Skip to main content

Full text of "Elements of intellectual philosophy"

See other formats 


,0,'^- 

:  %.# 

s^"^. 

^. 


A-  utilized  by\he  Internet  Archive  \ 


in  2G.fl  with  funding  from 
The%lbrary  of  Congress 


c^^' 


^.   v^^ 

>*O0^ 

xO^.. 

\.  ^^^' 

v^^-^^ 

..s^%. 

o 

:.  httR://www.archive.org/details/elementsof  intel^^ 


^j-    y" 


-^^  ^ 


•^^.-.  v^^ 


x^  ''-'. 


ELEMENTS 


OF 


INTELLECTUAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


BY 


REV.  JOSEPH  ALDEN,  D.D.,  LL.D., 

LATE   PRESIDENT   OF   JEFFERSON  COLLEGE. 


NEV/    YORK: 

B,  APPLETON"  &  CO.,  90,  92  &  94  GRAND  ST. 

1868. 


EwTEKED,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  tlie  year  1866,  hy 

J).  viPPLETON  &  CO., 

Id  thf  Clcrk'£   Ofllce  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  tlie 
Southern  District  of  lle^v  York. 


^-€a.. 


TO 

WILLIAM  CULLEN  BRYANT. 


As  a  poet  yoih  deal  with  reality.  You  have 
written  that  only  which  you  have  seen^  felt^  and 
fully  Relieved.  In  preparing  this  elementary  worh 
on  Philosophy  J  I  have  endeavored  to  pursue  a  simi- 
lar course,  I  tahe  great  pleasure  in  dedicating  it 
to  -  one  whose  friendship  I  have  long  regarded  as 
among  the  highest  honors  of  my  life. 

Joseph  Aldeh. 


OOlsrTEI^TS, 


CHAPTER  I. 

PAGB 

Introductory  Remarks,         .  .  .  .  .13 


CHAPTER  II. 

The  Mind's   Cognizing  Power — Faculties — Mental   An- 
alysis,   .  .  .  .  .  .  .19 

CHAPTER  III. 

Object  of  a  Text-book — ^Metaphorical  Language  in  Re- 
lation TO  Mental  Operations,  .  .  ,25 

CHAPTER  lY. 
Cognition  of  Material  Objects,     .  .  .  .81 

CHAPTER  y. 
Extension—Figure — ^Original  and  Acquired  Perception,  87 


6  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  YI. 

PAGE 

Primary  and  Secondary  Qualities  of  Matter,     .  .        44 

CHAPTER  YII. 

Theories  of  Perception — Locke — Berkeley,  ,  .        48 

CHAPTER  YIII. 

Theories  of  Perception — Reid— Brown,     .  .  .55 

CHAPTER  IX. 
Theory  of  Sir  William  Hamilton,  .  ,  .63 

CHAPTER  X. 
Relativity  of  Knowledge,   .  .  .  ,  .71 

CHAPTER  XI. 

Remarks  on  the  Nature  of  Perception,    ,  .  .80 

CHAPTER  XII. 

Cognition  of  Mental  Operations — Personality — Unity — 

Identity — Consciousness,  .  .  .  .84 

CHAPTER  XIII. 
Cognition  of  Space,  ......      100 

CHAPTER  XIY. 
Cognition  of  Time,    .  .  .  .  .  .107 


COKTEIS^TS. 


CHAPTER  XY. 

PAGE 

Cognition  op  Relations,      .  .  .  .  .111 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

Resemblance  and  Generalization — General  and  Abstract 

Terms,     .......      115 

CHAPTER  XYII. 

Cause  and  Effect,    ......      128 

CHAPTER  XYIII. 

Cognition  of  Beauty,  .  .  .  .  .      147 

CHAPTER  XIX. 
Cognition  op  Rectitude,        .  .  ,  ,  .163 

CHAPTER  XX. 

Reasoning,      .  .  .  .  .  ,  .      189 

» 

CHAPTER  XXI. 
Mathematical  Reasoning,     .  .  .  .  •      20S 

CHAPTER  XXII. 
The  Syllogism,  ......      215 

CHAPTER  XXIII. 
Memory^  .....      223 


8  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XXIY. 

PAGE 

Association,  .  .  .  .  .  ,      240 

CHAPTER  XXY. 
Imagination,   ...,..•      248 

CHAPTER  XXYI. 

TkeWill,       .  .  .  .  .  .  .261 

CHAPTER  XXYII. 

Attention,   ,  •  •  .  .  .  .  ,      280 

CHAPTER  XXYIII. 

Understanding  and  Reason — Faith — Infinity,        .  .      284 


PREFACE 


The  object  of  this  book  is  not  to  teach  a  system 
of  philosophy,  but  to  aid  the  student  in  studying 
subjects  which  are  adapted  to  promote  fixedness 
of  attention  and  discrimination  of  thought,  .and 
which  underlie  all  thinking  pertaining  to  human 
action  and  progress.  This  object  has  determined 
the  selection  of  topics,  and  the  mode  of  treating 
them.  The  topics  treated  relate  chiefly  to  the 
cognitive  faculties.  The  general  plan  is  indicated 
by  the  following  questions :  Wliat  can  the  mind 
do  ?    How  does  it  do  it  ? 

The  book  might  well  enough  be  termed  "  Ele- 
mentary Exercises  in  Thinking.^'  In  an  experience 
of  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  century  as  a  college 


1 0  PEEFACE. 

teacher,  tlie  autlior  found  that  lie  was  successful 
just  in  proportion  as  lie  was  elementary  in  liis 
instructions.  If  men  become  familiar  with  the 
alphabet  of  thinking,  they  are  prepared  for  pro- 
gress toward  profoundness. 

In  accordance  with  the  object  above  stated,  no 
topic  has  received  an  exhaustive  djscussion ;  and 
yet  no  topic  has  received  superficial  consideration. 
The  first  books  put  into  the  hands  of  the  student 
should  not  be  commonplace  compilations,  but 
should  be  characterized  by  a  freshness,  vivacity, 
and  clearness  of  thought  which  luay  be  communi- 
cated to  his  mind.  This  v/ill  be  of  more  value 
than  numberless  propositions  committed  to  mem- 
ory. 

The  book  may  be  found  serviceable  to  those 
desirous  of  improvement  who  may  not  be  favored 
with  a  teacher.  They  will  find  no  difficulty  in 
understanding  it.  The  author  believes  that  there 
is  nothing  cognizable  in  philosophy  which  cannot  be 
clearly  expressed  in  good  English ;  though,  as  Dr. 
Chalmers  remarks,  he  "is  fully  aware  that  whoso- 
ever, in  treating  of  the  human  mind,  aims  to  be 


PEEFACE.  11 

understood,  must  lay  liis  account  with  forfeiting,  in 
the  opinion  of  a  very  large  proportion  of  Ms  read- 
ers, all  pretensions  to  depth,  to  subtlety,  and  to 
invention." 

The  author  has  no  desire  to  inspire  a  love  of 
metaphysical  disputation,  or  of  metaphysical  lore. 
The  object  of  education  is  to  fit  men  for  the  service 
of  God  here  and  hereafter.  Life  here  is  for  wise 
action.  Habits  of  sober  and  accurate  thought  are 
among  the  conditions  of  wise  action.  Such  habits 
the  study  of  philosophy  should  form. 

The  teacher  v/hose  views  of  the  end  and  method 
of  teaching  correspond  with  those  of  the  author, 
will  find  the  boot  abundantly  large  enough  for  the 
length  of  time  usually  devoted  to  this  study  in  our 
schools  and  colleges.  The  college  teacher  who 
may  see  fit  to  use  it,  may  find  that  his  discussions 
with  his  pupils  in  connection  with  the  text,  will 
prepare  them  to  understand  and  appreciate  the 
supplementary  lectures  which  he  will  doubtless  feel 
inclined  to  prepare. 

Should  the  work  meet  the  approbation  of  teach- 
ers, and  be  used  as  a  text-book  to  a  considerable 


12  PKEFACE. 

extent,  it  is  the  intention  of  tlie  author  to  prepare, 

for  the  benefit  of  those  who  have  entered  upon  a 

course  in  philosophy  under  his  guidance,  a  volume 

embracing   additional    topics   and  more  extended 

investigations. 

J.  A. 


ELEMEITTS 


IlsTTELLEOTUAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


CHAPTER  I. 

IK-TBODUCTOKT     EEMABKS. 

Nfmerous  definitions  of  pMlosopliy  have  been 
given.  It  would  be  of  no  advantage  to  repeat  them. 
"We  have  before  us  a  field  to  explore.  It  is  of  com- 
paratively little  importance  what  name  we  give  to 
the  field,  or  to  the  process  of  exploration. 

A  perfect  definition  of  a  science  must  include  all 
that  belongs  to  it,  and  exclude  all  that  does  not  belong 
to  it.  It  marks,  therefore,  the  completion,  not  the 
commencement  of  the  science. 

When  used  with  reference  to  investigations  which 
have  the  mind  for  their  subject,  the  term  philosophy 
is  synonymous  with  science.  Mental  philosophy  and 
mental  science  are  the  same. 

Mental  philosophy  has  the  mind  for  its  subject- 


14  ELEMENTS    OF    INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPnT. 

matter;  just  as  natural  philosophy  has  the  material 
world  for  its  subject-matter. 

The  mind  is  a  spiritual  existence  which  perceives, 
remembers,  imagines,  loves,  etc. ;  that  is,  which  per- 
forms operations  which  we  call  perceiving,  remem- 
bering, imagining,  loving. 

Existence  cannot  be  defined.  There  is  no  such 
thing,  as  existence,  apart  from  things  existing.  Every 
one  knows  what  it  is  for  a  thing  to  be — to  exist.  To 
the  questions.  What  is  being  ?  In  what  does  existence 
consist  ?  no  answers  conveying  information  can  be 
given. 

The  mind  is  a  spiritual  existence.  By  spiritual  is 
meant  that  which  is  not  material — the  antithesis  of 
material.  We  describe  the  mind  positively,  when  we 
stat'$  what  it  can  do.  We  describe  it  negatively, 
when  we  state  that  it  has  none  of  the  qualities  of 
matter. 

The  mind  is  self-active,  and  can  think,  feel,  and 
will.  Matter  is  inert,  extended,  and  divisible.  Ob- 
jects with  qualities  so  different  cannot  reasonably  be 
regarded  as  identical. 

We  know  the  mind  as  connected  with  the  bodyo 
Its  action  is  modified  by  the  body.  The  acts  which 
we  term  mental  acts  are  the  acts  of  mind  connected 
with  a  material  organization.  What  acts  a  disem- 
bodied mind  can  perform,  v/e  do  not  know.  Our 
knowledge  is  confined  to  acts  of  mind  united  to  the 
body. 


INTEODUCTOIIY   REMARKS.  15 

A  mental  act  may  be  conditioned  on  a  state  of  the 
body;  but  it  is,  nevertheless,  an  act  of  the  mind.  An 
act  of  perception  may  be  conditioned  on  the  state  of 
the  brain;  but  the  brain  without  the  mind  cannot 
perform  an  act  of  perception.  The  act  is  therefore  a 
mental  act.  A  pain  felt  in  the  finger  is  felt  by  the 
mind ;  for,  if  the  mind  be  taken  av/ay,  no  laceration 
of  the  finger  will  occasion  pain. 

The  first  thing  to  be  done  in  studying  the  science 
of  mind,  is  to  observe  the  operations  of  the  mind. 
The  mind  can  observe  its  own  operations.  It  can 
make  its  own  operations  the  object  of  attention,  just 
as  it  can  make  the  operations  of  a  sewing-machine 
the  object  of  attention. 

The  mind  sees  the  operations  of  the  machine 
through  the  instrumentality  of  the  eyes.  It  sees  its 
own  operations  by  a  direct  beholding.  The  question, 
"How  can  the  mind  cognize  its  own  operations?"  is 
as  easily  answered  as  the  question,  "How  can  the 
mind  cognize  the  operations  of  a  machine  ?  " 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  we  cognize  our  mental 
acts  by  means  of  consciousness — as  though  conscious- 
ness were  an  instrument  by  which  we  cognize  them. 

We  must  be  careful  to  avoid,  mistaking  words  for 
things — imaginary  processes  for  real  processes.  To 
say  that  we  cognize  our  mental  operations  by  means 
of  consciousness,  is  simply  to  say  that  we  do  cognize 
them.  To  say  that  consciousness  informs  us  of  what 
takes  pikce  in  our  minds,  is  simply  to  say  that  the 


IG  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

mind  cognizes  its  own  operations.  Such  forms  of 
expression  do  not  explain  how  the  cognition  takes 
place. 

Some  writers  have  used  language  which  would 
seem  to  imply  that  a  definite  act  or  operation  of 
consciousness,  is  necessary  to  make  known  to  us  each 
thought  and  feeling ;  that  without  the  putting  forth 
of  such  an  act,  our  thoughts  and  feelings  would  be 
unknown  to  us.  A  ymter  says,  "Consciousness  is 
the  faculty  by  which  the  various  powers  of  the  mind 
are  made  known  to  us."  If  by  this  he  means  to 
assert  that  the  mind  must  put  forth  action  in  order 
that  we  may  know  what  pov»^ers  of  action  it  possesses, 
the  assertion  is  true ;  but  if  he  means  to  assert  that 
a  separate  and  peculiar  act  of  consciousness  is  neces- 
sary to  make  known  to  us  our  mental  acts,  just  as  an 
act  of  perception  is  necssary  to  make  known  to  us 
the  existence  of  external  objects,  the  assertion  is  not 
true.     It  lacks  proof.     It  leads  to  an  absurdity. 

We  have  a  mental  act — an  act  of  memory,  we 
will  suppose.  According  to  the  theory  above  stated, 
an  act  of  consciousness  is  necessary  to  make  known 
to  us  that  act  of  memory.  This  act  of  consciousness, 
being  a  mental  act,  must  needs  have  another  act  of 
consciousness  to  make  it  known  to  us,  and  that 
another,  and  so  on  ad  infinitmn! 

This  erroneous  view  is  the  result  of  supposing  that 
there  is  an  analogy  between  the  mode  by  which  the 
mind    cognizes  external  objects,  and  the  mode  by 


INTRODUCTORY   REMARKS.  1*? 

which  it  cognizes  its  own  operations.  False  analogies 
and  imaginary  mental  processes  are  frequent  sources 
of  error. 

Accurate  observation  of  our  mental  operations  is 
difficult.  The  habit  of  observation  can  be  formed  by 
earnest  and  patient  effort.  No  progress  can  be  made 
in  the  study  of  mind^  unless  this  habit  be  formed. 
The  operations  of  the  mind,  the  facts  which  are  the 
subjects  of  study,  must,  in  every  instance,  be  observed 
by  the  student  for  himself.  Facts  recorded  by  others 
will  be  of  no  service  to  him,  except  as  they  enable 
him  to  see  them  for  himself.  "Instruction  can  do 
little  more  than  point  out  the  position  in  which  the 
pupil  ought  to  place  himself,  in  order  to  verify,  by 
his  own  experience,  the  facts  which  his  instructor 
proposes  to  him  as  true."  The  pupil  may  "  get  by 
heart "  systems  of  philosophy  (so  called) ;  but  little 
or  no  benefit  will  result  beyond  that  of  improving  a 
verbal  memory. 

It  may  be  a  useful  exercise  for  the  young  student 
to  reverse  his  train  of  thought.  Let  him  observe 
what  thought  now  occupies  his  mind ;  then  let  him 
endeavor  to  recall  the  thought  which  immediately 
preceded  it,  and  so  on,  as  far  as  recollection  will  ena« 
ble  him  to  go.  He  will  thus  be  aided  in  making  his 
mental  acts  the  object  of  attention. 

Let  the  pupil,  at  the  outset,  resolve  to  be  satisfied 
with  nothing  short  of  clear  definite  ideas  in  relation 
to  the  subject  considered.     Earnest  and  steady  look- 


18  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

0 

ing  at  a  subject,  will  render  that  clear  which  at  first 
appears  confused  and  obscure,  or  will  enable  him  to 
decide  that  there  are  no  materials  for  positive  definite 
knowledge  before  him.  Let  the  line  between  what 
he  sees,  and  what  he  does  not  see,  be  clearly  drawn. 


CHAPTER  IL 


AK"ALYSIS. 


The  mind  has  capacities  for  action.  It  can  do 
various  things.     It  can  know,  it  can  feel,  it  can  will. 

It  can  perform  different  acts  of  knowing,  that  is, 
it  can  acquire  different  kinds  of  knowledge,  and  can 
acquire  knowledge  under  different  conditions.  It  can 
cognize  the  existence  and  qualities  of  matter.  It  can 
cognize  the  relations  between  geometrical  figures.  It 
can  cognize,  to  some  extent,  the  causes  of  events.  It 
can  cognize  the  difference  between  right  and  wrong. 
These  different  acts  of  the  mind  are  distinguishable, 
and  can  be  classified.  We  can  form  classes  of  mental 
acts. 

These  classes  exist  as  classes  in  our  minds  only. 
As  our  mental  operations  actually  take  place,  those 
belonging  to  different  classes  are  blended.  The  suc- 
cessive mental  acts  of  an  hour  may  include  examples 
from  all  the  classes  formed.  The  mind  does  not  per- 
form one  class  of  acts  exclusively  for  a  time,  and  then 
pass  to  the  performance  of  acts   of  another  class. 


20  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

Acts  of  a  particular  class  may  predominate  at  a  given 
time,  but  various  other  acts  are  interspersed  with 
them,  or  are  contemporaneous. 

A  man  may  be  viewing  a  landscape.  He  is  ear- 
nestly engaged  in  cognizing  its  different  points  of  in- 
terest— the  hill,  the  stream,  the  grove,  the  cottage. 
Perceptions  constitute  the  majority  of  his  mental  acts, 
but  other  acts  intervene.  He  remembers  having  seen 
similar  objects:  he  infers  that  the  occupant  of  the  cot- 
tage must  be  a  man  of  taste.  Recollections  and  in- 
ferences are  thus  blended  with  his  perceptions. 

Mental  acts  are  classified  on  the  principle  of  re- 
semblance. The  resemblance  has  reference  to  the  ob- 
jects acted  upon  by  the  mind. 

We  can  look  upon  the  different  operations  of  a 
machine,  and  can  compare  the  operations,  as  well  as 
the  results  produced.  Not  so  with  the  mind.  The 
acts  of  the  mind,  regarded  as  analogous  to  the  revolu- 
tion of  the  wheels  of  a  machine,  are  invisible — incog- 
nizable. We  cannot  see  how  the  mind  perceives  :  we 
see  that  it  does  perceive,  and  what  it  perceives.  We 
can  compare  mental  operations  in  their  results  only. 

In  view  of  the  different  objects  which  the  mind 
can  act  upon — in  view  of  the  different  things  which 
the  mind  can  do,  we  can  classify  its  operations,  and 
ascribe  the  operations  thus  classified  to  different 
faculties. 

A  faculty  is  not  a  component  part  of  the  mind. 
The  mind  is  not  made  up  of  faculties  as  its  constitu- 


THE   mind's   OOGNIZIKG   POWER.  21 

ent  parts.  When  the  mind  is  cognizmg  external  ob- 
jects, we  say  it  is  exercising  the  faculty  of  percep- 
tion. When  it  is  recalling  past  thoughts,  we  say  it 
is  exercising  the  faculty  of  memory.  When  it  is  cog- 
nizing a  truth  by  the  aid  of  other  truths,  we  say  it 
is  exercising  the  faculty  of  reasoning.  We  use  the 
term  faculty  to  express  the  different  modes  of  the 
mind's  action.  We  must  remember  that  it  is  the 
mind  which  perceives,  remembers,  reasons ;  not 
something  separate  from  it  termed  a  faculty.  A 
faculty  denotes  a  power  of  the  mind  to  act  in  a  par- 
ticular way. 

We  may  regard  the  mind  as  having  a  greater  or 
smaller  number  of  faculties,  according  as  we  form  a 
greater  or  smaller  number  of  classes  of  mental 
operations.  We  may  form  a  greater  or  smaller 
number  of  classes,  according  as  we  pass  by  or  no- 
tice minor  differences  in  the  objects  acted  upon  by 
the  mind. 

The  mind  can  cognize  truth.  We  say  it  has  a 
faculty  for  cognizing  truth.  It  can  cognize  different 
kinds  of  truth.  It  can  cognize  truth  relating  to 
mq^terial  objects.  It  can  cognize  truth  relating  to 
human  duty.  It  can  cognize  truth  relating  to  space 
and  numbers.  We  may  thus  form  three  classes  of 
truths,  viz.,  material,  moral,  and  mathematical.  We 
may  thus  ascribe  to  the  mind  three  cognitive  facul- 
ties. 
.       We  may  carry  our  classification  still  further,  and 


22  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL    PKILOSOPIIY. 

speak  of  a  greater  number  of  cognitive  faculties, 
and  speak  in  accordance  with  the  truth.  We  may 
ascribe  to  the  mind  a  greater  or  smaller  number  of 
faculties,  and  may  state  nothing  but  truth  in  so 
doing.  The  question  before  the  student  is  not,  how 
many  faculties  has  the  mind,  but  what  operations 
can  it  perform  ?  In  determining  this  question,  it  is 
convenient  for  us  to  classify  the  operations  we  ob- 
serve. We  need  to  form  classes  enough  to  include 
all  the  operations  of  the  mind.  There  may  be  a 
needless  yet  truthful  multiplication  of  classes,  and, 
consequently,  of  faculties.  Let  it  be  remembered 
that  the  term  faculty  is  used  simply  to  denote  a  par- 
ticular mode  of  the  mind's  action. 

It  has  been  said,  that  the  method  to  be  pursued  in 
the  study  of  mental  philosophy  is  the  same  as  in 
natural  philosophy,  viz.,  to  observe  facts,  and  infer 
principles  or  laws.  The  remark  requires  some  modi- 
fication, in  consequence  of  the  difference  in  the  mate- 
rials composing  the  two  sciences.  The  instrument 
by  which  both  are  studied  is  the  same ;  but  the 
subjects  differ.  The  one  is  inert  matter;  the  other 
is  self-active  mind.  In  both  cases  we  are  to  observe 
facts ;  but  in  the  one  case  we  ask,  What  are  the 
passive  phenomena  before  us,  and  to  what  laws  are 
they  subject  ?  In  the  other  case  we  ask.  What  can 
the  mind  do  ?  The  difference  does  not  relate  so 
much  to  method,  as  to  the  attitude  of  mind.  There 
is  some  advantage  in  viewing  the  mental  phenomena 


THE    mind's    cognizing   POWER.  23 

as  the  acts  of- a  voluntary  being,  instead  of  viewing 
tlieni'  as  succeeding  each  other  according  to  certain 

laws. 

The  student  must  form  the  habit  of  analyzing  his 
mental  operations. 

To  analyze  a  chemical  substance,  is  to  resolve  it 
into  its  constituent  elements.  A  simple  substance 
cannot  be  analyzed.  To  analyze  a  mental  process,  is 
to  separate,  in  thought,  the  different  mental  acts 
which  constitute  that  process,  A  simple  mental  act 
cannot  be  analyzed. 

The  mind  is  seldom  in  a  simple  state ;  that  is,  is 
seldom  employed  in  performing  a  simple  act.  It  is 
seldom  that  one  simple  thought  is  present  to  the 
rnind  to  the  exclusion  of  all  other  thoughts.  To 
notice  separately  the  different  acts  or  states  which 
constitute  a  given  complex  state,  is  to  analyze  that 
complex  state. 

One  is  looking  upon  a  meadow.  The  state  of  his 
mind  is  that  of  perception.  There  are  various  ob- 
jects before  him— grass,  lilies,  trees,  cattle.  He 
hears  the  songs  of  the  birds,  and  the  murmur  of  the 
rivulet  by  Vr^hich  he  is  standing.  The  state  of  his 
mind  is  complex,  and  consists  of  various  perceptions 
by  means  of  the  eye  and  the  ear.  .To  notice  them 
separately  in  thought,  is  to  analyze  that  complex 
state. 

The  habit  of  analyzing  our  mental  states  is  adapt- 
ed to  promote  nice  discrimination.     Skill  in  distin- 


24  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

guishing  between  nice  shades  of  color  is  desirable ; 
but  skill  in  distinguishing  between  nice  shades  of 
thought  is  still  more  desirable.  He  who  would  be- 
come an  acute  thinker,  must  train  his  mind  to  habits 
of  mental  analysis. 


CHAPTER  III, 

OBJECT    OF    A    TEXT-BOOK — METAPHOEICAL    LANGUAGE 
IN  EELATIOI^  TO   MENTAL    OPERATIONS. 

To  Yiew  truths  directly,  and  not  through  the  me- 
dium  of  another's  mind,  or  from  a  traditional  stand- 
point, should  be  the  object  of  every  student.  His 
text-book  should  be  used  as  the  traveller  uses  his 
guide-book. 

The  traveller  visits  Rome.  He  gets  a  guide-book, 
that  he  may  know  where  to  go,  and  what  to  see. 
Each  morning  he  consults  his  guide-book,  and  by  its 
aid  forms  the  plans  of  the  day.  He  visits  St.  Peter's 
and  the  Vatican,  and  examines  the  objects  mentioned 
in  his  guide-book.  He  does  not  spend  his  time  in 
committing  to  memory  the  descriptions  contained  in 
the  book,  but  in  seeing  the  objects  described.  When 
questioned  respecting  St.  Peter's  and  the  Vatican,  he 
does  not  repeat  from  memory  what  he  has  read,  but 
tells  what  he  has  seen. 

So  with  a  text-book  in  mental  science.  Its  object 
is  not*  to  tell  men  what  to  believe,  but  what  to  see. 
2' 


26  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

TJnless  a  man  becomes  a  seer^  he  derives  no  advan- 
tage from  Ms  text-book  or  his  teacher. 

The  student  must  guard  against  being  misled  by 
the  use  of  metaphorical  language.  Many  of  the 
terms  employed  to  denote  the  operations  of  the  mind 
are  metaphorical.  They  were  originally  employed  to 
express  material  objects  and  material  phenomena. 

We  call  a  certain  operation  or  state  of  mind,  a 
mental  image.  We  speak  of  having  in  our  minds  an 
image  of  the  Capitol,  or  of  some  other  remarkable 
edifice.  In  reality,  there  can  be  no  resemblance  be- 
tween the  Capitol  and  that  state  of  mind — that  con- 
dition of  an  immaterial,  invisible  existence — which  we 
call  having  an  image  or  picture  of  the  Capitol  in  the 
mind.  We  must  be  on  our  guard,  lest  the  use  of  the 
term  image  should  modify  our  view  of  the  state  of 
mind  to  which  it  is  applied. 

We  speak  of  a  deep  impression  made  upon  the 
memory,  and  of  its  erasure  by  time.  The  language 
is  metaphorical,  and  should  not  lead  us  to  suppose 
that  there  is  an  analogy  between  an  impression  upon 
wax  and  an  impression  upon  memory.  And  yet 
this  assumed  analogy  is  sometimes  used  to  account 
for  facts.  For  instance,  it  is  a  fact  made  known  by 
observation  and  experience,  that  some  minds  remem- 
ber events  very  easily  for  a  time,  but  do  not  remem- 
ber them  long.  To  account  for  the  fact,  it  is  said 
that  impressions  easily  made  are  easily  effaced :  this 
passes  for  an  explanation  of  the  fact  above  stated.       ^ 


OBJECT    OF   A   TEXT-BOOK,    ETC.  27 

State  the  matter  thus :  Impressions  easily  made 
on  material  objects  are,  for  the  most  part,  easily 
effaced:  therefore  things  easily  committed  to  mem- 
ory are  easily  forgotten.  Every  one  sees  that  the 
conclusion  does  not  follow  from  the  premise. 

The  explanation  owes  its  plausihility  to  the  sup- 
posed analogy  between  impressions  on  matter  and 
the  mental  act  of  remembering.  There  is  no  such 
analogy.  The  idea  is  suggested  by  the  metaphorical 
use  of  the  term  impression.  The  student  must  be  on 
his  guard  against  being  thus  misled. 

He  must  also  avoid  drawing  literal  conclusions 
from  figurative  premises.  For  example,  conscience  is 
said  to  be  the  voice  of  God  in  the  soul :  hence,  its 
dictates  must  be  infallibly  correct. 

The  premise  is  figurative ;  the  conclusion  literal. 
The  expression,  "  Conscience  the  voice  of  God  in  the 
soul,"  means,  "  God  has  given  the  soul  power  to  cog- 
nize the  difference  between  right  and  wrong — to  cog- 
nize duty  and  its  opposite."  Give  the  premise  a  lit- 
eral form,  and  the  matter  stands  thus :  God  has 
given  the  mind  power  to  cognize  the  difference  be- 
tween right  and  wrong;  therefore  all  its  decisions 
are  infallible.  With  just  as  much  truth  it  may  be 
said,  "  God  has  given  the  mind  power  to  distinguish 
between  truth  and  error;  therefore  all  its  decisions 
are  infallible." 

"  Although,"  says  Sir  William  Drummond,  "  it  be 
very  difficult  to  speak  of  the  mind  without  employ- 


28  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

ing  figurative  language  and  without  borrowing  from 
analogy,  yet  it  is  altogether  unphilosoj)hical  to  build 
an  argument  on  a  trope,  or  found  a  system  on  a 
simile." 

Another  source  of  error  is  that  resulting  from 
personification  of  the  faculties.  The  ^difierent  facul- 
ties, which,  we  have  seen,  are  only  different  modes 
of  the  mind's  operation,  have  been  treated  as  sepa- 
rate and  independent  personalities,  having  extensive 
dealings  with  one  another,  and  with  their  master,  the 
mind.  This  source  of  error  has  been  noticed  by 
several  writers,  yet  few  have  successfully  guarded 
against  it.  Some  eminent  modern  writers  have,  by 
their  excessive  personification  of  the  faculties,  poured 
confusion  over  the  whole  mental  field. 

Hobbes  censured  "  that  metaphorical  speech  of 
attributing  command  and  subjection  to  the  faculties 
of  the  soul,  as  if  they  made  a  commonwealth  or 
family  within  themselves,  and  could  speak  to  one 
another." 

Locke  says :  "  I  suspect  that  this  way  of  speaking 
of  faculties  has  led  many  into  a  confused  notion  of 
so  many  distinct  agents  within  us,  which  had  their 
several  provinces  and  authorities,  and  did  command, 
obey,  and  perform  several  actions  as  so  many  distinct 
beings ;  which  has  been  no  small  occasion  of  wran- 
gling, obscurity,  and  uncertainty  in  questions  relating 
to -them." 

Notice  some  illustrations  of  the  error  to  be  avoid- 


29 


ed.  "  The  senses  inform  us  of  the  existence  of  the 
external  world."  The  senses  are  here  represented  as 
intelligent  agents  giving  information  to  another  intel- 
ligent agent,  the  mind — "ns."  The  truth  intended 
to  be  conveyed  is,  "  The  mind,  through  the  organs  of 
sense,  cognizes  the  external  world." 

"  Perception  furnishes  the  memory  and  reason 
with  materials  on  which  to  act."  Avoiding  personi- 
fication, the  thought  is,  "  The  mind  perceives  truths, 
remembers  them,  and  cognizes  other  truths  by  their 
aid." 

"  When  we  attend  to  any  change  which  happens 
in  nature,  judgment  informs  us  that  there  must  be  a 
cause  of  this  change."  Literally,  "  When  the  mind 
attends  to  any  change,  it  perceives  that  the  change 
or  event  must  have  had  a  cause."  The  language 
used  above  implies  that  judgment  is  an  agent  sepa- 
rate from  the  mind,  whereas  it  is  an  act  of  the  mind. 

No  writer  has  carried  personification  of  the  facul- 
ties to  a  greater  length  than  has  Kant.  "  Pure  rea- 
son," he  says,  "  leaves  every  thing  to  the  understand- 
ing which  refers  immediately  to  the  objects  of  the 
intuition,  or  rather  to  their  synthesis  in  the  imagina- 
tion." Here  the  mind  disappears  altogether,  and 
certain  imaginary  entities  take  its  place. 

"The  understanding  cannot  perceive,  and  the 
senses  cannot  think." 

Here  the  faculties  are  represented  as  independent 
entities.     Literally  expressed,  the  thought  is,  "  The 


30  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

mind  cannot,  except  through  the  organism  of  the 
Benses,  cognize  material  objects,  and  cannot  cognize 
spiritual  objects  by  the  said  organism  of  the  senses." 

Cousin  says  :  "  The  senses  attest  the  existence  of 
concrete  quantities  and  bodies ;  consciousness,  the 
internal  sense,  attests  the  presence  of  a  succession  of 
thoughts,  and  of  all  the  phenomena  which  pertain  to 
personal  identity ;  but  at  the  same  time  reason  inter- 
venes, and  pronounces  that  the  relations  of  the  quan- 
tities in  question  are  abstract,  universal,  and  neces- 
sary." 

The  senses,  consciousness,  and  reason,  are  here 
set  forth  as  personages  doing  the  work  of  the  mind. 
To  use  such  language  in  describing  the  acts  of  the 
one  indivisible  mind,  tends  to  produce  obscurity  and 
error. 

The  above  illustrations  show,  that  facts  in  rela- 
tion to  the  mind  "  should  be  stated  in  the  simplest, 
most  direct,  and  least  figurative  language  we  can 
select."  When  compelled  to  use  metaphorical  terms, 
we  should  notice  exactly  the  meaning  intended  to  be 
conveyed  by  them. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

COGNITION^   OF   MATERIAL   OBJECTS. 

What  can  the  mind  do  ?  It  can  know — cognize — 
acquire  knowledge.  These  forms  of  expression  are 
identical. 

What  can  the  mind  cognize  ?  It  can  cognize 
matter — the  external  world.  It  cognizes  matter 
through  the  senses.  When  it  is  asked.  How  can  the 
mind  cognize  matter  through  the  senses  ?  we  can 
state  the  conditions  of  cognition,  and  that  is  all  we 
can  do. 

These  conditions  may  he  stated  thus :  An  ob- 
ject is  presented  to  the  organ  of  sense.  A  tree, 
for  example,  is  so  presented  that  the  light  reflected 
from  it  enters  the  eye,  and  forms  an  image  upon  the 
retina,  which  is  an  expansion  of  the  optic  nerve  in 
the  back  part  of  the  eye.  If  the  optic  nerve  and  the 
brain  be  in  a  healthful  state,  the  mind  cognizes  the 
tree — that  is,  perceives  its  existence,  form,  and  color. 
Why  these  conditions  are  followed  by  cognitions,  we 
do  not  know.  God  has  so  ordained. 
t      If  any  of  these  conditions  are  wanting,  cognition 


32  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

will  not  take  place.  If  the  eye  is  disordered  so  that 
an  image  is  not  formed  on  the  retina — if  the  optic 
nerve  or  the  brain  be  not  in  their  normal  state,  cog- 
nition will  not  take  j)lace. 

When  we  have  stated  the  conditions  of  cognition, 
we  have  not  told  how  the  mind  cognizes.  The  con- 
ditions are  material  or  physiological ;  the  act  of  cog- 
nition is  mental.  Keeping  in  mind  this  distinction 
will  aid  us  in  avoiding  error.  The  act  of  cognition 
is  a  simple  act,  and  cannot  be  explained  otherwise 
than  by  stating  its  conditions  and  results.  We 
should  never  attempt  to  explain  what  is  unexplain- 
able. 

We  have  stated  the  conditions  of  cognition  by 
the  sense  of  sight.  In  cognition  by  the  sense  of 
touch,  the  conditions  are,  that  the  object  be  brought 
in  contact  with  the  organ — the  hand,  for  example — 
and  that  the  connection  formed  by  the  nerves  be- 
tween the  organ  and  the  brain  be  uninterrupted,  and 
that  the  nerves  and  brain  be  in  a  normal  state. 

In  cognition  by  the  ear,  the  vibrations  of  the 
air  must  strike  upon  the  tympanum,  and  the  impres- 
sion or  affection  thereby  produced  be  transmitted,  by 
means  of  the  bones  of  the  ear  and  the  auditory 
nerve,  to  the  brain. 

In  cognition  by  taste,  the  object  must  be  applied 
to  the  organ,  and  the  impression  transmitted  to  the 
brain.     So  in  smelling. 

We   call  the  effect   of  the  presentation   of  the 


COGNITION^   OF   MATERIAL   OBJECTS.  33 

object  to  the  organ,  an  impression.  By  this  term 
we  mean  that  change,  whatever  it  may  be,  which 
experience  has  shown  is  necessary  to  cognition.  The 
same  may  be  said  of  the  phrase,  "  transmitted  by 
the  nerves  to  the  brain."  We  mean  by  it,  that  state 
of  the  nerves  and  .brain,  whatever  it  may  be,  which 
experience  has  shown  is  necessary  to  cognition. 

How  do  we  know  that  matter  exists  ?  We  see 
it — feel  it — cognize  it.  Does  the  eye  see  it  ?  Does 
the  hand  feel  it  ?  Take  away  the  mind,  and  what 
can  the  eye  or  the  hand  do  ?  It  is  the  mind  that  sees 
and  feels.  It  is  the  mind  which  cognizes  the  exist- 
ence of  the  tree,  just  as  it  is  the  mind  which  cognizes 
the  relation  of  equality  between  two  and  two.  In 
the  one  case,  the  agency  of  the  senses  is  nsed ;  in  the 
other,  not. 

If  it  be  asked.  How  do  we  know  that  things  are 
as  we  perceive  them  to  be  ?  How  do  we  know  that 
matter  exists  ?  we  can  only  reply,  "  We  know  it." 
We  cannot  doubt  the  direct,  intuitive  cognitions  of 
our  minds.  We  cannot  doubt  that  the  whole  of  an 
object  is  greater  than  its  part.  We  cannot  doubt 
that  the  tree  standing  before  us  exists.  The  ground 
of  the  certainty  of  our  knowledge  is,  in  both  cases, 
the  same.  We  must  accept  our  intuitive  cognitions 
as  true. 

It  is  said  that  consciousness  assures  us  of  the 
truth  of  our  cognitions.  It  has  already  been  re- 
marked, that  to  see  an  object,  and  to  be  conscious 
2*  .. 


34  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

that  we  see  an  object,  is  one  and  the  same  thing.  To 
ask,. How  do  you  know  that  you  are  conscious  that 
you  see  an  object  ?  is  to  ask,  How  do  you  know  that 
you  see  it  ? 

Some  say.  We  are  conscious  of  the  state  of  mind 
termed  cognition  or  j)erception,  and  of  nothing  else. 
We  see  an  external  object.  The  seeing — cognizing, 
is  confessedly  a  mental  act.  Of  its  existence,  it  is 
said,  we  are  certain ;  but  we  are  not  certain  of  any 
thing  else.  We  are  not  certain  that  there  is  any 
thing  external  corresponding  to  this  state  of  mind, 
which  alone  is  the  object  of  consciousness.  Thus  we 
have  no  certainty  of  the  existence  of  external  objects. 

The  error  contained  in  the  above  statement  con- 
sists in  not  taking  the  whole  of  the  conscious  state 
of  mind  into  view.  That  of  which  we  are  conscious 
is  this  :  we  are  conscious  that  we  cognize  the  object. 
When  we  say  we  are  conscious  that  we  have  a  cogni- 
tion— a  subjective  state  of  mind — we  have  not  stated 
the  whole  truth.  Our  consciousness  embraces  the 
cognition  of  the  object.  We  are  as  certain  that  we 
cognize  the  object,  as  we  are  that  we  have  a  mental 
state. 

The  term  consciousness  is  properly  coniSned  to 
our  mental  operations.  We  cannot,  in  strict  propri- 
ety, say  that  we  are  conscious  of  a  tree  ;  but  we  can 
say  we  are  conscious  that  we  perceive  a  tree. 

If  it  be  asked,  What  is  the  object  of  the  mind  in 
perception  ?  the  reply  is.  The  object  perceived.     The 


COGlSriTION    OF   MATERIAL    OBJECTS.  35 

objects  of  cognition  are  tlie  things  cognized.  If  we 
scrutinize  our  mental  operations,  we  shall  find  noth- 
ing but  the  act  of  mind  and  the  objects  perceived. 
If  it  be  asked,  How  can  the  mind,  which  is  spirit,  act 
upon  matter  ?  How  can  the  mind  act  upon  objects  at  a 
distance  from  it,  as  in  the  case  of  perception  by  the 
eye  ?  we  reply.  The  mind  does  act  on  matter,  so  far  as 
cognizing  it  is  concerned,  and  it  does  cognize  distant 
objects.  In  proof  of  this,  we  appeal  to  conscious- 
ness— that  is,  to  observation  of  what  takes  place 
when  we  cognize  external  objects. 

Some  philosophers  have  labored  hard  to  discover 
how  the  idea  of  externality — of  something  external — 
is  first  acquired.  It  is  acquired  when  the  mind  cog- 
nizes an  external  object.  Whenever  the  mind  cog- 
nizes an  object  out  of  the  mind,  it  cognizes  it  as  out 
of  the  mind.  No  one,  in  cognizing  a  material  object 
by  means  of  sight  or  touch,  ever  cognized  it  as  a 
modification  of  his  own  mind,  or  as  existing  within 
his  mind. 

Do  we  get  the  idea  of  something  es.ternal  through 
the  agency  of  any  of  our  senses  except  touch  and 
sight  ?  Take  the  sense  of  hearing.  Suppose  a  per- 
son destitute  of  all  the  senses  except  hearing.  Let  a 
violin  be  sounded  near  him.  What  would  be  the 
effect  on  his  mind  ?  He  would  cognize  a  sound ; 
and  he  would  cognize  it  as  external  to  his  own  mind. 
He  would  have  no  knovfledge  of  the  violin ;  but  he 
would  have  a  knowledge  of  sound.     He  would  not 


36  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPnY. 

have  a  knowledge  of  something  external  extended 
and  offering  resistance  to  muscular  effort ;  but  he 
would  have  a  knowledge  of  sound  as  external  to  his 
mind,  and  could  probably  infer  the  existence  of  a 
cause  external  to  his  mind. 

In  like  manner,  we  may  have  a  knowledge  of 
something  external  to  us,  in  the  exercise  of  all  our 
senses.  We  get  the  idea  of  externality  through  all 
our  senses  ;  but  not,  in  all  cases,  the  idea  of  extended 
externality.  A  distinction  is  to  be  made  between 
externality  extended  and  unextended. 


CHAPTER  V. 

EXTENSIOIS" — ^FIGURE — ORIGIl^AL    AND    ACQUIRED    PER- 
CEPTIONS. 

"  It  is  certain  that  sight  alone,  and  independently 
of  touchj  affords  ns  the  idea  of  extension ;  for  exten- 
sion is  the  necessary  object  of  vision,  and  we  should 
see  nothing  if  we  did  not  see  it  extended.  I  even 
believe  that  sight  must  give  us  the  notion  of  exten- 
sion more  readily  than  touch,  because  sight  makes  us 
remark  more  promptly  and  permanently  than  touch 
that  contiguity,  and,  at  the  same  time,  that  distinc- 
tion of  parts  in  which  extension  consists.  Moreover, 
vision  alone  gives  us  the  idea  of  the  color  of  objects. 
Let  us  suppose  now  parts  of  space  differently  colored 
and  presented  to  our  eyes.  The  difference  of  colors 
will  necessarily  cause  us  to  observe  the  boundaries 
or  limits  which  separate  two  neighboring  colors,  and, 
consequently,  will  give  us  an  idea  of  figure,  for  we 
conceive  of  a  figure  when  we  conceive  a  limitation  or 
boundary  on  all  sides." 

An  appeal  to  our  consciousness,  that  is,  observa- 
tion of  what  takes  place  in  the  exercise  of  vision, 


38  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

shows  that  the  mind  cognizes  extension  and  form  by 
means  of  the  eye ;  that  is,  cognizes  extended  and  fig- 
ured objects  by  means  of  the  eye. 

Some  contend  that  we  get  the  idea  of  exten- 
sion and  figure  by  means  of  the  sense  of  touch, 
and  that  those  ideas  are,  by  association,  transferred 
to  our  visual  perceptions.  So  far  is  this  from  being 
clear,  it  is  doubtful  whether  any  accurate  idea  of  fig- 
ure could  be  gained  by  the  sense  of  touch  only.  Let 
one  be  blindfolded,  and  then  let  an  object  different 
from  any  object  previously  seen  and  handled  be  pre- 
sented to  the  sense  of  touch,  and  he  will  form  a  very 
inaccurate  idea  of  its  figure. 

Some  admit  that  we  can  cognize  extension  by  the 
eye,  but  deny  that  we  can  cognize  figure,  that  is,  so- 
lidity, length,  breadth,  and  thickness.  That  we  now 
acquire  a  knowledge  of  solidity  by  the  eye  is,  it  is 
said,  the  result  of  inference  from  our  experience  gained 
by  the  sense  of  touch.  It  is  admitted  that  we  seem 
to  cognize  solidity  by  means  of  sight,  and  in  reply,  it 
is  said  that  we  seem  to  cognize  distance  by  the  sense 
of  sight,  whereas  our  cognition  of  distance  is  an  infer- 
ence or  judgment.  Now  we  affirm  that  we  do  cog- 
nize distance  by  means  of  the  eye.  Those  who  deny 
this  assume  that  in  all  our  primary  perceptions  by 
sight  all  objects  appear  equally  near.  This  is  a  mere 
assumption.  Memory  does  not  reveal  to  us  our  first 
perceptions.  The  oft-quoted  case  of  Cheselden's  pa- 
tient has  no  bearing  upon  the  point.  The  imperfect 
cognition  by  means  of  the  organ  before  it  was  in  its 


EXTENSION,    FIGURE,    ETC.  39 

normal  state,  shows  nothing  as  to  the  origjiial  cl^?io^u 
of  the  organ.  Young  children  have  very  inaccura.te 
cognitions  of  the  distance  of  objects,  but  they  give 
no  indications  of  cognizing  all  objects  as  equally  near. 

We  cognize  external  objects  as  external.  We 
cognize  them  as  distinct  from  us,  and  distant  from  us. 
The  quantity  of  distance  is  imperfectly  cognized  by 
the  eye.  A  process  of  inference  is  added  to  the  vis- 
ual perception,  and  thus  our  cognitions  become  more 
and  more  accurate. 

The  state  of  mind  which  we  call  seeing  distance, 
is  a  complex  state.  We  see  an  object — a  tower  for 
example.  We  see  it  as  distant  from  us.  When  we 
make  the  distance  an  object  of  attention,  and  attempt 
to  determine  the  amount  of  the  distance,  a  process  of 
inference  takes  place.  In  view  of  a  former  analogous 
experience,  the  mind  decides  that  the  object  is,  say, 
five  miles  distant.  The  cognition  in  regard  to  the 
exact  distance  is  not  a  direct  cognition.  It  is  an  in- 
ference or  judgment  founded  upon  the  visual  appear- 
ance of  the  object,  conjoined  with  former  experience. 
In  many  instances,  this  process  of  inferring  is  so  rapid 
that  it  escapes  our  attention. 

It  is  asked.  How,  since  the  image  on  the  retina  is 
inverted,  do  we  see  objects  upright  ?  The  reply  is, 
we  do  see  them  upright.  This  we  know.  Why  the 
physical  conditions  of  perception  are  as  they  are,  we 
do  not  know.  A  similar  answer  may  be  given  to  the 
question,  why,  when  there  is  an  image  of  the  object 
in  each  eye,  we  see  but  one  object.     Some  recent  dis- 


40  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

coveries  in  optics  reveal  in  a  measure  the  connection 
between  binocular  vision  and  the  cognitio»  of  form. 

A  distinction  exists  between  our  original  and  our 
acquired  perceptions.  The  one  class  are  perceptions 
proper,  the  other  inferences.  The  distinction  may 
also  be  expressed  by  calling  the  former  direct  cogni- 
tions, and  the  latter  indirect  cognitions. 

We  hear  music :  we  say  we  hear  a  hand-organ  in 
the  street.  In  truth,  we  hear  the  sounds  produced  by 
the  organ.  By  means  of  sight  or  touch,  we  have  cog- 
nized the  existence  of  organs.  We  have  learned  that 
a  particular  instrument  is  the  cause  of  particular 
sounds.  When  we  cognize  those  sounds,  we  seem  to 
cognize  the  instrument.  But  the  mental  process  is  as 
follows.  We  hear  the  sound,  and  infer  the  presence 
of  an  organ.  The  inference  is  founded  on  our  expe- 
rience. On  former  occasions,  "we  have  known  that 
similar  sounds  proceeded  from  an  organ.  On  the 
principle  that  like  causes  produce  like  effects,  we  infer 
that  the  sounds  which  we  now  hear  proceed  from  an 
organ.  That  there  is  an  organ  in  the  street  is  an 
inference  from  analogy. 

We  see  a  plate  of  butter,  and  we  say  it  looks  soft. 
But  softness  and  hardness  are  not  originally  cognized 
by  the  eye,  but  by  touch.  We  have  found,  from  tac- 
tual examination,  that  butter  under  certain  conditions 
is  soft.  We  have  noted  the  appearance  it  then  pre- 
sented. When  we  see  that  appearance,  we  infer  soft- 
ness.    We  do  not  see  softness,  but  the   signs  from 


EXTENSION,   FIGURE,   ETC.  41 

which  we  infer  it.  We  must  thus  learn  to  distinguish 
between  our  sense  perceptions  and  our  inferences. 
Both  are  acts  of  the  mind,  hut  they  are  not  identical 
— do  not  belong  to  the  same  class. 

Are  our  perceptions  copies  of  external  objects? 
Does  the  perception  of  a  rose  resemble  a  rose  ?  Is 
there  a  resemblance  between  the  idea  of  a  rose  and 
the  material  rose  ? 

To  perceive  a  rose,  to  have  an  idea  of  a  rose,  is  a 
mental  act — an  act  of  a  spiritual,  invisible,  indivisible 
existence.  Can  there  be  any  resemblance  between 
said  act  and  a  rose  ? 

That  such  a  resemblance  exists  is  sometimes 
assumed.  It  might  be  regarded  as  a  harmless  error, 
were  it  not  that  it  may  influence  one's  subsequent 
thinking.  An  inference  may  be  drawn  from  the 
assumption.  That* inference  may  form  a  portion  of 
an  argument,  which  must  therefore  be  unsound.  It 
may  well  be  doubted  whether  there  can  be  any  such 
thing  as  harmless  error.  It  is  always  liable  to  in- 
fluence our  thinking. 

The  phrase,  mental  image  or  picture,  is  properly 
used  to  express  a  particular  state  of  mind.  We 
speak  of  having  a  mental  picture,  conception,  or  image 
of  some  edifice  we  have  seen- — of  the  church  we  were 
accustomed  to  frequent  in  our  early  days.  A  moment's 
reflection  will  show  that  there  can  be  no  resemblance 
between  the  church,  a  material  object,  and  the  act  of 
mind  calling  it  to  distinct  remembrance. 


42  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

We  may,  from  reading  or  hearing  a  description  of 
a  scene,  form  a  conception,  or  image,  or  picture  of 
said  scene  in  our  minds.  Those  terms  express  a  cer- 
tain state  of  mind ;  but  that  state  of  mind,  while  it 
has  a  certain  relation  to  the  material  objects,  has  no 
literal  resemblance  to  them. 

It  may  be  asked.  Are  all  mental  acts  alike  ?  Is 
the  perception  of  a  rose  like  the  perception  of  a 
stone  ? 

The  act  of  perception  cannot  be  distinguished  in 
thought  from  the  perception — that  is,  the  perception 
as  act  cannot  be  distinguished  from  the  perception  as 
knowledge.  The  only  difference  we  can  perceive 
with  respect  to  the  acts  above  mentioned  is,  the  one 
is  the  perception  of  a  rose,  the  other  of  a  stone. 

Is  it  proper  to  say,  "  I  believe  in  the  existence  of 
a  material  world "  ?  We  have  seen  that  by  the  or- 
ganism of  the  senses,  we  cognize  the  existence  of  the 
material  world.  To  cognize  a  truth  immediately,  and 
to  believe  a  truth,  are  different  mental  acts.  We 
believe  a  friend's  statement  in  regard  to  something 
he  has  witnessed:  we  believe  that  statement  to  be 
true,  but  we  do  not  know  it  to  be  true.  We  know 
that  the  whole  is  greater  than  its  i:>ai%  and  that 
matter  exists.  Our  knowledge  of  these  truths  is 
direct,  intuitive. 

Belief  is  founded  on  testimony  or  evidence,  and  is 
elearly  distinguishable  from  intuitive  cognition. 


EXTENSION,    FIGUKE,    ETC.  43 

We  may  have  beliefs  in  whose  truth  we  have  as 
much  confidence  as  we  have  in  our  intuitive  cogni- 
tions. Still  a  belief  is  not  an  intuitive  cognition.  As 
our  cognition  of  the  existence  of  matter  is  intuitive,  it 
should  not  be  spoken  of  as  a  belief. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

PEIMARY  AND    SECONDARY  QUALITIES   OF  MATTER. 

Matter  is  that  which  possesses  certain  qualities. 
Some  of  these  qualities  are  intuitively  cognized; 
others  are  the  subjects  of  inference.  To  the  ques- 
tions, What  is  matter  apart  from  its  qualities  ?  What 
is  the  essence  of  matter?  we  answer,  we  do  not 
know  that  there  is  any  such  thing. 

Some  of  the  qualities  of  matter  are  essential  to  its 
existence  as  matter.  Some  qualities  are  common  to 
all  matter.  There  are  other  qualities  which  belong 
to  some  kinds  of  matter  only. 

The  division  made  by  most  writers,  is  that  of 
primary  and  secondary.  The  primary  qualities  are 
those  which  are  common  to  all  matter.  Thus  exten- 
sion is  a  primary  quality. 

Secondary  qualities  are  those  which  belong  to 
some  kinds  of  matter.  Thus  fragrance,  heat,  sonorous- 
ness, belong  to  some  kinds  of  matter,  but  not  to  all. 

The  primary  qualities  are  cognized  directly,  intui- 
tively. The  cognition  of  them  is,  in  fact,  inseparable 
from  the  cognition  of  matter — is  the  cognition  of 


PEIMARY  AND   SECONDARY   QUALITIES    OF   MATTEE.      45 

matter.  If  we  did  not  cognize  matter  as  extended 
and  solid,  or  having  the  capability  of  resisting  press- 
ure, we  should  not  cognize  it  at  all. 

The  secondary-  qualities  are  cognized  indirectly. 
Their  existence  is  inferred  from  certain  effects.  You 
see  a  musical  instrument — a  yiolin,  for  example.  You 
cognize  it  as  matter  having  extension  and  resistance. 
You  do  not  cognize  the  fact  that  it,  or  certain  por- 
tions of  it,  has  the  quality  of  producing  musical 
sound.  The  strings  are  made  to  vibrate :  you  have 
a  cognition  of  sound.  From  observation  you  con- 
clude that  the  sound  is  produced  by  the  vibration 
of  the  strings:  you  conclude  those  strings  are  pos- 
sessed of  a  peculiar  quality — a  quality  not  |)ossessed 
by  all  forms  of  matter.  The  cognition  of  this  quality 
is  not  a  direct,  but  an  indirect  cognition. 

The  same  remarks  luay  be  made  respecting  the 
quality  of  fragrance. 

With  respect  to  flavor  or  taste,  the  case  is  different. 
Apply  a  sweet  body  to  the  organ,  and  the  perception 
of  sweetness  is  immediate — as  immediate  as  the  per- 
ception of  extension  or  resistance.  We  are  as  certain 
that  we  cognize  sweetness  directly  as  that  we  cognize 
hardness  directly. 

The  secondary  qualities  are  affirmed  by  some  to 
have  no  existence  except  in  the  mind.  "These  are 
not,"  says  Hamilton,  "in  propriety  qualities  of  bodies 
at  all.  As  apprehended,  they  are  only  subjective 
affections,  and  belong  only  to  bodies  in   so  far  as 


46  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

these  are  supposed  to  be  furnished  with  the  powers 
capable  of  specifically  determining  the  various  parts 
of  our  nervous  apparatus  to  the  particular  action,  or 
-rather  passion,  of  which  they  are  susceptible ;  which 
determined  action  or  passion  is  the  quality  of  which 
we  are  immediately  cognizant;  the  external  concause 
of  that  internal  effect  remaining  to  the  perception 
altogether  unknown."  The  error  of  regarding  the 
secondary  qualities  as  existing  only  in  the  mind,  has 
arisen  from  applying  the  same  term  to  the  mental 
affection  and  the  cause  of  that  affection.  Heat,  as  a 
feeling,  exists  only  in  the  mind ;  but  heat,  as  a  cause 
of  that  feeling,  is  a  real  quality.  Let  one  touch  a 
piece  of  red-hot  iron.  He  will  cognize  the  fact  that 
the  iron  has  heat.  He  may  not  be  able  to  tell  what 
it  consists  of,  but  that  does  not  nullify  his  cognition 
of  its  existence.  He  is  not  able  to  tell  what  extension 
consists  of,  but  that  does  not  nullify  his  cognition  of 
extension. 

Sound,  it  is  said,  exists  only  in  the  mind.  It  is 
true  that  it  exists,  as  a  cognition,  in  the  mind,  but  the 
cause  of  that  cognition  is  as  truly  a  quality  of  the 
violin  as  extension  is  a  quality. 

Color  is  said  to  be  in  the  mind  only.  We  see 
only  the  light,  it  is  said.  The  color  of  an  object  de- 
pends upon  the  rays  of  light  which  it  reflects.  An 
object  which  reflects  green  rays,  appears  green,  and 
one  which  reflects  red  rays,  appears  red.  But,  why 
does  one  object  reflect  green  rays  and  another  red? 
Is  there  not  something  in  the  object  which  reflects 


PEIMAET  AND  SECONDARY   QUALITIES    OF   MATTER.      47 

green  rays — some  peculiar  arrangement  of  the  par- 
ticles of  matter  wliicli  causes  the  reflection  of  those 
rays  ?  If  so,  then  there  is  something  in  the  object 
iv^hich  determines  its  color,  and  color  is  not  a  creation 
of  the  mind. 

Do  we  not  know  what  color  consists  in,  as  well  as 
we  know  what  gravity  consists  in,  and  what  extension 
consists  in  ? 

Is  it,  then,  proper  to  speak  of  some  qualities  in 
matter  as  the  unknown  cause  of  certain  mental  affec- 
tions ?  May  it  not  just  as  well  be  said,  that  exten- 
sion is  the  unknown  cause  of  a  certain  mental  state 
which  we  call  the  cognition  of  extension,  as  to  say 
that  savor  is  the  unknown  cause  of  a  certain  mental 
affection  v/hich  we  term  the  cognition  of  sweetness  ? 
In  the  one  case,  we  cognize  the  body  as  extended  ;  in 
the  other,  we  cognize  it  as  sapid. 

There  has  been,  it  seems  to  us,  an  unnecessary 
amount  of  labor  bestowed  upon  this  distinction  in 
regard  to  the  qualities  of  matter.  The  threefold  dis- 
tinction of  Hamilton  has  led  to  no  beneficial  results. 
The  sum  of  what  can  be  safely  affirmed,  seems  to  be 
this  :  Some  qualities  are  essential  to  matter — ^belong 
to  all  matter.  Some  qualities  belong  only  to  certain 
portions  of  matter.  In  regard  to  these  qualities  (of 
both  kinds),  some  are  cognized  directly,  and  some 
indirectly.  Some  are  cognized  more  clearly  than 
others.  In  short,  our  knov/ledge  of  the  qualities  of 
matter,  like  our  knowledge  of  other  subjects,  is  made 
up  of  intuitive  perceptions  and  inferences. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THEORIES    OF   PEECEPTIOlSr LOCKE BERKELEY. 

Various  opinions  have  been  held  on  the  subject 
of  perception.  Some  of  them  must  be  briefly  con- 
sidered. 

"  It  is  singular,  and  at  first  sight  unaccountable, 
how  it  should  ever  have  been  pro|)ounded,  that  in 
the  act  of  perception,  as,  for  example,  in  looking  at 
a  tree,  there  is  an  independent  image,  form,  or  phan- 
tasm, or  idea  of  the  tree,  interposed  between  the  tree 
itself  and  the  percipient  being. 

''  A  man  has  only  to  look  at  any  object  before  him, 
not  contenting  himself  with  words,  to  be  satisfied  of 
the  non-existence  of  any  such  image  or  idea*  To  one 
of  untutored  and  unperverted  mind,  the  very  sugges- 
tion of  such  a  thing  would  appear  absurd.  He  per- 
ceives the  external  object,  and,  let  him  look  as  in- 
tently as  he  may,  he  can  perceive  nothing  else. 

"Philosophers,  however,  Avere  not  content  with 
simple  facts,  and  a  simple  statement  of  these  facts. 

"  Amongst  other  conceits,  divers  of  them  a2:)pear  to 
have  entertained  the  notion  that  some  intermediate 


THEOBIES    OF    PERCEPTlOl^j    ETC.  49 

image  or  phantasm  is  requisite,  for  the  unmeaning  rea- 
son, that  the  immaterial  mind  cannot  come  into  con- 
tact Vvdth  matter,  or  have  any  communication  with 
it,  except,  as  several  of  these  philosophers  suppose, 
through  a  fine,  filmy,  shadowy,  unsubstantial  me- 
dium ;  overlooking  that  it  is  the  business  of  philoso- 
phy at  all  times  to  tate  facts  as  they  are,  to  regard 
what  is  done, — not  to  perplex  itself  with  hypotheti- 
cal impossibilities.  What  mind  can  do,  and  what 
matter  can  do,  must  be  determined  by  dry  facts. 
The  best  proof  of  the  practicability  of  a  thing,  is 
that  it  takes  place. 

"  They  might  have  known,  by  merely  opening  their 
eyes,  that  intelligent  beings  do  see  material  objects, 
and  that  in  this  simple  act  they  are  utterly  uncon- 
scious of  any  image,  species,  idea,  representation,  or 
whatever  else  a  metaphysician  might  choose  to  call 
that  imaginary  entity. 

"  Even  philosophers  who  did  not  consider  any  inde- 
pendent entity  of  this  kind  to  exist,  held  the  kindred 
doctrine  that  there  is  a  purely  mental  phenomenon, 
whicb  is  the  immediate  thing  perceived,  either  con- 
stituting the  object  itself,  or  intervening  in  some  in- 
explicable way  between  the  external  object  and  the 
percipient  being,  so  as  practically  to  prevent  him 
from  getting  at  the  object,  or  to  keep  it  aloof  from 
him ;  an  hypothesis,  in  whatever  way  it  may  be  put 
or  expressed,  that  embodies  as  rank  a  fiction  as  the 
other. 

3 


50  ELEMENTS    OF   mTELLECTXJAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

"It  seems  to  have  been  only  after  a  thousand 
struggles,  that  the  simple  truth  was  arrived  at,  which 
is  not  by  any  means  yet  universally  received, — the 
truth  that  the  perception  of  external  things  through 
the  organs  of  sense  is  a  direct  mental  act — a  phe- 
nomenon of  consciousness  not  susceptible  of  being 
resolved  into  any  thing  else."  * 

Locke  sometimes  uses  language  which  would  in 
dicate  the  doctrine  of  direct  intuitive  perception,  but 
the  theory  which  determined  his  thinking  was  the 
ideal  theory. 

"Whatsoever  the  mind  perceives  in  itself,  or  is 
the  immediate  object  of  perception,  thought,  or  un- 
derstanding, that  I  call  idea."t  This  implies  that 
the  object  of  perception  is  something  in  the  mind. 
There  is  a  confusion  of  the  object  of  perception  with 
the  act  of  perception. 

"  Since  extension,  figure,  number,  and  motion  of 
bodies  of  an  observable  bigness,  may  be  observed  at 
a  distance  by  the  sight,  it  is  evident  some  singly  im- 
perceptible bodies  must  come  from  them  to  the  eyes, 
and  thereby  convey  to  the  brain  some  motion,  which 
produces  these  ideas   which   we  have   of   them   in 

us."t 

This  implies  that   the   external  objects   are   not 

directly  perceived  by  the  eye. 

"It  is  evident  that  the  mind  knows  not  things 

*  Bailey.  f  Essay,  Book  I.,  chap,  viii.,  sec.  8. 

X  Ibid.,  sec.  12. 


51 

immediately,  but  only  by  tlie  intervention  of  the 
ideas  it  lias  of  them.  Our  knowledge  is  therefore 
real,  only  so  far  as  there  is  a  conformity  between  our 
ideas  and  the  reality  of  things.  But  what  shall  be 
here  the  criterion?  How  shall  the  mind,  when  it 
perceives  nothing  but  its  own  ideas,  know  that  they 
agree  with  things  themselves  ?  This,  though  it 
seemxS  not  to  want  difficulty,  yet,  I  think,  there  be 
two  sorts  of  ideas,  that,  we  may  be  assured,  agree 
with  things."  * 

These  extracts  make  it  plain  that  Locke  did  not 
regard  external  objects  as  directly  perceived  by  the 
mind.  The  direct  object  of  perception  v/as  some- 
thing intermediate.  The  mind  "perceives  nothing 
but  its  own  ideas."  He  believed  that  there  are  ex- 
ternal objects  with  which  they  agree — which  they 
represent. 

But  if  the  mind  perceives  nothing  but  its  own 
ideas,  how  can  it  know  that  there  are  any  other 
things  ?  How  can  it  know  that  there  are  external 
things  corresponding  to  these  ideas  ?  By  concession, 
these  external  things  are  unperceived — unknown. 
The  mind  can  cognize  an  agreement  between  two 
known  things,  but  how  can  it  cognize  an  agreement 
between  a  known  object  and  an  unknown  one  ? 

Locke  admits  that  there  is  a  difficulty,  but 
thinks  that  "  there  be  two  sorts  of  ideas,  that,  we 
may  be  assured,  agree  with  things." 

*  Essay,  Book  lY.,  chap,  iv.,  sec.  3. 


52  IifLEMEITTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

On  Locke's  theory  of  perception,  it  is  plain,  we 
can  have  no  knowledge  of  any  thing  out  of  the 
mind.  Idealism  is  the  logical  consequence  of  the 
theory.  This  remark  is  true  with  respect  to  every 
theory  of  mediate  perception.  If  the  object  of  the 
mind  in  perception  be  an  idea,  image,  phantasm,  and 
not  external  objects,  then  we  have  no  knowledge  of 
external^  objects.  It  may  be  affirmed  that  these 
ideas,  images,  phantasms,  represent  external  objects. 
But  of  this,  the  advocates  of  the  theory  have  no 
proof.  They  have  therefore  no  ground  for  believing 
in  the  existence  of  an  external  world. 

While  Locke  tau2:ht  that  the  ideas,  which  are  the 
objects  of  perception,  represent  external  realities, 
Berkeley,  with  greater  logical  consistency,  denied 
the  existence  of  external  realities. 

"  In  common  talk,"  says  Berkeley,  "  the  objects 
of  our  senses  are  not  termed  ideas,  but  things.  Call 
them  so  still,  provided  you  do  not  attribute  to  them 
any  absolute  existence,  and  I  shall  never  quarrel  with 
you  for  a  word." 

Again,  he  says :  "  It  is  an  opinion  strangely  pre- 
vailing amongst  men,  that  houses,  mountains,  rivers, 
and,  in  a  word,  all  sensible  objects,  have  an  existence 
natural  and  real,  distinct  from  their  being  perceived 
by  the  understanding.  But  with  how  great  an  as- 
surance and  acquiescence  soever  this  principle  may 
be  entertained  in  this  world,  yet,  whosoever  shall 
find  in  his  heart  to  call  it  in  question,  may,  if  I  mis 


53 

take  not,  perceive  it  to  involve  a  manifest  contradic- 
tion. For  wliat  are  tlie  prementioned  objects,  but 
tlie  things  we  perceive  by  the  sense ;  and  what  do 
we  perceive  besides  our  own  ideas  and  sensations ; 
and  is  it  not  plainly  repugnant  that  any  one  of  these, 
or  any  combination  of  them,  should  exist  unper- 
ceived  ?  " 

Here  the  existence  of  any  thing  excepting  our 
ideas  and  sensations  is  distinctly  denied.  The  rea- 
soning— if  the  term  can  properly  be'  applied  to  a 
mere  assumption  and  shifting  of  terms — is  as'  fol- 
lows : 

Jlouses,  mountains,  and  rivers,  are  the  objects 
of  our  senses ;  but  the  only  things  we  perceive  by 
sense  are  our  own  ideas  and  sensations :  hence  houses, 
mountains,  etc.,  have  no  existence  except  in  the 
mind.  ' 

Houses,  mountains,  etc.,  are  called  ideas,  and  then 

all  the  qualities  of  ideas  are  ascribed  to  them.     But 

"f 
to  call  a  thing  by  the  name  of  another  thing,  does 

not  change  the  nature  of  the  former  to  that  of  the 

latter.     To  call  a  horse  a  bird,  does  not  change  him 

into  a  bird. 

It  may  be  asked.  Whence  come  our  ideas  of 
houses  and  mountains,  if  there  are  no  such  material 
objects  to  cause  them  ?  Berkeley  would  reply,  that 
the  Author  of  Nature  "  imprints  them  in  the  senses." 

The  followiog  remarks  from  the  pen  of  Bailey 
are   deemed   accurate ;     \  Much  as  his    [Berkeley's] 


54  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

arguments  have  been  extolled,  whoever  closely  ex- 
amines them  will  find  that  he  does  not  adduce  a  sin- 
gle one  (arguments  in  a  circle  excepted)  to  prove  his 
fundamental  position ;  but,  having  assumed  it  with- 
out proof,  he  is  thenceforward  occupied  partly  in  de- 
ducing conclusions  from  iL,  partly  in  explaining  facts 
according  to  it,  partly  in  contending  with  objections 
which  nothing  but  his  original  assumption  enables 
him  to  combat,  partly  in  overcoming  doctrines  not 
necessarily  held  in  connection  with  the  absolute  ex- 
istence of  an  external  world,  and  partly  in  attempt- 
ing, by  a  retrograde  process,  to  confirm  the  truth  of 
the  assumed  proposition  from  its  own  consequences. 

''  That  in  doing  this  he  has  shown  great  logical 
adroitness  and  fertility  of  invention,  much  metaphysi- 
cal knowledge  and  acumen,  a  wide  range  of  thought, 
and  a  fluent  and  felicitous  style,  I  most  cheerfully 
admit." 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THEOKIES    or   PERCEPTIO]^ — KEID BKOWN^o 

Dr,  Thomas  Reid  has  the  merit  of  overthrowing 
the  theory  of  mediate  perception — ^that  is,  the  theory 
of  perception  through  the  agency  of  ideas  intervening 
and  bridging  the  space  between  matter  and  mind. 
Before  his  time  that  theory  was  very  generally  held. 
It  is  true  that  in  many  authors  there  may  be  found 
passages  indicating  correct  views  of  perception ;  still 
the  ideal  theory  influenced  the  general  tone  of  philo- 
sophical thinking.  The  isolated  passages  referred  to 
do  not  lessen  the  substantial  merit  of  Reid  in  leading 
the  way  to  more  truthful  views  than  had  previously 
obtained  general  currency. 

Reid  saw  the  truth  in  regard  to  the  perception  of 
external  objects,  but  did  not  see  it  with  entire  clear- 
ness. He  saw  that  there  was  no  intermediate  object 
between  the  mind  and  the  object  perceived— that  we 
have  a  direct,  immediate,  intuitive  perception  of  ex- 
ternal objects;  but  he  did  not  discriminate  accurately 
between  sensation  and  perception.  He  sometimes 
used  language  adapted  to  make  the  impression  that 


56  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

he  regarded  sensation  as  the  instrument  of  perception. 
He  taught  that  sensation  always  precedes  perception. 
^  He  says :  '^  The  impression  made  upon  the  organs, 
,  nerves,  and  brain,  is  followed  by  a  sensation,  and  this 
sensation  is  followed  by  a  perception  of  the  object.'^ 
Again :  "  The  impression  made  upon  the  nerves  and 
brain  is  performed  behind  the  scenes,  and  the  mind 
sees  nothing  of  it.  But  every  such  impression^  by  the 
laws  of  the  drama,  is  followed  by  a  sensation  which  is 
the  first  scene  exhibited  to  the  mind,  and  this  scene 
is  quickly  succeeded  by  another,  which  is  the  percep- 
tion of  the  object." 

Professor  Dugald  Stewart  understood  Reid  to 
teach  "  that  the  mind  is  so  formed  that  certain  impres- 
sions produced  upon  our  organs  of  sense  by  external 
objects,  are  followed  by  corresponding  sensations,  and 
that  these  sensations  (which  have  no  more  resem- 
blance to  the  qualities  of  matter  than  the  words  of 
language  have  to  the  things  which  they  denote)  are 
followed  by  a  perception  of  the  existence  and  quali- 
ties of  the  bodies  by  which  the  impressions  are 
made." 

"  Every  different  perception,"  says  Reid,  "  is  con- 
joined with  a  sensation  proper  to  it.  The  one  is  the 
sign,  the  other  is  the  thing  signified." 

These  expressions  would  seem  to  indicate  that 
Reid  regarded  perception  as  an  inference  from  sensa- 
tion, and  not  a  direct  knowledge  of  the  object.  But 
he  remarks :  "  We  ask  no  argument  for  the  existence 


57 


of  the  object,  Ibut  that  we  perceive  it :  perception 
commands  our  belief  upon  its  own  authority,  and  dis- 
dains to  rest  its  authority  upon  any  reasoning  what- 
ever." Exception  may  be  taken  to  the  use  of  the 
term  belief  in  connection  with  perception,  yet  the 
passage  shows  that  he  regarded  perception  as  a  direct 
knowledge  of  the  object — not  a  knowledge  acquired 
by  inference. 

As  was  stated  above,  the  defect  in  Reid's  view  of 
perception  was  owing  to  a  want  of  accurate  discrimi- 
nation between  sensation  and  perception.  The  dis- 
tinction stated  by  Bailey  is  clear  and  satisfactory. 
Sensation  is  "  an  affection  felt  to  be  in'some  part  of 
the  body,  whether  attended  or  not  by  a  discernment 
of  any  thing  different  from,  or  external  to  the  sen- 
tient being."  Perception  is  "  discerning  something 
different  from,  or  external  to,  the  percipient  being, 
whether  attended  or  not  by  a  bodily  sensation." 

Sensation  and  perception  are  not  always  conjoined. 
We  may  have  sensations  without  perceptions.  Place 
a  piece  of  ice  near  the  body.  A  radiation  of  caloric 
from  the  body — a  change  in  the  condition  of  the 
body — will  produce  a  sensation  of  cold  or  chilliness. 
This  is  in  one  sense  a  knowledge ;  that  is  to  say,  I 
know  that  I  have  in  my  body  a  sensation  of  chilli 
ness ;  but  it  is  not  a  perception,  i,  6,,  a  cognition  of 
something  external. 

After  long-continued  bodily  exertion,  there  is  felt, 
in  different  parts  of  the  body,  a  sensation  of,  fatigue. 
3^' 


58  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

This  is  not  necessarily  conjoined  with  the  perception 
of  any  external  object. 

When  one  has  gone  without  food  for  an  unusual 
period,  the  condition  of  the  stomach  produces  the 
sensation  of  hunger.  This  sensation  is  not  in  any  way 
connected  with  the  perception  of  any  thing  external. 
These  sensations  are  feelings  localized  in  the  body. 
They  are  mental  acts,  states,  or  affections,  clearly  dis- 
tinguishable from  perceptions. 

We  may  have  perceptions  without  sensations. 
An  object  of  sight  is  presented— a  tree  for  example. 
The  cognition  is  immediate.  If  we  consult  our  con- 
sciousness, we  shall  find  nothing  but  a  direct  cognition 
of  the  tree.  The  conditions  of  this  cognition,  the 
rays  of  light  reflected  from  the  object  to  the  eye,  the 
picture  on  the  retina,  the  state  of  the  optic  nerve  and 
the  brain,  are  not  within  the  sphere  of  consciousness. 
All  that  we  are  conscious  of  is  an  immediate  percep- 
tion of  the  tree.  When  the  organ  is  in  a  healthy 
state,  we  are  conscious  of  no  feeling  localized  in  the 
organ — ^no  sensation.  If  the  organ  be  diseased,  a 
painful  sensation  may  be  felt  in  it,  but  the  sensation 
has  no  connection  with  vision — that  is,  in  no  way  con- 
tributes to  it.  It  may  be  occasioned  by  nerves  en- 
tirely distinct  from  the  optic  nerve. 

Let  the  keys  of  a  piano  be  struck :  we  hear  a 
sound.  Is  it  a  sensation,  that  is,  a  feeling  localized  in 
the  ear,  or  is  it  a  cognition  of  sound  ?  Plainly  the 
latter.     We  cognize  a  sound.     It  is  a  mental  act.     We 


59 

are  conscious  of  i^e  act,  "but  are  not  ordinarily  con- 
scious of  any  local  affection  of  the  organ. 

In  case  the  ear  is  diseased,  the  vibrations  of  the 
atmosphere,  one  of  the  conditions  of  the  mental  act 
of  hearing,  may  occasion  a  painful  sensation.  Even 
when  the  organ  is  in  a  healthy  state,  vibrations  of 
great  intensity,  such  as  those  occasioned  by  the  explo- 
sion of  a  cannon  near  to  one,  will  occasion  a  painful 
sensation. 

Some  writers  have  used  the  term  sensation  in  con- 
nection with  hearing,  when  they  should  have  used 
the  term  emotion.  They  have  spoken  of  the  agreea- 
ble and  disagreeable  sensations  of  hearing,  when  they 
meant  the  agreeable  or  disagreeable  emotions  conse- 
quent upon  the  cognition  of  sounds.  Some  sounds  are 
agreeable,  and  some  disagreeable.  An  attendant  or 
consequent  emotion  is  one  thing,  a  preceding  sensation 
is  another  thing.  The  two  things  should  not  be  con- 
founded. 

Perception  by  the  sense  of  touch  is  attended  by  a 
sensation — a  feeling  localized  in  the  organ.  The  sen- 
sation is  separable  in  thought  from  the  perception. 
Cognitions  by  the  sense  of  taste  and  of  smell  are  also 
attended  with  sensations.  But  a  large  portion  of  our 
perceptions  are  neither  preceded  nor  attended  by  sen- 
sations. If  the  above  remarks  are  correct,  the  reader 
will  place  a  just  estimate  on  Sir  William  Hamilton's 
law,  the  alleged  discovery  of  which  is  claimed  as  one 
of  his  contributions  to  philosophy — "  the  grand  law  by 


60  ELEMEISTTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

wMcli  perception  and  sensation  ara  governed  by  their 
reciprocal  relation."  This  lavf,  which  Hamilton  says 
"  has  been  wholly  overlooked  by  onr  psychologists," 
is  thus  stated :  "  Perception  and  sensation,  though  al- 
ways coexistent,  are  always  in  the  inverse  ratio  to 
each  other." 

Had  Reid  distinguished  clearly  between  sensation 
and  perception,  there  would  have  been  no  occasion 
for  charging  him  with  failing  to  teach  the  true  doc- 
trine of  perception.  That  he  held  it  substantially,  no 
candid  reader  of  his  works  can  doubt. 

Dr.  Thomas  Brown,  whose  "Lectures  on  the 
Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind  "  furnish  frequent 
examples  of  wonderful  acuteness,  taught,  in  regard  to 
perception,  that  when  an  object  is  presented  to  our 
organs  of  sense,  a  certain  mental  state  is  occasioned, 
and  this  conscious  state  of  mind  is  followed  by  an 
irresistible  belief  of  the  existence  of  the  object 
causing  said  mental  state. 

Brown  discarded  altogether  the  doctrine  of  ideas, 
that  is,  of  a  terthim  quid  between  the  object  per- 
ceived and  the  perceiving  mind,  but  he  did  not  give  a 
true  account  of  the  process  of  perception.  He  says, 
when  an  object  is  presented  to  the  organs  of  sense,  a 
mental  state  follows  that  presentation,  and  that  state 
is  followed  by  an  irresistible  belief  of  the  existence 
of  the  object.  But  what  is  that  mental  state  ?  When 
a  table  is  placed  before  me,  a  mental  state  is  produced. 
What  is  that  mental  state  ?     It  is  a  direct  perception 


61, 


of  tlie  table.  As  soon  as  the  light  falls  upon  the 
table  and  is  reflected  to  the  eye,  the  mind  sees  the 
table.  The  conscious  act  or  state  of  mind  is  a  simple 
act  or  state,  and  cannot  be  analyzed  into  an  act  fol- 
lowed by  an  irresistible  belief. 

In  consequence  of  his  view  of  perception,  Brown 
found  great  difficulty  in  determining  the  origin  of  our 
idea  of  externality.  An  object  is  presented  to  the 
senses,  and  produces  a  state  of  mind.  All  that  we 
are  conscious  of  is  a  state  of  mind — a  subjective  af- 
fection. We  know  that  it  must  have  a  cause,  but 
whether  that  cause  be  an  external  object  or  not,  we 
cannot  know,  so  long  as  we  are  destitute  of  the  idea 
of  externality.  In  attempting  to  account  for  the  ori- 
gin of  our  ideas  of  externality,  he  gives  a  striking 
specimen  of  ingenuity,  but  fails  to  remove  the  diffi- 
culty, which  is  of  his  own  creation. 

It  is  simply  absurd  to  ask  how  we  get  the  idea  of 
externality  in  connection  with  our  perception  of  ex- 
ternal objects.  When  we  cognize  an  external  object, 
we  cognize  it  as  external.  If  we  cognize  it  at  all,  we 
must  cognize  it  as  external  to  the  mind  and  to  the 
bodily  organism.  No  one  cognizing  an  object  by  one 
of  the  senses,  ever  cognized  it  as  a  mere  modification 
of  his  own  mind.  The  mind  was  made  to  cognize 
external  objects.  The  idea  of  externality  is  neces- 
sarily involved  in  every  cognition  of  matter. 

Brown's  doctrine  of  perception  as  logically  leads 
to   idealism,  as  does   the  doctrine  of  perception  by 


62  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

means  of  ideas.  If  we  are  conscious  of  cognizing 
ideas  only,  then  we  have  no  means  of  knowing  that 
there  are  external  objects  corresponding  to  those 
ideas.  If,  as  Brown  affirms,  we  are  conscious  only  of 
a  mental  state,  how  can  we  know  that  the  cause  of 
that  mental  state  has  a  material  existence  ?  Brown 
calls  in  the  aid  of  an  irresistible  belief,  bu^  conscious- 
ness does  not  testify  to  the  presence  of  said  belief. 
It  testifies  to  the  direct  cognition  of  the  object. 


/k  ajZcA.  y^i 


■t^^-^%'^'t'^'t>^ 


■     CHAPTER  IX. 

THEORY    OF   SIR   WILLIAM   HAMILTOl^T. 

Sir  William  Hamilton  claims  to  teach  the  doctrine 
of  direct  perception  more  emphatically  than  any  of 
his  predecessors.  It  is  supposed  by  some  that  he  cor- 
rected the  errors  of  Reid  and  Brown^  and  gave  an 
exposition  of  the  philosophy  of  perception,  at  once 
convincing  and  exhaustive.  A  brief  examination  of 
his  teachings  may  prove  a  useful  exercise. 

He  teaches  that  the  mind  has  a  direct,  immediate, 
intuitive  perception  of  external  objects.  After  a  con- 
sideration of  the  various  objections  that  have  been 
made  to  the  doctrine  of  direct  perception,  he  re- 
marks :  "  We  have  thus  found,  by  an  examination  of 
the  various  grounds  on  which  it  has  been  attempted 
to  establish  the  necessity  of  rejecting  the  testimony 
of  consciousness  to  the  intuitive  perception  of  the 
external  world,  that  the  grounds  are,"^  one  and  all, 
incompetent." 

He  would  extend  the  sphere  of  consciousness,  so 
as  to  include  the  object  perceived  as  well  as  the  per- 
ceiving act.     He  insists  on  the  propriety  of  saying, 


64  ELEMENTS    OF   USTTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

"  I  am  conscious  of  the  inkstand,"  instead  of  saying, 
"  I  am  conscious  that  I  perceive  the  inkstand."  "  A 
^  slight  consideration,"  he  affirms,  "  is  sufficient  to 
reconcile  us  to  the  expression,  as  showing,  if  we 
hold  the  doctrine  of  immediate  perception,  the  ne- 
cessity of  not  limiting  consciousness  to  our  subjec- 
tiye  states."  Again  he  says :  "  The  assertion  that 
we  can  be  conscious  of  the  act  of  knowledge 
without  being  conscious  of  the  object,  is  virtually 
suicidal." 

The  reader  may  be  surprised  to  learn  from  Ham- 
ilton, who  so  strenuously  contends  for  the  authority 
of  consciousness,  that  although  ''we  are  conscious  of 
the  inkstand,"  we  do  not  see  it.  To  be  conscious  of 
the  inkstand  must  mean  to  be  conscious  that  we  see 
the  inkstand.  Tet,  according  to  Hamilton,  we  do 
not  see  it.  "  We  perceive,  through  no  sense,  augh^"// 
external  but  what  is  in  immediate  relation  and  in 
immediate  contact  with  its  organ ;  and  that  is  true, 
which  Democritus  of  old  asserted,  that  all  our 
senses  are  only  modifications  of  touch.  Through  the 
eye  we  perceive  nothing  but  the  rays  of  light  in  rela- 
tion to,  and  in  contact  Vvdth,  the  retina ;  what  we  add 
to  this  perception  must  not  be  taken  into  account." 
"  To  say,  for  example,  that  we  perceive  by  sight  the 
sun  or  moon,  is  a  false  or  an  elliptical  expression.  We 
perceive  nothing  but  certain  modifications  of  light  in 
immediate  relation  to  our  organ  of  vision ;  and  so  far 
from  Dr.  Reid  being  philosophically  correct,  Avhen  he 


THEORY    OF    SIR   WILLIAM    HAMILTON".  65 

says  that,  'when "ten  men  look  at  tlie  sun  or  moon, 
they  all  see  the  same  indiyidual  object/  the  truth  is 
that  each  of  these  persons  sees  a  cliiFerent  object,  be- 
cause each  person  sees  a  different  complement  of  rays  in 
relation  to  his  individual  organ.  In  fact,  if  we  look 
alternately  with  each,  we  have  a  different  object  iil 
our  right,  and  a  different  object  in  our  left  eye.  It  is 
not  by  perception,  but  by  a  process  of  reasoning,  that 
we  connect  the  objects  of  sense  with  existences  be- 
yond the  sphere  of  immediate  knowledge.  It  is  enough 
that  perception  affords  us  the  knowledge  of  the  noji- 
ego  at  the  point  of  sense.  To  arrogate  to  it  the 
power  of  immediately  informing  us  of  the  existence 
of  external  things,  which  are  only  the  cause  of  the 
objects  which  are  immediately  perceived,  is  either 
positively  erroneous,  or  a  confusion  of  language 
arising  from  an  inadequate  discrimination  of  the 
phenomena.  Such  assumptions  tend  only  to  throw 
discredit  on  the  doctrine  of  intuitive  perception ;  and 
such  assumptions  you  will  find  scattered  over  the 
works  both  of  Reid  and  Stewart.  I  would  therefore 
establish  as  a  fundamental  position  of  the  doctrine 
of  immediate  perception,  the  opinion  of  I)emocritus 
— that  all  our  senses  are  only  modifications  of 
touch;  in  other  words,  that  the  external  object  of 
perception  is  always  in  contact  with  the  organs  of 
sense." 

Do  not  the   assumptions  of  Hamilton  "tend  to 
throw  discredit  on  the  doctrine  of  intuitive  percep- 


66  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

tion"?  What  are  his  assertions  iit  regard  to  visible 
objects?  We  see  only  modifications  of  light,  and 
difierent  persons  looking  at  the  sun  see  different 
objects.  Will  it  be  said  different  rays  of  light  enter 
different  eyes  ?  True,  but  does  that  fact  prove  that 
all  do  not  see  the  same  object?  A  cannon  is  fired: 
the  undulations  or  portions  of  undulations  that  strike 
upon  the  tympanums  of  ten  different  persons  are 
different  ;  does  that  prevent  their  all  hearing  the 
same  cannon? 

The  learned  author  confounds  the  condition  of 
perception  with  the  object  of  perception.  The  en- 
trance of  rays  of  light  is  a  condition  of  perception. 
Every  beholder  of  the  sun  is  conscious  of  seeing  it: 
he  is  not  conscious  of  seeing  certain  modifications  of 
light.  In  fact,  he  knows  nothing  about  light,  the 
retina,  the  optic  nerve,  till  informed  by  the  physiol- 
ogist. 

These  assumptions  of  Hamilton  are  entirely  incon- 
sistent with  the  doctrine  of  direct,  intuitive  perception. 
If  we  see  only  rays  of  light,  how  do  we  know  there 
is  any  thing  but  said  rays  ?  Hamilton  stoutly  con- 
tends that  we  must  receive  the  attestations  of  con- 
sciousness as  true.  His  whole  doctrine  of  intuitive 
perception  rests  upon  the  truthfulness  of  conscious- 
ness. Now,  we  are  as  conscious  that  we  see  the 
inkstand  when  it  is  before  us  on  the  table,  as  we  are 
that  we  feel  it  when  we  place  our  hand  upon  it.  If 
Hamilton's  assertion  that  we  do  not  see  the  inkstand 


THEORY   OF   SIR   WILLIAM   UAMILTON.  67 

but  only  rays  of  light,  be  true,  then  consciousness  is 
deceptive.  If  we  are  deceived  as  to  seeing  the  ink- 
stand, we  may  be  deceived  as  to  feeling  the  inkstand. 
All  ground  for  certainty  is  gone. 

Thus  it  appears  that  no  man  has  more  emphatically 
asserted  the  truthfulness  of  consciousness,  and  no  man 
has  more  emphatically  denied  it. 

He  has  made  other  assertions  equally  inconsistent 
with  the  doctrine  of  intuitive  perception.  When  he 
insists  on  so  direct  a  cognition  that  it  is  proper  for 
us  to  say  that  we  are  conscious  of  the  object,  conscious 
of  the  inkstand,  we  have  certainly  a  right  to  suppose 
that  a  real  object  is  perceived.  This  he  does  not 
deny — in  words  at  least.  He  affirms  that  "we  per- 
ceive the  material  reality."  "But  what,"  he  asks, 
"  is  meant  by  perceiving  the  material  reality  ?  "  We 
give  his  answer ;  but  shall  be  obliged  to  repeat  his 
question,  "What  is  meant?"  in  respect  to  several 
of  his  phrases.  "  In  the  first  place,"  he  says,  in  reply 
to  the  question,  "  it  does  not  mean  that  we  perceive 
the  material  reality  absolutely  and  in  itself;  that  is, 
out  of  relation  to  our  organs  or  faculties."  What  is 
meant  by  "perceiving  the  material  reality  absolutely 
and  in  itself"  ?  What  is  meant  by  the  explanatory 
phrase  "  out  of  relation  to  our  organs  and  faculties  "  ? 

Having  told  us,  in  his  way,  what  is  not  meant  by 
perceiving  the  material  reality,  he  proceeds :  "  On  the 
contrary,  the  total  and  real  object  of  perception  is  the 
external  object  under  relation  to  our  sense  and  the 


68  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

faculty  of  cognition."  What  is  meant  by  "under 
relation  to  our  sense  and  the  faculty  of  cognition"? 
He  continues:  "Bat  though  thus  relative  to  us,  the 
object  is  still  no  representation,  no  modification  of 
the  ego.  It  is  the  non-ego^  modified  and  relative  it 
may  be,  but  still  the  non-ego.  I  formerly  illustrated 
this  to  you  by  a  supposition.  Suppose  that  the  total 
object  in  perception  is  12;  and  suppose  that. the 
external  reality  contributes  6,  the  material  sense  3, 
and  the  mind  3~this  may  enable  you  to  form  some 
rude  conjecture  of  the  nature  of  the  object  of  percep- 
tion." The  material  reality  perceived  is  thus  a  com- 
pound of  matter,  sense,  and  mind  !  Consciousness 
says  it  is  matter. 

What  modification  does  the  non-ego  receive  from 
the  mind  ?  Suppose  the  non-ego  to  be  a  house ;  what 
modification  does  it  receive  at  the  hands  of  "the  ma- 
terial sense,"  and  "  the  mind,"  when  perception  takes 
place  ? 

A  house  is  before  me :  the  light  is  reflected  from 
the  house  to  the  eye,  and  an  image  of  the  house  is 
formed  on  the  retina.  The  optic  nerve  and  the  brain 
are  in  their  normal  state.  A  cognition  takes  place. 
The  mind  cognizes  the  house.  All  the  facts  men- 
tioned as  preceding  the  act  of  cognition  are  physio- 
logical conditions  of  the  act.  When  these  take  place, 
the  simple  inexplicable  act  of  cognition  takes  place. 
If  cognizing  the  house  is  modifying  it,  it  is  so  modified. 

Hamilton   tells   us   that  the  simple  cognition   is 


THEORY   OF   SIR   WILLIAM   HAMILTON".  69 

made  up  of  contributions  from  three  sources,  viz. : 
the  house,  the  material  sense,  and  the  mind.  The 
house  contributes,  say,  one-half;  the  material  struc- 
ture of  the  eye  one-third  ;   and  the  mind  one-third. 

Consciousness  gives  us  no  information  of  this 
partnership.  We  are  conscious  of  perceiving  the 
house.  If  this  consciousness  is  erroneous,  and  the 
object  of  perception  is  not  the  house,  but  a  certain 
threefold  combination,  then  consciousness  is  not  trust- 
worthy, and  universal  skepticism  must  be  our  portion. 

Observe  the  impropriety  of  that  mode  of  speaking, 
adopted  by  many  writers,  which  represents  knowledge 
as  the  joint  contribution  of  mind  and  object.  Mind 
and  object  are  both  necessary  in  order  to  knowledge, 
but  it  does  not  follow  that  knowledge  is  a  compound 
of  mind  and  object.  What  is  the  relation  between 
mind  and  object?  The  mind  knows,  the  object  is 
known.  That  is  the  whole  of  the  matter.  If  it  be 
asked,  How  can  the  mind  know  ?  the  conditions  of  the 
cognizing  act  may  be  stated,  but  the  cognizing  act 
cannot  be  described. 

The  following  passage  contains  a  doctrine  of  per- 
ception closely  allied  to,  if  not  identical  with,  that  held 
by  Dr.  Thomas  Brown,  and  censured  by  Hamilton. 
"If  it  be  asked,"  says  Hamilton,  "How  do  we  know 
that  this  object  (of  perception)  is  not  a  mere  mode  of 
mind,  illusively  presented  to  us  as  a  mode  of  matter? 
then,  indeed,  we  must  reply,  that  we  do  not  in  pro- 
priety know  that  what  we  are  compelled  to  perceive 


70  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHr. 

as  not  self— is  not  a  perception  of  self;  and  that  we 
can  only  on  reflection  believe  such  to  be  the  case,  in 
reliance  tipon  the  original  necessity  of  so  believing 
imposed  on  tis  by  our  nature." 

After  all,  then,  our  knowledge  of  external  objects 
as  separate  from  the  mind,  is  not  a  direct  cognition, 
but  an  inevitable  belief! 


CHAPTER  X. 

EELATIYITY   OF   KNOWLEDGE. 

Much  has  "been  said  by  late  writers  about  tlie 
relativity  of  our  knowledge,  the  tendency  of  which  is 
to  weaken  the  grounds  of  certainty  of  knowledge. 
We  are  told  that  "  we  know  mind  and  matter  not  in 
themselves,  but  in  their  accidents  and  phenomena*' 

Hamilton  aiBrms  that  "all  human  knowledge," 
consequently  all  human  philosophy,  "is  only  of  the 
relative  and  phenomenal.  In  this  proposition  the 
term  relative  is  opposed  to  the  absolute ;  and,  there- 
fore, in  saying  that  we  know  only  the  relative,  I  vir- 
tually assert  that  we  know  nothing  absolute — nothing 
existing  absolutely,  in  and  for  itself,  and  without 
relation  to  us  and  our  faculties."  Of  course  we 
cannot  know  that  which  has  no  relation  to  our  facul- 
ties— that  which  is  not  an  object  of  knowledge — that 
which  is  unknowable.  The  distinction,  then,  between 
the  relative  and  the  absolute,  is  simply  the  distinction 
between  that  which  can  be  known  and  that  which 
cannot  be  known.  It  is  granted  that  our  knowledge 
is  limited.     We  know  but  in  part.     Beyond  and  con- 


V2  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY, 

nected  with  all  that  is  known,  there  is  much  that  is 
unknown.  If  the  terms  relative  and  absolute  were 
intended  to  express  this  distinction,  thej  were  not 
happily  chosen ;  for  when  we  are  told  our  knowledge 
is  only  relative  and  phenomenal,  there  is  a  tendency 
to  regard  it  as  unsubstantial.  If  the  terms  were  not 
intended  to  express  this  distinction,  what  were  they 
intended  to  express  ?  What  is  meant  by  "  existing 
absolutely  and  of  itself,  without  relation  to  us  and 
our  faculties"?  How  is  it  known  that  there  are 
objects  existing  out  of  relation  to  our  faculties?  If 
we  are  authorized  to  affirm  that  there  are  such  ob- 
jects, that  affirmation  is  knov/ledge.  Hov*^  came  the 
exTsteiice  of  these  unknown  and  unknowable  objects 
to  be  known  ?  If  an  object  is  without  relation  to  our 
faculties,  it  cannot  be  cognized  by  our  faculties,  and 
of  course  its  existence  cannot  be  affirmed. 

Hamilton  proceeds  to  illustrate  the  assertions 
above  quoted  :  "  I  shall  illustrate  this  by  its  applica- 
tion. Our  knowledge  is  either  of  matter  or  of  mind. 
Now,  what  is  matter  ?  What  do  we  know  of  mat- 
ter ?  Matter,  or  body,  is  to  us  the  name  either  of 
something  known  or  of  something  unknown.  In  so 
far  as  matter  is  the  name  of  something  known,  it 
means  that  which  appears  to  us  under  the  forms  of 
extension,  solidity,  divisibility,  figure,  motion,  rough- 
ness, smoothness,  color,  heat,  cold,  etc. ;  in  short,  it 
is  a  common  name  for  certain  series,  aggregate,  or 
complement  of  appearances  or  phenomena  manifested 


RELATIVITY    OF   KNOWLEDGE.  73 

in  coexistence.  Put  as  the  plienomena  appear  only 
in  conjunction,  we  are  compelled,  by  the  constitution 
of  our  nature,  to  think  them  conjoined  in  and  by 
something ;  and  as  they  are  phenomena,  we  cannot 
think  them  the  phenomena  of  nothing,  but  must  re- 
gard them  as  the  properties  or  qualities  of  something 
that  is  extended,  solid,  figured,  etc.  But  this  some- 
thing, absolutely  and  in  itself-— ^^  6.,  considered  apart 
from  its  phenomena — is  to  us  as  zero.  It  is  only  in 
its  qualities,  only  in  its  effects,  in  its  relative  or  phe- 
nomenal existence,  that  it  is  cognizable  or  conceiv- 
able. It  is  only  by  a  law  of  thought  that  compels  us 
to  think  of  something  absolute  and  unknown  as  the 
basis  or  condition  of  the  relative  and  known,  that 
something  obtains  a  kind  of  incomprehensible  reality 
to  us.  Now,  that  which  manifests  its  qualities — in 
other  words,  that  in  which  the  appearing  causes  in- 
here, that  to  which  they  belong — is  called,  then,  sub- 
ject^ or  substance^  or  substratum.  To  this  subject  of 
the  phenomena  of  extension,  solidity,  etc.,  the  term 
matter^  or  material  substance^  is  commonly  given ;  and 
therefore,  as  contradistinguished  from  these  qualities, 
it  is  the  name  of  something  unknown  and  incon- 
ceivable." 

The  same  doctrine  in  regard  to  our  knowledge  of 
matter  was  taught  by  Professor  Dugald  Stewart. 
"  It  is  not  matter  or  body  which  I  perceive  by  my 
senses,  but  only  extension,  color,  figure,  and  certain 
other  qualities  which  the  constitution  of  my  nature 
4 


74  ELEMENTS   OF   lOTTELLECTUAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

leads  me  to  refer  to  something  which  is  extended, 
figured,  colored." 

In  opposition  to  these  high  authorities,  it  may  be 
safely  affirmed  that  it  is  not  true  that  we  perceive 
extension,  figure,  color,  etc.,  and  infer  the  existence 
of  something  in  which  they  inhere.  We  intuitively 
cognize  matter  or  body  as  extended,  figured,  colored, 
etc.  If  we  do  not  cognize  matter — body — directly, 
we  cognize  nothing  directly.  If  we  do  not  know 
what  matter  is,  we  do  not  know  what  any  thing  is. 
Extension,  and  color,  and  other  facts  in  relation  to 
matter,  when  considered  apart  from  body,  are  mere 
abstractions ;  and  abstractions  are  not  known  enti- 
ties inhering  in  an  unknown  something.  We  can 
consider  extension,  solidity,  color,  etc.,  abstractly, 
but  that  is  not  cognizing  them  as  entities  belonging 
to  an  unknown  substratum.  We  cognize  body  as 
extended,  divisible,  colored,  etc.  If  the  use  of  ab- 
stract terms  had  been  avoided  in  relation  to  body, 
the  doctrine  of  a  substratum^  and  of  a  relative  knowl- 
edge of  matter,  would  not  have  been  known.  It  is 
the  offspring  of  scholastic  abstraction. 

The  position  I  have  taken  is  supported  by  one  of 
the  most  sober  and  accurate  thinkers  of  the  day.  "  I 
can  see,"  says  McCosh,  "  no  evidence  whatever  for  the 
existence  of  any  such  thing  as  a  substratum^  lying  in 
or  beyond,  or  standing  under  all  that  comes  under  our 
immediate  knowledge.  There  is  no  topic  on  which 
there  has  been  a  greater  amount  of  unintelligible  Ian- 


RELATIVITY    OF    KITOWLEDGE.  75 

guage  employed  than  on  this.  We  know,  it  is  said, 
only  qualities ;  but  we  are  constrained  by  reason,  or 
by  common  sense,  to  believe  in  a  something  in  which 
they  inhere.  Or,  qualities,  it  is  said,  fall  under  sense, 
while  substance  is  known  by  reason.  Others,  pro- 
ceeding on  these  admissions,  maintain  that,  qualities 
alone  being  known,  we  may  doubt  whether  there  is 
such  a  thing  as  substance,  and  may  certainly  affirm 
that  we  can  never  know  it.  Now,  in  opposition  to 
all  this  style  of  thinking  and  of  writing,  which  has 
prevailed  to  so  great  an  extent  since  the  days  of 
Locke,  I  maintain  that  we  never  know  qualities  with- 
out also  knowing  substance.  Qualities,  as  qualities, 
distinct  from  substances,  are  as  much  unknown  to  us 
as  substance  distinct  from  qualities." 

Again :  "  It  is  very  common  to  say  that  sub 
stance  is  a  thing  behind  the  qualities,  or  underneath 
them,  acting  as  a  substratum,  basis,  ground,  or  sup- 
port. All  such  language  is  in  its  very  nature  meta- 
phorical ;  the  analogy  is  of  the  most  distant  kind, 
and  may  have  a  misleading  character.  The  sub- 
stance is  the  very  thing  itself  considered  in  a  certain 
aspect,  and  the  qualities  are  its  action  or  manifesta- 
tion. Again,  it  is  frequently  said  that  qualities  are 
known,  whereas  substance  cannot  be  known,  or,  if 
known,  known  only  by  some  deeper  or  more  tran- 
scendental principle  of  the  mind.  Now,  I  hold  that 
we  never  know  quality  except  as  the  quality  of  a 
substance,  and  that  we  know  both  equally  in  one  un- 


76  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

divided  act.  This  is  a  somewhat  less  mystical  and 
mysterious  account  than  that  commonly  given  ty 
metaphysicians,  but  is,  as  it  appears  to  me,  in  strict 
accordance  with  the  revelations  of  consciousness." 

We  are  told  by  some  writers,  that  the  essence  of 
matter  and  mind  is  unknown.  The  author  above 
quoted  says  of  essence  :  ''  It  is  a  very  mystical  word, 
and  a  whole  aggregate  of  foolish  speculations  has 
clustered  around  it."  "  We  are  not  warranted  to 
maintain  that  there  must  be  something  lying  further 
in  than  the  qualities  we  know,  and  that  this  some- 
thing is  entitled  to  be  regarded  as  the  essence  of  the 
object.  We  have  no  ground  whatever  for  believing 
that  there  must  be,  or  that  there  is,  something  more 
internal  or  central  than  the  substance  and  quality 
which  we  know.  True,  there  are  probably  occult 
qualities  even  in  those  objects  with  which  we  are 
most  intimately  acquainted ;  but  we  are  not  there- 
fore warranted  to  conclude,  that  what  is  concealed 
must  differ  in  nature  or  in  kind  from  Avhat  is  re- 
vealed, or  that  it  is  in  any  way  more  necessary  to  the 
existence  or  the  continuance  of  the  object.  I  have  a 
shrewd  suspicion  that  there  is  a  vast  amount  of  un- 
meaning talk  in  the  language  which  is  employed  on 
this  special  subject  by  metaphysicians,  who  would 
see  something  which  the  vulgar  cannot  discern, 
whereas  they  should  be  contented  with  pointing  to 
what  all  men  perceive.  It  is  quite  conceivable,  and 
perfectly  probable,  that  though  we  should  know  all 


RELATIVITY   OF   KNOWLEDGE.  77 

about  any  given  terrestrial  or  material  object,  we 
should,  after  all,  not  fall  in  with  any  thing  more 
mysterious  or  deep  than  those  wonders  which  come 
every  day  under  our  notice  in  the  world  without,  and 
the  world  within  us." 

The  following  are  the  views  of  this  author  in 
regard  to  existence  in  itself:  "I  cannot  give  my 
adhesion  to  the  opinion  of  those  who  speak  so 
strongly  of  man  being  incapacitated  to  know  Being. 
I  have  already  intimated  my  dissent  from  that  Kant- 
ian doctrine,  that  we  do  not  know  things,  but  ap- 
pearances ;  and  even  from  the  theory  of  those  Scot- 
tish metaphysicians  who  affirm  that  we  do  not  know 
things,  but  qualities.  What  we  know,  is  the  thing 
manifesting  itself  to  us — is  the  thing  exercising  par- 
ticular qualities.  But  then  it  is  confidently  asserted 
that  we  do  not  know  the  '  thing  in  itself.'  The  lan- 
guage, I  rather  think,  is  unmeaning ;  but  if  it  has  a 
meaning,  it  is  incorrect.  I  do  not  believe  that  there 
is  any  such  thing  in  existence  as  Being  in  itself,  or 
that  man  can  even  so  much  as  imagine  it ;  and  if 
this  be  so,  it  is  clear  that  we  cannot  know  it,  and 
desirable  that  we  should  not  suppose  that  we  know 
it.  Of  this  I  am  sure,  that  those  Neo-Platonists  who 
professed  to  be  able  to  rise  to  the  discovery  of  Being 
in  itself  (which  could  only  be  the  abstract  idea  of 
Being),  and  to  be  employed  in  gazing  on  it,  had  mis- 
erably bare  and  most  unprofitable  matter  of  medita- 
tion  whether  for  intellectual,  or  moral,  or  religious 


78  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

ends.  But  if  any  mean  to  deny  that  we  can  know 
Being  as  it  is,  I  maintain  in  opposition  to  them,  and 
I  appeal  to  consciousness  to  confirm  me,  when  I  say, 
that  we  immediately  know  Being  in  every  act  of 
cognition.  But  then  we  are  told  that  we  cannot 
know  the  mystery  of  Being.  I  am  under  a  strong 
impression  that  speculators  have  attached  a  much 
greater  amount  of  mystery  to  this  simple  subject 
than  really  belongs  to  it.  Of  this  I  am  sure,  that 
much  of  the  obscurity  Avhich  has  collected  around  it 
has  sprung  from  the  confused  discussions  of  meta- 
physicians, who  have  labored  to  explain  what  needs 
no  explanation  to  our  intelligence,  or  to  get  a  basis 
on  which  to  build  what  stands  securely  on  its  own 
foundation.  I  do  indeed  most  fully  admit,  that  there 
may  be  much  about  Being  which  we  do  not  know ; 
much  about  Being  generally,  much  about  every  indi- 
vidual Being,  unknown  to  us,  and  unknowable  to  us 
in  this  world.  Still,  I  do  affirm  that  we  know  so 
much  of  Being,  and  that  any  further  knowledge  con- 
veyed to  us  woiild  not  set  aside  our  present  knowl- 
edge, but  would  simply  enlarge  it."  ^' 

The  following  remarks  in  regard  to  the  phrase, 
"  knowing  things  in  themselves,"  are  by  Bailey  : 

"It  is  worth  while  to  advert  more  particularly 
to  the  proposition  often  reiterated  by  Kant,  that  we 
cannot  know  things  in  themselves — a  proposition  ex- 
tensively accepted  by  philosophers. 

*  McCosVs  '*  Intuitions  of  the  Mind,"  p.  163. 


KELATIYITY    OF   KISTOWLEDGE.  79 

"  This  is,  in  my  view,  a  perfectly  unmeaning  as- 
sertion. We  cannot  form  the  slightest  conception  of 
knowing  external  things,  except  as  we  do  know 
them,  i.  e.,  through  the  organs  of  sense.  Do  you 
demur  at  this  ?  Then  he  so  good  as  to  tell  me  the 
precise  signification  of  knowing  things  in  them- 
selves ;  give  me  a  specimen  of  that  sort  of  knowl- 
edge which  we  have  not ;  and  point  out  how  you 
have  gained  so  envious  a  piece  of  transcendental  in- 
formation. 

"  No  one,  manifestly,  is  entitled  to  deny  that  our 
knowledge  is  of  things  in  themselves,  unless  he  not 
only  possesses  the  sort  of  knowledge  which  he  denies 
to  others,  and  has  found,  in  comparison,  that  we — 
the  rest  of  the  human  race — have  only  a  knowledge 
of  things  as  they  are  not  in  themselves,  but  actually 
produces  it  for  our  examination.  Till  that  is  done, 
assertions  ahout  knowing  things  in  themselves  must 
be  regarded  as  utterly  without  meaning," 


CHAPTER  XL 

HEMAEKS    02T  THE  NATURE    OF*  PERCEPTION. 

It  has  not  been  my  design  to  give  an  historical 
account  of  the  various  theories  of  perception.  I 
have  noticed  some  errors,  for  the  purpose  of  enabling 
the  student  to  get  a  clearer  view  of  the  truth.  On 
this,  as  on  many  other  subjects,  the  simple  truth  has 
been  overlooked,  and  almost  every  conceivable  form 
of  error  has  been  adopted,  and  exploded.  The  true 
doctrine  of  perception  is  very  simple,  and  has  always 
been  held  by  all  except  philosophers.  It  is  some- 
times asked,  Can  the  existence  of  an  external  world 
be  proved  ?  The  reply  is.  It  is  an  object  of  direct 
cognition,  and  hence  is  not  susceptible  of  proof  or 
disproof.  "  For,  let  us  pause  a  moment,  and  reflect 
what  constitutes  proof — what  proof  is.  It  is  neither 
more  nor  less  than  some  fact  which  causes  us,  or 
which  is  adduced  for  the  purpose  of  causing  us,  to 
discern  or  to  believe  some  other  fact. 

"  Now,  a  fact  must  be  either  external  or  internal, 
material  or  mental,  relating  to  the  world  without  or 
the  world  within.     But  an  external  fact  cannot  be 


REMARKS    ON   THE   KATURIJ    OF   PERCEPTION.         81 

adduced  in  proof  that  there  are  such  things  as  exter- 
nal objects ;  for  that  would  be  alleging  as  evidence 
the  very  truth  to  be  proved.  IsTor  can  it  be  adduced 
in  disproof;  for  that  would  be  affirming  the  positive 
existence  of  a  thing  in  order  to  disprove  its  exist- 
ence. 

"  But  if  an  external  fact  cannot,  in  this  case,  be 
brought  forward  in  proof  or  disproof,  it  is  equally 
plain  that  a  purely  mental  or  internal  fact  cannot  be 
adduced  for  either  purpose. 

"  The  only  mental  or  internal  fact  which  can  be 
mentioned  as  at  .all  relating  to  the  subject,  is,  that 
we  perceive  external  objects :  but  this  cannot,  of 
course,  be  alleged  in  proof  of  itself,  or  of  its  own 
truth ;  nor  can  it  be  brought,  without  egregious  ab- 
sur^^,  in  disproof  of  itself. 

"  That  there  are  external  objects  perceived  by  us, 
is,  therefore,  a  primary  fact,  which  admits  neither  of 
being  proved  nor  disproved ;  and  it  is  amazing  that 
philosophers  of  great  depth  and  power  have  attempt- 
ed to  .do  either."  * 

The  following  remarks  by  the  author  above  quo- 
ted are  worthy  of  attention  : 

"  When  we  perceive  an  object,  we  have  not  any 
consciousness  of  the  conditions  of  the  nerves  and 
brain  concerned  in  the  resulting  act  of  perception, 
nor  of  the  motions  of  any  inorganic  medium  between 
the  object  and  our  organ :  we  are  conscious  of  per- 

*  Bailey 

.     4*     .    - 


82  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

ceiving  the  external  object,  and  nothing  else.  In 
seeing,  we  are  not  conscious  of  the  retina,  nor  of  the 
rays  of  light  impinging  upon  it,  nor  of  the  picture 
there  delineated.  In  hearing,  we  are  not  conscious 
of  the  drum  of  the  ear,  nor  of  the  pulses  of  the  air 
by  which  it  is  struck,  nor,  in  either  case,  of  any  com- 
munication between  those  parts  and  the  brain. 

"As  we  are  unconscious  of  the  physical  process,  so 
what  we  are  conscious  of  perceiving  is  not  at  all  af- 
fected by  our  being  able  or  unable  to  trace  that  pro- 
cess of  which  perception  is  the  result.  In  other 
words,  our  perception  of  external  objects  is  not  alter- 
able by  any  insight  or  want  of  insight  into  its  physi- 
cal causes.  What  is  designated  by  the  words  '  seeing 
an  object,'  is  the  same  mental  state  in  the  child,  the 
savage,  the  philosopher,  and  as  a  simple  modification 
of  consciousness  neither  wants  nor  admits  of  any 
analysis  or  explanation.  Although  the  physical 
events  leading  to  it  may  be  minutely  investigated,  it 
cannot  itself  be  resolved  into  any  mental  state  or 
states.  You  may  trace  the  course  of  light  from  the 
object  to  the  organ,  you  may  follow  its  refractions  by 
the  lens  of  the  eye,  you  may  detect  the  picture  on 
the  retina,  you  may  explore  the  connection  of  the 
optic  nerve  with  the  brain ;  but  you  do  not,  by  all 
these  discoveries,  valuable  as  fhey  are,  alter  in  the 
slightest  degree  the  resulting  state  of  consciousness 
denominated  seeing  the  object.  Although  they  are 
facts  in  the  physical  process  absolutely  necessary  to 


EEMAKKS    OK  THE   NATUEE    OF   PEKCEPTION.         83 

the  result,  a  knowledge  of  them  does  not  in  the  least 
modify  the  consequent  perception.  Hence  it  follows 
that  no  extent  of  investigation,  no  discovery  in  sci- 
ence, can  ever  change  the  character  of  our  acquaint- 
ance with  external  objects.  If  we  could  push  our  in- 
sight of  nature  to  the  utmost  imaginable  extreme,  if 
we  could  ascertain  the  shape  and  pursue  the  move- 
ments of  every  particle  of  matter  in  the  world  around 
us,  we  should  still  have  only  the  same  hind  of  knowl- 
edge, although  highly  exalted  in  degree,  which  we 
have  now;  we  should  still  be  acquainted  with  the 
material  universe  only  through  our  sensitive  organs. 
The  telescope  and  the  microscope,  w^hile  they  extend 
the  reach  of  our  senses,  do  not  in  the  slightest  degree 
alter  the  nature  of  our  perceptions.  And  further, 
all  the  various  steps  in  the  physical  process  through 
which  we  become  cognizant  of  any  external  object 
are  external  objects  themselves,  and  are  perceived  in 
the  same  way  as  the  rest." 


CHAPTER  XII. 

COGlSriTION    OF    MENTAL    OPERATIONS — PEESOKALITY — 
IDENTITY — CEASELESS  ACTIYITT — CONSCIOUSNESS. 

We  have  seen  that  the  mind  can  cognize  the  ex- 
istence and  qualities  of  material  objects.  But  mate- 
rial objects  are  not  the  sole  objects  of  knowledge. 
We  do  not  acquire  all  our  knowledge  through  the 
agency  of  the  senses. 

The  mind  can  cogniz®  its  own  existence  and  oper- 
ations. If  it  be  asked,  How  can  the  mind  be  at  the 
same  time  both  subject  and  object  of  knowledge  ?  we 
can  only  reply,  such  is  the  fact.  Our  knowledge  of  a 
fact  is  not  destroyed  by  our  ignorance  of  the  manner 
in  which  the  fact  takes  place. 

We  have  a  direct  cognition  of  our  mental  opera- 
tions. We  do  not,  it  is  true,  see  them  by  the  eye,  or 
hear  them  by  the  ear,  but  we  have  a  direct  cognition 
of  them. 

We  have  also  a  direct  cognition  of  our  existence. 
Whenever  the  mind  cognizes  the  existence  of  an  ob- 
ject, it  cognizes  its  own  existence.  In  the  con- 
sciousness  of  cognizing  the  object   is  involved  the 


COGNITION   OF   MENTAL   OPERATIONS,   ETC.  85 

consciousness  of  cognizing  its  own  existence.  In 
every  mental  act  there  is  a  direct  cognition  of  the 
existence  of  the  mind.  Some  writers  aiBrm  that  we 
are  conscious  only  of  our  mental  acts  or  states,  and 
that  the  existence  of  the  mind  is  an  inference — a  ne- 
cessary inference,  indeed,  but  still  an  inference — from 
those  mental  acts  or  states.  Thus  I  am  conscious  of 
an  act,  therefore  there  must  be  an  agent. 

Professor  Stewart,  one  of  the  few  men  who  have 
not  been  overrated  by  their  admirers,  says :  "  We  are 
not  immediately  conscious  of  its  (the  mind's)  exist- 
ence, but  we  are  conscious  of  sensation,  thought,  and 
volition,  operations  which  imply  the  existence  of 
something  which  feels,  thinks,  and  wills." 

ISTo  doubt  the  existence  of  thought  implies  a 
thinker,  just  as  the  existence  of  a  watch  implies  a 
maker.  In  the  latter  case,  the  inference  is  separable 
in  thought  from  the  fact.  But  not  so  in  regard  to 
the  thinker.  The  cognition  of  the  existence  of  the 
thinker  is  contemporaneous  with  and  inseparable 
from  the  conscious  thought.  The  consciousness  of 
the  existence  of  the  mind  operating  is  an  integral 
part  of  the  conscious  act.  The  perceiving  agent  and 
the  thing  perceived  are  embraced  in  the  same  act  of 
consciousness. 

Professor  Mansel  teaches  the  doctrine  of  a  direct 
^cognition.  "  Is  it  not,"  he  says,  "  a  flat  contradiction 
to  maintain  that  I  am  not  immediately  conscious  of 
myself,  but  only  of  my  sensations  or  volitions  ?     Who 


86  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

then  is  this  Zthat  is  conscious,  and  how  can  Zbe  con- 
scious of  such  states  as  mine  ?  In  this  case  it  would 
surely  be  far  more  accurate  to  say,  not  that  I  am  con- 
scious of  my  sensations,  but  that  the  sensation  is 
conscious  of  itself;  but  thus  worded,  the  glaring  ab- 
surdity of  the  theory  would  carry  with  it  its  own  ref- 
utation." "  The  one  presented  substance^  the  source 
from  which  our  data  for  thinking  on  the  subject  are 
originally  drawn,  is  myself.  Whatever  may  be  the 
variety  of  the  phenomena  of  consciousness,  sensations 
by  this  or  that  organ, ♦volitions,  thoughts,  imagina- 
tions, of  all  we  are  immediately  conscious  as  affec- 
tions of  one  and  the  same  self.  It  is  not  by  any 
afterthought  of  reflection  that  I  combine  together 
sight,  hearing,  thought,  and  volition,  into  a  factitious 
unity  or  compounded  whole ;  in  each  case  I  am  im- 
mediately conscious  of  myself  seeing  and  hearing, 
willing  and  thinking.  This  self-personality,  like  all 
other  simple  apprehensions,  is  indefinable,  but  it  is 
so  because  it  is  superior  to  definition.  It  can  be  ana- 
lyzed into  no  simple  element,  for  it  is  itself  the  sim- 
plest of  all ;  it  can  be  made  no  clearer  by  description 
or  comparison,  for  it  is  revealed  to  us  in  all  the  clear- 
ness of  an  original  intuition,  of  which  description  and 
comparison  can  furnish  only  faint  and  partial  resem- 
blances." 

We  cognize  the  mind  as  existing  as  a  person,  not 
as  a  thing.  To  be  conscious  of  our  existence,  is  to  be 
conscious  of  our  existence  as  persons.     Some  would 


COGNITION    OF   MENTAL   OPERATIONS,    ETC.  87 

ap]3ear  to  find  difficulty  in  determining  in  what  per- 
sonality consists,  just  as  they  find  difficulty  in  deter- 
mining in  what  truth  consists  and  in  what  existence 
consists.  To  inquire  in  what  our  personality  consists, 
is  to  inquire  in  what  we  consist.  An  inanimate  thing 
has  certain  qualities,  that  is,  there  are  certain  things 
or  facts  true  concerning  it.  The  same  is  true  of  a 
brute  and  of  a  person.  We  can  inquire  what  things 
are  true  of  each,  and  can  thus  learn  what  things  are 
peculiar  to  each.  This  covers  the  whole  ground  of 
inquiry  open  to  us.  The  main  fact  characteristic  of  a 
person  as  distinguished  from  a  brute  is,  that  a  person 
has  the  power  of  cognizing  duty,  and  of  acting  freely 
in  relation  to  it. 

To  cognize  the  mind  as  a  person,  is  to  Qognize  it 
as  one — as  having  unity.  We  are  conscious  of  nu- 
merous operations,  but  we  are  conscious  of  them  as 
the  operations  of  one  operator.  The  question.  What 
is  one?  in  what  does  unity  consist?  cannot  be  an- 
swered. The  mind  is  capable  of  knowing  many 
things  which  it  cannot  describe  or  explain.  Every 
simple  elementary  idea,  every  intuition,  belongs  to 
this  class.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  observe  that 
none  of  thes-e  things  need  to  be  described  or  explained. 

It  is  said  by  some,  that,  while  we  cognize  the 
existence  and  operations  of  the  mind,  we  do  not 
cognize  its  nature.  The  nature  of  an  object  is  not 
something  different  from  the  object,  as  many  seem 
to  imagine.     Suppose  an  object  possesses  four  prop- 


88  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

erties ;  that  is,  there  are  four  things  cognizable, 
true,  concerning  it.  When  we  have  cognized  those 
four  things,  is  there  still  something  different  from 
them  remaining  unknown,  viz.,  its  nature  ?  The 
questions,  What  is  a  thing,  and  what  is  its  nature  ? 
are  identical.  A  recognition  of  this  truth  would 
have  saved  many  discussions. 

When  the  question  is  asked  respecting  a  thing. 
What  is  it  ?  the  answer  states  facts  concerning  it.  To 
tell  what  a  thing  is  fully,  is  to  state  all  facts  belong- 
ing to  it;  that  is,  everything  that  is  true  concern- 
ing it — all  its  properties  or  qualities.  If  it  be  a 
compound  object,  its  constituent  elements  as  well  as 
its  qualities  are  stated.  If  it  be  a  simple  object,  its 
qualities  are  stated.  If,  when  the  question.  What  is  a 
thing  ?  has  thus  been  answered,  the  question  is  still 
asked,  What  is  its  nature  ?  the  answer  will  consist  of 
a  statement  of  its  most  prominent  characteristics  or 
qualities,  but  said  characteristics  or  qualities  will  be 
found  among  the  facts  stated  in  answer  to  the  ques- 
tion. What  is  it  ? 

The  mind  continues  to  be  the  same  mind  amid 
all  changes  of  its  operations  and  conditions,  and  all 
changes  of  the  body.  The  conscious  operations  of 
to-day  may  differ  widely  from  those  of  yesterday ;  but 
I  am  as  certain  that  I  am  the  same  person  that  I  was 
yesterday,  as  I  am  that  I  exist  to-day. 

The  doctrine  of  personal  identity  requires  no 
proof.     It  is   intuitively  perceived.      Why,  then,  it 


COGNITION   OF  MENTAL   OPERATIONS,   ETC.  89 

may  be  asked,  have  there  been  discussions  and  dis- 
putes about  it  ?    Disputes  imply  difficulties. 

Difficulties  always  arise  when  men  try  to  prove 
self-evident  truths,  or  to  answer  questions  which  are 
unanswerable.  Locke  attempted  to  answer  the  ques- 
tion, "In  what  does  our  identity  consist?"  and,  of 
course,  fell  into  confusion  of  thought.  Unable  to 
answer  the  question,  he  unwittingly  answered  in  its 
stead,  ".On  what  is  our  cognition  of  identity  con- 
ditioned ?  " 

The  cognition  of  identity  is  conditioned  on  an  act 
of  remembrance.  If  Ave  could  not  remember  any 
past  act,  we  could  have  no  idea  of  personal  identity. 
Our  knowledge  would  be  confined  to  our  present 
existence  and  present  acts.  When  we  remember  a 
mental  act,  we  remember  it  ais  our  act.  The  idea  of 
identity  is  involved  in  every  act  of  remembrance. 
Identity  does  not  depend  upon  memory,  but  memory 
is  the  necessary  condition  of  cognizing  it.  Our  cog- 
nition of  personal  identity  is  thus  an  intuition  con- 
ditioned on  an  act  of  remembrance. 

Is  the  mind  always  active?  Are  its  operations 
ceaseless  ?  We  know  from  experience  that  it  is 
always  active  during  our  waking  hours.  Its  action 
is  sometimes  sluggish  and  sometimes  rapid,  but  it 
always  acts — always  exists  in  some  active  state.  Is 
it  always  active  during  sleep  ?  Sleep  seems  to  be  a 
bodily  affection  solely.  It  consists  in  the  temporary 
inability  of  the  organs  of  sense  to  perform  their  func- 


90  ELEMENTS    OF   IISTTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

tions.  We  know  that  the  mind  is  active  up  to  the 
time  when  sleep  takes  place.  We  know  that  we  often 
dream ;  that  is,  we  remember  operations  that  took 
place  when  we  were  asleep.  We  know  that  we  dream 
more  when  our  sleep  is  broken  than  when  it  is  sound.  J 
We  know  that  the  mind  is  active  as  soon  as  sleep  is 
removed.  We  sometimes  have  dreams,  that  is,  mental 
operations  take  place  during  sleep,  which  we  do  not 
remember;  for  we  are  observed  to  speak  in  sleep,  and 
do  not  remember  it  when  we  awake.  The  probability 
is  that  the  mind  in  its  normal  state  is  always  active. 

Is  the  mind  always  conscious  of  its  operations?  or 
can  it  perform  unconscious  processes?  Those  who 
affirm  that  the  mind  can  perform  acts  of  which  it  is 
unconscious,  state,  as  example,  the  case  of  the  striking 
of  a  clock  when  one  is  reading.  He  does  not  hear  it, 
he  says.  Tou  must  have. heard  it,  says  his  friend,  for 
it  has  just  struck.  I  was  not  conscious  of  it.  Was 
it  a  case  of  unconscious  hearing  ?  or  did  he  hear  it, 
but,  in  consequence  of  paying  no  attention  to  it, 
forget  it  ? 

Often  a  man  has  been  told  that  he  has  performed 
a  certain  act.  He  affirms,  in  all  honesty,  that  he  has 
not  performed  it.  Some  time  afterwards  he  remem- 
bers the  act.  But  for  that  accidental  remembrance, 
the  act  might  be  quoted  as  an  example  of  unconscious 
mental  operation. 

A  person  is  reading  aloud.  His  attention  wan- 
ders.    He  turns  the  leaf,  but  is  perfectly  ignorant  of 


COGNITION   OF   MENTAL   OPERATIONS,   ETC.  91 

the  ideas  expressed  on  the  pages  read.  His  mind  has 
been  occupied  by  some  other  topic.  He  must  have 
cognized  the  letters  and  words,  and  performed  acts 
of  will  causing  utterance.  Were  those  acts  micon- 
^sciously  performed,  or  were  they  consciously  per- 
formed, but  immediately  forgotten  in  consequence  of 
the  lack  of  attention  ?  Some  degree  of  attention,  we 
know,  is  necessary,  in  order  that  we  may  remember. 

A  skilful  musician  performs  a  piece  of  music  on 
the  piano.  Is  there  a  volition  connected  with  every 
movement  of  the  fingers  ?  When  he  first  began  to 
play,  he  was  conscious  of  a  distinct  volition  in  con- 
nection with  every  movement.  When  a  high  degree 
of  skill  has  been  attained,  he  is  not  conscious  of  any 
such  volition.  He  is  conscious  only  of  a  general  pur- 
pose to  perform  the  piece.  Do  the  volitions  take 
place  unconsciously  ?  Reid  says,  the  action  of  the 
fingers  in  this  case  is  mechanical — an  illustration  of 
what  he  calls  a  mechanical  habit.  An  objection  to 
Reid's  view  is  found  in  the  fact,  that  if  a  false  note  is 
struck,  it  is  instantly  perceived  and  corrected.  This 
would  indicate  attention,  though  the  person  may  not 
be  conscious  of  bestowing  it. 

Stewart  says  there  is  conscious  volition  antecedent 
to  each  movement.  He  says:  "I  cannot  help  thinking 
it  more  philosophical  to  suppose  that  those  actions 
which  are  originally  voluntary  always  continue  so, 
although  in  the  case  of  bperations  which  ua^o  beome 
habitual  in  consequence  of  long  practice,  w<^  m^>  not 


92  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

be  able  to  recollect  every  different  volition.  Thus,  in 
the  case  of  a  performer  on  the  harpsichord,  I  appre- 
hend that  there  is  an  act  of  the  will  preceding  every 
motion  of  the  fingers,  although  he  may  not  be  able  to 
recollect  these  volitions  afterwards,  and  although  he^, 
may,  during  the  time  of  his  performance,  be  employed 
in  carrying  on  a  separate  train  of  thought.  For  it 
must  be  remarked,  that  the  most  rapid  performer  can, 
when  he  pleases,  play  so  slowly  as  to  be  able  to  attend 
to  and  to  recollect  every  separate  act  of  his  will  in 
the  various  movements  of  his  fingers,  and  he  can 
gradually  accelerate  the  rate  of  his  execution  till  he 
is  unable  to  recollect  these  acts. ,  Now,  in  this  in- 
stance, one  of  two  suppositions  must  be  made.  The 
one  is,  that  the  operations  in  the  two  cases  are  carried 
on  in  precisely  the  same  manner,  and  differ  only  in 
the  degree  of  rapidity ;  and  the  other,  that  when  this 
rapidity  exceeds  a  certain  rate,  the  operation  is  taken 
entirely  out  of  our  hands,  and  is  carried  on  by  some 
unknown  power,  of  the  nature  of  which  we  are  as 
ignorant  as  we  are  of  the  cause  of  the  circulation  of 
the  blood,  or  of  the  motion  of  the  intestines.  The  last 
supposition  seems  to  me  to  be  somewhat  similar  to 
that  of  a  man  who  should  maintain,  that  although  a 
body  projected  with  a  moderate  velocity  is  seen  to 
pass  through  all  the  intermediate  spaces  in  moving 
from  one  place  to  another,  yet  we  are  not  entitled 
to  conclude  that  this  happens  when  the  body  moves 
60  quickly  as  to  become  invisible  to  the  eye. 


4i> 
COGNITION   OF   MENTAL   OPERATIONS,   ETC.  93 

"  The  former  supposition  is  supported  by  the  an- 
alogy of  many  other  facts  in  our  constitution.  An 
expert  accountant,  for  example,  can  sum  up,  almost 
at  a  single  glance  of  his  eye,  a  long  column  of  figures. 
He  can  tell  the  sum  with  unerring  certainty,  while, 
at  the  same  time,  he  is  unable  to  recollect  any  one 
of  the  figures  of  which  that  sum  is  composed ;  and 
yet  nobody  doubts  that  each  one  of  these  figures  has 
passed  through  his  mind,  or  supposes  that  when  the 
rapidity  of  the  process  becomes  so  great  that  he  is 
unable  to  recollect  the  various  steps,  he  obtains  the 
result  by  a  sort  of  inspiration." 

Sir  William  Hamilton  advocates  the  doctrine  of 
unconscious  mental  agency.  He  asks :  "Are  there,  in 
ordinary,  mental  modifications,  i,  6.,  mental  activities 
and  passivities,  of  which  we  are  unconscious,  but 
which  manifest  their  existence  by  effects  of  which  we 
are  conscious  ?  " 

That  there  are  mental  modifications  beyond  the 
sphere  of  consciousness,  is  doubtless  true ;  our  habits 
and  dispositions  are  examples  of  such  modifications ; 
but  are  there  such  modifications  as  may  properly  be 
termed  activities  beyond  the  sphere  of  consciousness  ? 
Are  there  any  unconscious  mental  activities  ? 

"  Let  us  take  our  first  example,"  says  Hamilton, 
"  from  perception — the  perception  of  external  ob- 
jects— and  in  that  faculty  let  us  commence  with  the 
sense  of  sight.  Now,  you  either  already  know,  or 
can  at  once  be  informed,  what  it  is  that  has  obtained 


04  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPnY. 

the  name  of  the  Minwium  Visibile,  You  are,  of 
course,  aware  in  general,  that  vision  is  the  result  of 
the  rays  of  light  reflected  from  the  surface  of  objects 
to  the  eye ;  a  greater  number  of  rays  is  reflected 
from  a  larger  surface :  if  the  superficial  extent  of  an 
object,  and,  consequently,  the  number  of  rays  which 
it  reflects,  be  diminished  beyond  a  certain  limit,  the 
object  becomes  invisible ;  and  the  minimum  visibile 
is  the  smallest  expanse  which  can  be  seen — which 
can  consciously  afiect  us — which  we  can  be  conscious 
of  seeing.  This  being  understood,  it  is  plain  that  if 
we  divide  the  minimum  visibile  into  two  parts,  nei- 
ther half  can,  by  itself,  be  an  object  of  vision,  or 
visual  consciousness.  They  are,  severally  and  apart, 
to  consciousness  as  zero.  But  it  is  evident  that  each 
half  must,  by  itself,  have  produced  in  us  a  certain 
modification,  real,  though  unperceived ;  for  as  the 
perceived  whole  is  nothing  but  the  union  of  the  un- 
perceived halves,  so  the  perception — the  perceived 
affection  itself  of  which  we  are  conscious — is  only 
the  sum  of  two  modifications,  each  of  which  sev- 
erally eludes  our  consciousness." 

The  above  does  not  prove  that  we  can  perform 
unconscious  acts.  There  is,  on  the  part  of  the  au- 
thor, a  failure  to  distinguish  between  a  material  or 
physiological  condition  of  perception  and  the  mental 
act  of  perception.  The  conscious  perception  of  the 
minimum  visibile  is  not  made  up  of  two  unconscious 
perceptions.     We  may  admit  that  each  half  of  the 


COGlSriTION   OF   MENTAL   OPERATIONS,    ETC.  95 

expanse  has  produced  a  certain  modification  of  the 
organism  of  sense  ;  but  a  modification  of  tlie  organ- 
Ism  of  sense  is  one  thing,  and  the  modification  of  a 
mental  act  is  another.  The  two  must  not  be  con- 
founded. Assume  that  the  modification  is  a  mental 
act,  and  you  have  an  example  of  an  unconscious  men- 
tal act ;  but  the  modification  is  not  a  mental  act,  but 
the  condition  of  a  mental  act. 

The  whole  expanse  perceived  is  the  union  of  the 
two  halves ;  but  it  does  not  follow  that"  the  percep- 
tion of  the  whole,  considered  as  a  mental  act,  is  made 
up  of  two  half  perceptions  considered  as  ^mental  acts. 
His  remarks  are  tantamount  to  this.  The  minimum 
visibile  produces  a  perception ;  therefore  half  of  it 
must  produce  half  a  perception :  but  we  are  not 
conscious  of  the  half  perception;  therefore  we  have 
unconscious  perceptions. 

Suppose  a  pair  of  scales,  with  an  ounce  weight  in 
one  of  the  scales.  Put  another  ounce  weight  in  the 
other  scale,  and  it  will  bring  that  side  down  to  a  level 
with  the  other.  No  one  would  say  that  half  an  ounce 
will  bring  it  down  halfway.  An  ounce  is  the  small- 
est weight  that  will  bring  down  the  scale,  and  so  the 
minimum  visibile  is  the  smallest  expanse  that  will 
produce  perception.  Each  half  of  the  minimum  visi- 
bile produces  a  modification  of  the  organ  of  sense,  on 
which  the  mental  act  is  conditioned. 

Again  he  says  :  "  When  we  look  at  a  distant  for- 
est, we  perceive  a  certain  expanse  of  green.     Of  this, 


96  ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

as  an  affection  of  our  organism,  we  are  clearly  and 
distinctly  conscious.  Now,  the  expanse  of  which  we 
are  conscious  is  evidently  made  up  of  parts  of  which 
we  are  not  conscious.  No  leaf,  perhaps  no  tree,  may 
be  separately  visible.  But  the  greenness  of  the  for- 
est is  made  up  of  the  greenness  of  the  leaves ;  that 
is,  the  total  impression  of  which  we  are  conscious  is 
made  up  of  an  infinitude  of  small  impressions  of 
which  we  are  not  conscious." 

Here  the  impressions  upon  the  organs  of  sense, 
which  are  among  the  conditions  of  perception,  are 
confounded  with  the  mental  act  of  perception.  We 
are  conscious  of  perceiving  the  outline  and  color  of 
the  forest.  Whatever  impressions  were  made  upon 
the  organs  of  sense,  whatever  rays  of  light  were  re- 
flected from  whatever  number  of  leaves,  are  the  con- 
ditions of  perception,  and  not  the  mental  act  of  per- 
ception. Those  conditions  are  not  within  the  sphere 
of  consciousness ;  they  are  modifications  of  the  mate- 
rial organs.  One  is  not  authorized  to  say,  "  Modifi- 
cations of  the  material  organs  may  take  place  with- 
out our  being  conscious  of  them ;  therefore  mental 
acts  may  take  place  without  our  being  conscious  of 
them." 

"  Take  another  example,"  says  Hamilton,  ''  from 
the  sense  of  hearing.  In  this  sense  there  is,  in  like 
manner,  a  Minimum  Audibile  ;  that  is,  a  sound  the 
least  that  can  come  into  perception  and  conscious- 
ness.     But  this   minimum   audibile  is  made  up  of 


COGKITIOIS-    OF   MENTAL    OPERATIONS,    ETC.  97 

parts  whicli  severally  affect  tlie  sense,  but  of  which 
afFections,  separately,  we  are  not  conscious,  though 
of  their  joint  result  we  are.  We  must,  therefore, 
here  likewise  admit  the  reality  of  modifications  be- 
yond the  sphere  of  consciousness.  Take  a  special 
example.  When  we  hear  the  distant  murmur  of  the 
sea,  what  are  the  constituents  of  the  total  perception 
of  which  we  are  conscious  ?  This  murmur  is  a  sum 
made  up  of  parts,  and  the  sum  would  be  as  zero  if 
the  parts  did  not  count  as  something.  The  noise  of 
the  sea  is  a  complement  of  the  noise  of  its  several 
waves ;  and  if  the  noise  of  each  wave  made  no  im- 
pression on  our  sense,  the  noise  of  the  sea,  as  the 
result  of  these  impressions,  could  not  be  realized. 
But  the  noise  of  each  several  wave,  at  the  distance 
we  suppose,  is  inaudible ;  we  must,  however,  admit 
that  they  produce  a  certain  modification,  beyond  con- 
sciousness, on  the  recipient  subject';  for  this  is  neces- 
sarily involved  in  the  reality  of  their  result." 

One  wave  is  inaudible,  but  a  hundred  waves  are 
audible.  Therefore  the  audible  is  made  up  of  one 
hundred  inaudibles ;  the  conscious  mental  act  is  made 
up  of  one  hundred  unconscious  mental  modifications. 
If  by  "  modifications  on  the  recipient  subject " 
he  does  not  mean  mental  modifications,  then  the 
point  for  which  he  is  contending,  viz.,  unconscious 
mental  operations,  is  not  reached.  He  confounds 
here,   as   above,   impressions    on    the    organism    of 


98  ELEMEN^TS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

sense — conditions  of  perception — with  the  act  of  per- 
ception. 

The  vibrations  caused  by  one  wave  fail  to  affect 
the  ear  so  as  to  produce  a  cognition  of  sound ;  the 
vibration  of  one  hundred  waves  do  so  affect  the  ear 
as  to  produce  a  cognition  of  sound.  This  is  a  fair 
statement  of  the  facts  of  the  case.  It  furnishes  no 
proof  of  unconscious  mental  agency. 

The  fact  that  the  mind  may  possess  latent  knowl- 
edge, does  not  prove  that  it  can  perform  unconscious 
mental  acts.  The  condition  of  the  mind,  as  distin- 
guished from  acts  of  the  mind,  is,  of  course,  beyond 
the  sphere  of  consciousness.  A  habit  is  a  condition 
of  the  mind  which  is  manifested  by  effects — conscious 
acts.  A  condition  of  mind  may  be  termed  a  modifi- 
cation of  mind,  but  it  cannot  properly  be  termed  a 
mental  agency.  Hamilton  does  not  use  the  term 
"unconscious  mental  operation;"  but  if  he  is  not 
arguing  in  behalf  of  the  proposition  that  such  oper- 
ations may  take  place,  he  is  arguing  for  that  which 
no  one  ever  disputed. 

The  case  of  the  somnambulist  does  not  furnish  an 
example  of  unconscious  mental  action.  He  gives 
abundant  proof,  when  in  that  state,  that  he  is  con- 
scious of  his  actions — that  he  knows  what  he  is 
about.  When  he  is  awake,  he  has  no  remembrance 
of  what  took  place  in  his  sleep.  To  forget  and  to  be 
unconscious,  are  not  identical. 


COGNITION    OF   MENTAL    OPERATIONS,    ETC.  99 

Cases  of  disordered  mental  action  seem  to  furnish 
examples  of  unconscious  mental  action.  Admitting 
that  unconscious  mental  action  does  take  place  in 
cases  of  disease,  the  question  still  remains,  Can  the 
mind,  when  it  is  in  its  normal  state,  perform  opera- 
tions of  which  it  is  unconscious  ? 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

COGl^ITIOK     OF     SPACE, 

There  is  a  difference  between  knowing  what  a 
thing  is,  and  telling  what  it  is.  Our  inability  to  de- 
fine or  describe  a  thing  does  not  authorize  us  to  deny 
its  existence.  Every  one  knows  there  is  such  a  thing 
as  truth,  ^.  6.,  true  propositions ;  but  no  one  can  tell 
what  truth  is.  If  the  question  be  asked,  In  what 
does  truth  consist  ?  no  answer  can  be  given.  There  is 
no  such  thing  as  truth  apart  from  true  propositions ; 
as  there  is  no  such  thing  as  life  apart  from  living 
things.  When  it  is  said  we  cannot  cognize  being  in 
itself,  if  by  being  in  itself  is  meant  existence  apart 
from  things  existing,  the  assertion  is  true,  for  there 
is  no  such  thing.  That  which  is  not,  we  cannot 
cognize. 

Of  a  provable  proposition  the  question  may  be 
asked.  In  what  does  its  truth  consist — /.  6.,  on  what 
proof  does  it  rest  ?  But  if  the  question  be  asked 
with  respect  to  a  self-evident  proposition,  such  as  that 
the  whole  is  greater  than  its  part,  no  answer  can  be 


COGNITIOK   OF   SPACE.  101 

given.  You  may  say  it  consists  in  being  true,  but 
that  is  only  an  awkward  re-affirmance. 

We  cannot  tell  what  an  act  of  perception  is.  Do 
you  say  it  is  a  mental  act  ?  What  kind  of  a  mental  act  ? 
An  act  of  perceiving.  What  kind  of  mental  act  is  an 
act  of  perceiving  ?  To  this  question  we  can  give  no 
answer.  If  asked  in  what  it  consists,  we  can  only  an- 
swer, It  consists  in  perceiving.  We  are  not,  then,  to 
call  in  question  the  reality  of  a  thing,  merely  because 
we  are  not  able  to  tell  what  it  is,  or  in  what  it  consists. 

We  have  seen  that  our  cognition  of  identity  is 
not  a  remembrance,  but  an  intuition  conditioned 
upon  a  remembrance.  An  intuitive  cognition  may 
thus  be  conditioned  on  a  preceding  act  of  mind. 
Such  a  cognition  is  distinguishable  from  an  inference 
properly  so  called. 

We  can  cognize  space.  The  cognition  of  space  is 
intuitive,  though  it  is  conditioned  on  the  cognition  of 
body.  If  we  had  no  knowledge  of  body,  it  does  not 
appear  that  we  should  have  any  knowledge  of  space. 

When  we  cognize  an  object  as  existing,  we  cog- 
nize it  as  existing  in  space.  We  are  as  conscious 
that  we  cognize  it  in  space,  as  we  are  that  we  cog- 
nize it  at  all.  The  two  cognitions  are  inseparable. 
Space,  then,  exists  independently  of  the  mind  which 
cognizes  it.  The  tree  which  we  cognize  as  existing 
in  space,  exists  when  it  is  not  perceived.  We  have 
the  same  ground  for  asserting  that  space  exists  when 
it  is  not  perceived,  as  we  have  for  asserting  that  the 


102       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

tree  exists  when  it  is  not  perceived.  Consciousness 
does  not  affirm  that  the  mind  creates  space :  it  affirms 
that  the  mind  cognizes  it.  It  is  not,  then,  a  creation 
of  the  mind,  a  subjective  state,  as  is  held  by  Kant, 
Hamilton,  Whewell,  and  others. 

"According  to  Kant,"  says  McCosh,  "space  and 
time  are  forms  given  by  the  mind  to  the  phenomena 
which  are  presented  through  the  senses,  and  are  not 
to  be  considered  as  having  any  thing  more  than  a 
subjective  existence.  It  is  one  of  the  most  fatal 
heresies — ^that  is,  dogmas  opposed  to  the  revelations 
of  consciousness — ever  introduced  into  philosophy, 
and  it  lies  at  the  basis  of  all  the  aberrations  in  the 
school  of  speculation  which  followed.  For  those 
who  were  taught  that  the  mind  could  create  space 
and  time,  soon  learned  to  suppose  that  the  mind 
could  also  create  the  objects  and  events  cognized  as 
existing  in  space  and  time,  till  the  whole  external 
universe  became  ideal,  and  all  reality  was  supposed 
to  lie  in  a  series  of  connected  mental  forms?' 

McCosh  frankly  admits  that  there  are  difficulties 
connected  with  space  as  an  objective  existence. 
"But,"  he  remarks,  "it  is  of  all  courses  the  most 
foolish  and  suicidal  to  urge  the  difficulties  connected 
with  space  and  time  as  a  reason  for  setting  aside  our 
intuitive  convictions  respecting  them,  say  in  regard 
to  their  reality.  Doubtless  we  are  landed  in  some 
perplexities  by  allowing  that  they  are  real,  but  we 
are  landed  in  more  hopeless  difficulties  and  in  far 


COGNITION   OF   SPACE.  103 

more  serious  consequences  when  we  deny  their 
reality ;  and  there  is  this  important  difference  in  the 
cases,  that  in  the  one  the  difficulties  arise  from  the 
nature  of  the  subject,  whereas  in  the  other  they  are 
created  by  our  own  unwarranted  affirmations  and 
speculations." 

Professor  D.  Stewart  says :  "  We  have  an  irre- 
sistible conviction  that  space  is  necessarily  existent, 
and  that  its  annihilation  is  impossible.  To  call  this 
proposition  in  question,  is  to  open  the  door  to  uni- 
versal skepticism." 

If  we  are  asked.  What  is  space  ?  in  what  does  it 
consist  ?  we  answer,  we  cannot  tell.  Our  inability 
to  state  in  what  space  consists,  does  not  prove  that 
it  does  not  exist.  Our  inability  to  state  in  what  the 
Divine  Existence  consists,  does  not  prove  that  there 
is  no  Divine  Existence. 

Space  is  not  a  material  existence.  It  is  extended, 
but  it  has  not  material  extension.  When  we  cognize 
it,  we  do  not  cognize  it  as  possessing  any  of  the 
qualities  of  matter.  It  has  not  gravity,  solidity,  or 
visible  and  tangible  form.  It  has  no  one  of  the 
qualities  of  matter. 

Space  is  not  a  spiritual  existence ;  it  is  not  an 
existence  that  thinks,  feels,  and  wills.  We  have  no 
proof  that  it  thinks,  feels,  and  wills;  no  reason  to 
suppose  that  it  does. 

Will  it  be  asked.  If  it  be  not  a  material  nor  spiritual 
existence,  what  kind  of  existence  is  it  ?    We  reply, 


104       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

It  is  space.  All  existences  do  not  of  necessity  come 
under  the  head  of  material  and  spiritual  existences. 
It  does  not  follow  that  if  space  be  neither  material 
nor  spiritual,  there  is  no  such  thing.  We  know  that 
it  is ;  we  cognize  its  existence. 

Space  is  not  an  attribute  of  God,  as  was  assumed 
by  Dr.  Samuel  Clark.  God  is  a  spirit.  His  attributes 
are  the  attributes  of  a  spiritual  being.  Space,  we 
have  seen,  is  not  a  spiritual  existence,  and  for  the 
same  reason  we  may  affirm  that  it  is  not  the  attribute 
of  a  spiritual  being. 

Space  is  limitless.  When  the  mind  makes  it  the 
object  of  attention,  it  sees  that  it  can  have  no  limit. 
If  it  be  asked  how  the  mind  can  see  so  far,  I  reply : 
We  are  not  called  upon  to  tell  how  a  thing  is  done, 
in  order  to  know  that  it  is  done.  We  cognize  the 
fact  that  all  truth  is  consistent;  that  two  proposi- 
tions, one  directly  in  conflict  with  the  other,  cannot 
be  true.  Our  conviction  of  the  proposition  is  not  an 
inference  .from  a  number  of  experiences.  The  first 
time  we  found  an  assertion  in  conflict  with  a  known 
truth,  we  knew  it  was  false.  We  are  just  as  sure 
that  truth  is  consistent  with  itself  in  Jupiter  as  on 
the  earth,  though  our  minds  have  never '  made  an 
excursion  to  that  planet. 

If  the  mind  can  cognize  the  fact  that  truth  is 
everywhere  consistent  with  itself  throughout  the 
universe,  may  it  not  cognize  the  fact  that  space  is 
Umitless  ? 


COGNITION   OF   SPACE.  105 

It  is  common  to  say  that  space  is  limitless,  be- 
cause we  cannot  conceive  of  its  being  limited.  A 
mode  of  expression  more  strictly  accordant  with  our 
consciousness  is,  that  the  mind  sees  that  space  can 
have  no  limits. 

Conceivability  or  non-conceiv ability  is  not  a  test 
of  truth.  The  phrase,  "I  cannot  conceive  of  it,"  has 
two  meanings  which  must  not  be  confounded.  Two 
hills  cannot  exist  without  an  intervening  valley. 
Why  not?  I  cannot' conceive  of  such  a  thing,  is  the 
reply.  The  phrase  thus  used  expresses  our  cognition 
of  the  impossibility  of  the  thing.  The  mind  sees  that 
it  cannot  be. 

A  person  ignorant  of  the  existence  of  a  magnetic 
telegraph  is  assured,  on  evidence  that  he  cannot 
doubt,  that  a  message  was  sent  to  California  and  an 
answer  returned  the  same  day.  He  says,  I  cannot 
conceive  of  such  a  thing !  The  phrase  expresses  his 
ignorance  of  the  manner  in  which  the  communication 
took  place. 

Space  always  has  existed,  and  always  will  exist. 
This  is  a  bold  affirmation;  but  it  is  one  which  the 
mind  is  abundantly  competent  to  make.  Suppose 
that  all  material  objects  were  annihilated :  we  know 
that  space  would  remain.  Go  back  in  thought  to  the 
era  of  creation :  space  existed  then.  The  mind  sees 
that  it  always  must  have  existed,  as  clearly  as  it  sees 
that  the  whole  is  greater  than  its  part. 

Space  is  not  divisible ;  that  is,  it  is  not  divisibl 
5- 


106       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOtHY. 

in  the  sense  in  which  matter  is  divisible.  Matter  is 
divided  when  the  parts  are  separated  so  that  space 
intervenes.  Space  cannot  be  thus  divided.  We 
cannot  separate  space  from  space. 

Space  is  not  made  up  of  parts,  yet  it  may  be  said 
to  have  parts  or  portions.  A  portion  larger  or  smaller 
may  be  occupied  by  created  objects ;  yet  space  is  not 
made  up  of  portions  as  the  earth  is  made  up  of  por- 
tions. 

Points  in  space  may  be  taken,  and  these  points 

may  sustain  certain  relations  to  each  other.  The 
science  of  geometry  has  for  its  subject-matter  the 
relations  of  space.  We  can  take  a  finite  portion 
of  space,  and  cognize  its  relations;  yet  the  infinite 
is  not  made  up  of  multiplications  of  the  finite. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 


COGI^ITIO]^    OF    TIME. 


Whek  we  remember  an  event,  we  remember  it  as 
past.  We  thus  have  a  cognition  of  time.  The  cog- 
nition is  involved  in  every  act  of  remembrance.  We 
know  that  all  events  take  place  in  time. 

What  is  time  ?  It  is  sometimes  said  that  it  is  a 
portion  of  duration  measured  by  the  revolution  of 
the  heavenly  bodies.  But  it  may  be  asked.  What  is 
duration  ?  We  cannot  give  a  definition  or  description 
of  duration.  Yet  we  know  that  duration  is.  Like 
space,  it  is  neither  a  material  nor  a  spiritual  existence. 
It  is  not  a  creation  of  the  mind  or  form  of  our  cogni- 
tions, as  is  asserted  by  Kant  and  others — whatever 
that  phrase  may  mean. 

Duration  had  no  beginning,  and  will  have  no  end. 
The  ground  of  this  assertion  is,  that  the  mind  sees 
that  there  never  could  have  been  a  time  when  dura« 
tion  was  not.  We  turn  to  the  past,  and  see  that  there 
could  not  have  been  a  starting  point  to  duration. 
We  turn  to  the  future,  and  see  that  it  must  continue 


108       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

to  be.     Time,  duration  as  measured  by  the  sun,  may 
be  no  longer ;  but  duration  must  go  on  forever. 

It  is  thought  by  some,  that  what  we  have  described 
as  acts  of  cognition,  are  really  acts  of  imagination. 
We  go  back  or  forward,  it  is  said,  in  imagination, 
and  find  no  beginning  or  end  of  duration;  but  our 
imaginations  are  not  cognitions.  I  affirm  that  we 
cognize  the  fact  that  duration  never  began  and  never 
will  have  an  end.  It  is  a  question  to  be  decided  by 
an  appeal  to  consciousness.  Do  we  not  know  that 
duration  will  never  be  ended  ?  Are  we  not  as  certain 
of  it  as  we  are  that  the  sun  exists  ?  This  is  not 
cognizing  a  fact  at  an  infinite  distance  in  the  future, 
but  cognizing  the  fact  that  duration  not  only  is,  but 
must  be  forever. 

It  is  said  that  time  cannot  have  a  real  existence ; 
for  then  God,  who  cognizes  all  things,  v/ould  cognize 
its  existence :  but  v/ith  God  there  is  no  succession ; 
all  events  are  present  to  his  view  in  an  "  eternal  now." 
We  can  form  no  conception  of  an  "  eternal  now." 
God  views  events  as  successive,  because  they  are  suc- 
cessive. His  views  must  be  in  accordance  with  truth. 
He  created  things  at  difierent  times ;  and  he  contin- 
ues to  act.  Immutability  does  not  prevent  him  from 
doing  to-day  what  he  did  not  do  yesterday.  He  is 
the  same  to-day,  yesterday,  and  forever — that  is,  his 
holy  character  remains  unchanged.  Character  re- 
mains unchanged,  though  the  acts  that  manifest  it 
may  vary  and  take  place  at  difierent  times. 


COGNITION    OF   TIME.  109 

The  mode  of  the  Divine  existence,  and  of  the 
action  of  the  Divine  Mind,  is  beyond  our  powers  of 
cos-nition.  Hence  we  should  make  no  unauthorized 
or  unmeaning  assertions  concerning  it. 

Duration  is  a  reality.  It  is  a  fact  that  events  take 
place  as  successive ;  that  successiveness  may  be  meas- 
ured. Some  writers  say  that  time  is  a  mere  word  ex- 
pressive of  the  fact  that  events  are  successive.  Sup- 
pose all  events  and  all  created  objects  were  to  cease — 
would  there  be  any  such  thing  as  duration?  God 
would  endure.  Is  time, 'then,  an  attribute  of  God,  as 
some  have  contended  ?  The  everlasting  existence  .of 
God  is  a  fact,  but  is  no  part  of  his  being,  as  benevo- 
lence and  justice  are. 

What  then  is  time,  or  duration  ?  The  best  answer 
that  can  be  given  is,  that  it  is  time,  duration.  We 
know  what  it  is,  though  we  cannot  define  it  or  state 
in  what  it  consists. 

We  have  all  the  knowledge  of  time  that  is  needed. 
We  must  not,  in  order  to  carry  out  pur  notions  of 
philosophical  inquiry,  multiply  words  without  knovfl- 
edge.  In  every  department  of  knowledge  the  last 
resort  is,  the  mind's  cognition  that  a  thing  is  ;  and  all 
questions  beyond  that  may  be  answered  by  saying, 
"  I  don't  know."  It  oftea  requires  as  much  discrimi- 
nation to  make  an  intelligent  confession  of  ignorance, 
as  to  make  the  clearest  explanations. 

Duration  and  space  are  infinite ;  that  is,  the  one 
has  limitless  extension,  and  the  other  is  without  be- 


110       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

ginning  or  end.  It  has  been  said  that  if  space  and 
time  are  infinite  realities,  and  God  is  an  infinite  Being, 
then  we  have  three  infinite  existences — which,  it  is 
alleged,  is  impossible.  It  is  not  possible  that  there 
be  three  infinite  beings,  but  there  is  no  absurdity  in 
supposing  the  existence  of  limitless  space  as  the 
theatre  of  creative  power  for  an  infinite  being,  nor  in 
supposing  that  that  being  has  always  lived,  and  al- 
ways will  live.  We  do  not  assume  that  infinite  dura, 
tion  is  an  infinite  being. 


CHAPTER  XV. 


EELATIOl^S. 


Whek  we  cognize  two  or  more  objects,  we  cog- 
nize something  more  than  their  existence  and  quali- 
ties. When  we  cognize  the  pillars  of  a  portico,  we 
see  that  they  are  similar  to  each  other.  "We  look 
upon  two  adjacent  mountains,  and  see  that  one  is 
higher  than  the  other.  We  see  a  number  of  men 
marching,  and  that  one  goes  before  the  other.  We 
see  a  blow  given  to  a  standing  pillar,  and  it  falls : 
the  blow  caused  the  pillar  to  fall. 

In  the  above-mentioned  cases  we  cognize  the  ob- 
jects, and  certain  relations  existing  between  them ; 
we  cognize  the  relations  of  resemblance,  superiority, 
of  antecedence  and  consequence,  and  of  cause  and 
effect. 

No  object,  material  or  mental,  exists  isolated. 
The  almost  numberless  existences  have  relations  ex- 
isting between  thfem,  and  a  knowledge  of  these  rela- 
tions constitutes  no  small  part  of  our  knowledge. 

Existences  and  their  relations  may  be  said  to 
constitute  the  entire  material  of  our  knowledge. 


112       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

Some  of  the  more  obvious  relations  may  easily  be 
classified,  such  as  those  of  resemblance,  of  proportion, 
and  of  cause  and  eflfect.  The  number  of  relations  is 
so  great,  that  an  exhaustive  classification  cannot  be 
made.  The  field  of  mental  discovery — I  do  not  mean 
as  to  the  operations  of  mind,  but  as  to  truth — per- 
tains chiefly  to  relations  between  known  existences 
and  truths.  Relations  exist  not  only  between  exist- 
ing things,  but  between  one  another.  Every  thought 
sustains  certain  relations  to  other  thoughts.  The 
cognition  of  relations  previously  unnoticed,  consti- 
tutes, to  a  good  degree,  originality,  of  thought. 

An  original  thinker  does  not  create  truth,  any 
mors  than  an  original  geographical  discoverer  creates 
the  rivers  and  mountains  which  he  makes  known  to 
the  world.  The  man  of  original  thought  is  one  who 
sees  more  clearly  and  further  than  his  fellows.  Origi- 
nality of  thought  is  not  then  a  sudden  inspiration,  it 
is  simply  mental  seeing — ^^eeing  vfhat  is.  The  power 
may  thus  be  cultivated.  The  sailor  sharpens  his 
vision  by  careful  and  earnest  looking  into  the  distant 
blending  of  the  earth  and  sky,  and  hence  can  discern 
a  sail  long  before  it  is  visible  to  uneducated  eyes.  In 
like  manner,  some,  by  steady  and  earnest  looking  in 
the  direction  of  truth,  come  to  see  objects  unseen  by 
others.  Newton  cultivated  original  thought  by  long 
and  patient  looking.  All  true  originality  is  to  be 
sought  in  that  way,  and  not  by  imitating  the  uncouth 
phraseology  of  men  claiming  to  possess  origii?ahty 


RELATIONS.  113 

The  perception  of  relations  has  usually  been 
treated  as  an  act  of  judgment.  If  one  chooses  to  call 
those  cognitions  which  are  the  result  of  the  cognition 
of  two  or  more  objects,  judgments,  it  may  be  well, 
though  there  is  danger  of  leading  the  indiscriminating 
reader  to  suppose  a  judgment  to  be  something  generi- 
cally  different  from  a  cognition. 

Judgment  is  said  to  be  the  result  of  comparison. 
The  mind  compares  two  objects,  and  judges  that  they 
are  equal,  or  that  one  is  greater  than  the  other — that 
they  agree  or  disagree.  It  is  desirable  to  confine  the 
word  judgment  to  those  opinions  or  beliefs  which  are 
the  result  of  evidence  made  up  of  parts,  each  incon- 
clusive in  itself,  or  of  evidences  conflicting.  Thus  we 
say  a  man  has  sound  judgment,  whose  opinions  on  dif- 
ficult and  complicated  subjects  are  usually  correct. 

The  operation  of  the  mind  in  cognizing  relations, 
seems  to  be  this :  We  cognize  the  objects,  and  then 
the  relation  existing  between  them.  Our  cognitions 
of  relations  are  conditioned  upon  our  cognition  of  the 
objects  related.  This  is  what  actually  takes  place ; 
and  nothing  is  gained,  and  much  may  be  lost,  by  call- 
ing in  the  agency  of  the  faculty  of  judgment. 

Our  knowledge  of  relations  is  as  positive  and  real 
as  our  knowledge  of  existences.  The  mind  does  not 
create  the  resemblance  between  two  objects  ;  it  sim- 
ply cognizes  it.  The  resemblance  is  a  reality  as  truly 
as  the  resembling  objects  are  a  reality.  The  reality 
of  the  resemblance  is  not  a  reality  apart  from  the  re- 


114       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

sembling  objects.  There  can  be  no  such  thing  as  re- 
semblance apart  from  resembling  objects.  The  fact 
that  the  objects  resemble  each  other,  is  a  real  fact. 
Our  knowledge  which  has  relations  for  its  subject,  is 
thus  as  real  as  any  portion  of  our  knowledge. 

Some  relations  are  cognized  intuitively,  and  others 
mediately,  that  is,  by  the  aid  of  other  truths.  The 
relations  existing  between  material  and  spiritual 
existences,  and  between  all  objects  of  thought  and 
feeling,  are  inexhaustible  to  finite  minds. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

EESEMBLAl!^CE — GENERALIZATION GENEEAL    TERMS- 
ABSTRACT   TERMS. 

One  of  the  most  important  of  relations  is  that  of 
resemblance.  Our  cognition  of  resemblance  is  said 
to  be  the  result  of  comparison.  It  is  said  we  com- 
pare the  objects,  and  by  an  act  of  judgment  perceive 
that  they  are  like  or  unlike.  What  is  the  process  as 
revealed  by  consciousness  ?  I  look  toward  a  forest, 
and  see  two  oaks,  and  also  see  that  they  are  simi- 
lar in  size,  form,  and  color. ,  The  perception  of  the 
trees  is  a  direct  act,  and  the  perception  of  their  resem- 
blance follows  the  perception  of  the  trees.  If  both 
the  trees  are  within  range  of  vision  at  the  same  mo- 
ment, the  perception  of  resemblance  immediately  fol- 
lows the  perception  of  the  trees.  It  may  be  that  the 
trees  may  not  both  be  perceived  at  the  same  moment. 
An  act  of  memory  then  takes  place  antecedent  to  the 
perception  of  resemblance.  The  perception  of  resem- 
blance is  a  direct  perception,  conditioned  on  the  per- 
ception of  the  trees.  Comparison  is  not  therefore  an 
act  generically  different  from  an  act  of  cognition. 


116       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

Classification  and  generalization  are  conditioned 
on  oiir  power  of  cognizing  resemblance.  Our  cog- 
nitions are  always  of  particulars — are  always  individ- 
ual cognitions.  If  we  had  not  the  power  of  classifi- 
cation, we  should  be  overwhelmed  with  the  number 
of  individual  objects,  and  language  would  fail  us  in 
our  attempts  to  designate  them.  By  classification  we 
condense  our  knowledge,  and  make  it  manageable. 

We  have  before  us,  in  a  park,  a  vast  number  of 
animals.  We  have  never  seen  them  before.  Were 
our  knowledge  confined  to  individuals,  it  would  soon 
become  confused  and  unwieldy.  But  we  notice  that 
some  resemble  others,  and  we  mentally  separate  those 
resembling  each  other  in  certain  points,  and  put  them 
in  a  class  by  themselves.  We  give  to  each  class  a 
name. 

The  process  supposed  is  strictly  analogous  to  the 
process  of  generalization.  Objects  resembling  each 
other  are  placed  in  a  class  by  themselves,  and  a  name 
given  to  the  class.  The  name  thus  given  is  a  com- 
mon or  general  term. 

(^Have  general  terms  any  meaning?/  Are  there 
any  real  existences  corresponding  to  the  terms  ani- 
mal, man,  tree  ?  There  are  individual  animals,  indi- 
vidual m.cn,  individual  trees.  Are  there  any  such 
things  as  a  general  animal,  a  general  man,  a  general 
tree  ?  We  can  form  a  conception,  idea,  or  notion 
of  an  individual  animal — a  bear,  for  instance  ;  of  an 
individual  man — John,  for  instance  ;  of  an  individual 


RESEMBLANCE,   ETC.  117 

tree — the  hickory  that  overshadowed  the  homestead. 
But  can  we  form  a  conception  or  notion  of  a  general 
man,  a  general  animal,  a  general  tree  ?  If  we  make 
the  attempt,  shall  we  not  find  the  notion  of  an  indi- 
vidual as  the  result  ?  Have*  general  terms,  then, 
no  meaning  ?     Are  they  merely  names  ? 

It  may  be  said  that  general  terms  stand  for  all  the 
individuals  of  the  class — that  man  means  all  men. 
We  must  distinguish,  between  general  and  collective 
terms.  A  collective  term,  such  as  army,  congrega- 
tion, church,  includes  the  aggregate  of  individuals 
composing  the  army  or  the  church.  The  amount  of 
meaning  of  the  term  varies  at  different  times.  But 
not  so  with  general  terms.  The  meaning  of  the 
term  man  remains  the  same,  whether  there  are  more 
or  fewer  men.  It  is  clear  that  it  has  some  meaning, 
is  not  a  mere, name,  and  that  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  an  existing  man  in  general  for  it  to  signify. 
What,  then,  does  it  stand  for?  What  is  the  object 
of  our  thoughts,  when  we  employ  a  general  term  ? 
The  general  term  or  name  of  a  class  expresses  the 
qualities  common  to  all  the  members  of  the  class. 
Man  stands  for  those  qualities  which  belong  to  all 
men.  We  see  that  all  men  resemble  each  other  in 
some  respects,  though  they  may  differ  in  other  re- 
spects. The  term  man,  then,  has  a  meaning  as  truly 
as  the  term  John. 

McCosh  remarks :  "It  has  been  very  generally 
allowed  by  philosophers,  that  the  mind  begins  with 


118       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

the  knowledge  of  individual  objects  or  scenes  pre- 
sented to  it.  .  Among  these  objects  it  may,  by  its 
comparative  faculty,  discover  resemblances.  In  some 
cases  the  comparison  is  preceded  by  an  abstraction 
of  the  qualities  in  respect  of  which  the  objects  are 
alike ;  in  other  cases  it  may  be  perceived,  at  once  that 
there  is  ^  resemblance,  and  the  abstraction  of  the 
points  of  resemblance  may  follow.  In  all  cases,  both 
the  discovery  of  resemblance  and  abstraction  are 
needful  to  generalization,  in  which  we  put  in  a  class, 
and  usually  call  by  a  common  name,  the  objects 
thought  to  resemble  each  other  in  certain  respects, 
and  so  far  as  they  resemble  each  other. 

"  I  am  prepared  to  lay  down,  in  regard  to  generali- 
zation, a  proposition  similar  to  that  which  I  am  in- 
clined to  enforce  in  regard  to  abstraction.  When  the 
individuals  are  real,  the  generalization  has  also  a  real- 
ity ;  that  is,  there  is  a  reality  in  the  class.  True,  I 
may  constitute  a  class  from  imaginary  individuals — 
say  a  class  of  griffins,  or  a  class  of  mermaids,  or  a 
class  of  ghosts.  In  such  a  case  the  general  is  as 
unreal  as  the  singular.  But  if  my  generalization  is 
from  real  objects ;  if  it  is  a  generalization  made  up 
of  objects  in  nature,  say  of  marbles,  or  reptiles,  or 
cruciferous  plants,  or  even  of  objects  of  human  work- 
manship, such  as  chairs,  or  houses,  or  churches,  then 
the  intellectual  product  has  also  a  reality  involved. 

"I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  the  general  exists,  or 
can  exist,  as  an  individual  thing,  like  the  singulars 


119 

which  it  embraces — that  the  class  crocodile  has  the 
same  sort  of  existence  as  the  individual  crocodile ; 
but  I  maintain  that  it  has  a  reality  in  the  common 
attributes  possessed  by  the  objects. 

"  In  abstraction,  the  reality  may  be  simply  that  of 
an  attribute  in  an  individual  object.  In  generaliza- 
tion, it  is  the  possession  of  a  common  attribute  by  an 
indefinite  number  of  objects.  The  composition  of 
marble  is  a  fact  quite  as  much,  though  not  exactly  of 
the  same  sort,  as  the  limestone  itself.  The  possession 
of  cold  blood,  and  of  the  three  heart-compartments, 
is  a  reality  quite  as  much  as  the  individual  crocodile 
is.  The  possession  of  four  cross  petals  is  a  real  thing, 
just  as  a  particular  wild  mustard  plant  is.  The  struc- 
ture and  adaptation  to  a  practical  use,  of  chair,  house, 
and  church,  are  not  fictitious,  any  more  than  this 
chair,  or  this  house,  or  this  church  is.  This  account 
preserves  us,  on  the  one  hand,  from  an  extravagant 
realism,  which  would  give  to  the  universal  the  same 
sort  of  reality  as  the  singular;  and,  on  the  other, 
from  an  extreme  conceptualism  or  nominalism,  which 
would  place  the  reality  solely  in  the  conception  of 
the  mind,  or  in  the  name.  The  class  has  a  reality, 
but  it  is  simply  in  the  possession  of  common  qualities 
by  an  indefinite  number  of  objects. 

"According  to  this  view,  abstraction  and  generali- 
zation are  processes  of  a  very  high  order ;  they  are, 
in  fact,  essential  to  philosophy,  quite  as  much  so 
indeed,  as  Plato  and  the  Schoolmen  supposed.    With 


120       ELEMENTS  -OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

out  them  we  can  never  reach  the  truths  on  which  the 
higher  forms  of  wisdom  gaze.  They  always  presup- 
pose, indeed,  that  something  has  been  given  them ; 
but,  acting  upon  this,  they  turn  it  to  most  important 
purposes ;  and  if  they  start  with  realities  and  are 
properly  conducted,  they  are  ever  in  the  region  of 
realities,  and  of  realities  of  the  highest  kind.  We 
shall  see,  as  we  advance,  tliat  all  philosophic  notions 
and  maxims  are  the  results  of  these  processes,  some 
of  them  being  abstractions,  and  others  being  also  of 
the  nature  of  generalizations." 

Generalization  is  said  to  depend  upon  abstraction. 
There  is  connected  with  the  latter  term,  at  least  in 
the  minds  of  some,  an  obscurity  which  it  may  be 
well  to  dispel.  The  act  of  abstraction  is  not  so  diffi- 
cult and  mysterious  as  is  sometimes  supposed.  We 
see  an  object — a  rose,  for  example — and  fix  our  atten- 
tion exclusively  upon  the  color.  We  perform  an  act 
of  abstraction.  To  contemplate  an  object  abstractly, 
is  to  make  it  an  object  of  exclusive  attention. 

Abstract  and  general  terms  are  often  confounded. 
Abstract  terms  are  expressive  of  our  notion  of  quali- 
ties, attributes,  or  objects,  viewed  apart  from  the 
qualities,  attributes,  or  objects  with  which  they  are 
connected.  I  see  a  round  object — a  globe.  I  can 
contemplate  the  roundness  apart  from  the  color  and 
density  of  the  ball.  I  say  of  the  ball  that  it  is 
round.  The  same  quality  w^hich  leads  me  to  affirm 
that  the  ball  is  round,  when  contemplated  apart  from 


121 

tlie  ball,  separated  in  thouglit  from  the  ball,  is  called 
roundness.  Is  there  any  such  thing  as  roundness  ? 
Not  as  a  separate  entity.  Roundness  is  the  name  ap- 
plied to  a  quality  viewed  apart  from  other  qualities. 
It  has,  therefore,  a  real  significance, 

"Abstraction,"  says  McCosh,  "may  be  considered 
in  a  wider  or  in  a  narrower  sense.  It  may  be  regard- 
ed, in  an  extended  sense,  as  that  operation  of  mind 
in  which,  to  use  the  language  of  Whately,  '  we  draw 
off  and  contemplate  separately  any  part  of  an  object 
presented  to  the  mind,  disregarding  the  rest.'  In 
this  more  general  sense  the  parts  may  exist  separately 
as  well  as  the  whole ;  thus,  having  seen  a  judge  with 
his  wig,  we  can  not  only  separate  in  thought  the  wig 
from  the  judge,  but  the  wig  can  in  fact  be  separated 
from  the  wearer.  In  a  narrower  sense,  abstraction  is 
that  operation  of  mind  in  which  we  contemplate  the 
quality  of  an  object  separately  from  the  object. 

" '  An  abstract  name,'  says  Mr.  Mill  ('  Logic,'  book 
i.  ch.  ii.),  ^is  a  name  which  stands  for  an  attribute  of 
a  thing.'  In  this  sense,  the  part  separated  in  thought 
cannot  be  separated  from  the  object  in  fact.  Color 
may  be  thought  of  (not  seen  or  imagined)  apart  from 
an  extended  body,  but  cannot  exist  apart  from  a  col- 
ored object. 

"  It  is  a  common  impression  that  our  abstractions 

are  in  no  sense  realities.     I  wish,  at  this  early  stage 

of  the  investigations  to  be  prosecuted  in  this  treatise, 

to  set  myself  against  this  view  which  has  sometimes 

6 


122       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

been  positively  expressed,  but  is  far  more  freg[nently 
underlying  and  implied  in  statements  and  arguments 
without  being  formally  announced.  I  lay  down  a 
very  different  position,  that  if  the  concrete  be  real, 
and  the  abstraction  be  properly  made,  the  abstract 
thing,  that  is,  the  thing  contemplated  in  the  abstrac- 
tion, will  also  be  real.  I  may  never  have  seen  a  bird 
without  vangs,  but  I  can  consider  the  wings  apart 
from  the  bird,  and  I  am  sure  that  the  wings  have  as 
real  an  existence  as  the  bird  itself.  This  will  be  ad- 
mitted at  once  in  regard  to  all  such  cases  as  this,  in 
which  I  can  in  fact  separate  the  pinions  from  the 
body  of  the  fowl.  But  I  go  a  step  further,  anel 
maintain,  that  even  in  cases  in  which  the  part  ab- 
stracted cannot  be  separated  in  reality  from  the 
whole,  still  it  is  to  be  considered  as  real.  It  may  not 
have,  or  be  capable  of  having,  an  independent  real- 
ity, but  still  it  has  a  reality.  I  can  tliink  of  gravita.- 
tion  apart  from  a  given  body,  or  from  the  chemical 
affinity  of  that  body ;  and  in  doing  so  I  do  not  sup- 
pose that  it  can  exist  apart  from  body ;  still  the 
gravitation  has  an  existence  just  as  much  as  the  body 
has:  it  has  not  a  reality  independent  of  the  body, 
but  it  has  a  reality  in  the  body,  as  a  quality  of  it. 
The  same  remark  might  be  applied  to,  and  will  hold 
good  of,  any  other  abstraction.  No  doubt,  if  the 
original  concrete  object  be  imaginary,  the  abstrac- 
tion formed  from  it  may  be  the  same.  I  can  separate 
in  thought  the  beauty  of  Venus  from  Venus  herself; 


RESEIilBLAJSrCE,    ETC.  123 

and,  of  course,  as  Venus  is  ideal,  so  also  is  her 
beauty.  But  wlien  the  object  is  real,  and  I  abstract 
or  separately  contemplate  what  has  been  known  in 
the  real,  then,  as  the  concrete  object  is  real,  so  is  also 
the  part  or  quality  abstracted  real ;  not  that  it  may 
be  a  reality  capable  of  subsisting  in  itself,  but  still  a 
reality  in  the  object  as  a  quality  of  it. 

"  I  reckon  it  of  the  utmost  moment  to  make  this 
remark.  The  view  here  presented  saves  us,  on  the 
one  hand,  from  an  extreme  realism,  which  would 
attribute  an  independent  reality  to  every  quality  ab- 
stracted— which  would,  for  example,  represent  beauty 
as  a  separate  thing,  like  a  beautiful  scene  in  nature ; 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  from  what  is  more  important 
in  our  present  inquiry,  from  regarding  it  as  a  non- 
entity, or  at  the  utmost  as  a  mere  form  or  creation 
of  the  mind.  We  are  ever  hearing  the  phrase  re- 
peated, a  ^  mere  abstraction ; '  and  the  language  is 
applied  to  such  objects  as  space,  time,  beauty,  and 
even  truth  and  moral  good.  In  opposition  to  such 
views,  I  maintain  that  abstraction  is  not  necessarily 
concerned  about  fictions  or  illusions.  Abstractions 
are  not,  as  they  have  often  been  represented,  the 
attenuated  ghosts  of  departed  quantities ;  they  may 
rather  be  represented  as  the  very  skeleton  of  the 
body,  not  capable  of  action  alone,  but  still  an  impor- 
tant existence  in  the  body,  acting  with  its  covering 
of  flesh  and  skin." 

In  former  times,  the  question,  "  What  is  the  ob- 


124       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   rHILOSOPHY. 

ject  of  thought  when  we  employ  general  terms  ?  " 
was  a  prolific  subject  of  discussion. 

The  Nominalists  held  that  general  terms  are  mere 
names  without  any  signification — that  we  have  no 
ideas  corresponding  to  general  terms.  The  Realists 
held  that  there  are  real  existences  corresponding  to 
those  terms. 

Nominalism  is  still  held  by  quite  a  number  of 
philosopher,^ :  a  modified  style  of  realism  seems  also 
to  be  held  by  some. 

We  have  seen  what  general  terms  signify.  It 
may  be  well  to  notice  a  statement  made  by  nominal- 
ists. It  is  said  that  we  can  form  no  general  idea  of 
any  class  of  objects :  we  can  form  only  particular 
ideas.  We  can  form  an  idea  of  an  acute-angled  tri- 
angle, and  of  a  right-angled  triangle,  and  of  an 
obtuse-angled  triangle ;  but  we  cannot  form  an  idea 
of  a  general  triangle  which  shall  be  acute,  right, 
obtuse,  and  right-angled  at  the  same  time. 

In  this  statement  the  term  idea  is  used  as  synony- 
mous with  image.  We  cannot  form  a  mental  image 
of  an  acute,  obtuse,  and  right-angled  triangle  in  one. 
It  should  be  observed  that  a  fact  may  be  real,  though 
not  mentally  picturable.  The  general  term  may 
have  a  meaning,  though  that  meaning  may  not  con- 
stitute a  mental  image. 

.  The  general  term  triangle  includes  the  qualities 
in  which  the  different  kinds  of  triano;le  ao:ree. 
They  agree  in  having  three  sides  and  three  angles. 


125 


No  one  affirms  that  the  general  term  stands  for  any 
and  every  kind  of  triangle  in  particular,  as  the  objec- 
tion above  stated  assumes.  It  stands  for  those  things 
which  are  common  to  all  triangles. 

Bailey  denies  altogether  the  existence  of  abstract 
ideas  or  notions.  "  It  has  been  maintained  by  emi- 
nent philosophers,  that  we  form  in  our  minds  what 
they  term  abstract  notions  corresponding  to  the  ab- 
stract terms  employed  in  writing  and  speaking ;  but 
they  have  not  been  hitherto  successful  in  their  at- 
tempts to  show  what  an  abstract  notion  is.  On 
closely  analyzing  what  passes  in  my  own  mind,  I  do 
not  discover  that  I  can  think  of  any  thing  but  par- 
ticular objects  and  events,  either  apart  or  combined, 
single  or  numerous,  with  various  degrees  of  distinct- 
ness or  completeness." 

Again :  "  Now,  my  doctrine  is,  that,  as  we  are 
unable  to  perceive,  so  we  are  unable  to  conceive  any 
separate  entity  corresponding  to  an  abstract  term ; 
nor  are  we  conscious  of  any  peculiar  mental  phe- 
nomena to  which  that  term  can  be  applied.  In  dif- 
ferent language,  we  have  no  ideas  in  the  mind  an- 
swering to  such  words  as  extension  and  motion ;  but 
when  they  are  used,  v>^e  think  of  an  extended  and 
moving  body.  Our  thoughts  on  such  occasions  may 
frequently  be  vague,  shadowy,  indistinct,  and  fugi- 
tive, but  their  real  character  is  what  I  have  described 
it  to  be." 

Because  the  term  brightness  suggests  the  thought 


•^ 


126       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

of  the  sun,  or  a  lamp,  or  some  other  bright  object, 
^  Bailey  affirms  that  it  has  no  meaning — that  is,  "  no 
^   notion  corresponding  to  it;"  that  there  are  "no  pe- 
>  culiar  mental  phenomena  to  which  it  can  be  applied." 
,.^         We  affirm  that  it  expresses  a  quality  considered 
,t    apart  from  the  object  to  which  it  belongs,  and  that 
\  this  is  the  peculiar  mental  phenomenon  to  which  it  is 
:    properly  applied.     Bright  expresses  a  quality  belong- 
ing to  some  object.     Brightness  exj^resses  the  qual- 
ity mentally   viewed   as   separate   from   the   object. 
Brightness  is  not  an  entity  separate  from  a  material 
object.     It  marks  a  quality  of  a  material  object  con- 
templated in  a  particular  way.      Brightness,  truth, 
life,  denote  no  separate  entities,  but  qualities  of  ob- 
jects, propositions,  beings,  viewed  abstractly.     The 
abstract  term  does  not  express  an  existence,  but  a 
mental  phenomenon  vfhich  is  as  real  as  any  existence. 
The  fact  that  an  abstract  or  general  term  brings 
up   with    greater   or  less    distinctness   a    particular 
image,  does  not  prove  that  said  image  is  the  signifi- 
cation of  the  te]'m.     When  you  speak  of  the  >house 
m  which  you  live,  the  image  of  the  house  arises,  and 
of  the  overhanging  tree  also.     But  the  tree  is  no  part 
of  the  idea  of  the  house. 

General  terms  and  abstract  terms,  then,  are  not 
mere  words.  They  do  not  express  entities  apart 
from  the  individuals  of  the  class,  and  the  substance. 
They  do  not  express  nonentities,  but  realities  such  as 
have  been  described  above. 


127 


Individual  terms  are  more  definite  and  precise 
tlian  general  and  abstract  terms.  In  composition, 
vivacity  is  promoted  by  avoiding  as  much  as  may  be 
the  use  of  abstract,  general,  and  collective  terms. 
The  fact  that  our  original  cognitions  are  individual, 
gives  a  hint  as  to  the  best  mode  of  producing  cogni- 
tions in  the  minds  of  others. 


CHAPTEK  XVIt 

CAUSE     A]^D     EFFECT. 

Events  have  various  relations  existing  between 
them.  The  most  important  one  is  that  of  cause  and 
effect.  \ 

Every  physical  event  has  a  cause.  We  may  he 
ignorant  of  the  cause  of  a  given  event — we  may  fail 
to  discover  it  even  after  the  most  careful  investiga- 
tion ;  hut  we  know  that  the  event  had  a  cause. 
What  is  the  ground  of  this  knowledge  ? 

We  will  suppose  the  event  to  be  the  fall  of  a 
tree :  what  is  the  ground  of  our  knowledge  of  that 
event  ?  We  saw  it — we  saw  the  tree  fall ;  that  is, 
the  mind  cognized  the  fact  through  the  sense  of 
sight. 

What  is  the  ground  of  our  knowledge  that  the 
event  thus  cognized  had  a  cause  ?  The  same  as  our 
knowledge  of  the  event :  we  saw  it — not  the  particu- 
lar cause  of  the  event,  but  saw  that  it  had  a  cause. 

We  know  that  an  event  has  a  cause  just  as  we 
know  that  the  event  occurs.  In  both  cases  we  cog- 
nize the  fact.     Whenever  we  cognize  an  event,  we 


CAUSE   AND   EFFECT.  129 

also  cognize  the  fact  that  it  had  a  cause.     Both  are 

•*      direct,  intuitive  coo-nitions  of  the  mind.     In  the  one 

\^      case,  the  cognition  may  take  place  through  the  agen- 

cy  of  the  senses ;  in  the  other  case,  the  cognition  is 
;      conditioned  on  the  cognition  of  the  event.""  ^  ^f^ " 

Perhaps  it  may  Ibe  said,  in  answer  to  the  question, 

How  do  we  know  that  every  event  has  a  cause  ?  that 
u       we  know  it  from  experience.    If  by  this  is  meant,  that 

in  the  case  of  every  event  cognized  by  us,  we  have 
^  cognized  the  fact  that  it  had  some  cause,  the  asser- 
J  tion  is  true.  But  the  idea  of  cause  is  no  more  the 
^  result  of  experience,  than  the  idea  of  the  event  is  the 
^"  result  of  experience.  Cognitions  of  both  are  expe- 
.  riences,  but  not  deductions  from  former  experiences. 
I  The  truth  of  the  proposition,  every  event  has  a 

i  "^cause,  is  not  the  result  of  experience  in  the  sense  in    fi^'^ 

which  the  expression  is  commonly  used.      We  say    ^^^^ 

we  learn  from  experience  that  men  are  to  be  tried 

.     /before  they  are  trusted.     The  conclusion  is  the  result 

I     .;^  of  numerous  cognitions.     No  single  cognition  would   -4 

I   *^  authorize  the  conclusion.     We  learn  from  experience   ^^ 

^  that  all  kinds  of  wood  will  burn — not  that  we  have 

I    <^   burned  all  kinds  of  wood :  we  have  burned  several   .7 
K     .  .  .      ^; 

'   J  ^    kinds,  and  hence  conclude  that  all  kinds  of  wood  will  ).' 

X    burn. 

We  do  not  come  to   the  conclusion  that  every 
-    event  has  a  cause,  because  we  have  found  that  a 
number  of  events  have  had  causes,  and  hence  con- 
elude  that  all  must  have.     The  truth  that  all  events 


fes^^ 


130       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

must  have  causes  is  cognized  as  soon  as  an  event  is 
cognized.  When  we  have  cognized  a  thousand 
events,  no  additional  certainty  is  thereby  added  to 
the  proposition.  We  are  certain  of  its  truth  when 
we  have  cognized  one  event. 

ISTo  one,  on  consulting  his  past  consciousness,  will 
2nd  that  he  was  once  ignorant  of  the  truth  that  every 
;3vent  must  have  a  cause — that  is,  ignorant  after  he 
Aad  cognized  an  event — and  that  he  acquired  that 
•'  ruth  gradually  by  experience. 

The  infant  gives  evidence  that  it  cognizes  this 
iruth  as  soon  as  it  cognizes  events.  It  also  cognizes 
the  kindred  proposition  that  like  causes  produce  like 
effects.  Let  him  burn  his  fingers  in  the  flame  of  a 
candle,  and  he  will  not  thrust  them  into  the  flame  a 
second  time. 

The  maxim,  every  event  must  have  a  cause,  is 
a  generalized  statement  of  what  we  intuitively  cog- 
nize whenever  we  cognize  an  event. 

The  following  is  McCosh's  method  of  showing 
that  our  cognition  of  causality  is  not  a  generalization 
from  experience : 

"  First,  it  would  not,  as  being  the  result  of  gen- 
eralization, operate  at  so  early  a  period  of  life  as  our 
belief  in  cause  and  effect  evidently  does.  The  causal 
belief  [cognition]  is  as  strong  in  infancy  as  in  mature 
life  or  in  old  age ;  is  as  strong  among  savages  as  in 
civilized  countries  in  which  scientific  observation  has 
made  the  greatest  advances.     True,  savage  nations 


CAUSE   AND   EFFECT.  131 

have  not  a  belief  in  the  nniformity  of  nature,  which 
is  a  result  of  observation ;  they  discover  events  which 
are  thought  to  have  no  cause  in  nature,  but  then  they 
seek  for  a  cause  beyond  nature.  Now,  if  the  con- 
viction of  causation  were  like  the  belief  in  the  uni- 
formity of  nature,  a  principle  derived  from  induc- 
tion— which  must  necessarily  be  a  large  induction — 
it  would  be  difficult  to  account  for  its  existence  and 
its  invariable  operation  in  the  earliest  stages  of  indi- 
vidual life  and  of  society.  I  admit  that  all  this  merely 
proves  that  there  is  a  native  instinct  or  inclination 
prompting  us  to  rise  from  an  eifect  to  a  cause,  and  by 
no  means  justifies  us  in  standing  up  for  a  necessary 
conviction. 

"  Secondly,  it  would  scarcely  account  for  the  uni- 
versality of  the  belief  of  men  brought  up  in  such 
various  countries  and  situations,  attached  to  such 
different  sects  and  creeds,  and  under  the  influence 
of  all  kinds  of  whim  and  caprice.  This  can  be  most 
satisfactorily  explained  by  supposing  that  there  is  a 
native  principle  at  work,  inclining  and  guiding  all 
men.  Such  a  consideration,  I  allovf,  does  not  show 
that  the  conviction  is  a  fundamental  one,  nor  would 
I  urge  it  as  in  itself  a  positive  proof  of  the  existence 
even  of  a  native  instinct ;  still  it  is  a  strong  presump- 
tion. Indeed,  the  theory  which  supposes  that  there 
is  some  original  impulse  or  inclination,  is  the  only 
one   which   can   give  a  full   explanation  of  all  the 


132       ELEMEISTTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

beliefs   which    man    cherishes,    and    the   judgments 
which  he  ever  pronounces. 

"  Thirdly,  it  would  not  account  for  the  fundamental 
and  necessary  character  of  the  judgment.  This  is 
the  conclusive  circumstance,  of  which  the  others  are 
to  be  regarded  as  merely  corroborations.  No  pos- 
sible length  or  uniformity  could  or  should  give  this 
necessity  of  conviction  to  the  judgment.  We  might 
have  seen  A  and  B,  this  stone  and  that  stone,  this 
star  and  that  star,  this  man  and  that  man  together, 
a  thousand,  or  a  million,  or  a  billion  of  times,  and 
without  our  ever  having  seen  them  separate ;  but  this 
would  not  and  ought  not  to  necessitate  us  to  believe 
that  they  have  been  forever  together,  and  shall  be 
forever  together,  and  must  be  forever  together.  No 
doubt,  it  would  lead  us  when  we  fell  in  with  the  one 
to  look  for  the  other,  and  we  would  wonder  if  the 
one  presented  itself  without  the  other  ;  still,  it  is 
possible  for  us  to  conceive,  and,  on  evidence  being 
produced,  to  believe  that  there  may  be  the  one  with- 
out the  other.  It  was  long  supposed  that  all  metals 
are  comparatively  heavy;  but  while  every  one  was 
astonished  at  the  fact,  no  one  was  prepared  to  deny 
it,  when  it  was  shown  by  Davy  that  potassium  floated 
on  water.  Down  to  a  very  recent  date  civilized  men 
had  never  seen  a  black  swan,  yet  no  naturalist  was 
ever  so  presumptuous  as  to  affirm  that  there  never 
could  be  such  an  animal ;  and  when  black  swans 
were  discovered  in  Australia,  scientific  men,  no  doubt, 


CAUSE    AND   EFFECT.  133 

wondered,  but  never  went  so  far  as  to  deny  the  fact. 
A  very  wide  and  uniform  experience  would  justify  a 
general  expectation,  but  not  a  necessary  conviction ; 
and  this  experience  is  liable  to  be  disturbed  at  any 
time  by  a  new  occurrence  inconsistent  with  what  has 
been  previously  known  to  us.  But  the  belief  in  the 
connection  between  cause  and  effect  is  of  a  totally 
different  character.  We  can  believe  that  two  things 
which  have  been  united  since  creation  began,  may 
never  be  united  again  while  creation  lasts;  but  we 
never  can  be  made  to  believe,  or  rather  think,  judge, 
or  decide  (for  this  is  the  right  expression),  that  a 
change  can  take  place  without  a  cause.  We  can 
believe  that  night  and  day  might  henceforth  be  dis- 
connected, and  that  from  and  after  this  day  or  some 
other  day  there  would  only  be  perpetual  day  or  per- 
petual night  on  the  earth;  but  we  could  never  be 
:  made  to  decide  that,  the  causes  which  produced  day 
,  and  night  being  the  same,  there  ever  could  be  any 
''^^^other  effect  than  day  and  night.  We  could  believe, 
|^.pn  sufficient  evidence,  that  the  sun  might  not  rise  on 
^^  our  earth  to-morrow ;  but  we  never  could  be  made  to 
judge  that,  the  sun  and  earth  and  all  other  things 
necessary  to  the  sun  rising  on  our  earth  abiding  as 
they  are,  the  luminary  of  day  should  not  run  his 
round  as  usual.  We  see  at  once  that  there  is  a  dif- 
ference between  the  judgment  of  the  mind  in  the  two 
cases ;  in  the  case  in  which  we  have  before  us  a  mere 
conjunction  sanctioned  by  a  wide  and   invariable  in- 


134       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

duction,  and  that  in  which  we  have  an  effect,  and 
connect  it  with  its  cause.  The  one  belief  can  be 
overcome,  and  should  be  overcome  at  any  time  by  a 
new  inconsistent  fact  coming  under  our  observation ; 
whereas,  in  regard  to  the  other,  we  are  confident  that 
it  never  can  be  modified  or  set  aside,  and  we  feel  that 
it  ought  not  to  be  overborne." 

^ir.  J.  S.  Mill,  the  author  of  Mill's  "Logic"  and 
other  very  able  works,  denies  that  the  cognition  of 
"  the  law  of  causation  "  is  intuitive.  He  regards  the 
proposition  that  every  event  has  a  cause  as  true,  so 
far  as  this  world  is  concerned,  because  observation 
has  shown  it  to  be  true. 

"  The  uniformity  in  the  succession  of  events,"  he 
remarks,  "  otherwise  called  the  law  of  causation,  must 
not  be  received  as  a  law  of  the  universe,  but  of  that 
portion  of  it  only  that  is  within  range  of  our  sure 
observation,  with  a  reasonable  degree  of  extension  to 
adjacent  cases." 

Again :  "  I  am  convinced  that  any  one  accustomed 
to  abstraction  and  analysis,  who  vfill  fairly  exert  his 
faculties  for  the  purpose,  will,  when  his  imagination 
has  learned  to  entertain  the  notion,  find  no  difficulty 
in  conceiving  that  in  some  one,  for  instance,  of  the 
many  firmaments  into  which  sidereal  astronomy  now 
divides  the  universe,  events  may  succeed  one  another 
at  random  without  any  fixed  law ;  nor  can  any  thing 
m  our  experience,  or  in  our  mental  nature,  constitute 


CAUSE   AND   EFFECT.  135 

a  sufficient,  or  indeed  any  reason  for  believing  that 
this  is  nowhere  the  case." 

If  by  "events  succeeding  one  another  at  random," 
he  means  happening  without  a  cause,  then  our  "  men- 
tal nature"  does  furnish  a  sufficient  reason  for  deny- 
ing his  assertion.  The  mind  is  so  constituted  that  it 
cognizes  the  fact  that  distant  events  must  have  causes, 
as  well  as  those  which  are  near  at  hand. 

If  he  means  to  assert  that  a  different  kind  of  uni- 
formity may  exist  in  other  portions  of  the  universe, 
the  assertion  may  be  correct.  Different  causes  may 
exist  in  different  portions  of  the  universe.  The  uni- 
formity which  we  witness  may  not  prevail  throughout 
the  universe;  but  the  truth  that  every  event  has  a 
cause  does  thus  prevail. 

If  it  be  asked.  How  do  we  know  that  an  event  in 
Sirius  must  have  a  cause  ?  the  reply  is,  the  mind 
cognizes  that  truth.  If  it  be  asked.  How  can  the 
mind  cognize  a  truth  so  distant  from  it  ?  the  reply  is, 
the  mind  does  cognize  said  truth.  The  questions. 
Sow  can  the  mind  cognize?  and  ii^Jiat  does  it  cog- 
nize ?  are  distinct.  We  can  ansv/er  the  latter,  but 
not  the  former. 

Dr.  Thomas  Brown  taught  that  invariable  ante- 
cedence and  consequence  constitutes  the  relation  of 
cause  and  effect.  He  affirms  that  "  we  have  no  other 
idea  in  our  minds  when  we  speak  of  cause  and  effect, 
than  an  invariable  antecedence  and  consequence." 

If   antecedence   and   consequence   constitute   the 


136       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

relation  of  cause  and  effect,  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  power.  The  terms  power,  efficacy,  energy,  mean 
nothing  but  invariable  antecedence  and  consequence. 

"  To  him,"  says  this  author,  "  Avho  had  previously 
kindled  a  fire,  and  placed  on  it  a  vessel  full  of  water, 
with  a  certainty  that  in  that  situation  the  water 
would  become  speedily  hot,  what  additional  informa- 
tion would  be  given  by  telling  him  that  the  fire  had 
the  power  of  boiling  water?" 

"It  is  only  by  confoundiug  casual  with  uniform 
and  invariable  antecedence,  that  power  can  be  con- 
ceived to  be  something  different  from  antecedence." 

"  In  the  various  changes  that  occur,  there  can  as 
little  be  any  poAvers  or  susceptibilities  different  from 
the  antecedents  and  consequents  themselves^  as  there 
can  be  forms  differing  from  the  coexisting  particles 
of  matter  which  constitute  them." 

In  opposition  to  these  assertions,  it  is  sufiicient  to 
say  that  all  men  do  cognize  the  existence  of  power 
in  the  antecedents  which  are  causes.  Words  expres- 
sive of  the  idea  of  power  are  found  in  every  language. 
All  men  testify  to  the  fdct  that  they  intuitively  cog- 
nize the  existence  of  power.  If  they,  like  Brown, 
deny  it  in  words,  their  actions  testify  to  the  truth. 

There  are  many  things  invariably  antecedent 
to  other  things^  which  are  not  the  causes  of  those 
things.  The  antecedent  which  has  power  to  produce 
the  consequent,  is  the  antecedent  which  we  cognize  as 
the  cause. 


CAUSE   AND   EFFECT.  137 

"Simple   and    invariable    succession,"    says    Dr. 

Hickok,  "is  not  onr  conviction  of  cause  and  effect, 

nor  at  all  like  it.      Night  invariably  succeeds  the 

day;  one  o'clock  invariably  succeeds  twelve  o'clock; 

one  fixed  star  invariably  succeeds  another  fixed  star 

in  crossing  our  meridian ;  but  none  of  these  invariable 

successions   is  our  conviction  of  causal  connection. 

If  we  assume  two  pair  of  wheels,  one  of  which  has 

each  wheel  separately  driven  so  that   the  cogs   in 

their  periphery  exactly  match  in  every  revolution; 

but  the  other  pair  is  so  constructed,  that  one  wheel 

being  moved,  its  cogs  drive  the  other ;  there  will  be 

alike  invariable  succession  in  each  case ;  but  we  must 

'     carry  the  mind  quite  beyond  the  fact  of  invariable 

.     succession  to  some  efficiency  in  an  antecedent  that 

^'     produces  the  consequent.     No  conception  of  simple 

^    succession,  no  matter  how  invariable,  is  our  notion  of 

^    cause." 

J*^     The  consciousness  of  the  reader  will  attest  the 
^    truth  of  the  statement  thus  made. 
^    ^  The  following  remarks  are  from  the  pen  of  Pro- 
fessor Wilson,  Dr.  Brown's  successor  in  the  chair  of 
Moral  Philosophy  at  Edinburgh.     They  are  given  as 
quoted  by  Hamilton.      The   test   proposed  by   Dr. 
J ! Brown  was:   "Let  any  one  ask  himself  what  it  is 
which  he  means  by  the  term  power,  and,  without 
contenting  himself  with  a  few  phrases  v/hich  signify 
nothing,  reflect  before  he  gives  his  answer,  and  he 
will  find  that  he  means  nothing  more  than  that,  in 


138       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PniLOSOPIIY. 

all  similar  circumstances,  the  explosion  of  gunpow- 
der Tvill  be  the  immediate  and  uniform  consequence 
of  the  application  of  a  spark." 

^2,  "Let  us,  then,"  says  Professor  Wilson,  "apply 
'  *  the  test  by  which  Dr.  Bro^yn  proposes  the  truth  of 
his*^iews  shall  be  tried.  Let  us  ask  ourselves  what 
we  mean  when  we  say  that  the  spark  has  power  to 
kindle  the  gunpowder — that  powder  is  susceptible  of 
being  kindled  by  the  spark.  Do  we  mean  only,  that 
when  they  come  together  this  will  happen  ?  Do  we 
merely  predict  this  visible  and  certain  futurity  ? 
apJ'  We  do  not  fear  to  say,  that  when  we  speak  of  a 
^**power  in  one  substance  to  produce  a  change  in  an- 
other, and  of  a  susceptibility  of  such  change  in  that 
other,  v/e  express  more  than  our  belief  that  the 
change  has  taken  place,  and  will  take  place.  There 
is  more  in  our  mind  than  a  conviction  of  the  past  and 
a  foresight  of  the  future.  There  is,  besides  this,  the 
conception  of  a  fixed  constitution  of  their  nature, 
which  determines  the  event — a  constitution  which, 
while  it  lasts,  makes  the  event  the  necessary  conse- 
quence of  the  situation  in  which  the  objects  are 
placed.  We  should  say,  then,  that  there  are  includ- 
ed in  these  terms,  'power'  and  'susceptibility  of 
change,'  two  ideas  which  are  not  expressed  in  Dr. 
Brown's  analysis — one  of  necessity,  and  the  other  of 
a  constitution  of  things,  in  which  that  necessity  is 
established.  That  these  two  ideas  are  not  expressed 
in  Dr.  Brown's  analysis,  is  seen  by  quoting  again  his 


CAUSE   AWD   EFFECT.  139 

words :  '  He  will  find  that  he  means  nothing  more 
than  that,  in  all  similar  circumstances,  the  explosion 
of  gunpowder  will  be  the  immediate  and  uniform 
consequence  of  the  application  of  a  spark.' 

"  It  is  certain,  from  the  whole  tenor  of  his  work, 
that  Dr.  Brown  has  designed  to  exclude  the  idea  of 
necessity  from  his  analysis."  ,  ^ 

The  following  is  Dr.  Hickok's  account  of  Kant's 
view  of  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect : 

"  Kant  assumes  the  phenomenal  consequences  to 
be  real ;  but  what  the  substances  as  things  in  them- 
selves, of  which  these  phenomena  are  only  qualities, 
truly  are,  can  never  be  known  by  human  intelligence. 
The  mind,  as  a  regulative  principle  of  its  thinking  in 
judgments,  is  obliged  to  use  the  conception  of  cau- 
sality, and  bring  its  sequences  into  connection  under 
this  category ;  but  this  notion  of  causality  is  alto- 
gether subjective — a  mental  conception  for  regulat- 
ing the  mind's  own  thinking ;  and  we  cannot  say 
that  the  phenomenal  realities  have  any  such  connec- 
tions in  the  things  themselves.  The  mind  has  such 
original  forms,  as  pure  conceptions,  from  itself,  and, 
in  thinking,  it  fits  these  forms  on  to  the  real  phe- 
nomena, and  brings  them  into  orderly  connection 
thereby ;  but  it  is  the  mind  which  makes  the  con- 
nections, and  not  that  the  connections  are  in  the 
things  themselves,  and  that  they  make  the  mind  to 
know  after  their  conditions."  ..   , 

Kant  admits  that  we  have  the  idea  of  power,  but 


140       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

affirms  that  it  is  simply  "  subjective" — a  figment  of 
the  mind,  not  a  cognition  of  reality.  Consciousness 
attests  that  the  idea  of  power  is  the  cognition  of  a 
reality  in  things  themselves. 

Sir  William  Hamilton  has  put  forth  a  new  theory 
of  causality ;  we  presume  his  claims  to  originality  in 
regard  to  it  are  just. 

The  following  is  his  account  of  "  the  phenomenon 
of  causality":  "When  we  are  aware  of  something 
which  begins  to  be,  we  are,  by  the  necessity  of  our 
intelligence,  constrained  to  believe  that  it  has  a 
cause.  But  what  does  the  expression,  that  it  has  a 
eausCy  signify  ?  If  we  analyze  our  thought,  we  shall 
find  that  it  simply  means  that,  as  we  cannot  con- 
ceive any  new  existence  to  commence,  therefore  all 
that  is  now  seen  to  arise  under  a  new  appearance  had 
previously  an  existence  under  a  prior  form.  We  are 
utterly  unable  to  realize  in  thought  the  possibility  of 
the  complement  of  existence  being  either  increased 
or  diminished.  We  are  unable,  on  the  one  hand,  to 
conceive  of  nothing  becoming  something,  or,  on  the 
other  hand,  of  something  becoming  nothing.  When 
God  is  said  to  create  out  of  nothing,  we  construe  this 
to  thought  by  supposing  that  He  evolves  existence 
out  of  Himself.  We  view  the  Creator  as  the  cause  of 
the  universe.  Mjc  7iihilo  rdhil^  in  nihilum  nil  posse 
reverti^  expresses,  in  its  purest  form,  the  whole  intel- 
lectual phenomenon  of  causality."  He  affirms  "  that 
causation  is  simply  our  inability  to  think  an  absolute 


CAUSE   AND   EFFECT.  141 

commencement  or  an  absolute  termination  of  be- 
ing." 

If  causation  is  simply  our  inability  to  think  an 
absolute  commencement  or  an  absolute  termination 
of  being,  it  is  wholly  a  subjective  matter.  But  it  is 
to  be  presumed  that  he  meant  that  our  idea  of  cause 
is  the  result  of  our  inability.  The  question  is  not  to 
be  decided  by  an  inference  from  an  elaborate  theory 
of  "  the  conditioned,"  or  from  any  other  theory,  but 
by  an  appeal  to  consciousness.  Whenever  an  event 
takes  place,  does  not  every  one  intuitively  cognize 
the  truth  that  it  had  an  adequate  cause  ?  Is  not  the 
cognition  of  cause  as  clear  and  defined  a  cognition, 
as  any  cognition  of  which  we  are  conscious  ?  May 
we  not  as  well  say  that  our  cognition  of  a  body  as 
extended  or  colored  is  the  result  of  "  inability, "  as 
our  cognition  of  cause  ?  If  it  be  a  fact  of  conscious- 
ness, that  whenever  we  cognize  an  event  we  intui- 
tively cognize  the  fact  that  it  must  have  an  adequate 
cause,  then  the  elaborate  theory  of  Hamilton  is 
false. 

Some  questions  may  be  asked  with  respect  to 
Hamilton's  statements  as  to  the  phenomena  of  cau- 
sality. Is  it  true  that  "  all  that  is  now  seen  to  arise 
under  a  new  appearance,  had  previously  an  existence 
under  a  prior  form "  ?  In  v/hat  form  did  the  mate- 
rial universe  exist,  before  God  "  in  the  beginning  cre- 
ated the  heavens  and  the  earth "  ?  Will  it  be  said 
that  it  existed  in  the  power  of  God  ?     That  is  simply 


142        ELEMENTS    OF    INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

saying  that  God  had  power  to  bring  it  into  exist- 
ence. 

Is  it  true  that  we  cannot  conceive  of  God  cre- 
^  ating  something  out  of  nothing ;  and  that  we  con- 
strue it  to  thought  "by  supposing  that  He  evolyes  ex- 
istence out  of  Himself?  We  cannot,  it  is  granted, 
conceive  how  God  creates  something  out  of  nothing ; 
but  we  can  conceive  the  fact  of  His  doing  so. 

What  is  meant  by  evolving  existence  out  of  Him- 
self? Is  it  affirmed  that  the  world  previously  exist- 
ed in  God  ?  If  it  existed  as  matter,  is  God  then 
material  ?  If  it  existed  as  spirit,  then  can  spirit  be 
changed  into  matter  ? 

Can  any  thing  be  properly  said  to  be  evolved 
L  from  the  Divine  existence  in  any  other  sense  than 
'  that  of  being  created  by  Divine  power  ?  If  this  is 
what  Hamilton  means,  then  his  view  of  causation  is 
reduced  to  the  one  received  practically  by  all  men, 
and  his  claims  to  the  discovery  amount  simply  to  a 
new  use  of  terms. 

It  has  by  some  been  thought  difficult  to  account 
for  the  character  of  necessity  which  attaches  to  our 
idea  of  cause.  When  we  see  an  event,  Ave  not  only 
see  that  it  has  a  cause,  but  that  it  must  have  a  cause. 

We  see  that  a  cause  is  necessary  because  it  is 
necessary,  just  as  we  see  that  a  raven  is  black  be- 
cause it  is  black.  That  every  event  "imtst  have  a 
cause,  is  a  truth  v/hich  the  human  mind  can  cognize  ; 
that  the  raven  is  black,  is  also  a  truth  which  the 


CAUSE   AND   EFFECT.  143 

human  mind  can  cognize;  and  there  is  no  more  diffi- 
culty or  mystery  in  tlie  one  case  than  in  the  other. 

The  law  or  fact  of  causation  is  sometimes  inaccu- 
rately stated,  and  needless  difficulties  have  thus  heen 
caused.  "  As  the  doctrine  of  causation  is  sometimes 
stated,"  says  McCosh,  "  it  might  appear  as  if  we 
were  required,  in  following  the  chain  of  cause  and 
effect,  to  go  back  ad  infinitwn.  It  is  said  in  a  loose 
way,  that  every  object  must  have  a  cause  ;  and  then, 
as  this  cause  must  also  have  a  cause,  it  might  seem  as 
if  ^we  were  compelled  to  go  on  forever  from  one  link 
to  another.  In  particular,  it  might  appear  as  if  we 
could  never  legitimately  argue  from  the  law  of  cau- 
sation in  favor  of  this  world  being  caused ;  for,  if 
the  law  of  cause  and  effect  be  universal,  then  we 
must  seek  for  a  cause,  not  only  of  the  world,  but  of 
the  Being  who  made  the  world ;  and  if  it  be  not  uni- 
versal, then  it  is  conceivable  that  this  world  may  be 
one  of  the  things  that  are  not  caused.  This  is  an 
objection  urged  with  great  confidence  by  Kant ;  and 
a  large  school  of  metaphysicians  seem  to  think  that 
it  is  fatal  to  any  argument  in  favor  of  the  Divine  ex- 
istence derived  from  human  intelligence,  as  in  every 
such  argument  the  law  of  causation  must  enter  as  an 
element.  Kant  endeavors  to  escape  from  the  dismal 
consequences  in  which  he  felt  himself  being  en- 
gulfed, by  declaring  that  the  law  of  9ause  and  effect, 
which  thus  required  an  infinite  fegressits^  was  a  law 
of  thought  and  not  of  things,  and  by  calling  in   a 


144       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

moral  argument  (which  argument  has  again  been 
assailed  by  the  very  objections  which  Kant  directed 
against  the  speculative  argument ;  for  if  our  intelli- 
gence be  a  delusion,  why  may  not  our  moral  convic- 
tions also  be  so  ?)  ;  while  a  large  body  of  thinkers 
appealed  to  some  sort  of  mysterious  faith  which  will 
not  submit  to  be  examined,  or  even  expressed.  But, 
with  all  deference  to  these  bold  asseverations,  I  main- 
tain  that  if  only  this  cc^smos'^can  be  shown  to  bear 
marks  of  being  an  effect,  the  argument  from  causa- 
tion can  carry  us  up  to  a*'supermundane'5<3ausef'while 
it  does  not  require  us  to  go  back  to  a  cause  of  that 
cause.  All  inquiry  into  causation  conducts  us  to 
substance ;  but  it  does  not  compel  us  to  go  on  fur- 
ther, or  to  go  on  forever.  The  law  of  causality  does 
insist  that  the  world,  as  an  effect,  must  have  a  cause 
in  a  Being  possessing  power;  and  if,  on  inquiring 
into  the  nature  of  that  Being,  we  have  reason  to 
believe  that  He  or  it  must  be  an  effect,  it  would  in- 
sist on  our  going  on  to  look  out  for  a  further  cause. 
But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  w^e  find  no  signs  of  that 
Being  who  made  the  w^orld  being  an  effect,  our  intui- 
tion regarding  causation  would  be  entirely  satisfied 
in  looking  on  that  Being  as  uncaused,  as  self-existent, 
as  having  power  in  Himself.  It  thus  appears  that 
this  difficulty,  which  has  puzzled  so  many,  has  arisen 
entirely  from  a  misapprehension  and  perversion  of 
the  law  of  causation,  commencing  with  Hume,  and 
presented  in  a  new  form  by  Kant." 


CAUSE   AND    EFFECT.  145 

Nearly  allied  to  the  maxim,  Every  event  must 
have  an  adequate  cause,  is  the  maxim,  Like  causes 
produce  like  effects.  This  principle  lies  at  the  foun- 
dation of  our  belief  in  the  uniformity  of  the  course 
of  nature.  Some  of  the  Scotch  philosophers  refer 
our  belief  in  the  uniformity  of  nature  to  an  original 
principle.  Reid  says :  "  God  hath  implanted  in  hu- 
man minds  an  original  principle,  by  which  we  believe 
and  expect  the  continuance  of  those  connections 
which  we  have  observed  in  times  past." 

This  is  a  very  incautious  statement.  If  the 
human  mind  is  made  to  believe  that  the  course  of 
nature  is  uniform— that  is,  if  this  belief  is  original 
and  instinctive — then  the  human  mind  cannot  believe 
a  miracle,  however  well  attested,  since  a  miracle  is 
a  deviation  from  the  uniform  course  of  nature.  If 
this  principle  be  implanted  in  the  minds  of  all  men, 
it  will  be  found  in  the  minds  of  those  who  shall  live 
when  the  world's  -history  is  about  to  be  closed. 
Hence  they  will  be  led  by  a  divinely  implanted  prin^ 
ciple  to  believe  what  is  not  true  ! 

It  is  a  self-evident  truth,  that  the  same  or  similar 
causes,  under  the  same  or  similar  conditions,  will  pro- 
duce the  same  or  similar  effects.  Hence,  so  lono-  as 
the  present  causes  are  in  operation,  the  course  of 
nature  will  be  uniform.  ^  When  new  causes  come  into 
operation,  changes  will  take  place.  We  have  ob- 
served that  events  have  followed  each  other  with  3 
1 


146       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

certain  nniformity,  and  hence  we  infer  that,  so  long 
as  present  causes  continue  to  operate,  events  will  suc- 
ceed each  other  with  a  like  uniformity.  We  expect 
causes  to  remain  as  they  are,  till  we  have  some  rea- 
son to  suppose  that  there  will  be  a  change. 


CHAPTER  XVIIL 

COGNITION      OF      BEAUTY. 

The  mind  can  cognize  beauty.  We  turn  our  eyes 
in  winter  toward  the  trunk  and  leafless  brandies  of 
a  tree;  we  cognize  its  existence  and  form.  We 
turn  our  eyes  in  spring  toward  the  tree  in  full 
bloom,  and  we  cognize  the  additional  fact  that  it  is 
beautiful.  We  turn  our  eyes  upward  in  a  clear  night : 
we  cognize  the  fact  that  the  stars  studding  the  blue 
vault  are  beautiful.  We  hear  a  strain  of  music,  and 
cognize  the  fact  that  it  is  beautiful.  We  witness  an 
act  of  self-sacrificing  affection,  and  cognize  the  fact 
that  it  is  beautiful.  We  cognize  objects  that  are  use- 
ful, objects  that  are  injurious,  and  objects  that  are 
beautiful.  Our  cognitions  of  beauty  are  as  distinct 
from  our  cognitions  of  the  useful,  as  are  our  cognitions 
of  the  injurious. 

Beauty  appertains  to  objects  animate  and  inani- 
mate, material  and  spiritual;  to  feelings,  thoughts, 
and  actions.  It  would  be  as  impossible  to  make  an 
exhaustive  enumeration  of  beautiful  objects,  as  to 
make  an  exhaustive  enumeration  of  true  propositions. 


148       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

How  do  Ave  know  that  the  objects  we  call  beauti- 
ful, are  beautiful  ?  Just  as  we  know  that  the  propo- 
sitions we  call  true,  are  true.  We  know  that  the 
mind  has  poA^er  to  cognize  truth  and  beauty,  because 
it  does  cognize  truth  and  beauty.  When  we  perceive 
the  rainbow,  we  perceive  its  beauty.  We  have  a  di- 
rect, intuitive  cognition  of  the  beauty  of  many  objects. 
In  regard  to  every  kind  of  knowledge,  we  must  rely 
upon  our  primary  cognitions,  or  we  are  at  once  with- 
out any  ground  of  certainty.  If  things  are  not  as  we 
cognize  them  to  be,  then  there  is  an  end  to  all  knowl- 
edge.    Universal  skepticism  is  the  result. 

The  human  mind  is  not  infallible.  It  may  err  in 
its  cognitions.  One  may  think  a  proposition  to  be 
true  when  it  is  not,  and  one  may  think  an  object 
beautiful  when  it  is  not.  But  there  are  propositions 
relating  both  to  truth  and  beauty,  in  regard  to  which 
he  is  not  liable  to  err.  There  are  intuitive  cognitions 
which  are  certain.  How  do  we  know  them  to  be  cer- 
tainly true  ?  We  cognize  the  fact ;  and  we  must  rely 
upon  the  cognition,  or  fall  into  universal  skepticism. 
Because  the  mind  may  err  in  certain  cognitions,  it 
does  not  follow  that  it  may  err  in  regard  to  all  cog- 
nitions. 

Beauty,  as  we  have  seen,  is  varied,  as  well  as 
truth ;  that  is,  there  are  various  things  that  are  beau- 
tiful, and  various  things  that  are  true.  In  what  one 
thing  do  these  diversified  beautiful  objects  agree? 
The  only  answer  that  can  be  given  to  this  question  is, 


COGNITION   OF   BEAUTY.  149 

that  they  agree  in  being  beautiful.  The  idea  of  beauty 
is  a  simple  idea,  and  cannot  be  analyzed. 

Writers  have  nevertheless  attempted  to  analyze 
it,  and  to  discover  in  what  beauty  consists.  Different 
qualities  or  facts  have  been  named  by  different  wri- 
ters as  constituting  the  beautiful.  The  qualities  thus 
set  forth  belong  to  some  beautiful  objects,  but  not  to 
all.  "  Some  have  thought,"  says  Cousin,  "  to  find 
the  beautiful  in  proportion ;  and  this  is,  in  fact,  one 
of  the  conditions  of  beauty,  but  it  is  not  the  only 
one."  *  ♦  ♦  "  What  makes  the  terrible  beauty 
of  a  storm  ?  what  makes  that  of  a  great  picture,  of 
an  isolated  verse,  or  a  sublime  ode  ?  "  The  remark 
above  quoted  applies  to  all  attempts  to  state  in  what 
the  beautiful  consists. 

In  truth,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  the  beautiful 
apart  from  beautiful  objects.  Beauty  is  not  an  inde- 
pendent entity.  It  is  a  quality  of  objects,  and  of  re- 
lations between  objects.  Beauty  is  a  general  term, 
standing  for  that  in  which  ail  beautiful  objects  agree ; 
just  as  truth  is  a  general  term,  standing  for  that  in 
which  all  true  propositions  agree. 

Cousin  affirms :  "  Truth,  beauty,  and  goodness  are 
attributes,  not  entities.  Now,  there  is  no  attribute 
without  a  subject.  And  as  here  the  question  is  con- 
cerning absolute  truth,  beauty,  and  goodness,  their 
substance  can  be  nothing  else  but  the  absolute  Being. 
It  is  thus  we  arrive  at  God." 

Has  Cousin  come  any  nearer  telling  us  what  beauty 


150       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

is,  than  those  who  say  it  consists  in  proportion  ?  To 
afSrm  that  beauty  is  an  attribute  of  God,  is  simply  to 
aiBrm  that  God  is  beautiful.  When  we  say  wisdom 
is  an  attribute  of  God,  we  simply  affirm  that  God  is 
wise — we  do  not  explain  what  wisdom  is.  It  may 
safely  be  affirmed  that  the  Divine  character  is  beauti- 
ful ;  but  that  is  not  explaining  in  what  beauty  con- 
sists. 

Professor  Haven  affirms  that  "The  true,  the  beauti- 
ful, and  the  good  exist  as  simple,  absolute,  eternal 
principles.  They  are  in  the  Divine  mind.  They  are 
in  the  Divine  works.  They  are  in  a  sense  independent 
of  Deity.  He  does  not  create  them.  He  cannot  re- 
verse or  change  their  nature.  He  works  according  to 
them.  They  are  not  created  by,  but  only  manifested 
in  what  God  does." 

Is  this  a  successful  attempt  to  tell  us  what  beauty 
is  ?  It  is,  according  to  our  author,  the  manifestation 
of  a  simple,  absolute,  eternal  principle  existing  in  the 
Divine  mind.  Is  it  certain  that  there  is  any  informa- 
tion contained  in  these  vfords?  What  kind  of  a 
principle  is  this  principle  of  beauty  ?  Wherein  does 
it  differ  from  the  principle  of  truth  ?  What  proof  is 
there  that  the  principle  of  beauty  is  a  simple,  abso- 
lute, and  eternal  principle  in  the  Divine  mind,  any 
more  than  the  principle  of  form,  or  of  extension  ? 

It  is  said  that  beauty  is  the  manifestation  of  the 
Divine  nature.  It  is  true,  and  so  are  all  God's  works 
the  manifestation  of  His  nature — of  His  character ; 


COGNITION   OF  BEAUTY.  151 

that  is,  they  show  what  He  is.  We  have  no  reason 
to  suppose  that  beauty  is,  in  a  peculiar  sense,  the 
manifestation  of  the  Divine  nature.  God  is  the  author 
of  all  created  beauty;  but  the  fact  that  God  has 
created  a  thing  does  not  prove  that  it  is  identical  in 
nature  with  Him ;  ^.  6.,  that  it  is  a  part  of  Himself. 
He  created  matter,  but  matter  is  no  part  of  the  Divine 
nature. 

It  is  useless  to  attempt  to  say  what  beauty  and 
truth  are,  except  by  saying  that  they  are  beauty  and 
truth.  Attempts  to  go  beyond  this,  and  to  affirm 
that  they  are  principles  in  the  Divine  mind,  convey 
no  definite  ideas,  and  have  a  pantheistic  tendency. 

It  may  not  be  amiss  to  notice  in  this  connection 
the  not  infrequent  expression,  "  God  is  the  principle 
of  truth."  What  is  the  meaning  of  the  expression? 
Is  it  that  He  is  the  author  and  source  of  all  truth  ? 
Did  He  create  space  and  its  relations,  and  originate 
the  difference  between  right  and  wrong  ?  Was  there 
ever  a  time  when  the  difference  between  right  and 
wrong  did  not  exist  ?  Will  it  be  said  that  "  his 
Being  embraces  all  truth"  ?  Is  it  not  proper  to  ask 
for  the  meaning  of  that  expression  ? 

Christ  is  said  to  be  the  truth;  but  that  does  not 
mean  that  truth  and  the  Divine  existence  are  the 
same.  God  is  said  to  be  love;  but  love  and  the 
Divine  existence  are  not  the  same.  God  is  also  said 
to  be  a  consuming  fire :  but  a  consuming  fire  and  the 
Divine  existence  are  not  the  same. 


152       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

Christ  is  said  to  be  the  truth,  because  the  truths 
relating  to  him  are  to  man  the  most  important  of  all 
truths.  In  comparison  with  the  truths  which  are 
able  to  make  us  wise  unto  salvation,  all  scientific  and 
political  truths  are  of  little  value. 

These  remarks  in  regard  to  the  principle  of  truth, 
apply  in  all  respects  to  the  principle  of  beauty. 

It  is  affirmed  by  some  that  all  beauty  is  the  ex- 
pression of  mental  qualities.  There  is  a  beauty  of 
expression.  A  countenance  whose  features  are  plain, 
not  to  say  ugly,  beams  vv^ith  an  expression  of  benev- 
olence, and  is  therefore  beautiful.  A  delicate  lily  is 
beautiful.  It  suggests  the  idea  of  woman's  delicacy 
and  purity.  It  is  remotely  analogous  to  woman's 
delicacy  and  purity.  A  distinction  is  to  be  made 
between  the  signs  of  a  thing  and  an  analogy  between 
two  things.  We  have  found  from  experience  that 
certain  things  signify  the  presence  of  other  things. 
We  have  also  found  that  certain  things  are  analogous. 
This  distinction  is  overlooked  by  those  who  would 
refer  all  beauty  to  expression. 

Much  of  the  beauty  of  the  human  countenance 
is  the  beauty  of  expression,  and  depends,  not  on  the 
form  and  coloring  of  the  features,  but  upon  the  con- 
dition of  the  mind.  The  condition  of  the  indwelling 
mind  vfill  give  expression  to  the  countenance.  One 
cannot  change  the  structure  of  his  features,  but  he 
can  change  the  condition  of  his  mind.  Let  him  aim 
to  form  a  beautiful  mind,  and  so  far  as  he  succeeds,  it 


COGNITION   OF   BEAUTY.  153 

will  appear  in  the  expression  of  his  countenance  and 
person.  ^. 

Association  has  a  great  influence  on  our  opinions 
in  regard  to  beauty.  It  has,  in  some  instances,  power 
to  reverse  our  ideas  as  to  the  beauty  of  an  object. 
An  object,  an  article  of  dress,  for  example,  when  first 
seen  by  us,  may  appear  to  us  the  reverse  of  beautiful ; 
but  when  we  have  seen  it  worn  by  those  whose  opin- 
ions we  are  accustomed  to  respect — when  it  has  be- 
come the  fashion — we  come  to  regard  it  as  beautiful. 
In  consequence  of  association,  some  objects  are  re- 
garded in  some  countries  as  beautiful,  which  are 
regarded  as  ugly  in  other  countries.  In  consequence 
of  the  diversities  of  opinion  in  regard  to  beauty, 
caused  by  association,  some  have  referred  all  beauty 
to  association.  They  deny  that  there  is  any  such 
thing  as  intrinsic  beauty — that  there  are  any  objects 
originally  adapted  to  produce  ideas  of  beauty.  They 
affirm  that  the  power  now  possessed  by  some  objects 
to  awaken  in  our  minds  ideas  and  emotions  of  beauty, 
is  wholly  owing  to  association. 

To  such  it  is  sufficient  to  say,  that  association  will 
account  for  the  transfer  of  the  idea  of  beauty  from 
one  object  to  another,  but  cannot  account  for  the 
origin  of  the  idea.  The  idea  of  beauty  must  either  be 
innate,  or  some  object  must  have  an  original  adapta- 
tion to  produce  it ;  that  is,  there  must  be  some  object 
beautiful  in  itself. 

Association  controls  oftentimes  our  opinions  of 
1* 


154       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

beauty,  but  never  controls  our  intuitive  cognitions 
of  beauty.  There  are  objects  whose  beauty  all  men 
cognize  intuitively.  The  rainbow,  the  flower  of  bright 
hues,  the  stars,  are  regarded  as  beautiful  by  all  who 
have  the  ordinary  attributes  of  humanity.  When  we 
pass  from  the  sphere  of  intuition,  and  proceed  to  form 
judgments,  opinions,  on  matters  pertaining  to  beauty, 
we  are  liable  to  err,  as  in  regard  to  all  other  subjects. 
Hence  diversities  of  opinion  in  regard  to  beauty  exist, 
just  as  diversities  of  opinion  in  regard  to  government 
exist.  This  does  not  prove  that  beauty  is  wholly 
subjective,  and  that  one  man's  judgments  are  as  good 
as  another's.  There  are  truths  relating  to  beauty, 
just  as  there  are  truths  relating  to  numbers ;  that  is, 
there  are  truths  aesthetic  and  truths  mathematical.  The 
mind's  modes  of  procedure  in  cognizing  these  kinds  of 
truth  are  similar.  It  cognizes  some  truths  intuitively, 
and  others  by  the  aid  of  truths  previously  known. 

All  men  possess  the  power  of  cognizing  beauty ; 
but  all  men  do  not  possess  this  power  in  the  same 
degree.  All  men  can  cognize  mathematical  truth, 
but  some  men  can  cognize  it  with  greater  clearness 
and  rapidity  than  others. 

The  actual  differences  among  men  as  to  their 
power  of  cognizing  beauty  are  owing  to  two  causes. 
There  is  an  original  difference  in  the  structure  of  their 
minds.  Some  men  have  by  nature  a  keener  sense  of 
beauty  than  others.  Then  some  men  have  the  power 
of  perceiving  beauty  more  fully  developed  by  educa- 


COGNITIOK    OP   BEAUTY.  155 

tion — hj  the  education  of  instruction  or  the  education 
of  circumstances. 

There  is  a  greater  difference  among  men  in  their 
power  of  perceiving  beauty  than  in  their  power  of 
perceiving  truth — especially  truth  in  relation  to  prac- 
tical matters.  Men  are  compelled  by  circumstances 
to  exercise  their  pov/ers  in  perceiving  truth  more 
than  in  perceiving  beauty.  Hence  the  power  of  per- 
ceiving truth  is  more  fully  developed. 

The  cognition  of  beauty  is  not  a  sensational  cog- 
nition. By  smell  and  taste  we  have,  or  may  have, 
agreeable  sensations.  By  the  eye  and  ear  we  cog- 
nize beauty,  w^hich  cognition  is  followed  by  or  at- 
tended with  a  peculiar  emotion,  separable  in  thought 
from  the  cognition.  An  agreeable  sensation — that  is, 
an  agreeable  feeling  localized  in  some  part  of  the 
body — is  one  thing ;  an  emotion,  such  a^  the  emotion 
of  beauty — -a  purely  mental  act — is  another.  The 
feeling  of  beauty,  if  the  expression  be  allowed,  is 
not  a  sensational  feeling.  When  we  look  at  the 
heavens  or  the  waving  wheat  field,  or  listen  to  the 
gsolian  harp,  the  enjoyment  is  not  localized  in  the 
eye  and  ear.  The  enjoyment  is  as  purely  mental  as 
that  resulting  from  perceiving  a  neat^  demonstration 
in  geometry. 

The  emotion  of  beauty  is  a  simple  emotion,  which 
cannot  be  described  or  analyzed,  and  can  be  known 
only  by  being  felt.  It  is  conditioned  on  the  cogni- 
tion of  a  beautiful  object,  or  the  presence  of  the  idea 


156       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  beauty  in  the  mind.  If  we  choose  to  call  the 
mind's  power  of  cognizing  and  enjoying  beauty  the 
aesthetic  faculty,  the  acts  of  said  faculty  may  be 
regarded  as  complex — composed  of  a  cognition  and 
an  emotion. 

Minds  are  differently  constituted  as  to  power  to 
perform  the  different  elements  of  this  complex  act. 
In  some  the  perceptive  and  in  others  the  emotive 
element  predominates.  Some  men  have  clearer  and 
more  discriminative  perceptions  of  beauty,  and  oth- 
ers have  a  deeper  susceptibility  in  view  of  it. 

Is  there  a  standard  of  beauty,  or  of  taste — 
an  aesthetic  yard-stick — something  with  which  we 
compare  objects,  and  judge  them  to  be  beautiful  or 
not,  according  as  they  agree  or  disagree  with  it  ?  Is 
every  cognition  of  beauty  a  judgment,  the  result  of 
comparison  ? 

Some  of  our  cognitions  of  beauty  are  direct,  in- 
tuitive,  and  hence  do  not  involve  the  process  of  com- 
parison. In  such  cases,  there  can  be  no  reference  to 
a  standard.  Some  of  our  cognitions  are  conditioned 
upon  other  cognitions,  and  may  be  said  to  be  the 
result  of  comparison;  that  is,  the  process  of  com- 
parison is  among  the  conditions  of  the  cognition. 
But  in  these  cases  there  is  no  one  idea  or  standard 
with  which  the  object  in  question  is  compared. 

There  is  what  may  be  called  a  practical  standard 
of  taste,  by  which  all  are  in  some  degree  influenced. 
The  books,  statues,  pictures,  and  edifices  which  have 


COGNITION  OF   BEAUTY.  157 

received  the  approbation  and  admiration  of  all  culti* 
vated  minds,  form  a  practical  standard  of  taste. 
When  a  new  work  appears,  we  often  unconsciously 
compare  it  with  works  of  established  reputation,  and 
form  our  judgment  accordingly. 

While  a  due  regard  should  be  paid  to  authority, 
it  should  not  be  allowed  to  interfere  with  the  forma- 
tion of  independent  literary  judgments  f  nor  should 
one's  freshness  and  originality  be  impaired  by  a  too 
scrupulous  conformity  to  the  models  furnished  by 
standard  authors  and  artists. 

God  designed  that  men  should  perceive  and  enjoy 
beauty.  This  appears  from  the  fact  that  He  has  been 
profuse  in  the  creation  of  beauty,  and  has  given  man 
capacity  to  perceive  and  enjoy  it.  Hence  it  is  man's 
duty  to  cultivate  his  power  of  cognizing  beauty. 

It  is  cultivated  by  exercise.  The  choicest  speci- 
mens of  beauty  in  nature  and  art  should  be  studied, 
that  the  mind's  power  of  cognizing  beauty  may  be 
improved. 

The  wise  artist  does  not  study  his>  model  that  he 
may  practise  a  servile  imitation.  He  studies  it  to 
heighten  his  sense  of  the  beautiful — that  is,  to  im- 
prove his  power  of  perceiving  beauty — ^that  he  may 
form  higher  conceptions  which  he  may  strive  to 
realize. 

The  study  of  beauty  has  a  tendency  to  refine  and 
ennoble  the  mind.  Rightly  conducted,  it  is  favor- 
able to  morals,  though  there  is  no  necessary  connec- 


i- 


158       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

tion  between  a  fine  taste  and  good  morals.  They 
have  often  been  dissociated.  There  have  been  men 
of  fine  taste  and  of  corrupt  morals.  Their  corrupt 
morals  were  not  the  consequence  of  their  fine  taste. 
Whatever  elevates  the  mind  tends  to  good  morals, 
though  that  tendency  may  be  counteracted  by  other 
causes. 

Our  Puritan  fathers  erred  in  dissociating  beauty 
from  religion.  In  avoiding  the  Romish  idolatry  of 
worshipping  the  beautiful,  they  went  to  the  opposite 
extreme.  Hence  the  absence  of  all  decoration  in 
their  places  of  worship,  and  the  formation  of  a  char- 
acter in  which  the  aesthetic  element  was  sadly  want- 
ing. God's  works  are  beautiful,  and  hence  :?aan's 
works  dedicated  to  God's  service  should  be  beautiful. 
"  Beauty  and  strength  are  in  thy  sanctuary."  There 
is  a  beauty  of  holiness  which,  in  one  sense,  includes 
all  other  beauty.  God's  children  should  not  ignore 
the  beauty  which  their  Father  has  taken  so  much 
pains  to  create. 

There  are  certain  emotions  that  are  sometimes 
called  emotions  of  taste.  These  are  the  emotions  of 
beauty,  grandeur,  sublimity,  and  the  ludicrous.  The 
emotion  of  grandeur  is  nearly  allied  to  the  emotion 
of  beauty.  An  object  which  has  none  of  the  ele- 
ments of  beauty  would  scarcely  be  called  a  grand  | 
object.  An  object  may  be  sublime  without  being  at 
all  beautiful. 

All  the  emotions  of  taste  are  simple  emotions, 


COGNITION    OF   BEAUTY.  159 

and  can  be  known  only  from  experience.  The  emo- 
tion of  sublimity  is  more  intense  and  transient  than 
the  emotion  of  beauty.  There  are  fewer  objects  in 
nature,  and  fewer  thoughts,  that  awaken  it.  There 
are  more  beautiful  than  sublime  writers. 

Is  there  any  such  thing  as  sublimity  apart  from 
the  emotion  ?  The  emotion  is  always  preceded  by  a 
cognition  or  conception  as  its  cause,  and  we  call  the 
object  of  that  cognition  or  conception  sublime.  In 
what  the  sublimity  of  objects  consists,  cannot  be 
told.  There  are  certain  objects  that  are  sublime  be- 
cause they  produce  a  certain  effect  on  our  minds.  In 
some  cases  this  effect  may  be  owing  to  association ; 
but  there  must  be  some  objects  originally  adapted  to 
produce  the  emotion,  or  we  could  never  have  it.  We 
give  the  name  of  sublimity  to  that  in  an  object, 
whatever  it  may  be,  which  produces  the  emotion  of 
sublimity. 

What  is  wit  ?  That  which  produces  a  peculiar 
effect  when  cognized,  which  effect  we  term  the  emo- 
tion of  the  ludicrous.  We  can  no  more  tell  in  what 
wit  consists,  than  we  can  tell  in  what  truth  consists. 
Attempts  to  reduce  it  to  a  single  principle  or  charac- 
teristic have  failed.  A  great  variety  of  thoughts 
and  relations  are  witty. 

The  lowest  form  of  wit  is  termed  hufiior,  and 
may  be  possessed  by  one  by  no  means  remarkable  for 
intellectual  power.  The  higher  forms  of  wit  require 
a  nice   discrimination,   which  is   alliqd  to  intellect- 


160       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

ual  power.  It  has  sometimes  been  said  that  wit  and 
judgment  never  meet  in  the  same  person.  The  ques- 
tion is  one  to  be  determined  by  observation. 

Wit  and  judgment — that  is,  the  capacity  for  cog- 
nizing the  relations  of  the  ludicrous,  and  capacity  for 
cognizing  the  relations  necessary  to  come  to  sound 
conclusions— are  not  allied  in  the  sense  that  the  pres- 
ence of  the  one  indicates  the  presence  of  the  other. 
A  man  may  have  a  sound  practical  judgment,  and 
be  almost  wholly  incapable  of  cognizing  ludicrous 
relations ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  I  think  it  will  be 
found  that  the  person  who  has  wit  in  its  highest 
power — that  is,  power  to  cognize  those  relations 
which  constitute  the  highest  form  of  wit — will  have 
power  to  cognize  the  relations  necessary  to  the  for- 
mation of  sound  opinions. 

The  fine  arts,  painting,  poetry,  music,  sculpture, 
architecture,  and  gardening,  have  for  their  basis 
man's  aesthetic  nature — that  is,  his  power  of  cognizing 
and  enjoying  beauty.  They  are  said  to  be  addressed 
to  the  eye  and  ear ;  but  properly  speaking,  they  are 
addressed  to  the  mind.  They  should  receive  due  at- 
tention from  all  who  would  give  to  their  minds  a  full 
and  harmonious  development. 

Beauty  should  be  studied  in  subordination  to  truth 
and  goodness.  "  The  effect  of  the  Beautiful  upon  the 
soul,"  says  Professor  Shedd,  "when  unmixed,  un- 
counteracted,  and  exorbitant,  is  enervation.  .  .  .  When 
the  sesthetical  prevails  over  the  intellectual  and  moral, 


COGNITION   OF   BEAUTY.  161 

the  prime  qualities,  the  depth,  the  originality,  and 
the  power  die  out  of  letters,  and  the  mediocrity  that 
ensues  is  but  poorly  concealed  by  the  elegance  and 
polish  thrown  over  it.  Even  when  there  is  much 
genius  and  much  originality,  an  excess  of  Art,  a  too 
deep  suffusion  of  beauty,  a  too  fine  flush  of  color,  is 
often  the  cause  of  a  radical  defect." 

In  further  proof  of  his  viewSi,  he  refers  to  "  John 
Milton,  one  of  those  two  minds  which  tower  high 
above  all  others  in  the  sphere  of  modern  literature. 
If  there  ever  was  a  man  in  v/hom  the  aesthetic  was  in 
complete  subjection  to  the  intellectual  and  moral, 
without  being  in  the  least  suppressed  or  mutilated  by 
them,  that  man  was  Milton.  If  there  ever  was  a 
human  intellect  so  entirely  master  of  itself,  of  such  a 
severe  type,  that  all  its  processes  seem  to  have  been 
the  pure  issue  of  discipline  and  law,  it  was  the  intel- 
lect of  Milton.  In  contemplating  the  grandeur  of  the 
products  of  his  mind,  we  are  apt  to  lose  sight  of  the 
mind  itself,  and  of  his  intellectual  character.  If  we 
rightly  consider  it,  the  discipline  to  which  he  sub- 
jected himself,  and  the  austere  style  of  intellect  and 
of  art  in  which  it  resulted,  are  as  worthy  of  the  rev- 
erence and  admiration  of  the  scholar  as  the  'Paradise 
Lost.'  We  have  unfortunately  no  minute  and  de- 
tailed account  of  his  every-day  life ;  but  from  all  that 
we  do  know,  and  from  all  that  we  can  infer  from  the 
lofty,  colossal  culture  and  character  in  which  he  comes 
down  to  us,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  Milton  must  have 


162       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL  PIIIIOSOPHT, 

subjected  his  intellect  to  a  restraint,  and  rigid  dealing 
with  its  luxurious  tendencies,  as  strict  as  that  to 
which  Simeon  Stylites  or  St.  Francis  of  Assisi  sub- 
jected their  bodies.  We  can  trace  the  process,  the 
defecating,  purifying  process,  that  went  on  in  his  in- 
tellect, through  his  entire  productions.  The  longer 
he  lived,  and  the  more  he  composed,  the  severer  be- 
came his  taste,  and  the  more  grandly  and  serenely 
beautiful  became  his  works.  It  is  true  that  the 
theory  of  art,  and  of  culture,  opposed  to  that  which 
we  are  recommending,  may  complain  of  the  occasional 
absence  of  beauty,  and  may  charge  as  a  fault  an  un- 
due nakedness  and  austerity  of  form.  But  one  thing 
is  certain,  and  must  be  granted  by  the  candid  critic, 
that  whenever  the  element  of  Beauty  is  found  in  Mil- 
ton, it  is  found  in  absolute  purity.  That  severe  re- 
fining process,  that  test  of  light  and  fire,  to  which  all 
his  materials  w^ere  subjected,  left  no  residuum  which 
was  not  perfectly  pure.  And  therefore  it  is,  that 
throughout  universal  literature,  a  more  absolute 
Beauty,  and  a  more  delicate  aerial  grace,  are  not  to 
be  found  than  appear  in  the  '  Comus,'  and  the  Fourth 
Book  of  '  Paradise  Lost.' " 


CHAPTER  XIX. 


COGNITION    OF   KECTITUDE. 


We  see  a  person  inflicting  a  severe  Wow  upon  an 
unofiending  stranger.  We  cognize  by  the  eye  the 
blow  and  its  physical  efiects.  We  also  cognize  the 
fact  that  it  was  wrong.  When  we  say  that  the  blow 
was  wrong,  we  mean  that  the  person  did  wrong  in 
giving  the.  blow. 

Will  any  one  ask.  How  do  we  know  that  the  blow 
was  wrong  ?  We  know  it,  just  as  we  know  that  the 
blow  was  struck.  We  saw  the  blow,  and  saw  that  it 
was  wrong.  In  both  cases  it  was  the  mind  that  saw. 
If  we  can  trust  the  mind's  cognitive  power  in  regard 
to  the  blow,  we  can  trust  it  in  regard  to  the  moral 
character  of  the  blow. 

We  see  a  man  in  danger  of  drowning.  Another 
rescues  him.  We  see  the  act,  and  we  also  see  that  it 
is  right. 

We  see  one  giving  another  money.  We  do  not 
know  whether  the  act  is  right  or  wrong.  If  it  be  in 
payment  for  goods  purchased,  it  is  right ;  if  it  be 
given  in  bribery,  it  is  wrong.  In  this  case,  the  cog- 
nition of  the  moral  character  of  the  act  is  not  direct, 


164       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

as  in  the  former  cases.  It  is  conditioned  upon  a  cog- 
nition of  the  motive  of  the  giver. 

In  simple  and  clear  cases,  the  cognition  of  the 
moral  character  of  an  action  is  intuitive  ;  in  complex 
cases,  the  cognition  is  inferential — that  is,  is  condi- 
tioned on  preceding  cognitions.  Hence,  in  complex 
cases,  there  is  liability  to  error :  different  minds  may 
come  to  different  conclusions  as  to  the  moral  character 
of  an  act. 

There  is  thus  a  difference  between  right  and 
wrong.  We  know  that  there  is  a  difference  between 
right  and  wrong  actions,  just  as  we  know  that  there 
is  a  difference  between  white  and  black  objects :  we 
cognize  the  fact  in  both  cases.  Nothing  is  gained 
by  saying  that  reason  makes  known  to  us  the  dis- 
tinction ;  for  reason  is  not  something  distinct  from 
us — our  minds.  We  may  ascribe  some  acts  of  the 
mind  to  reason  and  some  to  the  understanding ;  but 
if  the  mind  is  one,  those  terms  simply  express  different 
modes  of  its  action.  When  the  mind  is  cognizing 
contingent  truth,  it  is  said  by  some  to  be  exercising 
the  understanding ;  when  it  is  cognizing  necessary 
truth,  it  is  said  to  be  exercising  the  reason.  The  real 
distinction  relates  to  the  nature  of  the  truth  cognized. 

Some  seem  to  think  that  the  mind  does  not  arrive 
at  truth  in  regard  to  morals  in  the  same  Avay  in  which 
it  arrives  at  truths  in  regard  to  agriculture  and  poli- 
tics. A  special  organ  must  be  constructed  and 
endowed  with   infallibility.      Reason   or   conscience 


COGNITION   OF   RECTITUDE.  165 

must  be  endowed  with  powers  transcending  other 
faculties,  that  it  may  make  known  to  us  the  difference 
between  right  and  wrong,  and  authoritatively  tell  us 
our  duty.  Numerous  errors  in  regard  to  the  elements 
of  morality  have  resulted  from  this  personification  of 
reason  and  conscience. 

It  may  be  asked,  "  Has  not  man  a  conscience  to 
make  known  to  him  his  duty  ?  " 

What  is  meant  by  the  expression,  "Man  has  a 
conscience"?  Simply  that  man  has  the  power  of  cog- 
nizing right  and  wrong  actions.  The  mind  can  cog- 
nize right  and  its  opposite ;  man  has  a  conscience ; 
the  mind  possesses  a  moral  faculty :  all  these  are 
identical  expressions. 

It  may  be  said,  "  All  men  do  not  agree  in  their 
views  of  right  and  wrong.  If  man  is  endowed  with 
a  moral  faculty — ^if  conscience  is  possessed  by  all  men — 
then  all  men  would  have  the  same  views  as  to  moral 
questions.  Sight  is  possessed  by  all  men,  and  hence 
all  men  agree  in  distinguishing  black  from  white. 
There  are  no  instances  in  which  some  men  contend 
that  white  is  black ;  but  there  are  frequent  examples 
of  men  differing  in  regard  to  the  same  action — some 
regarding  it  as  right  and  others  as  wrong." 

The  inference  thus  drawn  is  not  legitimate.  It 
does  not  follow  from  the  premise,  "  All  men  are  en- 
dowed Avith  the  power  of  cognizing  the  difference 
between  right  and  wrong,*'  that  all  men  will  agree 
in  regard  to  the  moral  character  of  all  actions.     The 


166       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

inference  as  drawn  by  the  objector  is  founded  on  the 
assumption,  that  if  the  mind  has  power  to  cognize  the 
moral  qualities  of  actions,  it  must  be  infallible  in  the 
exercise  of  that  power.  This  assumption  is  unauthor- 
ized. The  mind  is  not  infallible  in  any  of  its  mediate 
cognitions.  Men  have  the  power  of  distinguishing 
truth  from  falsehood.  They  know  that  the  assertion, 
"  The  whole  is  greater  than  its  part,"  is  true,  and  that 
the  assertion,  "The  whole  is  less  than  its  part,"  is  false. 
But  the  fact  that  the  mind  has  thus  power  to  cognize 
truth,  does  not  prove  that  its  cognitions  of  truth  must 
in  all  case  be  infallible,  and  that  all  men  will  think 
alike  on  all  questions  relating  to  truth. 

Some  truths  are  simple  and  self-luminous.  In 
regard  to  such  truths  all  men  agree  in  their  cogni- 
tions. Some  truths  or  questions  are  complicated, 
and  can  be  cognized  only  through  the  medium  of 
other  truths.  Hence  there  is  liability  to  error.  Hence 
there  will  be  diversities  of  judgments.  But  diver- 
sities of  opinion  in  regard  to  what  is  true  and  false  in 
certain  cases,  do  not  prove  that  the  mind  has  not  the 
power  to  cognize  truth  —  do  not  prove  that  there 
is  no  diiference  between  truth  and  error.  In  like 
manner,  diversities  of  opinion  in  regard  to  what  is 
right  and  wrong  in  certain  cases,  do  not  prove  that 
the  mind  has  not  power  to  cognize  rectitude — do  not 
prove  that  there  is  no  difference  between  right  and 
wrong. 

Every  one  is  conscious  that  he  has  power  to  cog- 


COGJSriTION   OF  RECTITUDE,  167 

nize  rectitude — that  is,  to  cognize  the  moral  quality 
of  actions.  How  does  he  know  that  others  have  this 
power — that  it  is  an  attribute  of  humanity  ? 

He  infers  from  the  actions  of  others  that  they  have 
this  power. 

How  does  he  know  that  men  in  other  lands  and  in 
other  ages  possessed  this  power  ? 

The  proof  of  the  fact  is  found  in  the  structure  of 
every  language  and  in  every  historic  record.  In 
every  language  there  are  words  expressive  of  right 
and  wrong,  of  obligation,  of  praise  and  blame. 
Words  are  expressive  of  ideas :  the  people  using 
those  languages  had  ideas  of  right  and  wrong,  of 
obligation,  of  praise  and  blame — that  is,  had  the 
power  of  cognizing  the  moral  quality  of  actions. 
Every  code  of  laws  that  has  come  down  to  us,  re- 
cognizes moral  distinctions.  There  have  been  unjust 
laws  ;  yet  the  statutes  of  all  nations  have  a  wonderful 
agreement  in  forbidding  that  which  is  wrong  and 
allowing  that  which  is  right. 

The  approbation  which  the  heroes  of  history  have 
received,  is  based  on  the  supposed  possession  of  good 
qualities.  Bad  men  have  been  honored,  but  not  be- 
cause they  were  bad. 

Conscience,  then,  is  an  original  attribute  of  our 
nature ;  in  other  words,  all  men  have  the  power  of 
cognizing  the  moral  qualities  of  actions.  The  mind 
is  not  infallible  in  the  exercise  of  this  power.  It  may 
form  erroneous  conclusions  in  regard  to  duty,  and  it 


168       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

may  form  erroneous  conclusions  in  regard  to  ques- 
tions of  political  economy. 

In  regard  to  some  actions,  all  men's  cognitions  are 
the  same.  In  regard  to  some  actions,  the  cognition 
of  the  moral  quality  is  intuitive.  All  men's  intuitions 
in  regard  to  a  given  truth  are  the  same.  In  other 
words,  some  truths  are  self-evident,  and  in  regard  to 
such  truths  all  men  agree.  The  axioms  of  geometry 
are  self-evident,  and  all  men  agree  that  they  are  true. 
There  are  self-evident  truths  in  morals.  In  regard  to 
these  all  men  agree. 

That  benevolence  is  right  and  malignity  is  wrong, 
are  self-evident  truths.  In  regard  to  such  truths,  the 
cognitions  of  all  men  are  the  same.  It  is  not  affirmed 
that  all  men  would  assent  to  the  generalized  state- 
ment that  malignity  is  wrong ;  but  let  an  act  of 
wanton,  unprovoked  malignity  be  witnessed,  and  all 
men  would  see  that  it  is  wrong.  Let  an  act  of  true 
benevolence  be  witnessed,  and  all  men  would  approve 
it  as  right.  Differences  of  opinion,  as  has  been  before 
remarked,  may  take  place  in  complicated  cases,  where 
the  steps  taken  to  reach  the  conclusion  are  numerous, 
and  depending  upon  truths  which  may  be  imperfectly 
apprehended.  White  and  black  are  clearly  distin- 
guishable by  all  men  when  white  and  black  objects 
are  before  them,  and  so  of  other  colors.  But  let  two 
colors  be  blended,  as  in  the  structure  of  the  rainbow, 
and  it  is  difficult  to  say  where  one  color  ends  and  the 
other  begins.     If  men  were  required  to  state  which 


COGNITION   OF   RECTITUDE.  169 

color  predominated  at  a  particular  point,  there  would 
be  diversities  of  opinion,  though  there  would  be 
none  as  to  the  difference  between  the  two  colors.  So 
the  difference  between  right  and  wrong  is  clearly 
seen  in  simple  cases.  In  complicated  ones,  there  will 
be  diversities  of  opinion. 

In  what  does  rectitude  consist?  What  consti- 
tutes a  right  action  ?  We  have  seen  that  we  cannot 
answer  similar  questions  asked  with  reference  to 
truth.  We  cannot  tell  in  what  truth  consists ;  we 
cannot  tell  what  constitutes  a  true  proposition.  We 
are  in  the  same  condition  in  relation  to  these  ques- 
tions when  asked  with  reference  to  rectitude.  When, 
with  respect  to  a  particular  act,  it  is  asked,  What 
constitutes  its  Tightness  ?  we  may  be  able  to  give  an 
answer.  For  example:  I  see  one  giving  money  tc 
relieve  a  person  in  distress.  The  act  is  a  right  one. 
Why  is  it  right  ?  Because  kindness  to  the  distressed 
— ^benevolence — is  right.  On  what  does  the  Tightness 
of  benevolence  depend?  It  may  be  said  that  it  is 
right  because  God  commands  it.  With  reverence  be 
it  asked,  on  what  does  the  lightness  of  God's  com 
mand  depend  ?  A  number  of  questions  may  be  asked, 
but  the  point  to  which  we  shall  be  brought  is  a 
confession  of  our  inability  to  state  in  what  right 
consists. 

It  will  be  asked.  Does  not  the  Tightness  of  an  action 
consist  in  its  tendency  to  promote  happiness  ?     The 
Tightness  of  a  particular  action  may  be  made  known 
8 


170       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

to  US  by  its  tendency  to  promote  happiness  ;  but  the 
question  may  be  asked,  Why  is  it  right  to  promote 
happiness  ? 

The  followers  of  Paley  and  Bentham  affirm  that 
the  moral  difference  betY>^een  actions  is  founded 
•wholly  on  their  tendency  to  promote  happiness  or 
misery.  Those  actions  which  tend  to  promote  happi- 
ness are  right,  and  right  on  that  account  alone ;  and 
those  actions  which  tend  to  cause  misery  are  wrong, 
and  wrong  on  that  account  alone.  The  question, 
Why  are  actions  tending  to  happiness  right  ?  re- 
mains unanswered. 

We  may  admit  that  right  actions  tend  to  promote 
happiness  ;  but  it  does  not  prove  that  their  rightness 
consists  in  this  tendency.  In  many  cases,  we  intui- 
tively cognize  an  act  to  be  right  before  we  take  the 
consequences  into  view — when  we  are  wholly  igno- 
rant of  the  consequences.  The  mind  clearly  distin- 
guishes between  utility  and  rightness.  These  are 
not  identical.  Let  the  appeal  be  made  to  conscious 
ness. 

If  the  theory  under  consideration  were  true,  then 
if  murder,  malignity,  and  treason  were  followed  by 
the  greatest  amount  of  happiness,  they  would  be 
right.  This  conclusion,  so  diametrically  opposed  to 
our  intuitive  cognitions,  is  sufficient  to  show  the  un- 
soundness of  the  theory. 

Again,  on  this  theory  a  system  of  morals  would 
be  impossible  to  one  of  less  than  infinite  knowledge. 


COGNITION    OF   RECTITUDE.  l7l 

Indeed,  a  finite  mind  conld  never  settle  a  single  ques* 
tion  of  duty.  We  wish  to  know  whether  an  action 
is  right.  If  there  is  no  difference  in  actions  except  in 
relation  to  their  consequences,  then  we  wish  to  know 
whether  the  action  will  be  followed  by  more  happi- 
ness than,  misery  during  the  whole  duration  of  our 
being.  Infinite  knowledge  would  be  required  to 
determine  whether  the  action  is  right  or  wrong ;  and 
infinite  knowledge  is  not  ours. 

The  tendency  of  an  action  to  promote  happiness 
no  more  constitutes  its  rightness,  than  the  tendency 
of  mathematical  truths  to  utility  constitutes  their 
trueness.  There  are  certain  mathematical  principles 
or  truths  useful  to  the  engineer.  Their  tendency,  if 
rightly  applied,  is  to  make  his  work  secure.  Their 
utility  is  a  fact — a  fact  clearly  distinguishable  from 
their  truth.  Moral  truths,  rightly  applied,  are  use- 
ful— render  the  structure  of  happiness  stable ;  but 
their  utility  is  clearly  distinguishable  from  their 
rightness. 

As  it  is  conceded  that  we  are  under  obligation  to 
do  right,  if  doing  right  consists  in  securing  the  great- 
est amount  of  happiness,  then  if  we  could  secure 
more  happiness  by  serving  Satan  than  by  serving 
God,  we  should  be  under  obligation  to  do  so  ! 

Why  are  we  under  obligation  to  do  right  ?  At- 
tempts have  been  made  to  answer  this  question — to 
give  a  reason  for  doing  right — to  prove  that  we 
ought  to  do  right.     The  consequence  has  been,  that 


172       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

obscurity  has  been  thrown  upon  a  subject  naturally 
clear.  This  is  always  the  consequence  of  attempts 
to  prove  self-evident  truths. 

Why  should  we  believe  a  true  proposition  when 
it  is  clearly  set  before  the  mind  ?  Because  it  is  true. 
Why  should  we  do  right  ?  Because  it  is  right.  The 
obligation  to  do  right  is  involved  in  the  j)erception 
of  right ;  or  it  may  be  stated  thus  :  It  is  a  self-evident 
truth,  that  we  are  under  obligation  to  do  right.  No 
truth  clearer  than  this  can  be  brought  to  prove  it. 
We  may  state  advantages  following  right  doing,  and 
disadvantages  following  wrong  doing.  But  these 
facts  only  show  that  it  is  prudent  to  do  right ;  they 
do  not  add  to  the  force  of  the  obligation. 

It  may  be  said  that  we  should  do  right  because 
God  commands  it.  Undoubtedly  all  God's  com- 
mands are  right,  and  it  is  our  duty  to  obey  them. 
But  the  fact  that  it  is  right  for  us  to  obey  God's 
commands,  does  not  prove  that  God  created  the 
distinction  between  right  and  wrong — that  things 
which  are  right  are  so  simply  because  He  commands 
us  to  do  them.  That  which  is  created,  is  created  in 
time — ^that  is,  at  some  time.  Now,  was  there  ever  a 
time  when  malignity  was  right  and  benevolence 
wrong  ?  Has  God  always  been  just  and  holy  ?  Has 
He  always  been  a  hater  of  iniquity  ?  Then  the  dis- 
tinction between  holiness  and  iniquity  has  always 
existed — there  never  was  a  time  when  it  began 
to  be. 


COG]SriTIOK   OF   EECTITUDE.  173 

The  question,  Why  should  we  obey  God's  com- 
mand? remains  as  yet  unanswered.  The  true  an- 
swer is,  because  it  is  right  to  do  so.  It  may  be  said, 
we  should  obey  Him  because  He  is  our  Creator.  Why 
does  the  creature  owe  obedience  to  its  Creator  ?  It 
will  be  said,  because  He  made  him.  Suppose  the 
maker  of  man  were  an  unholy  being,  and  command- 
ed man  to  practise  iniqaity.  Suppose  man's  moral 
nature  to  be  as  it  now  is,  would  it  be  right  for  man 
to  practise  iniquity  ?  If  it  would  not,  then  the  mere 
relation  of  Creator  and  creature  does  not  of  itself 
involve  the  duty  of  obedience  on  the  part  of  the 
latter.  Suppose — with  reverence  be  it  spoken — ^tliat 
God's  commands  should  be  the  opposite  of  what  they 
are;  suppose  He  should  command  us  to  be  sinful, 
would  it  be  right  for  us  to  be  sinful?  We  know 
that  it  is  impossible  for  Him  to  command  that  which 
is  not  right,  just  as  it  is  impossible  for  Him  to  lie ; 
but  if  it  were  possible,  and  were  done,  would  not  our 
obligation  to  obedience  cease  ? 

Will  it  be  said.  If  God  command  me  to  murder 
a  man,  it  would  be  right  to  do  so  ?  If  God  were  to 
command  you  to  take  ^he  life  of  a  man,  it  would  be 
right  for  you  to  do  so.  But  to  take  the  life  of  a  man 
in  obedience  to  God's  commands,  is  one  thing ;  and  to 
take  the  life  of  a  man  with  malice  prepense  and  in 
violation  of  God's  command,  is  another  thing.  The 
latter  is  murder,  the  former  is  not. 

God  could  not  authorize  murder.     His  perfections 


174       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

forbid  it.  He  can  authorize  one  to  take  the  life  of 
another.  All  souls  are  His,  and  He  may  dispose  of 
them  according  to  His  righteous  will.  Whatever 
may  be  the  case  in  regard  to  sinless  beings,  we  have 
sinned,  and  forfeited  our  lives  to  His  justice.  He 
may  therefore  take  our  lives  in  any  way  that  He 
chooses — by  disease,  or  by  the  instrumentality  of 
men. 

While  God  cannot  change  wrong  into  right,  yet, 
whenever  He  commands  us  to  perform  an  act,  it  be- 
comes moral,  though  before  it  was  indifferent.  In 
many  cases  it  is  a  matter  of  indifference  what  kind 
of  dress  we  wear ;  we  may  wear  this  or  that,  with- 
out doing  wrong.  If  God  were  to  command  us  to 
wear  a  particular  dress,  it  would  be  wrong  for  us  not 
to  do  so.  So  far  as  there  are  actions  without  a  moral 
character,  they  become  moral  and  obligatory  when 
commanded  by  Him. 

Men  are  under  obligation  to  do  what  is  right — 
not  what  they  may  think  is  right.  It  is  a  popular 
error,  that  sincerity  in  error  changes  the  moral 
character  of  acts  consequent  upon  that  error.  It  is 
thought  that  if  a  man  sincerely  believes  he  is  right, 
his  action  will  be  right. 

Sincerity  in  error  in  physical  matters  does  not 
affect  the  consequences  of  the  error.  If  a  man  build- 
ing a  tower  sincerely  believes  that  he  has  so  con- 
structed it  that  the  line  of  gravity  falls  within  the 
base,  and  yet  it  falls  without  the  base,  his  sincerity 


COGNITION    OF   EECTITUDEo  175 

will  not  prevent  the  tower  froDi  falling.  Sincerity  in 
error  will  not  reverse  the  law  of  gravitation. 

If  a  man  intending  to  visit  a  city  lying  eastward, 
"by  mistake  takes  a  road  leading  northward,  he 
may  sincerely  believe  he  is  right,  but  he  will  not 
reach  the  desired  city.  Sincerity  in  error  cannot 
change  the  point  of  compass.  Can  it  change  the 
supreme  law  of  right,  to  which  even  God  himself 
is  subject  ? 

A  man  may  sincerely  believe  that  he  is  doing 
God's  will  when  he  is  going  contrary  to  that  will — 
as  Paul  thought  he  was  doing  God  service  when  he 
was  persecuting  unto  death  the  followers  of  Christ. 
It  is  true  that  failure  to  do  God's  will  in  such  circum- 
stances may  be  attended  with  less  guilt  than  when 
the  failure  is  the  result  of  wilful  passion ;  still,  if  one 
has  acted  contrary  to  God's  will,  he  has  done  wrong. 
Thinking  a  thing  to  be  right  will  not  make  it  right, 
any  more  than  thinking  a  thing  to  be  true  will  make 
it  true.  It  is  singular  that  an  error  so  transparent  as 
that  uinder  consideration  should  have  had  so  wide  an 
influence. 

Intention  to  do  right  is  not  doing  right ;  it  is  a 
necessary  condition  of  doing  right.  Intention  to  take 
the  right  road  is  not  taking  the  right  road ;  nor  does 
it  of  necessity  lead  to  taking  the  right  road. 

The  right  road  may  be  taken  by  accident,  but  we 
can  never  do  right  by  accident. 

It  is  said  that  the  moral  character  of  an  act  lies  in 


176       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

the  intention.  Intention  is  the  condition  of  perform* 
ing  a  moral  act,  not  the  constituting  quality  of  the 
act.  Intention  is  used  in  two  senses.  Sometimes  it 
means  the  motives  prompting  to  action.  Suppose  the 
act  to  be  the  payment  of  a  just  debt.  The  act  in 
itself  is  right ;  but  if  the  debtor  pay  it  solely  through 
fear  of  an  arrest,  he  does  not  do  his  duty — does  not 
do  right.  Here  it  is  seen  that  in  order  to  perform  a 
right  action,  the  act  must  be  in  itself  right,  and  it 
must  be  performed  from  right  motives. 

Intention  is  also  used  in  the  sense  of  volition. 
A  man  may  conform  to  a  physical  law  without  in- 
tending to  do  it.  A  farmer,  though  ignorant  of  an 
important  law  of  vegetation,  may  conform  to  it,  and 
he  will  reap  all  the  advantages  resulting  from  con- 
formity to  that  law.  But  a  purpose  to  obey,  a  volun- 
tary obedience  to  moral  law,  is  essential;  there  can 
be  no  obedience  in  ignorance  or  by  accident.  We 
must  know  what  the  law  is,  and  voluntarily  conform 
to  it. 

Moral  qualities  belong  to  actions.  Actions  are 
performed  by  the  intelligent,  accountable  mind.  The 
body  is  the  instrument  of  the  mind.  Bodily  changes, 
physical  acts  as  they  are  sometimes  termed,  consid- 
ered apart  from  the  mind,  have  no  moral  character. 
The  motion  of  the  limbs  occasioned  by  the  action  of 
a  galvanic  battery  has  no  moral  character.  The 
motion  of  the  limbs  as  caused  by  the  volitions  of  the 
mind  has  a  moral  character.      The   volitions  are  a 


COGNITIOK    OF   EECTITUDE.  177 

part  of  the  mental  act ;  and  the  dispositions  and  de- 
sires leading  to  the  volition  are  a  part  of  the  act,  and 
come  within  the  view  of  the  mind,  when  it  decides 
that  the  act  is  right  or  wrong. 

In  order  to  a  perfect  moral  action,  the  act  its-elf, 
that  is,  the  end  sought  to  be  eifected,  must  be  right ; 
the  intention  must  be  right,  and  the  action  of  mind 
and  body  must  correspond  with  the  intention. 

Some  actions  are  intrinsically  right-^for  example, 
acts  of  honesty  and  benevolence :  some  actions  are 
intrinsically  wrong,  such  as  acts  of  malignity  and 
treachery.  Some  actions  are  neither  right  nor  v/rong 
in  themselves,  but  are  right  or  wrong  according  to 
circumstances.  It  may  not  be  wrong  for  me  to  sway 
my  body  backwards  and  forwards  in  my  own  study ; 
but  it  would  be  wrong  for  me  to  do  so  in  the  house 
of  God  during  public  worship. 

Is  morality  predicable  of  dispositions  and  habits 
as  well  as  of  voluntary  actions  ?  Some  affirm  that 
morality  is  predicable  only  of  voluntary  actions  ;  but, 
in  order  to  include  all  things  plainly  moral,  they  give 
an  unauthorized  extension  to  the  term  voluntary. 
They  make  it  include  our  desires  and  affections.  A 
man  earnestly  desires  to  exercise  revenge  upon  an- 
other—  earnestly  desires  to  injure  him.  He  puts 
forth  no  voluntary  act  designed  to  injure  him,  be- 
cause he  has  no  opportunity.  The  desire  is  clearly 
distinguishable  from  a  volition — an  act  of  the  wiM — 
that  is,  of  the  mind  willing.  Is  the  desire  destitute 
8* 


178        ELEMENTS    OF    INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

of  a  moral  character  ?  Is  it  not  as  clearly  wrong  a? 
a  volition  causing  a  blow  is  wrong  ? 

There  may  he  thus  virtuous  and  vicious  desires* 
In  like  manner,  there  may  be  virtuous  and  vicious  dis- 
positions and  habits. 

Dispositions  and  habits  are  not  acts,  but  condi- 
tions of  mind  causing  acts,  and  determining  their 
moral  character.  A  man  who  is  constantly  perform- 
ing benevolent  acts,  forms  a  habit  of  benevolence.  A 
man  who  is  continually  performing  selfish  acts,  forms 
a  habit  of  selfishness.  These  habits  form  a  portion  of 
the  character  of  each.  Is  the  character  of  the  one 
praiseworthy,  and  the  character  of  the  other  blame- 
worthy; or  are  our  approbation  and  disapprobation 
confined  to  the  voluntary  actions  ? 

I  think  the  general  sense  of  mankind  attributes 
virtue  and  vice  to  dispositions  and  character  as  well 
as  to  strictly  voluntary  acts.  It  would  be  more 
correct  to  say  that  the  moral  character  of  our  actions 
depends  upon  our  dispositions,  rather  than  that  moral- 
ity is  confined  to  our  volitions. 

Men  are  under  obligation  to  do  right — to  do  right 
in  all  things  and  at  all  times.  Have  they  power  to 
do  so  ?  Is  man's  ability  commensurate  with  his 
obligation  ? 

In  his  present  fallen  condition,  man  is  not  able  to 
act  with  perfect  uprightness — to  be  perfectly  holy. 
He  is  fallible  in  his  judgments,  and.  hence  often  fails 
to  form  right  ideas  as  to  his  duty.     We  must  know 


COGI^ITION   OF   RECTITUDE.  179 

our  duty  perfectly  in  order  to  perform  it  perfectly. 
In  order  to  perfect  holiness,  there  must  be  a  per- 
fect  knowledge   of    duty,   and    this   man   does   not 

possess. 

Does  man's  ignorance  of  duty  excuse  him  from 
performing  it  ?  The  answer  depends  upon  the  causes 
of  his  ignorance.  If  he  is  wilfully  ignorant — ignorant 
because  he  will  not  use  his  powers  aright — if  he  is 
misled  by  prejudice  and  passion,  he  is  responsible  for 
the  causes  of  the  ignorance,  and  consequently  for  the 
ignorance  itself. 

Suppose  man  has  a  perfect  knowledge  of  duty : 
has  he  ability  to  perform  it  perfectly — to  be  perfectly 
holy?  : 

Man  was  originally  endowed!  with  full  power  to 
do  his  whole  duty — 1]0  be  perfectly  holy.  But  the 
Scriptures  teach  that  by  the  fall  and  by  his  wilful 
transgressions  his  capacity  for  right  doing  has  been 
lessened.  It  is  conceded  by  all  that  a  man,  by  form- 
ing sinful  habits,  diminishes  his  power  to  do  right. 
He  diminishes  his  power  to  see  duty  and  to  do  it.  Is 
his  obligation  to  do  right/  thereby  lessened  ?  or  may 
the  moral  Governor  hold  1dm  responsible  for  not  doing 

all  that  he  could  have  do/iie,  if  he  had  not  lessened  his 

/ 
moral  power  ?^  / 

Some  think  that,  in/  this  case,  man  is  responsible 

only  for  what  he  has   power  to  do — no  matter  how 

the  lack  of  power  waf/^  occasioned.     They  hold  him 

punishable  for  the  act  'of  lessening  his  power,  but  not 

•  / 


180        ELEMENTS    OF    INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

accountable  for  doing  that  whicli  would  have  been 
his  duty  had  he  not  lessened  his  power. 

To  this  it  may  be  objected,  that  it  makes  God's 
claims  dependent  upon  the  will  of  the  sinner.  Just 
so  far  as  the  sinner  lessens  his  power  to  do  right, 
God's .  claims  to  obedience  are  lowered.  A  new  law 
must  be  made  for  the  sinner  every  day;  or  rather,  he 
makes  a  new  law  for  himself! 

If,  in  proportion  as  the  sinner  lessens  by  sinning 
his  moral  power,  God's  claims  to  his  obedience  are 
lessened,  then  if  he  could  destroy  all  his  power  to  do 
right,  God  would  have  no  claims  to  his  obedience  at 
all.  He  would  be  a  subject  of  punishment,  but  not 
subject  to  the  law  of  holiness.  Is  it  reasonable  to 
suppose  that  a  man  by  sinning  can  place  himself 
without  the  domain  of  God's  law  ?  Is  not  God's 
law  immutable  and  binding  forever  on  every  moral 
being  ? 

We  find  that  men  are  in  fact  unable  to  perfectly 
obey  God's  law ;  and  ye.^j  God  commands  them  to  be 
holy  as  He  is  holy.  It  Avould  seem,  therefore,  that 
God  claims  that  which  mail,  in  his  fallen  condition,  is 
unable  to  perform.  "We  aro  here  met  by  a  difficulty 
that  human  wisdom  cannc>t  solve.  Men  are  born 
without  the  requisite  power  to  render  perfect  obe- 
dience to  God's  law :  their  power  is  lessened  still  more 
by  voluntary  transgression ;  but  this  is  the  result  of 
a  native  tendency  to  evil.  Wbence  this  strange  con 
dition  ?     The  Bible  informs  us  that  it  is  the  result  of 


COGKITION   OF   RECTITUDE.  181 

Adam's  sin.  Whether  one  accept  the  explanation  or 
not,  the  difficulty  still  remains. 

The  present  disordered  condition  of  the  human 
mind,  whether  it  he  regarded  as  a  consequence  of 
Adam's  sin,  or  whether  it  he  regarded  as  the  result 
of  creation,  is  a  mystery  that  the  future  may  solve. 
At  present  it  is  one  of  those  things  in  regard  to  which 
it  may  be  said,  "  clouds  and  darkness  are  round  about 
him."  Still,  this  should  never  for  a  moment  permit  us 
to  doubt  the  truth,  that  "justice  and  judgment  are 
the  habitation  of  his  throne."  We  must  not  deny  a 
well-established  fact  because  we  cannot  give  a  satis- 
factory explanation  of  it. 

The  difficulty  above  noted  is  in  nowise  chargeable 
to  revealed  religion.  Man  is  as  he  is,  whether  the 
Bible  be  a  revelation  from  God  or  not.  Revelation 
proposes  a  remedial  system,  and  in  its  perfect  adapta- 
tion to  fallen  man  is  found  one  of  the  strongest  ar- 
guments for  its  truth. 

Much  is  said  about  the  duty  of  obeying  the  dic- 
tates of  conscience :  what  is  meant  by  tl  e  expres- 
sion ?  Acting  in  accordance  with  our  perceptions 
of  right. 

Do  we  always  do  right  when  we  obey  con- 
science ?  That  is,  do  we  always  do  right  when  we 
think  we  are  doing  right  ?  Are  our  moral  judgments 
always  correct  ?  Or  doe^s  our  thinking  a  thing  to  be 
right,  make  it  right  ? 

To  ask,  Ought  we  always  to  obev  cop^r^ienr-e  ?  is  to 


182       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

ask.  Ought  we  always  to  do  wliat  w^e  think  is  right  ? 
The  reply  to  this  is  obvious.  We  are  not  to  act  con- 
trary  to  our  convictions  of  duty ;  but  then  our  views 
of  duty  should  be  accurate. 

Suppose  one  fully  believes  it  to  be  his  duty  to  per- 
secute those  whom  he  regards  as  heretics.  In  popular 
language,  his  conscience  tells  him  he  ought  to  do  it. 
If  he  obeys  his  conscience,  if  he  acts  according  to 
his  erroneous  convictions  of  duty,  he  does  wrong ;  for 
it  is  not  God's  will  that  any  one  should  persecute 
others.  If  he  disobeys  his  conscience,  acts  contrary 
to  his  erroneous  conviction  of  duty,  he  does  wrong. 
The  wrong  consists,  it  is  said,  in  violating  his  con- 
science ;  but  this  simply  means  that  he  refused  to  act 
in  accordance  with  his  convictions  of  duty.  The 
wrong  consists  in  acting  contrary  to  what  he  believed 
to  be  the  will  of  God.  He  believed  it  to  be  God's 
will  that  he  should  persecute ;  but  from  tenderness  of 
heart,  or  fear  of  public  opinion,  he  declined  to  do 
what  he  believed  to  be  God's  will,  and  thus  was 
guilty,  in  principle,  of  disobeying  God — -just  as  a 
child  may  be  guilty  of  disobedience  to  his  parent,  by 
refusing  to  do  what  he  believed  his  parent  com- 
manded, though  that  belief  was  erroneous. 

We  see  thus  that  a  man,  by  entertaining  wrong 
opinions,  may  be  in  a  condition  in  which  he  will  do 
wrong  whether  he  acts  or  refrains  from  acting.  Is  he 
then  to  blame  ? 

That  depends  on  the  causes  of  his  being  in  that 


COGNITION    OF   EECTITUDE.  183 

position.  If  the  cause  was  Ms  neglect  to  investigate 
and  understand  the  truth  on  which  his  duty  was  con- 
ditioned, he  is  of  course  responsible  for  being  in  that 
unhappy  position. 

We  are  under  obligation  to  have  right  views  of 
duty,  and  to  act  in  accordance  with  those  views. 
Hence  we  see  the  importance  of  a  knowledge  of  re- 
ligious truth,  so  much  insisted  on  in  the  Scriptures. 
An  orthodox  creed  is  an  essential  condition  of  an  or- 
thodox life. 

Are  we  to  decide  questions  of  duty  for  ourselves, 
or  are  we  to  defer  to  the  judgment  and  authority  of 
others  ?  Are  we  ever  to  act  contrary  to  our  con- 
victions of  right  from  regard  to  the  authority  of 
others  ? 

We  have  seen  that  one  is  under  obligation  to  know 
his  duty — to  know  it  himself.  Whatever  aid  he  can 
get  from  others  in  arriving  at  true  conclusions  in  regard 
to  duty,  he  is  under  obligation  to  get ;  but  he  cannot 
throw  upon  others  the  responsibility  of  deciding. 
He  must  act  for  himself,  and  therefore  he  must  think 
for  himself:  thinking,  in  such  cases,  is  not  separable 
from  action.  Every  one  must  give  account  of  himself 
unto  God.  Priest  or  potentate  cannot  answer  for 
him ;  therefore  they  are  not  to  decide  questions  of 
duty  for  him. 

It  has  been  said  by  some  men  of  great  reputation, 
that  in  regard  to  religious  matters  a  man's  own  con- 
science is  to  be  his  guide,  but  that  in  regard  to  civil 


184       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

matters  the  law  of  the  land,  and  not  conscience,  is  to 
be  his  guide. 

To  say  that  a  man's  conscience  is  to  be  his  guide 
in  religious  matters,  is  to  say  that  he  is  to  decide  for 
himself  what  his  duty  is  in  regard  to  religion,  and  to 
do  it. 

To  say  that  the  law,  as  distinguished  from  con- 
science, is  to  be  one's  guide  in  civil  matters,  is  to  say 
that  one  is  to  do  what  the  law  enjoins,  whether  he 
regards  it  as  right,  as  according  to  the  will  of  God, 
or  not. 

This  view  implies  a  distinction  in  regard  to  human 
actions  which  does  not  exist.  It  is  not  true  that  some 
of  our  actions  are  religious,  and  others  civil  or  sec- 
ular. God's  will  has  respect  to  all  our  actions. 
Whether  we  eat  or  drink,  or  whatsoever  we  do,  we 
are  to  do  all  to  the  glory  of  God — to  do  all  with  ref- 
erence to  pleasing  God.  Acts  pertaining  to  govern- 
ment have  a  moral  character,  are  religious  acts,  as 
truly  as  acts  pertaining  to  the  public  worship  of  God. 
It  is  God's  will  that  men  should  worship  Him :  it  is 
also  His  will  that  they  should  obey  magistrates.  In 
all  things  God's  will  is  to  be  our  guide.  This  is  what 
is  meant  when  it  is  said  conscience  should  be  our 
guide. 

Again,  this  view  implies  that  rulers  have  the 
power  of  changing  moral  distinctions — if  not  of 
creating  them.  If  the  law  is  to  be  our  guide,  then 
whatever  the  law  enjohas  must  be  right.     Suppose  it 


COGNITION   OF   EECTITUDE.  185 

enjoins  idolatry — are  we  to  worship  idols  ?  Can  a 
legislature  or  a  despot  change  the  ten  command- 
ments ?  The  apostles  said,  we  ought  to  obey  God 
rather  than  man. 

The  true  doctrine  is  plain.  Government  is  a  di- 
vine institution.  It  is  our  duty  to  obey  all  the  laws, 
unless  they  come  in  conflict  with  the  law  of  God. 
Every  one  must  decide  for  himself  whether  in  a  given 
case  there  is  a  conflict  or  not.  If  the  law  commands 
him  to  do  what  is  wrong,  or  what  he  thinks  is  wrong, 
he  is  to  refuse  to  obey,  and  submit  to  the  penalty.  If 
it  inflicts  wrong  upon  him  at  the  hand  of  others,  he  is 
to  suffer  it. without  resistance;  unless  the  oppression 
is  so  great  as  to  justify  a  revolution — that  is,  a  forci- 
ble overthrow  of  the  oppressive  government,  and  the 
establishing  of  another  in  its  place.  The  fact  that  a 
law  is  unwise  and  unjust,  does  not  authorize  us  to 
disobey  it,  or  forcibly  resist  its  execution.  It  is  often 
our  duty  to  suffer  wrong.  When  the  wrong  is  well- 
nigh  intolerable,  and  there  is  a  fair  prospect  that  an 
attempt  to  overthrow  the  government  and  establish  a 
better  one  would  be  successful,  then  a  people  are  jus- 
tified in  resorting  to  the  right  of  revolution. 

Thus  it  may  be  our  duty  to  submit  to  a  govern- 
ment, for  a  time  at  least,  which  had  its  origin  in  in- 
justice and  cruelty.  The  fact  that  we  are  com- 
manded to  pay  tribute  to  Caesar,  does  not  prove  that 
Caesar  has  a  right  to  sway  the  sceptre  of  absolute 
authority,  and  that  it  would  not  be  right  to  dethrone 


186       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

him  if  we  had  the  power.  The  fact  that  a  slave  is 
commanded  to  obey  his  master,  does  not  prove  that 
the  master  has  a  right  to  his  obedience.  Rights  and 
duties,  when  different  persons  are  concerned,  are  not 
always  reciprocal.  It  may  be  my  duty  to  obey  a 
highwayman  till  such  time  .  as  I  can  put  a  bullet 
through  him. 

The  view  under  consideration  destroys  the  right 
of  private  judgment,  and  hence  destroys  personal  ac- 
countability. Man  is  no  longer  responsible  for  his 
conduct  in  civil  matters.  His  responsibility  is  thrown 
on  the  government.  It  may  just  as  well  be  thrown 
on  the  priest  or  the  fjope. 

This  view  was  adopted  in  consequence  of  an  il- 
logical conclusion  drawn  from  the  proposition,  that 
every  man  should  follow  his  convictions  of  duty  in 
civil  as  well  as  religious  matters.  The  conclusion 
was,  that  every  man  would  be  at  liberty  to  do  that 
which  was  right  in  his  own  eyes — that  anarchy  would 
be  the  result.  One  man  would  think  that  one  law 
was  wrong,  and  would  disobey  it ;  and  another,  an- 
other :  consequently,  the  authority  of  law  would  be 
at  an  end. 

Ko  such  conclusion  can  be  legitimately  drawn  from 
the  premises.  Every  man  is  under  obligation  to  act 
according  to  his  convictions  of  duty ;  he  is  also  under 
obligation  to  have  his  convictions  of  duty  accurate. 
If  his  convictions  are  accurate,  he  vfill  conscientiously 
obey  all  laws  except  those  which  are  really  in  con- 


COGNITION   03^^   RECTITUDE.  187 

flict  with  the  law  of  God,  and  no  one  will  contend 
that  any  government  can  nullify  the  law  of  God. 
Suppose  his  convictions  of  duty  are  inaccurate — that 
he  thinks  that  a  law  is  opposed  to  the  law  of  God 
when  it  is  not :  he  will  not  obey  it ;  he  will  disobey, 
and  suffer  the  penalty.  He  thus  recognizes  the  au- 
thority of  government.  He  makes  no  resistance  to 
the  laws.  In  fact,  he  renders  a  passive  obedience  to 
the  law.  Anarchy  cannot  take  place  where  every 
law  is  either  actively  or  passively  obeyed — where 
every  law  is  obeyed,  or  the  penalty  of  non-obedience 
submitted  to. 

Can  conscience  be  perverted?  That  is,  can  the 
mind  come  to  wrong  conclusions  in  respect  to  duty  ? 
Of  course,  as  it  is  fallible,  it  may  err  in  regard  to  ques- 
tions of  duty  as  in  regard  to  all  other  questions.  The 
error  may  result  from  an  inaccurate  view  of  the  facts 
of  the  case,  or  from  an  obtuseness  of  perception. 

The  mind's  power  of  cognizing  duty  may  be  im- 
paired by  neglecting  to  exercise  it  aright.  The  sus- 
ceptibility of  feeling  may  be  in  like  manner  decreased. 
Sin  blinds  the  mind — ^lessens  its  discriminating  power, 
and  hardens  the  heart— renders  the  mind  less  suscep- 
tible of  enjoyment  or  suffering,  as  duty  is  or  is  not 
performed. 

Can  conscience  be  eradicated- — can  the  mind  lose 
its  power  of  cognizing  moral  distinctions,  and  its 
power  of  feeling  remorse  ?  We  have  seen  that  by 
wrong  doing  the  discriminating  and  emotive  power 


188       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

may  be  impaired :  can  it  be  annihilated  ?  Can  a 
man  by  sinning  destroy  his  moral  nature  ? 

We  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  such  an  event 
can  take  place.  Conscience  sometimes  seems  to  slum- 
ber; that  is,  a  man  seems  insensible  to  moral  distinc- 
tions, and  sins  grievously  without  any  apparent  sense 
of  guilt  or  remorse.  But  this  slumber  is  often 
broken,  and  the  mind  seems  to  have  all  its  discrimina- 
tion and  moral  sensibility  restored. 

What  is  meant  by  the  supremacy  of  conscience  ? 
Simply,  that  we  ought  always  to  do  right.  Two 
plans  of  action  are  proposed :  one  will  be  productive 
of  great  pecuniary  benefit,  but  will  involve  a  course 
of  wrong  doing ;  the  other  proposes  that  which  is 
strictly  right.  Of  the  two,  we  should  adopt  the  lat- 
ter :  we  were  made  to  do  right,  and  it  can  never  be 
right  to  do  wrong.  We  may  say  that  one  plan  is 
dictated  by  the  understanding,  and  the  other  by  con- 
science, and  thus  be  led  to  speak  of  a  conflict  between 
understanding  and  conscience ;  but  the  conflict  is  be- 
tween the  plans,  not  between  two  imaginary  entities 
termed  faculties.  Both  plans  were  apprehended  by 
the  mind.  The  mind  sees  that  one  is  right,  and  the 
other  wrong. 

To  say  that  conscience  should  be  carefully  culti- 
vated, is  to  say  that  we  should  take  the  utmost  pains 
to  learn  what  is  right,  and  to  do  it ;  that  we  should 
seek  first  the  kingdom  of  God  and  his  righteousness. 


^  ^:     (Prr  ^yv%.  i  ^ .        n 


/^'f^^l/^y^/  L  ^z-t^ 


J^^^i^tcAZcU  /^. 


CHAPTER  XX. 


EEASOKING. 


ISTo  mental  process  is  more  important  than  that  of 
reasoning.  Hence  a  clear  explanation  of  it  is  de- 
sirable. 

To  give  an  explanation  or  analysis  of  the  process 
of  reasoning,  is  to  state  what  the  mind  does  when  it 
reasons.  As  all  men  frequently  perform  acts  of  rea- 
soning, it  ought  not  to  be  difficult  to,  describe  the 
acts  thus  performed. 

Reasoning  is  an  act  of  the  mind — not  the  act  of  a 
supposed  faculty  distinct  from  the  mind,  or  forming 
a  constituent  portion  of  the  mind.  In  regard  to  no 
mental  process  has  personification  been  carried  to 
greater  excess  than  in  regard  to  the  process  of  reason- 
ing. Reason,  or  the  reasoning  faculty,  has  been  en- 
dowed with  nearly  all  the  attributes  of  personality. 
It  is  said  to  inform  the  mind,  to  receive  from  the- 
senses  facts  and  draw  inferences  from  them ;  it  is 
said  to  fall  into  error,  and  to  lead  the  mind  astray. 
This  unfortunate  use  of  language  has  thrown  needless 


190       ELEMEl^TS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

obscurity  over  the  subject  of  reasoning.  In  consider- 
ing this  subject,  let  the  student  forget,  for  the  time 
being,  the  existence  of  faculties ;  let  him  ignore  the 
existence  of  Reason,  and  Judgment,  and  Comparison, 
and  the  like  personages,  and  confine  his  attention  to 
successive  mental  acts  which  constitute  the  process 
of  reasoning.  He  will  not  find  it  to  be  so  obscure 
and  complicated  a  matter  as  it  is  commonly  supposed 
to  be. 

It  is  the  mind  which  reasons,  just  as  it  is  the 
mind  that  cognizes  external  objects  and  remembers. 
Reasoning  is  a  cognizing  act  of  the  mind.  We  cog- 
nize by  reasoning  truths  which  were  unknown  to  us 
before.  Reasoning,  then,  is  the  mental  process  of 
cognizing  unknown  truths,  by  means  of  those  that 
are  known.  We  can  attend  to  this  process  in  a 
given  instance,  and  state  the  successive  steps. 

We  have  seen  that  some  of  our  cognitions  are 
direct,  immediate,  intuitive.  Such  are  our  cognitions 
of  the  existence  of  material  objects,  and  of  the  self- 
evident  truths  termed  axioms.  But  all  our  cogni- 
tions are  not  direct,  immediate,  intuitive.  Our 
knowledge  of  some  truths  is  conditioned  upon  our 
previous  knowledge  of  other  truths ;  that  is,  we  see 
some  things  to  be  true  in  consequence  of  having  seen 
some  other  things  to  be  true.  This  last  method  of 
seeing  is  reasoning.  If  we  observe  what  the  mind 
does — what  its  successive  acts  are  when  it  sees  a 
thing  to  be  true  because  it  has  previously  seen  an- 


REASONING.  191 

other  thing  to  be  true — we  shall  observe  the  process 
of  reasoning. 

We  are  not  at  liberty  to  assume  that  the  process 
of  reasoning  is  in  all  cases  identical.  The  effect  of 
so  doing  is  a  liability  to  warp  our  facts  to  suit  the 
assumption.  This  assumption  has  sometimes  been 
made  by  those  attempting  to  give  an  analysis  of  the 
process  of  reasoning.  The  mind  may  have  different 
modes  of  procedure  in  cognizing  unknown  truths  by 
means  of  known  truths.  When  we  have  observed 
the  process  in  different  circumstances,  and  in  regard 
to  a  variety  of  truths,  we  may  be  prepared  to  affirm 
that  the  reasoning  process  is  or  is  not  identical  in  all 
cases. 

Before  proceeding  to  consider  an  example  of  rea- 
soning, we  would  remind  the  student  that  all  condi- 
tioned cognition  is  not  reasoning.  We  have  some 
direct,  intuitive  cognitions  conditioned  on  a  previous 
cognition.  Thus,  our  cognition  of  space  is  condi- 
tioned on  our  cognition  of  body.  Our  cognition  of 
power  is  conditioned  upon  our  cognition  of  change 
in  an  object.  We  cannot  be  said  to  arrive  at  a 
knowledge  of  space  and  power  by  reasoning.  They 
have  the  directness  and  universality  characteristic  of 
intuitions. 

Again,  the  cognition  of  certain  relations  is  condi- 
tioned on  previous  cognitions.  We  cognize  the  re- 
semblance between  two  pillars.  The  cognition  is 
conditioned  upon  the  previous  cognition  of  the  pil- 


192       ELEMENTS    OF   INTEL^OECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

lars.  Objects  must  be  known  before  the  relations 
between  them  can  be  known.  Hence  the  cognition 
of  certain  relations,  though  conditioned  on  other  cog- 
nitions, is  not  reasoning. 

This  direct  cognition  of  relations  is  generally- 
termed  a  judgment.  Hence  we  hear  of  judgment 
and  reasoning — ^of  reasoning  being  made  up  of  judg- 
ments. The  >  naming  of  an  act  does  not  alter  its 
nature,  though  it  may  cause  confusion  in  relation  to 
it.  The  direct  perception  of  the  relation  of  similar- 
ity, superiority,  equality,  may  be  called  a  judgment, 
but  it  is  no  part  of  the  process  of  reasoning — that  is, 
of  the  process  peculiar  to  reasoning.  The  term  judg- 
ment is  used  in  two  senses :  one,  to  express  the  cog- 
nition consequent  upon  comparing  two  objects ;  the 
other,  to  express  the  decision  which  the  mind  comes 
to  when  it  has  considered  the  evidence  favorable  and 
adverse  to  a  particular  proposition.  It  would  be 
well  to  confine  the  use  of  the  word  to  the  latter 
sense. 

Let  us  now  examine  some  instances  of  reasoning, 
and  observe  the  successive  mental  acts.  Reasoning, 
as  we  have  seen,  is  the  mental  process  of  cognizing 
unknown  truths  by  means  of  those  that  are  known. 

Suppose  I  am  passing  along  the  street,  and  see 
dilapidated  walls  and  the  charred  remains  of  timber. 
I  infer  that  a  building  has  been  destroyed  by  fire. 
The  facts  directly  perceived  are  the  crumbling  walls 
and  charred  remains,  and  yet  I  know  that  there  has 


eeasokhstCt.  193 

been  a  fire  ttere.  Using  common  language,  I  may 
sajr,  I  see  there  has  been  a  fire  there ;  but  through  the 
agency  of  sense  I  see  only  the  evidences  of  fire.  The 
truth  that  there  has  been  fire  there,  is  not  a  sense- 
perception — is  not  a  direct  perception,  but  an  infer- 
ence. It  is  a  knowledge,  however,  and  may  have  as 
much  certainty  attached  to  it  as  attaches  to  a  direct 
perception. 

Suppose  I  had  never  witnessed  the  action  of  fire : 
could  I,  on  seeing  the  ruins,  infer  that  a  building  had 
been  destroyed  by  fire  ?  Suppose  I  had  witnessed 
the  action  of  fire,  but  had  entirely  forgotten  its 
effect :  could  I  make  the  above  inference  from  the 
sight  of  the  ruins  ?  A  condition  of  the  inference, 
then,  is  recollected  knov^edge.  I  infer  that  the  pres- 
ent ruin  is  the  effect  of  fire,  because  I  have  previously 
known  that  such  is  the  effect  of  fire.  The  whole 
process  of  cognizing  the  fact  that  a  fire  destroyed 
the  building,  may  be  stated  thus  :  1.  A  sense-percep- 
tion of  the  ruins.  2,  A  recollection  of  the  effects  of 
fire  previously  known.  3.  An  inference  from  anal- 
ogy— illustrating  the  principle  that  like  causes  pro- 
duce like  effects — that  the  present  ruins  were  caused 
by  fire.  All  that  is  peculiar  to  the  process  is  infer- 
ring. This  is  conditioned  on  sense-perception  and 
recollected  knowledge. 

It  may  be  said  that  I  know  from  experience  that 
the  building  was  destroyed  by  fire.  My  experience 
is  not  experience  pertaining  to  the  case  in.  hand.  I 
9 


194       ELEMENTS    O:^   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

have  seen  other  buildings  destroyed  by  fire.  I  did 
not  see  this  building  destroyed.  Strictly  speaking,  I 
have  had  no  experience  in  the  matter.  I  have  had 
experience  in  similar  cases.  How  can  I,  then,  decide 
that  fire  destroyed  this  building,  because  fire  de- 
stroyed other  buildings  ?  I  answer,  the  mind  does 
thus  decide.  We  must  accept  the  fact  that  the  mind 
does  thus  cognize  the  existence  of  fire  as  the  cause  of 
the  ruin  in  question,  as  we  accept  the  fact  that  it 
cognizes  the  existence  of  material  objects  when  pre- 
sented to  the  senses.  Where  the  analogy  is  perfect, 
the  cognition  is  one  of  certainty. 

It  may  be  said  that  the  mind,  in  making  an  ana- 
logical inference,  proceeds  upon  the  principle  that  like 
causes  produce  like  effects.  When  it  is  said  the  mind 
proceeds  upon  a  certain  principle,  the  meaning  is  not 
very  clear.  If  by  the  expression  is  meant  that  the 
procedure  or  act  exemplifies  a  certain  principle,  the 
meaning  is  clear.  But  if  it  be  meant  that  the  con- 
clusion is  an  inference  from  the  general  fact,  the 
meaning  is  not  true.  One  sees  a  tree  fall.  He  sees 
that  there  was  some  cause  for  its  falling.  But  the 
truth  that  the  fall  of  the  tree  had  a  cause,  is  not  an 
inference  from  the  general  truth  that  every  change  has 
a  cause.  The  cognition  was  intuitive.  The  mind, 
on  seeino;  the  fall  of  the  tree,  and  co2:nizino^  the  fact 
that  it  must  have  had  a  cause,  may  be  said  to  pro- 
ceed upon  the  principle  that  every  effect  must  have  a 
cause ;  but  the  cognition  is  not  an  inference  from, 


EEASONIN^G.  195 

but  an  exemplification  of  that  principle.  In  like 
manner,  the  inference  in  the  case  under  considera- 
tion is  an  exemplification  of  the  truth,  that  like 
causes  produce  like  effects. 

•^^^Take  another  example  of  reasoning.  I  hear  an 
organ  in  an  adjoining  apartment.  It  may  be  said 
that  I  know  the  organ  is  there  because  I  hear  it. 
But  all  that  I  hear  is  a  sound.  That  is  the  sum  of 
my  direct  cognition.  I  remember  that  I  have  heard 
similar  sounds,  and  that  I  had  a  direct  cognition  that 
they  were  caused  by  an  organ.  I  infer  that  the 
sound  now  heard  is  caused  by  an  organ.  The  men- 
tal process  is  similar  to  the  one  above  described. 
There  is  first  a  direct  cognition — i,  e.,  sense-percep- 
tion— of  sound ;  secondly,  recollected  cognitions  of 
similar  sounds  and  their  causes ;  thirdly,  an  infer- 
ence from  analogy  that  the  present  sounds  are  caused 
by  an  organ.  The  inference  exemplifies  the  truth, 
that  like  causes  produce  like  effects.  We  have  in 
the  process  an  act  of  cognition,  an  act  of  memory, 
and  an  act  differing  from  both,  viz.,  an  inference. 
Reasoning  is  thus  inferring  unknown  truths  from 
those  that  are  known. 

A  man  is  standing  on  the  bank  of  a  river.  He 
wishes  to  place  his  fish-hook  at  the  bottom  of  the 
river.  He  attaches  a  piece  of  lead  to  it,  with  the  cer- 
tainty that  it  will  sink  to  the  bottom.  That  the  lead 
will  sink,  is  an  inference  from  analogy.  The  mental 
process  is  the  same  as  in  the  two  cases  above  noticed. 


196        ELEMENTS    OF    INTELLECTUAL   PKILOSOPHT. 

We  have  thus  considered  three  cases  of  inferring 
— cases  in  which  the  inferences  had  reference  to  the 
past,  the  present,  and  the  future.  In  each  case, 
the  certainty  of  the  inference  is  proportioned  to  the 
exactness  of  the  resembhince  to  former  cases. 

A  farmer  surveys  his  fields  with  reference  to  dis- 
tributing his  crops.  He  concludes  that  a  certain 
field  will  yield  a  good  crop  of  corn,  because  he  has 
found  from  experience  that  soils  of  that  description 
have  yielded  a  good  crop.  He  has  had  no  experience 
connected  with  that  particu.lar  field.  He  has  had 
experience  of  similar  fields.  His  inference  is  an 
inference  from  analogy.  It  will  be  true  in  propor- 
tion as  the  field  in  question,  and  attendant  circum- 
stances, are  similar  to  those  of  which  he  has  had 
experience. 

The  merchant  determines  to  import  a  certain  arti- 
cle, because  he  believes  there  will  be  a  demand  for  it, 
and  that  he  can  sell  it  at  a  profit.  His  experience 
has  taught  him  that,  on  former  occasions,  when  the 
circumstances  of  the  country  werc^  similar  to  present 
circumstances,  there  was  a  demand  for  the  article  in 
question.  He  infers  that  the  article  will  be  again  in 
demand.  The  inference  is  founded  on  present  and 
recollected  cognitions.  The  facts  whicli  are  the 
object  of  his  present  cognitions — which  constitute 
the  circumstances  of  the  country — may  be  numerous 
and  complicated.  Some  of  them  may  be  cognized 
by  him  directly,  and  some  may  be  received  on  testi* 


REASONING.  197 

mony,  and  some  may  be  inferred  from  other  facts. 
He  is  therefore  liable  to  error  in  regard  to  his  facts — 
in  regard  to  the  grounds  of  his  inference.  He  may 
err  as  to  the  degree  of  similarity  between  the  pres- 
ent circumstances  of  the  country  and  the  circum- 
stances when  the  demand  existed.  The  analogy  may 
be  so  small,  that  the  inference  may  not  be  accurate. 
But  the  mental  process  is  the  same  as  in  the  cases 
above  described. 

The  physician  is  called  to  visit  a  patient.  He 
finds  the  patient  has  a  certain  disease.  He  prescribes 
a  certain  medicine,  which  he  is  confident  will  work  a 
cure.  He  may  be  asked  the  ground  of  his  confi- 
dence, and  he  answers,  he  is  acting  from  experience. 
He  knows  from  experience  that  the  medicine  will 
cure  the  disease. 

Now,  what  he  really  knov\^s  is,  that  the  medicine 
was  efiective  in  a  similar  case.  With  the  present 
patient  he  has  had  no  experience.  He  has  found 
that,  in  other  similar  cases,  the  medicine  effected  a 
cure ;  he  therefore  infers  that  it  will  work  a  cure  in 
the  present  case.  His  judgments  from  experience 
are  inferences  from  analogy,  and  will  be  sound  in 
proportion  to  the  strictness  of  the  analogy  between 
the  condition  of  his  present  and  former  patients. 

The  statesman  is  said  to  be  governed  by  experi- 
ence— his  individual  experience,  and  the  recorded 
experience  of  the  past.  He  adopts  such  measures 
as    experience    has    shown    to    be    wise.      He    has 


198       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

learned  that  certain  measures  in  certain  circum- 
stances have  proved  beneficial  ;  he  therefore  con- 
cludes that  similar  measures  in  similar  circumstances 
will  prove  beneficial.  His  conclusions  from  experi- 
ence are  inferences  from  analogy.  Thus  we  have  the 
type  of  all  reasoning  from  experience.  Reasoning 
from  experience  is  inferring  from  analogy. 

Let  us  next  consider  the  ordinary  argument  ibr 
the  existence  of  an  intelligent  First  Cause  of  the 
world.  We  observe  in  nature  indications  of  design. 
Design  implies  an  intelligent  designer.  Hence  the 
world  had  an  intelligent  Creator.  We  cognize  cer- 
tain facts.  We  know  from  experience  what  indica- 
tions of  design  are.  We  have  seen  certain  things 
which  we  know  to  be  the  work  of  design ;  hence, 
when  we  see  analogous  things  in  nature,  we  infer 
that  they  were  the  result  of  design.  In  the  same 
way  we  know  that  design  is  the  work  of  an  intelli- 
gent cause,  a  person.  The  argument  for  the  exist- 
ence of  God  is  thus  an  argument  from  analogy. 

It  thus  appears  that  analogical  reasoning  compre- 
hends a  very  large  portion  of  our  reasonings.  It  is 
not,  as  has  been  sometimes  stated  in  books,  a  second- 
ary and  imperfect  mode  of  reasoning,  chiefly  useful 
In  answering  objections.  Nearly  all  the  reasonings 
pertaining  to  practical  life  are  reasonings  from  anal- 
ogy. It  is  the  type  of  by  far  the  greatest  portion  of 
the  reasonings  of  life. 

Tlie  conclusions  arrived  a,t  by  analogy  vary  from 


BEASONING.  199 

certainty  to  the  lowest  degree  of  probability.  If 
you  see  footprints  on  the  sand,  you  are  perfectly  sure 
that  some  person  has  been  there.  If  you  cast  lead 
into  the  water,  you  are  perfectly  sure  that  it  will 
sink.  Tou  meet  with  a  stranger :  you  are  perfectly 
sure  that  he  is  not  infallible  in  all  his  conclusions. 
The  certainty,  in  these  cases,  is  the  result  of  analogi- 
cal inference. 

You  meet  a  large  assemblage  of  uncultivated 
people,  and  find  that  they  are  partaking  freely  of 
intoxicating  drinks.  You  infer  that  it  is  highly 
probable  that  there  Avill  be  some  disorder. 

There  is  liability  to  error  in  reasoning  from  anal- 
ogy. The  error  commonly  is  caused  by  an  imperfect 
cognition  of  facts.  An  analogy  is  supposed  to  exist 
when  it  does  not,  or  the  analogy  is  less  perfect  than 
is  supposed.  False  and  imperfect  analogies  have 
been  most  fruitful  sources  of  error. 

The  mind  should  be  carefully  trained  to  an  accu- 
rate perception  of  analogies.  It  is  a  most  impor- 
tant part  of  the  training  of  a  reasoner.  One  of  the 
ablest  lawyers  of  our  country  remarked  to  the  au- 
thor, "  A  perfect  perception  of  analogies  would  make 
a  perfect  lawyer." 

We  do  not  reason  by  mferring :  inferring  is  rea- 
soning. Are  analogical  inferences  the  only  inferences 
drawn  by  the  mind  ? 

Let  it  be  proposed  to  prove  the  following  proposi- 
tion :    The  President  did  not  affix  his  signature  at 


200       ELEMEJ^TS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY, 

Washington  to  a  certain  document  on  the  fourth 
of  January.  Let  the  truth  be  substantiated  that 
the  President  was  on  that  day,  and  during  the 
whole  of  that  day,  at  Boston.  Of  course,  he  could 
not  affix  his  signature  to  a  document  in  Washington. 
The  inference  is  irresistible :  on  what  is  it  grounded  ? 
On  two  facts  or  knowledges :  the  one,  that  a  man 
cannot  act  where  he  is  not ;  and  the  other,  that  the 
President  was  in  Boston.  If  we  were  destitute  of 
either  of  these  knowledges,  the  inference  would  not 
be  sound.  We  know  from  experience  that  a  man 
cannot  act  where  he  is  not,  and  from  personal  obser- 
vation or  testimony  that  the  President  was  in  Boston. 
The  inference  from  these  facts  cannot  fairly  be  classed 
under  the  head  of  analogy.  In  the  case  of  a  piece  of 
lead  being  cast  into  water,  the  inference  is  from  anal- 
ogy. We  have  seen  other  pieces  sink,  and  confidently 
believe  that  this  will  sink.  Our  belief  is  so  strong, 
that  we  say  we  know  it  will  sink. 

When  we  know  the  facts  above  stated,  we  see 
that  the  signature  was  impossible.  The  inference  is 
not  a  belief,  however  confident.  It  is  a  knowledge. 
We  not  only  see  that  the  proposition  may  be  true  : 
we  see  that  it  must  be  true.  The  process  is  clearly 
distinguishable  from  the  analogical  process.  The 
principle  illustrated  in  the  analogical  process  is,  like 
causes  produce  like  effects.  The  principle  or  general 
fact  illustrated  in  the  case  before  us  is,  that  a  man 
cannot  act  where  he  is  not.  The  inference  may  be 
called  an  inference  from  implication. 


REASONING.  201 

Take  another  example.  One  enters  a  portrait 
gallery.  He  sees  a  portrait  wliich  is  a  striking  like- 
ness of  his  friend  B.  On  inquiry,  he  learns  that  it  is 
the  portrait  of  Mr.  C.  C  is  unknown  to  him,  but 
he  infers  that  he  resembles  his  friend  B.  Here  is  an 
inference  grounded  on  the  fact  that  the  portrait  is  a 
striking  likeness  of  two  different  persons.  In  that 
fact  is  implied  the  fact  that  the  two  persons  resemble 
each  other.  The  inference  is  one  of  implication,  and 
not  of  analogy.  It  may  perhaps  be  stated  in  an 
analogical  form,  but  the  statement  would  be  a  forced 
one,  and  the  principle  illustrated  is  not  the  analogical 
principle.  The  general  fact  illustrated  is,  that  things 
that  resemble  the  same  things  resemble  one  another. 

A  man  lost  all  his  money  yesterday ;  therefore  he 
cannot  pay  a  debt  due.  Here  is  a  fact  and  an  infer- 
ence.    The  conclusion  is  implied  in  the  fact. 

Analogy  is  not,  therefore,  the  type  of  all  reason- 
ing. We  cognize  some  new  truths  by  analogy,  and 
others  because  implied  in  truths  already  known.  The 
author  has  not  examined  any  example  of  reasoning 
that  does  not  come  under  the  head  of  analogy  or 
implication. 

In  reasoning  from  analogy,  the  process  and  the 
principle  illustrated  are  always  the  same.  In  reason- 
ing from  implication,  the  process  varies,  or  rather  the 
principle  illustrated  differs  as  the  facts  or  premises 
differ.  This  we  should  expect.  The  process  consists 
in  seeing  a  truth  in  consequence  of  its  relation  to  an- 
9* 


202       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

other  truth.  Tiniths  are  connected  by  various  rela- 
tions. Hence,  one  truth  introduces  another  to  the 
mind's  view  by  a  relation  different  from  that  by 
which  another  truth  introduces  one.  In  other  words, 
we  should  not  expect  to  find  all  truths  implied  in 
other  truths  in  the  same  way. 


4r>w 


Cy  O^^^  'iiS'^'it-'^-i,-!, 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

MATHEMATICAL   REASONIlS'a. 

Mathematical  reasoning  is  reasoning  concerning 
mathematical  truth.  It  is  cognizing  unknown  mathe- 
matical truths  by  means  of  those  that  are  known. 
Certainty  attaches  to  mathematical  reasoning,  but 
this  does  not  constitute  the  difference  between  mathe- 
matical and  moral  reasoning;  that  is,  reasoning  on 
subjects  that  are  mathematical  and  those  that  are 
not  mathematical — reasoning  relating  to  necessary 
truth  and  to  contingent  truth.  Some  of  our  conclu- 
sions from  contingent  truths  are  as  certain  as  are  all 
our  conclusions  from  necessary  truths.  The  conclu- 
sions in  some  of  the  examples  above  given  are  as 
certain  as  any  of  the  conclusions  of  geometry;  and  to 
affirm  the  opposite  is  as  absurd  as  to  affirm  the  oppo- 
site of  the  conclusions  of  geometry.  To  affirm  that 
a  man  in  Boston  can  write  his  sign  manual  in  Wash- 
ington, is  not  less  absurd  than  to  say  that  two  lines  that 
are  equal  to  a  third  line  are  not  equal  to  one  another. 

It  has  been  said  that  the  certainty  of  geometrical 


204       ELEMENTS    OE   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

reasoning  is  owing  to  the  exactness  of  its  definitions, 
and  that  a  similar  exactness  in  our  definitions  in 
morals  and  politics  would  secure  a  similar  certaintj 
m  moral  and  political  reasoning.  The  remark  is 
founded  on  a  misapprehension  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
definitions  of  geometry.  They  are  not  arbitrary  eon- 
structions  depending  upon  the  skill  of  the  writers 
on  geometry.  They  are  not  creations  of  the  mind. 
They  are  statements  of  necessary  truths.  They  are 
statements  of  facts  respecting  space  and  its  relations. 
A  straight  line  is  a  certain  relation  in  space  between 
two  objects  or  points  in  space.  Angles  are  certain 
combinations  of  straight  lines.  So  of  other  geomet- 
rical figures  described  in  the  definitions.  The  defi- 
nitions are  statements  of  facts  in  relation  to  space,  as 
the  definitions  of  geology  are  statements  of  facts  ii? 
regard  to  the  earth. 

They  are  not  mere  conceptions  of  the  mind — 
hypotheses,  from  which  we  infer  hypothetical  truth. 
They  are  realities — that  is,  real  truths  in  relation  to 
space,  which  are  cognized  as  soon  as  they  are  set  be- 
fore the  mind. 

If  they  were  mere  hypotheses,  mental  figments,  we 
should  be  at  liberty  to  vary  them ;  but  this  has  not 
been  done,  and  cannot  be  done.  Writers  on  geom.- 
etry  have  difiered  slightly  in  their  modes  of  expres- 
sion when  stating  the  definitions  ^  but  all  have 
directed  the  mind  to  the  same  truths.  If  they  are 
hypotheses,   they   are   mere   creations  of  the   mind. 


MATHEMATICAL   REASONING.  205 

The  uniforin  agreement  of  geometers  in  regard  to 
them  is  inexplicable  on  the  supposition  that  they  are 
hypotheses,  hut  perfectly  explicable  on  the  supposi- 
tion "that  they  are  cognized  relations  of  space — ne- 
cessary truths. 

It  is  objected  to  this  view,  that  had  we  never  seen 
a  material  line,  angle,  or  circle,  we  could  not  under- 
stand the  definitions  of  geometry.  Doubtless  our 
first  ideas  of  lines,  angles,  and  circles,  are  received 
through  the  agency  of  the  senses.  Our  primary  cog- 
nitions are  probably  cognitions  by  the  senses.  Our 
cognition  of  space  is  conditioned  on  our  cognition  of 
matter.  In  like  manner,  our  cognition  of  the  relations 
of  space — forms  of  shape,  may  be  conditioned  on  our 
cognition  of  material  forms. 

Mill  denies  that  the  definitions  of  geometry  have 
any  existence — denies  that  there  are  any  geometrical 
forms  distinct  from  material  forms.  He  says:  "There 
exist  no  points  without  magnitude,  no  lines  without 
breadth,  nor  perfectly  straight  ;  no  circles  v/ith  all 
their  radii  exactly  equal,  nor  squares  with  all  their 
angles  perfectly  right.  It  will  perhaps  be  said  that 
the  assumption  does  not  extend  to  the  actual,  but 
only  to  the  possible  existence  of  such  things.  I  answer 
that,  according  to  any  test  that  we  have  of  possi- 
bility, they  are  not  even  possible.  Their  existence,  so 
far  as  we  can  form  any  judgment,  would  seem  to  be 
inconsistent  with  the  physical  constitution  of  our 
planet,  at  least,  if  not  of  the  universe.     To  get  rid  of 


206       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

this  difficulty,  and  at  the  same  time  to  save  the  credit 
of  the  supposed  systems  of  necessary  truths,  it  is 
customary  to  say  that  the  points,  lines,  circles,  and 
squares  which  are  the  subject  of  geometry,  exist  in  our 
conceptions  merely,  and  are  part  of  our  minds ;  which 
minds,  by  working  on  their  own  materials,  construct 
an  a  priori  science,  the  evidence  of  which  is  purely 
mental,  and  has  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  outward 
experience.  By  howsoever  high  authorities  this  doc- 
trine may  have  been  sanctioned,  it  appears  to  me 
psychologically  incorrect.  The  points,  lines,  circles, 
and  squares  which  any  one  has  in  his  mind,  are,  I 
apprehend,  simply  copies  of  the  points,  lines,  circles, 
and  squares  which  he  has  known  by  experience.  A 
line  as  defined  by  geometers  is  wholly  inconceivable. 
We  can  reason  about  a  line  as  if  it  had  no  breadth ; 
because  we  have  a  power,  which  is  the  foundation 
of  the  control  we  can  exercise  over  the  operations  of 
our  minds ;  the  power,  when  a  perception  is  present 
to  our  senses,  or  a  conception  to  our  intellects,  of 
attending  to  a  part  only  of  that  perception  or  concep- 
tion, instead  of  the  whole.  But  we  cannot  conceive 
of  a  line  without  breadth;  we  can  form  no  mental 
picture  of  such  a  line :  all  the  lines  which  we  have  in 
our  minds  are  lines  possessing  breadth.  If  any  one 
doubts  this,  we  may  refer  him  to  his  own  experience.- 
I  much  question  if  any  one  who  fancies  that  he  can 
conceive  what  is  called  a  mathematical  line,  thinks  so 
from  the  evidence  of  his  consciousness.     I  suspect  it 


MATHEMATICAL   REASONING.  207 

is  rather  because  he  supposes  that  unless  such  a  con- 
ception were  possible,  mathematics  could  not  exist  as 
a  science ;  a  supposition  which  there  will  be  no  diffi- 
culty in  showing  to  be  entirely  groundless. 

"  Since,  then,  neither  in  nature  nor  in  the  human 
mind  do  there  exist  any  objects  exactly  correspond- 
ing to  the  definitions  of  geometry,  while  yet  that 
science"^  cannot  be  supposed  to  be  conversant  about 
nonentities ;  nothing  remains  but  to  consider  geom- 
etry as  conversant  with  such  lines,  angles,  and 
figures  as  really  exist;  and  the  definitions,  as  they 
are  called,  must  be  regarded  as  some  of  our  first  and 
most  obvious  generalizations  concerning  those  natural 
objects." 

We  admit  that  "there  exist  no  real  [material] 
things  exactly  conformable  to  the  definitions;"  but 
unless  material  things  are  admitted  to  comprehend 
all  things,  his  assertion  is  not  necessarily  correct. 
We  affirm  that  there  exist  real  things  exactly  con- 
formable to  the  definitions  ;  that  there  are  real  rela- 
tions of  space,  which  are  intuitively  cognized  when 
the  mind's  attention  is  directed  to  them. 

He  says,  "  We  cannot  conceive  of  a  line  without 
breadth,"  by  which  we  suppose  he  means,  we  can 
form  no  mental  picture  of  such  a  line.  Material 
objects  are  the  only  objects  of  which  we  can  form 
mental  pictures.  We  can  form  no  mental  picture  of 
the  human  mind,  yet  it  is  a  reality.  All  spiritual 
truths  are  unpicturable.     If  reality  were  confined  to 


208        ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

the  picturaWe,  materialism  v/ould  be  the  only  true 
philosophy. 

The  definitions  of  geometry  are  then  neither  arbi- 
trary creations  of  the  mind,  nor  mere  copies  of  ma- 
terial objects.  If  the  former  were  true,  the  science 
of  geometry  would  be  wholly  subjective.  If  the 
latter,  then  it  would  follow,  as  Mill  affirms,  that 
the  peculiar  certainty  always  ascribed  to  it*^"is  an 
illusion." 

Dugald  Stewart  taught  that  reasoning  in  geometry 
is  built  wholly  upon  the  definitions.  The  definitions 
.he  regarded  as  hypotheses,  and  hence  the  results  of 
demonstration  as  only  hypothetically  true. 

We  have  seen  that  the  definitions  of  geometry 
are  statements  of  facts.  Let  us  next  consider  the 
axioms.  The  axioms  are  generalized  statements  of 
self-evident  truths.  Like  all  intuitive  truths,  they 
are  cognized  by  all  men — are  admitted  by  all.  This 
has  been  denied.  It  has  been  said  that  the  savages 
of  the  western  world  never  cognized  the  axioms, 
and  hence  the  assertion  that  all  men  cognize  them  is 
not  true.  It  is  true  that  the  axioms  of  geometry,  as 
they  are  stated  in  books,  have  not  been  present  to 
the  minds  of  all  men.  But  it  must  be  remembered; 
that  truth  of  every  kind  is  first  cognized  in  particu- 
lar or  individual  instances.  Did  the  savage  ever 
fail  to  perceive  that  the  whole  of  a  deer  was  greater 
than  its  part  ?  Did  he  ever  proceed  to  a  division 
of  the  results  of  hunting  on  the  opposite  principle  ? 


MATHEMATICAL   REASONING.  209 

When  an  individual  case  occurred,  did  he  ever  fail  to 
perceive  that  two  arrows,  each  equal  in  length  to  a 
third,  were  equal  to  one  another  ?  The  tiaiths  of 
which  the  axioms  are  the  generalized  statement  are 
intuitively  cognized  hy  all  men  as  instances  occur. 
They  are  intuitive,  necessary  truths. 

Mill  affirms  that  the  axioms  "  are  experimental 
truths — generalizations  from  observation."  Observe 
that  a  generalization  from  observation  is  one  thing — 
a  generalized  statement  of  an  intuitive  cognition 
another  thing.  That  all  men  are  mortal,  is  a  gener- 
alizatioD  from  observation.  A  series  of  observa- 
tions— that  is,  a  number  of  observed  facts — is  neces- 
sary to  a  generalization.  A  single  intuitive  cognition 
renders  the  truth  of  the  axioms  as  certain  as  a  thou- 
sand cognitions.  When  we  have  seen  two  rods  each 
equal  to  a  third,  we  intuitively  cognize  their  equality 
with  each  other ;  and  the  statement  of  the  fact  thus 
cognized  in  a  general  form  constitutes  an  axiom.  A 
single  cognition  gives  us  the  axiom.  -Vf  e  see  that  it 
is  true  and  must  be  true  from  one  example  as  v/ell  as 
from  a  thousand. 

The  question.  Does  geometrical  reasoning  depend 
upon  the  axioms  or  the  definitions  ?  has  been  ear- 
nestly discussed.  Locke  and  others  contended  that 
the  axioms  contribute  nothing  to  the  reasoning. 
Stewart  adopted  the  same  view,  and  contended 
that  geometrical  reasoning  depends  upon  the  defini- 
tions.     Whewell,  whose  view  of  the  nature  of  the 


210       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

definitions  approaches  very  nearly  to  the  true  view, 
contends  that  the  axioms,  as  well  as  the  definitions, 
must  be  admitted  as  first  principles  of  geometrical 
reasoning. 

The  expression,  first  principles  of  reasoning,  is 
equivocal.  First  principles  may  mean  the  facts  from 
which  the  reasoning  starts,  or  they  may  mean  princi- 
ples or  truths  from  which  all  the  truths  of  geometry 
are  deduced.  Thus  it  is  sometimes  said,  that  from  a 
few  simple  truths  the  far-reaching  science  of  geome- 
try has  been  built  up.  The  impression  on  some 
minds  seems  to  be,  that  the  science  is  constructed 
out  of  the  few  truths  expressed  in  the  axioms  or  defi- 
nitions, or  both,  either  by  combination  or  deduction. 
It  is,  perhaps,  a  common  impression,  that  the  truths 
of  every  science  are  deduced  from  self-evident  truths. 
This  impression  is  in  consequence  of  the  fact,  that 
when  we  trace  our  knowledge  in  any  department  of 
science  to  its  origin,  we  arrive  at  self-evident  truths. 
But  it  does  not  follow  from  this,  that  all  our  knowl- 
edge is  deduced  from  those  self-evident  truths. 
Truth  is  deduced  only  from  comprehensive  truths, 
and  self-evident  truths  are  always  simple.  Self-evi- 
dent truths  may  constitute  the  origin,  but  not  the 
source  of  all  our  knowledge.  It  does  not  follow, 
because  a  knowledge  of  certain  truths  is  necessary 
to  the  knowledge  of  other  truths,  that  the  latter 
are  contained  m  the  former.  A  truth  may  be  the 
condition   of  my   cognizing   another   truth,  witliout 


I 


MATHEMATICAL   REASONIIS^G.  211 

containing  that  truth.  So  far  is  it  from  being  true 
that  the  science  of  geometry  is  deduced  from  the 
axioms,  it  may  be  affirmed  that  no  truth  can  be 
deduced  from  an  axiom.  Take  any  one  of  the  ac- 
knowledged axioms  (for  some  propositions  which 
appear  among  the  axioms  in  some  treatises  are  really 
definitions),  and  try* to  deduce  a  truth  from  it.  Take 
the  axiom,  "  Things  equal  to  the  same  things  are 
equal  to  one  another,"  and  what  truth  can  you  de- 
duce from  it  ?  None.  It  will  be  said,  we  prove 
propositions  by  its  aid.  Let  that  assertion  be  made 
good  by  an  appeal  to  facts.  Take  the  first  problem 
of  Euclid — ^to  construct  an  equilateral  triangle.  The 
process  of  proving  that  the  triangle  constructed  is 
equilateral,  consists  in  showing  that  two  sides  of  the 
triangle,  viz.,  A  and  B,  are  equal,  because  radii  of 
the  same  circle ;  and  that  the  sides  B  and  C  are 
equal,  because  radii  of  the  same  circle.  The  sides  A 
and  C  have  thus  been  shown  to  be  equal  to  B,  there- 
fore they  are  equal  to  one  another.  If  the  question 
be  asked.  On  what  ground  is  the  conclusion  made 
that  A  and  C  are  equal  ?  the  reply  may  be,  Because 
things  equal  to  the  same  are  equal  to  one  another. 
The  conclusion  is  supposed  to  be  drawn  from  the 
axiom  as  a  premise.  But  suppose  one  had  never 
heard  the  axiom  stated.  He  would  perceive  the 
equality  of  the  two  lines  as  soon  as  he  had  perceived 
their  equality  to  a  third  line.  In  fact,  the  truth  is 
seen  before  the  axiom  is  quoted,  and  before  it  is 


212       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

called  to  mind.  Of  course,  it  cannot  be  drawn  from 
the  axiom.  If  we  consult  what  takes  place  m  our 
minds,  we  shall  discover  that,  as  soon  as  we  see  that 
A  and  C  are  equal  to  B,  we  see  that  they  are  equal  to 
one  another.  We  see  that  they  are  equal  because 
they  are  equal ;  just  as  we  see  the  tree  before  us, 
because  it  is  before  us. 

In  the  demonstration,  the  conditions  of  the  cogni- 
tion of  the  equality  of  A  to  B  and  C  to  B  are  given, 
and  then  the  truth  of  their  equality  to  each  other  is 
announced.  The  question  is  asked,  Why?  and  the 
reply  is,  "  Because  things  equal  to  the  same  are  equal 
to  one  another."  A  generalized  statement  of  what  is 
intuitively  perceived  to  be  true  in  a  given  case,  is 
given  as  the  reason  of  it ;  that  is,  the  repetition  of  a 
truth  is  given  as  the  reason  of  that  truth  !  There  is 
no  reasoning  in  such  a  course  of  procedure. 

Take  another  example.  In  the  course  of  a  demon- 
stration, it  is  seen  and  stated  that  an  angle  A  is  a 
part  of  an  angle  B,  therefore  B  is  greater  than  A. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  quote  or  to  call  to  mind  the 
axiom.  The  whole  is  greater  than  its  part,  before  we 
cognize  the  fact  that  B  is  greater  than  A.  It  is  in- 
tuitively perceived ;  and  when  we  quote  the  axiom, 
our  cognition  is  not  aifected  by  it.  It  is  a  mere  repe- 
tition in  a  general  form  of  the  truth  intuitively  per- 
ceived in  the  case  in  hand. 

It  thus  appears  that  conclusions  in  geometry  are 
not  deduced  from  the  axioms — that  the  axioms  have 


^lATHEMATICAL   EEASONi:^rG.  213 

no  probative  force.  If  treatises  on  geometry  were  to 
omit  all  reference  to  axioms,  the  reasoning  v/oukl  be 
just  as  intelligible  and  irresistible  as  it  is  now. 

It  may  perhaps  be  said,  that  if  the  axioms  were 
not  true,  the  steps  in  the  demonstration  which  exem- 
plify them  would  not  be  true.  A  little  reflection  y^^ill 
show  that  this  is  tantamount  to  saying,  that  if  cer- 
tain things  were  not  true,  they  would  not  be  true. 

The  truths  of  geometry  are,  then,  not  deduced 
from  the  axioms.  Geometrical  reasoning  does  not 
depend  upon  the  axioms.  The  science  of  geometry 
is  not  built  up  of  axioms. 

Does  geometrical  reasoning,  then,  depend  upon 
the  definitions  ?  In  a  certain  sense  it  does.  Geo- 
metrical reasoning  depends  upon  the  definitions  in 
the  same  sense  in  which  geological  reasoning  de- 
pends upon  the  rocks  which  constitute  the  facts  of 
the  science.  The  definitions  are  the  facts  which  the 
geometer  reasons  about.  He  compares  them,  and 
cognizes  relations  existing  betv^een  them.  The  new 
truths  arrived  at  are  not  inferences,  but  intuitive  cog- 
nitions. A  demonstration  is  a  series  of  intuitive  cog- 
nitions conditioned  upon  preceding  cognitions.  At 
the  outset  the  intuitive  cognitions  are  conditioned 
on  the  truths  contained  in  the  definitions :  each  new 
cognition  may  be  the  condition  of  a  new  cogni- 
tion, as  each  step  in  the  ascent  of  a  mountain  may 
be  the  condition  of  a  v/ider  prospect. 

A  geometrical  demonstration  is  a  series  of  intui- 


214       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   rHILOSOPHY. 

tive  cognitions  conditioned  on  preceding  truths — 
starting  with  the  truth  contained  in  the  definitions. 
The  process  is  plainly  distinguishable  from  that  of 
inferring. 

If  the  definitions  are  not  truths,  if  they  are  mere 
mental  figments,  then  the  relations  between  them  are 
figments,  and  that  which  is  regarded  as  the  most  cer- 
tain of  all  knowledge  becomes  unreal,  fictitious. 
But  the  definitions  are  truths,  self-evident,  necessary 
truths.  They  are  assented  to  by  all  as  soon  as  clearly 
stated  ;  that  is,  it  is  seen  that  space  has,  and  must 
have,  the  relations  indicated  by  the  definitions.  The 
certainty  of  the  reasoning  depends  upon  the  nature 
of  the  truth  reasoned  about,  and  not  upon  skilfulness 
of  definition.  It  is  therefore  unreasonable  to  demand 
mathematical  demonstration  in  relation  to  contins^ent 
truths.  No  fact,  that  is,  no  contingent  event,  can  be 
mathematically  demonstrated. 

It  was  stated  above  that  a  demonstration  consists 
of  a  series  of  intuitive  cognitions,  each  conditioned 
on  preceding  cognitions.  Testimony  and  inference 
have  no  place  in  a  demonstration ;  for  every  step  must 
not  only  be  seen  to  be  true,  but  necessarily  true,  and 
the  opposite  impossible.  The  opposite  of  the  truest 
testimony  is  often  not  impossible.  The  opposite  of 
the  soundest  inference  is  not  impossible.  The  truth  j 
of  the  above  assertion  in  regard  to  geometrical  de-  j 
monstration  can  be  tested  by  an  analysis  of  a  demon- 
stration. 


^^.^/ 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

THE    SYLLOGISM. 

It  has  been  affirmed  that  the  syllogism  is  the  mode 
of  reasoning  in  regard  both  to  contingent  and  neces- 
sary truth.  A  syllogism  consists  of  a  major  and 
minor  premise  and  a  conclusion.  The  following  is  an 
example : 

All  men  are  mortal : 

Socrates  is  a  man ; 

Therefore,  Socrates  is  mortal. 
It  is  affirmed  that  the  reasoning  process  is  the 
same  in  all  cases.  Whately  says  that  "  one  of  the 
chief  impediments  in  attaining  a  just  view  of  the  na- 
ture and  object  of  Logic,  is  the  not  fully  understand- 
ing or  not  sufficiently  keeping  in  mind  the  sameistess 
of  the  reasoning  process  in  all  cases."  The  syllogism 
he  regards  as  the  type  of  all  reasoning,  and  the  prin- 
ciple on  which  syllogisms  are  constructed  "is  the 
miiversal  principle  of  reasoning."  This  universal 
principle  is  the  Dictum  of  Aristotle,  viz.,  "that 
whatever  is  predicated  (^.  6.,  affirmed  or  denied)  uni- 
versally of  any  class  of  things,  may  be  predicated  in 


216        ELEMENTS    OF   II^TELLECTUAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

like  marnier   (viz.,  affirmed  or  denied)  of  any  thing 
comprehended  in  that  class." 

.  "  'Now  to  remind  one,  on  each  occasion,  that  so 
and  so  is  referable  to  such  and  such  a  class,  and  that 
the  class  which  happens  to  be  before  us  comprehends 
such  and  such  things — this  is  precisely  all  that  is  ever 
acco7nplished  hy  reasoning,'^'' 

If  this  is  all,  reasoning  has  a  much  less  extended 
scope  than  is  generally  supposed.  If  the  analysis  we 
have  given  of  contingent  and  demonstrative  reason 
be  true,  the  process  is  not  in  all  cases  the  same ;  and 
the  Dictum  is  not  the  universal  principle  of  reasoning. 
The  process  by  which  we  cognize  truths  previously 
unknown,  is  something  more  than  a  reminding  that 
the  object  we  are  reasoning  about  belongs  to  a  certain 
class  of  objects. 

The  following  remarks  of  Bailey  are  worthy  of 
attention  :  ^'  The  Dictum  de  omni  et  nullo^  viz.,  that 
'  whatever  is  predicated  universally  of  any  class  of 
things,  may  be  predicated  in  like  manner  of  any  thing, 
comprehended  in  that  class,'  is  not  only  stated  by 
logicians  to  be  a  general  maxim,  of  the  application 
of  which  every  direct  syllogism  is  a  particular  in- 
stance, but  proclaimed  to  be  the  universal  principle 
of  reasoning. 

"  If  we  closely  scrutinize  the  meaning  of  this  maxim, 
undazzled  by  the  somewhat  magnificent  and  imposing 
phraseology  in  which  it  has  been  spoken  of,  we  shall 
find  it  an  obviously  simple  and  undeniable  proposition, 


1 


THE    SYLLOGISM.  217 

viz.,  whatever  is  asserted  of  a  class  may  be  asserted 
of  any  species  or  individual  of  that  class.  A  class, 
ht)Vfever,  we  must  bear  in  mind,  is  not  a  collective  or 
corporate  whole,  which,  as  a  whole,  possesses  proper- 
ties or  attributes  different  from  those  of  the  individ- 
uals composing  it;  but  what  is  predicated  of  it  is 
predicated  of  every  separate  individual  ranked  under 
it.  The  proposition,  *A11  men  are  fallible,'  affirms  that 
every  individual  man  is  fallible ;  while  the  proposi- 
tion, 'The  army  is  large,'  affirms  of  the  body  col- 
lectively something  which  it  does  not  affirm  of  any 
single  individual  in  it.  If  a  class  v/ere  such  a  col- 
lective body,  the  Aristotelian  maxim  could  not  be  true. 
"  The  dictum,  therefore,  it  is  plain,  means  neither 
more  nor  less  than  that  w^hatever  is  predicated  of 
every  individual  of  a  class,  may  be  predicated  of  any 
individual,  or  any  number  of  individuals,  of  that  class. 
As,  however,  what  can  be  truly  predicated  of  any 
thing  must  be  a  property  or  attribute  actually  pos- 
sessed, we  may,  if  we  choose,  leave  out  predication 
altogether,  and  then  the  maxim  w^ill  appear  in  a  still 
simpler  shape,  as  follows :  What  belongs  to  every 
individual  of  a  class  must  belong  to  any  individual 
of  that  class.  However  it  may  be  expressed,  it  is 
obviously  a  self-evident  and  indisputable  truth,  like 
the  other  maxims  we  have  just  been  considering ;  and 
this  view  of  its  coordinate  character  is  sufficient  of 
itself  to  determine  the  accuracy  of  the  maxim  which 
proclaims  it  the  universal  principle  of  reasoning. 
10 


218       ELEMENTS    OP   INTELLECTUAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

"If  this  doctrine  were  true,  every  act  of  reasoning 
would  be  an  exemplification  of  this  one  maxim,  and 
might  be  ranged  under  it.  In  other  words,  all  rea- 
soning without  exce|)tion  would  consist  in  concluding 
that  an  attribute  belongs  to  some  individual  class,  be- 
cause it  belongs  to  every  individual  of  that  class.  No 
other  reason,  according  to  this  theory,  can  possibly 
exist  or  be  assigned.  The  sole  ground  on  which  we 
can  argue  that  an  individual  thing  possesses  any 
attribute,  is,  that  the  thing  belongs  to  a  class,  all  the 
members  of  which  possess  the  attribute." 

From  the  examples  of  reasoning  which  have 
been  given,  the  student  can  decide  whether  they  all 
come  under  the  head  of  what  may  be  termed  class- 
reasoning;  whether  the  concUision,  be  it  an  inference 
from  analogy,  or  a  cognition  conditioned  on  preceding 
cognitions,  is  reached  by  referring  the  subject  to  a 
particular  class  or  not. 

The  doctrine  above  stated  assumes  that  all  our 
reasonings  proceed  from  general  principles,  which 
assumption  is  unauthorized  and  is  contrary  to  fact. 
All  reasoning  at  the  outset  proceeds  from  facts  di- 
rectly cognized.  By  reasoning  from  facts  we  acquire 
general  conclusions,  and  may  use  these  conclusions  as 
premises  or  facts  for  further  reasoning. 

When  we  thus  use  a  general  conclusion  as  a 
premise,  the  whole  reasoning  rests  upon  the  facts 
from  which  the  conclusion  was  deduced. 

General  principles  may  be  revealed  to  us,  and  we 


THE   SYLLOGISM.  219 

may  draw  inferences  from  them.  The  absolute  per- 
fection of  God  is  revealed  to  iis  :  we  may  infer  from 
it  that  such  and  such  things  cannot  be  done  by  him. 
If  all  our  reasonings  proceeded  upon  general  prin- 
ciples— that  is,  if  a  general  principle  must  in  all  cases 
form  the  major  premise — then,  in  order  that  our  rea- 
soning be  sound,  the  major  premise  must  be  revealed 
to  us,  or  we  must  intuitively  cognize  its  truth.  But 
all  our  intuitions  are  of  individual  truths,  not  of 
general  principles ;  and  all  general  principles  are  not 
revealed  to  us.  They  are  arrived  at  by  induction, 
which  is  inferring  from  analogy. 

That  every  argument  may  be  stated  in  a  syllogistic 
form,  does  not  prove  that  the  mind  used  the  syllogistic 
form,  in  mating  the  inference.  The  different  steps  in 
a  geometrical  demonstration  can  be  stated  in  a  syl- 
logistic form;  but  the  mind  does  not  use  that  form  in 
reaching  the  conclusion.  In  the  problem  above  ad- 
duced, in  which  the  object  is  to  prove  that  the  tri- 
angle constructed  is  equilateral,  two  sides  are  shown 
each  to  be  equal  to  the  third  side,  and  consequently 
they  are  equal  to  one  another.  The  mind  sees  their 
equality  to  one  another  as  soon  as  it  sees  their  equal- 
ity to  the  third  side.  The  argument  may  be  stated 
in  a  syllogistic  form. 

Things  equal  to  the  same  are  equal  to  one  another : 

A  and  C  are  each  equal  to  B  ; 

Therefore,  they  are  equal  to  one  another. 

We  have  seen  that  the  conclusion  follows  as  soon 


220       ELEMENTS    OF    INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

as  we  see  that  A  and  C  are  equal  to  B.  It  is  not 
drawn  from  the  axiom.  The  axiom  is  merely  the 
generalized  statement  of  what  is  intuitively  cognized 
in  an  invividual  case.  The  mind  made  no  use  of  the 
major  premise  in  coming  to  the  conclusion ;  the 
conclusion  would  have  been  reached  just  as  quickly, 
if  the  major  premise  had  never  been  heard  of.  Every 
step  in  a  geometrical  demonstration  can  be  stated  in 
the  form  of  a  syllogism.  The  remarks  respecting  the 
problem  above  noticed  will  apply  to  every  geomet- 
rical syllogism. 

Instead  of  all  reasoning  being  resolvable  into  the 
syllogism,  a  large  portion  of  syllogistic  reasoning  is 
resolvable  into  reasoning  from  analogy.  Take  the 
example  given  above : 

All  men  are  mortal : 

Socrates  is  a  man  ; 

Therefore,  Socrates  is  mortal. 
Here  the  thing  to  be  proved,  the  unknown  truth 
to  be  reached  by  means  of  the  known,  is  the  mortality 
of  Socrates.  What  is  it  inferred  from  ?  According 
to  the  syllogism,  from  the  major  premise,  "All  men  are 
mortal."  But  how  does  the  reasoner  know  that  all 
men,  including  Socrates,  are  mortal  ?  For  as  Socrates 
is  a  man,  his  being  mortal  must  be  known,  that  the 
premise  may  be  valid ;  that  is,  the  thing  to  be  proved 
must  be  known,  in  order  that  it  may  be  proved ! 

It  has  been  charged  against  the  syllogism,  that  in 
the  major  premise  it  assumes  the  point  to  be  proved ; 


THE   SYLLOGISM.  221 

that  every  syllogism  is  a  petitio  principii.  The  charge 
is  good  against  the  syllogism  of  Avliich  the  above  is 
the  type. 

The  mortality  of  Socrates,  or  of  any  other  man,  is 
provable.  What  is  the  process  of  proof?  All  men 
v/ho  have  lived  heretofore  have  died:  Socrates  is 
like  them — has  the  same  attributes;  therefore,  So- 
crates will  die.  In  other  words,  a  great  many  beings 
like  Socrates  have  died ;  therefore,  he  will  die.  The 
inference  is  plainly  an  inference  from  analogy.  The 
real  argument  cannot  be  stated  in  a  syllogism  con- 
structed in  accordance  with  the  dictum. 

Men  learn  to  reason  by  reasoning,  and  not  by  the 
study  of  treatises  on  logic,  which  are  not  necessarily 
logical  treatises.  The  author  bas  questioned  quite  a 
number  of  men  eminent  for  power  in  reasoning,  and 
in  no  instance  was  the  study  of  a  technical  logic 
referred  to  as  a  source  of  that  power.  They  learned 
to  reason  by  reasoning. 

In  fact,  logic  as  taught  in  the  schools  does  not 
profess  to  teach  one  how  to  reason.  It  professes  to 
teach  him  how  to  cast  an  argument  into  a  syllogistic 
form,  in  order  that  its  soundness  or  unsoundness  may 
appear  from  the  form  of  the  syllogism,  though  the 
argument  were  not  understood.  It  would  furnish,  as 
it  were,  a  mechanical  test  of  arguments. 

May  there  not  be  a  more  excellent  way — that  of 
training  the  mind  to  look  directly  at  the  proposition 
in  question,  to  scan  the  premises  to  see  if  they  are 


222       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLEOTFAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

true,  and  the  inference  to  see  if  it  be  legitimate?  If 
reasoning  consists  in  perceiving  certain  relations  exist- 
ing between  truths,  the  power  of  cognizing  relations 
should  be  exercised  in  preference  to  the  practice  of 
formal  rules.  We  learn  to  reason  by  reasoning,  just 
as  we  learn  to  remember  by  remembering.  Let  the 
student  select  the  best  specimens  of  reasoning  to  be 
found  in  the  language.  Let  him  make  those  speci- 
mens the  subject  of  a  careful  study.  Let  him  note 
how  such  men  as  Marshall  and  Webster  and  other 
great  reasoners  reasoned,  and  let  him  go  and  do  like- 
wise. 

The  study  of  mathematics  may  form  habits  favor- 
able to  moral  reasoning,  but  cannot  make  a  moral 
reasoner ;  that  is,  cannot  make  one  skilful  in  reasoning 
on  subjects  that  are  not  mathematical.  The  exclusive 
,  devotion  of  the  mind  for  a  long  time  to  mathematical 
reasoning,  has  a  tendency  to  unfit  one  for  moral 
reasoning.  The  mind  forms  the  habit  of  demanding 
certainty  at  every  step,  and  acquires  no  skill  in 
weighing  probabilities,  and  evolving  the  truth  from 
conflicting  evidences.  To  estimate  probabilities,  and 
to  reconcile  apparent  contradictions,  and  to  detect 
tendencies,  are  processes  Avhich  the  reasoner  on  prac- 
tical matters  has  occasion  to  perform  daily ;  and  he 
who  acquires  skill  in  these  processes  is  better  fitted 
for  practical  life  than  he  who  has  skill  in  the  use  of 
the  calculus. 


(7  A  ^r^a-it/a., 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 


MEMORY, 


Our  cognitions,  feelings,  and  volitions  are  con- 
stantly changing.  As  they  pass  from  consciousness, 
they  leave  the  mind  in  a  condition  which  renders 
their  resuscitation  possible.  The  mind  can  remember 
or  recall  its  past  operations. 

How  the  mind  remembers  we  cannot  tell ;  that  is, 
we  cannot  describe  the  act  of  remembering.  We  have 
seen  that  we  cannot  describe  the  act  of  perception ; 
we  can  only  state  its  conditions.  "We  can  pursue  a 
similar  course  in  regard  to  memory. 

In  order  that  a  thing  may  be  remembered,  it  must 
receive  some  degree  of  attention.  Objects  which 
receive  little  or  no  attention,  are  seldom  remembered. 
That  memory  is  conditioned  on  attention,  is  known 
to  all. 

The  attention  may  be  spontaneous  or  voluntary. 
The  object  of  thought  may  be  in  itself  so  interesting, 
that  the  attention  shall  be  spontaneously  fixed  upon 
it.  In  reading  an  interesting  narrative,  we  may  be 
conscious  of  no  effort  at  attention,  and  yet  the  atten- 
tion may  be  so  intensely  fixed  upon  it,  that  we  may 


224       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

become  insensible  to  objects  around  ns.  Such  iiarra 
tives  are  easily  remembered.  Hence,  if  we  would  have 
others  remember  what  we  say,  we  must  make  our 
discourse  interesting. 

The  attention  may,  by  an  effort,  an  act  of  will,  be 
fixed  on  objects  which  are  not  interesting — which  do 
not  attract  spontaneous  attention.  To  be  able  thus 
to  fix  the  attention,  is  the  chief  characteristic  of  a 
well-disciplined  mind.  The  habit  can  be  gained  only 
by  repeated  and  long-continued  effort. 

Clear  and  definite  apprehension  is  necessary  to 
distinct  remembrance.  The  idea  cannot  appear  in 
memory  with  greater  distinctness  than  it  appeared  in 
perception.  Hence,  he  who  is  cultivating  the  power 
of  clear  seeing,  is  cultivating  his  memory  also.  The 
right  culture  of  one  power  of  the  mind  tends  to  the 
improvement  of  the  other  powers. 

Objects  which  awaken  emotion  arc  more  easily 
remembered  than  those  which  do  not.  The  effect  of 
the  emotion  may  be  to  concentrate  the  attention 
upon  the  object.  It  is  said  that  such  objects  make  a 
deeper  impression  upon  the  mind,  and  are  therefore 
the  more  perfectly  remembered.  The  phrase  is  simply 
a  repetition  of  the  fact  which  it  seeks  to  account  for. 

Repetition  is  favorable  to  remembrance.  A  story 
heard  several  times  is  remembered  with  all  its  details*; 
if  it  is  heard  but  once,  only  the  outline  is  remem- 
bered. The  more  frequently  an  object  is  present  to 
the  mind,  the  more  readily  it  is  recalled. 


MEMOEY.  225 

Relying  upon  the  mind's  power  to  remember — or 
trusting  to  memory — is  another  condition  of  remem- 
brance. This  is  the  same  thing  as  exercising  the 
mind  vigorously  in  remembering.  The  mind's  power 
in  regard  to  every  kind  of  action  is  increased  in  pro- 
portion to  the  legitimate,  vigorous  exercise  which  it 
receives.  Two  persons  may  resolve  to  commit  the 
same  poem  to  memory.  One,  under  a  mistaken  view 
of  the  relation  of  repetition  to  remembrance,  reads  it 
over  a  score  of  times  before  he  attempts  to  repeat  it. 
The  other  undertakes  to  repeat  it  after  a  single  peru- 
sal, and  refers  to  the  book  only  when,  after  long-con- 
tinued effort,  he  fails  to  remember  the  stanza  at 
fault.  The  latter  pursues  the  course  best  adapted  to 
strengthen  his  memory. 

The  use  of  written  memoranda  is  unfavorable 
to  good  habits  of  remembering.  He  who  relies  upon 
his  memoranda,  will  not  rely  upon  his  memory. 
Power  in  remembering  is  thereby  impaired.  Self- 
reliance  is  as  important  in  regard  to  memory  as  it  is 
in  regard  to  moral  perception  and  voluntary  action. 
One's  memory  Avill  serve  him  just  in  proportion  as  he . 
really  trusts  it.  One  of  the  ablest  and  most  exten- 
sive practitioners  of  law  in  ISTew  York  city  never 
keeps  a  memorandum  of  the  cases  on  hand.  It  is  not 
known  that  he  ever  failed  to  attend  to  a  case  at  the 
appointed  time. 

An    orderly    and    natural    arrangement    of   our 
knowledge  is  favorable  to  memory.     A  well-arranged 
10* 


226       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

discourse  or  essay,  in  which  the  thoughts  are  placed 
in  their  natural  relations  to  each  other,  is  easily  re- 
membered. Of  a  desultory,  disconnected  essay  or 
discourse,  we  can  remember  only  here  and  there  a 
thought.  This  is  owing  to  the  fact  that  our  thoughts 
succeed  each  other  according  to  certain  relations,  or 
laws  of  association.  Why  they  succeed  each  other 
according  to  these  laws,  we  cannot  tell. 

Susceptibility,  retentivenes^,  and  readiness  have 
been  named  as  the  qualities  of  a  good  memory ;  in 
other  words,  it  is  desirable  that  the  mind  should  be 
able  to  commit  to  memory  easily,  retain  that  which 
is  thus  committed,  and  readily  reproduce  it  when 
wanted.  Some  minds  commit  to  memory  rapidly, 
and  quickly  forget  what  they  have  committed. 
Some  commit  with  difficulty,  but  retain  it  long. 
Some  retain  with  fidelity,  but  recall  it  slowly.  Com- 
monly, slowness  of  recollection  is  not  owing  to  any 
peculiar  mental  action  in  remembering.  There  is  a 
great  difference  in  minds  with  respect  to  rapidity 
and  slowness  of  action.  A  mind  whose  general 
operations  are  slow,  will  be  slow  in  remembering. 
Some  minds  are  rapid,  retentive,  and  ready  with 
respect  to  remembering. 

Some  acts  of  memory  are  spontaneous,  and  some 
are  voluntary ;  that  is,  voluntary  efforts  are  neces- 
sary in  order  to  recall  the  desired  thought.  Memory 
is  not  directly  subject  to  the  will.  The  mind  cannot 
will  the  presence  of  any  thought :  the  attempt  pre- 


MEMORY.  227 

supposes  the  presence  of  the  thought.  We  wish  to 
remember  something — we  cannot  tell  what  it  is,  for 
that  would  be  to  remember  it.  It  seems  to  be 
utterly  gone  from  our  minds ;  and  yet,  if  another 
thought  is  suggested,  we  can  see  at  once  that  it  is 
not  the  thought  whose  presence  we  desire.  We 
make  an  effort  to  remember.  The  effort  consists  in 
fixing  our  attention  on  objects  known  to  be  con- 
nected with  the  forgotten  thought — in  putting  the 
mind  in  a  waiting  attitude.  By-and-by  the  thought 
is  resuscitated :  perhaps  we  can  trace  the  successive 
associated  thoughts  which  brought  it  to  mind — per- 
haps not.  Sometimes  a  thought  seems  to  flash  upon 
our  minds  without  any  apparent  connection  with  any 
other  thought.  Are  there  such  disconnected  mental 
acts  ? 

Dugald  Stewart  thinks  the  thoughts  constituting 
the  links  in  the  chain  of  association  pass  so  quickly 
that  we  do  not  remember  their  presence.  Hamil- 
ton's explanation  is  based  on  his  theory  of  latent, 
unconscious  mental  modifications. 

Minds  differ  as  to  their  power  of  remembering. 
This  may  be  owing,  in  some  cases,  to  original  differ- 
ences in  the  structure  of  the  minds  thus  differing, 
and  in  some  cases  to  culture.  There  is  in  the  case 
of  nearly  all  persons  a  necessity  for  the  exercise  of 
memory  which  produces  a  considerable  degree  of 
development. 

Some  men  have   an   extraordinary   capacity  for 


228       ELEMENTS    OF    lA'TELI  ECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

remembering  dates  and  names,  and  an  ordinary, 
perhaps  inferior  capacity  of  remembering  ordinary 
things.  "Others  remember  permanently,  and  with- 
out effort,  localities,  the  faces  of  persons,  and  every 
form  of  external  nature.  Some  have  great  facility  in 
recollecting  words  and  their  relations  to  each  other." 

"That  these  differences,"  says  Dr.  Wayland, 
"  can  be  accounted  for  in  some  degree  by  educa- 
tion, I  have  no  doubt.  In  the  most  remarkable 
instances,  however,  they  seem  to  depend  chiefly 
upon  natural  endowment.  I  have  known  several 
persons  who  have  been  gifted  with  some  of  these 
forms  of  recollection  in  a  very  uncommon  degree, 
and  they  have  uniformly  told  me  that  the  things 
which  they  remembered  cost  them  no  more  pains 
than  those  which  they  forgot.  All  the  account 
which  they  could  give  of  the  matter  was,  that 
some  classes  of  facts,  without  any  special  effort, 
remained  permanently  fixed  in  their  recollection, 
while  others  were  as  readily  forgotten  by  them  as 
by  other  men.  A  highly  esteemed  clergyman  of 
Massachusetts,  lately  deceased,  who  could  tell  the 
year  of  the  graduation  of  every  alumnus  of  his  uni- 
versity, and  the  minutest  incidents  relating  to  every 
ordination  in  his  vicinity  for  the  last  half  century, 
assured  me  that  it  cost  him  no  labor,  but  that  it  was, 
so  far  as  he  knew,  a  mental  peculiarity. 

"  The  large  development  of  any  particular  form  of 
memory  is   not,  of  necessity,  accompanied  by  any 


MEMORY.  229 

other  remarkable  intellectual  endowments.  Instances 
have  frequently  been  noticed  of  men  with  prodigious 
powers  of  recollection,  whose  abilities  in  other  re- 
sjDCCts  were  even  below  mediocrity.  Very  remark- 
able memory  has  even  been  observed  in  persons  of  so 
infirm  an  understanding,  that  they  did  not  even  com- 
prehend what  they  accurately  repeated.  In  this  case, 
probably,  the  power  was  mere  susceptibility  of  mem- 
ory ;  that  is,  the  power  of  acquiring  on  the  instant, 
without  the  ability  of  permanent  recollection.  A 
very  remarkable  case  of  this  one-sided  power  is  men- 
tioned in  the  life  of  the  late  Mr.  Roscoe,  of  Liver- 
pool. A  young  Welsh  fisherman,  of  about  the  age 
of  eighteen,  was  found  to  have  made  most  remark- 
able progress  in  the  study  of  languages.  He  was 
not  only  familiar  with  Latin  and  Greek,  but  also  with 
Hebrew,  Arabic,  and  other  Oriental  dialects.  Some 
benevolent  gentlemen  in  that  city  provided  means 
for  giving  him  every  literary  advantage,  in  the  hope 
that  his  vast  acquisitions  might  be  made  useful  to 
society,  and  also  that  he  might  unfold  the  processes 
by  which  his  singular  attainments  had  been  made. 
The  attempt  was,  however,  unsuccessful.  He  seemed 
not  to  be  peculiarly  capable  of  education,  but,  with 
the  exception  of  this  peculiar  gift,  his  mind  partook 
entirely  of  the  character  of  the  class  with  which  he 
had  been  associated." 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  rare  that  high  intellectual 
powers   are   found    in   connection   with   a   defective 


230       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

memory.  "  For  intellectnal  power  of  the  highest 
order,"  says  Hamilton,  "  none  were  distinguished 
above  Grotius  and  Pascal ;  and  Groiius  and  Pascal 
forgot  nothing  they  had  ever  read  or  thought.  Leib- 
nitz and  Euler  were  not  less  celebrated  for  their  in- 
telligence than  for  their  memory,  and  both  could 
repeat  the  whole  of  the  u^iieid,  Donellus  knew  the 
Corpus  Juris  by  neart,  and  yet  he  was  one  of  the 
profoundest  and  most  original  speculators  in  jurispru- 
dence. Muratori,  though  not  a  genius  of  the  very 
highest  order,  was  still  a  man  of  great  ability  and 
judgment ;  and  so  powerful  was  his  retention,  that 
in  making  quotations  he  had  only  to  read  his  pas- 
sages, put  the  books  in  their  place,  and  then  to  write 
out  from  memory  the  words.  Ben  Jonson  tells  us 
that  he  could  repeat  all  he  had  ever  written,  and 
whole  books  that  he  had  read.  Themistocles  could 
call  by  their  names  the  twenty  thousand  citizens  of 
Athens ;  Cyrus  is  reported  to  have  known  the  names 
of  every  soldier  in  his  army.  Hortensius,  after 
Cicero  the  greatest  orator  of  Rome,  after  sitting  a 
whole  day  at  a  public  sale,  correctly  enunciated  from 
memory  all  the  things  sold,  their  prices,  and  the 
names  of  the  purchasers.  Niebuhr,  the  historian  of 
Rome,  was  not  less  distinguished  for  his  memory 
than  for  his  acuteness.  In  his  youth  he  was  em- 
ployed in  one  of  the  public  offices  of  Denmark ;  part 
of  a  book  of  accounts  having  been  destroyed,  he  re- 
stored it  from  his  recollection.     Sir  James  Mackin- 


MEMORY.  231 

tosh  was,  likewise,  remarkable  for  his  power  of  mem- 
ory. An  instance  I  can  give  you  which  I  witnessed 
myself.  In  a  conversation  I  had  with  him,  we  hap- 
pened to  touch  upon  an  author  whom  I  mentioned  in 
my  last  lecture — Muretus ;  and  Sir  James  recited 
from  his  oration  in  praise  of  the  massacre  of  St.  Bar- 
tholomew some  considerable  passages.  Mr.  Dugald 
Stewart,  and  the  late  Dr.  Gregory,  are  likewise  ex- 
amples of  great  talent  united  with  great  memory." 

As  there  has  been  thought  to  be  an  incompatibil- 
ity between  great  powers  of  memory  and  a  sound 
judgment,  it  may  be  well  to  consider  the  relation  of 
memory  to  judgment ;  that  is,  what  relation  those 
mental  acts  which  we  call  acts  of  memory  sustain  to 
those  mental  acts  which  we  call  conclusions  or  judg- 
ments. 

A  man  of  good  judgment  draws  accurate  inferences 
from  complex  premises.  From  simple  premises,  men 
of  slender  capacity  can  draw  accurate  inferences.  If 
one  sees  footprints  on  the  sand,  he  infers  that  some 
person  has  been  walking  there.  When  the  premises 
are  complex — when  the  inference  is  to  be  drawn  from 
a  variety  of  facts,  some  of  them  obscure,  perhaps,  and 
some  of  them  apparently  in  conflict,  there  is  difficulty 
and  liability  to  error.  A  man  who  cognizes  the  truth 
—draws  accurate  conclusions — under  such  circum- 
stances, is  called  a  man  of  good  judgment. 

The  various  facts  from  which  he  draws  his  infer- 
ences must  be  viewed,  not  separately,  but  in  theii 


232       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

relations  to  each  other.  This  comprehensive  view 
requires  the  exercise  of  memory.  The  facts  must  be 
clearly  before  the  mind,  either  by  direct  seeing  oi 
distinct  remembrance.  Besides,  the  final  conclusion 
must  be  the  result  of  many  subordinate  conclusions. 
Hence  they  must  all  be  distinctly  remembered.  Unles^i 
a  man,  therefore,  have  a  good  memory,  he  cannot  be  a 
man  of  good  judgment.  He  may  not  have  a  good 
memory  for  dates  and  casual  occurrences ;  but  he  must 
have  a  good  memory  in  relation  to  the  materials  oi 
his  reasonings.  He  must  have  a  good  memory  in 
relation  to  trains  of  thought. 

The  power  of  memory  is  early  developed,  and,  in 
comparison  with  the  other  powers,  early  decays.  The 
first  indications  of  mental  decline  have  respect  to  the 
memory.  The  aged  man  forgets  recent  events.  He 
forgets  the  events  of  yesterday,  while  he  remembers 
the  events  of  childhood.     Why  is  this  ? 

It  is  said  that  events  in  early  life  make  a  deeper 
impression  upon  the  memory  than  events  in  later  life, 
and  are  therefore  remembered.  Is  this  apparent 
reason  for  the  fact  any  more  than  a  re-afiirmance  of 
the  fact  in  other  words  ?  The  careful  observer  will 
meet  with  many  examples  of  this  method  of  proce- 
dure, when  attempts  are  made  to  give  a  reason  for 
that  for  which  no  reason  can  be  given.  Does  the 
mind  ever  forget  any  of  its  experiences  ?  Are  any 
mental  operations  so  entirely  forgotten  that  they 
cannot  be  recalled  ? 


MEMORY.  '  233 

"  From  remarkable  and  well  authenticated  facts," 
says  Dr.  Wayland,  "it  appears  that,  probably  from 
some  unexplained  condition  of  the  material  organs, 
the  recollection  of  knowledge  long  since  obliterated 
may  be  suddenly  revived.  These  cases  have  been 
observed  to  occur  most  frequently  in  extreme  sick- 
ness, and  on  the  near  approach  of  death.  May  it  not 
be  that,  in  our  present  state,  the  material  and  imma- 
terial part  of  man  being  intimately  united,  our  failure 
of  recollection  is  caused  by  some  condition  of  the 
material  organism ;  and  that,  as  this  union  approaches 
dissolution,  the  power  of  the  material  over  the  im- 
material is  weakened,  and  the  knowledge  which  we 
have  once  acquired  is  more  fully  revealed  to  our 
consciousness,  indicating  that  when  the  separation  is 
complete  it  will  remain  with  us  forever  ? 

"A  variety  of  cases  are  mentioned  by  writers  on  this 
subject,  a  few  of  which  are  here  inserted. 

"An  instance  is  mentioned  by  Coleridge  of  a  ser- 
vant-girl in  Germany,  who,  in  extreme  sickness,  was 
observed  to  repeat  passages  of  Greek,  Latin,  and 
Hebrew,  though  she  was  known  to  have  no  acquaint- 
ance with  those  languages.  Upon  inquiry  into  her 
history,  it  was  found  that  many  years  before,  she  had 
been  a  domestic  in  the  family  of  a  learned  professor, 
who  Vt^as  in  the  habit  of  repeating  aloud  passages 
from  his  favorite  authors  while  walking  in  his  study, 
which  adjoined  the  apartment  in  which  she  was  ac- 
customed to  labor.    This  case  is  the  more  remarkable. 


234       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

inasmuch  as  the  person  had  never  been  conscious 
herself  of  having  acquired  the  knowledge  which  she, 
under  these  circumstances,  exhibited, 

"The  Rev.  Mr.  Flint,  a  very  intelligent  gentleman, 
who,  in  a  series  of  interesting  letters,  has  related  his 
experiences  in  the  valley  of  the  Mississippi,  informs 
^us  that,  under  a  desperate  attack  of  typhus  fever,  as 
his  attendants  afterwards  told  him,  he  repeated  whole 
pages  from  Virgil  and  Homer,  which  he  had  never 
committed  to  memory,  and  of  which,  after  his  re- 
covery, he  could  not  recollect  a  line. 

"  Dr.  Abercrombie,  in  his  work  on  intellectual  phi- 
losophy, mentions  a  variety  of  cases  in  which  persons 
in  extreme  sickness,  and  under  operations  for  injuries 
of  the  head,  conversed  in  languages  which  they  had 
known  in  youth,  but  had  for  many  years  entirely  for- 
gotten. 

"  Dr.  Rush  mentions  the  case  of  an  Italian  gentle- 
man who  died  of  yellow  fever  in  New  York,  who,  in 
the  beginning  of  his  sickness,  spoke  English ;  in  the 
middle  of  it,  French ;  but  on  the  day  of  his  death, 
nothing  but  Italian.  A  Lutheran  clergyman  informed 
Dr.  Rush  that  the  Germans  and  Swedes  of  his  con- 
gregation in  Philadelphia,  when  near  death,  always 
prayed  in  their  native  languages,  though  some  of 
them,  he  was  confident,  had  not  spoken  them  for  fifty 
or  sixty  years. 

"  Dr.  Abercrombie  mentions  another  case,  of  a  boy, 
who,  at  the  age  of  four,  received  a  fracture  of  the 


MEMOEY.  235 

skull,  for  wliich  he  underwent  the  operation  of  the 
trepan.  He  was  at  the  time  in  a  state  of  perfect 
stupor ;  and,  after  his  recovery,  retained  no  recollec- 
tion either  of  the  accident  or  of  the  operation.  At 
the  age  of  fifteen,  during  the  delirium  of  a  fever,  he 
gave  his  mother  a  correct  description  of  the  operation, 
and  the  persons  who  were  present  at  it,  with  their 
dress  and  other  minute  particulars.  He  had  never 
been  observed  to  allude  to  it  before,  and  no  means 
were  known  by  which  he  could  have  acquired  a 
knowledge  of  the  circumstances  which  he  related. 

"What  conclusion  we  are  authorized  to  draw  from 
these  facts,  it  is  difficult  to  determine.  They,  how- 
ever, indicate  that  what  we  seem  to  forget  can  never 
be  irretrievably  lost  to  the  percipient  soul.  The 
means  for  recalling  it  in  some  inexplicable  manner 
appears  to  exist ;  and  when,  under  some  unknown 
conditions,  they  are  called  into  action,  all  or  any  part 
of  our  knowledge  may  on  the  instant  be  brought  to 
our  recollection. 

"  The  moral  lesson  which  these  facts  inculcate  is 
obvious.  If  every  impression  made  upon  the  mind 
is  to  remain  upon  it  forever ;  if  the  soul  be  a  tablet 
from  which  nothing  that  is  written  is  ever  erased,  how 
great  is  the  importance  of  imbuing  it  with  that  knowl- 
edge w^hich  shall  be  a  source  of  joy  to  us  as  long  as 
we  exist.  And,  again,  since  knowledge  which  iies  so 
long  dormant  may  be  revived  unexpectedly,  under 
conditions  which  we  cannot  foresee,  and  at  times 


236       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

when  it  may  have  the  most  important  bearings  upon 
our  decisions  and  our  destiny,  it  is  of  the  greatest 
consequence  to  us  to  store  tbe  mind  with  such  knowl- 
edge as  shall  invigorate  our  principles  and  confirm 
our  virtue.  He  who  reads  a  corrupting  book  for  pas- 
time may  thoughtlessly  lay  it  down,  and  suppose  that 
in  a  few  days  all  the  images  which  it  has  created  will 
have  passed  from  his  remembrance  forever.  But 
these  latent  ideas  may  be  recalled  by  some  casual  as- 
sociation, or  some  physical  condition  of  the  brain,  and 
give  that  bias  to  his  mind  in  the  hour  of  temj)tation, 
which  will  determine  him  to  a  course  that  shall  tend 
to  his  final  undoing." 

The  power  of  memory  is  susceptible  of  rapid  and 
great  improvement ;  and^  as  many  of  the  most  im- 
portant of  the  operations  of  the  mind  are  conditioned 
upon  its  proper  exercise,  it  is  worthy  of  cultivation. 
The  law  of  its  growth  is  exercise,  and  the  only  diffi- 
culty lying  in  the  way  is  indolence.  Every  fact, 
every  thought  perfectly  mastered,  increases  the 
power  of  the  memory.  The  memory  is  not  like  a 
storehouse,  which  may  be  filled  to  repletion.  It  is  a 
power  that  grows  strong  in  proportion  to  the  amount 
of  work  it  does.  The  more  one  remembers  accu- 
rately and  perfectly,  the  more  he  can  remember. 
Few,  if  any,  acquire  the  power  of  memory  which 
they  might  acquire. 

There  is  in  the  minds  of  some  a  prejudice  against 
committing  to  memorj  ve7'I)ati7n ;  but  the  power  of 


MEMORY.  237 

SO  doing  is  very  desirable,  and  almost  indispensable. 
No  power  of  retaining  wbat  is  called  the  substance 
of  a  discourse  or  chapter  will  supply  its  place. 
What  is  wanted  is  j^ower  to  remember  thoughts  in 
their  connection,  and  words  also.  In  early  life,  the 
mind  should  be  exercised  much  in  committing  to 
memory.  The  habit  thus  formed  y/ill  be  of  great 
importance  in  subsequent  life.  It  is  not,  of  course, 
to  be  a  substitute  for  the  exercise  of  other  powers, 
but  a  condition  for  the  exercise  of  those  powers.  If 
those  teachers  who  rigidly  exact  the  accurate  exer- 
cise of  the  memory,  would  in  like  manner  exact  a 
rigid  exercise  of  the  reasoning  power,  there  would  be 
no  prejudices  against  their  pupils  in  consequence  of 
their  power  of  memory.  They  would  not  be  termed 
men  of  mere  memory. 

As  Dr.  Wayland  remarks,  "  The  importance  of 
this  faculty  is  frequently  underrated,  especially  by 
young  men.  If  a  man  succeed  in  almost  any  depart- 
ment of  intellectual  labor,  it  is  often  said,  by  way  of 
disparagement,  that  his  elfort  is  nothing  but  the 
result  of  unusual  memory.  Were  this  the  fact,  it 
would  still  be  true  that  the  cultivation  of  memory  to 
high  perfection,  so  that  our  past  knowledge  is  always 
available  in  every  emergency,  is  neither  an  ordinary 
nor  a  contemptiblo*  attainment.  But  the  assertion  is 
commonly  unfounded.  Yv^hile  distinguished  success 
in  any  department  can  rarely  be  attained  by  the 
exercise  of  memory  alone,  it  is  equally  true  that  the 


238       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

noblest  powers  would  be  continually  liable  to  morti* 
fying  ^failure  without  it.  Let  us,  then,  labor  to  culti- 
vate this  faculty  by  every  means  in  our  power, 
always  remembering  that  we  shall  derive  from  it  the 
greatest  advantage,  not  by  allowing  it  to  supersede 
the  use  of  the  other  faculties,  but  by  training  it  to 
act  in  subordination  to  them.  He  who  reasons  with- 
out facts  must  always  proceed  in  the  dark ;  while  he 
who  relies  on  isolated  facts,  neither  using  his  powers 
of  generalization  nor  reasoning,  must  be  willing  to 
remain  always  a  child." 

Is  memory  to  be  trusted  ?  Can  we  rely  upon  our 
recollections  ?  It  is  said  that  memory  sometimes 
deceives  us :  how,  then,  can  we  be  sure  that  in  any 
given  instance  it  does  not  deceive  us  ?  If  a  witness 
is  known  to  testify  falsely  sometimes,  how  can  we  be 
sure  that  he  testifies  truly  at  any  given  time,  unless 
there  is  other  evidence  to  the  truth  of  what  he 
affirms  ? 

The  attentive  reader  will  readily  see  that  there  is 
no  analogy  between  mistakes  in  regard  to  remember- 
ing and  false  testimony  on  the  part  of  a  witness. 

What  is  meant  by  the  expression,  Our  memory 
sometimes  deceives  us  ?  Simply  that  w^e  sometimes 
think  we  remember  a  thing  when  we  do  not  remem- 
ber it ;  just  as  we  sometimes  think  we  see  a  thing 
when  we  do  not  see  it.  The  fact  that  sometimes,  in 
a  mist,  we  mistake  a  shrub  for  a  man,  does  not  cause 
u$  to  doubt  whether  we  see  the  man  that  stands 


MEMORY.  239 

before  us  in  the  clear  sunlight.  There  are  some 
things  whicli^we  are  absolutely  certain  we  see ;  so 
there  are  some  things  which  we  are  absolutely  cer- 
tain we  remember.  Trusting  our  memories  is  trust- 
ing our  minds.  We  can  trust  our  minds  in  regard  to 
our  recollections  as  well  as  in  regard  to  our  percep- 
tions. 


•-5"..^'    (/'^-^  ^-^^£^r^ 


n 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 


ASSOCIATION. 


In  all  our  waking  hours  we  are  conscious  of  a 
constant  succession  of  tliouglits  and  feelings.  We 
can  influence  the  train  of  thought  by  turning  our 
attention  to  certain  objects,  and  withdray/ing  it  from 
other  objects;  but  when  we  make  no  such  effort,  the 
train  proceeds  spontaneously.  The  thoughts  do  not, 
however,  succeed  each  other  at  random,  but  accord- 
ing to  certain  laws,  or  certain  relations  existing  be- 
tween them.  The  relations  most  influential  are  those 
of  resemblance,  contrast,  contiguity  in  time  or  place, 
and  cause  and  effect.  These  are  commonly  called 
laws  of  association.  They  are  facts  derived  from 
experience. 

Thoughts  have  a  tendency  to  introduce  resem- 
bling thoughts,  or  are  naturally  followed  by  resem- 
bling thoughts.  You  see  a  building  :  you  remember 
one  similar  to  it.  You  read  a  beautiful  passage :  you 
remember  a  similar  one.  The  suggesting  similarity 
between  two  things  may  relate  to  the  things  them- 
selves, or  to  their  causes,  or  to  their  consequences. 


ASSOCIATION.  241 

The  resemblance  may  be  striking,  or  it  may  be 
sliglit.  Dr.  Thomas  Brown  affirms  that  genius  con- 
sists in  the  capacity  of  associating  ideas  by  remote 
analogies. 

Thoughts  have  a  tendency  to  introduce  their 
opposites.  The  palace  suggests  the  hovel,  the  desert 
the  luxuriant  field.  The  rhetorical  figure  of  antithe- 
sis is  founded  on  the  principle  of  contrast.  Fewer 
thoughts  are  introduced  by  this  relation  than  by  the 
relation  of  resemblance. 

When  we  visit  the  scenes  of  our  childhood,  the 
incidents  of  that  period  are  brought  to  mind.  We 
never  think  of  Thermopyl^  without  thinking  of 
Leonidas.  We  never  think  of  Calvary  without 
thinking  of  the  stupendous  event  of  which  it  was 
the  scene.  Places  owe  their  chief  interest  to  the 
events  associated  vath  them.  Contiguity  in  time 
and  place  is  a  principle  of  association  in  all  mind^ 
and  a  leading  one  in  uneducated  minds. 

When  we  see  an  event,  we  think  of  its  cause  and 
of  its  consequences.  This  principle  of  association  is 
prominent  in  philosophical  minds. 

The  above-mentioned  relations  have  a  great  influ- 
ence in  determining  our  trains  of  thought ;  yet  other 
relations  have  an  influence.  The  relations  between 
our  thoughts  are  numberless,  and  any  one  of  them 
may  introduce  a  thought.  Some  have  attempted  to 
enumerate  all  the  laws  of  association,  and  have  enu- 
merated primary  and  secondary  laws — objective  and 
11 


242       ELEMEIS^TS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

subjective  laws.  To  enumerate  all  the  facts  that  may 
cause  one  thought  to  introduce  another,  would  be  to 
enumerate  all  the  relations  existino-  between  our 
thoughts  ;  and  that  is  impossible. 

Our  spontaneous  trains  of  thought  are  modified 
by  the  peculiar  emotive  condition  of  the  mind.  Dif- 
ferent laws  of  association  operate  in  diiferent  moods 
of  mind.  When  the  mind  is  in  a  gloomy  state,  a 
joyous  assembly  may  suggest  a  funeral :  vfhen  in  a 
cheerful  state,  it  calls  to  remembrance  a  similar 
assembly.  In  the  one  case  the  principle  of  contrast, 
and  in  the  other  that  of  similitude,  determines  the 
suggestion. 

While  our  trains  of  thought  are  thus  dependent 
upon  relations  which  we  do  not  create,  yet  they  are 
not  beyond  our  control.  We  can  cause  our  thoughts 
to  succeed  each  other  in  accordance  with  certain  rela- 
tions rather  than  others.  We  can  put  our  minds  in 
an  attitude  favorable  to  the  operation  of  a  particular 
law.  The  more  our  thoughts  succeed  each  other  ac- 
cording to  that  law,  the  greater  will  be  their  tendency 
to  do  so.  In  this  way,  in  the  case  of  the  poet,  the 
law  of  resemblance  and  of  contrast  becomes  promi- 
nent, and  in  the  case  of  the  philosopher,  the  law  of 
cause  and  effect. 

"  The  will,"  says  Dr.  Hickok,  "  may  have  much 
to  do  in  regulating  and  controlling  the  association  of 
thought,  and  an  earnest  and  protracted  effort  may 
cultivate  and  discipline  this  faculty  in  various  direc- 


ASSOCIATIO]sr.  243 

tions.  A  man  may  make  himself  a  rhymer,  a  pun- 
ster, a  dealer  in  charades  and  anagrams,  by  certain 

hahits  of  associating  thoughts  v/ith  words  ;  or  observ- 
ing, inventive,  practically  effective,  by  certain  associa- 
tions of  thonghts  with  things.  An  orderly  and  me- 
thodical train  of  thought  may  be  cultivated  by  keep- 
ing the  operation  of  this  faculty  under  the  regula- 
tions of  time,  place,  and  circumstance,  so  that  the 
thought  may  be  appropriate  to  the  occasion." 

Some  w^riters  have  treated  this  subject  in  a  man 
ner  that  has  led  to  erroneous  conclusions.  They  have 
'regarded  the  mind  as  wholly  passive  in  respect- to  its 
trains  of  thought — as  helplessly  subject  to  the  laws 
of  association.  Our  trains  of  thought,  it  is  said,  do 
not  depend  upon  our  wills,  but  upon  laws  ordained  by 
a  higher  power.  We  are  therefore  not  responsible 
for  them,  nor  for  the  conclusions  to  which  they  lead 
us.  Thus  man  is  not  responsible  for  his  belief.  He 
may  be  an  infidel  and  not  be  to  blame  for  it.  Dr. 
Thomas  Brown  and  Lord  Brougham  teach  that  men 
are  not  responsible  for  their  opinions.  And  there  is 
a  popular  prejudice  which  regards  freedom  of  opinion 
as  inconsistent  with  responsibility  for  belief. 

It  is  true  that  belief  is  not  under  the  direct  con- 
trol of  the  will.  We  cannot  believe  a  proposition  by 
willing  to  believe  it.  Belief  depends  upon  evidence. 
We  can  attend  to  the  evidence  of  a  proposition ;  we 
can  guard  against  the  influence  of  prejudice.  If 
the  evidence  is  adequate,  belief  follows.     Our  belief 


244       ELEMENTS    OF    INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

is  tluis  indirectly  under  our  control.  A  direct  con- 
trol over  all  our  states  of  mind  is  not  a  necessary 
condition  of  responsibility  for  our  belief. 

We  are  responsible  for  the  right  exercise  of  our 
minds ;  and  the  right  exercise  of  our  minds  will  re- 
sult in  the  formation  of  correct  opinions. 

We  are  responsible  for  our  actions,  and  we  are 
under  obligation  to  act  rationally.  If  we  act  ration- 
ally, we  shall  act  in  accordance  with  our  views  of 
truth — that  is,  with  our  opinions ;  hence  the  responsi- 
bility reaches  back  to  our  opinions. 

God  holds  us  responsible  for  our  opinions.  He 
requires  us  to  believe  the  truth,  to  form  correct  opin- 
ions.    This  is  taught  throughout  the  Bible. 

The  law  of  resemblance  suggests  an  important 
mode  of  procedure  in  respect  to  self-culture.  When 
we  store  the  mind  with  choice  thoughts,  they  will, 
by  the  law  of  resemblance,  introduce  similar  ones. 
Hence  we  should  become  familiar  with  the  best 
thoughts  of  the  best  authors.  This  explains,  in  part 
at  least,  the  fact  of  mental  assimilation.  We  become 
like  those  with  whose  works  we  are  familiar. 

The  laws  of  association  are  sometimes  considered 
under  the  head  of  memory,  as  though  they  operated 
only  in  reviving  thoughts  that  have  been  experienced. 
This  is  not  the  case.  If  we  may  be  said  to  remember 
by  association,  we  may  be  said  to  reason  by  associa- 
tion. The  laws  of  association  often  bring  to  our 
minds  thouo-hts  that  were  never  there  before. 


ASSOCIATIO]^.  245 

Suppose  one  is  engaged  in  the  work  of  original 
composition.  He  designs  to  prove  a  particular  propo- 
sition. The  thoughts  which  constitute  that  proof  are 
not  present  to  his  mind.  He  cannot  directly  will 
their  presence — that  would  be  to  have  them  already. 
He  fixes  his  attention  on  the  proposition.  He  watches 
for  thoughts  which  tend  to  his  purpose.  From  the 
ceaseless  flow  of  thoughts,  he  selects  such  as  seem 
suited  to  his  purpose.  These  introduce  others  of  like 
tendency.  By  degrees  the  materials  for  his  proof  are 
selected.  The  train  from  which  they  were  selected 
was  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  association  modi- 
fied by  his  will — -just  as  is  the  case  in  voluntary  recol- 
lection. 

In  this  case,  thoughts  which  were  never  in  the 
mind  before,  are  introduced  by  the  same  laws  or  rela- 
tions which  call  up  thoughts  that  had  formerly  been 
in  the  mind. 

Association  is  therefore  not  properly  termed  a 
faculty.  It  denotes  a  mode  of  the  mind's  operation 
with  respect  to  several  of  its  faculties.  It  is  true,  v/e 
define  a  faculty  to  be  a  mode  of  the  mind's  operation : 
association  is  a  mode  of  the  mind's  operation,  but  not 
in  the  sense  in  which  we  use  that  phrase  Avhen  we 
would  designate  a  faculty.  Associated  thoughts  form 
a  portion  of  the  operations  classed  under  the  head  of 
memory,  of  reasoning,  of  imagination,  of  the  aesthetic 
and  moral  faculties.  Association  is  a  term  expressive , 
of  our  thoughts  as  successive  and  related. 


246       ELEMENTS    OF   II!TTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

A  knowledge  of  the  prmci|)les  of  association  is 
specially  important  to  the  dramatist,  the  writer  of 
fiction,  and  the  critic.  The  dramatist  and  novelist 
form  ideal  characters  which  are  represented  as  speak 
ing  and  acting.  Their  language  and  actions  must  be 
in  keeping  with  their  characters.  The  characters 
must  be  natural,  and  their  language  and  action  in  ac- 
cordance Vv^ith  the  natural  laws  of  thought  and  feel- 
ing. The  facts  connected  with  association  must 
therefore  be  known  to  the  author.  The  same  is  true 
of  the  critic,  whose  office  is  to  sit  in  judgment  on  the 
productions  of  the  author.  One  important  question 
he  is  to  decide  is,  Are  the  characters  and  incidents  of 
the  work  natural — that  is,  in  accordance  with  the 
laws  of  thought  and  feeling  ?  A  knowledge  of  those 
laws  is  a  necessary  condition  of  an  intelligent  de- 
cision. 

The  principle  of  habit  is  usually  referred  to  asso- 
ciation. The  law  or  fact  which  underlies  habit  is  not 
strictly  a  law  o£  association,  yet  it  is  one  of  great 
importance. 

The  repetition  of  an  act  increases  the  tendency 
to  the  performance  of  that  act,  and  increased  facility 
in  performing  it.  Repetition  continued  at  stated  in- 
tervals forms  a  habit,  which  is  a  condition  of  mind 
disposing  to  perform  certain  acts,  and  giving  facility 
in  the  performance  of  said  acts.  A  habit  may  be 
grafted  on  an  original  disposition,  or  it  may  be  wholly 


ASSOCIATION^.  247 

factitious.  The  chief  object  of  education  is  the  forma- 
tion of  right  mental  habits. 

Habits  are  active  or  passive.  One  may  form  a 
habit  of  industry  or  a  habit  of  indolence.  The  one  is 
formed  by  action,  the  other  by  inaction. 

A  course  of  action '  which  is  unpleasant  at  first, 
becomes  pleasant  when  habitual.  Labor  is  not  in  it- 
self pleasant  to  many,  if  indeed  it  be  to  any ;  but 
habit  makes  it  agreeable,  nay,  a  source  of  high  enjoy- 
ment. We  have,  therefore,  to  fix  upon  that  course  of 
exertion  which  duty  requires,  and  habit  will  soon 
render  it  agreeable. 

When  a  habit  is  founded  on  the  love  of  some  par- 
ticular indulgence,  the  pleasure  decays  as  the  habit  is 
formed,  and  the  pain  of  want  is  the  stimulus  instead 
of  expected  pleasure. 

Right  habits  increase  our  power  to  do  right,  and 
lessen  the  difficulties  in  our  way.  The  constitution 
of  our  minds  whereby  we  are  rendered  capable  of 
forming  habits,  is  thus  a  cause  for  gratitude  to  our 
Maker. 

Our  great  business  here  is  the  formation  of  right 
habits.  Right  habits,  so  far  as  they  are  perfectly 
formed,  render  the  soul  perfect,  and  confirm  it  in  that 
condition.  If  one  were  suddenly  made  perfectly  vir- 
tuous, he  would  need  to  form  habits  of  virtue  to  pre- 
serve him  in  that  condition. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

IMAGINATION. 

You  have  seen  an  edifice :  when  absent  from  it, 
you  can  form  a  mental  image  of  it — can  see  it  with 
the  mind's  eye.  The  capacity  of  the  mind  for  per- 
forming this  act,  is  termed  imagination.  The  act  is  a 
simple  one,  and  is  thus  incapable  of  definition.  We 
use  figurative  language  v/hen  we  call  it  an  image. 
There  can  he  no  literal  resemblance  between  an  edi- 
fice,— material  object,  and  an  act  of  the  immaterial 
mind. 

It  may  be  said  the  image  of  the  edifice  is  a  re- 
membrance, more  or  less  perfect,  of  its  appearance. 
This  is  true ;  but  the  image-making  power  is  clearly 
distinguishable  from  the  remembering  power.  This 
appears  from  the  fact  that  we  can  form  images  of 
things  which  we  have  not  seen.  A  skilful  description 
of  the  edifice  will  enable  us  to  form  an  image  of  it, 
almost  as  complete  as  if  we  had  seen  it.  To  remem- 
ber is  to  recall  past  mental  states,  recognizing  them 
as  past.  The  process  of  image-making  will  take 
place  in  remembering  according  to  the  nature  of  the 


IMAGINATIOIfr.  249 

mental  acts  recalled,  and  the  habits  of  the  inclivid- 
iial's  mind. 

We  can  also  form  images  of  things  which  never 
have  existed.  An  architect  forms  a  mental  image  of 
the  edifice  he  is  about  to  erect. 

This  image-making  power  has  been  called  by  some 
writers  conception.  Conception  is  by  them  defined 
to  be  the  power  to  form  an  image  of  an  object  pre- 
viously perceived.  It  is  comparatively  of  little  con- 
sequence what  name  is  given  to  a  mental  act,  so  that 
the  act  be  clearly  stated. 

Those  who  would  designate  the  image-making 
power  by  the  term  conception,  apply  the  term  imagi- 
nation to  the  process  by  which  conceptions  are  com- 
bined into  new  wholes.  For  example,  one  may  take 
conceptions  of  different  features,  and  selecting  one 
from  one  man  and  another  from  another,  may  form  a 
new  combination  of  features  differing  from  any  that 
has  existed.  He  must  select  his  features,  which  said 
writers  call  an  exercise  of  abstraction,  and  combine 
them,  and  the  result  is  a  product  of  imagination. 
Imagination,  they  tell  us,  is  thus  a  complex  opera- 
tion, to  which  abstraction,  conceptioli,  and  taste 
render  their  aid.  The  objection  to  this  statement  is, 
that  the  calling  in  the  aid  of  several  faculties  tends 
to  produce  obscurity,  if  not  confusion^^  in  the  reader's 
mind. 

The  operation  of  forming  new  wholes,  whatever 
we  may  call  those  wholes,  is  a  complex  operation. 
11* 


250        ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

Let  the  object  be  to  form  an  image,  conception,  or 
product  of  imagination,  different  from  any  thing 
before  known.  Let  the  object  be  to  form  an  imagi- 
nary castle  differing  from  any  castle  that  has  existed. 
The  mind  selects  from  castles  which  it  has  seen,  or 
heard,  or  read  of,  certain  parts,  and  out  of  these  parts, 
which  exist  as  mental  images,  it  forms  a  new  whole. 
We  cannot  tell  how  it  does  this:  we  know  that 
it  does  do  it.  Nothing  is  gained  by  saying  that 
abstraction  selects  the  materials,  that  judgment  or 
taste  approves  the  selection.  Li  the  complex  opera- 
tions referred  to  imagination,  mental  acts  which  we, 
when  classifying  mental  acts,  refer  to  separate  facul- 
ties, find  a  place.  The  same  is  true  of  all  complex  or 
combined  mental  operations,  whether  they  have  refer- 
ence to  the  formation  of  images,  the  discovery  of 
truth,  or  its  communication.  An  act  of  imagination 
is  not  the  act  of  something  separate  from  the  mind ; 
it  is  the  mind  acting  in  a  particular  way — putting 
forth  peculiar  acts,  forming  images. 

The  power  of  forming  mental  images  is  possessed 
by  all  men,  but,  like  other  powers,  is  not  possessed 
by  all  in  the  same  degree.  Some  can  form  distinct 
and  vivid  images  of  objects  which  they  have  seen,  or 
which  are  described  in  language ;  others  form  dim 
and  indistinct  images. 

Some  readily  form  images  of  objects  thus  set 
before  them,  but  are  destitute  of  the  power  of  form- 
ing new  images.     They  can  only  repeat  the  processes 


IMAGINATION.  251 

of  other  minds.  This  has  heen  termed  a  passive  ex- 
ercise of  the  imagination. 

An  active  exercise  is  said  to  consist  in  forming 
new  images,  by  means  of  the  process  of  selection  and 
combination  above  noticed. 

An  author  is  said  to  have  a  creative  imagination 
who  produces  new  scenes  and  new  characters.  Is  it 
certain  that  the  process  of  construction  is  that  assum- 
ed above  ?  Did  Shakespeare,  when  he  created  a  new 
character,  take  one  quality  from  one  real  character 
and  another  from  another,  and  tlius  form  a  new  char- 
acter out  of  old  materials  ?  To  answer  this  question 
by  an  appeal  to  consciousness,  it  would  be  necessary 
to  have  the  consciousness  of  one  possessing  a  creative 
imagination.  May  not  the  mind  possess  a  power 
more  strictly  analogous  to  the  creative  ?  In  the  orig- 
ination of  a  new  character,  may  not  the  process  be 
that  of  construction  from  analogy — not  that  of  selec- 
tion and  combination  ?  May  there  not  be  a  difference 
between  a  combination  of  cognized  parts  into  a  new 
whole,  and  the  production  of  a  new  whole  analogous 
to  something  previously  known  ? 

One  man  studies  a  picture.  He  makes  a  copy  of 
it,  or  changes  it  by  introducing  some  parts  from  an- 
other picture.  Another  studies  the  same  picture. 
Conceptions  are  awakened  which  he  throws  upon  the 
canvas.  His  work  is  not  made  up  of  parts  of  the 
pictures  studied,  and  yet  it  was  occasioned  by  the 
study  of  them.     May  we  not  safely  affirm  that  the 


252        ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY, 

original  productions  of  the  mind  referred  to  imagina- 
tion are  more  nearly  allied  to  the  creative  than  to  the 
formative  ?  I  am  aware  that  this  is  not  pointing  out 
in  what  the  distinction  consists. 

The  power  of  imagination  is  not  to  be  confounded 
with  the  power  to  cognize  beauty.  In  order  to  form 
beautiful  imaginative  creations,  there  must  be  the 
power  of  cognizing  beauty;  but  the  power  to  cognize 
beauty  may  be  possessed  by  one  who  has  little  or  no 
power  of  imagination,  formative  or  creative. 

One  who  abounds  in  the  use  of  jBgures  is  said  to 
have  a  fine  imagination,  whereas  his  characteristic 
power  is  that  of  cognizing  analogies.  With  it  is 
probably  always  connected  the  power  of  forming 
mental  images,  but  not  of  necessity  the  power  of  pro- 
ducing new  combinations.  "When  Burke's  gorgeous 
imagination  is  spoken  of,  reference  is  had  to  his  power 
of  cognizing  analogies.  Analogies  are  cognized,  not 
created.  A  man  looks  upon  the  fading  leaf,  and 
exclaims,  "We  all  do  fade  as  a  leaf."  He  sees  an 
analogy.  He  creates  nothing.  The  act  is  cognitive, 
not  imaginative. 

The  forming  a  mental  image  of  a  visible  object 
is  the  act  which  gives  designation  to  the  power 
under  consideration.  There  are  other  acts,  by  no 
means  identical  with  it,  referred  to  the  same  power. 
We  form  an  imaginary  character.  Grant  that  it  is 
made  up  of  traits  selected  from  characters  known  to 
us,  yet  the  conceptions  of  those  traits  are  not  images 


IMAGINATIOl!*r.  253 

in  the  sense  in  wliich  our  conception  of  St.  Peter's 
is  an  image.  A  conception  of  a  character  difters  from 
a  conception  of  a  landscape.  The  idea  of  the  pictur- 
able  enters  into  the  one,  and  not  into  the  other. 

An  imaginary  conversation  is  held.  There  may 
be  images  of  persons  supposed  to  he  conversing,  but 
there  are  no  images  of  the  sentences  supposed  to  be 
uttered. 

We  thus  apply  the  term  imaginary  to  things  un- 
real as  distinguishable  from  real :  we  do  not  confine 
the  term  to  the  picturable. 

Poetry  and  fiction  are  said  to  be  the  products  of 
imagination.  By  this  is  meant,  that  acts  which  we 
term  acts  of  imagination  have  a  prominent  place  in 
said  works.  The  plan  of  a  work  of  fiction,  its  char- 
acters and  incidents,  may  be  imaginary — that  is,  the 
mental  acts  expressed  in  language  are  those  that  we 
refer  to  the  head  of  imagination ;  but  much  of  the  fill- 
ing up  of  4he  plot  may  consist  of  acts  that  we  refer  to 
other  heads.  Sound  reasoning,  admirable  illustrations 
of  important  principles,  are  found  in  works  termed 
works  of  imagination.  Poetry  is  not  necessarily  the 
product  of  imagination.  There  are  scenes  in  nature,  an 
accurate  description  of  which — an  accurate  statement 
of  the  truth  in  relation  to  which — constitutes  poetry. 
The  poetry  of  a  stanza  or  stanzas  may  consist  of  the 
expression  of  a  fine  analogy.  There  are  human  ac- 
tions, the  simple  record  of  v^hich  constitutes  poetry. 

There  are  operations  far  removed  from  poetry  and 


254        ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

fiction,  in  wHcli  acts  of  imagination  have  a  prominent 
place.  A  military  commander  forms  his  plan  of  a 
campaign.  He  has  a  mental  image  of  the  country 
which  is  the  theatre  of  y/ar,  of  his  own  army  and 
that  of  the  enemy,  and  of  the  movements  which  will 
probably  be  made.  He  fights  imaginary  battles,  and 
conducts  an  imaginary  campaign.  Here  is  a  series 
of  mental  operations  of  great  importance,  tending  to 
great  practical  results.  Of  this  series,  processes  that 
are  legitimately  referable  to  imagination  form  an 
essential  part.  The  series  abounds  with  sound  rea- 
sonings, but  they  are  founded  on  supposititious  or 
imaginary  events.  A  good  imagination  may  be  said 
to  be  essential  to  a  great  military  commander. 

The  same  is  true  of  all  men  of  enterprise  and  fore- 
cast. Plans  having  reference  to  the  future  call  into 
exercise  the  constructive  power  of  the  mind  as  truly 
as  did  the  composition  of  "Paradise  Lost."  In  such 
cases  there  is  no  call  for  the  aesthetic  element.  A  man 
may  be  a  great  general  and  a  great  man  of  business 
without  having  the  power  of  perceiving  beauty. 

Hypotheses  are  imaginary  solutions  of  scientific 
questions,  and  have  often  been  formed  as  the  guides 
of  experiment.  If  experiment  proves  the  hypothesis 
to  be  true,  the  hypothesis  becomes  a  theory.  Ima- 
gination has,  therefore,  much  to  do  with  scientific 
progress. 

Imagination  -is  most  important  with  respect  to 
models;  that   is,   the   mental   operation   of  forming 


IMAGINATIO:^.  255 

models  is  most  important.  No  one  in  any  depart- 
ment of  effort  attains  an  excellence  transcending  his 
conception  of  excellence.  He  alyv^ays  comes  short 
of  it.  In  the  fine  arts,  the  artist  never  realizes  the 
full  beauty  of  his  ideal.  The  artist  has  his  model — 
his  conception  of  excellence.  To  realize  it  on  the 
canvas,  or  in  marble,  or  in  the  anthem,  is  the  object 
of  his  effort.  He  vfho  cannot  form  a  conception  of 
high  excellence  can  never  become  an  original  artist. 
He  can  be  only  a  copyist,  an  imitator. 

The  painter  or  sculptor  repairs  to  those  portions 
of  the  world  where  the  most  perfect  specimens  of  art 
are  to  be  found.  These  specimens  he  studies,  not 
that  he  may  imitate  them,  but  that  he  may  be  aided 
in  forming  conceptions,  models,  to  which  he  may 
give  a  local  habitation  and  a  name. 

The  importance  of  models  is  not  confined  to  the 
fine  arts.  They  have  their  place  in  every  department 
of  human  effort  where  excellence  is  sought.  Espe- 
cially are  they  important  in  the  most  important  of 
all  arts,  the  art  of  forming  a  strong,  beautiful,  and 
holy  mind. 

Every  student  should  form  a  true  conception  of 
excellence  in  regard  to  character  and  attainment. 
One  of  the  great  advantages  of  biography  is  to  ena- 
ble us  to  form  models  of  excellence,  to  the  realization 
of  which  our  efforts  should  be  directed. 

The  importance  of  models  in  relation  to  the  forma- 
tion of  character  appears  from  the  fact,  that  one  ob- 


256       ELEMENTS    OF    INTELLECTUAL   PRILOSOPHr. 

ject  of  Christ's  mission  was  to  furnish  a  perfect  model 
of  human  excellence — a  conception  that  no  man  be- 
fore His  time  ever  attained.  There  is  no  proof  that 
the  idea  of  a  perfect  manhood  was  ever  possessed  by 
any  one  who  did  not  derive  it  from  a  knowledge  of 
the  character  of  Christ.  In  all  our  efforts  at  self-im- 
provement, regard  should  be  had  to  the  perfect  model 
set  before  us  in  the  character  of  Christ.  To  neglect 
this  model  when  aiming  at  excellence  of  character, 
were  more  unwise  than  to  close  our  eyes  on  the 
beauty  of  nature  when  attempting  to  improve  our 
power  of  cognizing  beauty. 

The  legitimate  operations  of  imagination  are  at- 
tended with  enjoyment  and  profit.  Even  the  perver- 
sion of  this  power  is  attended  with  enjoyment.  The 
day-dreamer  is  happy  for  the  time  being. 

Hence,  imagination  should  receive  proper  culture 
in  the  work  of  self-improvement.  The  imagination 
is  cultivated,  as  memory  and  the  reasoning  faculties 
are  cultivated,  by  exercise.  The  mind  performs  the 
process  of  reasoning  more  readily  in  proportion  as  it 
is  exercised  in  reasoning.  The  mind  performs  the 
process  of  imagining  the  more  readily  in  proportion 
as  it  is  exercised  in  imagining. 

How  shall  it  be  exercised  ?  By  reading  works  of 
imagination,  by  forming  wise  plans  and  scientific  hy- 
potheses. 

It  is  supposed  by  some  that  the  chief  exercise  of 
the  imagination  consists  in  reading  works  of  fiction. 


IMAGIKATIOX.  257 

In  regard  to  a  vast  number  of  such  works,  they  con- 
tain very  little  that  can  he  legitimately  said  to  he  the 
product  of  imagination.  There  are  few  writers  of 
creative  power.  The  y/orks  of  such  writers  only  are 
worthy  of  being  read.  The  works  of  such  writers, 
unless  they  contain  moral  poison,  will  always  be 
read  with  profit. 

The  mind  grows  by  intimate  communion  with  su- 
perior minds.  Intimacy  with  a  man  of  genius,  per- 
sonally or  by  his  works,  will  promote  mental  im- 
provement. Who  ever  read  and  understood  Shake- 
speare, Milton,  Bunyan^  Dickens,  and  Thackeray,  with- 
out receiving  not  merely  amusement,  but  mental 
profit? 

We  cannot  associate  habitually  with  feeble  minds 
without  injury  to  ourselves.  We  cannot  become  fa- 
miliar with  the  works  of  feeble  minds  without  injury. 
The  mass  of  fiction  with  which  the  press  groans  is  for 
the  most  part  the  product  of  feeble  minds,  and  hence 
should  be  avoided  altogether. 

"  We  may  cultivate  the  imagination,"  says  Dr. 
Wayland,  "  by  studying  attentively  works  most  dis- 
tinguished for  poetical  combination.  I  say  study  at- 
tentively, in  distinction  from  the  mere  cursory  peru- 
sal of  classical  authors.  Vf  e  must  not  only  read,  but 
meditate  on  the  sublime  and  beautiful  in  thought,  un- 
til we  feel  the  full  force  of  every  analogy,  entering 
into  the  spirit  of  the  writer  himself,  if  we  would  avail 
ourselves  of  the  most   successful  efforts   of  human 


258        ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

genius.  We  thus  acquire  the  intellectual  habits  of  the 
masters  of  human  thought.  In  the  language  of  poetry 
we  catch  a  portion  of  their  inspiration,  instead  of  ser- 
vilely rendering  their  thoughts  in  our  own  language. 
It  is  by  a  diligent  study  of  a  few  of  the  best  writers, 
and  not  the  hasty  reading  of  many,  that  we  derive 
the  greatest  benefit  from  the  study  of  the  classics  of 
our  own  or  any  other  country."  These  remarks  have 
reference  to  mental  culture  in  general,  as  well  as  to 
imagination. 

The  propriety  of  using  fiction  as  the  vehicle  of 
truth,  is  settled  by  the  example  of  Christ.  The  para- 
bles of  the  New  Testament  furnish  the  requisite  au- 
thority for  those  who,  like  Bunyan,  would  use  the 
gifts  of  imagination  bestowed  upon  them  in  teaching 
and  enforcing  truth. 

Some  seem  to  suppose  that  high  powers  of  imagi- 
nation and  of  reasoning  are  incompatible.  We  have 
thus  far  seen  nothing  in  the  character  of  the  opera- 
tions classed  under  the  heads  of  imagination  and 
reasoning  which  would  show  any  incompatibility. 
So  far  is  this  prejudice  from  being  true,  it  may  safely 
be  afiirmed  that  the  right  cultivation  of  one  faculty 
has  a  tendency  to  strengthen  all  the  faculties.  This 
is  only  saying  that  the  legitimate  action  of  the  mind 
in  one  class  of  operations,  quickens  its  power  to  per- 
form other  operations.  The  legitimate  use  of  the  axe 
strengthens  the  arm  to  use  the  plane. 

The  term   fancy  has  been   employed   in   several 


IMAGIKATION".  259 

meanings.  With  Stewart  it  is  the  power  of  cognizing 
analogies.  "  It  is,"  says  he,  "  the  power  of  fancy 
which  supplies  the  poet  with  metaphorical  language, 
and  with  all  the  analogies  which  are  the  foundation 
of  his  allusions.  But  it  is  the  power  of  imagination 
which  creates  the  complex  scenes  he  describes,  and 
the  fictitious  characters  which  he  delineates." 

Some  of  the  German  writers  give  the  name  fancy 
to  the  spontaneous  exercise  of  imagination — sponta- 
neous as  distinguished  from  voluntary. 

I  think  the  prevailing  usage  of  the  term  fancy  is 
to  express  the  lighter  forms  of  imagination.  A 
scheme  or  plan  which  is  but  remotely  analogous  to 
truth,  which  pays  but  little  regard  to  the  natural,  is 
said  to  be  a  fanciful  scheme.  The  productions  of  an 
ill-regulated  imagination  v/ould  often  be  termed  fan- 
ciful. 

Some  operations  are  improperly  ascribed  to  the 
imagination.  It  is  said  that  a  man  passing  through  a 
graveyard  at  night  imagined  that  he  saw  a  ghost. 
What  were  the  facts  of  the  case  ?  He  saw  a  white 
rose  in  bloom,  and  under  the  influence  of  fear  inferred 
that  it  v/as  a  ghost.  His  error  was  a  false  conclusion 
from  a  sense-perception. 

A  man  imagines  that  he  has  been  slighted,  when 
he  has  not.  He  has  drawn  a  conclusion  that  the  facts 
in  regard  to  his  treatment  did  not  warrant. 

A  well-developed  imagination  is  a  source  of  en- 
joyment and  of  power.     We  cognize  truth  in  the 


260       ELEMEl^TS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

concrete,  not  in  the  abstract.  We  arrive  at  general 
truths  by  means  of  individual  truths.  The  dramatist, 
the  vrriter  of  imaginary  histories,  has  it  in  his  power 
to  communicate  truth  more  effectively  than  the  phi- 
losopher. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 


THE    WILL. 


The  will  is  the  mind  v/illiiig — not  a  separate 
agent,  as  the  language  often  used  respecting  it  would 
imply.  It  has  been  called  the  executive  faculty,  and 
the  attributes  of  personality  have  been  assigned  to 
it.  To  such  an  extent  has  this  been  the  case,  that  it 
is  difficult  to  think  on  this  subject  without  regarding 
the  will  as  an  entity  controlling  the  mind.  Let  it  be 
remembered  that  by  the  voluntary  faculty,  or  the 
will,  we  mean  simply  the  capacity  of  the  mind  to  per- 
form acts  of  volition  ;  just  as  by  memory  we  mean 
the  capacity  of  the  mind  to  recall  past  thoughts  and 
feelings.  An  act  of  the  will  is  an  act  of  the  mind — 
the  mind  willing  or  performing  an  act  of  volition. 
We  must  guard  against  the  impression  that  the  will 
is  an  agent  separate  from  the  mind,  and  controlling 
its  acts. 

The  mind,  then,  has  the  power  of  performing  acts 
of  volition.  A  volition  cannot  be  defined.  It  is  a 
simple  act,  and  is  known  only  in  consciousness.     You 


262     eleme:^ts  of  intellectual  philosophy. 

will  to  move  your  arm;  the  motion  takes  place. 
The  volition  causing  the  motion  is  clearly  defined  in 
consciousness,  though  it  cannot  be  in  language. 

Volitions  sustain  important  relations  to  other 
mental  acts.  They  are  conditioned  on  other  acts  or 
states  of  mind,  and  influence  succeeding  acts  or 
states. 

Volition  is  alvf ays  preceded  by  desire.  Desire  is 
a  simple  feeling  known  in  consciousness,  but  incapable 
of  analysis  or  definition.  Consciousness  testifies  that 
eyerj  volition  is  preceded  by  some  desire.  Contem- 
plate any  volition  of  which  you  have  been  conscious. 
Why  did  you  put  forth  that  volition  ?  Ton  v/ill  find 
that  some  desire  occasioned  it. 

If  you  doubt  the  truth  of  the  affirmation,  if  you 
think  the  mind  can  will  without  having  aoy  desire 
whatever  to  do  so,  make  the  experiment ;  perform  an 
act  of  will  without  any  antecedent  desire :  you  will 
probably  find  yourself  in  the  condition  of  a  pupil  who 
stoutly  contended  that  he  could  put  forth  a  volition 
without  any  antecedent  desire  if  he  heed  a  mind  to. 

There  is  in  consciousness  a  plain  distinction  be- 
tween the  state  of  mind  termed  desire  and  the  state 
of  mind  termed  volition,  though  some  writers  regard 
them  as  identical.  It  is  thouHit  that  some  difiiculties 
are  avoided  by  regarding  them  as  identical.  But  we 
should  consult  consciousness,  and  abide  by  its  deci- 
sions— not  departing  from  them  in  the  vain  hope  of 
avoiding  difficulties. 


THE    WILL.  263 

A  man  desires  to  take  a  journey.  The  desire  may 
Ibe  felt  for  years  before  the  will  to  take  the  journey  is 
put  forth.  Those  who  regard  desire  and  volition  as 
identical,  say  that  what  we  call  volition  is  simply  an 
intense  form  of  the  desire.  It  is  true  that  the  desire 
may  become  gradually  or  suddenly  more  intense,  and 
the  consequence  may  be  a  volition ;  but  the  volition 
is  clearly  distinguishable  in  consciousness  from  the 
desire.  'No  man  ever  mistook  a  desire  for  his  dinner, 
however  great  that  desire,  for  the  act  of  willing  to  eat. 

Will  it  be  said  that  we  sometimes  will  in  opposi- 
tion to  desire?  The  error  implied  in  this  assertion 
arises  from  failing  to  distinguish  between  two  desires 
that  may  be  felt  at  the  same  time.  Let  us  consider 
an  example  of  willing  in  opposition  to  desire.  A 
child  has  no  desire  to  go  to  school,  and  yet  he  goes : 
of  course  he  wills  to  go.  Does  he  will  to  go  in  oppo- 
sition to  his  desire?  He  wills  in  opposition  to  his 
desire  to  stay  at  home  or  go  to  the  play-ground,  but 
not  in  opposition  to  his  desire  to  avoid  punishment 
which  might  follow  truancy.  Let  the  question,  "  Why 
did  he  go  ?  "  be  answered.  It  will  be  foimd  that  he 
was  influenced  by  some  motive — a  desire  to  please  his 
parents,  or  to  avoid  punishment,  or  a  sense  of  duty. 

The  mind  is  free  in  willing.  No  material  restraint 
is  laid  upon  it.  No  mental  restraint  is  laid  upon  it. 
The  mind  is  conscious  when  it  wills  that  it  exercises 
freed^om. 

What  is  meant  by  freedom  of  v/ill  —  the  theme 


264       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

of  SO  much  discussion?  It  may  be  replied,  The  free- 
dom of  tlie  mind  in  willing.  If  it  Ibe  asked,  In  what 
does  the  freedom  of  the  mind  in  willing  consist  ?  I 
do  not  know  that  any  better  answer  can  be  given  than 
that  it  consists  in  being  free.  To  speak  of  the  freedom 
of  voluntariness  is  to  speak  of  the  freedom  of  freedom. 
Freedom  with  respect  to  mental  operations,  if  not 
identical  with  voluntariness,  is  inseparable  from  it. 

A  man  acts  freely  when  he  acts  without  constraint 
— when  he  does  as  he  pleases.  It  would  be  a  singu- 
lar definition  of  free  acting,  to  say  that  he  acts  freely 
when  he  does  not  do  as  he  pleases.  By  action  is 
meant  voluntary  action.  In  all  such  action,  volition 
is  the  essential  element.  What  can  be  affirmed  of  the 
action  can  be  affirmed  of  the  volition. 

To  act  as  one  pleases,  is  to  act  in  accordance  with 
one's  desires.  The  mind  is  free  as  respects  volition 
when  it  can  vf ill  as  it  desires  to.  That  it  can  and  does 
thus  will,  is  attested  by  every  one's  consciousness. 

The  freedom  of  fhe  mind  in  willing  is  an  intuitive 
truth.  It  is  seen  by  all  who  are  capable  of  account- 
able action.  When  one  says,  "I  feel  that  I  am  a 
free  moral  agent,"  he  gives  expression  to  an  intuitive 
cognition. 

Hence,  that  man  is  a  free  moral  agent  does  not 
require  proof.  All  arguments  against  it  must  be  fal- 
lacious— as  are  all  arguments  brought  against  intui- 
tive truths.     Whether  we  can  detect  the  fallacy  or 


THE    WILL.  205 

not,  makes  no  difference  as  to  our  convictions  in  re- 
gard to  human  freedom. 

It  may  be  said.  There  are  some  who  deny  that  the 
will  is  free — who  hold  to  the  doctrine  of  fatalism. 
Now,  as  it  is  characteristic  of  self-evident  truths  that 
they  are  admitted  by  all,  it  follows  that  the  freedom 
of  the  will,  or  rather  of  man  in  willing,  is  not  a  self 
evident  truth. 

It  is  true  that  the  mark  of  an  mtuitive  or  self-evi- 
dent fact  is,  that  it  is  admitted  by  all  either  in  words 
or  by  action.  That  the  things  around  us  are  real, 
not  mere  subjective  illusions,  is  a  self-evident  truth; 
but  there  are  philosophers  who  profess  to  believe  that 
they  are  merely  subjective — there  are  idealists.  Still, 
in  their  practical  conduct,  they  regard  a  wall  as  a 
wall,  and  an  enraged  animal  as  a  reality,  and  not  a 
subjective  idea.  By  their  action  they  recognize  the 
truth  that  the  objects  around  us  are  real. 

There  are  men  who  profess  to  disbelieve  in  human 
freedom  and  human  accountability ;  but  let  any  one 
appropriate  the  property  of  such  men,  and  they  will 
complain  of  the  injustice  done  them,  and  demand  the 
punishment  of  the  offender.  They  thus  recognize  the 
doctrine  of  human  freedom  and  human  accountability. 

We  have  seen  that  some  desire  always  precedes  a 
volition ;  we  have  seen  that  man  wills  as  he  pleases — 
that  is,  as  he  desires :  does  he  always  will  in  accord- 
ance with  the  strongest  desire  ?  Suppose  there  are 
two  desires  in  his  mind  at  the  same  time,  or  that  they 
12 


266       ELEMENTS    OF   KSTTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

succeed  each  other  in  alternation  so  rapidly  that,  for 
all  practical  purposes,  it  is  the  same  as  if  they  were 
co-existent.  Suppose  one  desire  is  stronger  than  the 
other :  in  accordance  with  which  will  the  man  Avill  ? 
Which  will  lead  him  to  determine  to  do  or  not  to  do 
a  certain  thing,  the  stronger  or  the  weaker  desire  ? 
It  may  be  said,  he  may  follow  which  one  he  pleases. 
True ;  hut  which  will  he  please  to  follow,  the  weaker 
or  the  stronger  desire  ? 

The  proper  method  of  deciding  in  this  case,  is 
for  each  one  to  consult  his  own  consciousness — his 
own  experience.  Take  a  case  in  which  two  or  more 
desires  were  felt,  and  a  decision  was  to  be  made. 
Note  the  decision  made,  and  which  desire  it  was  the 
result  of.  Can  any  one  find  a  case  in  which  he  acted 
in  accordance  with  the  weaker  desire — did  one  thing 
when  he  had  a  greater  desire  to  do  another  practi- 
cable thing — another  thing  equally  within  his  capacity 
for  action  ? 

It  is  said  that  we  ground  our  assertion,  that  the 
mind  wills  in  accordance  with  the  strongest  desire,  on 
the  fact  that  the  act  of  will  v/as  performed.  We  are 
charged  with  saying  that  the  desire  was  the  strongest 
because  volition  resulted  from  it.  Instead  of  this,  we 
affirm  that  the  mind  is  capable  of  comparing  two 
desires,  and  of  cognizing  their  relative  strength.  The 
question  whether  the  mind  is  influenced  to  will  by  the 
stronger  or  feebler  desire,  can  thus  be  referred  to 
consciousness,  and  a  definite  decision  can  be  reached. 


THE    WILL.  267 

Cannot  a  man  act  in  accordance  with  the  weaker 
desire,  if  he  chooses  to  ?  Is  not  this  choosing  an- 
other form  of  expressing  the  fact  that,  on  the  whole, 
the  so-called  weaker  desire  is  the  stronger;  or  that 
the  object  of  the  supposed  weaker  desire  is  desired 
more  than  the  object  of  the  supposed  stronger  desire? 
Suppose  the  two  objects  of  desire  be  a  suit  of  clothes 
and  a  horse.  It  is  readily  supposable  that  the  desire 
for  the  horse  is  stronger  than  the  desire  for  the  suit 
of  clothes.  If  it  be — if  we  knoy,^  it  to  be  so — then 
could  we  not  confidently  predict  that  he  would  pur- 
chase the  horse  ?  What  Y/ould  be  the  ground  of  our 
prediction  ?  Would  it  not  be  the  uniform  experience 
that  we  have  had,  that  men  act  according  to  the 
strongest  desire  ? 

Suppose  our  predictions  fail  to  be  realized :  the 
clothes  are  purchased.  We  inquire  how  this  came  to 
pass,  when  the  desire  for  the  horse  was  the  strongest. 
We  learn  that  certain  other  conditions  were  present- 
ed to  his  mind  :  his  parents  expressed  their  disappro- 
bation of  his  purpose  to  purchase  the  horse;  the 
clothes  were  highly  commended  by  one  in  whose 
taste  he  had  confidence;  these  and  other  considera- 
tions influenced  him.  The  combined  desire  to  please 
his  parents  and  to  possess  the  clothes  became 
stronger  than  the  desire  which  y/e  supposed  Yfould 
occasion  a  decision. 

Observe,  we  do  not  affirm  that  the  strongest  de- 
sire governs  the  mind  just  as  the  heaviest  Vv^eight 


268        ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY, 

brings  down  the  balance.  The  presence  of  this  and 
kindred  false  analogies  has  vitiated  a  great  deal  of 
the  thinking  that  has  been  exercised  on  this  subject. 
The  mind  is  not  a  passive  subject,  in  which  desires 
spontaneously  spring  up  and  irresistibly  control  it :  it 
is  an  active  free  agent,  that  can  do  what  it  has  a 
mind  to,  and  does  do  what  it  has  a  mind  to. 

Desires,  it  is  true,  are  in  their  origin  spontane- 
ous ;  but  the  mind  has  an  indirect  control  over  them 
— can  repress  or  indulge  them,  and  can  thus,  in  view 
of  them,  determine  its  own  volitions. 

Man'  has  thus  a  self-determining  povv^er.  No 
being  wills  for  him.  He  wills  himself  as  he  pleases. 
To  say  that  the  will  has  a  self-determining  power,  is 
to  say  that  the  mind  has  a  self-determining  power. 
The  will  is  nothing  apart  from  the  mind  willing. 
The  question  is  whether  the  mind  determines  its 
volitions  in  view  of  motives  or  without  motives,  or 
in  opposition  to  all  motives  ? 

What  are  motives  ?  Are  they  external  to  the 
mind,  or  internal  ?  A  man's  motives  are  the  reasons 
of  his  conduct.  Man  is  a  reasonable  being,  and 
should  have  a  reason  for  all  that  he  does — that  is,  for 
all  his  voluntary  actions.  To  act  from  good  motives, 
is  to  be  a  good  man ;  to  act  from  bad  motives,  is  to 
be  a  bad  man. 

A  man's  motives,  it  was  said,  are  the  reasons  of 
his  conduct  ;  they  are  internal — being  conscious 
states  of  mind  for  which  he  is  responsible.     External 


THE   WILL.  269 

objects  may  be  the  occasion  of  producing  states  of 
mind  wMcli  constitute  motives.  An  apple  may 
attract  one's  attention  and  awaken  a  desire  to  pos- 
sess it,  and  that  may  lead  to  effort — acts  of  will. 
The  desire  to  possess  it  was  a  motive.  The  apple 
itself,  irrespective  of  the  desire,  cannot  be  a  motive. 
What  is  true  of  the  apple,  is  true  of  all  objects  ex- 
ternal to  the  mind.  They  are  not  motives,  but  may 
be  the  occasion  of  motives.  Every  motive,  before 
it  causes  action,  takes  the  form  of  a  desire.  The 
word  motive  is  more  comprehensive  than  desire,  and 
includes  the  states  of  mind  which  give  rise  and 
modification  to  desire.  '^ 

Consciousness  affirms  that  man  acts  from  motives. 
We  can  recall  no  act  of  our  own  that  had  not  some 
motive — was  not  incited  by  some  desire.  The  mo- 
tive may  have  been  a  very  foolish  one — a  very  frivo- 
lous desire ;  but  some  motive  there  was.  To  the 
question,  Why  did  you  do  so  ?  some  answer  can  be 
given.  Insolence  may  say.  Because  I  chose  to  do 
so,  or  had  a  mind  to  ;  but  something  was  antecedent 
to  the  deed,  and  connected  with  it. 

To  say  that  men  determine  their  acts  in  view  of 
the  strongest  motive,  is  to  say  that  they  act  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  strongest  desire.  No  state  of 
mind  influences  the  decision  of  the  mind,  except  as 
it  awakens  a  desire  or  desires.  To  say  that  men  de- 
termine their  actions  in  view  of  motives,  and  that 
they  always  act  in   accordance  with  the   strongest 


270       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

motive,  is  simply  to  say  that  men  act  in  accord* 
anc€  with  their  strongest  desires. 

There  is  a  caricature  of  this  doctrine  which  rep- 
resents motives  as  external,  and  the  strongest  as  gov- 
erning the  mind.  Man  is  thus  under  the  control  of 
objects  without  him,  and  is  as  destitute  of  freedom 
as  the  vessel  without  a  rudder  which  must  go  be- 
fore the  wind. 

To  avoid  this  conclusion,  they  claim  for  the  will  a 
self-determining  power ;  they  claim  for  man  a  power 
to  will  without  motives,  and  in  opposition  to  all  mo- 
tives. This  they  think  essential  to  freedom.  They 
admit  that  man  usually,  if  not  uniformly,  acts  from 
motives ;  but  he  must,  they  think,  have  power  to 
rise  above  them,  and  act  independently  of  them,  or 
he  cannot  be  free. 

To  this  view  there  is  the  objection,  that  we  are 
always  conscious  of  acting  from  some  motive,  and 
always  take  it  for  granted  that  all  other  men  act 
from  motives.  The  moral  character  of  acts  is 
judged  of  by  the  motives.  We  proceed  upon  the 
conviction  that  human  actions  have  motives,  just  as 
we  proceed  upon  the  conviction  that  physical  events 
have  causes. 

To  affirm  that  man  must  have  a  power  to  will 
without  motives  and  in  opposition  to  all  motives, 
and  yet  to  confess  that  he  seldom  if  ever  exercises 
that  povv^er,  while  he  is  nevertheless  free,  seems  to  be 
somewhat  inconsistent. 


THE    WILL.  271 

!Again,  to  act  without  motive  is  to  act  without 
a  reason.  To  contend,  therefore,  that  a  man  must  be 
able  to  act  without  motives  in  order  to  he  free,  is  to 
contend  that  he  must  he  able  to  act  irrationally  in 
order  to  be  free.  Wherein  would  a  mental  act, 
prompted  by  no  motive  whatever,  differ  as  to  ration- 
ality from  the  movement  of  a  limb  by  galvanism  ? 

This  view  is  a  false  inference  from  a  fact  of  con- 
sciousness—the fact  of  remorse.  When  we  are  con- 
scious that  we  have  done  wrong,  we  are  conscious  of 
guilt ;  and.  in  the  consciousness  of  guilt  is  involved, 
the  consciousness  that  we  might  have  acted  differ- 
ently. If  there  were  no  power  to  act  differently, 
there  could  be  no  sense  of  blame.  The  false  infer- 
ence drawn  from  this  fact  is,  that  we  might  have 
acted  differently,  all  our  feelings  which  preceded 
volition  and  all  the  circumstances  heing  the  saine. 
The  error  lies  in  assuming  that  our  conviction  that 
we  might  have  acted  differently,  is  a  conviction  that 
we  might  have  acted  differently  all  motives  and  cir- 
cumstances being  the  same.  This  assumption  is  un- 
warranted. 

Suppose,  in  a  moment  of  passion  occasioned  by 
a  false  view  of  the  conduct  of  another,  you  strike 
him  and  inflict  a  serious  injury.  In  a  short  time  you 
are  conscious  that  you  have  done  wrong.  Tou  see 
that  there  was  no  cause  for  your  anger,  and  that,  if 
there  had  been,  you  had  no  right  to  yield  to  it.  Tou 
say  to  yourself,  "  I  ought  not  to  have  been  so  hasty. 


272       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

A  moment's  reflection  would  have  made  it  plain  that 
I  was  in  error.  I  ought  to  have  been  on  my  guard 
against  the  impulse  of  passion,  and  controlled  my- 
self." You  would  feel  that  you  could  have  acted 
differently,  by  having  had  a  different  state  of  mind — 
different  motives.  You  would  not  feel  that,  had  you 
been  just  as  hasty,  thoughtless,  and  unguarded  as 
you  were,  you  could  have  acted  differently.  The  ob- 
ligation to  have  acted  differently  involves  the  obliga- 
tion to  have  had  different  motives,  and  does  not 
prove  that  you  can  act  without  motives. 

All  our  control  over  our  mental  operations  is  in- 
direct. We  cannot,  by  an  act  of  mere  volition,  cause 
any  thought  or  feeling  to  be  present  to  the  mind. 
We  may  will  to  do  things  adapted  to  cause  the  pres- 
ence of  said  thought  or  feeling.  We  control  our 
mind  as  we  control  nature,  by  obeying  its  laws. 

Motives  are  sometimes  spoken  of  as  existing  with- 
out the  mind,  whereas  they  are  states  of  mind.  These 
states  of  mind  may  be  occasioned  by  external  objects. 
When  an  external  object  awakens  a  desire  vfhich 
leads  to  action,  that  object  is  loosely  spoken  of  as  the 
impelling  motive.  A  thief  breaks  into  a  bank,  and 
steals  a  quantity  of  gold.  The  gold  is  said  to  have 
influenced  his  action.  It  is  true  that  the  gold  pre- 
sented a  temptation  to  him ;  but  this  was  in  conse- 
quence of  the  condition  of  his  mind.  If  his  mind  had 
been  in  a  perfectly  healthy  moral  condition,  the  gold 
would  have  presented  no  temptation.     Its  power  over 


THE   WILL.  2'73 

the  thief  was  owing  wholly  to  the  thievish  condition 
of  the  mind.  For  that  condition  said  thief  was  re- 
sponsible. 

What  is  true  of  the  gold,  is  true  of  all  external 
objects  as  to  their  power  to  produce  voluntary  action. 
So  far  as  they  influence  the  mind  in  connection  with 
volition,  it  is  owing  wholly  to  the  subjective  condition 
of  the  mind,  for  which  consciousness  asserts  that  we 
are  responsible. 

We  are  responsible  for  certain  states  of  mind  irre- 
spective of  the  means  by  which  they  were  produced. 
A  malignant  disposition  is  the  object  of  moral  disap- 
probation, whether  that  disposition  was  caused  by 
voluntary  acts  or  was  inherited.  To  say  that  one  is 
to  blame  for  having  a  malignant  disposition,  is  to  say 
that  he  ought  to  have  a  different  disposition,  and  that 
he  might  have  a  different  disposition.  If  the  disposi- 
tion was  born  with  him,  how  could  he  be  without  it  ? 
Here  we  had  better  confess  our  ignorance  than  deny 
the  facts  of  consciousness.  Some  deny  that  we  inherit 
from  our  first  parents  any  evil  dispositions,  though 
the  fact  is  afiirmed  by  the  Word  of  God,  and  is  in 
keeping  with  universal  experience. 

So  in  regard  to  our  volitions.  We  should  admit 
the  facts  attested  by  consciousness,  whether  we  can  ex- 
plain the  difficulties  or  not.  We  ara conscious  that  our 
volitions  are  preceded  by  desires,  and  that  we  always 
will  in  accordance  with  the  strongest  desire.  In  our 
consciousness  of  blame  for  doing  a  wrong  act,  is  in- 
12* 


274       ELEMENTS    OP   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

volved  the  consciousness  of  avoidability ;  that  is,  that 
we  might  have  acted  otherwise.  We  are  conscious 
of  a  self-determining  power — that  is,  of  free  self- 
determination  in  view  of  motives  which  are  states  of 
mind  for  which  we  are  accountable. 

In  some  minds  there  seems  to  be  a  difficulty  of 
reconciling  free  volitions  with  any  conditions  what- 
ever. Such  should  remember  that  every  thing  which 
begins  to  be  is  conditioned.  Every  event  is  con- 
ditioned on  some  other  event.  Our  control  over  all 
our  mental  operations  is  a  conditioned  control.  Our 
power  to  cognize  external  objects  is  conditioned  on 
putting  our  organs  in  certain  relations  to  the  object. 
Our  power  to  remember  is  conditioned  on  certain 
laws  of  mind.  It  may  be  our  duty  to  have  a  certain 
thought  present  to  our  minds  at  a  certain  hour,  but 
we  cannot  place  it  there  by  simply  willing  it.  It 
may  be  our  duty  to  cognize  a  certain  truth,  but  we 
cannot  cognize  it  by  simply  willing  to  cognize  it.  We 
must  turn  our  attention  to  the  truths  on  which  its  cog- 
nition is  conditioned.  It  may  be  our  duty  to  put  forth 
certain  volitions  at  a  certain  time,  but  the  power  to 
do  so  may  be  conditioned  on  certain  states  of  mind. 
The  mind's  power  of  willing  is  conditioned,  and  yet 
free.  The  fact  that  events  are  conditioned  does  not 
prove  that  they  are  the  result  of  fatal  necessity. 

The  doctrine  set  forth  in  these  pages  makes  our 
volitions  dependent  upon  our  dispositions  and  char- 
acter.    Dr.  Hickok  remarks :  "  There  is  in  all  men  a 


THE    WILL.  276 

deep  consciousness  that,  somehow,  there  is  an  alter- 
native to  present  disposition  and  character,  and  thus 
an  avoidability  in  all  voluntary  action." 

Whether  we  are  able  to  explain  the  "  somehow  " 
or  not,  let  us  admit  the  testimony  of  consciousness. 

The  impression  that  the  doctrine  of  the  strongest 
motive — that  is,  the  doctrine  that  the  mind  deter- 
mines to  act  or  not  to  act  in  view  of  motives,  or  in 
accordance  with  the  strongest  desire — ^is  inconsistent 
with  freedom  of  v/ill,  is  very  strong  on  the  minds  of 
some  able  thinkers,  and  has  led  them  to  seek  for 
means  of  avoiding  the  supposed  difficulty.  Very  few 
such  men  have  failed  to  see  and  acknowledge  the 
absurdity  of  volitions  without  motives  and  in  oppo- 
sition to  motives,  and  yet  they  have  found  motives 
in  their  way,  and  have  sought,  as  it  were,  to  get  rid 
of  them. 

McCosh  admits  that  volitions  have  causes,  but 
would  seem  to  deny  that  the  causes  of  volitions  are 
found  in  antecedent  dispositions  and  desires.  He 
says  :  "  V/"e  hold — we  cannot  but  hold- — that  the  prin- 
ciple of  cause  and  effect  reigns  in  mind  as  in  mat- 
ter. Our  intuitive  belief  in  causation  leads  us  to 
this  conclusion.  It  is  on  account  of  the  existence  of 
such  a  connection  that  we  can  anticipate  the  future  in 
regard  to  the  actions  of  intelligent  and  voluntary 
beings,  as  well  as  in  regard  to  changes  in  material 
substances.  It  is  upon  it  that  we  ground  our  confi- 
dence in  the  character  and  word  of  God.     But  there 


276       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

is  an  important  difference  between  the  manner  in 
whicli  this  principle  operates  in  body  and  spirit.  In 
all  proper  mental  operations,  the  causes  and  the  effects 
both  lie  within  the  mind.  Mind  is  a  self-acting  sub- 
stance, and  hence  its  activity  and  independence." 

He  proceeds  to  give  his  idea  of  cause  in  connection 
with  mental  phenomena :  "  The  true  cause  of  any 
given  mental  phenomenon,  its  unconditional  antece- 
dent, which  always  v/ill  produce  it,  and  without  which 
it  cannot  recur,  is  composed  of  two  things — the  im- 
mediately preceding  state,  and  a  mental  power  or 
faculty." 

In  case  of  a  volition,  then,  the  cause  would  be  the 
immediately  preceding  state  of  mind,  and  the  mental 
power  or  faculty  of  wilL  He  would  probably  admit 
that  the  immediately  preceding  state  of  mind  was  a 
desire.  We  have  then  a  desire  as  one  element  of  the 
cause,  and  the  will  as  the  other.  The  will,  be  it  remem- 
bered, is  simply  the  name  given  to  the  capacity  of 
the  mind  for  willing.  The  will  in  action  is  the  mind 
willing.  "Why  is  this  power  exercised?  Why  is 
this  element  of  the  cause  active  instead  of  latent  ? 
Is  it  owing  to  the  presence  of  the  desire  ?  If  so,  is 
not  this  admitting  that  the  mind  wills  under  the  in- 
centive of  desire  ? 

But  he  does  not  admit  this  conclusion.  He  says : 
"  Now,  we  hold  it  to  be  an  incontrovertible  fact,  and 
one  of  great  importance,  that  the  true  determiniug 
cause  in  every  given  volition  is  not  a  mere  anterior 


THE    WILL.  277 

excitement,  but  the  very  soul  itself  "by  its  inherent 
power  of  will."  ^ 

No  doubt  the  soul  or  mind  wills — determines  its 
own  volitions;  but  why  does  it  determine  to  put 
forth  now  sinful  volitions,  and  now  holy  ones  ?  What 
is  the  cause  of  the  difference  ?  Does  it  consist  "  in 
the  inherent  power  of  the  will "  ?  Does  that  phrase 
express  any  thing  more  than  the  fact  that  the  mind 
can  will  ?  To  say  that  the  mind  can  will,  is  not  to 
answer  the  question,  "Why  does  the  mind  will  thus 
and  so  ? 

In  the  following  passage  he  seems  to  admit  the 
doctrine  of  a  non-rational  self-determining  power : 

"  We  must  ever  hold  that  a  mere  incitement  can 
become  a  motive  only  so  far  as  sanctioned  by  the 
will ;  so  that  it  is  not  so  much  the  incentive  that  de- 
termines the  will,  as  the  will  that  adopts  the  incen- 
tive." 

Why  does  the  will — or  the  mind  willing — adopt 
one  incentive  rather  than  another?  In  so  doing, 
does  it  act  arbitrarily,  without  any  reason — without 
any  motive  ? 

Will  it  be  said,  Because  it  chooses  to  ?  Why 
does  it  choose  to  ?  The  expression,  the  mind  wills 
in  a  particular  way  because  it  chooses  to,  must  mean 
either  that  it  wills  because  it  wills,  or  that  it  wills 
because  it  desires  to. 

Wherein  does  sanctioning  a  motive  differ  from 
acting  in  view  of  it,  or  at  its  promptings  ?     Is  there 


278       ELEMENTS    OF    INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

any  distinction  in  consciousness  between  sanctioning 
an  incentive,  and  acting  in  accordance  with  it  ? 

Dr.  McCosh  rarely  mistakes  words  for  things,  as 
he  seems  to  have  done  in  endeavoring  .to  avoid  the 
supposed  difficulty  attendant  upon  the  doctrine  that 
the  mind  always  puts  forth  volition  in  accordance 
with  the  strongest  motive.  May  not  his  error  arise 
from  attempting  to  seek  for  profoundness  where  the 
truth  is  very  simple  ?  Do  not  all  men,  learned  and 
unlearned,  act  on  the  principle  that  men  will  be  gov- 
erned by  the  strongest  motive  ? 

Let  it  be  remembered  that  there  is  no  analogy 
between  the  influence  of  a  motive  on  the  mind,  and 
the  influence  of  a  weight  on  a  balance.  A  motive  is 
as  difierent  from  a  weight  as  a  balance  is  from  a 
mind.  We  are  obliged  to  use  figurative  language 
when  describing  mental  operations ;  but  the  borrowed 
terms  should  not  be  allowed  to  give  us  a  distorted 
view  of  the  facts  they  are  borrowed  to  cypress.  This 
has  been  the  case  in  regard  to  the  matter  under  con- 
sideration. 

Nothing  is  gained,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  by  ascrib- 
ing the  will  to  the  spiritual  in  man.  All  the  thoughts, 
and  feelings,  and  acts  of  which  we  are  conscious,  are 
the  thoughts,  and  feehngs,  and  acts  of  the  human 
spirit.  Some  of  its  operations  are  conditioned  upon 
its  connection  with  the  body,  some  of  them  have  re- 
lation to  material  realities,  and  some  to  spiritual 
realities.     It  has  not  yet  been  shown  that  the  mind, 


THE    WILL.  27^ 

when  acting  in  relation  to  spiritual  realities,  does  not 
proceed  on  the  same  principles  as  when  acting  in  re- 
lation to  material  realities.  Motives  drawn  from  the 
spiritual  ought  to  have  more  weight  than  motives 
drawn  from  the  material.  When  they  do  not,  it  is 
owing  to  the  moral  condition  of  the  soul — "  the 
spiritual  disposition  " 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 


ATTENTIOJSr. 


The  subject  of  attention  has  been  frequently 
noticed  in  the  foregoing  pages.  Every  one  knows 
what  attention  is,  tbougb  few  possess  the  power  of 
attention  in  a  high  degree  :  few  have  the  power  of 
fixing  the  mind  upon  an  unattractive  subject,  and  of 
keeping  it  fixed  till  the  end  aimed  at  is  gained. 

Attention  has  been  treated  by  some  writers  as  a 
separate  faculty :  so  far  as  we  are  conscious  of  effort 
in  relation  to  attention,  the  effort  is  a  voluntary  one — 
is  an  act  of  will. 

It  is  of  little  consequence  whether  we  regard  it 
as  a  separate  faculty,  or  as  a  form  of  volition ;  but  it 
is  of  the  utmost  consequence  that  power  of  attention 
be  acquired. 

No  object  can  be  seen  unless  the  eyes  are  turned 
towards  it.  No  spiritual  truth  can  be  seen,  no  propo- 
sition cognized,  no  complex  subject  understood,  un- 
less the  mind  be  fixed  steadily  and  continuously 
upon  it. 


ATTENTIOjST.  281 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  thinker  does  not 
create  truth ;  he  only  sees  it.  The  original  thinker 
simply  sees  truths  that  have  not  been  seen  before. 
Truths  are  seen  by  looking  at  them — fixing  the  at- 
tention exclusively  upon  them.  Subjects  are  not  com- 
prehended by  a  single  mental  glance.  Long-con- 
tinued thoughtfulness — meditation — which  consists 
mainly  in  fixing  the  attention  upon  them,  is  necessary. 

The  student's  first  efforts  at  attention  are  not  re- 
markably successful.  He  opens  an  argumentative 
work,  and  resolves  to  master  the  arguments.  He  be- 
gins to  read  with  a  vigorous  effort  at  attention.  Before 
he  has  reached  the  bottom  of  the  page,  perhaps  be- 
fore he  has  reached  the  third  sentence,  he  finds  his 
attention  wandering  to  other  objects.  He  has  read 
the  words,  perhaps  pronounced  them  aloud,  but  has 
no  idea  of  the  thoughts  they  were  intended  to  ex- 
press. He  begins  again,  but  soon  finds  his  attention 
turned  towards  objects  far  removed  from  the  train  of 
thought  before  him.  After  a  score  of  efforts,  per- 
haps, he  is  able  to  keep  his  attention  fixed  till  he  has 
reached  the  bottom  of  the  page.  If  he  will  faithfully 
persevere  in  this  course,  he  will  ultimately  be  able  to 
attend  to  a  long  argument  as  easily  as  he  now  attends 
to  an  attractive  narrative. 

In  all  his  studies,  the  student  should  have  reference 
to  forming  the  habit  of  attention.  No  exercise  is 
more  conducive  to  this  than  analyzing  works  of 
thought.  Various  other  advantages  will  result  from 
that  exercise. 


282        ELEMENTS    OP    INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

Let  the  student  select,  say,  an  argumentative  ora- 
tion of  Daniel  Webster,  or  tlie  work  of  some  first- 
rate  mind;  and  let  him  read  with  the  purpose  of 
seizing  the  outline  of  the  plan — the  frame-work  of 
the  discourse.  Let  him  fix  his  attention  on  the  suc- 
cessive thoughts  which  constitute  the  train,  noting 
the  relation  of  each  one  to  that  which  follows.  Let 
Mm  endeavor  to  remember  each  thought  by  its  rela- 
tion to  that  which  preceded  it,  and  not  by  associating 
it  with  certain  forms  of  expression,  or  the  place  which 
it  occupies  on  the  printed  page.  Let  the  successive 
thoughts  be  thus  noticed  and  remembered  at  the  ex- 
pense of  as  few  perusals  as  possible.  Let  the  succes- 
sive steps  be  mentally  reviewed  frequently,  now  by  a 
condensed  statement  of  each  point  in  the  train,  and 
now  by  a  statement,  not  of  the  thoughts,  but  of  the 
relations  they  sustain  to  each  other.  This  last  will 
compel  attention  to  the  thoughts  dissociated  from  the 
language  in  which  they  are  expressed.  Suppose,  for 
example,  the  analysis  be  on  this  wise.  First  there  is 
an  introductory  remark,  then  a  statement  of  the  prop- 
osition, then  an  argument  fi'om  analogy  in  support  of 
it,  then  an  illustration  drawn  from  history,  then  an 
inference  from  the  proposition.  Perfect  thoroughness 
is  thus  secured,  and  the  habit  of  seizing  and  retaining 
trains  of  thought  formed. 

The  discipline  thus  secured  will  enable  the  student 
to  arrange  in  his  mind  trains  of  his  own  construction, 
and  keep  them  as  steadily  before  his  mind  as  if  they 


ATTENTIO]^".  283 

were  on  paper.  This  power  is  indispensable  to  tlie 
extempore  speaker.  The  extempore  speaker  who 
speaks  with  power,  does  not  utter  that  which  occurs 
to  him  after  he  has  risen  to  speak ;  he  ntters  that 
which  he  has  pre-composed  mentally.  True,  a  man 
should  acquire  the  power  of  "  thinking  on  his  legs," — 
of  speaking  to  the  point  on  questions  which  it  was 
impossible  for  him  to  premeditate. 

Some  of  the  most  eminent  public  speakers  not 
only  arrange  their  trains  of  thought  mentally,  but 
even  compose  the  sentences.  Robert  Hall's  cele- 
brated discourse  on  infidelity  was  thus  pre-composed, 
and  the  orations  of  Daniel  Webster  give  abundant 
proof  that  he  possessed  and  practised  this  power. 

The  exercise  of  attention  is  the  condition  of  clear 
apprehension,  and  is  scarcely  distinguishable  from  it. 
We  have  seen  that  it  is  the  condition  of  accurate  re- 
membering. Clear  apprehension  and  accurate  remem- 
brance are  essential  to  sound  reasoning. 

Sir  Isaac  KTewton  ascribed  his  success  to  fixed  and 
patient  attention.  Profound  investigation  is  little 
more  than  concentrated,  long-continued  attention. 
The  power  of  attention  is  therefore  worthy  of  assidu- 
ous cultivation. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

TRUTH — UNDERSTAINTDIZSTG     AND     EEASOIS" FAITH     AKD 

KEASON — IISTFINITT. 

We  have  seen  that  no  definition  can  be  given  of 
truth.  Every  one  whose  mind  is  in  a  normal  state 
knows  what  truth  is,  or  rather  knows  what  true  prop- 
ositions are.  There  are  different  kinds  of  truth  ;  that 
is,  there  are  true  propositions  relating  to  different 
classes  of  objects.  There  are  truths  material,  spirit- 
ual, sesthetic,  moral,  etc.  Some  truths  are  contingent 
and  some  are  necessary.  It  is  true  that  there  is  such 
a  place  as  Moscow.  There  was  a  time  when  it  was 
not  true.  There  may  come  a  time  when  it  will  not 
be  true.  The  earth  revolves  around  the  sun  once  a 
year.  There  was  a  time  when  it  did  not  revolve,  and 
there  may  be  a  time  when  it  will  not  revolve.  Such 
truths  are  called  contingent ;  not  because  they  are  not 
subject  to  uniform  laws,  but  to  distinguish  them  from 
necessary  truths. 

The  whole  is  greater  than  its  part,  is  a  true  propo- 
sition, necessarily  true.     That  it  should  not  be  true 


285 

is  an  impossibility.  There  is  no  sucli  impossibility 
attaching  to  propositions  affirming  contingent  truth. 

The  truths  of  geometry  are  necessary  truths. 
That  all  right  angles  are  equal,  always  was  and 
always  will  be  true,  everywhere. 

How  can  contingent  truths  be  distinguished  from 
necessary  tru^ths  ?  Some  writers  state  the  marks  of 
necessary  truths,  such  as  absolute  certainty,  and  the 
fkct  that  the  opposite  of  a  necessaiy  truth  is  not  only 
false  but  absurd.  These  are  facts  respecting  neces- 
sary truths ;  but  we  do  not  look  at  these  facts  and 
infer  from  them  that  the  truth  is  a  necessary  one. 
We  distinguish  between  contingent  and  necessary 
truths  hj  direct  seeing.  When  we  cognize  a  contin- 
gent truth,  we  cognize  it  as  contingent;  when  we 
cognize  a  necessary  truth,  we  cognize  it  as  necessary : 
just  as  when  we  cognize  a  white  object,  we  cognize 
it  as  white,  and  when  we  cognize  a  black  object,  we 
cognize  it  as  black.  Some  contingent  truths  are  cog- 
nized directly  and  some  indirectly ;  the  same  is  true 
of  necessary  truths. 

Some  waiters  refer  contingent  truths  to  the  under- 
standing, and  necessary  truths  to  the  reason.  It  is 
the  mind  which  distinguishes  contingent  from  neces- 
sary truths,  not  certain  imaginary  entities  called  un- 
derstanding and  reason. 

The  distinction  betvfeen  the  understanding  and 
reason,  to  which  so  great  importance  is  attached  by 
some,  is  simply  the  distinction  between  contingent 


286        ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

and  necessary  truth — a  distinction  by  no  means  of 
modern  discovery,  as  is  \yell  known  to  those  who  are 
at  all  acquainted  with  the  earlier  English  writers  on 
morals  and  theology. 

Some  Y/riters  seem  to  teach  that  necessary  truths, 
or  the  truths  of  reason,  are  more  intimately  connected 
with  the  mind  than  contingent  truths — truths  of  the 
understanding.  They  use  language  which  implies 
that  some  necessary  truths  are  native  to  the  mind, 
and  are  evolved  from  it  on  certain  occasions. 

There  is  no  reason  to  think  that  any  truth  is  native 
to  the  mind  in  any  other  sense  than  that  the  mind 
has  capacity  to  cognize  it.  The  relation  of  the  mind 
to  all  kinds  of  truth  is  the  same.  The  mind  cognizes, 
truth  is  cognized.  No  truths  are  evolved  from  the 
mind  except  as  the  mind  is  the  object  of  cognition. 

It  is  commonly  supposed  that  greater  certainty 
attaches  to  necessary  than  to  contingent  truths.  All 
necessary  truths  are  certain,  absolutely  certain.  But 
all  contingent  truths  are  not  therefore  A^oid  of  cer- 
tainty. A  contingent  truth  may  be  as  certain  as  a  • 
necessary  truth.  It  is  certain  that  there  is  such  a 
place  as  London.  It  is  certain  that  Washington  lived. 
We  are  as  certain  of  the  truth  of  these  propositions 
as  Ave  are  of  the  proposition  which  affirms  the  equal- 
ity of  alternate  angles. 

All  necessary  truths  are  certain.  Some  contingent 
truths  are  certain,  and  some  are  doubtful.  The  un- 
certainty of  a  truth  has  reference  to  our  cognizing 


287 

power,  not  to  the  truth  itself.  If  it  be  a  truth,  if  the 
proposition  is  true,  it  is  certainly  true. 

Another  distinction  of  importance  is  that  between 
intuitive  and  deductiye  truths.  Intuitive  truths  are 
also  called  self-evident  truths.  Some  writers  seem  to 
regard  intuitive  truths  as  coming  from  the  mind, 
whereas  they  come  from  the  mind  only  in  the  sense 
that  they  are  cognized  by  the  mind.  Intuitive 
truths  do  not  constitute  a  class  of  truths  generically 
different  from  other  truths,  as  geometrical  differ  from 
geological  truths.  The  term  intuitive  has  reference 
to  the  mode  of  cognition,  not  to  the  nature  of  the 
truths.  Intuitive  truths  are  those  which  are  cognized 
directly,  immediately,  without  the  aid  of  any  other 
truths.  In  every  department  of  knowledge  there  are 
some  truths  that  are  self-evident — which  are  cognized 
intuitively.  Our  intuitions  are  not  inspirations- — 
knowledge  derived  from  a  source  differing  from  that 
whence  our  other  knowledge  is  derived.  They  are 
direct  cognitions  of  the  mind.  They  are  native  only 
as  our  cognizing  capacity  is  native. 

Deductive  truths  are  those  cognized  by  the  aid  of 
other  truths.  The  term  would  indicate  that  all  truths 
mediately  cognized  were  wrapped  up  in  self-evident 
truths,  and  deduced  from  them.  Some  truths  are  de- 
duced from  other  truths ;  but  some  truths  are  seen  to 
be  true  in  conseqence  of  our  having  seen  certain  other 
truths  to  be  true.  These  cannot  properly  be  said  to 
be  deduced  from  those  truths,  certainly  not  in  the 


288       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

sense  of  being  evolved  from  them.  Inferential  would 
perhaps  Ibe  a  better  term  than  deductive.  AH  our 
cognitions  are  either  intuitive  or  inferential.  We 
infer  that  a  proposition  is  true,  that  is,  discern  its 
truth,  in  consequence  of  having  discerned  the  truth  of 
some  other  proposition  or  propositions. 

If  a  man  denies  intuitive  truths,  he  cannot  be 
reasoned  with.  He  denies  every  thing.  It  does  not 
follov/  from  this,  that  all  inferential  truths  are  educed 
from  intuitive  truths.  We  perceive  some  things  to 
be  true  because  we  have  intuitively  cognized  some 
other  things  to  be  true. 

What  truths  have  we  a  right  to  regard  as  intui- 
tive ?  May  every  man  have  a  set  of  intuitions  of  his 
own  ?  When  he  wishes  a  thing  to  be  true  and  can- 
not prove  it,  may  he  place  it  among  his  intuitions  ? 
Certainly  not.  Those  truths  only  can  be  regarded  as 
intuitive  which  are  received  as  true  by  all  men.  In- 
tuitive truths  are  admitted  either  by  word  or  deed 
by  all  men. 

Faith  and  Reason, — The  relation  of  faith  to  reason 
is  a  very  simple  one.  They  are  not  antagonistic,  but 
concordant.  Faith  is  confidence  in  testimony,  which 
involves  confidence  in  character.  Testimony  is  a 
source  of  knowledge.  The  knowledge  of  a  jury  re- 
specting the  guilt  or  innocence  of  a  prisoner  is  from 
testimony. 

Testimony  may  give  us  certain  knowledge.  Only 
a  few  Americans  have  seen  the  city  of  Canton,  yet  all 


TRUTH,    ETC.  289 

Americans  are  sure  there  is  such  a  city.  This  certain 
knowledge  rests  upon  testimony  alone.  It  is  reason- 
able for  a  man  to  believe  good  testimony ;  that  is,  it 
is  reasonable  to  have  faith. 

Religious  and  secular  faith  differ  only  as  their 
objects  differ.  The  doctrines  of  Revelation  are  re- 
ceived by  faith — that  is,  on  the  testimony  of  God. 
It  is  certainly  reasonable  to  believe  God's  testimony ; 
therefore  it  is  reasonable  to  exercise  religious  faith. 
There  is,  therefore,  no  antagonism  between  religious 
faith  and  reason. 

If  we  have  God's  testimony,  it  is  reasonable  to 
believe  it,  whether  we  can  fally  understand  it  or  not. 
To  believe  that  which  we  do  not  comprehend,  is  not 
to  believe  that  which  is  unreasonable  and  absurd. 

We  must  have  satisfactory  evidence  that  we  have 
God's  testimony.  We  must  examine  the  evidence  on 
which  the  claim  of  the  Bible  to  be  the  testimony  of 
God  rests.  If  we  find  satisfactory  evidence,  the 
Bible  is  to  be  believed. 

It  may  be  asked.  Suppose  it  contain  contradictions 
and  absurdities,  are  they  to  be  believed  ?  Certainly 
not.  If  it  contain  contradictions  and  absurdities, 
and  it  is  certain  that  they  are  not  interpolations,  then 
there  is  not  satisfactory  evidence  that  it  is  God's  tes- 
timony; for  his  testimony  cannot  be  contradictory 
and  absurd.  The  alleged  contradictions  must  be  dis- 
posed of  in  considering  the  evidence  of  the  Bible's 
being  God's  testimony.  If  the  conclusion  be  that  the 
13 


290       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

Bible  is  God's  vford,  it  is  reasonable  to  believe  all  it 
contains.  Faitli,  confidence  in  His  testimony  and 
character,  is  in  the  liighest  degree  reasonable. 

The  Infinite, — There  is  no  such  thing  as  a  general 
infinite.  There  are  infinite  things  or  attributes,  just 
as  there  are  true  propositions;  but  the  infinite  and 
the  true  are  not  independent  entities.  We  cognize 
infinite  objects,  and  can  thus  form  an  abstract  idea  of 
infinity.  The  idea  is  not  definable.  As  we  say  truth 
is  that  in  y/hich  all  true  propositions  agree,  so  "we  may 
say  that  the  infinite  is  that  in  which  all  infinite  ob- 
jects agree. 

That  \%  infinite  which  has  no  limit.  That  which 
we  cognize  as  limitless  is  to  us  infinite.  We  must 
distinguish  betv^een  the  infinite  and  the  indefinite. 
God's  Yfisclom  is  infinite ;  it  transcends  all  our 
powers  of  apprehension.  So  of  His  mercy  and  His 
benevolence.  Infinite  existence  is  everlasting  exist- 
ence. When  we  speak  of  God  as  the  infinite  exist- 
ence, we  mean  that  all  His  attributes  are  infinite. 

The  human  mind  can  form  no  adequate  apprehen- 
sion of  the  infinite — that  is,  of  infinite  things*.  And 
yet  it  is  not,  properly  speaking,  a  negative  apprehen- 
sion which  we  have  of  it.  The  fact  that  we  cannot 
know  every  thing  about  a  subject  or  object,  does  not 
prove  that  we  cannot  know  any  thing  about  it.  The 
fact  that  we  cannot  by  searching  find  out  God  to 
perfection,  does  not  prove  that  we  cannot  know  many 
things  respecting  Him. 


TEUTII,    ETC.  291 

God  is  infinite ;  that  is.  His  existence  and  attri 
butes  are  without  limit — transcend  all  our  powers  o± 
apprehension.  We  know  that  nothing  can  "be  added 
to  them. 

There  has  been  a  great  deal  written  about  the 
absolute  and  infinite  which  conveys  no  meaning  to 
such  as  have  not  the  faculty  of  understanding  the 
unintelligible.  Many  assertions  have  been  made  for 
which  there  is  no  proof.  For  example,  Mansel  says  : 
"  That  which  is  conceived  as  absolute  and  infinite, 
must  be  conceived  of  as  containing  within  itself  the 
sum,  not  only  of  all  actual, 'but  of  all  possible  modes 
of  being," 

"  The  nature  of  man's  conviction  in  regard  to  in- 
finity," says  McCosh,  "  is  fitted  to  impress  us,  at  one 
and  the  same  time,  with  the  s-trength  and  the  weak- 
ness of  human  intelligence,  which  is  powerful  in  that 
it  can  apprehend  so  much,  but  feeble  in  that  it  can 
apprehend  no  more.  The  idea  entertained  is  felt  to 
be  inadequate,  but  this  is  one  of  its  excellences,  that 
it  is  felt  to  be  inadequate;  for  it  would  indeed  be  lam- 
entably deficient,  if  it  did  not  acknowledge  of  itself 
that  it  falls  infinitely  beneath  the  magnitude  of  the 
object.  The  mind  is  led  by  an  inward  tendency  to 
stretch  its  ideas  wider  and  wider,  but  is  made  to 
know,  at  the  most  extreme  point  which  it  has  reached, 
that  there  is  something  further  on.  It  is  thus  im- 
pelled to  be  ever  striving  after  something  which  it  has 
not  yet  reached,  and  to  look  beyond  the  limits  of  time 


292       ELEMENTS    OF   INTELLECTUAL   PHILOSOPHY. 

into  eternity  beyond,  in  which  there  is  the  prospect 
of  a  noble  occupation  in  beholding,  through  ages 
which  can  come  to  no  end,  and  a  space  which  has  no 
bounds,  the  manifestation  of  a  might  and  an  excel- 
lence of  which  we  can  never  know  all,  but  of  which 
we  may  ever  know  more.  It  is  an  idea  which  would 
ever  allure  us  up  toward  a  God  of  infinite  perfection, 
and  yet  make  us  feel  more  and  more  impressively  the 
higher  we  ascend,  that  we  are,  after  all,  infinitely  be- 
neath Him.  Man's  capacity  to  form  such  an  idea  is 
a  proof  that  he  was  formed  by  an  infinite  God,  and  in 
the  image  of  an  infinite  God ;  his  incapacity  in  spite 
of  all  his  efforts  to  form  a  higher  idea,  is  fitted  to 
show  us  how  wide  the  space  and  how  impassable  the 
gulf  which  separates  man  as  finite  from  God  the 
infinite." 


THE   EiTD. 

d  tCL  C^A^^n^     Y^fy^  Q(y»-\^  i^ 


D.  APPLETON  &   CO:S  PUBLICATIONS. 


ENGLISH  LANGUAGE. 


Exposition  of  tlie  Grammatical   Structure 

of  tlie  English.  Language. 

By  John  Mulligan,  A.  M.     Large  12nio,  5^74  pages. 

This  work  is  a  complete  system  of  English  Grammar,  embracing  not  only 
all  that  has  been  developed  by  the  later  philologists,  but  also  the  results  of 
years  of  study  on  the  part  of  its  author.  "  One  great  advantage  of  this  book 
is  its  admirable  arrangement.  Instead  of  proceeding  at  once  to  the  dry 
details  which  are  distasteful  to  the  pupil,  Mr,  M.  commences  by  viewing  the 
sentence  as  a  whole,  analyzing  it  into  its  proper  parts,  and  exhibiting  their 
connection ;  and,  after  having  thus  parsed  the  sentence  logically,  proceeds 
to  consider  the  individual  words  v/hich  compose  it,  in  all  their  grammatical 
relations. 

Dictionary  of  tlie  Englist  Language. 

By  Alexander  Reed,  A.  M.     12mo,  572  pages. 

This  work,  which  is  designed  for  schools,  has  been  compiled  with  direct 
reference  to  their  wants,  by  a  teacher  of  experience,  judgment,  and  scholar- 
ship. It  contains,  in  small  compass  and  the  most  convenient  form,  the 
Pronunciation  and  Definitions  of  all  English  words  authorized  by  good 
usage;  a  full  Vocabulary  of  Foreign  Roots;  an  accented  list  of  Greek, 
Latin,  and  Scripture  Proper .  Names ;  and  an  Appendix,  showing  the  pro- 
nunciation of  nearly  three  thousand  of  the  most  important  Geographical 
Names.  It  is  philosophical  in  its  arrangement,  grouping  derivatives  under 
their  primitives,  and  gives  the  root  of  every  word  in  the  language,  thus 
affording  a  clear  insight  into  comparative  philology. 

Either  as  a  work  of  reference,  or  a  text-book  for  daily  study,  this  Diction- 
ary will  be  found  to  possess  important  advantages  over  all  others.  Some  of 
our  best  scholars  commend  it  in  the  strongest  terms :  among  whom  may  be 
mentined  Rev.  Dr.  Henry,  lat§  of  New  York  University;  D.  M.  Reese, 
formerly  Superintendent  of  Schools  of  New  York ;  and  the  late  Bishop  Wain- 
WRIGHT.  Prof.  Frost,  of  Philadelphia,  pronounces  the  plan  excellent.  Rev. 
M.  P.  Parks,  late  Prof.  U.  S.  Military  Academy  at  West  Point,  says:  **I 
consider  it  superior  to  any  of  the  School  Dictionaries  with  which  I  ara 
acquainted."  ,       . 


D.  AFFLETON  &   CO.'jS  FUBLICATIONS, 

The  Hand-Book  of  Houseliold  Science. 

A  Popular  Account  of  Heat,  Light,  Air,  Aliment,  and  Cleansing,  in 
their  Scientific  Principles  and  Domestic  Applications.  By  E.  L. 
YOUMANS,  M.D,     12mo,  Illustrated,  470  pages. 

Various  books  have  been  prepared  which  cross  the  field  of  domestic 
science  at  different  points,  but  this  is  the  first  work  that  traverses  and 
occupies  the  whole  ground.  Hardly  a  page  can  be  opened  to  that  does  not 
convey  information  interesting  and  valuable  to  every  person  who  dwells  in  a 
house.  The  work  will  be  found  not  only  of  high  practical  utility,  but  capti- 
vating to  the  student,  and  unequalled  in  the  interest  of  its  recitations. 

From  the  Sv/perintendent  of  Public  Instruction  in  the  State  of  Pennsyl/oania, 
"  The  daily  and  hourly  importance  of  the  topics  embraced  in  the  work,  their  im- 
perious claims  upon  public  attention,  and  their  intimate  connection  with  individual 
and  social  welfare,  together  with  the  compendious  arrangement  and  copious  fulness  of 
information  presented,  and  the  cautious  accuracy  and  precision  of  statement,  make  it  a 
publication  of  the  highest  practical  value  for  both  the  household  and  the  school. 

"  Yery  respectfully  yours, 
"Prof.  EdwaedL,  YouMANS.  HENRY  C.  HICKOK." 

From  the  Superintendent  of  Schools  of  the  State  of  New  York, 
"  It  embodies  scientific  information  of  the  highest  importance,  arranged  with  much 
care,  and  so  clearly  stated  that  even  the  ordinary  mind  can  scarcely  fail  to  grasp  and 
retain  the  truths  it  unfolds  and  illustrates.  It  would  prove  a  most  valuable  class-book 
in  our  high  scliools,  and  I  am  satisfied  that  an  examination  into  its  merits  would  result 
in  its  general  introduction  into  such  institutions.        Yery  respectfully  yours, 

"H.  H.  YAN"  DYCK,  Superintendent  Public  Instruction." 

From  the  Springfield  Republican. 
"  It  is  the  work  of  a  man  thoroughly  scientific  and  thorougly  practical.  It  is  no 
extravagance  to  say  that  a  mastery  of  its  contents  will  secure  a  better  knowledge  of 
the  applications  of  Chemistry,  Physiology,  and  Natural  Philosophy,  to  life  and  life's 
concerns,  than  the  combined  treatises  upon  these  subjects  which  are  usually  found  in 
our  school-rooms." 

From  the  Detroit  Ad'vertiser. 
"This  is  one  of  the  most  valuable  and  important  books  that  has  of  late  been  issued 
from  the  press.  It  will  do  more  to  elevate  and  connect  the  ordinary  duties  of  house- 
hold life  with  the  domain  of  science  than  any  other  work  yet  published.  It  is  so  ar- 
ranged that  the  general  reader  and  the  man  of  science  may  refer  to  it  with  satisfaction : 
but  it  is  also  a  book  which  ought  by  all  means  to  be  introduced  in  our  schools,  and 
which  every  young  woman  who  expects  to  be  any  thing  more  than  a  doll  or  parlor 
ftutomatoUj'should  study  and  become  as  familiar  with  as  she  is  with  her  prayer-book.'* 

From  ffie  Philadelphia  Saturday  Courier, 
"Few  persons  realize — few  persons  begin  to  realize — the  importance  of  thoroughly 
nnderstanding  the  nature  and  efl'ects  of  light,  heat,  air,  and  food ;  yet  the  value  of  sucn 
knowledge  can  hardly  be  overstated.  Mr.  Youmans'  work  is  the  clearest  and  fullest 
exposition  of  science  in  those  relations  that  has  yet  appeared.  School  committees  and 
persons  directly  interested  in  education,  who  have  long  been  searching  for  a  work  of 
this  kind,  will  rejoice  to  find  the  fruit  of  their  quest  in  this  manual.  It  is  a  valuable 
book,  Avritten  for  a  valuable  purpose :  the  desire  to  lift  our  ordinary  domestic  life  int« 
int  dignity  of  intelligence  pervades  it  throughout,  and  tinctures  it  in  the  gratru" 


2>.  APPLETON  d'  CO:S  PUBLICATION'S, 
THE 

Correlation  and  Conservation  of  Forces. 

"WITH  AN 

INTRODUCTION   AND    BEIEF    BIOGKAPHICAL   NOTICES. 
By  EDWARD  L.  YOUMANS,  M.D.     12mo,  490  pages. 


CONTENTS. 
I.  By  W.  R.  Grove.    The  Correlation  of  Physical  Forces. 
II.  By  Prof.  Helmholtz.     The  Interaction  of  Natural  Forces. 
III.  By  J.  R.  Mayer.     1.  Remarks  on  the  Forces  of  Inorganic  Nature. 

2.  On  Celestial  Dynamics. 

3.  On  the  Mechanical  Equivalent  of  Heat. 

lY.  By  Dr.  Faraday.    Some  Thoughts  on  the  Conservation  of  Forces. 
V.  By  Prof.  Liebig.    The  Connection  and  Equivalence  of  Forces. 
VI.  By  Dr.  Carpenter.     The  Correlation  of  the  Physical  and  Vital  Forces. 

"  This  work  is  a  very  welcome  addition  to  our  scientific  literature,  and  will  t>e 
particularly  acceptable  to  those  who  wish  to  obtain  a  popular,  but  at  the  same  time 
precise  and  clear  view  of  what  Faraday  justly  calls  the  highest  law  in  physical  science, 
the  principle  of  the  conservation  of  force.  Sufficient  attention  has  not  been  paid  to  the 
publication  of  collected  monographs  or  memoirs  upon  special  subjects.  Dr.  Youmans' 
work  exhibits  the  value  of  such  collections  in  a  very  striking  manner,  and  we  earnestly 
hope  his  excellent  example  may  be  followed  in  other  branches  of  science." — American 
Journal  of /Science. 

"  It  was  a  happy  thought  which  suggested  the  publication  of  this  volume.  The 
question  is  often  asked,  and  not  so  easily  answered,  What  are  the  new  doctrines  of  the 
Correlation  and  Conservation  of  Forces?  In  this  volume  we  have  the  answer,  and 
with  the  reasons  of  its  chief  expounders ;  those  who  are  ignorant  on  that  theme,  can 
thus  question  the  original  authorities."— i^ew  Englander, 

"  We  here  have  the  original  expositions  of  the  new  Philosophy  of  Forces,  accompa- 
nied by  an  excellent  exposition  of  both  the  expositions  and  the  expositors ;  the  whole 
will  be  a  rare  treat  to  the  lovers  of  advancing  scientific  thought."— Jfe^Ao^*^ 
Quarterly  Review. 

"This  is,  perhaps,  the  most  remarkable  book  of  the  age.  We  have  hero  the  latest 
discoveries,  and  the  highest  results  of  thought  concerning  the  nature,  laws,  and  con* 
nections  of  the  forces  of  the  universe.  Ko  higher  or  more  sublime  problem  can  engage 
the  intellect  of  man  than  is  discussed  by  these  doctors  of  science  intent  alone  on  arriv- 
ing at  the  tvuih.''''^— Detroit  Free  Press. 

"This  work  presents  a  praiseworthy  specimen  of  complete  and  faithful  authorship, 
and  its  publication  at  this  time  will  form  an  epoch  in  tho  experience  of  nwny  thinking 
minds."—     ihune* 


i>.   APPLET  ON  c&   C0:B  PUBLIC  ATI0N8. 


TlNaLISH  LANGUAGE 


Hand-Book  of  tlie  English  Language. 

By  G.  E.  Latham,  M.D.,  F.R.S.     12mo,  398  pages. 

The  ethnological  relations  of  the  English  Language,  its  history  and  ana» 
lysis,  its  spelling  and  pronunciation,  etymology  and  syntax,  are  here  treated 
with  a  completeness,  learning,  and  grasp  of  inteUect,  that  will  be  vainly 
sought  elsewhere.  The  elements  of  our  tongue,  the  successive  changes  by 
which  it  has  been  modified,  the  origin  of  its  peculiar  expressions,  and  other 
subjects  of  like  importance  and  interest,  receive  due  attention  of  the  author, 
who  ranks  among  the  most  accomplished  scholars  of  England.  Whether  for 
private  study,  or  as  a  manual  for  college  and  high-school  classes.  Dr.  Latham's 
Hand-Book  will  be  found  one  of  the  most  useful  works  extant  in  the  depart- 
ment of  belles-lettres. 

Graliam^s  English.  Synonymes^ 

Classified  and  explained ;  with  practical  exercises,  designed  for  schools 
and  private  tuition ;  with  an  introduction  and  illustrative  authorities. 
By  Henry  Reed,  LL.D.     12mo,  344  pages. 

This  treatise  is  intended  to  teach  the  right  use  of  words.  It  explains  the 
principal  synonymes  of  the  language,  classified  and  arranged  in  pairs,  and 
illustrates  their  use  at  different  eras  with  passages  from  Shakespeare,  Milton, 
and  Wordsworth.  Exercises  are  appended,  which  require  the  pupil  to  fiU 
blanks  by  the  insertion  of  the  words  compared,  selecting  in  each  case  the 
one  that  is  adapted  to  the  context.  Thus  practically  impressed  on  the  pupil'3 
mind,  their  distinctive  meanings  wiU  not  soon  be  forgotten. 

The  attention  of  teachers  is  particularly  invited  to  this  work,  as  one  of 
the  most  useful  that  can  be  found  for  imparting  a  thorough  acquaintance  with 
our  tongue.  Besides  teaching  the  student  how  to  avoid  common  inaccu- 
racies of  expression,  and  training  him  to  that  precision  which  is  essential  to 
a  good  style,  it  will  be  found  highly  serviceable  in  disciplining  his  mind  by 
accustoming  it  to  a  critical  appreciation  of  nice  distinctions.  Y/herever  it 
has  been  introduced  into  academic  or  collegiate  institutions,  it  has  awakened 
great  interest  in  the  study  of  words,  and  proved  a  valuable  auxihary  tc 
'  ourses  of  grammar  and  rhetoric. 


D.  APPLETON  &   CO:S  PUBLICATIONS, 

History  of  English.  Literature. 

By  WILLIAM  SPALDING,  A.M.,  Professor  of  Logic,  Rhetoric,  and 
Metaphysics,  in  the  University  of  St.  Andrews.  12mo,  413 
pages. 

The  above  work  is  offered  as  a  Text-book  for  the  use  of  advanced  Schools 
and  Academies.  It  traces  the  literary  progress  of  the  nation  from  Anglo- 
Saxon  times  to  the  present  day,  and  furnishes  a  comprehensive  outline  of 
the  origin  and  growth  of  our  language.  Those  literary  monuments  of  early 
date  which  are  thought  most  worthy  of  attention,  are  described  with  con- 
siderable fuhiess  and  in  an  attractive  manner.  Constant  effort  is  made  to 
arouse  reflection,  both  by  occasional  remarks  on  the  relations  between  in- 
tellectual culture  and  the  world  of  reality  and  action,  and  by  hints  as  to  the 
laws  on  which  criticism  is  founded.  The  characteristics  of  the  most  cele- 
brated modern  works  are  analyzed  at  length. 

The  style  of  the  author  is  remarkably  clear  and  interestmg,  compelling 
the  reader  to  linger  over  his  pages  with  unwearied  attention. 

Manual  of  Grecian  and  Koman  Antiquities. 

By  Dr.  E.  F.  BOJESEN,  with  Notes  and  Questions  by  Rev.  THOMAS 
K.  ARNOLD.     12mo,  209  pages. 

The  present  Manuals  of  Greek  and  Roman  Antiquities  are  far  superior 
to  any  thing  on  the  same  topics  as  yet  offered  to  the  American  public.  A 
leading  Review  of  Germany  says  of  the  Roman  Manual : — "  Small  as  the 
compass  of  it  is,  we  may  confidently  affirm  that  it  is  a  great  improvement 
on  all  preceding  works  of  the  kmd.  We  no  longer  meet  with  the  wretched 
old  method,  in  which  subjects  essentially  distinct  are  herded  together,  and 
connected  subjects  disconnected,  but  have  a  simple,  systematic  arrangement, 
by  which  the  reader  readily  receives  a  clear  representation  of  Roman  life. 
We  no  longer  stumble  against  countless  errors  in  detail,  which,  though  long 
ago  assailed  and  extirpated  by  Niebuhr  and  others,  have  found  their  last 
place  of  refuge  in  our  manuals.  The  recent  investigations  of  philologists 
and  jurists  have  been  extensively,  but  carefully  aiM  circumspectly  used." 


D.  APPLETON  c&   Q0:B  PUBLICATIONS. 

Elements  of  Logic. 

With  an  Introductory  view  of  Philosophy  in  general,  and  a  Preliminary 
View  of  the  Keason.     By  IIenry  W.  Tappan.     12mo,  46'7  pages. 

Not  considering  Logic  as  an  abstraction,  Prof.  Tappan  assigns  it  its 
proper  place  among  kindred  sciences,  and  takes  the  student  over  the  whole 
field  of  Philosophy,  that  the  connection  of  its  various  parts  may  be  distinctly 
perceived.  He  presents  the  subject,  not  merely  as  a  method  of  obtaining 
inferences  from  truths,  but  also  as  a  method  of  establishing  those  first  truths 
and  general  principles  that  must  precede  all  deduction.  The  great  starting- 
points  of  theory,  the  sources  to  which  we  must  look  for  premises  in  every 
department  of  science,  are  viewed  in  connection  with  Logic ;  the  relations 
between  the  two  are  examined ;  and  the  proper  understanding  of  both  is 
thus  greatly  facilitated.  This  is  new  ground ;  yet  it  is  what  the  profound 
thinker  and  all  who  would  master  the  subject  have  long  needed. 

In  carrying  out  this  plan,  the  author  begins  with  Philosophy  in  general ; 
shows  the  distinction  between  the  Phenomenal  and  the  Metaphenomenal, 
the  Objective  and  the  Subjective,  the  Sensual  and  the  Transcendental ;  defines 
Ideas  and  the  laws  of  their  development ;  and  then  proceeds  to  treat  of  the 
divisions  of  General  Philosophy,  Metaphysics,  and  Nomology — in  the  latter 
of  which,  with  Ethics,  ^Esthetics,  and  Somatology,  Logic  is  included. 

The  interesting  questions  incidentally  opened  up,  such  as  the  Criteria  of 
a  True  Philosophy,  receive  attention,  and  then,  after  a  brief  preliminary 
view  of  the  Reason  and  lis  functions,  we  are  introduced  to  Logic  Proper. 
The  evolution  of  Ideas,  in  all  their  variety,  is  first  set  set  forth  at  length ; 
and  numerous  important  points,  now  for  the  first  time  found  in  a  system  of 
Logic,  such  as  the  relation  between  matter  and  spirit,  right  and  wrong,  free- 
dom and  responsibility,  are  discussed  in  a  manner  v/hich  proves  the  author 
a  practical  adept  in  the  science  he  would  teach.  Inductive  and  Deductive 
Logic  follow ;  the  latter  of  which  embraces  all  the  rules,  principles,  and 
formulsG  to  be  found  in  the  text-books  of  former  dialecticians,  and  to  which, 
for  the  most  part,  they  confine  themselves. 

The  work  closes  with  a  masterly  dissertation  on  the  nature  of  proof,  its  | 
different  kinds,  degrees  of  evidence,  circumstantial  evidence,  reasoning  from  ; 
experience  and  analogy,  and  the  calculation  of  chances.  Important  as  these 
subjects  are,  and  intimately  as  they  are  connected  with  the  work  of  the 
dialecticiau,  they  have  heretofore  had  no  place  in  treatises  on  Logic ;  Mr. 
Tappen  is  the  first  to  unfold  their  connection  with  this  science,  and  the 
clearnegs  and  comprehensiveness  jjdtli|Which  he  has  treated  them  leave 
nothing,  to  be  desired.  Q    i    TC        ^ 


^o 

0^ 

-^  >*  :/; 

^-     ^^*^ 

,0  0,^         °\ 

<l 

v*'^' 

e- 

^o     - 

V^     '-  ^ 

*"/ 

■     H 

'   .^-l" 

s-" ■'',;%.   " 

\       *^ 

91 

* 

■■>^ 

^'X^'  .^ 

.^12?!*./,     ^^ 

\^^'' 

o 

1> 

%^' 

:   ■'^^' 

.^** 

%    '  , 

X^^' 

%. 

> 

■^0 

/^" 

I    A  - 

^ 

'^z- 

*0 

^^. '"^T 

1  \  '^ 

./ 

1    -^^ 

/ 

x^" 


^ 


A^^' 


'^^^  Deacidified  using  the  Bookkeeper  process. 

^     ^^         Neutralizing  agent:  Magnesium  Oxide 
■  -\   '        ■"':      Treatment  Date:  Sept.  2004 

PreservationTechnologies 

A  WORLD  LEADER  IN  PAPER  PRESERVATION 

111  Thomson  Park  Drive 
Cranberry  Township.  PA  16066 
(724)779-2111 


■A^^       't.. 


^^%'^' 


^^  v^ 


^  ^J.  ^  *  ^^ 


^<^^ 


,^^'v^- 


^Oo^ 


Q  ■; 


.  >    ,.  ^'  "  "  /■    ' 


,\0=^^. 


\  c-  i*<Px  '.'Hi,-  /     ^ 


■'%jy^ 


,%•• 


\ 


'->'^%'^~.* 


>::>.        ^  r    .    ,    -*• 


% 


#\v'^'i:*r''o"''  '  -^^ 


,-V-"^ 


.^      ,v\^- 


^       *J':f^ 


..-''d^ 


.^0■ 


%- 


,^/  'Jti^^^  ><  ^ 


LIBRARY  OF  CONGRESS 


0  013  175  595  8