RBt^H-o^ot^
Walsh
Philosophy
Collection
PRESENTED ^0^*^
LIBRARIES of the
UNIVERSITY o/TORONTO
I
J
THE
ELEMENTS OF MORALITY,
INCLUDING
POLITY,
BY
WILLIAM WHEWELL, D.D.,
MASTEft OF TRINITY COLLEGE, AND PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE.
AUTHOR OF THE HISTORY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE
INDUCTIVE SCIENCES.
IN TWO VOLUMES.
AafXTrdhia e^oi/re? hia^ioa-ovaiv aAAi/Aoj?.
VOLUME L
LONDON :
JOHN W. PARKER, WEST STRAND.
M.DCCC.XLV.
TO
WILLIAM WOKDSWORTH, Esquire,
POET LAUREAT.
My dear Mr. Wordsworth,
I AM desirous that, . if the present book finds
its way to the next generation, it should make known to
them that . I had the great privilege of your friendship.
And there is no one to whom I could with more pro-
priety dedicate such a work : since in your Poems, at
the season of life when the mind and the heart are
most wrought on by poetry, I, along with many others,
found a spirit of pure and comprehensive morality, ope-
rating to raise your readers above the moral temper of
those times. I shall rejoice if it appear from the fol-
lowing pages, that such influences have not been wasted
upon me.
That you may long enjoy the reverence and affection
with which England, on such grounds, regards you, is
the wish and prayer of
My dear Mr. Wordsworth,
Your cordial friend and admirer.
W. WHEWELL.
Trinity College^ Cambridge ^
April 14, 1845.
\
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2008 with funding from
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PREFACE
The Reader will perceive that this Work is not described
in the Title as having Moral PMlosopJiy for its subject,
but is entitled Elements of Morality. The distinction be-
tween the two subjects to which these two terms may be
most appropriately applied, is important. Morality, and
the Philosophy of Morality, differ in the same manner
and in the same degree as Geometry, and the Philosophy of
Geometry. Of these two subjects, Geometry consists of a
series of positive and definite Propositions, deduced one from
another, in succession, by rigorous reasoning, and all rest-
ing upon certain Definitions and Self-evident Axioms. The
Philosophy of Geometry is quite a different subject; it
includes such Inquiries as these : — Whence is the Cogency
of Geometrical proof? What is the Evidence of the Axioms
and Definitions ? What are the Faculties by which we be-
come aware of their truth I and the like. The two kinds
of speculation have been pursued, for the most part, by two
different classes of persons ; — the Geometers, and the Meta-
physicians ; for it has been far more the occupation of
Metaphysicians than of Geometers, to discuss such questions
as I have stated, the nature of Geometrical Proofs, Geometri-
cal Axioms, the Geometrical Faculty, and the like. And if we
construct a complete System of Geometry, it will be almost
exactly the same, whatever be the views which we take on
vi PREFACE.
these Metaphysical questions. To construct such a System,
requires labour and thought of quite a different kind from
that which is requisite in the discussion of the questions,
(vhether Geometry rest upon Axioms? whether man has a
Geometrical Faculty ? and the like. But though Geometry
in a very different thing from such Philosophy of Geometry,
the existence of a Scientific System of Geometry is very
requisite for the progress of such philosophy. If we had
had no Euclid, we should have had no dissertations on such
philosophical questions as I have mentioned. It was the
familiar possession of a body of Geometrical Truth, syste-
matically arranged and solidly demonstrated, which led men
to inquire, in virtue of what conditions, and what human
faculties, such a body of truth was possible. Men would
never have discussed whether and why Geometrical Truth
was possible, if they had not had before them an undeniable
collection of such Truth. Or if, without having any cer-
tainty or knowledge of Geometrical Propositions, men had
speculated and disputed, as to whether they could have
such knowledge and such certainty ; we cannot suppose that
they could have arrived at any distinct or stable result of
such speculations. The construction of the Elements of
Geometry, besides being the creation of a precious and
imperishable body of Scientific Truth, was the first step in
the Philosophy of Geometry.
It has long appeared to me that the relation which thus
subsists between Geometry and the Philosophy of Geometry,
must subsist also between Morality and the Philosophy of
Morality. If we had a View of Morality, in which Moral
Propositions were deduced from Axioms, by successive steps
PREFACE. vii
of reasoning, so far as to form a connected System of
Moral Truth ; we should then have before us definite Pro-
blems, if we proceeded to inquire, what is the nature and
evidence of Moral Axioms ; and what are the Faculties by
which we know them to be true. On this account, it seemed
to me that the Construction of Elements of Morality ought
to precede any attempt to settle the disputed and doubtful
questions which are regarded as belonging to the Philosophy
of Morality.
Of course, as in the case of Geometry, the Construc-
tion of a Systematic Body of Truth in Morality, if it could
be achieved, would have other, and perhaps far higher
advantages, than the mere aid it would afford to the pro-
secution of the Philosophy of Morality. In Morality, in-
deed, this independent value of the Truth, could hardly fail
to be more evident and more eminent than in any other
Subject. A sure and connected knowledge of the Duties of
man, of the Supreme Rules and Highest Objects of human
action, would naturally throw most important light upon all
the greatest concerns of man, both theoretical and practical.
It is true, that the difficulty of constructing a solid
System of Morality may be expected to be, in some degree,
great, in proportion to its great value and extensive bear-
ings, when once constructed. But on the other hand, this
acknowledged difficulty in the task will, it may be hoped,
procure some indulgence to him who undertakes it, if he
perform his labour patiently, and as far as he can, consist-
ently. Even if he be not wholly successful, he may produce
a result of which some part may have a permanent value,
and which may be rendered more complete by his successors.
viii PREFACE.
I do not know whether these general reflexions will
appear superfluous, to the Reader of the System of Morality
now offered to his notice. I am desirous that he should
understand that, though I do not speak of my work as a
Philosophy of Morality, I have tried to make it a work of
rigorous reasoning, and therefore, so far at least, philoso-
phical.
I have, at the same time, used, as much as possible, the
language in which moral opinions and moral arguments are
expressed on common occasions; only attempting to give
so much of precision to the meaning of the terms used, as
may make the reasoning good. If the reasoning be really
rigorous, it is, I conceive, a presumptive evidence of the
truth of the System, that the arguments are expressed in
language familiarly recognized as significant and convincing :
just as the demonstrations of Geometry may, in many in-
stances, be best expressed in the language of the practical
land-measurer.
The Principles which are the foundation of the reason-
ing in this System of Morality are those which are given
in Articles 269, 270, and 271, as the Express Principles of
Humanity, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order, Earnestness, and
Moral Ends. These Principles may be considered as, in
some measure, analogous, in Morality, to the Axioms in
Geometry. I have attempted to show how we are led to
these Principles. But I hope I may once more refer to the
analogy of Geometry ; and remind the reader, that all the
controversies which turn on matters hehw the Axioms do
not affect the Superstructure which is built upon them.
If any one believe that Humanity, Justice, Tmth, Purity,
PREFACE. ix
Order, Earnestness, and Moral Purpose, are fundamental
Principles of human action ; in whatever manner he arrives
at this conviction, he will be able to go along with me from
this point ; and to follow me into the Doctrines of the
Morality of Reason, the Morality of Religion, Polity, and
International Law.
I hope the Reader will find the convenience which I
seem to myself to have found, in the Division of the gene-
ral trunk of Morality into Five Branches : Jurisprudence ;
the Morality of Reason ; the Morality of Religion ; Polity ;
International Law. These five provinces, though intimately
connected, appear to be distinct, and their boundaries well
defined. The subjects belonging to each, and even the
general style of treating them, are different. I hope, in
particular, that the separation of the Morality of Religion
from that of mere Reason, will be considered an improve-
ment. It enables us to trace the guidance of human Rea-
son, consistently and continuously, retaining a due sense of
the superior authority of Religion ; and it shows that, in
many places, this guidance of human Reason is insufficient
without Religion, and points to Religion as a necessary
higher guide.
By going through the subject in this shape, I have been
unavoidably led to treat of subjects which are of a profes-
sional kind ; and in which, therefore, an unprofessional
writer is in great danger of errour. This is especially the
case with the first subject. Jurisprudence. I can scarcely
hope that Jurists and Lawyers will not find, in what I have
written, mistakes as to laws and legal expressions. These
I hope they will pardon ; seeing what I trust I have made
X PREFACE.
manifest, that some details on that subject were an essen-
tial part of my plan. This portion of my work has had the
great advantage of being read and remarked on by my
friend Mr. William Empson. I have taken the liberty of
using some of his remarks, especially in the Notes on this
Second Book. To him I am indebted also for a general
reference to the Act of Crimes and Punishments, now
under the consideration of the Legislature ; of which I have
made some use. Besides the common English law-books,
I have referred to some American ones, especially Chancellor
Kent"*s Commentaries on American Law^ Judge Story's Com-
mentaries on Equity^ and his Conflict of Laws, In the Fifth
Book, on Polity, I have made free use of many excellent
works of my Contemporaries; especially Mr. Hallam's
Middle Ages^ and English Constitution ; Mr. Allen's Inquiry
into the Boyal Prerogative ; Sir Francis Palgrave's History of
the English Commonwealth ; Mr. Jones's work on Bent, and
(particularly in the Chapter on the Representative System)
Lord Brougham's Political Philosophy.
I have necessarily had to deliver opinions which bear,
more or less closely, upon questions now agitated with a
view to practical results. In doing this, I trust that I have
said nothing but what belongs to a system of Morality, and
that I shall be judged merely as a Moralist.
CONTENTS
THE FIRST VOLUME.
BOOK I.
INTRODUCTION.
ELEMENTARY NOTIONS AND DEFINITIONS.
Chap. I. The Reason
Art.l. Human Actions.
2. Thoughts and Things. Sensation and Reflection.
3. General and Abstract Conceptions.
4. Names of Conceptions.
5. Truth and Errour. General Relations.
6. Ideas of Space, Time, &c. Reasoning.
7' Axioms.
8. Laws of Nature. Certain and probable events.
9. Theories.
10. The Reason (Speculative).
11. The Understanding.
12. The Intellect.
13. Action.
14. Intention.
15. Will.
16. Rules of Action.
17. Means and Ends.
18. Rules with Reasons.
19. Chains of Rules.
20. The Reason (Practical).
21. The Speculative and Practical Reason.
22. Development of Mind.
23. Instincts
24. Springs of Action. Motives.
xii CONTENTS.
VAQB
Chap. II. The Springs op Human Action . . .10
Art. 25. Five Classes.
1. The Appetites.
26. Natural Wants
27. Artificial Wants.
2. The Affections.
28. Tend to Persons.
29. Love.
30. Kinds of Love
31. Anger.
32. Gratitude. Resentment. Malice.
33. Man in Society.
34. Intercourse of Men.
3. The Mental Desires.
35. Tend to Abstractions.
36. Memory and Imagination.
37. Good. Hope and Fear.
38. Separation of Mental Desires. Instincts.
39. The Desire of Safety.
40. Instinct of Self-preservation.
41. Desire of Security.
42. Desire of Liberty.
43. Men at Enmity.
44. The Desire of Having.
45. Things and Persons.
46. Property is necessary.
47- The Desire of Family Society.
48. The Desire of Civil Society.
49. Mental Desires include Affections.
50. The Need of a Mutual Understanding.
51. Promises are necessary.
52. The Desire of Superiority.
53. Desire of Equal Rules.
54. The Desire of Knowledge.
55. Knowledge and Reason.
4. The Moral Sentiments.
56. Approbation and Disapprobation.
CONTENTS. xiii
PAOB
5. The Reflex Sentiments.
Reflex Thought.
The Desire of being loved.
The Desire of Esteem.
The Desire of our oxen Approval.
6. General Remarks.
Springs of Action operate through the Will.
Are modified by Thought.
Our Reason is Ourselves.-.. _^
Passion.
Moral Rules exist necessarily . . 32
Rules necessary for the Peace of Society.
QQ. Rules necessary for the Action of Man as Man.
67* Reason our necessary guide.
68. Rules not founded in mutual fear.
69. Rules tend to unite men.
Chap. IV. Right, Adjective, and Right^ Susbtantive . 36
Jrt. 57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
— ^ 63.
64.
Chap. III.
Art. 65.
Art. 70.
Right, relatively used,
71.
Refers to a superior End.
72.
Right, absolutely used.
73.
The Supreme Good.
74.
Ought. Duty.
75.
Why Ought I ?
76.
Morality.
77.
Man a Moral Being.
78.
Rights must exist.
79.
Rights separately proved.
80.
Five Primary kinds of Rights.
81.
Wrong. Injury.
82.
Rights are Realities.
83.
Punishment.
84.
Rights, and right.
85.
Obligation.
86.
Obligation and Duty.
87.
Obliged and Ought.
88.
Obligation and Moral Claim.
89.
Perfect and Imperfect Obligation.
XIV
CONTENTS.
.90.
Jus the Doctrine of Rights and Obligations.
91.
Duties. Virtues. Goodness. Vice.
92.
Virtuous and vicious internal acts.
93.
Sins.
94.
The State.
Chap. V. Immutable Morality and Mutable Law . 49
Art. 95. How there can be various Laws and fixed
Morality.
96. Conceptions fixed, Definitions variable.
97. Idea and Fact in Morality.
98. Sentiment of Rights
99. Sentiment of Wrongs.
100. Effect of these Sentiments.
101. Sense of Duty.
102. Responsibility. Merit.
103. Convictions.
104. Moral Education and Cultivation.
BOOK II.
JUS.
OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS.
Chap. I. Rights in General 57
Art. 105. Law and Morality.
106. Law seeks to be just.
107. Roman and English Law.
108. Five Classes of Primary Rights.
109. Rights imperfectly held.
110. Property and Contract distinct.
111. Private and Public Wrongs.
Chap. II. The Rights of the Person . . . .64
Art. 112. Wrongs against the Person. Homicide, &c.
113. False Imprisonment, &c.
114. Mala Praxis, &c.
CONTENTS. XV
TAoa
Art. 115. Excusable Homicide.
116. Dangerous Games.
117. Self-defense.
118. Manslaughter.
119. Murder.
120. Justifiable Homicide.
121. Nocturnal Thief.
1 22. Provocation .
123. Accessories.
124. Duels.
125. Punishment.
126. Riot, &;c.
127. Chastisement.
128. Classes of Men with imperfect Rights.
Chap. III. The Rights of Property . . . -74
Art. 129. Property is necessary.
130. Moveable Property.
131. Money.
132. Property in Land.
133. Real and Personal Property.
134. Owner and Tenant.
135. Ryots. Serfs. Metayers. Farmers.
136. Feudal System.
137. Its present influence.
138. Quiritarian Ownership.
139. Title. Conveyance. Remedies, &c.
140. Transfer, &c.
141. "Wrongs. Larceny, Burglary, &c.
142. Fraud.
143. Trespass.
144. Dominium Eminens.
145. Public Property.
146. Res NuUius.
147. Incorporeal Property.
148. Feudal Services.
149. Animalia ferae naturae.
150. Treasure Trove, &c.
151. Prescription.
152. Trusts.
xvi
CONTENTS.
Art. 153.
Alienation.
154.
Succession.
155.
Delivery.
156.
Necessity.
Chap. IV. The Rights of Contract
Art. 157.
Contracts to be enforced.
158.
Promises and Contracts.
159.
Nude Pacts.
160.
Consideration.
161.
Duress.
162.
Contracts of Minors, &c.
163.
Contracts void by Fraud.
164.
Formulas of Contracts.
165.
Nominate Contracts.
166.
Mutuum and Commodatum.
167.
Repairs and Expenses.
168
Debt.
169.
Promissory Notes and Bills of Exchange.
170.
Bailment, &c.
171.
Eviction, &c.
172.
Seller's disclosures.
173.
Equality. Bona Fide.
174.
Stricti Juris. Interpretation.
175.
Breach of Contract.
90
Chap. V. The Rights op Marriage . . . .99
Art. 176. Institution of Marriage to be upheld.
177. National Sentiment respecting Marriage.
178. The Family.
179. Jewish Marriage.
180. Greek Marriage.
181. Roman Marriage.
182. English Marriage.
183. Husband and Wife.
184. Adultery.
185. Rights over Children. Roman Law.
186. English Law.
187. Rape and Seduction. Roman Law.
CONTENTS. xvii
PAGE
Art. 188. Rape and Seduction. Englisli Law.
189. Inheritance.
190. Testament. Roman.
191. Limited.
192. Will. English.
193. Entail.
194. Legacies.
195. Dowry. Jointure.
196. Tutor. Curator.
197^ Guardian.
198. Lawful Marriage.
199. Roman Forms of Marriage.
200. English Forms of Marriage.
201. Religious Ceremony of Marriage.
202. Divorce in Roman Law.
203. Divorce in English Law.
204. Concubinage, &c.
205. Incest.
Chap. V. The Rights op Government, or State Rights . 117
Art. 206. Authority.
207. Patriarchal Government.
208. National Government.
209. The Supreme Authority.
210. Constitution. The Executive Function.
211. The Judicial Function.
212. Rebellion. Treason, &c.
213. Natural Jus. National Jus.
214. International Jus.
215. Government de Jure and de Facto.
216. Legislative Body.
217. Fact of Law and Idea of Justice to be brought
together.
218. Law and Justice cannot exist separately.
219. Law is a means of Moral Education.
220. Jural Discipline of the Romans.
221. Influence of Justice on Law.
222. Law leads to Morality.
223. Other Classes of Rights.
The Right of Reputation.
224. Defamation in Roman and English Law.
VOL. I. b
xviii CONTENTS.
BOOK III.
MORALITY.
OF VIRTUES AND DUTIES.
VAliK
Chap. I. Of Moral Precepts 131
Art. 225. Morality regards internal Acts.
226. Duties and Virtues.
227- Moral depends on jural Character.
228. Laws and Moral Precepts-
229. Precepts of the Five Classes.
Chap. II. Of the Idea of Moral Goodness . . 13(i
Art. 230. The Supreme Law must be positive.
231. Conceptions to which it tends.
232. Ideas of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity,
Order.
233. Idea of Goodness.
234. Objective and Subjective Justice, &c.
235. Names of Objective and Subjective Virtues.
236. The Five Cardinal Virtues.
237. Vice.
Chap. III. Virtues and Vices 144
1. Virtues of the Affections.
Art. 238. Kinds of Love. The Heart.
239. Regard. Gratitude, &c.
240. Good-humour. Good-nature, &c.
241. Mildness. Meekness, &c.
242. Sympathy. Compassion, &c.
243. Admiration. Reverence, &c.
244. Resentment. Indignation, &c.
245. Offense. Revenge, &c.
246. Ill-humour. Ill-nature, &c.
247. Contempt. Insult, &c.
248. Zeal. Energy, &c.
249. Sloth. Cowardice, &c.
250. Decision. Earnestness, &c.
251. Merriment. Buffoonery, &c.
CONTENTS. xix
PAQK
2. Virtues of the Mental Desires.
Art. 252. Liberality. Fear of Poverty, &c.
253. Covetousness. Frugality, &c.
254. Ambition. Fairness.
3. Virtues connected with Truth.
255. Truthfulness. Fidelity, &c.
4. Virtues relating to the Bodily Desires.
256. Temperance. Chastity, &c.
5. Intellectual Virtues.
257. Obedience, &c.
258. Prudence.
259. Wisdom.
260. Love of Truth. Talents, &c.
6. Reflex Virtues and
Vices.
261. Vanity. Honour, &c.
262. Pride. Insolence, &c.
263. Selfishness. Self-devotion,
&c.
264. Heroic Virtues.
265. The Moral Vocabulary is
a Moral Lesson.
266. The common judgment is
moral.
Chap. IV. Moral Principles
.
Art. 267. Moral exercises needed.
165
268. Operative Principles and Express Principles.
269. The Principles (express) of Humanity, Justice,
Truth, Purity, Order.
270. The Principle of Earnestness.
271. The Principle of Moral Ends.
272. Operative Principles. Spirit of Justice, &c.
Chap. V. Duties 169
Art. 273. Virtue depends on Duty.
274. Duty involves conscious Thought.
275. Duty becomes Virtue by repetition.
276. No Heroic Duties.
b2
XX CONTENTS.
PAOR
Art. 277. The Sense of Duty.
278. Duty is determined by social relations.
279. Duty gives Moral Significance to Obligations.
280. Classification of Duties.
Chap. YI. Duties of the Affections .... 173
Art. 281. Special benevolent Affections are Duties.
282. Gratitude is a Duty.
283. Reverence for Superiors is a Duty.
284. Filial Affection is a Duty.
285. Parental Affection is a Duty
286. Conjugal Affection is a Duty.
287. Fraternal Affection is a Duty.
288. Love of Fellow-citizens is a Duty.
289. Other Relative Duties of Affection.
290. Duty of Universal Benevolence.
291. The Human Family.
292. Duty of Compassion.
Chap. VII. Op the Moral Culture op the Affections
AS A Duty 184
Art. 293. We are approved or condemned for our Affec-
tions.
294. We can cultivate our Affections by thoughts
of Duty ;
295. By unfolding conceptions of Virtues ;
296. By unfolding the notion of doing Good ;
297. By acts of Duty.
298. We have never done all that is possible.
299. Our Moral Culture is a Duty.
300. Our Moral Progress never terminates.
301. It is our Duty to cultivate Gratitude, &c.
302. This Duty includes the Duty of Gratitude, &c.
303. Transgression is an interruption of moral pro-
304. The greatest interruptions are the greatest
transgressions.
305. The Duty of Moral Culture adds to other
Duties.
306. Moral Perfection is our greatest Good.
Chap.
VIII.
Art.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
CONTENTS. xxi
FAGE
Duties respecting Property and other Ob-
jects OF Desires . . . .192
Desires to be directed by a Spirit of Justice;
And by a Spirit of Moral Purpose.
Duty of Moral Progress in such Spirit.
Wealth is a means of Moral Progress:
For poor as well as rich.
Power to be used for Moral Culture of others.
Chap. IX. Duties connected with Truth . . . 197
Art. 313. Lie not.
314. Perfoi-m Promises.
315. This Duty regulated by Mutual Understanding.
316. The Spirit of Truth.
317. Spirit of Truth to be cultivated by Acts.
318. Solemn Promises.
Chap. X. Duties connected with Purity . . . 201
Art. 319. Principle of Purity.
320. There is a Higher Part of our Nature.
321. Special Duties of Purity.
322. Purity of Heart to be cultivated.
323. Impure Acts especially impede Moral Progress ;
324. Though not forbidden by Law.
325. Seduction.
326. Purity of Youth to be preserved.
327. The prospect of Marriage a preservative.
Chap. XI. Duties of Order 210
Art. 328. Duties, and Spirit of Obedience.
329. Duties depend on Customs in part.
330. Duty of Obedience to the Laws.
331. In many cases the Letter not the Spirit of the
Laws.
332. Duties of Command.
333. Public Duties.
334. Political Duties of Conservation and Progress.
xxii CONTENTS.
PAGE
Chap. XII. Intellectual Duties 216
Art. 335. Duties of Prudence and Wisdom in command.
336. The Duty of Consideration.
337. Not Superseded by right Intention.
338. The Duty of acting rationally.
339. The Duty of acting according to Rule.
340. The Duty of Wisdom.
341. Conceptions to be defined.
342. The Duty of Intellectual Culture;
343. Especially for Legislators ;
344. And Educators.
Chap. XIII. Of Transgression .... 226
Art. 345. Our highest object is Intellectual and Moral
346. Of ourselves and others.
347. Such progress is possible.
348. Can never terminate.
349. Transgression.
350. Temptation.
351. Resistance.
352. Degrees of Guilt.
353. Measure of Guilt.
354. Interruption of Moral Progress.
355. Repentance.
356. Amendment.
357. Not necessarily sufficient.
358. Amendment must be immediate.
Chap. XIV. Of Conscience 234
Art. 359. What is Conscience ?
360. Sjoiteresis, Syneidesis.
361. Conscience the Law.
362. Conscience the Witness.
363. Conscience the Punisher.
364. To act against Conscience is wrong.
365. Is to act according to Conscience always right ?
366. Conscience to be enlightened and instructed.
I?67. Aid of Religion needed.
CONTENTS. xxiii
PAOB
Art. 368. Conscience not an Ultimate Authority.
369. May be erroneous.
370. Not valid as a Reason.
371. Reverence due to Conscience.
372. A good man is conscientious.
373. Doubtful Conscience. Good Conscience.
Chap. XV. Cases of Conscience respecting Truth . 242
^ 374.
Cases of Conscience.
375.
Casuistry often suspected.
376.
A Case of Conscience means, What ought I
to do?
377.
Interpretation of Promises.
378.
Erroneous Promises.
379.
Promises released by the Promisee.
380.
Unlawful Promises
381.
Not to be kept : but the Relative Duty is
violated.
382.
Promises which become unlawful.
383.
Which Promisee does not think unlawful.
384.
Elector's Promise.
385.
Promise to a Representative.
386.
Promise to be kept after the immoral action.
387.
Contradictory Promises.
388.
Impossible Promises.
389.
Extorted Promises.
390.
Promise to Robbers.
391.
Should the Promise be given?
392.
Analogy of the Law.
393.
Lies.
394.
Falsehoods under Convention.
39.5.
To be carefully limited.
396.
Lie to conceal a Secret.
397.
Lie to preserve a Man's Life.
398.
Lies of Necessity.
399.
Heroic Lies.
400.
Advocate's Assertions.
401.
Advocate's Profession to be Moral.
402.
Seller's Concealments.
403.
The Alexandrian Merchant.
XXIV
CONTENTS.
Art. 404. Promise of Marriage.
405. The unlawful Promise of Marriage.
406. Implied Promise of Marriage.
Chap. XVI. Of Cases of Necessity
265
Art. 407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
Cases of extreme Danger :
First, to one's Self.
Necessity to be rigorously understood.
Constraint is not Necessity.
Fear of certain Death is Necessity.
Necessity does not justify, but may excuse Acts,
Cases of Necessity must involve repugnance.
Cases of Necessity are therefore not to be defined.
And because Necessity destroys deliberation,
Reference to be had to the person's Moral
Culture.
Death is an event in Man's moral being.
Necessity has no Law.
Case of Necessity from Danger to others.
Such Cases of Necessity are not to be defined.
Conflicts of Duties to be decided by regard to
Moral Culture.
Strong Moral Principles decide such Conflicts.
Heroic Acts.
Resistance to Government.
Chap. XVII. Of Things Allowable
279
Art. 425. The notion of Allowable belongs to Cases of
Necessity.
426. Is not lightly to be extended.
- 427. Some things are Indifferent.
428. But many of these, only at first sight.
429. The selection is to be directed by Moral Culture.
430. Acts are not indifferent, because they foster
habits.
431. Hence Acts are a Discipline.
432. Mortification. Askesis.
433. Not ascetic, but spontaneous Virtue is required.
434. Discipline of the Intellect.
.CONTENTS. XXV
PAGE
Art. 435. Nothing is too slight for Discipline.
436. Things indifferent diminish with Moral Progress ;
437- But never vanish.
Chap. XVIII. Of Ignorance and Errour.
Art. 438. Ignorance and Errour may arise from neglect
of Intellectual Duty :
439. May be unavoidable.
440. If unavoidable, they excuse: but care is needed.
441. Their consequences to be redressed.
442. If they arise from Negligence, are defects.
443. But they may palliate actions.
444. Ignorance and Errour as the Want of Common
Moral Principles,
445. Suspend or invert the Moral Progress.
446. The Want is blameable.
447* Errours of Principle are not exculpations.
448. Many arise from confused Conceptions ;
449. And from the Confusion of Moral Terms ;
450. Which also produces Prejudices.
451. This confusion partly excuses Errour.
452. Such Errour to be tolerated.
453. The National Standard of Morals may produce
Errour.
454. This Errour may be removeable.
455. Wilful Ignorance or Errour.
456. Summary of Rules.
Chap. XIX. Progressive Standards op Morality . . 303
Art. 457. National Standards of Morality
458. Are connected with National Laws.
459. Moral Precepts are exemplary and relative.
460. Morality rests upon Law.
461. Law is subject to the Authority of Morality.
462. Moral Rules improved by precision of Con-
ception,
463. In nations and in individuals.
464. Conceptions of Person; Property; Right.
XXVI
CONTENTS.
Chap. XX. The State
Art. 465. What is the State?
466. The Conception among the Greeks.
467. Among the Romans.
468. In later times.
469. The State is not a mere Concourse of men.
470. The State is one and perpetual.
471. The State is Sovereign.
472. The People is not the Source of Rights.
473. The State is a Moral Agent.
474. Duties of the State.
475. Duty of Moral Progress.
PAGK
309
Chap. XXI. Justice
316
Art. 476. Conception of Natural Law among the Greeks.
477« Among the Romans.
478. Is universal, though not uniform.
479. Is denoted by Jus.
480. Involves historical Definitions.
481. Rights cannot be founded on Injustice.
482. Rights not always vitiated by previous injustice.
483. No single Rule is absolute.
484. Justice assigns Rights according to existing
Conditions.
485. Justice rejects what is arbitrary.
486. Idea and Fact in Justice.
487. Both maxims of Justice acknowledged in Law.
488. Past violence is gradually obliterated.
489. Law must conform to this course.
490. It is not unjust that citizens suffer with the
State.
491. War not necessarily unjust.
492. What is just respecting past violence ?
493. To aim constantly at remedying it.
494. Law tends slowly to Justice.
495. Law tends constantly to Justice.
Chap. XXII. Equity ....
Art. 496. Equity is Equality.
497. Separation of Justice and Equity.
328
CONTENTS. xxvii
PAGE
Art. 498. Equity not properly defined, the judgment of a
good man.
499. The Praetor's power did not disregard the Law.
500. Equity not properly defined as abating the
rigour of the Law.
501. Equity does supply some defects in Law in
England.
502. Fixed rules necessary, and necessarily insuf-
ficient.
503. Maxims of Equity.
504. jEquitas sequitur legem.
505. In equalijure melior est conditio possidentis.
506. Qui sentit onus^ sentire debet et commodum.
507. Other Maxims.
508. The Natural Rights of Man.
509. Whether all men are bom equal.
510. AH men are moral beings.
Chap. XXIII. Humanity 337
Art. 511. Greek and Roman notions of Humanity.
512. Advance of the notion in spite of obstacles.
513. Further advance. Religion.
514. All men must have the primary Rights.
515. Natural Rights and Civil Rights.
516. Natural Obligations
517. Are as important as Natural Rights.
518. Whether Natural Rights are indefeasible.
519. Civil Rights to be conformed to Natural Rights.
Chap. XXIY. Slavery 344
Art. 520. Slavery ancient and modern.
521. Definitions of Slavery.
522. It is contrary to Morality.
523. May be excusable in early stages of progress.
524. Is condemned when moral progress goes on.
525. Is the negro inferior to the white ?
526. Language is the character of man.
527. Inconsistency of those who hold negro inferiority ;
528. Especially in prohibiting negro education.
529. Abolition of Slavery a great moral object.
Art
. 530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
Chap.
XXV.
Art.
536.
537.
538.
xxviii CONTENTS.
PAGE
Abolition to be pursued by legal means.
Hopes of negro Emancipation.
Serfs. Leibeigener, &c.
Progress of Emancipation in England.
Moral advance produced by Freedom.
Social Freedom requires Political Freedom.
Pleasure, Interest, Happiness, Utility,
Expediency ...... 354
Pleasure, &c., are various views of Good.
Definition of Pleasure.
If Pleasure be the highest object, there is no
Duty.
539. We may promote men's Pleasure from Bene-
volence.
540. There are Pleasures in Virtue.
541. Definition of Interest.
542. Interest cannot rightly be the highest Object.
543. Men do not necessarily seek their Interest.
544. Definition of Happiness.
545. We must be Happy by being Virtuous.
546. That Virtue is Happiness, to be learnt from
Religion.
547. It is not enough to make men Content.
548. To aim at the Greatest Happiness, cannot be
the ground of Duty.
549. In reasoning on this ground. Rules are assumed.
550. Paley's account of Human Happiness;
551. Is not used by him in his reasonings.
552. Happiness supposes a Supreme object, Morality
supposes a Supreme Rule.
553. Definition of Utility.
554. UtiHty cannot be the ground of Duty.
555. Definition of Expediency.
Whether what is expedient is right.
Chap. XXVI. Moral Education . . . 369
Art, 556. Punishments are the Sanctions of Laws.
557' Not all wrong acts are punished.
558. Whether the sole object of Punishment be pre-
vention.
CONTENTS. xxix.
PAGK
Art. 559. Laws with their Sanctions are a part of Moral
Education.
560. National Morality is a part of Moral Education.
561 . Domestic Teaching is a part of Moral Education.
562. Domestic Teaching of Families residing among
strangers.
563. Individual Thought is a part of Moral Edu-
cation.
564. A man's thoughts are influenced by other men.
565. Moral Education requires Religious Education.
BOOK I.
INTRODUCTION.
ELEMENTARY NOTIONS AND
DEFINITIONS.
BOOK L
INTRODUCTION.
ELEMENTAKY NOTIONS AND DEFINITIONS.
Chapter I.
THE EEASON.
1. In the present work I have to speak of the
Actions of man, and of those Faculties by which he acts
as man. These faculties belong to man in virtue of the
Human Nature which is common to all men. They are
Human Faculties, and give rise to Human Actions.
I and my readers share in this common Human Nature ;
and hence, instead of saying that man acts thus and thus,
or has such and such faculties, I shall often say that we
act thus, or that we have such faculties.
2. Man has faculties of Sensation, by which he per-
ceives and observes Things^ or objects without him ; and
faculties of Reflection, by which he is aware of Thoughts,
or actions within him.
These faculties of Sensation and Reflection are inseparably
combined in their operation. We cannot observe external
Things without some degree of Thought ; nor can we reflect
upon our Thoughts, without being influenced in the course of
our reflection by the Things which we have observed.
3. Man, thus combining Observation and Reflection,
is led to regard external things as grouped and classed, in
his thoughts. He contemplates objects under general and
VOL. I. B
2 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
abstract forms ; and thus has Conceptions or Notions of them,
and applies to them Names. Thus bread, fruit, flesh, are
classed together and indicated by the general name of food ;
food, clothing, tools, arms, are all included in the general
name property. Such terms are abstract, as well as gene-
ral : in calling many different things food, we designate one
certain use of the things, abstracting it from the things them-
selves, and neglecting their other qualities. In like manner,
when we call many different things property, we abstract one
special view of the things so described, from all various cir-
cumstances which may belong to them.
4. When we consider things under these general and
abstract aspects, they can be denoted by Names, as we have
said. Names indicate a class of things, or relations of
things, which have all a single general and abstract aspect.
The Conception is that, in our thoughts, which we express or
signify by the Name.
Man not only contemplates things, or objects, and their
relations ; but he contemplates also Changes of things and of
their relations, or Facts. Thus he observes that the stars
move round the pole, or that Brutus stabs Caesar. Or the
absence of change may be a Fact ; as, that the pole-star does
not move.
Facts, as well as things, are described by general and
abstract words. Things are described by Substantives ;
Facts, by Verbs, or words which assert.
5. When the relations or changes so asserted really exist
or occur, the assertions are true. We can, by various processes,
of observation and reflection, satisfy ourselves that some
assertions are true and some false. We can be certain and
sure of such truth and such falsehood. We may convince
ourselves and convince others of it ; but we may also mistake
in such conviction. Man has means of knowing Truth, but
is also liable to Errour.
Ch. 1.] THE REASON. 3
Truth and Errour are concerned about many General
Relations of objects, which belong to them in the view
in which we apprehend them. For example, we apprehend
objects as existing in Space and Time ; as being One or
Many ; Like or Unlike; as moving, and affecting each other's
motions ; and many other relations.
We can, in thought, separate these General Relations from
the objects and facts. Such general relations are Space,
Time, Number, Resemblance, Cause and Effect, and the
like. These general relations thus separated may be termed
Ideas; but the term Idea is often used more loosely, to
designate all abstract objects of thought.
6. Objects and facts being regulated by these Ideas,
we can, by the nature of our Ideas themselves, as for
example the Ideas of Space, Time, Number, and the like,
connect one fact with another by necessary consequence.
Thus, we observe the fact that the stars move uniformly
about the pole ; we observe also their distances from each
other. We can connect, with these facts, the times and
places of their rising and setting, by a necessary process of
thought. Such a process of thought is reasoning. We can
reason, so that from the north polar distance of the star,
and the latitude of the place of observation, we can deduce
the interval of time between the star's rising and setting.
7. When we thus reason concerning things existing
under these general relations of Space, Time, Number, and
the like, we proceed upon, and necessarily assume, certain
grounds, or Fundamental Principles, respecting these rela-
tions. And these Principles, the origin and basis of our
reasoning, may be separately asserted, as Axioms. Such
Principles are the Axioms of Geometry.
8. By observation of the external world according
to the general relations of Space, Time, Number, Resem-
blance, Cause and Effect, and the like, we become acquainted
b2
4 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
with it, so as to trace its course in some degree. We
apprehend facts, or objects, as conforming to a general Rule
or Law. Thus, the Stars in general conform to the Law,
that they revolve uniformly about the pole. The Planets
conform to certain other Laws, which were discovered by
the Chaldean and Greek astronomers. Such Laws are Laws
of Nature.
When we discover such a constancy and sequence in
events, we believe some to be the consequences of the
others. We are then led forwards to future, as well as
backwards to past events. We believe that some events
will certainly happen, that others are probable. We beheve
it certain that the sun will rise to-morrow, and probable
that he will shine.
9. We can, in our thoughts, separate Laws of Nature
from the Facts which conform to them. When we do this,
the Law is represented by the Ideas and Conceptions which
it involves. Thus the Law of a Planet's motion round
the Sun, as to space, is represented by the conception of an
Ellipse, the Sun being in its Focus. Laws so abstracted
from Facts are Theories.
10. The operations by which we frame and deal* with
Ideas and Conceptions, and all other acts of thought, are
ascribed to the mind ; they are mental operations and acts.
The mental operations which have been noticed ; namely,
to conceive objects in a general and abstract manner (3) ; to
apply names to them (4) ; to reason (6) ; to apprehend first
principles of reasoning (7) ; to conceive general rules (9) ;
to apprehend facts as conformable to general Rules (8) ;
are functions belonging to man, exclusively of all other
animals. They are ascribed to a faculty specially human,
the Beason.
The substantive Reason^ thus used, has a wider sense
than the verb to reason. The Reason is not only the faculty
Ch. I.] THE REASON. 5
by which we reason from fundamental principles, when we
have anyhow attained or assumed these; it is also the
faculty by which we apprehend fundamental principles. By
our Reason, we not only reason from the axioms of Geometry,
but also see the truth of the axioms.
The special substantive, a reason^ denotes a step in rea-
soning.
11. Of the processes which have been mentioned as
belonging to the Reason, some are also ascribed to the
Understanding, but not all. The Reason and the Under-
standing have not been steadily distinguished by English
writers. The most simple way to use the substantive Under-
standing in a definite sense, is to make it correspond, in its
extent, with the verb understand. To understand anything,
is to apprehend it according to certain assumed ideas and
rules; we do not include, in the meaning of the word,
an examination of the ground of the ideas and rules, by
reference to which we understand the thing. We under-
stand a Language, when we apprehend what is said, accord-
ing to the established vocabulary and grammar of the
language ; without inquiring how the words came to have
their meaning, or what is the ground of the grammatical
rules. We understand the sense, without reasoning about
the etymology and syntax. Again, we understand a Ma-
chine when we perceive how its parts will work upon one
another according to the known laws of mechanics, without
inquiring what is the ground of these laws.
Reasoning may be requisite to understanding. We may
have to reason about the syntax, in order to understand the
sense : we may have to reason upon mechanical principles, in
order to understand the machine. But understanding leaves
still room for reasoning: we may understand the elliptical
theory of Mars's motions, and may still require a reason
for the theory. Also we may understand what is not
6 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
conformable to Reason; as when we understand a man's
arguments, and think them unfounded in Reason.
We understand a thing, as we have said, when we
apprehend it according to certain assumed ideas and rules.
We reason, in order to deduce such rules from first prin-
ciples, or from one another. But the rules and principles,
which must be expressed when we reason, may be only im-
plied when we understand. We may understand the sense
of a speech, without thinking of rules of grammar. We
may understand the working of a machine, without thinking
of propositions in the sciences of geometry and mechanics.
The Reason is employed both in understanding and in
reasoning; but the Principles which are explicitly asserted
in reasoning, are only implicitly applied in understanding.
The Reason includes, as we have said, both the Faculty
of seeing First Principles, and the Reasoning Faculty by
which we obtain other Principles. The Understanding is
the Faculty of applying Principles however obtained.
The Reason, of which we here speak, is the Speculative
Reason. We shall hereafter have to speak of the Prac-
tical Reason also.
12. The term Intellect is derived from a verb {intel-
ligo) which signifies to understand: but the term itself is
usually so applied as to imply a Faculty which recognizes
Principles explicitly as well as implicitly ; and abstract as
well as applied; and therefore agrees with the Reason
rather than the Understanding ; and the same extent of sig-
nification belongs to the adjective intellectual.
13. Man not only can contemplate external things ;
he can also act upon them and with them. He can gather
the fruits of the earth, and make bread. He can take
such things to himself, as his property, or give them to
another man, as a reward.
The word Action may be applied, in the most general
Ch. I.] THE REASON. 7
manner, to all exercise of the external or internal facul-
ties of man. But we do not always so use the word.
We often distinguish external action from internal thought^
though thought is also a kind of activity. We also often
distinguish actions from words^ as when we say man's
actions contradict his words. Yet in a more general sense,
we include a man's words in his actions. We say that
a man's actions correspond with his words, when he per-
forms what he has promised ; though the performance itself
should be words ; as when he has promised to plead a cause.
14. We direct our thoughts to an action which we
are about to perform : we intend to do it : we make it our
aim: we place it before us, and act with purpose (propo-
situm) : we design it, or mark it out beforehand {designo).
15. Will, or Volition, is the last step of intention,
the first step of action. It is the internal act which leads
to external acts.
An action that proceeds from my will or volition is
my act. But if it do not proceed from my will, it is not
my act, though my limbs may be employed in it; as for
instance, if my hand, moved by another man whose strength
overmasters mine, strikes a blow. In such a case, I am
not a Free Agent. Human Actions suppose the Freedom
of the Agent. In order to act, a man must be so cir-
cumstanced that his volitions take effect on his limbs and
organs, according to the usual constitution of man.
The Will is stimulated to action by certain Springs of
Action, of which we shall afterwards speak.
16. Among the Springs of Action, are Rules or
Laws. There are Laws of Human Action, as well as Laws
of Nature (8). But while the Laws of Nature are asser-
tions only, as ; Mars revolves in an ellipse ; a solar eclipse
will take place at the new moon; the Laws of human
action are commands : as, Steal not ; or, Thou shalt not
8 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
steal : We must be temperate. These imperative Laws of
Human Action, we shall call Rules. Such Rules, when
adjusted with due regard to the Springs of Action, direct
the Will.
17. Actions may lead to events, as causes to effects:
they may have consequences, immediate or remote. To
steal, is an action which may have the gain of a shilling
for its immediate, and whipping for its remote consequence.
An End is a consequence intended, aimed at, purposed,
designed (14). When we act with purpose, we have an
End, to which the action is a Means. To possess the fruit
being my end, I purposely cultivate the plant as the means.
18. The Rules of Action (l6) may command actions
as means to an end : thus : Steal not, that thou be not
whipt. Be temperate, in order to be healthy.
19. We have often a Series of Actions each of
which is a means, towards the next, as an end. We dig
the ground, that we may make the plant to grow; we
make a spade, that we may dig the ground; we take a
branch of a tree, to make a handle for the spade.
20. To discern the consequences of actions; to act
with purpose ; and to consider our actions as means to an
end; are processes which are ascribed to the Reason, as
well as the mental operations which have already been
spoken of (10).
As possessing Reason, man is called rational or reason-
able. But the latter term is often used in a more special
sense; meaning, agreeable to such rules and measures as
man, by the use of his reason, may discover.
21. The Reason, when employed in such processes as
have been noticed already (lO), is the Speculative Reason:
we oppose to this the Practical Reason, which guides us
in applying Rules to our actions, and discerning the conse-
quences of actions (20). The Speculative Reason tends to
Ch. I.] THE REASON. 9
speculative Truth; in which ideas, conceptions, and abstract
propositions are contemplated : the Practical Reason guides
us to truth, so far as it concerns our actions. By the
Practical Reason, we apprehend objects and facts in a
manner conformable to their true relations; and hence, we
discern the true consequences of our actions, though the
relations and the actions are not explicitly contemplated.
The true apprehension of the relations of things is only
implied in the Act of the Will, by which we take such
means as lead to our ends.
22. The ideas, relations, rules, conceptions of ends
and means, and the like, which are implicitly involved in
the exercise of the Practical Reason, may be unfolded^ so
as to be matter of contemplation. In this manner, the
Practical Reason is developed into the Speculative Reason.
Such a developement of the human mind is produced by
the exercise of Thought.
23. Animals, as well as man, conform their actions to
the true relations of objects (21), and perform actions which
look like means to ends (17). Thus, bees build cells in hex-
agonal forms, so as to fill space ; and birds build nests,
so as to shelter themselves and their young. But in the
case of animals, the tendency to action cannot be unfolded
into ideas, and conceptions of ends. Bees have no con-
ceptions of hexagons, separate from their cells. Birds do
not contemplate an end, when they build a nest : for they
build nests in a state of captivity, where there is no end to
be answered. The tendencies to such actions are implanted
in the constitution of the animal, but are not capable of
being unfolded into ideas, as in a rational nature they
are (21). Hence such tendencies are called Instincts^ and
are distinguished from Practical Reason.
24. Instinct, as well as Reason, operates through the
Will, to direct the actions. In both cases, the Will is stimu-
10 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
lated into action by certain Appetites and Desires, which
we shall term Springs of Action.
We use the term Springs of action, rather than Princi-
ples of action, because the term Principles is used equivo-
cally, not only for Operative Principles, which produce action,
but for Express Principles, which assert Propositions.
The Springs of Action of which we have to speak, are
the Motive Powers of man's conscious nature, and might
hence be called Motives. They first put man in motion;
that is, in the state of internal motion which leads to in-
tention and will. But in common language, the term Motive
is rather used to designate the special object of the intention,
than the general desire which impel us to intend. When
a man labours hard for gain, his spring of action being the
desire of having, his Motive is to get money. But he may
do the same thing, his Motive being to support his family,
and then his spring of action is his family affections.
Chapter II.
THE SPKINGS OF HUMAN ACTION.
25. The Springs of Action in man may be enumerated
as follows: The Appetites or Bodily Desires; the Affections;
the Mental Desires ; the Moral Sentiments ; and the Reflex
Sentiments. We* shall consider them in order.
1. The Appetites.
26. The Appetites or Bodily Desires are common to
man and brutes. The strongest and most obvious of them are
the Appetites for Food (Hunger and Thirst), by which the
individual is sustained ; and that by which the species is
continued. These appetites are tendencies towards cer-
Ch.IL] the springs of human action. 11
tain bodily things, and cravings for these things when they
are withheld.
But besides these, there are many other bodily Desires
which may be classed with the Appetites, and which are
powerful springs of action. Such are the desire of rest
after labour, the desire of sleep after long waking, the desire
of warmth and shelter, the desire of air and exercise.
These Desires are Natural Wants ; they are Needs
of man''s nature. Man cannot exist at all, except they are
satisfied in some degree ; and cannot exist in a healthy and
stable condition, except they are satisfied in an adequate
degree.
27. Moreover, by the constitution of man, certain
Pleasures are conjoined with the satisfying of these wants ;
and the Springs of Action, of which we now speak, include
the Desire of these Pleasures. Thus, man has not only
an appetite for food, but a desire of delicious food, and
a Sense of Taste, by which he relishes such food. He has,
in like manner, a pleasure in sweet odours, and a desire
of this pleasure ; and similarly for the other senses.
Man uses various Arts, to satisfy his natural wants, and
to gratify his desires for the pleasures of sense, of which
we have spoken. As such gratifications, through means of
art, become habitual, they also become Wants, and are
termed Artificial Wants. These Artificial Wants, no less
than Natural Wants, are powerful Springs of Action
among men,
2. The Affections.
28. The Afifections are tendencies or cravings directed
towards conscious individuals ; not, like the Desires, tenden-
cies and cravings for bodily objects. The Bodily Desires
tend to things. Affections to Persons.
12 INTRODUCTION. [Book 1
But the Affections are not mere tendencies or cravings,
they are internal Emotions or Feehngs : being directed to
persons, not to things, they mould the thoughts in a way
quite different from what the Appetites do.
29. The two principal affections are Love, and Anger.
The term Love, is sometimes used to describe the Bodily
Desires, as when we talk of a Love of wine, or a Love of the
pleasures of the table. But the more direct and proper
sense of the word, is that in which it denotes an affection
towards a person. A man''s love of his wife and chil-
dren is more properly Love, than his love of wine or of
music.
SO. The most important of the Affections which thus
come under the name of Love are ; — the Love of the mother
and of the father towards the children. Maternal and
Paternal Love ; — the Love of children towards their pa-
rents, Fihal Love; — the Love of brothers and sisters
towards each other. Fraternal Love ; the special and dis-
tinguishing affection of man towards woman, and woman
towards man, which tends to the conjugal union; this is
often expressed by the word Love, without any epithet ;
its natural sequel is Conjugal Love. Also, among the kinds
of Love we must enumerate Friendship, and our Love of
our Companions ; likewise the Affection, so far as it par-
takes of the nature of Love, with which we regard our
fellow-citizens, our fellow-countrymen, our fellow-men.
31. The Affection of Anger also appears in various
forms. Anger comes into play against any one who as-
saults or threatens us, in man as in other animals ; and
this Affection, giving vehemence and rapidity to our actions,
aids us in self-defence. Anger in this form, is the natural
repulsion and return to any harm which falls upon us
or approaches us, and is called Besmtment, as being the
Ch. II.] THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION. 13
m
sentiment which is a natural re-action to the hostile sen-
timent of another person. JgmA
32. The Affections conspire with the JTesires. We
are angry with those who take from us, or prevent our
obtaining, what we desire. We love tho^e;^who aid us in
gratifying our desires. These affections are modified ac-
cording to the circumstances under which they thus arise,
and receive special names. Men feel Gratitude towards
those who have conferred benefits upon them. As they
feel sudden Besentment against a sudden attack, they
feel Permanent Anger against those who have inflicted or
endeavour to inflict pain or harm upon them, or whose
desires come in conflict with theirs. When this feeling is
no longer a burst of emotion, but a settled and steady
feeling, it is Hatred, Malice^ or Ill-will. When malice
prompts men to return pain and harm to those from whom
they have received pain or harm, it is Revenge.
All these Affections belong to the irascible part of man's
nature.
83. The Affections, as has been said, are directed
towards persons. In speaking of them, we suppose him
who feels them to live as a man among men. He is in
Society; and his desires and affections are excited, deter-
mined, and modified by the circumstances of his social
condition. These circumstances may be various, both for
the individual, and for the general body of the society.
There are various Forms and Stages of Society. We may
conceive, as the original form, a society in which there are
no Affections except the Family Affection, and no Appetites
except the Natural Wants. But as the Society becomes more
numerous, and Artificial Wants increase, many other kinds
of relation and dependence grow up among the individuals
who compose the society, and the Affections are modified
by these new conditions.
14 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
34. In speaking of other Desires and Affections which
we still have to notice, we continue to suppose man exist-
ing in society : and we shall have to consider mainly, at
first, those Desires and Affections which have reference to
the intercouse of a man with other men.
3. The Mental Desires.
35. The Appetites are of the nature of Instincts,
in that they tend to their objects, without their objects
being present to the mind as abstract notions. But yet
when we bring into view abstract notions, the bodily de-
sires may be described as tendencies to such abstractions.
Thus Hunger and Thirst may be described as the Desire
of Food: which is, as we have seen (3), an abstract
notion. All the Bodily Desires may be included in the
Desire of Pleasure^ which is a still more abstract notion.
As the developement of the human mind goes on by
the exercise of thought (22), the objects of desire are all
presented to the mind as abstract notions, more or less
general. In this way, the Bodily Desires may be presented
in a general and abstract form. But besides these general
and abstract forms of Bodily Desires, there are other Desires
which cannot be conceived in any other way than with
reference to abstractions ; as the Desire of Fame, the De-
sire of Knowledge. These we shall call Mental Desires.
36. We now speak of those Springs of Action which
result from the operations of the mind. Among such
operations, besides those which have been referred to, we
must place Memory^ by which past facts and objects are
recalled to the mind, and subjected to its view, in the same
manner as if they were present; and Imagination^ by
which the distant, the absent, and the future is represented
to the mind, under combinations and aspects imposed by
the mind itself. These faculties fill up the abstract out-
Ch. II.] THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION. 15
line of the objects of desire, with particulars and images,
by means of which they obtain a far stronger hold upon
the purpose and will, than the mere abstraction of itself
could have. By their means, the desire of a general and
abstract object impels us, not merely with the force residing
in the ultimate generality, but with a power belonging to
the whole of the successive steps of generalization, from
objects of sense upwards.
87. Every object of desire as contemplated by the
mind may be described by a general term as a Good.
Quicquid petitur petitur sub specie boni. This is the
most general aspect of the objects of desire. Opposed to
the objects of desire, are objects which we shun, as Pain,
Constraint, and the Want or Privation of objects of desire.
These are Evils. The mind, furnished with the stores of
Memory, and exercising the powers of Imagination, can
contemplate remotely future, as well as immediate gra-
tifications, arising from the attainment of objects of desire.
Such objects, contemplated as future, are wished for ; if the
attainment of our wishes, is deemed probable, they are
hoped. The infliction of future evils, if probable, is feared.
Evil so contemplated is Danger. Hope and Fear are
springs of action no less powerful than present Desire.
38. We must now consider the particular Mental
Desires separately.
In order that we may distinguish and enumerate the
more important and more elementary of the Mental Desires,
we may remark, that Desires, operating merely as tenden-
cies to action, and not unfolded by the exercise of thought,
so as to become tendencies to mental objects, (abstrac-
tions,) are like Instincts (23). Hence we may consider
those Desires as distinct, which look like the developements
of different Instincts. The Instincts of animals are a
kind of image of the Desires of man ; and we may con-
16 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
sider those as so many distinct Elementary Desires, of
which we find so many images in the Instincts of animals.
And the Desires of which w^e shall speak, being also the
most universal and most powerful of those by which man's
actions are determined, are those which we have especially
to notice, among the Springs of Action.
The Mental Desires of which we shall first speak, are the
Desire of Safety, the Desire of Having, the Desire of So-
ciety, the Desire of Superiority, the Desire of Knowledge.
39. The Desire of Safety. All the bodily desires
may be included under one general expression, as the Desire
of Personal Wellbeing, or the like. But in order to frame
rules of action, we must refer to something more limited
and definite than this. Moreover, in our view of the
springs of human action, we are to suppose man to be in
Society, and to have his desires determined by the cir-
cumstances of his social condition (34).
Now if the desires alone be taken into our account, a
man living among men is liable to have his desires frus-
strated, and to suffer harm, pain, wounds, and even death,
through the operation of the conflicting desires of other
men. We can conceive a condition in which men are in
a perpetual state of war and violence, like hostile beasts
of prey. But the desires of man, when his irascible affec-
tions are not inflamed by conflict, tend towards a state
of things the opposite of this. He desires peace and tran-
quillity. He hopes for these ; he fears their opposites. These
desires, hopes, and fears are so strong, that man's life is
scarcely tolerable if they are not in some degree gratified.
Man requires, as indispensable to his human condition, a re-
moval of his fears of violence and harm to his body, arising
from the conflicting desires of other men. This feeling we
may call the Desire of Safety. It is one of the strongest,
most universal and most constant of all the desires of men.
Ch. II.] THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION. 17
40. We find Instincts of animals which correspond
to this Spring of action in man. Such an Instinct is vari-
ously described, as the Instinct of Self-defence, or of Self-
preservation, the instinctive Love of Life, and the like.
This Instinct stimulates all the faculties of animals in
the most energetic manner ; is able to master their strong-
est appetites and affections ; and often calls into play an
almost incredible sagacity and strength.
41. In man, the instinctive love of life, the instinc-
tive desire to avoid privation, pain, and constraint, are
expanded and unfolded by memory, reflection and foresight.
Life, ease, comfort, peace, tranquillity, become objects to
which man tends with conscious thought, as well as from
blind impulse. Nor can he be at all satisfied, except he
can look forwards to the future, as well as the present
enjoyment, of these advantages. He must not only have
present Safety, but Security for the future. When, how-
ever, we speak of the Desire of Safety, as one of the
principal elementary Mental Desires, we may understand
Security to be included in the expression.
42. We have mentioned Constraint as one of the
things which men desire to avoid. Even when unaccompa-
nied with pain or danger, extraneous force, compelling or
restraining our motions, is felt as a grievous infliction. We
cannot act so as to make our actions our own, without
acting freely; and the Desire of Free Agency, which we
naturally feel, is confirmed and made more urgent, by our
perceiving that such freedom is necessary to all properly
human action. Hence the Love of Liberty is one of the
powerful Springs of human action ; but so far as it is of an
elementary nature, it is included in the Desire of Safety
and Security from bodily harm of which we now speak.
43. The Safety, Security and Liberty of the body,
which man thus requires, as conditions without which he
VOL. I. C
18 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
cannot exist satisfactorily, are easily endangered by the
angry affections of other men, stimulated by their desires,
conflicting with his. By such conflicts Malice is produced
(32) ; and malicious intention shows itself in deeds of force
and violence, or in other kinds of attempts upon the safety
and liberty of the man. Others become his Enemies, and
he becomes theirs. And the natural Enmity, as well as the
Society of mankind, modifies their other desires.
44. The Desire of Hamng. The Desire of Having,
so far as it refers to the means of subsistence, is a develope-
ment of the instinct of self-preservation, which impels animals
to seek food and other necessaries of life. But even in
animals, we see a desire of having which goes beyond this ;
for some animals have an instinct of storing; and this in-
stinct is very different from mere desire of food. It often
controls present appetite, and leads the animal to hide
what it cannot use as food, as well as what it can. In man
the Desire of Having is apparent in all stages of Society
{SS), Food, clothing, weapons, tools, ornaments, houses,
carriages, ships, are universally objects of his desire. In
the first place, indeed, man desires these things as a means
of gratifying his natural appetites, or his affections ; of sup-
porting and sheltering his family ; of repelling and master-
ing his enemies. But the desire to possess such objects,
as it exists in man, goes beyond the measure of their obvious
use. He delights to consider them as connected with him-
self in a permanent and exclusive manner, and to look upon
them as Us^ as his own. The things which he thus looks
upon as his own, he is disturbed at the prospect of losing,
and is angry at any one who attempts to take them from him.
Nor can he be at ease in his thoughts, or act steadily and
tranquilly, except he be allowed to possess in quiet and
security what he thus has as his. He needs to hold it as
his Property.
Ch. II.] THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION. 19
45. The objects to which the desire of possessing
applies are called Things, as contrasted with Persons. In
considering the rules of human action, Things are contem-
plated as morally passive, the objects of possession and
use ; capable only of being given, received, acted with or
on : Persons are active, or capable of action ; and are con-
sidered as conscious, inteUigent, intentional agents.
Things, as objects of possession, are contemplated under
various aspects of generality and abstraction. In a general
way, they are termed Possessions, Wealth, Riches. There is
one particular kind of Possession which is used in transfer-
ring aU other kinds, and which hence measures and repre-
sents all other kinds. This is Money, which most com-
monly has the form of copper, silver, or gold, and which is
especially called Riches.
46. Wealth or Property includes all objects which
are subservient to the satisfaction of our wants ; and thus the
desire which regards property is strengthened by the pro-
gress of Artificial Wants (32). Again, most of the relations
of society imply some intercourse with regard to property,
some giving and receiving. The progress of society, with
the extension and multiplication of these social relations, give
additional operation to property, and increase its hold on
men's minds. And thus, in a society in which artificial
wants and social relations are extended and multiplied,
still more than in more simple states of society, there
can be no tranquillity, peace, or comfort, except man can
possess in security and quiet that which he regards as his
Property.
Without Property, and the recognition of Property in
Society, even man's free agency cannot exist. If another
may at any moment take from me my food, my clothing, my
tools, I can no longer, with any confidence or steadiness
labour, or travel, or reckon upon being able to live from
c2
20 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
day to day. In order to act, I must act on, or with
things ; and I must for that purpose have secure property
in things.
47. The Desire of Society appears in man in two
very conspicuous forms ; — the Desire of Family Society and
the Desire of Civil Society. These may be treated of as
elementary desires ; we have images of them in the instincts
of animals ; — of the former, in pairing animals, of the latter,
in gregarious animals.
That man has a Desire of Family Society, in addition to
his mere bodily desires, is plain. In the rudest tribes, the
man and his wife are bound together by this desire. They
wish for and seek habitual companionship and help, not
merely occasional pleasure. The woman can hardly subsist
through the time of child-bearing, or the child be supported,
without the existence of the ties of family. When the
family circle is completed by the addition of children, this
desire of companionship is awakened and gratified in a wider
sphere. The desires which first lead to the existence of
the Family are refined, as well as extended, by the existence
of the Family. A desire of a general sympathy among
the members of the Family, purifies and elevates the opera-
ration of the mere bodily desires. There are added to the
gratification of the desires, immeasureable new pleasures
growing out of the ofl&ces of mutual love to which the family
gives occasion.
These gratifications are so congenial to the nature of
man, so universally and constantly sought, so uneasily and
impatiently dispensed with, that no form of man's existence
can be tolerable or stable in which men in general are not
able to enjoy or to hope for them. There can be no peace,
comfort, tranquillity, or order in a state of society in which
there are not permanent conjugal unions.
The existence of permanent marriages is requisite, as
Ch. II.] THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION. 21
has been said, for the sustentation of the mother and the
child during its earliest age. It is requisite no less for the
instruction of the child in the use of language, in the direc-
tion of its actions by rules, and in the other manifestations
of a social and rational human nature. And thus the exist-
ence of marriage is requisite not only to continue the race of
mankind, but also to transmit from generation to generation
the social and rational character of man. And this neces-
sity is perceived by man, when his reflection is called into
play; and thus the Regard for Marriage which men feel is
confirmed, and the Desire of Family Society strengthened
in its general influence upon man.
48. The Desire of Civil Society also is an important
spring of action in the nature of man. The other desires
which we have mentioned, the desire of safety, and the
desire of property, may be supposed to give rise to a
desire of civil society, as of a means by which such objects
may be secured. But there appears to exist in man a De-
sire of Society of a more unconscious and elementary kind ;
of which, as has been said, we have an image in the instincts
of gregarious animals. Man also is a gregarious, or more
properly, a social animal. He is nowhere found, nor can
he exist, in any other state than in Society, of some form
or other. Indeed, the same conditions of his being which
make him necessarily exist as a member of a family, make
him also, after a few generations, necessarily exist as a
member of a family in a larger sense ; of a tribe, a clan,
a nation. And though, in cases in which the free agency
of the individual comes into play, these ties of family
may be loosened or broken ; man still only passes from
one form of society to another, and his state is ever social.
The existence of a language is, of itself, undeniable evidence
of a recognized society among those who have this bond
of union : for those who use the same language have common
22 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
classifications of things and action, common generalizations
and abstractions ; which imply, in a great degree, common
judgments and common rules of action. Society, bound
together by such ties, is a Community.
Men, connected by this bond, have a pleasure in their
mutual society. They are pleased with the companionship
and intercourse which take place at the social board,
in the street, the market, the council-room. Men desire
to act, and are fitted to act, in common ; declaring and
enforcing rules by which the conduct of all shall be
governed : they thus act as governors, legislators, judges,
subjects, citizens. Without such community of action, and
such common rules really enforced, there can be no tolerable
comfort, peace, or order. Without civil society, man cannot
act as man.
49. The Mental Desires which we have mentioned,
include the Appetites and Affections, and may take the
place of them in some of our future reasonings. The De-
sire of Personal Safety, and the Desire of Having, include
the Desires of all bodily objects requisite for the support,
ease and comfort of the individual. The Desire of Family
Society includes the Love, of Wife, Parents, Children,
Brothers, Sisters, and the like. The affection of Anger
is an attendant upon all our Desires ; for we are angry
with those who interfere with our Desires; angry with
those who threaten our Safety, our Property, or our Family
enjoyments.
50. There is another Spring of Action intimately
connected with the existence of society, and in some measure
implied in what has been said ; but which we must also
speak of separately : I mean, the Need of a Mutual Under-
standing among men. I speak of this as a Need, rather than
a Desire; for Mutual Understanding is rather a necessity
of man's condition, than an object of his conscious desire.
Ch. IL] the springs of human action. 23
We see this necessity even in animals, especially in those which
are gregarious. In their associated condition, they derive
help and advantage from one another : and many of them,
especially those that live, travel or hunt in companies, are
seen to reckon upon each other's actions with great pre-
cision and confidence. In societies of men, this mutual
aid and mutual reliance are no less necessary than among
beavers or bees. But in man, this aid and reliance are
not the work of mere Instinct. There must be a Mutual
Understanding by which men learn to anticipate and to
depend upon the actions of each other. This mutual
understanding presupposes that man has the power of
determining his future actions ; and that he has the power
of making other men aware of his determination. It pre-
supposes Purpose as its matter (14), and Language as its
Instrument (4). The verb to understand^ as has been said
(11), has especial reference to the use of language.
When we have determined a future action by intention
or settled purpose, we communicate the intention to another
person who is concerned in the result, by a Promise. The
person to whom my promise is made, (the Promisee^) under-
stands my purpose, and is led to reckon in his actions
upon my purposed action; and I understand him to re-
gulate his actions by this reckoning.
51. A large part of the actions which take place
among men, are regulated by their mutual understanding,
established by promises, or in some other way. In most
forms of society, each person depends for food, for clothing,
for shelter, for safety, for comfort, for enjoyment, or for
the greater part of these, upon a mutual understanding
with other men. There is a mutual dependence, the result
of a mutual understanding.
One of the ways in which this result is carried into effect
is, by the establishment of different employments and occu-
24 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
pations, businesses and offices, among different classes of men.
One man employs himself solely in preparing food for men ;
others, in preparing clothing ; and again ; one, in preparing
clothing for the feet ; another, clothing for the body. Again,
one man's business is to protect the other from foreign foes ;
he is a soldier : another's occupation is to decide disputes
which occur within the society ; he is a judge. Persons
are placed in such situations by general understanding,
express or implied; and each man, in his actions, reckons
upon the others discharging their offices according to their
respective trades and professions. This mutual understand-
ing is a universal bond, which could not be removed without
the community falling to pieces ; it is force of cohesion,
permeating the structure of society, so that if this force were
to cease to act, the whole mass would crumble into dust.
We therefore place this Need of a Mutual Understanding
among the principal springs of human action.
52. The Desire of Superiority may be placed among
the elementary Desires, since it is seen to exist as an instinct
in many of the bolder animals, manifesting itself in the
exertions which they make in their conflicts with one an-
other. In such cases, this desire is often mixt up with
the instinct of self-defence and the impulses of anger, as in
the combats of pugnacious animals ; but in racing and hunt-
ing, we see, in dogs and horses, a desire of superiority,
showing itself as a distinct spring of action ; and the like
may be observed in other similar cases.
In man, this desire of superiority appears on a wider
scale, the subjects of comparison being vastly more numerous
and complicated. A man desires to know himself more
swift, more strong, more skilful than another; hence the
contests of the palestra, and even wanton combats for life
or death. A man desires to be more wealthy than his
neighbours; and hence accumulates riches by labour, agri-
Ch. II.] THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION. 25
culture, trade or traffic. But man not only wishes to
surpass, but to guide and control other men. He wishes
that they should obey when he commands. He has a Desire
of Power. To this object, strength and skill and riches
may all be as means to ends. The desire of being superior
as regards those circumstances, may be the desire of being
more powerful than others, with whom we compare ourselves.
53. This desire of being superior to others in the
advantages which we possess, and especially in power, is
very general among men. Most men would wish to be
strong, skilful, rich ; but especially to be powerful, so that
other men should conform to their will and do their bidding.
But all cannot be superior to others. If each desire to be
the strongest, there can be no repose or order, except these
conflicting desires balance each other. All cannot be superior;
but none need be inferior, for all may be equal. The uni-
versal desire of superiority cannot be gratified ; but if it be
transformed into a universal impatience of inferiority, it
may become the regulating force of society.
When we say that none need be inferior, for all may be
equal ; it is not meant that all may have equal shares of the
objects of human desires ; but that each may equally have
what is his, not holding it at the will or command of another
man. The equality of which we speak, is the establishment
of equal rules, not the establishment of a rule of equal
division. Such a rule as the latter, would be inconsistent
with the nature of property: for that which is a man's
property, is his with its increase, and passes from him if
he give or destroy it ; so that the shares of different in-
dividuals, even if equal at first, cannot continue equal. But
Equal Rules may be established; and the impatience of
inferiority, which is natural to man, will not be satisfied
with any rules which have not the aspect of equality. It is
true, that this equality of rules may be modified by external
26 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
circumstances ; as we have just seen, that the equality of
shares must be disturbed by passing changes : but still,
the desires of men constantly point to equal rules, as
those which alone are tolerable ; and there can be no per-
manent tranquillity in a community, except under the sway
of rules, which are equal for all ; so far as the nature of
man, and the previous condition of the society, allow of rules
at the same time steady and equal. And thus, the Desire
of Superiority, transformed into the Desire of Equal Rules,
is one of the powerful springs of human action.
54. The Desire of Knowledge may also be enume-
rated among the elementary desires. Of this Desire, also,
we see a sort of image, in the curiosity and prying pro-
pensities of many animals: but in them, these propensities
are generally subservient to the actions by which sustenance
is obtained or danger avoided.
In man, the Desire of Knowledge is identical with the
desire or propensity of the mind to unfold itself (22) ;
and with the desire which we have to contemplate our
own conceptions, as distinctly and connectedly as is possible
for us. Man, by his rational nature, is constantly impelled
to think, to reason, to classify, to trace causes and con-
sequences ; to do this, is to know ; and to continue to do
it, is to go on from knowledge to knowledge.
55. Knowledge influences human actions, not so
much by the exertions which it impels men to make for
the purpose of acquiring knowledge, as by the different
aspects which it gives to the other objects of desire. An
ugly pebble may be a most desirable possession, if we
know how to extract from it a cure for disease. The
desire to possess a particular piece of ground, may become
very vehement, by our knowing that it is the heritage left
us by our ancestors. Our impatience of the constraint
which a body of men impose upon us, may be much in-
Ch. II.] THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION. 27
flamed, by our knowing that such constraint is inconsistent
with ancient maxims of law, or with rules of reason, or
with the true destination of man. In such cases, our de-
sires and actions are influenced by our knowledge, that is,
by our Beason. Our knowledge, thus considered as a Spring
of Action, is identical with the Reason, by which we contem-
plate abstract and general conceptions, and thus determine
for ourselves rules and ends of action. This is a task
which it is our object to perform in the present work.
4. The Moral Sentiments.
56. That which is conformable to Rules of Action
is right. What we mean by right, will be considered more
particularly afterwards : but before we proceed to that
question, we may observe, that our judgment of actions
as right, or as wrong., the opposite of right, is accompanied
with certain Affections, or Sentiments. That which is right
we approve ; that which is wrong we disapprove. What is
wrong, naturally excites a modification of Anger, which we
term Indignation. Wrong done to ourselves excites instant
Resentment (31) ; but our Anger against wrong as wrong,
when we do not consider it as affecting ourselves, is Indig-
nation. And in like manner, what is right is the natural
object of a kind of love, namely, of Esteem. These Affec-
tions, Approbation and Disapprobation, Indignation and
Esteem, are the Moral Sentiments.
Though the Moral Sentiments thus partake of the nature
of the Affections, they differ in this respect, that they
have for their objects in the first instance, not Persons,
but Actions. We love a friend; we approve his acts of
benevolence. We are angry with a man who picks our
pocket, and disapprove of his act.
But the Sentiment is transferred from the action to the
agent; and thus the Moral Sentiments combine with and
28 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
modify our other affections, and are powerful Springs of
Action. We befriend a man, or we choose him for our
friend, and do him good offices, not because he is our
brother, but because we approve his actions, and therefore
love him, and would treat him as our brother. We help
to inflict pain or even death upon a man, not because he
has done us especially any harm, but because he has com-
mitted an act of which we strongly disapprove, and which
excites a strong indignation against him.
There are Sentiments which partake of the nature of
Esteem or Approval, but imply no settled Moral Rule,
and include feelings of surprise and conscious inferiority
in ourselves. Such are Admiration^ and Awe.
5. Reflex Sentiments.
57. Besides the Moral Sentiments which impel us
to act in one way or another to other men, accordingly
as we approve or disapprove their actions, there are also
certain Sentiments which have a reference to their judg-
ment of us and their affections towards us; and these
Sentiments are also Springs of Action. These we shall
term Reflex Sentiments^ for they imply Reflex Thought. In
order to regard another man's Sentiments concerning me,
I must form a conception of his Sentiments as the image
of my own ; and of myself as the object of those sentiments.
58. The Desire of leing loved is one of these Reflex
Sentiments. In minds so far unfolded by thought as to
be capable of reflex processes, this Sentiment commonly
accompanies love; but it belongs to a stage of mental
developement higher than mere elementary love. Yet we
see traces of it in the behaviour of those animals which
seek to be fondled and caressed.
59. The Desire of Esteem is a powerful and exten-
sive Spring of Action. We desire that other men should
Ch. II.] THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION. 29
think that what we do is right. Hence, this desire as-
sumes some generally established Rule of what is right.
Without ourselves esteeming what is right, we cannot con-
ceive Esteem, and thus truly cannot feel the Desire of
Esteem. But in this case, we may still feel the Desire of
Admiration^ the Desire of Honour, the Low of Fame, the Love
of Glory, and the like Reflex Sentiments ; which do not imply
our own approval of the Rule by which others judge. Yet
these are very powerful Springs of action in many men.
60. Finally, there is a Reflex Sentiment which we
may term the Desire of our own Approval. This implies
that we have adopted a Rule according to which we judge
Actions to be right, and that we desire to conform our
own actions to this Rule. Such a Desire is a Spring of
Action, which must ' balance all others, in order that the
Rule may be really valid. What the nature of such a
Rule must be, we shall have to consider : in the mean time,
we may remark, that the Desire of our own Approval, of
which we now speak, is included in the meaning of the term
Conscience.
Among the Reflex Sentiments, we may place all those
Springs of Action which are designated by some compound
of the word Self; as Self-Admiration, Self- Love. These,
for the most part, are elementary Springs of Action, com-
bined and modified by reflex habits of thought. Thus Self-
Love may be understood to include the Desire of Property,
of Bodily comfort, and the like, along with a distinct con-
sideration of One"'s Self. In this view, Self- Love is rather
a habit of regarding and providing for the elementary De-
sires, than a distinct Desire. It is sometimes spoken of as
a General Regard for our own Good ; and as we have
said (37), the term Good is so used as to include the
objects of all the elementary Desires.
30 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
6. General Bemarh.
61. It appears by what has been said, that the
different kinds of Springs of Action are distinguished by
the nature of their objects. The Appetites have for their
objects, Things ; the Affections, Persons ; the Mental
Desires have Abstractions ; the Moral Sentiments, Actions ;
and the Reflex Sentiments have for their objects the thoughts
of other persons, or our own, about ourselves.
The Springs of Action which we have enumerated
do not operate upon man as Forces operate upon inert
Matter. They all operate through the Will. A man is
moved by these Springs, when he will do that to which they
impel him. Different springs of action may operate at the
same time, and with opposite tendencies. The Desire of
Safety would keep the sailor or soldier at home, but the
Desire of Gain, or the Love of Glory, sends him to the
sea or to the war. In either case, it is through his Will
that the Desires act. He stays at home because he wills to
do so ; or he goes forth because he wills it.
62. In determining his actions, man is seldom impelled
merely by the most elementary Springs of Action, bodily
desire and affection. By the progress of thought in ever}-
man, bodily desires are combined with mental desires, and
elementary affections with moral sentiments.
The men who most seek the pleasures of eating, seek
at the same time the pleasures of society. The most blind
maternal love generally takes the form of approving, as well
as loving, its darling. And thus, in man, the Desires and
Affections are unfolded by thought, so as to involve abstract
conceptions and the notion of a Rule. The Reason, to which
such steps belong (10) is at work, in all the actions which
the Springs of Action produce.
Ch. [L] the springs of human action. 31
63. Reason is conceived as being in all persons the
same in its nature. Different men desire different things,
love different persons ; but that which is seen to be true
in virtue of the Reason, is true for all men alike. The
influence of desire or affection may be mistaken for the
result of Reason, for man is liable to errour (5) ; and so
far, the decisions of Reason may be different in different
men. But such decisions are not all really reasonable. So
far as men decide conformably to Reason, they decide alike.
His Appetites, and Desires, and Affections are peculiar to
each man ; but his Reason is a common attribute of all man-
kind : and each man has his Reason in virtue of his par-
ticipation of this common faculty of discerning truth and
falsehood.
But though each man"'s Desires and Affections belong spe-
cially to himself, while Reason is a common faculty in all
men ; we consider our Reason as being oursehes, rather than
our Desires and Affections. We speak of Desire, Love,
Anger, as mastering us, or of ourselves as controlling them.
If we decide to prefer some remote and abstract good to
immediate pleasures ; or to conform to a rule which brings us
present pain ; which decision implies the exercise of Reason ;
we more particularly consider such acts as our own acts. Such
acts are deemed especially the result, not of the impulse of
our desires, but of our own volition.
If we ask why we thus identify ourselves with our rational
part, rather than with our desires and affections ; we reply,
that it is because the Reason alone is capable of that reflex
act by which we become conscious of ourselves. To have so
much thought as to distinguish between ourselves and our
springs of action, is to be rational ; and the Reason which
can make this distinction, necessarily places herself on one
side, and the Desires, which make no such distinction, on
the other. It is by the Reason that we are conscious ;
32 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
and hence we place the seat of our consciousness in the
Reason.
64. The habit of identifying ourselves with our Rea-
son, and not with our Desires, is further indicated by the
term Passion, which is appHed to Desire and Affection when
uncontrolled by Reason; as if man in such cases were
passive, and merely acted on; and as if he were really
active, only when he acts in conformity with his Reason.
Thus, we speak, of a man being in a Passion, meaning an
uncontrolled fit of anger ; and having a Passion for an ob-
ject, meaning an uncontrolled desire.
Still, it is to be recollected that man, under the influence
of such Passions, is not really passive. When he acts under
such influences, he adopts the suggestions of Desire or Affec-
tion, and rejects the control of Reason ; but this is what
he does in all violations of reasonable Rules. Passion does
not prevent a man's knowing that there is a Rule, and that
he is violating it. To say that Passion is irresistible, is to
annihilate Reason, and to exclude the most essential con-
dition of Human Action.
Chapter III.
MORAL RULES EXIST NECESSARILY.
65. In enumerating and describing, as we have done,
certain Desires, as among the most powerful Springs of
human action, we have stated (39) that man's life is scarcely
tolerable if these Desires are not in some degree gratified :
that man cannot be at all satisfied without some security in
such gratification (41); that without property, which gratifies
one of these Desires, man's free agency cannot exist (45) ;
that without marriage, which gratifies another, there can be
Ch. III.] MORAL RULES EXIST NECESSARILY. sS
no peace, comfort, tranquillity, or order (47). And the same
may be said of all those Springs of Action which we enu-
merated as Mental Desires. Without some provision for
the tranquil gratification of these Desires, Society is dis-
turbed, unbalanced, painful. The gratification of such De-
sires must be a part of the Order of the Society. There must
be Rules which direct the course and limits of such gratifi-
cation. Such Rules are necessary for the Peace of Society.
66. Man acts as man, when he acts under the in-
fluence of Reason, and Reason directs us to Rules. Rules
of action are necessary, therefore, for the action of man as
man. We cannot conceive man as man, without conceiving
him as subject to Rules, and making part of an Order in
which Rules prevail. He must act freely, therefore he must
have Security. He must act by means of external things,
therefore he must have Property. He must act with refer-
ence to other men's intentions, therefore there must be
Contracts. He must act with reference to Parents, Wife
and Children, therefore there must be Families. We can-
not conceive man divested of free agency, of relation to
external things, of communication with other men, of the
ties of blood and affection. We must therefore conceive
him as existing in Security, with Property, Contracts and
Family, subsisting about him ; existing, therefore, under
Rules by which these things are established ; and thus, such
Rules are necessary for the action of man as man.
Such Rules being established, that which is conformable
to them is ripkt, and the Rules are moral Rules. We must
afterwards endeavour to establish such Rules in detail;
but in the mean time, we have shown in general that the
establishment of Moral Rules is necessary for the peace of
society and for the action of man as man.
67. That Rules, determined by the Reason to be
reasonable, are the necessary guides of Desire and Af-
VOL. I. D
34 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
fection, is also apparent from a consideration of the nature
of Reason. We cannot help recognizing, in the Reason,
an authority to repress and resist Appetite and Desire, when
the two come in conflict. The Reason is the light of
man's constitution, which reveals to him himself, and enables
him to choose between different objects. And this light,
by being light, is fit to guide us; as in the world with-
out, so in the world within us, the light, by guiding us,
proves that it is its office to guide us.
68. It has been said by some that the Rules of
human action, by which men in Society are governed, are
the results of mutual Fear, by which the conflicting De-
sires of different persons are balanced. But this is not a
true view of the subject. Mutual fear and conflicting de-
sires prevail among wild animals; but yet animals have not
among them Moral Rules of action. Brute beasts cannot
properly be said to steal from one another, to wrong one
another, to be morally guilty. They cannot transgress a
Moral Rule; because they have not Reason, by which they
may conceive a Moral Rule. Mutual fear and conflicting
desire cannot give rise to a Rule, when there does not
exist the Reason ; which, presenting the objects of desire
and fear under the general and abstract forms of concep-
tions, must supply the materials for a Rule. It is therefore
not Fear and Desire, but Reason, which is the source of
Moral Rules.
69. Moral Rules balance the repulsive tendencies of
the Desires. The Desires, so far as they are desires of
external objects in each person, tend to disunite men ; for
they make each person the sole centre of his own springs
of action. Further, they tend to bring men into conflict
and opposition ; for two men desire the same field, the same
house, the same wife. But there are also faculties which
draw men together, as the Affections of Family and of
Ch. III.] MORAL RULES EXIST NECESSARILY. 35
Civil Society. The mutual understanding of men, expressed
in Language, enables them and leads them to act in
union, and to help each other. The objects of desire
being assigned by general Rules, the repulsive influences
are controlled, the attractive are confirmed in their effect.
General Rules being established, the Desires are sources,
not of opposition, but of agreement. All men sympathise
with my Desire to keep my own; all men approve of
General Rules, and of those who conform to them. The
Reflex Sentiments strengthen this mutual attraction. The
Desire to be approved, and the Desire to be esteemed, draw
men together. These Sentiments, resulting from settled
Moral Rules, remove discord, and establish concord. They
tend to make men unanimous.
And, on the other hand, such Rules as tend to produce
this effect, agree with that character of Moral Rules, which
we have shown to belong to them. Such Rules, with regard
to the Affections and Desires, as tend to control the re-
pulsive, and confirm the attractive forces which operate in
human Society ; such as tend to unite men, to establish
concord, unanimity, sympathy; agree with that which is
the general character of Moral Rules. And as there is a
Universal Human Reason, common to all men, so far as it
is unfolded, and to which each man's reason must conform ;
so is there a Universal Moral Sympathy, common to all men,
so far as it is unfolded ; a Conscience of mankind, to which
each man's Conscience must conform.
But in order to arrive at such Moral Rules as we have
spoken of, we must proceed by a series of several steps,
and upon this course we now enter.
d2
36
Chapter IV.
RIGHT, ADJECTIVE, AND RIGHT,
SUBSTANTIVE.
70. In order to establish Rules of human action
we must consider more exactly the import of the terms
right and wrong ^ which we have already used i^^Q)*
It has been said (18) that Rules of Action may direct
actions to be performed as means to an end. Examples
of such Rules are these : Be temperate, in order to be
healthy : Labour, that you may gain money.
The adjective rigJit signifies conformable to Rule; and is
used with reference to the object of the Rule. To be
temperate, is the right way to be healthy. To labour, is
the right way to gain money.
In these cases the adjective right is used relatively ; that
is, relatively to the object of the Rule.
71. It has been said also (19) that we may have a
Series of actions, each of which is a means to the next as
an end. A man labours, that he may gain money : he
wishes to gain money, that he may educate his children :
he would educate his children, in order that they may pro-
sper in the world.
In these cases, the inferior ends lead to higher ones, and
derive their value from these. Each subordinate action
aims at the end next above it, as a good (37). In the
series of actions just mentioned, a man's gain is regarded
as a good, because it tends to the education of his children.
Education is considered as valuable, because it tends ta
prosperity.
And the Rules which prescribe such actions, derive their
imperative force and validity, each from the Rule above
it. The Superior Rule supplies a reason for the inferior.
Ch. IV.] RIGHT, AND RIGHTS. S7
The Rule, to labour, derives its force from the Rule, to seek
gain: this Rule receives its force (in the case we are con-
sidering) from the Rule, to educate our children : this again
has for its reason, to forward the prosperity/ of our children.
. 72. But besides such Subordinate Rules, there must
be a Supreme Rule of Human Action. For the succession
of Means and Ends, with the corresponding series of subor-
dinate and superior Rules, must somewhere terminate. And
the inferior ends would have no value, as leading to the
highest, except the highest end had a value of its own.
The superior Rules could give no validity to the subordi-
nate ones, except there were a Supreme Rule from which
the validity of all of these were ultimately derived. There-
fore there is a Supreme Rule of Human Action. That
which is conformable to the Supreme Rule, is absolutely
right; and is called right, simply, without relation to a
special end. The opposite to right is wrong.
73. The Supreme Rule of Human Action may also
be described by its Object.
The Object of the Supreme Rule of human action is
spoken of as the True End of human action^ the Ultimate or
Supreme Good, the Summum Bonum.
74. There are various other ways of expressing the
opposition of right and wrong, and the Supreme Rule of
Human Action ; namely, the Rule to do what is right and
to abstain from doing what is wrong. We say, we ought
to do what is right; we ought not to do what is wrong.
To do what is right is our Dutg ; to do what is wrong is
a transgression, an offense; a violation of our Duty.
75. The question Why? respecting human actions,
demands a reason, which may be given by a reference from
a lower Rule to a higher. Why ought I to be frugal or
industrious ? In order that I may not want a maintenance.
Why must I avoid want? Because I must seek to act
^8 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
independently. Why should I act independently? that I
may act rightly.
Hence, with regard to the Supreme Rule, the question
Why ? admits of no further answer. Why must I do what
is right ? Because it is right. Why should I do what I
ought ? Because I ought. The Supreme Rule supplies a rea-
son for that which it commands, by hein^ the Supreme Rule.
76. Rightness and Wrongness are, as we have already
said, the Moral qualities of actions. The Rules which, in
subordination to the Supreme Rule, determine what is right
and what is wrong, are Moral Rules. The doctrine which
treats of actions as right and wrong, is Morality,
77. Since, as we have seen (58), Moral Rules are
necessary, according to the constitution of human nature;
Man is necessarily a Moral Being.
78. We have now to establish Moral Rules ; and for
that purpose, we must consider in what kind of Terms they
must be expressed. Among those Terms must be Bights ;
and Rights must exist, as we proceed to show.
Rules of human action must be expressed by means of
words denoting those abstract and general Conceptions which
include the principal objects of human desire and affection.
And, in order that these Conceptions may regulate men's
actions, they must be Conceptions of something which really
exists among men. If they are not this, they cannot, by
their operation, balance, moderate, check and direct the
desires and affections which tend to really existing objects.
For instance, my desire to possess what another has, may
be checked and controlled by the Conception of Property;
by my looking upon it as his Property. But this could
not happen, if there were no such thing as Property. If
Property had not been a reality among men, the Concep-
tion of it could never have had the power, which in human
Society it constantly has had, to suppress or moderate the
Ch. IV.] RIGHT, AND RIGHTS. g^
greater part of the acts to which the bodily desires, and the
desire of having, would naturally impel men. In like man-
ner, the Conceptions of Promises, of Contract, of Marriage,
and the like, restrain or limit most of the acts to which
the uncontrolled desires and affections would give rise.
This must necessarily be, in order that Rules of action
may operate upon men ; but this could not be, if the things
thus conceived did not really exist among men.
Further : the conceptions on which Rules of action de-
pend must not only be realized among men, but their results
must also be assigned and appropriated to particular men.
The realities which are conceived as Property, as Personal
Security, as Contract, as Marriage, must be attached to
persons, and vested in them, as attributes or possessions.
We must be able to conceive such things, as being one
man's or another man's: as mi/ property, ^our debt, Ms
wife. Without this condition, the Rules of which we speak
could not produce their effect of counteracting and balancing
the Desires and Affections. For the Desires and Affections
are tendencies to action residing in Persons. Each Person's
Desires have a tendency to himself: the Affections have
Persons for their objects ; the Desires of things also give rise
to Affections towards Persons. Since all these tendencies
to action are thus directed to and from Persons, the Rules
of action, which balance these tendencies, must also point
to Persons. My desire to take away what another man
has, and my anger against him for witholding it from me,
must be balanced by the thought that it is Ms Property. To
use a mathematical image, the centers of the forces, attrac-
tive and repulsive, which we have termed Springs of Action,
are in Persons ; and therefore the Conceptions by which these
forces are kept in equilibrium must also point to Persons.
The Rules of Action, being Moral Rules, must neces-
torily be subordinate to the Supreme Rule of human
40 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
action; and combining this condition with the two others
of which we have spoken, we are led to this conclusion :
That in order that Moral Rules may exist, there must be
abstract Conceptions, including the principal objects of human
desire and affection ; which abstract Conceptions must be
Realities, vested in particular Persons as attributes or pos-
sessions, according to Rules subordinate to the Supreme
Rule of Human Action.
But Abstractions vested in particular Persons, as posses-
sions, by Rules subordinate to the Supreme Rule, sue Rights;
and our conclusion may be expressed by saying. That in
order that Moral Rules may exist. Men must have Rights.
We have already given examples of Rights ; such as a
man's Right to his Personal Safety, to his Property, to his
Debts, to his Wife. Without supposing the existence of
such Rights, no Moral Rules can be given.
79. What has been said in general {65 and 78),
to prove the necessary existence of Moral Rules, and there-
fore, of Rights, among men ; may be further illustrated by
considering, separately, the principal Springs of Action of
which we have spoken ; and especially the Mental Desires ;
for these include the Appetites and the Affections (49). It
is evident that the Desire of Personal Safety (39) requires
that there should exist a Right of Personal Safety. With-
out such a Right, the Desire would give rise to a constant
tempest of Anger and Fear, arising from the assaults,
actual or apprehended, of other men. But a Right of
Personal Safety, when actually established, holds in check
the impulses which give rise to such assaults, and reduces
the tempest to a calm. In this calm, man, free from ex-
treme agitations of Fear and Anger, can act with a refer-
ence to Rules founded on other men's Rights; and can
thus, and no otherwise, exercise his rational and moral
nature. And in like manner, the Desire of Having requires
Ch. IV.] RIGHT, A.ND RIGHTS. 4^
that there should exist a Right of Property : for without
the estabhshment of such a Right, the possession of any
objects of desire would, in like manner, give rise to Fear
and Anger; and to an agitation of men''s minds, in which
rational and moral action could not take place. But a
Right of Property once established, there may be a state
of repose, in which the Reason and the Moral Sentiments
can act. Again, the Need of Mutual Understanding re-
quires that a Right of Contract should exist. If no man
could depend upon the actions of other men, every man's
actions must be performed in a tumult of vague conjectures,
hopes and fears, like the actions of a man when surround-
ing objects are whirled about him by shifting winds. Each
man having no certainty as to what another man would
do, Society must be dissolved by the repulsion of conflict-
ing Desires and mutual Fears. But if the Right of Con-
tract be established, so that one man can depend upon
what another has contracted to do, as something cer-
tain; the mutual Fears are removed; the objects included
in the Contracts, and the intentions of the Contractors,
become stable things ; and man can act with reference to
fixed moral Rules, as his moral nature requires. Again,
the Desire of Family Society requires the establishment of
Family Rights ; that is, of those peculiar Rights, respecting
the Members of the Family, to which the Desires point.
The Husband must have an exclusive Right to the Society
of the Wife, as a Wife. The Father must have Rights over
his Children, which other men have not. Without these ties,
which bind Families together in a manner in some respects
exclusive, ungoverned bodily Desire and irregular Afifection
would tend to transient and capricious unions of man and
woman ; and these would lead to storms of angry rivalry, and
the pains of deserted affection. Moreover, on this suppo-
sition, the suffering mother and the starving child have no
42 INTRODUCTION. [Book I'.
one to depend on : the child has no one to educate him ;
to introduce him into Human Society; to bring him ac-
quainted with the Rules of Action of mankind; and thus
to evoke his rational and moral nature. In the bosom
of the Family, when its inclosure is protected by Family
Rights, the woman and the child are sustained through
seasons of helplessness, the desires of Family Society are
gratified, and the moral nature of man is unfolded; and
thus Family Rights necessarily exist.
In the same manner, the Desire of Civil Society requires
a peculiar Class of Rights, which we shall call the Rights of
Government. For the actual establishment of Rights is the
actual enforcement of Rules ; and this requires that the
office of enforcing Rules should be committed to some special
body of men, as the guardians of the Rules. In order that
Rights may really exist in a society, the Governors of the
Society must have the Right of enforcing the Rules by which
such Rights are defined.^ If such a Right be not vested in
the Governors, other Rights, however they may be nominally
acknowledged, do not really exist in the Society. If Personal
Security and Property, and Contract, and Marriage be
spoken of as actual realities ; but if, notwithstanding this,
the Right of Government to inforce the consequences of these
realities be not upheld ; there are, in fact, no real Rights
in such a Society ; and in proportion as the unreality of the
Rights of Government becomes manifest, the Society loses its
social character ; and the moral character of riian cannot find
its sphere of action in such a condition.
80. There are other Rights, required by other De-
sires : but none of so primary and universal a character aS
those which I have now mentioned. The Desire of Know-
ledge requires Rights which, under the names of the Right
of Self Culture, the Right of Education, the Right of Free-
dom of Opinion, and the Hke, may come to be of importance,
Ch. IV.] BIGHT, AND RIGHTS. 4^
in the Stages of Society in which men's habits of thought
are much developed ; but which may be omitted in our
primary system of Rights. The Desire of Superiority, as
we have said {5S), requires that men, in a Society, shall
have their Rights assigned by equal Rules ; and thus
strengthens such Rights when they exist. The Reflex
Sentiments have also, in some Stages of Society, their cor-
responding Rights. Thus, men have a Right to their Re-
putation allowed them in the Laws of many Societies.
But the primary and universal Rights of men are those
five which we first enumerated: the Right of Personal
Security; the Right of Property; the Right of Contract;
Family Rights ; and the Rights of Government.
81. The opposite of Rights are Wrongs. A man's
Rights may be infringed, transgressed, violated, by the actions
of other men. Thus, a man infringes my Right to Personal
Safety by striking me ; my Right to my Property, by stealing,
it; my Right to a Contracted Debt, by not paying me.
He who thus violates a man's Rights, does him a Wrong,
The word Injury is also especially used to designate the
infraction of a Right. This is sometimes used merely to
express harm; but in correct language harm is distinguished
from wrong, damnum from injuria.
82. It has been said that Rights must be Realities
in human Society. Rights are made Realities in human
Society by its conduct as a Society. The conceptions of
personal security, property, contract, marriage, and the like,
are realized among men by their actions. Men, existing in
the condition of a Society, regulate their conduct by these
conceptions : they appropriate to each his Rights : for the
most part they respect each other's Rights ; and they con-
strain, expel,, or otherwise punish, those who by their actions
contradict these realities, or disturb the appropriation of
them. The appropriation of Rights is established and de-
44r INTRODUCTION. [Book L
clared by tJie Law ; or by Custom, which is Law expressed
in actions instead of words ; and the Law also gives Rights
vahdity or reaHty, by assigning Punishment to those who
violate them.
83. Punishment is itself a Reality, and thus gives
reality to the Rights which Laws establish. The various
forms of Punishment, constraint, bodily pain, loss of pos-
sessions, exile, death, are among the most common and
palpable of the real things from which the human affections
and desires recoil. And by the existence of Law, sup-
ported, when necessary, by Punishment, Personal Safety,
Property, Contracts, Marriage, become things no less real
than the most palpable objects of bodily desire. Through
the reality of such things, human Society, instead of being
a mere struggle of appetites, desires, and affections, tend-
ing to and from different quarters, is a balanced system,
governed by a coherent body of Rules. And all these Rules
spring, not from Desire or Affection, which know nothing
of Rules, or of the terms in which they are expressed;
but from Reason, which, apprehending Rules, directs us to
right actions, as those which are conformable to the Su-
preme Rules; and to Rights, as the Terms in which Sub-
ordinate Rules must be expressed.
84. From what has been said, it will be seen that
the adjective right has a much wider signification than the
substantive Right. Every thing is right which is conformable
to the Supreme Rule of human action ; but that only is a
Right which, being conformable to the Supreme Rule, is
realized in Society, and vested in a particular person. Hence
the two words may often be properly opposed. We may^\
say that a poor man has no Right to relief, but it is righji^
he should have it. A rich man has a Right to destroy the
harvest of his fields, but to do so would not be right.
85. To a Right, on one side, corresponds an Ohliga'
Ch. IV.] RIGHT, AND RIGHTS. '4^
tion on the other. If a man has a Right to my horse, I
have an Obligation to let him have it. If a man has a
Right to the fruit of a certain tree, all other persons are
under an Obligation to abstain from appropriating it. Men
are obliged to respect each other's Rights.
86. My Obligation is to give another man his Right ;
my Duty is to do what is right (74). Hence Dut^ is a
wider term than Obligation ; just as right, the adjective, is
wider than Right, the substantive.
We have here fixed the term Obligation to a nar-
rower sense than is sometimes given to it ; but it will be
found most convenient to use the word in the way just
defined, according to which it is a correlative to Right. We
shall also use the participle obliged, with the same limita-
tion.
87. Hence there is a difference between obliged and
ought. I ought to do my Duty; T am obliged to give a
man his Right. I am not obliged to relieve a distressed
man, but I ought to do so. There are other phrases which
are employed on such subjects. We speak of a man being
bound in conscience to tell the truth, and bound in law to
pay his debts. But when the word bound is used simply,
it more generally refers to Duty, than to Obligation.
88. Duty has no correlative, as Obligation has the
correlative Right. What it is our Duty to do, we must
do because it is right, not because any one can demand it
of us. We may, however, speak of those who are parti-
cularly benefited by our discharge of our Duties, as having
a Moral Claim upon us. A distressed man has a Moral
Claim to be relieved, in cases in which it is our Duty to
relieve him.
89. The distinctions just explained are sometimes
expressed by using the terms Perfect Obligation and Im-'
perfect Obligation for Obligation and Dut^ respectively : and
46 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
the terms Perfect Right and Imperfect Rights for RigM
and Moral Claim respectively. But these phrases have the
inconvenience of making it seem as if our Duties arose from
the Rights of others ; and as if Duties were only legal
Obligations, with an inferior degree of binding force.
We must treat of Rights before we treat of Duties ;
for as we have said (78), the terms which express Rights
are necessarily employed in laying down Moral Rules. We
must establish the Rights, and the Laws of Property, be-
fore we can lay down the Moral Rules, Do not steal, or
Do not covet another man's Property.
90. Hence before we treat of the Doctrine of Duties,
which is Morality, we must treat of the Doctrine of Rights
and Obligations.
There is no term in the English language which de-
notes the Doctrine of Rights and Obligations. In Latin,
French, and German, the same term which denotes a Right
denotes also the Doctrine of Rights. Thus we say Jus meum^
and Studium Juris : mon Droit and V etude du Droit : mein
Recht, and die Kentniss des Rechts. In English, we say my
Right, their Rights, but we do not use the term in the
other sense. Instead of this, we employ various phrases:
thus Jus Naturce has sometimes been translated The Law
of Nature; sometimes, The Rights of Nature, Natural Rights,
Natural Justice. But no one of these phrases fully ex-
presses the Doctrine of Rights : for Rights are not Law
only, nor Justice only ; (meaning by Law the Law of Society,
and by Justice, that which is right) they are both Law and
Justice ; Law because Justice ; Justice expressed in Law.
Hence, when we have occasion to speak of the Doctrine
of Rights and Obligations in a single word, we shall borrow
the Latin term Jus : and by the adjective jural, we shall
denote that which has reference to the Doctrine of Rights
and Obligations ; as by the adjective moral we denote that
Ch. IV.] RIGHT, AND RIGHTS. 4>'7
which has reference to the Doctrince of Duties. We have
already in the Enghsh language several derivatives from the
term Jus, in the technical sense vi^hich we adopt : as Jurist,
Jurisprudence, Jurisdiction ; so that the word need not
sound strange in our ears. Jus is the study of the Jurist.
The term Jurisprudence has sometimes been applied by Eng-
lish writers to describe the Doctrine of Rights and Obliga-
tions in general : but the corresponding Latin term is often
written in separate words Juris Prudentia, a knowledge of
Jus. It seems unreasonable and inconvenient to make the
English name of this Doctrine so much more complex than
its names in other languages. The word Jus is also implied
in the word Injury. The words just and Justice are con-
nected with the same root ; but by these, we express moral,
not merely jural, notions.
91. Rights, and the difference of right an^ wTong,
being once brought into view, there are many terms both
moral and jural, which can be explained by reference to
those fundamental notions. Duties, are Actions, or Courses
of Action, considered as being right. Virtues are the Habits
of Mind by which we perform Duties. And Virtue, used
generally, includes all special Virtues ; as Duty includes all
special Duties. Virtue and Duty are the objects of our
Moral Sentiments {55). We appro'ce Duty, but we esteem
and admire and love Virtue. Virtue is the natural object
of Love, and is in this view called Goodness,
Actions which are opposite to right are Violations of
Duties, Transgressions, Offenses. As transgressions of Law,
they are Crimes. They are of various degrees of Guilt.
Some are atrocious or heinous Crimes: others are shghter
Offenses, more excusable and pardonable.
The transgression of a Duty, considered as a Habit, is
a Vice : and Vice in general includes all special Vices.
The sentiment of disapproval of Offenses or Vices admits
48 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
of various modifications. Some vices are hateful^ some, de-
spicable: some render the perpetrator odious, some make
hinji contemptible. Some things we more lightly blame, others
we more strongly condemn, or look upon with detestation and
horrour.
92. The sentiments with which we regard Virtue
and Vice, Virtues and Vices, Acts of Duty and Violations
of Duty, are applied to the internal acts which determine
the external action. Thus we speak of a good intention.
Si laudable purpose, Sb vicious thought.
These Sentiments are extended also to the persons who
perform the acts, external or internal. Men, as well as
actions, are called on the one hand good, xirtuous, praise^
worthy, admirable, excellent ; on the other hand bad^ mciousy
blam^able, abominable, wicked. When men's actions are right,
both they and their actions are moral ; if the contrary,
immoral.
Virtues and Vices have been spoken of as Habits : but
they may also be considered as the results of the Disposi-
tions and Characters of men. Considered as a Disposition,
Vice is Depravity, or Wickedness.
93. The consideration of Virtue and Vice, with re-
ference to Religion, will come before us in a succeeding
part of this work. But we may here remark, that Virtue,
which is conformable to the Supreme Law of our Nature,
is the Will of God, the Author of our Nature. Hence, the
Xaw of Duty is the Command of God.
Transgressions of Duty, considered as Offences against
God, are Sins. God upholds the Law of Duty by Rewards
and Punishments, which are assigned to the Souls of men.
94. Rights, as we have said (71), are established in
Society by the Law; that is, in such Society by the Law
of that Society. When this Law is not merely a Rule,
tacitly understood and naturally growing into being, but
Ch. IV.] RIGHT, AND RIGHTS. 49
expressly declared and really enforced, it is termed Positive
Law, in distinction from Natural Law, or the Law of Na-
ture*. Society when it thus declares and enforces Laws,
acts as a State ; not merely as an assemblage of individuals,
but as a Collective Agent. A State has an organization
by which it acts. It has a Government, Tribunals, stated
modes of action. It has Governors, Magistrates, Judges,
Executive Officers, and all requisite provisions for the Ad-
ministration of the Law. When need arises in consequence
of men^s actions, and transactions one with another, a man
charged with a crime is apprehended ; or of two persons
who allege conflicting Rights, one institutes a Suit against
the other. The case is brought before a Court or Tribunal,
in which the Judge takes cognizance of such matters; and
is tried. Evidence is adduced. Witnesses are heard. The
accused man is found guilty ; or is acquitted, if it do not ap-
pear that he is guilty. Between the two contending parties
Judgment is given. The Sentence of the Court is carried
into effect. And thus. Rights are realized, and Remedies
are provided for Wrongs.
Chapter V.
IMMUTABLE MORALITY AND MUTABLE LAW.
95. It has been stated (78) that Moral Rules must
be expressed by reference to Men's Rights ; and thus they
necessarily depend upon Rights actually existing. Further,
it has been stated (94) that Men's Actual Rights are deter-
mined by Positive Law ; Men's Rights in each Community
are determined by the Positive Law of that Community.
* It will afterwards appear that no Body of Definite Laws can be
proved to be the Laws of Nature.
VOL. I. E
50 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
But the Laws of different Communities are different; and
the determination of Men's Rights by various States are
various. Personal Security, Property, Contract, Marriage,
are regulated by very different Rules in one State and in
another. Private War, Slavery, Polygamy, Concubinage,
have been permitted by the Laws of some States ; and many
other practices which are forbidden by our Laws. And
it seems to follow from this, that Morality, which depends
on the Laws, must prescribe different Rules, in the States
in which such practices are permitted, and in those in which
they are forbidden.
But on the other hand, we have shown (66) that Moral
Rules exist necessarily; that they are necessary to the
action of man as man ; and that they result necessarily from
the possession of Reason. From this it seems to follow, that
moral Rules must be necessary truths, flowing from the
moral nature of man ; and that therefore, like other neces-
sary truths, they must be universal and unchangeable.
And accordingly. Moralists have constantly spoken of Mo-
rality as a body of fixed, immutable, universal Truths.
How are these two opposite doctrines to be recon-
ciled?
96. They are thus reconciled. The Conceptions of
the fundamental Rights of Men are universal, and flow
necessarily from the Moral Nature of Man : the Definitions
of these Rights are diverse, and are determined by the
Laws of each State. The Conceptions of Personal Security,
Security, Property, Contract, Family, exist everywhere ;
and man cannot be conceived to exist as a moral being,
in a social condition, without them. The Rules by which
Personal Safety, Property, Contract, Families are main-
tained and protected, are different in different Communities,
and will differ according to the needs and purposes of each
Community. The Rules of Morality are universal and
Ch. v.] IMMUTABLE MORALITY. 51
immutable, so far as they are expressed in terms of these
Conceptions in their general form : it is always our Duty to
respect the Personal Safety, the Property, the Contracts,
the Family Ties, of others. But if we go into those details of
Law by which these conceptions are in different Communities
differently defined, the Rules of Morality may differ. In
one country the wayfarer may morally pluck the fruits of
the earth as he passes, and in another he may not ; because
when so plucked, in one place they are, and in another they
are not, the Property of him on whose field they grew. The
Precept, Do not steals is universal ; the Law, To pluck is to
steals is partial.
97. All Truths include an Idea and a Fact. The
Idea is derived from the mind within, the Fact from the
world without. In the instance of Rights, of which we are
now speaking, the Idea, or Conception of the Right, is sup-
plied by our consciousness of our Moral Nature and its
Conditions ; the Fact, or Definition of the Right, is supplied
by the Law of the Society in which we live, and the train
of events which have made that Law what it is. The Moral
Nature of Man is moulded into shape by the History of
each Nation ; and thus, though we have, in different places,
different Laws, we have everywhere the same Morality.
98. The existence of Rights gives rise to a Sentiment
of Rights and a Sentiment of Wrongs^ which may be arranged
with the Moral Sentiments among our Springs of Action.
Rights, as we have seen, procure and secure to us the
gratification of certain Desires and Affections. These
gratifications become more important in our eyes, by being
permanent and stable possessions ; which we hold, not only
without fear of interruption, but with the consent and
sympathy of all mankind. And with this affection for our
own Right, grows up an affection for Rights in general.
We see with complacency and sympathy the manifestations
e2
52 INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
of this regard for Rights in others. We recognize it as
a sentiment which binds us to all men, and all men to us.
99. Also, Rights being established, Wrongs, the
violations of these Rights, excite a stronger feeling than
the mere privation or interruption of our gratifications.
Rights, being assigned to each person by Rules to which
the common Reason of mankind assents, we resent the
violation of these Rights, not only as an assault upon an
individual, but as an aggression upon all mankind. When
we receive a Wrong, we know that we have with us the
resentment of all our fellow-men, at the infraction of a Rule
which all acknowledge. We entertain our resentful emotions
with complacency : they become strengthened and rooted, by
this conviction of general sympathy. The anger which we
feel, is no longer the impulse of our own individual feelings :
it is an affection of the common heart of mankind. We not
only entertain our wrath, we cling to it as something good,
and admire it as something laudable. We deem our indig-
nation to be virtuous.
100. This Sentiment of Wrongs, along with the Senti-
ment of Rights, operate powerfully in supporting Rights
when they are once established, and in maintaining that
peace and order of Society, which are the proper atmo-
sphere of man's moral nature. For these Sentiments give
force and energy to the exertions with which men resist any
violation of established Rules; and they fill with fear and
shame those who know themselves to be violators of such
Rules. The man who has Rights on his side, is bold and
vigorous ; the conscious wrong-doer is, by that very circum-
stance, deprived of courage and energy. Men will not wil-
lingly expose themselves to the indignation, as well as resist-
ance and punishment, with which the perpetrators of Wrongs
are received ; and thus Rights are, for the most part, ob-
served, and treated with respect.
Ch. v.] immutable morality. 5g
101. These, which may be called Jural Sentimmts, are
the germs of Moral Sentiments, of a larger and deeper im-
port. The Sentiment of Indignation against Wrongs, when
expanded and unfolded by habitual thought, leads us to the
condemnation of all dispositions which tend to produce
Wrongs. All such dispositions are disapproved of, as im-
moral. In like manner, the Sentiment of Rights, when
extended and unfolded by the thoughts of what is due to
others, as well as to ourselves, produces a Sentiment of
Obligation, and hence a Sentiment of Duty, or, as it is often
termed, a Sense of Duty. And this Sense of Duty, and Con-
demnation of immoral Dispositions, are important parts of
our Moral Sentiments.
102. Man, recognizing Moral Rules as the neces-
sary conditions of his being (66), and recognizing Punish-
ment as a necessary means of giving reality to such Rules,
(83), recognizes himself, as liable to Punishment for trans-
gression of Moral Rules. Even before he learns what the
consequences to himself of transgression will be, he knows
that he is exposed to those consequences, whatever they may
be. He must answer for his actions, when the demand is
made by real authority ; he is responsible. If his actions are
condemned, the results of the condemnation fall upon him.
On the other hand, if his actions are approved, the results of
the approval belong to him. He deserves these results
whatever they may be. And thus he has a Sense of Bespon-
sibility and a Sentiment of the Merit and Demerit of Actions.
103. When man has distinguished actions in general,
according to their Moral Character, as good or bad ; and
has assigned to them Merit or Demerit ; he must, in order
to apply these distinctions, judge of particular actions, and
determine to which moral class they belong. His judg-
ments, both in the adoption of Moral Rules, and in the
application of them to particular actions, must be formed by
54« INTRODUCTION. [Book I.
the use of his Reason. By the use of his Reason, dealing
with all the elements of the human constitution within him,
and the world without him, he is led to Conmctions, both as
to Rules and as to Facts ; both as to what has been done,
and by whom, and what is its Merit or Demerit.
104. The Moral Sentiments are further unfolded and
expanded by action, habit and thought. And this process
is the Moral Cultivation or Moral Education of Man. This
Cultivation and Education depend upon various conditions,
and are promoted or extended by various causes. Among
these, we may notice the influence of one man upon another,
in affecting his Moral Sentiments, or the application of them
to actions. We have already spoken of the influence exer-
cised by the parents upon the child, in educing his moral
nature (47). But in many other ways, as well as in this,
men exercise an influence in modifying each other's Moral
Sentiments and Convictions. Men may, by speaking, by
writing, by all the modes of the intercourse of life, direct
the course of other men's thoughts ; and thus affect their
judgment of what is right and what is wrong, and their
feelings with regard to actions and persons. And the ex-
ercise of such influence, by one man upon another, is an
important kind of Action ; and one for which the Agent
is responsible, as well as for any actions which directly
affect his primary Rights.
Rights are, as we have said, in every particular case,
determined by actual Law and History. Before proceeding
with Morality, we shall take some examples of such actual
determinations.
BOOK 11.
JUS.
OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS.
BOOK II
JUS,
OF EIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS.
Chapter I.
RIGHTS IN GENERAL.
105. We have seen (94) that Rights are defined by
Positive Laws ; but we have seen also, that according to the
Conception of Rights (78), they are to be conformable to the
Supreme Rule of human action. The Law assigns to each
person his Rights ; but the Law also aims at giving to each
person what it is right he should have. That which is
legally fixed, is also intended to be morally right. Jus has
for its object to conform to the idea of Justice.
Hence it appears as if Law must depend upon Morality ;
whereas we have previously stated (90) that we must treat
of Rights before we treat of Duties. We must explain
this apparent inconsistency.
Law must be considered, in the first place, as positively
and peremptorily fixed ; it judges everything according to
its own legal Rules and Definitions. But these Rules and
Definitions may change from time to time ; and in the course
of the moral cultivation and education of man, of which we
have spoken (104.), do change. Men change their Rules, with
the view of making them more nearly conformable to the
Supreme Rule of human action. They endeavour to deter-
mine Rights more rightly ; to make Laws more just. And
58 JUS. [Book II.
thus, for the moment, at any time, Morality depends upon
Law ; but in the long run, Law must be regulated by Mo-
rality. The Morality of the individual depends on his not
violating the Law of his nation; but the National Law
must be framed according to the National view of Morality.
The moral offence of coveting my neighbour's goods, as well
as the crime of stealing, extends to everything which the
Law determines to be his goods. But the Law which gives
him everything, and leaves me to starve, may be an unjust
Law ; and if so, may be altered by the progress of time, and
by the improved Morality of the legislative body.
106. Hence, in the first place, we must consider the
Law as fixed and given ; and this we shall do in the present
Book. But even in presenting the Law under this aspect,
we shall find indications of that moral aim, which, as we
have said, the Law has. We shall often find expressions
of the Legislator, or of the Jurists who comment upon the
Law, which imply that they could not conceive a Law which
did not aspire to be just. We shall find Reasons given
for Laws, all of which depend upon the Supreme Reason
for a Law, that it is right.
107. Of the Systems of Law actually established in
the world, two especially deserve our notice, and may throw
light upon our subject, if we follow them into some detail ;
namely, the System finally established in the ancient world,
and the System actually established in our own country.
The former Body of Law was that which prevailed when the
whole civilized world was one single State; the latter is
that which prevails in the State in which we live. I speak of
the Roman Law, and the Enghsh Law. These two Systems
of Law are those in which we are most interested, as past
and present realities. They are the Laws of two nations,
both of them eminent for the clearness of their jural per-
ceptions, and their vigorous habits of jural action. We may
Ch. 1.] RIGHTS IN GENERAL. 69
also take some examples of Laws from the Laws of the
Jews ; for these are of importance, in consequence of their
antiquity, their authority, and their influence upon Christians.
And for the reason just mentioned, we shall take into our
review some of the Comments of Jurists, as well as the
Decrees of Legislators.
108. In order conveniently to survey the legal Defi-
nitions of Rights, we must divide Rights into their kinds,
and arrange them in order. The Division and Arrangement
of Rights in different Codes, and different Jurists, have been
various. We shall have before us the Division and Arrange-
ment which are most suited to our purpose, if we take
those Classes of Rights to which we have been led by our
survey of the Springs of Human Action. Of these Classes,
the principal are, as we have said (80), the Bights of Personal
Security ^ the Bights of Property^ the Bights of Contract^ the
Bights of Marriage^ and the Bights of Gomrnment. To these
we might add, as has been said, other Rights, arising from
less simple and universal springs of action, as the Right
to Freedom of Opinion, and the Right to Reputation. But
these are less important ; and we shall for the most part
confine our attention to the Fixe Principal Classes of Rights
which we have mentioned.
In the Roman and in the English Law, all the five Classes
of Rights are, for the most part, clearly and fully established ;
and the same is the case in all communities, in which Law
has made any considerable advance. In rude and turbulent
conditions of Society, it may happen that some of these Rights
are very imperfectly defined, and very precariously held; or it
may be, that from a portion of the community some of them
are withheld altogether. Thus, in countries where Slavery
exists, the Slave has not the Rights of Personal Security.
The constraint which Slavery implies, is of itself an entire
violation of the Rights of Security. And the Slave is further
60 JUS. [Book l[.
liable to blows and wounds at the will of his master. He
has no legal remedy for such inflictions, which would be
Wrongs, if any Rights of the Person existed for him. And
with the loss of this class of Rights he loses all. He can
have no Property; for he can have nothing which his
master may not take from him, using violence if other
courses fail. He cannot Contract to do anything ; for what
he is to do, must depend on the Will of his master. He
cannot even have the Rights of Marriage; for his master
may at any time separate him from the sharer of his bed.
109. Thus, in such cases, we have an absence of all
the Classes of Rights. Such cases are recognized in the
Roman Law, for Slavery was one of the elements of Roman
Society. One of the distinctions laid down as the basis of
the Roman Code is, that all men are Freemen or Slaves.
*' Summa divisio de jure personarum hsec est, quod omnes
homines aut liberi sunt aut servi*."' But this state of things
was afterwards altered, by the improved condition of the
national morality. The steps of transition in the abolition
of slavery are gradual. In many countries, there exist classes
which, without being Slaves destitute of Rights, have Rights
inferior in kind to the Classes above them. In many cases
these inferior Classes are the successors of a vanquished
race: for in ancient times, by the custom of nations, the
conquered in war became the slaves or servants of the
conquerors. The stages by which, from this condition, men
pass to an equality of Rights, are generally connected with
the Right of Property, and especially with the tenure of
property in land. Thus, in many countries, in which the
land is cultivated by Serfs, who are allowed to raise their
own subsistence from the soil, but compelled also to labour
for the Master to whom the land belongs, men are often
ascripti glehoe; bought, sold, and inherited with the land:
• Inst. I. 8.
ch. l] rights in general. 61
yet they are not slaves. They have a right to their own
share of the produce ; and, under favourable circumstances,
pass by various gradations into the condition of Freemen ;
a change which is taking place extensively at present, in the
state of the cultivators of Europe. Property in Land is a
Right which exists in all States ; yet in some States the
Right of Property of individuals has been much limited.
In some of the ancient Republics, as for instance Sparta,
the land belonged in common to all the citizens. And
in another form of Society, which prevailed in India, the
Ryots or Cultivators generally occupied the land in com-
mon, and were collected in villages under officers who
distributed to the cultivators and tradesmen their respec-
tive shares of the produce *, Out of the earlier forms of
tenure of land, emerged the more complete Rights of Pro-
perty of modern times ; bearing traces however, in many
respects, of their historical origin.
The Rights of Marriage are justly considered as essential
to settled Society : and those who look back to the origins
of things, speak of those men as the founders of Society,
whose office it was to establish this institution : concuhitu fvo-
hibere vago. Yet the female slave has been at the mercy
of her master, wherever slavery has existed : polygamy has
been a practice extensively prevalent, and has only gra-
dually given way to more perfect forms of the Rights of
Marriage.
110. It may be asked whether the Five Principal
Classes of Rights, which we have mentioned, are entirely
distinct ; whether one Class does not run into another.
Especially, it may be asked whether Contracts do not neces-
sarily imply Property ; for we contract to buy and sell our
property ; and whether Property be not merely a general
tacit Contract that each shall have his share. To this we
* Jones On Rent, p. 110.
62 JUS. [Book II.
reply, that Contract is really distinct from Property : We
contract for services, for bodily labour, for mental labour,
for knowledge and intelligence, as in hiring a teacher, or
combining in a literary work. It may perhaps be said, that
a man's limbs, his knowledge, his intelligence, his mind, are
his Property ; so that, in these cases also. Contract implies
Property. But to speak thus, is to introduce a lax and
fanciful use of words, which renders all exact expression and
rigorous reasoning impossible. Such a use of words annihi-
lates the fundamental distinction of Persons and Things;
and is inconsistent with our previous reasonings, in which
we established the existence of Rights. For the Right of
Property was shown to be necessary, by considering that
man cannot act without some command of the external
world, the world of material objects. By the nature of our
arguments, we spoke of Property as something external,
visible, tangible; or at furthest we included, (as we shall
see,) only the inseparable appendages of such material
Property. We cannot consider Jcnowledge and mind as
Property, without making Property cease to have any definite
meaning at all. Hence Contract may exist where Property
does not ; the two Conceptions, and the correspoding Classes
of Rights, are independent of each other.
Again : we reply, that Property cannot be said to depend
upon tacit Contract, if we are to classify Rights at all. For
Contract, as we now consider it, is the result of a Special
Act ; or at least of an Understanding founded on some dis-
tinct analogy. A Contract implies Language, or something
equivalent to Language : Property does not imply the use
of Language, or any substitute for it. A tacit Contract, not
understood from any special act, but, without any special
ground, assumed as a universal fact among men, is not a
Contract, in the sense in which we have used the term in our
previous reasonings. Moreover, if we suppose the prevalent
Ch. I.] RIGHTS IN GENERAL. 60
respect for the Right of Property to be founded upon a
tacit general Contract, we must, for the like reasons, suppose
the prevalent respect for the Rights of the Person, and for
the Rights of Marriage, to be founded upon tacit general
Contracts: and thus, all Rights would be identified with
Rights of Contract. But such a use of terms would make
all classification of Rights impossible. We must, therefore,
make Contract a special and definite kind of Right : and if
we do this, Property will be independent of Contract, and
the corresponding Classes of Rights will be distinct from
each' other.
The Five Classes of Rights of which we have spoken
do not occur, in that form, in the Roman Law. But we
see in that Law indications which readily direct us to those
Rights. The leading distinction of heads, in the Institutes
of the Roman Law, is of Persons, Things, and Actions.
Omne jus quo utimur vel ad Personas pertinet^ ml ad Bes^
vel ad Actiones*, Here Actiones means legal proceedings ;
but we may take the term as representing peculiarly the
Class of Rights of Contract; for these derive their reality
especially from the support of the judicial authority. The
Second Book of Justinian's Institutes is mainly concerning
Property, De Rebus; and the Third, concerning Contracts.
Family Rights also are distinguished in the Institutes from
the other Rights of Persons. Thus, in the First Book,
the ninth and tenth Titles are, De Patria Potestate and
De Nuptiis.
111. In both the Roman Law and the English Law,
there is a distinction of Wrongs, as Private, and Pubhc
Wrongs. For the Social order being established, in which
respect for the Rights of all is commanded, those who trans-
gress this respect, offend, not only against the particular
persons whom they injure, but also against the State, the
* Inst. I. 2.
e^ JUS. [Book II.
general protector of Rights. If one man violently beats or
wounds another, he not only wrongs him, but violates the
general order of Society. On the other hand, if one man
claims another's field or house, he may do him wrong, but
he puts forward his claim under the show of law and justice.
The former is a Crime ; a Public Wrong ; and a Crime be-
longs to Criminal Law, and must be tried by Criminal Courts.
The latter is a question of Private Rights, belonging to Civil
Law, and to be decided by an Action or Suit, Actio, In
England, the Office of the State as the guardian of Order,
and of the Rights of all, is embodied in the person of the
Sovereign. A person who commits violence, breaks the King's
Peace.
Taking the Classes of Rights as we have stated them,
we shall now notice some of the jural expressions and dis-
tinctions by which these Rights, and the corresponding
Classes of Wrongs, have been practically carried into effect
in particular circumstances.
Chapter II.
THE RIGHTS OF THE PERSON.
112. The Rights of the Person are the Rights to
Safety, Security, and Free Agency, which, as we have said,
(67), are requisite for the peace of Society, and the human
and moral character of man''s actions. These Rights are
protected by the Laws, which prohibit deeds of force and
violence in general. But from the extreme of violence,
the infliction of death, there is a gradation to slighter acts,
which also are Wrongs or Injuries. The division of these
Wrongg against the Person is very similar in the laws of
most countries.
Ch. II.] RIGHTS OF THE PERSON. 65
In the Laws given to the Jewish people, the primary
Law upon this subject was the Command, Thou shalt not
kill: and this Law was followed out by various Rules con-
cerning Smiting : which are given in the Book of Exodus,
chap. xxi. verse 12, and the following verses.
In the English Law, proceeding from Homicide, which
is the highest crime against the Safety of the person, the
following offences are treated of : Maim ; (anciently Mai/-
hem,) which is an injury depriving a man of the use of
some bodily member : Wounding ; which consists in giving
a man some hurt with a weapon which breaks the skin;
Battery ; which is any, the least. Hurt or Violence unlaw-
fully and wilfully done : Assault ; which is an attempt to
do such violence. Threats and Menaces, by which a man is
put in bodily fear, are not punishable; but they may be
the ground of compelling the person who uses them to give
sureties that he will keep the peace.
The least touching of another person wilfully or in anger
is Battery: for the Law, as the Commentators upon it
remark, cannot draw the lines between different lower de-
grees of violence, and therefore totally prohibits the lowest
degree. In like manner among the Romans, the Cor-
nelian Law, De Injuriis, prohibited Fulsatio, as well as Ver-
heratio: distinguishing Verberation, which was accompanied
with pain, from Pulsation which was not.
113. Besides the above, there are other Wrongs
against the person, consisting in Violations of the Right
of Personal Liberty. These come under the head of False
Imprisonment ; so called in opposition to true Imprisonment,
which is constraint put upon the person by the authority
of the law.
To these offenses may be added Kidnapping, the forcible
abduction or stealing away of a man, woman, or child,
from their own country, and sending them into another.
VOL. I. F
66 JUS. [Book II.
This offense was noticed also in the Jewish Law * : "He
that stealeth a man, and selleth him, or if he be found in his
hand, he shall surely be put to death." So likewise in the
Roman Law, Plagium, the offense of buying, selling, taking
or keeping as a slave, a freeman, was severely punished.
The Plagiarius was generally condemned to the mines.
114. The English Law also takes congnizance of
injuries affecting a man's health, arising, not from Malice,
but from neglect. Thus a remedy is given when a person
is injured by selling him unwholesome provisions or wine ;
or by a neighbour's exercise of a noisome trade which in-
fects the air. There is also a legal remedy given to a man
for the neglect or unskilful management of his physician,
surgeon, or apothecary, which is called mala praxis. The
same is the course of the Roman Law-|- : Imperitia culpw
adnumeratur: veluti si medicus curationem deliquerit, male
quampiam secuerit, aut perperam ei medicaifmntum dederit.
The Injuries which are under our consideration, in this
part of our work, are, for the most part, accompanied with
MaHce; but the physician's Indifference to his patient's
health, and Disregard of the Trust reposed in him, are
held by the Legislator to give to such damage, so inflicted,
the character of Wrong, as well as Damage.
Malicious Intention is requisite to the notion of the
Wrongs or Crimes here spoken of. But in the cases
which have just been mentioned, the Malicious Intention
is inferred from the act itself. In all cases of personal
daipage inflicted, the law infers malicious intention, except
there be some circumstances to excuse, mitigate, or justify
the act.
• Exodus xxi. 16.
t Inst. IV. 3. Want of skill is accounted an oflFense ; as in a case
in which the physician leaves off his attendance on the patient v^^hile
the cure is incomplete, or performs a surgical operation wrongly, or
gives pernicious medicines.
Ch. II.] RIGHTS OF THE PERSON. 67
115. Homicide is excusaUe when it is committed
without intention ; in the Law phrase, by Misadmnture, per
infortunium ; as in fche case mentioned in the Jewish Law* :
When a man goeih into the wood with his neighbour to hew
wood^ and his hand fetcheth a stroJce with the axe to cut down
the tree^ and the head slippeth from the hehe^ and lighteth upon
his neighbour that he die. But though this is termed Ex-
cusable Homicide, the Jewish Law did not protect the slayer
till he had reached one of the Cities of Refuge ; and the
Enghsh Law levied a fine upon the delinquent, and made
him forfeit the thing which was the instrument of death,
under the name of a Deodand, The fine has been remitted
at the suit of the person concerned as far back as our legal
records reach ; but the law of Deodand is still in force.
These enactments seem to be intended to express the high
value which the law sets upon human life ; so that it always
supposes some degree of blame in the conduct of him who
takes away life, except by express permission of the Law
itself.
116. In the same spirit, the Law does not generally
allow Games, which may end in blood, to be received in
justifications of homicide ; as Tilting, Sword-playing, Boxing.
And in general, if death ensue in consequence of idle,
dangerous, and unlawful acts, as shooting, or casting stones
in a town, the slayer is guilty of Manslaughter, and not of
Misadventure only. But to show how much such distinctions
depend upon the actual law, we may observe, that by the
English Law, if the king command or permit such diversions,
and death ensue, it is only Misadventure. In like manner,
by the Laws both of Athens and Rome, he who killed
another in the Pancratium or Public games, authorized or
permitted by the State, was not held guilty of Homicide f.
Si quis colluctatione, ml in pancratio^ vel pugilis, dum inter se
• Deut. xix. 5. t Plato Leg. Lib. vii. Dig. ix. 2. 7.
f2
68 JUS. [Book II.
exercentur^ alius alium occiderit, cessat Aquileia (Lex), quia
gloria? causa et virtutis, non injurice gratia, mdetur damnum
117. Homicide in Self-defence, se defendendo, upon a
sudden affray, is excusable rather than justifiable by the
English Law. When a man protects himself from assault
in an unpremeditated quarrel, and kills him who assaults
him, it is termed by the Law chance-medley ; (or, as some
choose to write it, chaud medley C) which signifies a casual
affray, (or else an affray in the heat of blood, chaude meslee).
This term is rightly applied, when the slayer engages in no
struggle, except what is necessary for self-defense.
118. When Homicide results from sudden heat of
passion, arising naturally from provocation, without an
intention previously formed, it is in English Law termed
Manslaughter ; as when one person kills another in a sudden
quarrel. For the Law pays, say the Commentators*, such
regard to human frailty, as not to put hasty acts, and deli-
berate acts, on the same footing with regard to guilt. But
in cases where homicide is committed upon provocation, if
there be a sufficient cooling time, for passion to subside, and
reason to interpose ; and if the person so provoked afterwards
kill the other, this is deliberate revenge, and not heat of
blood, and amounts to Murder.
119. Murder is Homicide committed with previous
intention, which is termed Malice prepense, or Malice afore-
thought. This is the most atrocious of Crimes.
120. Homicide is justifiable by the Law of England
when it is committed for the prevention of any forcible and
atrocious crime. If a person attempts robbery or murder,
or endeavours to break open a house in the night-time, and
is killed in such attempt, the slayer is acquitted |. The
• Blackstone, iv. 191.
t By the more modem decisions of law, the distinction of night and
Ch. II.] RIGHTS OF THE PERSON. 69
Jewish Law had the Hke rules*: If a thief he found breaking
up^ and be smitten that he die, there shall no blood be shed
for him. So also in the Roman Law : the Law of the
Twelve Tables was, Si nox (noctu) furtum faxit, sim {si eum)
aliquis occisit (pcciderit) jurw cwsus esto. But there was,
in this case, to be no attempt at secrecy on the part of the
slayer ; but, on the contrary, a loud appeal to any one within
hearing I ; Lea^ xii. Tabularem furem noctu deprehensum
occidere permittit, ut tamen id ipsum clamore testificatur. In
the day-time, the person attacked by a robber is allowed
to put him to death if he cannot otherwise defend himself:
but we are not, by the English law, allowed to kill any one
in order to prevent a crime, if the crime be unaccompanied
by violence. In this case, the law requires us to cause the
offender to be legally apprehended and tried. So also the
Jewish law, in the place already quoted | : If the sun be
risen upon him,, there shall be blood shed for him, for he should
make full restitution. And the Roman Law is similar J :
Interdiu deprehensum ita {lex) permittit occidere, si is se
telo defendat, ut tamen ceque cum clamore testificetur. And
again; 8ed et si quemcunque alium ferro se petentem quis
occiderit, non mdehitur injuria occidisse ; et si metu quis mortis
furem occiderit. Sin autem cum possit adprehendere maluit
occidere, magis est ut injuria, fecisse mdeatur.
day is no longer noticed. The owner is now understood to be entitled to
defend his own to the last extremity; subject to the condition of showing
that that extremity was requisite for the defense.
* Exod. xxii. 2.
t Dig. ix. 2. 4. The Law of the Twelve Tables makes slaying a thief
detected in the night to be allowable, provided the slayer call aloud on
the occasion of the act.
X Exodus xxii. 3.
l^S Dig. ix. 2, 3. A thief detected by day may be slain if he defend
himself with a weapon, and if, as before, the slayer call aloud. And
if a man slay him who assaults him with a weapon it is justifiable ; and
if a man slay a robber, being in fear of his life. But if he was able to
apprehend him, and chose rather to slay him, it is not justifiable.
70 JUS. [Book U.
121. The Laws of Solon*, and the proposed Laws of
Plato -[■, agree with those already mentioned, in making a
wide distinction between the modes of resistance permitted
against the nocturnal and the diurnal thief. It has been
discussed among Jurists J, what is the ground of this dif-
ference. The reason which they assign is this : that the
Law does not allow a man to be put to death by a private
hand, on account of an expected loss for which the law can
give redress ; but only on account of danger to the person,
which may be beyond redress : that therefore by day, when
the person attacked can see the extent of his danger, he is
justified only to the extent of his danger, and so far as the
wrongs are of an irremediable kind : but that by night, when
the unknown extent of the danger may lead him to believe
it extreme, and when aid and testimony are difficult to
obtain, he is justified to the extent of his fear. The Law is
willing to accept such justification, because it cannot afford
him redress any other way.
122. When a person commits acts of violence against
another, having received extreme Provocation, but not being
in danger, by the Law of England, the provocation mitigates,
but does not justify the offense. The Mitigation is not
available, if there have intervened time sufficient for the
passions to cool : for if that be the case, the Law itself
is ready to redress the injury. Hence, when two persons
in cold blood meet and fight, any mischief done by one to
the other cannot be excused by alleging previous Provocation.
And thus, in the case of a Duel, in which the combatants
take measures tending to destroy each other**s lives, the Law
has fixed the crime of Murder on them.
123. A person committing an act of violence may have
others who assist or abet him, without their taking the same
* Demosth. adv. Timocrat. f Legg. Lib. ix.
X Grot. B. et P. ii. i. 12.
Ch. II.] RIGHTS OF THE PERSON. .71
share in the act which he does himself. He is the Principal^
they are the Accessories. And these are distinguished into
Accessories before the Fact, as those who urge a man to
commit murder, and provide him with arms; and Accessories
after the Fact, as those who harbour the murderer, know-
ing the crime to have been committed. Some distinctions
are made in the assignment of punishment to Principals
and Accessories : but absence when the crime is committed l/lr^
is requisite to make a man an Accessory. Thus the Seconds
in a Duel are guilty of murder as Principals in the Second
degree.
124. As we have said, the English Law does not
allow Provocation to excuse acts of violence, except when
there has been no time for passion to cool ; and therefore
does not acquit either of the combatants in a Duel on the
ground of any provocation which he may have received.
Yet the administration of the Law has often been so con-
ducted, that it has seemed to recognize the Challenge as an
excuse for the attempted Homicide. This inconsistency, be-
tween the letter and the practice of the Law, has, perhaps,
in some measure, arisen out of the customs which prevailed
in Europe some centuries ago, when Duels were permitted
openly by Christian States ; and the person who did not
seek redress, by such means, against any expression of con-
tempt or menace uttered against him, incurred general blame
and contempt as a coward.
125. Among the justifiable acts of violence, we may
notice those which the Law not only permits, but authorizes
and commands ; as the Imprisonment of criminals, and their
Punishment by stripes, wounds, maiming, exile, or death.
But in such cases, nothing is allowable which the Law
does not require. To kill the greatest of malefactors ex-
tra-judically, that is, not according to the prescribed course
of the administration of the Law, is Murder. Hence, if
72 JUS. [Book I r.
the judge wlio condemns, be not lawfully authorized to do
so, he is guilty of murder. And the judgment must be
executed by the proper Officer, for no one else is autho-
rized by law to do it. The Judge may condemn, but must
leave it to the Sheriff or his Deputy to execute the sen-
tence. Even if the Officer alters the manner of execution,
as if he beheads one adjudged to be hanged, it is murder.
126. Other cases in which Homicide is justifiable,
because committed for the furtherance of the law, are these :
when an officer, in the execution of his office, kills a person
who resists him: — when prisoners assault the gaoler or
officer, trying to escape, and he kills them: — when an
assembly of persons (that is twelve, or more) has become
riotous, and being required to disperse by the proper
magistrates, refuse to do so. But it is added, by the ex-
positors of these laws, that there must be in such cases an
apparent necessity on the officer's side in order to justify him.
It must appear that the culprit could not be apprehended,
the prisoner could not be kept in hold, the riot could not
be suppressed, in any other way.
127. There is another class of actions which may
assume the aspect of infringements of the Rights of the
Person, but which are justified in virtue of the Authority
which the Law recognizes as residing in the persons who
commit the acts. According to the English Law, the Father
has an authority over his Children which entitles him to
strike or constrain them, under certain conditions. A
Master has a like authority over his Apprentice, and a
Schoolmaster over his Scholar. In these cases, it is justi-
fiable to beat or confine the pupil in a moderate degree,
in the way of Chastisement or Correction. In cases of volun-
tary service, the Employer is allowed to exercise constraint
over the hired Servant or hired Labourer, in whose services
he for the time obtains a Right. Thus, I prohibit my Ser-
Ch. il] rights of the person. 73
vants from going out of my house except at stated times,
and when I do not require their services. I have a Right
to continued and active labour from the workmen whom I
have hired.
128. In some countries, the Master has a legal Right
to inflict stripes or other violence upon his Servant, the
Landlord upon his Tenant, or one Class of the inhabitants
upon another. In these cases the Class thus subjected
possess in an imperfect degree the Rights of the Person.
Such classes have been called by various names, in various
ages and countries, according to their history and circum-
stances : as Helots^ Vassals^ Serfs ; and when entirely divested
of Rights, Slams. We do not here inquire how far it is
really consistent with justice and humanity that men should
be thus partially or entirely deprived of Rights. But even
when such Classes legally exist, the Law limits the power
of the Master over the Dependent. Some such Dependents
can be sold with the land, but cannot be separated from
it : they are prwdial Slaves, Serfs^ Ascripti Glehw. Other
Slaves may be sold ofi* the land, and disposed of at the
will of the Master. These may be kept in the house for
menial services, as domestic Slaves ; or employed in various
labours for the Master''s benefit and at his pleasure. Thus
the ancient Greeks and Romans employed slaves as their
Artisans.
The relations between Master and Servant, are thus
connected with the relations between Landlord and Tenant ;
and thus point out to us a close connection between the
Rights of the Person and the Rights of Property.
■ 74
Chapter III.
THE EIGHTS OF PKOPEKTY.
129. As we have already said, the existence of the
Right of Property is requisite as a condition of the Free
Agency of man, and the Peace and Order of Society (79).
Accordingly, in all Countries such Rights do exist. In
every form of Society, there are circumstances under which
the necessaries and comforts of life, — food, clothing, tools,
arms — are held to belong to a man, so as to be his Property.
The Rights of Property being established, the Sentiment of
Rights and the Sentiment of Wrongs (98, 99) give great
force and stability to the institution. We cling with strong
and tenacious affection to what is our own. We earnestly
approve the rule which makes it ours, and which conse-
quently makes yours what is yours. A regard for the dis-
tinction of meum and tuum prevails. A reverence for Pro-
perty is felt. The necessity of its existence, as a condition
of human society, is generally perceived, and this perception
gives force to the Rules by which Property is defined.
These Rules are, in each particular case, supplied by the
Law of the Land. The Law determines what shall belong
to one man, and what to another.
130. With regard to some Kinds of Property, when
they are thus assigned, the Right of the Proprietor or Oioner
shares itself in a distinct, visible form. The objects are
taken hold of, carried about, used, consumed; as for in-
stance, clothing, food, tools, arms. Things of this kind are
moveable Property. Moreover, such Property may be retained
by the Proprietor, or given by him to another person, at his
pleasure. It may be given either absolutely, or on condition
of receiving a return ; that is, given in Barter or Exchange.
Ch. III.] RIGHTS OF PROPERTY. 75
Thus, Property leads to Exchange; and Exchange again leads
to the establishment of some general Instrument and Mea-
sure of Exchangeable Value ; that is, to the use of Money.
The natural Measure of the Exchangeable Value of any
objects is the labour of producing, or the difficulty of pro-
curing the objects. Gold and Silver have been most com-
monly used as Money, because they are procured with a
tolerable uniform degree of labour ; because they perish very
slowly when kept ; and because they are easily divisible into
definite portions.
131. When mankind have settled employments, and
settled habits of intercourse, the natural Value in Exchange,
either of these, or of any other objects, can never long differ
from the Standard, or Measure, of which we have spoken ;
the labour of producing and difficulty of procuring them.
For if the Exchangeable Value of any class of things were
less, proportionally, than the Labour of producing them, men
would turn themselves from this kind of Labour, to other
employments, in which an equal Exchangeable Value might
be obtained with less labour ; and thus, the number of persons
employed in producing this class of things being diminished, the
difficulty of other persons procuring them from the producers
would be increased, and the Exchangeable Value would rise.
And in like manner, if the Exchangeable Value of any class
of things were greater, proportionally, than the Labour of
producing them, other persons would turn themselves to
this kind of Labour, and the value of the class of things
would fall. Thus if the exchangeable value of gold and silver
were greater than that of other objects, obtained with equal
labour, men would turn their exertions to the collecting gold
and silver, as the easiest way of obtaining the other objects
of their desires. And though the intercourse of men, and
their power of changing their employments, may not be so
unfettered as to produce this result immediately ; yet, in the
76 JUS. [Book IL
long run, the Measure of Value in Exchange will be the
amount of Labour employed in producing the objects.
132. But, besides Moveable Property, consisting of
objects which the Proprietor can hold, remove, consume,
or transfer in a manifest manner ; there is Property of
another kind, which cannot be removed or destroyed, or pos-
sessed in a visible manner ; and which yet must be, and by
the Laws of every Country is, vested in Proprietors. We
speak now of Property in Land. It is requisite that such
Property should be established ; for in every Country, man
subsists on the fruits of the Earth, or on animals which
are supported by the Earth ; and in order to live, he must
have, on the face of the earth, his dwelling-place, and the
source of his food and clothing; he must have his house
and his field. In most countries, the earth does not supply
man with what he needs, except by cultivation ; and the
Cultivator must be stimulated to perform his task, by having
his portion of the fruits of his labour assigned to him as
his Property. But whatever amount of Cultivation be ne-
cessary, the produce of the earth, and the soil itself, are, in
every country, assigned to some class of Landlords as Pro-
perty, or are assumed as Property by the State itself.
183. The assignation of Landed Property to its
owners, as of all other Property, is deifined and determined
by the Law of the Land. But in Landed Property, the
acts of Ownership are less obvious, natural and effective, than
they are in other kinds of property; and therefore Pro-
perty in Land is more peculiarly and manifestly determined
and directed by the Law, than Property in Moveables.
The ancient Law of England treats Land as that Thing
which is eminently and peculiarly the subject of Laws con-
cerning Property, while all other Things are considered as
only appendages to Persons. Hence, Land is termed Real
Property; everything else is Personal Property.
Cii. HI] RIGHTS OF PROPERTY. 77
134. In most countries, the Cultivators are a different
class from the Proprietor of the Land ; whether the Pro-
prietor be another Class, or the State itself. The Rights
of the Cultivator and of the Proprietor are determined by
Law, or by Custom equivalent to Law, and are various
in various countries. The share given by the Cultivator
to the Proprietor is Bent. He who holds the land is the
Tenant, in contradistinction to the Landlord, who owns it.
1S5. In the greater part of Asia*, the Sovereign is
the sole Proprietor; and as such, receives a fixed portion
(commonly one-fifth) of the produce from the Cultivator;
who is, in India, called a Bi/ot. In Russia, and a great part
of Germany, the Cultivator supports himself on a part of
the Land ; and pays a Rent to the Landlord in his Labour ;
being obliged, during a fixed portion of his time, (as for
instance, during three days in the week,) to work in the
cultivation of the Landlord's exclusive share : such Cultiva-
tors are Serfs. But these Labour-Rents sometimes became
unlimited, and the Serf approached in condition to a Slave.
In other parts of Europe, as in Greece, Italy, and France,
in ancient and in modern times, the Cultivator has been
supplied by the Landlord with the means of cultivation, and
has paid to him a fixed portion of the produce ; generally
one half. Hence such Cultivators are called Coloni Fartiarii,
Coloni Medietari% Metayers. In a few spots on 'the Earth,
of which England is an example, there are, between the
Landlord and the labouring Cultivator, an intermediate
class, the Farmers ; who pay a Money-Rent to the Land-
lord, Wages to the Labourer, and have for themselves the
whole produce obtained from the Land. The Farmer must
be able to subsist the Labourer, while he is toiling so as
to raise a future crop of produce : therefore he must possess
a Stock, or Capital, already accumulated. The amount of the
* Jones On Rent.
78 JUS. [Book II.
produce which the Farmer has, after paying Rent, Wages,
and other expenses, is the Profits of his Stock.
136. These various forms of the distribution of the
wealth produced by the soil of each Country affect very greatly
other Rights, as well as the Rights of Property (129). The
Serf generally possesses in a very imperfect degree the Rights
of the Person against his Lord ; but against other persons,
his Lord is supposed to afford him protection. In modern
Europe, there prevailed, for several centuries, a System of
Tenure of Land with such mutual Rights and Obligations ;
namely, the Feudal System. According to this system, Land
was held on the conditions of Protection from the Superior,
and Service from the Inferior; and according to these
conditions, a series of Persons, each subordinate to the one
above him, had a modified Property in the Land. Each
such person was the Vassal of the one above him, his
Swperior Lord or Seignior. Each Lord had a Right to
certain Payments or Dues from his Vassals ; and the Vassal,
being marshalled as a Soldier under his Lord, was enabled
to protect himself and others. The Land thus granted by
a superior to an inferior was called a Feud or Fee. None
of these Feuds or Fees was an absolute Property ; all were
held of the Sovereign, at least in England. He was the
only Landlord ; and the highest Title of Ownership under
the Feudal System was Tenant in Fee Simple, Besides
Tenants of various kinds, there were mere Labourers who
held no Fees, and were called Villeins. At first, this Cul-
tivator in England was precisely in the situation of the
Russian Serf*. In the three centuries beginning from about
A.D. 1300, the unlimited Labour-Rents paid by the English
Villeins for the lands allotted them were gradually commuted
for definite services, still payable to the Lord. Out of this
grew a legal Right of some of the cultivators to the
* Jones On Bent, p. 40.
Ch. III.] RIGHTS OF PROPERTl'. 79
occupation of their Lands, which were registered in a list
kept by the Lord. Hence these were called Copyhold Tenures^
in distinction to the usual possession of the Soil by a freeman,
which was a Freehold Tenure,
137. The relations which the Tenure of Landed
Property establishes among different classes continue to
influence the Laws, and still more the Forms of Law, in
each country, long after their original force has been lost.
Two hundred years have barely elapsed since the personal
bondage of the Villein ceased to exist among us. Copy-
hold Tenures are still familiar. The Lord of the Manor,
the representative of the Feudal Seignior, has still various
Rights, due to him from Copyhold Tenants : as Heriots,
payable on the death of the Tenant; Fines, payable when
the Land is alienated by the Tenant to another person;
the Rights of pursuing Game, which are reserved to the
Lord of the Manor, even in Freeholds. And the phrases
used in transferring Landed Property still have many traces
of the Feudal System.
138. In Hke manner, in the Roman Law the con-
ditions of Property and the modes of transferring it retained
to a late period traces of the earlier modes of Tenure. In
the earliest known stage of the Roman Law, Lands, with
the Slaves and Cattle requisite for their cultivation, were
transferred by a ceremonious form called Mancipatio ; and
the Quirites, or original Roman citizens, could not transfer
ownership in any other way. Hence arose a division of Bes
Manciple things which could be thus transferred, and Bes nee
Manciple things which could not. But though a man could
not acquire Quiritarian ownership or Dominium, without
this process, he might have possession and use of a thing
without such ownership ; and the later jurists recognized
this kind of Right. They say*, There is among foreigners
* Gaius II. 40, who lived in the time of the Antonines.
80 ' JUS. [Book II.
only one kind of ownership (dominium), so that a man is
either the owner of a thing, or he is not. And this was
formerly the case among the Roman people : for a man was
either the owner ex jure Quiritium, or he was not. But
afterwards the ownership was split; so that now one man may
be the Owner of a thing ex jure Quiritium, and yet another
person may have it in his possession (in honis). For in-
stance, if in the case of a thing which is res mancipi, I do
not transfer it to you by mancipatio, but merely deliver it
to you, the thing indeed becomes your thing (in honis tuis),
but it will remain mine ex jure Quiritium, until by con-
tinued possession you have acquired a Right (donee tu earn
possidendo usucapias). When that is complete, it is yours
absolutely (pleno jure),
139. Upon the conditions of tenure of land, depend
the Title or evidence of ownership; the modes of Con-
veyance or Transfer by Contract; the modes of Succession
on the death of the Proprietor, whether by his Testament,
or ab intestato : the judicial Remedies for Wrongs : and
the like. A person's landed property so much determines
his condition, that we commonly speak of his land as
his Estate. The possesssion of a house, or habitation, is
important to man in his social condition, not only as a
means of shelter and bodily comfort, but also as giving
him a fixed local position in the Community. By such
possession, he is a Householder ; and for many import-
ant purposes the State or City is considered as consist-
ing of Householders. The place, neighbourhood, city, or
country in which a person has his habitation, is his Domi-
cile (Domicilium). A person's Domicile, for the most part,
places him under the Laws of the State in which it is
situated.
140. As Property in Land, and in the fruits produced
by the cultivation of the Land, is established and realized by
Ch.III.] rights of property. 81
the Laws and Customs of each country ; in like manner is
established Property in other objects, which can be dis-
tributed and assigned to special persons; for instance, in
flocks and herds, and their produce ; in the produce of the
interior of the earth, as mines ; in all that we fabricate by
fashioning into a new form the materials thus produced, —
wood, stone, metal, and the parts of plants and of animals.
With regard to all these, and other forms of material or
corporeal Property, the Law in every Country recognizes
certain modes of acquiring, possessing, and transferring them,
as conferring Rights.
141. The Wrongs, or Injuries by which the Rights
of Property are violated, are distinguished and classed by
the Law according to their circumstances. The Command,
Thou shalt not steals is the basis of all Laws on this subject.
The definition of Stealing^ or Larceny (Lafrocinium), in the
English Law*, is "the felonious taking and carrying away
the goods of another." The definition of the Roman Law j-
was nearly the same. " Furtum est contrectatio fraudulosa,
lucri faciendi causa, vel ipsius rei, vel etiam ejus usus pos-
sessionisve." The English Law further distinguishes pri-
vately Stealing X, as for instance, picking the pocket; and
open and violent Larceny, which is Robbery ; this the Roman
Law^ calls Bona vi rapta. Another crime against property
is Burglary {Burgi Latrocinium), or nocturnal Housebreak-
ing ; for the Law considers the crime if committed by night
as much more heinous than the like act committed by day ;
* Blackstone, iv. 229. The more exact definition, by modern lawyers,
of Theft is, a taking or removing of some Thing; being the Property of
some other Person and of some value ; without due Consent (to be
separately defined) ; with intent to despoil the owner, and fraudulently
appropriate the thing.
t Instit, IV. 1.
t The distinction of privately stealing is now done away as an aggi-a-
vation. § Dig. xlvii. 8.
VOL. 1. G
82 JUS. [Book II.
as we have already seen that it makes a difference in the
Right of self-defence in the two cases.
142. The crime of Theft, as above defined, includes
only the cases in which the Thief touches and takes the
material object : but besides these, a person may be despoiled
of his property by Fraud ; as for instance, when an Order to
deliver goods is fabricated or forged by some one who has
no Right to give such Order. This is Forgery. In the
Roman Law* it was Crimen Falsi. " Lex Cornelia de falsis
pcenam irrogat ei qui testamentum aliudve instrumentum
falsum scripserit, signaverit, recitaverit, subjecerit; vel sig-
num adulterinum fecerit, sculpserit, expresserit, sciens, dolo
malo." We need not here attempt to enumerate the various
forms of fraud and deception by which a person may be
deprived of his property. They are all included in the
term Cheating.
143. According to the English Law, Larceny applies
only to moveable Property; for landed Property, by its
nature, cannot be taken and carried away. And even of
things that adhere to the Land, as Corn, Grass, Trees, and
the like, no Larceny can be committed by the Common Law
of England. The Severance of these from their roots is an
Injury against the real Estate, which is termed a Trespass,
* Inst. IV. 18. 7. " The Law of Forgery appoints a punishment for
a man, if knowingly, and with fraudulent intent, he has written, sealed,
recited, or substituted a testament or other instrument : or if he has,
with like knowledge and intent, forged the signet of another person,
by marking, or other way of expressing." The English Law is, " Who-
soever by means of any-false Seal, Signature, Stamp, Impression, or Mark,
deceptively used to obtain undue credit, &c. or by means of any Macliine,
Instrument, or Thing, artfully contrived and fraudulently used for the
purpose of Deception, or by the false and deceptive Use of any other
Instrument or Thing by Sleight of Hand or other Device, or by any false
Personation, shall cheat or defraud any other Person of any Property,
shall incur Penalties, &c.
Ch. III.] RIGHTS OF PROPERTY. 83
But this state of the English Law has in several instances
been altered in modern times *.
144. There are some further distinctions with regard
to Property, which it may be useful to notice. According to
the Roman Lawyers, the power of individuals over their pro-
perty, which they termed Dominium Vulgare^ was subject to
the power which the State, or the Sovereign had, to prescribe
the conditions on which they were to hold and enjoy their
possessions: this -power wslb Dominium Emimns. The State,
which defines and establishes the Rights of the Owner,
always limits those Rights ; either by national maxims, as in
Asiatic Empires, where the Sovereign is the Proprietor of the
Soil ; and in Feudal Kingdoms, where the King is the Sove-
reign Lord of every Fee ; or by cases of public necessity and
convenience; as when a man is compelled by the State to
part with his house, that the street may be improved.
145. Again : besides Private Property, ^es Singulorum,
the Roman Lawyers reckoned various kinds of Public Pro-
perty; thus, SLiaong Bes Publico are highways, streets, bridges,
the walls and gates of a city; public gardens, grounds, fields
and estates ; markets, courts of justice ; prisons ; docks and
harbours; fleets and their furniture, and the artillery, arms,
and carriages of public armies ; also the wealth of the
public Treasury ; and many other kinds of property, accord-
ing to the various institutions and modes of administration
of different states.
146. There are other things, which are common in
their use, hence called Bes Communes ; but incapable of being
appropriated, hence also called Bes NulUus ; as air, running
water, the sea, the shore. These can be used by each
• The ultimate conclusion at which English Lawyers have arrived on
this subject is, that it would be desirable to abolish the distinctions of the
Law of Theft with regard to things severed and not severed from the
realty. See Act of Crimes and Punishments^ Chap, xviii. Sect 1. Art. 6.
g2
84 JUS. [Book H.
person without any hurt or loss to other persons, and are
hence said to be things quorum innoxia est utilitas. Yet
these are not, in all cases, reckoned Bes Nullius. States
claim a property in their navigable rivers, and even in the
sea near their shores. And by the English Law, although
a person can have no property in running water, he may
possess as property a lake or river, under the designation of
" so many acres of ground covered with water.'** He may also
have a property in the use of running water : but this be-
longs to property of another kind, which we must now notice.
147. Private property is corporeal or incorporeal.
Corporeal property is such as we have mentioned, both
moveable and immoveable : the immoveable being lands,
houses, mines, and the like. But besides these kinds of
property, a man may have a property in the Use of land
or its adjuncts. This is the case, for instance, when a
man has a Right of way over another's land; or has a
water-mill, of which the water flows through another''s estate :
for he has a Right to the flow of the water; and the
owner of the other estate is not allowed to stop or turn
aside the stream which drives the mill. Such Limitations
of the Proprietor's Right, by the Right of another to some
use of the property, arising from neighbourhood (mcinape)^
or other relations, are called in the Roman Law, Servitutes,
Servitudes or Services; and are treated with great detail
and distinctness by the Roman Lawyers. Such Property
is termed by English Lawyers incorporeal Property. Ser-
vitudes of a Property for the convenience of a neighbouring
property are called in English Law, Easements.
148. The Feudal System in England gave to the
Tenant an ownership charged with several Services^ as homage,
ward, marriage, relief, and (in the principal Tenures) with
the Service of following the Lord to the wars. As wars
became of less consequence in the internal condition of the
Ch. III.] RIGHTS OF PROPERTY. 85
nation, and property of more, this kind of Tenure became
very burdensome: and at length, at the Restoration of
Charles the Second, all these Military Tenures^ as they
were called, were abolished ; and were reduced by Act of
Parliament to the Tenures which were called Free Socage^
and Freehold. This implies a Tenure by certain and de-
terminate services of no degrading kind. Yet even freehold
Proprietors still owe certain Services to the Lord of the
Manor, who now stands in the place of the Feudal Lord.
Services, due from land, and other kinds of Incorporeal
Property, are capable of being inherited, • and are termed
in English Law, Incorporeal Hereditaments. Such incor-
poreal property must necessarily be an adjunct to corporeal
property : it must have a corporeal subject, land, or some-
thing else, in which it inheres. For Property is of the
nature of a Thing (45).
149. There are some things, with regard to which
the Definition of Law, as to whether they are private pro-
perty or common things, are very various. Tame animals,
animalia domitce naturce, as horses, cattle, and sheep, are
the subjects of direct Property. But wild animals, animalia
force naturw, as fish, and several kinds of birds which are
not housed or domesticated, do, by £he Roman Law, cease
to be our property as soon as they go away from us. Wild
birds and wild beasts, when they quit my land, cease to
be my property; and even while they continue there, are
mine only by the Right which I have of pursuing them.
The Roman Law gives a Right of taking such creatures,
even in another man's land. "Occupanti conceditur: nee
interest, quod ad feras bestias et volucres attinet, utrum in
suo fundo aliquis capiat an in alieno." The Jurists ap-
pear to have given such Rules, from a wish to exemplify
their doctrine, that there are things which become property
by the act of taking them. Such a Rule would be very
86 JUS. [Book II.
inconvenient in a well cultivated country. Accordingly, later
commentators (as Heineccius) add " modo non prohibeamur
ingressu fundi a domino."*** By the ancient law of England
the Game, so long as it is on the land, belongs to the
owner of the land ratione soli. But this state of the Right
was interfered with by royal and other privileges. A license
from the State was required to kill game; and at one
period, none were allowed to do so without the qualifica-
tion of possessing certain property. The Right of taking
the game still remains, in many instances, not a Property
commonly transferred with the land, but a Service under
the control of the Lord of the Manor ; and in our Game
Laws, we have a laborious system of Enactments for the
purpose of protecting this Right.
150. The property of things which have no apparent
owner, d^eo-Trora, has been variously assigned by the Laws
of various Countries : such things, for instance, as Treasure
found by accident, which is called in the English Law
Treasure Trove, and is given to the King, or the Person
to whom he grants it. Another instance is, land left dry
by some alteration in the course of a river. The Roman
lawyers laid down various Rules according to which they
assigned this land to the Proprietors of the adjacent banks.
More modem writers give it to the State*.
151. In like manner, the Law determines what length
of time of undisturbed possession or enjoyment of things
is to be considered as conferring the Right of Property.
In the early Roman Law this mode of acquiring the Right
of Property is termed Usucapio. Gains f says, "Usucapio
mobilium quidem rerum anno completur; fundi vero et
sedium biennio; et ita Cap. xii. tabularum cautum est.''
And he gives the reason for this J : " Quod ideo receptum
• Grot. B. et P. ii. 8. 8. f Gaius, ii. 42.
+ Id. II. 44. Prescription in moveables is established by a year's pos-
Ch. III.] RIGHTS OF PROPERTY. 87
videtur ne rerum domlnia diutius in incerto essent: cum
sufficerit domino ad inquirendam rem suam anni aut biennii
spatium." But this refers to the formalities of the Roman
Law in its early stages. The more general term for this
mode of acquiring a Right by lapse of time was Prcescrip-
tio, or Temporis Prcescriptio. This is regulated by various
laws ; for instance* : " Prsescriptione bona fide possidentes
adversus prsesentes annorum decem, absentes autem viginti
muniuntur."" In the English Law, Prescription is made a valid
source of Right by the Statutes of Limitation, that is, Acts
of Parliament which limit the time within which actions for
Wrongs may be brought. The period of unquestioned pos-
session which establishes a Right is in different cases, sixty,
fifty, thirty and twenty years | : And the Commentators
state that the reason of these Statutes of Limitations is
to preserve the peace of the kingdom, and to prevent the
frauds which might ensue, if a man were allowed to bring
an action for any injury committed at any distance of time.
To this effect, they quote the maxim of the jurists J : " In-
terest reipublicEe ut sit finis litium."
152. Besides the ownership of a thing, by which a
person is entitled to use it, there are cases in which a
person is recognized as the owner by law, and yet bound
to give to another the advantage of the use of a property.
Property so committed to a person is called in Latin,
fidei commissum, in English, a Trust: the person to whom
it is committed is fidei commissarius, a Trustee. A Trustee
session ; in land and house by two years. Which seems to have been
made the rule in order that the ownership of property might not be
longer uncertain. For one or two years was time sufficient for the owner
to ascertain his property.
• Cod. VII. 35. 7.
t Blackstone, iii. 307. The last Statute of Limitations assigns twenty
years as the period for land ; and various periods from six years down-
wards are fixed as to personal actions.
t It is for the pubHc good that there be an end to lawsuits.
88 JUS. [Book II.
possesses and administers property for the benefit of others ;
generally, on certain condi^ns and accordiiig to certain
rules. *
153. The Right of Moveables generally implies a
Bight of Alienation ; that is, of transferring them to another
by Gift, Sale, or Barter. The Right to Immoveables does
not so universally imply a Right of Alienation; for the
Dominium Eminens (144) of the State or the Sovereign may
come in, and may prohibit or limit such a transfer. Thus
a Feudal Tenant could not alienate his Fee to another Per-
son. The Fee must be granted by the Lord only.
154. Again ; the State regulates, by special Laws and
Customs, the Succession of Property ; that is, the disposal
of a man''s property after his death, whether moveable or
immoveable. It determines whether he shall have the
power of disposing of the whole, or of part, by his Will and
Testament. And if the man die intestate^ the Law determines
in what manner his property shall be assigned to the mem-
bers of his family, or to other persons. In some States, as
in ancient Rome, the property was equally divided among
the children ; in others, as in England, there is a Law of
Primogeniture, by which a larger portion, or the whole (so
far as landed property is concerned), is given to the eldest
son. Such differences depend upon the different views of
the relations of Families, and their Property, to the State,
which prevail in different times and Countries.
155. To give, or alienate Property, some external
act is requisite; for we are now speaking of Laws which deal
with external acts. The Law must define what Act^ (in-
cluding words in the term Acts) shall constitute giving or
alienating. It must determine, for instance, whether Words
of Transfer bo sufficient for this purpose; and if so, with
what publicity they must be uttered, in order to be valid ;
or whether some Act of Delivery be also requisite. The
Ch. III.] RIGHTS OF PROPERTY. 89
latter was the case in the Roman and in the English Law ;
at least in the most formal kinds of transfer.
Also an Act of Acceptance on the other part is requisite ;
for it would be intolerable that a person should, without my
consent, have the power of giving me what might be in the
highest degree burdensome or troublesome ; as if he were to
give me a wild beast. And the act of acceptance must also
be defined by Law.
156. Questions have been discussed among Jurists
as to the Rule which is to be followed when the Right
of Property comes in conflict with the Needs of Personal
Safety. For instance ; When, in a ship, the common stock
of provisions fails, is it allowable for the Passengers to use
that which belongs to one of them in spite of his will?
When a fire is raging in a town, is it allowable, in order
to stop it, to pull down a house without consent of the
owner ? When a ship runs foul of the cables of other ships,
is it allowable for the captain to cut these cables if his ship
cannot otherwise be extricated ?
In such cases, it has been decided by the Roman Law,
and its Commentators, that the Right of Property must give
way. Necessity, they say*, overrules all Laws. But this is
to be required only in extreme cases, and when all other
courses fail. To which is added, by most Jurists, that when
it is possible, restitution is to be made for the damage com-
mitted. A like Rule is recognized in the English Law-f-.
It has been held, by some English Lawyers, that a
starving man may justifiably take food ; but others deny
that such necessity gives a Right; inasmuch as the poor
are otherwise provided for by Law J.
• Grot. II. 2. 6. 4. t Kent's Commentaries, ii. 838. X Bl. iv. 32.
90
Chapter IV.
THE RIGHTS OF CONTRACT.
157. We have already (50) spoken of the necessity of
mutual understanding and mutual dependence among men ;
and the consequent necessity of the fulfilment of Promises, as
one of the principal bonds of Society. The necessity of de-
pending upon assurances made by other men, gives birth to
a Right in the person to whom the assurances are made. A
person has, under due conditions, a Right to the fulfilment
of a Promise. The Law realizes this Right, and must there-
fore define the conditions. The mutual assurances, which the
Law undertakes to enforce, are called Contracts. In the
language of the Roman Law, the Judge is made to say *,
" Pacta Conventa quae neque dolo malo, neque adversus leges,
plebiscita, Senatus consulta, edicta Principum, neque quo
fraus cui rerum fiat, facta erunt, servabo."
158. The Law, which enforces Contracts, must de-
termine what Promises are valid Contracts. To show the
necessity of recurring to actual Law on this subject, we may
remark how vague, arbitrary, and inconvenient are the
maxims on this point, which Jurists have attempted to draw
from the nature of the case. Thus it has been asserted -|-,
that of the three ways of speaking of the future : / intend
to giw you : I shall give you : I promise you : the two former
do not give a Right to the person addressed ; but the third
does. It is evident that this distinction is as arbitrary as
any merely legal one can be : and if such rules are arbitrary,
they must be established as a matter of fact, not of reason-
ing: that is, they must be established by actual Laws.
• Dig. II. 14, 17. I will enforce Pacts and Contracts which are made in
conformity with the Laws, the Decrees of the People and of the Senate,
the Edicts of the Emperor, in good faith, and with no fraudulent design.
t Grot. B. et P. ii. 11. 2.
Ch. IV.] RIGHTS OF CONTRACT. 91
159. But according to the Roman Law, even the
last formula, / promise you^ did not convey a Right. It
was called a bare Promise, Nudum Pactum ; as not being
clothed with the circumstances of mutual advantage and
fonnal act, which are requisite to a valid engagement.
In thus refusing to recognize a bare Promise as creating
a Right, the Law proceeds with a due regard to the gra-
vity of Rights. Relations so important must be brought
into being only by acts of a calm and deliberate kind. If
a verbal promise, however hasty, informal, and destitute
of reasonable motive, were to be sanctioned as creating a
Right, the Law must carry into effect the most extravagant
proposals of gamesters ; as for instance, when a man stakes
the whole of his fortune on the turn of a die: for the
meaning of such an act is, " I promise to give you so much,
if the cast is so." But the Law, whose purpose is to pro-
duce and maintain a moral and social condition of man,
in which human actions are deliberate, rational and co-
herent, refuses its sanction and aid to such rash, irrational,
and incoherent proceedings.
Hence the Roman Law rejects Contracts in which there is
no Cause or Consideration*: " Cum nulla subest causa prop-
ter conventionem, hie constat constitere non posse obliga-
tionem. Igitur nuda pactio obligationem non facit." And
the same is the case in the English Law : in which a Con-
tract is defined f, " An agreement of two or more persons,
upon sufficient Consideration^ to do or not to do a parti-
cular thing:" and the Consideration is necessary to the
validity of the Contract.
160. The Law, though it requires a Consideration on
each side as a Contract, does not undertake to provide an
* Dig. II. 14. 7. When there is no reason for the contract, there can
be no obligation. Hence a nude pact does not establish an obligation,
t Bl. II. 445.
92 JUS. [Book II.
equality of advantage to both; but is contented with any
degree of reciprocity, leaving the force of the Consideration
to be weighed by the contracting parties. Thus money
paid is a valuable consideration : but a good consideration
also is that of blood, or of natural love and affection, when
a man grants an estate to a poor relation on motives of
generosity, prudence, and natural duty*. And as a Consi-
deration is made necessary by the Law, in order to avoid
the inconvenience of giving legal force to mere verbal pro-
mises, the Contract may be made in so solemn a manner
that the Law will suppose a Consideration, though it be
not expressed. This is the case in the English Law, when
a man executes a bond under his seal.
On the other hand, the Law will not recognize a Con-
tract for which the Consideration is an illegal act. Thus
the Roman Law-j-: "Pacta quae causam turpem habent
non sunt servanda.*" And the English Lawj recognizes a
number of cases of this kind, as annulling Contracts.
161. Contracts are 'coid also when made under vio-
lence and constraint. In such cases the person so con-
strained and compelled is, in the language of the Law, in
Duress {Durities). The Law also recognizes Durities per
minds, Fear arising from threats, as a circumstance which
invalidates a contract made under its influence. But this
fear must be of a serious kind; fear of loss of life, or of
limb ; and this upon sufficient reason ; or, as an ancient
English Law-writer expresses it J, "Non suspicio cujus-
libet vani et meticulosi hominis, sed talis quae possit cadere
in hominem constantem." A fear of being beaten, though
• Bl. II. 297.
t Dig. II. 14, 17. Pacts for a shameful consideration are not to be
enforced.
t Kent's Com., ii. 466.
§ Bracton. quoted Blackst. ii. 131. Not the suspicion of a light-minded
and timorous person, but such as may fall upon a man of ftrm mind.
Ch. IV.] RIGHTS OF CONTRACT. OS
ever so well grounded, is no duress ; neither is the fear of
having one's house burned, or one''s goods taken away or
destroyed; because, in these cases, a man may obtain redress ;
but no sufficient compensation can be made for loss of life
or limb.
162. Contracts are also void, from the want of that
free agency which the law requires, when the deficiency
arises, not from violence or threats, but from the condition
of the party as to age or understanding. Persons under the
legal full age, called Minors or Infants by the Law, cannot
make a valid Contract. By the English Law the Wife also
is incapable of binding herself by Contract ; her interests
being supposed to be so inseparably bound up with those of
her Husband, that she cannot act independently of him.
A Contract made by a person not having the use of Reason,
non compos mentis, is void. The Contracts of Lunatics are void
from the time when the Lunacy commences. It has also been
settled by the English Law*, that a Contract made by a
man in a state of intoxication, if his state be such that he
do not know the Consequences of his conduct, is void.
Imbecility of Mind is not sufficient to set aside a Contract,
when there is not an essential privation of Reason, or an
incapacity of understanding and acting in the common affairs
of hfe.
163. Contracts may be rendered void by Deception or
Fraud practised on one side ; but it is a matter of no small
difficulty to lay down consistent Rules on this subject. The
Roman Law, as we have seen (157), does not enforce Con-
tracts which are made dolo mala. And this is further explained
in the same place-]- : " Dolus malus fit calliditate et fallacia.
• Kent, II. 151
t Dig. II. 14, 17. Fraud is the use of trick and deception. A pact is
fraudulent when, for the purpose of circumventing some person, one
thing is done and another simulated to he done.
94 • JUS. [BooKir.
Dolo malo pactum fit quoties circumscribendi alterius causa
aliud agitur et aliud agi simulatur.'" But it is easier to lay
down Rules on this subject when Contracts have been dis-
tinguished into different kinds.
164. The Roman Jurists have divided Contracts,
according to the Consideration, into four Kinds, expressed
by the four Formulae : Do ut des ; Facio ut facias ; Facio ut
des ; Do ut facias. The First includes Contracts of Buying
and Selling^ of Barter or Exchange, and Loans of Money :
the Second includes Contracts of Commission^ Partnership,
and the like : the Third includes Contracts of Hiring and
Sermce, as when a Servant or Workman engages to work for
certain wages : the Fourth is the Counterpart of the Third,
when one person Contracts to pay the other who serves or
works.
165. The most common of these Contracts, in which
there are familiar names for the correlative acts ; Buying
and Selling ; a Commission given and taJcen ; Letting and
Hiring; — Venditio et Emptio, Mandatum, Locatio et Conductio ;
the Roman Jurists termed Contractus Nominati ; all others,
as Barter, were Contractus Innominati ; and they laid down
different Rules for the two Classes.
Thus a Sale was valid, as soon as the price was agreed
upon ; re Integra., that is, before payment or delivery. But
in the innominate Contracts, re integrd, the parties were
allowed to retract. This difference was founded in the
greater frequency and familiarity of the nominate Contracts,
which made deliberation less necessary, and delay more
inconvenient. But in Sales, in order to remove any doubt
which might arise, as to whether the Sale was completed, the
practice was sometimes adopted of giving Arrha, Earnest, a
portion of the price ; which, however small, made the Con-
tract binding. Among the Northern Nations, shaking the
parties' hands together had this efficacy ; and a sale thus made
Ch. IV.] RIGHTS OF CONTRACT. 95
was called handsale ; whence handsel was also used for the earn-
est of the price *. In the same manner a symbolical delimry
of the goods was introduced : as for instance, the delivery of
th e key of the warehouse in which they were contained.
166. Borrowing and Lending, is a Contract, in which
the Romans distinguished two different cases, which we
confound under one term. Mutuum was applied to the
lending of those things which are reckoned by number,
weight, and measure ; as wine, oil, corn, coined money, of
which the borrower receives a stated quantity which he may
use, consume, or part with. Commodatum was that which
was lent, to be restored identically the same ; as a book,
a harp, a horse. And the Law made a distinction in the
responsibility of the borrower in these two cases. The person
who had received a thing as commodatum, was bound indeed to
keep it with as much care as if it were his own, or with more,
if more were possible : yet if it were lost or destroyed by
no fault of his, he was not bound to make compensation.
But if he had received a thing as mutuum^ it was to be
repaid at any rate, in whatever way it had been consumed
or lost-f*. Paleyi calls commodatum^ inconsum.ahle property.
The other kind, consumable property^ is also termed Res
fungihiles by the Roman Law ; for one portion can dis-
charge the office of another. "R-es ejus generis functionem
recipere dicuntur; id est, restitui posse per quod genere
idem est J."
167. Besides the Hiring of Labour, Locatio Operis
faciendi^ there is Locatio Bei, the Letting of a Thing to
* Blackstone, ii. 448.
+ Inst. III. 15. The principle of the distinction by which mutuum
and commodatum are opposed, as to liability of risk in the case of loss,
is the principle of ownership : Res perit domino, in case of innocent loss, is
a universal rule. In mutuum the property is transferred to the Bor-
rower : in commodatum it remains with the Lender. Therefore the loss
in the first case falls on the Borrower, in the second on the Lender,
ij: Moral PhU. 15. in. c. 3. $ Grot. B. et P. ii. 30. 13.
96 JUS. [Book II.
hire, as letting a house. In this case, also, the Hirer is
bound to ordinary care and diligence, and is answerable
for neglect : but the extent of his Obligations, as to Re-
pairs and Expenses, must be settled by express Rules of
Law or Custom*.
168. When the Obligation of one party to pay Money
to the other is established, and not yet performed, the money
to be paid is a Deht^ due from the Debtor to the Creditor.
Hence Debt may arise out of any of the above kinds of
Contract, as Sale, Hiring, and the like.
169. Among many forms of Debt, we may notice
those recorded in writing : thus, when I write, I promise to
pay to A.B, one pounds I acknowledge myself indebted to
A.B. to the amount of one pound. When I write to
M.N., Pay to A.B. one pounds and M.N. does this, I
make myself indebted to M.N. one pound, which is to be
afterwards reckoned between M. N. and me. Documents of
the former kind are Promissory Notes; those of the latter
kind are Bills of Exchange. These Documents may be trans-
ferred from hand to hand, and may, with them, transfer the
Debt. This may be done by making them payable to
A. B. or Bearer ; or by their being indorsed by A. B. when
he transfers them to C ; by C when he transfers them to
another ; and so on. Bills and Notes thus transferable, and
still unpaid, may answer the purpose of Money ; they may
constitute a Paper-Money.
170. Other kinds of Deposits, on express or implied
Contract, are enumerated in the Roman Law : as Pignus.,
a Pledge or Pawn for a Debt ; Bepositum, a Deposit with-
out Reward. Delivery of Goods from one person to another
on trust is called by the English Lawyers Bailment^, and
the Goods are said to be bailed to him who receives them.
171. With regard to Contracts of Sale, Questions
occur. How far the Seller is obliged to make good the
* Sir W. Jones, On Bailment, classes the scale of liabilities.
Ch. IV.] RIGHTS OF CONTRACT. 97
Title (135) to the thing sold : How far he is responsible
for its quality : How far, in making the bargain, he is bound
to disclose all circumstances which may affect the price.
With regard to the Title, by the Roman Law* the Seller
was responsible, "Sive tota res evincatur sive pars, habet
regressum emptor in venditorem"!"." The same is the case
in the English Law : a fair price impHes warranty of Title j.
As to the Quality of the goods sold, the Seller is not
responsible, when they can be judged by the Purchaser's
own discretion. The rule then is Camat emptor. If goods
ordered, be found not to correspond with the order, the
Purchaser is required immediately to return them to the
Vendor, or give him notice to take them back: otherwise
he is presumed to acquiesce in the result.
172. The Obligation of disclosing the circumstances
which effect the price of a thing sold, has been a matter
of great discussion among Jurists and Moralists. Cicero J
states such a case. A merchant of Alexandria brings a
supply of corn to Rhodes in a time of great scarcity and
dearth. He knows that many other merchant-vessels
laden with corn are also on their way to llhodes, which
the Rhodians do not know. Is he bound to disclose this
circumstance? As a matter cf legal obligation, which is
the point now under consideration, it is agreed that the
seller is forbidden to misrepresent the intrinsic qualities of
his wares. But it is pronounced that he is not obliged to
disclose all extraneous circumstances which may effect their
value II . " Venditorem, quatenus jure civile constitutum est,
* Dig. XXI. 2. 1.
t If it be proved that the Title is bad, either for the whole or part,
the Buyer has his remedy against the Seller.
X Kent, Com. ii. 478. § Off. iii. 12.
II So far the rules of Civil Law go, the Seller must disclose the defects
of his wares : as to the rest, he must act without deceit : but, being a
seller he must wish to get the best price. " I bring my wares to market :
VOL I. H
98 JUS. [Book II.
dicere vitia oportere ; csetera sine insidiis agere ; at, quo-
niam vendat, velle quam optime vendere. Adduxi, exposui,
vendo meum ; non pluris quam caeteri ; fortasse etiam
minoris, cum major est copia. Cui fit injuria V In the
same manner it has been decided by an English court "^j
that the Purchaser of an estate was not obliged to disclose
to the Seller his knowledge of the existence of a mine on
the Estate.
But it is further stated to be law|, that the Seller is
liable, if he fraudulently misrepresent the quality of the
thing sold, in some particulars in which the Buyer had not
equal means of knowledge : or if he do so, in such a manner
as to induce the Buyer to forbear making the enquiries,
which, for his own security and advantage, he would other-
wise have made.
173. It has been attempted]: to express all Rules
on this subject by saying that the Rule of Contract is
Equality/: "Ut ex insequalitate jus oriatur minus habenti^."
But this maxim must not be carried so far as to destroy
the nature of a Contract : for by that, we do not agree,
generally, to give and receive equal things ; but we deter-
mine what we are to give and receive. The Rule is rather
to be sought in the intentions and expectations of the par-
ties contracting. Each is obliged to do that which he
gives the other reason to expect, and knows that he does
expect. This is expressed by saying that the transaction
is bond fide^ in good faith.
174. Yet in many cases, the estimate of the inten-
tions and expectations of the parties must be vague and
obscure ; and instead of attempting to regulate the course of
I offer them for sale ; I sell what is my own ; not dearer than others ;
perhaps cheaper, as I have a larger stock. Whom do I wrong ?"
• Kent, II. 489. t Ibid. ii. 487. % Grot. B. et P. ii. 12.
§ So that he who receives the less has a claim arising from the in-
equality.
Ch. IV.] RIGHTS OF CONTRACT. 99
law by these, it may be more proper to apply strict rules of
interpretation to the language of Contracts. Hence the
Roman Law makes a distinction of actions honm fidei^ and
actions stricti juris.
Rules of Interpretation of the Language of Contracts have
been laid down by Jurists ; and are an important part of the
doctrine of Contracts, in its applications. These Rules,
for the most part, have for their object to combine good
faith with exact Law. Such are these, for instance; that
common words are to be understood in a common sense;
Terms of Art in their technical sense : that when it is ne-
cessary, words are to be interpreted by the matter, effect,
and accompaniments : and the like*.
175. The wrongs which violate the Rights of Con-
tract are Fraud., of which some causes have been considered ;
and Breach of Contract., against which the Law provides
Remedies, by actions of various kinds ; but on these we need
not further dwell.
Chapter V.
THE RIGHTS OF MARRIAGE.
176. We have already pointed out (47) that one of
the most powerful Springs of action in man is the Desire of
Family Society, which grows out of his Appetites and Affec-
tions. The needs of mane's condition so operate, that he
cannot exist in a social and moral state, except there be,
established in Society, Rights which sanction and protect
the gratification of this Desire. Such Rights, with the
corresponding mutual obligations, are given to the Husband
and Wife, united in a legitimate Marriage ; and the Rights
* Grot. P. et B. 11. 16.
100 JUS. [Book II.
thus vested in the Husband, and in the Wife, are the Rights
of Marriage.
Marriage and Property are termed Institutions ; inasmuch
as they imply the establishment of General Rules, by which,
not only the special parties are bound, (as in Contracts) ; but
by which the whole Society also is governed. These two
Institutions are the basis of Society. The Right of Per-
sonal Security is requisite, in order to preserve a man from
hour to hour, and from day to day; the Institution of
Property is requisite, in order that man may subsist on the
fruits of the earth from year to year; the Institution of
Marriage is indispensable, in order to the continuance of
the community from generation to generation.
177. The Desires and Affections, growing out of the
Institution of Marriage, tend to balance the action of the
elementary Desires and Affections, and to maintain man in
a moral and social condition. The Elementary Desires
and Affections, which lead to the Union of the Sexes, are
refined and tranquillized by the marriage tie. The Mutual
Confidence, and the identification of habits and interests
between husband and wife, which marriage, in its most
complete form, tends to generate, give a hew charm and
a new value to life. When such a conception of a happy
married life is formed, it is universally approved of; and
thus the Moral Sentiments confirm the Conjugal Affections.
Each successive generation of young persons, catching the
like sentiments, and susceptible of the like affections, looks
with hope and desire to this image of a happy marriage,
as an important part of the business and object of life.
Thus there is produced a National Sentiment respecting
Marriage, which makes the Institution still more efiicacious
in its influence upon the moral and social condition of
those among whom it prevails.
178. The Children which Marriage produces give
Ch. v.] rights of marriage. 101
rise to Affections which still further tend to bind together
the Community by Moral and Social links. In the first
period of their existence, Children are a common object
of Affection to the parents, and draw closer the ties of
their mutual Affection. Then comes the Education of the
child ; in which the parents have a common care, which
further identifies their sympathies and objects. The Bro-
thers and Sisters of the child, when they come, bring with
them new bonds of affection, new sympathies, new common
objects. The habits of a Family take the place of the
wishes of an Individual, in determining the habitation, the
mode of living, the meals, and the like; and thus, these
circumstances are determined by influences, more social
and more refined than mere bodily desire. The Family is
one of the most important elements of the social life of
every Community.
Familia is the word by which the Romans denoted the
persons thus collected in the house, along with their parents :
and also, along with the servants of the House. {Famuli)
The head of the family was called Paterfamilias ; his wife
was Materfamilias.
179. The nature and extent of the Eights, which
Marriage gives, have been different in different ages and
countries ; and the national conception of the conjugal bond
has often fallen short, in various degrees, of that complete
and permanent union of one man with one woman, which
we have pointed at. Polygamy, Concubinage, and arbitrary
Divorce, have been tolerated in many States ; but still, the
notion of a complete Marriage appears always to have
been, the union of one Husband and one Wife for life.
Although Polygamy existed in the earlier periods of the
Jewish nation, we find, in the Scriptures, that, beginning
with man, at his creation, a single' woman was given to
him as his helpmate. And though Solomon is related to
102 JUS. [Book II.
have had many wives, as the custom of Asiatic Sovereigns
has generally been ; in the description of a good wife which
is inserted in his Book of Proverbs*, she is represented
as sole mistress of the household, and as the object of
an entire trust and respect, inconsistent with her being
one of several wives. And though Moses permitted to the
Jews more than one wife, he prohibited manyf-; which
"many" is believed by the Commentators to be more than
four. This permission was rather a concession to an exist-
ing practice, than a law consistent with the general scheme
of the Laws of Moses. The practice of polygamy is said J
to have ceased entirely among the Jews after the return
from the Babylonish Captivity.
180. Polygamy was not a Grecian practice. The
Heroes of Homer appear never to have had more than one
aXo')(os ; though they are sometimes represented as living in
concubinage with TraXXaKai. According to the views of
Greek Legislators and Philosophers, Marriage was to be
considered as having for its object the maintenance of the
State, by the continuation of the race of citizens : and we see,
in the Republic of Plato, and elsewhere, indications that
they could tolerate extravagant deviations from the more
complete domestic conception of marriage, if the political
object was provided for.
181. The Roman Law, however, approached closely
to the conception of a complete marriage, which has been
noticed. The Definition given in the Institutes is this { :
" Nuptise, sive Matrimonium, est viri et mulieris conjunctio,
individuam vitse consuetudinem constituens.*" In another
place II it is described as "Consortium omnis vitse: divini
et humani juris communicatio."
• Prov. xxxi. t Deut. xvii. 17. f Mich. Law of Moses, ii. 12.
§ Inst. I. 0. Marriage or Matrimony is the union of a man and a woman
so as to constitute an inseparable habitual course of life.
II Dig. XXIII. 21. A partnership for life, with a joint participation in all
Rights hu^an and divine.
Ch.V.] rights of marriage. 103
182. The English Law goes further, and considers
the Husband and Wife as one Person. As the Lawyers
state it * : the very being or legal existence of the woman
is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated
and consolidated in that of her husband : under whose wing,
protection, and cover, she performs everything ; and is there-
fore in our Law French a feme-concert^ foemina viro co-operta ;
and her condition during marriage is called her coverture.
Hence a man cannot grant anything to his wife by a legal
act, or enter into covenant with her ; for this would be to
covenant with himself. The husband is bound by law to
provide his wife with the necessaries of life ; if she incur
debts for such things, he is obliged to pay them. Even
if the debts of the wife have been incurred before marriage,
the husband is bound to discharge them : for he has espoused
her and her circumstances together. If she suffers an injury,
she applies for redress in her husband's name as well as her
own. If any one has a claim upon her, the suit must be
directed against her husband also. In criminal prosecutions,
indeed, the wife may be indicted and prosecuted separately ;
for the union is only a civil union. But even in such cases,
husband and wife are not allowed to be Evidence for or
against each other : partly, say the Lawyers, because it is
impossible their testimony should be impartial ; but prin-
cipally, because of the union of Person. For being thus
one Person, if they were admitted witnesses for each other,
they would contradict one maxim of Lawf* ; Nemo in propria
* Blackst. I. 442. But perhaps it would be more just to say that the
principle which limits the rules of Law, as between Husband and Wife,
is not that of the union of the two, but of the conjugal supremacy of
the Husband.
+ No one can be a witness in his own case. No one is bound to accuse
himself. But perhaps it would be more just to say, that the principal
reason is not that of the identity of person ; but that community of
interest J which prevents their being evidence for each other ; while the
public policy of preventing domestic quarrels, prohibits their being evi-
dence against each other.
104 JUS. [Book II
causa testis esse debet : and if against each other, they would
contradict another Maxim : Nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare.
In the Roman Law, on the contrary, the Husband and
Wife are considered as two distinct Persons, and may have
separate Estates, Debts, Contracts, and Injuries. And
hence, in the Ecclesiastical Courts of England, which derive
their views and maxims from the Roman Law, a woman may
sue and be sued, without her husband.
183. According to the System of Law which we
have been describing, the husband is the Head of the Fa-
mily, and the Wife is subordinate to him. He represents
the Family in its legal relations ; and in such matters she
has no Rights against him. He has a Right to act for her ;
and even, in some cases, to coerce her. The Roman Law
allowed the husband, for some misdemeanours*, " Flagellis
et fustibus acriter verberare uxorem;"'' for others, onlyf
" Modicam castigationem adhibere."" Something of the same
kind was allowed by the old Law of England ; for, say the
Lawyers, since the husband is to answer for her misbehaviour,
the Law thought it reasonable to entrust him with the
power of restraining her. And the Right to obedience, from
the Wife, is vested in the Husband, for the sake of preserving
Order in the Family, and of protecting and benefiting all
the Members of it.
184. The inequality between Men and Women, which
thus appears in the ancient conceptions of Marriage, is shown
also in the established notions of the Wrongs, by which the
Rights of Marriage are violated. Thou shalt not commit
adultery^ is the fundamental Law on this subject ; but this
was commonly applied only to the offense committed by or
with the wife. By the Jewish Law| the adulterer and the
adulteress were to be put to death. By the Old Roman
Law, the adulterer was at the mercy of the injured husband,
• To beat his wife severely with whip or stick.
t To apply moderate correction. % Levit. xx. 10.
Ch. v.] rights of marriage. 105
and might be prosecuted by any person; but under the
emperors, the Right of prosecution was hmited to the hus-
band, or the near relatives of the adulteress. The adulteress
was to be repudiated and otherwise punished. In England,
adultery, as a public crime, is under the jurisdiction of the
Ecclesiastical Courts ; but the Common Law also gives, to
the Husband, Damages from the person who was guilty of
Criminal Conversation with his wife.
185. The Right of the Parent to the obedience of
the Child is a fundamental Rule in all the ancient Forms of
Society. The Law of Moses, Honour and oley thy Father
and thy Mother ; is recognized in all nations. The ancient
Roman notions carried this so far, that they gave the Father
a Right over the life of the Son. Even in the latest times,
the Son is contemplated as entirely in the power of the Fa-
ther; and this expression implied that the Father was in-
vested with the Right to act for the Children upon all legal
occasions. The Institute says*: "Qui ex te et uxore tua
nascitur, in tua potestate est : Item qui ex filio tuo et uxore
ejus nascitur, id est nepos tuus et neptis, aequo in tua sunt
potestate ; et pronepos et proneptis, et deinceps caeteri.
Qui autem ex filia tua nascuntur, in potestate tua non sunt,
sed in patris eorum.*" And this went so far that the Son could
have no Rights against his Father. All that he acquired
became, not his, but his Father's. Some Jurists refer this
to a legal fiction of the unity of the Father and the Son ;
others, to a maxim that the condition of the Master of the
Family might be made better by the acts of the other mem-
bers of the Family, but could not legally be made worse.
* Inst. I. 9. He who is bom of you and your wife is in your power :
also he who is bom of your son and his wife, that is, your grandson and
grand-daughter, are likewise in your power ; and so your great-grandson
and great-grand-daughter ; and in the same way, for the succeeding steps.
But they who are born of your daughter are not in your power, but in
their father's.
106 JUS. [Book II.
186. The English Law does not go so far as the
Roman in this respect ; but still invests the Father with
considerable Rights over his Son. He may correct him
in a reasonable manner. He may delegate part of this
parental authority to a Tutor or Schoolmaster, who is in
loco parentis*. He has the benefit of his children's labour
so long as they live with him. He has, however, no power
over any property which the son has acquired, except as
Trustee or Guardian ; but on the other hand, the Son, while
under age, is not capable of acquiring any property, by
Contract made independently of his father.
The Rights with which the head of the Family was thus
invested carried with them corresponding obligations. As
we have already stated (182), the husband is bound to
provide his wife with the necessaries of life, and also to
pay her debts. Also, the Father is, by the English Law,
bound to provide maintenance for his own offspring. By
the Roman Law-f* this obligation was reciprocal. " Si quis
a liberis ali desideret, vel si liberi ut a parente exhibeantur,
judex de ea re cognoscet." The Head of the Family was
the Supporter, Protector, and Director of all the other
members. The Education of Children, so that they may,
in their turn, become good members of new Families, and
good Citizens, is contemplated as an important object by
most legislators ; but is, in a great measure, left to the
unforced care of parents. To neglect this oflSce, is rather
the omission of a Moral Duty, than the violation of a Legal
Obligation.
• Perhaps it would be more correct to say, that the Schoolmaster's
authority is not delegated from the parent, but analogous to the parent's.
It depends on some of the same reasons ; and exists where there is not
a parent to delegate, as well as where there is.
t Dig. XXV. 3. 5. If any one requires to be supported by his children,
or if children require to be maintained by the parent, the judge shall
take cognizance of the matter.
Ch. v.] rights of marriage. 107
187. The Family Affections, and the Moral Senti-
ments connected with them, make both men and women
look with grief and indignation upon the violation of female
chastity, in those who are under their care and protection.
The woman who gives up her person to any other man
than her husband, is conceived to be destitute of the proper
affections and sentiments of a wife ; and therefore, unfit
for the proper destination of a woman. To seduce her to
this condition, is to bring her to disgrace, and to make
her marriage with another man almost hopeless. To force
her person, brings upon her some portion of this disgrace
and calamity, in addition to the injury which is involved
in all violence. The laws of most countries recognize these
Wrongs against Female Chastity, Bape and Seduction. Thus
by the Jewish Law*, the Man who forced a betrothed
woman was to be put to death. If she was not betrothed,
he was to make her his wife, without being allowed after-
wards to put her away. The Roman Law justified homi-
cide, when committed by the woman in defense of her
chastity; or by a man, in defense of his relatives, when force
of this kind was offered. The English law, likewise, excuses
a woman killing a man who attempts to ravish her ; and
the husband or father is justified in killing a man who
attempts a Rape upon his wife or daughter. The Roman
Law, in the time of Justinian, refused to make any dis-
tinction in the guilt of the violator of chastity, whether the
woman consented or notf : " Si enim ipsi raptores, metu vel
atrocitate pcense, ab hujusmodi facinore se temperaverint,
nuUi muheri, sive volenti sive non volenti, peccandi locus
relinquetur: quia hoc ipsum mile mulierum ab insidiis ne-
quissimi hominis qui meditatur rapinam, inducitur."
• Deut. xxii. 25, &c.
t Cod. IX. 13. If through fear, and in virtue of the severity of the
punishment, seducers abstain from such offenses, no woman, willing or
unwilling, will have an opportunity of transgressing. The will of woman
is itself forced by tlie arts of the ravishcr.
108 JUS. [Book II.
188. The English Law punishes Rape with death,
but makes it a necessary ingredient in the crime that it
be committed against the will of the woman. It is some-
times assigned as a reason for the capital punishment, that
the offense is a destruction of the woman''s moral being.
But the English Law has no direct punishment for the
moral offense of Seduction, as we have seen that it has none
for Adultery. These crimes are punished indirectly, as
Loss inflicted, on the Father and the Husband. In the
latter case, the Husband may receive Damages from the
Adulterer, for the Injury done him : in the case of Seduc-
tion, the Father may recover Damages for the loss of his
daughter's Services during her pregnancy, by the act of
the Seducer, per quod sermtium amisit. The necessity of
taking this course for the remedy of these wrongs, is ex-
plained, by considering that the Common Law of England
has, for its main objects, the security of person and property ;
and therefore, does not undertake to treat offenses accord-
ing to their moral depravity, or the grief and indignation
which they produce.
189. According to the ancient legal views of the
Family, in most nations, as we have seen in the cases of
the Roman and the English Law, the possession of property
in land is an attribute of the Family, rather than of the
individual ; the right of the wife and children being merged
in, or derived from, that of the Head of the Family. Follow-
ing the same view, the Law directs that, on the death of
the Father, the land shall descend to the children : for they
then, in their turn, one or more of them, become Heads of
Families, and take the place of the Father, as members of
the State. Accordingly, in the Roman Law, when the
Father died, those of his children who were then under
his power (in patria potestate), were his proper heirs (hce-
redes sui), and divided his possessions among them ; all other
heirs were kwredes extranei. In England, on the establish-
Ch.V] rights of marriage. 109
ment of the Feudal Constitution, by William the Conqueror,
the law of primogeniture was established, by which Lands
descended to the eldest son alone. In this view, the Pro-
perty was considered as a Fief to be held by military Service ;
and the whole property was assumed to be a proper means
of supporting the dignity of the holder. The younger sons
were supposed to be provided for by the eldest, and by their
own exertions in the various professions which were open
to them, military, civil, ecclesiastical, and mercantile. It is
consistent with the view which this Rule assumes, that the
Rule was not extended to personal Property; for such pro-
perty was not held as a Fief. In this, no primogeniture is
allowed, all males and females of equal degree sharing equally.
If direct and proper heirs failed, the same view, of the
transmission of Property in the Family, led to Rules of Law
which determined the persons to whom it was to be given ;
but upon these Rules, and their differences in different states,
we need not now dwell.
1-90. In most Systems of Law, though the Law
assigned a Rule for the disposal of a man's property after his
death, the proprietor has been allowed to vary this disposal,
partly or entirely, on declaring his intention before proper
Witnesses. Hence, the Declaration so witnessed is called
Testamentum in Latin, Will in English. The ground of this
Right of the Testator is, that a man, previous to his death,
may dispose of his property, and may exercise an authority
over his children ; and that the continuity and order of the
Family were supposed to be preserved, by allowing this
Right to operate through the time of his death, and there,
fore after that moment. Yet the RigKt of the Testator,
like the other Rights of Property, is limited by Rules of
Law. The Roman Law says * : " Testamenti factio non
* Dig, XXVIII. 1. 3. The Right of making a Testament is a Right
by Law.
110 JUS. [Book II.
privati sed public! juris est."" In the early times of Rome
the citizens made their Wills at the Public Assemblies
{Calata Comitid)^ although afterwards, other modes of pro-
cedure were introduced.
191. The Right of disposing of property by Testa-
ment, was not unlimited. If a man had a Son under his
power^ he was obliged either to make him an heir, or to
exhcBredate him, expressly assigning a reason : and even if
other near relations, who would without a Testament have
inherited, were passed over in silence, they could claim a
portion of the property : the Testament in such a case was
called inqfficiosum Testamentum, as being made non ex officio
192. In England, the power of disposing by Will
of a portion of a man's moveable property was recognized
by Magna Charta* : but until modern times, a man could
leave only one-third of his moveable property away from
his wife and children. No Will of lands was permitted till
the time of Henry the Eighth ; and then, only of a certain
portion -f : nor was it till after the Restoration of Charles
the Second, that the power of devising became so universal
as it is at present. By the English Law, a man''s Heirs
were contemplated as interested in his property, as well
as the man himself. Property, from this attribute of being
inherited, was called Hereditaments. Hence it was held,
by the Lawyers, that no freehold interest in land could be
conveyed, without the use of the word Heirs. If Land
be given to a man for ever, or to him and his Assigns for
ever, this vests in him but an estate for life. This limitation
was founded upon a view borrowed from the Feudal System,
according to which the estate was given in consideration of
the Tenant's personal qualities, to be held by personal service.
The limitation was upheld by a maxim of the Roman Jurists :
• Bl. IV. 423. t lb. II. 12.
Ch. v.] RIGHTS OF MARRIAGE.. m
" Donationes sunt stricti juris, ne quis plus donasse praesu-
matur quam expresserit."
193. Although at present the proprietor in England
has, in general, the Right of disposing of the Estate by
Will, there is an exception to this, in the case of entailed
Estates. This power of entailing was established by the
Statute of Westminster, the Second, (in the thirteenth year
of Edward I.), which is commonly called the Statute De
Bonis Conditionalihus. This law gave the Proprietor a power
of transmitting to his Heirs the enjoyment of the Property,
without their having the Right of transmitting it to any one,
except the Heirs who should come after them. Property,
thus limited, was termed Feudum taUiatum, a curtailed fief,
feetail ; from which expression the word entailed comes.
194. Besides the power of disposing of the whole
Estate, both the Roman and the English Law allow the
Proprietor the power of giving Legacies {Legata) to special
persons. But all such Bequests are limited by the con-
dition, that the Testator's Debts must first be paid.
195. There are other distributions of property, which,
according to the laws of various countries, arise out of Mar-
riage; as the Dowry, or Dower of the Bride, {Dotarium,
Douaire), in the Roman Law, Dos : and the Jointure of the
widow; {Junctura, a joint possession). On these it is not
necessary here to dwell.
196. As the Law, in the general case, directs that the
heir should receive the benefit of his Father's property {Pa-
trimonium) after his death, so it also directed that he should,
if it were necessary, receive the benefit of his Father's guid-
ance. In the Roman Law, the Father had power to appoint,
by Testament, a person to exercise parental care and respon-
sibility for his son or daughter after his death, so long as
the child was of unripe age (impuhes). This Guardian was
called Tutor ^ or Curator ; the child was his PupiUus. The
112 JUS. [BookII.
Tutor had the care of the person, the Curator of the estate.
Without the sanction of the Curator, the Pupillus could do
no act by which he diminished his property. But the care
of the person of the child belonged, in a great degree, to the
Mother, as the care of the property did to the Curator.
When the Father did not appoint a Tutor by his Will, the
Law of the Twelve Tables gave the Tutela to the nearest
relatives*; " Legitimae Tutelae lege xii Tabularum agnatis
delatse sunt, et consanguineis ; item patruis : id est, his qui
ad legitimam hsereditatem admitti possunt : hoc, summa
providentia, ut qui sperarent banc successionem, iidem tueren-
tur bona, ne dilapidentur.'' The view of the ancient English
Law was quite different. It also gave a Guardian to a
Minor ; but the Guardianship devolved upon the next of
kin who could not inherit the Estate. The Law, it is saidf,
judges it improper to trust the person of an infant {3Iinor)
to a person who may by possibility become heir to him ; that
there may be no temptation, nor even suspicion of tempta-
tion, for him to abuse his trust.
197. An English Law of more modern times, (the
12th year of Charles II,) allows the Father to appoint a
Guardian to his Son, by Deed or Will, so long as he is
a Minor, that is, under the full legal age. This age is in
England twenty-one: Scotland agrees with England, both
probably copying the old Saxon Rules which prevailed on
the Continent. By the Roman Law, a youth could perform
certain legal acts at the age of fourteen ; but up to the age
of twenty-five, he could not dispose of property, without being
supported by the Authority of a Curator I.
* Dig. XXVI. 4, 1. Guardianship according to Law is by the Twelve
Tables given to the father's relations and to relations by blood, that is to
those who may have a legal claim to the inheritance. And this was
prudently done, that those who are allowed to look for the succession
may see that the estate is not dilapidated.
tBl. 1.461. t^iff- IV. 4.].
Ch. v.] rights of marriage. 113
198. All that has been said of the Rights and Obli-
gations of a Man with regard to his Wife and Children,
apply only to such wife and children as the law recognizes :
to his lawful wife, and his legitimate children, born of a
lawful marriage. What a Lawful Marriage is, the Law
must define.
Marriage is a Contract; and though it is, in most
countries, a Contract of a special character, solemnized with
peculiar ceremonies, it must be, in many respects, governed
by the general Rules of Contracts. Thus, the persons
marrying must be of sound mind ; of the age which the Law
considers as mature ; and free from other legal impediments,
such as an inconsistent previous Contract. They must also
understand each other to intend that perpetual union which
Marriage implies.
199. By the Roman Law, the essence of Marriage
was Consent ; the Consent " both of those who come
together, and of those under whose power they are." This
Consent was to be manifested by some public act ; for in-
stance, Declaration before friends, and afterwards continued
Cohabitation for a year. This mode of marriage was Urns.
But ancient custom had handed down and sanctioned other
forms of marriage, confarreatio and coemptio^ by which the
woman became part of the man'*s household. She was then
said in manum mri convenire.
200. By the old Law of England*, a Contract made
per mrha de prwsenti, by words in the present tense, was
a valid marriage : thus, / take thee M. for my husband:
I take thee N. for my wife. The same is still the case by
the Law of Scotland. Also, a promise of marriage ^er verba
de futuro ; — / will marry thee ; — became a valid marriage
by cohabitation ; in the same way in which a contract con-
cerning goods became valid by the delivery of the goods.
* BJ. I. 489.
VOL. I. I
1L4 JUS. [Book II.
By later English Statutes, marriages in England were, for
many purposes, not allowed to be valid, except such as were
celebrated after due notice {Banns or License) in some parish-
church or public chapel ; and by a person in Sacred Orders.
But this restriction has since been enlarged, so that the
religious part of the ceremony is no longer necessary.
201 . With reference to the grounds on which Mar-
riage has very generally been accompanied w^ith a rehgious
sanction, we may remark, that the Conjugal Union is con-
templated, not as a mere Contract for Cohabitation, but
as an engagement binding the parties to mutual affection,
and to a community of the scheme and ends of life. Hence
a mere legal Contract, which must regard actions alone,
cannot express its full import. The Sentiment of Duty
must be brought into operation, and the appeal to this
sentiment belongs to the province of Religion (84).
202. Divorce is the Separation of the Marriage
Union. According to the Roman Law, as the Consent and
Conjugal Affection of the parties was an essential part of a
marriage, their acquiescence was necessary to its continu-
ance. Either party might declare his or her intention to
dissolve the connexion ; and no judicial decree, or inter-
ference of public authority, was requisite in order to carry
this purpose into effect. Yet such separations were gene-
rally made with some form. As there was Marriage by
confarreatio and coemptio, there was Divorce by diffarreatio
and emancipatio. Bepudium was the rejection of a Mar-
riage promised by Sponsalia {Betrothing)^ but not completed.
The practice of Divorce was afterwards checked by Law
(the Lex Papia Poppcea). Under the Christian Emperors
it was punished in various ways; but still the power re-
mained, subject to certain forms in its exercise.
203. There is no Law of England which authorizes
Divorce. Every particular case must be the effect of a
Ch. v.] RIGHTS OF MARRIAGE. 115
Special Act of Parliament. Even the gravest violation of
the Rights of Marriage, Adultery, is, by the English Law,
only cause of separation from led and hoard ; it does not
lead to a dissolution of the Marriage. The reason given
for this by the Commentators is, that if Divorce were
allowed to depend upon a matter within the power of either
of the parties, they would probably be extremely frequent.
The Ecclesiastical Courts, which have a portion of the juris-
diction concerning Marriages, in virtue of the religious cha-
racter of the ordinance, can, upon due grounds, grant a
separation, not only a mensd et thoro, but a total Divorce a
vinculo matrimonii. But this must be for causes of impedi-
ment existing before the marriage. When these are shown,
the marriage is declared null, as having been unlawful ah
initio^ and the parties are separated pro salute animarum^
that they may not endanger their Souls by living in a state
of known sin. But still the Ecclesiastical Law, like the
Common Law of England, grants no Divorce for any Super-
venient Cause ; according to Commentators *, it deems so
highly, and with such mysterious reverence, the nuptial tie,
that it will not allow it to be unloosed for any cause whatever
that arises after the Union is made. But it is mainly moved
to take this view of marriage by the authority of religion.
204. As we have already seen, the only kind of
Marriage which is recognized by the Roman Law as com-
plete, is that of one husband with one wife. Climate does
not necessarily occasion any exception to this Rule. Thus
the Law of Justinian, promulgated by the Romans in the
climate of modem Turkey, is express -j- : " Duas uxores
eodem tempore habere non licet."
Yet the Laws of several Countries in various ways take
note of other unions arising from the irregular operation
• Bl. 1. 440.
t Inst. I. 10. G. It is not lawful to have two wives at the same time.
116 JUS. [Book II.
of those Desires and Affections which lead to Family con-
nexions. There are various provisions in the Laws of Rome
respecting Concubines; and in our own Laws, with regard
to Illegitimate Children, or Bastards. By the Roman Law,
a true marriage could only take place between Roman
citizens*: " Justas nuptias inter se cives Romani contra-
hunt qui secundum precepta legum coeunt,"*"' No other
unions were complete marriages.
It depends upon the law, and the general structure of
each State, whom a citizen is allowed to marry. He may be
prohibited from taking a wife beyond a certain circle. He
may be forbidden to marry a stranger. He may be compel-
led to marry, not only within his own Nation, but within his
own Tribe.
205. On the other hand, men and women are, in
almost all countries, forbidden to marry within a certain
circle of relationship. Marriages within these limits were
forbidden by the Romans as Nuptice incestce ; and the union
of persons so related is Incest. Such unions were those of
Parents and Children, Brothers and Sisters -(-. "Nuptiae
consistere non possunt inter eas personas quae in numero
parentium liberorumve sunt, sive proximi sive ulterioris gra-
dus sunt, usque ad infinitum." The degrees of kindred
between which marriage is prohibited have been different
in different times and places. But everywhere incestuous
unions have been looked upon not only with condemnation,
but with horrour. It has been conceived that there is a
Divine curse upon them.
The chastity of woman, which, as we have seen (187), is
so highly prized, requires to be guarded and supported by the
* Inst. I. 10. 1. That is a true marriage which is contracted between
Roman citizens who come together in the manner directed by the Law.
t Marriage cannot take place between those persons who stand in the
relation of parents and children, whetlier of a near or of a more remote
degree, to any number of steps.
Ch. v.] RIGHTS OF MARRIAGE. 117
sympathy and reverence of her Family for this treasure.
Her relatives, with whom she familiarly lives, especially her
Father and her Brothers, are the natural Guardians of her
purity. In the intercourse between men and women not
withheld by any impediment, the thoughts often turn to
the union of sexes. Men are prone to solicit, and women
apt to yield, when the union is one on which the thoughts
are allowed to dwell. The opportunity and authority which
near relationships usually give, would add to this tendency,
if the belief of a Divine curse upon transgression did not
keep the thoughts and affections in harmony with the rever-
ence for the woman's chastity. The Law supports this tone
of the thoughts and affections, by its prohibition of incestuous
marriages.
Chapter VI.
THE EIGHTS OF GOVEENMENT, OE
STATE EIGHTS.
206. We have already stated (48), that among the
most powerful Springs of Human Action is the Desire of
Civil Society; and that man cannot exist as man except
he exist in Civil Society, under the sway of Eules of Action
really enforced by some of the Members of the Community.
Those Members of the Community, whose office it thus is
to enforce the Eules, through which the Community sub-
sists, are, for this purpose, invested with Eights, which
are here termed Bights of Gomrnment. The possessor
of these Eights is spoken of as having Authority in the
Community.
207. We have rights of this kind even in the Family;
and especially in Families where the paternal Power is most
118 JUS. [Book n.
ample. As we have seen (185), in some countries, the
Father has exercised a power of Life and Death over the
Son. We may, in such a case, conceive the Father laying
down Rules for the conduct of the Family, and enforcing
them by any penalties which he may appoint.
When the Children of such a Family grow up, and when
they themselves marry and have children, we may still
conceive the habit of obedience to the Head of the Family
to remain. As the Family extends, it becomes a Family
in a wider sense ; a House, a Tribe, a Clan, a Nation ; but
it may still continue to recognize a Supreme Right to
obedience in the common parent. Such is a Patriarchal
Gomrnrmnt. The Right of Government is here vested
entirely in the Patriarch. The other members of the Com-
munity have only the Obligation of Obedience towards him.
208. The Patriarchal Government is naturally broken
up by the death of the Patriarch. We may suppose a
Patriarchal Government to be continued generation after
generation, by some agreement in the Family, as to who
is to inherit the Patriarchal Authority : but such a govern-
ment, though it may exist as an Institution, is no longer
the natural result of the Family habits of affection and
obedience. To obey a brother, a nephew, or a remoter
relative, is not a natural, necessary, and universal rule. The
Patriarchal Form of Society being broken up, the mixtures
of Families, their migrations and various fortunes, still
further loosen and destroy the bonds of Patriarchal Go-
vernment, and form men into Nations, according to various
conditions of race, dwelling-place, and history. The National
Government then takes place of the Patriarchal.
209. The person or persons in whom the Supreme
Authority in each nation resides, are determined in every
case by the History of the nation (97). The whole past
History of each nation has terminated in the Fact of its
Ch. VI.] GOVERNMENT, OR STATE RIGHTS. 119
present Government. In the Course of History, the Govern-
ing Authorities of Nations have passed into various hands,
have been variously distributed, and have assumed many
various forms. Nations which were. formerly separate, are
now united under the same Supreme Authority: Nations
which were formerly united as one, have now separate
governments : the Lines of Succession of Governors, the
modes of appointing them, the way of their exercising their
authority in each nation, have changed. The Laws by
which they govern have also changed. But in every Nation,
so far as it is subjected to Rules of Action ; so far as
its members really possess Rights and Obligations; there
is some Supreme Authority, in which the Rights of Govern-
ment are vested.
210. The Supreme Authority may reside in one
Person, or in many. It may be exercised by one Person,
under conditions depending upon the consent and co-
operation of others. In almost all nations, there is a
Difference of RanJcs^ connected with the conditions of the
exercise of the Supreme Power. Besides the highest Gover-
nor, (King, Consul, President, or in whatever other name
he governs,) there are Nobles, Senators, Lords, Citizens,
Aliens, often Slaves. Some of these Ranks have Authority,
which, like that of the highest Governor, is the result of
the History of the Nation. They have Rights with reference
to each other, determined by Laws and Customs, tradi-
tionally received, or historically instituted.
The structure of a Society considered with regard to this
Difference of Ranks, is its Political Structure. The Laws
and Customs which determine the Rights of different Ranks,
aud their share in the Supreme Authority, are the Constitution
of the Nation.
In every Constitution, the Supreme Authority is termed
also the Sovereign Power. As the Constitution places the
120 -JUS. [Book II.
Sovereign power in the hands of One, or of a few men of
Rank, or of the General Body of the Citizens, the State is
a Monarchy, an Aristocracy^ or a Democracy. These are
the Simple Forms of Government.
The Sovereign Power executes the existing Laws, and
on all occasions, both in reference to the citizens within the
State, and to persons and states without, acts for the State.
These are the Executive Functions of the Government.
211. It is the existence of a Supreme Authority, or
Government, which gives reality to the other Rights; —
the Rights of the Person, of Property, of Contract, of Mar-
riage. The Government acts as the State (94), and carries
into effect the Laws by which Rights and Obligations are
defined. The Government also, by means of its tribunals
and Judges (94), decides disputed questions which arise
among its citizens concerning their Rights and Obligations.
These are the Judicial Functions of the Government.
But the Definitions of Rights and Obligations, though
given by the Law of each nation, are not arbitrary and
capricious (105). They are intended in all nations to be
right ; that is, conformable to the Supreme Rule of Human
action. They are intended to be just, that is, conformable
to the Moral Idea of Justice, as well as to the actual Fact
of Law. Such Moral Ideas will be the subject of our con-
sideration hereafter.
212. Offenses against the Rights of Government are
Rebellion, when subjects openly and by force resist the
Governors : Treason, when by combination and contrivance
they seek to dispossess them : Sedition, when they attempt
to transfer some of the functions of Government from the
Governors to other hands. In many free states, where the
citizens have a considerable share in the government, they
are divided into Parties, which act upon opposite or dif-
ferent maxims in the administration of the State. When
Ch. VI] government, or state rights. 121
a Party acts not for the good of the State, but for its own
advantage as a Party, it is a Faction.
213. Since, in all Nations, the Definitions of Rights
and Obligations are intended to be right and just, it is
natural that there should be much that is common in the
views and determinations of all nations on these subjects.
That which is common in the determinations of all Nations
respecting Rights and Obligations, is called Jus Naturae^ or
Jus Gentium. That which is peculiar in the Law of a
particular State or City, is called Jus Cimle^ or Jus Muni-
cipale. We may distinguish these two kinds of Jus as
Natural Jus and National Jus. Jus Civile, Ciml Law, is
often used to denote Jus Civile Bomanorum, the Roman
Law.
214. Nations or States are, for the most part, inde-
pendent bodies, with no common authority to which they can
refer. Each is a Sovereign State, acknowledging no Superior.
Hence there is no Authority which can define or enforce
their Rights which they claim against each other. But the
general rules and analogies of Natural Jus (212) lead to
determinations of the Rights and Obligations of Nations,
which form a body of acknowledged Law. This body of
Law is Jus inter Gentes, and may be termed International
215. Though the existing Government in each Nation
is a Fact, the result of preceding historical Facts (209),
it is not merely a Fact. Governments for the most part
claim to exist by Justice, as well as by Power. They
recognize the Rules of National Jus and International Jus
of which we have spoken ; and assert themselves to be
Governments de jure as well as de facto. Moral Ideas,
and the Sentiments combined with them, have great force
among the springs of action {5^^ ; and thus the opinion,
generally prevalent, that any person or body of persons
122 JUS. [Book II.
does or does not possess the Government of a Nation de
jure^ will very materially effect the support and obedience
which men will render to it, and will thus determine the
historical fact of its standing or falling. The existing
Government is a Fact; but it is a Fact determined by
the previously operating Idea of Justice. Its power rests
on the general opinion of its Authority. Might does not
make Right ; the opinion of Right makes Might ; and
the Might thus generated determines all subordinate ques-
tions of Right.
216. Although we at first, while treating of Jus,
consider the Laws of each State as absolutely fixed and
given (105), yet Laws are intended, as we have said (211),
to be just. Hence the State has, for one of its offices, to
remove out of the Laws all that is unjust, so as to make
them more and more just. That part of the Governing Body
which is by the Constitution (210) thus invested with
Authority to make and alter Laws, is the Legislatiw Body^
or Legislature. The Executive and Judicial branches of
Government, of which we have already spoken (210, 211),
and the Legislative Branch now spoken of, form the three
great Members of every Constitution.
217. It will be our business hereafter to consider
the Moral Idea of Justice, and its consequences; but we
may already easily discern cases in which the general analogy
of Natural Jus would lead to a modification of Laws. If,
for instance, one Nation have made war upon another,
invaded the Country, and reduced the inhabitants to slavery :
(as in ancient times was the Rule of International Jus;)
when the conquered inhabitants have lived as slaves for
many generations, it would be agreeable to National Jus
to annul the Laws which keep the slaves in bondage (this
being done, of course, by the proper legislative authority).
For the ancient conquest, in which the condition of the
Ch. VI.] GOVERNMENT, OR STATE RIGHTS. 123
slaves was founded, was a transitory and accidental event,
and cannot properly be the basis of an eternal Law. In-
deed, the progress of time not only obliterates the effect
of such events, but overthrows even the Rules of' Inter-
national Jus by which the events formerly produced such
effects : for it is now no longer a Rule of International
Law, that when one nation conquers another in war, it
makes slaves of the inhabitants.
By following such changes, States may aim at constantly
making their Laws continually more and more just. In
doing so, they tend to bring together the Idea of Justice
and the Fact of Law. The Laws are rendered just ; and
they are actually carried into effect because they are the
measures of Justice.
218. The Idea and the Fact cannot be separated.
We cannot have Justice without Law, that is, without
actual historical Law. For Justice requires us to give to
each man his own, and Law alone determines what is each
man'*s own. If we draw inferences from the notion of Justice,
without taking account of the traditions of Law and History,
we shall be led to contradiction and confusion. Thus, if
we say that Justice implies Equality, and if we thereupon
attempt to make the Property of all citizens always equal,
we destroy the conception of Property. If, on the like
ground, we declare that no man shall lose by a Contract,
we destroy the conception of a Contract. Justice implies
Property, and Property implies permanent actual possession,
historically established. Justice implies Contracts ; and a
Contract implies that a transaction which takes place at
one time, determines arbitrarily what follows. If we do
not take the historical definitions of Property, Contract,
and the like, the things themselves disappear ; and there
is no longer any material for the Idea of Justice to act
upon.
124 JUS. [Book II.
And on the other hand, we cannot be content with the
mere Fact of Law, without the idea of Justice. Power
without Authority, Might without Right, give Possession,
but do not give Property. In order that Law may be
looked upon as Law, it must be combined with Justice.
219. Actual and fixed Laws are requisite as means
for the moral education of the members of the State (104).
For the Moral Ideas are educed in man by his being made
to understand the Terms denoting Moral Conceptions ; and
these Terms become intelligible by being applied under defi-
nite conditions. Moral Conceptions cannot be applied, with-
out assuming the jural Conceptions of Property, Contract,
Marriage, and the hke. A child cannot learn that he ought
not to take what is not his own, except he be made to under-
stand what is, and what is not, his own. The Laws being,
as in many States they are or have been, familiarly made
known to young persons, form an important part of their
education. And the Reasons commonly given for the Laws,
involve the Idea of Justice, and serve to educe that Idea in
the minds of the citizens.
220. Among the ancient Romans, the earliest Laws,
and the Maxims and Formulae of Laws, were thus inculcated
iii the earliest years of life. Their children were made fami-
liar with these expressions, as our children are with Nursery
Rhymes. Cicero says* to his brother : "A pueris enim didi-
cimus Si in jus vocat, atque ejusmodi alias leges nominare."
And again -j-: "Nostis quae sequuntur; discebamus enim pueri
xn (Tabulas) ut carmen necessiarum." And it was the
office of the higher class of Romans to expound the appli-
cation and interpretation of the Law to their clients. The
familiarity with the Law, thus generated, joined with a
* De Leg, li. 4. From the time of our boyhood we learnt, If a man sues
you at Law, and other Laws of that kind, by rote.
t Id. II. 23. You know what follows, for when we were boys we leamt
the Twelve Tables like a familiar rhyme.
Ch. VI.] GOVERNMENT, OR STATE RIGHTS. 125
belief that the Roman Law was the perfection of justice,
constituted a Moral Education for the Romans.
In like manner, the habitual use of expressions implying
moral qualities and moral sentiments, calls up moral notions
and moral sentiments in those who thus learn the language
of morality. But moral notions and moral sentiments can
have no definiteness and fixity, except the Rules by which
their objects are determined are definite and fixed ; and
these Rules are Law and Custom.
Each successive generation, deriving its education from
the existing Laws and Customs of the Nation, and being
imbued with a belief that these Laws, and the Maxims which
they imply, are right and just, will transmit the same edu-
cation to the next generation. And thus the stability and
consistency of the State will be preserved.
221. Thus the Laws of each country must be in
a great measure fixed and permanent, in order that the
Moral Education of the citizens may go forwards consistently,
and in order that the Stability of the State may be preserved.
But the Laws, if they are to be just, cannot be absolutely
fixed ; because if they were so, they would involve arbitrary
elements, depending entirely upon the accidental events and
Institutions of former times ; and this mixture of an Arbitrary
Element is inconsistent with the Idea of Justice.
The Idea of Justice, so far as it has operated in forming
the Laws of any State, has operated in each generation upon
the materials which the existing state of the Community
supplied, and has thus more or less modified the Laws in each
generation. It would not be the Idea of Justice, if it did
not produce such modifications ; for it is not just that there
should be arbitrary inequalities among men. But differences
among men and classes of men, arising from the events of
former times, can never be removed ; because the present
condition of man is, in all cases, determined by their past
126 JUS. [Book II.
condition : and among the features of this present condition,
are their convictions as to their Rights and Obligations, which
necessarily are derived from the past. For example, it is not
just that there should be arbitrary differences in the distribu-
tion of Property. But there must be vast inequalities in the
distribution of Property; for Property being a permanent
thing, the inequalities of its distribution go on accumulating
for ages ; and this is not unjust. Yet still, these Rules of
permanence in Property must not be regarded as absolutely
fixed. Justice or Humanity may require such fixed Rules
to bend ; as we have seen that fixed Rules of Law bend in
cases of necessity, as self-defence and the like (118 and 152).
And it may be jusii or humane, not merely to make an
exception to the Law, but to alter the Law ; and the Law
itself may thus become more just and more humane.
222. Thus the Law, in so far as it is a given fixed
Fact, is a means of Education, by giving shape and sub-
stance to our Ideas. But again, it is to be a means of
Moral Education, and is to give shape and substance to
our Ideas of Justice : and for this purpose it must be fixed
only so far as Justice makes it fixed. The Law must per-
petually and slowly tend towards the idea of Justice; —
slowly, because it must always be fixed enough to afford
a standing ground for our thoughts and a means of edu-
cation;— perpetually, because there will never cease to re-
main some portion of the arbitrary historical element, on
which it is its office still to operate.
Since we are thus brought to views in which the Idea
of Justice comes under our consideration, (and by the like
reasonings we should be led to other Moral Ideas,) we
shall now proceed to the part of our subject to which
these Ideas belong, — Morahty.
223. Before we proceed, it will be proper to observe
that there are other Classes of Rights, which we have not
Ch. VI.] GOVERNMENT, OR STATE RIGHTS. 127
yet considered, because they are of a less extensive and
fundamental kind than the Five Principal Classes. Also,
they involve Moral notions and offices of the Reason not
yet treated of. Of these we may briefly notice the Right
of Reputation.
The Eight of Beputation.
224. We have noticed the Desire of Esteem, and the
Fear of Condemnation and Infamy, as Springs of Human
Action (55). Although the objects to which these Desires
tend are notions which are not unfolded in our minds with-
out the operation of reflection ; they are, still, so universal,
that the tranquillity of man in society cannot subsist, except
the objects of these, as of other Desires, are estabhshed as
Rights. Contumely, the expression of condemnation and
scorn, naturally provoke acts of violence; and may often,
on that account, be prohibited, as the first step in a violation
of personal Rights. To take away a man''s Good Name,
or Good Repute, may prevent his neighbours trusting him,
and may bring on him great loss. Hence the law forbids
such acts*. " Si quis librum ad infamiam alicujus pertinen-
tem scripserit, composuerit, ediderit, dolove malo fecerit, quo
quod eorum fieret, etiamsi alterius nomine ediderit, vel sine
nomine, uti de ea re agere liceret." But the Commentator
adds, that this is punishable only if the infamy be unde-
served | : '•'- Eum qui nocentem infamaverit, non est bonum
sequum ob eam rem condemnari ; peccata enim nocentium
nota esse et oportere et expedire." But a man's good Repu-
• Dig. xLvii. 10. 5. If any one shall have written, composed, put forth,
or by any trick caused to be written, composed, or put forth, any book
tending to the defamation of another, even though it be put forth in the
name of another person, or without a name, he may be proceeded against.
t Dig. XLVII. 10. 18. For defaming a guilty man, it is not right and fit
that a man be condemned; for the crimes of guilty men ought to be
known.
128 JUS. Book II.
tation, when deserved, is protected as a personal right* :
"Est enim famse, ut et vitse, habenda ratio." In like
manner, the English Law takes cognizance of injuries
affecting a man's Reputation, committed by malicious, slan-
derous, and scandalous words, spoken, or otherwise published,
and tending to his damage and derogation. The Rule with
regard to the words which the Law thus considers injurious,
is, that they are such as may endanger a man by subjecting
liim to the penalties of the Law; may exclude him from
Society ; may impair his Trade, or may affect him as a
Magistrate, or one in pubhc Trust. But it is added by the
Lawyers, that mere Scurrility, or opprobrious words, which
neither in themselves import, nor are in fact attended with
any hurtful effects, are not punishable by the common Law.
Such Scandals are however cognizable in the Ecclesiastical
Courts ; as for instance, to call a man an adulterer or a
heretic. By the Common Law, words uttered in the heat
of passion, as to call a man a Rogue or a Rascal, if pro-
ductive of no ill consequences, are not punishable. Nor are
words of advice or admonition punishable, in consequence
of any ill spoken of the person admonished; for, say the
Lawyers, they are not maliciously spoken. Moreover, if the
person who has spoken ill of another, be able to prove the
words to be true, he justifies himself, even though special
damage have ensued ; for then it is no slander or false tale ;
as we have seen is the provision also in the Roman Law.
• Dig. xLviT. 10. 18. For reputation, as well as life, is to be protected
by Law.
BOOK III.
MORALITY.
OF VIRTUES AND DUTIES.
VOL. I.
BOOK III
MORALITY.
OF YIETUES AND DUTIES.
Chapter I.
OF MORAL PRECEPTS.
225. By the constitution of our human nature, we
are necessarily led to assume and refer to a Supreme Rule
of human action ; and to conceive human actions, our own
and those of other men, to be absolutely right, when they
are conformable to this Rule. In order that such a Rule
may have a definite form, in human Society, men must have
Rights ; and must also have their Obligations, corresponding,
in each man, to the Rights of others. The real existence of
Rights and Obligations is a condition requisite for the defi-
nite application of the Supreme Rule of Human Action : for,
by the existence of Rights and Obligations, the objects of
human desire and affection assume such a general and ab-
stract form, that they may be made the subjects of Rules of
Action. These points have been discussed and established
in the First Book.
The Rights and Obligations which really exist among men
are regulated by Laws, or Customs equivalent to Laws.
Some of the most important of such Laws have been stated
in the Second Book. Laws regard external actions only.
But external actions are the result of internal actions,
namely, of Will and Intention, of Mental Desires and of
k2
132 MORALITY. [Book III.
Affections. These internal actions are essential parts of
external actions, considered as human actions; or rather,
these internal actions, Desire, Affection, Intention, Will,
are the only really human part of actions.
External actions, as the motions in our own limbs, and
the motions and changes thereby produced in material things,
and in the state of other persons, are not our actions,
except so far as they are the consequences of our intention
and will. When we have willed, what follows is a conse-
quence of Laws of Nature, extraneous to us; and derives
its character of right or wrong, so far as we are concerned
in it, from the Will, and that which preceded the Will.
Thus, if I fire off a pistol and kill a man, his pain and death,
the grief of his friends, the loss to his family and his country,
all follow as the consequence of the act of Will by which I
pull the trigger. They are all morally included in that
act of the Will. All those consequences are produced by
the working of the Springs of Action within me. They
may all be prevented by the operation of other Faculties,
withholding me from this act of Will. Hence the Will,
the Springs of Action which impel it, and the Faculties
which control and direct it, must be the main subjects of
our consideration, in treating of actions as right and wrong.
Will, Intention, Desire, Affection, are governed, not
merely by external objects and by transient impulses, but by
Habits and Dispositions, which give a permanent character
to the operation of the Springs of Action and of the control-
ling Faculties.
226. The Reason is the Faculty by which we con-
ceive General Rules, and Special Cases as conformable to
General Rules (14). It is therefore the Faculty by which
we conceive Actions as right or wrong. The Moral Senti-
ments, Approval of what is right, Condemnation of what is
wrong, are powerful Springs of action (82), and thus impel
Ch. I.] OF MORAL PRECEPTS. 133
us to carry into effect the judgments formed by the Reason.
When we intentionally conform to the Supreme Rule, we
speak of our actions as rightly directed by our Reason.
Actions to which we are rightly directed by our Reason
are Duties. The Habits and Dispositions by which we per-
form our Duties are Virtues. Morality is the Doctrine of
Duties and Virtues.
227. The internal actions, Desire, Affection, Intention,
Will, point to external Acts ; they have external acts for
their Objects, and derive their character and significance, as
right or wrong, from the external Acts to which they thus
point. Thus the Desire of Having leads to Acts of appro-
priation, and derives its character, as right or wrong, from
the Acts of appropriation to which it points. Hence, if this,
or any other internal Act, point to external Acts of which
the character, as right or wrong, is already determined in the
preceding Book ; these internal Acts have their characters
as right or wrong determined. If the Desire of Having
point to the Act of Stealing, which Act is wrong; the Desire
itself is wrong. For, as we have already said, it is the
internal Springs of Action from which the Act derives its
character of wrong. If it be wrong, it is so because the
Desire and Intention which produce it are wrong.
The character of actions considered with reference to the
internal Springs of Action from which they proceed, is their
Moral character.
The Moral character of actions is governed by their jural
character. To steal is jurally wrong ; it is contrary to
universal natural Law. Hence the Volition which aims at
theft is morally wrong. The Intention which points to theft
is also morally wrong. The Desire of that which belongs to
another is morally wrong. These internal acts are wrong,
even if the external act do not take place. It is wrong
to put my hand in a man's pocket in order to pick it, even
134 MORALITY. [Book III.
if I find nothing there. It is wrong to intend to do so,
even if I am prevented making the attempt by the presence
of a looker-on. It is wrong to desire another man's money,
even if I do not proceed to take it.
228. As there are Laws, which express Eules of ex-
ternal action, there are also Moral Precepts^ which express
Rules of internal action ; that is, of Will and Intention,
of the Desires and Affections. Thus the Law is. Do not
steal ; the Moral Precept is. Do not covet, or desire what is
another's.
Such Moral Precepts express our Duties. They may be
put in various forms. Thus the Precept, Do not covet,
may be expressed by saying, It is wrong to covet ; We ought
not to covet ; We must not covet ; We should not covet ;
We are not to covet ; It is our Dutt/ not to covet ; We are
morally hound not to covet ; We must not he guilty of covet-
ousness.
229. As the Laws which describe our principal Obli-
gations have reference respectively to the principal Desires
and Affections of our nature, the Moral Precepts which
respect those Desires will correspond to each of our prin-
cipal Obligations. Hence we shall have Precepts of Duty
corresponding to each of the Classes of Rights, of which
we have spoken in the last Book.
Thus there are Rights of the Person, and a correspond-
ing Class of Obligations. We are bound by Law to ab-
stain from inflicting any personal harm on any one through
anger, malice, or negligence. We are therefore bound
morally to abstain from the affections which aim at any such
harm, and the habits of mind which lead to it. It is our
Duty to avoid Anger, Mahce, and the Carelessness which
may lead to another'^s hurt. The Moral Precepts are ; Be
not angry with any man : Bear no Malice : Neglect no one"'s
safety.
Ch. I.] OF MORAL PRECEPTS. 135
There are the Rights of Property, and a corresponding
Class of Obligations. We are bound by Law not to meddle
with the Property of another ; not to take or appropriate
what is not our own. We are morally bound to abstain
from the Intentions and Desires which point to such appro-
priation. It is our Duty to avoid the Wish to possess what
is another'^s. The Moral Precept is, Do not covet.
There is a Class of Obligations which regards Contracts
and Promises. We are bound by Law to perform our
Contracts ; not to break our Engagements. We are morally
bound not to wish to break our Engagements. And as
the moral obligation is not confined by mere legal limits,
we are morally bound to perform our engagements, whether
or not they are legally valid as Contracts. It is our Duty
to perform our Promises: not to deceive or mislead any
man by our words. The Moral Precepts are, Do not break
your word ; Do not deceive.
There is a Class of Obligations which regards the Mar-
riage Union. We are bound by Law not to meddle with
the person, or seduce the conjugal affection, of her who
belongs to another. There is a Class of Duties which
regard the Desires and Affections on which this Union is
founded. We are morally bound not to allow these Desires
and Affections to point to unlawful objects. The Moral
Precept is, Do not lust after her.
There is a Class of Obhgations which regard the Gover-
nors and the Government of the State to which we belong.
We are jurally bound to obey the Governors, and to conform
our actions to the Law. We are morally bound to conform our
Desires and Intentions to the Law. It is our Duty to submit
to positive Laws, as the realization and definition of the Su-
preme Law. The Moral Precepts are. Do not desire what
the Law forbids. Do not desire to violate general Laws.
The Moral Precepts just stated : Be not angry : Bear
136 MORALITY. [Book III.
no malice : Do not covet : Do not lie : Do not deceive : Do
not lust : Do not desire to break Law : are to be applied
to the whole train of our affections, desires, thoughts, and
purposes, and to the whole course of actions, internal and
external, which make up our lives. By their application
to the various circumstances of human character and con-
dition, the Classes of Duties, thus pointed out, are further
particularized and defined.
Chapter II.
OF THE IDEA OF MOEAL GOODNESS.
230. These Moral Precepts, as now stated, are ne-
gative. They prohibit certain kinds of internal actions.
They point out certain Conceptions which we are to avoid :
Anger, Malice, Covetousness, Lying, Deceit, Lust, Law-
breaking. These are internal acts from which we are mo-
rally bound to abstain. These are points from which the
Forces of morality tend.
But negative Precepts and repulsive Forces cannot sufiice
to express the character of Morality. The Supreme Law
of Human Action must be positive. It must command
as well as prohibit. It must direct us what to tend to^ as
well as from. It must not merely repress and control the
Affections, Desires, and Intentions; it must direct them to
their proper objects, and enjoin steadiness and energy in
them, thus directed. The Supreme Law of our Actions must
be a Law for all the Powers of Action. It must include
the whole of our nature. Its rule for Affection and Desire
must be, not that they shall be extinguished, but that
they shall be right Affection and right Desire. And the
Reason, which has for its office the formation of Concep-
Ch. II.] THE IDEA OF MORAL GOODNESS. 137
tions to which the Mental Affections and Desires tend, must
form Conceptions to which the right Affections and right
Desires may tend.
231. The Conceptions to which Morality directs our
Desires and Affections, may be collected, in a general way,
from what has been said of the Conceptions from which the
impulses of Morality urge us. As Morality calls us from
Anger, Malice, Covetousness, Lying, Deceit, Lust, Law-
breaking ; she impels us to an opposite set of qualities : —
Mildness, Kindness, Liberality, Fairness, Truthfulness, Hu-
manity, Temperance, Chastity, Obedience. These Conceptions
must enter into the Idea of the End of Human Action.
These must be included in the Supreme Law of Human
Action. These points indicate the place to which the lines
of Duty all tend. The Supreme Law of Human Action
must be found in the point to which all such lines con-
verge. It may be conceived as the Ideal Center of such
special moral tendencies as we have spoken of; and thus,
as the Idea of Morahty.
232. We may proceed somewhat further in the de-
termination of this Ideal Center, or Idea of Morality. The
Supreme Law of Human Action must be a Law which
belongs to man as man ; a thing in which all men sympa-
thize, and which binds together man and man by the tie of
their common humanity {69). It excludes all that operates
merely to separate men ; for example, all Desires that tend
to a center in each individual, without any regard to the
common sympathy of mankind ; and especially, all Affections
which operate directly to introduce discord and conflict ; as
we have seen, accordingly, that it excludes Malice and
Anger, and directs us to Mildness and Kindness. The
absence of all the affections which tend to separate men, and
the aggregate of the Affections which unite them, may be
expressed by the term Benevolence, understood in its largest
138 MORALITY. [Book III.
and fullest sense, as including all the ties of Love which bind
men together. We feel and conceive the affection of Love,
at first, as binding together the members of the same
Family, or of the same Community : but man is capable
of extending his Love to all mankind ; in proportion as there
is unfolded, in his mind, the conception of the community of
their nature and his own ; — of their common affections, rea-
son, and moral sentiments in which all mankind participate.
With the development of this conception, he is led to a love
of man as man, and a desire of the good of all men ; — an
affection in which all mankind are ready to sympathize, and
which binds together man as man. This Affection, then, of
Love to man as man, is a part of the Supreme Law of
Human Action : and the Idea of a complete and universal
Benewlence is a point in the direction of the Ideal Center,
or a part of the Idea of Morality of which we have spoken.
Again ; in the Supreme Law of Human Action we must
exclude, as we have said, all Desires that merely tend to their
center in the individual, without regard to the common
sympathy of mankind. The Desire of Property is, in its
original form, of this kind. Each man desires Property for
himself alone. But the nature of Morality, as we have seen,
points out Liberahty and Fairness as the proper guides
of action, in opposition to Selfish Covetousness. Liberality
partakes of Benevolence ; but Fairness may be conceived
as the Desire that each person should have his own. And
this Desire may be conceived in its most complete and
comprehensive form as Justice: and the Idea of Justice,
thus fully understood, is part of that Ideal Center or Idea of
Morality above mentioned.
Again; among the necessary conditions of a Rule of
human action, is the existence of a Common Understanding
among men, such that they can depend upon each other's
actions. Lying and Deceit tend to separate and disunite
Ch. II.] THE IDEA OF MORAL GOODNESS. 139
men ; and to make all actions implying mutual dependence,
that is, all social action and social life, impossible. Such acts
are accordingly excluded by the Supreme Rule, and Truth-
fulness and Honesty are pointed out as proper guides of
Moral Action. These qualities, conceived in their most
complete form, as extending from the Acts to the Words,
and from the Words to the Intentions, may be termed
IntegritT/^ as implying an entire consistence of external and
internal acts ; or may be termed Truth, as implying an
agreement of the verbal expression with the thought : and
the Idea of Truth, in this full and comprehensive sense, is
a part of the Central Idea, or Idea of Morality.
Again : the bodily Appetites and Desires, still more than
the mental ones, tend to their center in the individual,
and thus operate to disunite and oppose men. The Affections
make the bodily Desires, in some measure, operate towards
the union and sympathy of men ; but still more towards their
conflict and disunion, except so far as both Desires and
Affections are governed by Obligations. The Supreme Rule
requires that they should be so governed as not even to tend
to violate Obligations ; — that they should be conformed to
Precepts of Duty; and therefore, that they should be
controlled and directed by the Moral Sentiments and the
Reason. The Control of the Appetites by the Moral Sen-
timents and the Reason is recommended to us by Morality,
under the Conceptions of Temperance and Chastity. In our
moral view of the Springs of Action, we conceive the Appetites
and Desires as elements which ought to be thus controlled.
Appetite and Desire are the Lower Parts ; Moral Sentiments
and Reason are the Higher Parts, of our Nature : and the
Precepts which recommend to us Temperance and Chastity
may be expressed in a general form by saying, that the
Higher Part of our Nature ought to control and govern the
Lower. We may express this Control and Government
140 MORALITY. [Book III.
in the most general and comprehensive way, by the term
Purity ; and the Idea of Purity, thus completely and com-
prehensively understood, is a part of the Ideal Center, or
Idea of Morality.
Again ; the Supreme Law of Human Action, in order
to operate effectively upon men's minds, must be distinctly
and definitely conceived, at least in some of its parts and
applications. But all distinct and definite conceptions of
Laws of Human Action must involve a reference to the
relations which positive Laws establish. Hence Moral Rules,
in order to be distinct and definite, must depend upon
Laws ; and must suppose Laws to be fixed and permanent.
It is our Duty to promote, by our acts, this fixity and per-
manence : and the Duty, of course, extends to our internal
actions, to Will, Intention, Desire and Affection, as well
as to external act. We must conform our Dispositions to
the Laws; obey the Laws cordially, or administer them care-
fully, according to the position we may happen to hold in
the community. This disposition may be denoted by the
term Order, understood in a large and comprehensive sense.
But further : not only positive human Laws, but subordinate
moral Rules, are necessary conditions of morality. We can-
not conform our actions, intentions, desires, to the Supreme
Rule, without having in our thoughts subordinate Rules, which
are partial expressions of the Supreme Rule ; and to such
subordinate Rules, it is our Duty to conform our Intentions
and Desires. The disposition to do this may also be in-
cluded in the term Order, taken in its largest sense. We
thus denote, by this term, a disposition to conform, both
to positive human Laws as the necessary conditions of this,
and to special Moral Rules, as the expression of the Su-
preme Rule. And the Idea of Order in this comprehen-
sive sense is part of the Central Idea of Morality.
233. Thus we have five Ideas, Benevolence, Justice,
Ch. II.] THE IDEA OF MORAL GOODNESS. 141
Truth, Purity, and Order, which may be considered as the
elements of the Central Idea of Morality, or as the Car-
dinal Points of the Supreme Rule of Human Action.
We are not to conceive these Ideas as distinct and
separable, but rather as connected and combined in a fun-
damental and intimate manner. Thus, we have already
mentioned moral qualities which partake of more than one,
as Liberality partakes of Benevolence and Justice : Honesty,
of Justice and Truth. And all these dispositions, Benevo-
lence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order, may be conceived to
be included in a Love of Goodness. The Disposition en-
joined by the Supreme Law of Human Action is the Love
of Moral Good as Good, and the desire to advance towards
it as the ultimate and only real object of action. To this
object, all special affections, all external objects, and the
desires of such objects, all intercourse of men, all institu-
tions of society, are considered as subordinate and instru-
mental. And thus, this Love of Good includes, excites,
nourishes, and directs to their proper ends, those more special
Affections and Dispositions of which we have spoken.
In order to describe the character and conduct con-
formable to the Supreme Rule, we may speak of it as the
character and conduct of a good man. That is right which
a good man would do. Those are right affections which
a good man would feel.
234. Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order, have
been considered as Dispositions in man. But these Dispo-
sitions may be conceived as Desires or Affections, tending to
certain abstract mental Objects or Ideas. Thus, Benevo-
lence is a Desire or Affection which has for its Object the
Good of all Mankind. This object may be expressed by the
term Humanity. Humanity, which is thus the ideal object
of Benevolence, is also a term used to describe the dispo-
sition itself, as it exists in man, who is the subject of this
142 MORALITY. [Book III.
affection. We have thus an objective and a subjective Huma-
nity. In like manner, Justice is a Desire which has for its
Object the Rule, To each his own. This Rule is itself de-
scribed as Justice, (" I ask for Justice"); and thus we have
subjective Justice, the Disposition, and objective Justice, the
Rule. In like manner. Truth, the Disposition as it exists in
man, its Subject, assumes and tends to an Objective Truth,
the agreement between the reality of things and our ex-
pressed conceptions of them. Purity, the Disposition, has
for its Object an Ideal Purity, free from all blemish and taint
of mere desire. Willing conformity to Law, which is sub-
jective Order, has, for its Object, Law itself, which may be
described as Objective Order. Thus, some of the most
common and familiar abstract terms. Humanity, Justice,
Truth, Purity, Order, are used to describe both subjectively,
the Disposition, and objectively, the Idea to which it tends.
235. There are, however, other terms by which the
two significations of each of these words is separately ex-
pressed. Thus, as we have seen, subjective Humanity is
Benevolence ; objective Humanity is the Good of all Mankind,
the Welfare of Man, and the like. Perhaps one of the most
usual modes of describing the object of Benevolence, in its
largest sense, is to say, that it is the increase of Human Hap-
piness. Justice is used with equal familiarity for Subjective
Justice, the Disposition, and Objective Justice, the Rule.
Subjective Truth is called Truthfulness, Veracity; and under
certain conditions, Faithfulness, Fidelity. Special portions
of objective Truth are Truths : and are also termed Verities.
Purity in its subjective sense may be distinguished, as
Purity of Hearty from Purity used objectively, as when
we speak of the Love of Purity, Subjective Order is Order-
liness, Obedience, or, as we have said, willing Conformity to
Law : Objective Order is Law, Rule, which includes Special
Laws and Rules, as Truth includes special Verities.
Ch. II.] THE IDEA OF MORAL GOODNESS. 143
236. These five terms, in their Subjective Sense, Be-
nevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order, are Dispositions
conformable to the Supreme Law of Human Action : they
are therefore Virtues (226). And inasmuch as they are the
leading points to which we have been led, by our analysis
of human springs of action, and human obligations, we
may term them Cardinal Virtues; although they are dif-
ferent from the list of Cardinal Virtues as usually given,
Temperance, Fortitude, Justice, and Wisdom. This latter
list is too unphilosophical a division to be employed with
any advantage in Morality. But the Virtues which have
names in common language, are all conceived as Virtues,
in consequence of partaking of one or more of our five
Cardinal Virtues, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and
Order ; and we may arrange the Virtues in general accord-
ing to their affinity with these five.
The five Cardinal Virtues may be variously combined
with the Springs of Human Action ; but yet each of these
Virtues has its more peculiar sphere of operation in our
nature. Benevolence is mainly concerned in guiding and
governing the Affections ; Justice, in controlling and cor-
recting our Mental Desires ; Truth, in directing the Mutual
Understanding of men ; Purity, in regulating the Bodily
Desires. Order engages the Reason in the consideration of
Rules and Laws, by which Virtue and its opposite are
defined.
237. The opposite of Virtue, or the want of it, is
Vice : and the language of all nations supplies us with a long
list of Virtues, arising from the combination of the Cardinal
Virtues with the various springs and conditions of human
action, and of the antagonist Vices. These names of Vir-
tues and Vices are Abstract Terms, and have Adjectives con-
nected with them, by which the varieties of human character
and disposition are familiarly designated. The limits of
144 M0RAL1T\^ [Book III.
Virtue and Vice, however, are far from being manifest and
obvious. It is often very difficult to say where Virtue ends,
and where Vice begins. To define such limits, when it is
possible, must be our business, when we come to treat of
Questions of Duty. But it is necessary for us to employ the
names of Virtues and Vices in a general and usual sense,
before we thus attempt to define their limits. The names
of Virtues and Vices are the Vocabulary of Morality ; and of
this Vocabulary, we shall give a brief account ; arranging
the Terms, as we have said, according to their affinity with
the Five Cardinal Virtues.
Chapter III.
VIRTUES AND VICES.
1. Virtues of the Affections.
238. Benevolence is the Virtue of the Affection
of Love. This Afiection is variously modified, according to
the persons to whom it is directed, and the accompanying
circumstances. Thus there is Conjugal Love, the Love of
Husband and Wife ; Parental (Paternal and Maternal)
Love ; Filial Love ; Fraternal Love, and other kinds of
Family Affection ; Friendship, the Love by which Friends
are especially drawn to each other ; our Love of our Fellow-
Citizens ; of our Fellow-Countrymen ; finally, the Love which
we bear to the whole Human Race and to every member
of it. All these Kinds of Love are Springs of Action, and
Sources of Emotion, which it is the business of Morality,
not to resist and destroy, but to govern and direct. When
these natural Affections are directed to their proper objects,
and regulated by Reason, they are virtuous Affections.
Those in whom they are wanting are blamed as without
Ch. III.] VIRTUES AND VICES. I45
natural affection. They are all included in the general term,
Benevolent Affections. They are spoken of figuratively as
the Heart. A man's heart is hard, or cold, when these affec-
tions are feeble and dull in him ; he is warmhearted, when
they are strong; and openhearted, when they are readily
bestowed on those around him.
239. Benevolent Affections are called hindly affections,
for they knit us to our Kind, the Human Race. Hence
hind, the adjective, describes the disposition of a person
full of such affections. A man is estranged from his friends,
when those affections cease ; he is unkind, when the oppo-
site prevail ; he is unsocial, when he shuns the occasions of
kindly intercourse with companions.
When a benevolent affection turns our attention upon
its object in a tranquil manner, it is Begard. Love, is the
affection in a more marked form. It is Tenderness, when
it implies a sensitive and vigilant solicitude for the good
of its object ; Fondness, when it absorbs the thought, so
that Reason is disregarded. When this is the case, the
affection is no longer a Virtue : still less is it so, when Love
becomes doting, overweening, passionate.
Love towards a person, growing out of good received
from him, is Gratitude. A grateful person expresses his
emotions in Words, which are Thanhs ; but he is also desirous
of doing Acts of gratitude ; of returning Good for Good.
Gratitude is a natural and virtuous Affection ; but the Acts
which it prompts must be limited by Rules of Duty. A
man who does what is wrong in return for benefits received,
makes his Benefactor the director of his actions, instead of
directing them himself, as Morality requires. Hence he is
said to sell himself; and to be venal.
240. The manifestations of the benevolent affections,
in their influence upon the habitual external Behaviour, have
various names. Such affections, regarding a particular per-
YOL. I. L
146 MORALITY. [Book III.
son, and not necessarily leading to action, are Good-will.
When they produce a current of cheerful thoughts, they
are Good-humour. When benevolent feelings lead a man
to comply readily with the wishes of others, or to seek
to give them pleasure, we have Good-nature. When this
Disposition is shown on the part of a superior, we term
him gracious and benign. When a person's Good-nature
makes it easy to address him, he is affable. If, in his be-
haviour, he avoid all that may give offense to others, he
is courteous. This Disposition is conceived to have generated
in the inhabitants of cities, Habits of behaviour which are
termed Urbanity and Cimlity. The opposite of these is
241. Good-humour may often be disturbed by the
Provocations which offenses and outrages occasion ; but there
are virtuous Dispositions which support our benevolence
under such provocations. Such dispositions are Gentleness^
Mildness^ MeeJcness. Under the influence of these, we re-
press or avoid the resentment and anger, which offenses
against us, and insults offered to us, tend to produce; we
preserve benevolence, tranquillity, and good-humour in our
minds ; and manifest such a disposition in our behaviour.
With these dispositions, if men act wrongly or foolishly,
we are tolerant and indulgent; if they offend us, we pardon
and forgiioe them. We are ready to do this ; we are
placable. To be intolerant^ unforgiving^ implacable^ is a
vicious Disposition.
242. The Benevolent Affections are also modified by
a regard to the circumstances of the object. We naturally
share in the emotions which we witness in man : we have
a Fellow-feeling^ a Sympathy with them. When this Dis-
position leads us to feel pain at the sight of pain, it is
Compassion ; we commiserate the object. This feeling, being
strongly confirmed by Piety, came to be called Pity. Such
Ch. III.] VIRTUES AND VICES. 147
a Disposition, as it prompts us to abstain from adding to
the pain felt, is Mercy ^ or Clemency; as it prompts us to
remove the pain or want which we see, it is Charity. But
this word has also a wider sense, in which it describes
Benevolence, as it makes us abstain from judging unfa-
vourably of other men. All these are virtuous Affections,
and lead to the performance of Duties of Benevolence.
243. Admiration can hardly be called a benevolent
affection towards its object ; for we admire what does not
draw our Love ; as when we admire a great geometer. But
if we admire a man as a good man, we also love him
(91). Esteem is the benevolent affection which we enter-
tain towards that of which we approve. Persons whom we
esteem, but to whom we are not drawn by love, we respect.
When, with such a Disposition, we look at them as our
Superiors, we reverence them ; in a higher degree, this Af-
fection is Veneration; when combined with Fear, it is Awe.
Reverence assumes, in its object, Authority and Power,
combined with Justice and Goodness.
244. The irascible Affections are, for the most part,
opposed to the virtue of Benevolence; and therefore are to
be repressed and controlled. Yet these Affections also have
their moral office, and give rise to Virtues. They act as
a Defense against harm and wrong; and hence, in their
various modifications, they may be termed Defensive Affec-
tions. As opposed to harm, inflicted or threatened, they are
Resentment ; as directed against wrong, they are Indigna-
tion {56). And these Emotions may be blameless or praise-
worthy ; as when we feel natural and proper Resentment^ or
just Indignation. Such Sentiments are an important and
necessary part of Virtue ; not of Benevolence, strictly speak-
ing, but of Justice. Without Indignation against cruelty,
fraud, falsehood, foulness, disorder, the Virtues have not their
full force in the mind.
l2
148 MORALITY. [Book III.
But Anger, in order to be virtuous, must be directed solely
against moral Wrong. Malevolent Affections directed towards
Persons are Vices ; Antipathy^ Dislike^ Aversion to any person,
independently of his bad character and conduct, are vicious.
It is vicious to be displeased, irritated, incensed, exasperated
at any person, merely because his actions interfere with
our pleasures and desires. The proneness to such Anger
is Irascibility. Still more vicious are our Emotions, when
they swell into Rage and Fury, or settle into Malice and
Hatred. The term Bancour denotes a fixed Hate, which, by
its inward working, has, as it were, diseased the Soul in which
it exists. Spite implies a vigilant desire to depress and mor-
tify its object. All these malevolent Feelings are vicious.
245. Moderate Anger, arising from pain inflicted on
us is Offense ; which term is also used for the offensive Act.
A person commits an offense, or offends, in the latter sense ;
and takes offense, or is offended, in the former. If the
Act be one which violently transgress common rules, it is
an Outrage. Anger at pain received, impelling a man to
inflict pain in return, is Bexenge. This term also implies
the object or aim of the feeling, as well as the feehng itself.
A man is stimulated hy Bemnge, and seeks his Bevenge. The
same may be said of the word Vengeance, another form of
the word, but of the same origin. The man who admits
into his heart this Affection, and retains it, is revengeful,
vengeful, vindictive.
246. The Malevolent Feelings, as manifested in the
external behaviour, have various names. As they affect our
disposition to a person, without necessarily leading to action,
they are Ill-will. When they disturb the usual current of
cheerful thoughts, they are Ill-humour. When malevolent
feelings lead us to speak or act with a view of giving pain to
others, they are Ill-nature. When they make us rejoice in
another person's pain, they are Malignity. If the pleasure.
Ch. III.] VIRTUES AND VICES. 149
which a mahgnant man takes in another man''s pain, be un-
checkt by compassion, when the pain is evident, he is cruel ;
and as such a disposition shows a deficiency in the common
feelings which bind men together, he is inhuman. If this cha-
racter be strongly marked, the man is saisage ; he approaches
to the character and temper of wild beasts ; he is brutal.
The Malevolent Affections are also modified by a regard
to the circumstances of the object of them, as compared with
our own circumstances. Malevolent Pain at the Good which
happens to another, and at our own Want of this Good, is
Eniiy.
247. Contempt can hardly be called a malevolent
feeling; for we may despise persons without hating them.
Contempt consists rather in an estimate of a man as below
a certain Standard of Character, to which our Esteem is
given. We despise a man for Cowardice, because we admire
Courage. The verb despise (despicio, to look down upon,)
shows that such a view is implied. The word Scorn implies
a condemnation of this kind, so strong that it approaches to
Indignation. The expression of contempt, in a marked man-
ner, is an Insult. If the discrepance of the contemplated
character with the assumed standard be extravagant, so as
to excite a sudden and poignant feeling of Incongruity, our
Contempt expresses itself in Laughter. The character is
regarded as ridiculous.
248. There are various modifications of character and
conduct which arise from the greater or less Energy of the
affections, and appear as Virtues or as Vices. The feelings
of Love of Right, and Anger at Wrong, in a permanent and
energetic form, are. virtuous Zeal. Courage, the habit of
mind which rejects Fear, is allied to this virtue; as is Forti-
tude, the habit of not yielding to Pain. From such dispo-
sitions of mind, arise Energy and Activity in action ; which
are important virtues when the action is virtuous.
150 MORALITY. [Book III.
24.9. Though Hope and Fear are not Affections, they
operate in increasing or diminishing our energy and activity,
as the Affections do. The Disposition in which the emotion
of Hope predominates is also termed Hope, or Hopefulness,
Joy and Joy fulness describe rather Delight produced by some
special event, than any permanent Disposition ; but Cheerful-
ness^ like Hopefulness, is rather an habitual Disposition; and
when governed by Rules of Duty, is an auxiliary Virtue.
A tranquil yet cheerful flow of the spirits keeps the thoughts
and feelings in a condition suitable to virtuous action. The
want of activity and energy is Sluggishness, Sloth, Idleness,
Laziness, Indolence; which are habits alien to virtue, and
connected with the Vice of Apathy, the absence of lively
affections and desires. As the influence of Fear predomi-
nates, the character becomes timid, and tends to Cowardice,
the opposite of Courage. Such habits are at variance with
the Rules of Duty; for these Rules often direct us in a
course which leads through Danger, either to the Person or
Fortune of the Actor, or to the Good-will which others feel
for him. In order that a man may act rightly, he must
Sict freely, independently. Men wanting in Independence of
Character, and seeking the favour of others, without regard
to moral Rules, are slavish, servile, obsequious, cringing, fawn-
ing ; they are Flatterers and Sycophants. Such dispositions
make men abject and base. The want of cheerfulness and
hopefulness is Despondency, Dejection, Sullenness, Melancholy,
Gloom ; which are habits of mind adverse to active virtue.
The theological moralists have made Acedia (aKrjSia), Apathy
with regard to Good, one of their seven deadly sins.
250. We have placed here the Virtues and Vices
which are connected with Energy or Zeal, because these
qualities depend very much upon the strength of the Affec-
tions. They depend also, however, upon the Habits of Mind
by which the intention is directed. The energetic man
Ch. III.] VIRTUES AND VICES. 151
decides soon and conclusively what course to take. This is
Decision. Energy also manifests itself in Fixity of Purpose.
When the purpose is once formed, the energetic man's course
is determined; his doubts are resolved; and he goes on in
spite of difficulty and danger. This is Determination, Resolu-
tion. A man who adheres to his purpose, in spite of strong
motives to draw him away, is firm ; but if the motives which
he resists are reasonable, he is obstinate. Firmness implies
a good cause ; Obstinacy a bad one. Energy and Zeal may
also become extreme, so as to trespass upon Benevolence.
In this case they are Overzeal, Vehemence., Harshness., Im-
patience.
Zeal, operating through the Reason, is Earnestness, which
leads to Seriousness. With this quality, Cheerfulness is not
inconsistent, but Levity is. Care sometimes implies only
so much attention as Earnestness requires ; at other times,
it implies more than is consistent with Cheerfulness. It
is right to take Care, but it is not necessary to be full of
Care. It is wrong to be careless, reckless. A disposition to
attend to Trifles only is Frivolity.
251. Connected with the pleasures of Cheerfulness,
there are pleasures which show themselves externally in
good-humoured Laughter; as the pleasures of Jesting and the
like. These arise from intellectual acts, and may be spoken
of hereafter; but we may here remark, that under the
influence of Levity, they lead to mere Merriment, Buffoonery,
Folly.
2. Virtues of the Mental Desires.
252. Property is the Conception about which the Car-
dinal virtue of Justice is especially concerned; and hence
the dispositions and habits of mind which regard Property,
have Justice for their leading virtue. Yet Wealth, and Pro-
perty of all kinds, may be used as a means of Benevolence ;
152 MORALITY. [Book III.
and from this use, arise Virtues ; as Charity^ already men-
tioned, Liberality (a willingness to give), and the like.
Wealth may be desired as a means either to such ends, or to
different ones. Hence the Disposition which aims at acqui-
sition, may be virtuous or vicious, according to the ulterior
object. A man may desire Wealth as a means of Luxury
and Sensuality; and in such a case, the Desire of Wealth
is opposed to Temperance, rather than to Justice.
The Desire of the means of Subsistence is an universal
and necessary Desire. A Wish for a Competence, — for so
much property as may free a man from solicitude respecting
common needs and common enjoyments, — is not opposed
either to Justice or to Temperance. The prospect of Poverty
and Penury ; the pressure of Privation and Want ; the sense
of Dependence upon others ; — greatly tend to disturb the
influence of virtue in the mind. The Fear of these evils
is not a vice. Also wealth may be desired as a means of
benevolent action, or of right action, in many other ways.
A person''s power of doing good, of many kinds, depends
much upon the Station and Influence which wealth bestows.
253. But though wealth may be desired for ends
which make the Desire virtuous ; the progress of men's habits
is such that, when sought at first as a means, it is afterwards
desired as an end. The Desire to acquire money is then
unlimited; and is Covetousness, Avarice. The man's greediness
in desiring, is Cupidity : his eagerness in taking, is Rapacity.
He scrapes and hoards. He spares carefully and spends
unwillingly : he is parsimonious^ niggardly^ penurious. His
solicitude and privations make him miserable. He is a Miser.
On the other hand, such habits of care, with regard to
sparing and spending, as may tend to avoid Poverty and Pri-
vation, are reckoned as Virtues; such virtues are Economy,
Frugality. By these, a man thrives or grows in his possessions :
he is thrifty. A person who is destitute of these qualities is
Ch. III.] VIRTUES AND VICES. 153
an UntJirifi. A willingness to give is Liberality, Generosity,
Bountifulness ; which are reckoned Virtues. But this dispo-
sition may be excessive : the man is then lavish, extraicagant.
254. Property conveys Power to the Possessor: but
there are also many other Sources of Power. Whoever
aims at a larger share of Power than his neighbours possess,
is, so far, regardless of Justice. The Desire of Power is
Ambition. But the Desire of Power for good ends, and the
Desire of the Power which moral excellence gives, may be
termed laudable Ambition,
The Disposition which represses our own desires, whether
of money, power, victory, or any other object; and con-
templates the desires and claims of other persons with
equal favour ; is Fairness. This is a kind of personal applica-
tion of Justice, to questions between ourselves and others.
Impartiality is more commonly used for the Fairness which
decides justly between two other persons.
3. Virtues connected with Truth.
255. We have mentioned {2S5) some of the names
of the Virtues connected with Truth ; as Truthfulness, Ve-
racity. These express a conformity of our words to the
reality. The conformity of our actions to our Engagements,
whether express or implied, is Fidelity, Good Faith. Thus
a subject is faithful to the engagement which binds him
to the Sovereign of the State. If, in such a case, Love is
added to Fidelity, it becomes Loyalty.
A man who says what he knows to be untrue, is a Liar.
He is guilty of Falsehood. A man who says what he thinks,
is sincere. Such a man shows himself what he is. A man
who conceals some important part of his feelings or thoughts
dissembles. When he assumes the appearance of virtues
which he really does not possess, he is a Hypocrite. By
such means men impose upon others, and deceive them.
154 MORALITY. [Book III.
Lies and Deceit are often used as means of Fraud; which
is an offense against Property, and therefore contrary to
Justice as well as Truth. A person who defrauds, circum-
vents, cheats any one, must be destitute both of Justice and
of Truth. Property and Language may both be con-
sidered as Universal Contracts, to which the whole human
race are parties ; Fraud by means of Falsehood violates
both these Contracts.
A man free from all fraudulent dispositions is honest ; he
is a man of Probity. He is not drawn aside, by the desire
of gain, to act obliquely, tortuously^ in a crooJced manner.
He is straightforward^ and upright. His intentions, words,
and actions, form a whole in which there is no inconsistent
part. This is Integrity. A deceitful man may have two
purposes ; one, apparent, simulated, declared ; the other
secretly held, but dissembled, till it can be acted on. To
have two purposes in this way is Duplicity. The truthful
person, on the contrary, has Simplicity for a part of his
character : he has Singleness of Purpose^ Singleness of heart.
He is frank and open^ showing himself as he really is.
4. Virtues relating to the Bodily Desires.
256. The gratification of the Appetites or Bodily
Desires, to a certain extent, and under certain conditions, is
requisite for the continuance of the individual and of the
Species, and therefore is not vicious. These Desires being
mere attributes of the Body, cannot have, of themselves,
a moral character. They are to be controlled by moral
Rules, and made subservient to moral Affections, and thus,
are the materials of Virtues. The Habits of thus con-
trolling the bodily Desires, are the Virtues of Temperance
and Chastity. The Demeanour produced by a chaste mind,
especially in women, is Modesty.
By the establishment of Family and Social Relations, the
Ch. III.] VIRTUES AND VICES. 155
gratification of the bodily wants is connected with the im-
pulses of Affection and the Love of Society. The shelter of
the common family roof, and the social meal, as well as the
marriage-bed, are the objects of far other feelings than mere
bodily desires. The Appetites are thus made subservient to
the Affections. They are absorbed by the Affections, and
are thus purified. All gratifications of the Appetites, sought
as gratifications merely, are impure and vicious. Among
such vices is the Lorn of the Pleasures of the Table. When
the Desire of Food is gratified to excess, there is Gluttony.,
Gulosiiy. When there is an excessive solicitude about the
gratification of the Taste, the man is an Epicure. The Love
of Drink involves, not only a bodily Appetite, but a com-
placency in the mental condition to which certain liquors
lead ; namely, the condition of Intoxication or Ehriety ; a
condition in which the Reason loses the power of directing
our actions. The Vice of falling into such a condition is
Intemperance., Drunkenness.
The other leading bodily Desire, when not morally con-
trolled, is Lust. The control of this within moral limits, is
Continence. The vicious indulgence is Lewdness., Lechery.
Persons whose guiding springs of action are these bodily
desires, are sensual., carnal. A chaste and modest person
does not allow his eyes or his imagination to dwell on things
which may excite Lust. Such images are obscene, indecent.
To suggest such images in speech is Obscenity. All such
filthy conversation pollutes the mind. A man who makes
pleasure the object of his actions is a Voluptuary. Such men
generally cast off moral restraint, and are hence dissolute,
profligate. A woman who thinks lightly of chastity is a
Wanton.
When the arts of life are employed to gratify artificial
wants and desires, those who give their attention and solici-
tude to obtain such gratifications are Iztacurious. Luxury
166 MORALITY. [Book III.
is often employed to describe the aggregate of such grati-
fications ; but the Solicitude employed on the means of
gratification, rather than any special Class of such means,
appears to be essential to our conception of Luxury. Things
which are Luxuries in one stage of society, become uni-
versal Wants, and consequently Necessaries, in another
stage. Linen garments, glass windows, tea, were Luxuries
a few centuries ago in this country. They are now Neces-
saries of life.
5. Intellectual Virtues.
257. The Disposition by which we accept Law and
Rule as the necessary guides of human action, is that which
we have termed Order. This Virtue is also, as we have
said (235), termed Orderliness, Obedience, and the like. But
it is a Virtue to govern carefully, as well as to obey cordi-
ally, according to the position we hold in the community.
A virtuous governor must be guided by Justice; but
Justice itself must be defined by specific Rules. Laws
and Rules must be apprehended by the Intellect, and must
be expressed in terms of general conceptions constructed by
the Reason. Hence, the Virtues connected with Order
especially include operations of the Intellect, and may be
termed Intellectual Virtues.
258. The abstract Conceptions of the objects of our
mental Desires, as Property, Power, Society, require ope-
rations of the Reason for their formation. By the further
operation of the like Faculties, we form still more abstract
and general conceptions of objects of action, as Good, Well-
being, Happiness, Expediency, Interest, and the like. Rules
of Action, dependent upon such Conceptions, may be con-
ceived and expressed. Various moralists have stated various
Rules, thus expressed. Different individuals govern their
conduct by one or other of such Rules, more or less clearly
Ch. III.] VIRTUES AND VICES. 157
apprehended. One man looks to Interest as his object,
another to Happiness, another to Wellbeing, another to the
Happiness of Mankind, and so on.
One or other of such objects being assumed as the end
of human action, Prudence is the Intellectual Virtue by
which we select the right means to this end. A man is
prudent, who acts so as to promote his own Interest, if his
Interest be assumed to be the proper Object of action : but
if we conceive Happiness to be a higher object than Interest,
he is prudent, if he disregard mere Interest, and attend only
to his Happiness. Prudence supposes the value of the end
to be assumed, and refers only to the adaptation of the
means. It is the selection of right means for given ends.
259. In the notion of Wisdom^ we include, not only,
as in Prudence, a right selection of means for an assumed
end, but also a right selection of the end. However prudent
a man may be in seeking his Interest, he is not wise, if, in
doing this, he neglect a truer end of human action. Wis-
dom is the habit by which we select right means for right
ends. We approve and admire Prudence relatively to its
end : we approve and admire Wisdom absolutely. We com-
mend the prudent man, as taking the best course for his pur-
pose ; but we do not necessarily agree with him in his estimate
of his object. We venerate the wise man, as one knowing,
better than we do, the true object of action, as well as the
means of approaching it. Wisdom is a Cardinal Virtue,
like Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity ; and with reference
to the first, as well as the other four, human Dispositions
are good, as they partake of the Cardinal Virtue. Wisdom
is the complete Idea of Intellectual Excellence; as Benevo-
lence, Justice, Truth, and Purity, are of Moral Excellence.
260. Prudence is, etymologically speaking, the same
word as Providence, that is Foresight, But we do not call
a man prudent, except he not only see the bearing of actions
)
158 MORALITY. [Book III.
on a distant end, but act upon his foresight. A man who
gambles, with a clear foresight that gambling will ruin him,
is not prudent. Prudence is a Virtue, not of the Specu-
lative Reason, which contemplates Conceptions, but of the
Practical Reason, which guides our Actions.
The guidance of our Actions by Reason, requires us to
attend both to the present and to probable future circum-
stances ; it requires Attention, and Forethought, or Forecast.
It requires, too, the employment of Thought upon the Cir-
cumstances of the case. A virtuous man must be thoughtful,
considerate. The want of thoughtfulness is a part of that
Levity which we have already noticed as involving a Vice
of the Affections.
In order to act prudently, we must not only have Pru-
dent thought, but have it at the right time for action ;
this is Presence of Mind. Cunning is a lower kind of Pru-
dence, that seeks its ends by means, of which the end is
not intended to be seen by others, when they are used.
By our Intellectual Faculties we are able to apprehend
and know Truth, that is, Objective Truth (234) ; and espe-
cially. Truths which bear upon our actions, and which must
be taken into account in framing Rules of Action. Truth
is the proper object of Reason; that is, of the universal
Reason of mankind : and the Supreme Rule of human action
which belongs to mankind, in virtue of their universal Fa-
culties, must depend upon the Truths which Reason makes
known to us. The Love of Knowledge impels men to aim
at the Knowledge of such Truths : and the Love of Truth,
which thus contributes to a Knowledge of the Supreme
Law, is a Virtue.
The progress which each man makes in the Knowledge
of Truth, depends in a great measure upon himself; upon
his Observation ; his Diligence, Attention, Patience, in seek-
ing the Truth. His progress depends also upon external
; .,
Ch. III.] VIRTUES AND VICES. 159
circumstances ; upon the Intellectual and Moral Develop-
ment of the Society in which he lives ; and upon his own
Education, in the largest sense of the term. But there
are also differences of the Mental Faculties, between one
person and another. One man excels another in Acuteness
and Clearness of the mind, when employed in observation
or in reasoning; one man has a quicker or a more tena-
cious Memory than another. There are various degrees of
Sagacity; various kinds of Imagination. Some men have
Genius. These Faculties are not properly termed Virtues,
but Gifts^ Endowments^ Ability. They may be used as
means to right ends, and hence they are termed Talents;
by a metaphor taken from the Parable in the New Tes-
tament, which teaches us that a man is blameable, when he y
does not use the means of right action assigned to him.
6. Reflex Virtues and Vices.
261. We may place, among the Intellectual Virtues
and Vices, those which depend upon our apprehension of
other men's sentiments concerning us. For such Virtues
and Vices imply reflex thought. We have already enume-
rated (57) among the springs of human action, the Reflex
Sentiments, in which we form a conception of other men's
sentiments, by the image of our own; and of ourselves, as
the object of those sentiments. Such are the Desire of
Esteem, the Desire of Admiration, the Love of Fame, and
the like.
There is a difference to be made between the Desire
of Esteem and the Desire of Admiration. Esteem is given
to what is deemed right and good. Admiration and Ap-
plause are often bestowed upon qualities which have no
moral character; as strength, skill, beauty, wit, and the
like. The want of such qualities is a ground, among many
men, of Contempt; and if the deficiency appear suddenly
160 MORALITY. [Book III.
and glaringly, of Ridicule. Ridicule implies that the object
which excites it is so palpably below the standard which
we apply to it, that the comparison is extravagant and
absurd. The Desire of Admiration produces a Fear and
Dread of this Contempt and Ridicule. But the Desire
of being admired, for other than moral excellences, has
in it nothing of Virtue. He who desires the Esteem of
others, desires them to regard him as good ; and will, for
the most part, be disposed to sympathize with them in their
admiration for what is good. The Desire of Esteem there-
fore is easily consistent with Virtue.
The Desire of Admiration produces a ready belief that
we are admired, and a Joy and Elation of Mind accom-
panying such belief. This Disposition is Vanity. One who
is treated with marks of general esteem among men, is
brought to Honour. One who is pointed at as an object
of general disesteem, is brought to Disgrace ; and, if he
feel the Disgrace, is put to Shame. But Honour and
Shame likewise indicate, subjectively, the Sensibility of the
man to those indications of general Esteem and Disesteem.
We speak also o^ False Honour , and JF^alse Shame; meaning
Dispositions to be influenced by Applause on the one side,
and Blame or Ridicule on the other, even when they are
not rightly bestowed. True Honour is a Regard for what
is right and good, considered especially as the object of
sympathy and esteem among men. A man of Honour, an
honourable man, has an especial abhorrence of the Vices of
Fraud and Falsehood. The Desire of Admiration in another
form is the Love of Glory. In Civil Society are established
marks of Public Honour, as Rank, Titles, Decorations, and
the like. Dispositions, for the most part, allied to Vanity,
fasten upon these objects; and thus we have the Love of
BanJc, or the like. But such marks of honour are often
accompanied with Political Power ; as when, in England, a
Ch. in.] VIRTUES AND VICES. ISI
man is made a Peer. In this case, the Desire of Rank
may be Ambition, rather than Vanity.
262. When I have formed a conception of myself^
I am led to regard myself as the object of my own moral
sentiments. If I approve my own character, I feel Belf-
esteem. If I am the object of my own Admiration, without
requiring the sympathy of others, this feeling is Pride ; a
Vice which estranges me from other men. The Satisfaction
which is felt in my own Admiration, is Self-complacency; a
feeling which blinds men to their true character.
I ought to render my Character such as to deserve es-
teem, and therefore, such as to deserve my own esteem,
if I contemplate my own character. If I do this, I may
reject wrong acts and emotions, as unsuited to the charac-
ter which I thus ascribe to myself. The Disposition to do
this, appears to be what is meant by a Proper Pride : but
this way of regarding one's own character appears to involve
a share of Self-complacency. Men reckon among virtues, the
Magnanimity which disregards small dangers and small inju-
ries or offenses. The opposite term, Pusillanimity, denotes
cowardice ; a quick sensibility to offenses is Captiousness.
Pride is, in its tendency, at variance with the Benevolent
Virtues, Meekness, Reverence, Courtesy. But the virtue
which is especially opposed to Pride, is Humility. He who is
humble in his estimate of himself, is also modest in comparing
himself with others; but, as we have said (256), Female
Modesty has a more especial meaning. When Pride is mani-
fested so as to imply Contempt of others, it is Haughtiness,
Disdain ; if Unkindness be added, it is Insolence. The inso-
lent man is overbearing, domineering, arrogant. Self-esteem,
so far as it regards the Operation of the Intellect, is Self-
opinion. When this excludes all mistrust of one's self, it is
Self-sufficiency: and, as taking much for granted, it is Presump-
tion. When Pride fastens upon special points, it is Conceit.
VOL. I. M
162 MORALITY. [Book III.
263. The Habits of mind by which we resist the
impulses of desire and affection, so as to conform to rules of
virtue or prudence, are Self-control^ Self-command^ Self-watch-
fulness; Self mistrust ; when the desires which we control are
so lively that we cannot suppress them, though we resist
them, it is Self-denial. When we seek our own gratification,
in disregard of more virtuous objects, it is SelfseeJcing.
When we let our Will take its course, in spite of manifest
warnings of prudence, it is Self-will.
The Habit of making ourselves the principal object of
our attention and solicitude, is the Vice of Selfishness. A
man is selfish, if the Desires which tend to himself (the
Desires of the Body, the Desire of Property, and the like),
rather than the Affections, are his leading Springs of Action.
These may be termed Selfish Desires. The term implies an
Excess in the attention which we give to ourselves, a Defect
in that which we give to others; and is always used in an
unfavourable sense. Hence the term is not applied to the
predominance of those Desires which do not interfere with
the claims of others. We call a man selfish, in whom the
Love of Money or of Bodily Ease prevails, because such
Dispositions make him disregard the claims of others; but
we do not call a man selfish, in whom the Love of Knowledge
or of Society is strong ; for my pursuit of knowledge takes
nothing from other persons ; and my love of society implies
an acknowledgment of some kind of merit or value in other
men. Pride and Vanity are selfish dispositions; for the
proud man is too much occupied with his own admiration
of himself, and the vain man with admiration of himself
proceeding from other men, to regard, with due attention,
the claims of his neighbours.
The Selfish Man thinks only of himself: hence he has
no Consideration for others : no due care for their feelings,
condition, and claims. This Virtue is required in all ; there
Ch. III.] VIRTUES AND VICES. 163
is a higher degree of it, Unselfishness ; the disposition of a per-
son who pays no regard to his own gratification when that of
another person comes in competition with it. A still higher
degree of such virtue is Self-devotion ; the virtue of him who
willingly incurs pain, danger, or death, to procure benefits
for another.
264. There are some dispositions regarded as Virtues,
which are conceived to go beyond the standard of common
characters. Such virtues are called noble; and when ele-
vated still higher in our thoughts, they are heroic or heroical.
Heroism generally implies great Fortitude or Courage, com-
bined with Self-devotion. History is full of heroic acts ;
as that of Regulus, who refused to counsel his countrymen to
peace, and returned to Carthage to die in tortures ; that of
Virginius, who stabbed his daughter to preserve her from
dishonour; that of the elder Brutus, who, as judge, con-
demned his own sons to death ; that of Lucilius, who saved
the younger Brutus by offering himself to the pursuers as
Brutus ; that of Socrates, who preferred to receive death in
obedience to the Laws of his country, though escape was
offered him by his friends. The acts of Martyrs^ who died
for the Truth, when they might have saved their lives by
denying it, are heroical.
^1^^. The Moral Vocabulary of which we have taken
a survey, the Collection of Terms describing Virtues and
Vices, is used to express the judgments of mankind in
general, respecting the Dispositions and Characters of men.
The approval or disapproval implied in each Term is, for the
most part, so well understood, that the mere use of the term
pronounces a moral sentence on the subject to which it
is applied. And the moral judgment of mankind, thus ex-
pressed in a recognized form, is very efficacious in forming
the moral sentiments of each person ; and hence, in modify-
ing the characters and affections of men. The Vocabulary
of Virtues and Vices is a constant moral Lesscm ; perpetually
m2
164 MORALITY. [Book III.
operating to bring each man's moral sentiments into agree-
ment with the general judgment of men. Every man is
taught, by the use of moral language, to admire Gratitude
and Filial Love, to condemn Revenge and Cruelty ; and the
like.
For the most part, this Lesson agrees with the Lesson
of true Morality, and points rightly to the Supreme Law of
Human Action. This may be readily understood. For the
Supreme Law of Human Action must be a Law in which all
men, as men, sympathize (98). Hence the common moral
judgment, of which we have been speaking, which is expressed
and communicated by the moral language commonly in use
among men, will, in general at least, conform to the Supreme
Law. What are universally held as Virtues, must be dis-
positions in conformity with this Law. What are universally
reckoned Vices, must be wrong.
And a man, in so far as he is taught and formed by
the general judgment of men, thus conveyed in the language
of the Morality universally recognized, will be rightly taught.
A man whose character contains what all men reckon
Virtues, and is free from what are universally reckoned
Vices, will be a good man. His affections and desires
being thus regulated, he will tend to the possession of the
Operative Moral Principles of Benevolence, Justice, Truth,
Purity, Order ; which we have stated as the Elements of
the Supreme Law.
266. To the doctrine, that the common judgment of
mankind respecting Virtues and Vices agrees, generally, with
true Morality; it may be objected, that there are dispo-
sitions which we reckon vicious ; and which yet, in many ages
and countries, have been esteemed laudable, as Revenge.
To this we reply, that men do not conceive themselves pro-
nouncing the moral judgment of mankind when, under the
influence of strong emotion, they speak of the satisfaction
arising from Revenge, or appeal to the sympathy of othrr
Ch. Ill] VIRTUES AND VICES. 165
men alike moved. No Moralist, speaking calmly, and in the
Name of Mankind, would say that boundless Revenge is
good and virtuous. So far as he could praise or defend the
Disposition, it would be by identifying it with the Punish-
ment of Wrong, that is, with Justice. Men speak of Re-
venge as "a kind of wild Justice;" and approve it only so
far as it partakes of the nature of Justice. And in like
manner, all other dispositions are reckoned Virtues, even
in the common judgment of mankind, only so far as they
agree with, and partake of, the Cardinal Virtues, Benevo-
lence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order.
Chapter IV.
MORAL PRINCIPLES.
267. It is the business of our Reason to frame Rules
of moral action, which are more or less partial expressions
of the Supreme Rule (231, 257). When we have an
assemblage of such Rules expressed in words, they may be
variously connected, by means of the Conceptions which they
involve; and Rules may be deduced, one from another,
by reasoning; some being of a more general, and others
of a more special nature. But such connexion and such
reasoning must rest ultimately upon certain fundamental
general Rules, which we may term Principles; just as in
Geometry the reasoning rests ultimately upon the Axioms
and Definitions. In order, therefore, that we may be able
to express Moral Rules in words, we must state certain
Moral Principles as the foundation of such Rules.
Then Moral Principles, being the expression of the Su-
preme Rule of Human Action, must coincide in their effect
with the Ideas of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and
Order ; which, as we have seen (230)^ are the Elements, or
166 MORALITY. [Book III.
Cardinal Points, of the Supreme Rule. In order to lay-
down such Principles as we speak of, we have to express
those Cardinal Ideas.
268. The term Principles is variously used. Springs
of Action, as Affections, Desires, Dispositions, are often
termed Principles of Action ; especially when they operate in
a steady and consistent manner. We put such steady Prin-
ciples in opposition to transient and casual Feelings^ which
may be inconsistent with themselves. Our Feelings may
prompt us to be kind to one person, and harsh to another ;
but Benevolence, operating as a Principle, would make us
kind to all. We have hitherto avoided speaking bf " Prin-
ciples of Action ;■" and have called the Affections and Desires
Springs of Action (24). Custom allows us to term Bene-
volence, and the other Cardinal Virtues, Moral Principles,
when they operate in any man steadily and consistently, even
though they be not expressed in words. But we must dis-
tinguish the term Principles^ used in this sense, from the
fundamental Rules, the basis of other Rules, which we have
also more especially called Moral Principles. We may call
the former Operative Principles, the latter. Express Princi-
ples. The former are Principles of Action, the latter are
Principles of Reason.
In order that a man's Character should conform to the
Supreme Rule, it is requisite that Benevolence, Justice,
Truth, Purity, and Order, should be in him Operative Prin-
ciples. In order that he should express his Rules of Action
so that they may be contemplated by the Reason, and
communicated from one person to another, it is requisite
that he should arrive at Express Principles.
269. Express Moral Principles must, as we have al-
ready said, be the expression of those Ideas which are the
elements of the Supreme Rule. We have already been led
to attempt to obtain such expressions, in speaking of these
Moral Ideas.
Ch. IV.] MORAL PRINCIPLES. 167
We have seen (231) that the Idea of Benevolence is, that
of an Affection, which makes man, as man, an object of love
to us. We may therefore state it as a Moral Principle,
that Man is to he hved as Man. We may term this the
Principle of Humanity.
We have seen that the Idea of Justice is, that of a Desire
that, of external things, each person should have his own,
without any preference of ourselves to others, or of one
person to another. We may state this also as a Moral
Principle, that Each Man is to ham his own; and this
we may term the Principle of Justice.
We have seen that the Idea of Truth (as a Cardinal
Virtue) is, the Idea of a Conformity to a Universal Under-
standing among men, which is involved in the use of language,
and according to which Understanding, each may depend
upon the representations of the others. Hence we may
state it as a Moral Principle, that We must conform to
the Universal Understanding among men which the use of
Language implies: and this we may call the Principle of
Truth.
Again, we have seen that the Idea of Purity implies the
contemplation of mere Appetite and Desire, as the Lower
Parts of our nature, which are to be governed by, and made
subservient to, the Moral Sentiments and Reason, the Higher
Parts. We may state this as a moral Principle, that The
Lower Parts of our Nature are to he governed hy^ and sub-
servient to, the Higher. This is the Principle of Purity.
Again, we have seen that the Idea of Order implies a
conformity, both to positive Human Laws, as the necessary
conditions of morality, and to special Moral Rules, as the
expression of the Supreme Rule. We may therefore state
it as a Moral Principle, that We must obey positive Laws as
the necessary Conditions of Morality ; and this is the Principle
of Order. We need not state it as a Principle that we must
168 MORALITY. [Book III.
obey subordinate Moral Rules : for the claims of such Rules
may be established in virtue of the Primary Moral Principles
which we are now stating.
270. These five Express Moral Principles may be
fuHher unfolded; and the Conceptions by which we designate
them, Humanity, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, may be
further defined hereafter. But we do not fully express the
import of the Cardinal Virtues of Benevolence, Justice, and
the like, without adding some further Principles to those
which we have mentioned. Benevolence must be strong,
as well as general : vivid in its degree, as well as universal
in its application. And the same is true of the other
Affections rightly directed. As we have already said (229),
the Supreme Law must not only direct the Affections and
Intentions to their proper objects, but require steadiness and
energy in them thus directed. The recognition of this con-
dition of the Supreme Rule is shown in the place which
Zeal, Energy, Earnestness, hold among the Virtues (250). In
order to express this, we may therefore state, as a Moral
Principle, that The Affections and Intentions must not only
he rightly directed^ hut energetic ; and this we may call the
Principle of Earnestness.
271. Again, it is not enough for the character of virtue,
that each person should confine his desires to those objects
which Justice assigns to him. His desires are not virtuous, if
they terminate in the objects themselves. The Supreme Law
of Human Action requires us (232) to consider Moral Good,
as the object to which all other objects are subordinate, and
from which they derive their only moral value. Morality
cannot allow us to desire external things, as wealth, power,
or honour, for their own sake, but only as means to moral
ends. And we may state this as a Moral Principle, that
Things are to he sought only as means to moral ends ; and this
we may term the Principle of Moral Purpose.
Ch. IV.] MORAL PRINCIPLES. iQi^
272. To the Express Principles which we have thus
stated, correspond Operative Principles of Benevolence, Jus-
tice, Truth, Purity, Order, Earnestness, and Moral Purpose ;
which exist in each man's character, in so far as the Ex-
press Principles above stated become his habitual guides and
springs of action ; in so far as these express the tendencies
of his affections and purposes. In this sense, as Operative
Principles, a man is also said to have a Spirit of Benevo-
lence, of Justice, and the like.
It may be proper hereafter to state other Moral Principles,
in addition to these seven : but these seven will enable us to
lay down many Rules of Duty, which is the purpose for which
we put them forwards. We must now speak of Duty;
and in the first place, of the distinction between Duty and
Virtue.
Chapter V.
DUTIES.
273. We have already stated, that Virtue and Duty
differ, as the Habit and the Act ; as the internal Disposition,
and the outward Manifestation. Acts do not prove the
existence of the Dispositions to which they generally cor-
respond. A man may frequently give relief to a person in
distress, without being really compassionate ; he may habitu-
ally perform what he has promised, without real integrity.
Such is the case, for instance, when a man gives alms to
avoid importunity ; or pays his debts to escape disgrace.
Acts do not even prove Habits ; for an Act may be solitary ;
like that of her
Who paid a tradesman once to make him stare.
But notwithstanding this. Acts of Duty are both the most
170 MORALITY. [Book III.
natural operation of virtuous Dispositions, and the most
effectual mode of forming virtuous Habits. Hence, Acts of
Duty are requisite, both as the manifestations of Virtue, and
as the means of becoming virtuous. The Virtues belong to
a deeper part of our nature than the Duties, being the
sources out of which our acts of Duty spring. But Duties are
more capable of definite description and determination than
Virtue not exhibited in Act ; and hence Duties are the more
especial subject of the Moralist's discussions. The Virtues
are what w^ are ; the Duties are what we do. It is more
important what we are, than what we do ; but it is more
easy to speak of what we do, than of what we are; and
moreover, what we are, gives rise to what we do ; and what
we do, shows what we are.
274. Duties, in their general form, coincide with Vir-
tues. Justice is a Virtue ; Justice is also a Duty. But they
are generally conceived with this difference ; that Virtue is
more of an imconscious Disposition ; Duty implies more of
Conscious Thought. Our Virtues exist and operate without
our thinking about them ; we perform an act of Duty, think-
ing that we ought to do it. To think an Act a Duty, is to
think we ought to do it ; it is to think it right ; to think it
conformable to the Supreme Rule of Human Action.
To think an act right, is to think that there is a Reason
for it, by which it is shewn to be conformable to the
Supreme Rule. Such Reasons are given, when we shew
that Acts are conformable to the Moral Principles which
have just been laid down (269) ; for these Principles express
parts of the Supreme Rule. Hence, Rules of Duty are to
be established by a reference to those Principles, as their
Reasons.
275. Virtue is a Habit of the Desires, Affections, and
Will ; Duty involves an operation of the Reason, by which
the Desires, Affections, and Will, are directed and governed.
Ch. v.] duties. 171
By the frequent performance of such acts of direction and
government, they become habitual, easy, famiHar, and finally
cease to be objects of consciousness ; and thus Duty becomes
Virtue.
276. We may make a further distinction between
Duty and Virtue ; indicating that we carry the notion of
Virtue farther than that of Duty. We speak of Heroic
Virtues^ as we have seen (264), but never of Heroic Duties.
Heroic Virtues are Virtues beyond the range of Duty.
Duty implies Rules of Duty, but Heroic Virtue soars above
Rules.
277. The act of conscious thought by which we
recognize our Duties, turns our attention upon ourselves as
the objects of the Moral Sentiments of Approbation and
Condemnation (262). The habit of regarding ourselves as
worthy of Condemnation when we do wrong, and as conse-
quently liable to Punishment, the consequence of deserved
Condemnation, in a world in which the Supreme Law is
really administered, is the Sense of Besponsihility. This
Habit of Thought is not explicitly recognized in our notion
of Virtue, but it forms part of our conception of Duty ; and
is often termed the Sense of Duty,
278. A further feature in our Conception of Duty
is, that it includes the notion of Actions determined by ex-
ternal Relations and Circumstances, as well as by internal
Dispositions. Duties depend upon the social position of
men, and other like conditions. There are Duties of Pa-
rents and Children, of Husbands and Wives, of Friends,
of Neighbours, of Magistrates, of Members of various
Bodies and Professions. Men's Virtues manifest themselves
in various Acts of Duty, according to these conditions. The
descriptions of Duties must include a reference to those
varieties of circumstance and condition. There belong to
each man the Duties of his Station. Our Duties, so far as
.^^- ^/c^^wJ^c^thJXuj^ Zy 4t^ ^2
■^e^<3
172 MORALITY. [Book HI.
they regard our special Relations to particular persons, may
be termed Relative Duties.
279. It has already been seen, that there are Obli-
gations which depend upon these same conditions. Every
man has his Obligations which belong to his Station. Duties
extend beyond Obligations, and direct the Affections, De-
sires, and Intentions, as well as the Actions. Duties give
a Moral Significance to Obligations. Thus I have Obli-
gations as a Father, or as a Son. And these Obligations
determine certain good offices which are to take place be-
tween the Father and the Son. But my Duties as a
Father, or as a Son, must give a Moral Significance to these
good offices. They must make them the manifestation of
an internal Spring of Action ; that is, of an Affection which
binds together Father and Son. Such a tie of Affection
is the Moral Meaning of the Paternal and Filial Obliga-
tions ; for such a tie of Affection will constantly give rise to
mutual good offices. Again, I have Obligations as a Master
or as a Servant ; and these determine certain acts of ser-
vice and of guidance ; but my Duties as a Master or as a
Servant suppose the relation of the two to be a bond of
good- will, producing cordial and considerate service and
guidance. Service and guidance, in order to be Duties,
must proceed from internal affections, and must thus have
a Moral Meaning.
This Maxim, that there is a Moral Significance in our
Social Relations, will often serve to point out our Duties.
All acts relative to other men, in order to be moral, must
proceed from an internal Spring of Affection ; our Obliga-
tions, being what we ought to do, are also Duties. But
in order that they may be Duties, there must exist an
Affection which is the natural Source of such acts; and this
Affection is itself a Duty.
280. The Affections from which Duties thus proceed,
Ch. v.] duties. 373
will be, for the most part, those Affections which naturally
grow up in the bosoms of men, so far as they are influenced
by the common moral judgments of mankind ; they will be
Virtuous Affections ; the Affections which belong to a good
man (232, 265).
Our Duties are determined by the General Notions of
the Virtues on the one hand, and on the other, by the So-
cial Relations, special Circumstances, Conditions, Rights and
Obligations of men.
So far as Duties depend on the Notions of the Virtues,
they will admit of a Classification corresponding to that of
the Virtues, already given. We shall have Duties of the
Affections; Duties respecting Property and other Objects
of Desire ; Duties connected with Truth ; Duties connected
with the Bodily Desires; Duties connected with Order.
Each of these Classes contains Duties which may be dis-
tinguished according to the Social Relations with which they
are concerned.
Chapter VI.
DUTIES OF THE AFFECTIONS.
281. The Supreme Law of Human Action adopts
and authorizes the Benevolent Affections, as a part of human
nature which binds men together, and depends upon their
common humanity. This we have expressed, by laying down
the Principle of Benevolence as one of our fundamental
Moral Principles (269). But further; the Supreme Law
requires that the Affections thus authorized be vivid, strong,
and permanent. This we have expressed, by stating the
Principle of Earnestness as one of our fundamental Moral
Principles (270). Now the more general Benevolent Affections
174 MORALITY. [Book III.
which bind men together cannot be vivid and strong, except
the special Benevolent Affections, determined by family rela-
tions, and other external circumstances, be also vivid and
strong. For the Affection of Universal Benevolence is only
the expansion of the Love belonging to narrower circles of
relation. The Affection of the most General Benevolence is
expressed by saying that we love all men as our Brothers.
The heart learns to love, by its contact with its nearest
objects of love, and by the occasions arising out of its
intercourse with neighbouring men. If it do not begin
its lesson of Duty in that school, it will never be able to
apply it in a more comprehensive sphere. The Natural
Affections are the proper moral School of the Heart. The
lessons of the benevolent affections are further inculcated
by the general moral judgment of mankind ; for the uni-
versal voice of man commends Gratitude, Family Affection,
Compassion, and the like, as Virtues. Hence a good man,
in his progress towards the sympathy with man as man,
which is implied in the Supreme Rule, will be led to
possess the Affections thus universally regarded as Virtues
(265). Moreover, such Affections are requisite to give to
the obligations of Family, and the like, their moral signifi-
cance. They are therefore Duties (279).
Hence the special kinds of benevolent Affection, Grati-
tude, Compassion, Reverence for Superiors, Filial Affection,
Parental Affection, Conjugal Affection, Fraternal Affection,
are all Duties. They are Affections in which all men sym-
pathize. They are Natural Affections. Those who have them
not, are universally condemned as without natural affection.
Such men have not found admission into the Moral School
of the Heart. They have not made the first steps towards
that Universal Benevolence, which is a Fundamental Moral
Principle. Such men must be destitute of that warmth of
right affections which the Principle of Earnestness requires.
Ch.VI.] duties of the affections. 175
Such men cannot give to the Obligations of their Station
that Moral significance which Morahty requires.
We will consider this further, with regard to the above
kinds of Affection in particular.
282. Gratitude to Benefactors is a Duty of the Af-
fections. To render advantage for advantage, is often a
matter of mutual contract ; to render good-will for good-
will, is the Duty which gives a Moral Significance to the
Obligations of such contracts (279). Gratitude, that is,
Good-will in return for benefits conferred with good-will,
is a natural feeling, and is universally acknowledged as a
Virtue (280). He, therefore, who does not feel this, has
made little advance in the natural progress of the benevolent
affections ; he is little influenced by the sympathy of men
in favour of Virtue. The ungrateful man disregards one
of the most manifest lessons of morality ; that in which the
common understanding of mankind apprehends mutual good-
will, as the proper signification of good ofiices, given and
received. He violates this understanding ; and is necessarily
looked upon with repugnance and alarm, as one on whom
the common ties of Humanity have no hold. He trans-
gresses a Rule which all men can and must sympathize in
approving ; and which draws men together by the common
recognition of the significance of external relations. Thus
he is a violator of a Duty.
Hence, Gratitude is a Duty of the Affections. A man
who is devoid of gratitude cannot be a good man. And
the Affection of gratitude, which is thus a Duty, will tend
to express itself in acts. But no special acts are directed
by this Rule of Duty. Gratitude is one Rule for the Affec-
tions, but the Rules of Action must be governed by the
consideration of all the Rules of the Affections, and all the
Moral Principles. The actions which gratitude prompts
may be prohibited by other Rules of Duty, derived from the
176 MORALITY. [Book III.
Principle of Benevolence in other bearings, or from the
principles of Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, and their
combinations.
283. Beterencefor Superiors is a Duty. Reverence is
a Benevolent Affection, which assumes in its object Supe-
riority of Condition to ourselves, combined with Justice and
Goodness. Obedience to Law and Authority are Obligations;
and these Obligations, like all others, have a Moral Sig-
nificance (279), when the Law is just and the Authority
rightful. They require in the Inferior Party, a Spirit of
Obedience (272) ; an Obedience of the Heart. When the per-
son, thus invested with Authority, is also invested with Good-
ness, the heart joins, and ought to join, with its Obedience,
the Love which belongs to Virtue (91). And thus, this
union of the Spirit of Obedience and Love, Reverence
for Superiors, is a Duty.
This Sentiment is fostered by a sympathy with the natural
feelings, and with the common moral judgments of man-
kind, expressed by means of terms implying Virtue and
Vice. That Reverence for Superiors is a natural feeling,
we see in the willing submission with which, in all ages
and countries. Superiors have been treated by their Infe-
riors ; and in the cordial submission rendered to Laws.
(Man has, among his natural feelings, a Reverence for Some-
thing better, wiser, more stable, more permanent than him-
self. He readily believes in the existence of something of
this nature ; and has, in his mind, a ready Sentiment of defe-
rential Regard for it. And this feeling is fostered by the
general sympathy of men. The common moral judgment of
mankind appears in the commendation bestowed upon such
dispositions. Disloyalty to the Sovereign, Disobedience to
Authority, Sedition, Treason, Rebellion, are, in themselves,
looked upon with feelings of Dislike and Indignation. If
a person does not participate in these feelings, he is not
Ch. VI.] DUTIES OF THE AFFECTIONS. 177
likely to possess Benevolent Affections at all. If he have
no sympathy with these emotions, his Affections cannot be
conformable to that Supreme Law, in which all men, as
men, sympathize. If Goodness and Justice, joined with
Superiority of condition, are not regarded by a man with.
Reverence, he has not that feeling towards Goodness and
Justice by which virtuous men are bound together. A par-
ticipation in this feeling belongs to a good man. And this
feeling is requisite to invest with a moral significance the
obligation of Obedience to the governing authorities of the
State. For such Obedience must be a Duty, as well as
an Obligation, in order that it may have a moral character.
But if Obedience be a Duty, Reverence, the Obedience of
the heart, which is the internal spring of external obedience,
must also be a Duty. And this Reverence, being a part of
the natural feelings of a good man, and a necessary condition
of the Duties of Obedience, is itself a Duty.
If it be said, that in the actual constitution of the world,
it may happen that Superiority of social condition is not
joined with goodness and justice, and that thus this affection
has no proper place ; we reply, that however this may be
the case in particular instances, human government is requi-
site as a general condition of morality, and especially as
a condition of justice and order. The Governors of Society
are therefore, so far as this condition requires, the represen-
tatives of Justice and Order ; and reverence to them, under
this aspect, is still a general Duty. A Reverence for Supe-
riors and Governors, as the representatives and cardinal
points of justice and order, is requisite, to give a moral
significance to the structure of human society. Rever-
ence in inferiors, and Benevolence in superiors, are ties of
affection which alone can bind together a community in
which there are superiors and inferiors, so as to give them
moral relations. And in every community, those who are,
VOL. I. N
178 MORALITY. [Book III.
by its constitution and nature, the depositaries and sources
of law and government, must be looked upon as superiors,
and are, in that capacity, proper objects of reverence.
284. Filial Affection, the Affection of the Child
towards the Parent, is a Duty of the Affections. The
Supreme Law of our nature requires us to possess the Ope-
rative Principle of Benevolence ; but it is unlikely that
we shall possess this Principle, if we do not possess those
benevolent affections which are the most natural and uni-
versal ; which are commended to us and urged upon us by
the sympathy and common judgment of mankind ; and for
which there are strong and manifest reasons. Fihal Affec-
tion is pressed upon us in all these ways. It is a natural
and universal affection among men, failing to show itself
only under very peculiar circumstances. It is everywhere
regarded as a Virtue. A child wanting in love toward his
parent, is looked upon with abhorrence, as an unnatural
child. And this affection is supported by the strong and
evident reasons, of its being agreeable to the Duties of Gra-
titude and Reverence. For, in the common course of events,
children receive from their parents far more kindness, and
far greater benefits, than from any other persons. And
the sentiment of deferential regard and conscious depend-
ence, which is natural to man ; and for which he naturally
assumes in his thoughts, as an object, a person wiser and
better than himself; is, by the natural condition of man,
directed, in the first place, towards the Parents. The child,
who learns from them his lessons of what is good and
wise ; who sees and feels himself to be dependent upon
them, and weak and ignorant in comparison of them ; sees
in them the necessary and proper objects of Reverence.
This Sentiment gives a Moral Significance to the Family
relation. Such an affection in the child towards the Parent,
combined with Parental Affection on the other part, are
Ch. VL] duties of the affections. 179
ties of affection which must exist, in order that the Mem-
bers of the Family may have moral relations to each other,
such as correspond to the obHgation of obedience in the
child, and support and care in the parent (279). If this
Affection be not a Duty, there is no Duty on the part
of the child; for Duty extends to the Springs of Action,
and therefore to the Affections. Hence Filial Affection
is a necessary portion of the Benevolent Affections which
a good man must possess ; and being conformable to the
Duties of Gratitude and Reverence for Superiors, and essen-
tial to the existence of Filial Duty, it is itself a Duty.
This Affection tends to govern the Actions. Under the
influence of Filial Affection, Obedience to Parents tends
to become an Obedience of Love. Such an obedience is
not merely a submission of our wishes and desires to those
of others ; but an identification of our wishes and desires
with those of the persons whom we love and obey. We
wish what they wish. Our intentions anticipate their com-
mands. The pleasure of giving them pleasure, is a more
powerful Spring of Action, than any pleasures obtained in
opposition to their wishes.
285. The Duty of Parental Affection is shown on the
like grounds. This Affection is a necessary portion of our
benevolent affections. It is natural and universal ; and com-
mended by the common judgment of mankind, who loudly
condemn an unnatural Parent. If a person do not feel
an affection thus urged upon him, the Operative Principle
of Benevolence must be entirely wanting in him, or greatly
defective. Such an affection is requisite to give a moral
significance to the Family relation. The Obligation of Sup-
port and Care on the part of the Parents, is necessary for
the preservation and wellbeing of the Child. These good
offices are generally secured by the impulse of a strong and
almost universal affection, supported by the general sym-
n2
180 MORALITY [Book III.
pathy of mankind. This Affection gives a moral significance
to the Obligations of the parent ; and constitutes a tie which
is requisite, in order that the parent and child may have a
moral relation to each other. If this Affection be not a
Duty, there is no Duty on the part of the Parent ; for Duty
regards the Affections. Thus the Parental Affection is a
part of the Benevolent Affections which a good man must
necessarily possess ; and inasmuch as it is the natural Secu-
rity for the most essential Obligations of man, and requisite
to the existence of Parental Duty, it is a Duty.
286. Conjugal Affection is, in a like manner, a Duty.
This affection produces the marriage union, or grows out
of it, where it is not repressed by adverse feelings. It is
supported by the sympathy and approbation of mankind;
for all admire and praise a husband and wife, so far as
they are bound together by a strong and steady mutual
affection. It is this affection which alone gives moral sig-
nificance to the legal union. Without the supposition of
this tie of affection, there can be no moral relation between
the two ; no Duties, no Moral Claims ; for duties and moral
claims belong to the affections. Moreover, the married
condition involves a Promise of such affection ; and there-
fore the want of the affection, in that condition, implies a
breach of promise, as well as a coldness of heart; and
violates the Principle of Truth, as well as the Principle
of Benevolence. Thus, the Conjugal Affection is a part of
the benevolent affections which a married person must pos-
sess, in order to be good ; and being required by the Principle
of Truth, and essential to the existence of Conjugal Duty,
it is itself a Duty.
287. Fraternal Affection is a Duty. Such an affec-
tion is natural ; it readily grows up under the usual
circumstances of Family intercourse. Not to have this
affection, implies a want of that warmth and tenderness of
Cii. VI.] DUTIES OF THE AFFECTIONS. 181
heart, out of which Family Affections are unfolded by the
conditions of the Family. If a man is wanting in this
disposition, we conceive that his Benevolence, in its more
comprehensive bearings, will be feeble and cold. If he do not
love his brother, he is Httle likely to love a stranger. This
affection gives a moral significance to the mutual good offices
which a Family requires and gives rise to. These good
offices between brethren cannot be Duties, except the affec-
tion which prompts them be a Duty. And thus Fraternal
Affection is a part of the Benevolent Affections which a
good man must possess; and being essential to the existence
of Fraternal Duties, is itself a Duty.
288. The Love of our Fellow-citizens is a Duty. This
is a Fraternal Affection of a wider kind. A Community,
a Tribe, a Nation, may be considered as a wider Family.
The benevolent affections fasten themselves upon that part
of mankind with whom we principally converse, and with
whom we share many common influences. A common
descent, a common history, a common language, common
manners, common laws, draw fellow-citizens together, as,
in a narrower way, the habits and common conditions of
a family draw together the members of the family. And
the mutual services and knowledge of each other, thus pro-
duced, tend to generate a mutual affection. This Affection
gives a moral significance to all mutual Services; for the
mutual Services of Fellow-citizens cannot be Duties, except
their mutual Good-will be a Duty. And thus a Love towards
his Fellow-citizens is part of the Benevolent Affections which
a good man will necessarily possess ; and being necessary to
the existence of social and civil Duties, it is itself a Duty.
289. In the same manner, it is seen that we have
Duties of Benevolent Affection towards all persons who are
connected with us by any less comprehensive social relations ;
as to our Servants, our Masters, our Dependents, our Em-
ployers, and the like.
182 MORALITY. [Book III.
290. A Duty of the same kind exists towards the
whole human race. There is a Duty of Universal Benevolence
which we ought to bear to men as men. We have already
(231) stated, that in considering the conditions of the Su-
preme Law of Human Action, we are led to the Idea
of absolute and Universal Benevolence, as a part of that
which the Law must include. And we have stated the
express Principle which represents this Idea {^Q9)'i that we
must love man as man. This Principle now comes before
us as an expression of a Duty. In taking this view of it,
we imply that the Principle is requisite to give a moral
significance to our social relations ; for this has been noted
as a character of Duties (279). This character will now
be seen to belong to the Affection of Universal Benevolence
towards man as man. We have Duties to all men : Duties
of Justice and Truth are to be performed towards all men.
But these Duties cannot be performed as Duties, except
they proceed from an internal Spring of Action. They
must be the results of Affection. And thus an Affection
towards all men, being essential to the existence of all
other duties towards them, is itself a Duty.
291. As our love of the members of the same family,
or of the same community, is unfolded by our being led to
see and feel what their nature has in common with ours ; so
our love of mankind in general is unfolded, by our being
led to see and feel that they have a human nature, which
is identical with our own. We are by degrees led to look
upon them as Members of the same Race ; as Children,
along with ourselves, of the great human Family. And thus,
we love them with an extension of the love which we bestow
upon our brothers. We look upon all Mankind as our
Brothers.
292. But this Duty of the Love of Mankind goes
further. We come to feel a love for all mankind, of which
we have spoken, by having brought before our thoughts,
Ch. VI.] DUTIES OF THE AFFECTIONS. 183
the common human nature which they share with us.
But there is a kind of love which we far more readily
feel for those who offer themselves to our notice, as under
the infliction of pain or grief. There is (242) a natural
impulse of Compassion^ which draws, to such persons, our
benevolent regard; and which prompts us to do them good
offices by which their distress may be relieved. This
Compassion for the Afflicted, merely as afflicted, is a
feeling which the whole human race sympathize in, and
which is by all commended and loved. It thus naturally
exists, among the benevolent affections, which are unfolded
in a man's bosom, as he becomes more and more fully
possessed of those Operative Moral Principles which belong
to the Supreme Rule of Human Action, and in which man,
as man, universally sympathizes. And the Acts which pro-
ceed from this affection of Compassion, are part of that
course of action, which the Supreme Rule, drawing together
all men, in virtue of that which belongs to all, directs and
enjoins. Hence, Acts of Compassion are what men ought to
do. They are Duties. But these acts cannot be Duties,
except the Affection from which they proceed is a Duty.
And thus Compassion, which, as we have seen, is a part
of the benevolent affections possessed by a good man, being
essential to the Duties of Charity, is itself a Duty.
And thus, we have established as Duties, the Affections of
Gratitude, Reverence for Superiors, Filial, Parental, Con-
jugal, and Fraternal Affection, the Love of our Fellow-
citizens, and the Love of Man as Man, and Compassion.
184 MORALITY. [Book 111.
Chapter VII.
OF THE MORAL CULTURE OF THE
AFFECTIONS AS A DUTY.
293. It has been shown that Gratitude to Benefac-
tors, Reverence to Superiors, Compassion to the Afflicted,
are Duties; as also are Filial, Parental, Conjugal, and
Fraternal Affection, the Love of our Fellow-citizens, and
the Universal Benevolence which embraces all men as men.
These Affections we ought to possess. Such Affections
therefore we ought to acquire. We ought to foster, cherish,
cultivate them. We ought to establish these Affections
in our Minds ; to direct our Affections by these Forms of
Duty. We ought to form our character in such a way
that these Benevolent Affections shall belong to it.
To this doctrine, it may be objected, that we have not
the power of doing what we are thus enjoined to do.
It may be said, that we have not the power of generating
or directing our Affections, and of forming our own cha-
racter. It may be urged, that we cannot love a particular
person, or love under particular circumstances, and with a
particular kind of love, merely because we will to do so.
Love, it may be said, cannot be thus compelled by com-
mand. Character cannot be thus formed by Rule.
But we reply, that the objection, thus stated, involves
much too large an assertion. It is very far from being
true, that we have no power over our own affections or
our own character. The universal voice of mankind recog-
nizes the existence of such a power, by the condemnation
which it awards to the want of the affections above men-
tioned. If a child do not love his parent, a father or a
mother their child, a brother his brother; all men join in
condemning the person thus destitute of natural affection.
Ch. VII.] MORAL CULTURE OF THE AFFECTIONS. 185
He offends against the common nature of man. And in
like manner, all men look with repugnance and disappro-
bation upon the ungrateful or pitiless man. All men blame
him who is irreverent towards a just and good Master.
These, and the like moral judgments of mankind, imply
that a man's affections are, in some way, his own act.
The affections are thus declared to be part of that internal
action for which he is responsible. He is a proper sub-
ject of praise or blame for what he feels; and so far, his
feeling is his doing.
294. And we can perceive that we have, in various
ways, power over our feelings. Even immediately, by the
power which we possess of directing our train of thoughts,
we can foster or repress an affection. We can call be-
fore our minds, and dwell upon, those features of charac-
ter and situation, which tend to impress on our minds one
Sentiment or another. We can, for instance, think on all
that our parents have done and suffered for us, and can thus
move our hearts to a love of them. And above all, the
recollection that affections are natural and right, will fix
and promote them. We shall constantly approximate to
those benevolent affections, which we constantly regard as
recommended by the universal sympathy of mankind, and
as conformable to the supreme law of our being. While,
on the other hand, coldness and hardness of heart, — still
more, malevolence or perversely directed affection, — per-
petually dwelt upon in our thoughts, as feelings which
estrange us from our kind, make us a natural object of
their abhorrence, and violate the very essence of our nature,
— will be, by this means, repressed and extinguished.
295. The course of thought by which the virtuous
affections are promoted, may sometimes be traced, in the
progress of special Conceptions, and in the significance of
the terms by which they are denoted. Thus the clear
186 MORALITY. [Book III.
apprehension of a common internal nature in all men, which
suggests the use of the term Humanity to designate this
common nature, leads, further, to the benevolent affection
towards man as man ; which affection is also termed Hu-
manity. Thus, the apprehension of objective Humanity
tends to promote subjective Humanity {^Zb). We shall
hereafter consider the progress by which some Conceptions of
this kind have arrived at clearness and comprehensiveness
of signification. We shall thus be led to see some of the
steps by which the affections are cultivated.
296. Moreover, the Benevolent Affections impel us to
endeavour to do good to the objects of them. We wish to
promote the wellbeing of those whom we love. This their
wellbeing, thus becomes the object of our desires and
intentions. But the conception of the Wellbeing of other
persons, which we thus place before us as our object, may be
variously modified and transformed by the operations of
our thoughts. We may conceive it as merely their Pleasure,
or as their Interest, or as their Happiness. And as some
of these are truer and more moral views of Wellbeing than
others ; we may, by the exercise of our Faculties, advance
from those which are false and wrong, to those which are
true and right. This possession of true conceptions of the
ends to which our benevolent affections must direct us, is
a part of our character : and this, depending upon our own
course of thought, is in a great measure in our own power.
297. And besides this direct operation of thought
upon the affections, there are many circumstances and con-
ditions which have an influence in the formation of our
character ; and which, being in our power, put the formation
of our character also in our power. As we have already
said. Acts of Duty generate Virtues : and our acts depend
upon our will. We can, by directing our Acts, form our
Habits ; and Habits of external action extend their in-
Ch. VII.] MORAL CULTURE OF THE AFFECTIONS. 187
fluence to the internal feelings. Each link of this chain
may be in some degree loose ; and yet the whole will exert
a constant pressure upon the character, drawing it towards
the line of Duty. The Acts of Duty may be imperfectly
done ; the good Habits may be imperfectly formed ; the
internal Feelings may imperfectly correspond to the Habits ;
but yet, by the steady performance of Acts of Duty, the
cultivation of a virtuous character is perpetually promoted.
298. It may be objected, that when we have done all
that is possible in the formation of our character, still there
will remain in it much of good and evil, the result of our
original native qualities which we cannot alter, and of
external circumstances over which we have no control ;
and thus, that our character and disposition is not in our
own power. To this we reply, that, as we have before said,
our character and disposition is in our own power, so far as
to be a subject of praise or blame. For if praise and blame
are not applied to character and disposition, to what can
they be apphed ? We are endeavouring to define those
dispositions which are the proper objects of approbation.
An opponent, whose objections imply that nothing is a
proper object of approbation or disapprobation, has no
common ground with us ; and with him, therefore, it is
useless to reason. But further ; when it is said that there
will remain in our character much that is good and evil,
the result of its native elements, even when we have done
all that is possible to repress the evil, and promote the
good ; we reply, that we never can be said to have done all
that is possible, in the improvement of our character. So
long as life continues, thoughts of Duty, and acts of Duty,
by which our internal being may be improved, are possible :
and so long, therefore, we are responsible for not labouring
to remove the evil which remains, and to forward the good.
299. We thus see, that as there are certain Affec-
188 MORALITY. [Book 111.
tions which are Duties, so is it in our power to foster and
cherish those affections ; to form and improve our character,
so that those dispositions shall make a part of it; and to
continue this course of self-improvement to the end of our
lives. This course may be termed our Self-cultivation, or
Moral Culture; and the effect which it produces upon our
character is our Moral Progress. This Progress is carried
on, as we have seen, by giving earnestness and vividness to
our Moral Affections, generality and clearness to the con-
ceptions by which such affections are regulated, steadiness
to our habits of Moral Action. It also requires us to give
consistency to our Rules of Duty; and generally, to give
consistency, comprehensiveness, and completeness, to the
whole of our intellectual and moral being.
300. Our Moral Culture and Moral Progress can
never be terminated in our lifetime : for we can never reach
a condition in which there is no possibility of giving more
earnestness and vividness to our moral affections, more
generality and clearness to our conceptions of moral objects,
more steadiness to our moral habits. The formation of
a human character is never ended. There will always be
some part of it which does not fully conform to Virtue.
It will always be possible to go further in these respects.
The Supreme Law of our Being, by which we arc directed
to Duty and Virtue, is not satisfied, except the whole of
our Being conform to it. Hence this Law demands a
perpetual Moral Progress; and such a perpetual Moral
Progress is necessary, in consequence of other changes
also. New persons, new objects, are constantly presented
to us: new thoughts, new views of ends and means,
constantly arise in the mind. And as these arise, the
feelings which they occasion, ought constantly to be con-
formed to the Supreme Law. The Affections must con-
stantly expand and modify themselves, according to these
Ch. VII.] MORAL CULTURE OF THE AFFECTIONS. 189
developements of the mind, so as to remain in harmony
with the Moral Ideas. The current of thought is constantly-
flowing, and constantly receiving accessions from fresh rills,
put in motion by the course of the outer world. It thus
becomes constantly wider and deeper through life, except
when it is narrowed and constrained by external obstacles.
The whole of this current of thought must be tinged by the
virtuous affections ; and there must, therefore, be a constantly
flowing source of moral goodness to preserve the moral colour
of the stream. As there is, in the head, a fountain of per-
petual internal change ; there must be, in the heart, a foun-
tain which shall give to every change a character of good.
801. Thus there is a Duty of Moral Self-culture,
which can never be interrupted nor terminated. With refer-
ence to that part of Morality of which we are now speaking,
this is the Duty of the Culture of the Affections. It is our
duty constantly to cultivate the Affections which have been
described as Duties ; Gratitude ; Compassion ; Reverence ;
Family Love ; the Love of our Fellow-countrymen ; the
Love of our Fellow-men. This Culture of the benevolent
affections is a Duty which never stops nor ends.
302. Further; the Duty of thus cultivating these
Affections includes the Duty of possessing such affoctions ;
and may often, in our consideration, take the place of the
Duties which we have mentioned. The Duty of cultivating
Gratitude and Compassion includes the Duty of feeling Gra-
titude and Compassion. That we are to cultivate such Affec-
tions, is a reason for feeling them, which is added to the
other reasons, but which includes them all. We are to feel
Gratitude and Compassion, because it is right : we are to
cultivate them, because it is right to feel them ; but we
cultivate them by feehng them. The Duty of Self-culture
enjoins upon us the same feelings which the Duty of Gra-
titude and the Duty of Compassion enjoined before.
190 MORALIT\\ [Book III.
303. The constant and interminable moral culture
of the affections which is thus a Duty, and includes the
other Duties of the Affections, may suffer interruption and
reverse. The progress at which such culture aims, is
thwarted by every act which is morally wrong. The moral
progress of our affections is interrupted by every malicious
act, by every feeling of malice, by the want of love on occa-
sions when the circumstances and relations of our position
call for it. Our moral progress is reversed when such
malice, or such coldness of heart, becomes habitual. The
transgression of moral precepts, whether they regard ex-
ternal acts, or internal springs of action, is a suspension,
and may be a termination, of our moral progress. And
this effect of transgression, as being a contradiction of our
moral culture, adds greatly to the importance of its moral
aspect.
304. We may further add, that in this aspect of
transgressions of Duty, that they interrupt or undo our moral
progress, we have the aspect of them which most determines
their moral weight ; so that those transgressions are con-
sidered most grave, which most interrupt our moral progress.
As the interruption or inversion of this progress becomes
more decided, the transgression becomes more grievous.
This subject will be pursued afterwards.
We may likewise remark, as a point which will be here-
after pursued, that Moral Progress, the Supreme Law of
our nature, must necessarily be the way to Happiness^ the
Supreme Object of our nature.
305. It may perhaps appear to some that there is
nothing gained in Morality by the view just presented;
since the Duty of Moral Culture is identical with other
Duties already spoken of. But this is not so. By pre-
senting to our minds the Conception of Moral Culture, our
Duties often assume a different aspect from that which they
Ch. VII.] MORAL CULTURE OF THE AFFECTIONS. 191
have when considered separately ; and we are able to esta-
blish Rules of Action, of a wider and completer kind than
those to which the contemplation of more partial Duties
would lead. For instance, the Duty of Compassion assumes
a new and larger aspect, when we consider every com-
passionate act and compassionate feeling to be not only
a relative Duty towards the distressed object, but a means
of softening and improving our own heart : and this aspect
of the Duty may be a better guide for our actions and
feehngs than any narrower view would be. And thus our
Duties, when regarded as parts of our Moral Progress,
may be looked upon as higher objects of moral desire, and
higher aims, than more special objects and more partial
aims could be.
306. Although Moral Culture can never reach its
termination, it may be conceived as a Progress towards an
Ideal Object by which its tendency is marked. Our Moral
Progress may be conceived as a constant tendency towards
an Ideal Point of complete Moral Perfection; — the same
Ideal Center of Morality of which we have already spoken
(231). The Elements of this ideal Moral Perfection are,
as we have already said, the Cardinal Virtues, Benevolence,
Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order. To these we are con-
stantly to tend. We are to establish them in our minds
as Principles : that is (268) as Operative Principles — the
Operative Principles of our Being. To do this, we may look
upon as the Highest Object of our actions ; as the Greatest
Good of which our moral nature is capable.
For the present, we are considering only the Moral
Culture of the Affections; which requires us to make Bene-
volence an Operative Principle of our Being, so that it may
manifest itself in all its modifications, according to our con-
dition and relations to other men. But what has been said
192 MORALITY. [Book III.
of the Duty of Moral Culture, and of its bearing upon
more Special Duties, and upon violations of Duty, applies
equally to the other classes of Duties, as well as to those of
the Affections. We now proceed to those other classes.
Chapter VIII.
DUTIES EESPECTING PROPEETY AND
OTHER OBJECTS OF DESIRES.
307. The Rules of Duty with regard to external
things, as objects of possession, are consequences of the
Principle of Justice, that Each man is to have his own ; and
of the Principle of Moral Ends, that Things are to be sought
only as means to moral ends.
The Rule that each man is to have his own, is a Rule
which regulates all external acts relative to Property. It
thus prescribes external Duties. But these external Duties
imply also an internal Duty, directing the Desires and
Affections. We must desire that each man should have his
own, and must desire things for ourselves, only so far as
they are assigned to us by this rule. And this Duty en-
joins a perfect Fairness and Evenness in our views of exter-
nal possession ; an Equality in our estimate of our own
claims with those of other persons ; and an absence of any
vehemence of Desire which might disturb this equality.
The Duty of a Spirit of Justice excludes all Cupidity or
eagerness in our desires of wealth; all Covetousness, or wish
to possess what is another's ; all Partiality, or disposition to
deviate from equal Rule in judging between ourselves and
others. The Rule of action is. Let each man have his
own ; but the Rule of desire is. Let no man seek his own,
Ch. VIII.] DUTIES RESPECTING PROPERTY, ETC. 193
except so far as the former Rule directs him to do so.
Justice gives to each man his own : but each ought to cling
to his own, not from the love of riches, but from the love of
Justice. It is the love of equal and steady laws, not of
possessions, which makes a good man appropriate wh^^t is his.
This rule does not require us to abstain from the usual
transactions respecting property : — buying and selling, get-
ting and spending; for it is by being employed in such
transactions, that property is an instrument of human ac-
tion,— the means by which the characters and dispositions of
men manifest themselves. A rich man may employ many
men in his service by means of his wealth ; nor does morality
forbid this ; but then, they must be employed for moral
purposes.
308. Justice, as we have said, directs us to desire
external things only in so far as an equal and steady Rule
assigns them to us as our own. But further : even when
they are our own, our desires must not turn to external
things, as ultimate and independent objects. We must not
seek them for their own sake, but as Means to moral Ends.
We must not desire gold and lands, as things in themselves
desirable; but as things which will enable us to do good.
We are not forbidden by morality to use our possessions in
upholding and carrying on the usual relations of society ; as
those of Employer and Workman, Master and Servant ; for
the duties of men suppose the existence and fixity of these
relations ; but we must consider these relations, also, as
means of our duty ; and must maintain and direct them,
only in such a manner as that they are such means of duty.
We must in all things regulate our desire of wealth and its
results by the Spirit of Moral Purpose.
Thus we are directed by Morality to regard Property
only as a mean of doing good. In the eyes of the Moralist
no possessions are absolute and unconditional property ; the
VOL. I. O
194 MORALITY. [Book III.
possessor holds them only in trust for moral and benevolent
purposes. He is a Trustee (152) for the general benefit of
mankind; and the Condition of the Trust is, not merely
that he shall give something, in cases where benevolence
directs ; but that he should employ the whole so as to pro-
mote moral ends. Not only in giving, but in buying goods,
paying wages, saving or spending, he is bound to act morally.
When the proprietor asks, Have I not a Right to do what
I will with my own? the Moralist replies, No; you have not
a moral Right to do what is wrong with your own.
The same may be said of the other Desires. A good man
may seek Rank, or eminent station in the state, and may
desire the Power which Rank and Station give. But then, he
will seek these his Objects only in entire fairness of act and
spirit ; and he will desire them only as means of doing good.
309. Thus, the Duties of the Desires are determined
by the Principle of Justice, and the Principle of Moral
Purpose. But these Principles, in order to have their
proper place in the character, must become complete Ope-
rative Principles. The Spirit of Justice, and the Spirit
of Moral Purpose must pervade the whole of the good
man's being, must regulate all his thoughts and wishes.
This is a condition of ideal moral perfection, towards which
we may tend, but to which we can never fully attain. Yet,
that we have it in our power to make some advance in this
direction, is plain. We have it in our power to become
in some degree just and morally minded ; for if this were
not so, we should deserve no condemnation for being unjust
and sordid minded. Since, then, we can make progress
towards the possession of these Principles of Justice and
Moral Purpose, in which a large portion of our Duty is
contained, our Duty requires us to make such Progress.
There is, in these respects, as in the case of the Affections,
a Duty of Moral Progress and of Moral Culture.
Ch. VIII.] DUTIES RESPECTING PROPERTY, ETC. 195
310. The conception of our Moral Culture being
placed before us, as an object of our desires and endeavours,
our Duties with regard to Wealth, and other external
things, assume a new aspect, by which light may often be
thrown upon the course of our Duty. We are to use
Wealth only as a means of our Moral Culture and Moral
Progress. Hence, though, as we have said, if we are rich, we
may use Wealth in most of its ordinary applications, as in
maintaining many servants, or in employing many workmen ;
we must take care that there is not, in our affections to such
dependents, or in the occupation thus given to our thoughts,
or in the results which we intend or expect, anything which
prevents our moral progress. And since benevolence to
our dependents is a part of moral excellence, we must give
to our relation to them such a character as promotes their
welfare.
Sll. As the rich man is bound in Duty to seek and
to use wealth for moral ends only, and to make it a means
of his moral culture ; so the poor man, who has to labour
in order to provide himself with the necessaries and com-
forts of life, is also bound to abstain from all labours that
are immoral ; and to combine, with a care for his bodily
wants, a care also for his moral progress. A man may not,
because he is poor, engage himself in the service of vice ; or
sell, for his own gain, what is committed to him as a trust.
And however large a portion of his time and thought,
a man's necessary labours may demand; he must always
recollect that he has a mind, which is to be instructed and
morally cultivated, as well as a body to be supported. The
poorest, as well as the richest man, is a moral agent ; and
does not conform to the law of his being, except he make all
other ends subservient to moral ends. He who seeks a
mere livelihood, must still seek to make acting rightly, and
doing good, the ends of his living. He who has the largest
196 MORALITY. [IJook 111.
superfluity cannot live for a higher purpose, and may not
live for a lower.
312. The power which wealth bestows upon its pos-
sessor, and any other power or influence over his fellow-men,
which any one may possess, must be used for their welfare,
in obedience to the Principle of Benevolence, as we have
already said. The welfare of men may be contemplated
under various aspects ; as Interest, Happiness, and the
like. But our contemplation of the good of other men
cannot be complete, except we include in it that which we
consider as the highest good for ourselves ; namely, Moral
Progress. Our Benevolence, therefore, will not be con-
sistent with our moral views, except we seek to promote
the Moral Culture of those over whom our power extends.
The Moral Culture and progress of Man, considered as an
object which we may endeavour to promote, includes many
comprehensive and complex conceptions ; the Liberty, the
Education, the Civilization of Man, may all be considered
as elements of their moral culture, which we may make
our objects in our efforts for their welfare ; and above
all. Religion may be looked upon as including the most
important part of such culture. In order to follow, into
further detail, the Duty of the Moral Culture of men, we
must unfold into particulars and consequences these Con-
ceptions of Liberty, Education, CiviHzation, Rehgion. This
it will hereafter be our business, in some measure, to do. In
the mean time, we proceed to another class of Duties.
197
Chapter IX.
DUTIES CONNECTED WITH TKUTH.
313. The Duties connected with Truth, are those
which result from the Principle of Truth already stated
(269) ; that we must conform to the universal understand-
ing among men which the use of language implies. This
Principle is expressed more briefly by saying, that we must
not Lie ; for a Lie is a violation of the universal understand-
ing of which we speak. This Rule of Duty is in agreement
with the universal moral sympathy of mankind, which con-
demns the Liar as hateful and despicable. That a Lie is
a violation of the general understanding of mankind, is the
reason why the Rule, Lie not^ is universally accepted by
mankind as an absolute Rule, even when a Lie infringes
no positive Rights. The other absolute Rules, Kill not^
Steal not, and the like, are requisite for the establishment
of Rights of the Person, of Property, and so on. A Lie
violates no Right, except the Right of knowing the truth ;
which is not a jural Right, though it may be a moral
claim. But the Rule is acknowledged by men as absolute;
because a Contract to speak the Truth is implied in the use
of Language ; and a Right to know the Truth is conveyed,
by every speaker, to the person to whom he addresses his
assertions.
Accordingly, when the common understanding among
men is not violated, a declaration is not a lie, although in
the common meaning of the term it would be false ; as when
a man says at the end of a letter, " I am your obedient
Servant,'' though the letter itself may contain a refusal to
obey or to serve the correspondent.
314. Not only Lying, but every mode of conveying a
false belief, is prohibited by the Principle of Truth. This
198 MORALITY. [Book III.
especially applies when we convey a belief of our own intention
in a matter affecting him whom we address ; that is, when we
make a Promise. We are bound by the Duty of Truth to
promise only what we intend to perform. All Deceit, Fraud,
Duplicity, Imposition is excluded by the Duty of Truth.
But if I have promised what I intended to perform,
and afterwards change my intention, does it cease to be
my Duty to perform my Promise ? It is plain that it does
not. To break my Promise is to break the understand-
ing between the Promisee and me. The understanding
established between us was, not a doubtful understanding;
namely, that, if I did not change my mind, I would do thus
and thus ; but an absolute one, that I would do thus. If a
Promise were capable of arbitrary revocation by the Pro-
miser, it would establish no common understanding, and
could be of no use in enabling the Promisee to regulate
his actions. At the time I make the Promise, I have the
power of determining my future actions, by retaining my
present intention. The engagement I make is, that I will
retain it; and this the Promisee must be able to reckon
upon, in order that the Promise may mean anything. It
is therefore a universal Duty to perform Promises.
815. The Duty of performing Promises is an extension
of the Obligation of performing Contracts. A Contract is
a Promise, sanctioned by the formalities which the law pre-
scribes, as necessary to make it valid. It is a Duty to
perform Contracts, as well as a legal Obligation ; but the
Duty is not limited by the formalities which limit the
legal Obligation. The legal ObKgation depends upon the
external form, as well as the intention; but the Duty
depends upon the intention and mutual understanding alone ;
and therefore the Duty of performing Promises must exist,
wherever the mutual understanding of the Promisor and
Promisee existed.
Ch. IX.] DUflES CONNECTED WITH TRUTH. I99
It follows from this, also, that Promises are to be per-
formed in the Sense in which they were made and received,
by the mutual understanding of the two parties, at the time.
SI 6. It is a Duty to avoid all Falsehood, Deceit,
Fraud, Duplicity, Imposition. Hence it is a Duty to have
the internal spring of action which impels us to avoid such
acts. It is a Duty to hate Lying, Deceit, Fraud, Du-
plicity : to have no wish to deceive or impose upon any
one : to profess and assume no intentions different from
those which we really entertain. Singleness of Heart. Sim-
plicity of Character, Openness, Frankness, are the virtues
which ought to give rise to our words and actions. We
ought to have in us the Operative Principle, or Spirit, of
Truth.
317. And as in the case of the other Principles,
because we ought to have this Principle in operation within
us, we ought to cultivate and encourage it in our hearts.
Our Moral Culture in this respect also is a Duty.
The Spirit of Truth is to be cultivated by Acts of
Truthfulness. That we have it in our power to be truth-
ful, is evident. The difficulty and need of exertion, indeed,
are on the other side. To say that which we know not to
be true; to assume the appearance of that which we are
not ; requires effort, invention, and contrivance. Truth
is the first thing that comes to our lips ; and we must do
some violence to ourselves, to substitute anything else for
it. In this respect, then, in order to cultivate a Spirit
of Truth in ourselves, we have only to obey our natural
impulses, and to say what we think and feel. But yet
there are many desires, purposes, and motives, which are
constantly impelling men to falsehood and deceit. Men
use language as a means to ends ; — not always, nor prin-
cipally, as the simple declaration of what they think and
feel ; but with a view to the effect which it will produce
200 MORALITY. [Book III.
upon the person addressed. And as a falsification or dis-
tortion of the real state of the case, often seems likely to
answer their purpose, better than a true representation, the
natural impulses of Truth are checked and overpowered by
other Springs of Action. Now the Moral Culture of the
Principle of Truth in us, requires that all such working
of our desires should be suppressed. To lie, to deceive, for
any purpose whatever, is utterly inconsistent with any care
for our moral progress.
It is impossible that the Operative Principle of Truth
should acquire that place in our character which morality
requires, if we allow it to be thrust aside by the desire of
pleasure, or gain, or power, or the like. The only way
in which we can advance towards the moral standard, at
which it is our Duty constantly to aim, is by a steady
and solemn determination, under no circumstances, to be
guilty of falsehood. A man earnestly aiming at his own
moral progress, will be true in his assertion, true to his
promises, true to his implied engagements, true in what
he says, true in what he does. No prospect of any object
of desire, or of any advantage, can sway him to any deceit
or fraud ; for objects of desire have no necessary tendency
to further his purpose ; whereas deceit and fraud are in
direct contradiction to it.
318. We have spoken of a steady and solemn deter-
mination not to be guilty of falsehood, as means of moral
culture. This expression supposes, that which our conscious-
ness as moral beings assures us of, that we have the power
of making such determinations of our future course of action.
We can determine and resolve upon a future act or course
of actions. We must do this, in order that we may promise,
and fulfil our promise But we may combine a greater than
ordinary degree of earnestness and self- watchfulness with
this determination ; a more than ordinary degree of dis-
Ch. LX.] duties connected with truth. 201
tinctness and gravity with the promise, or declaration in
which we express the determination. We may solemnly/
resolve, and solemnly promise. If we do this, we connect the
fulfilment of our resolution and promise more thoroughly
with the progress of our moral culture. We entwine the
two, so that the one cannot be broken, without great damage
to the other. We embark a larger portion than usual of
the moral treasure of our lives in one bottom, and risk a
more ruinous wreck. If we break a solemn resolution, a
solemn promise, what hope can we have of any steadiness
or vigour in our future moral course I How can we retain
the moral hopes and aspirations which are to carry us
forwards ? The growth of the Principle of Truth is arrested ;
the Principle itself seems to be eradicated. The interruption
and reverse in our moral progress is marked and glaring,
and hence (304) the offense is grievous. The violation of
a solemn promise is a moral offense of the highest kind.
There may be some cases in which there may be at first a
doubt what course this Rule of the Duty of Truth directs
us to take ; but these cases we shall consider, when we have
taken a view of the remaining Classes of Duties.
Chapter X.
DUTIES CONNECTED WITH PURITY.
319. The Duties connected with Purity, are those
which result from the Principle of Purity ; that the Lower
Parts of our Nature are to be governed by and subservient
to the Higher Parts. Thus the Appetites and Desires,
which find their gratification in meat and drink, with tho
accompaniments of a decent table, are to be indulged as
subservient to the support of life, strength, and cheerful^
202 MORALITi'. [Book III.
ness, and the cultivation of the social affections ; the in-
dulgence is to be limited by these purposes, and these
purposes by moral rules. In like manner, other desires,
mingled of bodily and mental elements, are to be indulged
only in subservience to the affections and hopes which
belong to them; and the affections and hopes are to be
regulated by conditions which morality and law prescribe.
In the gradation of the parts of human nature, we place
bodily appetite, and all merely selfish desires, below affec-
tion ; but mere blind affection we place below the moral
affection which approves of goodness. The affections of
the heart in some measure refine the desires of the body ;
but the affections of the heart may be greatly impure, if
they are not regulated by the law of the heart, which
morality teaches. Affection alone does not make actions
moral, or remove that stain of impurity which they derive
from bodily appetite. The nature of man is purified, by
having a moral character given to it. This moral charac-
ter purifies the affections ; and the affections, thus purified,
communicate their purity to the desires which are subser-
vient to them. And thus. Morality does not require us
to extinguish the desires, or to reject the pleasures arising
from their gratification. Still, she directs us not to dwell
on this gratification in our thoughts, as an object; but to
accept from it that influence, which it can exercise in giv-
ing energy to our affections, without being itself a direct
object of contemplation. The bodily desires are made the
instruments and evidences of the affections ; and are thus
absorbed into the affections, and made conformable to the
Principle of Purity.
320. The distinction of the Lower and Higher Parts
of our Nature, by means of which we express the Prin-
ciple of Purity, has been rejected by some moralists, and
has been termed Declamation. Such moralists contend that
Ch. X.] DUTIES CONNECTED WITH PURITY. 203
pleasure is universally and necessarily the object of human
action ; and that human pleasures do not differ in kind,
but only in intensity and duration : so that, according to
these teachers, there is no difference of superior and in-
ferior, between the pleasures of appetite, the pleasures of
affection, and the pleasure of doing good. Hence, say
they, the only difference in the character of actions, is
their being better or worse means of obtaining pleasure.
But the universal reason of man assents to the opposite
doctrine, delivered by Butler : who maintains that our prin-
ciples of action do not differ in degree merely, but in
kind also ; some being, by the constitution of human nature,
superior to others, and their natural governors. Thus,
as he teaches, the Rule of our nature is, that Prudence
shall control Appetite, and that the Moral Sentiments shall
control the Affections. If we take the opposite view, we
obliterate the difference between man and brute beasts.
We make no distinction between the blame which we be-
stow upon Errour, and upon Crime ; for on this supposition,
Crime is only miscalculation ; and merely means an erroneous
way of seeking pleasure. If we follow this view, we make
a bad heart the same thing as a bad head. According
to this doctrine, we can have no Supreme Rule of Action ;
for if pleasure be the highest object of action, it is also
the lowest. With such opinions, we deprive the words
right and wrong of their common meaning; for to men
in general, they do not mean right and wrong roads to
enjoyment, which this view makes them mean.
321. The Duties of Purity are those which follow
from such an operation of the Principle. They prohibit
indulgence in the pleasures of the Table for the sake of
bodily gratification alone; though they allow our meals to
be so conducted, that they may not only satisfy the bodily
wants of nature, but also minister to the cheerful and
204 MORALITY. [Book III.
social flow of spirits and thought, which is a condition
favourable to moral action. They prohibit, in like manner,
the gratification of other bodily appetites when sought for
their own sake ; though they allow such gratification under
the sanction of the conjugal tie, and with the hope of
that extension of family affections, and family duties, which
the birth of children brings.
822. As it is our Duty to regulate our actions by these
Rules it is our Duty also to acquire and possess an inward
Principle, from which such a course of action will spring.
It is our Duty to acquire and possess within us an Operative
Principle, or Spirit, of Purity, which may of itself, and with-
out the recollection of express Rules, direct us from all that
is impure. A good man has dispositions, and habits of
mind, which not only restrain him from acts of intemperance
and unchastity, but repress and banish intemperate and
unchaste desires and wishes.
And though it may sometimes be difficult for a man
to arrive at this state of Purity of Heart and Mind; it
is always the Duty of every man to aim at it. A moral
Self-culture in such Purity, is a constant and universal Duty,
of which the obligation can never relax nor terminate. A
Moral Progress in this, as in other respects, must be the
constant aim of a good man.
323. Offenses against the Duties of which we are
now speaking, more distinctly than in other Classes of Duties,
produce their effect, of impeding our Moral Progress, and
turning our course backwards. The intemperate and un-
chaste person becomes, by every vicious act and every vicious
purpose, plainly more and more prone to Vice. These
Vices affect his habits of mind in a very direct manner.
The Glutton and the Epicure, eager and curious respecting
the pleasures of the palate, can hardly give due weight
in their thoughts to higher objects ; and they often stimu-
Ch. X.] DUTIES CONNECTED WITH PURITY. 205
late and overtask the bodily functions, till the mind is
oppressed, impeded, or arrested in its intellectual and moral
operations. In the man who indulges a love of intoxicating
liquors, this takes place more evidently and more rapidly.
He speedily reduces himself to a condition in which neither
reason nor moral restraint has its due power. The indul-
gence of other sensual appetites stimulates the bodily desires
and inflames the imagination. Lust, obeyed as mere Lust,
tends to fill the mind with obscene thoughts, and to make
the intellect and the fancy mere ministers of Appetite. By
such courses, the heart and affections are corrupted : the
imagination is polluted : the character is depraved. Any
steps in such a course are the opposite of a moral pro-
gress : they are steps in a course of moral degradation, of
which the end is utter depravity, filthiness, and profligacy;
in short, moral ruin. Transgressions of the Rules of Duty,
of the kind now referred to, especially produce their effect,
,as steps of a course. The act of transgression leaves a
more distinct trace in the habits, than in the case of mere
mental desires. The appetites become more powerful by
being gratified. Their craving becomes, by indulgence, more
and more importunate and irresistible. The body will not
let the mind turn away from the accustomed path of sen-
suality. Sensual acts leave a stain of material filth upon
the mind ; of which it takes long and earnest efforts to
remove the trace, so that it shall not afterwards give a
sensual tendency to the Will. And thus, every sensual act
contributes to the moral degradation of which we have
spoken; and is grossly at variance with the Duty of our
own Moral Culture.
324. It is very important to dwell upon this Duty
of Moral Self-culture, in reference to offenses of Impurity ;
for these offenses are not mere extensions of the notion
of jural wrongs, as some moral offenses are. Jurally speak-
\
206 MORALITY. [Book III.
ing, each person may be said to have a Right over his
own body, provided he injure no other person ; and two
persons may appear to have a Right to agree to unite in acts
of sensuality, when no Right of a husband or a father is
violated. Accordingly, Fornication, and Concubinage, have
not been generally prohibited by the Laws of Ancient and
Modern Countries. But yet such practices have almost
always been condemned as impure and degraded. And the
consideration of the Duty of Moral Self-culture, which we
have insisted on, shows the propriety of this condemnation.
No person can use his body for purposes of mere Lust,
without utterly abandoning all aim at his Moral Progress,
and all hope of it. He who thus gives himself up to the
government of the Lower parts of his nature, neglects and
despises the Higher. So far as he does this, he renounces
his moral nature, reduces himself to the level of brute
beasts, and goes on resolutely and recklessly to moral ruin.
It is true, that men may continue to perform some Duties,
and to aim at some Virtues, while they still do not refrain
from the Vice of Impurity. But it is plain, that a man's
desire of Moral Progress must be so feeble and inconsistent
as not to deserve the name, if he contentedly and inten-
tionally pursues a course which manifestly leads to the pol-
lution and degradation of one main element of a moral
character.
325. The different constitution of the heart and mind
in the two sexes, as well as the difference in corporeal con-
ditions, lead to some special considerations respecting their
Duties. The Desires and Affections of both sexes lead to
the Conjugal Union : but according to the natural feelings
of most persons, and the practice of most communities,
the man proposes and urges the union, before it takes place ;
the woman yields and consents. The man is impelled by
a love which he proclaims to the object of it ; and he asks
Ch. X.] DUTIES CONNECTED WITH PURITY. 207
for a return in which he has the character of a conqueror.
The woman is led to consent, not only by affection, but
by the hope of a Hfe filled with those family affections,
and family enjoyments, for which, as her heart whispers
to her, she was made. When these natural propensities
operate under due moral restraint, they lead to the marriage
union. But moral restraints may be disregarded in some
cases ; and in other cases may be so feeble, that the solici-
tation on one side overcomes the resistance on the other ;
and the woman is seduced to a bodily union without
marriage. This is an act of sensuality ; and thus, as we
have already said, an offense against morality. And in
consequence of the character and conditions of the two
sexes, of which we have just spoken, after such an act, the
woman continues to yield, but the man is no longer ready
to bind himself to her by the marriage tie. She is be-
trayed, as well as seduced. In so far as the Seducer
breaks the engagements which he has expressly or implicitly
made, he violates the Duty of Good Faith, as well as the
Duty of Chastity. But what we have here to observe is,
that by the act of unchastity, he not only renounces the
Duty of Moral Culture, so far as he himself is concerned;
but that he is a Violator of the Duty of Benevolence, as
the author of her moral degradation ; perhaps of her utter
moral ruin. For, as we have already said, the Vice of
Sensuality, once admitted, has an especial, and almost irre-
sistible tendency, to extend itself over the whole character.
The woman who has yielded to blind affection, afterwards,
when her affections are chilled, and her character hardened,
by the disappointment and treachery she has experienced,
and retaining the trace of sensual desire which unchastity
produces, may, as we know she often does, become a Wanton ;
may give herself up to lasciviousness ; may sink from one
degree of impurity to another, till she end in a state of
208 MORALITY. [Book III.
utter moral ruin. There are said to be men who inten-
tionally, and without remorse, practise the Seduction of
women. It cannot but seem very strange, to a person
of the ordinary kind of affections, that a human being
should employ his skill and exertions in urging a woman,
whom he pretends to love and admire, down this moral
descent. Such conduct appears to involve a want of com-
mon humanity ; for the moral degradation of the woman
deprives her of almost all that is admirable and estimable,
even in the eyes of her seducer himself; and would be
mourned by him as the bitterest evil, and resented as the
most grievous wrong, if it were inflicted upon any one for
whom he has a family affection. To say nothing of the
duty of purity, a man who is not restrained by his Humanity
from such a course of action, must look upon the moral
destruction of women with the kind of indifference with
which the sportsman looks upon the death and wounds of
beasts and birds which he pursues. It is difficult to con-
ceive a more monstrous degree of inhumanity than is implied
in such a view of human beings. The cruelty is greater
than if the pursuer were, in wilful levity, to inflict bodily
pain and wounds : for this moral damage is, and is commonly
held to be, a greater calamity than any bodily suffering. The
moral ruin of a woman makes her an object of abhorrence
to those who are bound to her by ties of family love ; and
produces in her and in them extreme bitterness of he^rt,
and a gloom approaching to the blackness of despair.
326. The tendency of sensual indulgence to inflame
the desires, defile the imagination, and corrupt the heart,
makes the Duty of Purity especially important in the season
of youth. Habits of indulgence, begun in that season, can
hardly fail to give their impress to the character, throughout
life. The common belief that this is so, appears in the
contempt and condemnation which the loss of virginity in
Ch. X.] DUTIES CONNECTED WITH PURITl^ 209
unmarried women, has in all ages and countries incurred.
In its effects upon the moral culture of the character, un-
chastity is as destructive in men as in women. No young
man who has any regard for his moral progress, will make
his body the instrument of lust. And as connected with the
government of his bodily desires, both in the way of cause
and of consequence, he will guard the purity of his mind. He
will avoid admitting into his own thoughts, or suggesting to
others, lascivious images. He will avoid placing himself in
circumstances of temptation or opportunity. He will watch
the affections which may arise in his heart towards particular
persons, in order to suppress them ; well aware how vehement
may become the combined urgency of unlawful affection, and
sensual desire ; and in what a career of vice they plunge
those whom they overmaster.
827. The direction of the Affections and Desires,
here referred to, towards their proper object. Marriage, is
the best mode of avoiding the degradation of character
which is produced by their improper operation. Virtuous
love, as it has often been said, is the best preservative
against impure acts and thoughts. The Love which looks
forwards to the conjugal union, includes a reverence for the
conjugal condition, and all its circumstances. Such a love
produces in the mind a kind of moral illumination, which
shows the lover how foul a thing mere lust is ; and makes
him see, as a self-evident truth, that affection is requisite
to purify desire, and virtue necessary to purify affection.
Other Duties arising out of the conjugal union depend
upon the Principle of Order, and must be considered in
reference to that Principle.
VOL. I.
210 MORALIT\\ [Book 111-
Chapter XI.
DUTIES OF OEDER.
328. The Principle of Order is, that we must obiey
positive Laws as the necessary conditions of morality (269).
This Principle leads to various Duties of Obedience towards
persons connected with us by various social relations ; for
these social relations are established and recognized by Laws ;
or by Customs equivalent to Laws ; and are the points on
which our ObHgations, and therefore our relative Duties,
depend: and many of these relations give one person an
authority over another. Thus, by the laws and customs
of nations, parents have a large amount of authority over
their children. In most places, the husband has by law and
usage some authority over the wife ; the master over the
servant ; and everywhere, there are magistrates and gover-
nors, in whom are vested authority over the members of the
community in general. There is, for all, an Obligation to
submit to this Authority ; and, in order that such acts
of Submission may be moral, there must be corresponding
Duties of Obedience. There must therefore be Duties of
Obedience of Children to Parents, of Wives to Husbands,
of Servants to Masters, of Private Persons to Magistrates ;
and these, we term Duties of Order, or more specially.
Duties of Obedience.
These Duties of Obedience, in order to be moral, must
arise from a corresponding internal Disposition ; from a
Spirit of Obedience. It is therefore our Duty to possess
such a Spirit of Obedience, and a corresponding Affection
towards our Superiors. We have already spoken of cer-
tain Affections, — Reverence towards our Superiors, Love of
Parents, Conjugal Love, and the like, — as Duties. We have
there also remarked, that these Duties involve the Prin-
Ch. XL] DUTIES OF ORDER. 211
ciple of Order, as well as the Principle of Benevolence ;
and that the Affections, thus enjoined, show themselves in
acts of willing Obedience.
329. The Rules of the Duty of Obedience, belong-
ing to each of the Relations of Society, that of the Child,
that of the Wife, that of the Servant, and the like, must
depend, in part, upon the Rules which Law and Custom have
established in each community. For our Duties are such as
give moral significance to our legal Obligations (279) ; and
the Obligations of the various Members of the Family to
each other, must depend upon the idea of the structure of
the Family, entertained in each community. The limits of
Filial Obedience are very different, in the customs of dif-
ferent countries ; and these customs must have their weight
in defining the Limits of Duty. In all states of Society,
in the early stages of life, the Parent is the natural guide
and governor of the child ; and it is the Duty of the child
to obey such government and guidance. But we cannot
pretend to say, generally, how far or how long this Duty
extends. For instance, we cannot lay down any universal
Rule to determine whether the Parent may prevent the son
from selecting a wife, or the daughter a husband, by their
own choice; and whether, in such a case, it is the child^s
Duty to obey: or whether, supposing that obedience to a
prohibition in such a case be a Duty, it be a Duty also to
take the husband or the wife whom the Parent selects. In
some countries, the marriage of the child is a matter usually
managed altogether by the parents. In such cases, it is
the child^s duty to bring the affections, as far as possible,
into harmony with the custom. But those communities and
those parents appear to provide better for that special per-
sonal affection which the completeness of the marriage
union requires, who allow to young men and young women
freedom of choice in marriage. Where this is the case,
p2
212 MORALITY. [Book III.
it is the Duty of the man to select a partner to whom his
heart tells him he is likely to bear a true conjugal aifection ;
and of the woman, also, to give her hand only when she
can give her heart. But even in such cases, filial duty
requires, if not absolute obedience, great reverence and de-
ference to the wishes of parents ; especially while the children
are young ; and while, consequently, the habit of submitting
to the parent's guidance must be still in force, in a family
directed by Rules of Duty. In the same manner, the kind
of authority which the husband, by law and custom, has
over the wife, is different in different communities. In all
countries, the man is the head and representative of the
family, and is the person to whom political ofiices are as-
signed. But to what extent the husband, and to what
extent the wife, shall rule in domestic concerns, will be
regulated by local usage, or by special understanding of the
parties. And in every case, the Duties of the husband
and of the wife are those which give a moral significance
to the Rules which usage and mutual understanding esta-
blish. While established. Duty requires the married pair
to conform to the Rules ; but Duty requires, too, that this
should be done in a spirit of Affection and Confidence ; the
acts thus performed expressing the common will of the two.
And in the same way, the Obligations of obedience in
Servants are variously determined by law, use, or agree-
ment ; and their Duties will vary with their Obligations :
but in all cases, there are Duties corresponding to their
Obligations; their offices must be performed faithfully and
heartily, not with a grudging and merely formal service. And
with respect to political relations, a willing obedience to the
laws, an affection for his country, a love of its institutions
and of its constitution, a loyalty to its sovereign, are proper
feelings of a good man, in a rightly constituted state ; and
are Duties, except where, by some special historical facts,
Ch. XI.] DUTIES OF ORDER. 213
objects, on which such feelings can be employed, are want-
ing.
330. A wiUing obedience to the Laws of the Land
is, as we have said, a Duty; for the Laws define those
social relations which determine the course of our Duties ;
the Laws establish those Obligations of which our Duties
are the expansion, and to which our Duties give a moral
signification. But Laws themselves aim at a moral signi-
fication ; they seek to be just and equitable Laws. We
shall hereafter consider the moral character of Laws ; but
we may here remark, that so far as they have an obvious
moral signification, it is our duty to accept and obey them
according to this signification. In cases where the Law
is equitable, it is our Duty to conform to the Spirit as
well as to the Letter of the Law.
331 . There are, however, many cases in which the Law is
arbitrary, and rests upon the Authority of the State alone ;
or in some other way, is devoid of any obvious moral signi-
fication. There are many forms, details, and magnitudes
regulated by Law, merely because they must be fixed by
some Rule, and Law is the proper Rule. In such cases
we have no Duty, but to conform to the letter of the Law.
And accordingly, the Law itself so directs us ; and the Courts
of Justice pronounce their decisions, according to the Letter
of the Law. In such indifferent matters, we are not to
seek for a Spirit beyond the Letter. The State itself, to
which our Duties refer, gives us to understand that we are
to guide ourselves by the Letter. Nor, in such cases, is
the Intention of the Legislator the measure of our Duty.
It is not with any particular Legislator or Body of Legis-
lators that we have to do. The State enjoins the Law;
and we accept the Law as the State understands it. The
State must be supposed to have accepted the Law, and to
understand it, according to the meaning of the words ; for
the State has accepted and adopted the expressed words,
214 MORALITY. [Book III.
not the unexpressed meaning of any man or set of men.
If any set of Legislators failed in expressing what they
meant, the State cannot be bound by their incapacity. And
thus, in indifferent matters, the Letter of the Law, and not
some supposed Spirit besides the Letter, is the proper guide
of our obedience. The business of Legislation is to prevent
our Duties depending upon anything so vague and obscure,
as the Spirit of a Law not expressed in the Letter.
332. We have spoken hitherto of Duties of Obedience ;
but the Duties of Order include also the Duties which exist
on the other side ; the Duties of Command. As it is a Duty
to give a cordial obedience to just authority, with a regard
to the purposes for which the authority subsists ; so is it
a Duty to exercise Authority for its proper purposes, and
in a spirit of benevolence towards those who are its subjects.
As it is the Child's Duty to submit to the guidance and
government of the Parent, it is the Parent's Duty to guide
the Child aright, and to govern it by Rules which the
good of the child itself justifies. As far as it is the Wife's
Duty to obey the commands of her husband, it is the
Husband's Duty to command nothing harshly, capriciously,
or unreasonably ; but such acts only as may fall in with an
affectionate and confiding conduct of their united course of
life. As it is the Servant's Duty to do his work willingly,
and bear to his employer such respect as suits their rela-
tive condition; it is the Employer's Duty, in directing
those who labour in his service, to consider their powers
and their comfort. It is his Duty, also, not to make the
relation of employer and servant a source of estrangement
between the two classes, by a hard and repulsive demeanour;
for this cannot be the true moral aspect of the relation
between men, since they are bound together by the Duty
of mutual Benevolence. As to their place in the social scale
of a particular community, men may be called Superiors and
Inferiors; but no class of men are superior or inferior to
Ch. XI.] DUTIES OF ORDER. 215
others, in their moral claim to kindness in our intention, and
gentleness in our manner. So far as the relations of society
receive their true moral significance, they bind together all
the members of the society by a tie of benevolence ; which
has, for its natural results, ready and willing good offices of
all to all ; frank, affable, and courteous intercourse of all
with all. If this feeling of benevolence had its due effect,
the repulsive forces which social distinctions bring into play —
the pride of rank and station, the capricious exclusions of
fashion, the supreme regard of each class to its own. comfort,
the excessive jealousy of interference, the impatience of intru-
sion— would disappear before it ; and, so far as the influence
of such a feeling operates upon the members of a commu-
nity, those repulsive elements will diminish and melt away. /
S83. The Duties of Order, so far as regards the
State, like other Duties, include the Duty of giving a moral
significance to the social and civil relations with which they
deal. Every man who has any power, or any function in the
State assigned him, must exercise it in such a manner as
to give a moral meaning to his office. He must act, on
the part of the State, as a public representative of its
moral character. If he be a Judge, he must administer
the Laws impartially, and so as to make them instruments
of justice. If he be an administrative officer, he must
carry into effect the intentions of the Community; giving
to it, as far as the Rules of his office admit, the character
of a moral agent acting rightly. If he have assigned to
him a vote by which he shares in the election of a legisla-
tor or a governor, the vote is a Trust for public purposes
(152) ; and it is grossly immoral to convert such a Trust to
purposes of private gain. All such Duties are Public Duties ;
and Public, no less than Private Duties, require us to use
all our external means and powers for the furtherance of
Morality.
216 MORALiri\ [Book III.
334. The Laws and Customs which determine how far
each person shall have a share in the government of the State,
define the Political Rights and Obligations of men ; and
the general scheme of Government, thus constituted, is the
Constitution of the Country. In every country, the Poli-
tical Rights and Obligations of men ought to be in a
great measure fixed; for otherwise the Laws could not
remain fixed, and could afford no fixed points to serve as
the basis of Duty. It is therefore the Duty of a citizen to
use his Political Rights, so as to give to the Laws the fixity
which the purposes of Morality require. This is the Politi-
cal Duty of Conser'&aiion. On the other hand, the Political
Rights and Obligations of the citizens of a State may
change from time to time ; for by course of time and cir-
cumstance, it often becomes possible to alter the Laws in
general, and Political Laws in particular, so as better to
further the purposes of Morality. It is the Duty of a
citizen to use his Political Rights in promoting changes of
this description. This is the Political Duty of Progress.
Chapter XII.
INTELLECTUAL DUTIES.
335. BfismEs the Duties of Kindness, which the Duties
of Command include, there are other Duties of Command,
which require our attention. He who has authority, must
issue Commands, not only kind, but also prudent, and wise.
He has faculties by which he is enabled to judge of such
characters in Rules of Action : and he is bound to em-
ploy these faculties, as well as his Affections, in the per-
formance of his Duty. Thus, there are Duties which belong
to these faculties. .We may term them generally. Duties
Ch. XII.] INTELLECTUAL DUTIES. 2l7
of the Intellectual Faculties; but we may conveniently
distinguish among them, the Duty of Prudence^ and the
Duty of Wisdom,
We have already said, that we conceive Prudence as
the Virtue by which we select right means for given ends ;
while Wisdom implies the selection of right ends, as well
as of right means. Those who have authority over others,
have to lay down Laws for their conduct ; and these Laws
may be considered as means, to ends which the Lawgiver
contemplates. There are certain objects, which those who
possess authority by their social position, may be assumed
as having constantly and necessarily in their desires : thus,
a head of a family desires sustenance for his family, tran-
quillity among the members of it, freedom from debts con-
tracted by them ; as an employer, he desires to have his
work well and carefully done ; and the like : and he mani-
fests his Prudence by the Laws, which he lays down, or the
Rules on which he acts, with reference to these objects.
But perhaps a father makes it his main object that his
sons and his daughters should rise to riches and rank:
and then, though he may be prudent in the means he
takes for such ends, we may doubt whether he is wise in
selecting these as his highest ends.
336. But we have to select the ends of action, and
the means to them, for ourselves, as well as for others;
and Prudence and Wisdom are concerned in this selection,
in the former, as in the latter case. We may therefore
consider the Duty of Prudence, and the Duty of Wisdom,
without any special reference to the offices of command
over others, which men may have to execute.
The Duty of Prudence, like other Duties, implies that
man has a power over the faculties, which such a Duty
requires him to employ. That man has some power over
his own thoughts, is evident. He can retain an object of
218 MORALITY. [Book III.
thought in his mind : contemplate it in various aspects and
bearings; scrutinize it; deliberate upon it. This is Inquiry and
Consideration ; and by this proceeding, he can often discover
means to an end, and consequences of an act, which escape
his notice, in a more rapid and slight mode of regarding
the subject. Now the means to an end have their moral
character affected by the end. The consequences of an
act contribute to the moral character of the act. The
points which Consideration and Inquiry brings into view,
may determine whether the act be good or bad. And since
we must employ all our Faculties and Powers in order to
conform our actions to the Supreme Law, we must exercise
this power of Consideration; and thus every man, as a
moral agent, is bound by a Duty of Consideration^ including
a Duty of Inquiry.
337. The Intention is directed by the various Springs
of Action, including the Moral Sentiments and the Reason.
Morality requires that Intention be directed rightly : that
is, towards the Ideas contained in the Supreme Law ;
Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order. There
is a Duty of right Intention, which is included in all other
Duties. Now we have here to remark, that this Duty
of Right Intention does not replace or supersede the Duty
of Consideration. We must consider the means, as they
are in themselves, as well as in subservience to the end at
which our intention points. We must consider the con-
sequences which will follow upon our act, as well as the
act which we directly intend. For a good end does not
justify the means which we employ, if a due consideration
would shew us that the means are wrongly selected : and
that an act is in itself moral, does not justify it, if by a
due consideration we might see that it would lead to evil
consequences. I may have a wish to improve the charac-
ter of my child : I may hastily punish him, with such an
Ch. XII.] INTELLECTUAL DUTIES. 219
intention. But the intention does not justify the haste.
If a little thought and care, bestowed upon the subject,
would have shown me that these courses would make him
worse, and not better, I am to blame. I have violated
the Duty of Consideration. And in like manner, the Duty
of Consideration is transgressed by any want of a Regard
to Consequences. I may heedlessly indulge the desires of
a child, or give what a man asks of me. But if the
consequences of doing this be mischief to the child or to
the man, and mischief which a little thought would have
shown to be probable, or certain, I am culpable. Here,
also, I have violated the Duty of Consideration. Haste and
Heedlessness are grave offenses, in cases which concern the
welfare of others. We have already seen that the Law
treats such offenses as violations of our Obligations (114):
and our Duties, in this, as in other cases, are extensions
of our Obligations. If Law require in us a care and con-
sideration for the wellbeing of our fellow-men, Morality
must require such care and consideration still more; and
must require more care and more consideration than the
Law can enforce. Benevolence aims at the good of those
among whom we are placed: but she must take to her
aid the best exertions of the Intellect, in order to deter-
mine by what means such good is to be brought about ;
and what will be the consequences of any acts which such
a purpose may suggest to us.
338. It is in our power to deliberate ; but even after
deliberation, we may be mistaken. It may be asked, if we
are responsible for such a mistake. Is it a violation of any
Duty to select wrong means to good ends, or to err in
foreseeing the consequences of actions meant for good ? If we
here also follow the analogy of the Law, we shall be led
to conclude that, in some cases at least, such an errour
is blameable. A physician who administers medicaments
220 MORALITY. [Book III.
grossly pernicious, is condemned by the Law for his errour,
however right may have been his intentions, and with
however much thought he may have gone to his errour.
And the common judgment of mankind throws a Hke blame
upon similar errours. Men are indignant against folly and
ignorance, when they affect important acts ; as well as
against evil intention. Men feel, and express, a strong moral
indignation against a father, who ruins the character of
his child by bad teaching, though he may have employed
much pains upon its education : against a pilot who wrecks
his ship by bad steering, though he may have steered his
best: against a legislator who makes bad laws, though he
thought them good. And if we look into the ground of
this indignation, and of the moral condemnation which it
involves, we shall see that the persons, in these cases, are
judged to be to blame, because they deviated from the
guidance of that Reason which is the common light of
all mankind. They had a Faculty which points out the
difference between what is good and what is bad, in such
cases; between right means and wrong means, to the ac-
knowledged ends. They cannot have duly employed this
Faculty, or they would not have gone wrong. They acted
irrationally, and in so doing, they violated a Duty ; and thus
we are led to recognize the Duty of acting rationally. It is
our Duty, not only to be careful and considerate in our
choice of means to ends, but also to choose rationally.
We do not say that it. is our Duty to choose rightly,
for there may be inevitable errours : but at least, we must
use our Reason in choosing, and avoid such errours as her
light manifests to us.
We do not say that it is easy to determine what errours
can, and what cannot be avoided : what selection of means
for an acknowledged end is rational, and what is irrational.
So far as such a distinction can be drawn, it will be our
Ch.XII.] intellectual duties. 221
business hereafter to examine it. But the difficulty of doing
this, does not prevent our recognizing, in general, the Duty
of acting rationally, as one of our intellectual Duties.
S89. The Reason directs our course in various ways :
among others, by accepting Rules of action, and directing
the conduct in conformity to them. Such Rules have it
for their office to control and regulate the variable and
discordant action of men's Affections and Desires : to render
permanent and consistent the guidance, which Reason, ope-
rating without Rules, exercises, in each person, doubtfully
and interruptedly. Rules are the primary expressions of
Duties. The Rules, Do not Jcill^ Do not steals Do not lie,
and the like, are the basis of moral action. The formation,
the establishment, the acceptance of such Rules, is the mode
in which man becomes a moral agent. But besides such
Rules, others, of a less absolute and general kind, are among
the most suitable and efficacious means of controlling the
conduct in a rational and moral manner. Such are those
we have just mentioned : Children, obey your parents :
Masters, treat your sergeants with kindness. Such Rules,
accepted as right, and retained in the recollection as the
constant guides of our conduct, extend the sway of Reason
to times when, without them, we might be led wrong by
passion or desire. They sustain us against the pressure of
special seasons of temptation ; and extend, to the worse
periods of our rational and moral life, the influence of the
better periods. To act by such Rules, is the very meaning
of acting according to Duty. Further ; not only are such
Moral Rules means by which our Reason guides us, but
other Rules also, not directly moral, but of a prudential cha-
racter only, are among the proper means of directing our
conduct rationally. Thus, we may avoid intemperance, by
conforming to Rules which shall moderate our eating and
drinking; we may escape debt and poverty, by conforming
222 MORALITY. [Book III.
to Rules limiting our habitual expenses ; we may suppress
our tendencies to harsh and rude behaviour, by conforming
ourselves to Rules of courtesy. Rules of this kind, more or
less distinctly expressed in words, are the proper guides
of man, as a rational being. They are the modes in which
the general convictions of the Reason are brought into
contact with particular cases of action. It is our Duty
thus to regulate our conduct ; and thus we have a Duty of
acting according to Rule,
840. Moral Rules, in so far as they are moral,
are absolute, being expressions of the Supreme Rule of
human action, which nothing can overmaster or supersede.
Prudential Rules, having for their object subordinate ends,
may be set aside in particular cases, as these objects
themselves may. They must give way, for instance, when-
ever they interfere with Moral Rules. Moral Rules only,
are, in the highest sense, the proper guides of human life.
Hence, it is our Duty to accept or to frame Moral Rules,
as the means of our guidance. This is a Duty, which has
not, like the Duties of which we have been speaking, reference
to any subordinate end, but to the highest ; it is the Duty
of Wisdom, not a Duty of Providence.
The Duty of Wisdom is the Duty of framing or adopting
such Rules of action as are consistent with the Supreme
Rule of Human Action. It is the Duty of having Rules
of Duty: for, as we have seen, the Rules of Duty are
determined, on the one hand, by those Moral Ideas which
serve to express the Supreme Rule ; while, on the other
hand, they are determined by the various social relations and
conditions of man''s life.
341. By what means can we obtain Rules of Duty
which are truly moral, truly consistent with the Supreme
Rule? We have already been employed in laying down
such Rules ; and we have seen, in some measure, by what
Ch. XII.] INTELLECTUAL DUTIES. 223
process they may be arrived at. We find that there are
external conditions necessary to the existence of man as
a moral being; that there are certain Rights and Obli-
gations, according to which, as external Facts, man's Duties
are regulated. There are, also, certain Ideas of Virtues,
namely. Benevolence, Justice, and the like, according to
which, as internal Ideas, the conceptions of Duty are
regulated. By the combination of these two elements, we
have endeavoured to define, in some measure, the scheme
of Duties which belong to man. But we have, in several
instances, been led to see that some further steps are
requisite, before we can describe our Duties in a complete
manner; and before we can produce Rules which shall
admit of definite application, in the cases which commonly
offer themselves to our notice. Among the steps which
are thus pointed out to us, as required for the formation
of more definite Rules of Duty, are Determinations and
Definitions, more exact than we have yet obtained, of some
of the Conceptions, in terms of which our Rules must
necessarily be expressed; such conceptions, for instance,
as Justice, Humanity, Happiness, and the like. The next
step which we shall take, in the establishment of Moral
Rules, will be to attempt to analyze and define, more
precisely than we have yet done, several such Conceptions
as these, and to apply, in particular cases, the Conceptions
thus defined. We may, in this way, best hope to obtain,
both Moral Truths of a general kind, and the determination
of the questions which belong to special cases.
342. The precision of our Conceptions, which may thus
aid us in arriving at Moral Truths, is a proper object for
us to aim at, as a mode of promoting our Moral Culture.
It is our Duty to aim at such an intellectual progress, as a
means to our moral progress. And not only may this par-
ticular kind of improvement of the intellect, be an aid in our
224 MORALITY. [Book III.
moral culture; but the improvement of the intellect in
general, in its conceptions and operations, is fitted to have
this effect. And it is therefore our Duty to aim at such
improvement. Corresponding to the Duty of Moral Culture
of ourselves, there is a Duty of intellectual Culture. To
cultivate our Intellect, is, in itself, a source of gratification.
The love of knowledge which we have spoken of, as one
of the desires of man, impels him constantly to make his
knowledge more and more extensive, more and more precise,
more and more connected ; and an advance of this kind is
indeed a Culture of the Intellect. But besides all other
Truth, to which the love of knowledge leads, and where
man seeks for the satisfaction of knowing, this desire leads
to Moral Truth, which is the proper guide of man''s life ;
and which, therefore, he is impelled to seek, not only by
pleasure, but by Duty.
848. Moral Truth is, as we have said, the proper
guide of human life ; and hence, those who have to guide
others, are under a more peculiar necessity of knowing
Moral Truth, and of possessing precise and consistent moral
conceptions. Those especially need such Truth, such Pre-
cision, and such Consistency, whose ofiice it is to make
Rules for others, or to teach them the Rules which they
are to follow ; — those, that is, who have to legislate for
mankind, or to educate them. The Duty of Wisdom is
especially incumbent on Legislators and on Educators.
Since the offices of Legislation and of Education especially
require the possession of Moral Truth, we shall defer the
consideration of those offices in detail, till we have, under
our notice, those further elements of Moral Truth, which we
still have to consider.
We will only observe, before we quit this part of the
subject, that Legislation implies, not merely combinations of
Conceptions, and mental results of Ideas, but also the external
Ch. XII.] INTELLECTUAL DUTIES. 225
Facts, by which Law is realized. Laws are Moral Rules,
clothed in an actual historical Form. The Legislator must
also be a Governor ; or at least his ideas must be adopted and
enforced by the Governor, in order to make them be Laws.
S44. In like manner. Education, so far as it teaches
Rules of action, implies external facts, which give reality
to the Precepts inculcated. The Educator teaches the
learner the Laws of the Land, for instance, in order that
he may guide himself by them; but in order that his
teaching may have its effect, he must be able to speak
of these Laws, as actually existing Laws; not as merely
possible conceivable Rules. And when the Educator has to
teach, not merely human Laws, but moral Rules, he must
still be able to present these moral Rules, not merely as
imaginable, but as possessing a real Authority. Moral Rules
derive their substance from the Supreme Rule of Human
Action, of which they are partial expressions. Hence, this
Supreme Rule must have a real authority, and an actual
force. The Educator teaches his pupil to do what is abso-
lutely right ; and because it is right : but this teaching
supposes that its being right includes a sufficient reason for
doing it ; estimating reasons according to the real condition
and destination of man.
The Supreme Rule of Human Action derives its Real
Authority, and its actual force, from its being the Law of
God, the Creator of Man. The Reason for doing what is
absolutely right, is, that it is the Will of God, through which
the condition and destination of man are what they are.
We are thus led to Religion, as a necessary part of the
Moral Education of men. But in order to complete the train
of thought by which Morality leads us to Religion, we must
pursue somewhat further the subject of Moral Transgression,
of which we have already spoken (303).
VOL. I. Q
226
Chapter XIII.
OF TKANSGRESSION.
345. In our survey of the several classes of Duties
(281 — 344) we have seen that, beside the direct Duties
of action, and of affection towards others, there are reflex
Duties which regard ourselves : the Duties, namely, of
unfolding within us, or establishing in our minds the Opera-
tive Moral Principles from which external Duties must pro-
ceed ; the Duty of aiming at our own Moral Progress. The
Duty of cultivating in our own minds the principles of
Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order. We have
it for our business and proper aim, to make our Lives a
Moral Progress, in which these Principles constantly become
more and more identified with our habits of action, thought,
and feeling. We have to form our character, so that these
principles are its predominant features. We have to seek
not only to do^ but to he ; not only to perform acts of Duty,
but to become virtuous (299, &c.).
Further: there is an Intellectual, as well as a moral
progress, at which we must aim ; an Intellectual Progress,
which is a means to a Moral Progress. We are to en-
deavour constantly to improve our powers of apprehending
Truth, in order that we may be able the more readily and
firmly to lay hold on that Moral Truth, which is the proper
guide of our Lives (342).
346. We have to aim at this moral and intellectual
progress as the Greatest Good whch we can desire for our-
selves (306). But further, the complete Benevolence which is
part of the character at which we thus aim, and which seeks
the good of others, must seek for them that good which for
ourselves we esteem the greatest. Our benevolence, there-
Ch. XIIL] of transgression. 227
fore, will seek the moral progress of others as well as our
own; and intellectual progress for them, no less than for
ourselves, as a means of moral progress. And thus, the
complex Object, at which we shall constantly have to aim,
is, the Moral and Intellectual Progress of Ourselves and of
the rest of Mankind.
We may consider this as the highest object of action
and thought which we can propose to ourselves ; and in
proportion as we make this our object, and direct our
thoughts and purposes to it, we elevate our minds.
347. We have already seen (293, &;c.) that we have
the power, in some measure at least, of carrying on this
moral and intellectual progress within ourselves. That this
progress must be altogether incomplete and imperfect with-
out the aid of Religion, we shall hereafter see ; but it is at
least so far possible for men to promote or neglect their
own moral progress, that one man shall differ very much
from another in the advance he has thus made. Two men
may be, at least by comparison, one virtuous and another
vicious ; and by a like difference, they may be at very
different stages of their moral progress ; if, indeed, we may
not say of some, that the course of their lives is a con-
stant moral degradation rather than a progress.
348. This moral progress, as we have said (300),
can never terminate while we remain on earth. So long
as we live, we shall have room to make ourselves better
and wiser: to increase the warmth of our benevolence, to
purify our hearts, to elevate our thoughts, to make ourselves
more and more virtuous. To do this, is a moral growth and
nurture ; a moral life, which can never end, while our natural
life goes on. Or if the moral progress end, the moral life
is turned to moral disorder. In the moral faculties, if there
be not a healthy growth, there must be a morbid decay
and foul disease.
q2
228 MORALITY. [Book III.
349. The Moral life is nourished by the perpetual
aliment of moral actions, moral habits, moral thoughts, moral
affections. All acts of Duty, and all affections which lead to
acts of Duty, tend to promote our Moral Culture. On the
other hand, all Transgressions of Duty interrupt our Moral
Culture, arrest our Moral Progress, and are steps in a
retrograde moral course. Unkind affections, unlawful de-
sires, fraudulent intentions, impure imaginations, are incon-
sistent with our moral advancement, while they occupy us ;
and are proofs that we have much still to do, in giving a
moral character to our being. If these things form fre-
quent and common parts of our lives, they are proofs that
we have made little moral progress; or rather, that we
have made none, and are making none. If these things
are acquiesced in by us, and allowed to grow into habits,
we are not going forwards, but backwards, in moral cha-
racter. So far as this is our case, we tend to become more
and more degraded, depraved, vicious (303).
350. Thus, if wrong affections, desires, intentions,
and imaginations, occur in our lives at all, they are interrup-
tions of our moral progress; and evidences that, in our
moral culture, we have still much to do. Yet such things
may occur, so long as our moral culture is incomplete ; and
since, during our lives, it ever must be incomplete, they may
occur so long as life remains. The Springs of Action, not
fully converted into Moral Principles, may, under special
circumstances, tend to deviate from the Law of Duty. De-
sires may be inflamed. Affections perverted. Reason misled,
Consideration omitted, Rules neglected, lower aims put in
the place of the highest ; and man may fall below the line
which morality draws. The circumstances which tend to
produce such an effect are Temptations. By the impulses
of the Springs of Action, not fully controlled by Rules of
Duty, man is tempted to transgress such Rules.
Ch. XIIL] OF TRANSGRESSION. 229
351. It is the moral business of man to remt Temp-
tation. The powers by which we guide ourselves, the
Reason, and the Moral Sentiments, must be employed in
controlling the Desires and Affections which impel us in an
immoral direction. All the results of our Moral Culture
must be called to our aid for this purpose. The Express
Moral Principles which we have learnt ; the Operative Moral
Principles which we have acquired ; Consideration, Rational
Action, and Rules of Duty, we must call into operation,
that they may overcome the immoral impulses by which we
are urged. This we must do as moral agents ; although to
these resources. Religion alone can give their full force.
If a man does not effectually resist Temptation ; if he is
overcome and yields, he transgresses the Rules of Duty;
he offends against Morality ; he commits a vicious act. The
contemplation of man under this aspect, as liable to Trans-
gressions and Offenses, introduces us to very important and
serious views of his condition and destination.
352. Transgressions or Offenses are described by
various terms, implying various degrees of condemnation.
As defects from the standard of Morality they are Faults ;
and when we would ascribe them to weakness of Will,
rather than to wrong intention, they are called Failings.
As transgression becomes graver, more grievous, we have no
term which directly expresses an enormous violation of
morality (as do the latin scelus, flagitium, f acinus). Vice
implies the disposition to transgress ; Guilt and Crime pro-
perly express the violation of human laws; and Sin^ an
offense against God. But Guilt and Crime are terms also
used of the violation of moral laws ; and all Transgressions
are Sins. Those who commit Sins are wicked, which is said
to have meant, originally, under the influence of coil spirits.
Sins are described, according to their character, as acts of
cruelty, of injustice, of falsehood, of uncleanness, and the
230 MORALITY. [Book III.
like. As they excite our moral abhorrence, they are termed
hateful^ heinous^ atrocious^ shocking, abominahle, detestable, exe-
crable. Crimes are said, figuratively, in proportion as they
are greater, to be higher, deeper, heavier, darker. As their
criminal nature is more manifest, they are flagrant.
353. It may be asked, according to what Measure
and Standard do moral transgressions become greater and
graver. Is there a definite gradation from slight Failings
to atrocious Crimes; and if so, what circumstances fix the
place of each Offense in this Scale ? To this we reply, that
the universal voice of mankind declares some offenses to
be greater, some to be less ; some heavier, some Hghter.
But yet, since the moral transgression consists in the per-
version of internal affections, desires, and will; and since
this internal condition cannot be fully known and compared
in any two cases, at least in any two classes of cases; it
must be almost impossible to declare one class of transgres-
sions to be better or worse than another. This at least
we may say ; that to pronounce one kind of offenses better
and slighter than another, would tend to convey a false
opinion respecting the offenses thus in some degree pre-
ferred and palliated. For no transgression can be said to
be so much better than another, as not to be utterly bad.
No offense can rightly be deemed slight, since the shghtest
utterly interrupts our moral progress.
354. But in this aspect of offenses, that they inter-
rupt or undo our moral progress, we have a kind of Measure,
of their magnitude. Those offenses are most grievous, which
are most pernicious in their effect upon our moral culture.
Some may interrupt our moral culture for a time, and it
may nevertheless be resumed. Others may show that moral
culture has no place in our thoughts ; that we have no wish
to be better than we are. Other transgressions may imply
a recklessness or despair of moral progress ; a state of mind
Ch. XIII.] O^ TRANSGRESSION. 2S1
which points to moral ruin as its natural sequel. The
gravity of the offense will therefore be increased by all cir-
cumstances which indicate it to be the result of an habitually
immoral state of the Affections and Desires, of settled and
deliberate purpose, of a want or a rejection of moral aims.
The hope that an offense may be only a transient interrup-
tion of the offender'*s moral progress, is favoured by its
being the result of great and sudden Temptation, plainly
at variance with the habitual course of the affections and
will. Such circumstances, therefore, tend to make an offense
less grave and mischievous to the offender.
355. I have already pointed out, of what nature the
mischief is, which offenses do to the offender. So long as
there is a suspension of the authority of Duty, there is a
suspension of the proper moral functions of man. So long
as immoral thought, purpose, and affection prevail, the
moral progress, which is the proper course of man's life;
is arrested or inverted. Acts of Wickedness are steps
towards moral ruin. Or, to resume a figure which we have
alrealy employed; the moral life is nourished by the per-
petual aliment of moral purposes, desires and affections.
By an immoral act, poison is taken into the human being,
which tends to enfeeble, distemper, and destroy the moral life.
We are now led to ask, whether there is any remedy
for this mischief. When transgression has been committed,
how is rectitude to be restored l When the moral progress
has been interrupted and turned back, how is the regress to
be checked, the lost ground to be recovered, the progress to
be resumed ? When poison has been taken into our moral
being, how is it to be ejected, and the powers of life restored
to their healthful action?
The mode in which the poison of immoral purposes, de-
sires, and affections, was taken into our being was, by their
being our purposes, our desires, our affections. In order to
232 MORALITY. [Book III
expel their effect, they must be rejected as our purposes, our
desires, our affections. They must be repudiated, so that
they shall no longer belong to us. They must be changed
into their reverse ; desire, into aversion ; love, into hate ; the
purpose to do, into the purpose to undo ; joy in what was
done, to sorrow that it was done. This change must be
carried, by an effort of thought, into the past. We must
recall in our memory the past act of transgression, contra-
dicting, as we do so, the motives by which we were misled,
and condemning the purpose which we formed. This change,
this sorrow, this renunciation and condemnation of our past
act, is Repentance. The transgressor must repent. We do
not say that this suffices to remedy the evil. It does not do
so. But there can be no remedy of the evil without this.
This, at least, he must do. He must make the effort of
Repentance, in order to cast out of his being the poison
of immoral act or purpose. He, for this purpose, must see
his moral regression as what it is, a dire mischief, which,
if not remedied, tends to immeasurable evil.
356. But the regression must not only be lamented,
it must also be repaired. We must not only reject the
past offense by repentance, but we must seek to resume
the course which morality points out. We must endeavour
to restore our moral progress ; to regain the ground which
we have lost; to avoid all repetition of the errours and
offenses which we have committed. We must direct our
Moral Culture to our recovery and renovation. We must
amend ourselves. We must reform our lives. Amendment
and Reformation^ as well as Repentance, are the necessary
sequel of transgression, in virtue of that Duty of Moral
Culture and Moral Progress which is constantly incumbent
upon all men.
357. The Moralist is thus led to teach, that after
Transgression, Repentance and Amendment are necessary
Ch. XIIL] OF TRANSGRESSION. 233
steps in our Moral Culture. But the Moralist cannot pro-
nounce how far these steps can avail as a remedy for the
evil; how far they can repair the broken completeness of
man's moral course ; how far they can restore the health
of man's moral life ; how far they can finally, and upon
the whole, avert the consequences of sin from man's con-
dition and destination. These are points on which the
Moralist necessarily looks to Religion for her teaching.
These questions regard the effects of Sin upon the Soul,
and the concerns of the Soul belong to Religion. They
regard the provision made by God for saving man from the
effects of Sin, and this is also a matter belonging to
Religion.
358. There is, however, one consequence of what has
been said, which we may notice. We have said, that when
a man has deviated from the course of Duty, he cannot
resume his moral progress without Repentance and Amend-
ment. "We may remark further, that the Amendment is
required by Morality to be immediate. If a man repents
in the middle of an immoral act, he will not go on with the
act. As soon as the authority of Morality is acknowledged,
the moral course of action must begin ; and not at some
later period, when pending acts have been completed.
Duty is the perpetual rightful Governor of every man ; and
the man who merely promises to obey this Governor at
some future time, is really disobedient. The man who com-
pletes an immoral act, knowing it to be immoral, commits
a new offense. He yielded to temptation, in the first part
of the act ; he sins against conviction, in the second.
This remark may be of use when we come to consider
some cases of Duty. For instance, if I have made an
immoral promise, and see my fault, it is my Duty not to
complete the act by performing the promise.
234
Chapter XIV.
OF CONSCIENCE. '
S59. The Desires and Affections receive their Culture
by being converted into, or comprehended in, the Operative
Moral Principles. The Faculties which control and direct
the Desires and Affections, namely, the Reason and the
Moral Sentiments, must also receive their Culture, in order
that the being of man may tend to its proper completeness.
The Culture of these Faculties implies the formation or
adoption, in our minds, of Rules of Duty, and the applica-
tion of such Rules to our own actions, with the accompany-
ing Sentiment of Approval or Disapproval of ourselves.
Thus, by the culture of these controlling and directing
Faculties, we form habits, according to which we turn
our attention upon ourselves, and approve or disapprove
what we there discern. These Faculties, thus cultured, are
the Conscience of each man. The word conscious implies
a reflex attention of the mind to its own condition or
operation; a contemplation of what we ourselves feel and
do. "Wefeel pain, but we are conscious of impatience. We
start unconsciously at a surprize, but in danger we are
conscious of fear. Our consciousness reveals to us not only
our most secret acts, but our desires, affections, and in-
tentions. These are the especial subjects of morality, and
we cannot think of them, without considering them as right
or wrong. We approve, or disapprove, of what we have
done, or tried to do. We consider our acts, external and
internal, with reference to a moral standard of right and
wrong. We recognize them as virtuous or vicious. The
Faculty or Habit of doing this is Conscience.
360. As Science means Knowledge^ Conscience etymo-
logically means Self-knowledge ; and such is the meaning of
Ch. XIV.] OF CONSCIENCE. 235
the word in Latin and French, and of the corresponding
word in Greek ; (conscientia, conscience^ crvveiSricns). But
the English word implies a Moral Standard of action in the
mind, as well as a Consciousness of our own actions. It
may be convenient to us to mark this distinction of an in-
ternal Moral Standard, as one part of Conscience ; and Self-
knowledge, or Consciousness^ as another part. The one is
the Internal Law; the other, the Internal Accuser, Wit-
ness, and Judge.
This distinction was noted by early Christian Moralists.
They termed the former par^ of Conscience, Synteresis,
the internal Repository : the latter, St/neidesis, the internal
Knowledge. We may term the former. Conscience as
Law; the latter. Conscience as Witness.
361. We have already (341) spoken of the steps by
which we establish in our minds that internal Law which
we call Conscience. It is established by such a Culture of
our Reason as enables us to frame or to accept Rules
which are in agreement with the Supreme Law ; and by the
agreement of our Moral Sentiments with such Rules. Con-
science as Law, is the expression of the condition at which
we have aimed, in our advance towards a knowledge of the
Supreme Law. It is a Stage in our moral and intellectual
Progress.
862. The Offices of Conscience as Witness, Accuser,
and Judge, cannot easily be separated ; for to be conscious
of having done an act, to question its character, and to
know that it is wrong, are steps which usually follow close
upon each other. Yet these steps may often be distinct.
It may require some consideration, and some careful exer-
cise of the intellect, to discern the important features of
an act, and to apply to it the appropriate Rules of Duty.
The moralists who distinguish the Synteresis from the Syn-
eidesis, represent the acts of Conscience as expressed by the
236 MORALITY. [Book III.
three members of a Syllogism ; of which the first contains
the Law, the Second, the Witness^ the Third, the Judg-
ment, As an example, we may take this Syllogism:
He who dissembles, transgresses the Duty of Truth ;
I have dissembled;
Therefore I have transgressed the Duty .of Truth.
363. We may also note a further office which is
ascribed to Conscience. She inflicts Punishment for the
offenses thus condemned. For the Self-accusation and Self-
condemnation, of which we have spoken, bring with them
their especial pains. Repentance is sorrow ; Remorse is
a pang, a torment. Transgression lies like a weight on the
Conscience, and makes it feel burthened and oppressed.
Again, the Conscience is spoken of as the Record of offenses
committed ; and as stained, polluted, blackened, by our
transgressions.
364. Conscience, the Judge, must pronounce its de-
cision according to Conscience, the Law. If we have not
transgressed the Law of Conscience, Conscience acquits us.
If we have violated the Law of Conscience, Conscience con-
demns us.
He who is condemned by his own Conscience, is guilty.
He has really done wrong. He has really offended against
the Supreme Rule. His actions are inconsistent with the
Stage at which he has arrived, in his moral progress. They
are therefore inconsistent with Morality. He who acts
against his Conscience is always wrong.
365. The question naturally occurs, whether, on the
other hand, he who acts according to his conscience is always
right: whether he who is acquitted by his conscience is
free from blame. Is it enough for the demands of morality,
if each person compares his actions to the Standard of right
and wrong which he has in his mind? Is this a complete
justification \
Ch. XIV.] OF CONSCIENCE. 237
It is evident, that to answer these questions in the affir-
mative, would lead to great inconsistencies in our Morality.
For, under the influence of Education, Laws, Prejudices,
and Passions, the Standard of right and wrong, which
exists in men's minds for the time, is often very different
from that which the Moralist can assent to. Men have
often committed thefts, frauds, impositions, homicides, think-
ing their actions right; though they were such as all
Moralists would condemn as wrong. Such men acted ac-
cording to their Consciences. Were they thereby justified ?
366. What has already been said, may suggest a
Reply to such questions. It is the Duty of man con-
stantly to prosecute his moral and intellectual Culture (345).
This requires, not only that we should conform our actions
to the Standard which we have in our minds for the time ;
but that, also, we are to make this Standard truly moral.
Whatever subordinate Law we have in our minds, is to
be looked upon only as a step to the Supreme Law ; — the
Law of complete Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and
Order. Conscience, the Law, must be constantly directed
with the purpose of making it conform to this Supreme
Law. We must seek for such light, such knowledge, as
may enable us constantly to promote this conformity. We
must labour to enlighten and instruct our Conscience. This
task can never be ended. So long as life and powers of
thought remain to us, we may always be able to acquire
a still clearer and higher view than we yet possess, of the
Supreme Law of our Being. We never can have done
all that is in our power, in this respect. It never can be
consistent with our Duty, to despair of enlightening and
instructing our Conscience, beyond what we have yet done.
Our standard of virtue is not high enough, if we think it
need be made no higher. Virtue has never so completely
238 MORALITY. [Book III.
taken possession of man'*s being, but that she may possess
it still more completely; and therefore, any conception of
Virtue, which we look upon as perfect, must, on that very
account, be imperfect. Conscience is never fully formed,
but always in the course of formation.
367'. We may add, that in attempting to enlighten
and instruct our Conscience, and to carry on our moral
progress, we are led to feel the want of some light and
some power in addition to the light of mere reason, and
the ordinary powers which we possess over our own minds ;
and that Religion offers to us the hope of such a power,
which will, if duly sought, be exercised upon us.
368. It appears from what has just been said, that
we cannot properly refer to our Conscience as an Ultimate
and Supreme Authority. It has only a subordinate and
intermediate Authority ; standing between the Supreme Law,
to which it is bound to conform, and our own Actions, which
must conform to it, in order to be moral. Conscience is
not a Standard, personal to each man ; as each man has his
standard of bodily appetite. Each»man's Standard of morals,
is a standard of Morals, only because it is supposed to
represent the Supreme Standard, which is expressed by
the Moral Ideas, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and
Wisdom. As each man has his Reason, in virtue of his
participation in the Common Reason of mankind, so each
man has his Conscience, in virtue of his participation in
the Common Conscience of mankind, by which Benevolence,
Justice, Truth, Purity, and Wisdom, are recognized as the
Supreme Law of Man's Being. As the object of Reason is
to determine what is true, so the object of Conscience is to
determine what is right. As each man's Reason may err,
and thus lead him to false opinion, so each man's Conscience
may err, and lead him to a false moral standard. As false
Ch. XIV.] OF CONSCIENCE. 239
opinion does not disprove the reality of Truth, so the false
moral standards of men do not disprove the reality of a
Supreme Rule of Human Action.
369. Since Conscience is thus a subordinate and
fallible Rule, it appears, that for a man to act according to
his conscience, is not necessarily to act rightly. His con-
science may be erroneous. It may be culpably in errour ;
for he may not have taken due pains to enlighten and
instruct it. If the conscience be in errour, it must be so,
for this reason, that the man's moral and intellectual pro-
gress is still incomplete ; and this incompleteness is no justi-
fication of what is done under its influence. A conformity
to an Erroneous Conscience is no more blameless, than an
act of imperfect Benevolence, or imperfect Justice.
370. Moreover, since Conscience has only this sub-
ordinate and derivative authority, it cannot be right for a
man to refer to his own Conscience, as a supreme and
ultimate ground of action. The making our Conscience a
ground of action, to this extent, is in itself wrong ; since it
is abandoning that Duty of further enlightening and in-
structing our Conscience, which can never cease to be a
Duty. That a man acts according to his Conscience, is not
a reason for his actions, which can supersede the necessity of
assigning other Reasons. If an action be according to his
Conscience, it must be so because it is conformable to his
Conceptions of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Wisdom ;
and his reason for the action is more properly rendered by
showing that the act does conform to these Moral Ideas,
than by saying that it is according to his Conscience. To \
allege that an act is according to my Conscience ; meaning
thereby, that I act according to a Rule which is already
fixed and settled in my mind, so that I will no longer
examine whether the Rule be right; is to reject the real
signification of moral Rules. It is the conduct of a person
(
(
240 MORALITY. [Book Jll.
who pursues a wrong road to the place he aims at ; and
refuses to have it proved that the road is wrong.
Indeed, the very use of the term Conscience^ in rendering
moral reasons for actions, may tend to mislead us, by pre-
senting conscience to our minds as an authoritative and
supreme guide. To dwell too much upon this abstraction,
which, as we have said, merely denotes a step in our
progress towards the Supreme Rule, may obstruct and dis-
turb our further progress. We may confuse our minds, by
fixing our consciousness too much upon our Conscience ; —
by reflecting upon this reflex habit. It has been said, that
if I talk of my Humility, I lose it ; something of the same
kind may be said of Conscience.
371. But though a virtuous man may abstain from
speaking much of his Conscience, he will not reverence its
guidance the less on that account ; or rather, his silence, if
he be silent, will be that of reverence. For nothing can be
more worthy of reverence than Conscience. It is, as we have
said, the expression of the Supreme Rule, so far as each
man has been able to discern that Rule. Conscience is
to each man the representative of the Supreme Law, and
is invested with the authority of the Supreme Law. It is
the voice which pronounces for him the distinction of right
and wrong, of moral good and evil ; and when he has done
all that he can to enhghten and instruct it, by the aid
of Religion, as well as of Morality, it is for him the Voice
of God.
372. To disobey the commands and prohibitions of
Conscience, under any circumstances, is utterly immoral ; it
is the very essence of immorality. In order to be moral, a
man must be thoroughly conscientious ; he must be careful to
satisfy himself what the decision of his Conscience is, and
must be resolved to follow the course thus prescribed, at any
risk, and at any sacrifice. Nothing can be right which he does
Ch. XIV.] OF CONSCIENCE. 241
not do with a clear conscience. Whatever danger or sorrovv
lies in that direction, whatever advantage and gratification
of the desires and affections in the other, he must not shrink
or waver. Whatever may be gained by acting against his
conscience, the consistency and welfare of his whole moral
being is lost. His moral progress is utterly arrested. He
commits a grievous transgression ; and, as we have already
said, morality can assure him of no meg.ns by which the evil
may be remedied, and the broken unity of his moral being
restored. To be steadily, resolutely, and carefully consci-
entious, is a Rule which every one, who aims at his moral
progress, must regard as paramount to all others.
373. Inasmuch as each man's Conscience is the
Supreme Law, so far as he has been able to discover that
Law ; and inasmuch as this discovery is a task to be per-
formed only by a diligent and continued exercise of our
faculties; there may be periods when each man is aware
that the task has been imperfectly performed on special
points, and may be uncertain what is right and what is
wrong. In such cases, his Conscience is doubtful. The
removal of such doubts, is to be sought by the further use
of the means by which the Conscience is enlightened and
instructed. When the doubts turn rather upon special
points than upon the general course of action, they are
Scruples of Conscience.
What a person can do without offending against his
Conscience, when the question has been deliberately pro-
pounded and solved in his own mind, he does with a safe
conscience^ or with a good conscience.
VOL. 1. R
242
Chapter XV.
CASES OF CONSCIENCE EESPECTING TEUTH.
874. It will appear from the preceding Chapter,
that in all right action, the Conscience is employed, con-
sciously or unconsciously. A man is hound in Conscience
to do what he thinks right ; but he is also bound to em-
ploy his faculties diligently, in ascertaining what is right.
In cases in which he has not ascertained what is right,
his Conscience is doubtful ; and for the purposes of right
action, it is requisite that these doubts be removed. Cases
which are considered by Moralists with the view of doing
this, are Cases of Conscience.
We are not to suppose that any particular Class of
questions in Morals are Cases of Conscience. Every case
of Moral action is, for the person who acts, a Case of
Conscience. But in the greater part of such cases, the
Rule of Duty is so plain and obvious, that no doubt
arises, as to the course of action ; and thus, no internal
inquiry brings the Conscience into notice. In cases in
which there appear to be conflicting Duties, or reasons
for opposite courses of action, we must endeavour to decide
between them, by enlightening and instructing the conscience;
and these are especially termed Cases of Conscience.
375. Since, in Cases of conflicting Duties, whichever
way we decide, one Duty is, or seems to be, evaded or
violated. Cases of Conscience, as proposed by Moralists,
have often the aspect of Questions as to when Duties
may be evaded or violated. To discuss such questions,
has been supposed, by the world in general, more likely to
pervert than to improve men"*s minds ; and hence Casuistry,
the part of Morality which is concerned with such dis-
cussions, has often been looked upon with dislike.
Ch. XV.] CASES OF CONSCIENCE. 243
376. But the question, in every Case of Conscience,
really is, not, How may Duty be evaded? but, What is
Duti/? — not, How may I avoid doing what I ought to do?
but, What ought I to do f And this is a question which a
virtuous man cannot help perpetually asking himself; and
to which the answer may very often be far from obvious
In such Cases, he will be glad to know to what decision
the Moralist, treating such questions in a general form,
and free from the influence of personal temptation, has
been led. We shall here consider a few Questions of this
kind.
There occur Cases of Conscience respecting all Classes
of Duties : but in many of these Classes, the decision of
the question may require a more exact determination of
the Conceptions involved in it; for instance, in questions
concerning Duties of Justice, of Humanity, which Concep-
tions will be examined hereafter. But there are some
Cases which we may consider by the aid of Rules and
Maxims already laid down.
Such are particularly the Cases which respect the Duties
of Truth (Subjective Truth, Veracity). The Rules Lie not.
Perform your Promise, are of universal validity; and the
conceptions of Lie, and of Promise, are so simple and
distinct, that, in general, the Rules may be directly and
easily applied. We shall consider first some such Questions
relative to Promises.
377. In what sense are Promises to be interpreted?
We have already said (315), that the Mutual Understand-
ing of the two parties, at the time of making the promise,
is the sense in which it is the Promisor's Duty to fulfil it.
This is the right Interpretation of the promise, because
the promise expressed and established this Mutual Under-
standing. If the Promisor, intending deceit to the Pro-
misee, or to other persons, has used expressions, with a
r2
244 MORALITY. [Book III.
view to their being misunderstood, he has already violated
the Duty of Truth. If he repent of this, his only way
of resuming a moral condition is, to carry back the effect
of his repentance to the time of making the promise,
and to act as if he had intended what he was understood
to intend.
Since the Promisor may be the only speaker in the
transaction, and the Promisee may imply his acceptance of
the Promise, and the sense in which he understands it, only
by his silence, or by words of assent; we may state, as
the Rule in such cases, that the Promiser is bound in
the sense in which he believes the Promisee to understand
him. For this is the only Common Understanding be-
tween them.
878. It may be, that the Common Understanding
of what the Promiser is to do for the Promisee, includes
some suppositions which are afterwards discovered to be
false : and it may be asked, if the Promise is still binding.
This is the case of Erroneous Promises. And the answer
to the question is, that the false supposition releases the
Promiser, so far as it was included in the Common Under-
standing. Thus, a person solicits alms from you, telling
you the tale of his distresses. Your purse being empty
at the time, you promise to relieve him if he will call
again. In the mean time, you discover that his story con-
tained falsehood. How far are you bound by your Promise 1
It is plain that if the Promise was understood by both
of you to be unconditional, and the delay, to take place
merely on account of the state of your purse, the Pro-
mise is binding. But if the Promise was understood to
be conditional, on the truth of the tale ; and if the false-
hoods are material ; the Promiser is released. Yet it must
be very difficult for the Promiser to know how far his
Promise is hypothetically understood. And therefore, to
Ch.XV.] cases of conscience. 245
avoid the moral trouble which such doubts produce, it
is wise in such cases to express the condition on which
the Promise is given.
379. There is one circumstance respecting Promises
which must be noticed. The Duty which they create, is not
an absolute, but a Belatim Duty. It is a Duty relative to
the Promisee only. He is the only person affected by the
non-performance of the Promise. He has a Moral Claim
for this performance ; but he may relinquish this Claim,
as he may relinquish any Right or Possession. And when
he has done this, the duty of performing the promise
ceases. Hence it is laid down, as a Rule of Morality re-
specting Promises, that they are not hinding when released
hy the Promisee.
380. The principal Class of Cases of Conscience
respecting Promises is, that of what are called Unlawful
Promises ; that is, Promises to do an immoral act ; for we
are not now speaking of law, but of morality.
When the immoral character of the act was known to
the parties at the time, the Question of Immoral Promises
is answered by recollecting what has been said (358) respect-
ing violations of Duty. The transgressor ought to repent
and amend; and as a part of his amendment, he ought
not to go on with an immoral act which is begun. To
Promise, and to Perform, are parts of the same connected
act. If the Performance be immoral, the Promise was so.
To promise, was a transgression of Duty begun ; to perform,
is to complete the transgression. It is my Duty to stop
in the mid course of the act, as it was my Duty not to
enter upon it at first. When the question of Duty is
proposed, there can be no other answer.
This appUes at once to all promises to perform, or to
participate in, any act of violence, injustice, fraud, or
impurity. In all such cases, the Promisor, by his Promise,
246 MORALITY. [Book III.
has rejected his moral nature ; and can only resume it, by
repudiating his own act. Even to do this, does not leave
him blameless; for, as we have said, repentance does not
obliterate past guilt ; but this is necessary : this is the only
way in which he can avoid the continuation and further
degradation of his moral condition. He offended in the
Promise ; he offends again in the Performance. Whatever
Temptation led him to sin, in the first part of the act ;
he sins against conviction, if he perform his promise, when
the question has been brought before his conscience.
381. But in breaking my Promise, immoral though
it be, I violate my Relative Duty to the Promisee; and
the case may be one in which he denies, and even blame-
lessly denies, the immorality of the act promised. For
instance, I have promised the less worthy Candidate for
an office, that I will vote for him. I cannot expect to induce
him to release me from my Promise, by representing to him
his own unworthiness. Nevertheless, my relative Duty to
him must give way to my absolute Duty of voting for the
most worthy Candidate. But though I now do what I ought,
I am not therefore blameless as to the past. The violation
of a Relative Duty, is an offense against the Promisee.
He has good reason to complain of me ; and I have reason
to feel repentance and shame, for having given him a claim
upon me which I cannot satisfy. This is the unhappy
consequence of making an immoral Promise.
In other cases, where the Promisee is aware that the act
promised is immoral, he did wrong in accepting, as I in
making, the promise. He ought to release me from the
promise, not. as an act of grace, but as an act of Duty.
If he do not, my shame at not satisfying his claim upon me, is
rightly lost in my shame at having given him such a claim.
382. When the Act promised was not immoral at
the time of promising, but becomes so afterwards, it is not
Ch. XV.] CASES OF CONSCIENCE. 247
to be performed. For since we are asking what virtuous
men would do, we are to suppose that they would not
have made the promise, if they had known that performance
would be immoral ; and that they will release each other,
now that it appears to be immoral. That the act should
be lawful at the time of performance, was a part of the
understanding which the promise conveyed. If a merchant
promises his foreign correspondent to send him a ship-load
of corn at a time appointed, and before the time arrive,
the exportation of com is forbidden by law ; he is liberated
from his engagement. Both parties must have understood
that the promise was made, on the supposition that the
act would be lawful ; and that the engagement was annulled,
when it became unlawful, and therefore immoral.
383. In the case where one party sees that the
performance is immoral, and the other does not, the diffi-
culty is greater ; but the Rule by which we may direct
ourselves is, that the promise must be understood as a pro-
mise made between virtuous men, and involving such a con-
ditional engagement as may morally be made : and so
understood, must be fufilled.
Thus, if I promise to vote for an unworthy candidate,
the promise was immoral, and is not to be kept, as we have
said. But if I promise to vote for a candidate who, after
my promise, becomes unworthy, not having been so before,
am I bound ? We say, No : for I promised on the suppo-
sition of his worthiness ; and he, who ought to regard me
as a moral man in making my promises, must have under-
stood that this supposition was implied. But yet my refusal
to fulfil my promise may give him ground to say, that it is
not his worthiness, but my intentions, which have changed.
And this must be a matter difficult of proof; at least to
him ; and therefore it will be difficult to show him that I
have not violated my Relative Duty to him. The prospect
248 MORALITY. [Book III.
of such difficulties, is a strong reason for not making pro-
mises respecting elections, in cases where the worthiness of
the candidates, at the time of voting, ought alone to decide
the election.
384. But there may be cases, in which an uncon-
ditional promise to vote for a candidate at an election may
morally be given ; and then it must be kept. There are
cases in which the matter is left much to the discretion of
the elector ; and in such cases, though merit may determine
his choice, he may fix his own time for making up his mind ;
and may promise when he has decided. Any candidate who
offers himself after this, comes too late.
385. Or again, the Promise may imply an informal
Contract ; as when a person is elected to act on behalf of the
Electors ; or on the belief that he and they have a common
purpose. This is the case, when the Representative of a body
of men is to be elected. They look out for a person whose
character fits him to act for them, and they promise to vote
for him. He, on the other hand, by his conduct and his
professions, pledges himself to follow a course of action which
they approve. Promises thus made, are not immoral. Such
a mutual understanding is requisite, between the Electors
and their Representatives ; and can only be established, by
their promising him their votes. The Electors are bound to
elect the fittest person ; but the Candidate with whom they
have come to this understanding is thereby and thenceforth
the fittest. The election is like the election of an Agent ;
and as we have said, is rather of the nature of a Contract,
than of an election on the ground of merit only.
But then, in order that this Contract may morally be
made, it must be for moral purposes. Such would be an
understanding between the Electors and the Candidate, that
he, acting as their Representative, shall aim to preserve the
Constitution, or to reform the Abuses, of the body into which
Ch.XV.] cases of conscience. 249
he is elected. But if the understanding be, that he shall
give them money in return for their votes, the Contract is
an immoral one. The power of electing a Representative
is in their hands for the sake of some public good ; it is
a violation of Duty, to turn such a power into a means of
private gain (311).
386. It is sometimes made a Question, Supposing
such an informal Contract immorally made, whether, when
the immoral end is answered, it is a Duty to perform the
rest of the Contract ; for instance, if a person were elected
to an office of public trust on promise of sums of money
to the electors, whether, after the election, it is his duty
to pay these sums. We may remark, that the question,
here, is not What he is to do as an innocent man ; for by
the supposition he is a guilty one ; having been concerned
in an immoral bargain. If the question be, What is he to do
as a repentant man, convinced of his guilt, and wishing
henceforth to do what is right, the answer is, that he must
pay. There is no reason why he should add, to the viola-
tion of his absolute Duty, the violation of his Relative Duty
to the Promisees. If, in his repentance, he wishes not to
complete an immoral transaction, he is to recollect that the
immoral transaction is completed by his election. If he
wish to mark his hatred of the offense, he may signify his
meaning more clearly, by expressing his repentance, and
paying the money, than by keeping it ; which may be inter-
preted as adding avarice and falsehood to the violation of
pubhc Duties.
387. Promises are immoral, which contradict a former
Promise, and therefore are not to be kept; but here, as
in other cases, there is a violation of the Relative Duty to
the promisee ; and a ground for shame and repentance, so
far as regards him. And here we have another warning,
of the need of being cautious in making promises.
250 MORALITY. [Book III.
388. Promises which it is impossible to perform, are
evidently not to be kept ; but then, it can hardly be that
such Promises can be made, without some want of due con-
sideration and forethought on the Part of the Promiser,
which gives the Promisee good ground for complaint. If
the Promiser was aware of the impossibility at the time of
making the promise, he is guilty of fraud ; for by making
the promise, he implied his belief of the possibility of per-
forming it.
When the Promiser himself occasions the impossibility, it
is a breach of promise.
389. Are Promises extorted by Fear or Violence
binding ? This is a question which has been much debated
among Moralists. We must apply to it the Rule which
we have already laid down ; that the Promise, if morally
made, must be kept. If I ought not to keep the Promise,
I ought not to have made it. The question, therefore, will
be, whether I could morally make such a Promise. And
it may be remarked, that if I could not morally make the
Promise, I cannot morally derive advantage from any con-
tract which was combined with the Promise ; for to do this,
is a part of the same Act, as to make the Contract. I
cannot morally derive advantage from one part of the Con-
tract, and refuse to perform another part. If I find the
Contract to have been immoral, I must undo, as far as I
can, its effects ; and go back, in my condition, to the state
in which the Contract was made.
890. These Maxims may be applied to a case of this
kind often discussed. A man falls into the power of a
band of robbers, and, in fear of violence, promises them
that if they will set him free, he will afterwards send
them a certain sum of money. He is liberated on his
promise : is he bound afterwards to send the money ? Ac-
cording to the above considerations, if it was not immoral
Ch.XV.] cases of conscience. 251
to make the Promise, it is a Duty to keep it. And this
Rule is so obvious a one, and its application so direct, that
we may wonder that any other should have been taken.
The reasons given for doubt, or for the opposite decision,
are various. Thus Cicero says*, that with robbers, we have
no tie of common faith or obligation. But we shall, of
course, answer, that we keep our word, not as what is due
to robbers, but as what is due to ourselves, and necessary
to our character of truthful men : not as what is an act of
obligation to them, but an act of reverence to truth. We
may add, that we can hardly say that we have no ties of
common obligation with them, when we have made them
a promise, and have received life and liberty as a consi-
deration for it. We make a Contract with them, though
it may be an informal one. They fulfil their part of the
Contract : if we do not fulfil ours, we shall take a very
strange way of exemplifying our asserted moral superiority
over them.
It has also been alleged, as a reason why the Promise
thus given should not be kept, that their confidence in
Promises will thus greatly facilitate the perpetration of such
robberies ; — that in this way, such Contracts may be made
the means of almost unlimited extortion ■[-. Upon this we
may remark, that it is right to regard the probable conse-
quences of our actions; and we must agree, that it would
be wrong to contribute to maintain a state of things in
which lawless banditti levy ransoms upon peaceable citizens.
But these considerations, if acted on, would prevent our
making the Promise. And if, notwithstanding these con-
siderations, we have made the promise, we must consider
how far it is likely that to keep our word, rather than
to break it, would make us the supporters of such a habit
of extortion. Is it probable that the banditti will give up
* Off. III. 29. t Taley, B. iii. c. 5.
252 MORALITY. [Book III.
their practice, simply because their captives, liberated on
such promises, do not perform them ? Is it not likely that,
their power remaining, such disappointments would induce
them to seek some more effectual mode of extortion ? Do we
not, by making and adhering to such contracts, prevent
their adding murder to robbery 1 And is not the most pro-
per and hopeful course for suppressing such robbery, to call
for, and, if required, to assist, the vigorous administration of
the laws against robbers, which exist in every State. Till
that can be done, may it not tend to preserve, from extreme
cruelties, those who fall into the hands of the robbers, that
they should have some confidence in the payment of the
ransom agreed upon ? Even on the balance of probable ad-
vantage, it would seem that such a promise is to be kept.
But on our principles, we should not look to these results
so much as to our own moral culture. By keeping this
promise, we cherish and exemplify our regard for truth.
What moral quality do we cultivate by breaking it ? If
it be replied, that we thus cultivate a regard for conse-
quences ; we reply, that consequences, when both their exist-
ence, and their moral character, are so doubtful, are not
the main objects for our regard. The consequences which
take the shape of strict veracity in ourselves, and the con-
sequent confidence of others in us, are proper objects of
moral action. The consequences which take the shape of
possible inconvenience produced to robbers by our own un-
truthfulness, are not proper objects for us to aim at.
391. It may be asked, whether, in order to avoid
thus contributing to robbers, we ought to refuse to make
the promise ; and whether, thus, we ought to incur violence,
or even death. This is included in the general question, what
we ought to do in ccises of extreme necessity^ when the adhe-
rence to the usual Rules of Duty brings with it danger of
life, limb, and the like terrible consequences. And to such
Ch. XV.] CASES OF CONSCIENCE. 253
questions perhaps no general answer can be given. They
are commonly put in this form : Whether in such cases of
necessity it be allowable to violate Duty : and in this form,
something may be said respecting them hereafter.
392. If it be said, that the Law denies the validity
of such engagements, by annulling Contracts made under
duress; we reply, that even the Law requires that men should
not allege light fears, as reasons for the nullity of a Contract.
The Law makes Duress nothing less than the fear of loss of
life or limb (l6l) ; and thus shews that it expects that men
will show some firmness, in refusing to be parties to illegal
acts. It is true, that the Law would annul a Contract
made under the circumstances which we have described.
It would also punish the robbers, if they were brought
under its administration. But then we must recollect that
Duty does not necessarily confirm the advantages to which
the administration of the Law would entitle us ; while Duty
does necessarily confirm our obligations, and extend them,
so as to give them a moral meaning. Duty interprets in-
formal obligations, so as to make them evidence of internal
principles. Duty requires the performance of promises, so
as to make them evidence of a Spirit of Truthfulness.
3.98. Lies stand nearly on the same footing as pro-
mises ; for a Lie is a violation of the general understanding
among mankind, which the use of language implies, as we
have already said (313). And as has already been stated,
that is a Lie which violates this mutual understanding,
and nothing else. Hence the term Lie is not applicable,
when no mutual understanding is violated. Such is the
case in Parables, Fables, Tales avowedly fictitious, or noto-
riously so, according to the literary habits of the time;
as Novels, Dramas, Poems. A person, the most careful of
his moral culture, may employ himself in such fictions. Yet
there are provinces of literature in which the most rigorous
254 MORALITY. [Book IH.
attention to Truth is a Duty, as in History and Personal
Narratives.
894. There are various understood Contentions in
society, according to which words, spoken or written under
particular circumstances, have a meaning different from that
which the general laws of language would give them. I have
already noticed such phrases as, / am your obedient sertant^
at the foot of a letter; which, though not literally true, is not
to be called a Lie. The Convention is here so established,
that no one is for a moment misled by it. In the same
way, if, when I wish not to be interrupted by visitors, I
write upon my door. Not at home, and if there be a common
understanding to that effect; this is no more a lie than if
I were to write. Not to he seen.
895. But if I put the same words in the mouth of
a Servant, and if the Convention be not regularly established
in all classes of society, the Case is different. It is a vio-
lation of Duty in me to make the Servant tell a lie : it is
an offense against his moral culture (312). He may under-
stand the Convention to be so fully established in the class
with which my intercourse lies, that the words, though not
literally true, convey no false belief. In this case, he may
use them, and I may direct him to use them, blamelessly.
But it is my Duty to ascertain that he does thus understand
the words, as a conventional form ; and in order to give
them this character, he should not be allowed to deviate
from the form, or to add any false circumstance ; as, that
his master has just gone out, or the like.
896. The view that we have taken, of the nature of
a Lie, suggests an answer to some of the excuses sometimes
offered for lies. For instance, some men tell lies in order
to preserve a secret which they wish not to be known ; and
allege, in their justification, that the Questioner has no
Right to know the truth. To such a plea we reply, that
Ch. XV.] CASES OF CONSCIENCE. 255
the Questioner has a right not to be told a lie, for all
men have such a Right. By answering his question at
all, I give him a Right to a true answer. If I take my
stand on the ground that he has no Right to an answer,
I must give him no answer. I may tell him that he has
no Right to an answer.
But it may be said, that to do this will in many cases
be to disclose the secret which we wish to conceal. For
instance, the author of an anonymous work, who wishes to
remain unknown as the author, but is suspected, is asked
whether he wrote the work. To refuse to reply, would
be to acknowledge it. Such authors have held, that in such
a case, they may deny the authorship. They urge, that the
Questioner has no right to know: that the Author has a
Right to remain concealed, and has no means of doing so but
by such a denial. But this defense is wrong. The author
has no moral Right to remain concealed at the expense of
telhng a Lie : that is, it is not right in him thus to protect
himself. But on the other hand, he is not bound to answer.
Nor need he directly refuse to do so. He may evade the
question, or turn off the subject. There is nothing to prevent V
his saying, " How can you ask such a question ? " or any-
thing of the like kind, which may remove the expectation of
an answer. If he cannot secure his object in this or some
similar way, it is to be recollected that he has drawn the
inconvenience upon himself, by first writing an anonymous >C
work, and then engaging in conversation on such terms,
that he cannot escape answering questions about the author-
ship of the work. He has no Right, moral or other, to
insist that these two employments may be pursued jointly Xs
without inconvenience. Familiar conversation is a play of
reciprocal insight and reciprocal guidance of thought ; and
such weapons, a man may very rightly use, to guard his
secret. But he may not assume that it must be guarded
x<?^fi-r*^ yUi^*-*^v,z^ ^>=> _ Pt^. ^'y £-A^'
256 MORALITY. . [Book III.
^ at any rate, by means right or wrong; by declarations true A
or false. On the other hand, he may seek, as widely as he s^t^
chooses, for some turn of conversation by which he may f^^
baffle curiosity, without violating truth. To discover such ^
a turn, is a matter of skill, self-command, and invention.
If he fail and be detected, he may receive some vexation or
inconvenience ; but if he succeed at the expense of truth,
he receives a moral stain.
397. The like considerations apply in a case often
discussed among moralists. A man is pursued by murderers
who seek his life, and I conceal him. They ask me if I
know where he is. Am I to say that I do not know \ In
this case, it is evident that I may blamelessly refuse to
answer the question ; but in this, as in the other case, not
to answer, may be to speak plainly. I may also represent
to the pursuers the wickedness of their purpose ; I may call
in the aid of the law. These latter courses are blameless.
But suppose that these resources fail, that the pursuers
turn their fury upon me, and that they threaten to kill me,
except I disclose to them the hiding-place of their victim.
We have here a new case ; the prospect of my own death if
I do not make myself accessary to a murder, for, to give up
the man to his murderers, would be to be accessory to his
death. This is a Case of Necessity, and a Lie in such a
Case is not to be judged of by common Rules, y^^ ^ '*'*^ 7^
398. Lies of Necessity. Falsehoods told for the purposentocc.^
of saving one's Ufe ; or to avoid some other extreme peril, L^ A
have found much sympathy among mankind. They are looked "JL^*
upon as at least excusable, and allowable. We must here-
after consider them among other Cases of Necessity. Lies
of Necessity, told for the sake of saving a friend from some
great misfortune, have met with a warmer admiration, in the
cases in which they are narrated. Such for instance was
the falsehood told by Grotius'*s wife to save her husband,
>C «^ / "
Ch. XV.] CASES OF CONSCIENCE. 25T
when she represented the box in which he was contained
as a box of theological books.
S99. But when such falsehoods which thus save a
friend from ruin are accompanied with some great foreseen
calamity to the teller, they excite a still higher admiration,
and may be termed Heroic Lies: as when Lucilius offers
himself to the soldiers of Octavius to be killed, declaring
himself to be Brutus. So far as such acts come under the
Moralist's notice, they must be considered under a special
head ; for Heroic Virtue, as we have already said, is beyond
the range of the Rules of Duty.
400. Though assertions, not literally true, may, by
general Convention, cease to be Lies, we must be careful
of trifling with the limits of such cases, and of too readily
assuming, and acting upon, such Conventions. Carelessness
in these matters, will diminish our habitual reverence for
truth. Some Moralists have ranked with the cases in
which Convention supersedes the general rule of truth, an
Advocate asserting the justice, or his beHef in the justice,
of his Client's cause *. As a reason why he may do this,
though he believe otherwise, it is said, that no promise
to speak the truth was given, or supposed to be given. But
we reply by asking; If there is no mutual understanding
that he shall speak truly, to what purpose does he speak,
or to what purpose do the judges hear ?
By those who contend for such indulgence to Advocates,
it is alleged, that the Profession of Advocate exists as an
instrument for the administration of Justice in the Com-
munity ; and that it is a necessary maxim of the Advocate's
Profession, that he is to do all that can be done for his
Client. It is urged, that the application of Laws is a
matter of great complexity and difficulty: that the right
administration of them in doubtful cases, is best provided
• Paley, B. iii. c. 15.
VOL. I. .- S
258 MORALITY. [Book III.
for, if the arguments on each side be urged with the utmost
force, and if the Judge alone decide which side is in the
right ; that for this purpose, each Advocate must urge all
the arguments he can devise ; and must enforce them with
all the skill he can command. It is added, to justify the
Advocate, that being the Advocate, he is not the Judge ; —
that it is not his office to determine on which side Justice
is ; and that therefore his duty, in his office, is not affected
by his belief on this subject.
In reply to these considerations, the Moralist may grant
that it is likely to answer the ends of Justice in a com-
munity, that there should exist a Profession of Advocates ;
ready to urge, with full force, the arguments on each side
in doubtful cases. And if the Advocate, in his mode of
pleading and exercising his profession, allows it to be under-
stood that this is all that he undertakes to do, he does not
transgress his Duties of Truth and Justice, even in pleading
for a bad cause ; since even for a bad cause, there may be
arguments, and even good arguments. But if, in pleading,
he assert his belief that his cause is just, when he believes
it unjust, he offends against Truth ; as any other man would
do who, in like manner, made a like assertion. Nor is it
conducive to the ends of justice, that every man however
palpably unjust his cause be, should have such support
to it.
To the argument, that the Advocate is not the Judge,
and therefore, that he is not responsible for his judgment
on the merits of the case; the Moralist will reply, that every
man is, in an unofficial sense, by being a moral agent, a
Judge of right and wrong, and an Advocate of what is
right ; and is, so far, bound to be just in his judgments,
and sincere in his exhortations. This general character of
a moral agent, he cannot put off, by putting on any pro-
fessional character. Every man, when he advocates a case
Ch. XV.] CASES OF CONSCIENCE. 259
in which morality is concerned, has an influence upon his
hearers, which arises from the belief that he shares the
moral sentiments of all mankind. This influence of his
supposed morality, is one of his possessions ; which, like all
his possessions, he is bound to use for moral ends. If he
mix up his character as an Advocate, with his character as
a Moral Agent, using his moral influence for the Advocate's
purpose, he acts immorally. He makes the Moral Rule
subordinate to the Professional Rule. He sells to his Client,
not only his skill and learning, but himself. He makes it
the Supreme Object -of his life to be, not a good man, but a
successful Lawyer.
If it be alleged, that by allowing the difference of his
professional and unprofessional character to be seen in his
pleading, the Advocate will lose his influence with his
hearers ; the Moralist will reply, that he ought not to
have an influence which arises from a false representation
of himself; and that if he employ the influence of his
unprofessional character, he is bound, in the use of it, to
unprofessional Rules of Duty.
The Advocate must look upon his Profession, like every
other endowment and possession, as an Instrument, which
he must use for the purposes of Morality. To act rightly,
is his proper object : to succeed as an Advocate, is a proper
object, only so far as it is consistent with the former.
To cultivate his Moral being, is his highest end ; to cul-
tivate his Professional eminence, is a subordinate aim.
401. But further; not only is the Advocate to
cultivate and practise his profession in subordination to
moral ends, and to reject its Rules where they are incon-
sistent with this subordination ; but moreover, there belong
to him moral ends which regard his Profession; namely,
to make it an Institution fitted to promote Morality. He
must seek, so to shape its Rules, and so to alter them if
S2
260 MORALITY. [Book III.
need be, that they shall be subservient to the Rules of
Duty. To raise and purify the character of the Advocate's
profession, so that it may answer the ends of justice,
without requiring insincerity in the Advocate, is a proper
aim for a good man who is a Lawyer; — a purpose on
which he may well and worthily employ his efforts and his
influence.
402. There are other Cases, in which the Duty of
Truth may be violated by silence ; — by that which we omit
to say: as in selling defective wares, without notice of
their faults ; those faults being such as, by the universal
understanding relative to such transactions, the Seller is
bound to disclose. In these, as in the other cases, the
Duty is, in a great measure, defined by the general under-
standing existing among Buyers and Sellers. In giving
this Rule, we follow the guidance of the Law; which, in
its decisions, recognizes such a general understanding with
regard to sales. But here also Morality takes the Mean-
ing, not the Letter of the Law, for her guide. We may
apply this to a case stated by Cicero, and often since dis-
cussed by Moralists. We have already considered the case
jurally (172). In a time of great scarcity at Rhodes, a
corn-merchant of Alexandria arrived there with a cargo of
grain. The Merchant knew, what the Rhodians did not
know, that a number of other vessels laden with corn were
on their way to Rhodes: was he bound in conscience to
communicate this fact to the buyers?
403. The universal Rule, that we may not deceive
men, must apply in this case. The Moralists cannot doubt
that it would be wrong for the merchant to tell any false-
hood, in order to raise the price of his wares. It would
be plainly immoral for him to say, that he did not know
that any other vessels were coming. But may he, the
Seller, be silent, and allow the Buyers, ignorant of the truth
Ch. XV.] CASES OF CONSCIENCE. 261
which he knows, to raise the price by their mutual com-
petition ? This is a question belonging to trade in general ;
and must, as we have said, be answered according to the
general understanding which we suppose to prevail among
Buyers and Sellers. In common cases, both alike are sup-
posed to have a regard to the prospect of an increased
Supply, or an increased Scarcity. The Buyer does not
depend upon the Seller, nor the Seller upon the Buyer,
for this information. He who has, or thinks he has,
superior information on this subject, takes advantage of it,
and is understood to do so : and prices are settled by the
general play of such opinions, proceeding from all sides.
But if a Seller possess information which he is not under-
stood to have, and takes advantage of it, he violates the
general understanding, and thus, is guilty of deceit. If
the merchant in question ask such an exorbitant price for
his com, as to imply that no further supply is probable,
he falls under this blame. On the other hand, he is not
bound to sell his corn to-day for the price to which it
may fall to-morrow, when the other vessels arrive; for, as
a trader, he may take advantage of the greater skill and
foresight which has brought him first to the port. We
cannot say that he is generally bound to reveal to the
buyer any special circumstance which may affect the market-
price ; as for instance, the probable speedy arrival of other
vessels : for to make this a part of his duty, would be to
lay down a Rule which would place skill and ignorance,
diligence and indolence, on an equality ; and would thus
destroy the essence of trade. But if the Buyer asks ques-
tions on this subject, the Seller may not tell a lie. And
if the Seller is silent as to this circumstance, he takes
upon himself the responsibility, as a moral agent, of making
an equitable estimate of the gain to which his unsuspected
superiority of knowledge entitles him. If it be said, that
262 MORALITY. [Book III.
it is very unlikely that a trader will be content with this,
when he can get more ; we shall of course reply, that
the question is not what a trader is likely to do, but
what a good man, (Vir bonus, as Cicero puts the case,)
ought to do.
404. Promises of Marriage often give rise to doubts
and fears; for the Promise implies much; — no less than
affection and general community of interests during a whole
life. A person may well hesitate before giving such a
promise, and having given it, may fear whether he is not
engaging for more than he can perform. But on the other
hand, the Promise, sincerely given, leads to its own ful-
filment; for affection grows, in virtue of the confidence
which such an engagement establishes between the parties ;
the marriage union adds new ties to those which drew them
together ; and the progress of a well conducted married life
makes conjugal affection continue as a habit.
But the intention of fulfilling the engagement in this
sense, and the belief of a power to do so, can alone render
it right to make the Promise. A Promise of Marriage,
though made, cannot morally be carried into effect, by him
who does not intend thus to perform the engagement, or
who despairs of doing so. If, before the Marriage takes
place, he find the germ of conjugal affection wanting in
his heart, the course of Duty is, to withdraw from entering
upon the immoral condition of a mere external conjugal
union. But still, in doing this, he violates a most serious
Relative Duty to the person thus deceived. She may have
to accuse him of no less an injury, than the blighted hopes
and ruined happiness of her whole life. To a man of any
moral feeling, or even of any natural feeling, the remorse of
having done such a wrong, by the promise of affection and
livelong companionship, must be intense. And his shame
also must be profound : for he may be supposed to have
Ch. XV.] CASES OF CONSCIENCE. 263
well examined his heart before he made the promise ; and
if his affections be so dark to himself, or so fickle, that
in spite of his self-examination, he has remained so long
in errour, and has been led to such a false step at last ;
how can he hope ever to be justified in making a like engage-
ment with another person ? A life of remorse and shame
would be the proper sequel to such a fault.
The same remarks apply when the Promise is made on
the other side.
405. We may notice here a Case of Conscience
treated of by preceding Moralists *. A certain person in
the lifetime of his wife had promised marriage to another
woman if he should ever be free. The wife died, and the
woman demanded performance of the promise. The man
then alleged doubts whether the promise was binding, in-
asmuch as it was immorally given. The Question proposed
has usually been, Whether 'the man is bound to marry the
woman ? But if we take the real Moral Question, Whether
he ought to marry her ? we must answer, that this does not
depend on the Promise alone. If he wishes not to marry
her, because he has ceased to bear her the affection which
the conjugal union requires ; according to what we have said,
he ought not to marry her. If, on the other hand, he still
wishes to marry her, there is nothing in the immoral condition
of the promise formerly given which need prevent it. That
promise was an offense against Duty in itself, inasmuch as
it implied a heart alienated from the former wife. But this
does not necessarily vitiate all his succeeding dispositions
to the woman to whom the promise was made. We may
suppose the old promise annulled, and he may, after the
first wife's death, promise the same thing without blame,
and perform his promise.
* PaJey, B. iii. c. 5. I state the case as Paley states it. Sanderson,
from whom he professes to take it, states it differently.
264 MORALITY. [Book III.
406. Without there being an absolute Promise of
Marriage, there are often manifest suggestions of such a
common purpose, between man and woman, which lead to
difficulties of the same kind. In all countries, and especially
in countries in which men and women are left free, in a
great measure, to choose for themselves their partners in
married life, marriage is the great event of life ; it is the
point to which the thoughts and imaginations, the hopes and
designs of the young of both sexes, constantly tend. This
is still more particularly the case with women ; inasmuch
as their social position depends mainly upon that of the
husband. Hence the manner and behaviour of young men
and young women, have a frequent reference, tacit or open,
to the possibility of engagements of marriage among them.
Conversation, of almost any kind, may disclose features of
character and disposition, by which one heart may be drawn
to another; and indications of such inclination may be
given, in all degrees, from the slighest to the most marked.
Among such a variety of elements, it may often be doubtful
how far such marks of preference, on the one side and on
the other, may be equivalent to an Offer of Marriage, or to
an Engagement. Nor can any general Rule be laid down ;
for much must depend upon the conventions of society.
But we may say, in general, that Morality requires of us
a most serious and reverent estimate of the marriage state ;
and of the union of heart, and community of moral pur-
pose, by which the parties ought to be drawn together.
Any behaviour, therefore, which, while it appears to tend to
such a purpose, is really frivolous and unmeaning, or prompt-
ed only by vanity, or love of amusement, is at variance with
Duty. Such behaviour is a very unfit portion of a life
which has our Moral Culture for its constant purpose ; and
which looks upon the prospect of marriage, and the tone
of intercourse with women, as means to this end.
Ch. XV.] CASES OF CONSCIENCE. 265
The above are given as Specimens only of Cases of
Conscience respecting Truth; not as a complete Collec-
tion, or even as including all the more prominent classes of
Cases. But the remarks made upon the above cases may-
serve to shov^r the manner in which we are led, by the doc-
trines of Morality, to treat them ; and the like Rules may
be applied to other Cases.
Chapter XVI.
OF CASES OF NECESSITY.
407. The discussion of Cases of Conscience, which
we were pursuing in the last Chapter, led us, in several
instances, to Cases of Necessity ; and these, we stated that
we must reserve for a separate consideration. Cases of
Conscience are those in which conflicting Duties and con-
flicting Rules are weighed deliberately, the time and cir-
cumstances allowing of this. Cases of Necessity are those
in which a man is impelled to violate Common Duties and
Common Rules by the pressure of extreme danger or fear ;
as when a man kills another in defense of himself or his
family ; or when he steals, or tells a lie, to save his life.
408. We shall first consider the Cases in which a man
thus violates Common Rules under the pressure of danger to
himself. The Law shows us that men judge such danger,
when extreme, to justify the transgression of Common Rules.
Thus, in the Laws of most countries, the Command, Thou
shalt not kill^ is suspended when I am attacked by a burglar
or a robber; and the Command, Thou shalt not steal, is
suspended when I am perishing with hunger. And the
common moral judgment of mankind looks with indulgence
upon the transgressions of ordinary Rules in such extraor-
266 MORALITY. [Book III.
dinary circumstances. The Moralist must, in like manner,
allow, that there are Cases of Necessity, in which the Com-
mon Rules of Duty may be transgressed. But these Cases
of Necessity must be treated with great caution.
409. In the first place, the Necessity, which is the con-
dition of these Cases, must be very rigorously understood. It
must be some such extreme peril and terrour of immediate
death, or of some dreadful immediate evil, little short of
death, as produces a pressure on the mind far beyond the
usual course of human motives and passions. It is not every
extraordinary emergency, when fear and other passions are
excited somewhat beyond their usual bounds, that justifies
acts which would otherwise be crimes. It is not a moderate
danger, that justifies acts of violence and falsehood. The
Law teaches us this, when it does not permit us to kill the
diurnal housebreaker, or the flying robber; and when it
requires, in order that a Contract, made under fear, shall be
annulled, that the fear shall have been such as not a timid
merely, but a firm man, might feel. To allow any looseness
of signification in this condition of Cases of Necessity,
would destroy all Morality. If not only the fear of death,
but the fear of any great evil, would justify falsehood, there
would be an end of the Duty of Truth. For any evil would
appear great, when it was impending over us ; and the Duty,
being confined in its influence to cases in which there were
no fears of inconvenience to overcome, would have no office
left. And the same might be said of the other Duties.
If it be said that fear excuses the violation of Moral Rules,
because it carries us out of ourselves ; we reply, that so far
as fear carries us out of ourselves, it makes us cease to be
moral agents ; and that if we allow any ordinary fears to do
this, we abandon our moral character. To be thus carried
out of ourselves, by fear and other passions such as commonly
occur, is to be immoral and wicked. The precise office of
Ch. XVI.] CASES OF NECESSITY. 267
Morality is, to condemn those who yield to such a necessity
as this. We cannot make transgression blameless, merely
by calling the Case a Case of Necessity.
410. In excuse of transgression of Moral Rules under
Constraint, it has been said, that when man's Liberty ceases,
his moral agency ceases. But to make this maxim in every
degree true, the notion of a Cessation of man's Hberty must
be very rigorously understood. In truth, man's Liberty, as
a moral agent, never ceases, till he is moved as a piece of
mere brute matter. Nothing but the man's own voHtion
can move his muscles. No force, which other men can
exert, can compel him, by physical means, to utter a word,
or sign his name. It is not merely being put in close
prison, and scantily fed, that can deprive man of the liberty
which moral agency supposes. His liberty is not a liberty
that can act only when all external obstacles and influences
are removed ; for in fact, that can never be. Moral
Liberty shows itself, not in acting without external in-
fluences, but in acting in spite of external influences. To
resist fear and danger, and still to do what we will to do,
is the manifestation of our liberty. If we plead the limi-
tation of our liberty as a reason why we are not bound by
Moral Rules, we cast off such Rules altogether; for our
liberty is always limited. It is not therefore by being de-
prived of Liberty merely, that we are placed in a Case of
Necessity. Even when we are in prison, or otherwise under a
constraint, we are bound by the ordinary Rules of Morality.
411. We have said, that the fear of immediate death
constitutes a Case of Necessity. The fear of immediate
death constitutes one of the most distinct and plain of such
cases. The reason of fixing upon such a case, is that such
a fear, in most persons, produces a paroxysm and agony
of terrour and trouble which subvert the usual balance
of the mind, and the usual course of thought and action.
268 MORALIT\\ [Book III.
What is done under such circumstances, may be considered
as an exception to the common condition of the man'*8
being. It has not the same bearing upon the man's moral
culture as acts done in a more tranquil and deliberate
manner. In cases where the condition is so extreme, we
may allow a deviation from Moral Rules, without infringing
their general authority. In addition to this reason for
taking the fear of immediate death as a prominent example
of a Case of Necessity, this condition makes the danger
more inevitable. It may be supposed, in general, that if
the threatened death be not immediate, other means of
averting that result may be found by the person threatened,
besides the violations of Moral Rules, which are the alter-
native. If, however, a death not immediate can be presented
to the mind as an inemtaUe menace, it may perhaps constitute
a Case of Necessity, on the grounds above stated.
412. But though the fear of immediate, or of certain,
death, as the alternative, must be allowed to constitute a Case
of Necessity, so far as such Cases are to be recognized ; we
are not therefore to conclude that such fear liberates us from
all Duties, or justifies all Acts. We do not say, generally,
that a man may, without blame, tell a Lie, or violate
other Duties, in order to save his life. If we were to decide
thus, what would become of our moral approval of Martyrs,
who incur death by their open assertion of the truth ?
and of our admiration of virtuous men in other cases, who
perform acts of Duty, knowing that they lead to their death?
Even in Cases of Necessity, the violation of Rule may not be
without blame ; but the blame may be mitigated, in consi-
deration of the Necessity: or, reference being had to the
circumstances of the case and of the person, the act may
be even excusable and allowable.
413. We shall not attempt to define or enumerate
Cases of Necessity. A consideration of the pecuhar character
Ch. XVI.] CASES OF NECESSITY. 269
of such cases will shew that the Moralist ought not to
undertake such definition and enumeration. In the Act
which is excused as a Case of Necessity, there must be
a struggle and compunction in the mind of the agent
respecting the Duty violated ; although the extreme urgency
of the motives which act in the opposite direction, may
prevail. For we are supposing the agent to be a virtuous
man ; and are considering what such a one may do, in a Case
of Necessity. And we cannot suppose that such a man can
violate the broadest Rules of Morality, without pain and
trouble of mind. If we suppose a good man to be led,
under the terrour of immediate death, not otherwise to
be avoided, to tell a lie, or to stab the keeper of his prison ;
or a woman to give up her person to the lust of a man,
we cannot suppose this to take place without great anguish
and strong abhorrence of the acts thus committed. The
intense vehemence with which man clings to life may over-
master this abhorrence; and even the best estimate which
the person, at the moment, can form of the course of Duty,
may direct such acts. But a person would not be virtuous
who could commit them without repugnance, or look upon
them with complacency. Any acquiescence in the acts,
except as great though inevitable evils ; any indifference
with regard to the violation of the usual Rules of Morality ;
is at once immoral. When the act is over, there has been
a dire and mortal struggle between Moral Rules and Self-
preservation ; and if we rejoice that we are preserved, we
must still regret that, even for a moment, the general Rules
of Duty were compelled to give way. We cannot look upon
lying, or homicide, or being an instrument of lust, with
approbation; even if, under the circumstances, we think
that the acts have been, in this case, excusable. In such
Cases of Necessity, we may excuse the act, but we cannot
admire it. On the contrary, in such cases, our admiration
270 MORALITY. [Book III.
is bestowed on the other side. We admire a man who
suffers death, rather than tell a lie : we admire Socrates
who would not escape from unjust legal bondage and death,
even when he could do so without violence; we admire a
woman who suffers death rather than submit to violation.
It is plain that those who act thus, conform to the law
of Duty: those who, in such cases of necessity, act other-
wise, may do only what, in such cases, is excusable or
allowable; but the Moralist must not let them suppose
that they take the course which is alone right, or eminently
commendable.
414. This being the case, we must necessarily abstain
from laying down any definition of the limits of Cases of
Necessity; and any Precepts for such cases. For if we
were to define, beforehand, the conditions under which
lying, or homicide, or submission to lust, is the proper
course; those who accepted our Rules, would, when the
occasion came, take that course without the reluctance and
compunction, which are essential to make an act allowable
in virtue of Necessity. If we were to trace a definite
boundary, beyond which the Common Rules of Morality
no longer hold good ; men, in circumstances of temptation,
would be looking out to see when they had passed this
formal boundary, and were entitled to use the license which
such a position would give. They would be inquiring at
what moment they were beyond the jurisdiction of ordinary
Morality; in order that they might then disregard Moral
Rules. Whereas this is not the disposition which the
Moralist can approve or allow, even in Cases of Necessity.
He requires, in order that he may give his approbation,
or withhold his condemnation, a struggle in giving up what
is commonly right ; as well as a wish to do no more than
is, in uncommon cases, allowable. He cannot wish to aid
any one in looking with composure upon the shock that
Ch. XVI.] CASES OF NECESSITY. 271
his moral being must receive, by the emergencies of a Case
of Necessity.
415. A further reason for not defining such cases, is
this; that the appHcation of such Rules requires a calmness
and fairness which cannot be looked for in a case of necessity.
By the supposition of a case of necessity, the man is so
thrown off his balance, that he cannot conform to the Rules
of Duty in their exact and primary form. If we state
these Rules in a relaxed form, Cases of Necessity will occur,
in which, from the like want of balance of mind, he will
transgress even the enlarged Rule. The MoraHst cannot
deliver, as a Precept, Lie not except in great emergencies.
If he were to say so, to a man, under the influence of
passion, small emergencies would appear great ; and thus
such persons might learn to lie without compunction. The
Moralist says. Lie not at all. If an extreme emergency
occurs, he grants that there are Cases of Necessity in which
transgressions of Moral Rules may be excusable ; and if he
have to pronounce a moral sentence on the case, he will
take into account the circumstances of the case and of the
person.
416. He will attend to the circumstances of the per-
son, as well as of the case. For though the man who has
to act in a Case of Necessity is not likely to look to the
Moralist for Rules of Action; it is very likely, or rather,
inevitable, that his course of action will depend upon his
own previous Moral Culture. A man who, like Socrates, has
cherished in his mind, for many years, a reverence for the
laws, will wait his death from their operation, rather than
evade them. A man who has carried the love of truth,
a woman who has carried the love of chastity, to a high
point, will die, rather than incur the guilt they abhor.
Other persons, not so far advanced in Moral Progress, will
yield to the present fear, and seek the allowable course,
272 MORALITY. [Book III.
which, in such Cases of Necessity, may exist. The conduct,
in such cases, is governed, not by Rules, but by the Ope-
rative Moral Principles which have been taken into the
character so as to be the Springs of Action.
The conduct of a person in a Case of Necessity, as in
any other case, must be considered with reference to his
moral culture, in order that we may determine how far it is
good or bad. Now in the case in which a person, whose
moral culture has, up to that point been going on, violates
the ordinary Rules of Duty in a Case of Necessity ; his
moral progress must, as we have said, receive a shock. There
has been a mortal struggle between Moral Rules and Self-
preservation ; and Morahty has been overcome. So far, the
event is a suspension or reversal of moral culture, like any
other transgression. But this has not taken place in the
ordinary course of the man's being : it has been at a moment
of paroxysm and agony ; when by the terrour of immediate
death, or dreadful evil, his mind was thrown off its usual
balance. This event in his moral culture, is, therefore,
not to be reckoned as if it had happened at any other time.
Perhaps, the struggle and the defeat of Morality, was but for
a moment ; and implies no real permanent depravation of
the character. Perhaps, the shock, though severe, was
transient. Perhaps the moral derangement was a sharp
and critical disorder, brought on by special external circum-
stances ; which, once past, does not affect the general moral
health. In Cases of Necessity, when Rules have been
violated, the Moralist may be willing to hope that such is
the case; and in this hope, may abstain from condemning
the actor, and may thus pronounce his act allowable. In
delivering such a Sentence, the Moralist trusts that, as the
Moral Culture has been interrupted by extraordinary cir-
cumstances, or turned into a strange channel ; it will also
afterwards be resumed with extraordinary zeal, and pursued
Ch. XVI.] CASES OF NECESSITY. 273
with extraordinary advantage. The man who has had to
take a merely allowable course, has great reason to examine
his conscience and his heart, in order to see that they have
received no stain or wrench ; and to remove the defect, if
they have. And if any more than native aid may be ob-
tained in such a task, he has, more than others, reason to
seek for it. If he do not need Repentance and Amend-
ment after his act, at least he needs a renewed Recogni-
tion, in his heart, of the Moral Rule which he has violated.
417. We may remark, that we have spoken of cases
in which the direct Rule of Duty leads to Death; as if
Death were nothing more than one among many objects of
human fear, although the greatest. Death is, however,
also the end of our moral career, so far as this life is con-
cerned. This consideration would not affect the merely
Moral Question ; which is a question concerning the Course
that Duty and Virtue require, so long as life lasts. But
Rehgion, which presents Death to us as, not merely the
end of this life, but the beginning of another, gives a new
aspect to all such questions. Still, in the eye of Religion,
as in the eye of Morality, Death is only one of the events
of man's being; and every man's conduct with regard to
this as to the other events, must be governed by the Law
of Duty.
418. It appears from what has been said, that Cases
of Necessity, in which the conflict is between Moral Rules
and Self-preservation, are properly spoken of in the common
maxim, which declares that Necessity has no Law ; but the
exception to Law amounts only to this ; that transgression
is allowable, provided the Necessity be extreme.
419. In the case in which Moral Rules are trans-
gressed, not for the sake of our own preservation, but in
order to preserve some other person from great impending
evil ; we may have a Case of Necessity, which is also a
VOL. I. T
274 MORALITY. [Book III.
Conflict of Duties : for to preserve another person from great
evil, is a part of the general Duty of Benevolence ; and
when the person is connected with us by special relations,
to do this, is involved in the Duties of the Specific Affec-
tions. Thus, when the wife of Grotius saved him by a lie ;
when Lucilius saved Brutus by falsely personating him ;
when Virginius preserved his daughter from pollution by
her murder; when a man, in rescuing a neighbour from
death, kills the robber who assails him ; we have two
Duties, placed in opposition to each other; on one side,
the Duty of rescuing, from a terrible and impending evil,
a husband, a friend, a daughter, a neighbour ; on the other
hand, the Duty of not telling a falsehood, or committing
homicide.
These Cases of Conflict of Duties differ from the Cases of
Conscience formerly considered, in having, as one alternative,
death, or some extreme evil, immediately impending over a
person whom we love; and hence, they hardly admit of a deli-
berate previous decision what we oupht to do ; but rather
lead to some paroxysmal act, of which we afterwards enquire
whether it was allowahle^ as in other Cases of Necessity.
420. In these Cases, as in the other Cases of Necessity,
the Moralist must abstain from laying down definite Rules of
decision ; and for the like reasons as before. To state Ge-
neral Rules for deciding Conflicts between opposing Duties,
would have an immoral tendency. For such a procedure
would necessarily seem to make light of the Duties which
were thus, in a general manner, postponed to other Duties ;
and would tend to remove the compunction, which any
Moral Rule violated, ought to occasion to the Actor. We
may see these defects, in the Rules which have been proposed
for such purposes. For example, it has been said by some,
that the wife of Grotius and the friend of Brutus were
justified in what they did, because the Duty of Truth is
Ch. XVI.] CASES OF NECESSITY. 275
only a Duty to one's self; and Duties to a Husband or a
Friend are of a higher order than Duties to one*'s self*.
But the result of this Maxim would evidently be, that any
Lie, however great, might be told to procure the smallest
benefit to a Husband or Friend ; which is a most immoral
conclusion.
421. But though in such Cases of Conflict of Duties,
no Moral Rules can be laid down, as of universal validity,
the course taken by the Actor will depend, and ought
to depend, upon his state of Moral Culture. And perhaps
the best mode of deciding any particular case, is to consider
how the two sides of the alternative would have affected
the Moral Culture and Moral Progress of the person.
Thus, in the case of Grotius'*s wife. Conjugal Love was
in Conflict with the Love of Truth. Both of these are
Moral Principles, to be cultivated in our hearts, by their
influence upon our actions. If the wife had neglected an
opportunity which offered itself, of saving the husband from
death, the shock to Conjugal Affection would have been
intense ; and the irremediable evil, when it had fallen upon
her, must have brought with it a self-accusation and despair,
against which the recollection of scrupulous veracity could
hardly have supported her. If, on the contrary, in such
extreme necessity she uttered a falsehood; even if it had been
to friends, it might have remained in her mind as an excep-
tion, without weakening the habitual reverence for Truth: but
the deceit being, in fact, used towards enemies, with whom the
same common understanding does not obtain, which subsists
among friends, it would naturally still less be felt to be an
act in which the Duty of Truth was lightly dealt with ; so
that there were reasons to hope, that if any wound were
inflicted on the Love of Truth by the act, it might heal
readily and completely. And for the like reasons, in extreme
* Eschenmayer, Moralphilosophie. Stuttgart, 1818. § 187- Nothluge.
t2
276 MORALITY. [Book III.
cases, the duties of the affections may be generally preferred
to the duties of truth and justice. But then this must be
understood only of Cases of Necessity, that is, of death or
other peril of the highest kind, incumbent upon the object
of affection : for otherwise, such a Rule would destroy the
duties of truth and justice altogether.
422. As we have said, in such Cases of Necessity,
men will hardly, in general, look to the Rules of Moralists
for the direction of their conduct. But though they may
not do this, they will be determined, in their conduct on
such emergencies, by their previous moral culture and moral
progress. A man who, acting under a momentary sense
of duty, kills his daughter to preserve her purity, must
have cultivated to a high degree his love of purity ; and has
probably not cultivated, in the same degree, his horrour
of homicide. Yet we can hardly blame him, in the same
way as we should do, if immoral springs of action had over-
mastered a moral Principle; for both those Principles are
to be cherished in the Moral Culture of Man, If, in Cases
of Necessity, the conflict of opposing Duties be decided
by the energetic action of a Principle, which, though dis-
proportioned to other Principles, is still moral, we may
pronounce the act excusable ; without pretending to decide
that some other course might not have been selected, by
a character of more even and comprehensive Moral Culture.
The predominant Principle in each character, will show
itself, not only by prevailing in the struggle, when the
conflict is begun ; but also by stimulating the invention,
and suggesting a course of conduct, which, to a more in-
different mind, would not have occurred. It was the strength
of conjugal affection, which suggested to Grotius"'s wife the
device to save her husband ; it was the strength of friend-
ship, which suggested to Lucilius the thought of presenting
himself as Brutus ; it was the horrour of shame and slavery,
Ch. XVI.] CASES OF NECESSITY. 277
which inspired in the mind of Virginius, the thought of
killing his daughter. A strong Moral Principle, like any
other Spring of Action, shows its strength by the activity,
vigour, and inventiveness which it calls out in the mind.
423. In such cases as have been described, when the
course chosen implies self-devotion, or the sacrifice of strong
special affections, along with great courage or fortitude, the
act becomes an Heroic Act. As Heroic Acts, accordingly,
we have already mentioned the acts of Lucilius, and of Vir-
ginius ; also (264) of the elder Brutus, Regulus, Socrates.
Thus, Heroic Acts approach very near to those Cases of
Necessity which involve Conflicting Duties. And they will
be judged by the Moralist, in nearly the same manner as
such Cases. Heroic Acts arise from the energetic predo-
minance of some Operative Principle, which, overpowering
selfish desires and affections, doubt and fear, stimulates the
mind to some act out of the common course of human action.
If the Principle which thus manifests itself, be a Moral Prin-
ciple, although disproportioned to other Moral Principles in
the character; the Moralist may, not only pronounce the
acts excusable, but may even admire them, as Heroic Acts ;
that is, as Acts out of the reach of Rule. But at the same
time, it must be recollected, that the Origin of Heroic Acts,
in general, is a disproportion in the Moral Character. To
aim at Heroic Virtues only, would be an extremely bad
culture of ourselves. It would lead to an entire rejection
of Duties ; for as we have said (276), we speak of Heroic
Virtues, but not of Heroic Duties.
424. Among the Cases of Necessity, there is one
Class which may be specially noticed ; namely, those in
which, under the pressure of Necessity, the Duty of Obe-
dience to Government is put aside — Cases of Resistance
to Governors, and of Revolutions. Such cases have occur-
red, in the history of almost all nations; but they are
278 MORALITY. [Book III.
usually defended, and can only be morally defended, as
Cases of Necessity. Under all common circumstances, the
Duty of Obedience to the Government historically esta-
blished in the Community, is incumbent upon every Citizen.
There may occur circumstances, in which the preservation
of the Constitution of the Country, or the Welfare of the
People, may make Resistance and Revolution necessary. But
the Moralist must say, in such, as in other Cases of Necessity,
that the Necessity must be extreme, before a violation of the
Rules of Duty is allowable. All common means must be
tried, all the resources of the Constitution exhausted, all
other courses explored, before Resistance becomes moral.
And we cannot define beforehand, at least, except in a very
general way, what are those marks of Necessity which thus
justify Resistance to Government. The Moralist abstains
from doing this, in these, for the same reasons as in other
Cases of Necessity. It would not answer the purposes of
Morality, to draw lines, and mark points, to which discon-
tented citizens might look forwards, in order to see when
they had acquired the privileges of a condition free from the
Rule of Obedience. We are not to class Resistance and
Revolution among ordinary conditions of Society. On the
contrary, they are to be looked forward to as dire calamities,
whenever they come ; with which the mind is never to be
familiarized, any more than with any other great transgres-
sions of Rules, which, in Cases of Necessity, may occur.
When the Case of Necessity occurs, the Necessity will be
expressed in the language of historical facts and current
opinions. Both the Necessity and the expression of it,
will depend upon the Moral and Political Culture which the
Community has attained. If, according to the historical
Constitution, and actual condition of the Community, the
Necessity be really extreme ; and if all Constitutional courses
having been exhausted, the operation of Moral Principle in
Ch. XVI.] CASES OF NECESSITY. 279
the Community has produced Resistance, and led to Revo-
lution, the Revolution may be necessary, and even glorious.
But even in this case, it is conducive to Morality that the
deviation from the common Rules of the Constitution should
be, and should appear to be, as small as is consistent with
the object to be secured. There may be occasions, on which
the Morahst may have to dwell with satisfaction upon such
Revolutions; and on the heroic acts by which they were
brought about; but in general, it will be his province to
speak of the ordinary Rules of Duty, and of their applica-
tion, rather than of the difficult and disquieting questions of
Exceptions to Ordinary Rules.
Chapter XVII.
OF THINGS ALLOWABLE.
425. We have been led, by our reasonings, to state
that, in Cases of Necessity, certain courses of action may
be declared Allowable or Permitted, even though we may not
be able to pronounce them absolutely right ; as to tell a
lie to save one's own life, or the life of a friend. There
is a prevalent inclination among men to extend this notion
of things which are permitted or allowable, though not
rigorously right, to many other cases. It is often asked,
with a latent persuasion that the Moralist cannot fail to
return an affirmative answer. Whether it be not allowable
to utter a falsehood, in order to preserve an important
secret: Whether, under very provoking circumstances, anger
on our own account be not allowable : Whether, in deciding
a question of merit, we may not allowably lean a little to
a member of our own family : Whether, a slight occasional
excess of moderation, in eating and drinking, be not al-
280 MORALITC. [Book III.
lowable. These, and many questions of the like kind, are
often propounded : and it may be proper to consider what
reply the Moralist must make to them.
The notion of what is allowable, is admitted in Cases of
Necessity, as expressing our acquiescence in certain actions
as exceptions to General Moral Rules ; so that, though the
general Maxims of Morality will not authorize us to pro-
nounce them right, our regard for the condition of human
nature will not permit us to pronounce them wrong. But
to extend this notion of allowaUe to Cases of common
occurrence, when there is no necessity, and only such a
temptation as is often arising; is to annihilate all Rule.
The meaning of every Moral Rule is, that it is to be
obeyed, in spite of temptation to transgress. If, professing
to accept the Rule as our Rule, we still deviate from it,
whenever any considerable temptation occurs ; the Rule is
not our Rule. It is no part of the habitual conduct of our
thoughts ; no part of our moral culture.
426. Further: the merely propounding such questions
as the above, whether deviations from the Rules of Truth,
and Benevolence, and Justice, and Temperance, be allow-
able, of itself shows that the Moral Culture is very imper-
fect. It shows that the Love of Truth, of Benevolence,
of Justice, of Temperance, is not established in the mind ;
that the Moral Rules which express these Virtues are re-
ceived as an extraneous constraint, which we would gladly
escape from ; not accepted as desirable means to a wisht-
for end. To enquire whether, under specified circumstances,
violation of Moral Rules be not allowable, is to show that
our thoughts are seeking not the way to conform to the
Rule, but the way to evade it. To make a Class of Al-
lowable Things, would be to sanction and confirm this dis-
position. We should place an insurmountable impediment
in the way of the Moral Culture of men, if we taught
Ch. XVIL] OF THINGS ALLOWABLE. 281
them to classify actions as Good, Bad, and Allowable. For
they might be led to fill their lives with Allowable actions,
to the neglect of those which are Good : and it is evident
that to do this, would be to remove all moral progress
and all moral aim.
427. But it may be said, there must be a class of
actions which are merely Allowable : those which are not
either good or bad ; where a person may take one course
or the other without blame : as for instance, to choose Law
or Medicine for his profession : to spend more or less upon
his dress and table, within the limits which his fortune
prescribes: to eat more or less: to study more or less;
•or to study one branch of literature or another. In these,
and an infinite number of others, the like matters, it may
be urged that it is allowable to adopt either side. Good men
constantly do both the one and the other of the things, thus
put as alternatives. There is no necessary character of good
or bad on either side ; and either side is allowable.
Upon this we remark, that if, in such alternatives, there
be not on either side any necessary character of good or
bad, a man is permitted by morality to choose one side
or the other according to other considerations. If this be
so, the things may be described as Things Indifferent, rather
than as things allowable. And undoubtedly, there are, at
every period of our lives, many things about us, which are,
so far as we can discern, morally indifferent. We cannot
see that Moral Rules are applicable to them. We cannot
see that either alternative will effect our Moral Culture.
428. But we may further remark, that in many cases,
in which no moral result appears at first sight, a moral
result exists: and may even, by us, be discerned as pro-
bable. The choice of a profession, for instance, can hardly
be a matter of indifference, in a moral point of view. We
have already seen that there are wide moral questions, in-
282 MORALITY. [Book III.
separably connected with the profession of an Advocate.
Questions of the like kind might be stated, belonging to
the profession of a Physician. How far either of the pro-
fessions is, for each person, a moral one, must depend upon
those solutions of such questions which are accepted by
him. Moreover, each of these professions must, in a many
ways, produce a very great effect upon the moral culture
of the person who exercises it. A man's profession deter-
mines the sphere and kind of his actions ; and it is in the
doing of these actions, that the man's moral character is
to be formed. The choice of a profession, therefore, must be
very far from indifferent, in its moral results, for each man.
429. But, though the choice of a profession be im-
portant in its moral bearings, it by no means follows from
this, that it must be governed by any uniform Rule for
all. What is good for one man, may be bad for another,
according to the difference of native character and previous
circumstances. The effect of a profession, as influencing
the man's moral culture, will depend upon the moral cul-
ture which has taken place already. In a man's moral and
intellectual progress, all the steps are connected: and his
moral and intellectual Education, which has preceded his
entrance upon his profession, may have made his Profession
the best Sequel to his Education. We have said that,
in the extraordinary exertions of moral principles, the energy
of the principle stimulates the mind to select and follow
out appropriate trains of thought. The same is the case,
also, in the ordinary operation of the principles by which
the general course of a man's life is determined. The
Operative Principles which are the strongest in his cha-
racter, decide him to take one course or another; and if
these Operative Principles are Moral Principles, they will
tend to continue his Moral Culture in the scheme of life
to which they have impelled him. And thus, though we
Ch. XVII.] OF THINGS ALLOWABLE. 288
do not, in such cases, pretend to lay down Rules of choice
which shall be appHcable to all men alike ; yet we see
that the choice is, for each man, very far from a matter
of indifference ; that on the contrary, the congruity of his
social position, with his character, and moral and intel-
lectual condition, may influence, very favourably, or very
unfavourably, his moral culture throughout his life. To
decide our choice in such alternatives, is one of the great
offices of Prudence and Wisdom ; of Prudence, if we con-
sider the decision with reference to any object short of
the highest Moral Progress : of Wisdom, if we decide so
as most to further that highest object.
430. But there are other ways in which actions, at
first sight seemingly indifferent, have really a character of
good or bad. They may form or foster Habits, which are
often plainly not indifferent, though the single acts may
appear so. Slight changes, daily repeated, may produce
an evident modification. To exaggerate a little the events
of the stories which we tell in conversation; to overpoint
the antithesis of our remarks; to eat or drink to the full
gratification of appetite; to give way to slight impulses
of impatience or anger; may, on each single occasion,
appear so small a matter as to be allowable; and yet,
in this way may be generated Habits of violating truth,
justice, temperance and kindness, at least in some degree. J
And such Habits, existing in any degree, are necessarily
very adverse to our moral culture. Habits are generated
by successive acts ; and, in their turn, produce a continuation
of the acts; and every act in which we trifle with the
suggestions of truth, justice, temperance, kindness, or any
other virtue, may, and more or less must, extend its con-
sequences to the subsequent tenour of our lives. And in
the same manner, acts in which we act with a strict and
special regard to truth, to justice, to temperance, to kind-
284 MORALITY. [Book III.
ness, in spite of minute temptations to the contrary, in
matters however apparently small and unimportant, may,
by the habits which they tend to form, or to uphold, be
of service to us in our moral culture.
431. Acts which are thus performed, rather from a
regard to their influence in the formation of habits, than from
their own value, are practised as a Discipline. Many of the
seemingly trivial acts, which make up the tissue of our com-
mon lives, require to be regarded in this view, in order that
they may be duly regulated by moral considerations. The in-
dulgence of selfish desires in small matters; ill-humour; sharp
expressions ; obstinacy in trifles ; must be avoided ; because
the contrary habits, — self-denial in small matters for the
sake of others; cheerful and kind words used to them;
the habit of yielding to the wishes of others in trifles ; — are
not only manifestations of a benevolent disposition, where
it does exist ; but are a discipline of benevolence, by which
its growth is fostered. We must avoid colouring a story
in order to produce an effect ; arguing for the sake of
victory only ; depreciating the characters and actions of men
in order to show our wit and genius; because such habits
are inconsistent with the disposition of an earnest and
sincere love of truth and justice; and because such habits
tend to make those who practise them, indifferent to truth
and justice, in comparison of the gratification of vanity
and pride. The opposite practices ; — a strict fidelity in nar-
ration ; a moderation in maintaining our opinion, even when
we are confident we are right ; an abstinence from speaking
evil of any ; — are a Discipline of truth and fairness. In like
manner, the gratifications of the Table, even if they be
not carried so far as to interfere immediately with moral
action, by overloading the body, or clouding the mind,
may interfere with our moral culture, by fostering a habit
of self-indulgence, rather than of self-denial. Rules of living.
Ch. XVII.] OF THINGS ALLOWABLE. 285
which make the satisfaction of the bodily appetites a dis-
cipline of moderation, are the proper mode of making that
part of our nature subservient to our moral culture. And
as we have already said, our bodily appetites have in them-
selves no moral character. It is only by being thus made
to contribute to our moral Discipline, that they can cease
to be obstacles in the way of our moral progress.
482. In a character morally disciplined, the bodily
Desires do not operate upon the actions in a direct and
unmingled manner, but through the Habits. The direct
operation of the desires is controlled ; they are wrapt up
and put out of sight, in the round of events by which
the needs of the body are supplied. The more rigorous
moralists have spoken of the bodily desires, as being killed,
or mortified ; and have taught that this Mortification of the
Desires of the body is necessary for the full completion
of our moral culture.
The Discipline, which consists in limiting or rejecting
the indulgence of the Desires of the body, has been carried
very far by some, with the view of mortifying such desires.
With these persons. Discipline, Askesis, has been made a
direct object; and they have adopted many practices to
attain their object, which have hence been termed Ascetic
Practices.
433. But it does not appear that this ascetic course,
in which the mortification of the desires of the body is made
a direct and primary object, is really well suited to the moral
culture of men in general. The object of Discipline is not
Discipline itself, but the unconscious Habits which Discipline
generates. Discipline is not complete, till we do spontaneously
the actions in which we have been disciplined. A man has
not completed the discipline by which he learns to swim, till
he can swim with no more effort or thought than he requires
to walk. An accomplished swimmer swims spontaneously,
286 MORALITY. [Book III.
when he finds himself in the water. A man has not com-
pleted his discipline in a foreign language, till he can
understand and use it without recalling his rules of grammar ;
till, as it is often expressed, he thinks in the language.
And such is the object, in this, and in other courses of
bodily or mental discipline. The like is the case in our
moral culture. Spontaneous, not Ascetic Virtue, is that
which the Morahst desires to see among men. So far as
ascetic practices may be requisite to generate habits of
self-denial and self-control, they may be rightly employed:
but we are not to forget that ascetic practices have, in
themselves, no moral value. If they are good at all, they
are good only as means to something else. Discipline is
good as Discipline : but Discipline is completed, only by
reaching the end of the ascetic struggle with inclination.
In our moral culture, we are to aim, not at the means
but at the end: not at the Ascetic Struggle, but at the
Disciplined Spontaneity.
434. What has been said of the Discipline by which
moral virtues are fostered, applies likewise to the Discipline
of the Intellect. Many employments of the mind, appa-
rently unimportant and indifferent, are important parts of
our intellectual and moral formation. Intellectual employ-
ments, which are generally pursued for the mere pleasure
of the pursuit ; favourite studies ; books of our own choice,
and the like ; can hardly fail to have a great influence upon
the intellectual habits, and thus may promote or impede
the development of the intellectual virtues. Studies and
reading, which have in them no direct immoral tendency,
may yet dissipate and distract the mind. The love of
mere intellectual amusement may destroy the habit of solid
thought, and interfere with those Duties of Consideration,
and of acting rationally, of which we have spoken ; indul-
gence in the literature of mere imagination, humour, wit
Ch. XVII.] OF THINGS ALLOWABLE. 287
and the like, may destroy the love of truth ; the exclusive
cultivation of the material and mathematical sciences may
make the mind dull and captious in dealing with moral
conceptions. Any course of intellectual employment, if
allowed too much to absorb the mind, may check and per-
vert that balanced and complete intellectual culture, which
is most conducive to the progress of the whole man.
435. Thus actions of all kinds, otherwise unimportant,
become important as parts of a Discipline. Scarcely anything
can be said to be indifferent, when considered with reference
to the effect which it may produce upon our lives, through
corporeal, intellectual, and moral habits. Every act, how-
ever slight, may be good or bad, when considered as an
indication of good moral discipline, or of the want of it ;
as, in the eyes of those who are judges of manners, every act
is an indication of good or of ill Breeding.
436. For this reason, the Moralist does not readily
class any act as Indifferent ; or pronounce any act Allowable,
which is no more than allowable. It may be difficult, or impos-
sible, to see the bearing of a single trifling act, on the actor's
moral condition ; and it would be unwise to lay down general
rules for such acts. But the act may, nevertheless, have
such an influence ; and each man has it for a duty, to
exercise a careful guidance and control over even trifling
acts ; recollecting how trifling Acts grow into Habits ; and
how important a part of a man's moral condition his Habits
are. The more entirely a man's whole being is governed
and directed by Moral Principles, and the more does the
circle of Things Indifferent narrow and dwindle. As the
moral light grows stronger, everything assumes a colour
of good or bad, between which he has to choose. Every-
thing, however trivial or mean, affords aliment and occasions
to virtue. And as all things thus become good or bad,
nothing is merely allowable. If it be allowable, it is right ;
288 MORALITY. [Book III.
and is what must be done because it is right, not what may
be done because it is allowable.
437. It is true, that thus to estimate every act,
however trivial, as having a moral value from its influence
upon our character, implies a clearness of view, as to the
operation of such influences, which we can never fully attain
to. This condition of mind, in which all acts are good or
are bad, and none indififerent, is one which we may approxi-
mate to, but can never arrive at. When we have exercised
all our sagacity and diligence, in determining what acts are
right, and what are wrong ; there will still remain a residue,
at every period of our lives, which will have the aspect
of being indifferent. Nor need we be disturbed that this is
so. If, habitually referring things to a moral standard, and
exercising such care and thought as a serious conduct of
the business of life requires, we keep our eyes open to the
good and the bad of the actions which come before us, in
order to choose the good and shun the bad ; we carry on
our moral culture, according to the stage at which we have
(arrived. But in order to do this, we must, at each step,
ask, not what is allowable, but what is right ; not what we
may do, but what we ought to do. If to these questions we
can obtain, on any particular subject, no definite response
from our consciences, we may guide our course by the best
lights of prudence which we can obtain ; always recollecting,
however, that our not being able to see that there is one
course which we ought to take, rather , than another, is an
imperfection of vision, which arises from the defect of our
intellectual and moral faculties ; and which we may hope to
see removed, when our minds are further enlightened, in
a more advanced stage of our moral progress.
289
Chapter XVIII.
OF IGNORANCE AND ERROUR.
438. Ignorance and Errour are often referred to,
among the causes which make Actions excusable. It will
be proper to consider how far Actions which are generally
wrong, are, by Ignorance and Errour, rendered excusable in
the Agent.
We have already spoken of Intellectual Duties ; and the
existence of such Duties leads to some Maxims which bear
upon the question now before us. We have mentioned
(336 — 342) the Duty of Consideration ; the Duty of acting
according to Rule ; and the Duty of acting rationally. We
have further spoken of the Duty of our own Intellectual
Culture ; and also (366) of the Duty of constantly enlighten-
ing and instructing our Conscience. These Duties cannot
be neglected or omitted, without a transgression of that
Duty of Moral Culture, which is our highest and most
comprehensive Duty.
439. But Ignorance and Errour may arise from other
Causes, besides the neglect of these Intellectual Duties ; for
example, they may arise from our want of information, which
we have not any means of obtaining ; or from our receiving
false information, which we have no reason to suspect of
falsehood. In such cases Ignorance and Errour are unavoid-
able: or, in the language sometimes used by Moralists,
they are invincible Ignorance and invincible Errour. They
cannot be avoided or overcome by any obvious exertions of
ours. We have performed, it is supposed, the Duty of In-
quiry and Consideration (336) which is incumbent upon us,
and still we remain in Ignorance or in Errour. On this
supposition, the actions which we ignorantly and erroneously
perform are blameless. We have no way of avoiding or
VOL. I. U
290 MORALITY. [Book III.
removing Ignorance or Errour, but by Inquiry and Con-
sideration. If we have done all that is in our power to free
our actions from these defects ; the defects may be con-
sidered as no longer belonging to us. If I purchase a horse,
and have a suspicion that he has been stolen from a previous
owner, I must inquire for the evidence of such a fact, and
weigh it carefully. But if the result of my inquiry and
deliberation is, to remove entirely the suspicion, I may
blamelessly buy him, though he should afterwards be found
to be a stolen horse. And in the same manner, I am blame-
less, if the circumstances of the sale are such as to banish
suspicion ; as for example, if he is sold in open market, it
may be that this circumstance is, in consequence of the
habits of the country, sufficient to remove the necessity of
inquiry. In this case, Errour, when it occurs, may be con-
sidered as unavoidable; and the erroneous action is still
blameless.
440. But it is requisite, to the moral character of the
act, that we should direct ourselves by the real inward
belief to which we are led, and not merely by any external
result. A mere formal inquiry, for the sake of saving
appearances, or of complying with the letter of our maxims,
cannot make the act moral. Such a pretended conformity
to the Duty of Inquiry, is insincere and dishonest.
It will often be difficult for us to determine, whether
we have been sufficiently persevering and minute in the
Inquiries, which we have made, into the facts which guide
our actions ; and when we have been deceived, and have
thus been led to do what we wished to avoid; as soon as
the deceit is discovered, we may perhaps wonder that we did
not detect it sooner ; and may regret that we did not carry
our inquiry further. Thus, when I have bought a horse,
and afterwards find him to have been stolen ; I may regret
that I did not inquire more carefully into the Seller s story.
Ch. XVIII.] OF IGNORANCE AND ERROUR. 291
This regret includes some condemnation of the act which I
have committed under the influence of the deceit, and ap-
proaches to the character of repentance. And such senti-
ments of self-condemnation and repentance are well founded,
when we have been negligent in our inquiries. It is very
difficult to know when we have done all in our power to as-
certain the truth of facts ; and therefore, difficult to know
when we are quite free from the blame of such negligence.
Hence we are led to this Maxim; that UnavoidaUe
Ignorance or Errour removes the blame of the actions which it
causes ; hut that we are to be noery careful of not too easily
supposing our ignorance to be unavoidable.
441. Of course, as soon as we discover that, through
ignorance or errour, we have done a wrong to any one, it is
our Duty to remedy the wrong. If we have bought what was
stolen from him, we must restore the thing to him ; and the
like. Any resistance in our minds to this step, is immoral.
When our ignorance ends, the excuse which it supplies to us
ends. We may avoid blame, in virtue of our Ignorance or
Errour, but we may not receive advantage from it. We
regret our Errour ; but if we retain the benefits of it, we
shall have to repent of our Fault. There is dishonesty in
resisting the consequences of the detection of our errour ; as
there is dishonesty in willingly abstaining from detecting our
errour.
442. When Ignorance and Errour are of such a
kind that they may be avoided by Inquiry and Considera-
tion, the actions to which they give occasion are not freed
from blame by the ignorance and the errour. Yet Ignorance
and Errour, even when they are the consequence of a neglect
of the Duties of Inquiry and Consideration, may exist for
a time, without producing any external action which vio-
lates Moral Rules. So long as this is the case, the fault
which we have committed is the general Neglect of that
U2
292 MORALITY. [Book III.
Intellectual Culture which is requisite to our moral progress.
But when Ignorance and Errour, thus produced, give rise
to special violations of Moral Rules, such transgressions are
not excusable on account of the Ignorance and Errour. If
a man remain, through Negligence, ignorant, or mistaken,
as to the amount of his income, and in consequence, con-
tract debts greater than he can pay, he is not blameless ;
though Ignorance and Errour are the occasion of the wrong
which he does to his creditors. He is culpable for not
ascertaining what he could afford to spend, before he in-
curred his debts. If, with the same ignorance, he had not
incurred such debts, he might still be blamed for Negligence
in not ascertaining the conditions under which he had to
act. But when his Negligence inflicts loss on other persons,
it becomes a carelessness of Justice and Honesty embodied
in act ; and therefore a transgression of a graver kind.
443. Still, there is a difference between Carelessness
of Justice and Honesty, and intentional /^justice and Dis-
honesty. Debts contracted through negligent ignorance of
our income, are not so culpable as Debts contracted with
fraudulent intentions. In one case, the Duty of Considera-
tion is, for the time, omitted ; but it may be resumed. In
the other case, the Duty of Justice or of Honesty is in-
tentionally violated ; and the Violation must be repented of.
In one case, the moral progress is suspended ; in the other,
it is reversed. And thus, Ignorance and Errour arising
from negligence, though they cannot excuse, may palliate our
transgressions, hy excluding intentional wrong.
444. But besides Ignorance and Errour with regard
to the Facts on which the direction of our actions must
depend ; there may, also, be Ignorance and Errour with
regard to the Rules by which the moral character of actions
is determined. And it may be made a Question, how far
such Ignorance and Errour render actions excusable, which
Ch. XVIII.] OF IGNORANCE AND ERROUR. 293
are contrary to Moral Rules. If a man be ignorant that
theft is a crime, is he guilty when he steals? If a man
believe slavery to be consistent with morality, is he excusable
in buying and selling men ? If a man think that property
is an immoral institution, is he justified in disregarding the
Rights of Property in other men ?
To such questions, we reply, in the first place, that a
person labouring under Ignorance and Errour, such as are
here described; — ignorant that theft is a crime ; that buying
and selling men is immoral ; that property is an institution
necessary for moral action among men; — must be i§ a
very imperfect state of moral culture. We have shown
that, in virtue of man's moral nature, property is a neces-
sary institution, and theft necessarily a crime ; and we shall
be able to show, in like manner, that buying and selling
men is immoral.
These Moral Truths spring from the moral nature of
man and are unfolded in an explicit form, by our moral
and intellectual culture. They are virtually included in the
Express Principles of Humanity, Justice, Truth, Purity,
Order, Earnestness, and Moral Purpose, which we formerly
stated (269). Such general moral truths, thus derived from
the Fundamental Principles of Morality, may themselves
be termed Moral Principles. And as the denial of the
Express Principles of Morality implies a defect in the Ope-
rative Principles, namely, Benevolence, Justice, Truth,
Purity, and Wisdom ; so a denial of the Derivative Prin-
ciples, which result from the Fundamental Principles, also
implies a defect in the same Operative Principles. A per-
son who denies the necessity of Property, the criminality
of theft, and the like, must either be a person in whom
the power and habit of intellectual deduction are feeble and
confused ; or he must be a person who denies the express
Fundamental Principles of Benevolence, Justice, Truth,
294 MORALITY. [Book III.
Purity, and Order. Denying these express Principles, he
cannot possess, except in a very imperfect and obscure form,
the Operative Principles which form the Cardinal Virtues
of men. Hence a person who is in Ignorance and Errour
on such points as have been mentioned, the necessity of
Property, the criminality of Theft, and the like, may be
said to be wanting in the Common Moral Principles of
men.
445. Putting off for a moment the Question how far
this condition — ^the Want of the Common Moral Principles —
may be said to excuse or exculpate actions arising from such
a condition ; we cannot hesitate to say that such a con-
dition implies a low stage of moral culture. The man who
is in this condition, has made a very small advance in that
Moral Progress, at which, as Moral Agents, we must
constantly aim. When Ignorance and Errour take the
form of a Want of the Common Moral Principles, they
may easily suspend or reverse the Moral Progress of the
Man, as much as many kinds of Transgression would do.
And hence, they must produce upon the Man's Moral Being,
the effects which the Suspension and Inversion of the Moral
Progress does produce.
We shall not now attempt to determine what is the
result of a suspended and inverted Moral Culture, when not
retrieved by any subsequent progress. Perhaps Morality alone
cannot decide this question; perhaps she must refer us to
Religion, in order that we may learn what consequences
such a final suspension and inversion of moral progress pro-
duces, upon man's destination and condition. But we must
necessarily conceive thus of the result : that the condition
of the man whose moral progress is finally suspended and
inverted is, in some way, opposite to that of the virtuous
man ; and this, equally, whether the want of progress arise
from transgression of moral principles, or the want of them.
Ch. XVIII.] OF IGNORANCE AND ERROUR. 295
If Virtue lead to Happiness, as we have said it must (304),
the Want of the Common Moral Principles must lead to
an unhappy condition. The man who, wanting the Com-
mon Moral Principles, transgresses them, cannot be placed,
by his Ignorance and Errour, on a hke footing with the
man who knows these Principles, and conforms to them in
his actions. If such Ignorance and Errour be not faults,
they must at least be considered as great moral misfortunes.
Such Ignorance and Errour belong to a Conscience dark
and erroneous; and a dark and erroneous Conscience is a
great moral calamity.
446. But the general judgment of mankind regards
the Want of the Common Moral Principles, not only as a
Misfortune and a Calamity, but as a Fault. The man who
shows this Want of Moral Principles by the declarations
which he makes, incurs the disapprobation and repugnance
which we give to moral wrong. We abhor a man who
asserts that no affection is due from a child to a parent.
We do not hear with patience men asserting that they have
a Right to buy and sell their brother men as if they were
cattle. We condemn, as immoral, a man who refuses to
acknowledge any Duty of Kindness, or Justice, or Truth,
towards other men. These are Errours which we do not
hold to be innocent or excusable. We think they might
have been avoided, and ought to have been avoided. Each
man's Reason, and the Instruction which each man receives,
in the general course of Society, might, we hold, have
taught him better than this. And this, our conviction,
agrees with what we have said of Intellectual Duties. We
require of men that they should be rational ; we have seen
(338) that there is a Duty of acting rationally. And as
there is a Duty of acting rationally, there is a Duty of
thinking rationally; for rational thinking is a condition of
296 MORALITY. [Book III.
rational acting. And to deny, or to be ignoraht of, the
Common Moral Principles of Man, is to be, to a certain
extent, irrational. It is to neglect or pervert the use of
the human Reason, by which all men are capable of arriving
at such Principles. And thus Ignorance or Errour^ in the
form of the Want of the Common Moral Principles of Man,
are blameahle.
447. Hence, as a general distinction. Moralists pro-
nounce Errours of Fact^ when not accompanied with negli-
gence, to he exculpations of the actions which they occasion ;
but Errours of Principle, not to he exculpations. And in
this distinction, they agree with the Jurists : who lay
down these two cardinal maxims : Ignorantia fa^cti excusat :
Ignorantia juris non excusat. Ignorance of the Fact is
an excuse; Ignorance of the Law is no excuse. A man
is not criminal for not directing his actions by a Fact,
which he did not know from observation or testimony ; and
which he could not know any other way. On the other
hand, ignorance of the Law cannot be accepted by the
Law as an excuse. The Law is requisite for the guidance
of each citizen in his social transactions, and it is his business
to make himself acquainted with it so far as it concerns
him. The Law is Natural Justice, with such additional
regulations, as are requisite to define its application ; the
Law, therefore, is requisite for each man's moral guidance.
It is his duty, as well as his obligation, to guide himself
by it, and, therefore, to make himself acquainted with
it. And the Law, in assuming a knowledge of the actual
Laws, assumes only a knowledge of that Rational Law
which is the basis of Actual Laws, and of its special con-
sequences in our own country. Such assumptions are
requisite for the administration of Laws. If a man might
plead ignorance of the Law, in excuse of a crime, it would
Ch. XVIIl.] OF IGNORANCE AND ERROUR. 297
be impossible to convict criminals ; for men would remain
wilfully ignorant of the Law, in order to avail themselves
of this excuse ; and even if they were not ignorant, it would
be difficult, or impossible, to prove their knowledge. Hence,
it is everywhere presumed that the citizen is acquainted
with the Law of the State ; and in like manner, it is pre-
sumed, by the Moralist, that man, as a moral being, is
acquainted with the Laws to which his Moral Nature directs
him : and if he transgresses these Laws, or pleads ignorance,
as his excuse, the excuse is generally not to be accepted.
448. But though the Moralist pronounces Ignorance
and Errour, when they appear as the Want of common Prin-
ciples, to be blaraeable ; and rejects such a Want, when offer-
ed as an exculpation of immoral actions, because it implies
a neglect or perversion of Reason ; it is still proper for him
to recollect, that it is by no means easy to avoid all im-
perfection and confusion in the use of the Reason. It is
our Duty to act and think rationally, as it is our privilege
to be rational ; but it is by no means easy to think in a
manner perfectly rational. The original Endowments, in-
ternal Habits, and external Circumstances of men, make
Ignorance and Errour, even with regard to the Common
Moral Principles of men, very difficult to avoid. Few
persons are able to see, all that the light of Reason is
capable of showing. Men may miss their way at many a
point, in the path to and from the Fundamental Principles
of Morality. We have been led to such Fundamental Prin-
ciples (Express Principles (see 268)) by the examination of
several abstract and general Conceptions. And we deduce
from these Fundamental Principles, special Duties, also
by means of abstract and general Conceptions. But in
forming these abstract and general Conceptions, which are
thus the objects of our thoughts, and the guides of our
reasonings, we may perform these intellectual processes very
298 MORALITY. [Book III.
imperfectly ; and in attempting them, we may fall into con^
fusion, ambiguity, inconsistency ; and thus into Errour. Ab-
straction and Generalization are intellectual processes which
are very inexactly and obscurely performed by most persons :
and in the confusion and obscurity of the general and abstract
Conceptions thus formed, there is a source of a great deal
of irrationality and incoherence, which thus infuses itself
into the Moral Principles held by men; even when they
have not been negligent, nor intentionally perverse, in their
moral reasonings. Thus, if a person maintain theft to be
no crime, his Errour may arise from a very confused appre-
hension of that abstract conception, the Bight of Property ;
or from a very imperfect notion of that balanced jural
Condition of Society, in which Rights are necessary. If
a person deny the necessity of Property, perhaps his
Errour arises from some confused notion of equality^ applied
to the quantities of men's possessions, instead of the Rights
of the possessors. If a man assert that buying and selhng
men is not immoral, his Errour may arise from a very
defective conception of Humanity, the brotherhood of man
to man; as we shall afterwards endeavour to show. In
these and the like cases, it may be difficult for some men
to avoid those imperfect and confused notions which thus
lead to Errours, that are, in themselves, contrary to Reason.
449. And this imperfection and confusion of moral
notions is, in some measure, augmented and extended by the
use of Moral Terms, as it prevails among men. For while
many men^s notions are thus defective and obscure, and on
that account, as well as on others, different, under the same
name ; men reason as if the same Term always meant the
same Conception, and thus fall into Errour. Abstract and
general Terms are not only marks of our Conceptions, and
thus, helps to the memory in reasoning ; they are also our
instruments of Reasoning. Without the names of Con-
Ch. XVUI.] OF IGNORAN^CE AND ERROUR. 299
ceptions, we cannot reason at all ; and hence, if the names
are applied in a confused and variable manner, we are led
to false and inconsistent Principles. Principles are established
and assented to, in one sense of their Terms ; and then, they
are applied and urged upon our assent, in another sense.
And this cause may make a man inconsistent, even with
himself; for we often remember and refer to Principles
expressed in words, when we do not clearly retain in our
minds the meaning of the Terms which they involve. This
confused use of Terms, by ourselves and those around us,
leads to many Moral Errours. We live in an atmosphere^^
of Language, by which we see Moral Truths obscured and dis-^
torted. But still we must recollect, that without the use
of Language, we should not be able to see Moral Truths
at all ; as without an atmosphere we should have no day-
light.
450. Language is not only thus a source of moral
obscurity and inconsistency difficult to be avoided ; but also,
a source of Prejudices ; for it subjects our minds to the in-
fluences of those with whom we share the habitual use of
language ; our families, our educators, our class, our nation.
These Influences are Causes of Errour difficult to avoid.
451. It will be well to recollect this, in order that
we may abstain from applying to men, on account of the
Express Principles which they assert, and which are contrary
to true Moral Principles, that condemnation, which pro-
perly belongs to immoral Operative Principles. If, indeed,
men carry out immoral Principles into immoral actions, we
cannot be mistaken in condemning them. In that case,
there must be something worthy of condemnation. But if,
while they assert Principles which, in their expression, are
immoral, the acts which they bring forth, as examples of
their Principles, are kind, just, true, pure and orderly ; we
300 MORALITY. [Book III.
may rather suppose that there is, not so much any distinct
immorality in their Principles, as understood by themselves ;
but rather some confusion in their language, or some inco-
herence in their generalizations.
For, though opinion leads to practice, and false opinion
seems to be the first step to wrong action ; there is, in the
nature of man, a very general inconsistency, which prevents
this connexion from being at all certain or universal. Men
who hold false general opinions, compensate an errour of
belief, by another errour, of reasoning ; and derive, from false
speculations, blameless or moral Rules of Practice. The re-
collection that this may be so, should temper, not the prompti-
tude of our rejection of false opinions, but the vehemence of
our condemnation of those who hold these opinions.
452. So to abstain from condemning seemingly wrong
Principles, is to tolerate them ; and this Duty of Toleration is
incumbent upon us, as we have just seen, in virtue of the
imperfection of the human Faculties, and their general in-
sufficiency for the task of constructing, in each man's mind,
a perfect connected system of Moral Truth. And thus, we
are led to pronounce that Ignorance and Errour^ especially
with regard to very general and abstract Principles^ are to
he tolerated.
453. » Further: Ignorance and Errour, on moral sub-
jects, may arise, not only from the imperfection of the
human Faculties, but also from external Circumstances, as
Education, and the defects of the National Standard of
Morality. These exert an influence upon our minds, through
the use of language, as we have said (450) ; and in other
ways. The Ignorance and Errour thus arising are not
absolutely unavoidable ; for every man may raise, by moral
self-culture, his standard of Morality above that of his Edu-
cation, or of his Nation ; but they are difficult to avoid ; for
Ch. XVIIL] of ignorance and ERROUR. 301
the very power of self-culture is affected by the Habits of
youth, and by the national customs. Hence, we may con-
sider the Ignorance and Errour, which arise from such
causes, as difficultly vincible : and as in some measure, in-
voluntary. Hence, such Ignorance and Errour excuse, in
some degree, the transgression of Moral Rule, which they
occasion. They do not remove altogether, but they diminish
the blame. A youth of a savage nation, who has been
bred up to look upon theft as innocent or meritorious, does
not incur the same moral stain by praising an act of theft,
as a boy who has been brought up amid a strict respect for
property. But then, on the other hand, the moral culture
of the former is very imperfect. His moral nature is very
scantily unfolded ; his conscience is very dark. This, as we
have said, is a calamity, if it be not a fault.
454. A further reason why Ignorance and Errour, when
they arise from external Causes, and are hardly avoidable,
may be deemed to diminish the amount of the transgression,
is, that in such cases, the moral defects of the character may
often admit of remedy. The defective Moral Culture may
afterwards be carried further onwards, by the help of exter-
nal circumstances more favourable. A bad Education may
be succeeded by a better. A low standard of Morality may
be superseded by a higher, when this latter is brought
before the mind. The dark conscience may be enlightened ;
and thus, the Ignorance and the Errour may be in some
measure removed. Hence, the interruption or inversion of
the moral progress, produced or indicated by transgressions,
which take place in such a condition of Ignorance or Errour,
are not so great, nor their remedy so hopeless, as when the
transgressions proceed more entirely from the internal cha-
racter, without this influence of external causes. And thus,
according to what was said respecting the amount of trans-
gressions (353), offenses, arising from such hardly avoidable
302 MORALITY. [Book III.
Ignorance or Errour, are diminished in their heinousness,
by their being so occasioned.
455. Ignorance and Errour may be considered under
one other aspect, which it is important to attend to ;
namely, when they are wilful^ or as it is sometimes termed
by morahsts, affected. Such would be, for instance, these
cases : A man who will not examine the Title-deeds of his
estate ; because he fears to find that it is not his by Right :
A man who will not enquire into the amount of his income ;
because he fears that, when he does so, he will discover the
necessity of diminishing his expenses: A man who will not
attend to the proofs of the immorality of a practice which
he follows ; for instance, slave-dealing ; A man who, really
believing that negros have human faculties, pretends to
believe that they have not, in order to justify his making
slaves of them : and generally, A man who either refuses to
attend to the proofs of his duties, because he does not intend
to perform them ; or who denies some proposition, merely be-
cause it would tend to establish the proof of such duties.
Such wilful and affected Ignorance does not., in any degree,
excuse or exculpate the transgressions which it accompanies.
Indeed, it seems rather to aggravate them : for it adds to
the moral regression which the offense implies, a perversion
of the intellect, adopted with a view to a consistency in
immorality.
It may be thought, perhaps, that assumed or afibcted
Ignorance or Errour should be spoken of as an Offense
against Truth ; that is, against Truthfulness : and in many
cases it may be so. But in moral doctrines, and especially
in those of an abstract and general kind, there is, as we have
just said, room for considerable vagueness and incoherency,
in the obscure region of transition from particular to general
propositions : and hence, it may often be difficult to say
whether or not a man really holds the opinion which he
Ch. XVIII.] OF IGNORANCE AND ERROUR SOS
asserts. Some of those who assert property to be an immoral
institution, have probably rather confused than immoral
minds. Those who assert the negros not to have human
faculties, and yet make laws against their human faculties
being educated, may perhaps not quite disbelieve their own
assertion; though it is inconsistent with their conduct.
There is room for some self-deceit on such subjects; and this
may, to some extent, liberate a man from the blame of
Falsehood. But even if there be not Falsehood, there is
often, in such cases as we have described, and in many
others, Ignorance and Errour which may be called wilful : and
such Ignorance and Errour are no excuses for transgression.
456. Thus the general result of our view of this
subject is, that Ignorance and Errour, when unavoidable,
are excuses for offenses: when difficultly vincible, they
diminish the offense ; when wilful, they do not at all diminish
it. We have seen, too, that on very general and abstract
moral doctrines. Ignorance and Errour are to be tolerated,
out of regard for the imperfection of man"'s faculties.
Chapter XIX.
PKOGRESSIVE STANDARDS OF MORALITY.
457. Nations and Communities, as well as individuals,
have their Standards of right and wrong, which assume the
reality of a Universal Standard of right and wrong. They
have not only Laws, which determine Rights and Obli-
gations, but also current moral Precepts and Rules, which
express the conceptions of Duties and Virtues. The assumed
existence of a Standard of right and wrong shows itself in
the sentiments which are associated with the conceptions
304 MORALITY. [Book III.
and names of Virtues and Vices. Vices are, in all ages and
countries, named only to be condemned. Violence, Fraud,
Falsehood, Indecency, are objects of aversion at all times
and places. There is no nation or language, which has not
the means of expressing this; and none, which does not
express it.
It is true, the actions, to which this aversion and con-
demnation are applied, are different in different ages and
countries. In some countries, plunder of strangers, slavery,
polygamy, have been regarded as blameless ; to us, they are
offenses and vices. This difference arises from the diversity
of the Definitions ofBAghts in different times and places : for,
as we have seen. Rights are defined by Law, and Virtues and
Duties depend upon Rights. Yet the variety of Laws, in
various nations, does not prevent Rights from being a neces-
sary element of man''s condition; and in like manner, the
diversity of Standards of Morality does not prevent Virtue
from being a necessary object of man''s approval ; nor hinder
Conscience, which recognizes Virtue, from being a universal
attribute of mankind.
458. There must be, in all cases, a great connexion
between the National Laws and the National Standard of
Morality. Both the one and the other express that which
is deemed right. Laws are enacted, or upheld, because
it is considered right that they should be so. Actions also
are approved or disapproved according as they are looked
upon as right or wrong. And the consciences of individuals
accommodate themselves, in a great measure, to the law.
If the national law allow polygamy, or slavery, the individual
commonly practises it without self-condemnation. The ex-
hortation of the National Moralist is, in the first place.
To obey the Law. The National Moral Precepts take for
granted the National Laws. The national conceptions of
Ch. XIX] STANDARDS OF MORALITY. 305
the various relations of society, as Property, Marriage, the
Family, the State, and the like, which are the basis of the
Laws, are also the basis of the Morals, of the Nation.
459. But though, in every Nation, Law and Morality
are connected, they are, for the most part, not identical.
The difference of Law and Morality, which we have noticed
(105), is that which is generally understood : Law refers to
definite external acts absolutely commanded or prohibited ;
Morality refers to internal springs of action ; and as results
of these, to acts of a less definite kind. The Precepts of
Law are positive and absolute. The Precepts of Morality
respecting actions, are exemplary and relative ; — that is, they
only exemplify the disposition from which the actions pro-
ceed ; and they refer to the legal conditions of Society. The
Precepts of Law, Thou shalt not hill ; Thou shalt not steal ;
Thou shalt not break thy promise ; — must be considered, in the
first place, as fixed and absolute (105). The injunctions of
Morality are to be understood as recognizing the authority
of these commands ; but as carrying the signification of them
much further.
460. Law deals with matters external and visible, such
as Objects of desire, (Things,) and Actions, and thus creates
Rights. Morality has to do with matters internal and in-
visible ; with Desires and Intentions, as well as with Laws
and Rights. Desires and Intentions cannot be defined or
described in any way, without some reference to Things and
Actions; and therefore, cannot supply a basis of Morality
independent of Law : and thus Morality, in the first place,
is dependent upon Law. Rights afford the fixed points by
which moral positions are determined. Rights also supply
some of the principal forces by which the moral sentiments
produce their effect. Law affords a support to the frame-
work of society ; but Law does not suffice for the social life
of man, without Morality. Law and Morality coincide in
VOL. I. X
306 MORALITY. [Book III.
their general form and outlines ; but Law is stiff and hard ;
Morality of a more flexible, yet more pervadingly active
nature. Law is the rigid skeleton, which MoraHty clothes
with living flesh and acting muscles. Law supplies the fixed
positions, on which the Machinery of Duty can rest, so as
to move the world.
461. But though Morality rests upon Law, Law is
subject to the Authority of Morality : Law is the Basis
of Morality, but yet Morality is the Standard of Law.
Law is fixed for the moment, and Morality supposes
its fixity : but Morality is a supreme and eternal Rule,
which Law must recognize. Law must always attempt to
conform to Morality. Thus, though the Law is, in the
first instance, assumed to be fixed, and though its commands
are accepted as absolute and peremptory; it is not to be
considered as entirely and finally unchangeable. The com-
mands of Law are themselves liable to be judged of, as good
or bad. They, and their application in particular cases, may
be morally wrong, as well as right.
The Law itself acknowledges this. It puts forward its
Rules and Definitions of Rights, as not absolutely fixed
and universal. They admit of exceptions in extreme cases.
In many such cases, there are special moral considerations,
which counteract the general Reasons of the Rule, and
suspend its operation. The Law, Thou shalt not Mil, admits
of exception in cases of self-defense, burglary, and the like
(117) : the Right of Property gives way in cases of neces-
sity (156) : and, in its general administration, the National
Law either itself aspires to be the voice of Natural Justice,
as the Roman Law did ; or has, as in England, a juris-
diction of Equity combined with it, and proceeding by Rules
of natural justice. Thus Law herself recognizes Justice, as
a Standard to which she must conform her commands, and
which her definitions cannot alter.
Ch.XIX.] standards of morality. 307
And thus, again, as Rights are to be used as instruments
of MoraHty by individuals, so also are they by communities.
Rights are built upon Law, but Law is to be subservient
to Morality. Morality sanctions Law, but Law must per-
petually seek the sanction of Morality. Moral Rules at first
agree with Laws ; but if the Moral Rules are improved, the
Laws ought to follow the improvement.
462. We must consider some of the steps by which
Moral Rules are improved. We have already stated, that
among these steps, is the more exact Definition of some of
the Conceptions, in terms of which Moral Rules are expressed.
We shall now therefore proceed to consider, with a view
to such a more exact determination of their import as our
subject may require, some of the Conceptions of this kind ;
such, for instance, as The State, Justice, Humanity, Liberty,
and the like.
Such Conceptions, in the progress of nations, gradually
become clearer and clearer among men. We may sup-
pose that, at first, man's social and moral faculties are very
imperfectly developed. His notions are mainly fastened
upon objects of sense ; his language refers, for the most
part, to such objects. His moral conceptions are dim and
vague ; and the words by which they are indicated, are
employed in a loose and wavering manner. Such is usually
the case with all terms of moral import, in the earliest history
of a language and of a nation. As the intellectual culture
of the nation proceeds, abstract words are used with more
precision; and in consequence, the conceptions, designated
by such words, grow clearer in men's minds. Wide and
general, as well as limited and narrow terms, are employed,
in expressing those moral truths upon which moral precepts
rest ; and by which the characters of nations are unfolded
and fashioned : nor can we say to what extent this intellectual
and moral progress may proceed.
x2
308 MORALITC. [Book III.
463. The intellectual progress of individuals follows
nearly the same course, in these respects, as that of nations ;
although the steps of the progress may succeed each other
with far greater rapidity. In consequence of the influence
of the opinions of past generations upon the views of the
present, through the working of literature, language, insti-
tutions, and traditions, each man*'s mind may pass in a short
time, through successive modes of thought which, in the course
of history, have been slowly unfolded one out of another.
The intellectual revolutions of centuries are compressed into
a few years of a man^^s youth ; a man's moral conceptions,
as they are in our time, are affected by those of the Greeks,
of the Latins, and of the earlier times of our own country ;
not to speak here of the influence of Religion, greater than
all the rest.
But though the intellectual progress of the individual is
thus a compendium, and a very brief compendium, of the
intellectual progress of man, the two careers are of the same
kind ; — a constant advance from the material to the abstract;
from the particular to the general ; but, in what is abstract
and general, an advance from the dim and vague to the
distinct and precise. And we now proceed to trace, in
several instances, what the steps of this advance have been,
in order to determine what they necessarily must be, and at
what point we may consider ourselves as having arrived.
464. Among these steps, one of the first is the
formation of a conception of a Person^ as something having
active and conscious Will and Thought, as we ourselves
have : and differing, thus, from Things^ which are unconscious
and merely passive. We have already remarked that this
distinction of Persons and Things is one of the foundation-
stones of man's moral nature (45).
Again ; another important fundamental step in Morals,
is the recognition of Things as belonging to Persons; to our-
Ch. XIX.] STANDARDS OF MORALITY. 309
selves and others; the distinction of meum and tuum (129),
This relation is at first indicated only by grammatical modifi-
cations denoting possession ; such as the pronouns which have
been mentioned. But Things, viewed under this aspect, are
soon denoted by a general abstract Term, and are called
Property.
Property is assigned to different persons by general Rules,
and each man's Property is his Right. And in like manner,
other abstract Conceptions, vested as possessions in particular
persons by general Rules, are Rights; as we have already
said. This Conception of Bights is established among men,
wherever there is settled and tranquil society.
Some of the succeeding steps in the progress of Moral
Conceptions we must consider more in detail.
Chapter XX.
THE STATE.
Ai^5. In order to proceed in a distinct manner with
our reasonings, we must have a Conception of The State ;
a conception which is one of the foundations of Morahty
(94). By the State, we mean the Community, as the
Source of the reality of Rights. The State impHes a col-
lection or aggregation of men: but it is not a mere Collection,
like a herd of cattle, in which there are no Rights. The
State implies Society: but not a voluntary association; for
the State is a necessary Society: man cannot exist out of such
a Society. The State implies Rulers and Government : but the
Rulers and the Government are not the State : for the State
may change its Rulers and its mode of Government, and
yet remain the same State. The State implies Laws ; but
the State is not the Laws ; it is the Origin and Enforcer
of the Laws: it is the Being whose mind and voice the
310 MORALITY. [Book III.
Laws are. It may be said that the State, thus understood,
is a mere Abstraction : but as we have all along seen, Moral
Truths cannot be expressed but by Abstractions, and human
life is governed by Abstractions. Law itself is an abstrac-
tion : Property, Power, Security, Life, the objects of human
desire, are Abstractions : even Home, Food, Raiment, when
we speak of them in the general way which moral reasonings
require, are Abstractions. In like manner, the Family, the
Tribe, are Abstractions ; and the State is an extension of
these Abstractions ; including in the conception, some special
attributes which belong to our subject ; as for instance, that
already mentioned ; that the State gives reality to Rights,
delivers and executes the Laws.
466. This conception prevailed from an early period.
In the Jewish People, indeed, the Laws were God's Laws,
supported by his sanction ; and the conception of the State,
as the origin of Law, was, among them, not brought into
clear view. But the conception of the State as the origin
of Rights and Obligations, was familiar among the Greeks.
" It is manifest," says Aristotle*, "That the State (rj ttoXl^)
is one of the Things which exist by nature : and that man
is by nature an animal living in States (ttoXitlkov i^wou,
a political animal). A man belonging to no State, is less
than man, or more. And thus we find in Homer, a savage
man reviled as
a<^pjjra)p, ddefiKTTios, dvearios.
A Tribeless, Lawless, Homeless Wretch." (II. ix. 62.)
He further adds, "The State exists before the family or
the individual, as the body exists before the members ; for
if the body do not exist, the hand or the foot is not really
a hand or a foot." Where, as we find by the context, he
means, that the State exists before the Individual, in the
order of reasoning. The Conditions of the Individual's
• Polit. I. i.
Ch. XX.] THE STATE. 311
being, are to be derived from the Conditions of the State,
and not reversely. The variety of forms of Government
which prevailed among the Greek cities, and the changes
of form which often succeeded each other in the same city,
prevented the philosophers of that nation from confounding
the State with the Governors, as was often done in long-
enduring monarchies ; while the strong constraint which the
Laws, in many Grecian States, exercised over individual
inclinations, made it unlikely that men should then view
the State as a 'coluntary association ; a doctrine which
was adopted at a later period. That the State, notwith-
standing this constraint, was an object of great reverence,
not only as the Origin of Law, but the Teacher of Justice
and Virtue, the reader of the Greek authors of the Re-
publican time, will recollect abundant proofs. I may mention,
for the sake of example, the expostulation which Socrates,
in his dialogue with Crito, makes the State address to
himself, on the supposition that he had attempted to escape
from prison*.
467. The Romans were, in like manner, familiar
with the conception of the State, as the condition of a
society in which Rights exist. In Cicero''s work De Be-
puhlicd he says-|-, "Est igitur Res publica res populi : po-
pulus autem, non omnis hominum coetus, quoquo modo con-
gregatus : sed coetus multitudinis juris consensu et utilitatis
communione sociatus."
4tQS. The Conception of the State became, in later
times, less clear and steady. The creation and destruction
of Kingdoms and States which took place between the epochs
of Alexander and Augustus; the concentration of all the
* Plato. Crito. $.11.
t Lib. I. 25. The State, or the Commonwealth, is the Community:
but a Community is not every assemblage of men, anyhow gathered
together : but an assemblage connected by agreement respecting Rights,
and common participation of Advantage.
312 MORALITY. [Book III.
powers of the Roman Commonwealth in the Emperor : the
separation of the Roman Empire into new kingdoms ; the
further subdivision of the powers of government which pre-
vailed under the Feudal System ; the nearly absolute power
of Kings inmost European countries; — all tended to unsettle
and confuse in men's minds the Conception of the State. On
the one side, men confounded the King with the State,
and conceived that in him was the source of Law and
Authority. And in opposition to this, there grew up, in
modern times, opinions in which the doctrine of the State,
as the source of Rights, was rejected ; and Society was
represented as a mere Concourse of Indimduals. According
to this doctrine, individuals compose a State by contributing,
to a common stock, the Rights which they naturally possess ;
sharing the aggregate of such Rights among themselves by
common consent ; and establishing officers, to carry their
agreement into effect.
469. This latter doctrine is quite untenable. Without
the existence of a State, we have no Rights ; nor can the
Rights of the State be at all explained, by any aggregation
of the Rights of Individuals. Has the State of England its
Right to the National Territory by summing up in itself
the Rights of individual Landholders ? Or does not, rather,
each Landholder derive his Right to his Property from the
State ? It is plain that the latter, not the former, is the
case. The Right to Land is derived from the Law of the
Land; that is the Law of the State. Independently of
the Law of the Land, no man has a Right to land in
England. The National Right is not the result, but the
origin of the Right of individuals. And in like manner,
of other National Rights. England, as a State, may make
war upon France ; and in the course of war, may kill
Frenchmen, and seize French possessions. But an indi-
vidual Englishman has no fraction of such a Right. Even if
Ch. XX.] THE STATE. 313
he declares that he will withdraw himself from a share in the
national compact, and will act for himself, he is not allowed
to do, on a small scale, what the nation does upon a large
one. The Right of the State to make War, depends on its
being the State; not on its being a Collection of Individuals.
470. The State is conceived as one ; the Individuals
of which it is composed being many : the State is conceived
SiS permanent, while the individuals are born and die. Indi-
viduals derive, from the State, their Possessions, Privileges,
and Condition, in the community ; either directly, or by the
State determining the Possessions, Privileges, and Condition
of the Family, and the Laws of their derivation. The State,
as a single permanent agent, in its proper functions, acts for
the many constantly changing individuals, of which it con-
sists. States have, with each other, intercourse of various
kinds; making Treaties of Peace, Commerce, or Alliance
with each other ; and making War on each other, if the
necessity arises. The State bounds the legal relations of
the individual : the citizens of different states have no legal
relations with each other, except through their States.
471. The State is, thus, the necessary Origin of all
the Rights which exist within itself. It is an Authority,
superior to all other Authorities ; and from which they are
all derived. This Supreme and Original Authority, thus
residing in the State, is its Sovereignty. A state which
is, in all its internal relations, independent of all other
States, is a Sovereign State. In the monarchies of modern
Europe, the Supreme Power has been conceived as vested in
the Monarch ; and he has been looked upon as the origin of
all other power. In such cases, the Monarch is termed the
Sovereign : but in Republics, such as the United States of
North America, no person is Sovereign. The term Sovereign
has also been appUed to the People ; but a people, deprived
of that organization which makes them a State, are not sove-
reign. They cannot exercise or impart authority. We can
314 MORALITY. [Book III.
with no propriety speak of the Sovereign People of England ;
except we mean the State of England; and thus include
King, Lords, and Commons, in the term People : if People
denote individuals, without governors and magistrates, we
can with no more propriety speak of the Sovereign People
of England, than of the Sovereign People of Yorkshire.
If the People of Yorkshire be not sovereign, because they
are under the authority of England ; the People of England
are not sovereign, because, by the same rule, they are under
the authority of King, Lords and Commons. If there be
any established Authority, the rule of such Authority de-
termines where the Sovereignty resides. If we suppose all
established authority annihilated, no body of men is sovereign
over any individual ; and each man is sovereign, with as good
a Right as any other man or any collection of men.
472. If it be said that the People is really the
Sovereign Authority, and the Source of Rights, because
it is by the common consent of the People that the Supreme
Authority is conferred upon the sovereign governors of the
State : we reply, that such a transfer of sovereign power to
governors, by the common consent of the members of a
society, has very rarely taken place ; and if in a few societies
it have ever occurred, such uncommon and extraordinary
events afford no grounds for the existence of Rights, in com-
munities in which nothing of the kind has ever taken place.
And in the next place, we remark, that whenever a society
have thus conferred supreme authority upon their governors
by common consent, they have, in their actions, presupposed
the existence of Rights derived from States. If a body
of men, for instance, by common consent frame a government
for the country in which they live ; or for another country,
which they have purchased, and into which they are mi-
grating : they suppose, in the first instance, that the country
is theirs as their native land ; and in the second instance, as
a purchase. But yet mere individuals alone cannot have such
Ch. XX.] THE STATE. 815
Property : for Property in land, as we have seen, and pur-
chase of Land, for the like reasons, are creations of the Law.
473. Thus the Conception of a Sovereign State, as the
origin and guardian of Rights, is necessary, in order that we
may conceive Rights as realities. We may add, that the
State is necessarily conceived as a Moral Agent; since it
makes war and peace, which it may do justly or unjustly ;
keeps Treaties, or breaks them ; educates its children, or
neglects them. What are the Rules of Justice in the actions
of States, we must afterwards consider : but it is plain that
we must consider the State as an Agent, to whose conduct
such Rules are applicable.
474. Since the State is thus a Moral Agent, we may
apply to it the Rules of Duty, and the doctrines of Morality,
which we have already established. The State has its
Duties ; Duties of Truth and Justice, as all agree ; for all
hold it to be the Duty of a State to observe its Treaties, to
abstain from the Possessions of another State ; and the like.
A State has also Duties of Benevolence ; To relieve its poor,
to liberate its slaves, are often urged upon a State, as mani-
fest Duties of this kind.
And, as the condition of other Duties being performed,
the moral Education of its citizens, and consequently of
itself, is a Duty of the State. It is its Duty to establish in
the minds of its children, and to unfold more and more into
constant and progressive operation, the Moral Ideas of Bene-
volence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order.
475. Thus Moral Progress is the Duty of States, as
well as of individuals. States, like individuals, have a conti-
nuous existence ; a series of purposes and actions ; a con-
nected course of being ; a Life. During this Life, it is their
Duty to conform their being more and more to the Moral
Ideas; and this Duty extends to all their actions, and all
times of their action.
316
Chapter XXI.
JUSTICE.
476. Rights are, as we have formerly said, necessary
conditions of man'*s action as man; and the State is the
necessary origin and basis of Rights : the State defines
them and realizes them. But though Rights are thus, in
each case, what, by the State, they are defined to be ; there
is yet, in men's minds, a fundamental conviction, that Rights
are not arbitrary. It is conceived that there is a higher
Rule, to which Rights ought to conform ; that they should
be, not only ordered^ but just ; that there are not only posi-
tive Laws, enacted by special bodies of men, but a Natural
Law, depending upon the nature of man.
This conception of Natural Law, appears among the
Greek philosophers. "There are," says Aristotle*, "two
kinds of Law; that which is proper to each community;
and that which is common to all. For there is, as all men
perceive more or less clearly, a Natural Justice and Injus-
tice, which men in common recognize, even if they have no
society nor compact with each other. Thus the Antigone
of Sophocles is made to say, that it was right for her, in
spite of the tyrant's command, to bury her brother Polynices,
as a part of a Natural Law :
"For this is no command of yesterday,
But everliving Law, its source unknown."
The Books of the Laws of Plato proceed upon the same
supposition ; and are an attempt to draw out, in detail, the
Code of Natural Law which was thus assumed to exist.
477. This Conception of a Natural Law, derived from
Reason, and universally valid for all men, was still more
distinctly entertained by the Romans. This appears in
• Met. 1. 13.
Ch. XXL] JUSTICE. 317
Cicero'^s Dialogues on the Laws in several places*, and still
more emphatically in a passage in the work De Eepuhlicaf:
" Law is right Reason, congruous to Nature, pervading all
minds, constant, eternal; which calls to Duty by its com-
mands, and repels from wrong doing by its prohibitions ; and
to the good, does not command or forbid in vain ; while the
wicked are unmoved by its exhortations and warnings. This
Law cannot be annulled, superseded, or overruled. No
Senate, no People can loose us from it ; no Jurist, no Inter-
preter, can explain it away. It is not one Law at Rome,
another at Athens ; one, at present, another at some future
time; but one Law, perpetual and immutable, includes all
Nations and all Times :[:.'"
The Law, thus described by Cicero, includes Justice, as
well as Law. In the notion of Natural Law, the distinction
of Obligations and Duties is not recognized.
478. But it may be said that the Natural Law, thus
described by Cicero, nowhere exists. The actual Law is
different at Rome and at Athens, and in every different
State. And since the Natural Law, of which we speak,
cannot be the same as all these Codes, it cannot be the
same with an^/; and is actually nothing.
The reply to this difficulty is contained in what we have
already said {95, 96) ; That the Conceptions of the Funda-
mental Rights, which Law establishes, are necessary and
universal for all men ; but that the Definitions of these Rights
are Facts, which grow out of the History of each Commu-
nity, and may be different in different times and places. The
Second Book of this Work contains a view of this Natural
Law; the Laws of Rome and of England being there
employed, as exemplification, not as the necessary form, of
* Legg. i. 6 ; 11. 4. t De Rep. iii. 22. quoted Lactant. Inst. vi. 8.
X I have omitted the concluding clause of the paragraph, " Of this
Law the Author and Giver is God ;" as belonging to another part of my
subject.
318 MORALITY. [Book III.
Natural Law. We there saw, that in many instances, the
Commentators on these Laws have announced Maxims of
Natural Law, as the basis of the actual Law.
479. The Roman term, Jus^ (in its sense of a body
of Laws, and of Doctrines on which Laws depend,) is especially
adapted to denote this Natural Law ; for it implies, at the
same time. Law and Justice (90). The consistency of the Law
with Justice, is assumed throughout the Roman Jurispru-
dence. Thus in the commencement of the Institutes we
read*: " Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum
cuique tribuendi. Jurisprudentia est divinarum atque huma-
narum rerum scientia, justi atque injusti cognitio." But Jus-
tice, thus assumed as identical with Jus^ in its results, is a
conception which requires to be more exactly defined and
developed than we have yet done, before we can so apply it.
This we must now attempt to do.
480. As we have said. Law, in every form in which
it exists, must involve actual Definitions, as well as the
general Conception of Natural Law or Justice. These Defi-
nitions will depend upon past events. Thus, the tenure of
land in each country depends upon past conquests, and
migrations of the races which inhabit the country ; upon
many inheritances, many contracts of buying and selling,
and the like, which have taken place among individuals:
upon Laws which have been made, relative to such property,
and such transfers; and upon various other circumstances.
Justice gives to each his own ; but the actual Law must
define what is each person's own, according to all these
circumstances. And the like may be said of all other
branches of Natural Law.
481. According to our idea of Rights, as assigned by
• Inst. 1. 1. Justice is the constant and pei-petual intention of giving
to each his own Right. Jurisprudence is the knowledge of divine and
human things, (as required for that intention) : the science of what is
just and unjust.
Ch. XXI.] JUSTICE. 319
Natural Law, each person must have those Rights which it is
just he should have. A person cannot have Rights which it
is unjust he should have. If the actual Laws of any State
give him such Rights, those Rights are unjust; and that
they are so, is a reason for altering the Law, or its appli-
cation. If a man has acquired a seeming Right, in violation
of Justice, Natural Law rejects such Rights. According
to Natural Law, Bights cannot he founded on Injustice.
482. On the other hand, existing Rights, in each
country, as we have seen, depend upon its History : and the
History of every country contains many acts of injustice.
It cannot be doubted that the present Rights of Property
in Land, for instance, have, in every country, been brought
into being by transactions, many of which have been unjust.
Shall we say that Justice requires us to deprive persons
of such Rights, when any Injustice can be discovered in their
origin or transmission ; however remote may be the blemish,
and however blameless the present holders ? If an estate were
acquired by fraud centuries ago, and have since been possessed,
without dispute, by generations of unconscious successors ;
or sold to a multitude of poor and honest purchasers ; shall
we say that it still, in Justice, belongs to the heirs of the
defrauded person ; and that, according to Natural Law, the
present possessors ought to restore the property to those
heirs ? No one, probably, would assert it to be just to destroy
supposed existing Rights on such grounds as these. All would
allow that Justice is, in such a case, with the Possessors.
483. Indeed, to assert the contrary, would be to make
that Law of Descent, by which the heirs of the defrauded
person might claim the property, paramount over all other
Laws. It would be to make that Rule of inheritance absolute
and indestructible, while other Rules, as for instance, bond fide
purchase, prescription, and the like, are comparatively re-
jected. There can be no reason, in Natural Law, for erecting
320 MORALITY. [Book III.
any one Rule of Derivation of Rights into this absolute
Supremacy over all others.
484. Thus the maxim, that Rights cannot be founded
in Injustice, is not to be applied in such a way as to make
every past Injustice overturn present possession. Injustice
is an arbitrary act, done in disregard of Rule and Reason.
Justice abhors all that is arbitrary ; for it requires all things
to be done according to Reason, and therefore, according
to Rule. But then, the Law of Inheritance is an arbitrary
thing, as well as the Act of Fraud. The Law of Inheritance
is quite different in different countries; and might, in this
country, have been different from what it is, if the Law had
so ordered it. Justice accepts, in general, the Law of
Inheritance, as her Rule ; yet not absolutely, as Supreme,
but relatively, as a means to her end. Justice annuls, in
general, the Effect of acts of Fraud ; but still, not without
limit in the contemplation of Effects ; but only, so far as
the condemnation of such effects is a means to her end-
Justice cannot disregard the existing state of possessions,
and turn her attention only to their origin. She cannot
found her sentence on one particular past event, and take
no account of the more recent events and the present
conditions. On the contrary, it is the present with which
she has especially to do. She has to pronounce upon existing
Rights, as to whether they are valid or not ; and she must
look at them, as they exist. And hence, as a balance to our
former maxim, we must lay down this : Justice assigns Bights
according to existing conditions.
485. Thus Justice rejects that which is arbitrary,
alike in the past and in the present. She condemns the
ancient fraud, from which the present possession is derived :
she limits the Rule of inheritance, on which the opposing
present claim is founded. She pronounces that no Right
can be founded in Injustice : but she pronounces the Right
Ch. XXL] JUSTICE. 321
of the present holders to be founded, not on the ancient
Injustice, but on the recent transactions ; which are free
from the stain of Injustice, and by which the ancient stain
may be diluted or obliterated. A thing unjustly acquired,
may, by long undisturbed possession, and hona fide tenure,
become a just property: and accordingly, so the Laws of
States decide (151).
486. The opposition of the two maxims respecting
Justice, which have just been stated, is a result of the
universal opposition of Ideas and Facts which exists in every
subject of Thought (97). In the Idea^ Justice cannot admit
of anything arbitrary; for what is arbitrary is unjust. In
the Fact^ every transaction must have in it something
arbitrary, for it must depend upon external circumstances,
which are not governed by our Ideas. In Idea, Justice
would assign Property without regard to previous possession ;
but in Fact, by rejecting the regard to previous possession
it ceases to be Property.
The same opposition may be remarked, in other parts
of Natural Law. In Idea, for instance. Justice requires
that all classes of men should have equal Rights : but in
Fact, men form themselves into Classes, and by that very
act make their Rights unequal. In Idea, men should make
and perform their Contracts according to perfect Equahty;
but in Fact, the Terms of the Contract must be regarded
by Justice, because Equality is too obscure and indefinite a
foundation for a just decision. And the like may be said
in other cases.
487. The Steps by which the Conception of Justice
has been unfolded and defined among men, have involved a
recognition of both the maxims which have been stated.
The Laws of all Countries annul Rights acquired in violent
and illegal ways ; and the Laws of all Countries allow undis-
turbed Possession, in the sincere belief of Right, to give,
VOL. I. Y
322 MORALITV. [Book III.
at least in some cases, and after some lapse of time, a com-
plete Right. To all men, when the origin of existing
Rights is shewn to be some violent and unjust act, the
Rights appear to be unjust. But when it is shown, on the
other hand, that the traces of this arbitrary origin are only
such as inevitably exist in all Rights, the Rights again seem
just. When we consider how greatly the existing tenure
of Land, in this country, depends upon the violent confisca-
tions which took place in the Norman Conquest, the Rights
of many of our landlords may appear to be unjust. But
when we recollect that the Saxons, whom the Normans con-
quered, had themselves obtained possession of the land by
a similar conquest ; and that the transactions respecting pro-
perty in England have, for nearly eight hundred years,
assumed the validity of the Rights acquired by the Norman
Conquest; we see that it would be unjust to fix our atten-
tion on that particular event, as especially vitiating Rights.
488. The remoteness of an act of violence in point
of time ; the complexity of the events which have succeeded
it ; the degree in which it has faded into oblivion ; the
habit of disregarding it established in the community ; — all
these, are circumstances which make it just to disregard
the bearing of the event upon existing Rights. Every cir-
cumstance, by which the effect of a past event upon men's
thoughts and actions is enfeebled, makes it less of a reality
in the present condition of things ; and therefore, less an
element for consideration in the assignment of Rights ac-
cording to justice.
489. What has now been said, agrees with what was
said formerly (218) in speaking of the Idea of Justice;
namely, that though, in general. Justice is determined by
Law, the Law must be framed in accordance with Justice.
Justice is directly and positively determined by Law; for
a man's just Rights are those which the Law gives him.
Ch. XXL] JUSTICE. 323
The Law must be framed in accordance with Justice;
and must therefore reject all that is arbitrary and unequal,
as soon as it is seen to be so. Hence the Law, in order
that it may accord with Justice, may be changed from time
to time, in proportion as different external facts are made
objects of attention. For instance, if one State, (suppose
Helos,) act with great violence and cruelty towards another;
(suppose Sparta;) it may be just in Sparta, to punish Helos,
by reducing its citizens to a condition of subjection, and
depriving them of their property. But after several gene-
rations, when the transgression is fallen into oblivion, it
would be unjust to make any Laws, on the ground of such
transgression. When such a time has arrived, it may be just
to make laws, in order to render the condition of the Helots
less subject ; or in order to restore to them their territory.
490. On this imaginary case, we may make one or
two further remarks. It may be objected to the above
statement, that it cannot be just to punish a whole State
for the offense of some of its citizens ; still less to continue
the punishment to succeeding unoffending generations. And
this is true, so far as such a remark can be applied, con-
sistently with the nature of Punishment, and of a State. But
when one State is injured by another, it must deal with the
offending State as a whole ; and it cannot extend its regard
to individuals, in such a manner as would render impossible
the punishment of injuries done by the State. If indivi-
duals have offended against a foreign State ; and if the
State to which they belong, refuses to punish them, or to
give them up ; it makes itself a party to their wrong. And
when, on this ground, a penal infliction takes place, this
infliction must operate alike on the offenders and their fellow-
citizens; alike on those citizens who were in being at the
time of the wrong, and on succeeding generations. For the
State, according to the conception of it, is a collective and
y2
324 MORALITY. [Book III.
perpetual body (470) ; its condition is communicated to con-
temporary and to successive members of it, by their being
Members. In this, there is no injustice ; any more than
there is in the transmission of the Possessions, or of the
Rank of a Family, to its Members, and to successive gene-
rations. Nations derive their prosperous or adverse condi-
tion from their history, and from their transactions with
other nations; and individuals, more or less, share in the
prosperous or adverse condition of the nation.
491. States have not, nor can have, any way of
punishing Injuries, or of asserting their Rights against other
States, except War. They have no common Superior Tri-
bunal to which they can appeal (214) : and they can seek
Justice in no other way. Also War would not answer its
purpose, nor would it he War, if it did not produce some
inconvenience to the vanquished State, and consequently to
its citizens. Innocent citizens must be involved with the
guilty, in the punishment ; as the children of a guilty parent
are necessarily involved in his punishment.
With regard to the seizure of the Property of the van-
quished by the victorious State ; it may further be re-
marked, that the citizens of the vanquished State derived
Rights from their State ; and that, therefore, they neces-
sarily lose their Rights, when their State loses its power of
maintaining Rights*.
It is not therefore necessarily unjust that there should
take place, between States, acts of violence, which affect,
through succeeding generations, the distribution of property
and the relation of classes. The possibility of such events,
is a necessary condition of the existence of States. The
Actions of States, as of individuals, produce permanen
consequences. If they did not do so, questions of justice
* Such maxims may be much mitigated in practice by International
Law, as we shall see hereafter.
Ch. XXI.] JUSTICE. 325
and injustice respecting such actions would be of little
importance.
492. But if such violent events have at some time
taken place, must their consequences remain unchanged!
If calamities have been inflicted by one nation upon another,
even as a just punishment; does justice require these in-
flictions to be perpetuated without limit ? If a nation have
been enslaved and despoiled, even for their wrongs, may
not the time come when they may be restored to freedom
and property? We reply, in accordance with what has
been said, that in proportion as the traces of the wrong are
obliterated in men''s minds, Justice will aim at obliterating
them in their condition also. The privations and subjec-
tion of the subjugated class, so soon as they cease to be
looked upon as penal, appear as arbitrary, and therefore
unjust. As soon as the inequality appears as an arbitrary
one, Justice requires that it shall be removed.
But then, no present inequality can be quite arbitrary,
because every actual inequality depends upon the Laws
and Habits by which the present is derived from the past ;
and such Laws and Habits are requisite, in order that
there may be, between the present and the past, that con-
nexion which the continuity of the Life of States (475)
requires. The Events of History have, at every step, led
to present inequalities ; to a difference of high and low,
rich and poor. Justice does not require that we should
abolish all such distinctions; for to do this, would be to
abolish Rights, the necessary conditions of Justice. What
then is the course which Justice prescribes?
493. We answer, that Justice requires us to aim
constantly to remedy the inequalities which History produces.
We do not say that Justice requires us to restore any
previous condition which has been unjustly changed, but
to remedy the effects of the change. For, in fact, a previous
326 MORALITY. [Book III.
State of things never can be restored : and when a change
takes place, then, after a short time has elapsed, there have
grown up, under the new State of things, new Rights, which
it would be unjust to annul. What has once happened,
can never cease to have happened. In the course of a
nation's history, what has been done, cannot be undone.
We may do something of an opposite tendency ; and when
what has been done was unjust, it is just to do something
to remedy the injustice. If we are asked whether the
consequences of events are to be perpetual ; we may answer,
that the consequences of events are perpetual ; but that the
consequence of a second event may counteract those of a
former one. And we pronounce that such a second event
ought to take place, when there exist inequalities, origin-
ating in the injustice of a former event.
494. Such remedying of Injustice is a part of the
general Duty of Moral Progress, which belongs to States as
well as to individuals (475). We have already said, that the
Law must perpetually and slowly tend to the Idea of Justice.
We now see further the import of this assertion. The
Law must tend slowly towards Justice, because the influence
of the Facts of History upon existing Eights must always
be great: and it is not just to disregard this influence.
The influence itself is, however, weakened by the lapse of
time, and the intervention of new events. It is the Duty
of men to act justly, in these new events : it is the Duty
of States, to make just Laws, in reference to the new aspect
which those new events give to history. And Justice, thus,
and History as regulated by Duty, constantly, but slowly,
mould each other.
495. Again, the Law must tend perpetually towards
Justice : that is, its progress in that direction can never
be . looked upon as terminated. For the influence of the
past Facts of History upon Law, though constantly wearing
Ch. XXL] JUSTICE. 327
out, can never be quite obliterated. Even if, in all present
events, men did act justly and legislate justly, still there
would remain traces of the ancient order of things. For
instance, the distribution of landed property at present,
must always continue to depend upon the original and
ancient migrations of mankind, by which each Nation became
possessed of its present territory ; and upon many suc-
ceeding events ; some of which have been acts of Injustice.
The administration of Law, and the progress of Legislation,
can never obliterate the effect of these bygone arbitrary and
unjust acts ; while new arbitrary and unjust acts are con-
stantly happening. Thus Law, who must constantly travel
onwards towards Justice, must always have some part of her
journey still to perform. Or to use another image : the pure
waters of Justice are constantly poured into the mingled
stream of the Law, in order to purify it; but we cannot
hope to see the time when all the impurities which the
latter has collected, in its passage through the realms of
History, shall have disappeared ; and the clear united cur-
rent shall flow on indistinguishable.
And thus both the maxims which have been stated retain
their truth and validity. Bight cannot he founded on In-
justice: such is the negative maxim which serves to define
the Idea of Justice. Justice assigns Eights according to
existing Conditions : such is the positive maxim which makes
Justice applicable to Facts.
We have taken the exemplification of the conditions of
Justice from imaginary relations between States, because
in such a case there is not, as in all transactions between
individuals there is, a mixture of the considerations of Law,
with the question of Justice. But still Justice, as distin-
guished from Law, is to be considered in questions between
individuals. The term employed to designate Justice in
this point of view, is Equity.
328
Chapter XXII.
EQUITY.
496. Equity derives its Name from Equality; and
in the Conception, also, is understood to imply, in some
way, equal advantages assigned to the parties contemplated.
In this sense, attempts have been made, at various periods,
to introduce the Conception of Equity, as explanatory of or
supplementary to, the Conception of Justice. It will be
found that this mode of conceiving Equity, has led to some
Maxims which are worthy of notice.
Aristotle* says that InequaHty is one kind of Injustice;
and that Injustice is to be remedied by Equality ; — by
Equality of Ratios, in Distributive Justice; — by equality
of Shares, in Corrective Justice. Thus Distributive Justice
makes A's share be to B's share as A's right is to B's right :
Corrective Justice takes from A, the wrong doer, and gives
to B, who is wronged. But this view of the equality which
constitutes Justice is partial and fanciful : it cannot be ex-
tended to cases in general. Still, there is a notion of Equality,
as a kind of Justice. Cicero says-j-, " Jus constat ex his par-
tibus, Natura, Lege, Consuetudine, Judicato, Bono et uEquo,
Pacto." This expression Boim et ^quo was familiarly used
in this sense by the Roman Lawyers. Thus Ulpian J, " Jus
est Ars Boni et ^Equi." And this notion of equal justice
has been carried into some detail. Thus Grotius makes
Equality the Rule of Contracts J ; they require equality of
knowledge ; equahty of liberty ; and, within certain limits,
equality of advantage.
• Eth. Nich. V. 2.
t Ad Hermn, ii. 13. Jus consists of these portions ; Natural Law,
Positive Law, Custom, Decisions, liquity, Contract.
X Dig. I. i. 1. § B. ct P. ii. xii. 8.
Ch, XXIL] equity. 329
497. Justice and Equity, originally conceived as
identical, in the course of time were separated ; for Justice,
in its administration, was necessarily fixed and limited by
Laws and Rules ; while Equity was conceived as not so
limited. And as Laws and Rules, however much meant to
be just, and however carefully constructed, will yet press
upon individual cases in a way which seems hard; Equity
was conceived as that kind of Justice which was not thus
bound by Laws and Rules, and which was disposed to reheve
such hardships. The Virtue which exists in such a dispo-
sition, is termed by Aristotle*, 'EvrieiK em ; and he defines
it to be, The Correction of the Law, where it is defective
by reason of its universality. The Law, he says, is neces-
sarily universal in its expressions : but some things cannot
rightly be expressed universally. There is a defect, not in
the Law, nor in the Lawgivers ; but in the nature of things.
And the eirieiKe^, or equitable, is opposed to the aKpifio-
^iKaiov, or rigidly just. The same opposition is repeatedly
recognized in the Roman Law. Thus-|-, " Placuit in omnibus
rebus prsecipuam esse justitise sequitatisque, quam stricti
juris rationem." And in another place |, " Haec ^quitas
suggerit, etsi jure deficiamur." And the Praetor's judicial
office was sometimes described, as if its object were to
administer Equity in this sense J : " Jus Pr&torium est quod
Praetores introduxerunt, adjuvandi, vel supplendi, vel corri-
gendi juris civilis gratia, propter utihtatem publicam." Simi-
lar functions have often been ascribed to the Jurisdiction
of the Court of Chancery in England. Thus Bacon, on
* Eth. Nich. V. 10.
t Codeje. III. 1. 8. It has been thought good that regard be had to
Justice and Equity, rather than to strict Rights.
t Dig. XXX. iii. 2. 5. This is suggested by Equity, although Law fails
us
§ Dig. I. 1. 7. Praetors' Law is that which the Praetors have intro-
duced, for the pubHc good, for the sake of helping out, supplementing,
and correcting the Civil Law.
330 MORALITY. [Book III.
occasion of assuming the office of Chancellor, says*, "Chan-
cery is ordained to supply the Law, not to subvert the
Law : " and Chancellor Finch says, that the nature of
Equity is to amplify, enlarge, and add to the letter of
the Law. This has sometimes been stated by saying, that
Equity decides ■[• "de rebus quas Lex non exacte definit,
sed arbitrio honi mri permittit."
498. But this description of Equity is too vague to
be applicable ; and has not been really accepted and acted
upon in the administration of Justice, either in Rome or in
England. For a Justice, administered, not according to
Rules, but according to the immediate aspect of each case,
would be deficient in the first requisite of Justice, that of
being consistent with itself. We have already said (3^9),
that Rules are necessary in Morality, to subdue the tempta-
tions of special cases ; they are especially necessary as regards
Justice, to correct the delusive aspect of particular cases.
To leave the decision of cases to the conscience of the
Judge, however wise and good, would lead to those arbitrary
decisions which Justice especially abhors. In this view,
Selden'*s condemnation of Equity is deserved J ; " For Law we
have a measure, and we know what to trust to. Equity is
according to the Conscience of him who is Chancellor ; and
as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity. 'Tis all one as
if they should make the standard for the measure the Chan-
cellor's foot. What an uncertain measure would this be ! "
Since Morality is governed by fixed Rules, Equity, which is
a part of Morality, must also have its fixed Rules. And
as the Rules of Law are the foundations of Justice, the
Rules of Equity cannot be in general inconsistent with those
of Law.
• Bacon's Works, iv. 488.
t Grot. Be JEquitate. Concerning things which the haw does not
exactly define, hut knaves to the discretion of a good man.
X fable Talk.
Ch. XXIL] equity. 331
499. Accordingly, the Praetor's power did not extend
to the overthrow or disregard of the written Law. When
the law was applicable, the Praetor was to stand by it * ;
and we find such remarks as this-|- : " Quod quidem per-
quam durum est ; sed ita lex scripta est." Nor does a
Court of Equity in England decide differently from a Court
of Law, except in cases which involve circumstances to
which a Court of Law cannot advert. Equity, as we have
said, has its Maxims ; and one of the first of these Maxims
is J, ^quitas sequitur Legem ; Equity follows the Law.
500. Nor does Jurisprudential Equity fill up the
measure of the description of Moral Equity, that it abates
the rigour of thd Law. Blackstone has shown how far this
is from being a description of the Equity of English Courts.
No such power of abating the rigour of Law, he says, is
contended for by the Court of Chancery^. The Law is
rigorous, which declares that land which a man bequeaths
to a legatee shall not, after his death, be liable to simple
contract debts, even if the debt be for money employed in
purchasing this very land. The Law is rigorous which
commands that the father shall never immediately succeed
as heir to the land of the son : yet in these cases, a Court
of Equity can give no relief. Jurisprudential Equity, there-
fore, does not extend to Cases of legal hardship in general.
501. In a certain sense, however, and to a certain
extent. Equity does supply defects in the Law. Equity, as
a branch of Jurisprudence, must, like all branches of Juris-
prudence, act by definite Processes, and according to fixed
Rules. But the Processes and the Rules of Equity Juris-
prudence, came into being, at first, as remedies to the
defects of Law: and though, by being reduced to a fixed
form and settled maxims, they can no longer be appealed to
* Story. Commentaries on Equity^ p. 6.
t Dig. XL. ix. 12. 1. This is very hard : but this is the written law.
X Story. Eq. § Comm. iii. 430.
332 MORALITY. [Book III.
as remedies for all hardships and defects of Law, they have
still a remedial and suppletory character.
This agrees with the account which the best authorities
give of the origin of the Equitable Jurisdiction of the
Court of Chancery in England. In the Common or tra-
ditional Law of England, the process of an action began by
certain writs or documents of prescribed form, which were
issued from the King''s Chancery, on apph cation made there;
and which brought the action into the Courts of Common
Law. The Chancellor, therefore, (according to Lord Hard-
wicke,) when any petition for such a writ was referred to
him, was the most proper judge, whether such a writ could
be framed and issued, as might furnish an adequate relief
to the party ; and if he found the Common Law remedies
deficient, he might proceed according to the extraordinary
power committed to him by the reference * ; " Ne Curia
Regis deficeret in justitia exercenda." Thus the exercise
of an equitable jurisdiction by the Chancellor, arose from
his being the Officer to whom applications were made,
for writs on which to ground actions at the Common Law.
Where that Law afforded no remedy, he was led to extend
a discretionary remedy ; and thus, the forum of Common
Law and the forum of Equity were separated in England f.
502. It is not necessary to prosecute further our
account of Jurisprudential Equity ; since our business is
rather with Moral Equity. And by tracing the course of
the development of this Conception, as we have now stated
it, we are able to give a connected account of this moral
quality. We may accept, as a starting point, Aristotle's
Definition: Equity is a Correction of Law where it is de-
fective by reason of its universality. But Equity itself
must proceed by fixed Laws, otherwise it would be defec-
* Lest the King's Court should be deficient in administering justice,
t Stoiy. Eq. 44.
Ch. XXII] EQUIT\^ 333
tive in consistency. As the Rules of Equity thus become
fixed, Equity ceases to be able to correct all the defects
of Law ; and becomes itself, as Law was at first, an imper-
fect expression of Justice ; and thus we have, in the notion
of Equity, a recognition of two Maxims to a certain extent
opposite to each other ; that Fixed Rules are requisite for
the expression of Justice ; and that No Fixed Rules can so
completely express Justice, but that the conception of Justice
will, in some particular cases, seem to require exceptions to
the Rules.
503. The administration of Equity has led to the
currency of many Maxims, which may be considered Maxims
of Moral, as well as Jurisprudential Equity; since their
acceptance in the Courts of Law has been due to their pre-
sumed agreement with Justice. We may notice some of these
Maxims ; not as being always universally true, or free from
doubt and difficulty in their application ; but as bringing
forwards some of the points on which Equity must prin-
cipally depend ; and as showing, by examples, the kind of
Equality in which it consists. Among such maxims are the
following.
504. uEquitas sequitur legem ; " Equity follows the
Law." And this may be understood in two senses ; either
that Equity is based upon the Relations which the Law
establishes ; or that Equity follows the Analogy of the Law.
We have already said, that Justice assumes the Definitions
of Rights which Law gives. Hence Equity supposes that
to be a man's Property, that to be a Marriage, that to be
a Contract, which the Law makes such. Yet if there be
merely some formal defect in a Contract, moral Equity will
still hold it valid. Again, Equity follows the Analogy of
Law; thus in England, where the Law gives the whole
landed property to the eldest son, that would not be an
334. MORALITY. [Book III.
equitable decision which should divide the property amongst
the children equally.
505. In equali jure melior est conditio possidentis ;
" Where Rights are equal, Possession is a ground of pre-
ference.'' As if two persons have been equally innocent
and equally diligent, the one in trying to recover a property
lost by fraud ; the other in transacting a bona fide purchase
of the property ; he who is in possession is preferred.
But there are other maxims, which throw the task of
judging of deficiencies in the property on one side especially :
for instance, in matters which are apparent on due exami-
nation, the Rule is Caveat emptor^ Let the buyer take care
of himself (172).
506. Q,ui sentit onns^ sentire debet et commodum ; qui
sentit commodum, sentire debet et onus ; " He who bears the
burthen ought to receive the profit ; he who reaps the
profit ought to bear the burthen."" Thus, if a man, dying,
leaves his wife pregnant, so that it is uncertain who will
be heir to his lands; if the next presumptive heir, in the
mean time, sow the land, it is equitable that the harvest
also shall be his. And on the other hand, they who enjoy
the benefit of any improvement of land arising from public
works ; as, for instance, from a general drainage ; ought to
contribute to the expense of the works.
507. There are other maxims which refer to the
general responsibility of actions, as for instance, Necessitas
non Jiabet legem ; " Necessity has no law ;" which we have re-
ferred to in speaking of cases of necessity (418). And again :
Quifacit per alium facit per se ; " What a man does through
the agency of others is his act." Others refer to the mode of
interpreting Laws or Contracts, and administering Justice :
as, Expressio unius est exclusio alterius ; " The mention of one
person is the exclusion of another." Nevm dsbet esse judex
Ch. XXIL] equity. 335
in propria causa ; "A man is not to be judge in his own
cause." All these maxims may be looked upon as indications
and fragments of a supposed Natural Law ; which can never
be expressed except by indications and fragments ; since,
as we have said, no Rules can express Equity, so as not to
require exceptions.
508. Other Indications of the assumed existence of
a Natural Law, the necessary result of Justice and Equity,
may be traced in expressions, which are often used in moral
and political discussions. Thus, we hear of the Natural
Rights of man ; and as examples of these, of the Right to
Subsistence^ the Right to Freedom^ and the like. In speaking
of these Rights as Natural^ it is not meant that they are
universally recognized by the Laws of States. In truth,
Rights of the citizens to Subsistence and to Freedom, are
so far limited and modified by the Laws of most States,
that they can hardly be said to exist as general Rights.
By speaking of such Rights, and describing them as the
dictates of Nat%ral Justice^ as is often done, it is meant
that the Laws ought to recognize and establish them. But
something more than this seems to be meant, by speaking
of the Natural Right to Subsistence, and the like ; for to
say that such a Right is what the Law ought to establish,
is merely to class the recognition of this Right with all the
other prudential improvements, of which the Laws of any
State are susceptible. The Laws ought to aim at securing
the Purity and Rationality, as well as the Subsistence, of the
people. By speaking of the Claim of men to Subsistence
as a Rights it appears to be meant that it is not only con-
formable to the Duty of States, in the general sense in
which it is their Duty to make their laws constantly better ;
but that it is conformable to Justice in some more special
sense, in which Justice is expressed by definite and universal
Principles.
336 MORALITY. [Book III.
509. Yet the Principles of Justice which have been
propounded as the basis of the Natural Rights of Men, are
such as it is difficult to establish, in a definite and universal
form. It has, for instance, been said, that All men are horn
equal. But it is evident that this is not true as a fact.
For not only are children, . for a long time after birth,
necessarily in the power of parents and others; but the
external conditions of the society in which a man is born,
as the laws of property and the like, determine his relation
to other men, during life. If it be said that these are
extraneous and accidental circumstances, not born with the
man ; we answer, that if we reject from our consideration, as
extraneous and accidental, all such conditions, there remains
nothing which we can call intrinsic and necessary, but the
material conditions of man^s existence ; and if we were to
adopt this view, the principle might more properly be stated.
All men are equally horn. The relations of Family, Property,
and the like, are as essential to man's moral being, as
Language, without which his mind cannot be unfolded to
the apprehension of Rules, and the distinction of right and
wrong. If therefore our assumed equality rejects the former
circumstances, it must reject the latter.
510. But though in Fact men are not born equal,
they are all born with a capacity for being moral agents:
and this Idea is the basis of all Morality. And we may
lay it down as a universal Principle, from which we may
hereafter reason, that All men are moral beings.
This Principle may be perhaps considered as rather a
Principle of Humanity, than a Principle of Justice. For
this, and any other Principle from which we derive the claims
of men to Subsistence, Freedom, &c., must involve a re-
cognition of that Common Human Nature, by which all
mankind are bound together. We shall therefore treat of
such Rights in treating of the Conception of Humanity.
337
Chapter XXIII.
HUMANITY.
511. It has already been stated, that a universal
Benevolence towards all men, as partakers of the same
Common Human Nature with ourselves, is a part of the
Supreme Law of human being. But the lapse of time, the
growth of institutions, and the development of man's moral
nature, are requisite to bring this affection into its due pro-
minence. The affections of men, in a rude condition, are
confined within narrower limits; and have, for their main or
sole objects, the persons who are bound to them by especial
ties. The family affections which connect parent and child,
husband and wife, brothers and sisters, have their force in
every form of human society. The sympathies which bind
together a kindred in a wider sense, the feelings of clanship,
are powerful, in communities in which a more comprehensive
kind of benevolence is unfelt. In rude and half-savage
tribes, in which clansmen assist each other with unbounded
zeal, the stranger is looked upon as naturally an object of
enmity. The historians of Greece and Rome notice indica-
tions of this having been the early condition of man''s feel-
ings in those countries. But the progress of the culture of
those nations led to a more moral state of the affections.
The Greeks had a name for the Love of man as man. This
affection they termed (pCKavOpoDiria^ and reckoned it a virtue.
Aristotle expresses this* by saying that all men have a
feeling of kindred and good-will to all. And the Stoics
called this tie of general good-will by a name borrowed
from the word which Aristotle here uses (ot/cetwcrts'), as
kindness is connected with the word Hn. The Romans in
* Anth. Eth. Nich. vill. 1. w? oIk^iov dtra'; avdpwrro*: dvdpwiria kcu
ipiKoi/.
VOL. 1. Z
338 MORALITY. [Book III.
like manner, though at first they had but one word to
designate a stranger and an enemy (hostis), came to be
sensible of the universal bond of good-will which unites man
to man. They received with applause the verse of Terence :
Homo sum : humani niliil a me alienum puto.
A man am I, and feel for all mankind.
And their philosophers followed the Greeks, in assuming
the common social feeling of mankind as one of the foun-
dations of their morality. Thus Cicero adopts, what he
calls the Formula of the Stoics* : "Detrahere aliquid alicui,
et hominem hominis incommode suum augere commodum,
magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, quam
csetera quse possunt aut corpori accidere, aut rebus externis ;
nam principio toUit convictum humanum et societatem."
In the same strain Seneca says-f, " Societatem telle, et uni-
tatem generis humani qua vita continetur, scindes."
512. The Roman conception, of a Law, identical
with Natural Law, and yet the benefits of which were the
peculiar privilege of Roman citizens, for a time impeded
the application of such maxims ; for men who had no
right to justice, could have little claim to kindness. The
current conception of a true marriage, as being limited
to the union of Roman citizens, and of domestic slavery
as being a part of the order of society, were circumstances
unfavourable to the development of a benevolence equally
embracing all men. But these circumstances gradually
lost their hold on men''s minds. The distinction of Roman
and Provincial marriages faded away; and there grew up
a feeling of horrour towards the cruelty which slavery
* Off. III. 5. For a man to abstract anything from another man, and
to increase his own comfort by the discomfort of another, is more against
Nature, than death, than poverty, than any other thing which can hap-
pen, either to his body or to his external havings. For in the first place
it takes away human society and community of life.
t De Bene/, iv. 18. Take away society, and you rend asunder the
unity of the human race in which our life is bound up.
Ch. XXIII.] HUMANITY. 339
involved. We find a recognition of this view in the Roman
Lawyers. Thus Ulpian says *, " Manumissio a jure gentium
originem sumsit, utpote quum jure naturali omnes liberi
nascerentur, nee esset nota manumissio, quum servitus esset
incognita. Sed posteaquam jure gentium servitus invasit,
secutum est beneficium manumissionis ; ut quum uno naturali
nomine homines appellarentur, jure gentium tria genera
esse coeperunt, liberi, et his contrarium servi, et tertium
genus, liberti, id est, qui desierant esse servi." And with
regard to marriage, the Roman lawyers sometimes appear
to incline to extend the notion of it even to brute animals*!*.
" Jus naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit : nam
jus istud non humani generis proprium, sed omnium animalium
quae in terra, quae in mari nascuntur, avium quoque, com-
mune est. Hinc descendit maris et foeminae conjunctio,
quam nos matrimonium appellamus, hinc liberorum pro-
creatio, hinc educatio : videmus enim caetera quoque animalia,
feras etiam, istius juris peritia censeri." Attempts such as
this, to extend the meaning of Jus^ in any sense, to brute
animals, can only perplex the subject. The word Bights
has no meaning, as applied to animals, which cannot under-
stand the word. Our Rights and our Obligations are
necessarily limited by the limits of human nature. They
all spring out of the recognition of our common Humanity.
* Dig. I. i. 4. Manumission of Slaves had its origin not in natural but
in positive Law. For by the Law of nature all are bom free, and when
there was no slavery there could be no manumission. But when by the
positive Law of nations, slavery was introduced; the relief from this
infliction by manumission was also introduced. And thus men, who by
nature were all alike men, were divided into three kinds, freemen,
slaves, and freed men, who had been slaves.
t Dig. I. i. 1. Natural Law is that which nature teaches all animals :
such Law is not peculiar to the human race, but common also to beasts,
fishes, and birds. Hence arises the union of male and female which we
call marriage, hence the procreation and nurture of children ; for we see
that brutes, and even wild beasts, are acquainted with the Natural Law
which regulates such matters.
z2
340 MORALITY. [Book III.
Our duties with regard to brute animals depend upon no
mutual Rights; but upon the Duty of Self-culture; to
which our treatment of them, like our other actions, must
be made subservient. Animals offer to us images of some
of the lower parts of our nature; but except so far as
these elements are directed and governed by the higher
elements, they are not subjects of moral consideration. As
far as the limits of humanity extend, however, there are
mutual ties of Duty which bind together all men; and as
the basis of all others, a Duty of Mutual Kindness ; which,
as we see, is acknowledged by the Jurists, as well as by
the Moralists, of Rome, in spite of the originally narrow
basis of their Jurisprudence.
513. The progress of the Conception of Humanity^
as a universal bond which knits together the whole human
race, and makes kindness to every member of it a Duty, was
immeasurably promoted by the teaching and influence of
Christianity. In the course of time, domestic slavery was
abolished ; and marriage received the sanction of the Church,
and was alike honourable in all. The antipathies of nations,
the jealousies of classes, the selfishness, fierceness, and cold-
ness of men's hearts; the narrowness and dimness of their
understandings, have prevented their receiving cordially and
fully, the comprehensive precepts of benevolence which Chris-
tianity delivers ; but as these obstacles have been more and
more overcome, the doctrine has been more and more assent-
ed to, and felt to be trud, by all persons of moral culture ;
that there is a Duty of Universal Benevolence which we are
to bear to all men as men ; and which we are to fulfil, by
deahng with them as men ; as beings having the like affec-
tions and reason, rights and claims, which we ourselves have.
514. This conception of Humanity, as a Principle
within us, requiring us to recognize in others the same
Rights which we claim for ourselves, may be further illus-
Ch. XXIII.] HUMANITY. 341
trated. Such a principle of Humanity, requiring us to
recognize men as men, requires us more especially to recog-
nize them as such, in their capacity of moral agents. They
have not only like desires and affections with ourselves ; but
also, like faculties of Reason and Self-guidance ; by which
they discern the difference of right and wrong, and feel
the duty of doing the right, and abstaining from the wrong.
This view of their condition, as Moral Agents, is that by
which we must entirely sympathize with them ; as it is the
view of our own condition in which we are fully conscious
of ourselves. Humanity requires that we should feel satis-
faction in the desires and means of enjoyment of our fellow-
men ; but Humanity requires, still more clearly, that we
should feel a satisfaction in their having the desires and the
means of doing their Duty. Now the fundamental Rights of
which we have so often spoken, the Rights of the Person, of
Property, and the like, are means, and necessary conditions,
of Duty. It is necessary to moral action, that the agent
should be free, not liable to unlimited and unregulated
constraint and violence ; that is, that he should have Rights
of the Person. It is necessary to moral action, that the
agent should have some command over external things ; for
this is implied in action; that is, it is necessary that he
should have Rights of Property. And in like manner, in
order that any class of persons may exist permanently in a
community, as moral agents, it is requisite that they should
possess the Right of Marriage; for without that Right,
some of the strongest of man's desires cannot be under
moral control; nor can the sentiment of Rights be trans-
mitted from one generation to another. The Right of
Contract is a necessary accompaniment of the Right of
Property; for if the person can possess, he may buy and
sell. And thus, these Rights are means, and necessary
conditions, of men's being moral agents ; and the Humanity
which makes us desire that all men should be able to regu-
342 MORALITY. [Book III.
late themselves by a Love of Duty, requires that all should
he iuTested with these Bights.
515. These Rights, which Humanity requires that all
men should possess, may be called Natural Rights ; and in
this sense, we may say that Man has Natural Rights of
Personal Security from Violence, of Sustenance and Property
so far as is implied in moral agency, and of Marriage. But
we must distinguish these Natural Bights^ which men ought
to have, from the Rights of which we have hitherto spoken,
which men really have in Civil Society, and which may be
called Ciml Bights.
516. As the Natural Rights, of which we speak, are
those which are implied in Moral Agency ; so, on the other
hand, they imply Moral Agency, and consequently imply
Duties, or Moral Obligations. As there is a Natural Right
of Security against violence, there is a Natural Obligation
to abstain from violence. As there is a Natural Right
of Property for every man, to some extent or other ; so
there is a Natural Obligation to abstain from the Property
of others, and to fulfil our Contracts. As there is a Natural
Right of Marriage, so there is a Natural Obligation of Fore-
thought, which directs men to make provision for the Suste-
nance of a Family, before they add to the existing numbers
of the Community.
517. Humanity requires us to insist upon these Rights,
and upon the corresponding Obligations, with equal force.
We may declare such Rights to be natural, universal,
necessary ; but we must declare the Obligations to be
equally natural, universal, necessary. Humanity requires
that men should have the means of doing their Duty ; she
requires also no less that they should do it. She is solicit-
ous about their welfare; in the first place, about their
welfare in the subordinate sense, the means of enjoyment
and of action ; in the next place, about their welfare in the
superior sense, the pursuit of right ends by right means.
Ch. XXIIL] humanity. 343
To insist upon man's Natural Rights, and to lose sight of
the corresponding Obligations, is not the tendency of the
Humanity of a moral man.
518. Such Natural Rights as we have mentioned,
are sometimes spoken of as indefeasible^ and inalienable.
When, by such expressions, it is meant that no act, either
of a man's own or of other men, can make it cease to be
an object of Humanity that he should possess such Rights,
the expressions are just. No constraint and violence, actually
exercised upon men, can prevent the humane man from
desiring that they should have Rights which may protect
them from such inflictions ; and even if a man, for himself,
renounce the Rights which are requisite to his being a
moral agent, the humane man must still desire that they
should be restored to him. If these Rights are taken away,
or given away, it is right that they should be given back to
every man; and in this sense, they are indefeasible and
inalienable.
But if it be meant, that when the Law takes away,
or the act of the individual gives away, these Rights, the
Law and the Act are not to be regarded, this applica-
tion of the words is not admissible. The Laws of every
State have their validity ; and if these Laws are contrary to
Humanity or to Justice, such vices of the Laws are to be
remedied, not by the Moralist declaring such Laws null
and void of themselves; but by the Legislator annulling
them, or substituting better Laws in their room. And
although it may be humane and right, that the Laws should
not sanction Contracts by which a citizen renounces the
fundamental Rights of man ; yet if such a Contract is made
according to Law, the Law enforces it, and the Moralist, as
before, may say that the Law ought to be changed ; but he
may not say that, till changed, it ought not to be executed.
519. Thus, those which we have called the Natural
344 MORALITY. [Book Ill-
Rights of man, may be, for a time at least, superceded
by their not being Civil Rights. They may be Rights
in the eye of Humanity; that is, such as ought to he the
Rights of all members of every community ; but not Rights
in the eye of Law, that is, such as are the Rights of all
members of a given community. Natural Rights are the
Ideal conditions of moral society ; they may be suspended in
Fact ; the Idea being imperfectly realized. When this is so,
it is the business of all good men constantly to make the
Fact approach to the Idea ; to make Law agree with Hu-
manity : to make Civil Rights coincide with Natural Rights.
In many communities, this task may at the present,
or at any given time, be imperfectly fulfilled ; and in such
cases, there exist Classes of the Society which possess, in
an imperfect degree, or in no degree, the Natural Rights
of Man. It will be proper to examine more particularly
some of these States of Society, with their characteristic
Classes: and to consider the manner in which they exemplify
the doctrine which we have been propounding.
Chapter XXIV.
SLAVERY.
520. In ancient nations, we find the existence of
Slaves everywhere familiar. Bondmen and Bondwomen, and
the buying and selling of men, occur frequently in the Books
of Moses. In Homer, and the Greek tragedians, domestic
slavery is contemplated as the general lot of those conquered
in war, their wives and children. The slaves, thus obtained,
were employed, both in the business of the house, in the
labours of agriculture, and as workmen in various handi-
crafts. They were so universally thus employed, that they
Ch. XXIV.] SLAVERY. 34a
were considered as a necessary portion of society. A State,
says Aristotle*, consists of Families ; a Family, of Freemen
and Slaves. And in like manner, the Roman Law lays this
down as the primary division of persons f, " Omnes homines
aut liberi sunt aut servi." Slavery, thus derived from the
ancient world, was, in the course of time, nearly extinguished
in Christian States. But in modern times, a new form of ^
slavery has grown up ; the slavery of the negroes, who are
carried from Africa to America ; and employed there, they
and their descendants, as domestic servants and agricultural
labourers.
521. The character of complete Slavery is, that the
Slave has no Rights. And this complete kind of Slavery has
been recognized and ordained by the Laws of many nations.
Gains, the Roman Jurist, says J, "In potestate sunt servi
dominorum. Quae quidem potestas juris gentium est ; nam
apud omnes perseque gentes animadvertere possumus dominis
in servos vitse necisque potestatem fuisse, et quodcunque
per servum acquiritur id domino acquiri." Thus the Slave
had neither the Right of protection from extreme violence
and death, inflicted by his master, nor the Right of property
in anything which he might happen to produce or acquire.
The Slave is the property of the Master, in the same manner
as a horse or a cart is. And these maxims are promulgated
in modern Laws. " A Slave," says the Louisiana Code J,
"is in the power of the Master to whom he belongs. The
Master may sell him, dispose of his person, his industry,
his labour ; he can do nothing, possess nothing, nor acquire
anything but which must belong to his master." The Laws
* Polit, I. 2. t Inst. I. 3.
% Dig. I. 6. 1. Among the "thmgs in our power" are the slaves of
which we are masters. And this " power" is a general institution of
nations ; for we may observe that in all nations alike the master has the
power of life and death over the slave ; and whatever is acquired by the
slave, is acquired for the master.
•j^ Channing's Works, Vol. ii. p. 17.
346 MORALITY. [Book III.
of South Carolina say, " Slaves shall be deemed, taken,
reported and adjudged, to be chattels personal in the hands
of their Masters, and possessions to all intents and purposes
whatsoever." Accordingly, it is held in America that the
cohabitation of slaves, being limited by the pleasure of the
master, cannot be marriage; and that a slave cannot be guilty
of theft ; just as dogs and horses cannot marry and cannot
steal. It is true, that in some countries, in which the most
complete slavery prevails, the master is not allowed by the
Laws to put his slave to death; and some punishment is
inflicted if he does so. But such a Law does not invest the
slave with any Rights. It is only a Law against what is
shocking to the general feeling, like the English Laws
against cruelty to animals. It is now penal in this country
to torture a horse or a dog; but a horse or a dog are still
only objects of possession, without any Rights or any ac-
knowledged moral nature.
522. Slavery is contrary to the Fundamental Prin-
ciples of Morality. It neglects the great primary distinction
of Persons and Things (45) ; converting a Person into a
Thing, an object merely passive, without any recognized
attributes of Human nature. A slave is, in the eye of
the State which stamps him with that character, not
acknowledged as a man. His pleasures and pains, his
wishes and desires, his needs and springs of action, his
thoughts and feelings, are of no value whatever in the eye
of the community. He is reduced to the level of the
brutes. Even his Crimes, as we have said, are not ac-
knowledged as Wrongs ; lest it should be supposed that, as
he may do a Wrong, he may suffer one. And as there are
for him no Wrongs, because there are no Rights ; so there
is for him nothing morally right ; that is, as we have seen,
nothing conformable to the Supreme Rule of Human Nature;
for the Supreme Rule of his condition is the will of his
Ch. XXIV.] SLAVERY. 347
master. He is thus divested of his moral nature, which
is contrary to the great Principle we have already laid
down ; that all men are moral beings ; — a Principle which,
we have seen (510, 514), is one of the universal Truths of ")C
Morality, whether it be taken as a Principle of Justice or
of Humanity. It is a Principle of Justice, depending upon
the participation of all in a common Humanity : it is a
Principle of Humanity as authoritative and cogent as the
fundamental Idea of Justice.
523. All men are moral beings, and cannot be
treated as mere brutes and things, without an extreme vio- s^
lation of the Duties of Humanity. In some communities,
the Conception of Humanity may be dimly and vaguely de-
veloped ; and the guilt of this violation of Duty, in this as
in other cases, may be modified by this circumstance. The
offense of the defender and promoter of Slavery, may not
bo that of acting against Conscience, but of not enlighten-
ing his Conscience ; of not raising his standard of morality.
And this offense, again, may be modified by the circum-
stances in which a person is placed. In the ancient world,
especially in the earlier periods, when the friendly inter-
course of nations was rare, the feeling of Humanity very
imperfectly unfolded, and the thoughts by which such feelings
are fostered and supported not yet familiar among men ; the
opportunity of enlightening the conscience and raising the
moral standard were wanting; and if, in such cases, virtu-
ous men practised slavery without doubt or misgiving ; and
with the natural mercy, in their treatment of slaves, which
benevolence cultivated in the other relations of life would
usually produce in this; we may pronounce them to have
been excusable, on the ground of the defects of their national
standard of morality (453) : though upon such men, and
upon all men, there was a duty incumbent, of raising the
national standard of Morality. But now, after morality and
/3<^ iiMJ»-*^ >rv »^ et^ A--^^ >y^t^ >c*»**-t^ ^4.A*-*.^~>a , ^<?^<^
rtr^.'i ^^e^^^^.'^-^t^^. ^^^ -^ ^^t^
S48 MORALITY. [Book II I.
religion have so far raised the standard of morality in Chris-
tian nations, that among them, the Slavery which they
inherited from the ancient world has been extinguished;
Nations, which do not adopt the Standard of Morality thus
elevated, are chargeable with a voluntary preference of inhu-
manity and injustice to humanity and justice (455).
524. A very little progress in humanity, is sufficient
to lead men to see the cruelty and immorality of making
slaves, of men of our own race, Plato* notices it as a
necessary result of an improved morality, that Greeks should
not make slaves of Greeks. This injunction had already
been given to the Jewsf : If thy Ir other (which in this place
and others means thy fellow-countrymen) he sold unto thee,,
thou shalt not make him serve as a bondman. No man can
think it conformable to Justice and Humanity that he, or
his Family, should be thrown into a state of slavery ; and
in considering his fellow-countrymen, he can readily sym-
pathize with them, and identify his case with theirs ; and
thus, he acknowledges that to make them slaves, is inhuman
and unjust. The Romans, as we have seen, extended this
feeling to all the world ; and their Jurists declared, that no
man was a slave by nature. It is indeed plain that our
Humanity, in order to be consistent, must extend to all
men. To conceive slavery a cruel and unjust lot for our
countrymen, but a reasonable and tolerable fate for foreign-
ers, can arise only from dulness and narrowness of mind,
and benevolence scantily cultivated. In the eye of Morality,
all men are Brothers ; and the crime of maintaining Slavery,
is the crime of making or keeping a Brother a Slave.
525. There is one defense of negro slavery, which
represents the negro as a being inferior to the white man
in his faculties. He is asserted to approach in his nature
to the inferior animals ; and hence it is inferred that he
• Rep. V. 14. t Lcvit. xxv. 39.
f^*^:^ «^ t 4^ ^..££^^.c^ €?Z'
Ch.XXIV.] slavery. 34*
may be possessed as a Thing, like the animals. But this
defense is manifestly quite baseless. The same faculties of
mind have appeared in the negro, as in the white, so far
as the condition of negro nations and negro classes has
afforded opportunities for their development. The negroes
do not appear to be duller, ruder or coarser, in mind or
habits, than many savage white nations ; or than nations,
now highly cultured, were, in their early condition. The
negro has a moral nature, and is therefore included in the
consequences which follow from the Principle, that all men
have a common nature. The negro has the same affections
. and springs of action as we ourselves. He loves his wife,
his children, his home, and any security and stability which
is granted him. He can buy and sell, promise and perform.
He has, as much as any race of men, moral sentiments.
He can admire and love what is good ; he can condemn and
hate what is bad. He has the Sentiment of Rights and
Wrongs also. Though the Law allows him no Rights, he
can feel bitterly the monstrous Wrong of the Law. His
Reason is the Universal Reason of men. He understands
the general and abstract Forms in which Language presents
the objects and rules, with which Reason deals. He
recognizes, as we do, a Supreme Rule of Human action
and Human being ; for, like us, he can direct his thoughts
and acts to what is absolutely right. In short, there is no
phrase which can be used, describing the moral and rational
nature of man, which may not be used of the negro, as of the
white. The assertion that there is, between the white and
the black race, any difference on which the one can found
a Right to make slaves of the other, is utterly false.
526. If it be said, that the negro approaches in
his external form to some kinds of monkeys ; and if it be
asked how we draw the line between man and such infe-
rior animals ; we reply, that all beings are men, who have a
^^t..^^^-^ ^ ^— /. Ir^ . .- . .^^ ^ -. . ^^ ^.^. MJLAjt^^^
•«<%^
350 MORALITY. [Book III.
moral and rational nature, such as we have described: but
if some plain and simple criterion of the difference between
man and brutes be required ; we can point at such a cha-
racter at once, in the use of Language. A being who can
understand and apply the general terms of which language
consists, can apprehend Rules of action, Means and Ends,
and hence, the Supreme Rule. He is a rational, and con-
sequently a moral being. He is our brother.
527. It is difficult to believe that those who, in de-
fense of their own practice of slavery, allege the inferiority
of the negro race, do really think their assertion true. To
such persons, negro women are objects of sexual desire.
Upon their asserted view, they are thus guilty of an offense
which men have everywhere looked upon as bestial and
horrible. Moreover, the Laws of Nature contradict their
assertion; for the offspring of such mixtures are marked
with the physical and moral characters of both parents, as
in other human unions. And when the slave-owner treats
his own child, thus produced, as a slave ; and works him,
tortures him, or sells him, as he would a brute animal ;
(which it is said slave-owners do ;) he tears out of his heart
those affections which are the roots of all Morality, and the
absence of which makes lust entirely brutal.
528. Again, in States where negro Slaves are nume-
rous, to teach them to write or to read is forbidden by
Law, under the severest penalties. Such Laws suppose the
capacity of negroes for intellectual culture ; and are an im-
plicit confession that it is necessary to degrade their minds,
in order to keep their bodies in slavery. When such prac-
tices and such Laws prevail, to defend negro slavery by
asserting the inferiority of the negro race, can hardly be
free from the guilt of wilful blindness of conscience, persisted
in, in order to uphold conscious wrong.
529. The Morahst, then, must pronounce Slavery
Ch. XXIV.] SLAVERY. Sol
to be utterly inconsistent with Humanity; and with Prin-
ciples, which, being derived from the universal nature of man,
may be deemed fundamental Principles of Justice. Slavery
is utterly abhorrent to the essence of Morality, and cannot
be looked upon as a tolerable condition of Society, nor
acquiesced in as what may allowably be. Whenever Slavery
exists, its Abolition must be one of the great objects of
every good man.
530. It will, of course, be understood, from what has
already been said, that this Abolition is to be sought by
legal and constitutional means only. When Slavery exists,
its annihilation is an end which must be constantly kept in
view ; but to which we must sometimes be content to
approach by degrees. It is an Idea to which we must
endeavour to make the Fact conform ; but the conformity
may not be immediately brought to pass. The Laws of
the State are to be observed, even when they enact Slavery ;
for the Moralist cannot authorize the citizen to choose what
Laws he will obey, and what he will not. Natural Rights
must yield to Civil Rights, in the hope that Civil Rights will
be more and more made to harmonize with Natural Rights.
Slavery is never to be acquiesced in, always to be condemned ;
but we may, and must, tolerate a gradual transition from
Slavery to Emancipation, such as the conditions of Legis-
lation and even the benefit of the slave, render inevitable.
Still, on the other hand, we are to recollect, that delay
is to be tolerated, only so far as it is inevitable : and that
to quicken the course of Emancipation is no less humane
and just, than it is to give Legislation this direction, and to
prepare both slaves and masters for the change.
531. It may be hoped, by the Moralist, that the
emancipation of the negro race will go on with accelerated
rapidity ; for every State in which free negroes live, as
moral and rational beings, is a refutation of the solitary
a52 MORALITY. [Book III.
argument in defense of negro slavery, drawn from the
asserted unfitness of the negro for freedom. When the
free negro population of cultured communities have, by the
manifestation of their moral and rational nature, made
themselves recognized as brethren by their white fellow-
citizens, it cannot be that their black brethren will long
be kept in slavery in neighbouring States professing a like
reverence for freedom.
532. Slavery nowhere exists in Europe in a form so
repugnant to Humanity as is negro slavery. But there are,
in some parts, many vestiges of slavery, and classes inter-
mediate betwen slaves and freemen. The Ser/s^ who have
existed and still exist in different countries, may be con-
sidered as holding such an intermediate place ; and in
different countries in different degrees. In Russia, serfage
is hardly distinguishable from slavery. The labourers are
bound to the soil by the Law : they 2bVQ prcedial serfs (128).
By the general custom of the country, they are bound to
work on the demesnes of the landowner three days in the
week; and have land allotted to them from which they
extract their own subsistence. But the peasant is, with all
his family and descendants, at the disposal of the lord. In
some parts, the Serfs have been allowed the privilege of
acquiring and transmitting personal property ; and in some,
they may even purchase or inherit land. In other parts
of Europe, Serfage has assumed a less slavish character.
In some parts of Germany, the peasant is no longer at-
tached by the law to the soil : and his labour which he
owes to his landlord is definite in kind and amount.
Such peasants are called Leibeigener, In other parts this
labour-rent is commuted for a corn-rent or a money-rent,
though the tenant is still liable for some trifling services.
Such tenants are called Meyer*.
* Jones On Rent.
Ch. XXIV.] SLAVERY. 353
533. The social structure of England has gone through
these several forms. For two centuries after the Norman
Conquest, a large proportion of the body of cultivators was in
the situation of the Russian serf; they were termed Villeins.
During the next three hundred years the unlimited labour-
rents paid by the Villeins were gradually commuted for
definite services, still payable in kind; and they had a
legal Right to their lands which they occupied, which legal
Right was called Copyhold. It is only about two hundred
years, since the personal bondage of the Villeins ceased to
exist in England.
534. The contemplation of the change which has
taken place in this country, and which appears to be taking
place elsewhere, from a condition in which men are little
better than Slaves, to one in which they are Freemen ; and
of the manifest and immense advance in moral and intel-
lectual culture, which such a change has brought with it ;
must strongly stimulate the Moralist to recommend and
promote the progress of social freedom and the removal of
every law and custom that contains any trace of Slavery.
535. We distinguish social from political freedom ;
the former depending upon the domestic or praedial relation
of Servant and Master (128) ; the latter, upon the relation
of Subject or Citizen, and Government. If men have Rights
of the Person, of Property, and the like ; they may be socially
Freemen; however despotic the established government be.
They are politically free, when each Class has such a share
in the Government, as enables it to assert and secure its
Rights. But Social Freedom can hardly exist, without Poli-
tical Freedom : the Lowest Class can hardly have and retain
Rights, without possessing some political power of main-
taining them. In countries where Serfage prevails, the Serfs
have no political power. The landlords form an Aristocracy ;
and the Sovereign and they, possess, between them, the
VOL. I. A A
354 MORALITY. [Book III.
powers of the State. When Serfage gives place to Social
Freedom, there must" be, in the Constitution, an Estate of the
People, or some other Political Authority, representing and
protecting the general body of free citizens.
But the subject of Political Freedom must be considered
hereafter.
Chapter XXV.
PLEASUKE, INTEREST, HAPPINESS, UTILITY,
EXPEDIENCY.
536. We may follow the subject of Humanity or
Benevolence somewhat further. Humanity is, as we have
said, a Principle, in virtue of which we represent to ourselves
other men as of the same nature with ourselves, and enter
into their feelings, hopes, and prospects, as if they were our
own. We desire the good of others as we desire our own good.
But the Good which we desire for ourselves is contem-
plated under various aspects. We may have, as the Object
of our desires in a general form. Pleasure^ Enjoyment, or
Gratification ; we may have Interest^ or Advantage ; we may
have Happiness. And as our desires point to one or other
of these general Objects for ourselves, they may also aim at
the like Objects for others. Om' Benevolence may urge us
to give pleasure to others, or to promote their interest, or
to make them happy.
In order to see how these views affect the Duties of
Benevolence, we may examine further the Conceptions of
Pleasure, Interest, and Happiness.
537. Pleasure arises from our attaining the objects
of our Desires. It is what we feel, when our Desires are
satisfied, or in some measure gratified. All actions which
Ch. XXV.] PLEASURE. 355
are not directed by the Reason, may be conceived as per-
formed in order to obtain Pleasure, or to avoid its oppo-
site, Pain. Actions directed by Reason, may also be directed
to Pleasure. They may be directed to the objects of Mental
Desires, which Reason presents to us under general abstract
forms ; as Wealth, Power, and the like : and to obtain such
objects, may give us Pleasure. But Pleasure is more especi-
ally considered as the object of less abstract and reflective
Desires, as Bodily Pleasure, and the like. Pleasure is sought
simply and for itself ; not as a means to an end, nor in
obedience to a Rule. If we seek Wealth or Power as means
to an end, we do not seek them merely as pleasure.
538. Since Pleasure is sought, not in obedience to
a Rule, but simply for itself, to make Pleasure our object,
is not consistent with the Supreme Rule of Human Action.
To make Pleasure the object of human action, is to reject
the supposition of a Supreme Rule, and a Supreme Object.
For if Pleasure be the Highest Object, it is also the Lowest.
If Pleasure be the Highest Object of Human Action, nothing
can be absolutely right ; nor can be right in any other
sense, than as the right road to Pleasure. If Pleasure be
the object of human action, we must reject Duty as the
guide of Human Actions. The good man makes Pleasure
his object, only so far as it is consistent with the Supreme
Rule of Duty. He does not desert Duty for Pleasure, but
he finds his Pleasure in Duty.
539. Since we cannot rightly desire for ourselves
Pleasure, as our ultimate object, we cannot rightly desire it
for others, whom we love in some degree as ourselves. Merely
to give Pleasure to men, without regarding whether the Plea-
sures be right or wrong, is not a moral kind of Humanity.
But though we may not make it our business to promote
the Pleasures of those around us, as an ultimate object, for
them and for us ; we may rightly make the promotion of
A a2
356 MORALITY. [Book III.
their Pleasures, so far as they are not wrong Pleasures, one
of our main objects; both as a manifestation of Benevo-
lence, and as a means of cultivating that affection. The
sjrmpathy with other men, which Morality requires of us, is
best fostered and strengthened, by an habitual participation
in their efforts to obtain those objects which give them plea-
sure.
540. Though Pleasures are sought, as independent
and ultimate objects of desire, they often involve references
and consequences, and trains of feeling and thought, which
connect them with higher objects, and with Moral Rules.
The Desires of the Body point simply to Selfish Pleasures ;
but the Pleasures of the Affections imply a Sympathy with
other persons, which is a kind of benevolence ; and therefore,
of the nature of virtue. The Pleasures to which the Love of
Knowledge leads, involve a culture of the mind, which gives
activity to the Reason ; and which, thus, may aid the moral
culture. And when the moral culture is so far advanced,
that Conscience is heard clearly, and Virtue is beloved ;
the approval of Conscience, and the conscious activity of
Virtue, may be sought, as the greatest Pleasures of which
man's nature is susceptible.
But in general, Pleasure^ as an object of action, is dis-
tinguished from, and opposed to. Duty ; and so far as this is
done, although we may aim at promoting the Pleasures of
others, as a step in our moral culture, a due regard for the
moral culture of others will not allow us to make their Plea-
sure a supreme and ultimate object.
541. Another general form under which the object of
action presents itself to us, is Interest. We seek our own
Interest : and hence we are bound, by the Duties of Bene-
volence, to seek the Interest of others also. Interest is
conceived as an object of affection or desire, approved of,
to some extent, by Reason. A prudent man seeks his own
Ch. XXV.] INTEREST. 357
Interest. When Interest and Pleasure come in competition,
Reason directs us to follow our Interest, and to resist
the temptation of Pleasure. We may estimate our Interest
according to various Standards ; but in speaking of Interest,
we suppose ^ome Standard. We say that one thing is more
for our Interest than another : for example, we may say
that it is more for our Interest to be honest, than to be
cunning. In stating such a maxim, we take, for our stand-
ard of Interest, the acquisition of wealth, or the esta-
blishment of our good name. The Standard of Interest is
not an absolute, but an assumed Standard; just as the
ends aimed at by Prudence are not absolute, but assumed
ends (258). But we sometimes suppose an absolute and
supreme Standard of Interest; we speak of our true Interest,
our highest Interest. We say that our true and highest
Interest is, the elevation and purification of our moral being.
Also, the Affection which we feel towards a person, or for
a mental object, is spoken of, as an Interest which we take
or feel : that is, the person or object is conceived as of con-
siderable amount, according to our Standard of Interest.
But we may estimate another man's Interest differently
from his own feeling respecting it. We may say, it was
such a one's Interest to improve his estate, but he took
no Interest in it. Again ; different classes of objects of
action imply different Standards of Interest. A man's
affections are employed on one set of objects, his thoughts
on another. Hence we have the Interests of the Heart,
and the Interests of the Intellect. The Interest of the
Individual may point one way : the Interest of the State,
another.
542. Of course, Benevolence directs us to promote
the true and highest Interest of other men, as it directs us
to seek our own. We may also seek to promote the Interest
of others, in a lower and narrower sense ; as we may seek
358 MORALIT\\ [Book III.
to promote their Pleasures: and such a course may be a
part of morality, either as a manifestation, or as a disci-
pline, of Benevolence. But to promote any Interest of
men, which is not the highest; or any seeming Interest,
which is not a true one; cannot rightly be made our ulti-
mate object.
543. It has sometimes been said, that men, in all
their actions, necessarily seeh their Interest^ or what ap-
pears to them their Interest. The notion involved in this
assertion appears to be, that every action may be considered
as a tendency to some object, which may be included in
the term Interest. The brave man, when he rushes into
battle, seeks victory, or glory, which, for the time, he
thinks are his Interest. The timid man, when he runs away
from the enemy, seeks safety, which seems to him his In-
terest. But the assertion thus made, involves a confusion
of thought and language, such as not only would prevent
our being able to state any distinct doctrines of Morality,
but such as even common usage may teach us to correct.
The brave man is not impelled to seek victory or glory,
nor the timid man, to seek safety, by any view of Interest,
such as that with which the prudent man thoughtfully seeks
his Interest. The springs of action in these cases are Courage,
and Fear : not any seeking of an Abstract Object, which In-
terest is; still less, any seeking of an Abstract Object involv-
ing a Standard of value by which all things are compared,
which Interest also is. If we say that the brave man rushes
into the battle, and the timid man rushes out of it, each seek-
ing his Interest, we must also say, that the bull-dog attacks
his antagonist, and the frightened horse runs away from
his master, seeking his Interest ; which it would be reckoned
absurd to say. The proposition, that all actions are prompted
by the prospect of our own Interest, is, not asserted, in
general, as anything more than an identical proposition.
Ch. XXV.] HAPPINESS. 359
But to make it true, even in that character, the common
usage of language must be violated.
544. Happiness is the object of human action in its
most general form ; as including all other objects, and ap-
proved by the Reason. As Pleasure is the aim of mere
Desire, and Interest the aim of Prudence ; so Happiness
is the aim of Wisdom. Happiness is conceived as necessarily
an ultimate object of action. To be happy, includes or
supersedes all other gratifications. If we are happy, we
do not miss that which we have not ; if we are not happy,
we want something more, whatever we have. The Desire
of Happiness is the Supreme Desire. All other Desires,
of Pleasure, Wealth, Power, Fame, are included in this,
and are subordinate to it. We may make other objects our
ultimate objects ; but we can do so, only by identifying them
with this. Happiness is our being's end and aim.
545. Since Happiness is necessarily the Supreme Ob-
ject of our Desires, and Duty the Supreme Rule of our
actions, there can be no harmony in our being, except
our Happiness coincide with our Duty. That which we
contemplate as the Ultimate and Universal Object of Desire,
must be identical with that which we contemplate as the
Ultimate and Supreme Guide of our Intentions. As moral
beings, our Happiness must be found in our Moral Pro-
gress, and in the consequences of our Moral Progress : we
must be happy by being virtuous.
546. How this is to be. Religion alone can fully
instruct us: but by the nature of our faculties, this must
be. And as this is the nature of the Happiness which we
are to seek for ourselves, so is it the nature of the Hap-
piness which we are to endeavour to bestow upon others.
We are directed by Benevolence, to seek to make them
happy, by making them virtuous ; to promote their Hap-
360 MORALITY. [Book III.
piness, by promoting their moral Progress ; to make them
feel their Happiness to be coincident with their Duty.
The identification of Happiness with Duty on merely
philosophical grounds, is a question of great difficulty. It
is difficult, even for the philosopher, to keep this Identity
steadily fixed in his mind, as an Operative Principle ; and
it does not appear to be possible to make such an identity
evident and effective in the minds of men in general. But
Rehgion presents to us this Truth, of the identity of Hap-
piness and Duty, in connexion with other Truths, by means
of which it may be made fully evident and convincing, to
minds of every degree of intellectual culture : and the minds
of men, for the most part, receive the conviction of the
Truth from their Religious Education.
547. We may also, as an exercise and discipline of
Benevolence, seek to make them happy, in a more partial
view ; namely, by placing them in a condition in which
they have no wants unsupplied; for, as we have said, this
is part of the conception of happiness. If we make this
our object, we shall have to supply those wants which are
universal, and do not depend upon special mental culture ;
and we shall have to impart such mental culture, as may
make them feel no wants which cannot be supplied. We
shall have to minister to their human needs ; and to mode-
rate their wishes : in short, to make them content. Contmt
is a necessary part of Happiness ; and men may be rendered
content, by gratifying their desires in part, and limiting
them in part, till none remain unsatisfied. That men's
desires should be moderate and limited, is a condition very
requisite to Content; and therefore, to Happiness: for
except some moderating influence be exercised, the Desires,
both bodily and mental, grow with indulgence. Hence, we
promote the Happiness of men by moderating their Desires :
Ch. XXV.] HAPPINESS. 361
and any influence of this kind, which we can exert upon
them ; as for instance, by teaching and discipline, may be
a work of Benevolence. But on the other hand, we must
recollect that the objects to which many of our Desires tend,
are means of moral action ; and that it is necessary to the
moral activity and moral culture of a man, that he should
desire and obtain such objects. We ought not to wish to
reduce a man to a state of Content, by taking away the
desire of the fundamental Rights of man. We ought not to
wish the Slave to be contented in his Slavery; living like
a brute animal in dependence upon his master, and looking
to no law, higher than his Master's Will. On the con-
trary, we ought to wish that he should both desire and
have Liberty, in order that he may enter upon that course
of moral agency and moral progress, which is the only pro-
per occupation of his human faculties. In order to promote
the Happiness of mankind, we must endeavour to promote
their Liberty : both the Social Liberty, which invests them
with the Fundamental Rights of man; and the Political
Liberty, which is the guardian of such Rights, and the most
favourable condition for moral and intellectual progress.
We shall pursue this subject hereafter.
548. In some Systems of Morality, the Desire of our
own Happiness^ and of that of mankind, has been made to
occupy a larger space than we assign to it. This Desire
has, indeed, been made the basis of the whole of Morality,
and the ground and measure of all our Duties. It has been
said, that our Principle of action, so far as we ourselves are
concerned, must be to attain, as much as possible, our own
Happiness ; and that the Rule which is to guide us in actions
which affect others, is to increase as much as possible their
Happiness. This view of the subject has been so much
insisted on, that we may make a few remarks upon it.
We may remark, that according to the explanation which
362 MORALITY. [Book III.
we have given above, of the Conception of Happiness, it is
quite true, that we ought to act so as to increase as much as
possible our own Happiness and the Happiness of others;
but we must add, that this Truth cannot enable us to frame
Rules of Duty, or to decide Questions of Morality. It is
an identical Truth. Since Happiness is the ultimate object
of our aims, and includes all other objects ; whatever else
we aim at, we identify with Happiness. Whatever other
end we seek, we seek that as Wiefar end. And with regard
to other persons ; Benevolence urges us to promote their
Happiness ; for in that, all good is included, and we wish to
do them good. But these Maxims, though true, are, of
themselves, altogether barren. The Questions still occur,
What are the things which will increase our own Happiness?
What will increase the Happiness of others? Of what
elements does Happiness consist ? According to our account
of it, Happiness does not imply any special elements ; but
only a general conception of an ultimate and sufficing Object.
How are we to measure Happiness, and thus to proceed to
ascertain, by what acts it may be increased ? If we can do
this, then, indeed, we may extract Rules and Results, from
the Maxim that we are to increase our own and others'*
Happiness : but without this step, we can draw no conse-
quences from the Maxim. If we take the Conception in its
just aspect, how little does it help us in such questions as
occur to us ! I wish to know whether I may seek sensual
pleasure ; whether I may tell a flattering lie. I ask. Will it
increase or diminish the Sum of Human Happiness to do so ?
This mode of putting the question cannot help me. How
can I know whether these acts will increase or diminish the
Sum of Human Happiness? The immediate pleasures of
gratified sense, or of gratified vanity, I may, perhaps, in
some degree, estimate ; but how am I to estimate the indi-
rect and remote effects of the acts, on myself and others ;
Ch. XXV.] HAPPINESS. 363
and how am I to measure the total effect thus produced, on
Human Happiness ? By a sensual act, or by a lie, I weaken,
it may be said, the habit of temperance and of truth in my
own mind ; and by my example, I produce a like effect on
the minds of others. Suppose, then, that I regard this con-
sequence, and see that the act thus leads to something of
unhappiness ; still, this effect is perhaps slight and precarious ;
how am I to balance this result, against those direct grati-
fications which are produced by the acts now spoken of?
It does not appear that, under this form, the question admits
of an answer.
54.9. The mode in which Moralists have been able to
apply this Principle, of aiming at the greatest amount of
Human Happiness, to the establishment of Moral Rules; has
been, by assuming that man must act according to Rules. I
say assuming ; for it does not appear, that we can proxe that
the Principle of increasing as much as possible the Happiness
of man requires us to act by general Rules. The man who
is tempted to sensual pleasure, or mendacious flattery, naay
say, I do not intend that what I do now should be a Rule
for myself, or for others. At present I seek to promote
Human Happiness, by making an exception to Rules: in
general I shall conform to the Rules. To this, the Moralist
replies, that to speak and think thus, is to reject Rules
altogether: that Rules are not recognized, except they be
applied in all cases, and relied upon as the antagonists of the
temptations which particular cases offer. In short, he says,
that man, by his nature, must act by Rules ; and that he,
the Moralist, who has to decide respecting the character of
human action, has to establish Rules of human action. Thus
he assumes, in addition to his Principle of the Greatest
Amount of Human Happiness, another Principle, of the
Universality of Rule ; and it is this latter Principle, which
really gives a Moral character to his results. If we are to
have Rules of action, we must have Rules, that men are to
S64 MORALITY. [Book III.
be temperate and truthful; though special violations of
temperance or of truth may seem to offer an increase of
human happiness. Such Rules as, that we may lie to please
a friend, or may seek bodily pleasure where we can find it,
are inconsistent with man's nature. But that they are so, is
shown, by reasoning from the necessary conditions of Rules
of action, not by considering the notion of Happiness ; for
the pursuit of Happiness does, really, often lead men to fol-
low such immoral Rules as have just been mentioned. The
Rules, to le temperate and to he truthful, are not established
by showing that they lead to the greatest amount of Human
Happiness ; for we have no means of estimating the amount
of Human Happiness which results from any given hypothe-
sis. These Rules may, indeed, be said to be proved by a
consideration of the intolerable unhappiness which would
result from the absence of such Rules. We have already
{Q5) used this consideration in establishing Moral Rules in
general. But this line of reasoning is quite a different
course from employing the Conception of Happiness, as a
means of comparing one particular Rule of Duty with
another; an employment of the notion of Happiness for
which it is, as I have said, quite unfit.
550. The Principle of aiming at the greatest amount
of Human Happiness, has been strangely dealt with by
the Moralists who have principally employed it. As we
have already said, in order to deduce Moral Rules from it,
it seems to be necessary to find some measure of Happi-
ness; or to resolve it into some more definite elements;
and then, to estimate the moral value of actions, by means
of this measure, or those elements. But this course has
not been followed by such Moralists. Dr. Paley, who rests
Moral Rules upon their tendency to promote Human Hap-
piness, has, indeed, begun by giving some account of his
view of Happiness. It does not, he says, consist in the
pleasures of sense ; nor in exemption from pain, labour, and
Ch. XXV.] HAPPINESS. 365
care; nor in greatness and elevated station; it consists in
the exercise of the social affections ; in the exercise of the
faculties of body or mind in the pursuit of some engaging
end; in the prudent constitution of the habits; and in
health : and, as he suggests in a note, perhaps in a certain
condition of the nerves. Having given this analysis of Hap-
piness, we naturally look to see how he next brings the
word into use in his reasonings. We find the word occu-
pying a very prominent place in the first sentence of his
next chapter ; in which he tells us, that "Virtue is the doing
good to mankind for the sake of everlasting Happiness." But
it is plain that, in this use of the word, there is no refer-
ence to the analysis of Happiness contained in the preceding
chapter ; and we are therefore, so far as reasoning is con-
cerned, here thrown back upon the general notion which the
word Happiness^ without any special explanation, suggests.
551. When Paley proceeds, a little further on, to
establish Moral Doctrines, for instance the Right of Pro-
perty, he rests the propriety of this Institution of Property
upon its advantages ; — that it increases the produce of the
earth ; preserves this produce to maturity ; prevents con-
tests ; and increases the conveniency of living. Doubtless,
all these results may be understood, as additions to the Sum
of Human Happiness ; but there is no attempt made to show
that these additions counterbalance the subtraction from
Human Happiness arising from the wants of some persons,
the superfluity of others, the contests and crimes of many,
which Property produces. The Principle of the Greatest
Human Happiness, thus loosely applied, leaves the Right of
Property to stand upon a general apprehension of its advan-
tages. The same is the case with the other Fundamental
Rights of Man, and the Fundamental Rules of Morality.
They are not proved, in Paley's work, by showing, in any
distinct manner, that they increase the Sum of Human
366 MORALITY. [Book III.
Happiness; for no way is offered of measuring this Sum,
or its Increase. But the Fundamental Rights and Funda-
mental Rules are asserted; and the student is told that
they are necessary to Human Happiness. This all can
readily assent to ; for the end for which Rights and Rules
exist, whatever other name it bear, may be considered as in-
cluded in the term Happiness. And thus, Fundamental Rights
and Rules, and the vague general notion of Human Happi-
ness as their ultimate end, stand side by side in such systems
of Morality, but have not really any logical connexion.
552. There is, however, one character of such Systems
which is implied in this mode of employing the term Hap-
piness. They seek to deduce the Rules of Action from a
Supreme Ohject of Desire ; whereas we have deduced them
from a Supreme Bide of Action, They direct men to aim
at Happiness ; we direct them to aim at Acting Rightly.
We deduce our Rules from the Constitution of man's na-
ture ; they, from the Objects of his desires. As expressing
this difference, the Terms and Reasonings employed in such
systems may be worthy our consideration.
558. There is an expression often used by Morahsts of
this class, which may be noticed in this point of view. They
often declare Utility to be the Ground and Measure of the
Morality of actions. Now Utility cannot be in itself an
Ultimate End. That is useful^ which is subservient to some
further end. A wheel is useful as a portion of a carriage ; a
carriage is useful in order to take a journey ; a journey is
useful, in order to visit a friend ; to see and talk with a
friend is useful, if it makes us happy. All things whicli
have a value for their utility, have a reference to some
ulterior end ; and if we assume some Ultimate End, such as
Happiness is conceived to be, all things may be estimated
by their Utility. Thus the estimate of actions by their
Utility may be conceived as identical with the estimate of
Ch. XXV.] UTILITY. 367
them as contributing to Human Happiness; and accords
ingly, the two phrases have been principally used by the
same school of Moralists.
554. The judgment which we have to pronounce upon
Utility, as a ground of estimating the character of actions,
is implied in what has been already said. We cannot esti-
mate the value of anything, as being useful to an End,
except by assuming the value of the End. If a Coach be
a thing of no value, a Coach-wheel must be a thing of no
value. If travelling be of no use, a travelling carriage is
of no use. The measure of the value of actions by their
Utility, is liable to all the inconvenience and indefiniteness
of the determination of the End for which they are useful ;
and besides, to the difficulty of determining how far they are
useful to the end. A system in which actions are estimated
by their Utility in promoting Human Happiness, will be
liable to the objections already stated against the Principle
of the Greatest Human Happiness ; and will also require
a just mode of measuring the value of Actions as Means,
the End being given. We have all along been applying a
very different method, in order to judge of actions. We
ask. What is right? not, What is useful? acknowledging,
as we have said, a Supreme Rule, and not being content
with seeking Means which derive their value from the as-
sumed value of their Ends.
555. Another Term which has been much used by
Moralists of this School is Expediency. " Whatever is ex-
pedient," says Paley, "is right*." Now we have to observe
here, as before, that the main .significance of such assertions
is in the rejection, which they imply, of any independent and
fundamental meaning in the term right. Those who make
such assertions, intend to say, that Actions are right because
they promote some object ; Human Happiness, for instance ;
* Paley, B. i. c. 6.
368 MORALI'n^ [Book III.
and that those who speak of acts, as absolutely right, are
in errour. In the common use of language, we speak of
actions as expedient^ when they promote some end which we
have selected, and which we do not intend to have ques-
tioned. If we are prepared to put forwards the end of
our actions as the Proper End of action, we call them, not
expedient^ but right. It may be expedient for a man to
lie, in order to free himself from captivity. He may stay
in captivity, because he will not tell a lie ; but in this case,
we say, he does what is right, and rejects what is expedient.
Expedient implies, according to its etymolog}% a way out of
difficulties. But Morality places before us a higher object
than merely to escape from difficulties. She teaches us to
aim at what is right. What is expedient, may be expedient
as a means to what is right. It may be expedient to tell
the truth, in order to rescue an innocent person from death.
But we do not describe such an action properly by caUing it
expedient. It is much more than expedient, it is right :
it is recommended, not by Expediency, but by Duty. In
such cases, we can speak approvingly, not only of the action,
as a right means, but of the end, as a right end. Truth is
not properly commended, when it is described as a good
way of getting out of a difficulty, or of gaining our ends.
Those who use this term, Expediency^ to describe the
proper end of human action, are prompted to do so by a
wish to reject Terms which imply a Supreme Rule of action ;
they wish to recognize none but subordinate Rules deter-
mined by the Objects at which men aim. And it is true,
in this sense, that whatever is expedient with a view to an
end, is the right way to the end : but this does not justify
the Moralist in confounding what is relatimly expedient with
what is absolutely right : nor in speaking of things as expe-
dient absolutely, without pointing out the purpose which they
are expedient for.
.369
Chapter XXVI.
MORAL EDUCATION.
556. The Laws of eacli Community lay down certain
Rules of Action, commands or prohibitions, for the members
of the Community. But they do more : they direct that
certain Punishments shall be inflicted on those who transgress
the Law ; as Fine, Imprisonment, Bodily Pain, Mutilation,
Infamy, Exile, Death. And the Community, by its officers,
inflicts these Punishments. It is in this manner, that the
Laws become real Rules of action ; and that in the minds of
all men. Law-keeping and Law-breaking become objects which
are sought and avoided, with the same earnestness and care
as the other objects of the most powerful desires and
aversions of men. The Punishment which thus gives reality
to the Law, is the Sanction of the Law.
557. The Laws command what is in the community
deemed right, and hence, Punishments are inflicted upon
actions which are deemed wrong : although all wrong actions
are not necessarily punished by Law. We have already
explained (457, ^58) the relation between the National Law
and the National Morality. The National Law expresses
certain fixed and fundamental portions of the National
Morality : but not the whole. Law deals with external and
visible acts, such as afiect men^^s Rights ; Morality deals, be-
sides, with acts which are right or wrong, though they do not
directly afiect Rights; and with internal springs of action.
The Law must always be just ; but there may be many things
which are just, and which yet cannot be enforced by Law.
The Law must prohibit only what is wrong, though it may
not prohibit all that is morally wrong.
558. Since the Law must always be just. Punishments
must be inflicted only on what is morally wrong. It is
VOL. I. B B
370 MORALITY. [Book III.
sometimes said that the sole object of Punishment is the
prevention of harm to the members of the community ;
but this is not the conception of Punishment. Punishment
implies moral transgression. Crimes are violations of Law ;
but Crimes are universally understood to be offenses against
Morality also. If, in enforcing any law, of which the sole
object were the prevention of harm to the community, some
individuals were subjected to pain, these individuals being
morally blameless, the pain would not be conceived as Pun-
ishment; if the infliction were to take the character of
Punishment, the proceeding would be considered as into-
lerable. When persons, afflicted with or suspected of con-
tagious disorders, are put in constraint for the good of the
community (as in quarantine), this constraint is not called
Punishment. A Law that such persons should be put to
death, even though the health of the community might be
so best secured, would be rejected by all men as monstrous.
An object of Punishment is the prevention of Crime ; but
it is the prevention of Crime as Crime, and not merely as
Harm.
559. Thus the Laws, with their Sanctions, express
in some measure the moral judgment of the Community;
and by expressing it, they impress it upon the minds of
individual members of the Community. That which the Law
condemns and punishes, is understood by all to be wrong;
and thus, each person who lives under the Law, has a
number of fixed points, which direct his mind in the
determination of right and wrong. The Laws, with their
Sanctions, are a part of the Moral Education of each citi-
zen's mind.
660. As we have said, there is a National Morality,
which is of wider extent, and more deeply seated in men's
minds, than the written Law. The expressions of moral
judgments respecting actions and characters, which are put
Ch. XXVI.] MORAL EDUCATION. 371
forth in speeches upon public occasions, in the poetry and
literature of the nation, and the like, take for granted a
general agreement of men on points of Morality : and such
expressions of moral judgments also produce their impression
on individuals; they diffuse and perpetuate the judgment
which they express ; and form a part of the Moral Edu-
cation of the citizens.
This Moral Education of the members of a community,
must be such as tends to bring the moral judgments of indivi-
duals into harmony with those of the community. In order
that the business of any community may be carried on, the
citizens must have their moral judgments, in a great measure
at least, in harmony with the Laws, and with the general
jural and moral maxims which prevail, and have prevailed,
in the community. If Judges and Litigants, Governors
and Subjects, Magistrates and Legislators, all believed the
Laws, and the usual procedures of the State, to be unjust
and wrong; they would no longer go on executing and
obeying them. They would no longer speak of them with
respect: and magistrates who should speak disrespectfully
of the Law, would not themselves be respected. The Laws
being disregarded, the State would tend to dissolution.
Thus, without some harmony between the moral judgments
of the Community, as expressed in its Laws and Customs,
and those of individuals, the continued and coherent exist-
ence of the State is impossible.
561. But though the Laws, with their Sanctions,
and the public currency of moral sentiments and opinions
in harmony with the Laws, form an important part of the
moral education of the citizens, the moral judgments of each
person are, for the most part, formed, in a still greater
degree, by the influence of Parents, and other Friends,
among whom childhood and youth are spent. This Domestic
Teaching is the most effective portion of every one's moral
372 MORALITY. [Book III.
education. The moral judgments respecting actions, cha-
racters, virtues, vices, objects and rules of action, which
prevail in the domestic sphere, are so mingled with the moral
conceptions, in every stage of their development, that they
cannot be separated and dissevered by any subsequent
operations; and thus, such moral judgments are imparted
to each person in his earliest years, and transmitted from
generation to generation.
562. In general, this Domestic Moral Education must
' be in harmony with the National Morality, and the National
Law ; for otherwise, as we have said, men would not perform
their business as citizens in such a manner as to keep up the
life of the State. But yet domestic education may often be
something much more varied and peculiar, than it would be,
if it were the mere echo of the Law, or the repetition of
public formularies of morality, with explanations and com-
mentaries. The Morality of different nations is very differ-
ent in its Rules ; and still more, in the doctrines and beliefs
which form the foundation of the Rules. These doctrines
and beliefs are transmitted to successive generations, mainly
by domestic teaching. But it may happen that a Family,
belonging to one nation, dwells, even for several generations,
in the country of another State ; as the Jews dwell in the
various states of Europe, and Christian merchants in China.
In such cases, the domestic teaching may not agree with
the morality of the nation among which the Family resides;
but will rather be derived from the belief of the nation
to which the Family belongs. Such a Family will commonly
teach to its children obedience to the laws of the State of
their abode ; but it will instil such moral sentiments and
opinions as are usual in the Nation of its origin. For such
persons, the belief belonging to the scattered Nation, super-
sedes the doctrines locally prevalent in the State. In this
case, the moral education of each person fits him, it may
Ch. XXVI.] MORAL EDUCATION. 373
be, to be a peaceable resident in one nation; but it fits him
to be a faithful member of a distant community.
563. But further: though each person's moral judg-
ments are much influenced by the moral judgments of the
community to which he belongs, and still more, by those of
the family of which he is a child, they are not entirely derived
from those sources. Each person has, also, Something
Individual in his moral sentiments and opinions. A person
may accept the Standard of morality which is established
among his neighbours; but each person may for himself
improve and elevate this Standard. A person may ac-
cept the Doctrines and the Belief which prevail among his
neighbours, but he may also employ his own thoughts in
determining what is the true doctrine, and what he must
believe as being true. Indeed, in a certain degree, a man
is bound, as a moral and rational being, to do this. He is
bound, as a moral being, continually to elevate his Standard
of Morality (366). If he acquiesce passively in a National
Standard, his moral progress must be small. Again: he
is bound, as a rational being, to accept, as Truth, only what
he sees as Truth. It may be, that he behoves what his nation^
believes, with regard to the foundations of morality ; but'
this his belief is an act of his own Reason ; and if it be
not so, it is not belief. Now each man's own Reason
presents to him the Truth under various aspects, depending
upon his personal intellectual culture. The Truth, as he
sees it, may not agree with what he has been taught by
others. He obtains, by his own efforts, a more perfect
view of the Truth, than the national formularies convey
to him. He elevates his Standard of Truth above the
National Standard; as he elevates his Standard of Mo-
rality above the National Standard. To do this, is Self-
education ; and this Education operates, in addition to the
National Education, and Domestic Education, in forming a
man's moral character.
374 MORALITY. [Book III.
564!. The Self-education by which a man arrives at
his own view of Virtue and Truth, must be, finally and
specially, his own act : but the mental processes and habits
by which he is led on, from step to step, in his progress
towards such views, may be determined or aided by the
influence of other persons, especially by such influence exerted
in his youth. Masters and Teachers, of various kinds, may
discipline and instruct the mind, so that it shall be more
or less ready and apt to seek a knowledge of Virtue and
Truth; and to recognize them, in proportion as they present
themselves. And the teaching which thus unfolds the
Faculties of the pupil, as well as that which communicates
to him Opinions and Beliefs, is Education. This Education
is highly important to our moral being. For it especially
fits us for that perpetual progress which is our highest
moral duty, and which includes all our other Duties (345).
565. A knowledge of Truth is requisite, as the foun-
dation of Morality. And although the aspect of the Truths
which are the foundations of Morality may vary, according
to the various intellectual culture which those who contem-
plate them have received, there is one general Truth which
must always form a part of those foundations : namely, the
Truth that Duty is the way to Happiness. But as we have
already said (54>6), the identification of Happiness with Duty,
on merely philosophical grounds, is a line of thought and
reasoning, full of difficulty ; and this difficulty is effectually
removed only by Religious Education.
We are thus led to Religion, as the next step of our
progress; and to that, we now proceed.
END OF VOLUME THE FIRST.
'':;/'
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