a ceremonial visit
African to the King of Italy. The incident proved to be of con-
th ^M^r si^^^rable significance ; it was the prologue to the last act in
terranean. the drama of the Near East. At that moment Russia was
smarting under the humiliation imposed upon her by the
Paladin of Potsdam, who in his shining armour stood forth
ostentatiously by the side of Austria and Hungary. The
poverty not the will of Russia had consented to the annexa-
tion of Bosnia and the Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary.
Italy, too, regarded with increasing uneasiness the advance
of the Habsburgs in the Balkans. Consequently, after 1909,
Italy and Russia tended to draw together.
France And not only Russia and Italy. Bismarck's constant, and

ay. Qj^ ^YiQ whole successful, endeavour was to throw apples of
discord among the members of the European family. Thus
in 1881 he had tossed Tunis to France, not from any love of
France, but because, as he well knew, Italy had long had
a reversionary interest in that country. But in 1896 France

388

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

England

and

France.

Tripob".

and Italy concluded a convention which finally closed a long
series of disputes arising out of the French protectorate in
Tunis.i

The same thing was happening in regard to Anglo-French
relations. Just as Bismarck had encouraged French preten-
sions in Tunis in order to keep Italy and France at arm's
length, so he had for similar reasons smiled upon the British
occupation of Egypt. For more than twenty years that occu-
pation formed the principal obstacle to any cordial under-
standing between France and Great Britain. But the growing
menace of German diplomacy at last brought the two countries
together, and in 1904 an Anglo-French agreement was con-
cluded. This agreement finally composed all difierences in
the Mediterranean : England was to have a free hand in Egypt
and France in Morocco.

France had been in undisputed possession of Algeria ever
since 1844. Consequently, of all the dominions of the Otto-
man Empire on the African shore of the ]\Iediterranean
Tripoli alone remained. As far back as 1901 France, in
return for the concessions in regard to Tunis, had agreed
to give Italy a free hand in Tripoli ; and, from that time
onwards, there was a general understanding among the
European Chancelleries that when the final liquidation of
the Ottoman estates was efiected Tripoli would fall to the
share of Italy. Her reversionary rights were tacitly recog-
nized in the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, and again at
Algeciras in 1906.

Those rights were now menaced from an unexpected quarter.
The Kaiser's visit to Tangier in March, 1905, had resulted
chiefly in a strengthening of the Anglo-French alliance ; the
attempted coup at Agadir in July, 1911, had a similar efiect.
But German intervention in the western Mediterranean was
merely for demonstration purposes ; to assist her ' national
credit ' ; to indicate to the Western Powers that she could
not be treated as a quantite negligeable — even in fields
relatively remote. But the scientific interest which German
geologists and archaeologists had lately developed in Tripoli

Cf. Albin, Grands Traites politiques, p. 290.

XVI BALKAN LEAGUE AND BALKAN WARS 389

was otherwise interpreted at Rome ; and the descent of the
Panther upon Agadir convinced Italy that, unless she was
prepared to forgo for all time her reversionary interests in
Tripoli, the hour for claiming them had struck.

For many years past Italy had pursued a policy of economic The
and commercial penetration in Tripoli, and had pursued it ^l^^^l *"
without any obstruction from the Turks. But there, as
elsewhere, the revolution of 1908 profoundly modified the
situation. The Young Turks were as much in Tripoli as
in Macedonia opposed to Christians. At every turn the
Italians found themselves thwarted. It might be merely
the Moslem fanaticism characteristic of Young Turk policy.
But the suspicion deepened that between Moslem fanaticism
and Teutonic zeal for scientific research there was more than
an accidental connexion. Be this as it might, Italy deemed
that the time had come for decisive action.

That action fell, nevertheless, as a bolt fi'om the blue. Turco-
On September 27 Italy suddenly presented to Turkey an ^^r^"
ultimatum demanding the consent of the Porte to an Italian Sept. 29,
occupation of Tripoli under the sovereignty of the Sultan, it< imQ
and subject to the payment of an annual tribute. A reply
was required within forty -eight hours, but already the Italian
transports were on their way to Tripoli, and on September 29
Avar Mas declared.

The details of the war do not concern this narrative. It Italy and
must suffice to say that even in Tripoli Italy had no easy ^^'^^'
task. She occupied the coast toAvns of Tripoli, Bengazi, and
Derna without difficulty, but against the combined resistance
of Turks and Arabs she could make little progress in the
interior. The Turks, trusting that the situation would be
relieved for them by international complications, obstinately
refused to make any concessions to Italy. But between her
two allies Germany was in a difficult position. She was in-
dignant that one ally should, without permission from Berlin,
have ventured to attack the other ally at Constantinople ;
but, on the other hand, she had no wish to throw Italy into
the arms of the Triple Entente. Italy, however, was deter-
mined to wring consent from the Porte, and in the spring
of 1912 her navy attacked at several points; a couple of

390 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

Turkish warships were sunk off Beirut ; the forts at the
entrance to the Dardanelles were bombarded on April 18 ;
Rhodes and the Dodecanese Archipelago were occupied in
May. To the bombardment of the Dardanelles Turkey
retorted by closing the Straits. This proved highly incon-
venient to neutrals, and after a month they were reopened.
Throughout the summer the war went languidly on, entailing
much expense to Italy, and very little either of expense or
even inconvenience to the Turks.

In two ways the war was indeed decidedly advantageous to
the policy of the Young Turks. On the one hand, ' by recon-
ciling Turk and Arab in a holy war in Africa, the Tripoli
campaign healed for a time the running sore in Arabia which
had for years drained the resources of the Empire '.^ On the
other, the naval operations of Italy in the Aegean aroused
acute friction between the Italians and the Greeks, whose
reversionary interests in the islands were at least as strong
as those of Italy upon the African littoral. That friction
would be likely to increase, and in any case could not be
otherwise than advantageous to the Turk.
Treaty of But suddenly a new danger threatened him. The Tripoli
Lausaune. campaign was still dragging its slow length along, and
seemed likely to be protracted for years, when the conflagra-
tion blazed up to which the Tripoli War had applied the first
match. In view of the more immediate danger the Porte at
last came to terms with Italy, and the Treaty of Lausanne
was hastily signed at Ouchy on October 18. The Turks
were to withdraw from Tripoli ; Italy from the Aegean
islands ; the Khalifal authority of the Sultan in Ti'ipoli was
to remain intact ; he was to grant an amnesty and a good
administration to the islands ; Italy was to assume respon-
sibility for Tripoli's share of the Ottoman debt. The cession
of Tripoli was assumed but sub silentio. The withdrawal of
the Italian troops from the islands was to be subsequent to
and consequent upon the withdrawal of the Turkish troops
from Africa. Italy has contended that the latter condition
has not been fulfilled, and she remains, therefore, in Rhodes

^ Nationalism and War in the Near East, p. 159.

XVI BALKAN LEAGUE AND BALKAN WARS 391

and the Dodecanese. Her continued occupation has not
injured the Turks, but it has kept out the Greeks.

On the same day that the Treaty of Lausanne was signed
Greece declared war upon the Ottoman Empire. This time
she was not alone. The miracle had occurred. The Balkan
States had combined against the conunon enemy. The
circumstances which had conduced to this astonishing and
unique event demand investigation.

The idea of a permanent alliance or even a confederation Tiie
among the Christian States of the Balkans was frequently L^.j^y'^.
canvassed after the Treaty of Berlin. But the aggrandize-
ment of Bulgaria in 1885, and the war which ensued between
Bulgaria and Serbia, shattered the hope for many years to
come. M. Trikoupis, at that time Prime Minister of Greece,
made an effort to revive it in 1891, and with that object paid
a visit to Belgrade and Sofia. The Serbian statesmen wel-
comed his advances, but Stambuloif, who was then supreme
in Bulgaria, was deeply committed to the Central Powers
and through them to the Porte, and frowned upon the project
of a Balkan League.

The real obstacle, however, to an entente between the DifR-
Balkan Powers arose, as the previous chapter has shown, ^j '"
from their conflicting interests in Macedonia. Bulgaria donia.
consistently favoured the policy of autonomy, in the not
unreasonable expectation that autonomy would prove to be
the prelude to the union of the greater part if not the whole
of Macedonia with Bulgaria. Neither Serbia nor Greece
could entertain an equally capacious ambition, and from the
first, therefore, advocated not autonomy but partition.

Each of the three neighbouring States was genuinely
concerned for the unhappy condition of its co-nationals
in Macedonia, but the bitter rivalry between them pre-
vented anything approaching to cordial co-operation for a
general improvement. The Young Turk revolution brought
matters to a head. That revolution, as a close and shrewd
observer has said, was ' in fact a last eftbrt of the INIoslem
minority to retain its ascendancy in the face of growing
resistance on the part of subject races and impending
European intervention '. The revival of the constitution was

392 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

little more than an ingenious device for appeasing Liberal
sentiment abroad while furnishing a pretext for the abroga-
tion of the historic rights of the Christian nationalities at
home. That the subject peoples would combine in defence
of their rights, and that their reconciliation Avould react on
the kindred States across the frontier, was not foreseen by
the inexperienced but self-confident soldiers and politicians
who now directed the destinies of the Turkish Empire.*

The triumphant success of the Committee of Union and
Progress so far from improving the condition of Macedonia
served only to accentuate its sufferings. The Bulgarians of
the kingdom were deeply stirred by them. They saw with
indignation and alarm that the Young Turks were bent upon
exterminating such Bulgarians as they could not compel
to emigrate. M. Shopoft', the Bulgarian consul-general at
Salonica, stated in 1910 that the Bulgarian population had
in fifteen years been reduced by twenty-five per cent. ; the
number of refugees was becoming a serious problem in Bul-
garia, while the terrible massacres at Ishtib and Kotchani, the
'murders, pillaging, tortures, and persecutions' compelled
' the most peaceful Bulgarian statesmen ' to ask themselves
' if all this was not the result of a deliberate plan on the part
of the Young Turks to solve the Macedonian and Thracian
problem by clearing those two provinces of their Bulgarian
and Christian inhabitants. ^
The En- Between 1910 and 1912 there were various indications of
the Bal- Some improvement in the mutual relations of the Balkan
kans. States. In 1910 the Tsar Ferdinand, the shrewdest of all
the Balkan diplomatists, paid a visit to Cettinje to take part,
together with the Crown Prince of Serbia and the Crown
Prince of Greece, in the celebration of King Peter's Jubilee.
At Easter, 1911, some three hundred students from the Uni-

^ The Balkan League : a series of articles contributed to The Times in
June, 1913, by their '■ovcw correspondent in the Balkan Peninsula'. To
these admirable articles 1 desire to make specific acknowledgement of my
obligations. No individual did more than the writer of them to bring into
being the League which he so brilliantly chronicled.

^ GueshofF, Ttie Balkan League, p. 8. The reader may be reminded
that M. Gueshoft', Prime Minister of Bulgaria in 1912, was educated at
the Owens College (now the Victoria University of), Manchester.

XVI BALKAN LEAGUE AND BALKAN WARS 393

versity of Sofia received a cordial welcome at Athens. In
April of the same year M. Venizelos made a proposal to
Bulgaria for a definite alliance, through the intermediation
of Mr. J. D. Bourcliier, The Times correspondent in the
Balkan Peninsula. In May the Greek Patriarch and the
Bulgarian Exarch so far forgot their secular animosity as to
combine in a protest to the Sultan against the persecution of
his Christian subjects. In July the Tsar Ferdinand obtained
a revision of the Bulgarian constitution, under which the
executive was authorized to conclude secret political treaties
without communication to the Legislature. In October
M. Gueshofl", Prime INIinister of Bulgaria, had an exceed-
ingly confidential interview with M. Milanovanic, the Prime
Minister of Serbia.^ In February, 1912, the several heirs
apparent of the Balkan States met at Sofia to celebrate the
coming of age of Prince Boris, heir to the Tsardom of
Bulgaria.

All these things, the social gatherings patent to the world,
the political negotiations conducted in profoundest secrecy,
pointed in the same direction, and were designed to one end.

A favourable issue was not long delayed. On March 18, Serbo
1912, a definite treaty was signed between the kingdoms ^"^f^^^^
of Serbia and Bulgaria. This was in itself a marvel of March 13,
patient diplomacy. Not since 1878 had the relations between ^^^^•
the two States been cordial, nor were their interests or
their antagonisms identical. To Serbia, Austria-Hungary
was the enemy. The little land-locked State, Avhich yet
hoped to become the nucleus of a Jugo-Slav Empire, was in
necessary antagonism to the Power which had thrust itself
into the heart of the Balkans, and which, while heading the
Slavs off from access to the Adriatic, itself wanted to push
through Slav lands to the Aegean. Bulgaria, on the other
hand, had no special reason for enmity against Vienna or
Buda-Pesth. The 'unredeemed' Bulgarians were subjects
not of the Emperor Francis Joseph but of the Ottoman Sultan,
and while the antagonisms of the two States dififered their
mutual interests clashed. To Thrace and eastern Macedonia

^ See Gueshoff, op. cit., pp. 15 sq.

394

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Serbia could of course make no claim. Bulgaria could not
dream of acquiring Old Serbia. But there was a consider-
able intermediate zone in Macedonia to which both could
put forward substantial pretensions. The treaty concluded
in jNIarch, 1912, reflected these conditions.

By that treaty the two States entered into a defensive
alliance ; they mutually guaranteed each other's dominions
and engaged to take common action if the interests of either
were threatened by the attack of a Great Power upon Turkey ;
at the same time they defined their respective claims in
Macedonia should a partition be effected : Old Serbia and
the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, that is, all the territory north and
west of the Shar Mountains, was to go to Serbia, the territory
east of the Rhodope Mountains and the river Struma to Bul-
garia ; the intermediate regions of Macedonia ' lying between
the Shar Mountains and the Rhodope Mountains, the Archi-
pelago, and the Lake of Ochrida' were, if possible, to be
formed into the autonomous province long desired by Bul-
garia ; but if such an organization of this territory appeared
to the two parties to be impossible it was to be divided into
three zones : Bulgaria was to have the region round Ochrida ;
Serbia was to get an additional strip in northern Macedonia,
while the unassigned residuum was to be subject to the
arbitration of the Tsar of Russia.

In order to give the treaty additional solemnity it was
signed not only by the ministers but by the sovereigns of
the two States, and at the end of April the Tsar notified his
acceptance of the difficult function assigned to him under its
provisions. A separate military convention was concluded
at Varna on May 29 ^ ; and a further agreement between
the general staff's was signed in June. It is noticeable,
however, that there was a marked difference of military
opinion as to the 'principal theatre of war', the Bulgarian
staff" pronouncing, as was natural, for the valley of the Maritza,
the Serbians for the Vardar valley.

Two months after the signature of the Serbo-Bulgarian
Bulgarian Treaty an arrangement was reached between Greece and

?qi ^ ^^' ^ "^^^ ^^^^ texts of all these important treaties will be found in Appendices
to Gueshoff, op. cit.

Military
conven-
tion.

Greco-

XVI BALKAN LEAGUE AND BALKAN WARS 395

Bulgaria. It differed in one important respect from that
concluded between the latter and Serbia. Between Greeks
and Bulgarians nothing was said as to the partition of Mace-
donia. Further, it was expressly provided that if war broke
out between Turkey and Greece on the question of the
admission of the Cretan deputies to the Greek Parliament,
Bulgaria, not being interested in the question, should be
bound only to benevolent neutrality.

There was good reason for this proviso. The Cretan diflS- The
culty had become acute, and, indeed, threatened to involve gueNtk.n
the kingdom in revolution. The accession of the Young
Turks had only intensified the confusion in regard to the
great Greek island. They were by no means disposed to
acquiesce in its alienation from the Ottoman Empire. The
Greek Cretans were absolutely determined to unite them-
selves to the kingdom of Greece. The Powers were impar-
tially anxious to prevent the extermination of the jNIoslem
population by the Greeks, or the Greek population by the
Turks, but they were even more concerned to prevent this
inflammable island from lighting a wider conflagration. As
soon as the foreign contingents had left the island (July, 1909)
the Cretans hoisted the Greek flag. A month later the
Powers returned and lowered it. The hesitation of King
George's Government in the face of these events precipitated
a military revolt in Athens, and all but led to the overthrow
of the dynasty. The revolt of the army in August was fol-
lowed by the mutiny of the navy at the Piraeus in September,
and the condition of Greece appeared to be desperate.

It was saved by the advent of a great statesman. M. Veni- Elef-
zelos had already shown his capacity for leadership in Crete yenlzelos.
when, in February, 1910, he was summoned to Athens to
advise the Military League. Having come to Athens to
advise the League he remained to advise the king. In
October the League overturned the Dragoumis ministry, and
King George invited the Cretan statesman to form a Cabinet.
M. Venizelos accepted the difficult task, eflected a much-
needed revision of the constitution, and propounded an
extensive programme of domestic reforms.

But the execution of such a programme predicated peace,

396 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

internal and external, and in addition a certain basis of
financial stability and commercial prosperity.

The Young Turks were quite determined that neither con-
dition should be satisfied. They imposed upon Greek com-
merce a boycott so strict as all but to reduce to ruin that
nation of seafarers and traders. A further obstacle to
the commercial development of Greece was interposed by the
Young Turks when they declined to sanction the linking-up
of the Greek railway system with that of Macedonia. These
manifestations of the extreme and persistent hostility of the
' New Moslems ', combined with their refusal to acquiesce
in the alienation of Crete, at last drove Greece into the
' impossible ' alliance with Bulgaria.
Greco- The defensive alliance signed in May was followed in Sep-

military tember, as in the case of Serbia, by a detailed military con-
conven- vention. Bulgaria was to supply at least 300,000 men to
22 i912. operate in the vilayets of Kossovo, Monastir, and Salonica.
If, however, Serbia should come in, Bulgaria was to be
' allowed to use her forces in Thrace '. Greece was to supply
at least 120,000 men ; but the real gain to the alliance was
of course the adhesion of the Greek fleet, whose ' chief aim
will be to secure naval supremacy over the Aegean Sea, thus
interrupting all communications by that route between Asia
Minor and European Turkey '. How efficiently Greece per-
formed that part of the common task the immediate sequel
will show.
The For the crisis was now at hand. It was forced gener-

^ctor^*'^ ally by the condition of Macedonia, and in particular by the
revolt of the Albanians. In no direction had the Young
Turks mishandled the affairs of the empire more egregiously
than in regard to Albania. It might, indeed, have been
expected that a party which set out with the ideal of ' union
and progress ' would have dealt sympathetically and success-
fully with this perennial problem. The Albanian factor, like
every other in the complex problem of the Near East, is
double-edged, external and internal. On the one hand,
Albania is an object of desire to Austria-Hungary, to Italy,
and to Greece, to say nothing of Serbia ; on the other, the
Albanians, though a source of considerable strength to the

XVI BALKAN LEAGUE AND BALKAN WARS 397

personnel of the Ottoman Empire, have never 8ho\Mi them-
selves susceptible of conquest or absorption. They are, indeed,
too far lacking in political integration either to conquer
or to be conquered. * A barbarous country ', as Caesar
observed long ago, 'is less easily conquered than a civil.'
The highland tribesmen of Albania have defied, in turn,
every would-be conqueror, by reason not of their strength,
but by reason of their weakness. It is easier to kill a lion
than a jelly-fish.

The almost incredible fatuity of Young Turk policy pro-
mised, however, to give to the Albanians a coherence which
they had hitherto lacked, and their successful rising in the
spring of 1912, still more the spread of the revolt to Mace-
donia, precipitated, in more ways than one, the Balkan
crisis.

To the rising in northern Albania the Young Turks would Albanian
probably have paid no more heed than had the Old Turks on ^^^^^S-
a dozen similar occasions, but for the intrusion of a novel
phenomenon. The fact that the Turkish troops made common
cause with the Albanian insurgents compelled the notice of
Constantinople. But there was Avorse to come. In June the
troops at Monastir broke out into mutiny, and demanded
the overthrow of the Young Turk ministry. In July the
strongest man of the party, the man who had suppressed
the counter-revolution in April, 1909, Mahmud Shevket
Pasha, the minister of war, resigned, and was replaced by one
of the strongest opponents of the Young Turk regime, Nazim
Pasha. In August Hilmi Pasha followed Shevket into
retirement.

Things were, in the meantime, hastening to a crisis in Albanian
Macedonia. Both Greece and Serbia were becoming seriously <ienjan(lji.
alarmed by the unexpected success achieved by the Alba-
nians, who were now openly demanding the cession to them
of the entire vilayets of ^lonastir and Uskub. Unless, there-
fore, the Balkan League interposed promptly, Greece and
Serbia might find the ground cut from under their feet
in Macedonia. Bulgaria was less directly interested
than her allies in the pretensions put forward by the
Albanians, but she was far more concerned than they in

398

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Bulgaria
and tlie
Porte.

The
Powers
and the
Balkans.

Outbreak
of war.

the terrible massacre of Macedonian Bulgars at Kotchana
and Berana.

On August 14 a great popular demonstration, repre-
sentative of all parts of the Bulgarian kingdom, was organ-
ized at Sofia to protest against the massacres at Kotchana ;
to demand immediate autonomy for Macedonia and Thrace,
or, in default, immediate war against the Porte. Ten days
later a congress, representing the various brotherhoods of the
Macedonian and Thracian districts, opened its sessions at
Sofia. The resolutions of the congress were identical with
those of the popular demonstration. In the midst of the
excitement aroused by these meetings there arrived from
Cettinje a proposal for immediate action. None of the
Balkan States was more whole-hearted in the Balkan cause
than Montenegro, and none was so eager for a fight. In
April an arrangement had been arrived at between her and
Bulgaria ; the proposal which now reached Sofia was the
outcome of it. On August 26 the die was cast ; Bulgaria
agreed that in October war should be declared.

While the Turks and the Balkan States were mobilizing,
the Powers put out all their efforts to maintain the peace.
In September the States of the Balkan League appealed to
the Powers to join them in demanding an immediate and
radical reform in Macedonia : a Christian governor, a local
legislature, and a militia recruited exclusively within the
province. The Powers urged concession upon the Porte and
patience upon the Balkan League. It was futile to expect
either. Nothing but overwhelming pressure exerted at
Constantinople could at this moment have averted war.
Instead of taking that course the Powers presented an
ultimatum simultaneously at Sofia, Belgrade, Athens, and
Cettinje. In brief, the Powers will insist upon the reforms
adumbrated in the Treaty of Berlin ; but the Balkan States
must not fight ; if they do, the Powers will see that they get
nothing by it.

This masterpiece of European diplomacy Mas presented at
the Balkan capitals on October 8, 1912. On the same day
King Nicholas of Montenegro declared war at Constantinople.
The other three States presented their ultimatum on the 14th.

XVI BALKAN LEAGUE AND BALKAN WARS 399

On the 18th the Porte declared war upon Bulgaria and
Serbia ; and on the same day Greece declared war upon the
Porte.

Then, as M. GueshoflP writes, ' a miracle took place. . . . The War
Within the brief space of one month the Balkan Alliance (o^'/^jon
demolished the Ottoman Empire, four tiny countries Avith Oct.-Dec,
a population of some 10,000,000 souls defeating a great ^^^"^^
Power whose inhabitants numbered 25,000,000'. Each of
the allies did its part, though the brunt of the fighting fell
upon the Bulgarians.

Bulgaria was, however, from the outset in a false position. Bnlgaria's
Its true political objective was Salonica ; its purpose the ^
emancipation of Macedonia, Military considerations com-
pelled it to make Constantinople its objective, and Thrace
its campaigning gi'ound. The greater, therefore, its military
success, the more certain its political disappointment.

The success of the Bulgarians in the autumn campaign
was, indeed, phenomenal. On October 18 a large and
finely equipped army crossed the Thracian frontier under
General Savoff*. Its first impact with the Turks Avas on the
22nd at Kirk Kilisse, a position of enormous strength to the
north-east of Adrianople. After two days' fighting the Turks
fled in panic, and Kirk Kilisse was in the hands of their
enemies. Then followed a week of hard fighting, knoAvn
to history as the Battle of Lule Burgas, and at the end of it
the Turks were in full retreat on Constantinople. One Bul-
garian army was now in front of the Tchataldja lines, another
was investing Adrianople. On November 4, after a campaign
of less than a fortnight, the Porte appealed to the PoAvers
for mediation. Bulgaria refused to accept it ; but no progress
Avas, thereafter, made either towards Constantinople or
toA\'ards the taking of Adrianople. Bulgaria had shot its
bolt ; it had Avon an astonishing victory over the Turks, but
politically had already lost everything Avhich it had set out
to attain. On November 19 orders came from Sofia that
the attack upon the Tchataldja lines must be suspended.
What did that order import ? Was it the cholera Avhicli had
broken out in Constantinople, and which protected the city
from attack more effectually than the Young Turks ? Was

400 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

it pressure from the Powers? And more particularly from
St. Petersburg ? We learn from M. GuesliofF that M. Sazonoff
had wired to Sofia on November 9 that Serbia must not be
allowed to seek any territorial acquisitions on the Adriatic
coast ^ ; but M. Gueshoff" is silent as to any orders respecting
Bulgarian access to the Bosphorus. The explanation must
be sought elsewhere. Before we seek it we must turn to
the achievements of Serbia.
Serbia's Hardly less astonishing, though on a smaller scale than
^^^ ' the victories of Bulgaria, were the equally rapid victories of
the Serbs. On October 18 King Peter issued a proclamation
to his troops declaring that the object of the Balkan League
was to secure the welfare and liberty of Macedonia, and
promising that Serbia would bring liberty, fraternity, and
equality to the Christian and Moslem Serbs and Albanians
with whom for thirteen centuries Serbia had had a common
existence. Splendidly did the army vindicate King Peter's
words. The Serbian forces, which were about 150,000 strong,
were divided into three armies. One marched into Novi-Bazar,
and, after a week's stiff fighting, cleared the Turks out of
that no man's land. Having done that a portion of this army
was dispatched down the Drin valley into Albania.

A second army occupied Pristina (October 23), while the
third and main army, under the crown prince, made for
Uskub. The Turks barred the way to the ancient capital
of the Serbs by the occupation of Kumanovo, and there on
the 22nd of October the two armies met. Three days of
fierce fighting resulted in a complete victory for the Serbs.
At last, on that historic field, the stain of Kossovo was wiped
out. Patiently, for five hundred years, the Serbs had waited
for the hour of revenge ; that it would some day come they
had never doubted ; at last it was achieved. Two days later
the Turks evacuated Uskub, and on October 26 the Serbs
entered their ancient capital in triumph. Now came the
supreme question. Should they press for the Aegean or
the Adriatic? Europe had already announced its decision
that under no circumstances should Serbia be allowed to

1 Gueshoff, op. cit., p. 63.

XVI BALKAN LEAGUE AND BALKAN WARS 401

retain any part of the Albanian coast. But was the will
of diplomacy to prevail against the intoxicating military
successes of the Balkan League?

Forty thousand Serbian troops were sent off to Adrianople
to encourage their Bulgarian allies to a more vigorous offensive
in Thrace, and help was also sent in Greek vessels to the Mon-
tenegrins, who Avere making slow progress against Scutari.
Meanwhile the main body of the Serbs flung themselves upon
the Turks at Prilep and thrust them back upon Monastir ;
from Monastir they drove them in utter confusion upon
the guns of the advancing Greeks. The capture of Ochrida
followed upon that of Monastir.

Serbia, having thus cleared the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar,
Old Serbia, and western Macedonia, now turned its attention
to Albania, and, with the aid of the Montenegrins, occupied
Alessio and Durazzo before the end of November.

On December 3 the belligerents accepted an armistice Armistice
proposed to them by the Powers, but from this armistice
the Greeks were, at the instance of the League, expressly
excluded. The League could not afibrd to permit the
activity of the Greek fleet in the Aegean to be, even
temporarily, interrupted.

On land the part played by the Greeks, though from their The
own standpoint immensely significant, was, in a military sense, ^^^
relatively small. They fought an engagement at Elassona
on October 19, and they occupied Grevena on the Slst and
Prevesa on November 3. Their march towards Salonica was
not indeed seriously contested by the Turks. Whether the
withdrawal of the latter was due, as was at the time widely
believed, to the advice tendered at Constantinople by the
German ambassador, or whether the Turks were actuated
exclusively by military considerations cannot with certainty
be determined. The Turks ofibred some resistance at Yenidje
on November 3, but they were completely routed, and three
days later the Greeks entered Salonica.

If the Turks were indeed animated by a desire to estrange Salonica.
the Bulgarians and the Greeks their manoeuvre was only
executed just in time. For hardly had the Greek troops
occupied Salonica when the Bulgarians arrived at the gates.

1984 D d

402

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

The

(xreek

fleet.

The

Adriatic

coast.

The Lon-
don Con-
ferences,
Dec.
1912-
Jan. 1913,

Only after some demur did the Greeks allow their allies to
enter the city, and from the outset they made it abundantly
clear not only that they had themselves come to Salonica
to stay but that they would permit no divided authority
in the city which they claimed exclusively as their own.
From the outset a Greek governor-general was in com-
mand, and the whole administration was in the hands of
Greeks. In order still further to emphasize the situation,
the King of the Hellenes and his court transferred them-
selves to Salonica.

Meanwhile, at sea, the Greek fleet had, from the outset
of war, established a complete supremacy : practically all
the islands, except Cyprus and those which were actually
in the occupation of Italy, passed without resistance into
Greek hands. But Greece looked beyond the Aegean to the
Adriatic. On December 3 the Greek fleet shelled Avlona,
where its appearance caused grave concern both to Italy
and to Austria-Hungary. Both Powers firmly intimated to
Greece that though she might bombard Avlona she would
not be permitted to retain it as a naval base.

Austria-Hungary had already made similar representations
to Serbia in respect to the northern Albanian ports. It was
obvious, therefore, that the forces of European diplomacy
were beginning to operate. But the military situation of
the Turks was desperate, and when the armistice was con-
cluded on December 3 the Turks remained in possession
only of Constantinople, Adrianople, Janina, and the Albanian
Scutari. Outside the walls of those four cities they no
longer held a foot of ground in Europe.

The centre of interest was now transferred, however, from
the Balkans to London. Ten days after the conclusion of
the armistice delegates from the belligerent States met in
London. Side by side with the conference of delegates sat
a second conference composed of the ambassadors accredited
to the Court of St James's by the five Great Powers. The
latter sat continuously under the presidency of the English
Foreign Secretary from December 1912 down to August 1913.^

1 The reasons for this arrangement and the coui'se of negotiations were

XVI BALKAN LEAGUE AND BALKAN WARS 403

From the outset the negotiations between the representatives
of the Ottoman Turk and those of the Balkan allies were
exceedingly difficult, and nothing but the tact and patience
of Sir Edward Grey, combined with an occasional plain and
strong word in season, could have kept the negotiators
together so long.

Turkey held out for the retention of the four cities which
at the moment represented all that was left of the Ottoman
Empire in Europe : Constantinople, Adrianople, Scutari, and
Janina. As to the first there was no dispute ; the main
obstacle to peace was presented by the question of Adrianople
and Thrace. A secondary difficulty arose from the claim put
in by Rouraania to a readjustment of the boundaries of the
Dobrudja as compensation for her neutrality. By January 22,
1913, both difficulties had been more or less overcome, and
Turkey had agreed to accept as the boundary between herself
and Bulgaria a line drawn from Midia on the Black Sea to
Enos at the mouth of the Maritza on the Aegean, thus sur-
rendering Adrianople.

But Europe was reckoning without the Young Turks. On Enver's
January 23 Enver Bey, at the head of a military deputa- ^^^Ifg^i
tion, burst into the chamber where the Council was sitting Jan. 23.
in Constantinople, denounced the proposal to surrender
Adrianople, insisted on the resignation of the grand vizier,
Kiamil Pasha, and shot Nazim Pasha the Turkish commander-
in-chief.

Enver's coup d'Stat brought the London negotiations to an
abrupt conclusion, and on February 1 the Conference broke
up. Mahmud Shevket Pasha, the hero of 1909, replaced
Kiamil as grand vizier ; but the Young Turks proved them-
selves quite incapable of redeeming the military situation.
It was indeed beyond redemption.

The armistice was denounced by the allies on January 29, Eesump-
and on February 4 the Bulgarians resumed the attack upon ^^r.
Adrianople. Not, however, until March 26 did the great
fortress fall, and the Bulgarians had to share the credit of
taking it with the Serbians. Meanwhile the Greeks had

explained to the House of Commons by Sir Edward Grey on August 12,
1913, in a speech of great historic importajice. — Hansard, vol. Ivi, p. 2283.

Dd2

404

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Scutari.

won a brilliant and resounding victory. On March 6 the
great fortress of Janina, the lair of the ' Lion ' and hitherto
deemed impregnable, fell to their assault ; the Turkish garri-
son, 33,000 strong, became prisoners of war, and 200 guns
were taken by the victors. The completeness of the Greek
victory did not, however, make for harmony among the
allies, and it was of sinister import that the day which wit-
nessed the entry of the Greeks into Janina was marked by
an encounter of desperate and sanguinary character between
Greek and Bulgarian troops near Salonica.

Adrianople and Janina gone, there remained to the Turks,
outside the walls of Constantinople, nothing but Scutari in
Albania. Already (March 2) the Porte had made a formal
request to the Powers for mediation. On the 16th the
Balkan League accepted 'in principle' the proposed media-
tion of the Powers, but stipulated for the cession of Scutari
and all the Aegean islands as well as the payment of an in-
demnity.
Albania. Scutari was indeed the key of the diplomatic situation.
Montenegro, the tiny State on whose belialf Mr. Gladstone
had evoked so much, passionate sympathy in England, was
determined to take Scutari whatever the decision of the
European Powers. The latter had indeed decided, as far
back as December, 1912, that Scutari must remain in the
hands of Albania. The latter was to be an autonomous
State under a prince selected by the Great Powers, assisted
by an international commission of control and a gendarmerie
under the command of officers drawn from one of the smaller
neutral States.

Whence came this interest in the affairs of Albania ? On
the part of Austria and Italy it was no new thing. An autono-
mous Albania was an essential feature of Count Aerenthal's
Balkan policy, and upon this point Austria-Hungary was
supported by Italy and Russia. Italy's motives are obvious
and have been already explained ; those of Russia are more
obscure.

There was, however, another Power supremely interested,
though in a different way, in the future of Albania. Nothing
which concerned the future position of Austria-Hungary on

Germany
and the
Balkan
League.

XVI BALKAN LEAGUE AND BALKAN WARS 405

the Adriatic could be a matter of indifference to Berlin.
But Germany had a furtlier interest in the matter. If the
argument of the preceding chapter be accepted as sound,
little pains are needed to explain the action of Germany.
The Young Turk revolution of 1908 had threatened to dissi-
pate the carefully garnered influence of Germany at Con-
stantinople. That danger had, however, been skilfully over-
come. Abdul Hamid himself had not been more esteemed at
Berlin than was now Enver Bey, Far more serious, however,
was the set back to German ambitions threatened by the
formation of the Balkan League. Still more by its rapid
and astonishing victories in the autumn of 1912.

Hardly had the League entered upon the path of victory
when Serbia received a solemn warning that she would not
be permitted to retain any ports upon the Adriatic. This
was a cruel blow to her natural ambitions ; but it was some-
thing more. It was a diplomatic move of Machiavellian
subtlety and skill. If Serbia could be effectually headed off
from the Adriatic ; if the eastern boundaries of an autono-
mous Albania could be drawn on sufficiently generous lines,
Serbia would not only be deprived of some of the accessions
contemplated in her partition treaty with Bulgaria (March,
1912),^ but would be compelled to seek access to the sea on
the shores of the Aegean instead of the Adriatic. A conflict
of interests between Serbia and Bulgaria would almost cer-
tainly ensue in Macedonia ; conflict between Serbia and
Greece was not improbable. Thus would the solidarity of
the Balkan League, by far the most formidable obstacle
which had ever intervened between Mitteleuropa and the
Mediterranean, be effectively broken. How far this motive
did consciously inspire the policy of Germany and Austria-
Hungary at this momentous crisis it is not yet possible to
say with certainty ; but the subsequent course of events has
rendered the inference almost irresistible. In the light of
those events, the words of Sir Edward Grey on August 12,
1913, his congratulations upon the achievement of an autono-
mous Albania, have a ring either of irony or of innocence.

1 Supra, p. 394.

406 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

But to return to Scutari. With or without the leave of
the Powers Montenegro was determined to have it, and on
February 6, 1912, the town was attacked with a force of
50,000 men, of whom Serbia contributed 12,000-14,000. But
Scutari resisted every assault and inflicted heavy losses upon
its assailants. On March 24 the Montenegrins so far yielded
to the representations of the Powers as to allow the civil
population to leave the town, but as for the possession of the
town and the adjoining territory that was a matter between
Montenegro and the Porte, with which the Powers had no
right to interfere.
Fall of The Powers, however, were not to be denied. On April 4

an international squadron appeared off Antivari and proceeded
to blockade the Montenegrin coast between Antivari and the
Drin river. Still Montenegro maintained its defiance, and
at last, after severe fighting, Scutari was starved into sur-
render (April 22). The Turkish garrison, under Essad Pasha,
was allowed to march out with all the honours of war and
to take with them their arms and stores, and on April 26
Prince Danilo, Cro\m Prince of Montenegro, entered the
town in triumph. But his triumph was brief. The Powers
insisted that the to^ni should be surrendered to them ;
King Peter at last yielded, and Scutari was taken over by
an international force landed from the warships. The pressure'
thus put upon Montenegro in the interests of an autonomous
Albania had an ugly appearance at the time, and subsequent
events did not tend to render it less unattractive. To these
events we shall refer presently. Attention must for the
moment be concentrated upon Constantinople.
Treaty of A few days before the fall of Scutari an armistice was
May 3o' concluded between Turkey and the Balkan League, and the
1913. next day (April 21) the League agreed to accept uncon-
ditionally the mediation of the Powers, but reserved the
right to discuss with the Powers the questions as to the
frontiers of Thrace and Albania, and the future of the Aegean
islands. Negotiations were accordingly reopened in London
on May 20, and on the 30th the Treaty of London was signed.
Everything beyond the Enos-Midia line and the island of
Crete was ceded by the Porte to the Balkan allies, while the

XVI BALKAN LEAGUE AND BALKAN WARS 407

question of Albania and of the islands was left in the hands
of the Powers.

The European Concert congratulated itself upon a remark-
able achievement : the problem which for centuries had
confronted Europe had been solved ; the clouds which had
threatened the peace of Europe had been dissipated ; the
end of the Ottoman Empire, long foreseen and long dreaded
as the certain prelude to Armageddon, had come, and come
in the best possible way ; young nations of high promise had
been brought to the birth ; the older nations were united, as
never before, in bonds of amity and mutual goodwill. Such
was the jubilant tone of contemporary criticism.

Yet in the midst of jubilation there sounded notes of warn- The vic-
ing and of alarm. Nor were they, unfortunately, without the^swils.
justification. Already ominous signs of profound disagree-
ment between the victors as to the disposal of the spoils were
apparent. As to that, nothing whatever had been said in the
Treaty of London. Whether the temper which already pre-
vailed at Sofia, Belgrade, and Athens would have permitted
interference is very doubtful : the Treaty of London did not
attempt it. In effect the belauded treaty had done nothhig
but affix the common seal of Europe to a deed for the wind-
ing-up of the affairs of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. How
the assets were to be distributed among the creditors did not
concern the official receivers. Yet here lay the real crux of
the situation.

The problem was in fact intensified by the sudden collapse
of the Ottoman Empire and the unexpected success achieved
by each of the allies. The Balkan League might have held
together if it had been compelled to fight rather harder for
its victory. Greece and Serbia in particular were intoxicated
by a success far greater than they could have dared to
anticipate. Bulgaria's success had been not less emphatic ;
but it had been achieved at gi'eater cost, and in the wrong
direction. The Bulgarians were undisputed masters of Thrace ;
but it was not for Thrace they had gone to war. The Greeks
were in Salonica ; the Serbs in Uskub and Monastir. For
the victorious and war-worn Bulgarians the situation was,
therefore, peculiarly exasperating.

408 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

Dissen- Bulgaria's exasperation was Germany's opportunity. To
amono-the ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^ Bulgarian jealousy against her allies was not
Allies. difficult, but Germany spared no effort in the performance of
this sinister task. The immediate sequel will demonstrate
the measure of her success. Bulgaria and Greece had
appointed a joint commission to delimit their frontiers in
Macedonia on April 7 ; it broke up without reaching an
agreement on May 9. Roumania, too, was tugging at Bul-
garia in regard to a rectification of the frontiers of the
Dobrudja. On May 7 an agreement was signed by which
Bulgaria assented to the cession of Silistria and its fortifica-
tions, together with a strip of the Dobrudja. Notmthstanding
this agreement a military convention was concluded between
Serbia, Greece, and Roumania, and on May 28 Serbia
demanded that the treaty of partition concluded between
herself and Bulgaria in March, 1912, should be so amended
as to compensate her for the loss of territory due to the
formation of an autonomous Albania. The demand was not
in itself unreasonable. It was impossible to deny that the
formation of an autonomous Albania had profoundly modified
the situation, and had modified it to the detriment of Serbia
in a way which had not been foreseen by either party to the
treaty of March, 1912. On the other hand the demand was
peculiarly irritating to Bulgaria, who found herself bowed out
of Macedonia by Greece.
Interven- The situation was highly critical when, on June 8, the Tsar
the Tsar ^f Russia offered his services as arbitrator. Taking advantage
Nicholas, of the position assigned to and accepted by him in the treaty
of March, 1912, the Tsar appealed to the Kings of Serbia and
Bulgaria not to ' dim the glory they had earned in common '
by a fratricidal war, but to turn to Russia for the settlement
of their differences ; and, at the same time, he solemnly
warned them that 'the State which begins war Avould be
held responsible before the Slav cause ', and he reserved to
himself ' all liberty as to the attitude which Russia will adopt
in regard to the results of such a criminal struggle '.

Serbia accepted the Tsar's offfer ; but Bulgaria, though not
actually declining it, made various conditions ; attributed all
the blame for the dispute to Serbia, and reminded the Tsar

XVI BALKAN LEAGUE AND BALKAN WARS 409

that Russia had long ago acknowledged the right of Bulgaria
to protect the Bulgarians of jSIacedonia.

Events were plainly hurrying to a catastrophe. Greece The War
had made up its mind to fight Bulgaria, if necessary, for J^^^^"
Salonica ; Serbia demanded access to the Aegean. ' Bulgaria
is washed by two seas and grudges Serbia a single port.' So
ran the order of the day issued at Belgrade on July 1, Mean-
while, on June 2, Greece and Serbia concluded an offensive
and defensive alliance against Bulgaria for ten years. Serbia
was to be allowed to retain Monastir. The Greeks did not
like the surrender of a town which they regarded (as did
Bulgaria) as their own in reversion, but Venizelos persuaded
them to the sacrifice, on the ground that unless they made
it they might lose Salonica. Bulgaria, in order to detach
Greece from Serbia, offered her the guarantee of Salonica,
but M. Venizelos had already given his word to Serbia, and
he was not prepared to break it.

On the night of June 29 the rupture occurred. Acting,
according to M. Gueshoff",^ on an order from head-quarters, the
Bulgarians attacked their Serbian allies. M. Gueshofi" himself
describes it as a ' criminal act ', but declares that the military
authorities were solely responsible for it ; that the Cabinet
was ignorant that the order had been issued, and that as soon
as they learnt of it they begged the Tsar to intervene. We
cannot yet test the truth of this statement, but M. Gueshofi"
is a man of honour, and it is notorious that the army was in
a warlike mood. But wherever the fault lay the allies were
now at each other's throats ; the w\ar of partition had begun.

It lasted only a month ; but the record of that month is full
both of horror and of interest. The Serbs and Greeks, attack-
ing in turn with great ferocity, drove the Bulgarians before
them. Serbia wiped out the stain of Slivnitza ; the Greeks,
who had not had any real chance for the display of military
qualities in the earlier war, more than redeemed the honour
tarnished in 1897. In the course of their retreat the Bul-
garians inflicted hideous cruelties upon the Greek population
of Macedonia ; the Greeks, in their advance, retaliated in

1 Gueshoflf, op. cit., p. 92.

410 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

kind. But the Bulgarians had not only to face Serbs and
Greeks. On July 9 Roumania intervened, seized Silistria,
and marched on Sofia. Bulgaria could offer no resistance
and wisely bowed to the inevitable. Three days later
(July 12) the Turks came in, recaptured Adrianople (July 20),
and marched towards Tivnovo. Bulgaria had the effrontery
to appeal to the Powers against the infraction of the Treaty
of London ; King Carol of Roumania urged his allies to stay
their hands ; on July 31 an armistice was concluded, and on
August 10 peace was signed at Bucharest.
Treaty of Bulgaria, the aggressor, was beaten to the earth and could
rest, Aug. ^^^ hope for mercy. By the Treaty of Bucharest she lost to
10, 1913. Roumania a large strip of the Dobrudja, including the im-
portant fortress of Silistria ; she lost also the greater part of
Macedonia which she would almost certainly have received
under the Tsar's award, and had to content herself with
a narrow strip giving access to the Aegean at the inferior
port of Dedeagatch. Serbia obtained central Macedonia,
including Ochrida and Monastir, Kossovo, and the eastern
half of Novi-Bazar ; the western half going to Montenegro.
Greece obtained Epirus, southern Macedonia, Salonica, and
the seaboard as far east as the Mesta, thus including Kavala.
Bulgaria But the cup of Bulgaria's humiliation was not yet full.
^g "^' She had still to settle with the Porte, and peace was not
actually signed between them until September 29. The
quarrel between the allies put the Ottoman Empire on its
feet again. The Turks were indeed restricted to the Enos-
Midia line, but lines do not always run straight even in Thrace,
and the new line was so drawn as to leave the Ottoman
Empire in possession of Adrianople, Demotica, and Kirk
Kilisse. Having been compelled to surrender a large part
of Macedonia to her allies, Bulgaria now lost Thrace as well.
Even the control of the railway leading to her poor acquisi-
tion on the Aegean was denied to her.^ The terms dictated
by the Porte were hard, and Bulgaria made an attempt by
an appeal to the Powers to evade payment of the bill she
had run up. The attempt though natural was futile. The

^ Gibbons, op. cit., p. 325.

XVI BALKAN LEAGUE AND BALKAN WARS 411

Powers did go so far as to present a joint note to the Porte,
urging the fulfilment of the Treaty of London, but the Sultan
was well aware that the Powers would never employ force to
compel Turkey to satisfy a defeated and discredited Bulgaria,
and the joint note was ignored.

For the loss of Adrianople, Demotica, and Kirk Kilisse, Bulgaria
therefore, Bulgaria blamed the Powers in general and faif^^"^"
England in particular. It was believed at Sofia that England
was induced to consent to a variation of the Enos-Midia line
by Turkish promises in regard to the Bagdad railway. There
was no ground for the suspicion , but it was one of several
factors which influenced the decision of Bulgaria in 1915.

We may now briefly summarize the results of the two Eesults of
Balkan Wars. The two wars were estimated to have cost, ^^ ^^\
in money, about £245,000,000, and in killed and wounded,
348,000. The heaviest loss in both categories fell upon Bul-
garia, who sacrificed 140,000 men and spent £90,000,000 ; the
Turks, 100,000 men and £80,000,000 ; the Serbians 70,000,
and £50,000,000 ; while the Greeks, whose gains were by far
the most conspicuous, acquired them at the relatively trifling
cost of 30,000 men and £25,000,000.

In territory and population Turkey was the only loser.
Before the war her European population was estimated to be
6,130,200, and her area 65,350 square miles. Of population
she lost 4,239,200, and she was left with only 10,882 square
miles of territory. Greece was the largest gainer, increasing
her population from 2,666,000 to 4,363,000, and her area
from 25,014 to 41,933 square miles. Serbia increased her
population from just under three millions to four and a half,
and nearly doubled her territory, increasing it from 18,650
to 33,891 square miles. Roumania added 286,000 to a popu-
lation which was and is the largest in the Balkans, now
amounting to about seven and a half millions, and gained
2,687 square miles of territory, entirely, of course, at the
expense of Bulgaria. The net gains of Bulgaria were only
125,490 in population and 9,663 square miles ; while Mon-
tenegro raised her population from 250,000 to 480,000, and
her area from 3,474 to 5,603 square miles.^

^ Robertson and Bartholomew, Historical Atlas, p. 24.

412 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

The significance of the changes efiected in the map of
' Turkey in Europe ' cannot, however, be measured solely by
statistics.
Greece. The settlement effected in the Treaty of Bucharest was
neither satisfactory nor complete. Of the recent belligerents
Greece had most cause for satisfaction. To the north-east
her territorial gains were not only enormous in extent, but
of the highest commercial and strategic importance. The
acquisition of Salonica was in itself a veritable triumph for
the Greek cause, and Greece would have been well advised
to be content with it. The insistence upon Kavala, whatever
her ethnographic claims may have been, is now recognized
as a political blunder. To have conceded Kavala to Bulgaria
would have gone some way towards satisfying the legitimate
claims of the latter in Macedonia, without in any way im-
perilling the position of Greece. If Greece had followed the
sage advice of Yenizelos the concession would have been
made. To her undoing she preferred to support the hot-
headed demands of the soldiers and the king. On the north-
west, Greece acquired the greater part of Epirus, including
the great fortress of Janina, but she was still unsatisfied.
For many months she continued to urge her claims to por-
tions of southern Albania, assigned by the Powers to the new
autonomous State. But to press them would have brought
Greece into conflict with Italy. ' Italy ', said the Marquis
di San Giuliano, ' will even go to the length of war to prevent
Greece occupying Valona ; on this point her decision is irre-
vocable.' ^ On that side Greece, therefore, remained unsatis-
fied. There remained the question of the islands. Of these,
incomparably the most important was, of course, Crete.
Crete was definitively assigned to Greece, and on December 14,
1913, it was formally taken over by King Constantine,
accompanied by the crown prince and the Prime Minister,
M. Venizelos. Thus was one long chapter closed. The
question as to the rest of the islands was reserved to the
Powers, who ultimately awarded to Greece all the islands of
which the Porte could dispose, except Imbros and Tenedos,

1 Kerofilas, Venizelos, p. 155.

XVI BALKAN LEAGUE AND BALKAN WARS 413

which were regarded as essential for the safeguarding of the
entrance to the Dardanelles, and were, therefore, left to
Turkey. The Sporades, including Rhodes, remained in the
occupation of Italy. Greece, therefore, had reason for pro-
found satisfaction. Not that even for her the settlement
was complete. Some 300,000 Greeks are said to remain
under Bulgarian rule in Thrace and eastern Macedonia,
while in the Ottoman Empire — mainly, of course, on the
Asiatic side of the Straits — Greece still claims some 3,000,000
' unredeemed' co-nationals. But no settlement can achieve
ethnogi-aphic completeness, least of all one which is concerned
with the Balkans, and Greece had little cause to quarrel with
that of 1913.

Nor had Roumania. In proportion to her sacrifices her Eouma-
gains were considerable, but for the satisfaction of her larger °^*'
claims the Balkan Wars afforded no opportunity. The
' unredeemed ' Roumanians are the subjects either of Austria-
Hungary or of Russia. Transylvania, the Bukovina, and
Bessarabia are the provinces to which, in any large settle-
ment on ethnographic lines, Roumania will be able to prefer
a strong claim. But the time is not yet.

Of Bulgaria's position in 1913 it is not, at the moment,^ Bulgaria,
easy to write with detachment and impartiality. Bulgaria
is at present fighting on the side of the enemies of Great
Britain. AMiether she would be found in those ranks if
the diplomacy of the Quadruple Entente, and in particular of
England, had been more skilful, is a question which it is
not, at the moment, possible to answer. Wherever the
fault may lie Bulgaria is to-day in the enemy camp. More-
over, the misfortunes of Bulgaria in 1913 were largely of
her own making, not the less so if her shrewd German [king
was pushed on to the destruction of his country by subtle
suggestions from Vienna and Berlin. ^Vhen the Treaty of
London was signed in May fate seemed to hold for Bulgaria
the promise of a brilliant future. Despite the secular hos-
tility of the Greeks and the rivalry of the Latins, Bulgaria
was then first favourite for the hegemony of the Balkans.

1 1916.

414 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

The Bulgarians lacked some of the cultural qualifications of
their neighbours ; they were the latest comers into Balkan
society, but they had given proof of a virile and progressive
temper and were advancing rapidly in the arts of both peace
and war. Then suddenly, owing, if not solely to their own
intemperate folly, then to their inability to resist subtle tempta-
tion or to restrain the impatience of their co-nationals, they
flung away in a short month the great position secured to
them by the patient labours of a generation. Had they but
been able to resist provocation and to await the award of
the Russian Tsar, the greater part of central as well as
eastern Macedonia must have fallen to them. As it was,
they got an area relatively circumscribed, with a wretched
coast-line bounded by the Mesta, and in Dedeagatch a miser-
able apology for an Aegean port ; above all they lost the
coveted districts of Ochrida and Monastir. The impartial
judgement of history will probably incline to the view that
in defining so narrowly the share of Bulgaria, Greece and
Serbia alike showed short-sightedness and parsimony. Even
on the admission of Philhellenists Greece blundered badly
in pressing her claims against Bulgaria so far. The latter
ought at least to have been allowed a wider outlet on the
Aegean littoral with Kavala as a port. Nothing less could
reconcile Bulgaria to the retention of Salonica by Greece.
Serbia. Serbia, too, showed herself lacking in prudent generosity.

But while Greece was without excuse Serbia was not. What
was the Serbian case ? It may be stated in the words of the
general order issued by King Peter to his troops on the eve
of the second war (July 1, 1913). 'The Bulgarians, our allies
of yesterday, with whom we fought side by side, whom as
true brothers we helped with all our heart, watering their
Adrianople with our blood, will not let us take the
Macedonian districts that we won at the price of such
sacrifices. Bulgaria doubled her territory in our common
warfare, and will not let Serbia have land not half the size,
neither the birthplace of our hero king, Marco, nor Monastir,
where you covered yourself with glory and pursued the last
Turkish troops sent against you. Bulgaria is washed by two
seas, and grudges Serbia a single port. Serbia and her

XVI BALKAN LEAGUE AND BALKAN WARS 415

makers — the Serbian army — cannot and must not permit
this.'^

The gains of Serbia were, as we have seen, very consider-
able. The division of Novi-Bazar between herself and Monte-
negro brought her into immediate contact with the Southern
Slavs of the Black Mountains, while the acquisition of Old
Serbia and central Macedonia carried her territory south-
wards towards the Aegean. But Serbia's crucial problem was
not solved. She was still a land-locked country ; deprived by
the subtle diplomacy of the German Powers of her natural
access to the Aegean, and pushed by them into immediate con-
flict with the Bulgarians, perhaps into ultimate conflict with
Greece. Disappointed of her dearest ambition, flushed with
victory, duped by interested advice, Serbia can hardly be
blamed for having inflicted humiliation upon Bulgaria, and
for having yielded to the temptation of unexpected territorial
acquisitions.

Montenegro shared both the success and the disappoint- Monte-
ment of her kinsmen, now for the first time her neighbours. ^^S^^-
To Scutari Montenegro could advance no claims consistent
with the principles either of nationality or of ecclesiastical
aflinity. But King Nicholas's disappointment at being
deprived of it was acute, and was hardly compensated by the
acquisition of the western half of Novi-Bazar. His position as
regards seaboard was less desperate than that of Serbia, but
he too had an account to settle with the European Concert.

To have kept the harmony of that Concert unbroken was The
a very remai-kable achievement, and the credit of it belongs ^nd
primarily to the English Foreign Secretary. Whether the Albania,
harmony was worth the trouble needed to preserve it is an
open question. There are those who would have preferred
to see it broken, if necessary, at the moment when the German
Powers vetoed the access of the Serbs to the Adriatic. It
must not, however, be forgotten that this masterpiece of
German diplomacy could hardly have been achieved had it
not appeared to coincide with the dominant dogma of English
policy in the Near East, the principle of nationality. Mace-

* Gueshofif, op. cit., p. 102.

416 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

donian autonomy had so long been the watchword of a group
of English politicians and publicists that little pains were
needed to excite them to enthusiasm on behalf of an auto-
nomous Albania.
Albania. Macedonia, as we have seen, was a hard nut to crack.
Albania was, in a sense, even harder. That the idea of auto-
nomy was seductive is undeniable. Such a solution offered
obvious advantages. It might stifle the incipient pretensions
of Italy and Austria-Hungary ; it might arrest the incon-
venient claims of Greece upon ' northern Epirus ' ; it might
interpose a powerful barrier between the Southern Slavs
and the Adriatic ; it might, above all, repair the havoc which
the formation of the Balkan alliance had wrought in German
plans in regard to the Near East. Nor was it the least of its
advantages that it could be commended, without excessive
explanation of details, by democratic ministers to the pro-
gi'essive democracies of Western Europe.

Of the conditions which really prevailed in Albania little
was or is accurately known. But it was decreed that it
should be autonomous, and on November 23 Prince William
of Wied, a German prince, a Prussian soldier, a nephew of
the Queen of Roumania, was selected for the difficult task of
ruling over the wild highlanders of Albania. On March 7,
1914, he arrived at Durazzo, where he was welcomed by Essad
Pasha, the defender of Scutari, and himself an aspirant to the
crown. Prince William of Wied never had a chance of
making good in his new principality. The ambitious dis-
loyalty of Essad Pasha ; the turbulence of tlft Albanian
tribesmen, among whom there was entire lack of coherence
or of unity ; the intrigues of more than one interested Power,
rendered his position from the first impossible. The prince
and his family were compelled to take refuge temporarily on
an Italian warship on May 24, and in September they left the
country. The government then fell into the hands of a son
of the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid, Bushan Eddin Effendi, who
appointed Essad Pasha grand vizier and commander-in-
chief. When the European War broke out no central
authority existed in Albania. The authority of Essad Pasha
was recognized at Durazzo ; the Greeks took possession of

XVI BALKAN LEAGUE AND BALKAN WARS 417

southern Albania or northern Epirus ; the Italians promptly
occupied Valona. For the rest there were as many rulers in
Albania as there are tribes.

Besides Albania two other questions were left outstanding Armenia.
after the Peace of Bucharest. The settlement of the Aegean
islands has already been described. That of Armenia demands
a few words. If ' autonomy ' be a word to conjure with in
regard to Albania, why not also in regard to Armenia ? But
the former has at least one advantage over the latter.
Albania exists as a geographical entity ; Armenia does not.
Nor is there, as Mr. Hogarth has pointed out, any ' geographi-
cal unit of the Ottoman area in which Armenians are the
majority. If they cluster more thickly in the vilayets of
Angora, Sivas, Erzeroum, Kharput, and Van, i. e. in eastern-
most Asia Minor, than elsewhere, . . . they are consistently a
minority in any large administrative district '.^ Where, then,
as he pertinently asks, is it possible to constitute an autono-
mous Armenia? The question remains unanswered. In
February, 1914, the Porte agreed to admit to the Ottoman
Parliament seventy Armenian deputies, who should be nomi-
nated by the Armenian Patriarch, and to carry out various
administrative and judicial reforms in the Anatolian vilayets
inhabited largely by Amienians. But the outbreak of the
European War afforded the Ottoman Government a chance
of solving a secular problem by other and more congenial
methods. Massacres of Armenian Christians have been
frequent in the past ; but the Turks have been obliged to
stay their hands by the intervention of the Powers. That
interference was no longer to be feared. An unprecedented
opportunity presented itself to the Turks. Of that oppor-
tunity they are believed to have made full use. A policy
of extermination was deliberately adopted, and has been
consistently pursued. It is at least simpler than autonomy.

For the conclusion of peace at Bucharest one Power in Europe Mittel-
took special credit to itself. No sooner Mas it signed than the ^*^P^
Emperor William telegraphed to his cousin, King Carol of Peace of
Roumania, his hearty congratulations upon the successful ^"^^^-

1 The Balkans, p. 384:.
UM E e

418 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

issue of his ' wise and truly statesmanlike policy '. ' I rejoice',
he added, 'at our mutual co-operation in the cause of peace.'
Shortly afterwards King Constantine of Greece received at
Potsdam, fi-om the emperor's own hands, the baton of a
Field-Marshal in the Prussian army.

If the Kaiser had been active in the cause of peace his
august ally at Vienna had done his utmost to enlarge the
area of war. On August 9, 1913, the day before the signature
of peace at Bucharest, Austria-Hungary communicated to Italy
and to Germany 'her intention of taking action against Serbia,
and defined such action as defensive, hoping to bring into
operation the casus foederis of the Triple Alliance '.^ Italy
refused to recognize the proposed aggression of Austria-
Hungary against Serbia as a casus foederis. Germany also
exercised a restraining influence upon her ally, and the attack
was consequently postponed ; but only for eleven months.
Germany was not quite ready : on November 22, however,
M. Jules Cambon, the French ambassador at Berlin, reported
that the German Emperor had ceased to be 'the champion
of peace against the warlike tendencies of certain jDarties in
Germany, and had come to think that war with France was
inevitable'.^

France, therefore, would have to be fought : but the eyes
of the German Powers, and more particularly of Austria-
Hungary, were fixed not upon the west but upon the south-
east.
Attack Serbia had committed two unpardonable crimes : she had

Serbia strengthened the barrier between Austria-Hungary and
Salonica ; and she had enormously enhanced her own
prestige as the representative of Jugo-Slav aspirations.
Serbia, therefore, must be annihilated.

But Serbia did not stand alone. By her side were Greece
and Roumania. The association of these three Balkan States
appeared to be peculiarly menacing to the Habsburg Empire.
Greece, firmly planted in Salonica, was a fatal obstacle to the

1 Telegram from the Marquis di San Giuliano to Signer Giolitti : quoted
by the latter in the Italian Chamber, Dec. 5, 1914 {Collected Diplomatic
Documents, p. 401).

* Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 142.

XVI BALKAN LEAGUE AND BALKAN WARS 419

hopes so long cherished by Austria. The prestige acquired
by Serbia undoubtedly tended to create unrest among the
Slavonic peoples still subject to the Dual Monarchy. And
if Jugo-Slav enthusiasm threatened the integrity of the
Dual Monarchy upon one side, the ambitions of a Greater
Roumania threatened it upon another. The visit of the
Tsar Nicholas to Constanza in the spring of 1914 was inter-
preted in Vienna as a recognition of this fact, and as an
indication of a rapjirochement between St. Petersburg and
Bucharest.

If, therefore, the menace presented to * Central Europe ' by The
the first Balkan League had been efiectually dissipated, the p^™\^
menace of a second Balkan League remained. One crumb and the
of consolation the second war had, however, brought to the ^t*^™^^
German Powers : the vitality and power of recuperation mani-
fested by the Ottoman Turk. So long as the Turks remained
in Constantinople there was no reason for despair. The key
to German policy was to be found upon the shores of the
Bosphorus.

Constantinople and Salonica were then the dual objectives
of Austro-German ambition. Across the path to both of them
lay Belgrade. At all hazards the Power which commanded
Belgrade must be crushed.

How was it to be done? The military problem was, of
course, easy of solution ; not so the diplomatic. The time
has not yet come for unravelling the tangled skein of events
which will render memorable the history of the months
which preceded the outbreak of the Great European War
in August, 1914. Attention must, however, be drawn, briefly
and simply, to certain unquestionable facts which bear directly
upon the theme of this book.

On June 12, 1914, the German Emperor, accompanied by The

Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, visited the Archduke Franz ^i'i°an

*^ ' Emperor

Ferdinand and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, at their and the

castle of Konopisht in Bohemia, ^\^lat passed between the '^"^"

august visitor and his hosts must be matter for conjecture.

A responsible writer has, however, given currency to a story

that the object of the Emperor William's visit was to provide

an inheritance for the two sons of the Duchess of Hohenberg,

Ee 2

420 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

and at the same time to arrange for the eventual absorption
of the German lands of the House of Habsburg into the
German Empire.^

The Archduke Franz Ferdinand was heir to the Dual
Monarchy, but his marriage was morganatic, and his children
were portionless. Both he and his wife were the objects of
incessant intrigue alike at Vienna and at Buda-Pesth, where
the archduke was credited with pro-Slav sympathies.
Assassina- On June 28 the archduke and his wife were assassinated
A^^hd k ^^ *^^ streets of the Bosnian capital, Serajevo. None of the
Franz usual precautions for the safety of royal visitors had been
^^^^- taken. On the contrary, the police of Serajevo received
June* 28, Orders that such precautions were unnecessary, as the
1914. military authorities were to be responsible for all arrange-
ments. As the imperial visitors drove from the station
a bomb was thrown at the carriage by the son of an Austrian
police official. On arriving at the Town Hall the archduke
is said to have exclaimed : * Now I know why Count Tisza
advised me to postpone my journey.' ^ Still no precautions
were taken to safeguard the archduke, though the town was
known to be full of conspirators. On their way from the
Town Hall to the hospital, the archduke and his wife were
mortally wounded by three shots deliberately fired by a
second assassin. It is reported that the archduke, in his
last moments, exclaimed : ' The fellow will get the Golden
Cross of Merit for this.' True or not the story points to
a current suspicion. The assassin though not a Serbian
subject was a Serb, but by whom was he employed? No
steps were taken to punish those who had so grossly neglected
the duty of guarding the archduke's person, though the
canaille of Serajevo were let loose among the Serbs, while
the Austrian police stood idly by. The funeral accorded
to the archduke served to deepen the mystery attending
his death. Prince Arthur of Connaught was appointed to
represent King George, but he did not leave London. The

1 Cf. The Pact o/Konopisht, by H. Wickham Steed, Nineteenth Centuri/
and After, February, 1916, but other stories are current.

2 Stated by Mr. Steed on the authority of The Times correspondent at
Serajevo.

XVI BALKAN LEAGUE AND BALKAN WARS 421

Oerman Emperor announced his intention of being present,
but when the time came he Avas indisposed. The funeral
of the heir to the Dual Monarchy was * private '. The satis-
faction which prevailed in certain quarters in Vienna and
Buda-Pesth was hardly concealed.

Nevertheless, the Serbians were to be chastised for a Austrian
dastardly crime planned in Belgrade,* Accordingly, on Ultima-
July 23, the Austro-Hungarian Government addressed to Serbia,
Serbia the following ultimatum : — '^^^y ^•

* On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna,
on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the
following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment : —

' " Servia recognizes that the fait dCcomjM regarding Bosnia
has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform
to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with
article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice
of the Great Powers, Servia undertakes to renounce from
now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which
she has adopted Mith regard to the annexation since last
autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction
of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in
future on good neighbourly terms w^ith the latter."

* The history of recent years, and in particular the painful
events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of
a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part
of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy.
The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the
Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself
manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the
shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and
murders.

' Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained
in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian
Government has done nothing to repress these movements.
It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies
and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has
tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the
glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the partici-

1 The Serbian Government challenged proof, never aflbrded, of its
connivance in the crime. It also pointed out that it had previously
offered to an-est the assassins, but the Austrian Government had depre-
cated the precautionary step.

422 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap.

pation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation.
It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public
instruction ; in short, it has permitted all manifestations of
a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the
Monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

' This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government
had not ceased at the moment when the events of the
28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole
world.

'It results from the depositions and confessions of the
criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that
the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade ; that
the arms and explosives with which the murderers were
provided had been given to them by Servian officers and
functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana ; and finally,
that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms
was organized and effiscted by the chiefs of the Servian
frontier service.

' The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investiga-
tion do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to
pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance
which they have maintained for years in face of the machina-
tions hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the
territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary,
impose on them the duty of putting an end to the intrigues
which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the
Monarchy.

' To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government
see themselves compelled to demand from the Royal Servian
Government a formal assurance that they condemn this
dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy ; in other
words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of
which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging
to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means
this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

' In order to give a formal character to this undertaking
the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front
page of their " Official Journal " of the 13/26 July the follow-
ing declaration : —

' *' The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propa-
ganda directed against Austria-Hungary — i.e., the general
tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they
sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal
proceedings.

' " The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and

XVI BALKAN LEAGUE AND BALKAN WARS 423

functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda
and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to
which the Rojal Government were solemnly pledged by their
declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

' " The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate
all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the
destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of
Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn
oflBcers and functionaries, and the whole population of the
kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed with the
utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such
machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate
and suppress."

' This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to
the Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the
King and shall be published in the "Official Bulletin" of
the Army.

' The Royal Servian Government further undertake :

* 1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred
and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the
general tendency of which is directed against its territorial
integrity ;

* 2. To dissolve immediately the society styled " Narodna
Odbrana ", to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to
proceed in the same manner against other societies and their
branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall
take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved
from continuing their activity under another name and
form ;

*3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction
in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as
regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves,
or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-
Hungary ;

' 4. To remove from the military service, and from the
administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty
of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose
names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve
to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal
Government ;

' 5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives
of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of
the subversive movement directed against the territorial
integrity of the Monarchy ;

' 6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the

424 THE EASTERN QUESTION chap, xvi

plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory ; delegates
of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the
investigation relating thereto ;

* 7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija
Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch,
a Servian State employ^, who have been compromised by
the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo ;

* 8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of
the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and
explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely
the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica
guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo
crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier ;

'9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with
explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high
Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwith-
standing their official position, have not hesitated since the
crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews
in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government ;
and, finally,

'10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government with-
out delay of the execution of the measures comprised under
the preceding heads.

'The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of
the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday
evening, the 25th July.

* A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial
inquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned
under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note.'

Forty-eight hours only were permitted for a reply to this
ultimatum which was communicated, together with an ex-
planatory memorandum, to the Powers, on July 24.

Diplomacy, therefore, had only twenty-four hours in which
to work. The Serbian Government did its utmost to avert
the war, plainly pre-determined by the German Powers. It
replied promptly, accepting eight out of the ten principal
points and not actually rejecting the other two. No sub-
mission could have been more complete and even abject.
To complete the evidence of Serbia's conciliatory attitude it
is only necessary to recall the fact that she offered to submit
the whole question at issue between the two Governments,
either to the Hague Tribunal or to the Great Powers, which
took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the

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426

THE EASTERN QUESTION

CHAP.

Austria

and

Salonica

Serbian Government on the 18tli (31st) March, 1909.^ But
nothing could avail to avert war. The German Powers were
ready and they had struck.

From the mass of the diplomatic correspondence two not
insignificant, but almost casual, remarks may be unearthed.
On July 25, Sir Rennel Rodd, British ambassador at Rome,
telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey : ' There is reliable informa-
tion that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway '.'^
On the 29th, the British charge d'affaires at Constantinople
telegraphed : ' I understand that the designs of Austria may
extend considerably beyond the Sanjak and a punitive
occupation of Serbian territory. I gathered this fi'om
a remark let fall by the Austrian ambassador here, who
spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica under
Greek administration, and of the assistance on which the
Austrian army could count from INIussulman population dis-
contented with Serbian rule '."

The old and the new Rome were equally awake to the fact
that Austria was looking beyond Serbia to Salonica.

Austria declared war upon Serbia on July 28 ; Gemiany
peanWar. declared war upon Russia on August 1, and upon France on
August 3 ; Germany invaded Belgium on August 4, and on
the same day Great Britain declared war on Germany.

Once more the problem of the Near East, still unsolved,
apparently insoluble, had involved the world in war.

^ British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 39, 1914 {Collected Documents^
p. 31).
^ Idem, No. 19. 3 idem. No. 82.

The Euro-

For further reference : I. E. Gueshoflf, The Balkan League (Eng. trans.,
London, 1915 : contains many original documents of first-rate importance) ;
C. Kerofilas, Eleftherios Venizelos (Eng. trans., London, 1915: popular
but useful) ; Annual Begister for the years 1912-14 ; Collected Diplomatic
Docum,ents relating to the outbreak of the Buropeaii War (London,
1915: contains British, French, Belgian, Serbian, German, and Austro-
Hungarian official correspondence) ; Nationalism and War in the Near
East, by a Diplomatist (Clarendon Press, 1915) ; J. G. Schurman, The
Balkan Wars, 1912-13 (Clarendon Press, 1915) ; D. J. Cassavetti, Hellas
and the Balko.n Wars ; Jean Pelissier, Dix Mots de Chierre dans les
Balkans (Oct. 1912- Aug. 1913) (Paris, 1915) ; H. Barby, Les Victoires
Serbes (Paris, 1915), U^^i^opie Serbe (Paris, 1915) ; Balcanicus, La Bulgarie

XVI BALKAN LEAGUE AND BALKAN WARS 427

(with documents) (Paris, 1915) ; Songeon, Histoire de la Bulgare, 4S5-1913
(Paris, li)14) ; Gabriel Hanotaux, La Guerre des Balkans et VEurojye
(Paris, 1914).

The contemporary volumes of the Edinburgh Review, the Quarterly,
the Bound Table, the Nineteenth Century and After, the Fortnightly,
and other Reviews are also of great value for the history of this as of other
recent periods.

EPILOGUE

1914-16

' Le plan pangermaniste constitue la raison unique de la guerre. II est,
en efifet, la cause a la fois de sa naissance et de sa prolongation jusqu'a
la victoire des Allies indispensable a la liberte du monde.' — Andre
Ch^radame (1916).

' The war comes from the East ; the war is waged for the East ; the war
Avill be decided in the East.' — Ernst Jackh in Deutsche Politik (Dec. 22,
1916). (Quoted in The Neiv Europe, Feb. 8, 1917.)

Origins of The Great War, initiated by the events which have been
San wS narrated in the preceding chapters, still rages without abate-
ment. As these pages go to press the war is in its thirty-first
month. Each month that has passed has rendered it more
and more clear that the clue to the attack launched, in
August, 1914, by the Hohenzollern and the Habsburgs upon
their unprepared and unofiending neighbours must be sought
and will be found in the Balkan Peninsula.

When the storm cloud burst upon Europe in July, 1914,
the minds of men were bewildered by the appalling sudden-
ness of the catastrophe. Opinion as to the origin of the
crisis and the scope of the resulting conflict would seem to
have passed since those days through three distinct phases.
Before the actual outbreak of war, and while diplomacy was
still at work, there was a disposition to regard the Serbo-
Austrian-Hungarian dispute as merely a fresh manifestation
of the saccular problem of the Near East. It was hoped that
the area of conflict might, by the efforts of diplomacy, be
again localized as it had been in 1912-13. That the Central
Empires in striking at Serbia were really challenging the
whole position of Great Britain in the Near East and in the
Further East was, to say the least, very imperfectly realized
even in the most responsible quarters in this country. Why
should Great Britain concern herself with the chastisement
inflicted by Austria-Hungary upon a nation of assassins and

EPILOGUE 429

pig-merchants ? Such was the thought commonly entertained
and not infrequently expressed.

Then came the attack upon Belgium and France. The
public mind, incapable of grasping more than one aspect of
the question at a time, rushed to the conclusion that the
quarrel fastened upon Serbia was merely the occasion, not
the cause, of the European War. The Central Empires had
found in Serbia a pretext for the attack — long contemplated
and prepared for — upon France, Russia, and Great Britain.

Gradually, as men have had time to reflect upon the
essential causes of the conflict and to reconstruct the recent
past in the light of the present, opinion has hardened into con-
viction that the assault upon the peasant State of Serbia was
not merely the occasion of the world- war, but a revelation of it,
the fundamental cause. That assault was, in fact, the outcome
of ambitions which have dominated the mind of the German
Emperor, and have dictated the main lines of his diplomacy,
ever since his accession to the throne. Bismarck had long
ago perceived the gravitation of the Habsburgs towards
Buda-Pesth. He attempted to console them for their expul-
sion from Germany, and at the same time to involve them in
perpetual hostility to Russia, by the gift of the Southern
Slav provinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. That gift
suggested to the Habsburgs the idea of opening up a road
between Vienna and the Aegean. But the way to Salonica
was barred by Belgrade. An independent Serbia, still more
a Greater Serbia of which the Southern Slavs had long
dreamt, blocked the path not only of the Habsburgs to
Salonica but of the Hohenzollern to Constantinople. The
Jugo-Slavs alone stood between the Central Empires and the
realization of their dream of a Mitteleuropa, stretching
from Hamburg to Constantinople. Nor was Constantinople
the ultimate goal. From Constantinople a highway was in
building which should can-y German traders and German
soldiers to the Persian Gulf. Once established on the Persian
Gulf what was to hinder a further advance ? The flank of
the Great Sea-Power had been turned ; there was no longer
any insuperable obstacle between Germany and the dominion
of the East.

430 THE EASTERN QUESTION

There were, however, one or two intermediate steps to be
taken. Behind the Southern Slavs stood Russia ; Russia,
therefore, must be crushed. In close alliance with Russia
stood France ; a swift descent upon France, the occupation
of Paris, a peace dictated to the French, on sufficiently
lenient terms, should precede the annihilation of Russia.
True, Great Britain would regard ^vith grave concern a
German victory over France ; but what could Great Britain,
rendered impotent by domestic dissensions, do to avert it,
even if she would.

Such were the calculations which determined the method
and the moment of the world-war. The dominating motives
of that war were the realization of the dream of a great
Central-European Empire stretching from the German Ocean
to the shores of the Bosphorus, and the extension of German
influence in those Asiatic lands, of which, for a land-power,
Constantinople, as of old, still holds the key.

If this diagnosis be correct, the successive symptoms which,
in the course of the disorder of the last three years, have
manifested themselves, appear not merely intelligible but
inevitable.

Whether by a timely display of force the Turk could have
been kept true to his ancient connexion with Great Britain
and France ; whether by more sagacious diplomacy the
hostility of Bulgaria could have been averted, and the co-
operation of Greece secured ; whether by the military inter-
vention of the Entente Powers the cruel blow could have
been warded ofl^ from Serbia and Montenegro ; whether
the Dardanelles expedition was faulty only in execution or
radically unsound in conception ; whether Roumania came
in too tardily or moved too soon, and in a wrong direction :
these are questions of high significance, but the time for
answering them has not yet come.

Meanwhile, it may be convenient to summarize the events

of the last two and a half years, so far as they have reacted

upon the problems discussed in the preceding pages.

Turkey On the outbreak of the European War (August, 1914) the

^^^. ^ Porte declared its neutrality — a course which was followed,

in October, by Greece, Roumania, and Bulgaria. The allied

EPILOGUE 431

Powers of Great Britain, France, and Russia gave an assurance
to the Sultan that, if the Ottoman Empire maintained its
neutrality, the independence and integrity of the Empire
would be respected during the war, and provided for at the
peace settlement. That many of the most responsible states-
men of the Porte sincerely desired the maintenance of
neutrality cannot be doubted ; but the forces working in
the contrary direction were too powerful. The traditional
enmity against Russia ; the chance of recovering Egypt and
Cyprus fi'om Great Britain ; the astute policy which for
a quarter of a century Germany had pursued at Constanti-
nople ; the German training imparted to the Turkish army ;
above all the powerful personality of Enver Bey, who, early
in 1914, had been appointed Minister of War — all these
things impelled the Porte to embrace the cause of the
Central Empires. Nor was it long before Turkey gave
unmistakable indications of her real proclivities. In the
first week of the war the German cruisers, the Goeben and
the Breslcm, having eluded the pursuit of the allied fleet in
the Mediterranean, reached the Bosphorus, were purchased
by the Porte, and commissioned in the Turkish navy. Great
Britain and Russia refused to recognize the transfer as valid,
but the Porte took no notice of the protest. Meanwhile,
Germany poured money, munitions, and men into Turkey ;
German officers were placed in command of the forts of the
Dardanelles ; a German General, Liman Pasha, was appointed
Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish army, and on October 28
the Turkish fleet bombarded Odessa and other unfortified
ports belonging to Russia on the Black Sea. To the protest
made by the ambassadors of the allied Powers the Porte did
not reply, and on November 1 the ambassadors demanded
their passports and quitted Constantinople. A few days
later the Dardanelles forts were bombarded by English and
French ships, Akaba in the Red Sea was bombarded by
H.M.S. Minerva, and on November 5 Cyprus was formally
annexed by Great Britain. For the first time Great Britain
and the Ottoman Empire were really at war.

Left to themselves the Ottoman Turks might possibly have
remained true to their traditional policy ; but considerable

432 THE EASTERN QUESTION

irritation had been aroused against England by the detention
of two powerful battle-ahips which were being built in English
yards, and the arrival of which at the Bosphorus had been
impatiently awaited by a large body of patriotic subscribers.
That irritation supplied the spark utilized at the last moment
to set fire to the combustible materials which had been
steadily accumulated by German foresight at Constantinople.
The Pan- The German anticipation unquestionably was that by
Plan. means of the Turkish alliance she would be able to exploit
Mesopotamia, to penetrate Persia commercially and politi-
cally, to deliver a powerful attack upon the British position
in Egypt, and to threaten the hegemony of Great Britain in
India. For all these ambitious schemes Constantinople was
to be an indispensable base.^

It cannot, at the moment of writing (February, 1917), be
said that all danger in these diverse directions has been dissi-
pated. Nor can it yet be accurately known how serious during
the last two years has been the German threat to British
world-power. But at least it may be said that none of these
designs has been actually achieved. Still, German authority
is as yet unchallenged in Constantinople ; a pathway has
been hewn from Hamburg and Berlin to the Bosphorus,
and from the Bosphorus to Bagdad the Turco-German
position is still unassailed. On the other hand, the attacks
upon Egypt have thus far ignominiously failed, and, although
British arms suffered a serious reverse in Mesopotamia in 1916,
speedy and effective measures are in progress towards a re-
assertion of British supremacy in the middle-East.
Serbia. In the Balkans, however, German influence is, at present,

predominant. In the autumn of 1914 Austria-Hungary
launched a terrific attack upon Serbia, and after four
months of sanguinary fighting succeeded (December 2) in
capturing Belgrade. But their triumph was short-lived.
By an heroic effort the Serbians, three days later, re-
captured their capital ; the Habsburg assault was repelled,
and for the first half of 1915 Serbia enjoyed a respite, from
the attacks of external enemies. An epidemic of typhus

' Cf. a powerful speech by Earl Curzon of Kedleston in the House of
Lords, Feb. 20, 1917.

EPILOGUE 433

fever in its most virulent form wrought terrible havoc,
however, upon an exhausted, ill-fed, and, in certain parts,
congested population. From this danger Serbia was
rescued by the heroism of English doctors and English
nurses, warmly seconded by American and other volun-
teers. Had the methods of English diplomacy been as
energetic and effective as those of the English Medical
Service, Serbia might still have escaped the terrible fate
in store for her. Judged by results, and as yet we have
no other materials for judgement, nothing could have been
more inept than the efforts of allied English diplomacy in
the Balkans throughout the year 1915.

One difficulty that arose cannot, in fairness, be attributed Italy
to the diplomacy of England and her allies. It was inherent ^dnatk-
in the situation. In May, 1915, Italy threw in her lot with
the Triple Entente. She had declined in 1914 to regard the
Austro-German attack upon their neighbours as a casus
foederis, and on February 12, 1915, she informed Austria
that any further action in the Balkans, on the part of
Austria-Hungary, would be regarded by Italy as an un-
friendly act. That her action contributed to the respite
enjoyed by Serbia cannot be gainsaid. Germany was very
anxious to avoid a rupture with Italy, and offered large
concessions, of course at the expense of her ally ; but early
in May Italy denounced the Triple Alliance, and on the
twenty-third declared war upon Austria-Hungary.

Italy was determined to seize the opportunity for com-
pleting the work of the Risorgimento, for rectifying her
frontier on the side of the Trentino, for securing her naval
ascendancy in the Adriatic, and for * redeeming ' the islands
of the Dalmatian archipelago and those districts on the
eastern littoral of the Adriatic, which had for centuries
formed part of the historic Republic of Venice. Her
quarrel, therefore, was not primarily with the Ilohen-
zollern, but with the Habsburgs, who since 1797 had been
in almost continuous occupation of these portions of the
Venetian inheritance.

The pretensions of Italy, however well justified politically Italy and
and historically, introduced a considerable complication into Serbia.

1984 F f

434 THE EASTERN QUESTION

the diplomatic situation. In particular they aroused grave
perturbation among the Southern Slavs and especially in
Serbia. In the eastern part of the Istrian Peninsula, and
along the whole coast from Fiume to Albania, the population
is predominantly Slav. The dream of a Greater Serbia
would be frustrated were Italy to acquire the Dalmatian
coast and islands. Rather than see Italy established there,
the Serbs would prefer to leave Austria-Hungary in occupa-
tion. The situation was an embarrassing one for the Triple
Entente, and, in the event of their victory, may again
become acute. Southern Slav opinion was strongly roused
by the rumour which gained credence in May, 1915, that
in order to secure the adhesion of Italy the Powers of the
Triple Entente had conceded her claims to Northern
Dalmatia and several of the islands of the archipelago.
Be this as it may, Italy, as we have seen, adhered to the
alliance of which Serbia forms an integral part.
TheDar- The Triple Entente needed all the friends they could
expedi- muster in south-eastern Europe. In February the world
tion- learnt that an English fleet, assisted by a French squadron,

was bombarding the forts of the Dardanelles, and high hopes
were entertained in the allied countries that the passage of
the Straits would be quickly forced. Nothing would have
done so much to frustrate German diplomacy in south-
eastern Europe as a successful blow at Constantinople. But
the hopes aroused by the initiation of the enterprise were
not destined to fulfilment. It soon became evident that
the navy alone could not achieve the task entrusted to it.
Towards the end of April a large force of troops was landed
on the Gallipoli Peninsula ; but the end of May came, and
there was nothing to show for the loss of nearly 40,000
men. On August 6th a second army, consisting largely of
Australians, New Zealanders, and English Territorials, was
thrown on-to the peninsula. The troops displayed superb
courage, but the conditions were impossible ; Sir Ian
Hamilton, who had commanded, was succeeded by Sir
C. C. Munro, to whom was assigned the difficult and un-
grateful task of evacuating an untenable position. To the
amazement and admiration of the world a feat, deemed

EPILOGUE 435

almost impossible, was accomplished before the end of
December, without the loss of a single man. How far
the expedition to the Dardanelles may have averted dangers
in other directions it is impossible, as yet, to say ; but, as
regards the accomplishment of its immediate aims, the
enterprise was a ghastly though a gallant failure.

The failure was apparent long before it was proclaimed
by the abandonment of the attempt. Nor was that failure
slow to react upon the situation in the Balkans.

On the outbreak of the European War Greece had pro- Greece
claimed its neutrality, though the Premier, M. Venizclos, at
the same time declared that Greece had treaty obligations
in regard to Serbia, and that she intended to fulfil them.
But in Greece, as elsewhere in the Near East, opinions if
not sympathies were sharply divided. The Greek kingdom
owed its existence to the Powers comprising the Triple
Entente ; the dynasty owed its cro\\Ti to their nomination ; to
them the people were tied by every bond of historical grati-
tude. No one realized this more clearly than M. Venizelos,
and no one could have shown himself more determined to
repay the debt with compound interest. Moreover, iNI. Veni-
zelos believed that the dictates of policy were identical with
those of gratitude. The ci-eator of the Balkan League had
not abandoned, despite the perfidious conduct of one of his
partners, the hope of realizing the dream which had inspired
his policy in 1912. The one solution of a secular problem
at once feasible in itself and compatible with the claims
of nationality was and is a Balkan Federation. A German
hegemony in the Balkans, an Ottoman Empire dependent
upon Berlin, would dissipate that dream for ever. To
Greece, as to the other Balkan States, it was essential that
Germany should not be permitted to establish herself per-
manently on the Bosphorus. If that disaster was to be
averted mutual concessions would have to be made, and
Venizelos was statesman enough to make them. Early in
1915 he tried to persuade his sovereign to offer Kavalla
and a slice of 'Greek' Macedonia to Bulgaria. He was
anxious also to co-operate in the attack upon the Dardanelles
with allies who had offered to Greece a large territorial con-

Ff2

436 THfi EASTERN QUESTION

cession in the Smyrna district. To neither suggestion would
King Constantine and his Hohenzollern consort listen. Veni-
zelos consequently resigned.
Policy of If Venizelos desired harmony among the Balkan States, so
hi^tl^^^^^^ also, and not less ardently, did the allies. Macedonia still
Balkans, remained the crux of the situation, Hohenzollern-Habs-
burg diplomacy had, as we have seen, thrown oil upon the
flames of inter-Balkan rivalries in that region. Bulgaria,
the Avilling cat's-paw of the Central Empires, had in 1913
drawn down upon herself deserved disaster, but that she
would permanently acquiesce in the terms imposed upon
her by the Treaty of Bucharest^ was not to be expected.
Venizelos was quick to recognize this truth. Had his
advice been followed Bulgaria would have gained a better
outlet to the Aegean than that afibrded by Dedeagatch.
Serbia possessed no statesman of the calibre of Venizelos.
But the situation of Serbia was in the last degree hazardous,
and under the pressure of grim necessity Serbia might have
been expected to listen to the voice of prudence. How far
that voice reached her ears in the early summer of 1915
we cannot yet know for certain. Almost anything can be
believed of the diplomacy of the Entente at that period,
and many things can be asserted on the authority of
Sir Edward Carson, who in October resigned his place
in the Cabinet as a protest against the Balkan policy of
his colleagues. But the time for a full investigation has
not yet come, and, in the meantime, it must suffice to
record results.
Bulgaria. Not until August, 1915, was Serbia induced to oflfer such
concessions in Macedonia to Bulgaria as might possibly
have sufficed, in May, to keep Bulgaria out of the clutches
of the Central Empires. In Bulgaria, as elsewhere, opinion
was sharply divided. Both groups of Great Powers had
their adherents at Sofia. Had the Russian advance been
maintained in 1915 ; had the Dardanelles been forced ; had
pressure been put by the Entente upon Serbia and Greece
to make reasonable concessions in Macedonia, Bulgaria might

^ Supra, p. 410.

EPILOGUE 437

jiot have yielded to the seductions of German gold and to
the wiles of German diplomacy. But why should a German
king of Bulgaria have thrown in his lot with Powers who
were apparently heading for military disaster ; whose
diplomacy was as inept as their arms were feeble? What
more natural than that when the German avalanche de-
scended upon Serbia in the autumn of 1915 Bulgaria
should have co-operated in the discomfiture of a detested
rival ?

Yet the Entente built their plans upon the hope, if not
the expectation, that Bulgaria might possibly be induced to
enter the war on the side of the allies against Turkey.'
Serbia was anxious to attack Bulgaria in September, while
her mobilization was still incomplete. It is generally be-
lieved that the allies intervened to restrain the Serbian
attack ; hoping against hope that a concordat between the
Balkan States might still be arrived at. To that hope
Serbia was sacrificed. ^

A great Austro-German army, under the command of Field- The chas-
Marshal von Mackensen, concentrated upon the Serbian ^'^^I'^^^^lJjJ^
frontier in September, and on the 7th of October it crossed
the Danube. Two days later Belgrade surrendered, and for
the next few weeks von Mackensen, descending upon the de-
voted country in overwhelming strength, drove the Serbians
before him, until the whole country was in the occupation of
the Austro-German forces. The Bulgarians captured Nish
on November 5 and effected a junction with the army under
von Mackensen ; Serbia was annihilated ; a remnant of the
Serbian army took refuge in the mountains of Montenegro
and Albania, while numbers of deported civilians sought the
hospitality of the allies. On November 28 Germany officially
declared the Balkan campaign to be at an end. For the time
being Serbia had ceased to exist as a Balkan State.

What had the allies done to succour her? On Septem- Balkan
ber 28 Sir Edward Grey, from his place in the House of P^'^g

^ ,.,-,. Entente

1 Cf. Speech of Sir Edward Grey in House of Commons, Oct. 1-1, l91o. Powers.

2 Cf. The Times, Nov. 22, 1915: but for a contrary view cf. Dr. E. J.
Dillon— no apologist for English diplomacy— oj9. Fortnightly Review,
Jan., 1916.

438 THE EASTERN QUESTION

Commons, uttered a gi'ave, though not unfriendly, warning
to Bulgaria, and declared that Great Britain was determined,
in concert with her allies, to give to her friends in the Balkans
all the support in her power in a manner that would be most
welcome to them ' without reserve and without qualification'.
How was this solemn promise fulfilled ? Russia was not, at
the moment, in a position to afford any effective assistance,
but on October 4 she dispatched an ultimatum to Bulgaria,
and a few days later declared war upon her. On October 5
the advance guard of an Anglo-French force, under General
Sarrail and Sir Bryan Mahon, began to disembark at Salon ica.
The force was miserably inadequate in numbers and equip-
ment, and it came too late. Its arrival precipitated a crisis
Kinjr Con- in Greece. As a result of an appeal to the country in June,
stantine x^jj^g Constantine had been reluctantly compelled to recall
Yenizelcs. Venizelos to power in September. Venizelos was as deter-
mined as ever to respect the obligations of Greece towards
Serbia, and to throw the weight of Greece into the scale of
the allies. But despite his parliamentary majority he was no
longer master of the situation. The failure of the Dardanelles
expedition, the retreat of Russia, the impending intervention
of Bulgaria on the Austro-German side,^ the exhortations and
warnings which followed in rapid succession from Berlin,
above all, the knowledge that von Mackensen was preparing
to annihilate Serbia, had stiffened the back of King Constan-
tine. Venizelos had asked England and France whether, in
the event of a Bulgarian attack upon Serbia, the Western
Powers would be prepared to send a force to Salonica to
take the place of the Serbian contingent contemplated by
the Greco-Serbian treaty. The landing of the Anglo-French
force in October was the practical response of the allies to
the * invitation ' of Venizelos. Technically, however, the
landing looked like a violation of Greek neutrality, and Veni-
zelos was compelled by his master to enter a formal protest
against it. But the protest was followed by an announce-
ment that Greece would respect her treaty with Serbia, and
would march to her assistance, if she were attacked by
Bulgaria. That announcement cost Venizelos his place. He
was promptly dismissed by King Constantine, who, flouting

EPILOGUE 439

the terms of the Constitution, effected what was virtually
a monarchical coui) dStat.

The king's violation of the Hellenic Constitution was the
opportunity of the protecting Powers. They failed to seize
it, and King Constantine remained master of the situation.
From an attitude of neutrality professedly ' benevolent ', he
passed rapidly to one of hostility almost openly avowed.
That hostility deepened as the year 1916 advanced. On
May 25, in accordance with the tenns of an agreement
secretly concluded between Greece, Germany, and Bulgaria,
King Constantine handed over to the Bulgarians Fort llupel,
an important position which commanded the flank of the
French army in Salonica. A feAv weeks later a whole
division of the Greek army was instructed to surrender to
the Germans and Bulgarians at Kavalla. Kavalla itself was
occupied by King Constantine's friends, who carried off the
Greek division, with all its equipment, to Germany. Nearly
the whole of Greek ^lacedonia was now in the hands of
Germany and her allies, and the Greek patriots, led by
Venizelos, were reduced to despair. In September a Greek
Committee of National Defence was set up at Salonica, and
in October Venizelos himself arrived there.

By this time, however, the Balkan situation had been Rouma-
further complicated by the military intervention of Roumania ven"iuli^'
on the side of the allies. In Roumania, as elsewhere, opinion
was, on the outbreak of the war, sharply divided. The
sympathies of King Carol were, not unnaturally, with his
Hohenzollern kinsmen, and, had he not been, in the strict
sense of the term, a constitutional sovereign, his country
would have been committed to an Austro-German alliance.
Nor was the choice of Roumania quite obviously dictated by
her interests. If the coveted districts of Transylvania and
the Bukovina were in the hands of the Habsburgs, Russia
still kept her hold on Bessarabia. A ' Greater Roumania ',
corresponding in area to the ethnographical distribution of
population, would involve the acquisition of all three pro-
vinces. Could Roumania hope, either by diplomacy or by
war, to achieve the complete reunion of the Roumanian
people ?

440 THE EASTERN QUESTION"

In October, 1914, the two strongest pro-German forces in
Roumania Avere removed, almost simultaneously, by death :
King Carol himself, and his old friend and confidant
Demetrius Sturdza. Roumania had already declared her
neutrality, and that neutrality was, for some time, scrupu-
lously observed. The natural affinities of the Roumanians
attract them, as we have seen, towards France and Italy, and
it was anticipated that Italy's entrance into the war would
be speedily followed by that of Roumania. But not until
August, 1916, was the anticipation fulfilled. On August 27
Roumania declared Avar and flung a large force into Tran-
sylvania. The Austrian garrisons were overwhelmed, and
in a few weeks a considerable part of Transylvania had
passed into Roumanian hands. But the success, achieved in
defiance of sound strategy, and also, it is said, in complete
disregard of warnings addressed to Roumania by her allies,
was of brief duration. In September Mackensen invaded
the Dobrudja from the south, entered Silistria on Septem-
ber 10, and, though checked for awhile on the Rasova-Tuzla
line, renewed his advance in October and captured Constanza
on the twenty-second.

Meanwhile, a German army, under General von Falkenhayn,
advanced from the west, and on September 26 inflicted
a severe defeat upon the Roumanians at the Rothen Thurm
pass. The Roumanians, though they fought desperately, were
steadily pressed back ; at the end of November Mackensen
joined hands with Falkenhayn, and on December 6 the
German armies occupied Bucharest.

Thus another Balkan State was temporarily crushed.
From Belgrade to Constantinople, from Bucharest to the
valley of the Vardar, the Central Empires are in undisputed
command of the Balkan Peninsula. A corner of Greek
Macedonia is still held by the Anglo-French force under
General Sarrail, and towards the end of November a Serbian
army, reformed and re-equipped, had the gratification of
(Jermany reoccupying Monastir. But the German successes in the
(Tieece north-east of the peninsula naturally emboldened their
friends in the south-Avest, and the increasing hostility of the
Athenian Government rendered the position of the allies in

EPILOGUE 441

Salonica exceedingly precarious. The patience with which
tlie vagaries of King Constantine have been treated by the
allied governments has tended to evoke contempt rather
than gratitude in Athens. We may not even hazard a con-
jecture as to the obstacles which have impeded the dealings
of the allies with the Hellenic Government. Whatever the
nature of those obstacles the results have been disastrous.
We have discouraged our friends and put heart into our
enemies. King Constantine, obviously playing for time, was
allowed to gain it. The attitude of his partisans in Athens
towards the allies grew daily more insolent, until it cul-
minated (December 1-2, 1916) in a dastardly attack upon
a small Franco-British force which Admiral de Fournet
deemed it prudent to land at the Piraeus. For that out-
rage the Hellenic Government has formally apologized, and
has consented to withdraw the Greek army from Thessaly —
a position which obviously menaced the security of the allied
force in Salonica.

But the whole position in Greece is, from the point of view
of Great Britain and her allies, pre-eminently unsatisfactory.
Venizelos, the elected leader of the Greek people, is an exile
from the capital, and is powerless to influence the course of
his nation's policy. Power is vested in a king, who has
hitherto taken his orders from Berlin, and whose position
rests not upon the support of his people but upon that of
his army. By means of a blockade the allied Powers have
enforced the acceptance of their modest terms, and have ex-
torted some measure of respect for their flags and their repre-
sentatives. But the diplomatic position is one of unstable
equilibrium, and its maintenance from day to day depends
wholly upon the issue of the military struggle elsewhere.

This narrative must therefore be brought to an abrupt The Teaco
end ; it cannot pretend to reach a conclusion. The problem ^^^^^^'
which this book was designed to unravel appears for the and the
time being more than ever insoluble. All the Balkan States ^'"^^f/j",,
have been thrown into the witches' cauldron, and what may
issue therefrom no man can tell. But the allied governments
have, with admirable perspicacity, enunciated principles which,
if they be accepted as the basis of a European settlement,

442 THE EASTERN QUESTION

must have far-reaching consequences in the lands once subject
to the Ottoman Empire. 'No peace ', the allies have declared,
* is possible so long as they have not secured . . . the recogni-
tion of the principle of nationalities and of the free existence
of small states.'^ These principles are inconsistent with
the continued presence of the Ottoman Turk in Europe.
Turkey has forfeited its claim to the protection of the allied
Powers. ' A Turkish Government, controlled, subsidized, and
supported by Germany, has been guilty of massacres in
Armenia and Syria more horrible than any recorded in the
history even of those unhappy countries. Evidently the
interests of peace and the claims of nationality alike require
that Turkish rule over alien races shall if possible be brought
to an end.' ^ From the day when the Ottomans first made
themselves masters of the Balkan Peninsula down to the
present hour their rule has been that of an alien tyrant.
They have never even attempted the task of assimilating the
subject peoples ; they have been content to establish and to
maintain in European lands a military encampment. Depend-
ing from the first upon the power of the sword, and upon
that alone, they are now destined to perish by the sword.
The allied governments are pledged beyond recall to 'the
setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny
of the Turks ; and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman
Empire as decidedly foreign to Western civilization '.^

The task thus indicated was all but accomplished by the
States of the Balkan League in 1912. The formation of that
League, and still more the astonishing success achieved by
its arms, constituted a serious set-back to the realization of
Pan-German hopes in the Near East. At all hazards the unity
of the League had to be broken ; the remnant of Ottoman
Power upon the Bosphorus had to be saved. Both objects
were successfully attained by German diplomacy. The Balkan
allies were precipitated into a suicidal conflict ; the Sultan
recovered Adrianople, and the terms of peace were so arranged

^ Allies' Reply to German Peace Overtures, Dec. 31, 1916.
^ Mr. Balfour's Dispatch to the British Ambassador at Washiugton.
The Times, Jan. 18, 1917.
'' AUies' Reply to President Wilson, Jan. 10, 1917.

EPILOGUE 443

as to render practically certain an early renewal of the contest
between the Balkan States, The German Emperor con-
gratulated his Hohenzollern kinsman in Roumania upon the
conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest. The congratulations
were due rather to Berlin. From the first moment of his
accession to the throne the Emperor William had spared no
pains to bind the Ottoman Sultan in ties of gratitude to
himself. Of the 300,000,000 Moslems throughout the world
he had proclaimed himself the champion and friend. Their
Khalif still reigned at Constantinople. The gate to the East
was still guarded by the ally of the Habsburg and the friend
of the Hohenzollern.

Not upon these lines can any permanent solution of the
Eastern Question be reached. The peoples who were sub-
merged by the oncoming of the Ottoman flood have now again
reappeared as the waters have subsided. If the principles
solemnly proclaimed by the allies are to prevail ; if the new
map of Europe is so drawn as to respect them, the Balkan
lands Avill be divided among the Balkan peoples. But the
geographical distribution of those peoples is so complex, the
ethnographical demarcation is so disputable, that the mere
enunciation of the nationality principle will not sufiice to
secure a satisfactory settlement. Greeks, Bulgars, Albanians,
Roumanians, and Southern Slavs will have to learn to live
side by side in the Balkan Peninsula on terms, if not of
precise mathematical equality, at least of mutual forbearance
and goodwill.

Otherwise there can be no peace for them or for Europe
at large. Ever since the advent of the Turk the Balkans
have been one of the main battle-grounds of Europe. For at
least a century the storm centre of European politics has lain
in the Balkans. The struggle for Hellenic independence ;
the ambition of Mehemet Ali ; the rivalry of Russia and
Great Britain at Constantinople ; the jealousies of Great
Britain and France in Egypt ; the inclusion of Jugo-Slavs in
the conglomerate Empire of the Habsburgs ; the determina-
tion of the Hohenzollern to extend Pan-German domination
from Berlin to Belgrade, from Belgrade to the Bosphorus, from
the Bosphorus to Bagdad, fi-om Bagdad to Basra — these have

444 THE EASTERN QUESTION

been the main causes of unrest in Europe from the over-
throw of Napoleon to the outbreak of the European War. In
an unsolved Eastern Question the origin of that war is to be
found. For that secular problem the Peace must propound
a solution. Should it fail to do so, the Near East will in
the future, as in the past, afford a nidus for international
rivalries, and furnish occasions for recurring strife.

APPENDIX A

LIST OF OTTOMAN RULERS

0th man I .

Orkhan

Murad I (Amurath)

Bajazet I .

Interregnum and Civil Wa

Mohammed I

Murad II .

Mohammed II

Bajazet II

Selim I .

Suleiman I (Solj'man the Magnifice

Selim II (the ' Sot 0

Murad III

Mohammed III

Achmet I .

Mustapha I

Othman II

Mustapha ^

Murad IV .

Ibrahim .

Mohammed IV

Suleiman II

Achmet II

Mustapha II

Achmet III

Mahmud I

Othman III

Mustapha III

Abdul Hamid I

Selim III .

Mustapha IV

Mahmud II

Abdul Medjid

Abdul Aziz

Murad V .

Abdul Hamid II

Mohammed V .

^ Sometimes omitted from the list

1288-1326

1326-1359

1359-1389

1389-1402

1402-1413

1413-1421

1421-1451

1451-1481

1481-1512

1512-1520

1520-1566

1566-1574

1574-1595

1595-1603

1603-1617

1617-1618

1618-1622

1622-1623

1623-1640

1640-1648

1648-1687

1687-1691

1691-1695

1695-1703

1703-1730

1730-1754

1754-1757

1757-1773

1773-1789

1789-1807

1807-1808

1808-1839

1839-1861

1861-1876

1876

1876-1909

1909-

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MONTENEGRO

Danilo Petrovich hereditary Yladika (1711)

I \ I

Prince Danilo I, murdered Michael, ob. 1867 Peter

(1862-60) I

Lorka i Peter I of
Serbia
Nicolas I, Prince 1860-1910 =pMilena Vukotech
(King 1910-) I

Danilo =^ Militza Helena ^Victor Emmanuel III

(Jutta) of Meek- I of Italy

Ifenburg-
Strelitz

SERBIA (OBRENOVI6)

Milosh, Prince of Serbia Ephraim, ob. 1856

1817-19 (abd.), 1859-60

Milan, Prince, ob. 1839 Michael, Prince Milosh, ob. 1861

1839-42, deposed |

1860-8, murdered Milan I, Prince 1868-82 ; King
,1882-9; abd. 1889; ob. 1901

Alexander I =;= Draga Mash i n . murdered

1889-1903

murdered

s.p.

1903

SERBIA (KARAGEORGEVI6)

George Petrovich (Kara George), murdered 1817

Alexander I, Prince 1842-59 deposed, ob. 1885

Peter I, =;= Lorka of Montenegro
King 1903 j

George Alexander

Denounced rights 1909

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449

APPENDIX C

SHRINKAGE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN EUROPE
DURING THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS

^mUes^' Population.

1817 218,600 19,660,000

1857 (after Treaty of Paris) . . . 193,600 17,400,000

1878 (after Treaty of Berlin) . . . 129,500 9,600,000

1914 (after the Balkan Wars) . . . 10,882 1,891,000

Qg

INDEX

Abdul Aziz, 276.

Abdul Hamid, Sultan, 16, 317, 342,

349, 354, 357, 368, 383.
Abdul Medjid, 212, 222, 275.
Abercromby, Sir Ralph, 154.
Aberdeen, 4th Earl of, 220.
Achmet I, Sultan, 96.
Achmet II, Sultan, 97.
Achmet III, Sultan, 97.
Acre, 217 ; siege of, 152.
Adana, 211.
Aden, 82, 213.
Adrianople, 39, 401, 403 ; Ottoman

capital, 57.
Adriatic, the, 16, 170; problem of,

344.
Aegean, the, 26.
Aerentbal. Baron von, 369, 379.
Agadir, 388.

Albania, 43, 72, 182, 396, 404, 415.
Alberoni, Cardinal, 5.
Albert, Prince of Saxe-Coburg, 220.
Aleaddin, Seljukian Sultan, 37.
Alexander I, Tsar, 5, 155, 165, 169,

175, 184, 189.
Alexander II, Tsar, 242.
Alexander III, Tsar, 312, 352.
Alexander I of Serbia, 375.
Alexandria, 202.
Algiers, 82, 201.
All Pasha of Janina, 182.
Anatolia, 75.
Andrassy Note, 286.
Arabia, 218 ; conquered by Turks,

77.
Argyle, 8th Duke of, quoted, 220,

236.
Armenia, 350 seq., 417.
Armenian Church, 349.
Armenian Massacres, 320, 349, 384,
Armenians, 16.
Asia Minor, Turks in, 37, 38.
Athens, 186, 189.
Augustus III of Poland, 130.
Aurelian, Emperor, 44.
Ausgleich, the, 375.
Austria, 134, 344, 359; and the

Adriatic, 170, 373; and the

Aegean, 15 ; and the Balkans,
345, 372 ; and Bosnia, 15 ; and
Crimean War, 235, 245 ; and
Herzegovina, 15 ; and Salonica,
426 ; and Serbia, 418, 421 ; and
the Slavs, 376 seq.

Austria-Hungary, races in, 376.

Azov, 75, 112, 119, 125, 135.

Bagdad, 19, 82, 432.

Bagdad Railway, 15, 21, 358.

Bajazet, Sultan, 58.

Balkan League, the, 16, 32, 391

seq., 394.
Balkan Wars : first (1912), 398 seq. ;

the second, 409 seq. ; results of,

411.
Balkans, physical features of, 22.
Balta Liman, convention of, 261.
Baltic, the, British Fleet in, 237.
Bar, Confederation of, 131.
Barbarossa, Khaireddin, 82, 85.
Basil II, Emperor (Bulgaroktonos),

49.
Basra, 19.
Battenberg, Prince Alexander of,

311.
Battles :

Aboukir, 152.

Alma, 238.

Angora, 61.

Austerlitz, 156.

Balaclava, 239.

Baphaeon, 38.

Dragashan, 176.

Friedland, 165.

Hermanstadt, 62.

Hohenlinden, 153.

Inkerman, 239.

Jena, 156.

Khoczim, 106.

Kirk Kilisse, 399.

Konieh, 207.

Kossovo, 58.

Kumanovo, 400.

Lepanto, 2, 4, 99.

Lule Burgas, 399.

Marengo, 153.

INDEX

451

Mohacz (1687), 79, 112.

Navarino, 196.

Nessib, 212.

Nikopolis, 59.

Peterwardein, 121.

Pultawa, 119.

St. Gotbard, 4, 104.

Slivnitza, 316.

Tchernaya, 243.

Trafalgar, 156.

Varna (1444), 63.

Zenta, 114.
Bayezid II, Sultan, 76.
Beaconsfield, Benjamin Disraeli,

Earl of, 14, 236, 295, 300, 302,

346, 363.
Belgrade, 23, 34, 43, 112, 121, 281.

419, 429, 432.
Belgrade, conquered by Turks,

78.
Berlin Memorandum, 287. See also

Treaties.
Bessarabia, 169, 246, 259.
Bismarck, Count Otto von, 13, 15.

249, 301, 343, 386, 429.
Black Sea, 75, 117, 123, 125, 186,

234, 242, 245, 248, 481 ; Russia

and, 2, 5.
Boniface IX, Pope, 59.
Bosnia, 13, 165, 278, 282, 302, 359,

876, 378, 429.
Bosphorus, the, 11, 246.
Bourchier, Mr. J. D., 393.
Brankovic, George, 62, 72.
Bratiano, M. Jean, 268.
Brunnow, Baron, 213.
Brusa, 38.
Bucharest, 440.
Biula Pesth, conquered by Turks,

81.
Bukovina, the. 138, 256, 439.
Bulgaria, 13. 25, 33, 43, 165, 289

seq., 303, 305, 309 seq., 430, 435,

436, 438 ; Church of, 290 ; consti-
tution of, 310 ; independence of,

359, 371; in 1913, 413.
Bulgaria and Macedonia, 362.
Bulgarian atrocities, 292.
Bulgarian Empire : the First, 47 ;

the Second, 49.
Bulgarian Exarchate, 291.
Bulgarians, the, 46.
Bulgarias, union of, 317.
Buonaparte. See Napoleon I.
Byron, Lord, 183, 187 ; and Greece,

9.
Byzantine Empire, 41.

Cabot, John Sebastian, 20.

Candia, siege of. 101.

Canning, George, 9, 187, 190, 192,
194, 195 ; and Russia, 10.

Canning, Stratford, 191, 196, 208.
See also Lord Stratford de Red-
cliffe.

Canrobert, General, 239.

Cantacuzenos, John, 39.

Capitulations: of 1535, 6.
of 1740, 225.
French, 88, 127.

Capo d'Istria, Count, 175, 185, 200.

Castlereagh, Viscount, 9.

Castriotis, George, 73.

Catherine II, Tsarina of Russia, 6,
129, 132; and Joseph II, 138,
141 ; and Roumania, 257.

Cattaro, Bocche di, 166.

Cavour, Count, 241, 245.

Charles IV, Duke of Lorraine, 109.

Charles V, Emperor, 79. 83, 85.

Charles XII of Sweden, 119.

Charles of HohenzoUern-Sigmarin-
gen, Prince, 269.

Chios, 186.

Choiseul, Due de, 131.

Church, General, 183.

Clarendon, 4th Earl of, 137, 228.

Clementine, Princess of Orleans,
319.

Coalition, war of second (1798), 153.

Codrington, Admiral Sir Edward,
196.

Columbus, Christopher, 20.

Comnenos, House of, 41.

Comnenus David, Emperor, 75.

Constantine, Emperor, 41.

Constantine, King of Greece. 436,
438, 439, 441.

Constantinople, 19, 33. 34, 42, 117,
165,166, 429, 430, 432, 443 ; cap-
ture of, by the Turks, 64 ; confer-
ence at (1876), 294; conquest of,
20; Germany and, 15.

Couza, Colonel Alexander. 266.

Crete, 10, 12, 13, 78, 103, 188,201,206,
218, 308, 321, 331 seq., 370, 395.

Crimea, the, 75, 112, 140,246.

Crimean War, p. 12, chap, s., passim.

Croats, the, 51.

Cromer, Earl of, 236.

Crusade, Fourth, 41.

Cyprus, 99, 302, 431.

Cyprus Convention, 351.

Czartoryski, Prince Adam, 155.

Czartoryskis, the, 130.

452

INDEX

Dacia, 44, 254.

Dalmatia, 24, 156, 170. 344.

Danilo, Prince of Montenegro,

289.
Danube, river, 25 ; navigation of,

246.
Danubian Principalities, 232, 246.

See Moldavia, Wallacliia, and

Roumania.
Dardanelles, 11, 430, 431, 434.
D'Argenson, Marquis of, 6.
Delyannis, Theodore, 3.34.
Demotika, battle of, 39.
Derby, ISth Earl of, 293, 299.
Doria, Andrea, 83.
Draga, Queen of Serbia, 375.
Dreikaiserhimd, 345.
Driault, Edouard, quoted, 2.
Duckworth, Admiral, 157.
Durazzo, 416.
Dushan, Stephen, 53.

Eastern Question defined, 1-3,444.

Edinburgh, Alfied, Duke of, 328.

Edinburgh Review, quoted, 234.

Edward VII, King, 378, 380.

Egypt, 34, 139, 218, 348, 431, 432 ;
conquered by Turks, 77 ; Eng-
land and, 12, 388 ; France and,
6, 7 ; Napoleon and, 150.

Elphinstone, Admiral, 133.

England and Balkan insurrections,
293 ; and Eastern Question, 6, 12,
143, 428; and Egypt, 12, 388;
Philhellenism in, 187 ; relations
of, with Russia, 1, 133, 143, 219,
(1839) 213, (1853) 229.

Enver Bey, 359, 403, 431.

Ertogrul, 37, 38.

Essad Pasha, 406, 416.

Eugene of Savoy, Prince, 114, 121.

Eupatoria, 242.

European War (1914), 426, 428.

Evans, Sir Arthur, quoted, 18.

Falkenhayn, General von. 440.
Ferdinand 1, Emperor, 80.
Ferdinand, Prince of Saxe-Coburg-

Gotha, 319.
Ferdinand I, Tsar of Bulgaria, 370,

392.
Finlay, Dr. George, 327.
Fiume, 344.

Flanders, Baldwin, Count of, 41.
Fox, Charles James, and Russia,

145.
Fmnce and Eastern Question, 6,

429 ; and Roumania, 261 ; and
Turkey, 83, 124, 126; diplomacy
of, 124; intervention of, inMorea,
198.

Francis Joseph, Emperor, 368, 375.

Francis I, King of France, 6, 83,
85.

Franks, the, 42.

Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, 377,
419, 420.

Frederick II of Prussia, 131, 132.

Freeman, E. A., quoted, 70.

Gallipoli, 39, 434.

Gaulis, quoted, 348, 355.

George, Prince of Greece, 335, 338.

George I, King of Greece, 329.

Germany and Asia Minor, 357 ; and
the Balkans, 15 ; and Balkan
Wars, 405, 442 ; and Turkey, 16,
419, 431.

Gibbons, H. A., quoted, 42, 69.

Gladstone, Wm. Ewart, 292, 329,
347.

Goltz, General von der, 354.

Goriainow Serge, quoted, 209.

Gortschakoff, Prince, 232, 243, 249,
346.

Granville, 2nd Earl, 250.

Greco-Turkish War (1897), 336.

Greece, 33, 165, 303, 321 seq., 430,
435.

Greece and Macedonia, 16, 362;
conquered by Turks, 60, 74 ; con-
stitution of 1844, 326 ; constitu-
tion of 1864, 330; independence
of, 10 ; independent kingdom of,
199; insurrection of 1843, 325;
in 1913, 412 ; kingdom of, chap,
viii, passim ; revolution of, 1862,
327 ; War of Independence, 2, 28,
chap, viii, passim.

Greek Church, relations of, with
Turks, 68.

Greek (Orthodox) Church, 180.

Greeks, the, 43.

Grey, Sir Edward, 403, 405, 437.

Gueshoff, M., 393, 400.

Giilhane, Hatti-Scherif of, 222.

Gustavus III, 142.

Habsburgs, the, and Eastern Ques-
tion, 15.

Haypa, Pact of, 333.

Hardenberg, Count, scheme for
partition of Turkey, 165.

Hatti-Humayoun, the, 275.

INDEX

453

Hatzfeld, Count, 347.
HUmi Pasha, 368, 383.
Henry II, King of France, 86.
Herzberg, Count, 143.
Herzegovina, the, 13, 278,282,302,

359.
Hetaireia Philike, 182.
Hogarth, D. G., quoted, 18.
Holy Alliance, 174.
Holy League, (1570) 98, (1684)

103.
Holy Places, 224.
Hungary, 105, 107 ; conquered by

Turks, 81, 114.
Hunter, Sir W. W., quoted, 18.
Hunyadi, John Corvinus, 62,72.
Hypsilanti, Prince Alexander, 8.

175.

Ibrahim Pasha, 188, 196, 206.

Ibrahim I, Sultan, 97.

Iconium (Konia), 41.

Ignatieff, General, 294.

Illyria, 170, 277.

Illyrians, the, 43.

India, 432.

Ionian Isles, 6, 7, 149, 154, 168,

170 323
Istria' 156i 170, 344.
Italy and Adriatic, 27, 373, 433 ; and

Dalmatia, 24 ; and Tripoli, 388 ;

war with Turkey (191 Ij, 16.
Ivan the Terrible, 118.

Janissaries, the, 90, 102, 161, 192 ;

aboHtion of, 192.
John, Don of Austria, 99.
John V, Emperor, 57.
Joseph il, Emperor, 6, 135.
Jugo-Slavs, the, 277, 305, 345 ; and

Adriatic, 373, 379, 405.

Kabardas, the, 135.
Kaminyi, John, 104.
Karageorgevic, Prince Alexander,

281.
Karageorgevic, Peter, 288.
Karaveloff, 311.
Kars, 244, 246, 296.
Kaulbars, General, 318.
Kavala, 410, 412, 414, 435, 439.
Khalifate, the, 77.
Khartoum, 206.
Kiamil Pasha, 383, 403.
Kinglake, A. W.. quoted. 224.
Kiuprili, Achmet, 102.

Kiuprili, Mohammed, 102.
Kiuprili III, Mustapha, 113.
Kiuprilis, the, 4, 97.
Knights of St. John, 43, 78.
Koraes, Adamantios, 181.
Kordofan, 206.
Korniloff, Admiral, 239.
Kutaya, 208 ; convention of, 209.

Ladislas, King of Hungaiy, 63.

Laibach Circular, 174.

La Marmora, General, 241, 243.

Latin Empire ofConstantinople,41.

Lavalette, M. de, 224.

Leczynski, Stanislaus, 125.

Leopold I, Emperor, 107.

Lesseps, M. de, 21.

Lewis, King of Hungary, 80.

Lewis the Great of Hungary, 42,
54, 57.

Liman Pasha, 431.

Lissa, 168.

London Conference of 1912, 402.

London Convention of 1840,214.

London, Treaties of. See Treaties.

Louis Philippe, King of France,
213 226.

Louis 'XIV', 102, 104, 107.

Lyons, Admiral Sir Edmund, after-
wards Lord, 239.

Macedonia, 13, 14, 82, 309, 391,
chap, xi, passim; physical fea-
tures, 26,

Mackensen, Field Marshal von,
437, 440.

Mahmud II, Sultan, 163, 192, 212.

Malcolm, Sir Pulteney, 210.

Malta, 78, 87, 154, 170.

Mamelukes, the, 205.

Maria Theresa, Queen, 133.

Maritza river, 26.

Maximilian II, Emperor, 82, 99.

Mehemet Ali, 10, 158, 188, 198.
chap, xi, passim.

Menschikoff, Prince, 228, 231,238.

Mesopotamia. 34, 432 ; England
and, 358.

Metternich, Count, 174, 190, 211 ;
and Greek Insun-ection, 184.

Michael the Brave, 254.

Milan, Prince of Serbia, 288.

Milan I. King of Serbia, 315,
374.

Miller, Dr. William, quoted, 2.

Missolonghi, 186, 188.

Mitteleuropa. 21, 429.

454

INDEX

Moguls, the, 37.
Mohammed I, Sultan, 61.
Mohammed II, Sultan, 63 ; death

of, 75.
Mohammed III, Sultan, 96.
Mohammed V, Sultan, 384.
Moldavia, 8, 122, 125, 134, 135, 137,

139, 157, 165, 167, 199.
Moltke, Count Helmuth von, 212,

348.
Monastir, 401, 440.
Montecuculi, Marshal, 104.
Montenegro, 13, 72, 289, 373; in

1913, 415, 4.30.
Montesquieu, quoted, 126.
Morea, the, 121, 134, 183; Ibrahim

in, 188 ; Venetian rule in, 103.
Morier, Sir Robert, 235.
Morley, Viscount, of Blackburn,

quoted, 2.
Morocco, 388.

MouravieflF, General, 208, 244.
Miinchengratz, convention of, 211.
Miinnich, Marshal, 129.
Murad I, Sultan, 57.
Murad II, Sultan, 61.
Murad III, Sultan, 96.
Mui-ad IV, Sultan, 96.
Miirzteg Programme, 368.
Mustapha Kara, 106, 110.
Mustapha I, Sultan, 96.
Mustapha 11, Sultan, 97.
Mustapha IV, Sultan, 163.

Napier, Sir Charles, 217, 237.

Napoleon I, 149, 153, 277; and
Alexander I, 167; and Egypt,
150; and India, 154; and Near
East, 6 ; and Paul I, 153 ; and
Persia, 158; and Turkey, 157,
167 ; in Syria, 152.

Napoleon III, Emperor, 224, 236,
245 ; and Koumania, 262.

Nationality, principle of, in
Balkans, 14.

Naumann, Dr. Friedrich, 356.

Nelson, Lord, 156.

Nesselrode, Count, 235.

Newbiggin, Miss, quoted, 34.

Nice, truce of, 85.

Nicea, 38, 41.

Nicholas, King of Montenegro, 398.

Nicholas, Prince, of Montenegro,
288.

Nicholas I, Tsar, 12, 190, 207, 213,
220 229 242

Nicholas 11, Tsar, 320, 368, 381.

Nicomedia, 38.
Nihilism, Russian, 352,
Northcote, Sir S. (Earl of Iddes-

leigh), 299.
Novi-Bazar, Sandjak of, 278, 380,

400.

Obrenovic, Prince Michael, 281.

Obrenovic, Milan, 163.

Obrenovic, Milosh, 163.

Oczakov, 126, 139, 142, 145, 146.

Oglou, Passwan, 161.

Omar Pasha, 237, 242.

Orkhan, Sultan, 38.

OrlofF, Count Alexis, 133, 209.

Osman, Sultan, 38.

Othman II, Sultan, 96.

Otto of Bavaria, King of Greece,

199.
Otto, king of Hellenes, 321.
Ottoman Empire, 431, 442 ; decay

of, 92.
Ottomans, characteristics of, 67

seq. ; first settlement in Europe,

39 ; origins of, 37.
Ottoman Turks, 3.

Pacifico, Don, 327.
Palaeologi, the, 39.
Palaeologus, Emperor Michael, 42.
Palmerston, Viscount, 11, 12, 208.

210, 213, 226, 327.
Pan-Slavism, 283, 345.
Paris. Declaration of 1856, 247.
Paul I, Tsar, 153.
Pelissier, General, 243, 432.
Persia, 82.
Peter the Great, Tsar, 5, 112, 117;

will of, 138.
Peter III, Tsar, 130.
Peter, King of Serbia, 375.
Petrovic, George (Kara George).

162.
Phanariotes, the, 68, 178, 2.56.
Philip II, King of Spain, 87.
Pitt, William, the younger, 7, 127,

143, 145.
Pius V, Pope, 98.
Plevna, siege of, 296.
Plombieres, 252.
Poland, 130, 149, 165.
Poland, Turkish war with (1672),

105.
Poniatowski, Stanislas, 130.
Potemkin, Count, 258.
Prilep, 401.
Prussia and Crimean War, 235.

INDEX

455

Raglan, 1st Baron, 237.

Ragusa, 170.

Railways in Balkans, 30.

Rakoczy II, George, 102.

Reschid Pasha, 222.

Rhegas, 181.

Rhodes, 75 ; conquered by Turks,
78.

Roman roads in Balkans, 30.

Rosetta, 203.

Roumania, 18, 25, 33, 34, chap, xi,
passim, 296, 303, 304, 410, 430,
439 ; constitution of, 270 ; king-
dom of, 273 ; in 1913, 413. See
also Danubian Principalities,
Moldavia, and Wallachia.

Roumanians, the, 44, 254.

Roumelia, 165.

Roumelia, Eastern, 312.

Roxalana, Sultana, 88.

Russia, 103, 429; and the Greek
Church, 136; and Serbia, 381; and
Turkey, 5, 117.

Russo-Turkish Wars: (1736) 124;
(1768) 132; (1827) 197; (1877)
13, 295.

St. Arnaud, Marshal, 237.

St. Petersburg, Protocol of, 191.

Salisbury, 3rd Marquis of, 235, 302.

Salonica, 15, 23, 287, 345, 369, 419,
429, 438, 439, 441 ; Austria and,
374 ; Greeks in, 401.

Sardinia and Ciimean War, 241,
251.

Schouvaloff, Count, 295, 302.

Scutari, 404, 406.

Sebastiani, Colonel, 154.

Sebastopol, 146, 238, 244,

SeUm I, Sultan, 77.

Selim III, Sultan, 144, 159.

Selim the Sot, Sultan, 96.

Seljukian Turks, 37. 41 ; Empire
of, 75.

Serajevo, 420.

Serbia, 13, 16, 18, 23, 33, 165, 170,
246, 278, 374, 428, 430, 432, 433,
437 ; and Adriatic, 27 ; and Ma-
cedonia, 364 ; Church of, 279 ;
Greater, 17 ; Mediaeval Empire
of, 42, 52-5; Old, 278; rising
of 1804, 160-4.

Serbo-Bulgarian War (1885), 315.

Serbs, the, 51.

Seves, Colonel (Suleiman Pasha),
204.

Seymour, Sir Hamilton, 12, 229.

Sigismund, King of Hungary, 59.

Silistra, 237.

Simeon the Great, 47.

Simpson, General, 243.

Sinope, 234.

Slavs, Southern, 42 ; independence

of, extinguished, 72.
Slovenes, the, 51.
Smith, Sir Sidney, 152.
Sobieski. John, King of Poland,

4, 5, 106, 109.
Sokoli, 118.

Stahremberg, Count, 109.
Stambouloff", Stephen, 313, 317.

319, 391.
Stephen the Great, Voyvode of

Moldavia, 46.
Stratford de Redcliffe, Lord, 228,

231 {see Canning).
Sudan, the, 206.
Suez Canal, 6, 21.
Suez Canal shares, 298.
Suez, Isthmus of, 213.
Suleiman I, Sultan, 78, 256 ; Empire

of, 89.
Suleiman II, 97.
Suleiman, the Magnificent, 4, 6.
Suleiman Pasha, 39.
Suvaroff, Marshal, 142.
Syria, 34, 139, 206, 217, 218 ;

conquered by Turks, 77 ; France

and, 6 ; Napoleon and, 152.

Tanzimat. the, 222.
Tchataldja, 399.
Temesvar, 121.
Tewfik Pasha, 383.
Thiers, A., 214.
Thracians, the, 44.
Timour the Tartar, 60.
Tirnovo, Patriarchate of, 290.
Todleben, Colonel von, 239.
Tdkoli, Emmerich, 108.
Trade routes, ancient, 19.
Trajan, Emperor, 44, 254.
Transylvania, 105, 114, 439; con-
quered by Turks, 81.
Treaties :

Adrianople, 10, 164, 199.

Akerman, 164, 194.

Amiens, 154.

Azov, 5.

Belgrade, 125, 256.

Berlin, (1878) 13, 302.

Bucharest, (1812) 6, 169, 258;

(1913) 33, 51, 410.

Carlovritz, 4, 114, 256.

456

INDEX

Constantinople, (1479) 74.

Crespy, 86.

Finkenstein, 158.

Jassy, 6, 146.

Kutschuk-Kainardji, 6, 135, 228.

Lausanne, (1912) 390.

London, (1827) 194; (1832) 10,

199; (1840)11; (1841)11,21;

(1863) 329; (1871) 251; (1913)

33, 406.
Paris, (1856) 245.
Passarowitz, 121, 256.
Pressburg, 156.
Pruth, 119.

San Stephano, 13, 296, 863.
Sistova, 146.
Sitvatorok, 100.
Szegeddin, 62.
Tilsit, 165.

Unkiar-Skelessi, 11,209, 215, 219.
Vasvar, 104.
Vienna, (1815) 170.
Westphalia, 101.
Zurawno, 106.

Trebizond, 75 ; Empire of, 42.

Trentino, 344.

Trieste 170 344.

Trikoupis, Charilios. 322, 333, 391.

Triple Alliance (1788), 6, 143.

Triple Alliance (1882), 346.

Tripoli, 388.

Tunis, 386.

Turco-Egyptian War (1832), 206.

Turco-Egyptian War (1839), 212.

Turco-Italian W^ar (1911), 389.

Turco-Serb War (1876), 293.

Turkey, reforms in (1839), 222;

scheme for partition of (1781),

139.

Ukraine, the, 106.

Ukraine, Cossacks of the, 105.

Urosh, Stephen, 52.
Uskub, 400.

Valona, 412.

Varna, 237. See Battles.

Vasco de Gama, 20.

Vassos, Colonel, 335, 337.

Venetian Republic, 42, 74, 76, 85,

98.
Venice, 120, 156 ; rule of, in Morea,

181; war with Turks (1645-1718),

101.
Venizelos, Eleftherios, 338,393,395,

409,435,438,441.
Vergennes, 131.
Victoria, Queen, 235, 317 ; Empress

of India, 298.
Vienna, note (1853), 233; 'Four

Points of, note, 241 ; siege of,

(1529)80; (1683)110.
Villeneuve, Marquis de, 125.

Wahabites of Ai-abia, 205.
Wallachia. 122, 125, 134, 135, 137,

139, 157, 165, 199.
War, European, of 1914, 17.
Wellington, Duke of, 10, 190, 191,

197.
Wied, Prince William of, 416.
William II, German Empei'Or, 15,

342, 347, 419, 429, 443.
William II at Constantinople, 354.
William II at Damascus, 355.
William II at Jerusalem, 355.
Williams, General Fenwick, 244.

Yenishehr, 38.

Young Turks, 16, 359, 369.

Young Turks, revolution, 382.

Zaimis, M., 339, 370.
Zapolya, John, 80.
Zips, County of, 133.

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THE UNIVERSITY

OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES

FROM THE LIBRARY OF
FRANK J. KLINGBERG

Marriott, J.' A. R.

The Eastern Que stion «-Af^-iix^4j«*r?g^

Clarendon Press, 1917

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