arnegie Endowment for International Pea
DIVISION OF ECONOMICS AND HISTORY
E~ PRELIMINARY ECONOMIC STUDIES OF THE WAR
EFFECTS OF THE WAR UPON
FRENCH ECONOMIC LIFE
C VRNEGIE ENDOWMENT
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Publications of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Division of Economics and History
John Bates Clark, Director
PRELIMINARY ECONOMIC STUDIES OF THE WAR
No. 23
EFFECTS OF THE WAR UPON
FRENCH ECONOMIC LIFE
A Collection of Five Monographs
EDITED BY
CHARLES GIDE
Professor of Political Science at the University of Paris
The Effect of the War upon the French Merchant Marine, by Henri Mazel
The Effect of the War upon the French Textile Industry, by Albert Aftalion
The Effect of the War upon French Finance, by Bertrand Nogaro
The Effect of the War upon French Commercial Policy, by Albert Aftalion
The Effect of the War upon Labour in France, by Willian Oualid
EFFECTS OF THE WAR UPON
FRENCH ECONOMIC LIFE
A Collection of Five Monographs
EDITED BY
CHARLES GIDE
Professor of Political Economy at the University of Paris
OXFORD : AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
London, Edinburgh, New York, Toronto, Melbourne, and Bombay
HUMPHREY MILFORD
1923
PRINTED IN ENGLAND
AT THE OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY THE DIRECTOR
THESE monographs constitute a multum in parvo of French
economic history since the outbreak of the war. Revealing the
expedients by which the country gathered in funds enough to
carry the war through, they show in what financial condition
the country is left. The serious inroads made on agriculture in
France made that country, formerly self-sustaining, dependent
on importations at a time when the state of the exchanges has
rendered that resource difficult and costly. Transportation has
been obstructed and the mercantile marine has passed through
vicissitudes which have called out energetic measures for
restoring it. The output of textile industries has been reduced
and the export trade in them has been lost, partly by the
difficulty of importing raw materials, partly because of the
invasion of the manufacturing section of France by the German
armies, and, very largely, by sheer destruction of working
people. These effects of war are of such a kind as would
naturally be caused by the sudden transfer of the greater part
of an entire population from producing to fighting, but the
account of the actual extent of them will be found profoundly
interesting.
In the changed condition of labour one encounters something
even more significant than the other effects of the struggle,
and not easily foreseen except in its very general features. An
outbreak of war and a sudden decree of mobilization in the very
midst of the harvesting season must, of course, cripple the
work of the field as it would that of the factory, but it was just
at this time, when workers were elsewhere scarce, that the
refugees from invaded districts created in certain areas a difficult
problem of unemployment. This made necessary a rapid and
extensive reorganization of the national working forces, trans-
ferring labour to points of greatest need and successfully enlist-
ing the labour of women and of foreign and colonial workers.
The handling of such problems and of those connected with
wages, during the war and the demobilization at the close of it,
affords a shining example of the efficiency of Republican
France in industry as well as in warfare, and goes far to explain
6 INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY THE DIRECTOR
the quick recovery of that country, which bore the brunt of the
German attack and was the greatest sufferer by its devastation.
The peace of the world is in no small degree dependent on
the commercial regulations of the several countries. It was to
be expected that commerce with hostile countries would cease
during the war and be resumed at some time after its close, and
also that the importation of food from all available quarters
would be favoured ; but it was hardly expected that import
duties, as applied to merchandise generally, would be sup-
planted, as in the latter years of the war it was, by prohibitions
applied to importation from countries both hostile and friendly.
Yet such was the case, not only in France, but in other countries.
The supreme importance of getting supplies for the army made
it dangerous to allow either money or cargo space to be used
for bringing in less necessary articles.
Such a control of commerce by states engaged in war is, in
reality, only a part of a general fact, namely, that modern
warfare has to be carried on by working forces as well as fighting
ones, that the population at home and in the field must be
mobilized, and that even when conscription ensures great forces
in the field, a state is sorely handicapped if it leaves the army
of support — the workers in mills, fields, shops, railway cars, and
ships — to be secured only in the ordinary economic way. In
any great war of the future in which forces are at all evenly
balanced, the side will be successful which applies military rules
to makers and carriers of food, clothing, munitions, and army
supplies, as well as to the fighting army. The government of
the whole force at home and in the field will have to be martial.
Economic science itself calls for a general supplanting of the
ordinary control of production in times of war. Such are a few
of the lessons to be derived from this brief compendium of
economic facts.
JOHN BATES CLARK,
Director.
THE EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON THE
FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE
BY HENRI MAZEL
DIRECTOR OF THE REVUE DE LA MARINE MARCHANDE
.'•*-•
CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION ....... 11
I. THE FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE AT THE OUTBREAK
OF THE WAR 12
II. THE FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE DURING THE WAR 15
III. THE FLUCTUATIONS OF MARITIME FREIGHT RATES 19
IV. GOVERNMENT REQUISITIONS . . . .25
V. THE PROFITS OF THE SHIPPING INDUSTRY . . 27
VI. CREW WAGES 29
VII. MARINE INSURANCE . . . . . .32
CONCLUSION 33
THE EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON THE
FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE
INTRODUCTION
NUMEROUS articles and books have been written about the
decay of the French merchant marine. This decay has been
greatly exaggerated, however, and the truth is that the word
should be used in this connexion only in a relative sense.
During the thirty years that intervened between the Franco-
German War of 1870-1 and the end of the last century, as a matter
of fact, the total tonnage of the French merchant marine
fluctuated relatively little. Immediately after the victory of
the German arms it comprised a million net tons, approximately,
and in only one period of four years (1893-6) did it fall slightly
below 900,000 net tons. Four years later (1900), however, it
rose again to its former level, and after that its growth was
regular up to the outbreak of the World War in 1914, when it
comprised approximately 1,629,000 net tons.
In the first fifteen years of this century, accordingly, the total
net tonnage of the French merchant marine underwent an
increase of more than 60 per cent., so that it is manifestly an
exaggeration to speak of its decay in an absolute sense of the
word.
On the other hand, it is not to be denied that the French
merchant marine grew slowly in comparison with those of
certain other countries, so that in a relative sense the use of the
word is perhaps justifiable. If we take as our starting-point
the year 1874 (the earliest year for which the Annuaire statistiqtie
was published by the Service de statistique generate de la France),
we find that from that year to 1913 the French merchant
12 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
marine increased only from 1,037,000 to 1,582,416 net tons,
whereas in the same period of forty years the British merchant
marine increased from 5,912,000 to 12,106,000 net tons, that
of Germany from 1,068,000 to 3,320,000 net tons, that of the
United States from 3,659,000 to 7,929,000 net tons, that of
Norway from 1,317,000 to 1,767,000 net tons, and that of Japan
from nothing to 2,151,000 gross tons. Meanwhile, the merchant
marines of other countries, while not as large as that of France,
nevertheless underwent proportionately greater increases : those
of Holland, Greece, Russia, and Denmark more than doubled ;
those of Sweden and Spain almost doubled ; and that of little
Belgium more than trebled. The Italian merchant marine alone
increased proportionately less than that of France, namely, from
1,032,000 to 1,137,000 net tons.
I. THE FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE AT THE OUTBREAK OF
THE WAR
According to the Annuaire statistique of 1917, on December 31,
1913, the French merchant marine comprised 17,719 vessels
with a total carrying capacity of 1,582,416 net tons (2,447,734
gross tons).1 This fleet was manned by 86,005 seamen and
12,725 mechanics and firemen. In regard to the 17,719 vessels
referred to, however, it is to be remarked that the great
majority (14,123) were sailing vessels of less than thirty tons.
If we take into account only the vessels of five hundred tons or
more, we find that the French merchant marine comprised
166 sailing vessels and 436 steamers. The vessels of more than
two thousand tons, moreover, numbered only 256, of which
60 were sailing vessels.
1 Ed. note. In the Introduction it is stated that the French merchant marine
comprised approximately 1,629,000 net tons at the outbreak of the war, so that
there was an increase of 46,484 net tons, or thereabouts, in the first half of 1914.
Further on (p. 16) it is stated that there were 2,498,285 gross tons at the out-
break of the war, so that the increase of gross tons in the first half of 1914 amounted
to 50,551.
THE FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE
13
In the course of the year 1913 these vessels were employed
as follows :
DISTRIBUTION OF THE FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE ACCORDING
TO SERVICE IN 1913
Firemen
No. of
fan
and
vessels
tons
Net tons
Crew
Mechanics
Inshore fishery
12,105
170,464
116,744
51,369
953
Offshore fishery
351
73,841
56,607
8,650
19
Coasting trade
1,436
117,263
95,303
4,933
556
Mediterranean and European seas
425
569,857
330,303
5,234
3,332
Ocean trade
469
1,411,460
940,917
11,679
6,590
Port service ....
868
63,167
17,199
2,942
1,006
Pleasure-boats
347
14,983
6,672
1,198
269
1 718
26,699
18,671
Total
17,719
2,447,734
1,582,416
86,005
12,725
The following table shows the tonnage entered and cleared at
French ports in the year 1913 :
TONNAGE ENTERED AND CLEARED AT FRENCH PORTS IN 1913
Net Tons
f Trade with foreign countries . . 11,185,375
French vessels 1 ,, ,, French colonies . . 6,733,065
^Offshore fishery 150,761
Total .
, f Trade with foreign countries
Foreign vessels •< . .
|^ ,, „ French colonies
Total .
Grand total .
17,069,201
52,990,920
763,753
53,754,673
70,823,874
The above table comprises both vessels in ballast and vessels
with cargoes ; if only the latter are considered, the figures are
as follows :
TONNAGE OF VESSELS WITH CARGOES ENTERED AND CLEARED AT
FRENCH PORTS IN 1913
Net Tons
French vessels 15,781,000
Foreign vessels 44,837,000
Total
60,618,000
EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
The movement of the coasting trade (vessels with
only) is indicated by the following table :
cargoes
TONNAGE OF FRENCH VESSELS ENGAGED IN COASTING TRADE IN 1913
TT ji i .L TT 11 i Ton the Atlantic . .
Net Tons
. 3,263,646
Headland to Headland*
. 3 016 062
Total
. 6,279,708
jnters ffrom the Atlantic to the Mediterranean .
\Jrom the Mediterranean to the Atlantic .
Total ......
Grand Total
197,868
185,944
383,812
. 6,663,520
The following table, finally, indicates the movement of ships
and cargoes to and from French ports in the year 1913 :
PRINCIPAL FRENCH PORTS IN ORDER OF TONNAGE ENTERED AND CLEARED
AND MERCHANDISE HANDLED IN 1913
Ports
Marseilles
Havre .
Cherbourg
Boulogne
Bordeaux
Rouen .
Dunkerque .
Calais .
La Rochelle .
Cette .
Nantes
St. Nazaire .
Toulon
Dieppe
Nice
St. Louis-du-Rhone
Rank according
to tonnage
entered and
cleared
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Tonnage Bank according
entered and • to volume of
cleared (millions merchandise
of tons) handled
21,254
11,109
9,302
7,222
6,647
5,262
5,140
2,543
2,532
2,531
2,255
2,229
1,258
1,214
1,158
1,109
1
4
23
13
3
2
5
9
12
10
6
7
16
14
22
15
Volume of
merchandise
handled
(millions
of tons)
9,516
4,434
270
988
4,672
5,761
3,699
1,073
1,027
1,061
2,012
1,885
572
622
293
596
The combined movement in and out of the other ports was
less than a million tons ; among them was the port of Bayonne,
which ranked No. 17 as regards tonnage entered and cleared
and No. 11 as regards volume of merchandise handled (1,027 tons
THE FltENCH MERCHANT MARINE
of 1,000 kgs.), and the port of Caen, which ranked No. 21 in the
first category and No. 8 in the second category (1,126 tons).
II. THE FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE DURING THE WAR
During the war the French merchant marine lost nearly
one-half of its tonnage, as shown by the following table :
NUMBER AND TONNAGE OF FRENCH SHIPS LOST DURING THE PERIOD
OF HOSTILITIES (1914-19)
Losses due <
to enemy action to m
Ships
Gross tons
Shipt
1914 1
7
14,833-51
16
1915
42
96,880-01
66
1916
173
195,340-21
60
1917
373
442,167-51
61
1918
104
166,164-08
64
1919
1
4,334-29
41
date of loss "^
unknown I
>. 11
6,250-79
—
Losses due
to marine hazards
Gross tons
8,525-97
37,421-96
20,418-01
40,221-83
31,197-50
24,913-26
Total
Ships Gross tons
23
108
233
434
168
42
11
23,359-48
134,301-97
215,758-22
482,389-34
197,361-58
29,247-55
6,250-79
Total
711 925,970-40 308 162,698-53
1,019 1,088,668-93
A large part of this loss was recovered, however, by the
building of new ships both in France and abroad, as shown by
the following table :
FRENCH SHIPS BUILT IN FRANCE AND ABROAD DURING THE PERIOD OF
HOSTILITIES (1914-19)
1914 l
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
Ships built
in Fr'ance
Ships Gross tons
12,893-05
92,388-37
13,059-59
2,496-62
21,846-07
13,108-78
12
30
18
15
24
20
Ships built abroaft
for French account
Ships Gross tons
5,410-98
4,533-85
5,289-43
40,907-49
30,712-36
5,529-68
4
18
4
20
10
15
Ships
16
48
22
35
34
35
Total
Gross Ions
18,304-03
96,922-22
18,349-02
43,404-11
52,558-43
18,638-46
Total 119 155,792-48 71 92,383-79 190 248.176-27
To the ships built both in France and abroad, moreover, it is
1 From August 1 to December 31.
16
EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
necessary to add the ships purchased from foreign owners, the
total tonnage of which was :
GBOSS TONNAGE OF FRENCH MERCHANT SHIPS PURCHASED ABROAD DURING
THE PERIOD OF HOSTILITIES (1914-18)
Year
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
Total
Gross Tons
717
14,589
47,930
83,202
42,399
188,837
At the end of 1913, as already observed, the French merchant
marine comprised 2,447,734 gross tons ; but in the first half of
1914 there was an increase of 50,551 gross tons, so that the total
at the outbreak of the war was 2,498,285 gross tons. If from
this figure we subtract the total losses during the war (1,088,668),
and to the resulting difference (1,409, 61 7) add the total tonnage of
the ships built both in France and abroad during the war ( 248,176),
that of the ships purchased from foreign owners (188,837), that
of the ships of the State Fleet (342,947),* and that of the ships
captured from the Germans and Austro-Hungarians (60,000),
we find that the total amounts to slightly more than 2,249,000
gross tons, which may be said to represent the approximate
gross tonnage of the French merchant marine at the present time.
It is necessary to take into account, finally, the ships ordered
both built in France and abroad, and both by the Government
and by private owners, since January 1, 1919. This is shown
by the following table :
NUMBER AND GROSS TONNAGE OF SHIPS ORDERED BUILT BOTH IN PRANCE
AND ABROAD SINCE JANUARY 1, 1919
Liners .....
Freight and passenger vessels
Freighters ....
Sailing vessels with auxiliary power
Sailing vessels ....
Total
Ships
Gross Tons
67
706,692
15
100,296
223
791,845
11
4,705
5
1,521
321 1,605,059
Ed. note. See explanation at top of page 32.
THE FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE 17
If the foregoing statistics bring to light only a slight recovery
of tonnage (459,836 tons) l between 1914 and 1918, the fact is
not to be forgotten that during that period France voluntarily
ceased to build ships in order to use her shipyards for the
manufacture of arms and munitions. Inasmuch as almost all
of the allied and neutral governments issued decrees prohibit-
ing transfers of flags, moreover, French shipowners found it
extremely difficult to procure the tonnage necessary for the
reconstitution of their fleets. Since January 1, 1919, neverthe-
less, despite the fact that this prohibition has remained in force,
and that the conditions of shipbuilding and ship buying have
been rendered most onerous by the rise of international ex-
change, nearly 150 vessels, representing an increase of 246,142
gross tons, have been added to the French merchant marine.
To sum up, the French merchant marine, which comprised
2,498,285 gross tons at the outbreak of the war, to-day com-
prises, notwithstanding its loss of 1,088,668 gross tons during
the war, approximately 2,249,000 gross tons. It is necessary to
bear in mind, however, that the old tonnage of 1914 was
inadequate, since three-fourths of French exports were carried
in foreign bottoms (a proportion larger than the normal) ; and
the new tonnage will be still more inadequate on account of the
enormous amount of maritime commerce which will manifestly
be necessary for the restoration of the invaded regions and the
general economic reconstruction of the country. The French
Government has formulated great plans along this line, and
according to declarations it has made in the Chamber of
Deputies it proposes to increase the tonnage of the merchant
marine to no less than 5,000,000 — more than double the pre-war
tonnage.
But of this proposed tonnage, however, less than half is now
available ; and even among the ships comprising the aforesaid
2,249,000 gross tons, moreover, there are several in a more or
less unsea worthy condition. But it is estimated that the orders
already placed by the French Government, as well as by
1 Ed. note. This figure apparently includes ships built and purchased at home
and abroad, plus a part of the State Fleet and captures during the war.
1569.88
18
EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
private owners, will increase the total tonnage to 4,000,000,
and it is hoped that the recoveries from Germany, as well as
the friendly cessions made by the United States and England,
will bring it up to the aforesaid prospective figure of 5,000,000.
Before the last Chamber adjourned it voted a credit of
1,830,000,000 francs for the construction and purchase of
approximately one million tons to take the place of worn-out
tonnage or to increase that already in service. The Senate,
however, has yet to pass upon this matter.
Finally, there is reason to believe that the French ship-
building industry is now destined to undergo a great inde-
pendent development. Heretofore, as a matter of fact, it has
not been very productive, as shown by the following table
indicating the total gross tonnage of the ships launched in
France in the ten years immediately preceding the war :
GROSS TONNAGE OP SHIPS BUILT IN FRANCE IN THE YEARS 1904-13
Tear
1904
1905
J906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
Total
Gross Tons
119,470
75,179
59,351
75,852
163,291
70,454
67,527
83,093
140,271
138,287
. 992,775
These figures are very small in comparison with those
corresponding to England, Germany, the United States, and
even Japan ; but it is more than likely that this situation will
change. Already an important producer of sheet-iron and
fashion-pieces, France is now destined to become one of the
foremost mining countries. The iron deposits recently dis-
covered in Normandy and Brittany will be added to those
located in the recovered territory of Lorraine, and the proba-
bilities are that France will be able to supply all the demands
of the European countries. It is true that she will lack the
THE FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE 19
necessary coal to enable her shipyards to compete on absolutely
equal terms with those of England or Germany ; but by ex-
changing her iron-ore for foreign coal it is probable that she will
be able to balance the scales. It is by no means impossible,
indeed, that France will sooner or later become an active
competitor of the great shipbuilding countries, that the Seine
and the Loire will become actual rivals of the Clyde and the
Tyne.
It may be added, finally, that the directors of the French
shipbuilding industry have hitherto exhibited a certain timidity
which is to be held at least partially responsible for the slowness
of its development. The long-established system of protecting
both shipowners and shipbuilders by the payment of bounties
had the unfortunate and perhaps inevitable effect of making
them relax, causing the owners to lose much of their one-time
courage and energy and the builders to fall into somewhat
negligent and dilatory habits. Then, too, not only was the
annual budget appropriation for shipbuilding limited, but at
the same time the law itself was of a temporary character, so
that the closer the date of its expiration approached, the fewer
were the orders placed for new ships owing to the uncertainty
of the shipowners regarding the policy to follow. The con-
struction of merchant ships was consequently neglected in
favour of the construction of war vessels bringing a more regular
return ; and this led to the gradual acquisition of government
administrative habits not at all favourable to a great industrial
development. Inasmuch as the bounty laws have expired and
are not to be renewed, however, it is safe to assume that this
old timidity will soon disappear, and that the shipping business
will quickly rise to meet the new conditions.
III. THE FLUCTUATIONS OF MARITIME FREIGHT RATES
It is difficult to give the freight rates individual to the
French merchant marine, for the reason that the freight-rate
market is in London and the rates prevailing in the French
ports are modelled after those of the great English port. In
B 2
20 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
Circulars Nos. 1003 and 1028 of the Committee of French
Shipowners (Comite des Armateurs de France) are to be found
numerous items of information, from which the following
characteristic data are taken :
FREIGHT RATES PREVAILING IN THE FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE FROM
JANUARY 1913 TO DECEMBER 1917
Year Month
1913 January Europe to Argentina and return
Europe to United States and return
United States to Mediterranean .
Europe to South Africa
Oriental and Australian trade
July France to Argentina and retiirn .
Glasgow to Argentina
Baltimore to Alexandria
Traffic in the Baltic ....
Transatlantic trade ....
Havana to Europe ....
December Antwerp to United States and return .
Hamburg to Calcutta
Rotterdam to United States and return
Gulf of Mexico to Europe .
Santos to Europe ....
1914 March Hamburg to the Black Sea .
Argentina to the United States .
New York to Manchester .
Far East trade .....
Cuba to Europe ....
June Baltimore to Mediterranean
New York to Bristol Channel
United States to Genoa
New York to Brazil ....
Transpacific trade ....
July Hamburg to Black Sea
Nikolaiefsk to United Kingdom .
Baltic and White Sea trade
Norfolk (U.S.) to Italy
Transpacific trade ....
August Transatlantic trade ....
New York to France (neutral flag)
Galveston to United Kingdom
September Transpacific trade
European trade
United States to Mediterranean .
Glasgow to Canada
United Kingdom to Australia
Per dead-
weight ton
Francs
7-10
7-18
11-25
7-50
8-12
5-93
6-25
8-12
6-40
5-30
7-50
4-70
3-75
4-54
6-13
3-86
3-59
2-65
4-70
4-21
4-84
6-55
4-54
6-09
3-75
3-12
3-26
3-43
4-37
6-55
5-62
3-85
6-55
5-75
4-35
5-20
6-25
5-00
4-65
THE FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE
Year Month
1914 October
December
1915 January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
Mobile to Scandinavia .
Transatlantic trade .
New Brunswick to Italy
Oriental trade ....
New York to South America
Philadelphia to United Kingdom
Mediterranean trade .
Transatlantic trade
Liverpool to Mediterranean
Australia to United Kingdom
Transatlantic trade
Mediterranean trade .
United States to Mediterranean .
Buenos Aires to United Kingdom
Singapore to United Kingdom
Transatlantic trade
European trade
Transatlantic trade
Coal trade from Iceland
United States to Antilles .
Mediterranean trade (3 months) .
Mediterranean trade (9 months) .
Transatlantic trade
European trade
Italy to United States
United States to Antilles
Transatlantic trade
White Sea trade
Argentina to United States
United States to United Kingdom
Mediterranean trade .
Transatlantic trade
New York to Argentina
Java to United Kingdom .
White Sea trade
Baltimore to Glasgow
Transatlantic trade
Liverpool to Australia
Charleston to Liverpool
Mediterranean traffic .
White Sea trade
Haifong to United Kingdom
New York to Argentina
Dublin to White Sea
Liverpool to Canada .
Oriental trade ....
Wales to White Sea .
Transatlantic trade
Per dead'
weight ton
Francs
8-7«
5-00
7-50
8-00
4-65
9-05
8-10
7-00
7-90
10-00
8-40
8-95
25-00
12-15
10-00
30-85
13-22
18-75
23-31
12-15
15-60
20-92
15-00
14-35
20-00
. 15-00
21-85
20-07
22-50
37-50
16-85
19-35
18-75
23-10
20-60
31-25
18-75
19-35
37-50
18-10
21-55
15-80
16-25
32-50
19-35
17-50
36-40
19-60
.
FREIGHT RATES PREVAILING IN THE FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE FROM
JANUARY 1913 TO DECEMBER 1917 (continued)
Year Month
November
December
1916 January
February
March
April
May-
June
July
August
New York to Australia
Traffic of the Antilles
Mediterranean trade .
Australian trade
European trade
Transatlantic trade
Transatlantic trade
United States to Vladivostok
Mediterranean trade .
French Atlantic trade
United States to Europe
Transatlantic trade .
Oriental trade ....
Montevideo to the United States
Far East traffic
United States to Europe
Far East trade ....
Transatlantic trade
United States to Italy
United Kingdom to West Africa .
Transatlantic trade
United States to United Kingdom
Mediterranean trade .
Oriental-United States trade
Transatlantic trade
United States to Far East .
New York to South America
United States to Mediterranean .
Transatlantic trade
United States to South America .
United States to Far East .
United States to Antilles .
European trade
Far East trade .
Archangel to the United States .
Mediterranean trade .
Transatlantic trade
Mediterranean trade .
Transatlantic trade
United States to Argentina
United Kingdom to France
Transatlantic trade
New Zealand to United Kingdom
Transatlantic trade
Transatlantic trade
Per dead-
weight ton
Franca
21-00
17-70
18-20
23-55
22-20
19-50
22-95
25-65
23-55
28-35
40-50
28-00
31-40
25-20
30-08
63-00
32-20
42-00
39-20
36-40
34-75
69-50
48-65
55-60
39-20
38-50
35-00
56-00
45-82
59-92
50-76
39-48
46-15
60-35
85-44
71-20
64-08
74-02
52-95
60-20
66-42
70-42
45-50
56-00
52-79
THE FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE
Year Month
1916 August United Kingdom to Dieppe and Sicily .
United States to South America .
United States to Antilles .
September Transatlantic trade ....
United Kingdom to Mediterranean
United States to South America .
October United Kingdom to East Africa .
Dieppe to Sicily ....
United States to Chile
Transatlantic trade ....
November Transatlantic trade ....
Japan to the United States
Coal traffic with northern France
United States to Antilles
December Liverpool to Alexandria
United States to Chile
United States to Antilles
United Kingdom to Dunkerque and Sicily
1917 January Transatlantic trade ....
United Kingdom to Mediterranean
United Kingdom to Dieppe and Gibraltar
United States to Antilles
United States to South America .
February Transatlantic trade . . . .
United States to Chile
March French coal trade ....
Transatlantic trade ....
United States to South America .
April United Kingdom to Dunkerque and Brest
Transatlantic trade ....
United States to South America .
May United Kingdom to Dunkerque and Brest
United States to South America .
June United Kingdom to Dunkerque and Brest
United States to South America .
Transpacific trade ....
July United States to Far East .
United States to Antilles
Transpacific trade ....
August United States to South America .
United States to Antilles . . .
September United States to Argentina
United States to Antilles
United Kingdom to Dunkerque and Sicily
October United States to Antilles .
United States to west coast of England
November Transatlantic trade
Per dead-
weight Ion
Franca
51-38
49-27
49-41
. 48-79
. 48-79
34-85
46-15
62-53
31-26
45-15
62-52
41-68
72-94
53-84
48-63
33-34
59-35
83-37
56-96
66-00
86-44
55-58
60-85
41-68
24-04
97-25
69-46
62-52
. 136-30
. 156-74
64-74
68-15
. 149-35
67-88
. 176-50
67-88
99-79
76-93
67-88
85-50
74-67
. 47-52
67-88
54-31
66-52
50-91
57-70
63-13
24 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
FREIGHT RATES PREVAILING IN THE FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE FROM
JANUARY 1913 TO DECEMBER 1917 (continued)
Per dead-
Year Month weight ton
Francs
1917 November United Kingdom to Sicily 66-52
United States to Antilles 47-52
United States to South America 44-12
December United Kingdom to Dunkerque and Sicily . . . 63-13
United States to South America . . . . 54-31
United States to Antilles 47-52
The figures for the year 1918 have not yet been published.
According to another computation made by the same Com-
mittee of French Shipowners, the average annual freight rates
per day and per gross ton in the years 1911-17 were as follows :
AVERAGE MARITIME FREIGHT RATES PER DAY PER GROSS TON IN THE
YEARS 1911-17
1911 0-291
1912 0-451
1913 0-372
1914 0-311
1915 1-220
1916 2-940
1917 . . 4-083
As regards the period immediately before and after the
armistice, the Bulletin trimestriel de la Statistique generate de la
France (October 1919) gives the following figures indicating the
maritime freight rates per metric ton in francs, but on the basis
of London exchange :
MARITIME FREIGHT RATES PER METRIC TON, BEFORE AND AFTER THE
ARMISTICE
(Francs, on basis of London Exchange)
Nov. 8, Nov. 29, Sept. 12,
1918 1918 1919
Wheat and Maize :
Northern Range to United Kingdom . 289-62 68-06 44-24
Northern Range to French Atlantic ports 318-58 74-58 81-09
Northern Range to Genoa . . . 434-28 130-28
Australia to United Kingdom . . 279-18 76-31 77-55
Argentina to United Kingdom . . — 80-65
Buenos Aires to Genoa ... — 142-60
Cotton :
New York to Liverpool . . . 670-81 671-16 333-61
New Orleans to United Kingdom . . 729-14 729-52 246-87
New Orleans to Havre . — — 280-23
Tin: FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE 25
IV. GOVERNMENT REQUISITIONS
The number and gross tonnage of the merchant ships
requisitioned by the French navy during the war was
approximately as follows :
REQUISITIONS or FRENCH MKKI H ANT VESSELS BY THE FRENCH NAVY
DURING THE WAR
Year
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
Total ... 417 1,058,920
The requisitioning of so large an amount of tonnage interfered
considerably with the commercial activity of the merchant
marine, and the indemnities paid by the Government com-
pensated only in small measure the actual losses of the shipping
business.
The matter of the rates of compensation in the case of
requisitioned ships is very difficult. The number of decrees and
circulars issued in regard to it exceeds a hundred, and much
litigation arising from it is still pending before the Conseil
Ships
Gross Tonnage
109
205,450
192
508,000
56
136,960
55
202,130
5
6,380
The Central Committee of Shipowners, on its part, has devoted
a dozen or more of its circulars to the clearing-up of the diffi-
culties created by this abundance of official or legal texts.
Circular No. 1,000, issued on July 20, 1917, contains some
relatively clear statements indicating the manner in wrhich the
Government proposed to regulate the indemnities payable to
owners of vessels requisitioned by it.
In order to make adjustments, three scales were established,
the first relating to line freight vessels and varying according to
their speed, the second relating to ordinary freight vessels
(tramps) and varying according to their deadweight tonnage,
and the third relating to mixed (passenger and freight) vessels,
liners, and hospital ships, and varying according to their speed.
26
EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
The scales include two kinds of compensation, that is, com-
pensation for transfer of charter, fixed in 1917, and compensa-
tion for loss of use of vessel, applying to the four years 1914-17,
and based on the compensation for loss of charter, for 1914 at
the rate of 22 per cent, of the amount of the latter, for 1915 at
40 per cent., for 1916 at 42-50 per cent., and for 1917 at 45 per
cent., for all classes of vessels.
All the rates are slightly lower than the English rates. The
following tables furnish information in regard to them :
TABLE OF RATES OF COMPENSATION FOR REQUISITION AND USE OF
LINE FREIGHTERS
Speed of Vessel
13 knots and over
12 ,, „ leas than 13
11 „ „ „ „ 12
10 „ ,. „ „ 11
10
Compensation for
Transfer of Charter
French Scale
1917
17,347
16,231
15,072
14,493
13,913
Compensation for
Loss of Use of Vessel
1914
1915
1916
1917
3-82
6-94
7-37
7-81
3-37
6-49
6-90
7-30
3-32
6-03
6-41
6-78
3-19
5-80
6-16
6-52
3-06
5-57
5-91
6-26
Vessels of 3,000 tons and
less than 4,000 gross tons . 0-580
Vessels of 2,000 tons and
less than 3,000 gross tons . 1-160
Vessels of less than 2,000
gross tons . . . 1-740
Sur-Kates
0-130 0-232 0-247 0-261
0-260 0-464 0-493 0-522
0-390 0-696 0-740 0-783
TABLE OF RATES OF COMPENSATION FOR REQUISITION AND USE OF
ORDINARY FREIGHTERS
(per gross ton and per month)
Deadweight tonnage
More than 5,000 tons .
From 4,001 to 5,000 tons
„ 3,001 „ 4,000 .,
„ 2,201 „ 3,000 „
„ 1,801 „ 2,200 .,
1,300 „ 1,800 „
Compensation for
Transfer of Charter
French Scale
1917
1914
Compensation for
Loss of Use of Vessel
1915 1916
1917
13,043
2-87
5-22
5-54
5-87
13,623
3
5-45
5-79
6-13
14,202
3-12
5-68
6-04
6-39
14,782
3-25
5-91
6-28
6-65
15,362
3-38
6-14
6-53
6-91
15,942
3-51
6-38
6-78
7-17
THE FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE 27
TABLE OF RATES or COMPENSATION FOB REQUISITION AND USE or
PASSENGER AND FREIGHT VESSELS AND LINERS
(Class II of the English scale : ships of the expeditionary forces)
and of
HOSPITAL SHIPS
(per grosj ton and per month)
Compensation for
Transfer of Charter Compensation for
Speed of the, Vessel French Scale Loss of Use of Vessel
1917 1914 1915 1916 1917
Passenger and Freight Vessels and Liners
13 knots and less than 17 . 20,290 4-46 8-12 8-62 9-13
14 .. „ 15 . 19,130 4-21 7-6.r> 8-13 8-61
13 .. 14 . 17,971 3-95 7-19 7-64 8O9
12 „ „ 13 . 16,811 3-70 6-72 7-14 7-56
Less than 12 knots . 15.6C2 3-44 6-26 6-65 7-04
Hospital Ships
14 knots and more . . 19,709 4-34 7-88 8-38 8-87
Less than 14 knots . . 18,550 4-08 7-42 7-88 8-35
V. THE PROFITS OF THE SHIPPING INDUSTRY
Before the war the financial condition of the shipping business
in France was not as favourable as it was in certain other
countries. The four great French navigation companies were
the following (the last two having been consolidated during the
war) :
Gross Tonnage
Messageries Maritime s . . 345,360
Transatlantique . . . 331,669
Chargeurs Reunis . . . 134,104
Sud-Allantique . . . 101,603
And then there were also the Transports Maritimes a Vapeur
(88,000 tons), the Havraise Peninsulaire (55,000 tons), the
Compagnie Cyprien Fabre (49,000 tons), the Navigation Mixte
Touache (44,000 tons), and the Compagnie Paquet (40,000 tons).
The dividends declared and distributed were as follows :
1910 1911 1912
Per cent. Per cent. Per cent.
M essa geries maritimes ... 5 0 0
Transatlantique .... 2*4 2-4 1*6
Cyprien Fabre .... 5 5 6
Transports maritime* ... 5 6 6
28
These earnings are considerably lower than those of the large
German navigation companies, as shown by the following
table :
1910 1911 1912
Per cent. Per cent. Per cent,
Hamburg- American Line .8 9 10
North German Lloyd 3 5
Hansa Line (Bremen) . . 20
Kosmos Line (Hamburg) . 14
v
It is impossible to determine to what extent the profits of the
shipping business in France increased during the war. The
opinions and estimates that have been given, both favourable
and unfavourable, have been influenced by political considera-
tions, and it will be possible to verify them only after the lapse
of several years.
If one were to suppose that the shipowners used their profits
entirely or largely for the reconstruction of their fleets, one
might conclude that these profits exceeded a billion francs.
The fact is that during the war the shipowners built or purchased
some 459,000 tons and ordered some 1,242,000 tons, that is,
a total of approximately 1 ,700,000 tons.1 Reckoning the average
cost per ton at 1,000 francs, it follows that the total cost of this
reconstructed fleet would amount to 1,700,000,000 francs. But
such a computation would be unreliable, for nobody knows how
much of their profits the shipowners actually used for the
reconstruction of their fleets.
As regards passenger rates, it may be said that they went up
on all lines. By way of example, we reproduce the following
table showing the percentage increases established by three of
the larger French navigation companies :
Messageries Maritimes
Per cent.
Indo-China, China, Japan. Madagascar. Australia . . . 139
North Mediterranean ........ 200
South Mediterranean . . . . . . . .140
1 This figure does not include the orders placed by the Government, amounting
to 340,000 tons ; if we add this figure to the total of 1,700,000 tons, the result
approximates the 2,249,000 tons given on p. 16 as representing the total tonnage
of the French merchant marine at the present time.
THE FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE
Compagnie Traiuatlanti
New York .....
Antilles (with elimination of return tickets)
Algeria ......
Morocco , ....
Corsica
Compagnie Fraissinet
Per cent.
. 125
50 to 60
. 00
50
(approximately) 5
VI. CREW WAGES
The following table shows the increase in the wages of the
crews of the vessels of the merchant marine, the figures given
corresponding to vessels navigating in the North Sea and
Atlantic Ocean (those corresponding to vessels navigating in
the Mediterranean Sea being almost the same for long voyages
and considerably less for coasting trade) :
CREW WAGES IN THE FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE BEFORE AND AFTER
THE WAR
After Percentage
Before the War August 15, 1919 increase
(Francs per month) Per cent.
140 385 175
118 370 213-56
90 330 266-66
55 180 227-27
60 150 275
140 385 175
118 360 205-08
90 330 266-66
Boatswains
Boatswain's mate
Sailora
Apprentices
Cabin-boys
Head firemen .
Firemen .
Coal-passers
As regards the size of the crews and the number of working
hours, no legislative modification of the previous conditions
was made during the war, these matters having continued to
be regulated by the law of April 17, 1907.
As regards the number of men employed by the merchant
marine, it fluctuated very little during the forty years preceding
the war. Whereas in 1873 it was 98,989, in 1913 it was 98,730.
In 1914, however, it decreased slightly to 92,733, and during the
war it fell off greatly in consequence of the requisitioning of
a large part of the merchant marine.
30 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
Fuel and Labour. The increase in the price of coal during
the war, according to the regular statements published in
La Re forme economique, WP.S as follows :
INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF COAL IN THE YEARS 1914-18
Industrial Coal
of northern France English ( Welsh) coal
Year delivered on board ship c.i.f. 1
Francs per ton Francs per ton
1914 . 20-50 29-70
1915
1916
1917
1918
33-00 41-85
35-00 75-00
40-00 101-25
42-00 101-25
Refined petroleum, which cost 26-50 francs per hectolitre in
1914, had risen to 51-75 francs at the time of the armistice
(November 1918), and is now (November 1919) worth 61-75
francs.
The cost of labour increased prodigiously during the war,
wages having doubled, trebled, and here and there even quad-
rupled. At the present time (November 15, 1919) dockers and
cranemen are being paid as follows :
WAGES CURRENT AT THE MORE IMPORTANT FRENCH PORTS ON
NOVEMBER 15, 1919
Dunkerque :
Wages by the day :
Ordinary day — 20 francs.
First half of the night — 15 francs.
Second half of the night — 25 francs.
Entire night — 40 francs.
Extra hours : 3 to 4-50 francs per hour according to time of day.
Sunday (all day) — 40 francs.
Salaries by the month :
Cranemen — 525 and 550 francs.
Engineers — 550 and 575 francs.
Havre :
Wages by the day :
Dockers — 18 francs.
Draymen — 18 francs and 5 francs for preparatory work.
Extra hours : 2-50 to 3 francs per hour.
Sunday — 14 francs per half-day.
Entire night — 48 francs.
1 Ed. note, c.i.f., technical abbreviation for cartage, insurance, and freight.
THE FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE 31
Rout*:
Wages by the day :
From 13 francs for rollers of empty casks
To 18 francs for coal-carrien.
Extra hours : 2-50 francs per hour.
Salaries by the month :
Cranemen (operators of hydraulic cranes) — 400 francs.
,, (operators of steam cranes) — 600 francs.
Bordeaux :
Dockers — 15 francs per day (according to merchandise handled).
Dockers — 15 francs per day.
„ 22-50 francs per night.
Extra hours : 2*50 francs by day and 3-50 francs by night.
Cranemen — 450 francs per month.
Xante* :
Dockers — 14 francs per day.
„ 20 francs per night.
Iron-workers — 7 francs per day.
,, 10 francs per night.
La Rochelle-Pallice :
Dockers — 13-50 francs per day (minimum).
Cranemen — 12 francs per day (also 3 francs additional for high cost of living
and 0-10 francs per hour of operation. Allowance of 10 francs per month
for each child under 16 years and 15 francs per month after the third
child).
Cette:
Cranemen — 16 francs per day.
Cart-loaders — 23 francs per day,
Extra hours : 3 francs per hour.
Marseilles :
Dockers — 18 francs per day.
Carters and draymen — 15-75 to 21 francs per day (according to number of
horses).
Dock- guards — 15 francs per day.
Extra hours : 3 francs for carters and 4 francs for dockers.
Sunday — 24 frencs.
Strikes. There were no strikes during the war for the reason
that the personnel of the various divisions of the merchant
marine was under military control. After the war there were
a few individual movements of relatively minor importance :
a short strike of the officers of the merchant marine in April
1919; a strike of the dockers at Havre on March 24, 1919;
another strike in the same port in July and August ; a few
short strikes in other ports.
32 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
The collective agreement which ended the strike at Havre in
August contained the following provisions :
The employers consented to a minimum wage of 12 francs
per day, and agreed not to reduce wages below that amount
until it had been established that the cost of living had gone
down at least 10 per cent.
A high-cost-of-living additional wage was temporarily con-
ceded by the Employers' Association of Havre to the least
favoured unions of that city, the amount having been fixed at
4 francs per day, payable from August 1 to September 30, 1919.
VII. MARINE INSURANCE
A law of April 19, 1917, instituted compulsory war risk
insurance on the hulls of all French vessels of five hundred
gross tons or more. The terms of the decree of April 25, issued
in execution of the said law, fixed the monthly premium rates
as follows :
Sailing
Steamer Vessels
Per cent.
(a) Navigation between all the ports of France, the United
Kingdom, the Iberian Peninsula, and the western basin
of the Mediterranean Sea (that is west of a line drawn
from Cape Bon to Cape Boco of Sicily) ... 3 4-50
(b) Navigation between all the ports of the western basin of
the Mediterranean Sea ...... 2-75 4-15
(c) Navigation between all the ports of the Mediterranean
Sea (excluding those of the Adriatic) .... 3 4 '50
(d) Direct navigation between all the ports of France, the
United Kingdom, the Iberian Peninsula, the western
basin of the Mediterranean Sea, and all the Atlantic
ports of Africa and America . . . . .2-25 3
(e) Direct navigation between all the ports of France, the
United Kingdom, the Iberian Peninsula, the western
basin of the Mediterranean Sea, and all the ports of
the Pacific and Indian Oceans (via Cape Horn, Cape of
Good Hope, or Panama Canal) ..... 2 2-25
(/) Direct navigation between all the ports of the Mediter-
ranean Sea and those beyond Suez .... 2-25 2-25
(g) Direct navigation between all the French ports on the
North Sea, the English Channel, and the Atlantic Ocean
and those beyond Suez .... . 2-75 2-25
(h) Direct navigation between all the French ports and all
the ports of Holland, Sweden (only Gothenburg), Norway,
and Russia (only Arctic Ocean) 3-50 5-25
THE FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE 33
In the application of the rates it was provided that motor-
boats were to be classed with steamers and sailing vessels with
auxiliary power to sailing vessels ; towed barges were likewise
to be classed with sailing vessels.
The premium was to be reduced 3 per cent, if the vessel was
armed, 2 per cent, if it was equipped with wireless telegraph,
and 5 per cent, if it was both armed and equipped with wireless
telegraph.
The decree further provided that if the insurance were
demanded for a period of three months, a reduction of 5 per
cent, in the amount of the premium would be made.
The rates specified in the above decree were reduced 75 per
cent, by the decree of November 15, 1918.
The decree of January 20, 1919, provided that after the first
of the following February the monthly premium rate was to be
fixed uniformly at 0-25 per cent, per month.
Finally, a law of October 8, 1919, authorized the suspension
of the above-mentioned law of April 19, 1917.
CONCLUSION
The French merchant marine was put to a severe test by the
war ; but although it was severely handicapped by the fact
that the nation was forced to concentrate all its forces for the
repulse of the enemy, we have seen that it was able to survive
the long period of trial without significant destruction, and is
now in process of reconstruction on a larger scale than ever.
At the same time, however, there is no intention or desire to
rival or compete with the merchant marines of other countries ,.
such as those of England and the United States. On the con-
trary, there is only the wish to maintain its former rank and
to prevent its being surpassed by the merchant marines of
countries of smaller population and less wealth.
It is largely to private enterprise that the French merchant
marine will be indebted for its recovery. The fact is that the
public authorities of France have not always supported the
efforts of private initiative as strongly as it seems they might
1569.88
34 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
have done, and at times, indeed, they have actually obstructed
them. At the beginning of the war more merchant ships were
requisitioned than were actually needed, with the result that
many of them lay idle in the ports for a considerable length of
time. Had they been left in the hands of their owners, it is
obvious that they would have done much toward maintaining
the economic activity of the country. The shipyards, on their
part, were completely diverted from their special work to the
manufacture of arms and munitions ; and here again it seems
that the French Government would have exhibited more fore-
sight if it had devised some means of increasing its output of
arms and munitions to the utmost without at the same time
completely arresting its shipbuilding industry.
In the course of the war some interesting but inopportune
attempts were made by the public authorities completely to
modify the shipping business. A socialist deputy placed at the
head of the Administration of the Merchant Marine insisted
that the profits realized by the shipowners were excessive, and
called upon the National Assembly to adopt his great plans for
the creation of a State Fleet (Flotte d'Etat). As a matter of fact,
the National Assembly did vote him considerable sums,
amounting to 850,000,000 francs, wherewith a certain number
of ships were purchased by the Government and are still being
operated by it ; but the accounts relating to these purchases
and operations have not yet been published, so that it is
difficult to form an opinion regarding the results.
The French merchant marine is further handicapped by
certain unfavourable conditions to which technical writers
attribute the slowness and weakness of its development. In
the first place, the Government departments having control of
it are distributed among several ministries, so that there can
be no unity of thought and action. The shipowners, moreover,
are diverted from the practice of independent chartering by
a custom which reserves this practice to administrative officers
known as courtiers maritimes (ship-brokers). Thus the ship-
owners do not engage in tramp traffic, which is really the -basis
of the shipping business, but in line traffic, which calls for less
THE FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE 35
initiative and activity and giv»^ NM> to the necessity of Govern-
ment subventions. In the second place, the navigators them-
selves might make progress in many ways — better professional
instruction, better moral conduct, better health (tuberculosis
and alcoholism are very prevalent among them), better disci-
pline, and better understanding with their employers. In the
third place, the French seaports leave much to be desired as
regards their means of access (the water in some of the harbours
being too shallow), as regards their equipment in the way of
quays, docks, &c., and as regards their connexions with interior
railways, canals, &c. In the fourth place, finally, the present
regulations should be revised, modernized, and made more
elastic ; the merchant marine should get rid of the military
traditions arising from its long subordination to the navy ; and
the agents of the Under-Secretaries of State should turn their
attention to economic matters.
All these improvements will come sooner or later. The regu-
lations are gradually being improved and modernized, and it
would be unjust to say that the French merchant marine is still
under a regime such as existed in the time of Colbert. The
maritimes inscrits (registered mariners), as all navigators are
called in France, are making progress in every direction, and
are in no way inferior to the navigators of any other country.
Great public works have been planned and begun for the
improvement of the ports with reference to the new conditions,
and the total contemplated expenditures amount to no less than
three and a half billion francs. During the war the shipowners
gave evidence of the greatest energy and tenacity, and it will
be an easy matter, when desired, to reduce the role of the
official courtiers maritimes in such a way as to give the ship-
owners the privilege of independent chartering. In the domain
of public authorities, finally, great progress has also been made
in the direction of the unification of the services of the merchant
marine. The administration of the seaports, hitherto bizarrely
separated from that of the merchant marine, has just been
placed in the same hands by the re-establishment of the Under-
Secretaryship of State of the Merchant Marine (January 20,
o2
36 THE FRENCH MERCHANT MARINE
1920), and there is lacking only the bringing together of the
registration and measurement of capacity services, now con-
trolled by the Customs Administration under the supervision
of the Ministry of Finance, to bring about the long-awaited
establishment of a separate Ministry of the Merchant Marine.
THE EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON THE
FRENCH TEXTILE INDUSTRY
BY ALBERT AFTALION
PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LILLE
CONTENTS
PAGE
I. GENERAL SURVEY . . . . . .41
II. THE WOOL INDUSTRY . . . . .48
III. THE LINEN, HEMP, AND JUTE INDUSTRIES . . 55
IV. THE COTTON INDUSTRY . . . . .60
V. THE SILK INDUSTRY . . . . . .66
VI. SUMMARY ........ 71
THE EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON THE
FRENCH TEXTILE INDUSTRY
I. GENERAL SURVEY
ON the eve of the war the condition of the French textile
industry was for the most part satisfactory. It had perfected
its equipment and increased its productive capacity. It is true,
however, that it still had much progress to make and many
improvements to inaugurate. In certain localities and in certain
branches it had not had sufficient courage to discard machinery
that was more or less worn or antiquated ; but in other localities
and branches it had an excellent mechanical equipment, as well
as a technical and commercial organization which could stand
comparison with the best there was in other countries.
Thanks to the development it had thus undergone, as well as
to the existence of import duties protecting it against foreign
competition, the French textile industry had succeeded in
acquiring complete control of the home market. By the very
nature of things, to be sure, it had to procure from other coun-
tries its entire supply of some of the necessary raw materials,
such as cotton and jute, and most of its supply of the others,
such as silk, wool, and flax. As regards manufactured textile
products, on the other hand, there were only a few special
articles which France had to purchase abroad. For her own
manufactured textile products, moreover, she had succeeded in
creating important outside markets, not only in her own colonies
(Algeria, Indo-China, Senegal, Madagascar, &c.), but also in
numerous foreign countries. In 1913, the year before the out-
break of the war, the value of her imports of raw textile
materials and manufactured textile products combined totalled
2,127,000,000 francs, whereas the value of her corresponding
exports totalled 2,135,000,000 francs. Thus France was able to
pay with her sales for all of her purchases abroad, and at the
41
42
same time have all the raw material she needed for the satis-
faction of her own requirements.
This state of affairs was completely disrupted, as we shall see
in the course of this study, by the abnormal conditions created
by the war. While this applies to a certain extent to all of
the textile industries, in this immediate connexion it seems
advisable to leave the silk industry out of consideration, since its
fate was somewhat different from that of the others. As regards
the wool, cotton, linen, and jute industries, however, if we glance
at the figures indicating the imports of the corresponding raw
materials we cannot fail to see the disastrous influence of the
war upon them. The prodigious falling-off of these imports
during the war is clearly revealed in the following table :
AMOUNT OF IMPORTS OF RAW TEXTILE MATERIALS INTO FRANCE IN
1913 AND 1918
Metric Tons
1913
1918
286,000
44,000
329,000
142,000
113,000
7,000
30,000
16,000
122,000
9.000
Total . . . 880,000 218,000
Thus from 1913, the year before the outbreak of the war,
to 1918, the last year of the war, the imports of raw textile
materials other than silk decreased from 880,000 to 218,000
metric tons — a decrease of more than 75 per cent. The signifi-
cance of this decrease becomes apparent when it is recalled that
all of the cotton and jute put through the process of manufacture
in French textile mills came from abroad ; as regards wool, on
the other hand, French clips produced scarcely a seventh or an
eighth of the total quantity worked up in France ; and as
regards linen and hemp, finally, the French production of raw
material constituted less than a third of the total quantity
received by the spinning mills. It is obvious, accordingly, that
a falling-off of imports as pronounced as that indicated in the
above table must necessarily have exerted a very restrictive
influence upon the total production of manufactured textile
products in France.
THE FRENCH TEXTILE INDUSTRY 43
What do \ve ob>i«rvi' a» rojranU the country's foreign trade
in manufactured textile products V The following table indi-
cati •- the value of the export.- thereof before and during the
war : l
VALUE OF EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURED TEXTILE PRODUCTS FROM FRANCE
IN 1913 AND 1918
Millions of Franca
1913 1918
Yarn ... 212 57
Woollen (cloth) . 220 40
Cotton (cloth) . . 385 244
Linen and Hemp (cloth) 27 4
Jute (cloth) . 17 31
Total ... 861 376
Thus the value of the exports of manufactured textile
products, whereof France was so proud before the war, de-
creased from 861,000,000 francs in 1913 to 376,000,000 francs
in 1918 — a decrease of more than 56 per cent. The above
figure for 1918, moreover, takes into account the intervening
rise of prices ; and if we made no allowance for this, we would
find that the figure corresponding to 1918 would amount to
scarcely a sixth of that corresponding to 1913. During the war
France lost a number of foreign markets in which she had pre-
viously secured a firm foothold ; she ceased to be a factor in the
world -market as an exporter of manufactured textile products.
As regards the imports of manufactured textile products, on
the other hand, their value underwent a prodigious increase,
as shown by the following table :
VALUE OF IMPORTS OF MANUFACTURED TEXTILE PRODUCTS INTO FRANCE
IN 1913 AND 1918
Millions of France
1913 1918
Yarn ... 64 884
Woollen (cloth) . 51 544
Cotton (cloth) . 56 648
Linen and Hemp (cloth) 10 101
Jute (cloth) . 15 190
Total ... 196 2,367
1 In the case of manufactured products we give figures representing value instead
of quantity, for the reason that we consider them of greater interest.
44 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
Thus the increase was truly prodigious, the difference
amounting to more than two billion francs, or almost twelve
times the total value of the imports in 1913. It is true that the
increase was considerably accentuated, as in the case of the
exports, by the intervening rise of prices; apart from this,
however, the imports for 1918 were not less than five times as
heavy as those for 1913. In short, France ceased to be an
exporter of manufactured textile products and became an
importer thereof.
The foregoing tables complete and clarify one another, all
three of them bearing witness to the disastrous influence of the
war upon the French textile industry in general. In 1918 this
industry received from abroad only 218,000 tons of raw material,
as compared with 880,000 tons in 1913 ; it consumed for manu-
facturing purposes only a quarter of its normal pre-war con-
sumption. Before the war France was able to supply not only
her own needs, but also a part of the needs of other countries ;
during the war, however, she ceased to sell her goods abroad
and at the same time was obliged to make large foreign pur-
chases for the satisfaction of her own requirements. Whereas
in 1913 the value of her exports of manufactured textile
products exceeded the value of her corresponding imports by
some 665,000,000 francs, in 1918, on the other hand, we find
that the latter exceeded the former by more than two billion
francs. Thus the entire French balance of trade with respect
to manufactured products of the textile industry sustained
a loss of some 2,654,000,000 francs between the years 1913
and 1918.
The causes of the greatly decreased production of the French
textile industry are not difficult to discover. One of the chief
difficulties was that which was common to almost all French
industries, namely, the scarcity of workers caused by the
mobilization, which in a country of forty million inhabitants
took more than seven million persons away from productive
occupations. Like the other industries, moreover, the textile
industry suffered severely from the disruption of transportation
and the shortage of coal.
THE FRENCH TEXTILE INDUSTRY 45
But the severest blow suffered by the French textile industry
was dealt by a more special factor, namely, by the German
invasion of the northern and eastern departments, which placed
a large proportion of the textile mills either in the hands of the
enemy, or else within range of his guns. The Departement du
Nord is the principal centre of the French textile industry ;
according to the census of 1911, of a total of 805,000 persons
employed in textile establishments throughout all France,
178,000, or nearly a quarter, were concentrated in that depart-
ment. In several of the other invaded departments (Somme,
Marne, Aisne, Pas-de-Calais), moreover, the textile industry had
likewise acquired some importance. The silk industry was but
slightly represented in this part of the country, so that it escaped
the disastrous consequences of the invasion almost entirely.
As regards the wool industry, however, nearly all of the country's
combing machines, three-fourths of its spindles, and two-thirds
of its looms were located either in invaded territory or else so
close to the firing-line that they had to be shut down. As regards
the linen industry, the same applies to almost all of the spindles
and to more than half of the looms. As regards the cotton
industry, finally, while it was less severely affected than the
others, almost a third of the spindles had to be left idle. It is
obvious that an enormous decrease in production necessarily
resulted from this dispossession of so large a part of the country's
mechanical equipment.
Toward the end of the war, moreover, the situation was
aggravated by other factors. The total French imports of raw
textile materials other than silk before and during the war are
indicated by the following table :
AMOUNT OF IMPORTS OF RAW TEXTILE MATERIALS (EXCLUDING SILK) INTO
FRANCE IN 1913 AND IN 1915-18
Tear Metric Tons
1913 880,000
1915
1916
1917
1918
382,000
457,000
428,000
218,000
These figures show that the French textile manufacturers,
46 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
after they had sufficiently recovered from the effects of the first
terrible blow, took up production in the uninvaded parts of the
country. Having slightly modified their personnel, they made
an effort to increase the productivity of the mechanical equip-
ment left at their disposal. The existing machinery was over-
hauled and in some cases even added to, while some of that
which was so close to the firing-line that it could not be used
was taken down and remounted elsewhere. Sometimes, indeed,
but rather rarely, new mills were erected. All this accounts for
the fact that the imports of raw materials in 1916 show a con-
siderable increase with respect to those of the preceding year.
Beginning with 1917, however, a new falling-off in the imports
of raw materials is to be observed ; and it becomes especially
pronounced in the following year. Whereas in 1916 some
457,000 tons of raw materials were imported, or approximately
one-half of the quantity corresponding to 1913, in 1918 only
218,000 tons were imported, or approximately one-fourth of the
quantity corresponding to 1913. In 1916 the industry suffered
from the loss of a large part of its mechanical equipment ; in
1918 even the equipment left available was inadequately supplied
with raw material. This new decrease in importation, and
consequently in production, was a result of the renewal of the
German submarine activity in 1917.
When we compare the imports of raw textile materials with
the imports of merchandise of all kinds, however, we note that
the falling-off between 1916 and 1918 was greater with respect
to the former than with respect to the latter. The total tonnage
of the loaded ships that entered French ports decreased from
twenty-six millions in 1916 to twenty millions in 1918 — a falling-
off of one-fourth. In the same period the imports of mer-
chandise of all kinds decreased from forty millions to twenty-
nine millions of tons — a falling-off of one -third. With respect
to textile materials, however, we have seen that the falling-off
amounted to one -half. The decrease was thus proportionately
greater than that which should have resulted from the reduction
of the merchant fleet available.
More than from the reduction of the merchant fleet, however,
THE FRENCH TEXTILE INDUSTRY 47
tlio French textile industry suffered from a direct consequence ^r—
thereof, namely, from the policy of restrictions which the /
Government adopted with respect to importation and exporta-
tion immediately after the renewal of the German submarine
activity. France was determined that this should in no way
detract from her military power, and accordingly she resolved
to direct all her efforts toward the adoption of whatever measures
were calculated to ensure victory. To this end, therefore, she
deliberately and courageously sacrificed many economic interests
which could be looked upon as thoroughly legitimate. It was
because she was inspired by this predominant desire for victory,
indeed, that in spite of and in the worst phase of the submarine
activity she persistently refused to employ her shipbuilding
establishments for their normal purpose and continued to use
them for the manufacture of guns and ammunition.
These same considerations lay at the foundation of the policy
of priorities that was adopted in the matter of maritime trans-
portation. By virtue of this policy preference was given to the
transportation of merchandise deemed essential to military
success, such as munitions and certain indispensable food
products. Wool, cotton, and jute intended to supply the needs
of the civil population were consequently conceded but little
space in the available ships. In fact, even the textile materials
necessary for the manufacture of soldiers' uniforms, blankets,
&c., were considered less essential than certain other kinds of
war material and were accordingly accepted for transportation
only in more or less limited quantities.
The same considerations further led, moreover, to the policy
of transporting compact and easily handled manufactured
products in preference to heavy and bulky raw materials. To
a considerable extent, for instance, more flour and less wheat
were transported, more oil and less oleaginous seeds, more paper
and less cellulose, more powder and less nitrate, and also more
yarn and cloth and less raw cotton and wool. The Government,
and especially the Army Supply Service, was led to cut down
its foreign purchases of raw materials in favour of manufactured
products, notwithstanding the resultant disadvantages with
48 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
respect to the economic life of the country. Inasmuch as
manufactured textile products required less cargo space than
raw textile materials, more cargo space was thus left available
for munitions. The burden of the higher cost was willingly
borne, and foreign industries were deliberately permitted to
thrive at the expense of domestic industries. Everything was
held subordinate to that which was considered necessary for the
achievement of victory.
Moreover, while the Government departments were econo-
mizing cargo space by increasing their purchases of foreign
manufactured products, at the same time, in order to save
money and prevent the rise of foreign exchange, they restricted
the purchase of manufactured products for private accounts
by prohibiting their importation.
It is necessary to add, finally, that besides these transportation
difficulties there was still another factor that helped to reduce
the supply of textile materials, namely, the ever-increasing
restrictions placed by certain countries upon their exportation.
This applies, for instance, to Australia, which reserved its wool
production for England alone, having sold out its entire supply
to her for a number of years in advance.
We have set forth, accordingly, the chief causes of the
paralysation of the French textile industry during the war —
the causes which made it necessary for France to rely upon
foreign industries to supply her demand, both civil and military,
for manufactured textile products. Following this general
survey, we may now pass on to a brief consideration of each of
the various branches of the textile industry,
II, THE WOOL INDUSTRY
Of all the French textile industries the wool and linen
industries were the most severely affected by the war, due to
the fact that they were more concentrated than the others in
the regions invaded by the enemy. For the country in general,
however, the paralysation of the wool industry had the most
serious consequences on account of the very important position
THE FRENCH TEXTILE INDUSTRY 49
which it had occupied in the economic life of the people. It is
to this industry, accordingly, that we will turn our attention
first.
Before the war the French wool industry had attained a high
degree of technical development and at the same time had
built up a splendid commercial organization. It showed a
tendency to become concentrated in the region of Roubaix-
Tourcoing, where it was conducted in large mills provided with
excellent mechanical equipment and managed by men possessed
of a genuine spirit of enterprise. Division of labour was corre-
lated with frequent examples of integration, the same company
in many cases importing its raw wool directly from the country
of production, operating its own combing, spinning, and
weaving mills, and even maintaining its own retail stores.
French manufacturers of woollen yarn and cloth had not only
succeeded in acquiring complete control of the home market,
but had also developed a heavy export trade, shipping large
quantities of combed wool, yarn, and cloth to England,
Germany, Belgium, Italy, the United States, and other
countries.
The war dealt the French wool industry a severe blow,
permitting it to be continued only on a terribly reduced scale.
The annual French clip, which before the war had amounted to
some 35,000 tons, was greatly reduced in consequence of the loss
of a large part of the country's ovine stock. In particular,
however, it is the falling-off in the imports of foreign wool that
accounts for the full gravity of the decreased production. The
following table shows the French imports of foreign wool in bulk
before and during the war :
AMOUNT OF IMPORTS OF RAW WOOL INTO FRANCE IN 1913 AND IN 1915-18
Year Metric Tons
1913 269,000
1915
1916
1917
1918
65,000
78,000
60,000
40,000
Thus in 1916 the imports of foreign wool amounted to less
1589.38
50 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
than a third of what they were in 1913. Beginning with 1917,
moreover, we note a further falling-off ; and in 1918 the total
dwindles down to 40,000 tons, or a little more than a seventh of
the pre-war figure.
Along with this decrease in the imports of raw material,
moreover, there was an almost complete stoppage of the exports
of woollen yarn and cloth and at the same time an astonishing
increase in the imports thereof. France, no longer able to
manufacture, ceased to sell to foreign countries, and was
obliged to purchase in considerable volume from them.
Moreover, even before it is a question of yarn and cloth, so to
speak, this same shift in trade is to be observed with respect to the
combing industry — which in the other textile industries is more
or less a part of the spinning industry, but in the wool industry
constitutes a separate branch of special interest and importance.
Before the war the annual exports of combed wool amounted to
some 26,000 tons, representing a value of some 140,000,000
francs. During the war, however, this export trade ceased, one
may say, entirely ; according to French custom-house statistics,
the exports of combed wool in the years 1915, 1916, 1917, and
1918 amounted to only 107, 228, 253, and 269 tons respectively.
On the other hand, the imports of combed wool, which before
the war had amounted to almost nothing, during the war
acquired considerable importance ; instead of the 100-200 tons
received before the war, in 1916 the receipts amounted to
4,067 tons valued at 49,000,000 francs and in 1918 to 1,754 tons
valued at 35,000,000 francs.
Thus wool combing was practically a dead industry in France
during the war.
As regards woollen yarn and cloth, the same or similar
phenomena are to be observed. In the first place, a falling-off
in the exports : whereas in 1913 the value of the exports of
woollen yarn was 102,000,000 francs, in 1918 it was not more
than 1,000,000 francs ; and whereas in 1913 the value of the
exports of woollen cloth was 220,000,000 francs, in 1918 it was
not more than 40,000,000 francs.
The imports of woollen yarn and cloth, on the other hand,
THE FRENCH TEXTILE INDUSTRY 51
underwent an astonishing increase, as shown by the following
table :
VALUE OF IMPORTS OF WOOLLEN YARN AND CLOTH INTO FRANCE IN
1913 AND IN 1915-18
Million* of Franca
Year Yarn Cloth Total
1913 6 51 57
1915
1916
1917
1918
63 500 563
135 811 946
182 609 791
229 544 773
Thus whereas in 1913 the value of the imports of woollen
yarn and cloth was only 57,000,000 francs, in 1916 it was no
le<s than 946,000,000 francs — an increase of more than 1,500 per
cent. It was in 1916, however, that these imports reached their
high-water mark. In that year the value of the imports of
woollen yarn and cloth underwent an increase of some
889,000,000 francs with respect to that of the corresponding
imports in 1913 ; and if we add to this figure that corresponding
to the imports of combed wool, we find that the total increase
amounted to no less than 938,000,000 francs. On the other
hand, the value of the exports of woollen yarn and cloth, as
well as of combed wool, underwent a decrease of 434,000,000
francs. For the entire balance of trade, accordingly, the total
loss amounted to the enormous sum of 1,372,000,000, or almost
a billion and a half francs.
After 1916, despite the fact that the imports of raw material
continued to decrease, the imports of manufactured products
likewise decreased. The Government, to be sure, continued to
purchase considerable quantities of manufactured products
abroad ; but purchases of manufactured products for private
accounts were restricted by import prohibitions established in
France and export prohibitions established in other countries.
As regards the imports of English cloths, in particular, the
Anglo-French agreement of August 24, 1917, provided that
they were to be reduced to a limited proportion equal to
approximately one-third of the quantity imported in 1916. In
reality, however, this proportion was considerably exceeded,
D2
32 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
especially by reason of the direct and indirect purchases
made for the account of the Government to supply the needs
of the army. The decrease of the imports in 1918 as compared
with 1916 was considerably less in the case of yarn and cloth
than it was in the case of raw material.
The principal cause of this loss sustained by the French wool
industry is already known ; it was due to the fact that this
industry was largely concentrated in the regions invaded by the
enemy. According to the census of 1906 (the last offering
information regarding the matter), of 171,000 persons actively
employed in the wool industry throughout France more than
one-half (85,619) were in the Departement du Nord alone ; and
if we add to this the number of persons so employed in the
other departments which were partially or wholly invaded, we
find that the total is more than 116,000, or approximately
two -thirds of the entire personnel.
The wool-combing industry was entirely confined to the
Departement du Nord and the Departement de la Marne. Of
10,600 persons employed in this branch of the industry in 1906
no less than 7,200 were in the former department, which fell
entirely into the hands of the enemy, and 1,400 were in the latter
department, which was constantly within range of his guns. Thus
wool combing, which had come to be one of the country's most
flourishing industries, was practically wiped out during the war.
As regards the wool spinning industry, of 30,300 persons
actively employed in it, according to the same census of 1906,
some 20,500, or approximately two-thirds, were in the invaded
departments. In the Departement du Nord alone was concen-
trated one-half of the entire French spinning personnel, that is,
15,900 persons ; and in particular three-fourths of the entire
personnel engaged in the spinning of combed wool were con-
centrated there, that is, 12,000 out of 16,600 persons.
Moreover, the disastrous effects of the enemy invasion upon
the wool spinning industry is further shown by the figures
indicating the loss of mechanical equipment. Of approximately
2,000,000 combed wool spindles operating in France some
1,750,000, or seven-eighths, were in mills located in territory
THE FKKNCII TKXTILE INDUSTRY N
which \vas either occupied by enemy troops or menaced by
enemy gunfire ; of 369,000 twisting spindles, moreover, 315,000
were in the same regions ; while of 715,000 carded wool spindles,
finally, 250,000 had to be abandoned. Altogether, therefore,
the loss amounted to 2,315,000 out of 3,084,000 spindles ;
that is to say, during the war the French spinning-mills lost
" •") per cent, of the mechanical equipment at their disposal
before the war.
A- regards the wool weaving industry, the situation was but
-lightly better. According to the same census of 1906, of
121,000 persons engaged in weaving wool throughout France,
61,000, or approximately one-half, were in the Departement du
A:ord, and 82,000, or approximately two-thirds, were in all the
invaded departments combined. As regards the mechanical
equipment, of 55,000 looms throughout the country approxi-
mately 25,000 were in the region of Roubaix-Tourcoing, 4,000
in the region of Fourmies, and 6,500 in the region of Rheims ;
and there were also some in the Departement des Ardennes and
the Departement de la Somme. Thus two-thirds of the country's
looms were located in regions which were either actually
invaded or constantly menaced by the enemy.
In general, accordingly, it may be said that during the war
the French wool industry lost all of its combing machines,
three-fourths of its spindles, and two-thirds of its looms.
An effort was made, nevertheless, to augment the means of
production in the uninvaded parts of the country. It was not
easy to create new plants, however, owing to the difficulty of
procuring the necessary mechanical equipment. Before the
war the machinery used by the French wool industry came
from three centres of production — from the region of Roubaix-
Tourcoing, from Alsace, and from England. Inasmuch as the
first two sources were cut off, however, the only one left was
the third, whence the delays in delivery were truly terrible.
Where, moreover, was it possible to find the necessary operatives
for new plants, when those already in existence were desperately
short of help ? As a matter of fact, the number of entirely new
plants created was very small ; one may cite a combing-mill
54 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
with some twenty combers, the installation of some 35,000 new
carded wool spindles and a number of carded wool looms.
Besides this, the machinery of certain mills located in and
around Rheims was taken down and remounted in regions
where it could be operated in security from the enemy gunfire
— as at Elbeuf, Romorantin, Roanne, &c.
Towards the end of the war, however, these efforts put forth
to the end of partially rehabilitating the French wool industry
were rendered futile by the cutting off of the supplies of raw
material, which made it impossible for the French textile
manufacturers to use to their full extent even the greatly reduced
means of production left at their disposal. As indicated above,
the imports of wool, which decreased from 209,000 tons in 1913
to 78,000 tons in 1916, dwindled down to only 40,000 tons in
1918. The imports of wool from Australia, which was one of
the most important sources of French supply, fell off in conse-
quence of the renewal of the German submarine activity and
the French shipping policy adopted in consequence thereof.
French vessels were not authorized to make voyages as long as
that to Australia for the purpose of procuring wool, so that the
Government departments resigned themselves to the purchase
of manufactured products in less distant countries, especially
England, thereby economizing time and cargo space. The small
supply of wool that continued to come from Australia was
limited to the amount necessary for war purposes, and was
brought to France largely by English vessels navigating in
conformity with agreements concluded between the French
Army Supply Service and the British Ministerial Departments.
But it was not long before even these consignments were carried
only as far as Port Said, where they were transhipped to French
vessels ; and later even this became difficult, so that consider-
able quantities of wool purchased in Australia were held up
there indefinitely. According to the custom-house statistics
for 1918, the imports of Australian wool in that year amounted
to only 4,000 tons, or less than 5 per cent, of the annual pre-war
imports. Moreover, the agreement whereby Australia reserved
her entire wool production for England from November 1916
THE FRENCH TEXTILE INDUSTRY 55
to the end of the year following the declaration of peace, made
it necessary for French manufacturers to buy Australian wool
in England, which, however, allowed them to have only very
small quantities — 7,000 tons in 1918, or only 25 per cent, of
the amount ordinarily received from England before the war.
As regards the imports of wool from the Argentine Republic
and Uruguay, the second great source of French supply, the
shipping difficulties were not so great because the distance was
shorter. But in this case difficulties of a financial nature were
encountered, the unfavourable condition of French credits and
French exchange in the Argentine Republic having led the
more important business houses in that country, if not to reject,
at least carefully to consider the orders for wool placed by the
French Government. The credit of 100,000,000 pesos which
the Government of the Argentine Republic agreed to open for
us was reserved by preference for purchases of grain and
linseed for military uses. The available funds left over for
the purchase of wool were consequently insufficient, so that
the imports in 1918 amounted to only 17,000 tons, or approxi-
mately 20 per cent, of the annual pre-war imports.
It will be seen, accordingly, that the French wool industry
could not supply even the needs of the army during the war,
making it necessary for the Army Supply Service to resort to
the purchase of manufactured products abroad. This enables
us to understand why it was that, whereas before the war the
value of the exports exceeded that of the imports by some
400,000,000 francs, in 1916 and 1918 the value of the imports
exceeded that of the exports by 966,000,000 and 768,000,000
francs respectively. And even so, moreover, the demand of the
civil population for woollen clothing and furnishings was not
nearly as well supplied as it was before the war.
III. THE LINEN, HEMP, AND JUTE INDUSTRIES
The linen industry suffered no less than the wool industry
from the disruptive influence of the war. Although of less
importance than the latter, to be sure, it occupied a by no
56
means insignificant position among the various French textile
industries. Protected by import duties, it had not only suc-
ceeded in eliminating foreign manufactured products from the
home market, but at the same time had developed a consider-
able export trade, with the result that before the war it was
shipping ever-increasing quantities of yarn and cloth to various
foreign countries — even to England, the great competitor of
France.
Like the wool industry, however, the linen industry was
concentrated chiefly in the Departement du Nord, so that during
the war it was destined to suffer virtually the same fate.
The flax-spinning industry was confined almost entirely to
the Departement du Nord. According to the census of 1906, of
21,400 persons actively employed in spinning flax throughout
the country no less than 19,500 were in that department, while
of 572,000 flax spindles 510,000 were located there. The spin-
ning mills were nearly all situated either in regions actually
occupied by the Germans or else in regions constantly exposed
to their gunfire — as, for instance, the region of Armentieres,
which for a long time escaped occupation, to be sure, but was
completely devastated by bombardments.
The linen-weaving industry was more than half confined to
the Departement du Nord. According to the same census of
1906, of 66,000 persons actively employed in weaving linen
cloth 34,000 were in that department ; of 17,500 power-looms,
moreover, approximately 10,000 were located there, while of
20,000 hand-looms 12,000 were located there. Thus the only
weaving establishments that were destined to remain in the
possession of France during the war were those in the west and
in the Departement des Vosges — which means that the country
was deprived of more than three-fifths of the mechanical
equipment at its disposal before the war.
Even the mills located in the uninvaded sections, moreover,
were destined to be inadequately supplied with raw material.
The region of the Lys, which is the agricultural centre of the
production of French and Belgian flax, fell entirely into the
hands of the Germans. Italian hemp, on the other hand, was
THE FRENCH TEXTILE INDUSTRY 57
received only in limited quantities, chiefly because of the
n --tri< -tioii.s placed upon its exportation by the Italian Govern-
ment. Of special importance, however, was the cutting-off of
the supply of flax previously received from Russia, the greatest
flax-producing country in the world ; but since Russian flax
could be forwarded to France only via Archangel, the submarine
activity necessarily had the same disastrous consequences with
respect to it as it had with respect to the other raw textile
materials. Then, too, there were the difficulties created by the
Russian revolution.
Under the influence of all these factors the French linen and
hemp industries came to an almost complete standstill during
the war. Instead of exporting manufactured products, accord-
ingly, it became necessary to import them — especially for
military purposes, for the Aeronautical Service in particular.
The following table show's the imports of flax and hemp
before and during the war :
AMOUNT OF IMPORTS OF FLAX AND HEMP INTO FEANCE IN 1913 AND IN 1915-18
Metric Tons
Year Flax Hemp
1913 . 113,000 30,000
1915 . 3,000 8,000
1916 . 15,000 24,000
1917 . 8,000 14,000
1918 . 7,000 6,000
Thus the imports of flax and hemp combined decreased from
143,000 tons in 1913 to 39,000 tons in 1916, and again to only
13,000 tons in 1918, so that in the last year of the war they
amounted to approximately one-eleventh of what they were
in the year before the war. At the same time, moreover, the
French agricultural production declined on account of the
shortage of labour, as well as of seed, and the lack of facilities
for the processes of retting and scutching.
Deprived of its means of production and of its supply of raw
material, accordingly, the French linen industry could produce
only limited quantities of merchandise. It could no longer be
a question, so to speak, of shipping linen yarn and cloth to
58 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
foreign countries, so that whereas in 1913 the value of the
exports thereof amounted to some 73,000,000 francs, in 1918 it
amounted to only 7,000,000 francs. In order to supply her
domestic needs, on the other hand, it was necessary for France
to make large foreign purchases, as shown by the following
table :
VALUE OF IMPORTS OF LIKEN YARN AND CLOTH INTO FRANCE IN 1913
AND 1915-18
Millions of Francs
Year Yarn Cloth
1913 10
1915
1916
1917
1918
15 13
42 23
121 . 55
42 101
In the case of the linen industry the weaving mills suffered
much less than the spinning mills from the effects of the German
invasion, so that it is in the imports of yarn that the most
pronounced increase is to be observed, namely, from 7,000,000
francs in 1913 to no less than 121,000,000 francs in 1917. In
the same period, however, the value of the imports of linen
cloth increased from 10,000,000 francs to 55,000,000 francs.
In 1918, when France received but little flax from Russia on
account of the chaotic conditions prevailing in that country,
she also received less linen yarn from abroad, with the result
that the French weaving mills, which had been forced by the
lack of domestic yarn to make use of foreign yarn, found them-
selves deprived of the latter as well. England, in particular,
in order to keep her own weaving mills supplied, greatly limited
her sales of linen yarn ; at the same time, however, she continued
to sell linen cloth, having actually sold France considerably
more in 1918 than in 1917-47,000,000 and 21,000,000 francs
worth respectively. In general, the value of the imports of
linen cloth of all origins increased to 101,000,000 francs.
If we compare the foreign ttrade of 1917 with that of 1913,
accordingly, we find that, whereas in 1913 the value of the
exports of manufactured products of the linen industry ex-
ceeded that of the imports by some 56,000,000 francs, in 1917
THE FRENCH TEXTILE INDUSTRY 59
the value of the imports exceeded that of the exports by some
163,000,000 francs, the difference representing a loss of some
219,000,000 francs with respect to the entire French balance of
trade. In 1918 the loss was not quite so great, but was never-
theless appreciable.
Notwithstanding this decrease of exports and increase of
imports, it may be said that the consumption of linen goods by
the French civil population practically ceased during the war,
due to the fact that the people, instead of buying new things,
got all the use they possibly could out of what they already had.
And this also signifies a loss which, could it be evaluated, would
be found to represent a considerable sum.
With the linen industry, and especially the hemp industry,
is to be classed the jute industry, which is closely allied with
them technologically.
The jute industry suffered much less than the linen industry
from the effects of the German invasion. In this case, more-
over, the imports of raw material underwent a much less
pronounced decrease in the early part of the war, as shown
by the following table :
AMOUNT OF IMPORTS OF JUTE INTO FRANCE IN 1913 AND IN 1915-18
Year Metric tons
1913 122,000
1915 75,000
1916 78,000
1917 . 67,000
1918 9,000
Thus in 1916 the imports of raw material amounted to
approximately two-thirds of what they were in 1913 ; but
here again a new decrease is to be observed in 1917, and another
much greater one in 1918, due again to the renewal of the
German submarine activity and the French shipping policy
adopted in consequence thereof. France chose to employ her
ships for other purposes than for the conveyance of cumbersome
cargoes of jute from British India. The Government, which
60
EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
had great need of jute bags for military purposes, decided to
import the manufactured product, instead of the raw material.
The following table shows the value of the imports of jute
cloth before and during the war :
VALUE OF IMPORTS OF JUTE CLOTH INTO FRANCE IN 1913 AND 1915-18
Millions of francs
Year Value
1913 15
1915
1916
1917
1918
49
43
54
90
Thus the value of the imports of jute cloth in 1918 was
six times as high as it was in 1913. On the other hand, the
value of the exports of jute cloth increased from 17,000,000
francs in 1913 to 31,000,000 francs in 1918.
IV. THE COTTON INDUSTRY
Having considered the wool and linen industries, which were
the two textile industries most seriously affected by the German
occupation of the northern and eastern departments of France,
we may pass along to a consideration of the cotton industry,
upon which the war exerted a considerably less disastrous
influence.
Like the wool industry, the cotton industry had acquired
complete control of the home market before the war. There
is little doubt, however, that this was in large measure due to
the existence of import duties protecting it against foreign
competition. Like the wool industry, moreover, it exported
a considerable part of its output ; but unlike the wool industry,
it consigned three-fourths of its exports to French colonies,
where they were still under the protection of French import
duties, and only one-fourth to foreign countries.
The war was destined to place in the hands of the Germans
portions of the cotton industry which, though not as large as
THE FRENCH TEXTILE INDUSTRY 61
in the ca>e of the wool and linen industries were by no means
insignificant.
As regards cotton spinning, of a total of 47,700 persons so
employed throughout France, according to the census of 1906r
M»me 18,600 were in the Departement du Nord, which was one
of the three great centres of the French cotton-spinning industry,
the other two being the Departement des Vosges and Normandie.
Of a total of 7,500,000 spindles throughout France more than
2,000,000 were in the north.
As regards cotton weaving, the census of 1906 gives only
3,200 persons so employed in the north out of a toal of 118,000
throughout France. On the eve of the war the number of
power-looms throughout the country was 140,000 and only
13,000 of them were in the north ; but it is necessary to take
into account the fact that these figures refer to textile mills
manufacturing cotton cloth only and not to those manufacturing
mixed weaves. In reality, however, cotton yarn was used by
the weaving mills of the north to an appreciable extent not
indicated in the above figures — especially at Armentieres and
Lille for the manufacture of cotton-linen mixtures, and in the
Roubaix-Tourcoing region for the manufacture of cotton-wool
mixtures.
The manufacture of cotton yarn and cloth in the north of
France came to a complete standstill during the war, while at
the same time the country lost the output of a certain number
of mills in the east which fell into the hands of the enemy or
had to be shut down by reason of their proximity to the
firing-line.
In consequence of this curtailment of the means of production
it was to be expected that there would be a decrease in the
imports of raw material and in the exports of manufactured
products, as well as an increase in the imports of manufactured
products. It was also, to be expected, however, that these
changes in the case of the cotton industry would be much less
pronounced than they were in the case of the wool and linen
industries, since the former fell to a less extent into the hands
of the enemy.
62 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
The following table shows the imports of raw cotton and
cotton waste before and during the war :
AMOUNT OF IMPORTS OF RAW COTTON AND COTTON WASTE INTO FKANCE
IN 1913 AND IN 1915-18
Year Metric tons
1913 329,000
1915
1916
1917
1918
228,000
255,000
273,000
142,000
In the first three years of the war the falling-off, although
appreciable, was not enormous. In 1917 the imports show
a decrease of only 56,000 tons with respect to those in 1913,
that is, a decrease of approximately one-sixth. In 1918,
however, there is to be observed a new and very pronounced
decrease, due, as in the case of the other textile industries, to
the renewal of the German submarine activity and the French
shipping policy adopted in consequence thereof. The French
public authorities were of the opinion that for a nation at war
and intent upon victory the available merchant ships could
be used for more urgent purposes than for the transportation
of raw cotton from abroad. In order to leave more cargo
space for war materials, accordingly, and despite the resulting
disadvantages for domestic industry, they decided to restrict
the importation of raw cotton and to buy foreign manu-
factured products, which were less cumbersome and could
be obtained from less distant countries, notably England.
But if this shipping policy thus led to an increase in the
purchases of foreign manufactured products intended to
supply the needs of the army, the commercial and financial
policy adopted with reference to the requirements of the
civil population was calculated to diminish the supply ; for
the foreign purchase of cotton cloth for private accounts was
prohibited.
However that may be, if not in 1918, at least in the preceding
years of the war, the imports of raw cotton fell off very little
as compared with those of raw wool and flax. In view of this
THE FRENCH TEXTILE INDUSTRY 63
fact one would expect a correspondingly small decrease in the
exports of cotton yarn and cloth, as well as a correspondingly
small increase in the imports thereof. We shall see, however,
that such was not the case; that well before 1918, on the
contrary, these two movements showed a very pronounced
tendency to become accentuated.
In the first place, as a matter of fact, the above figures
representing the imports of raw cotton are deceptive for the
reason that they comprise both raw cotton (cotton wool) and
cotton waste, the custom-house statistics making no distinction
between the two. During the war, however, the imports of
cotton waste increased considerably for the reason that the
Ammunition Service used large quantities of it in the manu-
facture of gun-cotton ; thus the imports of raw cotton under-
went a much more pronounced decrease than is indicated in
the above table. The quantity of raw cotton received by the
spinning mills, and consequently the production of the French
cotton industry, decreased markedly in the first years of the
war, due not only to the enemy invasion, but also to the
scarcity of operatives, to the ever-increasing internal and
external transportation difficulties, to the shortage of coal
supplies, &c.
In the second place, moreover, it is necessary to take into
account a considerably increased demand for cotton cloth
during the war. In addition to the normal demand, there
was the enormous requirement of the army, which consumed
a very large quantity of cotton goods. With respect to both
the army and the civil population, furthermore, the great
scarcity and high cost of woollen and linen goods caused
the law of substitution to work in the manner in which it
ordinarily works with respect to textile products ; that is,
cotton goods were largely used in place of woollen and linen
goods. In the case of manufactured products of the cotton
industry, therefore, this accounts for the double phenomenon
of a pronounced decrease of exports and an enormous increase
of imports.
Yarn
Cloth
Total
24
385
409
5
185
190
11
302
313
13
275
288
10
244
254
64
The following table indicates the value of the exports of
cotton yarn and cloth before and during the war :
VALUE OF EXPORTS OP COTTON YARN AND CLOTH FROM FRANCE IN 1913
AND IN 1915-18
Millions of francs
Year
1913
1915
1916
1917
1918
Thus even before the year 1918 the decrease in the exports
of manufactured products was appreciable. In 1917 it amounted
to 121,000,000 francs with respect to 1913 ; and in 1918, owing
to the shortage of the supply of raw cotton, it was still greater,
amounting to 155,000,000 francs with respect to 1913. The
French colonies, deprived of French cotton cloth, had either to
procure what they needed from foreign countries or else to
restrict their consumption.
As regards the imports of manufactured cotton products, the
movement was as follows :
VALUE OF IMPORTS OF COTTON YARN AND CLOTH INTO FRANCE IN 1913
AND IN 1915-18
Millions of francs
Year
1913
1915
1916
1917
1918
Thus well before 1918 the imports of cotton yarn and cloth
had increased prodigiously. In 1917 they already amounted
to more than six tunes what they amounted to before the war ;
and with respect to 1917, if we reckon the increase of imports
with the decrease of exports, we find that the total loss for the
entire balance of trade was about 639,000,000 francs.
In 1918 there was a new increase in the imports of cotton
yarn and cloth, notwithstanding the fact that the foreign
purchase of cloth for private accounts was restricted by the
Yarn
Cloth
Total
33
56
89
129
383
512
230
366
596
283
324
607
486
648
1,134
THE FRENCH TEXTILE INDUSTRY 65
import prohibitions established in April 1917. English cloths,
in particular, which constituted two-thirds of the total imports,
were to be imported into France, according to the above-
mentioned Anglo-French agreement of August 24, 1917, in
a proportion equal to only one-half of the imports corresponding
to the years 1914, 1915, and 1916. This was a very small
proportion, being equivalent to only two-fifths of the imports
of English cotton cloths in 1916. If the imports of English
cotton cloths had been kept within the proportion fixed, they
would have amounted to only 9,600 tons ; as a matter of fact,
however, they totalled three times that amount, or 29,400 tons.
The excess over and above the specified proportion was due
chiefly to the direct and indirect purchases made for the account
of the Government. As stated above, the public authorities of
France, in order to economize cargo space in the vessels available
and thereby leave room for the transportation of war materials,
in 1918 adopted the policy of purchasing foreign manufactured
products instead of foreign raw materials, and in pursuit of
this policy they bought English cotton cloth instead of American
raw cotton.
Moreover, French imports of cotton cloth manufactured in
the United States underwent a considerable increase, especially
because of the purchases made by the Government ; whereas
in 1917 these imports amounted to only 800 tons, in 1918 they
totalled nearly five times that amount (3,800 tons).
In consequence of this self-sacrificing shipping policy which
France resolved to pursue to the end of strengthening her
military power to the utmost, the French cotton industry was
inadequately supplied with raw material ; and at the same
time the country ran heavily into debt as a result of its increased
purchases of foreign manufactured products. Thus in addition
to the losses France sustained in direct consequence of the
enemy invasion, there were the losses which she voluntarily
and courageously accepted to the end of ensuring the triumph
of the common allied cause. If we compare the foreign trade
in manufactured cotton products of 1918 with that of 1913,
taking into account the decrease of exports and the increase
1569.38
66 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
of imports, we find that the total loss for the French balance
of trade was more than a billion (1,200,000,000) francs.
In the ca'se of the wool industry we have seen that the loss
was more than a billion francs in 1918 and almost a billion and
a half francs in 1916. This affords an index to the extent of
the disaster suffered by the French textile industry during the
war. And in the case of cotton, as in the case of wool and linen,
it is necessary to remark that the demand of the civil population,
despite the large purchases made abroad and the great decrease
in the exports to foreign countries, was very inadequately
supplied.
V. THE SILK INDUSTRY
The history of the silk industry in France during the war is
quite different from that of the other textile industries for
various reasons, chief among which is the fact that it escaped,
for the most part, the disastrous consequences of the enemy
invasion. It did not, to be sure, escape them entirely. It was
deprived of some 60,000 schappe spindles in the occupied
regions, and it also lost the production of the looms in the
Departements de la Somme, de VAisne, du Nord, and de la Marne
— a production by no means insignificant. Proportionately,
however, these losses were not nearly as great as those which
were sustained, as we have seen, by the wool, the linen, and even
the cotton industry.
The silk industry was the only one of the French textile
industries which was able to maintain a heavy export trade
throughout the war. Before the war, despite the fact that
foreign competition had somewhat interfered with the develop-
ment of French spinning and throwing mills, and despite the
fact that foreign markets for French fabrics were becoming
harder to create by reason of the efforts which numerous other
countries were putting forth to increase their production
(especially the United States, where a truly remarkable progress
had been made along this line), the French silk industry had
succeeded in maintaining its important position in the world.
Thanks to the skill of its directors and workers, as also to its
THE FRENCH TEXTILE INDUSTRY
67
good taste, and especially to its extreme adaptability, which
permitted a continual adjustment of its output to the ever-
changing demands of its clientele, it was able constantly to
increase the great variety of its products. During the war it
continued to exhibit the same traditional qualities for which
it was famous, and at the same time managed to adapt itself
with the same facility to the greatly altered commercial and
economic conditions.
This does not mean, however, that the silk industry escaped
the blows of the war entirely. On the contrary, it was brought
face to face with difficulties of all kinds ; and while it managed
to surmount many of them, to be sure, at the same time it is
not to be denied that its productive activity was considerably
lessened.
This appears from the following table showing the movement
of the imports of raw material, that is, raw silk and floss-silk,
before and during the war :
AMOUNT OF IMPORTS OF RAW SILK AND FLOSS-SILK INTO FRANCE IN 1913
AND IN 1915-18
Year Metric quintals x
1913 198,000
1915
1916
1917
1918
93,000
132,000
124,000
145,000
In the first part of the war the decrease was very pronounced,
due to the fact that transportation from Japan and China
became very difficult. Later on, however, there was a recovery ;
the imports increased somewhat, and we do not note here, as
we did in the case of the other textile industries, any new and
pronounced falling-off in 1917 and 1918 due to the renewal of
the German submarine activity and the French shipping policy
adopted in consequence thereof. In 1918 the imports reached
145,000 metric quintals, or approximately three-fourths of what
they were in the year before the war.
The fact is that the silk industry had fewer ships at its disposal
than the other textile industries. Before the war it had about
1 Ed. Note. : Metric quintal = 100 kilograms = 222-5 pounds.
E 2
68
20,000 tons per annum, as compared with nearly 300,000 tons
for the wool industry and with more than 300,000 tons for the
cotton industry. Thus the maintenance of the available tonnage
at approximately the same level was less difficult for the silk
industry than for the other textile industries. Furthermore,
although raw silk is a very bulky material for its weight, and
one which consequently requires more cargo space, at the same
time it is a material of very great value, so that persons engaged
in the transportation of it, whether French or Japanese, are
always glad to accept it as a cargo because of the high freight
rates which they can charge. It is necessary to take into account,
finally, the fact that the Army Supply Service, and especially
the Aeronautical Service, had need of ever-increasing quantities
of floss-silk, so that the French merchant marine carried con-
siderable quantities of this material by priority. From 1915 to
1918 the imports of floss-silk nearly doubled, increasing from
42,000 to 79,000 quintals, whereas the imports of raw silk
increased but very little, namely, from 48,000 to 54,000 quintals.
As in the procurement of silk, so also in the manufacture of
silk, the industry had serious obstacles to surmount. The chief
difficulty was that created by the scarcity of workers, which in
the first few months of the war left idle two-thirds of the looms
and the majority of the spindles. Here again, however, the
correct solution of the problem was discovered and applied,
with the result that a notable recovery was made.
But the greatest danger that confronted the French silk
industry lay in the marketing of its manufactured products*
Silk being essentially a luxury product, what the French silk
manufacturers had most to fear was abandonment by their old
clientele, not only in France, but also in other countries —
especially in the belligerent countries impoverished by war and
forced to economize. This danger was increased by the fact
that some of the allied countries, notably England, in conformity
with a general policy of restriction rendered necessary by the
war were destined to prohibit the importation of foreign
merchandise deemed non-essential, especially silk articles.
In this connexion, however, it is necessary to remark that
THE FRENCH TEXTILE INDUSTRY
69
not all of the manufactured products of the silk industry are
luxury articles, and that for a long time before the war this
industry had sought to democratize its production. It continued
its efforts along this line in the first part of the war, and in so
doing was aided by the great scarcity and high prices of the
other textile products, so that silk came to be looked upon
almost as an article of prime necessity, taking the place of wool,
linen, &c. As already stated, moreover, considerable quantities
of silk products, especially floss-silk, were required for military
purposes, especially for the Aeronautical Service. Further-
more, the war, which was impoverishing the world in general,
had the effect of greatly increasing, first in the neutral countries,
and then in the belligerent countries, the incomes and purchasing
power of certain persons who became the natural clients of the
silk industry, especially as regards high-grade fabrics. With
regard to the import prohibitions established in England,
finally, it may be said that the suspension of this prohibition
with respect to French silks was to become one of the chief aims,
from the French standpoint, of the negotiations entered into
in 1917 — an aim which came to be fully realized by the Anglo-
French agreement of August 24 of that year.
Likewise in the case of manufactured products of the silk
industry the movement of the foreign trade shows considerable
fluctuations. The value of the imports of silk thread and silk
fabrics before and during the war are indicated by the following
table :
VALUE OF IMPORTS OF SILK THREAD AND FABRICS INTO FRANCE IN
1913 AND 1915-18
Millions of francs
Thread Fabrics
Tear
1913
1915
1916
1917
1918
5
1
4
19
38
49
23
46
58
50
The increase was especially pronounced, as will be seen, in
the case of silk thread, and it related almost entirely to floss-
silk thread, which, owing to the loss of the schappe spinning
70
EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
mills in the north could not be produced in quantities sufficient
to supply the demand of the Army Supply Service. In the case
of silk fabrics, unlike what we observed in the case of the
manufactured products of the other textile industries, the war-
time figures show no pronounced increase over the pre-war figure.
Of special interest in the case of the silk industry, however,
are the figures corresponding to the exports. Before the war
this industry was exporting approximately two -thirds of its
output ; that is to say, of some 600,000,000 francs' worth of
merchandise produced it was shipping some 400,000,000 francs'
worth to foreign countries. The following table indicates the
value of the exports of silk thread and silk fabrics before and
during the war :
FRANCE IN
VALUE OF EXPORTS OF SILK THREAD AND FABRICS
1913 AND 1915-18
Millions of francs
Year Thread Fabrics
1913 24 386
1915
1916
1917
1918
341
514
494
498
Total
410
362
547
521
515
Thus the total exports, after having fallen off somewhat in
the first part of the war, recovered rapidly, and in 1916 attained
an unprecedented maximum ; and in 1917 and 1918, despite
a slight decrease with respect to 1916, they were still greater
than they were in the year before the war.
As regards the exports of silk fabrics to England, France's
great foreign market, in the first few months of 1917 they
underwent a considerable decrease with respect to 1916 under
the influence of the English import prohibitions ; but in the
last few months of 1917, as well as in 1918, they recovered
somewhat in consequence of the above-mentioned Anglo-French
agreement of August 24, 1917, whereby French silks were given
free access to the English market. The result was that the
value of the exports to England alone, having amounted to
252,000,000 francs in 1916, increased to 281,000,000 francs in
1917, and again to 341,000,000 francs in 1918.
THE FRENCH TEXTILE INDUSTRY 71
But if in place of these value figures, which are influenced by
the rise of prices that took place during the war, we substitute
the corresponding quantity figures, we find the situation less
favourable with respect to the exports of silk ; whereas before
the war they ranged from 50,000 to 60,000 quintals, in the last
two years of the war, on the other hand, they averaged only
40,000 quintals.
Thus the silk industry, while it maintained a greater power
of resistance than the other textile industries during the war,
was nevertheless put to a very severe test. Owing to the rise
of prices, to be sure, the value of its exports, despite an actual
decrease in the quantities, remained about the same. At the
same time, however, the price of raw material also increased,
and consequently the total amount paid for foreign purchases
of raw silk and floss-silk. If we compute the total value of the
imports and exports of silk products of all kinds, including raw
silk, floss-silk, silk thread, and silk fabrics, we find that in 1913
the value of the foreign purchases amounted to 415,000,000
francs, and the value of the foreign sales to 589,000,000 francs,
the value of the exports thus exceeding that of the imports by
174,000,000 francs. In 1918, on the other hand, the foreign
purchases, under the influence of the intervening rise of prices,
amounted to 774,000,000 francs, while the foreign sales amounted
to 775,000,000 francs, the value of the exports thus exceeding
that of the imports by only 1,000,000 francs. The difference
between the excess value of the exports of 1913 and 1918,
amounting to 173,000,000 francs, represents the loss to the
French balance of trade as regards the silk industry.
VI. SUMMARY
Thus even in the case of the silk industry, the most favoured
of the French textile industries during the war, the balance of
trade shows a considerable loss with respect to the pre-war
figures. But it was in the wool, cotton, and linen industries
that the greatest losses, applying particularly to manufactured
72 EFFECT UPON FRENCH TEXTILE INDUSTRY
products, were sustained, amounting, as they did, to nearly
three billion francs.
But we have several times pointed out that the consumption
of textile products by the French civil population, despite the
decrease in exports and the enormous increase in imports, fell
far below the normal. This was due to the fact that voluntary
restrictions, and especially enforced restrictions resulting from
the rise of prices, import prohibitions, transportation diffi-
culties, &c., greatly reduced the number of purchases made for
private accounts. The majority of the manufactured products
received from abroad consisted of war materials, such as
uniforms and military equipment for soldiers, steel, powder,
rails, cars, camions, automobiles, wire, motors, material and
parts for flying-machines, &c.
It would be a mistake to judge the private consumption of
textile products in France solely on the basis of what was to be
seen on the main streets of Paris and the other large cities ;
for it is likewise necessary to take into account what was to be
seen in the smaller cities, as well as in the towns, villages, and
rural districts. If one could have entered the houses occupied
by the greater part of the French people, and compared the
condition of their wardrobes and linen-closets as it was during
the war with what it was before the war, one would have been
surprised to find how little there was in them, how little of that
which had been worn out and thrown away had been replaced.
But if the war left the French civil population without
manufactured textile products, it also left the French textile
industry without means of production, due to the incredible
depredations committed by the enemy. Thus the replenish-
ment of the wardrobes and linen-closets is not the task of to-day
or to-morrow. The most immediate task is the reconstitution
of the textile equipment, which alone will permit a re-establish-
ment of the pre-war balance of trade. Despite the serious
difficulties that are constantly arising, this work is being carried
on with the utmost energy in the liberated regions, especially
in the north, the principal centre of the French textile industry.
THE EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
FRENCH FINANCE
BY BERTRAND NOGARO
PROFESSOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAEN
CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION 77
I. PUBLIC EXPENDITURES ..... 78
II. SOURCES OF PUBLIC REVENUE .... 79
III. CONDITIONS OF THE BUDGET EQUILIBRIUM . . 88
IV. PAPER CURRENCY AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE . 93
THE EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
FRENCH FINANCE
INTRODUCTION
BEFORE we enter upon a discussion of French finance during
the war, it is necessary that we say a few words regarding the
financial condition of the country on the eve of the war. We
must recall, as a matter of fact, that even before the period
of hostilities the status of French public finance was rather
abnormal. The budget did not balance ; the fiscal system was
archaic ; and the general income tax, just voted, had not yet
been put into effect when the war began. On the other hand,
the monetary situation was excellent and the exchange favour-
able. The Bank of France had a stock of gold amounting to
four billion francs (four tunes as large as that of the Bank of
England) ; and while its note circulation amounted to nearly
six billion francs, the fact is that it could have doubled this
amount, in case of need, without exceeding the ratio customarily
maintained between the paper issue and the metal reserve.
At the beginning of the war, accordingly, the French Govern-
ment could easily obtain the funds it needed without having
recourse to loans or taxes. It was not until 1915, as a matter
of fact, that the first long-term loan was issued, and not until
1916 that the Government began seriously to concern itself
with the development of the public resources.
First we shall briefly consider the budgetary expenditures
during the war, and then we shall take up in somewhat greater
detail the budgetary receipts. After that we shall inquire into
the problem of the balance of the French budget, and finally
we shall devote a separate chapter to the role of the Bank of
France and the question of foreign exchange.
77
78 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
I. PUBLIC EXPENDITURES
In the first years of the war the French Government did not
lay a regular budget before the chambers. It was not until
November 13, 1917, indeed, that the Minister of Finance
submitted the draft of a budget for the fiscal year (Vexercice)
1918,1 setting forth the expenditures considered ordinary and
the corresponding receipts. It seems none the less expedient
to give here, at the very start, a general summary of the
appropriations voted by the French parliament since the
beginning of the hostilities, representing, as they do, a long
series of 4 provisional twelfths ' (douziemes provisoires), original
credits and supplementary credits :
Fiscal year Francs
1914 2 8,898,583,901
1915 22,804,486,525
1916
1917
1918
1919
32,945,145,169
41,679,599,629
55,192,338,060
44,180,456,444 3
Total . . . . . 205,700,609,728
This total of more than two hundred billion francs corresponds
to some estimated expenditures the amount of which was not
all paid out before the end of the year 1919, the estimates
slightly exceeding the actual disbursements. It is, nevertheless,
interesting to observe their apportionment, as indicated by
the following table :
Francs
Ordinary civil service expenditures ...... 15,726,550,339
Expenditures for the public debt 25,415,971,375
Military expenditures and extraordinary civil service expenditures 164,558,088,014
Total 205,700,609,728
1 Ed. note : ' L'exercice ' refers to a fiscal year for which accounts are kept on
the basis of accrued assets and accrued liabilities, as distinguished from actual
receipts and disbursements.
2 From August 1 to December 31.
3 These figures, submitted by the Minister of Finance to the General Reporter of
the Budget in the Chamber of Deputies in May, 1919, are incomplete. According to
a statement made by the Minister of Finance on December 30, the appropriations of
1919 amounted to 48,300 millions, instead of 44,180 millions, so that the total
appropriations amount to nearly 210, instead of 205, billions.
FRENCH FINANCE 79
II. SOURCES OF PUBLIC REVENUE
At the end of the year 1919 the revenue received by the
French Government since the beginning of the war totalled
as
Billion
francs Percent.
Ordinary receipts :
Taxes, Government monopolies and enterprises ... 31 16-4
Extraordinary receipts :
Advances of the Bank of France and the Bank of Algeria . 25 13-3
Treasury bills and short-term bonds ..... 49 25-0
Foreign credits ........ 33 17-0
Consolidated debt ........ 53 27-7
Total .......... 191 99-4
This table shows that the ordinary receipts of the French
Government sufficed to cover only a small proportion of the
total expenditures during the period specified. It also brings
to light the very great relative importance of the advances
made by the banks of issue, as well as the high proportion of
the floating and short-term debt with respect to the consolidated
debt.
Following these general observations, we will now examine
the development of the various categories of receipts in order.
A. Ordinary Receipts — Taxes and Government
Monopolies and Enterprises
The receipts of the French budget, that is, those corresponding
to the fiscal mechanism in operation before the war, aggregated
slightly less than five billion francs per annum. Accordingly,
we may estimate at approximately twenty-five billions the
revenue which could have been obtained from taxes and from
Government monopolies and enterprises between April 1, 1914,
and the end of 1919, if the fiscal system had not been modified
and if the returns had continued to be made on a normal basis.
As a matter of fact, the figures given above indicate a total
of thirty-one billions, that is, an additional six billions over
and above the estimated total for the period specified ; but
80 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
it is necessary to bear in mind that in consequence of the
mobilization, as also of the enemy invasion of a large and
valuable part of the territory of France, the actual receipts
were at first much less than the budgetary estimates — the
deficit having amounted to 38-6 per cent, for the last five months
of 1914, 19 per cent, for 1915, and 3-5 per cent, for 1916. It
was not until 1917 that a surplus appeared, amounting to
20-9 per cent,, in that year, 33 per cent, in 1918, and almost
100 per cent, in 1919.
It is to be observed, moreover, that this increase of receipts
in the last two years of the war and in 1919 is not attributable
solely to the recovery of the economic activity of the country.
From the figures furnished by the Minister of Finance, as
a matter of fact, it appears that the revenue derived from the
old taxes levied on the basis of the pre-war rates would have
resulted, despite the increased return from customs duties after
1915, in a deficit of some two and a half million francs for the
entire period considered. It is therefore to increases in the rates
of existing taxes and to the establishment of new taxes, that is,
to the fiscal measures that were adopted while the war was in
progress, that the difference between the returns that would
have been made on the basis of the pre-war fiscal system and
those that were actually made on the basis of the modified
system is to be attributed — a difference amounting to approxi-
mately eight and a half billion francs for the entire period
considered. And although the efforts put forth in France to
increase the public revenues were perhaps less vigorous than
those put forth in some of the other belligerent countries, it is
to be borne in mind that the combined effect of the fiscal
measures adopted during the war and of the steady return to
normal economic conditions enabled the French Government,
in 1919, to draw up a budget comprising receipts aggregating
nearly ten billion (instead of five billion) francs.
It therefore seems expedient to examine here the measures
adopted by the French Government since the commencement
of the period of hostilities to the end of increasing the ordinary
public revenues. These measures consist, on the one hand,
FRENCH FINANCE 81
of the increase of the rates of existing taxes, and, on the other
hand, of the establishment of new taxes.
As regards the new taxes established since August 1, 1914,
the first to be mentioned is the general income tax, which was ^
voted a few days prior to the commencement of the hostilities
(law of July 15, 1914), but was not put into effect until January
1, 1916, and was afterwards supplemented by further schedules
created in conformity with the law of July 31, 1917. Aside
from the income tax, the first great fiscal measure adopted in
France during the war was the establishment of *b£ wnr pmfifs <
-*.*iv (law of July 1, 1916). Then comes the military war tax ^
(law of December 30, 1916), an assessment upon citizens exempt
from military service and levied on the basis of the income tax.
The other sources of public revenue created during the war
consisted of a number of indirect jaxes : consumption taxes on </
colonial ware>, mineral waters, patent medicines, and amuse-
ments (law of December 30, 1916) ; tax on commercial payments ^
and luxuries (laws of December 31, 19177and June 28, 1918) ;
special tax on goods shipped into and from the country under
special derogation from the established import and export pro-
hibitions (decree of June 15 and law of September 29, 1917).
On the other hand, numerous increases in the rates of existing
taxes were voted during the period of hostilities. The general
income tax rate, increased first by a law of December 30, 1916,
was again increased by a law of July 31, 1917, and once more
by a law of June 29, 1918.1 The rate of the war profits tax was
likewise increased by the first two of these laws. Several
assimilated taxes were doubled and the securities tax was
considerably increased by the law of December 30, 1916.
The inheritance and bequest taxes were also increased by the
law of December 31, 1917, and the tax on corporate holdings
by that of June 29, 1918. The same applies to several indirect
taxes : tax on alcohol (law of June 30, 1916) ; tax on sugar,
light alcoholic beverages, chicory and coffee substitutes (laws
of December 30, 1916, and June 29, 1918) ; tax on vinegars
1 This law at the same time abolished the two old direct taxes, the personal
property tax and the door and window tax.
1569- iiS v
8% EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
(law of June 29, 1918) ; tax on transportation (laws of March 31
and June 29, 1918) ; tax on verification of weights and measures
(law of June 29, 1918). The registration and stamp taxes were
also several times increased and extended to new objects (laws
of December 31, 1917, and June 29, 1918). Finally, the selling
price of Government monopoly products and services was
increased : the price of gunpowder by the law of September 29,
1917 ; the price of matches by the decrees of October 1, 1917,
and May 26, 1919; the price of tobaccoes by the laws of
December 30, 1916, January 17, 1918, and May 27, 1919 ;
and the postal, telegraph, and telephone rates by the law of
December 30, 1916.
All of these fiscal measures were calculated to produce,
according to official estimates, an jncreaggjof ordinary receipts
amounting to approximately three billion francs per annum.
Farther on, when we come to study the conditions of the
budget equilibrium, we shall find that these receipts are
altogether inadequate for the requirements of the normal
post-war budget.
In concluding this brief exposition of the fiscal measures
adopted since the commencement of hostilities, it is sufficient
for us to set forth the essential features. The fact is that it
would be very difficult to discover here any indications of a new
fiscal policy in France. If the general income tax was not put
into effect until the war was in progress, the principle of it,
on the other hand, was established beforehand ; and despite
the successive increases in its rate, the comparatively small
return from it proves that it has not yet become a fundamental
part of the French fiscal system.1 Likewise the war profits
tax, weakly applied, has produced absurdly little revenue;2
1 The estimated return from the income tax was only 40,000,000 francs in 1916,
the rate having been 2 per cent, on all incomes exceeding 5,000 francs. This rate
was increased to 10 per cent, by the law of December 30, 1916, and then to 12-50 per
cent, by the law of July 31, 1917 (with exemption only of incomes of less than 3,000
francs). Finally, the law of June 29, 1918, established a progressive rate which rose
as high as 20 per cent, on incomes exceeding 550,000 francs. The estimated yield
on this basis amounted to 250,000,000 francs for 1918 and 370,000,000 francs for
1919, but the returns were not made regularly.
2 The rate of the war profits tax was originally 50 per cent. It was increased
FRENCH FINANCE 83
and it constitutes, moreover, an essentially temporary measure.
In general, accordingly, it is to be recognized that the French
fiscal system, both before and since the period of hostilities,
has been characterized by a predominance of taxes on articles
of consumption.1
B. Extraordinary Receipts — Advances of the Banks of Issue,
Treasury Bills, Short-term National Defence Bonds, Long-
term Loans, Foreign Credits
It follows from what has been said that the funds required
by the French Government for the prosecution of the war had
to be raised for the most part by means of public borrowing and
especially by treasury operations.
Advances of the Banks of Issue. Of the extraordinary sources
~oF~?evenue to which the French Government had recourse
during the w#r the first to be mentioned are the advances made
by the Bank of France. A law passed a few days after the
commencement of hostilities (August 5, 1914) ratified a clause
in the convention concluded with the Bank of France on Novem-
ber 11, 1911, whereby the latter bound itself to advance a sum
of 2,900,000,000 francs to the Government in the event of
a mobilization. The stipulated amount of the advance was
increased to six billions by a new convention concluded on
December 21, 1914, and ratified by a law of December 26, 1914.
The conventions concluded on May 4, 1915, February 13 and
October 2, 1917, April 5 and June 5, 1918, and March 5 and
April 24, 1919, and ratified by the laws of July 19, 1915,
February 16 and October 4, 1917, June 7, 1918, and March 5
to 60 per cent, by the law of December 30, 1916, for profits exceeding 500,000
francs. A subsequent law of December 31, 1917, applied the original rate only to
profits of loss than 100,000 francs, and increased it to 60 per cent, on profits from
100,000 to 250,000 francs, to 70 per cent, on profits from 250,000 to 500,000 francs,
and to 80 per cent, on profits exceeding 500,000 francs. But the returns made on
April 30, 1919, scarcely exceeded 800,000,000 francs.
1 According to the budget estimates for 1919, the indirect taxes were to yield
approximately 1,000,000,000 francs, th« customs duties 1,500,000,000 francs, the
sugar tax 1,000,000,000 francs (corrected to 300,000,000 francs;, the securities tax
285,000,000 francs, the registration tax (which includes the inheritance tax)
1,000,000,000 francs, and the stamp tax 260,000,000 francs.
F2
84 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
and July 17, 1919, successively increased the maximum of the
advances of the Bank of France to nine, twelve, fifteen, eighteen,
twenty-one, twenty-four and twenty-seven billion francs
respectively.
Conventions of the same nature were likewise concluded with
the Bank of Algeria, the advances of which to the Government,
fixed at a maximum of 200,000,000 francs by the convention
of September 6, 1915, were increased to 300,000,000 and then
to 400,000,000 francs (convention of September 23, 1918,
ratified by the law of October 8, 1918).
The advances actually made by these two banks are sum-
marized in the following table :
ADVANCES MADE TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT DURING THE WAR BY THE BANK
OF FRANCE AND THE BANK OF ALGERIA
Year Bank of France Bank of Algeria
Francs Francs Francs
1914 . . 3,900,000,000 3,900,000,000
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919 (Jan
1,100,000,000 75,000,000 1,175,000,000
2,500,000,000 50,000,000 2,550,000,000
5,000,000,000 60,000,000 5,060,000,000
4,650,000,000 130,000,000 4,780,000,000
-Apr.) . 5,250,000,000 80,000,000 5,330,000,0001
Total . . 22,400,000,000 395,000,000 22,795,000,000
These advances 'were made on conditions favourable to the
Government, which was to pay interest on them at the rate of
1 per cent, for the period of the duration of the hostilities and
the year following their cessation, and 3 per cent., including
amortization, thereafter.
Short-term National Defence Bonds. Recourse to public
borrowing was first had in the form of an issue of short-term
bonds, which were different from ordinary treasury bills and
were called Bons de la Defense Nationale. The issue of these
bonds was authorized by a decree of September 13, 1914, and
their interest, payable in advance, was fixed at 4 per cent, for
the three-months' issue and 5 per cent, for the six-months' and
1 Figures submitted by the Ministry of Finance to the General Reporter of the
Budget of 1919. On December 31, 1919, the advances totalled approximately
twenty-five billion francs.
FRENCH FINANCE 85
one-year issues. That they were very well received by the
public is shown by the following table indicating the amounts
subscribed for them :
-CRIPTIONS TO THE SHORT-TERM NATIONAL DEFENCE BONDS ISSUED BY THE
FRENCH GOVERNMENT DURING THE WAR
Year
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919 (Jan.-Apr.)
Total
Francs
1,288,334,000
4,974,584,000
6,311,458,000
6,946,624,000
2,813,981,000
7,454,134,000
29,789,115,0001
The ordinary treasury bills, carrying a lower rate of interest,
ceased to be subscribed for until 1918, when two successive
ministerial decisions increased the interest on them to 3 per cent,
for those running from one to less than two months, 3-50 per
cent, for those running from two to less than three months,
4-50 per cent, for those running from three months to less than
one year, and 5 per cent, for those running one year. Thanks
to these new provisions the subscriptions for the ordinary
treasury bills increased to more than 500,000,000 francs in
1919.
Long-term National Defence Bonds. It was not until Feb-
ruary 13, 1915, that the Government had recourse to a long-
term loan by the promulgation of a decree authorizing the
issue of ten-year bonds at 5 per cent. Another decree of
February 9, 1917, provided for the issue of a new type of bonds
known as Obligations de la Defense Nationale. These bonds,
called ' quinquennials ', were to fall due at the end of five years,
but were in reality to be redeemable at the end of the first year.
They were accepted in payment of subscriptions to the great
consolidating loans, whereof we shall have something to say
further on, and their issue was several times suspended, this
accounting for the irregularity and steady decrease of their
1 On December 31, 1919, the total amount for that year corresponding to the
Eons de la Defense Nationale was nearly 10,000,000,000 francs, making the total
floating debt amount to approximately 49,000,000,000 francs.
86 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
circulation. So it was that the amount of the ten-year bonds
outstanding, after having reached almost four billions before
the negotiation of the first consolidating loan, afterwards
declined to a few hundred millions.
The Four Consolidating Loans of the National Defence. In
the course of the year 1915 it seemed necessary to consolidate
a part of the short-term debt ; and the Government decided to
issue an unlimited loan in the form of rentes perpetuelles, that is,
in the form of annuities redeemable at Government option by
repayment of the capital sum (law of November 16, 1915).
The nominal interest was fixed at 5 per cent, and the issue price
at 88 francs. Subscribers, moreover, were secured against early
conversion by a provision according to which this loan was not
to be redeemable prior to January 31, 1931. The nominal
capital subscribed was 15,204,959,052 francs, and the amount
realized 13,380,367,662 francs, of which nearly one-half was
paid in cash.
A second loan was authorized by the law of September 15,
1916, and it was of the same character as the first — unlimited
in amount, with no fixed date of maturity, bearing interest at
5 per cent., irredeemable before January 31, 1931. The issue
price, however, was fixed at 87-50 francs. The nominal capital
subscribed was 11,513,978,260 francs, and the amount realized
10,082,452,967 francs, of which more than half (5,425,000,000)
was paid in cash.
The third loan was issued in conformity with the law of
October 26, 1917, and was likewise without a fixed date of
maturity, the rate of interest being 4 per cent, and the issue
price 68-60 francs. It was irredeemable before January 1, 1943.
The period of subscription began on November 26 and closed
on December 16, the nominal amount subscribed having totalled
14,803,096,000 francs, and the amount realized 10,171,202,000
francs, slightly more than half of which (5,133,894,000 francs)
was paid in cash.1
1 The law of November 26, 1917, also created a special fund constituted by budget
appropriations amounting to 60,000,000 francs per month to be used for the purpose
of buying in the rentes on the market, with the object of enabling the holders of
these securities to negotiate them.
FRENCH FINANCE 87
The fourth loan, authorized by the law of September 19, 1918,
was issued, like the first three, in the form of rentes perpetuelks.
The rate of interest was fixed at 4 per cent, and the issue price
at 70-80 francs. The amount of the subscription was unlimited,
and the redemption was not to take place prior to January 1,
1944. The proceeds of this loan were much greater than those
of any of the preceding loans, the nominal capital subscribed
having totalled no less than 30,690,456,000 francs, and the
amount realized 21,743,885,000 francs. The payments in cash,
however, represented only a third of this amount (7,099,283,000
francs), the payments in treasury bills alone representing nearly
13,000,000,000 francs. Thus it is, more than any of the pre-
ceding issues, in the nature of a consolidating loan.
The combined product of the four great National Defence
loans thus amounts to some 55,000,000,000 francs, this repre-
senting a nominal subscribed capital of 72,000,000,000 francs
and an annual interest charge of 3,000,000,000 francs. Although
the success of these issues cannot be denied, the existence of
a short-term or floating debt of 82,500,000,000 francs (not
including the advances of the banks of issue) brings to light the
imminent necessity of making a new appeal to the public, to
take place in the early part of 1920.1
Foreign Credits. Besides the advances of the Bank of France
and the Bank of Algeria, the issue of treasury bills and short-
term and long-term National Defence bonds, and the loans
offered for public subscription in the form of rentes perpetuelles,
the French Government also had recourse to foreign loans, which
constitute a small part of the floating debt and a greater part
of the consolidated debt of the country.
The two countries which gave France by far the largest
1 The first post-war consolidating loan has not yet been issued, but it was
authorized by a vote of the two chambers on December 30, 1919. This new loan is
to be issued in 5 per cent, bonds redeemable in sixty years by means of semi-annual
drawings. The issue price is to be close to 100 francs, and the redemption rate
150 francs. These bonds, like those of the preceding issues, are to be exempt from
taxation, and similarly the subscriptions for them are to be payable in treasury bills.
The repurchase fund created by the law of October 25, 1917, will be able to support
the market value of these bonds by permitting the Government to buy them in at
a figure not lower than the issue price.
88 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
amount of financial aid were EnglancLand the United States.
At the end of the first quarter of 1919 the treasury bills dis-
counted by the British Treasury amounted to 11,484,000,000
francs,1 while those taken by the Bank of England amounted
to^ l,639,000?OOQJrancs.
The loan operations conducted in the United States were
much more complicated, the most important being the following :
1. Issues of ordinary treasury bills.
2. A Franco-British loan made in 1915 at 5 per cent., whereof
the proportion falling to France, fixed at 250,000,000 dollars,
represents 1,243,000,000 francs.
3. An advance of 10,000,000 dollars made by a group of
American banks at 7-50 per cent., placing 518,000,000 francs
at the disposal of the French Government.
4. A credit of 427,000,000 francs proceeding from loans of
French cities (Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux) passed to the
Government.
5. Advances made by the United States Government at 4 per
cent., totalling 12,710,000,000 francs at the beginning of 1919.
It should be added, finally, that the French Government also
obtained, to cover certain necessary purchases, numerous credits
from Japan and various neutral countries. These credits, which
amount to scarcely 500,000,000 francs altogether, have already
been repaid in part.
III. CONDITIONS OF THE BUDGET EQUILIBRIUM
The period of extraordinary war expenditure and of military
occupation may now be looked upon as terminated, but from
this time on the problem will be that of raising funds to meet
the enormous temporary and permanent obligations which the
war has left. In order to appreciate the full importance of this
problem it is necessary to bear in mind, first and foremost,
that France, which is only half as wealthy as England, was
called upon to bear a burden of expense almost equally heavy
1 These bills are in terms of pounds sterling and are renewable up to the end of
the third year after the cessation of the hostilities.
FRENCH FINANCE 89
and at the same time has to provide for an equally large public
debt. We have seen, as a matter of fact, that the actual
expenditures of the French Government during the period of
hostilities amounted to approximately two hundred billion
francs, of which only about thirty billions were covered by
on iinary receipts, Th^yjqjSSc_debtHbefore the war having also
been approximately thirt^blllioji_francs, it follows that the
entire public debt after the war is equal to the cost of the war,
__ .„ A "" ' * •••• ' '
that is, about two hundred billion francs, and represents an
annual chare of so
ms even if we assume that the defeated enemy will be able
to make the reparations demanded of him, inasmuch as the
re-establishment of peace conditions implies a discontinuance
of the policy of borrowing, the problem now is that of devising
ways and means of balancing the budget with only the ordinary
receipts proceeding from taxes and from Government monopolies
and enterprises.
A first step toward the adoption of an ordinary budget was
taken in 1918. While continuing to vote the quarterly credits
for the defrayal of the war expenses, in that year the French
parliament was called upon to vote an ordinary civil service
budget, the first draft of which had been submitted to it on
November 13, 1917. This budget theoretically comprised the
permanent expenditures necessary for the maintenance of the
civil service, the public debt, and the corresponding ordinary
receipts. In the bill submitted to the chamber by the Minister
of Finance the civil service expenditures for 1919 were estimated
at 2,870,775,276 francs and the public debt (pre-war debt, the
5 per cent, loans of 1915 and 1916, the floating debt, and the
consolidated debt, including annuities and pensions) at
4,889,042,759 francs, the two together making a total of
7,769,818,035 francsT^As regards the receipts, on the other
ium?lr~t}ie~revenue proceeding from sources provided in the
existing legislation was estimated at 6,542,513,930 francs and
that proceeding from new fiscal measures under consideration
at 1,266,500,000 francs, the two together making a total of
7,809,913,930 francg>
90 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
On September 24, 1918, the draft of a second regular budget
was laid before the chamber, comprising the civil service
expenditures for 1919 and the corresponding ordinary receipts.
The expenditures and receipts provided for in this budget
amounted to almost nine billion francs (8,926,534,330 francs
in expenditures and 8,931,825,205 francs in receipts), thus
exceeding those of the preceding budget by more than a billion
francs. Like the preceding budget, this budget was severely
criticized by the parliamentary committees and this led to the
submission of a revised draft by the Minister of Finance on
April 17, 1919. The revised draft increased the estimated
expenditures to 10,305,361,755 francs, chiefly by taking into
account the arrears due on the new loan, and the estimated
receipts to 10,607,332,784 francs, by reducing the estimated
return from the tax on commercial payments and at the same
time taking into account two billion francs of extraordinary
receipts.
In the last analysis the balance of the regular budget, which
was adopted with but a few slight modifications, was effected
in a purely factitious manner by the inclusion of receipts of an
essentially temporary character ; and this budget itself was
incomplete, for it nowhere near provided for all the permanent
expenditures, since it included no appropriation for military
expenditures.1
To meet the expenses of 1920 the Government provided itself
with the credits necessary for the first quarter of the year by
calling upon the chamber for three ' provisional twelfths '.
These credits were approved by the chamber on December 30,
1919, and they amounted to 12,788,850,378 francs, which sum
was apportioned as follows :
Francs
Ordinary civil service expenditures . . 3,684,413,833
Supplementary budgets .... 394,403,424
Military expenditures 2,735,000,000
Extraordinary civil service expenditures . . 5,975,033,119
Total 12,788,850,376
1 A bill submitted by the Minister of Finance on June 20 to procure a billion and
a half francs of new revenue was voted down.
FRENCH FINANCE 91
It was not until January 13, 1920, that the draft of a complete
budget for the fiscal year 1920 was submitted. It was divided
into three parts as follows :
1. An ordinary budget comprising all the ordinary expendi-
tures, both civil and military, for the year 1920, and calling
for appropriations amounting to 17,861,140,000 francs.
2. An extraordinary budget comprising, on the one hand, the
4 extraordinary expenditures resulting from the war ', and, on
the other hand, ' the extraordinary expenditures properly
so-called ' ; the former were estimated at 6,615,279,055 francs
and the latter of 951,804,000 francs, the two together making
a total of 7,508,083,055 francs.
3. An account of expenditures recoverable from the payments
due in conformity with the terms of the peace treaty — virtually
a separate budget totalling 22,089,597,500 francs.
Thus the total estimated expenditures for the fiscal year 1920
amount to some 47,500,000,000 francs.
In order to meet this outlay the French Government, in so far y
as the account of recoverable expenditures is concerned, will/
have recourse to loans, the amount of which will be recovered
from Germany and her allies. The extraordinary budget will )
be met, up to the amount of three billions, with funds proceeding /
from the sale of national bonds and the balance with funds \
proceeding from new loans. As regards the ordinary budget, it
is to be balanced by fiscal resources estimated at 17,861,140,000
francs.
The return from taxes actually in force having been estimated
at only 9,367,800,000 francs, certain new taxes were established
which were calculated to yield 6,516,406,000 francs in 1920,
leaving a sum of two billion francs to be raised on provisional
account for the balancing of the budget. These taxes, however,
will amount to 8,271,000,000 francs in 1921.
The increased receipts provided for in the budget of 1920
were to be derived, according to a plan submitted by M. Klotz
together with the draft of the 1920 budget, from an advance
of the income tax rate and the securities tax rate ; also from the
establishment of various taxes on capital (notably on increments
92 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
in the value of real estate and additions to commercial capital),
and on articles of consumption (notably beverages) ; from the
modification of several taxes, such as that on amusements ;
from the constitution of a Government monopoly for the pur-
chase and importation of refined oils ; and finally from the
establishment of a tax on the turnover of commercial enter-
prises, which alone was calculated to yield some 4,200,000,000
francs.
The coming into power of a new Minister of Finance, whose
fiscal ideas appear to differ considerably froni those of his
predecessor, does not permit us at the time of this writing to
foretell with certainty what fiscal measures will finally be
submitted to parliament to be voted upon. A fortiori we can
make no definite prophecies regarding the probable return from
the taxes which will be established. We can merely recall here
that the aggregate of private-incomes in France was estimated
at approximately thirty -five billion francs before the war ;
but inasmuch as the ordinary post-war budget has to provide
for some twenty billion francs, it is manifestly possible to raise
such a sum only if it is admitted that incomes on the average
V C^' have nominally increased in consequence of the general rise
*0^- of prices and the augmentation of the monetary circulation.
^ In order to balance the budget, therefore, it will apparently
be necessary to retain in circulation for a considerable length
°f ^mie a large Part °f the paper currency issued during the war ;
and it will also be necessary to take into account the change
in the distribution of private incomes brought about by the
war in such a way as to throw the burden of the new fiscal
requirements as much as possible upon those whose incomes
have undergone the greatest increase. It must be recognized,
however, that owing to the absence of a general estimate of
each income before the war, it is in practice very difficult to
make a rigorous application of this principle in the establish-
ment of new taxes. The chief question at the present time seems
to be : Is the French fiscal system finally going to develop in
a manner analogous to the British fiscal system by the develop-
ment of the income tax or taxes on gains in wealth, or is it
FRENCH FINANCE 93
going to continue to be based primarily on consumption taxes ?
.Winning the last hypothesis to be realized, one may ask,
finally, whether by an ingenious combination of t real ' taxes,
affecting chiefly articles of luxury, the new French fiscal system
would not succeed in realizing the principle of progression to
a degree equal to that which would result from a broader
application of the income tax.
IV. PAPER CURRENCY AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE
At the beginning of this study we called attention to the
important role played in French public finance during the war
by the advances made to the Government by the Bank of
France. The maximum of these advances, as we have seen,
was fixed at twenty-seven billion francs by the law of July 17,
1919, with the reservation, however, that a payment of three
billions was to be made out of funds proceeding from the next
consolidating loan. These advances of the Bank of France
had as a necessary counterpart a corresponding increase of the
maximum authorized issue ; and so it was that the note
circulation was successively increased up to the maximum
limit of forty billion francs established by the same law of
July 17, 1919.1
This figure appears very large when compared with that
corresponding to other countries, especially England. In
regard to France, however, it is to be observed that the note
circulation was already six billion francs in 1914, and that from
three to four billions of gold and silver disappeared from
circulation. All in all, accordingly, the note circulation was
merely quadrupled. On the other hand, it is necessary to bear
in mind that the rapidity of the monetary circulation is much
lower in France than it is in England, because of the inadequate
development of the practices of deposit banking and clearing,
this necessitating a larger volume of currency for the same
volume of business. Finally, it is to be observed that the issue
1 In January, 1920, as a matter of fact, the note circulation amounted to thirty-
eight billion francs.
94 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
of notes not only enabled the French Government to secure
immediate advances and thus meet a part of its expenses
directly, but at the same tune, by increasing the amounts
available as savings, permitted it to meet an increase of fiscal
obligations which it would have been unable to meet with the
supply of currency that existed before the war.
In a discussion of French public finance during the war it is
V necessary to include a brief survey of French exchange and of
the measures adopted by the Government itself, as well as by
the Bank of France, to support it. Thanks to the solidity of
the French monetary system, as also to the position of France
as a creditor nation, at the beginning of the war the rate of
exchange with respect to all countries was favourable. The
decline did not commence until the month of February, 1915,
from which time it continued almost steadily until the end of
the year, until it reached approximately 10 per cent, with
respect to the English pound sterling, 12 per cent, with respect
to the American dollar, and 26 per cent, with respect to the
Dutch florin. In 1916 the rate of exchange remained approxi-
mately where it was at the end of 1915 with respect to England
and the United States, while it continued to fluctuate with
respect to the neutral countries. In 1917 and 1918 the value
of the franc remained stable with respect to the pound and the
dollar, but the exchange value of the latter began to decline
and to fluctuate with that of the franc in the neutral markets.
All this is easily explained. French exchange declined at
first in 1915 in consequence of the necessity of increasing the
imports when it was no longer possible to use gold for inter-
national settlements. It was then that the Bank of France
intervened for the purpose of obtaining foreign credits chiefly
in England and the United States. Afterwards the French
Government obtained the right to have its treasury bills accepted
first by the British Treasury and then by the United States
Treasury, the credits thus obtained enabling the French Govern-
ment, through the mediation of the Bank of France, to supply
exchange to French importers.
The allied Governments adopted similar measures to the end
FRENCH FINANCE 95
of facilitating the settlements corresponding to their purchases
in neutral countries ; but these measures were not sufficiently
concerted or on a sufficiently large scale to maintain a stability
of their currencies in neutral markets equal to that maintained
in their own markets.
After the armistice the French Government did not have
sufficient credits in allfed markets to furnish French importers
with exchange, so that the value of the franc began to fluctuate
independently in all foreign markets, finally declining to
a point lower than it had ever reached during the war. The
lowest point was reached on December 9, 1919, when the pound
sterling was quoted at 45-15 francs, the dollar at 11-80 francs,
the peseta at 2-45 francs, and the Swiss franc at 2-35 francs.1
The enormous excess of imports which has appeared since
the armistice, however, averaging approximately two billion
francs per month, leads one to suppose that French merchants
and manufacturers have succeeded in obtaining credits in
foreign markets. But it is obvious that credits obtained
individually and under varying conditions, and coming on the
exchange market as bills carrying the risk of private transac-
tions, do not have the same effect upon the exchange market
as large national credits affording a supply of exchange when
commercial bills are lacking.
The future of French exchange is therefore rather uncertain.
It appears only that it is dependent, until the undoubtedly
rather remote time when France will have a normal balance
of accounts, upon the possibility of obtaining sufficient foreign
credits and upon the manner in which these credits are used.
The writer is therefore of the opinion that, if the credits obtained
are sufficient for the present and do not rest too heavily upon
the future, the creation of a central agency, such as a bureau of
foreign exchange with sufficient resources at its disposal to
become a factor in the market, would constitute the most
efficacious means of stabilizing the rate of exchange and
progressively raising it to its normal level.
1 On February 7, 1920, it declined to 48-99 francs to the pound and 15 francs
to the dollar.
THE EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
FRENCH COMMERCIAL POLICY
BY ALBERT AFTALION
PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LIILE
CONTENTS
PAGE
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE NEW POLICY PURSUED DUR-
ING THE WAR ....... 101
THE PRINCIPLES AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW
POLICY 107
THE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED WITH
FOREIGN COUNTRIES 120
THE POLICY PURSUED AFTER THE ARMISTICE 127
o2
THE EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON FRENCH
COMMERCIAL POLICY
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE NEW POLICY PURSUED
DURING THE WAR
IT was not until some time after the declaration of war that
French commercial policy as regards importation began to
acquire a character quite different from that which it had before
the war.
At first it was the old policy, that is, the existing tariff
legislation, that was applied. This policy was modified, however,
in two important ways. In the first place, a series of measures,
laws and decrees promulgated in 1914 and 1915 interdicted all
commerce with the enemy and prohibited the importation into
France of all merchandise of German or Austro-Hungarian
origin ; and later on this same prohibition was extended to cover,
under certain conditions, all merchandise manufactured in
neutral countries with materials of enemy origin. In the second
place, a number of decrees and a law promulgated in 1914 and
1915 favoured the importation of certain kinds of merchandise,
especially food products, by suspending or reducing the ordinary
customs duties applicable to them.
Otherwise, it may be said that the principles in application
before the war were maintained in the early part of the war.
In other words, French tariff legislation at first preserved its
well-known protective character.
After 1916, however, the long duration of the hostilities,
coupled with the efforts which they caused to be put forth and
the general transformation of economic conditions for which
they were responsible, led to the adoption of a new policy
which was inspired by very different principles. The policy of
101
102 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
protection began to give way to a policy of prohibition ; that is
to say, instead of levying duties on merchandise imported from
abroad, it was deemed expedient to prohibit its importation
altogether. The prohibition was no longer applied to enemy
products alone, as in 1914 and 1915, but to those of the neutral
and allied countries as well. It was no longer a question of an
act of war, of directing blows against the enemy ; it was a
question of safeguarding the great national interests with a view
to facilitating the prosecution of the war.
In 1916, however, only a weak effort was put forth in the
direction of prohibition, and it was not until 1917 that the new
policy reached its full development. In that year prohibition
became general ; in theory, at least, it became the established
rule. It remained in force, moreover, until the cessation of
hostilities and even for some time after the signing of the
armistice. Nor was it peculiar to France ; for measures of pro-
hibition were likewise adopted by several of the other allied
countries, including England, Italy, Russia, and even the United
States.
Two closely related ideas lay at the foundation of the new
policy in France ; in the first place, the scarcity of the country's
financial resources, of its means of payment ; in the second
place, the necessity of giving priority to imports of the products
considered most useful to a nation at war. On the one hand,
therefore, were reasons of economy dictated by the unfavourable
condition of the national finances — reasons which rendered
desirable the adoption of measures to decrease the imports of
foreign products for the sake of the direct saving of money
resulting from a curtailment of foreign buying. On the other
hand, was the necessity of restricting or suspending the importa-
tion of non-essential products in favour of essential products.
These two policies — the policy of economy and the policy of
priorities — combined to result in the closing of the French
frontiers to a very large number of foreign products.
The unfavourable condition of the country's finances was due
to the grave modifications which the war had brought about in
its general balance of trade and balance of foreign accounts.
FRENCH COMMERCIAL POLICY 103
Before the war, to be sure, France imported more than she
exported. In the first place, however, the amount of the excess
imports was always very moderate ; it never exceeded two
billion francs per annum and was ordinarily much less than that.
In the second place, moreover, the country had various resources
on which it could rely to pay for these excesses, notably the
interest and the profit accruing from large amounts of capital it
had invested abroad. During the war, however, the revenue
from these foreign investments decreased more and more as the
hostilities continued, this applying especially to those in the
East European countries, Russia, Turkey, Rumania, and
Bulgaria. At the same time, moreover — and this is the most
important, the most alarming point — the excesses of imports
became greater than would formerly have been considered
possible ; instead of amounting to one or two billion francs, as
in previous years, the excess amounted to seven billions in
1915, fourteen and a half billions in 1916, twenty-one and
a half billions in 1917, and eighteen billions in 1918, making
a total of some sixty billion francs for the four years of the war.
The fact is that the simultaneous decrease in the capacities
of domestic production and increase in the requirements of
domestic consumption were more pronounced in France than in
most of the belligerent countries. The productive capacities
were greatly lessened both in consequence of the mobilization
and in consequence of the occupation by the enemy of several
of the country's foremost industrial departments. Out of a
total population of only forty millions no less than eight million
men were called upon to leave the fields and factories in response
to the call to arms. At the same time, furthermore, France lost
her beautiful wheat and beetroot land in the departments of
Nord, Pas-de-Calais, Aisne, and Somme, the majority of her
iron ore (which is extracted principally from the deposits of
Lorraine), half of her coal (the majority of her coal mines falling
either into the hands of or else under the fire of the enemy),
her great metallurgical establishments of the north and east,
almost all of her flax spinning mills and her wool combing and
spinning mills, a large portion of her cotton spinning mills, her
104 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
ss and faience factories of the north, and many other
industrial establishments.
During the same period in which the country was so gravely
deprived of its resources of men and materials, moreover, it was
called upon to satisfy the requirements of a disproportionately
increased consumption. Not only was it necessary to supply the
ordinary demands of the civil population, which had probably
not decreased a great deal, and certainly not as much as the
means of production ; but at the same time it was necessary to
satisfy that formidable mass of new requirements created by the
prosecution of a war which was destined to last so long and to
be conducted with such prodigious energy and such powerful
armaments.
It was inevitable that such disproportion between the greatly
reduced capacities of domestic production and greatly aug-
mented requirements of domestic consumption should bring
about a considerable decrease of exports and a very pronounced
increase of imports. This is indicated by the following table
showing the relative value of the imports and exports in the year
before the war and in the four years of the war :
VALUE OF FRENCH IMPORTS AND EXPORTS IN 1913 AND IN 1915-18
Millions of francs
Year Imports Exports
1913 8,421 6,880
1915
1916
1917
1918
11,036 3,937
20,640 6,215
27,554 6,013
22,301 4,723
Thus the value of the exports, which in the year before the war
had amounted to nearly seven billion francs, remained well
below that figure during the war, notwithstanding the pronounced
rise of prices that intervened. On the other hand, the value of
the imports, which had never exceeded eight and a half billions,
increased to no less than twenty-seven and a half billions in 1917.
This accounts for the enormous excess of imports referred to
above.
The pronounced increase in the imports at a time when the
FRENCH COMMERCIAL POLICY 105
exports were declining, and the income from foreign investment -
diminishing, brought to light, and aggravated more and more
every day, the unfavourable condition of the national resources ;
and this, in turn, resulted in a slow but continuous depreciation
of French exchange.
In order to check this depreciation, and at the same time to
strengthen its foreign financial status, the French Government had
recourse to various measures. Many of the foreign securities held
in France were resold abroad, while the Bank of France released
a part of its gold reserve for the purpose of opening new foreign
credits. Later on, moreover, the Government itself solicited and
obtained numerous important credits from several of the allied
and neutral countries. The sums advanced to France by
England and the United States (after its entrance into the war)
averaged more than a billion francs per month ; 1 and smaller
credit accounts were likewise opened with other countries, includ-
ing Switzerland, Spain, Argentine Republic, Brazil, and others . In
this manner the stability of French exchange was maintained in
England and the United States in 1917 and 1918 ; and the same
result was achieved to a less extent in the neutral countries.
But these credit arrangements, while they helped to remove
some of the contemporary difficulties of the war, were at the
same time calculated to make things worse for the future.
Formerly noted for the amount of her foreign credits, France was
destined to become a debtor, to see a daily increase, moreover, in
the amount of an outstanding obligation of which she could
not hope to rid herself for many years to come. It was obviously
necessary to prevent this steady accumulation of more and more
indebtedness, therefore, or at least to moderate the rate of
accumulation ; and inasmuch as it was largely due to increased
foreign buying, the only thing to do was to put a stop, in so far
as possible, to the purchase and importation of foreign products.
The existing protective tariff was insufficient for the accom-
plishment of the purpose. In the first place, it had lost much of
its force. French customs duties are not ad valorem duties, as
1 Up to the end of the year 1918 France had contracted a foreign debt of more
than thirty billion francs.
106 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
is well known, but specific duties levied according to the nature
of the merchandise involved. The general rise of prices that
became more and more accentuated throughout the war brought
it about, accordingly, that the duties collected represented an
ever- decreasing proportion of the value of the merchandise to
which they were applied. That is to say, their protective power
gradually diminished. In the second place, it was no longer
a question of protection ; it was no longer a question of safe-
guarding domestic production by preventing a lowering of prices
due to foreign competition. For prices were already high enough,
and nobody had any desire to favour a further rise. No, it was
merely a question of putting an end to an increase of imports for
which the country lacked the necessary means of payment—
a question of checking the increase of the national debt and the
depreciation of French exchange. In order to accomplish this
purpose the Government was not content merely to levy
ordinary, even increased, import duties ; it was impelled to
go still further and prohibit importation altogether.
The second of the two ideas referred to above, namely, the
policy of priorities, led to this same solution. Inasmuch as the
country's foreign financial resources proceeding both from its
exports and from its credit arrangements were limited, it was
obviously necessary to reserve them for the purchase of the most
useful kinds of merchandise. The degree of utility was gauged
with reference to the end to which everything was subordinated :
victory in the war. From this standpoint, accordingly, there
appeared a hierarchy, as it were, in the requirements of the
country. First and foremost, it wras imperative that it should be
able to purchase all the materials necessary for the prosecution
of the war ; and after that, within certain limits, the materials
and products essential to its economic life. It was obvious that
the procurement of the merchandise comprised in these two
categories could be favoured by restricting or suppressing the
purchase and importation of other less essential products. The
Government was therefore led to establish prohibition of im-
portation with respect to the products considered least useful to
a nation at war ; and the latter were in reality the only products
FRENCH COMMERCIAL POLICY 107
to which the measures adopted were intended to apply, how-
MM'ver general the prohibition may have become in appearance.
In a neighbouring domain, that is, in the domain of maritime
transportation, the same reasons — the unfavourable status of the
national resources and the necessity of giving priority to import -
of the most useful character — gave rise to a policy similar to the
new commercial policy. The measures adopted varied, to be
sure, according as it was deemed sufficient merely to license
u part of the merchant marine, or as it was decided to resort to
outright requisitioning ; but in both cases general programmes
were established with reference to the country's tonnage
resources, and in these programmes a decrease was made in the
number of ships to be used for the transportation of non-essential
merchandise, while an increase was made in the total tonnage
reserved for the necessary imports of the Government depart-
ments. Among the latter as well, moreover, priorities were
established, and provision was made for the transportation of
those kinds of merchandise in particular which were calculated
most effectively to satisfy the requirements of a nation at war.
The same reasons gave rise to the war-time shipping policy,
accordingly, as gave rise to the war-time trading policy, causing
them to pursue similar ends. The action of the former, moreover,
reinforced that of the latter ; for the products to which the
prohibition of importation was made to apply were generally
the same products to which the means of transportation were
denied. The shipping policy was even more rigorous than the
trading policy, as a matter of fact, since many kinds of
merchandise which were authorized to enter the country by way
of exception to the rule could not be brought there for lack of
cargo space in the available ships.
THE PRINCIPLES AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW POLICY
It was not until the second or third year of the war, as we
have already observed, that the policy of prohibition was
generally adopted and applied.
At first, it was precisely the reverse policy that was pursued ;
108 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
that is to say, far from even dreaming of the closing of the
country's ports to foreign products, the Government actually
opened them still further by the suppression or reduction of
various import duties. Such was the object of a series of decrees
issued immediately after the declaration of war, in the months
of August and September, 1914, with a view to facilitating the
importation of a number of necessary products, such as cattle,
horses, meat, and various cereals and dry vegetables. In 1914
and 1915, moreover, there followed other decrees whereby the
import duties applicable to certain other food products, as
well as to certain products of importance to the national
defence, such as rails, bridges, nitrates, jute bags, &c., were
either considerably reduced or entirely suspended. Finally,
a law passed on August 14, 1915, favoured in a similar way the
importation of the raw materials (paper and cellulose) used in
the making of newspapers.
We have remarked that certain measures of prohibition were
enforced from the very beginning of the war. The fact is,
however, that these measures had nothing in common with
the general prohibition policy subsequently adopted ; for they
related only to enemy merchandise and were merely a conse-
quence of the regulations interdicting all commerce with the
enemy countries. The decree of September 24, 1914, and the
laws of April 5 and August 17, 1915, contained rigorous pro-
visions designed to prevent the importation into France of all
products of German or Austro-Hungarian origin. Later on,
moreover, in consequence of a decision of May 15, 1916, the
same provisions were extended to cover merchandise manu-
factured in the neutral countries with materials of enemy
origin, when the value of the latter amounted to a proportion
of more than 25 per cent, (subsequently changed, with certain
exceptions, to 5 per cent.) of the total value of the product.
With respect to the two categories of merchandise just men-
tioned, however, it was stipulated that the prohibition might
be suspended at any time by virtue of a special decision of the
Minister of Finance — which meant that the Government reserved
the right to authorize the importation of certain products of
FRENCH COMMERCIAL POLICY 109
special importance to the national defence or to the economic
life of the country.
It was not until the year 1916 that there appeared the
prohibition regulations which gave the country's commercial
policy an entirely new character, that is, the regulations
affecting the merchandise of the neutral and allied countries.
O
The fundamental object of the law of May 6, 1916, was to
give the Government the necessary authority to check the
increasing invasion of foreign products. Two means of accom-
plishing this purpose were placed at its disposal: it might,
by decree, either increase the customs duties or establish
prohibition of importation. Prior to the middle of the year
1919 it has had recourse to the first of these two means only
in a somewhat exceptional manner, that is, only with respect
to alcohol and automobiles. It was destined to make very
extensive use, on the other hand, of its legal authorization to
prohibit importation altogether.
During the year 1916, however, the policy of prohibition did
not become general. The decree of May 11, as well as the
decrees subsequently issued in the course of that year, closed
the French frontiers only to a relatively small number of
products, chiefly luxury articles or articles of a more or less
superfluous character.
It was not until the year 1917, as a matter of fact, that
prohibition of importation was actually inaugurated as a general
policy with a broad application. It was in conformity with
a decree of March 22 of , that year, to be precise, that the com-
mercial policy of France as regards importation really entered
into a new phase.
The decree of March 22, 1917, established the principle of
general prohibition of importation with respect to all products
not purchased for the account of the Government. At the same
time, however, it made provision for two series of exceptions
to this rule ; that is to say, it provided that derogations from
the prohibition might be granted either in a general way or
within the limits of certain specified amounts. A Committee
110 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
on Derogations from the Prohibition of Importation was
created in the Ministry of Commerce with the object of con-
sidering, and submitting to the Minister, propositions, concerning
any general derogation to benefit certain products and the
limited imports to be authorized for certain other products.
The system provided for in the decree in question made
distinction between three categories of merchandise.
The first category comprised those products which were to be
looked upon as indispensable to the country, and of which it
was to be feared that only rather inadequate quantities, at best,
could be procured from abroad. In the case of these products
of prime necessity a general derogation from the prohibition
was established ; that is to say, it was provided that their
importation was to be subject to no restrictions whatsoever.
The second category comprised products which it was deemed
necessary to procure from abroad only up to a certain limit,
beyond which they would cease to be indispensable. This
idea is found to be a practical application of the theory of the
decreasing utility of products so familiar to contemporary
economic science. In the case of certain products, therefore,
the decree provided for limited imports and for prohibition of
importation beyond the limits specified.
The third category, finally, comprised products the foreign
purchase of which was held unnecessary, either because they
were less useful for the prosecution of the war, or because France
herself, or her colonies, produced the necessary minimum of
them. For these products prohibition was established. The
question is : Was this prohibition absolute ? While the decree
itself did not definitely settle this question, certain it is that
absolute prohibition was the logical sequence of the system.
For since the first category comprised products to be allowed
to enter the country without any restrictions whatsoever, and
the second category products to be admitted in certain limited
quantities, it follows that the third category ought properly to
have comprised products to be excluded altogether.
In a rational organization the second category would naturally
comprise the largest number of products. Economists familiar
FRENCH COMMERCIAL POLICY 111
with the above-mentioned theory of the decreasing utility of
products will agree that there are few kinds of merchandix;
whereof unlimited importation is desirable and likewise few
whereof no importation whatsoever is tolerable. The fact is,
indeed, that the utility of imports is generally great enough
up to a certain limit, which is sometimes very high and some-
times very low ; and beyond that limit the utility falls away.
The entire problem resolved itself, accordingly, into a question
of the quantity of imports to be authorized — a quantity which
it was necessary to determine from the standpoint of the given
circumstances, that is, from the standpoint of a nation struggling
to conduct one of the longest and most bitter of wars with
decreased resources at its disposal, and ready to resort to
almost any means calculated to ensure victory. For the
majority of products the problem was to determine this
quantity. The majority of products should have been placed
in the category of merchandise to be allowed to enter the
country in determined quantities.
The fixation of the limits constituted one of the chief functions
of the aforesaid Committee on Derogations from the Prohibition
of Importation created in conformity with the decree of March
22, 1917 — which committee was afterwards divided into several
narrowly specialized sub-committees comprising representatives
of various Government departments, and representatives of
industry, agriculture, and commerce. Having official statistics
at their disposal, and being in a position to benefit by expert
knowledge and experience, the committee and sub-committees
were called upon to determine, on the one hand, the war-time
requirements of the national consumption, and, on the other
hand, the war-time capacities of the national production. But
the difference between these two quantities could serve only
as a basis or starting-point for the fixation of the limits, since
for the totality of products it would probably have been too
large in proportion to the country's means of payment. After
the completion of this first task, accordingly, it was foreseen
that it would be necessary to undertake a second ; that is to
say, it would be necessary to group the various products together
112 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
in a general limited importation programme. In this way the
country's import requirements could be regulated with reference
to its foreign resources, and the different kinds of merchandise
could be compared with reference to their origin, whereupon
the necessary reductions could be made in the case of those
imports which were considered least useful, or which came from
countries in which the national means of payment were pro-
portionately smaller. Thus an effective effort could be made
to curtail foreign purchases with a view to keeping them within,
or as nearly as possible within, the limits of the national means
of payment.
The work done in this way to regulate the imports of private
parties, moreover, was designed to supplement and complete
that done for the imports of the Government departments.
A committee had been created to draw up a programme com-
prising the totality of the latter. The Government departments,
such as the Ministries of War, Munitions, the Marine, Public
Works, and Approvisionment, first made known their require-
ments of foreign products, whereupon their demands were
assembled and classified and then carefully examined and
compared with reference to their relative importance or
urgency. The Ministry of Finance, in turn, made known the
status of the national resources in the various foreign countries.
In this way it was possible to reduce the less urgent require-
ments and to authorize the purchase only of those products
which were considered the most useful or which could be
procured from those countries in which the national resources
were the greatest. An effort was made to adjust the importation
programmes as closely as possible to the available means of
payment by giving priority to the country's most urgent
requirements.
At first limited to the purchases of the Government depart-
ments, the importation programmes were afterwards made to
comprise certain private purchases, which were assimilated to
the former and likewise permitted to benefit by the credits
opened for the Government. In this way authority was given
for private purchase made in execution of the orders of the
FRENCH COMMERCIAL POLICY 113
Government, as well as for purchases of consortiums, of which
\vr >hall have something to say farther on.
The fixation of the limits for a considerable number of
products, a general application of the system of limited imports,
would have led, for private purchases intended to meet the
requirements of private consumption, to the establishment of
programmes similar to those of the Government departments.
Thus the combining of both would have produced a compre-
hensive programme covering all kinds of merchandise the
importation of which into France would have been officially
authorized.
As regards private purchases, however, the elaboration of
the programmes, the generalization of the system of limited
imports, was evidently a long and difficult undertaking. Not
only did it call for a very large amount of documentation, which
it would take a considerable length of time to assemble, but at
the same time it involved the necessity of making some very
delicate decisions. As provided in the decree of March 22, 1917,
itself,1 moreover, as soon as the limits were once fixed, a second
series of operations would be created as a necessary corollary
of the first ; that is to say, it would become necessary to
apportion the total amount of the authorized imports corre-
sponding to each category of merchandise among the various
importers or among the various industrial or commercial
groups ; and this would be a task sufficiently difficult in
itself.
While waiting for the completion of all this work, that is,
for the limits to be fixed and the corresponding amounts to be
apportioned, was the prohibition regulation to be rigorously
enforced, was all importation to be interdicted, at the risk
of seriously disrupting the economic life of the country ? This
did not seem expedient. Furthermore, the orders issued in
execution of the decree of March 22 authorized the aforesaid
committee and sub-committees to make special exceptions in
favour of certain products. Thus individual derogations, for
which the decree referred to did not explicitly provide, and
1 Last paragraph of Article 3.
1569-38 ,,
114 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
which the logic of the system perhaps implicitly excluded, in
reality became one of the most important measures adopted.
But it was well understood that the granting of individual
derogations constituted a vicious measure. When there is no
general plan of the national requirements to refer to, no compre-
hensive programme of the kinds and quantities of indispensable
merchandise, there is no secure basis on which to draw a
distinction between imports to be admitted and imports to be
prohibited. The decisions made consequently seem more or less
arbitrary ; and in order to escape this reproach, the authorities
do not dare to deny to some what they concede to others. The
derogations consequently multiply, with the result that the
imports quickly reach an amount greatly in excess of that which
would have been authorized by a definite programme drawn up
in advance. All of the various comparisons which have to be
made in the elaboration of a programme — comparisons of the
nature of the merchandise, of the requirements it meets, of
the quantities imported, of the countries of origin — are neglected
when the derogation demands are successively considered, day
by day, as fast as they are received. The utility of each one
is examined separately, and since most of them are always
found to offer some degree of utility, the result is that authoriza-
tions are given for the importation of numerous products
without regard to those already given.
That is why, since the evils inherent to the practice of granting
individual derogations were well known, an effort was made
to circumscribe the field of their application by favouring
limited imports of a certain number of products, pending the
time when it might be possible to undertake the elaboration
of a general importation programme.
It was the ideas just set forth that inspired the successive
orders that were issued in execution of the decree of March 22,
1917. The most important of these orders were those of
April 13 and September 8, 1917. The latter, which abrogated
and replaced those preceding, is the one which remained
longest in force and the one which constituted, as it were, the
FHKNCH COMMERCIAL POLICY 115
code of the matter. It distinguishes, not three categorii- <>l
merchandise, ;is did the decree of March 22, 1917, but only two.
On the one hand, there are the products to benefit by a general
derogation from the prohibition of importation and hence to be
allowed to enter the country entirely without restrictions. The
number of these products is small ; List A, which enumerates
them, includes chiefly food products (cereals, rice, vegetables,
potatoes, milk, fish), certain raw materials (phosphates, coal,
crude oil, nitrates), and agricultural machinery.
On the other hand, there are the prohibited products. This
category comprises the great majority, nearly all, in fact, of
the materials and products falling under the general customs
nomenclature. They are enumerated in Lists B, C, D, E, F,
and G ; that is, in reality, List B being itself divided into seven
parts, in twelve lists, for the most part very long.
With respect to all the products in this second category,
special or individual derogations from the prohibition of
importation may be granted in conformity with the opinion of
the qualified committees and sub-committees : the Committee
on Derogations from the Prohibition of Importation, divided
into seven sub-committees for the products of List B ; the
committee on fatty materials for List C ; the Committee on
wood for List D ; the committee on diamonds and precious
stones for List E ; the interministerial committee on metals
for List F ; and the committee on chemical products for List G.
Aside from the products comprised in the two categories of
merchandise just referred to, there are only ten or so articles
of merchandise falling under special regulations — articles
subject to absolute prohibition, generally speaking, either
because they possess a noxious character (alcohols, liqueurs,
brandies), or because the State reserves a monopoly on their
importation (sugar, tobacco, matches).
For the great mass of merchandise, therefore, the regime was
that of prohibition of importation, modified by the possibility
of special or individual derogations.
As regards the fixation of the limits, the order of September 8,
1917, made no mention of it. The purpose was not forgotten, but
H 2
116 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
an effort was made to accomplish it by other means, especially
by the general application of the policy of consortiums.
The consortiums were associations of joint purchase and
distribution instituted in conformity with an agreement con-
cluded between a number of merchants and manufacturers
on the one hand, and the public authorities on the other hand.
The latter established the regulation of their organization and
supervised their activity. They were of the nature of cartels,
operating under official sanction, with the understanding that
they were to submit to Government supervision and abide by
whatever rules were established in regard to prices, exchange,
transportation, &c. The Government authorized them to make
use of the credits opened by foreign Governments, even making
payments for them in foreign money and accepting reimburse-
ment in French money. In this way it sought to avoid the
heavy demands on the market made by the individuals for
foreign bills, and to stabilize exchange.
Likewise in the case of maritime transportation the Govern-
ment favoured the merchandise of the consortiums. Finally it
conceded them almost a monopoly of importation. It was with
this very object that the prohibition policy had been extended
to include a number of products of great utility, such as cotton,
jute, petroleum, oleaginous seeds, &c., which might logically
have been exempted from prohibition on account of the urgent
demand for the small quantities of them available. It was not
due to any desire to prevent their importation into France ;
it was due to a desire to reserve the control of their importa-
tion for the consortiums. Derogations from the prohibition,
that is, authorizations to import, were granted only to the
consortiums ; they were refused, in principle, to those who
abstained from associating themselves with the consortiums and
from falling in with the policy of restrictions, priorities, and
prices which the war imposed upon the country in general.
But if authorizations to import were given to the consortiums,
they were given only within the limits of certain fixed pro-
portions established by the Committee on Derogations on which
they were dependent — proportions, moreover, which were
FRENCH COMMERCIAL POLICY 117
made subject to the approval of the organization charged with
drawing up the importation programmes of the Government
departments. There can be no doubt that the creation of
consortiums greatly facilitated the establishment of the limited
proportions. It lies in the nature of the consortiums to centralize
the demands of their members in such a way that their total
foreign purchase requirements may be easily known, whereupon
the proportions may be reduced by making the eliminations
deemed necessary under the given circumstances. In the same
way there was facilitated the delicate task of apportioning the
amount of the authorized limited imports among the individual
buyers. It also lies in the nature of every joint-purchase
association to establish the rules according to which the mer-
chandise bought by it is to be distributed.
If, therefore, a very large number of consortiums had been
created, as was at first hoped, the difficulties connected with
fixing the limits and elaborating the rules of apportionment
would have been lessened, and it would have been possible to
draw up a general importation programme covering a very
large number of products. But the creation of the consortiums
itself brought up some very complicated and difficult problems,
so that the number actually organized was in reality very
small, including only those for cotton, jute, fatty materials,
petroleum, paper pulp, print paper, and Swiss wood. The
number of limited importation proportions established by the
consortiums was likewise very small, accordingly, and the work
of fixing the limits, which it was hoped would be realized by
the multiplication of the consortiums, came nowhere near
acquiring the scope which had been anticipated.
Besides the consortiums, however, other joint-purchase
associations were constituted during the war, namely the
so-called comptoirs. These were groups of manufacturers
engaged in buying foreign raw materials and transforming
them into the manufactured products required by the Govern-
ment departments. They were often created for the purpose
of meeting the conditions imposed by one or another of the
other allied countries, notably the United States, which, after
118 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
its entrance into the war, decided to permit the exportation
only of merchandise purchased by the allied Governments
through representative missions sent to America. The missions
made purchases for the comptoirs, paying for them out of the
credits opened for the French Government, and the comptoirs
reimbursed the French treasury in French money. The comptoirs
established much looser bonds among their adherents than did
the consortiums. They paid no attention to prices ; they did
not organize heavily capitalized companies ; and they realized
no profits. They merely assembled the foreign purchase
requirements of their members — requirements which were
themselves dependent upon the orders of the Government.
This last point facilitated the establishment of the limited
importation proportions permitted to the comptoirs. The
proportions were determined by the committee on which they
were dependent, that is to say, in reality, by reason of the
merchandise involved, by the interministerial committee on
metals, and were made subject to the approval of the organiza-
tion charged with drawing up the importation programme of
the Government departments.
The purchases of both the consortiums and the comptoirs were
assimilated to those of the Government departments and hence
given a place in the latter's importation programme. Aside
from that, moreover, the committee and sub-committees on
derogations were authorized (in conformity with the decree of
March 22, 1917) to establish limited importation proportions
to serve as a basis for the granting of special authorizations.
For certain products they made use of this right ; and they
further decided that individual derogations from the prohibition
should be granted only within the limits of the proportions
established. But proportions were actually established, as
matter of fact, only for a rather small number of products.
For the great majority of the products enumerated in the
twelve lists mentioned above, therefore, there were no limited
proportions ; it was a question of individual derogations
authorizing importation in unlimited quantities. But while
this was true of a very considerable number of products, it is
FRENCH COMMERCIAL POLICY 119
necessary to take into account the fact that the total value
of these imports represented a relatively small part of the
totality of French imports. The greater part consisted of the
imports of the Government departments and the assimilated
imports of the consortiums and coinptoirs.
However that may be, it is necessary to add that the practical
application of the policy of individual derogations gave rise
to the very difficulties that had been feared. Some of the
committees and sub-committees were undoubtedly rather
severe in the granting of the derogations, whereas others were
more lenient. In general, however, it may be said that much
liberality was shown in the authorizations given. The system
of individual derogations did not permit of such rigorous
restrictions as would have been necessary for effectively putting
a stop to the invasion of foreign products.
If we seek to determine the influence of the prohibition
measures by an examination of the custom-house statistics,
we find that between the year 1917, in which these measures
were applied only in part, and the year 1918, in which they
were applied in full, there was a pronounced decrease in the
country's imports. Computed on the same basis of values,
in order to eliminate the price fluctuations in the two years,
the imports decreased from 27,554,000,000 francs in 1917 to
19,915,000,000 francs in 1918. This represents a considerable
decrease, since it amounts to seven and a half billion francs,
or to more than a quarter of the total for 1917.
An examination of the custom-house statistics shows that the
decrease applied to a very large number of products, especially
to those largely intended for private consumption, such as
perfumeries and soaps, pottery, glass and crystals, certain
textiles, leather and leather goods, &c. But it is necessary
to guard against attributing the decrease entirely to the pro-
hibition of importation ; for the fact is that other factors
likewise had more or less to do with it. One of them was the
decrease in the merchant tonnage left available in consequence
of the German submarine operations. A second factor, more-
over, was the policy of priorities that was pursued in the matter
of transportation, especially maritime transportation, which
prevented the importation precisely of those products to which
the prohibition applied. Finally, there was the ever-increasing
scarcity of foreign products available for purchase, as well
as the prohibitions of exportation established in many countries
in consequence thereof. Thus the prohibition of importation
was only partially responsible for the falling-off in the imports,
and it is difficult to determine what was properly due to its
influence alone.
THE COMMEECIAL AGEEEMENTS CONCLUDED
WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Our survey of the commercial policy of France during the war
as regards importation would be incomplete if we failed to
include in it, a brief account of the commercial agreements
which were concluded with certain foreign countries.
Agreements of the kind referred to — creating, as they did,
important exceptions to the general prohibition regulations —
were entered into with England, Italy, Switzerland, and Spain.
Each of them was negotiated with a particular object, however,
and hence they differ from one another to such an extent that it
seems expedient to examine them separately.
Owing to the important role played by English merchandise
in the totality of French imports, our attention is drawn in
particular to the Franco-English agreement of August 24, 1917.
At the time of the commencement of the negotiations which led
to the conclusion of this agreement, as a matter of fact, France
had already inaugurated her policy of prohibition ; but England
had likewise entered upon the same course, and perhaps with
even more vigour. In the commercial relations between the two
countries, accordingly, France found herself in danger of losing
— on account of the falling-off in her exports of various products,
such as silks, wines, Paris articles, &c. — all the advantages
she had sought to gain by the adoption of measures to decrease
her imports.
FRENCH COMMERCIAL POLICY 121
But the situation was not the same for the two countries.
The war had dealt France a much more vigorous blow, depriving
her of many of her most productive departments, as well as of
a considerably larger proportion of workers withdrawn from
production in consequence of the mobilization.
In the year 1913 the commercial relations between France and
England were characterized by a considerable excess of French
exports, as shown by the following figures :
English Exports French Exports Excess of
to France to England French Exports
Millions of francs
1,115 1,454 339
In the year 1916 the state of affairs appears completely
reversed, the balance of trade indicating an enormous excess of
English exports, as shown by the following figures :
English Exports French Exports Excess of
to France to England French Exports
Millions of francs
5,967 1,118 4,849
On the strength of these facts the French Government succeeded
in inducing the English Government to abolish the prohibition
of importation which it had established with respect to French
products, doing so, moreover, at a time when France herself
was enforcing rigorous restrictions with respect to the importa-
tion of a number of important English products.
The Franco -English agreement of August 24, 1917, provided
for the free importation of French products into England, under \
reservation of the granting of a licence by the English Bureau
of Paris — which constituted a mere formality. Exception was
made only in the case of a small number of articles enumerated
in Table A annexed to the agreement. The fact of the matter
is, indeed, that French exports to England wrere actually cut
off in the case of only two articles of considerable importance,
namely, spirits (the value of the exports of which had amounted
to some twenty million francs in 1916) and dress feathers (the
value of the exports of which had amounted to some eleven and
a half million francs).
122 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
As regards English merchandise, on the other hand, if the
principle was likewise that of permitting its free importation
into France under licence, the fact is that this principle was
subject to more numerous and more important exceptions.
The principal articles of merchandise concerned were those
enumerated in Table B annexed to the agreement — cotton,
wool, and jute cloths, soap, oils and fats, wax and tallow candles.
The limitation was important in two ways. In the first place,
it involved products the imports of which from England were
very heavy, representing a value of more than 850,000,000
francs in 1916, of which textiles alone amounted to more than
800,000,000. In the second place, the importation of these
products was authorized only within rather restricted limits-
fixed at 50 per cent., to be precise, of the average imports of
1914, 1915, and 1916. But the imports of 1914 and 1915 had been
much lighter than those of 1916, amounting altogether, indeed,
to less than those of 1916. For the entire list of products
specified, therefore, the imports authorized by the agreement in
question represented scarcely a third of those corresponding to
1916.
Almost absolute freedom of exportation from France to
England ; freedom of exportation from England to France
with some rather important limitations — such, accordingly, were
the outstanding features of the Franco-English commercial
agreement of August 24, 1917.
As regards the results achieved, by drawing comparisons with
the period immediately preceding the conclusion of the agree-
ment, that is, the period in which the policy of prohibition wa&
being pursued in both countries, one would be led to expect, on
the one hand, a rather pronounced increase in French exports to
England, and, on the other hand, a corresponding, but some-
what less pronounced, increase in English exports to France.
As a matter of fact, however, if we compare the commercial
movement of 1917 with that of 1918, using the same basis of
estimate for the two years, we note a falling-off in this last year
with respect to both the exports and the imports of France ;:
in the case of the former it is rather slight, but in the case of the
FRENCH COMMERCIAL POLICY
latter it is quite marked. As regards the exports, this falling-off
wa> due to the general shortage of raw materials, coal, labour,
and means of transportation, which paralysed French industry
to such an extent that it was unable to take full advantage of
the favourable conditions which the agreement created for it ;
and as regards the imports, on the other hand, it was due to
the ever-increasing scarcity of purchasable merchandise in the
belligerent countries.
A careful study of French custom-house statistics, however,
shows that the Franco-English commercial agreement of August
24, 1917, produced to a certain extent, at least, the results which
it was expected to produce, especially with respect to French
exports. The shipments of French products to England had
rapidly decreased in the first eight or nine months of 1917, owing
largely to the influence of the English prohibition of importation
which had just been established. After the conclusion of the
agreement, however, the decrease stopped ; and in the period
immediately following, that is, in the last few months of 1917
and in 1918, an interesting increase is to be observed in the
French exports of silks, wearing apparel, wines, and fruits. The
agreement facilitated the exports, therefore, and did not
increase the imports ; in other words, it improved the French
balance of trade. Altogether, accordingly, it may be said that
the Franco-English agreement of August 24, 1917, was rather
favourable to French interests during the war.
The agreement concluded with Italy on May 80, 1917, was
of less importance in relation to the policy of prohibition than
the agreements concluded with England and the other countries.
This is to be accounted for by the fact that France was a creditor
of Italy and a debtor of the other countries. French paper was
at\ premium in Italy. There was no reason, accordingly, for
a rigorous enforcement of the prohibition regulations with
respect to Italian merchandise ; for since the fundamental
object of the policy, from the standpoint of France, had been to
prevent the increase of her foreign indebtedness, it could logically
be applied only to those countries which were her creditors. She
124
could therefore allow Italian merchandise to cross her frontiers
without suffering any great disadvantage therefrom ; in one
way, indeed, she even benefited by it, that is, in so far as it
caused her imports from Italy to take the place of those from
other countries in which her exchange was depreciated.
France could easily accept, therefore, the provisions of the
agreement concluded with Italy on May 30, 1917, relating to the
suspension of the prohibition which had been established in
both countries with respect to the importation of certain pro-
ducts. The agreement seems to have favoured Italian imports
of products such as wines, fruits, silks, &c., the amount of which
was notably greater in 1917 than it was in 1918 ; and it did not
prevent, on the other hand, decrease in French exports to Italy.
For the reasons given, however, France had no occasion to be
alarmed by this improvement of Italy's balance of trade. In
one way, as already stated, she even benefited by it ; for by
purchasing 1,832,810 hectolitres of Italian wine in 1918, as com-
pared with only 293,436 hectolitres in 1917, for example, she
was able to decrease her purchase of Spanish wine, of which
she imported only 1,198,573 hectolitres in 1918, as compared
with 4,583,003 hectolitres in 1917.
The fundamental object of the agreement concluded with
Switzerland on December 29, 1917, was to enable France to
obtain credits in that country, of which she was very much in
need owing to the unfavourable status of her exchange there.
With respect to a certain number of Swiss products, on the other
hand, including chocolate, watches and clocks, jewellery, em-
broidery, footwear, silk cloth and thread, and hat braids, the
prohibition of importation was suspended in France up to a
total monthly value of two and a half million francs.
The agreement did not prevent a decrease of Swiss imports
into France in 1918 ; in the case of the majority of the above-
mentioned products in particular, as a matter of fact, the actual
imports were less than the authorized proportions, less, moreover,
than the imports of the preceding year.
If the Franco-English agreement of August 24, 1917, was
FRENCH COMMERCIAL POLICY 125
intrinsically the most important of all the commercial agree-
ments concluded with foreign countries during the war, the
Franco-Spanish agreement of February 28, 1918, was certainly
the most instructive, on the other hand, by reason of the
effective manner in which it was applied. The fact is, however,
that the instructive character of the commercial relations
between France and Spain does not date from the conclusion of
the agreement in question, but from the immediately preceding
period. A study of the commercial relations between the two
countries in this period shows what a rigorously pursued policy
of prohibition could have accomplished, and a study of the facts
corresponding to the following period shows what could be
achieved by the establishment of a general system of limited
imports, a general importation programme.
In the last few months of 1917 it was decided that the French
frontiers, owing to the grave depreciation of French exchange
in Spain, as well as to the fact that it was impossible for France
to obtain credits in that country, should be strictly closed to
Spanish products intended for private consumption, and that
the granting of derogations from the prohibition of importation
should be provisionally discontinued.
This measure was maintained in force for some time after
the conclusion of the agreement of February 28, 1918, owing to
certain delays in the putting of the latter into application. Its
effects were uniformly-characteristic, the total imports decreasing
in the first half of the year 1918 to approximately a third of
what they were in the first half of the preceding year. The
decrease was especially pronounced in the case of products not
intended chiefly for war industries. The imports decreased to
25 per cent, of what they were in the first half of 1917 in the case
of ^varns and textiles, to 8 per cent, in the case of wines, to 7 per
cent, in the case of oils, and to 4 per cent, in the case of leather
goods. This brings to light what could be accomplished by a
rigorous application of the policy of prohibition.
The agreement of February 28, 1918, modified the situation.
It enabled France to procure Spanish credits amounting to
a total of 250,000,000 pesetas up to the end of the year, and
126
these credits, in turn, enabled her to resume the purchase of
Spanish products. France, on the other hand, agreed to sus-
pend the prohibition of importation in 1918 within the limits of
certain specified proportions, the products involved including
especially wines and fruits (bananas and oranges), as well as
essences for perfumery, cork in the form of slabs and stoppers,
and a few others.
After the agreement went into effect derogations from the
prohibition were again granted ; but the system of individual
derogations was abandoned. It was decided to authorize the
importation of Spanish products, both by the Government
departments and by private parties, only within the limits of the
credit of 250 million pesetas opened for the year 1918, in addi-
tion to credits of approximately 100,000,000 pesetas proceeding
from French exports to Spain. In other words, it was decided
to establish a general importation programme adjusted to the
country's financial resources in Spain, amounting, as they did,
to approximately 350,000,000 pesetas. Cognizance was taken
of the purchase requirements of the Government departments
and of private parties, and these requirements were carefully
compared with reference to their urgency in relation to the
prosecution of the war and the restrictions of private consump-
tion for which the war was responsible. The necessary elimina-
tions were made, and the 350,000,000 pesetas were properly
apportioned with respect to the various categories of merchan-
dise and the various classes of consumers. All importation of
Spanish products was interdicted beyond the limits of propor-
tions established in the programme.
The result was that in the second half of 1918 the imports in
France from Spain, while they were heavier than they had been
in the first half of that year, were considerably lighter than they
had been in the second half of 1917. For the entire year of 1918,
thanks to the suspension of the derogations from the prohibition
of importation, as also to the execution of the agreement of
February 28 and to the establishment of a general importation
programme, French imports of Spanish merchandise amounted to
scarcely two-fifths of those corresponding to the preceding year.
FRENCH COMMEBCUL POLICY 127
Their amount, computed on the same basis of valuation, totalled
568,000,000 francs in 1918, as compared with 1,348,000,000
francs in 1917. And a second result of the establishment of the
importation programmes was the application it was found pos-
sible to make of the principle or policy of priorities, that is, the
giving of preference to imports of products calculated to satisfy
the most urgent requirements of the country.
If it had been found possible to generalize the system adopted
with respect to Spain, as the French Government always wanted
to do but was unable to do, there is no doubt that the policy of
prohibition of importation would have been much more success-
ful than it was, both in decreasing the country's imports and in
favouring the procurement of those products which were con-
sidered most useful to a nation at war.
THE POLICY PURSUED AFTER THE ARMISTICE
With the war, or rather the military operations, at an end,
and the armistice signed, the problem of the importation policy
to be pursued presented new aspects.
Some of the reasons which had led to the establishment of the
prohibition of importation had disappeared, while the necessity
of giving priority to war materials obviously no longer existed.
It was to be hoped, moreover, that the invasion of foreign
products and the increase of the outstanding debt would no
longer be a cause for alarm, since the formidable purchases
which it had been necessary to make for the prosecution of
the war could now be discontinued.
When the situation was examined closely, however, it was
perceived that the old reasons for prohibition, while they were
somewhat modified, to be sure, and had lost some of their
previous cogency, nevertheless continued to exist.
There was still reason to give priority, if not to war materials,
at least to other materials and products essential to the economic
reconstruction of the country and especially of the liberated
regions — raw materials, industrial machinery, cattle and
agricultural implements, and certain indispensable food products.
128 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
In view of the necessarily unfavourable status of the country's
financial resources, the purchase of merchandise of this nature
could obviously be facilitated by prohibiting the importation
of other things of less utility.
There still existed, moreover, the danger of excessive foreign
purchases, of large excesses of imports ; for there was no change
in the great disproportion between the increased requirements
of domestic consumption and the decreased capacities of
domestic production. As regards the former, to be sure, the
greatest requirement of all, war materials, was eliminated ;
but in its place there appeared the requirements for the economic
reconstruction of the country. Furthermore, the absprption
power of the French market was very greatly increased by the
many allowances conceded by the Government to the families
of the mobilized, the demobilized, the widows, and the in-
capacitated, which, in addition to the income resulting from the
production of merchandise, represented a supplementary pur-
chase power of very great importance. The productive capaci-
ties of the .country were very greatly lessened, on the other
hand, both in consequence of the terrible devastations committed
by the enemy and in consequence of the heavy losses of men.
Besides the old reasons for prohibition, moreover, new
reasons also entered into consideration. It was clear that the
foreign credits which had been opened for France during the
war in the interest of the common allied cause would now be
closed, or at least greatly restricted, while the sources of revenue
on which she had been able to rely to pay for her purchases of
foreign products would be cut off ; and this, in turn, would
result in a further pronounced depreciation of her exchange.
While the national means of payment were thus destined to
diminish, there appeared the danger of an increased importation
of products of slight utility. The check upon the excessive
purchase of products intended for private consumption furnished
by the reduction of the merchant marine, as well as by the policy
of priorities pursued in the matter of maritime transportation,
was destined to be removed as soon as there was left available
the large amount of cargo space that had been reserved for the
FRENCH COMMERCIAL POLICY 129
transportation of war materials. This was a supplementary
reason for maintaining the prohibition regulations in force,
constituting, as they did, the only means of preventing excessive
foreign purchases.
In favour of the maintenance of the prohibition of importa-
tion, finally, there might be invoked the necessity of giving
a more vigorous protection to domestic industry during the
period of economic reconstruction. The renaissance of French
industry was destined to be accomplished under especially
difficult conditions, and with an inadequacy of workers, equip-
ment, raw materials, and means of transportation calculated
considerably to increase the net cost of the undertaking. To
maintain the tariff schedule adopted before the war was to
leave French industry without protection against the competi-
tion of foreign countries upon which the war had had a far less
damaging effect. It seemed absolutely necessary, accordingly,
to establish a protection which would have the double character
of being particularly energetic and at the same tune essentially
provisional. Prohibition of importation could serve to accom-
plish this purpose ; and more than an increase of the customs
duties, it offered the double character required. Having appeared
at a time when protectionist ideas were passing into the back-
ground, the policy of prohibition could now become a means of
reinforcing the policy of protection ; and at the same time it
tended to accomplish the purpose for which it had originally
been adopted, namely, to prevent the increase of the national
debt and the depreciation of French exchange.
It was at first decided to maintain the prohibition regulations,
accordingly, but only in part. The decree of January 20, 1919,
provided for a revision of the lists of products the importation
of which into France was interdicted ; for some of them the
prohibition was suspended, but for a very large number of them
it was maintained in full force. In short, no radical change was
made in the old system.
But the principle of free trade had made great progress in
men's minds. It was progressively reintroduced in many
interior transactions from which it had been excluded during
i
1569-38
130 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
the war, and there was a demand that the same thing should be
done in the case of exterior transactions. A protest was raised
against a regulation which was accused of creating trouble,
paralysing initiative, and at the same time tending to increase
1he cost of living.
Under the influence of these charges, doubtless, in the course
of the year 1919 there were adopted a number of seemingly
transitional measures constituting a preparatory step toward
a return to free trade or rather toward a protective policy
similar to that pursued before the war.
It will be remembered that the law of May 6, 1916, had placed
two means of checking foreign importation at the disposal of the
Government ; it might, by decree, either establish prohibition of
importation, or else increase the customs duties. This latter
means, whereof scarcely any use had been made during the war,
was now employed to facilitate the renunciation of the former.
The decrees of June 13 and 14, 1919, suppressed the prohibi-
tion of importation for the great majority of products, but at the
same time established ad valorem surtaxes, of 5 to 20 per cent,
over and above the amount of the customs duties in force. For
the majority of products this meant an abandonment of the
policy of prohibition and a return to the policy of protection.
As regards the surtaxes referred to, they were instituted by
reason of the pronounced rise of prices affecting almost all com-
modities, and they were intended to re-establish, to a certain
extent, the relation previously existing between the amount of
the customs duties and the value of the merchandise to which
they were applied.
The system of ad valorem surtaxes had only an ephemeral
duration. The decrees of July 7 and 8, 1919, sought to accom-
plish the same purpose as those of the preceding month, but to
do so by slightly different means.
But the prohibition regulations were destined to suffer
severer blows than those dealt by the decrees of June 13 and 14.
The decree of July 7 suppressed the prohibition for the majority
of commodities (especially textile products) to which it had
applied in June ; except for a very small number of products,
FRENCH COMMERCIAL POLICY 131
such as refrigerated meats, wheat, wines and liqueurs, and print
paper, it was entirely abrogated. As regards the first two of the
products mentioned, however, it was not so much a question of
preventing their importation as it was a question of reserving the
monopoly for the Government departments and permitting the
execution of the international agreements concluded with
reference to their purchase. As regards wines, except for certain
kinds, a decree of September 4, 1919, was destined to authorize
their free importation in unlimited quantities. As regards print
paper, the prohibition of importation was likewise destined to be
suspended by the decree of November 14, 1919.
Of whatever importance these special measures may have been
with respect to certain articles of merchandise, it may be said
that the policy of prohibition of importation was abandoned.
The Government therefore returned to its old protective policy ;
but in order to make allowance for the general rise of prices it
adopted a method of procedure different from that of the ad
valorem surtaxes, which were suppressed, by the decree of July 8,
1919. This decree, which was ratified by a law passed on
January 9, 1920, provided for the establishment of specific
duties, that is, duties levied according to the nature of the
merchandise involved. It was deemed inadvisable, however, to
establish a general increase of the existing duties with a view to
harmonizing them with the new price conditions ; in the first
place, because this would be a long and laborious task, and one
difficult to accomplish without the help of parliament ; in the
second place, and in particular, because it was felt that prices
were in an extremely unstable condition, of a nature such that
it would be more expedient to have recourse only to measures of
an essentially provisional or temporary character. The specific
duties established in the existing tariff schedule were accordingly
maintained, but for a number of products they were increased
according to certain specified coefficients, that is, they were
multiplied, for example, by two or by three or by five. The
coefficients were subjected to periodical revision with a view to
permitting their frequent readjustment to the new conditions
brought about by the fluctuating prices of commodities.
i2
132 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
It will be seen that the adoption of the system of coefficients
does not constitute the inauguration of a new commercial policy,
but is merely a return to the old protective policy. It is merely
a provisional measure calculated to adjust the customs duties to
the new price conditions, pending the time when the latter become
more stable. Then it will be possible to effect the complete
revision of the tariff schedule rendered necessary by the general
disruption of economic conditions in France and other countries.
The special war-tune policy, that is, the policy of prohibition
of importation, thus ceased to exist. The agreements concluded
with certain foreign countries for the purpose of attenuating the
rigour of the policy no longer had any raison d'etre, consequently,
and were therefore cancelled. The Franco-English agreement of
August 24, 1917, as well as the subsequent covenant of May 15,
1919, which modified its terms, were denounced by England and
were no longer effective after October 27, 1919. The agreement
concluded with Spain on February 28, 1918, was not renewed at
the time of its expiration. The Franco-Italian agreement of
May 30, 1917, was not denounced, but it no longer had any im-
portance with respect to the importation of Italian merchandise
by reason of the almost general suppression of the prohibition
regulations. As regards the agreement concluded with Switzer-
land on December 29, 1917, and renewed on March 25, 1919,
it expired on December 31, 1919 ; but with respect to watches
and clocks, as well as to embroideries, it was modified by two
special agreements which were prolonged to January 31, 1920.
Thus the policy of prohibition of importation may be said to
have won the day. The imports of foreign merchandise into
France, no longer hindered by the prohibition regulations, or by
the scarcity of cargo space, or by the policy of priorities, under-
went a considerable increase in 1919. Notwithstanding the fact
that the purchases of war materials ceased, the excess of imports
was considerably greater in that year than it was in 1918,
amounting to some 24,000,000 francs. Since the foreign credits
which had been opened for the French Government during
the war were either entirely suppressed or greatly reduced, on the
other hand, the foreign rate of exchange rose, as far-sighted
FRENCH COMMERCIAL POLICY 133
people had foreseen would happen, to truly disastrous heights,
the American dollar, the Spanish peseta, the Swiss franc, and
the Dutch florin being now (last part of January 1920) quoted
in Paris at two and a half times par, and the English pound and
the Swedish krone at two times par. If it is impossible for France
to return to the regime of prohibition of importation, it is of the
utmost importance for her to obtain foreign credits while
waiting for Germany to make reparations imposed upon her in
conformity with the terms of the peace treaty. The definitive
improvement of the country's economic condition can be brought
about only by a considerable development of its productive
capacity and export trade ; but it is necessary to bear in mind
that it will be a long time, owing to the condition in which the
war has left the country in general, and the invaded regions in
particular, before this development can be fully realized.
THE EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
LABOUR IN FRANCE
BY WILLIAM OUALID
PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE FACULTY OF LAW
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF STRASSBURG
CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION : THE MOBILIZATION AND ITS CONSE-
QUENCES 139
«
CHAPTER I : UNEMPLOYMENT . . 141
CHAPTER II : THE PLACING OF WORKERS . . .144
CHAPTER III : THE LABOUR MARKET .... 148
Section 1 : Military Labour . . '. . .150
Section 2 : Female Labour . . 156
Section 3 : Foreign and Colonial Labour . . .163
CHAPTER IV : THE ROLE AND CONTROL OF THE STATE 168
Section 1 : ^The Control of Labour .... 168
Section 2 : Wages 170
Section 3 : Strikes, Syndical Action, and Arbitration 178
CHAPTER V : LABOUR AND THE DEMOBILIZATION 187
THE EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
LABOUR IN FRANCE1
INTRODUCTION : THE MOBILIZATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
THE mobilization decree came as a surprise when the
people of France were hard at work. It was precisely at
harvest time. The young and able-bodied men hurried from
the fields and left the old men, women, and children to gather
the crops. Three and a half million reservists flocked to the
military depots. Almost half (47 per cent.) of the factories,
stores, and offices closed their doors, and their personnel
was either mobilized (22 per cent.) or discharged (44 per
cent.). In the establishments left open only a third (34 per
cent.) of the previous personnel remained.2 Two million
workers, soon to be reinforced by thousands of refugees from
the invaded regions and from Belgium, found themselves
without employment.
1 The chief sources consulted in the preparation of this study were :
(a) Le Bulletin du Minister e du Travail (fran^ais) ;
(b) Le Bulletin des Usines de Guerre (published from 1916 to 1918 by the Ministry
of Munitions) ;
(c) Le Bulletin de r Association pour la Lutte contre le Cltomage.
Furthermore, the writer, who held an important position in the Ministry of
Munitions during the war and was previously connected with the Ministry of Labour,
has supplemented his personal observations and recollections with a large amount of
material collected and formulated by him.
2 Thus an investigation conducted by the Inspectors of Labour (an investigation
hereafter to be conducted at regular intervals for the purpose of providing means
whereby to measure the economic recovery of the country) shows that of 37,168
industrial and commercial establishments, employing 1,272,160 persons in normal
times, 19,355 (53 per cent.), employing 439,346 persons (34 per cent.), remained
active in August, 1914. The hardest hit were the building trade, in which the
personnel decreased from 59,747 to 10,059 (16 per cent.), thewood industry (71,253
to 17.671—24 per cent.), the steel and iron industry (311,660 to 101,595—39 per
cent.), the clothing industry (115,692 to 38,298—33 per cent.), and the textile
industry (258,967 to 94,412—36 per cent.). The least affected were the carrying
trade (24,468 to 13,052—53 per cent.), and the food industry (83,371 to 43,418—
56 per cent.).
139
140 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
It was necessary to take action with all possible speed. No
employment agency in time of peace could have met the
situation created by this extraordinary combination of cir-
cumstances— a sudden afflux of workers, an absence of the
means of production. The war industries were in the stage of
experimentation and organization. The employment offices
of the labour syndicates, which in the first half of 1914 had
placed 49,302 workers, were deprived of their personnel ; and
they were especially concerned, moreover, with the placing of
workers in the food industry. The public employment bureaus
instituted by the law of March 14, 1904, were manifestly too
few in number and too narrow in their range of activity. Of
200 cities with more than ten thousand inhabitants legally
authorized to establish such bureaus, only 127 actually pos-
sessed them. Altogether they placed only 84,000 workers,
chiefly in their own localities. These employment bureaus
constituted but an inadequate resource, therefore, and it was
imperative for the Government to adopt some measure calcu-
lated to furnish the immediate relief which the situation de-
manded. On August 20, 1914, it created the National Unem-
ployment Fund (Fonds National de Ch&mage) by voting an
appropriation of 20,000,000 francs to be used for the aid of
unemployed workers. Shortly afterwards, on October 28, 1914,
it established the Central Office for the Placing of Unemployed
Workers and Refugees (VOffice Central de Placement des Cho-
meurs et des Refugies), which at first served as a genuine agency
of direct placement and later became a model of inspiration
for the unification and coordination of the regional and
departmental bureaus that were in turn created.
In these two ways, that is, in the aiding and placing of
unemployed workers, the French Government entered into an
entirely new field of activity, a field in which it had been
practically a stranger before the war. For this reason the step
merits consideration at the very start — all the more so because
the figures showing the number of unemployed workers aided
and placed furnish a true index to the fluctuations of the
country's economic activity during the war. The steady de-
LABOUR IN FRANCE 141
crease in the number aided and the steady increase in the
number placed indicate the efforts that were put forth and the
results that were achieved.
CHAPTER I : UNEMPLOYMENT
THE National Unemployment Fund was created by the
Ministry of Labour. It was a veritable innovation, for previ-
ously the French Government had abstained from the granting
of pecuniary aid to able-bodied workers, while in general the
country's decreasing population had constituted an effective
guarantee against chronic unemployment. The Fund referred
to has been in existence since August 24, 1914, and its field of
operation is limited chiefly to Paris. Its mechanism is as
follows : In each department or in each city of at least five
thousand inhabitants the local authorities are invited to
establish, under the name of the Unemployment Fund (Fonds
de Chomage], a service directed by a joint committee for the
distribution of aid, either in money or in kind, to unemployed
workers. The Government, represented by the National Un-
employment Fund, reimburses the local authorities to the
extent of one-third of the sums distributed by them, but with
the understanding that the amount of their individual dis-
bursements shall not exceed 1-25 francs per diem for the head
of a family, plus 50 centimes for each person dependent upon
him. This system is supplemented, of course, by the ordinary
subsidies granted to the unemployment insurance societies and
by governmental participation in the defrayal of the travelling
expenses of persons out of work.
At the beginning of the war more than 400,000 unemployed
workers were registered in the Paris Unemployment Fund.
On October 15, 1914, only 293,824 persons were receiving
allowances from it, and on December 31, 1914, the number had
further decreased to 230,765. In five months it furnished
pecuniary aid to the amount of 23,500,000 francs. After 1915
there was a gradual decrease in the number of unemployed
142 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
throughout the country. In the Department of the Seine
(Paris and suburbs) it declined from 285,248 on January 1, 1915,
to 97,229 on January 1, 1916 ; then to 35,238 on January 1,
1917, and again to 15,039 on January 1, 1918. The total dis-
bursements, which amounted to 62,244,242 francs in 1915,
decreased to 26,494,438 in 1916 and to 5,115,476 in 1917.
Thus between January, 1915, and January, 1917, the number
of unemployed workers and the amount of the disbursements
underwent a decrease of 98 per cent.
The same applies in general to the rest of France, although
the manner of distribution of the unemployment funds of
the provincial districts differed considerably from that of
Paris. In some of them aid was given only in money,
whereas in others it was given both in money and in
kind ; and still others gave it in the form of work, some-
times supplemented by payments in money or in kind. The
total number of unemployment funds operating in 1915 was 25,
whereas in 1916 it was only 16 ; and in the same years their
disbursements decreased from 3,910,894 to 1,244,686 francs.
The number of unemployed workers aided by those funds which
furnished information regarding the matter was 12,314 in
January, 1915, 4,491 in December, 1915 (seven funds), and
5,011 in January, 1916, as against 1,705 in January, 1917 (four
funds). At the end of 1917 four funds were giving aid to
1,423 unemployed workers, and their combined disbursements
amounted to 502,248 francs. Thus the decrease was in the
ratio of 100 to 14. While this decrease is less than that of the
Paris Fund, it is nevertheless very pronounced ; and the
difference is to be accounted for by the fact that in Paris the
control was more rigorous.
The foregoing figures are confirmed, both in a general and
in a relative way, by the inquiries conducted by the Ministry
of Labour in May and November, 1916, and again in May, 1917.
Unemployment disappeared from the labour market and was
followed by a general labour shortage. In April, 1916, the total
number of unemployed workers and refugees throughout the
country was 24,548 men and 88,839 women, whereas in the
LABOUR IN FRANCE 143
following November it was only 8,704 men and 38,563 women.
Approximately 75 per cent, of these figures, moreover, pertain
to the Department of the Seine alone.
Another sign of renewed activity is to be seen in the gradual
reopening of establishments that had been closed. As regards
the 37,168 establishments mentioned in the footnote on page 139
as having been investigated, and as having employed 1,272,160
persons in normal times, the following observations are to be
made : The number of establishments in active operation was
19,655 (53 per cent.) in August, 1914 ; 30,745 (82 per cent.) in
January, 1915 ; 30,745 (82 per cent.) in January, 1916 ; 32,488
(87 per cent.) in January, 1917 ; and 33,336 (90 per cent.) in
January, 1918. The number of persons employed in these
establishments, on the other hand, was 439,346 (34 per cent.)
in August, 1914 ; 744,145 (58 per cent.) in January, 1915 ;
1,037,064 (81 per cent.) in January, 1916 ; 1,226,480 (96 per
cent.) in January, 1917 ; and 1,281,265 (more than 100 per
cent.) in January, 1918. The increase in personnel amounted
to as much as 166 per cent. (519,615 as against 311,668) in the
metal trades, and 120 per cent. (74,167 as against 61,706) in
the chemical industry. From 1917 to the latter part of 1918
there was a steady improvement as regards unemployment. On
November 15, 1918, four days after the armistice, there were in
existence 94 unemployment funds which had been created at
various times in thirty of the departments of France. Of these
94 funds, 10 had never operated at all, 70 had ceased to operate
for lack of unemployed workers to aid, while only 14 were still
active ; and the latter were giving aid only to an insignificant
number of persons. In Paris proper, for example, there were
but 9,734 unemployed workers in November, 1918, as compared
with 293,824 in October, 1914 ; and in its suburbs, but 316 as
compared with 53,202 in January, 1915. It remains to be noted
that of the 9,905 persons registered, 20 per cent, were of normal
capacity and working, 31-8 per cent, were of normal capacity
and not working, while 6-8 per cent, were sick or injured and
unable towork. Thus the actual beneficiaries numbered scarcely
three thousand in the Department of the Seine — which is
144 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
tantamount to declaring that at the close of the war there were
no unemployed workers in Paris and its suburbs ; and the same
was probably true of the provincial districts as well.
CHAPTER II : THE PLACING OF WORKERS
BY what means did France succeed in achieving this result ?
In answering this question we must not, of course, fail to recog-
nize the effect of the reestablishment of the country's com-
mercial and industrial activity and of the consequent demand
for labour of all kinds. Further on we shall consider the im-
portance of these factors. It would be unjust, however, to
overlook the efforts that were put forth to organize and develop
in France a public employment service, which, as we have
already observed, had been almost non-existent before the war.
It was not sufficient merely to give pecuniary aid to the unem-
ployed. It was also necessary to provide work for them ; and
to that end it was necessary to maintain direct and uninterrupted
communication between those offering employment and those
seeking it. Such efforts, moreover, could not be limited to a
single commune or department, but were necessarily extended
to the country as a whole. This was all the more needful on
account of the state of war and the extraordinary conditions
resulting from it. The invasion of territory, together with the
creation and development of industries in thinly populated
regions, led to a continual displacement of labour and called
for the introduction of order and method to the end of relieving
the chaotic condition of the labour market.
In September and October, 1914, numerous relief organiza-
tions sprang into existence throughout the country, and in the
general confusion public authorities and private groups com-
peted with one another in disorganized activity. On October 26,
the Central Office for the Placing of Unemployed Workers and
Refugees (V Office Central de Placement des Chomeurs et des
Refugies) was created. Theoretically placed as the keystone of
LABOUR IN FRANCE 145
tlu« system of local employment bureaus, this institution was
at first called upon to meet the most urgent needs. Among
other things it made an effort to reestablish contact between
the refugees scattered over the length and breadth of France
and the disorganized business enterprises. For more than
a year (from October, 1914, to the end of 1915) it negotiated
direct placements, acting in concert with the prefects of the
various departments in whose charge the refugees were placed
and with the representatives of the great industries — coal, iron
and steel, textile, railways, &c. In particular, it made arrange-
ments for the transportation of workers and their families to
the scene of their employment, first by entering the cost against
the State, then by concluding agreements with the railway
companies. At the same time (March 15, 1915) a National
Office of Farm Labour (Office National de la Main-tfceuvre
Agricole) was created through the mediation of the principal
agricultural associations.
A second period of activity dates from January 1916.
Workers were reclassed in their own callings, business activity
was resumed, and unemployment practically disappeared as an
economic phenomenon. The number of municipal and depart-
mental bureaus also increased, and the Central Office, restored
to its legitimate role, became the source of inspiration and
control of the local employment bureaus. A cursory glance at
the conditions and methods of this organization will reveal its
nature and importance.
The slow development of the municipal bureaus was largely
due to the fact that the municipalities were reluctant to incur
the expense ; and since they were not obliged to do so, it was
necessary to encourage their participation in the scheme. After
1911 the Minister of Labour came to their aid by offering to
every municipal bureau, subject to the control of a joint com-
mittee of employers and workers, a contribution proportional
to the number of positions secured by it. This measure had
produced but little result, however, when the stream of refugees
began to flow toward Paris and the uninvaded departments.
There was no longer time for tentative measures or for economy.
1509-38
146 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
On February 5, 1915, the Minister of Labour invited the pre-
fects of the departments to create joint committees of employers
and workers ' for the study of questions relating to the main-
tenance of national labour ' ; and he suggested to them, for the
accomplishment of this purpose, the organization of depart-
mental employment bureaus. On December 29 he encouraged
the creation of such bureaus by extending to those which were
willing to subject themselves to the control of a joint com-
mittee, as well as to certain regulations, the State subsidies
which until then had been reserved exclusively for municipal
bureaus. The effect was instantaneous. Within a few weeks
57 departments were provided with employment bureaus, and
26 were awaiting a decision of the Council General. On Decem-
ber 1, 1916, of 77 uninvaded departments, 70 possessed such
bureaus, and on November 1, 1918, just before the armistice,
the entire system emanating from the Central Office comprised,
aside from the Central Foreign Labour Service (Service Central
de la Main-d'ceuvre fitrangere), together with certain bureaus
of Alsace-Lorraine, 6 regional bureaus (organs of control and
administration) operating at Paris, Nancy, Toulouse, Marseilles,
Nantes, and Lyons ; 87 departmental bureaus performing in
general the functions of municipal bureaus for the cities in
which they were installed ; 110 municipal bureaus ; and 2 sea-
men's offices. In permanent contact, whether directly or
through the mediation of the Central Office, their directors were
brought together for the purpose of studying the general
measures to be adopted in common to the end of increasing
their activity and strengthening their association. Informed
as regards the condition of the labour market by a weekly
bulletin annexed to the Journal Officiel, the various bureaus
witnessed a daily increase in the number and diversity of
positions secured by them.
From 1914 to the end of 1915 the total number of workers
placed by the National Office of Paris was 44,442, whereof
approximately 32,000 were transported to other cities. The
municipal bureaus of Paris placed 8,675 ; and the balance of
the Department of the Seine, 775. It was not until the second
LABOUR IN FRANCE 147
half of 1915 that the departmental and municipal bureaus of
the provincial districts became active in like manner ; during
this period they placed 57,982 persons.
In 1916 the total number of workers provided with employ-
ment by the public bureaus of all kinds was 161,314, which
number increased to 194,000 in 1917 and to 326,000 in 1918.
Of this last number, 11,000 were wounded men, 24,000 agri-
cultural labourers, and 34,000 persons employed in different
services in the rear of the French and Allied armies.
These figures, applying, as they do, to an ever-increasing
variety of occupations, call for an analysis. Men of special
training, who had never secured positions save by direct solici-
tation or through personal influence, began now to have recourse
to public employment bureaus. In the large cities, as in Paris,
they were encouraged in this by the opening of professional
bureaus and sections which specialized in different branches of
activity — domestic servants, steel and iron workers, journey-
men, clerks, &c. — and the personnel of which was thoroughly
conversant with the situation and able to render service of value
both to employers and to persons in search of work.
In general the method of joint committees was applied. The
Paris and the provincial offices did not cover the same field.
The provincial municipal bureaus placed especially domestic
servants (42 per cent.), journeymen (15 per cent.), workers in
the food industry (15 per cent.), workers in various mercantile
trades (8-6 per cent.), and a very few agricultural labourers
(4 per cent.). The departmental bureaus, on the other hand,
specialized notably in the placing of agricultural labourers
(25-8 per cent.) ; next came journeymen and unskilled workers
(20 per cent.) ; and finally workers in the metal trades (10 per
cent.). In Paris domestic servants also came first, but in a
smaller proportion (29 per cent.) ; then followed journeymen
(21 per cent.), workers in mercantile trades (4-6 per cent.), and
lastly workers in the food industry (3 per cent.).
It will be seen, accordingly, that the war in France brought
about a development of public employment bureaus which
previous legislative measures had merely foreshadowed. True
K 2
148 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
it is that the results came far from equalling those achieved in
Great Britain, where in 1916 more than 1,500,000 workers were
placed by the 378 ' labour exchanges '. Paris and the Depart-
ment of the Seine led the movement and were followed by the
provincial districts, which extended the benefits of the service
to trades in which such practices were previously unknown.
In 1914 these bureaus were unorganized and left to the discretion
of municipalities which failed to appreciate their importance ;
in 1918 they secured employment for workers at the rate of
500,000 per annum and made it possible for the country
successfully to meet the gravest labour crisis with which it had
ever been threatened. Besides rendering satisfactory pecuniary
aid — the foremost necessity in the face of a disorganized labour
market — the public bureaus were able to adapt the resources of
labour to demands which asserted themselves with an intensity
entirely unprecedented. Following the cessation of hostilities,
moreover, they were called upon to manifest their vitality in
a still more impressive manner in the replacing of demobilized
soldiers, the reclassification of persons newly trained for special
trades, and the readjustment of workers from the war industries
to the conditions and requirements of peace-time activity. In
our final chapter we shall endeavour to set forth with what
success these efforts were rewarded.
CHAPTER III : THE LABOUR MARKET
AT the beginning of the war, as we have seen, the industrial
inertia, appearing, as it did, in the form of widespread unem-
ployment, adapted itself more or less successfully to the general
shortage of labour. Soon, however, the economic struggle for
materials and the industrial mobilization, which was a corollary
to the military mobilization, disclosed the scarcity of workers
and the inadequacy of the precautions which had been taken.
It had been thought that the war could be conducted with the
materials and supplies already on hand, together with the
LABOUR IN FRANCE 149
maintenance of the necessary repairs. The notion prevailed that
the resources of the State establishments would suffice — con-
struction works, shell factories, powder mills, &c. — assisted by
certain large plants which specialized in the production of war
materials, such as those of Creusot, Saint-Chamond, Firminy,
and Montbard Aulnoye. The labour question did not even
come up for discussion. The contingents were fixed and could
easily be brought together. The only workers to be retained,
provisionally or definitively, were certain highly skilled foremen
(agents de maitrise) and specialists of military age whom it would
be difficult to replace. In the State establishments these did
not number more than 1,400 ; and in the private establishments
not more than 2,500. As regards the mobilized soldiers, they
were to be replaced by old workers, specialists designated in
advance, and by untrained workers of both sexes to be engaged
immediately.
This programme was rigorously carried out. The State
establishments employed some 30,000 workers, men and women,
nearly one-half of whom were new ; the powder mills, approxi-
mately 10,000. As regards the private establishments, their
personnel decreased from 8,808 to 5,352. Altogether the
munitions factories did not employ more than 45,000 workers
at the beginning of the war. One may form an idea of the
importance of this figure by comparing it with the corresponding
figure at the end of the war — approximately 2,000,000 workers,
that is to say, an increase of 3,900 per cent. Moreover, after the
first few battles had demonstrated the immensity of the in-
dustrial effort called for and the uncertain length of the struggle
awaiting the country, the necessity of providing the establish-
ments with an adequate working personnel was promptly
recognized. The mobilization had gathered skilled workers of
all kinds under the colours, and it was to them that the
authorities of the Government first turned. It was soon seen,
however, that their number was insufficient, the more so for
the reason that it was imperative to maintain the full strength
of the military effectives. Civil labour, of women as well as of
men, was drawn upon, but it also proved unequal to the demand.
150 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
Recourse was finally had, accordingly, to the foreign and
colonial labour market.
In this way there were gathered together the various elements
whereof the working population of France consisted during the
war, under conditions and in proportions which must be em-
phasized as we examine them, one by one, for the purpose of
determining their true nature and importance, as well as the
disposition made of them.
Section 1 : Military Labour
A mobilization, disastrous as it may be to the economic
activity of a country by reason of its general nature, never-
theless carries with it its own cure. It enables the public
authorities to dispose of men under the colours in the manner
most advantageous to the general interests of the country,
either by retaining them in the army or by diverting them to
war industries. This idea dominated the policy adopted in
France as regards the employment of military labour. The
4 inorganic ' or disorganized period, which we have just outlined,
was succeeded by a period of transition and reorganization ; and
this, in turn, was followed by an ' organic ' period wherein the
system functioned with a minimum amount of friction.
(1) The period of reorganization. An embryonic organization
appeared in the month of September 1914. In each region
industrial groups were formed for the utilization of near-by
establishments for the manufacture of munitions. To the end
of providing the indispensable personnel — aside, of course, from
the civil workers recruited on the spot and the female workers
gradually brought together — the following measures were
adopted : A complete list was drawn up of all the metal workers
present in the military depots of the interior — turners, fitters,
tool-makers, countersinkers, smelters, moulders, hammerers,
rollers, firemen, &c. — and an order was issued to withhold them
from the army ; and with the exhaustion of this source, to
recall from the army all workmen over thirty-five years of age.
Blank orders were likewise issued to certain qualified manu-
LABOUR IN FRANCE 151
facturers authorizing them to levy on the military depots for
such skilled and unskilled workers as they required. Finally,
the control of detached factory workers began to take form.
These measures permitted a partial resumption of manu-
facturing activity, so that in May 1915, on the eve of the re-
organization of the war industries by the creation of the Under-
Secretaryship of Artillery, the total number of civil and military
workers (men and women) attached to the artillery factories
alone was 312,000, that is to say, six times as large as in August
1914. A notable result was thus achieved in less than a
year.
(2) The organic period. The organic period began with the
creation of the Under-Secretaryship of Artillery. The artillery
programme was enlarged ; the manufacture of powder, ex-
plosives, and chemical products was increased ; and the
requirements as regards personnel developed accordingly. The
measures outlined in the preceding period were coordinated
and regularized ; at first purely administrative, they now
acquired a legislative character. Among other things, an
understanding was reached between the Under-Secretary of
Artillery and the Commander-in-Chief of the military forces
whereby the resources of the army were thrown open to the
requirements of industry. In view of the pressing need for
war materials of all kinds, the Commander-in-Chief agreed to
surrender all the men demanded by the Under-Secretary of
Artillery who were not absolutely indispensable for the main-
tenance of the military effectives. In the interior, the regional
commanding generals received orders to satisfy the demands of
industries from the available resources of the military depots.
From the question of supply attention was then turned to the
question of demand. Manufacturers were called upon to
formulate their requirements. At the start a very simple
method was employed. The heads of factories were requested
to furnish the names of trained workers whom they knew and
desired, and at the same time to state the total number of
workers they required. The age limit was abolished. In less
than two months more than 50,000 demands for particular men
152 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
designated by name were thus addressed to the Under-Secretary-
ship of Artillery ; from July to December, 1915, this number
increased to 150,000, and for the entire duration of the war
it amounted to approximately 214,000. As a matter of fact,
however, this method had many disadvantages and was subject
to much abuse. The workmen selected by name sometimes
could not be brought together, due to the fact that they had
been killed or wounded or had changed their address. More-
over, fraudulence was facilitated and negligence encouraged.
The employers showed a tendency to solicit the recall of their
former workmen rather than to recruit new elements (civil and
female workers). The demands for particular workers desig-
nated by name were therefore suppressed — save in special cases
in which personal considerations played a more or less important
role — and a system was adopted whereby manufacturers were
called upon to make known only the number of workers they
required. They limited themselves, for example, to demanding
10 turners, 20 smelters, &c. From June, 1915, to January, 1918,
this system gave rise to some 345,000 numerical demands which
were satisfactorily met.
In order that the system might be successfully applied, it
was necessary to know the number of trained workers available
in the various lines. To this end a general census was taken of
all workers in the different industries (metal, wood, chemicals,
&c.) in all army corps and divisions at the front and in the
interior. All specially trained men were required to fill out, on
their own responsibility, cards giving complete data concerning
their particular line of work, and these cards were forwarded
to the office of the Under-Secretary of Artillery to be classified
and filed. In this manner there was rendered possible the prepa-
ration of a catalogue of names grouped according to the age
and military aptitude of the persons involved. This catalogue,
in which a few names were entered twice, finally contained
some 700,000 individual cards. In each special line of work
information was to be had as regards (1) the age, (2) the family
conditions, (3) the origin, of all men in the industry ; and every
month a table was drawn up showing the number of men
LABOUR IN FRANCE 153
available for each line and the age up to which they might be
employed in the factories. At a given time, for example, the
minimum age limit was twenty-six years for chemists, twenty-
one years for turners, &c. This system of classification, which
was of the greatest importance, for a long time served as a model
for similar systems in other countries, and numerous foreign
visitors who were aware of its existence took occasion to express
great admiration for it.
(3) The juridical status of mobilized workers. The employ-
ment of men qualified for military service in factories involved
a number of juridical problems. What was to be their status ?
Were they to remain soldiers and hence under the authority of
the Ministry of War, or were they to regain a civilian status
and hence be free to quit their positions, change their place of
employment, take part in strikes, &c. ? At the beginning of
the war a certain diversity of opinion and policy prevailed in
regard to the matter ; and the first step, accordingly, was to
establish uniformity. Articles 6 and 7 of the law of August 17,
1915 (more commonly known as the Dalbiez Law), stipulated
the general conditions under which mobilized men might be
employed in factories and laid down the broad lines of their
juridical status. Although seemingly designed for a particular
branch of workers, this law in reality exerted a decisive influence
upon the disposition of the entire body of workers. As a matter
of fact, it vested the public authorities with two kinds of control
over the manufacturers : (1) it permitted them to grant or
refuse the mobilized workers demanded ; (2) it stipulated the
working conditions and wages to be observed. This necessarily
involved the adoption of a uniform system for the entire
working class, and a few words concerning this important point
are therefore in order.
As regards men qualified for military service to be employed
in factory work, the law divided them into two groups : (1)
specialists, that is, skilled workers ; (2) labourers, that is,
workers without special knowledge or ability. In the case of
the former, it was stipulated that they might be diverted to
factory work, regardless of age, provided they had been em-
154 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
ployed in their speciality for at least one year before the war.
A declaration was signed by them certifying that they had
fulfilled this requirement, and severe penalties (fine and im-
prisonment) were indicated for those found guilty of signing
false declarations. In the case of persons in the second group,
they were also required to show a year's employment, but their
assignment was made subject to a certain order of precedence,
viz. : (1) men not qualified for military service ; (2) men from
forty to forty-eight years of age belonging to the reserve of the
territorial army ; (3) men from thirty-five to forty years of age
belonging to the territorial army. In each of these classes it
was stipulated that the fathers of the largest families and the
oldest men were to be employed first. Finally, in order to
secure the application of these rules to persons already employed
in the factories at the time of the promulgation of the law, in-
vestigations looking to their revision were undertaken by joint
committees composed of equal numbers of employers and
workers.
As regards their juridical status, the men of military age
assigned to the munitions factories were regarded as specially
detached soldiers, so that they possessed a double character-
military and civil. In reality, they belonged to the army, for
the Minister of War retained his authority over them. They
could not change their occupation without permission, and
during non- working hours they remained subject to military
discipline and jurisdiction, and were bound to obey the orders
of a controller of military labour. On the other hand, for the
entire period of their industrial occupation, that is to say,
while they were actually at work in yard or factory, they were
treated as civilians. They received the wages current in the
region, and their position in the factory was independent of
their rank in the army.
(4) The control of military labour. An impartial board of
supervision was required for the control and protection of these
workers, whom it was necessary to safeguard against the pres-
sure exerted by unscrupulous employers who were ready to take
advantage of their position by threatening to send men back
LABOUR IN FRANCE 155
•
into the army. This was the so-called ' control of military
labour '. At the beginning of the war this control devolved
upon the officers under whom the factories had been placed ;
and in May, 1915, a special corps was created, aided by delegates
chosen from among the mobilized men belonging to the civil
Labour Inspection Corps. Composed of 40 officers at the start,
as compared with 66 officers and 392 assistant controllers in
January 1918, this body was vested with powers both of a
technical and of a military character. It was charged in general
with the control of soldiers employed in factory work. It was
called upon to see to it that advantageous use of their services
was made, to discover all exploitation of military labour, and
to exercise general supervision with respect to working con-
ditions (wages, hours, days of rest, &c.). On the other hand, it
played the role of commanding officer. It authorized transfers
of men from one factory to another ; it supervised the military
personnel outside of the factories ; it watched over the habits
and deportment of workers ; it made inquiries regarding
general living conditions ; it investigated the demand for
labour ; it discovered and prosecuted frauds ; and finally, it
established direct relations with the labour syndicates for the
purpose of receiving the complaints and suggestions of military
workers who were not allowed to go out on strike.
(5) The numerical results. The result of the recruiting efforts
that were put forth, and of the systematic and limited use that
was made of military labour in the munitions factories, may be
measured by the increase in the number of men diverted to this
work. On January 1, 1915, 244,847 workers were employed in
the artillery factories, powder mills, and plants for the manu-
facture of chemical products, aviation supplies, mines, gun-
carriages, &c. On January 1, 1916, this number had increased
to 391,682, and on January 1, 1917, to 540,607. On January 1,
1918, thanks to certain recoveries, it had decreased to 528,250,
after having reached in February, 1917, the maximum of
550,394. The apportionment by trades, on the other hand, was
as follows : 97,000 skilled metal workers, 89,000 journeymen,
72,000 factory hands, 58,000 fitters, 46,000 wood- workers,
156 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
38,000 engineers, directors, foremen, &c., 37,000 turners,
27,000 miscellaneous workers, 17,000 powder and explosive
makers, 16,000 moulders, 10,000 firemen, 9,000 office workers,
8,000 draughtsmen and chemists, 2,000 miners and quarrymen.
Thus more than 500,000 men of military age and aptitude were
deemed more useful in the factory than in the army.
Section 2: Female Labour
At the same time that recourse was being had to military
labour, the employment of women was also becoming general ;
and in the organization and regulation of female labour the
State likewise intervened. It facilitated the recruiting of
women workers chiefly by authorizing or tolerating certain
deviations from the general principles of labour legislation as
regards working hours, minimum age for factory work, inter-
diction of night work, &c. Its intervention extended also to
the organizing of employment offices, to the hiring, discharging,
and installing of women workers in newly industrialized cities, to
the creating of refectories, dormitories, canteens, day nurseries,
foundling hospitals, medical clinics, &c.
(1) The female effectives. There is still lacking in France
a general census indicating the total number of women engaged
in industrial or agricultural war work and the number of women
who abandoned domestic service and accessory occupations in
order to take up a regular trade. On the other hand, a number
of special investigations conducted by the Ministry of Labour,
as well as by the ministries of the National Defence, furnish an
abundance of sufficiently accurate information regarding the
utilization and development of female labour, as also regarding
its classification, productive power, and professional value, and
the technical and economic consequences of its employment.
In July 1917, and July 1918, the Minister of Labour ordered
a general investigation of private industries in France. The
investigation took the form of inquiries, the first of which
covered 52,278 establishments which had employed 487,474
women before the war. It showed that the number had fallen
LABOUR IN FRANCE 157
to 199,107 in August 1914, but had risen again to 418,579 in
July 1915, and to 626,881 in July 1917— an increase of 120 per
cent. The second inquiry covered only 41,475 establishments.
The war was then in full swing, and the German advance had
reached its maximum. The absolute figures are lower, therefore,
but the general movement remains constant. The 41,475
establishments employed 454,642 women in July 1914 ; 179,398
in August 1914 ; 543,025 in July 1917 ; 548,589 in January
1918; and 533,523 in July 1918. If we represent the pre-war
figure by 100, we find that the variation on the dates specified
was as follows : 100, 39, 119, 121, 117. The increase was
especially pronounced in the industries of the National Defence,
the personnel . of which was recruited by levies made upon
certain deserted branches. In July 1918, in seven of fifteen
industrial groups the number of women employed was greater
than it was in time of peace ; thus for 100 women employed
before the war, there were 677 employed in the iron and steel
industries, 461 in transporting and handling merchandise,
150 in the wood industry, 141 in the chemical industry, 111 in
the leather and hide industry, 301 in stone cutting and building,
and 105 in various trades. On the other hand, there was a de-
crease in eight groups in which women are especially poorly
paid ; for 100 women employed before the war, there were only
69 in the food industry, 92 in the textile industry, 91 in the
clothing industry, 85 in the fine-metal industry, 79 in the pre-
cious and non-precious stone industry, and 73 in the book
industry. All told, the industries which gained in numbers did
so to the extent of 118,614 additional workers (211,894 as
against 93,280), whereas the industries which lost in numbers
did so to the extent of 39,733 workers (321,629 as against
361,362). The net gain, therefore, was 78,881 (17-34 per cent.).
Finally, in the total personnel of the establishments embraced
in the inquiry the proportion of female workers, which before
the war had amounted to 33 per cent., increased to 38 per cent,
in August 1914, primarily in consequence of the departure of
the men called into the army, and thereafter remained constant
at approximately 40 per cent. In July 1918, there were
158 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
533,523 women to 785,380 men, as compared with 454,642
women to 929,407 men in July 1914.
In the above-mentioned industries of the National Defence
analogous data were derived from a number of private investi-
gations. For the powder mills and artillery factories alone are
there figures for the entire duration of the war. On the eve of
the mobilization, women were employed only in the State
establishments, and to the very low number of 4,800 ; but
immediately after the mobilization the employment of 8,400
women raised the total to approximately 13,000. Private
industry followed suit. In January 1916 the war industries
were employing 110,000 women ; this number increased to
402,000 in August 1917 ; to 417,000 in January 1918 ; and to
445,000 in September 1918 — or approximately 24-5 per cent,
of the total working personnel. If we consider all the establish-
ments working for the National Defence (armament, mines,
commissariat, aviation service, sanitation service, navy, Ameri-
can army, great railway systems), with respect to which the
general data run only to October 1&17, we find that the number
of women workers increased as follows : October 1917, 446,212 ;
January 1918, 552,389; July 1918, 582,785; September
1918, 600,733. Finally, the number of women employed in
various bureaus and services of the army as secretaries, steno-
graphers, bookkeepers, &c., and not included in the above
figures, amounted to 132,468 on January 1, 1918, whereas before
the war not a single woman had been engaged in work of this
kind.
(2) Deviations from existing legislation. This increase and the
substitution of women for men was facilitated by relaxations of
pre-war regulations. In a series of circulars issued on August 2,
3, and 14, the greatest leniency had been enjoined upon the
Inspectors of Labour in the application of the laws governing
working hours, night work, days of rest, &c., and a large number
of industries had benefited thereby. An inquiry conducted in
June 1917 showed that of 164,267 women working in 787
private establishments, 58,784 (35-78 per cent.) were employed
at night ; and that of these 58,784 more than 2,000 were less
LABOUR IN FRANCE 159
than eighteen years of age. In April 1918, on the other hand,
an inquiry covering 784 establishments working for the National
Defence (each of them employing more than 100 women and all
of them together employing 256,992 women out of a total of
653,124 workers) showed that 191 (26 per cent.) of these
establishments kept their women employees working beyond
the legal limit of ten hours daily. In numerous instances even
the weekly day of rest had been neglected, especially at the
commencement of the hostilities. In 1916, of 791 establish-
ments 668 granted every Sunday as a day of rest, 16 granted
another day of the week, while 107 allowed only a half-day on
Sunday every week or every second week. In 1917 there were
781 establishments granting the weekly day of rest and only
10 refusing it. The country was ' installed in the war ', and
even the labour legislation was regaining its authority.
(3) Female occupations. In what particular kinds of work
were women employed ? What is the verdict regarding their
output ? What technical modifications did their employment
involve ?
In answer to the first of these questions it may be said that
there was practically no kind of work in which women were not
employed during the war, and that the diversity of occupations
increased according to their adaptability. At first they were
given light work calling for skill rather than for strength, later
on heavy work, and finally skilled work demanding special
knowledge and ability. They were employed especially in the
operation of new machines, in which their apprenticeship was
rapid and their work soon became more or less automatic.
Turning, countersinking, drilling, threading, the making of
shells, cases, relays and fuses, the operating of steam engines,
presses, &c. — all these were entrusted to them. Afterwards,
and even at the start, they were charged with the shifting of
commodities of all kinds, with loading and unloading raw
materials in the steel mills, foundries, shell factories, &c., as
also at boat landings and railway stations, where they likewise
handled boxes, packages, and baggage. Inside the factories
they were called upon to carry objects of various kinds, and
160 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
intervention was frequently necessary to prevent them from
overexerting themselves. Moreover, it was imperative to
facilitate their work by the use of trucks, barrows, wagonettes,
miniature drays, automobiles, electric cars, &c.
Their chosen employment was the inspection of products.
They examined and tested the detached parts of automobiles,
munitions of all kinds and their various elements, sometimes
with the help of delicate measuring instruments, such as
calibre-gauges, &c. In the munitions factories the operations
of control and verification were reserved for them almost ex-
clusively. Everywhere they took stock, weighed, marked,
hauled, piled up, packed and wrapped the products of the
factories. They excelled in the loading and packing of car-
tridges, as well as in the counting and checking of percussion
caps, shrapnel balls, &c. In the divisions of clothing, food, and
chemical products they were employed in sewing, bagging, &c.
For the first time it was possible to study the relative value
of the work of men and women on a large scale. The formula
' like pay for like work ' passed from the domain of theory to
that of practical application. As was to be foreseen, the pro-
duction of women workers, stimulated by the enthusiasm which
they brought to the work as beginners, by their desire for gain,
and even, it is said, by their ignorance of the necessity of con-
serving their strength, was highly satisfactory when they were
employed according to their special aptitudes. Sometimes they
produced more than men, as, for example, in weaving ; and
frequently they produced fully as much as men, as in the
operation of automatic machinery. In general, however,
although one takes pleasure in recognizing their courage, their
fidelity to duty, and their skill, it must be admitted that they
were lacking in strength, power of resistance, assiduity, and
regularity. Their absences were much more frequent than those
of men, and they adapted themselves poorly to night work,
especially when married and called upon to perform domestic
duties during the day.
Great pains have been taken to estimate the relative pro-
duction of men and women engaged in the same kind of work.
LABOUR IN FRANCE 161
In masonry, for example, it has been found that four women
are required to do the work of three men. For manual labour
in series, the production of women is inversely proportional to
the effort called for in each operation ; favourable for small,
light pieces, it becomes unfavourable for large, heavy pieces.
In firing, for example, two women can not accomplish as much
as one man. On the other hand, they show remarkable ability
in the use of delicate measuring instruments, electric control
appliances, travelling cranes, &c. In general, therefore, the
employment of women may be said to necessitate an increased
number of workers in any particular branch, either because the
required number of women is greater than the required number
of men, or because the women have to be supplemented and
assisted by men skilled at certain kinds of work which women
can not do, such as the regulating or the mounting of machinery.
The necessary increase in personnel averages a quarter or a third.
Thus a workshop in which thirty-two lathes are operated by
sixteen men and sixteen women may be operated by thirty-two
women and seven men. This liberates nine men, but they have
to be replaced by sixteen women. Herein, accordingly, lies the
justification of the difference between women's and men's wages,
caused, as it is, by the general increase of expense involved in
the employment of women.
In order to render the employment of women possible and to
qualify them to take the place of men, manufacturers were
obliged to modify considerably their equipment and methods.
Mechanical contrivances were multiplied to lighten the labour
of women workers — hoisting devices for lifting and carrying
heavy objects, special machines for tightening and removing
sand from shells, for filling bottles, for piling sand in foundries,
&c., rotating bridges, travelling cranes, tackle on mono-rails,
mechanical advancement of lathes, machines to cut wood,
cloth, &c. The working models were simplified by the divi-
sion of labour, the organization of production in series, and
extreme specialization. The schedule of hours was modified,
the composition of gangs was altered, workshops were organ-
ized, products were taken apart to facilitate their handling,
L
1569.88
162 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
tables and seats were installed, special clothing was distrib-
uted, &c.
(4) Factory hygiene and welfare. In order to overcome the
difficulties created by the presence of women in factories, and
to diminish the evil effects which intensive day and night work
were calculated to have upon their own health, as well as upon
that of the children which they might later bear, numerous
measures were successively adopted as the war progressed,
some of them purely administrative, others practical. On
April 21, 1916, a Committee on Female Labour was appointed
by the Ministry of Munitions 4 for the study of women's wages,
the recruiting, employment, and organization of female labour,
and the measures calculated to improve the material and moral
condition of women factory workers.' The investigations and
recommendations of this committee are extremely interesting.
Composed of public officials, health officers, parliamentarians,
physicians, and employers and employees, it made a careful
study of the hygienic conditions and security of workshops, the
protection of maternity, nursing-rooms, nurseries, play-rooms,
the housing of workers, relief stations, &c., &c. Its recom-
mendations were either anticipated or adopted, and factory
hygiene reacted to the presence of women, who are ordinarily
more exacting than men in such matters. Dressing-rooms,
lavatories, and well-kept toilets were provided ; medical service
was created or extended ; and in accordance with the law,
nurseries, nursing-rooms, and play-rooms were installed in all
factories employing more than one hui^lred women. Several
factories, moreover, even went beyond the requirements of the
law and established recreation rooms (in imitation of those in
England), canteens, cooperative lunch-rooms, &c. Moreover,
supervision was also provided by calling in women of culture
and refinement who were versed in the relations of employers
and employees and in the study of factory welfare in general.
In this way an effort was made to render factory life less
onerous, less irksome, and less injurious to the women workers.
A beneficial effect of these measures is revealed in the reaction
of the birth-rate to them. Medical visits, the employment of
LABOUR IN FRANCE 163
pregnant women at less difficult and equally well paid work,
pecuniary allowances, rewards for new-born children — all this
< nrouraged and facilitated the rise of the birth-rate. Boards of
intelligent and experienced men assumed control and super-
vision of the matter, and thus the war, destroyer of men, in-
directly helped to secure the welfare of posterity.
Section 3 : Foreign and Colonial Labour
Even before the war the disproportion between the economic
development of France and the low national birth-rate had
necessitated recourse to the employment of foreign labour. In
1911, of the 39,191,133 inhabitants of the country some
1,160,000 were foreigners ; that is to say, there were 296
foreigners for every 10,000 inhabitants. In 1906, the corre-
sponding proportion was 275 per 10,000. Ranging in age for
the most part from twenty to thirty years, almost all of these
foreigners had a specific calling, and altogether they represented
3-24 per cent, of the 21,000,000 persons constituting the total
working population. They were employed especially in various
industries, in which they numbered approximately 265,000
(7-47 per cent.), and in agriculture, in which they numbered
44,753 (1-85 per cent.). The Italians came first with 151,241,
followed by the Belgians with 98,376, the Spaniards with 35,823,
the Germans with 27,624, and the Swiss with 24,839. Their
immigration was not always spontaneous or of individual
initiative, but was stimulated and intensified by a systematic
effort. The Comite des Forges, for example, caused large con-
tingents to come from Italy to work in the mines and factories
of Meurthe and Moselle. Numerous mining and agricultural
companies made extensive use of foreign and colonial labour —
Belgians, Luxemburgians, Germans, Poles, Algerians, &c.
(1 ) Immigration. The war accentuated the scarcity of labour,
so that colonial and foreign workers were placed under contri-
bution. The State mobilized for industrial purposes the native
populations of French colonies and protectorates — Algeria,
Tunis, Indo-China — and even organized the recruiting of
L 2
164
workers in China. Manufacturers, on their part, hired Italians
and especially Spaniards, while the National Committee on
Farm Labour undertook the organization of immigration
bureaus at the frontier of the Pyrenees.
This triple effort deserves analysis. An appeal was first made
to the Algerians and Chinese. Toward the end of 1915 several
convoys brought 4,500 Annamese workers into France —
military and civil, skilled and unskilled. This undertaking was
so successful that an additional 20,000 were called for from
Indo-China. At the same time an effort was made to develop
the recruiting of unskilled Algerian workers, who were con-
sidered especially valuable by reason of their extraordinary
physical powers of resistance. A first attempt through the
mediation of private agencies proved disappointing, so that the
method of recruiting was modified and a scheme of judicious
selection adopted. By means of a veritable industrial mobiliza-
tion, the Government of Algeria itself took charge of the
rounding-up and selection of the Kabyles destined to go to
France. At the same time, moreover, a mission was sent to
China to make arrangements with the Chinese Government for
the recruiting of labourers in that country. Finally, recourse
was had to other North Africans (Tunisians and Moroccans),
Madagascans, and West Africans. By January 1, 1917,
there had been obtained from these sources 34,179 North
Africans (23,032 Algerians, 7,219 Moroccans, 3,856 Tunisians),
29,937 Annamese, 901 Madagascans, and 5,965 Chinese. The
work of recruiting was entrusted to a special committee,
together with the duties of administration, surveillance, and
enrolment. A certain unification of employment was also
established. The Indo-Chinese and Madagascans were all
' militarized ' and engaged for the duration of the war, with an
additional period of six months following the conclusion of
peace. As regards the North Africans, while theoretically
engaged as civilians, they were as a matter of fact subjected to
a rather strict discipline and enrolled under French sub-officers
familiar with their language and customs. The same was true
of the Chinese labourers, who were employed in gangs and
LABOUR IN FRANCE 165
placed under the control of native and Fivm-h officers. The
number of labourers thus recruited totalled 140,373 at the end of
the war, of which 59,558 were North Africans (34,506 Algerians,
li>,695 Moroccans, 1^,357 Tunisians), 42,751 Annamese, 3,469
Madagascans, and 34,595 Chinese, all of whom were employed
at different kinds of industrial and agricultural work for the
support of the army.
.Mean while, the Minister of Munitions, who had charge of the
manufacture of war materials, undertook to organize the re-
cruiting of foreign labourers of the white race. Owing to the
inadequacy of the measures adopted by private manufacturers,
whose efforts wrere hampered by the existence of the state of
war, he encouraged and facilitated the immigration of Italian,
Greek, Swedish, Polish, Portuguese, and Spanish labourers, in
addition to such workers of those nationalities as came of their
own volition.1 In certain cases it was necessary for the State
to enter into negotiations with the interested Governments to
the end of insuring the arrival of foreign labourers in sufficient
numbers. Agreements were thus concluded with the Govern-
ments of Italy and Portugal regarding the conditions of re-
cruiting, transportation, and remuneration, and the protection
of their citizens in France. These agreements became the basis
of later international social laws and of numerous labour and
immigration treaties into which France was called upon to enter
as soon as the war ended. At the same time French consuls
assisted in the recruiting of various classes of foreign workers.
Numerous Greek refugees were taken from the islands off the
coast of Asia Minor by ships returning from Salonika and
transported to Marseilles, there to be apportioned among the
establishments working for the National Defence. In general,
the direct recruiting of workers in foreign countries was effected
by official representatives of the French Government, without
1 The number of these from May to December, 1915, was 28,966 men, 4,362
women, and 3,701 children, whereof 27,196 altogether (21,650 men, 3,153 women,
and 2,393 children) went into agriculture and the balance into industry. During
the first half of 1916 this number increased to 30.106 (17,916 for agriculture and
12,190 for industry).
166 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
private intermediaries, with the result that much expense and
many mistakes were avoided.
(2) Immigration depots and bureaus. The introduction of
large numbers of foreign labourers into France gave rise to
numerous difficulties and complications. Until put to work, in
the first place, it was necessary for them to be fed and housed.
Accordingly, immigration depots were established at various
places (Marseilles and Bayonne, later at Perpignan and Nantes,
and in the interior of the country at Lyons) for the care of
foreign workers temporarily without employment or moving from
one locality to another. These depots also helped to secure the
proper selection of foreign workers with reference to their physical
and mental qualifications, as well as to the nature of their work.
Their existence, moreover, helped to stimulate immigration,
since the assurance of being cared for and provided with work
under, favourable conditions was naturally calculated to attract
foreign labour. The depots received from manufacturers de-
finite demands for workers to be employed under fixed con-
ditions, and they were thus able to provide work immediately
for foreign workers, who would have found lengthy detention
in labour camps extremely irksome.
(3) Working conditions. The foreign workers thus placed
were for the most part taken from contingents numbering from
a few dozen to several hundred men. These contingents
were formed in such a way as to obviate the necessity of em-
ploying a large number of interpreters, and to enable the
labourers to adapt themselves to a new environment and avoid
the sudden change of habits resulting from a rapid dispersion
throughout the country. Although in principle, in order to
avoid all semblance of competition, the working conditions
offered to foreigners were the same as those offered to native
Frenchmen (equal pay, equal hours, &c.), it was nevertheless
frequently necessary to provide quarters and food for foreign
workers with reference to their peculiar habits and requirements.
These measures of detail facilitated the acclimation of foreign
workers, who, once they were in France, made constant and
successful use of the bureaus for obtaining employment.
LABOUR IN FRANCE 167
(4) Supervision and control. The state of war necessitated
the adoption of special measures affecting foreign workers, and
at the same time it provided numerous means of action which
the Government was able to utilize in the interest of the
National Defence. The movements of the foreign labourers had
to be controlled. A decree of April 21, 1917, while confirming
and completing the previous measures, aimed also to facilitate
justified transfers of workers from one place to another, but at
the same time to restrict ill-considered movements which would
have caused the stream of foreign labour to flow toward Pari-.
An appropriate system of identification cards, issued at the
frontier and vised at intervals during the holder's sojourn in
France and according to his movements, rendered such control
more effective.
Police measures alone, however, were not sufficient to insure
the necessary stability. A serious effort looking toward the
adaptation of foreign workers to existing conditions was
especially needed. The resources of the mobilization furnished
the means for the enrolment and control of foreign labour.
A corps of interpreters, familiar not only with the language,
but also with the mentality, of the workers of the different
nationalities, was organized, and its intervention forestalled
many conflicts. Frequent visits of inspection on the part of these
interpreters enabled the foreigners to make known theirgrievances
and at the same time gave their employers an opportunity to
make the necessary explanations. By persuasion, as well as by
more forcible means, the principle of equal pay for foreign and
French workers was applied. The foreigners saw their savings
increased by the organization of canteens, 4 soup-kitchens,'
cooperative stores, &c., while at the same time their housing
conditions were improved, they were helped to acquire a
knowledge of the French language, the sick were cared for in hos-
pitals, &c. Finally, as a result of these efforts, a sense of union
was created among the different elements of the population.
The effect of all this activity soon revealed itself in a favour-
able manner. From July, 1916, to July, 1917, approximately
25,000 foreigners (12,500 Greeks, 6,500 Portuguese, 3,500
168
Italians, 1,600 Spaniards, 241 Montenegrins, 186 Swedes,
37 Japanese) were introduced into France exclusively for in-
dustrial work. The movement was continued until the end of
the war, by which time more than 100,000 foreign labourers
had been brought into Fiance through the direct efforts of the
Government. The Central Foreign Labour Service was created,
and its vitality was such that it was continued after the war
was over. It is obvious that France, bled almost white, will for
a long time have more need than ever before of foreign workers.
CHAPTEE IV : THE ROLE AND CONTROL OF THE STATE
IN all these domains, as we have seen, the State gave very
valuable assistance to industry. In the first place, it determined
the proportion in which the various classes of workers were to
be employed in establishments working for the National
Defence, specifying the operations to be entrusted to women or
to foreigners and limiting the proportion of military labour to
the total number of workers. In the second place, it prohibited
the unregulated transfer of certain classes of skilled workers.
In the third place, it intervened authoritatively in the fixing of
wages and in the arbitration of differences between employers
and employees.
Section 1 : The Control of Labour
(1) The use of labour. Inasmuch as each worker withdrawn
from the army decreased precisely so much the military strength
of the country, employers were expected to resort to such
measures in moderation and so far as possible to make use of
other workers. This, of course, called for a constant effort of
adaptation and innovation ; and, like all such efforts, it re-
quired exterior constraint. This constraint applied not only to
the workers themselves, by forcing them to seek and accept
employment in the munitions factories, but also to the em-
ployers, by urging them to make a maximum use both of the
regular and of the supplemental labour resources. Special
LABOUR IN FRANCE 169
employment offices were created for the munitions factories ;
unemployment allowances wen* >u»pended or denied to workers
who refused to accept a position in line with their speciality ;
all replacement of civil labour by military labour was prohibited
when there was a shortage of the latter ; and military labour
;is refused when civil labour was already available. Con-
trollers were charged with the enforcement of these rules, and
frequent visits of inspection insured the wise employment of
military labour and its exclusive assignment to the munitions
factorie- .
The results of this control were soon manifest. Whereas
military labour showed a marked decline toward the end of
the war, civil labour showed a steady rise. From 129,429 on
August 31, 1915, the number of civil workers increased to 256,602
on January 1, 1916 ; to 545,688 on January 1, 1917 ; and again
to 641,677 on January 1, 1918. In order to enable the inspectors
to determine at a glance whether military labour was being
diverted from its proper employment, an enumeration was
made of the operations to be entrusted exclusively to civil
workers, women and children. A circular issued by the
Minister of Munitions on July 20, 1916, enumerated in detail
the kinds of work for which the employment of women was
obligatory : operation of presses for the manufacture of forged
steel shells of 75 mm.-120 mm. ; verification and measurement
of the temperature of the cast ; control before moulding ;
hydraulic tests ; placing of the moulds, &c. These rules were
sanctioned by adequate measures. Not only were military
workers employed at these tasks withdrawn on short notice,
but all military labour demanded by manufacturers in default
was refused until the rules were complied with.
(2) The suppression of ' enticing.' The scarcity of good
workers illustrated in a practical way the famous saying of
Richard Cobden that ' when two employers compete for a
single workman, wages rise '. The enticement of workers on the
part of manufacturers became a common practice. Paid agents
of the heads of certain business establishments distributed
handbills or posted up notices informing the workers that
170 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
they could find elsewhere ' good wages, steady employment,
and congenial work '. This was a form of unfair competition
and an encouragement of instability on the part of the workers.
The State, however, did not remain indifferent to such action.
It had at its disposal two weapons, the simple menace of which
was sufficient to put an end to all such practices : (1) the right
to requisition workers, which enabled it to restrain those con-
templating departure and to force deserters to return ; (2) the
possibility of considering such enticements as clandestine place-
ments prohibited by law. Without exaggerating the practical
scope of these measures, it is evident that they constituted
a serious derogation from the principle of free labour, but that
they were fully justified by the circumstances of the war.
Section 2 : Wages
(1) The causes of wage fluctuations. According to the public
belief, the labouring people were the greatest profiteers of the
war. The rise of wages, it is claimed, was chiefly responsible
for the rise of prices. The fact is, however, that public belief
does not always conform to the truth, and that there is a wide-
spread tendency on the part of the popular masses to generalize
hastily from superficial observation. The fact is that wages by
no means followed the rising curve of prices. The rise of prices,
on the contrary, preceded and exceeded the rise of wages,
which advanced at a slower rate in an effort to close up the
intervening distance. As a matter of fact, wages are not as
mobile as prices ; appertaining to the person of the labourer,
they have borrowed from him a certain fixed character. They
are traditional and but slightly elastic. On analysing their
movement during the war, we find that they did not imme-
diately follow the rise of prices, which manifested itself rather
quickly ; and from the start the curve was fairly true to the
rising form which it still conserves.
At the beginning of the war, on the other hand, there was
a pronounced decline of wages. Unemployment was general.
Certain establishments discontinued their operations, and
workers were forced to seek employment at the best pay ob-
LABOUR IN FKANCi; 171
hiinublo. But it was not long before the reverse movement
began. Economic activity recovered ; the war industries were
i-ivated and developed ; production was intensified ; soldiers
were brought back from the trenches to the factories ; women
and foreigners were employed to fill vacancies, &c. The result
wjiN that wages rose, but in an unequal manner ; that is, the
rise was not uniform throughout the country. Regional rates
persisted ; and in one and the same locality they varied greatly
according to trades.
The rise of wages was caused by three main factors : (1) the
general rise of prices ; (2) the decreased supply of labour ;
(3) the increased demand for labour. This accounts for the
divergences that are encountered. Although the rise was general,
it was by no means uniform, because the intensity of the supply
and demand was different. In some industries, as in those
directly concerned with the National Defence, no efforts were
made to prevent it ; for the purchaser, in this case the State,
was ready to meet all increases, even to provoke them. The
rise varied also according to regions, since the cost of pro-
duction likewise varied. But this observation, well founded in
time of peace, tended to lose its value in the course of the war.
It is undoubtedly true that the isolation of the interior markets
resulted in a diversity of prices which in time of peace would
have been equalized by transportation facilities ; but in stirring
up the French population, the war tended to make wages inde-
pendent of the region, to make them personal to the worker.
Military workers coming originally from Paris and sent to the
Loire demanded Parisian wages ; and in spite of opposition it
was often necessary to accede to their demands. Regional
wages were thus unified, thanks to the general rise of prices.
Let us now take up the wage movement in detail, distinguish-
ing, as required by tradition, between the nature and the rate
of the wages paid both in industry and in agriculture. In the
former we distinguish between the established and organized
trades, on the one hand, and those more affected by the war,
on the other hand. To illustrate this distinction, let us take :
(1) wages in the munitions factories ; (2) wages in the building
172 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
and clothing trades, each employing an important class of
workers ; (3) wages in agriculture.1
(a) Munitions factories. The workers in the war industries
were particularly favoured in the matter of wages. Never-
theless, it is necessary to distinguish between Paris and the
provincial districts. In the region of Paris the minimum wages
were fixed by the Ministry of Munitions, whereas in the depart-
ments they were fixed by agreements between employers and
workers. The agreements were validated by the Minister of
Labour, and thus acquired an official or legal character. It was
a genuine innovation and its importance we shall consider
further on.
A comparison of these data with wages previously registered
enables us to form an idea of the rise. Frequently, to be sure,
these rates indicate merely the basic or so-called ' living ' wage.
They also indicate, however, the minimum remuneration of an
average piece-worker, or else specify that the piece-work rate
must be sufficient to assure the labourer of a definite average
premium of 20 to 30 per cent, above the basic wage. Finally,
when a workman, by reason of his speciality, is unable to do
piece-work, as, for example, a tool repairman, his minimum
wage is fixed by adding a minimum increase to the basic wage.
The wage proper is not the only remuneration of the labourer,
but is supplemented in time of war by the so-called ' high-
cost-of-living bonus.' The object of this is simple. In the
hope that wages will fall, and in order not to make official
and permanent recognition of the rise, employers prefer to
resolve their labour compensation into two elements — the one
fixed and corresponding to the value of the labour as a com-
modity, the other variable and corresponding to the cost of
1 The data here utilized are taken from the Slatistique generate de la France and
are impartial and disinterested. Moreover, they rely on documents of various
origins for mutual completion and control, viz. : (1) for small business, some ques-
tionnaires addressed to expert advisers and covering fifty-two trades (forty-five
male and seven female) ; (2) for certain trades of big business, the wage estimates
of the Inspectors of Labour ; (3) for average day wages of the lower labourers, the
data of the prefects ; (4) for the military establishments of the State, an investigation
conducted in 1917 and the memoranda of wages fixed by agreement between the
workers and the employers ; (5) for the clothing industry, the current rates fixed
by law.
LABOUR IN FRANC 1-:
173
living. This represent >, in reality, a combination of the two
great economic theories regarding wage rates, namely, the iron
law of wu«ji'>, and the law of productivity. The high-cost-of-
living bonus is, in general, inversely proportional to the wage.
Starting from a maximum corresponding to a low wage, it
decreases according as the wage increases and disappears when
the wage reaches a certain maximum.1 Reckoning the wages
and the bonuses together, the remuneration of factory workers
before and during the war is shown by the following table : 2
APPROXIMATE EARNINGS (WAGE PLUS BONUS) OF FACTORY WORKERS IN FRANCE BEFORE
AND DURING THE WAR
Remuneration by the hour
Wnrkerv
Region of Paris
Other regions
Men
Before
the' War
End
of 1917
End
of 1918
Percentage Before
increase the War
End
of 1917
End
of 1918
Percentage
increase
Unskilled
workers .
0-50-0-60
0-95 . .
1-30
116
0-38
0-63
0-93
145
Fitters
0-80-1-20
1-45-1-50
1-7.-)
75
0-57
1-00
1-30
128
Turners
0-80-1-20
1-50-1-55
1-70
70
0-63
1-00
1-30
105
Machinists
0-80-0-95
1-43 . .
1-65
91
0-53
0-93
1-73
135
Borers
0-65-0-95
1-40 ..
1-60
100
0-49
0-85
1-15
130
Blacksmiths
0-80-1-10
1-45 ..
1-65
74
0-57
0-97
1-27
123
Smelters .
0-75-1-00
1-40 ..
1-60
98
0-59
0-96
1-26
112
Sawyers .
0-80-1-00
1-50 ..
1-70
89
0-55
0-93
1-23
119
Spinners .
0-90-1-10
1-70 ..
1-75
75
0-61
1-00
1-30
113
85
123
IFomen
Unskilled
workers .
0-30-0-35
0-75 ..
1-15
241
0-23
0-51
0-81
250
Skilled
workers .
0-35-0-40
0-95 ..
1-25
211
—
—
—
—
Machinists
0-50-0-60
1-20 ..
1-45
241
—
—
—
Mechanics .
0-50-0-60
0-95 ..
1-25
108
—
—
—
175 ;
250
1 The figures in the table are taken from the Bulletin de la Statistique generate
de la France (April, 1918). and are completed for 1918 from the records of the
Ministry of Munitions.
2 Thus the high-cost-of -living bonus fixed by the Ministry of Munitions on July 24,
1918, was 3 francs per diem for workers earning less than 10 francs per diem, the
total earnings not to exceed 12-50 francs ; and by the progressive decrease it fell
to 50 centimes per diem for a wage of 17 to 18 francs, the total not to exceed
18 francs. As regards women, the bonus was 2 francs per diem for those earning
less than 9 francs, the total not to exceed 10-50 francs, and decreased to 50 centimes
for those earning 13 to 14 francs.
174
EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
It will be seen from this table that the wages of labourers
underwent an increase of approximately 70 per cent, between
1914 and 1917 in the region of Paris and in the other regions,
and an increase of 176 and 145 per cent., respectively, for the
other regions between 1914 and 1918. For skilled workers the
increase averaged 60 per cent, in Paris in 1917 and from 70 to
120 per cent, in the other regions, thus confirming the tendency
toward equalization. As regards women employed in factories,
on the average their wages more than doubled in 1917 and
almost trebled in 1918. It is proper to remark, however, that
for certain classes of women workers, such as skilled mechanics
and machinists, it is difficult to draw a comparison with the
pre-war period for the reason that skilled women workers at that
time were extremely rare. Production in series was not wide-
spread in industry. At the present time women receive com-
pensation nearly equal to that of men, after taking into account
the supplementary expenses incident to their employment.
(b) Building trades. Before the war wages in the building
trades were periodically verified by memoranda based on public
works. During the war the official wage was extended to such
work in consequence of a pronounced labour movement. The
comparison between the wages paid before the war and the wages
current at the end of 1917 reveals the following differences :
WAGES IN THE BUILDING TRADES BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR IN FRANCE
Remuneration by the hour
Workers
Region of Paris
Other regions
Before
the War
End of
1917
Percentage
increase
Before
the War
End of
1917
Percentage
increase
Masons. 0-95
1-50
58
0-51
0-76
49
Carpenters 1*00
Joiners i 0-85
1-50
1-40
50
65
0-53
0-51
0-78
0-76
47
49
Locksmiths ! 0-75-090 1-35
64
0-50
0-73
46
Plumbers
0-90 . i 1-35
39
0-53
0-77
45
Painters 0-85 . | 1-40
65
0-49
0-70
43
Navvies 0-80
1-40
75
0-40
0-71
77
60
50
Thus the increase averaged 60 per cent, for all workers in the
building trades in the region of Paris and 50 per cent, in other
LABOUR IN FRANCE
175
regions. The navvies alone benefited by an increase of 75 to
77 per cent., respectively.
(c) Clothing and petty trades. Finally, it was not until 1917
that the wages of the workers in the petty trades underwent
an increase. Until then they had varied but little, and they rose
very slowly. According to the Clothing Trade Syndicate, at the
time of the Paris strikes of 1917, the apprentices were earning
50 centimes per diem, the small hands 1-50 francs, the second
hands 2-50 francs, and the first hands from 3-50 to 5-00 francs.
These were genuine war wages. Afterwards the increase was
fairly pronounced. In 1917 the first hands were earning from
6 to 8 francs per diem, and in March 1918, in consequence of
an agreement concluded in the clothing industry, the second
hands were earning from 4«50 to 6 francs. The increase averaged
65 per cent, above the pre-war wages.
In the clothing industry for home workers the wages re-
mained very low, so that in 1917 the best paid workers of this
kind were earning from 45 to 50 centimes an hour in the de-
partments of la Seine, les Bouches-du-Rhone, le Gard, and la
Seine-et-Marne. In eleven departments their wages averaged
30-35 centimes an hour, and in sixty-two departments they
averaged 20-29 centimes an hour. Finally, in the departments
of Allier and Tarn they were as low as 15-19 centimes an hour.
(d) Agriculture. The movement of agricultural wages may
be determined on the basis of an extensive inquiry conducted
in 1918. The general figures may be grouped as follows :
DAILY WAGES OF FARM WORKERS IN FRANCE IN 1914-1916 AND 1918
Wages by the day
Percentage increase
workers not
Section
Workers not boarded
Workers boarded
boarded
1914 1916 1918
1914 1916
1914-16 1914-18
Northwest
3-25
4-66
5-88
1-86
2-80
50
81
North .
3-44
4-93
6-00 .
2-11
3-28
55
75
Northeast
3-75
5-35
6-00
2-48
3-29
37
60
West .
3-3 1
5-45
6-40
2-46
4-08
60
90
Central .
3-87
5-92
6-40
2-83
4-53
60
65
East .
3-43
5-15
7-25
2-14
3-46
62
107
Southeast
2-87
4-51
7-75
1-56
2-53
62
120
South .
3-46
5-19
7-90
2-29
3-83
67
128
Southwest
3-42
5-15
7-33
2-34
3-77
61
115
Average
3-43
5-15
6-75
2-23
3-54
50
97
176 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
From 1914 to 1916, accordingly, the increase averaged 50 per
cent. ; and from 1914 to 1918, 97 per cent. Geographically,
however, the increases were not equal. The smallest rises were
in the regions of the north-east, while the largest were in the
west and, more recently, in the central regions.
(2) Wages and the cost of living. It is now important, in
conclusion, to compare these wages with the cost of living.
It is impossible, however, to follow the variations of the latter
with the precision befitting a study of price movements. We
shall take as the basis of comparison the points of departure
and arrival. Furthermore, it is difficult to establish a compre-
hensive deduction for wages in general owing to the lack of
a possible standard, which would imply a coefficient of cor-
rection based on the number of workers to which the various
established rates would apply. None the less, it follows that
if by way of exception certain trades or, more correctly, certain
workers, especially unskilled workers, saw their wages more
than double, the great mass of industrial and agricultural
workers benefited by an average increase of scarcely more
than 60-75 per cent,
Thus, if for the sake of comparison, and without attempting
to enter into a detailed analysis, we estimate the average
increase in all trades during the war at 100 per cent., we arrive
at this conclusion, namely, that wages doubled, whereas the
prices of articles of the retail trade increased from 300 to 350 per
cent. On the average, therefore, if the nominal wage increased,
the real wage not only did not increase in the same proportion,
but even underwent a relative decrease. Undoubtedly, under
the pressure of the high cost of living, wage demands were
accentuated and led to an increase that was especially pro-
nounced between 1916 and 1918 in the munitions factories and
in agriculture. But the difference in the price curve and the
wage curve is still large.
(3) Improvement of living conditions. From this there re-
sulted an incontestable evil which the rise of wages alone could
not prevent. For although an increase of compensation is the
first means of adapting the condition of the working people to
LABOUR IN FRANCE 177
a new economic situation, it is not always a satisfactory means.
In this respect the intervention of the State, together with the
efforts of employers and workers looking to the improvement
of living conditions, served to limit wage demands during the
war.
In the industrial centres the increase of the working popula-
tion rendered the question of food and shelter most acute. At
Marseilles, for example, the number of inhabitants nearly
doubled, increasing from 550,619 to 947,000 ; at St. Etienne it
increased from 148,656 to 212,000, and at Bourges from 49,000
in 1914 to 130,000 in 1917. A few insignificant villages, such
as St. Medard in Jalles, became populous centres of industry.
Barracks were erected, dormitories constructed, land requisi-
tioned to circumvent the excessive demands of the owners,
&c. For the providing of food a serious effort toward organiza-
tion was made by the interested parties themselves, the
directors of State establishments, and the heads of private
industries, notably in the creation of restaurants, canteens,
cooperative stores, &c. These different institutions were soon
grouped under the supervision of the Ministry of Munitions,
which coordinated their efforts, facilitated their provisioning,
and helped them financially by the establishment of a Food
Office and a Cooperative Fund with the aid of employers'
contributions and cooperative societies. Parliament, on its
part, on June 29 and 30, 1917, voted an appropriation to be
used for the making of repayable advances to the institutions
created with a view to bettering the general living conditions of
workers employed in munitions factories.
In January, 1918, the cooperative institutions numbered
932 (119 restaurants and 813 stores) ; the canteens of the State
establishments numbered 45 (42 restaurants and 3 stores) ;
the patronal institutions numbered 328 (161 restaurants and
167 stores). Altogether, accordingly, there were 322 restaurants
and 983 stores, which during the first three months of 1918 did
business to the value of : cooperative institutions, 91,672,116
francs (restaurants, 7,866,657 francs ; stores, 83,805,459 francs) ;
canteens, 4,944,028 francs (4,298,724 and 645,304 francs,
M
1569-38
178 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
respectively) ; patronal institutions, 16,071,427 francs (6,807,436
and 9,263,991 francs, respectively). In only three months these
institutions did a combined business amounting to more than
112,000,000 francs, this corresponding to a total annual turnover
of more than 450,000,000 francs, of which five-sixths repre-
sented sales in the stores and one-sixth food in the restaurants.
The comparison of two sets of figures shows the creative
effort that was put forth. Of 680 institutions which made
known their business figures, 444 (108 of them restaurants)
were created during the war and did business totaling 45,400,000
francs in the first three months of 1918. Only 136 (45 res-
taurants) were in existence before the war, and their figures,
which were 20,500,000 francs for the first three months of 1913,
show an increase to 46,000,000 for the first three months of
1918. Here again the war revealed the advantages of a great
social institution — consumers' cooperation.
Section 3 : Strikes, Syndical Action., and Arbitration
(1) The number of strikes. In paralysing the economic life of
the country the war at first completely put an end to strike
movements. The sense of danger aroused by the German in-
vasion, together with the thought of defending the national
territory, also helped to bring this about. Gradually, however,
these movements began to increase again at the end of the year
1916, reaching a crisis in the spring of 1917, to be followed by
relative quiet until the end of the war. In July, 1914, there
had been 109 strikes affecting 15 industries. In the first nine
months of the war, that is, from August 2, 1914, to April 30,
1915, there were reported but 32 strikes involving only 1,723
workers ; and the longest of these did not last more than three
days. After the latter date, however, they became more and
more frequent. In 1915 there were 98 strikes, 71 of which were
due to wage demands. Moreover, their duration also increased,
one of them lasting two weeks. They involved 9,361 workers,
and resulted in 16 successes, 44 failures, and 38 compromises.
In 1916 the number was still greater — 394 strikes involving
LABOUR IN FRANCE 179
workers. Thus for the first two and a half years of the
war there were altogether 430 vtrikes involving 51,830 workers.
They were especially frequent in the textile industry (89), in
the transportation business (80), in the metal trades (56), in
the leather and hides industry (41), in the building trades (36),
and in the chemical industry (25). The majority (348) were
caused by wage questions. Of the total 430 strikes, 102 (in-
volving 30 per cent, of the strikers) were successful, 178 (21 per
cent, of the strikers) were unsuccessful, and 150 (49 per cent, of
the strikers) resulted in compromise. The year 1916, however,
was not comparable in this respect with the pre-war years,
since in 1913, for example, there had been reported no less than
10,073 strikes involving 220,000 workers, and resulting in a loss
of 2,223,000 days of work.
The year 1917, on the other hand, opened in an atmosphere
of strikes. At first they attacked the munitions factories,
where they were due to the new schedule of wages and to
a system of bonuses to which the workers were opposed. In
order to put an end to this, the Minister of Munitions ordered
the establishment of a minimum wage and compulsory arbitra-
tion of wage questions — a matter to which we shall refer
further on. The immediate result was not favourable. The
order even had the effect of causing strikes, due to the im-
patience of workers to see the new rates put into force. In the
months of May and June strikes became most numerous,
especially among women workers. They began with the cloth-
cutting branch as affecting luxury articles, and gradually in-
volved the entire clothing and fine wear industry, finally
spreading even to the munitions factories. In the cutting and
clothing branches, as a matter of fact, wages not only remained
low, but were even lower than in time of peace. The first
struggle that took place in Paris tended to place them on the
pre-war level. Dressmakers were found to be earning 3 francs
per diem, excluding Sundays — that is to say, scarcely 80 francs
a month in the height of the season. Another demand was that
of the * English week ' — that is, a half day's rest on Saturday
with pay. The strike lasted 12 days and resulted in : (1) a rise
M 2
180 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
of wages and the granting of the high-cost-of -living bonus ;
(2) the voting and enactment of the law of June 11, 1917, pro-
viding for the introduction of the English week.
At the same time, 171 strikes involving 58,571 workers
(40,775 men and 17,796 women) took place in the munit ons
factories. They caused the loss of 142,339 days of work, and
were due to wage demands (131) and the question of working-
men's solidarity (35). Altogether, however, despite the fears
to which they gave rise, they involved only 3-38 per cent, of
the men and 12-06 per cent, of the women employed in the
manufacture of munitions. Later on, toward the end of 1917,
a number of strikes occurred in the steel and iron industry of
the Loire, but they were quickly checked.
(2) The causes of strikes. The causes of these strikes have
been much discussed. Some people saw in them the hand of
the enemy, and to this argument the arrest of a few foreign
workers among the strikers lent colour. In reality, however,
these strikes were due both to economic and to psychological
causes. The misunderstanding of certain workshop regulations
by workers new to the industry ; unjust dismissals of workers ;
the state of lassitude brought about by the prolongation of the
war and the difficulties to which it gave rise ; excessive profits
of employers ; demands of the retail trade ; the rising cost of
living ; the increased demand for distractions and luxuries ;
the dissatisfaction of certain workers who considered themselves
misplaced, or who were jealous of newcomers in the trade
better paid than themselves ; the question of the regulation of
work ; the demand for shorter hours ; and finally, imitation
and contagion — all these were elements in the problem.
The truth is, however, that it was especially economic con-
siderations, rooted in the increasing disproportion between the
reward of labour and the cost of living, that caused and sus-
tained the discontent. Proof of this lies in the fact that the
principal demand was for the so-called ' high-cost-of-living
bonus.' The female workers in the clothing industry could not
see why their former companions, who had entered the muni-
tions factories, were earning from 12 to 15 francs a day, while
LABOUR IN FRANCE 181
they were forced to content themselves with 4 or 5 francs a day.
Many workers, moreover, felt themselves wronged by the con-
tinual changing and refixing of wages. Their fears were some-
times imaginary, but often real. As regards piece-workers, an
increased production was often followed by a reduction of the
price per piece. The Minister of Munitions was forced to insist
on greater fairness on the part of manufacturers. The substitu-
tion of time-work for piece-work at first led to a diminution
of remuneration. Taking advantage of their authority and of
the workers' fear of being sent back to the army, certain
employers did not hesitate to reduce the wages of skilled
military workers, who were jealous of the higher earnings of
the newly arrived civil and female workers. The docking of
wages and the imposition of fines increased, and the workers
were deprived of certain advantages which they had enjoyed
for a long time. The rates of compensation were obscure,
secret, imperfect, or indefinite. All this accounts for the re-
crudescence of strikes in 1917, the total of which was 697 for
the year, with 190 to 270 in May and June, respectively, against
an average of not more than 40 a month in 1918.
(3) The action of the Government. The Government considered
the ways and means of combating strikes from all standpoints.
It first took up the matter of wages, fixing a minimum wage to
be paid by munitions manufacturers. On the other hand, it
demanded that the workers should submit all differences to
arbitration and conciliation. It also improved the living and
working conditions of the working class by organizing social
war activities, encouraging collective agreements, and seeking
to establish closer relations between workers and employers.
In constant touch with the labour syndicates, it listened to
their grievances, and at the same time called upon employers
to lend an ear to the representatives of their workers in regulat-
ing an institution which the war had developed, namely, that
of the factory delegates.
(a) Official regulation of wages. Even before the war em-
ployers working for the State were subject to the regulation of
wages. The Millerand Decrees of August 10, 1899, stipulated
182 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
that in the execution of contracts with the State, the Depart-
ments, and the Communes, the wages paid should be equal to
the normal current wages of the region as fixed by joint com-
mittees of employers and workers. The law of August 17, 1915,
legally established this principle by declaring it applicable to
mobilized workers. The Inspectors of Labour were therefore
bound to confirm and establish basic wages ; and in doing so
they took as a basis the most liberal wages paid in the facto-
ries— this not alone with the object of improving the condition
of the working class, but also with the object of avoiding labour
competition between factories and the frequent displacements
resulting therefrom.
On January 16, 1917, a further step was taken in the form of
a decision by the Minister of Munitions — the importance and
pioneer character of which was not at first appreciated — whereby
the rates and conditions of compensation applicable to all male
and female workers engaged in the manufacture of guns,
munitions, and war materials under the control of the Ministry
of Munitions were officially fixed.
Thus it was no longer a question of confirming a pre-
established wage, but of recognizing an official authoritative
minimum wage. A twofold conception was introduced by this
decision of the Ministry of Munitions : on the one hand, that
of a uniform basic wage for all workers of one and the same
specialty ; on the other hand, that of an additional bonus as
compensation for the production of the more skilled workers.
As regards compensation for piece-work, it was calculated in
such a manner as to permit piece-workers of average skill to
attain the basic salary of time-workers plus a certain premium.
The least favoured workers were thus assured of a fixed com-
pensation which should serve as a basis of adjustment in case
of a dispute. These wages, moreover, possessed a double
character : first, they were regional wages commensurate with
the local living conditions, but made flexible through premiums
and allowances adjustable to the displacements caused by the
war ; second, they were wage-schedules perfected and sub-
divided in such a way as to secure remuneration for workers in
LABOUR IN FKAN< I 183
proportion to their skill. The fir>t >< hedule established was
that for the region of Paris, approved by the Minister of
Munitions on March 2, 1917. The entire year of 1917 was
employed in the elaboration of analogous schedules, called
4 wage memoranda ' (bordereaux des salaires), in the different
!v^i<>n> of France. By February, 1918, no less than 153 of these
had been established in the various industries — the steel and
iron industry, the cement, chemical products, machinery,
electricity, aviation, &c.
Besides the question of wage-rates, the memoranda regulated
various accessory questions, such as deductions for poor work-
manship, payment of workers in case of involuntary stoppage
of work, posting of rates and use of explicit payment sheets for
the avoidance of disputes.
This decision was received in varying spirit. Very h'ttle
criticism was made of the principle involved, but its application
gave rise to numerous difficulties. The workers found fault
with the distinctions made as to trades. Certain employers
attempted to elude the regulation, some on the ground of
exemption from its application, others through subterfuges
of one kind and another. This provoked numerous protests
and strikes on the part of the workers. On the whole, however,
the results of the regulation of wages by superior authority were
successful. Everywhere an improvement of wages was felt,
especially in the case of female and unskilled workers. In
nearly all cases the wages paid were higher than the official
rates. Even in the non-involved industries, such as the building
trade and naval construction, it resulted in a favourable reper-
cussion leading to an interministerial conference for the regula-
tion of wages from the standpoint both of uniformity and of
arbitration.
(b) Arbitration. The regulation of wages is in effect a matter
for arbitration, which is necessary for the establishment of
a scale of wages either in advance of or in consequence of
strikes. It was not by pure coincidence that on the same day
on which the minimum wage rates were fixed there were
established by the decree of January 17, 1917, permanent
184 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
arbitration and conciliation commissions inspired by the desire
to insure both the indispensable continuity of war manufactures
and the equitable adjustment of labour conflicts. The decree
in question began by prohibiting the breaking of labour con-
tracts previous to conciliation and arbitration. In each region
it created joint committees of workers and employers before
which the grounds of dispute were to be laid by the Labour
Control. The committees called together the parties concerned,
undertook to bring about conciliation, and in case of failure
pronounced a decision which became obligatory. If the em-
ployer refused to acquiesce in the rates of compensation as fixed
by the decision, the wages were to be advanced to the workers
by the State and retained on the completion of the contract.
In case either employers or workers refused to abide by the
decision, the factory might be requisitioned and placed at the
disposal of the military authorities. Further, with the ami of
standardizing wages, the Minister was given the right of ex-
tending to an entire region the decision rendered in a special
case.
This machinery for arbitration and conciliation was no
novelty in France. It had already been set up by the law of
December 27, 1892. This law, however, was devoid of sanction
and without compulsory character, so that in practice it had
been almost entirely neglected. The Minister of Munitions
assured to workers a minimum wage, but at the same time he
imposed conciliation and arbitration as a measure to which it
was necessary to have recourse prior to all concerted cessation
from work. Opposition of two kinds was encountered : first,
from employers, who protested against an encroachment on
their right to control wages ; second, from workers, who re-
sented the curtailment of their right to combine and. strike.
The chief difficulty, however, was that of finding men for these
committees who enjoyed the confidence of both sides. Never-
theless, the task was undertaken and its success was immediate.
The first committee was constituted in Paris on February 2 and
speedily divided into four sections — metals, chemical products,
building, and leather. By August 24 each industrial region
LABOUR IN FRANCE 185
possessed one of these committees, and their range of activity
rapidly extended. They did not confine themselves to adjusting
Disputes that had already arisen;- but they also anticipated
disagreements by facilitating direct collaboration between em-
ployers and workers, by fixing wages, by issuing recommenda-
tions as to working conditions of labour, &c. Their competence
and impartiality were effective guarantees of fair and impartial
treatment in the eyes of labour.
In November, 1917, there were sixty-one of these committees
in existence which had adjusted numerous disputes — among
others, through a decision rendered in September, 1917, a
serious conflict involving the aviation factories in the region of
Paris.
(c) Factory delegates. While the State was thus endeavouring
to diminish the importance and frequency of disagreements,
the war, by introducing entirely new elements into the factories,
was developing the factory delegate, who represented a more
or less retrograde movement. He was a worker chosen by his
companions in the factory or workshop to represent their
particular demands. His field of action was more restricted
than that of the syndicate or trade-union, since it was confined
to the limits of the factory or workshop and did not comprise
the entire trade. In this sense his work was useful, since it
rendered the demands and issues clear cut. On the other hand,
the factory delegate was more easily swayed by the unthinking
masses, who had not been progressively educated up to the less
egoistic syndical conception.
The presence of women from other trades and of a mass of
unskilled labourers thus led to the choice of the factory dele-
gates. The attitude of these delegates was often provocative,
and their relations with the labour syndicates were often
difficult. The syndicates looked askance upon this intrusion
on the authority of their special representatives ; and they
strove to unite in the person of the delegate the quality of both
factory and syndical delegate. The attitude of the Government
was of a twofold nature : in the first place, it tended to en-
courage the institution, in order to provide the workers with
186 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
a means of giving expression to their grievances, and without
syndical action ; and in so doing, it merely imitated certain
large employers who admitted the delegate but not the syndi-
cate. In the second place, when the factory delegate, chosen
without restrictions, became an agitator, it undertook to point
out the danger of his course. Since the factory delegate exists,
we must perforce recognize certain virtues in him. The Com-
mittee of Arbitration of the Seme (Comite d' Arbitrage de la
Seine) in its session of June 28, 1917, expressed the unanimous
desire to see factory delegates, instituted in the war industries,
charged with the task of insuring permanent intercourse be-
tween the workers and the directors, and of preventing, by
means of timely discussions, disputes which might become
envenomed. The Minister adopted the idea and put it into
operation, while seeking to minimize its disadvantages. The
right to become a delegate was not open to every worker in the
factory .or workshop, but was limited to workers who had been
attached to the factory for a certain length of time, generally
a year. The election of delegates was by vote, the electors
being exclusively French workers, men or women, twenty-one
or more years of age, and employed in the factory for at least
three months. The vote was taken, as in a political election, by
an absolute majority on the first ballot and by a plurality on
the second ballot. For each group of 25 to 100 workers there
was to be one delegate and one assistant delegate, or by
corporations at the rate of one delegate for each 100 workers.
For more than 100 workers in the workshop or corporation
the number of delegates was doubled. The duration of the
mandate was for one year, with eligibility for reelection.
The circular instituting the factory delegates was followed
by others which set forth the difficulties to which their existence
gave rise. Their role was not denned. When the election as
held was accepted as valid, the employers nevertheless saw in
it only the selection of an authorized intermediary charged
with transmitting the individual demands of his companions.
The workers, on the other hand, sometimes regarded him as
the mandatory of the syndicate charged with examining, not
LABOUR IN FRANCE 187
only questions of interest to the workshop, but also questions
touching the entire factory or trade. They manifested a ten-
dency to unite in committee the delegates of the various work-
shops of the factory and to submit their demands through
a single syndical delegate. This is in substance, as has been
said, ' the Soviets of the factory.'
Little by little, however, the institution acquired recognition
and the wisdom born of experience. The delegates were re-
ceived at a fixed time by those in authority, when they were
invited to explain the operations and working conditions of the
workshops and factories and to set forth their views and the
general demands of their constituents. Their task was facili-
tated by authorizing them to employ their working hours, for
which they were paid, for receiving their companions and
hearing their grievances. But nothing is so delicate as this
institution, which depends essentially upon the character of
workers who enjoy the confidence of their fellows. Often the
choice falls upon a glib talker or a man of pleasing manner and
appearance ; but at other times the most worthy are selected,
and in the latter case the results are highly satisfactory.
CHAPTER V : LABOUR AND THE DEMOBILIZATION
THE armistice found France in full industrial activity. Her
efforts and achievements have already been described. In a
single day her munitions factories became useless. Whatever
diligence may be shown, it is obvious that a certain time will be
needed to adapt her industries to the conditions and require-
ments of peace-time production. Special qualifications are
required for the work ; innumerable technical and economic
difficulties must be surmounted, machinery must be trans-
formed, markets recovered, future uncertainties discounted,
supplies of raw materials replenished, &c. Having devoted all
her thoughts and energies to the prosecution of the war, and
having been constrained, during the last few months of the
hostilities, to bend all her efforts toward the defence of her
188 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
territory and the final victorious offensive, France was unable
to establish a programme of demobilization and reconstruction.
She was therefore surprised by the armistice. In the labour
market the conditions were virtually the same as those resulting
from the declaration of war. The munitions -factory workers
were left without employment, and to these were added the
demobilized soldiers ; and then, too, the war cripples were
involved in the economic struggle for existence. In the absence
of a preestablished programme, opportunistic measures were
quickly taken. Varying according to the class of workers, these
measures sought to decrease the amount of unemployment by
making the demobilization of the soldiers and the releasing of
workers gradual, by assisting them to find reemployment, and
finally by giving to those crippled a technical education befitting
their condition.
It is difficult, apparently, to compel employers to retain un-
profitable workers. They are inclined to discharge the least
useful of their hands, especially unskilled women workers.
Again the State intervened, first by way of example, then by
acts of authority. It issued orders that in its own establish-
ments no dismissals were to be made except in cases of extreme
necessity. Everything else was preferable : the completion of
urgent work ; the reduction of working hours, as far as possible,
down to five hours per day ; the suppression of night work ;
the suspension of work on Saturday, with corresponding re-
duction of wages, but with maintenance of the high-cost-of-
living bonus, &c. When dismissal became necessary, a certain
order of precedence was to be observed. The first to be released
were country women, then single women, then married women
whose husbands were working, then women who were heads of
families, and finally women coming from the invaded territory.
All were granted a fixed indemnity and a supplementary sum
proportional to the length of their employment in the factory,
without prejudice to the right to receive the pecuniary aid
granted to all persons out of work. This example set by the
State provoked among the workers in private industries an
agitation to obtain like treatment. Here, too, the State
LABOUR IN FRANCE 189
assumed in part the payment of an indemnity for dismissal, the
balance falling upon the employer.
The war had given promise of lasting so long that France
had taken no steps toward a systematic tabulation of the
intentions of the demobilized soldiers regarding the resumption
of their economic activity nor of the employments open to
them. It was necessary to await the signing of the armistice
before the law could be passed regarding the legality of labour
contracts made by mobilized soldiers. Finally, so jealous is the
watch maintained in France for violations of the principle of
equality that the economic necessities were not taken into
consideration in determining the order of the demobilization of
the men. It is true that the example of England in this respect
was not very encouraging. It was decided, accordingly, to
demobilize the men according to age, the oldest first. The
number of children was also taken into account, each child
being fictitiously supposed to add one year to the father's age.
On the other hand, the law of November 22, 1918, provided
that 4 employers and public and private establishments shall
guarantee to their demobilized personnel, should the latter so
desire, that within a month following demobilization, barring
impossibility, the proof of which devolves upon the employer,
they shall be reinstated in the employment which each held at
the time of mobilization at the normal rate of compensation
current in the trade at the present moment.' Finally, on the
strength of a first appropriation of funds to enable them to
regain a footing in civil life, the law of March 22, 1919, awarded
to soldiers a fixed bonus of 250 francs, together with an in-
demnity varying according to the duration of military service
and the length of time under arms and at the front (20 francs
per month in the latter case). These measures did not preclude
a certain vacillation. A number of demobilized soldiers were
either unable or unwilling to resume their pre-war employment.
This is not the place to analyse the causes ; but the demand
for labour is such that unemployment threatens only such of
the demobilized soldiers as have no definite trade.
Finally, consideration had to be given to those unfortunates,
190 EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON
the cripples, whom the war had rendered physically incapable
of resuming their trade. Their case was dealt with to some
extent during the war. Their professional reeducation was
assured by granting it to them as a right subject to demand.
As regards pensions, on the other hand, provision was made
that they should in no case be curtailed on the ground of the
pensioner's reeducation or readaptation.
The law of January 2, 1918, created a National Bureau for
the Crippled (Office National des MutiUs), with a view to con-
necting all private and public institutions concerned with the
welfare of these unfortunates. Professional schools were
created ; centres of agricultural reeducation were established ;
learned societies and national congresses made a study of the
employments open to them ; positions were reserved for them ;
the law concerning accident compensation was modified by that
of November 25, 1916, lest manufacturers might be led to
discard it from fear of too heavy responsibility ; special branches
of employment offices were devoted to their needs, &c. These
combined efforts led to favourable results. In 1919 some
25,000 war cripples were provided with work by the employ-
ment offices, and some 10,000 attended the centres of re-
education and secured positions through these channels.
In a short sketch of this character no attempt can be made
to enumerate all the questions involved and all the measures of
a social nature taken during the war. We will seek only to set
forth the results in the most summary manner possible. The
war left the French labour market in a lamentable condition.
Already underpopulated before the war, the country today is
bled white. The active population is reduced by the loss of
1,400,000 killed and .500,000 mutilated. The depopulation of
the provincial districts and the overpopulation of the cities is
accentuated. Female labour in the factory, rendered necessary
by the mobilization of the men and prolonged by male labour
shortage and by the disappearance of the present and future
heads of families, will react unfavourably upon the health and
upon the demographic and the moral future of the country.
Social cleavage has increased. A census showing the industriali-
LABOUR IN FRANCE 191
zation of France would reveal a reversal of the former ratio
between agriculture and industry and the aggravation of social
conflicts. Such misfortunes can be obviated by the State, with
the memory of its former successful intervention, by bringing
to bear upon the disputes between capital and labour the
weight of its equitable authority. If such proves to be the
outcome, if the conquests of the war — compulsory arbitration
and a general minimum wage — are conserved and extended,
then the sacrifice will not have been in vain, and the terrible
drama that was enacted in France will result for her in an
immense social progress.
INDEX
Aeronautical Service, 57, 68-69.
Africa, iin{K>rtation of labour from, 164.
Agriculture, wages in, 175.
Awiio, Departement do, -\:>. 103.
Algeria : advances to government by
Bank of (table). 84 ; importation of
labour from, 163-164.
Alsaoe Lorraine, 53, 146.
Ammunition Service, use of cotton by,
63.
Anglo-French agreement, 51, 65, 70.
Annuaire statist ique, 11-12.
Appropriations, voted since beginning of
war (table), 78.
Arbitration of labour differences, 183
et aeq.
Archangel, 57.
Ardennes, Departement des, 53.
Argentine Republic : difficulty of im-
portation of wool from, 55 ; credit
granted by, 55, 10.r>.
Armentieres, 61.
Army Supply Service : restrictions on
foreign purchases of, 47 ; importation
of Australian wool by, 54-55 ; need of
silk by, 68 ; demand of, for thread
silk, 70.
Australia, restrictions on exportation of
wool from, 48, 54.
Balance of trade : loss of, with reference
to manufactured textiles, 44 ; with
reference to combed wool, 51 ; with
reference to linen industry, 59 ; with
reference to cotton industry, 66 ;
with reference to silk industry, 71 ;
increased excess of imports, 103-104 ;
1913, 121 ; 1916. 121.
Bank of Algeria, advances to govern-
ment by, 84.
Bank of France : gold supply of, before
the war, 77 ; advances to govern-
ment by, 83-84, 93 ; releasing of bank
reserve by, 105.
Bayonne, 14 ; immigration depot at,
166.
Beetroot land, loss of, 103.
Belgium, influx of refugees from, 139.
Birth-rate, influence of factory labour
of women on, 163.
IMMI
Bonds : short-term National Defence,
84-85 ; Treasury bilk 85 ; long-term,
85.
Eons de la Diffuse. Nationals, 84.
Bonus: high-cost -of -living, 173, 180;
to soldiers, 189.
Book industry, women employed in, 156.
Bounties, disadvantages of shipping, 19.
Bourges, increased population of, 177.
Brazil, credit obtained from, 105.
Budget : of 1918, 78 ; details of, 89 ;
of 1919, 90-91.
Building trade : effect of mobilization
on, 139 ; women employed in, 157 ;
wages in, 174 ; strikes in, 179.
Caen, 15.
Carrying trade : effect of mobilization
on, 139 ; women employed in, 157 ;
strikes in, 179.
Central Foreign Labour Service, 146,
168.
Central Office for Placing of Unemployed
Workers and Refugees, 140, 144-145.
Chamber of Deputies, 17 ; plan of, to
increase tonnage, 18.
Chemical industry : women employed in,
157 ; strikes in, 179.
China, importation of workers from, 164.
Clothing industry : effect of mobiliza-
tion on, 139 ; women employed in,
157 ; wages in, 175.
Coal : increase in price of, 30 ; shortage
of, 44 ; loss of coalfields, 103.
Cobden, Richard, 169.
Coefficients, system of, 131-132.
Colbert, 35.
Comite" des Forge*, 163.
Commercial agreements, with foreign
countries, 120 et aeq.
Committee of Arbitration of the Seine,
186.
Committee of French Shipowners, 20, 25.
Committee on Derogations from the
Prohibition of Importation, object of,
110 *Mf,
Committee on Female Labour, 162-163.
Compensation, rates of, for requisition
of freighters and passenger ships
(table), 2«-27.
N
194
INDEX
Comptcrirs, object of, 117-118.
Conseil d'Stat, 25.
Consortiums, 113 ; organization and
object of, 116-117; monopoly of
importation, 116.
Co-operative Fund, 177-178.
Cotton industry : effect of invasion on,
45 ; condition of, before the war,
60-61 ; imports of raw cotton, 1913,
1915-1918 (table), 62 ; restriction of
importation of cotton, 62 ; spinning,
61 ; weaving, 61 ; imports and ex-
ports of cotton yarn and cloth, 1913,
1915-1918 (table), 64.
Credits : foreign, 105 ; reduction of,
132-133.
Creusot, 149.
Crews : condition of, 29 ; wages of, 30,
32.
Dalbiez Law, 153-154.
Demobilization, effect on labour con-
ditions of, 187 et seq.
Departments (political divisions). See
under individual names.
Derogations : from prohibition policy,
110, 113 et seq. ; to consortiums, 116 ;
condition of granting of, 118-119.
Disbursements, apportionment of (table),
78.
Employers' Association of Havre, 32.
Employment, effect of mobilization on,
139 et seq.
Employment agencies ; inadequacy of,
140 ; professional, 147 ; for muni-
tions factories, 169.
England : loans floated in, 88 ; obtain-
ing credit in, 94, 105 ; commercial
agreement with, 120 et seq. ; exports,
1913 and 1916 (table), 121 ; labour
exchanges in, 148.
' English week ', 179.
' Enticing ' and its suppression, 169-170.
Exchange : condition of, before the
war, 94 ; compared with other coun-
tries, 94 ; decline of, 94, 105 ; future
of, 95 ; rise of foreign, 133.
Expenditures, apportionment of, for
1920 (table), 90.
Exports : value of, in 1913 and 1915-
1918 (table), 104; English and
French, 1913 and 1916 (table), 121.
Factories and mills, loss of, 104.
Factory delegates, 186-186.
Factory workers, mobilization of, 151
et seq. ; approximate earnings of, 173.
Farm workers, daily wages of, 1914-1916
and 1918 (table), 175.
Female Labour, Committee on, 162-163.
See also Women.
Finance, Ministry of, 78 et seq.
Firminy, 149.
Flax : Belgian, 56 ; imports of, 1913,
1915-1918 (table), 57; cutting off
supply of, 57.
Fleet : size of, 12 ; number of seamen
(mechanics and firemen) in, 12, 29.
Food industry: effect of mobilization
on, 139 ; women employed in, 157.
Food Office, 177.
Foreign investments, decline in revenue
from, 105.
Foreign labour, employment of, 163.
Fourmies, 53.
Franc, decline after Armistice of, 95.
France : ships built in, and abroad
during World War (table), 15 ; shipa
built in and abroad since January
1919 (table), 16 ; gross tonnage built
in, 1904-1913 (table), 18; exports,
1913 and 1916 (table), 121.
France, Bank of : gold supply of, before
the war, 77 ; advances to government
by, 83-84, 93 ; releasing of bank
reserve by, 105.
Franco-English agreement : articles of.
120 et seq. ; results of, 122-123 ;
denouncing of, 132.
Franco-German War of 1870-1871, 11.
Franco-Spanish agreement, 125 et seq.
Free trade, 129-130.
Freighters, requisition of (table), 26-27.
Freight rates, 1913-1917 (table), 20
et seq. ; average annual, 1911-1918
(table), 24 ; before and after Armistice
(table), 24.
French shipowners, Committee of, 20, 25.
Government restrictions, on importa-
tion and exportation, 47.
Havre, 31-32.
Hemp : decrease of imports of, 57 ;
imports of, 1913, 1915-1918 (table),
58.
Immigration : of labour, 163 et seq. ;
depots, 166.
Imports : value of, in 1913 and 1915-
1918 (table), 104 ; effect of decrease
of tonnage on, 119. See also individual
commodities.
Income tax, 81 ; proposed advance of,
91.
INDKX
195
Indemnities, scales for requisitioned
, .
Indo-China, immigration of Ulxnir from.
163-164.
EMpeoton of Labour, 188 i • •'.'. 182.
Insurance. marine. .'ll! 33.
Insurance societies. unemployment, 141.
Iron and sfo'el imiuHiry : effect of
mobilization on, 139; womni em-
ployed in, 157.
Italy, commercial agreement with, 123-
124,
Japan, credit obtained from, 88.
Joint committees, for employment, 140-
147.
Jute, imports of, 1U13, 1915-1918 (table),
59.
Jute cloth, importation of, 1913, 1915-
1918 (table), 60.
Klotz, Ul.
Labour : scarcity of, 44 ; in silk in-
dustry, 68 ; organization of, 150-151 ;
mobilization of factory workers, 151
1 1 seq. ; inspectors of, 158-159, 182 ;
employment of foreign, 163; legisla-
tion concerning, 168 et .-•<•/. ; approxi-
mate earnings of factory workers, 173 ;
effect of mobilization on, 187 et seq. ;
strikes, see Strikes. See oho Women.
Labour, Ministry of, 139 et seq., 172 ;
investigation by, 156-157.
Leather and hide industry : women
employed in, 157 ; strikes in, 179.
Lille, 61.
Linen industry : position of, before the
war, 55-56 ; weaving, 56 ; importa-
tion of manufactured linen, 57-58.
Loans : National Defence, unlimited, of
1915, 86 ; unlimited, of 1916, 86 ; of
1917,86; of 1918, 87; foreign, 87-88.
Loire, 171.
Lyons, 146 ; immigration depot at, 166.
Lys, loss of, 56.
Machinery : loss of, 52-53 ; need of
new, 53-54.
Marine insurance : compulsory, 32-33 ;
premium rates of (table), 32.
Marine, Ministry of, 112.
Markets, loss of foreign, 43.
.Miiriie. Dcpartement de, 45.
Marseilles, 146, 165 ; immigration depot
at, 166 ; increased population, 177.
Merchant marine: ilihtrilnit i<>n of (table).
i:i ; admini.ti.il ion of, 34; need of
.Minis-try for, 36.
Metallurgical ot.tlili.-hmenta, lofitsof, 103.
Mem the. Ki:;.
.Millel.UI.I Decree, IM \*2.
MillH and factorial, IOHH of, luj.
Mining, mllijeuee on shipbuilding, 18-19.
Ministries. See under individual desig-
nations.
Mobilization, 139 ; of skilled labourers,
149-150.
Mont bard Aulnoye, 149.
Moselle, 163.
Munitions: Ministry of, 112, 139, 162
et seq., 182 ; increase in personnel of,
149 ; employment offices for, 169 ;
wages in, factories, 172.
Nancy, 146.
Nantes, 146 ; immigration depot at, 166.
National Bureau for the Crippled. 190.
National Defence : Ministry of, 156
et seq. ; bonds. See Bonds.
National Office of Farm Labour, 145 ;
immigration of Labour by, 164.
National Unemployment Fund, creation
of, 140-141.
Navigation companies : tonnage (table),
27 ; dividends (table), 27 ; compari-
son with German companies (table), 28.
Nord, Departement du, 103 ; centre of
textile industry, 45 ; wool combing
industry in, 52 ; wool spinning in-
dustry in, 52 ; linen industry in, 56 ;
cotton industry in, 61.
Note circulation, increase of, 93.
Obligations de la Defense Rationale, 85.
Paiis : unemployment fund of, 141
et seq. ; wages of labourers in, 174.
Pas-de-Calais, Departement de, 45, 103.
Passenger rates : increase of, 28-29.
Passenger ships, rates of compensation
for requisition of (table), 26-27.
Perpignan, immigration depot at, 166.
Petroleum, increase in cost of, 30.
Population, increases of, in industrial
centres, 177.
Port Said, 54.
Priorities : effect of, on importation of
textiles, 47 ; to imports of useful
products, 102, 106 ; in shipping, 107,
120 ; need of, after war, 127-128.
Production, effect of war on, 103-104.
Profits, in reconstruction of fleets. 28.
196
INDEX
Prohibition : policy of, to safeguard
national interests, 102 ; of least use-
ful products, 107 ; scope and develop-
ment of, 107 et seq. ; maintenance of,
129 ; abolition of, 130-131.
Public debt, before and after the war,
89.
Public finance, status of, before the war,
77.
Public Works, Ministry of, 112.
Refugees, influx of, from Belgium, 139.
Requisitioning of ships, 25, 34.
Revenue : sources and amount of, 79 ;
deficit in, 80 ; increasing of, 81-82 ;
decrease of, from foreign investments,
103.
Rheims, 53-54.
Roubaix-Tourcoing, 49, 61.
Saint-Chamard, 149.
Saint-Etienne, increase in population of,
177.
Saint-Medard, increase in population of,
177.
Salonika, 165.
Securities, reselling of foreign, 105.
Seine, Department of the, unemploy-
ment fund of, 141 et seq.
Shipbuilding, condition of, 19.
Shipowners, Committee of French, 20,
25.
Shipping, effect of priorities on, 107, 120.
Shipping policy, 107; effect of, on
textile industry, 47-48, 54, 62, 65.
Ships : built in France and abroad
during World War (table), 15 ; bought
during war (table), 16 ; built in
France and abroad since January
1919 (table), 16 ; requisitioning of, 25,
34 ; rates of compensation for re-
quisition of freighters and passenger
ships (table), 26-27 ; profits in recon-
struction of fleets, 28 ; conditions
and wages of crews, 29-30, 32.
Shipyards, use of, for munitions, 17, 34.
Silk : effect of invasion on, 45, 66 ;
maintenance of export trade, 66 ;
imports of raw, 67 ; scarcity of labour
68 ; difficulty of marketing, 68-69 ;
export of, to England, 70 ; rise in
pnce of, 71.
Somme, Departement de, 45, 103.
Spain, credit obtained from, 105 ; com-
mercial agreement with, 125 et seq.
Specific duties, establishment of, 131.
State Fleet (Flotte d'l&tat), 34.
Strikes, 178 et seq. ; of April 1919, 31 ;
of March 1919, 31; of July and
August 1919, 31 ; causes of, 180-181.
Subsidies, state, 146.
Surtaxes, ad valorem, 130-131.
Switzerland : credit obtained from, 105 ;
agreement with, 124 et seq.
Tariff : regulation of 1914-1915, 101 ;
inadequacy of protective, 106 ; return
to protective, 131.
Taxes : consumption, 81 ; on com-
mercial payments and luxuries, on
exports and imports, 81 ; increase of,
81-82, 91-92 ; return from, 1920, 91 ;
on turnover of commercial enterprises,
92 ; ad valorem surtaxes, 130-131.
Textiles : condition of industry, before
and during the war, 41-42 ; decrease
of imports of raw materials, 42 ;
decrease in export of manufactured,
43 ; increased imports of manu-
factured, 43 ; value of imports and
exports of manufactured textile pro-
ducts, 1913 and 1918 (table), 43;
causes of decreased production, 44-
45 ; imports of raw textile materials,
1913, 1915-1918 (table), 45 ; renewal
of production and later decrease, 46 ;
effect of mobilization on, 139 ; women
employed in, 157 ; strikes, 179.
Tonnage : 1870-1914, 11 ; increase
compared with other countries, 11-
12 ; entered and cleared at French
ports, 1913 (table), 13 ; of vessels in
coasting trade, 1913 (table), 14 ; lost
during the World War (table), 15 ;
decline of, 15 ; at present time, 16-
17 ; proposed increase of, 17-18 ;
gross tonnage built in France, 1904-
1913 (table), 18 ; of navigation com-
panies (table), 17 ; decrease and effect
on imports, 119.
Toulouse, 146.
Transportation, difficulties of, 48.
Tunis, importation of labour from, 163-
164.
Unemployment, 141 et seq.
United States, import of cotton cloth
from, 65 ; loan operations in, 88, 94,
105.
Uruguay, difficulty of wool importation
from, 55.
Vessels. See Ships.
Vosges, Departement des, 56, 61.
INDEX
197
M i <>f crews, 29; inm-aae in. .'Hi ;
in Kivni-h jH.rtu in 1019 (table). .'Ml 31 ;
riiinininin, l\'2. 179, 183. 11)1 ; living
of. IrtH; fluctuations of. 170 171
munition* factories, 17- ; of factory
worker^ 17.S 174; in linilding. trade,
174; in clothing trade. I7"> ; in
agriculture. 17.">; compared \\ithcO8t
of li\ ing, 176 ; wage memoranda, 183.
\\ . Ministry of. 112.
W.i r profits tax. 81.
Wheat, land, loss of, 103.
Women : in civil labour, 149, 166
et aeg. ; regulations for women in
industry, 168 et aeq. ; Committee on
rVin.ilc Laliom. ItiJ in;},
of factory labour of. on Imth
1H.'< ; work of, H-M i M. d 169; ap-
proximate earningH of. in factories,
1 7.'{ -174.
Wood indtiHtry : Hlrrt of innliiliAilion
on, I'M; wonirn cniploycd in, 157.
Wool induHtry : effect of invasion on.
46, 62 ; restrictions on ini|x)rtation
of, from AuHtralia, 48, 54 ; condition
of, before the war, 49 ; reduction of
imports, 49-60, 54 ; combing, 50, 5l! ;
yarn and cloth, 50-51 ; spinning, 52-
53 ; weaving, 53 ; importation from
Uruguay, 55.
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